THE PUBLIC PLANNING AGENCY AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION:

AN ORGANIZATIONAL APPROACH

by

CARL VERNON SORENSEN

B.Sc., The University of Alberta, 1964

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF

THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

MASTER OF SCIENCE

in

THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES

(School of Community and Regional Planning)

We accept this thesis as conforming
to the required standard

THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

October, 1981

Carl Vernon Sorensen, 1981
In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by his representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission.

School of Community and Regional Planning

The University of British Columbia
2075 Wesbrook Place
Vancouver, Canada
V6T 1W5

Date: December 10, 1981
THE PUBLIC PLANNING AGENCY AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION:
AN ORGANIZATIONAL APPROACH

ABSTRACT

Public planning agencies in democratic political systems are faced by a demand from the public for the opportunity to have an influence on decision-making processes. Evidence suggests that this demand for public participation will not decline.

The typical planning agency response to this demand results from common perceptions of the arguments in favour of participation. The literature suggests that this response has been a reluctant and marginal inclusion of public participation in decision-making processes, in reaction to forces external to the agency. The usual arguments for public participation in planning are based in democratic political theory, and are arguments which have to do with the benefits of participation for the public or the political system. These arguments are themselves not conclusive, for there are different schools of democratic theory which ascribe different levels of significance to participation.

Public participation approached from the basis of this political theory does not lead to a concept of it being of significant benefit to the planning agency's organizational needs, except insofar as engaging in participation may make the agency conform to political requirements.

An alternative approach, based on organizational theory, considers public participation from the viewpoint of how it may serve organizational needs of the public planning agency. The current Open Systems view of organizations provides such a means for undertaking an organizational approach to public participation. It considers an organization's communication with its external environment to be a critical element in its functioning.
An examination of the principles and concepts of the Open Systems view of organizations demonstrates that they are applicable to public participation and the public planning agency. The Open Systems view can be integrated with a model of a public planning agency developed according to current planning theory, and with political systems theory as the latter pertains to a planning agency's interrelationships with its environment. When this integration is done within the context of the manner in which the representative democratic system functions, the result suggests that public participation assists in meeting certain "organizational" needs of the public planning agency. This "organizational approach" to public participation provides a rationale for a planning agency's positive attitude towards public participation, since it is an approach which considers the benefits to the planning agency as an organization.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT ii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT vii

CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 1

A. The Hypothesis 1

B. Public Participation as a Public Issue 3
   1. An Understanding of the Public Issue 3
   2. Development of the Public Issue 5
   3. The Future of the Public Participation Issue 9
   4. Planning Agency Response to the Public Participation Issue 15

C. An Organizational Approach to Public Participation 18
   1. The Need for a Positive Approach 18
   2. A Positive Approach in the Open System View 23

CHAPTER II: SCOPE, LIMITATIONS, AND METHODOLOGY 25

A. General Scope and Limitations 25

B. Specific Assumptions and Limitations 26

C. Methodology 32

CHAPTER III: THE OPEN SYSTEMS VIEW OF ORGANIZATIONS 34

A. Open Systems Theory 34
   1. Relevance to the Hypothesis 34
   2. Description of Open Systems Theory 34
   3. The Boundary Question 36
   4. The Open - Closed Continuum 37
   5. Environmental Characteristics 38

B. External Communications and the Open System 41
   1. The Centrality of Communication 41
   2. Communication - The Link with the Environment 43
   3. External Communication and the Boundary Question 45
   4. Some Important Communication Concepts
      - Senders and Receivers
      - Communication Direction
      - Message, Meaning, and Channel
      - Formal or Informal

C. A Summary Statement 53
CHAPTER IV: RELEVANT CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PUBLIC PLANNING AGENCY AND ITS CONTEXT

A. The Public Planning Agency as an Open System
   1. Recognition of Contingencies
   2. The Environment
   3. Communication with the Environment: The Reason for Special Attention
   4. Attention to Concepts
   5. A Concluding Statement

B. The Organizational Context
   1. An Understanding of Context
   2. Formal Political Structure
      - The Basis of Municipal Government
      - The Service Orientation of Local Government
      - The Official Representative Process
      - General Authority Norms
   3. Bureaucracy
      - Pervasiveness
      - Characteristics and Assumptions of Bureaucracy
      - Bureaucracy in Government
   4. Administration
      - Administrative Principles
      - Administrative Reality

C. Planning Theory, and an Operational Model of Planning

CHAPTER V: THE NEED FOR PUBLIC PARTICIPATION AS EXTERNAL COMMUNICATION

A. The Political System Framework of Analysis
   1. Public Planning is Political
   2. System Persistence
   3. System Inputs
   4. System Outputs
   5. System Feedback
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to acknowledge, firstly, the support and decisions of the City of Edmonton, particularly from the Planning Department and the Board of Commissioners, resulting in my being granted educational leave from my position with the City. This led to me being able to undertake and complete a programme of graduate studies at the University of British Columbia School of Community and Regional Planning. Secondly, I wish to acknowledge the encouragement and support of my wife, Joanne, both in my taking advantage of this opportunity and, more importantly, in persevering through the work and sacrifices of personal time involved. Life is made easier by people such as her. Thirdly, I wish to acknowledge the support, encouragement, and stimulation of people with whom I associated while at the School of Community and Regional Planning. Of these I single out Brahm Wiesman (whose interest was personal as well as professional) and Jamie Wallin, my advisers, and Walter Hardwick and Peter Oberlander. They and others, including fellow students, made my return to student life a great experience. I recommend such an experience to anyone.

Carl V. Sorensen
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

A. The Hypothesis

"Organization theory as represented by the Open Systems view of organizations supports the urban public planning agency's engagement in a process of public participation in planning."

The objective in examining this hypothesis is to demonstrate that current organization theory represented by the Open Systems view provides a functionally-based organizational framework for a positive approach to public participation in planning. Such a framework supports public participation in planning in two respects:

1. it complements the current professional theory to which the planning profession subscribes; and

2. it asserts an organizational need for external communication, which for a public planning agency is fulfilled by public participation.

The Open Systems view of organizations, when applied to a public planning agency, provides a rationale for public participation in planning which does not have its source in the prescriptions of democratic or planning theory. Both of these bodies of theory address the issue of public participation in terms of political and professional norms which are imposed on a public planning agency by virtue of its being a part of a particular political system, on the one hand, and its being a part of a particular profession, on the other. The organizational approach, through the Open Systems view, provides a rationale which has as its source a body of theory which is fundamentally free of norms associated with democratic or planning theory. The organizational approach is therefore neutral with respect to the democratic or professional context of the agency.

The Open System organizational approach to public participation examines the public planning agency as an entity with environment-shaped
requirements and constraints which are intrinsic to it as an organization. These requirements and constraints in turn shape its organizational needs for external communication. The hypothesis postulates that for a public planning agency these requirements and constraints are such that a process of public participation fulfills external communication needs.

However, the organizational approach which leads to this assertion involves an examination of the public planning agency's situation. While democratic and planning theory do not provide the fundamental rationale for public participation in this organizational approach, the political and professional context of the agency shapes its environment. Therefore political and professional norms, through the means of the organizational approach, affect the agency's need for public participation. They must be taken into account in the organizational approach.
B. Public Participation as a Public Issue

1. An Understanding of the Public Issue

The subject of "participation" is currently the object of a great deal of debate within liberal democratic societies. This debate is not exclusively an academic or intellectual one, nor is it exclusively political. It involves "ordinary people", as well as politicians, industrial workers, and bureaucrats. Participation, especially "public participation", has become a public issue. The reason for this derives from an understanding of participation as "the extent to which groups and individuals have an effect on the decision-making process" (Alford, 1969:21). The debate over participation involves some groups and individuals striving to achieve more direct and substantive participation in the decision-making processes with which they are involved, while others strive to contain or limit it within defined limits.

The most common decision-making context in which participation is discussed and debated is that of politics and government. The issue in this context is labelled as "public participation", "citizen participation", "participatory democracy", or similar terms. There is a great deal of literature representing the thinking of scholars of society and democratic political processes, both for and against public participation (Walker, 1966; Pateman, 1970; Benello and Roussopoulos, 1971; and Langton, 1978, to name only a few examples).

In the context of democratic governmental processes the issue involves many aspects which are broader than the seemingly straightforward one of governmental decision-making. It involves, for example, the whole area of
the relationship of participation in governmental decision-making to participation in a variety of other decision-making processes within society within which individuals and groups find themselves (Pateman, 1970). However, the issue is most obvious in recent public demands for increased participation in government. In its purest form, without getting enmeshed in definitional problems of democracy, the issue there is based on the values of our political culture. In the Canadian context, says one writer,

it can be taken as fact that Canadians perceive the political system as largely democratic, and it can therefore be assumed that one of the values of Canadian political culture is participation in the governmental process, at whatever level (Higgins, 1977:195).

It may well be that individuals do not see the issue in terms of values which they identify as political values; for many the issue is seen simply in terms of being able to have an effect on decision-making processes which affect them; in this case governmental processes. Whether or not their concern is explicitly political or is prompted by an explicitly-held theoretical position, the practical effect is the same.

The issue of public participation addressed by the hypothesis is concerned with some general public involvement in day-to-day governmental processes such that "groups and individuals have an effect on the decision-making process". It is "some activity through which the citizen interacts with his or her political environment" (Meadow, 1980:71), but more specifically interaction activities which go beyond the formal electoral process and activities associated with it. Citizens (i.e. the public) are no longer willing to participate in government only through the electoral process, or indirectly by way of persuading and influencing elected officials between elections. The
public is attempting to participate in government functions by communicating more directly and continually with any public agency which is perceived to have a significant part in governmental decision-making, in order to have an effect on the decision-making process. No agency which has any part in governmental processes is unaffected by the issue. Any such agency is subject to demands for increased public participation, whether it is elected or appointed, or concerned with policy-making or administrative decisions.

Urban public planning agencies are particularly susceptible to finding themselves involved in the issue of public participation. Planning has to do with matters which affect the public in its day-to-day reality as well in a long-term sense, whether in direct or indirect social or economic terms. The public therefore expects urban planning agencies to respond to its values, perceptions, and needs. At the same time, planning agencies are expected to provide highly professional and technical advice and decisions. The combination of planning with the democratic political process makes public planning agencies a major target of demands for increased public participation in planning.

2. Development of the Public Issue

Participation in governmental decision-making is not a new phenomenon. There have always been, in democratic political systems, those individuals and groups within the "public" who by virtue of position, wealth, or other means of exercising influence or power, have been able to demand and be accorded a participatory role in government and its agencies. In the case of planning up to the early 1960's, for example, the planner acknowledged and
responded to the influence of community leaders. "The planner responded to elites, for pragmatic reasons, that is, to achieve acceptance of planning goals" (Burke, 1979:66). Participation of this type occurred not so much because it served organizational communication needs as because of the fact that it served the purpose of having planning agencies' decisions accepted. Beyond this type of participation by elements of the public, widespread participation in political processes occurred almost invariably only through the electoral process.

But more recently, the nature of what is understood as public participation in government has changed. Through the 1960's and 1970's, participation began to take the form of a gathering of individuals other than community leaders around a common cause - a substantive issue (Burke, 1979:72), and of demands by such individuals to be more directly and personally involved in the decision-making respecting such substantive issues. In other words, what is now understood by public participation in governmental decision-making is an effect on the decision-making process which is not limited to the electoral process. At the same time another significant change took place respecting where, within the public, the demand for participation was coming from, i.e. the individuals other than community leaders who were grouping around a common cause. Fish says that the early demands for public participation meant participation by the under-privileged of society, but that it has spread to all kinds of neighbourhoods and socio-economic groups (Fish, 1976:179-180). Sewell and Coppock support this in their contention that the pressure for public participation has been especially acute in matters which affect minorities, but now involves issues which concern a large part of the population of particular
areas (Sewell and Coppock, 1977:1). It is recognized that these changes noted are very unevenly distributed within Canadian society, but as a broad generalization they have occurred.

What are the reasons for this development? Some writers have suggested that, within urban municipal government, it is because of the fact that the pace and timing of urbanization has brought to the forefront a variety of problems associated with population concentration. What were formerly non-controversial and technical issues have become controversial policy and value-related issues, "based on conflicting competitive views...over the purpose, nature, and form of cities" (Higgins, 1977:198-199). Plunkett states:

The principal concerns of Canadian city dwellers currently extend beyond the provision of essential community housekeeping services. These now include such matters as the social dislocation caused by urban re-development, the provision and location of public housing, the protection of city neighbourhoods with a particular life-style and the resolution of conflict between the expansion of expressways for the movement of vehicles and mass transit emphasizing the movement of people (Plunkett, 1976:331).

These types of issues have become matters of everyday life for which individuals have a personal concern, and "on matters of the politics of everyday life, citizens know what they want" (Margolis, 1979:88). Both Higgins and Plunkett suggest, furthermore, that these now controversial issues have been thrust upon a political and administrative system designed to meet the needs of stable communities and to deal with non-controversial and technical issues, "a sort of trusteeship role for the provision of essential community services" (Plunkett, 1976:331). One result of these two factors has been a greater demand by the public for an enlarged participation in the issues with which municipal governments are concerned.
Others point to the fact that "administrative officials have accumulated vast powers to influence policy decisions and to effect the individual and collective rights of the citizenry" (Kernaghan, 1973:573). They agree that civil servants are "independent actors in the policy process rather than simply administrators of decisions formulated by their political masters" (Brodie and McNaughton, 1980:242). These officials are secure in their agencies and impervious to change. As a result,

there has arisen an interest in and demand for direct citizen participation in bureaucratic agencies with the hope that direct participation will make it possible to affect agency programmes and performance (David, 1973:61)

An analysis by Kaufman provides a similar view. He describes (in the American situation, but with applicability to Canada) a succession of shifts in society's values respecting government among three values: representativeness, politically neutral competence, and executive (non-neutral) leadership (Kaufman, 1978:462). The emphasis on any one of these over a period of time brings about a shift to the one following. In his analysis, the period up to the recent has been one with less emphasis on the representative value, as evidenced by the building of professional bureaucracies and executive leadership. The result is that in recent years many people have come to have

a feeling that they as individuals cannot effectively register their own preferences on the decisions emanating from the organs of government. These people have begun to demand redress of the balance among the three values, with special attention to the deficiencies in representativeness (Kaufman, 1978:463).

He contends that after a period of more emphasis on representativeness (politicizing, reorganization, and decentralization of administration), there will once again be a return to values expressed by the demand for neutrality and independence of the civil service (Kaufman, 1978:473).
3. The Future of the Public Participation Issue

The question may properly be raised as to whether or not the current issue of public participation in governmental decision-making is one which will persist over time. Is it a "fad", or does it have any lasting significance for a public planning agency? Although the hypothesis implies that these questions are irrelevant, in that the agency should be concerned with public participation in any event, the practicalities of agency operations suggest that the questions are important. Individuals and organizations do not always make changes or adopt a new approach unless they are forced to, even if the changes and new approach would be to their long-term benefit.

One would expect to find an answer to the question of the issue's persistence in either the body of theory which considers participation within the context of political activity, or in conclusions drawn from empirical evidence. The body of political theory which addresses the issue is democratic theory, and within that theory the subject of participation has a central role (Pateman, 1970). But within this political theory, the subject of participation is represented by two main schools of thought: the behaviouralists, who argue that the definition of democracy should be revised to recognize the limited role of the general public to essentially approving or disapproving decisions or policy-making by leadership groups and elites; and the post-behaviouralists, who argue that instead of such a redefinition of democracy, political systems should be changed to allow for the realization of the classical democratic ideals of participation (Bureau of Municipal Research, 1975:7-8). The behaviouralist position would therefore suggest that in theory public participation should not increase and the question should not be resolved in favour
of participation. The post-behaviouralist position would suggest that in theory the question must be resolved in favour of public participation and its increase.

Among the empirical observers, some suggest that public participation and demands for it will increase. They tend to suggest this will be because of a greater participative experience and sophistication on the part of the public. Inglehart, for example, is of the opinion that such factors as emerging cultural values emphasizing spontaneity and self-expression, and the expansion of education, mean that political and organizational skills are no longer concentrated among the holders of official roles, and that an increasingly articulate and politically sophisticated public will "demand participation in making major decisions, not just a voice in selecting their decision-makers" (Inglehart, 1977:15-16, 22, 293). Participation will be more and more on the basis of issue-specific ad hoc organizations (Inglehart, 1977:302). Within a planning context, Burke says that "once citizens are permitted to participate in a community activity, they tend to demand increased influence. It is safe to predict, therefore, that citizens will exert more rather than less influence in future community planning activities" (Burke, 1979:27).

On the other hand, there are observers who are of the opinion that the demand will decline and the issue will no longer be as significant. Higgins, for example, suggests with respect to the "wave of group activism" in Canada that "there are some signs of it waning in those cities (such as Toronto) where it hit earliest" (Higgins, 1977:197). Sewell and Coppock hold the view that the movement towards public participation may be on the wane, and may soon
die out because of public apathy and lack of willingness to bear the personal costs, and because of the resistance of officials (Sewell and Coppock, 1977:6). The Bureau of Municipal Research exemplifies an intermediate position, as a result of its studies. Likely the climate can be favourable to "partial" participation (Pateman's definition), but "no matter how carefully designed the participative structure might be in terms of providing for meaningful citizen involvement, the political climate must be favourable if it is to be successful" (Bureau of Municipal Research, 1975:53).

There seems to be no compelling base in political theory and no overwhelming empirical evidence suggesting an answer to the question of whether the issue of public participation will decline or will continue to be of concern to society. However, there is another approach to the question which provides some insight. This approach is provided by Downs's "issue-attention cycle" (Downs, 1972), and has been partially applied to the public participation issue in the context of planning by Sewell and Coppock (1977). This issue-attention cycle as described by Downs (1972) offers a way of looking into the future.

Downs has said that any one domestic issue rarely remains long in American public attention, "even if it involves a continuing problem of crucial importance to society" (38). Public attitudes and behaviour respecting any issue go through an issue-attention cycle where problems which have gained prominence gradually fade from public attention, even though still largely unresolved. The five stages of the cycle are:

1. the pre-problem stage,
2. alarmed discovery and euphoric enthusiasm,
3. realizing the cost of significant progress,
4. gradual decline of intense public interest, and
5. the post-problem stage.
At Stage 2 the public suddenly becomes aware of and alarmed by an issue, and responds with euphoric enthusiasm about society's ability to deal with it within a relatively short time without any fundamental re-ordering of society itself. At Stage 3 there is a realization of the cost of dealing with the issue, not only in terms of money but also in terms of major sacrifices by large groups of the population. There is also a realization that the issue results from arrangements which provide significant benefits to some (and often many) members of society. In Stage 4 the feelings of discouragement by some groups and individuals, by others of being threatened, and by others of sheer boredom result in a decline of general public interest and attention. Thus the issue arrives at Stage 5, which is one of lesser attention to it or of only periodic recurrence of interest in it.

Sewell and Coppock suggest that the public participation issue is now passing from Stage 2 to Stage 3 of the cycle (Sewell and Coppock, 1977:6). This seems reasonably valid, in terms of the empirical evidence discussed above. However, Sewell and Coppock say nothing with respect to whether, or when, the issue will pass to the later stages.

Downs's thinking respecting Stages 4 and 5 provides two observations relevant to public participation as an urban issue. First, Downs says that even though an issue goes through Stage 5, it has a different place in public attention than it did in the pre-problem stage. Likely during the cycle new institutions, programmes, and policies will have been created relating to the issue, and these will persist. In his words, "problems that have gone through the cycle almost always receive a higher level of attention, public effort, and general concern than those still in the pre-discovery stage"
Second, Downs acknowledges that not all major issues (social problems) go through this cycle; those that do have some specific characteristics. But even for those which do go through the cycle, there may be characteristics of the issue which either prolong it or delay its eventual moving into Stages 4 and 5. This may occur if the issue is visible and has some degree of widespread effect, if the blame can be fixed to a small group of "villains" who are seen to have wealth or power and the capability to change the situation, if the costs of solution can be hidden, and if the issue is ambiguous. Should a delay occur, then it may be possible for proponents of solutions to accomplish significant changes if they work fast.

In the first case, Downs's description of the expected post-problem Stage leads one to conclude that there will likely be a persistence of higher levels of public participation than had previously been the case, if one assumes that to be the "solution". In the second case, the public participation issue may indeed have the characteristics which lead to the cycle being prolonged or delayed. The issue remains visible in urban areas because of the substantive concerns with which urban government must deal, and because of the public's personal interest in how these concerns and their solutions affect them. The participation issue does now have a more widespread effect than it did previously, since those concerned are now not just various ethnic or economic minority groups but include whole neighbourhoods and communities of people of heterogeneous character. The "blame" for the problem can be fixed to public agencies and administrators, who are seen to be those groups whose acquiescence would allow greater participation; and the financial costs can be hidden in public agency expenditures where they are not directly borne by those benefiting.
Here we may note that even Kaufman, who was discussed earlier as having a cyclical view of society's values such that eventually there would again be support for a neutral and independent civil service, provides some support for Downs's proposition regarding the situation at Stage 5. He states:

'It should not be inferred that the process is fruitless because the cycle of values is repetitive. Wheels turning on their own axles do advance. Each time the balance among values is redressed, only to require redress again, some new accommodation among the myriad interests in the society is reached' (Kaufman, 1978:473).

This analysis of the public participation issue in terms of Downs's issue-attention cycle leads to the conclusion that at least for the foreseeable future the issue will remain one with a relatively high profile in urban areas. Even in the long-term, the issue is likely to result in a greater emphasis on public participation than was previously the case.

Moreover, Downs's analysis suggests that public administrative agencies such as planning agencies will be at the focus of the issue. As Kaufman says,

'the quest for representativeness in this generation centers primarily on administrative agencies. Since administrative agencies have grown dramatically in size, function, and authority in the middle third of this century, this is hardly surprising. Chief executives, legislatures, and courts make more decisions of sweeping effect, but the agencies make a far greater number of decisions affecting individual citizens in intimate ways. In them lies the source of much present unrest; in them, therefore, the remedies are sought' (Kaufman, 1978:464).

Public planning agencies are therefore confronted by long-term demands for increased public participation, and cannot ignore the issue in the expectation that it will become insignificant.
4. **Planning Agency Response to the Public Participation Issue**

The foregoing section examined the development of the public participation issue, its current focus, and the likelihood that it will persist. The conclusion is that public planning agencies, together with other public agencies, are confronted by long-term demands for increased public participation. They cannot ignore the issue in the expectation that it will become insignificant. Given this conclusion, it is enlightening to review the response of planners to demands for increased public participation.

In some instances an enlarged public role in planning and policy-making has been both accepted and encouraged by government officials (and politicians). But Sewell and Coppock, writing with respect to the Canadian experience, say "the experience, however, has not been universally good and there has been a steady stream of reports by participants, administrators and observers pointing to negative results" (Sewell and Coppock, 1977:5). Greater interaction with the public has been welcomed by planners and administrators where this has seemed to be a means of more accurately assessing public views, of obtaining additional expertise, or of furnishing greater opportunities to gain public understanding of proposed policies. But Sewell and Coppock go on to say:

On the whole, however, a generally cautious view seems to have been adopted, resulting in rather small, incremental changes in existing mechanisms for involving the public. The reasons given include the fact that greater involvement inevitably means that more time is taken in reaching a decision, and that the costs of planning increase (especially where long, drawn-out public hearings are involved). Perhaps there is also an underlying concern that increased public participation will result in a reduction of power and prestige for the planner; the administrator, or the politician (Sewell and Coppock, 1977:6).
An interesting counter-position, at least in terms of the attitudes of planners in two Canadian cities, is provided by the Bureau of Municipal Research. The Bureau conducted a survey of city planners and other appointed officials respecting their concepts of public participation. The Bureau proposed four concepts, ranked as an hierarchy ranging from minimum to maximum participation, consisting of information, consultation, partnership, and citizen control. Almost three-quarters (71.4%) of the city planners considered participation to be "partnership" and "citizen control", where partnership was defined as shared planning and decision-making power, and citizen control was defined as citizens having a direct and controlling influence on the elected representative, who serves as a delegate. None of them considered it to be "information". In contrast to this, 80% of other city officials considered participation to be "information" and "consultation", where information was defined as creating a more informed electorate but not promoting shared decision-making, and consultation was defined as citizens obtaining information and responding, and helping to develop alternative solutions (Bureau of Municipal Research, 1975:46).

These results seem to indicate that city planners may have a favourable disposition toward some form of "significant" public participation, certainly more so than other appointed officials. However, even 60% of other officials perceived of participation as being at least consultation. Perhaps this survey indicates that while planners are favourable to public participation they work in a situation where other appointed officials do not offer them much encouragement to promote it.
One writer has taken a very pessimistic view of the prospects for public participation, laying the blame with the ruling elites and the emphasis on "expertise" characteristic of the technocratic society. Non-participation is perpetuated by the elites' and technocrats' use of a vocabulary filled with nebulous quantities of things that have every appearance of precise calibration, and decorated with vaguely mechanistic-mechanical terms like 'parameters,' 'structures,' 'variables,' 'inputs and outputs,' 'correlations,' 'inventories,' 'maximizations,' and 'optimization.' The terminology derives from involuted statistical procedures and methodological mysteries to which only graduate education gives access (Roszak, 1969:142-143).

Possibly this pessimistic evaluation, stated in 1969, reflects an extreme disappointment resulting from the combination of hopefulness and setbacks surrounding the early stages of public participation.
C. An Organizational Approach to Public Participation

1. The Need for a Positive Approach

While it may be that public participation in various forms has become common in some planning activities, Burke observes "this is not to say that it is widely or amicably accepted" (Burke, 1979:13). The response of public planning agencies has been essentially reactive, directed at meeting the needs or demands of individuals or groups external to the agency. Public agencies generally take the position that public participation is an intrusion in their legitimate roles and duties, and is disruptive of traditional processes of organizational authority and responsibility (including those leading to elected superiors). When public agencies do attempt to accommodate forms of public participation, they often do so in a manner which seeks to mold it in accord with their own concepts. One writer has observed in this connection that:

> the dominant tendency among bureaucracies in response to outside threats....is to seek to change the environment rather than to modify internal structures to accord with external changes (Schmandt, 1973:29).

Although the literature suggest that planning agencies have made some attempts to adapt to public participation as an "outside threat", such adaptation is essentially a reactive accommodation. It happens because agencies are forced to respond, and it happens in a form which assumes that the requirement for it is external. The adaptation has therefore not been based, except in a purely survival sense, on an analysis of whether and how public participation can be of positive benefit to the agency itself as it attempts to fulfill its function in a responsible and legitimate way. Such an analysis would proceed from the assumption that there is an essential internal requirement for it (Alford, 1969:21).
The reason for this typical public agency response lies in the framework of theories and principles by which public administration has traditionally functioned and been structured. Functional processes and structure have been established from the perspectives of representative democratic theory, scientific management theory, and administrative principles. These either exclude the concept of public participation or, at best, give it only a very limited role. Moreover, these theories and principles essentially complement each other, by fixing the public agency in a neutral role responsible to the public through a hierarchical structure via the electoral process.

The alternative theory which deals with public participation is perceived to be the body of "classical" democratic theory, which espouses the inherent legitimacy of public participation in political and other social processes (Pateman, 1970: Chap. II). However, it is largely ignored by public agencies, in part because it is not itself the dominant theory of democracy, and in part because it does not complement scientific management theory and accepted administrative principles. But it is this very classical theory which is the theoretical stimulus to the public participation issue. The result is summed up in Self's statement:

The study of administration could be viewed as a battleground between the contending perspectives of the political scientist and the organisation or management theorists; but the potential contestants are on such different wave-lengths that the battle is rarely joined. In theory, political scientists are neutral over values, although much interested in the analysis of value conflicts. In practice, many of them, at least in democracies, are concerned with realising or protecting the values of democratic control over administration. On the other hand, management theorists and experts are usually concerned to promote some concept of administrative efficiency, and organisational analysis is seen mainly as a prelude to suitable prescriptions (Self, 1972:14-15).
The public planning agency's response to the public participation issue is generally characterized by the situation described above. However, its situation is complicated by the fact that its professional theory base itself addresses the issue of public participation, and does so in a positive manner. The conceptual base of planning as consisting of procedural theory rather than primarily substantive theory has gained the increasing attention of theorists and scholars in the field (Smith, 1970; Connor, 1972; Friedman and Hudson, 1974; and Galloway and Mahayni, 1977). This procedural planning theory, especially in its "transactive" and "advocacy" variants, is concerned with the matter of professional/client interaction in the planning process, and the roles of the professional (i.e. planner) and the client in this interaction process.

Where the client is understood to be elected decision-making bodies, procedural planning theory can still be argued to be complementary to the representative democracy, scientific management, and administrative principles which public agencies have traditionally drawn on. But where the client is understood to be the public itself, in addition to or apart from elected representative bodies, then procedural planning theory comes into some conflict with these other traditional principles. Certain aspects of procedural theory, as will be discussed later, point to the public as client. This has led to the propounding of various "typologies" of citizen or public participation in planning (Arnstein, 1969; Bureau of Municipal Research, 1975:46; Van Loon and Whittington, 1976:109; and Burke, 1979:74-76), each developing a hierarchy of the degrees of participation. The various typologies have two elements in common: the involvement of non-elected members of the community, and some degree of the public's impact on decision-making which goes beyond the electoral process.
The public planning agency, if it subscribes to its own profession's current theory with the public as client, would presumably welcome and cultivate at least some forms of public participation. But if it subscribes to this professional theory, the agency is placed in a situation of conflict between that theory and the other theories or principles to which it subscribes or is expected to subscribe. There are two parts to this conflict: first, some element of conflict with representative democratic theory; and second, an apparently obvious conflict with scientific management and administrative principles.

Speaking generally, the evidence suggests that to a large degree public administration tends to still rely on traditional theory as described above, especially on the management and administrative side. It therefore resists increased public participation and serious re-consideration of classical democratic theory. Public planning agencies are, with some exceptions, cast in this mold. More specifically, such public planning agencies ignore in practice significant aspects of their own current professional theory.

Faced with concern for the maintenance or revitalization of participatory democracy, with actual public demands for public participation, and with its own professional theory, the public planning agency cannot ignore the public participation issue. It must seek ways to take a positive approach to public participation. In doing so it will maintain its own validity, it will align itself more firmly with its own body of professional theory, and it will be able to direct its resources to critical substantive planning issues. One way for the planning agency to do this is to find support for public
participation in terms of its functioning as an organization. This differs from the more common approach, which is from the perspective of democratic theory and which results in the conflicts described above. The suggestion is not that this more common approach is wrong, but that the planning agency will be more responsive to public participation if it is convinced of the benefits to itself as an organization.

