THE EVOLUTION OF URBAN AND REGIONAL PLANNING IN CANADA:
1900-1960

by

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to the required standard

THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA
May 1981

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ABSTRACT

Urban and regional planning is now accepted as a legitimate function of government. But the evolution of Canadian planning from its inception at the turn of the century to its new-found status as an objective technical exercise has been a profoundly complex process involving questions about the very nature of society. This thesis is an attempt to trace the development of the theory and practice of planning from its controversial beginnings at the turn of the century to its final acceptance as a necessary and desirable function of the state.

At the beginning of the century it became clear that the rapid pace of urbanization and the capitalist institutions of private property and unregulated private markets were in serious conflict. The new urban, industrial order that accompanied capital accumulation was plagued by interdependencies and interactions which made the unrestricted use of property an antiquated and dangerous illusion threatening the physical health of the population, the efficiency of the urban system, and the social stability of the entire society.

Canadians responded to this conflict in three distinct and somewhat contradictory ways. One approach which was advocated by agrarian radicals was to implement reforms in Canadian society in order to revitalize rural life and reverse the undesirable trend of urbanization. The second approach, which was advocated by urban liberals, was to accept urbanization as both desirable and inexorable and to accommodate it by initiating limited reforms while still preserving the basic features of capitalism. The third response, advocated by urban radicals, was to
accept urbanization as inexorable and to restructure capitalist institutions which were inimical to the sorts of government planning they thought was necessary to manage the new urban order.

Urban and regional planning was considered as essential by all these groups. After going through several initial stages of development, a comprehensive body of planning theory which appealed to all three groups was formulated by leading Canadian planners such as Adams. This theory integrated the aesthetic concerns of city beautiful planning, the efficiency concerns of American city planning, and the equity concerns of British town planning. The theory envisaged a strong role for the state in controlling property and providing housing.

By the twenties, the consensus that had formed around this theory of planning collapsed due to a gradual amelioration of urban problems and an overt confrontation between liberals and urban and agrarian radicals. During the twenties a new, more conservative theory of planning developed which emphasized the protection of private property and the provision of public infrastructure to accommodate private accumulation. Planners became allied with real estate interests who were eager to use zoning and other powers of the state to their advantage.

With the collapse of the economy in the thirties, the latent ideological conflicts which had been submerged in the twenties reappeared with renewed vitality. The urban and agrarian radicals joined forces to form a socialist party dedicated to eradicating capitalism and replacing it with a planned economy. Liberals were forced to formulate a new system of both managing the crisis and preserving capitalism. Gradually
they developed a new consensus that was based on the three principles of Keynesian stabilization policies, social welfare and sectoral planning for those areas of the economy plagued by market failures.

Housing and land were defined as one of the sectors of the economy affected by market failures. Major government reports defined a new postwar system of urban and regional planning to mitigate these failures in land and housing markets. The reports were highly critical of the type of planning existing in the twenties, and proposed a new more comprehensive system of planning and of controls over property.

The urban liberals, however, who were the dominant group, were apprehensive about the increased role of the state envisaged in these reports. Consequently, they only partially implemented the recommended reforms. Urban and regional planning, although strengthened, was ultimately subordinated to the interests of private markets and property. It again became a passive system of regulation providing necessary services to accommodate private expansion and regulations to enhance property rights. Nonetheless, its strengthened position ensured that the worst features of development were eliminated.

The tendency of liberal planning to shift back and forth between more aggressive intervention during times of crisis and very passive intervention during times of stability has meant that, because of the long lag times between the emergence of crisis and the creation of plans and institutions capable of managing the crisis, Canadian planning has been strongest after the crisis has already subsided or when it has changed form. Consequently, the ability to plan has been highest when
the need to plan has been lowest.

One question raised by the thesis is why the more passive liberal approach to planning emerged as the dominant one. It is argued that this is due, in large part, to Canada's unique character of economic development and class structure. Unlike countries such as Britain which developed more socialist modes of planning, urbanization in Canada was accompanied by a rapid expansion in agriculture and staple industries. Consequently, the Canadian response to development was logically divided between urban and rural concerns. Canada's industrial capitalist class and working class which were both promoting more aggressive urban planning were too weak to have much influence. The more powerful agrarian radicals and mercantile capitalists were able to direct attention away from the emerging urban problems to rural and resource issues which directly affected them.

In the end, the urban liberals were successful in resolving the conflict between urbanization and capitalist institutions. Limited acceptance of urban and regional planning allowed for the successful management of urban problems within the framework of capitalist institutions. Whether it will continue to be successful in doing this only time will tell.
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PART ONE: THE BACKGROUND
CHAPTER I
THE URBAN CHALLENGE

Near the turn of the twentieth century Canadians possessed an overwhelming sense of optimism. The Canadian west was filling up with immigrants, a transcontinental railway had been completed, and a new industrial sector was emerging in the central regions of Ontario.\(^1\) Prime Minister Wilfred Laurier reflected the mood of the times when he told an audience in Ottawa in 1904 that "we are proud to call ourselves a nation, and it is a matter for pride that we have more population than many of the nations of Europe. Our population at this moment can not be far from six million and it is not presumptuous to expect by the next census it may have reached eight million." To a round of cheers Laurier boldly declared that "As the nineteenth century was that of the U.S., so I think the twentieth century shall be filled by Canada.\(^2\)

Laurier's pronouncement was not without basis. During the period from 1896 to 1920 the Canadian economy did undergo a phenomenal expansion. Wheat exports, for example, increased twenty times. The value of wood and pulp and paper exports increased nine times, manufacturing output rose about six times, and total external trade per capita grew by four times.\(^3\) Canadian population, meanwhile, grew by an astounding sixty-four percent from 1901 to 1920, compared to a growth rate of twenty four percent during the previous two decades. For the first time since confederation the number of people entering Canada exceeded those leaving. (See figures 1 and 2)

This rapid economic and population growth was having a profound
FIGURE #1
Intercensul Percentage Change in Population by Urban and Rural,
1881 to 1961

Percent Change

Growth of population
Growth of urban population
Growth of rural population


(Source: Leroy Stone, Urban Development in Canada, (Ottawa: DBS, 1967), 28.)
FIGURE #2

Canada: Net International Migration, 1871-1971

impact on Canada's settlement pattern. Indeed, Canadian historians have long noted that Canada's settlement pattern has, in large part, been determined by the nature of its economic development. Initial staples such as fish, fur and timber required few permanent settlements. Therefore, Canada remained sparsely populated and rural in nature. But the new agricultural development, unlike the previous development, required a system of permanent urban settlements to supply the necessary services and manufactured goods. Consequently, the strength of agricultural development and linked manufacturing industries was resulting, inexorably, in a rapid urbanization of the Canadian population. For example, Figure 1 demonstrates that while Canada's population was increasing rapidly from 1901 to 1911, Canada's urban population was increasing even more rapidly. In fact, by 1921, almost one out of every two Canadians were urban residents compared to 1891 when just over one in four were urban. (See Figure #3).

An important feature of this rapid urbanization was the growing concentration of population in large metropolitan centres. In 1881 Canada had only one city in the over 100,000 population category; Montreal. But by 1921 seven Canadian cities were in this large category and the proportion of population living in cities larger than 100,000 increased about nine percent to twenty-four percent of the Canadian population by 1921. (See table 2). Changing technology was creating "agglomerative economies" which forced firms to locate in larger urban centres. In fact, in spite of the overall rapid growth during the 1901 to 1911 period, 115 of the 164 counties in Eastern Canada lost population as employment relocated from smaller towns to the larger
<table>
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<th>Year</th>
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<th>Change from Previous Period</th>
<th># of Cities over 100,000</th>
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<td>44.9</td>
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(Source: Leroy Stone, Urban Development in Canada, (Ottawa: DBS, 1967), 32.)
Economic growth and technical change was also resulting in profound changes in the internal structure of cities. Prior to industrialization North American cities had had relatively stable land use patterns. Different types of uses such as residential, commercial and industrial were relatively mixed and the poor and wealthy lived in close proximity to each other. Much of the employment was actually located in the residential units. But the new industrial city was different. Emerging social classes and ethnic groups were now being segregated into separate neighbourhoods which had distinct characteristics. Some sections of the city were being given over to middle class residential uses, others to commercial, some to manufacturing and still others to urban slums inhabited by immigrants. Spatial patterns were clearly in a state of rapid change.

II

Adner Weber in his famous study of 19th century urbanization commented that "the most remarkable social phenomena of the present century is the concentration of population in cities." Although this process of urbanization was universal throughout the western world, it caught Canada by surprise. Canada had been actively promoting, thoroughly expecting and even pleading for growth. But it was thought that such growth would be comprised of farmers filling up the vast agricultural hinterlands of the Canadian west. There was general agreement with the observations made in one study of Canadian society that "Canada is primarily, and probably always will be an agricultural nation." But
as the figures in the previous section illustrate, Canada was rapidly becoming an urban nation.

This rapid growth of Canada's urban population and the emergence of a new group of large metropolitan centres posed a set of problems that were to plague Canada for a long time to come. Toronto, for example, was suddenly expected to cope with the influx of 180,000 people over the 1901 to 1911 decade compared to an increase of less than 30,000 in the previous decade. Winnipeg experienced an increase of 94,000 in the 1901-1911 decade compared to about 17,000 in the previous ten-year period. Other cities such as Edmonton, Calgary, Regina and Saskatoon grew from small villages to medium-sized cities almost overnight. (See Table #2)

One consequence of this rapid growth was a serious shortage of housing. This shortage was caused by both the inability of the construction industry to expand output fast enough to meet the rising demand and by a shortage of accessible urban land. This shortage of accessible urban land was resulting from the dynamics of growth itself. The growing concentration of employment in the central areas of the city resulting from changing modes of production meant that more workers would have to live within an area fixed by the maximum commuting distance from this employment. This growth pressure could have been alleviated by decentralizing employment to peripheral locations, extending urban infrastructure or developing new transportation technology capable of efficiently moving more people over longer distances. But because of institutional impediments, technical limitations and the cost of capital each of these approaches to increasing the supply of accessible urban land took a long time to implement and even longer time to have the
**TABLE #2**  
Population of Selected Canadian Cities  
1891 to 1931  
(figures rounded to nearest 1000)

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Year</th>
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<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>691,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>819,000</td>
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(Source: Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Census 1921, Vol. I, Table 12; Census 1931, Vol. II, Table 8. Figures are for 1931 boundaries unless otherwise noted.)

* Boundary change from previous period.

**Some of the growth for Montreal and Toronto during the 1901-11 period is due to boundary expansions. Stone, in Urban Development in Canada, has calculated population for these and other major metropolitan regions for the years 1901 to 1961, using identical boundaries. Stone's figures indicate that the rate of growth of Toronto and Montreal for the 1901-11 period was similar to the rate of growth indicated by the census figures. Therefore, most of the growth indicated by these census figures was due to actual population growth and not boundary expansion.**
desired effect. In the interim the inevitable result was rising prices, congestion and increasing density.\textsuperscript{11}

From 1900 to 1913 land prices were rising at an alarming rate. In Calgary, a downtown lot sold for $150 in 1895, $2000 in 1905 and $3000 in 1912.\textsuperscript{12} In Vancouver, a downtown lot that was selling for eight dollars per foot in 1886 was selling for $4000 per foot by 1911.\textsuperscript{13} Residential land in Toronto increased from ten dollars a foot in 1907 to seventy-five dollars per foot in 1909.\textsuperscript{14} On average, it was estimated that urban land prices rose about six times between 1902 and 1914.\textsuperscript{15} As the subsequent collapse in the land market in 1913-1914 demonstrated, such appreciation of land prices was clearly artificial.

But while the price increases were artificial the results were felt for a long time after the speculation had subsided. For one thing, the lure of profits based on optimistic forecasts of future growth encouraged a frenzy of premature land subdivision. The western cities were the worst offenders. By 1921 Saskatoon, with a population of 26,000, had enough land subdivided to accommodate about 500,000 people and enough services actually installed to house about 50,000.\textsuperscript{16} The mayor, not satisfied that this was sufficient, wanted the surveyed land to extend from the current six mile radius from the city centre to ten miles. Calgary and Edmonton had enough land subdivided to handle over one million people. By 1914, Calgary had repossessed 26,763 serviced lots because of tax defaults and by the mid-1920's had a total of 73,000 of the city's 225,000 vacant building lots in its possession.\textsuperscript{17} As was the case in most Canadian cities, many of these "serviced" lots were too far from existing employment to be of much assistance in alleviating
the housing shortage and the services provided normally excluded some of the important essentials such as water and sewage disposal.

The cities further to the east were not spared the excess. It would have taken about one million people to fill up the subdivided lots in suburban Winnipeg. By the 1920's only one lot in thirteen was built on while 55 percent of the lots in the city itself were vacant. In Ottawa, Thomas Adams, the federal government's planning expert, estimated that the supply of lots would handle about 1.6 million souls. And in Montreal, portions of the subdivided land have not been used even today.

The municipalities, then, were expending what limited capital they had by building roads in locations where there was little demand. The allocation of scarce capital to this needless activity merely impeded the ability to provide other necessary services such as water and sewer facilities in the appropriate locations.

Despite the impediment of high land prices and poorly allocated public investment, housing construction soared to levels not equalled again until after World War II (See Figure #4). Yet even though completions in the 1901-11 decade were more than double the number of completions in the previous decade, housing construction was still unable to keep up with population growth. Figures from the census summarized in Table 3, reveal that the population growth per housing completion increased from an average of 3.7 people per start during the 1890's to 4.8 people per start in the 1900's. The increase in the population to starts ratio was even greater in some provinces.

These shortages when combined with excess land prices which the builder had to pass on in terms of higher housing prices, were responsible for a rise in rents of 60% during the 1901-11 decade. With
<table>
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<th>1910's</th>
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</table>

Total housing Completions

115,000 161,000 391,000 355,000 462,000 346,000

(Source: Census of Canada, Selected Years)
FIGURE #4

Housing Completions 1890 - 1950

(Source: Buckley & Urquhart, Historical Statistics of Canada, 510)
rents rising twice as fast as wages, workers had to economize on housing and builders had to economize on land to keep prices within reasonable limits. The result was higher density and overcrowding.

In the urban centres where growth pressure was greatest the overcrowding was the most acute. While Canada as a whole produced one housing unit for each 4.5 new people in the 1901-11 decade, Vancouver produced one for 5.4, Montreal one for each 6.3 people and Winnipeg one for each 6.4. But overcrowding and poor quality housing was more serious than these average figures indicate. A Bureau of Municipal Research study completed in 1918 found that there was an average eight people per house in one downtown district in Toronto compared to a citywide average of five per house, and the density was seventy-one people per acre compared to the citywide average of twenty-one people per acre. Of the 1056 homes surveyed, 841 were found to be in defective condition, and thirty-five houses had no water supply. The study noted that development pressure from the core area which had bid up land prices by 300 percent from 1909 to 1916 was leading to the replacement of residential dwellings by factory and commercial development. The result was increased crowding as the resident population, unable to relocate to the suburbs because of the higher transportation costs, was forced into a dwindling housing stock. As the study noted:

Apparently the residents, when forced by circumstances to vacate their dwellings do not always leave the district, but manage to crowd into some other dwellings in the vicinity.

Another study of Toronto reported finding twenty-seven men in one six-room house and fourteen men in another three-room house at 88 Walter
A municipal officer described some of the conditions in Toronto in the following way:

There is scarcely a vacant house fit to live in that is not inhabited and in many cases by numerous families; in fact, respectable people have had to live in stables, tents, old cars, sheds (others in damp cellars) where we would not place a valued animal, let alone a human being.27

Another Toronto report several years later commented that "In these homes there is a lack of sanitary conditions, one outdoor closet for dozens of men, women and children. It is simply disgraceful... nauseating odours and sights on every hand."28

In some sections of Winnipeg the housing conditions were equally deplorable. One expert frankly admitted that "The filth, squalor and overcrowding among the foreign element is beyond our power of description."28 J.S. Woodsworth, the Methodist minister and first leader of the Canadian Cooperative Federation (CCF), described living conditions of several residents in the following way:

Shack - one-room and a lean-to. Furniture - two beds, a bunk stove, bench, two chairs, table, barrel of sauerkraut. Everything very dirty. Two families lived here. Women were dirty, unkempt, barefooted, half-clothed. Children wore only print slips. Baby was in swaddling clothes and lying in a cradle of sacking suspended from the ceiling by ropes at the corners.29

According to another report over one-third of the homes in a downtown area of Winnipeg had two to eight families.30 By 1902, only one-third of Winnipeg homes had sewer connections and 5000 had no water supply. Six thousand five hundred outdoor privies spotted the urban landscape.31 Meanwhile, homeowners continued to crowd in boarders in order to generate sufficient income to cover the high land cost. J.S.
Woodsworth described several examples of this process. He stated:

M. Simok and N. Selenk endeavored to ascertain how many adults they could crowd into a given space. Selenk managed to accommodate forty-three occupants in five rooms where only fourteen could hope to find sufficient atmosphere for healthy respiration. Simok ran his neighbour close, having twenty-four in one room... Mrs. Machterlink is a widow; she has rented a house in which there are five rooms. She has two families as tenants and between fifteen and twenty men boarders. 32

The suburban shack towns located on the urban periphery were often as miserable as the downtown slums. Dr. Hodgetts, a health officer for the government's Commission of Conservation, concluded that "should the married man live in the suburbs, it is perhaps in a shack town, the whole family being crowded into one or two rooms intended to serve as a kitchen annex to the home he hopes to build. His great expectations are slow to materialize and frequently he, or some others of his family die in the making of the home, victims of unsanitary housing." 33 Hodgetts described one such shack town in the following way:

This colony is crowded into a lot of miserable shacks, filthy both outside and inside; no cellars, no drainage, closets on the surface of the ground, vile beyond description; water from shallow wells which were dirty and unfit for use, and most of them came within a few feet of the closets. 34

While it is difficult to know how accurately these descriptions portrayed urban life in Canada around the turn of the century, it is nonetheless clear that there were serious urban problems. And these problems were more than just humanitarian concern. For one thing, as the metropolitan centres were passing size and density thresholds, the old methods of supplying urban services were rapidly becoming dangerously obsolete. 35 The increasing density of outdoor privies and other
sources of residential and industrial waste made drinking water from individual wells risky at best. Meanwhile, the disposal of larger and larger quantities of waste into the same water bodies that supplied the cities drinking water created serious health problems. Numerous epidemics were reported in all the Canadian cities.  

Fires were also a growing threat. The crowding of poorly constructed buildings made of highly flammable material meant that the fire spread easily and the lack of adequate water supplies meant that they were very difficult to put out. In 1886, Vancouver burned to the ground.  

Half of Calgary burned down the same year. Density and scale were also creating problems for transportation. Longer distances required heavy fixed investments in urban transportation and upgrading and widening of roads. The uncontrolled subdivision process made the transportation problem even more difficult. In some cases the unimaginative grid pattern meant that roads were often built on impassible slopes. In other instances, roads in two subdivisions didn't even meet.  

The growing obsolescence of the old techniques of providing basic services meant that Canadians had to not only supply urban services to meet the needs of the new population but also had to supply new services for the rest of the population whose existing facilities were becoming outmoded. New fire departments had to be set up. Privies had to be replaced with a comprehensive sewage system. Water had to be piped into houses to replace individual wells. Garbage had to be collected and disposed of by some central system. Power had to be supplied to houses.  

The economies of scale in providing each of these services necessitated new large institutions and increased public regulation which
The municipal governments had little experience providing.\textsuperscript{40} The result was that the urban centres were struggling just to keep from falling behind. D.T. de Glazebrook, in his \textit{History of Toronto}, commented that "nothing is more basic to the well-being of a community than a plentiful supply of pure water and no need of Toronto was less well met."\textsuperscript{41} Toronto was in a constant battle to keep extending its waterpipe further out in the bay to avoid the sewage build-up near shore.

Permeating this mosaic of urban problems was the question of social stability. In 1898, Adna Weber concluded that the urban society, because of its greater diversity, seemed to have less moral cohesion than rural society.\textsuperscript{42} J.S. Woodsworth, one of Canada's leading urban experts at the turn of the century, came to a similar conclusion. He observed that:

\begin{quote}
In the cities we have the rich and the poor, the classes and the masses, with all that these distinctions involve. The tendency is that the well-to-do gather in more or less exclusive suburbs while the poor are segregated in slum districts and between them there is very little direct intercourse. The employer may meet his employee at business, but there is little bond of connection... This condition is intensified and more complicated when larger numbers of foreigners are brought into civil life. Differences of language, of race, and of religion, often running parallel, deepen and broaden the chasm.\textsuperscript{43}
\end{quote}

This "chasm" mentioned by Woodsworth was causing increasing concern among Canadians. The President of the Toronto Board of Trade cautioned that "as the population of our city becomes more dense, there is an increase in the idle, the viscour, the depraved the the improvident classes, who can scarcely be prevented from flocking from all quarters in our midst."\textsuperscript{44}

The issue became more acute as the flow of immigrants into
into Canadian cities accelerated. Over all, from 1901 to 1921, Canada received 800,000 non-British immigrants. Their proportion of the population increased from 6.7 percent to 13.8 percent of the Canadian population during this period. Table 4 illustrates that this trend of increasing proportions of immigrant population was particularly pronounced in the major cities.

But what caused even greater concern was that these immigrants were gathering in large slum areas. One major study of Toronto found that "the majority of the residents of the 'ward' are of foreign birth or of foreign parentage." This posed major problems, according to the report, because foreigners had low standards of living and moral conduct, and the means of socializing them were inadequate. These social problems created by slum life were perceived as a major threat to the sound Canadian middle-class values. Toronto's Hodgetts, the federal government's medical officer, described the danger when he said:

The slums, like the tentacles of the devil fish, receives its prey within its walls, retains and engulfs him by imperceptible yet rapid degrees. Its denizens sink into apathy and develop that strange malady of the modern city, the slum disease. This is an infection productive of infections, a contagent which, as it spread through the slum, creates new slum dwellings as it passes, leaving its victims stricken with inertia, slothfulness, drunkenness and criminality.

Some prominent Canadians expressed concern about the impact of immigrants who knew little of Canadian values and institutions of the Canadian political system. Others seemed convinced that the whole Canadian way of life was in jeopardy. R.B. Bennett, Canada's future
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>% Can. Born</th>
<th>% U.K. Born</th>
<th>% Foreign Born</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Montreal</td>
<td>1901</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1911</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toronto</td>
<td>1901</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1911</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winnipeg</td>
<td>1901</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>19%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1911</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>25%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vancouver</td>
<td>1901</td>
<td>56%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1911</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Computed from Census of Canada, 1901 and 1911)
Prime Minister, exclaimed in 1907 that "we must not allow our shores to be overrun by Asianics and become dominated by an alien race.\textsuperscript{50}

One thing was clear. If Canadian values were to be safe-guarded, comprehensive government action was required to assimilate the immigrant population and to arrest the trend towards social chaos.\textsuperscript{51} More comprehensive approaches of urban management were necessary if Canadian cities were to remain livable and efficient. And these new comprehensive approaches such as permanent fire departments, water and sewage facilities, higher quality housing, public transit and other necessary urban infrastructure all required new centralized institutions and public controls over private development. The "laissez-faire" approach to city building which had accommodated growth prior to 1900 when Canada's development was somewhat slower and less concentrated seemed incapable of handling this new faster and fundamentally different type of urban expansion occurring at the turn of the century.

III

Canada was clearly undergoing a fundamental transformation. George Paish, in an address before the Canadian Club in 1913, made an observation that few Canadians would disagree with. He commented that:

The difference between the conditions of Canada today and what it was when I first came to Canada in 1899 is really remarkable. I came to Canada from the U.S. and I arrived at the conclusion that Canada was a job-trot affair. This is not my impression today. Since 1899 Canada has entirely changed her character.\textsuperscript{52}

But the new complex urban industrial society that was emerging from 1890 to 1920 posed a new set of problems that required new and
more comprehensive types of collective action. In terms of modern economics, the new urban society was characterized by major market imperfections such as externalities, indivisibilities, market lags, public goods, natural monopolies and inequitable distribution of income. The existence of these imperfections meant that the unregulated private market forces would not result in an efficient allocation of resources. Charles Hastings, the Toronto Medical Health Officer, put the matter a bit more bluntly when he said:

The contamination of any one class of the people will affect the rest of the social body... None can think for a moment that these are matters in which he has no personal interest. While he may evade the duty, he can never be sure of evading the penalty of his neglect... a common grave.

But there was a dilemma for Canadian society. Those same liberal, capitalist ideas and institutions that had been so successful in promoting economic development were inimical to the collective action and state regulation required to manage the very society that they had created. Indeed, the rights of private property, the primacy of the individual relative to the collective and the capitalist market economy were essential tenets of the liberal society. For John Locke, the "raison d'etre" of the modern political state was the defence of individual private property; not its regulation. Collective action by the state justified its revolutionary overthrow. Adam Smith, the founder of liberal political economy, viewed government as wasteful, corrupt and inefficient. Writing in the 1770's Smith argued that:

The statesman who should attempt to direct private people in what manner they ought to employ their capital would not only load himself with a most unnecessary tension, but assumes an authority which could safely be trusted not only to no single person, but no council or senate.
Smith argued that the hidden hand of the free market unrestrained by
government regulation would promote the public interest. The state's
role should be limited to defence, maintenance of law and order, and the
errection and maintenance of "those public institutions and those public
works though they may be in the highest degree advantages to a great
society, are, however, of such a nature, that the profit could never
repay the expense to any individual or small number of individuals and
which therefore it cannot be expected that any individual or small num-
ber of individuals should erect and maintain." 58

Although there has been lively debates over the intensity and
character of Canadian ideology, there is general agreement that Canada,
in large part, embraced these liberal, capitalist ideals which had been
developed over one hundred years before the urban revolution had
occurred. 59 Such prominent Canadian thinkers and politicians as John A.
MacDonald, for example, were opposed to universal suffrage because "those
who had no property would come to have the governing power - the power
of imposing the burden on those who had property." 60 Mackenzie King in
commenting on the deficiencies of the socialist view in his 1918 text,
*Industry and Humanity,* noted that "psychologists are agreed that of all
instincts, that of ownership if the most deeply rooted." King maintained
that "public bodies are in a position to more or less disregard consider-
atations of economy which private concerns necessarily take account." 61
Goldwin Smith, another leading intellectual and liberal, stated in 1893
that "The best of all governments is that which has least occasion to
govern." Smith complimented Canada and the United States for their
immunity to the trend of increasing government involvement in the
British economy and he attributed such immunity to the fact that North Americans possessed, or hoped to possess property. And at the turn of the century there was widespread opposition to pensions, minimum wages and other associated government welfare measures because these measures would jeopardize self-reliance and individualism. Social welfare was better left to private charities.

Admittedly, Canadians certainly tolerated and even promoted some state involvement in the economy. But the major interventions such as the building of the railways were in the pursuit of economic development and largely within the framework of Adam Smith's definition of public works. But as Michael Bliss has shown, the same business interests that supported this state involvement vehemently opposed regulation of private business. Thus the active state could be used to promote growth and accumulation of property but not to regulate or control it.

IV

Canadian society was clearly in the midst of a profound transformation. From 1896 to 1920 the country was experiencing remarkable growth. But this material progress was accompanied by numerous problems such as slums, disease, congestion, poverty, overcrowding and social instability; problems whose solution required the development of new techniques that would stretch Canadian ingenuity and physical resources. Not only did new services have to be provided to accommodate the rapidly expanding population, but new types of services had to be built to replace the now obsolete services of the existing population. Yet if this task was
not enough, Canadian society faced an additional hurdle; it had to initiate these reforms under the careful scrutiny of institutions and an ideology inimical to the very government regulations necessary to cope with the new urban society. The irony was that these liberal institutions and ideas gave birth to a new urban and industrial order which they could not manage. The urban challenge was that the urban problems and conflicts accompanying the rise of the urban society had to be solved; but without destroying the dominant liberal institutions and ideology which had taken root prior to the urban, industrial revolution. This was a demanding challenge indeed.
Footnotes

1. For an excellent summary of the changes occurring during this period see: Robert Craig Brown and Ramsay Cook, Canada 1896-1921 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1974).

2. Wilfred Laurier, Addresses to the Canadian Club of Ottawa (Ottawa: January 18, 1904), 154.


6. Spelt, Urban Development; Stone, Urban Development; Gertler and Crowley, Changing Canadian Cities; Gilmore, Spatial Distribution.

7. Mackintosh, Economic Background, 54-55.


15. Ibid., 128.


17. A.G. Dalzell, "Housing, The Relation of Housing and Town Planning in Cities such as Vancouver," *Journal of the Town Planning Institute of Canada* (hereafter *JTPIC*), Vol. VI, No.3 (June 1927), 104.


19. Ibid., 116.


22. Ibid., 84.


25. Ibid., 32.


31. Ibid., 229-236.


34. Ibid., 57.

30.


37. Morley, Vancouver, 87.

38. Fraser, Calgary, 80.


40. For a discussion of this process see items cited in Footnote 35.


44. President of the Board of Trade, Reports of the President and Treasurer of the Toronto Board of Trade (Toronto: 1886), 41; cited by Stephen Spencer, "Toronto's First Annexation Era: Property and Services in the 1880's," 33.


47. Ibid., 74-75.


50. Cited in Brown and Cook, Canada, 1846-1921, 68.


58. Ibid., 681.


61. Mackenzie King, Industry and Humanity (Toronto: Thomas Allen, 1918), 411; Ibid., 414.

32.


CHAPTER II
THE URBAN REFORM MOVEMENT, 1890 to 1920

During the first several decades of the twentieth century Canadian society was undergoing a transformation that struck at the very roots of the nation's foundations. The problems associated with industrialization and the prodigious rise of urban centres challenged a social order more appropriate to managing an agrarian society than the emerging urban one. Canadians were all too aware that something had to be done. Businessmen were increasingly concerned about the inadequacies of urban infrastructure and workers' housing. The rising middle class feared the dreaded diseases lurking in the depths of the city's core. The churches, appalled at the degree of poverty and inequity, demanded that remedial action be taken, while labour, forced to fear the brunt of the urban industrial problems, was ready to act if no one else would. In fact, some observers were convinced that a failure to provide satisfactory solutions to the problems of slums, poverty, disease and moral corruption would lead to revolution.

Canadians were not slow in responding to the urban challenge. As early as the 1890's newspapers, such as the News & World in Toronto, and The Star and La Presse in Montreal, brought urban reform issues to national prominence by inundating the public with seething descriptions of municipal corruption and urban decay. Businessmen such as Herbert Ames and Morley Wickett formed groups dedicated to "putting the machine in honest hands." Others formed groups such as the Single Tax Association and the Public Ownership League to pressure for more fundamental
reforms in the operation of Canadian cities. New organizations such as the Toronto Bureau of Municipal Research undertook detailed studies of the urban problem. Christian groups such as the YMCA and Salvation Army struck out at the evils of crime, poverty and debauchery. Their lead was followed by the established churches who formed the Moral and Social Reform Council in an attempt to save Canadians from the malignancy of urban decay.

The complexity of the problems and the diversity of Canadian society ensured that the response to the urban challenge was far from homogenous. In fact, Canadian historian Paul Rutherford has concluded that "so wide has the scope of the urban reform movement been that some readers may feel it was merely a collection of assorted causes linked only by a general focus on the city and its problems." But although there is some truth to Rutherford's comment that the diversity of response defies easy grouping, it is possible to identify three broad categories of response which emerged during the period 1890 to 1920. These three responses will be termed agrarian radicalism, urban liberalism and urban radicalism.

In the ensuing discussion it should be kept in mind that the advocates of each of these three responses were a very loosely connected group of individuals who had many important differences between themselves as well as with those of the other two groups. These three groups were not formally organized and although at times they became active in certain formal political associations and identified with certain political ideologies, care should be taken when attempting to associate them with any one political movement or with
a conventional political philosophy such as conservatism, liberalism or socialism.

II

Agrarian radicalism, one of the three dimensions of the Canadian response to urbanization, was based on two fundamental principles. First, agrarian radicals argued that the preservation of the rural way of life was central to Canada's future and the solution of the urban problem. Second, agrarian radicals had an organic view of society; individualism and the lack of cooperative spirit in the new urban order were vehemently denounced while strong collectivist policies such as cooperatives and active state intervention were advocated as necessary for the management of Canadian society.

Underlying the agrarian radicalism view was an almost romantic attachment to the rural way of life. W.C. Good, a leader of the United Farmers of Ontario and major publicist of the rural cause, wrote in 1919 that "it is an inestimable privilege to see one's own children, clear-eyed and happy-hearted, racing joyously over the hills." To Good, the advantages of rural life were many. For example, "agriculture has practically a monopoly on fresh air and sunshine." Also, "country life is quiet, while city life has many disturbing distractions and interruptions." Therefore, "country life," according to Good, "encourages continuity of thought and development of strength of character."³

Andrew MacPhail, another rural admirer, Tory, and editor of the
popular University Magazine, lamented in 1908 that "we have resolutely
turned our faces from an agricultural and pastoral life, from the
simple joys that go with the occupations" to the industrial factory and
urban slum. To MacPhail, this was a serious breach, for "it is
eternally true that the tribal god and the god of the household exist
in the country" and that the city "was always the home of the false
gods" of materialism and individual greed.

Agrarian radicals viewed urbanization as a dangerous trend that
threatened the health of the nation. Canada's manufacturing industries,
leadership capability, moral character and city life itself were all
dependent on a vibrant rural community. W.C. Good, for example,
observed, "All life, whether country or city, comes ultimately from
those connected with Old Mother Earth." And John MacDougall, a Metho-
dist minister and author of a comprehensive study of the rural problem
written in 1913, concluded that "the city is the graveyard of physique,
and cannot maintain itself unless replenished."

For Major Dennison, a United Empire Loyalist and Ontario Tory,
the farmers were the only reliable class in Canada; the rootless urban
masses were not to be trusted. Andrew MacPhail was even more emphatic.
He cautioned that "if the country districts decay, the whole of Canada
is bound to decay as well."

To agrarian radicals, then, the cause of Canada's problems was
the urbanization process itself. Starting from this premise, the
solution seemed obvious; urban growth would have to be stopped by
revitalizing agricultural life. The regeneration of agricultural life
would, in turn, soothe the burning sores of urban decay. As one
reformer, writing in a 1918 edition of the journal *Conservation of Life*, suggested:

...... the question of bettering our agricultural conditions and increasing our primary production is intimately connected with the problem of rural population and the present unhealthy growth of large towns and it is probable that if we can satisfactorily solve the first problem, the other two will to a very great extent solve themselves.  

This revitalization of agriculture, along with other policies promoting a return to the land, should, according to agrarian radicalism, receive top priority. Governor-General Grey, for example, commented that "the most pressing problem of the time ... is how the re-establish the people in a profitable and beautiful life on the land." Sir John Willison, the chairman of the Ontario Unemployment Commission and editor of *The Globe*, even saw such an urban to rural migration as the obvious solution to unemployment and related social problems. Writing in a widely circulated book published in 1917, Willison observed that:

... thousands of foreigners flocked to centres of population and became public charges or beneficiaries of private charity. The cities in which these experienced yet farmless farmers congregate are only a few hours removed from millions of acres of fertile but unbroken land. For the future, immigration should be so handled as to prevent such separation of complementary assets.

Underlying the rural romanticism of agrarian radicalism was the second major principle; an organic view of society. This organic view of society was manifested in different ways. For Tories such as Andrew MacPhail, agrarian life reflected respect for tradition, church, hierarchy, family, law and social order; all the conservative values
that were being eroded by the new corrupt urban society. Further, Quebec, which was viewed by some as the most backward area of Canada, was considered by the Tories as a major asset. MacPhail remarked that "Canada can only be saved by the Conservative spirit, and that spirit in organized form exists only in Quebec." 

The organic view of society was manifested in a somewhat different way by the other agrarian radicals who were not Tories. For people such as W.C. Good and William Irvine, the Methodist preacher and one of the leaders of the Saskatchewan Grain Growers Association, the superior cooperative spirit reflected in rural life could only be sustained by strong collectivist policies designed to stamp out individual greed and profit making. Another Methodist minister active in agrarian reform put the matter quite bluntly in a successful resolution that he guided through the Methodist General Conference of 1918. The resolution stated that:

> the revelation of the superior efficiency of rational organization and cooperation, combine with the underlying ethics of Jesus, to demand nothing less than a transference of the whole economic life from a basis of competition and profits to one of cooperation and service.

Gradually, these more interventionist oriented agrarian radicals pieced together a specific strategy for coping with rural problems and, by implication, the urban problem. First, the tariff which was a tool of Eastern capitalists designed to secure a surplus profit at the expense of the farmer, had to be eliminated. Land speculation and absentee ownership also had to be controlled. W.C. Good tied these two issues of the tariff and land speculation together in an insightful
book entitled *Production and Subsidies in Canada*. Good's argument was based, in large part, on the analysis contained in Henry George's book, *Progress and Poverty*. George, an American reformer, was perplexed by the persistence of poverty along side of material progress. He began to study this enigma of poverty and progress by examining the three factors of production: land, labour and capital. Capitalists secured profits in return for providing capital and workers received wages in exchange for labour power. But land was different; it was a gift of nature whose supply was fixed and whose value was determined by the accessibility of the site and the growth of population and production of the community. George argued that this land value, which was created by the community at large, accrued as an unearned increment to individual landowners. The puzzle of progress and poverty was solved. Landowners were reaping the benefit at the expense of labour and capital. The solution, concluded George, was to place a tax on land to collect 100 percent of the unearned increment. This tax would replace all other taxes, thereby increasing wages and profits. Poverty would be eliminated and production would flourish as a result of removing the impediment of rapacious landowners demanding exorbitant rents and withholding land from the market to drive up prices. Spatial patterns would be more efficient and workers and capitalists would find new incentive after receiving the rewards of their effort. And the social conflict between capital and labour would be solved.

Good was among the millions of readers impressed by Henry George's argument. In sympathy with George, Good argued that land values were created by the community and that the land rent was appropriated as an
unearned increment by private owners. But Good's argument contained one major alteration. Good concluded that farmers were the ones exploited by the private appropriation of land rent. According to Good, "the evil of land speculation creates a class of parasites who must be supported at the public expense; and the farmers' earnings are largely drawn upon to support these parasites."

The farmer was not getting his just return because labour could not pay a just price for food because of low wages and high land prices, and capital was forced to rely on tariffs to compensate for a lowering of profits caused by landowners capturing the unearned increment. Good did not fully reconcile the obvious dilemma that farmers were landowners and, consequently, received some land rent themselves. Good concluded that "the first and most fundamental requirement for securing justice in distribution is, therefore, the social appropriation of ground rent" and that the revenue generated by the collection of rent would allow for the elimination of the tariff, the revitalization of rural life and the stamping out of rampant individualism.

Another measure required to solve the rural problem was the nationalization of private monopolies such as the railways, telegraph, express lines and other exploitative institutions that were reaping surplus profits at the farmers' expense. Additional measures recommended included income and inheritance taxes, public control over natural resources, better education, improved rural credit and the setting up of cooperatives. As G.R. MacPherson has documented in his book, Each for All: The Co-operative Movement in English Canada, cooperatives were an especially significant part of the reform movement.
Mr. Alphonse Desjardins, founder of the Canadian Cooperative Parish Bank System in Quebec, received enthusiastic support for his proposals delivered at the Social Service Congress of 1914. These proposals called for an expanded system of cooperatives and other self-help ventures. Desjardins summed up his ideas by stating that "instead of the unChristian doctrine of struggle for life let us have union for life as the foundation stone of the prosperity and grandeur of our agricultural classes."\(^{22}\)

For agrarian radicals, all problems of Canada and of the farmer emanated from the corrupt and self-serving urban centres which were gaining control of the country's affairs. Government policy, the Church, and educational institutions were, according to the radicals, biased towards the urban centre. The Secretary of the Canadian Council of Agriculture in introducing the "Farmers' Platform" in 1916, wrote that "it is becoming more apparent each year that our parliament is coming more and more under the direct influence of wealth of industrial, financial and transportation interests represented by men of wealth in financial and industrial centres and if the rural population and the common people, including the wage earners, are to have their viewpoint represented in parliament, a democratic system of nomination and electing representatives must be adopted."\(^{23}\)

Clearly, the agrarian radicals were contemplating direct political action. William Irvine, in his book *The Farmer in Politics*, provided a cogent defence of the need for a political party and urged farmers on to this task. Agrarian radicals soon became influential through their participation in formal political parties with which they had common
ground such as the United Farmers of Ontario which won the 1919 provincial election, the Farmers of Alberta which came to provincial power in 1921, and the Progressive Party, which emerged as the second largest party in the 1921 federal election. The political success of the agrarian radicals ensured that their direct approach to solving urban problems by revitalizing agricultural life would have a substantial impact on the nature of urban reform. Indeed, for a large number of Canadians, the salvation of the city was in the country.

III

Urban liberalism, the second of the three major responses to the urban crisis, was founded on two basic principles. First, urban liberals fully accepted that "under modern conditions a depletion of the rural sections is inevitable." On this point, urban liberals were in fundamental disagreement with agrarian radicals. As Herbert Ames, a Montreal manufacturer and prominent urban liberal reformer commented, "the cry to the towns overwhelms the counter-cry back to the land." Consequently, Ames concluded that "because the tendency is certain to grow stronger in the years to come ... we must be prepared for larger cities in the future."

Further, the urban liberals perceived this natural trend to urban living and industrial progress as desirable. Frank Beer, a prominent Toronto businessman, chastised the agricultural community for arrogantly elevating itself to the position of backbone of the nation by warning them "that a backbone alone is only a museum exhibit."
Others, such as Mackenzie King and Byron Walker, the general director of the Bank of Commerce and founder of the Civic Guild, a Toronto urban reform organization, expressed a widely held vision of the potential urban society as captivating as the romantic vision of the countryside articulated by the agrarian radicals. In his 1918 book *Industry and Humanity*, King bragged that "large-scale urbanization of industry, by rendering possible increased production with gradual lessening of human effort, has paved the way for the substitution of democracy for serfdom ... Never before did the spheres of organized social effort give promise of such rapid and vast expansion."

Walker was equally enthusiastic. In an address to the Canadian Club of Toronto in 1905 he remarked that:

> Toronto is the second largest city of our country; it is the largest of the English-speaking people; we want to show the English about what our material civilization amounts to... we do not always want to remain a wooden backwoods place with provincial ideas.

In Quebec, a new wave of French Canadians, such as economist Errol Bouchette, urged Francophones to participate in the new industrial society instead of trying to return to the bygone days of the habitant. The slogan "Emparons-nous l'industrie" replaced "Emparons-nous du sol." Even the Minister of Agriculture in the federal government admitted during the 1914 Conference on City Planning that the "cities of the past and many of the cities of the present have been responsible for the building up of the greatest forces of our modern age" and "are responsible for the advance that civilization has made."

The second major principle underlying the urban liberal view
was the commitment to preserving the dominant capitalist institutions of private property, the market, a restricted role for government and the primacy of the individual. After all, many of the prominent urban liberals were Canada's business elite. But unlike more conservative elements in Canadian society, the urban liberals did accept the need for reform. The problems of the new urban society were just too acute to be ignored. In fact, the problems posed a direct threat to the business elite who provided the impetus for the urban liberal movement.

The disease-plagued slums, for example, posed a direct threat to the physical health of the urban elite. As Charles Hodgetts, the federal government's medical expert, pointed out, the germs did not respect class differences. It was also widely believed that urban poverty encouraged social habits that challenged middle-class values. J.J. Kelso, Superintendent of the Department of Neglected Children, aroused concern when he described the dangers of the slum problem in the following manner.

These slums are exceedingly dangerous to the health and morals of the city because they are, to the great majority of people, inhuman and unexplored retreats. These slums should be attacked and abolished because they are the great enemy to the home which is the foundation of the state. Bad housing conditions inevitably tend to drunkenness in parents; to delinquency in children; to immorality in the growing generation; to the spread of typhoid fever, diptheria, scarlet fever and the ravages of the great white plague.

Other observers writing in Industrial Canada, the magazine of the Canadian Manufacturers' Association and in the Canadian Municipal Journal warned that the continuation of the poor urban conditions could lead to a breakout of "Bolshevism". "Out of slums" editorialized
Industrial Canada, "stalk the socialist with his red flag, the union agitator with the auctioneer's voice and the anarchist with his torch." 35

Meanwhile, several prominent businessmen noted that the inability of corrupt municipal government to provide necessary infrastructure in an efficient manner impeded the expansion of industry and imposed excessive tax burdens. 36 The urgency of this latter concern was heightened by the fact that near the turn of the century the budgets of the major cities such as Toronto, Montreal, Winnipeg, Edmonton and Calgary sometimes exceeded the total provincial budgets of their respective provinces. 37

But urban liberals faced a dilemma. How could they manage the new complex and interdependent urban order within the confines of institutions hostile to the collectivist policies required to mitigate urban problems? The urban liberals soon found what they thought was the solution to the dilemma: the application of scientific business principles to municipal management.

This call for scientific management of public affairs was widespread and intense. Frank Adams, the Dean of the Faculty of Applied Science at McGill, writing in the highly-regarded volume, The New Era in Canada, stated that "Canadians must administer the national domain with the same initiative, care and ability that a great commercial corporation conducts its affairs." 38 Frank Beer, writing in the same volume, echoed Adams' recommendations when he remarked that "the standards now regulating private enterprise should be equally or more rigorously exercised in the conduct of public affairs." 39

To most Canadians, the application of the principle of the new school of scientific management to public affairs was only natural.
The principle that was revolutionizing the process of production seemed more than capable of banishing the evils of "inefficient management" which many observers felt were "perhaps the worst of all evils from which cities suffer." And as urban liberals such as Ames pointed out as early as 1896, a city is nothing more than "a joint stock enterprise in which every citizen is a shareholder" and the "members of council are the directors of this great business enterprise." The recognition of this fact was viewed as essential to dealing with the urban problem. The Director of the New York Bureau of Municipal Research struck a responsive chord during his 1913 visit to Toronto when he insisted that "if you recognize city government for what it is, a great service corporation, you can get efficient services by dealing with government problems the same as you would in any other great corporation."

The urban liberals thought that they had resolved their dilemma. Scientific management practised by business experts could handle the new urban problems. Sweeping social changes were not necessary. The mayor of Winnipeg reported to a 1916 urban conference that "it matters little about the system -- the man is the main consideration. Poor men with a good system will not ensure good government, but good men may, no matter what the system." Toronto's business community was pleased to hear Morley Wickett express similar sentiments when he reported to them that "if we want good municipal government we must get the right men to take charge." And who were the right men? Businessmen, of course, for as John Willison wrote in 1917, "as a rule the men most successful in private affairs make the best public representatives on account of their training and business experiences."
Urban liberals suggested that the application of business principles to municipal management and the attraction of good men to municipal administration could be expedited by implementing several reforms in municipal administration. One reform recommended by Goldwin Smith was to transfer the power of elected councils to a commission comprised of experts. Some reformers found this undemocratic measure a bit extreme. Nonetheless, most agreed that a reduction in the influence of politicians in municipal affairs was a requisite for good government. J.O. Miller wrote that "yearly elections, the ward system and patronage... are the three main evils of the present system." These petty demands of politics discouraged men of substance from coming "forward to serve the city in any official capacity." As Morley Wickett, Canada's leading expert and an active municipal politician pointed out, the prospective reformer "has to face a great many things. He has to face a campaign." What was required was the "divorce of administration from legislation" which, as Miller pointed out, was "the fundamental principle that governs the conduct of every great business organization." Morley Wickett concluded that the separation of powers could be best accomplished by transferring power to a strong board of control comprised of able administrators who would be appointed for six years. It was also suggested that the average council member would be elected for a longer period of time by the city at large instead of by wards. These councilmen would have a concern for the general public good, as opposed to the petty local needs.

