PLANNING STRATEGIES FOR CANADIAN URBAN PLANNERS: A CASE STUDY OF REGINA

by

DIANA RITA SALOMAA

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Department of Community and Regional Planning

The University of British Columbia
2075 Wesbrook Place
Vancouver, Canada
V6T 1W5

Date October, 1981
ABSTRACT

The purpose of this thesis is to examine a new approach to planning as advocated by Ron Clark, the Director of Planning in Regina from 1976 to 1980. Compared to the traditional planning role, Clark outlined an activist orientation to planning based on the following five strategies. It was short term and issue oriented as opposed to "master" planning, policy planning versus reactive and regulatory planning, public participation rather than planning for private interests, and political intervention instead of a passive and non-controversial role.

The study reviews the relevant literature to develop a theoretical perspective on the urban planner's role. The traditional approach to planning, the rational comprehensive model, is examined along with two basic reforms to this model in order to contrast the planning style advocated by Clark. Next, theoretical concerns regarding each of Clark's strategies are outlined. A case study of the inner city is the basis for analyzing the extent to which these strategies were put into practice. In addition, the formulation of Regina RSVP, a municipal development plan for the City, is examined to ascertain the extent of public input as the latter strategy was to be a major feature of planning in Regina.

The study concludes that Clark was successful in introducing a new planning process to Regina. This was reflected in city council's support of Regina RSVP. Rather than being a traditional land use plan, RSVP documents presented a strategy for public planning, described major and emerging issues confronting the City, and offered policy objectives for resolving
these issues. In the process, a model for the future development of Regina emerged.

The case study on inner city planning clearly showed that Regina planners were successful in implementing their strategies. Planning staff and community groups identified pressing inner city problems, short term action was taken, planning was policy oriented, there was a considerable amount of community level participation, and Regina planners were activists in terms of both initiating action and lobbying for the implementation of planning goals.

However, the study also found some limitations in the application of these strategies. With respect to Regina RSVP, public participation was not initiated at an early stage of the planning process. There was a lack of documented evidence on many inner city problems or research on viable growth alternatives. Lastly, the strategies of political intervention and public participation create potential role conflicts as to who should initiate planning goals.

Two external constraints which reduced the effective application of these strategies also became apparent. First, policy planning at the local level is difficult due to the dominant role of the provincial government. Secondly, planners are constrained in making long term improvements as their legitimacy has been limited primarily to technical matters. Local planners are unable to make any basic changes as they have little power to influence social and economic trends. At best, they can support programs that alleviate some of their worst effects.
This case study has illustrated an approach to planning that re-defined the planner's role beyond the traditionally passive and technical role critics have claimed characterize the profession. Regina planners were largely successful in implementing their strategies. Because the approach used in Regina went well beyond basic reforms to the profession, and proved to be implementable, the strategies of short term action, issue orientation, policy formation, public participation, and political intervention should be used by other urban planners in Canada.

If planners want to assume a more influential role in city development, there will have to be more discussion on the practice and function of the planning profession. Planning education should also reflect a more responsible role for planners. The values and purposes of planning should be stressed over technical competency. An understanding of who and what we are planning for is more important than achieving proficiency in using planning tools.
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CHAPTER ONE
AN EXAMINATION OF PLANNING PRACTICE

1.1 INTRODUCTION

Since World War II, Canada has rapidly become urbanized with its population increasingly concentrated in a few large centers. Concurrent with this growth in city size, the Canadian urban planning profession has expanded. In 1949, there were only six planning departments in all of Canada and forty-five planners. Today, most cities have separate planning departments incorporated in the municipal government structure. Recently, planning has specialized and broadened its sphere of influence. There are now numerous regional, social, and special purpose planning agencies. As well, senior levels of government have begun to employ urban planners. (Gerecke, 1976)

Despite the number of people entering and practising the profession, planners have been criticized (particularly around the late 1960's and early 1970's) for doing little to direct urban growth in any well-conceived manner. According to the Federal Task Force on Housing and Urban Development (1969), planners, in their eager desire to accommodate growth, have become technicians. They are preoccupied with matters such as the administration of zoning and subdivision regulations and the provision of municipal infrastructure. The Task Force claimed that planners have done little to question the social and ecological consequences of continued growth nor have they provided much initiative in public policy formation.

