THE NATIONAL SALVATION ASSOCIATION:
THE CASE OF THE SEVEN WORTHIES

by

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B.A., University of Auckland, 1979

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF ARTS

in
THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES
(Department of History)

We accept this thesis as conforming
to the required standard

THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA
July 1982

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Date July 14, 1982
The National Salvation Association brought into prominence and temporary alliance social forces that would figure importantly in the tempestuous course of the following decades: the dissident intellectuals and professionals, the more or less modernized or Westernized elements of the urban population and part of the commercial sector of the population. They shared a sense of the need to save China from external aggression and civil war. Moreover, they desired change in China. The National Salvation Association acted as a vehicle for modernization, and a catalyst for change.

From this study it is evident that the National Salvation Association was well organized with effective group leadership. During the fifteen months after its formal inauguration (May 1936), the National Salvation Association, in the face of ever-increasing KMT efforts to control the press, produced a large quantity of literature. Some of this literature, as well as a wide selection of biographical, reminiscent and commemorative materials, has greatly aided the present study. This has been supplemented by various periodicals and newspapers of the period.

As a microcosm of the National Salvation Association as a whole, an examination of the Shanghai Women's National Salvation Association has shown first, that not only was the participation of women in the Shanghai Women's National Salvation Association a continuation of a politicization trend but that these women were at least as militant and politically sensitive as their male counterparts. Second, the Shanghai Women's National Salvation Association was
characterized by a curious amalgamation of Shanghai's female labour force and women intellectuals and professionals.

Both the leadership and the support base of the National Salvation Association were marked by a preponderance of intellectuals and professionals. They used the printed medium to espouse wider liberal-democratic socio-political concerns.

The case of the seven worthies brought the seven Shanghai National Salvation leaders to national prominence; they became in effect a cause célèbre for democratic rights. But, the enduring significance of the National Salvation Association was that the prominence afforded by the trial made possible the use of these people as symbols for the united front. Five of the seven retained prominent positions during the Sino-Japanese War through involvement with the Democratic League.
PREFACE

This study is preliminary and partial in many respects. It is meant as an introduction to issues and questions that have continued to remain elusive. Source materials are abundant, but have not always been easily obtainable, and when available, have frequently been more useful for research with an earlier time period in view. Moreover, the information in the Chinese materials is often vague and unclear, as well as at times quite contradictory from one account to another.

Initially, the topic of this study was thought a good choice as an M.A. thesis, because of the potential it had to shed light on the role of Chinese urban intellectuals and professionals in organized patriotic activities in the immediate pre-Sino-Japanese War period. However, it has become evident that research on this topic requires detailed investigation, not only of the socio-political context in which the National Salvation Association emerged, but also of the actors - those urban intellectuals and professionals who provided leadership for the organization, expressed liberal-democratic views in National Salvation manifestoes and other literature, and who became increasingly alienated from the KMT.

Constraints of time, sources, and the need for further detailed knowledge of the actors and the organization in a wider time framework contribute to the difficulties faced in researching this topic for an M.A. thesis. Thus, as an exploration of a topic, it is limited to many tentative conclusions, leaving many questions unanswered, and raising a host of others. Yet, I do not subscribe to the notion that the writing of recent history must wait until all the facts are in.
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### ABBREVIATIONS

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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>CCP</td>
<td>Chinese Communist Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>KMT</td>
<td>Kuomintang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KWCP</td>
<td>Kuo-wen chou-pao [National News Weekly]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCH</td>
<td>North China Herald and Supreme Court and Consular Gazette</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRC</td>
<td>People's Republic of China</td>
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<tr>
<td>TCSH</td>
<td>Ta-chung sheng-huo [Life of the Masses]</td>
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<tr>
<td>YMCA</td>
<td>Young Men's Christian Association</td>
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<td>YWCA</td>
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

At various stages of this study several scholars gave help and criticism that improved the quality of the work beyond the reach of my ability. Among those who should be specially mentioned are: Professor Arif Dirlik of the Department of History, Duke University, under whom this study first evolved in a research seminar, and Professor Edgar Wickberg of the Department of History, University of British Columbia. As my thesis advisor, Professor Wickberg gave invaluable help, useful criticism, and encouragement, without which this thesis may not have been completed. Finally, my thanks to Mrs. Rosabella Prasad for typing the manuscript.
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

It was within a complex tapestry of social and political complexity that the strands of the National Salvation Association were woven. The time framework of this study is restricted essentially to the period May 1936 to August 1937. This period extends from the formal organization of the Ch'uan-kuo ke chieh chiu-kuo lien-ho hui [All-China National Salvation Federation] (popularly known as the National Salvation Association) in May 1936, to the release of the seven National Salvation Association leaders from prison in August 1937. A longer time span may well have been useful in understanding the historical precedents of the National Salvation Association, but due largely to the constraints of time this has not been possible. Then too, this study does not include analysis of the December Ninth Movement. The December Ninth Movement was essentially a student movement — narrower in focus, support, and leadership than the National Salvation Association.

The geographical focus of this thesis is primarily limited to Shanghai. The justification for this choice is that Shanghai was the focal centre of National Salvation activity in China in the pre-Sino-Japanese War period. It was also the headquarters of the National Salvation Association, and the main centre for the publishing of Chiu-wang wen-hsueh [National Salvation Literature]. Finally, it was in Shanghai that the seven National Salvation Association leaders lived and were arrested; an event which marked a crucial turning point in the fortunes of the National Salvation Association.

This study focuses on the National Salvation Association
leadership at the expense of rank and file National Salvation Association members. First, sources to some extent dictate such a choice. There is a rich legacy of writings available, both about and written by a number of the National Salvation Association leaders. But investigation of the support base of the National Salvation Association is very much handicapped by the anonymity of the subjects. No study will be complete until the question is satisfactorily answered: Who were these people?

Second, it was thought that these materials would provide some useful insights into understanding the nature of the organization as a whole. Moreover by emphasizing the leadership who epitomized China's urban educated professionals, it was hoped to gain a better understanding of a segment of society in Republican China, which has received little scholarly attention.

This study of the National Salvation Association is justified for the following reasons: First, as a microcosm of organized patriotism, the National Salvation Association provides us with a better understanding of the character and limits of patriotism in China in general, and in Shanghai in particular. Second, it supports the notion of growing disaffection among intellectuals and professionals from the KMT during the 1930s, and suggests that this segment of society, at least in the pre-Sino-Japanese War period, did not opt for a Communist solution to China's social, political or economic problems. Third, it reveals the wide ranging liberal-democratic ideals held by the National Salvation Association leaders, as seen particularly in National Salvation manifestoes and patriotic literature of the period. Finally, it suggests that the National Salvation Association facilitated a close relationship, in the political arena, between
Chinese labour and the Chinese intelligentsia.

This study arose out of a desire to analyse in greater detail an aspect of Republican China that to date has received a modicum of attention in Chinese sources, and which has been commented on generally by some Western historians. Presumably the political sensitivity of the topic has precluded much scholarly research and publication in both the Republic of China and the PRC. However some writings, either in the form of reminiscent account or biographical study have emerged from the Chinese press in the PRC, the Republic of China, and Hong Kong. In one way or another these publications have revealed crucial information that would have remained hidden, but few of them are without partisan bias, and at the same time they fail to give a conceptual framework to the study of the National Salvation Association.

The few Western scholars who have examined the National Salvation Association have offered different interpretations. Linebarger and Rosinger, writing during the early 1940s about the immediate pre-Sino-Japanese War period, stressed the immediate political importance of the National Salvation Association, an importance which had given its leaders positions on the first People's Political Council, created in 1938. This was the advisory body to the KMT during the Sino-Japanese War. But, neither Linebarger nor Rosinger made any real effort to examine in depth the affairs of the National Salvation Association.

A number of other historians who have written since 1949, on the other hand, have been more concerned with the Communist revolution, than with any serious attempt to discuss the National Salvation Association. Others such as Israel and Klein, Lutz and Wales (Helen Snow)
have tended to view the National Salvation Association within the context of student unrest, spearheaded by the December Ninth demonstration of 1935. This approach fails to recognize that although students gave significant support to the National Salvation Association; particularly in the months after December 9, 1935; they did not lead the organization. The leadership of the National Salvation Association was assumed by intellectuals and professionals. Among the intellectuals, university professors and teachers were prominent. The professionals included lawyers, bankers and journalists. Similarly the support base of the National Salvation Association was also wider than that of the student movement. Finally, Van Slyke and Domes, writing in the 1960s, have paid some attention to the National Salvation Association within the framework of works largely given to the consideration of wider interests. No monographs of which I am aware give extensive treatment to this issue.

One problem basic to this study concerns the use of terms. For example, Chinese materials are frequently inconsistent in the use of the terms: Chiu-kuo hui [National Salvation Association], Ch'üan-kuo ke-chieh chiu-kuo lien-ho hui [All-China National Salvation Federation] and Chiu-wang yün-tung [National Salvation Movement]. Moreover, these terms are used interchangeably in many Chinese and Western language sources. One reason for this apparent lack of precision is that prior to the formation of the Ch'üan-kuo ke-chieh chiu-kuo lien-ho hui (May 1936), a closer literal translation of which would be 'All-China National Salvation Federation from all walks of life,' the term Chiu-kuo hui was used in documents to designate the local patriotic National Salvation groups, which had no national suasion, but which had
emerged in China's cities some years earlier. However, even after the
Ch'üan-juo ke-chieh chiu-kuo lien-ho hui was formed, it was frequently
referred to in Chinese and Western language sources as Chiu-kuo hui and
"National Salvation Association", respectively, and in some Western
language materials as 'the Association.' Similarly, the term
Chiu-wang yün-tung has been used without any time distinction, and
thus at times without distinguishing it from the Ch'üan-kuo ke-chieh
chiu-kuo lien-ho hui in Chinese and Western sources alike.

In this study I have endeavoured to be precise in the use of
these terms. Where translating or quoting sources, I have retained
the term used. Where a local National Salvation Association is
intended, I have indicated this by stating its location, as for example,
Shanghai Women's National Salvation Association (emphasis mine), I
have also retained the use of the term National Salvation Movement.
I think it is reasonable to use this term both before and after
May 1936 to continue to refer to National Salvation patriotic activities
in China.

The growth of the National Salvation Movement in many different
cities appears to justify the use of the terms National Salvation
Association or All-China National Salvation Federation, only after the
more formal national organization came into existence.

Finally, some sources refer to the Chiu-kuo chen-hsien [National
Salvation Front]. This was formed after the formal organization of the
National Salvation Association, but little is known about its precise
nature. Presumably it shared the same character and people as the
National Salvation Association as a whole.

The term Ch'i chün-tzu has frequently been translated as 'Seven
Gentlemen,' leading to complications over Shih Liang, a lady among them. Thus I have chosen to use the term 'Seven Worthies' when referring to the seven National Salvation leaders. This seems more in keeping with their morally upright characters, and the esteemed position in which they were held by society. The term Chun-tzu is used in classical Chinese texts to denote a person of superior or upright character, without reference to gender. The use of Chun-tzu in the case of political martyrs was established for the use of the six martyrs of the Hundred Days Reform of 1898. The first use of the term in the case of the National Salvation leaders was in the use of liu-chun [Six Worthies] in the Ta-kung Pao ['L'Impartial'] of Tientsin on December 5, 1936, to refer to the six male leaders from Shanghai.

The connection between the May Fourth Movement and the National Salvation Association is not clearly evident. Yet on the whole the assertion of some linkage appears plausible. Perhaps the most persuasive clue lies in the fact that many of the non-student intellectuals and professionals in the National Salvation Association were in a sense 'the May Fourth generation' grown up. In 1919 they had been students, but by the 1930s they had grown to maturity. For example, Wang Tsao-shih was a student at Tsinghua University at the time of the May Fourth Movement of 1919, and he became a student leader. By the mid-1930s, Wang had opened a law practice in Shanghai, and later became Dean of Arts at Kuang-hua University in Shanghai. He was one of the seven worthies.

The student demonstrations against China's humiliation by Japan at the Versailles Peace Conference began on May 4, 1919, sparking a nationwide protest movement. As it gradually involved political,
intellectual, economic, social and cultural issues, May Fourth became a turning point in Chinese history. The Chinese students of 1919 proclaimed their lack of confidence in the warlord Government of the day. More than this, they denied the legitimacy of any government in which the Chinese people refused to place their confidence. It was this assertion, implied rather than articulated, at the time, that constituted the real impact of the May Fourth experience on later Chinese politics.

Some parallels exist between the May Fourth Movement and the National Salvation Movement of the 1930s. One such is the proliferation of publishing. Chinese publishing underwent a remarkable development after the May Fourth Incident. The new periodicals were generally short-lived. Their names revealed the temper of the time. These new periodicals are noteworthy for one fact preeminently: they introduced to the public, and provided a channel of communication for, young Chinese intellectuals who became prominent social, political or literary figures in China during the following decades. Actually, the "periodical fever" during the years following the May Fourth Incident was epoch-making both in the development of Chinese public opinion and in the shaping of the new intellectuals. Newspapers in the major cities were also influenced by the revolutionary tide after the May Fourth Incident. Many of them added special columns or published supplementary magazines in order to print new literary works and discuss the cultural and student movements.

The 1920s in China was an era of intense efforts at political, intellectual and literary change. Students and their teachers were at the centre of the ferment. Various movements and associations
proliferated; there were political study groups and literary societies. Among these the New Culture Movement held a prominent place. Its avowed goal was no less than the transformation of the entire fabric of Chinese culture: social and personal mores, values, art, literature, language and scholarship, and even political forms. New Culturalists did not consider themselves to be breaking with China's past, but rather moving the old culture into a new and dynamic present.

The National Salvation Movement was one of the major ingredients in the political life of the 1930s. The early 1930s were a particularly agonizing and acute time for Chinese intellectuals and professionals, who formed the support base of the National Salvation Movement. The nation stood in great danger from the threat of Japanese aggression, yet factionalism, KMT party/military dictatorship, residual warlordism, and the existence of armed Communist enclaves in Kiangsi and elsewhere, created internal warfare and disunity, leaving China ill-prepared to meet the Japanese threat. Urgent problems of social and economic reform were compounded by worldwide economic depression and seemed insoluble. The student movement which seemed so powerful in an earlier decade had been effectively suppressed. Many students abandoned their hopes for fundamental change and turned from political involvement to the hedonistic pursuit of personal satisfaction. But, idealism and nationalism remained strong, and some students chose instead to become involved in programs of rural reconstruction, mass education, and patriotic activities, such as the National Salvation Movement.

In the 1930s the disparity between KMT claims and KMT accomplishments did not escape the notice of intellectuals and professionals. They
were increasingly estranged from the Government due to the KMT's attitude toward them, as reflected in its persistent efforts to regiment education, its distrust of even moderate criticism, its attempts to exploit the student movement for its own ends or to suppress it entirely, its resort to harsh methods in dealing with its opponents, and its sedulous promotion of its own sterile ideology. Yet we must be careful not to exaggerate the extent of intellectual disaffection or its consequences. Many who recognized the political and intellectual debilities of the KMT maintained allegiance to it nonetheless.

As in the past, China's chaos and civil wars had always afforded good excuses and opportunities for foreign aggression. While the main forces of the Tungpei Army were engaged in fighting the warlord Yen Hsi-shan, Japan struck Mukden on September 19, 1931. The failure of the League of Nations to restrain Japan from all-out aggression resulted in the fall of the whole of Manchuria to Japan.

After the Mukden Incident, National Salvation replaced revolution as the most pressing problem for the politically sensitive students, intellectuals and professionals, and China personified would receive a great deal more sentimental love than it formerly had.

It should be borne in mind that despite some progress in social and economic life, China in the mid-1930s was not much better than in the 1920s, which were characterized by warlordism. Although Chiang Kai-shek's own power and prestige had risen measurably, his virtual control or power had not extended beyond eight provinces, namely, Kiangsu, Chekiang, Anhwei, Kiangsi, Fukien, Honan, Hupei and Hunan. In North China, Sung Che-yuan was half-loyal to Nanking; so was
Han Fu-Ch'ü, warlord of Shantung. In Shansi, except for a brief period in 1930, Yen Hsi-shan had ruled with an iron hand since the founding of the Republic. In Western China, the Ma families still held Ninghsia and Tsinghai as their feudal fiefs. However, the two Mas with their Moslem subjects, being strongly anti-Communist, helped to secure the North West for Chiang Kai-shek.

Most of the warlords just mentioned were opposed to Chiang, but they opposed the Communists even more. While a majority of them were anti-Japanese and wished to see civil war ended, some like Han Fu-Ch'ü, and to some extent even Sung Che-yüan and Yen Hsi-shan, were ambiguous in their attitude toward resistance against Japan.

Since early 1932 Chiang Kai-shek's policy toward Japan and the CCP had been characterized by the slogan an-nei jang wai [internal pacification before resistance against external aggression]. In effect, Chiang Kai-shek tried to apply a dual policy by which negotiation and resistance were to be used simultaneously as a means to slow down Japanese aggression. While temporizing with Japan, Chiang sought to exterminate the CCP.

The consummation of the Ho-Umetsu negotiations in early July 1935 set the stage for the removal from Hopei province of all military and political persons and groups unfriendly to Japan, and therefore ushered in a new era of Japanese control in North China. Japan's all-out aggressive policy which was beginning to take shape in early 1933 had definitely manifested itself in the spring of 1935 when Japan launched the 'self government' movement of five provinces (Suiyuan, Chahar, Hopei, Shantung, and Honan) in North China.

After much solicitation for a puppet leader among the old and the
new Chinese militarists, from Wu P'ei-fu to Yen Hsi-shan, the Japanese Army in North China, with the consent of the Kwantung Army in Manchuria, eventually settled on General Sung Che-yüan.

No sooner had Sung Che-yüan and his 29th Army taken over in late September 1935 the control of Peking and the Tientsin area, than Major General Doihara Kenji, chief of the Kwantung Army's Special Service Section, set out to engineer a series of incidents and to confront Sung Che-yüan with open demands for immediate proclamation of self-government. Evidently the strong measures taken by the Japanese military had the full support of the Japanese Government, for an October 28, 1935 the Japanese Foreign Minister Hirota announced the Three Principles of Japan's China policy: first, thorough suppression of anti-Japanese thoughts and activities in China; second, conclusion of a Sino-Japanese anti-Communist military pact; and third, achievement of "economic cooperation" between Japan, Manchukuo, and China, with a special position provided for North China.

The open manifestation of Japan's aggressive policy hastened the development of the self-government movement on the one hand. Self-government, among other things included: autonomy or freedom from central control. On the other hand, it aroused a new surge of Chinese patriotism which had gained momentum since the Mukden Incident. The crowning success of Doihara's adventure was the separation of East Hopei from Chinese jurisdiction by the inauguration of the "East Hopei anti-Communist and self-government council" with the notorious Yin Ju-keng as chairman on November 24, 1935. The establishment of the Hopei-Chahar Political Council in December 1935, with Sung Che-yüan as chairman, touched off the greatest student
patriotic movement since the May Fourth Movement of 1919.

The students in Peking exploded in demonstrations on December 9 and 16, 1935. These outbursts protested Japanese aggression, criticized Nanking's dilatory tactics, and demanded immediate resistance. The disturbance, like the May Fourth and May Thirtieth (1925) Movements soon spread to other cities and regions. Shanghai in particular was swept along, partly because the foreign concessions provided a convenient haven for critics of Nanking's policy.

Shanghai, as a centre of revolutionary movements held a position in modern Chinese history unequalled even by Peking. It was here that Mao Tse-tung helped to establish the CCP, and Sun Yat-sen lectured on the Three People's Principles. Few other places would qualify so well as a "hot bed of rebellion," with the possible exception of Canton.

That China appeared to enter a new era after 1900 has been widely noted. Changes were taking place in all aspects of social, political and intellectual life. Among these was the spectacular growth of modern Chinese journalism. Publishing was big business and it was lucrative. Although most of the newspapers and journals were at first sponsored by Westerners, control soon gravitated into Chinese hands. Shanghai was a major centre for publishing newspapers and other literature. The volume of publishing presupposed the existence of a literate or semi-literate reading public in the treaty ports such as Shanghai, and the peripheral areas.

