THE POLITICAL MODEL OF POWER IN ORGANIZATIONS

by

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Abstract

This thesis is based on the idea that the understanding of power in organizations is enhanced by simultaneously considering the level of the individual, the organization and society. The discussion focuses on two contemporary but fundamentally different models of power. By comparing the models in terms of their levels of analysis insights are gained about the nature of their differences. Based on Habermas' theory of cognitive interest a framework is proposed in which both models may be incorporated. It is further suggested that a third model is necessary to obtain a total view of the phenomenon of power in organizations.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The topic of power and politics is becoming increasingly popular. Books about power are found in many areas of human endeavour, mainly in political science, (Chomsky et al., 1982; Adam and Giliomee, 1979; Morley et al., 1983; Elias, 1982; Dahlie and Fernando, 1981) but also in such diverse fields as sports (Murray & Lear, 1981), law (Kairys, 1982), environment (Epstein, 1979), the media (Halberstam, 1979), religion (Horowitz, 1982), health (Foucault, 1972), feminism (Lips, 1981) and personal development (Korda, 1975; Leboeuf, 1982; Castaneda, 1974; 1983). This lively interest in power is shared by many researchers in social science and organizational scientists are no exception.

This thesis is an attempt to contribute to the discussion on power. The first of its two objectives is to provide an analysis of two fundamentally different views of power in organizations. A comparison is made between the work of Jeffrey Pfeffer, a well known and respected researcher in the field, with that of Stewart Clegg, a researcher whose work has been largely ignored. The aim is to show how, by referring to the level of analysis, these researchers have constructed their model of power. The second objective is to propose a framework that can provide criteria for critical though constructive evaluation. In addition, the framework allows the appraisal to be used as a guide towards a deeper understanding of the concept of power.

The thesis is divided into four main sections. The first is an overview of the power literature. The goal is to show how
in organizational science, the presently prevailing political model of power has its roots in three other models that developed partly sequentially and partly in a parallel fashion. The models have been categorized as the field theoretical model, the exchange model and the contingency model. The political model has been subdivided into two sections, one representing the traditional view and one representing the radical perspective.

In the second part a rationale is given for using the level of analysis as a vehicle for comparison. Next, the two selected models are described in terms of their characteristic elements. Part three is concerned with the organization of these elements according to their respective levels and with a discussion of the relationships that exist between the level of the individual and the organization, between the level of the individual and society and between the level of the organization and society. It finishes with a detailed discussion and a preliminary evaluation of the two models and highlights their differences and similarities.

The last part considers four possible responses to the findings of the analysis. It is concluded that the most constructive approach is offered by Habermas' theory of cognitive interests and the application of this theory is briefly illustrated. In the last part of this section it is suggested that Habermas' approach is subject to certain limitations and the argument is made that the role of one element of his theory (the historical-hermeneutic sciences)
should be expanded extensively in order to significantly increase our knowledge of power in organizations.

The thesis ends with a brief discussion of its findings and recommendations for future research.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF MODELS OF POWER

A survey of organizational literature reveals an increasing concern with power in organizations. Contemporary research efforts are usually guided by previous statements on power in the fields of psychology, sociology and political science. It is the purpose of this chapter to trace the development of the concept by referring to the literature that informs most of today's discussion on power in organizations. Four major models of power are recognized: the field theoretical model, the exchange model, the contingency model and the political model. The political model to which most theorists now subscribe is further subdivided by contrasting the traditional perspective to a radical one.

THE FIELD THEORY MODEL OF POWER

Field theorists approach power from the perspective of social psychology. They relate power and its exercise to psychological properties of the individual such as needs, motives and desires. The individual is seen as a dynamic entity composed of various opposing forces which tend towards equilibrium. Power is seen as a force external to the individual which influences an individual's system of internal forces.

Kurt Lewin (1951), described these internal forces as a dynamic field, the individual life space that includes all the psychological facts of the past, present and future having existence for the individual at a given moment. Life facts are located in different regions of the dynamic field and are
interdependent so that a change in one region affects all other regions. Within a particular life space all regions are dependent on all other regions. Lewin distinguished between simple dependence and organizational dependence. These constructs refer to the developmental processes of differentiation and integration respectively. Noting that it would be impossible to formulate changes in regions of organizational dependence in the same way as those having only simple dependence he defined such changes in terms of inducing force:

the power of b over a is the quotient of the maximum force which b can induce on a, and the maximum resistance which a can offer (Lewin, 1951:336)

Later theorists have interpreted Lewin's definition as referring to a person "a" and a person "b". Cartwright (1959) for example, interpreted "resistance" as opposition existing in the life space of another person. His modified definition of power reads:

the power of O over P with respect to a given change at a specified time equals the maximum strength of the resultant force which O can set up in that direction at that time. The strength of the resultant force on P is determined by the relative magnitudes of the forces activated by O to "comply" and to "resist". (Cartwright, 1959:193)

Cartwright further proposed a set of conditions for the exercise of power the most important of which are the behavioral repertory of O (depending upon his social skill, possession of resources and social position), and the motive bases of P (needs, desires, wants). The stronger O's behavioral repertory the more he will be inclined to exercise power.

French and Raven (1959) discussed power in terms of P, the
person over whom power is exercised and define power in much the same terms as Cartwright. They focused on the extent to which P could tap into, what Cartwright called motive forces, which energize behaviour. The authors see the ability of O to influence a particular region in the lifespace of P as dependent upon P's perception of how O can meet some of the needs of P. Thus, the needs of P form the bases of power for O. French and Raven proposed five such bases: reward power, coercive power, legitimate power, referent power and expert power.

They focused on some of the consequences that the exercise of power may have, i.e. the new state of dependence of O on P, the nature of the relationships that result and the influence the exercise of power may have on other bases of power.

In keeping with the social psychological nature of the field theoretical perspective its proponents tend to focus on interpersonal relations. Structural variables are usually limited to a person's position in the organization or in society.

THE EXCHANGE MODEL OF POWER

Exchange theorists view power in terms of economic relations between individuals or between groups. The acquisition and exercise of power is assumed to be a function of the costs and rewards that social actors mediate for each other (Pollard & Mitchell, 1972).

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Raven later included a sixth base 'information power' (Swingle, 1975). Another category 'connection power' has been proposed by Paul Hersey and Marshall Goldsmith (Hersey and Blanchard, 1982).
In one of the early formulations of exchange theory Thibaut and Kelley (1959) use the behavioral repertory of social actors as the basis for their discussion. They suggest that in any dyadic relationship the two sets of possible behavioural responses can be arranged in the form of a matrix. Power is defined in terms of the value of the range of possible outcomes.

The power of A over B increases with A's ability to affect the quality of outcomes attained by B. (Thibaut and Kelley, 1959:101)

Actors would typically attempt to minimize costs while maximizing awards. The exercise of power or the extent of control over an actor's behavior is constrained by the costs that the use of power involves. Control may also be limited when the other actor has countervailing power, i.e. when A values outcomes which B can mediate.

Thibaut & Kelley further proposed a set of strategies that can be used to acquire or increase power. These are: (1) developing one's own alternatives and/or reducing the other actor's alternatives to obtain valued outcomes; (2) improving one's ability to deliver rewards or building up the value of one's product valued by others; (3) reducing the other's skills and devaluing the other's product.

An important aspect of Thibaut & Kelley's formulation of power relations is that it is stated in terms of dyadic relations. Crucial to the dyad is the very high level of interdependence of its members (Wolff, 1950), making power a function of the level of dependency.

Emerson (1962), who also described power within the dyad,
equated power relations to dependency:

The dependence of actor A upon actor B is (1) directly proportional to A's motivational investment in goals mediated by B, and (2) inversely proportional to the availability of those goals to A outside of the A-B relation. (Emerson, 1962:32)

Emerson's focus was on the consequences of costs that resulted from specific interactions. He suggested that in order to minimize costs people would tend to shift their attitudes and values in the direction of those upon whom they are dependent. Because of this progressive shift in attitude, power relations (and by implication dependence relations) would tend toward balance. He suggested a set of strategies that actors might employ to build towards balanced power relations. Not surprisingly, these recommendations are a reversed variation of Thibaut & Kelley's strategies to increase power: (1) A can reduce motivational investment in goals mediated by B or A can cultivate alternative sources; (2) B can increase motivational investment in goals mediated by A or can be denied alternative sources for such goals.

The strongest statement about the role of exchange processes is found in Blau (1964) for whom the process of social exchange is the central principle in social life. If the state of balance was a consequence of the dynamics of power for Emerson, for Blau it became the point of departure. Imbalances in social relations are created by exchanges which are unilateral. Provision of unilateral services gives rise to power relations.

A person who commands services others need, and who is independent of any at their command, attains power over
others by making the satisfaction of their need contingent on their compliance (Blau, 1964:22)

Unlike Thibaut & Kelley and Emerson, Blau made an attempt to formulate conditions for extending power relations from the level of the dyad to that of organizations and institutions, to what he called the complex level. Blau utilized "the analysis of simpler processes for clarifying complex structures". In principle, power differentiation on the complex level develops analogous to differentiation on a simple level. In addition, there are secondary exchange relations which follow from emergent properties existing in complex structures that do not have a counterpart in simpler ones. For example, when power is collectively approved organization becomes possible through the process of legitimizing power into authority. Opposition occurs when there is collective disapproval of power, presumably leading to the breakdown of organizations. The difference between micro (simple) structures and macro (complex) structures is that the latter are established systems of legitimation made possible by emergent properties not existing on the micro level.

Much of the work of exchange theorists is grounded in social psychology and small groups research. To this extent it is similar to the field theoretical perspective. Where an attempt is made to generalize to larger structures as Blau does,

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2 While Blau's formulation of transition from a simple to a complex level is not without problems, pertinent to this discussion are the dynamic differences that exist between individuals and groups.
it is by means of extrapolating from the processes found in individual interaction.

THE CONTINGENCY MODEL OF POWER

In strategic contingency theory the concepts of interdependence and uncertainty are emphasized. Power is seen as the ability to cope with questions of uncertainty since it is assumed that individuals are rational and that it is rational to search for certainty. Those who can reduce uncertainty have power. Insofar as the ability to provide determinateness and certainty increases one's independence it also increases others' dependence giving more power to the independent actor.

A strategic contingency theory of power as formulated by Hickson et al. (1971) and further refined by Hambrick (1974) and Hinings et al. (1975) rests on two major previous contributions by Crozier (1964) and Thompson (1967).

Crozier analyzed what he called the simple structure of Industrial Monopoly, a tobacco processing firm in France. He found that maintenance workers wielded power over both production workers and their own superiors because their behavior was less rule bound and therefore unpredictable. Power resided in the fact that others were uncertain about maintenance workers' behaviour. This led Crozier to propose that

The power of A over B depends on A's ability to predict B's behavior and on the uncertainty of B about A's behaviour, A has more bargaining power. (Crozier, 1964:158)

Organizations attempt to limit power struggles through institutional structure and hierarchical order and by
selectively distributing information. Power accrues to managers to the extent that they are able to rationalize and to control rules on the one hand and to make exceptions to those rules on the other. The "uncertainty" in Crozier's formulation follows from the fact that people, as free agents who participate and are part of a power structure, use strategic means to increase their relative power. To the extent that they succeed in making their behaviour less predictable they create uncertainty for others.