Conover, in looking at the case for participatory management in business (a related issue with similar elements of conflict and resistance) takes a similar approach, which he acknowledges "may strike some readers as a mercenary way" to deal with a subject which has deep and profound implications for democracy (Conover, 1978:197). But, he says, "more progress will be made if the argument for change is presented in the best light to those whose support is most important to effect the change" (Conover, 1978:197). Since the support of the planning agency as an organization obviously is necessary for this positive approach, it is particularly important to convince the agency that its own interests will be served by engaging in public participation.

This approach is what is meant by an "organizational approach". It is essentially proactive and organization-directed, in contrast to the more usual reactive, other-directed approaches. The approach is admittedly complicated by unavoidable fundamental ethical and normative political concerns. They are unavoidable because "by its very nature, public administration is more intimately involved with basic issues of political theory than any other body of organized knowledge "(Dimock and Dimock, 1969:6). In fact, as will be shown, the arguments in support of an organizational approach to public participation, in the case of a public planning agency, are in large measure similar to the arguments in support of a democratic theory approach.
2. A Positive Approach in the Open System View

The Open Systems view of organizations provides the public planning agency with a framework for a positive organizational approach to public participation. While this view is relevant for all organizations, it is particularly applicable to the public planning agency.

The Open Systems view takes the position that organizations perform the functions of sub-systems within society, the larger social system (Ullrich and Wieland, 1980:31). Organizations are open systems which are "affected by changes in their environments, the so-called external variables "(Ullrich and Wieland, 1980:25). This environment is potentially without bounds and includes many unknown and uncontrollable variables. In effect what this means is that all organizations are more or less open organizations.

A critical function of an open organization must therefore be its adaptation to the environment. It must develop and maintain an effective system of communication with its environment in order to both understand and adapt to it. This is "external communication", which serves both the organization and its environment in a two-way process. The importance of external communication depends on the degree to which the organization is affected by external variables. Hence it depends on the organization itself (its inputs, processes, and outputs) and its environment.

The Open Systems view of organizations is highly relevant for public agency organizations. Not only are they affected by external variables for the same reasons as any other organization, but the external environment is more important because it is the "owner" of the organization through the political process (Thompson, 1975:11). The public agency is established to
serve the public, i.e. the environment. External communication of one form or another is essential, whether directly with the public as the environment, or through the intermediary role of elected officials.

This brings us to the relevance of the Open Systems view in the hypothesis. Given the nature of the public participation issue as described in the previous section, together with the nature of current planning theory, public participation is by definition one form of external communication for a public planning agency. It is one form of communication between the agency and its environment. The importance of public participation for the agency therefore depends firstly, on the extent of the agency's need for external communication, i.e. the extent to which it is or should be an open organization, and secondly, on the extent to which public participation fulfills external communication needs. The answer to both of these lies in:

1) the overall situation in which the planning agency finds itself;

2) the processes by which the planning agency functions; and

3) the planning agency's inputs and outputs.

Support for the hypothesis is developed by an examination of these factors.

To the extent that such support is found, democratic norms are served as well.
CHAPTER II: SCOPE, LIMITATIONS, AND METHODOLOGY

A. General Scope and Limitations

The title of this study, and the discussion up to this point, suggests its scope and some of its limitations. It is concerned with public participation in the context of an organization, the planning public agency. This defines the scope as follows:

1) participation is examined in relation to the planning function as carried out by an organization, not in relation to planning generally or to planners as individuals;

2) the organization of interest is a public planning agency, not planning agencies generally; and

3) the use of the word "public" is taken to mean all people within the jurisdiction of a particular governmental unit, whether as groups or individuals and irrespective of allegiance or rights.
B. Specific Assumptions and Limitations

In addition to the general scope and limitations of this study as described above, there are a series of specific assumptions made which impose limitations on it. These are listed here, together with a brief review of the major implications of each.

Assumption #1: The political system within which the public planning agency exists is a representative democratic one at the urban municipal government level.

This assumption establishes, firstly, that the planning agency is committed to the principle that its actions and functions are essentially intended to be responsive to the needs and wishes of the public, however these are expressed.

Secondly, the assumption establishes that ultimate decision-making in the governmental process (short of the process of choosing or rejecting representatives) is the responsibility of an elected entity of some sort - a city council, or a chief executive such as a mayor or reeve. The agency is therefore accountable to such an elected entity. Significant departures from that accountability would involve political changes of a constitutional nature, or could occur only with the express approval of the elected entity.

Thirdly, this assumption provides a limitation on the extent to which public participation provides a means for groups and individuals to have an effect on the decision-making process. Since this implication is critical to an understanding of what is meant by public participation, it bears further elaboration at this point.
The extent of public participation is the subject of widespread debate. On the one hand, for example, Benello and Roussopoulos in discussing participation in terms of participatory democracy, say that:

In a participatory democracy, decision-making is the process whereby people propose, discuss, decide, plan, and implement those decisions that affect their lives. This requires that the decision-making be continuous and significant, direct rather than through representatives, and organized around issues instead of personalities. It requires that the decision-making process be set up in a functional manner, so that constituencies significantly affected by decisions are the ones that make them and elected delegates can be recalled instantly (Benello and Roussopoulos, 1971:5-6).

On the other hand, Easton notes with respect to democratic political systems, theoretically it would be possible to envision a condition in which each decision was made and implemented by means uniquely extemporized for the occasion. In practice, the kinds of commitment involved compels every system to provide some members to care for the day-to-day activities related to the making and execution of decisions. Even in the smallest group, we can expect to find that the power and responsibility of caring for recurring matters as well as crises tends to reside in the hands of the few (Easton, 1965b:205).

In a similar vein, Pennock suggests that the rational man in a modern state would soon be driven to a representative form of democracy (Pennock, 1979:269). One writer goes back to early democratic theorists and observes that "even so ardent a liberal as John Stuart Mill recognized that only a minute proportion of any citizenry could participate directly in the activities of government" (Kornberg, 1980:1).

For our purposes, the extent to which groups and individuals can have an effect on the governmental decision-making process is limited by the authority of individuals elected to representative decision-making positions. Continuous and direct public participation in decision-making does not exist by right; where it does occur it is permitted by elected officials and may be revoked.
This study follows more after Oppenheimer, who suggests "it is perhaps necessary to look at participatory democracy as a utopia, in the sense that it is not completely achievable" (Oppenheimer, 1971:280). While the classical ideal may not be attainable, it can still remain a goal. Moreover, responsibility and accountability are undermined without an informed and involved public (Bureau of Municipal Research, 1975:8). Pateman, who makes a strong case for "full" participation defined as "process where each individual member of a decision-making body has equal power to determine the outcome of a decision" (Pateman, 1970:71), agrees that there may be some question as to the practicality of full participation within a large national political system (Pateman, 1970:109). However, she also suggests that participation does not preclude a representative system, and vice-versa. One writer has stated that society has "suffered from our excessive concern with the protection and maintenance of our political system" and that "the time has come to direct our attention to the infinitely more difficult task of involving larger and larger numbers of people in the process of government" (Walker, 1966:392).

This assumption therefore means that the public participation we are concerned with is a form of participation which involves the "public" as one participant or communicator and the public planning agency as the other, but within the broad constraints of a representative political system. But while it puts an "upper" limit on participation, the hypothesis also suggests that, for organizational purposes, participation involves more than a mere informing of the public. Its intent is to show that the "infinitely more difficult task of involving larger and larger numbers of people in the process of government", i.e., public participation, is to the public planning agency's benefit. It is
therefore consistent with the views of Oppenheimer, Pateman, and Walker as quoted above.

**Assumption #2:** The planning agency is assumed to be comprised of individuals who are altruistic, having no private motives other than discharging their functions as members of the agency operating under Assumption #1.

This assumption establishes, firstly, that the individual members of the planning agency attempt to further its functions. They do not act contrary to these by consciously promoting their personal aggrandisement and well-being, or by promoting activities of the agency which are contrary to its concept of its social function. Secondly, the members of the agency share with it the general norms and values of a representative democratic political system respecting responsiveness and accountability as described above. Thirdly, individuals within the agency are not manipulative or coercive, in terms of unfairly using persons or situations solely to its advantage.

This assumption may appear to be an unrealistic one on the basis of the evidence of how public planning agencies operate. However, without this assumption the hypothesis would have to take into account the psychological make-up of individuals, together with the power struggles, shifting alliances, status-seeking, and the like which take place within an organization and which often have subversive or non-organizational purposes.

**Assumption #3:** The public planning agency model is one which may be broadly called a "city planning department", existing as a part of an urban municipal government structure.
Public planning agencies exist in a wide variety of representative democratic systems and sub-systems. Each of these has its own political and structural characteristics. These individual characteristics are in large part accompanied by individual characteristics of the respective environments, in terms of what comprises the environment and what it expects of the particular sub-system. This in turn has implications for the external communication which the agency engages in.

The public planning agency model selected for this study is what may broadly be called a "city planning department". The agency is therefore a part of a municipal (or local) government, where the formal political body consists of an elected council and a mayor or reeve. Aside from the methodological reason of selecting a particular form of political sub-system, in order to make the study manageable, there are two principle reasons for selecting a city planning department:

1. The issue of public participation in planning is especially relevant to the municipal government setting, which is traditionally one of the closest and most open to the public both physically and in terms of many day-to-day issues (Fish, 1976:179); hence municipal government planning agencies are especially subject to public participation demands and pressures;

2. Public planning agencies within urban municipal government are perhaps the most widespread and common forms of public planning.

There are many types of municipal public planning agencies, but the one most commonly associated with "planning" is the land use planning agency. It serves our purpose to focus on such a planning agency where the specifics of the
substantive area of agency involvement must be considered. However, the study will be applicable to other substantive areas, as well as having some relevance to other governmental levels or sub-systems within which planning occurs. 

Assumption #4: The public planning agency is not concerned directly with any internal organizational impacts of public participation, although the agency may be affected internally. 

It is recognized that public participation as external communication clearly may have a significant impact on internal organizational concerns such as structure, processes, and interrelationships. However, the hypothesis focuses on the organizational need for public participation in terms of the organization's interaction with its environment. The fact that public participation may have either positive or negative impacts on such things as internal communication, organizational development, "job enrichment", internal efficiency, and the like, is not of any concern. It is assumed that internal impacts are essentially neutral, and that internal adjustments necessitated by public participation will be made.
C. Methodology

The study and presentation of evidence in support of the hypothesis is essentially theoretical in nature, based on theory and concepts relevant to it. The hypothesis is examined primarily by means of:

1. a review of the critical relevant literature primarily in the areas of: the Open Systems view of organizations, citizen or public participation, planning theory, democratic and political systems theory, and administrative and bureaucratic theory;

2. an integration of the external communication aspect of the Open Systems view of organizations with ideas of public participation, within the context of planning agency located within a municipal democratic political structure; and

3. a discussion of some of the practical implications of the organizational approach for a public planning agency, using a current proposal for public participation in planning in a Canadian city as an example to illustrate these implications.

The methodology followed consists of:

1.a) a presentation of the relevant Systems Theory and Open Systems concepts of organizations; and

b) a review of the significance of external communication in the Open Systems view;

2.a) an examination of the public planning agency to show that it can be described as an Open System, together with an analysis of the public planning agency's environment to demonstrate the importance of external
communication to the agency because it is an Open System and a planning agency; and

b) a review of the "organizational context" of a municipal public planning agency, i.e. the situation in which the organization finds itself, under two main headings: political, and administrative/bureaucratic;

3.a) a review of current planning theory, in order to provide an assumed operational model of a municipal public planning agency which establishes that agency's method of putting theory into practice; and

b) a description of how public participation helps to fulfill the public planning agency's need for external communication according to the assumed operational model;

4. a discussion of some of the functional implications for the public planning agency, illustrated by the example of a currently proposed public participation process;

No new theory is developed or suggested. Explication of the thesis results, in simple terms, in an application of current recognized organizational concepts to a current issue of public administration which is particularly relevant to the field of planning. The inclusion by example of a current proposal is not intended to prove or disprove the hypothesis. It is noted that the proposal, while a real-world proposal, is subject to review and revision prior to implementation.
CHAPTER III: THE OPEN SYSTEMS VIEW OF ORGANIZATIONS

A. Open Systems Theory

1. Relevance to the Hypothesis

The central concept in this study is embodied in what is referred to as the Open Systems view of organizations. From this concept comes a recognition of the importance of the organization-environment relationship, and hence the inescapable necessity for the organization to have external communication. It is from this, in turn, that the hypothesis proposes the usefulness of public participation as a form of external communication for the public planning agency. It is therefore essential to have an understanding of the Open Systems view of organizations before proceeding further. A brief description is therefore provided here.

2. Description of Open Systems Theory

The study of organizations has, in recent years, paid attention to the subject of organizational communication in its own right as a determinant of organizational effectiveness. This interest is derived in large part from the Systems School of organizational behaviour (Rogers and Rogers, 1976:30-50). Research on organization-environment relationship has obtained a central place in present-day organization theory (Pennings and Tripathi, 1978:171). This large volume of research and writing on organizations and their environments is in itself a relatively recent development, since the utilization of the systems approach began gathering momentum in the early 1960's (Kast and Rosenzweig, 1972:449). The key concepts are derived from general systems theory as set forth by writers such as Kenneth Boulding, Walter Buckley, David Easton, Talcott
Parsons, and Ludwig von Bertalanffy (Kast and Rosenzweig, 1972:449). The thinking has progressed to the stage that theorists suggest most organizations have only a limited degree of freedom from environmental sources of influence, and one recent writer notes:

Organization theorizing and research in the past decade has...gradually reduced the role of persons as significant decision makers in organizations. Various external constraints have been identified as sharply limiting the role that participants play in selecting an organization's structures and activities (Aldrich, 1979:136).

This is in sharp contrast with the more traditional way of looking at organizations, by drawing a sharp distinction between an organization and its environment, seeing the organization's response to demands mainly in terms of the organization's attempts to protect its identity and established way of doing things. The organization is usually assumed to be an established identity, and the principal concern is with tracing decision processes within it (Alford, 1969:19).

The Systems School postulates that all organizational communication is crucial, in that it holds the organization together, while the Open Systems aspect of it in turn emphasizes the interrelationships and communication between the organization and its environment.

In the Open Systems view, an organization is a social system, but as a social system it does not have a structure which can be separated from its functioning (Katz and Kahn, 1966:31). The organization therefore consists of a structure of persons taken together with the relationships whereby they function. This includes relationships outside its boundaries, because any social system (the organization) exists within a larger social supra-system and has some interrelationship with the rest of it (the environment).
Before the development of the Systems School (especially the Open Systems view), not all schools of thought and writers attached equal importance to the influence of external factors. While most schools of organizational thought agree that external factors are numerous, the Open Systems view places greater emphasis on the qualitative significance of their influence. Whereas earlier Schools regarded external factors as being disturbances or discrepancy factors impinging in a relatively less significant manner on the major internal organizational processes, the Open Systems view holds that environmental influences are not to be considered simply as sources of "error-variance". Such influences are integrally related to the functioning of the system (Katz and Kahn, 1966:27). Therefore one cannot truly understand a social system (an organization, in our case) without a study of the external forces, which are in fact a part of it.

Moreover, these external influences are not just influences on the individuals who comprise the social system, for Systems Theory holds that the whole is not just equal to the sum of its parts. The system itself can be explained only as a totality (Kast and Rosenzweig, 1972:450); it must be understood and examined as having its own existence as a total unit, a system (Downs, Berg, and Linkugel, 1977:19; and Rogers and Rogers, 1976:48-50).

3. The Boundary Question

In a pure Open Systems view of organizations, an organization as a social system is not defined by any arbitrary, pre-determined, fixed, or formal boundary. The organizational "unit" is simply a system within which the components have more frequent communication or a greater degree of
interrelationship with each other than with other components of the larger supra-system. The boundary of an organization, and therefore what constitutes an organization as a system, is flexible. It depends on the purpose for analysis of the organization, such as goals, internal structure, inter-organizational relationships, and the like (Rogers and Rogers, 1976:62).

It follows, from a pure Open Systems view, that the components which comprise an organizational unit for one purpose may not comprise the same organizational unit for another purpose. "Organizational boundaries are not firmly fixed and may vary, depending on the situation an organization faces", says Aldrich (1979:17). He goes even further, stating that "often organizations have no discretion in the matter - either boundaries change or survival becomes problematic" (1979:17). This variable boundary concept is difficult to grasp, when one is accustomed to thinking in terms of formal organizations where an individual is either a member of the agency organization or is not, regardless of the situation. Again in a pure sense, what this means is that the significant organization boundary may not coincide with the formally specified one, and what is assumed to be external may not be external.

4. The Open-Closed Continuum

Even with the significance of the Open Systems view of organizations as an approach to organizational behaviour it is now recognized that most social organizations and their sub-systems are not completely open either. They are partially open and partially closed, along a continuum from "open" to "closed" where open and closed are relative terms and a matter of degree. Organizations vary in the amount of environmental uncertainty
encountered, and in the number of external factors affecting them. On this subject "there seems to be a widely held view (often more implicit than explicit) that open-system thinking is good and closed system thinking is bad. We have not become sufficiently sophisticated to recognize that both are appropriate under certain conditions" (Kast and Rosenzweig, 1972:453-454).

The conditions which vary among organizations, within an organization over time, and within an organization among its different parts are conditions which determine whether open or closed-system thinking is appropriate. Not all parts of an organization need be highly responsive to external conditions (Mink, Shultz, and Mink, 1979:8). The organization may even have to use closed-systems concepts at certain levels (e.g. a technical core) to reduce uncertainty and to create more effective performance (Kast and Rosenzweig, 1972:454).

5. Environmental Characteristics

Notwithstanding that openness is a matter of degree, any organization will be affected by some external variables beyond its immediate control. If the environment is stable, then the implication is that the organization will be able to develop fairly fixed sets of routines for dealing with it, and to select fairly formalized structures (Aldrich, 1979:67).

However, most modern organizations "live in economic, political, and technological environments which are predictably unstable" (Argyris and Sohon, 1978:9). In fact, many organization theorists suggest that organizational environments themselves are changing, and are more and more coming to be characterized by what is referred to as "environmental turbulence"
(Emery and Trist, 1972:268). This is the rate of inter-connection within the environment (i.e. communication completely external to the organization, among the components of the environment). It is not the same as chaos in the environment, but is an increasing causal inter-connection within the environment which leads to increasing environmental complexity. Environmental turbulence has a profound impact on an organization which is relatively open, for it "renders environments obscure to local observers. The causal laws connecting external events become incomprehensible to persons having no firsthand knowledge of the distant forces at work" (Aldrich, 1979:69).

Recent organization theorists have examined the requirements which environmental instability and turbulence place on relatively open organizations. Notable among these theorists are Argyris and Schon, who posit that because of environmental turbulence, the "requirement for organizational learning is not an occasional, sporadic phenomenon, but is continuous and endemic to our society" (Argyris and Schon, 1978:9). They have developed a number of ideas regarding what they consider to be essential organizational learning. One which is worth noting is that there must be both "single-loop and double-loop" learning (1978:18-26). Single-loop learning is learning within the framework of existing norms, goals, rules, and the like (i.e. doing better what you already know must be done). The necessity for single-loop learning is fairly obvious. Double-loop learning, on the other hand, is not so obvious (or simple). It involves learning about changes required in norms, goals, rules, and the like (i.e. determining new things which must be done and how to do them). Double-loop learning is becoming more critical with the character of environments which organizations confront. Argyris and Schon couple these two
learning loops with the further idea that organizations must learn to learn; this they refer to as "deutero-learning" (1978:26).

Organizations normally engage in some deutero-learning about single-loop learning, but it is especially necessary for double-loop learning. Argyris and Schon are not alone in stressing these needs for learning and for learning about learning. Selznick, writing two decades earlier, noted that an "institution" should "explore the implications of ... change for decision-making in a wide variety of organizational activities" (Selznick, 1957:27). Mink, Shultz, and Mink refer to the need for open organizations to have "a bias toward change and creation of special mechanisms to promote it" (Mink, Shultz, and Mink, 1979:16). These writers are suggesting that organizations should be pre-disposed to change, and to learn about how they should change, and should even have special procedures, mechanisms, or individuals aimed at promoting both. If they do not, the problems of adaptation to the environment are severe.
B. External Communication and the Open System

1. The Centrality of Communication

Communication and interrelationship has a central importance to the Systems approach to organizations. External communication is in turn the part of communication which is central to the Open Systems view. By external communication is meant, of course, the communication which involves the organization and its environment together. External communication does not refer to other communication linkages which are within the environment completely external to the organization. These latter are the environmental turbulence discussed earlier. While they may be highly significant for the organization, their impact is transmitted to the organization through its external communication.

An understanding of organizational communication in all its forms depends on a good understanding of what is meant by communication. Webster's New World Dictionary, 1971, defines "communication" as "a giving, or giving and receiving, of information, etc. by talk, gestures, writing, etc.", and defines "communicate" as "to be connected with". Significant concepts are embodied in these definitions, namely:

- communication is both giving and receiving;
- communication is the giving and receiving of various things, not just information;
- communication occurs by various means (talk, gestures, writing, etc.); and
- communication is a connection.

If one combines these with Rogers and Rogers concepts, one can arrive at an understanding of communication as:
"a method or process of interrelationship, interaction, and transaction, by various means, resulting in being informed or having knowledge about."

Communication is thus the whole act of transmission - giving, receiving, and the connection between the two, and including the response; it can be described as a "joint process". This understanding of communication is akin to the concept of "interrelationship", and it is in this sense that it is viewed by the Systems School - communication is interrelationship. Wigand observes that all inter-organizational relationships occur in some sort of communicative form (Wigand, 1979:369), and the same may be said with respect to any organizational relationships.

It is worth noting here that organizational communication is a different concept than interpersonal communication, although the latter is an element of it. Organizational communication is communication or interrelationship involving the whole organizational "social system," in contrast with communication involving persons as individuals of which it is comprised. This is because of the Systems concept that the whole is different from the sum of its parts; it has its own character as a total unit. With reference to organizational learning (which they consider to result from external communication), Argyris and Schon provide support for this when they say "it is clear that organizational learning is not the same thing as individual learning, even when individuals who learn are members of the organization" (Argyris and Schon, 1978:9). But they go on to emphasize that even while organizational learning is not merely individual learning, "organizations learn only through the experience and actions of individuals". One cannot ignore the fact that interpersonal communication is vital, "for it is
the major element in two-way communications" (Gortner, 1977:174). The process of organizational communication depends on the interplay and combining of interpersonal communications, and that interpersonal communication affects the system.

2. Communication - The Link with the Environment

Based on the Open Systems view that organizations have only a limited degree of freedom from environmental influence and that persons in organizations have a relatively limited role as decision-makers in them because of external constraints, an organization's interrelationship with the environment is then critical. In systems terms, the organization's communication with its environment consists of the "inputs" which it receives from the environment, and the "outputs" which it provides to the environment. These inputs and outputs are not only the tangible goods, resources, services, and the like which an organization uses and produces (although it includes these), but more importantly, consist also of a whole variety of intangibles such as demands, commands, decisions, information, influence, support, and the like. External communication is any contact with the external environment.

Another Systems concept which is important in relation to external communication is the input/output linkage. One normally thinks only in terms of inputs affecting outputs through a conversion process within an organization, but the reverse is also true - organizational outputs affect inputs to the organization. Whereas the former occurs within the organization, the latter occurs within its environment. In the words of Argyris and Schon, "organizations are necessarily involved in continual transaction with their
internal and external environments (that is, in situations) which are continually changing both as a result of forces external to organizations, and as a result of organizational responses to their situations" (Argyris and Schon, 1978:42). This statement draws attention to the fact that the internal environment changes as a result of forces external to organizations. Changes to the internal as well as the external environment results from the organizational response. What this represents is the concept of feedback, and feedback together with the input and output processes as a whole is interactive. Because of the inescapable feedback effect of outputs through the environment which is increasingly turbulent, organizations must learn about their environments accurately enough and quickly enough to permit organizational adjustments. This suggests that feedback must be deliberately sought by the organization in order to provide a certain degree of organization-initiated self-regulation. It helps the organization to maintain a steady state, often in spite of other external relationships (Rogers and Rogers, 1976:50). Organizations must judge the amount and sources of support that can be mobilized for their goal or goals, be they public, private, commercial, or non-commercial, organizations. "Hence the establishment in the appropriate form of interaction with the many relevant parts of its environment can be a major organizational consideration in a complex society" (Thompson and McEwen, 1972:266).

In fact, organizations with complex environments tend to create specialized agencies to deal with inputs from the environment. Information, knowledge, and communication of individuals has to be co-ordinated if it is to be of any use to organizations, especially where information-gathering involves a considerable degree of uncertainty and the results are not predictable. It
should possibly be put in the hands of a separate agency (Arrow, 1974:54). Doing this in a situation of an unpredictable environment will not help to eliminate the uncertainty resulting from unreliable and poorly interpreted individual communication (Aldrich, 1979:123), but it will assist in embedding "learning agents discoveries...in organizational memory" (Argyris and Schon, 1978:19).

What are the organization's inputs with which it must be concerned? For some organizations the answer is obvious - materials, technology, employees, financial resources, and "market" information are required for them to perform a function and therefore continue to exist. For other organizations, the answer is not so obvious. Some of the foregoing list are required, but there may be no automatic "market" mechanism to perform a communication function between the organization and its environment. Inputs in the form of answers to questions such as: is the organizational output acceptable? will the environment continue to provide financial resources in return for outputs? what is the relevant environment? what is the technology to use? - must be found by some means other than a straightforward commercial buying, selling, and profit-making system of communication and interrelationships.

3. External Communication and the Boundary Question

In the discussion of Open Systems theory we touched briefly on the question of determining an organization's boundary in a pure system sense, in contrast with an observable formal boundary. That question is relevant to this discussion of external communication inasmuch as the boundary by definition determines what part of an organization's total communication is internal and
what is external. In a pure system analysis, based on Rogers and Rogers suggestion respecting what constitutes the organization, external communication is by definition relatively less frequent (although not necessarily less important) than internal communication. A formal organizational boundary imposed on the "system" organization will likely convert to external communication what should be regarded as internal communication. Immediately, it would seem, the amount and frequency of external communication is increased and is made even more important for the organization's functioning than it otherwise would be. The converse of this is that what appears to be external communication should possibly be regarded as "system" internal communication. Where organization boundaries should change in order to promote survival of the organization (in Aldrich's terms), but cannot because they are formal and fixed, the organization's response may, for survival, require clear recognition of some apparently external communication as internal communication.

4. Some Important Communication Concepts

The subject of external communication is not as well-ordered into distinct concepts and models as is that of internal communication. One reason is that the subject is a more recent one for rigorous study. Another is that external communication is not capable of analysis in tandem with ideas of organizational structure. The study of internal structure and its control has necessitated an understanding of internal communication, but there is no identifiable or controllable external structure which can be as readily studied. Hence the knowledge of external communication is less. A third reason is the very fluidity of external communication itself. It does not lend itself
to categorization and specialization of function. Nevertheless, there are some concepts which are relevant to both internal and external communication, as well as some which are unique to the latter.

**Senders and Receivers**

Communication is a joint interactive process between sender and receiver. That is, any individual or other component concurrently assumes both of the sender/receiver roles, making communication an interrelationship (Rogers and Rogers, 1976:17-18). Although the interpersonal aspect is crucial, this interrelationship or concurrent sender/receiver function is equally applicable to groups of persons (Downs, Berg, and Linkugel, 1977:35).

The variability of interrelationship roles makes it critical that the organization identify the audience (the external interactor) in the case of communication initiated by the organization (Lillico, 1972:13). The communication must be matched with the intended audiences, says Lillico. A parallel rule could be established for communication received by the organization, that the communication should be matched with (interpreted in terms of) the perceived sender, and Lillico refers to this as well. Rogers and Rogers refer to the former type of identification as "feed forward", which is information about the receiver gained by the source prior to initiating communication (Rogers and Rogers, 1976:14). What both of these amount to is gaining an understanding of the "frame of reference" or "mental set" of the other component in an interaction (Gortner, 1977:187-188), since each communicator is a unique "communication filter" influencing a message in terms of both its purpose as sent and its purpose as received.
In addition to the basic sender and receiver components of external communication, there are specialized roles in the process. Of particular importance are gatekeepers, who are individuals strongly connected internally and externally, gathering and understanding external information and translating it into meaningful terms for the organization (Tushman and Katz, 1980:1071-1073). Rogers and Rogers refer to gatekeepers specifically engaged in external communication as "cosmopolites", distinguishing them from gatekeepers generally (Rogers and Rogers, 1976:139-140). Respecting such specialization, Aldrich suggests that "authorities in small organizations might be willing and able to rely on information brought into the organization informally by members" but, "as organizational and environmental complexity increases, organizations can no longer afford nondifferentiated boundary-spanning activities" (Aldrich, 1979:255). Unstable environments are likely to require increased specialization and flexibility in boundary-role routines.

**Communication Direction**

External communication is neither vertical nor horizontal. It is not upward or downward, since those terms refer to a superior/subordinate relationship in an organizational structure which is absent from an organization/environment interrelationship. Nor is external communication horizontal in the usual sense of being a flow between parallel levels in differing structures. The flow is instead a multi-directional outward/inward one, not necessarily governed by a division of labour between members of the environment. There is little the organization can do to control or regulate inward communication from senders. Inward communication is largely voluntary,
although it may be formal or informal. A major exception to this is inward communication which the organization may demand from its environment in order to perform a function for the environment. This may be related to an outward flow which is of a regulatory or control nature, if that is one of the organization's functions.

Unlike upward internal communication, which is more likely to be positive than negative because it is often aimed to please and placate superiors (Rogers and Rogers, 1976:97), inward communication is likely to have a strong negative tone, particularly if it is feedback. However, it may be positive if the sender desires some benefit in return.