The city's administrators would be in the hands of "a new profession of civic administrators" who possessed the necessary skills to
run the city as a business enterprise. And, as a business enterprise, it was important that only the shareholders could vote. Morley Wickett concluded that because the municipality was "a species of joint stock company, only those contributing capital" should be "allowed to share in the direction of its affairs. That this is a useful concept will be denied by few."\(^{50}\)

Urban liberals realized some success in pushing these administrative reforms. For example, Boards of Control were set up in Toronto government in 1896, in Winnipeg in 1906, Ottawa in 1907, Montreal in 1909, Hamilton in 1911 and London in 1914. Also, property qualifications restricting widespread participation in politics were successfully defended.\(^{51}\)

Once in power, what should the new reform-minded council do to solve the urban problem? One of the first tasks recommended by the urban liberals was to complete a social survey and set up a universal system for reporting municipal statistics. Political scientist John Cooper summarized the benefits of such an undertaking in a paper delivered to the first meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association in 1914. He said:

> A Municipal survey, as the term is used in America, is intended to fulfill two purposes. It informs the heads of departments and other officials how their work compares in efficiency with that done in other cities. In this respect, it is much like the list of batting averages in the world of baseball and the bowling and batting records in the world of cricket. Secondly, it informs the citizens of the inner workings of the municipal system, increases their interest and gives them a guarantee of its efficiency.\(^{52}\)

Liberal reformers soon got their way. The Social Service Council
began undertaking detailed surveys of most major cities. Toronto reformers such as Wickett successfully pressed for the setting up of the Toronto Bureau of Municipal Research, for the purposes of promoting "efficient and economic government, to promote the adoption of scientific methods of accounting and reporting of details of public business, to secure constructive publicity in matters pertaining to public affairs, and to these ends collect, classify, analyze, correlate, interpret and publish facts as to the administration of government".

Some urban liberals seemed almost convinced that the collection of statistics would, somehow, eliminate urban problems. Herbert Ames' pioneering study of Montreal, for example, contained no actual recommendations and, in a lecture to a Montreal audience, he suggested that more comprehensive data than that contained in his already meticulously factual study would have been of great assistance in fingering "upon the exact localities where human life, where the family of the industrial worker is fighting against unjust odds".

But the mere collection of facts and the appointment of honest experts to municipal institutions could not solve the urban problems; and the liberal reformers knew it. The question of implementing specific policies to control the city had to be faced. But the question of developing appropriate policy reintroduced the dilemma that the liberals had been trying to avoid. On the one hand, the urban liberals had a natural disinclination for any major change in the role of government in urban affairs. For example, Herbert Ames, after completing his exhaustive study of urban problems in Montreal, cautioned that the government has "no right to take chances with the people's money" and that "we cannot
interfere with the inscrutable law of supply and demand". James Mavor, a University of Toronto political scientist, concluded that the results of public ownership of utilities was "apt to be inefficient management and excess in the number of employees". Yet on the other hand, the shortage of housing for migrating labourers and the lack of adequate public infrastructure were impeding one of the urban liberals' primary objectives: economic growth. Something would have to give way.

Mayor Thomas Urquhart of Toronto suggested that "if private enterprise does not supply this need (housing) in the very near future, it may be necessary for the city to consider the question of housing accommodation and seek for legislation which would enable us to utilize some of our land for the purposes of erecting housing of moderate size and at a moderate rental". The Globe, however, resisted such measures, arguing that "there is no necessity for entangling the city in this business either by guaranteeing bonds or by constructing and renting houses for working men. Private enterprise will furnish these houses as soon as there is a commercial demand for them, just as it has been furnishing the high grade of apartment houses".

The liberals preferred solution to this impasse was what Morley Wickett called "conservative innovation and the gradual growth of municipal legislation". More specifically, Herbert Ames suggested that the answer to the health problem could be found in "wise sanitary laws faithfully enforced", while the housing problem could be solved by "philanthropy and 5x". This latter policy involved the establishment of philanthropic housing associations funded by public-spirited
entrepreneurs willing to construct high-quality housing in return for a maximum profit of 5%. Herbert Ames described the benefits of this process in the following way:

Here the philanthropist may well step in, and even at the risk of investing a few thousand at a comparatively low rate of remuneration, it is his privilege to show what can be done and by experience learn how best to do it. Every sanitary dwelling erected empties a rookery. There is a general moving up all along the line. Not only those who occupy, but a whole neighbourhood is benefitted whenever a model dwelling is built therein.63

In Toronto, the Canadian Manufacturing Association and the Board of Trade, along with other prominent businessmen, formed the Toronto Housing Company in 1912, and pressured the provincial government to pass legislation allowing the cities to guarantee bonds up to 85 percent of the value of the housing project in return for a maximum 6 percent rate of return. The company soon became active, constructing 242 housing units by 1930. The company made a point of emphasizing, however, that the ventures were being "constructed upon strictly business principles".

In Hamilton, Ontario, large firms such as Westinghouse and International Harvester responded to the growing housing shortages by initiating a housing support program for their workers. The motives of the business groups were clear. Maintaining an adequate and stable labour supply and moderating wages necessitated some intervention in the urban housing market.64 As Industrial Canada pointed out, well-housed workers "are more efficient, contented and reliable".65

This concern over housing brought urban liberals in conflict with land speculators, whose greedy activities were thought to be driving up land and housing prices which, in turn, necessitated payment of higher
wages, thereby reducing manufacturers' profits. "If real estate men", reasoned Industrial Canada, "squeeze employees, the employees will, in self-defence, squeeze employers for higher wages." Consequently, some urban liberals, particularly the manufacturers, had sympathy for the ideas of Henry George of collecting urban land rent and controlling speculation. After all, Henry George had handed the manufacturers a cogent solution for the rising conflict between capital and labour by emphasizing that the real conflict was between capital and labour on one side versus landowners on the other. Everyone, George argued, except parasitic landowners, would benefit from the single tax. As George stated:

Tax manufacturers and the effect is to check manufacturing; tax improvements and the effect is to lessen improvements; tax commerce and the effect is to prevent exchange; tax capital and the effect is to drive it away. But the whole value of land may be taken in taxation and the only effect will be to stimulate industry, to open new opportunities to capital and to increase the production of wealth.

Public utilities, which were considered more crucial to urban growth, received even greater attention among liberals than housing. W.F. Maclean, a federal M.P., warned a group of Toronto's businessmen gathered at the Empire Club of Canada that the lack of sewers, roads and utilities "will strangle the growth and extension of Toronto". Maclean concluded that:

If Toronto is to grow, we must control all these great essentials that are necessary for its growth. The city ought to have public ownership in regards to these things especially where it is a matter of growth and development.

As the public ownership experiments in major Canadian cities
illustrate, urban liberals were able and willing to step outside the bounds of private enterprise when this would further the cause of growth, maintain stability and improve efficiency. When these objectives were not seriously threatened, they relied on the preferred options of scientific study and ad hoc regulations. In this way, the urban liberals could further the cause of business without abandoning the dominant institutions of Canadian society.

IV

Urban radicalism, the third and weakest of the three responses to the urban challenge, was, to some extent, a synthesis of urban liberalism and agrarian radicalism. Like the urban liberals, urban radicals concluded that the emerging industrial society was the way of the future. But unlike urban liberals, urban radicals believed that urban life could only be properly managed if the liberal values of individualism, laissez-faire and competition gave way to the values of cooperation and equity. In this way, the urban radicals combined the collectivism of agrarian radicals with the urbanism of the urban liberals.

Urban radicalism received much of its impetus from Canada's social gospel movement and the new urban professional classes involved in public health and social welfare. Social gospellers, such as J.S. Woodsworth, the future leader of the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation (C.C.F.), firmly believed that urban industrial life was the essence of Canadian society and, as such, should be the primary concern of Canadian reformers. In one of the first major books on
Canada's urban problems, Woodsworth observed that "within a few years, half of our population will be living in cities and large towns." This led him to conclude that:

Whatever the lines of future development, the importance of the city cannot be overestimated. It is destined to exercise a dominating influence over the whole country. The cities are the ganglia or nerve centres of the whole of our social system. They are the very heart of our body politic. From the political, the social, the educational, the religious and the commercial standpoint, the city is the centre to which the whole nation is tributary.

But for Woodsworth and the urban radicals, the city was not simply an evil phenomenon that Canadians were forced to accept. In spite of economic problems, the city had a positive side. In his book on the city, Woodsworth approvingly quoted Dr. Frank Mason North, Secretary of the New York City Extension and the Missionary Society of the Methodist Church, when Dr. North commented that the city "in its libraries and universities, in its treasures of art and of science, finds its resources. The city is the test and the opportunity of mind." Woodsworth also agreed with another urban commentator that "to the city we are to look for a rebirth of democracy, a democracy that will possess the instincts of the past, along with a belief in the powers of cooperative effort."

Woodsworth and his compatriots concluded that the city was fundamentally different from the country and that "city life is like a spider's web--pull one thread and you pull every thread", whereas "in the rural district each family lives its own life in a large degree independently." Woodsworth felt that, because the city was "a certain
type of social organism, so the physical city must be considered as a whole and the various parts must be subordinated to the whole--yes, that their highest welfare is dependent on that of the whole."74

For Woodsworth, the city's potential could only be realized by creating a new social order based on cooperation. Woodsworth concluded that:

'Surely in our laws, vested interests and property rights must give way before the rights of men and the welfare of society. And may we not expect that our religion will become less individualistic.'75

Indeed, the very benefit of the city was that the problems and complexities would force society to change from a competitive to a cooperative basis.

These collectivist sentiments continued to dominate urban radical thinking on Canada's urban problems. At the Social Service Congress, a major conference organized by the Social Service Council which was an organization set up by Canada's churches to deal with social issues, Reverend Carman, who was the General Superintendent of the Methodist Church, emphasized that society was organic and it existence depended on an active government. And the Reverend J.W. Aitken suggested that Jesus Christ had very little sympathy with the man whose chief object is to make money. Aitken remarked that the "one great enemy of the principle of cooperation is the spirit of individual competition which obtains in the business world today" and "breeds suspicion and sometimes hatred." Another participant at the conference concluded that "if there is any essential injustice in the social system it must be removed. No amount of welfare work under the system can compensate for all the wrongs inherent in it." James Simpson, who was a prominent
Toronto politician and leading socialist and Methodist, suggested in his address to the Social Service Council that the church should "assist to change a system which is founded upon private selfishness and greed, to one in which public interest would be the chief concern." The Methodist Church must have agreed with Simpson's call for a new social order, for several years after the Social Service Congress they passed a resolution explicitly condemning the existing capitalist society and advocating a society where "the whole of economic life" would be changed from "a basis of competition and profit to one of cooperation and service."

The urban radicals' major focus of attack was on the land speculators and the private utilities, where evil profiteering was alleged to be the cause of Canada's problems. Organizations such as the Single Tax Association and the Anti-Poverty Society, which both espoused the ideas of Henry George, the Public Ownership League and the Nationalist Association, which advocated public ownership of utilities, sprang up in Canadian cities, while newspapers such as the Labour Union, the Palladian of Labour, the Labour Advocate, the Citizen and Country, and the Canadian Municipal Journal provided the means of disseminating the ideas throughout the population.

One particularly enthusiastic supporter of these ideas was Philip Thompson, a prominent labour leader and journalist. He noted that while "we have made great progress of late years . . . the system of monopoly of land and capital and competition among workers" has created legions of poor who are "poor because they have been robbed."
considered that "of all forms of monopoly the most oppressive and the most insidious is that of private ownership of land". In complete sympathy with the ideas of Henry George, Thompson concluded that "the land belongs of right to the whole community and that any claim on the part of an individual to more than a right of occupancy or cultivation ... is robbery." "Land," argued Thompson, "ought not to be a commodity, because, like air and water, it is necessary to human existence and all men have by birthright equal rights to its use." 80

A growing number of Canadians agreed with Thompson and Henry George's notions that "the private ownership of land has been the greatest cause of serfdom". 81 The Reverend Carman, who was the superintendent of the Methodist Church, applauded Henry George for his "tremendous persistence in drawing attention to the evils of land monopology". 82 J.S. Woodsworth, in his popular text on urban problems, suggested that "ultimately all land belongs to the state or the community". 83 Charles Hodgetts, who was the federal government's top health expert, complained that urban growth had "bred an army of land speculators and jerry builders who are a detriment to the community and a curse to the mechanic and artisan classes," while J.O. Miller, who was the principal of Ridley College insisted in one of the definitive articles on urban problems that "until we learn that the private exploitation of the unearned increment is a crime against the city, we cannot be said to have mastered the first principles of the conservation of the civic wealth". Miller concluded that some form of public land ownership was necessary to arrest this "robbery of the public domain" and to ensure that the unearned
increment accrued to those to whom "it properly belonged." 84

The public utility companies were equally vilified. J.O. Miller stated that "the interests of the people demand that city councils should seek to obtain close control of all public utilities." 85 The Canadian Engineer cautioned that "the experience of municipalities has taught the people that whenever a monopoly has been created by a private company, the stockholders have enriched themselves at the expense of the people." 86 Even more conservative politicians such as W. T. Lighthall, the mayor of Westmount, had lost patience with the private monopolies. The monopoly, argued Lighthall, was:

- the enemy of competition, low rates, and municipal control: its inevitable aim is to crush out all competition and attain the sole monopoly in the future . . . if private companies can control them, the people are not free. 87

For urban radicals, the solution to the private monopoly problem was public ownership. For some advocates of public ownership, such as Toronto economist, A.H. Sinclair, the recommendation of public ownership was a simply a logical conclusion derived from objective technical analysis. In a comprehensive statistical analysis of other countries, Sinclair concluded that because public utilities were natural monopolies not regulated by the rigours of competition, municipal ownership of the utility was in most instances the best way of providing cheap and efficient service. 88 Other proponents such as Alan Thompson and F.S. Spence, a Toronto municipal politician, while agreeing with Sinclair's analysis, put more emphasis on the question of morality and equity than Sinclair had. Thompson insisted that the profits from public utilities should accrue to the people, not the
private monopoly because "the value is a public value; it is created by the people, not by the operators". F.S. Spence in summarizing all the arguments in favour of public ownership of the Toronto Street Railway, concluded with the following comment:

The fifth reason is a moral reason. There is a social cohesiveness in the co-operation of a community with a common objective for the common good. When the man is working for the community he is working for himself. It is thus we attain the ideal. Ours becomes a better city.

In addition to calling for public ownership of public utilities and the collection of the unearned increment, urban radicals pressured for direct public construction of housing. The liberal solution of building regulations and private philanthropy were considered inadequate. Woods-worth, for example, stated that "the issuing of regulations or the passing of by-laws will not clear up a congested district". This important difference between liberals and radicals on the question of housing was well illustrated in the debate over the Toronto Housing Company, the private philanthropic effort initiated in 1912 by leading Toronto manufacturers such as Frank Beer. The Toronto Labour Council rejected the whole concept of using public money to support private philanthropy. The council argued that it would be superior to have the government use the funds to directly construct the housing instead of channelling it through a third party of businessmen who were building housing that was not only beyond the reach of the poor, but was also being constructed by non-union labour. James Simpson summarized the Toronto Housing Company attempt as "a clear evasion of municipal responsibility". Simpson continued by issuing the following caution:
Working men should always look with suspicion on co-partnership schemes called cooperation because they invariably lead them into assuming responsibilities that make them easy victims of men who live by exploiting them.  

Urban liberal Frank Beer disagreed. According to Beer, government construction of housing "may end in the loss of virility, initiative and perseverance in the class which needs these qualities most".  

While some urban radicals were content with these reforms, others saw them as just a step in the creation of a new society organized along socialist lines. Philip Thompson, for example, was convinced that "the Single Tax movement is doing excellent work in breaking ground for socialism by causing people to think of the evils begotten by land monopoly and the way to remedy them". Organizations such as the Social Reform League, the Canadian Socialist Federation and the Social Democratic Party viewed major reforms such as public ownership of land and utilities as part of a larger transition to public ownership of all industry.  

The impact of urban radicals on urban policy is difficult to assess. The radicals did have some limited electoral success in municipal and provincial politics, as well as some success in implementing reforms, such as public ownership of utilities, and improvement of municipal workers' wages. However, the reforms were usually only successful when they were also supported by urban liberals, whose motivations of efficiency and economic growth were quite different from the equity and moral concerns of urban radicals. Consequently, the major reforms such as public ownership of telephone companies, hydro utilities...
and public transit systems, while involving qualitative change in the management of the urban industrial society, should not necessarily be interpreted as involving a real transfer of power from capitalists to the public sector. As the Ontario Socialist League Manifesto warned, many public ownership movements are "an attempt of the capitalist class to secure government control of public utilities for the purpose of obtaining greater security in the exploitation of industries and not for the amelioration of the conditions of the working class."  

Canada's almost single-minded pursuit of economic development presented Canadians with the major challenge of managing a new urban industrial society under the careful scrutiny of institutions and an ideology poorly equipped for the task. Canadian society responded to the challenge in a diverse and somewhat inconsistent fashion. Agrarian radicals who were appalled by the moral and physical decay wrought by urbanization, preached a return to rural life as the country's salvation. Further, they argued that if the return to rural life was to be successful, it would have to be based on strong collectivist principles, including state intervention and the foundation of rural cooperatives.

Urban liberals disagreed. They considered urbanization and industrialization as the path toward a bright future. Preaching a return to rural life was not only a romantic dream; it was a rejection of progress. The urban liberals disagreed with agrarian collectivists on another point as well. The liberals, while acknowledging the severity
of urban problems, viewed the collectivism reflected in agrarian politics as unhealthy. The urban liberals argued that the solution to the urban challenge must be found within the parameters of the dominant capitalist institutions. Reforms, not a restructuring of Canadian society, were the answer. These reforms tended to be in the interests of the business classes who dominated the urban liberal movement. Government ownership, for example, was strongly advocated when it expedited expansion or reduced the price of services required by business. But the urban liberals still faced a dilemma. How could the urban problems that threatened their livelihood be solved without reducing the rights of private property and the individual? The urban liberals were reluctantly drawn into pushing for more and more fundamental reforms as the urban problems intensified and the solutions of "scientific management" appeared inadequate.

But what was perceived as a dilemma by the liberals was seen as a unique opportunity by urban radicals. For radicals, the very problems and complexity of city life was the force that liberated Canada from the greedy, competitive society they deplored, to a new society based on cooperative principles. The urban challenge would be met by changing these capitalist institutions and ideology that were causing the problems. But here the urban radicals also faced a dilemma. The support for fundamental changes in Canadian society was weak. Indeed, even the urban liberals had difficulty in generating sufficient support, especially for their more progressive ideas in the areas of housing land speculation and public utilities.
While there was obvious conflict between these three distinct responses to Canada's urban problems, there was also a basis for alliance. Urban and agrarian radicals agreed on the need for structural change. Urban liberals and urban radicals agreed on the inevitability of urban life. And while the liberals and radicals disagreed on their vision of the ultimate society and had different motives in advocating reforms, these factions did have some common ground, especially in the reforms proposed in the area of public utilities and land speculation. These potential alliances, as well as the conflicts, ensured that the response of Canadian society to urban problems would be a profoundly complex process.
Footnotes


20. Ibid., 53.

21. Ibid., 89.


28. Mackenzie King, Industry and Humanity, 105; Ibid., 93.


32. Charles Hodgetts, "Unsanitary Housing."


34. See, for example, "Bolshevism and Its Dangers," Canadian Municipal Journal (CMJ) (March 1920), 76; Industrial Canada (Oct. 1921), 1.

35. Industrial Canada (May 1912), 1149.


46. Globe, Nov. 17, 1902, cited by John Weaver, "The Modern City Realized: Toronto Civic Affairs."


51. For a summary of these reforms see: John Weaver, "Tomorrow's Metropolis Revisited: A Critical Assessment of Urban Reform in Canada, 1890-1920," in Alan Artibise and Gil Stelter, eds., The Canadian City: Essays in Urban History (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1977), 393-419; James Anderson, "Municipal Reform Movement in Western Canada."


55. Ames, City Below the Hill, 103.

56. Ibid., 114.

58. For expression of this concern see: W.F. Maclean, "A Greater Toronto;" "Industrial Housing Schemes that Pay," CE (August 1926), 808; "Housing Crisis Demands Government," CE (July, 1918); John Weaver, Shaping the Canadian City; A. Artibise, Winnipeg; Saywell, Housing Canadians, 137-41.

59. Toronto City Council, Minutes, 1905, Appendix 2, cited in Saywell, Housing Canadians, 141.


62. Ames, City Below the Hill, 106.

63. Ibid., 107.


65. Industrial Canada (May 1912), 1149.

66. See for example: Industrial Canada (May 1912), 1149; (June 1912) 1260; (Jan. 1913), 843.

67. George, Progress and Poverty, 414.


69. See for example: Weaver, Shaping the Canadian City.


71. Woodsworth, My Neighbour, 18.

72. Ibid., 22.

73. Ibid., 215; Ibid., 23.

74. Ibid., 14; Ibid., 28.

75. Ibid., 24.


78. For a discussion of these organizations see Homel, "James Simpson."


81. George, Progress and Poverty, 8; for a discussion of the impact of Henry George's ideas in Canada see: Cook, "Henry George & the Poverty of Canadian Progress."


83. Woodsworth, My Neighbour, 38.


95. For a summary and analysis of these reforms, see: Anderson, "Municipal Reform in Western Canada;" Weaver, Shaping the Canadian City; H.V. Nelles, Politics of Development; Forests, Mines and Hydro-Electric Power in Ontario (Toronto: MacMillan, 1974).

96. Cited by Homel, "James Simpson."
PART TWO: THE EVOLUTION OF PLANNING
CHAPTER III
THE EMERGENCE OF PLANNING, PART ONE:
AESTHETICS, EFFICIENCY AND EQUITY

By the turn of the century Canadians were all too aware of the problems of managing the emerging urban industrial society. They were also becoming aware of the difficulties of mitigating these increasingly complex problems. Few Canadians would have disagreed with Clifford Sifton's comments made at the 1914 City Planning Conference held in Toronto that:

We have many theories for the redress of social evils... the advocates of each claim that their particular theory will set everything right. Yet when we divest ourselves of the enthusiasm which people are apt to acquire when they take up one particular idea, it takes very little serious consideration to lead one to the conclusion that while each one of these remedies suggested has some merit... not one of them would radically alter the law that has heretofore obtained with inexorable regularity; namely, that the growth of poverty, misery and crime accompany industrial and commercial expansion on a large scale.¹

Simple solutions were no match for complex problems. Political scientist Bryce Stewart, for example, observed that government building regulations, the urban liberals favoured technique for combatting urban decay, "discourages prospective builders and encourages the continuance of old houses, especially if the restrictions are insufficient to meet the desired ends." Stewart was also skeptical of the provincial health legislation which allowed the authorities "to condemn unsanitary housing" but which "only creates a further scarcity and increases rentals."² Clearly, something qualitatively different from isolated reforms was required.

According to Sifton, this qualitatively different remedy so
necessary for solving the problems of the new society was now available. "It is to be found," suggested Sifton, "in a rational system of town planning," which if properly applied will "eradicate most of these evils."  

Canadians had disagreed on many of the issues regarding reform and management of the new society. But they were quickly reaching a consensus on the need for coordinating individual actions in the interdependent industrial society through the mechanism of a plan. The idea seemed logical, objective and in the public interest. Few could disagree. Urban liberals such as W.D. Lighthall, the mayor of Westmount, and Frank Beer, the Toronto manufacturer, actively promoted the concept. According to Beer, "it will be seen that no remedy will be found ... apart from a wise planning of the city."  

Lighthall was even more adamant. He replaced his originally scheduled speech to the Empire Club of Canada with a speech devoted to a matter "of very great urgency." The matter of great urgency was town planning. In his talk, Lighthall emphasized that "sanitation and housing have already been tried as such and now it is found that these attempts to eradicate slum evils are handicapped and largely rendered useless by the absence of general city planning."  

Such planning, suggested Lighthall, was essential for the proper functioning of industrial society. 

Urban radicals such as Woodsworth were equally enthusiastic. Woodsworth suggested that "civic reforms of all kinds are dependent upon better living conditions and these in turn are largely dependent upon the lay-out of the city." Consequently, Woodsworth concluded that "too great emphasis cannot be laid upon the necessity for a comprehensive city plan."  

Also, the idea of scientific planning was central to the agrarian radicals' solution to the rural problem. Planning, it seemed, was the one thing that appeared capable of overcoming the deep ideological
conflicts between the agrarian radicals, the urban liberals and the urban radicals.

Thus the popularity of planning was definitely growing. The Canadian Annual Review of Public Affairs noted that "Municipal Conventions, Boards of Trade meetings, educational and religious bodies, leading manufacturers and clergymen, Canadian Clubs, the Commission of Conservation at Ottawa, City Councils, women's societies, labour organizations -- all discussed the idea."

Discussion was accompanied by concrete action. In 1914, the Annual Review reported that "at this time the science of civics and the city planning idea are making great progress. Since 1909, twenty-two planning commissions had been appointed in U.S. cities and in Canada, Calgary, Winnipeg, Regina, Edmonton, Saskatoon and Lethbridge also have City Planning Commissions while Toronto and Montreal have Park Commissions."

By 1920, most major Canadian cities had attempted to prepare some type of plan, comprehensive planning legislation had been passed in most provinces, the federal government had set up a special commission to promote planning and the Town Planning Institute of Canada, a professional organization of planners, had been formed. By any measure, the progress of planning appeared impressive. Laissez-faire liberalism seemed in retreat.

II

Although most Canadians agreed on the need for some type of planning, there was still uncertainty and disagreement concerning the specific form that planning ought to take. Considering the ideological and class conflicts that were being subsumed under the umbrella of
planning and the lack of experience with any type of explicit planning, the existence of such disagreements and uncertainties was far from surprising. Consequently, planning went through several stages in its early development as Canadians struggled to formulate a set of planning principles acceptable to disparate ideological groups.

The first stage was heavily influenced by the architects and the ideas of "City Beautiful". City Beautiful was a style of planning originating, in part, from the American planning efforts for the 1893 Columbian Exposition in Chicago and the 1902 plan for the City of Washington, D.C., which was, in turn, based on the original 1791 Washington plan prepared by the French architect, L'Enfant.\textsuperscript{9}

The three basic ingredients of City Beautiful planning included monumental civic centres to inspire civic pride, wide boulevards appropriately landscaped, and a system of linked parks designed to give the city breathing space. Daniel Burnham, who was one of the primary figures in the American movement summarized his views on planning at the 1910 London International Planning Conference, by stating that the objectives of planning must be "order and beauty".\textsuperscript{10} Charles Robinson, another of the American promoters of city beautiful planning, saw it as a means of coping with most of the evils of urban society. According to Robinson, even the irrepressible "slum disease" could be exorcized by proper application of City Beautiful principles. Robinson surmised that:

\begin{quote}
It has been found that there is no better way to redeem a slum district than by cutting into it a great highway that will be filled with the through travel of the city's industries. Like a stream of pure water, cleansing what it touches, this tide of traffic, pulsating with the joyousness of the city's life and toil, wakes the district to the larger interests and higher purpose.\textsuperscript{11}
\end{quote}
In the 1890's, City Beautiful ideas slowly began to take hold in Canada. The Canadian Architect and Builder, which was one of the earlier journals dealing with urban issues, began advocating the need for parks to "provide relief from the noisy confusion and worry of the city" and for impressive city gateways, noble avenues and embellished public buildings and squares. A.T. Taylor, a prominent Montreal architect decried the haphazard growth of Canadian cities and held up Paris and Washington as examples of progressive cities where the provision of "open spaces, radiating boulevards and noble buildings" and planned development ensured order and beauty.  

It was not long before a number of City Beautiful plans had been prepared for several major Canadian cities. In Toronto in 1897, a number of leading businessmen including Byron Walker, who was the manager of the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, H.C. Cox, President of the Canadian Life Assurance, G.A. Howell, owner of the Standard Paper Company and K.J. Dunston, manager of Bell Telephone, formed the Toronto Guild of Civic Art, an organization dedicated "to promote and encourage civic art". With the support of the Board of Trade and the Canadian Manufacturer's Association, the Civic Guild began pressuring Toronto City Council to prepare a civic improvement plan. Lack of action on the part of council motivated the enthusiastic Guild members to go ahead and prepare a plan themselves. The plan went through several versions and was finally published in its most comprehensive form in 1909.

According to the Guild, the intention of the plan was "for the improvement and beautifying of the city", a task which the plan suggested "divides itself into two branches, namely, the radial road project and those which have relation to the connection of our various squares and
parks by boulevards, driveways and parkways". The parks system proposed by the Guild was given considerable emphasis. The Guild advocated "a practically continuous chain of parks and parkways surrounding the city, linked by boulevards with the existing parks". The park system would be comprised of a hierarchy of parks, from local playgrounds and inner city parks to the large, linear natural parks designed to preserve the scenic areas of the city such as ravines and waterfronts.

In promoting the plan, Byron Walker lamented the "ugliness of Toronto" and held up European cities which had "everywhere beautiful parks completed and perfected". Walker went on to state that:

All who have confidence in the future of the city who are loyal to Toronto realize that we must have some such system of radial roads.

W.A. Langdon, who was one of the authors of the plan and president of the Ontario Association of Architects, emphasized that "to let the place grow without a plan would meet no favour", for it would result in ugly and haphazard development. The plan should be implemented by a "continuous body with a continuous policy devoted entirely to this one purpose, with a certain appropriation (of funds) and able to employ expert advice".

In Quebec, the Association of Architects, which had for a number of years been pressuring the Montreal city government to establish a standing Art Committee to promote civic embellishment, prepared a plan for Montreal similar in principle to the Toronto effort. The Montreal plan advocated two diagonal roads and a number of grand boulevards connecting Montreal parks.

Other Canadian cities were characterized by even more comprehensive efforts. In 1899, the Laurier government created the Ottawa
Improvement Commission with the object of making Canada's capital city the "Washington of the north". Frederick Todd, who was a Montreal landscape architect who had been an advocate of the need for systems of parks, was hired to prepare the plan. The plan, completed in 1903, reflected the standard City Beautiful concepts: a system of parks, connected by boulevards which would highlight the monumental vistas such as the Parliament Buildings. In a display of civic pride, Todd bragged that Washington and Paris, while beautiful, could not come close to matching the "grandness or impressive scenery" that characterized Ottawa. Todd added that if this potential beauty was to be preserved, his plan would have to be rigidly adhered to. "On no account," urged Todd, should the plan "be subject to alterations to meet the wishes or whims of self-interested parties." Having completed the Ottawa plan, Todd went on to Edmonton where he proposed a plan again based on the now accepted principles of City Beautiful.

City Beautiful planning received a major impetus with the arrival of Thomas Mawson in 1911. This must be considered one of the many small ironies in the development of Canadian planning, for Mawson was a British planner promoting what was normally considered to be the American City Beautiful planning idea at precisely the time that American planners were shifting to a new set of planning concepts. Meanwhile the British planners, who had never been that enthralled with City Beautiful planning, were actively engaged in a style of planning concerned with public health and housing; concerns qualitatively different from City Beautiful. Canada, then, somehow attracted one of the least representative British town planners to experiment on her cities.

Just before his arrival in Canada, Mawson had summarized his
thoughts on planning in a major book entitled, Civic Art: Studies in Town Planning Parks, Boulevards and Open Spaces. In spite of its British origins, the book stands as one of the most comprehensive statements of City Beautiful thought. In the introduction Mawson stated that:

The aim of civic art as distinct from practical, is to educate, to train the vision to see beauty in every line drawn, in the design of every structure, in every planted tree and in every sketch of greenswood laid down.

Mawson's book went on to emphasize the necessity of "a chain of parks, gardens and open spaces connected by boulevards and parkways" and adulated Daniel Burnham, the American City Beautiful planner, for his efforts to impose a diagonal street plan and to construct monumental buildings to inspire residents in the city of Chicago. Mawson remained dedicated to these principles long after his American compatriots had abandoned them. In his 1918 Presidential Address to the British Town Planning Institute, Mawson claimed that "everything should be subservient to one controlling factor, namely, the commercial values of Sylvan beauty."

Upon his arrival in Canada, Mawson began a lecture series promoting his views on planning. The Canadian audience must have been impressed, for Mawson was soon hired to prepare plans for Banff, Vancouver, Regina and Calgary. The Vancouver Commission called for the preparation of a plan for the entrance to Stanley Park. Mawson proposed a number of physical embellishments, including a major boulevard connecting the park to the city and a civic centre located somewhere along the boulevard. The purpose of the plan was "to provide a composition
which, in its arrangement and its disposition of the masses, would approach, when completed, what is know as the 'Grand Manner', securing at the same time, great vistas from many directions and especially on Georgia Street and the harbour."³⁰

The following year Calgary had Mawson prepare a comprehensive plan that would manage the city's future growth. The City Planning Commission, which had been created in 1911 to oversee the process of town planning, suggested that hiring Mawson, one of the most prominent town planners available, would be of substantial publicity value for the City of Calgary. In initiating the planning process, the City Planning Commission requested that Mawson give due consideration to urgent matters including the transportation and housing problems, as well as problems related to parks and aesthetics.³¹ The plan, as expected, contained recommendations for wide, diagonal roads, parks and a monumental civic centre. But as had been requested by his clients, Mawson also included proposals calling for the construction of workers' housing in garden suburbs.³²

In the same year, Mawson prepared another similar plan for the City of Regina.³³ Again, although the plan was devoted largely to the traditional City Beautiful matters, Mawson did give some attention to matters of housing and building garden suburbs. It appears that the circumstances of rapid urban growth forced a City Beautiful planner to extend his concerns beyond the narrow parameters of the City Beautiful style. Yet, despite these attempts by Mawson to make the plan relevant to the pressing problems faced by Regina and Calgary, both cities displayed little interest in implementing the plan's recommendations.
In fact, Regina didn't even want a copy of their planning report from Mawson. 34

The initial popularity of City Beautiful planning in Canada was probably related to the lack of alternative planning approaches at the time of growing acceptance of the concept of planning. Just as the Americans had accepted the only planning concepts with which they had some experience, Canadians were naturally attracted to a similar approach to planning advocated by the architects, who were, at the time, members of one of the few professions that had some recognized expertise in the field of city planning. This process was, no doubt, reinforced by the arrival in Canada of such a prominent international planning expert as Thomas Mawson.

But the appeal of City Beautiful planning in Canada was due to several other reasons. City Beautiful planning appeared, at first, to be the perfect answer to the concerns of prominent urban liberals, such as Byron Walker. It was thought that City Beautiful planning would achieve their primary objectives of urban growth and development. Walker, for example, urged his fellow Toronto businessmen to promote the Civic Guild plan "to show the Briton abroad what our material civilization could amount to". Walker concluded his promotional speech to the Canadian Club of Toronto by asking:

Have we no national pride? . . . We do not always want to remain a wooden backwoods place with narrow provincial ideas. We aim to be cosmo-politan, to have a larger outlook. Winnipeg is a dangerous rival in the west . . . if Canada is to be a nation and the twentieth century belongs to us, then we must do our part--and do it well. 35

Walker also emphasized that the plan would increase "the value
of property in the outside places."\textsuperscript{36} It appeared that City Beautiful planning could not provide "remedies for the evils of the congestion of population in cities," but would also be able to do this without challenging the rights of private property.\textsuperscript{37} The disturbing conflict between growth and prevailing liberal institutions seemed resolved.

In spite of these virtues, City Beautiful planning was soon subjected to a critical examination. The American planners mounted a spirited attack on City Beautiful planning at the 1912 National Conference on City Planning, where A.W. Bruner who was a former City Beautiful planner admitted that "the City Beautiful failed -- failed because it began at the wrong end." Bruner went on to conclude that "since utility and beauty go hand-in-hand, let us insist on utility. Since we have in mind a combination of science and art, let us emphasize science."\textsuperscript{38}

As Canadian historian Walter Van Nus has shown in his work on City Beautiful, Canadian reformers also began attacking City Beautiful concepts during the period 1910 to 1918.\textsuperscript{39} For example, Charles Hodgetts, who was the federal government's health expert and promoter of town planning, while acknowledging that "the creation of civic centres, the establishment of elaborate systems of parks and playgrounds, and the creation of city beautiful" had some benefit, complained that City Beautiful planning left the city centre "a sumtown and the suburbs a paradise for the speculator." Another planner lamented that the public had come to assume that town planning "is only concerned with what is called by the ugly word 'beautification'; therefore, it is only another scheme for spending the money of citizens."\textsuperscript{40} The members of the Civic Guild of Toronto, the most ardent Canadian promoters of City Beautiful, gradually abandoned the City Beautiful style.\textsuperscript{41} Even Mawson, himself,
seemed aware of the growing criticism of City Beautiful planning, for in his book on Civic Art, he wrote an introduction almost apologizing for the book's preoccupation with aesthetic matters. Mawson confessed that:

My original intention in writing this book was to urge the claims of landscape architecture by treating almost entirely parks, gardens and boulevards ... I quickly recognized that these things, though intensely important, were merely part of a larger whole and that Art must embrace town planning.  

As Van Nus has convincingly documented, City Beautiful planning was soon viewed as being incapable of solving urban problems; particularly those relating to housing, congestion and public health. Nor was it capable of passing the rigorous financial tests imposed by the new science of efficiency central to urban liberals. Walker, discussing the Toronto Guild's plan, admitted that "as to the financial aspect, I say frankly that I haven't any idea what the cost will be." This must have been a painful statement for a leading businessman and banker to make. But despite its deficiencies, City Beautiful planning did succeed in laying some of the foundations for the future development of Canadian planning. City Beautiful planners helped disseminate the idea that the haphazard development of cities should be consciously regulated by the imposition of a rational plan prepared by a group of professional experts versed in the science of planning who worked for a lay commission that existed above partisan politics. Thomas Adams, who was the next British planner to affect Canadian planning and a harsh critic of City Beautiful planning, admitted that aspects of City Beautiful planning had been useful "for the purpose of diverting public attention to the planning of your city and the advantages of exercising foresight."
City Beautiful planners also popularized the notion that the urban problem was a problem related to the physical arrangement of the city and that the state had a legitimate role to play in providing park and other public goods. The impact of these principles was to be felt for a long time. But despite these achievements, City Beautiful planning had not provided an acceptable answer to Canada's pressing problems. The search for a set of more appropriate planning principles capable of uniting agrarian radicals, urban liberals and urban radicals would have to go on.

III

The transition to an alternative style of planning was occurring before Mawson had even finished his City Beautiful planning activities. At the municipal levels the same pressures that had encouraged Mawson to extend his concern beyond the "city beautiful" in his Calgary and Regina plans were encouraging several major Canadian cities to develop growth management strategies that transcended the narrow limits of aesthetics.

Winnipeg, for example, prepared an urban policy report in 1913 which reflected a concept of planning fundamentally different from the concept of planning that guided City Beautiful. As in the case of other Canadian cities, the initial emphasis in planning was the provision of parks, boulevards and related aesthetic improvements. But with the appointment of a City Planning Commission in 1911 by the municipal council, planning in Winnipeg set off in a new direction. The impetus for the creation of this Planning Commission had come from the local business elite who were largely urban liberal in orientation and
a group of middle class professionals, who leaned more towards urban radical sentiments. While the business elite's interest in planning was motivated by their desire to use planning to promote growth, the middle class professionals such as Pearson, a British town planner, were interested in planning as a tool for regulating urban development in the public interest. They defined the public interest in the following way:

The ideal city must be laid out as to assure for all the citizens proper light and air, recreation space, and sanitary facilities, and must in addition have such restrictive regulations and such equipment for inspection as will tend to secure for all citizens the maximum of good health. The ideal city must be as convenient as it is possible to make it, and this will involve the proper width and direction of main highways and subsidiary streets, adequate and properly distributed transportation facilities, etc., and these questions must be studied with a view to the present and probably future movements of the people between their work and their homes and the places of recreation and would involve ultimately the planning of zones which would bring about an economic distribution of work and places of residence. In respect to all changes the aesthetic consideration must be kept in view, for the element of beauty in architecture, in the arrangement of streets, bridges, boulevards, and parks, in the proper treatment of focal points and the creation of attractive vistas, as well as in the detail of street maps and of everything else allowed upon the streets is a most important function.

The Commission's nineteen members which included representatives from business, labour, professional organizations and government, decided that the preparation of the planning report could best be accomplished by dividing the task up into six subject areas: social aspects, including health and welfare policies, housing, transportation, waterfront and docking, aesthetics, and physical aspects.
In preparing their policy paper, the Planning Commission collected an impressive quantity of data. They undertook a survey of 2222 of Winnipeg's houses to assess housing conditions, interviewed the occupants of 4212 houses to obtain data on the origin and destination of household trips, collected comprehensive real estate values, analyzed vital statistics and the quality of public health and assembled information on planning activities in fifty other major cities. On the basis of their analysis, they concluded that Winnipeg was suffering from major urban problems, including overcrowding, lack of basic sanitary services, traffic congestion, poor quality housing, expansion of industrial and commercial activities into residential zones and a high death rate.

To deal with these problems the Commission report made a number of proposals. It was suggested that the housing problem be dealt with by having the city build garden suburbs containing "model housing", which would be connected to existing areas of employment by rapid transit. These policies to expand housing supply would be complemented by strict enforcement of more stringent health and building bylaws to regulate the quality of the existing housing stock. Congestion in the downtown core would be reduced by decentralizing employment to strategically located factory districts. The plan proposed that progressive labour legislation be passed to ensure a high standard of working conditions in these new factory districts as well as in all the city's industrial areas. Additional recommendations included the standard City Beautiful concerns such as expanding park and playground facilities, building a boulevard around the city to connect the parks system and a civic centre project. Finally, the Commission proposed that an ongoing committee of
citizens and experts be set up to prepare a more detailed plan for the City and that the provincial government be urged to pass "a general Housing and Town Planning Act" which would allow municipalities to prepare comprehensive plans. 50

The response to the Commission's plan was mixed. The Winnipeg Free Press and Winnipeg Trades and Labour Council praised the efforts of the planning committee. The City Council, however, whose support was necessary for the plan's implementation, displayed a general indifference to the planning effort. The members of council who were on the Planning Commission had been conspicuously absent from many of the Planning Commission meetings and had refused to provide adequate financial backing for the Commission's activities. In the end, the Council declined to event print the report. Some observers suggested that Council's reluctance to support the Commission was because Council represented real estate interests who were opposed to the regulation of their business by public planning. 51

Undeterred, William Pearson and his professional colleagues formed the Winnipeg Housing and Town Planning Association to lobby for the implementation of the plan's recommendations. Their efforts were not completely unrewarded for, in 1914, a Greater Winnipeg Planning Commission was created to prepare a comprehensive street plan and in 1916 the provincial government passed town planning legislation. 52

While most of the Planning Commission's recommendations were largely ignored, their planning report clearly had introduced some major new planning concepts. The report implied that planning must place as much emphasis on social and economic issues as on aesthetic objectives that had guided City Beautiful planning. To achieve these broad
objectives, planning would have to deal with virtually all aspects of urban life. There would have to be a comprehensive physical plan that would control location and character of not only City Beautiful projects such as civic centres, parks and boulevards, but of all physical development, public and private. To meet the plan's social objectives, the physical plan would have to be complemented by additional policies such as labour legislation to improve the quality of working life. Finally, the Commission's report proposed a planning process that would be undertaken by a permanent staff of planning experts who would work in conjunction with a group of citizens representing the community interest.

As geographer Peter Smith has shown, similar changes in the concept of planning were occurring in Alberta. In November, 1912, a provincial town planning conference was held in Alberta. Several resolutions were passed, including one proposing government construction of workmen's houses, and the passage of town planning legislation similar to the British Town Planning and Housing Act that had been passed in 1909. Following this conference, the city of Edmonton hired a firm to prepare a comprehensive plan for the city's future development. The plan, like the Winnipeg plan, extended the focus of planning beyond the aesthetic. While the plan made specific proposals regarding a civic centre and a park system, the plan also recommended municipal construction of workers' housing in garden suburbs organized under cooperative ownership, building regulations covering all private construction and "districting bylaws" that would restrict certain land uses such as industrial, commercial and higher density housing to certain areas of the city. And in Toronto, a major report investigating slum conditions recommended the preparation of a city plan that would have as its major focus the provision of suburban
garden cities connected to the city's employment centres by rapid transit. A new set of planning principles emphasizing housing and efficiency as well as aesthetics and which advocated strong government controls on private property were gradually evolving.

Concurrent with these new planning studies was another major planning effort based on a set of principles different from both City Beautiful planning and from the Winnipeg style of planning. This planning effort occurred in Ottawa. As previously mentioned, the Ottawa Improvement Commission set up by the Laurier government to transform Ottawa into the "Washington of the north", had already completed a "city beautiful" plan in 1903. In a new initiative in 1913, the federal government created the Federal Planning Commission to prepare "a comprehensive scheme or plan, looking to the future growth and development of the cities of Ottawa and Hull". The Commission suggested that the preparation of the plan should pay particular attention "to the architectural character of future government buildings, public administration and private buildings and to adequate and convenient arrangements for vehicular and pedestrian travel . . . and to parks and connecting boulevards". Clearly, the Commission had in mind another "city beautiful" plan. Appropriately, they hired E.H. Bennett, who was an assistant of Daniel Burnham, the prominent American City Beautiful planner. The Commission may have got more than they expected, for Burnham's approach to planning had evidently changed.

The Burnham-inspired plan for Ottawa certainly contained elements of City Beautiful planning. The report emphasized that "we should have a beautiful federal district" and that "nature, indeed, offers a direct invitation to make this northern capital one of the most beautiful in
the world." Proposals concerning parks, boulevards, and public build-
ings indicated how "to make Ottawa and Hull the City Beautiful". But
while the plan reflected some of the standard City Beautiful themes, it
contained additional components that made it qualitatively distinct from
the standard city beautiful plan.

In his introductory section, E.H. Bennett, the plan's primary
author, maintained that "the two chief factors in making a city attractive
are, first, the convenience of its arrangements with respect to the
business, comfort and enjoyment of its inhabitants and, secondly, its
general aspect in regard to dignity and beauty". Aesthetic concerns,
then, were now considered secondary to the concerns of efficiency.
Bennett went on to suggest that:

A city plan has to do primarily with the pro-
portion and interrelation of each of the areas
devoted to commercial, residential and re-
creational activities.

With due regard to this new emphasis, the plan recommended that
"the authorities take steps to segregate industry into certain areas .
to control and protect residential districts and to control the heights
of buildings by passing the necessary building bylaws and regulations." To
guide his decisions as to what uses should go where, Bennett relied
on a version of what was later to be known as the concentric zone theory.
According to Bennett:

The structure of a city will be found generally
speaking to have a tendency to take a circular
form. The centre is devoted to intense business;
adjacent to the centre is concentrated a zone of
tenement, warehouse and industrial development.
Outside of this, and spreading out indefinitely
are the residential areas. Radial arteries from
these outlying areas pierce the inner rings of
the mixed occupancy in each of these central
sections. Outlying business centres grow up
along these arteries, their size and importance dependent on their distance from and on the facilities for movement into the main centre; also on the extent and quality of the surrounding residential districts.

To ensure that these trends were maintained, the plan proposed specific restrictions for each zone and guidelines for the necessary transition of some zones to other uses. To achieve maximum efficiency the plan recommended that these zones be connected by a comprehensive street system that allowed movement along the most direct routes.

Bennett also expressed concern over the promotion of industry. The plan stated that it was "of vital importance to Ottawa that its industry should be helped and not hindered." To assist industry "it is regarded as vital in the effective arrangement of the city that the industries should be concentrated in the industrial areas and not scattered over the city indiscriminately" and that "in order that workers may pass readily to and from the scene of their occupations, convenient and rapid transit is of the first moment." 

IV

Canadians had responded to the urban challenge in several distinct and conflicting ways. But many Canadians, whatever their ideological differences, were becoming increasingly attracted to the idea of town planning as a means for resolving Canada's problems. But despite this general consensus emerging around the concept of planning there were growing differences on precisely what form planning practice ought to take.

Initially City Beautiful planning with its emphasis on parks,
civic centres and wide boulevards became the accepted approach. But it was soon discredited on the grounds that it was costly and incapable of resolving Canada's urban problems. Two alternative approaches to planning began emerging as replacements for City Beautiful. One approach which was best reflected to the Bennett plan for Ottawa emphasized the significance of transportation, districting and the function interrelations between all the city's components. In essence, this approach, which was gaining prominence in the United States, fundamentally altered prevailing North American planning concepts by adding the concerns of efficiency to the old City Beautiful concerns of aesthetics.63

The second approach, which was gaining prominence in Britain, added the third concern of social welfare to the concerns of aesthetics and efficiency.64 This third objective was most explicitly manifested in the concern for housing that was expressed in the Edmonton, Winnipeg and Toronto planning reports but was conspicuously absent from Bennett's Ottawa plan. It was still not clear whether Canadian planning would evolve towards the American approach with its emphasis on efficiency or the British approach with its emphasis on equity as well as efficiency.
Footnotes


2. B. Stewart, "The Housing of Our Immigrant Worker," 100.


6. Woodsworth, My Neighbour, 30.


8. Ibid., 721.


11. Charles Robinson, Modern Civic Art (New York: Putnam & Sons, 1903), 121.


15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
23. Scott, American City Planning, 110-83.
26. Ibid., 2.
27. Ibid.
32. Mawson & Sons, Calgary: A Preliminary Scheme for Controlling the Economic Growth of the City (Calgary: 1914); for an excellent discussion of Mawson's Calgary plan see: E. Joyce Morrow, Calgary Many Years Hence: The Mawson Report in Perspective (Calgary: City of Calgary/Univ. of Calgary, 1979).