Thompson (1967) who saw organizations as systems of interdependent parts in open relation to their environment, stressed the dependency aspect of power. His discussion of Crozier emphasized that apparently power is a function of the "ability to solve dependency problems" (Thompson, 1979:129). Thompson further followed Emerson who observed that the obverse of power is dependence. Indeed, Thompson's definition of power is virtually identical to that of Emerson except that "actor P" and "actor O" have been replaced by "organization P" and "an element of the task environment O".

The dependence of organization P upon an element of the task environment O is

(1) directly proportional to "the organization's need for resources or performance which that element can provide" and

(2) inversely proportional to "the ability of other elements of the task environment to provide the same resource or performance. (Thompson, 1967:129)

By recasting Emerson's definition into organizational terms Thompson attempts to lift the definition of power above the constraints of the level of the individual.

Hinings et al. (1975) also endeavored to shift the focus of
a personalized concept of power to organizational subunits as units of analysis. Focusing on the notion of uncertainty these authors proposed that power accrues to organizational units under certain conditions. These are centrality of workflow and non-substitutability insofar as they relate to coping with uncertainty.

Together with centrality of workflows and substitutability of activities, coping with uncertainty gives rise to dependencies of one subunit upon another, because the activities performed by one are contingencies for the activities of another (Hinings et al., 1975:22)

Uncertainties are primarily seen as arising from environmental pressures such as those following from scarcity of raw materials or impending restrictive legislation. Likewise, the disposal of outputs are contingent upon variations in the nature of the environment.

The nature of power strategies can be either to increase or to reduce power. Power is increased when a central, non-substitutable subunit reduces the impact that uncertainty has on the organization. Power is decreased when uncertainty itself is eliminated.

According to the hypothesis, a sales department which transmits steady orders despite a volatile market has high power; a sales department which reduces the uncertainty itself by long-term tied contracts had low power (Hickson et al., 1971:224)

The contingency theory of power has been formulated on the level of the organization rather than on the level of the individual. "Actors" are now "subunits" and the "mediation of rewards and preferred outcomes" has been replaced by "the ability to cope with uncertainty".
THE POLITICAL MODEL OF POWER

A Traditional View

Theorists who view power as a political process tend to discuss power from a political science or sociology rather than a social psychology perspective. Decision making and coalition formation as well as individual political behaviour is emphasized. Decision outcomes are thought to reflect power relations as well as the exercise of power. Structural properties of organizations such as hierarchies, information networks and the division of labour become the focus for study. The political model proposes that individuals join coalitions with the political objective of influencing the outcomes of decisions or the criteria by which decisions are being made.

The centrality of decision making in social organizations was stressed by March (1962) who suggested that decision making was one of the key focal points for social science. Individuals' behaviour can be studied in terms of the decisions that they make. If such decisions vary from predicted ones the change can be attributed to processes of influence. Power is

that which induces behavior on the part of the individual at time t1 different from that which might be predicted on the basis of a knowledge of the individual organism at time t0 (March, 1962:438)

Another theorist who focused on the outcome of decisions was Dahl (1957) whose definition of power is probably the most well known:

A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do" (Dahl, 1957:202)

Dahl proposed that the exercise of power can be expressed by M,
the probability of an event occurring given an action by A. This probability is a function of four factors: the magnitude, distribution, scope and domain of A's power. In addition Dahl suggested that A's power would be based on particular resources and would be dependent upon A's political skills.

The idea of coalition formation was introduced by Cyert and March (1963) in an attempt to explain organizational versus individual goal setting. Coalitions are loosely coupled groups of individuals internal as well as external to the organization. Coalitions have no clearly defined boundaries and may vary over time depending upon their purpose. Coalition formation is seen as political behaviour, the objectives of its members being to achieve a particular goal favourable to their position.

Recent discussions of power as a political process tend to be rather eclectic. (Pfeffer, 1981, Mintzberg, 1982). These authors attempt to incorporate many of the different viewpoints of power in an all-embracing way.

Pfeffer's aim was to synthesize all previous statements of power in one coherent treatment. (Pfeffer, 1981). Organizational power Pfeffer argues is first and foremost the result of the division of labour following from task specialization. Power therefore is a structural phenomenon. Furthermore, organizational actors exercise their power over issues, making the decision making process a central point of concern. The strength, scope and domain of an individual's power is thought to be a function of (1) the resources available to him, (2) the nature of his dependence relations, (3) the
leverage of the various coalitions of which he is a member, (4) the degree to which he can mediate reduction of uncertainty and finally, (5) his political skills.

In addition to synthesizing previous theories Pfeffer stresses the importance of language as an expressive means for political activity.

The task of political language and symbolic activity is to rationalize and justify decisions that are largely the result of power and influence, in order to make these results acceptable and legitimate in the organization. In fact, without this legitimation and rationalization, the exercise of power is hindered. (Pfeffer, 1981:184)

A Radical View

So far, power has been discussed from the perspective of the individual or groups of individuals (coalitions, subunits) and their ability to influence organizational processes. However, power can also be seen as a generalized strategy used by the management of organizations to control the organizations' output. One of the most important aspects of converting inputs into outputs is labour and it is rational for organizations to attempt to control this variable as much as possible.

Braverman in his book *Labor and Monopoly Capital* (1974), traces the historical development of relations of labour. He stresses the importance of control over the labour process and suggests that by controlling the decisions made in the course of work the work itself will be controlled. The process involves several steps: 1. All knowledge about the labour process is obtained.

2. This knowledge is concentrated in the hands of management
and cannot be accessed by those who carry out the labour.

3. Management uses its monopoly power over knowledge to control the labour process.

4. By dividing tasks into ever smaller components workers are deskilled and become easily substitutable.

Edwards (1981) made a distinction between three different types of control: simple, technical and bureaucratic. Simple control mainly occurs in small firms where owners exercise direct control over the workers. Technical control is structural because it involves design of machinery and the planning of workflows. Bureaucratic control exists where the social organization of the firm itself forms the controlling framework, an institutionalized hierarchy of rules.

In a recent article, Clegg (1981) consolidates his ideas of power by proposing a set of "selection" rules which are related to the various class levels of society. His basic premise is that

Structural forms, such as organizations, are complex social regulations that are historical products both of the class struggle and of changing cycles of capital accumulation. (Clegg, 1981:551)

Different modes of control Clegg argues, are a function of the class levels within organizations. Lower class participants (the workers) for example are subject to intensive control whereas ruling class participants (management) experience extensive control.

From this overview it appears that the field theoretical, the exchange and the contingency perspective have been subsumed
under the idea that power should be understood politically. This perspective which now dominates the literature on power has been referred to as the traditional view. A fundamentally different but equally political view is held by a number of Marxian informed researchers. This has been referred to as the radical perspective. The rest of this thesis is concerned with an analysis of the differences and similarities of these traditional and radical viewpoints.
III. THE POLITICAL MODEL, TWO PERSPECTIVES

The work of two theorists has been selected for further discussion: the model proposed by Jeffrey Pfeffer and that propounded by Stewart Clegg. The reason for this choice is twofold. First, within the context of a political outlook Pfeffer and Clegg are representative of the traditional and radical view respectively. Second, and most importantly, while Pfeffer's work is generally well established within the mainstream of theorizing about power in organizations, Clegg's contribution has been largely ignored. With a few notable exceptions (e.g. Hickson, et al., 1981; Astley and Van de Ven, 1983) his books on power published in 1975, 1979 and 1980 as well as his 1981 article in the Administrative Science Quarterly, not cited in (mainstream) studies of power.

The discussion of Pfeffer's model is largely based on his book Power in Organizations (1981). The analysis of Clegg's perspective mainly relies on his paper "Organization and Control" published in the Administrative Science Quarterly (1981) as well as on relevant sections from Clegg (1975;1979) and Clegg and Dunkerley (1980). No attempt is made to give a complete, exhaustive account of their work. Rather material has been selected and presented relevant to the focus of this thesis, viz. the level of analysis.

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3 The latter point poses some intriguing questions. However, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to speculate on possible political reasons for excluding Clegg's work from deliberations about power. Rather, an attempt is made to assess his contribution by critically comparing it to Pfeffer's work.
POWER IN ORGANIZATIONS ACCORDING TO JEFFREY PFEFFER

Pfeffer presents a dual perspective of power. He suggests that power has a static (structural) and a dynamic (process) component. This distinction refers to an organization as a system at rest and as a system in action respectively (Pfeffer, 1981:7) When the system is at rest power can be recognized as that force which characterizes the relationship between social actors. Power is potential for influence embedded in the structure of the organization. Organizational structure in turn, is a reflection of the division of labour. According to Pfeffer power is

sociological in that power is seen as the result of the division of labour following from task specialization. ...Power is first and foremost a structural phenomenon. (Pfeffer, 1981:x)

This power potential comes to be expressed in the dynamics of organizing through the use of politics. Political activity is characteristic of the system in action. Politics are

those activities taken within organizations to acquire, develop and use power and other resources to obtain one's preferred outcomes in a situation in which there is uncertainty or dissensus about choices. (Pfeffer, 1981:7)

Upon closer examination of Pfeffer's model it becomes clear that the static and dynamic aspects of power are related in a complementary way. Organization structure, insofar as it is an expression of task specialization is the framework which defines and constrains political activity.

For purposes of this analysis it is useful to extend the difference between power and politics to the remainder of Pfeffer's discussion. Elements of the model can be grouped
according to their dominant characteristic, that is whether their relations are mainly structurally defined or are shaped by the process of political activity. That is not to say of course, that such a distinction is always mutually exclusive. However, bearing this in mind it is possible to organize the more important components in two groups.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Power</th>
<th>Politics</th>
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<tr>
<td>Structure/Hierarchy</td>
<td>Language</td>
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<td>Determinants/Sources</td>
<td>Strategies</td>
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<td>Conditions for Conflict</td>
<td>Exercise of Power</td>
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<td>Stability</td>
<td>Change</td>
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Table I - Elements Characterized by Power or Politics

In addition to possible overlaps the elements grouped under each heading are also dynamically related. For example, power strategies are usually directed at increasing determinants or sources of power. Power is exercised over issues but only if these issues take on enough importance to result in conflict and the exercise of power. Finally, while stability and change are mutually exclusive they are both governed by the process of institutionalization as will be considered at a later section.

Let us now turn to a detailed discussion of Pfeffer's model.

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"The measurement of power was not included since it is only marginally important to the discussion."
Structure/hierarchy

Despite Pfeffer's emphasis on the importance of task specialization and structural arrangements, there is virtually no discussion of structure in the model. Pfeffer treats the division of labour as given and to a large degree as immutable. To the extent that the other elements grouped under power are related to structure it is possible to surmise how variations in structural arrangements might impact power relations but this is nowhere made explicit.