Even by the end of the 19th century Shanghai had begun to attract ambitious and restless youths of the neighbouring provinces. After 1919, with the general loosening of family ties, Shanghai looked
even more like the land of opportunity for a larger influx of migrants.

Population also grew rapidly in Shanghai. This growth was the result of an influx into the city of industrialists, merchants, peasant-labourers, and unemployed youths in search of a better livelihood. Intellectuals and cultural non-conformists flocked to Shanghai, and sought refuge under foreign law.

A study of the National Salvation Association, which was centred in Shanghai, demands some understanding of the nature of China's urban intelligentsia at this time. The word "intelligentsia," while Russian in origin, has frequently been used with reference to Chinese society. This word is used with a wide range of meaning, and the outer limits of this range are by no means sharply defined. Often it seems to mean no more than the cultural stratum.

Before we hasten to a too facile definition of the 20th century Chinese intelligentsia as simply a temporarily displaced bureaucratic class, it should be noted that within the millennial history of China strong strands of alienation, withdrawal, and even of martyrdom are integral parts of Confucian tradition.

Traditionally the intelligentsia, or intellectuals, were part of the official ruling elite. In traditional China the writer had a different social position than the writer in Western society, who in earliest times was integrated into society and somewhat later moved to dependence on aristocratic patronage. At the end of the 19th century, however, the position of Chinese writers and intellectuals had changed significantly. Writers became professionals. Two factors were immediately responsible for this change. One was the rejection of tradition, which had led numerous intellectuals to renounce the
official system of the educated elite. Moreover, the examination system by which an educated man entered the civil service was terminated in 1905. The development of the publishing industry, which allowed writers and intellectuals alike to earn an income from writing, was the second factor that led to the change in Chinese writers' social position. In short, the commercialization of writing led to professionalism.

This change to professionalism, however, does not mean that writers abandoned their roles as intellectuals. Writers, as intellectuals, assumed the role of political and social critics, exponents of change and often became political activists. Whereas in early 20th century China not all intellectuals were writers, most writers, as the literate, articulate, and concerned segment of the population, were intellectuals. For this reason, their literary creations reflect their historical concerns, their ideological assumptions, and their preoccupation with the cultural change that they considered themselves to have initiated.

Thus the history of the National Salvation Association is of interest for displaying the activity of non-student intellectuals and other city dwellers, particularly professional groups. It is interesting to note that a number of these people who assumed leadership in the National Salvation Association had long-standing involvement in the KMT, not a few of them being KMT members. This is exemplified by Shih Liang and Shen Chün-ju who were both long-standing KMT members.

The National Salvation Association was one of the elements in the rise of a patriotic spirit in China in response to the continuing
Japanese pressure after the Mukden Incident of September 18, 1931. Its immediate aim was to pressure the Central Government to change from its conciliatory policy towards Japan, to a policy of immediate resistance. With civil war looming ahead, the National Salvation Association made its utmost effort to stop the civil war on the one hand, and on the other, to unite the nation to cope with Japan. The CCP also called for a nation-wide united front against Japan. This was not simply the result of policy decisions made in Moscow or China. It was strongly influenced by the powerful surge of patriotism that swept through China's cities after the student uprisings of December 1935.

Students and various other groups in China's cities organized for National Salvation Association work at this time. It was especially in Shanghai that the December Ninth demonstration in Peking induced an immediate response in Shanghai. On December 21, 1935 there were student demonstrations in Shanghai, and on December 22, plans were made to form a Shanghai Universities Students National Salvation Association.  

In Shanghai, the Women's National Salvation Association was formed on December 21, 1935 with Shih Liang, as one of its leaders. Over two hundred writers, lawyers and newspapermen met in the Ningpo residents' guild to form the Cultural National Salvation Association on December 27. Ma Hsiang-po was their president. Other groups which organized at this time included the Vocational National Salvation Association in which Sha Ch'ien-li was a director. A scholar in jurisprudence, he practised law in Shanghai in the 1930s. He was another of the seven worthies. The University Professors'
National Salvation Association and the Society for National Crisis Education, both led by T'ao Hsing-chih, organized at this time. A Workers' National Salvation Association possibly was formed.

Besides issuing manifestoes and publishing patriotic literature, the various National Salvation Associations in Shanghai helped in the organization of demonstrations. After the initial enthusiastic response of students on December 21, and again on December 24, when the police were out in force, future demonstrations kept to commemorative days or other occasions of public assembly. For these later demonstrations the first of which occurred on January 28, 1936 and led to the formation of the All-China National Salvation Federation, industrial workers played a major role.

Late in May 1936 two National Salvation Congresses were held in Shanghai; the culmination of several months of organization. The first Congress met on May 29, to form the All-China Student National Salvation Federation. Then, on May 30, three thousand people took part in a demonstration which marched to the tombs of the May Thirtieth 1925 victims and distributed handbills purporting to show the progressive annexation of China by Japan. This was followed, on May 31, by the second National Salvation Congress at which the All-China National Salvation Federation was formally inaugurated.

The seven worthies, all leaders in the National Salvation Association, were arrested in the early morning hours of November 23. Their law case, which became known by the press as the Ai-kuo wu tsui [Patriotism is not a crime] case, attracted wide public attention, which continued to intensify until their release from prison on August 1, 1937 a few weeks after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident and the beginning of the Sino-Japanese War.
INTRODUCTION

NOTES

1 Romanization is Wade-Giles except that postal spellings have been used for well known geographical names.


8 Lin Yutang, A History of the Press and Public Opinion in China (Shanghai: Kelly and Walsh, 1936) p. 88.


10 Li Shou-tung, ed., Chiu-kuo wu tsui ch'i ch'un-tzu shih chien (Shanghai: publisher unknown, 1937) p. 89.
Ibid., p. 95.

NCH, 25 December 1935.

Li, Chiu-kuo wu tsui ch'i chün-tzu shih chien, p. 105.

NCH, 1 January 1936, Ibid., p. 78.

Li, Chiu-kuo wu tsui ch'i chün-tzu shih chien p. 88.

Ibid., pp. 60-61.

NCH, 1 January 1936.


Chiu-wang shou-ts'e (no place; publisher unknown) p. 41.

NCH, 3 June 1936.
CHAPTER 2: ASPECTS OF NATIONAL SALVATION ASSOCIATION 
ORGANIZATION AND NON-LITERARY ACTIVITY

The focus of this chapter concerns various aspects of National Salvation Association organization and non-literary activity prior to the arrest of the seven worthies, November 1936. The chapter also includes a case study of the Shanghai Women's National Salvation Association.

It is clear that although the December Ninth demonstration had signalled a renewal of patriotic activity in the case of Peking, patriotic activity in Shanghai had continued since 1931. Shanghai had been the largest centre of anti-Japanese activity after the Mukden Incident. Opposition to Japan was particularly virulent among the intellectuals in Shanghai, where a proliferation of anti-Japanese organizations had emerged in the early 1930s. The seven worthies in their trial traced the National Salvation Association back to several of these. For example, in December 1931 a Chung hua min-kuo kuo-nan chiu-chi hui [Society for the Relief of the National Crisis of the Chinese Republic] was formed. The Society criticized the domestic policies of the KMT and demanded a strong anti-Japanese line. With over two hundred members and branches in sixteen provinces, Domes claimed that it formed one of the largest formal opposition groups at a time when KMT tutelage permitted little opposition. In terms of the size of the membership, this claim seems questionable.

Nevertheless, the magnitude of the anti-Japanese response in Shanghai was sufficient to provoke the Japanese to demand that Shanghai Mayor Wu T'ieh-ch'eng abolish all anti-Japanese organizations and to
attack Shanghai on January 28, 1932, when Wu was unable to meet the demand, due in part to both his own limited means of enforcing the abolition of anti-Japanese organizations and the magnitude of the anti-Japanese response. The Shanghai Incident grew out of efforts to suppress disorders that accompanied an anti-Japanese boycott, that was in turn a response to the Manchurian Incident. A cease-fire agreement reached in May 1932 stipulated the suppression of all anti-Japanese activities. At their trial in 1937 the seven worthies singled out the Ko t'uan-t'i chiu-kuo lien-ho hui [Federation for National Salvation] as an important antecedent of the National Salvation Association. Chinese documents used thus far have not indicated the nature of this organization.

The December Ninth Incident in Peking induced an immediate response in Shanghai. The NCH of December 18, 1935 reported that there had been meetings of Shanghai students in support of Peking students and that the Federation of Local University Students for National Salvation had sent a telegram to the Government. This telegram urged the restoration of East Hopei to China. Preparations were made for the inauguration of a National Salvation Federation of Various Public Bodies in Shanghai, which would publish a newspaper. On December 22 plans were made to form a Shanghai University Students National Salvation Federation. Students in various other cities organized for National Salvation work. Thus, in early 1936 the Fu-nü sheng-huo [Women's Life] noted that thirty two cities had Student National Salvation Association groups.

The Shanghai Women's National Salvation Association was formed on December 21, 1935 with Shih Liang, a leading lawyer, as one of
its leaders. This is discussed in greater depth later in this chapter. Over two hundred writers, lawyers and newspapermen met in the Ningpo Residents' Guild to form the Shanghai Cultural National Salvation Association on December 27. Ma Hsiang-po (Ma Liang) a ninety-five-year old ex-Manchu official, who had written vigorously on Japanese aggression after 1931, was their president. A cursory glance at various Chinese sources suggests that an in-depth study of the Shanghai Cultural National Salvation Association would prove not only interesting, but would shed additional light on the ideological character of the National Salvation Movement as a whole. One obvious advantage is the existence of several signed manifestoes, which yield several hundred names of people who to greater or lesser extent were involved in the National Salvation Movement. These included writers, such as Hsü Chieh, Hsü Mou-yung, Chou Li-po, and Cheng Chen-to, and economists, such as Hsieh Mu-ch'iao, and Chang Nai-ch'i.

Besides the emergence of the Shanghai Women's National Salvation Association and the Shanghai Cultural National Salvation Association, other groups which formed in December 1935 included: the Shanghai Vocational National Salvation Association, in which Sha Ch'ien-li was active, the Shanghai University Professor's National Salvation Association and the Society for National Crisis Education, founded by T'ao Hsing-chih shortly after December 9, 1935. However we lack details concerning these groups. Nevertheless, on the basis of present information, a table (at the end of this chapter) reconstructs the possible organization of the National Salvation Association and the relationship between its various components.

Sources vary concerning the existence or not of a Shanghai
Workers' National Salvation Association. Freyn suggests that attempts in Shanghai, 'to draw workers into the National Salvation Movement led to immediate suppression, but a Workers' Anti-Japanese National Salvation Association was nevertheless formed in February 1936.' Freyn argues that the 'Workers' Anti-Japanese National Salvation Association remained illegal, and that the Japanese in particular spared no effort to hunt down its members.' Rosinger likewise supports the notion of the formation of a Workers' National Salvation Association, and the subsequent declaration of its illegality. Smith simply asserts that 'groups of workers ... formed National Salvation Associations.' None of these writers indicate their sources for such comments. Notwithstanding, their views are consistent with the claims of one Chinese source, but are refuted by another which noted that in late-1935 - early-1936, industrial workers did not have their own group in Shanghai but were expected to enter the Shanghai Vocational National Salvation Association.

On the basis of what I have seen, there are no published manifestoes, reports of activities, mentions of leadership or other references to a Shanghai Workers' National Salvation Association (with the exception already noted) which would help to verify the existence of such a group. This is in marked contrast to the potted accounts that are available concerning other Shanghai National Salvation Association groups. Curiously, it seems that even though industrial workers may have been expected to join the Shanghai Vocational National Salvation Association, some women workers are reported as being involved in the Shanghai Women's National Salvation Association. Whether they held dual membership is not known.
Although the existence of all these groups is well documented, several problems concerning National Salvation Association organization remain. For example, I have not been able to determine the precise relationship of these various local National Salvation Association groups to each other. Nor is it clear what actual authority each group commanded over its own affairs. Finally, while it seems possible to argue for a separate development of the Student National Salvation Association wing of the National Salvation Association, the precise role of students in the National Salvation Association as a whole is more difficult to ascertain.

Two National Salvation Association Congresses were significant for subsequent National Salvation Association organization and activity. According to one source, these two Congresses were held in Shanghai late in May 1936. Late May was chosen to coincide with the commemoration of the May Thirtieth 1925 Incident. In 1936 this date had acquired a new significance with the sudden expansion of the Japanese garrison at Tientsin to well above the limits of the Boxer Protocol. This further fueled anti-Japanese feelings in Shanghai.

The first National Salvation Association Congress met on May 29, 1936. This was a student Congress. Twenty six representatives from student National Salvation organizations attended this Congress. The All-China Student National Salvation Federation was formed. The second National Salvation Association Congress was held on May 31, 1936. At this Congress the All China National Salvation Federation was formed, with representatives of at least forty different organizations present at its inauguration. Membership of this body was open to groups rather than individuals. The largest representation came from Tientsin
Although National Salvation groups were active in Sian prior to the Sian Incident in December 1936, at their trial, the seven accused claimed that there had been no representative from Sian at the inauguration.

The All China National Salvation Federation elected a thirty-five member executive committee. Those elected included Ma Hsiang-po, Tsou T'ao-fen (at this point in Hong Kong) and Madame Sun (Sung Ch'ing-ling). When John Gunther was in China in 1939, he described the National Salvation Association as 'her group' which 'was in a sense the origin of the united front.' There seems to be no other evidence for the importance of Madame Sun in the Association, apart from her role at the time of the trial of the seven worthies. I have not been able to determine the names of other members of the executive committee. Whether other members of the executive committee were from Shanghai, where the headquarters of the National Salvation Association was located, is not known. The precise function of the executive committee is also unclear. More is known about the standing committee of thirteen to fifteen members which was also elected to be responsible for National Salvation Association policy formulation. Those elected included Shen Ch'un-ju, Sha Ch'ien-li, Wang Tsao-shih, Chang Nai-ch'i, Shih Liang and Li Kung-p'u, the latter elected in absentia, although the NCH of June 3, 1936 reported him present at the May 30 demonstration. At least six of the standing committee came from Shanghai.

The question of National Salvation Association finances also deserves attention. Lineberger claims first, that the National Salvation Movement was financed essentially through voluntary
contributions; second, that most of the National Salvation Movement's work was done by volunteers who asked for no financial remuneration, travelling and working at their own expense; and finally, that approximately Ch.$5,000 sufficed to cover headquarters expenses in Shanghai.  

Almost without exception, Chinese sources that I have seen do not discuss the question of the finances of the National Salvation Association. However the Chiu-wang shou-tse noted that the National Salvation Association sought voluntary financial contributions, particularly from businessmen and professionals, for a relief fund, to provide temporary relief to refugees, especially in North China. Various centres for receiving contributions, designated for this purpose, were established. Questions such as how, where, when and how much money was distributed are not mentioned. Nor is it clear what criteria were used in deciding who should receive this financial assistance, or even whether the assistance given was in kind, such as food or clothing, or cash. It is, moreover, difficult to verify Linebarger's claim regarding the finance of the National Salvation Association's headquarters in Shanghai, on at least two counts. First, he does not specify the time period for which this Ch.$5,000 was sufficient. Second, Linebarger gives no indication of his source for such a figure. I have not been able to substantiate or refute this, on the basis of any other source which I have seen. It would also be interesting to know to what extent, if at all, the National Salvation Association's coffers were aided by finances from publishing endeavours.

The National Salvation Association in Shanghai, and presumably
elsewhere, included a well organized training program. Only one Chinese text which I have used for this study refers to National Salvation training in any depth. The *Chiu-wang shou-ts'e* provides insight into one aspect of National Salvation organization, and thus reinforces the notion of a well organized body. The National Salvation Association training programme was in part implemented in conjunction with National Salvation Association cell groups. These cell groups met once a week, or every ten days, for the purpose of study and discussion. The National Salvation Association also considered that training and propaganda work were complementary, though one was not a substitute for the other.

The National Salvation Association aimed to train both 'the masses' and 'cadres'. Training classes were held for the masses outside of working hours, so that those taking National Salvation training courses were free to seek employment. Classes were held every day for one to two hours. There is no indication in the Chinese sources that I have seen of the course duration, whether weeks or months, or who was responsible for leading such courses. In addition to the regular daily training classes, study groups and colloquia were also held for 'the masses'. These were held every five days or once a week, and were less formal than the regular training classes.

In Shanghai, a National Salvation Association training office provided the venue for cadre training. Whether this was the same place as the Shanghai National Salvation Association headquarters, I am still unsure. Cadres lived together at the training office for the duration of their training. They were not free to seek employment.
Study groups and colloquia were used to train cadres, the aim being to strengthen the theoretical basis acquired in the regular training classes for the 'masses'.

In terms of content, the training course for cadres included first, political economy theory; second, mass movement's methods; third, general knowledge of military affairs; and finally, knowledge and experience of defence. It is unclear how the third and fourth section differed. The first section, political economy theory, was divided into fifteen sub-sections: (1) Basic knowledge of economics; (2) basic knowledge of philosophy; (3) national united front; (4) social structure; (5) revolution history; (6) world affairs; (7) imperialism; (8) national problems; (9) democratic government; (10) workers' and peasants' problems; (11) youth problems; (12) women's problems; (13) traitors, and the theory of traitors; (14) war-time economy; and (15) war-time diplomacy. Unfortunately, the text I used does not contain a breakdown of the other three areas of training content. However, the content of National Salvation training, as revealed in this one section, shows the wide range of issues with which the National Salvation Association was concerned. It is not certain what criteria were used in the selection of people to take cadre training or who was responsible for giving this training. Nor is it clear what cadres were supposed to do, once trained. These issues raise further questions, such as: why were these topics taught, and what were the long term goals of National Salvation training?

To attempt to estimate the size of the National Salvation Association is difficult. In the purported absence of membership lists
indicators of size must include numbers who attended National Salvation Association meetings, participated in National Salvation demonstration marches, and signed manifestoes. Even then, documentation used for this study precludes a precise estimate. Morwood suggests that the National Salvation Association had 'some eight hundred thousand members.' He gives no indication how this figure was calculated. It may well be too low an estimate. For example, as early as late 1935, one Chinese source stated that from December 9-31, 1935 more than 136,000 students, from thirty two cities and representing over four hundred schools, participated in National Salvation meetings. At the local level, over one thousand women attended the Shanghai Women's National Salvation Association inaugural meeting, and participated in the demonstration march the same day. Shanghai and Peking Cultural National Salvation Association manifestoes yielded 283 and 149 signatures respectively.

SHANGHAI WOMEN'S NATIONAL SALVATION ASSOCIATION

Education had always been esteemed in China, but for men. During the first few decades of the twentieth century however, the press began to claim that education of women was of basic importance; that the education of women held the key to China's survival; it was not a luxury that could be put off until a later date. Just how did the press justify this view? The main link between women's education and the national welfare of China expressed in the press was the traditional maternal role of women. Women were to be educated because they would be the mothers of the Chinese race and of the Chinese citizens of the future. Education was not justified as an
inherent right of women.

Shanghai had led the way in the establishment of women's education. The first girls' school had been established in 1897, and was connected with the reform movement. But, while there had been a proliferation of girls' schools in Shanghai, the actual number of girls being educated had been abysmally low. A comparatively small number of Chinese urban women may have enjoyed some education, particularly at the lower levels by the May Fourth era and thus a measure of liberation from their traditional role. Rural women remained essentially unaffected.

Coeducation had existed in some institutions of higher learning prior to the May Fourth Incident. For instance, in 1918 the Canton Christian College first opened its doors to women. By 1922 twenty-eight universities and colleges in China had female students. Although the female enrollment in each of these institutions was relatively small, the acceptance of female students was of greater significance than the actual number of students who attended.

