

CAIMAW - PORTRAIT OF A CANADIAN UNION

by

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ABSTRACT

This study of CAIMAW's history attempts to explain why some Canadians in recent times have abandoned international unions to found and develop an independent Canadian union, to determine whether such an independent union is identifiably different from those unions traditionally operating in Canada, and to identify the factors that operate in favour and mitigate against the success of Canadians in their attempt to create and develop such a union.

Personal interviews with the major figures related to this study comprise an essential source of information. Due to the cooperation extended by CAIMAW, a search of union files was conducted and constitutions, pamphlets, correspondence, newspaper articles, union publications and other relevant documents were examined. Published sources provided secondary information for the majority of this paper.

A societal mood in the 1960's of labour militancy, uncertainty arising from adaptation to change, a desire for Canadian self-assertion, and a corresponding resentment of American influence in Canadian affairs combined to set the stage for the formation of breakaway independent Canadian unions in Winnipeg and Vancouver. Lack of control over their own affairs and the imposition on the membership of unpopular union decisions by international officers created unrest among these Winnipeg and Vancouver workers, and a demand for greater membership decision-making authority. Refusal by the international unions involved to respond to this demand resulted in a coalition of union dissidents and

nationalists in a common cause, the rejection of their international unions and the founding of their own, independent national unions.

The merger of the Winnipeg and Vancouver breakaway unions gave rise to a constitutional battle seated in philosophical differences with overtones of regionalism. It was a struggle between business unionism and social unionism, and a corresponding struggle between centralized authority and local autonomy. The resolution of this struggle in the rejection of business unionism and centralized authority laid the foundations for the policies and practices of CAIMAW as it operates today. These policies and practices make CAIMAW a union that is identifiably different from traditional international unions in terms of greater decision-making power for the rank and file, different methods of bargaining, and a different organizational structure. These differences do not, however, appear to have hindered CAIMAW's ability to win benefits for its membership that are at least comparable to those won by international unions.

An independent union such as CAIMAW faces difficulties in its formation and development due to the established place of international unions in Canadian labour institutions. But weaknesses within these institutions such as interunion and intraunion divisions have allowed CAIMAW to survive and, indeed, grow. CAIMAW can draw support from union dissidents, nationalists and socialists of the New Left, groups which traditional labour institutions in Canada have failed to accommodate. To the extent that a society creates institutions in accordance with its needs, there exists an important place for CAIMAW in Canada.

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Chapter I

Introduction

This is a study of an independent Canadian union, the Canadian Association of Industrial Mechanical and Allied Workers (CAIMAW). It is a union that was founded in the 1960's by dissident members of international unions in Winnipeg and Vancouver, dissidents who joined forces to form the union as it is known today. This union stands as a challenge to the practice of international unionism in Canada and, through rapid growth, has established itself as a viable labour organization.

The emergence and growth of CAIMAW has been accompanied by considerable controversy. Proponents of international unionism charge that CAIMAW uses nationalism, an irrelevant issue, as a tool to mount attacks on international unions; that CAIMAW is radical, strike-prone and uses its union power in an irresponsible manner; and that CAIMAW raids international union certifications rather than directing its efforts to the more principled goal of organizing the unorganized. CAIMAW supporters flatly deny these charges. They argue that CAIMAW is an organization that represents a principled unionism that is free of the failings of international unions - namely control of Canadian unions from the United States, and a lack of democratic rights for the union membership. These charges and counter charges have been based on the emotions, prejudices and union politics of those involved, factors which have distorted and clouded the debate. No documented facts exist to enable impartial observers to properly understand and assess CAIMAW as a labour organization. Rather, they are left to speculate and reach

Table I

CAIMAW MEMBERSHIP 1966 - 1981

| Year | Membership | Branches/ Locals | Percentage Increase In Membership |
|---------|------------|---------------------|---|
| 1981 | 7000 | 20 | 8% |
| 1980 | 6500 | 18 | 4% |
| 1978 | 6250 | 18 | 0% |
| 1976-77 | 6250 | 17 | 19% |
| 1974-75 | 5260 | 13 | 82% |
| 1973 | 2889 | 7 | 20% |
| 1972 | 2406 | 5 | 15% |
| 1971 | 2086 | 4 | 26% |
| 1970 | 1648 | 22 | 10% |
| 1969 | 1497 | 21 | 31% |
| 1968 | 1140 | 17 | 42% |
| 1966 | 800 | 3 | |

Source: Labour Organizations in Canada, 1966-1981.

Note: Until 1971, Branches/Locals reported represented certified plants.

conclusions based on unsubstantiated and incomplete information. This study is addressed to these impartial observers. It documents the birth of CAIMAW, and CAIMAW's philosophy, policies and practices as they exist today. This study was undertaken in order to increase our understanding of CAIMAW as a Canadian labour organization, and to raise the relevant issues surrounding its existence based on fact rather than emotion and prejudice.

Through the first half of the twentieth century, American trade unions extended their sphere of influence into Canada in the form of international unions. They brought with them the policies and philosophies of the American Federation of Labour, an organization which was dedicated to the principles of business unionism, aimed for short term objectives achievable through economic action, and rejected union participation in politics. Although international unions quickly became the dominant force in Canadian organized labour, movements of resistance to American unions and to the policies and philosophy they represented appeared almost immediately. Each in its turn, the National Trades and Labour Congress, the Canadian Federation of Labour, One Big Union and the All Canadian Congress of Labour battled for a sovereign Canadian labour movement that would allow for political action by unions, provide an alternative to business unionism, and accommodate the organization of workers along industrial rather than craft lines. Not one of these organizations was able to break the hold of international unions on Canadian labour, or even maintain its own existence. Contemporary international unions have removed many sources of complaint by becoming

politically involved in Canada through support of the New Democratic Party, and by moving from craft unionism to industrial unionism. Yet resistance, in the form of organizations such as CAIMAW, continues to exist.

This study of CAIMAW's history is undertaken in order to identify and evaluate significant factors surrounding the current expression of Canadian unionism. Specifically, an attempt is made to identify the reasons why some Canadian workers in recent times have abandoned international unions to found and develop a new independent Canadian union. Also, an analysis of CAIMAW's philosophy, policies and practices addresses itself to the question of whether such a new, independent union is, in fact, identifiably different from those unions traditionally operating in Canada. And finally, attention is paid to the present day industrial relations forces that operate in favour and mitigate against the success of Canadians in their attempt to create and develop an independent Canadian union.

An important question in the study of CAIMAW is why the desire for independent Canadian unionism should have reemerged when it did - during the 1960's. Therefore, on the premise that the creation of institutions such as unions must reflect the forces that are significant in the society that it serves, my treatment of the topic opens with a chapter outlining in brief the social, political and labour relations forces operative in Canada during the 1960's. These were the forces

that provided the context and perhaps set the stage for the birth of CAIMAW in 1964, and for its subsequent development.

Chapter three examines the birth of CAIMAW in Winnipeg in 1964, and its establishment as a viable representative force for workers in eighteen Winnipeg plants and factories by 1970. The struggle for autonomy by the members of Local 174 of the International Union of Molders and Allied Workers is described, the causes of the final break with the international union are documented, and the difficulties encountered in the resultant creation of CAIMAW are examined.

Chapter four is concerned with events occurring in Vancouver between 1966 and 1970. The Lenkurt dispute of 1966 is examined, with attention being directed to the causes and results of the bitter struggle that developed within the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers during the course of the dispute. The breakaway movement and the formation of the independent Canadian Electrical Workers Union as a result of this struggle is analyzed. The course of the development of the CEW is traced from its formation in 1966 until its 1970 merger with CAIMAW, focusing on the growth of the CEW, its struggle for survival, and its certifications at Phillips Cable in Vancouver and Alberta.

Chapter five deals with the 1970 merger of the CEW with the Winnipeg union, CAIMAW, to produce the Canadian Association of Industrial Mechanical and Allied Workers as it operates today. The

reasons for the merger are examined, and the emergence and final resolution of the constitutional battle that resulted from the merger are analyzed. Finally, significant features of the constitution, structure and policies of the modern-day CAIMAW that resulted are described.

Chapter six examines CAIMAW's entry into and performance in the mining industry of British Columbia in order to present a profile of CAIMAW as it exists and operates today. An attempt is made to identify the reasons why B. C. miners abandoned their international unions to join CAIMAW. CAIMAW's policies, practices and method of operation in the mines are examined, and an analysis of CAIMAW's successes in bargaining is undertaken. Chapter seven presents the conclusions reached as a result of this study.

Personal interviews with the major figures related to this study comprise an essential source of information. Due to the cooperation extended by CAIMAW, a search of union files was conducted and constitutions, pamphlets, correspondence, newspapers, union publications and other documents were examined. Published sources provided secondary information for the majority of this paper.

Chapter II

The Sixties - The Age of Anxiety

Not an easy time...but a time to excite the daring, to
test the strong, and to give new promise to the timid.

Lester Pearson

A REASSESSMENT OF CANADIAN SOCIETY

A TIME OF CHANGE

Canadians ushered in the 1960's under the political leadership of the John Diefenbaker Conservative government. They could look back on the previous decade with some satisfaction. The 1950's had produced substantial stability, economic growth and social progress. It had been the "Age of Happy Problems", in which the major task had been to conform to the existing social and economic systems, systems which were generally regarded as serving Canada well. Optimism, complacency with the status quo and widespread conservatism marked the psyche of the nation.¹ Events of the 1960's, however, were to shake these attitudes to the core.

In the election of April 8, 1963, the Diefenbaker government was defeated and power was assumed by the Liberal party, led by Lester Pearson. Prompted by new-guard liberals within the party, the Pearson administration unleashed a rapid series of fundamental social changes in Canada between the years 1963 and 1967.² These changes included the redistribution of constituency boundaries by an independent commission, the laying of the foundations for a bilingual federal civil service, the beginnings of constitutional reform, new regulatory agencies for transportation and broadcasting, a new Labour Code, the Canada Pension Plan, the Canada Assistance Plan, a guaranteed minimum income plan for

old-age pensioners, medicare legislation, the establishment of a health resources fund, youth allowances, the liberalization of divorce laws, collective bargaining for civil servants and a new national flag.³

An easy assimilation of these major social changes by Canadians was made difficult by the hesitating, haphazard way in which they were introduced. The Pearson administration failed to give these changes any appearance of purpose, direction or rational priorities. The result was a society beset by confusion, a society which began to view its government as a bumbling and incompetent administration.⁴ Complacency gave way to uncertainty, a struggle to adapt to change and to a reexamination of traditional values and institutions.

In a way, Pearson was like a man walking through an apiary, punching a stick into beehives. He seemed chagrined when the bees, instead of just buzzing around him briefly and settling into new life patterns, stung the very man who had set them free.⁵

A TIME OF AWAKENING

One of the major targets for reexamination during the 1960's was the question of Canadian national identity, a reexamination that was given impetus by the Pearson administration. Pearson was a continentalist, who believed that closer ties to the United States were essential in order to loosen Canada's ties to Britain. Dedicated to the establishment of an independent Canadian state through the severing of

the British umbilical cord, he introduced to the country a Canadian flag in February 15, 1965. The new flag was quickly accepted by the Canadian people, and no doubt made a significant contribution to a growing sense of national pride. In explaining the quick acceptance and ready satisfaction with which most Canadians regarded the new flag, A.R.M. Lower wrote:

The point is simply that the country is growing up, coming to see itself as an entity, taking the interest in itself that any organism, to be healthy, must. Each time, that is, that the average citizen looks at the new flag, he unconsciously says to himself, "That's me!"⁶

The growing sense of national pride was given a further boost in 1967, as Canadians celebrated their hundredth birthday as a nation, and proudly hosted Expo '67 in Montreal. It was a year of national euphoria. Songs were sung in celebration of confederation, a magnificent nationwide birthday party erupted on the first of July, and Expo '67 was proudly hailed as "the greatest thing we have ever done as a nation".⁷ Thirty five million visitors attended Expo, and Canadians were proud of the impression of Canada that Expo created.

Never again will they need to think of us - or will we need to think of ourselves - as an impotent appendage of either Britain or the United States....They will know that we are a nation which has joined the twentieth century and is headed for the twenty first.⁸

A TIME OF CONTROVERSY

The new flag, centennial year and Expo '67 were positive, unifying forces in the search for an independent Canadian identity, filling Canadians with a sense of national pride. But there was a much more difficult and divisive force at work in the rise of Canadian nationalism - the issue of Canada's ties to the United States. The cornerstone of this issue was the role played by multinational corporations in the economy of the country, a factor which gave Canadian nationalism a distinctly anti-American flavour.

Throughout the 1950's and 1960's, the economy of Canada was swamped by the investment of massive U. S. capital, and by the growing ownership and control of Canadian industries by subsidiaries of American corporations.⁹ American investment resulted in the development of oil and gas refineries, the mining and smelting industries and various lines of secondary manufacturing. It was the power that drove the economy, and resulted in Canadians enjoying the second highest standard of living in the world. But the scale was such that by 1960, some Canadians were becoming alarmed.

The alarm was first sounded in a meaningful way in 1963 by Walter Gordon, Finance Minister in the Pearson administration. Gordon believed that if a nation lost control over the new technology, corporate decision-making and economic power, it would forfeit its national economic, political and even cultural independence. In order to preserve Canadian independence, he wanted to pit the power of the

state against the growing power of multinational corporations. As stated by Professor Abraham Rotstein, political economist from the University of Toronto:

The politics of the new technological society increasingly turns on the question of who makes these crucial corporate decisions....The survival of indigenous social institutions and cultural values in the face of technological pressures become a matter for action by the most powerful of our political institutions, the nation state.¹⁰

In his 1963 budget, Gordon attempted to slow down the foreign takeover of Canadian assets. The budget provided for a takeover tax to be levied on sales of shares in listed Canadian companies to non-Canadians, the reduction of the withholding tax on dividends paid to nonresidents for companies whose shares were at least 25 percent Canadian owned, and an increase in this tax for firms with a lower proportion of Canadian ownership.¹¹

Gordon's budget immediately produced an outcry of opposition. The economic benefits of American investment were so great that any attempt to stop or control it either ran against the self-interest of powerful groups, or was honestly felt to be detrimental to the public good. Russell Irvine, research director of the Canadian Labour Congress, declared that Walter Gordon was "unfit to manage the affairs of Antarctica, let alone Canada", and Eric Kierans, president of the Montreal Stock Exchange, saw the takeover tax as "an axe to murder the

record of trust and confidence between Canada and other countries". Prices on the Toronto Stock Exchange plummeted and, finally, on June 19, 1963, Gordon was forced to announce to the Commons that the takeover tax would be withdrawn.¹²

But a subsequent series of unilateral actions by the United States demonstrated that Gordon's concerns for Canada's economic, political and cultural sovereignty were well founded.

First, American concern for their unfavourable balance of payment position and the sagging American dollar led the United States to implement an interest equalization tax in 1963. This tax raised the effective interest cost to foreign borrowers by 1.25 percent. The response of the business community in Canada was dramatic. Some American subsidiaries hurriedly began to move dividends and cash reserves out of the country, the Toronto Stock Exchange industrial index fell a record 15.29 points, and Canada's foreign exchange reserves were depleted by \$110 million, with a bigger outflow predicted. The country faced the very real possibility of national bankruptcy.¹³

Walter Gordon made an emergency trip to Washington in an attempt to rescue Canada from this fate. American officials, admitting that they had "not been fully aware of how closely the two capital markets had become integrated", granted Canada exemption from the tax. In return, however, Canada had to agree to restrict its exchange reserves, and the exemption was limited to an amount that was subject to the president's discretion. The fiscal crisis in Canada was over, but

the conditions placed on Canada's rescue were seen as a restriction of the country's fiscal flexibility, and therefore its ability to pursue an independent monetary policy. John Diefenbaker told the Commons that the agreement was "not in keeping with the sovereignty of this nation", and Scott Gordon, head of the Carleton University Economics Department, stated that "with one act we have put into the hands of the U. S. President more control of our economy than the past 20 years of growth of American investment in Canada represent."¹⁴

Next, the vulnerability of Canadian political sovereignty to American policy was brought to the fore when, in an attempt to improve its still ailing balance of payment position, the United States introduced guidelines for the direction of U. S. investment abroad. Although initially exempt, these guidelines were applied to Canada in December, 1965. They required American corporations to limit new foreign investment, to increase the return flow of earnings to the United States, and to buy American. To the alarm of many Canadians, Secretary of the the Treasury Henry Fowler explained these guidelines to the U. S. Council of the International Chamber of Commerce by stating:

We must all recognize that the reconciliation of national interests and those of multinational corporations is essential to a future with freedom....Therefore, they have not only a commercial importance but a highly significant role in a U. S. foreign policy.¹⁵

The economic impact of the guidelines, coupled with the fact that international corporations must now serve the aims of U. S. foreign policy, proved to be too much even for Eric Kierans, an outspoken critic of Gordon's Canadianization policies in 1963. He now joined Gordon's camp in condemning the threat posed by the guidelines to Canadian economic and political independence, stating "the guidelines represent, in my opinion, a tightening of the American grip on our economy that threatens the attainment of our economic objectives and are an infringement on our political sovereignty".¹⁶

It became increasingly obvious throughout the sixties that multinational corporations imported into Canada both U. S. law and U. S. foreign policy, thereby threatening Canadian economic and political independence. The U. S. anti-trust laws could prevent mergers of Canadian subsidiaries, even if such agreements were in the best interests of the Canadian economy. The American Trading with the Enemy Act could prevent Canadian subsidiaries of American firms from selling goods and services to any nation that the State Department declared an enemy, and thus prevent Canadian export sales to countries such as North Korea, Cuba and Mainland China.¹⁷

By the mid-sixties, even concern for Canadian culture was brought to public attention by the inability of the Canadian government to regulate Time and Readers Digest, both American publications. In his 1965 budget, Gordon introduced legislation to disallow advertising in foreign owned publications as a tax deduction. The U. S. State Department threatened that unless Time and Readers Digest were granted

exemption, Canada's quotas on oil exports to the U. S. would be reviewed, and congressional approval of the auto pact with Canada might not be forthcoming. The Pearson government capitulated and exempted the only two publications its legislation might have affected, due to fear of American retaliation.¹⁸ Gratton O'Leary summed up the mounting concern for the independence of Canadian culture that the episode created when he told the Senate:

If this House votes for this legislation [exclusion] it will be voting the proposition that Washington has a right to interfere in a matter of purely Canadian concern and voting a probable death sentence on Canadian periodical press with all that this can entail for our future voyage through history.¹⁹

In response to society's growing concern for Canadian independence and to pressure from Walter Gordon, the Pearson administration established a Task Force on the Structure of Canadian Industry, headed by a leading Canadian economist, Mel Watkins. The unanimous conclusions of the Task Force concurred with Gordon's view that foreign control of industry posed a threat to national independence by shifting decision making outside the country, and warned that subsidiary companies could be used by foreign governments as instruments of their foreign policy. It stated:

Foreign control means the potential shift outside the country of the locus of some types of decision

making. To the extent decision making is eroded, national independence being in the broad sense, the ability to make decisions in the national interest is reduced....The Canadian based subsidiary is confronted with two peaks of sovereignty; it must choose and might be expected to defer to the higher peak. In the nature of the case, the higher peak will typically be the home country.²⁰

However, the Watkins' Report was shelved by the Liberal caucus, a caucus which was dominated by continentalists who believed that closer ties to the United States were essential in order to loosen Canada's traditional ties to Britain. The report was dismissed by the Liberal government as "nothing but the opinion of a few university teachers".²¹

The Canadian government had, through Walter Gordon and the Watkins' Report, set in motion a critical reassessment of Canada's links with the United States. Yet it did little or nothing to act on the findings of the Watkins' Report, or to ease the mounting concern for Canadian independence. The result was a sense of anger and frustration among the growing number of nationalists in Canadian society.

Canadian nationalists were given a further push towards militancy in 1971 when the United States introduced restrictive trade policies. In announcing these policies, Richard Nixon ignored the impact they would have on Canada, and identified Japan as the major trading partner of the United States. Again Canada was going to be

adversely affected by U. S. unilateral action, imposed in a manner that reflected either ignorance of or insensitivity to the effect of these policies on Canada. Peter Newman, editor of MacLeans magazine, summed up the growing resentment of many in Canadian society by 1971 when he explained his own attitude towards the United States.

I really respected Americans for their strengths, sympathized with them in their woes and wished them well - though I hoped they would not overrun my country completely. But in the months since Richard Nixon's trade offensive came into being, this attitude of polite moderation has been increasingly hard to maintain.... In 1970, United States-Canadian trade exceeded the value of United States-Japanese trade by some ten billion dollars. How could Nixon not know that? And the answer that keeps coming back from the void is: Because he does not know we exist. In another time we would have shrugged off Nixon's howler. But Canadians today are experiencing a mood of surging self-assertion and the idea that to the American president we are a noncountry makes us bloody mad.²²

THE REORGANIZATION OF CANADA'S LEFT

THE FOUNDING OF THE NDP

As Canada was preparing to enter the 1960's and face the major social, political and economic changes that the decade would bring, important changes were occurring within the country's socialist

movement, as the left wing faction sought new ways to relate and to fit into Canadian society.

In 1933, the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation of Canada (CCF) had been founded as the party of the left. The 1933 Regina Manifesto established the party's policies as calling for economic planning, socialization of banking and insurance, public ownership of utilities and socialized health care services. The founding members envisaged that the CCF would consist of a union between a political socialist movement, organized labour and farmer's groups. But the trade union movement refused to become involved in any meaningful way. This was partly because the official House of Labour, The Trades and Labour Congress (TLC), followed the American labour tradition of avoiding political partisanship, and partly because the rival Canadian Congress of Labour (CCL) opted for a policy of CCF support at its 1943 convention, making the TLC suspicious that the CCF supported dual unionism and opposed international unions.²³

In 1956, the TLC and the CCL merged to form the Canadian Labour Congress (CLC). Spurred on by the CCL unions, the CLC elected to follow a course of political involvement.²⁴

The 1958 federal election resulted in a landslide victory for John Diefenbaker and the Conservative party. Members of the CCF, who had been confident that a Liberal decline would mean an ascendancy of socialism, were bitterly disappointed. CCF representation in parliament

had been severely damaged, making apparent the need for a reexamination of the policies and practices of the party.²⁵

In April 1958, the CLC convention passed a resolution calling for the formation of a completely new socialist party. The declaration commended the CCF for the contribution it had made to Canadian society, but stressed the need for a "broadly based people's political movement which embraces the CCF, the labour movement, farm organizations, professional people and other liberally minded persons interested in basic social reform".²⁶ The CCF agreed to this proposal and in 1961, 1801 delegates gathered to found the New Democratic Party (NDP) and to dissolve the CCF. Thirty seven percent of these delegates were from the ranks of organized labour.²⁷

The founding convention was optimistic that this new party of the left would be free of certain negative factors in the image of the CCF which, it was felt, had restricted the party's electoral support. These factors included the image of what was now considered to be the stale doctrinaire socialism of the Regina Manifesto, the image of a party which, although friendly to labour, had not accommodated full labour participation, and the image of hostility to TLC unions through association with the CCL.²⁸ Therefore, the NDP could, it was hoped, enjoy a broader base of both labour and popular support, thereby achieving what had always eluded the CCF - electoral success.

THE WAFFLE GROUP

The activists within the NDP during its early years were drawn largely from the former CCF party and from the CCL unions. In advocating moderate social reform and in avoiding doctrinaire socialist platforms, they made a conscious effort to move the party to the right.²⁹ But in 1965, a new activist faction emerged within the party, a group that became known as the Young Turks. Self-proclaimed "radical pragmatists", their central goal was to achieve electoral success for the party. Their policies were decidedly nationalistic, and they proposed a program designed to achieve economic independence from the United States.³⁰

However the nationalistic, anti-American features of the Young Turks' program were divisive, both for the trade unions and the NDP. International unions were embarrassed to find young staff members rallying to the new group which preached Canadian independence from American domination. The NDP was faced with the prospect of reconciling its support for and by the international unions with the Canadian nationalistic philosophy of the Young Turks. "How could the party decry Canadian economic dependence on the United States and simultaneously justify international unionism?"³¹ Due to these internal inconsistencies, the NDP faced difficulties in accommodating the nationalism and desire for economic independence that was growing in Canadian society.

The forces of nationalism continued to build within the NDP party, spearheaded by a faction of young members who called themselves the Waffle Group. This group differed from the Young Turks in that its philosophy was based on a return to true socialism rather than pragmatism.³² In the spring of 1969, they produced a "Manifesto for an Independent Socialist Canada". The document rejected the NDP's tendency to water down socialist thought in order to win mass electorate support, stating that "if it waffled, it would waffle to the left".³³ To the Wafflers, socialism could be achieved through nationalism and nationalism could be achieved through socialism. As stated by Mel Watkins, author of the Watkins's report and leader of the group:

On the road to socialism, aspirations for independence or feelings of nationalism and particularly anti-imperialism, should be taken into account in their own right. For to pursue independence in a serious way in Canada is to make visible the necessity and desirability of socialism.³⁴

The Waffle Group advocated the contemporary brand of socialism as characterized by the New Left, a socialism which rejected the leadership of Russia, distrusted bureaucratized forms of power, and favoured participatory democracy.³⁵ It called not only for the nationalization of "key industries strategic to planning our economy" but also for "widespread democratic participation in social decision making, particularly in the workplace".³⁶

The Waffle saw the established labour movement as an important ally in its struggle for an independent socialist Canada. It believed, however, that first it would have to be "'revitalized and extended' through both a 'major takeover by unions of management's present prerogatives' and a 'major takeover by rank-and-file workers of the labour bureaucracy's present prerogatives'".³⁷ But the Waffle found that the major source of opposition to its socialist platform arose from the ranks of the NDP - affiliated international trade unions.³⁸ It began therefore to attack international union leaders as reactionary, and called for "completely independent Canadian unions as a long term goal".³⁹

Under pressure from its trade union affiliates, the NDP ordered the Waffle Group to disband in Ontario. A year later, the Waffle voluntarily withdrew from the NDP in Saskatchewan. But to its supporters, it had become apparent that the NDP was not only unable to pursue nationalist policies, but also was unable to provide an expression for the left wing stream of political thought in the socialist movement. They placed the blame for both these failures on the dominance of international unions in Canada and their influence in the party. In particular, the international trade union movement became seen as a major roadblock to the achievement of socialism in Canada, creating a rift between some members of the left and international unions, and resulting in a critical reassessment by some Canadian socialists of the desirability of American influence on Canadian labour.⁴⁰

THE LABOUR RELATIONS SCENE

During the 1960's, the work force underwent a rapid change in its composition, as the baby boom entered the labour market. There was a rapid influx of younger workers in their late teens and early twenties, the age group that was most strongly attracted to the philosophies of the Young Turks and the Waffle. They were workers who exhibited a tendency towards militancy. The youth of the 1960's have been described as the "Explosive Generation",⁴¹ a generation with no memories of depression or war, a generation that enjoyed a higher level and quality of education than their elders, and a generation that could be influenced, due to improved communications, by "the violent confrontations of youth with the establishment elsewhere".⁴² Consequently, many of the young workers entering the labour force in the 1960's were workers that were most likely to be drawn to the philosophy of the Young Turks and the Waffle, more inclined to question the status quo, and less willing to submit to the authority imposed by the discipline of the modern industrial system.⁴³ This change in attitude within the workforce was a factor that no doubt contributed to the turbulence that characterized labour relations in the 1960's.⁴⁴

During the 1960's, an unusually high proportion of contracts negotiated by union officers were refused ratification by the membership.⁴⁵ Crispo and Arthurs noted "such refusals are evidence of the waning power of the union hierarchy whose prestige and authority are undermined by repudiation of their negotiating 'successes'".⁴⁶ Widespread violence and illegality accompanied many disputes during the

decade. Numerous incidents occurred of violence and property damage, mass demonstrations and confrontations with the police,⁴⁷ indicating the existence of militant unrest among Canada's unionized labour force.

In some ways, the unrest exhibited by the work force can be seen as a reflection of the unrest growing in Canadian society during the decade. Canadians, prodded into a questioning of established values and institutions by adaptation to social change and uncertainty, enthusiastically attempted to establish a society that was unfettered by influences exerted by either Britain or the United States, and to carve out for themselves a place in the world that was uniquely Canadian. Unfortunate unilateral actions by the United States during the decade brought into sharp focus the impact on Canada of American influence. Yet the government in Canada did little or nothing to alleviate this source of frustration, or to take positive steps towards the achievement of the goal of national Canadian self-assertion.

This social ferment could be readily incorporated into the Canadian industrial relations system. One of the participants in the system, multinational corporations, were under attack from Walter Gordon, who charged that they posed a threat to Canadian economic, political and cultural independence by causing decision making to be exported out of the country. To many in Canadian society it was becoming obvious that this criticism could be as easily applied to the other participant in the system, international unions. Headquartered in the United States and developing policies geared to the American workers who made up by far the greatest proportion of their membership, were not

the decisions that affected Canadian workers also exported out of the country? To a work force with a growing desire for Canadian self-assertion, a greater tendency towards militancy, and an increasingly sceptical attitude towards the status quo, the existing labour relations system was no longer likely to be accepted without question.

Gordon, possibly for political reasons, did not attack international unionism in his fight for Canadian independence, but limited his battle to the repatriation of the Canadian economy from multinational corporations. The traditional institutions for the expression of workers' interests in Canada are the labour movement and the NDP. However the official trade union movement was made up primarily of international unions, unions which could hardly carry the banner of repatriating the decision making that affected the Canadian worker. By the same token, the NDP, because of its involvement with the labour movement, could not rally to such a cause either. To do so would imply an attack on the official trade union movement itself. There was, therefore, no existing institution that could give expression to the surging forces of nationalism on behalf of the Canadian worker. The labour relations system of the 1960's could not accommodate the growing desire for Canadian self-assertion, the rising nationalism and the mounting anti-Americanism that were becoming strongly felt throughout Canadian society. It is not surprising, therefore, that new institutions which could do so should arise, namely independent national unions.

FOOTNOTES

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Chapter III

The Winnipeg Mavericks

It is the right of individuals to belong to the
union of their choice in a democratic society.

Pat McEvoy

THE BREAK WITH THE MOLDERS

RUMBLINGS OF DISCONTENT

The unrest, critical reexamination of existing institutions and labour militancy that was occurring in Canada during the 1960's found expression in Winnipeg in 1964, when some workers took the rather drastic step of breaking with their international union to form a new, independent Canadian union to be known as the Canadian Association of Industrial Mechanical and Allied Workers. These workers were members of Local 174 of the International Molders Union.

The International Molders Union, headquartered in Cincinnati, Ohio, had been organized in the United States in 1859. Although the overwhelming majority of its membership was American, by 1960 its Canadian members numbered 7,500. Included among its Canadian certifications was Local 174 in Winnipeg, made up of sixteen plants and comprised of approximately 560 union members.¹

The unrest in Local 174 centered around three basic issues. The first complaint involved the distribution of funds collected by the local union. Each member of the local paid \$5.00 per month in union dues, and out of this amount, \$3.75 had to be sent to Cincinnati. This per capita tax was laid down in the constitution of the international union and had to be paid by all chartered locals. But Local 174 felt

that they were receiving very little in return. Many major financial obligations of the local had to be met out of the \$1.25 per member that remained, including all arbitration expenses. "They were", said Al Pitt, a member of Local 174 at the time, "bleeding us white".²

The second source of unrest stemmed from the servicing provided by the Molders. The international staff representative, Michael Capri, serviced a huge area stretching from Thunder Bay to Vancouver. The time and attention that he could give to Local 174 was, therefore, very limited. To make matters worse, he was appointed to his position by the international office, and he did not enjoy the full confidence or support of the membership. He was described by Pat McEvoy, then president of Local 174, as "completely ineffective - rarely in town and always of the side of the international".³ In an attempt to improve servicing, the local decided in 1959 to hire an additional staff representative, and elected John Gugulyn to the post. Reporting to the international staff representative, he worked part-time for the local and part-time for the international. The cost of his salary was shared by the international and the local union, the local's share coming out of the small proportion of membership dues that they were allowed to keep. However, Gugulyn did enjoy the confidence and support of the membership.⁴

The third issue of concern centered around the question of autonomy in bargaining. Although the local elected its own bargaining committee, an international representative was always present during contract negotiations. Progress reports on negotiations had to be

forwarded to Cincinnati, and "it was Cincinnati that always had the final say".⁵ To the local membership, it seemed that this final say was too often in the direction of accepting an inadequate settlement. Worse yet, negotiating committees operated under the fear that if Cincinnati's recommendations were not accepted by the local, strike funds would not be forthcoming. This fear became real in 1963 when strike funds were withheld from workers at Canada Metal for four weeks, and became available only when the local membership exerted considerable pressure on Michael Capri.⁶ The methods used by the international to impose a settlement are now suspected to have gone as far as interfering with ballot boxes on contract ratification votes. "We often wondered why we never had a strike when it seemed to us the membership was ready to take a stand," said Pat McEvoy. "But a long time afterwards, a guy admitted to changing the boxes."⁷

The sources of unrest in Local 174 were not unique. In the wake of growing nationalism in Canadian society, critics of international unions have increasingly charged, among other things, that international unions drain large sums of money from Canada, that American union leaders violate Canadian sovereignty by interfering in collective bargaining, and that international executives in the United States arbitrarily hire and fire Canadian union officials regardless of the wishes of the local membership.⁸ Such charges are no doubt guilty of oversimplification through generalization, since, as Jamieson points out, "the actual relationships of Canadian unions to their international affiliates are extremely varied from one industry or trade to another and highly complex".⁹

Crispo notes that due to the lack of reliable statistical evidence, "one is bound to feel ill at ease when generalizing about the new flow of funds and benefits between Canada and the United States in international unions".¹⁰ Fortunately, for the purpose of this study, such generalizations are not necessary. It is sufficient to state that the membership of Local 174 did not perceive that they were getting value for their money. The charge that international unions tend to fill their coffers on Canadian dues dollars was, therefore, likely to find fertile ground among these Winnipeg workers. In particular, the service that they were paying for was not forthcoming in an adequate manner. Crispo notes that there have been many instances in Canada where the servicing provided by international unions has been inadequate, particularly in the Prairies and the Maritimes where small populations and large geographical distances make servicing expensive. "It is hardly surprising" he notes, "that those involved should question the value of belonging to an international union."¹¹

Similarly, in generalizing about the interference of international headquarters in collective bargaining, it has been argued that although international executives typically have the constitutional power to exert considerable control over collective bargaining in Canada (e.g. by vetoing local strike votes and withholding strike benefits), in practice, "this power is rarely invoked".¹² But the International Molders Union did interfere in Local 174's bargaining. Jamieson notes that this practice by international unions tends to "cause a great deal of hostility" within their Canadian locals,¹³ an observation that could certainly be applied to Local 174.

Finally, although variation may exist within international unions in regard to the appointment of officials, Jamieson points out that craft unions formally affiliated with the American Federation of Labour typically appoint the international representatives assigned to administrative districts in Canada, representatives who are subject to removal by the international president.¹⁴ The International Molders Union, an old craft union, pursued this policy. As a result, it is not surprising that Michael Capri should view the Cincinnati officers as his highest authority, rather than the membership of Local 174. Worse yet, the membership did not concur with the choice of representative made by the Cincinnati officers.

Although dissent within Local 174 was sparked by the issue of unsatisfactory union representation, at a time of rising national aspirations and critical reexaminations of existing institutions, including international unions, this dissent could quickly be translated into a nationalistic argument. As Adams points out, "Some continentalists hold that the question of Canadian versus international unionism is irrelevant. If an international does a good job on behalf of its members and its members believe that their interests are best served by an international union, then the nationalists have no case."¹⁵ But conversely, in cases where an international union is clearly guilty of many of the deficiencies that nationalists have identified, then a demand by Canadians for control over their own affairs will likely arise - if for no other reason than to improve the union representation provided.

THE BID FOR AUTONOMY

In 1960, an international convention of the Molders Union was held in Cincinnati. Local 174 was represented at the convention by their elected delegation. The mission of the delegation was to make clear to the international union the sources of dissatisfaction within the local, to request a greater degree of Canadian autonomy, and to demand more financial aid for local members.¹⁶

Local 174's objective went down to dismal defeat. Their delegates' resolution calling for a greater degree of Canadian autonomy was rejected by the resolutions committee, and was not allowed to reach the convention floor. A last ditch attempt by the delegation to raise the issue on the convention floor simply resulted in the microphones being shut off from the head table.¹⁷

The delegation from Local 174 neither expected nor were prepared for the treatment their resolution received. A resolution that to them was of prime importance had been brushed aside in an offhand, dictatorial manner. Worse yet, they found that the "American delegates' knowledge of Canadian labour history and Canadian unionism was so poor they couldn't even effectively debate the issue of Canadian autonomy".¹⁸ As for any awareness of the problems of Local 174 itself, the delegation was asked, "Where is Winnipeg?" It was a bitter revelation to the Winnipeg delegation that the centre of decision making power in their union showed little knowledge of or interest in their problems. "We were really shattered" said Pat McEvoy. "We couldn't believe the

arrogance and the treatment we had received from our own union."¹⁹ The delegation returned to Winnipeg feeling angry, frustrated, and no doubt isolated from the centre of union decision making power.

In fact, the delegation's chances for achieving greater Canadian autonomy within the union were probably poor from the beginning. First, it has been found that appeals for Canadian autonomy are less likely to succeed when they are raised by Canadian delegates on the convention floor than when they are raised by the union's Executive Board.²⁰ The delegation from Local 174 did not enjoy the support of the Executive Board and therefore their efforts were probably doomed to defeat. Secondly, in old craft unions such as the Molders Union, there tends to be "considerably greater centralization in the international executives and correspondingly greater control over Canadian subsidiaries" than occurs in former CIO unions.²¹ This fact, combined with the fear of setting a "dangerous precedent" for the American segments of the union, has resulted in old craft unions such as the Molders being particularly resistant to pleas for Canadian autonomy.²²

Nevertheless, in 1962, Local 174 attempted once more to bring their dissatisfactions to the attention of the international union by sponsoring a special trip by delegates to Cincinnati. The delegates' mission was to present a brief to the international Executive Board, pleading for better service, more money and a greater degree of autonomy in decision making. Instead of demonstrating any sympathy or sensitivity to what Local 174 felt were legitimate grievances, the international president, William Lazzerini, made it clear that he was

"opposed to Canadian independence" and reminded the delegation that "the tail does not wag the dog".²³ This time, the delegation was not surprised by the reception that their request received. They hinted at the possibility of breaking with the Molders Union if some response to their concerns was not forthcoming. However, the international union did not take these threats seriously and ignored Local 174's demands.²⁴

In 1963, Local 174 sent one more special delegation to Cincinnati to plead before the Executive Board. It would be the last. The trip was a last ditch effort to get some redress to their concerns from within the existing system. But the only response forthcoming from the Executive Board was to give the local an estimate of eight weeks survival if it struck out on its own. "You will regret it", they told the Winnipeg delegation. "In eight weeks you will be finished."²⁵ Clearly, Cincinnati still did not take the unrest in Local 174 seriously.

This was a major miscalculation on the part of the international union, because there were factors operative within Local 174 that could overcome the general apathy that has been found to exist among Canadians towards the issue of international unions.²⁶ First, inadequate servicing, a perceived drain of dues money from the local and unwelcome interference in collective bargaining had given rise to union dissidents within the local. Attempts to gain redress to their concerns had been totally rebuffed by the international union, leading to a belief by the dissidents that it was futile to attempt to achieve change from within the existing system. Further, the arrogant and

dictatorial response of the international union at a time of a growing desire for Canadian self-assertion and resentment of American control over Canadian affairs meant that the union dissidents could quickly and easily join forces with the growing number of nationalists to mount a determined challenge to the international. In keeping with the labour militancy and unrest occurring in Canada, this challenge could quite conceivably take the rather drastic form of breaking with the international union.

Moreover, Local 174 could be seen as a part of the western labour tradition that had, since the early 1900's, challenged the policies of international unions operating in Canada, particularly the organization of workers along craft rather than industrial lines, the perceived conservatism of the unions affiliated to the American Federation of Labour, and the policy of political neutrality by the labour movement.²⁷ In fact, Local 174 had ties to One Big Union, one such western labour organization born in 1919 that had represented "a western assault upon the policies of international unionism in Canada",²⁸ and had advocated radical unionism, socialism, syndicalism and the organization of workers into one large industrial union.²⁹ It was an organization which had broken with international unionism in order to pursue its independent policies. Local 174 had within its ranks the certification for Ideal Brass Limited, a certification which, until the 1950's, had been held by One Big Union. Also, Local 174's president, Pat McEvoy, was a friend of one of the leaders of One Big Union, R. B. Russell. The two men had spent many hours discussing the

philosophy of unionism, and McEvoy had been "greatly influenced" by Russell.³⁰

The union dissidents and nationalists within Local 174, therefore, had an example to follow in their quarrel with the International Molders Union. Better union representation and Canadian control over Canadian union affairs could be achieved by breaking with international unionism and forming their own labour organization, as One Big Union had done before them. At the suggestion of taking this action, "many thought they could see One Big Union all over again".³¹

Local 174's final plea before the International Executive Board, therefore, was not an idle threat, and the response of the international union to the problems plagueing the local was totally inappropriate. "The possibility of breaking away was always there" said Pat McEvoy. "But it took the arrogance we encountered in Cincinnati to finally make us do it. There was no other way out."³²

THE BIRTH OF CAIMAW

Immediately following the failure of the 1963 delegation to achieve any response to its demands, the executive of Local 174 began calling meetings of the workers at the local's individual plants. At these meetings, they pressed for a break with the international union, appealed to the membership to be "masters in their own house" and urged the establishment of a "truly democratic union".³³ Due to the factors discussed above, they received strong support from the membership. All

that remained was to wait for the appropriate open season to come up at each plant, and to sign the workers up into the new union.³⁴

The first plant to become legally eligible for a change in unions happened to be Griffin Steel Foundries. On June 14, 1964, a meeting of Griffin Steel employees was held in the old Winnipeg Labour Temple, and a constitution for the new union, to be known as the Canadian Association of Industrial Mechanical and Allied Workers (CAIMAW), was adopted. On June 21, 1964, CAIMAW applied to the Manitoba Labour Board for certification at the Griffin Foundry. A certification vote conducted in September, 1964 resulted in an overwhelming victory for the new union. Subordinate Unit 1, CAIMAW, replaced the Molders as the bargaining agent for the employees at Griffin Steel.