Pfeffer does discuss two kinds of power which follow from task specialization and its structural representation. First, the power that comes from authority. Authority results when formal power becomes legitimized through acceptance of a particular power distribution within a given social context (the organization). Second, the power that follows from controlling those tasks that are critical to the organization's survival or that are otherwise of great importance.

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This is rather surprising, especially in view of earlier statements Pfeffer made on the importance of structure (see for example Pfeffer, 1978:26). Furthermore this treatment (or rather non-treatment) of structure is in marked contrast to Mintzberg (1983) whose views are similar to Pfeffer's but whose discussion of power is firmly anchored in organization structure.
Determinants (sources) Of Power

Pfeffer suggests that there are five variables which determine organizational power: (1) structural position, (2) ability to provide critical resources, (3) coping with uncertainty, (4) consensus, and (5) political skills.

Structural position refers to the relative importance of the task, the greater the importance of the task the greater the power. The view that power follows from the ability to provide critical resources relies heavily on Emerson (1962) who related power to dependency. Similarly, Hickson et al.'s (1971) strategic contingency theory has been used as the basis for the view that coping with uncertainty provides a source of power. Pfeffer suggests that the resource dependence perspective and the uncertainty perspective are but variants of the same idea namely "the ability to solve objectively defined organizational problems" (Pfeffer, 1981:101). It is suggested that the power flowing from consensus as formulated by Pfeffer is another variant of this perspective. When subunits in organizations are able to articulate a clear, consensually shared perspective their power is enhanced. When a high level of consensus about the activities of the subunit exists it will be seen as more reliable and therefore more predictable. "This greater predictability encourages those who need to know that their money is well spent, to allocate funds towards those areas of greater predictability" (Pfeffer, 1981:123). Consensus, because it increases predictability reduces uncertainty.

Finally, political skills are a source of power. Pfeffer
does not elaborate on what these skills are or how they are precisely applied. As a measure of political skills he suggests that it is represented by the capacity to correctly perceive one's role and the function of one's subunit as well as the distribution of power. Advantages arising from the previous four determinants are of little value if no political skills are available to social actors to consolidate and defend their position.

Conditions For Conflict

The point of transition where power becomes political activity is when conflict occurs. Pfeffer proposes the following model describing conditions leading to conflict:

![Diagram](Pfeffer,1981:69)

Figure 1 - Conditions for Conflict

Interdependence, heterogeneous goals and heterogeneous beliefs about technology according to Pfeffer, are necessary but not sufficient conditions for conflict. Scarcity, in whatever
form, will determine whether a conflict does in fact develop. Subsequently, the importance of the issue as well as the distribution of power within the organization will ultimately determine if and to what extent political activity ensues. Political activity is directed to influence decision situations which arise from the condition of conflict. It is for this reason that one of the central concerns of the political model is the process by which decisions are made.

Stability

Pfeffer argues that existing power relationships in organizations experience only minor shift over time. On the whole power tends to be stable and to be perpetuated. This is the inevitable result of the process of institutionalization whereby certain beliefs and practices which have come to be seen as legitimate are considered objective facts. In addition, social actors who hold power tend to maintain or increase that power by appropriating more and more power sources. Power begets power.

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6 I suggest that this model is inconsistent with what Pfeffer argues elsewhere in the book. Importance of issues and distribution of power do not merely modify conflict after it has occurred. These factors will in part determine whether issues lead to conflict or indeed, whether issues become issues at all. For example on page 306 Pfeffer describes how 'Engineering was at one time the most powerful department in the firm, after the firm was acquired by a large conglomerate and a financial type was put in charge of it, finance became to assume increasing power'. Apparently, those resources important to the finance interests became critical to the organization.
Language

An important role is reserved for the use of language in Pfeffer's model. He proposes that competition for power takes place on two levels, the substantive and the symbolic.

It is through the competition that occurs on both a symbolic level as well as with respect to interdependencies and power relationships that the outcomes of organizational power and politics are determined. (Pfeffer, 1981:229)

Symbolic action may take the form of ceremonies, symbols, settings and language. The function of language as symbol Pfeffer argues, is only expressive. It is mainly used to rationalize and legitimize decision. It is the power distribution that is instrumental. In this respect language is important in the exercise of power and contributes only marginally to its development. 7

Not surprisingly, the application of language as a political tool centres around decision making. Language can be used to influence which dimensions of decision making are used and which of those are seen as most important. Furthermore, it can take cues from how other similar decisions are seen and finally, it can provide the very context within which decisions are framed.

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7 I suggest that Pfeffer seriously understates the importance of language as an instrumental tool. It has been argued (Cohen, 1974) that symbols are both expressive and instrumental. For example a ceremonial of authority is a reflection of that authority but the same ceremonial also functions as a means to recreate and reconstruct authority. The important but nevertheless limited role that Pfeffer accords to language is a function of his continued emphasis on structure as the defining characteristic of power. All actions, language included are constrained by the existing power distribution in the organization.
The use of language as a political tool depends for its effectiveness on the existence of two factors. The first is that many people do not have clear preferences, at least not a priori. (This view is consistent with the notion that people justify actions only after they have taken them. Reality is enacted through interpretation and reinterpretation of past actions. {Weick, 1969}). The second factor is that decision outcomes are often ambiguous in that they tend to entail many complex issues as well as possess multiple attributes. Therefore, people come to confuse symbolic outcomes for substantive ones. The reality of the consequences of symbolic outcomes are nonetheless real since social actors act on the basis of their perception.

**Strategies**

Strategies to develop and enhance power are intimately related to the underlying power source. Central to any strategy is the decision making process. The strategies themselves may take many forms, coalition formation with parties inside and outside the organization, for example the use of outside consultants, memberships on important committees, logrolling, cooptation, controlling the agenda, controlling decision alternatives etc. Whatever the strategy it is crucial that the attempt to influence be made as unobtrusive as possible, avoiding overt display of power. Ideally, the influence should be such that the decision making process appears logical and rational.
Strategies may be employed at different levels of sophistication. A strategy could be used for example to interpret outside consultants' solution to a particular problem in terms of one's own expertise. It would be a better strategy however to selectively release information to the consultants which makes a particular type of solution inevitable. But the most sophisticated strategy would be to have the consultants hired in the first place or to hire the "right" kind of consultants.

**Exercise Of Power**

Whether or not particular strategies will be used is a function of the actor's political skills and the costs that are involved in the exercise of power. The latter point is emphasized by exchange theorists such as Thibaut & Kelley (1959), Emerson (1962) and Blau (1964).

**Change**

Despite the strong tendency to perpetuate power organizations do undergo change. This is brought about "chiefly by major changes in the organizations' environment which create problems or constraints which are too pervasive to ignore" (Pfeffer, 1981:329). When faced with such compelling circumstances organizations adapt to ensure survival. To the extent that organizations are institutionalized they cannot adapt sufficiently. Pfeffer argues that at the level of society
organizations survive through selection rather than adaptation and that it is selection which serves as the mechanism for change. Given an ecology of populations competition is a force which ensures selection and by implication change. To the extent that competition is disallowed through forces of institutionalization on the societal level by means of rules and central planning, change becomes impossible and organizations will be seriously out of phase with the environment.

It is interesting to observe how Pfeffer's model is traditional in more than one respect. Not only are his statements about power firmly grounded in social psychology and the systems view of organizations, it is also presented in the generally accepted manner of empirically supported statements. Clegg's model relies much more on theoretical exposition. The following sketch of his model will of necessity reflect some of this orientation.

POWER IN ORGANIZATIONS ACCORDING TO STEWART CLEGG

Clegg views power as domination of one social class over another exercised through control of the labour process. Power relations, according to Clegg, are more than relations of dependence, they involve the notion of freedom. Freedom is the \textit{power} to develop natural attributes, capacities and abilities. To the extent that people are subordinated through power they lose their autonomy. The important variables are autonomy and domination rather than power and dependence.
The class structure prevailing in society constitutes its structure of domination. Economic relations of production continually produce and reinforce this structure. Organizations are seen as the loci where the struggle between classes is played out. Organizations are structures of regional domination and subordination within the social system. Domination in organizations takes the form of hegemony which is control of one class over another by consent rather than by force. Hegemony is reflected in a way of life which relies on certain principles and assumptions that are taken for granted such as private property and the forces of the market.

Clegg proposes that in order to understand the power relations which constitute organizations' structure it is necessary to study the "rules" which are the governing principles of organizations. Any definition of power therefore would be concerned with rules.

To illustrate this point Clegg uses the analogy of a chess game where the power of the pieces is not defined by the position they currently hold in an ongoing game. More appropriately, power is a function of the rules that govern the pieces' movements. In Clegg and Dunkerley's words, power is a function of the relationship of pieces to rules, in that rules invest a certain power in a piece independently of its position on the board. (Clegg and Dunkerley, 1980:444).

Of course, this definition does not exclude the possibility that the various combinations of positions would not influence the power of the piece. But the argument is that such positions evolve historically in the process of the game and are rule
bound.

The ideas that form the core of Clegg's model of power in organizations are (1) class relations, (2) economic conditions and (3) their expression in historically developed rules for organizing the labour process.

Class Relations
Class relations in modern industrial society have been central to much theorizing by sociologists (Dahrendorf, 1959; Bendix and Lipset, 1966). Social classes are typically defined by their members' relation to the economic process, even to the extent that sub-classes are grouped in terms of their collar colour.

In his model Clegg distinguishes three broad social classes. The working class, the new middle class and the ruling class. The contradictory nature of social stratification produces a set of conflicting relations which can be conceptualized as follows.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Working Class</th>
<th>New Middle Class</th>
<th>Ruling Class</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Demarcation disputes; closed shop exclusions; local, regional, and international division of labor.</td>
<td>Men in the middle engaged in disputes about bonus, productivity, speeds, for example.</td>
<td>Disputes about liquidation, bankruptcy; capital strikes and starvation; lock-outs; &quot;rationalization&quot; through productivity and restrictive practices deals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Line vs. staff conflicts; cosmopolitans vs. locals; bureaucrats vs. professionals.</td>
<td>Disputes about the cheapening of non-surplus value producing labor process, through automation; standardization, via, for example, Electronic Data Processing (EDP) and other microprocess-relnted technology.</td>
<td>Disputes about takeovers, mergers, trustification.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table II - Social Class and Power in Organizations
Organizations are the sites where such conflicts are played out.
Economic Conditions

Organizations Clegg argues, should be seen in the broadest possible way, that is as they exist in a world economic system. He agrees with Wallerstein that the capitalist mode of production can only exist within a world economy.

As a formal structure, a world economy is defined as a single division of labour within which are located multiple cultures... but which has no overwhelming political structure. Without a political structure to redistribute the appropriated surplus, the surplus can only be redistributed via the "market", however frequently States located within the world economy intervene to distort the market. Hence the mode of production is capitalist. (Wallerstein cited in Clegg and Dunkerley, 1980:459).