Many of the Task Force's criticisms of the Canadian planning profession were substantiated by a 1971 study conducted by
Kent Gerecke. Gerecke sent questionnaires to all the urban planning directors in Canada in an attempt to identify Canadian planning practice.

Survey results showed there was an emphasis on "traditional, physical, design-oriented planning" in Canada rather than a move to a "new socio-economic, citizen participation and research-oriented planning". The major findings were: (a) Over half of the important planning decisions made were related to facilitating, servicing or controlling community growth. There was less concern about confronting transportation, housing or public finance problems. Social and ecological issues (eg. poverty, the quality of the environment) were overlooked entirely. (b) The type of planning activity undertaken was largely determined outside the planning agency. This meant that planners provided ad hoc remedies to crises instead of initiating policies to guide and direct growth. (c) The majority of planners preferred to leave controversial matters to politicians. (d) The public was very seldom consulted through questionnaires or surveys. (e) Research was limited to specific issues rather than being conducted on a continuous basis. (f) The Planning Director's major role was administrative. They viewed the function of their agencies as preparing and administering comprehensive plans, zoning and subdivision regulations.

The image of Canadian planners as timid, conservative and technical was reinforced by the Ontario Economic Council (1973):

"Two things are evident. First, the senior public planners have, in effect, been doing very little planning; they have served largely as planning administrators, carrying out chiefly housekeeping functions. Second, they have offered few initiatives and innovations... They have not, in any
discernible sense, emerged as a truly innovative force in the area of public policy formulation."

There is much discussion in planning literature on the need to reassess what the professional planner's role ought to encompass. In the early history of planning, problems were relatively clear cut. Urban growth was haphazard and unregulated. Municipal infrastructure such as sewage facilities, drinking water, roads and schools was inadequate or non-existent. Consequently, the task of the planner was simple. He was to facilitate the orderly development of the city.

In recent decades, the pace of urbanization has rapidly increased. As a result, the planning function has assumed greater importance with the actions of planners affecting the lives of most Canadians. Critics claim it is no longer sufficient for planners to simply focus on the technical details of growth. If planners want to have more control over the development of cities, they must adopt a more active and aggressive role. They must assume greater responsibility for determining public policies affecting all aspects of the city. (Levin, 1966) Questions regarding the allocation of public resources, the consequences of continued urban growth, as well as the form of future growth should be raised.

According to the literature, planners have not responded to the new challenges confronting them. Critics claim that unless there is a re-examination of the role and function of planners, they will be relegated to the role of bureaucrats enforcing increasingly irrelevant regulations. (Editorial, Plan Canada, 1966) In the meantime, the real task of city building will, by default, be left to politicians, developers, architects and
1.2 **RATIONALE**

The purpose of this thesis is to examine a more active role for planners as advocated by Ron Clark, the Director of Planning in Regina from 1976 to 1980. I was attracted to Clark's approach as he made a conscious effort to avoid many of the limitations of past planning practice. His planning philosophy was based on the following five strategies. It was short term and issue oriented as opposed to comprehensive "master" planning which seldom, he believed, resulted in any action. It was policy planning rather than technical, reactive and regulatory planning. It was based on public participation as opposed to planning for private interests. Finally, it was based on political intervention. This meant that Regina planners assumed an active role. They were not afraid to challenge established political and economic interests.

I felt that Clark's strategies should be further examined as they represented significant reforms to shortcomings in planning practice. This approach could provide a new model for planning which should be practiced by all Canadian urban planners.

1.3 **METHOD**

This thesis will examine the extent to which Clark* was able to put his planning strategies into practice. The focus on

* It should be noted that although I specifically refer to Ron Clark throughout this thesis, I am also referring to Regina planning staff. Their contribution and support was necessary for the implementation of these strategies.
the strategies themselves rather than an evaluation of results achieved is necessary because of the inherent difficulties of isolating other causal factors such as the political climate which may influence the success or failure of a program. This approach serves to illustrate both the constraints planners are confronted with as well as ways they can exert a greater influence over planning decisions.