One by one, the plants that made up Local 174 of the Molders came into open season and began to use the opportunity to leave the Molders Union and join CAIMAW. Pat McEvoy retained the presidency of the Molder's local, using his position to engineer and organize the exodus. Finally, in 1965, after successfully changing the allegiance of six of the local's sixteen plants, he knew he had exhausted his support, resigned from his position and joined CAIMAW himself.³⁵ By this time, CAIMAW had been successfully launched.

STRUGGLES FOR POWER

While waiting for the legal opportunity to break with the Molders Union, the executive of Local 174 decided to unilaterally solve

the problem of the drain on the local's finances. This they were able to do by finding and exploiting a loophole in the international union's constitution. Under the terms of the constitution, each local was permitted to set the membership initiation fee at any amount between \$10 and \$100. After the initiation fee was paid, the employee became a member in good standing of the union and began paying membership dues. The local was required to remit to the international union \$8.75 of each initiation fee, and \$3.75 of the \$5 monthly dues thereafter. In December, 1963, Local 174 increased the membership initiation fee from \$10 to \$100, the maximum allowed under the constitution. Prospective members were allowed to pay off this initiation fee in twenty monthly installments of \$5 each. They did not become members in good standing until the initiation fee was fully paid, and the international was not entitled to its per capita tax until that time. The net effect of these changes was that although new recruits paid \$5 per month to the local in the usual manner, Cincinnati received nothing on their behalf for the twenty months required to pay off the initiation fee. Local 174 kept the entire amount.³⁶

The International Executive Board, unresponsive to the problems of Local 174 up until now, reacted vigorously to this outright rebellion. After orders to remit dues for the new recruits were ignored, Mr. Lazzarini charged five officers of the local with violation of the constitution, suspended them from office and ordered them to stand trial. The five officers named were "P. J. McEvoy, President; S. Boychuk, Vice President; John Thiessen, Corresponding Secretary; Harvey Singbell, Treasurer; and Jack Kuhtney, Recording Secretary."³⁷

In short, the rebellion against the international encompassed the entire executive of Local 174. The international then placed Local 174 under trusteeship, with none other than the unpopular international staff representative, Michael Capri, appointed as administrator.³⁸ Such actions only increased the unrest within Local 174, and provided further impetus to the break with the Molders Union.

The executive of Local 174 decided to fight the suspensions and the imposition of the trusteeship in the Manitoba Court of Queens Bench. Naming Mr. Lazzarini and Mr. Capri as defendants, and claiming that they were "acting on behalf of themselves and the more than 500 members of the local",³⁹ the executive argued that "there is nothing in the constitution to prevent it taking the initiation fee in easy stages and that the \$100 fee was passed December 17 at a meeting of the local membership".⁴⁰ Finally, after lengthy court battles, on May 11, 1964 the Manitoba Court of Appeal lifted the suspensions and the control placed on the local by the international union. Local 174 would keep its rebellious executive.

As the exodus of Local 174's plants got underway, the international increased its efforts to regain control of the local. Unable to dislodge the executive, Mr. Lazzarini turned his attention to John Gugulyn, the local's elected business agent who was actively participating in the break with the Molders. On November 30, 1964, the International Executive Board suspended him from holding office in the local for five years, and ordered him fired from his position.⁴¹ The local responded by unanimously reelecting him to his job for another

three year term.⁴² But again, the international chose to ignore the membership's wishes. On January 11, 1965, William Lazzerini wrote to Pat McEvoy demanding the immediate dismissal of John Gugulyn.

I would remind you that as an officer of Local 174, you have personally assumed certain responsibilities and obligations. Among these responsibilities and obligations is the handling of funds in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution of this union (Art XVI, Part 46). You are under bond to secure compliance therewith and will be held personally liable for any of Local 174's funds that are paid to J. Gugulyn.⁴³

Local 174 returned to the courts, which upheld the right of the local's business agent to keep his job. Instead of opposing the court decision, the International Executive Board passed a new ruling against Gugulyn, barring him from membership in the Molders Union on the grounds that he was "unworthy to be part of a Canadian labour organization".⁴⁴ This statement must have seemed ironic to those within the local who were working to replace the Molders with an independent Canadian union, because there was little doubt that what had made him "unworthy" was his suspected participation in the breakaways already occurring within the local.⁴⁵

As Local 174's plants moved out of the Molders Union and joined CAIMAW, the international union became increasingly concerned. Michael Capri went door to door, trying to convince the membership to

remain with the Molders. The international distributed pamphlets in great numbers, and threatened that membership in the union would be suspended if support was given to CAIMAW.⁴⁶ In 1965, top level meetings were held between officials of the CLC and the Molders Union in Ottawa, and other meetings were held in Winnipeg between the CLC, CLC-affiliated unions and the Molders to discuss the Molders problems.⁴⁷ The CLC representative in the Winnipeg area embarked on a campaign of talking to workers on the shop floor, and the CLC and the Manitoba Federation of Labour (MFL) began distributing literature in an attempt to dissuade workers from joining CAIMAW.⁴⁸

Many employers joined the Molders Union in campaigning against the turn to CAIMAW. They also put out literature, trying to convince the employees that they were "lucky to have such a good union as the Molders".⁴⁹ Employees were suspended for signing others into CAIMAW on the shop floor. Employers also intervened in the new applications for certification, claiming that CAIMAW did not represent the majority of the employees and that the granting of such a certification would lead to anarchy and chaos on the shop floor. "After all", they argued before the Manitoba Labour Board, "who is going to control these people?"⁵⁰

By mid 1966, CAIMAW had exhausted its support from within the multiplant local. "By then the international's campaign was having an effect."⁵¹ Seven plants had, by this time, abandoned the Molders Union and joined CAIMAW, plants that represented approximately 45 percent of the employees represented by Local 174. But CAIMAW's growth from then on would have to come from other sources.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF CAIMAW

ORGANIZATION EFFORTS

The new union, CAIMAW, was to be "completely controlled by the rank and file".⁵² This philosophy was no doubt attractive to union dissidents who resented the degree of control exerted by the Molders officers, to the nationalists who saw it as a method of placing control of union affairs in the hands of Canadians, and to those who shared the syndicalist views of One Big Union in that it gave the workers control over their own organization, if not the means of production. There were to be no full-time appointed officers or professionals in positions of control in the new union. In 1965, John Gugulyn was hired by CAIMAW as a full-time business agent, but his position brought with it no voting power. Only officers elected by the rank and file had voting power, and hence control over decision making.⁵³ Each plant was represented by having the right to elect one member each to the Executive Board. The union appealed to prospective members on the grounds of democracy, grass roots rank and file control, and autonomy in decision making.⁵⁴

One of the earliest objectives of the new union, laid down at its first formal meeting in July, 1964, was to "expand to a larger National body".⁵⁵ With this aim in mind, an organizing committee was formed in May, 1965, charged with the task of organizing new shops and promoting the growth of CAIMAW.⁵⁶ Although obtaining certification from other unions was by no means ruled out, the specific target for the organizing committee was to be unorganized shops, which were to be

"handbilled at the rate of about one a week".⁵⁷ By June, 1966, the union was sufficiently established to hire a full-time organizer to assume the responsibility for this important task. The first convention of the union elected Pat McEvoy to the position.

The union grew rapidly. In the years between 1964 and 1970, CAIMAW won certifications from the Molders Union, the Retail Clerks Union and the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (IAM) (see Table II). Typical complaints about these international unions included poor service, high per capita dues and inadequate strike assistance.⁵⁸ The majority of CAIMAW's new certifications, however, were for relatively small, previously unorganized shops, places that have perhaps proved themselves very difficult to organize and to service (see Table II). Of particular pride to the CAIMAW organizing committee were the certifications won for Asbestonos Corporation office staff and the Coldstream Products service employees. These two groups were the first of their kind to ever unionize in the area.⁵⁹ It is perhaps significant that both groups chose to organize after CAIMAW had won the certifications for the more traditionally unionized employees at their plants.

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Table II
CAIMAW Certifications 1964 - 1970

| DATE | EMPLOYER | PREVIOUS CERTIFICATION | NO. OF EMPLOYEES |
|----------|---------------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------|
| Sep 1964 | Griffin Steel | Int. Molders 174 | 60 |
| Dec 1964 | Winnipeg Motors | Int. Molders 174 | 100 |
| Mar 1965 | Canada Iron | Int. Molders 174 | 70 |
| Mar 1965 | Ideal Brass | Int. Molders 174 | 150 |
| Mar 1965 | Bullocks Ltd | Int. Molders 174 | 60 |
| Mar 1965 | Canada Metal | Int. Molders 174 | 30 |
| Sep 1965 | Freuhauf Trailer | Uncertified | 30 |
| Apr 1966 | Asbestonos | Int. Molders 174 | 20 |
| Apr 1966 | Electrollier | Uncertified | 80 |
| Apr 1966 | Automatic Metal Press | Uncertified | 20 |
| Apr 1967 | Coldstream | Uncertified | 125 |
| Apr 1967 | Asbestonos Office Staff | Uncertified | 5 |
| May 1967 | Silverline | Abandoned Molders | 40 |
| Jan 1967 | Acme Chrome | Uncertified | 80 |
| Jun 1967 | Coldstream Service Employees | Uncertified | 140 |
| May 1968 | Kwolson Refrigeration | Uncertified | 12 |
| Jun 1968 | Hartline Furniture | Uncertified | 25 |
| Jun 1968 | Rodway Refridg. | Uncertified | 5 |
| Jun 1968 | Commercial Air Cond. | Uncertified | 5 |
| Sep 1968 | Flemming & Peddlar | Uncertified | 20 |
| Mar 1969 | Western Flyer | Uncertified | 300 |
| Mar 1969 | Dicks Containers | Uncertified | 80 |
| Apr 1969 | National Drugs | Retail Clerks Union | 50 |
| Apr 1969 | Bell Foundry | Uncertified | 70 |
| Mar 1970 | Bristol Aerospace | I.A.M. | 600 |

Source: Various issues of the Bulletin, the Review and the CAIMAW Review, 1964-1970

THE CLC DECLARES WAR

In early 1969, CAIMAW, now approximately one thousand members strong, had two important certifications pending before the Manitoba Labour Board. The first was for the right to represent the three hundred employees at Western Flyer Coach, employees who, in 1968, had decertified the IAM on the grounds that they were "dissatisfied with the international union's servicing".⁶⁰ The second application was for the bargaining rights for Bristol Aerospace's six hundred workers, also represented by IAM. Bristol workers were dissatisfied not only with the international union's servicing, but also "with the pay rates settled for after a strike last year and with the strike pay they had received".⁶¹ If CAIMAW were successful in these two applications, it would mean a boost of almost 100 percent in its membership and would represent heavy losses for the IAM.

The Machinists were concerned and sent some of their top National officers to Winnipeg. Harold Thayer, director of education for the Machinists Union and Mike Rygus, the Canadian head of the union, both arrived in Winnipeg in January to "confer with union and management about the CAIMAW membership drive".⁶² By February, the Winnipeg Free Press was reporting "it is an open secret in the Union Centre, the home of many administrative offices, that the Machinists Union has trouble on its hands".⁶³

Up until this time, the Canadian Labour establishment had tried to ignore the presence of the breakaway union on the labour scene. But the membership drive now underway was too much. A policy for the protection of the jurisdictions of CLC affiliates would have to be formulated. In a closed meeting, officials of the CLC, MFL and the Winnipeg and District Labour Council (WDLC) decided to launch a campaign to wipe out the Canadian organization. John F. Simonds, Assistant National Director of the CLC acted as spokesman in announcing to the press:

A campaign has been launched to bring the membership of the independent Canadian Association of Industrial Mechanical and Allied Workers back into the ranks of the legitimate trade union movement. The time has come to put an end to this independent organization which has been wooing local trade unionists with rash promises and false and malicious accusations and we must not allow these workers to be seduced into removing themselves from the protection of the labour council, the Federation or the Canadian Labour Congress.⁶⁴

Just how the Canadian union was to be destroyed was left unexplained, but Mr. Simonds promised that the campaign would be "full scale".⁶⁵

To many observers, this declaration of war by the CLC spelled doom for CAIMAW. Labour reporter Dudley Magnus warned, "They won't last long if the 1½ million members of the CLC has its way, and the CLC has the money and time to fight. In fact, it is indeed backs to the wall,

men, you've had it".⁶⁶ But CAIMAW officials were not going to capitulate. "We have been ready since 1966 when we passed a resolution that we would use all our resources and manpower to thwart any move by American dominated unions in their attempt to defeat the development of a truly independent Canadian movement" said Gugulyn.⁶⁷

The CLC announcement resulted in a strong reaction from the workers at Bristol Aerospace. Machinists from the plant descended on the Union Centre, parading a Canadian flag and a life-size effigy of a Machinist union official in front of the building. The effigy was dragged and kicked, and the picketers displayed signs announcing "Bristol Employees Protest Interference of MFL and WDLA" and "Bristol Employees will Fight for the Right to Choose a Canadian Union". "The complaint is that they want to join CAIMAW but are being prevented from doing so by the attempts of international unions to destroy the Canadian union."⁶⁸

THE BATTLE FOR BRISTOL AEROSPACE

The CAIMAW certification campaign caused a major upheaval within the Bristol plant local - Lodge 741. Mike Rygus was booed at a union meeting for evasive answers to members' questions, and the lodge's president, several members of the executive committee and more than a dozen shop stewards resigned from their posts. Complaints included "harrassment tactics and half truths used by the international officers in dealing with the membership",⁶⁹ lack of service, and inadequate

assistance in union business. A resigned executive committee member announced "Members are just disgusted".⁷⁰

The results of a certification vote held in March 1969 were 280 in favour of CAIMAW and 251 in favour of IAM. However, under the Manitoba labour law of the day, a majority of those eligible to vote was required before certification could be granted. Since many eligible voters had not cast ballots, CAIMAW had not won a majority of workers eligible to vote, and their application for certification was denied.

The interunion struggle at Bristol did not end with this decision by the Manitoba Labour Board. The international office of the Machinists Union ordered that three members of Lodge 741 stand trial on charges of "promoting dual unionism", and it was rumoured that another nine men would be charged at a future date. The three men charged, Bill Behma, Bert Chatfield and Wayne Nowazek faced suspension of membership and possible fines if found guilty of the charges.⁷¹

However, Lodge 741 was still in a state of revolt. At a meeting of the membership held on May 26, 1969, the lodge voted to drop the trial proceedings and dismiss the charges against the "accused".⁷² The membership also demanded that the executive explain the details of an expenditure of \$5,000 from the lodge's funds that had been spent in the campaign to defeat the Canadian union. At the end of the meeting, with only one dissenting vote, the membership urged the resignation of the executive because "it had lost the confidence of the members".⁷³

Instead of providing an accounting of the funds spent in the certification battle without the approval of the membership, the international placed Lodge 741 under trusteeship, with Stanley Carter, international representative of the union in Winnipeg, placed in charge of the lodge and its business. Furthermore, despite the lodge's expressed views on the subject, the three charged men would stand trial as ordered.⁷⁴ Those Bristol workers who were fighting the international union were quick to point to these actions as "examples of interference from Washington".⁷⁵ Mr. Goodison, official Grand Lodge representative for IAM in Toronto, retorted that what had been imposed on Lodge 741 was not a trusteeship but "supervision". While a trustee takes complete control of a union, he argued, a supervisor is a third party to signing expenditures, along with the treasurer and vice-president. However a supervisor did, he admitted, "have the power of veto".⁷⁶ To Bristol workers who were anxious to achieve a greater degree of autonomy in their own affairs, it is doubtful whether this distinction would have seemed too clear.

The central issue raised in the battle was one of autonomy. "The men want their own Canadian institution to run their own affairs" said Pat McEvoy. "There is no local autonomy. All the direction comes from the U. S." Jim Goodison flatly denied this charge. "All representatives of unions are Canadian in Canada" he stated. "We have different attitudes towards bargaining than in the United States. There is no interference by the international organization."⁷⁷ But many of the rank and file at Bristol did not agree. Mike Kostanski, former chief shop steward and then still a member of the international reported

"We're treated like a bunch of kids...big brother in the States is supposed to know best."⁷⁸ Certainly, in view of the overruling of the lodge's wishes regarding the "accused", and in view of the "supervision" imposed on the lodge by the international, it would seem that this assessment had a great deal of merit. Again, the cause of union dissidents was almost inseparably linked to the cause of Canadian nationalists.

The insistence of the Machinists international to proceed with the trials of the three men charged with promoting dual unionism resulted in unexpected reactions from within the ranks of the recognized labour establishment in Winnipeg. In an unprecedented move, the Manitoba district council of the nationalistic Canadian Brotherhood of Railway Transport and General Workers (CBRT) voted to support the rebel members of another CLC-affiliated union, and oppose the actions of the Machinists. In explaining the stand taken by the Canadian railway union, Mr. Harry Hapin, secretary for the council stated, "What has this country (Canada) come to when three men can't stand up and say what they want without being tried by Washington - what depths of despair have we dropped to?"⁷⁹

The trials were conducted in July, 1969. But the policies of the international in attempting to regain control of the lodge were only fanning the flame of nationalistic resentment. Approximately one hundred people paraded outside the Hotel Fort Gary where the trials were being held, "demonstrating Canadian solidarity against the control exercised in Canada by United States offices of international unions."⁸⁰

Handbills were given out to the picketers by the Manitoba Association of Students, stating their support for the parade. The demonstration had been organized by the CBRT, protesting the fact that a "trial of Canadians was taking place on a United States based union's orders."⁸¹ However, the railway brotherhood's insignia was not displayed on the grounds that members were demonstrating as individuals, not as a union. The reason given for making this distinction was "it isn't customary for an affiliate of the CLC to demonstrate publicly concerning the internal affairs of another CLC affiliate."⁸² In spite of these protests, all three men were found guilty of the charges, and were suspended from membership in the international union indefinitely.⁸³

The following year, at the next legal opportunity, CAIMAW applied again for certification at Bristol Aerospace. This time, 312 voted in favour of CAIMAW and 251 voted in favour of the international union. The Manitoba Labour Board granted CAIMAW the bargaining rights for the plant. John Gugulyn announced to the press that "the former trusteeship of the local...is no longer in effect" and promised that the group would now "enjoy complete autonomy and the freedom to decide on how their local unit will operate."⁸⁴ To the union dissidents at the Bristol plant, this promise no doubt meant that they would achieve better union representation. To the nationalists, it probably meant Canadian control over Canadian affairs. To those who shared both these sentiments, both advantages would be forthcoming, because the two issues could be seen as inseparably linked.

THE STRIKE AT BELL FOUNDRY

In September of 1969, CAIMAW faced its most crucial test to date as a union - its first strike. The seventy newly organized workers at Bell Foundry voted overwhelmingly to strike for their first contract.

It was a difficult strike from the beginning. Accusations of violence by both sides were accompanied by court injunctions restraining employees from picketing, outright refusal on the part of the employer to negotiate, and continued production with the use of non-union labour.⁸⁵ Although the injunction against picketing was soon lifted, the company refused to give assurances that "out-of-town strike breakers" would not be brought in.⁸⁶ The union responded by stating that it would "ask the provincial government to assist by preventing strike breakers from operating and it hopes other unions will help the strikers."⁸⁷ It was to be sorely disappointed on both counts.

Initially, the president of MFL, Mr. H. L. Stevens, seemed sympathetic to the CAIMAW strikers. He told the Winnipeg Free Press, "I'm sure that if the Canadian Association of Industrial Mechanical and Allied Workers was to ask the assistance of the Federation to stop the strike breaking tactics of Bell Foundry, the executive council would give it full, unbiased consideration."⁸⁸ The Winnipeg Free Press speculated,

If the Federation council decides to assist the strikers on moral grounds, such a decision would considerably strengthen the morale of the strikers...The move would also cause considerable concern with top CLC officials in Ottawa, as it would conflict with the policy laid down by the CLC to destroy the union and bring the members into the "legitimate trade union movement".⁸⁹

CAIMAW officials, responding to Mr. Steven's published statement, sought the assistance of the Federation with the hope that support on the picket line would be forthcoming. But the Federation sent a terse reply, refusing help on the grounds that CAIMAW "was not an affiliate and was using methods of operation in opposition to Federation principles".⁹⁰ The CLC's policy of the destruction of CAIMAW would be followed after all. "It is believed he [Len Stevens] was pressured into the terse refusal by several MFL members who have no love for the Canadian union" reported the Winnipeg Free Press.⁹¹

However, many Canadian affiliates of the MFL did not agree with the stand taken by the Federation, and refused to adhere to it. The four hundred Manitoba members of the Letter Carriers Union of Canada voted to provide food, financial and moral support for the CAIMAW strikers. Their representative condemned the stand taken by the MFL saying,

It is the basic principle of labour movements to support all workers in strife with employers. When I read this report that the Federation stand was against this labour group (CAIMAW) that is fighting for genuine rights as acknowledged by the Manitoba Labour Board, I believe that certain people in the Manitoba Federation of Labour have been managerially oriented....This is just providing ammunition for the employer....I don't give a hoot about differences between the MFL and the Canadian union. Its the men on the picket line I'm worried about.⁹²

The Canadian Union of Postal Workers (CUPW) joined the Letter Carriers in their opposition to the Federation's policy regarding CAIMAW. Together, the two Canadian unions demanded at a closed meeting of MFL and WDLC that CAIMAW's strike at Bell Foundry "against terrible working conditions" be supported.

About 80 delegates at the regular meeting of the council in the Union Centre voted, with only a few dissenters, to close the meeting to the press, visitors and other unauthorized persons. Delegates were aware that some hot debate would come when the presence of top postal union representatives was evident and that a plea from them to support the Bell strikers would be made.⁹³

The meeting was described as "stormy". The MFL refused to change its stand on the Bell strike and as a result, CUPW withdrew from the Federation. The Letter Carriers, not members of the MFL, acted by

withdrawing from the WDLC. Although it was reported that "both representatives of the postal unions say they will return to the MFL fold if the Federation tenders 'at least moral support for the striking workers,'"⁹⁴ the unions to this day remain unaffiliated to the Federation.⁹⁵ Their actions during the Bell Foundry dispute did, however, establish close ties between the postal unions and CAIMAW that have endured to the present time.

Another source of discomfort for the established labour movement because of its policies regarding CAIMAW was an incident occurring on October 3, when high ranking National officers of the Canadian Union of Public Employees (CUPE) joined the Bell workers on the picket lines. James Dowell, director of education, John McMillan, director of organization and Gilbert Levine, research director, happened to be in Winnipeg and, hearing of the strike, appeared on the picket lines carrying signs to show support for the strikers. By this act, the three officers of the second largest union in Canada had acted in sympathy with a union that the CLC had vowed to destroy. Reported the Winnipeg Free Press:

Their picketing has caused more than an ordinary stir behind the scenes of the Canadian Labour Congress....Just when morale was at its lowest in the independent union's ranks because of an injunction and company militancy, the three members of a union affiliated with the CLC acted in sympathy.⁹⁶

Donald MacDonald, president of the CLC refused outright to discuss the matter. But Stanley Little, general vice-president of the CLC and president of CUPE, said he had faith that his officers knew what they were doing. He did not, however, "seem the happiest man when he discussed the subject of his national staffers parading with a placard on the picket line of a union that is supposed to be outlawed by the Canadian Labour Congress".⁹⁷

On November 20, the MFL and CLC were faced with the most serious defiance of their edict when twenty locals of the Canadian Brotherhood of Railway, Transport and General Workers gave their "moral and financial support" to the Bell strikers. In a letter to the striking union, Harry Haplin wrote, "We deplore and protest the scab strike breaking tactics used at Bell Foundry....We have authorized our members not to cross the picket line."⁹⁸ Local 107 of the Canadian Railway Union then delivered an ultimatum to MFL. Either the Federation announce, in public, support for the Bell Strikers, or the local would withdraw from both the MFL and the WDLC and would urge all other locals of CBRT, representing 3,500 workers in Manitoba, to do the same. Mr. Hogan, representing the local, said that the local wanted "a clear-cut statement, made publicly by the council, that it specifically backs the Bell strikers, actually naming where they are on strike".⁹⁹ He added "We shall attend the next council meeting (December 16) as a delegation and demand the statement from the council or withdraw and cease to pay per capita tax".¹⁰⁰

The ultimatum caused "turmoil behind the scenes in the council hierarchy".¹⁰¹ On the one hand, the council was affiliated to the CLC, and was therefore expected to follow a policy of backing CLC directives - in this case, the destruction of CAIMAW. Besides, if the council backed the maverick union, it would in effect be breaking faith with the international unions, also paying per capita tax. If it did so, a withdrawal of the international unions was not felt to be unlikely, an event which would break up the council. On the other hand, Canadian unions, also affiliated to the council, had shown themselves to be openly sympathetic to CAIMAW, and many had already given financial and moral support to the union and its strikers in defiance of the council's policies. The two postal unions had gone so far as to break with the Federation, and now the 3,500 strong Canadian Railway Union was threatening to do the same. It was perhaps an understatement when officials told the press that "they expected the December 16 meeting to be a lively one".¹⁰²

On December 7, WDLC Secretary Alb Walker issued a press release which was a model of compromise. On the one hand, he indicated the council's support for the Bell strikers and condemned the employer against whom they were striking. On the other hand, he made clear the council's strong disapproval of CAIMAW as a union. His statement read:

The labour council has always given full support both sympathetic and moral, to all bona fide striking workers, including those currently on the picket line at Bell Foundry....The labour council will not and cannot support any union that

constantly raids and undermines unions affiliated to recognized labour bodies in Canada and this includes the Canadian Association of Industrial Mechanical and Allied Workers....We do not condone the unethical practices of any employer, including Bell Foundry, who chooses to use the ex parte injunction and other means, rather than bargain in good faith.¹⁰³

This statement satisfied the Canadian Railway union. Representatives of Local 107 and five other CBRT Locals who had already drawn up letters of disaffiliation from MFL and WDLC told reporters, "In view of the labour council's press release the action we were contemplating (withdrawal from the labour council) will be cancelled."¹⁰⁴

The MFL's policies regarding the Bell dispute not only aroused the opposition of some of its Canadian affiliates, but also brought CAIMAW the support and sympathy of some members of the general public who were "disgusted by the treatment a Canadian union is receiving at the hands of the so-called international or American unions operating in this country".¹⁰⁵ The Federation also found itself under attack from the press.¹⁰⁶ Wrote Dudley Magnus of the Winnipeg Free Press,

The organized labour movement is having an understandably difficult time explaining its refusal to help a certain union on strike at a local foundry. The union and the strike are legal. It is over wages and working conditions. It fits properly

into labour's long struggle on behalf of the working man. What makes this particular strike so different that it doesn't even merit the moral support, not to mention financial help, of the Canadian Congress of labour and its Winnipeg affiliates? The difference is that employees at Bell Foundry broke away from the CLC [sic] and joined an independent union which the CLC has outlawed. Why should the CLC help workers who quit to join another union and thereby condone what is called "raiding" in the labour movement? The CLC may be able to justify its position to its own and its members satisfaction. But in the light of the trade union movement's expressed concern for all workers, organized or unorganized, the CLC has a lot of explaining to do before the average man will understand what is going on and why at Bell Foundry.¹⁰⁷

In fact, the Bell dispute had placed CLC affiliated organizations in the difficult position of having to balance sectarian interests, no doubt based on the principle of protection of jurisdiction, against the trade union principle of support for workers engaged in a legitimate struggle with the employer. By choosing to place sectarian interests before trade union principles, the MFL brought down on its head the angry opposition of the general public, the press and several Canadian affiliates.

Due to Bell Foundry's refusal to negotiate with CAIMAW and to its determination to continue production with the use of non-union labour, CAIMAW officials also hoped to elicit the aid of Manitoba's NDP

government in their efforts to obtain a collective agreement. The government, however, did nothing to help resolve the dispute. Although Labour Minister Russ Paulley stated that he was "strongly opposed to the use of the ex parte injunction by the employer", his only promise of action was a statement that the "Manitoba government is considering proposing legislation to scrap the provincial law that permits the use of injunctions in connection with the picket lines".¹⁰⁸ This promise for the distant future was, of course, of little help to the Bell strikers. The labour minister also told the legislature that his department would investigate the union charges that strike breakers were being brought in to replace the striking workers at the foundry.¹⁰⁹ If such an investigation was ever conducted, however, its results were never announced, and it produced no action from the government. Also, a request by the union for the establishment of an industrial inquiry commission to investigate the dispute was denied. Mr. Paulley explained this refusal by telling the legislature that "he did not feel this type of inquiry should be established at the present time....the law did not allow him to impose compulsory arbitration on the parties".¹¹⁰

The refusal of the government to intervene in the dispute brought it under attack from the Letter Carriers Union. Mr. Mowatt pointed out that the dispute was for a first time contract at the plant, and noted that the government had often brought opposing parties together under the Manitoba Labour Relations Act in such circumstances. He cited the disputes of the bricklayers, the abattoir workers and the Teamster drivers for crippled children as examples of government involvement in the achievement of a first time contract. "Labour

Minister Paulley has failed in his duties" regarding the strike at Bell Foundry, said Mr. Mowatt. He even accused Mr. Paulley of now "denying receipt" of the telegram from the union requesting the establishment of the commission.¹¹¹ The Winnipeg newspapers that were covering the dispute agreed that the intervention of the government could prove useful in bringing the parties together, and could not understand why Mr. Paulley was refusing to act.¹¹²

But Manitoba had an NDP government that reflected the close relationship that existed between the NDP and international unions. The cabinet contained many ministers who had ties to international unions - unions which had pledged themselves to the destruction of CAIMAW. The labour minister himself had come from the ranks of a CLC affiliated international railway union. Mr. Sid Green, Minister of Mines and Natural Resources, had been the legal advisor for the Molders Union during the court battles that had accompanied the breakup of Local 174. He had, apparently, developed at that time a "passionate hatred for CAIMAW".¹¹³ There was no particular love for the independent Canadian union within the ranks of the Schreyer government, a fact which, to CAIMAW officials, explained the government's reluctance to intervene in the Bell dispute.

Finally, fourteen months after the strike began, the Molders Union signed up the non-union employees working behind the picket line, and were granted certification at the plant. The employer then signed a collective agreement with the Molders "quietly and without any resistance".¹¹⁴ CAIMAW's first strike had been effectively broken.

CLC affiliates in Manitoba often proved themselves to have "an inadequate respect for each others picket lines,"¹¹⁵ a fact which no doubt proved detrimental to the effectiveness of any strike. In view of the stand taken by MFL in refusing moral and financial aid to CAIMAW strikes, CAIMAW was perhaps particularly vulnerable to the use of strike breaking tactics by employers. Due to the influence of international unions within the NDP, CAIMAW was not likely to receive wholehearted assistance from the NDP government in such a situation. At the same time, however, the MFL's policy of protecting the jurisdictions of international affiliates at the expense of trade union principles earned CAIMAW the sympathy and support of some members of the general public, the press and perhaps most importantly, Canadian affiliates of the CLC. Due to these factors, the strike at Bell Foundry was broken - but CAIMAW as a union was not.

CAIMAW AND POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT

The workers who broke away from the Molders Union had been used to the concept of political partisan involvement by unions. The Molders Union had supported the establishment of the NDP in 1960, and Local 174 was itself affiliated to the NDP in Manitoba. As soon as CAIMAW was established, therefore, its members addressed themselves to the question of the political policies that the new breakaway union would adopt.¹¹⁶

Initially, to many members, support for the NDP seemed a logical direction to take. After all, their break with the Molders Union had been due to a perceived drain of funds, lack of service, dictatorial attitude of the international executive and lack of respect for the rights of Canadian workers. They had no quarrel with the Molder's support for the NDP. Besides, the NDP was the only existing political party in Canada that could be viewed as the political arm of labour. However, the relationship of the NDP with international unions proved to be a crucial factor in preventing the union from adopting this policy.

First, some of the membership in CAIMAW did not feel that the NDP was going far enough in the pursuit of socialist goals. To them, the NDP seemed "no different from the rest".¹¹⁷ Perhaps they concluded, as the Waffle group came to conclude, that it was the influence of a conservative American labour movement that prevented the NDP from promoting true socialist ideals, a belief that would provide this group with another reason for opposing international unionism. Certainly, it was a factor which led this group to oppose CAIMAW support for the NDP, and instead to "look for the formation of a completely new political party" that would more actively represent the needs of Canadian labour.¹¹⁸

Secondly, many CAIMAW members who did support the NDP changed their attitude when, as members of an independent breakaway group operating outside the ranks of the traditional labour establishment, they found their offers of campaign assistance politely refused.¹¹⁹ To

accept support from members of the maverick group would leave the NDP open to the same accusations of support of dual unionism that had plagued the CCF when it accepted the support of the CCL. This, the NDP was no doubt anxious to avoid. But CAIMAW members felt shunned by the political party they supported. The NDP's policies towards them left them bitter and "soured a lot of people" towards the concept of CAIMAW support for a political party.¹²⁰ For both these reasons, the constitution of the new union prohibited affiliation and donations to "any political party".¹²¹

This constitutional provision was not likely to undergo any change because, as CAIMAW developed, its differences with the NDP increased. In 1969, Mr. L. Orlikow, NDP Member of Parliament, called upon Bristol employees to cast their ballots in favour of the IAM during CAIMAW's certification campaign at their plant. He justified his intervention on the grounds that the workers "need powerful assistance in the event of a strike".¹²² What Mr. Orlikow appears to have overlooked is that part of the discontent of the Bristol workers stemmed from what they considered to be inadequate assistance from their international union during a strike the previous year. Certainly, his comments could not have done much to endear the NDP to CAIMAW. The inconsistency of the NDP's position in supporting both nationalism and international unions was brought to the fore when Mr. E. B. Osler, Liberal Member of Parliament for Winnipeg South Centre, criticized Mr. Orlikow in the House of Commons for "having taken it upon himself to intervene in the free election of workers at Bristol Aerospace in the constituency I represent".¹²³ He pointed out that Mr. Orlikow was, in

effect, urging unionists to rely on the power of foreign unions. "This from a member of a party that decries all American influence in our Canadian society, this is strange talk indeed" he said. In the House of Commons, Mr. Osler asked members of the NDP what they thought of this conduct by one of their party. "I received" he reported, "no understandable reply".¹²⁴

Moreover, the Manitoba NDP government provided, if anything, a hostile environment for the development of the breakaway union. As discussed above, it was a government that appeared to have no sympathy for CAIMAW. The government's refusal to intervene in the Bell Foundry dispute could only be expected to strengthen the resolve of CAIMAW to refrain from NDP support. During the Schreyer administration, this situation did not change. In the midst of a CAIMAW strike in 1974 at the government run Flyer Industries, Sid Green announced that management had the right to hire non-union labour, and that he would hire non-union labour in the Flyer Industries strike if necessary.¹²⁵ Minister of Labour Russ Paulley stated that "he would be willing to open the plant if enough people were prepared to return to work". When asked if that meant the government was prepared to hire strike breakers, Paulley answered "That doesn't necessarily mean the goon type strikebreaking." "He obviously meant he would hire the non-goon kind," retorted McEvoy.¹²⁶

CAIMAW and the Schreyer government clashed again during the 1976 strike at Griffin Steel. A union request for a conciliation board and a commission was flatly denied by Paulley, as was a request to regulate compulsory overtime, the major issue in the dispute. In evaluating the government response to the strike, McEvoy complained:

They sure didn't do anything to help us. All they did was fiddle around with time and three-quarter legislation when what we really needed was legislation regulating compulsory overtime....The NDP is going to have to make up its mind whether it is a party of the workers or it isn't!¹²⁷

Today, the relationship between CAIMAW and the NDP is mixed. On one hand, some NDP politicians have been supportive of CAIMAW, and CAIMAW recognizes the NDP party as the political party in Canada most likely to be favourable to labour.¹²⁸ On the other hand, CAIMAW's experiences with the Schreyer administration have left a legacy of bitterness towards the NDP within CAIMAW's ranks, and an attitude that "some political parties are better than others, but none of them can be completely trusted".¹²⁹ Also, CAIMAW adheres to the view that political beliefs are the personal concern of individual members, and not a subject appropriate for a union as an organization. Consequently, CAIMAW still follows the policy of refraining from affiliation with any political party, "preferring to leave such choice to the member on an individual basis".¹³⁰ A policy resolution put forward at the 1979 National convention that would allow the National union or the local unions to "support a particular party in a particular circumstance",

including providing financial donations, was defeated.¹³¹ "After what they did to us?" asked some convention delegates. "Remember Griffin Steel!"¹³² The National union does, however, have the right to actively support pro-labour legislation and oppose anti-labour legislation. It can and does pursue a policy of political involvement, concerning itself with such issues as Workmans' Compensation legislation and mining legislation. It supports or condemns political policies, including those of the NDP,¹³³ but remains aloof from partisan politics and political parties.

CAIMAW AND CANADA'S LABOUR ESTABLISHMENT

THE MANITOBA LABOUR BOARD

The CLC's declaration of war on CAIMAW caused particular concern to the new union regarding cases it presented before the Manitoba Labour Board. Cases put before the board were heard by a three man panel, consisting of a chairman, a representative from management and a representative from labour. But labour representatives were typically drawn from the ranks of international unions, due to their firmly entrenched position in Canada's recognized labour establishment. Since these unions were bound to the CLC's publicly declared policy of destroying CAIMAW, CAIMAW officers doubted whether their cases would receive an impartial hearing, and called upon the Labour Minister to "disqualify the present labour representatives...from adjudicating any

matter involving the Canadian Association".¹³⁴ They argued, "It would be like asking the association's enemies for assistance in certification matters if the association were to appear before a board on which the present labour representatives sit."¹³⁵

Such disqualifications were not forthcoming, leaving CAIMAW with little choice but to take its chances with the existing composition of the Labour Board. But officers of the new union remained convinced that this was a factor that was detrimental to their interests. Such beliefs were strengthened when the Manitoba Labour Board made rulings on CAIMAW certifications which, to CAIMAW officers, seemed unfair. One example of such a ruling occurred in December, 1965 when CAIMAW applied for the bargaining rights at Community Chev Motors, an unorganized plant. The union had signed up a majority of the painters, auto-body mechanics and mechanics working at the plant. But the board ruled that these employees did not represent a unit appropriate for bargaining, that office employees must be included in the application and denied a certification vote on the grounds that CAIMAW did not have as members a majority of this larger unit.¹³⁶ Another example of what appeared to CAIMAW officers to be an unjust ruling occurred in 1968 during a CAIMAW certification attempt at Tantalum Mining Corporation, an uncertified underground mine. CAIMAW began its organizing drive at the mine in the early part of February, 1968 and on April 10, 1968, filed a certification application with 90 percent of the employees as members. But on April 4, 1968, the United Steelworkers of America filed an application for certification, claiming to have a majority of the employees as members of their union. CAIMAW pointed out to the board

that under the Manitoba Labour Relations Act application for certification of unorganized workers could be made at any time, and urged the board to hold a certification vote. But the board denied CAIMAW the vote, and certified the United Steelworkers of America as the bargaining agent for the mine.¹³⁷ Such rulings merely reinforced the view of CAIMAW officers that, due to the composition of the board, "any technicality at all would result in our application for certification being dismissed".¹³⁸

CAIMAW AND THE CLC

In the early days of its existence, CAIMAW did not adopt a hostile stance towards the CLC. As stated in the first edition of the new union's newspaper, "The Association has not had any quarrel with the Canadian Labour Congress or other affiliated unions".¹³⁹ In fact, the question of CAIMAW's affiliation to the CLC was raised at the new union's first convention in October, 1965.¹⁴⁰ Although the motion for CLC affiliation was defeated on the convention floor, the very fact that the issue was raised indicates that, initially at least, hostility towards the CLC was not a plank in CAIMAW's platform.

It is doubtful whether the CLC could have accepted CAIMAW as an affiliate, even if such an application had been made. First, the CLC adheres to a principle of the exclusive jurisdiction of its affiliates.¹⁴¹ Although jurisdictions do overlap to a certain extent, CAIMAW was organizing in fields already allocated to the Machinists, the Molders and the Steelworkers. CAIMAW's jurisdiction would, therefore,

have been unacceptable to the CLC. Secondly, the change in union certification of the plants making up Local 174 of the Molders was regarded as the raiding of a CLC affiliate, an act expressly forbidden by the CLC.¹⁴²

In fact, the CLC's policies of raiding operated to prevent the dissident Molders from replacing their union with another CLC affiliate, and forced them to stay on the path of developing their own independent union. John Gugulyn, in his capacity as one of the leaders of CAIMAW, approached an international union in 1964 with a view to CAIMAW joining them. The international, however, was unable to accept the group for fear of leaving itself open to charges of raiding another CLC affiliate.¹⁴³

The fact that Gugulyn considered the merger of CAIMAW with an international union indicates that his motive in supporting the formation of CAIMAW was not nationalism per se, but the desire to achieve better union representation than that provided by the Molders. He and his supporters were union dissidents rather than nationalists, and as such, another union that could provide good representation was a viable alternative - even an international one. Whether the majority of the CAIMAW membership would have supported such a move if anything had resulted from the talks with the unnamed international will have to remain speculation. But presumably, such a proposal would have caused the nationalists within CAIMAW's ranks, anxious to achieve Canadian

control over their own affairs, to part company with the union dissidents on the issue. Because of the CLC's policies on raiding, such an event did not take place. The union dissidents and the nationalists continued to share a common cause.