The advantage of situating organizations within a world economic system, according to Clegg, is twofold. One, the problems associated with a systems view (where problems of boundaries are ignored) or a cognitivist view (which ignores the significance that microscopic interactions have in the societal context), are avoided. Two, organizations can be more easily studied from a historical perspective.

Historically, organizations have changed in response to the demands of the world market economy and in accordance with the possibilities offered by the development of sophisticated technologies. One of the most important consequences of this development is an ever increasing specialization of tasks. The division of tasks into ever smaller components has led to the deskilling of manual labour and the hyperskilling of mental labour. The resulting shifts in power relations became expressed in (1) a separation of task from hierarchical position and (2) the change from simple control to technical and
bureaucratic control.

The separation of task from position gave rise to the notion of "informal power"; the deviation from the formal distribution. Offe (1976) has described this process as the shift from a task-continuous status organization to one which is task-discontinuous. In the former, there exists a relationship between different positions in the hierarchy, such that "a superordinate position would differ from a subordinate position merely in terms of greater mastery of the rules and greater ability, knowledge and experience in production" (Clegg and Dunkerley, 1980:462). In the latter, with increasing differentiation between mental and manual labour, greater skills and knowledge do not necessarily lead to a superordinate position. To the extent that these skills are critical to an organization they become a source of informal power.

In a parallel fashion, the transition from the 19th century small business economy to the 20th century large corporations created increasing conflict between workers and employers over the control over the methods of production. Edwards (1981) signals a development from simple control to technical and bureaucratic control in response to respective crises on the level of the blue collar and white collar worker. Simple control involved the direct supervision of owners on the process of production (such as is still the case in what Mintzberg (1979) called "simple" organizations). Technical control refers to the use of technology and machines to control the labour process. Bureaucratic control is the institutionalization of
control through the definition of rules, laws and standard operating procedures which guide the work of middle management and clerical staff.

The important characteristic of both technical and bureaucratic control is that they are structural, that is they become embedded in the very fabric which constitutes the organization.

Rules For Organizing The Labour Process

Clegg's conception of power relations involves the translation of historical developments and the utilization of different types of control into a set of rules. The rules are sedimented in that they have been historically laid down, not necessarily through the process of one rule replacing the other, but by a 'layering' of rules superimposed on one another. The rules are selected rules in that organizations enact them selectively. Power therefore, is expressed in a series of sedimented selection rules which are related temporally and spatially to the social class system.

The model of power which Clegg proposes is descriptive of organizations' functioning is reproduced below. It relates the class structure of society to rules that are dominant at a particular level and at a particular moment in time.
In addition to these relationships Clegg suggests that "the rules may be related to the development of long waves in the world economy. They become dominant at particular moments because they represent strategies appropriate to the
conjunctural possibilities of accumulation" (Clegg, 1981:552).

Some of the differences between the models are beginning to emerge from this description. It can be seen for example that Pfeffer discusses power mainly in terms of individuals, yet he emphasizes structure. A similar structural emphasis appears in Clegg's model but he is more concerned with the society than with individuals. In the next chapter these differences will be explored further.

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8 It should be noted that the vertical axis of the model does not represent a temporal scale even though Clegg seems to suggest this.
IV. A COMPARISON OF LEVELS OF ANALYSIS

Since Pfeffer and Clegg approach the topic from such different perspectives, development of reliable criteria for comparison seems problematic. However, since most models in social science are constructed on at least one particular level of analysis, a comparison of the two models could be made in terms of their level of analysis.

Kemelgor (1976) has suggested that many studies of power have confined themselves to boundaries that are both arbitrary and narrow.

One apparent problem stems from the fact that studies are at different levels —societal, organizational, and personal or individual. Rather than ignoring related levels as independent of one another, it is postulated that a mutually interactive relationship exists among the societal, organizational and individual theoretical formulations. (Kemelgor, 1976:143).

Farrel and Petersen (1982) have called attention to the problem that in many studies of power the distinction among different units of analysis is blurred. A large number of studies they maintain, confuse issues by talking about the power of individuals, units and inter-organizational networks in the same discussion. The studies fail to consider the critical issues of the distinctiveness or similarity of correlates of politics for each level of analysis as well as the linkages between the different levels. (Farrell and Petersen, 1982:405).

Thus, by establishing on which level or levels Pfeffer and Clegg's models are stated and by further investigating how these levels are related, the models could be compared and the concerns raised by both Kemelgor and Farrell and Petersen could be addressed. Such a comparison might fruitfully proceed by
utilizing a modified version of an analytic model of power proposed by Kemelgor (1976).

There are two ways in which Kemelgor's model may serve the present analysis: (a) as heuristic device to map both models in terms of their levels of analysis (b) as ideal conceptual model in which the levels of analysis are clarified through their containment in what Kaplan (1964) has called explanatory shells, but where the concept becomes completely understood only when considered in its reciprocal relations. Kemelgor conceives of these relationships as linkage concepts.

Linkage concepts could be seen as rules of transformation. Farrell and Petersen (1982) for example suggest a typology using dimensions such as internal versus external and vertical versus lateral as a possible framework. No doubt there are several equally useful ways of making these transitions. The question addressed here is whether Pfeffer and Clegg have made any
attempt to connect the various levels of analysis.

In order to do so the models should be located on their respective levels for which criteria have been defined by referring to the literature. These descriptive criteria will aid in the decision which elements of the models under investigation properly belong in the realm of the individual, the organization or society.

LOCATION OF THE MODELS

The Individual As Unit Of Analysis

At the level of the individual Field Theory and Exchange Theory and to a lesser extent political science theories have been dominant in theorizing about power in organizations. The social psychological perspective of field theorists (Lewin, 1951; Cartwright, 1959; French and Raven, 1959) emphasizes personal relations. These are subsequently transformed to economic relations in the view of exchange theorists, (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959; Emerson, 1962), and (Blau, 19643). The political view stresses the centrality of individuals attaining outcomes in the face of opposition (Dahl, 1956), the importance of coalition formation (Cyert and March, 1963) and the use of bargaining tactics (Bacharach & Lawler, 1980).

Power is seen as an interplay between individuals in dyadic relationships, arising out of needs and desires existing in one individual which may be unilaterally met by another. Political behaviour is energized when one individual perceives another as being in a position to mediate rewards that satisfy the
individual's motive base. The range of possible power relations is a function of people's social skills, linguistic ability, possession of resources and the costs which the use of power may entail.

Models of power relations on the level of the individual typically employ mathematical formulae defining levels of compliance and resistance (Cartwright, 1959), or the probability that a given behaviour will occur (Dahl, 1957). Another model often employed is that of the matrix, defining possible behavioural repertoires of individuals (Thibaut and Kelley, 1959; Pendse, 1983). But the most common treatment of power on the individual level is the articulation of a set of strategies which enhance (or delimit) individuals' power (Thibaut and Kelley, 1959; Emerson, 1962; Mulder, 1977; Mintzberg, 1983).

The elements of Pfeffer's model that are characterized by politics all fit these criteria. Strategies, language and the exercise of power refer to the behaviour of individuals as they attempt to develop their power position. Strategies for example such as coalition formation, influencing of decisions or the formation of issues, cooptation and manipulation of others, clearly belong at the level of the individual. Usually the decision to join a coalition will be based on the level of reward that such (often temporary) memberships may involve. The social skills of individuals as well as other people's perception of them are of the utmost importance for the success of a particular strategy.

Language is a symbolic means used by individuals to justify
decisions to interpret which resources are critical to the organization, to substitute symbolic outcomes for substantive ones, to advocate their position and in general to develop and strengthen their power. While it can be argued convincingly that language is equally important at the level of the organization for laws, rules and procedures to guide efforts of organizational members, Pfeffer argues that this aspect of language is only secondary. Consequently language as interpreted by Pfeffer is considered only at the level of the individual.

Whether or not power will be exercised will be dependent upon the costs such use involves, the relative importance of the issue, and the perceived benefit of the outcome. Exercise of power therefore involves the weighing of costs and benefits as these relate to the individual.

In keeping with his statement that for the discussion of power "individuals" are unimportant, Clegg does not use the individual as a unit of analysis. Nor does he anywhere discuss personal attributes, needs, desires or motives. In Clegg's model people are viewed rather deterministically, only as subjects of control. The hegemonic nature of this control prevents individuals from influencing the process of organizing.
The Organization As Unit Of Analysis

The strategic contingency and to some extent the political view of power are dominant on the level of the organization. This perspective is closely related to a systems approach to organizations (Thompson, 1967), as well as the structural point of view propounded by theorists such as Mintzberg (1979). At the organizational level of analysis the focus is on relations between subunits (Hickson et al., 1971; Hambrick, 1974; Hinings et al., 1975), and structural configurations (Mintzberg, 1983).

Power is viewed as resulting from structural imperatives external to the individual and defining individuals' behaviour through role prescription. Division of labour, centrality of decision making, information networks etc. shape the functioning of the organization, leaving little opportunity for individual manipulation. The exercise of power follows from authority positions which have been legitimated by goal consensus and acceptance of the necessity for task specialization.

Research of power relations on the level of the organization focuses on the influence of size, technology, organizational design, geographic location and production mode. Of interest are relationships between organizational structure and organizational control (Ouchi, 1977; Edwards, 1981), the relative influence of structuring of activities and centralized decision making on levels of conflict (Child, 1973), the use of control mechanisms such as budgets (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1975), (Pfeffer and Moore, 1980) or the importance of ownership,
publics and external coalitions (Mintzberg, 1983).

Following these criteria it is easy to relate those elements of Pfeffer's model that are characterized by power to the organizational level of analysis. For Pfeffer the structure of the organization resulting from the division of labour defines the distribution of power. Such distribution is dependent on position, not individual acumen. Role prescription determines the range of individual behaviour as well as the relative power that the individual has. The power of a person will therefore vary as a function of organizational structure. The nature of hierarchical power is that of formal authority.

People in positions of authority possess power sources by virtue of that position. The more central their activities are the fewer alternatives available to the organization, the greater the amount of power sources that individuals may acquire. Control over technology, information or uncertainty are crucial sources of power and they accrue to those who hold positions in the organization granting them these controls.

Conditions that lead to conflict are related to organization structure as well as to environmental conditions. Insofar as the latter are treated as "given" they provide imperatives for action. The specialization of tasks creates high levels of interdependence. This factor, combined with the existence of heterogeneous goals, heterogeneous beliefs about technology and scarcity leads to conditions of conflict. It is in response to these conditions that political activity will take place.
Clegg's technical rules and social regulative rules meet the criteria for the organizational level.

Technical rules refer to the domination of the labour process by technology. The development of these rules, according to Clegg, was a function of the rise of scientific management combined with advancement in technology. Technology, through the process of deskilling, frames the way in which workers labour. It is a structural means of control in the hands of management.