36. Ibid., 137.


39. Van Nus, "The Fate of City Beautiful Thought in Canada."


42. Mawson, Civic Art, 1.


46. Artibise, Winnipeg, 267-79.

47. Winnipeg Plan, 4-5.

48. Ibid., 2-5.

49. Ibid., 7.

50. Ibid., 8-15.

52. Ibid., 277-79.
57. Ibid., 14; Ibid., 20; Ibid., 23.
58. Ibid., 23.
59. Ibid., 31.
60. Ibid., 49.
61. Ibid., 31.
62. Ibid., 24.
63. Scott, American City Planning, 110-270.
64. Cherry, Evolution of British Town Planning; Ashworth, Genesis of Modern Town Planning.
Canadian planning was obviously in a state of transition between the discredited City Beautiful approach and the two new approaches emerging in the United States and Britain. One of the most significant initiatives influencing the decision as to which direction Canadian planning would go was the establishment of the federal government's Commission of Conservation. The Commission was a response to the growing concern in North America over the management of natural resources. The American government accepted the recommendations of a 1890 national conference convened to consider natural resource policy and establish a National Commission to undertake an inventory of all natural resources in the United States.\(^1\) Aware of the desirability of a continental resource policy, the American president called the North American Conservation Conference, which passed a series of resolutions calling for the establishment of the Canadian equivalent to the U.S. National Commission. Although there was some debate considering the need for a new government agency to handle matters already under scrutiny of existing government departments, all parties fully accepted the need for scientific management of Canadian resources. With unanimous consent, the Canadian parliament passed the legislation in 1909 to establish the Commission of Conservation.\(^2\)
The Commission was a unique experiment in government organization. The federal government, cognizant of the fact resource policy was a joint federal/provincial matter, structured the Commission so that the federal ministers of the Interior, Agriculture and Mines and the provincial ministers responsible for natural resources would be *ex officio* members. An additional twenty individuals were appointed to the Commission to sit with these eleven *ex officio* representatives. In recognition of the complexity of resource management, the Act stipulated that at least one university professor with expertise in resource issues must be chosen to sit among the twenty appointed members. The thirty-one members of the Commission were expected to advise government on matters "relating to the conservation and better utilization of the natural resources of Canada, to make such inventories, collect and disseminate such information, conduct such investigations inside and outside of Canada, and frame such recommendations as seen conducive to the accomplishment of that end".

Clifford Sifton, who was the former Liberal Minister of the Interior, was appointed as Commission Chairman. In his inaugural address to the Commission, Sifton predicted that after years of slow development, Canada's "time has come. Population is flowing in; development of resources is proceeding rapidly, trade is growing." Sifton called for the application of "various branches of scientific thought" by "enlightened and educated men to rationally administer public affairs and prevent the wasteful exploitation of resources by foreign capital".

For Sifton and many other Canadians rational conservation policy was not designed to prevent development. Instead, it was thought that
rational policy would simply assist development by making it more efficient. Sifton concluded that:

If we attempt to stand in the way of development, our efforts will assuredly be of no avail either to stop development or to promote conservation. It will not, however, be hard to show that the best and most highly economic development and exploitation in the interests of the people can only take place by having regard to the principles of conservation.5

Sifton, then typified the urban liberal's commitment to development combined with the acceptance of rational planning as a tool necessary for proper development to take place. His first priority as Chairman of the Commission was to complete a scientific inventory of available resources; a task he considered essential for promoting development.

Sifton's interest in town planning was motivated by the same concern for development and efficiency. In his initial address to the Commission, he emphasized that "the physical strength of the people is the resource from which all others derive value".6 Several years later, at the opening address to the City Planning Conference, Sifton described how this initial interest in public health evolved into an interest in town planning when he said:

We thought that while it was vastly important to conserve our minerals and our forests and to increase the productivity of our fisheries and of our agricultural land, and generally to conserve all those natural resources from which man derives his livelihood, it was still more important that the efficiency of the human unit, the health and the happiness of the vigour of the individual, should be preserved. Therefore, we have to take some interest in the promotion of a greater degree of attention to matters pertaining to public health and in so doing we came into contact with the necessity for close, careful and systematic attention to the planning of our towns and cities.7
It would seem logical to assume that because the Commission was inspired by the Americans, the type of planning that the Commission would promote would be more akin to the American style of planning than the British approach. But, ironically, the Commission was instrumental in promoting the British approach to planning with its emphasis on concerns of health and housing. The Commission's first activities in planning were under the direction of Charles Hodgetts, a doctor driven by the desire to eradicate disease. In his several reports to the Commission of Conservation, Hodgetts called for the establishment of town planning as a means for preventing disease and providing adequate housing for Canadians. In his first report, entitled "Unsanitary Housing", Hodgetts maintained that:

No government can justify its existence unless it carefully considers this important question and places upon the statute book a law with ample and adequate regulations for dealing with unsanitary houses of all classes of the community and for conferring power on city, town and village municipalities whereby they may not only control, but in a measure direct, town and suburb planning.

Hodgetts was highly critical of American planning. He chastised the U.S. for concentrating on frivolous embellishments while ignoring the real issues of housing and health. "It is not so much the city beautiful as the city healthy that we want for Canada," exclaimed Hodgetts. He urged Canadians not "to be led away by what civic improvement and other leagues have done in the United States." Hodgetts described the objectives of the town planning he was advocating as:

1. to encourage and facilitate through cooperation in the provision of housing accommodation for town dwellers whereby they will have sufficient light, air and space.
101.

2. to ensure the exercise of foresight in reserving plenty of space for the development of main thoroughfares when required.

3. to take into account everything that helps to make town life worth living.\textsuperscript{10}

To achieve these objectives, Hodgetts proposed that Canadian provinces adopt town planning and housing legislation similar to the British Town Planning and Housing Act and create a central authority organized along the lines of the Local Government Board in England. Hodgetts also suggested that Canadians should follow the German technique of preserving districts for specific land uses so as to ensure a proper coordination "of the various constituent parts of a modern town . . . in such a manner that they will form an harmonious whole." As well, he advocated the British approach of constructing cooperative housing in pleasant garden suburbs and new towns. "The most interesting and illuminative model for our new Canadian towns," stated Hodgetts, "is to be found in Letchworth Garden City."\textsuperscript{11} Hodgetts concluded that the implementation of the recommendations would control the "army of land speculators and jerry builders who are a detriment to the community and a crime to the mechanic and artisan classes."\textsuperscript{12}

Hodgetts carried on his crusade for town planning beyond the offices of the Commission. Armed with comprehensive statistics on health and housing and copious notes on the details of planning practices in every major Western country, the tireless Hodgetts travelled from city to city publicizing his recommendations. In fact, his efforts may have been an important influence on the innovative Winnipeg planning report, for in 1912, Hodgetts attended the first Canadian Town Planning Conference
held in Winnipeg, and in one of the major speeches to the conference, he argued for his views that planning must consider all aspects of urban life, especially health and housing. 

1914 was a pivotal year for Canadian planning. The Commission of Conservation had successfully petitioned the American organizers of the National Planning Conferences on City Planning to hold their conference in Canada. The conference heard speakers from Canada, England and the United States detail planning theory and practice in their respective countries and was instrumental in promoting interest in the idea of planning in Canada. The conference, which hosted 350 delegates, concluded with the passage of a resolution urging the Commission to create a Town Planning Branch to investigate and promote planning in Canada.

Attending the conference was the British planner, Thomas Adams, a man who was to have a profound impact on Canadian planning. Adams, a Scot, was widely considered to be the leading member of the British planning establishment. In 1900 he was appointed the first Secretary of the Garden City Association and a few years later became the manager of the First Garden City Company, which built Letchworth, which was the first English new town built along the lines advocated by Ebenezer Howard and the Garden City Association. Adams continued his impressive career by becoming the government official charged with the administration of the new 1909 British Housing and Town Planning Act and becoming the first President of the British Town Planning Institute, formed in 1914.

The Commission of Conservation had been anxious to hire Adams
for several years. Hodgetts, after meeting Adams at the 1911 National City Planning Conference in Philadelphia, was convinced that Adams was the best man available to "grapple with the difficulties we have today." In response to a petition received in 1912, signed by such prominent Canadian institutions as the Canadian Manufacturers Association, the Canadian Public Health Association, and the Union of Canadian Municipalities, as well as a host of leading individuals, the Commission of Conservation requested the Canadian Prime Minister, Robert Borden, to ask the British government to allow Adams to come to Canada to advise the Canadian government on planning matters. At first, the British government, thinking Adams was too valuable to their planning effort, declined the offer. But after a second request by Borden, the British government gave in and Adams was hired on a three-year contract to head the newly created Town Planning Branch of the Commission.

The Canadian government could not have found a more qualified planner. Upon Adams' departure, the influential Town Planning Review commented that "the Dominion of Canada is to be congratulated on having succeeded in decoying Mr. Adams out of this country". The Review's editorial went on to say "much as we wish to help our Colonies, we cannot help feeling a certain resentment towards Canada for having robbed us of the man who is justly looked up to as the head of the profession in this country". Similar sentiments were expressed at a farewell dinner held for Adams by the Town Planning Institute, at which Adams was credited with setting up the British Town Planning Institute, initiating Britain's first garden city and implementing the provisions of Britain's new Housing and Town Planning Act.
Prior to Adams' arrival, Canadian planning had made substantial strides forward. But despite this progress, a comprehensive body of planning theory had still not been formulated. Adams, however, was about to fill this void.

II

Adams typified the growing confidence in Western society that man was capable of shaping his destiny by the rational application of scientific principles. "Our first duty," proclaimed Adams, "is to acquire a thorough knowledge of our own conditions and to formulate and strive for the attainment of our own ideals, in our own way and with the realization of our power to shape our own future."\(^{20}\) The application of scientific management involved firm government intervention to protect the public good against individual greed. "The day is past," declared Adams, "when substantial natural progress can be made by a people that function on the imitative grooves of precedent or follow the deadly doctrine of laissez-faire."\(^{21}\)

In hiring Adams, the Canadian government could not have found a planner that better typified British planning sentiments. For Adams, the objectives of planning were threefold: efficiency, health and amenity.\(^{22}\) To achieve these objectives it was necessary to expand the sphere of planning to include virtually all aspects of urban life, especially those of health and housing. In his comments at the 1914 City Planning Conference in Toronto, Adams defined what he meant by town planning. Town planning, suggested Adams, was not the construction of garden suburbs and garden cities. Nor was it the American "city planning", which Adams thought was limited to simply "the control of street lines,
laying out of boulevards and open space, control of the skyline in buildings and other matters which are concerned with the monumental side of the town rather than with the home life of the people.  

According to Adams, town planning was defined in the following way:

Now town planning in brief includes the consideration of every aspect of civic life and civic growth. There is nothing in the development of the city which does not come under the purview of town planning properly understood. And the essence of town planning as the essence of city life, is the safeguarding of the health of the community and the provision of proper homes for the people. On that basis we have to build up the whole of our theory and practice on the subject.

After several years of studying Canadian problems, Adams concluded that the limits of town planning would have to be extended even further than he had originally envisaged. In a major report for the Commission of Conservation, he concluded that "we need rural planning as well as town planning". To symbolize this broadening of scope, Adams suggested that the term town planning should be replaced with the term "planning and development". He justified this change in terminology in the following way:

The change in terminology . . . arises from the fact that the same principles which are proving successful in regard to the organization of town life are necessary to be applied to rural life. In other words, the scope of planning and development cannot in practice be limited to urban development . . .

Changing the definition of planning or calling for the application of "scientific principles" would not solve Canada's problems. If Adams and the Commission were to be successful, they would have to provide more details on what those specific planning principles were. Adams responded to this challenge and slowly developed a theory of
planning by drawing on British and American practice and building on the indigenous progress that had already occurred in Canadian planning practice.\textsuperscript{27}

Adams suggested that the overriding theme that distinguished planning was the scientific management of land. "The land question," declared Adams, "is at the root of all social questions."\textsuperscript{28} Consequently, the primary purpose of "town and country planning" must be the proper development and use of both urban and rural land, so as to secure efficiency, convenience, health and amenity; that is town planning as it is being thought out and worked in Britain, and it is in that form that we have adopted it here."\textsuperscript{29}

Adams viewed land as Canada's most neglected yet "greatest natural resource".\textsuperscript{30} To properly manage it, the planner would have to take a comprehensive and holistic view, because all the different aspects of land development were, in the end, interdependent. In one of his first statements in Canada, Adams criticized the Toronto Harbour Plan before his Toronto audience assembled for the 1914 City Planning Conference, because the plan tried to deal with the harbour in isolation from the whole city.\textsuperscript{31} Nothing could be considered by itself. In a similar criticism of another planning proposal, Adams stated:

Undoubtedly, however, the proper procedure in this matter, as in all matters of city development, is to take a comprehensive view of the whole problem and not to deal with it in components except in the degree that such components are linked up with a general scheme.\textsuperscript{32}

Adams, like many of his compatriots, suggested that the preparation of a comprehensive plan should occur at a number of different levels: from the general regional plan down to the detailed site plan.
The regional plan was necessary because of the interdependence of urban and rural society. Adams remarked, for example, that:

Looking at the nation as a whole we usually permit ourselves to divide it into two parts -- rural and urban, or from an industrial standpoint, agriculture and manufacturing. There can be no real distinction between these two classes of area or industry . . . agriculture, mining and manufacturing are not in conflict but are related parts of the great whole . . .

As a consequence of this interdependence, Adams concluded that:

It is important that study be made of regional areas as it is only by the study of such areas that there can be a proper appreciation of the distribution of industry and of the interdependence of town and country. We hear much of city planning and something of country planning, but what is most wanted is the planning of the town-country which is comprised in the region.

Having defined the appropriate boundaries of the study area, the planner should then take a sequence of steps comprised of a comprehensive survey, analysis, plan and implementation. The survey should be broken down into two stages. First, a general regional survey should be made to ascertain topographical information, land use capability and land use patterns. A more detailed survey of the built up areas should then be done in order to obtain information relating to the existing transportation facilities, municipal services, land values, topography and existing land uses.

Upon completion of the comprehensive survey, the planner would then analyze the data and draw up a broad regional strategy dealing with the general regional land use pattern and a more detailed urban plan for the built up areas. Adams felt that, in drawing up the broad regional strategy, the planner should be cognizant of the fact that the problems
of "overcrowding and bad sanitary conditions in the cities and towns" and the problem "of isolation of rural districts" were obviously related. While emphasizing that "it is futile to fight against the tendency of men to locate in the cities", Adams maintained that "new town settlements (garden cities) should be established where there are good facilities for profitable production and distribution, where manufacturing and intensive farming should be successfully carried on and where advantage can be taken of the tendency to remove industries from crowded centres to rural districts". Adams observed that this policy of decentralizing growth to new settlements would achieve the two important objectives of revitalizing rural areas by ensuring sufficient concentrations of population to sustain a higher level of social and economic services and of relieving the congestion plaguing the larger urban centres. In Adams' words:

It is by these means that the welfare of rural and urban industries can be promoted and that economic distribution of people can be secured, instead of having them crowded into large cities on the one hand or doomed to unhealthy isolation on the other hand.

In a major report for the Commission, Adams suggested that the agricultural area of the region should be revitalized in other ways as well as government support of decentralization. Government provision of rural credit, support for cooperatives, better manpower training and the provision of better transportation and other public infrastructure were all recommended.

But while all these policies were useful, Adams emphasized that none of them would work unless the problem of land speculation was
eliminated. Land speculation, argued Adams, caused "absentee landlord­
ism, idleness of fertile and accessible areas, inflated land values --
representing a tax on industry -- and unhealthy living conditions."41

In his major report, entitled *Rural Planning and Development*,
Adams presented detailed evidence to support his claim. According to
his report, speculators had subdivided and got government to install
urban services on land that would not be needed for decades. This pre­
mature subdivision of land resulted in needless expenditures of scarce
public capital and withdrew good agricultural land from production long
before it should have been. "When the land is owned by an absentee,"
observed Adams, "it is not cultivated at all."42 The leapfrog develop­
ment pattern made the provision of services necessary to secure proper
sanitary conditions difficult "because the buildings are too widely
scattered" and forced workers "to travel long distances to their work,"
causing a "general paralysis of the whole neighbourhood". Adams also
discovered that "most frequently it is the good land lying closest to
the railways that is held by speculators, causing the land users to pay
excessive prices or to go on the poorer land in more remote districts."
In addition to causing improper use of land, uncontrolled speculation
imposed a "tax on industry -- whether it be agriculture or manufacture,"
by allowing community land values to fall "into the pockets of men who
have left the country". "Socially created land values," complained
Adams, "are inflated and exploited and monopolies in natural resources
are established."43

Adams proposed a number of policies to control the evils of
speculation. First, there should be a proper system of land assessment
managed by a group of "competent and trained valuers, who understand the principles of land valuation" and can assist the operation of the market by providing sound information on land values. "Real estate operators," suggested Adams, "are not good valuers, and their experience is hurtful rather than helpful to sound judgment." Second, Adams recommended that land developers be required to pay for the servicing of their land. "The time has come," declared Adams, "not only for municipalities in Canada to cease to be bankers for real estate operators, but for the municipalities to make it obligatory that the local improvements necessary to provide certain minimum standards of sanitation and convenience of access should be provided before lots are put on the market for building purposes." It was argued that this policy would discourage the "forcing of land on the market before it is ripe for development." Third, Adams proposed that "where speculation occurs, it should be subject to a high increment tax at the time when any land is transferred -- a tax which would act as a deterrent against speculation and as a means of obtaining for the community as much as possible of the value which is socially created". Finally, Adams recommended that it was critical that the regional plan ensure that the land is allocated to the use for which it is best suited: fertile land to agriculture, well-drained land for urban purposes and scenic natural areas for parks. This sort of planning that attempted to adapt land use patterns to the natural features of the region would require abandonment of the old grid pattern of subdividing.

To ensure that the recommended land use patterns were maintained, strict development controls to limit new subdivisions to designated areas on the urban periphery, and "agricultural zones" to protect fertile land
should be strictly enforced. Adams also recommended that the government should consider leasing land instead of selling it to private buyers. Adams admitted that "while there are objections to the leasehold system, it possesses the great advantage of restricting injurious speculation and of leaving the farmer's capital free for farming operations."  

The next step in the planning process was to prepare a more detailed urban plan within the parameters of the regional strategy. Like many of his compatriots, Adams viewed the city as an organism comprised of a number of interdependent components that had to be coordinated if the system was going to function properly. At the 1914 Planning Conference, Adams suggested that:

A great community may be likened to a great hotel. Your boulevards and your public places, your parks and your baths and so on are the vestibules and the reception rooms. Your factories and your workshops are the kitchen and the sculleries, and your homes are the bedrooms where the people sleep and live. . . . in a great hotel, it is necessary to have a fine vestibule, a fine reception room, but the real essential thing to make the guests comfortable is that the kitchen shall be clean and properly ordered and that the bedrooms shall be comfortable.

In preparing the urban plan, the expert should designate a number of zones to reserve land for appropriate uses and prevent incompatible land uses from infringing on each other. Adams recommended the use of five zones, including heavy industry, light industry, commercial, low density residential and high density residential. Regulations for each of these zones should be devised to control land use, the height of buildings, and the density. Areas near railways and other transportation facilities should be reserved for industries while residences should be located in areas free from noise and air pollution. A transportation plan
should be drawn up to allow for efficient movement between these interdependent components. The roads should be classified according to main traffic arteries, major streets, and minor streets for residential purposes. The width of the street should be adjusted to reflect traffic demand, while the location of streets should be planned to avoid unnecessarily steep grades. This latter principle required the replacement of the grid pattern with a more flexible street design adapted to the unique topography of the urban area. Adams suggested that the plan should provide for adequate recreational facilities, civic centres and municipal services, as well as subdivision controls to regulate the characteristics of new urban areas. Finally, the urban area should be surrounded by an agricultural zone which would prevent premature subdivision of peripheral land.

Adams urged that the urban plan should give special consideration to the question of housing. In one of his many addresses to Canadian audiences, Adams urged that "we have to learn how to solve the problem of housing the common man" for "the human factor is the most important in industrial equipment." Adams justified this emphasis on housing for two reasons. First of all, good housing would increase the efficiency of workers. In an address to the Canadian Club of Montreal, Adams cautioned that the failure to provide good and reasonably priced housing meant that the businessman "is not only paying more for the men, but is losing the advantage of getting that efficiency which he could get if they were housed in the proper conditions." Adams concluded that "when you look at it from this point of view, you see how essential it is that you should take into account the question
of housing of the people at the same time that you proceed to plan any
great city." Adams also felt that adequate housing should be pro-
vided as a social right. "True patriotism," preached Adams, "embraces
the ideal of securing amelioration of social conditions" such as bad
housing and poverty. Adams argued that "the whole problem of
housing is mixed up with the question of land and the development of
land is so dependent on town planning of the right kind, that housing
and planning schemes must proceed side by side." Consequently, he
suggested that his proposals regarding proper development of new land
and decentralization of employment to new towns to relieve urban con-
gestion would go a long way in solving the problem. These measures,
however, were not considered sufficient. Additional government pro-
grams, including financial support for worker housing cooperatives,
government land assembly and construction, slum clearance, were all
necessary if the housing problem was to be solved. Private enterprise
was either unwilling or unable to do the job. Co-ops were viewed with
particular favour because they would maintain individual ownership and
initiative. In undertaking slum clearance, Adams made the follow-
ing plea:

Please do not proceed to pull down houses when
you do not have the facilities for erecting
houses to take their place. The common home
of the common man must be a good home.

Adams also stated that the slum rebuilding should not be
impeded by having to provide high compensation to owners when expro-
priating land. "There should not be property rights in dwellings
used for human habitation that are a menace to the health, morality
and well-being of the race," suggested Adams. Consequently, the
public should be allowed to redevelop slum areas of the city without having to pay full compensation to the owners.

Having completed the survey, analyzed the data and formulated the plan, the planner should then concentrate on the last stage of the process: implementation. According to Adams, that was both the most important and the most ignored element in planning. Adams was critical of the Ottawa plan, for example, because there was no specific scheme for implementing it. In fact, one of the reasons that Adams proposed that the term town planning be replaced with the term planning and development, was to emphasize that a proper planning process was not just the preparation of the plan, but involved both preparation and implementation. In his annual report to the Commission Adams remarked that:

> A proper planning scheme is essentially a development scheme, not a mere plan and report as to how things might be done, but a statutory plan and scheme showing how they have to be done.

Adams cautioned that, while the plan must be followed, a good plan should be flexible and constantly updated. In a major speech to a Vancouver audience, Adams warned that:

> The plan must not be too rigid or attempt to deal with smaller matters of detail that cannot be accurately determined in advance. It must be elastic and capable of variation as circumstances and conditions alter.

Adams theory of planning was similar to the approach evolving in Britain and developing in its embryonic stages in some Canadian planning efforts such as those in Winnipeg. His approach to planning combined the goals of equity with those of efficiency and required a fundamental
expansion of government powers particularly in areas such as the construction of workers' housing, the elimination of slums, the building of new towns to decentralize urban growth and to revitalize rural areas and in controls on land development including public land banking and taxation to collect the "unearned increment". This body of planning theory contained elements that appealed to agrarian radicals who were interested in revitalizing agricultural life, urban liberals who wanted a more efficient urban system and urban radicals who wanted greater equity. Whether these planning principles would be implemented or not was, however, still far from clear.

III

Upon his appointment to the Commission, Adams immediately set out to promote his vision of planning. One of his first priorities was to get each of the provincial governments to pass legislation giving governments the power to control private land. On this front, considerable progress had already been made before Adams arrived in Canada. In response to pressures at both the local level and from the Commission of Conservation, New Brunswick and Nova Scotia had passed town planning legislation in 1912 and Alberta, in 1913. New Brunswick's, Nova Scotia's and Alberta's legislation were based almost verbatim on the 1909 British Town Planning and Housing Act.

Both the Canadian and British legislation allowed local governments to prepare a town planning scheme to control urban development so as to secure adequate traffic provisions, sanitary facilities and open spaces and other necessary public facilities. Like the British
Act, the provincial legislation did not require municipalities to prepare town planning schemes if they didn't desire to. Like the British Act, the provincial legislation allowed municipalities to expropriate land to put a planning scheme into effect and to remove any construction built since the scheme had come into effect and which did not comply with it. The New Brunswick and Alberta legislation also contained a provision similar to the provision in the British legislation allowing the government to collect 50 percent of any increase in land values attributed to public investment as well as to pay 50 percent compensation for any decrease in land values caused by government investments. Land use controls that may have reduced land values by restricting development potential did not necessitate payment of compensation.

Despite these similarities the Canadian legislation differed from the British in several ways. In accordance with the Constitutional distribution of powers, the Canadian provincial governments, not the federal government, were given complete jurisdiction over planning. In Britain, of course, all powers were vested in the central government. Also, in all three provinces, a section of the British Act (Section 54 (2)), stipulating that the local government would have to obtain senior government approval prior to initiating the preparation of a town plan, was excluded. This section of the British Act had been attacked for imposing unnecessary central government restrictions that impeded the planning activities of local governments. A third and most important difference was that the Canadian legislation restricted the application of planning controls to only those areas about to be developed; existing built-up areas were outside the jurisdiction of planning powers. This
defect was probably inadvertent for Canadian legislators who had copied the British legislation seemed unaware of the misleading organization of the British Act. The British Act contained two sections: one dealing with town planning which contained provisions for planning new suburban development and one dealing with housing which contained provisions for the planning of built-up urban areas. In taking the British legislation almost verbatim it appears that the Canadian legislators mistakenly assumed that the housing section of the British Act simply dealt with housing. Consequently by taking only the town planning section of the British Act, Canadians adopted a truncated version. This interpretation of Canadian legislators inadvertently omitting important sections of the British legislation is partly substantiated by Peter Smith's research on the origins of Alberta legislation which illustrates how little understanding Canadian legislators seemed to have of the legislative initiatives.

Nova Scotia's Act was different from the other legislation in several ways. While Alberta's, New Brunswick's and Britain's legislation required senior government approval before a town planning scheme was legally binding, the Nova Scotia legislation allowed local government complete local control over their own planning. Secondly, Nova Scotia's legislation contained a provision allowing the local government to guarantee the debt of philanthropic private housing corporations or to set up a municipal housing corporation to provide working class accommodation. Thirdly, Nova Scotia's Act, while allowing the payment of compensation to owners of land whose value had depreciated as a result of the planning scheme, had excluded the provision allowing the government to collect 50 percent of any planning induced increase in the value of land. Nova Scotia also had amended the Halifax Charter to allow the city to prepare a town planning scheme for built up areas.
Ontario also passed planning legislation in 1913. This legislation, which was entitled the City and Suburbs Plan Act, was, however, very different from other planning acts. The Act restricted planning to simply the right of government to approve or reject subdivision applications from private developers. This limited role for planning was further restricted by the stipulation that this subdivision approval process be limited to only those subdivisions proposed for areas within five miles of cities over 50,000 population. Also, in 1913, Ontario, along with Quebec, passed separate housing legislation which allowed local governments to guarantee the debt of philanthropic housing associations. In the same year, Alberta passed a piece of legislation entitled the Unearned Increment Tax. While the 5% rate of tax would have shocked Henry George, the tax did accept Henry George's notion that the community had a right to collect community-created land values.

After reviewing the progress in planning legislation, Hodgetts and the Commission of Conservation decided to prepare a model town planning act in the hope of getting those provinces with legislation to improve their Acts and those provinces without legislation to get some passed. The Commission drew up their model legislation in 1914 and presented it to the National Conference on City Planning for discussion.

The Commission's model legislation, while similar in most respects to the existing Alberta and New Brunswick Acts, differed from the existing provincial acts in several important ways. First and foremost, the Commission's model act allowed for the preparation of a town planning scheme for land whether it was already built on or not. In fact, the draft act stated that a "local Town Planning Board shall prepare and constantly keep up a comprehensive plan of the whole territory."
Clearly, the Commission considered the provincial acts deficient because they all had restricted the preparation of town planning schemes to only those areas about to be developed.

The Commission's draft Act also called for the establishment of a local Town Planning Board to prepare the planning schemes and a provincial Town Planning Board to supervise and approve all planning proposals prepared by the local board. The Act stipulated that the approval of both of these boards was required before any land could be subdivided. As well, the draft legislation specifically required that both the provincial and local boards shall be comprised of a group of experts including a qualified town planner, a financial expert, a doctor, an architect, an engineer and a legal expert. In defending this section, Hodgetts argued that:

In this way it is proposed to remove the important matters in connection with town planning out of the hands of our municipal councils. Speaking freely, as a Canadian, I may say after twenty-seven odd years of public experience, that I am not impressed with the achievements or the capabilities of 'town councils'.

The response to the Commission's proposal at the 1914 City Planning Conference in Toronto was mixed. W.F. Burditt, who was Chairman of St. John's Town Planning Commission, commented that New Brunswick had already passed legislation virtually identical to the Commission's draft Act. The New Brunswick official still seemed unable to grasp that the New Brunswick legislation had unknowingly restricted the power to plan to only those areas about to be developed. Others seemed more insightful. C.J. Yorath, Saskatoon's City Commissioner, complained that the draft Act did not go far enough because it did not make the
preparation of planning schemes mandatory. Yorath maintained that planning must be "made compulsory" for "it has been found in Great Britain that acts that are voluntary prove a failure". Yorath also criticized the Act because it contained no provisions for housing and "housing is a very essential part of town planning".

Others criticized the proposal for different reasons. Businessman C.N. Mitchell felt that the function of the town planning board vis-à-vis other government departments was not clearly defined and that it was not clear how the increased value of land subject to the 50 percent betterment levy would be ascertained. A representative from Alberta thought that there would be friction between the municipal politicians and the local boards comprised of independent experts. George Langley, who was the Minister of Municipal Affairs in Saskatchewan, was particularly sensitive to the political repercussions of having independent boards controlling councils, who were duly elected representatives of the people. "The bill," exclaimed Langley, "is a reversal entirely of our democratic order of things." He went on to warn that "it would not be possible to take this bill with the proposal to create a central board to any of the provincial governments of the Dominion with a hope of getting them to adopt it."

In reply to these criticism, Hodgetts reiterated his belief that town councils were incapable of handling such a complex and important function, that the housing question would be dealt with in a separate piece of legislation now being prepared by the Commission, and that it was impolitic to make planning compulsory. He also defended the proposed Act's vague definition of town planning by emphasizing that the proposed legislation was intended to be vague enough so that local governments
could prepare whatever type of planning schemes they wanted. "I would point out," he concluded, "that the legislation is simply enabling legislation." 77

With Hodgetts' departure to England, Adams took over the task of preparing model town planning legislation. Like Hodgetts, Adams was critical of the existing provincial legislation because it excluded provisions for planning in built up areas. He was especially critical of the Ontario legislation, which restricted planning to those areas within five miles of towns greater than 50,000 population. "The Act (Ontario's)," he suggested, "is of comparatively small value in securing the proper planning of even the few cities in which it applies." 78

Adams was in general agreement with the view of planning reflected in the Commission's proposed Act. In fact, the only major revision that Adams made to the Commission's draft Act was to add the provision that the preparation of a town planning scheme by local government was compulsory. Adams also made a number of minor revisions including more detailed descriptions of planning powers, a more specific formula for determining compensation and betterment payments, and explicit statement of the rights of government to impose zoning restrictions. 79

Both Nova Scotia and Saskatchewan were impressed with Adams' proposals. In 1915, Nova Scotia passed a new Town Planning Act that was drawn up by Adams. Saskatchewan followed suit in 1917. 80 Under Adams' initiative, the colony had outdone the mother country; Britain did not pass as sophisticated town planning legislation until 1919. 81

Progress was not as sparkling in the other provinces. In spite of Adams' efforts, Manitoba, although finally passing planning legislation in 1916, passed an act similar to the old New Brunswick Act which Adams
had criticized for its failure to provide for planning for built up areas and for its failure to make planning compulsory. Under pressure from both the Commission and municipal governments, Ontario passed a new Planning and Development Act in 1917 that extended planning to built up areas and removed some of the restrictions on the type of city allowed to do planning. Adams commented that the new Ontario Act "is not entirely satisfactory but is in the right direction". He specifically criticized the Act for not providing for government powers to acquire land, to collect land rents and to control land use through zoning. Adams was more impressed with Ontario's decision to create a new Department of Municipal Affairs to promote and supervise planning the the province. Quebec and British Columbia were the source of greater disappointment for Adams. Neither passed planning legislation during his stay in Canada.

Another area where Adams and the Commission of Conservation had some success was housing. During the debate on town planning legislation at the City Planning Conference in Toronto, Hodgetts had indicated that the Commission intended to draw up a model housing act to complement the town planning legislation. Under the auspices of the Commission, Adams, who was deeply committed to the view that housing was an integral component of planning, ultimately drew up the promised housing legislation for the federal government's housing committee formed in 1918 to administer a 25 million dollar fund, set up by the federal government to handle the projected postwar housing shortage. The federal government's program had two primary objectives: to provide housing and to provide employment. The Order in Council on Housing
summarized the government's motivation in the following way:

In view of the national importance of the matter which touches vitally the health, morals, and general wellbeing of the entire community, and its relation to the welfare of returned soldiers and their families, together with the fact that the carrying out of such a policy on a substantial scale by provincial governments would afford considerable employment during the period of reconstruction and readjustment of industry following the war, the Minister recommends as follows...

Adams viewed the government's housing initiative as a unique opportunity to cement the relationship between housing and planning. He prepared a set of regulations to ensure that the funds would only be disbursed if the proposed housing scheme met a series of comprehensive planning standards. In the words of the report prepared by Adams for the Housing Committee:

The object of the Government in making provision for a loan of $25,000,000 at 5% to the Provincial Government for housing purposes is: a) to promote the erection of dwelling houses of modern character, to relieve congestion of population in cities and towns; b) to put within reach of all workingmen, particularly returning soldiers, the opportunity of acquiring their own home at actual cost of the building and land acquired at a fair value, thus eliminating the profits of speculation; c) to contribute to the general health and wellbeing of the community by encouraging suitable town planning and housing schemes.

The standards included provisions for open space, drainage, water supply, ventilation and light, construction materials, height and size requirements and streets. The loans were restricted to philanthropic housing societies, municipal and provincial governments and owner builders earning under $3000 per year. The regulations drawn up by Adams clearly intended that the public sector, not the private builder should take the
initiative in developing the housing sites. The Order in Council stated that:

The success of the housing movement depends upon the acquirement of suitable land at its fair value at a cost which workingmen can afford. It is essential, that statutory provision shall be made by the provinces for a cheap and speedy method of compulsory taking of the land required for housing purposes to facilitate proper planning and to secure economy in connection with housing schemes, comparatively large sites should, as a rule, be chosen so as to permit comprehensive treatment.  

By 1918, then, Adams and the Commission had made an important step towards implementing their planning principles by getting some of the provinces to pass legislation allowing local governments to control land use and land development. They had also convinced the federal government to implement a national housing program to provide housing. The progress gave all those interested in promoting planning cause for optimism.

IV

The laying down of planning theory and the passage of legislation did not guarantee that planning schemes would be formulated or implemented. The Commission and Adams were all too aware that the success of planning depended on convincing those who now had the power to plan to use it. The Commission, which had no authority to do anything but provide advice, soon began a major publicity campaign designed to stir the authorities into action.

Hodgetts and his public health committee had already launched an aggressive promotional campaign before Adams had arrived in Canada.
In his statement to the Commission of Conservation in 1913, Hodgetts reported that he had "delivered public addresses on housing, town-planning, infantile mortality and the care of the feeble-minded, tuberculosis and many other public health questions" from "Edmonton and Calgary in the west to Halifax in the East". In the same year, Hodgetts made the proposal for holding a National Conference on Town Planning. The result of his promotional efforts was the impressive 1914 City Planning Conference, which successfully gave town planning a national focus and led to the creation of the Town Planning Branch of the Commission of Conservation and the hiring of Adams.

Adams praised the efforts of Hodgetts to mold public opinion to support the concept of planning. Adams, who was keenly aware that the passage of planning legislation, the formulation of planning principles and all other related activities would be futile unless sufficient public support for planning was aroused, promised to continue the energetic efforts of his predecessors. Continue he did. In his first two weeks in Canada, Adams had gone to Winnipeg to consult on the preparation of town planning legislation, to British Columbia to address two major meetings on the need for town planning and to judge a Vancouver Civic Centre plan, attended three meetings in Toronto to consider a Toronto-Hamilton transportation plan, addressed the Toronto Housing Company, went to Berlin, Ontario to advise on a plan, then to Montreal to address the Canadian Club on planning, as well as going to Washington, D.C. to give speeches to the American Civic Association, the American Institute of Architects and the Federation of Women's Clubs. This was an apt display of both Adams' endurance and of the efficiency of Canada's transportation system. The next twelve months were every bit as
hectic. From Adams' report to the Commission, it appears that Adams had visited virtually every major town in Canada to promote the idea of planning. And during his six years with the Commission, Adams had assisted in the preparation of major planning schemes in Canada, including major plans for Halifax, Saint John, Ojibway, Kipawa, Iroquois Falls and Renfrew, among other cities.

To complement his public speaking efforts, Adams published the new journal, *Conservation of Life*, and set up the Civic Improvement League of Canada to promote interest in planning. This latter effort was particularly impressive. In November, 1915, at Adams' initiative, leading members of Canada's business elite, including G.F. Benson, President of the Montreal Board of Trade, A.G. Parker, Manager of the Bank of Montreal, Sir John Willison, an Ontario manufacturer, Frank Beer, members of Canada's intellectual elite, including Professor Adam Shortt, Dr. Frank Adams of McGill and Dr. Morley Wickett from the University of Toronto, leading "social gospellers" such as J.S. Woodsworth of the Canadian Welfare League and Rev. S.L. Alexander from Calgary, prominent middle class professionals such as landscape architect, F.J. Todd and Dr. H.L. Britten, director of the Bureau of Municipal Research, as well as eminent politicians such as Clifford Sifton and the Honourable Sydney Fisher, Minister of Agriculture, met in Ottawa to form the Civic Improvement League of Canada. Prominent urban liberals, urban radicals and agrarian radicals all attended this conference. Adams and the idea of planning appeared to be succeeding in bringing these conflicting groups together.

The objectives of the League, as stated in the constitution, were to serve "a general and effective public interest in all municipal affairs with special regard to the question of town planning". In his address to
the meeting, Adams emphasized that "all the expert advice that could be given would be more or less futile unless the people are aroused to an intelligent appreciation of the advantages of the advice that is being offered to them". Adams maintained that "we cannot give that guidance and enlightenment effectively by preaching; we must arouse public interest sufficiently by local organizations to cause the truth to be sought after by the people themselves." 96

The Conference agreed with Adams. With unanimous support, the participants agreed to set up a Civic Improvement League, comprised of a Dominion Council with 100 members representing all of Canada's provinces and major organizations, and local leagues in each major city to promote planning. Several months later the group held its first conference during which papers were delivered by Adams as well as other experts on all the facets of urban and rural planning. 97 The discussion indicated that a general consensus was forming on the need for the type of planning advocated by Adams. To the delegates, planning was objective, scientific and in the public interest. Resolutions were passed urging the creation of provincial departments of municipal affairs, the passage of town planning legislation, the initiation of comprehensive surveys and the operation of planning schemes. The more than 150 delegates representing all the major towns in Canada returned to their communities to lobby for the resolutions. In 1917, they met again in Winnipeg to discuss town planning issues. To reflect the growing consensus that planning must deal with all important matters in both rural and urban communities, the second conference was entitled Urban and Rural Development. 98 Again the delegates returned to their communities carrying all the latest data and ideas on planning. Adams
had clearly created an effective vehicle for promoting the Commission's views.

Adams and the Commission of Conservation had made remarkable progress in developing planning theory, planning legislation and public support. However, Adams was fully aware that one more thing was required if Canadian planning was to be successful. That thing was qualified planners. Throughout his work, Adams had emphasized that planning was a scientific endeavour that required special expertise. "The two chief enemies of proper planning," lectured Adams, "are the self-styled practical man without scientific knowledge or imagination who has been running things so badly in the past. The other is the unbalanced enthusiast who paints beautiful pictures without considering how they can be carried into effect."

To produce a scientific profession required a professional organization. Fresh from his experience of setting up the British Town Planning Institute, Adams decided to create a comparable professional institute in Canada, as a means of symbolizing the birth of a new and distinct expertise and "promoting educational causes on town planning in Universities." In May, 1919, a group of professionals came together and formed the Town Planning Institute of Canada. In order to dispel the notion that anyone could be a planner, the creators of the Institute had devoted considerable attention to defining a stringent set of eligibility requirements that restricted full membership in the Institute to qualified architects, engineers and land surveyors who
had completed a course in Town Planning and prepared a thesis on a planning-related topic or had taken a qualifying examination administered by the Institute.¹⁰¹

In the first issues of its new journal, The Town Planning Institute of Canada described itself as "an organization that would bring architects, surveyors, engineers and landscape architects into definite professional relation with town planning with a view to qualifications for the increased demand for town planning work".¹⁰² The Institute stated that its specific priorities would be:

a) to advance the study of town planning, civic design and kindred subjects, and of the arts and sciences applying to these subjects.

b) to promote the scientific and artistic development of land in urban and rural districts.

c) to secure the association of those interested in the study of town planning and to promote their interest.¹⁰³

"Canada needs planning but she also needs town planners," declared the Institute. "The Institute will help to promote the one and to create the other." Within a year of formation, the fledgling Institute boasted that it had 117 members.¹⁰⁴ Canada had a new profession.

VI

By the turn of the century Canada was facing some serious problems resulting from changing settlement patterns that threatened the very viability of the dominant order. The problems had generated the three distinct and conflicting responses of agrarian radicalism, urban liberalism and urban radicalism. But despite their differences
each group maintained support for the emerging discipline of planning. To all it seemed like the logical answer to Canada's problems.

But while it was easy to accept the concept of planning it was much more difficult to agree on the specific form that planning ought to take. Initially some advocated what became known as City Beautiful planning with its emphasis on parks, monumental civic centres and wide boulevards. While this City Beautiful approach was attractive because it did not challenge the rights of private property, it was soon rejected on the grounds that it was expensive and did little to alleviate the major urban problems such as congestion.

Introduced to take its place were two alternative styles of planning. One which was based on American practice emphasized efficiency. The other which was closer to British practice emphasized social concerns as well as concerns of efficiency. Before Adams' arrival it was not clear which direction Canadian planning would take. No sufficient planning theory had yet been laid down to adequately guide planning practice regardless of which alternative was chosen.

The setting up of the Commission of Conservation and the arrival of Adams were important factors expediting the development of planning. Adams and the Commission laid down a body of planning theory, promoted the passage of planning legislation, advised on the preparation of plans, generated substantial public support for planning and helped form two very important new institutions, the Civic Improvement League to encourage public support and the Town Planning Institute of Canada to encourage professional development. It was, by any measure, an impressive set of achievements for a single decade.
The planning principles formulated by Adams and the Commission had clearly shifted planning towards the British approach with its emphasis on equity and its acceptance of a strong entrepreneurial role for government and away from the more passive American approach reflected in Bennett's plan for Ottawa. At the same time Adams was successful in developing a set of planning principles which would appeal to all three ideological groups. Agrarian radicals, for example, could easily support the controls over land speculation, the provision of rural credit, the scientific laying out of farms, and the provision of adequate rural infrastructure and the decentralization of growth to small rural settlements which Adams and his colleagues proposed. The urban liberals were enthusiastic about the proposals for better coordination between land uses and transportation facilities designed to ensure a more efficient movement of goods and people. They were also supportive of a more logical planning of municipal infrastructure, and regulations that would prevent the intrusion of unwanted uses into their neighbourhoods and measures to provide cheaper workers' housing. Urban radicals were pleased with calls for public ownership of land, the public construction of housing and the elimination of slums. Sir John Willison probably best summed up this broad appeal of planning when he observed that, "it (planning) is not a movement for a class, or a section, or a city, but a movement for the whole population". It appeared that a consensus had been reached.

But lurking under the cloak of this consensus on planning were some fundamental differences. Each group still saw planning from a different perspective. The urban liberals, such as Frank Beer, saw
planning as a means of increasing the efficiency of movement of goods and workers. Urban socialists, such as Woodsworth and James Simpson, saw planning as a means of replacing the chaos and evils of capitalism with a rational system of providing all those in society with the basic needs such as housing. Agrarian representatives saw it as a means of coping with the problems imposed by speculators and monopolies.

Adams seemed convinced that these differences could be resolved by the application of scientific principles. But the inconsistencies and shifts in emphasis in his own statements on planning revealed that it would be far from easy to conceal potential conflicts and maintain the fragile consensus on the nature of planning a society. For example, at times Adams implied that the question of social justice was central to planning. Yet on other occasions, especially when he was speaking to business audiences, Adams maintained the primary function of planning was efficiency. Sometimes housing and public health were primary planning issues, while other times Adams considered that "the first question to be considered in the planning of any kind of area is the question of industry". Often Adams would emphasize that the government must provide the initiative for development and that rights of private property must be strictly controlled and even abrogated if the public interest was jeopardized. "For lack of consciousness in the past," complained Adams, "we have placed the sanctity of property on a higher level than human life and civic welfare." Consequently, Adams argued that society cannot "hold hand to antiquated notions regarding the license to use the rights of property to the injury of mankind". But Adams also felt that "a scheme to successfully attain the desired objectives must be so framed as to make the
utmost use of individual enterprise" and that the rights of private property were sacred. At times he emphasized that the growth of cities was both inevitable and desirable and that urban problems were the dominant issues in planning. Yet he also stated that "urgent as our urban problems are, our chief attention needs to be directed to our rural problems."  

The Town Planning Institute continued Adams' attempts to maintain a consensus on the ability of objective, scientific planning to resolve the problems of Canadian society. The definition of planning represented a laudable effort to symbolize this consensus. For the Institute, planning was understood in the following way:

Town planning may be defined as the scientific and orderly disposition of land and buildings in use and development with the view to avoiding congestion and securing economic and social efficiency, health and well-being in urban and rural communities.

Such a definition combined the interests of the agrarian radicals, the urban liberals and the urban radicals. Planners, in a brash display of optimism, hoped to rise above these fundamental conflicts. The 1920's would show whether this noble and heroic effort would be successful.
Footnotes

1. For events leading up to the formation of the Commission, see Clifford Sifton, "Inaugural Address," C.C.A.R., 1910, 4-5.


5. Ibid., 6.

6. Ibid., 12.


11. Ibid., 132.

12. Ibid., 132.


19. Ibid., 243.


24. Ibid., 149.


30. Ibid., 100.


35. Ibid., 259-60; Adams, Rural Planning, 242-43.

36. Adams, "Town and Regional Planning in Relation to Industrial Growth," 9, 49.

37. Ibid., 10.
38. Adams, *Rural Planning*, 244.
39. Ibid., 172.
40. Ibid., 142-77.
41. Ibid., 141.
42. Ibid., 107.
43. Ibid., 111; Ibid., 106; Ibid., 107; Ibid., 106; Ibid., 102.
44. Ibid., 115.
45. Ibid., 117.
46. Ibid., 124.
47. Ibid., 114.
48. Ibid., 230.
49. Ibid., 204.
52. Ibid., 262-69.
58. Adams, "Town Planning and the Housing Problem."
69. Ibid., 140.
71. Ibid., 163.
72. Ibid., 165-6.
73. Ibid., 166.
74. Ibid., 167.
75. Ibid., 164-5.
76. Ibid., 169-70.
77. Ibid., 170-1.
78. Ibid., 177-8.
82. Ashworth, Genesis of Modern British Town Planning, 199-200.
85. Proceedings of Conference on City Planning, Toronto, 177.
86. CCAR, 1919, 123-30.
87. Ibid., 123.
88. Ibid., 126.
89. CCAR, 1913, 5.
90. Ibid., 5.
96. Ibid., 34; Ibid., 12.
100. Adams, "Housing, Town Planning and Municipal Government," 105.