The dissident members of Molders Local 174 had, therefore, because of restraints inherent in the system, embarked on a path that was to keep them outside the traditional labour establishment when they broke with the Molders Union. As a result, they were free to develop their own independent policies, which became increasingly critical of American domination of the Canadian labour movement.¹⁴⁴ In the surge of Canadian nationalism that was sweeping the country, these policies had appeal for many Canadians, and were the cause of some discomfort for the CLC. By the time the CLC had publicly vowed to destroy CAIMAW, the new union had developed enough faith and confidence in itself and its policies that it was determined to fight for the right to follow an independent course. To reporter Dudley Magnus, the fault for this state of affairs lay with the CLC, and its inability to effectively deal with situations where workers were dissatisfied with their incumbent union. He wrote:

The CLC was at fault in not providing some means to allow a change for members that find they want another leadership. The CLC policy has been since its 1956 merger convention, that raiding is forbidden, period. Thus CAIMAW men, rejected by the so-called recognized labour movement because of technicalities of the CLC constitution which border

on the arrogant, were compelled to go it on their own. As time passed, the dissidents grew in physical and mental strength. They now believe in themselves and with no holds barred will fight to maintain the status quo.¹⁴⁵

As CAIMAW established itself and consolidated its position outside the ranks of "legitimate labour", the CLC "let the lone Winnipeg union run on, trying to forget it existed".¹⁴⁶ But CAIMAW's 1969 applications for Flyer Coach Industries and Bristol Aerospace resulted in a dramatic change in that policy. Speculated Magnus:

It became clear to the CLC that something had to be done to placate the international U. S. head office of the Machinists...."What next" could be perhaps the machinists of the same international union employed at the Winnipeg International Airport by Air Canada. "When will this maverick union stop raiding?" the CLC muttered angrily under its breath.¹⁴⁷

The policy of the CLC, therefore, would now be the destruction of CAIMAW and the return of its members to the CLC fold. The justification given for this policy was the "unprincipled" actions of CAIMAW in raiding CLC affiliates. In fact, it appears that this criticism was unfair. CAIMAW's objectives in terms of growth were directed towards previously unorganized plants and, generally speaking, its expansion was in plants where no union had previously existed (see Table II). The CLC could hardly justify its objective of returning

these CAIMAW members to the CLC fold when they had never been in the fold in the first place. Those attacks on the certifications of other unions that were made occurred only when workers in these plants, dissatisfied with their incumbent union, approached CAIMAW seeking change. CAIMAW's attitude to such requests was that "individuals have the right to belong to the union of their choice in a democratic society".¹⁴⁸ Although this argument did not impress the CLC, it found support in the press.

Why doesn't the congress admit it was at fault in the first place in not having adequate facilities for dissidents? In a democracy there are always dissidents. Why won't the congress recognize that if a group wants to be all Canadian, that's the business of the workers themselves....Besides, unions that have rump movements in them have generally asked for rebellion, in the same sense that employers wouldn't have unions unless they deserved them.¹⁴⁹

The campaign launched by the CLC in 1969 did not succeed in destroying CAIMAW. Defiance of the CLC policy by several Canadian affiliates was, no doubt, an important factor contributing to its failure. Furthermore, during the dispute at Bell Foundry, the policy brought down on the heads of the CLC, the Manitoba Federation of Labour and the Winnipeg and District Labour Council the criticism of the public, the press and many Canadian affiliates. As such, it perhaps inflicted more damage to the "legitimate" ranks of labour than it did to its target - CAIMAW. At a time when Canadian nationalism was on the

rise, the policy of protection of international unions by destroying a Canadian organization caused embarrassment for the CLC and gained for CAIMAW the sympathetic support of many Canadians.

They were certified by the Manitoba Labour Board and they became a legitimate member union of the Canadian trade union movement. The "crime" they had committed was to break away, which isn't allowed by the big unions of the CLC....They are "unprincipled" only because they committed the "crime" of daring to start out on their own as a Canadian group. Personally, I think they should be in the "house of labour" as Mr. Stevens calls it. But I also think they are entitled to choose whatever union they want - even their own if they can afford to start one, which is what they did.¹⁵⁰

The emergence of CAIMAW on the industrial relations scene illuminated weaknesses that existed in the Canadian labour establishment itself. First, the inconsistency of the NDP's position in simultaneously supporting international unionism and Canadian independence was made clear when NDP members chose to express an opinion during CAIMAW certification campaigns. No doubt for this reason, the NDP tended to remain carefully aloof from such contests. And the inconsistency of Manitoba's NDP government in simultaneously depicting itself as a political party sympathetic to Canadian labour and at the same time refusing to assist CAIMAW, a legitimate trade union certified by the Manitoba Labour Board, brought it under attack from some Canadian CLC affiliates.

Secondly, the CLC's policy of the destruction of CAIMAW led to the refusal of the MFL and the WDLC to provide moral and financial assistance to CAIMAW members on strike at Bell Foundry. This policy illuminated an interunion split within the Congress and the Federation, a split between international and Canadian affiliates. The failure of the CLC to accomplish the destruction of CAIMAW was no doubt largely due to the refusal of Canadian affiliates to adhere to the policy. Moreover, the CLC's policy earned for CAIMAW the sympathy and support of an increasingly nationalistic public and press.

These weaknesses within the Canadian labour institutions tended to offset the difficulties CAIMAW faced due to the firmly entrenched position of international unions in Canada. CAIMAW, therefore, would not only survive - it would grow.

FOOTNOTES

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2. Ibid.
3. Information obtained from Mr. P. McEvoy, Regional Vice President, Canadian Association of Industrial Mechanical and Allied Workers, personal interview, Vancouver, B. C.
4. Information obtained from Mr. A. Pitt, op. cit., personal interview, Vancouver, B. C.
5. Information obtained from Mr. P. McEvoy, op. cit., personal interview, Vancouver, B. C.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. S. Jamieson, Industrial Relations in Canada, 2nd ed., Toronto, Macmillan of Canada, 1975, pp.46-47.
9. Ibid., p.47.
10. J. Crispo, International Unionism, Toronto, McGraw-Hill Co. of Canada Ltd., 1967, p.277.
11. Ibid., p.82.
12. Ibid., p.181.
13. Jamieson, op. cit., pp.57-58.
14. Ibid., p.56.
15. R. Adams, "Canada-U. S. Labor Link Under Stress", Industrial Relations, vol. 15, no. 3, Oct. 1976, p.303.
16. Information obtained from Mr. P. McEvoy, op. cit., personal interview, Vancouver, B. C.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.

20. M. Thompson, "The Evolving Role of Canadians in International Unions", paper presented to the 17th Annual Conference, Canadian Industrial Relations Association, June 1-3, 1980.
21. Jamieson, op. cit., p.46.
22. Thompson, op. cit.
23. Information obtained from Mr. P. McEvoy, op. cit., personal interview, Vancouver, B. C.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
26. Crispo, op. cit., p.321.
27. Jamieson, op. cit., p.20.
28. D. Bercuson, Fools and Wise Men, Toronto, McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd., 1978, p.69.
29. Ibid., p.33.
30. Information obtained from Mr. P. McEvoy, op. cit., personal interview, Vancouver, B. C.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid.
34. The term "open season" refers to that period of time during the life of a collective agreement when application may be made to the Labour Board for a change in bargaining agent.
35. Information obtained from Mr. P. McEvoy, op. cit., personal interview, Vancouver, B. C.
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37. International Molders and Allied Workers Union, "Statement of Charges", April 8, 1964, CAIMAW Union Files.
38. International Molders and Allied Workers Union, "Notice of Suspension", April 8, 1964, CAIMAW Union Files.
39. Winnipeg Free Press, c. April 30, 1964, CAIMAW Union Files.
40. Winnipeg Free Press, c. May 25, 1964, CAIMAW Union Files.
41. Winnipeg Free Press, c. Feb. 1, 1965, CAIMAW Union Files.

42. Winnipeg Free Press, c. Feb. 3, 1965, CAIMAW Union Files.
43. Information in a letter from W. A. Lazzerini to P. McEvoy, Jan. 11, 1965, CAIMAW Union Files.
44. Winnipeg Free Press, c. Feb. 1, 1965, CAIMAW Union Files.
45. Ibid.
46. Information obtained from Mr. P. McEvoy, op. cit., personal interview, Vancouver, B. C.
47. Bulletin, vol. 1, no. 1, Sept. 1965, p. 3.
48. Information obtained from Mr. P. McEvoy, op. cit., personal interview, Vancouver, B. C.
49. Ibid.
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59. Review, vol. 3, no. 3, June 1967, p.4.
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65. Ibid.

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84. Winnipeg Free Press, c. March 1, 1970, CAIMAW Union Files.
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90. Ibid., c. Oct. 30, 1969, CAIMAW Union Files.
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94. Winnipeg Tribune, c. Oct. 16, 1969, CAIMAW Union Files.
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102. Ibid.
103. Winnipeg Tribune, c. Dec. 8, 1969, CAIMAW Union Files.
104. Ibid.
105. Winnipeg Free Press, c. Nov. 10, 1969, CAIMAW Union Files.
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148. Information obtained from Mr. P. McEvoy, op. cit., personal interview, Vancouver, B. C.
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Chapter IV

The Vancouver Outcasts

...to advance the material well - being and prosperity of Canadian workers, and to build a Canadian union which will return to the ideals of democracy and liberty upon which the labour movement was built.

George Brown

THE LENKURT DISPUTE

IBEW AND LOCAL 213

While the Molders Union was facing outright revolt in Winnipeg, trouble was brewing in Vancouver for another American based craft union, the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW). The source of that trouble was IBEW Local 213, a large multiplant local which represented linemen, wiremen, electricians and factory workers in such diversified operations as B. C. Hydro and electronic manufacturing companies.¹ Local 213 had always been known for its militancy, and according to some of its membership, "the fighting tradition of Local 213, IBEW, since its formation in 1901 was a matter of pride to all members".² Local 213 also contained a significant Communist party caucus, and therefore had a strong left wing tradition.³

Relations between the local union and the international had been strained for years. In 1955, Business Manager George Gee had been expelled by international officers in Washington, and 23 leading members of the local were suspended for up to fifteen years, all on charges of communism. In the years that followed, four members were suspended by the international for opposing the union's dues structure. The local was placed under trusteeship and denied membership meetings for a period of six years, and fourteen years of repeated requests by the local for the removal of the appointed international staff representative, Jack Ross, had been denied.⁴ Ross was unpopular with the membership. They believed he had been interfering with and undermining contract

negotiations for years, and making "deals" behind the backs of the membership. Ross did, however, enjoy the full confidence and support of William Ladyman, the Toronto-based Canadian vice-president of IBEW.⁵ Local 213's complaints, therefore, fell on deaf ears. In February 1966, friction between the international union and Local 213 was again brought to the fore when the international officers fired the local's assistant business agent, John Morrison.

Morrison had been appointed to his position by the local's elected business agent, Art O'Keeffe. He had never been a favourite with the membership, but his dismissal by Washington headquarters was perceived as unwarranted interference by the international union, and caused considerable resentment within the local.⁶ Worse yet, the procedures followed by the international in accomplishing the dismissal were regarded as "kangaroo court tactics" and as a "flagrant flouting of justice". Art O'Keeffe, who acted as counsel for Morrison at the hearings, protested to Ladyman that the trial had been conducted in abstentia, that valuable evidence had been denied admittance, and that the proceedings had not resulted in a fair hearing.⁷

Unrest was becoming particularly evident among the local's members employed at Lenkurt Electric, a manufacturer of telecommunications equipment employing approximately 350 unionized workers. Lenkurt workers complained that their elected shop steward committee had failed to provide adequate leadership, had failed to process grievances to the membership's satisfaction, and that the chief shop steward had not attended a union meeting in two years.

Consequently, in early 1966, a completely new group of representatives were elected to the shop steward committee, including a new chief shop steward, George Brown. It was a more militant group, who immediately "began to deal with the backlog of grievances".⁸

THE LENKURT WALKOUT

The collective agreement between Lenkurt Electric and IBEW expired on March 1, 1966. Negotiations for a new contract began in January 1966, but quickly reached an impasse. The company was willing to provide employees in the Metal Shop with a small wage increase, but insisted that the rest of the contract be extended, unchanged, for another year. The company arrived at negotiation meetings unprepared, unwilling to make any concessions in their position, and began stockpiling, probably in anticipation of a strike.⁹

The employees working at the plant were mostly women. Their wages were as low as \$1.51 per hour, making unacceptable the company's position of extending the contract unchanged. Furthermore, the membership was well aware that the company's stockpiling would undermine their position if negotiations resulted in an impasse and a strike. Therefore, in February 1966, a union meeting attended by two hundred Lenkurt workers voted in favour of a ban on all overtime - a typical union response to such a situation. But O'Keeffe expressed concern about the militancy of the Lenkurt women, telling the meeting that he would "know what to do if only I had two hundred hairy chested linemen".¹⁰ Even women who had never before spoken at a union meeting

leapt to their feet to rebuke him for such an attitude. Despite O'Keeffe's fears, the Lenkurt women made it clear that they were prepared to fight for an improved contract.

The company responded to the overtime ban by pressuring the employees, interrogating them as to their refusal to work overtime, and recording such refusals as instances of absenteeism in their files.¹¹ "Many of the women were reduced to tears over it".¹² At a department meeting, employees were told that if they agreed to work overtime they would be placed on a preferred overtime list, that anyone caught talking union on coffee or lunch breaks would be fired on the spot, and that no one needed to belong to the union to work at Lenkurt.¹³

The situation became so tense that union representatives George Brown and Tom Constable¹⁴ (who had replaced John Morrison) met with the company on April 23, 1966, to demand that a stop be put to the company's pressure tactics. They managed to extract a promise from Lenkurt's Vice-President Mark Swails that the employees would not be asked to work overtime until a new contract was signed. When news of the promise hit the shop floor, the employees felt that the pressure had been lifted and the tension was greatly reduced.¹⁵ Unfortunately, the promise had been made without the knowledge or consent of the company president, Charles Hunter, who was attending a conference when the agreement was made. When Hunter returned to the plant on Monday, April 25, he immediately reinstated the overtime requirement. Sifting down to the workers, this information created confusion and chaos. To

many, it represented an outright breach of faith that was the "last straw".¹⁶

To add to the confusion, the IBEW leadership were all in Winnipeg attending a CLC convention, and were not therefore on hand to provide guidance. The union was not in a legal strike position at the time. Although the collective agreement had expired on March 1, under the B. C. Labour Relations Act it was still a legal contract until conciliation procedures had been exhausted. This requirement had not been met, but in response to the company's latest position on overtime, the workers walked off the job at 10:00 o'clock on April 27.

The company responded by immediately firing five employees, apparently chosen at random from among the striking workers.¹⁷ Charles Hunter then sent telegrams to all the employees' homes, telling them to report to work on their next designated shift or be fired. The five people already fired would not be reinstated. Therefore, 257 employees ignored the order, and were dismissed by the company. The company then applied for and received injunctions restraining picketing, and advertised in the paper to fill the vacancies left by the dismissals.¹⁸

This was the situation to which Vancouver's labour leaders returned from the CLC convention, a convention which had passed a resolution calling for all affiliates to fight court injunctions, even if civil disobedience was necessary.¹⁹

THE LENKURT SELLOUT

On May 3, Lenkurt spokesman Ben Metcalfe announced that the firm had received more than 1,300 job applications since advertising for workers to replace the 257 that had remained off the job. "We have already hired seventy five new employees and interviews will continue until May 26" he said. Meanwhile, the B. C. Federation of Labour and the Vancouver and District Labour Council (VDLC) pledged full financial and moral support for the fired employees, and O'Keefe announced that he and other union officials were meeting with the company in an effort to get the employees reinstated.²⁰

Union officials did meet with the company on May 9, but unexpectedly, O'Keefe was not invited to the meeting. The two union representatives present, Jack Ross and Angus MacDonald, president of Local 213,²¹ signed an agreement with the company whereby all fired employees could apply for their former jobs, and there would be no discrimination against those rehired because of their participation in the walkout. However, all seniority would be lost, and it was left unspecified exactly how many of the 257 employees would be rehired. The membership of Local 213 angrily repudiated the agreement which MacDonald had signed, and the B. C. Federation refused to endorse the settlement.²²

Instead, on May 11, 1966, a demonstration organized jointly by the B. C. Federation, the VDLC and Local 213, IBEW, was held outside the Lenkurt plant in defiance of the court injunction prohibiting picketing.

The support given to this demonstration by Vancouver's labour leaders was no doubt influenced by the recent CLC resolution to fight such injunctions. Two hundred demonstrators and seven carloads of RCMP officers descended on the plant. Although a Sheriff attempted to read aloud the court injunction, a mass coughing fit overcame the demonstrators, preventing his words from being heard. Paddy Neale, secretary of the Vancouver and District Labour Council, told the press "Our intention is to shut down the plant - then maybe they'll talk to us. If necessary we'll have another picket line here tomorrow - a bigger one."²³

The next day, at least three hundred pickets appeared outside the Lenkurt plant. The RCMP took a tough stand, and demonstrators and police clashed in a scene that was described as "the worst in Vancouver area picket lines in several years". Pushing, kicking and shoving erupted in the confrontation. A union official charged police with brutality and intimidation, and police arrested six picketers and two union leaders, charging them with contempt of court.²⁴

Violence broke out again that night at a Local 213 meeting in the IBEW union hall. An executive meeting was held prior to a general Lenkurt membership meeting, at which MacDonald presented the executive with a telegram from Ladyman which ordered the suspension and dismissal of Art O'Keeffe. O'Keeffe had been charged with a breach of the union's constitution for failing to honour the May 9 agreement signed by MacDonald, and Ladyman took the action "under the authority given him by the IBEW's international office in Washington, D. C."²⁵ "In fact, Ross

and MacDonald had set O'Keefe up from the beginning," said Jess Succamore. "Ross and O'Keefe did not get along, and Ross used Lenkurt to get rid of O'Keefe."²⁶ Paddy Neale agreed with this assessment, adding "MacDonald was after O'Keefe's job".²⁷

But a group of activists in the strike had heard of Ladyman's order, and reacted angrily and violently to O'Keefe's dismissal. They burst into the room to break up the executive meeting, charged MacDonald with betrayal of the Lenkurt employees, and blamed him for the suspension of O'Keefe. They punched and cursed MacDonald, bodily ejected him from the hall, and posted guards to prevent his return.²⁸

Meanwhile, the general meeting of Lenkurt employees was convening in the hall. Hearing of these events, they passed resolutions condemning MacDonald and declaring non-confidence in his leadership. MacDonald was forbidden to attend any further meetings of the local, and full support was pledged for O'Keefe. Finally, a resolution was passed instructing MacDonald to sign strike benefit cheques for the strikers. The strikers had not, apparently, received any strike pay from the local union's \$40,000 strike fund because MacDonald refused to sign the cheques. Previously the local had provided strike benefits in cases of illegal strikes.²⁹ It appeared to the membership, therefore, that there was no excuse for MacDonald's actions.³⁰ As the meeting ended, volunteers got sleeping bags so that they could occupy and guard the hall all night. "We want to make sure that MacDonald doesn't sneak back and padlock the place. This is our hall" said one of the union members.³¹

Despite the resolutions passed by the membership, Ladyman insisted that "O'Keefe was still suspended and has no status in the union".³² O'Keefe, however, continued to report to his office and carry out his union duties. "I've been suspended," he said, "but the members don't seem to care about it, so I'm not worried either."³³ At a membership meeting on May 15, one thousand members reaffirmed their support of O'Keefe. When the local's vice-president, Fred Allison, ruled that O'Keefe could not address the meeting because he had been suspended, the membership roared its disapproval and forcibly took the microphone away from him. Allison adjourned the meeting and walked out, accompanied by another executive member, Frank Hogan and ten rank and file members. The membership continued the meeting under a new chairman, passed a vote of confidence in both O'Keefe and Morrison and called for the dismissal of Jack Ross.³⁴

On May 16, a meeting was held between the company and a joint B. C. Federation, VDLC and IBEW committee in an attempt to reach a settlement over the issue of the dismissed workers. The labour committee consisted of Syd Thompson of the International Woodworkers Association (IWA), Jack Moore, vice-president of the B. C. Federation, Jack Ross and John Hiebert, an executive member of Local 213 who supported MacDonald. The discussion with Lenkurt, however, proved futile. Syd Thompson reported:

The company is a hard-nosed outfit. We (the committee) recognized the seriousness of the situation and we just about bent over backwards to

find a solution, but the company wouldn't give an inch. The company refused point blank to compromise on its offer of May 9 to the strikers. We pointed out that the labour movement would never tolerate these terms but we got nowhere. The company's out to fight us on the picket lines and in the courts.³⁵

In fact, the efforts of the Vancouver labour officials to achieve a settlement with the company were futile from the beginning because, behind the scenes, the company was being supported in its stand by IBEW officials. "The international reps, Ross, Ladyman and MacDonald, were making back door deals with Hunter" said Paddy Neale. "That is why we weren't getting anywhere with him."³⁶ According to Donna Pooghkay, a Lenkurt striker, the international representatives really had little choice. "They were under orders from Washington to get us back to work or else."³⁷ But it appears that the IBEW officers were also motivated by their own hierarchial attitudes and ambitions. "Ross announced that maybe the company's position was not such a bad thing, because it gave the company an opportunity to get rid of troublemakers, and the union would be able to get rid of people it didn't want" said Paddy Neale. As for MacDonald, "he was in cahoots because he wanted O'Keefe's job".³⁸

The efforts of the B. C. Federation and VDLC to win a better settlement for the fired Lenkurt workers brought them a sharp rebuke from William Ladyman in Toronto. "The Federation has had a habit in recent years of getting into things" he said. "The international has not asked for help from the B. C. Federation. We are quite big enough

to settle this ourselves." He said he understood the Federation's main concern was to avoid entanglements in the IBEW's internal problems, while getting the 257 dismissed Lenkurt employee back to work. "But we are able to do it better than they are" he said.³⁹ Paddy Neale, secretary of VDLC replied "I wish Mr. Ladyman realized how difficult the situation is out here - I wish he was interested enough to come out and look at the situation."⁴⁰

Meanwhile, the Executive Board of Local 213 asked the B. C. Supreme Court for an injunction giving it possession of the union hall, and for a restraining order preventing O'Keeffe, Constable and others from taking possession of the local's records and assets.⁴¹ Both orders were eventually issued. "We always thought it was our hall" said Donna Pooghkay. "But the courts ruled that it belonged to the international."⁴²

Finally, on May 28, a mass union meeting was held at which the Lenkurt Strike Committee presented two motions to the membership. The first motion was for the repudiation of the terms of the settlement as a sellout. The second motion was a reluctant recommendation to return to work. A spokesman for the committee then told the executive, "You are the Judas Escariots of the labour movement, and someday, you will be cleansed from it."⁴³ With that, the committee walked out of the meeting.

Knowing that they could not expect to win any concessions from the company, the workers voted to return to work. "The inevitable

results of betrayal and disorganization had been accepted by the strikers."⁴⁴ But they also unanimously repudiated the terms of the settlement. The B. C. Federation and the VDLC were not enthusiastic about the agreement either. "I'm disappointed" said Paddy Neale. "They (the strikers) are going back for the same offer they rejected some time ago."⁴⁵ Angus MacDonald's attitude, however, was that "if the workers had not been mislead, they would have been back at work a long time ago."⁴⁶

THE AFTERMATH

In fact, at least 76 of the 257 striking employees were rejected for reemployment by the company.⁴⁷ Those who were rehired returned to work with a loss of all seniority rights. It was a crushing defeat for the membership of Local 213, who had been fighting the combined forces of the courts, the company and their own union. Furthermore, the entire newly elected Lenkurt shop steward committee were refused reemployment by the company, as was any Lenkurt worker who was in a position to challenge the union leadership of MacDonald. Union militancy within the plant had been effectively eliminated. In a letter to Doug Collins of the CBC, a Lenkurt worker stated:

Most of the union (the IBEW) representatives of the Lenkurt workers have been working hand in glove with the company management and against the interests of those they are paid to represent for some time....It seems evident there was deliberate provocation on the part of management to force a walkout so they

could use the situation as an excuse to get rid of the genuine shop stewards they now had to deal with.... MacDonald has shown himself to be nothing but an agent of the Lenkurt management and the international union executive who are outright gangsters and dictators. Every single shop steward but one was rejected, including the chief steward. (The one exception happened to be on sick leave at the time of the strike.) It surprises no one that the ex chief shop steward has been given his job back. The workers now employed are even more under the control of a company union.⁴⁸

The international union then brought its own brand of discipline to bear on the rebellious members of Local 213, laying charges and imposing suspensions ranging from one to thirty years. The B. C. Federation and VDLC asked IBEW to delay these actions until after the courts had completed their sentencing of the individuals charged for their participation in the May 11 and May 12 demonstrations, fearing that the IBEW proceedings could be used by the courts. IBEW refused this request. They did, however, postpone the impending elections in Local 213 until after the suspensions had been imposed. The result was that none of those who had opposed the international during the Lenkurt dispute would be eligible to run in the local's elections. Art O'Keefe, nominated for reelection as business manager, was given a fifteen year suspension, and John Kapalka, presidential hopeful, received a one year suspension. Les McDonald, nominated to the position of vice president, was suspended for thirty years, and George Brown, who had already been elected as representative from the manufacturing

section by acclamation, received a fifteen year suspension. Tom Constable was removed from his position as assistant business manager and suspended for three years.⁴⁹ Opposition to William Ladyman and the local Executive Board had, therefore, been effectively removed.

The Lenkurt strikers and their supporters were also subjected to the discipline of the courts for the two days of demonstrations that occurred during the dispute. Provincial Attorney General Robert Bonner laid charges against thirty people for contempt of court, and the courts dealt with them harshly. In particular, four labour leaders, Tom Clark, Paddy Neale, Jeff Power and Art O'Keeffe were sentenced to jail for terms of four to six months. The government and the courts made it clear that defiance of court injunctions and militant demonstrations would not be tolerated in British Columbia.⁵⁰ Labour's charges of police brutality and provocation, however, were ignored.

Perhaps the most significant effect of the Lenkurt strike was that it had brought into sharp focus the ability and willingness of the international hierarchy in Canada to overrule the wishes of the membership by imposing an inadequate settlement, a fact which created resentment among the local's members. Although the overt struggle had taken place between the local's membership and the international's Canadian officers, some members felt that the Canadian officers were, in fact, imposing the dictates or the philosophy of the American union leaders in Washington. Ladyman, Ross and MacDonald were seen as "stooges" and "puppets" of the international's American leaders on whom they were dependent for the furtherance of their hierarchial ambitions.

"Ladyman would never have dared do what he did unless he knew he had the approval of the officers in Washington", said Jess Succamore.⁵¹ The Lenkurt dispute, therefore, had given rise to both union dissidents within the local, and to a nationalistic resentment of American influence in the union, an influence that was seen as even co-opting Canadian officers.

The Lenkurt strike, which began as a simple dispute over working conditions, has become something much broader and more vital - an event of concern to the entire working class and the nation. The crisis results from the fact of U. S. domination over Canadian affairs, and particularly over the organized labour movement which is effected with the cooperation of Canadian labour bureaucrats who obtain office from the U. S. officials and depend on them for support. The present situation will be changed only if we change the conditions that give rise to it - by breaking the hold of U. S. domination and returning control of union affairs to those who it rightfully belongs - the Canadian working people....The Lenkurt strike has brought into sharp focus the issue of U. S. domination, and any settlement which stops short of putting an end to American control and returning the union to its members will not end the crisis but merely postpone the decision....The Local Executive MUST conduct the union's business according to membership instructions as decided at regular meetings. Orders from the international should NEVER take precedence over membership decisions....The fight of the electrical workers is one which concerns and affects all labour. It is but a part of the general fight

for an independent Canadian trade union movement and the independence of the nation.⁵²

THE CANADIAN ELECTRICAL WORKERS UNION

THE FORMATION OF CEW

The Lenkurt strikers had been defeated on all fronts. They had lost their battle in the courts, they had lost their battle with the company, and they had lost their battle with the international union. Blame for these defeats was placed on the union hierarchy, and bitterness was widespread throughout Local 213. Many of the Lenkurt members were disillusioned, feeling that they just could not win against the powerful union hierarchy which, combined with the forces of management and the courts, had proved it could impose its dictates against the wishes of the membership. Others, however, emerged from the dispute angered by a sense of injustice and more determined than ever to continue the fight.⁵³

Among those Lenkurt workers determined to continue the fight were George Brown, chief shop steward at Lenkurt and Jess Succamore, a union activist at the plant. Both men were given fines of one hundred dollars by the courts for their participation in the Lenkurt demonstrations, and both were refused reemployment by the company. In trials that were conducted in absentia, George Brown was suspended from membership in the IBEW for fifteen years, and Jess Succamore was given a twenty five year suspension. Feeling that the suspensions were unjust,

however, they were not going to accept them meekly. When Fred Allison announced the suspensions at a membership meeting and asked Jess Succamore to leave because he was no longer a member in good standing, Succamore rose to his feet and told him "You are going to have to put me out, and I don't think you are man enough to do it."⁵⁴ The membership roared its approval and the meeting ended in disarray. The initial intention, therefore, was to achieve change from within the system.

A meeting of the suspended IBEW members and their supporters was held the following week in the Boilermakers Hall. The sixty people in attendance were addressed by Ray Haynes, acting president of the B. C. Federation and two other Federation representatives, Len Guy and Charlie Stewart. They expressed their sympathy for the Lenkurt workers, their belief in the justice of their cause, and their disappointment that they could not have done more to help.⁵⁵ The people attending the meeting were touched by the sincere statements of sympathy from the Federation's representatives. So much so that after Haynes and his group left, Les McDonald, sentenced to a thirty year suspension by the IBEW, leapt to his feet and told the audience "What we need is a new Canadian Electrical Workers Union".⁵⁶ He then gave a rousing speech in which he called for the formation of a truly Canadian union run by and for Canadians, a union based on democratic principles and free of the dictatorial hierarchial structure of the IBEW. The meeting erupted with enthusiasm for the idea. Tom Constable told those in attendance that he was sure he could get five hundred gas workers to join, and George Brown agreed that perhaps the time was ripe for the formation of such a union. "Les McDonald didn't really mean it" said Jess Succamore. "He was just

carried away with the emotions of the moment."⁵⁷ Nevertheless, his speech set into motion a train of thought that could not be stopped.

At a meeting held a few days later to discuss the idea of a new union, Les McDonald announced that he had changed his mind. He now felt that the solution was to stay in the IBEW to try to effect change from within. The formation of a new union would simply be "idealistic" he told the meeting.⁵⁸ But several people at the meeting, including George Brown and Jess Succamore, had reevaluated their initial decision to try to change the IBEW from within.

This reevaluation was based on two principles. First, they had been suspended from the IBEW, and therefore were not in any position to fight for change from within.⁵⁹ Secondly, the practices and policies of the IBEW were such that it was felt that it was almost impossible for anyone to succeed in challenging the established hierarchy, even if they were in good standing with the union.

"At union meetings, questions that the leadership doesn't want to answer are just ruled out of order. Or, looking at the clock, they will use delaying tactics until they can adjourn the meeting because time has run out. They can and do change the rules as they go along so that it is impossible for the membership to get anywhere in opposing them."⁶⁰

These concerns appear to have been justified, for the Canadian Autonomy Council, a group of IBEW members in Eastern Canada who were

also attempting to achieve change from within the IBEW, had come to the same conclusion. In a letter to International President Freeman they complained:

We have been told that the IBEW is democratic and that no dictatorship will be tolerated. Yet we are made aware of dictatorship at every meeting. A president and a business agent stifle discussion, there is the slipping of bills quickly through a meeting before members understand or question them. Statements made which may be prejudicial or may compromise a business manager are left out of the minutes or mumbled out with only the odd audible word being passed. All these things we know of. We have lost faith in you and what you call democracy. Agreements have been signed without being brought before the membership. We have been saddled with debts, bill after bill and all opposition to them is suppressed in a most arrogant manner.⁶¹

For Jess Succamore, the final indication of the futility of achieving change from within the IBEW came when the local's Executive Board reduced his suspension from twenty five years to five years, only to have their decision overruled by William Ladyman and the twenty five year suspension reimposed. "By the time we finished fighting them, we knew there was nothing we could do in that union" said Donna Pooghkay. "There still is nothing you can do in that union."⁶²

Some of the activists in the Lenkurt dispute, therefore, now believed that change was impossible to achieve from within the IBEW,

both because those who were prepared to fight for change had been expelled from the system, and because of the policies and practices of the IBEW in suppressing opposition. To them, the answer now seemed to lie in Les McDonald's original idea - the formation of a new Canadian union. Accordingly, on November 6, 1966, seventeen people gathered to found the new union, and to elect its first officers. The union was to be known as the Canadian Electrical Workers Union (CEW). George Angus was elected as the union's first president, George Brown served as vice president, Donna Pooghkay became the secretary-treasurer and Jess Succamore was elected to the Executive Board.⁶³

POLICIES AND PRACTICES OF CEW

The CEW was founded to provide a union controlled by the rank and file. All officers were to be elected, from the shop stewards to the president. There were to be no appointed officials. The membership controlled the use of the local funds and enjoyed the right to recall officers. No agreement could be signed without membership approval, and no member could be disciplined unless the majority of the local members so decided. Furthermore, in order to ensure that the union's officials did not lose touch with the interests of the rank and file, the highest pay for any full-time officer could not exceed the top job rate earned by the membership.⁶⁴ The CEW, therefore, addressed itself to the concerns of union dissidents who resented both the imposition of the dictates of a union hierarchy over the wishes of the membership, such as had occurred during the Lenkurt dispute, and the suppression of the

membership's attempts to achieve change within a union, such as had occurred within the IBEW.

It was also to be a union which advocated the development of a truly independent Canadian union movement and which, from its formation, had the goal of Canadian self-determination for Canadian labour. The CEW was to be a Canadian union that was free of foreign domination. Its constitution was "made in Canada by Canadians and only Canadian workers can change it....The CEW is not anti-American but, we do oppose the Americanization of the Canadian labour movement. We are mature enough to run our own unions without foreign interference".⁶⁵ No doubt influenced by both society's growing resentment of American influence in Canada, and also by the wave of nationalistic resentment sparked by the Lenkurt dispute, the CEW was founded on a decidedly nationalistic platform. It therefore addressed itself to the concerns of Canadian nationalists who had as their goal the control of Canadian institutions by Canadians.

The CEW shared Walter Gordon's fears that the growing American ownership of Canadian industries posed a threat to Canadian economic and political independence. However, it also saw the existence of international unions as a factor that contributed to this problem through the payment of Canadian union dues to the international offices in the United States, international offices that exerted undue control over unions in Canada.⁶⁶

The CEW also saw freedom from foreign domination as a legitimate goal in its own right, based on the simple principle of national self respect. "We were aware that true internationalism is based on a relationship between sovereign nations," said Jess Succamore.⁶⁷ International unions did not represent this relationship between equal partners. Rather, they were seen to represent American domination of Canadian labour.

We have in this province of B. C., leaders of American controlled unions who refer to workers in Canadian unions or those that wish to be in Canadian unions as being "wrapped in the flag". We would like to say that it is the obligation of every Canadian worker to fight for Canadian unions, and the use of American flags on International union's constitutions and in union halls is certainly nothing to be proud of in Canada today. So we say, why shouldn't Canadian workers want their own flag? It is common knowledge that the Canadian trade unionist is the only worker in the world who is controlled by a foreign country. Canadians want Canadian unions and things Canadian just as any other foreign controlled people would, and they will not long tolerate certain leaders in American unions covering their own shortcomings by saying nothing can be done as their head office and their constitution does not allow it.⁶⁸

There were, then, two major planks in the platform of CEW's policies. One was to provide a type of unionism that was based on democracy and grass roots rank and file control. The other was to

provide a vehicle for Canadians to practice unionism independent of any influence or domination from the United States. Democracy and nationalism were the two pillars upon which the CEW was built.

The founding officers of the CEW had considered joining the independent United Electrical Workers Union (UE) as an alternative to developing their own union. But the UE was an international union. Although it provided for Canadian autonomy, the founders of the CEW felt that "what had been given as a favour could also be taken away".⁶⁹ The UE did not, therefore, fully meet the goals of the Canadian nationalists. Also, the UE was a union that was strongly influenced by the Communist party. This influence was viewed with suspicion by many officers of the CEW. Some no doubt simply did not share the radical political beliefs of the UE. Others were probably as anxious to avoid the wishes of the union membership being subordinated to political ideology as they were to having them subordinated to international union officers. For both these reasons, the "UE didn't seem to quite fit the bill".⁷⁰

The CEW, on the other hand, through its twin policies of rank and file control and Canadian nationalism, provided a vehicle for union dissidents and Canadian nationalists to join forces in pursuit of common goals. Indeed, to many members of the CEW, the two issues of unsatisfactory unionism and Canadian self-assertion could be seen as interrelated. To them, the unsatisfactory representation provided by international unions was a direct result of the imposition of American union philosophies and practices on Canadian workers, particularly the

power vested in union officers and the overruling of the wishes of the rank and file. Furthermore, the CEW, from its formation, rejected partisan political involvement, being of the opinion that "no political party really does a job".⁷¹ The CEW could, therefore, muster the support of the New Left socialists, who, like the Waffle group, saw nationalism as the route to true socialism, supported the transference of union power from the union hierarchy to the membership, and opposed international unions as a reactionary force and an obstacle to the achievement of true socialism. By remaining aloof from partisan politics, the CEW could accommodate this group without alienating those union dissidents and nationalists who did not share strong left wing political beliefs.

By adhering to the basic twin philosophies of rank and file control and Canadian nationalism, therefore, the CEW drew support from union dissidents, Canadian nationalists and socialists who adhered to the views of the New Left and the Waffle group. The three groups, each for their own reasons, shared the common goals of rank and file control and opposition to international unions. "There were seven people on the Executive Board of the CEW", said Jess Succamore "and each had their own reasons for supporting the union's philosophy".⁷²

ORGANIZATION EFFORTS

When the CEW was founded, it was a union with no certifications, and therefore no dues base to provide financial viability to the organization. The initial activity of the union was

restricted with the publication of a newspaper, the Livewire, in which it set forth its views of democracy and nationalism. The union's financial existence was sustained by the purchase of membership in the organization by linemen and wiremen who, at the same time, maintained their membership in the IBEW, necessary for employment. Such dual membership was strictly forbidden by the IBEW. In view of the discipline that the IBEW could bring to bear on those who held such dual membership (suspension), those who followed the practice did so at great risk. It was, therefore, necessary for the CEW to give assurances that membership in their union was a secret that would be carefully guarded.⁷³

In spite of the risks involved, enough electricians and electrical workers joined the union to maintain its financial viability and ensure its survival.⁷⁴ In explaining his position of support for the CEW, a construction worker wrote:

To me, it is a matter of simple democracy, a right to form our own policy through a democratic Canadian constitution, to go in any direction chosen by a Canadian membership. It is not a subject to be questioned, but a right that must be established. This duty must be carried out by the rank and file, let us not suffer the illusion that our present so-called leadership will fight for these rights: on the contrary, the large percentage of these American lackeys will leave no stone unturned to see we don't get them. But there is no doubt that workers in Canada are on the move, and the growing tide of resentment against dictatorship from

Washington through our own Canadian stooges is growing irresistible. We will never be satisfied until our needs and grievances get the sympathetic ear of a Canadian union for Canadians.⁷⁵

In effect, the CEW provided a vehicle for the expression of Canadian self-assertion and the achievement of better union representation in terms of responsiveness to the rank and file that were becoming important to many in Canadian society in the 1960's. It was a vehicle that international unions could not, or too often would not, provide.

However, no union could exist for long without a certified unit to represent. Barry Sharbo, Executive Board member of the CEW said "his union's prime organizational policy will be to seek new members immediately among unorganized electrical plants".⁷⁶

The first certification for CEW was won not at an unorganized plant, but at Phillips Cables, whose 114 employees were represented by Local 213, IBEW. The employees at Phillips were dissatisfied with the IBEW. They were coping with a difficult employer, and the two collective agreements signed prior to 1967 had been achieved only after lengthy, bitter strikes. The support forthcoming from the international during these strikes was seen to be grossly inadequate. When the Phillips employees went on strike in 1962, they initially received no strike pay. The local managed to raise money through a Christmas tree sale and similar activities, and some strike pay was distributed. But no money at all was forthcoming from the international, because the IBEW

constitution prohibited the depletion of the international's strike fund below two million dollars, and the fund was down to that level at the time.⁷⁷ This position created a great deal of resentment among the Phillips workers, who, during the five month strike, faced serious financial difficulties. Dissatisfaction was increased when the agreement that ended the strike provided them with only a three cent increase over the prestrike offer.⁷⁸

As members of Local 213 IBEW, the Phillips employees were also influenced by the strained relationship that had existed between the local and the international for years. Furthermore, the major upheaval that had occurred within the local during the Lenkurt dispute caused the Phillips employees to consider drastic change.⁷⁹

Jess Succamore had worked at Phillips before being employed by Lenkurt. He knew of the dissatisfaction of the Phillips employees with the IBEW, and he had contacts within the plant. CEW launched a raid in January 1967, campaigning on its two platforms of democracy and nationalism. Both issues received equal emphasis. The CEW promised the workers control over their own union affairs and urged them to "vote Canadian" as their own "Canadian centennial project".⁸⁰ Support was provided for the CEW during the campaign by the Pulp and Paper Workers of Canada (PPWC). The PPWC provided speakers and distributed literature, making appeals to the Phillips workers on the grounds of national self-determination. The PPWC served as an example of the fact that a Canadian breakaway union could survive and indeed grow, an

example that no doubt proved invaluable for the unknown, untested CEW. In a letter to the Phillips employees, Gordie Wickham of the PPWC wrote:

Fellow Canadians: I as the President of the 850 member Harmac Local of Canadian Paperworkers, would like to say you are doing a great service to all Canadian workers by taking a stand against undemocratic U. S. controlled unions, as we in the paper workers have also done. At Harmac, we have gone from strength to strength along with our union, the Pulp and Paper Workers of Canada which, since being organized just over three years ago, now comprises 11 local unions in the province of B. C. and is growing every day. The bigger the majority is for the Canadian union at Phillips, the greater is the inspiration for more Canadian workers to follow your example.⁸¹

The IBEW, which had been unresponsive to the unrest in Local 213 up until now, reacted to the sign up campaign at Phillips by splitting the local into three separate locals. The electronic manufacturing segment of Local 213 became Local 264, while the Hydro segment became Local 258. The move was undertaken by William Ladyman, supposedly in order to provide "a greater degree of autonomy for the membership".