A link between the education of women in China and the politicization of women in China is evident. While not all women revolutionaries in early 20th century China were educated women, as educational opportunities for women expanded, so too did their participation in political activities increase. The participation of women in patriotic societies and mass demonstrations was not peculiar to the 1930s. Prior to the 1911 Revolution women had organized several patriotic societies, and marched in political demonstrations. For example, in 1908 thousands of girls in Canton marched on behalf of China's position in the Tatsu Maru dispute.
In the contemporary records and in later memoirs one sometimes encounters the names of wives of revolutionaries who at the same time were themselves pursuing revolutionary careers. For example, Ho Hsiang-ning (Madame Liao Chung-k'ai), and Ho Chen (Madame Liu Kuang-han), who had both accompanied their husbands to Japan, were among the earliest female members of the T'ung-meng hui [United League].

Perhaps the most notorious of the early women revolutionaries was Ch'iu Chin. Rankin aptly characterized her as a "revolutionary romantic with a flair for dramatic action." Ch'iu Chin's political activity ranged on the one hand from joining the Kuang-fu hui [Restoration Society] in China in 1905, to founding the Kung-ai hui [Common Love Society] in Tokyo, another society of male and female revolutionaries which was committed to ending Manchu rule in China; and on the other hand to founding and co-editing Chung-kuo nu pao [Chinese Women's Paper]. (which in 1906 was the most radical magazine for women), and at the same time serving as principal of two Shaohsing schools, Ming-tao Girls' School and Ta-t'ung School, where she conducted military training for the girls in these schools. Thus, Ch'iu Chin provides an example of the political goals and the style of female political participation on the eve of the 1911 Revolution. This politicization gained momentum during the subsequent years. Throughout the May Fourth era, the women's movement organized around such demands as the right to marry freely, vote, be elected to office, own property and be educated.

In the mid 1930s women's periodicals such as the Fu-nu sheng-huo [Women's Life] equated female education with a strong and prosperous China. This was no mere rationalization designed for its appeal to
nationalistic interests for feminist ends. These women journalists who wrote for the press, firmly believed that their feminism was an integral part of nationalism. They lived and worked in the atmosphere of ardent nationalism that was growing in the student and intellectual circles in China and Japan. They were at least as committed to saving China as their male counterparts, but as women they defined China's weakness also in terms of the inferior position allotted to them as the female half of the population.\(^{50}\)

An understanding of the role of women in the National Salvation Movement in general, and in the Shanghai Women's National Salvation Association in particular is compelling for two reasons. First, it sheds light on the style of women's political activity in China, especially in urban centres. Particularly interesting is the close link in political activity between educated professional women, and the female urban labour force.

The numerical importance of women in Shanghai's labour force is illustrated by one scholar who noted that in 1928, 56% of all Shanghai workers were women (9.2% were children), only 6% in Tientsin but 44% in Hangchow and 51% in Hankow.\(^{51}\) Early in China's industrialization process, women had been organizing and carrying out strikes for shorter hours of work and better pay. There had been two peaks of strike activity in the 1920s: the first in 1922 and the second beginning with the May Thirtieth Movement in 1925 and continuing into 1926.

In 1922 sixty factories had been struck in eighty strikes and over 30,000 women workers had been involved.\(^{52}\) Hsiang Ching-yü is credited with leading two strikes in 1924; one in a Shanghai silk filature in which 12,000 women struck and another in the Nanyang Tobacco Plant.\(^{54}\)
Hsiang was not the only woman who had been active in strike organization. Others included Ts'ai Ch'ang, who had earlier gone to France, and Liu Chien-hsien, a textile worker. This strike activity suggests that the participation of women workers in the Shanghai Women's National Salvation Association was but the continuation of a politicization trend. Ever more important, it suggests that women workers were, on their own, just as politically militant as male workers, and that economic concerns were increasingly linked to political issues.

The Shanghai Women's National Salvation Association held its inaugural meeting December 21, 1935 at the Shanghai YWCA. According to one report, more than one thousand women attended. These women represented various segments of urban society: students, shop employees, workers, lawyers, civil servants, writers and housewives. On the basis of the sources I have seen, it is not possible to determine what proportion of the total number each group represented. The sources do not provide a list of names of women who attended this meeting, so with few exceptions most of these women must remain anonymous.

The attendance of women workers at this meeting is interesting for several reasons. First it suggests that these women opted, or were expected to join the Shanghai Women's National Salvation Association (emphasis mine), in preference to a workers National Salvation Association, while men workers, it seems, were expected to join the Shanghai Vocational National Salvation Association. Although there was no Chinese newspaper press coverage, the *Fu-nü sheng-huo* recorded that a Shanghai Women's National Salvation Association demonstration march took place December 21, 1935.
This immediately followed the conclusion of the Shanghai Women's National Salvation Association inaugural meeting. If, as the Fu-nü Sheng-huo claimed, more than one thousand women took part in the late afternoon march through the streets of Shanghai, then it must have attracted considerable public attention. The lack of Chinese press attention, and the failure of other periodicals to report on this demonstration suggests that while the proclamation of martial law in Shanghai the day before seemingly had no deterrent effect on the women demonstrators, the Central Government's suppression of the press essentially deterred press coverage of the event. Perhaps too, by the mid 1930s demonstration marches, even by women, were less newsworthy than before.

The slogans used by the Shanghai Women's National Salvation Association did not reflect feminist concerns, such as equal rights or women's education. Various slogans were used, such as, "Kill the traitors who commit treason;" "We're not afraid to die;" "Oppose secret diplomacy;" "Defend the patriotic movement;" and "Down with XX (Japanese) imperialism." These slogans reflect the concerns expressed by various National Salvation manifestoes of the period.61

It is difficult to determine the size of the Shanghai Women's National Salvation Association. Shih Liang claimed that it had more than 1,600 members.62 The Women's National Salvation Association was established in at least several other urban centres, including Peking and Tientsin, but the size of these groups is not known. National salvation manifestoes issued by the Shanghai Women's National Salvation Association may provide a more precise indication of the size of that organization, but to date I have only seen one of these.63
This did not mention size.

In the Shanghai Women's National Salvation Association Shih Liang (born 1907), one of China's first and most famous woman lawyers, was one of the leaders. Shih graduated in law in the mid 1920s. She had joined the KMT by the mid 1920s, and during the Northern Expedition, 1926-27, headed the Personnel Training Section under the Revolutionary Army's General Political Department. In the late 1920s Shih held several minor posts in Kiangsu, but by the end of the decade she was practising law in Shanghai.

In the Sino-Japanese War period, Shih Liang, as well as Shen Ch'un-ju, Chang Nai-ch'i, Li Kung-p'u, and Tsou T'ao-fen figured prominently in the T'ung-i chien-kuo t'ung-chih hui [The United National Construction League], the Chung-kuo min-chu cheng-t'uan ta t'ung-meng [The Grand Alliance of Chinese Democratic Parties] and the Chung-kuo min-chu t'ung-meng hui [The China Democratic League].

Later on, after the Sino-Japanese War, Shih headed a liaison committee under the KMT-sponsored New Life Movement and was among the organizers of the leftist-oriented Fu-nü lien-i hui [China Women's League], which was placed under the Chung-hua ch'uan-kuo fu-nü lien-ho hui [All-China Women's Federation] when the CCP came to power in 1949. With the exception of leading Communists Ts'ai Ch'ang and Teng Ying-ch'ao (Madame Chou En-lai) and other prominent women such as Sung Ch'ing-ling (Madame Sun Yat-sen) and Ho Hsiang-ning (Madame Liao Chung-k'ai), few women emerged with so many significant posts as Shih Liang in the early years of the PRC.

Shih Liang epitomized the leadership, at least, and, one suspects, a large proportion of the rank and file members of the National
Salvation Association, in leaning, not toward the CCP, but toward the minor democratic parties and groups which emerged in the Sino-Japanese War period and continued in the PRC. It should be noted that there were some people in the minority parties who held membership also in the CCP, and some who wanted CCP membership, but who were repeatedly denied it.

It is significant that several other prominent women, such as Ho Hsiang-ning, Sung Ch'ing-ling and the writer Chiang Ping-chih (Ting Ling) were also active in their support of the National Salvation Association. A curious feature of the Shanghai Women's National Salvation Association was that it seems as if men, also, could and did join. Male domination of girl student groups was a feature of the 1920s. To what extent men dominated, or led, the Women's National Salvation Association remains, in terms of my own research, unknown. At this point I am only able to link the name of one man to the Shanghai Women's National Salvation Association: P'an Kung-chan. The commissioner of education of the city government of Greater Shanghai since 1932, P'an was earlier a leader in the 1919 student movement.

Focussing attention on the Shanghai Women's National Salvation Association does more than just strengthen our grasp, which at best is tenuous on the role of women in urban Republican China. The Shanghai Women's National Salvation Association also serves as an example of the wide range of National Salvation Association activity as a whole.

NATIONAL SALVATION NON-LITERARY ACTIVITY

The various National Salvation Association groups in Shanghai not only issued manifestoes and produced patriotic literature, but
also helped organize demonstrations. One such demonstration by students culminated in the occupation of the North Rail Station in Shanghai on December 24, 1935, where the police were out in force. Future demonstrations tended to keep to commemorative days or other occasions of public assembly such as the funeral of the film star Wan Ling-yu. In these later demonstrations, the first of which occurred on January 28, 1936 and led to the formation of the All-Shanghai Federation of National Salvation Unions, industrial workers who had joined in T'ao Hsing-chih's National Crisis Education Movement played a leading role. On May 30, 1936 three thousand people took part in what the NCH described as a 'violent anti-Japanese demonstration'. The demonstration was to express opposition to the progressive annexation of China by Japan.

There is little information on the activities of the National Salvation Association for the few months prior to the arrest of the seven worthies in November 1936. T'ao Hsing-chih went abroad to spread the National Salvation message to Europe and North America. He visited twenty eight nations. T'ao helped to form the All-Europe Overseas Chinese National Salvation Federation and gave several lectures in America. These included lectures to New York dockers, who were presumably non-Chinese. They subsequently refused to ship arms to Japan. This suggests that T'ao appealed to both overseas Chinese and to non-Chinese in key positions.

An attempt by National Salvation leaders to hold a commemorative meeting of the Manchurian Incident on September 18 in Shanghai was stopped by KMT authorities, who claimed to be very disturbed by the sudden appearance of anti-Japanese incidents. These included the
murder of a Japanese clerk in Shanghai July 10,\textsuperscript{78} the Ch'eng-tu Incident, where two Japanese were killed while opening a consulate,\textsuperscript{79} and the Pakhœi Incident on September 3 when a Japanese man was killed in East Kwangtung.\textsuperscript{80} Just prior to September 18, the Shanghai KMT headquarters published a circular. This circular proclaimed that the National Salvation Association was illegal, 'a collective body of reactionaries,' who collected money to enrich themselves under the guise of National Salvation. Several National Salvation leaders including Madame Sun sent a letter to the NCH to deny these charges and to suggest that the Government prove its charges in court if it dared.\textsuperscript{81} The National Salvation leaders claimed that the Association had not been registered because the freedom of association granted by the Provisional Constitution had been removed by later laws. They questioned why the Government should not be overjoyed at organized patriotism at a time when the Government itself could not lead such organizations because of diplomatic considerations.

In November 1936 a Japanese-instigated attack on Suiyuan was begun by Mongol troops. Initial skirmishes on November 2,\textsuperscript{82} led to the capture of Pailingmiao on November 7.\textsuperscript{83} At the same time, a wave of industrial strikes started in Shanghai.

Communist Chinese historians have claimed that these strikes were great anti-Japanese strikes.\textsuperscript{84} It is difficult to substantiate this claim. First, the initial strike was in a Chinese silk factory. The occasion for the strike concerned the dismissal of thirty two union leaders.\textsuperscript{85} Second, although strikes soon became concentrated in the Japanese mills of Shanghai and spread quickly to the northern cities of Tientsin, Tsingtao and Sian,\textsuperscript{86} the issue was not clearly one
of resistance to the Japanese. National Salvation leaders gave their strong support to the strikers, by staging a demonstration in Shanghai; to the same strikers, Chang Hsueh-liang made generous donations. But workers in Japanese factories demanded higher wages at a time of great prosperity in the cotton industry. Japanese mill owners viewed these strikes as sequels to the Chinese mill strikes of the previous week and felt that there was no agitation on anti-Japanese lines, no handbills and no other inflammatory matter. The strikes, which continued until approximately November 22, assumed a more serious nature on later occasions, when there were conflicts with the police and some slight damage was inflicted on factories. Third, with the exception of one pitched battle between police and workers at the Toyoda mill on November 17, which the Japanese director of the Mill Owner's Association describes as 'a riot engineered by a number of extreme elements,' the strikes were described by the NCH as having 'all the appearances of regular trouble between capital and labour.'

There is no evidence in any of the Chinese sources that I have used to suggest that the National Salvation Association instigated these strikes. It is clear, however, that the National Salvation Association supported these developments in November 1936. At a meeting held in the Y.M.C.A. compound in Shanghai to commemorate Sun Yat-sen's birthday, over two thousand students, professors and labourers contributed to a strike relief fund for Chinese workers in Japanese-owned factories. Some people who attended the meeting suggested demanding the immediate release of all arrested strikers by using the threat of a general strike. Others suggested the organization of a special committee to give the maximum possible aid to
the strikers. While the National Salvation Association encouraged strike activity, one source also suggested that the organization contributed financial aid to the strikers. At the same time the Association voted to send contributions to Suiyuan and at the end of November eight representatives of the Shanghai public delivered Ch.$100,000 to the war front.

It was at this point, in the early hours of November 23, 1936 that the seven Shanghai leaders of the National Salvation Association were arrested and the general clampdown on anti-Japanese activity intensified. The various National Salvation groups, born out of both earlier anti-Japanese organizations and the December Ninth demonstration, and culminating in the National Salvation Association, had had almost a year in which to develop. The National Salvationists had produced a large amount of literature. These groups were not legally recognized by the Government, nor were they given a real chance to develop. Nevertheless, in the cities, where anti-Japanese propaganda had its chief effect, due in part to the proliferation of the press in the cities and to the ever-increasing alienation of intellectuals from the KMT, the response to patriotic appeals intensified.
TABLE: NATIONAL SALVATION ASSOCIATION: ORGANIZATION, MAY 1936

NOTES:

1. For sources for Table, see Notes to Chapter 2

2. The All-China National Salvation Federation was an umbrella organization which elected both the standing committee and the executive committee.

3. Possible dual membership of standing and executive committees existed.

4. Precise nature of the relationship between the All-China Student National Salvation Federation and the All-China National Salvation Federation is not yet determined.


6. The existence of a Workers' National Salvation Association is questionable.

7. Dual membership existed between local National Salvation Associations; at least at the leadership level, and possibly at the membership level.

8. Various local National Salvation Associations and the All-China National Salvation Federation published manifestoes.

9. The nature of the relationship between local National Salvation Associations and National Salvation Association propaganda, training and cell group work, is yet to be determined.

10. Propaganda, training and cell group work were distinct but linked National Salvation Association functions.
CHAPTER 2: ASPECTS OF NATIONAL SALVATION ASSOCIATION

ORGANIZATION AND NON-LITERARY ACTIVITY

NOTES


3 Crowley, Japan's Quest for Autonomy, p. 160.

4 Hsu Ting Lee-hsia, Government Control of the Press in Modern China, 1900-1949 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975), p. 103 mentions the agreement.


8 NCH January 1, 1936, and Li, Chiu-Kuo wu tsui ch'i ch'un-tzu shih-chien, p. 78.

9 Hsieh (pronounced Hsueh).

10 Li, Chiu-kuo wu tsui ch'i ch'un-tzu shih chien, pp. 77-88. See also Ma Hsiang-po, Ma Hsiang-po (Liang) hsien-sheng nien-p'u (Taipei: Wen hai ch'u-pan she, 1971) and Ma Hsiang-po wen-chi Reprint (Taipei: Wen hai ch'u-pan she, 1972). Sha was a director in the Shanghai Vocational National Salvation Association.


12 Ibid. See also Nym Wales, Notes on the Chinese Student Movement (mimeographed) (Madison, CT, 1959) p. 43.


16 Li, Chiu-kuo wu tsui ch'i ch'un-tzu shih chien, pp. 60-61.

17 Chiu-wang shou-ts'e (Shanghai: Sheng-huo shu-tien, 1939) p. 41. This mentions preparations.

18 NCH May 20, 1936, June 3, 1936.

19 Chiu-wang shou-ts'e, p. 41.


21 L. P. Van Slyke, Enemies and Friends: The United Front in Chinese Communist History p. 71. At the trial the accused claimed that the Sian movement had 'a different content.' Li, Chiu-kuo wu tsui ch'i ch'un-tzu shih chien, p. 71.

22 Li, Chiu-kuo wu tsui ch'i ch'un-tzu shih chien, pp. 71, 100.

23 Ibid., pp. 62-63.

24 Ibid., p. 85.

25 Soong (Sung) Ch'ing-ling, Wei hsin Chung-kuo fen-tou (Peking: Jen-min ch'u-pan she, 1952) p. 74.


27 Li, Chiu-kuo wu tsui ch'i ch'un-tzu shih chien, pp. 156-170.

28 Ibid., p. 62.

29 Ibid., p. 62.

30 Ibid., p. 62.

31 Ibid., p. 62.
Paul Linebarger, The China of Chiang Kai-shek (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1941), p. 176. It is not clear whether this figure was sufficient for expenses per month or per annum.

Chiu-wang shou-t'se, p. 166.

Ibid., p. 167.

See the Chiu-wang shou-t'se. According to the Table of Contents of the Chiu-wang shou-t'se the section which dealt with training was in pp. 103-109 inclusive. However the text I used did not contain pp. 106-115 inclusive, and thus omitted several pages of the section relating to training.

Ibid., p. 105.


William Morwood, Duel for the Middle Kingdom: The Struggle Between Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Tse-tung for Control of China (New York, Everest House, 1980) p. 177.


TCSH 1:6 (1935) p. 158.

TCSH 1:15 (1936) p. 361.


Witke, "Transformation of Attitudes Toward Women During the May Fourth Era of Modern China." p. 51.

The full name is Chung-kuo t'ung-meng hui [China United League].


Ibid., p. 349.


Hsiang Ch'ing-yu, "Chung-kuo tsui-chin fu-nü yun-tung," Fu-nü nien-chien (Shanghai) 1924, pp. 77-87. See also Hung-ch'i p'iao-p'iao, 5 pp. 28-31.


Ibid.

Hung-ch'i p'iao-p'iao, 1:75; 5:172; 8:53.


Fu-nü sheng-huo 2:1 (1936) p. 235, states Ch'ing-nien hui (YMCA) but Li, Chiu-kuo wu tsui ch'i chün-tzu shih chien, p. 105 states Nü ch'ing nien-hui (YWCA).


Li, Chiu-kuo wu tsui ch'i ch'un-tzu shih chien pp. 60-61.


National Salvation Association manifestoes are discussed in Chapter 3.

Li, Chiu-kuo wu tsui ch'i ch'un-tzu shih chien, p. 105.

L. P. Van Slyke, Enemies and Friends: The United Front in Chinese Communist History, pp. 171-172, suggests this was probably sometime between the fall of 1943 and the spring of 1944. Carson Chang, The Third Force in China (New York: Bookman Associates, 1952), p. 115, simply says the National Salvation Association was allowed to join later. No dates were given.

Ho Hsiang-ning, the wife of Liao Chung-k'ai, was the first woman to join the T'ung-meng-hui, 1905. For biographical data see Howard L. Boorman and Richard C. Howard, eds., Biographical Dictionary of Republican China, 4 vols (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967-1971). Entry: Ho Hsiang-ning.

Klein and Clark, eds. Biographical Dictionary of Chinese Communism, 1921-1965, p. 765. Shih Liang has held positions such as Minister of Justice; member, standing committee of various National People's Congresses, Vice Chairman, China Democratic League; and various positions in women's affairs.

For example Sung Ch'ing-ling was reported as repeatedly asking to join the CCP. See Beijing Review 21 May 25, 1981, p. 5.

Chung-kuo fu-nu, September 1967, p. 22.

