AN ANALYSIS OF THE STABLE SINGLE RESOURCE MINING COMMUNITY
IN BRITISH COLUMBIA

by

ROBERT JOHN MICHAEL GUUNDER

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Department of Graduate Studies, School of Community and Regional Planning

The University of British Columbia
2075 Wesbrook Place
Vancouver, Canada
V6T 1W5

Date April 20, 1981
ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the problems of impermanence, isolation and external dependency of single resource mining communities (SRMCs) in British Columbia. It poses the question: can the problems of SRMCs be resolved within the parameters of our present planning/decision-making system?

After an outline of the historical evolution and the specific problems of SRMCs identified in the Canadian literature, demonstrating the inherent impermanence of these communities, the study reviews relevant critical literature from the field of political economy. The reviewed literature suggests the significance of socially allocated indirect wages such as social services and infrastructure for the perception of quality of life by British Columbians, and in particular to the problems of isolation and dependency of SRMCs. Three groups of concerned actors in SRMCs are identified: government, multinational extraction companies, and community residents. These actors' goals and resultant roles are determined from the literature and inter-actor conflict and alliances explored, along with their respective value positions and ideology.

Liberal belief in the value of economic growth results in an alliance between government and organized capital. To facilitate provincial development in a competitive global economy, the provincial government tries to minimize
extraction expenditures for the mining companies, attempting to provide low aggregate labour costs while still maintaining a politically stable environment. This government/corporate alliance results in lower than (provincial) average levels of indirect wages for residents of SRMCs. Furthermore, local self-determination is purposely limited. These conditions create many of the typical SRMC problems, leading to community dissatisfaction and high turnover rates.

A case study of the five-volume provincial Plan for Tumbler Ridge is then undertaken. It was found that the dominant goal of the plan is to create a community capable of attracting and maintaining a viable labour force at lowest government and corporate cost. Proposed levels of collective consumption are intentionally lower than in non-SRMCs and below provincial standards. Seventy percent of the repayment of the community's direct costs is allocated to Tumbler Ridge's future residents, even though the potential life span of the community could be as little as fifteen years. The proposed per capita municipal debt is over three times higher for Tumbler Ridge than the per capita debt of Vancouver. The planning document proposes specifically limiting local government self-determination in Tumbler Ridge to protect corporate rate payers, even though the ratio of residential to corporate municipal debt is similar to the ratio in Vancouver.

The thesis concludes that a contradiction exists between the requirements of a stable community at the local level and those for attracting multinational corporate development at
the provincial level. As a result SRMCs are inherently unstable. Resolution of SRMC problems does not appear likely within the constraints of our present decision-making system. Planners should acknowledge this reality and attempt to design implementable alternatives to the traditional SRMC. One efficient option may be the modern commuting work camp, allowing mine workers to live in a stable community when not at the work site.
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I. CAN THE PROBLEMS OF SINGLE RESOURCE MINING COMMUNITIES BE RESOLVED?

Canadian planners and academics have identified and addressed many of the problems of the socio-economic environment in the development and evolution of resource based communities (Viet 1978). Bradbury (1980 : p.27) succinctly summarizes these problems as "high labour turnover with its associated community and industrial costs: distorted demographic structures; personal and physical isolation; and the instability and impermanence of all resource-based towns". These problems result in high social and economic costs to both residents of resource communities and Canadian society as a whole. The Department of Regional Economic Expansion identifies 811 single resource based communities across Canada of which 99 communities presently exist in British Columbia, many of them based on mining (Canada 1977). Though over time planners and academics have attempted to suggest solutions to the problems of single resource communities, their problems still persist today. The British Columbian government is about to commence comprehensive development in Northeast British Columbia of a new 10,000 resident single resource mining community, Tumbler Ridge. A minimum of 4.3 million dollars is being spent on planning studies for the new community, yet the designers concede Tumbler Ridge may be plagued by many of the traditional problems of single resource mining communities (Thompson, Berwick, Pratt 1978a). Over one million Canadians live in these rural communities (Lucas 1971). Why are many of
their problems not resolved? This thesis explores these issues and considers the question: Can the problems of single resource mining communities be resolved within our present social decision-making system?

THE SINGLE RESOURCE MINING COMMUNITY

McCann (1978:p.46) states a single resource mining community's purpose is "to house and service workers engaged in extraction". Single resource mining communities must locate near where the resource is located, often this is in isolated hinterland regions. By definition a single resource mining community (SRMC) has only one dominant type of industry supporting the community, extraction of the resource. When this resource is either depleted or world prices make it uneconomical to continue extraction of the resource, there is no reason for continuation of the the community (Parker 1963, Skaburskis 1980). Corporate capital is disinclined to invest in other than economically reliable staple extraction in "low productivity" regions, which is often the case of isolated SRMCs, when it has the whole world to choose a location giving lowest aggregate factor costs of production (Friedmannn and Weaver 1979). Clegg's (1958) thesis catalogues the many ghost towns of Southeast British Columbia, testifying to the inherent impermanence of hinterland mining communities.

A SRMC can be created two ways, from nothing, or by co-
option of an existing community into a single resource mining community. In the latter case, while a community existed before, a new community is created in the same territorial space due to the dominance of the new project changing the economic structure of the community. Both types of new mining communities are dependent on the mining project, or projects, for a majority of community employment. In the case of a co-opted community, Markusen (1978a) states that the mining sector captures labour from the traditional employment sectors, perhaps agriculture or forestry, and as a result makes the previous independent community, through growth and employment change, a community dependent on the mining resource. Two possible examples of this are British Petroleum's Sukunka proposal for Chetwynd (Best 1980, Paget and Rabnett 1980) and the existing city of Fort McMurray, the latter being now completely dependent on oil sands for continued existence in its present state (Matthiassen 1971).

Lucas (1971), in his definitive structural - functional sociological analysis of single industry resource towns, stated that there are four stages to a single enterprise community's life. The first stage is construction of the industrial plant, or mine, and township; with a resultant boom town atmosphere due to a large number of transient construction workers. The second stage of community life is recruitment of citizens with high rates of community turnover. The third stage is transition of the community to non-company control, and the final stage is maturity of the community due to time,
with a large population of retired workers. Himelfarb (1977) identifies a fifth stage of resource town life, decline. During this stage the industry or mine closes leaving the non-mobile residents with virtually nothing. There is little market value for resident owned housing. The remaining workers have nothing to sell, not even their skills. Lucas states communities evolve at different rates, with many never evolving beyond the second or third stage. As a result of these different stages and rates of evolution, specific resource community's characteristics vary depending on the community's stage of development.

Lucas (1971 p.20) writes, "Canadian communities of single industry are twentieth century products of an age of industry and technology. There are few myths of the "old days" in these communities. The residents know that their situation is bounded by bureaucracy and a precise division of labour which in turn depends on a complex national and international division of labour. They know that their future depends upon impersonal forces outside their community such as head office decisions, government policies, and international trading agreements".

PROBLEMS AND COSTS OF SINGLE RESOURCE MINING COMMUNITY STABILITY

Forcse (1975:p.31), in referring to the dependency and precariousness of SRMCs writes, "if a Marxist had wishes to
create a prototype of capitalist-worker relations, he could have done little better than to devise such communities. They offer a situation wherein there is a virtual class polarization in the sense that there is no substantial middle class of clerical and service employees, or even many small merchants or professionals". SRMCs are "artificial communities of persons of subordinant class status, irrespective of whether or not the residents are conscious of, or find immediate salient, their subordination" (ibid p.32). A fundamental problem and cost for these communities, especially in the first two stages of Lucas'(1971) cycle, is community and employment turnover. High turnover rates not only cost the extraction companies large amounts of money in recruitment and training, but also infer a social cost to the SRMC's residents. Social networks are repeatedly broken, and new residents and workers are constantly moving in and out of the community (Riffel 1975). Wichern (1971) and others have indicated that the high mobility and lack of middle class detracts from the ability to form a stable core population to create a sense of "community". Without the concept of community the SRMC remains purely a dormitory extension of the workplace, potentially producing further community turnover.

Conversely, when Himlefarb's (1977) fifth stage of community decline is reached, the company closes the mine and the majority of the residents are unemployed. Unlike a community in the stages of construction and recruitment, a mature community in decline may have many retired and senior
workers unable to afford to move out of the dying community and with little or no remaining equity in their home, social networks and services are lost. Both the economic and social investment of the SRMC resident in the community is forfeited as the town expires.

GOVERNMENT POLICY PROMOTING STABILITY

The British Columbian and federal governments, recognizing the economic and social costs of high turnover in newly created and co-opted single resource mining communities have attempted to resolve the problem as exemplified by Viet's (1978) study Labour Turnover and Community Stability: Implications for Northeast Coal Development in British Columbia conducted jointly for both governments. Bradbury (1980:p.19) writes, "Companies and governments hope that new settlement forms would attract a more stable workforce and thus mitigate the old problem of high turnover". Attraction of married couples to SRMCs and promotion of home ownership in municipal status communities was seen as a mechanism to promote stability. To this end in British Columbia changes were made to the Municipal Act in 1965 to promote municipal status for newly created SRMCs. Bradbury (1980) details the failure of this act and the failure of this approach to quickly create a stable community, as this approach failed to address the dependent nature of SRMCs on their extraction corporations, which compete in a global economy.
Federal government policy exists to deal with the final stage of SRMC development, mine closure and community decline. The Canadian Government, through the Department of Regional Economic Expansion, has developed a reactive planning strategy to transfer funds to support SRMC residents after industrial closure (Canada 1977). However this strategy appears to be a social welfare policy of short term transfers to mitigate the impact of inevitable community closure. The policy does not deal with the underlying problems of external dependency of SRMCs, which is the ultimate cause of this eventuality of closure.

A contradiction appears to exist between provincial and federal government policies promoting low turnover in SRMCs to create stability and the inevitability of community closure with its resultant impacts on immobile residents, who have their life savings and life social commitments invested in the community. Often SRMCs, depending on the nature of the extracted resource and potential demand, have a short time frame for existence. For example, potential Northeast British Columbian coal contracts requiring the construction of the new SRMC of Tumbler Ridge are only 15 years long, with known reserves of 25 years (Vancouver Sun January 26, 1981, Taylor 1978). The potential exists for community closure in as little as fifteen years. Yet intrinsic to the conceptual plan for Tumbler Ridge is promotion of a stable community with minimal turnover (Thompson Berwick Pratt 1978a). This dependency on the external world for renewal of the coal contracts in
fifteen years is a fact of life for future residents of Tumbler Ridge, yet it is not addressed by the community plan (which is only concerned with a ten year time frame), nor the provincial government. This contradiction of promoting stability for an impermanent community when combined with problems of hinterland isolation may lead to further problems in SRMCs and lower potential quality of life for SRMC residents.

COLLECTIVE CONSUMPTION, UNEVEN DEVELOPMENT AND THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY

Many researchers of SRMCs note the extremely limited facilities and services in these isolated communities (Lucas 1971, Bancroft 1975). This lack of services and facilities limit freedom of choice for SRMC residents which often manifests itself in social problems and high turnover (Siemens 1975, Viet 1978). Bancroft (1975 :p.38) writes that many of the SRMCs he studied in British Columbia "particularly the most isolated ones, lack some school, health and leisure/recreation facilities, while most suffer from a limited range of shops and housing shortages". Provision of services taken for granted in an urban environment are often lacking in SRMCs.

Mellos (1980) notes that one of the roles of the state in contemporary society is development of the material infrastructure, such as health facilities, housing, transportation, as well as maintenance of the social
infrastructure through education, welfare programmes, unemployment and health insurance; promoting mass loyalty to the society and expanding the productive capacity of the labour force. This provision of social and material infrastructure for members of society is an indirect wage for their aggregate labour, not accruing to the individual in the form of salary, but in the form of general social allowances (Castells 1978). However, this indirect wage is not equitably distributed in society. Castells (1978:p.15) writes "it seems that the traditional inequality in terms of income, which is inherent in capitalism, is expressed in new social cleavages related to the accessibility and use of certain collective services, from housing conditions to working hours, passing through the type and level of health, educational and cultural facilities". Castells refers to this inequitable indirect wage to the individual as collective consumption.

While the indirect spoils of society's production are inequitably distributed between classes, there is also another cleavage:-between metropole and hinterland. While Castell's argument of unequal collective consumption is directly applied to the urban environment, it is equally appropriate in a hinterland SRMC. The hinterland SRMC is an extension of the metropolitan core area, they are locked together culturally and economically, forming two spatial nodes in the greater socio-economic system. (McCann 1978, Castells 1977).

Marchak (1975a) develops an argument of metro hinterland domination in British Columbia. Decision making is done in the
metropole, where senior government offices and corporate headquarters are located. Decisions are typically made in the metropolitan interest. Shearer (1968) notes the majority of British Columbia residents reside in the Vancouver-Victoria metropole area, where the metropole residents are favoured with more diversified and specialized services. Marchak (1975a p.40) discusses the inequality of distribution between metropole and hinterland and refers to the hinterland's population, which "as a whole experiences common conditions such as lack of cultural facilities, a truncated economy and a lopsided occupational structure vis-a-vis the metropolitan population." Residents of SRMCs receive less indirect wages through collective consumption because they are part of the hinterland, and this inequitable distribution is compounded by the predominantly working-class structure of the SRMCs (Forcese 1975).

The metropolitan hinterland relationship is argued by many to be responsible for uneven territorial development (Frank 1967, Amin 1974, Friedmann and Weaver 1979). Bradbury (1979:p.149), referring to Vancouver's domination of the interior of British Columbia, writes, "the unevenness resulting from this domination is derived from the concentration of capital and production elements in the Canadian Core, and as a consequence draining off of capital skills and labour from the peripheral regions". The metropole extracts not only staples from the hinterland but the very ability of the hinterland to develop itself as an autonomous
economic region, and in return compensates the region's labour with limited aggregate indirect and direct wages.

These problems of uneven development and uneven collective consumption originate from the organization of production and consumption in our society, which in turn is structured by the evolution of the international economy (Castells 1978, Friedmann and Weaver 1979). While a SRMC and Vancouver may be a hinterland and metropole; British Columbia and Japan may represent the same relationship at a larger geographic scale (Layton 1980). Bradbury (1979 p.149) writes, "the phase of the internationalism of capital in the 1960's and 1970's exposed resource-base economies for {sic} a different set of conditions in which local regions become part of an international economy owned and operated by a hegemonic fraction of capital under the auspices of a multinational corporation". In the global economy and its supportive late capitalist ideology the state acts as both the supplier of labour and constructor of infrastructure, as well as the legimator for corporate extraction (Mellos 1980, Jensen 1980, Bradbury 1977). Holland (1979:p.205) writes, "in a capitalist system both politics and the role of labour tend to be marginalized relative to a close central relationship between capital and the state, with an intermediate but central role played by ideology ...i.e., the framework of implicit assumptions values, concepts, ideas and dogmas dominant in a capitalist society".

The state requires corporate development to give the
appearance of a healthy economy and, so, stay in power (Black 1979). Thus the state serves to deliver its own territorial economy into a servile hinterland metropole relationship within the global economy. Some capture of valued added does accrue to the local metropole in development of a hinterland area for exportations of its staples in the global economy, but the majority accrues to the dominant international metropole. British Columbia, by exporting coking coal to the Japanese market, becomes an hinterland to the Japanese economy, but at the same time exports of coal from Northeast and Southeast British Columbia to Japan does allow capture of limited value-added to the local metropole of Vancouver (Cuneo 1979a). Japan definitely gains. Vancouver may partially gain, depending on the particular deal in question. The hinterland regions producing the coal resources, however, receive little in return from the provincial metropole Vancouver, and virtually no return from the international metropole apart from direct wages. What indirect wages or collective consumption the hinterland SRMCs do receive appears just sufficient to maintain a functional, politically stable labour force (Cuneo 1979b).

THE PROVINCIAL STAPLE ECONOMY, COAL AND NORTHEAST DEVELOPMENT

British Columbia's economy is based on staple industries, primarily exporting forestry and mining products to the world market (Phillips 1978). The province is extremely rugged with
dispersed pockets of economically viable mineral and fossil fuel deposits. While the population of British Columbia is approximately 2.6 million, 65 per cent of this population is located in the Lower Mainland (Province of B.C. 1980). Extraction of resources throughout the sparsely settled province often requires building new settlements to house the construction and extraction work forces. Between 1965 and 1971, British Columbia's last major period of multinational development for resource extraction, eight new single-industry resource towns were created: Sparwood, Elkford, Logan Lake, Port Alice, Fraser Lake, Gold River, Mackenzie, and Tahsis; as well as significant resource-related expansion of four other small communities (Pagnet and Rabnett 1980). Two communities in Southeast British Columbia, Sparwood and Elkford, where developed to facilitate coal extraction.

Coal mining has been a significant staple industry in British Columbia since the 19th century. In 1914 coal mining was conducted in three regions of British Columbia; the Crowsnest Pass area in Southeast British Columbia, near Merrit, and on Vancouver Island near Naniamo (Dick 1914). Coal production in the Crowsnest area has continued to the present. However, large-scale production from the Southeast did not occur until 1970, when annual production exceeded one million metric tons for the first time. Two corporations, Kaiser and Fording Coal (Cominco), export Southeast coal through the Roberts Bank Port Facility, predominately to Japan. In 1975 the two companies' Southeast mines comprised the majority of
British Columbia's coal output with the extraction of 5.6 metric tons (Halvorson 1980).

Major coal reserves in Northeast British Columbia were recognized in the early 1970s to be potentially economically viable for extraction. At private sector instigation the provincial and federal governments entered into preliminary planning for Northeast coal development. The Northeast coal deposits are six hundred rail miles from the nearest developable maritime harbour at Prince Rupert (see figure I). While the quality of the coking coal meets highest world standards, the greatest challenge to economically viable extraction has been the potential transportation costs. Existing rail lines will require re-enforcement, a 115 kilometer spur line must be built, and new appropriate rolling stock manufactured. A coal port is proposed for development at Ridley Island, near Prince Rupert. As well, a new SRMC will have to be built near the coal fields, as no communities presently exist within reasonable commuting distance for the future work force. The proposed community, Tumbler Ridge (see figure I), will initially service three mine sites (Halvorson 1980).

For the first time in British Columbia, the development approach being taken to coordinate and plan the project is from a comprehensive perspective under provincial direction (Paget and Rabnett 1980). The corporations are responsible for their mine sites; transportation, settlement and social infrastructure are the direct responsibility of the state.
Negotiations of the actual coal contracts were done directly between the extraction corporations and the foreign coal buyers. Like Southeast coal, Japan appears to be the prime metropole, having to date (March 1981) signed the only accord, a preliminary fifteen year agreement ratified in January 1981 (Vancouver Sun, January 26, 1981).