Coming so soon after the "Lenkurt affair", I am sure there will be those who, for their own personal reasons, will raise the cry of "International dictatorship." However, regardless of any innuendoes, I have made my decision based solely on

the continuing problems which appear to be confronting our members in the manufacturing field....Since becoming Vice President of the First District I have directed my efforts towards amalgamating Local Unions for greater strength and stability within the various branches of our industry. At the same time, as with the situation in Local Union 213, we must be realistic and acknowledge the fact that where our membership is discontented and where it is apparent the existing status quo does not serve the best interests of the said membership, I must reluctantly agree to create new Local Unions.⁸²

Ladyman's decision to split the local was undertaken in response to the unrest that existed within the manufacturing section, unrest that was made obvious by the CEW campaign at Phillips. It is likely that he was in fact countering the unrest that stemmed from the IBEW practice of maintaining two classes of union membership, and the disparity in wages that were bargained for the two groups. Class A membership was for the skilled tradesmen in the union, and Class B membership was for the industrial workers in manufacturing. In Local 213, the tradesmen supported the manufacturing workers in their complaints that the wage difference between the two classes was unfair.⁸³ By splitting the local into three segments, Ladyman could isolate the manufacturing workers from the tradesmen, thereby reducing wage comparisons between the two groups and removing an important source of support for the manufacturing workers in their complaints. The

manufacturing workers would then not be as likely to challenge the status quo.

During the course of the campaign at Phillips, the IBEW questioned whether the Canadian union was an appropriate and legitimate agent for bargaining. Also, pointing out that the CEW was starting from scratch with no certifications, no affiliations and very little money, it questioned its strength as a union.⁸⁴ CEW's platform of nationalism was countered by red baiting, and by the proposition that "Canadian nationalism is a smoke screen thrown up by this disenchanted group".⁸⁵ As for the issue of democracy, the IBEW contended that it provided ample opportunity for the membership to have input into union affairs.

Within the IBEW you have every conceivable means to discuss and relate what you as members feel has or has not been accomplished by your local. The democratic right of each and every member is carefully guarded and the place to rectify and resolve your trade union policies, work conditions, etc., is at your unit and general meetings. Let all the local hear the problems of manufacturing and let's unify all the membership.⁸⁶

The majority of the Phillips employees, however, did not agree. By February, 1967, the CEW had signed up enough workers to apply to the Labour Relations Board for certification. The board responded to the application by subjecting CEW to a very close scrutiny, inspecting all its records and books on three different occasions. Unable to find

any irregularities, the board ordered a representation vote, which took place on May 26, 1967. The 3½ month delay between the application and the vote presented difficulties for the CEW. Such delays always work to the benefit of the incumbent union, giving it time to regroup and rebuild, while the raiding union is faced with the difficulty of retaining its support and the impetus of its campaign. Despite the delays, the Phillips employees voted 57 to 50 in favour of the CEW. By a slim majority, CEW had won its first certification, described as "a major breakthrough which will be used to base the expansion of the group as a national union".⁸⁷

IBEW responded to the CEW victory by urging the employees to stay with the international union regardless of the vote results. By signing Honorary Withdrawal Cards, they pointed out, the employees could maintain their membership in IBEW and "all advantages of the IBEW such as job opportunities are available to holders of Honorary Withdrawal Cards. Stay with Local 264."⁸⁸ The IBEW also urged the Phillips employees to refuse to join the CEW, and not to sign their dues check-off.⁸⁹ This campaign, if successful, would have posed a serious threat to the new union, undermining its financial viability and its effectiveness as a bargaining agent. Fortunately for the CEW, the campaign failed, the Phillips employees supported the CEW, and the CEW was able to consolidate its position at its first certified plant.

By late 1967, the Phillips Cables employees in Sentinel, Alberta were also experiencing dissatisfaction with the IBEW. Membership unrest at this IBEW local stemmed from a perceived lack of

communication with the international, lack of service, and a belief that their international representative, A. J. Metcalfe undermined negotiations through secret meetings with the employer.⁹⁰ "The only time they [the members] ever saw Metcalfe was to see him come into town, see the boss and leave town again."⁹¹

To add to this general unrest, the Phillips employees in the Alberta plant were very dissatisfied with their collective agreement. The base starting rate at the beginning of the three year contract was the minimum wage legislated by the province, and at expiry, was only \$1.40 an hour. It was a contract which the negotiating committee felt they had been "bullied into signing" by their international representative.⁹² Dissatisfaction at the plant was so great that the employees were contemplating an illegal walkout.⁹³

The Vancouver employees of Phillips Cables had, however, by breaking with the IBEW, provided an example to the Alberta employees that there was an alternate method available for gaining redress to their grievances. The Phillips employees in Alberta wrote to the Phillips employees in Vancouver, requesting information on their new bargaining agent and a copy of their collective agreement. As a result of these communications, and with only three weeks left in open season, the CEW launched a certification campaign at the Alberta plant. On January 28, 1968, the CEW called an organization meeting for the employees, and all 34 of the workers present at the meeting joined the CEW on the spot. By February 6, 106 of the 110 employees had joined the

CEW, and Local 2 CEW applied to the Alberta Labour Board for certification for the unit.⁹⁴

Despite the overwhelming support for CEW among the Alberta Phillips employees, on April 2, 1968 the board denied a certification vote at the plant on narrow technical grounds. Because the officers of Local 2 had been elected by acclamation at the founding meeting, the referendum vote of the membership required by the constitution had not been conducted. The local had, according to the board, violated its own constitution. Furthermore, the membership decided to stipulate April in their bylaws as the month for holding regular annual election of officers, a time that did not interfere with contract negotiations. Because the original officers were elected at the founding meeting in February, the board ruled that the local had also violated its own bylaws. The board ruled that, due to these violations, the CEW was not an agent appropriate for bargaining.⁹⁵ "It was a scandalous decision based on the flimsiest of technicalities" said Jess Succamore.⁹⁶

In April 1968, the IBEW responded to the insurrection at the Sentinel plant by cancelling all membership meetings. In May, 100 employees at the plant signed a petition indicating their support of CEW, and asked the board to reconsider its April 9 decision. The board refused the request. On June 27, 1968, Local 2 CEW made a second application for certification at the plant. It was dismissed by the board on the legitimate grounds that it was untimely. "We just put the application in to keep the pot boiling" said Succamore.⁹⁷

The CEW strongly protested the board's refusal to grant a certification vote, and argued that the board's decision amounted to a denial of the employees' right to the union of their choice.⁹⁸ Condemnation of the board's decision was also forthcoming from the Phillips Employees in Vancouver, who pointed out that the maintenance of the IBEW as bargaining agent for the Phillips Alberta employees was unfair, unjust, and amounted, in their opinion, to favouritism for international unions by the board.

It appears the democratic rights and working conditions of workers in this country are and always will be denied, until each and every one of us takes a stand against the big internationals such as IBEW. The IBEW is a dead issue at Sentinel, except for the dues dollar. There has not been an IBEW meeting in that local since last February. Yet the Labour Board allows these circumstances to continue. Is this your idea of a just and fair society? As long as I am a worker and a citizen of this country, I am prepared to devote all my time to the establishment of Canadian unions to fight for our rights, to make them equal for all.⁹⁹

Finally, on January 8, 1969, CEW applied in an identical manner for certification of the Sentinel workers. Yet this time, the board had no objections regarding the technicalities that had prevented a vote the previous year. A certification vote was ordered. IBEW withdrew from the contest, handing its jurisdiction over to another international union, the United Steelworkers of America (USWA), who were

accordingly placed on the ballot. The result of the vote was a solid majority for the CEW, and the new Canadian union was granted its second certification.¹⁰⁰

The certification battle at the Phillips plant in Alberta was fought on the issues of democracy and nationalism. "It was the first opportunity to present our case based entirely on the issues, free from personalities and free from the clouds of Lenkurt"¹⁰¹ said Succamore. But the thirteen month long campaign waged so far from its Vancouver base had financially and physically drained the CEW and its officers. In fact, the CEW officers went personally deep into debt to sustain the drive.¹⁰² The CEW obviously had officers who were personally deeply committed to their cause. It was also a union whose philosophy could appeal to workers outside the confines of British Columbia. But it now faced a serious financial crisis.

CEW was able to survive the crisis due to modest financial support donated by various independent labour organizations across the country. Several locals of the PPWC, the Council of Canadian Unions, the Canadian Textile Council in Brantford, Ontario and the Falconbridge Captains Body of the independent Local 598 of the Mine Mill and Smelter Workers Union all gave financial support and moral encouragement to the CEW at this crucial time. Struggling financially themselves, they were not able to donate enough to make things easy for the CEW, but their support appears to have been a very important factor in the ability of the CEW to recover from the strain placed on the organization by the

certification campaign at Sentinel. "It was a hell of a fight" said Jess Succamore. "But it was the birth of our union."¹⁰³

The CEW did not, however, lose sight of its original goal of seeking certifications at unorganized electrical plants. CEW officers went through the yellow pages of the telephone book to compile lists of such plants, which they handbilled. As a result of these efforts, the union launched certification campaigns at Friden, an unorganized division of Singer Company of Canada, and at Cascades Electronics, an unorganized manufacturer of components for cable television systems. The CEW lost a certification vote conducted at Friden on June 12, 1968, by a margin of ten votes to eight. The union did, however, win the bargaining rights for the one hundred employees at Cascades Electronics in the same year.¹⁰⁴

ATTACKS ON CEW CERTIFICATIONS

In 1968, at the first legal opportunity, IBEW launched a campaign to try to win back the certification for the Phillips plant in Vancouver. CEW was thus faced with its first crucial test in measuring its ability to satisfy the workers that it represented. The employees seemed to prefer the representation provided by CEW to that they had received from the IBEW, because the IBEW was unable to sign up enough employees to apply to the board for certification.¹⁰⁵

In 1969, immediately following its certification victory in Alberta, the CEW faced another full scale raid at the Phillips Vancouver

plant. The raid was launched by the IBEW but, meeting with little success in their sign-up campaign, they again turned over their jurisdiction to the Steelworkers, who continued the raid.

The Steelworkers campaigned on a platform of union size, and financial and physical resources. It was obvious, the Steelworkers argued, that because of their size, monetary resources, trained personnel, service departments and experience, they were in a much stronger position to advance the interests of the workers than was the isolated, small and financially poor CEW. A small organization such as the CEW was weak, they maintained, and therefore could only fall prey to company domination.¹⁰⁶

In theory, this was a strong argument. But the Phillips employees had already had experience with a large financially secure union, the IBEW, and had found that theory did not always match practice. The IBEW may have had a two million dollar strike fund, which the CEW certainly did not. Yet the Phillips employees had been financially on their own during the 1962 strike. The IBEW may have been a large, powerful organization that could exert considerable pressure on an employer, yet the contract negotiated on the employees' behalf was regarded as poor. Therefore, despite the fact that the CEW was small and financially insecure, many of the employees felt that they had nothing to lose.¹⁰⁷

On March 18, 1969, the Steelworkers placed an application for certification before the Labour Relations Board, claiming that they had

as members 63 of the 120 employees at the plant. The workers at Phillips were convinced, however, that they had signed up nowhere near that number of employees, and were "confidently predicting that the board would throw out the application".¹⁰⁸ Also, the CEW pointed out that the Steelworkers had applied for an incomplete bargaining unit. But on April 24, one month after the deadline for making certification applications had passed, the board simply amended the Steelworkers application, and ordered a certification vote be held at the plant. The vote was conducted on May 15, 1969, with 92 of the Phillips employees voting for the CEW, and 23 voting for the Steelworkers.¹⁰⁹

As the CEW struggled to establish itself as a viable bargaining agent, therefore, it found itself under attack from the combined forces of two powerful international trade unions, IBEW and the Steelworkers. But it appears that the Phillips employees were well satisfied with the representation provided by the CEW, and that the new union had established a secure position for itself at the Phillips plant. These early certification battles with the Steelworkers set the stage for the development of an intense interunion rivalry that was to mark significantly the history of both organizations, and which continues to the present day.

CEW's PLACE IN THE ESTABLISHED STRUCTURE

CEW AND THE CLC

The formation of the CEW was not accompanied by a hostile confrontation with the CLC, B. C. Federation or any of their affiliates, with the sole exception of IBEW. In fact, some members of the B. C. Federation appear to have had certain sympathies for the IBEW dissidents. The first constitution of the CEW was run off in the IWA hall with the full knowledge of some of the officers of that union, who chose to look the other way. Ray Haynes, acting president of the B. C. Federation, told the CEW officers that he did not blame them for the action that they were taking. In the aftermath of Lenkurt, "the general reaction of the B. C. Federation was that we had a right to beef". In fact, the VDLC even tolerated the presence of CEW representatives at its meetings.¹¹⁰ Although there was sympathy for the CEW officers within B. C.'s labour establishment, the CEW, initially at least, was not really taken seriously. "Their attitude was very condescending" said Jess Succamore.¹¹¹ "We really hardly knew they existed" agreed Paddy Neale.¹¹²

This attitude of the labour establishment changed when CEW won its first certification at Phillips Cable. Suddenly, the CEW became seen as a union that could be a divisive force, undermining the unity and therefore the strength of the labour movement as a whole by removing workers from the CLC fold. Consequently, the CLC joined the certification battle at Phillips Cable, Vancouver in January 1968,

urging Phillips employees to return to the CLC by supporting the IBEW. In a letter sent to all Phillips employees, the CLC stated:

The Canadian Labour Congress, representing 1½ million workers in Canada extend a sincere invitation to all eligible employees who have not already done so, to return to the ranks of the recognized Canadian labour movement through Local 264, IBEW. Fragmentation, by breaking up recognized unions and forming small isolated groups, as is done by the CEW, is not only a disservice to the employees involved but to the whole Canadian labour movement. Strong, militant and effective unions are built on unity not disunity and by all members playing their part in taking an interest and by actively participating in all affairs of their union. Only unions affiliated to the Canadian Labour Congress, such as the IBEW, can depend on help and assistance from the Congress, Federations of Labour and Labour Councils. In the very near future, you will have the opportunity to reestablish IBEW, Local 264 as your bargaining agent. We in the Canadian Labour Congress, urge you to support Local 264 now and rejoin the ranks of the recognized and legitimate labour movement, so that we may go forward strong and united.¹¹³

The B. C. Federation also entered the campaign, urging the Phillips employees not to cause fragmentation of the labour movement by continuing their support of CEW.¹¹⁴

According to the B. C. Federation and the CLC, therefore, the determinative factor for the employees in their choice of unions should not be the question of whether or not the IBEW provided Canadian self determination, democracy and rank and file control, but rather the fact that isolated breakaway unions were too weak to serve the interests of their members, and only served to fragment and therefore weaken the trade union movement as a whole.

However, Canadian self determination and the type of unionism provided by the CEW were important issues for the Phillips employees. In a reply to the CLC that was signed by 79 Phillips employees, the workers asked the Congress:

Are you aware of the reasons why Phillips Cables Employees changed their union? Are you aware that Local 264 and 213 IBEW who are supposedly Canadian, hold all conventions in the U.S.A.? Have you read the new bylaws of IBEW Local 264? For example, Article V, Section 2 referring to Business Manager says "He may remove any member from any shop or job (when not in violation of any agreement) for not complying with our laws and rules....Stewards shall be appointed (where needed) by the Business Manager. They shall work under his direction and be subject to his authority. He can remove any steward, as such, at any time".¹¹⁵

The CLC and the B. C. Federation had not, therefore, addressed the issues that were really important to the Phillips employees.

There can be little doubt that the CLC's and Federation's concerns about the fragmentation of the labour movement caused by the existence of the CEW were justified. But in their reply to the CLC, Phillips employees were quick to point out that the fault for this lay with the Congress, and not with the CEW or their supporters. "Why is the CEW not recognized by the CLC?" the employees demanded to know. "What does it take to be an affiliate of the CLC?"¹¹⁶

In fact, the CEW could never have been granted admission to the CLC or its affiliated bodies. The factors which prevented CEW from joining the recognized labour movement stemmed from two policies of the CLC. First, the CEW had been formed with the intention of organizing workers in the electrical field, a jurisdiction that the CLC had already granted to IBEW. Due to the CLC's policy of exclusive jurisdiction, "no other union could infringe on this jurisdiction". Secondly, by organizing the workers at Phillips Cables, the CEW had committed the "cannobilistic act" of raiding, an act that was strictly forbidden by the CLC.¹¹⁷ For both these reasons, the CEW was destined from its formation to operate outside the mainstream of Canadian labour.

By the same token, the decision of the Phillips employees to leave the IBEW made it extremely difficult for them to remain within the CLC fold, because the CLC's policies regarding raiding and union jurisdiction do not easily accommodate a change in unions. The Phillips employees could not replace the IBEW with any other CLC affiliate, for such an act would make their new union guilty of raiding. "They would first have had to decertify their existing union, and then approach

another union" said Paddy Neale.¹¹⁸ The problem with this approach, however, was that it would leave them without any union protection in the interim. Even then, they could still run afoul of the CLC's policies of jurisdiction in their choice of a new union. "Jurisdictions do overlap to a certain extent" said Paddy Neale. "But it could cause problems in precluding another union from accepting them."¹¹⁹ There are, then, significant difficulties in keeping employees who demand a change in unions within the CLC. "That is why the Teamsters pick up a lot of people".¹²⁰ Because the Teamsters are not affiliated to the CLC, they are not subject to these restrictions in accepting a group of employees who seek a change in unions.

For all practical purposes, therefore, the price that the Phillips employees would have had to pay to remain within the "legitimate" trade union movement was to retain the IBEW as their bargaining agent. Dissatisfied with the IBEW, this was apparently a price that they were not prepared to pay. The union of their choice, the CEW, was itself unacceptable to the CLC. The argument that support of the CEW divided and weakened the labour movement, therefore, did not impress the CEW or its members at Phillips Cable. The fragmentation that resulted did not stem from the merits or lack of them in the philosophy of the CEW, but from rigidities inherent in the CLC system.

CEW AND PROVINCIAL LABOUR BOARDS

The CEW's experiences with the B. C. and Alberta Labour Relations Boards had, by 1970, caused the officers of the new union to seriously question whether the CEW or any other independent union was receiving fair and impartial treatment from the boards. Their misgivings arose from the fact that labour representatives were largely drawn from the ranks of international unions, and were based not so much on any blantly obvious miscarriage of justice in any one particular case, but on a pattern that seemed to be emerging from a series of singularly quite insignificant events.

The first of these instances occurred when CEW applied for certification at the Vancouver Phillips Cables plant in 1967. Noting the incredibly close scrutiny undertaken by the B. C. Labour Board of the new unions records, books and papers, and the fact that this scrutiny was undertaken not once but three times before a vote was ordered, the CEW was left with the impression that the stance of the board was to actively seek some irregularity. Also, noting the board's past decisions in dealing with the PPWC and the Canadian Ironworkers Union, they were certain that if some small technicality had been discovered, a representation vote would have been denied.¹²¹ The CEW pointed to the decision of the Alberta Labour Relations Board in denying a certification vote to the workers at the Sentinel plant as an example of a technicality without merit being used to deny certification to a Canadian union.¹²² They also noted that in its dealings with the Steelworker's application for certification at the Phillips plant in

1969, the B. C. Labour Relations Board had not allowed a technical error to stand in the way of ordering a vote. It was not the leniency of the board on this matter that the CEW objected to, for the CEW took the position that rigidities and technicalities should never take precedence over the exercise of democratic rights. What bothered the CEW was that they had serious doubts that the board would have reached a similar decision if a Canadian union had made the same mistake in a certification application.¹²³

The Steelworker's application created another reason for disquiet within the CEW about the justice administered by the board. They were certain that the Steelworker's had signed up, at the maximum, 30 of the 120 employees, and were convinced that the Steelworkers lacked the majority required for a certification vote. When the vote results were tabulated, CEW 92, Steelworkers 23, they wondered if their original assessment had been correct, and that a vote had been called in violation of the membership requirement stipulated in the Labour Relations Act.¹²⁴

The CEW also complained about delays forthcoming from the boards in their dealings with the Canadian union. The certification vote at Phillips Cables, Vancouver, was held 3½ months after the certification application had been filed. Yet the challenge by the Steelworkers in 1969 culminated in a vote within two months, despite the time consuming difficulties of the erroneous application to be corrected. The certification battle at Phillips Cables in Alberta dragged on for thirteen months before the Alberta Board ordered a vote.

Of particular concern to the CEW was the fact that such delays favour the incumbent union, allowing it time to regroup and rebuild its support, while the raiding union is faced with the problem of maintaining the momentum of its campaign. It did not appear to the CEW that the boards operated at the same speed in processing its certification applications as it did in processing that of the international.¹²⁵

Finally, the CEW was concerned about delays that were consistently occurring in correspondence between the B. C. Board and the CEW. All correspondence from the board must be answered within ten days. Yet consistently, letters to the CEW were delayed, allowing its officers very little time to respond. For example, notice to the CEW of the Steelworker's application was received by the CEW "seven days after the company received theirs". Notification of the board's amendment to the Steelworker's application, dated April 24, 1969, was dated by the board's mailing machine April 29, 1969 and received by the CEW on April 30. They had only four days to respond to this serious issue.¹²⁶

The CEW readily admitted that each of these incidents, taken by themselves, did not seem significant. What was important, they contended, was that they seemed to represent a consistent pattern of discrimination by the boards against Canadian unions. They did not, the CEW admitted, represent proof of this allegation. However they argued that "justice must be rooted in confidence", and that because of these incidents, they were justified in losing confidence in the decisions of the boards.¹²⁷ Most of these incidents could be regarded as resulting

from the obvious difficulty of always administering absolutely equal justice, or as accidents. However, to view them in that light would imply that the CEW would benefit as often as it would suffer from such difficulties in the system. This was not the case, leading the CEW to the conclusion that it was not the laws of probability operating, but an attitude of discrimination by the boards.

The CEW's lack of confidence in the justice meted out by the boards was shared by many independent Canadian labour organizations, and can be identified as a characteristic of such groups. The PPWC and the Canadian Ironworkers expressed similar complaints in their dealings with the boards, as did the independent CAIMAW group in Winnipeg. The Canadian Workers Federation also supported this contention. In a letter to George Brown regarding the Alberta Board's denial of a certification vote at Sentinel, the Federation's secretary- treasurer Frank Izzard wrote:

The board's decision in favour of the "establishment" does not come as a surprise when one understands its composition. But it does serve, once again, the notice that the right of free association is a right that must be fought for, especially by the Canadian worker who wishes to rid himself of the do-nothing international.¹²⁸

The conclusion that Labour Boards could be expected to lean towards a more sympathetic treatment of international unions than of Canadian breakaways because labour representatives were typically drawn

from the ranks of the international unions was even shared by some representatives of the international unions. When CEW representatives expressed their opinion that the Steelworkers did not stand a chance in their certification attempt at Phillips Cables, Archie MacDonald, a Steelworker staff representative, replied "We've got people in the right places. It pays to have reps on the board."¹²⁹ MacDonald was, no doubt, referring to Pen Baskin, area supervisor for the Steelworkers Union and a member of the B. C. Labour Relations Board.

The CEW's lack of confidence in the boards' decisions led it to call for the appointment of representatives of independent Canadian unions to provincial labour boards. In a policy resolution, passed at the CEW's second annual convention in 1968, it called on provincial governments to adopt this practice in order to "ensure fair and equal treatment for all unions when they make representations before the boards".¹³⁰

CEW AND CAIMAW

Until 1970, the CEW in Vancouver and CAIMAW in Winnipeg had been established and had developed in a manner completely independent of each other. Yet they shared certain common characteristics. Both groups had been operating in industrial plants represented by international craft unions, unions which were regarded as providing unsatisfactory representation. "I sometimes wonder about the ability of craft unions to properly represent industrial workers" said Paddy Neale. "They seem to have the attitude that the skilled craftsmen are all that

count and to hell with the rest."¹³¹ In particular, both groups were dissatisfied with the degree of decision making their unions allowed them, and were resentful of the imposition of the dictates of union officers over the wishes of the membership. Because these dictates arose, or were perceived to arise, from union officers in the United States, the unrest created by the refusal of the union hierarchies to respond to the wishes of the membership was intensified by a nationalistic resentment of the control exerted by American union leaders on Canadian workers. Both groups originally made attempts to gain redress to their dissatisfactions from within their unions. It was only when it became apparent that they could not succeed in these attempts that union dissidents and Canadian nationalists joined forces to rebel against the status quo and go their own way.

The organizations that they formed were similar in many respects. They both adopted a nonpartisan political stance, and they both set themselves the goal of organizing the unorganized. Democracy, rank and file control and the rejection of the exercise of power by appointed officials were the major principles of both organizations. Both organizations provided a vehicle for union dissidents to achieve a change in unions, a vehicle which CLC affiliated unions could not provide because of rigidities in the CLC system. Both unions provided a vehicle for the nationalistic expression of Canadian self assertion and self determination that was becoming increasingly important in Canadian society, a vehicle which international unions, headquartered in the United States, could not. Both unions could also provide a vehicle for the expression of the socialist philosophy of the New Left and the

Waffle group, in that they supported nationalism, removed power from the union hierarchy and placed it in the hands of the rank and file, and challenged the dominance of international unions in Canada, unions that were regarded by this group as reactionary.

Although neither organization adopted a hostile stance to the "recognized labour establishment", both were destined from their formation to operate outside of its ranks because of rigidities inherent in the CLC system itself. Both organizations found themselves subjected to attacks from the recognized labour establishment, the CLC in Winnipeg announcing a policy of destroying CAIMAW, the IBEW and Steelworkers joining forces to eliminate the certifications of the CEW through raiding. Both organizations complained that they faced difficulties in their development due to the established position of international unions on Labour Relations Boards. Yet both unions survived. CAIMAW survived because of support it found among Canadian CLC affiliates, CEW survived because of support it found among other Canadian independent unions.

There were, however, certain differences between the Winnipeg based CAIMAW and the Vancouver based CEW. The leaders of Local 174 of the Molders Union, the local which had given birth to CAIMAW, were a group whose attitudes to international unions were coloured by the Winnipeg experience of One Big Union, a union which had presented a significant challenge to the dominance of international unions in Canada. The battle had involved a direct confrontation between the local leaders and the American international leaders in Cincinnati. In effect, the

local had won that battle, and for that reason, CAIMAW had been founded on a comparatively strong base - namely seven of the seventeen plants making up the local. The emergence of CAIMAW on the labour scene brought into sharp focus the existence of a division within the established Canadian labour movement - namely a split between the Canadian and the international unions affiliated with the CLC.

In contrast, many of the leaders of Local 213 IBEW in Vancouver were, and remained, international trade unionists, and supported the international union during the Lenkurt dispute. Although the local membership routed these leaders from their positions in the next elections, the fact that the membership did not have the support of their leaders during the Lenkurt dispute was no doubt a significant factor in the ability of the international to regain control of the local.

The international's victory over the local membership meant that the founders of the CEW were not able to base their new union on certifications from this IBEW local. The Lenkurt workers, for example, had been decimated. There were no real union activists left in the Lenkurt plant because they had been refused reemployment by the company. Nor were there dissidents left in positions of leadership within the Local 213 itself after the international had completed its trials and suspensions. The founders of CEW, unlike CAIMAW in Winnipeg, had not so much actively broken away from IBEW as they had been expelled from it, and their new union was forced to start from scratch. Due to their more

insecure start, the CEW was not as successful as CAIMAW in obtaining certifications.

CAIMAW in Winnipeg was based primarily on a single principle - to provide a different type of unionism to that provided by most internationals, a unionism based on democracy and rank and file control. Although CEW shared this platform, it was built on the additional platform of nationalism, based on national self determination for the Canadian union movement and freedom from any form of foreign influence or control. From the outset, therefore, CEW was more actively nationalistic than CAIMAW. The nationalism of CEW was no doubt strengthened by the union's contacts with other independent labour organizations such as the PPWC, contacts that CAIMAW, a group which remained basically isolated until 1970, did not have.

The CEW, like CAIMAW, illuminated the development of a split within the trade union establishment in Canada. While CAIMAW illuminated an interunion split between Canadian and international affiliates of the CLC, CEW illuminated an intraunion split, namely differences between the rank and file membership and their Canadian leaders. The membership by 1967, like many in Canadian society, were undergoing a critical reassessment of the desirability of strong ties between Canada and the United States, were experiencing a strong desire for Canadian national self assertion, and were becoming increasingly resentful of obvious U. S. domination over Canadian affairs. The Canadian leadership of international unions, on the other hand, possibly because of a genuine belief in continentalism, unswerving loyalty to

their unions, and no doubt also because of their own hierarchical security and ambitions, did not share these sentiments. Indeed, they sometimes actively suppressed them. The Lenkurt dispute did not involve a direct confrontation with American leaders in Washington. Rather, the battle took place between an increasingly nationalistic membership and their Canadian leaders. To many of the rank and file, it appeared that Canadian "puppets" of the international had pervaded the union hierarchy, from Angus MacDonald at the local level to William Ladyman at the national level.

An additional factor influencing the struggle between Canadian and international unionism in Canada appears to be the background of Canadian trade unionists. Many Canadian leaders of international unions had been born and brought up with international unions, and had never experienced or even seriously considered anything else. Art O'Keeffe, for example, despite the treatment he received at the hands of the IBEW during the Lenkurt dispute, maintained his loyalty to the international. Brown and Succamore, on the other hand, had been born and brought up in Britain, and had been active in the British trade union movement in their youth. Similarly, the founders of CAIMAW in Winnipeg had come from the tradition of One Big Union, and therefore had also had experience with an alternative to international unionism. Paddy Neale stressed the importance of an individual's background in the attitude taken towards international unions. "The problem is that new Canadians simply do not understand the necessity for international unions" he said.¹³² Jess Succamore agreed that they did not. But in his view, this was because new Canadians saw the existence of international unions

not as true international bodies, but as American unions dominating Canadian labour. "They know that the possibility of trade unions in their home country being dominated by some foreign country would be absolutely unthinkable." he said.¹³³ To him, it was trade unionists who had been reared with international unionism who lacked vision, in that they accepted unquestioningly a state of affairs that would never be permitted in any other country. The fact that both the leaders that founded CAIMAW in Winnipeg and the leaders that founded CEW in Vancouver had been exposed to an alternative to international unionism was no doubt a factor which contributed to their critical reassessment of their international unions, and to their decision to break away.

By 1970, both CAIMAW and CEW realized that there were serious obstacles preventing them from expanding into the national organizations that they hoped to become. CAIMAW, a broadly based industrial union, was quite isolated, and found itself unable to expand beyond the Winnipeg area because of a lack of resources.¹³⁴ The CEW had contacts with other independent Canadian labour organizations. Furthermore, it had succeeded in expanding beyond British Columbia. However, it was basically a union for electrical workers with a narrow jurisdiction, and therefore a restricted membership base.¹³⁵ It became evident to both organizations that changes would have to be made if they were to expand and grow. In 1970, the two unions came together to find a mutual solution to their problems through merger.

FOOTNOTES

1. J. Cameron, V. Reimer and C. Walker, "Lenkurt Strike", Unpublished Manuscript, BCIT, May, 1971, CAIMAW Union Files.
2. Members of IBEW Local 213 Who Want Union Democracy, Bulletin, no. 1, July 7, 1966, CAIMAW Union Files.
3. Information obtained from Mr. J. Succamore, Secretary Treasurer, Canadian Association of Industrial Mechanical and Allied Workers, personal interview, Vancouver, B. C.
4. Members of IBEW Local 213 Who Want Union Democracy, op. cit.
5. Ibid.
6. J. Cameron et al., op. cit.
7. Information in a letter from A. O'Keefe to W. Ladyman, February 8, 1966, CAIMAW Union Files.
8. J. Cameron et al., op. cit.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. Information in a transcript of an interview of Donna Pooghkay by J. Cameron, May 9, 1961, CAIMAW Union Files.
12. Information obtained from Mr. J. Succamore, op. cit., personal interview, Vancouver, B. C.
13. D. Pooghkay, op. cit.
14. Tom Constable later served as Mayor of Burnaby, B. C. 1977-1980.
15. D. Pooghkay, op. cit.
16. Information in a transcript of an interview of W. Little, Plant Manager, Lenkurt Electric, by C. Walker, May 16, 1971, CAIMAW Union Files.
17. D. Pooghkay, op. cit.
18. Vancouver Sun, April 29, 1966, p.2.
19. J. Cameron et al., op. cit.
20. Vancouver Sun, May 3, 1966, p.45.

21. This is not the Angus MacDonald that served on the B. C. Labour Relations Board.
22. Vancouver Sun, May 11, 1966, p.1.
23. Ibid.
24. Vancouver Sun, May 12, 1966, p.1.
25. Vancouver Sun, May 16, 1966, p.3.
26. Information obtained from Mr. J. Succamore, op. cit., personal interview, Vancouver, B. C.
27. Information obtained from Mr. P. Neale, Secretary, Vancouver and District Labour Council, personal interview, Vancouver, B. C.
28. Vancouver Sun, May 13, 1966, p.1.
29. Information obtained from Mr. J. Succamore, op. cit., personal interview, Vancouver, B. C.
30. Vancouver Sun, May 13, 1966, p.1.
31. Ibid.
32. Vancouver Sun, May 16, 1966, p.3.
33. Vancouver Sun, May 13, 1966, p.1.
34. Vancouver Sun, May 16, 1966, p.3.
35. Vancouver Sun, May 18, 1966, p.20.
36. Information obtained from Mr. P. Neale, op. cit., personal interview, Vancouver, B. C.
37. D. Pooghkay, op. cit.
38. Information obtained from Mr. P. Neale, op. cit., personal interview, Vancouver, B. C.
39. Vancouver Sun, May 16, 1966, p.3.
40. Ibid.
41. Vancouver Sun, May 25, 1966, p.3.
42. D. Pooghkay, op. cit.
43. Blacklisted Lenkurt Workers, "The Lenkurt Sellout", undated, CAIMAW Union Files.

44. J. Cameron et al., op. cit.
45. Vancouver Sun, May 30, 1966, p.1.
46. Ibid.
47. Information in an anonymous letter to D. Collins, June 14, 1966, CAIMAW Union Files.
48. Ibid.
49. Members of Local 213 IBEW, "Vote Out Executive Dictatorship", July 1966, CAIMAW Union Files.
50. J. Cameron et al., op. cit.
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53. D. Pooghkay, op. cit.
54. Information obtained from Mr. J. Succamore, op. cit., personal interview, Vancouver, B. C.
55. Ibid.
56. Ibid.
57. Ibid.
58. Ibid.
59. Ibid.
60. Ibid.
61. Information in a letter from the Canadian Autonomy Council, Members of IBEW to G. Freeman, undated, CAIMAW Union Files.
62. D. Pooghkay, op. cit.
63. Information obtained from Mr. J. Succamore, op. cit., personal interview, Vancouver, B. C.
64. Canadian Electrical Workers Union, "Election Bulletin," undated, CAIMAW Union Files.
65. Ibid.

66. CEW Livewire, vol 1, issue 2, April 1967, p.2, CAIMAW Union Files.
67. Information obtained from Mr. J. Succamore, op. cit., personal interview, Vancouver, B. C.
68. CEW Livewire, op. cit., p.4.
69. Information obtained from Mr. J. Succamore, op. cit., personal interview, Vancouver, B. C.
70. Ibid.
71. Ibid.
72. Ibid.
73. CEW Livewire, op. cit., p.4.
74. Ibid.
75. Ibid., p.2.
76. Vancouver Sun, May 27, 1967, p.15.
77. Information obtained from Mr. J. Succamore, op. cit., personal interview, Vancouver, B. C.
78. Ibid.
79. Vancouver Sun, May 27, 1967, p.15.
80. Canadian Electrical Workers Union, "Election Bulletin", op. cit.
81. Ibid.
82. Information in a letter from W. Ladyman to All Members of Local 213 in the Manufacturing Industry, Feb. 28, 1967, CAIMAW Union Files.
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Chapter V

The New CAIMAW

Goodnight Mr. Gompers, wherever you are

Kent Rowley

THE BREAKAWAYS JOIN FORCES

A QUESTION OF PHILOSOPHY

Since its formation in 1964, CAIMAW had set itself the goal of developing into a national union. However, it lacked the resources to expand beyond the Winnipeg area on its own. A solution to this problem presented itself when, in 1969, Pat McEvoy became aware of the existence of the CEW through the CEW publication, The Sparker. Feeling that a community of interest existed between his organization and the Vancouver based breakaway union, he contacted the officers of the CEW.¹ The officers of the CEW, realizing that their narrow jurisdiction proved restrictive to the growth of their union, and facing serious financial difficulties due to the organizational drive at the Phillips plant in Alberta, informed CAIMAW that they would welcome prospects of cooperation in a form that could range from the exchange of fraternal ties to full merger.² But the apparent community of interest between the two organizations was, in reality, overrated. Significant differences existed between the two unions that were to lead them on a collision course over issues that were rooted in basic ideology.

The CEW was deeply committed to its dual philosophy of self-determination for Canadian labour and the exercise of union democracy through rank and file control of decisions. In keeping with its philosophy of rank and file control, the CEW had no appointed officials in positions of influence in the union. In keeping with its

philosophy of nationalism, the CEW had a cause - the control of unions in Canada by Canadians.

By the time of the merger discussions, two distinct philosophies had emerged within CAIMAW. One, represented by Pat McEvoy, stood for the same principles of rank and file control as the CEW. The other, represented by John Gugulyn, CAIMAW's director of organization, basically embraced the principles of business unionism, a concept strongly rejected by the CEW. Unlike the CEW, Gugulyn did not pursue any cause, but limited his energies to furthering the interests of the membership with the employer. And, unlike the CEW, he adhered to a business unionism approach to decision making - namely that union decision making was best and most efficiently accomplished by being placed in the hands of a competent experienced professional, working on behalf of the membership to further their interests. "His attitude was 'pay me and I will look after you'" said Jess Succamore. "We believed that the members should run the union. Gugulyn believed that he should."³

John Gugulyn was an appointed official. The General Executive Board were all elected rank and file members, and CAIMAW's constitution delegated to these officers authority and responsibility for the administration of the union between conventions. However, Gugulyn, contrary to the spirit and intent of this constitutional provision - namely membership control - occupied a pivotal position in the union. His power stemmed from his ability to strongly influence the

Table III
OPPOSING IDEOLOGIES

| | GUGULYN | CEW | |
|-----------------|---|---|---|
| | Business Unionism | Rank & File Control | Nationalism |
| Objectives | Objectives: Limited to short term economic gain. No cause. Nationalism used as a selling feature to build membership and strengthen organization. Lack of enthusiasm for CCU due to limited return. | | Objectives: Cause - Building of a sovereign Canadian labour movement through support of the CCU. |
| Decision Making | Decisions best vested with trained professionals due to greater experience and expertise. | Decisions vested with membership - democracy. | |
| Information | Provision of information not necessary because decisions vested with trained professional. Control over information allows professional to retain control over decisions. | Provision of information essential in order to allow membership to make informed decisions. | |
| Staff Salaries | Large salaries for staff necessary in order to recruit expertise in professionals. No cause that can attract competent staff. | Large staff salaries discouraged so that staff do not lose touch with the rank and file they serve. | Large staff salaries not necessary because competent staff recruited by commitment to cause. Large salaries avoided to discourage staff motivation of economic opportunism. |
| Central Control | * Centralized control necessary to achieve control over decisions by competent trained professional. | * Local autonomy necessary to achieve membership control over decision making. | |

* Issue adds overtones of regionalism to ideological question.

elected General Executive Board, both through his control of the information they received and through the respect they had for his expertise.⁴

Gugulyn would always claim that he was just a hired hand. Yet everything Gugulyn wanted, Gugulyn got. He made sure the board only got the information he wanted them to get. The board would always wait for his opinion on everything, and they would refer and defer their decision making responsibility to him.⁵

Gugulyn's influence was in keeping with his business unionism approach to decision making. But it ran contrary to the strongly held ideology of the CEW, and to the constitutional intent of CAIMAW, both of which centered on membership control of decisions, and on the belief that the very last person who should wield such power was an appointed official over whom the membership had little control.

The CEW officers, however, were unaware of these underlying ideological differences between themselves and Gugulyn. Believing that a strong community of interest did exist between the two organizations, they agreed to meet with Allan Gold, president of CAIMAW and John Gugulyn in Vancouver in May 1969 to discuss the merger.⁶

THE MERGER

At the meeting with Gold and Gugulyn, CEW officers expressed concern about the structure of CAIMAW. CAIMAW had been set up in 1964

to consist of a National union and subordinate units (local unions). As the organization had grown and developed, each newly certified plant had merely been made part of Subordinate Unit 1. The distinction between the National union and Subordinate Unit 1 was, therefore, fuzzy and ill defined. The constitutional authority given to CAIMAW's officers was also a subject of criticism by CEW officers. They approved of the spirit and intent of the constitutional provision that all officers be elected rank and file members.⁷ But the CAIMAW constitution provided for the offices of president, two vice-presidents and a secretary-treasurer as national officers, as well as a full General Executive Board, consisting of a chairman and six members. National officers were forbidden to hold two positions in the union, a fact which prohibited the president, vice-presidents and secretary-treasurer from sitting on the General Executive Board.⁸ The result was a "duplication of effort and too many chiefs".⁹ Real authority for the administration of the union between membership conventions lay with the General Executive Board, leaving the other officers with very little influence. The president of the union did not even have the constitutional right to attend General Executive Board meetings. The secretary-treasurer could attend the meetings in order to record the minutes, but he had neither voice nor vote.¹⁰

John Gugulyn agreed with the CEW officers that these deficiencies existed in the constitution, and that the CEW had a superior organizational structure. He explained that the deficiencies were due to the fact that CAIMAW had been established with a groundswell of support, and had had to create its organization in a hurry. The CEW,

on the other hand, had established its organization first and then mustered its support, leaving it more time to carefully and methodically lay the framework for a good structure. Gugulyn assured the CEW officers that they would have ample opportunity to address and correct the difficulties that existed in CAIMAW's constitutional structure at the next membership convention, an assurance that satisfied the Vancouver group.¹¹

However, there were more problematic forces at work at the meeting, forces that stemmed from the philosophical differences that existed between Gugulyn and the Vancouver union. Gugulyn's sole reason for supporting the merger with the CEW was because "he saw it as a good move for expanding the union in the other provinces, as costs were prohibiting CAIMAW from moving out of Manitoba at that time".¹² To Gugulyn, the merger was nothing more than a business proposition.¹³ He was anxious therefore, to "sell" the CEW officers on the idea. He told them that CAIMAW enjoyed a membership of approximately two thousand, and was well able to provide financial assistance for organizational drives, strikes and legal advice.¹⁴ But he was overstating the true size of his union's membership and its financial strength. "He lied like hell to us", said Succamore.¹⁵

The officers of the CEW on the other hand, viewed the merger as more than a simple business deal. They had as their goal the strengthening not only of their own union, but the independent Canadian labour movement as a whole. Principle and their nationalist cause played an important part in their decision. "That is why the stupid

part of the lies Gugulyn told us is that if he had told us the truth, it wouldn't have mattered to us."¹⁶

Differences also existed in the expectations held of the results of the merger, differences that again flowed from opposing ideologies. As a vehicle for vesting decision making authority with the rank and file, the CEW was deeply committed to the principle of local autonomy. So much so that they were determined that a merger with CAIMAW would not result in a forfeit of the CEW's autonomy, or even its identity. Consequently, the CEW included in the conditions it stipulated for merger that CEW Locals 1 and 2 retain their identity by name, that the bylaws of CEW locals remain in effect, that CEW officers remain in office, that CAIMAW foster and encourage a policy of local autonomy, and that the local unions retain control of their finances by continuing their responsibility for the collection of dues.¹⁷ Although Gugulyn agreed to these conditions, his adherence to professional rather than membership decision making no doubt led him to favour centralized control rather than local autonomy. While the CEW was expecting to retain its autonomy and even its identity, Gugulyn was viewing the merger as an effective takeover of the CEW by CAIMAW, and as an absorption of the CEW into the Winnipeg union.¹⁸

The underlying differences in ideology between Gugulyn and the CEW officers were not known to the Vancouver group at the time of the merger discussions. CAIMAW agreed to all the conditions stipulated by the CEW, the members of both unions approved the merger, and the merger agreement was signed on December 1, 1969.