In conducting this evaluation, the following steps were required:

(a) To become familiar with both Clark's planning philosophy and problems confronting Regina. This was done through interviews with Ron Clark, key personnel in the Regina Planning Department and a city hall reporter for the Regina Leader-Post. Regina Planning Department documents were the primary source of information supplemented by articles in the Leader-Post.

(b) To compare Clark's strategies with approaches advocated by other theorists (the early concern with efficiency, rational comprehensive model, advocacy planning and the humanistic approach) to better understand what changes Clark proposed. I then examined theoretical concerns regarding each of Clark's planning strategies. Plan Canada and the American Institute of Planning Journal were the primary sources of information.

(c) To understand whether Clark was able to put his strategies into practice. I selected inner city planning as a case study. According to Planning Department documents, it was undergoing considerable development pressure posing a serious threat to the residential character of many inner city neighborhoods. The Planning Department placed high priority on solving inner
city problems.

(d) To briefly examine the process of formulating Regina RSVP, the new growth management strategy for Regina, as a case study on citizen participation. Regina RSVP was one of Clark's most significant achievements while Director of Planning. Citizen participation was a major feature of his approach.

1.4 THESIS ORGANIZATION

The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter Two reviews early planning in Regina. This contrasts planning under Clark to past approaches used as well as provides a background to current problems. Next, each of Clark's five planning strategies are outlined. Chapter Three discusses selected categories of planning thought to better understand the approach put into practice by Regina planning staff. In addition, theoretical concerns regarding each of Clark's strategies are examined. Chapter Four provides a general background to Regina in terms of historical roots, economy, population, housing demand and local government. Chapter Five describes the public participation program for Regina RSVP in order to determine the extent and type of public involvement in formulating growth management policies. Chapter Six describes the application of planning strategies to the inner city. It includes a summary of inner city problems, the Planning Department's approach to these problems, and major results achieved. Chapter Seven analyzes the extent to which Clark's strategies were actually applied in the inner city as well as the type of public involvement with regard to Regina RSVP. It looks at: (a) to what extent was planning short term and issue oriented, (b) how
well problems were substantiated by research and documented evidence, (c) scope of planning, (d) type of planning actions recommended, (e) mechanisms suggested to facilitate policy planning, (f) policy goals, (g) extent and type of public involvement with regard to Regina RSVP, (h) extent of resident involvement in inner city neighborhoods, (i) extent and type of political intervention, and (j) role conflicts this latter strategy created.

Chapter Seven also summarizes the limitations, constraints, and strengths of Clark's approach to planning.
CHAPTER TWO
PLANNING IN REGINA

According to Clark, previous planning in Regina exhibited few innovative characteristics. He believed it was typical of those cities which "emerge from the economic imperatives of a capitalist-directed society". (Clark, 1980:217) Planning decisions had been dictated by private interests with little opportunity for public intervention.

The following is a brief overview of Regina's early planning history according to a Planning Department document entitled Regina RSVP: A Planning Strategy for Regina (A Working Document) (1977A). It offers an insight into how Regina planners proposed to change the pattern of planning in the city. Clark felt that past planning in Regina clearly demonstrated the inadequacy of a passive and reactive planning function. In addition, it provides a background to current problems as it was believed many were the result of the adverse effects of early plans.

2.1 EFFECT OF EARLY PLANS

The first plan for Regina was produced in 1914 by Thomas Mawson, a British town planner. Until then, growth had been chaotic and ad hoc. Clark believed Mawson's plan had a long-lasting detrimental effect on the city. As Figure 1 illustrates, it reinforced a class bias for settlement. The upper and middle classes were encouraged to settle south of the CPR tracks, while the working class was directed north of the tracks.

However, Mawson's plan was not entirely negative. It did enhance the environmental quality of the city as it resulted in
Figure 1
Mawson's Plan

Source: Regina Planning Department, 1977A:10
an extensive residential tree planting program and park development.

The next major planning effort did not occur until 1927. This was when Regina's first zoning bylaw came into effect. Six zones (which differentiated between residential, business and industrial districts) were established for the city. Clark believed the bylaw only minimally restricted land use as uses in each zone overlapped considerably.

