INFORMAL ARGUMENTATION:
TOWARD A UNIFIED FOUNDATION FOR TEACHING COMPOSITION

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B.A., The University of British Columbia, 1981

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF ARTS
in
THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES
Department of English

We accept this thesis as conforming
to the required standard

THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA
October 1983
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Abstract

Since the birth of composition teaching in the nineteenth century, classroom emphasis has been on the "practical" task of ensuring that students be able to apply writing skills. Yet to have students practise skills for their own sake is ultimately to neglect the ethical rationale behind writing: to communicate not only information but also opinion. The overall purpose of any composition class should be to show students that writing skills are a vital link between themselves as individuals and the world of humanistic issues.

Perhaps the worst effect of the "skills only" approach to composition (that is, when instructional attention is focused on forms and models above all else) is that writing ceases to be a unified, organic process of creating and shaping ideas and opinions. Recently, both rhetoricians and composition theorists have proposed frameworks consisting of sets of unified principles; however, few such frameworks have been applied systematically to teaching writing.

The rationale behind this paper is to address the problem of reintroducing ethical content to the writing class by restoring a measure of respectability to "opinionable" writing. One way of working towards this goal is to adopt an informal argumentative framework for teaching composition: that is, a set of principles and strategies that acknowledges the opinionable nature of virtually all prose and that systematically guides a writer towards discovering opinions and supporting ideas through induction and synthesis of information. The main purpose of this paper, therefore, is to discover the theoretical principles of informal argumentation, primarily by tracing the development of exposition and argument as forms, kinds, and aims of writing from the eighteenth century until the present.

Chapter One explores the origins of exposition and its roots in the New Logic of Rene Descartes, Francis Bacon, and John Locke. Adam Smith and George
Campbell, two eighteenth-century rhetoricians, realized that rhetoric—the art of communication—also needed to adopt, at least partly, the new scientific methods which the empiricists wielded so successfully; otherwise rhetoric would be unable to communicate scientific matters. Smith's principles of clarity, precision, objectivity, and simplicity of diction are the cornerstones of exposition; yet he also emphasized the importance of communicating humanistic issues accurately and honestly. Campbell, for his part, equipped rhetoric with a philosophical foundation in which presenting information is one part of an organic discourse in which understanding and passion together give rise to truth. Thus, the logic of synthesis and induction together with these ethical concerns were united in eighteenth-century rhetoric.

These principles generally failed to characterize nineteenth-century composition and rhetoric texts, as Chapter Two shows. A survey of texts from the 1850's to the turn of the century traces the gradual compartmentalization of exposition, argument, and persuasion through their loss of the informal argumentative foundations which Smith and Campbell delineated. The majority of these texts emphasize practicality and ease of teaching through rule and model; the imitations of texts which present a theoretical or ethical framework tend to stress the practical skills. Chapter Three, which examines texts published from 1917 to 1968, reveals that the loss of an informal argumentative foundation for unifying discourse structures continues well into the twentieth century. By the 1930's, exposition in particular has become the aim, occasion, and form of discourse most emphasized in composition classrooms; argument has been relegated to the college debating team; and persuasion, because of its reliance on emotions rather than facts, has lost virtually all respectibility.

After 1969, a year heralding a widespread awareness of the role of rhetorical theory in composition teaching, argument and persuasion begin to regain their lost ground in the writing classroom. Chapter Four describes how
current theorists (Stephen Toulmin, Chaim Perelman, Richard Young, James Kinneavy and Frank D'Angelo, to name the major ones) view the role of argument and of informal argumentative processes in unifying exposition, argument, and persuasion.

In the final chapter, this paper attempts to answer the question—"To what extent have current composition texts adopted informal argumentative principles?" A survey of fourteen texts published between 1969 and 1983 reveals that several of the most popular and long-lived adhere to the same exposition-argument-persuasion model as did their predecessors of the 1890's. Others, however, have adopted some informal argumentative principles (such as the ethical stance which posits writing as a vehicle of opinion about issues, or the view of invention as a primarily inductive/synthesizing process).

This chapter concludes with suggestions, in the form of a classroom outline, for incorporating informal argumentative principles, particularly in a freshman English class which combines composition and literature. Such an approach to teaching writing will help fulfill one of the prime goals of a writing instructor: providing students not only with skills, but with a vital connection to the world of ethical purposes.
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Introduction

One of the most serious faults in teaching writing at the college level is a general failure on the part of instructors and textbook writers to incorporate an overall, unified rationale or purpose for learning writing skills. Since the nineteenth century, composition instruction has emphasized the "practical" idea of making sure students absorb and apply various skills. In doing so, composition teaching has divorced students from the ethical rationale behind all writing: to communicate, with a minimum of misunderstanding, that which the writer believes is good, true, or necessary for changing some existing state. Having Johnny produce a piece of expository writing, and then a piece of argumentative writing, and next a short passage of descriptive writing, and so on, just for the sake of exercising these skills, is often futile in the long run. It only serves to show Johnny that writing is really as mechanical and meaningless as he'd always suspected, and thus to hasten the day that he not only can't write, but won't. Perhaps he can't write because no one has hinted why he should try: writing will help connect him (as nothing else really can) to the humanistic world of ethical purposes.

Nothing disrupts the link between learning writing skills and students' understanding of this rationale behind the skills more than the teaching of the so-called "modes" of discourse which focuses instructional attention on forms of discourse above all else. When exposition, argument, and persuasion in particular are taught as mere skills, instructors and students alike fail to acknowledge that every aspect of writing is unified. We are only now really beginning to see this problem in all its enormity and error. However, basing our composition classes on a common framework for discourse is a direct means of working towards correcting the error. Although many frameworks uniting various aspects of discourse have been proposed by rhetoricians and composition
theorists, very few have been widely incorporated in practise.

This paper, then, has two main purposes. The first is to explore the origins of the development mainly of expository and argumentative writing, and the second is to show that the principles governing those forms of writing can constitute a framework for all prose, a framework I call informal argumentation. I define informal argumentation as a process of discovering opinions inductively: a writer gathers pieces of information; forms such "common sense" relations between these pieces as comparison, contrast, analogy, definition, time sequence, enumeration, and analysis; then synthesizes a thesis or opinion from these. Central to informal argumentation is the idea that virtually all pieces of prose are opinionable in nature, and that the process defined above is also a means of discovering, analyzing, and presenting one's own opinions in writing: of realizing, in effect, that writing is not just a tool for conveying information.

My first chapter will discuss primarily the origins and principles of exposition up to the end of the eighteenth century. The second and third chapters will trace the development of exposition, argument, and persuasion as "forms of discourse" in the nineteenth century and in the early to mid-twentieth century, demonstrating that the differentiation between them in texts results from a general failure to put informal argumentative principles into practice. Chapter Four will examine several modern theories about argument and its relation to teaching composition, while the final chapter will evaluate recent composition texts from the standpoint of how they treat exposition, argument, and persuasion and will conclude with an outline proposing how we can teach writing from an informal argumentative foundation.
I. The Foundations of Informal Argumentation

To trace the development of exposition, we need first to look at how and why rhetoricians (Adam Smith and George Campbell, specifically) responded to the need, critical by the eighteenth century, for ways of communicating new knowledge gained through empirical methods to quickly-expanding learned and general audiences. Essentially, these two figures were the first to attempt to perfect empirical methods for rhetoric. We shall see how Smith's narrative and didactic discourse, and Campbell's system rooted in mental associations, link writing with reason; the accumulation of and connections between facts form the arguments by which one both creates and proves a generalization or principle. No one would deny that this sort of reasoning is of major importance in modern expository writing.

Smith and Campbell attempted to reanimate rhetorical theory and practice with new tools of reasoning that, in the eighteenth century, had already become de rigueur for the sciences. A very brief look at the state of logic and rhetoric before the birth of the New Logic will highlight how fundamentally the means of inquiry changed in science and philosophy.

Up until the middle of the sixteenth century, rhetoricians as well as logicians relied mainly on deductive or scholastic reasoning to arrive at truth; the emphasis in inquiry was on the proper conception and expression of propositions, and their analysis against established truths to prove their veracity. After 1555, Peter Ramus's incisive removal of invention and arrangement from rhetoric to the realm of logic accomplished two things: it simplified logic but did not change its scholastic emphasis, and it left rhetoric with style, memory, and delivery only, skills with little substance to support them.

Rhetoric was not to be reunited with a method of reasoning until after the rapid birth and burgeoning of the new logic of Rene Descartes, Francis Bacon, and
John Locke. By this time, it had become imperative that rhetoric respond to and be able to wield this new logic; its only alternative would have been to lose altogether its remaining influence in the area of ethics. However, before examining how Smith and Campbell recognized this need, we must note which aspects of the new logic they saw as most important to rhetoric. The old logic, or scholasticism, saw truth as discoverable chiefly through the testing of new propositions against established ones. Descartes, Bacon, and Locke (generally regarded as the "inventors" of the new logic and its applications to inquiry) decided that the systematic examination of one's own experiences and observations leading to the formation of propositions was the sole means of discovering new knowledge.

Rene Descartes' *Discourse on Method* (1637) was intended to express one man's dissatisfaction with scholastic logic, and Part Two contains one of his strongest statements on this subject:

> . . .buildings planned and executed by a single architect are usually more beautiful and better proportioned than those which others have attempted to improve. . . .Thus I came to think that the sciences found in books, at least those whose reasonings are made up mainly of plausible arguments and yield no demonstrations, built up, as they are, little by little, from the opinions of many different contributors, do not get so near the truth as the simple reasonings which a man of good sense, making use of his natural powers, can carry out. . . .

Descartes proposed an alternative to the numerous precepts of scholastic logic, but emphasized that his "four rules for reasoning" are not necessarily suited to all intelligences. His modest hope, aired in Part One, was that this method "will be of some use to some people." The first rule is "to accept nothing as true which I did not evidently know to be such"; his second requires the division into parts, or analysis, of a problem "as may be required for its adequate solution"; the third calls for arranging thoughts in an order beginning with the simplest, and building up to the more complex; and the fourth, "to make enumerations so complete, and reviews so general, that I should be assured of
omitting nothing."

For the purpose of examining rhetoric's later adoption of the new logic, the critical rule is the third: a method of inquiry calling in large part for inductive reasoning. This rule can be said to constitute the basic foundation for the new logic and, concerning written discourse, a cornerstone of informal argumentation.

Not much earlier than Descartes, Francis Bacon had written The Dignity and Advancement of Learning (1605), essentially a propaganda piece for James I extolling the value of philosophy and the sciences and the need for further inquiry into them. Bacon contributed as much to the Cartesian foundation, as he did to establishing a new universal method of inquiry. Criticizing existing methods of inquiry and calling for a new one, Bacon promoted in The Advancement of Learning his own novum organum as the "genuine... method of interpreting nature"—no Cartesian pretensions of modesty either intended or forthcoming. Bacon allowed that the principles of science "might be justly formed by the common induction, or by sense and experience... there is everywhere a necessity for employing a genuine and correct induction, as well in the more general principles, as in the inferior propositions" (Book Five, Ch. 2).

For Bacon, natural history, or "the works and arts of nature," supplied the best potential for such a method of gaining new knowledge. He saw natural history as "a collection of materials for a just and solid induction, whereon philosophy is to be grounded" (Book Two, Ch. 3). We can now see that Bacon was not interested merely in proposing new logic for certain isolated, persevering intelligences; anyone with philosophical pretensions, he challenged, must make use of inductive reasoning, the fruit "of the mind of its own natural motion" (Book Five, Ch. 2): the universal means by which all men should discover all truths.
We should also note that Bacon saw the need for broadening the scope of rhetoric, although his suggestions were not taken up until the eighteenth century. First, he established rhetoric as a general art of communication, not merely limited to persuasion; second, he laid groundwork for the faculty psychology that Campbell, particularly, would see as central to discourse. Bacon the psychologist divided the mind into compartments: the understanding and reason of which logic treats; and the appetite, affections, and will with which ethics deals. He says

Reason transmits select and approved notions to the imagination before the decree is executed: for imagination always precedes and excites voluntary motions, and is therefore a common instrument, both to the reason and the will. . . (Book Five, Ch. 1).

At the same time, Bacon the rhetorician saw that art as "but to apply and recommend the dictates of reason to the imagination, in order to excite the affections and will," or to "fill the imagination with such observations and images as may assist reason, and not overthrow it" (Book Six, Ch. 3). It was for that reason primarily that Bacon indignantly refuted Plato's claim in the Gorgias that rhetoric, like cookery, is mere flattery. He instead conceived of rhetoric as a vehicle for communication of all kinds, fueled (in theory at least) with the art of reasoning inductively. Bacon also emphasized the importance of scientific communication, thus also laying essential groundwork for Smith's principles of objectivity and factuality in discourse: hallmarks of modern exposition.

Yet not even the bounteous Advancement of Learning enumerates principles which could help speakers or writers communicate the material which Bacon insisted belonged to rhetoric. Rhetoric as a potential vehicle for communicating truth was still a theoretical construct, and John Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690) continued to build on this construct by focusing in detail on the workings of the mind, and the origins and development of ideas through inductive reasoning. Perhaps, too, Smith and Campbell owe their greatest debt to
this work. For Locke's analysis of the mind paved the way for Smith's analyses of those objects which affect the mind and how they do so, and Campbell's views on how certain ways of thinking are manifested in various ends of discourse.

First and fundamentally, Locke rejected the notion that all humans are born knowing certain universal principles, presenting what was then devastating proof: "Are there not whole nations... amongst whom is not to be found so much as the notions of a deity, without which it is hard to imagine any law or rule of our actions or practical principles?" Locke not only sanctioned the Cartesian view that all new knowledge is founded on experience and observation, but also chipped away further at the crumbling foundation of scholastic and syllogistic logic. For moral laws, Locke demonstrated, as well as our way of acquiring knowledge, are founded inductively. The old logic is inadequate for forming such laws; it can only rationalize them. (Nor was Locke the last philosopher/rhetorician to condemn the syllogism as a form of reasoning. Campbell would echo this attack a century later.)

"All knowledge," Locke stated, "is founded on and ultimately derives itself from experience and observation employed either about external sensible objects, or the internal operations of our minds perceived by ourselves" (Section 17). External objects (sensations) and the internal sense make up the entirety of Locke's "simple ideas"; these ideas, processed by the faculties of perception, retention, discernment, denomination, and comparison through extension (degree) and number, in turn generate all new knowledge. Not content to say, like Descartes, that one has the option of reasoning consciously in an inductive way, Locke assumed that all normal humans must reason inductively by their very natures. This natural reasoning progresses from sensations, to simple ideas, to collections of simple ideas, to relations between simple ideas, and then to generalizations or "truths."
Locke's conception of the relations between simple ideas has its antecedents in Aristotle's common topoi. Degree, cause and effect, and time are, for Locke, "places" located in the mind, tools to help process sense data. He called such relations "complex ideas." Again, we can see how this view of mental logical relationships broadens into a view of them that includes their specific uses as ways of relating ideas in writing. In fact, one of the many benevolent by-products of Locke's work was his inadvertent returning of the topoi to rhetoric's domain: inadvertent because Locke was not specifically a rhetorician. But he recognized the fact that humans must not only make sense of their own ideas, but also communicate them to others in ways that help imbue them with meaning. Among these ways, or patterns, is definition (denomination) of simple and complex ideas, bringing about "affirmations" of those ideas (Section 63). Denomination serves both to name our own experiences and ideas, and to name those we communicate to others through the use of language. Locke expressed a fundamental problem of language philosophy when he stated that the names "that stand for complex ideas are full of uncertainty" (Section 63), a problem become paradox by the fact that our only way of communicating complex ideas is to name or define them. Yet Locke hoped that a man could form a "perfect" complex idea, "and such a man may speak properly, define perfectly and scientifically, and by defining give a perfect account of the nature of that sort of things" (Section 87a).

Such a perfect definition would have to rely on flawless inductive reasoning, a condition he and others believed not to be impossible to fulfill within the realm of science. Adam Smith, particularly, tried to infuse rhetoric with this kind of logic and thus help speakers and writers communicate not only scientific but ethical issues as "properly" and "perfectly" as Locke could wish. Wilbur Samuel Howell, analyzing Smith's work, divides his lectures (given in Edinburgh from 1748-50) into two general categories: communication, wherein rhetoric becomes the "theoretical instrument" for all communication of ideas; and
forms of discourse, or the study of the "structure and function of all the dis-
courses which ideas produce." When one can think of discourse as
communicative, and of its forms as the vehicles by which communications move from
writer to reader, then an equal simplicity of style, thought, and organization of
a discourse naturally follows, at least according to Smith.

Smith's Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres exemplify this principle of
simplicity, particularly in his discussion of the narrative, the didactic, and
the oratorical forms of discourse. Over them reigns one general rule: "Every
discourse proposes either barely to relate some fact or to prove some
proposition" (58). The narrative or historical form, though, differs from the
didactic and oratorical by virtue of containing merely the proposition and not
the proof: "the historian...acts as if he were an impartial narrator of the
facts" (31). According to Smith, narrative writing seeks merely to instruct the
reader, to lay out facts in particular ways: external facts or objects, or those
which take place in our minds (and we see Locke's influence over Smith's ways of
dealing with objects). External facts must be described either directly or in-
directly, the latter by the effect they have on those who perceive them; while
internal facts, much more difficult to describe directly, should instead be
attributed to described external causes or internal dispositions (58-62). What
this means for discourse is that all forms, even poetry, are founded first on
this treatment of facts; to attempt to delineate the forms as differing in their
underlying logic becomes in this light a futile exercise, or so Smith implies.

Of course, the absence in historical writing of what Smith calls "proof" is
an important factor, attributable to differing aims and occasions, between this
form of writing and the others. Yet Smith never defines exactly what he means by
"proof." We can assume, though, that it first relates closely to the degree of
bias or emotion in the treatment of the evidence in a discourse, either for good
or ill. For Smith also states that a historian "sets himself up to compare the
evidence that is brought for the proof. . .assuming the character of a didactic writer" from time to time (85). Because the concept of evidence, or facts, underlies all forms of writing for Smith, it follows that the treatment of these facts (proof) determines whether a piece of writing is predominantly narrative, didactic, or oratorical. A writer, then, changes the arrangement of facts according to the aim and occasion of the discourse in question.

Smith's didactic writing "puts forth arguments in their true light, . . . the arguments themselves are convincing" (58). I have already shown how both narrative and didactic discourse depend on a foundation of facts for their structure. The aim of instructing the reader links these two forms as well, for Smith states that both forms share that particular end. In fact, "the rules we have already given with regard to narrative composition will, with a few alterations, be easily accommodated to this species [didactic] also" (113). One of these alterations is the presence of proof or some degree of bias; the proof may either be a "strict one, applied to our reason and sound judgement," for didactic discourse, or one which by affecting the passions "persuades us at any rate" (84-5). Smith is careful to emphasize the "objective" nature of didactic prose, however:

When the design is to set the case in the clearest light, to give every argument its due force, and by this means persuade us no further than our unbiassed judgement is convinced, that is not to make use of the oratorical style (84).

Yet Smith may have grudgingly admitted that even the most unemotional proof contains some bias because certain facts have been selected by the writer for presentation over other facts (an idea which would wait for Chaim Perelman to develop more fully in The New Rhetoric, 1969). His differentiation of the forms seems almost unnecessary when their greatest distinction is between degrees of overt persuasion. And neither the narrative nor the didactic forms, though they are argumentative in the sense that they treat of facts and their presentation,
are overtly persuasive. By that criterion the two forms are structurally linked.

Fundamental to Smith's treatment of didactic discourse is the theme of simplicity, both of structure and style (he uses the terms "form" and "style" interchangeably). He calls the didactic "more simple than either deliberative or judicial" discourse in terms of structure (136), and lays out two possible ways of arranging it. The more inductive Aristotelian method involves the discussion of several subjects and the giving of a principle for each phenomenon, whereas the Newtonian method lays down certain principles, "primary or proved, in the beginning, from whence we account for several phenomena, connecting all together." The latter, says Smith, is "undoubtedly the most philosophical... vastly more ingenious and more engaging than the other" (139-40). Here we can note an overt attempt to furnish didactic and narrative discourse with certain tools used by the new logic: the aim and occasion Smith has in mind is scientific communication.