THE CCU

Meanwhile, other independent Canadian unions across the country were moving to join forces in the establishment of a new labour centre for independent unions. The initiative for this move came largely from Kent Rowley, a trade unionist who had been fighting for many years for the development of an independent Canadian labour movement. Prior to the 1960's, Rowley had seen his main support in this effort as coming from such unions as the United Electrical Workers, the United Fishermen and Allied Workers and the International Union of Mine Mill and Smelter Workers, unions whose leadership tended to have roots in the "Left of the Thirties and Forties".¹⁹ Many of these leaders were alleged to have been members of the Communist Party of Canada, a fact that had resulted in their expulsion from the CCL, effectively making them independent unions. At a conference in Hamilton in 1953, Rowley attempted to draw these unions together in a new independent labour centre. The attempt, however, failed.²⁰

During the 1960's, in the wave of nationalism that was sweeping the country, a new type of independent union was appearing on the scene. These unions included CAIMAW, founded in Winnipeg in 1964, CEW, founded in Vancouver in 1967, the Bricklayers Masons Independent Union of Canada, established in Ontario in 1965, the Canadian Union of Operating Engineers, founded in Toronto in 1960, the United Oil Workers of Canada, founded in Montreal in 1967 and the Pulp and Paper Workers of Canada, established in British Columbia in 1962.²¹ These unions were mostly breakaway unions, and had been founded as a result of

dissatisfaction with their parent international union. Their leaders incorporated nationalism into their philosophy, and resented the control exerted on international unions operating in Canada by their United States headquarters.

These were scattered cases but they comprised a pattern. All these workers had broken away, with grave difficulty, from American "parents" whom they found corrupt and oppressive. All resented their lack of control over their own affairs, the drain of their dues money southward, and the erosion of their own position through concessions to the companies. They made lengthy attempts to rectify the problems from within their internationals. They eventually concluded they had to get out.²²

These new unions now became the centre of Kent Rowley's attention, and he travelled across the country to establish contact with them. In 1967 he arrived in Vancouver to speak at the Fisherman's Hall. Through the PPWC, CEW officers Jess Succamore and George Brown learned of his visit, and attended the meeting. Greatly impressed by Rowley, the officers of the CEW formed a strong commitment to the goal of establishing an independent Canadian labour centre.²³ They were very receptive to the proposal made by Rowley at the 1967 Canadian Textile Convention in Branford, that "we appeal to labour across the land to join in building a united and completely independent Canadian trade union movement, totally free of any foreign domination".²⁴

In order to further the idea of a new labour centre, a meeting was called for July 1968 in Sudbury. The Canadian Union of Operating Engineers, the Bricklayers Masons Independent Union, Local 598 of the International Mine Mill and Smelter Workers Union and the Pulp and Paper Workers of Canada attended the conference. In keeping with its commitment to further the cause of Canadian unionism, so too did the CEW. George Brown drove from Vancouver to represent his union, camping out along the way because of his union's limited financial resources.²⁵ CAIMAW, still isolated in Winnipeg, did not attend.

The meeting resulted in a call for a founding convention of the new labour centre, to be named the Council of Canadian Unions (CCU), held in the Mine Mill Hall in Sudbury in July 1969. Jess Succamore attended the meeting on behalf of the CEW. But by this time, the CEW was already engaged in serious discussions with CAIMAW about the possibility of merger. Therefore, Succamore interrupted his journey to Sudbury to stop at Winnipeg and appeal to CAIMAW to send a representative to the founding convention. As a result, John Gugulyn attended the meeting in Sudbury on behalf of CAIMAW, but with observer status only.²⁶ The delegates elected Roy Scranton of Mine Mill as the council's first president. Harry Cooper was elected as first vice-president, John Meiorin became the central Canada vice-president and Kent Rowley was elected to the position of secretary-treasurer. Jess Succamore was elected as the council's first western vice-president. The CEW had not only developed a strong commitment to the principle of building a new independent Canadian labour centre, but also occupied a leadership position in the new centre from its

formation. CAIMAW lacked both these characteristics. In fact, dedication to the building of this new centre was yet another illustration of the difference in ideology between CEW and CAIMAW. The new centre was in keeping with the cause of the CEW - self determination for Canadian labour. CAIMAW, operating under the influence of the business unionism approach of Gugulyn, lacked such a cause.

THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN COMPETING IDEOLOGIES

THE 1970 NATIONAL CONVENTION

With the signing of the merger agreement, the CEW officially went out of existence. Initially, the CEW had no representation on the General Executive Board of their new union, CAIMAW. They were assured, however, that this problem, and their concerns about the structure of CAIMAW, could be addressed at the forthcoming union convention.²⁷

On May 2, 1970, a regular convention was held in Winnipeg, providing the old CEW with its first opportunity to have input into its new union. Vancouver Local 1 sent three delegates, John Nixon, John Mack and Gerry Grieve. Blairmore Local 2 was represented by Agnes Raber and Gerald Cotton. George Brown also attended the convention as a delegate. These ex-CEW delegates were, however, greatly outnumbered by the original CAIMAW group, who among them had thirty-five delegates.²⁸

Many resolutions were placed on the floor by the Vancouver delegates, resolutions that were basically designed to make the union

more democratic and to give the Vancouver and Blairmore sections a position of influence in the union. In particular, they addressed themselves to the structure of CAIMAW's General Executive Board, proposing that the six members provided for in the constitution should constitute a minimum number of members, and that one member be elected "by and from each subordinate unit, local or region".²⁹ Further, they proposed that the offices of "up to four regional vice-presidents" be added to the executive component of the union.³⁰

At the convention, Pat McEvoy openly associated himself with the Vancouver group. But in John Gugulyn, the Vancouver resolutions met with stiff opposition. It was then that George Brown became fully aware that a small clique had developed within CAIMAW. The source of this clique was the Griffin Steel plant. A disproportionate number of CAIMAW's officers came from this plant, giving it an overwhelming influence in the union. But the centre of this clique was John Gugulyn, who was "trying to seize complete control" and who was "afraid that his power was being eroded by the Vancouver resolutions".³¹

The centralized power exercised by Gugulyn was, of course, in keeping with his philosophy of vesting decision making authority in a trained professional. But it undermined the membership control advocated by the ex-CEW officers that relied on the principle of local autonomy. Also, no doubt, the attempts of the Vancouver group to win greater influence in the union and their opposition to the Winnipeg power clique of Griffin Steel added overtones of regionalism to this basic ideological difference.

Determined to check the power exerted by Gugulyn within the union, George Brown nominated Jess Succamore to the position of National 2nd vice-president, despite the fact that Succamore was now devoting most of his energies to the CCU, had promised his family that he would not hold office in the union, and did not even attend the convention. Brown nominated Succamore so that the Vancouver group would have a representative in a position of influence "if a fight became necessary".³²

Gugulyn opposed Succamore's nomination, looking for any reason he could find to argue against it, including pointing out that Succamore was not in attendance. Despite his efforts, Succamore was elected by a resounding majority. "What Gugulyn overlooked in his consternation is that I hadn't agreed to accept the position they elected me to" said Succamore. "George Brown was afraid to come to my house for two months, afraid to face my wife. It was the only time I ever saw him afraid of anything."³³ Succamore's election to the position of 2nd vice-president of the union was a "resounding setback for Gugulyn"³⁴, and proved to be an important lever in the struggle for power.

Gugulyn was successful, however, in getting the B. C. proposals for structural change defeated. But the Vancouver delegates did win some concessions. Due to their proposals, the president of the union was given the constitutional right to attend General Executive Board meetings with voice but no vote, and each province was given the right to "a minimum of one representative" on the General Executive Board.³⁵ Other changes for which the B. C. group were responsible was

the affiliation of the union with the CCU, the right of the membership to recall officers, and a change in the political "discrimination" stance of the union. The old CAIMAW constitution included in the authority given to the General Executive Board:

They shall have the right to decline or reject the nomination of any member or person or candidate for election who is proved to be a communist....or who is a member of any group who support the principle or belief other than the democratic form of government.³⁶

All such references to the privately held political beliefs or affiliations of the union's officers were deleted from the constitution, due to resolutions from B. C. delegates. "It was simply a question of upholding human rights."³⁷

Therefore, despite the fact that the Manitoba delegates greatly outnumbered those from the old CEW, the B. C. delegates were able to win some concessions and exert some influence within the union. "We had shown for the first time that Winnipeg could vote on the issues involved, and not as a clique" said Succamore.³⁸ The problem of regionalism was not, therefore, unsurmountable. However, the concessions won by the B. C. group were seen as marginal, and they left the convention realizing that in resolving the ideological problem of the influence of Gugulyn, they would first have to build their support.³⁹

THE FIGHT IS ON

After the convention, the relationship between John Gugulyn and the Vancouver officers worsened as their differences in ideology became more and more apparent, and as Gugulyn attempted to expand his control to include the B. C. section of the union. One such difference of opinion erupted over the position held by George Brown in the union. Brown had been appointed to the position of staff representative for the union in B. C. and Alberta in accordance with the merger agreement. Pat McEvoy held the corresponding position for Manitoba. Brown insisted that he should be elected to his position by the membership. Gugulyn, however, insisted that the job was not an elected one. "He wanted the right to appoint".⁴⁰ Despite Gugulyn's objections, a referendum vote of the membership was conducted and Brown was elected to the position. The principle involved was that the Vancouver officers were determined that the decision of who would serve as staff representative would be vested in the membership, and not an appointed official. Gugulyn, on the other hand, felt it should be vested in him, a trained, experienced professional.

Gugulyn then attempted to maintain the influence he exerted on the General Executive Board by controlling the information received from the Vancouver office. First, he instituted a system of daily report sheets, to be filled out by both Brown and McEvoy and forwarded to him. Gugulyn would then compile these daily reports into his own monthly reports, which he would present to the General Executive Board. Secondly, he refused to allow either Brown or McEvoy to attend General

Executive Board meetings. Prior to the merger, McEvoy had attended these meetings. But after openly associating himself with the Vancouver group at the convention, he was excluded from them by Gugulyn. The reason given by Gugulyn for this change was that if McEvoy had the right to attend, so too did George Brown, and the costs of bringing Brown to Winnipeg for this purpose precluded his attendance at these meetings.⁴¹ But to the B. C. officers, it was becoming apparent that Gugulyn was really setting up a system where all information was channeled through him, and which he could then selectively feed to the General Executive Board,⁴² thereby maintaining his influence and control.

Bypassing Gugulyn, Brown and Succamore complained directly to Allan Gold, president of the union, and Al Pitt, chairman of the General Executive Board, of the communications problem that existed between Vancouver and Winnipeg. Instead of the daily reports insisted on by Gugulyn, they wanted to submit a detailed two weekly report. They also pointed out that they were not receiving adequate information about events in Winnipeg.⁴³ At a meeting held on June 20, 1970, the members of the General Executive Board ruled that the staff should report to Gugulyn, now manager of staff, weekly.⁴⁴ Brown, therefore, attempted to circumvent the control exercised by Gugulyn over information by submitting a weekly report, already in compiled form.⁴⁵ This practice resulted in a vigorous protest from Gugulyn.

First, may I suggest that if you wish to challenge any of the discussion which took place at the Executive Board meeting, by all means do so.

However, it is my understanding that the staff would continue to make reports in the same fashion and on the same daily sheets as before. What would change is that the staff would be requested to submit these reports once a week and that I would compile same and distribute copies of the compiled reports to the members of the General Executive Board. You apparently have come to the conclusion that you will do my work....The facts are that I have written to you before requesting that the reports be sent in as described and that I will undertake the responsibility of compiling same....The daily reports are kept on file for the Executive Board to read in more detail if they wish! Your file so far is empty!⁴⁶

The ruling of the board, therefore, had done nothing to alleviate the problem of the reports. Worse yet, Gugulyn, an appointed official, had taken it upon himself to interpret the minutes of the General Executive Board meeting, a practice which infuriated the Vancouver officers.⁴⁷

Another source of friction between the two sections of the union was the issue of the union's commitment to the CCU. CAIMAW, in accordance with the merger agreement, had made the decision to affiliate to the CCU. But while the ex-CEW officers wholeheartedly supported the fledgling council, CAIMAW's General Executive Board, under the influence of John Gugulyn, were less than enthusiastic about it. They had to be prodded by the Vancouver officers, for example, to select a representative of the union to sit on the Executive Board of the CCU.⁴⁸ Also, at this early stage of the council's development, the CCU was not

equipped to bear the costs of bringing its own officers to its conventions. Jess Succamore was the council's first western vice-president, and the Vancouver officers asked the National union to bear the costs of Succamore's attendance at an impending CCU convention in Winnipeg. "We appreciate that this is a heavy strain on the finances of the union - but it is very important at this stage in the development of the council we support it", they wrote.⁴⁹ But the General Executive Board, at their meeting on June 20, 1970 refused the request, and ruled that the local unions would be responsible for the costs of sending their delegates to the CCU conventions.⁵⁰ The fact that one of its members, Succamore, occupied a leading position in the CCU, was ignored.

Indeed, the stance of the National union in Winnipeg was to downplay the significance of the council, a council which the Vancouver officers had committed themselves to support. This difference in attitude towards the CCU no doubt stemmed from the fact that Gugulyn, as a business unionist, did not share the CEW's nationalist cause, and could foresee little economic benefit to be derived from support of the CCU. This attitude was no doubt strengthened by the fact that the CCU itself shared the basic philosophy of the CEW regarding rank and file control of unions, and the restriction of the exercise of power by appointed officials. The philosophy of the CCU was itself, therefore, at odds with the business unionism philosophy of John Gugulyn. "The difference between the union opportunism of John Gugulyn and the principles of Kent Rowley were like day and night" said Succamore. "Gugulyn knew we had friends in the CCU and that's why he played down the significance of the council."⁵¹

The resentment of the Vancouver officers increased as the National union in Winnipeg adopted policies and practices that the ex-CEW officers believed to be in violation of the merger agreement. First, the General Executive Board decided not to immediately approve the by-laws of Local 1-B. C., but to refer them to Gugulyn for any recommended changes.⁵² The Vancouver section of the union regarded this decision not only as a violation of the merger agreement, but also as an infringement on local autonomy. To make matters worse, that autonomy had been sacrificed to an appointed official, a further infringement on the sovereignty of rank and file control.⁵³

Secondly, the June 20, 1970 meeting of the General Executive Board ruled that "part-time organizers shall be hired only when the situation warrants it and after consultation with the staff manager".⁵⁴ This decision meant that George Brown could not get the financing to hire part-time organizers for his district without the approval of John Gugulyn, and Gugulyn followed a policy:

- (a) that I can decide on the necessity of such hirings;
- (b) that organizational work must be well underway before added staff is forthcoming;
- (c) that in any event, I can justify to the Board , the necessity of such hirings even for small amounts of money.⁵⁵

In adherence with this policy, Gugulyn did, on occasion, refuse to pay for part-time organizers which Brown felt were necessary. This refusal was considered by the Vancouver officers to be a violation of the merger

agreement in which CAIMAW undertook to provide assistance in organizing, and it placed in the hands of an appointed official even more decision making power.⁵⁶

The Vancouver officers became outraged when they discovered that the General Executive Board, under the influence of Gugulyn, was even violating the decisions of convention delegates in their administration of the union, thereby overruling the decisions of the membership. The June meeting of the General Executive Board, for example, set the effective date of the union's affiliation with the CCU as July 1, 1970.⁵⁷ Yet the delegates to the 1970 convention had rejected a resolution giving the board the right to determine the effective date of affiliation to the council, and had called for affiliation to take effect immediately.⁵⁸ The ruling by the board, therefore, was seen by the Vancouver officers as a complete negation of the authority of convention delegates and the membership.⁵⁹

Even more infuriating to the Vancouver officers was the decision taken by the June 20 meeting of the General Executive Board in their appointment of John Gugulyn to the position of manager of staff, with full authority over and responsibility for the staff of the union.⁶⁰ This appointment represented another violation of decisions taken by delegates to the 1970 convention. Allan Gold, president for CAIMAW, had put forward to the delegates:

Resolution No. 28: Duties of Staff a) Director of Organizing and Servicing. He shall be responsible

for directing all organizing and servicing of this Association. He shall with the approval of the Executive Board have the right to hire temporary organizers. He will direct any organizer to any area to organize or to adequately service the membership. He shall be responsible for following the policies of the Executive Board and informing the staff of these policies.⁶¹

The resolution had been defeated by the delegates, but the General Executive Board had now, in effect, circumvented this decision by simply changing Gugulyn's title to manager of staff. He had the very powers that the membership had decided he should not have. This ruling by the board meant not only an overriding of the convention decision, but also a further slide in power to an appointed official - Gugulyn. Both issues were anathema to the principles and philosophy of the Vancouver section of the union, namely democracy and rank and file control. But they were in keeping with Gugulyn's philosophy of vesting decision making in a trained professional.

The National union was even violating the constitution of the union. The report by the secretary-treasurer that was supposed to be delivered to the delegates at the 1970 convention had been omitted from the convention proceedings. Also, Jess Succamore, even after repeated requests, was unable to obtain minutes of the General Executive Board meetings, financial statements or any other important papers relating to the running of the union, despite the fact that he was 2nd vice-president. Both of these actions were in violation of the

constitution, and therefore in violation of the decisions of the membership. They were also contrary to the Vancouver officers' deeply held philosophy of full disclosure of information to the membership in order to accomplish membership sovereignty in decision making. They now began to suspect that the financial information was being withheld because Gugulyn had been less than truthful about the financial status of the union at the time of the merger discussions.⁶²

In fact, as Succamore assumed his responsibilities as 2nd vice-president of the union, he found that his efforts to fulfill his duties were frustrated by a complete lack of information from Winnipeg. Both vice-presidents, for example, had been assigned the task of proofreading the new constitution by the General Executive Board. However, Succamore, despite repeated requests, was able to acquire neither a record of the seating of the delegates, nor a copy of the resolutions passed at convention. His input into the union administration as a whole was hampered because he was not provided with any of the important papers and documents related to the running of the union.⁶³ The influence of Gugulyn over union decision making, therefore, was being maintained.

To add to the frustration of the Vancouver officers, the National union in Winnipeg was not properly meeting its financial obligations to the Vancouver office. There were delays in the National union's payment of their share of the telephone bills and rent, and the petty cash fund was not kept adequately replenished.⁶⁴ These were, no doubt, minor annoyances which, under other circumstances, would not have

been very significant. But coming at a time when the Vancouver officers were seeing their deeply held philosophy of rank and file control and self determination for Canadian labour being undermined by Gugulyn's emphasis on professional decision making sovereignty and lack of interest in the CCU, these annoyances were not taken lightly.

Worse yet, these financial difficulties were coming at a time that Gugulyn was drawing a salary from the union which the Vancouver officers suspected to be exorbitant.⁶⁵ From Gugulyn's business unionist perspective, a large salary was no doubt justified on the grounds that without an attractive salary, a union cannot attract and recruit competent staff. However, large salaries were another anethma to the CEW's basic philosophy. To them, such practices merely resulted in economic opportunism by union staff, and caused them to lose touch with the rank and file they served. Large salaries were not necessary to recruit competent staff because they were attracted by dedication to the CEW's nationalist cause - an enticement that Gugulyn's philosophy did not provide. The Vancouver officers were outraged at the salary drawn from the union by Gugulyn.

Finally, the Vancouver officers became aware, for the first time, of the existence of a contract of employment between Gugulyn and CAIMAW, in effect in early 1970, in which Gugulyn had agreed to work part-time for the union at a salary of \$375 per month, while working full-time for and drawing a full salary from the Liberal Party in Manitoba.⁶⁶ This contract was a violation of many principles strongly held by the Vancouver officers. First, it was seen as economic

opportunism by a union official. Secondly, it represented a breach of the union's constitution which forbade any sort of partisan political involvement by the union. Thirdly, the existence of the contract, although approved by the General Executive Board, had been kept concealed from the Vancouver officers and the union membership. "We were appalled" said Jess Succamore, and he delivered a vigorous protest to Winnipeg.

This contract is a complete negation of all my concepts of trade union principles. This contract has been concealed from the members of our union. Until recently, it has been concealed from me as Vice-President of the Union. Brothers, honestly, how could anyone who professes to be an honest trade-unionist take \$375 a month from the union when at the same period members of our union at Bell Foundry were pounding the picket line, in sub zero weather for \$25 [a week].⁶⁷

THE "COMMIES" FROM THE COAST

The Vancouver officers now decided to fight for the type of union that they believed in, a union controlled by the rank and file. They would fight for a union in which the constitution was rigorously adhered to, in which the decisions of convention delegates were respected and upheld, in which information was fully disclosed to the membership, and in which the power of appointed officials was curtailed. Jess Succamore brought the full power of his office as 2nd vice-president to bear in this battle. He demanded his right to access

to information be respected, and the union's violations of the constitution be corrected.

I am 2nd vice-president. I am entitled to full reports and information pertaining to all decisions of this Association from the Chairman of the General Executive Board. I am not receiving any of the necessary information. Further, I charge that our Constitution is being violated, misinterpreted and abused at the present time....and yet we have the nerve to charge the international unions with concealing information from their members.⁶⁸

Succamore also accused the General Executive Board of having overstepped its authority by overriding the decision of the convention delegates on the timing of the union's affiliation to the CCU. "You had no right to set the date of July 1" he wrote. "Surely, in any democratic organization the voice of the membership as expressed at convention is the highest authority."⁶⁹

The General Executive Board's appointment of John Gugulyn as manager of staff also came under attack. Succamore pointed out that the appointment was in violation of the decision of the convention delegates, represented an undue slide in power to an appointed official, and was contrary to the spirit and intent of the union's constitution - namely membership control.⁷⁰

Jess Succamore then reported directly to the membership of Local 1 (B. C.) the full details of the difficulties being experienced by the Vancouver office with Winnipeg. In his report, delivered to and unanimously endorsed by the general meeting of Local 1 (B. C.), Succamore concluded:

I can assure you that I will support this union only as long as you are prepared to fight for the main principles of democracy and full disclosure of all information to our members. One final question. WHO RUNS THIS UNION? I think it should be the members and the officers along with the General Executive Board. I will be fighting for that position.⁷¹

The local membership rallied to support the position of the Vancouver officers in their battle with Winnipeg. They unanimously passed a resolution accusing the National office and the General Executive Board of having displayed an "obvious reluctance to carry out their responsibilities" of honouring the merger agreement, and directing them to honour in full their obligations to provide financial assistance, foster local autonomy and approve the by-laws of Locals 1 and 2. They also directed the National union to provide the membership with full information of the finances and staff expenses of the union.⁷²

The membership then elected a committee to draw up a statement of grievances to be presented to the General Executive Board. In this statement, the committee first complained about finances. They pointed

out that although the GEB meeting in July had decided to maintain a \$50 petty cash fund for the Vancouver office, it was taking over two months for Winnipeg to reimburse Vancouver's expenditures. "This action is contrary to the above motion of the GEB" they complained. "Article 3(c) of the constitution gives the secretary-treasurer all the authority required to carry out his responsibility. Why isn't he doing his job?"⁷³ They also complained that although CAIMAW had agreed during the merger negotiations to pay the \$50 per month rent on the Vancouver office and later to receive a \$25 refund from the local, the practice being followed was that the local had to pay the full \$50 and was refunded \$25 by the National office, "usually well after the 1st of the month when the rent is due".⁷⁴ They also charged that office supplies were not adequately forthcoming from the National office. "It doesn't help when we read that the National office has just purchased a new typewriter and we have to use the personal machine of our representative," they complained.⁷⁵ Further, they pointed out that under the terms of the merger agreement, CAIMAW had undertaken to bear organizing costs, an undertaking which the B. C. group did not now feel was being adequately honoured.

We would like to know if the National union is prepared to honour its obligations under the merger agreement and cooperate with B. C. on the above items? If this is not possible because of financial problems, then please tell us, and not just kid us along with frivolous resolutions duly adopted at GEB meetings.⁷⁶

The committee then charged that the local autonomy of Local 1 (B. C.) was not being adequately respected by the National office. The causes for this complaint were the delay of the GEB in approving the local's by-laws, and the method that the National office had used to acquire the names and addresses of the local's membership. Instead of following the formal procedure of requesting the local's secretary for the information, who would then in turn ask the local's membership to approve its release, the National office had acquired the address list through an informal request to a member of the local, who then sent the list to Winnipeg without the knowledge of the local membership or executive. This incident represented, the committee charged, "a blatant disregard for the autonomy of this local".⁷⁷

The above method of acquiring information must stop. If one can get material and information from a local by this method, then we may as well quit right now and allow Winnipeg to take over. We are very jealous of our Local Union autonomy and would like to remind the N.O. that is a major reason for us belonging to a Canadian union. Should the National want a look at our local books and finances then we request that the request be made through the local secretary. That's what he is elected to do.⁷⁸

The committee further demanded that communication be improved between the National office and Vancouver, and that Jess Succamore, as 2nd vice-president, be kept properly informed of all factors influencing the running of the union. "We recognize the importance of the officers of this union, and request that their constitutional authority be

respected."⁷⁹ In contrast, they protested the position of John Gugulyn in the union, pointing out that he had been given powers that were unconstitutional, appeared to be receiving a salary that was regarded as exorbitant (suspected to be \$225 per week), and was exerting excessive influence in the union. "John Gugulyn has no authority to interpret GEB minutes. He has done so with reference to reports and organizing."⁸⁰ Finally, the committee expressed concern about the disproportionate representation of Griffin Steel in the leadership of the union. Their report concluded:

To say that there is some dissatisfaction in B. C. is to put it mildly. Our concern is with DEMOCRACY and COMMUNICATIONS AMONG THE MEMBERS IN WINNIPEG AND B. C. AND ALBERTA. Local 1 had more communication with our brothers and sisters in Bristol BEFORE they came into our union.⁸¹

The endorsed report of Jess Succamore to the membership of Local 1 (B. C.), the membership resolutions, and the statement of grievances from their elected committee were all placed before the next General Executive Board meeting held in Winnipeg on September 26, 1970. But John Gugulyn had been launching his own campaign in his battle with the B. C. section of the union. He began trying to convince the Winnipeg leaders that the ex-CEW officers were Communists. He researched the background of George Brown and discovered that, before emigrating to Canada, Brown had travelled to Communist countries as part of the education for shop stewards given by his British union, the Amalgamated Engineers. Further, Gugulyn claimed to have documents from

the RCMP, proving that both Brown and Succamore were members of the Communist Party. No one else ever saw these documents, but as a result of this campaign, the Vancouver officers were dubbed the "Commies from the Coast". Gugulyn's charges that the Commies from the Coast were trying to take over the union succeeded in creating considerable suspicion in the minds of many of the Winnipeg executives as to the motives of Brown and Succamore in launching their battle against Gugulyn.⁸²

Despite the degree of success achieved by Gugulyn in his campaign, the General Executive Board took immediate action to be responsive to many of the grievances placed before them by Local 1 (B. C.). The complaints of the Vancouver section about finances were readily resolved by the September 26 meeting of the board, which ruled that the secretary-treasurer would have the authority to replenish the Vancouver petty cash fund without waiting for an audit of the bills, that the National office would pay the full \$50 rent for the Vancouver office, \$25 of this amount to be reimbursed by the local union at a later date, that the National office would share the cost of buying or leasing a typewriter for the B. C. office, and that the staff representative would have the authority to hire organizers without first requesting permission from the head office (but subject to approval later by the board). All the financial demands of Local 1 (B. C.), therefore, were met.⁸³

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The board was also responsive to the complaints of Local 1 (B. C.) about the violation of their local autonomy. First, the meeting ruled that the by-laws of Local 1 (B. C.) be approved. The complaint of the local about the methods used by the National office in acquiring the information of the membership lists, however, appears to have been a source of confusion for the board, in that its members could not understand how the informal method used could be interpreted as a violation of local autonomy. They needed the information, they claimed and defended their action as being simply one of pragmatism and not as any intended violation of rights. Despite their defence of their position however, the Winnipeg officers were careful to scrupulously follow the formal procedure demanded by Local 1 (B. C.) in requesting further information. Clearly, the National office did not understand the sensitivity of Local 1 (B. C.) on the question of local autonomy. Yet the Winnipeg officers seemed prepared to respect the local's wishes.⁸⁴

The General Executive Board also proved to be responsive to the complaints of the B. C. section about the withholding of information pertaining to the running of the union. The meeting ruled that "a copy of salary and expenses be provided to Local 1 (B. C.) upon their request" and that "the demands of Vice-President (Succamore) of B. C. for records and convention minutes, names and financial report be complied with".⁸⁵ The Winnipeg officers also agreed to send Succamore a copy of all decisions made by the General Executive Board in accordance with the constitutional requirement. The fact that this had not been done before, they claimed, was due to an oversight.⁸⁶

On the matter of rather narrow, specific problems, therefore, the General Executive Board attempted to resolve the grievances to the satisfaction of the B. C. section of the union. When it came to the broader question of union philosophy, however, the board, no doubt still under the strong influence of John Gugulyn, responded quite differently. Local 1 (B. C.) was demanding local autonomy, for example, and pointed to the merger agreement as an undertaking by CAIMAW to provide it. It appears that the difference between the National office and the local on the question was more quantitative than qualitative. The National office did not oppose local autonomy in principle. Rather, it was the degree of autonomy demanded by B. C. that was seen as excessive, and was not going to be granted by the National office.⁸⁷ There can be little doubt that the decision taken by the board in rejecting the degree of autonomy desired by B. C. served the interests of John Gugulyn in maintaining his position of power within the union.

Furthermore, while the B. C. section was demanding that the Merger Agreement be rigorously honoured, the Winnipeg officers took the position that, after the 1970 convention, the Merger Agreement ceased to have effect, the union's constitution now being the governing document of the relationship.⁸⁸ This policy was applied to both the question of local autonomy and the question of CAIMAW's obligation to provide organizing assistance to B. C., applications that served the interests of John Gugulyn in maintaining control over the union decision making process.

Your statement that Western Area determine what is best for organization in its own area and Alberta cannot be acceded to. The Executive Board has a responsibility to the membership in between conventions. They will decide what is best for the organization and in the best interests of the members so long as they are elected for that purpose. Your Executive Board is always prepared to work closely with the members of any local union or Staff Representative. We cannot however allow any person or local to usurp the functions of the Board.⁸⁹

Similarly, the board refused to acquiece to Local 1 (B. C.)'s complaints about the power relationships that existed in the union. First, they denied that a problem existed in terms of the representation of different certified plants on the union's executive, and the disproportionate power exerted by Griffin.⁹⁰ Secondly, they defended the position held by and the authority given to John Gugulyn. There would be no changes forthcoming on this question.

Under the constitution, we on the Board have a responsibility to ensure that the necessary servicing and organizational work is carried through, as well as many other day-to-day activities of the union. We have decided, that we require a person to supervise such activities and report to the Board on such. As for the salary of such person - it was arrived at by the Board considering the responsibilities of the job and in line with progressive increases to all staff representatives.

as they gain experience through service in the union's positions.⁹¹

Finally, the Board vigorously denied the charge that Gugulyn was exerting undue influence in the union.⁹² Despite the concessions granted to B. C., therefore, John Gugulyn was successful in retaining his power in the face of the B. C. campaign.

The concessions granted by the GEB meeting of September 26 did not succeed in bringing peace between the two sections of the union. Although the General Executive Board had ruled that Succamore would be given access to the information he demanded, the National office did not comply with the ruling. Neither the financial report nor the minutes of the GEB meetings were forthcoming from Winnipeg. Succamore, therefore, continued his protests.

I know of no other union, Canadian or American, where the 2nd Vice-President is denied information on the present financial position of the union. Yet an appointed official has full knowledge of these matters. I will now fight to have full disclosure of GEB minutes and financial statements to the officers and locals of the union.⁹³

At a general meeting of Local 1 (B. C.), the membership instructed the local's recording secretary, Peter Cameron, to demand compliance of the National office with the GEB's directive on behalf of the local, and passed a resolution demanding "that Brothers Al Pitt and Smilinsky be

reprimanded for failure to comply with the GEB directive and that this be entered in the record".⁹⁴

The information that Succamore did receive from Winnipeg only succeeded in adding fuel to the fire in the battle between the two sections of the union. The information disclosed that prior to the 1970 convention, two vacancies had existed on the General Executive Board, a fact which had not been revealed to Locals 1 and 2 CEW. The absence of notification of these vacancies to the two locals was not only a violation of the constitution, but also "denied our members an opportunity to have representation on the GEB".⁹⁵ A further violation of the constitution that was brought to light was that three of the members of that preconvention General Executive Board were from the same plant - Griffin Steel - in spite of the fact that the constitution limited the representation on the board from any plant to two. Further, Succamore discovered that the salary and expenses being drawn from the union by Gugulyn was equivalent to \$15,000 a year, an amount that he felt was excessive. "I have every intention of letting our members know this information" he warned the Winnipeg office. "I will go on record as saying that the top rates to staff are exorbitant."⁹⁶

Nor did Succamore accept the explanation of the GEB about the powers and authority given to Gugulyn. He continued to object to the power vested in an appointed official, and he maintained his position that Gugulyn's responsibilities represented a violation of the decision made by the 1970 delegates. The justification given by the General Executive Board was, he pointed out, "the very reasoning expressed at

the convention by the supporters of the resolution. And that position was defeated at convention because it was advocated by others that the elected officers run the union at all times".⁹⁷

There would be no further concessions from Winnipeg. In a step that was to mark the climax of the struggle between the Winnipeg and B. C. sections of the union, the Winnipeg office notified Succamore by registered letter that he had been suspended from the union for nonpayment of union dues.⁹⁸ In fact, Succamore had paid his union dues twelve months in advance. "I felt that the union needed the money more than I did, if that is possible," he remarked. "Really, it was just that they felt that they had to get rid of me. George Brown could foresee that he was going to be next."⁹⁹ Succamore immediately protested the suspension to Al Pitt, chairman of the General Executive Board, pointing out that the suspension was both undemocratic and unconstitutional.¹⁰⁰

However, this protest was to no avail, and a telegram received from Winnipeg on December 8, 1970 reaffirmed the decision. The membership of Local 1 (B. C.) stood firmly and unanimously behind Jess Succamore and instructed Peter Cameron, their recording secretary, to express their outrage of the suspension action to the National office. Cameron wrote:

When the membership heard at the general meeting that the National office was apparently determined to consider Brother Succamore suspended, there was

quite an emotional situation. Support for Brother Succamore was total, and some of the criticisms of the National office for their action and the methods of taking it, do not bear repetition in the relatively polite form of a letter.¹⁰¹

The local membership demanded that Allan Gold and Al Pitt arrange to visit them in Vancouver at the earliest possible time, and passed a motion to inform Winnipeg that "the local membership supports Jess Succamore and declares that a full examination of Local 1 records shows Jess Succamore to be a member in good standing with Local 1 (B. C.)".¹⁰² Cameron also warned the National office:

With all the concern over Brother Succamore's suspension, however, the membership has not lost sight of the fact that the requested financial reports from the National office have not been forthcoming. May I take this opportunity of formally requesting that a copy of the CAIMAW financial report be sent to myself on behalf of the local membership by registered mail immediately.¹⁰³

George Brown added his own protests to those of the membership, calling the suspension of Succamore an action which showed "an utter contempt for the principles of democracy upon which this Canadian union is founded".¹⁰⁴ The support for Succamore and the condemnation of the National office was total within the B. C. section of the union.

The suspension action also brought down on the heads of the National officers criticism from outside the union. Fred Mullin, president of the PPWC, called the suspension a "high handed headquarter action" and warned Al Pitt that:

"in my observation, Local 1 members are still wholeheartedly behind the Democratic Canadian Union Movement, but are now questioning the wisdom of handing over their hard won jurisdiction to an organization that in their eyes is committing acts which are worse than any American union would consider".¹⁰⁵

The CCU also expressed concern about the internal difficulties of CAIMAW, and urged the National office to resolve their problems before damage was done to the cause for the independent union movement as a whole.¹⁰⁶

Despite this pressure placed on the National officers, they made no move to rescind their decision on Succamore's suspension. Nor did they comply with Local 1 (B. C.)'s demand that Allan Gold and Al Pitt appear in Vancouver to answer to the membership. Therefore, the local informed the National office that they were sending a delegation to address the next General Executive Board meeting on January 16, 1971, and suggested that the board make arrangements to receive them. The board did so, and a delegation of four officers from Local 1 (B. C.) presented themselves at the meeting. The delegation consisted of Gerry Grieve, local president, "Pop" Jacobs, financial secretary, Peter

Cameron, recording secretary and George Brown, district representative. Jess Succamore was also in attendance, as was a delegation from Bristol Aerospace, who had been alerted by the B. C. section of the serious problems to be placed before the board. "It was because of the serious and unconstitutional operation of Winnipeg officers that the local went to this expense."¹⁰⁷

The Vancouver delegation quickly discovered that one of the members sitting on the General Executive Board, Cec Svenson, was now a foreman, and was therefore not even a member of the bargaining unit at the plant in which he worked. Svenson argued that he would resign from the board only after he had fully discharged his obligation to the membership in dealing with all current issues presently before the board. The board, with Svenson on it, then voted on the matter of Succamore's suspension, ruling that the suspension would stand. It was a tied vote, with the chairman, Al Pitt, casting the deciding vote.

The Vancouver delegation was not yet prepared to admit defeat. They suggested that since Svenson had achieved what he had come to do (uphold Succamore's suspension), he could now stand down from the board. Svenson did so and triumphantly left the meeting. But his departure exposed the fact that Svenson, a Gugulyn supporter, had refused to step down from the board only to ensure that Succamore remained suspended, and not to fully discharge his obligations to the membership as he had claimed. This proved to be too much for other board members who supported Gugulyn. "Maybe we were misled - maybe we didn't have all the facts" they decided.¹⁰⁸

The Vancouver delegation then made rousing speeches on the injustice of Succamore's suspension. "We didn't go through the struggle and strain we have gone through to set up a rotten Canadian union" Succamore warned the board. "We will destroy it rather than see it tarnished."¹⁰⁹ They were supported by the Bristol delegation, made up of Bill Behma, Mike Kostanski and Jim Gibbons. "The only thing I haven't got to correct this injustice is a vote", Jim Gibbons told the board. "You do!"¹¹⁰

Listening to the appeals of the two delegations, the board began to feel it should reconsider its decision. In response to Svenson's action and the presentations of the delegations, Gugulyn's influence over some of the board members began to weaken. The matter of Succamore's suspension was again put to a vote of the board, and this time the suspension was overturned. Succamore was reinstated to his position as 2nd vice-president of the union.¹¹¹ The balance was now beginning to tip in favour of the B. C. section of the union.

Succamore's first act upon reinstatement was to rise and call on the board to suspend Allan Gold, president of the association, and Ed Smilinski, secretary-treasurer, for failure to uphold the constitution. "That really caused an uproar."¹¹² The motion again resulted in a tied vote. The board did, however, ask for Gold's resignation. He refused to give it. The two sections of the union were locked in stalemate.¹¹³

Eventually, the meeting decided on a compromise, which in reality was the solution that Brown and Succamore wanted all along.

This compromise was the calling of a special national convention to rewrite the constitution of the union. It was decided that one member from each local would be on the resolutions committee, that Bristol representatives Mike Kostanski and Jim Gibbons would be in charge of making sure that the convention would be set up fairly, and Mike Kostanski of Bristol would act as ombudsman between the two factions of the union until convention.¹¹⁴

The Bristol representatives accepted the responsibility of maintaining the peace between the Winnipeg and Vancouver sections until the convention convened. In a letter delivered to both Jess Succamore and the members of the General Executive Board, Mike Kostanski and Jim Gibbons wrote:

We would like to point out at this time one very significant fact about that GEB meeting. We as observers were able to get admittance into this meeting. We were able to express our views and have the executive comply with demands. No matter what else we may think of them, they responded to democratic pressure. How far would we have been able to go with a U. S. controlled union? In the first place we would have never reached them at all. What we are trying to bring out is let us not tear this union apart in the process of building a perfect democracy in one operation. Therefore, we would ask everybody concerned to refrain from personal attacks as much as possible so as not to increase the bitter feelings, so that when we go to the convention we will be able to work out our problems in a rational and more amicable manner.¹¹⁵

THE 1971 CONVENTION

The B. C. section of the union were determined to fight for a constitution that would disseminate centralized power in the union and provide for the true practice of rank and file control. They planned and prepared well for this objective. Gugulyn still had quite a strong following in the union, and there was no evidence against him. It had not officially been Gugulyn who had violated the constitution and circumvented the convention delegates' decisions, but the elected officers of the union, and particularly the General Executive Board. But the Vancouver officers had no doubt that it was Gugulyn who lay behind these actions, due to his influence over the Winnipeg officers. Consequently, the Vancouver officers decided that an all out offensive against Gugulyn would be a faulty strategy. "We didn't want a bloodbath" said Succamore. "It wasn't a personal thing. And I have never said that Gugulyn didn't do his best for the membership. But it was a question of ideology."¹¹⁶

The strategy set by the Vancouver officers, therefore, was to build up support for their position within the union on the issues, and by doing so, to isolate Gugulyn. With this objective in mind, they wrote to many of the officers and members of the union, explaining their position and appealing for their support.