At the time of writing actual costs have not been released for the infrastructure costs of the project. Halvorson (1980) estimates total costs of approximately 850 million dollars for the infrastructure excluding Tumbler Ridge and necessary highway construction. Thompson, Berwicks, Pratt's (1978a) Conceptual plan estimates an approximate cost of 280 million dollars for Tumbler Ridge (based on 1977 prices). The total infrastructure costs using these figures and excluding mine and processing site costs, directly a responsibility of the corporations, appears to be approximately 1.2 billion dollars. The province's comprehensive planning appears to have allocated approximately seventy-five percent of the infrastructure investment to corporate production, such as transportation infrastructure to export the coal, and the remainder to consumer and collective consumption (housing and facilities) for the future residents of Tumbler Ridge.

**THESIS LIMITATIONS, OBJECTIVES AND OUTLINE**

Due to limitations of time and data the scope of this
study will be restricted to SRMCs in British Columbia, particularly Tumbler Ridge. However, relevant literature pertaining to the problems of SRMCs outside of British Columbia, both historic and contemporary, will be reviewed to facilitate an increased understanding of the problems of SRMCs. Detailed evaluation of the role of national and international unionism, as well as financial capital will be excluded from the study. Similarly, the specific details of physical planning for SRMCs will not be explored either, except when necessary for understanding the underlying ideological values that the physical plan expresses.

The specific objectives of this study are threefold. One, to identify and gain an indepth understanding of the characteristics and problems of SRMCs. Two, to develop an understanding of the factors creating specific problems in SRMCs which detract from the quality of life for SRMC residents. And three, to determine if the potential exists to rectify these problems within the potentially possible political/economic environment of British Columbia.

The next chapter will examine the concepts of community and community stability, quality of life, and ideology; and the relationship of these concepts to each other. Chapter Three will review the history of SRMCs in Canada from a viewpoint of evolving economic relationships and resultant shifting ideologies. This will be followed by an outline of the problems identified for SRMCs in the literature and proposed solutions to these problems (Chapter Four). In
Chapter Five the roles of the extraction companies, state and residents of SRMCs will be profiled, along with the present ideological mythologies legitimizing these roles. The following chapter will attempt to tie the problems of SRMCs to the existing political economy of British Columbia, trying to get beyond the values assumptions of the dominant ideology. This sixth chapter will argue that many, if not all, problems of British Columbia's SRMCs are related to the economic base of the global economy. With this view of the reasons creating and perpetrating many of the problems of SRMCs, the British Columbian government plan for Tumbler Ridge will be critiqued in Chapter Seven. The question of whether the problems of SRMCs can be resolved will then be discussed in the conclusion.
Notes

1. In actuality, Provincial Municipal Affairs reports have dealt with scenarios of premature mine closure. However, these scenarios are not included in active planning for Tumbler Ridge. See Skaburskis (1980), Thompson, Berwick, Pratt (1977).

2. Both international/national unionism and financial capital have been identified as significant influences in societal decision-making for SRMCs. Primarily due to time constraints these influences will not be explored in this thesis. For a succinct overview of international unionism in SRMCs see Marchak (1979: p.183-184) and Bradbury (1978). For elaboration of the role of financial capital in SRMCs see Bradbury (1979).
II. THEORIES OF COMMUNITY, STABILITY, QUALITY OF LIFE, IDEOLOGY, AND THE VALUES OF LIBERALISM

Marchak (1975b: p.1) succinctly describes ideologies as "screens through which we perceive the solid world. Their elements are assumptions, beliefs, explanations, values and orientations. They are seldom taught explicitly and systematically. They are rather transmitted through example, conversation, and casual observation". An individual's values are shaped by the dominant ideology of one's society. These values in turn shape what a person perceives as a desirous quality of life. For an individual to want to be a member of a particular community, one must perceive that the community can satisfy one's desired, attainable, wants and needs to allow fulfilment of a reasonable quality of life. If the ideology, or world view, of an individual for a particular quality of life is contrary to that which a particular community can provide, the individual will prefer not to live in that community.

Ideology shapes how Canadians perceive their environment and what standards of milieu that they will accept. If the dominant ideology, through encouraging different values, beliefs and desires, creates the perception that single resource mining communities are desirable places to live, then the residents of SRMCs will feel they have a satisfactory quality of life. The members of SRMCs will wish to remain in their communities and other non-SRMC residents may be attracted to SRMCs. This situation will continue unless
experienced reality contradicts the ideology so repeatedly that the original values and beliefs are abandoned. Conversely, if the dominant ideology creates a worldview in which SRMCs are not perceived as desirous places to live, individuals will not want to be permanent residents of SRMCs, regardless of what inducements are offered. Inducements perceived to conform to highly valued needs and aspirations may attract short term residents to these towns, but the individual will leave, if the person is able, once the inducements are either achieved or shown to be unattainable. For a SRMC to be stable, with low resident turnover, its members must perceive that the community is capable of fulfilling their ideologically shaped needs and wants, allowing the residents to live a valued quality of life, comparable to or better than other Canadian communities.

THE CONCEPT OF IDEOLOGY

Mannheim (1936) discerns two concepts of ideology: particular and total. A particular ideology is an individual's perception and interpretation of the world -- Marchak's screen if you will -- that has inconsistencies observable by other members of the person's epoch and/or social group. Mannheim's (1936:p.55) concept of total ideology is "concerned with the characteristics and composition of the total structure of the mind of {the} epoch or {the} group". The consciousness of this mind, a society's dominant ideology,
along with the society's institutional and political/cultural structure reflects the underlying productive base of that group or epoch (Grayson 1980).

The noted anthropologist Marvin Harris (1979), observing an historical epoch or societal group, be it modern Canadian society or Australian bushmen, would call the systems maintaining conventional wisdom, in our case "late liberalism", an 'emic' structure. Actions or decisions made using an emic perception of the world appear correct and logical to the individual acting within the framework of their dominant ideology. For Harris (1979:p.32) emic structures and actions "have as their hallmark the elevation of the native informant to the status of ultimate judge of the adequacy of the observer's descriptions and analyses. The test of the adequacy of emic analyses is their ability to generate statements the native accepts as real, meaningful, or appropriate". Conversely if an outside observer, or a member of a society, through scientific methodology observes a contradiction in the society's emic perception of the world, this observation is considered to be 'etic'. "Rather than employ concepts that are necessarily real, meaningful, and appropriate from the nature point of view, the observer is free to use alien categories and rules derived from the data language of science. Frequently, etic operations involve the measurement and juxtaposition of activities and events that native informants may find inappropriate or meaningless" (ibid).
The terms emic and etic are similar in meaning and use to Friedmann's (1973) concepts, based on Mannheim, of personal and processed knowledge. Personal knowledge is rule of thumb, ideological-based knowledge constructed from individual experience, whereas processed knowledge is testable scientific knowledge. Friedmann (1973:p.23), referring to Mannheim's (1936) *Ideology and Utopia*, writes, "he showed how ways of perceiving and forms of thinking derive from the position a person occupies in the social structure", the experiences an individual is exposed to shapes his/her perception of the world, and, accordingly, decisions made by the individual reflects this perception. Thus, the dominant, or total, ideology of an epoch reflects the interests of the dominant group controlling the productive base of the society. Ideology is "concerned with the justification of an existing set of social relations" (Friedmann 1973:p.26).

Friedmann and Mannheim argued that due to ideological justification and perception of a society's base and structure, implementation of fundamental change that would restructure the society's base is not possible unless the change would benefit the dominant group in that society. Perceived change that would not benefit the dominant group was considered utopian¹, as utopian change to rectify fundamental contradictions or problems in a society were not considered possible in the ideology fostered and believed by the dominant societal groups. The role of ideology is to obscure contradictions and problems in a society, to "lubricate" the
existing structure. "There is implicit in the word 'ideology' the insight that in certain situations the collective unconscious of certain groups obscures the real conditions of society both to itself and to others and thereby stabilizes it" (Mannheim 1936:p.40). To the members of an epoch or societal group, "The dominant ideology-- or conventional wisdom -- provides the ready references, the rule of thumb, the directions to the eyes and ears of its members" (Marchak 1975b:p.1). To contradict the personal experience, or personal reality, to fundamentally transcend the existing order requires an emanation of utopian elements of belief which will undermine the existing order and allow a dynamic change of society from topia to utopia (Mannheim 1936).

THE DOMINATE CANADIAN IDEOLOGY: LIBERALISM

Society is always dynamically changing due to the evolution of the society's base, as a result of environmental and technical permutation. Ideology cannot freeze societal structures, however ideology can act as a mechanism to continue dominant group control as the relationships of the economic base shift. Our present dominant ideology, liberalism, evolved as a result of the industrial revolution. Feudal society underwent a change of mode of production, shifting from a rurally-oriented ideology of tribute to an urban-oriented ideology of capitalism (Amin 1980). Marchak (1975b:p.9) writes, "what occurred was the creation of a new
population in the urban centres whose social realities were so different from those of the rural population that it developed new explanations for its actions, new values, and new orientations". The new urban ideology legitimated the primacy of the city, allowing justification of rural hinterland dependency (Bookchin 1974).

The basic liberal tenet espouses the primacy of the individual. Liberal values and beliefs perceive that "Man" is driven by a desire for pleasure. He/she takes rational action to achieve an eventual reward. The liberal worldview does not view the world organically or holistically, rather the liberal perception of the world is atomic; the world is broken down into its components, its individual pieces. The liberal perception of "Man" is "a creature with his eye constantly on the main chance. His ruling ambition is to get something for nothing, and the creative life of a community flourishes only if it has evolved rules, arrangements, and institutions which somehow foil this ambition" (Gervetz 1966:p.27).

From the industrial revolution until the present, aspects of society and ideology have shifted, but the concept of individualism has been central to the dominant ideology. Marchak (1979:p.267) writes, "the central focus of liberalism as ideology has been the individual: individual happiness, individual consumer choice, individual mobility. These have displaced a focus on the growth of corporate organizations, and placed the burden of personal success in life on the private person. Those who established the rules
were not identified as a ruling class; their central organizations were not perceived as ruling institutions. Government was viewed as a mediator, and society as a pluralist arrangement. Society, international relations, and technology have changed in the last hundred years, but the values of the dominant ideology have not changed. "The ideologies at the popular level are very much the same as they were in these other times. Speeches to the Chamber of Commerce reflect the same abiding faith in progress, material prosperity, and general affluence; the same evaluation of private property, individualism, and achievement; the same belief in the existence of equality and opportunity" (Marchak 1975b:p.9).

The most significant shift in ideology to affect 1980's Canada crystalized in the 1940s. Society shifted from a concept of individual independence to individual co-operation, laissez-faire to welfare state (Gervetz 1966). Grayson (1980) argues this shift took place as Canada's and the capitalist economic world's base shifted from liberal industrial capitalism to late or monopoly capitalism. Our present dominant ideology creates a worldview where the government deals with liberal, competitive, responsible profit-making companies, when in actuality major corporations are monopolistic, price setting enterprises of multinational proportions making abnormal profits, unresponsive to government or territorial needs (Holland 1979). Under late liberalism "the private corporation ceases to be a merely
economic entity; it becomes a political entity as well" (Gervetz 1966: p. 278). The predominant ideology argues for the universal interests of all members of society. The ideology argues that the good of one community should not be promoted over another, rather the good of all should be promoted (Mellos 1980). A classless universality is perceived to exist between all members of society (Marcuse 1968). There may be economic disparities between regions, but these can be equalized with transfer payments. Thus, quality of life, according to the ideology, should be comparable for all Canadians.

A CONCEPT OF QUALITY OF LIFE

The concept of "quality of life", has no firm meaning, beyond the vague notion of the "general welfare" (Olsen and Marwin 1977). Many writers of the Marxist school question the validity of the term, arguing "quality of life" is a liberal concept evolved by the ideology to confuse and conceal class conflict (Markusen 1978b). However, for the purposes of this thesis "quality of life" refers to the aggregate material and social requirements individuals consider important in life. These values are shaped by the dominant ideology. Castells (1978: p. 4) writes that what is really important to people is their everyday spatial environment, "when one is agitating for an improvement in the "quality of life", one is in the first instance referring to housing, transportation, public
facilities and open spaces, as well as to the forms of organization of all means of consumption and their relation to other activities. Perception of "quality of life" in a SRMC is shaped by the site-specific environment and degree of fulfillment of ideologically produced aspirations. As a result, whatever factors contribute to or detract from, aggregate quality of life for a group of people comprising a SRMC are ultimately determined by the members of the community themselves. And the residents' notion of "quality of life" is inherently defined by normative values, or societal ideology, of what is good or bad in life (Liu 1975).

An underlying ideological belief in liberalism is the belief in freedom of choice (Gervetz 1966). Migratory Canadians have freedom of movement in Canada and "emic" freedom of choice of community, the "etic" reality is that they must have some means of economic support in their chosen community, be it employment or U.I.C. Similarly if a worker desires to work in mining, the individual has freedom of choice of which mine and which SRMC, provided the person can find employment. Once located in an SRMC the individual has freedom of choice whether to remain or not. A significant factor in this decision is perceived quality of life of the individual in the SRMC (Matthiasson 1970, 1971, Nickels and Sexton 1976). SRMCs have significant problems in their spatial environment, availability and choice of services, isolation, as well as often being non-democratically controlled from the outside (Bradbury 1980). These problems are all contrary to
the accepted liberal values and beliefs of universal equality, and as a result detract from individual quality of life for SRMC residents. Unless other attributes are available in SRMCs, sufficiently supportive of a high quality of life (e.g., high salaries or desirable environment) to overcome the problems detracting from quality of life in SRMCs, the individual is likely to use one's option of freedom of choice and move to a community which is perceived as better (Nickels and Sexton 1976). The disillusioned worker will only remain if some mechanism, such as education (i.e., the person is only trained to work in mining) or perhaps economic debt, traps the individual in the SRMC.

THE CONCEPT OF COMMUNITY

The word community has many different meanings for different people (Hillery 1955). A town is a place in space where people live, it is not necessarily a community. Families locate in a space because there is a perceived advantage to do so. This perceived advantage can be comprised of a number of factors that can be summarized under three headings, economic/technological, socio/political, and cultural/ideological. When these economic, cultural and political factors come together to reinforce one another for a group of people, an interrelated structure is created that is more than the sum of its parts (Friedmann and Weaver 1979). When these interactions gel in territorial space a sense of
togetherness is created expressing the identification of the individual to the corporate whole (More 1516, Mumford 1961). For the purposes of this paper, when this structure exists in territorial space, and the spatial boundaries are cognizant to its members -- Mumford's (1938) consciously delimited "theatre" -- this structure is by definition a community. In this definition a community is both functional and territorial in structure; the social, economic and cultural concepts and networks exist in a concrete geographical space.

A SRMC, due to its size and isolated nature, can generally have only one cognitive "theatre", one level of known territorial and functional community. Whereas an urban area can have several levels of community, neighbourhood, city and region (Wellman and Crump 1978); the single-resource community can generally only have one, not necessarily defined by the town's legal boundaries, as it is surrounded by uninhabited "wilderness". Larger concepts, provinces and countries, cannot be communities in this definition, as their inhabitants are not cognizant of their "spatial theatre"; rather these larger concepts are ideological concepts of arbitrary territorial identity. Originally these larger concepts were created to fulfill structured socio-economic functions required at the time of their conception. However, original reasons for creation may now be historical anachronisms and identification and allegiance to such larger concepts is often fostered by dominant sub-regions and capital to facilitate non-dominant-area dependency (Markusen 1978b,
Smaller concepts of human interaction or association, such as the "ethnic community" are seldom communities in this definition either, as they are often functional but not territorial, or territorial but not functional. Many of these smaller factions have a degree of togetherness or corporate identity that make the factions building blocks through which the community is formed -- More's (1516) neighbourhoods if you will. However these associations and groups depend on the continuity of the encompassing community, for non-faction supplied networks, e.g., economic networks of employment, for maintenance of structures for ongoing existence.

A community is intangible as it is created by the relationship of its parts. If these parts and networks change significantly or are destroyed, the relationship creating the particular existing community will cease to exist.

Once established, a viable community is the organizational outcome of its members need for achievement of individual goals and group interests within unique environmental, cultural, political and economic constraints. If these constraints change or cease to exist -- for example, the appearance of a major new employer, a mine in a newly co-opted SRMC -- individuals and groups comprising the community will attempt to produce a different organizational structure, due to their needs for survival and achievement. This change will be attempted through class and sectoral struggle, to gain maximum advantage within the new constraints (Markusen 1978a).
Therefore, intrinsic to the concept of community is the ability of members to have a degree of self-determination and self-control of their environment in relationship to the non-static external world. This control is important to meet the residents' needs, allowing adaptation to their environment, economic or social, to maintain ongoing interactions and relationships, and above all, to create communal meaning for continued existence (Duvegnaud 1970).

If a community is affected by major change and a new organizational structure is not achieved, for example, when there is no economic base on which to form a new community structure, when the only mine in a SRMC has just closed, the community will eventually cease to exist. The territorial space will still exist, there may be the name of the town on a map, but a community in that space will no longer be an actuality, due to a lack of systematic functional interactions. The breakdown of community may result in migration of its members to other communities to meet their individual needs, or where migration is not possible for cultural or economic reasons, such as retired homeowners, anomie and a marked deterioration of individual quality of life could occur in isolated communities (Durkheim 1951, Himelfarb 1977).
A CONCEPT OF COMMUNITY STABILITY AND THE ROLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION

Community stability is an often used term in the literature but is seldom defined. Using the definition of community developed above, a stable community could be stated as a community with characteristics both capable of sustaining networks required for ongoing existence and consistent with the ideological values forming its members concepts of a community that provides a good quality of life. Intrinsic in these characteristics is a degree of internal self-control of the community by its members, an internal resilience to perceived disadvantageous change, and an internal adaptability to perceived advantageous change in its economic/technical, socio/political and cultural ideological networks. The members of a stable community have a degree of effective self-control that can represent itself as a concept of corporate togetherness to the external world (More 1516, Mumford 1961). A stable community is resilient to a decline of perceived aggregate quality of life of its residents, as well as capable of self-promotion of a higher quality of life for its residents. A community with low population turnover is not necessarily stable, rather, most stable communities encourage low population turnover, except if high turnover is advantageous to high quality of life for its permanent dominant core members; as stable communities can generally meet their residents' needs through self-promoted community change and control of the internal community environment.
Viet (1978), in her study, *Labour Turnover and Community Stability* noted the following characteristics from the liberal literature required to achieve a stable community in British Columbia: (1) a sense of individual belonging, a sense of community (Riffel 1975); (2) identification with place (Burdge 1972); (3) a perceived confidence in a stable economy, in the case of a SRMC perceived future employment for several years at the mine; (4) common norms; (5) services to meet perceived basic needs; (6) voluntary organizations (Baur 1975), and (7) a stable core group of permanent residents.