Li, Chiu-kuo wu tsui ch'i ch'un-tzu shih chien, p. 105.

The China Yearbook, ed., by H. G. W. Woodhead (Shanghai: 1936) p. 246. Also known as Y. Y. Phen.

NCH, January 1, 1936.


NCH, June 3, 1936. p. 408.
75 Ibid.

76 Mai Ch'ing, T'ao Hsing-chih (Hong Kong: San lien shu-tien, 1949), p. 53.

77 NCH, September 23, 1936, p. 531.

78 Ibid., July 15, 1936.

79 Ibid., September 2, and 9, 1936.

80 Ibid., September 16, 1936.

81 Ibid., September 30, 1936, p. 573.

82 NCH, November 4, 1936.

83 Ibid., November 11, 1936.

84 Ho Kán-chíh is an example.

85 NCH, November 4, 1936, p. 237.


87 NCH, November 11, 1936, p. 237.

88 Ibid., November 25, 1936, p. 316.

89 Ibid., November 18, 1936, p. 276.

90 Li, Chiu-kuo wù tsuì ch'i chün-tzu shih chien, pp. 69, 81.

91 NCH, December 2, 1936, p. 355.

CHAPTER 3: NATIONAL SALVATION LITERARY ACTIVITY

National Salvation literary activity included the publication of National Salvation manifestoes and patriotic literature in general. These emerged within a milieu of government suppression of the Chinese press. This chapter aims to consider first, government suppression of the press in the 1930s, second, patriotic literature in general and finally, National Salvation manifestoes. An awareness of these three elements should provide insight into both the character of the National Salvation Association and the arrest and trial of the seven worthies.

Although newspapers and books have proved useful, most of the information gleaned for this chapter has been obtained from Chinese periodical literature published during the 1930s. Chinese periodical literature during this period enjoyed a unique position. For various reasons, periodical publishing flourished more than the publication of books. Few periodicals survived more than a few years; some might have had one or two issues. So ephemeral were some that only the month and the day were printed but not the year. Few of these fugitive periodicals have reached libraries in the West and even when a library has a title, it rarely has all the issues.

GOVERNMENT SUPPRESSION OF THE PRESS

Because of the dominance of political problems in China throughout the 1930s, emphasis on the suppression of dissenting political views was from the very beginning a most important objective of censorship and it became increasingly crucial as the years went by. The conflict
between the KMT, determined to suppress publications supposedly detrimental to it, and writers bent on expressing their opinions reached a feverish pitch by the mid 1930s.

Central and local Government control was tighter over newspapers and periodicals, especially those that dealt with current affairs and social, economic, or political ideas, than over books or other types of publications. The Provisional Constitution promulgated in 1931 guaranteed freedom of speech, writing and publication, yet the publication laws in one way or another curtailed these constitutional rights of the people. Various news censorship regulations were proclaimed by the central as well as local Governments. In addition to the Publication Law of 1930 and the Regulations for its application in 1931, the Regulations for Punishing Counter-revolutionaries were decreed in 1929 and the emergency Law Governing Treason and Sedition in 1931. This law prescribed capital punishment or life imprisonment for those who engaged in seditious propaganda by writings, pictures, or word of mouth, with intent to subvert the Republic. To facilitate pre-publication censorship of books and periodicals, the Censorship Commission for Books and Periodicals was established in Shanghai in 1934.

Instead of coercion, it seems the Government at times resorted to incentives. One means used to incite the more prominent writers or editors to support the Central Government was evidently to offer them official positions. For example, early in 1936, two high ranking officials were sent to Shanghai to win over Tsou T'ao-fen. Declining an invitation to confer with Chiang Kai-shek in Nanking, Tsou later learned that Chiang had probably intended to give him a government position there.
In Japanese controlled areas of China, Japanese interference with Chinese publications everywhere grew steadily in the few years prior to the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War. On September 19, 1931 the Japanese army struck at Mukden under flimsy pretexts, and then extended its sway over all of North Eastern China, the richest and most fertile part of the country. As soon as it occupied that vast area, it established Manchukuo and lost no time in revising textbooks and outlawing Chinese patriotic writings. Strict censorship of newspapers and magazines was imposed by the Japanese army and the Japanese Embassy in cooperation with the Chinese puppet government officials.4

The Japanese invasion of Shanghai on January 28, 1932 met with fierce resistance from the Chinese Nineteenth Route Army. Although a ceasefire agreement reached in May 1932 stipulated the suppression of all anti-Japanese activities, the Chinese people's hatred for the Japanese remained intense. On April 10, 1933 Chiang Kai-shek made his position clear: "Before all the Communist bandits are destroyed, we must not talk about resisting the Japanese. Whoever disobeys this order will be given the severest punishment."5 The concomitant slogan, "internal pacification before resistance against external aggression" was kept alive by Chiang until the Sian Incident, December 12, 1936. Whatever the reasons were behind this policy, it was difficult for the Chinese people to accept emotionally. Since the Communists were clamouring for resistance to Japan, the Central Government was inclined to consider that those who advocated war with Japan must be either Communist or Communist-oriented. Patriotic student demonstrations were often dispersed by armed police and soldiers. Campuses were raided and the possession of any prohibited publications was sufficient
cause for the owner's arrest. But, the repression of patriotic student activity was such that those arrested were usually released after a few weeks' imprisonment.

In order not to offend the Japanese, the Government in its publications avoided using the term "Japan." In all publications, seemingly anti-Japanese expressions, including reports on the Japanese troop intrusion into North China, were outlawed. The symbols "X X" were employed to represent the two characters for Japan, should that nation be referred to in any unfavourable light. All negotiations with Japan were kept secret. Yet the Chinese periodical press was not acquiescent and by the mid 1930s many publications used the term "Japan" rather than the symbols "X X," and were increasingly strong in their condemnation of the exigencies of Japanese aggression.

Likewise, the secrecy of diplomatic negotiations was condemned by the Chinese periodical press. This response is significant as it reflects the growing sense of alienation from the Government in Nanking felt by contributors to the Chinese press.

Japanese meddling in the affairs of the Chinese press is further illustrated by the Hsin-sheng chou-k'an [New Life Weekly] case. The Hsin-sheng chou-k'an began publication in Shanghai in January 1934, shortly after the suspension of Sheng-huo chou-k'an [Life Weekly]. Sheng-huo chou-k'an was a popular weekly which at the height of its popularity in 1932 claimed a circulation of 155,000. In the early 1930s two of the editors of Sheng-huo chou-k'an were Tsou T'ao-fen and Hu Yu-chih. Sheng-huo chou-k'an's readers were mainly young people: students, white collar workers, small businessmen, professionals and primary and middle school teachers. The editor and publisher of
Hsin-sheng chou-k'אן, Tu Chung-yüan, was an industrialist and an admirer of Tsou T'ao-fen.

On May 4, 1935 Hsin-sheng chou-k'אן carried an article entitled "Random talk of the emperors," written by I Shui, the pseudonym of Ai Han-sung, who edited Sheng-huo chou-k'אן during its final days. The article began with a discussion of the powers Chinese emperors once enjoyed and the tragedy of some of the least fortunate emperors of China. Then it stated: "The Japanese war office and the capitalist class are the real rulers of Japan." The article concluded by calling P'u Yi, Emperor K'ang Teh of the so-called "Manchukuo," "puppet of the puppets." The Japanese claimed that the article was a great insult to the Emperor of Japan. Initially the article attracted little attention. However in June 1935, it suddenly aroused the belated wrath of the Japanese community in Shanghai. The Central Government in Nanking as well as the Shanghai Municipal Government was confronted with Japanese demands for apologies and remedial action.

On June 10, 1935 the Central Government issued a directive which called for the promotion of friendly relations with all neighbouring countries. The Mayor of Shanghai, Wu T'ieh-ch'eng, promptly apologized to the Japanese and ordered a ban on the periodical, the punishment of the persons responsible, and the destruction of all remaining copies of the issue; he also guaranteed that similar incidents would not recur. Tu Chung-yüan was arrested on July 2, 1935 on charges of publishing remarks derogatory to the Emperor of Japan. Arrangements were made to bring Tu to trial. On July 9, 1935 the Second Branch Kiangsu High Court was convened. Tu was formally charged not with sedition, but with committing an offense under Articles 116 and 310 of
the New Criminal Code, and Article 325 of the Old Criminal Code, for insulting the head of a friendly state. The conviction was made easy by the defense, who made no attempt to justify the article. Tu Chung-yuan was subsequently tried and sentenced to fourteen months of imprisonment, two months short of the maximum penalty prescribed. Chinese documents which I have seen do not indicate why he was not charged with sedition. All copies of the issue of the periodical, in which the article appeared, were to be confiscated. Furthermore, the judge declared the sentence final and denied Tu the right to appeal.

After the Hsin-sheng chou-k'an case, the campaign to suppress anti-Japanese literature grew even more intense. Three bookstore managers were brought to trial on December 11, and one peddler and another bookstore manager on December 9, 1935, all for selling anti-Japanese books in Shanghai. Incidents multiplied as many people were found guilty of the "crime" of being anti-Japanese. It should be noted that the Nanking Government's efforts to suppress anti-Japanese literature in the face of mounting Japanese expansion in China were similar to the efforts of some late Ch'ing dynasty officials who sought to suppress incendiary anti-Christian literature while confronted by a growing missionary enterprise.

The Chinese Government authorities also took steps to ensure that various political agencies and educational institutions were made fully aware of the situation concerning anti-Japanese literature, and urged them to exercise restraint. Agitation to boycott Japanese goods, as well as anti-Japanese speeches and organizations, were all proscribed. Various orders and proclamations were issued to suppress patriotic activities and literature. On
December 20, 1935 martial law was proclaimed for the Shanghai-Nanking area and on February 20, 1936 the Emergency Regulations for Keeping Peace and Order were promulgated. These Regulations authorized troops or police "to use force or other effective measures" to suppress all patriotic meetings and demonstrations. National Salvationists responded in their manifestoes and with articles in various periodicals, all of which expressed their disapproval of such measures.

In 1936 many periodicals were suppressed for allegedly being anti-Japanese, thirteen of them in November alone. Of these thirteen periodicals, I have seen various issues from only two: Tu-shu sheng-huo [Study Life] and Fu-nü sheng-huo [Women's Life]. It seems that suppression of periodicals in an ironic sense acted as a catalyst for further opposition to ever-increasing Government control, as illustrated by the proliferation of periodical literature during the 1930s.

What then, was the effect of Government suppression of the Chinese press in the 1930s, prior to the Sino-Japanese War? As compared with the number of books published each year, periodical publishing seemed to be more vigorous. Periodicals did not require much capital and thus enjoyed more flexibility than books and newspapers. A periodical which was banned could easily appear under a new title; frequently edited and published by the same persons. The more radical the periodical was, the sooner it changed its title. This is one of the reasons why, during this period, there was such a proliferation of periodicals published; most of them had but a short life. The proliferation of periodicals is emphasized by the Shanghai-shih nien-chien [Shanghai City Yearbook] 1935, which stated that in 1934 there were no less than two hundred twelve periodicals
published in Shanghai alone. But not all of these were concerned with political or social affairs.

The worst effect of Government suppression of the Chinese press, however, was that in proscribing all Communist publications and denouncing all anti-Japanese activities as Communist-instigated, the Government deprived the Chinese people of any reliable ways of learning the motives that prompted the Chinese Communists, and patriotic organizations such as the National Salvation Association, to promote anti-Japanese sentiments. Suppression of the Chinese press also reduced the public's access to information about Japanese activities in China and as to what anti-Japanese opposition existed. Finally, it should be observed that in this period the principal cause for censorship was ideological and was aimed at the Chinese Communists. In this connection, specific reasons advanced by the Ministry of the Interior for the suppression of publications were, frequently: spreading Communist propaganda, agitating class struggle and attacking the KMT.

Each new publication law, a product of its time, surpassed its predecessors in its emphasis on suppressing political opposition, especially in newspapers and periodicals that discussed the affairs of the state, and social, economic, or political ideas. Yet, proliferation of periodical literature continued in spite of stringent Government press control.

Patriotic Literature

Although Chinese documents used the terms Ai-kuo wen-hsüeh [Patriotic Literature] and Chiu-wang wen-hsüeh [National Salvation Literature], the distinction between these two genres is blurred.
Furthermore, the terms *Ai-kuo wen-hsüeh* and *Chiu-wang wen hsüeh* were used interchangeably. For these reasons, I propose to treat them together in this study.

The upsurge in the National Salvation Movement led to a proliferation of the patriotic press. One source stated that over a thousand periodicals were published by patriotic associations throughout China during 1936-1937, of which at least a hundred periodicals were based in Shanghai. Unfortunately almost none of this outpouring has reached Western libraries. Our interpretation of the significance of the National Salvation Association, in terms of the patriotic literature of the period, must therefore be based on only a few of the more prominent periodicals such as, *Ta-chung sheng-huo* [Life of the Masses], and *Fu-nü sheng-huo*.

*Ta-chung sheng-huo* was edited by Tsou T'ao-fen. This periodical stressed the need for immediate resistance to Japan to prevent the destruction of China. It also showed a keen awareness of other areas of world conflict in 1936, such as Italy's attack on Abyssinia and the Spanish Civil War, which its editors believed could serve as models for China under Japanese aggression. Tsou T'ao-fen devoted much space in the *Ta-chung sheng-huo* to articles which supported the United Front and the National Salvation Movement.

It should be noted that the *Ta-chung sheng-huo* published several articles on the Student National Salvation Movement. These pointed to the need for organization, education and action. Of particular interest is the report of the January 21, 1936 formation of a *Shang-hai ko ta-chung-hsüeh hsüeh-sheng chiu-kuo hsüan ch'üan t'uan* [All Shanghai Univeristy and Highschool National Salvation Propaganda Group]. This group of approximately eighty students,
according to the *Ta-chung sheng-huo*, formed three teams, each with a team leader, to effect National Salvation propaganda. This gives further support to the notion of a definite organizational structure within the National Salvation movement. Furthermore it would seem from these articles that at times the Shanghai Student National Salvation Movement's enthusiasm for propaganda and demonstrations to voice their anti-Japanese sentiment was kept in check by representatives of other branches of the National Salvation Movement, such as the Shanghai Cultural and Women's National Salvation Associations. This helps refute the commonly held view that the students led the National Salvation Movement, as suggested by such scholars as Wu Tien-wei.

The *Ta-chung sheng-huo* also provides a reprint of the first manifesto of the Peiping Cultural National Salvation Association. This was signed by one hundred forty nine people. It was not dated. The list of signees was headed by Ma Hsu-lun, an eminent Chinese educator and government official. It was similar in content to a manifesto issued by the Shanghai Cultural National Salvation Association, which is discussed later in this chapter.

Shanghai was in the vanguard of the movement in China to establish women's education, as it was in the whole range of contemporary intellectual activity, given its peculiarly cosmopolitan nature. Shanghai presented a favourable market for periodicals and newspapers, both by and for women. This is illustrated by the periodical *Fu-nü sheng-huo*, which was a strong advocate of women's participation in the National Salvation Movement. It devoted special issues to the role of women in the formation of the Shanghai Women's
National Salvation Association, highlighted the Shanghai Women's National Salvation Association demonstration marches, and published the Shanghai Women's National Salvation Association manifesto. Fu-nü sheng-huo was equally concerned with the fate of the Chinese nation: article after article stressed China's perilous condition in the modern world. The periodical's very publication was a graphic demonstration that the fate of the nation was no longer strictly a male concern. The overwhelming tenor of Fu-nü sheng-huo was one of ardent nationalism and devotion to the cause of strengthening China by improving the quality of Chinese womanhood.

The periodical most frequently quoted at the trial of the seven worthies, Chiu-wang ch'ing-pao [Bulletin of National Salvation] is not available in Western libraries. The one issue of Chiu-wang ch'ing-pao which I have seen, was dated October 10, 1937, and published in Shanghai. It is thus strictly outside the limited time framework of this thesis. However, if this issue can be taken as representative of the stance taken by contributors to Chiu-wang ch'ing-pao, then it reflects first, an overwhelming concern to denounce Japanese aggression. Second, articles also express the need for organization and training of the masses (min-tsung): both theoretical and practical. It contains little reference to local National Salvation affairs. Unlike earlier patriotic literature which employed the symbols "X X" to denote Japan, the Chiu-wang ch'ing-pao used the Chinese characters for Japan (Jih-pen), at least in this issue.

While considered within the general rubric of Ai-kuo wen-hsüeh [Patriotic Literature], Chiu-wang ch'ing-pao and other publications such as Chiu-wang pao-tao [National Salvation Report], and
Chiu-wang chou-k'an [National Salvation Weekly], were more specifically representative of Chiu-wang wen-hsūeh [National Salvation Literature]. These publications were published by the National Salvation Association and were narrower in focus than Ai-kuo wen-hsūeh. For example, the fourth issue of Chiu-wang pao-tao was a brief seven page report, which commemorated the December 9 (1935) movement. It also contained reports on student National Salvation affairs, particularly in Nanking, Peking and Tientsin; and several despatches relating to National Salvation endeavours in Cheng-tu. This supports the notion that while the National Salvation movement was based in Shanghai, it thrived also in other urban centres throughout China.

The Chiu-wang chou-k'an was an organ of the Shanghai Vocational National Salvation Association. Published in Shanghai, it contained discussion of national politics in general, and of local professional interests in particular. This periodical although representative of Chiu-wang wen-hsūeh, was first published in October 1937, after the seven worthies were released from prison. Thus it too falls outside the particular time-span of this present research. However, it is useful to observe that two of the contributors to this premier issue were Sha Ch'ien-li and the prominent writer, Shen Yen-ping (Mao Tun). This issue of Chiu-wang chou-k'an which had twelve pages, devoted several articles to the affairs of the Shanghai Vocational National Salvation Association. One article by Shen Yen-ping entitled "How to endure," included a Shanghai Vocational National Salvation Association manifesto. Unfortunately for our purposes, this was not signed or dated. The question of training in the National Salvation Association receives attention in several
articles. Concern was expressed that organization and training of the masses was lagging behind other National Salvation efforts. 

As genres of Chinese literature, and as vehicles for communicating views and ideas in China throughout the 1930s, Ai-kuo wen-hsüeh and Chiu-wang wen-hsüeh have received little attention from Western scholars. Both of these categories of literature invite further research.

Patriotic sentiment found expression not only in literature but also in patriotic music. The National Salvation Movement was made vocal through the development of a mass singing movement.

The first popular patriotic song "The March of the Guerrillas" (also called "The March of the Volunteers") was born in 1932. This song became a powerful influence in the spread of the National Salvation Movement. It was dedicated to the Chinese guerrilla fighters in Manchuria. In this song Nieh Erh, the composer, set the style for numerous other patriotic songs composed in the following years. The words are as follows:

Arise! Ye who refuse to be bondslaves!  
With our very flesh and blood  
Let us build our new Great Wall.  
China's masses have met the day of danger,  
Indignation fills the hearts of all our countrymen.
Arise! Arise! Arise!  
Many hearts with one mind,  
Brave the enemy's gunfire.  
March on!  
Brave the enemy's gunfire.  
March on! March on! March on!

The infusion of patriotic songs into a mass singing movement was chiefly due to the promotion by Liu Liang-mo, a young Christian, a graduate of the Shanghai College of Law. Being a singer himself, he started a mass singing club in the Shanghai Y.M.C.A., where he
worked after graduation. The mass singing movement spread rapidly.

Liu Liang-mo described his experience:

I found a buried voice in the bosom of the people waiting for expression. Our National Salvation Movement was proclaimed in 1935 and we were hearing such slogans as 'China must not be enslaved by Japan,' 'China must stop her civil war,' 'We must unite and resist the invaders.' The songs which I taught them expressed the same idea and to my great surprise in a short time they not only sang, 'Arise! Ye who refuse to be bondslaves,' but they roared it.41

Chinese periodicals provide the words, and the music in the Chinese pentatonic scale for various patriotic songs which were sung at National Salvation Association meetings and during demonstration marches. These songs were almost invariably bound up with the concern for national defence and expressed confidence in the final victory of China against Japan.