We feel there has been a small group controlling this union who were, and are, prepared to smash it rather than lose control of it. It is up to the

rest of us to show that Canadians can be responsible and get this union running properly....We feel it is imperative that the membership must control the union, that officers should be elected, not appointed and they must carry out the decisions of the Convention, Constitution and GEB meetings. Our main point is Local Autonomy. That is what we broke away from the American unions for.¹¹⁷

The delegates from Local 1 (B. C.) were chosen, and the local conducted schools for their delegates, explaining the issues and teaching them constitutional and convention procedure. Succamore devoted all his energies to the project.¹¹⁸ Finally, with their resolutions well prepared and their delegates well schooled and prepared to fight, the B. C. section of the union arrived in Winnipeg to attend the special convention, opened on May 2, 1971.

Al Pitt, by this time, felt that an overhauling of the constitution was a good thing, because "mistakes had been made".¹¹⁹ And the Vancouver section enjoyed the support of Pat McEvoy in their goals. Together, Succamore and McEvoy built up delegate support for their position. But there was still considerable opposition to be overcome from Gugulyn's camp. Allan Gold, for example, delayed calling the convention to order for two hours, arguing that it was ultra vires and should be cancelled. He refused to chair the meeting, and even tried to prevent the delivering of reports by the officers, including, or perhaps especially, Succamore's. He was successful in none of these attempts, however, getting voted down by the convention floor.¹²⁰

Eventually, Gugulyn and Brown were asked to co-chair the meeting, and it was called to order. The campaign of the Vancouver section was a resounding success, with the convention delegates adopting all the resolutions put forward by B. C. The result of the convention, therefore, was massive changes in the constitution of CAIMAW.¹²¹

The most important changes made were in the structure of the union. The General Executive Board, now referred to as the National Executive Board, would have the president, vice-president and secretary-treasurer as members, eliminating the duplication of effort that had existed under the old structure. Indeed, the president would preside over the board. Every National officer would be elected. Each local union had the right to one and only one National officer.¹²² Under the old constitution, the limit on the number of National officers or GEB members was placed on the plant, rather than the local union. Because Subordinate Unit #1 was a multiplant local comprised of many plants, this had given it the right to excessive representation in the leadership of the union. This effect had really been due to the accident of the way the union had developed since its inception. The change to limiting representation by local union rather than by plant was made to correct this situation.¹²³ It was a significant change in the power relationships in CAIMAW, eliminating the centre of power that had developed in Winnipeg, and distributing power more evenly throughout the union.

Changes were also made in the regional representation of the union by providing for the offices of regional vice-presidents. They

would be elected officers with broad powers, reporting to the National Executive Board.

Regional Vice-Presidents shall be responsible for organizing and servicing in their elected areas.... They shall have the right to hire representatives and temporary organizers with the approval of the National Executive Board. All paid representatives of the National Union shall normally work under the direction of a Regional Vice-President.¹²⁴

The existence of an appointed position with broad powers such as that previously held by John Gugulyn as manager of staff was, therefore, eliminated. Furthermore, each region of the union now had responsibility for its own affairs in terms of organizing and servicing, thereby encouraging regional self-determination and limiting centralized power. The spirit and intent of this change was even adopted into the policy resolutions passed at the convention.

It is the policy of the National union to see that National officers represent all areas of the union to ensure that democracy is practiced and to discourage the formation of centres of power.¹²⁵

The system of delegate representation at conventions was also changed. Previously, delegates had been elected on the basis of two delegates per plant, no matter what its size. As the union grew and kept adding newly certified plants to Subordinate Unit #1, so the number

of delegates at conventions from Subordinate Unit #1 grew, until it reached the stage where "Subordinate Unit #1 had more delegates than all other locals combined."¹²⁶ This situation was corrected by changing the system to one of representation by population, with no more than ten delegates allowed from each local.¹²⁷

The new constitution also incorporated a provision for the fostering and encouragement of local autonomy. The local unions also now had the constitutional right to information from the National union, including financial reports and minutes of the National Executive Board meetings.¹²⁸

The 1971 convention, therefore, resulted in significant constitutional changes, changes that were designed to eliminate the exercise of power by an appointed official, provide better regional representation, prevent the formation of centres of power, and firmly establish the principles of rank and file control and local autonomy. It was a convention hailed as "the most exciting and interesting convention ever since CAIMAW's inception in 1964".¹²⁹ Basically, CAIMAW had incorporated into its constitution the philosophies of the old CEW.

The union also underwent a change in philosophy as the key positions in the union changed hands during the 1971 convention. "The key position", explained Jess Succamore, "is who controls the money. Residual power goes where the cheque book goes."¹³⁰ For that reason, the Winnipeg group was anxious that one of their representatives be elected to the position of secretary-treasurer. The Vancouver officers

were anxious that a "dedicated trade unionist" hold the position. Each local was allowed only one National officer. Bill Behma from the Bristol plant was elected as president. Winnipeg then wanted to see the west get the position of vice-president. But with the cooperation of Pat McEvoy, McEvoy was quickly nominated for the position of vice-president, was elected and accepted the position before the Winnipeg group knew what had happened. The west then had to hold the position of secretary-treasurer. Jess Succamore was elected to the job, a position he has held ever since. "It shocked the Winnipeg group" said Succamore.¹³¹

George Brown was elected as regional vice-president for the west, and John Gugulyn was elected as regional vice-president for Winnipeg.¹³² What Gugulyn did not realize when he accepted the position was that McEvoy, as vice-president, now outranked him, and had full access to information. "That was the end of the blood-letting".¹³³ It was also the end of the philosophy of business unionism within CAIMAW.

In fact, the battle of the Vancouver officers was basically a battle against the emergence of a business unionism philosophy in CAIMAW, a philosophy that was spearheaded by John Gugulyn. The Vancouver officers waged this battle because the traits of business unionism that could be identified in Gugulyn's policies and practices endangered the two principles upon which they had built the CEW - rank and file control and nationalism.

First, Gugulyn's adherence to a business unionism philosophy of decision making meant that he believed that decision making should be in the hands of a trained professional. And it can be logically argued that such an individual could rely on expertise, training and experience to best and most efficiently advance the interests of the organization and the membership. Hence, Gugulyn was reluctant to relinquish his influence in the union's decision making process, probably not entirely out of a desire for personal power, but because of a genuine belief that this was best for the organization and the membership.

The ex-CEW officers did not share this belief. To them, membership control of the organization and not efficiency of decision making was the paramount consideration. To the extent that decision making is placed in the hands of a trained professional, it is necessarily removed from the rank and file. Even worse, if that trained professional is appointed rather than elected, then decision making influence is in the hands of someone over whom the membership has little control. Such a practice, therefore, can be seen as undermining the rank and file control of the union. When the elected General Executive Board referred and deferred much of their decision making responsibility to Gugulyn, and when they overruled the decisions of convention delegates elected by the membership, the resultant undermining of rank and file control proved to be intolerable to the ex-CEW officers.

Secondly, Gugulyn's adherence to business unionism meant that he did not pursue any cause or dedicate his energies to social change. Rather, he saw the objective of the union as being limited to the

achievement of short-term economic gains for the members in their relationship with employers. This was a goal that he appears to have pursued with energy and dedication. His expertise was well respected by the Winnipeg officers, and a lack of interest in the economic welfare of the membership is a criticism that is not levied against Gugulyn. But because he restricted his objectives to the achievement of short-term economic gains, he did not share the CEW's cause of the building of a national trade union movement, and therefore had little interest in such issues as the donation of moral and financial support to a fledgling council of small outcast unions such as the CCU. Canadian nationalism no doubt served a purpose for Gugulyn, but it was a purpose of pragmatism rather than principle. At a time of a rising desire for Canadian self-assertion, Canadian nationalism was a commodity that sold well. By selling it, the size and therefore the strength of the organization could be increased, thus enhancing its ability to further the economic objectives of the membership. Efforts to found an independent sovereign labour centre, however, could not be seen to bring any such immediate organizational benefit.

The ex-CEW officers, on the other hand, were dedicated not only to furthering the interests of the membership with their employer, but also to the liberation of Canadian labour from American domination. They had rejected joining the UE because to them, Canadian autonomy in an international union was not enough. They had spent some of their union's limited financial resources to send a representative to attend the founding meeting of the CCU. Also, after the merger, they pressured CAIMAW to provide moral and financial support to the new council. Like

Gugulyn, they were no doubt aware that the immediate return of such an investment was nonexistent. But they had a cause - the building of a sovereign Canadian labour movement. The building of an independent Canadian labour centre was a crucial part of that cause. By limiting his objectives to economic gains, therefore, Gugulyn could be seen as undermining the struggle for Canadian self-determination in the labour movement.

The 1971 convention was a victory for the philosophy of the ex-CEW officers on these issues, and a defeat for the philosophy of John Gugulyn. It established the direction in terms of ideology that would be pursued by CAIMAW. It was the rejection of the development of centres of power, the undue influence by appointed officials, and limitation of union objectives to short-term economic gains. Rather, CAIMAW would adhere to the principles of local rank and file control and local autonomy, as well as dedicate itself to the building of a sovereign Canadian labour movement through support of the CCU.

The internal struggles of CAIMAW during 1970 were not only rooted in ideology, but also in regionalism, a factor which pervades all aspects of Canadian society and which no Canadian union, or any other Canadian national institution, can ignore. At the 1971 convention, the delegates dealt with the question, and through changes made to the constitutional structure of the union, appear to have successfully resolved the issue. "There have been no instances of regionalism in our union since that time",¹³⁴ said Succamore.

In dealing with the problems of ideology and regionalism, the 1971 convention set the basic format that is followed by the union to the present day. To many of the CAIMAW officers, May 2, 1971 is regarded as the date of the birth of CAIMAW.¹³⁵

FOOTNOTES

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Chapter VI

CAIMAW In the Mining Industry

We could resist anything - except temptation

Jess Succamore

CAIMAW'S MINING CERTIFICATIONS

CAIMAW ENTERS THE MINES

The years that followed the 1971 resolution of CAIMAW's internal difficulties were years of progress and rapid growth for the Canadian union. In particular, the broader jurisdiction achieved by the merger with the Winnipeg group enabled the union in B. C. to seek and achieve many certifications in such diverse industries as foundries, auto servicing, metal fabricating and truck building (see Table IV). But perhaps the most dramatic and most controversial aspect of the union's expansion was CAIMAW's entry into the mines of British Columbia.

The events which were to lead CAIMAW into the B. C. mines began, ironically enough, not within CAIMAW or even the mining industry itself, but in the Alcan smelter at Kitimat. Many of the 1,800 workers at the plant were new Canadians, a category of worker described by Paddy Neale as "not understanding the necessity for international unions"¹ and described by Robert Laxer as "European immigrants who had brought to Canada the traditions of strong national unions in their home countries".² Lack of service and the drain of their dues dollar southward resulted in a growing dissatisfaction within the Kitimat local of their bargaining agent, the United Steelworkers of America (USWA), a dissatisfaction that led ultimately to rebellion and to the replacement of the Steelworkers with their own union, the Canadian Association of Smelter and Allied Workers (CASAW), certified in October 1972.³

Table IV

CAIMAW B. C. Certifications 1967-1981

| Date | Employer | Pre Certification | No of Emp |
|--------|----------------------|-----------------------------------|--------------|
| Jun 67 | Phillips Cables | IBEW | 312 |
| Jul 71 | Cascades Electronics | Uncertified | 100 |
| Jul 71 | Freightliner Canada | Int Machinists | 160 |
| Jul 71 | Canadian Kenworth | Int Machinists | 350 |
| Jan 72 | Montgomery Elevator | Uncertified | 15 |
| Mar 72 | G&F Installations | Uncertified | 4 |
| May 72 | Cannon Machine | Int Machinists | 25 |
| Jul 72 | Macro Kennametal | Int Molders | 30 |
| Jul 72 | Capital Wire Cloth | Int Machinists | 30 |
| Jul 72 | Freuhauf Trailers | Int Machinists | 21 |
| Aug 72 | Freightliner Office | Uncertified | 32 |
| Jan 73 | Fogg Motors | Int Machinists | 55 |
| Jan 73 | Inter. Harvester | Int Machinists | 66 |
| Jan 73 | Phillips Office | Uncertified | 20 |
| Feb 73 | Bethlehem Copper | Op Eng & Rock & Tunnel Workers | 300 |
| Feb 73 | Inland Kenworth | Int Machinists | 50 |
| Feb 73 | Hydraulic Services | Int Machinists | 11 |
| Mar 73 | Int Harvester (Coqu) | Uncertified | 10 |
| Apr 73 | No Sag Spring | Am. Upholsters | 45 |
| Aug 73 | Mainland Foundry | Steelworkers | 70 |
| Sep 73 | Arrow Transfer | Int Machinists | 25 |
| Sep 73 | Wrights Alu-Steel | Uncertified | 35 |
| Sep 73 | Thompson Machine | Uncertified | 15 |

| | | | |
|--------|-----------------------|----------------------------------|-----|
| Sep 73 | Bell Copper | Steelworkers | 170 |
| Jan 74 | Lincoln Steel | Int Ironworkers | 35 |
| Mar 74 | Shellburn Refin. | Oil Atomic & Chemical Workers | 110 |
| Apr 74 | Noranda Metal Ind | Steelworkers | 200 |
| Apr 74 | Anaconda Electronics | Uncertified | 100 |
| Apr 74 | McGill Ind. | Uncertified | 13 |
| Apr 74 | Lens & Shutter | Uncertified | 30 |
| May 74 | Endako Mines | Steelworkers | 400 |
| Jul 74 | Bethlehem Office | Uncertified | 30 |
| Dec 74 | Venture Welding | Uncertified | 8 |
| May 75 | Quadra Manufacturing | Uncertified | 150 |
| May 75 | Nye's Foundry | Uncertified | 8 |
| Sep 75 | A-1 Steel | Steelworkers | 100 |
| Nov 75 | Associated Foundry | Int Molders | 50 |
| Nov 75 | Western Canada Steel | Steelworkers | 300 |
| Dec 75 | Gibraltar Mines | Steelworkers | 400 |
| Jul 75 | Stanguard Electronics | Uncertified | 20 |
| Jan 76 | Heal Electronics | Uncertified | 9 |
| Jul 76 | Ocean Foundry | Int Molders | 12 |
| Aug 76 | Similkameen | Steelworkers | 280 |
| Mar 77 | Esco Foundry | Uncertified | 250 |
| Jul 77 | Metalex | Int Molders | 20 |
| Jan 78 | Pacific Dodge | Uncertified | 19 |
| Jun 78 | Northridge Chrysler | Uncertified | 30 |
| Jan 78 | Airco | Am. Sheetmetal | 35 |
| Aug 78 | Tonecraft | Uncertified | 25 |

| | | | |
|--------|--------------------|----------------|-----|
| Jan 79 | Schlage Lock | Int Machinists | 200 |
| May 79 | Western Mines | Steelworkers | 220 |
| Mar 80 | Aeroquip | Uncertified | 5 |
| Jan 80 | McLean & Powell | Int Molders | 25 |
| Jul 80 | Starforms | Uncertified | 35 |
| Oct 80 | Circuit Graphics | Uncertified | 35 |
| Dec 80 | Canadian Car | Int Machinists | 230 |
| Jan 81 | Reliable Guard | Uncertified | 8 |
| Feb 81 | Arrow (Abbotsford) | Uncertified | 10 |
| Feb 81 | Canadian Battery | Teamsters | 55 |

Data as of May, 1981.

43% of CAIMAW's certifications in B. C. were achieved at previously uncertified plants.

Source: Various issues of the CAIMAW Review dated July, 1971 to April, 1981.

The certification battle and subsequent victory of the new independent union at Kitimat had two significant effects. First, it served as an important example to the four thousand Cominco workers at Trail-Kimberley-Salmo, also represented by the Steelworkers. Spurred on by events in Kitimat, the Cominco workers also rebelled against the Steelworkers by forming their own union, the Canadian Workers Union (CWU), and immediately started a sign-up campaign. The rebellion against the Steelworkers and the move towards Canadian unionism was entering the B. C. mining industry.⁴

Secondly, the Kitimat certification established a network of strong relationships within the independent Canadian movement. Because the Kitimat workers had originally attempted to replace the Steelworkers with the Independent Pulp and Papers Workers of Canada (PPWC) in 1971, a strong relationship had been established between the two groups. But the PPWC also had contacts with CAIMAW. Through Fred Mullin, president of the PPWC, the leaders of the Kitimat rebellion, Klaus Herre and Tony Badior, met with CAIMAW officers on their way to stand trial before the Steelworker's court on charges of promoting dual unionism. As a result of these contacts, CAIMAW, together with the PPWC and Kent Rowly of the CCU, provided crucial support, advice and encouragement to CASAW in its certification battle with the Steelworkers.⁵ This not only established strong ties between the independent unions, but also crystallized a policy of involvement and support to any group of workers who were striving to establish an independent Canadian union. Wrote Klaus Herre in a letter of thanks to CAIMAW:

One aspect which has emerged above all others, is that Canadian unions have discovered that only a concerted effort on the part of all Canadian unionists will prepare the way for the day when the whole labour movement in Canada will be in the hands of the people of Canada. Canadian unionists have come to realize that their mission is not to build small individual empires. Independence, as peculiar as it may sound, is gained only by interdependence....We can and must work together; your support for the people of Kitimat clearly demonstrates this spirit of unity.⁶

Inspired by the Kitimat success and the Trail battle, the workers at the Bethlehem Mine in Ashcroft, dissatisfied with the service they were receiving and lack of influence in their own affairs, decided to take action against their bargaining agent, the Operating Engineers and the Rock and Tunnel Workers Union. Complaints included, "Money was assessed with no membership vote, and the business agent ran everything from Vancouver".⁷ In keeping with the pattern of the Kitimat and Trail workers, the Bethlehem workers established their own union, which they named the Highland Valley Miners Union. "They had no organization at all", said Succamore. "They just printed up cards. But about 100 of the 300 workers at the mine signed up. It was a terrific response to join nothing."⁸

The Bethlehem workers then contacted the Canadian Workers Union in Trail for guidance, and the network of contacts solidified during the Kitimat struggle went into operation. The CWU put the

Bethlehem miners in touch with Fred Mullin of the PPWC, who in turn contacted CAIMAW.

On November 11, 1972, Fred Mullin and Jess Succamore travelled to Ashcroft to meet with the Bethlehem workers. In keeping with their policy of providing any possible assistance to any workers attempting to form a Canadian union, Succamore and Mullin promised the Bethlehem miners their assistance in terms of technical and organizational advice, and their financial and moral support.⁹

To Fred Mullin, the most sensible course of action for the Bethlehem workers to take was to join CAIMAW. The Bethlehem workers, after due consideration, agreed. But although CAIMAW officers were prepared to lend them every possible assistance in their move towards Canadian unionism, for CAIMAW itself to venture into the mining industry was not exactly what they had in mind. "George Brown was worried", said Succamore. "He was aware that such a move would lead to an inevitable all-out battle with the Steelworkers."¹⁰ This apprehension was not due to any feelings of sympathy towards the international union that Kent Rowley had described as the "dreadnaught of the fleet" of American unionism. Rather, CAIMAW officers were of the view that the Steelworkers were "the biggest evil influence anywhere, and a powerful force within the traditional labour movement and the NDP".¹¹ They foresaw war with the Steelworkers as resulting in "redbaiting, purges" and a terrific battle for which they felt they would first have to build a strong base. "The trouble was," said Succamore, "we could resist

anything but temptation."¹² Feeling that the opportunity had to be seized, CAIMAW granted a charter to Bethlehem Copper - CAIMAW Local 8.

In spite of the fact that CAIMAW had only two meetings at Ashcroft, a majority of the Bethlehem workers quickly joined the Canadian union. "The signup was done entirely by the Bethlehem workers themselves."¹³ CAIMAW applied for certification at the mine, and on February 29, 1973, the workers voted 164 to 102 to certify the Canadian union as their bargaining agent.¹⁴ CAIMAW had its first mining certification in British Columbia.

THE MINES GO CAIMAW

The events in Ashcroft did not go unnoticed by other miners in the province who were dissatisfied with their union representation. Typical complaints of these miners against their international unions were lack of service, a drain of their dues money to the United States, and lack of responsiveness to the membership.¹⁵

Almost immediately after the CAIMAW certification at Bethlehem, the employees at the Noranda - owned Bell Copper mine at Granisle contacted CAIMAW, requesting a charter in the Canadian union. The mine had opened in 1971, and the Steelworkers had been certified and signed a collective agreement with just a handful of people working at the property. The agreement provided for only a ten cent increase over its two year life. "It looked suspiciously like a sweetheart agreement and the workers rebelled."¹⁶ In May 1973, CAIMAW Local 10 was formally

established at the mine. Within a few days of the start of open season, 70 percent of the Bell workers had joined the Canadian union.¹⁷

Despite the speedy success of the signup campaign, the certification campaign itself was drawn out over three months. The USWA intervened in the application by raising the technical objection that certain people who were covered by the certification, but for whom the Steelworkers had never bargained, should be added to the list of voters.¹⁸ The Labour Relations Board partly accepted this position, and the ballots of a certification vote held in August 1973 were never counted. Instead, a second vote was conducted in September 1973, resulting in an overwhelming 101 to 32 victory for CAIMAW.¹⁹

The CAIMAW campaign at Bethlehem also attracted the attention of workers at the nearby Lornex mine in the Highland Valley. During the certification campaign at Bethlehem, some of the Lornex miners approached CAIMAW supporters "to ask us when the hell we were going to organize them".²⁰ Shortly after CAIMAW was certified at Bethlehem, Lornex workers pursued this interest by approaching the Bethlehem workers with a formal request to join CAIMAW Local 8. The request was favourably received by the membership and executive at Bethlehem, and CAIMAW launched a signup campaign at the USWA certified Lornex mine in November 1973.

Meanwhile, the Cominco workers at Trail, Kimberley and Salmo were still in a state of rebellion against the USWA. Their attempt to replace the Steelworkers with their own Canadian Workers Union had

failed when the B. C. Labour Relations Board denied a certification vote in 1972 on technical grounds. First, one of the CWU organizers had made the mistake of enrolling other workers into the Canadian union before formally joining it himself. Secondly, at the union's organizational meeting (in which a bomb threat created considerable confusion), two people cast ballots in the election of officers who were not members of the union. The board, therefore, ruled that the Canadian Workers Union was not an agent appropriate for bargaining. The Canadian unionists were convinced that the non-members who had voted were in fact Steelworkers who had deliberately set out to disrupt the formation of the Canadian union, and argued that "it is a principle of law that a criminal should never be allowed to benefit from his illegal acts".²¹ The argument was to no avail.

With CAIMAW's entry into the mining industry, the Cominco workers decided to try again to dislodge the Steelworkers at their property, this time by joining CAIMAW. "They just announced to the press that they were joining us" said Succamore. "We got the news over the radio."²² Charters were granted, and CAIMAW Locals 14, 15 and 16 were formed to represent the workers at the different Cominco properties. The Cominco workers, especially in Trail, rapidly began to join CAIMAW with little prompting.

CAIMAW isn't trying but its winning hands down. There is no visible initial effort on the part of this comparatively new union that was formed in 1964....CAIMAW is riding a huge Canadianistic wave the country's currently experiencing. With Canadian

Rogers, CAIMAW didn't handbill anyone or canvas; the approach was made to CAIMAW and the association then went to work by applying with an overwhelming majority of signatures. The same technique is being applied in Trail: the issue of a charter and the signing up of members, while Steel officials stand virtually helpless, knee-deep in the "wave".²³

However, CAIMAW's initial flush of victory in the mining industry was to suffer two major setbacks. First, the signup campaign at Lornex fell 30 cards short of signing up a majority of the 460 employees at the mine. This failure may have been influenced by the fact that during the Lornex certification campaign, the Operating Engineers launched a raid at Bethlehem in an attempt to win back their lost local. This certification challenge culminated in a vote at Bethlehem. The result of the vote was a solid victory for CAIMAW. However, it was held a few days after the close of the open season at Lornex.

Secondly, CAIMAW's certification campaign at the Cominco properties of Trail-Kimberley-Salmo resulted in failure. The three properties were represented by the Steelworkers in a joint certification, a structure established by the old Mine Mill Union to protect it against raids by the Steelworkers. It was an effective defense, preventing the Steelworkers from obtaining certification until the Mine-Mill-Steel merger.²⁴ But the structure of joint certification also proved effective for the Steelworkers in preventing a successful raid by CAIMAW. "We had a lot of support at Trail, but not enough at

Kimberley", said Succamore. "What had been built as a fortress became a prison."²⁵

Nevertheless, news of CAIMAW was still circulating in the mining industry. In 1974 and with only two weeks left in open season, the miners at the Placer owned Endako Mine contacted the miners at Bell Copper to express an interest in leaving the Steelworkers and joining the Canadian union. Frustrated by what they felt to be a poor contract and delays by both the company and the union in negotiating a reopener, a majority of the four hundred Endako workers joined CAIMAW within five days of the start of the signup campaign.

The Steelworker's response to the rebellion at Endako was clumsy. First, it removed five members of the elected bargaining committee who had signed with CAIMAW. Next, it signed a memorandum of settlement with the company for a wage reopener on May 18, 1974 and "agreed to recommend its terms unreservedly to its members".²⁶ The ratification vote was close, resulting in 125 votes in favour, 139 against and 25 spoiled. A recount conducted by a local judge showed 137 votes in favour, 133 against and 13 spoiled.

CAIMAW had already applied for certification of the unit. The Steelworkers filed an objection, alleging among other things that the signing of the May 18 agreement meant that a contract was in force as of that date, making the CAIMAW application untimely. Then, perhaps sensing dissatisfaction among the Endako miners with the terms of the reopener, the Steelworkers reversed their position. They suddenly

contended that no binding collective agreement had been concluded, recommended that the agreement be rejected in a new vote, and urged the Endako miners to support the Steelworkers because they could get a better bargain than could CAIMAW.²⁷ A certification vote held in June 1974 resulted in a narrow CAIMAW victory of 148 to 143, and CAIMAW Local 17 won the bargaining rights for Endako.

The certification battle at Endako spilled over into its sister local at Gibraltar mines, also owned by Placer and represented by the Steelworkers. On October 6, 1974 and with only three weeks left in open season, a petition was sent to CAIMAW by the Gibraltar workers requesting a charter in the Canadian union. A successful sign-up campaign was launched, and application made for certification. The Steelworkers had negotiated a contract at Gibraltar shortly before the Endako rebellion which provided the Gibraltar workers with essentially the same rates negotiated in the controversial Endako reopener,²⁸ and which no doubt contributed to the same dissatisfaction by the workers. In addition, the Gibraltar workers complained that the Steelworkers were out of touch with the rank and file, taking stands on issues that seemed unimportant to the membership, and making concessions to the company on issues that the members felt were important.²⁹

The Steelworkers again raised a technical objection to CAIMAW's application for certification. Gibraltar workers had been signed up into the National union rather than Local 18, they argued, and since only a local union can make application under the B. C. Labour

Code, the vote should be declared invalid.³⁰ But the board refused to allow this technicality to prevent a vote, declaring:

"CAIMAW as a union is a well-known fact of industrial life in British Columbia. We have no doubt that the employees at Gibraltar Mines who signed cards between October 6 and October 30 were aware of the nature of Local 18 as an organization which they were joining."³¹

At the time of the certification campaign at Gibraltar, CAIMAW was engaged in a strike at Endako in an attempt to win for the workers wages and conditions that were an improvement on those provided for in the Placer/Steelworker memorandum of agreement. As part of its philosophy, CAIMAW insists that only those who retain union membership through the payment of dues or performance of picket duty are entitled to strike pay. Strong Steelworker supporters still at the Endako mine refused to do either, and the Steelworkers published leaflets telling the Gibraltar workers that Endako miners were starving because CAIMAW could not support a strike.³²

It was a strategy that initially worked for the Steelworkers. CAIMAW's certification challenge was narrowly defeated by a vote of 219 to 225. But it was a strategy that, in the long run, was to prove ineffective. CAIMAW complained to the Labour Relations Board of the "gross distortions" printed by the Steelworkers during the campaign. In fact, the Steelworkers had printed their allegations when the Endako workers still had their last pay cheques due from the company. Although

the board refused to interfere in policing the quality of such propaganda literature during a campaign, it did go on record as stating that the Steelworker's charges lacked any basis in fact.

In our judgement, there was no credible evidence that any employees or their families suffered more than the usual discomfort of a lengthy strike. Moreover, it must have been apparent to the Steelworkers that there was no basis in fact for the statements in their leaflets at the time they were made....In view of the currency of these charges in other representation campaigns even now, it is important to put that fact on the record.³³

The Steelworkers had retained the Gibraltar local, but they had done so at a loss of credibility. The following year, CAIMAW was back at Gibraltar. It easily won a certification vote in December 1975 by 238 votes to 111.

In 1976 the miners at the Noranda owned Brenda mines contacted CAIMAW. They had come into contact with CAIMAW during the 1976 CAIMAW strike against Bell Copper, when the Bell miners conducted secondary picketing at the Brenda mine.

Not surprisingly, the Steel leaders refused to honour CAIMAW's picket lines and ordered their members to cross them. This was the last straw for a group of Brenda miners who got in touch with CAIMAW and started signing cards.³⁴

But preoccupation with the 1976 CAIMAW strikes at Gibraltar and Bell Copper resulted in delays by the Canadian union in responding to the Brenda petition. When CAIMAW officers Peter Cameron, Jess Succamore and Roger Crowther did finally meet with the Brenda workers, there were only three weeks left in open season, and a work force to be signed up spread over one hundred miles. Despite these difficulties, 166 of the Brenda miners joined CAIMAW within the three week period. But this was two short of the majority required for a vote.

The company had hired 27 students just prior to our application being made and thus we were short of the majority of the total unit applied for. Ironically we had signed two more workers up but they quit. It was a tough break.³⁵

The workers at the Similkameen mine at Princeton were the next to contact CAIMAW. Their dissatisfaction with the Steelworkers as their bargaining agent was heightened by an unsuccessful strike at the mine the previous year, a strike which won the miners only five cents an hour over the pre-strike offer. It was, in fact, two Similkameen workers who had handbilled for the Steelworkers during CAIMAW's second raid at Gibraltar that, on their return to Similkameen, began the CAIMAW campaign.³⁶ CAIMAW granted the Similkameen workers their request for a charter on May 17, 1976, and three weeks later applied to the Labour Relations Board for certification. In "one of the shortest and quietest campaigns on record,"³⁷ the result was a 130 to 118 vote victory for CAIMAW Local 22.

In October 1978, the miners at the Utah mine at Port Hardy, dissatisfied with the service they were receiving from their bargaining agent, the Operating Engineers, requested a charter from CAIMAW. They were also dissatisfied with a "lack of financial control at the local level and their union's poor record on health and safety".³⁸ With 352 of the workers as members, CAIMAW was convinced that it had the required majority for a vote, and made application for certification. Seniority lists and Employers Council data showed that at a very maximum, there were 655 workers in the bargaining unit. However, when CAIMAW filed its application, the company produced a list of 706 employees, leaving the Canadian union two members short of the majority required for a certification vote. "No one could find where these extra people were. But the LRB did allow us to withdraw our application, because it was clear that we had every reason to believe we had a majority."³⁹

The workers at Western Mines, dissatisfied with the servicing provided by the Steelworkers, approached CAIMAW in May 1979 seeking a charter. In particular, they complained that "Steel staff reps were often unavailable when they were really needed."⁴⁰ Despite warnings by the Steelworkers not to remove themselves from the "House of Labour", the Western Mines workers voted 111 to 67 in favour of CAIMAW. CAIMAW had its first, and to date only, certification in a B. C. underground mine.

Table V

Representation Votes in B. C. Mines 1973 - 1981

| Date | Mine | Raiding Union | Incumbent Union | Vote Results CAIMAW INT'L | |
|----------|---------------|----------------------|-----------------|------------------------------|-----|
| Feb 1973 | Bethlehem | CAIMAW | Op. Eng | 164 | 102 |
| Sep 1973 | Bell Copper | CAIMAW | Steelworkers | 101 | 32 |
| Feb 1974 | Bethlehem | Op. Eng | CAIMAW | 176 | 82 |
| Jun 1974 | Endako | CAIMAW | Steelworkers | 147 | 143 |
| Sep 1974 | Bell Copper | Steelworkers | CAIMAW | 98 | 56 |
| Nov 1974 | Gibraltar | CAIMAW | Steelworkers | 219 | 225 |
| Jul 1975 | Endako | Steelworkers | CAIMAW | 261 | 129 |
| Dec 1975 | Gibraltar | CAIMAW | Steelworkers | 238 | 111 |
| Jul 1976 | Similkameen | CAIMAW | Steelworkers | 130 | 118 |
| Jun 1977 | Similkameen | Steelworkers | CAIMAW | 157 | 78 |
| Oct 1977 | Endako | Steelworkers | CAIMAW | 210 | 171 |
| May 1978 | Bethlehem | Steelworkers | CAIMAW | 139 | 100 |
| May 1979 | Western Mines | CAIMAW | Steelworkers | 111 | 67 |
| Dec 1979 | Granisle/Bell | Merger of Properties | | 210 | 293 |
| Jun 1979 | Similkameen | Steelworkers | CAIMAW | 121 | 100 |
| May 1980 | Endako | Steelworkers | CAIMAW | 254 | 157 |
| Jun 1980 | Afton | CAIMAW | Steelworkers | 93 | 151 |
| Feb 1981 | Babine Div | CAIMAW | Steel | 226 | 253 |
| Jun 1981 | Similkameen | Steelworkers | CAIMAW | 152 | 91 |

Note: This documentation does not include the numerous certification challenges that have taken place in the mines but which have not culminated in a vote.

Source: Various issues of the CAIMAW Review, 1973-1981.

In December 1979, CAIMAW suffered a major loss as one of its early mining certifications, Bell Copper, went back to the Steelworkers. This event was not due to any loss of support for CAIMAW by the Bell workers, or to any change in their views of the international union. Indeed, in October of that year, the Steelworkers had attempted to raid Bell Copper, but had failed to sign up enough members to apply for certification. Rather, the event was due to the purchase of the Granby owned Granisle mine by Noranda, owner of the neighbouring Bell Copper. The decision was made to merge the two bargaining units. Granisle, represented by the Steelworkers, had more employees than Bell Copper, and the results of the certification vote for the new merged property showed that their allegiance still lay with USWA. Accordingly, the Steelworkers won the joint vote by 293 to 210. But many of the officials of CAIMAW Local 10 were quickly elected to executive positions in the new Steelworker local. "Local 10" said Peter Cameron, "is our local on ice".⁴¹ In a letter to the CAIMAW Mining Council, the Bell workers wrote:

The workers at Bell Copper have decided to maintain CAIMAW, Local 10. It is our belief that, as the integration of the Bell and Granisle workforce proceeds, the advantages of CAIMAW will become abundantly clear to all workers at both properties. We joined CAIMAW in 1973 and would still be certified with CAIMAW except for the fact that our property was merged with the larger Granisle mine, represented by Steel. We look forward to the day when we are back in CAIMAW, the union that Bell workers respect and support.⁴²

In June 1980, the workers at the Afton mine in Kamloops approached CAIMAW requesting a charter. The Steelworkers had been certified while there were only a handful of workers at the property, and had signed what many felt to be an inferior collective agreement.⁴³ Although CAIMAW succeeded in signing up a majority of the workers at the mine, it lost the certification vote by 93 votes to 151. CAIMAW complained to the Labour Relations Board that its campaign had been frustrated by a surprise reopener negotiated in Vancouver by Steelworker officials and the company in the midst of the certification battle. But Afton management justified its reopener by claiming that it was necessary for "compelling business reasons", such as noncompetitive wage rates and difficulty in attracting trades people, a position which the board upheld. However, subsequent developments in wage settlements in the industry such as the Lornex 1980 agreement and the Gibraltar/Endako reopener has not caused Afton to be compelled to reopen their contract again. Peter Cameron wrote to Afton Mine Manager, Mike Lipkevich, pointing out that such considerations must be even more pressing now than at the time of the reopener, and suggested that "Afton wage rates be increased now, rather than waiting for the next open season".⁴⁴ No response was forthcoming.

FACTORS INFLUENCING THE TURN TO CAIMAW BY B. C. MINERS

Although the mines have not been the major source of CAIMAW's growth in B. C., and miners represent only 30% of CAIMAW's B. C. membership, by 1980, CAIMAW had become a major union in the mining industry of the province. CAIMAW's certification attempts and victories in the B. C. mines raise several questions of interest to observers of

the industrial relations system in B. C. mines. First, why did some mining certifications fall to CAIMAW, while others did not? Secondly, why did the miners in B. C. open pit mines turn to CAIMAW, while those in underground mines, with the exception of Western Mines, did not?

At least two issues in the answers to these questions appear to be clear. First, B. C. miners turned to CAIMAW because of widespread dissatisfaction with the representation provided by their international union. The international union that has been the real loser to CAIMAW in the mines is, of course, the Steelworkers. In explaining the exodus of the mines to CAIMAW, Peter Warrion, research director for the Steelworkers said, "Each involved a local story. Someone at the local level fouled up. With the size of our organization, it is impossible to always ensure that everyone at the local level is doing his job the way it should be done."⁴⁵ The evidence, however, does not appear to support this contention. Rather it is evident that between the years 1973 and 1980, CAIMAW has posed a serious threat to international unions' certifications at every major open pit mine in the province, with the exception of Granisle. Discontent with the international unions representing the mines in B. C. has, therefore, been widespread throughout the industry. The turn to CAIMAW has been in a manner resembling the domino effect, with the experiences of one mine affecting others. In this regard, the difference in the mines that certified CAIMAW and those that did not appears to be quantitative rather than qualitative. As an explanation of CAIMAW's success in achieving mining certifications, a member of mining management said "Steel as an organization just fell down on the job."⁴⁶ A representative of the B. C. Federation of Labour agreed. "Steel had a terrible structure,

with their barn bosses running everything. Some were good, but not many. I warned them when they lost Kitimat, but they just wouldn't listen."⁴⁷

Secondly, at a time of high national aspirations in Canadian society, the appeal to be members of a Canadian union and masters in their own house was, it is agreed on all sides, an effective argument for CAIMAW.⁴⁸ Again, because CAIMAW has posed a significant threat to international union certifications in most open pit mines in the province, the difference in the appeal of the national independence argument between miners in mines that certified CAIMAW and those that did not may be considered to be quantitative rather than qualitative.

It is apparent, however, that these two factors have changed over time, a fact which no doubt has had an influence on the pattern of CAIMAW's certification successes. First, the Steelworkers responded to their mining losses by reorganization in 1976, splitting up District 6 by the creation of District 3. "It made district decision making appear more accessible" said Peter Cameron.⁴⁹ "Sometimes we learn," said the representative of the B. C. Federation of Labour.⁵⁰ Also, the Steelworker campaign literature distributed at the Afton campaign in 1980 was of a higher calibre than that distributed during the Gibraltar campaign in 1974 which destroyed USWA credibility. Instead of portraying CAIMAW members as starving while on strike, the Steelworkers now campaign on a platform of the importance of membership in the House of Labour.⁵¹ Secondly, the desire for Canadian self-assertion has perhaps given way in B. C. to a mood of Western alienation towards the east, and a move towards separation. In the 1960's and 1970's, CAIMAW

provided a vehicle for the expression of Canadian nationalism. But in the 1980's, even it does not provide a vehicle, either ideologically or philosophically, for the societal move towards Western alienation and Western separation.

The changes in these factors are perhaps manifest in CAIMAW's pattern of certification successes. At first, during the early 1970's, the move towards CAIMAW seemed irresistible. Mines certified with CAIMAW almost by themselves. During the course of the decade, however, more and more effort had to be expended by CAIMAW, with less and less success, with the exception of Western Mines. The timing of the certification attempts at different mines could, therefore, be a crucial factor in whether or not CAIMAW succeeded at different properties.

A factor which could have influenced CAIMAW's success at different mines, but which is more difficult to analyze, is the role of external forces operating at the time of the certification drive, such as employer responses, certification challenges taking place at other mines, and CAIMAW strikes in progress at other properties. In terms of the role of certification challenges taking place at other mines, it is perhaps no truer anywhere than in labour relations in the mines, that nothing succeeds like success. Hence the domino effect in the turn of the mining industry to CAIMAW. But by the same token, a belief that the Bethlehem workers were going to leave CAIMAW could have had a significant effect on the Lornex workers during the CAIMAW certification campaign in 1974. How much such a factor influenced the Lornex miners, however, is impossible to measure. Also, how much the suspected employer interference at Utah and Afton influenced the CAIMAW drive may

never be known. All that can be said is that where such factors were absent, namely at Bethlehem, Similkameen, Bell and Gibraltar, the CAIMAW drive succeeded. The effect of an ongoing CAIMAW strike in the industry similarly defies conclusive analysis. Peter Cameron maintains that "it is extremely difficult to organize a property when you are in the middle of a major strike in the same industry".⁵² There can be little doubt that this factor has an effect, in that the Steelworkers, as a defendant union, centre much of their campaign around this issue. It was a strategy that no doubt proved successful at Afton, Utah and Brenda, for at the time of the certification campaigns at these properties, CAIMAW was engaged in or had recently concluded strikes at Endako, Gibraltar and Bell respectively. But the existence or recent conclusion of CAIMAW strikes did not deter the successful CAIMAW campaigns at Western Mines, Gibraltar or Similkameen. The impact of this factor therefore, remains inconclusive.