A stable core population is an intrinsic requirement for community, as well, a stable core population is required to maintain community social networks (Lucas 1971). Matthiasson (1971) observes that people stay in a community as a result of their perceived quality of life in the community. Individual ideological values for determination of quality of life depend on the individual's specific life style, one's particular ideology, e.g., rurally orientated, and one's perceived needs for their position in the family life cycle, e.g., needing a house to raise the kids. Though a community originally attracts members for employment reasons (Matthiasson 1971, Jackson 1971, Nickels et al 1976), a stable community core population can only be retained when the overall quality of life of both the community and employment is satisfactory to this core group. An inherent problem in SRMCs, as SRMCs have little choice of employment and little choice of publicly allotted services and facilities.
Wichern (1971, 1972) discusses a positive feedback mechanism in single resource communities, where, through time, a stable core community may grow. This core population perceives a long-term future existence in the community resulting in a desire to control their destiny and improve their everyday quality of life. Wichern argues this perception results in the rise of citizen participation, eventually resulting in the rise of citizen controlled rather than company controlled local government decision-making. Wichern (1972) states non-community decision makers, either provincially appointed administrators or "company men", are very competent at maintaining services in single resource mining communities, yet they seldom are capable of responding and adapting to change in the needs of collective consumption of community residents. Wichern argues the rise of citizen-controlled local government allows effective response to the citizens' perceived needs, improving individual quality of life. Kerri's (1971) research on volunteer organizations at Fort McMurray is supportive of this argument.

Goudy (1977), in his study of rural American communities, found distribution of power, citizen participation and commitment to the community more effective predictors of community satisfaction than were perceptions of service adequacy. Goudy's results suggested that residents found most satisfying those communities in which the residents perceive they had strong primary group relationships, where local people participated and took pride in civic affairs, where
decision-making was shared, where residents were heterogeneous and where people were committed to the community and its upkeep. Thus intrinsic to a stable community is the ability for residents to participate in and to control local decision-making, to allow the community to meet its perceived social and collective consumption needs.

Stelter and Artibise (1978) note the structure of particular SRMCs reflects the ideology of the time the communities were built. The present structure, ideology, and economic base, that produces problems in newly built SRMCs, has evolved historically. The next chapter traces this historical economic and ideological evolution of SRMCs in Canada, to point up the historical causes of contemporary SRMC problems.
Notes

1. Manneheim (1936:p.193) accepts Landauer's concept of utopia, where Landauer calls "every actual existing and ongoing social order a 'topia', then these wish-images which take on a revolutionary function will become utopias". "It is clear that those social strata which represent the prevailing social and intellectual order will experience as reality that structure of relationships of which they are bearers, while the group driven into opposition to the present order will be oriented towards the first stirrings of the social order for which they are stiving and which is being realized through them. The representatives of a given order will label as utopian all concepts of existence which from their point of view can in principle never be realized "(ibid: p.196).

2. This shift will be explored in more detail in Chapter Three.

3. A good example of this type of community is presented by the Slocan Valley. See Marchak (1979) and Slocan Valley Forest Management Report (1974).
III. AN HISTORICAL SKETCH OF SINGLE RESOURCE MINING COMMUNITIES AND THE CANADIAN IDEOLOGY

LAISSEZ-FAIRE PRIOR TO WORLD WAR ONE

In the latter half of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century Canada was dominated by a liberal frontier ideology in the realm of politics, economics and ethics (Guest 1980). Nelles (1974) documents the impact of the American frontier mythology on government legislation and private exploration of mineral resources on the Canadian Shield. Discoveries of mineral deposits in Northern and Western Canada created many instant communities. These mining communities varied in size from camps of a few individual miners to cities, such as Dawson with a 1901 population of 27,000 people (Innis 1936). Many of the boomtowns were not dominated by any one mining company, rather many sites, such as Dawson or Cobalt, had several individual claims, or shafts owned by different individuals or companies (Innis 1936, Baldwin 1978, Rea 1976). Dick (1917: p.258) wrote, referring to the Commission of Conservation's (1911) mine accident report, that "the death rate among miners in Canada is greater than in any other civilized country". Mining communities of the era mirrored the diversified and chaotic nature of the extraction process, the communities reflected the laissez-faire attitude of the liberal frontier (Stetler and Artibise 1978).
Adams (1917: p.17) noted, "a few years prior to 1901 the control of the planning and development of these towns was vested in rural municipalities". Yet municipal governments of this era were often impotent due to lack of financing and extraction company dominance (Innis 1936). There was little or no provincial or federal government involvement in community infrastructure or social standards, for either the community itself or the work environment, beyond basic safety standards and labour regulations (Commission of Conservation 1911). British Columbia had many single resource mining communities, both incorporated and unincorporated, at the turn of the century (Clegg 1958, Innis 1936). Lozovsky (1970) notes the provincial government position on both incorporated and unincorporated resource towns was basically undefined prior to the end of World War One. In particular, the question of unincorporated community existence was purely a matter of free enterprise and the initiative of individuals. "Whatever the consequences, they must be borne by the individual" (Lozovsky 1970: p.9).

In Ontario, Baldwin (1978:p.28), referring to the "many-company" town of Cobalt, writes, "any coherent development and planning strategy would have had to originate either from the provincial or municipal governments. Unfortunately, neither took much interest in the long range future of Cobalt". Government policy, by the turn of the century, was mainly concerned with boosting exploitation, administration of the peace and maintaining general stability to allow collection of

Innis (1936) wrote Dawson was founded by two service companies to supply goods to Klondike miners. Transportation, with the eventual exception of one road to Whitehorse, was privately owned. The early community had many health problems due to poor sanitation, starvation rations due to lack of foodstuffs, and poor self-built accommodations; scurvy, dysentry and typhoid were common. Dawson's hospital was built by a private individual, only as a last resort would the municipal government finance its operating costs, though people were dying on the streets. Fire was a major menace. However, within a few years Dawson had graded and drained streets, clean water, a fire brigade and electrical street lighting. These services were financed with difficulty by the municipal government through local taxation of both commercial enterprises and local residents. Unfortunately by this time Dawson was past the initial mining boom and the population was declining, progressively reducing the tax base.

Similarly, Cobalt was founded by a private transportation company, the railway (Baldwin 1978). Originally development was chaotic, the Canadian Mining Review (1906:p.72) wrote, "in all directions principally in the west end of town, people who have nothing else to go by but their own convenience, are building on the street and off it, and later on there will be endless confusion and litigation". Like Dawson, Cobalt was troubled with poor sanitation and water supply, resulting in
typhoid outbreaks, until the water works contract was let by the municipal government to private contractors. Financing for local government was continually a problem, with infrastructure lagging far behind boomtown demand, with little or no help from the extraction companies (Innis 1936).

The extraction companies had minimal interest in its workers, Guest (1980:p.23) writes that in an 1880s Royal Commission Report, "A Nova Scotia miner was asked: In the case of sickness or in the case of the death of a cutter or a laborer, would any assistance be rendered by the mining company except the doctor's attendance? A. Not as I know of, they are not in the habit of doing anything like that". Adams (1917:p.128) wrote, "We see on the one hand, balance sheets of mining corporations that bulge with big dividends, and on the other hand, the dreary, disorderly and unhealthy shack towns in which miners are forced to live, unredeemed by any public-spirited effort to improve them by those who conduct the operations."

THE COMPANY TOWN PERIOD BETWEEN THE WORLD WARS

By the First World War the basic frontier of European exploration and expansion in Canada was almost complete. It became progressively more difficult for the lone prospector to strike it rich. In areas such as the Klondike and Rossland-Trail, the individual, or small mining companies were absorbed by progressively larger companies until one dominant company
emerged. In the Klondike, capital investment replaced labour. Innis (1936) noted that hand labour cost $1.66 per cubic yard of gravel to extract and sluice for gold, with capital equipment the per yard cost dropped to 13 cents. In one instance one dredge run by three men replaced 156 men on the same company claim. As a result of capital investment over time, both wages and population dropped. Innis (1936:p.267-268) wrote, "The problems of the Yukon are the problems of all mining camps but focussed in a clearer light. The problem of overhead charges of a large town borne by a declining population is evident in the municipal facilities. The age group of the population tend to show large numbers at later ages, with the younger population steadily migrating to the outside. Schools become increasingly difficult to maintain. Churches find their support gradually declining. Government departments are faced with a steadily declining business."

In the Rossland-Trail area of British Columbia in 1921 corporate monopolization was created by the major Consolidated Mining and Smelting Company at Trail, when the company refused to accept lead and zinc ores from independent mines, resulting in the independent mines closing or being taken over by the smelting company (Innis 1936). This monopoly concentration was encouraged by government legislation as it allowed better capture of economic rent by the state for the extracted minerals (Innis 1936, Rea 1976).

By the 1920s large nationally-based Canadian and American mining companies dominated extraction across Canada (Rea
1968). With the fall of the 1929 market and the 1930's depression only the strong companies survived. Government continued to provide little or no servicing to these corporations and their 'dormitory towns'. In Ontario, "the province merely disposed of its mineral domain to private developers in as orderly a manner as possible, maintained some basic promotion and inspection services, its 3 percent tithes from profitable ventures" (Nelles 1974:p.431). The ideology of the day was to appear to stay away from the domain of the private sector (McCann 1978). However Innis (1936:p.404) noted, "Exploitation of virgin resources in mining, as in lumbering, tends to involve political manipulation." Rea (1976:p.86) noted that government policy towards mining was "supportive: the apparent objective was to raise revenue without discouraging private investment." The only cases of direct government intervention in resource communities, during this time period, were some provincial input into holistic community designs for several specific resource communities at the explicit request of the involved companies (McCann 1978, Saarinen 1979). During this time period government was not a directly involved actor in resource extraction, rather government served to maintain the peace and property rights of the extraction companies in return for a share of the economic rent.

Nelles (1974:p.432) succinctly summerizes the world view of the mining companies during the 1920s and 1930s towards government and society as a whole:
"An ardent individualism provided intellectual reinforcement for the industry's economic resentment of government intervention. The industrial symbol was the solitary prospector who made his way upward in the world through sheer wit and pluck without assistance from any quarter. That the symbol did not correspond to a reality of financial intrigue and technological intricacy attested not so much to its irrationality as to its strength and the psychological need it fulfilled. Events in an enormous game of international Monopoly had made these men suddenly rich beyond ordinary comprehension. For some, an extreme individualistic ideology performed the psychological function of legitimizing windfalls or fortunes gulled from their follow men. Whatever the hidden psychological reasons, it seems clear that much of the doctrinaire laissez-faire outlook of the mining industry was grounded in the strident self-confidence and individualism that universally accompanied the growth of the industry."

While an ardent individualism existed in the company head office, a paternalistic relationship existed between the local company management and the workers in the company town (Queen's 1953). The companies' interests were mainly to maintain and reproduce a stable skilled work force at minimum cost. In the company town the corporation controlled housing, retailing, community services and town administration, although the degree of domination varied from one community to the next (Queen's 1953, McCann 1978). While the corporations were responsible for the majority of the collective consumption of their workers, the companies were seldom concerned with providing social benefits for their township residents, especially during the period of general fiscal restraint of the 1930s (McCann 1978).

During this period British Columbia was atypical among the provinces of Canada in enacting The Company Town
Regulation Act of 1919. This act was primarily enacted to facilitate public access to company towns and allow general use of their roads. Lozovsky (1970) states its major clauses addressed problems and standards of water supply, sewerage, public health, roads, land subdivision, land registration and taxation. Consistent with the role of government for its day, the administration of the act was given to the Ministry of Lands and Forests, rather than to the Ministry of Municipal Affairs. Both Lozovsky (1970) and Queen's (1953) pointed out this was consistent with the ideology of the importance of extraction development, rather than development of SRMCs as desirable places to live. "The mine, mill, or plant has priority and the community is a necessary though secondary venture that grows up in the vicinity of the works operation" (Queen's 1953:p.57).

WORLD WAR II AND GOVERNMENT INVOLVEMENT: A SHIFT OF IDEOLOGY

With the Second World War and the country attempting to structure production as a national, co-operative effort came a change of orientation for government and national ideology. Concepts of government intervention in society changed. The concept of social welfare was realized to be no longer a luxury -- contrary to arguments of organized capital -- but a necessity for a smooth running economy, as well as a stabilizing mechanism for controlling labour and the populace in general in times of depression or crisis (Cuneo 1979b). As
a result government introduced social policies such as family allowance and unemployment insurance. The 'stigma' attached to social services produced by the 19th century laissez-faire ideology of individual effort shifted from 'embarrassment' and 'failure' to become a 'right' (Guest 1980). Government intervention in the daily life of individuals, stabilizing society and giving the appearance of actively promoting minimum standards of 'quality of life', gradually became the new expected norm.

Similarly, a new mobilization of resource extraction came about to assist the war effort. Government started to actively assist the extraction corporations in projects that the companies were not able to capitalize themselves. Steep Rock is a good example. The government diverted a river, lost a hydro-dam and drained a lake, built a 201 kilometer power line, built a spur railway and ore docks, all to allow private extraction of iron ore (Rea 1976). During the war, for the first time, major extraction infrastructure costs such as railways and community construction were born by the state directly for specific resource extraction companies, as were social welfare costs for individuals.
POST-WORLD WAR II, THE PROMINENCE OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND GOVERNMENT INVOLVEMENT IN SINGLE RESOURCE MINING COMMUNITY PLANNING

In Canada, during and immediately after the war the role of the state changed. Keynesian economics and concepts of government intervention in regulating society came into vogue (Girvetz 1966, Guest 1980, Cuneo 1979b). The despotism of company towns was held in disrespect (Queen's 1953). SRMCs built soon after the war were conceived under a feeling of needing to start anew "to build a better world" (Stelter and Artibise 1978:p.13). There was a general expectation for government involvement in the design and administration of SRMCs to eradicate the problems of prior company towns and provide an equal perceived quality of life for extraction workers as experienced that by the rest of Canada (ibid, Robinson 1962). With the rise of state intervention in the SRMC came a decrease in the perceived paternalistic relationship between labour and the local corporate management. The state became a new independent actor which both labour and capital could rely on; or so became the accepted mythology (Bradbury 1980).

Similarly, with this post-war shift in government economic and social policies there came a general change of corporate structure and international economic relations. The emerging monopoly corporations of the 1930s made large fortunes on defense contracts during the war. Marchak (1979:p.132) states, "The companies emerged from the second
war with expanded capacities for production on a more integrated basis than they had hitherto enjoyed, and with this some discovered the merits of 'efficiency'. These revitalized, vertically integrated, efficient multinational corporations evolved with the restructuring of the western economic system during the 1950s into principal actors in a new mode of production, transnational capitalism, exemplified by the post-war domination of the U.S. dollar, G.A.T.T. and the I.M.F. (Sunkel 1973, Blake and Walters 1976, Friedmann and Weaver 1979).

In 1946 38 percent of Canadian mining and smelting was foreign controlled; by 1957 this percentage had risen to 70 percent (Clement 1979). Wilkins (1974:p.308), referring to post-war American multinationals, wrote, "Americans unquestionably took the lead in the growth of mining and mineral processing that occurred in Canada." While foreign companies have always operated actively in Canada, from the 1850s to the early 1950s, the mining industry was predominantly Canadian controlled, arguably operating in Canadian interests or at least the interests of the dominant groups in Canadian society, with the Central Canadian owners exploiting the rest of Canada for their own goals. However, from the 1950s on there would be little argument in most quarters that, due to predominant foreign control, mineral extraction in Canada was no longer in Canada's interest, but rather foreign interest, predominantly American (Levitt 1970).

By the end of the 1950s the roles and interests of both
government and corporations had changed significantly from that of the 1930s, while the role of labour remained essentially the same. Under the new state involvement in individual welfare, policies for dealing with the problems of SRMCs and their residents, the extraction workers, changed accordingly, with resultant new norms and expectations on the part of the residents.

In British Columbia the 1919 Company Towns Act was no longer being actively applied (Queen's 1953). Instead, older company towns and newly created towns were being actively incorporated (Lozovsky 1970). Robinson (1962:p.5) wrote,

"although Canada's Company Towns have manifested fewer excesses than prevalent among their counterparts elsewhere, such towns nevertheless are not popular. The workers prefer a freer environment. The industrial entrepreneur dislikes the diversion of capital and effort required to build a new town and recognizes that being the triumvirate of sole employer, landlord, and town council results in poor labor- and resident-relations. Provincial governments regard such towns with suspicion as being at least temporarily beyond the scope of ordinary municipal laws. As a consequence, there is a fairly widespread feeling today that no more company towns should be built."

Instead, in the place of company towns there were erected comprehensively planned, incorporated communities with private home ownership, attempting to create an extension of the urban suburb in the hinterland wilderness, or at least this was the perceived intent (Stelter and Artibise 1978, Bradbury 1980). In British Columbia, Robinson (1962) detailed the planning and development of the single-industry town of Kitimat in the 1950s. The community was incorporated as a municipality by a special act of the legislature while the townsite was still
under construction. Robinson described how the corporation, Alcan, and the Provincial Government worked together to allow Alcan to build a 'model community', while allowing 'independent' control of the community through local government (Alcan paid 85 percent of the municipal taxes). During the 1950s and 1960s many single-resource communities were built across Canada with both corporate and government interaction in the planning process, resulting in locally governed communities; examples include Elliot Lake, Schefferville and Uranium City (Bradbury 1979, Robinson 1962, Stetler and Artibise 1978). In British Columbia the provincial government recognized its role in the creation of these new communities and in 1965 amended the Municipal Act to facilitate creation of resource communities (Lozovsky 1970, Bradbury 1980).

The physical appearance and perception of the SRMC had changed significantly from the randomly planned frontier community of the Klondike to the state and corporate designed suburban planned SRMC of the 1960s. For SRMCs, the role of the state, with its increasing responsibility for individual welfare, as well as the society's ideology, once frontier orientated, now urban orientated, had changed markedly. In later chapters the role of the state and the Canadian ideology will be explored in its 1980s context. The following chapter reviews the present problems of SRMCs identified in the Canadian literature and the proposed remedies.
IV. EXISTING CHARACTERISTICS AND PROBLEMS OF SINGLE RESOURCE MINING COMMUNITIES

IMPERMANENCE AND UNCERTAINTY

All single resource mining communities -- if they remain SRMCs -- are inherently impermanent; it is just a question of when they will cease to exist, as is testified to by the number of ghost towns scattered throughout British Columbia and Canada (Clegg 1958, Robinson 1962). SRMCs are abandoned for four possible reasons, physical depletion of the resource (Parker 1963), depressed world prices making extraction uneconomical (Skaburskis 1980), technical change resulting in obsolescence of the resource, and new, more competitive discoveries (Markusen 1978a). As SRMCs are impermanent, uncertainty of continued existence can become a central issue affecting individual quality of life for SRMC residents.