NATIONAL SALVATION MANIFESTOES

Various manifestoes of the National Salvation Association were published. In general, these manifestoes were statements of purpose, and outlined the objectives of the National Salvation Association. Particularly interesting are the few manifestoes which I have seen which have an appended list of signees. The names of these individuals, in the purported absence of National Salvation Association membership lists, provides some indication of the character of the National Salvation Association, particularly in terms of its social composition and its political leanings.

Two of the early National Salvation manifestoes were published in Ta-chung sheng-huo. The first entitled, "Plans for National Crisis Education," was composed by T'ao Hsing-chîn. It was divided
into eight short sections. This manifesto stressed the imminence of national destruction and the need for mass education to save China. The overall aims expressed were:

1. Advance the culture of the masses;
2. Seize freedom and equality for the Chinese race; and
3. Defend the integrity and independence of the Chinese Republic.

These three aims reflect first, the wide range of National Salvation goals. This is significant, as it shows that the National Salvation Movement was not merely concerned with the preservation of China's territorial integrity. Second, the aims, however well or ill-defined, give some indication of the concerns of National Salvation leaders, such as T'ao Hsing-chih. While the contents of this manifesto and others deserve further detailed research, probably the most that can be achieved here are a few insights here and there, seen as through a glass darkly.

"Culture" has always been a difficult and elusive concept. In the wake of the May 4, 1919 New Culture Movement the controversy over Chinese and Western cultures received attention from the pens of such scholars as Hu Shih and Liang Shu-ming. By the 1930s the intelligentsia were as much isolated in China's urban centres as they were intellectually and physically separated from the backward countryside. Social isolation and political impotency gave rise to restlessness, frustration and a growing need to find roots in Chinese society. Strident calls for cultural transformation were not only their intellectual prescriptions for the ills of China but also a reflection of social and political loneliness, their inability to effect
the changes they desired.

A disciple of John Dewey, T'ao Hsing-chih went further than Dewey's concepts of "education is life" and "education is society," and proclaimed that "life is education" and "society is education." Like Liang Shu-ming, T'ao contended that the character of modern Chinese education had alienated the Chinese intelligentsia from the rural masses of China and left them as parasites to perform any service for society at large. Thus, T'ao argued that China needed a new form of culture and education, which would immerse the intellectual in rural education where he would "learn by doing." Although T'ao was explicitly a Deweyite, his philosophical roots, like Liang Shu-ming's were anchored in the Neo-Confucianist thought of Wang Yang-ming. Wang's doctrine of Chih-hsing ho-i [the unity of knowledge and action], was reflected in T'ao's own courtesy name, Hsing-chi (action-knowledge) which he adopted about 1930. It seems that T'ao Hsing-chih used this manifesto, at least, to reiterate his concerns for mass education, and to further his goals for sheng-huo chiao-yü [life education].

The aims, to seize freedom and equality for the Chinese race, and to defend the integrity and independence of the Chinese Republic, were intertwined. Independence was a deceptively simple goal. It had at least three main components which the manifesto considered as essential: first, it presupposed sovereignty; second, sovereignty required freedom from interference; and, third, that freedom could only be guaranteed by its equality in strength with the strongest.

The first question of independence concerned China's sovereignty and its boundaries. The Japanese presence in North China made it clear that there was not merely the question of inequality but the much
more serious matter of the erosion of Chinese sovereignty with China proper. There was another aspect of sovereignty which related to the question of both equality and freedom from interference. This concerned the unequal treaties signed with Britain, France, Russia, the United States of America, Japan, and other powers, which were forced upon the Ch'ing dynasty from 1840 onwards. The task of trying to have them revised had begun even before the fall of the Ch'ing dynasty. But, there could be no significant improvement in China's position as long as Japan continued to make gains at China's expense.

The consummation of the Ho-Umetsu negotiations in July 1935, set the stage for removal from Hopeh province of all military and political persons and groups unfriendly to Japan, and therefore ushered in a new era of Japanese control in North China. Japan's all-out aggressive policy which had started to take shape in early 1933 had definitely manifested itself in the spring of 1935, when Japan launched the "self government" movement of five provinces (Suiyuan, Chahar, Hopeh, Shantung, and Honan) in North China.

The open manifestation of Japan's aggressive policy hastened the development of the self-government movement on the one hand, and, on the other, aroused a new surge of Chinese patriotism which had gained momentum since the Mukden Incident. The highlight of Doihara Kenji's adventure in North China was the separation of twenty-two counties in East Hopeh from Chinese jurisdiction by inaugurating the East Hopeh Anti-Communist and Self-Government Council, with the notorious Yin Ju-keng as chairman, on November 24, 1935. With these developments in mind, it is not surprising that T'ao Hsing-chih perceived that the problem of North China was not merely a local affair.
but a problem for national concern.

The second manifesto was entitled: "The Challenge of the People's Liberation Movement." This was the second declaration of the Shanghai Cultural National Salvation Association. It was issued by the thirty-five member executive committee, who decried the ineffectiveness of the previous declaration to change Government policy, and proposed that the Government should act so as to:

1. Fundamentally change the present foreign policy and make public information on all past diplomatic events;
2. Give freedom to mass organizations, protect the patriotic movement, and speedily set up a national (min-tsu) united front;
3. Stop all civil war;
4. Arm the people of the whole country;
5. Guarantee absolute freedom of assembly, association, speech and printed word;
6. Dismiss and punish all traitorous officials who are intimate with the enemy;
7. Break all economic contact with the enemy and restore a nation-wide boycott of enemy goods; and
8. Release all political prisoners and hasten to relieve the national crisis. 49

Amidst the crisis over North China, the KMT Fifth Congress convened at Nanking in early November 1935 and made no drastic changes of policy toward Japan which, since the Shanghai Incident in early 1932 had been characterized by the concept of an-nei jang-wai [internal pacification before resistance against external aggression].
The failure of the Nanking Government to make public information on all diplomatic events is illustrated by reference to two well-known Sino-Japanese accords: First, the Tangku Truce signed May 31, 1933 provided for the establishment of a demilitarized zone encompassing twenty-one districts on the Chinese side of the Sino-Manchurian frontier, or the non-fortification of the Chinese frontier. It marked the successful introduction of Kwantung Army military pressure into North China. The Tangku Truce also provided for a Chinese constabulary to keep law and order in the area. But neither the preamble to the Tangku Truce nor the accompanying declaration of the complete text was revealed at first publication. The second sentence of Article 4: "The said [Chinese] police force shall not be constituted by armed units hostile to Japanese feelings," was completely suppressed until 1937.50

Second, the Hirota Three Principles, announced by the Japanese Foreign Minister Hirota Koki, October 28, 1935 were finally published January 1936.51 The Hirota Three Principles demanded: thorough suppression of anti-Japanese thoughts and activities in China; conclusion of a Sino-Japanese anti-Communist military pact; and achievement of "economic cooperation" between Japan, Manchukuo, and China, with a special position provided for North China. In effect, Hirota's foreign policy aimed at isolating China from the rest of the world so as to coerce her into submission, and improving relations with the West, while preventing it from expanding its influence in Asia.

The concern for the cessation of civil war and the establishment of a united front, as expressed in this manifesto, was reiterated in
all subsequent National Salvation manifestoes that I have seen, and will be discussed in greater detail later in this chapter.

In seeking to understand the demands that freedom be given to mass organizations, and that the patriotic movement be protected, it should be recalled that this manifesto was published following the proclamation of martial law in Shanghai and Nanking on December 20, 1935. It seems that the Nanking Government was determined to consolidate its position through suppression not simply of the Communists, but also of the popular democratic movement and, in the last analysis, all critical groups.

The call to arm the people of the whole country is interesting. This proposal is not found in any other National Salvation manifesto that I have seen. It seems that the inclusion of this proposal in this manifesto could well be linked to the influence at least of Mesdames Sun Yat-sen (Sung Ch'ing-ling) and Liao Chung-k'ai in the National Salvation Movement. These two women were involved in an organization: the Chinese People's Committee for Armed Self-Defense. The precise nature of this organization, its support base, and its links with the National Salvation Movement raises questions for further research, which has not been elucidated by any documents which I have seen so far. How many other National Salvation leaders advocated the right of the people to bear arms is not clear.

As has been seen already, not only did the Nanking Government deny the rights of people to organize, to associate, and to assemble, which were part of Sun Yat-sen's doctrine, it failed to advocate them. Then too, the Provisional Constitution adopted May 12, 1931 stipulated that "all persons shall have the freedom of assembly and formation"
of associations..." and that "all persons shall have the liberty of speech and publication," but ever increasing suppression of democratic rights was the order of the day.

Understandably, the manifesto does not name the traitorous officials intimate with the enemy. Such officials may have been epitomized by Ho Ying-chin, who in December 1935 was the highest authority representing the Central Government, in North China: Acting Chairman of the Peking Sub-Council of the Military Affairs Council, of which Chiang Kai-shek was Chairman. Even since his submission to the Japanese demands as embodied in the so-called Ho-Umetsu agreement, July 6, 1935, Ho Ying-chin had been labelled as pro-Japanese, and incurred the ire of National Salvationists and students.

As noted earlier in this section, one of the demands of the Hirota Three Principles was the achievement of "economic cooperation" between Japan, Manchukuo, and China, with a special position provided for North China. The manifesto not only condemned Chinese economic contact with Japan, but advocated that a nation-wide boycott of Japanese goods be restored. An earlier widespread boycott of Japanese goods followed in the wake of the May 4 Incident 1919. In 1936, one scholar asserts that a nation-wide boycott of Japanese imports succeeded in cutting trade by two-thirds. Unfortunately he does not substantiate this with any evidence. However, the actual commercial damage inflicted upon Japan is still subject to debate.

The final demand for the release of political prisoners and relief of the national crisis is not surprising, given that the manifesto was published just two months after the December 9, 1935 Movement, during which many students were arrested. Perhaps however,
the sentiment expressed in this demand goes back even further to the Chung-kuo min-ch'üan pao-chang t'ung-meng [China League for the Protection of Civil Rights], in which at least three key National Salvationists were leaders. Founded in December 1932, this organization sought, sometimes successfully, to win the release from the KMT of political prisoners, many of them communists.

There were also sections in this manifesto which dealt with the duties of the Cultural National Salvation Association and with demands to the Central Government. These demands urged the Government to prohibit suppression of the patriotic movement by local authorities, especially those in the North. Neither of these documents mentioned the Communist Party by name and the call for a united front was not directly linked to the civil war and negotiations for a united government. However it should be noted that this does not preclude links between the National Salvation Association and the Communist Party. The nature of National Salvation Association - CCP links will be considered later.

On May 30, 1936 three thousand people took part in what the NCH described as a "violent" (emphasis mine) anti-Japanese demonstration in Shanghai, which commemorated the May 30, 1925 Incident. What the NCH meant by "violent" is uncertain. Violence cannot be quantified, nor is overt rioting necessarily its most significant expression. At the May 30 commemorative demonstration a resolution was passed by the demonstrators. This demanded:

1. The use of force to prevent smuggling in the North;
2. Government denunciation of the Hirota Three Principles;
3. Government rejection of "the trap" of joint (Sino-Japanese)
suppression of Communism;
4. Encouragement and protection of all National Salvation Movements in China; and
5. Amendment of the Draft Constitution to concur with Sun Yat-sen's Three People's Principles.  

The demilitarized zone facilitated Japan's "special trade": smuggling. The smuggling of silver proceeded Northeast-ward during much of 1935, while opium and ever increasing amounts of artificial silk yarn, sugar, and cigarette paper were carried Southwest-ward through the Great Wall passes from Manchuria into China proper. The "special trade reached a peak in early 1936, prior to this National Salvation statement being issued. It should be noted that although it is difficult to evaluate the smuggling situation in the North because of lack of quantitative statistical information, the loss of revenue through smuggling reached considerable proportions, regardless of statistical data discrepancies. For example, one source pointed out that total revenue losses (due to smuggling) from August 1935 - April 1936 amounted to over Ch.$25,000,000.  

It would seem that the demands in this resolution were a response of National Salvationists to the publication of the Hirota Three Principles, January 1936. Although it was not stated, possibly the demand for the amendment of the Draft Constitution to concur with Sun Yat-sen's Three People's Principles was essentially addressed to the problem of democratic rights, as discussed earlier.

These demands were supplemented by a more comprehensive manifesto which was formulated by the executive committee of the All-China Federation of National Salvation Unions on May 31, 1936.
This was a much more impassioned document. Firstly, it attempted to relate the National Salvation cause to the continued Japanese policy to "enslave" China. Secondly, it denounced the "authoritative groups" (sic). This referred to the seriousness of Japanese aggression.

The manifesto accused the Central Government of devoting itself to the unification of power without accepting the duties of a united power, principally the task of national defense. Despite repeated announcements of immediate destruction of the Communists the Government had not achieved its goal in the post 1927 period. At the same time it wasted valuable national resources, which could have been used against the external aggressor. Declarations were made by Li Tsung-jen to fight Japan at all costs. Feng Yü-hsiang advocated an end to civil war, alliance with the Soviet Union and joint resistance to Japan. The CCP revised its political programme so as to fight jointly with other parties. The executive committee of the All-China National Salvation Federation maintained that it should have been clear to the Government first, that there was "a unanimous demand on all sides that China needed a national revolution to struggle for independence and liberation," and second, that this could be achieved "only under the demand for a war of resistance against Japan, as the first principle in common."

The National Salvation Front alone, the manifesto claimed, had the power to break the deadlock between the various groups competing for power in China. The manifesto reasoned that "the National Salvation Front had no political ambition whatsoever" and that its only aim was to "promote the formation of a united, anti-enemy political power." The manifesto proposed to the various groups that:
1. All parties and groups immediately put an end to civil war;
2. All parties and groups immediately free the political prisoners in their custody;
3. All parties and groups immediately send formal delegates, through the National Salvation Front, to begin joint negotiations....;
4. The National Salvation Front will guarantee with all the power at its disposal, the faithful fulfillment of the anti-enemy programme by any and all parties and groups; and
5. The National Salvation Front will with all the power at its disposal, use sanctions against any party or group that violates the joint anti-enemy programme and acts to weaken the united strength against the enemy.

The cessation of civil war mentioned in this manifesto was addressed not only to the fighting between the KMT and the Communists in the North West of China, but also to the Civil War just erupting between the Central Government and Liang-Kwang (Kwangtung and Kwangsi) in the South. The last two proposals in the manifesto, although fine on paper, could have no effective bite in the militaristic battles of China.

This manifesto also raises some interesting questions concerning National Salvation power goals. If, as the manifesto claimed, the National Salvation Front had power and aimed to increase its power, then what determined the nature of this power? A cautious weighing of what little is definitely known suggests that although the National Salvation Front claimed a neutral mediatiorial role, it increasingly
supported and thus at least tacitly encouraged other power groups or individuals whose immediate goals at least, concurred with stated National Salvation goals; for example, to stop civil war, resist Japan, and form a united front.

In suggesting that the National Salvation Front gave at least tacit support to other power groups such as the CCP, it must be observed that in contrast to the increasing aggression of Japan and her determination to divorce North China from the jurisdiction of Nanking was the sharp decline in the Chinese Communist movement during the early 1930s. By 1933, the CCP work in the "white" areas had collapsed and most of its clandestine organizations were broken. 66 Everywhere the Communists were in retreat; not even one Soviet area was able to withstand the Nationalists' onslaught; and the Communist forces were either hiding as in the case of Kiangsi after the "Long March" or driven from their bases. 67 To the great majority of Chinese living in 1935 and 1936 the Red Army was almost non-existent, for it did not occupy even a single large city but rather took shelter behind the Ta-hsüeh shan (Great Snow Mountains) in Hsikang or in the caves of Northern Shansi. Yet the Communists were as committed and resolute as ever so far as their long time goal of Communism was concerned, but their immediate objectives were their own survival and national salvation from Japan's aggression. This objective of resistance to Japan's aggression coincided not only with the goal of Chang Hsueh-liang but with that of the National Salvationists as well. However, precise documentation of the extent of both support and encouragement given is not available. Which National Salvationists gave this support is also difficult to verify.
The National Salvation Front's encouragement and support to individuals whose immediate goals coincided with its own is exemplified in its relationship with Chang Hsueh-liang. In Shanghai, following the conclusion of the Fifth National Congress of the KMT held in November 1935, Chang Hsueh-liang witnessed the surge of the patriotic movement that caught his imagination. He plunged himself into close association with various intellectuals, such as Wang Chao-shih, Shen ch'un-ju, and Madame Sun Yat-sen,* under whose spell he was drawn closer to the National Salvation Movement, thereby strengthening his views of civil war and the formation of a united front against Japan. As it turned out Chang became one of the few men of power who patronized the cause of the students and the National Salvation Movement. The formal establishment of the National Salvation Association at Shanghai roughly coincided with the Liang-Kwang revolt in early June 1936. Both served as catalysts in shaping Chang's mind over China's domestic issues and policy toward Japan. As the central Government grew more repressive toward the National Salvation Movement, Chang appeared to move to the other extreme by giving it tacit protection.

The National Salvation Front's support and encouragement given to Chang Hsueh-liang is important for at least two reasons. First, it was reciprocated. Second, it helps refute the ideas of earlier historical studies which suggest a bipolar approach; identifying the CCP and the National Salvation Movement at one end of the spectrum, and the KMT at the other. Such a view seems to be untenable, at least in the pre-Sino-Japanese War period.

The manifesto also called for the maximum possible increase in the "power of the front," which meant presumably, in its role as a
petitioning group. According to Linebarger, the quest for policy and principle rather than political power was a new one to China, and as a result National Salvation leaders came to be esteemed almost universally. But Linebarger fails to note the existence of earlier pure ideals political groups such as the Ch'ing-i scholars of the late Nineteenth Century. Perhaps the distinction between the quest for policy and principle and the quest for power is not as precise as Linebarger suggests, and these are not necessarily mutually exclusive elements. It seems rather that the National Salvation Movement wanted mediatorial power and petitioning power, but it did not seek this power for itself as a policy making or governing body. But, to the extent that various National-Salvation leaders such as T'ao Hsing-chih and Madame Sun Yat-sen used the National Salvation Movement as a receptacle for their ideas, and as a vehicle to advance their own goals, then the National Salvation Movement was a powerful force if not ambivalent catalyst.

The May 1936 formation in Shanghai of the All-China Federation of National Salvation Unions coincided with the outbreak of the Liang-Kwang uprising. This had begun with a demand from the South West Political Council for immediate resistance to Japan on June 2, and a request for movement of troops to the North by the South West military leaders on June 4. This uprising, in which the South Western armies were renamed "Anti-Japanese National Salvation Forces" had an immediate impact on the Central Government. It resulted in the movement of troops to protect Hunan from invasion from the South. 73

The Liang-Kwang uprising presented a problem to the National Salvation Movement, since its aim was resistance to Japan, but its
methods were liable to lead to further civil war. In Shanghai one thousand five hundred students went on strike at Futan University on June 9 to protest Japanese activities in the North. On June 21 there was a siege of the Shanghai North Station in an attempt to hijack a train to go to Nanking. The object of this mission was to have been to petition the Central Government to solve the South West problem peacefully and to resist Japan. No formal statement by the National Salvation Association leaders in Shanghai was produced until a pamphlet, dated July 15, was issued by Tsou T'ao-fen, Shen Chūn-ju, Chang Nai-ch'i and T'ao Hsing-chih. This was entitled: "A Few Basic Conditions and Maximum Demands for Uniting to Meet the National Insult."

The pamphlet included a short plea to the South West to use as much pressure as possible on the Central Government to promote resistance to Japan, but to avoid taking a stand of opposition to the Central Government. Of the Chinese sources that I have seen, this document contained one of the longest remaining records of the views of the National Salvation leaders. It was an attempt to define the real standpoint of the National Salvation Front and to express the hopes of the writers in the various "authority groups" in the nation.