103. Ibid., 2.

104. Ibid., 2; Ibid., 2.


110. Adams, Rural Planning, 2.


114. JTPIC, Vol. 2 No. 2 (1923), 1.
The return to peace in 1918 provided Canadian planners with a unique opportunity. On the one hand, Canadians fully expected that the end of the war would be accompanied by a period to rapid growth and all of its associated problems which only a concerted planning effort seemed capable of mitigating. This concern was reinforced by the awareness that the divergence of capital to the war effort had resulted in an acute shortage of domestic necessites such as housing and urban infrastructure: shortages that could cause a national crisis unless appropriate government planning initiatives were launched.

At the same time that the need for planning seemed greater than ever, the nation's acceptance of the idea of planning had reached an unparalleled peak. The powerful Methodist Church, for example, was now calling for fundamental reforms including strong government regulations on private property. As historian Michael Bliss has argued, the church's tolerance of the battle for justice abroad pushed the church to fight for social justice at home. Dr. W.B. Creighton, the editor of the prestigious journal of the church drew the following conclusions:

... the war has taught us many things and it is teaching us that the right of conduct of business is after all, fundamentally, a national affair and while individualism must necessarily prevail to a certain extent, that extent is definitely limited to the point where it conserves the national wellbeing ... The state has the right to control all business and to wipe out of existence any business which is a damage to the state.

Most of the members of the Church must have agreed with Creighton for in
1918 they passed resolutions calling for the establishment of a Christian socialist society to replace the immoral capitalist order.\(^3\)

The Canadian council of Agriculture had also become more radical. In a manifesto entitled the *Farmers' Platform* they called for nationalization of the natural monopolies such as telephone and railway companies and the imposition of aggressive public planning to manage Canada's natural resources.\(^4\) Meanwhile, urban labour, strengthened by the dramatic increase in union strength, was calling for broad sweeping changes.\(^5\) Even Canada's elite seemed to accept the need for a more active public planning to replace the vagaries of the private market. A series of articles by prominent Canadians in the book *A New Era in Canada* called for sweeping reforms including comprehensive town planning, public ownership of utilities and public ownership of land required for urban development.\(^6\) In the introduction to the book it was suggested that:

> The final triumph of democracy could only be assured by the willing subordination of the individual to the state for the common good. That is the lesson Canadians have to learn in the new era, a lesson made easier for them by the heroic example of Canadian youth in war and the devotion of those who willingly gave themselves to a noble cause.\(^7\)

Similar sentiments exhorting the need for more public planning were expressed by Mackenzie King in his 1918 publication *Industry and Humanity*.\(^8\) It appeared that the sense of national commitment and patriotic fervour which had fueled Canada's war effort suddenly exploded into broadly based calls for widespread social and economic reforms. As Stephen Leacock wrote in 1920:

> Put in the plainest terms we are saying that the government of every country ought to supply work and pay to the unemployed, main-
tenance for the infirmed and aged, and education and opportunity for the children. These are vast tasks. And they involved, of course, a financial burden not dreamed of before the war. But here again the war has taught us many things... the finance of the war will prove to be a lesson in the finance of peace. The new burden is here to stay.

The end of the war, then, was an auspicious time for planning. The need for planning was pressing, the support strong, and much of the theoretical, legal and political groundwork necessary for planning had been laid by Adams and others before the war had ended. At first it seemed that these optimistic post-war expectations held by Canadian planners would be fulfilled. The expected postwar problems which provided the initial impetus for strengthened planning efforts were certainly appearing in most major Canadian cities. Acute housing shortages which had persisted during the war were seriously aggravated by the demobilization of 600,000 Canadian military personnel. The result was overcrowding and a dramatic rise in housing costs. Rents, for example, which had actually declined from 1913 to 1918 rose by an astonishing 10 percent in 1918 and 19 percent in 1919. Also, a postwar boom in housing and general construction stimulated by these strong demand pressures placed additional stress on the urban community.

Both labour and business pressured government to act. The Canadian Manufacturers' Association called for government construction of housing. In their magazine Industrial Canada, Canadian manufacturers reasoned that "private enterprise seems unable if not unwilling to shoulder the risk and expense of erecting enough houses to fill the present needs ... government itself should do something to solve the
Canadian manufacturers, along with other businessmen, feared that the failure to solve the postwar housing crisis and associated urban problems could lead to revolution and Bolshevism. These concerns were certainly reinforced by the increasing militancy of Canadian labour whose strength had been spurred by an astonishing increase in union membership from 143,000 in 1915 to 378,000 in 1919.

Major planning initiatives were quickly mounted. In Ontario, the Toronto Board of Trade, the Canadian Manufacturers Association and the labour unions joined forces in successfully petitioning the government to establish the Ontario Housing Committee in June of 1918. The Committee, comprised of leading Ontario manufacturers such as John Williston, Frank Beer and Thomas Roden, submitted a report calling for direct government construction of housing, the control of land speculation, the collection of the "unearned increments", the setting up of a provincial planning board comprised of experts who would advise and assist municipal governments in the preparation of planning schemes, the passage of legislation which would make the preparation of town plans compulsory, and the encouragement of new towns along the lines of Letchworth in England.

The report, then, was a clear endorsement of the concept of public planning and state intervention advocated by Adams and the Commission. Its authors had concluded that:

The function of governments has been widely extended in all enlightened countries during recent years. Gradually the state has assumed prerogatives which a century ago would have been regarded as seriously impinging on personal liberty... It appears possible, then, to establish a clear case for state intervention when the failure of private enterprise endangers public health and denies decent comfort to families of citizens.
The federal government's interest was also growing. In April 1919 the Dominion government set up a royal commission to enquire into the growing unrest in the country. The commission came to the following conclusion:

Another cause of unrest which we met with at practically every place was the scarcity of the housing and the poor quality of some of those which did exist. In nothing has production more significantly fallen during the four years war than in building of dwelling houses. The existing condition for the worker is not only the absence of sufficient housing accommodation but the inadequacy of those that are in existence. Poor sanitary conditions and insufficient rooms are the chief complaint. High price for building land and building materials has made it impossible for the worker to provide himself with a home. Some means should be adopted with as little delay as possible to remedy this defect.\(^{17}\)

As a consequence of these findings, the federal government requested Thomas Adams to prepare guidelines for a $25 million housing scheme which was responsible for constructing a total of 6,244 houses in 179 Canadian municipalities during the years 1920-24.\(^{18}\)

These housing initiatives taken by the government provided a powerful stimulus for the development of planning. Adams, who was deeply committed to the view that housing and planning were inseparable, designed the program so as to ensure that comprehensive planning would have to be undertaken before government funds were dispersed.\(^{19}\) The Ontario government's effort also explicitly stipulated the connection between comprehensive town planning and housing construction.\(^{20}\)

These specific efforts, combined with the general thrust towards planning in Canadian society, motivated comprehensive planning initiatives
at the local level. The Saint John Town Planning Commission under the direction of the Board of Trade member W.S. Curtis, began work on its regional plan in earnest. Kitchener-Waterloo, London, and Ottawa, all began preparing major plans. Montreal formed the Montreal Metropolitan Commission to supervise the municipal government activities. And in Toronto, the Toronto Housing Commission was formed in 1919 to analyze the city's housing and related urban problems. Meanwhile, the Saskatchewan and Nova Scotia planning acts which had made municipal planning compulsory, motivated the local governments in these two provinces to begin planning. Regina and Calgary took a renewed interest in their respective plans that had already been prepared by British planner Thomas Mawson but had been virtually ignored during the war. It appeared that the consensus that had formed around the idea of planning was going to be maintained.

But Canadian planners' growing prestige and optimism was to be shortlived. The fortuitous circumstances which had generated such enthusiasm for planning quickly changed. First, the post war economic boom which had motivated governments to prepare plans in anticipation of continued rapid growth came to a sharp halt in 1921. Exports declined by 26 percent, housing starts by 35 percent, prices by 40 percent and unemployment rose to over 16 percent. This sharp contraction imposed a necessary fiscal conservatism on all levels of government. Under conditions of restraint, activities such as constructing workers' housing and infrastructure or preparing comprehensive plans were not viewed with great favour. Even when recovery came in 1926, the Canadian economy never reached pre-war levels. As the figures in chapter one illustrate, expansion in the 1920's turned out to be much slower than
the rapid expansion from 1900 to 1911. Total population growth for the 1920's was 18 percent while urban growth was 31 percent and rural growth 7 percent. The respective growth rates for the 1901 to 1911 period were 35 percent, 62 percent and 21 percent.

Canada's largest metropolitan areas, while still growing faster than the national average, experienced similar declines in growth. Montreal's growth had dropped from 49 percent in the 1901-1911 period to 36 percent in the 1920's, Toronto's from 58 percent to 31 percent, Winnipeg's from 224 percent to 29 percent and Calgary's and Edmonton's from 570 percent and 216 percent respectively to 33 percent and 34 percent. Meanwhile, expansion of the major metropolitan centres in the Maritimes had come to a virtual standstill.

Housing starts never came close to approaching pre-war levels. Even during the peak construction years of the 1920's starts reached only 80 percent of the level of starts recorded in the pre-war boom period of 1911-1914. Yet despite lower starts, the lower rate of population growth meant that the severe housing shortages that had plagued Canada from 1900-1920 gradually eased. During the 1920's there was an average of one completion for each 3.4 new Canadians compared to one completion for each 4.8 in the 1901-1911 decade and one completion for each 4.5 people in the 1911-1921 period. At the same time, the introduction of new technology such as the automobile, the expansion of mass transit and the expansion of other new infrastructure increased the quantity of developable land thereby alleviating overcrowding and the problems of disease. By the 1920's it appeared that the urban crisis which had severely challenged Canadian society during the pre-war decade had subsided.
At the same time as the compulsion for planning was easing, the ideological consensus that had rallied around the concept of planning was breaking apart. While it had been relatively easy to gain agreement on planning in theory, it was virtually impossible to achieve agreement in practice. The fact that the agrarian radicals, the urban liberals and urban radicals all viewed planning of society from different ideological perspectives made such disagreement inevitable. By 1920 urban labour, for example, had become suspicious of the whole idea of planning. In a letter to the leading planning consultant, Noel Cauchon, Gordon Phillips, managing secretary of the London Chamber of Commerce, commented that:

Unfortunately, some of the labour men who are very much in evidence these days seem to think that town planning is a fad of the rich to protect his interests... and we are going to have considerable difficulty popularizing town planning with some of these people.\textsuperscript{29}

This decreasing confidence in the ability of scientific planning to solve post-war problems encouraged some of the urban and agrarian radicals to pursue other courses of action. Some radicals, such as J.S. Woodsworth, for example, took more direct measures including participating in major strikes such as the 1919 Winnipeg general strike as well as engaging in formal electoral politics through various labour parties. Some of the agrarian radicals such as William Irvine and W.C. Good were even more politically active. Along with a number of other agrarian radicals they engaged in formal electoral politics by participating in various agrarian oriented political parties such as the Progressive Party, which in the 1921 election emerged as the second largest party in the House of Commons.
For the liberals, scientific public planning quickly lost some of its appeal when it became obvious that the concept was incapable of maintaining the ideological consensus and the political stability that they had hoped for. To manage the heightened political tension emerging in the post-war period, the governing forces were compelled during limited instances to resort to more repressive techniques such as the military, strike-breaking and arrests if they wanted to maintain order.  

The success of these measures, combined with the gradual decline in political tension, discouraged liberals from implementing some of the more progressive reforms which at one time had seemed desirable measures for mitigating urban problems.

Planning was also losing some of its appeal as Canadians became increasingly aware of the restrictions on property that planning imposed. The Canadian Manufacturers Association, which was one of the lobbies that had been most supportive of planning, was beginning to grow impatient with government controls. They warned that "legislation has its function, but legislation which attempts to limit or prevent great natural laws will defeat its own ends and injure those whom it was designed to benefit." This view was actively promoted by the Canadian Reconstruction Association under the chairmanship of Sir John Willison, an active urban liberal. What urban liberals seemed to want was a return to "normalcy."

II

The decline in growth related problems that accompanied the economic downturn combined with the breakdown in the broad ideological consensus on the need for government intervention had immediate reper-
cussions for Canadian planning. One of the first consequences of these changes was the elimination of the Commission of Conservation in 1921.

The Commission had been a pivotal force promoting Canadian planning. It had been responsible for completing innovative resource policy analysis in the areas of forestry, mining and wildlife and had completed one of Canada's first river basin studies. It had prepared a broad energy policy comprised of surveys and analyses of Canadian energy supplies. It had also helped formulate a comprehensive set of planning principles, planning legislation and had been a vital force encouraging public support for the whole idea of comprehensive urban and regional planning.

In a review of Canadian planning written after he had left Canada Adams argued that before 1914 planning in Canada was "looked upon by many as a method of promoting rather than controlling the expansion of cities; of adding to and stabilizing land values rather than securing the object of health, safety and convenience." But, argued Adams, with the involvement of the Commission, planning changed from being simply a growth promoting exercise "for those interested in the ownership of land" to dealing with the "improvement of social and industrial conditions and of the standard of health." "The policy of the Commission," concluded Adams, "was to regulate land for the public welfare, rather than for the selfish interests of those who owned it."

Why, then, was the federal government so keen to abolish such an important institution? In the parliamentary debates, Prime Minister Meighen cited several reasons. First, he argued that the Commission's activities were overlapping those of other departments. Meighen complained that:
The Commission has gone about in one direction or another; laying its hands on anything that looked alluring, anything that could be regarded as a possible field for its activities. It has invaded the province of one department of government after another, one branch after another, and necessarily it has duplicated services wherever it has invaded.  

Second, Meighen asserted that the "work of the Commission has been most expensive and one could look for nothing else in view of the irresponsible character of the Commission; there was no effective control over the Commission's expenditures." Finally, Meighen suggested that because the Commission was an "independent body" which "bore no relationship to any Minister" it was not "consistent with our system of government." In supporting this statement, Meighen referred to a case where the Commission had made a submission to the International Joint Commission on a proposed power development which conflicted with the official Dominion government submission. "If one can conceive of anything more anomalous than that," surmised Meighen, "one's conception must be very lively."  

In defending the Commission the Honourable H.F. Beland pointed out that the costs of the Commission of about $100,000 per year was insignificant, that there was little evidence of overlap between the policy analysis done by the Commission and other departments, that the Commission was clearly responsible to the parliament in the same way as other government boards such as the Railway Commission, and that the Commission performed an invaluable service in "stimulating the departments to deal with problems and conditions affecting the efficient use of natural resources which formally receive little or no serious attention."
The Commission itself issued a memorandum in its defence. It pointed out that its budget was small and, further, was not increasing as alleged by its critics. The Commission, by providing a particularly detailed account of its activities, convincingly demonstrated that the alleged overlaps with other departments did not exist. "Such duplication," argued the Commission, "is financially impossible." The Commission reasoned that if it had "duplicated any substantial portion of the work of these departments with less than 2% of the money voted to the department for that purpose, it must have expended its funds with exceptional economy and efficiency." Besides, argued the Commission, by providing interdepartmental and intergovernmental policy advice, it had fulfilled a more general co-ordinating function and had a grasp of the larger picture which the individual departments which were concerned primarily with day-to-day administration had difficulty providing. In short, the Commission viewed itself as a sort of national planning agency whose independent scientific analysis rose beyond the specialized concerns of individual departments and the bickerings of partisan politics. The impressive performance of the Commission suggests that this claim was not without some substance.

This debate on the bill to abolish the Commission was virtually identical to the debate on the bill to create it in 1909. Yet in 1909, the debate concluded with almost unanimous support for the Commission while the 1921 debate concluded with almost unanimous rejection of it. How could arguments which held no sway in 1909 become so cogent in 1921? While it is difficult to fully assess the validity of the arguments involved, it is hard to resist the conclusion that the remarkable
shift in position was, in part, related to the perception that the Commis-
mission was gradually evolving into a system of national economic and
social planning which was beginning to challenge some segments of
private capital. While the Commission's aggressive efforts to block
private control of power development, to eliminate land speculation and
to construct housing were enthusiastically supported by some industrial-
ists, particularly in the Canadian Manufacturers Association, such inter-
ventions were not viewed with great favour by all business interests. 41

But whatever the reasons involved, the end of the Commission was
a serious setback to Canadian planners. The Town Planning Branch which
had been so instrumental in developing Canadian planning was transferred
to the Parks Branch of the Department of the Interior. Explicit
instructions were given to the reorganized planning branch to deal only
with planning matters that were related to land owned by the Canadian
government. This shift in the role of federal planners combined with
the termination of the federal government's housing program in 1923
meant that the Dominion government had almost completely withdrawn from
active involvement in Canadian town planning.

III

With the withdrawal of the federal government, the task of plan-
ning fell to the provincial and local governments. But these lower
levels of government were either unwilling or unable to shoulder this
additional responsibility. As a result, Canadian planning withered.

In Saint John, New Brunswick, the plan completed by W.F. Burditt
in 1922 ran into "unexpected opposition" that "prevented the plan from
being officially recognized until 1931." In Nova Scotia, H.B. Pickings, Engineer on the Halifax County Town Planning Board, reported in 1924 that although Nova Scotia's Town Planning Act had been on the books since 1915, "no city, town or municipality has yet commenced to operate fully under it," even though the legislation stipulated that planning was compulsory. In Quebec, civil appeals to the provincial government to pass legislation that would allow local governments to plan were unsuccessful because of lack of widespread support. Local governments in Quebec didn't even get the right to pass zoning bylaws let alone prepare comprehensive plans until 1930.

The situation was similar in Canada's western provinces. In Manitoba, the provincial government waited until 1921 before appointing a Town Planning Controller to administer the 1917 Town Planning Act. This didn't seem to have much effect for in 1924, W.E. Hobbs, who was the Town Planning Controller for the province, reported that no planning schemes in the province had been approved. In commenting on the present progress Hobbs made the following statement:

In the past I predicted when some of these schemes would be completed, but I have resolved to do so no more, having decided I am not cut out for a prophet.

Saskatchewan's provincial government had made a concerted effort to promote planning by setting up a Town Planning Branch and by requiring that all municipalities had to prepare comprehensive plans by 1922. Despite these efforts, not one Saskatchewan municipality submitted the required plan and the section of the Act making planning compulsory became inoperative. The situation in neighbouring Alberta was summed up by Engineer L.C. Charlesworth in the following way:
So far as town planning is concerned there is at the present time nothing doing. You are aware of course that in 1913 the Town Planning Act was passed. Prior to that time there had been a great deal of land subdivision and when the boom flattened out and the natural reaction followed and the war came on there was a great deal more subdivision than was required for proper development for many years to come. In consequence, action has been chiefly confined to cancellation of plans....

Meanwhile, the lack of interest in planning in British Columbia discouraged the provincial government from passing legislation that would allow local government to plan even if they wanted to.

The situation in Ontario was thought to be more promising. The provincial government had just completed a major report calling for strengthening of the provincial planning effort, close to twelve Ontario municipalities had recently set up Town Planning Commissions and a new organization called the Ontario Housing and Town Planning Association had been formed to pressure the provincial government to expand its planning activities. But in spite of these promising beginnings, the planning effort in Ontario fell far below expectations. In 1921, Ottawa petitioned the provincial government to pass legislation which would allow the city to implement the plan that was currently being prepared by engineer Noel Cauchon. The provincial government declined. In 1922, the Ontario Housing and Town Planning Association conference successfully pressured the provincial government to set up a legislative committee to prepare new planning legislation. But the proposed Ontario planning bill, which was similar to the more stronger legislation in Saskatchewan, was dropped from consideration when it was discovered that there was virtually no municipal support for it. Only seven of the approximately forty municipalities who were invited to a special hearing held by the provincial committee to solicit local government opinion on the planning bill bothered
to show up and of these seven, only three were in any way supportive.\textsuperscript{51}

Undeterred, a new delegation from Kitchener, Ontario petitioned the provincial government to change the Municipal Act to allow local government to pass zoning bylaws. This less ambitious demand was met and in 1924 Ontario municipalities got the right to pass comprehensive zoning by-laws.\textsuperscript{52}

But by the time that local governments finally got the power required to implement land use controls their interest in planning had virtually disappeared. In London, Ontario, the municipal council declined to pay for the printing of a planning study which they had commissioned Thomas Adams to prepare just a few years earlier. While a donation from the local Chamber of Commerce convinced the council to revitalize the effort, the plan was never officially adopted.\textsuperscript{53} In Hamilton, Ontario, the newly elected mayor was so opposed to planning that the local planners decided that they should not even both lobbying for action.\textsuperscript{54} Even Ottawa, the city which had petitioned the government for planning powers, refused to implement their recently completed plans even though the power to do so was now available.\textsuperscript{55} In 1924, H.L. Seymour reported that only a dozen on Ontario's municipalities had shown any inclination to plan and only one of these, Kitchener-Waterloo, had actually prepared a comprehensive plan which was about to be officially approved.\textsuperscript{56} Intermingled with these major disappointments were two celebrated achievements in Canadian planning in the immediate postwar period. One outstanding success was the comprehensive planning of the new resource town of Kapuskasing in northern Ontario. As historian Oiva Saarinen has documented, the planning of Canadian resource towns incorporated many of the aspects of British New Town ideology such as greenbelts, neighbourhood planning and curvilinear street designs. However, in towns such as Iroquois Falls, these principles were not realized
because of inadequate planning controls. The planners of Kapuskasing, which has been described by planner Ira Robinson as the first successful attempt to comprehensively plan a Canadian resource town, avoided this problem. In a unique arrangement, the resource corporation had given the full right to control town development to the provincial government planners. The planners strove to overcome the normal difficulties such as inadequate infrastructure and housing and chaotic land use patterns which had characterized previous town development. The 2,000 acre site was carefully chosen and provincial funds were provided to construct workers' housing, social facilities and basic infrastructure. Subdivided land was sold at the cost of development, and strict zoning bylaws including a greenbelt surrounding the town ensured that the land was allocated to the use for which it had been designated.

The second notable achievement occurred in 1924 when Kitchener and Waterloo, Ontario, became the first municipalities in Canada to pass a comprehensive zoning bylaw. As E. Bloomfield has shown in his detailed analysis of planning in Kitchener-Waterloo, for a number of years Kitchener had been very active in planning. In 1912, the city had hired a planner to prepare an overall urban plan. With the coming of the war, the planning effort became dormant until 1917 when Kitchener appointed a Town Planning Commission chaired by local industrialist A.R. Kaufman who, along with some other prominent citizens including Mayor Breithaupt, thought that Kitchener's already impressive growth as southwestern Ontario's emerging industrial centre could be expedited by the preparation of a comprehensive plan dealing with transportation, parks and the layout of the city into separate zones. Also pressure by local residents opposed to the location of an industry in their neighbourhood helped convince city council to prepare a plan.
Accordingly, in 1922 the Town Planning Commission retained Thomas Adams to prepare the plan. Adams delegated much of the task to his planning assistant, H.L. Seymour, who proceeded to assemble the data such as existing parks, improvements, land values and topography. The plan, completed in 1924, was referred to by Adams as "the most comprehensive town planning scheme for a Canadian city." The plan which projected a population for the city of 60,000, identified the appropriate location for future urban growth and specified some of the future investment in infrastructure required to accommodate the growth. The plan recommended the purchase of 159 acres of land in high amenity areas such as along the river system as well as proposing a number of improvements in local transportation to relieve congestion, and several aesthetic improvements such as the control of overhead wires and the tidying up of the approach from the train station to the civic centre. The report also recommended that a regional plan be prepared and that strict subdivision controls be imposed to ensure that the subdivision designs were appropriate and that they be built in the designated development zones.

The most celebrated feature of the plan, however, was the zoning bylaw which divided the city into five zones of single residential, residential, heavy industrial, light industrial and business. Public meetings and consultations were held to decide which areas should be designated for which use. In these proceedings, residential property owners who were fearful of intrusion by incompatible uses into their exclusive areas seemed to be most vociferous. After several major alterations, agreement was finally reached. But before the City could implement its zoning plan, it had to convince the Ontario government to amend its legislation to allow zoning. In October 1924 the provincial government, at the request of a number of municipalities headed by Kitchener, passed the necessary amend-
ments, and the proposed zoning plan became law.

Several years later, A.R. Kaufman, who was still chairman of the Kitchener Town Planning Commission, reported to the eighth annual convention of the Town Planning Institute of Canada that the Kitchener plan had been a success. According to Kaufman, "the building inspector was sorry the zoning ordinance was not passed 30 years ago." Meanwhile, the original reluctance on the part of some politicians and the public to pass a zoning bylaw had evaporated.

From the planners' perspective, the success was not an unqualified one. In submitting their report in 1923, Seymour and Adams acknowledged that "while the plan must be elastic and capable of modification to meet unperceived changes in conditions" the changes "should not be lightly made nor should any part of the plan be changed without regard to the effect of these changes on all parts." According to some planners, the Kitchener authorities did not adhere to this advice. While enthusiastically endorsing the passage of the zoning bylaw, the TPICJ remarked that "a study of the Kitchener zoning bylaw reveals the fact that it has not been passed without compromising concessions to private interests." And Vancouver planners were warned that the plan "will be a mere scrap of paper unless it is carried out in the spirit and intention of its creation and not emasculated to meet the demands of narrow-minded and selfish persons" as had been the case in Kitchener. Yet whatever its deficiencies, the passage of the Kitchener Zoning Bylaw was viewed by Canadian planners as a landmark.
But despite this worthy achievement, the development of Canadian planning in the postwar period fell far short of expectations. A.G. Dalzell, one of Canada's leading planners, complained that Canadian planning was standing still while planning in Britain and the United States was making impressive strides forward. The *Canadian Engineer* lamented that while "the ability of architects and engineers to conceive city plans together with the ability of technical experts, contractors and organizers and workers to carry the plan into execution" had improved enormously, the willingness of politicians to implement the plans had languished. William Pearson, Manitoba's leading planning promoter, simply concluded that "I sometimes think that many of us are possibly too far ahead of our time." For Thomas Adams, however, the problem was not that he was too far ahead of his time but that Canada was too far behind. In 1923 he left Canada for New York to become director of the mammoth New York Regional Planning Project initiated by the Russell Sage Foundation. His departure was another serious blow to a movement that was already floundering.

IV

The lack of progress in planning during the post war period forced Canadian planners to reassess the approach to planning that had been developed under the careful tutelage of Thomas Adams. By the beginning of the 1920's Adams had integrated the aesthetic component of city beautiful, the efficiency concerns of American city planning and the equity concerns of British town planning. He had outlined a comprehensive approach to planning, which proceeded through a sequence of stages from survey to analysis to plan and proceeded down a spatial hierarchy from the
general, regional plan to the more detailed urban plan. Central to Adams' perspective was the view that power should be gradually shifted from the private sector to public planners who would begin to take on an entrepreneurial role in owning and developing land, building housing and constructing garden suburbs. Initiatives that were undertaken by the private sector would be under strict public controls that would ensure that all development was in the public interest.

At first, most Canadian planners fully accepted this comprehensive perspective. In 1918, Alfred Buckley, the future editor of the *Town Planning Institute of Canada Journal*, reiterated Adams' sentiments when he demanded that the public sector initiate a large-scale housing construction program as part of a fully integrated town planning system. A.G. Dazell, another leading planner, enthusiastically supported Adams' contention that uncontrolled land speculation was a serious problem that had to be eliminated by the application of strict public controls. And the new *Town Planning Institute Journal*, in one of its first editorials on planning issues, attacked laissez faire town development as a system "at variance with scientific method" and called for a system of planning that would have as its primary concern the "bad housing conditions and environment that affect the lives of most of the people." The journal concluded that:

... the town planner believes that decent living conditions for the workers are not only possible but absolutely imperative if revolution and disaster are to be avoided.

But, as historian Walter Van Nus has cogently documented, some Canadian planners were growing increasingly doubtful about the application of these ambitious and laudable objectives during a period
of growing conservatism. Also, as Van Nus argues, they were having doubts about their ability to comprehensively plan a city. Consequently, Canadian planning theory began to shift away from comprehensive planning to a more passive managerial approach geared to the interests of the business community. 73 W.F. Burditt, for example, wrote a letter to Adams criticizing him for his vicious attacks on real estate interests and cautioned Adams to avoid creating "an impression that there is a conflict of interest between the real estate interests and those interests which you represent whereas, I would rather urge the view that in the ultimate analysis those interests are in harmony." 74 Another prominent planner and engineer, James Ewing, was also expressing sentiments at variance with Adams' view. In a report to the Town Planning Institute's second annual convention, Ewing argued that it was crucial that town planners solicit public support for planning by emphasizing planning was above all a matter of efficiency. In his report, Ewing made the following recommendation:

And so in attempting to educate all people what sort of argument shall we put in order to have the most telling effect? Shall we preach to them doctrines of the regeneration of mankind, and of the universal sociological uplight; or shall we extoll the gospel of arts and all beautiful things? I rather fancy that for the time being at least we shall have to leave the ethics and the artistic severely alone and stick to the plain economics and that when we talk it will be in terms of dollars and cents which is the language that they best understand. It is more benefitting a new pioneer country like this and moreover it has more punch to it. 75

Ewing certainly took his advice seriously. In a sharply worded address to Montreal's Civic Improvement League, Ewing told his audience "I want to dispel from your minds the commonly prevailing notion that town planning is a wild, fanciful and extravagant dream, the hair-brained conception of well meaning but impractical faddists and to instill in its
place the fact that it is sound, practical and economic, and a good business proposition."

Other prominent planners such as Noel Cauchon, who had become the second president of the Town Planning Institute after Adams left, expressed similar views. In an address to the Southwestern Ontario Town Planning Conference Cauchon maintained that the primary function of planning was "in the final analysis, to secure the highest efficiency in the unit of manpower and consequently in production". Several years later in his first presidential address to the Town Planning Institute, Cauchon reiterated his sentiment by offering a new motto to his fellow planners that read:

Health for efficiency: efficiency for production: production for well-being.

The growing conservatism in Canadian society was clearly causing a shift in planning theory away from the British approach with its concern for social issues as well as efficiency back to the American approach with its emphasis on efficiency alone. Planning could no longer continue to present itself as an objective activity above the ideological conflicts between agrarian radicals, urban liberals and urban radicals. Planners were being forced to more explicitly choose sides and the side they were choosing was urban liberalism.

Central to this shift in planning theory towards the American liberal approach was the growing emphasis on zoning. Zoning was originally intended as a legal device for restricting the types of land uses allowed in each area of the city. Ironically, this concept of regulating the use of private property was gaining broader appeal during a period of growing conservatism. The reason for this was that property owners, real estate interests and mortgage companies were becoming increasingly aware that the selective use of zoning controls would protect if not
increase certain property values by keeping unwanted activities and people out of desirable neighbourhoods. In New York, for example, commercial interests had pressured the government to enact zoning controls preventing the intrusion of garment industries into the prestigious Fifth Avenue shopping area. In San Francisco, wealthy residents pushed for the passage of zoning prohibiting the movement of Chinese laundries and, hence, the Chinese into their neighbourhoods. 79

Canadians were quickly learning similar lessons about the utility of selective zoning bylaws in protecting property values. W.J. Donald, for example, who was the secretary of the Niagara Falls Chamber of Commerce, told Canadian Planners and other officials attending the Southwestern Ontario Planning conference that:

The zoning or districting of towns and cities is to my mind not only an integral part of town planning but even the fundamental basis on which all town planning must rest ... Zoning protects and stabilizes property values, protects the property owner against depreciation and refusal to raise loans; protects the money-lenders who loan on property and in general protects the valuation on which the city bases its taxes. 80

Besides, Donald concluded, "zoning is one of the fundamentals of city planning which, fortunately, costs nothing except the cost of administration". 81 The powerful real estate boards and local business organizations must have agreed with Donald's assessment for it was not long before they were pressuring governments to adopt zoning ordinances. 82

Here was an opportunity to be relevant which Canadian planners could not resist. By the mid-20's it was rare to find an article or speech made by a Canadian planner that did not contain some mention of the need and benefit
of zoning. Indeed, it was not long before zoning became a measure of progress in planning. References were made to the fact that while "two thirds of the combined population of all cities" in the United States were "enjoying the benefits of zoning, only two (zoning by-laws) were enforced in Canada." An "unzoned city" was declared a "backward city" and Canada was declared 15 years behind the U.S. in planning because of its tardiness in adopting zoning by-laws.

Noel Cauchon, President of the Town Planning Institute and the full-time planner for the City of Ottawa, was a particularly enthusiastic supporter of zoning. In several articles on the subject, Cauchon defined zoning as the "function of town planning which determines the relative disposition of structure to site, detailing uses, areas, heights, intervals and the occupancy of structures." Although Cauchon defended the use of zoning on grounds of public health, his major appeal was to the property owner. In words reminiscent of businessman W.F. Donald, Cauchon maintained that "one of the chief functions of zoning and town planning is to stabilize the economic values and the use and development of land, be they commercial or residential." According to Cauchon, the imposition of zoning by-laws would impose order on the increasingly chaotic growth of Canadian cities. He observed that:

Stores, factories, garages, invade residential districts, apartment houses have sprung up amongst our most select homes... It is this stupid, wasteful jumble which zoning will prevent and gradually correct.

Cauchon also noted that his was a popular cause by pointing out that there were "increasing numbers of representations made to civic officials on behalf of citizens for restrictions against encroachment."
This was, of course, only logical for Cauchon bluntly concluded: "zoning protects the property owner."  

Fresh from his experience from preparing the Ottawa zoning plan, Cauchon wrote a comprehensive paper on zoning for the members of the Town Planning Institute. The paper contained the usual justification for zoning as well as a detailed description of four proposed zones of home district, work district, institutions and noxious uses. Each zone was further subdivided into three categories determined by the intensity of the land use. Home districts, for example, were broken up into low density, medium density and high density, while work districts were comprised of minimum intensity uses such as offices, medium intensity uses such as warehouses and high intensity uses such as industrial factories. A set of matrices measuring the degree of compatibility between the potential uses was provided along with the recommended colours for each zone.

Cauchon, however, did not devote quite as much attention as to how the planner should determine what land should be designated for what use. In fact, his concrete suggestion was that the allocation of land should be decided by local property owners. In Cauchon's words:

The property owners collectively should, insofar as possible, be allowed subject to the adequacy of the public services, to determine the permissive use of their related areas.

This elevated role of the local property owners, while consistent with the political mood, was, nonetheless, a remarkable transition for the Canadian planning movement which had just a few short years before been critical of the ability of owners to disregard the broader community welfare.
J.M. Kitchen, who had helped Cauchon prepare the article on the zoning plan, took most of Cauchon's zoning article verbatim and published it in a book entitled, *What it Means to Zone.* This publication was greeted with enthusiasm by the Canadian planners. The Institute's journal editorialized that Kitchen's book, "cannot fail to impress fair-minded readers who have no axe to grind and are capable of looking at the subject from the point of view of pure science." The journal noted that the lack of suitable planning controls "has brought its nemesis in the paralysis of the real estate business itself, since order-loving people will neither buy land nor erect buildings where they have no security that their values will not be destroyed by jumble building." And with some pleasure, the journal reported that "businessmen who once opposed all regulation of the use of land are taking the lead in this movement because they have seen that it pays." Another planner, B. Evan-Perry, who was chief architect for the federal Department of Health, welcomed the support wholeheartedly. He remarked that:

Due to the familiarity of the realtor with the creation and maintenance of property values through privately restricted areas primarily in residential areas he has been a real asset in zoning... The realtor is highly appreciative of the great services that are being rendered this country by the city planner. Realtors are pledging themselves to co-operate in every way.

But while most planners seemed content with the shift in emphasis that was occurring in Canadian planning theory, some were notably displeased. One planner warned his colleagues of the impending danger of overemphasizing zoning when he stated that although zoning was an important part of planning "the proper zoning plan cannot be prepared
non REGARD to the comprehensive plan of the transportation, street
and park system of the city." The planner continued by cautioning that:

While it is important, zoning should not be
carried out without regard to a general town
planning scheme, it is still more urgent that
it should not be done in sections. Cities
that cannot afford to prepare a complete scheme
should spend what they have available in making
a proper survey and then consequently doing work
that is part of a general scheme.96

Another planner attending the Toronto branch of the Engineering
Society of Canada lamented that "in Canada we are leaning towards the
type of American town which is inferior to that followed in England;
in the U.S. they are disposed to consider zoning as town planning,
whereas it is only a part of that science."97

Even Thomas Adams who was now in New York could not resist comment­
ing on the developments in Canadian planning. In an article sharply
critical of the attempt by real estate interests to control planning,
he summed up recent trends in Canadian planning in the following way:

There was a desire for improvement of social
and economic conditions in Canada and a
spirit in doing things for the public good
during those years (1914-1919) which unfor­
tunately does not seem to have been maintained
during the period of reconstruction since 1919.98

V

Probably the most consistent critic of the emerging trend to
"property oriented planning" and zoning was Alfred Buckley, the editor
of the Journal of the Planning Institute of Canada. Buckley was clearly
interested in rekindling some of the emphasis on direct public entre­
preneurship and equity which had formed such an integral part of Adams'
initial planning efforts. In a series of articles and speeches Buckley condemned industrial society for its "failure to house decently their low paid wage earners, while a small group of men are amassing riches beyond the dreams of avarice out of the home needs of people." He was particularly critical of the real estate industry whom he accused of promoting "the raw, profiteering view of land development" which "has wrought endless misery to mankind if it has put much money into the pockets of commercial buccaneers." For Buckley, this rapacious pursuit of profit at the expense of basic human needs raised serious doubts about the overall desirability of the capitalist society in which he lived. He concluded that:

A social system that keeps the few inordinately rich and the masses of the people not only poor in money but poor in enjoyment is fundamentally a failure. What was needed, argued Buckley, was "a new philosophy of the social life" in which the "concern for human welfare" would form the basis of planning. He insisted that:

We must have a renaissance of sociological concern, a new humanism that looks on the spoiled and spoiltiated city with the eyes of a Henry George or Ebenezer Howard or we shall make little progress.

Specifically, Buckley urged his colleagues to promote the British idea of the garden city which would form the basis for this new "social renaissance." The idea of garden cities had its origins in the utopian socialism of the Saint.Simon, Fourier and Robert Owen. Although there were some differences between these utopian socialists, generally, they all proposed a vision of a new society based on a sense of co-operation and collectivism manifested physically in the form of small
independent communities dedicated to the pursuit of a more humanitarian society.\footnote{104} Ebenezer Howard, a British court stenographer and father of the garden city idea, molded the concepts of these earlier utopian socialists into a captivating scenario which found substantial support among the British planning movement.\footnote{105}

Howard proposed that the overcrowding in large cities be relieved by decentralizing population to a number of small new communities located outside of the urban agglomeration. For Howard, the key to success of these communities was the public ownership of land which would allow the community to collect land rent, an upper size limit to the community of about 30,000 to prevent overcrowding and an agricultural greenbelt surrounding the community which would supply community food needs, recreational opportunities and prevent sprawl. Howard recommended that these small communities be grouped together into a regional urban complex comprised of about six small communities grouped around a larger central city of about 60,000 population. The components of this urban complex would all be connected to each other by rapid transit and would be separated by the agricultural greenbelts. For Howard, the primary purpose of the garden city idea was:

... to establish a situation of distribution to take the place of chaos: a just system of land tenure for one representing the selfishness which we hope is passing away; to found pensions with liberty for our aged poor now imprisoned in our workhouses; to banish despair and awaken hope in the breasts of those who have fallen; to silence the harsh voice of anger; and to awaken the soft notes of brotherhood and good will.\footnote{106}

Although planners such as Adams had advocated the construction of garden cities in Canada, no Canadian planner had articulated the
need for garden cities with the vitality and detailed vision that Buckley did. In a major speech to the Institute of Town Planners, Buckley described the garden city as "the answer of scientific reason to the universal demand for a more civilized basis of urban society." He described the progress that had been made in constructing the British garden cities of Letchworth and Welwyn and maintained that "there is nothing in the psychology of the Canadian people or in their economic conditions to make the garden city idea impossible." He proceeded to criticise his colleagues for not actively promoting the concept and accused them of abandoning some of their principles in order to solicit support among the powerful real estate interests. In a statement that must have tweaked the conscience of his compatriots, Buckley said:

Time after time I have seen public officials and others who have power to do things, touched with this new humanism, then I have discovered that some group of 'interests,' billboard proprietors, land dealers, or others have been busy and nothing was left but stolid, silent inertia or positive irritation with all reformers and innovators.... None of these men (i.e. Ebenezer Howard and Henry George) whom I have mentioned strangled his idea of human good because it might not have promoted his own financial interests or affected the outlook of his business friends. Their dream was for a greater happiness of the common people and a truer and more general prosperity. But whatever underlying sympathies there may have been for Buckley's position, most members of the Institute remained either unwilling or unable to generate a concern for equity or recapture the entrepreneurial role which they had relinquished to the private real estate interests. The increasing support for the struggling profession that emanated from the powerful real estate lobby was just too important to jeopardize.
By 1926 the sharp increase in export demand had ignited the Canadian economy and sparked a boom in manufacturing output and construction. Housing activity, which rose in 1929 to 70% above levels recorded in 1924, was particularly robust. Concurrent with this economic recovery was a recovery of interest in planning. Canadian planners, who had been infected by deep despair during the first part of the postwar decade, now viewed the future with a mild optimism. The new mood among planners was officially recorded at the 1928 Annual Town Planning Institute Convention where planners passed the following resolution:

The Town Planning Institute views with satisfaction the many signs of progress in Canadian town planning and especially the awakened sense of the civic importance of town planning manifested among the civic leaders of Canada and the consequent increasing numbers of towns and cities now busy with zoning by-laws.

This statement was not without some substance. Although planners were still displeased with the basic planning progress, they could point to concrete evidence indicating that a gradual recovery was underway. The strength of the recovery increased from east to west. In the Maritimes where economic recovery was weakest, there was little resurgent interest in planning at all. In Quebec, developments were a bit more encouraging. Beginning in 1926 a revitalized Montreal Civic Improvement League strengthened its main efforts to promote planning. The League drew up a proposed town planning act which it submitted to the provincial legislature, funded the preparation of a number of planning studies for Montreal and worked in conjunction with city
engineer H.A. Terrault on the preparation of a master plan. Their efforts were not all that successful. The legislature refused to adopt the proposed planning act and the City of Montreal never officially adopted the master plan that had been prepared. In 1930, however, the efforts of the local planners were partially rewarded when a Town Planning Board was set up within the Montreal Dept. of Public Works. The Board used the data from the planning studies to advise the city on public investments and other urban matters.\textsuperscript{112}

In Ontario there were also some signs of progress. During the late 1920's the City of Ottawa was providing enough annual funding to support the first permanent planning staff in Canada. The staff, which was comprised of two assistants headed by Noel Cauchon, supplied ongoing advice to the city on town planning matters and, in 1926, was requested by the city council to prepare a comprehensive zoning by-law. While the proposed by-law was never fully implemented, the small planning staff, working in conjunction with a newly reconstituted Federal District Commission which had a 15 year budget of $250,000, planned a number of capital works projects including a major downtown development project called Confederation Square. Although the progress in Ottawa was not up to expectations, a renewed interest was certainly evident.\textsuperscript{113}

Toronto also showed some signs of renewed interest. In 1928, the city appointed a City Planning Commission to provide advice on a proposed expansion of some major downtown streets. The Commission, which was comprised of a group of businessmen who were concerned that the growing congestion would impede commercial development of the downtown, prepared a 15 year - $35 million capital investment plan which would
upgrade the downtown street system. The authors of the report justified their proposals in the following way:

The stimulation to general business, to the building trades, in fact to every department of city life, from such a program will be certain and profound during the first fifteen years in which the work is proposed to be carried on and upon completion.\textsuperscript{114}

A task force made up of the heads of civic departments was set up to review the City Planning Commission's proposal. In the review, the task force agreed with the need for major street improvements and acknowledged that such improvements "would provide a permanent means for the facilities of traffic and at once afford opportunities for commercial and aesthetic development along profitable lines." The task force, while noting that the cost of these proposals seemed "incommensurate with the assumed benefit" maintained that such normal measures of financial evaluation should be set aside in this case. According to the task force:

A monumental work of the character proposed, fraught with such unquestionable benefit to Toronto, cannot be gauged by the standards ordinarily applied to municipal ventures of more local interest but should be approached with a larger vision, faith and courage coupled with a determination to adopt new, perhaps novel methods of procedure.\textsuperscript{115}

The citizens, however, were not completely taken with this line of reasoning. In 1929 the City Planning Commission's proposal was narrowly defeated by the voters. The next year a new Advisory City Planning Committee composed of civic officials prepared another plan remarkably similar to the one that had been defeated. The city officials also set up a permanent planning department headed by Tracy
de leMay who had been chief surveyor of the city for a number of years. Civic officials, it seemed, were beginning to recognize the benefits of planning.

In the west the resurgence was stronger. In Winnipeg, where planning had been dormant since the war, the Board of Trade, along with other leading citizens, encouraged a new City Council elected in 1927 on a platform to revive town planning to set up a town planning committee of council. This committee immediately began advising on capital works, street improvements and on the preparation of a comprehensive zoning bylaw.

In Saskatchewan there was even more planning activity. In 1928, the provincial government passed a more simplified Town Planning Act to replace the 1917 Act. The new legislation eliminated several features of the 1917 Act including the provision for compulsory planning, the collection of land profits through a betterment levy and the necessity of preparing a comprehensive town plan as a prerequisite to the passage of land use controls. According to the Saskatchewan provincial town planning director, the new Act would place the initiative for planning at the local level and would allow municipalities to "make a start on town planning without tying themselves up to anything at all." The provincial director assured municipalities that:

They may go as far as they like, from a by-law to keep a livery stable off main street to a full-fledged town plan. The new Act, an empowering Act, gives considerable latitude. The municipality can experiment until it sees that the thing is good.

Meanwhile, the two major cities in Saskatchewan were actively involved in the preparation of plans. In Regina, a group of local
volunteers under the auspices of the Town Planning Board prepared a comprehensive zoning bylaw which was passed by council in 1927. The bylaw, which was prepared without the aid of a town plan, divided the city into six zones including two categories of residential, business and commercial. The zoning restrictions were arranged in a hierarchical fashion so that the least restrictive zone of residential A was allowed in every other zone, the next least restrictive zone of residential B was allowed in every other zone except residential A and so on down to the most restricted zone of industrial B which was allowed only in industrial B zones. This type of zoning seems to indicate that the purpose of this bylaw was to protect more exclusive residential areas from intrusions of less desirable uses. If the purpose of the zoning had been to protect the health of the population or to implement a comprehensive plan, one would expect that the zoning would have been designed to keep future residences out of noxious industrial areas as well as to keep noxious industrial areas out of existing residential zones. The architects of the bylaw did not seem to think so.

In Saskatoon, where the city had acquired three-quarters of the land supply through tax forfeits, the planning effort was more comprehensive. In 1927, the city which was under the control of the new mayor who had been elected on a "town planning platform" appointed a Town Planning Board which was instructed to prepare a comprehensive plan. The Board subdivided the task into twelve subcategories including, among other topics, housing, zoning, transportation, parks, civic art and subdivision control. The Board was reconstituted in 1927 under the new name of the Town Planning Commission which was smaller in size and
less ambitious in its task. After completing a comprehensive survey to collect necessary data such as existing land use, traffic flows, land values, existing facilities, topography and future growth projections, the Commission hired Toronto engineering consultant A.K. Bunnell to prepare a comprehensive zoning bylaw which was approved in 1930. Having passed the zoning bylaw the planning staff continued their work on an arterial road plan.  