It was not until 1930 that a Town Planning Commission, whose purpose was to prepare a planning scheme for Regina, was established. Clark felt the fact that the plan followed the zoning bylaw revealed a marked uncertainty about the planning process. To this point there were no explicit public policies to direct growth.

Although a plan was prepared by the Commission, it was set aside due to the depression and World War II. Immediately after the war, a planning consultant named Eugene Faludi was hired to prepare a master plan. Clark believed the most negative aspect of Faludi's plan was his recommendation to establish suburban shopping centers. He claimed this created serious difficulties for current planning as it affected both the vitality and commercial viability of downtown Regina.

Faludi's plan was accompanied by a new zoning bylaw which was passed in 1949. The new bylaw was essentially the same as the first except that more land use zones were created. Like the 1927 bylaw, overlapping uses (particularly in business and industrial zones) were permitted.

According to Clark, the most damaging aspect of both by-
laws was that a large amount of land zoned for particular uses was vacant. There was no longer any need to establish policies to guide development since the future land uses were already decided upon. The result of over-zoning and the absence of growth management policies meant that development interests could dictate future patterns of growth.

As the Faludi plan quickly became outdated, a community planning scheme was prepared in 1961 by the Planning Department, which had been established ten years previously. The planning scheme reserved a large area for downtown development. Clark claimed this reflected an unrealistic outlook for the future economic growth of Regina. He believed the effect of the report was to encourage land speculation in the central business district and to place unnecessary redevelopment pressure on residential properties in the inner city.

The plan was implemented by a new zoning bylaw which was in effect from 1962 to 1968. Although this bylaw was more comprehensive than previous bylaws, it still allowed overlapping uses in particular zones.

In 1968, a new zoning bylaw was adopted. Conflicts arose as to whether the 1961 municipal planning scheme or 1968 zoning bylaw controlled city development. Critics of the 1961 planning scheme claimed it was intended as no more than a guide which was to serve as a framework for a later comprehensive plan. The later plan never followed. Problems arose whenever the 1961 planning scheme and zoning bylaws differed. (Leader-Post, October 3, 1973)

There was pressure from various interest groups, particu-
larly from those related to the property industry, to rescind the 1961 plan. These groups claimed the city could lose up to $57 million in development as anyone could launch an action to stop projects that conflicted with the 1961 plan. (Leader-Post, October 3, 1973)

In 1973, city council passed a resolution that made zoning bylaws the sole mechanism of planning control for the city. This meant that where there was a conflict, the zoning bylaws would prevail. According to Clark (1980:225):

"The implications of this resolution have been serious in terms of the growth and development of Regina. With no overall guidelines for development, planning is reduced to an ad hoc activity. Here zoning is being used inappropriately to direct the growth of a city, owing to the lack of a comprehensive plan for orderly development. In the absence of a plan, the nature of the development is dictated by private interests who own the land and by their ability to lobby successfully for rezoning of individual pieces of their land or whole areas. This creates considerable uncertainty as to the future development of any area of the city. Thus, if control is achieved by regulation instead of by public policy, development may be won for private than for public good."

Clark was determined that future planning in Regina would provide a sharp break with previous planning whereby:

(a) Private plans had been allowed to take precedence over public plans,

(b) Public planning had concentrated on planning by regulation rather than planning by public policy, and

(c) Planning had made no attempt to define and lead in the field of public policy. (Regina Planning Department, 1977A)

The following strategies, discussed in more detail below, form the cornerstone of Clark's efforts to achieve a new planning process for Regina. They are: short term action, issue oriented, policy formation, public participation, and political interven-
tion.

2.2  **STRATEGIES UTILIZED BY THE REGINA PLANNING DEPARTMENT (1976-1980)**

(Note: The following discussion of planning strategies is from Regina RSVP: A Working Document, 1977A)

A. **Short Term Action**

Clark felt that traditional long range plans have two basic limitations. They are soon outdated because it is difficult to accurately predict future trends. In addition, as these plans seek a unitary public interest, they are vague and abstract. It is difficult to stir political interest in them. As a result, they are seldom implemented. He believed that a more practical strategy is short term action. Short term plans adapt to changing circumstances and they are more readily translated into action.