The documents began by noting that the political situation had changed markedly since the December 9 Movement and that all leaders were beginning to see the importance of national salvation. It cited as examples the Government's release of the full Tangku Truce text and its protest to Japan over smuggling; the South West's call for resistance; the change in CCP policy with the renaming of the Workers' and Peasants' Soviet as the People's Soviet; and finally, the
refusal of Sung Che-yuan to form an autonomous organization in North China. Nevertheless the document held that there were still suspicions that National Salvation was only a "fashionable ornament" of no real significance and that the "united front" was only a temporary slogan which was being "used" by certain political groups. The National Salvation Front, in an effort to adopt a people's standpoint, indicated in this document that the united front was important for five reasons:

1. That if resistance is left to one group alone, it will fail;
2. That unless there is tolerance within the resistance movement, the people will end up opposing the government;
3. That in a united front the sincerity of all groups will be put to the test;
4. That if a united front is formed and natural confidence restored, traitorous acts will cease to be possible; and
5. That unless there is confidence in the united front, it will fail and with it the resistance to Japan, but if there is confidence the unity gained in resistance will also be of value after the war is over.

After extolling the virtues of the united front, the document identified six sources of authority in China. The first was Chiang Kai-shek, who was distinguished from the KMT. To Chiang Kai-shek, the writers of the document pleaded first, that five years of failure to uproot the Communists (since 1931) must have persuaded him that his policy of internal pacification before external resistance was not effective. Second, they claimed that in the national crisis situation, unity could be achieved by ending all civil war and permitting
freedom to anti-Japanese movements. They expressed hope that Chiang would then lead the Government to begin the righteous war of liberation. To the South West, they showed sympathy, but expressed hope that the South West would grant genuine freedom to the anti-Japanese movement. They urged the Northern leaders to cease repression of the student movement and the anti-Japanese masses. Regarding the KMT, they trusted that it would discard its past prejudice and again form a united front with the Communists. They appealed to the KMT to purge its ranks of pro-Japanese bureaucrats. To the Communists, the writers of the document expressed hope that the CCP would show its sincerity in the united front, by ending the attacks on central troops and that it would show tolerance to the richer classes, and prevent ideologically immature leftist youths in the cities from disrupting national salvation work. Finally, they appealed to the masses to be the most fervent of all the groups in their opposition to imperialism and bad government.

This pamphlet struck a neutral pose between all the contending groups and tried to point out the failings of each. A reference to "ideologically immature leftist youths" who tried to use the National Salvation Movement to spread class struggle, indicated that the CCP call for a united front was not being heeded by all leftists. The National Salvation leaders saw the KMT as the leader of the united front, with Chiang Kai-shek as the supreme commander. Later Communist historians who did not claim that the Communists led the National Salvation Movement, interpreted the united front as Communist-led, at this point.

How much influence this pamphlet had is difficult to determine.
Some of the questions it raised had already become academic. For example, Chiang Kai-shek, in dealing with the South West, had already pledged not to use arms against the South West by July 8, and the South West uprising began to disintegrate as Kwangtung capitulated to Nanking's control. Mao Tse-tung sent a letter to the National Salvation leaders to express the Communists support for National Salvation efforts toward a united front, an action which was used at the trial of the seven to tie them in with the CCP.

Mao Tse-tung stressed in his long and persuasive reply that he welcomed the conditions and demands set forth by the leaders of the National Salvation Movement and was glad to comply with them for the purpose of forming the "united front." He said, "We are in agreement with your manifesto, programme and demands, and earnestly desire to cooperate with you and all other parties and groups, either as organizations or as individuals.”

The fundamental tenor of the various National Salvation manifestoes that I have seen indicates that National Salvation was the paramount concern. This concern which encompassed both opposition to Japan and the termination of civil war in China took precedence over democratic concerns. It is not possible to detect any overt pro-Communist stance in any of the National Salvation manifestoes which I have seen. Notwithstanding, it is possible to determine that various signees of National Salvation manifestoes were Communist or Communist-oriented at the time the manifestoes were issued. But the amount of influence these persons may or may not have had is difficult to determine precisely.
CHAPTER 3: NATIONAL SALVATION LITERARY ACTIVITY

NOTES

1 "NCH May 19, 1931, p. 221; Hsien-cheng shou-ts'e (Kwang-tung: Chung-kuo wen-hua shih yeh chu', 1933), pp. 35-41.

2 Text of this Law is reprinted in KWCP 8:11 March 23, 1931; the Regulations for its application in ibid., 13:6 April 6, 1931.

3 Mu Hsin, Tsou T'ao-fen (Hong Kong: San lien shu-tien, 1959), p. 159.


5 Sheng-huo chou-k'an 8:3 April, 1933. p. 17.


7 Not infrequently Japan was referred to in periodical literature of the period as simply "the enemy" or "the adversary."

8 Hu Shih, Wo-men yao-ch'iu..." TKP December 29, 1935. At the time when Hu Shih wrote the article, the contents of the Tangku Truce, which had been signed in May 1933, had still not been made public.


10 Mu, Tsou T'ao-fen, pp. 53-54; and Lin Yutang, A History of the Press and Public Opinion in China (Shanghai: Kelly and Walsh Ltd., 1936), p. 151. All sources give approximately the same circulation figures. It should be noted that at its height Hsin ch'ing-nien [New Youth], the most important periodical of the May Fourth era, had a circulation of 16,000. See Chow Tse-tsung, The May Fourth Movement (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1964), p. 73.

11 Mu, Tsou-T'ao-fen, p. 49.

13 Ibid.

14 Ch'en Ying-hsing, ed. Chung-hua min-kuo hsing-fa chieh-shih t'u piao chi t'iao wen (Min kuo: Shang-wu yin shu kuan, 1936), pp. 268-269.

15 For a more detailed description of this case, see NCH July 3, 10, 17, 24, 1935, pp. 15, 60, 89-90, 100, 140.

16 NCH July 17 and 24, August 7, 1935, pp. 100, 151, 238.

17 See NCH October 16, 1935, for the so-called "anti-Japanese poster incident" in Hankow.


20 Mu, Tsou T'ao-fen, p. 190, lists the thirteen periodicals suppressed in November 1936.

21 Tu-shu sheng-huo was a Marxist review. Its writers included Li Kung-p'u, Ai Ssu-ch'i (a prominent Marxist theorist), and Chang Han-fu (a Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs in post 1949 PRC).

22 Accurate statistics on the publishing trade in China during this period are not available. Shen-pao nien-chien, 1936, pp. 1285-1286 states that a total of 8,148 titles were submitted for censorship from March 1932 to September 1935, and 5,075 titles were registered with the Ministry of the Interior from June 1928 to June 1935.


24 Shang-hai shih nien-chien (China), 1935 p. 536.

25 The Chinese Yearbook (Shanghai: Commercial Press) 1937 p. 1093, notes that during the period May 1936 to February 1937, 206 publications were suppressed by the Ministry of the Interior. The reasons for suppression were as follows: Agitating class struggle: 23; Attacking the KMT: 1; Attacking the Nationalist government: 23; Spreading Communist propaganda: 65; Proletarian arts: 11; Indecent: 2; Miscellaneous: 81. Total: 206.

27 For example, see TCSH 6 (1935) p. 137; 8 (1936) pp. 185-186; and 9 (1936) pp. 215-217.

28 **TCSH** 13 (1936) p. 329.

29 For example see *ibid.*, p. 330.


32 In both 1925 and 1928 Ma Hsu-lun was Vice Minister of Education. In 1927 he was a member of the Chekiang Political Council and the Administrative Commission; and Director of the Civil Affairs Bureau; and in 1928 Councillor to the National Government. Brief Biographical notes: Max Perleberg, *Who's Who in Modern China* (Hong Kong: Ye Olde Printerie, 1954), pp. 160-161, entry 9.8.


34 *Chiu-wang ch'ing-pao* October 10, 1937 is held at the National Library, Peking. A copy of this was obtained.

35 I have only seen the 4th issue of *Chiu-wang pao-tao* which was dated December 9, 1936.

36 *Chiu-wang chou-k'an* 1 (1937).


41 Frank B Lenz, "He taught China to Sing," *Christian Herald* October 1942, p. 17.

42 For example see *Fu-nü sheng-huo* (1936) and *TCSH* (1936), and particularly *TCSH* 13 (1936) p. 322.
The manifesto is dated January 6, 1936.

Liang's ultimate solution to China's unique cultural dilemma was modernization through cultural revival. Sey Guy Alitto, The Last Confucian: Liang Shu-ming and the Chinese Dilemma of Modernity (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 1979), especially chapters 4 and 8.


Doihara Kenji was the chief of the Kwantung Army's Special Service Section.

Yin Ju-Keng was a returned student from Waseda University. He was married to a Japanese woman.

TCSH 1:9 (1936) p. 231. The first declaration is contained in TCSH 1:6 (1935) p. 158. This was issued by the Shanghai Cultural National Salvation Movement, before its formal organization as a society. It likewise has eight sections and bears 283 signatures.

For text, see The Chinese Yearbook 1936-37 (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1937) p. 431.


Min-ch'üan chu-i [Doctrine of People's Rights or Democracy] is the second part of the San-min chu-i [Three Principles of the People].

Hsien-cheng shou-ts'e, pp. 35-41, especially chapter 2, which deals with the rights and duties of the people, Articles 14 and 15.

Tsou T'ao-fen was a member of its executive committee; Shen Chun-ju helped found the Chung-kuo min-ch'üan pao-chang t'ung-meng and Sung Ch'ing-ling was one of the organizers and chairman of the organization.

NCH June 3, 1936, p. 408. This was detailed earlier.

From December 1924 on, Shanghai was beset with a wave of labour troubles and in February 1925 a series of strikes against the Japanese cotton mills resulted in significant Communist gains in labour organizations. In mid-May a new round of disturbances at the Nagai Wata Mills led to the death of a worker named Ku Cheng-hung at the hands of a Japanese foreman on May 15, 1925. It was this act which was to lead directly to the May 30, Incident. What seemed at first to be a mere incident; a student demonstration, with an unfortunate bloody ending, became instead a movement that spread from Shanghai to the ports of the East coast and the Yangtze and led to a rash of strikes and a boycott against the British in Hong Kong and the South.


NCH June 3, 1936, p. 408.

The Tangku Truce (1933) provided for the establishment of a demilitarized zone. The Ch'in-Doihara Agreement of July 27, 1935 extended the demilitarized zone to include all the territory "East of a line drawn from Changping in Hopei to the wall in East Hopei via Yenching and Talinpao, and South of another line drawn from a point North of Tushihkou to a point south of Changpei." See Hsu Shu-hsi, The North China Problem (Shanghai: Kelly and Walsh Ltd., 1937), p. 21.


See NCH May 13, 1936, p. 262. This statement was reported in the London Press of May 9, 1936. It was later denied by Feng on May 12, 1936, in a statement to the foreign office in Nanking. See NCH May 20, 1936, p. 313.
For accounts on the collapse of CCP organs in the KMT-held areas, see U. T. Hsu, *Invisible Conflict* (Hong Kong: China View Points, 1958); Yang Tzu-lieh, *Chang Kuo-lao fu-jen hui-i lu* (Hong Kong: San-lien shu-tien, 1970); Yueh Sheng, *Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow and the Chinese Revolution* (Lawrence: The University of Kansas Press, 1971), chapters 16 and 17.

Before the "Long March" set out from Kiangsi in October 1934, there were four major Soviet bases, namely the Kiangsi, Western Hupeh-Hunan, Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei, and Northern Szechwan areas.

Ming-pao yueh-k'an 33 (1968) p. 50.


*KWCP* 13: 23 June 15, 1936 gives the texts.

*NCH* June 10, 1936, p. 445.

Ibid., June 24, 1936, p. 518.

Ibid., June 17, 1936, p. 492.

Ibid., June 24, 1936, p. 534.

Text in supplement to *T'an pai chi* (No place: September 1936), pp. 216-234.

Ibid., p. 231.


*NCH* July 8, 1936, p. 78


CHAPTER 4: THE ARREST AND TRIAL OF THE SEVEN WORTHIES

This chapter focuses first, on the arrest of the seven worthies, and second, on their trial, considering the public response evoked by the trial. The trial brought the National Salvation Association leaders national prominence as symbols of the united front and national unity in the face of external aggression. The actual arrival of the Japanese attack (the July 7, 1937 Marco Polo Bridge Incident) within weeks of their trial cut short the process of struggle for their release, but not before their names had become famous.

The final act by the National Salvation leaders before their arrest had been to send a telegram to the Central Government, to Fu Tso-i, the commander in Suiyuan, and to Chang Hsueh-liang, commander at Sian. This telegram demanded that immediate aid be given to the Suiyuan defenders and expressed full sympathy with them. The telegram to Chang Hsueh-liang also suggested the immediate despatch of troops to the front and exertion of pressure on the Central Government. Sha noted that the text of this telegram was printed in the Chiu-wang ch'ing-pao [National Salvation Bulletin] of November 22, 1936. This source is not held in Western libraries, and according to the Ch'uan-kuo Chung-wen ch'i-k'an lien-ho mu-lu [National Union List of Chinese Periodicals] the November 22, 1936 issue is not held in libraries in China. The leaders also put forward plans for the military training of workers for the defense of Shanghai in a pamphlet entitled 'A handbill petitioning the 2,300,000 citizens of Shanghai.' I have not seen the text. Two sources suggest that these actions provoked the Japanese to demand the suppression of the National Salvation Movement.
While this seems plausible, I can not at this point verify it. Edgar Snow suggested that the Japanese held National Salvation leaders responsible for the Shanghai strikes and that Nanking was willing to oblige Japan. The second source was a statement by Madame Sun on November 26, 1936. This statement concerned the arrest of the seven worthies. Madame Sun quoted from the Shanghai Mainichi Shinbun. This newspaper had reported her arrest along with the arrest of the seven leaders, on charges of complicity with the Communist Third International. Madame Sun suggested that the Japanese must have given the paper inside information of the impending arrests. Further research using Japanese sources may help to verify this suggestion.

Other sources mention the simultaneous arrest of two National Salvation leaders in Nanking: Sun Hsia-ts'un and Ts'ao Meng-Chun, and the restrictions placed on Ma Hsiang-po's actions. These were indications of a general attack on the 'Aid to Suiyuan Movement,' rather than an attack on National Salvation activities in Shanghai. Nevertheless, it was the case of the seven arrested in Shanghai, rather than the other arrests, which drew public attention. Later historians with the hindsight knowledge of the Sian Incident, which was to occur within three weeks of the arrest have given great prominence to the impact of the arrests on public opinion. However, a cursory survey of the contemporary press does not bear out this claim.

The Tung-fang tsa-chih ["The Eastern Miscellany"] mentioned the arrest of the seven in its diary but offered no comment. The Kuo-wen chou-pao [National News Weekly] failed to note their arrest in its diary and two weeks later reprinted one editorial from the Ta-kung pao ["L'Impartial"] which at the time was highlighting the Suiyuan
campaign. The *Ta-kung pao* did not bring the arrest into front page prominence. It published short articles on the arrest on November 24 and 25, 1936 and a longer article on November 26, reported on the first trial and the KMT statement issued through Shanghai Mayor Wu T'ieh-ch'eng. Two long articles on December 2 and 5, gave details of the backgrounds of those arrested and the public response to the arrest. This should not lead us to presume that the case did not attract attention, but it suggests that the attention evoked was more from various political leaders than from the press. Why this was the case I am still not sure. Perhaps it was in part because Chinese-language newspapers in Shanghai were censored by the News Censorship Bureau. This Bureau was established jointly in the International Settlement in March 1933 by the local KMT headquarters, the Shanghai Municipal Government, and the Shanghai Garrison Headquarters.

Given that the seven worthies were arrested in Shanghai, a few words about the Shanghai court system seems in order. In 1928, the Municipality of Greater Shanghai, which covered all of Shanghai outside the foreign settlements, was established by the Chinese Government and placed directly under the control of the Executive Yuan. Whereas the Shanghai Municipal Council with its Municipal Police still existed in the International Settlement and the French authorities in the French Settlement, and the foreign residents enjoyed the same extra-territorial privileges as before, the Mixed Court was returned to China in 1927 and became the Shanghai Provisional Court under the control of the Kiangsu Provincial Government. In 1930, in an agreement between China and some of the foreign powers, China was authorized to establish a District Court and a Branch High Court in Shanghai with jurisdiction over all
criminal and civil cases involving only Chinese citizens. Chinese laws were applicable in these courts, which were a part of China's judicial system, and all appeals had to be made to the Supreme Court of China. By an almost identical agreement, the rendition of the Mixed Court in the French Settlement took place on July 31, 1931. This agreement was renewed on April 1, 1933. Arrests of Chinese residents or raids on Chinese properties in the Settlement were made by the foreign Municipal Police and the residents handed over to the Chinese authorities.

The seven worthies were arrested in the early morning hours of November 23, 1936 although November 22 has frequently been quoted. Tsou, Chang and Shih were arrested in the French Settlement, tried in the afternoon and were released at 7.30 p.m. The remaining four were arrested in the International Settlement and released on bail that same afternoon. The charges were not clear at this stage but came under the category of "intent to injure the Chinese Republic." Sha related that the police were so uncertain of the charges that they did not know to which court to take the accused, the Kiangsu Shanghai First Special Court or the higher Second Special Court, reserved for very important cases only. In the end, the latter was chosen. At the trial the defense lawyers for the accused complained about the absence of warrants and the role of the Shanghai Security Bureau which acted in the Settlements outside its jurisdiction. Despite their release on bail, six of the accused were rearrested the same night. This followed a warning from the Public Security Bureau to the Settlement Court which stated that new criminal evidence had been discovered and that there was a danger that the accused would flee. Shih Liang had in the meantime gone to Soochow on business and then to visit her sick mother,
and was not arrested at this time.\textsuperscript{19} 

The French Court held its first-ever midnight session to try Tsou and Chang. Since the French Court found no good evidence against the accused, it remanded them in custody and then handed them over to the Chinese Procurator. The Chinese Procurator in turn transferred them to the Public Security Bureau and to the jurisdiction of the Shanghai District Court.\textsuperscript{20} After they had passed through three prisons in four days, Tsou and Chang eventually ended up in KMT hands.\textsuperscript{21} 

With the other four accused, transfer to the Public Security Bureau proved easier, as three of them were only temporary residents of the Settlements. The fourth, Sha, was a leader in the Shanghai Vocational National Salvation Association, against which evidence was cited by members of the Huo-hua tu-shu hui [Sparks Reading Society], the members of which had been arrested for fomenting mill strikes.\textsuperscript{22} Thus by November 27 all six men arrested had reached the Public Security Bureau and were transferred to Soochow on December 2.\textsuperscript{23} Shih Liang, who it was falsely rumoured was hidden in Madame Sun's house,\textsuperscript{24} reported to Soochow in late December on her mother's recovery from an illness.\textsuperscript{25} 

The news of the arrest was first printed on November 24\textsuperscript{26} after the Central News Agency branch in Shanghai announced it. The purported crimes of the arrested were: organization of an illegal group, currying favour with the Communists by inciting strikes and boycotts, and plotting to disturb the peace and upset the Government.\textsuperscript{27} The arrest was made under the emergency regulations of the previous February.\textsuperscript{28} On November 25, Shanghai Mayor, Wu T'ieh-ch'eng issued a formal statement to the press.\textsuperscript{29} This began:
Since Li Kung-p'u and others illegally organized the so-called Shanghai National Salvation Association, they have recklessly used the name of National Salvation to spread rumours. Their aim was undoubtedly to weaken the people's trust in the Government. Furthermore, recently they have been in league with 'red bandits,' have wildly proposed a popular front, have fanned class struggle and have even proposed the overthrow of the National Government and its replacement by a government of national defence....

Of particular interest in this statement is the suggestion that the National Salvation Association 'proposed a popular front and fanned class struggle.' Chinese sources consistently stated that the National Salvation Association advocated a min-tsu [national] front, not a jen-min [popular] front. Chinese sources which I have seen, with few exceptions, do not suggest the National Salvation Association 'fanned class struggle.' By the time this statement was issued Li Kung-p'u's school, called Liang Ts'ai, had been closed and thirteen periodicals with patriotic content had been suppressed.