Message, Meaning, and Channel

Communication of any sort is complicated by the fact that conceptually the meaning of a communication is not the same as the message. The message is the medium for conveying the meaning; a meaning (an idea or intended communication) is sender-encoded into a message which is then receiver-decoded into an interpreted meaning. We have already noted the significance of the sender and receiver frame of reference to this process. But more obvious is the significance of language. Communicators may use the same words but with different meanings, or different words with the same meaning. An appreciation of this is especially important for external organizational communication. Gortner notes that "consciously or unconsciously most organizations develop their own peculiar modes of speech" (Gortner, 1977:187). This is often done for internal reasons, in that internal communication is improved or aided by such special modes (Tushman and Katz, 1980:1072). But, as Tushman and Katz also say,
this hinders the acquisition, interpretation, and dissemination of information to and from the environment. Hence the importance of feedback (and feed forward), and of cosmopolites and other gatekeepers to provide some means for the correction and reinterpretation of meaning.

Similarly, the channel used (e.g. oral, written, graphic, gestures, etc.) affects both the encoding and decoding of a message; communicators (senders and receivers) use and react to different channels in different ways. Therefore senders in particular must endeavor to select the most appropriate channel for communication. If various channels are used there must be consistency in the meaning transmitted in order to maintain credibility. If the organization is concerned with inward communication, then it should pay attention to the channel structures and processes through which this communication comes, for the structures and processes themselves have a meaning (Bish, 1976:42-43).

**Formal or Informal**

As a result of the work of the Human Relations school, it has come to be realized that formal (official or explicitly sanctioned) communication does not fully describe the channels of communication which are important to an organization. It is perhaps informal communication which most clearly illustrates the concept of communication as interrelationship. Informal communication is largely highly interpersonal and exists in any social system simply by reason of the social need for interpersonal relationship. It is integrative, and as such, it affects the functioning of the system. But in an organizational setting, informal communication regularly develops beyond the
level of fulfilling a personal social need. This occurs because of a functional need for communication where no formal (or acceptable or satisfactory formal) channel exists (Gortner, 1977:177).

Informal communication therefore consists of all organizational communication which is not formal. It is usually oral and fast, and, although it occurs in all directions, it is not necessarily random since patterns are likely to build up (Downs, Berg, and Linkugel, 1977:24). Informal communication channels are usually complementary to and substitutable for formal channels.

Informal communication in an organizational context is often feared, because it may distort messages or counteract formal communication and cannot be controlled; attempted control may be strongly resisted (Downs, Berg, and Linkugel, 1977:25). However, many writers make the important point that organizations should not deal with informal communication exclusively by attempting to reduce it where it has an undesirable impact. They should also attempt to understand and use informal communication to their own advantage (Rogers and Rogers, 1976:83, for example). There is a danger in relying too much on informal communication, however, in that "if non-hierarchic channels are used too extensively...this may seriously undermine the hierarchic structure" (Gross, 1968:569). It is not a good substitute for good formal communication.

In external communication terms, formal communication may well occur primarily at the top management and lower levels of an organization (the latter where the organization deals directly with customers, clients, input suppliers, etc.) (Rogers and Rogers, 1976:67). In reality, however, every person in an organization is involved in external communication. Every individual is a
member of some other system which is a part of the environment. This type of organizational communication is completely informal and uncontrollable. It may in some cases be highly significant, as well as being the only interrelationship which parts of the environment have with the organization.
C. A Summary Statement

The Systems School approach to organizations does not provide a panacea for assisting organizations in dealing with their environments. However, its concepts do provide a more thorough understanding of complex situations than do other schools of thought, and an appreciation of them increases the likelihood of appropriate organizational action. Many organizations are operated intuitively and implicitly on the basis of some systems type approach, as their actions and decisions are adjusted to an evaluation of their situation. In the opinion of Kast and Rosenzweig, "if this approach to organization theory and management practice can be made more explicitly, we can facilitate better management and more effective organizations" (Kast and Rosenzweig, 1972:463).
A. The Public Planning Agency as an Open System

1. Recognition of Contingencies

We have briefly reviewed the current Open Systems view of organizations, the importance of external communication to the open system organization, and some concepts pertinent to external communication. The description of organizations as relatively open systems with a need for good external communication forms the basis of this study, as the hypothesis proposes that the public planning agency as an organization can make good use of public participation as external communication. Now we turn to an examination of the public planning agency to determine its open-system characteristics. This examination is essentially the first level of analysis of the study, for it is intended to show that the public planning agency is an organization which has distinctive characteristics which are critical from an open-system perspective, and hence has distinctive external communication requirements.

While the open-systems approach to organizations implies that there are certain general characteristics which are applicable to all organizations, open-system organizations are not all the same in their needs and characteristics. We have already noted that openness is a matter of degree in that some organizations are more open than others and that no organization is or can be completely open. The converse is, of course, that all organizations have some closed-system characteristics and some organizations are more closed than others, but that no organization is completely closed. But the differences among organizations goes beyond that. Organizations which may conceptually
exhibit the same degree of openness will at the same time have widely differing environments, not to mention structures, internal processes, means of communication, etc. Each organization is a unique system, shaped by its own unique contingencies. Hence, in an examination of organizational environment and external communication, "it is necessary... to understand the specificities of organization environments, in addition to their generalizable features" (Aiken and Bacharach, 1978:202).

One of the difficulties of the detailed application of Open Systems theory to any public agency is that by far the largest amount of research and analysis on organizations as open systems has been carried out in the context of profit-motivated business and private enterprise (Aldrich, 1979, for example). This poses problems, since public organizations differ in many respects from private and profit-oriented organizations. The investigation of business corporations as a prototype for organizations is an inadequate guide to public organizational behaviour, except to the extent that factors such as cultural and institutional norms lead organizations to emulate each other. For the most part, public organizations attempt to emulate private organizations in western culture (Self, 1972:249), so some private organization concepts are generally applicable. But as Aiken and Bacharach state, "what is dynamic about the environment of a business organization may be light years away from what is dynamic about the environment of a public bureaucracy" (Aiken and Bacharach, 1978:246).

For our purposes the difficulty is even more pronounced. Public agencies of different types are themselves unique, in terms of the environmental context within which they function, their mission, their structure, their
technology, and the like. Aiken and Bacharach note respecting environment for example, "the reason for calling the environment of a welfare organization heterogeneous may be rather remote from the reason for characterizing the environment of a local government in that way" (Aiken and Bacharach, 1978:246).

2. The Environment

A useful perspective from which to begin an open system analysis of a public planning agency is to look first at its environment. To do this requires a discussion of the boundary question as it relates to the agency. Even though taking the formal agency as the organization for analytical purposes means that the boundary is assumed to be clear, a consideration of the system-boundary in relation to the agency-boundary assists in describing the environment of the agency. Rogers and Rogers suggest that most analysts would feel the necessity to include a public agency's clientele within the system boundary in order to fully understand the functioning of the organization (Rogers and Rogers, 1976:62). In other words, in terms of the relative frequency of communication among components of the supra-system, the set of communications with clientele respecting the planning agency's function is so frequent that the clients are a part of the organization. If we take the suggestion of Downs, Berg, and Linkugel (1977:5), that one can classify an organization by the people associated with it to include the following four groups:

- the members of rank-and-file workers,
- the owners or managers of the organization,
the clients or public in contact with the organization, and
- the public at large,
then by Rogers and Rogers definition the planning system-organization certainly includes the first three groups. Burke also recognizes this possibility in conceding that "it is difficult to separate the client system from the planning organization. Some writers view both as one and the same. In some instances this is true" (Burke, 1979:279). Some might argue that the public planning agency's clientele must also include the fourth group, the public at large, and that it also is a part of the planning organization. Even if we reject that as impractical, it is certainly true that the third group - the clients or public in contact with the organization - is also a very large group. The clientele with which the public planning agency has frequent contact consists of many people. Therefore by this alternative the system-defined public planning organization is still potentially an enormous organization. Self alludes to this possibility for administrative bodies (public agencies) when he asks

Do they consist ....of fluctuating and overlapping systems of co-operative action possessing only a small degree of autonomous behaviour and intelligible mainly in terms of wider systems of social behaviour? (Self, 1972:248).

His phrase "fluctuating and overlapping systems of co-operative action" implies not only openness but also variability over time in what constitutes a public oriented "organisation". He goes on to state that "organisation theory is prone to the fallacy of misplaced concreteness when it supposes that organisations possess clearer boundaries...than they do" (Self, 1972:249).

By contrast to this approach which means a public planning agency is not in itself an organization, there is the earlier approach of Downs. Based on
more traditional closed-system thinking, Downs describes government as a whole as a decision-making instrument separate from the public except for the small group of citizens which controls the governing apparatus (Downs, 1957:24-26). It is separate because "when a small group of men acting in coalition runs the apparatus of state, we can reasonably speak of the government as a decision-maker separate from individual citizens at large" (Downs, 1957:17). Clearly if the governing apparatus is separate in this fashion, it must be considered to be a relatively closed system. By implication then, any public agency which is a part of that apparatus is itself also a closed sub-system of it. Although Downs does not speak specifically to the subject of public participation, it appears obvious that he does not see public participation as being of any significance except to choose the controlling coalition. He does not recognize any significant openness to government.

Downs's approach certainly does not accord with what has actually happened to government and public agency decision-making since he wrote in 1957. Moreover, if we return to the Rogers and Rogers definition and Burke's acknowledgement of what an organization consists of, we have a better appreciation of the significance of the environment to a formally defined public planning agency. If the clients of the agency are so significant that the pure system-organization of planning would include them, then it must follow that when these clients are artificially made a part of the environment by virtue of drawing the organization boundaries back to the formal agency boundaries, the clients become a part of the environment which is extremely significant and closely-linked to the agency. Furthermore, this part of the agency's environment is also large in a quantitative sense.
The planning agency and its client system are so closely linked, says Burke, that they can be seen to be engaged in a collaborative relationship, a relationship which is a partnership (Burke, 1979:279). If this seems to be a contradiction of the apparent fact that public planning agencies and other government agencies often exercise a great deal of authority and influence over the public, one needs to recognize that the impact of the environment is not always readily apparent. Also, returning to the Downs, Berg, and Linkugel list of people associated with an organization, it should be apparent that some parts of the agency's environment have more of an impact than others. This is illustrated by Kernaghan, who gives a classification of four broad categories of controls and influences over administrative decisions, with parallel categories of what he calls sources of administrative responsibility (Kernaghan, 1973:583). His use of the terms "controls" and "influences" acknowledges the openness of the administrative system. Although his classification is for administrative individuals rather than agencies within the parliamentary form of the Canadian government (i.e. the national government), it is applicable to agencies and to other forms and levels of government. His categories are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Controls and Influences</th>
<th>Sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Internal controls</td>
<td>Administrative superiors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal influences</td>
<td>Administrative superiors, peers, and subordinates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External controls</td>
<td>Political executives, legislators, judges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External influences</td>
<td>The general public, interest group representatives, mass media representatives</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These, he says, are all external to the individual. In agency terms, his use of
"internal" and "external" relates to what is internal and external to the agency. The external sources he groups according to whether or not they represent controls or influences, indicating his evaluation of the relative impact of the various external sources. He includes what we would call the public under external "influences", indicating relatively less impact from them than from the sources he includes under external "controls".

It is clear that the public planning agency is an organization whose environment is large and varied. The environment is by definition distinct from the agency but at the same time the two are interrelated in a unique institutionalized and politicized fashion. One writer has described this by saying that public or quasi-public organizations face "more complex coalitions of external forces than other organizations" (Mintzberg, 1973:108). Taking all these external factors into account, a public agency as "a legally defined organisation is sometimes a relatively weak centre of decision-making and may be controlled to a large extent from other centres" (Self, 1972:249). It is only one of a number of individuals or bodies who are "proximate policy makers", those who are the closest or most proximate to the actual making of a decision (Lindblom, 1968:30). Lindblom's description of the policy-making process is that there is no one policy-maker or policy-making body, not even in specific fields (such as planning). All such are only proximate policy-makers, forming part of a large and vaguely-defined group which engages in various processes out of which comes policy. Even those policy-makers with immediate legal authority share the policy-making process with a number of other participants such as political officials, party leaders, and other appointed administrative officials (Lindblom, 1968:39). This, of course, describes what is in fact a
process of environmental influence. (It is clear from Lindblom's later comments (1968:113) that he does not consider the public, generally, as being proximate policy-makers).

A number of pertinent questions arise for the planning agency - To what extent does it wish to be controlled by its environment? What parts of its environment should it respond to, and can it somehow balance external factors against each other? How can it best communicate with its environment? Is the environment changing, and how fast?

The agency may not only be a weak centre and controlled from other centres, it also is one which has a rapidly changing and turbulent environment (Emery and Trist, 1972:274). The "complex coalitions of external forces" are constantly changing into new and different coalitions. While the likelihood is that any organization will respond maladaptively to a turbulent and threatening environment (White, 1973:122), other writers suggest that in government it may well take some ten to fifteen years for an agency to even be aware of the new environment (Emery and Trist, 1972:279). It is questionable whether that length of time is fast enough given the rate at which environments are becoming turbulent.

What has been described for the public agency is a demanding environmental context within which its external communication must occur. In order to function effectively within this environment, a public agency must possess a "repertoire of response capabilities for environmental interaction" (White, 1973:122). This response capability depends on the acquisition of feedback from the effects of the organization's own outputs. "Without feedback and the capacity to respond to it, no system could survive for long, except by accident" (Easton, 1965b:32).
3. Communication with the Environment: The Reason for Special Attention

The necessity for any organization to interact with and respond to its environment by now is obvious. Chapter III and the foregoing have discussed this at some length, and have pointed out that the environments of public agencies are especially characterized by change and turbulence. One must then turn to the next question, which is, why must a public planning agency pay special attention to communication with that environment? After all, many organizations survive and function reasonably well in meeting their goals without any conscious, specific attention to their environments.

There are a number of reasons for this. The first one stems from the fact that the public agency is unlike most organizations which communicate with their environments through the medium of the market place. For the latter, inputs are procured and outputs disposed of through financial transactions. If such an organization's survival is threatened, or if it functions poorly, there are messages which are communicated to the organization through the market. Granted, even for some such organizations the market place often does not provide enough communication, or the communication may not be clearly understood by the organization. More and more market-based organizations are supplementing their market-derived information with other communication and specialized information, or with specialized communication agencies and devices.

But public agencies, except for those which are established to function as private corporations, do not function through the market place. They are free from the market test (Katz and Kahn, 1966:82), and are free from
it in two important respects. The first is that the service which is produced (the output) is either monopolistic (Gortner, 1977:6) or a free good. The environment, by and large, has no choice over whether or not to accept the service once it is agreed that it should be provided. The second is that there is no simple, commonly acceptable yardstick such as profits for measuring the achievement or success of the public agency (Gortner, 1977:7). As a result of the combination of these, the public agency must negotiate and bargain directly with its immediate source of energy renewal to ensure it acquires its "energic input" (Katz and Kahn, 1966:68), and it must communicate (interrelate) with its clients and the public in a manner which provides support for this negotiation and bargaining. Although this negotiation and bargaining provides an opportunity for measurement of achievement, by and large "the fact that revenue is received regardless of the quality or the quantity of results produced eliminates a critical check or penalty for poor performance" (Rapp, 1978:417). While the environment of the public agency has some ability to act as a constraint on negative agency performance, it is not an automatic, self-regulating process as in the case of the market. Moreover, the environment cannot reward good performance or encourage changes through such an automatic process. Because public agencies are free from the market test, say Katz and Kahn, they develop poor adaptive response mechanisms - they are not easily made aware of what to respond to (Katz and Kahn, 1966:82). Thompson and McEwen also refer to this measurement problem, when they say that for a government operation oriented to a less tangible purpose "the indices of effective operation are less likely to be precise" (Thompson and McEwen, 1972:257), and "as goals call for increasingly intangible, difficult-to-measure products, society finds it more
and more difficult to determine and reflect its acceptability of that product" (Thompson and McEwen, 1972:258).

While the foregoing speaks in terms of "products" in relation to established goals, the same lack-of-market-test problem occurs with respect to establishing the goals themselves. The setting of goals is not a static process, but is "a necessary and recurring problem facing any organization, whether it is governmental, military, business, educational, medical, religious, or other type" (Thompson and McEwen, 1972:256). But just as goals call for increasingly intangible, difficult-to-measure products, so "the signals that indicate unacceptable goals are less effective and perhaps longer in coming" (Thompson and McEwen, 1972:258). Thompson and McEwen discuss this at length, in relation to organizational environment. Additional complexity respecting goal establishment and goal achievement results from the fact that the environment of a public agency includes other organizations. In an open system, the goals of the agency are affected by the policies and actions of these other organizations (Eide, 1974:244).

A second major reason why the public agency must be attentive to its external communication stems from the basis of the agency's own formal existence. Although this is related to the first reason, that of determining public acceptability of output or goals (in that poor performance may well result in the agency's eventual demise), it has more to do with the independence of the agency. Private organizations may on their own respond to the environment by taking on new and different goals and so maintain their intrinsic existence, but a public agency is normally valued instrumentally for a particular purpose, rather than intrinsically (Self, 1972:251). The public
agency is established to serve a particular public purpose for society or a part of it. If it does not do that, there is no intrinsic reason to maintain it.

4. Attention to Concepts

The communication concepts (and attendant problems) discussed in Chapter III are all concepts which the public planning agency should be aware of. Good external communication can be achieved only if the agency is aware of techniques, channels, communicator roles, formality and informality, and the like, and of their relative advantages and disadvantages. Some of these bear repeating here for further illustration.

The variety of external elements in the environment of the agency means that there are a number of possible audiences for an agency-initiated communication. While some of these audiences are individuals and single-purpose groups which remain relatively stable and predictable, many of the audiences consist of "complex coalitions" with a multitude of purposes whose relative importance changes from time to time. Moreover, turbulence in the environment is evidenced by the fact that these complex coalitions change as new coalitions are formed. For this reason the planning agency must attempt to be aware of these coalitions and how they are reforming; the audience of the agency (the external communicators) must be identified to ensure that the appropriate communications are directed towards them. What may be less recognized by the agency is that inward communication should also be understood in relation to these changes in the external senders.

Similarly, the communicator role within the agency is performed at a variety of locations within it. While the agency may be well aware of this,
what may not be recognized is that the meaning received by the audience may vary with the audience's perception of the sender. And again, to repeat a point made above, an incoming communication may not only have differing meanings for differing internal receivers. It may be intended by the external sender for particular internal receivers, but received or interpreted by the wrong receiver.

This discussion illustrates the necessity of recognizing communication as an interactive process in its totality, where the communication event is joint and two-way, not simply an action-response sequence. The receipt of a communication is itself a response, involving the encoding and de-coding actions by communicators simultaneously.

A second example of an important concept is that of message vs. meaning. Some writers on public agencies give a great deal of weight to the bureaucratic language problem. Hummel, for example, deals with this extensively. He states in one place that bureaucratic language is only one-directional, and is acausal in that it provides no clue to its origin or legitimacy (Hummel, 1977:143). He goes even beyond that, saying that "a bureaucracy's language hides the questionability of that bureaucracy's own existence" (Hummel, 1977:147). In other words, not only is there a major message-meaning problem, but the problem is often deliberately used by the bureaucracy to protect itself. Another writer suggests that the public's perception of a "lack of compassion" in public organizations may be alleviated by improving outward external communication (Thompson, 1975: Chapters 3-4). Alternatively, he says, other communication channels such as an ombudsman may be required (Thompson, 1975: Chapter 8).
5. A Concluding Statement

It was noted earlier that urban municipal government is increasingly having to deal with substantive issues which are no longer technical; the issues are becoming policy matters of concern to the public. It is the agencies of municipal government responsible for dealing in some fashion with these policy issues which are becoming the focus of public concern and demands for public participation. In a municipal context, the agency that comes as close as any other to being a policy unit is the planning agency. It provides no tangible or concrete service, and in its functions it cuts across other agency concerns and responsibilities. In addition to having this policy focus, a planning agency is a particular target of public and political concerns because of "the effect of its decisions on the distribution of economic and social values among people and groups in the community" (Heikoff, 1975:77).

The conclusions one can draw is that the public planning agency, among all public agencies in municipal government, is an open system which must not neglect its external communication. The hypothesis is that public participation can provide some of the necessary external communication. But in order to arrive at a demonstration of that, one must first understand the context in which the agency exists (the specificities of the environment). This will be done in the next section. In the case of a public planning agency, however, this understanding is not sufficient because the planning agency has a body of theory which is unique among public agencies, and which must be taken into account in considering the process of participation. Planning theory includes theories of procedure, and the process of public participation cannot be adequately addressed in a planning function without incorporating procedural planning theory.
B. The Organizational Context

1. An Understanding of Context

At the conclusion of the section in which the public planning agency was described as an open system with external communication needs, it was noted that a more complete understanding of these needs requires an understanding of the overall context within which the agency functions as an organization. Meadow has described this in his statement that "the political system, its institutions and processes, shape the environment in which all communication takes place" (Meadow, 1980:27). If the environment is so shaped, it follows that communication with it is similarly shaped.

The public planning agency operates within an urban political system where the significant institutions and processes are comprised of:

a) the formal political structures,

b) the structures and processes representing bureaucratic principles, and

c) administrative norms and procedures.

While recognizing that these are all in combination components of the political system as Meadow uses the term, we will deal with these separately by referring to "formal political structures" as distinct from the other two. In this section the context will only be described, reserving a more thorough analysis of the implications to a later section. The brief treatment of them will bring out the main points, although it is recognized that there are subtle details and variations which in different situations may make any one of them more or less important.
2. **Formal Political Structure**

**The Basis of Municipal Government**

Urban Municipal governments in Canada are a part of the overall federal structure established under the British North America Act. Under that Act, the legal or constitutional position of municipal government is one in which it can be subjected to any "whim and fancy" of its senior provincial government (Higgins, 1977:53). While in practice this usually does not apply in the general conduct of provincial - municipal relations, in principle municipal governments and their agencies can do nothing that is not delegated to them.

There are two immediate consequences of this status. The one is that municipal government is but one of a number of governments responding to the needs and demands of the public, with a variety of elected officials who "represent" the public and its concerns. Instead of being able to approach a single representative on any matter, as in a unitary state such as Britain, the Canadian public must attempt to distinguish between the levels of problems relevant to one of a number of representatives (Fraser, 1980:239). The other is that, notwithstanding the absence of whim and fancy in provincial government control, "the history of municipal governments in Canada is generally one of steady and continual reduction in the scope of functions delegated to municipalities" (Higgins, 1977:54).

However, as we have noted earlier, municipal government also has a tradition of closeness to the public (both physically and in terms of matters with which it deals), and openness and visibility in decision-making. Lord Redcliffe-Maud and Wood describe local government as an opportunity to give expression to the "diversity of national life" and enabling people on a local basis to work out their own patterns of community, on the basis of their own
priorities, within some broader constraints and standards (Redcliffe-Maud and Wood, 1974:150).

The Service Orientation of Local Government

It was noted earlier that the pressures for increased public participation at the municipal level may in part be due to the changing nature of needs which the public wishes municipal government to address. Numerous students of local government have noted that its main tradition in practice has been in the provision of services. Historically it has functioned mainly as an, administrative agency, performing a service function for services generally deemed necessary or desirable (Higgins, 1977:50, 166; and Redcliffe-Maud, 1974:11, for example). Langrod says

It must not be forgotten that the problem of local government is...but a technical arrangement within the administrative system, a structural and functional detail, based on the adaptation of traditional forms of management to the varied needs of modern administration (Langrod, 1976:5).

This Service orientation has been reinforced by the traditional reform approach to municipal administration, that the provision of services was only an administrative matter (Fish, 1976:176) of snow plowing, building streets, disposing of sewage, etc. While lip service has been paid to both the service and participatory (or access) traditions, Higgins states that the studies and reports involving municipal reorganization in Canada show that it is "almost without exception" the access tradition which is surrendered through reorganization (Higgins, 1977:167).

But many of those supposedly technical service matters are becoming important policy matters. They have come to involve differences in value
perspectives, the choice of services to be provided (and the levels), and the pattern of service to be provided to which client groups (Fish, 1976:176). In addition, local government is now involved in a far wider range of functions than previously, many of which are clearly not technical in any respect (Higgins, 1977:54). These have developed in recent times, and many of them are the growth functions of local government (Redcliffe-Maud and Wood, 1974:15).

Higgins maintains that the apparent paradox of on the one hand a continued reduction in the scope of functions delegated to municipalities, and on the other hand their involvement in a wider range of functions is explained by the fact that the increasing number of functions is not accompanied by the scope for policy-making. Functions are delegated by provincial government in a situation where "municipal government is to an increasing extent becoming more of an administrative agency of provincial governments than has traditionally been the case", with provincial perspectives and standards applied (Higgins, 1977:70).

The Official Representative Process

Local or municipal government, is formally based on a representative system of legislative decision-making. The general characteristics of such a system are that the public does not participate directly in decision-making, but influences it through the election of representatives; that decision-making is determined by a majority voting process with consensus rare and not necessary; and that the implementation of decisions is given over to an administrative or executive group (Burke, 1979:76). Legislative decision-making is normally, but not necessarily, characterized by partisan politics (political parties).
Canadian municipal legislative bodies (councils) are generally small, with some exceptions. Higgins says this reflects a service and efficiency philosophy, that "the best way of getting decisions made quickly is to keep council small, and to have council run more as a consensus-seeking and non-political corporate board of directors than as a politically oriented legislature" (Higgins, 1977:99). Further, the observation has been made that municipal government is based on the congressional form of government "plunked down in the midst of a parliamentary context" (Fish, 1976:175). Hence, in the congressional tradition there are fixed terms of office (i.e. it is not "responsible") and there is no party discipline; the head of the government (mayor or reeve, etc.) is elected separately and may hold different views from the majority of other individuals elected, and there are no traditional forms of "party" policy making. But unlike the American congressional system, where the administrative body is responsible to the separately elected head of government, local government administrations are "servants of the local council, and derive from it their powers and duties" (Redcliffe-Maud and Wood, 1974:93). (Incidentally, this differs also from the parliamentary tradition where civil servants are servants of the Crown.)

In performing their "representative" function, two characteristics of council members are worth noting. The one is that they generally perceive of themselves as being trustees (in Edmund Burke's famous tradition, of each deciding on the basis what he or she personally considers right or just) rather than delegates (not using independent judgement or convictions, but each deciding on the basis of what is perceived to be the wishes of his or her constituency) (Higgins, 1977:274-275). This is not unusual, for likely most
legislators see themselves as trustees (Lindblom, 1968:73). The other characteristic is also described by Higgins. He found, specifically with respect to council members in Metro Toronto, that there was a socio-economic homogeneity among those elected that was not "representative" of socio-economic characteristics of the population. In fact, there were large segments of the electorate in Metro Toronto who were socio-economically "unrepresented" (Higgins, 1977:259). Looking across Canada, he found an unrepresentative distribution of occupations among council members, possibly having to do with certain occupational groups having more time to devote to political activities without a great loss of income. This unrepresentativeness is particularly worth noting when taken together with Council members perceptions of themselves as trustees.

**Administrative Roles**

In the absence of a clearly separate executive function as in the American congressional tradition, or an executive function separate by convention as in the parliamentary tradition, structures have been developed in the larger Canadian municipalities in which administrative officials have assumed some of the executive functions. Of the twenty-four largest Canadian cities studied, eleven had either a Commission or Manager form of appointed administration (Higgins, 1977:108-122). Higgins referred to these structures as decision-making models because in his analysis he found that the Commissioners or Managers had significant centralized decision-making powers. Of the remaining thirteen cities, eleven employed the elected Board of Control model, but even so the actual council still retained in principle some of the
executive functions which encourage administrative executive powers. An analyst of the American situation found that even there, where political executives are strong, the cities with appointed managers are relatively the most centralized in terms of administration (Lineberry and Fowler, 1967:716).

**General Authority Norms**

In addition to the specific aspects of the formal political structure described above, there are some general characteristics of Canadian political processes which help to shape the environment in which communication takes place. The one of these is that Canadian attitudes toward authority are more deferential than are American (Thomas, 1980:280). Another way of viewing this is that Canadians are "characterized by conservatism to a greater degree than in the United States" (Higgins, 1974:206). This is noteworthy not so much as an absolute as a relative characteristic by comparison with American political norms and traditions. Not only must this be borne in mind when one looks at participation experiences and the literature from the United States, but it is relevant to the question of how willing the public is to engage in participatory processes.

The other characteristic of a general nature relates to the foregoing, but is more specific to formal political processes. Atkinson and White suggest that all Canadian provinces are characterized by what they call "a debilitating subservience of the legislature to the executive" (Atkinson and White, 1980:255). Even more specifically, their analysis suggests that in the provinces created after Confederation a strong parliamentary tradition has been
slow to develop. In the case of Alberta, they say, parliamentary institutions were imposed from outside and had no local roots. This is in contrast with the older Canadian provinces where these institutions grew out of the society and developed with it (Atkinson and White, 1980:256). Legislatures therefore have existed primarily to support executives, not to serve their own inherent political role.

But the significance of this analysis for our purposes is the authors' statement that the population of the provinces (especially Alberta but also in the other provinces to a certain extent) developed a "decidedly non-parliamentary approach to government and to politics" (Atkinson and White, 1980:255). Such an approach one would expect to permeate municipal politics as well as provincial politics. It is likely a part of the deference to authority referred to above, and is supportive of certain decision-making models in Canadian municipal government.

3. **Bureaucracy**

   **Pervasiveness**

   There are two understandings of what is meant by bureaucracy. The one is what might be called the technical one, that bureaucracy is a term referring to certain "bureaucratic principles" by which organizations are structured and operate in order to carry out certain tasks or functions. The other is the more common one, where bureaucracy is understood to mean the non-elected administrative agencies of government, which are assumed or perceived to operate in certain well-known and not always appreciated ways. It is the first understanding of bureaucracy that will be covered under this heading of
"Bureaucracy", as it consists of one set of well-established concepts of how organizations function. The specific well-defined characteristics which refer more particularly to the operation of government agencies will be considered following this, under the heading "Administration".

Bureaucratic principles relate to organizational structures or processes which may be characteristic of any large formal organization. They are not unique to government agencies, but are "also found in business, unions, churches, universities, and even in baseball clubs" (Blau and Meyer, 1971:4). The proponents of bureaucracy, including the classical exposition by Weber, attach no invidious connotation to the term. They believe that bureaucracy is absolutely essential for large and complex modern organizations (Presthus, 1965:35). Blau and Meyer state "the type of organization designed to accomplish large-scale administrative tasks by systematically coordinating the work of many individuals is called a bureaucracy" (Blau and Meyer, 1971:4).