Social-regulative rules are just another form of control directed at those above the level of the worker. Rather than control by technology, these individuals are controlled through hegemony. Social-regulative rules control by socializing workers into a set of values and operating procedures that severely restrict their autonomy. An example would be the generally accepted notion that organizations are rational entities comprised of individuals which hold the consensually shared value of profit maximization.

Society As Unit Of Analysis
Relatively little work has been done by organizational theorists at the level of society (Nord, 1974) and has largely been the province of philosophers (Russell, 1969), political scientists (O'Brien et al., 1969), sociologists (Touraine, 1971) and economists (Galbraith, 1973). Those organizational theorists that did discuss power on this level were the radical theorists (Braverman, 1974; Stone, 1981).

At the societal level of analysis, power is seen as
embedded in relations of production. Emphasis is on the state of the economy, historical development of industry, the position of the state and such societal variables as stratification and norms and values. Types of organizations, monopolies, oligopolies or state owned enterprises are distinguished rather than internal structural configurations.

Studies of the level of society have been directed at collectivities, for example the interplay between unions and organizations of employers (Walton and McKersie, 1965), the changing position of the enterprise in society, (Touraine, 1971) and the need to study those organizations that are critical for societal decision making (Colignon and Cray, 1980). To the extent that researchers such as Hickson et al (1971) and Mintzberg, (1983) have gone beyond the level of the organization, they have typically focused on the more immediate environment rather than on society as a whole.

It is in his discussion of change versus stability that Pfeffer goes beyond the level of the individual organization. Stability of prevailing power distributions is a function of the process of institutionalization of organizations. In the face of environmental imperatives however organizations survive by natural selection. To the extent that environmental conditions

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This discussion ignores Pfeffer's considerable contribution in the area of inter-organizational studies (Pfeffer, 1972 a; Pfeffer, 1972 b; Pfeffer and Lebleci, 1973; (Pfeffer and Nowak, 1976; Pfeffer, 1977; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) since this literature does not explicitly deal with power, nor does Pfeffer relate this work to his discussion in Power in Organizations (1981)
allow survival through adaptation power relations will be unchanged because of the process of institutionalization. Drastic changes only occur when different types of organizations develop in response to environmental conditions.

The importance of the level of society in Clegg's model may be demonstrated by the fact that four out of a total of six rules meet the criteria for this level of analysis.

Extra organizational rules deal with the way in which cheap labour is obtained from the lower strata of society. Deskilling of manual labour makes workers highly substitutable thereby decreasing their relative power. Clegg suggests that extra organizational rules that segment the labour market control the worker at the level of society.

If technical rules control blue collar workers and social-regulative rules dominate white collar workers, those that enjoy "the least specificity of role prescription" (Clegg, 1981:558) are ruled by the socializing powers of educational institutions. Managerial activities are guided by what Clegg calls reproduction rules. The rationale for the existence of these rules lies in the non-ownership status of most modern managers. Educational institutions teach courses that propound the managerial perspective, thus perpetuating a system of domination.

State rules may be seen as a subset of strategic rules in that corporations in their desire to control environmental contingencies attempt "to use the state to affect the market in
their interests" (Clegg, 1981; 558). Organizations then, influence their environment in two ways, through control of the market and through control of the state.

Organizing the separate elements according to their level of analysis produces the following table. 11

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Analysis</th>
<th>Pfeffer</th>
<th>Clegg</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Individual</td>
<td>Language</td>
<td>Technical Rules</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strategies</td>
<td>Social Regulative Rules</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Exercise</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Structure/Hierarchy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Determinants/Sources</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conditions for Conflict</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Society</td>
<td>Stability/Change</td>
<td>Extra Organizational Rules</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Reproduction Rules</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Strategic Rules</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>State Rules</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table III - Models of Power Organized by Level of Analysis

For a more in depth consideration of these relations the level of the organization will be used as point of departure. By

10 It has been argued elsewhere that the adversary model of government and business is a myth and that "the business community is essentially in control of decision making at a policy level" (Whetter, 1976 p. 109)

11 Clegg's 1981 model published in the Administrative Science Quarterly departs considerably from earlier statements where countervailing power of individuals was important (Clegg, 1975). I think however that his latest formulation is more representative of his position on this issue today. Similarly, Pfeffer discusses relations between organizations extensively in Pfeffer and Salancik (1978). But Pfeffer does not integrate this work in his model of power.
focusing on this level, common to each model, it is possible to obtain insights about the other levels and to explore the differences in emphasis.

Pfeffer

In Pfeffer's model three components are located on the level of the organization: (1) Structure, (2) Sources of power and (3) Conditions for conflict. The most salient characteristic of these components is that they form the constraining boundaries within which political activity on the individual level occurs. In the preface to his book Pfeffer makes clear his view that power is chiefly derived from structure:

Power is seen as deriving from the division of labor that occurs as task specialization is implemented in organizations. When the overall tasks of the organization are divided into smaller parts, it is inevitable that some tasks will come to be more important than others.... Although individual skills and strategies can certainly affect the amount of power and the effectiveness with which it is used, power is first and foremost a structural phenomenon, and should be understood as such. (Pfeffer, 1981:x)

Throughout the book the dominant role of structure is repeatedly emphasized. In addition, the limited possibilities for individual actors to exert influence is stated on several occasions, for instance on page 137:

... the argument was made that although power was largely a function of position in the social structure and the social actors' net dependence with respect to other actors in the organization, there were still some strategies and tactics that could enhance the power of the actors within those constraints. (Pfeffer, 1981:137)

With respect to the sources of power, again, Pfeffer declares that "[t]he amount of power each actor possesses is
derived first, from the importance of the activity performed. It is in this sense that it can be said that power is structurally determined" (Pfeffer, 1981:98). Other determinants of power such as the ability to provide critical resources and coping with uncertainty are predicated upon such structural antecedents. It is only when power already accrues to actors because of the relative importance of their task that sources of power can be developed. Or in Pfeffer's words:

...power is at once structurally determined but also is more than structurally determined; power is affected by the capacity of organizational participants to enhance their bases of power and to convince others in the organization of their necessity and value. (Pfeffer, 1981:98)

Clearly, no power bases can be enhanced if actors don’t already possess them and possession of any power basis is a function of one's importance in the structure.

Power is used in the form of political activity when conflict occurs. Therefore, it is necessary to investigate which factors influence the occurrence of conflict. Pfeffer postulates three basic conditions: interdependence, heterogeneity and scarcity. The level of dependence of one actors upon the activity of another follows directly from the differentiation of tasks. Relations of dependence (and their concomitant power relations) are given, they are a function of the division of labour. Similarly, heterogeneity which may lead to disagreements about goals and about technology, follows from organizational structure. Pfeffer provides various examples of how conditions for conflict are 'built in'

... various subunits may have different goals explicitly provided as a part of their task assignment. These goals
may inherently conflict.... In addition, different subunits receive different information as a consequence of the division of labour... [which]... tend to cause a parochialism in point of view, in which each participant sees the world through his subunit's perspective. (Pfeffer, 1981:72).

the last conditions, scarcity, is the most important condition for without it there would be no decision problem and hence conflict would not occur.

To the extent that resources are insufficient to meet the various demands... choices have to be made concerning the allocation of those resources. The greater the scarcity as compared to the demand, the greater the power and the effort that will be expended in resolving the decision. (Pfeffer, 1981:69)

The resources that Pfeffer refers to are those necessary for the organization to operate such as personnel, money, customers, raw material and technology. The definition of what constitutes a scarce resource is in itself not given by structure. Indeed, Pfeffer suggests that scarcity "is, by definition, a concept that is defined in relative terms" which can seldom be determined objectively. However, the relative scarcity of a resource will be inevitably defined by those who control access to the resource in question or as Pfeffer puts it the organization or social actor possessing a resource can increase the value of that resource and their own power by claiming scarcity, and behaving as if the resource were scarce. (Pfeffer, 1981:82)

Thus, if actors are able to 'create' scarcity by virtue of prior possession of or control over a resource, it follows that ultimately scarcity too, is a function of the division of labour. Clearly, from Pfeffer's perspective the division of labour governs all conditions that give rise to conflict, whether explicit (as in the case of interdependence and
heterogeneity) or implicit (as in the case of scarcity).

From this discussion it can be concluded that not only is power understood structurally, it is also exclusively defined by structure. The specialization of tasks which makes 'some units more important than others' is the underlying mechanism by which power becomes differentiated. The more critical a task is for the survival of the organization, the greater the power, the more opportunity to engage in political activity.

One of the most important consequences of this view is that any political activity on the level of the individual is completely contained within structural constraints. Individuals' formal position in the organization defines the boundaries of their political action and allows automatic access to certain resources but not to others. In addition, the power that comes with the position can be enhanced depending upon an individual's political skill. The only variable it seems is an actor's skill at exploring the possibilities within a given structural framework. In Pfeffer's view it appears, the level of the individual is contained in and determined by the level of the organization.

If the relation between the level of the individual and the level of the organization is tightly coupled the connection between the level of the organization and that of society is far more tenuous. The environment is largely treated as given and is considered only to the extent that it directly affects an organization's functioning.

Pfeffer suggests that there are two possible ways for
organizations to survive in the long run, adaptation and selection. These are mechanisms by which organizations adapt to changes in the environment. Adaptation may be seriously obstructed by the process of institutionalization that takes place in organizations. Pfeffer lists three causes for institutionalization: (1) people become committed to past decisions, (2) over time beliefs, rules and practices become looked upon as objective reality, and (3) expansionary politics of power holders in organizations. To the extent that institutionalization is successful power relations remain stable but adaptation will be delayed and long term survival threatened. The mechanism of selection favours different organizational forms depending on the 'niches' that become available in the environment. Selection mechanisms bring about major shifts in the distribution of power, presumably by changing the division of labour. Pfeffer offers no suggestions as to how such fundamental changes might be brought about.  

At the level of society Pfeffer has shifted his focus from the structural imperatives of the organization to environmental demands and constraints. The organization's functioning as well as an organization's structure are determined by its environment. However, the interactions between environment and organizations seem to have very little influence on the distribution of power, at least in Pfeffer's treatment.

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12 It has been assumed in this thesis that major shifts in power in order to occupy a particular niche in the environment are the outcome of a political struggle between power holders although Pfeffer does not make this explicit.
Pfeffer's model of power is characterized by a rather deterministic outlook. Environments determine which organization will survive in the long run (given that the selection mechanism is dominant which Pfeffer seems to suggest), and the type of resources available to the organization. The division of labour in any organization determines who holds power over which resources and sets the boundaries for individual political activities.

Clegg

Next, let us consider Clegg's model. Clegg's technical rules and social-regulative rules which are stated on the level of the organization are no less deterministic that the structural constraints of Pfeffer's model. The form of this determinism however differs sharply from that of Pfeffer, both in terms of direction and expression. While it is true that technical and social-regulative rules govern the activities of individuals, their more important characteristic is, according to Clegg, that they are the inevitable outcome of the desire of the capitalist to appropriate surplus value. The rules are not given in the same way that Pfeffer's division of labour is given. Rather, they have evolved historically and are directly related to economic conditions.