The planning forces in Alberta were also stirring. In 1929, the provincial government passed what was intended to be a more workable Planning Act to replace the original 1913 Act which was considered too cumbersome and which had restricted planning to only those areas about to be developed. The new legislation called for the appointment of a Provincial Town Planning Board, allowed for the preparation of official plans for all areas whether developed or not, allowed for the passage of zoning bylaws, required that all subdivisions be approved by the Planning Board, allowed local governments, with the approval of the provincial government, to set up local planning commission as well as regional planning commissions for joint planning areas and also specified an appeal procedure for property owners dissatisfied with planning controls. The legislation also eliminated the betterment levy system that had been imposed in the original Act. The legislation was innovative in the sense that it allowed local planning commissioners to control the architectural character of urban development and also allowed the Provincial Town Planning and Rural Advisory Board to preserve natural beauty by acquiring provincial parks, and/or controlling all developments along provincial highways.
Within three years of the passage of the new legislation, the two major cities in Alberta of Edmonton and Calgary as well as eighteen other provincial municipalities had appointed town planning commissions, thirty-one municipalities were preparing some town planning studies and thirteen municipalities had passed zoning bylaws. Edmonton, for example, had for some time been passing ad hoc zoning controls to protect certain neighbourhoods from unwanted development. In 1927, Edmonton was advised by the Vancouver Town Planning Commission to hire a group of planning experts to prepare a comprehensive master plan on which future zoning and infrastructure investments could be based. But the city chose to ignore this advice and instead allowed the lay people running the Town Planning Commission to prepare a comprehensive zoning ordinance without preparing a town plan. A Zoning Bylaw was passed in 1930.

In Calgary, previous efforts to impose regulations preventing the intrusion of unwanted uses into residential neighbourhoods culminated in the preparation of a comprehensive zoning bylaw and street plan in 1929. Although local opposition and the coming of the depression prevented the implementation of these proposals, Calgary did pass a by-law in 1930 which strengthened previous efforts to prohibit construction in outlying areas too far beyond the urban fringe.

If planners were generally pleased with the progress being made in Alberta and Saskatchewan, they were euphoric about developments in British Columbia. For years, Canadian planners had accused B.C. of lagging behind the planning efforts in other provinces. B.C. stood out with Quebec as the only two provinces in Canada that had not passed
planning legislation. And Vancouver was one of the few major cities in Canada which had not at least attempted to prepare a comprehensive urban plan during the 1900-14 growth period. But by the end of the 1920's Canadian planners praised Vancouver as the most progressive and innovative city in Canada. Its planning efforts were held up as a textbook example which all of the cities were urged to emulate.

For British Columbia, the 1920's was a period of enormous prosperity. The opening of the Panama Canal had allowed the B.C. lumber industry to penetrate eastern markets where it had previously been uncompetitive because of prohibitive transportation costs. Its expansion in exports to the east, combined with massive investment in mining, fueled an economic boom which lasted through the whole decade. As a result, Vancouver grew at a rate during the 1920's that far out-paced the growth of any other major Canadian city except for Windsor, Ontario.

The optimism about Vancouver's future generated by this expansion, combined with a concern with the increasingly acute problems associated with urban growth, aroused interest in the idea of planning. In 1921 a town planning committee comprised of local prominent citizens was formed at the initiative of the Vancouver Board of Trade. The committee immediately set to work preparing a town planning bill which it submitted to the legislature in 1923. But after soliciting the views of municipal politicians across the province, the provincial premier decided that there was insufficient support for the legislation to warrant it being introduced in the house.

Faced with this setback, the promoters of the town planning legislation decided to launch a more aggressive effort. Members of the
newly formed Vancouver branch of the Town Planning Institute of Canada combined forces with, among others, the Vancouver Board of Trade, the Real Estate Exchange, the Trades and Labour Council, Professional Engineers of B.C. and with the newly formed subcommittee of Vancouver City Council to apply greater pressure on the provincial government to pass the proposed planning legislation. Finally, in December 1925, the province conceded to these requests.129

The passage of the B.C. Town Planning Act was not considered an unqualified success by the planning promoters. During the legislative process, the provincial government had made several major changes to the original bill. These changes which included the elimination of the provision for setting up a provincial town planning bureau to promote and advise on planning and the elimination of provisions creating a powerful town planning commission were criticized by the drafters of the original bill. The disagreement reflected some basic differences in the theory of public administration. On the one side, A.G. Smith, a prominent member of the Vancouver branch of T.P.I.C., expressed the widely held view that a city council which was bogged down by elections and petty day-to-day administration would be unable to undertake the important task of preparing a town plan that had to reflect the larger community interest. He maintained that this job could only properly be handled by an independent group of scientific experts who could rise above the petty concerns of day-to-day administration and develop objective policies that would be in the broad public interest. The plan prepared by the commission would have to be passed by city council. But once the plan was passed, all future public investments
would have to be approved by the planning commission whose responsibility it would be to judge whether the investments were consistent with the plan.  

But the provincial government, sensing that such a proposal would threaten the powers of the elected politicians, decided that the function of planning was better left under the direct control of the city council and other departments. Consequently, the Town Planning Act stripped the proposed commission of all real powers including the right to hire a permanent technical and support staff. The independent commission was to have only advisory powers.

The disappointment over the planning act was aggravated by the decision of the City of Vancouver to hire the American planning firm of Bartholomew to prepare the Vancouver plan instead of hiring two prominent Canadian planners, H.L. Seymour and A.G. Dalzell, who had also applied for the job. But the excitement and anticipation surrounding the initiation of the largest single planning project yet undertaken in Canada quickly soothed the discontent.

Bartholomew was quickly emerging as one of America's most successful planning consultants. Before obtaining the Vancouver contract, he had been involved in preparing plans for a number of major American cities including Newark, St. Louis, Detroit, Memphis and Washington, D.C. In 1922, he summarized his views on planning in an article entitled "The Principles of City Planning" published in the popular urban affairs journal, the American City. His ideas reflected what had become the almost standard American view of planning. According to Bartholomew and the "conventional American wisdom" urban planning was
defined in the following way:

City planning is that phase of municipal activity which analyzes the character and probable extent of the city's growth; suggests certain recommendations and provides for the co-ordination of all future improvements. City planning is essentially concerned with the physical development of cities. It has nothing to do with politics or administrative policies.\textsuperscript{134}

For Bartholomew and other leading American planners, the purpose of planning was to facilitate growth by providing the required urban services as efficiently as possible. Bartholomew emphasized that "modern cities, lacking in unity of design, do not easily promote the expansion of commerce, and industry and have numerous residential areas of doubtful value." The completion of a comprehensive plan, however, will give "a new impetus... to growth" which "finds its reflection in increased local property values and greater public convenience."\textsuperscript{135}

Bartholomew recommended that the comprehensive plan should be comprised of six components. The first and most significant component was the street system which, wrote Bartholomew, "is the fundamental element of the city plan."\textsuperscript{136} The street system was divided into the three categories of main arterial roads, secondary roads and minor roads. The main arterial roads proceeded out from the central business district to the outer areas of the city, while the secondary roads formed a concentric pattern at successive intervals from the central areas. The minor streets were expected to accommodate local residential traffic.

After completing the street plan, the planner was expected to prepare the remaining five components of the comprehensive plan. They included a transit plan, a road and water facilities plan to
accommodate the needs of industry, a recreation plan to "help stabilize land values and hence increase taxable return," a zoning ordinance and a civic art plan to improve the aesthetics of the city. Bartholomew emphasized that the zoning ordinance should only be prepared after the other components of the plan had been completed.

In preparing the Vancouver plan, Bartholomew and his consultants followed this proposed outline very closely. Indeed, one of Bartholomew's first acts was to deny requests from the Town Planning Commission that he prepare a comprehensive zoning bylaw "as a first step." Instead, Bartholomew proceeded through his proposed sequence of studies leaving the zoning question to the end. The street and transit system were analyzed and a set of detailed proposals were made to make Vancouver's system more akin to the ideal radial and concentric system described in Bartholomew's article. The overriding objective of these transportation proposals was to improve the access to the central business district. The next part of the plan made a number of proposals for improving the rail and port facilities so as to accommodate industry. This was followed by an analysis of the recreation system which included recommendations for the acquisition of over 5,000 acres of park land ranging from small neighbourhood parks up to regional parks located in high amenity areas. These parks were to be complemented by a system of scenic drives. Next came the zoning study and a civic art study. This latter part of the plan contained proposals for a civic centre that "will be a constant stimulus to civic pride" as well as other recommendations to conserve the natural beauty of Vancouver and make it "more pleasing to the eye."
It was the zoning study, however, which aroused the most interest. Ten zones ranging from single family residential up to heavy industrial were proposed. Bartholomew's method of allocating land to these ten different zones reflected several of the dominant biases that permeated North American planning practice at the time. The first bias was that the primary function of urban planning was to accommodate industrial growth. Hence, Bartholomew's first act in allocating land was to reserve all those areas suitable for industry by virtue of their proximity to rail or water for industrial purposes. "Zoning," concluded Bartholomew, "will encourage and facilitate location of new industry." Bartholomew went on to recommend that:

No raw material of any sort should be permitted to pass eastward to the port without a careful study being made as to whether it could be profitably worked up into a finished product...

The plan also recommended that:

A diversity of industry should be sought rather than a single predominating type in order to ensure a more stable labour supply and business balance...

The next underlying bias was the preference for single family homes relative to other types of accommodation. As the plan commented:

The retention of Vancouver as a city of single-family houses has always been close to the heart of those engaged in the preparation of this plan...

Consequently, the plan provided for unusually "large areas for single-family houses" at the expense of other types of uses.

In allocating the remaining land uses, Bartholomew relied on land use data from other North American cities and his population projection for Vancouver. First of all, the projected demand for some
uses such as commercial was calculated by multiplying the frontage of commercial use per capita by the projected population. Then those areas most suited for commercial use such as the central business district and areas along the major arterials were zoned commercial. As geographer John Bottomley has shown in his detailed analysis of planning in Vancouver, the ultimate result of this technique of allocation was a zoning system which conformed very closely to the concentric zone pattern that characterized many of the North American cities of the period. The central business district was the major commercial centre. Surrounding this was the zone of transition comprised of mixed uses including commercial uses spreading out from the expanding central business district, high density residential for the working class and poor, and light industrial. Beyond this zone was the lower density, higher quality housing of the city; the area zoned single family.

One subject conspicuously avoided by Bartholomew in his plan was the whole question of providing adequate housing for Vancouver's population. This decision by Bartholomew to omit housing was consistent with the vision of planning expressed in his article on planning principles. But evidently, several members of the Vancouver planning community had been influenced by Adams' lectures expressing the integral relation of housing to town planning. They asked Bartholomew and his consultants how they expected to deal with the housing issue. Bartholomew responded to these enquiries by stating that "while town planning can go far to create and maintain desirable housing conditions, it is beyond its scope... to concern itself with the very important economic problems" of ensuring adequate housing for the citizens.
Bartholomew also observed that:

Whether or not the city itself should engage in the building of homes is a matter that on this continent has generally been decided in the negative... The general opinion seems to be that such a building is in its nature a matter of private rather than public enterprise. 147

After several years of arduous studies the plan was finally finished. The consultants, who were obviously elated with their effort, concluded that with "the publication of this volume, a more or less definite plan of the city of Vancouver has been laid down for the next 30 or 40 years." 148 At first, Vancouver's politicians did not exhibit the same enthusiasm. Although the city had passed an interim zoning bylaw in 1927 to prevent the intrusion of undesirable uses into "select" residential areas, they were reluctant to pass the more comprehensive zoning ordinance recommended in the report. But after some discussion their apprehension faded and on December, 1928 the zoning bylaw was passed. 149 The local business community as well as Canadian planners were jubilant at the successful conclusion of the most comprehensive planning efforts yet undertaken in the country. Planning, it seemed, had finally made its long anticipated breakthrough.

VII

A successful pursuit of economic development during the first three decades of the twentieth century had clearly posed some profound
challenges to Canadian society. The conflict between the laissez-faire remnants of the bygone agricultural days and the demands of the new urban, industrial society created a degree of stress which had to be relieved. But there was some basic disagreement on how this ought to be done. One option which was advocated by the agrarian radicals was to maintain and strengthen agricultural life in Canada by initiating some major reforms in the structure of Canadian society. A second option which was urged by the urban liberals was to expedite and accommodate the process of industrial development by implementing a series of reforms within the framework of the capitalist institutions. The third option which was promoted by the urban radicals was to accept urban, industrial growth as inevitable and manage it by replacing the anarchistic, capitalist institutions which were inimical to the sort of public interventions necessary to cope with industrial society.

Some type of public planning was considered central to all three groups. This broad ideological consensus on the idea of planning combined with the exigencies of Canada's problems seemed to guarantee a rapid growth of the new discipline. At first, Canadian planning theory was founded on the idea of City Beautiful; parks, civic centres, and wide boulevards. But this costly and ineffective approach to planning was soon challenged by the two alternatives of "city planning" which was emerging in the United States and "town planning" which was emerging in Britain. "City planning" added the concerns of efficiency to the aesthetic concerns of city beautiful. Transportation and zoning became its dominant concerns. "Town planning" added the concerns of social welfare to the efficiency and aesthetic concerns of American "city planning". Provision of adequate
housing and maintenance of public health were central to the "town planning" perspective.

Under Adams' direction, Canadian planning which embraced the ideas of the British town planning movement with its emphasis on housing, garden cities and direct public entrepreneurship briefly succeeded in uniting the three ideologically hostile forces in Canada. But as Canada entered the 1920's, the euphoric expectations of the new Canadian planning profession were soon dashed by the harsh political and economic realities of the society in which they had to work. The postwar economic depression and the rising militancy of agrarian and urban radical forces intensified the social conflicts in Canadian society. This growing intensity of conflict helped shatter the fragile consensus that had turned around the idea of planning. Consequently the support for the comprehensive type of planning advocated by Adams withered. Planning legislation was ignored and planning programs terminated while important institutions such as the Commission of Conservation were abolished. Adams, himself, finally decided to leave for a more receptive environment in New York. The apprehension about planning was reinforced by a new conservatism that was sweeping across North America. In Canada, the urban liberals were withdrawing their support for the major reforms that once seemed necessary to maintain social order. Agrarian radicals lost much of their strength as their Progressive Party collapsed and merged with the Liberal Party. The support for urban radicals, weak to begin with, virtually disappeared.

This new, more conservative political environment and the setbacks in planning practice had forced Canadian planners to re-evaluate the planning theory formulated by Adams. It was not long before some
prominent planners had began urging their colleagues to adopt a less interventionist and more business oriented approach to planning more acceptable for the times. This new type of planning, which was similar to the approach developing in the U.S., consisted of applying zoning controls to prevent unwanted mixing of land uses. In theory, this American planning in the 1920's was simply a continuation of the "city planning" approach which had developed as a replacement for the discredited city beautiful method. In practice, however, this city planning approach was largely restricted to the ad hoc application of zoning controls to protect property values by preventing the intrusion of unwanted uses into certain sections of the city. In fact, zoning soon became almost synonymous with planning.

By the late 1920's, both the Canadian economy and Canadian planning began to recover from their respective depressions. The recovery revealed just how much Canadian planning had changed. In replacing the British town planning approach with American "city planning", Canadian planners had become protectors as opposed to regulators of private property. They had implicitly subordinated themselves to real estate interests and market trends which the more interventionist and entrepreneurial type of planning advocated by Adams had sought to control. In gaining wider acceptance, Canadian planners had to relinquish their role as the primary actors determining the pattern of spatial development. In the words of historian Van Nus, "... Most Canadian planners in those years exchanged the goal of an optimally efficient urban organism for that of an optimally profitable one for the property industry."

Some Canadian planners were far from comfortable with this new position. Several prominent planners, most notably Alfred Buckley, urged the return to the more aggressive British town planning approach with its emphasis on public ownership of land, public construction of
housing and garden cities. Others complained about the conspicuous deficiencies of the new Canadian practice. A.G. Dalzell, for example, writing to his compatriot W.F. Burditt expressed extreme reservations about the state of planning in Toronto in the late 1920's. In discussing the recent appointment of the Town Planning Commission, Dalzell remarked that:

This has been a serious disappointment because I fear it will have a bad effect on the town planning movement here. . . . The fault lies in the fact that the (Toronto Planning) Commission was chosen to suit certain political parties and that the main interest was real estate development and that there is no social impulse . . . . I have little faith in town planning movements which are fostered mainly by real estate interests. 151

The ease with which the Toronto bureaucracy set aside normally accepted practices of public finance when evaluating the Planning Commission's proposals for major public investments intended to increase property values in the downtown core, suggests that Dalzell's apprehensions were somewhat justified.

In the west where the planning recovery was stronger, similar apprehensions were expressed. The TPICJ admonished Regina's planning effort for not "aiming at something more comprehensive than a timid zoning bylaw". Edmonton was chastised for preparing a zoning bylaw before it had completed its urban plan. 152 Even Vancouver's highly regarded planning effort was hampered by the close alliance of the business community to the planning process. The housing question was ignored and garden suburb proposals urged by Alfred Buckley were not seriously considered. 153 The zoning plan itself was compromised. As the report noted:

The west end poses some difficult zoning problems . . . . If commercial districts are restricted in
their scientific and reasonable way, they do not meet with the wishes of owners of property who have anticipated certain structures or future business streets. For this reason the frontage of Denman and Robson streets have been zoned as six story commercial districts.154

Canadian planning, then, had been unable to remain above the ideological conflicts that characterized Canadian society. Most planners embraced urban liberal values with their emphasis on efficiency and the protection of property rights. These planners were partially successful in forging a new consensus around this more conservative style of planning. Some planners, however, such as Alfred Buckley clung to the unpopular, urban radical values with their emphasis on social change and social equity. But these inevitable debates on planning revealed that planning was far from the objective technical exercise that it had once appeared to be. As a result, Canadians were now becoming increasingly confused as to what planning really was as it shifted back and forth with the political trends. A survey of public opinion on the nature of planning near the end of the 1920's revealed just how confused they were. Some prominent Canadians viewed planning as a means of eradicating slums and providing adequate housing. Others viewed it as a method of maintaining beauty. Still others saw planning as a tool for improving efficiency and protecting property values through zoning.155 Such disagreement certainly did not engender great confidence among Canadians on the scientific origins of the new profession.

And if Canadians were confused about the nature of planning, they seemed even more confused about what they had accomplished during the first few decades of "Canada's century". A.K. Bunnell, a prominent consultant, was openly impressed. In reviewing recent developments, he
In conclusion, looking back over the past 25 years the town planners have no reason to be ashamed nor discouraged. Other Canadians had a more qualified assessment. W.W. Cory, the Deputy Minister of the Department of Interior, concluded that: "actual achievement in town planning in Canada is not yet as proportionally as large as in Great Britain or the United States; but there is a very vital interest in the subject throughout the Dominion". Some prominent planners were frankly appalled at the lack of progress. In a rather derisive evaluation of the state of planning, Canadian planner, J.A. Pounder, scoffed that: "... town planning has been at the hustings and has come out bruised, battered and broken". The TPICJ editorialized "it is not possible to report satisfactory progress in Canadian planning ... and preserve the dignity of truth". Perhaps the most devastating assessment came from Thomas Adams who scarcely acknowledge the existence of Canada in his new book entitled Recent Advances in Town Planning. As A.J. Dalzell wrote:

Mr. Adams' services were not as fruitful as he had hoped. Evidence of this is found in a book written by a man who spent several of the best years of his life in this Dominion and to the almost complete silence on his association with the work in Canada. To those who know, the silence is indeed eloquence. But such debates on past developments in Canadian planning were about to become a luxury. A slowdown in the economy in 1929 was the portent of a profound crisis that both Canadian society and Canadian planners were ill-prepared for. Canadian planning was about to confront the most demanding challenge it had yet faced. The second fragile consensus that planners had attempted to forge around the more
conservative American approach to planning during the twenties was about to collapse with even more vengeance than the collapse of the first consensus forged by Adams.
Footnotes


3. Ibid., 231.


5. Cook and Brown, Canada, Chapter 6.


7. Ibid., 6.


10. Saywell, Housing Canadians, 150-60.


12. Industrial Canada (July 1918), 1.

13. See for example: "Bolshevism and its Dangers," Canadian Municipal Journal (March 1920), 76; Industrial Canada (October 1921), 1.


16. Ibid., 24.


18. A.G. Dalzell, Housing in Canada (Toronto: Social Services Council, 1927), 37.


25. Mackintosh, Economic Background, 71-75.

26. See Figure 1, page 5.

27. Urquhart and Buckley, Historical Statistics of Canada, 511.

28. See Table 2, page 17.


30. For a summary of these developments see: Cook and Brown, Canada 1896-1921, 294-339.

31. Industrial Canada (October 1919), 1.

32. Cook and Brown, Canada 1896-1921, 325.

33. For a review of the Commission's work see: CCAR, 1910-1919.


35. House of Commons Debates (1921), 3959.

36. Ibid., 3959; 3959; 3960.

37. Ibid., 3961-66; 3966.


39. Ibid., p. 2.

40. Ibid., p. 11-12.

41. "Housing, Town Planning and Civic Improvement in Canada," Conservation, Vol. 4, No. 3 (July 1918), 72.


55. "Ottawa Town Planning Program," CE.

56. H.L. Seymour, "Report from the Provinces: Ontario."

58. A.V. Hall, "Considerations in the Layout (Kapuskasing)" TPICJ, Vol.1, No. 10 (June 1910), 5-12.


70. A. Buckley, "Housing of the Unskilled Wage Earners," Conservation, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Jan. 1920), 12-16.

72. TPICJ, Vol. 3 (April 1921), 1.


77. N. Cauchon, "Ethical and Practical Side of Town Planning," CE (December 1919), 512.


82. Ibid., 512.


88. Ibid., 464.

90. N. Cauchon, "Memorandum on Zoning."

91. Ibid., 5.


93. Ibid., 1.


95. B. Evan-Perry, "Zoning for Health," 22.


97. CE (Nov. 1920), 557.


100. A. Buckley, "Garden Cities and the Social Renaissance," TPICJ, Vol. 6, No. 3 (June 1927), 94.


103. Buckley, "Garden Cities and the Social Renaissance."


106. Ibid., 150.


108. Ibid., 91.


122. Ibid.


131. Smith, "British Columbian Town Planning Act."

132. "City Plan for Vancouver Now Complete."

133. For discussion of Bartholomew see: Scott, American City Planning, 110-270.


135. Ibid., 457.

136. Ibid., 458.

137. H. Bartholomew, A Plan for the City of Vancouver, British Columbia (including a General Plan of the Region) (Vancouver: n.p., 1928), 211.

138. Ibid., 211.
139. Ibid., 217-23.
140. Ibid., 144.
141. Ibid., 153.
142. Ibid., 153.
143. Ibid., 19.
144. Ibid., 225.
146. Ibid., 223; Ibid.; 234.
147. Ibid., 233.
148. Ibid., 257.
154. A Plan for the City of Vancouver, 223.


CHAPTER VI
CRISIS AND OPPORTUNITY:
FORMULATING A NEW CONSENSUS

Just as the resurgence in Canadian planning was gaining momentum, the Canadian economy sunk into the depths of the great depression. Some of the economic indicators summarized in the following figure reveal the severity of the contraction. By 1933, Gross Domestic Product had fallen to 70 percent of its peak level in 1929, the "official level" of unemployment had risen to an astonishing 19 percent and housing starts had collapsed to less than one third their previous volume.\(^1\) The Prairies, which depended more on limited exports of agricultural products than the rest of Canada, were particularly hard hit by both declining demand for exports and by a severe drought. In Alberta, provincial income in 1933 was only 38 percent of the level in 1929, while Saskatchewan's income had fallen to a mere 26 percent of its 1929 level.\(^2\)

During the period 1934-1939 the expansion of public works spending and increased defense spending had stimulated a partial recovery in the economy. But it was only with the mass public expenditures on arms during World War II that sufficient fiscal stimulus was applied to pull the economy out of its desultory state. By 1939, economic output had finally returned to the level it had reached in 1929, and by 1944, after four years of impressive growth, national output was almost three times higher than it had been at the trough of the depression.

As figure 5 shows, the recovery of construction was not quite as vigorous. Due to the diversion of resources to the production of armaments and related equipment during the war, housing starts did not really return to and finally exceed levels attained in the 1920's until after the war had concluded.
FIGURE #5
Selected Economic Indicators 1926 - 1950

(Source: Buckley & Urquhart, Historical Statistics of Canada, 132, 510)
The depression and war period was also accompanied by a sharp decline in population growth. Data in figure 1 show that during the 1930's the Canadian population growth of 11 percent was less than two-thirds of the level during the 1920's and only one-third of the level during the first decade of the century. Urban population, although continuing to grow faster than the average Canadian rate, also fell to about 60 percent of the level in the 1920's and 30 percent of the level of the 1900's. Even the growth of the largest metropolitan areas (see Table 1) was in sharp contrast to their robust performance in previous decades. The growth rate of Montreal, Toronto, and Vancouver dropped to about one-third of the levels experienced during the 1920's. Winnipeg's growth, meanwhile, was virtually non-existent. For the first time during the twentieth century, the average expansion of Canada's four largest metropolitan regions failed to surpass the rate of growth for the country as a whole.

The immediate impact of the depression on Canadian planning was devastating. Ironically, Canadian planning had originated in response to an equally dramatic crisis in Canadian development. But the techniques and theory that had evolved to manage the previous crisis of rapid growth were obviously poorly equipped to handle the problem of limited growth. In fact, Canadian planners had, unknowingly, reduced their relevance to the problems of the 1930's, for, in their attempt to become more relevant during the 1920's, the planners had gradually shifted their explicit function to that of being passive managers guiding urban growth instead of more active entrepreneurs helping to initiate growth.

Faced with mounting debt and freed from the burden of accommodating rapid growth, most Canadian municipalities logically concluded that a
curtailment of their planning activities was in order. Planning staffs were laid-off, consultants went out of business, and planning commissions including Alberta's Provincial Town Planning Board, were abolished. Faced with diminishing employment opportunities, Canada's planners became increasingly reluctant to support their professional organization. In December 1931, Dalzell, the President of the Institute, wrote that: "the times are difficult and everyone is more or less bound to give closer attention to personal business than formally. This makes the working of the Institute very difficult." The Institute tried to call a meeting of its Executive Council to discuss dwindling support but discovered that it was impossible to secure a quorum.

In 1931, Dalzell sent a questionnaire to the members of the Institute in an effort to ascertain the degree of support. The discouraging results, combined with the elimination of federal financial assistance to the Institute, convinced the leading members of the Institute to terminate the publication of their journal. This was another serious blow for as Secretary-Treasurer, J.M. Kitchen frankly confessed, the very existence of the Institute itself was dependent on "the continued existence of the journal." Meanwhile, the membership in the Institute, which had reached an impressive peak of 367 in 1930, had fallen to a paucity two by the 1940's.

Canadian planners continued to hope that some turnaround in their affairs was imminent. Particular optimism was held for the possibility of Noel Cauchon using his political influence to rally the cause of planning. In discussing their situation, Kitchen wrote to Dalzell in 1931 that "it is just possible that his (Cauchon) influence, if brought to bear, may change entirely the present outlook of the situation."
But Cauchon's untimely death in 1935 quickly dashed any hopes of this happening.

Canadian planners were clearly being severely shaken by the economic collapse. Such crises, however, are often double-edged. They can certainly place an unbearable stress on old institutions and ideas. But they can also present opportunities for innovative and bold initiatives. As the *Canadian Engineer* optimistically observed:

> The economic depression is forcing attention to many social and economic problems in community life which may result in a truer city planning than there has been before.  

It was not long before Canadian planners began to recognize and explore the opportunities provided by the depression. But they quickly realized that their success in doing so was contingent upon engineering another shift in planning style away from the passive techniques of urban management they had developed during the 1920's to a more entrepreneurial, interventionist approach that had been advocated by Adams. Noel Cauchon, for example, wrote several articles emphasizing that the lull in economic activity was an ideal time to undertake major infrastructure investments to obviate congestion.  

A.G. Dalzell, another prominent planner, cogently and persistently called for the promotion of a public housing construction program as a means of both reducing unemployment and meeting basic shelter needs. The *Canadian Engineer*, meanwhile, continued to publish editorials advocating a planned public investment effort. It appeared that the exigencies of the crisis faced by Canadian society would ensure that the next few years would be an exciting and vital time for Canada's planners. But while it was clear that planning had to change its focus it was still not clear exactly what form the new
planning would take. And if the previous periods were any indication, the formation of a new style of planning would be the subject of a long and arduous debate reflecting fundamental ideological differences.

II

With the collapse of the capitalist economy, the ideological conflicts which had been largely suppressed during the twenties emerged with a vengeance. One one side of the debate were a number of agrarian and urban radicals who now decided to join forces in their attempt to restructure Canadian society. In 1932, a group of Canadians which included a large contingent sympathetic to agrarian and urban radical ideas came together in Calgary to form a new political party called the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF).

While the diverse ideological origins of the new party were sure to cause some internal conflicts in the future, the party was able to project a comprehensive and unified image which was now explicitly socialist and more sympathetic to comprehensive public planning than its predecessors had been. The new party was also better organized, more powerful and more politically sophisticated than its progenitors. These attributes, combined with the severity of the economic crisis, ensured that these advocates of strong public planning would be an important force shaping the development of Canadian society.

Following the conference creating the CCF, a second convention was held in Regina in 1933 to debate policy. The League for Social Reconstruction, which had been officially formed as an independent research and policy group, comprised of members of the CCF, drew up a proposed Manifesto which was debated by the National Council of the CCF in 1933 and was then submitted to the Regina convention where it was passed as
the party's official platform. ¹⁵

The Manifesto began with a vilifying condemnation of the capitalist order. According to the Manifesto:

The present order is marked by glaring inequalities of wealth and opportunity, by chaotic waste and instability; and in an age of plenty it condemns the great mass of the people to poverty and insecurity. Power has become more and more concentrated into the hands of a small irresponsible minority of financiers and industrialists and to their predatory interests the majority are habitually sacrificed. When private profit is the main stimulus to economic effort, our society oscillates between periods of feverish prosperity in which the main benefits go to speculators and profiteers and catastrophic depression in which the common man's normal state of insecurity and hardship is accentuated. ¹⁶

The Manifesto explicitly proposed that this evil and chaotic society should be replaced by society based on rational, comprehensive planning undertaken by a group of experts working through a National Planning Commission. In the words of the Manifesto:

We believe that these evils can be removed only in planned and socialized economy in which our natural resources and principles means of production and distribution are owned, controlled, and operated by people. . . . The first step in this direction would be the setting up of a National Planning Commission consisting of a small body of economists, engineers, and statisticians assisted by an appropriate technical staff. The task of the Commission will be to plan for production, distribution and exchange of all goods and services necessary for the efficient functioning of the economy. ¹⁷

The Manifesto went on to elaborate some specific priority areas including nationalization of the major sectors of the economy such as banks, transportation, utilities and natural resources, tax changes to achieve a more equitable distribution of wealth, the strengthening of social services through programs such as a universal medical plan and "a program
of public spending on housing and other enterprises that will increase the real wealth of Canadians" and reduce employment. The Manifesto concluded with the following statement:

No CCF government will rest content until it has eradicated capitalism and put into operation the program of socialized planning which will lead to the establishment in Canada of the Co-operative Commonwealth.

Fresh from their experience in drafting the Regina Manifesto, the League for Social Reconstruction embarked on the ambitious task of preparing a detailed statement on just how this new society would be organized. The result of this effort was the publication of a very remarkable comprehensive book entitled Social Planning for Canada. Among the researchers involved were two men who were active in the Canadian planning profession, Leonard Marsh and Humphrey Carver.

The document began with an incisive analysis of the defects of the dominant order. The inequalities in income, the increasing concentration of economic power and the problems of boom and bust were exhaustively documented. Having surveyed the problems of capitalism, the report went on to scrutinize some of the existing and proposed policies for alleviating distress. The authors concluded that there had been a marked growth in government intervention in the Canadian economy over the past years. But after examining the major public initiatives, the study concluded that much of the government intervention was merely used to benefit and strengthen the position of the dominant private interest. Subsidies to industry, tariffs, the provision of public infrastructure, the generous purchase of bankrupt enterprises from distraught shareholders and the setting up of regulatory boards to impede competition were all
cited as examples of business-oriented policies. In the words of the report:

Private business has graciously allowed the government to undertake services essential to private business but in themselves unprofitable . . . . The state has had to step in to salvage bankrupt enterprise for the benefit of the private investor.21

Consequently, the authors argued that the expansion of these sorts of government initiatives as advocated by some of the leading business organizations would just aggravate problems of inequity and concentration while doing little to alleviate the obvious defect of the capitalist economy.

Other policies such as encouraging a return to the land also came in for criticism. In words that must have raised anguish among their rural supporters, the League stated that because agricultural was probably already over-extended the "back to the land" scheme could not possibly be regarded as a direct and all-sufficient remedy for unemployment.22 The League went on to remark that "the back to the land movement is fortunately not likely to get very far."23 The League, then, was shifting the new socialist movement closer to the urban radical's position.

Having itemized the inherent defects of the capitalist order and discredited some of the popular remedies, the authors went on to outline what they felt was the only solution to Canada's problems. This section of the book began with a theoretical discussion of what the authors viewed as the very foundation of the new order; planning. "The logic of planning," wrote the authors, "is familiar enough." Planning was simply an attempt to coordinate the activities of functionally interdependent components of the society. According to the authors "every competent housewife, every businessman, plans in some way, i.e.
arranges in some ordered manner how the household resources, or the personnel, the material and the capital of the business are to be disposed of". The report observed that:

In industry planning is well-recognized in the form of scientific management first built up by F.W. Taylor. A Central Planning Department is set up to coordinate successive operations instead of leaving them at the discretion of individual foremen. Duplication, idle capacity and wasted effort are eliminated; harmonious integration of the entire plant is made possible. 24

The planning proposed by the League was simply a logical extension of these concepts prevalent in the business firm to the economy as a whole. "Co-ordination is needed," argued the League, "not only within each industry but between different industries and different aspects of the economy as a whole". 25 The study noted that this trend towards broader planning was already well underway. Businesses were merging together to organize the planning of large sections of the Canadian economy and governments were intervening more and more to direct the country's affairs. This type of planning was insufficient however. The authors maintained that:

The logic of planning does not leave us here, for our analysis up to this point as demonstrated certain other things as well: that negative regulation is not enough, that a hybrid system of laissez faire and piecemeal state control is too defective to remove the major inequalities of the present economic society, that capitalist planning must by its nature be largely planning for the capitalist. 26

What distinguished the sort of planning advocated by the League from state capitalist planning was that the League's type of planning would be more comprehensive in that it would seek to manage the economy as "an integral whole" and that the planning would be in the public interest.
The League argued that this latter objective would be achieved by placing the "ultimate responsibility" of planning with the elected representatives of Parliament who were responsive to public opinion through the democratic process of elections. Working in conjunction with these elected representatives would be a "National Planning Commission" composed of a group of experts who would prepare the national plan. The relationship between experts and the political representatives was defined in the following way:

The legislature would initially define ends and select the final administrative authority. The technical task of working out meetings for securing those ends, however, would be left to the Planning Commission. Parliament thus acts in the capacity of the householder choosing an architect and instructing him as to the type of house he desires, then leaving the architect to find out how best and most effectively such a house can be built with the resources at the disposal of the client.  

The Planning Commission, then, had no legal authority above making the plan. The procedure outlined by the League was to have the Planning Commission consult with numerous organizations and people across the country in drawing up the plan. The League cautioned that "it is immensely important that the plan should not be simply a neat artificial system created in vacua by a small group of bureaucrats and imposed by them from above on an uncooperative public". Instead, argued the League, a plan "must enlist the sympathy and whole hearted cooperation of those who must actually put it into practice". "The plan," maintained the League, "must spring from the needs and capacities of the farms and factories, the mines and lumber camps, the banks, the railroads, the stores, and workers in them, the housewives who buy their products, who are the people planned for." The League argued that an essential
technique for ensuring that the wishes of the population were met was
to utilize the price mechanism which revealed what consumers desired and
what it cost to produce various types of goods in various ways. Having
solicited the broad involvement of relevant agencies and groups in the
country, the "Planning Commission will then, with such further consulta-
tion as may be necessary, formulate the complete plan". "On this basis,"
continued the League, "a national planning bill will be drafted and sub-
mitted to the Prime Minister and Cabinet."  

Once the appropriate plan had been decided on by the Parliament,
the plan had to be implemented. Central to the discussion on plan imple-
mentation was the distinction between positive and negative controls.
The League complained that Canada had already experimented with negative
regulations such as zoning which told firms what they could not do but
did little to control what they did do. Designating an area for resi-
dential development, for example, might prevent it from being used for
any thing but residential but would do little to ensure that the desired
housing was ever actually built. Besides, argued the League, these
sorts of regulations were easily subverted by the private capitalist
who retained the real control over the level and type of production and
over investment. What was needed, argued the League, was positive
control which would allow the planners to not only prevent things from
happening but would allow them to ensure that the desired ends were
achieved by giving them the direct entrepreneurial powers to undertake
development. As the League put it:  

The first element, therefore, in the sort of
planning which alone can be effective in
creating a more democratic society, is the
socialization of certain key functions in basic
industries which are of strategic importance
Having outlined the general theory of planning, the League went on to elaborate how it would be applied to specific sectors of the economy. Details of how and what industries should be nationalized, how a proposed comprehensive social welfare system would work, what policies were need to revitalize agriculture, and how fiscal and monetary policy ought to be applied were all presented.

Two topics that received special attention were planning for agriculture and planning for towns. Here the League relied heavily on the work that had been done by Adams under the auspices of the Commission of Conservation. For agriculture, the League proposed a number of planning policies including public ownership of major infrastructure, marketing boards, improved rural credit, the scientific layout of farms, the elimination of land speculation and the upgrading of social infrastructure. After remarking on the "inadequacies of community life and educational services in many rural areas", the League concluded "there is nothing of a social and educational nature already available, in part, to city dwellers which should not be equally available to the farm population."

In the case of towns, the League argued that unrestricted urban growth resulted in a "process of external expansion and internal decay." The suburban expansion on the periphery of the city was controlled by land speculators who's "overriding desire to make quick and profitable sales" encouraged them to subdivide prematurely and to design subdivisions in a manner that ignored "the ultimate needs of the community". "This speculation in real estate," maintained the League, "had subjected us to ridiculous land costs and has given us a city plan -- or absence of a plan -- of the most inconvenient, expensive and undignified kind."
The internal decay that accompanied this suburban expansion was equally deplorable. Builders abandoned the inner parts of the city for "more profitable business among the well-to-do in the expanding suburbs." The result was the lack of investment in inner city housing which was rundown in anticipation of encroachment of commercial developments. The League described the dynamics of this process in the following way:

What is known as a slum is really a property which the landlord thinking it can be sold at a good price to the outgrowing commercial section, does not bother to keep up in repair; the landlord is prepared to accept a low rent with a few responsibilities and await the harvest. Too often, and particularly during the last few years, the expected commercial expansion fails to materialize and properties fall into worse and worse repair. The low rent attracts the poorest and most destitute groups in a community: unable to meet rents elsewhere they have to crowd into the subdivided houses under the crumbling roofs of the slum and put up with conditions which violate all the principles of lighting, ventilation, and sanitation.

In words reminiscent of Adams, the League concluded that comprehensive town planning was needed to manage this complex and interdependent urban community. According to the League, "the central principle of town planning is to stabilize each section of the city for its appropriate use by recognizing and anticipating normal growth." Systematic surveys followed by analysis and plan preparation and implementation was the prescribed sequences of events. The planning process should possess both negative controls to "halt the premature subdivision of land" as well as positive controls such as direct public redevelopment of slum areas, public construction of housing, provision of parks and investment in necessary infrastructure.
The League emphasized that when the state redeveloped slum areas in the city, it must also provide subsidized housing to meet the shelter needs of the working class who had insufficient incomes to purchase market units. The housing should be undertaken as part of a "comprehensive town planning scheme" which would provide some stability in land use patterns. Of particular merit, argued the League, was the "neighbourhood unit" which was "a community or group of dwellings which together with their local services, such as a school, recreation centre, theatre, library, and local retail stores, can be considered a self-contained region". The League suggested that the housing subsidies necessary for the poor could be partially generated by having the public housing authority provide middle-class housing and use the profits to cover the deficits on working class housing. The League concluded their discussion of planning by emphasizing that:

Town planning for the whole of the city's residents (instead of for its wealthy areas) will only become a reality if the principles of land development are interpreted in future strictly in the public interest.

One critical area of policy which created some difficulty for these socialist planners was the issue of land ownership. A number of Canada's early planners had explicitly advocated various types of public land ownership and leases as a means of eliminating wasteful speculation and of collecting the unearned increment. One would think the revival of more interventionist planning would have incorporated such a proposal without a hesitation. But the new reform movement was based on an alliance between both rural and urban interests. While even some of the urban liberals had little difficulty accepting public land assembly and collection of land rents, the rural interest, which included a large
contingent of land owning farmers, held deep-rooted suspicions about any proposal to nationalize or control land. The issue of land ownership, then, was a delicate one. In 1931, the United Farmers of Canada boldly passed a resolution calling for the nationalization of all resources including the land. Other farmer's reform groups as well as other more conservative Canadians objected. Consequently, the Regina Manifesto avoided any mention of public land ownership. The League itself went as far as to issue the following statement:

> To avoid misunderstanding, we wish to emphasize again the public ownership of the agencies of distribution which we propose does not interfere in anyway with the full ownership of land by the farmer. We do not at all recommend the nationalization of land now held by individual owners.

The attempt to strengthen reform forces by uniting agrarian and urban interests had discouraged the planners from advocating public land ownership; a policy which had been considered by some planners as crucial to the solution of urban problems. The League seemed politically aware of this for their discussion of urban problems they made proposals for public housing construction and controls on land speculation which implied public land ownership. But because the League was apprehensive about giving any explicit endorsement for even a limited type of public land ownership, support for public land development in urban areas was not as strong as it could have been.

Despite this ambiguity on the question of land ownership, the League's overall theory of planning was both rigorous and unequivocal. The League's general view of planning had some obvious relationships with the intellectual traditions already established by some of Canada's earlier planners. The sequence of plan formulation from survey to
analysis to plan implementation, the emphasis on scientific expertise, the attempt to justify planning as rational effort to coordinate interdependent activities and the call for direct public entrepreneurship which formed an integral part of the League's general theory of planning were all remarkably similar to views expressed by planners such as Adams. This intellectual debt is explicitly revealed by the League's attempt to illustrate precisely what they were advocating by using the example of town planning. As the League observed:

An illustration of great practical importance is provided by city planning. With each individual left free to build where and what he likes with few or poorly enforced regulations, the result has been the familiar haphazard town with its internal discords in purpose and in style, its speculative development, the slums and second-hand housing. Negative planning is provided by regulations imposed upon personal liberties in the interest of health on property-owners to eliminate at least the most striking discord in objectives. Positive planning, however, applied to the development of the city as a whole comes into being only if . . . experts work out a scheme to arrange streets and buildings in such a way as to secure the most healthy and pleasant living conditions possible combined by the most economical provision of local improvements and the most complete harmony of design and style.

At the specific level of town planning and housing policy, the League's debt to Canada's early planners was even more obvious. As the League readily admitted:

In this concept of deliberate control and development according to a comprehensive plan of zones and amenities, there is nothing startling new. All we need is the will to do it.

But the League's view of planning, while similar in many respects, clearly displayed some important departures from earlier theory. First, the League had presented planning not as an isolated activity applied to one specific sector of society such as town development but as a general
method of decision making with universal applicability. By pursuing what seemed to be the logical extension of the planning theory method from something grafted onto capitalist institutions to something which would form the very core of social organization, the League had fundamentally altered the prevailing concepts of planning.

Second, the League rejected the previous notion of objective scientific planning for the idea of ends and means. Based on this view, all rational planning was, necessarily, subjective in the sense that the experts were attempting to realize some explicit ends determined through the political process. Only the means could be scientifically derived. This rejection of objective planning forced the League to investigate mechanisms such as the price system and public participation as ways of ascertaining social objectives. The objective planning notions held by early planners made such a search for social values irrelevant to the planning exercise.

By recognizing the political element of scientific planning, the League was also able to avoid the fruitless search for a social consensus on objective planning. Consequently, while their predecessors such as Adams' view of planning often appeared ambiguous and contradictory because they were designed to appeal to all social classes, the League's position on the more controversial measures such as public entrepreneurship and equity was unequivocal. Unlike their predecessors, the League fully recognized that the type of planning they were advocating could only be achieved by direct political action that would not be supported by all Canadians.

The socialist response to the depression had catapulted the idea of planning to a level of significance which even its most
enthusiastic advocates had not dared to contemplate just a few years before. Ironically, the League and its supporters were simply taking the arguments which business leaders had been making concerning the need for scientific management and turning them around to the business leaders' disadvantage. Indeed, if scientific managers were as useful as business leaders had maintained that they were, who needed the capitalist who simply consumed profits? If the public ownership of utilities that was beneficial to leading business interests was such a good idea, why wasn't it extended to all major sectors of the economy? Such questions demonstrated just how double-edged the theories of scientific management advocated by Canada's business elite really were. The urban liberals had helped lay the intellectual foundations for their own demise.

III

On the other side of the debate were the liberals. The liberals had always had some difficulty maintaining a consistent ideological perspective. For the first several decades of the twentieth century they had to grapple with the obvious conflicts between their allegiance to capitalism and the pressing problems of an urban society which seemed to require a stronger role for government. During the twenties this conflict seemed resolved. But with the coming of the depression and the challenge of the socialists, the liberals became painfully aware that once again they would have to search for a new consensus. This search for a new consensus was going to be arduous, agonizing and, above all, ideologically confusing for the liberals would once again be forced to seesaw back and forth between their defense of capitalism and their support for the fundamental reforms necessary to resolve Canada's problems and maintain order.
This search for a new liberal consensus began with a concentrated effort to convince all that the current economic problems would disappear on their own accord. Prime Minister R.B. Bennett, who had been unfortunate enough to have been elected in 1930, did initiate a limited public works program to relieve unemployment and did increase the Canadian tariff to protect home industries from imports. But when credit dried up in 1932, he retreated to the old comfortable policies of Gladstonian finance. Taxes were increased and expenditures were strictly controlled.

The continuing contraction of the economy in 1933 combined with the growing discontent raised doubts in the minds of the governing forces about the efficacy of this wait and see approach. It soon became obvious that if a complete collapse of society was to be avoided, it would be necessary to develop a new and innovative liberal set of policies and institutions on which a new consensus could be based. The validity of this conclusion was reinforced by the numerous defeats of incumbent provincial governments by those promising reform. In British Columbia a rejuvenated Liberal Party promising a new social order based on expanded public works, improved labour legislation and a comprehensive social welfare program was elected in 1933 while the socialist CCF became the official opposition. In Alberta, the newly formed reform party of Social Credit dislodged the existing government in 1935. In Quebec and Ontario new governments expressing a willingness to launch initiatives to deal with the problems were elected. And in Saskatchewan the socialist forces were making substantial gains. Meanwhile, at the municipal level socialists mayors were elected in a number of major cities including Vancouver, Winnipeg and Toronto.
These political developments, the persistence of the depression, and the influence of the American New Deal all convinced the federal government that it had to act. Appropriately, the government initiated a series of studies on various aspects of the economy and created a number of new institutions such as the Wheat Board, the Canadian Radio and Broadcasting Corporation, the Bank of Canada, and the progenitor of Trans-Canada Airlines. By 1935, Prime Minister Bennett had become an explicit supporter of large-scale government intervention and planning. In a set of radio broadcasts, he announced the Canadian version of Roosevelt's New Deal. He declared that:

I am for reform . . . and, in my mind, reform means government intervention. It means government control and regulation. It means the end of the laissez-faire.

As part of this reform package, the federal government appointed a special parliamentary committee to investigate the question of housing. The submissions made to this committee by various interest groups and experts from across Canada gave an excellent indication of the state of thought on housing and planning at the mid-point of the depression. One general view of the matter was expressed by several of Canada's prominent planners including Noel Cauchon, who was hired to assist the Committee, Percy Nobbs, who had prepared a major study of housing in Montreal, and E.J. Urwick, who presented the Committee with the report of the Lieutenant Governor's Committee on Housing Conditions in Toronto. All three gentlemen agreed on several basic points. First, they all emphasized that the solution of the housing problem was dependent upon implementing a comprehensive town planning program. Cauchon, who provided the first submission to the Committee, insisted that the Committee's terms of reference should
be "enlarged to include a national policy of town planning and housing". "The whole problem," reported Cauchon, "is a problem of town planning." This point was reiterated by Nobbs, who remarked to the Committee that "I cannot too strongly emphasize the fact that town planning and housing must go hand in hand".