Smith's forms of writing were his response to the new, "more simple," logic of the times, a logic of synthesis rather than primarily of analysis, as Howell puts it (563). Both the narrative and didactic forms represent basic ways of thinking about and structuring prose; they are not merely skills replacing a theory, but manifestations of a theory. In short, Smith's narrative discourse is still the foundation, in many respects, for modern expository writing: enumeration and description of objects or facts; objectivity; unity through time, place, and cause and effect; and simplicity of diction. Yet Smith's concept of didactic discourse links "objective" and highly specialized exposition to more argumentative, or more general, aims and occasions for discourse. Given that Smith saw narrative discourse as a non-persuasive form well suited for transmitting facts to a learned audience, then we can also see Smith acknowledging, through didactic discourse, the need for a less specialized, more flexible form to communicate both facts and their humanistic contexts to audiences needing
to be convinced as well as informed.

Smith never intended that various aims, occasions, and arrangements of facts in discourse should degenerate into discrete skills of writing. Even Campbell's more unified philosophy of rhetoric, which would in its response to the new logic so greatly complement and uphold Smith's practical principles, was later to be misapplied in a similar way. But unlike Smith, who makes a point of paring rhetoric down, almost Ramus-like, to a bare minimum of practical precepts, George Campbell emphasized a more holistic theory of rhetoric. One of the prime purposes of his *Philosophy of Rhetoric* (1776) was to establish rhetoric, or eloquence, as "indeed the grand art of communication, not of ideas only, but of sentiments, passions, dispositions, and purposes." Campbell saw how certain characteristics and conditions of the human mind could give rise to certain ways and kinds of communication. In addition, he saw eloquence as an art, both "polite" and "useful" (xlix), which "is founded in science. . . .There is. . . a natural relation between the sciences and the arts" (xlv). Elocution, in Campbell's system, given a logic and a methodology based on that of the new logic, would then link the arts and sciences by opening up communication of all thoughts pertaining to all disciplines. Such was Campbell's dream.

He saw as vitally necessary, then, the systemization of eloquence, its principles fully explained in terms of "the science of man" or human nature. Not content merely to explore "practical rhetoric," Campbell conducted a logical, indeed scientific, inquiry into what it is that gives rise to such concepts, or what causes differing ways and forms of writing.

Of first importance to us is Campbell's view of any discourse as a living thing, an organ constantly growing and changing, depending on the writer's purpose or "end." These ends, according to Campbell, are four: to enlighten the understanding, to please the imagination, to move the passions, and to influence the will; any discourse can incorporate more than one end, but only one will
emerge as principal. Linking these ends is a hierarchy of mental faculties and associations, each "preceding species" giving rise to the next highest, so that "knowledge. . .furnisheth materials for the fancy; the fancy culls, compounds, and, by her mimic art, disposes these materials so as the affect the passions; the passions are the natural spurs to volition or action" (p. 2). However oversimplified his (and other faculty psychologists') picture of the mind may be, Campbell clearly perceives, as did his predecessors David Hume and David Hartley, the importance of logical connectives originating in the mind, and of their relationship to emotions for the purposes of convincing or persuading an audience.10

Understanding, says Campbell, begins with perceptions, or "those things... from which all of our knowledge of fact is generated." Next, we acquire knowledge more systematically by "direct inspection of particulars" and then by inference from particulars through experience. Campbell's debt to Locke's development of ideas for the purposes of communication is obvious here. Also, like Smith, Campbell sees our perception and mental arrangements of objects or facts as a central principle in writing, again acknowledging rhetoric's need for a scientific, primarily inductive, method for speaking and writing.

Therefore, for Campbell, experience underlies logical rhetorical proof and supplies materials needed to convince and persuade an audience. Inferences or ideas thus formed must, however, connect to each other in order to make sense both to the writer and to the audience. Campbell enumerates resemblance, contiguity of time, and causation as the most fundamental kinds of connections between perceptions (with causation relating through inference most directly to experience—xxii–xxiii). Making clear connections between perceptions and ideas constitutes for Campbell the chief means of appealing primarily but not solely to the understanding (xxix), for appealing to the understanding is only the first step in virtually all kinds of discourse, Campbell emphasizes. Only one aim for
discourse "disdains all assistance whatever from the fancy...mathematical demonstration" (2-3). All other aims lack that extreme kind of specialization, which makes it necessary for the writer to instill at least some degree of conviction in the audience. To do so, a writer turns to experience, analogy, testimony, or calculation of chances (again, refinements of the topoi), and from these sources makes logical connections between discrete ideas. Also, in order to satisfy the audience's sense of judgment, one must connect the desired conduct of the audience to the gratification of their desires (275). In other words, Campbell acknowledges the presence of the aim of conviction in virtually all discourse, and acknowledges the writer's need to incorporate this aim. Conviction is the "avowed purpose" of discourse addressed to the understanding and that influencing the will; the logical structures building conviction apply equally to both.

In this sense conviction, for Campbell, appears synonymous with argument or the treatment of facts. Clearly, Campbell is the first rhetorician to propose informal argumentation as a structural foundation for general aims and occasions for discourse. For he takes into account the choice of facts and the connections between them; the awareness of how aim and occasion determine these choices; and the building of a thesis by induction and inference. This process—involving discourse as a vehicle which must prove some new discovery—also forms the logical and ethical foundation for Campbell's ends of discourse, and for his entire philosophy of rhetoric. To gain "barely the assent of the understanding" is not nearly as important from a moral standpoint as influencing the will to action or readiness for action (5-6). Informing an audience may be all very well, Campbell implies, but "in order to convince me by these arguments, they must be understood...attended to...remembered by me...They may, as it were, be felt" (73-4). In practise, very little discourse is unaccompanied by what Campbell calls vivacity, reason conjoined with feeling to produce belief. Thus,
a form of reasoning based on experience, inference, and induction, blended with emotion, "constitutes that vehemence of contention, to which the greatest exploits of eloquence ought doubtless to be ascribed. . . . Thus passion is the mover to action, reason is the guide" (77-8). Bacon's influence is especially strong here in that reason and passion are seen as complementary, not contradictory, in rhetoric.

Campbell's unity of reason and passion, of truth and goodness, combined with inductive reasoning from perceptions to connected ideas, constitutes for rhetoric a reunion with logic and ethical purpose. In terms of composition, Campbell does not present us with as clear-cut a set of practical principles as does Smith. But his methodology is clearly flexible enough to include not only writing that appeals primarily to a specialized, learned audience, but also to a less knowledgeable or more sceptical one. In other words, he extends into the realm of everyday communication a logic that applies to "everyday" situations, and proposes this primarily inductive structure for all prose. I have named this structure informal argumentation. That this structure should form the base for our modern exposition, argument, and persuasion is the argument to which I will devote the rest of this paper.

In a different, more orderly universe than this, we might have seen the rhetoric of Smith and Campbell, bolstered by the new logic of Descartes, Bacon, and Locke, inspiring a permanent foundation of inductive principles for all prose, linking and underlying its differing aims and occasions with a common structure based on informal logic. The fact that composition teaching in the nineteenth century instead emphasized writing as a set of disparate skills with little or no sense of a common foundation to them is due at least partly to the changing nature of faculty psychology. In Campbell's time it was conceived as a unified picture of the mind's operations; by the late nineteenth century it had become a way of compartmentalizing functions associated with the mind, such as
writing, and had passed the zenith of its popularity. Even long after it had ceased to be in vogue, this neat, compartmentalized view of the mind lent itself all too easily to a breakdown of Campbell's (and later Alexander Bain's) foundations into formulae intended for feeding to rows of bored composition students for the next century and a half to come.
I will not discuss the classical rhetoricians separately, because classical notions of the forms of writing, and of poetics, necessarily do not take into account the post-Renaissance shift towards empirical reasoning, which demanded new prose structures. However, some classical rhetorical influences appear in eighteenth-century rhetorical theories, the major ones undoubtedly being what Wilbur Samuel Howell describes as "the Aristotelian inheritance in logic," and the New Ciceronian movement of 1700 to 1759. Howell (in Eighteenth Century British Logic and Rhetoric; see footnote 6 for full citation) describes the attempts of several "peripatetics," influential up until 1825, to "restore the logic of Aristotle to its former pre-eminence in education and learning" (13). This also constituted a rebellion of sorts against Peter Ramus's sixteenth-century reforms. George Campbell's vehement attack on the syllogism in The Philosophy of Rhetoric underscores the continuing influence of Aristotelian logic as a method of inquiry throughout the eighteenth century. The New Ciceronians, more concerned with communication than with logic, exemplified even in their reforms a desire to restore to rhetoric a concern with its classical role as the art of communication. In large part because of the eighteenth-century investigation into classical rhetoric, the traditional communicative powers of rhetoric began to reawaken.

2Wilbur Samuel Howell, in his Logic and Rhetoric in England, 1550-1700 (New York: Russell and Russell Inc., 1961), emphasizes that although Ramus reformed the rules of logic, he did not introduce any new concepts, or change the essential nature of scholasticism except for eliminating some of its redundancies. After Ramism died out in England a century or so after it was introduced, the zeal for simplifying the arts remained alive, for the New Ciceronians saw fit to pare down Cicero's places or alternatives for assembling proof, and thus helped further to reduce the status of rhetorical invention in the minds of educators. In short, what with one well-meaning reform after another, rhetoric underwent a period of almost two hundred years—from Ramus until Adam Smith—during which it had little to boast of but skills fragmented from theory. Nor was this the last time such would be the case in rhetoric's history; late nineteenth-and early twentieth-century composition teaching exemplified the inadequacy for writing of skills whose theoretical rationale had been forgotten.

3Norman Kemp Smith, Descartes' Philosophical Writings (London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1952), Part Two. All further references will be cited in short form parenthetically in the text.

4Francis Bacon, Advancement of Learning and Novum Organum, revised edition (New York: The Colonial Press, 1900), Book Five, Ch. 4. All further references will be cited in short form parenthetically in the text.

5John Locke, An Essay Concerning the Understanding, Knowledge, Opinion and Assent, Benjamin Rand, ed. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1931), Section 4. This is an edition of the draft of Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding. All further references will be cited in short form parenthetically in the text.


7Adam Smith, Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres, John M. Lothian, ed.
In Lecture 21, Smith notes that a history and a historical poem differ in form only, and lays down what he sees as the end of poetry: "It is evident, therefore, that the author's design in writing [poetry] is to amuse us. . .amusement and entertainment [is] the chief design of the poet" (113-14). Smith's basic principles governing narrative writing, such as unity of time and place and character description, apply to poetry as well. Thus, to Smith, the logical foundations of poetry correspond to those of narrative writing; only the ends differ.

It should be noted that there exists no direct connection between Smith's Lectures and Campbell's Philosophy of Rhetoric. However, Hugh Blair based much of the material for his Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres (including the title) on Smith's work; and Campbell, who corresponded frequently with Blair, would likely have been acquainted with Smith's lectures even before they were published in 1762.

George Campbell, The Philosophy of Rhetoric, Lloyd F. Bitzer, ed. (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1963), p. xlix. All further references will be cited by page number in the text.

Campbell is indebted here to Hume and Hartley for their ideas on the relationship among perceptions, ideas, passions, the imagination, and the will. In A Treatise of Human Nature (1739), of which Part Three is devoted to an examination of the will and "direct" passions, Hume affirms "from experience, that our actions have a constant union with our motives, tempers, and circumstances" (David Hume: The Philosophical Works, Thomas Hill Green and Thomas Hodge Grose, eds., Vol. II, Scientia Verlag Aalen, 1964, p. 182). Union between actions of the mind, and the inferences thus established, are "natural and necessary"; in fact, what Hume calls moral evidence is "nothing but a conclusion concerning the actions of men. . .natural and moral evidence. . .are of the same nature, and deriv'd from the same principles" (186-7).

From there, Hume shows that, because human actions stem from the necessary actions of the mind, human impulses to action or passions subsume reason as "a motive to any action of the will" (193). "Reason alone can never produce any action, or give rise to volition," he emphasizes (194); yet given that all actions arise out of necessity, passions "can never, in any sense, be called unreasonable" (196).

The faculty of imagination closely influences the passions as well, in that by producing in the mind "a particular and determinate idea. . .[a passion] operates on the will with more violence" (203-4). "Nothing," Hume says, "is more capable of infusing any passion into the mind, than eloquence, by which objects are represented in their strongest and most lively colours" (204). Therefore, eloquence plays a major role in moving the passions to influence the will. From this, Campbell derives his idea of the importance of vivacity in convincing an audience.

David Hartley, in his Observations on Man (1749), presents doctrines which, as he says, are "taken from the Hints" of Newton and Locke concerning sensation, motion, and association of ideas (David Hartley, Observations on man, his frame, his duty, and his expectations, Vol. I, New York: Garland Publishing Inc., 1971, p. 5). In the second section of Vol. I, Hartley shows that simple ideas plus the associations of place, time, and resemblance, are the mind's way of trying to retain "copies" of the "Impressions (sensations) made on the Eye and Ear" (56). He further observes, "And it seems reasonable to expect, that, if a single Sensation can leave a perceptible Effect, Trace, or Vestige, for a short time, a
sufficient Repetition of a Sensation may leave a perceptible Effect of the same kind, but of a more permanent nature, i.e. an Idea" (57). Thus, for Hartley, resemblance in particular produces vivid ideas, a concept which Campbell incorporates into his rhetorical theory.

11 Campbell's unity of reason and passion, truth and goodness originates with Francis Bacon's concept of the role and scope of rhetoric--"to apply and recommend the dictates of reason to the imagination." Clearly, Campbell sees vivacity as a force which links logical structures of discourse with ethical purpose: a goal met particularly when the speaker or writer is engaged in persuasion for the good of his audience.
By the beginning of the nineteenth century, rhetorical theory had been re-equipped with an effective method of logical inquiry adapted from the New Logic and from the study of human nature. I have shown how Adam Smith's and George Campbell's theories form a foundation or framework for discourse, a framework I call informal argumentation, which acknowledges that virtually all prose seeks implicitly or explicitly to establish proof. Informal argumentation then guides writers to inquire into a subject in such a way that they build from simple pieces of information to complex syntheses of them through a process primarily of induction.

Smith augmented this framework with the principles of clarity and simplicity of diction as well as objectivity, or concern with facts. In doing so, he not only founded what we call expository writing but also, implicitly, linked scientific and historical discourse to the aim of convincing general audiences of its validity. Campbell, for his part, combined inductive logic and psychology. For him, reason and passion, truth and goodness, served to reunite rhetoric with ethical purpose.

Clearly, both men thought of exposition, argument, and persuasion as the offspring of inductive logic and ethics. It was at that point, near the end of the eighteenth century, that rhetoric had the potential to begin anew the task of inquiring into the realm of ethics not only on a theoretical level, but also at the level of teaching communication. The stage was set for students to be taught to view discourse holistically or, in other words, to see that all the skills involved in learning to write stem from the ethical foundation that communication necessarily takes human nature into account by dealing constantly with the opinionable, using informal argumentative methods of inquiry.

The nineteenth century did not fulfill this promise. Contemporary students
of rhetoric and composition theory look at this century as a time of fragmentation, when theories of discourse finally fell away from pedagogy. Nowhere is this more obvious than in the way composition texts of this time treated exposition, argument, and persuasion. Indeed, we owe the existence of the modern "modes" of discourse mainly to the fact that the principles of informal argumentation can be separated into formulae as readily as they can be united.

This formularization received increasing support from the movement in colleges toward a more practical education, which encouraged at the same time the detachment of the theory of faculty psychology from its manifestations in discourse. (Campbell had also incorporated its sister theory of associationism; for him, the differences between the ends of discourse were less important than their similarities.) Paradoxically, even as faculty psychology became less and less fashionable, rhetorical pedagogy continued to treat discourse as if its structures and goals sprang out of separate compartments of the mind.

The theme for my examination of representative texts of the nineteenth century is division—the pedagogical tendency to distinguish "elements" of discourse from each other. My aim is to see what happens to exposition, argument, and persuasion during this time; in other words, what purposes and structures are relegated to each? In order to show how the tendency to separate exposition from argument, and argument from persuasion, became more pronounced in composition texts up through the turn of the century, I will first look at Richard Whately (1828), and then examine representative texts primarily from the United States and Canada up to 1906.

Richard Whately's *Elements of Rhetoric* (1828) served as a definitive "practical rhetoric" up until the mid-nineteenth century, and continued to influence many textbook writers after the 1850's. Greatly influenced by Aristotle's and Campbell's views of the relationship between logic and rhetoric,
Whately rejected both the "narrow view" of rhetoric as only persuasive or ornamental, as well as the overly broad view of it as "all composition in prose. I propose," he states in his introduction, "to treat of Argumentative Composition, generally, and exclusively; considering Rhetoric...as an off-shoot from Logic..." Whately hoped not only to broaden the scope of classroom rhetoric but also to redress what he saw as Campbell's "great defect...his ignorance and utter misconception of the nature and object of Logic" (9).

Whately provides in his text a systematic analysis of how propositions and various classes of arguments form the basis of reasoning in argumentative and persuasive discourse. In this sense, he unifies discourse, for like Smith and Campbell, he examines argument and persuasion and finds that degree of bias or emotion is the main difference between them; their logical structures are otherwise similar. "It is evident that Argument must be, in most cases at least, the basis of Persuasion," he writes in his introduction. Later, in his discussion of persuasion, Whately elaborates on this theme of unity:

**Persuasion [is] the art of influencing the Will...in order that the Will may be influenced, two things are requisite; viz. 1. that the proposed Object should appear desirable; and 2. that the Means suggested should be proved to be conducive to the attainment of that object; and this last, evidently must depend on a process of Reasoning...Persuasion, therefore, depends on, first, Argument, (to prove the expediency of the Means proposed) and secondly, what is usually called Exhortation, i.e. the excitement of men to adopt those Means..." (117-118).

Whately, like Smith almost a century earlier, refuses to elaborate on "rules" of persuasion; for Whately, these rules have already been stated and form the basis of conviction, "an essential part of Persuasion" (117). This is one means by which Whately almost fuses argument and persuasion's underlying logical structures and even, to an extent, their aims: for the aim of persuasion (moving one to action) presupposes conviction (adherence to a concept tied in with that action), certainly according to Whately, Smith, and Campbell.
Whately has subsumed the aims of exposition into argument, acknowledging that arguments or proofs may "give satisfaction to a candid mind, and convey instruction to those who are ready to receive it," as well as "to compell the assent, or silence the objections, of an opponent" (70-71). Yet Whately's treatment of rhetoric as argumentative in a formal logical sense only serves in the long run to narrow rhetoric's scope. His definition of rhetoric dictates that he overlook many of those aspects of expository writing which Smith treated, including the structuring of description and narration. Also, the line between Whately's formal treatment of argument, and his more classical view of persuasion, is not at all a fine one. In fact he admits a gap between reasoning and passion on the basis of aim and structure:

When engaged in reasoning...our purpose not only need not be concealed, but may...without prejudice to the effect, be distinctly declared...even when the feelings we wish to excite are such as ought to operate, still our purpose and drift should be...not openly declared...This circumstance forms a remarkable distinction between [persuasion] and Argumentation (129-30).

Two things are evident in Whately's text. First, he implies that, since rhetoric is rooted in logic, rhetorical composition tends to be argumentative by nature (broadening immensely the scope of argument). Second, he demonstrates the dependency of what he sees as important aims and occasions for discourse on a foundation constructed wholly of formal logic. In theory, this foundation unites instructive, argumentative, and persuasive aims and occasions (though again, instructive discourse seeks implicitly to convince as well). However, Whately's main weakness is that, unlike Aristotle, he pins his hopes for rhetoric entirely on formal logic, depending on it only to form the framework from which to build discourse. Such a framework can only, as we shall see, serve eventually to set argument apart from other aims and occasions.

After the 1820's, classifying discourse according to its purpose and ways of achieving it, rather than by the form it took on paper (such as a letter or
narration) began slowly to appear in texts. In fact, by the 1850's it was quite normal for text book writers to try to do two things at once: classify types and aims of discourse to aid in their instruction, and attempt to redress what they saw as problems created earlier in the areas of rhetorical theory versus practice.

Henry Day was one such writer. In his *Elements of the Art of Rhetoric* (1850), Day attempted to reintroduce invention to rhetoric, to "reduce to a more exact system" the elements of discourse "in conformity to strict philosophical principles," and emphasize practical instruction in rhetoric "as an art, and not merely as a science." He begins by strongly criticizing Whately for not redeeming rhetoric from "the shackles and embarrassments of that view which confines it to mere argumentative composition, or the art of producing Belief" (Preface, v). Instead, Day intends to cover "the entire field of pure discourse," and starts by accounting for the objects or immediate ends of all "proper" discourse: explanation, conviction, excitation, and persuasion. He explains his choices in this passage:

> The process by which a new conception is produced, is by Explanation; that by which a new judgement is produced, is by Conviction; a change in the sensibilities is effected by the process of Excitation; and in the Will, by that of Persuasion (42).