There is some inconsistency in discussing bureaucracy in relationship to external communication, because bureaucracy does not expressly address the latter. Bureaucracy is concerned primarily with matters of internal structure and processes, similar to the scientific management approach to organizations, and largely ignores the external environment. However, by implication these principles are relevant to external communication as it is considered in the Open Systems approach, for in the latter the organization and its environment are inseparable in cause and effect. This serves to emphasize that a full analysis of external communication cannot ignore the "internal environment".
Characteristics and Assumptions of Bureaucracy

According to Weber, who is the person most influential in developing the idea and principles, bureaucracy has the following characteristics (Weber, 1947:333-336):

1) fixed and official jurisdictional areas which are regularly ordered by rules, i.e. by laws or administrative regulations;
2) principles of hierarchy and levels of graded authority which ensure an ordered system of super-and subordination in which higher offices supervise lower ones;
3) administration based upon written documents;
4) administration by full-time officials who are thoroughly and expertly trained; and
5) administration by general rules which are quite stable and comprehensive.

It should be apparent that many formal organizations, with their explicit regulations and official positions exemplify the controlled conditions which are described by these characteristics. Even though the daily internal activities and interactions of the members of a formal organization cannot be entirely accounted for by official regulations and positions, "the explicitly formal organization, the characteristics of which can be easily ascertained, reduces the number of variable conditions" within the organization (Blau and Meyer, 1971:15).

It is also apparent from Weber's list of characteristics that bureaucracy refers essentially to the way in which decisions are made, not what the decisions themselves are (Alford, 1969:17). Moreover, it implies the
development of specialization of decision-making within the organization, based on jurisdictional area, expertise, and hierarchy. As this specialization occurs, it is accompanied by specialization in working styles and mental processes, and by the need for control and co-ordination. This control and co-ordination is provided by the assignment of authority along hierarchical lines, resulting in the conditions for decision-making, and for participation in decision-making, being determined by a minority referred to as an oligarchical "inner elite" (Presthus, 1965:39,44).

But bureaucratic organizations are not monolithic - they are comprised of individuals downward along the hierarchy to whom is delegated authority related to the specialization of function. A large part of this delegated authority is discretionary even though there are rules and regulations; the delegation is always from the general to the more specific. Because of this discretion, each successively lower level in the hierarchy has some leeway for interpretation and choice among alternative courses of action. This interpretation and choice is based on the values, knowledge, and perceptions of the individuals at these levels. To reduce the cumulative effect of these "authority leakages", says Downs, the organization must attempt to reduce divergencies, so that in any large and multi-level organization a large part of the total activity consists of control activities which are "completely unrelated to the ...formal goals" in a direct sense (Downs, 1967:136).

A final general point worth noting for our purposes is that the characteristics of bureaucracy contain no description of how goals are set. The implication of fixed and official jurisdictional areas is that goals are not set within the bureaucratic process. "The bureaucratic model presumes that organi-
izational goals are known and are an unambiguous guide to action" (Aldrich, 1979:15).

To summarize, from Weber himself,

The decisive reason for the advance of bureaucratic organization has always been its purely technical superiority over any other form of organization... Precision, speed, unambiguity, knowledge of files, continuity, discretion, strict subordination, reduction of friction and of material and personal costs -these are raised to the optimum point in the strictly bureaucratic administration (Weber, 1946:214).

There is no room for any purely personal, irrational, or emotional elements.

Bureaucracy in Government

As noted above, bureaucracy as a way of arranging organizational structures and processes for decision-making is often confused with bureaucracy as an institution or organization itself. This is particularly true for government agencies, which are often referred to as bureaucracies. It would be more proper to speak of them as organizations which often are characterized by bureaucracy, recognizing that bureaucracy is only one method of decision-making.

Nevertheless, it is also true that most government agencies are characterized by bureaucracy. In fact, "insofar as bureaucracy connotes conformity...public administration is stamped with a higher degree of this characteristic than business management is" (Dimock and Dimock, 1969:51). One of the reasons for this, or at least a reason often advanced in support of bureaucracy in a democratic system, lies in the fact that bureaucracy promotes uniformity in decision-making, emphasizes impersonality, and hence produces
impartiality. The public is in principle treated in a universalistic rather than a particularistic fashion (Thompson, 1975:17), and this accords with the egalitarian principles of democracy.

But the attractiveness of bureaucracy to public administration goes beyond the complementarity of uniformity and impartiality with egalitarian service to the public. The bureaucratic process is recognized by government as producing "powerful institutions which greatly enhance potential capacities...because they are neutral instruments for rational administration on a large scale" (Blau and Meyer, 1971:4). Elsewhere Blau has stated this slightly differently, stating that "if men organize themselves and others for the purpose of realizing specific objectives assigned to or accepted by them, such as winning a war or collecting taxes, they establish a bureaucratic organization", where the fundamental principle is administrative efficiency (Blau, 1974:55). The strength of bureaucracy as an administrative decision-making process is well-recognized. "Democratic decisions are futile without an administrative apparatus strong enough to implement them" (Blau, 1974:56), and bureaucracy provides the apparatus with the strength necessary.

There is a third factor which leads to bureaucracy within government, as within other complex organizations. This is the interdependencies and demands within organizations produced by technological advance and specialization. The public administration's response to new political issues and to an increase in knowledge is an ever larger and more complex bureaucratic organization. It is a means of achieving goals related to new issues, and of differentiation and specialization to take advantage of increasing knowledge.
Finally, in addition to all these advantages of bureaucracy to government and public administration, there is a sense in which bureaucracy occurs directly as a response to the public itself. It is frequently the kind of response that continuous demands require, such as at the local level, for bureaucracy creates particular agencies to which particular issue groups within the public may go for satisfaction of their needs or demands. Alford maintains that "many groups in the electorate actively seek more bureaucracy..., realizing full well that the achievement of bureaucratic status by a service of local government means its relative permanence" (Alford, 1969:26-27). He also sees a danger in this, however, for "the very act of bureaucratization, while a response to one need, may be a failure to respond to another, and the implied specialization of function closes off other types of alternative responses" (Alford, 1969:28).

4. Administration

Administrative Principles

"The conventional view of the relationship between politics and administration", says Self, "is that of one between ends and means" (Self, 1972:149). The conventional view is the administrative principle that the appointed or hired administration which works for elected politicians has as its concern the neutral translation into practice of the political decisions which are independently derived from the politicians. Thus, this principle has it, the administration is not concerned with ends, but only with the means to achieve ends. The means are largely irrelevant, except insofar as ends are achieved. We have noted that the means normally involves the use of bureaucracy within administrative organizations. A part of this administrative principle
is the convention of the anonymity of the public official in terms of the policy process - policies are the politicians', not the officials'.

The overall Canadian tradition of public administration derives largely from the British tradition because of the shared political traditions centering on parliament and the Crown. In principle executive authority resides ultimately with the Sovereign, and political executives are merely advisors to the Sovereign. It is through the political executive that the administration is responsible ultimately to the Sovereign (Thomas, 1978:38). This differs in an important respect from the American congressional tradition, where the final executive authority resides with an individual who is elected and clearly political. In that tradition the public administration, which is responsible to the political executive, is bound to be caught up in the political processes surrounding the executive. The Canadian (British) parliamentary tradition on the other hand reinforces the convention of the neutrality and mean-orientation of the administration. "Canadian public servants have a stronger tradition of official neutrality than American" states Thomas (Thomas, 1980:290), which follows from the parliamentary tradition.

Easton provides an interesting view of the historical development of public administration by looking at the British political system (Easton, 1965b:125). He suggests that up to and during the eighteenth century the British legislature handled a large share of administrative as well as legislative demands and needs. However, with the rapid advance of industrialization and an increase in the matters requiring government attention, the legislature (Parliament) was "compelled by the nineteenth century to devise means to free itself from the resulting congestion, inefficiency, and confusion within
its own organization" (Easton, 1965b:125). The outcome was the development of a separative administrative apparatus charged with the task of handling routine requirements, so that the time and energy of politicians could be turned to broader political requirements. The significance of this view is that the administration deals with matters, however routine they may seem, which were originally clearly political in that they were dealt with by politicians.

Even apart from Easton's view, however within conventional administrative principle it is recognized that at the top of the administration there is an interaction with the politician, whether in the British or American tradition, who is the elected "superior". Thus at that top level the administrator is directly involved in at least some element of the political process. The top level administrator interacts with the politician and by implication with the elements of the political process to which the politician relates (Dimock and Dimock, 1969:71; and Thomas, 1980:290). But below that top level there is impartiality and pure administration, with no decisions or actions having a policy or political effect.

One can readily appreciate the attractiveness of bureaucracy with this understanding of administration.

**Administrative Reality**

The reality of public administration differs significantly from its principles. It reflects the inevitable political nature of any action which occurs anywhere within the overall political system. For one thing, any matter becomes political "essentially by being made so" (Self, 1972:150). Moreover, it is generally recognized that the administration is clearly involved in the
making of policy. As Gortner states, "it is now a commonly accepted idea that the public administrator's role is not only that of carrying out the policy mandated by the legislature but also that of being an active participant in making the policy in the first place" (Gortner, 1977:6). Some writers feel that administrative policy-making occurs only at the highest levels (Lindblom, 1968:75); and Campbell and Clarke, 1980:310, for example). Others have noted that in effect policy-making, in the sense of how and where it finally has an impact on the public, occurs throughout the administration by virtue of processes akin to the authority leakages discussed in connection with bureaucracy. According to Medeiros and Schmitt, for example, "the policy statements of courts, executives, and legislators...are often characterized by mixed objectives, broad generalities, and unclear commands, so public bureaucracies (sic) contribute to the making and formulation of public policy by interpreting law and reconstructing it into more operational dimensions" (Medeiros and Schmitt, 1977:4-5). This policy role is substantial, and is based on a combination of information, expertise, and discretion. Easton suggests that this is not unusual, because it results from normal organizational processes and is therefore not necessarily deliberate. Public administration is a social system itself, with highly differentiated internal structure, and such a system usually comes to fulfill multiple functions in addition to those assigned or expected (Easton, 1965b:126).

The fact that public administration is involved somehow or other in the policy-making process is not necessarily seen as undesirable by all administrative analysts and writers. According to Campbell and Szabolowski, there is a "theory in vogue among students of public administration today that formal
standards and procedures for maintenance of desired bureaucratic behaviour excessively impinge on the very individual discretion which calls forth the best in officials' instincts" (Campbell and Szablowski, 1980:209). It is seen by some as being necessary to good government in the sense of being able to meet the public's needs, and in meeting the deficiencies of politicians' knowledge and interpretation of the requirements of the public (Self, 1972:289). Easton also suggests that without the "self-expression" possible and found in modern administration, "it is doubtful whether the political authorities would be able to obtain the kind of knowledge they need in order to govern" (Easton, 1965b:253). But one of the less desirable results of this from the administrators' viewpoint, is that they have to attempt to balance the requirements or expressed policies of politicians, on the one hand, against the needs and demands of the public as they may be conveyed to the administration, on the other (Self, 1972:286). This requires a basic political skill on the part of the public administrator, for rational decisions in a political context are those which are politically feasible. Public administration must have the ability to consider and use a knowledge of human nature and the political system, and the interaction of all parts of the system, to balance these desires and demands and at the same time fulfill overall goals (Gortner, 1977:131-132).

Some writers on administration suggest or imply the desirability of public administration deliberately adopting an even more positive and activist role. Self is one, when he warns that if the political leadership is unequal to the task of defining adequate policies and goals then a purely administrative administration only emphasizes the resulting gaps (Self, 1972:295-296). Two
recent Canadian writers have discussed the merits of what they call objective vs. subjective accountability on the part of public administration (Campbell and Szabowski, 1980). Objective accountability, which is bureaucratic, does not call forth the best in officials' instincts; subjective accountability does. The latter consists of accountability to a broad range of policy participants, and of becoming active by taking risks, and fostering tension and conflict (1980:197). Campbell and Szabowski refer to studies which found that subjectively-oriented officials had greater interaction with legislators, party leaders, interest-group leaders, and ordinary citizens than those who were objectively-oriented (1980:198). The implication is that subjective accountability, greater interaction, and better performance go together, and that subjective accountability and greater interaction should therefore be encouraged. A more unusual position also in support of a positive and activist role for public administration is that taken some years ago by Long (Long, 1952). His proposition is that the public administration is not only a part of the executive of government, but that it is in itself an important medium for representing the values of society within the democratic system. While legislatures fail to represent all such values, the administration compensates for the deficiency by representing, through the individuals who comprise it, important and vital interests which are otherwise either poorly represented or not represented at all.

The literature on the subject of public administration, and the foregoing discussion, suggest that there is some debate within the field as to how public administration should or can best be carried out. This debate, while it is related to some of the principles and concepts of democratic theory, seems
to be genuinely concerned with simply what is good public administration apart from whether or not it is democratic. Significantly, the debate involves at its roots "structurally-based versus process-oriented concepts of administrative behavior" (Dunn and Fozouni, 1976:5-6), and raises the issue of whether or not bureaucracy is appropriate for public administration. In part the debate suggests that public administrators and the proponents of effective public administration are recognizing that public administration is inherently political. Rather than seeking to force public administration back into the mold of "means-orientation", the object of one side of the debate is instead to determine new models or patterns of behaviour for a public administration which is also "ends-oriented" within the framework of a democratic political system. This debate itself provides a part of the context within which to consider the public agency's external communication.
C. Planning Theory, and an Operational Model of Planning

1. Why Bring in Planning Theory?

A full development of the hypothesis for the public planning agency requires incorporation of current planning theory. The reason for this lies in the fact that the planning function, unlike the functions of many other public agencies, relies on its own professional body of procedural theory to guide its operation. This procedural theory provides the basis for the development of an operational model whereby a public agency carries out the planning function.

For a public planning agency, professional theory may be a sufficient reason for public participation. However, as noted in Chapter I, the public planning agency normally functions within an institutional framework where subscribing to its own professional theory as the sole basis for public participation may bring it into conflict with other prevailing norms and procedures within that institutional framework. Therefore a professional theory basis for public participation is not functionally sufficient for the planning agency. On the other hand, the professional theory basis is necessary. It must therefore also be incorporated in this study.

2. Procedural Planning Theory

Burke states:

In the 1950's and 1960's, two vying conceptions of planning were prevalent. One was a rational comprehensive model and the other was an incrementalist model. There is a growing realization, beginning in the 1970's, that such an "either/or" conception of planning is questionable. Two principles have been advanced:

1. There is no "best" type or style of planning;

2. The type or style of planning is contingent on the planning organization, the nature of the planning task, and the decision environment (Burke, 1979:296-297).
New approaches to planning have been developed - disjointed incrementalism, advocacy, and transactional -, all representing a shift from "rational" (or synoptic) planning to a concept of planning, as process. All recognize the influence of other individuals in defining planning objectives. There is a recognition that the planner and the planning agency are each just one of a number of influences on community decision-making and the emphasis is on the achievement of objectives as opposed to the development of master plans to guide day-to-day decisions (Burke, 1979:16). The present situation is one where the "mainstream theories of planning are principally concerned with procedural techniques. Substantive content is usually left to secondary levels of specialization" (Hudson, 1979:393).

There are various reasons for the shift from a rational comprehensive or synoptic planning theory to a process theory of planning. These have been well-documented in the planning and related literature (Davidoff and Reiner, 1962; Friedmann and Hudson, 1974; Galloway and Mahayni, 1977; Hudson, 1979; and Braybrooke and Lindblom, 1963, for example). The reasons can be summarized as follows, for our purposes:

1. Instead of the traditional, earlier focus on land-use planning, planning (as a profession) now is concerned with a broad range of issues such as land-use, housing, transportation, the environment, and the like. All are recognized as having impacts on each other. But the complexity of the problem of co-ordinating a large number of decisions in all these issue-areas, in the true synoptic or rational tradition, casts doubt on the usefulness of synoptic or rational planning (Heikoff, 1975:63; and Hudson, 1979).
2. "Problems" are often not what they seem, and the "rational" solutions of problems result in further problems (Rittel and Webber, 1973; Sharkansky, 1972; and Perin, 1967).

3. The planner is faced by a society with a wide variety of shifting and conflicting values, including his or her own, so that the validity or legitimacy of synoptic plans can be attacked from many sides (Heikoff, 1975).

4. The planner's fear of being found "wrong" in recommendation or "incomplete" in the range of variables or alternatives studied has led to an abuse of open-endedness and flexibility in the process of preparing synoptic plans, i.e. plans are not plans (Perin, 1967).

In short, says Hudson, there are a series of criticisms levelled at synoptic rationality:

its insensitivity to existing institutional performance capabilities; its reductionist epistemology; its failure to appreciate the cognitive limits of decision-makers, who cannot "optimize" but only "satisfice" choices by successive approximations...the synoptic tradition of expressing social values (a priori goal-setting; artificial separation of ends from means; presumption of a general public interest rather than pluralist interest)...its bias toward central control - in the definition of problems and solutions, in the evaluation of alternatives, and in the implementation of decisions (Hudson, 1979:389).

Regardless of whether or not one accepts these criticisms as valid (and Hudson notes that despite them, the basic simplicity of the synoptic approach encompasses practical tasks which must be addressed in some form even by its most adamant critics), a number of other deliberate approaches to planning have developed. As Sharkansky says:
The failure of decision-makers to follow the rigorous prescriptions of the rational model does not mean that their decisions are frenetic, unpatterned, or made without benefit of human reason (Sharkansky, 1972:52).

and

The finding of decision-practices which are not purely rational, therefore, is not a serious condemnation of the ways decisions are made in administrative systems (Sharkansky, 1972:53).

For the purpose of selecting a theory base and developing an operational model we must therefore examine the alternatives further. A useful starting point is to accept Hudson's assertion that the most important of these include incremental planning, transactive planning, advocacy planning, and radical planning (Hudson, 1979:388).

At the outset we are obliged to reject the radical theory of planning, as it is in contradiction to the position taken herein that the hypothesis can be developed within the existing representative democratic political system. The radical theory of planning as expounded by Grabow and Heskin goes beyond that in that it demands a "revolutionary change" of all existing systems (Grabow and Heskin, 1973:109). The planner is a radical agent of change "in all realms: social, economic, technological and scientific, educational, religious, cultural, sexual, and political" (Grabow and Heskin, 1973:112). "Radical planning would transform society. It is a concept of planning based on system change" says Burke (Burke, 1979:294), and is intended to challenge the assumptions of the way power is structured in local communities (Burke, 1979:83). Burke goes on to suggest that radical planning is not necessary, because "the broader interests of a community, including the interests of the powerless, tend to be served over time by means of competing
constituencies" (Burke, 1979:84). However, whether radical planning is necessary or not is irrelevant here, for the hypothesis is examined in the context of the existing system.

We will also for the present set aside the incremental school. Although under it plans are constructed by a mixture of "intuition, experience, rules of thumb, various techniques (rarely sophisticated) known to individual planners, and an endless series of consultations" (Horvat, 1972:200, cited in Hudson, 1979:389), it does not specifically refer to intuition or experience derived from consultations implicit in public participation. Its emphasis is still on the achievement of specific functional objectives (Hudson, 1979:388). As such the incremental approach does not in itself provide an answer to the criticism of the synoptic approach that the latter is incapable of properly taking into account the values of the society (and of the planners) for which planning is being carried out.

Heikoff notes that planning involves any or all of issues such as economic issues, or differences in cultural values and beliefs, all of which are issues for which there is no consensual framework within the community (Heikoff, 1975:22). The significance of this is that planning reality requires an explicit recognition of conflicting values and of their place in planning; "values are inescapable elements of any rational decision-making process, or any exercise of choice" (Davidoff and Reiner, 1962:103). Reiner has also asserted elsewhere that "if there is one truth in the world of the planner, it is that he is indeed deeply immersed in values at every turn" (Reiner, 1967:233). This has direct procedural consequences for planning, for the fact that community issues inevitably involve value components as well as technical
components "means that the values represented by the various members of the group must be integrated into the decision process" (Benello, 1971:46). This reality is often obscured by those who wish to limit planning problems to technical considerations in order to avoid "messy" questions of values involving differing perspectives of different people.

Of Hudson's remaining alternative approaches, transactive planning and advocacy planning both are concerned with a process of planning which includes dealing with values.

Dealing first with advocacy planning, one notes that it is essentially a process of planning based on pluralism (Hudson, 1979:390; and Burke, 1979:10). But while advocacy planning serves the important purpose of shifting the planning and decision-making processes out into the open, where there can be a full and explicit discussion of values, its basis in pluralism gives some difficulty in accepting it as a useful theory for a public planning agency. The assumption of pluralism is that all interests are achieved through the true interplay of various interests (Burke, 1979:83). This assumes that all interests are represented in the process, and that all have equal strength. Even if this were so, which Burke doubts, the advocacy approach reduces decision-making to brokerage among conflicting interests advocating different plans (Heikoff, 1975:26). As often as not the planning agency ends up being one of the interests advocating its own position.

The common analogy between advocacy planning and the legal advocacy system breaks down at the stage where a choice among the various positions is required. Unlike the legal system, there is in planning no universally accepted body of "received knowledge" such as statute law or precedents upon which to
base the choice. Moreover, if the planning agency is cast in the broker role, it cannot easily escape from being the advocate of its own position as well as the broker among the various positions.

The danger of the pluralist approach to planning (advocacy planning) in a political framework is that "pluralist politics runs the risk of stalemate. If a government is only a neutral empire, it cannot act unless there is a common denominator of group interests" (Heikoff, 1975:27). Pluralism or advocacy planning are not processes which can effectively handle all decisions, since some values cannot easily be negotiated by or among different individuals and groups. In this situation there is either no common denominator of group interests, or it may be so insignificant as to be meaningless. Because of this, says Heikoff, "if the state is not to be an initiator of policy, pluralist group conflict can cripple responsible government" (Heikoff, 1975:27). Those who are in positions of authority have the responsibility to also lead, not simply to attempt to follow the interplay of contending interest groups. Decisions which are binding on the whole society are necessary. The planning agency operating within a framework where the authority to make decisions rests finally within the representative political process has a valid role in providing its own positive advice into that process.

Further support for this position is provided by Easton, in his examination of political systems. He contends that system outputs (decisions) are not simply the product of a "passive summation of demands", a sort of process where all demands are added up or compared against one another, cancelling or modifying those that conflict, and weighing according to the number of similar demands (Easton, 1965b:346). The authorities are able to
sponsor new demands. Without the ability to do this, the simple summation of demands and their conversion into outputs (i.e. decision-making) would leave the authorities with little ability to cope with the environment. Only by having this ability can the authorities enable the system to be goal-oriented and adoptive (Easton, 1965b:346).

We can now turn to the transactive planning alternative. In a modified form it provides the most useful planning theory approach to public participation in a local government context.

The transactive planning approach, says Hudson, focuses on the intact experience of people's lives revealing policy issues to be addressed. Planning is not carried out with respect to an anonymous target community of beneficiaries, but in face-to-face contact with the people affected by decisions. Planning consists less of field surveys and data analyses, and more of interpersonal dialogue, marked by a process of mutual learning (Hudson, 1979:389).

Its basis is the proposition that because planning is normative and deals with values or "subjective realities, including political concerns, cultural, aesthetic, psychological and ideological considerations" (Hudson, 1979:392), planning must be a process which is interactive between planners and those for whom planning is being carried out.

Friedmann, who is the main theorizer of transactive planning, uses the terms technical planners and clients for these interactors (Friedmann, 1976). Without raising too many conceptual difficulties, we can substitute for these terms the public planning agency and the public, respectively. In doing so we recognize two possible difficulties:
1. that Friedmann's transactive dialogue is interpersonal (between individuals), not inter-group, and

2. that in Systems Theory the group has its own existence separate from the individuals comprising it.

However, we have also noted that interpersonal communication is perhaps the most significant channel of organizational communication and that organizational learning occurs from individual learning. Therefore we feel relatively safe in making this substitution.)

Transactive planning theory holds that the "processed" knowledge of the planning agency (concepts, substantive theory, analytical techniques, new perspectives, systematic search procedures, etc.) must be fused with the "personal" knowledge of the community (intimate knowledge of context, realistic alternatives, norms, priorities, feasibility judgements, operational details, etc.) in order that the community can learn about itself and make the learning effective in appropriate action (Friedmann, 1976). Only in this way can planning be really successful, for it is only in this way that planners and clients come to understand each other, and the other's knowledge. This process of mutual learning through dialogue is critical to transactive planning, for a "common image of the situation evolves through dialogue" (Friedmann, 1976:302), and with this image the community will be predisposed to act. Friedmann notes that there are situations so technical, or where technical expertise is so highly esteemed, that transactive dialogue and mutual learning are not applicable but in urban planning this is not the case (Friedmann, 1976:305). However, as Mink, Shultz, and Mink have warned, there can also be a danger in valuing process over content, or in maintaining a distinction between process
and content (Mink, Shultz, and Mink, 1979:33). Processed and personal knowledge are both important, as well as procedure.

Hudson concedes that the transactive approach is not necessarily the best model in all situations. Each of the alternative approaches has its strengths and weaknesses in different situations (Hudson, 1979:390-395). But in our case, that of a municipal public planning agency, we are concerned with a situation where the closeness of the community to the issues involved means that the community is directly affected by them and their resolution in a highly personal and individualized way. Transactive planning, in Hudson's analysis, has its major strength precisely in addressing this human dimension (Hudson, 1979:392), where there is the greatest necessity for the planning agency to understand problems through face-to-face interaction with those affected. Benello says on this point that the balancing of the many value trade-offs involved can only be achieved by involving those most directly affected, for where "customs, norms, ethical and social considerations inject themselves...groups made up of those affected are the only valid interpreters of such norms and values" (Benello, 1971:47).

The transactive approach which has been described is that which provides a planning theory basis for public participation as it can be engaged in by the public planning agency. It also corresponds closely to a description of the agency's need for Open Systems external communication in the form of public participation. The public planning agency needs public participation for the experiential knowledge which the public brings to the planning process, and for the support which the public provides the planning agency through the mutual learning process. This describes transactive planning. (Although it is
not directly relevant to the hypothesis in these terms, the support which the public provides the planning agency through the mutual learning process is nothing less than the "integrative" benefits of public participation held by classical democratic theory. Here we have a congruence of organization theory, planning theory, and democratic theory.

3. An Operational Model

What has been discussed up to now in this section is a basis in "mainstream" planning theory for public participation. The argument advanced has been that for a public planning agency at the urban local government level the transactive planning approach provides that basis. What is now necessary is to propose a full operational model for the planning agency within the representative democratic framework which we have assumed. Without that there can be no understanding of the processes and constraints on decision-making in respect of public planning.

To do this requires a modification of the transactive approach. The transactive approach is concerned not only with a transactive dialogue between planners and clients, but also with the operational processes of decision-making and control. It is in the latter respect that modification is necessary. "Transactive planning also refers to the evolution of decentralized planning institutions that help people take increasing control over the social processes that govern their welfare" say Hudson (Hudson, 1979:389). The origins for that lie in Friedmann's development of the approach, wherein the fusion of processed knowledge with personal knowledge is further "fused with action" (Friedmann, 1976:299), a process "embedded in continual evolution of ideas validated
through action" (Hudson, 1979:389). What this means in effect is a form of
direct democracy. Because of our assumption respecting a basic representative
political decision-making system, our model cannot accept the transactive
approach to its full extent as it relates to operation. Any formal devolution
or decentralization of decision-making to an independent process of fusing
knowledge with action can happen only to the extent that it is sanctioned
through the existing representative system. Such a change can be likened to a
constitutional change of local government, which is beyond our scope.

But even though the assumption is the major direct constraint on
utilization of the transactive planning approach, we can look behind the
assumption for a fuller understanding of the constraint. For this we refer to
Easton's observation quoted earlier, that although it would be possible to
envision each political decision being made and implemented in a direct
democracy fashion, in practice the delegation of decision-making to specialized
members of the system is necessary. This speaks directly to the decision-making
and implementation content of transactive planning, for it would similarly be
difficult to envision the full application of that aspect of transactive
planning in a community comprised of many people. In the absence of direct
decision-making there remains the responsibility for leadership, where someone
is responsible to take the initiative and make decisions binding on the
community. The practicalities of the situation therefore require a public
planning agency to accept the responsibility to be an initiator, as well as
either a mediator in the community or an enabler in the fusion of processed
knowledge with experiential knowledge.
We have noted, however, that a public planning agency does function in two decision-making modes. The one is where the agency in effect makes decisions respecting what to bring and recommend to political officials for their final binding decision. The other is where political officials have either explicitly or implicitly accepted decision-making by the agency, of a nature, where appointed officials themselves make binding decisions. Transactive dialogue and mutual learning can be employed in the first case to produce recommendations, with no conflict with representative decision-making, even though it does not take the next step of directly fusing knowledge with action. In the second case, transactive planning can in principle be carried through the action step as well. But in the first case the practicalities of leadership and decision-making will necessitate that the planning agency at times take the initiative to recommend without the benefit of full knowledge fusion resulting from a full transactive dialogue. In the second case, these same practicalities will necessitate that the planning agency at times take the initiative to act in a binding fashion without the full benefit of the fusion of knowledge with action. There cannot be a vacuum in the decision making process.

For these reasons the procedural planning theory base for public participation in an operational model is one which we will call qualified-transactive. It is qualified in two respects:

1. in the respect that final decision-making authority (action) rests with elected representatives, and

2. in the respect that the public planning agency is not only a mediating agency or a knowledge fusion enabler - it is also an initiator where mediation or knowledge fusion is inadequate or not possible.
Even so, the public planning agency under this modification is assumed to still strive for full transactive planning as a goal.

We have described the process of planning in our operational model as being essentially transactive but qualified as noted above. But describing the process of planning is not sufficient for the formulation of an operational model. What is needed to complete an operational model is an instrumental or method characteristic which answers the question: what are the decisions which should come out of the planning process? This is made more necessary by our having qualified the transactive approach to the process. The complete transactive approach, in fusing knowledge with action, results in the necessary decisions flowing from the fusion of processed and experiential knowledge. The decision, whatever it might be, is appropriate to the result of that fusion. The qualified transactive approach is not so simple, for decisions no longer happen as a fusion of knowledge with action.

We were led to the transactive approach by Hudson's and Burke's assertions that there has been a definite shifting away from rational comprehensive or synoptic planning which produces a comprehensive or master plan. Having accepted a qualified transactive process, we can note that we cannot then be led back to the outcome of the process being such a plan. One writer says quite emphatically

If the plan is viewed as the central preoccupation of the planning authority and the network of communication is largely devoted to a flow of information necessary to revise and rewrite a comprehensive plan, this activity will tend to centralize the planning process. A more "powerful" plan, increasingly co-ordinated and offering more detailed solutions to problems, limits the character of grass-roots participation (Hayward, 1974:21).
The answer to the question as to what decisions should come out of the planning process lies to a large extent in an understanding of the nature of the problems and issues which the process must address.