Ideally, the answer to this question of longevity is known, unfortunately this is seldom the case. Mack (1971) writes that if knowledge was complete, decisions could and should be perfect, however, with uncertainty, which is a lack of knowledge, comes deteriorated choice and resultant costs. Uncertainty involves eventual social costs for three reasons: (1) a chance of having to abandon a community is less traumatic than the abandonment itself; (2) people's behaviour is confused by uncertainty and may deteriorate, as pointed out
by Lucas (1971) for individual decision-making in resource communities with an indefinite future, and (3) misconceptions of severity of disadvantageous externalities - one is less likely to be concerned with the uncertainty of duration of a community when the particular impacts of community closure are not known (Mack 1971).

Rabnett and Associates (1978) note inability to evaluate economic risk results in residents and small entrepreneurs not investing in the community. They lack the information to develop a realistic perception of an amortization period to base community-level economic marketing systems on. The difficulty of borrowing mortgage money for a SRMC in the hinterland and the inherent risk of impermanence discourage private-sector housing construction (Bancroft 1975). As a result housing is often built and/or subsidized by the extraction corporations in these communities for their employers (Parkinson and DeTomasi 1980, Deprey 1973). Thus private housing markets do not evolve for service-sector employees and multi-unit rental accommodations are not developed; small business growth is slow, with high pricing and high closure rates (Lucas 1971, Parkinson and DeTomasi 1980). These factors often contribute to slower than planned community growth and regional development, often fostered by both the extraction company (Sullum et al 1978) and the provincial government (Halverson 1980), resulting in lower than expected quality of life for community residents. This is due to a lack of housing and service choice, as well as over
capitalization of infrastructure servicing, resulting in excessive community property tax rates (Rabnett and Associates 1978). Conversely, SRMC financing required to meet infrastructure needs for reasonable quality of life is often not available without higher government guarantees. Markusen and Glasmeier (1980: p.29) write with "a depleted resource .... The probability of a stable, long run production pattern {extraction} that will sustain a community that will in turn demand full capacity utilization of infrastructure and pay taxes to cover debt may be low or at least difficult to determine".

**ISOLATION**

Isolation is a fact of life and a problem for many hinterland communities (Riffel 1975). Isolation is caused by geographical separation from other communities and large cities, as SRMCs are required to locate at or near the mineral deposit to be extracted. However, isolation has other parameters apart from spatial dispersion. Lucas (1971) states isolation is also created by lack of alternatives for community residents. For many SRMCs there are no other communities within a daily driving distance. Often there may only be one doctor or dentist in the community, if the residents do not like him/her there is no other choice. Similarly, in many SRMCs there may only be one movie theatre or restaurant, if any at all. Community size restricts the
numbers and types of SRMC service and recreational facilities. Bancroft (1975:p.20) notes in his inventory of British Columbian SRMCs that "overall, the residents of study communities have access to only a restricted range of personal services and retail shops. Even less frequently have they a CHOICE between two or more service establishments of one type.... Selection of goods was limited and prices were at full list". Both Barclay et al (1974) and Matthiassen (1970) as well as Bancroft (1975) indicate isolation and resultant transportation costs and lack of choice contributes to a high cost for the available goods, leading to a high cost of living in SRMCs.

Porteous (1975a) writes "restricted choice of alternatives in single-resource communities mean {sic.} these communities cannot be urban, because the essence of urbanity is choice". Mainstream North American society is inherently urban orientated. Bookchin (1974:p.5) states, "cities play an indisputably dominant role in modern life. They visibly decide the development of modern society." Indeed, Merrington (1975:p.72) refers to the urban environment as "the dynamic principle of progress", a fundamental underpinning of the prevailing ideology legitimizing our freemarket system. Yet residents of SRMCs are effectively alienated from this urban environment, they are alienated from mainstream society. Residents of SRMCs are deprived of the urban opportunities the society, and the Canadian ideology as a whole, take for granted.
Perhaps because of this Siemens (1975) notes isolation can have a direct effect on mental health, contributing to "cabin fever" and alcoholism in SRMCs. For Siemens, community isolation is more psychological than physical, and is partially caused by lack of freedom of choice for fulfilling general needs, as well as the specific need for personal privacy. For Lucas (1971) the isolated nature and generally small size of resource communities result in residents having knowledge of everyone else in the community. This results in rigid social control and monitoring of individual behavior by the community. Bancroft (1975), as well as Matthiassen (1970), argues the need for residents on the "frontier" to have access to large southern communities several times a year to mitigate these problems of isolation. Yet Viet (1978) notes that such access is still seldom available more than once a year for most SRMC residents, due to limited holiday periods for mine workers and high costs of transportation; as well, any subsidized transportation is taxed as personal income.

DEPENDENCY: SINGLE INDUSTRY, DISTORTED DEMOGRAPHICS AND TURNOVER

A determining characteristic of SRMCs is that they are dominated by and dependent upon external commodity markets and other externalities. Furthermore, SRMCs are dominated by one or more large, externally controlled corporations for employment and continued SRMC existence. These communities are
branch plants, decisions critical to community life are made in distant, often foreign cities (Himelfarb 1977). Jackson (1971) defines the goal of these companies as an attempt over time to extract profit from their operations. As a result of their corporate goal the companies want a stable, inexpensive workforce to maximize productivity at minimal cost (Bradbury 1980). The literature acknowledges this domination, where it is to the companies' advantage to take a paternal interest in the community to promote stability, if a stable community will try to minimize labour turnover (Wichern 1972, Lucas 1971). It can cost the company up to $10,000 to locate and train a mine worker replacement (University of Saskatchewan 1979).

Viet (1978) states the problem of high labour turnover is often synonymous with community turnover. Unlike an urban environment, the resource companies are often the only significant employers in SRMCs. Loss of employment for any reason often means leaving the community to seek work, and often even to find housing. Community turnover is disruptive to social networks and local decision-making, detracting from community self-determination and individual satisfaction (Wichern 1971, Matthiasson 1971).

Lucas (1971) notes retirement due to age or injury in SRMCs with company controlled housing often means leaving the community. Viet (1978) observes that in the company owned town of Fermont, Quebec housing is sold to the company's employees. However, if the husband works for the mine and the wife does not, title of the house is in the man's name only. As a
result, for the women, divorce means loss of community, as there is no non-company accommodation in Fermont. Viet notes this is clear company policy to minimize required housing stock by expelling non-productive members of the community.

The demographics of many SRMCs are atypical of the Canadian population as a whole. The purpose of the SRMC is to act as a dormitory for the mine workers, and most of the mine workers are young through middle-aged males (Viet 1976). There are few women in the labour force in SRMCs. As a result there are disproportionately high ratios of males to females in SRMCs and the vast majority of females are typically married. MacMillan (1977) states it is company policy to have married males, where possible, as they are the most stable and least likely to quit their job. As mentioned earlier, accommodation for singles in SRMCs is often lacking (Rabnett 1978). Viet (1978) suggests one way to minimize this imbalance and potentially decrease turnover in SRMCs is to provide quality accommodation for both single males and females, as well as encouraging female hiring for mine workers.

Another demographic factor of SRMCs noted by Lucas (1971) is the age cycle of the community. When a new SRMC is recruiting, many families locating in the community are in their twenties and thirties. For those that stay, the average age of the community residents increases through time as most non-tedious job positions are filled and retained in the first few years of the new community. As a result the particular SRMC tends to reflect the interests of the majority age group.
If a resident is younger or older than the community norm, community services are less likely to be geared to provide for the individual, as in SRMCs there is often a lack of specialized services, due to the communities' small size (Bancroft 1975).

Matthiasson (1970, 1971) identifies employment as the major factor for residents initially coming to a SRMC. Hourly wages are high in the mining communities to offset perceived disadvantages of isolation and impermanence of job tenure and to attract skilled urban workers (MacMillan 1977). In Canada, only the construction industries tend to pay higher hourly wages (ibid). Markusen (1978a) identifies a number of effects that high wages and resultant in-migration of both mines and construction workers can have on the existing communities in the region of a new mining project. Community services are overwhelmed, the poor are displaced as prices rise (Dixon 1978). Due to high wages, workers are attracted from other employment sectors in the region to work in both construction and in the mine. The latent regional labour force is often attracted into the newly created sector by high pay. Native and household production for use value is replaced with wage labour for exchange value (Markusen and Schoenberger 1979, Weaver 1981). Dixon (1978) identifies profound community stress, as a result of parents becoming dual members of the labour force, resulting in increased juvenile problems, alcoholism, marital breakdown and rampant consumerism. Land use patterns can be profoundly shifted in the region by
demands on land both for mining and necessary inputs, such as water or power, for the mine project (Markusen 1978a). In 1977 in Fort McMurray, 15,000 transients passed through the community during a construction boom period, straining the supposedly adequately prepared social services (Parkinson and DeTomasi 1980).

Once construction and recruitment periods of a mining project are over, the single resource industry markedly stratifies the community. Lucas (1971) identifies three types of mobility in these communities: limited mobility by seniority for workers, lateral managerial mobility to other communities, and out-migration by young adults, after growing up in the community and finding no employment prospects. There is only one industry in these communities, as a result the industrial hierarchy forms the social hierarchy of the community (Riffel 1975). Because of the limited opportunities structure, and its effects on everyday life, several authors see a relationship between community turnover and limited mobility (Matthiasson 1971, Jackson 1971, Rabnett 1978, Bancroft 1975). Nickels et al (1976) found the least likely workers to leave a community were those of low intelligence and low aspirations, having often grown up in a community of similar size and opportunities as their present community. Indeed Peach (1970) states that youths of high ability and/or aspirations have little choice but to relocate in urban areas for higher education and employment.

Cram (1971) indicates individual dissatisfaction with
job-related self-esteem and self-actualization in mining communities is associated with high labour turnover. For Marx (Seeman 1969) this powerlessness to control one's own destiny and have pride in one's work produces a state of alienation. While the Marxian view argues that alienation is inherent in all wage labour under a capitalist mode of production, the literature indicates that alienation both in the Marxian and liberal senses is greater in a resource extraction community. Control comes from outside the community and the broader economy disproportionately shares the spoils of the community's labour through the town's typically limited facilities and services -- Castell's (1978) uneven indirect wage of collective consumption. A good example of this differentiation is the SRMC of Tungsten N.W.T., as reported in the Vancouver Sun (March 25, 1980). The 400 residents pay three million dollars a year in personal income tax and receive in return, in site specific benefits, one R.C.M.P., three teachers and a small school. It is not surprising that Bradbury (1980:p.30) states "alienated workers tend to use the towns as places in which to work for short periods to gain money before moving on to new jobs".

Lucas (1971) notes, mining or non-mining, single industry domination contributes to resource community residents acquiring a fatalistic outlook on the world, an anomic perception that the individual has no control over his/her own destiny; his/her destiny is controlled by forces outside the community. Durkheim (1951) theorized that an abrupt and
unfulfilled aspirations

MINE
(work environment)

self-determination in job

DEPENDENCE
(on outside world)

perceived needs met ONLY if consistent with EXTERNAL GOALS

COMMUNITY
(non-work environment)

self-determination through local government

unfulfilled needs

alienation

unknown future (lack of control)

turnover

stability (low turnover)

Figure II - Dynamics of stability, satisfaction and alienation in a single resource mining community.
unforeseen growth or diminution of an individual's power and wealth tend to produce anomie, a condition of normlessness, and that due to the business cycle it is a regular, therefore statistically normal, factor of existence in a capitalist society. Like alienation, in a small hinterland community of single industry, anomie may be felt more strongly than in Canadian society as a whole. This anomie and alienation feeds back on the community, potentially detracting from individual quality of life. Porteous (1975b) found only 44 per cent of respondents interviewed in Granisle, a British Columbian copper mining community, believing the company would not one day leave the workers stranded. This is consistent with Lucas' (1971) findings that community residents do not know how long the basic resource of the town will last, "the community is always on the verge of closing, but never actually closing" (ibid:p. 98), "the citizen of a single-industry community has the feeling that he has no control over his destiny" (ibid:p.339).

In conclusion to this section Figure II attempts to graphically represent the dynamics of external dependency, satisfaction and alienation in a single resource mining community. External control over both the mine and community by global markets and external decision makers results in direct alienation, anomie and dissatisfaction in both the work environment and non-work environment. Dissatisfaction also comes about through unfulfilled aspirations and needs that the external world, isolated SRMC, local mine and stratified
occupational and social structure cannot meet. Dissatisfaction leads to employment and community turnover, feeding back on itself, and potentially weakening self-determination as a result of broken social networks and perceived impotence. Occupational and community satisfaction, promoting stability, comes about through both local self-determination, again producing a positive feedback loop, and also external decisions. However, external decisions will only promote satisfaction for the mine workers and other SRMC residents if these decisions are consistent with external goals. It is no wonder that high rates of turnover exist in SRMCs.

PROPOSED ALTERNATIVES TO THE PRESENT FORM OF SINGLE RESOURCE MINING COMMUNITIES

The literature has suggested a number of alternative settlement forms that may mitigate many of the present problems of SRMCs. Robinson (1962) proposed planning on a regional basis, resulting in a centrally placed community with more than a single resource economic base. Robinson theorized that if several resource sites can be serviced from a central location this central community would be less likely to be impermanent. As a result, entrepreneurs would perceive less risk and evolution of a satisfactory private housing market would be more likely to occur. The community would be larger than a single SRMC and have more alternatives to choose between. As the central community would be more likely to
conform to expected ideological values of urbanity, isolation would be less of a problem. Because the central community would not be dependent on a single industry, external dependency would exert less control over community decision-making. The larger core population would be more likely to promote significant local self-determination resulting in decreased alienation and a more satisfactory community.

Parker (1963) proposed a permanent nomadic township that would move from site to site as a particular ore body expired. Thus a core population would be maintained over time, maintaining social networks. This alternative of movable townsites resolves the problem of impermanence after a fashion, though does not resolve the problems of isolation and dependency. A nomadic town would significantly contrast with the dominant values of Canadian urbanity, perhaps limiting resident collective consumption more so than the traditional SRMC. Identity with place, required for community, would be limited. Alienation may be greater in this mode of settlement than the conventional SRMC.

In Siberia, Soviet planners have evolved a group system of settlement. This system includes one central permanent community with several road-linked, non-permanent, extraction townsites within two hours travel of the central community (Slipchenko 1979). This system would seem to combine the best of both Robinson's and Parker's proposals.

Another alternative is presently being used at Rabbit Lake, which is a dormitory town where workers are flown in and
out of the mine site on a weekly shift basis (University of Saskatchewan 1979). There are about one hundred workers involved at the mine site at any one time, this compares to a population of 900 for the traditional SRMC originally proposed for the project. The mine site dormitory town is not the workers' community as defined by this thesis, rather the worker's community is where they live with their families in the outside world. Rabbit Lake has one of the lowest labour turnover rates in the Canadian mining industry (ibid). The mine site dormitory town is impermanent, isolated and completely run by the company, however this alternative allows the workers to live in a permanent, non-isolated, urban community, of their choice, with their families when they are not working. This alternative intentionally eliminates the potential of a future ghost town by dealing with the certainty of abandonment when the ore body expires. As well, this alternative confronts the problems of isolation and dependency by neither attempting to deal with them at the site, nor by attempting to obscure them. Yet, this alternative manages to capture a stable labour force who receive a perceived high quality of life as exemplified by their low turnover of less than 23 per cent per year (Nogas 1976).

Another alternative is to modify the conventional SRMC. Traditionally the construction and 'permanent' project workers are perceived differently in planning for new mining communities. Robinson (1962) suggested rather than having a short term shanty town for the large number of construction
workers {often several times the number of 'permanent' workers (Best 1980)}, planning should incorporate both sets of workers into the long range plans of a new community. Rather than being comprised of two waves of population the new community can be planned, built and run by one population, perhaps increasing the length of existence of the SRMC and inducing a relatively stable, self-determining core population from the beginning of the community. We will return to these policy issues in the last two chapters.

While considerable research has been done on the problem of SRMCs and prescriptive remedies proposed, few studies have specifically examined the roles and interactions of the concerned actors which create the structural setting for these problems in SRMCs. The next chapter proposes to redress this oversight by examining the roles and interactions of actors in SRMCs from a British Columbian perspective. This will provide a more analytic perspective from which to evaluate the probable success of various planning solutions in coming to grips with the SRMC problematique.
Notes

1. Bradbury (1979) addressed the roles of corporate capital, financial capital, labour and the state in a case study of Schefferville.
V. ACTORS IN SINGLE RESOURCE MINING COMMUNITIES AND THE LATE LIBERAL IDEOLOGY: A BRITISH COLUMBIAN PERSPECTIVE

Markusen (1978a) identifies three major groupings of actors in SRMCs: the state, organized capital, and labour. These aggregates of actors may be subdivided into many sectoral subgroups, in the case of labour, examples would be skilled or unskilled mineworkers, local management, or service worker; in the case of the different territorial levels of government, different ministries and agencies, each with their own particular mandate. These actors and their sectoral subgroups all have different interests and objectives, yet the different actors interact in territorial space to attempt to meet their individual goals. This interaction results in alliances and conflicts with specific outcomes of various degrees of goal attainment. As goals are often at odds between the different actors, equal success can seldom be met by all individuals. To assist the interactions of less successful actors in the system, mitigating processes, i.e., beliefs of future improvements and/or institutional structures such as unemployment insurance, are often developed to maintain continued participation of the less successful sub-groups (Cuneo 1979b).

ORGANIZED CAPITAL

The British Columbian mining industry is dominated by a small number of large multinational companies, predominately
American and Japanese controlled (Payne 1980). These corporations are run from executive offices in corporate centres such as New York or Toyko. Such transnational corporations operate through controlling interests in subsidiary companies in secondary metropoles such as Vancouver (Bradbury 1979). Indigenous companies are either 'squeezed out' of existence, or taken over by the multinational subsidiaries (Holland 1979). "The decisive difference between the two is that the {multinational} corporations have considerable control over their own supplies, finances and markets such that competition and risks are substantially reduced or eliminated" (Marchak 1975b:p.36).

Transnational corporations interested in resource extraction are there for one reason: as much profit accumulation as possible. This profit is not necessarily measurable within the confines of provincial or national accounts, rather it is aggregated within the integrated corporations own global accounts. Barnet and Muller (1974:p.186), describing transnational corporate diversification, state, "The subsidiary manager understands that the interest of the company in worldwide profit maximization may require minimization of {taxable} profits in his country, and that while the company will benefit from the 'efficient' allocation of profits, the country will not". Thus the site specific role of transnational corporations at a single resource mining community is extraction of the resource at minimum cost to the corporation. If a satisfactory cost of
extraction is not possible at a particular SRMC location, the transnational corporation will close that site and move to another SRMC, possibly in another country, where satisfactory costs can be achieved (Blake and Walters 1976).