The hierarchy Day gives is similar to Campbell's, though Day does not emphasize associations between these ends. He chooses rather to emphasize their differing structures, their "specific character" and "immediate end" (32). This is not to say that he fails to show how a few basic principles can unify discourse; he adopts, for example, the Aristotelian view that all compositions can be reduced to essentially two parts, the proposition and the discussion, an introduction and peroration being optional for Day (45). However, he makes a point of distinguishing the objects and, implicitly, the structures of discourses from each other. In explanation, according to Day, the object of discourse is to
inform or instruct, "to lead to a new conception or notion, or to modify one already existing in the mind. . .The object of explanatory discourse is some object or truth to be perceived" (51-2). Included in the processes of explanation are narration, description, analysis, exemplification, and comparison and contrast; here, Day reincorporates many of Smith's principles, and explains their uses in explanatory writing.

Yet when Day discusses conviction (or confirmation, as he also calls it), these principles vanish, and instead we see

the essential distinction between explanation and confirmation. While both processes address the understanding, the former seeks to produce a new or different perception, the latter, a new or different belief or judgement (86).

The process of confirmation rests, like Whately's, on a formal logical structure: including a careful division and classification of various proofs, topics, refutations, and arrangements of material. What Day has done is create two different forms of discourse addressing the understanding. One is based on formal logical principles, while the other is essentially the informal argumentation of Smith, Campbell, and the New Logicians of the seventeenth century. Where do these two forms merge?

Persuasion is perhaps one place. Although Day isolates persuasion as he does the other ends of discourse, he emphasizes that it "admits all the processes before described of explanation, conviction, and excitation," thus linking the "different, specific" ends of discourse. As Day explains it: "One will need to explain motives, convince the judgement. . .move passions. . .but all these processes must be introduced only in entire subserviency to that end—the moving of the will" (153). Clearly, Day is echoing Campbell, who shows how the ends of discourse can interrelate for that noblest purpose: the moving of the will to action. In this sense, then, Day has also unified different writing processes
under persuasion, which becomes the sole occasion for writing when one may (in addition to persuasive techniques) consciously use expository techniques for explaining a concept, and argumentative techniques for inducing a new belief.

Unfortunately, Day overshadowed this potentially holistic view of discourse with the "mental science" of the times, the belief that "the mind addressed may be in either one of three different states" corresponding with the intellectual, emotional, and active faculties (151). The result of this belief is that two different forms addressing the understanding are created in this text, and we see a conflict between what Day says about persuasion and how discourse aims and occasions become, not synthesized through persuasion, but laid out separately. This conflict between the writer's belief that discourse structures can be unified and the actual presentation of the material is one that recurs a number of times in nineteenth-century texts, and constitutes their major flaw.

A text that reflects concern for how thought processes underlie the domain of rhetoric is M.B. Hope's *The Princeton Text Book of Rhetoric* (1859). Hope sets forth "the ultimate grounds of the validity of arguments...in still clear, more forcible, and readily remembered relations," and emphasizes (as did Day) practical aspects of composition. Hope states on page one that rhetoric should classify and simplify the laws of human nature underlying "the phenomena which it is the object of Rhetoric to account for...conviction and persuasion," thus returning broadly to Whately's definition of rhetoric's scope which Day so criticized.

Hope then differentiates clearly between conviction and persuasion:

The former [conviction] is an effect upon the understanding—the intellectual or logical faculties—the latter (persuasion) is an effect upon the will, producing a change either of character, or conduct (2).

One important way in which this text differs from Whately's is Hope's treatment of conviction. Influenced by Franz Theremin's *Eloquence A Virtue*, Hope sees the
whole rhetorical process, an argumentative one, as designed to convey truth to another mind. An ethical viewpoint colors not only Hope's discussion of impassioned discourse but also his definition and discussion of argumentation: "the statement of an intermediate or middle term" whose function is to let the mind pass "in the way of proof, from known to unknown truth" (7). Hope's definition is particularly important because a "truth" thus proven is likely to be narrow in scope and application: for example, "truths" proven using the forensic or courtroom application of argumentative processes to become so popular in later decades.

Hope also differs from Whately by discussing and explaining narrative, descriptive, analytical, exemplificatory, and comparative principles within his section on conviction, though Hope specifically relates these processes to the end of instruction, which he calls a type of conviction. Yet Hope still equates actual argumentation with formal logic; in his classification of proofs, the less structured proofs by example, sign, analogy, and induction come near the bottom of his hierarchy.

Hope relates conviction to persuasion in the faculty psychologists' sense that the passions put convictions into action, but adds, "While persuasion is thus clearly distinguishable from conviction, in theory, it is not less distinct in experience and fact" (77). He thus sanctioned the growing practical emphasis on differentiation between aims as well as structures in discourse, a case of theory becoming increasingly detached from practice.

This practical emphasis found a powerful ally in Scottish educator Alexander Bain's view of rhetoric as essentially stylistic, setting an important precedent for division of discourse into the four forms or "modes" for ease of teaching. Yet we have now seen that the classification of discourse into different types and structures began long before 1866, when Bain's English Composition and Rhetoric was first published in Britain.
Bain was an associationist. Unlike the majority of text book writers at that time, he overtly allied himself not only with Whately and Hugh Blair, but especially with Campbell, and therefore perceived logical associations between his modes of description, narration, exposition, and persuasion. Bain's handling of the modes is also, in some ways, reminiscent of Smith's methodology. Like Smith, he mentions exposition only after an analysis of description and narration, and shows how exposition is based on "the existence of individual facts." Bain shows how facts can be classified, expressed as a general law, contrasted with others, broken down into constituent notions, and dealt with through example and illustration, thus inductively building towards complex ideas. These are methods both Smith and Campbell saw as integral parts of writing, and Bain's treatment reflects his own view of the importance of associating thought processes with their stylistic manifestations. Moreover, Bain shows that narration and description, for all forms of discourse but most particularly exposition, is able to "soften the rigours of scientific exposition by elements of more pervading human interest," to acknowledge "the feelings touched by the special objects of science as objects of sense" (161). Clearly, Bain is trying to draw together principles of discourse so that they underlie all different aims and occasions; he sees (as did Campbell) experience as essential in cultivating the necessary facts on which to base a piece of writing. By taking into account the relationships of discrimination, retentiveness, and agreement (which for an associationist cement all thought processes), Bain argues that his modes manifest similar logical structures—at least at the stylistic level. Perhaps more than any other text book writer at that time, Bain strove to unify all aspects of discourse by illuminating similarities more than differences between them through associationism.

If this is the case, why did Bain become a catalyst of division and fragmentation in discourse rather than the great "unifier"? First, his modes of
discourse could be both easily remembered and neatly packaged for composition classes (later, Bain's own work became more formalized; see footnote 6). Primarily because of this formalization, Bain's text circulated widely throughout Great Britain and the United States and was soon followed by reprintings and hosts of imitations. *English Composition and Rhetoric* was reprinted each year from 1866 to 1872, then five more times until 1886, and eleven American editions came out as opposed to only four in Britain. In short, the very popularity of Bain's text served to obscure, in the long run, Bain's more complex theoretical base and instead hastened the compartmentalization of his "modes."

Secondly, Bain's treatment of argument, though at first more unified structurally than Whately's, eventually descends into formalization. Argument, to Bain, is "exposition by proof... part of persuasion" (165-6). Although one can use argument in exposition or persuasion, proofs themselves are resolvable into allegations of similarity or dissimilarity

...the facts or principles adduced must be admitted, and sufficiently believed in, by the hearers... Secondly, a certain similarity must be admitted to hold between the facts or principles adduced and the point to be established. (187-8)

Clearly, argumentative structure forms the foundation for exposition and persuasion in this treatment (the difference between exposition and argument being the presence of proof), but the detailed classification of the various formal logical processes of argument which Bain gives obscures this link.

Like Whately, Bain distinguishes argument and persuasion by the degree of pathos present in each. "All Persuasion supposes that there are some feelings or human susceptibilities to work upon. In Argument, no attempt is made to heighten or diminish the feelings themselves; it is considered only how to bring a case under them" (200). One can base persuasion on "the modes of simple communication" (description, narration, exposition), on argument, or on the feelings; Bain adds that persuasion "is aided by all the arts that can strengthen
the bonds that cement ideas in the mind" such as the figures of speech. Thus Bain sees persuasion as both the synthesis of all structures and modes of prose, and as a vital link to poetics (184-6).

Argument in Bain's scheme, then, represents the logical side of discourse, that which can lend discourse coherence in the minds of an intelligent audience. Clearly, Bain did not intend that argument be isolated, or that the modes, elements, or aims of discourse be isolated from each other. Yet his work lent credence to an increasingly popular stance that discourse, reflecting rhetoric's decreasing concern with the communication of that which is probable, should be broken into fragments—to accommodate easily the learning of skills needed to communicate that which is seen as factual.

Up until and shortly after 1866, composition text book writers and theorists alike had vacillated between foregrounding argument or persuasion as the aim of rhetoric—to an extent also reflecting the conflict between values (persuasion) and facts (argument). Most were able to provide some sort of theoretical foundation or rationale, either organizational, ethical, or psychological, for their choice. In the latter decades of the nineteenth century, however, composition texts written in response to increasing demands for practical college level writing courses (including Day's and Hope's) began to emphasize "skills" as their aim. In their treatment of exposition, argument, and persuasion, certain representative texts of the 1870's and 1880's exemplify the contest between teaching writing as a series of fact-communicating skills, or treating writing as the extension of a rhetorical theory encompassing "reason and passion, truth and goodness" as well.

George P. Quackenbos's Advanced Course of Composition and Rhetoric, first published in 1854, had treated description, narration, argument, and speculation as "constituent parts" of discourse in general. Says Kitzhaber of Quackenbos, "He did not distinguish between argument and persuasion" (196-7). In the edition
revised by John Quackenbos in 1884, kinds of prose are distinguished not by aim but strictly by form: letters, narratives, fiction, essays, theses (argumentative discourses), and orations. "All the parts of composition" are now description, narration, argument, exposition, and speculation (381). Quackenbos then drew clear distinctions between exposition and argument, with a bellettristic focus in mind (see footnote 1): exposition explains an author's intentions, defines terms, and presents doctrines or principles for instructional purposes, while argument is "the statement of reasons for or against a proposition, made with the view of inducing belief in others" (354). However, he sees persuasion as part of argument (quite contrary to Bain), for in a thesis, one "lays down a proposition, and endeavors to persuade others that it is true" (385-6).

Quackenbos's sharpest division, then, is between the aim of exposition and that of argument/persuasion, and it is likely that his conception of rhetoric's function plays a significant role in this split. For Quackenbos, rhetoric "enables us to discern faults and beauties in the compositions of others; and . . . it teaches us to express and embellish our own thoughts, so as to produce the most forcible impression" (154). In short, this text bases its distinction between exposition and argument on the belletristic concept of rhetoric as stylistics—therefore differentiating, not unifying, underlying structures for aims and occasions for discourse.

The Science of Rhetoric (1877) by David J. Hill begins, on the other hand, by placing all discourse and all purposes for it under a set of "laws": those of "Mind, Idea, and Form. . . .the relation between thought and its expression." Like Whately, Hill sees the functions of discourse as primarily argumentative, "producing some change in the mind addressed." But Hill adds "whatever this change be, it is produced by ideas. . . . Rhetoric is, therefore, the science of the laws of effective discourse" (37). Indeed, like Campbell, Hill insists on a
relationship between logic, which "gives us the test of arguments," and rhetoric, which lets us "confirm (them) to the mind of another" (107).

Hill's treatment of exposition and argument (dealt with under "Laws of Idea") is rooted in an analysis of types, descriptions of, and relations among "parts" or things. At first glance, this treatment seems to offer a unified way of looking at discourse structure—a movement, in the true Lockeian tradition, from simple to progressively more complex interrelations among ideas. But Hill obscures these interrelations, especially when he comes to describing the practice of exposition and argument. The aim of exposition, he says, "consists in such an analysis of a general term as will make clear to the mind the general notion of which it is the sign" (95). One may increase comprehension of a notion through definition; extend the notion through analysis or division; or explain it through its relations with other notions (example, comparison, cause and effect). However, argument (which Hill sees as relating propositions to conclusions) receives the now usual formal treatment involving a full classification of the types and nature of various arguments. Notwithstanding its dense definition, exposition here is once again informally argumentative. Like Day, Hill has created a scheme in which classical scholastic logic provides the structure for argument, while inductive, synthetic logic provides another, separate structure—exposition.9

Few, if any, of the composition texts examined so far have presented any principles governing composition which have not appeared earlier in rhetorical theory in some form or another. One writer, J. Scott Clark, admits in A Practical Rhetoric for Instruction in English Composition and Revision (1886) that he introduces "few new principles," borrowing extensively from Aristotle, Blair, Campbell, Whately, Bain, Quackenbos, Hill, and others.10 Clark divides discourse into the forms of description, narration, exposition, oratory, and interestingly, persuasion rather than argument. Exposition is "the statement
and discussion of the essential attributes of some abstract or general theme," and Clark specifically warns the student to "avoid confounding it with other forms" (283-4). In this sense the "practicality" of the text is a measure of how easily one can distinguish the forms of discourse from each other. In another sense, Clark is concerned about the analysis and criticism of literary works, for he cites character sketches, book reviews, and plot summaries as prime examples of exposition on which college students ought to focus.

Persuasion receives a familiar definition from Clark: "that form of composition designed to influence the belief and the conduct of men according to the will of the writer." He adds

Of all the forms of composition, this is doubtless the most important. . . . One may seldom feel it necessary to engage in formal description, narration, or exposition; but there is hardly an American citizen whose interests do not often depend upon his ability to influence the belief and conduct of his associates (288).

Unlike many other textbook writers, such as Quackenbos, Clark sees argument as a secondary part of persuasion. Thus he concurs with Bain that argument is designed to ensure that "the means proposed. . . .be proved to be conducive to [the] end" (289). And as for the material with which arguments are formed, Clark says this: "The writer must think," fall back on his own knowledge (288).

Though Clark's treatment of argument is refreshingly devoid of formal logic, and though he states its link with persuasion, he repeats Quackenbos's and Hill's refusal to link argument to exposition. Clark's reason for this choice has already been quoted here; "formal" exposition has little to do with an American citizen's practical interests. In this text, exposition is the isolated form, mainly because Clark equates it not with everyday discourse but with belle-lettres.

By contrast, Theodore W. Hunt in The Principles of Written Discourse (first published in 1884) takes a psychological approach to rhetoric and composition
teaching. His aim is to "establish guiding principles..." when precepts are...pressed in place of organic principles, the entire art [of discourse] descends to the level of pedantry and is not worthy of the devotion of intelligent minds." Hunt intends to "reveal the basis of discourse in a true philosophy of the mind," and yet not neglect language, literature, a practical knowledge of the world, or the "moral elements in discourse"—a truly awesome task for any textbook.

Hunt criticizes Whately first (a seemingly popular pastime) for collapsing logic and rhetoric together (12). His retaliation is to divide discourse into types on the basis of "Human Powers of Intellect, Feelings, and Will"; this psychological slant yields exposition and argument for the intellect, and persuasion for the will, with emotional discourse preceding persuasion in this scheme (208-9). (Again, we have seen how Campbell, Day, and Hill have already used this conception of discourse in their own works.) For Hunt, exposition's "sole office is to instruct...As it simply aims to establish the meaning and not the truth of a proposition, it has no place for the convincing and persuasive." Yet Hunt emphasizes that instruction "is the basis of conviction, impression, and persuasion" (224-6). Like Campbell, Hunt believes that one cannot persuade without ensuring that an audience understands a concept first, and this foundation of faculty psychology accounts for Hunt's seemingly mechanical treatment of the "human powers."

Hunt clarifies his conception of the close relationship between exposition and argument "in that the first thing in argument is the exposition of terms, and in that often the best way of explaining an idea is to prove it" (224-6). He then discusses argumentative proof, treating it both formally and from the viewpoint of what he calls the "Topical Art," or informal proofs. His ethical stance, that the writer must consider human values, colors this discussion; definitions, proofs, topics are linked by ethical purpose (227-55). Yet Hunt
denies that argument "is equivalent in its province and purport to discourse itself. . . . This view of the science is undoubtedly extreme and misleading." He insists that argument "is but one among others," and that, if he had to choose a form to subsume all others, it would be persuasion (226-7). Persuasion, to Hunt, includes the highest degrees of emotion, immediacy, and ethical purpose: in this sense, he reiterates Campbell and Bain.

Hunt had come closer than many text book writers at this time to reuniting purposes for writing with a common underlying structure for them, persuasion being a focal point for explanation, proof, and ethical/emotional considerations. The problem with Hunt, however, lies with a conflict in the text between his holistic theory of rhetoric based on "a true philosophy of the mind," and his insistence on distinguishing the aims and occasions of discourse for teaching purposes. Exposition, alone in its vacuum of having "no place for the convincing and persuasive," reflects Hunt's implicit reliance on a dying faculty psychology.

Yet Hunt was one of a stubborn breed of rhetoricians who realized the importance of supporting practical precepts with at least some sort of theoretical foundation. By the 1890's, this foundation was swiftly disappearing from texts. Exposition, argument, and persuasion—reflecting the growing triumph of formula over philosophy in teaching composition—began their final metamorphoses during this decade into discrete "forms" or "types" of discourse. A brief look at some texts used in the early 1890's shows that only a few tatters of faculty psychology still clung to composition theory and practice, providing a theoretical rationale for differentiating exposition from argument.

John G.R. McElroy's *The Structure of English Prose* (sixth edition 1890) exemplifies the kind of text that equated forms of discourse with the understanding, feelings, and will. Repeating many earlier ideas, McElroy defines argument as dealing with judgments, persuasion as influencing the will, and "explanation" as setting forth the nature of terms—defining them. "In practice,
the processes of Explanation and Argument, etc. can never be carried on strictly alone," McElroy admits, suggesting that if one inserts "explanations between the parts of an argument, the two may be linked." Interestingly, persuasion "involves Explanation, Argument, and Excitation" in order to be "fair and judicious"; he echoes Hunt here (325). Still, exposition and argument remain isolated from each other structurally in this text.

Walter Scott Dalgleish, however, attempted to explain more systematically the relationship between exposition and argument. His Introductory Text-Book of English Composition (which enjoyed twelve Edinburgh printings and four by A & W MacKinlay of Halifax, N.S. up until 1893) presented exposition but not argumentation as a form of discourse. Argument, said Dalgleish, constitutes one of two types of expository composition, and has as its end the "production of belief." A writer must present either a proposition, or a term, and then prove it (71-3). Here we see argument subsumed with exposition and bolstered with formal logic as the method of proof, while "common sense" relationship as well as emotional/ethical proofs receive little real attention. In other words, persuasion (and the world of opinion) is ignored.

If one could point to any particular source for the increasing popularity of formal logical argument in texts at this time, it would probably be the work of George P. Baker of Harvard. An assistant professor of English, he was the first text book writer to develop a systematic course of instruction in argumentation and, particularly, in debate. The well-known "brief" or formal argumentative outline was his creation, and his Principles of Argumentation, first published in 1895, enjoyed reprintings up to as late as 1925. Generations of budding lawyers learned their "forensics" from Baker's courses and texts. Such was Harvard's prestige that the Baker system quickly became widespread; this trend almost certainly contributed to the "detachment" of informal methods of argument in composition texts and their gradual replacement with an isolated block of formal
logical methods of reasoning.

Many textbook writers, however, insisted on argument's link with exposition, even if they weren't able to articulate the nature of the link or the reasons behind its existence. Arlo Bates, in *Talks on Writing English* (1896) said, "It must be evident to anyone that Argument is closely allied with Exposition. . . since if a truth is clearly set forth it is likely to carry conviction with it." His declaration that "in Exposition the writer declares; in Argument he defends," and his discussion of the formal proofs involved in this "defense" could almost have been written by Baker. Finally, and very significantly, Bates rejects persuasion as having no place among the forms of discourse. "Persuasion, in the strict sense of the term, is of course not a kind of composition, but a quality of style," Kitzhaber (211) quotes Bates as emphasizing. Bain's work had at last been carried to a logical end, though Hunt (for one) would have shuddered to think that his vehicle for communicating values could be reduced to mere stylistic embellishment of "facts."

Elias J. MacEwan, in *The Essentials of Argumentation* (1898) saw a real need for mixing students' technical approach to writing with the literary. "Acting on this conviction [the writer] made the last two years' work in English composition --speeches, essays, discussions--largely argumentative" (1). Implicit here is an assumption that the argumentative approach is best suited to communicating both "facts" and values. MacEwan dealt with argument differently than his contemporaries, recognizing purpose and occasion as the determinants of whether an argument should be formal or informal. He also saw a link between argument, exposition, and persuasion: "However distinct from persuasion exposition and argumentation are in theory, it is impossible to keep them separate in practice" (1), an unintentional and poignant reminder of the gap between theory and practice by the turn of the century. He continues--"One may wish in
the same address to inform, to convince, to arouse, to explain a fact, to establish a truth, or to influence an action" (1-2). MacEwan clearly did not see discourse as divided into forms, modes, or types. Rather, he tended to place all methods of relating ideas under a general heading which could be called "persuasive writing," leaving room to communicate values and opinions as well as facts.