As a start, we note there appears to be a general agreement that the problems of society are becoming more complex and diverse. Our earlier references to the changing character of urban concerns suggests this. Toffler, for example, maintains that society is moving towards increased heterogeneity and diversity (Toffler, 1978:xiv-xv), and that more and more decisions must be made in a matter of hours rather than weeks (Toffler, 1978:xviii).

One of the more illuminating and provocative commentaries on planning problems characterizes them as "wicked" problems (Rittel and Webber, 1973). The problems are wicked not because they are ethically deplorable, but are wicked in a sense akin to being malignant, vicious, tricky, or aggressive. Among their distinguishing properties are the following:

1. there is no definitive formulation of the problem;
2. solutions to them are not true or false, but good or bad;
3. there is no immediate and ultimate test of a solution;
4. they do not have an enumerable (or exhaustively describable) set of potential solutions;
5. every problem is essentially unique; and
6. solutions to them will likely result in further problems; and
7. the existence of a condition representing a problem can be explained in numerous ways.

This characterization of planning problems is convincing, and bears some semblance to the complexity and diversity of problems which a public
planning agency faces. Against that we can compare Lindblom's description of what a rational decision-maker would do (Lindblom, 1968:13):

1. identify the problem;
2. clarify the goals, and rank them as to their importance;
3. list all the possible means - or policies - for achieving each of the goals;
4. assess all the costs and benefits that would seem to follow from each of the alternative policies;
5. compare the consequences of each alternative with the goals; and
6. select the package of goals and associated policies that would bring the greatest relative benefits and the least relative disadvantages.

The comparison shows that the rational decision-maker cannot cope with wicked problems; the rational approach, essentially a scientific method approach, was developed to deal with "tame" problems in situations the opposite of that which Toffler or Rittel and Webber describe.

Toffler suggests there are essentially only two ways of dealing with the situation: to strengthen the decision-making centre, or to take a participative remedial approach (Toffler, 1978:xviii). But the first, apart from being autocratic and anti-democratic, becomes increasingly error-prone, dangerous, and self-defeating, if decisions are incorrect, because "decisions become divorced from reality, and... errors will go uncorrected until they escalate into crisis" (Toffler, 1978:xviii).

Because we have modified transactive planning to a qualified-transactive planning approach, and have argued that the synoptic or
rational comprehensive approach to decision-making is inappropriate for the type of problems confronting planning, let us return to the incremental planning approach which was set aside earlier. As noted from Hudson, the emphasis of incremental planning is on the achievement of specific functional objectives. It addresses the question of the type of decisions which come out of the planning process. In a well-reasoned presentation of what they call a "strategy of disjointed incrementalism", Braybrooke and Lindblom discuss cogent arguments for its applicability in dealing with problems of the nature described by Rittel and Webber (Braybrooke and Lindblom, 1963: Chap. 5). To describe it in detail requires more space than is necessary here. Suffice it to say that it is a strategy by which the planning process can continuously make small decisions for particular problems, decisions whose effects can be contemplated and which can be reversed if results are not desirable, and which by their nature have effects which themselves can be remedied incrementally if they are not desirable. Moreover, it is a strategy by which planning can adapt to changing values, for no large-scale processes are set in motion which are irreversible. On the latter point, Braybrooke and Lindblom argue against making irreversible "large" decisions. We shall return to this shortly.

The strategy is singularly appropriate in combination with the transactive approach, because it speaks directly to the problem of how the public may tackle planning problems with a sense of accomplishment (Yates, 1976:172). The public's lack of time, information, and expertise can be accommodated, since not every problem is taken on and local problems may be gradually eroded through a series of "tangible successes" (Yates, 1976:172). This is psychologically important, as Perin has noted in her reference to the
obsessional frustration resulting from the production of unrealized comprehensive plans. "One effective means of developing assurance of competence is to stage small but visible successes" (Perin, 1967:338), and disjointed incrementalism encourages this.

Burke uses the term "remedial" planning, saying that disjointed incrementalism is a variation of it (Burke, 1979:287-288). That term is more descriptive of what the type of decisions are - they are basically remedial. We propose, therefore, that the appropriate operational model include remedial planning with the qualified-transactive approach, for the reasons discussed above. The operational model may therefore be labelled remedial/qualified-transactive for the present.

But this model is deficient in an important respect. It is not essentially concerned in any respect with even minimal basic decisions which influence the long-range future. The disjointed incrementalist, as represented by Braybrooke and Lindblom, argue that this deficiency is irrelevant because long-term concerns are inappropriate and incapable of consideration. The long-term "equilibrium" goal (to use a term from economics) is a continuously shifting unknown equilibrium. Nevertheless, the opposite argument can also be made that even though this equilibrium is continuously shifting, remedial planning should occur within a framework of a perception of the long-range future albeit where it is recognized that perception is continuously evolving (the shifting equilibrium). Long-range goals, and "large" and possibly irreversible decisions related to them, are important.

Toffler refers to this, saying that the decision process must be one "in which all goals, no matter whose, are continually re-evaluated in the light
of accelerating change" (Toffler, 1978:xix). Recognizing that the planning agency's and the public's knowledge is bounded or limited, however, one can select particular issues or problems and work toward resolving each independently within a long-range framework. This is the process of "strategic" planning described by Burke (1979:288). It rejects the principle of comprehensiveness but accepts the premise of a rational process through "an annual and ongoing process" of consciously and deliberately designing strategies to control the future (Burke, 1979:288). Strategic planning must and can be incorporated into our operational model, but recognizing that the evolving future is itself influenced by remedial decisions.

Our simple operational model is now complete, a strategic/remedial/qualified-transactive model. It incorporates the transactive process where, by mutual learning and the fusion of the public planning agency's processed knowledge with the public's experiential knowledge, remedial and strategic planning and decision-making can take place within a representative democratic political system. This is the operational model of a public planning agency which, in its organizational context, we shall now look at more closely relative to external communication.
CHAPTER V: THE NEED FOR PUBLIC PARTICIPATION AS EXTERNAL COMMUNICATION

A. The Political System Framework of Analysis

1. Public Planning is Political

The usefulness of public participation to the public planning agency, in organizational terms, must be found through an examination of how it benefits the agency in its relation with the public. The public is the other communicator in the process of engaging in public participation. To do this one must look at public participation with the concept that it is one form of external communication. It is then possible to analyse how well the planning agency's external communication needs are served by other forms of external communication, and of how public participation can remedy deficiencies that exist. The agency's overall external communication needs are found, in turn, through an examination of how external communication affects its inputs and outputs relative to its environment. Therein lies the reason to have a clear understanding of the organizational context of the agency - the situation within which it exists - which establishes the agency's basic purpose, its basic mode of operation, and the significant determinants of its processes.

The public planning agency exists, first and foremost, as an organization within the democratic political system. Its character is shaped by this reality, both in general terms because it is an agency of government responsible to elected officials and ultimately the electorate, and in more specific terms because administrative realities make inevitable its direct involvement in the policy-making process. However one defines democracy and the democratic process, or whether one takes the position that the political system is not as democratic as it should be, the electoral process and the general
acceptance of norms such as freedom of speech, assembly, and dissent mean that government is broadly responsive to the public. The public planning agency ultimately, therefore, exists as an instrument to meet the needs and wishes of the public, however poorly these may be defined or articulated. While it is recognized that every organization has its own internal or maintenance goals, a public agency in a democratic political system is inescapably judged by how well it fulfills a political function in relation to the public.

Because of this political context, one must look at the public planning agency's inputs and outputs, environment, and external communication in terms of the agency's being a part of the political system at the municipal government level. Its public is the municipal government's public. But the political system at the municipal level is not an independent or isolated system - it is impacted and constrained by other political systems as we have noted.

One of the noted writers on the subject of general system theory referred to earlier is David Easton. In addition to writing on general systems theory he has also written specifically on the subject of the political system, describing it in terms of being an open system (Easton, 1965a and 1965b). His description provides a framework which lends itself to the study of any agency within the political system, and we will therefore rely on it.

2. **System Persistence**

Easton's point-of-departure is to consider the activities which the political system must engage in, in order to persist. Persistence he defines differently from maintenance of the system. Persistence does not concern itself with the maintenance of any particular specific structure or
pattern, but rather with retention of the "essential variables" in the system that must operate within some normal range, otherwise the system is changed (Easton, 1965a:92). Persistence requires that members of the system "be able to adapt, correct, readjust, control, or modify the system or its parameters to cope with the problems created by internal or external stress" by a process of self-regulation which includes self-transformation in structures and goals (Easton, 1965a:87). Persistence is therefore not a perfectly static condition; in fact change is necessary for if the system is to persist it must be able to adapt itself to changing circumstances. Easton suggests that for democracies the essential variables would likely be "some vaguely defined degree of freedom of speech and association and popular participation in the political process" (Easton, 1965a:93).

We can note two things from the foregoing in relation to this study. One is that the hypothesis is not incompatible with the notion of system persistence; indeed it may even be seen, under the circumstances of demands for increased participation, as representing adaptation necessary for persistence in order that the public agency can more effectively perform (quite apart from adaptation to demands for public participation). A second is that the "essential variables" of democracy suggested by Easton are adhered to, in our assumption of a representative democratic system.

3. **System Inputs**

The major immediate environmental concern of any organization is the inputs it receives from the environment, for the public planning agency as a part of the political system, using Easton's framework, the environmental
influences on it focus in two major groups of inputs - demands and support (Easton, 1965b:27). The remainder of this section is based on Easton, 1965b, by applying his analysis and concepts to the public planning agency. He, of course, does not refer to the public planning agency or any specific agency.) The agency is but a part of a complex and continuing political conversion process which takes in the demands and support and out of them produces its outputs. But the outputs themselves must also be of concern to the agency, for the outputs influence the support demands. (29). The outputs of the agency shape the environment and influence its subsequent behaviour. Therefore, while the agency cannot directly determine the nature of the demands and support it receives, it can take action with respect to its outputs, the effects of which may reshape the environment in some way; that is to say, they influence conditions and behaviour there. In this way the outputs are able to modify the influences that continue to operate on the inputs and thereby the next round of inputs themselves (32).

We have earlier considered in general terms what the inputs to a public planning agency are, particularly noting how they differ from those of a private, profit-oriented organization. There are, of course, the obvious tangible inputs of personnel and financial resources, the "energetic inputs" which Katz and Kahn referred to. Under Easton's analysis the demands which a public agency receives are themselves a major group of inputs, and the other more easily determined energetic inputs are a portion of the support inputs which it receives. The demands are major determinants of the public agency's outputs, and the agency as an instrumental organization in large part owes its existence to these demands. While Easton himself does not draw this comparison, it is useful to note. In the case of the public agency, its environment through the
political process has brought about the organization to meet the demands, whereas for most private organizations the response to perceived needs (demands) results from individuals or existing organizations voluntarily establishing themselves to meet the demands. Demand inputs are therefore very significant for the planning agency.

For some public agencies the demand inputs are demands for tangible or measurable products or services (transportation, health care, etc.). But for an agency such as the public planning agency the demand inputs are basically demands that certain intangible decisions should be made by the agency. Easton refers to these demands as an expression that "an authoritative allocation with regard to a particular subject matter should or should not be made" (38). Demands may be quite specific, simple, and narrow in nature, requiring a decision or an allocation with respect to a particular situation which is unique. For a planning agency this may be a decision on the use of a particular piece of land, or where a roadway should be located, for example. But Easton notes that there is another class of demands, for decisions which are highly general, vague, and complex. "Broad pleas for better government, for a more vigorous defense policy, or for greater attention to the underprivileged, without specification of the exact steps to be taken" are examples of such highly generalized demands, and are no less demands than those which are more specific (39).

Demand inputs are transmitted to decision-makers in the political process through a number of channels (external communication). In some societies these have taken the form of institutions and processes which are characterized as democratic, but in Easton's analysis these can be understood
without any normative or ethical content. These channels are basically communication channels which are social inventions and which have in part evolved gradually to deal with demand input and the need to devise ways of handling it (121). The volume of demands in modern complex societies has grown enormously, requiring a variety of channeling mechanisms such as legislatures, interest groups, political parties, the mass media, or even administrative organizations themselves, to serve as input channels "that are continuously open, at least for those that are influential" (122). The modern differentiation of political from other social institutions, and the bureaucratization, professionalization and specialization of administrative structures are capacity responses to the need for processing a greater volume of demands (124). This response has included the professionalization of official political roles themselves, such as the evolution of full-time political positions, so that the occupants of the roles can devote more time to the political matters in institutions which are themselves differentiated from other institutions.

But Easton suggests that even this expansion and specialization of channels is not sufficient to allow processing of all demand inputs. The volume of demands is such that demand reduction is necessary, in order to not overload the decision-making system (729). Methods of "pre-processing" of demands have evolved in order to reduce those reaching decision-makers. These methods include the collection of similar demands, or the combination of different but related demands, or the assignment of demand processing to other institutions. Collection and combination occur in some of the channels themselves, for example through interest groups or political parties (128). Demand processing may often be re-assigned to administrative agencies.
In modern political systems dealing with a high volume of demands, existing channels may fail to adequately or satisfactorily process demands, or an excessive or unwanted reduction of demands may occur. Blockage of demands does not serve to obliterate them, and channel failure is then revealed in other modes of expressing demands such as protests and demonstrations. These protests or demonstrations may be aimed at satisfying the demands themselves, or at creating new channels through which they can be expressed. Channel failure is "manifest in the confusion among the members of the system with regard to the issues at stake or in the faulty and insufficient information that may reach the authorities with regard to the sources of discontent" (122).

Support inputs are somewhat more difficult to conceptualize. They are not as specific as demand inputs and they involve norms and values. Moreover, they are diffuse in their objects and are not concerned solely with identifiable agencies and institutions. For example, there can be support for "the system" without support for a specific agency or institution. Easton identifies three basic relevant objects of support in a political system: the "political community", the "regime", and the "authorities" (172). The first consists of all the members of the political system seen as a group of persons bound together for political purposes and sharing in its political activity - the nation, or the province, or the city (177). The second is what might be called the "constitutional order" - the set of political values and principles, operating rules, and structures by which the political community exists and functions (190). The third object - the authorities - is a part of the regime structure (205).
Our attention is focused on the latter. In Easton's terms, the authorities represent a continuum from those who have "the primary responsibility for making decisions at the most inclusive level in the system and hold the broadest discretion in doing so" to, those "whose range of discretion is considerably less and the scope of whose authority is considerably narrower" (213). The authorities continuum therefore ranges from the elected political executive through the levels of the administration. It is therefore the "authorities" which is our concern here, for a public planning agency is a component of the authorities. On a broad basis support for the authorities is ultimately translated into support for the regime, for there is little likelihood that a regime can survive if the members of the political system fail to support the occupants of authority roles within the regime (215). Thus if the authorities wish to ensure support for the regime they must attempt to ensure support for themselves. Presumably the public planning agency supports a democratic regime; it must therefore ultimately be concerned with providing support to it. The converse is also true, that support for the regime provides support for the authorities. The authorities' actions which generate regime support are also those which provide support for the authorities themselves. At a specific level the authorities must be concerned with the support input for themselves "if they are to have the power to formulate and implement their decisions" (216). The authorities must engage in the daily affairs of a political system; they must be recognized by most members of the system as having the responsibility for these matters; and their actions must be accepted as binding most of the time by most of the members as long as they act within the limits of their roles (212),
and,

if the members of a system are unable to provide enough support for some set of authorities who can assume responsibility for the daily affairs of the system and provide initiative and direction in identifying problems and taking some steps toward their solution, the system must collapse, for want of leadership (216).

Easton draws attention to the fact that changes in regime structures can themselves result in building up or reducing support for authorities (249). For example, structural changes aimed at merging and assimilating disparate groups in a community have historically proven to reduce support (250). Greater success in building support may result from structural changes which provide in the community a sense of awareness and responsiveness among separate groups, so that each group feels its own major needs and demands are recognized. Through groups considering the needs of others there is a greater likelihood that they will provide support for the common community and for authorities who attempt to meet these needs (250). Informal structural responses also serve to permit confrontation and accommodation among contending groups, and penetration of administrative structures to obtain representation for their points of view (254). Recognized informal groups such as political parties perform the same support-enhancing function (257).

Finally at this point we mention two other means of regulating and mobilizing support. The one is a belief in the existence of the common good, however it is defined (315). Belief in it imposes restraints on demand inputs which may jeopardize the whole system, and it provides a member of the system
with rewards simply in the gratification of making a contribution to the greater whole (316). Such members then become less unsupportive when they perceive an imbalance between demands and outputs. If the authorities are identified with the common good, then a belief in it can become a source of support. The other means is "the inculcation of a sense of legitimacy", which Easton says "is probably the single most effective device" for regulating the flow of support in favour of the authorities (278). In a democratic political system it provides the means whereby the authorities obtain compliance with their outputs and the carrying out of required activity. It is expressed through the acceptance of principles about the rights and duties of citizens and authorities, limits on the use of power, and popular participation. Without this sense of legitimacy the authorities will be the objects of decreased support.

Although in this discussion we have considered demands and support inputs as separate concepts, clearly they are not completely separable. The two are interactive in a political system (50). Demands directed toward the authorities are normally accompanied in some fashion by support for the authorities who are being expected or relied upon to deal with the demands. The converse is that support, even a general or diffuse support, is directed to the authorities because there are also demands directed which the environment wishes to result in outputs. Demand inputs are not directed to authorities in which one has no confidence (i.e. no support). But eventually those kinds of support and demand inputs would stop if the producers of them saw no outputs resulting.
4. **System Outputs**

We have to this point been dealing with inputs. Easton also provides an analysis of outputs which is applicable to a public planning agency. The outputs are the "stream of activities" flowing directly from the authorities themselves - their decisions, pronouncements, methods of operation, and the like (349). These outputs are not tangible or concrete in themselves, since they are the actual behaviour or activity of the authorities themselves. It is the consequences of the outputs which gives reality to them. The outcomes are their consequences and these outcomes are tangible or concrete in their effect.

While outputs are intangible activities as described, in themselves they enter into and have an effect on the environment. They can be judged against the basic values held by the community even by those who are not affected by the outcomes. Where outputs enable groups or individuals in the environment to share in these basic values, or where outputs are compatible with these values, then even though individuals or groups may not be materially better off or have improved services the sharing or reinforcement of these basic values may bring about support for the authorities. The reverse is also true, of course. Outputs therefore, are not only linked to specific support because their outcomes satisfy specific demands. Outputs are also linked to a more diffuse kind of support because norms and values are respected and maintained.

5. **System Feedback**

The foregoing illustrates that the conversion of inputs to outputs is not a process which stops at outputs. The authorities in a political system
cannot be concerned only with inputs, for outputs are a part of a continuous chain of activities "in which inputs and outputs each directly or indirectly affect each other" and the environment (345). The system, having produced outputs, acts on the environment and therefore back on itself. This process is "feedback". Without this feedback and the capacity to respond to it, no system could survive for long except by accident or coincidence. Feedback may do more than obvious regulation of the flow of outputs through modification of demand and support inputs originating in the environment. It may form the basis for modification in the basic objectives of the system itself (371). Although system behaviour may be goal-oriented, striving towards the achievement of existing objectives, feedback also alerts the system to the need to change goals and establish new objectives. This is Argyris and Schon's double-loop learning. Moreover, since system structures and processes are themselves often dependent on the nature of goals, changing the goals may result in profound changes in these structures and processes (371).

This feedback process which Easton describes is clearly basically the same process as organizational external communication. All open-system organizations are involved in this feedback process, which is communication with the environment. What Easton's analysis has done is to show how for a public agency in a political system the inputs and outputs are largely intangibles some of which have their impacts through tangible financial material resource inputs to the agency and tangible outcomes of the agency's outputs. External communication, feedback, provides a means whereby the agency interacts with its environment to either modify the environment or be modified by it.
In summary, Easton says:

Mere survival needs alone will give a distinct advantage to those systems that are sufficiently dynamic and flexible to modify their own behavior so as to cope with changes in their structure or in the environment. But beyond survival, feedback enables a system to explore and discover new ways of dealing with its problems. On the basis of information about present and past behavior, a system is able to select, reject, and emphasize one pattern of behavior in favor of another (370).
B. Public Participation as Feedback

1. Conventional Feedback

Easton has an analysis of feedback which provides the means to bring together the discussion up to this point, in order to address the essential proposition of the hypothesis.

In a political system the return of information to the authorities follows a series of channels, or feedback loops. These feedback loops channel not only the information that is fed back about the state of the system and the consequences of the authorities' outputs, but they include the outputs and their consequences themselves. Information feedback allows the authorities to respond to conditions in the environment, through the production of outputs. Feedback is more than a logical necessity; it is part of the reality of the political system (372).

Easton depicts a political system of multiple feedback loops. It represents a conventional way of describing the flow of outputs and inputs in a representative democratic system (372-376), consisting of a variety of loops linking producers of inputs and outputs, and various "collectors and transmitters" of support and demands. (These collectors and transmitters are not themselves producers of inputs or outputs; they are intermediaries, such as political parties, the mass media, interest groups, and the like, which function as points in the channels between input producers and output producers. They function to carry the flow of both inputs and outputs). Easton suggests there are a variety of loops in conventional political feedback. Some are completely within the environment, some are completely within the political system and some span the boundaries between the system and its environment. Regardless of their
location, however, they are interlinked to provide one overall feedback process. They represent common external communication for the political system and therefore for the public planning agency.

Two aspects of Easton's description of the feedback process are especially useful in leading to further development of the hypothesis. The one is the groups and individuals who are linked by the external communication loops, and the other is how they are linked by these loops. The groups and individuals who are linked are of two types - the producers of inputs and the producers of outputs. The producers of inputs (support and demands) are a relatively undifferentiated mass, while the producers of outputs consist of a legislature, an executive, and the administrative agency. The output producers are linked to each other by a variety of feedback loops, in recognition of the communication among them in terms of inputs and outputs. Easton recognizes conventional thinking (including legislative versus executive roles, and conventional administrative principles) in describing outputs to the environment as originating from only one output producer, the executive, and then flowing in one output link from the executive to the input producers in the environment. There are no output links from the legislature or administrative agency to the environment, because outputs to the environment come only from the executive. In the case of inputs, there is again only one direct link from the environment to output producers described, that being to the executive. There are no direct input links to the legislature or administrative agency, but these two are of course linked with the executive by their own loops. But even though there is an absence of these other direct input links to the legislature and administrative agency, there are other links between the environment and these
bodies by means of intermediary or indirect links. Easton describes a series of loops with input links joining input producers with the legislature and administrative agency, through interest group, political party, and mass media intermediaries. This description of indirect input links is also more or less in accordance with conventional thinking.

Certainly the absence of any direct environment to administrative agency link of any sort is not surprising, in principle. However, we do know even from Easton that an administrative agency such as a public planning agency produces outputs of its own which directly affect the environment, so an output link of that sort exists and is recognized in practice. But the existence, or necessity of an environment to administrative agency input link (which is one way of describing public participation) is not acknowledged.

The authorities require various kinds of information in order to know if they have succeeded in meeting demand inputs and in maintaining a desired level of support inputs. First, authorities need to know what the demands are, "what demands have been met by past outputs, which ones are continuing to be voiced, who are voicing them, and the like" (413). Second, they need to know the general level of diffuse support which exists. Third, they need to know what specific support there is because of specific outputs and their outcomes. In Easton's thinking, for a public planning agency this external communication occurs through the other, intermediary, groups.

The effectiveness of outputs in satisfying demands or generating support will be seriously affected by the accuracy of information fed back to the authorities. It is recognized that the feedback is subject to distortion or error because of its interpretation by the authorities themselves, but aside
from this, "the length, complexity, and fidelity of the transmission belt along which information has to be carried, if it is to reach the authorities, will contribute to the possibility and probability of error" (413-414). Where feedback can occur through face-to-face contact alone, the flow of information would likely be minimally inaccurate. However, what often occurs is that in large-scale, more differentiated systems, where complex structures stand between members and the authorities, as information...moves along a flow network toward the authorities, it may be so reinterpreted that it no longer mirrors the true state of mind of the members (414).

There may be error or distortion because of poor interpretation along the flow network at any point, a vital component of the flow network may be weak or missing, or the receivers of input may be incapable of routing it to the appropriate output producer for attention. The problem may also lie in part with the input itself, where it is so complex or poorly articulated that its meaning is lost in its movement along the "transmission belt".

2. The "Second Circuit" Feedback Loop

Feedback Channel Alternatives

There are a variety of feedback mechanisms available for providing the authorities with information and inputs in large-scale and complex political systems such as modern democracies. Easton assures us that those which he describes, although they are common, are only illustrative and not exhaustive, "they could be quickly multiplied by connecting any two actors in the system wherever it appears plausible that mutual interaction would occur, based at least upon information feedback" (373). Easton also notes that even if none among this variety is totally accurate, either singly or in combination,
the fact is that the greater the number available the less likely any one will dominate and distort the feedback. The various feedback mechanisms are in a sense competitive, and are likely not complementary (414).

This suggests that there is a benefit to be gained in terms of improved information if the authorities seek to develop some of the alternative mechanisms. There is a danger, of course, that if the information which is fed back through a number of mechanisms is consistent, but basically wrong, then the authorities are more completely misled. Another problem with numerous mechanisms may be that if the various channels feed back conflicting information, then the authorities will have to provide their own interpretation of what is correct.

In terms of the framework of Easton's political system and the place of the authorities within them, what the hypothesis states is that there is in planning an organizational need for an additional feedback loop. It is one which links the producers of inputs directly with the public planning agency. An additional feedback loop of this sort is what public participation consists of in relation to the planning agency - groups and individuals having an effect on the decision-making process where that decision-making process involves the planning agency's functions of either advising elected decision-makers or of itself making decisions which have been delegated to it. Using Easton's terminology, the first of these functions is one where the planning agency is not a direct producer of outputs which have outcomes for the environment (the public); the outcomes as far as the public is concerned result from outputs produced by elected decision-makers, and the planning agency is linked with these decision-makers by feedback loops such as Easton describes. The second
function is one where the planning agency is a direct output producer to the environment, with consequent outcomes from those direct outputs. In either of these functions, inputs of demand and support are returned to the planning agency, and without direct feedback to the agency (direct external communication) these are returned to the agency via official political structures.

The Hypothesis in Terms of a Feedback Channel Alternative

We can now examine the hypothesis in terms of the planning agency's organizational needs, as one of the "authorities" within a political system, for feedback or external communication as it can be provided by public participation. In these terms the hypothesis has two parts: first, that there is a need for a link to channel inputs more directly to the public planning agency as an output producer; and second, that there is a need for other direct links in order to channel agency outputs more directly to the environment as an input producer. No rigorous attempt will be made to distinguish between demand and support in the manner that Easton has done, for we recognize the fact that the two for the most part do not each have a separate existence as Easton has also pointed out. Demand inputs imply support inputs, and support inputs imply demand inputs, and both will be present in any particular input which is used to demonstrate that a feedback loop of public participation is needed. However, notwithstanding this absence of making such a distinction in the inputs, the terms demand and support will be used occasionally as seems appropriate for the sake of clarity or a better understanding.

These feedback loops in combination can be referred to as a "second circuit" of input and output links between the agency and its environment. The
"first circuit", then consists of the conventional electoral and responsible links. The need for a second circuit is argued by demonstrating support for two propositions first, that the conventional political process at the municipal government level is deficient and does not function as intended to provide adequate channels; and second, that by its inherent nature the representative political process at the municipal government level cannot provide adequate input and output channels as required by the public planning agency. The first proposition suggests, of course, that if the representative political process functioned better there would be less need for public participation. That is correct (remembering again that we are not concerned with democratic or ethical reasons for public participation), but the likelihood of necessary improvements occurring in the foreseeable future is not great. The reasons lie in the traditions of local government, its inferior status to the senior provincial government, and the non-legislative, executive orientation of provincial democratic processes as a whole. The proposition is the more positive of the two, suggesting that there are reasons for public participation irrespective of the state of representative processes. Both these propositions rely on the assumption stated in Chapter II that the agency and its members seek to act according to the wishes of the people in an equitable fashion, and according to some conception of the general public good.

The First Proposition

The first proposition concerns the deficiencies of the conventional representative process relative to a concept of how it should function in principle. A number of writers have referred to the failure of the representative process to adequately represent the electorate in decision-
making processes affecting the electorate. Schatzow, for example, says that political decision-makers do not know what their constituents want (Schatzow, 1977:142), and Van Loon and Whittington state respecting the electoral process that "it is difficult to determine the issue content of electoral participation" (Van Loon and Whittington, 1976:109). Self suggests that the decision-making capacity of elected political leadership has been reduced "to the point where traditional theory is no longer adequate" (Self, 1972:284). Hunnius refers to a somewhat more basic reason, "the artificial separation of politics from everyday life" and the restriction of "legitimate" political participation to political parties and the electoral process (Hunnius, 1974:208). Some of the criticisms of the representative process, including the latter, come near to striking at the heart of the representative process which by assumption we maintain. However, they can also be understood as indicating how the representative process could be improved while retaining its basic form. In the face of such deficiencies, the various alternative means of public intervention in the representative process itself, such as plebiscites, are clumsy and slow.

Kogan makes the proposal that the "first circuit" of democracy (the electoral process) may work poorly, although we know of no better, but that "the electoral mechanisms (the 'first circuit') and the official structures that support them are known to be insufficient as conveyors of client needs, demands, deprivations and that a second circuit of democracy is needed" (Kogan, 1974:303). He says this "second circuit" is public participation.

In the opinion of many analysts and observers, municipal government representation is particularly deficient in practice in representing its public and bringing the public's demand and support inputs to the authorities. There
are a number of reasons for this. The first and most general one, which is likely characteristic of all representative structures, is that a large part of the public simply does not have the ability, financial resources, status, or "power" to express its inputs through the electoral and representative process by virtue of its socio-economic situation. The more highly educated and higher income members of the public have better access to information, or can make better use of it (Downs, 1957:235, 253; and Laudon, 1977:13), and therefore have a knowledge advantage in putting their more sophisticated inputs into channels. Also, there are costs associated with specific acts of transmitting inputs to the authorities (time and money costs) which the higher income members can more easily absorb (Downs, 1957:252). The more educated and knowledgeable members of the public, generally corresponding to the higher income members, may also have a better understanding of where to direct their inputs most effectively. Lindblom lists a combination of four circumstances, other than an individual's own voluntary refusal to input, which lead to members of the public not being able to input: poverty, poor education, social isolation (ethnic minorities), and inadequate socialization (no acquired sense of the potential to input) (Lindblom, 1968:114-115). One writer has suggested that at the municipal level some of these barriers to input through conventional channels have been formally encouraged through such things as restrictions on the franchise, or requirements that only owners of property can vote on certain issues (Higgins, 1977:195).