The magnitude of the repression of the patriotic movement and the announcement of the suspected crimes of the arrested produced a heavy influx of petitions to the Government. On November 25 Li Tsung-jen and Pai Ch'ung-hsi petitioned Central Government leaders for the unconditional release of the seven, a request which they repeated on December 3. On November 26, 107 Peking professors sent a telegram to Nanking, which demanded that at a time of national crisis, unity, not squabbling, was needed. The telegram pointed out that the seven arrested were perceived by the whole nation to be fervent patriots and should be immediately released. The CCP Central Committee sent a telegram which suggested ways to aid the seven. Telegrams were also sent to the Central Government by overseas Chinese in Thailand and
Singapore. Over 300 overseas Chinese in the United States of America signed a telegram which stated that if the Chinese Government was sincere it would change its foreign policy and protect the patriotic movement, otherwise the Government would appear to be the dupe of pro-Japanese elements. Perhaps the most important telegram was that sent to Chiang Kai-shek in Loyang by over twenty members of the KMT Central Executive Committee, including Yü Yu-jen, Feng Yü-hsiang, Sun Fo, Li Lieh-chün and Shih Ying. This telegram requested that Chiang try in earnest to secure the release of the seven arrested.

Other expressions of sympathy came from Peking university and high school students who went on a two-day strike and sent representatives to Nanking. This was followed by a demonstration on December 12, in which the demonstrators called for 'a struggle for patriotic freedom and the release of the patriotic leaders.'

Without a full range of contemporary newspapers, it is impossible to evaluate the strength of the press reaction. One author claimed that the arrests provoked a reaction equal to the Suiyuan war. The Ta-kung pao's reporting of the arrest does not bear out this claim. Even though the Ta-kung pao began to use the term liu-chün [six gentlemen] and began to press for a detailed indictment or the immediate release of the arrested, the main fear it expressed was that this attack on members of the cultural world would undermine the tenuous unity achieved in the military realm.

Because of the reputations of the arrested and the sympathy they received from the Shanghai police, the arrested men were given very comfortable prison conditions. While in Shanghai, the arrested were allowed visits by their family and friends, and were permitted
unrestricted access to newspapers. They were not held in normal prison cells but were allowed special large rooms at the Public Security Bureau.\textsuperscript{41} On their transfer to Soochow they were given six rooms in the sick bay of the remand prison and were initially granted the same freedoms as in Shanghai.\textsuperscript{42} Shih Liang was held in the women's prison in Soochow, some distance from the other six.\textsuperscript{43}

With the successful conclusion of the Suiyuan War by the Chinese, and with national feeling aroused by this event and by the Government's open attack on the patriotic movement, Chiang Kai-shek proceeded to Sian on December 4\textsuperscript{44} to demand the renewed prosecution of the anti-Communist extermination campaign. Much has been written on the events of the following three weeks which included the arrest of Chiang on December 12 and his release on December 25.\textsuperscript{45} Chang Hsüeh-liang, the Sian commander, was threatened by Chiang with dismissal unless he could turn his Manchurian troops against the Communists, who had only just routed over-extended central armies in Kansu. While Chiang still stressed domestic pacification before external resistance, it was clear that he was unwilling to answer Chang's initial demands for the end to civil war, which were expressed before December 12. Soon after he had arrested Chiang, Chang sent a telegram to the Government at Nanking.\textsuperscript{46} The preamble stressed that the arrest of the Shanghai leaders had given rise to a feeling that patriotism had become a crime. In the eight demands at the end of the telegram, one advocated the immediate release of the arrested leaders and another urged that a National Salvation Assembly be convened.

The Sian Incident and its repercussions came to dominate
the Chinese scene to the extent that the case of the arrested leaders soon dropped into the background. Since the Central Government had rejected the eight demands made by Chang, and Chiang Kai-shek had left Sian without signing any agreement, the Government was under no obligation to release the leaders. Public attention became focussed on Chiang and those others who had joined him in negotiations in Sian, and, once Chiang was released, upon the results of the Incident for Chinese politics. Some political analysts tried to show that Sian had resulted in a polarization of the country, and especially of students, into left and right groups. They claimed that the leftists had been in the ascendancy during the calls for the unity of all parties in 1936, but after Sian had shown the insincerity of National Salvation slogans, the right had grown correspondingly in strength. Whether such a polarization occurred is less important than the fact that there was a new feeling in China that Chiang had accepted leadership of the resistance. The strength of the National Salvation Movement grew markedly. It clearly became the third largest organized political force in China. The Japanese Government and General Staff decided that with China's new determination, attempts should be made to retain North China as a buffer zone rather than to bring it under Japan.

At the third KMT Plenum held from February 15 to 22, 1937, Wang Ching-wei in his opening speech declared that the KMT's tasks were to recover lost territories and safeguard the existing ones, to stabilize internal conditions, to work for National Salvation and to inaugurate democratic government. Chiang made known the eight Sian demands and, on February 21, called for the total eradication of Communism from China, but allowed room for reconciliation, if the
Communists followed certain conditions. The communists for their part sent a telegram to the Plenum with their conditions for a united front. Thus the two major parties had begun to settle their differences in the interest of the nation's future.

THE TRIAL

Pressure was placed on the imprisoned leaders from the start of the Sian Incident. On December 14 all visitors were prohibited, all newspapers banned, and the prison guards were strengthened by military police. In mid-January 1937 it was announced that Wang and Sha had temporarily closed their law practices and that Chang and Wang had been dismissed from their banking and teaching jobs.

On January 20 twenty-one representatives of the Shanghai National Salvation Association came to the prison where the six men were held to visit the arrested. After they were refused permission to see the six men, they left a note with their names appended. A week later two of those who had signed, Ku Liu-hsing and Jen Sung-kao were arrested.

During their first two months in prison the seven were questioned five times by the procuracy. Though the National Salvation leaders expected that they would be released at the end of the two month legal period for lack of evidence, on January 29 the legal period was extended for a further two months. They were interrogated only once more during this extension.

On the very last day for interrogation a ten-part indictment was presented to the seven. This document named a further seven who were to be tried concurrently. They included T'ao Hsing-chih (at this
point in the United States of America), Ku Liu-hsing, Jen Sung-kao, and a certain Lo Ch'ing. On October 21, 1936 Lo Ch'ing had been arrested in Chiang-yin while carrying a copy of the public letter sent by Mao Tse-tung and the Communists to the National Salvation leaders. This was unreported at the time but his was the first arrest leading to the Government's attack on the National Salvation Association.

The full indictment was printed by the press and provided editorial comment such as the following, which after it had outlined the background of the seven, stated:

When the Shensi (Sian) affair was settled, Shen and the others should have been blameless, but the court lengthened the term once, and on the last day of the term, April 3, when many people expected the return to freedom of the arrested, unexpectedly the Soochow procurator's office suddenly issued its indictment.... This case is a sad one for the court, but basically there should be no heavy punishments inflicted, merely an extension of time.

The indictment of April 3 began with a brief outline of the activities of the arrested, from the initial organization of a National Salvation group until their arrest. Two "All-China National Salvation Federation" documents, the manifesto and the "First Political Principles for Resistance to Japan and National Salvation," were cited, as well as the July pamphlet by Tsou T'ao-fen. The ten formal charges spelt out in detail the earlier KMT accusation that the seven worthies endangered the Republic; preached ideas contrary to the Three People's Principles; deliberately worked for the Communist Party; prepared to overthrow the Government; propagated a popular front; and the new charge of having stirred up the Sian Incident, after mutual contact between Chang Hsüeh-liang and the accused. Perhaps the most interesting of the charges was the seventh, in which the procurator
quoted from a copy of the Stalinist periodical Tou-cheng [Struggle],
seized at Tsou T'ao-fen's house. This copy of Tou-cheng categorized
Chang Nai-ch'i as a comprador of the Shih t'ai-lin [Stalinist] group.
The procurator did not use the fact of Tsou's possession of the
periodical to point to CCP - National Salvation Association connections,
but to show that the National Salvation Movement, even if distinct
from extreme left Trotskyists, was still opposed to Sunist principles.

This long indictment was answered by a much longer document,
prepared by the accused and their lawyers, and submitted to the court
on June 6, 1937. This document attempted to answer the ten points
of the indictment with further documentation on behalf of the accused.
It also pointed out that the procurator had misquoted the documents
from which he cited. For example, the quotation from the National
Salvation manifesto, which stated, 'The Western Powers under their
erroneous policy of assisting Japanese imperialism to attack the Soviet
Union' was quoted as 'China (made) the mistake of attacking the Soviet
Union.' The care with which this whole reply was formulated only
serves to highlight the inadequacies of the indictment, in which legal
precision had to be put aside to give expression to the political
intent of the prosecution.

The opening session of the trial was held on June 11, 1937. Although plans had initially been made for an open trial, worries over
possible demonstrations and even rumours of the abduction of the
accused resulted in the trial being closed to the public. After
very stringent security precautions, the accused were brought to the
court. They immediately appealed the decision to hold the case in a
court closed to the public. They argued that this would facilitate
a miscarriage of justice. After much wrangling the court was opened to the accused's immediate families and press reporters. 71

Shen Chun-ju, the eldest of the accused, then sixty-four years old, was questioned first. 72 He explained the formation of the various National Salvation groups, and the aims of the National Salvation Association. One Chinese source noted that the court tried to link the Association to the CCP through the similarity of slogans. Shen then claimed that demands for unity were not the property of a single party. Shen explained that the Association had not been registered in order to prevent diplomatic embarrassment for the Government. He cited the case of sending a copy of the May 1936 National Salvation Manifesto to Mayor Wu as proof that there had never been any intention to keep their activities secret. The court tried to pin responsibility for the November 1936 strikes on the Association, but Shen maintained that his only act, as an individual, not as an Association member, was to give money to relieve strikers and their families. Shen denied any knowledge of Sian, which had occurred during his time in prison. He went on to explain that the Association had never called for a jen-min [popular] front, with its connotations of the left coalition in France and Spain, but for a min-tsu [national] front to include all parties. Shen's defence lawyer finally requested the court to note that Shen had been a KMT member for twenty five years.

Shen's examination lasted one and a half hours 73 and covered all the charges quite fully. Other examinations which followed were briefer and reiterated most of what Shen had said. Chang Nai-ch'i was also asked the reasons for the Association's attack on the 1936 draft constitution. He pointed out that the changes that had been demanded
had already been effected, so this could hardly be termed an attack.\footnote{74} Wang Tsao-shih was extremely articulate in the court.\footnote{75} He both explained the need for complete national unity and the various political concepts of political power and government. His examination proved embarrassing to the judge who was unable to stop him from speaking.\footnote{76} Li Kung-p'u, Tsou T'ao-fen, Sha Ch'ien-li and Shih Liang were then examined.\footnote{77} Shih called on the court to examine Ma Hsiang-po, as one knowledgeable in National Salvation affairs, an embarrassing request, for the Government had just made Ma a Government Advisor.\footnote{78} The three remaining suspects were then examined. Both Jen Sung-kao and Ku Liu-hsing denied membership in any National Salvation group, but claimed that they had appeared at Soochow out of sympathy with the arrested.\footnote{79} Lo Ch'ing denied any connection with the Association, though he conceded that, after a meeting with Chang Nai-Ch'i, he had conceived the idea of forming a Kiangsu Provincial National Salvation Association.\footnote{80} After the examination of each of the accused by the judge, their defence lawyers suggested documents and especially Government statements, which would show the falseness of the charges, but the judge replied that examination of these would be unnecessary.\footnote{81} The result of the judge's refusal to examine the defence's evidence was a petition submitted by the defence lawyers on behalf of the seven principal accused. This petition demanded the dismissal of the judge for fear of a miscarriage of justice. A similar petition was filed by Lo Ch'ing.\footnote{82} Two reasons for the petition were given by the defence lawyers for the accused. The first concerned the behaviour of the judge who did not allow a public trial, the second, the rejection of all evidence submitted by the defence without even ordering its scrutiny by the two assistant judges. On June 12 the
lawyers for Ku and Jen appeared in court but were told that the case had been temporarily suspended because of the petitions. 

On June 22 the accused and their lawyers sent two short documents to the court. One was entitled 'a note on political opinion' which gave reasons for National Salvation activity, and the other, a petition which submitted further evidence for the defence on each of the ten charges.

On June 25 the second trial began with new judicial personnel. The security precautions on that occasion were even more stringent than before, as if the Government was even more afraid of public demonstrations. The total hearing lasted seven hours and centred around the prosecution charge of the connections between the accused and Chang Hsueh-liang, which had purportedly led to the Sian Incident. All ten accused were again questioned and were able to refute the prosecution charges. The desperation of the prosecution was evident, when in response to the defense request to see the handbills which Ku and Jen had been carrying as 'propaganda contrary to the Three People's Principles' on their January visit to the Soochow prison, the prosecution could only offer a periodical from February. The demands of the defence to see the details of Chang Hsueh-liang's trial were granted. An adjournment was given, so that these documents could be consulted. This signalled the close of the court session. Other defense demands to call Ma Hsiang-po and Wu T'ieh-ch'eng were turned down by the court. In early July it was announced that the accused would be detained in prison for a further two months.
RESPONSE TO THE TRIAL

What of the public reaction to the trial? The case has been named the 'Patriotism is not a crime' case by the Chinese press. On May 27 a petition was sent to the Government by over one hundred members of Shanghai cultural circles. This petition requested the release of the seven and asked that the case against T'ao Hsing-chih be dropped. On June 11 over 4,800 people from Shanghai who had prepared to go to Soochow to hear the case filed a petition which called for the release of the accused, Government respect for the law and freedom of action for the patriotic movement. Feng Yu-hsiang, Yu Yu-jen and Li Lieh-chun renewed their call for an unconditional release of the seven. The following editorial from the Kuo-wen chou-pao [National News Weekly] expressed the futility of continuing with these criminal charges in the new political situation. The editorial stated:

Since the Shen case began, it has attracted much attention in society, but after the Sian Incident was settled and the CCP changed its policy, its real weight has been reduced. As it is now, it will probably be resolved in a short time. Organizations like the National Salvation Federation are already unnecessary in the present situation, and their desire for an end to the civil war has now been achieved....

Worries that the case of the seven worthies might not be so easily resolved began to be expressed after the first trial and the changing of the judge. The bankers of Shanghai petitioned on June 15 for the release of Chang Nai-Ch'i as someone who, with wide learning and ten years of banking experience, was needed at a time of economic reconstruction. A similar request was made on behalf of Tsou T'ao-fen by the Shanghai Publishers' Guild. A Kiangsi
public meeting, as reported in the press on June 20, sent a telegram to the Government, which demanded the release of Wang and the others, who were 'just and famous' people. It also stated that the danger to China had increased daily with 'devils' on all sides, and it urged the Government to fight the 'devils' and let the people live in peace.

Madame Sun and sixteen other National Salvation Association members and sympathizers addressed a telegram to the KMT executive committee. This telegram demanded a prompt decision in the case of the seven worthies since the accused had already been in prison for seven months.

Late in June a new movement began outside the court to effect the release of the accused. It was initiated by Madame Sun and Madame Liao Chung-k'ai, who, with fourteen others, submitted a petition to the Kiangsu High Court. They argued that if participation in National Salvation Association work was to become a crime, they too wished to accept responsibility and to be sent to prison. This petition was submitted on June 25 and was followed by a statement to the press which explained the aim of the Chiu-kuo ju-yü yun-tung [National Salvation Enter Prison Movement]. The aim of this movement was to gain freedom for the patriotic movement, at a time when the friction between the National Salvation Association and the Government had been reduced after the Sian Incident. In this changed situation, the continuation of the court case not only prolonged wrongful imprisonment but was a grave mistake in policy which rendered patriotism a crime. Since other methods had failed and since the accused were being charged on evidence drawn from periodicals and manifestoes in which others had had a hand, these others and any who
felt the call of National Salvation was right should sacrifice themselves and enter prison as patriotic criminals. The aim would be achieved by non-violent means and success would help provide both group unity useful in the coming war and a full recognition to the National Salvation Association.

The Chiu-kuo ju-yu yun-tung was an immediate success and began to gain wide support from many who had no connection with the National Salvation Association. 100 On June 27 a mass meeting of workers and students which numbered over three thousand met in Shanghai to hear Madame Sun speak. At a reception for the press later that day, it was announced that a few hundred who had attended the mass meeting, had already joined the movement, although press censorship made it difficult to inform the public. 101 By July 6, film stars and directors, writers, university professors, students, workers, officials and even employees of foreign businesses had joined and sent in petitions to the Government. The movement was not restricted to Shanghai, but was eagerly received in Peking, where even a group of elderly ladies demanded to enter prison. 102 They demanded admittance into custody, but were turned away by the procurator. On the next day they went again and were informed that if they produced evidence of their guilt, they might be charged. 103

On July 7 the Marco Polo Bridge Incident marked the beginning of the War of Resistance to Japan. Before the leaders of the Chiu-kuo ju-yu yun-tung could prepare their evidence, the accused were released on August 1. The patriotic leaders in Nanking were not released immediately. 104 The Government ban on National Salvation songs was lifted and orders for the arrest of Kuo Mei-shu, a leftist writer,
were cancelled. With this new spirit apparent in the Central Government, the released leaders issued a statement:

We deeply believe that under the Central leadership we must extend the great struggle for national liberation and that we will gain the final victory. We are prepared for a total sacrifice in order to fulfil our part of the people's vocation during the national liberation war.

The released leaders sent a telegram to Chiang Kai-shek in which they stated that they wished to continue National Salvation work and merely awaited his orders. Reports vary as to whether the release of the seven was unconditional or merely on bail, but none of those released was re-arrested under the KMT Government.

In retrospect the decision to bring charges against the arrested seems strange, considering the flimsy evidence which the prosecution was able to muster. Two possible reasons can be suggested as to why the KMT decided to press charges, although without Government documentation there is no means of knowing whether either is correct. The first is that, having arrested the Shanghai leaders in part because of Japanese pressure, the KMT had decided to keep the case in process, to convince Japan that China did not intend to start a war against Japan as had been demanded by the arrested. If this was the case, the KMT was prepared to risk losing face at home in order to gain time in its foreign relations, a procedure already well used during the early 1930s. The second alternative is that the KMT felt that the evidence against the accused would stand up in court and could be used as a tool against the Communists during the months of bargaining over the united front.

In either case the KMT misjudged the weakness of its own prosecution evidence and therefore allowed the case to appear as a
clear case of KMT political interest distorting the law. During June the case attracted the interest and the accused the sympathy and support of the general public. With the Chiu-kuo ju-yü yun-tung the accused were recognized as martyrs who deserved the sympathy of all in the nation. As symbols of the united front and national unity in the face of external aggression, the trial brought the National Salvation leaders national prominence. The actual arrival of the Japanese attack within weeks of their trial cut short the process of struggle for their release, but not before their names had become famous.
CHAPTER 4: THE ARREST AND TRIAL OF THE SEVEN WORTHIES


2 Sha Ch'ien-li, Ch'i jen chih yu (Shanghai: Sheng-huo shu-tien, 1937), p. 141.

3 Ibid., p. 141.


5 Ibid., p. 399.

6 Soong (Sung), Wei hsin Chung-kuo fen-tou, pp. 74-75.


9 This was the response of the Tientsin edition to the arrest.


11 NCH December 2, 1936, p. 378 and TKP November 24, 1936. Also by calculation from the information in Sha, Ch'i jen chih yu.

12 For example, in the answer to the court's indictment, which was prepared by the accused and their lawyers. Sha, Ch'i jen chih yu, p. 147.

13 NCH December 2, 1936. Li, Chiu-kuo wu tsui ch'i chün-tzu shih chien, p. 2.

14 NCH December 2, 1936. Sha, Ch'i jen chih yu, pp. 9, 18.

15 NCH December 2, 1936.

16 Sha, Ch'i jen chih yu, pp. 15-16.

17
17 Ibid., pp. 18-20.