MacEwan, however, could not reconcile the conflict among exposition, argument, and persuasion as being different in theory and similar in practice. He was forced to admit that some sort of unity among them exists because of the direction he took in his text, uniting discourse through purpose and occasion—even though the faculty psychology-based texts kept insisting on separation. On the other hand, John Genung was able to construct a theoretical foundation for his text, *Practical Elements of Rhetoric* (1899), a text based on rhetorical invention, not faculty psychology. One of the last authors to present five forms instead of four (persuasion as well as argument), Genung saw forms of discourse as manifestations of the inventional process. Certain "mental aptitudes" could influence the arrangement of material according to a writer's purpose.

"Argumentation," he stated, "may deal either with ideas (values) or with fact, that is, either with truth generalized into notions, such as are the subjects of exposition, or with individual and particular truths, such as are the subjects of narration and description" (407-8).

Genung chose to inquire "how reasoning can be adapted to clear and effective communication of thought, and what forms of argument are most useful and prevalent in ordinary (as opposed to purely forensic) literary tasks" (407-8). He decided that the *topoi* constituted "the simple and natural progress of the thought" in discourse (245), and saw argument as demonstrating truth through exploiting the various generalizations (created through exposition) between ideas and facts. Persuasion, meanwhile, communicated "practical, personal truths,
impulse" (447). This treatment of discourse inductively traces a writer's progress from observation (description and narration) to generalizations (exposition) to communicating these to an audience (argument and persuasion). As such, Genung's text comes closest in comparison with the majority of others in the 1890's to a view of prose as based on informal argumentation, one whereby inductive inquiry into a subject creates generalizations (syntheses) and the order of ideas.

In great contrast, Frederick H. Sykes's *Elementary English Composition* (1900) exemplifies the formularization of argument and of discourse. First published by Copp Clark of Toronto, the text lists the standard four "modes," with argument defined as "intended to convince one of the truth or falsity of a statement" and developed through formal induction, deduction, the proposition, and proofs. A brief reference notes that "arguments that appeal to our sympathy" are "of the nature of persuasion," but this text sees forms of discourse as completely separate in nature, function, and structure. Even expository writing, which other texts applied to a variety of occasions, is more or less limited here to topics such as "Making Peanut Brittle" (199). Certainly this text is "elementary," but its treatment of discourse was intended to form a firm foundation for later college courses, which would continue to emphasize the difference between discourse structures rather than their similarities or their application to the world of everyday opinion.

Continuing this trend was G.R. Carpenter's *Elements of Rhetoric and English Composition* (1899), also intended for high schools. "Writing that attempts to convince the reader by logical proof, we call argument; writing that attempts to induce the reader to do something, we call persuasion" (107). Such tools as the proposition, formal proofs, and the now-ubiquitous brief receive the bulk of Carpenter's attention in his chapter on argument. On the penultimate page he adds provocatively that "persuasion partakes of the nature of both argument and
exposition. . .partly to convince. . .partly to induce" (107) but fails to go into detail. The reader is left with separate "chunks" of discourse which are somehow distantly related, but, for the purposes of the writing course, can be taken as discrete.

By the turn of the century, exposition, argument, and persuasion had settled into readily remembered, easy to teach, "practical" modes. Exposition, designed to instruct, made use of informal argumentative concepts such as definition, comparison and contrast, exemplification, and occasionally narration and description of facts and events. But it had lost that ability (so central to Smith's and Campbell's philosophies) to be able to "preach to the unconverted." That task now fell to argumentation, and unfortunately, also to formal logic. As a result of this focus on formal reasoning, argument was now the form of discourse least likely to be concerned with general audiences, and most likely to concentrate on the courtroom and the debating table. Though persuasion retained its ancient aim of inducing an audience to some sort of action, the means by which it did so had become mainly emotional—-but emotion, distrusted by students of "fact," tended to fade into stylistics (as in Arlo Bates' text), or more commonly, was subsumed into argument as "specialized" oratory.

As will become apparent in my look at twentieth-century composition texts, the treatment of exposition, argument, and persuasion continues to be a fragmented one, at least up to and including the 1960's. Submerged and smothered by increasing emphasis on specialized skills, on communication of "facts" in the classroom, informal argumentation as a vehicle for communicating values disappeared for a long, dry period in the history of composition teaching. Some of its principles occasionally emerged in treatments of exposition. However, the lifeblood of rhetoric, opinionable discourse, continued to drain steadily out of classroom instruction during the first few decades of this century.

It is extremely significant, also, that this period (the 1890's to the
1960's) corresponds both to a noticeable loss of rhetoric's respectability in the classroom and of its status as a means for dialogue about ethical purposes.
Alexander Bain, *English Composition and Rhetoric: A Manual* (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1866). All further references will be cited by page number in the text. In 1887, Bain's revised *English Composition and Rhetoric* was published. The first part of this text, "Intellectual Qualities of Style," eliminated the "so-called kinds of composition" in order to focus on "other connexions" (vi): the forms of literary art. Here, Bain emphasized observation, analysis, and criticism of works (233) and how style carries intellectual and emotional qualities. In effect, he unified discourse structurally through what he had earlier referred to (in 1866) as "the bonds that cement ideas in the mind."


In his later text, *The Elements of Rhetoric and Composition: A Text-Book for Schools and Colleges*, new edition (New York: Sheldon & Company, 1886), Hill again united grammar and logic with rhetoric, "to add to correctness and conciseness such force and attentiveness as to make our thoughts clear and interesting." He did not mention modes or forms of discourse. Instead, Hill wanted the less experienced writer to master what was basically an informal argumentative structure first. "Facts, illustrations, or arguments" are essential to the discussion in a piece of writing, he said, and went on to show how one could arrange these either analytically or synthetically (16-22).

J. Scott Clark, *A Practical Rhetoric for Instruction in English Composition and Revision in Colleges and Intermediate Schools* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1886), p. vii. All further references will be cited by page number in the text.

Theodore W. Hunt, *The Principles of Written Discourse*, second edition (New York: A.C. Armstrong and Son, 1886), pp. 8-11. All further references will be cited by page number in the text.

Hunt was, of course, right given that argument was increasingly being equated with a formal logical structure whose only goal, it seemed, was to sharpen students' abilities to ferret out fallacies and facts. Obviously Hunt did not wish to see all of rhetoric reduced to this kind of sophistry.

Here, in chronological order, is an annotated list of composition texts I examined published between 1890 and 1906:

John G.R. McElroy, *The Structure of English Prose: A Manual of Composition and Rhetoric*, sixth edition (Toronto: Rose Publishing Co., 1890). In a sense, this text exemplifies the already wide gap between rhetorical theory and practice in colleges by the 1890's. In his preface, McElroy says that he intends to devote most space in his book to style, because questions relating to invention "are largely theoretical" and not of concern to "younger college students." Stylistic concerns such as grammar, vocabulary, sentencing, and other "qualities" take up over 230 pages of this 336-page text. McElroy bases his discussion of invention and arrangement on what are essentially Aristotelian *topoi*, but as promised, the aims, occasions, and structures of discourse get short shrift.
Whately's attempt to equate argumentative composition with rhetoric itself reflected his contention that rhetoric and logic be reunited in pedagogy. His text, then, places rhetorical theory and composition within one formal logical framework, and this is why Elements of Rhetoric is one of the very few "cornerstone" texts that does not divide discourse into separate forms.

Whately's rejection of rhetoric as ornamental is itself a statement for a unified theory of rhetoric, because the ornamental or belles-lettres movement conceived of rhetoric as the art which aims solely to cultivate taste and form style. Largely neglecting inventio and dispositio, the belles-lettres movement focused on the canons of elocutio and pronuntiatio. Studying taste, style (including schemes and tropes), and eloquence, and critically analyzing works for these traits, was and still is thought to prepare students for writing their own compositions and learning to appreciate excellence in others' writing. One of the leaders of the belles-lettres movement was Hugh Blair, whose Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres (1783) laid down what was in effect a detailed course of studies; it was highly influential in colleges throughout much of the nineteenth century both in Great Britain and the United States. The belles-lettres movement was a cornerstone of the later establishment, particularly in the U.S., of English departments dominated by literary criticism and composition rather than rhetoric in its classical sense.

A.R. Kitzhaber, in his dissertation "Rhetoric in American Colleges, 1850-1900" (University of Washington, 1953) mentions Samuel Newman as one of the first textbook writers in the United States to divide discourse into forms according to their aims and structures, not their literary type. Newman, in his Practical System of Rhetoric (1827) cited didactic, persuasive, and argumentative forms, and distinguished persuasion and argument in that the former induces action through the will, while the latter only convinces the understanding (Kitzhaber, 195-6).

Henry W. Day, Elements of the Art of Rhetoric: Adapted for Use in Colleges and Academies, and for Private Study, fourth edition (New York: A.S. Barnes and Burr, 1866). All further references will be cited by page number in the text. I should add that Whately and Day were both aiming to provide composition teaching with a philosophical foundation, but took entirely different approaches.


Franz Theremin, Eloquence A Virtue: An Outline of a Systematic Rhetoric, trans. William T. Shedd (Philadelphia: Smith, English and Co., 1859). I should point out that Shedd's translation was first published in 1844. "Eloquence," as Theremin states in his second chapter, "seeks to separate the true from the false, and to satisfy the understanding by argument." Here, Theremin obliquely shows how exposition and argument can be linked structurally through their infusion with ethical purpose. Theremin's view of the role of argument, joining explanation to persuasion, inspired Hope's comment that during impassioned discourse rhetoric becomes "an ethical power, ruling over the free spirit of man."
Walter Scott Dalgleish, Introductory Text-Book of English Composition, rev. edition (Halifax: A & W MacKinlay, 1893). The terms narration, description, and exposition come into this little handbook under the heading "The Structure of Paragraphs." In his Advanced Text-Book of English Composition, in Prose and Verse, published simultaneously, Dalgleish brings in "prose themes" which are based on narration, description, and exposition. He divides exposition into "discursive" and "argumentative" kinds; the latter borrows its techniques from Whately's formal logic and its organization from the classical five-part speech.

Arlo Bates, Talks on Writing English: First Series (Cambridge, Mass.: The Riverside Press, 1896). Bates' lectures progress from principles of diction and "quality" to exposition, argument, description, and narration, and finally to character, purpose, and criticism. His focus is without doubt a belletristic one.

Elias J. MacEwan, The Essentials of Argumentation (Boston: D.C. Heath and Co., 1893). MacEwan first says of his students at Kalamazoo's agricultural college "They had not time to study all the niceties of literary expression." For MacEwan, rhetoric is implicitly the study of argument and persuasion rather than of belle-lettres. His text treats the introduction, organization, kinds of evidence, and classes of argument in some detail, and provides background on both formal logical argument as well as argument based on "use, force, and source." Certainly formal logical argument does not in any way dominate this text.

John F. Genung, The Practical Elements of Rhetoric (Boston: Ginn and Company, 1899). Genung deals first with style (diction and figures of speech), then moves on to syntax and grammar. In his section on "Invention," Genung ties thought processes and their organization into description (objects), narration (events), exposition (generalizations), argumentation (truths), and persuasion (practical issues). He therefore deals not so much with forms of discourse as he does with what Frank D'Angelo would call "manifestations of thought processes." His organic treatment of discourse structures, unified through how we interpret our experiences, obviously has its antecedents in the New Logic and in Adam Smith's Lectures, but is unique for its particular time.

Frederick Henry Sykes, Elementary English Composition (Toronto: The Copp Clark Company Ltd., 1902). Sykes treats narration, description, exposition, and argument (which includes persuasion) as discrete units of discourse, each chapter peppered with its own exercises and lessons on grammar and style.

III. Precepts Without Principles

Even the most formulaic nineteenth-century composition texts tended to base their treatments of discourse on some kind of rationale, such as the theory of faculty psychology. Yet, long after the 1890's, when this theory began to lose its status as the key to understanding and exploring thought processes in philosophy, psychology, and especially rhetoric, composition texts generally retained as a teaching framework the principle that discourse aims and structures correspond to distinct areas of the mind: the understanding, the feelings, and the will. The problem with this view, however, was that it lent itself all too easily to a focus on discourse as having discrete forms—a problem exacerbated by the loss of any theoretical rationale for such a view. By the turn of the century this teaching framework (which was virtually all that remained of faculty psychology in rhetoric) dominated composition teaching and would for decades to come. The dearth of a new theoretical rationale for the resulting rules and models solidified the stereotypes of exposition, argument, and persuasion. By the 1920's, persuasion was equated with emotional appeals, argument with formal logical appeals, and exposition with the clear, objective elucidation of facts.

Certainly this growing emphasis in the twentieth century on exposition as the prime vehicle for communicating "facts" and "information," as "objective" and therefore scientifically valid, has its antecedents in Adam Smith's narrative and didactic forms of writing. But this modern descendent lacks Smith's, and George Campbell's, ethical stance on the role of narrative and didactic writing as communicating not just facts, but what is good as well as true. This is one reason why exposition treated as a "mode of discourse" falls far short of encompassing informal argumentation (the synthesis of pieces of information into theses or discoveries) first laid down by the New Logicians and, for rhetorical
theory, by Smith and Campbell. Without the connections and associations with argument and persuasion (as well as narration and description) which Smith and Campbell delineated, exposition's place as part of the entire informal argumentative framework was lost.

Although twentieth-century composition text books do quite often state that connections exist between such forms of writing as exposition and argument, or argument and persuasion, they still tend to rationalize such connections with the old faculty psychology adage that "one needs to understand something before being convinced." Thus, exposition has its own rules and structures to help bring about understanding and only understanding. In the representative texts I will be examining here, exposition is usually allied with definition and analysis. Argument is developed through such structures as the syllogism and the forensic brief, and is also associated with cause and effect, analogy, testimony, and circumstance. Finally, persuasion is rarely developed systematically as are argument and exposition, but is rather associated with emotional appeals and sometimes aspects of writing "style" such as the figures of speech. But in the utilitarian hierarchy of the forms of discourse, exposition comes first in usefulness and therefore importance; its connections with the "special skills" of argument or persuasion are given short shrift.

In effect, the typical composition text published in the first half of this century tends to be the epitome of pedagogy without theory. Even the works of such figures as Wayne Booth, Kenneth Burke, and Richard Weaver, who revivified rhetorical theory through their attempts to redefine and restructure rhetoric's role in human affairs, failed to influence composition teaching to any great degree before the 1960's. While rhetorical theorists after the 1930's began once more to acknowledge not only logos but ethos and pathos in everyday communication, composition text book writers continued to build their classes on logos only, a logos fragmented into discrete elements.
My examination of nineteenth-century texts reveals a pedagogical tendency to divide elements of discourse from each other. The following representative twentieth century texts, covering a period from World War I to the mid-1960's, illustrate the results of this same division: dissociation between the aims and structures of exposition, argument, and persuasion, creating and perpetuating a theoretical vacuum in composition teaching.

Forms of discourse were fully established in composition before 1920; in fact, virtually all texts published after 1910 were modeled on the exposition-argument-description-narration structure. Gerhard R. Lomer and Margaret Ashmun's *The Study and Practise of Writing English* (1917) presented a deviant nine forms of discourse, of which exposition and argument were but two. Exposition, according to the authors' definition, can be used "to lay a foundation for or to assist description, narration, or argument" (242). In other words, state Lomer and Ashmun, exposition as the "explanation of a term, ideas, conception. . .object. . .with the purpose of making any of them clearly understood" (241), seldom stands on its own in practice. Their illustration of how argumentation works develops further this idea of exposition's large role in discourse:

Argumentation has constant use for exposition. . . . It differs from mere exposition in having a somewhat different problem. Exposition seeks to make the unknown known; argumentation tries to remove uncertainty and unbelief. . . . (254-5)

Yet here are echoes of a paradox unearthed in a number of nineteenth-century texts. While seeming to realize that discourse can be built on one common foundation, Lomer and Ashmun still conceived of exposition and argument as two essentially different purposes and patterns, as most textbook writers had been doing for decades. Thus, the association between argument and exposition became largely obscured in practice, and "practice" is what their text is concerned with. Lomer and Ashmun also follow an established path in making persuasion a
part of argument, for argument to them not only proves something and anticipates objections (which is essentially the task of formal argumentation) but also "convinces a reader or an audience that some statement is true and that some specific attitude or action is advisable or necessary" (254). This is also the task of persuasion.

Lomer and Ashmun's text is fairly well representative of the way exposition, argument, and persuasion were being treated at this time. By contrast, however, Charles Sears Baldwin, in College Composition (1917), lashed out at the usual distinction drawn between argument and persuasion: the logic versus emotion dichotomy. (Baldwin had felt the same way in 1902, Kitzhaber notes.5) College Composition, published at the time Baldwin was on the verge of abandoning composition for research into rhetoric and poetics, attacked what he saw as the "oversimplification" of popular treatments of argument and persuasion:6 "We are not so crudely twofold that it is easy to find feeling without reason, or reason without feeling."7 Also rejecting the four modes, he saw discourse structures as "overlapping," wherein "information passes over into discussion, discussion into persuasion."

Most importantly, Baldwin does not subsume persuasion into argument; instead he expands persuasion, brings it out of hiding, to cover "in the largest sense...the whole field of the composition of ideas, or of rhetoric as understood by the ancients" (93). Argument, for Baldwin, is always "part of persuasion...essentially the giving of reasons for or against a proposition" (94-5), and exposition, included with argument under the section on discussion, is almost always part of argument and focuses on the gathering and presenting of facts.

In this text, Baldwin has taken giant steps towards unifying discourse under the banner of classical rhetorical theory. Indeed, as with Smith and Campbell, only the degree to which a discourse "moves men" differentiates informative from
discursive, and discursive from persuasive writing. Unfortunately, his examination of argument as "the commonest means of persuasion...usually oral" (133) serves only to dissociate it from the information/discussion/persuasion process because he treats it in the standard formal manner: through analysis, evidence, logical processes such as the syllogism and the enthymeme, and the forensic brief. Like David J. Hill and Henry Day before him, Baldwin has inadvertently created two basic structures for prose: one largely inductive and covering most aims and occasions for discourse; and the other formal, largely deductive, and too "specialized" for most aims and occasions for writing.

Yet the contrast between Baldwin's treatment of discourse and that in texts less than a decade later is quite remarkable. Texts of the 1920's exemplify what Robert J. Connors calls the "reign of the modes," a time when

In terms of new insights, the teaching of composition was frozen in its tracks...and despite a few novel treatments and up-to-date appearances, I cannot find a single text that is not derivative of the authors of the [eighteen] nineties (449).

Nor could I. The Elements of Composition (1925) by Henry S. Canby and John B. Opdyke defines exposition as "an explanation of...anything, indeed, that has to be made clear," and argument as "an attempt to prove or disprove the claim of a statement...to convince or persuade another mind of the truth of a given proposition," persuasion itself hidden away again under argument.8 We see a basic precept of faculty psychology in this passage:

Exposition appeals to the understanding. It does not appeal primarily to the will or the feelings or the imagination. Its purpose is to make clear...the basic laws of clearness are the laws of exposition (381).

This explanation causes trouble for the authors when they later insist that argument, also, appeals to the understanding in addition to convincing or
persuading someone, and that its aim "is almost invariably achieved through the
dynamic use of other forms of discourse" (582). For this text has carefully set
up separate aims and structures for discourse, only to assert that they are in
some way unified. Of course, this contradiction shows clearly how inadequate the
separate forms are as a way of teaching composition meaningfully when those forms
lack theoretical support. As if to make up for their momentary breach of
contract with the modes pedagogy, though, Canby and Opdyke treat argument as a
highly formal, forensic system of propositions, proofs, and briefs. They are
back on that familiar territory of separate structures for discourse wherein
argument is as specialized and as far removed from exposition as possible.