The Toronto Housing Report submitted by Urwick was more specific. According to this report, the causes of bad housing were insufficient incomes to the poor and inadequate town planning. In an analysis of the dynamics of urban growth similar to that contained in Social Planning for Canada, the report noted how the owners of land in the developed sections of the city let their existing structures run down in often unfounded anticipation of lucrative redevelopments while developers on the periphery ended up consuming scarce municipal resources by lobbying for premature extension of infrastructure. The report recommended that a city planning commission be set up to prepare a comprehensive plan to decentralize employment growth to properly planned areas with suitable infrastructure and housing, to redevelop slum areas using a "Radburn" like super block scheme and to implement a comprehensive zoning ordinance to discourage unrealistic expectations of redevelopment and the accompanying deterioration of existing structures in areas that were primarily suited for residential purposes.

The second point on which these submissions concurred was that the primary concern in developing a housing policy was to provide suitable housing for the poor and working class. The question of generating employment was only a secondary concern. As Hobbs noted: "this (housing) is a matter fundamentally independent of the depression, though aggravated by it". Following from this point, the submissions maintained that
because "private capital is incapable of providing low rental accommoda-
tion", the provision of decent housing for the working class must be a
fundamental obligation of the state. As the Bruce Report submitted
by Urwick concluded:

The community is responsible, we believe, for
the provision of satisfactory dwellings for
those who are too poor to afford them. This principle is widely if not universally accepted
by European countries; and has been the basis
of low cost housing development in Great Britain
since before the war. Toronto must follow the
example of the leading British cities. The responsibility must be shouldered. The time for
reconstruction is here.

While the submission justified community responsibility for
housing on grounds of social justice, they also argued that this sort
of expenditure made good economic sense. Nobbs, for example, observed
that because bad housing caused physical and social problems, the provi-
sion of proper housing must be "regarded as part of the national industrial plan making for efficiency". Or as the Lieutenant-Governor's Report bluntly put it:

It is not a question whether we shall pay or not
pay. It is a question whether we shall pay blindly
or intelligently, whether we shall pay for better
housing or for the damage done by that which is
worse. Housing of the poor we are going to provide.
Let's make no mistake about that. It is only a
question whether we shall house them in hospitals,
mental institutions, reformatories, and jails; or
whether we shall house them in clean, light and
sanitary surroundings where both body and soul will
have a chance. Which shall it be.

A somewhat different view of the housing question was expressed
in submissions from the Canadian Construction Association and the Deputy
Minister of Finance. First, these participants urged the Committee to
view housing policies as a means of stimulating the economy. The
Canadian Construction Association which represented major business elements such as mortgage companies, contractors and building material manufacturers told the Committee that the depression was "an unusual opportunity to initiate a national housing policy . . . that would ultimately eliminate the problems of unemployment relief". In a carefully prepared brief, the Construction Association attempted to demonstrate that government expenditures on housing would be almost self-financing. By stimulating employment both directly and indirectly through a multiplier effect, housing expenditures would reduce government relief payment and increase government tax revenue. W.C. Clark, the Deputy Minister of Finance, while not passing judgment on whether the housing expenditures would be self-financing or not, did concur with the general concept of using housing policy as a tool for stimulating the national economy. He reported to the Committee that:

We should concentrate essentially on the immediate emergency problem of using housing as a stimulant to business recovery and as an absorber of unemployment.

By viewing the housing problem as primarily a problem of unemployment the Canadian Construction Association and the Deputy Minister of Finance tended to side-step the issue of how to provide housing for the poor; an issue which had been central to the submissions received from planners such as Cauchon. W.C. Clark reported that:

I start with two general principles. One is that it would be wise to avoid undertaking commitments in regard for the most difficult and complicated aspects of housing; for example, the problem of slum clearance.

The Canadian Construction Association was not completely oblivious to the issue of housing the poor. However, J. Clark Reilly who was the
manager of the Association echoed the Deputy Minister's sentiments. He told the Committee that the primary issue was providing mortgage money to build new housing. Further, he insisted that any government initiatives must work through the existing private institutions. As he put it to the Committee:

- We have always taken the ground that the State should not be a competitor with industry but that in any method that is proposed the regular channels should be used in every way possible; that the State should not go to a program of housing on its own, but if possible, it should encourage the people who have an investment in industry. 📜

Specifically, the brief from the Construction Association recommended that the federal government ensure "existing banking and financial institutions . . . against loss" by setting up a national mortgage insurance fund that would "make funds available for the construction of new houses by private enterprise". 📜 The brief did acknowledge the problem of providing housing for the poor and rehabilitating slum areas. But as Cauchon pointed out, these sorts of proposals for mortgage insurance would do little, if anything to provide working class housing. 📜

The Housing Committee, then, heard what amounted to two fundamentally different approaches for dealing with the housing question. The approach presented by Canadian planners maintained that housing must be dealt with as part of a large strategy of comprehensive urban planning and that housing the poor was the primary purpose of public policy. The approach supported by the business community was to provide government subsidies to the private sector in order to increase new housing stocks and stimulate the national economy. Public planning, then, would simply continue to provide a service function for private capital in the way that it had during the prewar decades.
This latter view certainly had some basic appeal. First, this approach worked within the confines of capitalist institutions which the liberals wanted to preserve. Second, it was a strategy that was easy to administer. This was an important consideration as the Committee was well aware for the British North America Act imposed a complex set of constraints on what action the national government could in fact take. The Committee also had received evidence that the last federal housing grant implemented after the war had been less than a stunning success because it had allowed municipal governments which had lacked the required expertise to administer large sums of government money and to undertake the construction of housing as a public enterprise. As one witness before the Committee warned:

If a housing scheme is entered into again and enabling legislation passed and municipalities have anything to do with the matter, you are going to have a repetition of the same thing.63

While some other witnesses rejected this pessimistic interpretation of the last federal housing scheme, any doubts about municipal competence simply added one more reason why the government felt that it should work through private institutions.64 In the end, the views of the Canadian Construction Association prevailed.

In its final report to Parliament the Housing Committee recommended the creation of a National Housing Authority to undertake further studies of the housing question, to manage federal housing programs, and to provide housing mortgages at favourable rates. The Committee, while acknowledging that "there will always be a large number of people who cannot afford to purchase a home", emphasized that any housing policy should "be so framed with respect to the provision of employment".65
Based on the Committee's findings, the federal government drew up the Dominion Housing Act of 1935. The Act which was designed to "assist in the construction of new housing" allowed for the federal government to provide up to 20 percent of the value of a new house to the existing financial institutions at the below market rate of 3 percent. In turn, the private lenders would provide a mortgage at the prevailing rates of 60 percent of the house value and pass on the federal government's additional 20 percent at a 5 percent rate of interest.

In 1935 the federal government changed hands. King's Liberals successfully campaigned against Bennett on the grounds that Bennett's New Deal was unconstitutional and had been launched without due regard for parliament. The new government was greeted with a new series of criticisms from the planners and their sympathizers who were unhappy that the Dominion Housing Act had failed to incorporate their recommendations.

In 1937 the planners as well as others in sympathy with their position organized a housing conference in Ottawa out of which a new group called the National Housing and Planning Association (NHPA) was formed to lobby the federal government to implement a more comprehensive housing policy which would include slum clearance and the provision of low income housing. As well, the members of the new group continued to emphasize the necessity of undertaking these programs within the framework of a comprehensive town planning program. As one prominent member of the new organization put it:

To eradicate slums and erect new housing is only one side of the picture. Community planning to prevent the reoccurrence of conditions that go to make slums is the other . . . . In this sense housing and planning are the siamese twins of the modern housing movement. They are inseparably
linked together. Without planning the chaos of our cities will grow worse from day to day. 68

Similar criticisms of the federal government's ad hoc strategy came from those who were active in the League for Social Reconstruction. Frank Underhill, for example, wrote a particularly pointed critique of the government's policies. He complained that "Canada and the United States are the only two remaining countries in the Western World where the governments have refused to recognize the housing of the poor groups in the community as a public responsibility". He went on to develop what he considered to be the three fundamental elements on which a satisfactory housing policy should be based. The first element was the need to recognize that good quality working class housing could not "be produced by the private enterprise of the speculative builder at a rental cost which the lowest income groups can afford". Consequently, public enterprise was essential. A second necessary element was that the solution of the housing problem depended on building new housing on the periphery of cities where land was cheap. Slum clearance merely reduced the stock of units and ended up bailing "out politically influential slum landlords at high prices". 69 The third element was that the housing reform must include comprehensive town planning. As Underhill concluded:

Housing reform involves the building of communities and not merely individual houses. Unless a community is planned with provision for shops, schools and community recreational centres the areas in which the new houses are built will eventually be struck by blight. 70

These critics of federal policy were getting some support from within some official circles. One new body called the National Employment Commission which was charged with the task of finding ways to reduce Canada's continuing unemployment problem recommended that the federal
government implement "a comprehensive housing policy embracing a home improvement and assistance for low income rental housing". The Commission also commented that "hastily conceived or impromptu programs of public works were dangerous and likely to be abortive". According to the Commission it was critical that "the project should be such as can be planned thoroughly in advance". The Employment Commission specifically recommended that any housing and slum clearance projects should not go ahead unless "the areas in which the projects are to be located have been adequately planned and unless zoning regulations are sufficient to safeguard the investment and to secure suitability of the location".  

The federal government was not completely insensitive to these criticisms. In 1938, new housing legislation was passed which consolidated previous legislation including a slightly modified form of the 20 percent mortgage supplement contained in the Dominion Housing Act and mortgage guarantees for private builders who loaned funds for rehabilitating housing as well as a new set of provisions for federal loans for low income rental housing and a federal contribution paid to municipal governments in lieu of property tax on new housing. The new legislation also contained specific references to the need for undertaking adequate town planning as part of any housing project.  

On the surface it appeared that these new initiatives by the federal government had shifted policy closer to that advocated by the planners and the NHPA. But the NHPA was not so sure. At the 1939 conference of the NHPA the participants "all alluded to the fact that no housing act can be expected to reach low income families without direct government contribution to a rent reduction fund or without a capital grant". And Carver, who was now one of the prominent members of the
NHPA, told the conference that the provision of necessary subsidies "must ultimately be accepted by the Dominion government". 74

The federal government, however, maintained that if such subsidies were required they should come from provincial and municipal sources. 75 The government's justification for leaving the responsibility for initiating housing projects, undertaking suitable planning and providing necessary subsidies to the lower levels of government was based on the provisions of the BNA Act which had allocated "the task for providing housing accommodation at rentals within the capacity of low income groups to pay" as a primary responsibility of provincial governments. The federal government maintained that its limited incursions in the field of housing and planning were compelled "by the national interest" as means for "creating needed employment and directing public attention to the importance of housing problems generally and providing the basis for experience on which the provinces and municipalities may follow sound and proven policy in the future". 76

The federal government's position on the appropriate division of responsibility for housing and town planning was confirmed by the 1939 study of housing completed by the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Affairs. 77 This study's critical observations on the housing problem were similar to those of the NHPA. The study concluded that the provision of suitable housing for the poor by the state was essential, that comprehensive town planning was a necessary part of the solution and that housing policy should be designed primarily for the purpose of providing housing and not for stimulating employment. But the study concluded that the existing federal program which provided funds that left the primary responsibility for specific housing initiatives and town planning
with the provinces and municipalities, was sound. As the report stated:

Outside of national parks, most of the stimulus for regional and town planning must come from the provincial governments.

By 1939, then, the liberals were gradually accepting the necessity for more state intervention to cope with the depression. As part of their program, the governments were at least acknowledging the need for more comprehensive public planning. But their initiatives were still ad hoc and timid relative to the proposals for government planning emanating from the socialists in the League of Social Reconstruction. At the specific level of housing and town planning, the initiatives were particularly ineffective. Not one low income housing project had been built under the 1938 legislation before it was allowed to expire in 1940. Funding for the home improvement grant was cut. And the comprehensive town planning initiatives which everyone seemed to acknowledge were necessary, were not forthcoming from any level of government. The NHPA, the League for Social Reconstruction and other reform groups remained far from impressed with what had been accomplished.

In sum, it was not yet clear what the impact of the depression on Canadian planning would be. The urban and agrarian radicals who allied themselves under the banner of the socialist CCF had certainly articulated a clear vision of a new society in which public planning would replace capitalism. But although support for this view was growing, it was still not shared by a majority of Canadians. The liberals, meanwhile, were gradually acknowledging the necessity for reforms. But their position was far from coherent. Their continued commitment to private enterprise made them reluctant to institute any major reforms that did not operate within the parameters of capitalist institutions. But these
limited reforms were not resolving the basic problems of Canadian society. Unemployment continued and initiatives undertaken in the field of public works and housing were being done through normal private channels without the guidance of a comprehensive plan. The results were far from satisfactory. As A.G. Dalzell, an influential planner, observed:

In spite of the (town planning) knowledge thus available, the people of Canada continue to clammer for housing schemes to stimulate industry and to provide temporary employment they may find that their social problems have been enlarged instead of reduced.\[79\]

Obviously, the search for an acceptable set of principles to manage Canadian society would have to go on.

IV

With the outbreak of World War II interest in domestic issues quickly waned. The problems of the depression seemed to evaporate as the major public expenditures necessary to fund the war effort sparked a vigorous economic recovery that might have astonished all but the few who had fully accepted the new economic theories of John Maynard Keynes. Yet despite the exigencies of the war, many Canadians were fully aware that a number of fundamental questions regarding the management of Canadian society remained unresolved. Indeed, there was a general feeling among the experts the problems that had plagued Canada prior to the war would return with renewed vengence after the war had ended. This was certainly the experience of the first World War when the cessation of conflict was accompanied by a short post war boom characterized by rapid inflation and major shortages followed by a major recession and
rising political discontent. There was every reason to expect that the World War I experience would be mild relative to what would transpire after this war. This time the protest forces were substantially better organized. And the economy itself had been in much worse shape prior to this war than it had been prior to World War I. The governing forces were aware that the ad hoc measures that had been instituted during the 1930's were no match for the anticipated post war problems. A new liberal synthesis that would resolve the deficiencies of a capitalist order without destroying it had to be found. The debate on the nature of planning would have to continue with renewed earnest.

The formal efforts to forge a new liberal consensus began in 1939 with the appointment of the Cabinet Committee on Demobilization and Re-establishment. This Committee which was aided by an Advisory Committee comprised of prominent civil servants was charged with the responsibility of devising programs to assist in the re-integration of ex-servicemen back into civilian life. It soon became clear that this problem could only be dealt with within the context of the much larger issues of general post war reconstruction. Consequently, in 1941 a new Committee under the chairmanship of Dr. Cyril James was set up to develop a broad set of policies to handle all these anticipated problems of post war Canada. The Committee hired, among others, Dr. Leonard Marsh who had been one of the principle authors of Social Planning for Canada. The work of this Committee was augmented by a number of other bodies including the Special Parliamentary Committee on Reconstruction and Re-establishment created in 1942 and the Economic Advisory Committee which began examining the issue of reconstruction in 1942. It was not long before an impressive
array of documents, recommendations and studies on the postwar era rolled off the federal government's presses.  

The overriding theme dominating this entire effort was the issue of employment. As Cyril James succinctly put the matter in his first report to the Parliamentary Committee on Reconstruction and Re-establishment:

The essential requirement for Canadian prosperity and progress at the end of this war is that every individual's who's able to work and wishes to work should have a decent opportunity to work. All our foreign, fiscal, political, economic, agriculture and other policies ought to be designed to produce that overall result.

A second important theme expressed by James was the desirability of providing the necessary employment opportunities within the parameters of capitalist institutions. "It is the feeling of the Committee on Reconstruction," reported James, "that we shall attempt to preserve as far as we may ... the basic Canadian tradition of free enterprise and personal initiative." The relevant question with which James had to grapple was how full employment could be maintained within the parameters of a capitalist economy. The key to this dilemma lay in the new theories of Keynesian economics.

According to this new approach, the government would have to play an active role in economic management. But it would not have to go as far in reforming existing institutions as the League for Social Reconstruction and the CCF advocated. What was required, according to the reports, was a government commitment to using fiscal and monetary policies to stimulate the economy during downturns. An active public works program as well as a comprehensive social welfare to maintain
"the flow of purchasing power" would be important fiscal levers to help stabilize the economy. In this way, the government could maintain full employment while leaving the basic capitalist institutions intact.

The advisors were fully cognizant of the problems associated with previous public works efforts to combat the great depression. They emphasized that the successful pursuit of these new policies of stabilization required comprehensive planning at all levels of government. A list of well planned, socially useful public investment opportunities had to be drawn up and administrative mechanisms for initiating and coordinating these investments had to be created.

These advisors also attached special significance to the role of town planning and housing as integral components in this new Keynesian strategy. As one prominent observer noted: "almost everywhere you go everybody begins to talk about housing and town planning". Housing, in particular, was viewed as an excellent focus for the socially useful investment necessary to stimulate the postwar economy. And there was almost universal agreement that the success of this housing policy and public works program was dependent upon comprehensive town planning.

K.M. Cameron, chief engineer of the Departure of Public Works, warned the Parliamentary Committee on Reconstruction that: "We must have town and environmental planning in the sense of proper preparation of the regions and sites on which buildings and works must be located." Similar sentiments were expressed to the Committee by such diverse groups as the Canadian Congress of Labour, the Canadian Construction Association and the Canadian Federation of Mayors and Municipalities. This latter group, which presented a brief drawn up by the municipal politicians of Canada's leading cities was particularly adamant. The brief warned that
"urban disintegration is the product of laissez faire and the lack of imagination (and) if left unattended, it (the slums) will spread their malignant influence over wider and wider areas, until the entire community is one vast mass of blight and wasted decay". The brief, which specified the sorts of special measures such as slum clearance, infrastructure investment and low rental housing which were necessary to deal with the problem, concluded with the following statement:

By such a process, over a span of years, by providing both private and public construction are fitted into a well conceived, master plan, we may look forward on the one hand, to a reasonably permanent condition of full employment and on the other hand, toward the gradual realization of a better physical environment.

The Parliamentary Committee must have been impressed with these arguments for in the final report to the House of Commons in 1944 they urged the government to adopt a comprehensive housing and town planning policy. Similar recommendations were contained in the Economic Advisory Committee's White Paper on employment.

The advisory Committee on Reconstruction, meanwhile, considered the issue of housing and planning so critical that it set up a special committee under the chairmanship of economist C.A. Curtis of Queen's University to examine the whole matter in detail. The results of this Committee's endeavours were contained in a major report which attempted to set the foundations of Canada's postwar community and regional planning system.

The Curtis Committee's membership was far from homogenous. The research advisors and principle author of the report was Leonard Marsh, the man who had helped prepare the CCF's socialist blueprint, Social Planning for Canada. Marsh's perspective was undoubtedly reinforced by
G.S. Mooney, who was the Executive Director of the Canadian Confederation of Mayors and Municipalities and a former CCF candidate. The Chairman of the Committee was F.W. Nicolls who was from the federal Department of Finance. His views were more akin to the position of the Canadian Construction Association which wanted the new public planning to be limited to servicing private capital. Rounding the Committee out were two economists who were committed to the new Keynesian economics and several professional architects and town planners.

The report produced by this diverse group stands out as the first comprehensive effort to document and propose a set of solutions for Canada's housing and urban problems. Based on special data supplied by the Dominion Bureau of Statistics, the Committee concluded that Canada's housing problems were staggering. As of 1946 there was an estimated backlog of 320,000 housing units. The backlog included 175,000 units or about 12 percent of the existing housing stock which was in such poor shape it had to be replaced. Another 175,000 units of the existing stock required major upgrading. The Committee estimated in addition to the 320,000 units required to meet this backlog another 435,000 units would be required to meet the anticipated household formation during the period of 1946-1956. The Committee concluded that annual housing starts would have to be in the vicinity of 50,000 to 100,000 units if a major crisis was to be averted; an average output substantially higher than anything yet achieved.

Combined with this supply problem was an income problem. The report found that only about one-third of Canada's population could secure suitable housing through the normal market channels. Another one-third required some assistance to lower mortgage rates and the final third
would require major income subsidies. Also, as of 1941, almost one-half of the population was paying more for housing than they could comfortably afford.99

Inextricably linked to these housing problems was the larger urban problem; a problem which the Committee felt threatened the very vitality of Canadian life. The existing built-up areas were plagued with high and "unreasonable concentration and congestion", a general "deterioration of central business districts", "indiscriminant inter­mingling of incompatible uses" and a serious shortage of "public facilities (schools, libraries, hospitals, churches, playgrounds, etc.)".100 The suburbs suffered from equally serious problems. Premature subdivi­sion of land, shortages of necessary services, strip development along highways, a lack of "such industrial or commercial development as would strengthen and stabilize their tax revenue position" and poor quality housing construction were all cited by the report.101

The report went on to observe that "almost all of these problems derived from the disorderly and unregulated use-pattern of the land". The report complained that although some reform had been enacted over the years to deal with these sorts of problems, the reforms had been patheti­cally deficient. "Too often," wrote the Committee, "we had pursued policies of drift, piecemeal patching or compromise and adaption."

Further, the Committee's research revealed that "the necessary legislation techniques required for adequate town planning are not in operation anywhere in Canada".102 According to the Committee:

It is true that some town planning legislation exists . . . But they are, almost invariably, not drawn to the necessary dimensions of the task. Most of the provisions are of a general
nature and by and large they represent a form of negative control. In some cases they do little or nothing creatively by themselves, though they prevent certain things from being done. Even with these limitations, however, town planning legislation in Canada has not been successful; and for the most part it is inoperative. Provincial legislation alone, even if changed in form, will not be sufficient. A series of different functions, at all levels of governments, must be established and brought into harmonious operation. 103

Municipal governments and planning departments were also chastized in the Committee's review of Canada's planning efforts. "In many municipal circles," lamented the authors, "town planning is still thought of as a zoning process or perhaps an extension of city surveying". "Many municipalities have a division called a town planning department," remarked the report, "but most of them do very little more than a restricted administration of zoning and bylaw enforcement." 104 Obviously, the Commission had no sympathy for the passive approach to planning that had been evolving in the late 1920's.

To cope with the impending postwar crisis the Committee proposed a comprehensive housing and town planning policy. In the area of housing the Committee suggested that the federal legislation would have to be fundamentally altered. Provision for reduced downpayments, larger loans at lower rates of interest and mortgage insurance to extend access to new housing beyond the richest third of the population were all recommended. Meanwhile, the section of NHA dealing with low rental housing required "complete revision". 105 Necessary changes included increased federal loans at low rates of interest and federal contributions to subsidies required to cover the difference between the full cost of housing and the rents set at a specified proportion of the low income family's earnings. The report recommended that public housing
construction should total 15,000 units per year. Additional support was recommended for housing cooperatives, farm housing, rehabilitation and upgrading of the existing housing stock and public land acquisition for urban renewal.

The Committee fully accepted the view that the success of this postwar housing effort was contingent on launching a new vigorous program of town and community planning. "The matter of town and community planning," emphasized the Committee, "is in the forefront . . . ." Like Adams, the Committee considered planning as "essentially the matter of using land to its most efficient and socially desirable way".

The report, while acknowledging that constitutionally the matter of housing and town planning was a provincial responsibility, maintained that "there can be no truly national program in the postwar period unless the federal government takes a strong lead in providing some of the facilities in giving directions". One important role which the Committee envisaged for the federal government was to provide much of the necessary financing for local planning and housing programs. The report also recommended that funds for public works or housing projects should be made contingent on the local government preparing a comprehensive town plan.

The report went on to conclude that the federal government would have to bolster its promotion of town planning in some specific ways other than just tying federal financing to the preparation of a community plan. "There must be definite encouragement," maintained the authors, "by the best means that can be derived, to town planning activity all across the country." The report recommended that:

To accomplish this, it is recommended that a
specific federal government agency should be set up, equipped effectively a) to formulate a desirable standard of urban and rural planning; b) to encourage and assist the provinces in passing the necessary enabling legislation for municipal planning and regional planning; and c) to establish a competent and imaginative research and information service concerned with both the principles and techniques of urban physical planning . . . . It is imperative that it (agency) should not be subordinated in legislative authority or practical working, to some other activity such as housing or public works construction. 112

The provincial governments were expected to play a more direct role in the initiation of the new planning effort. The report recommended two major reforms. One was the creation of a "town planning board" in each of the provinces. The primary task of this provincial planning board would be to prepare broad provincial "master plans to regulate the development and secure economic use of the urban land throughout the province". 113

The Committee reasoned that such a provincial strategy of promoting regional planning that cut across "the arbitrary and often illogical" municipal boundaries was vital because "a city . . . is influenced by the resources and the degree of their development in the whole of the surrounding region". "Thus the logical and necessary counterpart of urban planning," stated the report, " . . . is a planning for the best development of the resources as a whole geographical and economic region in which it is situated." More specifically, this larger provincial plan would include a provincial zoning scheme to prevent "the subdividing or urbanization of areas where such subdivision or organization is deemed premature or where it is desirable, in the public interest, retain permanently for recreation, forestry, watershed protection, farming or other open development". 114 The provincial strategy would also help maintain
the integrity of the rural areas by encouraging the decentralization of employment.

The report proposed these broaden regional plans would be formulated by local regional planning committees that would work with local municipal government. All plans would have to be approved by the provincial planning board in order to ensure they were consistent with the broader provincial strategy.

Another major reform recommended by the report was the complete revamping of provincial town planning legislation. Proposed changes included provisions to make the preparation of a town plan by a local government and the creation of a permanent planning department mandatory. The Committee was particularly adamant on this latter point. "The technical planning organization for all municipalities," concluded the report, "must be part of the normal structure of these governments, not merely an ad hoc or auxillary body." In addition, the report recommended the need for local zoning powers, subdivision controls to prevent premature development outside existing municipal boundaries and measures to allow for the acquisition of private land "in strategic areas".

While the two senior levels of government were expected to set down the broad framework for planning, the local governments were to be responsible for undertaking the detailed planning that would determine the success of the whole postwar strategy. "Clearly the local municipality," suggested the report, "is the unit whose energy and efficiency will determine whether or not practical results will be obtained in the cities and towns in Canada."

The premier task that the local government was expected to perform was "to create the necessary planning machine (planning departments
and planning boards or commissions) and provide for the making of a master plan for the defined urban or rural areas." The proposed organizational scheme was to have a plan first prepared by the permanent, professional planning department and then submitted to a planning board comprised of lay-citizens who would then review the plan and hold public hearings. Finally, the plan would be submitted to the elected council for official ratification.

The master plan itself was expected to be based on a number of more detailed studies including plans for individual neighbourhoods, services, street and transit systems, parks, land use, zoning allocation and public acquisition for public facilities and urban renewal schemes. The Committee emphasized that the master plan was not to be viewed as a rigid blueprint for the future. "Rather," cautioned the report, "it must be administered as a continuous process, forever adapting itself to the shifts and changes which characterize the dynamic nature of human society." One feature of the planning effort which was particularly highlighted was the neighbourhood concept. The idea was not to build single houses, but to build a fully integrated neighbourhood or community which included local schools, shopping, recreational facilities and some employment nearby to serve the local workers. Through traffic should be discouraged by using curved street designs or cul-de-sacs. Pedestrian and vehicle traffic should also be separated through careful design, open space and road systems. The report concluded that the successful implementation of this neighbourhood planning concept would require rationalizing the building industries so that the organizations whether private or public, would be large enough to build a complete
neighbourhood instead of several single houses scattered along a monotonous grid pattern. This concept was considered relevant to the large scale redevelopment of blighted urban areas as well as to the new suburban expansion.

The idea was certainly not new. It had been advocated in a more comprehensive form by Garden City advocate, Ebenezer Howard and by the American planner, Clarence Stein, who, with Lewis Menford, built the Radburn development in New York which incorporated the features recommended in the Curtis report.

Another theme permeating the Curtis report was the more general question concerning the proper role of government in private land and housing markets. This issue, which had been at the very core of the debate in planning throughout the twentieth century, had never been successfully resolved. Indeed, this was the principle issue which divided the socialists who recommended the complete restructuring of the society and the liberals who wanted to initiate the necessary reforms within the parameters of the capitalist institution which they were disposed to defend.

The members of the Committee, who presented the different sides of the debate, seemed unable to articulate a clear resolution of this fundamental question. For example, the Committee fully acknowledged that the private sector would be unable to provide suitable accommodation for a large segment of the community population. According to their research, the Committee specifically concluded that the housing needs of about one-third of the population could only be met by subsidized public housing. Yet despite these findings, the Committee was very
timid in specifying appropriate targets for public housing construction. The report did mention that the government should aim to build 15,000 low income housing units per year. But this figure, which was buried in the middle of the report, was not even treated in the summary and conclusions. The ambiguity of the report on this question is further revealed by the presence of another statement in the report to the effect that specifying any target for low income housing was not possible. The Committee also emphasized that:

It has been assumed by the Committee that the great bulk of housing whether publicly or privately or cooperatively owned will be built by private contractors and corporations. Experience has shown that public housing has been most successful and effective where the design and building of these houses has been organized through the usual professional infrastructure and channels.

But the Committee combined this endorsement of private markets with bold pronouncements concerning the need for more direct public intervention. Past public building campaigns such as those initiated by the federal government following World War I were defended. And the private land market which the Committee argued was the primary obstacle to successful public planning was viciously attacked. As the Curtis Report remarked:

Some of the more important land policies handicapping urban and rural planning have been the restrictions placed on the power to regulate uses to which private property may be put; limitations on the freedom of urban and rural administrative units to purchase and hold land; difficulty in obtaining the public share from community created values in land. Equally damaging to successful urban and rural planning is the commonly held view that land is an ordinary commodity for unrestricted purchase and sale, the failure to recognize that its marketing and use are vested with the public interest of paramount concern to the community.
Specifically, the report alleged that this private land market was responsible for most of the problems experienced by urban communities. The argument by now was becoming almost standard. According to the analysis, unrealistic expectations regarding future development potential led to premature subdivision on the suburban periphery and the failure to properly maintain existing structures in built-up areas. This process was aggravated by the fact that many of the implications of individual land use decisions were borne by the community at large.

But while these problems of private land markets were well known, the politically palatable public solutions were difficult to find. Zoning and subdivision control were obviously part of the solution. But how could the authorities successfully redevelop blighted sections of the city without paying the existing landowners the inflated prices that were causing the problem in the first place. The Committee recommended strengthening the powers of expropriation but sidestepped the perplexing problem of how to determine appropriate levels of compensation. The report rather timidly cited the British Uthwatt report which, in essence, proposed the nationalization of private land. In the Committee's words:

> The recommendations of the Uthwatt Committee are of a far-reaching nature and while they may not be applicable in their entirety or even in part to Canadian conditions they nevertheless warrant close study. 127

Such close study, however, was never forthcoming. Meanwhile, the only really specific recommendation that the Committee made on the issue of public land ownership was that federal funds would be necessary because of the enormous sums involved. 128
The Committee's ambiguity on some of these basic points was highlighted by public presentations by the Committee's members. In several public lectures, Leonard Marsh expressed support for the Uthwatt approach, and promoted the view of the American housing expert, Catherine Bauer, that housing was a public utility, not a speculative private commodity. Benjamin Higgins, one of the Committee's economists, told a group of planners that private enterprise was incapable of building cheap housing and that 25 to 50 percent of the total housing starts should be public. He also firmly rejected the concept of providing low cost housing by building housing for the rich and thereby allowing the older units vacated by them to filter down to the lower income groups. As Higgins put it:

Need I labour the point that houses built for the rich do not become suitable for the poor by the mere process of wearing out? Even if not seriously deteriorated, they are likely to be inadequate in design, location and in other respects. The seeping down process is a notoriously unsatisfactory method of supplying low cost housing.

During the same lecture series, Eric Arthur, another member of the Committee, boldly concluded that public authorities should be able to expropriate the private land below inflated asking prices or assessed values. But Arthur also tried to allay some of the growing concerns that the public housing would be built by Crown corporations by explicitly stating that such housing would be built through normal market channels.

F.W. Nicolls, Chairman of the Committee, explicitly defended private enterprise. Writing in the Journal of the Royal Architectural Institute of Canada, Nicolls maintained that subsidized housing itself was an ineffective policy. The key, according to Nicolls, was to improve
the efficiency of private builders. Nicolls was clearly in agreement with A.S. Mathers of the National Construction Association who insisted "that private enterprise, especially large scale private enterprise can solve the housing problem for all in a decent and a very fine way." 

Obviously the Curtis Committee was unable to take a clear cut position on the question of public entrepreneurship and the extent of public control. The ambiguities that had characterized the work of earlier experts such as Adams had reappeared as the Committee valiantly tried to formulate a theory of planning that would appeal to both the socialists and the liberals.

Overall, the Curtis report was an important step in the rebirth of Canadian planning. Admittedly, its basic analysis contained little in the way of theories and proposals which had not been articulated before by Canada's pioneer planners such as Adams and Hodgetts. Admittedly, the report was disappointingly vague on some of the fundamental issues such as a public control over private land and the role of private versus public entrepreneurship in housing and the city building process; issues which were at the very core of the whole debate on postwar policy. But the report did bring the critical concerns of planning and housing to the public forum with a degree of rigour and comprehensiveness that forced authorities to take notice. The report did contain a devastating indictment of past policy that shamed those responsible into at least considering the need for the approaches advocated by the Committee to solve Canada's postwar urban problems. And the report helped to set the tone for an informed debate among professionals on the nature of planning postwar cities. The experts had delivered an impressive list of recommendations. It would now be up to the politicians to decide what would become of them.
The problems of growth which had plagued Canadian society for the first several decades of the twentieth century had generated the three distinct responses of agrarian radicalism, urban liberalism and urban radicalism. At first the conflict between these perspectives had been gradually submerged as a consensus formed on the ability of rational, scientific planning to resolve these problems. But the growing intensity of conflict following World War I shattered this fragile consensus. This outbreak of conflict had, however, been quickly suffocated by a new conservatism that swept across North America. The support for agrarian and urban radicals dissipated dramatically, while urban liberals, no longer seriously challenged by opposing groups or confronted by pressing economic and social problems, retreated from their ephemeral flirtation with serious reform. The emergence of this new, more conservative consensus had forced most Canadian planners to abandon the more interventionist approaches advocated by Adams for a more passive approach that would appeal to property owners.

The collapse of the capitalist economy shattered this second consensus with devastating precision. Again the conflicts which had been suppressed during the twenties emerged with renewed vitality. The agrarian and urban radicals, now more radical than ever, united to form an explicitly socialist political party dedicated to eradicating capitalism and replacing it with a planned economy. Their theory of socialist planning with its emphasis on equity, public ownership and participatory decision making was comprehensively developed in their detailed document *Social Planning for Canada*. On some important questions,
such as public land ownership they were equivocal because of internal disagreements resulting from their diverse ideological origins. But, nevertheless, they had articulated a remarkably clear set of proposals which appealed to a growing number of Canadians.

The persistence of the depression and the challenge from radicals forced the liberals to formulate a new set of principles. Again the liberals were faced with their perplexing dilemma of how to resolve the pressing problems of capitalist society while preserving capitalist institutions. After the completion of a number of official government reports a new approach was gradually taking form. These reports which were written by both socialist and liberal technocrats recommended major reforms including social welfare measures to redistribute income and maintain purchasing power, public investment planning to maintain economic stability and strong public planning and regulation in those sectors of the economy where capitalism did not seem to be performing well.

Housing and land policy were considered a high priority area requiring strong public planning. The Curtis report recommended a number of major reforms including government construction of housing for workers, urban renewal programs, new planning legislation strengthening expropriation powers and making the preparation of urban and regional plans mandatory, stronger government controls over private property and development and the preparation of broad provincial settlement plans. The Curtis report contained a seething condemnation of the ability of private markets to allocate land and housing and of past planning efforts to regulate development. The planning theory and
principles outlined in the report were, in many ways, similar to the theory of planning that had been outlined by Adams and the Commission but had never been fully implemented. Also, like Adams, the report was somewhat ambivalent on several important issues such as the role of public land ownership. The report along with the other reconstruction reports proposed a hybrid system combining many of the elements of socialism with those of capitalism. It was not as radical as the system proposed in Social Planning for Canada nor was it as capitalist as the system existing prior to the depression. It was, in short, another valiant effort to forge a new consensus capable of uniting the ideological hostile forces in Canada. The next few years would soon show how successful this effort would be.
Footnotes


2. Mackintosh, Economic Background, 137.


17. Ibid., 305.

18. Ibid., 312.

19. Ibid., 313.


21. Ibid., 173.

22. Ibid., 62.

23. Ibid., 215.

24. Ibid., 216.

25. Ibid., 221.

26. Ibid., 218.

27. Ibid., 228.

28. Ibid., 23788.

29. Ibid., 243.


31. Ibid., 453.

32. Ibid., 452.

33. Ibid., 452.

34. Ibid., 453.

35. Ibid., 453.

36. Ibid., 460; Ibid., 462.

37. Ibid., 454.


40. Ibid., 451-63.

41. Ibid., 215.

42. Ibid., 454.


46. Avakumovic, Socialism in Canada, 78-79.

47. For a detailed description of these measures see: Finkel, Business and Social Reform in the Thirties.


49. House of Commons, Special Committee on Housing, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1935).

50. Ibid., 8.

51. Ibid., 44.


53. House of Commons, Special Committee on Housing, Minutes, 41; Ibid., 93.


55. House of Commons, Special Committee on Housing, Minutes, 33.


57. House of Commons, Special Committee on Housing, Minutes, 101.
58. Ibid.

59. Ibid.

60. Ibid., 81.

61. Ibid., 294; Ibid., 299.

62. Ibid., 133.

63. Ibid., 64.

64. Ibid., 67.

65. Ibid., 364; Ibid., 380.


70. Ibid., 229.


72. National Housing Act, Statutes of Canada, George the VI, Ch. 49, 1938, 353-67.


74. Ibid., 71.


76. National Housing Act, Statutes of Canada, George VI, Ch. 49, 1938, 353.

77. H.E. Grauer, Housing, A Study Prepared for the Royal Commission on Dominion Provincial Relations (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1939).

78. Ibid., 71a.

80. See for example: House of Commons, Special Committee on Reconstruction and Re-establishment, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence (hereafter SPRR), Report No. 2 and 3, 1943, 33-79.


83. SPRR, Report No. 2 and 3, 1942, 34.

84. Ibid., 36.


87. SPRR, Report No. 6, 1942, 129.

88. SPRR, 1943, 95.

89. SPRR, 1943, 687-711; SPRR, 1943, 742-80; SPRR, 1943, 863-73.

90. SPRR, 1943, 873; Ibid., 873.

91. Ibid., 873.

92. SPRR, Final Report to the House of Commons, 1944, 479-80.


94. ACR, Housing and Community Planning.

95. H. Carver, Compassionate Landscape.
96. For an example of his perspectives see: F.W. Nicolls, "Private Enterprise Housing", RAICJ, Vol. 20, No. 9 (Sept. 1943), 145-9.

97. ACR, Housing and Community Planning, 4-5.

98. Ibid., 131-159.


100. Ibid., 161.

101. Ibid., 161-2.

102. Ibid., 161; Ibid., 160; Ibid. 16.

103. Ibid., 169.

104. Ibid., 181.

105. Ibid., 18.

106. Ibid., 153.

107. Ibid., 17-20.

108. Ibid., 9; Ibid., 9.

109. Ibid., 169.

110. Ibid.

111. Ibid., 169.

112. Ibid., 117.

113. Ibid., 171.

114. Ibid., 171.

115. Ibid., 173.

116. Ibid., 173-4.

117. Ibid., 174.

118. Ibid., 174.

119. Ibid., 180.

120. Ibid., 200, 233.

121. Ibid., 197-31.

122. Ibid., 153.
123. Ibid., 190.
124. Ibid., 9.
125. Ibid., 25-6.
126. Ibid., 182.
127. Ibid., 167.
128. Ibid., 166.
132. F.W. Nicolls, "Private Enterprise Housing".
CHAPTER VII
THE POSTWAR PLANNING SYSTEM

The reconstruction reports had called for a dramatic shift in the role of government. The new, more active, government was expected to maintain full employment by practising counter-cyclical policies, to provide a comprehensive social welfare program that would guarantee all Canadians a basic standard of living as well as maintaining purchasing power, and undertake detailed sectoral planning for those areas of the economy such as land development where market forces didn't seem to work very well.

This new scheme of economic management provided a renewed impetus for town planning in several ways. First, town planning was viewed as being an integral component of public works programs necessary to maintain full employment. Second, the specific idea of town planning benefitted from the more general mood in favour of increased government intervention articulated in the reconstruction reports. The Depression had raised such serious doubts about the basic viability of an unregulated market economy that any resistance to more public planning seemed irrational, if not impolitic.

Nonetheless, the liberal forces were still a bit apprehensive about this "new society" envisaged in the various reports. The Liberal party which was in power federally had certainly been promising many of the reforms recommended in these reports for several decades. But elections promises were simply promises. Implementation of promises, however, was a matter to be taken much more seriously.

Prior to the war the federal government had reluctantly begun to
implement elements of the new welfare state. Pressure from the Ginger Group, the forerunner of the CCF, on the minority government forced the King Liberals to set up an old age pension system in 1929. Following their re-election in 1935 the Liberals passed the 1938 National Housing Act and in 1940 passed the Unemployment Insurance Act. This latter piece of legislation in particular divided the federal cabinet.¹

But these measures were mild relative to the sorts of proposals made in the reconstruction reports. The Marsh Report on Social Security and the Curtis Report on Housing and Community Planning recommended broad sweeping changes including a universal health insurance program, improved pension and unemployment insurance, sickness, disability and maternity leave benefits, a child allowance program, and a large-scale public housing program. While the Prime Minister supported the need for some of these measures, some powerful members of the federal cabinet remained firmly opposed.

Political events in 1943 generated growing concern among the liberals about the political wisdom of maintaining this steadfast opposition to the welfare proposals.² The CCF, which vigorously supported an even more radical departure from past policy than that recommended in the reconstruction reports, was making spectacular gains. During 1943 the party, which had already firmly established itself in Saskatchewan, British Columbia, and Manitoba, made dramatic inroads into Ontario where its share of the popular vote jumped from 5 percent to 31 percent and the number of seats went from zero to 34.³ The party also made substantial gains in several federal by-elections and according to a 1943 Gallup poll was slightly ahead of both the Liberals and Conservatives in popular support.⁴
The mood of the times was clearly for reform. At their 1942 convention the Conservative party officially endorsed the need for a stronger government role to maintain full employment and to provide a comprehensive social welfare system. Their leader justified such measures in the following way:

I would say: would you rather adopt a policy which would retain the largest amount of free enterprise or hand over to the CCF? In plain words, I would say - half a loaf is better than no bread.5

The Liberal party was not far behind. The January 1944 throne speech expressed a strong commitment to the new welfare state. And in the subsequent sessions the federal government introduced legislation that would form the basis of their postwar welfare system.

II

The federal government viewed new legislative initiatives in housing and town planning as an important component of the postwar welfare state reforms. In 1944 the government introduced a new National Housing Act which set the tone for the new federal policy for the next several decades.6 The vigorous debate which accompanied the introduction of this legislation illustrated to all that there were still some fundamental disagreements on the nature of housing and town planning policy.

The 1944 legislation was intended to "promote the construction of new homes, the repair and modernization of existing homes, the improvement of living conditions and the expansion of employment in the postwar period."7 The contents of the new legislation were very similar
to those in the 1938 NHA which the new act replaced. Like the previous legislation, the 1944 act contained provisions for joint lending with private institutions for new housing and financial support for low-income rental housing and rural housing.

There were, however, a number of major changes in the new act. One change was the addition of a new section requiring the federal government to undertake research and disseminate information "leading to the construction or provision of more adequate and approved housing accommodation and the undertaking and adoption of community plans in Canada."^8

The second major change was that local housing authorities set up by municipal governments were no longer eligible for any of the federal assistance for low-income rental housing. Unlike the 1938 act, the 1944 act restricted the 90 percent federal government financing for housing to only insurance companies and limited dividend corporations. The incentive to the insurance companies to build low-income housing was further strengthened by the federal government financial guarantees that insured the insurance companies a minimum rate of return.\(^9\)

A third major change from the previous act was the provision of federal grants to cover up to 50 percent of the net cost of land acquisition of blighted areas for urban residential redevelopment projects. To be eligible for these funds the municipal or provincial governments had to sell the acquired land at an "appropriate price" to a private insurance company or limited dividend company which would be responsible for undertaking the construction and management of the new residential units.\(^10\)

In introducing the legislation the Minister of Finance drew
specific attention to the fact that the new act relied primarily on private institutions to plan and build the housing. The minister stated:

(this government) does not adopt the view that our municipalities should engage directly or through local housing authorities in a vast program of state housing financed by the federal government. We have given the most careful consideration to the representations made looking to this type of program; but under Canadian institutions we cannot believe that such a program would be sound or necessary.¹¹

The CCF opposed the minister's position. Stanley Knowles, an urban socialist from Winnipeg, lashed out at the Liberals for choosing to "underwrite the risk of private companies" instead of dealing with the housing problem "directly through the medium of public housing authorities."¹² The CCF member told the House that:

I cannot agree with the Minister when he takes the position that it is possible to lend money to limited dividend housing corporations to build low-rent housing projects... and yet on the other hand administrative difficulties are too great to consider doing the same for municipalities.¹³

The CCF member also criticized the legislation for doing virtually nothing about the housing needs of low-income Canadians and failing to provide sufficient funds to meet the demand for housing projected in the Curtis Report. Further, Knowles chastized the government for not providing direct support for town planning as recommended in the Curtis Report. The urban renewals grants, meanwhile, were dismissed as being "only for the purpose of enabling municipalities to buy inflated land in slum areas and turn it over to private organizations for housing projects." Knowles concluded his comments on the legislation by stating that:
We (the CCF) certainly think that it does not even approach a solution of the pressing problems of those in the lower income brackets who are in the most need for housing. We are sorry that it is not a move more in the direction of a public housing authority. We are not satisfied with the method the government is employing, namely, to assist private lending institutions to do the job.\textsuperscript{14}

Despite similar comments from other members of the opposition, the federal government stood firm in its resolve to deal with the housing problem by providing subsidies to private enterprise. In fact, in the following parliamentary sessions the government introduced additional amendments to the NHA which expanded the level of public subsidies. One amendment allowed the government to enter contracts with private builders which obligated the government to buy the builders' housing units if the private builder was unable to sell them at a pre-determined price. Another amendment made provisions for allowing the government to guarantee a minimum level of profit for builders of rental housing.\textsuperscript{15} And in 1946 the government launched a new Crown agency called Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC) which would be responsible for administering the NHA and "to provide a supplementary source of credit for the loan and trust companies which they can turn to in time of need."\textsuperscript{16}

The government was as enthusiastic in their defence of these initiatives as the opposition was in attacking them. In debating one of the amendments providing increased support for private firms, C.D. Howe, the Minister of Reconstruction, attempted to blunt the opposition's attack by glibly remarking that:

\begin{quote}
It has been said that the Bill simply makes it easier to finance private enterprise in building housing accommodation. I agree: that is the purpose of the Bill.\textsuperscript{17}
\end{quote}
And as C.D. Howe told the House, the policy of his government was "to lend every facility to private enterprise... to ensure that as large a portion of housing be build by private initiative."¹⁸

The government specifically defended its decision not to provide subsidized public housing on several grounds. First, as C.D. Howe remarked, "The difficulty with subsidized housing is that it does not build any more housing."¹⁹ Consequently, subsidized housing had no advantage over market housing in stabilizing employment. Second, as the Minister of Finance pointed out, the B.N.A. Act allocated the responsibility of housing to the provincial governments. The House was told that "the government does not believe that public housing with Dominion ownership represents a sound approach in a country of divided jurisdiction in which property and civil rights are the unquestioned field of provinces under peace time conditions." The government's failure to promote town planning in more direct ways was defended on similar grounds. The Minister of Finance reported to the House that according to the Constitution "town planning cannot be undertaken by the Dominion government directly."²⁰

With the introduction of each new set of amendments, the opposition parties patiently repeated their criticism of federal policy. Responding to the bill to create CMHC, Knowles again urged the government to deal with the housing problem by directly building houses in co-operation with the local governments instead of simply subsidizing private capital. The CCF warned the government that the private sector was simply unable to properly plan and deliver housing suitable to the lower income groups and chastized the government for being preoccupied with "the maintenance of private enterprise in the field
of housing." The leader of the CCF dismissed the government's efforts as simply guaranteeing "insurance companies and other financial institutions against certain losses they may incur in connection with loans they make."\(^{21}\)

The Conservative opposition also stepped up their attack. One member from Toronto who had worked on the Bruce Report of 1933, called for federal subsidies for low-income housing.\(^{22}\) Another attacked the government legislation for regarding housing as "purely a financial problem." He told the House that "we must take into account the community, the road, the school, water, sewage, playgrounds, other essential services and the amenities for decent housing." To achieve these objectives of integrating housing into a larger program of comprehensive town planning the member introduced a motion to make the provision of any federal housing funds including NHA mortgages to homeowners contingent on the presence of an official community plan. The amendment was rejected, however, on the grounds that it may impede the rate of new housing starts.\(^{23}\)

During the housing debate another federal housing agency called Wartime Housing Limited became the focus of a discussion which again revealed that there were some basic disagreements on the role that public enterprise ought to play in shaping urban Canada's postwar development.\(^{24}\) Wartime Housing was a federal agency created in 1941 to build new housing for workers in the mushrooming armament factories. In 1944 the government directed that Wartime Housing build homes for only war veterans who were unable to find accommodation. The Conservatives, however, alleged that the corporation should be eliminated because private firms were finding it difficult to compete with it. The CCF,
on the other hand, called for an expansion of Wartime Housing Ltd. to include large-scale, comprehensively planned housing projects directed to the lower income groups who were not served by the private builders.