To understand the nature of technical and social-regulative rules it is not sufficient to describe them, rather, the process that governed their 'sedimentation' should be emphasized. Technical rules -those that subordinate workers to machine
processes—developed after 1895 when Frederick Taylor presented his paper on piece rates. It was Taylor's objective to take all the important decisions and planning which vitally affect the output of the shop out of the hands of the workmen, and centralize them in a few men, each of whom is especially trained in the art of making those decisions and in seeing that they are carried out" (Taylor, 1907, sect. 126; cited in Clegg and Dunkerley, 1979:130).

By placing the complete control over work in the hands of a few 'managers' workers lose their bargaining power which until then had been vested in worker control over the methods of production.

Clegg suggests that Taylor's ideas were an 'antidote' for the difficulties faced by industries by the end of the 19th century. "Taylor" he says, "was an historical agent, rather than an individual subject" \(^{13}\) (p.127) After the depression which started in 1870 capitalists were faced with increased competition on an international level and declining profits. At the same time the growth of technology during the second half of the 19th century led to increased use of machines which opened the possibility for mass production of commodities. The nature of the labour force at that time presented a special problem.

In the U.S. at the end of the 19th century, the skilled workers, those with trade or craft training... engaged in a political struggle which was widespread enough to form an obstacle to... the accumulation of capital. At the same time there was arriving from Europe a mass of peasant immigrants who could not be incorporated... into the process of production. Labour processes therefore had to be modified. (Clegg, 1979:129)

It was Taylor who was able to remedy this problem through

\(^{13}\) My emphasis
his methods of scientific management. Control over the methods of production (in addition to control over the means of production which was vested in ownership), was achieved by the "breakdown of human skills, parallel and in addition to the developing machine processes " (p.129)

Clegg attributes a similar historical role to Elton Mayo in the development of social-regulative rules. Mayo was concerned with the adverse effects on the worker of technological change and the mechanistic model of economic man which prevailed in the days of scientific management. In 1933 when reporting on the Hawthorne experiments, Mayo concluded that

Human collaboration in work, in primitive and developed societies, has always depended for its perpetuation upon the evolution of a non-logical social code which regulates the relations between persons and their attitudes to one another. Insistence upon a merely economic logic of production especially if the logic is frequently changed interferes with the development of such a code and consequently gives rise in the group to a sense of human defeat. This human defeat results in the formation of a social code at a lower level and in opposition to the economic logic. One of its symptoms is "restriction". (Mayo, 1933:120-121 cited in Burrell and Morgan, 1979:139)

Re-institution of such a social code would restore the equilibrium which was disturbed by the disjuncture of man and his work, induced by technology.

While Clegg recognizes Mayo's "humanist critique of scientific management" (p.134), he maintains that Mayo's recommendations only served to control the worker in order to deal with such problems as production restriction and absenteeism. His discussion of Mayo's work is primarily informed by the latter's most influential work *The Social Problems of an Industrial Civilization* which was published in
1949. This means that the Human Relations School which gained so much prominence after the second world war followed from the economic upturn (rather than a downturn which inspired scientific management) after the second world war.

The fully employed war economy of the long post-war boom would pose particular problems for the organization and control of the labour process at the level of the individual enterprise. Specifically, it would withdraw the coercive domination of the reserve army of the unemployed. (Clegg, 1979 p.132).

In the absence of the possibility for exercising coercive domination, it became necessary, according to Clegg, to reassert control through hegemonic domination "in the guise of new forms of social solidarity ..." Clegg interprets Mayo's insistence on the need for co-operative efforts, the development of social skills and the creation in the worker of "the desire and capacity to work better with management" (Clegg, 1979:136) as a hegemonic answer to the management of labour problems. While Clegg's discussion of Mayo and the development of the Human Relations school of management takes on somewhat polemic overtones, it is clear that social-regulative rules are of a pervasiveness that far exceed the impact of the technical rules.

The rules that exist at the level of the organization refer to both control of the labour process itself and to control of the needs, desires and behaviour of the individual worker. To this extent Clegg's model of power as stated on the level of the organization is far more determinist at the level of the individual than Pfeffer's model. But more importantly Clegg's formulation of these rules is infused with a determinism derived from the economic endeavor of realizing surplus values, or in
Clegg's words:

Within the capitalist mode of production the economy is both the dominant and determinant structural level, over and above the ideological and political levels. (Clegg, 1979:124)

Structure therefore, is as important and defining for Clegg as it is for Pfeffer. The difference lies in the level at which they see these structural imperatives and to what extent individuals retain the possibility of exercising power. Clearly, Pfeffer believes this to be substantial, as evidenced by the overwhelming attention he gives in his book to the actions of individuals. For Clegg, the lack of autonomy of individuals (mainly those at the lower levels of society) would prevent them from exercising any power at all. Moreover, the severe restrictions on individual freedom imposed by technical and social regulative rules are reinforced by the rules that govern on the societal level.

LINKAGES BETWEEN LEVELS OF ANALYSIS

Let us now turn to the question of transitions between the models. Linkages according to Kemelgor's model are multidirectional. Consequently, any theory of power should not only explain how for instance organizational structure influences individual behaviour, it should also account for how these structures may be altered as the result of individual countervailing power. It is suggested that power at increasingly complex levels of analysis is of necessity qualitatively different. That is to say, it is not only greater in terms of magnitude but it also varies in scope and impact.
As a corollary, linkages must provide transitions between the different levels of complexity.

Pfeffer
In Pfeffer's discussion of power the question of how the individual level might be connected to the level of the organization is not addressed, simply because Pfeffer makes no distinction between units of analysis. This position is considered problematic.

Pfeffer proposes a contingency approach to the definition of the unit of analysis. He stipulates conditions which social actors should meet in order to be considered analytically separate. These conditions however cannot be maintained if his model of power is accepted. For example, Pfeffer says that social actors qualify as units when they are "internally homogeneous with respect to preferences and beliefs on the issues being investigated" (Pfeffer, 1981, p.36). Elsewhere however he argues that individuals tend to be only marginally aware of their real preferences, at least before decisions are taken. Moreover he suggests that decision outcomes are sufficiently ambiguous so that consent can be easily manipulated. How then is it possible to decide in advance whether people or groups of people are internally homogeneous? Pfeffer further suggests that a good measure of homogeneity is to decide at which point individuals are in agreement about enough important issues. But what are important issues is often a matter of interpretation, more specifically, the interpretation of the most powerful social actor.
Regardless of the question of homogeneity, the notion that units (departments) or organizations can act is an untenable reification. It was originally introduced in response to the need to raise the discussion on organizational power above the level of the individual so eloquently articulated by Perrow (1970). While it is possible and often desirable to talk about power at the aggregate level, such transition would have to take into account what Blau (1964) has called the "emergent properties" characteristic of groups. However, for the purposes of his discussion Pfeffer unquestioningly adopted Thompson (1967) interpretation of Emerson's (1959) definition of power in which he simply substituted the word "organization" for "individual".

Clegg

Contrary to Pfeffer's approach Clegg makes a serious effort to connect the level of the organization to that of society. In addition, he has organized his sets of rules such that they also relate to hierarchical levels within the organization. This according to Clegg mirrors precisely the class structure of society.

Despite this attempt the argument is flawed in one important aspect. Clegg's model is clearly exclusively unidirectional. There is no discussion of countervailing power, not on an individual level (which is understandable since Clegg never considers this level), but neither on a collective level. There is no mention is his set of rules of unions or of any
other collective resistance which may be offered against corporate power.

This finding is somewhat surprising in view of Clegg's rather lengthy treatment in his writings of the differences between formal and informal power and the way in which informal (and therefore illegitimate) power has become a problem for management. Clegg further suggests that the whole mainstream debate on power as we know it today developed from the concern with such informal power. An example would be Crozier's (1964) maintenance men.

Another problem only indirectly related is the link between society and organization as expressed in the "reproduction rules". The assumption is that the majority of middle managers is college educated but this may not hold for every type of society. The comparison between the way Pfeffer and Clegg have attempted to deal with the problem of transition turns out to be a difficult one because Pfeffer leaves the issue unexplored. If at all anything can be said it would be that Pfeffer's model implies a unidirectional transition going from the environment to the organization and from the organization to the individual. It seems fair to conclude that transitions in both models are explicitly or implicitly uni-directional and fall short of providing a balanced view of power. In addition, neither Pfeffer nor Clegg sees any direct relationship between

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14 Bank branch managers in Canada for example generally do not hold a college degree according to a recent study (Egri, 1983). It is much more likely that managers become socialized within organizations.
the level of society and the level of the individual or vice-versa.

One way of explaining this is in terms of the model itself rather than of power relations. Perhaps Kemelgor's linkage model should be revised as follows:

There is some support for this position. Given the necessity to engage in work in order to survive the relation person-work-society is historically and in principle tightly coupled. With the event of the industrial revolution work
became organized in production units. Touraine (1971) in his discussion of the evolution of the firm shows how the organization of work creates intermediary levels between the one-time direct link between work and society, or what became work and economic power. As firms evolved Touraine argued there grew an 'organization' between work and economic power. As firms became transformed into oligarchic enterprises another level was added, that of the 'institution'. Thus workers today are separated from but also connected to society by organizations and institutions. Similarly, in 1938 Russell observed the ever-pervading presence of organizations in people's lives. From before birth (the prenatal clinic) until after death (estate-taxes) and any time in between organizations play a major role. It is suggested that the influence of organizations has substantially increased rather than decreased since that time and that there is very little in our lives that does not occur in some organizational context.

Nevertheless, whether or not the linkage model of power is substantially correct, the failure of both Pfeffer and Clegg's models to deal satisfactorily with this issue must be noted. We will return to the dilemma of transitions between levels towards the end of this thesis.
V. **PFEFFER AND CLEGG'S POLITICAL MODELS OF POWER RECONSIDERED**

The foregoing analysis of Pfeffer and Clegg's work has provided some insight into the way their models of power are constructed. It has shown that while there are some striking similarities the models are characterized by their differences. Moreover the differences are so fundamental that a simple evaluation would be impossible. How then are we to proceed? To what extent can the results of this analysis serve to increase our understanding about power in organizations?

There are several possible responses. The first is as simple as it is unsatisfactory, namely to ignore the existence and the possible contribution of Clegg's model altogether. This is, in fact what is happening today. The discussion of power in the mainstream literature on organizations is carried on without the benefit of Clegg's and other radical theorists' insights. While it is possible and even likely that theories inspired by Marxist informed ideas are controversial and provocative they may still contribute in significant ways to the knowledge of organizations. By systematically ignoring work by people such as Clegg the discipline will ultimately be worse off.