Another factor which some have speculated to have had an influence in CAIMAW's successes or failures is the industrial relations policy adopted by the different management of the mining properties involved. On the one hand, "difficult" employers such as Noranda and Placer⁵³ make it hard for an incumbent union to achieve negotiating successes, thereby encouraging the workers to change allegiance to a different union. On the other hand, it has been argued that a paternalistic mining operation such as Bethlehem makes it difficult for an incumbent union to find a cause, and thereby maintain its support.⁵⁴ This theory does not explain how a challenger could find a cause on which to muster its support. If the challenger is CAIMAW, however, perhaps it could promote its nationalist cause in such a situation. At

first glance therefore, it would seem that CAIMAW could best succeed in obtaining certifications at mines whose management adhered to either of these two extremes, supported by the fact that CAIMAW has achieved certification at Bethlehem and Similkameen on the one hand, and Endako, Gibraltar and Bell on the other. But CAIMAW certification attempts failed at the Noranda owned Brenda mine, a difficult employer, and at Lornex, described as an easy employer.⁵⁵ Indeed, the lack of interest in CAIMAW demonstrated by the Granisle workers is attributed to the fact that Granby "was a good employer, which the employees associated with their bargaining agent, the Steelworkers".⁵⁶ It must also be stressed that CAIMAW has now been the incumbent union for years in mining properties of difficult employers (Placer and Noranda) and paternalistic companies (Bethlehem and Similkameen). Despite repeated raids by both the Operating Engineers and the Steelworkers, there has not been one mining property that, once certified with CAIMAW, has chosen to leave it. Yet the same forces must affect CAIMAW as an incumbent union in the same way that they affected the international unions when they held the certifications for these properties. The significance of this factor, therefore, must also remain inconclusive.

There can be little doubt that CAIMAW's support lies in the open pit mines of the province, rather than the underground mines, with the exception of Western Mines. One theory advanced by a miner to explain this phenomenon is that underground miners are a much closer knit group of workers than open pit miners, relying on each other to a considerable degree, even for their own safety. As a result, union rivalry is not likely to flourish in an underground mine.⁵⁷ In fact, even Western Mines fell into this pattern. The drive for CAIMAW was

initiated and carried by the surface crew in the mill and the electricians. The workers who showed the most reluctance to change unions were those who worked underground.⁵⁸

It will remain to be seen what impact the successful CAIMAW campaign at Western Mines will have on other underground mines. There can be little doubt that the move to CAIMAW in one open pit mine affected miners at other mining operations. This process was probably accelerated by the fact that there is a high employee turnover in open pit mines. A miner leaving a CAIMAW certified mine could, therefore, spread the CAIMAW word to other open pit mines at which he subsequently worked. But open pit miners rarely go underground, isolating the underground mines from this phenomenon. Now that Western Mines is certified with CAIMAW, the underground mines are no longer isolated in this manner. One can speculate, therefore, that the underground mines could now experience a turn to CAIMAW - particularly if the factors of the high degree of dissatisfaction with the Steelworkers and high degree of nationalism return.

Lastly, it can be speculated that the B. C. miners turned to CAIMAW because CAIMAW best typifies the traditional aspects of militancy that dominated the mining industry from the early 1900's in the form of the Western Federation of Miners, and their successor, the International Union of Mine Mill Workers. CAIMAW officers agree that CAIMAW represents the same aspects of "principled unionism" and "social unionism" as the old Mine Mill Union did.⁵⁹ Further, certain CAIMAW mining leaders stemmed from a Mine Mill background. Roger Crowther, for example, a leader in the Bethlehem miners' move to CAIMAW, is the son of

a staunch Mine Mill supporter.⁶⁰ Merle Rodocker, another CAIMAW organizer in the mines, referred to the interunion rivalry that had existed between Mine Mill and the Steelworkers by saying, "I am an old Mine Mill man myself, and my hatred of Steel goes back a long way."⁶¹

On the other hand, there are certain important differences between CAIMAW and Mine Mill. First, Mine Mill was essentially a craft union, organizing underground miners. CAIMAW, on the other hand, like the Steelworkers, is a broadly based industrial union. Secondly, CAIMAW has had most of its successes in open pit mines, and not in the stronghold of Mine Mill, underground. A mining official stressed the importance of this difference by saying:

The open pit miner is entirely different from the underground miner. He has totally different skills and works under totally different conditions. He is the new breed of miner. If I were to walk out here now (in an open pit mine certified by CAIMAW) and ask the fellows about Mine Mill, they wouldn't know what I was talking about.⁶²

Thirdly, Mine Mill was a union that tended to be dominated by the Communist party.⁶³ CAIMAW, on the other hand, remains aloof from political partisan involvement. And although Mine Mill leaders such as Harvey Murphy were supporters of the Communist party,⁶⁴ CAIMAW leaders tend to reject the traditional communist party line.⁶⁵ All that can be said, therefore, is that CAIMAW shares some, but not all of the philosophy of Mine Mill, and that certain individuals who had a sympathy for Mine Mill have supported CAIMAW.

Inconclusive as the foregoing analysis may be, two things are clear. First, whether certified with CAIMAW or not, a significant support for CAIMAW exists in most open pit mines in the province. But the same can be said of the Steelworkers. Certification votes conducted in the mines confirm the fact that both unions enjoy considerable support among B. C. miners (see Table V). The result has been the occurrence of frequent and constant certification battles between CAIMAW and the Steelworkers in the industry. This is aggravated by the fact that a high degree of turnover in labour is a characteristic of the industry, making organizing an ongoing task for an incumbent union in a mine. "When you have a work force that are 30 percent committed to CAIMAW, 30 percent supporters of Steel, and the rest transitory and reasonably uncommitted, the result is repeated raids."⁶⁶ Secondly, it is clear that in spite of the fact that the Steelworkers have improved both their structure and their propaganda, and in spite of the fact that nationalism may be giving way to western alienation and separation, the miners that have certified CAIMAW elect to keep them.

CAIMAW'S PERFORMANCE IN THE MINES

THE CAIMAW MINING COUNCIL

The mines that certified CAIMAW as their bargaining agent found themselves with a new and different kind of union. CAIMAW's philosophy of democracy, rank and file control and local autonomy were incorporated into their mining locals. The workers at each mine, therefore, were given control over their own affairs.

However, it was apparent that the decentralization that results from local autonomy at each mine, operating under slightly different conditions and separated geographically by large distances, could pose a structural problem for the organization as a whole. It was necessary, therefore, to find some way of binding the organization together. In 1977, the CAIMAW Mining Council was formed as a means of achieving organizational unity for the CAIMAW mining locals. The founding mines were Bethlehem, Bell, Endako and Gibraltar. With the certification of Similkameen and Western Mines, they too joined the Mining Council.

The Mining Council set for itself the goal of "exchanging ideas of common interest to mining locals and establishing coordination and cooperation of the members in bargaining".⁶⁷ Today, it operates as an aid to bargaining committees, researching and discussing such issues as wage spread for different job classifications at different mines, and exchanging information on contract problems. It also concerns itself with such issues as organizing, staff and training within the mining

sector of the union, and the health and safety concerns of miners,⁶⁸ as well as publishing the CAIMAW Miner, a newspaper which provides the membership with information on industrial relations issues in the mining industry.

The council meets four times a year. Meetings are held in the home town of the various locals on a rotating basis in order to give the general membership an opportunity to observe the council at work. It is funded by a one dollar per capita tax per month from member locals.

Each mining local is entitled to one delegate elected by the rank and file who has the power of a vote at council meetings. Locals may also send an alternate delegate, who may speak on any issue but who may not vote. Observers from the host local, the National Executive Board members for the mines and the mining staff representatives also have voice but no vote.⁶⁹ In keeping with CAIMAW's general policy of democracy and rank and file control, it is elected rank and file members from individual mining locals who control union decision making in terms of broad union policy and direction as set by the Mining Council.

A DIFFERENT STYLE OF BARGAINING

Although the CAIMAW Mining Council operates as an aid to bargaining committees on global issues, actual negotiations at each CAIMAW represented mine site are carried out by the local bargaining committee elected by the workers at their individual properties, assisted by a National union representative.⁷⁰ In this respect, to all appearances at least, bargaining by CAIMAW is carried out in a manner

identical to that followed by the Steelworkers in the mines that they represent. Despite this apparent similarity, the actual methods used by the two unions in achieving a collective agreement in the mines differ greatly, differences that involve two interrelated but separate issues.

First, the Steelworkers sometimes practice one-to-one negotiations, where the union staff representative meets privately with the company negotiator. Between the two of them, they hammer out a settlement. The elected bargaining committee does not take part in this process. This practice, in effect, places decision making with the staff representative rather than the bargaining committee. Lori Fairfield, Chief of Industrial Relations for Placer Developments, described his negotiating experience with the Steelworkers by saying "The chief spokesman for the union meets with the chief spokesman for the company and they map out where they are going."⁷¹ He added, "Most of the contracts I've settled (with the Steelworkers) have been worked out beforehand, before negotiations really get going. We go over the union demands with the leaders and what we're prepared to give them and we work it out."⁷² In contrast, CAIMAW never engages in one-to-one bargaining. The elected bargaining committee is fully involved in every meeting with the company, in keeping with the union's general policy of full rank and file control. "With CAIMAW, everything is on the record" said Lori Fairfield.⁷³ "You just can't get CAIMAW leaders to meet with you individually."⁷⁴ As stated in the CAIMAW News: "CAIMAW believes that everything must be done above-board and on the record at all times."⁷⁵

Lori Fairfield defended the Steelworker's style of bargaining by arguing that "communications are much more accommodating when you have one-to-one bargaining".⁷⁶ He argues that difficult problems are more easily resolved in this manner, because the parties enjoy more flexibility in discussions away from the bargaining table. "In a private meeting, you can explore all sorts of possible avenues available to you. But at the bargaining table, once you have made an offer, you have made it. You can't take it back."⁷⁷ Because difficult issues cannot be resolved as easily in negotiations that are restricted to the constraints inherent at the bargaining table, he argues, an impasse and a strike rather than a peaceful settlement is the likely outcome of the CAIMAW style of bargaining. The conclusion he draws, therefore, is that "collective bargaining (confined to the negotiating table where all members of the negotiating committees are present) doesn't work".⁷⁸ This does not really appear to be the case, since CAIMAW has achieved many collective agreements in the industry without resort to strike, and without resort to one-to-one bargaining (see Table VI). Many of these negotiations presumably involved resolving difficult issues. What Mr. Fairfield's observations may mean, however, is that the CAIMAW style of bargaining requires more expertise by negotiators on both sides of the bargaining table than the style followed by the Steelworkers, because the negotiators do not have available the "more accommodating" method of negotiating provided by one-to-one bargaining.

Secondly, the Steelworker leaders do not meet with the company with the blessing, or indeed the knowledge, of the elected bargaining committee or the membership. Rather, such meetings are kept secret, and when the parties arrive back at the bargaining table, the union leader

and the company put on an act for the benefit of the bargaining committee, pretending to argue issues that they had already resolved in their individual meetings. This practice, in effect, represents a manipulation of the membership and the elected bargaining committee. In describing the meetings, Fairfield said, "Many times we've said 'good, you can have your COLA clause' and the union will say 'Don't offer it. We'll demand it'"⁷⁹ Then, meeting with the negotiating committee at the bargaining table, the company, after a great deal of argument, finally gives in to an issue they have already conceded privately. "When we gave in, I pretended to be so mad I couldn't speak and let the Mine Manager sign the agreement" said Fairfield, recalling one such incident.⁸⁰ Even though the elected bargaining committee may agree to a collective agreement arrived at by such tactics, it is unlikely that their agreement implies the same degree of commitment to the settlement that a collective agreement arrived at in the CAIMAW style would. As CAIMAW points out:

Steel's practices are depriving its members of real collective bargaining. After all, the purpose of bargaining is to give the workers themselves more control over the decisions that affect them. Instead, Steel is collaborating with management to manipulate their own membership.⁸¹

A difference in the style of union decision making between CAIMAW and the international unions is also manifest in the day-to-day conduct of industrial relations in the B. C. mines. Here too, CAIMAW "operates under the principle of democracy".⁸² "Normally you would just deal with the business agent. Here, with CAIMAW, everything is done

with elected committees."⁸³ To the management of a mining company, themselves organized in a bureaucratic structure, this can prove frustrating. "With a business agent, he could say 'yes' or 'no'. But with CAIMAW's democracy, no one can make a decision. They say 'we don't do anything, the membership does it'. It is harder to get things resolved."⁸⁴

CAIMAW's style of bargaining and day-to-day conduct, therefore, on the negative side does not expedite decision making. On the positive side, however, the membership is probably more committed to decisions once they are made, because they have fully participated in their formation.

STRIKES AND BARGAINED SETTLEMENTS

CAIMAW's entry into the mining industry has been described by some as "disasterous, resulting in nothing but strikes just so that, for political reasons, they can do better than the internationals."⁸⁵ USWA has vigorously attacked CAIMAW's strike record in the mines, calling CAIMAW officers "irresponsible" and claiming that "because of our affiliation, we have more power to avert strikes and more control over strike situations when they happen".⁸⁶

Examining each of these charges in turn, there can be no question that CAIMAW has engaged in some lengthy and bitter work stoppages in the B. C. mines. But the causes of these work stoppages were not unreasonable union demands in an attempt at political one-upmanship by CAIMAW on the international unions.

First, among its mining certifications, CAIMAW held the bargaining rights for Noranda's Bell Copper, and still holds the bargaining rights for the Placer owned mines, Gibraltar and Endako. These are companies whom the Labour Relations Board noted in 1976 have traditionally "paid wage rates which are markedly below such other mining companies as Lornex, Bethlehem, Granisle, Similkameen et al".⁸⁷ Not surprisingly, therefore, it has been primarily at these properties that lengthy and bitter CAIMAW strikes have taken place.

A strike against Bell Copper in 1976 was precipitated not in an effort to gain wages or benefits that international unions did not have, but because the pre-strike offer, if accepted, would have resulted in Bell workers falling far behind.

Table VI

CAIMAW's Strikes and Settlements in B. C. Mines, 1973 - 1981

| Date | Bethlehem | Bell Copper | Endako | Gibraltar | Similkameen | Western |
|------|-----------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|--------------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| 1973 | Negotiated Settlement | | | | | |
| 1974 | | Negotiated Settlement | STRIKE 10 weeks | | | |
| 1975 | Negotiated Settlement | | | | | |
| 1976 | | STRIKE 29 weeks | | STRIKE 18 weeks | | |
| 1977 | STRIKE 6 weeks | | STRIKE 18 days | | Negotiated Settlement | |
| 1978 | | Negotiated Settlement | | LOCK-OUT STRIKE 34 weeks | | |
| 1979 | Negotiated Settlement | Negotiated Re-opener | STRIKE 36 weeks | | Negotiated Settlement | Negotiated Settlement |
| 1980 | | | Negotiated Re-opener | Negotiated Re-opener | | |
| 1981 | Negotiated Re-opener | | | | Negotiated Re-opener | |

Source: Various issues of the CAIMAW Review, 1973 - 1981

Noranda was making a farce of negotiations by offering wage increases which ranged from 3.6% for labourers to 10.4% for tradesmen. Acceptance of such an offer would have made Bell Copper Workers the lowest paid miners in B. C.⁸⁸

Similarly, a strike at Gibraltar in 1976 was precipitated partly by Gibraltar's attempt to dilute the force of the contract language, and partly by a pre-strike wage offer that "would have left CAIMAW members at the bottom of the spectrum and in fact earning wage rates in 1978 which are less than those paid right now in most other B. C. mines".⁸⁹

Curiously enough the Gibraltar strike was initially precipitated by noneconomic issues. The union sought relatively modest improvements in the contract language most of which would provide only those protections already enjoyed in the Endako or Craigmont agreements. Gibraltar resisted that effort and in fact sought certain refinements of its own which would dilute the force of the existing Gibraltar language relative to the Endako agreement.⁹⁰

The Gibraltar offer in 1978 that resulted in another bitter labour dispute contained the same deficiencies - namely an extremely low wage offer and an attempt to dilute the contract language, particularly the training clause and the grievance procedure provisions.⁹¹

Nor was the Endako strike in 1975 precipitated by an overzealous need on the part of CAIMAW to achieve negotiating successes beyond those achieved by international unions. Rather, negotiations failed because of Placer's determination that the memorandum of settlement signed with the Steelworkers, the settlement that had been a major factor in the workers' turn to CAIMAW, should constitute the basis of the new contract. This would have provided terms that even the Steelworkers, by the end of the CAIMAW campaign, were recommending should be rejected.

Canex Placer was determined that the settlement with the Steelworkers should be the substance of a new contract for the employees....It took a three month strike, punctuated by violence on the picket lines before CAIMAW made its point and a settlement of new and somewhat higher rates was achieved at the Endako mine.⁹²

Secondly, because the pattern has been for CAIMAW to engage in strikes, not in pursuit of unreasonable demands but in an attempt to prevent its members from falling far behind, the charge that CAIMAW's strike record shows its leaders to be irresponsible does not appear to be justified. Indeed, the resort to strike when faced with a pre-strike offer that considerably dilutes contract language and/or provides wages that are far inferior to others in the industry can be considered to be a traditional union response. Referring to the Gibraltar strike in 1976 the Labour Relations Board noted:

In this strike it (CAIMAW) is seeking to establish what it believes is the proper relationship of the terms of employment at Gibraltar to those enjoyed by members of a sister CAIMAW local at Endako....In the light of this historical record (between Gibraltar and Endako) the kind of contract terms now in existence at the Endako mine is an understandable point of reference for the Gibraltar strike.⁹³

Indeed, a dramatic example of extreme restraint in resort to work stoppage occurred at Gibraltar in 1978. For the reasons stated above, the company's final offer was unacceptable to the union. But rather than go on strike, the union chose the strategy of continuing to work under the terms of the expired contract until the price of copper, which at the time was very low, improved. At that time, the company could perhaps be more easily persuaded to make a more generous offer. The company's response to this strategy, however, was to unilaterally cancel the expired collective agreement, which had been kept in force by an extension clause. Even under these circumstances, the union refused to strike. "Of course we know it would be intolerable for any union to keep their members working without a collective agreement" said Lori Fairfield. "That's why we did it. But nothing happened."⁹⁴ In fact, the union did take a strike vote, not so much to achieve a new contract, as to enforce the terms of the old one. "In spite of the difficult circumstances, the union refused to be provoked into a strike" reported the CAIMAW Miner.⁹⁵ On May 23, 1978, therefore, the company served lock-out notice, and on May 26 closed the gate at the mine. CAIMAW members were again on the picket line. "The battlefield wasn't chosen

by the employees or their union. The employer forced the employees onto the picket line when copper was 66¢ a pound (Canadian)."⁹⁶

Finally, the Steelworkers contention that their affiliations provide them with both the power to avert strikes and the power to control strike situations when they occur, seems to be similarly unsupported by the evidence. CAIMAW's most lengthy and bitter strikes have taken place against Placer Developments. But the Steelworkers, when certified at Endako and Gibraltar, can hardly be said to have frightened Placer into submission with their power. Indeed, the lower Placer rates noted by the Labour Relations Board in 1976 were inherited by CAIMAW from the Steelworkers in the case of Gibraltar, and an improvement on the rates that the Steelworkers had negotiated at Endako, and this had been achieved by the Steelworkers only after frequent and lengthy Steelworker strikes. On the ten occasions that Placer negotiated with the Steelworkers prior to 1976, four resulted in lengthy strikes. The board noted that the 1976 Gibraltar dispute was characteristic for Placer. CAIMAW was not setting a new pattern, but simply maintaining one that had already been established at the Placer properties.

There have been a total of 12 occasions in which Placer Mines have been bargaining for contract renewals at a time when the unions would be in a legal strike position. Of these 12 occasions, there have been six strikes. Nor were these short, sharp work stoppages which quickly produced agreement. Excluding a one week strike at Craigmont in 1968,

there have been five major strikes ranging from two months to seven and a half months. The current four-month shutdown at the Gibraltar mine fits squarely into that pattern.⁹⁷

Nor does Noranda appear to be intimidated by the power of the Steelworker's affiliations. It is true that, unlike CAIMAW's strikes against Placer in recent years, a strike in 1979 by the Steelworkers at the Noranda owned Brenda mine was settled relatively quickly - in approximately three weeks. But this was due to the fact that shortly after the strike began, Similkameen settled with CAIMAW without a strike for rates that were in excess of the union demands at Brenda. "If it were not for that, I guarantee you that they would still be on the street" said a Brenda representative.⁹⁸

Conversely, neither of these mining companies see CAIMAW as being inherently weak because it lacks the size and affiliations of the Steelworkers. "For a small union, CAIMAW has made a lot of waves" said George Atkins, Industrial Relations Manager at Gibraltar. "I was amazed when I found out they only had seven thousand members. Judging from their performance, I thought they would have to be seven times that size."⁹⁹ "I think CAIMAW has definitely proved themselves in the industry" agreed a Brenda representative.¹⁰⁰

CAIMAW's long and bitter struggles in the mining industry do not, therefore, appear to have been due to the fact that CAIMAW lacks the power and affiliations of the Steelworkers, thereby making them disputes which the Steelworkers could have avoided. Rather, the central

cause appears to be conditions inherent in the mining industry itself. Mining companies do not face a loss of their market share or spoilage of their product as a result of a work stoppage at a mine. Moreover, with one mining company typically owning several properties, it can maintain its profits even if one of its operations is struck. Mining employees involved in a labour dispute typically leave town and find other jobs. The result of these factors is long labour disputes in the industry. The Labour Relations Board stated:

If this and other cases which the Board has experienced are any indication, the recent trend in B. C.'s mining industry is towards many long and bitter strikes. The struck employer continues to operate its other mines and the striking employees find other jobs. The attitude of both the employer and the trade union seems to be that the mineral will not spoil if it is left in the ground for a while longer.¹⁰¹

WAGE SETTLEMENTS IN THE MINES

Comparisons of bargaining successes in the mines is made particularly difficult because of the wide variety of provisions in different contracts, such as tool allowances, shift premiums, COLA formulae and so on. It can be said, however, that CAIMAW's 1979 contract negotiated with Similkameen contained such industry firsts as a union shop clause and the banking of overtime, provisions which the Steelworkers later incorporated into the Babine contract.¹⁰² Moreover, on costing the wide variety of continuous shift premiums in effect at

different mining properties, CAIMAW officers found the averaged hourly premiums for employees working continuous shifts ranged from 40¢ to as much as \$1.20 per hour, a range which Peter Cameron described as extreme. They have since had some bargaining success at closing this gap, an issue which the Steelworkers have not to date addressed.

Unions used to get into silly arguments as to who had the best continuous shift premiums. One would have a better weekend premium, the other would have a better afternoon shift premium. We just sat down and costed it out, averaging the total premiums for the hours worked. It sounds so elementary, but nobody had ever done it before. We explained the extreme range to our members and the employer was forced to respond to it.¹⁰³

CAIMAW, then, has led the way in several issues in the industry.

Perhaps the most visible aspect of a union's success in bargaining is the hourly wage rate negotiated for its members. Even these figures must be used with caution, however, since they are obviously affected not only by the union, but also by the industrial relations policy pursued by different mining companies in terms of willingness or ability to pay.

An examination of the top and bottom wage rates in B. C. copper and molybdenum producing mines (see Tables VII and VIII) indicates that Western Mines (CAIMAW) and Lornex (Steel) lead the industry in wages. But due to the leapfrog pattern of wage increases in

the mines, it is also essential to take into account the time of contract expiry. Because Western Mines expires nine months before Lornex and is ahead of Lornex up until three months before its expiry, it can be considered the better contract of the two.

Similkameen (CAIMAW) appears to be the next best contract. Although the Utah (Operating Engineers) trade rates are higher for the next three months, Similkameen's trade rates exceed those of Utah for the following seven months, and its labourer rates are higher throughout. This perhaps outweighs the fact that Utah expires seven months before Similkameen. By the same reasoning, it would appear that the next best contracts are Bethlehem (CAIMAW), Endako, (CAIMAW) and Gibraltar (CAIMAW) respectively.

Utah Mines (Operating Engineers) and Highmont Mines (Operating Engineers) can be ranked next. These contracts seem to be roughly comparable in trade rates, but Highmont rates for labourers are higher throughout. Although this must be offset by the fact that Utah expires four months before Highmont, Highmont can probably be considered the better contract.

Table VII

QUARTERLY COMPARISON OF B. C. OPEN PIT MINES
PRODUCING COPPER AND/OR MOLYBDENUM (Journeyman and Base Rates)

| | <u>Afton Mines STEEL</u> | <u>Brenda Mines STEEL</u> | <u>Utah Mines OP ENG</u> | <u>Babine Div STEEL</u> | <u>Lornex Mines STEEL</u> | <u>High- mont OP ENG</u> | <u>Endako Mines CAIMAW</u> | <u>Gibral- tar CAIMAW</u> | <u>Beth- lehem CAIMAW</u> | <u>Simil- kameen CAIMAW</u> |
|--------|----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|----------------------------------|---------------------------------|-----------------------------------|----------------------------------|------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| Apr/81 | 11.70 9.10 | 11.75 9.32 | 13.25 9.63 | 12.15 9.09 | 12.69 10.19 | 12.50 9.65 | 12.45 9.63 | 12.35 9.60 | 12.50 9.87 | 12.50 9.83 |
| Jul/81 | 11.99 9.39 | 11.97 9.54 | 13.25 9.63 | 12.40 9.34 | 13.98 11.48 | 12.50 9.65 | 13.10 10.13 | 13.10 10.10 | 13.50 10.87 | 13.50 10.83 |
| Oct/81 | 12.25 9.65 | 11.97 9.54 | 14.44 9.82 | 12.62 9.56 | 13.98 11.48 | 13.50 10.65 | 13.45 10.40 | 13.45 10.37 | 13.50 10.87 | 13.50 10.83 |
| Jan/82 | Exp Oct | Exp Oct | 13.63 10.01 | 12.85 9.79 | 14.18 11.68 | 13.70 10.85 | 13.78 10.66 | 13.78 10.63 | 13.78 11.15 | 13.77 11.05 |
| Apr/82 | | | 13.83 10.21 | 13.08 10.02 | 14.44 11.94 | 13.90 11.05 | 14.06 10.88 | 14.06 10.85 | 14.13 11.50 | 14.05 11.28 |
| Jul/82 | | | Exp April | Exp June | Exp June | 14.01 11.26 | 14.40 11.15 | 14.40 11.12 | 14.48 11.85 | 14.38 11.56 |
| Oct/82 | | | | | | Exp Aug | Exp Sept | Exp Sept | Exp Oct | 14.77 11.88 Exp Nov |

EXPIRY DATES WITHIN FIVE WEEKS

N.B. The effect of all COLA clauses is included. Future payments are calculated on the basis of inflation estimated at 12%.

Source: CAIMAW Miner, March, 1981.

Table VIII

QUARTERLY COMPARISON OF B. C. UNDERGROUND MINES
PRODUCING COPPER AND/OR MOLYBDENUM (Journeyman and Base Rates Rates)

| | <u>Western Mines</u> | <u>Craigmont</u> | <u>Boss</u> |
|--------|--------------------------|------------------|---------------|
| Apr/81 | 13.20 10.91 | 11.64 9.14 | 11.65 8.98 |
| Jul/81 | 13.54 11.25 | 11.96 9.43 | 11.90 9.23 |
| Oct/81 | Exp Sept | 12.22 9.69 | 12.12 9.45 |
| Jan/82 | | 12.48 9.95 | 12.35 9.68 |
| Apr/82 | | Exp Jan | Exp Mar |

N.B. The effect of all COLA clauses is included. Future payments are calculated on the basis of inflation at 12%.

Source: CAIMAW Miner March, 1981.

Babine (Steel) trade rates exceed the rates of the remaining mines. But the labourer rates at Babine do not match the rates at the other mines, and its contract expires a full eight months after Afton (Steel) and Brenda (Steel) and five months after Craigmont (Steel). Due to both these factors, it is probably inferior to all three mines. Craigmont has roughly similar rates to Afton and Brenda, but expires later and therefore can be ranked behind them. Afton appears to be slightly ahead of Brenda. Boss Mountain (Steel) is clearly the worst contract for wages in the industry, with the top and bottom rates being inferior to Craigmont and Babine throughout.¹⁰⁴

However, it must be remembered that reopeners, common in the industry in recent years, can quite suddenly change these rankings. It must also be taken into account that Noranda and Placer have traditionally paid the lowest rates in the industry, and that the policy followed by mining management in terms of relative wages paid can be expected to have made a considerable contribution to the results. Finally, the ranking of these contracts necessarily incorporates a high degree of subjectivity concerning the relative emphasis to be given to rates and contract expiry dates, a factor which is subject to interpretation.

Nevertheless, certain conclusions can be drawn with some degree of confidence. First, in mines that are certified by the Steelworkers, Noranda and Placer maintain their traditional place at the bottom of the rankings. CAIMAW no longer has a certification for a Noranda mine, and therefore how it would have fared against this employer will have to remain speculation. CAIMAW has, however, improved

the relative position of its Placer certifications, Gibraltar and Endako. (It must be remembered that it has also fought lengthy, bitter strikes against this employer.) Secondly, in dealing with mines that are owned by corporations other than Noranda and Placer, CAIMAW has certainly held its own.

To some extent, CAIMAW has been a leader in the industry, introducing such concepts as the banking of overtime, stronger union security clauses than the Rand formula traditionally found in the mines, and the concept of costing and comparing continuous shift premiums by averaging. Also, the rates negotiated in a peaceful settlement by CAIMAW at Similkameen served as the basis for the wage settlement at Brenda. However, it is also true that the Steelworker contract peacefully negotiated at Lornex in 1980 has served as a pattern for CAIMAW at Endako and Gibraltar.

Table IX

RANKING OF B. C. MINES BY WAGES

(Copper and Molybdenum)

| <u>Ranking</u> | <u>Mine</u> | <u>Union</u> | <u>Owner</u> |
|----------------|-------------|--------------|--------------|
| 1 | Western | CAIMAW | Brascan |
| 2 | Lornex | Steel | Rio Algomá |
| 3 | Similkameen | CAIMAW | Newmont |
| 4 | Bethlehem | CAIMAW | Cominco |
| 5 | Endako | CAIMAW | Placer |
| 6 | Gibraltar | CAIMAW | Placer |
| 7 | Highmont | Op Eng | Tech Corp |
| 8 | Utah | Op Eng | Utah Mining |
| 9 | Afton | Steel | Tech Corp |
| 10 | Brenda | Steel | Noranda |
| 11 | Craigmont | Steel | Placer |
| 12 | Babine | Steel | Noranda |
| 13 | Boss | Steel | Noranda |

Each union, therefore, can be said to have had an effect on the other.

THE BARGAINING STRUCTURE IN B. C. MINES

The area in which CAIMAW has unquestionably been a leader, and has had the most dramatic impact on the industry, has been the change in the bargaining structure in the B. C. mines - regarded by CAIMAW as one of its greatest achievements.

Although association bargaining is common in B. C., occurring in such industries as forest products, construction, transportation and hospitals, the mining industry has traditionally stuck firmly to fragmented bargaining. The reasons for this are twofold. First, individual mine sites exhibit great variation in terms of the product mined, richness of ore and geographical location of the property. Further, they sell their product in a market which is subject to sharp fluctuations in the international price of metals. "In that environment, it clearly makes sense for a mining employer to preserve its own flexibility in a decentralized bargaining format which can be sensitive to the peculiar market situation at each mine."¹⁰⁵ Secondly, fragmented bargaining has benefited the employer in the mining industry, making mining companies resistant to change. Unlike many industries, employers in mines face neither a loss of their market share due to brand name differentiation in the event of a work stoppage at a particular mine, nor a spoilage of their goods. It is common for several mines to be owned by a common employer, enabling them to maintain their cash flows from their other operations while one property is struck. Consequently, a tactic which mining employers can use with a

considerable degree of success is to engage in a lengthy dispute at one mine in order to impose a low settlement, which they can then use as a pattern to negotiate a low settlement at their other operations. As noted by the Labour Relations Board, fragmented bargaining "has had the not unexpected result of restraining the upper level of wage settlements which can be won by local unions at any one mine. This result can be graphically demonstrated by a comparison of wage rates in the forest product and mining industries".¹⁰⁶

It is true that, in some industries, fragmented bargaining provides a structure that benefits the unions, because it enables unions to utilize the tactic of whipsawing the employers. But fragmented bargaining is only one of the two necessary conditions for a union to successfully employ this technique. The other is a susceptibility of employers to a work stoppage. This second crucial ingredient is lacking in the mining industry. For the reasons stated above, mining employers are able to withstand long strikes, and have proved themselves willing to do so. The result is that mining employers have not only been able to prevent unions from engaging in whipsawing, but the fragmented bargaining structure allows them to engage in the practice themselves.

Indeed Paul Weiler, Professor at Harvard University and former chairman of the B. C. Labour Relations Board, uses the B. C. mining industry as an example of the circumstances where fragmentation in bargaining favours the employer, causing managerial resistance to change. In addition to the considerations already noted, Weiler points out in his book, Reconcilable Differences:

The mining employer does have a centralized industrial relations department. It can pursue a coherent, overall bargaining strategy. That department deals with the variety of union locals, each with its own certification, its own collective agreement, its own termination date....An employer whose antennae are in working order can isolate that union local which appears weakest (whether because of internal politics or the economic setting at that mine) and force it to accept a relatively niggardly settlement: one which serves as a favourable precedent in the employer's other negotiations. Suppose that local resists that attempt. It will have to strike to elicit a better offer from the employer....Even at the struck location, the employer is really just shifting production forward in time (by contrast with the employees whose skills are neither that mobile or that marketable and who suffer a dead loss of earning during the strike). Any one mine has a limited life span....The employer is in a position to make the calculation that a sacrifice in current net earnings from the struck mine is a worthwhile investment in favourable labour costs throughout its entire corporate structure....It is understandable that employers who enjoy that kind of bargaining power are rarely interested in altering a bargaining structure of separate, single location units.¹⁰⁷

In a footnote, Weiler notes that he saw "no better illustration of these dynamics than the relationship of CAIMAW and Canex Placer".¹⁰⁸ These conditions inherent in the industry have not gone unnoticed by CAIMAW. Not long after achieving certification at Placer's Gibraltar and Endako

properties, CAIMAW began to take evasive action against these inherent advantages for the B. C. mining employer.

First, with the formation of the CAIMAW Mining Council, CAIMAW began to enjoy, at least to some extent, the advantages enjoyed by mining employers in terms of a centralized bargaining policy and strategy. Although interunion rivalry with the Steelworkers and the certification of USWA at Craigmont prevented a complete centralization of union policy and strategy, the Mining Council provided a vehicle for CAIMAW to achieve cohesion and centralization at Placer's Gibraltar and Endako properties.

Secondly, in 1976, CAIMAW began to press for common expiry dates for the contracts at Gibraltar and Endako, proposing that a common expiry date for the two properties could provide a basis for the settlement of the ongoing Gibraltar dispute.¹⁰⁹ But common expiry dates at the two Placer properties would severely restrict the ability of Placer to use its economic strength to impose a low settlement on the property that bargained first, and subsequently use that settlement when bargaining later at the second property. The response of Placer to the proposal was, therefore, perhaps predictable.

We are not attracted whatsoever to the idea of joint bargaining with Endako or any other mining company. Neither do we see any advantage in striving for a common expiry date. Our position remains firm on the wage adjustment and expiry dates laid out in our last proposal. Our objective is to meet with you for the purpose of reaching a collective agreement

at Gibraltar. I would suggest this be a worthwhile objective for yourself.¹¹⁰

CAIMAW, therefore, turned to the use of secondary picketing at the Endako property to increase the pressure on Placer during the 1976 Gibraltar strike. Placer, for the first time in the mining industry, found that the 1976 strike underway at Gibraltar was disrupting the operations of another of its properties, Endako. Placer reacted vigorously, arguing before the Labour Relations Board that, due to the economic flexibility required by mining employers, the industry should be exempt from such union tactics.¹¹¹ The board agreed that:

...a crucial ingredient in that policy [economic flexibility] is the assurance that any strikes precipitated by the bargaining at one mine will not spill over into other mining operations. That is why Placer is especially concerned about the prospect of secondary location picketing.¹¹²

But it also noted that "the Board cannot turn a blind eye to the favourable bargaining results which mining employers have secured from that structure".¹¹³ It ruled that secondary picketing was a legitimate trade union tactic in the mining industry. No longer would a mining company be able to confine the effects of a labour dispute to one of its operations.

CAIMAW, in fact, introduced the concept of secondary picketing into the mining industry. The Steelworker's position has always been that "the mining industry is no place for secondary picketing".¹¹⁴ The

reasoning behind this assertion is twofold. First, secondary picketing has the disadvantage of adversely affecting a union's own members working at the secondary picketed location, by causing them to lose pay for a dispute that is not their own. CAIMAW appears to be aware of this disadvantage, because it has used the tactic in a spasmodic manner, closing the secondary location for only a few days at a time rather than for the duration of the primary dispute. But to use secondary picketing in this manner, the Steelworkers argue, is completely ineffective. "The only strikes that have an effect in the mining industry are long strikes" maintained Monty Alton of the Steelworkers. "To shut a mine down for a few days at a time simply saves the employer money. It is a farce."¹¹⁵ The Labour Relations Board's analysis of the effect of CAIMAW's secondary picketing at Endako, however, did not support this contention. Rather, the board argued that the tactic would "keep Placer off balance", reduce the advantages to Placer of the fragmented bargaining structure in the industry, and "help Placer appreciate some of the advantages of a broader bargaining structure".¹¹⁶

The next step in CAIMAW's attack on the established industrial relations bargaining structure in the mining industry was undertaken in the 1978 Gibraltar strike, when the Endako workers voted to pay four hours dues per member per month to help support the strike at Gibraltar. The Gibraltar workers reciprocated during the 1979 Endako strike against their common employer, Placer. The Steelworkers vigorously attacked this practice.

1

The Gibraltar workers did voluntarily raise their dues an additional 4 hours - BUT ON THE OTHER HAND

THE ALTERNATIVE WAS SECONDARY PICKETING. Some choice - raise your dues by 4 hours or face a secondary picket line when you come to work and LOSE 8 HOURS PAY. This is not democratic choice - it is blackmail.¹¹⁷

But this analysis demonstrates a lack of understanding of the industrial relations significance of these two events. By making these donations, the miners were providing striking workers at other mines with economic aid over and above that provided by their strike fund, thus enabling them to better withstand the hardships of a lengthy strike, and hence their ability to achieve an improved contract. It is true that CAIMAW's use of secondary picketing could impose hardships on members of a sister local not currently engaged in strike, making the alternative of donating four hours pay per month attractive. But if Placer had been able to impose a low offer on the employees at Gibraltar, this would have undoubtedly been used to hold down wages in the upcoming Endako negotiations. The Gibraltar dispute, therefore, was one to be fought not just by the Gibraltar employees, but by the Endako employees as well. The recognition and acceptance of this fact by the miners at Endako and Gibraltar represents, therefore, a significant and historical change in the power dynamics of industrial relations in the B. C. mining industry.

In October of 1978, the CAIMAW Mining Council extended this concept of mutual cooperation between miners at different mines by forming a Mutual Defense Pact for CAIMAW members in the mining industry. The terms of the pact are that workers at participating locals

automatically send two hours pay per month to assist workers on strike or locked out at a particular local, assistance that provides economic benefits in addition to the normal strike pay provided by the union's strike fund. Participation in the pact is voluntary for each local, requiring the approval of the local membership. By January 1981, all CAIMAW mining locals had joined the pact with the exception of Bethlehem Copper, which to date has chosen not to participate.

The Mutual Defense Pact represents an innovative concept in the industry - the support of a mine on strike by miners at other properties. It has been vigorously attacked by the Steelworkers, who see it as resulting in "exorbitant dues assessments" for a cause which they do not see as worthy, namely a strike at another mine.¹¹⁸ But in taking this position, the Steelworkers are missing the basic point - namely that employers in the mining industry have unquestionably benefited from their ability to maintain their cash flows during a work stoppage via their other mining operations. Their economic strength is not isolated to the mine on strike. Why then, should the other party to the relationship not employ the same tactic and derive the same benefit from doing so? In addition, a major consideration of the mining companies in arriving at wage settlements appears to be the settlements arrived at in other mines. This is due both to the fact that mining companies must compete for labour (particularly skilled tradesmen), and also because they appear to pursue company policy in terms of their relative positions for wages in the industry. "Similkameen doesn't like to be a pattern setter.... Bethlehem doesn't like to get too far behind....Lornex believes in paying".¹¹⁹ The consistency of the position of Noranda mines at the bottom of the wage groupings can almost

certainly be attributed to the corporate pursual of policy in terms of wages relative to other mines. Consequently, a struggle by workers at one mine is of vital interest to all workers in the industry. It is not an isolated battle. CAIMAW's Mutual Defence Pact represents a realization of the fact by the miners at properties certified by CAIMAW, and a willingness to partake in the struggle for higher wages regardless of where that struggle is occurring. The result can only be an increase in the bargaining power of the union.

CAIMAW's tactics have proved successful in moving mining employers out of the traditional fragmented bargaining structure. First, as part of the settlement for the 1978 Gibraltar strike, Placer conceded to a common expiry date for the contracts at its Endako and Gibraltar properties, a proposal it had refused to consider in 1976. In 1980, it attempted to escape from this arrangement by offering the Gibraltar employees an unsolicited one dollar per hour mid-term wage increase in return for an extension to the contract. The Gibraltar miners rejected this offer in a secret ballot vote by a resounding 97 percent. Secondly, as part of the settlement of the 1979 Endako strike, Placer acknowledged the interrelationship of the two locals by agreeing to a 5 percent increase for the Gibraltar employees.¹²⁰ For the miners at one mine to negotiate a wage increase for miners at another mine was unique, and described by CAIMAW as "a major breakthrough".¹²¹

Thirdly, in 1980, Placer simultaneously bargained reopeners for the two properties with a joint Endako/Gibraltar union negotiating committee. Although the management negotiating committees for the two

mines were separate and refused to sit together to bargain with the joint union committee, negotiations were carried out on the same day in the same hotel at Prince George. The joint union committee met alternately with the two management committees until agreements for the two properties had been reached, agreements which provided for essentially the same rates at the two mines (see Table VII). Despite attempts by the company to maintain the appearance of separate bargaining, these negotiations in fact represented a move from common expiry to joint bargaining. The result of the reopener was a "dramatic improvement in the relative wage position for the Gibraltar and Endako workers",¹²² and for the first time, the achievement of an agreement between CAIMAW and Placer without resort to work stoppage. CAIMAW attributes both of these results, at least in part, to its new bargaining strength.¹²³

Finally, in the face of "considerable employer resistance",¹²⁴ CAIMAW has lined up the expiry dates of the mines for which it is certified such that they all expire within a five week period (see Table VII). "It will enable us to isolate the employer of our choice, and then impose pattern bargaining on the rest" said Peter Cameron. Such an arrangement may also "enable us to bargain such issues as a portable pension plan",¹²⁵ never before possible in the industry.