Gunton (1980) documents the profit flows of Kaiser Resources, until recently a transnational-owned extraction corporation, presently producing two-thirds of B.C.'s coal exports. During Gunton's study period return on investment was over 35 per cent per year, while approximately 84 per cent of Kaiser's cash flow left the British Columbian economy. In another instance, Payne (1980) details how Bethlehem Copper's book profit before taxes between 1964 and 1975 was 49 per cent of its production revenue, Granisle's was 42 per cent, and Craigmont mines' were 47 per cent. Payne argues that these huge profits allow rapid payouts of debt, allowing corporate accumulation of large amounts of retained earnings. This increased net worth reflects in the value of the corporation's issued shared capital, allowing huge capital gains for the foreign owners, as well as collected "dividends which often far surpassed the value of their initial investment" (ibid:p.6).

The ideology of late liberalism allows corporate business to capture these large profits through the mythology that "the preservation of freedom is tied to the concentration of capital, the former justifying the latter" (Mellos 1980:p.120). The corporations foster this ideological belief with self-financed advertising campaigns as well as
sympathetic corporate media support (Payne 1980, Weaver 1980). Kaiser and other corporations are allowed by society to 'diversify' their large profits outside the region from which it is produced (such as British Columbia), due to the legitimizing explanation that it allows the corporations to be more stable to handle crisis -- such as periods of low world prices. One example of this explanation used to justify highly economically successful, diversified, corporations was given by the Chairman of the Hudson Bay Mining Company:

"One of the reasons why even marginal copper mines are seldom closed by low prices is that they are increasingly operated by large companies or groups with financial ability to weather periods of low prices" (Fraser, 1975).

Thus the role of global corporate business is international profit maximization by minimizing production costs, and the late liberal ideology legitimizes this role by making it synonymous with freedom and stability.

THE SITUATION OF LABOUR

Marx (1887) argued that all exchange value is based on labour. Whether labour production creates value in natural resources is a point of contention (Robinson, 1979). However, value of the extracted resource can only be realized by the corporation through the use of labour that extracts the minerals/hydrocarbons. Working in a mine is not a desirable occupation and labour recruitment, not to mention turnover, has been a major problem for the mining industry (MacMillan et
al, 1977). Skilled mine workers have often had to be recruited from other countries, for example, Koreans for the coal mines of Alberta (Viet 1978). As a result the industry has traditionally offered high wages and induced Canadian urbanites into relocating in SRMCs with promises of company financed home ownership in "ideal" planned townships (MacMillan et al 1977, Viet 1978, Bradbury 1980).

Empirical studies have shown that the main reason workers locate in SRMCs in Canada is to make money (Matthiasson 1971, Nickels et al 1976). The workers' general goal is to make as much money as they can in the SRMC, as quickly as possible (Bradbury 1980). The workers compete for as much of the value added created by their labour as their unions can secure in direct wages. Many of the workers are successfully recruited from an urban environment and intend returning to the city after "making their stake" (Bradbury 1980). A common belief of these workers is that they leave the urban environment of "classless universality" (Marcuse 1968), go to the isolated SRMC to make a lot of money quickly as workers, and then return to the urban environment to enjoy their accumulated reward. The reality, however, is that "the stake" is seldom made in the SRMC, as direct wages are only sufficiently higher to offset costs of living (Barclay et al 1974). Indirect wages, Castells' collective consumption, are in fact lower in SRMCs, due to the uneven allocation of infrastructure and services between metropole and hinterland (Marchak 1975a). As well, clear class distinctions regarding infrastructure,
housing and services exist in SRMCs between management, skilled required labour and general labour (Lucas 1971).

The disillusioned worker may move to another SRMC to try his/her luck again (Nickels et al 1976), or returns to the city provided he/she is not trapped by home ownership or other debts making migration difficult. "The emphasis on attracting families and promoting homeownership meant that many families become locked into such communities by mortgages, high taxes, and high cost of living" (Bradbury 1980:p.34). Exceptions to this unstable population are generally immigrants and individuals who grew up in comparable communities, without living extended periods in urban environments. As documented by Nickels et al (1976) rural-born Canadians are the most likely to look on SRMCs as a permanent home. These Canadians have been socialized to accept the level of indirect wages or collective consumption available in SRMCs. Viet (1978) documents that immigrants are often apart from the rest of Canadian society, due many times to language problems and, as such, are also likely to be more stable than urbanized Canadians.

The worker's role in SRMCs is to sell their labour, for as much as possible. Common beliefs encourages the idea that a SRMC is a place to make money quickly. It is on the "frontier", a modern day Klondike (Matthiasson 1970). The reality appears to be, however, that permanent residents of SRMCs are most likely to be anomie-trapped urbanites, non-Canadian immigrants and rurally socialized Canadians. Combined
direct and indirect wages may be lower for these hinterland residents than the metropole average.

THE FUNCTION OF THE STATE

The function of the state in SRMCs is not simple or unidimensional. Under Sections 109 and 117 of The British North American Act, the province is the sector of government dominant in the control of SRMCs. The ultimate goal of any government or state is to remain in "power". The government of British Columbia, be it Social Credit, or New Democratic Party, is no exception (Black 1979). The policy that British Columbian governments have historically chosen for actualizing their continuation in power is to appear to work for the immediate material interests of the electorate (Halversen 1980). Kraushaar and Gardels (1981) argue that the actions of the state is constrained by the economic base of society, capitalism, and the state's overriding concern is economic growth through facilitating capital accumulation. Economic growth often facilitates capital accumulation in the hands of a few members of society representing a contradiction for the state. The capitalist state has two conflicting needs. On the one hand the underlying concern of government is efficiency in increasing gross regional product, and the accumulation of capital. On the other hand the state has a need for legitimacy as appealing to all interests, to allow re-election. In late liberalism the state attempts to resolve this contradiction
through a minimum level of intervention in society to alleviate problems associated with rapid capital accumulation. This intervention is achieved by state allocation and production of goods and services, as well as direct transfer payments, 'the province working for the immediate material interests of the electorate'. "The first and most important function of the state is to enable the development of capitalism; the second is to make acceptable that development" (Davies 1974:p. 5).

A basic tenet of late liberal welfare state doctrine is the "concept of continuous economic growth that would steadily increase per capita income" (Krauchaar and Gardels 1981:p.2). Miller (1978:p. 6) argues this "growth motive substitutes for an authentically moral basis for capitalism". It is no wonder that government development criteria for SRMCs reflect this principle of efficiency for economic growth. Paget and Rabnett (1980:p.5) state "the key question is the efficiency of the risk investment; how to get the biggest (potential) bang for the buck". As government must appeal to the interests of the majority of the electorate to gain re-election, in hinterland regions an important ideological component of state activities is to create employment and distribute economic development (Davies 1974). The proposed development of Northeast Coal is a good example of the British Columbian government fostering capital accumulation while representing it to the electorate as increased employment and regional development. The Province's interventionist role in Northeast Coal development
has resulted in planned production and allocation of infrastructure to both extraction corporations and future residents of the development. However the majority of the allocations are going to the extraction companies to meet transport requirements (Halversen 1980). Davies (1974) cites several empirical studies showing that free enterprise state allocation for collective consumption has lagged far behind state allocation for corporate production. The policy and values of the provincial state in British Columbia appears consistent with that of other governments in similar situations. The province facilitates development of SRMCs to assist corporations in development of new mining enterprises, increasing economic growth and the government's opportunities for re-election. However above all, this development results in increased corporate capital accumulation.

THE CORPORATE/GOVERNMENT ALLIANCE AND LEGITIMIZING IDEOLOGY

In British Columbia, with the short time horizon of an electoral period, at most, five years long, "the role of the experts in the administration is degraded". "The major resource-using pressure groups vie for influence instead" (Halversen 1980:p.16). The most important resource-using pressure groups are, of course, organized business, and to a lesser degree organized labour. Gunton (1980:p.10) states that this influence, "provides externally controlled firms with sufficient political power to force provincial governments to
implement policies such as selling public resources below market value and providing indirect subsidies through the provision of cheap energy or infrastructure". As a result of the need to maintain power and the effect of pressure group influence, cabinet policy development is likely to arise in three areas only: (1) policies that result in production of startling economic gains; (2) those that may produce benefits for the "little people" or the electorate as a whole; and (3) "those that must be changed to maintain or improve British Columbia's position on world markets" (Halversen 1980:p.16, quoting Black 1979).

For a policy to accomplish any of the above three objectives when the government is influenced by distinct pressure-groups of organized international business, the province must continually create a stable environment in which individual corporations can maximize profits. The provincial government can seldom control corporate development in a positive fashion, it can only attempt to direct corporate investment by the use of incentives and regulations acceptable to the corporate sector (Holland 1979). The state can infrequently be a neutral structure, as its very continued existence depends on assisting corporate business to maintain ongoing conditions to perpetuate profit making and give the appearance of increased territorial wealth (Davies 1974, Kraushaar and Gardels 1981). If the province does not maintain these conditions the short term reality may be a lack of multinational corporate investment resulting in: (1) major
short term economic loss, (2) benefits to the electorate as a whole decreasing in the short term, and (3) British Columbia's position on world markets decreasing as transnational corporations would be disinclined to invest in an "unstable" area. This would probably result in a loss of power for the government (Darnette and Poncet 1980).

In the resultant corporate/state alliance the state acts "as a creator of infrastructure and a legitimator of corporate activity. Legitimation consists of the provision of the laws and social and economic infrastructure which facilitate corporate growth, especially in those sectors of the economy which depend upon large corporations as the means or mechanism of economic growth" (Bradbury 1979:p.149). International corporations relate to the provincial government as an institution to be manipulated in order to maximize profit. "In general terms, these companies have had two basic aims in their ongoing relationships with government, to preserve for themselves the maximum possible degree of autonomy within which to pursue their activities and to obtain the highest possible financial benefit from the state through either preferential tax treatment or subsidies" (Payne 1980:p.41).

Jensen (1980) identifies six functions that the state is often forced to fulfill due to the pressure of the aggregate influences of organized business. One, the state is bound to maintain and assume financial responsibility for the general conditions of production, i.e., infrastructure, such as railways, used potentially by more than one corporation. Two,
the state is obliged to maintain regulation of the exploitation of natural resources, so that a) environmental damage arising from one corporate production processer cannot adversely affect the profitability of other corporations; b) the state furthers the interests of corporate business in general by regulating profitable access to exploitation of raw material. Three, the state is often required to ensure the existence of sufficient and appropriately trained labour power in the required sectors and territorial space. Four, the state is bound to protect private property relationships to maintain stability and allow profitable production. Five, the state often has no choice but to pursue an extra-provincial policy which furthers the interest of international business at the provincial level, e.g., Alberta's or British Columbia's corporate energy policy versus Eastern Canadian manufacturing policy. And six, the state is often compelled to intervene when crisis threatens the continued production of surplus value and thus it attempts to implement economic stabilization policies.

These six functions of the state under transnational corporate influence have a profound influence on government policy for SRMCs. The provincial government is often forced into a clear alliance with multinational corporations. Yet the alliance is not with any one specific corporation at the regional level, rather this alliance is at the aggregate territorial level (Lipietz 1980). The ultimate goal of the state is its own continuity in power: the resultant policies
the state must pursue for SRMCs include creating a town containing stable, inexpensive labour for the extraction process, while maintaining the appearance of constructing the town to meet the best interests of the town's future residents. This encourages maximum votes for the government at the province-wide level -- as long as the mythology that provincial economic "growth" is synonymous with individual economic increase, predominates.

This notion of the "common good" is used to legitimize the state/corporate alliance. Gone are the classical liberal doctrines of pure individualism, legitimizing individual entrepreneurship, the right to be a Getty or a Rockefeller. While the current ideology misrepresents the workings of the market -- to give an appearance of competitive profit making companies battling for their share of the market (Holland 1979) -- it also legitimizes "the concepts of demand management, state subsidies and limited government ownership" (Weaver 1980:p.17). With an economic base of transnational corporate accumulation, the late liberal ideology supports collectivism and co-operation. "This is so because corporate planning and control assumes a societal or global character encompassing both private and public interests and promoting them as universal interests" (Mellos 1980:p.112). The distinction between the corporate and state spheres -- "the economic interest of the private appropriating individual and the public interest of community well being" -- no longer exist (ibid). The illusion is generally given that the public
interest has taken over the private interest for the common good.

The costs of infrastructure investments for resource extraction are initially borne by the province, working in the name of the common interests of the electorate. These costs are partially offset by taxation of the extraction company and the rest made up by the taxation of labour (Skaburskis 1980). However, the nature of the alliance between the state and corporate business often results in a disproportionately small share of infrastructure investment for public well-being (Carney 1980). "The state appears also to spend the minimum of social infrastructure required to actually retain the labour force, to reproduce and keep it quiet" (Davies 1974:p.9). The state attempts to find the equation giving maximum stability of labour at lowest state cost, so as to ensure minimum taxes and resultant minimal indirect labour costs to the company. "Regional policy initiatives must be such that they do not contradict the requirements of capital accumulation... The burden of taxation must not be increased to the point at which it threatens profitability of private capital" (Jenson 1980:p.10).

Thus the corporate/state alliance, evolved over time, locks provincial policy making, into a situation where policy must generally assist foreign corporations' exploitation of the province's natural resources. Provincial policy must repeatedly minimize labour costs, direct and indirect, for these companies at the expense of the majority of the
residents of British Columbia. Furthermore, provincial policy commonly has to attempt to conceal this inherently unsettling situation. To do otherwise would result in a loss of electoral power for the government. The institutional structure of society is shaped and inter-locked just as its ideology is shaped and inter-locked, by the economic base of transnational capitalism.
Notes

1. Kaiser Resources, the largest coal exporters in British Columbia, is presently controlled by the British Columbian Resource Investment Corporation (BCRIC), a Crown Corporation of the provincial government. However daily management of the company is under a company controlled by Kaiser International. Originally, coal rights on Kaiser's properties were given to Crowsnest Industries gratis by the provincial government. Kaiser acquired these rights in the late 1960's. In 1980 BCRIC reacquired these properties by purchasing Kaiser for the sum of approximately three hundred million dollars.

2. Conceivably this group of rurally socialized Canadians is decreasing with the impact of mass media, telestar, and the like, in rural communities. Markusen (1978b) raised this issue in the U.S.

3. Among the better examples of concealment of such by the emerging late liberal ideology -- private planning by transnational capital represented under the mantle of universal interests -- are the Club of Rome reports (Meadows et al 1972, Mesarovic and Pestel 1974, Tanberger 1976). Their doctrine of general sacrifice and global planning for the universal good was pointed out by Friedmann and Weaver (1979) to be underwritten by transnational corporations to further their corporate interests.
VI. SINGLE RESOURCE MINING COMMUNITIES AND THE SOCIETAL FRAMEWORK: THE CONTRADICTIONS OF COMMUNITY STABILITY

SINGLE RESOURCE MINING COMMUNITY PLANNING IN BRITISH COLUMBIA SINCE THE 1965 INSTANT TOWN ACT

In British Columbia the provincial government is habitually locked into its alliance with multinational corporate business for the administration of single resource mining communities. The province has filled the 'welfare-state' role and has become responsible for development of community well being in SRMCs. This provincial involvement resolves the blatant paternalistic problems of direct corporate intervention in company towns, promoting dissatisfaction and high turnover which result in high production costs for capital (Queen's 1953, Bradbury 1980). In filling the state policy of assisting capital accumulation, the province enacted legislation enabling SRMCs to function from their earliest stages as "autonomous" municipalities. As briefly mentioned earlier, the Instant Town Act (1965) facilitated incorporation of new SRMCs and allowed enfranchisement of the SRMCs' residents. Local residents became responsible for much of their own collective consumption, such as infrastructure. Representative government became the responsibility of the residents, rather than that of the extraction companies, at least this was the message the
act conveyed. Port (1972) and others, however, have documented the reality of continuing corporate domination of local government in both new and mature British Columbian single resource communities.

There is no specific New Towns Legislation in British Columbia. The 1965 Instant Town Act amended the then existing Municipal Act to allow the creation of municipalities in conjunction with natural resource extraction. The relevant sections of the Municipal Act (British Columbia 1979) are as follows:

Incorporation: natural resource development

9. (1) Notwithstanding sections 6 and 7, where, in the opinion of the Lieutenant Governor in Council, it is in the public interest to establish a municipality in conjunction with the development of a natural resource, the Lieutenant Governor in Council may, by letters patent, incorporate the residents of a rural area into a municipality on the receipt of a petition from at least 5 residents in the area of the proposed municipality.

(2) Until the first council is elected or 5 years from the date of incorporation, whichever is later, a municipality incorporated under this section is deemed to be a village for the purposes of sections 306 (2) and 307.

(3) The Council of a municipality incorporated under this section may provide housing for employees of the municipality and may incur liabilities for it on terms and conditions approved by the inspector, but no obligation incurred for this purpose shall exceed a term of 5 years.

(4) When a municipality is, or has been, established under this section, the Surveyor General shall, as soon as practicable, establish sufficient co-ordinate control monuments to enable the area, or portion of it, to be constituted an integrated survey area under Part 3 of the Land Survey Act, and, on completion of the required survey, he shall so constitute the area or portion. Thereafter the municipality shall be responsible for the protection
and maintenance of the co-ordinate control monuments.

Letters patent
13. (1) Letters patent incorporating a municipality shall specify the
(a) municipality's name, boundaries, area and class;
(b) qualifications for membership on the first council and for the voters at the first election;
(c) time and manner of electing the first council;
(d) terms of office for first council members;
(e) returning officer, or provision to appoint him, at the first election.
(2) The letters patent may specify
(a) polling places at the first election;
(b) that the returning officer shall determine the day, time and place of the council's first meeting;
(c) the sum of money which may be borrowed for the municipality's current expenditure in the first year, and for the next year, if deemed expedient;
(d) dates which may be observed initially, and once only, in place of statutory dates;
(e) other matters and conditions, including the appointment of an interim council, deemed proper or necessary by the Lieutenant Governor in Council.
(f) provision for the transfer to the municipality of any asset, right, claim, obligation or liability of a municipality dissolved on incorporation.
(3) The letters patent under section 9 or 10 may
(a) include exceptions from statutory provisions;
(b) specify the effective period or time for an exception;
(c) provide for restriction, modification or annulment by the Lieutenant Governor in Council of an exception or its effective period.
(4) Where a municipality has been incorporated under section 9, the Lieutenant Governor in Council, on the recommendation of the minister, may by supplementary letters patent provide for further exceptions and conditions.

Effective date of bylaw

306. (1) A bylaw adopted by the council of a city, town or district is in force from the date of the adoption or from a subsequent date fixed by the bylaw.

(2) A bylaw adopted by the council of a village is in force from the date of its registration with the inspector or from a subsequent date fixed by the bylaw.