**The Cultural Distinction**

Another response is to point to the cultural differences that exist between Pfeffer, who belongs to the North American tradition and Clegg whose background is European. Some of these cultural differences have been described by Kassem (1976) and we could list them side by side:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>[North]-American</th>
<th>European</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Approach</td>
<td>Microscopic (behavioural)</td>
<td>Macroscopic (structural)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field of Study</td>
<td>Organizational Psychology</td>
<td>Organizational Sociology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Man-in-Organization</td>
<td>Organization in Society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus on</td>
<td>People; their needs and attitudes</td>
<td>The organization as a whole</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>What goes on inside the system</td>
<td>What is going on between the system and its environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methodology</td>
<td>Laboratory experiments surveys, observation, longitudinal, one-case studies.</td>
<td>Comparative case studies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>Harmony based; status quo Anti-Marxian</td>
<td>Conflict based</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Marxian</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Kassem, 1197; cited in Clegg, 1979:3-4)

Table IV - Some Cultural Differences in Organizational Research

It is easy to see similarities between the criteria listed by Kassem and the differences encountered in the models. Differences in cultural backgrounds strongly influence theorists and an openness to these factors helps to gain insight into the forces that influence Pfeffer and Clegg's theorizing. However, the appreciation of culture alone does not guide towards a possible resolution of the differences between the models.
The Ideological Distinction

Burrell and Morgan (1979) go one step further in their book *Sociological Paradigms and Organizational Analysis* in which they organized existing theories of organization according to two sets of underlying assumptions. A dichotomous one dealing with assumptions held about the nature of society and a continuous one reflecting assumptions about the nature of social science. In its most simple form the scheme looks as follows:

### Sociology of Radical Change

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subjective</th>
<th>Objective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Radical Humanist</td>
<td>Radical Structuralist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpretive</td>
<td>Functionalist</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Sociology of Regulation

(Burrell and Morgan, 1979:22)

Figure 5 - Sociological Paradigms

Burrell and Morgan take for the basis of their analysis the development in sociological thought. For most theorists, those that follow the ideas of Durkheim, Weber and Pareto the most important sociological question is 'how is society possible'.
Explanations of society emphasize order, equilibrium and stability. Society is seen as a relatively stable and integrated structure based on normative order and value consensus. In this perception conflict plays a minor role functioning merely as a device for integration. Theorists for whom the most important question is how society changes tend to be informed by Marxian ideas that stress large scale structural conflict between social classes, the imposition of force to obtain conformity, and modes of domination. Society in this view is characterized by change, conflict and disintegration.

It seems reasonable to suggest that Pfeffer's approach to power would be consistent with the idea that society is dynamic but basically cohesive, relatively stable and predictable. Pfeffer's model is based on the premise of orderly organizations, structurally integrated, whose mode of operation is normatively guided. Conflict is seen as serving the function of redefining boundaries of personal influence within the constraints of the organizational structure. This would locate Pfeffer of the regulation side of the scheme.

By the same token Clegg can be classified as a theorist primarily concerned with conditions of conflict and domination. People in organizations are deprived both on a material and psychic level. It is the objective of Clegg's model to lay bare this process of coercion and forced choice so that changes may be brought about in the way the labour process is organized.

The objective-subjective dimension refers to assumptions held about social science. This dimension is further broken
down into ontology, epistemology, human nature and methodology. In the objectivist approach reality is external to the individual and can be observed, described and transmitted objectively. People's free will is limited to a large extent by environmental conditions and it is possible to predict people's behaviour from manipulations of the environment. Methodologies are concerned with grasping invariant relationships and the formulation of general laws. Subjectivists are guided by the idea that reality merely exists in the human mind, that by studying phenomena they will be transformed so that knowledge can only be experienced and never truly transmitted. People are not seen as dominated by their environment. Rather they themselves create the world they live in. The greater role that this view accords to free will makes human behaviour relatively unpredictable. Consequently, methodologies focus primarily on the way in which individuals constitute and are part of their environment. Emphasis is on understanding the subjective experience of individuals and not on the formulation of universal laws.

Since the objective-subjective dimension is continuous and since it contains four related but different elements it is not always possible to exactly define any one theorist's position in the scheme and the quadrants are of necessity an approximation. Nevertheless, in Pfeffer's case it is fairly easy to see that he would properly belong in the functionalist quadrant. In Pfeffer's view reality consists of concrete structures that can be objectively described, measured, comprehended and
communicated. People's actions are subjected to environmental constraints such as structural position and task specialization. By varying these conditions behaviour can be predicted within a given range. The problems of rigorous, controlled measurement and appropriate operationalization of concepts are central to Pfeffer's methodology.

Clegg's position on this dimension is much more problematic. He cannot be classified as Burrell and Morgan suggest (Burrell and Morgan, 1979:321) as a radical humanist because some elements in Clegg's model are more appropriately described by the radical structuralist label. The most striking feature of his model of power as will be recalled is its deterministic nature. There is virtually no room in Clegg's description for free will with the exception perhaps of those people that influence economic processes. This would render people, at least the majority that comprise the lower classes, helpless in the face of environmental constraints, that is the structure of sedimented selection rules. Ontologically speaking however, Clegg tends more in the direction of a nominalist conception of the world. That is he attempts to show how relations of production are consciously structured in particular ways and that moreover people in organizations are dominated linguistically by a language that legitimizes authority. The latter point should be distinguished from Pfeffer's idea of language as a tool for legitimation of decisions. Pfeffer accords mere symbolic significance to the manipulation of language whereas for Clegg its very structure is instrumental
for the domination of one class over another. Later it will be shown that the ambiguous status of Clegg on the objective-subjective dimension influences his model in a negative way. For the moment it can be concluded that Clegg's position on this dimension cannot be precisely indicated.

The Cognitive Distinction
Burrell and Morgan's classification adds to the understanding of the underlying ideological and methodological differences of the models but does so in a restrictive sense. In fact, the authors maintain that the points of view represented in the four quadrants are mutually exclusive. Acceptance of this position would force a choice between Pfeffer and Clegg and this is precisely what should be avoided.

The most promising approach to our predicament is offered by Jurgen Habermas' (1971) theory of cognitive interests. Habermas is a German philosopher and social theorist and belongs to the Frankfurt School of critical theory. Critical theory developed in opposition to positivism first articulated by Kant and later modified by the interpretations of Hegel and Marx. Critical theorists would be classified on the side of the sociology of change in Burrell and Morgan's scheme. Habermas is interested in exposing the underlying structure of dominance and coercion which supports the capitalist system. Habermas' work covers a broad range of ideas and his theory of cognitive interests can be seen as a reaction to the functionalist as well as the interpretive paradigm which occupy the range on the side of the sociology of regulation.
Briefly, Habermas grounds the idea of different cognitive interests in the natural history of the human species. As creatures who are not only concerned with problems of adaptation but who are consciously engaged in changing the environmental conditions. People are both in and transcend nature. Their organization in culture is a break with nature and represents human desire towards utopian fulfillment. The means of social organization that serves both self-preservation and self-fulfillment consist of work, language and domination. Work is the mode by which we gather information that expands our ability to control our environment. Language allows us to interpret and orient our actions towards a life within common traditions. Dominance is represented by the social constraints which conflict with our aims for preservation and fulfillment.

Habermas conceives of these modes of organization as serving different cognitive interests, the technical, the practical and the emancipatory respectively. The empirical-analytic sciences (those in the functionalist quadrant of Burrell and Morgan) serve the technical interest, the historical-hermeneutic (those in the interpretive quadrant) the practical interest and the critical sciences serve the emancipatory interest. The latter refers to all the theories located on the radical side of Burrell and Morgan's scheme. The difference between Habermas and Burrell and Morgan is that for Habermas the three possible orientations to science are general cognitive strategies aiming for the same goal. They are specific viewpoints that in themselves are equally valid and
that together will guide towards self-preservation and self-fulfillment. Acceptance of Habermas' theory would obviate the necessity to choose between theories; they can simply be considered together.

In a recent address Stablein (1982) sketched Habermas' theory of cognitive interests and discussed some of the consequences that adoption of this theory would have for organizational science. Stablein suggests that all three interests are required in organizational research and practice, and since each type is characterized by its own methods and validity claims, comparisons should be made within rather than between types, and that consequently, there is no one path that a priori leads to success. Stablein's interpretation of Habermas' theory makes it possible to evaluate Pfeffer and Clegg's contributions to the understanding of power in organizations, not by comparing them against some universal standard but by judging them on their own merits.

The first step in such an evaluation would be to properly classify Pfeffer and Clegg's models. As has been demonstrated by the foregoing analysis Pfeffer's model serves the technical interests and can be classified as an empirical-analytic approach and Clegg serves the emancipatory interest which makes his model a critical one.

The next step is to articulate criteria that are specific to each approach and that will serve as a standard for evaluation. What are some of the essential characteristics of the empirical-analytic sciences? The ultimate aim is to control
the environment, physical as well as social. Research that results in the formulation of universal laws based on consistently correct predictions of the behaviour of observable phenomena is considered successful. The truth or falsity of these laws depends on their logical relationship to empirical data. The most important criteria on which to judge the critical sciences is to what extent they free people from the domination inherent in the structure of society. Their objective is to raise the self-consciousness by transforming the unreflected consciousness into a reflected one. Critical reflection on one-self and on others is the method towards emancipation and self-formation.

The last step is the application of these criteria to the models. On the surface Pfeffer's research efforts are strikingly successful. It is possible to extract from his book a number of practical guidelines that when followed would develop one's power in any organizational setting. These guidelines tell us that in order to obtain power it is important to rise as high on the hierarchical ladder as possible, to appropriate those tasks that are central and crucial to the organization's survival (or define one's existing task in those terms), to be in a position to cope with problems of uncertainty (but making sure not to solve them permanently) to seek membership on all important committees, to align occasionally with others that support one's position, and to influence the decision making process at the earliest possible stages. All these activities should be carried out with great political
skill but most importantly should not be perceived by others as power seeking behaviour. Language and other symbolic means should be used to legitimize one's actions by making them appear rational.

The problem is one of generalizability. While these guidelines may roughly hold for those people that have already attained powerful positions in an organization, they are rules for the exercise of power once obtained. They apply only to certain kinds of people (management) and refer only to a certain kind of power (directing downward and horizontally, not upward). The model falls short of providing a model of power in general, rather it confines itself to a very limited statement that does not apply equally everywhere in time and space. Pfeffer's failure to take into account the influences of the environment has already been pointed out.

But even if accepting a limited point of view as legitimate there remain a number of concerns relating to the validity of the statements that Pfeffer makes the two most important of which will be highlighted. First there is the question of unit of analysis. As already discussed in Chapter II the properties of individuals are fundamentally different from those of groups and particularly when these groups have been organized hierarchically in organizational units. The relationship of a head of a department to the head of another department is radically different from the relationship of that head to the members of his/her own department. The idea that those that unit heads are acting for the unit on the basis of consensually
shared values is mere conjecture. Pfeffer is not able to satisfactorily define criteria of heterogeneity and homogeneity that lie at the basis of any statement about unified viewpoints of organizational units.