CAIMAW is proud of its accomplishments in changing the bargaining structure at the mines for which it is certified. The Steelworkers, however, refuse to be impressed. Monty Alton of the Steelworkers points to the coordinated bargaining structure at Cominco locals as an example of his unions accomplishments, and calls CAIMAW

"babes in the woods" in comparison. "You'd think they had just discovered fire when we've been cooking on joint bargaining for years" he said.¹²⁶ But what Mr. Alton fails to mention is that the foundation for the coordinated bargaining of Cominco locals in B. C. is the Trail-Kimberley-Salmo properties, and that this joint structure was not achieved by the Steelworkers, but inherited by them from Mine Mill at the time of the Steel-Mine-Mill merger. Since that time, some other Cominco owned properties in B. C. have been added to the program by the Steelworkers. But these properties are not confined to the mining industry, and therefore the industrial relations power dynamics of the Steelworker's coordinated bargaining at Cominco locals differ greatly from CAIMAW's coordinated bargaining in the mines. The Cominco property at Trail, for example, is a smelter that is used to process the ore produced at the Kimberley mine. Fragmented bargaining is not particularly advantageous to the employer in this situation, because production at one site is dependent on production at the other. This can be contrasted to the situation at Placer's properties, where, if one mine is closed in a labour dispute, the other can continue to operate at full capacity. To downplay CAIMAW's achievements in altering the bargaining structure in B. C. mines by pointing to the Steelworker's coordinated bargaining at Cominco locals is not, therefore, a legitimate comparison. Possibly for this reason, Peter Warrion, research director for the Steelworkers, does not attempt to liken coordinated bargaining at Cominco locals with coordinated bargaining in the mines, and concedes that CAIMAW has achieved something which, to date, his union has not really addressed. The Steelworkers have not moved towards coordinated bargaining in the mines, he claims, because they have been preoccupied

with achieving coordinated bargaining for the thousands of workers at Cominco locals.¹²⁷

It will remain to be seen just how great the impact of the changes in the bargaining structure achieved by CAIMAW will be in terms of higher wages and greater industrial peace in the mining industry. One effect that is already emerging is that the Steelworkers now appear to be moving hesitatingly in the same direction. After vigorously attacking CAIMAW's use of secondary picketing and the concept behind CAIMAW's Mutual Defense Pact, the Steelworkers, in June 1979, endorsed their future goal of common expiry in their B. C. certified mines.¹²⁸ "But they don't have a Mining Council and they oppose secondary picketing in the mining industry" said Peter Cameron. "I don't know how they think they are going to get there."¹²⁹ Certainly, to date, the Steelworkers have not had success in this goal. They told the membership at Babine that they were going to strive for common expiry of all the Noranda owned mining properties.¹³⁰ But the contract that they bargained at Babine maintains the widely different expiry dates for all Noranda owned mines in the province (see Table VII).

CAIMAW'S PHILOSOPHY AT WORK IN THE MINES

RANK AND FILE CONTROL

CAIMAW's philosophy has resulted in a change of union decision making in the mines they represent, shifting even day-to-day decisions from the business agents to elected committees who take their instructions from the membership. The practice of this philosophy

perhaps suffers the greatest strain in mines where management adheres to a paternalistic philosophy in dealing with their employees. This is because, in order to partake in union decision making, attendance at union meetings where votes are taken is essential. In mines where few important issues arise, miners tend not to go to union meetings. "Only a handful of people turn out to union meetings, and therefore, in practice, decision making falls into the hands of a few."¹³¹ However, it is also true that even in mines which practice paternalism, issues that are seen as important by the membership do inevitably arise, at least on occasion. At such times, the miners do attend union meetings, and do fully partake in the decisions surrounding that issue.¹³²

A necessary prerequisite to membership control in decision making, however, is an informed membership. CAIMAW not only appears to recognize this fact, but accepts the responsibility of providing miners with the required information through its newspaper the CAIMAW Miner. This paper lays out and explains for the membership many industrial relations issues, including the costing of continuous shift premiums by averaging, alternative continuous shift schedules and wage comparisons of all copper and molybdenum producing mines in the province. "We lay it out so that people can see what is going on. Nobody in the industry had ever done that before," said Cameron.¹³³ "Their level of 'propaganda' just has to be admired" said George Atkins, Industrial Relations Manager at Gibraltar Mines.¹³⁴ CAIMAW also assumes the responsibility of conducting numerous shop steward schools in the mines to provide education to the local leaders. The result is a local leadership that exhibits "a very high level of expertise", according to George Atkins.¹³⁵ A mining official at another of CAIMAW's certified

mines agrees, but added, "It is just that they are doing what the others should be doing - and aren't."¹³⁶ To CAIMAW, the importance of expertise in union leadership is more pressing in the mines than in any other industry, and therefore it provides the education and information necessary to achieve it.¹³⁷

Perhaps because of the high level of expertise exhibited by the leadership at CAIMAW certified mines, the membership tend to have a great deal of respect for their leaders. The result is that, "in contrast to the membership in construction unions who are very apathetic, it is not at all difficult for CAIMAW leaders to drum up any response they want from their membership".¹³⁸ It has been speculated that it is perhaps this phenomenon that has been responsible for the perception of CAIMAW by the industry as a highly militant union.¹³⁹ It is certainly a factor that qualifies the practical application of total rank and file control. At the same time, however, this influence of the leaders on the membership is voluntarily given and not constitutionally dictated, and therefore exists only at the pleasure of the membership. In order to maintain it, the leadership must be responsive to the rank and file, and therefore the membership exerts considerable influence on the leaders. Considerable influence operates in both directions.

LOCAL AUTONOMY

In keeping with CAIMAW's philosophy of local autonomy, the mines at which CAIMAW is certified enjoy local rights and considerable authority over the decisions that affect them. Each mining local, for example, has the constitutional right to important information

pertaining to the operation of the National union, such as minutes of NEB board meetings and financial statements. The local's records and funds are the property of the local, and the local cannot be put under trusteeship. Each mining local sets the amount of its own dues by a vote of the local membership involved, and dues check-offs are remitted by the company to the local union rather than the National union, enabling each local to retain complete control of its share of the funds.¹⁴⁰ Even important union decisions relating to broad union policy in the mining sector are made at the local level, such as a local's membership in the CAIMAW Mining Council, and a local's participation in the Mutual Defense Pact.

The implementation of CAIMAW's philosophy of local autonomy in the mines has been strongly criticized by Lori Fairfield of Placer as resulting in chaos. Speaking of the bitter 1978 Gibraltar dispute, Fairfield said, "The trouble is that the leaders at the National level just won't lead".¹⁴¹ Others, however, do not agree. In the opinion of George Atkins, "CAIMAW in fact exhibits more central control, rather than less." In the construction industry, he observed, "every business agent regards his own area as his own personal fiefdom and resents interference from anyone". In contrast, CAIMAW locals hold their National officers in high regard, and therefore, "their influence is large".¹⁴²

Again, this influence occurs not by constitutional authority, but as a result of respect gained through the high level of expertise exhibited by the National officers, a respect which is held throughout the industry. The Financial Post noted, "the union does boast some

top-flight leadership from people such as Succamore, Peter Cameron (who served on the B. C. Labour Relations Board for four years) and Cathy Walker, a recognized authority on the operation of the Workers' Compensation Board".¹⁴³ The influence exerted by the National officers again imposes technical limitations on the practice of total local autonomy taking place in CAIMAW certified mines. But again, the influence of National officers is not achieved by constitutional authority, but exists only at the pleasure of the local involved.

The foregoing analysis, however, requires qualification. The influence of the National officers has perhaps been most significant in Placer owned mines. "Relations with Placer have not been good" admitted George Atkins. "The locals may therefore feel the need to defer to the National."¹⁴⁴ Peter Cameron agrees. "The phenomenon that George is observing is probably due to the fact that Gibraltar employees have had to agonize through some very difficult decisions" he said.¹⁴⁵ It appears likely, therefore, that CAIMAW locals at mines where few difficult issues arise operate with a greater degree of independence than do locals which must deal with difficult industrial relations problems, when locals require, request and receive the assistance of the National union.

ISSUES CRYSTALLIZED IN THE MINES

CAIMAW's experiences in the mines have resulted in a clarification and refinement of issues surrounding its basic philosophy of democracy, rank and file control and local autonomy. "The issues have become crystallized more sharply in the mines than anywhere else"

said Peter Cameron.¹⁴⁶ This is probably due to the bitter rivalry between CAIMAW and the Steelworkers that has caused the two unions to define and defend their respective policies and practices.

CAIMAW's philosophy of rank and file control, democracy and local autonomy has resulted in several identifiable differences in union decision making power between CAIMAW and the international unions certified in the mines. Within the USWA, for example, the international president has broad constitutional powers. This power can be exercised over a local union, because the international president has the constitutional right to establish an "administratorship" over a local if he deems this action to be in the best interest of the union.¹⁴⁷ No officer in CAIMAW enjoys this right. On the contrary, the local union has the constitutional right to secede from the National union and retain its assets if the local membership so decide.¹⁴⁸ Similarly, in the Steelworkers, the international president has the constitutional power to suspend any officer "where in the opinion of the International President the best interests of the International Union or Local Union require".¹⁴⁹ No such provision exists in the constitution of CAIMAW. Instead, it is the membership who have the right to exert discipline on the union's officers, through exercise of the memberships right to recall officers and staff representatives by a petition of at least 25 percent of members "working within the declared jurisdiction of said officer or full time representative."¹⁵⁰

The vesting of union decision making in the membership by CAIMAW is also reflected in the constitutional requirements for collective agreements with employers. In CAIMAW, the right to ratify

collective agreements and memoranda of understanding with employers is firmly vested in the membership, and the power of union officers and staff representatives in this area of union decision making is restricted by the constitutional provision that

No agreement shall be entered into by any National Officer, Local Officer, or full-time representative, which changes any terms or provisions of an existing labour agreement or any terms of employment, unless approval has been granted for such action by the membership concerned.¹⁵¹

This provision can be contrasted to the Steelworkers constitutional provision on collective agreements which states, "The International Union shall be the contracting party in all collective agreements and all such agreements shall be signed by the International Officers."¹⁵² And the Steelworker's constitution contains no provision requiring the ratification of agreements by the membership. Real constitutional power over negotiated agreements is therefore vested in the USWA international officers.

The power of decision making of CAIMAW officers is, therefore, more limited than the power of Steelworker officers. And the power of decision making of CAIMAW's local unions and its membership is greater than that provided for in the Steelworkers. This is in keeping with CAIMAW's basic philosophy which "retains effective control at the local level where it is most accessible to the rank and file members".¹⁵³ Power of union decision making in CAIMAW is designed to flow from the bottom towards the top. The constitution of the Steelworkers, on the

other hand, allows for a greater degree of decision making authority to flow from the top downwards, and for more central control. To this extent, the Steelworkers can be said to more closely resemble a hierarchically structured bureaucracy than does CAIMAW.

This difference in the distribution of decision making authority is reflected in the operational practices of the unions in the mines. The Steelworkers employ appointed staff representatives to service the mines. The staff representatives, in the course of their duties, deal with management in the resolution of day-to-day problems that might occur. In doing so, they can and do make decisions. CAIMAW also utilizes appointed staff representatives to service their mining certifications. But CAIMAW staff representatives have no authority to make decisions. Indeed, they are not even entitled to a vote at Mining Council Meetings. Their function is solely advisory to the local officers and membership at the mines. The role of the staff representatives also differ during collective bargaining. As stated earlier, the Steelworker's staff representatives sometimes engage in one-to-one bargaining with the company. If such negotiations are successful, the objective of the staff representatives then, in effect, becomes the persuasion of the bargaining committee and membership to concur with the decisions that he has made. In contrast, CAIMAW staff representatives never engage in one-to-one bargaining with the employer, all agreements reached are the result of decisions made by the bargaining committee, and the role of the staff representative is restricted to consultation and providing advice.

These differences in constitutional provisions and union practices between the two unions probably have their origins in a difference in philosophical approach to unionism. The Steelworker's, through their more bureaucratized structure of decision making authority, can achieve organizational unity and cohesion, as well as efficiency in decision making. CAIMAW's policy of vesting decision making authority in its local unions and membership, on the other hand, can quite legitimately be seen as endangering this organizational unity, limiting the union's ability to pursue centralized policies, and resulting in an anarchistic approach to decision making. In adherence to a business unionism philosophy, it can be just as legitimately argued that union decision making is best and most efficiently made by a trained professional, who has the knowledge and expertise to make decisions that are genuinely in the best interests of the membership. CAIMAW, however, is philosophically dedicated to the principle of rank and file control of unions. CAIMAW can just as legitimately argue that a hierarchically structured system of decision making and reliance on appointed officials to make decisions removes control of the union from the membership, and places it in the hands of officials who may be motivated by their own hierarchical ambitions and objectives, rather than the needs and desires of the rank and file.

CAIMAW has attempted to limit the deficiencies that opponents of its philosophy can identify. First, as noted earlier, it actively pursues a policy of providing its members and local officers in mining with the necessary information and training to make informed decisions

through its newspaper, the CAIMAW Miner, and shop steward schools. The membership's reliance on the information and expertise of trained professionals in making good decisions is, therefore, reduced.

Secondly, CAIMAW officers acknowledge that the philosophy of local autonomy necessarily carries with it a high degree of decentralization. As noted earlier, employers in the mining industry have probably benefited from their ability to pursue a centralized policy themselves, while keeping union decision making fragmented and restricted to individual locals. CAIMAW's goal of moving the industry out of its fragmented bargaining mold requires a united effort on the part of all locals. The decentralization resulting from the practice of local autonomy is, therefore, particularly inappropriate for the mining industry, and made very apparent the need to achieve organizational unity and cohesion. "To have a sense of organization is important" said Peter Cameron. "Otherwise all you have is an employee organization."¹⁵⁴ High labour turnover in the industry makes this need even more pressing. "The constant must be the organization."¹⁵⁵

The traditional method for unions to achieve organizational unity and cohesion is through a bureaucratic structure of decision making. But with CAIMAW's philosophy of rank and file control, it rejects that approach. It chooses instead, what Cameron regards as the only other alternative - instilling in its members a sense of the value of membership itself.¹⁵⁶ It is through this method that CAIMAW strives to achieve an ongoing sense of formal organization, cohesion and unity.

It is a structure that represents a "dramatic departure from the traditional union bureaucracy".¹⁵⁷

CAIMAW attempts to instill in its members this sense of value of organizational membership by pursuing policies that create in CAIMAW members a keen sense of organizational formality and discipline - policies that clearly confer on members both obligations and rights.¹⁵⁸ It is of vital importance to CAIMAW that "membership means something".¹⁵⁹ It has been in the mines of B. C. that CAIMAW's policies in this regard have been most clearly illuminated, and can be most clearly contrasted to the policies flowing from the traditional decision making structure of the Steelworkers.

First, CAIMAW, like some other unions, but unlike the Steelworkers, insists that only workers who pay union dues or perform picket duties are entitled to strike benefits in the event of a strike. "It creates a sense of discipline" said Peter Cameron, "and some participation in the struggle".¹⁶⁰ To CAIMAW, this is not only principled unionism, but also essential in instilling a sense of value to union membership, and therefore to the cohesion of the union as an organization because of its structure. It is a policy that has been vigorously attacked by the Steelworkers.¹⁶¹ The Steelworkers feel that all striking employees are entitled to strike benefits from the union, and that CAIMAW is not fulfilling its obligations to the non-union members it represents. They vigorously attacked CAIMAW for adherence to this policy during the CAIMAW certification campaign at Gibraltar in

1975, portraying Endako workers as starving as a result. It was an attack that, initially at least, proved successful, causing CAIMAW some political difficulties. Nevertheless, CAIMAW remains unswayed from the policy. CAIMAW's structure requires it. The Steelworker's structure apparently does not.

Secondly, during the 1978 Gibraltar dispute, CAIMAW again had to clearly instill the value of union membership when it was forced to deal with the controversial issue of who could vote on the ratification of a collective agreement. In a manner that is typical of long disputes in the mining industry, many of the Gibraltar employees had left the area or found other jobs, and had not maintained their union membership. The company, fearing that only "union radicals" had maintained their membership, insisted that all bargaining unit employees vote on any offer made to end the dispute.¹⁶² This position was anathema to CAIMAW's basic organizational structure, which is dependent on instilling a clear sense of the value of union membership. It was a painful policy for CAIMAW to pursue, because negotiations broke down several times over the issue, the dispute dragged on and it became politically a controversial issue. The Steelworkers echoed the position of Placer that for all employees to vote, regardless of union membership, was the exercise of true democracy.¹⁶³ What was obvious to CAIMAW was that to allow such a vote to occur would make a mockery out of union membership. "The crucial question should be not why we don't let non-union members vote, but rather why aren't they members" said Peter Cameron.¹⁶⁴ It is evident that CAIMAW's organizational structure,

bound together by a sense of the value of membership itself, can ill afford to allow non-union members to participate in crucial organization decisions. Despite charges by the Steelworkers of discrimination against non-union members, CAIMAW refused to be swayed on this issue during the 1978 Gibraltar dispute, and after eight months, won its point. The strike was ended by a decision made exclusively by CAIMAW members.

CAIMAW's experiences in the mining industry have, therefore, clarified certain aspects of its philosophy. The organization is bound together not on a bureaucratic structure of decision making, but through a sense of the value of membership itself. And the policy of rank and file control for CAIMAW does not mean employee participation by referendum vote. It means control of the organization by the members and participants in that organization, a status that carries with it certain obligations, rights and a sense of organizational discipline.

It was, therefore, pursuant to a policy of providing any possible assistance to groups attempting to form Canadian unions, a policy that had been crystallized during the formation of CASAW, that brought CAIMAW into contact with the mines of this province. Bethlehem Copper, spurred on by events at Kitimat and Trail, became CAIMAW's first mining certification in B. C. The experiences of one mine then affected others, and the mines turned to CAIMAW in a manner resembling the domino effect, with very few open pit mines remaining immune. The central causes for the growth of CAIMAW support in the mines were a widespread

dissatisfaction with the Steelworkers throughout the industry, and the appeal of national independence in unionism at a time of high national aspirations. A variety of other factors may have acted as countervailing forces at the time of individual certification campaigns, such as challenges to CAIMAW certifications, or CAIMAW strikes taking place at other mines. The relative strength of the forces acting for and the forces acting against CAIMAW support at each individual mine site, complicated on occasion by suspected employer interference, is perhaps the explanation for the pattern of CAIMAW's certification successes in mining.

CAIMAW has incorporated its basic philosophy of democracy, rank and file control and local autonomy into the operation of its mining locals, resulting in a different style of bargaining, decision making and organizational structure to that traditionally practiced in mines. Business agents have been replaced in CAIMAW certified mines by elected committees who take their instruction from the membership, and the traditional hierarchical system of decision making has been replaced by the CAIMAW Mining Council as a means of determining broad union policy and direction. Even the traditional bureaucratic structure has been replaced by the installation of a sense of the value of membership itself as the means of binding the organization together.

The result of these changes has been a reduction in the speed and ease in which problems can be resolved, but a greater commitment by the membership to decisions once they have been made. The change

certainly does not appear to have interfered with CAIMAW's ability to achieve wages and benefits for its members that are at least comparable to those achieved by the international unions operating under the traditional structure. Indeed, these changes may even be responsible for CAIMAW's ability to achieve one thing that the international unions have not - maintain their support in all their mining locals. Despite an apparent decline in nationalism and despite attempted reform by the Steelworkers, repeated challenges by the Steelworkers to CAIMAW's mining certifications have consistently failed.

FOOTNOTES

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Chapter VII

CONCLUSIONS

The central cause for the birth and development of CAIMAW appears to be the issue of autonomy. The workers in Winnipeg and Vancouver who broke with their international unions were demanding control over their own affairs, and resented interference from any external force. This resentment became unrest when external interference imposed decisions on the membership that were at variance with their wishes. At a time of a societal desire for Canadian self-assertion and hostility towards American influence in Canada, this unrest reached the breaking point when control over these workers was exercised from the United States. Nationalism, therefore, acted as a catalyst for these workers in pursuit of their central goal - sovereignty over their own decisions. It was a catalyst that turned unrest into rebellion, a rejection of their international unions, and the formation of their own labour institutions, CAIMAW and the CEW. Indeed, the crucial issue in the story of CAIMAW is the distribution of union decision making authority between international officers, Canadian union leaders, local officers and the rank and file.

The members and officers of Local 174 of the International Molders Union were united in their resentment of the influence exercised by the Cincinnati officers in their union. They resented their control over the local's finances, their ability to appoint the local's staff representative, and their ability to interfere in the local's collective bargaining. Furthermore, the members and officers of Local 174 were united in their resentment of the influence exerted by their staff representative, Michael Capri. Capri was a fellow Canadian, but he was

an external influence, rarely in Winnipeg, and therefore was probably perceived as being out of touch with the local's problems. Worse yet, he was appointed by the international officers, and reliant on them for the furtherance of his career. The decisions that he made, therefore, were seen as being in the interests of the international union rather than the local membership. Capri represented centralized control. Local 174 wanted autonomy and control over their own affairs. Resentment of central authority became unrest when the decisions made by Capri and the Cincinnati officers were at variance with the wishes of the membership. Local 174, therefore, tried to restrict the influence of the international level of decision making by appealing for a greater degree of Canadian autonomy. But several attempts by the local to accomplish this change in decision making authority from within the system proved futile. The refusal of the international leaders to relinquish their sovereignty over decisions meant that the only recourse for Local 174 was to eliminate the American level of decision making completely by forming their own national union. In the context of a growing desire for national self-assertion and resentment of the influence of American decision making in Canada, this rather drastic step was one that the members and officers of Local 174 were prepared to take.

By the same token, the Lenkurt dispute in Vancouver involved a struggle for sovereignty over decisions by the membership. The confrontation again arose because of the unacceptability at the membership level of decisions made at higher levels. Here, the overt

confrontation arose between the Canadian heads of the international union and the rank and file membership, with the local officers being divided on the issue. By overriding the wishes of the membership on the terms of the Lenkurt settlement, the Canadian leaders demonstrated that sovereignty of decision making lay at their level, and not at the level of the rank and file, a situation that proved intolerable to many of the membership who wanted control over their own affairs. Again, the first reaction of the membership was to attempt to achieve change from within the system. This proved futile, both because those who were prepared to fight for change had been expelled from the system, and because of the policies and practices of the IBEW in suppressing opposition to the higher levels of decision making.

The Lenkurt dispute also involved a more subtle struggle in decision making power, occurring this time between the membership and the international leaders headquartered in Washington. The membership were convinced that Ladyman had been acting under orders from the international leaders, and blamed the Lenkurt sellout on the international level. Sovereignty of decision making on the issue was not seen as residing with the Canadian heads of the international union. Rather, the Canadian leaders were seen as puppets and stooges of the international officers, on whom they were dependent for their positions and their salaries. In the eyes of the Lenkurt workers, sovereignty of the decision making process lay outside the country. Again, because these decisions were unacceptable, and because of the social climate of the day, they were not going to be tolerated. Again, decision making

was brought back into the country by the elimination of the American level of influence through the formation of a National union.

The central cause for the rejection of the international unions by the founders of both CAIMAW and CEW was, therefore, the refusal of the international unions to allow the peak of sovereignty of decision making to move to the membership level. At a time of high national aspirations and resentment of American influence in Canada, the membership responded to the overruling of their decisions by pressuring for a change in the site of decision making sovereignty from within the system. Refusal of the international leaders to voluntarily limit their influence resulted in the elimination of the American level of decision making altogether, through the formation of National unions.

As CAIMAW developed, it became clear that the repatriation of decision making through the elimination of the international level of influence was not in itself enough. The question of the distribution of influence among the remaining three levels of decision making still had to be resolved.

Both CAIMAW and the CEW adhered to the principle of vesting sovereignty of decision making at the membership level. As originally constituted, rank and file decision making was accomplished through the election of all officers, and the rejection of the exercise of power by appointed officials. But John Gugulyn's influence, although not constitutionally authorized, represented power of decision making taking

place at the National level, rather than the local or membership levels. With the merger of the CEW and CAIMAW, Gugulyn attempted to expand this influence to incorporate the B. C. section of the union. Both Gugulyn's influence and repeated violations of the union's constitution were seen by the ex-CEW as the undermining of the authority of membership decision making, and as the exercise of sovereignty of influence at the National level. The constitutional battle that ensued was, therefore, a battle of sovereignty of decision making between the National level on the one hand, and the local leadership and membership on the other. The success of the B. C. section in changing the constitution of the union to provide for local autonomy, powerful regional representation and full disclosure of information to the local unions and the membership, as well as the elimination of centres of power and appointed positions of influence, can be seen as the firm entrenchment of decision making sovereignty with the rank and file and local officers. The resolution of CAIMAW's internal struggles was achieved by the relinquishing of decision making sovereignty by the centralized National union level. Had the National officers refused to accommodate this change, it can be speculated that CAIMAW may have suffered the same fate as the international unions, and been torn apart over the issue.

Clearly then, national sovereignty of decision making is not in itself the complete explanation for the emergence and growth of CAIMAW. It did provide the impetus for the founding of both CAIMAW and the CEW. And, as demonstrated by an examination of CAIMAW's growth in the mining industry, it has been a significant issue for Canadian

workers at a time of a strong desire for national self-assertion. Perhaps more important has been the question of the distribution of influence in decision making from within Canada. A recurring theme in the dissatisfaction of B. C. miners with their international unions was not so much that decision making was vested outside of the country, as the fact that it was not vested with the rank and file. Lack of responsiveness to the membership level of decision making by the international unions has been a crucial factor in the decision of workers to abandon their international union and join CAIMAW, a union in which sovereignty of decision making is clearly and firmly vested at the membership level. Workers, therefore, have demanded not only the repatriation of decision making to Canada, but also a shift in decision making sovereignty to the membership level. Failure of the international unions to respond to these demands has been the central cause for their loss of membership to CAIMAW.

Because the central cause for the creation of CAIMAW was the membership demand for autonomy and control over their own affairs, perhaps CAIMAW represents a resurgence of western Canadian labour institutions such as One Big Union which have posed a challenge to international unionism in Canada since the early 1900's. One Big Union, like CAIMAW, was founded as a result of resentment of centralized control. Many of the founders of CAIMAW were influenced by their links to One Big Union. Certainly CAIMAW, like One Big Union before it, is a union with a jurisdiction broad enough to enable it to organize almost all workers. Although CAIMAW does not preach the pure syndicalism of

One Big Union in advocating worker control over the means of production, it strongly adheres to the less radical and perhaps more broadly acceptable philosophy of providing the worker with control over his own institutions - trade unions. Although CAIMAW leaders do not have ties to Russia and traditional communism as the leaders of One Big Union did, CAIMAW's philosophy of rank and file control and the rejection of a bureaucratized organization structure are consistent with the philosophy of the contemporary brand of communism and socialism as advocated by the New Left and the Waffle group.

Perhaps the differences that exist between CAIMAW and One Big Union are due to the fact that CAIMAW has learned from the mistakes of One Big Union - namely an attempt by One Big Union leaders to impose their philosophy of communism and syndicalism on an unwilling membership. CAIMAW does not advocate pure syndicalism, yet its policies and practices do not alienate those who might adhere to this philosophy. Similarly, CAIMAW's rejection of partisan political involvement and its practice of defending the right of officers and members to adhere to their individual political beliefs means that it can accommodate proponents of all political persuasions. It is, therefore, a more sophisticated and viable organization through which workers can achieve autonomy and control over their own affairs than was One Big Union.

CAIMAW is a union that has not only repatriated decision making through the elimination of the international level of influence, but has also identified the rank and file membership as the highest

level of authority within the union. The result has been the development of policies and practices that are identifiably different from those of most other unions. It is a union which adheres to a philosophy of rank and file control and local autonomy, a philosophy that has resulted in a different style of operation in terms of bargaining and day to day resolution of problems, in the creation of internal institutions such as councils to determine broad policy and direction, in a greater emphasis on the availability of information and education, and in a rejection of a bureaucratized organizational structure. Its policies differ from most other unions also in terms of partisan political involvement, and the instillation of a sense of the value of membership in the organization.

These changes seem to have resulted in a reduction in the speed and ease with which industrial relations problems can be resolved at CAIMAW represented plants and properties, but a greater commitment by the membership to decisions once they have been made. The changes do not appear to have restricted CAIMAW's ability to win terms and conditions of employment for their membership that are at least comparable to other unions. Perhaps a significant effect of these changes is that CAIMAW is able to deal with and resolve internal problems arising from conflicting objectives of the membership more effectively than most unions. After all, if sovereignty of decision making is vested in the membership, it is more difficult to place the blame for any union decision on a centralized authority, including decisions that may not be seen as adequately promoting the interests of

specialized groups such as tradesmen. This factor may be partly responsible for CAIMAW's ability to retain its certifications in spite of repeated raids by international unions.

It is apparent that workers who choose to create and develop a new and different kind of union face significant difficulties that hamper their chances of success. These difficulties stem from the firmly entrenched position of international unions in Canada's labour institutions, and from the rigidities inherent in the institutions themselves.

From its formation, CAIMAW was forced to operate outside the traditional Canadian labour movement, because it was an unacceptable affiliate to the CLC and its related bodies. The changes in union certifications for both the dissidents in Local 174 of the Molder's Union and the employees of Phillips Cables were regarded as the raiding of a CLC affiliate, an act strictly forbidden by the traditional labour movement. Furthermore, both unions were organizing workers in fields for which the CLC had already granted exclusive jurisdiction to international unions. For both these reasons, there was no room in the CLC for the newly established unions. They would have to operate outside the established Canadian labour institutions because of rigidities inherent in the CLC system.

This fact has enabled the traditional labour movement to argue that workers should not support CAIMAW, because to do so would be to

fragment and weaken the labour movement as a whole, and because a union that lacks affiliation to the CLC is inherently weak. The impact of these arguments on workers who were considering joining CAIMAW is impossible to measure. But to the extent that they have swayed workers in certification campaigns, rejection from the CLC may have impeded CAIMAW's growth.

Although CAIMAW, from its formation, was forced to operate outside of the mainstream of traditional labour institutions, it appears it would have faced very little other difficulty from the CLC if it had not set for itself the goal of growth. The fact that both CAIMAW and the CEW existed seems to have been tolerated by the CLC and its affiliates, even though they were not accepted as a legitimate labour institution. But as CAIMAW grew, it brought down on its head the angry, vigorous opposition of the Canadian labour establishment. In Winnipeg, the CLC announced a policy of the destruction of CAIMAW, and in Vancouver, the CEW faced attacks on its certifications by the combined forces of the IBEW and the Steelworkers, backed by the CLC and the B. C. Federation of Labour.

Finally, new independent Canadian unions have complained of facing obstacles to their growth due to the established position of international union representatives on Labour Relations Boards. There does appear to be some evidence that the pattern of Labour Relations Board rulings have tended to be unsympathetic to CAIMAW presentations. But what can be said with more confidence is that, as members of the

CLC, an organization that has adopted a hostile stance towards CAIMAW, and at one time adopted a policy of its destruction, the international union representatives on Labour Boards are operating under a conflict of interest in ruling on CAIMAW presentations. This fact represents yet another problem to the ease with which independent Canadian unions can be built.

The view of CAIMAW's relationship with the Labour Boards, however, requires qualification. Although it is true that the international union representatives may be operating under a conflict of interest on CAIMAW presentations, it is also true that when CAIMAW emerged on the labour scene in 1964, it represented a reasonably new experience for the members of the boards - a breakaway Canadian union. It is understandable, therefore, that the boards may have been sceptical that CAIMAW was an organization that was viable enough to provide long-term representation for the employees, and be immune from employer interference. Although this concern may have been understandable, there was no evidence that it represented fact. The Labour Boards may have been overzealous in allowing legitimate but unsubstantiated concerns to deny workers their legal right to their choice of trade unions. Today, CAIMAW is a well known and recognized trade union, and such concerns are probably no longer a factor in board decisions. Also, due to the CAIMAW experience, boards are perhaps more used to the whole concept of the formation of new breakaway unions. The problem faced by new unions in certification applications before Labour Boards, therefore, may be diminishing.

Despite the factors mitigating against the successful development of a new independent union, the emergence of CAIMAW on the labour scene has illuminated certain deficiencies and weaknesses within the traditional labour movement itself. This fact has offset, at least to some extent, the difficulties previously described in building a new Canadian union.

Workers formed and developed CAIMAW because they were dissatisfied with the autonomy and representation provided by their international unions. The Phillips employees in Vancouver and Alberta abandoned the IBEW to join the CEW, and the Molders in Winnipeg abandoned the International Molders union to form CAIMAW. Both international unions are craft unions, and even Paddy Neale, Secretary of the Vancouver and District Labour council, admits that craft unions tend not to serve industrial workers well. Since that time, CAIMAW's growth from previously certified plants has largely been at the expense of the Steelworkers, the Machinists and the Molders, unions which have not been adequately responsive to their membership. Workers who find themselves with such inadequate representation may attempt to achieve change from within the system. Or they may conclude from the beginning that to achieve change from within the system is impossible, either because they feel they are greatly outnumbered, or because they have experienced suppression of opposition within their union. Workers who do attempt to achieve change from within may find their attempts futile. A change in unions then becomes the only answer. But what recourse does the CLC provide workers who reach this conclusion? None. Because of

the policies of the CLC regarding exclusive jurisdiction and raiding, these workers must either resign themselves to the inadequate representation provided, or leave the CLC altogether. In choosing the latter course of action, an independent union such as CAIMAW provides a viable alternative.

It can be speculated that perhaps these CLC policies of exclusive jurisdiction and restrictions on raiding have contributed to the emergence of some poor union representation within its ranks. Knowing that the traditional labour movement cannot easily accommodate a change in unions, and that its policies serve to protect existing certifications, some international unions may have become lax about responding to their membership. Yet the CLC protects the certifications of these unions, and places obstacles in the path of workers who wish to replace them with better unions. This seems to be a position that undermines a worker's right, protected by law, to the union of his choice. The CLC has only itself to blame, therefore, if workers leave its "fold", and by doing so, contribute to the growth of an independent union such as CAIMAW.

CAIMAW's "unprincipled" and "cannibalistic" acts, therefore, have really been nothing but the exercise of the workers' right to the union of their choice, and the provision of a vehicle for workers to replace inadequate union representation with representation they find more palatable. Yet the CLC has used CAIMAW's acceptance of workers demanding a change in unions as cause to refuse moral and financial

support to CAIMAW strikers, and to launch a policy that pledged the destruction of CAIMAW. This policy has earned the CLC the criticism of the public and the press, and has provided CAIMAW with sympathy. Indeed, many Canadian affiliates refused to adhere to it. As illustrated by the strike at Bell Foundry in 1969, the established labour movement found itself in the difficult position of having to balance support and protection of its affiliates on the one hand, with the basic union principle of support for workers in strife with their employer on the other. While international unions were demanding protection of their jurisdictions, Canadian unions refused to put sectarianism before trade union principles. The result was an inter-union split in the Congress itself. Defiance of the CLC policy by Canadian affiliates made an important contribution to the inability of the CLC to destroy CAIMAW.

It is apparent that the CLC is not able to mount a united concerted offensive against a union such as CAIMAW. Opposition to such a policy by its Canadian affiliates has been an important factor in its failure. It can be speculated, therefore, that the increase in the Canadian composition of the CLC that has occurred as a result of the development of public sector collective bargaining has significantly improved the chances that an independent Canadian union can survive and grow.

The emergence of CAIMAW on the labour relations scene has also illuminated the existence of intra-union divisions within the ranks of

the international unions. The membership, like many in Canadian society, were undergoing a critical reassessment of the desirability of strong ties between Canada and the United States, were experiencing a desire for Canadian self-assertion, and were becoming increasingly resentful of obvious U. S. domination over Canadian affairs. The Canadian leaders, on the other hand, operating under a genuine belief in continentalism, unswerving loyalty to their unions and no doubt their own hierarchical security and ambitions, did not share these sentiments. The result was the creation of a rift between the membership and the international union hierarchy that perhaps served to weaken the membership's loyalty to their international unions, and contributed to their willingness to replace them with a union whose leadership shared their nationalist sentiments.

Because of rigidities in Canadian labour institutions and the firmly entrenched position of international unions in these institutions, there are significant difficulties to be overcome in building a new independent union. The position of international unions is weakened by the existence of inter-union and intra-union splits in its ranks, splits which enable an independent Canadian union to survive, despite the difficulties it faces.

Perhaps CAIMAW's greatest strength lies in the fact that it answers some very real needs in Canadian society which the traditional labour establishment cannot. First, it provides a vehicle for a change in unions by Canadian workers who are dissatisfied with their incumbent

union. Because of rigidities in the CLC system, the CLC fails to meet this need. CAIMAW also provides a vehicle for the expression of Canadian self-assertion which the CLC, dominated by international unions, cannot.

CAIMAW's philosophy, policies and practices allow it to draw support from three groups in Canadian society. First, it can draw support from union dissidents, trade unionists who find themselves dissatisfied with the union representation provided by their international union. Common causes for complaint have centered on lack of control over their own affairs, the imposition by the union hierarchy of agreements with management that the membership do not support, and a perceived drain of dues funds with little being received in return. Failure of the international unions involved to respond to this membership dissatisfaction has led to rebellion. But these dissidents have not been able to resolve their problems from within the existing system, because of the CLC's principles of exclusive jurisdiction and prohibition on raiding. They have had to look outside the system - and CAIMAW can provide a viable alternative. They can support CAIMAW's attack on business unionism, because business unionism can be viewed as reliance on trained professionals who may not always make decisions with which the membership agree. They can support CAIMAW's attack on international unionism, because international unions can be regarded as making decisions that are in the best interests of their larger American membership at the expense of their Canadian membership when the interests of the two conflict. They can support CAIMAW's philosophy of

rank and file control, for if the membership has control over the decisions that affect them, then they can obviously avoid the sources of dissatisfaction they had experienced with their international unions, and provide themselves with the type of unionism they want.

Secondly, CAIMAW can draw support from Canadian nationalists who resent American influence over Canadian affairs. For this group, it was probably the refusal of the international union hierarchy, particularly in craft unions, to loosen central control and allow for Canadian autonomy that led to rebellion. This rebellion could take the form of a break with the American officers, because of the influence they exerted over their Canadian local unions and Canadian membership. Or it could take the form of a break with the international's Canadian leadership, because they could be seen as mere puppets and stooges of the American leaders on whom they relied for their positions and salaries. The nationalists, like the union dissidents, could view CAIMAW as a viable alternative. It is a National union controlled and run by Canadians, and therefore provides for complete Canadian self-assertion. Nationalists can support CAIMAW's attack on business unionism, because business unionism can be seen as an American philosophy that has been imposed on Canadian labour. They can support CAIMAW's attack on international unions, because international unions, controlled in the United States, can be seen as American domination of Canadian labour. They can support CAIMAW's policy of rank and file control, because it places decisions firmly in the hands of the Canadian worker they affect, and therefore represents true self-determination.

Finally, CAIMAW can draw support from the socialist forces of the New Left, the same forces that gave rise to the Waffle group. These are socialists who tend to incorporate nationalism into their political philosophy, distrust bureaucratized power and have a firm belief in the control by workers of their own institutions. To this group, the experiences of the Waffle represented a refusal of the international unions to reform themselves in pursuit of these goals, and even a seeming determination by international unions to prevent the achievement of true socialist ideals. Canadian unions such as CAIMAW could not be similarly accused, and therefore, the building of a sovereign Canadian labour movement became their goal. These socialists can support CAIMAW's attack on business unionism, because business unionism's limitation of objectives to the achievement of economic goals can be seen as hindering the movement towards a socialist state. They can support CAIMAW's attack on international unions, because international unions can be seen as hindering both nationalistic and socialist objectives. They can support CAIMAW's philosophy of rank and file control, because of their distrust of bureaucratized power and their belief in worker control of their own institutions.

International unions have failed at times to be responsive to their membership, failed at times to grant Canadian autonomy, and failed to wholeheartedly pursue socialist objectives. They have, as a result, created some union dissidents, some nationalistic resentment, and a belief by certain socialists that they are not an adequate vehicle through which to achieve a socialist state. Indeed, international

unions have, at times, actively suppressed all three forces. Stirrings of unrest by union dissidents have led to the imposition of trusteeships on locals and membership suspensions. Pleas for greater Canadian autonomy have been arrogantly dismissed by American leaders, and Canadians who have refused to follow the dictates of the international have been suspended. Under international union pressure, the Waffle group was expelled by the NDP. In CAIMAW, all three groups can join forces in an attempt to gain redress to their concerns. These groups are not mutually exclusive, and many CAIMAW supporters and leaders no doubt adhere to the sentiments of all three.

In effect, some international unions failed to accommodate the societal forces that were becoming significant in Canada during the 1960's, and remained significant for the next decade. They did not accommodate the rising labour militancy by responding to the complaints of the union dissidents regarding the quality of union representation provided. They did not respond to the rising Canadian nationalism and resentment of American influence in Canada by loosening central control and providing for greater Canadian autonomy. And they did not respond to the social forces of the New Left. CAIMAW does accommodate these forces. To the extent that a society creates institutions in accordance with its needs, there exists an important place for CAIMAW in Canada, a fact which perhaps, to date, has ensured its survival.

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Fairfield, L., Chief, Industrial Relations, Placer Developments.

Industrial Relations Manager of a B. C. open pit mine.

Industrial Relations Practitioner in a B. C. open pit mine.

McEvoy, P., Regional Vice-President, Canadian Association of Industrial Mechanical and Allied Workers.

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Neale, P., Secretary, Vancouver and District Labour Council.

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