Registration of village bylaws
307. A true copy of a bylaw adopted by the council of a village signed by the mayor or member presiding at the meeting at which the bylaw was adopted, and by the clerk, sealed with the seal of the village and certified to be a true copy by the clerk, shall be deposited for registration with the inspector, who may register or refuse to register the bylaw, or take any other action he considers in the public interest.

With this legislated authority the provincial government has complete freedom as to development standards and design for new SRMCs. Until five years from the date of incorporation or a duly elected council is in place, a new single resource mining community is completely controlled by the provincial government. In the incorporating letters patent the province has the right to change statutory provisions of the Municipal Act at incorporation or at any other time in the life of the community, ad infinitum. In British Columbia SRMCs are no longer company towns, they have the potential to be fiefs of the provincial government, acting in the interests of international corporate business, restricted and controlled by more specific legislation than other types of incorporated communities, allowing direct provincial control, at the whim of the Cabinet.

With the change to direct provincial intervention came the need for provincially sponsored planning. Planning is a social process reflecting the interactions of forces in society. For Castells (1978) planning serves two functions: (1) negotiating potential conflict between dominant groups; and (2), legitimization of the accepted political outcome of the negotiations. In a free enterprise economy planning often
facilitates accumulation both ideologically and institutionally:

"at the ideological level in terms of the rationalisation-legitimization of social interests, particularly through planning documents; at the political level, as a privileged instrument of negotiation and mediation which all groups present {dominant actors -- state and capital} attempt to appropriate in order to vest themselves with a social and technical neutrality" (Castells 1978:p.86).

State planning assists hinterland development to allow capital accumulation in peripheral regions, at the same time masking inequalities created in these regions by development (Davies 1974). The legitimizing belief "of the planners, and all others who manufacture it -- politicians, trade unionists, and the companies themselves -- is that receiving areas will be saved from decline or from underdevelopment", even though this belief lacks clear scientific support (ibid:p.14).

For peripheral regions "the state's role as ideology creator, and as a disguisher of both the reality of its intervention as an enabler and of the social effects of industry, is most fully worked out through the agencies concerned with social and physical planning" (ibid:p.15). In British Columbia the major agency involved in planning for SRMCs is the Ministry of Municipal Affairs. Paget and Rabnett (1980:p.1) write, "The Province and the Ministry responsible for settlement planning -- Municipal Affairs -- have to be involved to a greater extent in resource development communities than it would in dealing with normal communities".

Sullam et al (1978) identifies three types of planning
processes for new and existing resource communities. The first style of planning and the process practised by the provincial government up until the early 1970s, is reactive planning. This planning process attempted to achieve regulation of SRMCs by the provincial government through the design of the incorporating letters of patent of a new community, coupled with an incremental response to later impacts (Paget and Rabnett 1980). Sullam et al (1978) argue that this form of planning basically serves the extraction companies at the expense of present and future SRMC residents. This process only becomes aware of a problem, such as a lack of housing for the service sector, after its impact has created measurable damage. Reactive planning, being a form of incremental planning, tends to be nearsighted. At Elliot Lake reactive planning failed to even consider the possibility that ore contracts might not be renewed. This lack of fore-sight resulted in thousands of residents losing their lifetime investments (Robinson 1962). Paget and Rabnett (1980), writing for Municipal Affairs, acknowledge the failure of this type of planning, noting it failed to alleviate the "company town syndrome".

The second style of planning process described by Sullam et al (1978) and implicitly by Castells (1978) and Davies (1974), is compensating planning. This is the process presently being practiced by the Provincial Government, facilitated by the Municipal Act, and is exemplified by the planning documents prepared for Tumbler Ridge. This form of
planning perceives the problem of resource community design and growth as one of risk and advocates adjustments to growth by providing insurance through pre-growth negotiations. Fundamental to this process is the belief on the part of the state, that local and future community residents do not have the required information or resources to negotiate fairly with the resource company; they may not even be aware of the new resource community in the negotiation stage. Therefore the state must represent SRMC residents in development negotiations. Bradbury (1980) notes that little consideration is given to future residents by resource companies, except when it profits the company. Environmental, economic and social impact assessments are the legitimizing tools of the trade for compensating planning. In theory the state represents its own interests, as well as the interests of the present and future SRMC residents. In actuality the provincial government may only look after their constituents at the provincial macro-level of aggregation, through providing ideologically valued "growth", at the expense of the interests of the populace of a disaggregated micro-area of the impacted region the province is supposedly representing in negotiations (Markusen 1978a, Salisbury 1974).

The third type of planning process possible for SRMCs is territorial planning (Sullam et al 1978). This process dramatically changes the planning concept. Territorial planning is based on the local community and is not imposed by the state to serve the state's aggregate interests; rather,
territorial planning serves the long-range interests of the community's members. This type of planning process is not practised in British Columbia.

Territorial planning is concerned with the original and future residents of a SRMC, their particular ideology, economic linkages, lifestyle and political processes. This form of planning takes a longer range view, comparing potential development approaches, within the existing socio-economic framework to achieve the most desirable global outcome for a community's residents (Hilhorst 1979). As such it inherently contains utopian concepts unexceptable to the dominant groups in our society. However, it is explicitly cognitive of the site specific quality of life in the community (Weaver 1980), and thus is inherently more effective for improving SRMC living conditions through localized self-determination — typically at the expense of efficient corporate capital accumulation.

THE FAILURE OF SINGLE RESOURCE MINING COMMUNITY SELF-DETERMINATION IN BRITISH COLUMBIA

As described in Chapter Two, community self-determination is a key criteria for community stability. For community residents to engage in local self-determination a number of conditions must generally be present (Wichern et al 1971). One, a stable core population must exist in the SRMC. Bradbury (1980) argues this development of a core population is a basic
planning goal for SRMC development in British Columbia, and was a basic intent of the 1965 amendments to the Municipal Act, meant to promote home ownership. Two, this core group must have access to local government. The 1965 amendments facilitate formation of local government through incorporation of the SRMC. Three, the core group of community residents must perceive a long-term future in the SRMC. And four, local government must be perceived as having significant powers of control for the community.

The first two conditions are facilitated by present provincial institutional arrangements in British Columbia. However the latter two conditions are unlikely to be met successfully in a SRMC. With an induced, stable core, volunteer organizations evolve and an interest in local control may come about (Wichern et al 1971). But what of the criteria of "a perceived long term future", in a community where there is only one major industry based on an exhaustable resource, sold in a cyclic global economy? Local self-control through local government is impotent to deal with exogenous influences on the community, such as the world business cycle, or technical change destroying the economic value of the community's single resource. Ignoring all other considerations, to attempt to induce a stable core population, citizen participation and local government -- to create a stable community -- may be ineffective in a SRMC with a perceived short-term lease on life, i.e., the mine may close in a few years.
Without local control of employment, promoting a diversified, stable economic base (a "growth centre", or "hinter-politan" region perhaps), single resource mining towns with finite employment horizons may never be stable communities. Under the present global economic system, where footloose corporations locate for maximum profit, a diversified economic base is all but impossible in isolated single-staple communities under our present institutional arrangements. In this environment high community and employment turnover, involving non-trapped urbanized residents, is a result of more or less rational responses by individuals attempting to achieve both a higher and more stable quality of life for themselves. A belief system fostering perceived local self-determination will only promote stability in communities confident of long term employment security, allowing the community to remain as "home" for its residents for the foreseeable future. Few SRMCs in British Columbia are likely to promote this confidence, as testified by their high turnover rates (Bancroft 1975).

The provincial government's policy reinforces the belief that democratic co-operation of SRMC residents can result in mitigation of many of the problems in SRMCs, including population instability. Yet the local political processes are clearly impotent to deal with mine closure and loss of employment due to changing world markets or international, national and provincial decisions. Furthermore, SRMC governments are restricted by the Municipal Act to less self-
determination than other British Columbian communities. Indeed
the economic and institutional environments of a SRMC have
already been negotiated by the province through a compensating
planning process at community conception. The letters of
patent incorporating a SRMC are defined externally to the
community and can be changed at the whim of the provincial
cabinet, more easily than other non-resource communities.
Local decision-making in resource towns is further restricted
by requirements for receiving external financial capital for
public works (Bradbury 1979, 1980). In this environment
unfulfilled resident aspirations and demands, intensified by
exposure to volunteer organizations (Kerri 1971) and an
ideological value of democratic decision-making, may lead to
alienation and apathy.

A single resource mining community can seldom be a stable
community according to the definition defined by this thesis,
as SRMCs are critically dependent on outside controls. SRMCs
are not resilient to external changes in demand for their
staple product, or to new corporate or higher government
policy decisions. Nor are SRMCs adaptive (due to their
dominant raison d'etre -- to housing mine workers) to
perceived advantageous change. As a result, significant
changes in these communities are seldom locally initiated.
Limited local government, due to community apathy, is
routinely run indirectly in the interest of the extraction
corporation; which is also usually the major rate payer (Port
evolution, self-determination, is not a point at which stability is reached for the single resource mining community; true, the community may have local government, but this government is dominated by pre-negotiated constraints of international contracts and letters of incorporation and often economically controlled by outside circumstances.

PROBLEMS OF COLLECTIVE CONSUMPTION: UNEVEN ALLOCATION AND IDEOLOGICAL EQUALITY

As a result of ineffective local government and a provincial legislative system often unresponsive to the demands of a representatives "sitting on the back-benches", SRMCs are uncompetitive in fighting for the indirect wages of collective consumption due their predominately working-class residents (Black 1979). Peripheral regions, such as areas occupied by SRMCs, lack political clout to compete with large urban areas for public goods and services (Davies 1974). Castells (1978:p.169) argues that the indirect wage of collective consumption is a result of political and trade union struggle, as labour "acquired strength and political influence in advanced capitalist countries, the direct wage received by employees has increasingly been supplemented by an indirect wage, socially levied, and by collective goods and services which often become more important for the popular living standards than the nominal amount of direct wages." Due to social inequalities of predominately working class SRMCs
and territorial under-development in the hinterland, these communities are least capable of competing for this collective consumption in British Columbia. This inequality of indirect wages is compounded by the corporate influence on government attempting to minimize taxation costs for extraction corporations, where it is often in the company's interest as a major rate payer to minimize social service costs, as well as the frequent corporate dominating of local government decision-making processes.

Many problems in SRMCs are problems of uneven collective consumption. By definition of collective consumption as an indirect wage, resolution of housing, facilities and service problems in SRMCs cannot occur without eventual increased corporate costs. These costs, directly or indirectly, would detract from corporate profits. Problems of turnover in SRMCs could be decreased by increasing levels of collective consumption, improving the opportunity for advancement in the work force, and encouraging more citizen involvement in local government. However, these recommendations would incur corporate business costs either directly or indirectly through reduced productivity in the extraction process. On a provincial level the British Columbian Government is attempting to attract and maintain footloose international corporate investment. The societal framework in British Columbia, with its established corporate/government alliance, has evolved an equation balancing (1) SRMC workers' stability against (2) minimizing production costs, and (3) allowing
maximization of British Columbia's potential to attract transnational resource extraction through a politically stable environment. Payne (1979) documents the failure of the late N.D.P. government's attempt to slightly shift this equation in favour of the residents of British Columbia. To significantly improve the problems of inequitable collective consumption in SRMCs would again upset the balance of this equation, as it would probably incur greater economic cost for the international extraction corporations than the possible economic costs it might save by lowering employment turnover; i.e., it would lower economic efficiency. Benefits of this improvement would go to the SRMCs' residents, not to government, which was the intent of the failed N.D.P. mining legislation (Payne 1979, 1980), or the corporations. This reallocation would not be in the dominant actors' interests. There would be risk that the extraction corporations would invest elsewhere where costs are lower, resulting in increased potential for eventual provincial government defeat at the polls.

An intrinsic requirement of free enterprise, in advanced "industrial" countries such as Canada, is the creation of beliefs, often through the media, to encourage a high consumption of goods and services in order to fuel the economy. "One of the most essential problems of advanced capitalism is that of finding new markets able to keep up with the mass of capital which must be made productive and profitable" (Castells 1978:p.169). Girvetz (1966) argues mass
consumerism by all classes of society is required to prevent chronic stagnation -- Marx's internal colonization (Ferrarotti 1979). This demand for consumption is expressed in both consumer consumption, goods brought directly with wages and credit, and collective consumption, goods and services allocated by the indirect wages of state and institutional social allowances (Castells 1978). For Castells (1977) the settlement pattern is one of the many mechanisms that stimulate commodity consumption. Private "suburban" housing and the consumption behaviour this environment creates has been made possible by ideological beliefs fostered and reinforced by state policy (Harvey 1978). SRMCs are no exception, with their orientation to "suburban-like" single family housing (Bradbury 1980).

A central value of our present dominant ideology and reinforced by the "sovereignty of the consumer" myth, is individual freedom of choice (see Chapter II, Girvetz 1966). However, this freedom of choice is generally not available in SRMCs, as it is seldom site-specifically efficient from a corporate or state perspective. Another common value of late liberalism is belief in the universal standard of living, including equal "rights" to multiple consumer choice (Mellos 1980). Existence in a SRMC contradicts this belief, and as a result perceived quality of life for the SRMC's residents is lowered. This contradiction is partially offset by the liberal belief in growth (Girvetz 1966); one day the SRMC will grow to a size at which collective consumption and consumer choice is
FIGURE 3   CONTRADICTION OF THE STABLE SINGLE RESOURCE MINING COMMUNITY IN BRITISH COLUMBIA
comparable to larger urban environments. However, in a community based on a finite resource, externally controlled, this mythology is unlikely to fully obscure the reality of limited choice of consumption. For residents of SRMCs this inability to achieve the "universal right" of consumer equality can only lead to further alienation.

THE CONTRADICTION OF THE STABLE SINGLE RESOURCE MINING COMMUNITY AND THE FUNCTION OF THE STATE

A contradiction exists for Canadian SRMCs participating in the present global economy (see Figure III). Values created by the dominant Canadian ideology -- urban oriented choice, self-determination and individual aspirations for universal consumerism -- shape the perception of a "desirable quality of life" for residents of British Columbia. This concept of desirable quality of life in turn shapes the concept of a desirable community. A desirable SRMC, with the potential for stability, is required to provide a high standard of consumer and collective consumption for its inhabitants. The historically evolved institutional arrangements of government in British Columbia, maintains the concept of an electoral system in which government is chosen every few years. A prime ideological belief is that economic growth increases the share of all British Columbian's wealth. To reinforce this value and remain in power, government is compelled to facilitate corporate development to assist capital accumulation and
increase economic growth; the state/corporate alliance. As a result, the state generally has little choice but to minimize costs to the extraction corporations. In SRMCs this means attempting to minimize demand and the availability of collective consumption to maximize economic efficiency of the extraction process.

Thus a contradiction appears between state promotion of stable single resource mining communities, on the one hand, and the fact that stable SRMCs require a reasonable level of collective consumption. The state, based on present decision-making criteria, is obligated to attempt to minimize collective consumption to facilitate capital accumulation and attract further international capital development. The state can only "efficiently" provide the minimum collective consumption sufficient to attract and maintain a labour force. If this labour force has high turnover, the state can merely attempt to limit turnover to minimize aggregate extraction costs. If the most cost effective turnover rate is 90 percent of the work force per year, this is the standard of community the state is compelled to provide. The state cannot resolve the underlying reasons behind this high turnover; viz. poor quality of life in SRMCs. It is obligated to minimize cost, such as limiting local citizen self-determination to prevent develop of locally desired services and infrastructure, to maintain minimum collective consumption. As a result, in single resource mining communities there is both class and territorial exploitation resulting in alienation.
High turnover and instability is the outcome of this contradiction.
VII THE PROVINCE OF BRITISH COLUMBIA AND TUMBLER RIDGE: A CASE STUDY

Two important functions of the state, as noted by Jensen (1980), are to provide appropriate labour, and reproductive infrastructure for this labour, to facilitate corporate development. As a result, the Province of British Columbia must attempt to design and build single resource mining communities that minimize both problems and costs, so as to be able to attract and maintain labour, yet achieve a high level economic efficiency to allow maximization of corporate profits through low taxation and low overhead expenditures.

The Provincial Plan for Tumbler Ridge is the latest and most comprehensive plan to attempt to accomplish these goals (Thompson, Berwick, Pratt 1978 a, b, c, d, e, ). While the 1978 plan, itself, is now out of date for implementation without major change (among other considerations, it is based on a 10.25 per cent mortgage rate), the document represents present provincial policy and orientation (Paget and Rabnett 1980). Official planning documents typically serve the purpose of rationalizing and legitimizing dominant social group interests, they represent the documented outcome of predetermined class mediation, controlled and negotiated by planners on behalf of the interests of the state (Castells 1978). Similarly, these documents often include mystifying ideology to hide and confuse the underlying economic realities of society (Davies 1974, Goldstein 1975). The 1978 plan may never be implemented, but it reflects the institutional and
ideological policy of the state in regional development.

THE PLAN

The 1978 plan presents Tumbler Ridge as a SRMC competing with other SRMCs to attract and retain a stable labour force.

"The community spirit of residents, whether homeowners or renters, greatly influence the labour availability and attitude in the area. Equally important is the relationship and rivalry between the new community, other nearby towns of similar purpose, and the interface with more remote regions of industry or commerce. The proposals for Tumbler Ridge envisage a good size town, self-supportive in major commercial aspects and demanding a high calibre of municipal services" (Thompson Berwick Pratt 1978b:p.116).

The 1978 plan acknowledges Tumbler Ridge as a dormitory community for coal extractions.

"It is recognized that the primary reason for creating a new town is generally economic. The new town is necessary to house the anticipated labour force for a proposed new development" (Thompson Berwick Pratt 1978c:p.7).

In the plan the community is being designed to accommodate 10,000 future residents. Tumbler Ridge will be approximately sixty miles from Chetwynd and Dawson Creek via a proposed highway. The site of the new community is presently undeveloped, with only a few trappers residing in the area. The environment is mountainous, with a climate in which snow can be expected between September and May. The 1978 plan proposes two alternative physical layouts for the community. One layout is more dispersed with a higher ratio of single-family housing. This proposal is more rurally- and children-
oriented than the second denser, urban oriented proposal. Costs for the latter are about 5 per cent lower, though surveys of other comparable communities have shown a preference for the more dispersed layout.

The 1978 plan, as with most provincial planning in the 1970s, acknowledges the failure of the market to effectively create an efficient community for SRMCs, and therefore proposes comprehensive, pre-negotiative planning for Tumbler Ridge, with planning initiated by government.

"The solution involves negotiating a complete general development agreement between all development participants outlining the objectives and responsibilities and specifying desired service levels and delivery systems including questions of timing and financing" (Thompson Berwick Pratt 1978e:p.53).

Since future residents and local government for Tumbler Ridge will not be available in this negotiation stage, the plan proposes government represent these actors.