Second there is the lack of information about structural characteristics of organizations. If power is "first and foremost a structural phenomenon" then it is imperative to spell out what these structural conditions are. As an example, in his conditions for conflict (which are conditional for all political activity) one essential variable is that of centrality. For as Pfeffer argues

When power is concentrated, potential conflicts in goals and in definitions of technology are resolved by the imposition of a set of preferences and a view of technology which reflects the position of the dominant coalition controlling the organization (Pfeffer, 1981:87)

But if this is true then the idea that heterogeneous goals and heterogeneous beliefs about technology are instrumental in producing conflict is entirely dependent upon the level of centralized control. The greater the centralization the less influential these factors will be. In order to make any predictions about conflict (and consequently the use of power associated with it) we would need some measure of centrality, yet Pfeffer does not develop this variable. A different but related problem is that in either situation power is used. In the case of decentralized control conflicts are allowed to develop which (when important enough) will result in political activity. In the case of centralized control, power has been used to prevent the conflict from occurring in the first place.
Pfeffer does not consider this use of power in his discussion.

Given these objections (and several others could be raised that are entirely within the realm of empirical-analytic criteria) the general validity of Pfeffer's model will have to be doubted. The "recipe" for the development of power that Pfeffer provides may only be useful in certain kitchens. That is to say that certain types of organizations such as universities where Pfeffer has carried out most studies on power would find the model useful. Others, especially large, multinational corporate entities can benefit little from it.

By its very nature Clegg's model suffers from an entirely different set of problems the essence of which is Clegg's lack of self-reflexivity and the limited contribution he makes towards the emancipation of the dominated classes. As already alluded to Clegg is both a radical humanist and a radical structuralist. As a radical humanist Clegg critiques the way in which organizational science has developed by pointing to the interests it serves. In the tradition of Marxian informed critical theory he attempts, quite successfully, to lay bare the concentrated efforts in organizational science to solve problems of management, production and the realization of profits. His discussion of the concerns that guided such researchers as Taylor and Mayo is insightful, forceful and illuminating. To the extent that such critique is accepted as valuable by the research community it serves an emancipatory purpose. It encourages self-reflection on the part of those scientists who now dominate the field.
It is as a radical structuralist that Clegg fails in his emancipatory mission. First because he does not reflect on his own statements. He leaves out of consideration those elements of power that do not fit his conception of the problem, that is the existence of countervailing power of unions. Second, Clegg's insistence on the deterministic and immutable nature of the structure of society is at odds with the critical perspective which holds that society is enacted. If it is true that sedimentation of selected rules develops in response to long economic waves then the determinants of these waves should be subjected to analysis. Clegg merely treats them as given. It is the power of reflective activity, according to Habermas, to alter patterns of domination by making them transparent. It is suggested that Clegg in the exposition of his own model of power is not sufficiently reflective upon the ultimate transparency of what appear to be structural imperatives.

As a final measure of the emancipatory power of Clegg's model its utility for those that labour in organizations should be evaluated. The realization of workers that capitalist have increased their control by appropriating the methods of production in addition to the means of production through the introduction of 'labour saving' technologies did not await Clegg's model of power. The lower classes, those apparently most in need to be freed from domination have been actively engaged in the struggle for control over work since technology was first introduced. There is little that Clegg has to offer that might increase the understanding or that might guide effort
the change the pattern of structural domination.

Clegg, it appears, present somewhat of a paradox. His efforts to expose the underlying motives and assumptions of mainstream organizational theories are justified and his objections should be heard. By proposing his own "critical" model of power Clegg reappropriates some of the emancipatory power he accords others. In the final analysis Clegg appears too much of a positivist trying to prove his case to be entirely convincing in his critical self-reflexive endeavour.

The Cognitive Distinction Reconsidered

From the discussion on the relative merits of Pfeffer and Clegg's models of power judged on their own terms again more insight has been gained into the models. In addition areas of interaction can be observed which would not have been revealed had the models been compared with each other. It can be seen how each orientation to the problem of power may serve as a sounding board, a source of criticism and a source of inspiration for the other. Taken together (but not synthesized) the comprehension of power in organizations has been increased by Pfeffer and Clegg's models. Complete understanding will only be achieved however when the historical-hermeneutic sciences are included so that the practical interest may be served.

Let us consider what in Habermas' theory the contribution of the historical-hermeneutic approach would be to the understanding of power. As an illustration Stablein's (1982) interpretation and example will be used. The basic aim of the historical-hermeneutic sciences is to come to an understanding
of meaning in the interest of the "preservation and expansion of the intersubjectivity of possible action-orienting mutual orientation". Understanding therefore, serves as the basis for decision making. The basis for understanding in turn is the ability to apply language in a way that is free from distortion.

As an example of obtaining knowledge in the practical interest Stablein refers to change efforts and interventions in organizations known as organizational development where

> the change agent must be concerned with the specific situation at hand. The consultant must interpret the meaning of this situation in light of his/ her background and that of the client. (Stablein,1982:11)

Emphasis is on action-oriented research efforts by interpreting complex problems in a dialogue with others in order to come to consensual understanding

> How would the historical hermeneutic sciences contribute to the problem of obtaining a complete picture of power in organizations? Referring back to the dilemma of levels of analysis and their connections recall that neither Clegg nor Pfeffer made the connection between the individual and society. Following Habermas researchers would have to investigate the patterns of power distributions in society and how these affect people within and without organizations. This would involve a dialogue with people on all levels or organizations in order to understand how societal and organizational power distributions affect their lives. Action would be oriented towards making those power distributions compatible in the interest of the individual and the organization.
It is suggested that the role of mere understanding albeit in a dialogue that Habermas grants to the historical hermeneutic sciences is unnecessarily limited. Given the limitations of the critical sciences and the danger of diminished self-reflexivity on the part of the researcher Habermas' theory of cognitive interests does not fulfill its promise of exhausting all possible ways of knowing. In terms of the concept of power research in the practical interests will increase the understanding somewhat but not significantly so. At the root of this problem lies the particular perspective that Habermas has on the historical-hermeneutic sciences. He says for example that

The objectivist self-understanding of the hermeneutic sciences... defend s sterilized knowledge against the reflected appropriation of active traditions and locks up history in a museum. (Habermas, 1971:316)

Clearly in Habermas' opinion the role of the hermeneutic sciences must of necessity be limited.

It is argued that there is another potentially more fruitful way to perceive historical-hermeneutics. Hermeneutics developed at the end of Medieval times as an auxiliary of theology. Its task was the correct interpretation of canonical texts. The development of historicism, Dilthey's notion of "Verstehen" (emphatic understanding) and the influence of people like Wittgenstein and Winch, transformed hermeneutics from a dogmatic-normative science to a linguistically based relativist and subjectivist orientation. In 1965 Gadamer published a hermeneutics of language which formed the basis for a protracted
debate with Habermas. It is suggested that Gadamer's point of view on hermeneutics should be adopted not Habermas' since its broader scope allows for fundamental analysis. The emphasis should be on language. Language as will be recalled is the characteristic mode of organizing in the practical interest.

From the debate with Gadamer however it appears that Habermas sees language as subordinated to relations of labour and patterns of domination. While this is an arguable point it is Habermas himself who provides a possible solution to this problem in his theory of communicative competence. The basic idea of this theory is that communicative distortions (caused by patterns of domination) can be resolved by the anticipation of an ideal speech situation. If it is possible to communicate on the basis of universal pragmatics and anticipating undistorted conditions then it is not clear why this would fall outside the purview of hermeneutics which is concerned with interpretation of language. It is Gadamer's contention that Habermas is unjustified in granting the critical sciences the exclusive ability for achieving undistorted communications.

Similarly, by charging hermeneutics with the 'appropriation of active tradition' Habermas seems to reserve the ability for self-reflection for the critical sciences. But critical scientists do not always apply self-reflection to their own research. Gadamer suggests that the very nature of hermeneutics would make it extremely suited as a reflexive science. Gadamer

\[15\] For a discussion of this debate see Thomas McCarthy, 1978:170-187
conceeds that it is unavoidable that investigators harbour preconceptions and prejudgments about themselves and about their subject of study, but to think that they would be able to discard these all at once as Habermas seems to suggest is an illusion. At best researchers can be aware of them and take them into account when reflecting upon the phenomena of interpretive understanding. Thus a self-reflective sociolinguistically based hermeneutic science should be given a larger role in the scheme of cognitive interests.

If we accept for the moment an increased responsibility for the historical-hermeneutic sciences we can think of a possible scenario for research on power in organizations. Using the circular method of hermeneutics we can first try to grasp the whole concept of power that includes all levels (individual, organizational and societal), like a translator trying to understand the global significance of a piece of writing. Further detailed study of each component will provide increased understanding of the whole which in turn illuminates connections among the components. It is in this way that researchers can gain understanding of all the levels of analysis and their interconnections.

But it is not only the concept of power that can be grasped in this way, hermeneutics can also contribute to a better understanding of differential approaches like those of Clegg and Pfeffer. Without changing the models themselves (hermeneutics only attempts in depth understanding of phenomena) but also without "appropriating tradition" (hermeneutic understanding can
be pursued critically) it will allow us to make sense of the differences.
VI. CONCLUSION

One of the aims of this thesis has been to draw attention to the radically different viewpoints about power in organizations held by people such as Stewart Clegg. The analysis and discussion have been geared towards providing a possible framework for if not integration at least co-existence of the traditional and the critical perspectives. It is felt that the discipline would benefit from the insights potentially available within this framework.

An increased role for the historical-hermeneutic sciences, as argued in the final section would open up avenues of research that until now have been insufficiently explored. Research could proceed on at least three levels. (1) Power could be investigated as a concept so as to complete Habermas' scheme of the three sciences by serving the practical interest, (2) statements about power as formulated by others could be the focus of study (this thesis is an instance of this kind of research), (3) the role that language plays in theories of power could be topic under investigation.

As an example of the latter case it can be shown that the relative importance of language is a crucial differentiating characteristic between Pfeffer and Clegg's models. For Pfeffer language can be used to legitimate decisions and existing authority structure. It is therefore a tool, an expressive symbolic means employed by those in power to justify their actions by making them appear rational. It is this very requirement of rationality as a mode of organizing which for
Clegg points up the hegemonic role of language. Language is constitutive of a framework for relations of labour (e.g. social-regulative rules). Consequently it represents a 'form of life', a way of being in the world where rationality reigns supreme. Language is both the instrumental and the expressive means of domination.

More generally, hermeneutics could be used on an individual level where we could investigate how the human potential for growth as discussed by Carl Rogers and others, gets thwarted by the cognitive traps of certain linguistic formations. Organizations could be analyzed in terms of their linguistic structure (rules of conduct, cultural climate and means of communication) laying bare the structural patterns of power. Laws, forms of government, media and research produced in academic institutions are all areas on the level of society that can be subjected to hermeneutic analysis.

If it is true as Chomsky (1957) claims that there is an identical deep grammar underlying all natural languages the knowledge of which can make us linguistically competent and if it is equally true as Habermas claims that language consists of universal pragmatics that make us competent communicators then we have to turn to language as the basic means of understanding our world.
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