Clark cautioned that short term action did not rule out a long range perspective. Short term decisions must be made in the context of long term policies and objectives. A longer view provides guidelines for future development and it is a framework for observing and measuring change.

B. **Issue Oriented**

Clark believed that planners should concentrate on defining and resolving specific urban issues rather than formulating master plans. Crucial issues would be identified through an on-going dialogue with the public. A strategy of key interventions, with each intervention representing public policy translated into action, would confront and ameliorate the most immediate problems. He felt this approach would ensure that qua-
lity of life improvements could be made (such as affordable housing, public transit and access to open space). It also expanded the role of planners beyond the traditional emphasis on land administration.

Clark cautioned that while key interventions focused on immediate issues, planners must also keep in mind the complexity and inter-relatedness of urban problems.

Problems in Regina were divided into two categories: major and emerging issues. The Planning Department defined major issues as those that the public expressed the most concern towards. This was measured through media coverage, delegations to city council, and questions raised by visitors to a storefront planning office located in the downtown area. Although Clark acknowledged that this was not the most reliable method to determine community concerns, he felt that the issues raised were of interest to a significant number of people in Regina. The major issues were: (a) The City of Regina should support the Rail Relocation Program as it provided a unique opportunity to improve the urban environment and resolve transportation problems. (In 1974, the federal government passed the Rail Relocation and Grade Crossing Act. This allowed municipalities to relocate rail lines and it provided funding to implement plans on the vacated land.) (b) The downtown should be revitalized. (c) The inner city neighborhoods should be protected and made attractive residential areas for a variety of income groups.

Emerging issues were those that the Planning Department predicted could be significant problems in the future. In this case, the planners, rather than the public, defined the goals,
objectives and issues. The list was not meant to be exhaustive. The Planning Department felt that through future discussions, the public would agree with some, reject others and add many of their own issues. The emerging issues were: (a) The traditional form of low density, car dependent suburban residential development should be challenged. (b) Public transit should be promoted and improved. (c) The municipal government should play a more active role in alleviating inadequate housing supply, particularly for certain income groups. (d) All levels of government should take a more responsible attitude toward Native problems. (e) Well designed open space and recreational facilities should be given greater budgetary priority.

C. Policy Formation

According to Clark, local government has traditionally concerned itself with non-controversial "housekeeping" services. These services have the common characteristic of being related to property (eg. the provision of water supply, sewage collection and disposal, and fire and police protection). Senior governments, on the other hand, have been responsible for policy areas such as welfare, education, transportation and major public works. He believed that in recent years there has been a shift in emphasis in the role of local government. Both the rate and type of urban growth involve projects on a massive scale. These generate public attention and often bitter opposition. As a result, local officials are forced to consider controversial policy questions(eg. public transit versus more freeways).

Clark felt that planning in Regina must break the tendency
to be reactive and regulatory and move into the field of public policy. Well formulated policies would provide directions for future urban growth. They would specify the goals to be pursued and how these goals would be achieved. Consequently, Regina planning staff, with aid from the public, formulated policies on both the major and emerging issues confronting the city.

Planning Department documents outlined two ways that aggressive policy stimulation could be achieved. They were:

(a) **Public Dialogue** - The public must have an active voice in decision-making. To achieve this, the Planning Department's role was to promote communication between the public, city council, civic administration and other levels of government.

(b) **Policy Secretariat** - Most civic bureaucracies have no, or limited, policy capability. Clark felt there was a need to restructure local government to ensure a better policy making environment. He suggested that a policy secretariat responsible to council should be created. It would have an explicit policy formation and coordination mandate. In addition, input from informal organizations such as neighborhood planning groups should be integrated into the policy making function of municipalities.

D. **Public Participation**

According to Clark, private interests often determined the type of development a city experienced. In the past, the public had little opportunity to influence the nature of urban growth. The Planning Department felt this trend should be reversed with public interests taking precedence over private interests. This
could only be realized through a strategy of public planning.