A second reason that there is deficient representation lies in the unrepresentative character of municipal elected officials themselves. This is manifest in various ways. If one assumes that politicians act as trustees, not
delegates, but still attempt to represent the public according to their own perceptions of the public's demands and support, then these representatives should bear some overall resemblance to the public in order to broadly represent it. Numerous studies have shown that political representatives are not representative in that sense, in terms of the social, economic, occupational, educational, or ethnic characteristics of the public (Alexander, 1976:187; Higgins, 1977:259; and Sigelman and Vanderbok, 1977:621). A study of local government in Britain found that even with changes in the social composition of elected councils resulting from the spread of party politics (which we shall consider shortly), most of them still fail to proportionately represent the various elements of the public (Redcliffe-Maud and Wood, 1974:64). Lower socio-economic, minority ethnic, or less educated groups on the whole, therefore, tend generally to be under-represented or even unrepresented.

Another form of channel blockage of inputs within elected representatives themselves, at the municipal level, arises from the feature that municipal politicians are often elected from the city or municipality at large. The result is that not only are they not clearly representative of some separately identifiable segment of the public, where presumably demands and support vary and are therefore not separately represented, but they are perceived by the public to be less accessible and are less clearly identifiable on issues which are of concern to them (Heikoff, 1975:60; and Lineberry and Fowler, 1967:715). Elected representatives will likely then be less "conscious of their responsibility and accountability to their respective electorates" and therefore less responsive to the interests and demands of that electorate (Higgins, 1977:182). Dahl (1967) refers to the problems arising from
communication channel length and indirectness where legislators are remote. Kogan, in advocating a "second circuit" of democracy, refers to studies which indicate that municipal politicians are not very representative for the reasons discussed above, and which also indicate that little of their time is spent with their electors or on their electors' problems (Kogan, 1974:303). The result of all these deficiencies in representation (transmission of inputs) is that the bargaining and compromise which is a part of the decision-making process at the political level does not adequately reflect the inputs of input producers.

A third reason that there is deficient representation of the public's demand and support inputs lies in the generally non-partisan characteristic of municipal politics. We have referred to this already as being a characteristic of the Canadian situation. Political parties perform an important function of interest-aggregation and interest-articulation with respect to the public's demands and interests, "which means that parties sort and sift among a diversity of interests and demands, rejecting some, accepting some, working out compromises, correlating those accepted, and ordering them into priorities" (Higgins, 1977:266). In the absence of political parties interests and demands are articulated less clearly or not at all. "The completely haphazard and random methods whereby individuals are recruited for office at the municipal level" means that the function of articulation of demands performed by parties is lacking (Alexander, 1976:187). Higgins also draws attention to the fact that the individualism or isolation of candidates, and the consequent absence of stable group support, discourages candidates from offering truly representative choices to the public, because "to promise other than vague generalities exposes the candidate to the likelihood of being accused
at the subsequent election of not having fulfilled the pledges made in the preceding election" (Higgins, 1977:253). Political parties are an important "cue-giving" agency to the public in making electoral choices, and in their absence the public (voters) are left to make such decisions based on irrelevancies such as candidates' status, name-familiarity, or ethnic identification (Lineberry and Fowler, 1967:715). The view is also held that the introduction of party politics would not only result in a better representation process, but would also make the representatives themselves more representative. It would "widen the social spectrum from which they come" (Redcliffe-Maud and Wood, 1974:161).

It is recognized that partisan politics is not without its defects. The major opposition to it stems from the perception that it can lead to bribery and corruption, to the development of vested special interests, "caucus" decisions, that it is a deterrent to candidates, and, at the municipal level, can lead to possible partisan conflict with senior governments (Higgins, 1977:243; and Margolis, 1979:116). There are those who suggest that local "civic" parties are effective in performing the same representation-assisting function that major political parties do, without the disadvantages of the latter. But on this point, Higgins is of the opinion that "it is questionable...whether the civic parties are really 'parties' in terms of being more than just a label attached to candidates for election to council" (Higgins, 1977:242-243). On balance, given the nature of urban areas and their publics, it would seem that the absence of active, significant, and recognized political parties at the urban municipal level is more of a disadvantage than an advantage, in terms of such parties being a part of a feedback channel to the authorities.
A fourth reason that there is deficient representation of inputs lies in the traditional, and to some extent, formally-recognized technical or service orientation of municipal government. This has already been described. While it may still be true that many of the important real functions of municipal government and its authorities are concerned with the quantity, quality, and distribution of public services, these quantity, quality, and distribution decisions can no longer be the sole preserve of public service professionals serving a "board-of-directors" type of political decision-makers. The decisions required have become more fundamentally political decisions, relating to varying and various public demands (Frederickson, 1973:277). They are now policy-decisions which generate "genuine conflict and controversy which must be adequately reflected in a representative and responsive municipal structure" (Plunkett, 1976:332). But the traditional non-partisan concept of Canadian local government does not effectively accomplish such representation and responsiveness. It is non-policy-oriented; its structures emphasize the requirements of non-partisan decision-making based primarily on technical and financial considerations (Fish, 1976:176; and Plunkett, 1976:331-332).

This fourth reason has special implications for a public planning agency. As we have discussed, planning is one of a number of new functions with which urban governments are now concerned. Planning functions are completely different from traditional service functions. Not only are conventional channels ill-equipped to provide feedback and inputs in the traditional technical and public service functions which are becoming increasingly controversial, but they are even less well-equipped to perform a channel function for the new and inherently controversial areas of policy such as social and physical planning (Higgins, 1977:104).
A fifth reason that there is inadequate channelling of the public's inputs (i.e. representation) at the municipal level has to do with the earlier-noted feature that all municipal elected officials (the Mayor, or reeve, and council) are both legislature and executive in combination. Whereas one writer argues that this "structural fusion of legislative and executive leadership and functions seemingly imparts decisiveness, adaptability and responsiveness (emphasis added)" (Thomas, 1980:295), a British study of local government notes the opposite in terms of responsiveness. There it is suggested that the elected official is sometimes placed in a difficult position because of this fusion for two reasons (Redcliffe-Maud and Wood, 1974:21). Firstly, the elected official has taken part directly in the output production which results in feedback and may therefore be more reluctant to process that feedback input than if he or she had a position separate from an executive authority which produced the output. Secondly, in his or her executive capacity the elected official often needs to develop a close working relationship with administrative authorities, a relationship which could be jeopardized by processing negative feedback input with too much vigour.

A sixth reason that conventional and traditional feedback channels are not operating effectively to process inputs lies in the formal management structures which operate at the urban municipal government level. This refers to the decision-making models of Commissioner or Manager forms of appointed administration discussed earlier. These common decision-making models are in one sense not separable from the foregoing reasons, for they are all results of the reform-movement which has given municipal government the characteristics it has had up until recently. Nevertheless, it can also be considered separately
as a reason, because it is an essential part of the overall political context for the planning agency. It may impose an upper administrative level channel blockage of inputs to the planning agency. The effect is that, because Commissioners or a City Manager have significant structurally-based strength, they can as individuals block the processing of inputs. They are in a position to lead elected officials, rather than be directed by them, because of their structural strength in combination with not being directly accountable to the public (Higgins, 1977:114, 121).

Long's notion that the "bureaucracy" performs an essential representative function by virtue of its being comprised of individuals representing a socio-economic cross-section of the public is relevant here. One of the studies of the representativeness of elected officials found that not only are elected representatives unrepresentative in that sense, but Canadian public servants are even less representative (Sigelman and Vanderbok, 1977:621), 1968-1972 data). According to this study, public servants typically occupied a higher rung on the "class ladder" than legislators, and there was less class variability among public servants than among legislators. One can therefore not expect the channeling of public inputs through administrative agencies in a proxy fashion to occur because administrators are like the public. Nor can one expect this situation to be improved so long as training and education (pre-requisites for administrative appointment) remain a relative privilege of the higher socio-economic groups (Sigelman and Vanderbok, 1977:621).

The foregoing has discussed six reasons why the conventional representative political process at the municipal government level does not function
as it should to provide adequate input channels for demand and support to a public planning agency. Five of these six reasons are more or less unique to the municipal political system, and are relevant to Canadian urban government. The origin of these five reasons, in turn, can be traced largely to the "reform" of Canadian municipal government in the early part of this century, part of which found expression in institutions and structures imported from the United States (Fish, 1976). One of the objectives of these reforms was to produce "a no-nonsense, efficient and business-like regime, where decisions could be implemented by professional administrators rather than by victors in the battle over spoils" (Lineberry and Fowler, 1967:702). This goal of the reformers has been substantially fulfilled. But the result has been that "non-partisan elections, at-large constituencies and manager governments are associated with a lessened responsiveness of cities to the enduring conflicts of political life" (Lineberry and Fowler, 1967:715). The greater the reform, the lower the responsiveness. This process of making municipal government less responsive has had the effect of erecting barriers or channel blockages to input into the political system from its environment, the public, because "business-like" government has been instituted in a system where it cannot be accompanied by a "business-like" interaction between the authorities and the public. There is no market in which "business" interactions can take place because public services cannot be provided through a market process which provides market-transaction feedback to the decision-makers. That may have been satisfactory at a time when there were few demand and support inputs with which both the public and the authorities had to be concerned, and when those that were of concern were specific and narrow. That is no longer the case.
If these reasons themselves result from channel deficiencies which are an outgrowth of improper functioning of the representative system, then a valid suggestion is that a proper functioning of the system would rectify the channel deficiencies. If municipal government "reform" is the cause, then one alternative is obviously to return to the pre-reform "warm and personal government in the neighbourhoods" (Jones, 1973:74). However, one must seriously doubt this as an alternative which would provide an overall improvement in the determination of demand and support inputs to the authorities. Pre-reform types of political systems would not be able to provide services in a manner and a quality to satisfy the current needs of cities (Jones, 1973:74). Moreover, although this study is not concerned with the ethics and norms of democracy, we have implicitly assumed that the public planning agency functions within those norms. But the historical evidence is that corruption and self-serving were characteristics of pre-reform systems, and these characteristics are not in accordance with those norms. A return to corruption and self-serving would therefore be unacceptable. It is recognized that not all the pre-reform structures and processes were necessarily conducive to non-democratic ethics and norms. Ward government, for example, can equally well be conducive to democratic ethics and norms.

A more acceptable solution is to increase the representativeness and responsiveness of feedback loops while observing general democratic norms. As the evidence suggests this is difficult and not likely within the present structures and processes of municipal government, the alternative is to make use of alternative feedback loops which transmit inputs in a manner compatible with democratic norms. Such an alternative is public participation, a direct
feedback loop linking the public with our public planning agency, while maintaining the essential representative system. It can provide improved information to the public planning agency for its part in the conversion process. The outputs so produced, be they outputs which require further processing by elected officials before they become outputs to the environment (i.e. advice to elected officials), or direct outputs to the environment, will then have taken into account the demand and support inputs channeled to the agency.

We have dealt with the first proposition in support of a "second circuit", which centres on the deficiencies in the representative democratic system because of structure and process barriers to representation. The second proposition is that, by its very nature, the representative political process inherently does not provide input and output channels which are adequate for the public planning agency. Another way of stating it, with reference to the representative system described by Easton, is that the public planning agency requires direct loops linking it with the environment (the public) which do not have intervening collectors and transmitters of support and demands which are normally found in the structures and processes of the representative system. For our purposes, one of the significant aspects in which this argument differs from the first is that, while the first was concerned mainly with inputs to the planning agency, this argument is concerned with outputs as well. The public planning agency requires a direct output link with the environment as well as a direct input link for reasons which are in some cases unique to planning.

There is no suggestion in this that such direct links are the only links required. On the contrary, so long as the system is representative the
normal feedback loops are also required, for those describe how the representative process works. Because the public planning agency is one of the authorities whose outputs are ultimately subject to the political decision-making authorities, the demand and support inputs coming through these loops will remain an essential part of the feedback it receives in order that it can function within the representative process. While some of these loops will continue to connect the public planning agency with intervening collectors and transmitters of support and demands, other loops connecting the public planning agency with the political authorities will continue to bring the demand and support inputs to it through the political authorities.

The Second Proposition

Let us now turn to the reasons for stating the second proposition. To do this we will rely on the contents of three major themes which have been developed earlier in this chapter:

1. the implications of the operational model of a public planning agency, which was defined to be a strategic/remedial/qualified-transactive model;
2. the bureaucracy context; and
3. the administration context.

These are in addition to the formal political structure context, which continues to be implicit in this analysis.

The first reason identified is one we shall call the need for general knowledge of the environment. An improvement of the planning process results from the dispersal and collection of information, because it adds to the
data available to planners, and it enables the agency to canvass support for the very concept of planning to meet community needs (Hampton, 1977:29). Mechanisms beyond the conventional representative process are needed in order to gather more information about the public's needs for certain outputs, and to ensure that an agency considers an adequate number of alternatives (including the alternative of doing nothing) before embarking on new policies or programmes. Etzioni states that

The administrator needs a considerable understanding of how social systems work, how politics function, what the various groups' values and needs are, and what alternatives are practical and acceptable. In part, he can get the needed knowledge from proper training; in part, from continual interaction with the various groups inside and outside his unit which impinge in it (Etzioni, 1978:518).

In Gortner's view, decisions based on oversimplified issues almost always lead to further problems in the future. If the administrator gets too far away from "the problem", he says, there is a tendency to see the various parts of the problem in an undifferentiated way; therefore if contact is not kept with the many "publics" the administrator may well overlook their unique characteristic (Gortner, 1977:118). Public participation may therefore be used by administrators as a way for an organization to collect intelligence of all sorts and to reduce its isolation from issues and the "consumers" it serves.

In part this intelligence need and isolation reduction need results from uncertainty in the environment - instability and turbulence - as it changes ever more rapidly. Evidence suggest the future will not repeat the past; the needs of the public change. Therefore the appropriate or "best" solutions (outputs) change (Gortner, 1977:118). In Downs's analysis, the presence of uncertainty has itself converted democracy into representative government,
because decision-makers need representatives of the public who can simplify the task of determining where the public's demands and support lie (Downs, 1957:89). However, the differentiated diversity and uniqueness of the public's demands and the rapidity with which they change, suggest that representatives alone are no longer capable of simplifying and conveying these demands. A public planning agency must supplement such channels by itself being in contact with its environment.

While it may be that demand inputs could be reasonably adequately channeled by representatives, there is a growing realization that a response to such demands and the demands themselves need to be interpreted in terms of the public's values where values are significantly involved in the content (Gortner, 1977:117). Our earlier review of planning theory and concepts pointed out that this is the case for a public planning agency as its functions come be perceived less and less in terms of a materially-oriented or technical impact. It is generally recognized that "Western publics have been shifting from an overwhelming emphasis on material well-being and physical security toward greater emphasis on the quality of life" (Inglehart, 1977:3). Subjective aspects of well-being are entering into the demand and support input process, with the result that subjective values are involved. But these subjective values also involve the very means of achieving certain ends. Furthermore, the means and ends are involved with each other in organizations "that are set up to create a better society" (Oppenheimer, 1971:282). Modern writers note that the use of technology (which we can broadly interpret as means) cannot be distinguished from questions of how it is used, for whom, and by whom. Leiss, for example, states that "technology has a peculiar dynamic which necessitates
far-ranging adjustments in social and individual behaviour", and that modern technology is itself a broad social phenomenon which impacts the total social fabric (Leiss, 1974:108-109).

Unless an effort is made to understand the attitudes, values, and motivations of the public, the outputs of a planning agency are likely to have unanticipated consequences (Gortner, 1977:118). Decisions (outputs) will fail because decision-makers base choices on their attitudes and values, having taken for granted or presumed that the attitudes and values of others are comparable. As Heikoff, says, "this is why one of the important challenges, among the many faced by the planner, is to become aware of his own values, those of the decision-makers he works for, and those of the community" (Heikoff, 1975:96).

However, values are personal and unique to individuals or to groups of individuals, and cannot easily be conveyed among individuals or groups by means of intermediaries. Important values are lost through such a conveyance even if it is honestly attempted. What is more likely is that values are subject to re-interpretation or misinterpretation because of the values held by the intermediary. But this is one of the functions political representatives must perform, particularly if they are the sole channel. Such a transmission is best effected between producers of inputs and outputs themselves. Therefore, for general organizational purposes, in any public decision-making process, public input is the "principal source of information about what values the public holds" (Hendee, 1977:99). The transactive dialogue of the operational model incorporates this process.
The second reason for stating this proposition has to do with the need for knowledge of the political dynamics of the community in which the planning agency operates. This type of knowledge is necessary because the operational model describes a planning agency which is not simply a passive, mediating agency. It is one which intervenes on its own initiative in the issues as it perceives them, and it consciously attempts to shape its role in the community. It will do this, of course, having engaged in public participation for the first reason as discussed above. But a planning agency which takes such an initiating role will very likely initiate controversy (Heikoff, 1975:24). In order to effectively deal with such controversy within a representative political system, the agency must anticipate and understand the dynamics of the controversy. Heikoff lays great emphasis on this subject, warning that where controversy arises,

Unless the dispute can be focussed on the issues and resolved quickly through traditionally accepted political procedures, the community may become polarized....The substance of the planning issues then becomes lost in more general differences, and older antagonisms come to the surface and are intensified. The threat to the effectiveness of planning from acrimonious controversy is not only that planning proposals may be defeated, but also that community social and political cleavages may become so intensified that it will be useless to bring them up again for a long time (Heikoff, 1975:24-25).

Heikoff sees a greater danger in the results of the controversy itself than he does in the defeat of the controversial proposal. In fact, the implication is that the negative results of the controversy may outweigh the benefits achieved from acceptance of the controversial proposal.

Two kinds of such knowledge about community politics are necessary. One is knowledge of the facts of particular circumstances of time, place, and personalities; the other is a more general knowledge of how disagreements in the
community arise, how the various protagonists interact, and what are the usual practices or rules by which political and other institutions mediate them (Heikoff, 1975:1-2). Such knowledge can only be acquired by a planning agency which is intimately aware of its public, and of the potential effect of proposals on people with different economic and social interests and values. For reasons similar to those already discussed, the conventional representative process does not likely provide such knowledge, as the elected representatives themselves are political persons who filter information. Public participation can provide the agency with such knowledge.

At this point we can usefully turn to a third reason for public participation, based on this second proposition. It can be referred to as the organizational need for a knowledgeable and cognizant public. This is not meant in a narrow sense of education and learning, but in a broader sense of the public's awareness of itself and its diversity of needs and demands. Nor is it meant in the sense of "the public's right to know", which is a normative principle. What we refer to is the idea that the value-related public participation process is important to the public planning agency from an output as well as an input viewpoint.

Valued "things", both material and conceptual, are scarce - not all the desired values are available to be allocated or distributed to all in the environment. This means that there must be some form of trade-offs within the environment as to which values are to be realized, and by whom. This does not occur through a private market interaction but must take place through the public decision-making process. The transactive dialogue between the planning agency and the public, and within and among members of the public, better
enables the public to make judgements as to the allocation of values. This broadening of outlook within the public is an outcome of the decision-process when it involves the public. It comes about through participants enlarging their perspective, becoming more aware of "the complexities of the issues, the difficulties of providing governmental solutions, the vast amount of information that is required for long-range planning, and the necessity for some acceptable trade-offs between groups with competing goals" (Waterman, 1978:282).

Implicit in this reason advanced for public participation, as in our operational model, is the assertion that in modern times a professional planning agency does not have all the knowledge and information necessary to carry out a planning function. Campbell and Clarke assert that notwithstanding all the knowledge and technology available to "bureaucrats", the poor conceptualization and mismanagement of public programmes leads to the conclusion that "the days when one could accept bureaucratic claims to special competence are long past" (Campbell and Clarke, 1980:310). The claims of the necessity for keeping a competent administration closed no longer hold. Decision-makers require the input of an active public with a growing consciousness, in order that the decision-making process can become active (Breed, 1971:84-85). But there are short-comings in the public's interest and information (Sharkansky, 1972:225; and Lindblom, 1968:73). Sharkansky lays the blame on deficiencies inherent in the functioning of the electoral process, interest groups, and political parties as much as he does on inherent characteristics of individuals (Sharkansky, 1972:203). A direct communication link between the authorities and the public therefore provides a channel whereby
the public's information-level and interest is raised, to the extent that it can contribute to more effective decision-making. This is of course also recognized in the operational model of a public planning agency.

One might note that to a certain extent this outcome of public participation consists of what is referred to as "reconstructive leadership". Lindblom explains this as being the process whereby his proximate policy-makers, even though having to make their decisions within the constraints of existing public preferences, over time have the opportunity to alter the preferences that constrain them. This process is also recognized in the operational model. Another aspect to the public being knowledgeable and cognizant of planning and its issues is that public awareness and public support will often stimulate elected officials to act where action by them is required. The public "can help define the emerging issues that should be the political agenda of the community" (Waterman, 1978:281).

Although the hypothesis is not concerned with internal organizational aspects of a public planning agency, there is one sense in which internal characteristics do provide a fourth reason for arguing the benefits of public participation based on the second proposition. Organization theorists refer to evidence that when organizational environments are dynamic and uncertain, the organizations are then more effective if they are informally structured and not very centralized (Aldrich and Mindlin, 1978:154). Another manifestation of the internal influence of such an environment is that decreased certainty of information or knowledge about the environment generally results in more organization decisions being reached at lower levels within it (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1972:254). The implication is that, for effectiveness in
an organization where environmental information is important, contact with the environment should occur more informally at lower levels rather than predominantly through the top levels which conventionally represent the organization to the environment. A public planning agency is such an organization for which environmental information is important. It is at the same time one which has a dynamic and turbulent environment. Its effectiveness then, if the organizational theorists are correct, will depend on lower-level and somewhat informal contact with its environment. Public participation provides a channel for such contact.

The four reasons advanced so far, for public participation based on the second proposition, have been general reasons. From them it is possible to identify more specific and functionally-oriented reasons. For example, when Aldrich says that "a particular technology is effective only insofar as it is appropriate to the environment an organization faces" (Aldrich, 1979:18), it then follows that public participation is an aid in determining the most effective technology. Another example is the argument that the adoption of plans is facilitated (Grigsby, Marcuse, Haile, and others, 1974:1; Kaufman, 1978:464; and Sewell and Coppock, 1977:2). A further example is that it can be a means of overcoming public stereotyping of "bureaucrats" (Lipsky, 1976:209).

There is, one specific and functionally-related reason which is especially important to note, because of its major importance to any organization. This has to do with goal-formulation. The tendency of most organizations to emphasize methods rather than goals. However, this is an important source of "disorientation" in all organizations, says Selznick (1957:12). The public planning agency, as with most instrumental public
agencies, has goals which are in large measure established or ratified outside the agency. It cannot establish its own goals exclusively (Thompson and McEwen, 1972:264). But a negative result of this may be that it is a source of frustration to the agency, or of dissatisfaction to the public, or produce unattainable goals (Gortner, 1977:6). Therefore, while the planning agency cannot neglect goals if it is to have a sense of purpose or mission, it cannot establish them itself. On the other hand, neither must it permit them to be established, implicitly or otherwise, exclusively by its environment.

Therefore the presumption of bureaucracy that an organization's goals are known and are an unambiguous guide to action must, in the case of an organization such as a public planning agency, be modified to recognize goal-setting as a result of interaction between it and its environment (Aldrich, 1979:16). But because goals involve values, and imply the use of means to achieve goals, where the means themselves involve values, we are back to the necessity for some transactive link between the agency and the public. Goals in this context then become not just agency goals, but also goals of the public which are to be addressed through the agency. The goal-setting problem in these terms is essentially a question of what the public "wants done or can be persuaded to support" and of the relationship of the agency to the public in that question (Thompson and McEwen, 1972:256). And, as the public and its values are constantly changing, goals need to be reformulated or reinterpreted through an ongoing participatory process (Thompson and McEwen, 1972-256).

There is one final reason which we shall identify relative to the second proposition. It is not a significant one in terms of the broad principles which we have discussed, but in practical terms it is of significance
because it has to do with established structures which are of immense importance to municipal government. It relates directly to the principle of local outputs being determined by local inputs. As we have noted, municipal government authorities exist within a federal system of government where various levels of government are involved in overlapping responses to the public and its demands and support. More importantly, municipal government authorities exist in a situation where they are legally subject to the dictates of provincial governments, and where these same provincial governments are characterized by an executive orientation together with executive-supporting legislative behaviour. This situation can have a number of results. First, the public is confused as to "who is responsible for what" and where to direct its demands and support on particular issues in this complex jurisdictional maze (Campbell and Clarke, 1980:311). Second, as we have noted, while senior governments are intervening more and more in the issues for which municipal authorities are nominally responsible, it is municipal authorities which continue to bear the brunt of public inputs respecting these issues, partly because of these authorities' nominal responsibilities and partly because of the closeness of these authorities (Higgins, 1977:93-94). This happens even though the municipal authorities, especially in urban areas, are not in a position to cope with the demands. Third, a study of this situation in France suggests that such a situation results in the development of relationships between municipal and senior authorities which consist of "invisible linkages, loopholes to official rules, a network of personal contracts, and secret influences" without satisfactorily addressing the inputs of the public of the local area (Becquart-Leclercq, 1978:255). Good communication and participation involving local
authorities and the public can assist in overcoming this by leading to greater support input for local authorities, and a more effective translation of local demands into outputs where the senior governments are unavoidably involved. There is an internal output benefit as well, for the establishment of patterns of invisible linkages, loopholes, personal contacts, etc. tends to be transposed inside the municipal system, damaging its own representative capacities (Becquart-Leclercq, 1978:280). Counter-action of these relationships by close authority-public linkages promotes representation.
C. Public Participation in Relation to Established Agency Norms

1. Professional Theory

We have considered a variety of reasons in support of both grounds for arguing the proposal for a "second circuit" of democracy, public participation. Before going on to examine the practical implications of the proposal for the public planning agency, it is necessary to examine the proposal in light first of our operational model for the planning agency, and second, of administrative and bureaucratic norms and principles. The former is based on current planning theory, to which a planning agency should attempt to subscribe. The latter have been the guiding norms and principles for public agencies of any sort or function. Conflicts with either of them must be resolved either in favour of all these, or in favour of the proposal.

The examination against our operational model is by far the simplest. The operational model which was constructed, the strategic/remedial/qualified-transactive model, is not incompatible with the proposal. In fact the two are strikingly similar. A reasonable merging of current planning theory with the realities of planning by a governmental agency, with all that the latter means in terms of responsiveness, accountability, problem-solving, and intervention or leadership, produced a model to which a public planning agency can subscribe while still retaining a base in planning theory. Professional values embodied in the model are not contravened by the proposal, and one can therefore state that the organizational approach to public planning supports our operational model.
2. **Administrative Norms**

An examination of the proposal against administrative norms and principles is not quite so straightforward and simple. The proposal quite clearly is not compatible with the traditional and conventional administrative principle that the distinction between administration and politics is necessary because it represents a distinction between means and ends. That principle, as we have discussed it earlier, was intended to mean that the administration should not become involved in the policy-making process, but was to restrict itself to the implementation of decisions made by politicians as representatives of the public.

But if we accept Easton's analysis that the development of the public administration was an evolutionary process reflecting the need of politicians to divest themselves of increasingly vast amounts of routine detail, reserving to themselves the broader and more far-reaching non-routine matters, then we gain a different understanding of administration than is implied in the traditional principle. That which was divested by politicians was by definition essentially political before being divested, and did not undergo a transformation to being non-political by its being divested. Although it subsequently became known as "administration", possibly because it was carried out by a body of individuals known as "the administration", it remained and remains essentially political. The types of decisions involved are presumably no different, except perhaps in degree, than they were prior to being divested. Thus public administration decisions are essentially political decisions, and public administrators are extensions of the political process rather than separate from it. The decisions of administration supposedly respecting means (as opposed to ends) are as much political as are the decisions
of politicians respecting ends. We are mindful of Self's assertion that a matter becomes political essentially by being made so. It does not become political by suddenly being a matter with which the administration should not be concerned. We are also mindful of Hunnius' assertion that the separation of politics from everyday life is an artificial one, which can be taken to mean that everyday life is political.

The proposal for public participation therefore brings us full circle, back to the recognition of public administration decision-making activity as being political. The apparent conflict between the proposal and the traditional administrative principle, we suggest, can be resolved by finding the traditional administrative principle to be in error. What might be called the administrative "reality-in-practice", which finds that administration is not simply neutral implementation of political decisions but is political in effect, corresponds better with what we might call administrative "reality-in-principle". Some administrative theorists have attempted to move in this direction, as we have noted, but White notes that "even after theorists rejected the traditional dichotomy, there were few contributions to a theoretical understanding of how agencies interact with their environments" (White, 1973:118). The re-definition of administration as including policy-formulation was generally considered to be one where administration is involved in politics through an interaction between administrators and a variety of explicitly "political" actors. This is only partial recognition of the evolutionary process which Easton describes. A more careful examination of reality-in-practice leads to the conclusion that a revised administrative theory should be developed around the reality-in-principle based on Easton's analysis. It would
recognize administration as being involved in politics through the same types of interactions as politicians are involved in. A body of administrative theory of this sort, in a democratic political system, would then have to address itself to the question of the most efficacious manner of channelling demand and support inputs to administrative structures as well as to formal political structures, as administrative structures are then clearly recognized as an inherent part of the whole political process. We have already referred to Kernaghan's discussion of objective versus subjective administrative accountability (Kernaghan, 1973); it represents a proposition for such a body of administrative theory that would bring the theory around to a consideration of public participation by administrative structures.