The government reluctantly defended the corporation by pointing out that no one else seemed capable of building moderately priced rental housing. C.D. Howe assured Parliament that: "We would be very happy to withdraw but there seems to be no immediate prospect of housing of this type being produced by other means. I hope that the Dominion government's direct participation in the housing field will reduce rather than increase."25

C.D. Howe finally fulfilled his objective. After building over 46,000 housing units during its existence, Wartime Housing Ltd. was eliminated by the federal government in 1949.26 With the phasing out of Wartime Housing, the federal government had extricated itself from playing any direct entrepreneurial role in housing and urban development.

While the debate on housing and town planning policy was raging in Parliament, federal civil servants were actively trying to carry out their mandate contained in the 1944 NHA to promote town planning in Canada. As part of this effort, the federal government had submitted recommendations calling for the establishment of the Community Planning Association to the 1945 Dominion-Provincial Conference on Reconstruction. Due to various complications, the recommendations never came up for discussion.27

Various organizations remained convinced of the necessity of launching some sort of institution to promote community planning. The architects, engineers, and several members of the dormant TPIC such as
J.M. Kitchen, were discussing the possibility of revitalizing the old TPIC. The federal administrators of the NHA, meanwhile, were growing increasingly concerned that the lack of suitable community planning and zoning measures would jeopardize their loans. An educational effort to generate broad public support for planning was given high priority by the officials. In June of 1946 the federal government invited representatives from the provincial governments, the Canadian Federation of Mayors and Municipalities, the TPIC, the RAIC, the Engineers Institute, the Canadian Welfare Council and the Trades and Labour Congress to meet with federal government officials to discuss the urgent question of community planning. The comments made by C.D. Howe in his opening address to the conference illustrated the impetus that the new Keynesian economics had given to planning. Howe told the conference that "the federal government is prepared to do what it can to maintain high and stable levels of employment." Howe went on to describe how the success of any public works program as well as the general efficiency of postwar economic expansion depended on the preparation of comprehensive town plans. "In other words," concluded Howe, "to maintain employment and income levels as well as to provide for the healthy building and rebuilding of the places where we live, we must have carefully prepared community plans." Howe's remarks were followed by those of H.A. Young, Vice-President of the newly created CMHC. Young concurred with Howe on the importance of community planning in maintaining a "contented and healthy people" and in safeguarding mortgages. But he warned the conference that there was virtually no planning being done and little understanding
of what planning was. He recounted to the audience how CMHC was being asked to fund dozens of individual housing projects which were poorly integrated into the larger community. According to Young:

Upon investigation it is usually found that no neighbourhood provisions have been made. In such cases, it is impossible to consider the project without taking into account its relationship to the whole community. Such projects are generally too small to be planned as a neighbourhood. Generally no overall plan exists. Eventually the whole area becomes built up without any reasonable plan and it is then too costly to rectify mistakes resulting from the lack of an overall plan.  32

After hearing reports from the various provinces on what planning measures were being undertaken, and from the professional organizations on the inadequacy of existing planning practice, the conference was asked to consider a proposal to create a national organization that would "foster public understanding of, and participation in community planning in Canada." The organization was to be comprised primarily of lay people who would work at local levels to general support for planning. Information would be circulated through a medium of a central office in Ottawa.  33

In the fall of 1946 this new organization which was to be called the Community Planning Association of Canada (CPAC) was officially incorporated. It was not long before it became a vital force furthering the development of Canadian planning. The CPAC began publishing a regular newsletter summarizing current issues in planning, quoting planning conferences, undertaking special research projects and lobbying for more effective planning measures. 34

With the launching of CPAC and the passage of the NHA and CMHC
legislation, the federal government had firmly committed itself to playing an active role in revitalizing Canada's planning and housing efforts. But these federal initiatives disappointed those who had advocated a more aggressive role for the public sector in building Canadian cities. Instead of expanding public entrepreneurship in land and housing development, the federal government decided to provide massive public subsidies to stimulate and reorganize a private development industry. Instead of building housing for low-income people, the federal government decided to stimulate market housing and hope that filtering would meet the needs of the poor. Instead of directly engaging in community planning and making the allocation of public funds contingent on the preparation of plans, the federal government simply allowed the private banks and insurance companies to make most of the decisions about the character of the projects to be built.

The debate between a more active role for public entrepreneurship versus more passive management of private ownership initiative had been at the core of the whole debate on the nature of postwar planning. The federal government, arguing that public enterprise was inefficient, had opted for the private enterprise route. But as the critics pointed out, such an argument had little merit, especially in the area of housing and town planning. Indeed, the government had admitted that the private construction industry was poorly organized and inefficient. As the Minister of Finance himself observed:

One of the great weaknesses in the house building industry in Canada is the absence of a substantial number of companies with competent management and sufficient large resources to acquire enough blocks of land and to develop such areas in a comprehensive way providing all necessary community and incidental services. 35
Wartime Housing Ltd., on the other hand, was considered better organized and more efficient than private sector builders. If the federal government's primary interest was efficient construction, it would seem that if anything, the role of an already competent public sector should have been expanded; not eliminated. Yet the federal government gave substantial advantages to private entrepreneurs which it denied public entrepreneurs. Municipalities and provincial governments were ineligible for much of the funding that the federal government pumped into the private development industry. The opposition was simply asking that the public authorities and local housing co-operatives get the same treatment as the banks and insurance companies.

But for ideological reasons, the federal government seemed committed to a private sector solution supported by government subsidies. As C.D. Howe remarked at the Dominion-Provincial Conference on Reconstruction:

> It is the policy to ensure that as large a proportion as possible of housing be built by private initiative.

If Canadians wanted more direct control over the distribution of housing stock, the character of new development, the rebuilding of blighted areas, and the control of land, they would have to rely on the provincial and local governments. The federal government seemed more preoccupied with stimulating sufficient housing starts to maintain a stable level of employment and in building a competent private construction industry at public expense. The liberal forces, then, who were in charge of the federal government had not gone as far in their reforms as the reconstruction reports had recommended. Their commitment to capitalism still clearly overshadowed their support for reform.
The Curtis Report had recognized that Canada's provincial governments would have to play a leading role in the creation of a postwar planning system. The provinces were expected to pass planning legislation, prepare broad provincial settlement strategies and create provincial planning agencies to advise and guide the local governments' planning efforts. Although the provinces were not as assiduous in their endeavours as the Curtis Report had hoped, they did play an active role in the rebirth of Canadian town planning.

During the war the provincial governments had set up agencies and committees to advise on postwar reconstruction. Like their federal counterparts, these various reconstruction committees emphasized the significance of instituting a comprehensive town planning and housing policy as part of the postwar recovery strategy. Consequently, most of the provinces embarked on a thorough review of their planning legislation and strengthened the provincial apparatus for researching and advising on planning matters.

From the period 1939-38, all the provinces except Quebec, which continued to refuse to pass a planning act, revised their legislation to grant sufficient powers over land use to allow local governments to plan properly. In the case of Saskatchewan, Alberta, Nova Scotia and Manitoba, these amended acts remained largely unchanged from the acts in force prior to World War II. In B.C. and New Brunswick, the new legislation was significantly revised. In Ontario, the 1946 Planning Act was a complete departure from the previous planning legislation.
These amended provincial planning acts were similar to each other in many ways. All the acts embraced the official plan, zoning bylaws and subdivision controls as the primary instruments for planning. Although the procedure for adopting an official plan varied from province to province, the description of the official plan contained in the Ontario legislation was typical. According the the Ontario legislation an official plan was:

A plan consisting of maps and explanatory text prepared and recommended by the planning board and adopted and approved as provided in the Act, covering a planning area and showing a program of future development, including the regulation of municipal land, buildings and structures or the location of buildings and structures... and any other features designed to service the health, safety, convenience and welfare of the inhabitants.

In addition to describing the purpose and procedure for preparing and adopting an official plan, all the acts described procedures for adopting zoning bylaws to regulate land use and subdivision controls to guide new development. In all provinces except Manitoba and British Columbia the local government was explicitly prohibited from undertaking any acts such as public works or new bylaws which contravened the official community plan. In British Columbia a council could contravene the plan by a two-thirds majority vote. The official plan, then, was envisaged as a statutory document that could not be ignored at the whim of local governments.

But despite the emphasis placed on abiding by the official plan, all the planning acts allowed local governments to prepare and pass zoning bylaws to control land use or to impose subdivision regulations
without having first prepared an official plan to provide an appropriate framework for these decisions. Land use controls, then, were still viewed as something separate from the master plan. As well, none of the acts made the preparation of community plans or zoning bylaws by local governments compulsory.

All the acts also allowed local government to appoint an independent town planning board or commission to advise on and prepare community plans. Any municipality regardless of size was allowed to appoint these town planning boards and to prepare an official plan. For Ontario, which in the past had restricted the right to impose land use controls to only certain types of local governments, this was an important change. A plan could apply to any area of the municipality and it was usually expected to cover the whole territory within the municipal boundary. The section of the old New Brunswick planning act, which had restricted planning to only those areas about to be developed, was eliminated. Further, in all cases except Saskatchewan, provisions were made for any municipality to co-operate with adjoining municipalities to prepare a regional plan.

Another common feature of these planning acts was the provision for public involvement. In all the provinces except Ontario, the legislation contained specific criteria obligating the local government to give public notice of decisions to officially adopt a community plan and zoning bylaws and to hold public hearings to consider the objections. In Ontario, the designated planning authorities were required to hold a public hearing when preparing the plan but were not required to give public notice of impending passage of planning bylaws.
In spite of these similarities, there were marked variation between the provincial acts in the area of planning administration. The whole question of administration had been hotly debated from the first stage of planning discussions in Canada. One aspect of this debate was whether the municipal council or an independent planning board comprised of citizens should be the principal local institution for preparing plans or zoning bylaws. Those taking the latter position including the original pioneers such as Hodgetts, argued that the politicians who had a short-term parochial perspective were essentially incapable of managing an objective, technical task such as preparing a community plan. Others had suggested that this view of planning as being something "above politics" was undemocratic and that the politicians who were directly responsible to the citizens through the electoral system should be the ones in control of planning. A further argument was that planning was too technical and significant to be left to a lay body. Instead, it should be handled by a separate municipal department in the same manner as public works or finance.

A second part of this ongoing debate was whether the local governments should have to obtain provincial approval before the various planning mechanisms such as zoning controls or plans could be enforced. Some argued that this sort of direct provincial control over municipal decision making was an infringement on municipal rights. Others maintained that many of the local governments simply lacked the competence to manage such important matters as land use planning. The premature extension of public works, which in the past had threatened the financial solvency of many municipalities, was an experience which
provincial governments who were the ones ultimately responsible for municipal debt did not want repeated.

In the end, the provinces dealt with these issues in several different ways. Alberta's legislation which was passed in 1929 with minor amendments in 1945 and 1946, and Ontario's legislation which was first passed in 1946 opted for the highly centralized approach to planning. In both provinces, the implementation of an official plan, the passage of or amendments to any zoning bylaw and the registration of all new subdivisions rested with the provincial government. Also, the Ontario and Alberta governments could order a local government to prepare and implement a plan and if the municipality refused to comply, the provincial government could step in and prepare the plan itself. In Ontario, the powers of the local governments were further reduced by delegating the task of town plan preparation to an independent planning board appointed by the local government. The local government, however, still retained the right to vote on planning board resolutions before the resolutions were submitted to the provincial government. In Alberta the local government had the option of appointing such an independent planning agency or managing the plan through a committee of council.

Manitoba's and Nova Scotia's legislation were almost as centralized. Nova Scotia's legislation provided for similar provincial controls to those contained in Alberta's and Ontario's except in the case of subdivisions where the approval process remained in local government hands. In Manitoba's act, there was no provision for subdivision controls similar to those in other acts and the provincial government did not have the right to compel local governments to prepare
plans if the province so desired. In the area of planning approvals and zoning controls, provincial approval was required.

British Columbia's legislation, first passed in 1925, created the most decentralized of the provincial planning systems. The authority to prepare official plans and pass and amend zoning bylaws rested with local government. The provincial government did not have the right to order local governments to prepare plans nor to step in and prepare a plan itself if local governments refused. Local government also had the right to manage the plan preparation itself or to appoint an independent town planning commission to handle the matter. An amendment to the B.C. legislation in 1946 and 1948 did expand provincial responsibilities in planning. But not at the expense of local government. The 1946 amendment allowed the provincial government to control the subdivision process in unorganized areas which were outside the jurisdiction of local governments. The 1948 amendment granted the Province the right to appoint regional planning boards which would prepare regional plans in areas designated by the province. However, the decision to implement the recommendation of these regional plans still rested with the local governments.

The development of the Saskatchewan and New Brunswick legislation indicates just how difficult it was to reach an acceptable resolution of these issues of provincial versus local control. The 1945 Saskatchewan Community Planning Act allowed local government to prepare an official plan without obtaining provincial approval. Provincial approval was necessary in order to pass zoning bylaws. But the provincial government soon decided that this system was too decentralized. In 1949 an amend-
ment was passed that required municipalities to seek provincial government approval of local plans before they became official.

New Brunswick had a change of heart in the opposite direction. The 1936 Planning Act was virtually identical to the Alberta and Nova Scotia legislation. But opposition to this centralized planning system forced the province to relinquish all controls over planning to the local government. The province soon became aware that this abdication of any responsibility for planning was too extreme. Consequently, a further amendment in 1947 returned the right to the provincial government to authorize a provincial town planning board to impose planning controls on unorganized areas and to order local governments to prepare plans or prepare a plan for the local government if it failed to comply with this order.

In addition to revising the planning legislation, the provinces also created new provincial agencies which began to issue reports and offer needed advice on how to plan the postwar urban environment. Ontario, which had been one of the less enthusiastic supporters of planning in the pre-war period, was particularly energetic. A new department set up in 1944 called Planning and Development began organizing conferences and issuing research papers and manuals on various aspects of community planning and housing. B.C. had set up a new Division of Regional Planning within the Department of Municipal Affairs, Alberta appointed a Director of Town Planning in Public Works and revitalized its Town and Rural Planning Advisory Board, Saskatchewan set up a separate Department of Community Planning and New Brunswick created a Provincial Planning Board and a Community Planning Division.
in the Department of Municipal Affairs.

Relative to the recommendations of the Curtis Report, the performance of the provinces in the area of planning was deficient in several ways. For one thing, the provinces showed little willingness to prepare the broad provincial settlement and land use strategies which the Curtis Report considered an essential component of the post-war planning system. The legislation put in place by the provinces was also not up to expectation. The preparation of plans by local governments was not made obligatory, expropriation powers were not strengthened, no provisions were made to collect land rents or to deal with the problems of destabilizing speculation, zoning and subdivision controls were not subordinated to the master plan and there was no requirement that planning would be managed by a permanent professional staff working in a government department instead of by a lay commission.

The provinces clearly envisaged that the public sector would play a relatively passive role in urban development. Instead of providing for a strong public entrepreneurial role in rebuilding cities, owning and developing suburban land, providing working class housing and collecting land rents, the initiatives of the provinces largely restricted the public sector to imposing negative controls, to regulate or respond to private entrepreneurial decisions. The public sector retained the right to say what would not be built but left the power to decide what would be built in private hands.

In many respects, these new provincial planning systems were a vast improvement over past practice. The acts were administratively workable. Subdivision controls to guarantee minimum requirements to
protect public interest and ensure some efficiency in urban expansion were imposed on virtually all new development. Direct provincial support for local planning was forthcoming in every province except Quebec. All local governments had the power to control their land use patterns if they chose to use it. But many of the innovative features of the early planning initiatives had been dropped. The idea of compensation and betterment levies and strong expropriation powers to deal with the problems of the land market had been abandoned. The idea of having public planners actually perform the entrepreneurial task of preparing and implementing a development scheme was no longer a central consideration.

To some, the failure of the provinces to promote a more active role for public planners was viewed as a serious flaw in Canada's post-war planning system. For as Humphrey Carver, one of Canada's leading postwar planners remarked:

Zoning is a truly negative action giving the police authority to say on this land you shall not do this or not do that. As simply a procedure for restricting obnoxious land uses and removing nuisances from residential areas, zoning is an essential technique... Progress in planning techniques in city development has not come from zoning; but in England from positive acts of slum clearance and re-housing and in America from the incentive of Robert Moses in New York and from the creation of the Tennessee Valley Authority and the Greenbelt towns.

44
IV

The federal government had offered funds and some technical advice to aid postwar urban development. Provincial governments had passed the legislation and created the agencies necessary for postwar planning to operate. But the success of postwar planning really depended on the local governments who had been handed the responsibility for actually preparing and implementing the specific planning measures that would determine the character of urban growth in Canada.

Local governments were relatively quick to exploit this opportunity to regulate the physical growth of their communities. A survey by the federal government revealed that by the end of 1948 sixteen of the nineteen largest centres in Canada were preparing an urban plan. Of the 118 smaller centres between 5,000 and 30,000 population, fifty had appointed planning boards and thirty-two were well embarked in the plan preparation process. In some cases, such as Toronto and Montreal, the desire to prepare plans was so great that the planning initiatives were begun by the local government before the senior government had given serious thought to the postwar urban and regional planning system.

The planning process undertaken by local governments followed an increasingly accepted standard procedure which closely resembled the general scheme outlined in the Curtis Report. The publication of several texts and conferences on planning which endorsed these basic planning concepts contributed to the growing acceptance of this set of techniques.
The major planning instrument was the master plan. John Bland, one of the principal postwar consultants, described the master plan in the following way:

It will show in a unified manner all the programs for the development of the town, including plans for the environs of the town. This includes subdivision, suggestion for new areas for dwellings, industries and local shopping areas; water supply catchment areas, refuse and sewage disposal facilities; it may also include county parks, neighbouring shoreline development, and forest reservations. It is in fact a comprehensive pattern for the development of the town so far as it can be determined with the information available.

The master plans prepared for Canadian cities usually outlined a broad, general strategy for development for a period covering the next fifteen to thirty years. A consultant hired to prepare Toronto's master plan justified a thirty year time horizon on the grounds that "a longer period might lead to a visionary impracticability, a shorter period to a well-founded accusation of lack of foresight." They also emphasized that a master plan was only a general guide to development. More specific studies would have to be done to determine the precise character of future expansion.

There was almost universal acceptance among planners that the process of development transpiring over this fifteen to thirty year period involved unforeseen changes in growth patterns, new technology and social goals. Consequently, it was emphasized that:

The master plan thus conceived is not likely a blueprint for a building intended to be followed in all details without compromise. It is rather a guide to policy, and it must be revised from time to time in the light of new survey and up-to-date information.
Despite such changes, however, it was still thought that the basic features of the master plan would remain relevant for the period covered by the plan. "If it is soundly and carefully conceived in the first instance," wrote Bland, "the necessary revisions should be only in details."\(^{52}\)

There was also widespread agreement among planners that the master plan must cover the whole, functionally interdependent region instead of being restricted to any one small component of the urban area. The authors of the Toronto plan frankly admitted in their introduction that they "perceived that the political boundaries of the city bore no relation to the social and economic life of the people." Consequently, the planners concluded that "since in the planning sense political boundaries have no significance, the master plan, of necessity, applies to and encompasses the whole of the future built-up area of which Toronto is the centre and the most important part."\(^{53}\)

The first step in preparing the master plan was to complete a detailed survey of the region. Such a survey normally included a description of past development, geology, climate, land use, topography, existing public facilities, soil conditions, population distribution, land values and densities. Based on the data from this survey the planner then completed projections of future population trends and an analysis of existing and potential problems.

The existing urban problems identified in the master plans were similar to the descriptions contained in the Curtis Report. Almost all Canadian cities, it seemed, suffered from traffic congestion in the downtown cores, excessive railway crossings in the built-up areas,
blighted or poor quality residential areas deficient in necessary amenities such as parks and schools, a street system that allowed heavy through traffic to crisscross stable residential areas, indiscriminate mixing of incompatible land uses, scattered sprawl development on the urban periphery and a general poor aesthetic appearance. 54

Having identified the existing problems and projected future growth, the planner then proposed a set of policies to mitigate the existing problems as well as to accommodate future growth in a manner that would ensure that such problems would not reappear. These proposals normally included a general land use plan, and a list of capital improvements dealing with streets, parks, schools and other public facilities.

The general land use plan normally divided the city into commercial areas, industrial zones and residential neighbourhoods. The method of deciding what land should be allocated for what purpose was based largely on the concentric zone theory; a theory first formally proposed in the 1920's and used in the 1915 Ottawa plan and the 1929 Vancouver plan. 55 The theory was founded on the observation that the land use patterns in most North American cities tended to follow a similar trend. As John Bland put it in his postwar planning manual issued by the Canadian Chamber of Commerce:

"Their pattern of growth has a certain regularity and they are divided naturally into areas which are used for different purposes. 56"

All cities had "a central area where the main institutions are found." Surrounding this central area was a transitional zone of
mixed land uses which included run-down residential areas which were receding from the invading commercial and industrial zones. New higher density residential development was also located in this zone. As one proceeded from the central areas the density of the residential development decreased while its quality improved. Industry tended to be located in the central business district or close to railways and other transportation facilities sometimes situated on the periphery of the urban area.  

Bland argued that this concentric pattern of land use was natural and should be closely followed. He reasoned that:

A town plan can only guide the natural forces and smooth out difficulties and control the rate of change. A plan which ignored these natural forces working on the development of the town would be a failure.  

Most consultants seemed to agree with him. The 1950 Ottawa plan, for example, specifically proposed that the city should be divided into five zones proceeding concentrically outward from the centre of the city to progressively lower density zones. A greenbelt surrounding the urban area was proposed as a means of separating rural and urban uses.  

Paradoxically, the planners felt that preservation of these "natural concentric patterns" of development required substantial public controls over the "natural market forces." One popular set of proposals designed to safeguard these natural patterns included plans for street widening, expressways and public transit facilities which would increase the accessibility and competitive advantage of the central business district relative to other areas of the region. The
updated Vancouver plan, for example, reasoned that "the street system is the framework of the entire city structure around which the other components are built."\(^60\) The plan went on to propose that:

> Several wide and direct streets are needed to make the CBD accessible from all sections of the city and thus protect property values in the area. Otherwise the commercial development will tend to move to more outlying areas where less difficulty will be encountered by the people who patronize and use these facilities.\(^61\)

The Vancouver consultants warned, however, that such street improvements couldn't hope to accommodate the large traffic flows caused by increased automobile ownership. Consequently, it was recognized that the street improvements would have to be complemented by the improvement of transit facilities. As the planners put it:

> It was also becoming apparent that it would be financially and physically impossible to widen or improve enough streets and to provide parking facilities within or near the CBD area to accommodate all the private motor cars in a large urban area. Thus the most logical alternative solution was to improve transit facilities.\(^62\)

In addition to these transportation improvements, the master plans advocated civic centres and downtown modernization programs to strengthen the inner-city areas. The Vancouver planners explained these proposals in the following way:

> A civic centre comprised of several large public buildings so designed as to create a harmonic composition represents one of the highest forms of municipal achievement. It reflects great public spirit and is a stimulation for future civic interest and achievement.\(^63\)

Not all planners agreed with the desirability of basing the master plans on the concentric zone theory. Tracy LeMay, a leading
Toronto planner, argued that the congestion plaguing central areas was primarily a function of improper land use patterns. To accommodate traffic by massive improvements in public infrastructure merely perpetuated an inappropriate urban structure. A more satisfactory solution was to decentralize some of the employment to relatively self-contained satellite areas located on the urban periphery. The balance between employment and residential uses in these satellite communities would reduce pressures to commute long distances from decentralized residential areas to employment centres concentrated in a high density central zone.

Spence-Sales, another leading planner, concurred with this view. In a critique of Greber's Ottawa plan he lamented that Greber wanted to concentrate growth in the central urban area. "An urban fence," wrote Spence-Sales, "would seem to have no place in the treatment of Canadian cities." According to Spence-Sales, Greber had in fact ignored the natural trends to decentralization. Instead of perpetuating a concentric zone pattern, he should have harnessed these trends by proposing self-contained satellite communities.

Behind this debate on urban structure were some fundamentally different conceptions of planning. For consultants such as Bartholomew and Bland, natural forces which led to a concentric zone pattern and a highly centralized central business district had to be accommodated if planning was to be successful. The primacy of the central business district was viewed as particularly critical. As Bartholomew remarked in one of his reports to the Vancouver Planning Commission:
Thus it is imperative to encourage and promote the greatest possible vitality in the CBD. The stronger and better the CBD, the better will be the city we can build. 67

In essence, the master plans based on these principles merely confirmed existing land uses. The 1943 Toronto master plan, for example, openly admitted that "the master plan has been conceived as a flexible instrument, designed to control and direct the natural growth and development rather than restrict or prevent it." 68 The 1949 Toronto Official Plan conveyed a similar impression by stating that the zoning bylaw was to follow existing land use patterns. 69

For others, such as Spence-Sales and the CPAC, such a continuation of "natural market trends" was not what planning was all about. Urban structure was perceived as a product of conscious public decision making; not as something that evolved according to immutable natural laws. Market forces or trends could guide planning decisions but should be made subordinate to the planning process. In a report presented by the CPAC to the Canadian Federation of Mayors and Municipalities several prominent Canadian planners urged authorities to adopt a conscious planning policy that fundamentally altered these existing trends toward concentration which were, according to the report, the source of innumerable problems. "It is universally admitted," stated the report, "that overlarge cities have become more and more tedious and vulnerable, less and less efficient - the most costly in all ways in which to live to do business." 70 As an alternative to existing trends, the report proposed that growth be accommodated by building relatively independent satellite communities somewhat similar
to those proposed by Howard. "What we are suggesting," wrote the planner, "is the deliberate direction of redevelopment away from our large cities."  

For some planners, then, the role of public planning was to accommodate change. For others, planning was expected to determine these trends; not to respond. At the core of these alternative conceptions were differing perceptions of the public sector similar to the differences between socialists and liberals. In fact, this debate was reminiscent of the debate during the twenties between radical planners such as Buckley and more conservative planners such as Ewing who saw planning as a means of protecting property. To reverse market trends, the public sector would have had to play an active entrepreneurial role initiating and managing the construction of large-scale new communities. In fact, the CPAC specifically requested the federal government to construct ten such communities in each of Canada's capital cities to demonstrate what could be accomplished. The accommodation of private market decisions was a much more modest and politically palatable task.  

While there was some basic disagreements on the role of planning in shaping spatial structures, there was a consensus on most other aspects of the master plan. All the plans contained similar proposals for a system of park and recreation facilities, aesthetic embellishments, urban renewal rehabilitation and neighbourhood planning. In fact, this latter subject which was given some attention in the Curtis Report, became one of the primary concepts guiding virtually all the planning efforts. The idea of neighbourhood planning, which was
formally developed by the American planner Clarence Perry in the 1920's and was advocated in the Curtis Report, was succinctly summarized by planning consultant E.G. Faludi in the following way:

As any living organism is built up from cellular units, so are towns and cities built up from neighbourhood cells... It is an area focussed around the school and its size is determined by the radius of the major daily activities of its residents... A neighbourhood should offer shopping facilities within easy reach and provision must be made to satisfy all kinds of recreational needs, both for adults and for children. Routes to the school should not be threatened by traffic crossings. Through traffic must be discouraged and must be routed around the neighbourhood on special through traffic highways to which local traffic will have access at controlled points... A belt of green open spaces - parks or parkways - would serve to isolate the neighbourhoods from each other and from commercial and industrial areas so that one does not become a nuisance to the other.  

The planners thought that this sort of neighbourhood policy would help restore some sense of community to what appeared to be a socially disorganized mass. "Social life," wrote Greber, "would be revived due to improved groupings of places of work, of business, of worship, of intellectual and physical education, and of rest."  

The major tools of implementation advocated in the master plans were zoning bylaws, subdivision controls and select public expenditures on infrastructure and land acquisition for parks. It was also emphasized that the successful implementation of plans required community support which could only come from having community involvement in the preparation of plans. The actual type of proposed citizen participation in planning varied. For Greber and his consultants citizen participation was largely a matter of "an effective service of public
information." "No master plan," warned Greber, "can be successfully implemented, no town planning law effectively enforced, if the public and their representatives are not properly informed of the real and material value of town planning."  

The planning effort in Winnipeg envisaged a more active role for local citizens. The planners set up a special citizens advisory committee whose members were nominated by the local major interest groups. Eric Thrift, the Director of the Metropolitan Plan of Greater Winnipeg, admitted that this sort of involvement had certain disadvantages including extra meetings, long hours and discord. But he defended what he considered to be the authentic participation in Winnipeg's planning process compared to the more superficial participation that characterized some of the other cities. "There have been organizations," reflected Thrift, "to promote planning, to educate the public on the benefits, to inform the public on the merits of the plan - but seldom to get people to share in planning." Thrift went on to argue that:

All too often the expert makes his surveys and studies, prepares a plan, then brings it forth for the approval and support of the citizens. How much better to get citizens and specialists working together on the development of a community... The pounds of documents flowing from the planning office are the more significant when they are the work of many minds. Because they record the intention of many citizens, rather than a few hirelings, these flowing pounds of ideas are the more likely to be wrought into the molded forms of the metropolitan fabric.  

The final section of the postwar planning reports essentially included a discussion on planning administration. Here, the various consultants repeated the same set of arguments which had been made throughout the twentieth century. Bartholomew recommended in one of
his reports to the City of Vancouver that British Columbia adopt the standard American practice of placing the complete responsibility for planning with an independent citizen planning commission whose decision could only be overturned by a two-thirds majority vote of elected council members. Bartholomew found the hybrid Canadian system of appointing citizen planning commissions but giving them purely advisory functions unacceptable. He supported his proposal for strengthening the town planning commission on the following grounds:

Experience has shown that a citizens committee of the composition of the present town planning commission is the best agency to be charged with the responsibility of planning the city. Only such a commission can be representative of the various interests of the city; only such a commission can give continuing attention to long-range problems; only through the use of such a commission can the long-range viewpoint take precedence over political and departmental expediency.76

Other consultants such as John Bland and Spence-Sales vehemently opposed such notions. These two consultants urged in several of their reports than Canadian authorities give full planning responsibility to a full-time municipal planning department which would be responsive to Council in the same manner as other civic departments.77 They considered the advisory planning commission a frivolous element in the whole process. Spence-Sales summarized his argument against the independent planning commission in the following way:

In Canada the commissions are over-representative of real estate and building construction interests ... the composition...is such as to make doubtful that an objective viewpoint can be maintained. Usually the members of a commission cannot give the amount of time necessary to study and develop an adequate understanding of the complexities of physical planning.
It is neither carrying out successfully the prime function of preparing a plan for the physical development of the community it represents, nor is it rendering profitable advisory services as it is ill-equipped technically and administratively, is severely limited in its scope by financial restrictions imposed by councils and is not recognized by municipal offices both executive and technical as being an appropriate and capable instrument for planning purposes.78

This argument was gradually winning out in Canada as well as in the U.S. where Robert Walker, an American planning expert, was articulating similar attacks on the independent planning commission approach.79 By the middle of the 1950's most major Canadian cities had given the function of planning to a full-time professional staff incorporated in a separate planning department.

V

By the beginning of the 1950's Canadian planning was well underway. Amid the proliferation of master plans, zoning by-laws and permanent civic planning departments were two landmark projects that would help shape Canadian planning practice for the next several decades.

One of these projects was the initiation of Canada's first major urban redevelopment project, Regent's Park. The significance of this effort to rebuild part of downtown Toronto was summarized by housing planners Alison Hopwood and Albert Rose who commented in an article in the Canadian Forum that:

This is the first time in our history that an entire area, designated as blighted, is to be torn down, completely replanned and in which all the inhabitants are to be rehoused. It is
to be administered by the first municipal public housing authority in Canada... This is the first time in Canada that a principle of rental subsidies has been accepted and admitted by all levels of government.80

The planning of Regent's Park provided a suitable forum for a continuation of many of the debates surrounding the postwar planning system. In discussing Regent's Park, federal officials again revealed how committed they were to private sector solutions. Instead of taking direct action themselves, the federal government decided to channel public funds through a private agency arranged by the insurance industry called Housing Enterprise.81 The Citizens' Housing and Planning Association (CHDA), which had been formed in 1944 by people such as Humphrey Carver to lobby for housing reform, attacked the federal government's approach by arguing that the provision of public funds to the private sector to manage such an important public task as rebuilding cities was unjust and unsound. The CHDA urged the government authorities to create an independent Toronto housing authority to manage the low-rental housing projects and to provide rent subsidies to bring the rents within the reach of low income residents.82 The federal government denied these requests on the grounds that housing subsidies were not a federal matter. Also, as the blunt statement by Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent that "no government of which I am part will ever pass legislation to subsidize housing" revealed, the federal government was ideologically opposed to the concept of public housing.83

Municipal officials soon became impatient with the senior government's position. In 1946, the Toronto council decided to act on its own and successfully submitted a referendum to the electorate on a proposed
Regent's Park development scheme. Having secured a solid endorsement of the project from the voters, the City finally initiated Canada's first major redevelopment scheme.

The City decided to form an independent housing authority comprised of leading members of the community to oversee the project. After the necessary financing which included $2 million from a municipal debenture, $1.15 million from the federal government under the NHA provisions offering 50 percent financing for land acquisition and a $1000 grant per housing unit from the provincial government, the housing authority authorized construction. While construction was underway the authorities had to make some important decisions such as who should be allowed to live in the project and how much rent they should pay. In the end, the authority decided that rents should be set at about 20 percent of family income and that only natural families comprising two or more people would be allowed in the project.

In March 1949 the first resident moved in. The project was, however, running into some difficulty. The rents were higher than many residents had previously been paying. The authority was unable to accommodate all the displaced residents because the rate of construction was falling behind the rate of demolition and some residents were beginning to complain about their change in status from homeowners to tenants now under the control of a Housing Authority. Meanwhile, the project was well behind schedule and in 1952 the funds were exhausted. Consequently, the City of Toronto had to hold another referendum to raise an additional $5 million. Although the referendum was successful, it did spark a spirited debate between real estate interests who attacked
Regent's Park on the grounds that it was socialist and the CPAC who defended it as a socially desirable project. With the additional funds, the Housing Authority completed Canada's first major redevelopment scheme in 1957.

With the successful completion of Regent's Park, decades of persistent analysis and lobbying had finally come to fruition. An important experiment testing some of the theory which had guided Canadian planners for most of the twentieth century had been concluded. The experiment illustrated that substantial lobbying could force a route through the labyrinth of constitutional jockeying and philosophical posturing. In fact, the successful initiation of Regent's Park helped convince the federal government that it should set aside its constitutional arguments and pass legislation allowing for federal contributions to subsidized housing. Also, the fact that the project generated an annual surplus indicated that redevelopment projects were financially sound even when they provided geared-to-income housing. This financial performance was made all the more convincing by comprehensive evidence presented in the major evaluation of Regent's Park which highlighted many of the social benefits of better housing, including reduced crime, lower public maintenance costs and better health.

As well, Regent's Park experience revealed to planners some of the difficulties endemic in housing redevelopment. Costs were higher than anyone had expected, the social impact of community dislocation was far from insignificant and the problem of staging construction to accommodate displaced tenants was more challenging than some had thought.
The planners found that under Regent's Park's faded exterior that had been a viable community housing a diverse group of tenants and homeowners who were reluctant to become tenants. The old housing was flexible enough to accommodate different living arrangements such as sharing with boarders to generate additional family income. Existing families were not as economically deprived as the planners had originally thought.

Planners Albert Rose and Alison Hopwood articulated some of these sentiments in a review of Regent's Park. They said:

Within a short time the small corner grocery store will be gone. The local "pubs" (two in number) will be torn down. Some people have carried on a small business of one sort or another from their home. It will be difficult if not impossible to continue them. There are, in addition, a few good solid brick houses in the redevelopment areas which might have served adequately for another two decades. These, too, will be demolished without sufficient explanation to their owners.

Rose and Hopwood also commented on the problems of existing homeowners who would be placed in "a totally unfamiliar situation as tenants of a public housing authority enforcing relatively strict regulations."

Concerning the problem of dislocation, Rose and Hopwood found it hard to accept that "the people of Regent's Park have, during this entire period, received almost no explanation of the work of the Housing Authority, the progress of the project, and of the ultimate role of the tenants." They recommended that future projects should include community participation and public information programs.

Regent's Park was a demanding test of Canadian planning theory. As a major review by the aspiring young planner Len Gertler effectively argued, some major theoretical questions remained unresolved.
many of the cautions expressed by his predecessors, Gertler pointed out that it was doubtful whether the destruction of existing units which accompanied the development program was appropriate during times when housing was in short supply. It was doubtful whether the land to be redeveloped should necessarily be allocated to residential use. This was a matter that could only be decided within a framework of a comprehensive city plan. It was doubtful whether complete redevelopment was superior to a less traumatic rehabilitation program which combined selective upgrading of some of the better units and demolition of the obsolete ones. It was also doubtful, wrote Gertler, whether redevelopment of central areas should proceed without major new development on the urban periphery which would relieve pressure on the central areas and reduce the cost of land acquisition. As Gertler warned:

If slum housing is acquired and cleared without first increasing the supply of low-rental housing, not only will the public pay exorbitant prices for the land, but blight, far from being alleviated, will spread as those displaced from decongested areas move into whatever accommodation remains.91

Regent's Park, then, had helped raise a number of issues which could help guide future planning efforts. And Regent's Park also helped prove that it was possible to achieve goals which for so long had remained mere visions of "utopian reformers." As Albert Rose succinctly put it:

We have learned that it is possible to clear a slum and rebuild a community in the urban core of a metropolis.92

But unfortunately the lessons learned from this experience were not applied. During the 1950's little urban renewal was undertaken and
and during the 1960's, when urban renewal programs were expanded, the projects failed to even meet the standards set by Regent's Park let alone the suggestions made by those reviewing the Regent's Park Project.

VI

The second major planning project that was instrumental in shaping postwar practice was the construction of Canada's first major suburban new town, Don Mills. The project began in 1946 when a private development company owned by Canadian entrepreneur E.P. Taylor commenced assembling a 2,200 acre parcel of land on the outskirts of Toronto.

In 1952 the development corporation organized a planning staff to design the new suburban development of about 25,000 population along the lines of the British new town concept originally developed by Ebenezer Howard. But unlike the British new towns Don Mills was to be handled as a private venture. The project was an attempt, par excellence, to resolve the apparent conflict between capitalist institutions and the need for collective management of the new urban order. As the architects remarked:

> It's the aim of the development corporation to create under the free enterprise system, an integrated new town which will satisfy the requirements of private development and which will also be in accordance with the best principles of town planning.

The actual plan for Don Mills incorporated the now widely accepted planning concepts which had been advocated by Canadian planners such as Adams and their foreign counterparts such as Ebenezer Howard, Clarence Stein and Clarence Parry for the past several decades.
First of all, it was considered essential that the new town have a strong, diversified industrial base to ensure "a favourable assessment balance and a desirable relationship of work to home," in order to minimize costly long distance commuting. Second, the planners urged "that the balance of people of varied income levels was desirable for long lasting success of residential, commercial and industrial development." Consequently, it was concluded that "housing had to be developed for families of not only middle and high income levels, but also for those primary workers with gainful employment in the industries of the town." A third principle was Perry's now familiar neighbourhood concept. Don Mills was to be comprised of four separate neighbourhoods housing five to seven thousand people focussed around a major town centre providing shopping facilities, a high school and other higher order service functions. Each neighbourhood, in turn, would be designed around an elementary school, a recreation centre and a local shopping facility. A fourth principle was to use a system of inter-connected greenbelts to separate the town from surrounding developments.

A fifth principle accepted by Don Mills' planners was Clarence Stein's idea of separating through traffic and neighbourhood traffic by using a system of cul-de-sacs connected to a ring road and to minimize the conflict between pedestrians and vehicular traffic by locating public and commercial facilities in the centre of each neighbourhood so that they could be reached by travelling along the greenbelt system.

A final principle was to maintain overall architectural continuity by requiring each builder to hire an architect and having all the designs reviewed by an architectural committee. In attempting to
attain architectural continuity, the planners were cautious to avoid undue conformity. A concentrated effort was made to create diversity by forbidding any one building company from purchasing a row of adjacent lots. In this way, each builder's design would be scattered throughout the project.

Along with Regent's Park, Don Mills was a landmark in Canadian postwar planning practice. The project was one of the first major opportunities to test the Canadian postwar effort to integrate leading planning concepts with private enterprise institutions. The results were far unambiguous.

On the one hand, the impressive marketability of the project was a clear confirmation of a number of the dominant planning ideas. In fact, the market results were so convincing that Don Mills became a model for suburban development right across the country. But at the same time, Don Mills revealed some of the limitations of planning within the private enterprise system. Ironically, these limitations were partly a result of the very success of the basic planning concepts employed. These planning concepts were so highly regarded that the project began winning awards and was soon viewed as a prestigious development. The resulting surge in interest and demand allowed the profit-seeking private corporation to raise prices to well beyond the reach of the average metropolitan household. By 1960, house prices in Don Mills, which had been previously close to the average for the Toronto metropolitan region, leaped to levels well beyond average. The exclusiveness of Don Mills was further reinforced by the failure of the private corporation to provide the lower income housing called
for in the original plan. Consequently, the income of the average Don Mills household was almost twice as high as the average for the whole Toronto region.  

Unfortunately, the high incomes of the residents were partly responsible for thwarting the planners' efforts to reduce costly commuting by building a relatively self-sufficient town. Many of the blue collar employees, unable to find affordable accommodation within the town, were forced to live in surrounding developments. Although enough jobs were located in Don Mills to employ 50 percent of the resident population, only 10 percent of the residents actually worked there.  

In the end, the evaluation of Don Mills seemed to depend on who was judging it. In one review written by one of the consultants working for the corporation Don Mills was portrayed in the following way:  

The Canadian community of Don Mills, near Toronto, conceived and planned on the "New Town" principle, can be regarded as the first new town in Canada... The community stands as a monument to free enterprise and is one of the major achievements in the annals of Canadian real estate.

Several other reviews were not quite as flattering. The Town and Country Planning Journal while acknowledging that Don Mills was a "most impressive example of a complete community unit by private enterprise," lamented that the project "did not quite comply with the British concept for new towns." "Hardly any of the industrial workers," noted the journal, "live in the project, which has become in practice a middle class enclave." The editors of another major journal concurred. They summed up Don Mills in the following way:
Don Mills is a success - but in a way which had not been anticipated. It is a first rate dormitory suburb.  

Don Mills was a vast improvement over past development practice. But the Canadian preoccupation of planning within private sector constraints had some costs. Unlike the non-profit government managed approach used in the European suburban construction where land rents accrued to the community and could be used to support housing for a wide income range, the Canadian private sector approach seemed to assure that the land rents would accrue to private capital and that the provision of social housing necessary to accommodate a diverse population would be impeded. As the authors of a major evaluation of Canadian new towns succinctly observed more than a decade after Don Mills was completed.

The broad aim of both public and privately sponsored communities has been the same - to create pleasing urban-rural environments. But the publicly sponsored new community is free to aim for other social goals the private new community must neglect because of market considerations, which translate into buttressing the automobile society. The privately developed new community is more closely tied to the status quo; public new communities may experiment and innovate.

Canadian planning had made impressive strides forward. Legislation was in place, permanent planning departments were in operation, official plans were being prepared, innovative projects such as Don Mills and Regent's Park were well underway and an official citizens' lobby group was holding conferences and pressing officials for more
action. The only major achievement left to accomplish was to create a professional organization to give the new planning practice the prestige and legitimacy that its proponents thought it deserved.

The promoters of postwar planning were well aware of the importance of forming such a professional organization. J.M. Kitchen, who had been president of the old TPIC which had become dormant during the Depression, had faithfully kept the TPIC from being completely disbanded. Kitchen suggested that the revival of the old institute would be the best approach to revitalizing Canadian town planning in the postwar period. Although there was some sympathy for this position, the promoters of postwar planning opted for the creation of the CPAC which, as a lay body, could better mobilize public opinion in support of planning. CMHC remained committed, however, to assisting the revival of TPIC when the time seemed opportune. 105

With the surge in planning activity in the postwar period, Canadian planners were convinced that some sort of professional organization was essential as a "medium through which to develop and maintain high standards in the town planning profession and enhance the usefulness of that profession to the public." 106 In 1947 a small group of practising planners led by Tracy LeMay formed an officially chartered Ontario organization called the Institution for Professional Town Planners (IPTP). This fledgling organization continued to meet with J.M. Kitchen and other members of the council of the dormant TPIC to discuss an amalgamation between IPTP and TPIC which would result in the creation of a truly national institute. 107

In 1952 the two groups merged under the revised TPIC charter. The sixty members of the new institute included active members of the
old institute such as J.M. Kitchen, T.D. LeMay, A.E.K. Bunnell, A.G. Dalzell, S. Young and P. Nobbs, as well as a new group including H. Carver, E.G. Faludi, and J. Bland, who had all been instrumental in shaping the character of postwar planning. This merger of the old and the new ensured that the wealth of experience gained during the 1920's would not be completely lost.

The TPIC held its first annual meeting in Ottawa in the fall of 1952. Discussion immediately centred on the usual sort of questions faced by any new professional body; what distinguishes the profession from other professions and who is eligible for membership?

Gradually the institute formulated a position on these issues. It was decided that because there was already a lay body, the new TPIC, unlike the former TPIC, should be only a professional organization. The objectives of the institute were defined in the following way:

To promote the acquisition of knowledge pertaining to planning, to examine candidates for admission to the institute, hold conferences and exhibitions, build up a library, acquire property, accept gifts and endowments, encourage original research and maintain high standards in the profession.

At first, eligibility requirements were not overly stringent. All practising planners were admitted as long as they submitted a comprehensive statement on why they wanted to join. An interview to screen potential applicants could be held at the discretion of the TPIC council. But as the membership increased and the demand for planners surged, the TPIC could afford to be a bit more selective. Concern was expressed over the growing placement of "unqualified people" in planning jobs and in the tendency of draftsmen and others
who lacked the required expertise to join the Institute. In 1955 TPIC
president E.G. Faludi told the annual meeting that "in order to safe-
guard the welfare of our communities and integrity of the planning
profession we should claim a professional status."\footnote{111}

The council took his advice. In 1956 a new set of bylaws
defining eligibility were accepted and officially approved by the
federal Secretary of State.\footnote{112} To be eligible as an associate member
the applicant had to have either a recognized degree in planning plus
two years experience or four years of professional experience and pass
an exam administered by the Institute. Full membership required an
additional three years of experience.\footnote{113} With the official recognition
of the TPIC having been achieved, the new president of the Institute,
B. Pelletier, remarked that:

\begin{quote}
The foundation of a professional planning organ-
ization in Canada has now been established. I
believe our efforts can now be directed to other
fields and possibly official recognition and
ultimately a closed profession. At the present
time there is no legislation preventing anyone
professing to be a town planner and bringing
the profession generally into disrepute in the
public eye.\footnote{114}
\end{quote}

The establishment of the profession obviously required more than
a formal organization. A body of theory and a focus of activity were
also essential. The new profession essentially defined its focus in
the same way as the old Institute. The old TPIC definition of town
planning was accepted and the members viewed themselves as the experts
responsible for co-ordinating physical development.