As Clark said:

"Our role is to be provocative. What's wrong with dialogue? We're not afraid of the public. We want to be able to test some ideas on the public... get some reaction from the people. After all they are the ones who are going to be living here. They should have some say in the planning of the city." (Leader-Post, December 28, 1976:5)

To achieve public involvement on an ongoing and continuous basis, Clark believed the following was needed:

(a) **Information and awareness** - The City must provide the public with information about local issues as well as information on the activities and programs of local government departments. In addition, the City should initiate a series of seminars on the structure and operation of local government. It was believed an open flow of information was essential if the public was to participate meaningfully in the planning process.

(b) **Accessibility** - Most citizens have had little contact with the people who make decisions. The Planning Department recommended that politicians, administrators and planners make themselves accessible to the public. They should initiate dialogue on important planning issues. Suggested ways to achieve communication were the continued operation of a storefront planning office in the downtown area, neighborhood planning, and public meetings.

(c) **Responsiveness** - Planning must be responsive to divergent viewpoints as it was believed "building a better community is dependent upon communicating, listening, explaining, understanding and mutual education." (Regina Planning Department, 1977:62) To achieve this, Clark suggested funds be made avail-
able to community groups. This would allow them to research neighborhood problems and develop community plans. The civic bureaucracy should be reorganized to become more policy oriented. Finally, the Regina Planning Commission was urged to adopt a more active role. It consisted of 15 members who were appointed for three years by council to investigate matters related to the physical, social or economic circumstances of the municipality. (Leader-Post, April 16, 1977) The Commission had traditionally maintained a low public profile. Clark suggested it should begin to take a more active interest in planning matters. For example, they could host community meetings to determine the public's views.

F. Political Intervention

This strategy, although not explicitly described in planning documents, emerged as an important component of the approach to planning used in Regina. It included the following elements:

(a) Initiate planning action - Planners must be willing to take risks and become involved in controversy. With the aid of the public, they should frame their own questions, provide answers to these questions, and develop programs without waiting for requests to do so. (Gans, 1975) By assuming an active role, planners have a unique opportunity to play a more influential part in decision-making. Politicians confront problems without adequate information or even clear concepts of what they want to achieve. Planners can offer decision-makers information, analysis and policy recommendations. (Krumholz, Cogger, Linner, 1975)
However, presenting information alone is not enough. Planners must also seek out potential allies among the public, business, and political communities and show them how their interests are affected by various development proposals. (Krumholz et al, 1975)

(b) Making value positions clear - Activism, as it involves taking public positions on issues, implies that planners must decide which interest group they want to serve. Typically, planners have chosen to support and strengthen the position of the suburban, car owning, home owning, middle class groups in society. (Hague, 1974) Regina planners chose to give priority to low income inner city residents.
CHAPTER THREE

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

This chapter examines two major trends which have influenced planning practice, efficiency and the scientific method in the early 1900's, and the later appearance of the rational comprehensive model in the 1950's. These trends illustrate many of the limitations of planning practice which Clark was highly critical of. The profession's early adoption of the scientific method as the basis for their work led to a passive, value-free, technical and physical orientation to planning. Although this was replaced by the rational comprehensive model, the basic premises of early planning practice were not rejected. Instead, through the use of better tools, planners attempted to enhance rational and objective decision-making.

Two basic reforms to the rational comprehensive model, more communication and an expanded scope for planning, were then examined. These reforms were contrasted with Clark's approach to planning in order to see what alternatives he had to offer.

3.1 SELECTED TRENDS IN PLANNING THOUGHT

A. Efficiency and the Scientific Method

At the turn of the century, both Canada and the United States began their transformation from agricultural to industrial societies. Haphazard physical growth occurred as there were few, if any, governmental structures to cope with the problems of rapid urbanization. (Gunton, 1980) There were limited municipal sewer services, drinking water, garbage disposal or transit facilities. Subdivision and construction were unregulated and left to the whim of individual landowners. There was a growing
sense of disorder and social unrest, especially among the poor, as they suffered the worst effects of the transition to industrialization. (Heskin, 1980) Action had to be taken, particularly with respect to public health, as the upper and middle classes were fearful of the diseases and other social evils rampant in the slums.