Howard B. Grose's definition of exposition: "to inform, to make clear, or
explain" also serves to differentiate it from other discourse. His 1926 text
College Composition (printed only once) describes exposition as concerned with
definition, description, and process (the last two being primarily what other
texts called "expository" description and narration). Yet take note of this
passage:

Argument is that type of writing in which the intention is
to convince or persuade. Its fundamental processes are defin­
tion and division; and in form it is sometimes difficult or
impossible to distinguish from exposition. (166)

Unfortunately, Grose is not making a case here for a common framework for
exposition and argument in composition teaching; instead he has become trapped in
the same paradox as Lomer and Ashmun. He can get out of it only by invoking the
sacred name of practicality:

But for the practical purposes of this discussion there
need be no serious confusion, because argument, as we shall
use the term, is concerned only with matters about which
there is an evident and unmistakable difference of opinion.
(166)

What Grose ends up doing is dividing argument into two classes. The first
"seeks to influence thought alone," and the second "to influence thought and
produce action" (224). The first is treated fundamentally as exposition (Grose never does justify why, therefore, a separate type called "exposition" is needed) while the second is treated as if it were debate: the brief, propositions, and proof through testimony, circumstance, analogy, cause, and effect. Persuasion (mentioned briefly as another type of argument) can't be learned in text books, Grose states, because it is so closely allied with human nature. While the faculty psychologist rhetoricians had attempted to show how discourse structures reflect aspects of human nature, the text book writers of the early twentieth century decided that human nature (and by implication opinion) was better left for the specialists.

Two other texts, both printed in 1929, also deserve brief mention. Effective English, by J.R. and V.B. Hulbert, based its section on argument directly on George P. Baker's original brief format introduced first in 1895. Exposition, a process of definition and explanation, could also serve as part of formal argument, according to the Hulberts. In effect the authors placed exposition below argument in importance; like Whately, they believed that a system of formal argument could teach students "the structure which underlies all successful informal argument and much exposition."¹⁰ However, their types of discourse remained separated both in aim and structure. In other words, they failed to show how, exactly, formal argument relates to other forms of discourse.

Yet Raymond W. Pence's College Composition (1929; reprinted in 1930) ignored argument altogether. It receives, literally, a footnote in which Pence, explaining the development of the "expository-argumentative" paragraph, says, "No good purpose will be served in trying to draw any distinction here between exposition and argumentation."¹¹ Exposition subsumes argument completely, and persuasion disappears in this text. Even the proposition, traditionally the tool of formal argumentation, Pence sees as one of the "principal materials" of
exposition. In a sense, discourse is certainly unified here, yet the author develops this text on the basis that all "non-imaginative" writing aims to make something clear, to explain, heralding the hosts of expository-writing-only texts to appear in the 1930's and 40's.

In short, Canby and Opdyke, Grose, the Hulberts, and Pence all exemplify the struggle to bury any "confusing" signs of a theoretical unifying framework for discourse under the comforting practicality and ease of teaching the separate forms.

The 1930's was a time when the "modes of discourse" began to loosen their stranglehold on composition teaching, but there are relatively few signs that texts introduced a common structural framework in their place. Dana O. Jensen's Modern Composition and Rhetoric (1935) cites three purposes for discourse: to communicate facts, express opinions, or narrate incidents. In the second part of the text, the resulting "forms" are broken down into exposition (factual, opinionated, personal); exposition (the research paper); exposition (the precis, definition, critical review); narration; and finally, description. The authors caution that

Few themes are wholly narrative, descriptive, expository, or argumentative. . . .But the student. . . .must settle on none until he has thoroughly tested the fitness of all for his particular purpose (20).

Like the freshman chemistry student who dips litmus paper into various solutions to see it turn color, the student using Modern Composition and Rhetoric was required to try out the forms separately to determine which best suited the theme to be written. Yet this text attempts to move argumentative discourse closer to exposition in structure by calling argument "opininated" exposition, wherein a writer shifts her emphasis "from the facts to what the writer thinks about the facts" (180). But the authors provide an organizational guide that relies, like
informal argumentation, fairly heavily on the use of examples to convince a reader. But this glimpse of informal argument is more tantalizing than useful in unifying discourse, for the text focuses on how to write pieces "for the one primary purpose of explaining" (180). In effect, this text ignores the world of opinion and issues, and instead teaches the writing of "factual" pieces.

Another 1935 text, Purposive Prose: Selections in Exposition, begins more conservatively: "All that you write (or speak) falls into one of four 'forms of discourse.'" Another brief explanation of each follows. Argumentation's purpose is conviction "as to the desirability of that, or as to the truth of this, and so forth" (argument has again subsumed persuasion here). However, the authors choose not to deal with argument, which they equate with formal logic, because it is "almost universally taught nowadays not in classes in English composition but in classes of public speaking"—a revealing summary of the lowly state of argument and persuasion in composition teaching. Instead, aware of the demand for it, the authors focus on exposition, defining it as that form which "aims to make clear" primarily by definition and analysis. Clearly, this text as well as Jensen's exemplifies a growing "scientistic" concept that a clear, unbiased presentation of facts is more trustworthy and more correct than writing that takes an ethical stand.

One of the few Canadian composition texts in use at this time was M. Dorothy Mawdsley and Marjorie Leeming's Modern Composition for High Schools and Collegiates (1935). Both from the University of British Columbia, the authors presented modes of discourse organized according to principles such as unity (narration), coherence and emphasis (description), and arrangement (exposition). The section on argument at the end of the text was intended "chiefly as an aid in school debating"; though the authors admit of the "close relation" of argument to exposition, they do not discuss it. This text has no new treatments of discourse, instead choosing the popular option of emphasizing exposition at the
expense of argument and persuasion.

Earlier we saw evidence that many texts sense a unity between exposition and argument in theory while in practice they remain separate. Charles H. Raymond's A Book of English (1936) repeats this paradoxical idea. "Exposition and argument go hand in hand in ordinary speech and composition," he states. Next we are given definitions of exposition and argument little changed since 1890:  

Exposition explains something. . . . Argument consists in giving reasons to show the truth or falsity of a proposition. Its purpose is to convince a person of a way of belief or to persuade him to action.

Exercise topics for themes in this text are of the "how to" type for exposition and the "should be" type for argument, reinforcing the separation between the two of aim and structure. What we see in texts in the 1930's is a struggle for domination between exposition (both in its "pure" form as explanatory discourse and as "opinionable") and the modes pedagogy, or all forms as equal in usefulness but as separate in aim and structure. Those texts that still use the modes tend to retain the same formats and methods as earlier in the century, or even the late nineteenth century. Those that focus on exposition generally do so at the expense of argument and persuasion, refusing to deal with the world of opinion. Neither side operates under a theoretical rationale.

Strangely enough, the U.B.C. library's supply of superannuated composition texts lacks material from the late 1930's through most of the 1940's, forcing me to infer (besides noting World War Two's disruptive effects) that composition classes at U.B.C. during this time used older texts because they were still perceived as pedagogically valid. One, Fundamentals of Good Writing (1949), mentions what we now call the "communications triangle": medium, subject, and occasion, giving discourse an overall purpose. Yet, this is a text in transition as well, for it still focuses on "four kinds of discourse" which in this case reflect four basic intentions of a writer. Authors Cleanth Brooks and Robert
Penn Warren are still very much centered in separate discourse structures, as is plain to see in this passage:\textsuperscript{16}

Though most writing involves a mixture of the kinds of discourse, we can best study them in isolation. . . . It is only after one understands the kinds of discourse in a pure form that one can make them work together to give unity to a larger discourse.

Exposition and argument in this text receive standard treatments: exposition "explains or clarifies a subject [and] is the most common kind of writing" (38), developed through identification, description, illustration, narration, and other informal logical processes like comparison and contrast. Interestingly, analysis and definition are included in this list of ways of developing an expository piece. Argument, however, appeals "only" to the understanding and is "used to make the audience think or act as the arguer desires" (125). Most importantly, argument "implies conflict" (131), an idea that will resurface in the 1950's because of argument's long incarceration in the classroom as debate. Its methods of development include the usual ones: the proposition, testimony, analogy, the syllogism, and the brief. As we have seen before, exposition and argument constitute here formal and informal argument. The authors hint at common means of development, but maintain separate forms for the artificial purpose of studying them in "isolation" and for the immediate purpose also of emphasizing factual, non-contentious writing.

The separation of exposition and argument is also evident in Donald Davidson's \textit{American Composition and Rhetoric} (the third edition of which was published in 1953). In as circular a definition as one could ever wish to see, the author explains exposition as "Writing that tends toward exposition, even though it may not be pure exposition."\textsuperscript{17} Exposition by now, apparently, needs no elaboration. "Argument," Davidson continues, "will necessarily appear when it is proper to support an opinion," but exposition is "by far" the most prevalent form, he adds. He echoes other text book writers by laying out
clearly exposition's isolated purpose as "to explain rather than to describe, relate, or convince" (45). Yet argument, for him, contains definition and analysis, "which are expository in nature" (45). Davidson never really develops this idea of argument's expository nature, but rather shows how argument develops through the syllogism, inductive and deductive logic, use of evidence, and a "rather simple plan" he calls the "article of opinion," which is essentially the classical rhetorical scheme for arranging discourse (507-8). Persuasion, in this "simple plan," has disappeared, except for a very brief mention as being part of argument.

A Canadian text, A Handbook of Composition (1953), is aimed mainly at technical writers. Neither argument nor persuasion is dealt with here; the focus is on exposition as "writing which has as its chief purpose the making of an explanation or the passing on of information." One sample theme topic is "How To Dig An Indian Well" for simple exposition; for "objective/impersonal and persuasive" topics, more "formal" exposition was necessary. "Although argument is sometimes classified as a separate form of writing, we shall consider it as exposition...an explanation of the writer's views presented to persuade the reader" (43-4). However, the author deals with discourse on a formal basis only, not making any attempt to show structural unity. Such texts reflect the then prevailing school of thought that good writing is simply a craft—combining certain rules and structures to produce clear and factual prose.

The 1950's was a period when composition texts began to proliferate. In the interests of practicality, only a few of them will be examined in any detail as representatives of their time. Yet two things about these texts stand out: a general adherence to teaching writing through differentiating the "pure" forms of discourse from each other, and their emphasis on the craft of writing facts. A 1955 text, Expository Prose: An Analytic Approach, aims not so much at teaching expository writing as helping a student understand better the expository prose.
Exposition is defined very broadly at first as "the plain language in which men communicate with one another," then more narrowly as "concerned with the why of things." Specific methods of development include definition, proof, and analysis; finally, the text spells out its rationale for separating exposition from other forms: "It is by virtue of its being explanatory that expository prose differs from other kinds of prose" (1-2). This text is typical in its insistence on separating exposition and purifying it from contamination by other forms, and thus elevating it to the status of not only the most practical aim and occasion for writing, but in effect the only one really worth learning in the first place.

Similarly, Richard M. Weaver's text, Composition: A Course in Writing and Rhetoric (1957) has a broad communicative premise: "Education and communication together comprise the art of saying something that is worthwhile in ways that other people can understand." Weaver, the only major rhetorical scholar of the first half of this century other than Baldwin to venture into text book writing, nonetheless took the four forms approach. There had, however, been a change in text book writers' views of the forms over the last decade, especially given the influence of communications theory; by the mid-50's texts presented forms as reflecting four basic intentions of a writer. The modes of discourse were now metamorphosing into purposes for discourse and their methods of development. Yet, I emphasize that these purposes were still kept largely separate, and Richard Weaver reinforced separation with statements in his text such as this: "Though most writing involves a mixture of the kinds of discourse, we can best study them in isolation."

In Weaver's text, exposition is the kind of discourse that "explains a subject...to make the reader understand" (26-8) through the use of definition and analysis. Argumentation, however, is "distinguished from the other three forms in that its function is to prove" (26-8); here, Weaver both broadens and
narrows the scope of argument:

The methods of argumentation are a body of scientifically analyzed processes, which must be followed strictly to yield a correct result. . . . Argumentation . . . embraces the field in which men deliberate about choices, and therefore it demands a combination of logic and rhetoric (26-8).

The first sentence is a surprising one from a man who gently derided "science" as one of the age's "ultimate terms," for here we see argument again narrowed down to the laboratory procedures of school debate. Yet the second sentence widens argument into the field of human affairs; the rhetorical influence is vying for a place above the rigid hierarchy of discourse forms and formulae.

One more thing should be said about Weaver's text. It, at least, tries to rationalize its use of the four forms of discourse:

. . . there is enough inherent difference in the four forms to justify learning them. . . . Furthermore, the forms of discourse are important tools of analysis (28-9).

This statement reveals that the four forms of discourse were still heavily influential in composition pedagogy as late as the mid 1950's.

Hackett's Understanding and Being Understood (1957), as its title implies, is a "communicative" text, but it develops this premise: "good communication is logical." Such "basic elements" of communication as evidence, logic, organization, and skills of analysis form the main foundation for this text, which also puts oral persuasion and argument under a "special" category. The text states in its logic chapter that "we frequently are not thinking accurately and honestly when we use emotional devices to try to increase our influence over others." Good communication, therefore, tries to "harness" emotion and "relate" it to logical principles (105); obviously persuasion can be untrustworthy, and even argument is carefully confined in its scope to appeals through reasoning and evidence (479-80). The implicit message in this text faintly echoes Adam Smith's premise that narrative and didactic discourse should
be as sparing of the emotions as possible, but this text overlooks, as Smith does not, the existence of a discourse of opinion. The emphasis of *Understanding and Being Understood* is, again, more on "facts" than on what Wayne Booth would call "good reasons" (see footnote 1), for there are twelve references to facts and their presentation in the index, but only one reference to opinion, that being in the "special" argument section.

One more text of the 1950's deserves a brief examination: Philip L. Gerber's *Effective English* (1959). It begins by listing seven purposes for writing, three of which relate to convincing or persuading a reader. Gerber stays away from the four forms (his seven purposes are aids for focusing on a topic); nonetheless, he draws sharp distinctions between expository and argumentative purposes. Although exposition serves to work towards "enlightenment, solution, and mutual decision," through use of informal methods of development (see footnote 22), argument "by its very nature, excludes all viewpoints but that held by the arguer" (97):

> It involves the direct clash of divergent viewpoints. It involves contention between two opposing factions, the strong advocacy of for-and-against positions. Thus, argument begins when discussion ends (97).

What Gerber has in mind is argument as debate, as courtroom pyrotechnics: the popular view of argument as indeed a "specialized" skill.

Clearly, many of the "new" communication and purpose texts, which were slowly making their way into composition's territory in the 1950's, persisted in differentiating exposition from argument and persuasion, if not by type or form, then by purpose and still to a large extent by structure. Gerber's treatment of argument harkens back to George P. Baker's 1895 views. In fact, in his text, argument is as dissociated from composition as it was in the 1920's.

A number of 1960's texts still share these characteristics. Thomas Cain's
Common Sense About Writing (1967) unifies discourse under a classical rhetorical scheme of invention (including the *topoi*), disposition, expression, and revision, but centers on expository writing. Argument becomes "the defensible portion regarding the subject" of a piece of writing, and persuasion typically goes unmentioned. Arthur Hoole's The Fundamentals of Clear Writing (1967), a Canadian text, also focuses on exposition, "clear and effective writing," through a review of sentencing, punctuation, basic theme writing, diction, the precis, and the business letter. Like A Handbook of Composition (1953), this text is, more than anything else, a manual on two or three expository "forms."

These texts implicitly see writing as an exercise in empiricism, whereby if students can correctly juggle sets of "common sense" rules and procedures, they will be able to produce clear and unbiased prose. The empiricism of the New Logicians also rested on an ethical foundation—that of the search for truth, a probing into existing states for the purpose of changing them. But the empiricism of composition texts like these rests on the narrow plank of "scientism." A good example of such empiricism underlies Modern Communication Effectiveness (1963), a text which ostensibly looks only at exposition, but imbues it with an argumentative foundation. "We need formal logic when we express our serious ideas in language," says author Lawrence D. Brennan (31), and then bases the development of discourse on deduction, induction, propositions, and the syllogism (31–62). Here we see formal argument detached from "everyday" reasoning so that "our minds will have a nice regard for precision of thought in all of our communication" (64–5). Rather like Richard Whately and the Hulberts in Effective English (1929) Brennan sees formal logic as a framework on which to build all "successful" (that is, objective and factual) pieces of writing, but the logic he proposes does not take into consideration the existence of probabilities, for which informal argumentation tries to account.
Completing this look at composition texts from World War I to the mid 1960's is Kane and Peters' *A Practical Rhetoric of Expository Prose* (1966), in which the authors define rhetoric as "the study of how to employ words for communication." Exposition includes informative writing developed through explanation (definition) and analysis: it "probes and expands" and thus can incorporate "informative" description and narration as well (22-3). Persuasion is briefly mentioned as "attempts to change the convictions... to alter our values or attitudes," and argument, subsumed by persuasion, "tries to restrict emotional appeal as rigorously as possible and never substitutes it for logic or evidence" (24). Again, a text has succeeded in separating purposes and structures for discourse for practical reasons. One structure, exposition, is developed through informal logic and enjoys the role of "enlarging our experience." The other, argument/persuasion, is either rigidly formal and leeched of emotion, or is coercive, wheedling, unfactual, and therefore implicitly untrustworthy.

My point in examining ways in which these composition texts treat exposition, argument, and persuasion is to demonstrate how relatively little such treatments have changed between 1917 and 1968, and how little their lack of a theoretical rationale differs from a similar lack in late nineteenth-century texts. It is true that exposition and argument, particularly, evolved during this time from structures with no theoretical rationale other than a forgotten faculty psychology, to structures generated by a writer's intentions. Nevertheless, we have seen how texts written as recently as the 1960's not only persist in using the old "modes" terms for discourse, but also tend to dissociate purposes and structures from each other for two main reasons: in the interests of practicality in the classroom, and in the interests of teaching students that writing primarily involves the honing of those skills necessary to produce fact.

The status of exposition, argument, and persuasion by the late 1960's
reflects the attempts since the 1890's to differentiate among them. Exposition by the late 1960's is equated with such principles as clarity, objectivity, rationality: in other words, with all good, effective communication. Argument at the same time has dwindled to a short chapter or a few pages on formal logic—its purpose sometimes coinciding with exposition's, but its structure usually quite different from the informal one given for exposition. Instead, argument is in a limbo somewhere between fact and opinion. Persuasion is lowest of all, its opinionated emotionalism and "devices," and above all its purpose, deemed at worst inappropriate for serious prose writing, and at best an interesting exercise for students, who are afterwards expected to concentrate on gathering and effectively presenting facts.

Two fundamental questions now arise from this examination, questions relating to how we teach composition today. First, have text book writers since the 1960's tried to unify exposition, argument, and persuasion—to discover principles they have in common which could form a theoretical rationale for composition teaching beyond that of writing as a practical skill? Second, could the informal, inductive argumentation of Descartes, Bacon, Locke, Smith, and Campbell provide such a rationale? I don't think we can simply assume that no one teaches separate forms or structures of discourse today, or that no text now published incorporates them. Such an idee fixe does not die without a struggle.
Richard Weaver, in *Language is Sermonic* (1970), asserted that language both imposes order and imparts values through its power to name or define. He attempted to show that the rhetorician's moral commitment to, and ethical use of, definitions or "ultimate terms" orders his world and those of his students—such hierarchies serving to "interpret the world of reality."

Kenneth Burke, author of such works as *A Grammar of Motives* (1945), *A Rhetoric of Motives* (1950), and *Language as Symbolic Action* (1966), believes that language is necessarily symbolic; that language is constructed of terms that shape wholly our range of observation; and that any act of naming (identification) also constitutes a division and the potential for a transformation to a different place in a hierarchy of values. Rhetoric becomes for Burke "a symbolic means of inducing cooperation in beings that by nature respond to symbols...[and] an act that can prove opposites." Burke's Dramatistic Pentad—act, scene, agent, agency, purpose—is a vehicle for analyzing motives or reactions to the symbolic power of language.

Wayne Booth, in *Modern Dogma and the Rhetoric of Assent* (1974), tries to dismantle the "modern dogma" of belief in hard facts versus soft faith; of scientific knowledge versus no knowledge; of thought versus feelings. He believes in a philosophy in which "facts" become anything we think are "good reasons," or anything we intend as truth. Rhetoric becomes the vehicle in which we explore mutually our values and truths.

None of these authors, though all had been long established as rhetorical theorists before the 1960's, greatly influenced any of the pre-1960's textbook writers whose works I have examined in this chapter. I should also add, incidentally, that these composition texts are quite literally representative of the first half of this century, for I found them molding on the shelves of the main library of the University of British Columbia: a graveyard for once-popular and now long-forgotten texts.

Robert J. Connors, "The Rise and Fall of the Modes of Discourse," CCC 32 (December 1981), p. 448. All further references will be cited parenthetically in the text by page number.