Annual conferences were held to develop the theories necessary
to establish the profession's expertise in this area. Although little
new theory was formulated, the meetings did help disseminate conventional planning concepts as well as other information on the progress of planning in various cities and regions. These measures to secure and disseminate planning theory were reinforced by the establishment of a professional journal in 1959, and the setting up of town planning departments at McGill University in 1947, University of Manitoba in 1949, University of British Columbia in 1950 and the University of Toronto in 1951. A scholarship program administered by CMHC helped encourage students to enrol in these graduate schools. The planning profession, it seemed, had finally recovered from the devastation wrought by the great depression.

VIII

After a passionate and sometimes bitter debate, a new consensus which appeared to resolve the problems in Canadian society without destroying capitalist institutions had been forged. This new postwar consensus was founded on three broad principles of employing counter-cyclical fiscal and monetary policies to maintain full employment, of guaranteeing the poor a minimum level of social services and income, and of imposing public planning on sectors of the economy where private markets were not particularly successful in allocating resources.

Neither of the two major protagonists in the debate on the postwar society seemed overly comfortable with the new welfare state that was described in the reconstruction reports. The liberals felt that the new postwar society involved a much greater degree of public
control over private activities than they actually wanted. The socialists viewed the new postwar welfare state as nothing more than an attempt by the liberals to support private enterprise at public expense. But the vitality of the postwar economy quickly eliminated such apprehension. The liberals realized that the new postwar society did not require the degree of public intervention that the government planners had anticipated. Support for the socialist position, meanwhile, quickly evaporated when it became increasingly clear that the imminent collapse of the capitalist economy predicted by the socialists was not going to transpire.

This new postwar liberal synthesis had delegated an important role to town planning. New federal housing legislation provided that necessary funds for planning and postwar reconstruction and provincial planning legislation enabled local governments to prepare and implement urban and regional plans. A body of planning theory and methodology had been formulated through the efforts of the Curtis Report and other major conferences and workshops on planning. Master plans and subdivision regulations had been prepared for most Canadian communities. Several innovative projects such as Don Mills provided a model to guide the new suburban development. And a professional organization to promote the development of planning had been formed.

But the actual practice of postwar planning fell far short of the expectations contained in such major documents as the Curtis Report let alone the visions contained in the socialist documents as Social Planning for Canada. The federal government did not provide the public housing, the financial assistance for slum clearance or the federal
research agency recommended by Curtis. Instead it chose to support private enterprise at public expense and to dismantle the last vestiges of public entrepreneurship such as Wartime Housing Ltd. The provincial governments did not create the broad provincial settlement strategies, build the new towns, create the regional planning agencies or pass planning legislation which would make planning mandatory, collect land rents, control speculation or allow for expropriation of land for urban renewal. Nor did the local governments fully implement the detailed, comprehensive master plans that the Curtis Report called for. The planners, meanwhile, seemed relatively content with their role as passive managers of development who applied ad hoc controls designed to protect property and to accommodate private expansion. They were, in effect, simply continuing the tradition of "property oriented planning" that had been evolving in the twenties.

But while this postwar planning system failed to live up to expectations, the increased commitment to planning ensured that the worst aspects of development would at least be mitigated. The synthesis of planning and capitalism represented by Don Mills, whatever its defects, was clearly a substantial improvement on past practice. The liberals, it seemed, had once again found a viable consensus which would resolve the problems of Canadian society while preserving the basic features of capitalism.
Footnotes


2. Ibid., 264-5.


4. Granastein, Canada's War, 264-5.


7. "National Housing Act, (NHA)" Statutes of Canada, King George VI, Ch. 46 (1944), 299.

8. Ibid., Part V, Sec. 24, 419.

9. Ibid., Part II, Sec. 11, 412.

10. Ibid., Part II, Sec. 12, 412.


12. Ibid., 1944, 6: 6180.

13. Ibid., 1944, 6: 5984.

14. Ibid., 1944, 6: 5482; 5981; 5997; 5985.

15. "NHA," Statutes of Canada, King George VI, Ch. 61, Part I, Sec. 13 (1946); Ibid., Ch. 63.


17. Ibid., 1948, 4: 4180.

18. Ibid., 1948, 4: 4180; 1946, 4: 3691.

19. Ibid., 1948, 4: 4178.


22. Ibid., 1944, 4: 5985.


25. Ibid., 1946, 4: 3691.


28. Ibid., 9-10.


32. Ibid., 4.


34. Armstrong, "Founding Fathers of CPAC."

35. House of Commons Debates, 1944, 6: 5977.


37. Dominion-Provincial Conference on Reconstruction, Report of the Plenary Session No. 1, August 6, 1945, 6; for other statements illustrating the federal government's commitment to private enterprise see: SPRR, Report No. 2 and No. 3, 1942, 36; House of Commons Debates, 1948, 4: 4180; House of Commons Debates, 1946, 4: 3691.

38. See for example: New Brunswick, Rehabilitation Conference: Proceedings of the Rehabilitation Conference Held at Fredericton, March 6, 1945 (Fredericton: King's Printer, 1945); Ontario, Dept. of Planning and Development, Report of Conference on Planning and Development held at Toronto, May 8 & 9, 1944 (Toronto: King's Printer, 1944); Ontario, Dept. of Planning and Development, Five Broadcasts on Reconstruction (Toronto: n.p. 1944); Saskatchewan, Dept. of Reconstruction and Rehabilitation, Annual Report (Regina: King's Printer,
1944); British Columbia Postwar Rehabilitation Council, A Summary of Recommendations contained in the Interim Report of 1943 and Supplementary Reports of 1944 and 1945 (Victoria: King's Printer, 1945); for the federal government see: House of Commons, Special Committees on Reconstruction, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, 485-521, 801, 859, 1010-1102, 1943 and 129, 187, 1944.

39. "An Act Respecting Town Planning," Statutes of the Province of B.C., Ch. 55 (1925); "An Act to Amend the Town Planning Act," Statutes of B.C., Ch. 75, (1946); "An Act to Amend the Town Planning Act," Statutes of B.C., Ch. 96 (1948);

"Community Planning Act," Statutes of the Province of Saskatchewan, Ch. 54 (1945); "An Act to Amend the Community Act," Statutes of Sask., Ch. 45 (1948); "An Act to Amend the Community Planning Act," Statutes of Sask., Ch. 53 (1949);

"An Act Relating to Planning and Regulating the Development of Land," Statutes of Manitoba, Consolidated Amendments, Ch. 196 (1924); "An Act to Consolidate and Revise the Winnipeg Charter," Statutes of Manitoba, Ch. 81, Part XXIII;

"An Act Respecting Planning and Development," Statutes of the Province of Ontario, Ch. 71 (1946); "An Act to Amend the Planning Act," Statutes of Ontario, Ch. 75 (1947); "An Act to Amend the Planning Act," Statutes of Ontario, Ch. 71 (1949);

"Town Planning Act," Statutes of the Province of Nova Scotia, Ch. 8 (1939);

"Town Planning Act," Statutes of the Province of New Brunswick, Ch. 35 (1936); "An Act to Amend the Town Planning Act," Statutes of N.B., Ch. 59 (1938); "An Act to Amend the Town Planning Act," Statutes of N.B., Ch. 44 (1947).

40. For an excellent analysis of these acts see: Harold Spence-Sales, Planning Legislation in Canada: A Report to CMHC (Ottawa: 1949).


42. For a review of this debate see pp. 115-8; see also: ACR, Housing and Community Planning.

43. See for example: B.C. Postwar Rehabilitation Council, Preliminary Inquiry into Regional Planning in B.C. (Victoria: n.p., 1943); B.C., Bureau of Postwar Rehabilitation and Reconstruction, Regional Planning Division, Preliminary Report on Proposed Lower Mainland Regional Plan (Victoria: n.p., 1945); Sask., Dept. of Community Planning, Community Planning: A Precis


46. See for example, Toronto Planning Board, Master Plan for the City of Toronto (Toronto: n.p., 1943); A. Cousineau, "Community Planning Activity in Montreal, JRAIC, 20:4 (April 1943): 51-3.

47. For examples of some of these plans see the following reports by the Vancouver Town Planning Commission (VTPC), Preliminary Report Upon Economic Background and Population (1944); A Preliminary Report Upon Public Buildings and Civic Centres (1945); A Preliminary Report on Transit (1945); A Preliminary Report on Airports (1946); A Preliminary Report on Parks, Recreation and Schools (1946); A Preliminary Report on the Major Street Plan (1947); A Preliminary Report on the City's Appearance (1947); A Preliminary Report on the Administration of Planning (1948). Also see: Toronto Planning Board (TPB), Master Plan for the City of Toronto and Environs; Toronto City Planning Board (TCPB), Third Report and Official Plan (Toronto: TCPB, 1944); National Capital Planning Service (NCPS), Plan for the National Capital (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1950); City of Montreal, Dept. of City Planning, Planning for Montreal (Montreal: n.p., 1944); Halifax City Planning Commission, The Master Plan for the City of Halifax (Halifax, n.p., 1945); Saint John Town Planning Commission, A Plan for Saint John, N.B. (Saint John: n.p., 1945); Metropolitan Winnipeg Planning Commission, Background for Planning for Greater Winnipeg (Winnipeg: n.p., 1946); Regina, Community Planning Committee, Regina, 1946-1976 (Regina: n.p., 1946); CPAC, Community Planning in Canada (Ottawa, CPAC, 1948).

48. See for example: E.A. Arthur (ed.), Planning Canadian Towns and Cities: Montreal, McGill University, School of Architecture, Housing and Community Planning (Montreal: n.p. 1944); Sask. Dept. of Community Planning; Community Planning: A Precis; Government of Manitoba, Town and Community Post-War Planning; Ontario, Dept. of Planning and Development, Community Planning Conference; Nova Scotia, Dept. of Municipal Affairs, Community Planning; CPAC, Ontario Citizens' Planning Conference (Toronto:
316.


50. TPB. Master Plan, n.p.


52. Ibid., 56.

53. TPB. Master Plan, n.p.

54. For an excellent discussion of these problems see: NCPS, Plan for the National Capital, 63, 65, 68, 78, 127; CPAC, Community Planning in Canada.


57. Ibid., 5-11.

58. Ibid., 5.


60. VTPC. Preliminary Report on the Major Street Plan, 9.

61. Ibid., 9.


66. Ibid., 3.


68. TPC. Master Plan.


73. NCPS. Plan for the National Capital, 196.

74. Ibid., 285.


76. VTPC. Preliminary Report on Administration of the Plan, 6.


82. CHDA. A Statement on the Proposed Regent Park Housing Project (Toronto: n.p., 1946).

83. L. St. Laurent, cited by Humphrey Carver. Compassionate Landscape. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975), 84.


85. The following discussion is based on: Rose, Regent Park; Carver, Compassionate Landscape; CPAC, Community Planning News, various issues.

86. Rose. Regent Park, 190-201.

87. Ibid., 103-81.


89. Ibid., 35.

91. Ibid., 47.

92. Rose. Regent Park, 222.


94. Ibid., 9.

95. Ibid., 6.

96. Ibid., 6-7.


100. Ibid., 65-6.


111. "President's Address, TPIC Annual Meeting, July 1969."
112. "President's Address, TPIC Annual Meeting, June 5, 1958."
113. "TPIC Minutes, March 17, 1956."
114. "President's Address, TPIC Annual Meeting, June 5, 1958."
PART THREE: CONCLUSION
Urban and regional planning had finally been accepted as a legitimate function of the state. The evolution of Canadian planning from its inception at the turn of the century to its new found status as an objective technical exercise had been a profoundly complex process involving questions about the very nature of society.

At the turn of the century it had become painfully clear that the forces of capitalist accumulation and capitalist institutions of private property and unregulated private markets were in serious conflict. The new urban order that accompanied capital accumulation was plagued by interdependencies and interactions which made the unrestricted use of property an antiquated and dangerous illusion threatening the physical health of the population, the efficiency of the urban system and the social stability of the entire society.

Although it was obvious that this conflict had to be resolved there was little agreement on how to actually do it. One approach which was advocated by the agrarian radicals was to institute some major reforms in an attempt to revitalize the agrarian way of life. A second option urged by urban liberals was to expedite and accommodate the process of capitalist accumulation by initiating reforms within the framework of capitalist institutions. A third option promoted by urban radicals was to accept the process of urbanization as inevitable and manage it by restructuring the capitalist institutions which were inimical to the sort of public intervention necessary to cope with urban society.
Each of these three responses to the problem had weaknesses. The agrarian radicals wanted to hold back the seemingly inexorable forces of urbanization which were causing the problems in the first place and the urban radicals called for the elimination of the capitalist institutions which were impeding the management of the new order. While it may have seemed logical at a theoretical level to eliminate one of the two elements of the conflict, both the forces of urbanization and the capitalist institutions were so powerful that a strategy based on the elimination of either of them was politically naive. The urban liberal's approach was equally flawed. Although their acceptance of the forces of urbanization and capitalist institutions was politically palatable, the full acceptance of the two elements that were causing the stress in the first place made little sense.

The liberals, realizing that some reforms in capitalist institutions were essential, soon discovered what they thought would be the solution to their seemingly intractable dilemma. The solution was the new discipline of town planning which seemed so appealing that support for it cut across the whole ideological spectrum. To the agrarian radicals it was the obvious means of revitalizing agricultural life. To the urban radicals it appeared to be the mechanism by which the irrational market forces and the rights of private property could be subordinated to the public good. To liberals it seemed to be simply the application of the new scientific principles which were so useful in the business world to the management of the urban community.
There were, however, several different conceptions of what planning really was. The initial conception was based on the city beautiful approach with its emphasis on building monumental civic centres, wide boulevards and parks. This type of planning which had evolved in the United States seemed like the logical answer to urban problems; an answer which did not challenge the rights of private property. But this approach was soon discarded as it became increasingly obvious that it was both expensive and ineffective.

In its place emerged two alternative styles of planning. One which was developing in the United States and was termed city planning added the concerns of efficiency to the aesthetic concerns of city beautiful. Its primary emphasis was the provision of public infrastructure to accommodate and expedite growth and the application of zoning controls to protect private property. The other approach which was evolving in Britain and was termed town planning added the third concern of social welfare to the concerns of efficiency and aesthetics reflected in city planning. Its primary emphasis was the protection of people's health and the provision of adequate housing constructed in well planned garden suburbs. Public enterprise and public ownership of land were viewed as appropriate tools for achieving these objectives.

With the arrival of Thomas Adams and the creation of the Commission of Conservation and with the growing severity of urban problems the search for an acceptable concept of planning began in earnest. Under Adams' direction, Canadian planning gradually evolved towards the British approach with its emphasis on housing, public
entrepreneurship, garden suburbs and controls over land speculation. Adams outlined a process of planning which proceeded from survey to analysis to plan and called for the preparation of both broad regional plans and more detailed urban plans.

The theory of planning developed by Adams was far from unequivocal. Indeed, Adams often changed his position or chose to emphasize efficiency and the protection of property sometimes while emphasizing equity and public ownership at others. Nonetheless, his theory of planning did succeed in temporarily uniting the three ideologically hostile forces for it contained elements which appealed to both agrarian radicals, urban liberals and urban radicals.

Adams and his colleagues had made a valiant effort to develop an objective theory of planning which appeared to be above these conflicts in Canadian society. For a short time it appeared that this attempt would be successful. Planning legislation which was based on the British legislation was passed in most provinces, housing legislation was enacted and local governments began to prepare plans. However, the growing intensity of conflict following World War I quickly shattered any illusions of consensus that had formed around the concept of planning. Each of these groups obviously had different ideas about what planning ought to be. Agrarian and urban radicals, wanting more direct action, launched direct political challenges to the established order. The liberals quickly responded by using the power of the state to crush the most overt outbursts.
The collapse of the agrarian and urban radicals combined with the gradual amelioration of urban problems made possible by changing technology and slower rates of growth allowed the liberals to retreat from their ephemeral flirtation with serious reforms. As a result the support for comprehensive planning of the type outlined by Adams evaporated.

Canadian planners responded to this new more conservative mood of the twenties by developing a more passive approach based on the city planning ideas in the United States. Canadian planning began to ally itself with real estate interests by advocating the application of zoning controls to protect private property. Some planners such as Buckley opposed these changes and called for a more active planning which would be based on the construction of garden cities and would have as its primary aim the improvement of social welfare. But the consensus that had formed in the twenties precluded such action. The planning activities that were tolerated consisted largely of the ad hoc implementation of zoning controls to protect prestigious neighbourhoods from unwanted intrusions and to provide infrastructure to accommodate growth. Even the most comprehensive efforts such as the Vancouver plan merely responded to spatial trends established by market forces.

With the collapse of the capitalist economy in the thirties, the ideological debates which had subsided in the twenties reemerged with renewed vitality. Urban and agrarian radicals came together to form the socialist CCF which promised to eradicate capitalism and
replace it with a planned economy. This socialist theory of planning was meticulously developed in the document *Social Planning for Canada*. Its portrayal of public planning as a general technique of decision making which would form the very core of social organization was in stark contrast to previous theories which viewed planning as a limited activity applicable to one specific area of the economy. Market forces were not to be eliminated completely but would now be subordinated to a democratic planning process to ensure that they would operate in the public interest. It also distinguished between the goals of planning which would be defined by the political process and the means which would be scientifically derived by technical experts. This distinction acknowledged that all planning was subjective and political in the sense that it sought a particular set of ends whereas previous theories assumed that planning was a scientific, objective exercise above politics. This distinction in socialist planning between ends and means demonstrated the importance of democratic participation in the planning process. It also implied that the search for consensus on planning was futile because society was comprised of classes with different conflicting goals. The primary objectives of socialist planning were social equity as well as efficiency. Lastly, socialist planning emphasized the significance of using positive controls involving direct public entrepreneurship as well as negative controls. Positive controls were considered critical in order to allow the planners to ensure that the plan was actually implemented and to ensure that profits flowed to the community as a whole instead of to a small group of owners.
Although this socialist theory of planning was different from prevailing theories in many ways, it still owed an intellectual debt to the scientific theories of management espoused by the capitalist class, to the theories of planning developed by people such as Adams and the Commission of Conservation and to earlier urban and agrarian radicals such as Woodsworth. The socialist theory was, however, more comprehensive, more radical and more influential than its progenitors.

The collapse of the economy combined with the growing vitality of the socialists quickly convinced the liberals that they would have to define a new system to replace the discredited one that had effectively ruled Canada during the twenties. Again the liberals had to confront their dilemma of how to make the fundamental reforms that were obviously necessary and at the same time preserve the basic features of capitalist society.

Gradually government advisors began to define what the basic features of this new system would be. First, the government was expected to actively manage the economy by using fiscal and monetary policies to smooth out the ups and downs in private spending. Second, the government was expected to create a comprehensive social welfare system which would both ensure that all Canadians were provided with the basic necessities and that purchasing power would be maintained during recessions. Third, it was recommended that government planning powers be strengthened in those sectors of the economy where private markets didn't function particularly well.
This system gave a renewed impetus for planning in several ways. First, the experts recommended that fiscal policies required to stabilize the economy necessitated comprehensive planning of investments to ensure that they were well coordinated and socially useful. Housing, in particular, was considered an important public investment that demanded sound town planning if it was to be successful. Second, housing and land were considered one of the sectors of the economy where stronger public planning was required to compensate for the deficiencies of private markets.

The Curtis report provided a detailed outline of the form that this stronger planning of housing and land markets ought to take. The report began by noting that unregulated private markets led to socially inefficient outcomes. According to this analysis property owners in the developed sections of the city let their property deteriorate in anticipation of redevelopment to higher, more profitable uses. But because these expectations concerning future developments were unfounded, there was more deterioration of property than was justified. New suburban development, meanwhile, was built in a scattered, sprawl fashion thus substantially increasing the costs of public infrastructure and social services to the point where many of these new developments had to go without. The report noted that past planning efforts which had consisted largely of the ad hoc application of zoning controls to protect select properties from the intrusion of unwanted uses had been most ineffective.
To mitigate these deficiencies in private markets the Curtis report recommended a number of reforms. The federal government was advised to provide substantial funds for the construction of low cost housing and urban renewal as well as to promote town planning. The provincial governments were urged to amend their planning legislation in order to make the preparation of master plans by a professional planning staff in a permanent planning department of local government mandatory, to strengthen expropriation powers necessary for urban renewal and plan implementation and to allow for the creation of regional planning commissions to prepare plans for large, interdependent areas. The provincial governments were also urged to prepare broad provincial settlement plans that would protect agricultural land and allocate urban development to the most suitable areas. Local governments were expected to set up permanent planning staffs to prepare master plans. These master plans were official documents controlling the allocation of land to its socially appropriate uses and designating the public and social infrastructure necessary to accommodate projected demands. The planning process was to be comprised of a survey which would estimate the demand and supply for various land uses and facilities, an analysis which would attempt to ascertain the most appropriate way of meeting this forecast demand and a plan which would summarize how this demand would be met as well as the regulations and investments necessary to implement the land use schemes.

The analysis and recommendations in the Curtis report were similar in many ways to Adams' reports for the Commission of Conservation.
as well as the section of *Social Planning for Canada* which dealt with land and housing. But the Curtis report was vague or equivocal on several critical issues. For one thing the report did not make clear what specific role government would play in the provision of housing. Conflicting public statements by the report's authors on how much public housing would be built and how it would be provided merely added to this confusion. The report was also very ambiguous on the question of public controls over private land. The report noted that land prices were inflated, that land profits should accrue to the community and that passive land use regulations such as zoning and subdivision controls, while necessary, were far from sufficient. But the report did not mention how these problems should be dealt with. While it did acknowledge the utility of the British approach to nationalizing land, it refused to make any clear recommendations on the matter.

The postwar planning system outlined by the reconstruction reports clearly recommended an increased role for the state. The liberals were somewhat apprehensive, however, about the desirability of such broad reforms. But the growing strength of the socialists combined with the fear of postwar economic collapse convinced them that they had to act. Reluctantly they began to implement reforms. Federal housing legislation was changed, a new housing corporation was set up, provincial legislation was amended, provincial town planning boards were created, funds for planning and housing were provided and local government planning staffs began preparing master plans. But these reforms fell far short of the recommendations made in the
reconstruction reports. Public housing was not built, Wartime Housing Ltd., which was the public enterprise capable of building this housing, was dismantled, urban renewal was not undertaken on any significant scale, provincial planning legislation was not amended in the ways proposed, provincial settlement strategies were not prepared, regional planning commissions were not created and the social welfare measures that were recommended were not provided. As stated many times during the debates on postwar planning, the liberals primary aim was to implement only those reforms which would strengthen private enterprise. As one major statement of government policy frankly declared:

The creation of conditions under which the initiative and skill of private enterprise will result in new investment on a scale far exceeding pre-war levels is one of the principle problems of reconstruction policy. The tax policies of all governments can be a fundamental factor in the removal of undesirable and unnecessary obstacles."

Although these reforms did not go as far as the government reports had recommended let alone as far as socialists urged, the new postwar planning system did strengthen the role of urban and regional planning. The planning profession prospered. A new professional organization was created, planning departments in several major universities were formed, planning staffs were hired by governments, planning conferences were held and plans were prepared for major Canadian cities. But the planning that was done was largely a continuation of the passive liberal planning evolving in the twenties.
Liberal planning was portrayed as an objective, technical endeavour founded on scientific theories of land development such as concentric zone theory. The method of liberal planning was to analyze and extrapolate existing trends and to accommodate these trends by providing necessary services which the private sector seemed incapable of constructing. The primary objective in doing this was economic efficiency. Liberal planning's favourite tools for implementation were negative regulations such as zoning and subdivision controls. The state was not expected to play a major entrepreneurial role in shaping the spatial order of the city.

But despite its pretext of objectivity liberal planning's underlying normative assumption was that private market forces guided by limited public regulation would best determine the allocation of land. This was sometimes admitted by liberal planners who often confessed that their zoning regulations were simply following existing land use trends.² Liberal planning would sometimes modify these market trends but normally only when these trends threatened the position of a powerful group of residents. A common example of this was the implementation of zoning and business regulations designed to prevent the intrusion of unwanted people and unwanted uses into established urban neighbourhoods.³ By separating the rich and the poor, liberal planning may have helped to create the spatial expression of class structure.

Even in its most comprehensive efforts to prepare a city wide master plan, liberal planning assumed the primacy of capitalist institutions. The positivist theory on which the liberal master plan
was usually based was, in effect, a sophisticated and normally successful cover for its basic ideological assumptions. Positivists' theories such as concentric zone which had the appearance of being objective were, in fact, empirical descriptions of how cities evolved under capitalist institutions. Liberal planning simply assumed that the manner in which cities seemed to be evolving under capitalism was the manner in which they should evolve. In this way, liberal planning essentially reinforced the status quo under the banner of the public good.

The other comprehensive expression of liberal planning was the new satellite developments such as Don Mills. Here again liberal planners became subservient to market forces. Ironically, the satellite developments illustrated the benefits of planning compared to unregulated private markets quite convincingly. Development was planned in accordance with natural features, neighbourhood units were designed so as to provide necessary local services, the community as a whole was planned so as to provide local employment for the resident population thereby reducing costly commuting and the whole project was managed by a single institution capable of ensuring that the plan was implemented and externalities "internalized". But because this institution was a large private corporation, the land profits were not used to reduce the price of services or housing. Instead they accrued as rents or surplus to the private corporation. Consequently, the development failed to meet the original objectives of balanced population. These ventures were, in effect, distributing the benefits of planning to the middle and upper income groups and the profits from good planning to private capital. These new satellite developments
were an integration of planning and capitalism par excellence.

Just as in the twenties, not all Canadian planners were comfortable with this function of accommodating private capital. Planners such as Carver and Spence-Sales wanted planning to control private markets in the public interest and to provide social equity. They recommended that the public sector itself take on the task of building new towns and housing. These planners looked with some envy at the British postwar planning system which attempted to implement the socialist theories of planning articulated by the League for Social Reconstruction and, to some extent, by the Curtis report. There, planning was viewed as a normative, political exercise directed towards goals of both equity as well as efficiency. Through the normative process, society tried to subordinate private market forces to public planning instead of subordinating public planning to private markets as the liberals proposed. No trends such as concentric zone development or the growth of large urban agglomerations were considered inexorable. For example, if the growth of a major city such as London was considered undesirable, planning would alter this pattern by decentralizing growth to publicly initiated new towns. To alter undesirable trends, socialist planning required that the state perform a more active, entrepreneurial role in urban development. Public ownership of land to collect land rents for the community and direct public construction of housing and new towns were all viewed as necessary adjuncts to the negative controls such as zoning employed by liberal planning.
These calls for a more active planning incorporating features of the socialist approach went largely unheeded. Several innovative projects such as Regent's Park allowed planners to play a slightly more entrepreneurial role. But this project was an isolated case and when urban renewal was practiced on a large scale it excluded most of the important features of the socialist approach with its emphasis on equity.

Canadian planning, then, became a passive activity of regulating urban development to remove its worst features and providing necessary services to accommodate private capital. Planning had made significant advances compared to early practice. But these advances, while satisfying to some, failed to live up to the visions of Canada's original planners.

II

While Canadian planning ultimately reflected liberal values, it had, during its evolution swung back and forth between a liberal planning, which at times consisted of nothing more than the ad hoc use of land use controls and at other times involved the preparation of comprehensive master plans and a more activist planning incorporating elements of socialist theory. These shifts back and forth seemed to have coincided with certain broader socio-economic trends which affected the dominant urban liberal group's stance on planning.

Urban liberals were primarily concerned with preserving capitalist institutions and in promoting capital accumulation. Planning was viewed
as means of achieving these sometimes conflicting objectives simultaneously. Hence the liberals tended to shift to more comprehensive planning when the conflicts between capitalist institutions and urbanization were most intense.

The first period of serious conflict began about 1902 and peaked around 1912. (See Figure No. 6) The dramatic pace of growth during this period generated several forms of stress including increased social instability which manifested itself in the emergence of active unions and left wing political groups, a perceived increase in the physical and social dangers to middle class groups who lived adjacent to the working class immigrants and increased shortages of infrastructure necessary to support private accumulation. Urban liberals responded to the stress by mounting increasingly interventionist and comprehensive planning efforts. These efforts peaked in the period 1912-1919, during which time planning legislation was put in place, attempts were made to prepare for many cities, working class housing programs had begun, and conferences and planning studies were organized.

The stress that was anticipated after World War I kept the interest in planning alive until the beginning of the 1920's when it became clear that the problems were just not as severe as expected. The middle class were escaping from the urban problems by moving out to the suburbs, the rate of growth was much more moderate and could be accommodated without massive public interventions and the fear of Bolschevism and revolution dissipated as the left wing grew weaker. Planning, then, shifted back to a much less interventionist role. The only comprehensive master plan completed during this period was the
FIGURE #6

Relationship between Planning Activities and the Need for Planning

- Housing completions
- Periods of heightened planning activity

(Source: Buckley & Urquhart, *Historical Statistics of Canada*, 510)
Kitchener plan of 1924 which was launched because of the continued rapid growth of the city in the postwar period.

A minor shift from ad hoc liberal planning to more comprehensive liberal planning occurred during the late 1920's. This effort which was especially pronounced in Vancouver where the authorities began to prepare a comprehensive master plan was prompted by an increase in the rate of urban growth and a consequent intensification of some of the urban problems such as shortages of infrastructure and intrusion of unwanted uses into prestigious neighbourhoods.

A second major shift into more comprehensive planning occurred during World War II. The motivation was again based on the liberal interest in simultaneously preserving capitalist institutions and promoting economic expansion. The emergence of a concerted left wing opposition to capitalism and the fear of a major postwar depression convinced liberals that they would have to adopt a significantly more interventionist style of planning if they were to maintain power. But the failure of these problems to emerge with the anticipated intensity allowed the liberals to shift back to a less interventionist style of planning characterised by their rather ad hoc implementation of zoning and subdivision controls.

For liberals, then, planning was a peripheral activity promoted during times of serious political or economic stress. This meant, however, that because of the long lag times involved in mounting a comprehensive planning effort, the ability and commitment to plan was
often strongest when the need for planning was weak. For example, the first period of serious urban stress had peaked by 1912 while the planning response to this stress had not really fully developed until several years after the actual urban problems had begun to subside. The minor revival in more comprehensive liberal planning during the late 1920's again occurred in response to an increase in the growth rate already well underway several years before the planning system was geared up. The Vancouver plan, for example, was initiated as a result of stress emanating from Vancouver's rapid growth during the mid to late 1920's was not completed until the crisis of growth which it was responding to was replaced by a crisis of depression for which it was hopelessly irrelevant.

The increased interest in planning during the war was in anticipation of postwar political and economic stress. But the political and economic crisis which the planning system was supposed to have mitigated failed to appear. Hence, the actual practice of planning shifted back to a much more ad hoc style precisely during the period of postwar urban expansion when planning was most relevant and most capable of success.

It seems, then, that the strength of Canadian urban and regional planning has been, in part, a function of the intensity of political and economic stress. Periods of political and economic stress seem to have occurred either when growth has been very slow, such as during the depression, or during periods of very rapid growth. But because planning has reacted as opposed to anticipated crisis, the long response times have meant that the planning system was not really
capable of dealing with the problem until after the problem was already subsiding or changing form. (Fig. 6). This has helped discredit the ability of planning to manage problems and thereby impeded efforts to promote a stronger and more consistent attachment to planning so that the necessary measures and systems are in place and ready to respond as soon as the problems appear.

III

One of the perplexing questions raised by the study of Canadian planning history is why the liberal approach to planning emerged as the dominant one. This question seems even more perplexing when one considers that many of Canada's leading planners came from Britain and that many of the official Canadian planning and housing reports consistently recommended that the authorities adopt an approach to planning similar to the more interventionist British approach.  

One possible way of pursuing this question is to identify some of the differences between these two countries that may help to explain why they developed such different planning systems.

One rather obvious difference that may have been influential was the structure of government. Unlike Britain, which had one central government, Canada had two independent levels of government with varying responsibilities. In theory, the responsibility for housing, land management and urban planning clearly rested with the provincial government. But as the history of Canadian planning reveals, the allocation of these functions was far from clear in practice. The
passage of housing legislation, the activities of the Commission of Conservation and the research of the Curtis report were all examples of significant interventions by the federal government in the field of urban policy.

This rather vague allocation of responsibility between the two levels of government had several implications for Canadian planning. First, when neither level of government was eager to act, the unclear distribution of powers made it easier to rationalize such inaction on the grounds that the responsibility rested with the other level of government. This "buck passing" strategy was employed with particular skill by federal ministers such as C.D. Howe and Ipsley during the debate on postwar planning when they defended the federal government's decision not to fully implement the Curtis report's recommendations.9

Even when one level of government wanted to act, it often had to seek out the support and cooperation of the other level of government. When the federal government, for example, wanted to implement a housing program following the first world war or when the Commission of Conservation wanted to promote town planning, the provincial governments had to pass the appropriate legislation before the programs became operative. Thus, unlike Britain where only one level of government had to be convinced, planning reformers in Canada had to convince two levels of government to act before comprehensive reform could be implemented.

This split jurisdiction in Canada, then, may help to explain why planning was weaker in Canada than it was in Britain. But it can't
be more than a partial explanation because the impediments imposed by
the Canadian constitution could have been overcome if the motivation
to plan was strong enough. Obviously other factors must have been
involved.

A second difference that may have influenced the nature of
Canadian planning was the proximity to the United States. This close
proximity meant that the American liberal planning ideas were circu-
lated freely throughout Canada by joint conferences such as the 1914
Toronto Conference, American planning magazines which provided much
of the material for the Canadian planning journals and by American
planning consultants such as Bartholomew and Bennett, who came to
Canada to work on plans. This interaction with American planning
ideas was reinforced by the general trend in twentieth century Canada
of increasingly identifying with American rather than British ideas.
When it was time to formulate a postwar planning strategy, the inte-
gration with American culture was so complete that the drafting of
the Canadian postwar federal planning and housing legislation almost
copied the American legislation which had been drafted several years
before. 10

But the proximity to the United States, while obviously
influential, still does not fully explain the difference between Can-
adian and British planning, for Canada had also been as exposed to
British planning methods as it had to American ones. Therefore the
question remains as to why Canadians ultimately chose the American
liberal approach as opposed to the British socialist approach.
A third set of factors which may explain the adoption of American liberal planning instead of British socialist planning relates to the differences between the economic, spatial and class development in Canada compared to Britain. British economic development during the nineteenth and twentieth century consisted largely of an expansion in industrial production located in growing urban centres. The emerging British class structure was dominated by a growing industrial capitalist class and an urban working class which was increasingly better organized and more vocal in its demands for housing, high wages, and better working conditions. Industrial capitalists soon realized that the success of their enterprise was closely tied with the emerging discipline of town planning which promised a more efficient spatial structure that would make intra-urban movement of people and goods easier, better living conditions designed to make workers healthier and consequently more efficient, and cheaper housing and land prices which would reduce wage demands. The experience of some industrialists such as Robert Owens and the Cadbury and Lever Brothers in constructing well-planned self-sufficient new towns on large tracts of company assembled lands provided the capitalist class with concrete evidence that planning was beneficial to the profitability and the efficiency of the industrial enterprise. Consequently, major industrialists combined with Fabian socialists and the urban working class to push for the adoption of a comprehensive planning and housing effort in which the state would play a major entrepreneurial role in shaping spatial structure.

Thus, by the time Britain entered World War II it had had a long tradition of comprehensive planning involving the construction of
garden suburbs, several new towns motivated by Howard's garden city concepts, public construction of working class housing and urban renewal schemes. Faced with the horrendous problems of rebuilding after the war, British society naturally relied on this established planning tradition when it formulated its comprehensive postwar settlement strategy of decentralizing growth from congested urban areas such as London to government initiated self-contained new towns; revitalizing declining regions; directing industrial development; collecting land rents by nationalizing development rights; public construction of working class housing; massive rebuilding of slum areas; and strict development controls to protect vast areas for agricultural use and open space.

The nature of development in Canada was quite different. Unlike Britain, Canada's late nineteenth and early twentieth century urban, industrial development coincided with a rapid expansion of staple industries and rural population. During Canada's industrial boom from 1900 to 1930, agricultural employment grew by almost 60 percent from 717,000 to 1,128,000 and rural population increased by 200 percent from about 1.8 million to 5.4 million. In all, it is estimated that expansion in wheat production alone accounted for 25 to 30 percent of Canada's economic growth. While this expansion in agriculture and rural population was not quite as rapid as the growth in other employment and urban population, it was, nonetheless, in stark contrast to Britain where agricultural employment registered an absolute decline by about one-third during Britain's corresponding period of industrial
and urban expansion occurring between 1850 and 1900. Therefore, unlike Britain where the central focus of public concern was how to manage the new urban industrial order, the focus of concern in Canada was divided between the problems of rural settlement and staple industries on the one hand and urban centres and manufacturing industries on the other. Consequently, much of the attention of the major government policy makers was on rural and resource issues. National policy, for example, viewed the settlement of the west and the construction of infrastructure to stimulate staple development as major tools for national development. The planning activities of the Commission of Conservation also dealt largely with the staple development issues. Even the town planning activities of the Commission dealt for the most part with land development problems in rural regions as opposed to urban regions.

The country's image of itself was also heavily rural in flavour. National myths such as the true north strong and free, visions such as the unlimited resources of the frontier and cultural traditions such as those of the Group of Seven, all contributed to the view that Canada was not really an urban nation. In both fact and fiction the presence of the Canadian frontier, while never as captivating as the American frontier image, helped to draw concern away from the emerging urban problems and to discourage the use of government restrictions on private property rights which were viewed as the very basis of freedom in the new American society. Therefore, unlike Britain, the Canadian response to the city was logically divided between the agrarian radicals who chose to escape from it and the urban liberals and
socialists who viewed it as a permanent problem to be dealt with but
could not agree on the extent of state control required to manage it.

The class structure that evolved from the staple oriented
development further impeded the ability of the new nation to mount a
comprehensive urban planning effort similar to Britain's. Like Brit­
ain, Canada had an emerging industrial capitalist class which was
swayed by the arguments by British planners such as Adams who main­
tained that a more efficient spatial structure would reduce journey
to work times and better working class housing would increase worker
efficiency. Some industrialists were also receptive to the ideas of
Henry George who had argued the interest of capital and labour were
joined in opposition to the interest of the landowner whose attempts
to extract the land rent generated by economic expansion imposed an
implicit tax on industry and labour. Consequently, industrial capit­
alists such as Herbert Ames in Montreal, Frank Beer in Toronto, and
A.R. Kaufman in Kitchener, actively promoted town planning. Beer in
particular advocated a comprehensive approach to planning which
included public collection of land rents, publicly supported construc­tion of workers' housing and the construction of garden suburbs.\textsuperscript{19}
Along with some other Toronto manufacturers Beer actually attempted
to achieve some of these objectives by creating the Toronto Housing
Commission.\textsuperscript{20}

But this Canadian industrial capitalist class which was so
vital to development of comprehensive town planning was relatively
weak compared to the industrial capitalist class in Britain.\textsuperscript{21} In
fact, during the first critical period of urban development from 1890
to 1920 when Canada's approach to planning was taking form, Canadian industrial capital was engaged in a major battle for its very existence. As Wallace Clement writes:

An industrial structure did exist at the turn of the century in Canada which was independent of the United States and the ruling financial elite but it lacked the power, especially in terms of capital and market access to survive within this environment. Only a few were able to independently survive as viable operations.

The element of capitalist class that was gaining strength during this early period were those engaged in finance, merchandising, utilities, railways, resources and real estate. These "mercantile" capitalists did not have the same interest in promoting an aggressive system of urban planning, government ownership of land, and government construction of housing as manufacturers. Instead, mercantile capital was primarily interested in staple development and the construction of regional infrastructure to transport staples. Therefore, although there is some dispute on this point, it has been argued that because of their dominant position relative to industrial capital, mercantile capital could direct government spending away from the activities from the activities such as industrial expansion and working class housing to staple development. As Naylor writes in his exhaustive history of Canadian economic development:

The two main structural attributes of the Canadian economy, domination by commercial capital and its colonial status as a staple-extracting hinterland, complemented and reinforced each other. Industrial capital formation was retarded relative to investment in staple development and the creation of the commercial infrastructure necessary to extract and move staples. The character and patterns of transportation infrastructure put in place and the banking and financial intermediary structure bore all the hallmarks of a staple exporting economy.
Mercantilists, particularly finance capital, were far from uninterested in aspects of urban development. The insurance companies in particular were investing large sums in real estate and urban infrastructure. And this finance capital involved in real estate clearly had interests in promoting town planning. But the type of planning promoted by groups such as Toronto's Advisory City Planning Commission and the Vancouver Town Planning Commission which were both dominated by finance and real estate was very different from the approach to planning advocated by industrialists such as Frank Beer. Unlike the industrialists, real estate and finance had an interest in increasing property values and housing prices and ensuring that the state did not collect the land rents which were directly and indirectly accruing to finance and real estate capital. Instead, finance capital was interested in the limited use of zoning to protect prestigious neighbourhoods and the construction of public infrastructure to service new developments. The profits from these new developments were often so great and the entry into the land market so easy because of the supply of undeveloped land and the government's liberal land sale policies that a large capitalist class emerged which was directly engaged in land development. In Toronto, this powerful real estate lobby was successful in blocking industrial capital's efforts to promote government construction of housing.

Industrial capital, weak to being with, could hardly promote a comprehensive planning effort that challenged the interests of real estate and finance capital. What power industrial capital did have was
better directed to defending the tariff against western interests who wanted to see it dismantled. For some industrial capitalists even this was too much of an effort. Frank Beer, for example, gave up his manufacturing activities and became active in real estate himself. In this new role he ceased to be an effective advocate of the comprehensive town planning program that he had supported in the past.

The weakness in manufacturing in Canada also meant that the urban working class was relatively weak. Their political power was further reduced by the presence of strong ethnic and occupational cleavages which made the development of a collective class consciousness difficult if not impossible. Consequently, without the strong pressure for reforms emanating from Canada's urban working class, the Canadian state was less likely to implement a comprehensive set of planning measures which would have met active resistance from other powerful groups in Canada's urban centres.

The pressure for reforms that did command the attention of the Canadian state were from the west where the farmer, who had developed a strong class as well as regional consciousness, demanded changes in government policy. The sort of changes which were necessary to manage this metropolis-hinterland conflict were very different from the types of reforms required to resolve the problems of the metropolitan areas. Consequently, the reform forces in Canada, like their capitalist counterparts, had a strong rural and resource orientation. Further, the interests of the agrarian radical were not fully compatible with the interests of the urban socialist class. When the CCF attempted to
unite these two reform forces it encountered some conflict. The petty bourgeois mentality of the agrarian elements prevented the CCF from taking an unequivocal position on public land ownership. The left, then, weak to begin with, was further weakened by this division between rural and urban interests.

By the time Canada had entered World War II its urban planning tradition of passive management had already been well-established. The nature of its development and class structure had meant that the country had little experience with the more active type of planning involving the public ownership of land, public construction of housing and garden cities and suburbs which formed the basis of Britain's postwar planning. Also, because Canada did not suffer from the same degree of physical destruction that Britain had during World War II, the compulsion to actively plan was not as great. Consequently, Canada logically relied on an already established tradition of liberal planning.

IV

The exigent conflicts between capitalist urbanization and capitalist institutions had posed a profound challenge to Canadian society. Canadians had responded to this challenge in several different ways. Some had proposed the restructuring of society based on socialist planning principles. Others sought to mitigate these conflicts within the parameters of capitalist institutions.

Planning was considered essential to both groups. Socialists saw planning as the means of managing the new more equitable socialist
society. Liberals saw planning as the means of resolving the conflict between capitalist institutions and capitalist accumulation. As conflicts ebbed and flowed, the liberals were forced to entertain more and more significant reforms. Rapid urbanization at the turn of the century had forced them to accept limited controls over private property. The depression and anticipated postwar problems forced them to strengthen these controls. But the forces at work in Canadian society ensured that the support for reform was never quite strong enough to fundamentally alter the nature of Canadian society. Yet, the impetus for public planning was strong enough to ensure that the worse features of private development would be eliminated and that Canadian cities would, consequently, be more livable, more equitable and more efficient than they had in the past. The liberals, it seemed, had finally solved their dilemma of how to preserve the major features of capitalism while mitigating the problems of accumulation. A new consensus that grafted elements of public planning onto capitalist institutions had been forged. Capitalism, although clearly reformed, had ultimately emerged relatively unscathed.

But despite the emergence of this consensus, there were a number of questions that had not been fully resolved. No one yet knew what the impacts of imposing stronger regulation on private land markets would be. No one knew whether the spatial structure evolving under capitalist institutions could function during the postwar period. These questions would again force liberals to confront their dilemma of how to preserve capitalism and manage pressing problems. But this new
challenge would not come until the late 1960's. For a time, liberals could relax and enjoy the stability of the new consensus.
Footnotes


2. See for example: Chamber, Planning Suggestions, 5-11; TPB, Master Plan; TCPB, Third Report and Official Plan, 9.


4. See pages 243-46.


6. See Chapter One.

7. See for example: ACR, Housing and Community Planning, Marsh, Report on Social Security for Canada.

8. Carver, Housing.


10. For description of American legislation see: ACR, Housing and Community Planning, Ch. 3.


13. Ashworth, Genesis of Modern Town Planning; Cherry, Evolution of
British Town Planning; Hall, Urban and Regional Planning.


Economics, Vol. 6 (Nov. 1973), 565.

Geography of England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1973), 677.

17. The major study, for example, was: Adams, Rural Planning.

18. For a discussion of Canadian cultural and social development which
illustrate the strength of non-urban influences see: Cole
Harris, "Myth of the Land in Canadian Nationalism" in Peter
Russell, ed., Nationalism in Canada (Toronto: McClelland and
Stewart, 1960), 27-43; Carl Berger, "True North Strong and
Free;" Ibid., 3-26; S.D. Clark, The Developing Canadian Com­
munity (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1968); Michael Cross,
ed., The Frontier Thesis and the Canadas: The Debate on the
Impact of the Canadian Environment (Toronto: Copp Clark, 1970);
Maurice Careless, "Frontierism, Metropolitanism, and Canadian
History," in C. Berger, ed., Approaches to Canadian History
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1967); Margaret Atwood,
Survival: A Thematic Guide to Canadian Literature (Toronto:

19. For Beer's and other capitalists' positions see: Bureau of Munic­
ipal Research, What is the Ward Going to do with Toronto, 68;
Ontario Housing Committee, Report.

20. Shirley Spragge, "A Confluence of Interests: Housing Reform in
Toronto, 1900-1920" in Artibise and Stelter, eds., Usable Urban
Past, 247-68; of the 11 directors of the Toronto Corporation
six were industrial capitalists, three were professionals and
two were bankers.

21. Although there has been considerable debate on the nature and
evolution of Canada's capitalist class, there is little dis­
agreement with the observation that Canadian capitalists
engaged in manufacturing were weak relative to other "mercantil­
ist capitalists" engaged in utilities, railways, resources
merchandizing, finance and real estate. The debate has centred
on whether the weakness of Canadian manufacturing is due to the
behaviour of mercantile capitalists or to other factors. Those
interested in this debate should consult: Wallace Clement, The
Canadian Corporate Elite: An Analysis of Economic Power (Toronto:
McClelland and Stewart, 1975), 62-93; R.T. Naylor, The History
of Canadian Business, 1867-1914 (Toronto: Lorimer, 1975); Met


25. Ibid., 279.

26. Toronto's Advisory City Planning Commission Chairman was H.H. Williams, who was head of H.H. Williams and Company which was the largest real estate firm in Canada. The Vice-Chairman was Thomas Bradshaw who was President of North American Life Assurance Company and Vice-President of Canadian Surety Company; see B.M. Greene, ed., Who's Who in Canada, 1928-29 (Toronto: International Press, 1930); Report of the Advisory City Planning Commission, 1929; Vancouver's Town Planning Movement was dominated by real estate and construction interests; see: John Weaver, "The Property, Industry and Land Use Controls: The Vancouver Experience, 1910-1945," Plan Canada, Vol. 19 (1979), 211-226.


and Labour Radicalism in Canada, 1896-1932 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1975); Irving Abella, The Canadian Labour Movement, 1902-1960 (Ottawa: n.p., 1975); Irving Abella and David Miller, eds., The Canadian Worker in the Twentieth Century (Toronto: Oxford Univ. Press, 1978); the Canadian class was active during this early period 1900-1930. But much of the opposition came from those engaged in staple industries, particularly coal mining.


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