Planners adopted a simplistic approach to improving society. It was believed there was a direct relationship between the quality of the physical environment and the quality of life. (Heskin, 1980) The prescribed remedy for the various social evils was improvement of the physical setting. Thus, if well designed and well sited houses, playgrounds and community facilities could be substituted for the crowded conditions of the slums, then not only disease, but crime, delinquency, alcoholism, broken homes, and mental illness would disappear. (Webber, 1963) This marked the beginning of the profession's early and persistent focus on the physical development of the city.

While planners saw themselves as urban experts, they lacked a theoretical foundation for their work. (Heskin, 1980) During this period, at the turn of the century, philosophers such as Veblen and Dewey advocated the application of the scientific method to social affairs. (Heskin, 1980) Planners readily embraced this idea as it imbued them with a sense of professionalism. They claimed they were scientists and as such, would be efficient, dedicated to objectivity, and could carefully collect and analyze "factual" data in a dispassionate, value-free fashion. (Klosterman, 1978)
Critics claim that planners, because they so readily accepted their role as value-free technicians, became administrators of programs rather than proposers or evaluators of various alternatives. Their task was to find the means for achieving public policy objectives while avoiding the value questions of defining those objectives. By relying on politicians to determine planning goals, planners firmly aligned themselves with dominant political and economic interests. (Barr, 1972) Ethical questions regarding the allocation of public resources were seldom asked. (Davidoff, 1965)

Critics also claimed that planners had overestimated the role that physical structures play in shaping social behavior. (Webber, 1963) While some aspects of the city's physical environment can directly benefit residents, the physical setting, by itself, is only a minor condition for the realization of social and economic opportunities. Differences in social status, race, shortage of job opportunities, inadequate education, and low income present far more serious problems for upward mobility than inadequate physical structures.

B. Rational Comprehensive Model

By the 1950's, physical determinism was seen as too simplistic a theory. In its place, another model of planning was identified which saw the city as a complex system of economic, social and physical forces. (Heskin, 1980) The new premise of planning required far more comprehensive analysis. This meant that planners, when presented with a goal, must: (a) consider all of the alternatives open to them, (b) identify and evaluate all of the consequences which would follow from
the adoption of each alternative, and (c) select the alternative with the most preferred consequences in terms of the goal. (Friedmann, 1966)

To achieve this ideal, planners began to utilize sophisticated tools which were being developed at the time. These included cost-benefit analysis, input-output studies, simulation models and computer technology. (Heskin, 1980) It was believed that these tools would bring planners closer to the scientific ideal espoused in earlier planning theory, rational and objective decision-making.

The rational comprehensive model of planning assumes planners hold an all-seeing, all-encompassing view of the world. (Barr, 1972) Critics claim this is an impossible task as no one can know all of the available alternatives or all of the consequences which would follow from any action. (Friedmann, 1966) Theorists such as Braybrooke and Lindblom (1963) argue that decision-making, rather than being comprehensive, has the following characteristics. It is: (a) remedial, as decisions are made to solve immediate problems rather than to fulfil goals; (b) incremental, as relatively small changes are made; (c) serial, in that problems are successively attacked rather than solved at once; (d) exploratory, in that goals are continually being redefined; and (e) fragmented, in that only a limited number of alternatives are considered.

It also places a heavy emphasis on technical expertise. However, technical solutions do little to redistribute wealth, knowledge, skill, or other social goods. (Davidoff, 1965) The poor are the most disadvantaged by this approach to planning.
Through lack of education, they are ill-prepared to deal with the increasing bureaucratization and technical basis of decisions. (Peattie, 1968)

It also assumes that planners can identify a unified public interest. Their task is to produce a single plan containing the overall goals of the community. (Altshuler, 1965) In their quest for consensus, planners ignore the fact there are competing needs and aspirations among different groups.

Finally, as truly comprehensive goals are general, it is difficult to obtain political commitment to them. As a result, the plans often never reach the stage of implementation.

Because of these criticisms, theorists have suggested a variety of reforms to alleviate shortcomings in the rational comprehensive model of planning. The following is a discussion of some of these reforms as well as their limitations.