This would also raise the question of efficiency versus effectiveness, and thereby bring into question the common administrative emphasis on efficiency. Selznick says that "the cult of efficiency in administrative theory and practice is a modern way of over-stressing means and neglecting ends"; it fixes attention on maintaining a smooth-running machine, and "tends to stress techniques of organization that are essentially neutral, and therefore available for any goals, rather than methods peculiarly adapted to a distinctive type of organization" (Selznick, 1957:135). But if a democratic public administration is in principle political, and must therefore attempt to ensure adequate representation of inputs into the whole conversion process, it is then a "distinctive type of organization" which differs substantially from other organizations. The techniques of organization stressed should then not be those that are essentially neutral; the techniques of organization should be those that are directed towards the achievement of distinctively political
goals in a democratic system, which requires attention to representation (input) techniques. In the place of efficiency the organization should itself stress effectiveness, which is "the achievement of some policy goal, if possible at minimum cost but above all successfully" (Self, 1972:264). Decision-making will then not be rational in the technical sense, but will be rational in the political sense (Gortner, 1977:131). The apparent barriers to technically rational decision-making which consist of environmental factors such as the multitude of problems, goals, and policy-commitments that are imposed on decision-makers by actors in the environment of an administrative unit (Sharkansky, 1972:44), will instead themselves become inputs into politically rational decision-making.

3. Bureaucratic Principles

An examination of the proposal against bureaucratic principles of organization would normally give some difficulty. Public participation is not compatible with bureaucratic organization. Nor can Weber's tightly interlocking characteristics of bureaucracy be easily modified in part without rejecting bureaucracy as a whole.

Bureaucratic organization has been a central feature of administration in the traditional administration versus political decision-making (means versus ends) dichotomy, as well as having been more specifically a feature of the administrative stress on efficiency. Blau's statement that "if men organize themselves and others for the purpose of realizing specific objectives assigned to or accepted by them,... they establish a bureaucracy" is accompanied by the assertion that the fundamental principle is administrative
efficiency (Blau, 1974:55). Elsewhere he says that "a bureaucracy as an organizational form is judged by the criterion of efficiency", that "although both authoritarian elements and concessions to democratic elements are found in bureaucratic structures, efficiency is the ultimate basis for evaluating whether such elements are appropriate", and that "bureaucracy implies that considerations of efficiency outweigh all others in the formation and development of the organization" (Blau and Meyer, 1971:156).

But we have found a number of things about a public planning agency which specifically point to the inappropriateness of bureaucracy (in addition to our review of administrative principles). For example, the agency does not exist for the purpose of realizing specific assigned or accepted objectives. The reasons advanced herein for public participation, and our operational model, put the agency itself into the process of establishing the objectives themselves. Blau's statement that organization of individuals for the purpose of realizing specific assigned or accepted objectives results in the establishment of bureaucracy, with the fundamental principle of administrative efficiency, does not apply to the agency. That statement of Blau's is juxtaposed with another, that "if men organize themselves for the purpose of reaching common agreement on collective goals and actions by some form of majority rule, they establish a democratic organization", where the fundamental principle is freedom of dissent (Blau, 1974:55). Our planning agency is a part of the democratic process through administrative reality-in-principle. The agency is part of the public's organizing themselves "for the purpose of reaching common agreement on collective goals and actions."
Blau and Meyer unfortunately also make the statement that "democratic values require not only that social goals be determined by majority decision, but also that they be implemented through the most effective methods available - that is, by establishing organizations that are bureaucratically rather than democratically governed" (Blau and Meyer, 1971:156). That implies that the most effective method of implementing goals is one which is the most efficient (i.e. through bureaucratic administrative organizations). But if the traditional administration versus political decision-making and the administrative stress on efficiency are rejected, then one must reject the bureaucratic model as necessarily being the most effective model for public administration. Our conclusion is that the weight of evidence is on the opposite, that effectiveness in administration is not efficiency, and that effectiveness for a public planning agency is likely not bureaucracy.

We therefore reject bureaucracy in favour of the hypothesis, insofar as they are incompatible.
D. Some Operational Implications

1. The City of Edmonton's Public Participation Proposal

We have reviewed in detail the theoretical and conceptual support for the hypothesis, and have drawn on an analysis of the public planning agency, its organizational context, and its environment to show how the theory and concepts relate to it specifically. To test the hypothesis would require case analysis, in order to see whether or not, and to what extent public planning agencies which engage in public participation derive organizational-related benefits from it. Another type of case analysis would be to see whether or not the hypothesized organizational approach to public participation results in public participation which satisfies external demands for it.

No case analysis is provided here, and the hypothesis is therefore not tested in that sense. However, it is beneficial to briefly review a process of public participation which has been approved for implementation within a relatively large and complex urban political system. Such a review may, at least, show whether the proposal addresses some of the implications over which a planning agency has some influence.

The process of public participation selected is that found within the urban political system as it exists in Edmonton, Alberta. Edmonton is a city with a population in the order of 500,000 people, and is among the Canadian cities characterized by relatively rapid growth, in terms of both population and developed area. It shares most of the urban planning issues and problems common to Canadian cities: suburban residential and commercial development, increasing-density urban redevelopment, congestion, rising land costs, expansion into available land, and the like. It has recently approved, through
its General Municipal Plan (City of Edmonton, 1980), a "growth strategy" which calls for higher densities of development in both expansion and redeveloping areas. The City's local government consists of a major elected at large, and twelve councillors (aldermen) elected from six wards. Its administrative structure corresponds in general to the Commission model described by Higgins and referred to earlier.

The City has a recently-approved but not yet operational formal public participation process, which is described in the Appendix. It is not referred to in the relevant City documents as an "organizational approach" (City of Edmonton, 1980; and City of Edmonton, 1981). It appears to have been motivated, at least in part, by political and public demands for increased public participation. However, the stated "benefits" of the process (noted in the Appendix) suggest that some elements of the organizational approach are present, at least implicitly, in its having been put forward for approval.

2. Planned Participation

The Public planning agency must undertake a process of public participation in a planned and deliberate fashion, in order to realize the alleged benefits. Simple acceptance of public participation and the broad principles involved can lead to meaningless participation for the organization, to the reluctance of the public to participate, and to conflict (Davis, 1973:70). There are dangers, therefore, in "unplanned" participation (von Hentig, 1974); it warrants careful analysis and thought. In a sense this relates to the Open Systems concept of "equifinality", that certain system outputs can be achieved in different ways but that some systems processes have
inherently different results even though the system outputs are similar (Kast and Rosenzweig, 1972:450).

There is a need to define who is the relevant public, to develop mechanisms for their selection and involvement, and mechanisms to determine their inputs (Medeiros and Schmitt, 1977:153). Well-defined rules-of-the-game are required in order to prevent a "kind of free-wheeling chaos" out of which groups or individuals in the public would emerge to dominate and impose their own rigidities which would be no more useful than closed system rigidities (Hayward, 1974:18). Moreover, unordered and very informal participation may be high in creativity but low in effectiveness (Plunkett, 1974:261).

Hayward has suggested a set of requirements for a "participatory planning process" in education which has useful elements (Hayward, 1974:20-22). He includes among these elements what he calls a planning programme for the development of participation which would itself have the following elements:

1. a continuous identification of all the important segments of the public, their boundaries and interrelationships within the planning system;

2. an evaluation of the participatory process itself, in terms of mechanisms, operation, structures, etc.;

3. an assignment of responsibilities for establishing and maintaining the structures and mechanisms;

4. a systematic programme of analysis of "problems" which would be fed into the participatory network; and

5. a continuing programme of training in participatory skills and techniques.
But the full benefits of a public participation programme, suggests a group of planners who have analyzed such programmes in planning, can be achieved only when the public itself has participated in shaping the participation programme (Grigsby, Marcuse, Haile, and others, 1974:16).

The Edmonton process is clearly one which is planned beforehand. Its inception as explicit policy by virtue of its inclusion as a component of the General Municipal Plan (the GMP) is the first evidence of this. In that document the "bare bones" structure is found - a system of community-based, spatially-distributed, planning committees. The District Planning Handbook (City of Edmonton, 1981) carries planning for public participation even further, suggesting the composition of community-based structures, the inclusion of relevant groups and organizations, the "rules" and processes to be followed, the staffing requirements, the relationship to formal political structures, the content of the participatory processes, and the like.

Moreover, the approval of the public participation process itself involves a participatory process. This is the case for the policies as contained in the GMP, for that document was the subject of public involvement through workshops, meetings with interest groups, submissions of briefs, and the holding of mandatory public hearings by the City Council and its committees. It is also true of the details of the further development of the process. The District Planning Handbook (the Handbook) establishes the further participatory processes whereby public participation is to be developed, monitored, and modified as required.
3. **Internal Requisites**

In addition to planning the public participation, there are a number of things which the public planning agency must attend to within itself in order that its communicator role in the process is carried out effectively. A variety of these come out of the earlier discussion of communication concepts in Chapter III, but we refer to a few specifically here.

First, the agency must clearly identify the units or positions within itself which perform or to which are assigned a boundary spanning role. Downs goes so far as to suggest the creation of a unit free from direct operational responsibilities but familiar with the intimate details and variety of the agency's operation, purpose, interdependencies and the like, which would continuously provide the agency with information and analysis respecting the environment (Downs, 1967:183). Such a unit would not and could not be the only source of such information, but would have that as its major role. Such a unit would not be the sole focus of the agency's public participation, for the whole agency is more or less engaged in that; it is simply a specialized information gathering and analysis unit (Downs, 1967:185-186). The same unit should also perform a somewhat similar role in the reverse, providing the environment (the public) with information and analysis respecting the agency.

Second, the public planning agency must have the communicative ability to be understood by the relevant external communicators in its environment. This consists in part of procedural and interactional skills on the part of its own members—an ability to work with others (Burke, 1979:60). Substantive knowledge and creativity are obviously important in order to create a trust in the competence of the agency, but an additional emphasis on communication means that a different type of competence is required. But while
personal communication and interaction skills are part of the communicative capability, the competence must be of a deeper dialectic nature, where "error is continually interpreted and corrected, incompatibility and incongruity are continually engaged, and conflict is continually confronted and resolved" (Argyris and Schon, 1978:146). Only with this type of competence will the agency be able to foster communication as a joint-process, where messages are interpreted for meaning.

One of the essential features of this dialectical communication process, on the part of the agency, is a tolerance of criticism and controversy. A great deal of the demand and support input will be accompanied by controversy. These inputs will perhaps occur only if the public perceives the agency as being prepared to engage in controversy and to honestly deal with it. One writer has suggested that the presence of controversy is in itself evidence of fairly wide participation (Heikoff, 1975:22). Out of controversy, if it is confronted and handled in a transactive and dialectical manner, comes a better understanding on the part of all communicators.

But the agency must at the same time bear in mind the danger of prolonged controversy, as discussed earlier. There comes a point at which the agency must see continued controversy as counter-productive, and seek means to bring it to a close.

The Edmonton process addresses itself to internal requisites. Firstly, there are to be staff within the agency who are specifically assigned to the District Planning and other planning processes in which public participation is sought. Secondly, the assignment of a large number of staff with a high level of technical competence, and with communicative and interactive
skills reflects on emphasis on the agency being prepared to devote significant resources to public participation. These "assigned" staff do not represent the creation of an information analysis and communication-oriented unit as suggested by Downs, but on the other hand they are staff who can to advantage perform such functions for the agency as a whole from within the framework of an interactive relationship with the public on the substantive issues.

Thirdly, the Edmonton process attempts to organize the planning agency internally, in terms of both structure and processes, so that significant functions may be addressed through public participation. The functions are either to take place with the assigned participatory staff having primary responsibility, or they are to be brought before the public through the participation process for the generation of input to be taken into account by other staff.

There are some deficiencies in this aspect of the Edmonton process. Firstly, the major emphasis of the public participation process and assigned staff is to be the District Planning process described in the Appendix. While this may in one sense be appropriate because that process is a form of long-range planning which establishes the guidelines for more detailed implementation decisions, the danger exists that short-term decisions which have significant long-range impacts are not given the attention they deserve. Secondly, once this major emphasis on the District Planning process has been completed, there is the danger that the public participation process will lack the clear focus and terms of reference necessary for its continuation. Thirdly, in the functional areas within planning for which the primary staff responsibility lies with non-assigned staff, the opportunity exists for such func-
tional areas to be given little or no practical public involvement if the staff responsible have no personal commitment to such involvement.

These deficiencies result from the public participation process being linked so closely with the District Planning process. The impression given is that public participation will occur only in that context. Because of that, non-assigned planning staff may largely ignore the public participation process. It is recognized that to a significant extent the lesser emphasis on public participation in short-term, implementation-type decisions results from other factors. For example, time constraints are imposed by demands for decisions, and by provincial legislation, and these cannot easily be overcome. The overall community benefits of public participation may have to be demonstrated before such constraints are removed or modified.

Having noted the foregoing, one should not overlook the fact that the Edmonton process makes self-correction possible. Through the process of public participation itself, its terms of reference, content, structures, and the like may be modified. If may therefore be kept continually responsive to the changing needs of all the actors engaged.

4. Political Sanction

In the representative political system which we have assumed, elected representatives remain the ultimate decision-makers respecting outputs from any feedback loops to the public planning agency. Whether outputs can come directly from the agency itself, or whether they come from a process where the public is actually involved with the agency in the conversion of inputs to outputs, the "conversion process" is delegated, and any delegated production of
outputs can be taken back. (Here we ignore the fact that the public may, through its elected representatives, achieve a permanent delegation to a conversion process which does not involve the elected representatives). Moreover, elected representatives are the formal controllers of a significant part of the agency's own organizational matters. For example, they control its financial resources and can through various sanctions direct the agency as to what it may or may not do, including "no communication directly with the public". While the latter may be difficult to enforce in that the public cannot be prevented from attempting to communicate with the agency, such a direction would make real communication difficult as the agency would likely not be receptive to public participation and would take no initiatives to develop it.

Self notes that "elective representatives often are not a little jealous of efforts by planners or administrators to ascertain public wishes directly, as conflicting with their own prerogatives of interpreting those wishes" (Self, 1972:289). Other writers have noted the same situation, particularly with respect to planning (Heikoff, 1975:18; and Redcliffe-Maud and Wood, 1974:72). There are many examples, of public participation which have been opposed or frustrated by elected representatives, or the results of which have not been supported by representatives (Baker, 1978; and Stilger, 1978). In one case a legislative body had not been consulted for its approval or for funding, and therefore would not provide funding for implementation follow-up when that was required, because it did not have a stake in the outcome or follow-up (Baker, 1978:29). Stilger's observation is that if the result of public participation will have any legislative impact, the legislative body must be involved in formulating the programme, and that until legislators
recognize the need for additional information they will not use the information provided by the programme (Stilger, 1978:98).

Heikoff's advice, given in the context of plans requiring the approval of political leaders, is applicable to "plans" for public participation:

Before he unveils his plans, the professional planner should be sure that the decision makers have been given the available intelligence about the problems involved, and that they have had time to debate and formulate a policy framework for them. Some political leaders may not even agree that the problems exist (Heikoff, 1975:86).

This is especially likely to be the case where the "plans" involve the traditional prerogatives of elected representatives. Politicians must therefore be consulted in the establishment of a public participation process, so that they have a commitment to it. An ongoing involvement by politicians, once the process is established, will serve to reinforce such a commitment.

The Edmonton process recognizes the need for the approval and involvement of elected representatives. Such involvement occurs at two levels. The first level is the major "policy" commitment to it, through its being a component of the GMP. The GMP is a major policy document of the City and is required by provincial statute. A public participation process is not required in a GMP, so its voluntary inclusion may be seen as giving it particular status, especially since the approval of the GMP involved lengthy and detailed consideration by the City Council. A secondary effect of including the public participation policy within the GMP is that the policy commitment is not easily revoked; the GMP can only be amended after proposed amendments have been the subject of public hearings by City Council.
A second level of involvement of elected representatives lies in the procedural and structural details of public participation as set down in the Handbook. The Handbook notes the requirement for the politicians to be involved at key decision points in the participation process, as well as the requirement to participate through interaction both informally and formally in a more general sense.

5. Groups versus Individuals

In their examination of public participation in planning, Sewell and Coppock state that among the critical questions to be asked are: who should participate? and, what weight should be attached to the views of well-organized, articulate interest groups as against the views of the unorganized public? (Sewell and Coppock, 1977:7-11). A simple answer would be that the public participation process should take into account the inputs of all those who have a legitimate interest in a particular matter. The problem with this, of course, is that there may be substantial minorities who have a legitimate interest but who, as in the conventional representative process, fail to make their views known.

A common approach to determining the relevant public for participation or consultation purposes is identify groups or individuals who are potentially affected by a problem or a proposed course of action. Thompson, for example, suggests that there are three types of problems where "consultation" is necessary: when some action (means) is needed to solve a problem and the action may have a severely adverse effect on a minority, when the democratic process fails because those in authority (politicians) are not in touch or in sympathy.
with the majority of people affected by their decisions, or when local government officers are incompetent (Thompson, 1977:69). Disregarding the second and third type, the first represents this common approach - there is a problem or an action, so consult with the affected group. But this approach pre-supposes that the goals and the actions have been decided, whereas the arguments presented in support of the hypothesis involve participation being necessary to determine those.

On the basis of the hypothesis one would have to say that consultation (public participation) is necessary where required action is not narrowly technical with no social impact, and where the issue's require the public's input in order to determine objectives and the means to reach those objectives. But this proposition presents the planning agency with an unmanageable task, for the agency is limited in the time and personnel resources which it can commit, and the relevant public is huge.

The traditional and widely used approach is to participate with the public as it is represented by existing groups or organizations within it, commonly referred to as interest groups. The reason is that in large societies or communities such groups perform an interest-articulation function on the part of like-minded individuals, providing a channel whereby similar demand and support inputs can more easily be gathered and correlated (Higgins, 1977:226; and Hill, 1974:96). They also perform, for the planning agency, the important output channel function of providing vehicles for informing and educating (in a broad sense) the public. To a certain extent this educative function occurs by the group processes whereby individual and private interests are to some extent modified and prioritized according to the interests of other individuals in the
group (Hill, 1974:96-97). And, according to pluralist theory, the competition among various groups ensures that all interests will be taken into account (Bureau of Municipal Research, 1975:9).

However, there are recognized problems in relying on groups as a channel for public inputs. One is similar to that inherent in elected representatives, that group leaders who represent the group do not always in fact represent the rank and file membership (Bureau of Municipal Research, 1975:9; and Hunnius, 1974:192). Another is that groups, even if internally representative, do not necessarily represent the community (Hamilton, 1973:252; Hunnius, 1974:192; and Margolis, 1979:116). They are issue-oriented. A third is that the public may be suspicious that the planning agency is deliberately attempting to organize and use groups (Burke, 1979:82). Finally, reliance on groups may give them status so that they become powerful enough to "exact the price of disproportionate influence" (Downs, 1957:95).

Despite these problems, interest groups do provide a useful interest articulation function, so long as the planning agency recognizes their dangers and deficiencies. Hayward refers to the development of a "network of communication" through the identification and deliberate promotion of group formation, group awareness, and group expression, and suggests the need for some more-or-less permanent structures of representation and consultation as well as ad hoc bodies for specific issues or areas (Hayward, 1974:20). von Hentig suggests that an organization such as a planning agency should provide opportunities for the public to build up its own groups, but that "the way in which a group co-operates to create its forms of participatory planning and decision-making is more important than the rules, procedures, and institutions they come up with" (von Hentig, 1974:290).
Respecting the potential unrepresentativeness of neighbourhood residential groups,

It is better to let the various neighborhoods work out this problem of legitimate representation themselves than to have some outside force intervene prematurely and impose its own conception of legitimacy on them. We cannot have it both ways: true representation on one hand and immediate resolution of problems on the other. The various contentious groups should compete with each other for the loyalty of the local residents. The neighborhood will, in this manner, develop its own relevant political style. Thus, when the winner does proceed to speak for the neighborhood, there will be greater certainty that the group can deliver its constituency (Hamilton, 1973:253-254).

Somewhat in the same connection, one writer has warned against the institutionalization of a complex participatory system as against attempting to utilize many self-developed groups. Institutionalization results in rigidities, a decline in representative character, and the potential to "exact the price of disproportionate influence". This writer notes that

The feeling is that the differences in...the many groups reflect the different styles and histories of the areas in which they function - and that this is good. Above all, as they are not necessarily representative of all the citizens or interests in the community, to institutionalize them would really amount to institutionalizing a lobby (Bureau of Municipal Research, 1975:38).

Evidence suggests that groups should be approached with caution. The methods of participation which rely on groups, however constituted, need to be balanced by methods which seek to gather inputs from the relevant public comprised of individuals.

In a very major way, the Edmonton process attempts to deal with the question of how to elicit truly representative participation from the public. It recognizes that likely only a small proportion of the public will participate directly with a planning agency, and that to have more than a small proportion
participate is physically not feasible from the planning agency's viewpoint. The method of overcoming this lies in the creation of a set of area-based committees which provide the primary focus for direct participation activities. These committees are to be comprised of the representatives of certain other groups together with representatives of the public-at-large. The groups entitled to be represented on the committees will be those which are not specific interest groups, but which are characterized by being more or less representative of the "grass-roots" public-at-large. This structure therefore attempts to both make use of the good features of groups while at the same time striving to ensure some reasonable representation of the public and its overall concerns.

In addition to the foregoing, the Edmonton process also provides explicitly for two other approaches. One is that agency staff are generally directed to not limit their direct involvement with the formal representative committees. They are to search out and establish contact with the other relevant groups within the community, in order to also interact with them more directly. This will ensure that community concerns are not being filtered or reinterpreted by committee members (however these come to be members). The second additional approach is that planning staff are also directed to specifically search out and establish contact with interest groups within the community which are excluded from representation on the formal committee because they are more narrowly issue-oriented than community-representative.

The combination of these approaches can be summarized as:

1. including a primary reference group which is to be as truly representative as possible of the community;
2. involving secondary community-wide reference groups to elicit more
detailed concerns and participation, and to confirm the
communication from the primary reference group; and

3. involving specifically but on a separate basis the interest groups
within the community which have their own legitimate but narrower
corns.

In addition to the foregoing, the formal area committees are to be encouraged to
provide means such as sub-committees whereby particular groups and individuals
can provide their input to the primary committee.

Thus the Edmonton process contains some elements of institutionalization, in order to provide structure, and establish the separateness
and community-base of the principal contact point within the community. But the
potential rigidities and power of institutionalized structures are to be counteracted by the involvement, albeit on a different status, with all other groups
within the community, whether or not they are interest groups.

6. The Communication Techniques of Public Participation

Public participation is usually hampered by inadequate
communication methods or mechanisms as much as it is by any other deficiencies.
Mechanisms used must facilitate the flow of useful information between the
planning agency and the public however it is constituted or defined. But an
equally important consideration in the communicative process we have described
is the facilitation of the flow sharing of information between individuals and
groups within the public. It is only when this occurs that the public is able to
input demands and support into the planning process in a form which reflect the
public's shared perceptions of needs and priorities (Laudon, 1977:31). It is only when this occurs that the public is able to respond in a reasoned way to the outputs and outcomes of the planning process. Moreover, our whole emphasis in the planning process is on a resolution of issues within the context of the values and norms of the public. A primary emphasis on linkages only between the planning agency on the one hand, and individuals or groups in the public on the other, will mean that the agency implicitly has the function of deriving a consensus, of working out the conflicts within the public, and of determining the issues to be addressed. But the fundamental issue, to paraphrase Laudon, is how the public as a whole can provide its inputs along lines that reflect their shared values and preferences (Laudon, 1977:25). Most of modern information technology, he says, serves institutions as means of control, not as means of participation. What should be emphasized "is the capacity for horizontal communications which cut across the tendency for information flows to move vertically in the service of a centralizing planning process" (Hayward, 1974:20). Mechanisms and techniques of participation which facilitate this as well as inputs to and outputs from the planning agency (the so-called "vertical" flows) are those which will draw out the most usable feedback response for it. However, having said that, techniques for vertical flows cannot be ignored, for without them the planning agency is not itself engaged in the public participation.

In fact, a review of the literature suggests that most of the public participation techniques currently in use are aimed at information flows between the agency and the public (Grigsby, Marcuse, Haile, and others, 1974:10; Sewell and Coppock, 1977:3; and Hampton, 1977:35, for example). The most useful
techniques will obviously be those which can facilitate both participation within the public and the participation of the public with the planning agency at the same time. Sewell and Coppock, in their discussion of techniques, note that participatory techniques such as public meetings, workshops and seminars, and task forces have been successful in establishing and maintaining the credibility of and confidence in participatory processes (Sewell and Coppock, 1977:5). While they do not attempt to explain why, a comparison of these techniques with others suggests that these are precisely the type which facilitate communication flows in many directions rather than only vertically or only horizontally.

The Edmonton process does not explicitly address the importance of using appropriate communication techniques for the reasons discussed above. It does, however, identify this need to encourage open interaction between different interests within the community, in order to more comprehensively and equitably identify issues and needs.

On a more general level, the process discusses many situations where the use of "public workshop" communications and consensus-building is appropriate. This type of communication provides broad interaction within the public, and between the public and the planning agency. The process also acknowledges the need to match participation techniques with the varying interests, experiences, and abilities within the public.

7. The Decentralization Issue

A review of the operational implications of the public planning agency would not be complete without including the implications respecting
decentralization. According to Frederickson, "administrative decentralization, citizen participation, and neighborhood control are closely coupled in reality and part of the same theoretical family. But they are conceptually distinct" (Frederickson, 1973:263). There are two ways of understanding what is meant by decentralization, as is noted by Schmandt. The one is the traditional usage, which refers to both the territorial distribution of authority among various levels of government, and to "the vertical allocation of power within each of these levels" (Schmandt, 1973:18). The other meaning is "the devolution of public power to local groups and organizations outside the normally constituted government structure" (Schmandt, 1973:18). The latter meaning, says Schmandt, comes out of the context of public participation ideas; in this he supports Frederickson's linkage of participation and "devolved" control or power.

For our purposes, because of the assumption that the decision-making authority remains with elected political representatives and is not given over to neighbourhoods or other urban sub-units, we are not concerned with the issue of devolved or "neighbourhood control". However, we are dealing in public participation with the concept of public influence on decision-making within the political system, and Frederickson's linkage of three concepts applies equally well if that concept is substituted for the concept of "control". In fact, the linkage is perhaps even more apt, given Frederickson's use of the term "administrative decentralization", because the concept of public participation used in connection with the hypothesis is essentially one of how public participation can work within administrative processes (i.e. the "organizational approach" of the public planning agency). Even Davis, who argues against public participation, agrees that public participation and decentralization go together (Davis, 1973:64).
Frederickson goes even further with respect to the linkage, stating that

When any one of administrative decentralization, citizen participation, or neighborhood control is put forward as a potential reform without the other two, little reform will ensue and the result will likely be economically and politically counter productive (Frederickson, 1973:263).

The question, in terms of the hypothesis, is whether or not the same statement would apply if we substitute the concept of public influence over decision-making for control.

There are two contending viewpoints respecting decentralization. The one is exemplified by Davis, that decentralization produces unpredictability and inequity, may be accompanied by discrimination, and may verge into disintegration and disorganization (Davis, 1973:64). Langrod suggest that democracy is egalitarian and uniterian, and therefore "moves inevitably and by its very essence towards centralisation" (Langrod, 1976:8). It follows from this viewpoint that decentralization is undemocratic and non-egalitarian (Langrod, 1976:8). From Frederickson's statement (which we have modified slightly) that decentralization, participation, and influence must go together, we can take this line of thinking even further to observe that public participation because it requires decentralization also has non-democratic attributes. This line of thinking is fraught with pitfalls, and we can conveniently turn from it because we still retain the assumption respecting the largely democratic features of an over-riding representative democratic political system.

The other contending viewpoint respecting decentralization is more fruitful. It is essentially based in the notion that the more accessible the
political system, the more responsive it will be, and the smaller the unit which is the political system, the more accessible it will be (Higgins, 1977:167; and Dahl, 1967:957-960). The related idea is that the public perceives that it has a better chance to influence government decisions in a local political system than those in a more distant political system (i.e. the public feels more efficacious); the public also finds locally-oriented government business more comprehensible (Margolis, 1979:171).

None of this speaks directly to the hypothesis, which deals with public participation within an established political system rather than devolution to smaller political systems. However, the public participation referred to in the hypothesis represents a political sub-system within the established system, and similar reasoning can be applied to the sub-system. This suggests that public participation, as a sub-system, will function most effectively if it deals with more locally-oriented issues in a "local" location. It follows that decentralization of the planning agency, accompanied by a focus on more local issues, will encourage greater public participation. Although decentralization does not necessarily or automatically increase participation, it enhances the opportunities to influence through participation (Medeiros and Schmitt, 1977:151).

We are left with the paradox, however, that "the smaller the unit, the greater the opportunity for citizens to participate in the decisions of their government, yet the less of the environment they can control" (Dahl, 1973:960). The public may want more control or policy-making respecting a larger and more inclusive unit than the one in which they participate, but their participation must be reduced in such a larger unit. In answer to that we
return again to our assumption that the existing larger unit which consists of
the representative political system remains, and is subject to the demand and
support inputs from the public enhanced by public participation.

The Edmonton process addresses the matter of decentralization in a
straight-forward manner. The staff assigned to the formal public participation
process is to be decentralized into site offices located within the districts
which are their concern. There they will work within the various public parti-
cipation processes, including a direct interface with the community-based
committees of the respective districts. The concerns to be addressed will be
primarily district concerns, whether they are District Planning or other
planning issues. But through the expected interface with elected politicians
and through the decentralized planning staff's interface with its own agency,
the district will have the opportunity to bring forward issues and concerns
which are larger than district-wide.

The question that remains with respect to decentralization of staff
and the public participation process in Edmonton is whether or not the decen-
tralization into six districts is sufficient. In a city of 500,000 people, that
decentralization still results in over 80,000 people per district. It remains
to be seen if a public comprised of 80,000 people can perceive its district's
issues, concerns, and participation opportunities, to be local enough that the
desired public participation will occur.
CHAPTER VI: SUMMARY

Having developed the hypothesis, it now remains to summarize the case presented for it. The hypothesis has not been proved conclusively. What has been done is to demonstrate that, on the basis of an integration of various theories and concepts as they relate to the public planning agency, a case can be made for the agency's engaging in public participation for its own organizational reasons.

Chapter V has presented the central arguments in support of the hypothesis, that organization theory as represented by the Open Systems view of organizations supports the urban public planning agency's engagement in a process of public participation in planning. This has been done within the limitations and assumptions stated in Chapter II, and based on the description of the Open Systems view of organizations and their external communication in Chapter III.

In order to present the arguments in support of the hypothesis it was necessary to lay the groundwork of demonstrating that the public planning agency can appropriately be described as an open organization. This was done in Chapter IV. Proceeding from that base, Chapter IV then evaluated the overall external communication needs of the planning agency in Open System terms.