Elias J. MacEwan's *The Essentials of Argumentation* (1898) and Theodore W. Hunt's *The Principles of Written Discourse* (1884) exemplify this paradox: the need for a rationale to unify discourse, a rationale communicated poorly through teaching writing as a series of largely separate skills. (See Ch. 2, footnotes 11 and 13 for full citations.)


with the "Composition of Ideas" in informative, discursive, and persuasive discourse, and then with the "Composition of Images" in descriptive, narrative, and dramatic discourse. Baldwin not only moves away from the four modes, but in fact in this text "forms of discourse" as such do not really exist. The degree of informative, discursive, and persuasive elements present in a discourse determines its type.

8Henry S. Canby and John B. Opdyke, The Elements of Composition, revised, (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1925), p. 379. This text begins with word usage, spelling, etc., then deals with sentencing, paragraphing, the triad of unity-coherence-emphasis, and finally the "ends" of discourse: exposition, narration, description, and argument.

9Howard B. Grose, College Composition (New York: Scott, Foresman and Co., 1926), p. 105. This author includes invention in his treatment of discourse, beginning his text with an explanation of finding a subject and gathering, selecting, and arranging material. The second half focuses on "types" of composition: exposition, argument, description, narration. The text finishes with a section on diction and sentencing.


11Raymond W. Pence, College Composition (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1929), p. 26. He treats two kinds of writing, expository and imaginative, because to him all writing has as its main object either instruction or "the stirring of the emotions" (79).

12Dana O. Jensen, Morell R. Schmitz, and Henry F. Thoma, Modern Composition and Rhetoric (New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1935), p. 3. This text also treats topic selection and planning, paragraphing, unity and coherence, sentencing, and then the "three forms" of writing: factual, opinionated, narrative. Style and diction come last.

13James F. Fullington, Robert S. Newdick, and J. Harold Wilson, Purposive Prose: Selections in Exposition (D.C. Heath and Company, 1935), p. 3. The authors' aim is to present "models of specific varieties of problems in composition," focusing on exposition as the most "purposive" prose form, a form developed mainly by definition and analysis.


16Cleanth Brooks and Robert Penn Warren, Fundamentals of Good Writing (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1949), p. 31. This is essentially a modes text, with the rationale for the modes being that they reflect standard intentions for normal communication. Paragraphing, sentencing, diction, rhythm, metaphor are included; the authors emphasize repeatedly the inseparability of form and content in their discussions on style.
Donald Davison, *American Composition and Rhetoric*, third ed. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1953), p. 45. He structures his text on the four forms of discourse, and interestingly, also differentiates between composition (structure and organization) and rhetoric (persuasion and effectiveness), unintentionally showing how wide the rift was then between rhetoric and composition.


I.J. Kapstein, *Expository Prose: An Analytical Approach* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1955). This is really a text about how a writer's purpose can supply the driving force for an expository style, and how one can understand exposition's structures through analyzing models of it.

Richard M. Weaver, *Composition: A Course in Writing and Rhetoric* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1957), p. ix. Weaver begins with "problems of composition" such as finding and limiting a subject, and ordering and clarifying material, also incorporating the classical topoi in his text. His four "traditional" kinds of discourse are exposition, description, narration, and argumentation, each of which he discusses in detail. The rest of his text focuses on sentencing, paragraphing, diction, research, and usage. I was, perhaps illogically, disappointed at first that one of the twentieth century rhetoricians had anti-climactically built his text around the four forms of discourse. That seemed to me to be taking an easy path, contrary to the spirit of rhetorical and philosophical ground-breaking. Yet Weaver does try to rationalize his use of the four forms, and also structures his presentation of exposition and argument on the same ethical/philosophical foundation as that discussed throughout *Language is Sermonic*. Definition, the act of naming and ordering, comes first on Weaver's list for ways to develop exposition; and argumentation, he says, must incorporate one's "honestly conceived" views.

Hackett, et al., *Understand and Being Understood* (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1957). This text briefly mentions the four forms of narration, description, exposition, and argumentation, and shows how one adapts each form to one's purpose. Yet this text's main aim is to show how logic helps develop primarily expository discourse.

Philip L. Gerber, *Effective English* (New York: Random House, 1959), pp. 19-20. His general purposes for writing are to inform, explain, entertain, impress, convince, persuade, and actuate. For Gerber, discourse is developed generally through informal means such as definition, example, cause and effect, comparison and contrast, and analogy, and also through "specialized" means such as argumentation, oral speech, and research. The text also discusses the history of the English language, vocabulary, reading, and grammar.

Here is an annotated list, in chronological order, of the 1960's texts I examined:


Josephine J. Curto, *Writing With Understanding* (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Books, Inc., 1966). She distinguishes between argument and persuasion in
this way: "An argument is the process by which we reach conclusions; persuasion is getting others to accept these conclusions. The logical argument is just one of the methods of persuasion" (171). But Curto fails to bridge the structural gap she leaves between formal argument and informal persuasion.

Thomas S. Kane and Leonard J. Peters, A Practical Rhetoric of Expository Prose (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966). After outlining the kinds of discourse (exposition, description, narration, and persuasion) and detailing expository processes, styles, and purposes, the authors deal with invention, how to write "the essay," and then sentencing, paragraphing, punctuation, and diction. The emphasis in this text is definitely on style.


Robert Gunning, The Technique of Clear Writing, revised ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1968). Narrowing exposition to only one of its components, clarity, Gunning's aim is to increase readability in writing through adherence to ten principles—among them clear diction and sentencing, variety, and "tying into your reader's experience." He focuses on business, legal, technical, and journalistic writing.
IV. Rediscovering Informal Argumentation

We have seen how, from the 1920's to the 1960's, composition texts remained generally fixated on a view that exposition, argument, and persuasion could and should be differentiated for teaching purposes. Theory had deserted the composition classroom; practicality took its place. The dominance of exposition in texts after the 1920's reflects clearly its status as the most practical, factual, and all-encompassing form of writing, while the low status of argument and persuasion indicates composition's lack of interest before the 1960's in the opinionable. At the same time, the two basic tools of establishing an opinion or issue—the induction and synthesis of informal argumentation—remained largely buried under the rote rules and models for writing which were all that rhetorical theory's receding tide had left for the teaching of composition.

However, 1969 can be considered the year the tide turned. Since then, several attempts have been made to redress wrongs and to provide composition with the theoretical foundations lacking throughout much of its short history. It is not my intent to detail the myriad ways in which this rhetorical renaissance has begun to bring composition and rhetorical theory together, for during the past decade and a half, most rhetoricians have acknowledged this link, if not actually proposed pedagogies. By the same token, composition instructors have become increasingly aware of the need to turn to theory to support their teaching methods (see footnote 1). In rhetoric texts, in works on rhetorical theory, in journals, and at conferences, rhetoric and composition are at last reoccupying that broad, multi-disciplinary realm in which writing is defined as a process of mutual discovery, a way of exploring human nature, and a means of bringing about changes in society.

Unfortunately, such a view of writing has yet to make its way into the general teaching of composition in many North American colleges and universities.
In much daily practice, pedagogies based on discourse as having separate structures, as rules without a rationale, still dominate freshman composition classes in particular. I have shown that up until the 1960's most composition texts tended to differentiate and formularize exposition, argument, and persuasion primarily for teaching purposes; today, many popular texts still carry on this "tradition." One of the issues I will deal with in these last two chapters, in fact, is the extent and breadth of the gap between current composition texts' treatments of discourse aims and forms, and current theories on unifying discourse structures. This chapter, then, will examine several contemporary rhetoricians' attempts to devise unifying frameworks, ones largely dependent on argumentative foundations. Chapter Five will show the extent to which a number of popular texts still adhere to the "current-traditional" approach to discourse structures, though at the same time I will look at some recent texts which try to link theory and practice to unify discourse. I will conclude by suggesting how a composition instructor might apply these unifying informal argumentative principles to teaching writing, and will indicate how such an approach works toward unifying discourse structures on a pedagogical as well as a theoretical level.

Discourse theorists since the 1960's have begun to look at argumentation as having not only an "everyday" logic but also ethical purposes beyond that of symbolically destroying an opponent. In other words, argument is beginning to regain the materials necessary for it to build not only persuasive but expository discourse. Chief among the growing numbers of rhetoricians and composition theorists who have recently contributed to linking argumentative principles to discourse are the following: Stephen Toulmin, Chaim Perelman, Richard Young, Alton Becker, James Kinneavy, and Frank D'Angelo. I will briefly discuss how each sees argument's place in the world of discourse, and how each can be seen as working towards unifying argument with exposition and persuasion.
A pioneer of inquiry into "everyday" logic, Stephen Toulmin in *The Uses of Argument* (1958) examines how "problems about logic...apply in practice, and what connection they have with the canons and methods we use when, in everyday life, we actually assess the soundness, strength, and conclusiveness of arguments." Logic, instead of a system of specialized rules and methods, becomes in effect a heuristic able to help us discover how and why we know when the claims we make are sound. Toulmin says that argument is predominantly "justificatory," a claim he supports by showing that argument rests on a basic structure composed of data, claims, warrants, and qualifiers: in other words, any "everyday" argument makes a claim of some sort and needs data to support that claim. Often, that data must be backed up by information to show their validity (the warrant), and finally, the claim at times must be qualified. In presenting this structure, Toulmin is also rejecting the scholastic "minor premise; major premise; so conclusion" or categorical/syllogistic pattern (96). Instead, the data-warrant-claim-qualifier structure broadens the scope of argument by greatly increasing its ability to deal with issues and situations that are at once more "everyday," but at the same time more complex and multi-faceted, than the stylized occasions of argument found in debate or the courtroom.

Clearly, Toulmin's claim and data correspond to the "bare bones" requirements for an expository piece (as Aristotle, Smith, and Campbell also indicated), while his warrant and qualifier account for further necessary steps in the process of instilling conviction in an audience. Therefore, a data-claim-warrant-qualifier structure can potentially encompass expository, argumentative, or persuasive aims and occasions with relative ease. In fact, Toulmin implies strongly that this structure is rooted in an inductive process wherein the data and its presentation effectively decide the rest of the discourse's structure (99-100). Like Smith's process of expansion from narrative to didactic writing, and Campbell's overlapping "ends," Toulmin's structure accounts for any piece of
writing which relies on data to support a generalization: in other words, most aims and occasions for prose writing.

The implications for composition of such a theory are, I think, clear: data and the logical relations between them and a thesis statement underlie almost all prose. This central principle forms one of the cornerstones of informal argumentation. Thus, Toulmin has laid bare an immense and largely uncharted realm for teaching composition, that of viewing discourse structures on the basis of use of data and their synthesis into a claim or thesis. It is unfortunate that much work with Toulmin's structure in relation to composition has so far been limited to argumentation alone or to such fields as sentence combining (see footnote 2).

By contrast, both Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's treatise The New Rhetoric (1969) and Young, Becker, and Pike's Rhetoric: Discovery and Change (1970) not only broaden the role and scope of argumentation, as does Toulmin, but also relate it in some degree to other aims and occasions for discourse. The New Rhetoric establishes itself within the context of classical rhetoric, immediately reintroducing two concepts basic to classical rhetorical theory. First, argument by its very nature must deal with "the credible, the plausible, the probable." Second, the study of argumentative proofs should focus on to what extent they secure the "adherence" of an audience. Proofs, propositions, relegated since Ramus and Descartes to the realm of their "conformity with facts," have received no systematic attention outside formal logic, or in areas where humans constantly operate, Perelman charges. In effect, his book aims to untangle this paradox. A new rhetoric allowing methods of proof once again to account for the opinionable (or the adherence of an audience to the opinion of a speaker or writer) will help resolve this split between hard logic and "those areas which elude calculation" (2-4).

Argumentation, "the study of discursive techniques allowing us to induce or
to increase the mind's adherence to the theses presented for its assent" (4), becomes Perelman's vehicle by which rhetoric re-enters everyday discussion, deliberation, and inquiry. Just as Campbell believed that "logic therefore forges the arms that eloquence teacheth us to wield," Perelman sees discursive techniques as the tools "that will acknowledge the use of reason in directing our own actions and influencing those of others" (3). Argument, then, takes supreme place in Perelman's rhetorical theory; he assumes that without the opinionable, without that degree of probability or uncertainty which is traditionally rhetoric's domain, then argument cannot exist.

Perelman's entire treatise demonstrates how argumentative techniques work on the mind to secure its adherence to a thesis. I will look in particular at what Perelman says about data and their adaptation to argument and argumentative techniques, since these are of primary concern in relation to how they can apply to exposition and persuasion.

Opening his section on data and their adaptation to argument is the question—are arguments separate from data? Perelman's answer is that, in a given argument, one chooses what becomes data and what becomes argument. A writer's decision to select and isolate certain elements rather than others endows those elements with "presence, an essential factor in argumentation (acting) directly on our sensibility" (116). Those elements constituting data become so because "there seems to be an agreement...considered to be univocal and undisputed" that these elements are data (121), and presence has influenced that agreement. Another important concept about data is their expansion or, perhaps, diffusion into what Perelman calls notions. Here exemplified is the overall "facts/values" pattern on which The New Rhetoric is structured. Notions are abstractions such as honor, justice, morality which are plastic because they have no fixed meaning, but are attached to more concrete contexts and conventions, just as presumptions are attached to truths or facts in a given
argument. Perelman's definition of notions, of course, relates very strongly to his conception of argumentative processes:

...it is precisely because the notions used in argumentation are not univocal and have no fixed meaning that will not change that the conclusions of an argumentation are not binding. (132)

In other words, argument can never establish "facts" because of this concept of plasticity—the constantly changing nature of the stuff with which argument must deal. Presence and plasticity underlie informal argumentation, which in turn underlies exposition and persuasion. An expository or a persuasive piece of writing, given a similar purpose and occasion, will use essentially the same elements, and both authors then assume their audiences agree that these elements are data. However, the expository writer presumes that the bulk of these data constitute facts or truths for her audience, while the persuasive writer expands data into notions, which correspond to values, in order to bring forth a truth. Both Smith and Campbell sensed this distinction when they saw exposition and persuasion differentiated by the degree of pathos involved. The basic elements that make up data, and the fact that the same data can become presumptions or notions, constitutes the argumentative nature of discourse in general, according to Perelman.

The techniques of argumentation which Perelman explains are too many and complex to deal with here, but they serve to elaborate on this argumentative nature, or to "establish the structure" of a particular "reality" enmeshing a writer and audience. Among those techniques he discusses are argument through the particular case (or use of examples and illustrations); argument by analogy and metaphor; and argument by "dissociation of concepts." Clearly, all three correspond to the so-called methods of development given in texts for both exposition and argument. For example, argument through the particular case covers description, narration, example, illustration, and enumeration. Argument by analogy makes use of comparison, contrast, and cause and effect (through
similitude). Finally, argument by dissociation involves definition, classification, and partition, although dissociation can be responsible for establishing the other relationships among data as well.4

Perelman's theory of argumentation shows us a constantly shifting, fluid world like that of the single-celled creatures we see under a microscope: cells breaking apart, merging, never remaining the same. This fluidity, reiterated in his final chapter on the interaction, strength, amplitude, and order of arguments, takes us full circle to his first basic premise: that the kinds, starting points, and techniques of argument a speaker or writer uses depend ultimately on the nature of the audience being addressed. This premise underlies the aims and occasions of exposition, argument, and persuasion, and in that concrete sense, unifies them.

Both The New Rhetoric and Rhetoric: Discovery and Change work to uphold this premise. Yet their views on the role and scope of argument constitute a major difference between these works.5 On the one hand, Perelman does nothing less than equate argument with the entire workings of rhetoric. On the other hand, Young, Becker, and Pike both broaden and limit the role and scope of argument. First, rejecting what they claim is the traditional view of rhetoric as "skillful verbal coercion" (8), and rejecting the classical rhetorical aim of "control" of one human being over another (7), the authors are then able to broaden the scope of argumentative strategies to include any attempts to gain cooperation. Their use of Rogerian argument, wherein the arguer "identifies" with his "opponent") as a major technique, illustrates how argument can become a more flexible, non-hostile, humanitarian way of achieving closeness between differing minds. However, Young, Becker, and Pike limit themselves to general outlines of argumentative strategies--outlines which do not illustrate clearly the processes one may go through to gain an audience's "adherence." In effect, the authors reject the idea that drawing even informal logical relationships among data
constitutes a cooperative strategy.

Their one concession to argumentative processes is a discussion of "reconstructing a reader's image of himself" (230-35). Since reconstructing a reader's image involves convincing him through "irrefutable evidence," the authors feel that traditional argument is the best strategy to use to fulfill this intention. They focus only on deductive, specifically categorical, argument and include discussion of the syllogism and enthymeme because they provide a writer with "patterns for organizing the statements in your message clearly and persuasively" (231-32). For Young, Becker, and Pike, such traditional argument is simply one means (and, they add, a fairly limiting one) of organizing material in a piece of writing. It should be noted that the authors make one attempt to fit this kind of argument into the other intentions of a writer that they describe—that is, through the organizational heuristics they propose both for reconstructing and expanding a reader's image. Reconstruction involves establishing a major and minor premise and backing them with authorities; expansion replaces this section with "thesis and explanation," retaining the introduction, background, and conclusion sections. Expanding a reader's image is to the authors a less contentious, less potentially threatening intention with a less formalized organizational heuristic; it is, in effect, expository writing.

In *Rhetoric: Discovery and Change*, Young, Becker, and Pike phase exposition into argument and persuasion but only on the basis of strategies, not logical structure. The authors do not detail informal argumentative processes themselves, but discuss the differences between traditional versus Rogerian organization. Yet Young, Becker, and Pike are allied with Perelman, and with Campbell, in implying that basic data remain the same during a writer's shift from exposition to persuasion. Governing all writing choices, according to Young, Becker, and Pike, is social cooperation, or communicating shared values, both sublime and ordinary. Smith had insisted on the importance in discourse of
the speaker or writer's honest conception of truth and of its communication in simple, equally honest terms. Young, Becker, and Pike's "expansion of a reader's image" corresponds roughly to this view, while they also share Campbell's contention that reason, emotion, truth, and goodness constitute an ethical framework for communication.

Both *Rhetoric: Discovery and Change* and *The New Rhetoric* herald the slow emergence of argument from the narrow confines of forensics and debate into a position whereby it can become not only a theoretical but eventually a practical underlying structure for most aims and occasions of discourse. What this means for teaching composition is an infusion of an ethical framework for classroom writing through a single basic set of common principles, as opposed to many discrete precepts.

Also proposing a unifying framework is James Kinneavy's *A Theory of Discourse: The Aims of Discourse* (1971). The framework here consists of the essentially Aristotelian communications triangle of text, audience, and reality; a writer's manipulation of the triangle determines the aims, logic, organization, and style of a discourse. Kinneavy divides the aims into what he sees as dominant uses of language, these being referential, persuasive, literary, and expressive. I will explore briefly the logic and organization of referential discourse, and the logic of persuasive discourse, in an attempt to determine to what extent they share argumentative processes.

Kinneavy first differentiates reference discourse from the other three in this manner:

... 'reference' can be best understood as comprising scientific, informative, and exploratory discourse. ... 'reference' discourse, therefore, comprises these three types of discourse and excludes persuasive, literary, and expressive discourse. It is clear that all three of these latter include much reference to reality, but the reference to subject matter is secondary in each case, whereas in referential discourse it is primary.
In discussing the logic of reference discourse, Kinneavy also makes a distinction between the structures of the various aims, asserting that there are "different logics" for each. Reference discourse "has its various logical procedures, and they are quite distinct from the so-called 'rhetorical proofs' which constitute the logic of persuasion" (107). The logic Kinneavy proposes for scientific discourse encompasses a formal treatment of the nature and rules of both induction and deduction as well as of factuality (and the use of true-false propositions). For that kind of reference discourse he calls "informative," he cites the more tenuous notions of comprehensiveness and "surprise value." A third kind of reference discourse, the "exploratory," has "illogical" characteristics, as Kinneavy puts it; in fact the sample analysis he gives for an exploratory essay includes such informal processes as "happy medium" logic or synthesis of thesis and antithesis, and inductions "of a rather informal or common sense variety" providing support for generalizations (147-48). Clearly, Kinneavy is less comfortable with exploratory discourse—and yet, the informal argumentative processes it uses, centering on induction and synthesis, are those students most frequently use in classroom writing. Exploratory discourse, like Adam Smith's didactic discourse, could effectively bridge the scientific and opinionable, but Kinneavy does not explore this possibility.

Kinneavy also proposes different organizational patterns for the three types of reference discourse. These are, briefly, organization by deduction and induction for scientific; by factual/suprise value and comprehensiveness for informative; and for exploratory, a sort of dialectical pattern encompassing everything from debate to exposing and resolving "crises." Yet he takes too easy a path by reverting to an analysis of Platonic dialogue for exploratory discourse. It is simply unrealistic in the light of current aims and occasions for exploratory discourse (encompassing everything from investigative journalism
to literary criticism) to contend that dialectic forms its most common logical structure; dialectic may be a tool of analysis, but not of invention and organization. Also, in order to teach this kind of structure, one would be forced to limit exploratory discourse essentially to debate, as Kinneavy does, and not emphasize its problem-solving potential.