"It would be expected that the Province would exercise a proxy for the local government and future residents in the negotiation stage. This is fully defensible because of the Provincial constitutional jurisdiction in the area of municipal affairs" (Thompson Berwick Pratt 1978e:p. 53).

To co-ordinate this compensating planning process the plan calls for a specific organizational structure to administer and implement the negotiated programmes and policies. Castells (1978) and Davies (1974) would agree that this planning organization would serve to buffer the government from criticism and backlash from contradictions created by the state/corporate alliance. This organization
would legitimize the pre-negotiated plan as "professional planning" for a desirable community, rather than planning for minimum aggregate production costs.

The 1978 plan has a time horizon of ten years, though the plan assumes Tumbler Ridge will have a life span of over twenty years due to development of other undefined industries, as well as coal mining. The plan does not address the potential of mine closure and the psychological effects this potential may have on future residents. Nor does the plan deal with the effects of this uncertainty on potential private service sector development, even though this possibility of closure and resultant problems caused by it is expressed in the literature (Riffel 1975, Lucas 1971). The plan itself follows a linear sequence of development in the growth of the community, but admits to some degree of potential inaccuracy due to a lack of extraction corporation input into the plan. The impact of Tumbler Ridge on the region is considered outside of the scope of the 1978 plan and is not evaluated, even though as early as Robinson (1962) regional planning was considered an important aspect of SRMC planning.

The 1978 plan professes to build from the perspective of the individual, rather than from the perspective of creating a sense of community. Within the principles used for development of Tumbler Ridge in the plan, the individual is considered self-sufficient, so as to reduce resident dependence on both employer- and government-supplied social services.

"It {the Plan} must ensure in the end that currently
non-existent residents would be satisfied with their community in terms of housing quality and cost, municipal services, and taxes, but it must do so without shifting a disproportionate share of costs onto non-residents represented by the senior governments and the resource companies" (Thompson Berwick Pratt 1978a:p.11).

The 1978 plan does not define what a "disproportionate share of costs" is, though the residents will eventually pay the majority of the cost of the community. However, the plan does acknowledge that the quantity and quality of this collective consumption will be inferior to southern British Columbia.

"It is not efficient in terms of human and material resources for Tumbler Ridge to attempt to provide all things for all people, perhaps in a way that southern communities can afford to do. Therefore, in order too promote "efficiency" the range of options for physical and social services must be constrained. However, efficiency must not compromise resident satisfaction. In fact, if Tumbler Ridge is to be competitive in attracting a workforce from the limited labour supply, then the needs and aspirations of the inhabitants must be better satisfied in Tumbler Ridge than in other resource towns" (Thompson Berwick Pratt 1978c:p.10).

Indeed, as we will see below, the quality and quantity of collective consumption will be just sufficient to allow Tumbler Ridge to compete with other SRMCs for the necessary mining workforce. Clearly this is consistent with minimizing aggregate production costs for the coal extraction.

The plan proposes designing the community for a specific group of residents with similar aspiration levels and similar ways of satisfying these aspirations. This is in keeping with the corporate need of universal consumers with the same wants and desires, allowing production of the town at minimal cost.
"The desired inhabitants would have similar aspiration levels and similar ways of satisfying them" (Thompson Berwick Pratt 1978c:p.11).

"The residents must perceive their needs to be well satisfied by the constrained range of options offered" (ibid).

To attract similar residents the 1978 plan calls for a theme for the community. Three basic criteria are proposed for the type of future resident to be attracted to Tumbler Ridge to maximize stability and minimize cost: 1) people who do not want material goods or services; 2) sociable people that can provide their own entertainment; and 3) generalists that do not require special services (Thompson Berwick Pratt 1978a:p.11). Similarly the plan calls for the recruitment of married families rather than singles to minimize turnover and increase stability.

"In order to achieve community stability as early as possible deliberate and early policies should be implemented to attract and keep families in the community" (Thompson Berwick Pratt 1978b:p.549).

To maximize stability and minimize cost for Tumbler Ridge the province's comprehensive planning approach calls for direct government intervention in the normal market economy of the community. The plan as well as designing general community layout and public facilities and services, such as sewerage and roads, takes an active interest in designing the housing mix and town business core. The plan estimates ability to pay for housing and services, determines allocation, and incorporates this among its planning criteria. As such, traditional consumer consumption such as housing choice and
business choice are publicly defined.

THE PLAN: COLLECTIVE CONSUMPTION AND HOUSING

As an implicit goal of the plan appears to be minimization of costs to both government and the extraction companies, this is reflected in the standards, allocation and charges for collective consumption in the community. Service levels in the plan were determined as per the province's (1976) Guidelines for Coal Development. The planners considered the provincial service standards as a baseline for "base level and timing of services for the new town", as well as looking at the actual standards of several existing SRMCs to arrive at competitive standards.

"The existing level of service delivery was developed by examining B.C. Government service standards, programs, and policies; a projected base level and timing of services for the new town; and the level of services one could expect to find in an established Canadian resource town. A level of service delivery desired by resource town residents for a new town was then established" (Thompson Berwick Pratt 1978c:p.40).

"Since Tumbler Ridge must be efficient and compete for its population; the principle of urban standards should be followed initially. The options for alternative standards when the community stabilizes should be retained" (Thompson Berwick Pratt 1978b: p.546).

"It is recognized that the quality of life and thus morale of the residents and turnover in the workforce can be related to level of services. In this regard, since too high a level could cause comment from other resource communities, this report proposes a standard of services that would be in keeping with the level expected in a modern Canadian community" (Thompson Berwick Pratt 1978b:p.190).
The 1978 plan does not attempt to create a community with better quality of life than other SRMCs, rather the plan attempts to set social service standards that are most cost effective for implementation, yet still are capable of attracting and maintaining a labour force. Policy for Tumbler Ridge is to determine the equation giving maximum stability for lowest investment for lowest cost to the extraction companies. The plan justifies lower than average service standards by claiming the need for resident input into desired services. Essentially the plan incorporates limited future citizen participation to lower initial costs and to design "efficiently", as under-valued, though perhaps important services, would not be built.

"A reduced level of services or delayed facilities both can be changed by the residents themselves at such time when they feel the level of services as originally suggested can be afforded" (Thompson Berwick Pratt 1978d:p.132).

The document proposes offering less services at lower cost than required by provincial standards. However the plan hopes to satisfy future residents by restricting the type of resident recruited into the community, so that the residents of Tumbler Ridge will not demand a level of collective consumption comparable to southern British Columbia. The plan hopes to lower costs further by integrating diverse services together and using facilities to serve multiple services (Thompson Berwick Pratt 1978:p.112). Similarly, to reduce demand on services in the community and lower costs the plan
calls for efficient use of transportation to other communities.

"While it is unrealistic to expect to find as complete a range of goods and services as in a large metropolitan area, good transportation linkages will greatly reduce the perceived need for such goods and services as well as provide a reasonable level of access" (Thompson Berwick Pratt 1978b:p.176).

To lower demands on services such as health care, the plan designates the use of educational programs to train the residents to both prevent problems from arising and allow the residents to deal with simple problems when they do arise (Thompson Berwick Pratt 1978c:p.110-111). Similarly, the plan calls for a comprehensive volunteer program to assist professionals in the community and lower the number required (ibid:p.118). The residents of Tumbler Ridge, unlike residents of the Vancouver metropole, can provide for their own collective consumption in their spare time! In the same vain, the document calls for the substitution of professionals in the North with para-professionals.

"Increasing the number of para-professionals working in the North. This would decrease the demand and consequently the need, for professional staff and help reduce the costs of social service delivery" (ibid).

The 1978 plan considers creation and maintenance of a suitable housing supply imperative to create a "stable community". The plan states that the Province must play an active role in designing and controlling Tumbler Ridge's housing market. From a study of the communities of Grande Cache and Sparwood, the planners concluded a strong preference
among SRMC residents for single family housing. Both physical layouts of the community reflect this preference. Similarly, home ownership was found to be strongly correlated with community satisfaction. Four major criteria for housing were evolved for the plan: 1) affordability, to allow attraction of families with children; 2) choice, for both mine and service workers; 3) promotion of community stability, private ownership with choice creates stability; and 4) innovative housing to meet aspirations as well as climate (Thompson Berwick Pratt 1978b: p.352-3). The plan's policy is to integrate both mine worker and service worker housing and financing under government direction to facilitate low community turnover (Thompson Berwick Pratt 1978b:p.473). To promote a stable service sector with equal availability of housing the plan discourages the traditional corporate housing subsidiary (Thompson Berwick Pratt 1978d:p.120). This also has the advantage of lowering corporate costs and further shifts community costs onto the residents.

The document calls for predominately self-owned housing in Tumbler Ridge, with the planned housing availability attempting to make self-owned and self-financed housing available to all residents (Thompson Berwick Pratt 1978d:p.134). Though the plan is now out of date, as it based all housing mortgages on an interest rate of 10.25 per cent, it is significant that proposed mortgages be based on a ten per cent down payment over a twenty-five year period. Yet the coal mines may not last that long (presently proposed coal
contracts are for only fifteen years), leaving residents of Tumbler Ridge with outstanding mortgage payments on housing with no market value (Best 1980). The plan calculated resident ability to pay for housing and infrastructure as 30 per cent of the gross main family salary and sixty-seven per cent of any secondary income (Thompson Berwick Pratt 1978d:p.10). Initially, over half of a family's net income will go to pay for housing which may not have any intrinsic value even before the mortgage is paid out.

Self-ownership of housing is considered very important in the document, however housing and servicing costs are substantially higher in Tumbler Ridge than southern communities such as Vancouver.

"Housing affordability is critical to the success of the town" (Thompson Berwick Pratt 1978a: p.162).

"Shelter will cost 70% to 80% more in Tumbler Ridge due to labour and material premiums and to higher demands on housing performances" (Thompson Berwick Pratt 1978a:p.62).

To facilitate home ownership the plan proposes to artificially manipulate housing stock prices to fit the ability to pay (Thompson Berwick Pratt 1978d:p.134). Also, the document proposes offsetting the costs of servicing lots from the initial purchase price, rather recooping servicing costs in higher municipal rates (Thompson Berwick Pratt 1978a:p.9a). This proposal will minimize the need of corporate subsidies for housing, resulting in workers paying higher rates instead of receiving traditional SRMC housing subsidies. As well, this offset lot cost will lower the perceived cost of housing for
new Tumbler Ridge residents, increasing the propensity for home ownership. This home ownership will "trap" community residents into stability in Tumbler Ridge, and this stability will be further increased by high municipal rates increasing opportunity for resident debt; this is consistent with Bradbury's (1980) argument for Gold River.

As noted above, a basic tenet of the document is that the community will be self financed and it will not be a provincial economic liability -- it will pay for itself.

"While we must address the specific circumstances the town will face, and while we seek to introduce innovations which will enhance the quality of life in the town, we realize that the town will one day stand on its own and be responsible for its financial viability. The town, therefore must be designed to be financially viable" (Thompson Berwick Pratt 1978c:p.13-14).

Costs for housing, facilities, and services will be higher in Tumbler Ridge than Vancouver, due to the isolated nature of the community (Thompson Berwick Pratt 1978a:p.114). The total cost for the community in 1977 dollars was estimated in the plan to be approximately 286 million dollars. The private sector, residents and companies will directly absorb 82 percent of this cost, and another 7 percent indirectly in school and municipal taxes. The province and federal governments will pay for the remainder (Thompson Berwick Pratt 1978d:p.6). Residents of the community will directly pay 192 million for housing and on site physical services, 67 percent of the total cost of the community. The plan proposes the mining corporations pay 55 percent of the municipal rates,
as a result, residents will be responsible for repayment of 45 percent of the municipal debt (Thompson Berwick Pratt 1978d: p.143). This resident municipal debt will be over 9 million dollars, or three percent of the total community cost. Residents in Tumbler Ridge will be responsible for a per capita municipal debt of 860 dollars. In the metropole of Vancouver, the residential share of the municipal tax burden is 250 dollars per person (based on figures in Vancouver 1980, and a personal conversation with Pat Wolfe, City of Vancouver). In Tumbler Ridge, aggregate residential debt (housing and infrastructure costs) will be 70 percent of the total, 201 million dollars. The plan estimates 3,827 families, or "social units", in Tumbler Ridge when the community is fully developed. Average aggregate family debt, both housing and municipal, in Tumbler Ridge will be 53,000 dollars (in 1977 figures). The estimated annual average family gross income will be 20,140 dollars (evolved from table 9(5.6), Thompson Berwick Pratt 1978d: p.105). Thus the average family debt for labour recruited for Tumbler Ridge will be equivalent to over 2.6 years gross family income.

Tumbler Ridge will be a far cry from the traditional company-owned town of the early 1950s, where residents payed a nominal rent for accommodaton, on average "one-third of the rent they would pay for equivalent accommodaton in the nearest ordinary community" (Queen's 1953:p.97). If Tumbler Ridge prospers the residents will have their "investment" returned in future equity, however, if the mines should close, as is
the inevitability of all mines, and the community becomes a "ghost town", the eventuality of many SRMCs, this equity will be lost to the community residents. This plan and the present Municipal Act forces residents of new SRMCs to pay for the majority of their own collective consumption. In a new hinterland community residents cannot share in the accrued capital investments of historical community development, such as residents of Vancouver can, they must create and pay for this investment themselves. Societal wealth and collective consumption are unevenly distributed between metropole and resource town. Due to the precariousness of single resource staple extraction, the future residents of Tumbler Ridge may not even be able to recoup their personal investment. The 1978 plan, with its ten year time frame, does not so much as address this possibility!

THE PLAN AND LOCAL SELF-DETERMINATION

The 1978 plan, perhaps taking into account the alienating qualities of frustrated citizen participation, calls for little citizen input or self-control, of the town during the initial building and recruitment stages, yet this participation is an important requirement for the creation of a sense of community for the future new residents. The document recommends the formation of a Social Development Board, preferably with a partially elected membership. However, the majority of the seats are to be determined by the
province and the corporations, as the planners consider a fully elected board ineffective.

"While this method maximizes residents' participation, it is likely that it would be less effective administratively" (Thompson Berwick Pratt 1978c:p.114).

The plan proposes eventual local government as per the intent of the Municipal Act. However, the 1978 plan argues for the need of a special organizational structure, above the local government, to successfully implement the Province's comprehensive planning (Thompson Berwick Pratt 1978e:p.30).

"This organization should be legal, non-political, have control of financing, have decision-making power, have direct access to Premier and/or Cabinet, and consist of selected professionals who then act as a "development team"" (Thompson Berwick Pratt 1978e:p.37).

The intent of the plan is for this development organization to have effective control of the community until recruitment has been completed. This means a non-political, non-representative group of professionals controlling the community with stronger powers than local government for at least ten years (Thompson Berwick Pratt 1978c:p.A19).

"The current organizational structure for the public and private sectors tends to be formulated on a largely laissez-faire principle. The major impetus for social programs comes from within the community generally channelled through the local government. The local government then acts as the major focal point for co-ordination" (Thompson Berwick Pratt 1978e:p.29).

"The current structure does not ensure that any particular objectives will be fostered and certainly does not guarantee a comprehensive approach to the organizational concerns of the community" (ibid: p.30)
This proposed planning organization, with powers greater than local government, is perhaps an excellent idea for the construction stage of Tumbler Ridge, but it is certainly questionable for a community of several thousand people. Perceived lack of local control by the future residents of Tumbler Ridge will potentially increase resident alienation, perhaps inducing higher community turnover. This recommendation for a dominant technical organization of administrators is clearly contrary to Wichern's (1972) and Wichern's et al. (1971) findings concerning the need for responsible local government to promote stable SRMCs. This organization is responsive to the state, with its corporate alliance, rather than local Tumbler Ridge residents. Indeed, the 1978 plan makes clear, provincial policy to protect the extraction corporations from expenditures, potentially imposable by local government democratic decision-making.

"When the Company's property is placed on the tax roll and is taxed at an average commercial mill rate, then the Company's annual contribution may constitute 50% - 60% of the town's revenues. As a result the residents can expand their facilities and pay only a fraction of their costs. Unless controls are placed on the municipality's taxing capacity, then the Company can be unduly burdened" (Thompson Berwick Pratt 1978e:p,18)

The argument would be unacceptable in southern urban municipalities where percentage of corporate rates are comparable to Tumbler Ridge. In Vancouver, commercial owners pay 48 per cent of the municipal rates, and this percentage excludes Vancouver business taxes (personal conversation Pat Wolfe, City of Vancouver). Plainly the 1978 document is acting
on behalf of corporate interests.

THE PLAN: ITS EXPLICIT IDEOLOGY AND POTENTIAL FAILURE TO CREATE A STABLE COMMUNITY

The 1978 document is consistently written from an emic ideological perspective, incorporating liberal values and beliefs into the proposed community, while the above documented etic "reality" is one of facilitating capital accumulation. There are three 'themes' proposed for Tumbler Ridge: 1) community self-sufficiency; 2) learning community; and 3), experimental research community (Thompson Berwick Pratt 1978a:p.16). Regardless of which theme might have been chosen, all three themes reinforce the liberal worldview and at the same time potentially lower state/corporate costs for the community. The first theme legitimizes the responsibility of Tumbler Ridge's residents for their own collective consumption. The second theme proposes local training of community residents to increase work skills and be their own professionals. The third theme legitimizes the potential for planning mistakes and future problems in the community. Indeed, specific value orientations permeate the 1978 plan, attempting to lay an ideological foundation to create a belief that Tumbler Ridge is a desirable community regardless, of the problems created by 'efficient' design.

"A change in attitude towards resource towns should be encouraged to focus on the positive and not the negative aspects of resource town living. Each
participant has a responsibility to foster a new way of thinking which emphasizes the 'challenge and appeals to the frontier or pioneer spirit' (Thompson Berwick Pratt 1978c:p.13).

"The Company, the media, education institutions, social organizations and clubs have a responsibility to foster a new way of thinking which emphasizes the challenge and appeals to the pioneer spirit" (ibid:p.108).

The 1978 plan represents Tumbler Ridge's lack of collective consumption and user-pays philosophy as an advantage. The reality of poor services, expensive housing and a limited future is disguised by the ideological values of the frontier community.

The document this chapter has critiqued provides substantial support for the argument that a state/corporate alliance has evolved under transnational capitalism, in which the primary function of the state is to facilitate capital accumulation. The 1978 plan for Tumbler Ridge attempts to further dominant group interests in minimizing the cost of a stable labour force. And furthermore, the state's role as ideology creator has been underscored, as planners working through a provincial agency -- Municipal Affairs -- have been documented in the act of mystifying the reality of this role.