18 Li, Chiu-kuo wu tsui ch'i ch'un-tzu shih chien, p. 9, Sha, Ch'i jen chih yu, pp. 128-130.

19 Li, Chiu-kuo wu tsui ch'i ch'un-tzu shih chien, p. 9 and Sha, Ch'i jen chih yu, pp. 128-130.

20 NCH December 2, 1936, TKP November 25, 29, 1936.

21 Sha, Ch'i jen chih yu, p. 57.

22 Ibid., pp. 32-33.

23 Ibid., pp. 57, 66-70.

24 TKP December 2, 1936.

25 Li, Chiu-kuo wu tsui ch'i chun-tzu shih chien, p. 9.

26 Ibid., p. 1.

27 Sha, Ch'i jen chih-yu, pp. 133-143.

28 TKP November 24, 1936.


30 NCH December 2, 1936.

31 Mu, Tsou T'ao-fen, p. 190 gave a list. NCH December 16, 1936 states that 17 periodicals were stopped, Edgar Snow, Red Star Over China, p. 376, suggested 14.

32 Li, Chiu-kuo wu tsui ch'i ch'un-tzu shih chien, p. 127.

33 TKP December 5, 1936.

34 Li, Chiu-kuo wu tsui ch'i ch'un-tzu shih chien, pp. 126-127.

35 Mu, Tsou-T'ao-fen, p. 195.
34 Li, *Chiu-kuo wu tsui ch'i chün-tzu shih chien*, pp. 126-127.


37 TKP December 5, 1936.


41 Sha, *Ch'i jen chih yu*, pp. 48-51.

42 The details of the life of the accused in prison form a large portion of the latter half of Sha's book. A short description is given from Tsou's point of view in Li, *Chiu-kuo wu tsui ch'i chün-tzu shih chien*, pp. 136-141. During the time in prison Wang worked on his book, *Chung-kuo wen-t'i ti feri-hsi* [An Analysis of the Problems of China] (Shanghai, initially 1935, but repressed by Kuomintang censors.)

43 Sha, *Ch'i jen chih yu*, p. 105.


47 For example, there is only one mention of the arrest of the seven leaders in the *KWCP* of January 1937.

48 See the news editorials in the *KWCP* of January 1937.

49 *KWCP* 14:4 January 18, 1937, p. 9, is an example.


53 Ibid., pp. 531-532.


55 Sha, Ch'i jen chih yu, p. 91.

56 Ibid., p. 100.

57 Ibid., pp. 108-111.

58 Ibid., Preface p. 4.

59 Ibid., p. 113.

60 Ibid., Preface p. 4.

61 The indictment is printed in Li, Chiu-kuo wu tsui ch'i ch'un-tzu shih chien, pp. 15-30, and in Sha, Ch'i jen chih yu, pp. 133-143.

62 Li, Chiu-kuo wu tsui chi chun-tzu shih chien, p. 93.

63 TKP April 8, 1937.

64 KWCP 14:14 April 1937.

65 I have not found a copy of this document in any National Salvation text that I have seen.

66 Tou-cheng [Struggle] was a Stalinist journal of the CCP Central Bureau in Kiangsi, 1933-1934.

67 Sha, Ch'i jen chih yu, pp. 139-140.

68 Ibid., pp. 144-177.

69 Ibid., p. 150.
70 NCH June 11, 1937, p. 448.

71 Mu, Tsou T'ao-fen, p. 203 and Li, Chiu-kuo wu tsui ch'i ch'un-tzu shih chien, p. 112.

72 Li, Chiu-kuo wu tsui ch'i ch'un-tzu shih chien, pp. 60-71.

73 Li, Chiu-kuo wu tsui ch'i ch'un-tzu shih chien, p. 113.

74 Ibid., pp. 71-79.

75 Ibid., pp. 113. This description is from the Kuo-min chou k'an 1:7.

76 Ibid., pp. 78-82.

77 Ibid., pp. 78-82.


79 Li, Chiu-kuo wu tsui ch'i ch'un-tzu shih chien, p. 92.

80 Ibid., p. 93.

81 For example, the final demand of the lawyers was for the court not to pass judgement summarily. Li, Chiu-kuo wu tsui ch'i ch'un-tzu shih chien, p. 96.

82 Ibid., pp. 96-97.

83 NCH June 16, 1937.

84 Sha, Ch'i jen chih y'u, p. 178.

85 Li, Chiu-kuo wu tsui ch'i ch'un-tzu shih chien, p. 98.

86 Ibid., p. 98.

87 Ibid., p. 110.

88 Ibid., p. 114.

89 NCH July 7, 1937.
90 See the newspaper quotations in Li, Chiu-kuo wu tsui ch'i ch'un-tzu shih chien, pp. 110-120.

91 Ibid., pp. 123-124, which quotes the TKP.

92 Ibid., p. 121, which quotes the Chun-chung hsia-wen [Mass News].

93 Chiu-wang shou-ts'e, p. 43.


95 NCH June 23, 1937, p. 493.

96 Li, Chiu-kuo wu tsui ch'i ch'un-tzu shih chien, pp. 122-123.

97 Ibid., p. 156.

98 Ibid., pp. 156-157.

99 Ibid., pp. 158-161.

100 Ibid., p. 133.


102 Li, Chiu-kuo wu tsui ch'i ch'un-tzu shih chien, pp. 132-134.

103 Ibid., p. 170.

104 Ibid., Preface by Hu Yu-chih.

105 NCH August 4, 1937, p. 189.

106 Li, Chiu-kuo wu tsui ch'i ch'un-tzu shih chien, Preface.

107 NCH August 4, 1937.

108 Chiu-wang shou-ts'e, p. 43.

109 NCH August 4, 1937.
Without reducing problems of historical fact to questions of definition, we may clarify matters by asking what is meant by the National Salvation Association. It it is defined in terms of patriotic activities in the few decades which followed the May Fourth Movement, then it refers to a national, well organized Federation of local National Salvation Association groups, which had earlier antecedents in various anti-Japanese organizations.

If the National Salvation Association refers to the composite of political and intellectual currents in some way representative of 'middle class' interests in urban China during the mid-1930s, then this is significant, not only in the context of the past but for the light it throws on the present. This study has sought to illuminate both the organizational framework and activity of the National Salvation Association and the nature of the socio-political currents that pervaded it.

It was not the function of intellectual dissent that was new in China, but rather that it was given expression not only by intellectuals, but also by professionals. These professionals were variously educated in Chinese schools and universities, and in some cases abroad. They held strategic positions in such professions as law, finance, commerce, journalism. The involvement of professionals in the National Salvation Association marked their maturation as a political force. Confucian society had always assigned to its intellectual elite an important role as critics of the political order. Often this responsibility had been discharged only at the level of symbolic remonstrance, but on occasion criticism of imperial policy had been
more forcefully expressed by individuals or groups, sometimes with dire consequences.

Broadly defined as patriotic, and particularly with the aim to save the country (China) from foreign (Japanese) aggression, the National Salvation Association was also a receptacle and vehicle for espousing a wide range of other socio-political concepts. This was more than a mere passive or symbolic concern, as the protagonists were active and committed to these wider concerns. What is new and thus significant in the National Salvation Association as a vehicle itself for intellectual dissent, is that the dissenters were not only intellectuals but professionals, representative of Chinese urban society, and desirous of change in that society. Thus the National Salvation Association acted as a vehicle for modernization, and a catalyst for change.

To understand the conscious responses of those intellectuals and professionals who led the National Salvation Association, and who used the power of the pen to promulgate their views, we must make a serious attempt to understand their ideas. Right or wrong, men tend to believe that they act on the basis of their ideas. Thus, this study has shown that to define the National Salvation in negative terms, such as being anti-Japanese, is clearly too simplistic. The manifestoes and various National Salvation literature reveal that the writers exhibited a reasoned response to the changing political situation in China.

The National Salvation Association manifestoes and National Salvation literature show that in the mid-1930s writers became increasingly engaged in the political crises of their day. The split between Chiang Kai-shek's KMT and the Communists in particular, resulted in differing political commitments among writers and
and intellectuals. In terms of the National Salvation Association, an in-depth study of the Shanghai Cultural National Salvation Association, for which signed manifestoes exist, would prove not only interesting, but could shed further light on the ideological character of the National Salvation Association as a whole. For example, at present it is almost impossible to identify the left and especially the right with any great precision, as political attitudes in the National Salvation Association ranged all the way from those which coincided with Communist views to those of the KMT. Furthermore, continuing research should seek to investigate why some intellectuals joined the National Salvation Association and others stayed outside its orbit.

The increasing political and intellectual polarization in China after 1927, and especially after the establishment of the Nanking regime in 1928, affected the literary scene. The polarization was exacerbated by the presence of Japan in Manchuria during the first half of the 1930s. Chiang Kai-shek's weak response to the foreign danger in Manchuria and North China led to a growing radicalism among certain sections of Chinese society. This was given clear expression by intellectuals and writers through the power of the pen. In the 1930s the politics of right and left, in addition to National Salvation and global conflicts, became dominant concerns.

The question of whether those who write or expressed themselves publicly, as did the seven worthies, do indeed, in some manner, reflect the thought of society as a whole is in itself a most formidable one. In countries like China, in particular, we are confronted by the problem of an alienated intelligentsia - an
intelligentsia which thinks thoughts and uses a language quite alien to the masses as a whole. Yet study of the National Salvation Association suggests that however hesitant, efforts were being made to bridge the gaps between the urban masses and the National Salvation Association. For example, industrial workers and shop employees participated in the Shanghai women's National Salvation Association. This study supports the notion of increasing alienation of intellectuals and professionals from the KMT, which was at least in part a reaction to ever increasing KMT suppression of democratic rights, control of the press, and political ineptitude in foreign policy formulation and diplomacy. The language and the contents of National Salvation Association manifestoes and National Salvation literature show this alienation trend.

Sources dealing with the National Salvation Association also refute the suggestion that the National Salvation Association was Communist in character. While there may well have been, and probably were, Communists in the National Salvation Association, even in the pre-Sino-Japanese War period, sources do not indicate whether these persons assumed any leadership role, and thus influence, in the Association. Further detailed study of the literary works and other activities of these people would be a help to further investigation of this issue. It should be noted that at the time of the trial of the seven worthies, the court did not openly accuse them of Communism, but merely hinted at connections to the CCP. The exact nature of these connections has yet to be precisely determined. Perhaps the stance taken by the court came from a realization that proving charges of Communism against respected figures, well known in the
Shanghai professional world, would be difficult. Certainly the openness with which several KMT leaders rallied in support of the arrested, indicates that there was no general feeling that these people were anything but patriots.

This study has focussed to some extent on the Shanghai Women's National Salvation Association at the expense of other groups. But the rewards of the investigation have been significant. First, it has revealed a continuing trend of politicization of women in urban China, particularly Shanghai, showing that these Shanghai women were every bit as militant and politically sensitive as were their male counterparts. Second, no evidence was found of any male dominance or leadership of the Shanghai Women's Movement where male leadership of female groups was common. Third, the Shanghai Women's National Salvation Association reveals an interesting alliance between Shanghai's women intellectuals, professionals and labour force. Unfortunately, examining the Shanghai Women's National Salvation Association has not greatly enhanced our understanding of who many of these women were.

Some names we do know for sure, the others are nameless. The usefulness of these nameless women National Salvationists is therefore limited to a symbol. They represent a group image, rather than individual images. In the end, however, we must admit that a study of the Shanghai Women's National Salvation Association (and other constituent groups of the Association) will concern itself mainly with those who have left written testimony. Limited as such an undertaking may be, it has its own justification.

Consideration of the arrest and trial of the seven worthies
pointed to KMT suppression of both patriotic literature and the
patriotic movement. At the same time it showed that the response to
this KMT suppression was proliferation of literature, especially in
Shanghai, and increased numerical growth of the National Salvation
Association. The seven worthies were catapulted to National prominence
as a result of the trial. They became in effect a *cause célèbre* for
democratic rights. The response from various sections of Chinese
society indicated both frustration with the KMT's conciliatory policy
toward Japan and continued demands for democratic rights in China.

Much of the later interest in the National Salvation Association
and the seven worthies has come from the prominent role which these
people played in later Chinese politics. Tsou T'ao-fen died in 1944
in the area controlled by the New Fourth Army. He was posthumously
admitted to the CCP. Until his death he was treated with great
esteem in China.\(^1\) Li Kung-p'\(u\) was assassinated along with Wen I-to
in November 1946, in another famous case of political martyrdom.\(^2\)
The remaining five all served in high positions in China after 1949
as reminders of the united front.\(^3\) The prominence which made possible
the use of these people as symbols for the united front was the
result of the trial. The trial made them famous at a time when the
KMT had to relax its control to allow prosecution of a war of
resistance. They retained prominent positions during the Sino-
Japanese War through involvement with the Democratic League.

Thus, when we place the National Salvation Association in...
leadership of the Association. The National Salvation Association both produced large quantities of patriotic literature and absorbed a good deal of the attention paid by the KMT to the domestic scene.

The lack of documentary evidence renders it difficult to prove the extent to which the National Salvation Association advanced the cause of the united front. Certainly it can be argued that the National Salvation manifestoes had consistently advocated a united front, and that this goal was realized July 7, 1937, when the united front policy was made public. In the subsequent years various National Salvationists were employed in Government administrative posts, and several served as members of the First People's Political Council, which was established in July 1938. Thus the Government found it expedient to co-opt its critics. The extent to which the National Salvation Association advanced the other causes its membership espoused, is similarly difficult to determine. Some causes such as women's rights and mass education, awaited resolution after 1949.
NOTES


2See Jen-min ying-lieh (No place: Li-wen erh lieh-shih chi-nien wei yuan hui, 1946).

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GLOSSARY

Ai Han-sung (I Shui) (艾寒松) (易水)
Ai-kuo wu tsui [Patriotism is not a crime] (愛國無罪)
Ai-kuo wen-hsueh [Patriotic Literature] (愛國文學)
An-nei jang-wai [Internal pacification before resistance against external aggression] (安內攘外)
Chang Nai-ch'i (張乃器)
Chang Hsueh-liang (張學良)
Cheng Chen-to (鄭振鐸)
Ch'i ch'un-tzu (七君子)
Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石)
Chiang Ping-chih (Ting Ling) (蔣冰之) (丁玲)
Chih-hsing ho-i [the unity of knowledge and action] (知行合一)
Ch'ing-i [Pure Ideals] (清議)
Ch'iu Chin (秋瑾)
Chiu-kuo chen-hsien [National Salvation Front] (救國陣線)
Chiu-kuo hui [National Salvation Society] (救國會)
Chiu-kuo ju-yü yun-tung [National Salvation Enter Prison Movement] (救國入獄運動)
Chiu-wang ch'ing-pao [Bulletin of National Salvation] (救亡情報)
Chiu-wang chou-k'an [National Salvation Weekly] (救亡週刊)
Chiu-wang pao-tao [National Salvation Report] (救亡報導)
Chiu-wang wen-hsueh [National Salvation Literature] (救亡文學)
Chiu-wang yun-tung [National Salvation Movement] (救亡運動)
Chou En-lai (周恩來)
Chou Li-po (Li Po) (周立波) (立波)
Ch'uan-kuo Chung-wen ch'i-k'an [All China Chinese Periodicals] (全國中文期刊)
Ch'uan-kuo ke-chieh chiu-kuo lien-ho hui [All China National Salvation Federation] (全國各界救國聯合會)
Ch'un-chung hsin wen [Mass News] (群眾新聞)
Chung-hua ch'uan-kuo fu-nü lien-ho hui [All China Women's Federation] (中華全國婦女聯合會)
Chung-hua min-kuo kuo-nan chiu-chi hui [Society for the Relief of the National Crisis of the Chinese Republic] 
(中華民國國難救濟會)

Chung-kuo min-chu cheng-t'uan ta t'ung-meng [The Grand Alliance of Chinese Democratic Parties] (中國民主政團大同盟)

Chung-kuo min-chu t'ung-meng hui [The China Democratic League] (中國民主同盟會)

Chung-kuo min-ch'uan pao-chang [China League for the Protection of Civil Rights] (中國民權保障)

Chung-kuo nü-pao [Chinese Women's Paper] (中國女報)

Chung-kuo t'ung-meng hui [China United League] (中國同盟會)

Chung-kuo wen-t'i ti fen-hsi [An Analysis of the Problems of China] (中國問題的分析)

Feng Yu-hsiang (馮玉祥)

Fu-nü lien-i hui [China Women's League] (婦女聯宜會)

Fu-nü sheng-huo [Women's Life] (婦女生活)

Ho Chen (何震)

Ho Hsiang-ning (何香凝)

Ho Ying-chin (何應欽)

Hsiang Ching-yu (向警予)

Hsieh Mu-ch'iao (薛暮橋)

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Hsu Chieh (許傑)

Hsu Mou-yung (徐懋庸)

Hu Shih (胡適)

Hu Yu-chih (胡愈之)

Huo-hua tu-shu hui [Sparks Reading Society] (火花讀書會)

Jen-min [Popular] (人民)

Jen Sung-kao (任頌高)

Ke t'uan-t'i chiu-kuo lien-ho hui [Federation for National Salvation] (各國救國聯合會)

Ku Liu-hsing (顧留馨)

Kuang-fu hui [Common Love Society] (光復會)

Kuo-min chou-k'an [The National Weekly] (國民週刊)

Kuo-wen chou-pao [National News Weekly] (國聞週報)

Li Kung-p'u (李公樸)
Li-liang [Power, strength, force] (力量)
Li Lieh-chun (李烈钧)
Li Tsung-jen (李宗仁)
Li-yung ["used"] (利用)
Liang Shu-ming (梁漱溟)
Liao Chung-k'ai (廖仲恺) Liu-chun
Liu-chṳn [Six Gentlemen] (六君)
Liu Kuang-han (刘湘漢)
Liu Liang-mo (劉良模)
Lo Ch'ing (羅青)
Ma Hsiang-po (馬相伯) (馬良)
Mao Tse-tung (毛澤東)
Min-tsu [National] (民族)
Pai Ch'ung-hsi (百崇禧)
P'an Kung-chan (潘公展)
Sha Ch'ien-li (沙千里)
Shanghai fa-cheng hsueh-yüan [Shanghai College of Law and Political Science] (上海法政學院)
Shanghai K'ang-Jih chiu-kuo ta-t'ung hui [Shanghai National Salvation League for Resistance to Japan] (上海抗日救國大同會)
Shanghai ko ta chung-hsueh sheng chiu-kuo hsüan ch'üan t'uan [All Shanghai University and High School National Salvation Propaganda Group] (上海各大中學學生救國宣傳團)
Shanghai shih nien-chien [Shanghai City Yearbook] (上海市年鑑)
Shen Chün-ju (沈錦儒)
Shen Yen-ping (Mao Tun) (沈雁冰) (矛盾)
Sheng-huo chiao-yü [Life Education] (生活教育)
Sheng-huo chou-k'an [Life Weekly] (生活週刊)
Shih chien [Incident] (事件)
Shih Liang (史良)
Shih t'ai lin [Stalinist] (史太林)
Shih Ying (施瑛)
Sun Fo (孫科)
Sun Hsia-ts'un (孫夏村)
Sung Che-yüan (宋哲元)
Sung (Soong) Ch'ing-ling (宋慶齡)
Ta chung sheng-huo [Life of the Masses] (大众生活)
Ta-hsueh shan [Great Snow Mountains] (大雪山)
Ta-kung pao ["L'Impartial"] (大公报)
T'ao Hsing-chih (陶行知)
Teng Ying-ch'ao (邓颖超)
Tou-cheng [Struggle] (斗争)
Tsai Ch'ang (蔡畅)
Ts'an-an [Tragedy] (惨案)
Tsao Meng-ch'ün (曹孟君)
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T'ung-meng hui [The United League] (同盟会)
Wang Ching-wei (汪精衛)
Wang Tsao-shih (王造時)
Wang Yang-ming (王陽明)
Wu T'ieh-ch'eng (吳鐵城)
Yin Ju-keng (殷汝耕)
Yu Yu-jen (于右任)