It is a pity that Kinneavy doesn't try to set up an original organizational model for exploratory discourse, or tie it to any other patterns or processes. He has instead attached traditional processes and patterns to two types of reference discourse whose aims and occasions are more limited than those of exploratory discourse. Yet he attempts to relate some aspects of reference discourse, discourse concerned with subject matter, in some way to the logic of persuasive discourse, or that concerned with audience. Kinneavy bases this section on persuasive logic on the classical rhetorical logic as outlined in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, and focuses on ethos, pathos, and logos, the latter also called "the seemingly rational." But "what happens to information when it is incorporated into a persuasive document?" Kinneavy asks (253)—a question similar to Perelman's regarding data. Kinneavy's answer acknowledges a "scientismic" distrust of the opinionable:

"Facts" in persuasion are put to work to prove a scientific thesis. The facts which could do a disservice to the cause must be either concealed or minimized. . . . When facts have been minimized or concealed or magnified out of proportion, the result is a lack of comprehensiveness, the second component of ideal information (253-54).

On persuasion and exploratory discourse, Kinneavy cites forensic examination and cross-examination as "ample evidence of the usefulness of exploratory techniques in persuasion" (255). Yet here we have only two rather limited and limiting situations in which two all-encompassing aims of discourse, referential and persuasive, can blend: propaganda, and the courtroom. Despite Kinneavy's insistence that persuasion's status be elevated, it seems that discourse
emphasizing subject matter still has little use for the realm of opinion in this work; argumentative processes, informal or otherwise, do not act as a unifying framework for discourse here. In effect, A Theory of Discourse: The Aims of Discourse encourages the separation of expository, argumentative, and persuasive structures from a teaching point of view.7

Frank D'Angelo's A Conceptual Theory of Rhetoric (1975) takes a different approach to unifying discourse structurally. To D'Angelo, almost all discourse incorporates "conceptual patterns" such as description, narration, classification, comparison, contrast, analogy, cause and effect, partition, and enumeration.8 Not only are these patterns "symbolic manifestations of underlying thought processes" (20), but according to D'Angelo they tie in with the categories of classical rhetoric and traditional logic as well as with the "laws" of classical association theory (Campbell's and Bain's contiguity, similitude, repetition, and association). What D'Angelo is attempting to do here is not only unify discourse on the basis of these patterns, but also endow seemingly disparate schools of thought with a common theoretical rationale.

The tie here with informal argumentation is that D'Angelo's patterns constitute a sort of "everyday" logical structure, flexible enough to encompass virtually all discourse aims and occasions. "They are to be considered dynamic organizational processes...and not merely conventional, static patterns," D'Angelo emphasizes (57-8). By dividing arrangement of discourse into three types—logical, progressive, and repetitive—and listing the patterns that can make up each, D'Angelo clearly implies that no one pattern adheres to any one aim or occasion.

Of the rhetoricians I have examined here, D'Angelo comes closest to establishing a theoretical framework for building discourse from all-encompassing, informally logical relationships. Shortly, when I look at some recent composition texts, I will also examine D'Angelo's Process and Thought in
Composition (second ed., 1980) with an eye toward evaluating how he applies his conceptual theory to pedagogy.

Other composition theorists, as well as instructors, have recently begun exploring argument's relationship both to other aims and occasions for discourse and to formal versus "everyday" logic. The authors I surveyed in various rhetoric and composition journals recognize a difference between "formal" and "informal" argumentation, but are divided about which kind should be taught in composition classes. J. Woods and Douglas Walton, reviewing two logic and writing texts in Rhetoric Society Quarterly (1976), are not against informal logic or argumentation, but deplore its popular treatment as a loose association of mere "common sense homilies." Gerald Levin, in his article "On Freshman Composition and Logical Thinking" (1977), advocates a more systematic informal logic with some emphasis on traditional logic, while David S. Kaufer and Christine M. Neuwirth's "Integrating Formal Logic and the New Rhetoric" (1983) suggests, as the title implies, that formal logical as well as "rhetorically acceptable methods" should be combined in the writing class. Another text reviewer, David Lumsden, complains that Robert J. Fogelin's Understanding Arguments neglects the task of helping students work out "the broad structure" of an argument in its emphasis on "speech acts and pragmatics." Still others, like Andrea Lunsford in "Aristotelian vs. Rogerian Argument: A Reassessment" (1979) and Jeanne Fahnestock and Marie Secor in "Teaching Argument: A Theory of Types" (1983) would like to see classical argumentative structures form the foundation for teaching argument in writing courses: Lunsford links Rogerian to Aristotelian methods, and Fahnestock and Secor propose a "rhetorical/generative method" of teaching argument wherein students combine categorical and causal arguments into more complex evaluations and proposals. These last three authors, as well as Levin in particular, clear a pathway for exposition, argument, and persuasion being taught as aims and occasions for writing which stem from a
common system of informal logical relationships.¹⁰

My final chapter will illustrate that furnishing composition teaching with theoretical foundations is still a project in its prototype state, judging by the approaches of a number of popular texts. However, it is equally clear that a small group of textbook writers sees the link between exposition, argument, and persuasion as too obvious to pass over, and we shall see how these writers move toward an informal argumentative structure for these aims and occasions.
Since 1969, major rhetoricians have devoted an increasing amount of attention to the relation between rhetorical theory and composition. These theorists include Richard Young (the relation between invention as a heuristic and composition); James Kinneavy (a structural rationale for the forms of writing); Frank D'Angelo (the Aristotelian *topoi* as manifestations of thought processes in writing); W. Ross Winterowd (whose work has synthesized various theories and pedagogies); and to an extent, Chaim Perelman (who pays some attention to organization of argumentative strategies in discourse). This is only to name a few contemporary rhetoricians whose work has either become particularly influential after 1969, or whose major work was published after that date. Some textbook authors who have built their work on a theoretical background and whose texts have achieved a certain popularity include Janice Lauer (Kinneavy's and Young's theories applied); Frank D'Angelo (his conceptual theory applied); Maxine Hairston (D'Angelo's and Young's theories); Richard Young, Alton Becker, and Kenneth Pike; Stephen Toulmin (who co-authored a text on introductory reasoning); and Jacqueline Berke (whose text uses the *topoi* as a heuristic for writing).

Of course, before 1969, rhetoricians such as Wayne Booth, Kenneth Pike, Richard Ohmann, Douglas Ehninger, and Edward P.J. Corbett were exploring the link between rhetorical theory and composition. However, I see 1969 as the beginning of a much more widespread awareness of rhetoric's role in composition teaching than had existed before.

1Stephen Edelston Toulmin, *The Uses of Argument* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958), p. 1. All further references to this work will be cited by page number in the text.

Toulmin's influence in composition seems exemplified by such articles as James F. Stratman's "Teaching Written Argument: The Significance of Toulmin's Layout for Sentence Combining" in *College English* 44 (November 1982), 718-733. Stratman explores how Toulmin's layout might be usefully adapted to the teaching of argumentative sentence combining exercises. However, at the 64th Annual Speech Communication Association meeting, Toulmin and two other speakers reported on "Alternative Philosophical Groundings for Looking at Argumentation as a Way of Knowing," emphasizing a need to determine the limits of traditional rhetorical and logical models. (This seminar is reported in *The Rhetoric Society Quarterly*, VIII (Summer 1978), 114-15.)


Perelman's dissociation severs ties between single notions or conceptions comprised of unities of elements, the elements themselves being properly linked to each other (411-12). What is so powerful about dissociation is that it reconstructs reality, remodels it, and in doing so introduces new concepts or notions, which are themselves perhaps dissociated later. The fundamental units for dissociation are "philosophical pairs," primordial positive/negative values, though Perelman discusses other dissociative techniques such as using "disqualifying" prefixes, making substitutions, and even simply establishing definitions of notions.

Perelman's and Young, Becker, and Pike's works differ particularly in that the latter authors take a decidedly ethical stance in their definition of rhetoric, whereas Perelman is more utilitarian: he looks at rhetoric not from the viewpoint of what it should do in society, but what it actually does.


Kinneavy deplores the use of the term "exposition" for informative or scientific discourse, because, as he puts it, "it fosters the impression that only literary writing is creative...it confuses a mode of discourse with an aim of discourse." (79).

Kinneavy's work has been widely influential, especially in the area of new composition texts such as Four Worlds of Writing. The most likely reason for this is that Kinneavy provides a theoretical base for the "four forms" of writing per se; no longer must instructors teach them by rote, but can delve into the structures, the logic, behind each as presented by Kinneavy. Four World of Writing adopts his use of terms such as "informative" writing rather than "expository" writing, for certainly Kinneavy's breaking-up of exposition into finer categories does broaden the application of an aim that previously had done little but "provide information." In his article "A Theory of Discourse: A Retrospective" in CCC, 33 (May 1982), 196-201, John D. O'Banion describes Kinneavy's categories as "static" and his approach as "too closely tied to literary criticism to be helpful in composition." My own evaluation of Kinneavy's failure to unify discourse structures (beyond the extremely helpful but broad "triangle") is reflected in O'Banion's comment--"Kinneavy's refusal to deal with process in order to treat static texts...results in an unfortunate separation of the kinds of discourse...he ends up with self-imposed limitations."

Frank J. D'Angelo, A Conceptual Theory of Rhetoric (Cambridge, Mass.: Winthrop, 1975), p. 34. All further references to this work will be cited by page number in the text.

D'Angelo adds that when these thought patterns are embedded in sentences, "We call them aspects of style. When they are embedded in paragraphs and extended units of discourse, we call them aspects of structure." In other words, they encompass all levels and aspects of writing.

The following articles explore aspects of argumentation and logic and pedagogy relating to them. I have listed them here starting with the most recent:

Andrea A. Lunsford, "Aristotelian vs. Rogerian Argument: A Reassessment" in CCC, 30 (May 1979) 146-151.
Gerald Levin, "On Freshman Composition and Logical Thinking" in CCC, 28 (December 1977) 359-364.

Other texts which treat in varying degrees argument, exposition, and persuasion as having common structural features based on informal logical relationships among data include the following: Berke's Twenty Questions for the Writer (the logic used here is that of the topoi); Hairston's A Contemporary Rhetoric (which poses methods of development or "conceptual patterns" as a unifying foundation for discourse); and Skwire's Writing With a Thesis (which takes the Aristotelian view that discourse is essentially a two-part structure which can be elaborated on). See Ch. 5, footnote 2 for full citations.
Although the last decade has been a time when rhetorical theory and writing have grown toward a reconciliation, a marked incompatibility still exists between what James A. Berlin calls "the new rhetoric" of synthesis and unification, and the fragmented "current-traditional rhetoric" which, he says, still "clearly dominates thinking about writing instruction today."^1 Nowhere is this fragmentation more obvious than in many of today's most widely used and highly touted freshman composition texts, which persist in differentiating exposition, argument, and persuasion, using almost the same criteria as their turn-of-the-century antecedents. In fact, out of the fourteen post-1970 texts I surveyed, I found that six clearly differentiate discourse structures on the basis, mainly, of purpose; that five mention some commonalities between exposition and argument; and that only three clearly try to provide either an argumentative or informally logical framework for teaching writing. Perhaps not surprisingly, the six texts which differentiate expository, argumentative, and persuasive structures the most are universally-known "bibles" of the composition classroom.2

One noticeable and not particularly new trend in these texts is their separation of argument or opinionable writing from "the basic essay." The Prentice-Hall Handbook for Writers (seventh edition, 1978) effectively splits writing into the basic expository essay and the essay of opinion by devoting to the latter an isolated chapter on logical relationships such as definition, example, and differentiation as well as discussion of ethos and the fallacies. Such a treatment contradicts the text's earlier assertion that argument can be a part of "the whole composition." Similarly, The Little, Brown Handbook (1980) devotes its section on "Developing An Essay" to exposition, which in this text is writing whose primary purpose is to "expose information" (2-3), while a separate
chapter discusses argument, logic, and fallacies. This treatment seems to contradict the text's assertion that "In a way, all writing is arguing."

The Heath Handbook of Composition (tenth edition, 1981) dedicates itself to "expository/academic writing" only, but it includes a chapter on "Reasoning," which the careful student may find placed between "Diction/Word Selection" and "The Research Paper." This text isolates argument to an even greater degree by defining it as "any two statements connected in such a way that one is drawn from the other," thereby emphasizing a more formal logical treatment which, for all practical purposes, remains unconnected to exposition (287-310). Likewise, The Canadian Writer's Handbook (1980) mentions argument only under "Diction: weak generalizations" and perpetuates the split between fact and opinion by adding, "In an argument... fact would carry more weight than mere opinion" (260). Opinion, along with everything else, becomes a stylistic ornament in The New Strategy of Style (1978), when discussion of exposition and persuasion centers on paragraph models. For an expository purpose, the writer is advised to introduce the topic sentence first; for persuasion, she may lead up to it inductively. The implicit argument in the latter three texts, then, is this: that not only intention but the vehicle for the intention can be "pasted on" to a piece of writing at the lexical or syntactic level, as separate structures.

Just as in the 1940's and 50's when "exposition only" texts were in vogue, the transmission of factual information receives the same implicit emphasis in many composition texts today. In The Macmillan Handbook of English (seventh edition, 1982), exposition, argumentation, narration, and description are first given as "four widely accepted purposes or aims of the essay," the first two clearly differentiated from each other in preparation for the emphasis on exposition:

Writers who seek to inform or explain will present facts and ideas to their readers. . . . Writers who seek to convince will enlist the aid of techniques used in argumentation (8-9).
Again, the discussion of "The Task of Writing" is explicitly that of the task of writing expository, "factual" pieces, while persuasion (used interchangeably with argument) comes under "Problems of Composing." Interestingly, this text also describes exposition as "a personal effort to convince your readers that the position taken is sound" (5), then later combines argument and persuasion as a task demanding "that the writer take a position, state a thesis to be argued... according to the dictates of reason and logic" (200-1). This statement is a cue for another example of splitting fact and opinion, exposition and argument: for here, argument/persuasion is equated with formal logic and classical organization even as exposition focuses on more informal logic. Texts like this, and the five others I have described so far, are asking the student as well as the instructor to take a "basic expository" framework and somehow fit an argumentative one into or onto it at need, a task for which the student, and the inexperienced instructor in particular, are ill-prepared to carry out successfully.

Texts that attempt more clearly to outline commonalities between factual and opinionable writing include Jacqueline Berke's *Twenty Questions for the Writer* (1981) and Maxine Hairston's *A Contemporary Rhetoric* (third edition, 1982). Berke sees argument as the last of a series of twenty questions forming an inventional heuristic for the writer: "What case can be made for or against X?" Berke says this:

> In trying to build a case, we move beyond plain exposition into the more active and aggressive realm of argumentation... wherein the arguer tries not only to explain but to defend or refute what logicians call a proposition. ...(306)

Clearly, Berke sees and makes evident an interrelationship between writing both with and without an overt argumentative "edge," echoing in part the Campbellian idea that the understanding must be engaged before the will. Berke also notes that argument makes free use of the informal logical relationships of expository writing: definition, description, comparison, and so on (307). However, she
treats kinds of arguments as essentially special writing techniques which serve to prove propositions, creating again a split between argument as part of almost all writing aims and occasions, and argument as a separate skill of writing.

Hairston, on the other hand, embraces argument as the most important part of the rhetorical square of argument, purpose, audience, and persona. For Hairston, argument provides "a substantial and well-constructed base on which to build" (87). Argument, exposition, and persuasion in this scheme are united ("arguments include expository as well as persuasive prose"(266) through what Hairston, borrowing from D'Angelo, calls "thought patterns" of argument and exposition: definition, induction, deduction, cause and effect, and classification. As a result, unlike the composition handbooks, Hairston does not draw a line between expository "methods of development" and general kinds of argument. The only real break in this unification of exposition and argument through what are essentially the topoi occurs in chapters ten and eleven, wherein Hairston discusses "logical argument": including syllogisms and fallacies. It is as if no one is quite comfortable with the idea that writers can argue a thesis without knowing the structure of a syllogism—an event which occurs much more often than not in practice.

It is clear that even in texts emphasizing informal logic, a conflict can exist between that and a more formal analysis of argumentation. Earlier I examined Frank D'Angelo's A Conceptual Theory of Discourse in terms of how he unifies discourse in theory through informal logic. In his text Process and Thought in Composition (second edition, 1980), D'Angelo attempts to translate his theory into pedagogy. Basically, he builds his pedagogy on the common groundwork of the "patterns of thought" or the syntagmatic and paradigmatic structures on which he maintains all writing is based. Yet, "Persuasion as an Aim" is still equated here with the syllogism and the enthymeme, with a formal structure having little in common with the others. Argumentation (subsumed by persuasion)
also receives a traditional definition: "the giving of reasons to support the truth or falsity of a proposition. . . . Reasoning is thinking in a connected, logical manner by induction or deduction" (241). While D'Angelo certainly shows how argument or reasoning can and does make use of informal logic (chapter eight), he later maintains that a well planned argument will use "the deductive sequence," enabling the writer to "analyze the proposition carefully and to pick out the facts that will be most effective with the reader" (296). Again, we see argument not as a structural framework for discourse, but as a differentiated skill: in D'Angelo's case, as a tool of analysis more than production.

Writing With a Thesis (third edition, 1982) by David Skwire is in some ways similar to D'Angelo's text. The author divides the text into chapters based on different patterns of development (again, derivatives of the *topoi*), while argumentation constitutes a final, isolated chapter. Skwire does say, "This whole book has been about argumentation" (237) and encourages students throughout to form a thesis and prove it using informal logic—a process he equates with argumentation itself. Nonetheless, like Berke and Hairston as well, he feels it necessary to include this separate chapter on induction, deduction, the syllogism, and a few logical fallacies. One question to ask about this text, then, is—if the whole book has been about argumentation, why is such a chapter necessary?

Finally, also falling into my category of texts which mention commonalities between exposition, argument, and persuasion, is John F. Parker's The Process of Writing (1983). Parker states that exposition can be divided into "informative" or "persuasive" because "anything you say or write has an argumentative edge." In addition, Parker encourages the use of the informal logical methods of development as well as "specific evidence, accurate examples" for convincing an audience (Chapters Six, Seven). However, Parker defines and differentiates for students "a purely argumentative essay" and "pure exposition" at almost the same
time he emphasizes their commonalities; a reader of this text might be excused for thinking that the differences between them are more important than their similarities. Such differentiation for the sake of avoiding "confusion" serves only in the long run to tell students that "opinion" and "fact" are separate and deal with separate methods and materials, when (as Perelman implies) they spring from the common ground of what we perceive as data and how we relate them.

We can realistically conclude, then, that a good many of today's popular composition texts hint broadly that different aims and occasions for discourse must incorporate separate structures and separate rules of organization. It is a view that composition instructors since the nineteenth century have taken for granted, but a view that theorists are now realizing is harmful. For if nothing else, the separation of the argumentative "edge" from discourse which purports to give information implies to students that the expression of opinion is not only inferior to exposition, but for all that a highly specialized series of tricks requiring extraordinary types of reasoning. That is not the message instructors should be giving students, implicitly or otherwise.

I stated at the beginning of Chapter One that one of the reasons Johnny can't write is because no one has given him sufficient motivation to do so beyond the mechanical one of mastering rules and techniques to achieve some nebulous future "success." To reduce argumentation to yet another set of discrete skills has served, and will serve, only to stifle any interest on Johnny's part in the world of opinion and everyday probabilities: in other words, in the world of ethical issues. While modern composition theorists are now searching for ways to reconcile argumentation with the communication of "facts" in the writing classroom, we have seen that many composition texts still reflect the nineteenth- and early twentieth-century conception that something which is verifiable empirically is better, more useful, than something which is open to doubt or change.
To perpetuate this conception is to establish the act of writing in the classroom once and for all as a laboratory exercise.

I posed this question at the end of Chapter Three: could the informal, inductive argumentation stemming from Descartes, Bacon, Locke, Smith, and Campbell provide a theoretical rationale for teaching the aims and occasions of writing? Certainly a number of theorists, among them Perelman, have condemned the Cartesian rules of reasoning as originating the split between fact and opinion, and as contributing to the downfall of probability as a valid field of study. Yet we must keep in mind the difference between the raison d'être behind the New Logicians' methods of investigation, and the belief that only facts are good: the New Logicians were rebelling against the idea that truths are ready made and that new experiences must be tested against them, and proposed instead that the synthesis of new experiences and perceptions could be, themselves, truths. The works of Smith and Campbell in that light constitute two major attempts to equip an inventionless rhetoric with this new logic, to bring the discovery of truths within the grasp of the spoken and written word. And it is equally important to keep in mind that the nineteenth century's growing emphasis on the importance of facts helped to case-harden what had been "new" logic into a ready-made truth all of itself.