Additionally, this planning document supports the argument of the inability of planning, in our present decision-making system, to resolve many of the problems of SRMCs. The plan repeatedly stressed the need to recruit specifically restricted types of individuals to become future residents of Tumbler Ridge. The planning process used, appears
unable to structurally resolve many of the traditional problems of SRMCs: isolation, impermanence and dependency. Instead the plan attempted to obscure these problems by proposing recruitment of future residents that are less likely to be sensitive to them. MacMillan et al (1977) documents the inability of the Canadian labour supply to meet the present labour demands for the Canadian mining industry. Recruitment success, of future mine workers for Tumbler Ridge, is unlikely to be significantly better than experienced for other mining projects. Turnover is likely to remain near Bancroft's (1975) calculated British Columbian average of ninety percent. Urban-oriented mine workers will probably be recruited for Tumbler Ridge as a result. In Tumbler Ridge, potential dissatisfaction for urban-oriented workers may be higher than in other SRMCs, due to the 1978 plan's objective to design the community for easily satisfied homogenous residents.

The Tumbler Ridge plan restricts the potential for development of a stable community (as defined in Chapter Two). The document does not address the need for maintenance of the social and economic networks required for community. The plan fails to address means of dealing with damaged friendship and organizational networks created by potential community turnover. Nor does the plan address creation of alternative economic networks for employment if the mines require fewer workers over time, due to increased capitalization or reduced world demand. Similarly the plan does not explicitly address the Canadian ideological values required for an acceptable
quality of life, promoting stability (see Chapter Four). As a result of reliance on easily satisfied future residents, the plan does not handle problems of SRMCs, significantly differently than they have been handled in the past for other, now unstable, SRMCs. Tumbler Ridge will explicitly have limited choice of goods and services. Potential mine closure is ignored. The social hierarchy in Tumbler Ridge will be formed by the industrial occupational hierarchy, with little potential for fewer resultant social problems, caused by this hierarchy, than those noted by Lucas (1971). The community will lack adaptability to deal with change, as it is designed in the plan to exist, essentially, only for coal production. Loss of employment will generally result in community turnover destroying social networks. The 1978 plan compounds this latter problem, due to high property taxes and mortgage payments, required for mandatory housing. Forced private home ownership and resultant high monthly payments will serve as a mechanism to expel non-productive members from the community, as no low income housing is proposed for Tumbler Ridge (Thompson Berwick Pratt 1978b).

The plan's proposed creation of a planning organization with explicit veto power over local government will further weaken a sense of community in Tumbler Ridge, as well as detracting from the town's potential for stability. This proposed organization, when combined with other unresolved problems of external dependency, will probably result in a greater degree of alienation for the town's residents, than,
that, found in many other SRMCs with perceived more satisfactory local government (see figure II p.61). The 1978 plan deals with the physical environment and the social requirements of the townsite, but does not successfully deal with the future residents' needs required to create their own satisfactory environment and develop a sense of identity with place, required to produce a sense of community. Resultant alienation and potential high turnover may prevent a true sense of community from satisfactorily developing in Tumbler Ridge, at least if the town is created as proposed in this planning document.
VIII BEYOND THE STABLE SINGLE RESOURCE MINING COMMUNITY

RESOLUTION OF THE PROBLEMS OF SINGLE RESOURCE MINING COMMUNITIES: AN IMPOSSIBILITY

Tumbler Ridge exemplifies the role of the state facilitating transnational corporate development at the direct expense of the future residents of Tumbler Ridge and, indirectly, in the long run, the residents of the rest of the province. Provincial policy, while giving the appearance of promoting a desirable community, is in reality attempting to minimize costs for multinational corporate business. The present electoral system, footloose nature of transnational corporations, and expectations of "growth" on the part of the electorate -- perpetuated by the dominant ideology of late liberalism -- make this type of policy role for the state inevitable.

A "compensating" planning approach, as applied to SRMCs, cannot deal effectively with the real problems of isolation, impermanence and dependency. This type of planning approach, negotiating conditions between the various actors, can only favour the dominant order. The present planning process must hide, not resolve, the problems created for the non-dominant actors, residents of SRMCs; for the goal of this planning process is not resolution of SRMC problems, but resolution of problems detracting from capital accumulation. For staple
extraction these problems are lack of economic efficiency, increasing production costs and potential lack of societal stability changing the status quo (Davies 1974, Goldstein 1975).

This planning process, in achieving its real goals, cannot help but create problems for non-dominant actors, due to its "efficient" allocation of the finite economic rent from staple resources between the competing groups (Markusen 1978a). Furthermore, this compensating planning process, representing the state and corporate factions, will eventually create further long-term regional or territorial problems when the resource is either depleted or no longer of value to the extraction corporations (Holland 1979). A prime objective of the Tumbler Ridge Plan (Thompson Berwick Pratt 1978a-e) is supplying stable extraction labour at minimum cost over a ten year period. What will happen when coal demand ceases or the reserves run out? The transnational extraction companies will have achieved their goal, as they amortize their investments over a seven year period (Best 1980). The implementing government, due to facilitating the perception of provincial growth, will have achieved their goal of increased short-term votes (Black 1979). However, the infrastructure for Northeast coal is amortized over twenty years, housing over twenty-five years (Skaburskis 1980). Will these territorially fixed and financed structures have their investment recouped? If not, it will be to the detriment of the residents of British Columbia and in particular the residents of the SRMC.
Even more important from a humanistic perspective will be eventual loss of Tumbler Ridge's major employers. If the community of Tumbler Ridge is constructed, its 10,000 residents may eventually be left with little or no reason for existence when the coal mines eventually close. Even partial closure, or increased capitalization of the industry, will result in many Tumbler Ridge residents loosing employment. A reduced population in Tumbler Ridge would destroy the artificial housing market, resulting in a loss of housing equity for all remaining residents. In either eventuality, remaining unemployed residents will be a classical "mobile surplus labour army". In the worst case, residents' substantial personal investment in Tumbler Ridge may be worthless. Yet it appears policy for new SRMCs, like Tumbler Ridge, does not deal with this eventuality, it is irrelevant to the goals of attracting corporate development and maximization of the development's economic success for industry. Furthermore, this eventuality is beyond the political "cost/ benefit" time horizon of the electoral system.

For these reasons, the problems of SRMCs and uneven hinterland development cannot be resolved under our present societal decision-making framework. The present planning process in British Columbia, while giving the appearance of attempting to resolve these problems, is really attempting to achieve other goals, facilitating the interests of the
dominant actors in the decision-making framework. The late liberal Canadian ideology, if properly sold, may soften and hide the reality of SRMCs, but this ideology does not have the power to resolve this reality.

PLANNING FOR SINGLE RESOURCE MINING COMMUNITY RESIDENTS WITH OUR PRESENT DECISION-MAKING FRAMEWORK

Present compensating planning fails to directly address the problems of SRMCs. Due to the institutional framework of British Columbia, perhaps no planning process initiated by the state can address these fundamental problems. A territorial planning process potentially has this ability, but it is clearly inconsistent with the institutional imperatives of top-down decision-making. Applying a territorial approach to SRMCs, one must query the long-term outcome of development on present and future residents of the community and region in question. This is inconsistent with 'efficient' goal achievement of the dominant actors, however, who are concerned with functionally based goals, or territorial based goals at the aggregate level.

The long-term territorial outcome of SRMCs and finite staple resource extraction is quite clear. The resource will be depleted and extraction will no longer be possible. At this point, there will no longer be a need or functional purpose for the SRMCs, except for the few SRMCs that evolve into regional service centres (Stelter and Artibise 1978). Being
cognizant of this eventuality, a territorial planning process must ask if there can be alternative functions for the SRMCs once mineral/hydrocarbon extraction is completed. In the isolated, relatively unpopulated areas of British Columbia, away from the provincial metropole, there are few functions to be served by a SRMC apart from the function as a resource dispersing centre and a dormitory for the mines. These communities, unless they have another marketable resource, have no potential for further primary, secondary or tertiary industries, under present conditions in our existing global economy. Industries developed in these communities are inherently handicapped by diseconomies of distance and lack of urban economies of scale, unless they have special attributes making them suitable for tourism. Labour in these communities is skilled predominantly only in mining, skilled labour for secondary industries would have to displace mine workers. Furthermore, as already noted, corporations locate in space to maximize profit by minimizing production costs. An isolated SRMC, perhaps hundreds of miles from the nearest harbour, or significant market, hardly optimizes the minimization of production costs for secondary industry in the eyes of a transnational corporation.

If SRMCs are inherently impermanent, what are their options -- the Tumbler Ridge-type scheme discussed in the last chapter? Chapter Four notes three significant alternatives to the traditional SRMC: migratory communities of "mobile homes"; the impermanent work camp; and the concept of the regional
centre with satellite resource extracting camps or limited serviced towns. The last alternative in a region of finite mineral reserves faces the same eventuality as the traditional SRMC, in our present global economy, albeit within a longer time frame. When the mineral /hydrocarbon resources are depleted, this regional centre may no longer have a functional reason for existence. In Northern British Columbia the land is rugged, the area is great, and viable mineral /hydrocarbon deposits are widely dispersed; efficient development of the regional centre concept is unlikely to be effective. Moreover, one must question the quality of life of residents of these regions if they have to drive for two hours there and back to go to the doctor or, conversely, to go to work. Indeed, this form of settlement pattern is not unlike the present SRMC reality. Implementation of a policy promoting development of a regional alternative, under our present societal decision-making system, would only further institutionalize the present unequitable distribution of collective consumption in British Columbia's hinterland.

Parker's (1963) concept of the "mobile home community", while perhaps efficient for the present dominant actors in provincial development, certainly also limits the quality of life of the community's residents. All structures, facilities and houses, would have to be constructed to be mobile in British Columbia's rugged interior. Certainly the aesthetics of this mobile community would leave something to be desired. Furthermore, this alternative does not deal with the problems
of isolation and external dependency of SRMCs. The level of collective consumption in these communities would be no higher, at best, than presently proposed SRMCs.

The third alternative is the workcamp. A workcamp is not a community in the definition developed in this thesis. In a workcamp there are few social, cultural or political networks beyond the networks directly related to the economic work environment. Collective consumption in a workcamp is minimal, just sufficient to maintain a reasonable, efficient, level of labour turnover. However, perhaps this alternative is the best resolution of the problems of SRMCs, under our present societal decision-making framework. This alternative could be coupled to the use of air transportation to allow the use of commuting between the workcamp and a permanent large urban community of high collective consumption. Rabbit Lake, a workcamp using this air commute, has an annual turnover rate of 23 percent (Nogas 1976). This compares to the British Columbia average for SRMCs of over 90 percent (Bancroft 1975). The workers at Rabbit Lake appear satisfied, they work a week and then have a week off in an urban community. When the mine closes they still have equity in their homes, community membership and intact social networks. This alternative resolves the problems of SRMCs, by not creating them. Above all, this alternative is efficient for the extraction company (Nogas 1976).

Nickels et al (1976) and Matthiasson (1970,1971) state some people, primarily from rural backgrounds, enjoy and
desire to live in traditional SRMCs. However, MacMillan (1977) notes this population is not nearly enough to fill demand for labour recruitment for mining communities, requiring enlistment of urban-oriented workers and immigrants. The implementation of this workcamp option in future mining developments, while maintaining existing SRMCs while resources last, economically resolves the needs of both the rural- and urban-orientated workers required by the mining industry.

A workcamp option was discussed and dismissed for Tumbler Ridge by the provincial government, apparently for political, more so, than technical reasons (Province of British Columbia 1977). A significant reason for dismissal was the potential size of the camps, larger than some incorporated communities. Another stated reason was the preference of the extraction companies to have government administer to the mine workers' housing and well being, rather than the corporations themselves. Even with these reservations, the workcamp alternative received consideration by government, and was believed implementable.

The plan for Tumbler Ridge (Thompson Berwick Pratt 1978a-e 1978) projected a mine workforce of approximately 3,000 people for the four potential coal mines at full production. Assuming an additional 25 percent increase for service workers (cooks, cleaners, etc.), if four workcamps were built in place of Tumbler Ridge, the average size of each workcamp would be approximately 1,000. This is significantly smaller than workcamps successfully built and maintained for major long
term construction projects, such as James Bay (Bourrassa 1973). One advantage for the workcamp option, in place of the Tumbler Ridge townsite, is that fixed investment is minimized. As the mines surrounding Tumbler Ridge are depleted over time, other prospective mine sites to the south of Tumbler Ridge could be developed (Thompson Berwick Pratt 1978a), and the workcamp structures and workers relocated. Tumbler Ridge has sufficiently mild weather to allow dependable year round air service and is approximately twenty minutes by air from Prince George, a city of 70,000 (Thompson Berwick Pratt 1978a-e). A fly in, large scale commute option might have been implemented in place of the Tumbler Ridge townsite option for the Northeast Coal Development.

The period of the 1950s through the mid-1970s has been argued to be an unique epoch, where Keynesian economics was coupled to Beveridge's vision of economic justice (Miller 1978). Miller and others argue that this period, with the state giving the ideological vision of maintenance of the social minimum through allocation of ever-increasing collective consumption is at an end. The liberal economic pie is no longer growing, rather it is decreasing in size. The implementation of the workcamp option, in place of the post-1965 Instant Town Act single resource community, is perhaps now expedient under our present societal decision-making system. The ideological implications of a workcamp environment leaves something to be desired in our liberal value framework. Yet the reality behind this commuting workcamp alternative may
actually increase quality of life for many future mine workers. At least these workers will have a permanent community to call home.

Idealistically, a fundamental societal change may allow the implementation of community alternatives, which could result in resolution of the problems of SRMCs. To be successful, alternatives would have to shift the focus of dominant actors to include residents of SRMCs, and perhaps as Schumacher (1973) proposes question the concept of economic efficency and the liberal and state capitalist concept of growth. Perhaps, if arguments of a shrinking economy are supported by evidence of a long term trend, resultant loss of accepted norms of growth may allow a shift in societal values producing increased community determination (Miller 1979). In this environment territorial planning may be implementable.

One territorial planning answer to the problems of SRMCs would be to not develop staple extraction in isolated areas at all. Yet if an existing community desired staple extraction development, or if a group desired to create a community for staple production, a territorial planning response, being less externally controlled, could question long term community development options, unlike the plan for Tumbler Ridge, and consider the question of capital accumulation -- for whom. A common result of present economic development is capital accumulation accruing to international corporations, who globally diversify the territorially produced wealth. A territorial planning approach could attempt to capture the
majority of the produced economic rent for the producing community. This approach could result in sufficient territorial wealth to overcome many of the traditional problems of impermanence, isolation and dependency in SRMCs, allowing the creation of a strong sense of community and stability.

In the 1978 plan for Tumbler Ridge (Thompson Berwick Pratt 1978a-e), over seventy percent of the community cost is being payed for by the residents. The majority of the overall development costs are being financed by the provincial and federal governments for transportation infrastructure (Halvorson 1980). The corporations are only essentially paying for, and bearing the risk of, the actual extraction plant requirements (ibid). The corporations will have made, as a minimum, a fair rate of profit over their amortization period of seven years (Best 1980). After seven years these corporations will make superprofits, if past track records are anything to go on (Payne 1979, 1980, Gunton 1980). These profits will certainly leave the area, if not the country. If the mines, as well as the community, were developed by the residents of the area (perhaps with the assistance of the provincial government), rather than by international corporations, these super profits could stay in the producing area. Investment of these profits in local post-mining industry and improved community quality could result in both a more satisfactory community for Tumbler Ridge's residents and a community with an "unlimited future".
In this alternative environment, responsibility for social well being, apart from, perhaps, assistance in initial financial capital, would not reside with the provincial government, but on the shoulders of the community residents employed in the mining venture. The province could receive comparable or higher revenue from this alternative, than it could reasonably expect under the present situation, yet its long-term responsibilities would be lowered. Short term risk might remain the same, or slightly higher, for both the community and the province, but long-term local and provincial territorial return might be much higher. Many of the problems of SRMCs are created as a result of limited local control and the finite time horizon of the resource. With territorially controlled local investment, initially from mine profits and later from other industrial ventures, in balance with local area requirements of the social and physical environment, community networks could be maintained or continually modified to be resistant to mine closure and perceived external impacts detracting from a stable community. If Northeast Coal Development where to be planned from this, admittedly utopian perspective, the resultant community would be significantly more satisfactory, than that presently proposed by the 1978 Tumbler Ridge plan.

Perhaps, in areas were a more diversified economic base exists, this territorial alternative could be taken one step further and coupled to Robinson's (1962) regional centre
concept to produce a "hinter-politan" region. This territorial, self-controlled, region would allieviate many of the problems previously discussed with this established alternative, such as the need to attract corporate investment. In many ways this alternative, with a territorial, rather than functional, orientation, would be similar to Friedmann's and Weaver's (1979) "agripolitan" development. Only this proposal would be based on an initially staples extraction region, rather than an agricultural hinterland.

Essentially, adoption of a territorial alternative, in place of traditional resource extraction, would require local ownership of the staples resource and the means of extraction. In many ways this concept is not unlike the present provincially implemented British Columbia Investment Corporation (BCRIC), except communal ownership would be at the local regional level, rather than at the provincial level. Unlike BCRIC, restrictions would be required to be placed on profits, requiring reinvestment in the region. While perhaps, not implementable under our present societal decision-making system, this territorial option holds some hope for future resolution of the stable SRMC problem.

AREAS OF FURTHER STUDY

Over the last fifteen years a great deal of study has been conducted on the problems of resource communities in
Canada. The majority of these studies have been conducted from a liberal ideological perspective. With the exception of Bradbury (1978, 1979, 1980), few social scientists and planners have conducted research outside of this liberal value framework; clearly there is a need for further research on SRMCs drawing on the valuable analytical tools of critical political economy. As well, development of utopian prescriptions addressing the problems of hinterland development in British Columbia are called for, even if they may be unimplementable at the present time.

If the potential exists in the intermediate future for implementation of alternatives based on a territorial planning process, there are many areas requiring study. Research into organizational and political structures consistent with this philosophical base are required to determine which type of structure would produce equitable but efficient management of territorial development. The relationship between existing territorial governments and possible regional "hinter-politan" areas requires exploration. Equitable allocation of regional earnings to the individual must be determined. The relationship of the territorial region to the global economy must be explored. More fundamentally, research into optimal alternative industrial development for isolated hinterland areas must be explored. Questions of scale—what is the optimal size of a region for territorial development—require inquiry.

On a more immediate level, further research in modern
workcamp/commuting alternatives for SRMCs is required. While many documents acknowledge this option, no literature empirically explores the details of the workcamp/commuting option, even though this alternative appears successful at Rabbit Lake (Nogas 1976). Questions requiring exploration include; how do satisfaction levels empirically compare between a commuting workcamp and a traditional SRMC, what would be the composition of a stable workforce in this type of environment, what transportation options would be most efficient, as well, how do the long term costs compare?

Finally, further study of the role of planners in our present societal framework is required. Are planners to be negotiators and legitimizers of the goals of society's dominant actors, as Castells (1977, 1978) maintains, and this thesis supports, or can planners partake in other acknowledged institutional roles in societal decision-making?
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