The need having been established, Chapter IV then went on to describe the particular organizational context of the public planning agency with reference to the formal political structure within which it functions, and with reference to the bureaucratic and administrative organizational principles within which it functions. The unique professional basis for planning found in the planning profession's own body of procedural theory was also reviewed in Chapter IV.
From it was developed an operational model of a planning agency. The development of such a model from procedural planning theory is necessary because this theory should shape the agency's operation and professional approach to public participation; in effect it constitutes a part of the organizational context for the planning agency.

The critical step of showing public participation to be external communication able to meet certain organizational needs, occurred in Chapter V. Chapter V showed first that the urban public planning agency is a particular kind of open organization. It is a political entity because of its situation and functions within a political system. Because of this, its external communication needs are found to be the feedback needs, in terms of inputs and outputs, of political "authorities".

Chapter V then analyzed the conventional feedback processes for political authorities, to determine how well they serve the urban planning agency's external communication needs. Two propositions were advanced from this analysis, to the effect that the conventional feedback processes are insufficient to the public planning agency's needs, and cannot be expected to be sufficient. This is because of observable and inherent deficiencies in them, relative to the unique input and output needs of a public planning agency. External communication in the form of public participation can provide another feedback process which assists in meeting the planning agency's external communication needs. However, because of the assumptions respecting the political system, which themselves shape the organizational context, the public participation process of external communication cannot replace the conventional feedback processes.
The support for the hypothesis as demonstrated in Chapter V is derived largely from a distinguishable portion of the planning agency's organizational context. This is the "political entity" portion. Therefore it was subsequently necessary in Chapter V to examine public participation in relation to the other significant portions of the agency's organizational context. This was done specifically with reference to the agency's professional base and traditional organizational processes, by examining the compatibility of public participation with them. Public participation was found to be compatible with the professional base. It was suggested that the apparent incompatibility with traditional processes can be resolved by a recognition of these traditional processes as being inappropriate models to guide the agency in all its respects.

Finally, Chapter V considered selected operational implications, for the public planning agency, of accepting the hypothesis. There are a number of operational steps or concerns to which the agency must address itself in engaging in a process of public participation. In one example of such a process, in the City of Edmonton, Alberta, there is evidence that these operational implications have been explicitly considered as being necessary. Whether or not such operational steps are successful in bringing about the desired public participation remains to be seen.

More fundamentally, whether or not a process of public participation will in practice meet organizational needs remains to be tested. Such testing is not within the scope of this study. It will require a detailed analysis of cases where public participation has been put into practice.

In conclusion, urban public planning agencies should approach the issue of public participation from the viewpoint of determining how it can benefit them
as organizations. There has been a tendency to conceptualize urban issues such as public participation solely in political rather than also in administrative or institutional terms. At the same time, those administrative or institutional concepts which have been considered have been largely directed towards internal organizational matters, not also to external relationships. The result has been that there has not been a positive, organization-directed approach to public participation. White says:

Those who study administration must shift the focus of their theoretical orientation from the internal dynamics of organizations. Instead, they must center their attention on the interactions between public organizations and their environments and view internal dynamics as an aspect of this process (White, 1973:118).
REFERENCES

Aiken, Michael, and Samuel B. Bacharach

Aldrich, Howard E.

Aldrich, Howard, and Sergio Mindlin

Alexander, Alan

Alford, Robert R.
1969 Bureaucracy and Participation: Political Cultures in Four Wisconsin Cities; Chicago: Rand McNally

Argyris, Chris, and Donald A. Schon

Arnstein, Sherry R.
1969 "A Ladder of Citizen Participation", Journal of the American Institute of Planners; XXXV, 216-224

Arrow, Kenneth J.

Atkinson, Michael M., and Graham White
1980 "The Development of Provincial Legislatures", in Harold D. Clarke, Colin Campbell, F.Q. Quo, and Arthur Goddard (Eds.), Parliament, Policy and Representation; Agincourt, Ont.: Methuen Publications

Baker, David E.
Becquart - Leclercq, Jeanne

Bennello, C. George
1971 "Group Organization and Socio-Political Structure", in C. George Benello and Dimitrios Roussopoulos (Eds.) The Case for Participatory Democracy; New York: Grossman Publishers

Benello, C. George, and Dimitrios Roussopoulos
1971 "Introduction", in C. George Benello and Dimitrios Roussopoulos (Eds.), The Case for Participatory Democracy; New York: Grossman Publishers

Bish, Robert L.

Blau, Peter M.

Blau, Peter M., and Marshall W. Meyer
1971 Bureaucracy in Modern Society; New York: Random House

Braybrooke, David, and Charles E. Lindblom

Breed, Warren

Brodie, M. Janine, and Bruce D. McNaughton
1980 "Legislators versus Bureaucrats: The Norms of Governing in Canada", in Harold D. Clarke, Colin Campbell, F.Q. Quo, and Arthur Goddard (Eds.), Parliament, Policy and Representation; Agincourt, Ont.: Methuen Publications

Bureau of Municipal Research
1975 Citizen Participation in Metro Toronto: Climate for Cooperation?; Toronto: Bureau of Municipal Research

Burke, Edmund M.
Campbell, Colin, and Harold D. Clarke
1980 "Conspectus: Some Thoughts on Parliamentary Reform", in Harold D. Clarke, Colin Campbell, F.Q. Quo, and Arthur Goddard (Eds.), Parliament, Policy and Representation; Agincourt, Ont.: Methuen Publications

Campbell, Colin, and George Szablowski
1980 "The Centre and the Periphery: Superbureaucrats' Relations with MPs and Senators," in Harold D. Clarke, Colin Campbell, F.Q. Quo, and Arthur Goddard (Eds.), Parliament, Policy and Representation; Agincourt, Ont.: Methuen Publications

City of Edmonton
1980 General Municipal Plan; Edmonton, Alberta: City of Edmonton

City of Edmonton
1981 District Planning Handbook; Edmonton, Alberta: City of Edmonton

Connor, Desmond
1972 "Constructive Citizen Participation", Habitat; 15(1), 28-33

Connover, Donald K.

Dahl, Robert A.

Davidoff, Paul and Thomas A. Reiner

Davis, James

Dimock, Marshall Edward, and Gladys Ogden Dimock

Downs, Anthony

Downs, Anthony
1967 Inside Bureaucracy; Boston: Little, Brown and Company
Downs, Anthony
1972 "Up and Down with Ecology - The 'Issue - Attention Cycle'", The Public Interest; 28, 38-50

Downs, Cal, David M. Berg, and Wil A. Linkugel
1977 The Organizational Communicator; New York: Harper and Row, Publishers

Dunn, William N., and Bahman Fozouni
1976 Toward a Critical Administrative Theory; Beverly Hills; Sage Publications

Easton, David

Easton, David
1965b A Systems Analysis of Political Life; New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

Eide, Kjell
1974 "Participation and Participatory Planning in Educational Systems", in Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Participatory Planning in Education; Paris: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development

Emery, F.E., and E.L. Trist
1972 "The Causal Texture of Organizational Environments", in Merlin B. Brinkerhoff and Phillip R. Kunz (Eds.), Complex Organizations and Their Environments; Dubuque, Iowa: Wm. C. Brown Company Publishers

Etzioni, Amitai

Fish, Susan A.
1976 "Winning the Battle and Losing the War in the Fight to Improve Municipal Policy Making", in Lionel D. Feldman and Michael D. Goldrick (Eds.), Politics and Government of Urban Canada: Selected Readings; Toronto: Methuen Publications

Fraser, Alistair
1980 "Legislators and their Staffs", in Harold D. Clarke, Colin Campbell, F.Q. Quo, and Arthur Goddard (Eds.), Parliament, Policy and Representation; Agincourt, Ont.: Methuen Publications
Frederickson, George  

Friedmann, John  

Friedmann, John, and Barclay Hudson  

Galloway, Thomas D., and Riad G. Mahayni  

Gortner, Harold F.  
1977 Administration in the Public Sector; New York: John Wiley and Sons

Grabow, Stephen, and Allan Heskin  

Grigsby, J. Eugene, Peter Marcuse, Alan Haile, and Others  

Gross, Bertram  
1968 Organizations and Their Managing; New York: The Free Press

Hamilton, Charles V.  

Hampton, William  
1977 "Research into Public Participation in Structure Planning", in W.R. Derrick Sewell and J. T. Coppock (Eds.), Public Participation in Planning; London: John Wiley and Sons, Ltd.

Hayward, Beresford  
Heikoff, Joseph M.
1975 Politics and Urban Planning: A Primer; Urbana-Champaign, Ill.: Bureau of Urban and Regional Planning Research, University of Illinois

Hendee, John C.

Higgins, Donald J.H.
1977 Urban Canada: Its Government and Politics; Toronto: MacMillan of Canada

Hill, Melvyn A.
1974 "Political Judgment and the Viability of Institutions", in David P. Shugarman (Ed.), Thinking About Change; Toronto: University of Toronto Press

Hudson, Barclay M.

Hummel, Ralph P.

Hunnius, Gerry
1974 "Participation vs Parliament", in David P. Shugarman (Ed.), Thinking About Change; Toronto: University of Toronto Press

Inglehart, Ronald

Jones, Victor

Kast, Fremont E., and James E. Rosenzweig

Katz, Daniel, and Robert L. Kahn
Kaufman, Herbert

Kernaghan, Kenneth
1973 "Responsible Public Bureaucracy: A Rationale and a Framework for Analysis", Canadian Public Administration; 28, 572-603

Kogan, Maurice
1974 "Educational Planning Perspectives: Some Definitions Appropriate to the Participative Elements of Educational Government", in Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Participatory Planning in Education; Paris: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development

Kornberg, Allan, Harold D. Clarke, and Arthur Goddard

Langrod, Georges
1976 "Local Government and Democracy", in Lionel D. Feldman and Michael D. Goldrick (Eds.), Politics and Government of Urban Canada: Selected Readings; Toronto: Methuen Publications

Langton, Stuart
1978 Citizen Participation in America; Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath and Company

Laudon, Kenneth C.
1977 Communications Technology and Democratic Participation; New York: Praeger Publishers

Lawrence, Paul R., and Jay W. Lorsch
1972 "Organization and Environment", in Merlin P. Brinkerhoff and Phillip R. Kunz (Eds.), Complex Organizations and Their Environments; Dubuque, Iowa: Wm. C. Brown Company Publishers

Leiss, William
1974 "The False Imperatives of Technology", in David P. Shugarman (Ed.) Thinking About Change; Toronto; University of Toronto Press

Lillico, T. M.
1972 Managerial Communication; Oxford: Pergamon Press

Lindblom, Charles E.
Lineberry, Robert L., and Edmund P. Fowler  
1967 "Reformism and Public Policies in American Cities", *American Political Science Review*; 61, 701-716

Lipsky, Michael  

Long, Norton  
1952 "Bureaucracy and Constitutionalism", *American Political Science Review*; 46, 808-818

Margolis, Michael  

Meadow, Robert G.  

Medeiros, James A., and David E. Schmitt  
1977 *Public Bureaucracy: Values and Perspectives*; North Scituate, Mass.: Duxbury Press

Mink, Oscar G., James M. Shultz, and Barbara P. Mink  
1979 *Developing and Managing Open Organizations*; Austin, Texas: Learning Concepts

Mintzberg, Henry  

Oppenheimer, Martin  

Pateman, Carole  
1970 *Participation and Democratic Theory*; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Pennings, Johannes M., and Rama C. Tripathi  
Pennock, J. Roland  

Perin, Constance  
1967 "A Noiseless Secession from the Comprehensive Plan", Journal of the American Institute of Planners; XXXII, 336-347  

Plunkett, H. Dudley  

Plunkett, T.J.  

Presthus, Robert  
1965 The Organizational Society: An Analysis and a Theory; New York: Vintage Books  

Rapp, Brian W.  
1978 "You Can't Manage City Hall the Way You Manage General Motors", in Frederick S. Lane (Ed.), Current Issues in Public Administration; New York: St. Martin's Press.  

Redcliffe-Maud, Lord, and Bruce Wood  
1974 English Local Government Reformed; London: Oxford University Press  

Reiner, Thomas A.  
1967 "The Planner as Value Technician: Two Classes of Utopian Constructs and Their Impacts on Planning", in H. W. Eldredge (Ed.), Taming Megalopolis; Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books  

Rittel, Horst W. J., and Melvin M. Webber  

Rogers, Everett M., and Rekha Agarwala-Rogers  

Roszak, Theodore  
1969 The Making of a Counter Culture; Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday Anchor Books  

Schatzow, Steven  
1977 "The Influence of the Public on Federal Environmental Decision-making in Canada", in W.R. Derrick Sewell and J.T. Coppock (Eds.),
Public Participation in Planning; London: John Wiley and Sons, Ltd.

Schmandt, Henry J.

Self, Peter
1972 Administrative Theories and Politics; London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd.

Selznick, Philip

Sewell, W. R. Derrick, and J. T. Coppock
1977 "A Perspective on Public Participation in Planning", in W.R. Derrick Sewell and J. T. Coppock (Eds.), Public Participation in Planning; London: John Wiley and Sons, Ltd.

Sharkansky, Inc.
1972 Public Administration: Policy-Making in Government Agencies; Chicago: Markham Publishing Company

Sigelman, Lee, and William G. Vanderbok
1977 "Legislators, Bureaucrats, and Canadian Democracy: The Long and the Short of It", Canadian Journal of Political Science; 10, 615-623

Smith P. J.
1970 "Public Goals and the Canadian Environment", Plan Canada, 11, 4-12

Stilger, Robert L.

Thomas, Norman C.

Thomas, Rosamund
1978 The British Philosophy of Administration; London: Longman Group Limited

Thompson, J. M.
Thompson, James D., and William J. McEwen
1972 "Organizational Goals and Environment", in Merlin B. Brinkerhoff and Phillip R. Kunz (Eds.), Complex Organizations and Their Environments; Dubuque, Iowa: Wm. C. Brown Company Publishers

Thompson, Victor A.
1975 Without Sympathy or Enthusiasm: The Problem of Administrative Compassion; University, Alabama: The University of Alabama Press

Toffler, Alvin

Tushman, Michael L., and Ralph Katz
1980 "External Communication and Project Performance: An Investigation Into the Role of Gatekeepers", Management Science; 26, 1071—1085

Ullrich, Robert A., and George F. Wieland
1980 Organization Theory and Design; Homewood, Ill.: Richard D. Irwin, Inc.

Van Loon, Richard J., and Michael S. Whittington

von Hentig, Hartmut

Walker, Jack L.

Waterman, Nan

Weber, Max
1946 "Bureaucracy", in Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills, From Max Weber; New York: Oxford University Press

Weber, Max
1947 Theory of Social and Economic Organizations (translated by A.M. Henderson and T. Parsons); New York: Oxford University Press
White, Orion, Jr.

Wigand, Rolf T.
1979 "A Model of Interorganizational Communication Among Complex Organizations", in Klaus Krippendorf (Ed.), Communication and Control in Society; New York: Gordon and Breach Science Publishers

Yates, Douglas
APPENDIX

THE CITY OF EDMONTON DISTRICT PLANNING AND CITIZEN PARTICIPATION PROCESS

A. Introduction

The City of Edmonton, Alberta, proposes to establish a public participation process "to encourage the continuous involvement of citizens and business interests in land use planning" (City of Edmonton, 1980: Objective 4.A). The term "citizen participation" is used, referring to the involvement of citizens-at-large, community league representatives, business association representatives, special interest groups or members of the public in any task intended to influence or bring about a decision (City of Edmonton, 1981:3).

It therefore means essentially the same as "public participation" in the sense that the latter term is used in the development of the hypothesis.

This process has been approved through the adoption of the City's General Municipal Plan (City of Edmonton, 1980), adopted as formal City policy by a City bylaw on July 4, 1980 (hereafter referred to as the Plan). The public participation process (referred to in the General Municipal Plan as "citizen participation") is Component 4 of 18 components of the Plan. A brief description of the salient features of the proposed public participation process is provided here as an example of an attempt to establish such a process in a planning function within an urban political system, basically with reference to land use planning. The public participation process is referred to as "proposed" because in the latter part of 1981 it has yet to be implemented despite its official approval. (All further citations herein are from City of Edmonton, 1980, or City of Edmonton, 1981.)
There is no explicit evidence to suggest that the proposed citizen participation process represents an "organizational approach" as contained in the hypothesis. In fact, the statement is made in the Plan that

As a process of implementing the General Municipal Plan strategy, District Planning cannot be accomplished by City Council and the Civic Administration alone. It can be accomplished only with the consent and participation of the people of Edmonton. To achieve the involvement of the public in carrying out the General Municipal Plan, the Plan provides for a formal system of citizen participation on the District basis (1980: Component 4).

This implies that the process is intended only for the purposes of a specific planning exercise, the implementation of the plan. However, the Plan does go on to say that the proposal is made

in response to the concerns expressed during the Mayor's Neighbourhood Planning Conference, the Citizens' Concerns Survey, and General Municipal Plan workshops regarding the need for an ongoing, rather than an ad hoc, participation process. Involvement in the preparation of District Plans provides an opportune set of terms of reference for initiating such a structure, which could gradually evolve into responsibilities for advising on development and rezoning applications on an ongoing basis (1980: Component 4).

The proposal therefore is intended for a broader purpose than implementation of the Plan. However, the specific activities are still limited, and the approach still makes no reference to an organizational approach. Despite this, the proposal can be usefully considered as an illustration of an attempt by a public planning agency to initiate a public participation process within, and sanctioned by, an urban political system.
B. **Basic Characteristics**

In order to understand the proposed participation process and to relate it to the hypothesis, it is necessary to consider it together with another component of the Plan. This is the component represented by the objective "to undertake District Planning as a means of providing detailed planning services over broad areas of the city" (1980: Objective 3.A.) It is partly in connection with this District Planning process that citizen participation is to operate when established. As noted, the Plan states:

As a process of implementing the General Municipal Plan strategy, District Planning cannot be accomplished by City Council and the Civic Administration alone. It can be accomplished only with the consent and participation of the people of Edmonton. To achieve the involvement of the public in carrying out the General Municipal Plan, the Plan provides for a formal system of citizen participation on the District basis (1980: Component 4).

Thus we have two basic characteristics of the citizen participation process: that it is to occur in connection with a specific planning process, and that it is to be a formal system of participation.

Let us examine the intended content of this District Planning process. For the purposes of this process, the City is divided into six districts corresponding to the City's six aldermanic wards, and each of these is further divided into two sub-district (1980: Policy 3.A.3). A District Plan is to be prepared for each district, "to provide the link between growth projected by the General Municipal Plan and the regulation of development on specific sites through the Land Use Bylaw" (1980: Policy 3.A.2). (The Land Use Bylaw is basically the same as a zoning bylaw; it covers the whole of the City.) A reading of Policy 3.A.5 suggests that a District Plan will have two elements.
Firstly, it will in some respects have some of the characteristics of a master plan, prescribing areas for various land uses, identifying specific infrastructure requirements, providing for transportation facilities, and the like. Secondly, however it will in some respects also be a procedural plan in that it will determine the processes, criteria, or guidelines by which planning issues are resolved as they occur. The latter will not necessarily be restricted to land use or transportation issues, but may also include, for example, social impacts, and "any additional factors of concern to local residents or City Council" (1980: Policy 3.A.5(j)). Thus, while the District Plan may appear to be an "old-fashioned" plan, it is given the potential of having a much broader content and itself setting in motion an ongoing planning process.

But in addition to this potentially broad role for citizen participation by virtue of the broad potential of the District Planning process, the citizen participation process also has other areas of involvement. This includes the "monitoring of plans and the review of development applications" (1980: Policy 4.A.1), where "plans" appears to have an unlimited definition and "development applications" means any proposed specific physical development. This same policy also refers to the participation process as "providing input to the Planning Department on land use planning issues", without limiting what that input is.

The second basic characteristic of the citizen participation process is that it is to be a formal system. By this is not meant that the process will be stiff or ritualistic, but that it will be "formalized" and function according to clearly defined structures and procedures. In this regard the Plan states:
The City will create a structure to facilitate citizen participation...through the establishment of formal District Planning Committees composed of representatives elected from community leagues, area councils, and citizens at large (1980: Policy 4.A.1).

There will be a system of Planning Committees established, and:

District Planning Committees will be legally constituted under the Societies Act of Alberta (1980: Policy 4.A.2).

These Committees will be matched, in terms of geographic area of responsibility or "jurisdiction", with the districts of the District Planning process. Moreover, in order to enable these Committees to function with some independence,

The City will establish funding for citizen participation to assist District Planning Committees in meeting anticipated operational expenses (1980: Policy 4.A.3).

A third basic characteristic of the proposed citizen participation process is established by the fact that the planning agency (the City Planning Department) is to become physically decentralized in part. In accordance with the plan, "the City will establish one site office in each district" (1980: Policy 3.A.4). Further elaboration on this is provided in the District Planning Handbook (City of Edmonton, 1981:67-78). The latter contains a description of the personnel resources of the Department who will work in the District Planning and citizen participation processes from decentralized site office locations. The number and professional quality of personnel decentralized in this manner, together with their functional responsibilities at the decentralized locations (1981:74) indicates that a large amount of "significant" planning will occur in various places throughout the City.
The three foregoing basic characteristics of the proposed citizen participation process describe the following in a general sense:

1) the citizen component (i.e. the formalized channel for the citizens to participate);
2) the planning agency component (i.e. the channel for the planning agency to participate); and
3) the content (i.e. the subjects or matters concerning which participation will occur).

The Plan does not propose that this process take the place of any existing participatory processes, nor that the existing conventional electoral-political process would be modified. Existing interaction processes, whether informal or formalized, are assumed to continue.
C. The Overall Process

The proposal may also be examined in terms of some of the details of the overall process whereby the citizen and planning agency components will interact with respect to the content of the participation. This process has been spelled out to some extent in the District Planning Handbook (City of Edmonton, 1981). The details of the process would develop from its implementation and would likely evolve continuously throughout its operation over time. This may well result not only in variations in detail but also in changes to the basic framework which has been given formal approval.

There are three important aspects to the process viewed from a broad perspective. One is the composition and functions of the District Planning Committees, since in the formalized structure they are intended to be a major channel for the citizen component of participation; the second is the details of processes within the community; the third is the manner whereby City staff (in our case the Planning Department) are to interact with the community.

With respect to the first of these, the citizen component has its formal basis in six legally constituted District Planning Committees. Each relates to a geographical district of the City, each of which is in turn co-terminus with an aldermanic ward.

Here it is of interest to note that the District Planning Handbook replaces the term "District Planning Committee" with the term "Citizen Community Council". The reason for this lies in an exercise that the City Council engaged in at the same time the Plan was being developed and approved (1981:26). This was the review of the report of a "Task Force on City Government" which was charged with the task of reviewing a wide range of the
City's governmental and representative processes. Out of this exercise came City Council's commitment to improved processes of citizen participation generally, in all aspects of governmental decision-making. This resulted in the development of the concept of six Citizen Community Councils, each related to one of the six aldermanic wards. These Citizen Community Councils (CCCs) would in principle perform the same function relative to all City government matters as originally intended for the District Planning Committees relative to planning (1981:27). There would be no separate District Planning Committees, and the CCCs would incorporate the intended functions of the District Planning Committees. While the CCC concept does not alter the specifics of the proposed citizen participation process vis-a-vis planning, the broadening of the subject-related role of the process is significant for the planning function. The CCCs will clearly be a means whereby, within the context of the participation process, other citizen concerns can be integrated with land-use planning issues. Thus, even though City departments may still have their separate and distinct functions, the CCCs have the potential to deal with all public concerns in relation to these functions in a co-ordinated and integrated manner. In that respect the CCCs take on a subject-related issue-focus similar to that of the City Council.

The CCCs as a vehicle for citizen participation in planning are essentially representative bodies. It is therefore necessary to examine how representative they are, in terms of the districts within which they function. They are to be comprised both of representatives of other groups or organizations within the district, where such bodies have been explicitly and formally recognized by City Council as being appropriate to involve in the
process, and of representatives of the public-at-large selected through a
general public meeting within the district (1981: Appendix 1;6-7). But it is
also recognized that other organizations within the district, notwithstanding
their not being recognized by means of status on the CCCs, should still be
involved. In the absence of their formal recognition and representation, there
should be "regular meetings between the Citizen Community Councils and each
organization and/or through the membership of other organizations on
subcommittees of the Citizen Community Councils" (1981:57). The advisability
of involving as widespread a citizen base as possible in planning activities is
further recognized in the statements that

In addition to the Citizen Community Councils, other groups will
be encouraged to provide ongoing input during the preparation of
a plan. If the principles for the participation component of
district planning are to be realized, all groups must be offered
the opportunity continually to participate in the process on an
individual group basis, although all groups will be encouraged
to provide their input to and through the Citizen Community
Councils as well as directly to the planning teams (1981:58)

(The complete identification and involvement of the various groups within the
community, beyond the CCCs, is a task which relates to the manner whereby City
staff interact with the community, and will be discussed more fully in that
context).

The CCCs are not intended solely as primary citizen groups with which
City staff interact. They are also to perform an information dissemination and
communication function within the community. In this respect, the CCCs will be
responsible for "informing people as to how their input has been considered by
the Citizen Community Councils" and for "informing district citizens and
organizations of the Citizen Community Council's views, actions, or decisions
on policy matters on a frequent basis (once every two months)" (1981:56).
With respect to the second aspect of the total process, the detail of it within the community, this is still to be worked out. However, some of the stated "Principles for Participation by Citizen and Other Organizations" provide an indication of what the detail will be aimed at (1981:38-43):

1) involvement of the public through individual citizens and groups in the design and implementation of the citizen participation process;

2) definition of the roles and responsibilities of all participants in the process;

3) designing the process so that it can accommodate the different levels of interest, resources, capabilities, or interests of citizens and groups;

4) involvement of CCCs and other interest groups, or individuals, in evaluating and modifying the process;

5) contribution to the identification of planning issues and opportunities, the generation of alternative concepts and criteria for evaluating these alternatives, and the selection of a preferred alternative;

6) assistance in efforts to resolve conflicts within the community regarding goals, objectives, and/or planning decisions;

7) providing information to citizens and groups on a regular basis regarding progress on plans; and

8) encouraging broader roles and responsibilities to be assumed by the CCCs over time.

An example of the type of detailed activity is the activity to be undertaken in relation to the first of these principles stated above. The means
by which the citizen participation process comes into being is in itself a participative process. It is to be based on the need to achieve an open process through the provision of information, actively soliciting involvement of interest groups, and being responsive to community needs and proposals for change (1981:52)

A series of steps is proposed (1981:52-55):

1) identification, and establishment of communication with, likely groups, organizations, and interests within the district;

2) a widespread distribution of information respecting the proposed citizen participation and District Planning process within each district, to groups, interests, and organizations;

3) the conducting of a series of public workshops within districts, for the purposes of presenting information respecting the processes and structures proposed, identification of other key interest groups, and the like;

4) preliminary identification, through a participatory process, of the details of an ongoing participatory process which is appropriate for the district;

5) preparation of the terms of reference for the process within each district;

6) the conducting of a second series of public workshops within each district, where the terms of reference will be presented and changed as desired and feasible; and

7) the submission of the terms of reference to the City Council for approval and formal establishment of the individual district citizen participation and District Planning processes.
With respect to the third aspect of the total process, the manner in which City staff interact with the community, a number of points have been noted already. To recap: firstly, since the principal specific function of the citizen participation process and the CCCs is to be district planning and related land-use concerns (1981:27), the Planning Department's involvement is substantial; secondly, interaction is to be facilitated through the physical full-time decentralization of a significant number of planning staff; and thirdly, the staff decentralized to facilitate interaction is to be highly qualified and professional. In this latter respect, the desired attributes of the staff are stated (1981:68); they involve not only technical planning competence and managerial skills, but also strong interpersonal, participation, and conflict resolution skills.

Beyond these points, there is an emphasis on "direct contact between the planners and the Citizen Community Councils", with no intermediary used or required (1981:58). There is also a clear realization that the interaction in the process must not be limited to the CCC structure. For example, the statement is made that although community leagues are assured of representation on the CCCs,

individual community leagues will also be approached directly to identify and discuss issues or policies. As well, the geographic area covered by groups of three to four community leagues will be used as a basis for organizing and conducting workshops, enhancing the ability of community leagues to be involved in the planning process (1981:59).

Moreover, it is recognized that groups or interests not involved through the CCC structure cannot be overlooked by planning staff:

The composition of membership on the Citizen Community Councils specifically excludes limited partisan interest groups such as business associations, institutional groups or fraternal groups. Therefore, the plan teams must give particular attention to identify and attract the involvement of representatives from these types of organizations (1981:59).
D. The Process within the Political System

There is nothing within the proposed formalized citizen participation process in the City of Edmonton to suggest that the process will replace the decision-making authority of the City Council. The elected politicians will retain their authority to govern, and to make the decisions which are necessary whether or not they have come up through the participation process. In fact, the process envisaged will exist because of City Council's decision in approving concepts and policies contained within the General Municipal Plan; those concepts and policies can be revoked or amended by City Council at any time. Moreover, all the usual and more traditional processes by which the public participates in or influences decision-making will continue to exist. If the public is dissatisfied, for any reason, with the effects of the formalized participation process, the opportunity will be there for the public to make its representations to politicians, by legitimate means outside the formalized process, to change or do away with that process. In recognition of this, and to ensure that the political decision-makers retain a commitment to the process by virtue of their knowledge of it and sense of being a part of it, the proposal intends that the formalized process will not exist separately from the continuing formal political processes. They must interface. At the district level, for example, it is suggested that "there are a variety of ways in which this interface can be accomplished ranging from representation of ward aldermen on the Citizen Community Councils to formal policy conferences" (1981:57). It is also proposed that there must be the opportunity for City Council to provide direction or decisions at key decision points, and to provide its own inputs in the development and evaluation of goals and objectives, alternative concept plans, and policies (1981:43).
Within that context, however, the formalized process clearly represents the explicit establishment of an additional communication process within the urban political system. Its benefits are seen as follows (1981:22):

1. education of the public and government;
2. better decision-making;
3. strengthening of the democratic process;
4. encouraging leadership, individual responsibility, social interaction and community self-help; and,
5. ensuring implementable actions and policies through securing a broad base of awareness and understanding during the policy development phase.

These benefits will come about principally through the interaction of the public and the public planning agency leading to a more effective functioning of the political system.