I have described informal argumentation as a writing procedure that directs writers to inquire into a subject in such a way that they build from simple pieces of information to syntheses of them, by creating logical relationships among the pieces. The logical relationships comprise what could be called "common sense" ways of viewing and making sense of experiences, and they are nothing new: Aristotelian *topoi*, "methods of development," D'Angelo's and Hairston's "patterns of thought." I will give three examples of composition texts which clearly try to provide a sort of informal argumentative framework for teaching discourse. Then, to conclude this chapter, I will suggest how an
instructor, armed with the rationale that all writing is an act of building towards a truth, might use informal argumentation in the classroom.

First, William J. Brandt's *The Rhetoric of Argumentation* (1970) provides a comprehensive explanation of how exposition, argument, and persuasion can share common ground:

Traditionally. . .direct discourse (exposition) did not aim at merely giving information; its object was to persuade the reader to some sort of explicit judgment. A judgment involves not one term but two, and they must be connected to each other in a way that is ultimately logical (22).

For Brandt, argumentation provides a structural framework for non-imaginative discourse. His most valuable contribution, though, toward establishing an informal argumentative structure for discourse lies, ironically, in his slightly unflattering analysis of reportorial (expository) writing: "a bastard form of writing because it borrows structures and techniques haphazardly from other kinds of writing" (259). (This statement also refers obliquely to Smith's creation of didactic and narrative writing.) In reportorial writing, Brandt says, the writer must nevertheless take a persuasive, ethical, analogical, or experiential stance and set up "pseudo" logical connections (I would say "common sense" connections) to communicate this stance. These connections not only take the place of the formal logical ones present in traditional argument, but are also more accessible to a general audience (or, as Perelman might say, more likely to result in the audience's adherence to the argument in question). "Reportorial writing," says Brandt, "is actually a kind of pseudo-argumentation" (23). Thereby, he establishes not only the relation of "factual" to "opinionable" writing, but also the informal logical structures both share.

Less theoretical in its approach to discourse is *Four Worlds of Writing* (1981), which classifies discourse into the four "contexts" Lauer and her co-authors feel are most relevant to students' needs: private (expressive), public (persuasive), and the college and working worlds (expository). "The chapters
move a student from the expressive paper to the expository, from the inward to the outward, both in subject matter and audience" (xvi). In this text, the persuasive aim incorporates argumentation, and although there is discussion of proofs and informal reasoning, or organization, and of style in argumentation, (127-143), at no time is argument formalized or isolated. Four Worlds of Writing also links exposition to argument both through induction or deduction "which the persuasive aim also uses" (196) and through the descriptive, classificatory, or evaluative modes for developing an idea; the evaluative mode is also linked to persuasion (282). All aims and types of discourse in this text are linked, as well, by a general heuristic based on the tagmemic matrix in Rhetoric: Discovery and Change. Students try out different logical relationships over and over again throughout the text, linking them to all four contexts of writing.

Though not as innovative theoretically as Brandt's text, Four Worlds of Writing clearly strives to base at least some aims and occasions for discourse on a structure making use of informal logical connections, which, particularly when repeated, help students arrive inductively at discoveries of truths.

Finally, in Writing and Logic (1982), Gerald Levin establishes informal logic or methods of development as the foundation of expository and argumentative writing. "Exposition presents and explains facts and ideas, whereas argument uses these as evidence for conclusions," (9) Levin states as his view of the link between the two. For Levin, specific techniques for exposition and argumentation originate in paragraph structures and include definition, classification, analysis, cause and effect, comparison and contrast, analogy, and example—a familiar assortment (11-12). He later reintroduces these structures as organizational techniques, allowing students to see specific logical relationships among ideas, and also combines them with outlines of the structure of expository and argumentative essays. Although he devotes two chapters to inductive and deductive essays, Levin centers the bulk of his attention on
informal logic, and later, on a detailed look at argument and audience. Thus, even more explicitly than *Four Worlds of Writing*, *Writing and Logic* shows writers how exposition and argumentation can be built on a common, largely informal logical foundation.

In Chapter One, I showed how the new logic provided a method of inquiry which Smith and Campbell saw could apply to the art of communication as well as to the sciences. Both rhetoricians approached communication differently, Smith using principles from the new logic such as clarity, simplicity, and accurate observation of objects, and Campbell applying to rhetoric Locke's and Hume's concepts of logical mental connectives between objects as well as Bacon's unity of reason, emotion, and ethics. The synthesis of both these approaches yields a common logical and ethical structure for prose, a structure I have been calling informal argumentation. Its principles are these:

(1) All prose seeks either explicitly or implicitly to show the validity of a central idea (or claim, thesis). Campbell stressed that all discourse except mathematical proof must include conviction of this sort, while Perelman has shown how and to what extent the opinionable dominates everyday communication.

(2) All prose can be viewed as a "package" of pieces of information which illustrates the validity or truth of the central idea the writer wishes to present to an audience. Aristotle was the first to state that any given communication breaks down ultimately to a two-part "thesis and proof" structure. Smith's narrative writing was able at any time to take on such a structure, converting "facts" into "evidence" at need. And Perelman's concept of "adherence" imbues all discourse, even poetics, with the quality of expressing some truth; any prose involving any degree of probability by this token presents a claim and evidence to support it, an assertion echoing Toulmin's argument as well.

(3) The logical relationships among these pieces of information fulfill two main functions in a piece of prose: from their synthesis a writer can
discover or invent a central idea, and from their presentation a reader may more readily share the writer's discovery and be convinced of its validity. Locke was one of the first philosophers to see thinking (and by extension discourse) as a process joining "simple" pieces of information into "complex" syntheses of them. Smith began his Lectures with analyses of "simple" objects, then showed how the principles governing their description could be synthesized into more complex writing such as didactic. Campbell and Bain specifically discussed principles of association and indicated that these principles are ubiquitous in discourse. And recently, theorists such as D'Angelo have equated the Aristotelian topoi as well as associative principles with an underlying process which manifests itself in discourse as logical synthetic connections: the inductive "thread" weaving all aspects of the writing process into one basic pattern.

Clearly, informal argumentation as a theoretical construct recognizes the opinionable nature of discourse, particularly prose, by allowing writers to synthesize not only a central opinion but also the ideas needed to show that the opinion is true. For this reason, informal argumentation is richer soil for freshman composition than is any pedagogy based only on the mastery of a good style, adequate skills, or the achievement of "success." Informal argumentation also emphasizes skills, but goes beyond merely the mastery of them, for its rationale is to revitalize Johnny's awareness of written communication as a force capable of changing his life and the lives of others. In other words, informal argumentation reintroduces ethical content to composition teaching.

For teaching freshman English, and particularly a combined composition and literature course, I propose the following outline which puts into practice both the theoretical principles and the rationale behind informal argumentation. This outline is not intended to be a comprehensive pedagogy, but simply a set of guidelines suggesting how a composition instructor may help students discover reasonable opinions about issues and transform these opinions into prose.
A. The opinionable nature of prose

During the first two weeks of class, I use a simple version of James Kinneavy's triangle to explain the most important components of a piece of prose: context (or "real world"); writer; audience; and within the triangle, message. In my discussion of the message I explain that it not only includes the conventions and various skills of writing, but also "the writer's purpose in a concrete form, or the common sense arrangement of all the ideas and facts used to support a particular opinion," both purpose and opinion being key terms. I emphasize from the outset of the course that students will not be dealing with purely "informational" writing, that in fact the overall purpose of virtually everything they read and write will be to show that a particular opinion is valid.

After this overview, we begin examining prose selections in terms of what I call "implicit" and "explicit" opinion: in other words, does the writer actually state the purpose as an opinion and then back it up (explicit), or do we have to "read between the lines" to find a central opinion (implicit)? Our class discussion revolves around the following sorts of questions:

(a) Does the piece contain a stated central purpose, and is this purpose opinionable—an attempt to convince us of something that is open to argument?

(b) If the piece does not present an explicit opinion, then what implied beliefs and opinions does the writer hold?

(c) Does the evidence that the writer uses convince us that the central opinion, whether stated or implied, is a truth?

What I'm emphasizing here is recognition of the opinionable nature of prose and the metamorphosis of opinion into truth, as well as recognition of the aims and occasions of writing that tend to contain either explicit or implicit central opinions. Soon, students are able to analyze a variety of pieces in terms of
degrees of opinion and types of central ideas and purposes. Certainly we do not miss opportunities to discuss their own reactions to issues and opinions expressed in the readings, as well as their reactions to the writer's degree of bias. I discuss the importance and the validity of their personal reactions to issues as being starting points for forming reasonable opinions and gathering evidence for their own writing.

B. Developing skills in the context of informal argumentation

Beginning in the second week of the course, we cover basic writing skills and common conventions in roughly this order:

(a) sentence structure: from basic to complex, including punctuation;
(b) adding and embedding information in sentences; sentence combining;
(c) the importance of transitions as means of relating ideas in "common sense" ways.

At the same time we are still reading various pieces of prose and, in addition to our analyses of explicit and implicit opinions, students also begin to look at how sentencing and even punctuation affect their reactions to a piece and at ways sentencing augments the message and central purpose.

By the fourth week we have begun expanding the notion of "common sense" relations between ideas by exploring in detail the principles of definition (which includes work on diction and wordiness); the use of examples and illustrations to support a reasonable opinion; and the relations created through comparison, contrast, analogy (including an overview of simile and metaphor), description, narration, and classification. The skills involved in good paragraphing, as well as a continued emphasis on transitions, receive attention now. In about the seventh week, students understand that a writer chooses various terms and patterns of sentencing and paragraphing to help guide a reader towards acceptance of the writer's message.
Our continued readings focus now on ways writers use different terms and grammatical patterns, and the effects of these patterns on their understanding and acceptance of the writer's truth. All during our discussions of the uses of writing skills, students are practising these skills in short pieces written both at home and in class, gradually building up a storehouse of ways to relate ideas and guide readers towards accepting their opinions. In discussing these assignments, I also emphasize over and over the importance of having a central purpose or thesis, and of backing that thesis with supporting ideas which are related to each other in ways that will best guide the reader.

One assignment I have found both useful and meaningful for students (if a little frightening) is, by about the tenth week, having them write a letter to the editor of their favorite newspaper. In this piece, directed to an outside audience, they must back an opinionable thesis with ideas and facts logically related using the "common sense" methods. This assignment also constitutes an important step for inexperienced writers; they realize that their own opinions can make a mark, however small, in society.

C. Invention and arrangement for informal argumentative prose

The assignments up to the ninth week of the course are small, no more than 400-500 words, and the topic areas are given. These constraints generally mean a detailed discussion of invention too early in the course has little impact. But before the letter to the editor is due, I introduce a "problem-solving guide" which gives students some systematic help in creating and focusing topics, and at arriving at a thesis statement. A means of discovering opinions and supporting ideas about general issues, the guide looks roughly like this:

(a) Gather all information you think relates to your topic.

(b) Relate these pieces of information using "common sense" patterns. For example, you may classify pieces under broad headings; define important terms and concepts; compare and contrast pieces to help you draw an important conclusion about them; illustrate facts or ideas through description or narration; or draw analogies between your facts and ideas and some other situation.
(c) Decide which of these related ideas seems to stand out as most relevant or effective, and express it as a thesis statement. The most effective theses are often formed as a "cause-and-effect" complex sentence: "If the government passes such-and-such a bill, then . . .

(d) To support your thesis, use the pieces of information you have already gathered and related in "common sense" patterns. Compose an outline in which the most important ideas become topics for paragraphs, with less important ideas making up the bodies of these paragraphs.

(e) The conclusion of your piece should not just restate the thesis, but also answer the reader's unspoken, "Fine, but what does that mean for us?"

I go through this guide using some current issue (the government's latest budget, tuition fees, video games), and students practise gathering information and focusing it into a thesis according to the guide. I recommend that students try using this guide to help organize their thoughts before they write their letters; I require them, however, to hand in for peer evaluation their theses and outlines of supporting ideas shortly before the letter is due.

D. Informal argumentation, composition, and literature

In the combined freshman composition and literature course, it is not unknown for students who otherwise write adequately about general issues and personal interests to fail their first assignment on a literary work. The problem-solving guide I have outlined above forms, I think, a workable bridge between the principles of composition and the requirements of writing about literature. An only slightly modified version of this guide lets students explore novels, short stories, and plays in systematic (and therefore perhaps comforting) yet creative ways; this guide is presented fully in Appendix A. Instead of dealing with pieces of information whose sources are their own experiences, others' experiences, or general readings, students limit themselves to a work such as Shakespeare's Hamlet or Timothy Findley's novel The Wars. Their first task, after they have read the work, is to break down a character, scene, or event into individual traits (pieces of information); this method closely
corresponds to the Stage One delineated in Appendix A. Students form "common sense" relations between these individual traits (Stage Two), which helps them focus on and synthesize a discovery, framed in a thesis sentence (Stage Three). I ask students to consider their conclusion as an answer to the question "How does this discovery of yours affect either the character in question, or your view of some aspect of the work?" Appendix B shows how two students progressed through the guide from general topics to focused theses.

The theoretical background of this guide lies not only in the informal argumentative principle of synthesis, but also in Young, Becker, and Pike's tagmemic heuristic, D'Angelo's patterns of thought, and Aristotle's concept of invention as a heuristic designed to help us gather and arrange information whose sources are gleaned from observation. It is not my intention to discuss the guide in detail here, but I emphasize its appropriateness for helping students write about literature because it forms a link between the age-old human values and problems on which literature is fueled, and students' own growing awareness of issues.

To sum up, this teaching outline embodies and puts into practice the following informal argumentative principles:

(a) that the synthesis of facts and ideas to support opinions plays a major role in the writing process;

(b) that the main purpose of much writing and virtually all prose is to show the validity or truth of a central opinion;

(c) that to write and to read what others have written is to take part in a continual process of discovering and exchanging opinions about human values.

This outline, its emphasis on writing as the vehicle by which a writer validates some truth, and its detailing of the informal argumentative under-
structure of this vehicle, is designed to help students see clearly that writing is a force which shapes and directs opinions as well as "facts." Most importantly, they will realize that writing can shape and direct their opinions. For these inexperienced writers, the confusing world of human values will begin to take on a more substantial form and, therefore, greater meaning.

For teaching freshman English, adaptation of an informal argumentative framework constitutes a step toward reuniting skills with ethical purpose. Such a step is essential if student writers are ever to view themselves as the guardians of values which are their birthright and legacy.
1James A. Berlin, "Contemporary Composition: The Major Pedagogical Theories," CE, 44 (1982). Berlin also condemns college rhetoric for its concern "solely with the communication of truth that is certain and empirically verifiable—in other words, not probablistic."

2Here is a list of these popular texts, again, starting with the most recent. The most well known are not annotated:

John F. Parker, The Process of Writing (Don Mills, Ontario: Addison-Wesley Publishers, 1983). This is an interesting text that combines writing assignments with laboratory work and "workshops" on everything from grammar to stylistics. The purposes of discourse Parker deals with mainly are the informative and the persuasive.


Maxine Hairston, A Contemporary Rhetoric, third edition (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1982). A comprehensive and detailed text, A Contemporary Rhetoric combines a number of rhetorical theories, including D'Angelo's and, to an extent, Kinneavy's as well as some of the classical tradition. Her rhetorical "square" is a departure from the usual triangle, however, and constitutes an important move in integrating argument into the rest of discourse.


Jacqueline Berke, Twenty Questions for the Writer: A Rhetoric with Readings, third edition (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1981). Berke's twenty questions constitute a heuristic, helping students through what are essentially "methods of development" from basic narration and description up to what she sees as their synthesis or culmination: argument. Her treatment of argument, though, as I've mentioned, does not emphasize this synthesis.


3Frank J. D'Angelo, Process and Thought in Composition, second edition. (Cambridge, Mass.: Winthrop Publishers, Inc., 1980). All further references to this work will be cited by page number in the text. D'Angelo divides his text into "patterns of thought" and shows how these are incorporated in the "four basic aims" of discourse: informative, persuasive, literary, expressive. He notes how frequently informative and persuasive aims use the same thought patterns, such as analysis, description, exemplification, definition, comparison, narration, process, and cause and effect. In his first edition, D'Angelo omitted argument entirely, perhaps because of its "formal" nature. It is significant that he does not attempt to integrate argument with his theories.
All further references to these three texts will be cited by page number in the text:

William J. Brandt, *The Rhetoric of Argumentation* (The Bobbs-Merrill Co. Inc., 1970). Brandt and the other authors describe this text as a "grammar" of argumentation, a "disciplined, systematic" way of describing what goes on in a persuasive text. Rather than trying to superimpose existing logic on argument, Brandt attempts to determine the structures both of persuasive and what he calls reportorial writing: here, argumentation links both structurally.


Appendix A

THE TEXT PROBLEM SOLVING GUIDE

Stage One: LIST those ELEMENTS of a character, event, scene that appear relevant to your general focus. In other words, isolate and "freeze" character traits, plot elements etc.

Stage Two: TRACE CHANGES and or DIFFERENCES between these elements; "unfreeze" and relate them to each other using time sequence, contrast, comparison, analogy, classification, definition.

Stage Three: FIT these changing, differing elements into the BROAD BACKGROUND of the entire scene, chapter, or work. Here you are looking for cause-and-effect: why you think characters or events change as they do, and how these changes tie in with important issues in the work.

Stage Three is the point where you can formulate and refine your THESIS STATEMENT; decide what information you have gathered will best support your thesis; and think about a broader concluding "statement of discovery" about characters, issues, or the work as a whole.
I. CINDY'S NOTES FOR AN ESSAY ON HAMLET

Broad Focus: Act I, sc. ii (the banquet hall)

Stage One: Hamlet—mourning, uncertain, angry at the marriage by taking no action...Claudius—determined, takes action, rationalizes his own actions, goes for what he wants.

Narrower Focus: Who lives a tragic life? Hamlet or Claudius?

Stage Two: Hamlet delays action...Claudius acts immediately = Hamlet's early death and Claudius' "late" death. Protagonist and antagonist. Claudius repents but sticks to his goal. Hamlet delays his revenge—lacks action.

Stage Three: Claudius would have been dead long before if it weren't for Hamlet's weakness...different traits lead to their deaths—Claudius acts immediately to kill Hamlet when he learns of his discovery of Old Hamlet's murder. Hamlet wouldn't have died if Claudius were less decisive.

Working Thesis: The tragedy revolves around and accumulates because of Hamlet the protagonist and Claudius the antagonist.

Support: Character analyses of Hamlet and Claudius at beginning and end of play.

Working Conclusion: Consequently, if Hamlet is the tragic hero, then Claudius is the tragic villain.

II. JO-ANN'S NOTES FOR AN ESSAY ON HAMLET

Broad Focus: Act III, sc. ii (Claudius at prayer)

Stage One: Emotions—Hamlet—revenge, anger, excited, active, stimulated, obsessed—excitable for a reason. Claudius—feels guilt and remorse, practical, does not want to give up the fruit of his sins—point of no return.

Stage Two: Hamlet—procrastination throughout play, rationalizing, shown to be cruel here but only because of rationalizing, emotions from high to low. Claudius—comes to realize what he has done is evil (wash white as snow as in Macbeth) but ambition!

Narrowing Focus: In Act III, sc. ii, Hamlet and Claudius reach a turning point.

Stage Three: (Jo-Ann "fleshed this out" in a rough introduction) Hamlet thwarted in attempts at revenge because of his inability to take action. Claudius suspects Hamlet's knowledge and when he cannot win Hamlet over, resolves to have him killed to save his own power and ambition—undone at the end.

Working Thesis: Act III, sc. ii is a turning point in the play wherein both Hamlet's and Claudius' decisions to carry out their plans and achieve their goals are strengthened and made inalterable.

Support: Character analyses within Act III, sc. ii and within the final scene of the play.
Working Conclusion: Claudius, because of greed and a resolve to sustain his power, loses his Queen rather than the crown. This, however, becomes his own undoing because Hamlet finally fulfills his duty to his father and at the same time sends his uncle to hell—the final result of the "turning point" in the chapel.
Bibliography

Chapter One


Chapter Two


Sykes, Frederick H. *Elementary English Composition.* Toronto: The Copp Clark Company Ltd., 1902.


Chapter Three


Chapter Four


Chapter Five