C. Reforms to the Rational Comprehensive Model

Advocate planners felt that planning could be improved if planners represented the interests of a particular group, especially the poor. (Davidoff, 1965) It was felt these people had been underrepresented in the planning process. Consequently, advocate planners rejected the notion of a single "best" solution or the notion of a unitary public interest. (Peattie, 1963)

Proponents of advocacy planning claimed it would have the following advantages. It would better inform the public of the alternate choices available. It would force public planning agencies to compete with other planning groups. In the absence of opposition, public agencies have little incentive to improve the quality of their work. Those groups who have been critical
of establishment plans would be given the opportunity to produce superior plans. Finally, any plan submitted would make explicit the values underlying recommendations for particular courses of action. Reasons for supporting one set of proposals as well as reasons indicating the inferiority of other courses of action would be given, thus aiding decision-makers in their task of choosing the best plan. (Davidoff, 1965)

However, critics claim advocacy planning does not eliminate the problem of conflicting objectives because poor communities lack homogeneity or common interests. As well, people at the bottom of the social ladder are harder to draw into the planning process. Advocate planners often find themselves working with the more organized upwardly mobile elements of a poor area. Their demands are not necessarily representative of the larger community. (Peattie, 1968)

Finally, although Davidoff described advocates as a channel through which the interests of the community flowed, it has been claimed that professionals frequently set the agenda. They conceptualize the problem and define the terms of how the problem will be solved. The issues raised are often those the professional has the most expertise in or for which funding can be obtained rather than those highest on the community's list. (Peattie, 1968)

Transactive planners (Friedmann, 1976) believe planning can be improved if the communication gap between planners and their clients is closed. As planner's language is conceptual and mathematical while client's language is based on personal experience, there is an inability to exchange meaningful messages
between the two. Friedmann insists face-to-face contact with the people affected by planning decisions is needed. He believes this will facilitate growth and mutual learning between the planner and client.

Transactive planning has been criticized as being unrealistic and difficult to implement. As well, it does not address issues such as the imbalance in the distribution of economic and political power, or provide any insight on conflict resolution. (Friedmann, Hudson, 1974)

The collaborative theory of planning (Godschalk, Mills, 1966) also stresses planner-client communication. Dialogue is to be sustained through ongoing surveys of the behavior patterns of people and organizations (eg. preferences for various types of leisure activities). These surveys serve a dual function. First, they provide the planner with an avenue of collaboration with the public through activities interviews and discussions. Second, findings from the surveys aid in policy and planning decisions as survey results identify subcommunities, their values, and activities.

A major problem of this approach is the difficulty in making meaningful use of the massive and unstructured data acquired. In addition, survey costs are expensive. (Godschalk, 1967)

The result of this more humanistic trend in planning was a greater awareness of the growing inequities in society. As cities experienced higher concentrations of population, the disparities between growing affluence on the one hand and continued poverty on the other became more apparent. The response was to broaden planner's interests to include more
concern with the social and economic consequences of their plans. In Vancouver, for example, a Social Planning department emerged in 1968 as a separate municipal government department. (Egan, 1977) It was responsible for the evaluation and recommendation of social service grants to city council. In this way, the city could set annual priorities and support those services where social need was the greatest. The department also designed programs to cope with specific problems, particularly with regard to youth and senior citizens.

D. Limitation of Reforms to Planning

Today, the role of the professional community planner is still a highly uncertain one. There is still a considerable amount of disagreement as to what constitutes the planner's field and what his special skills and expertise are. Consequently, the planning field is governed by a large body of diverse theories and methodologies.

It has been suggested that the profession is being split into progressive and conservative wings. Progressive planners call for social planning to reduce racial and economic inequalities. Conservative planners defend traditional physical planning and the legitimacy of middle class values. (Rein, 1969)

According to some theorists, however, the reform tradition in planning has misread the failures of past planning practice. (Piven, 1975) Shortcomings have been attributed to either a lack of communication or a too narrow technical scope for planning. Piven claims these new doctrines have been enthusiastically adopted by planners as they cause a minimum of professional upheaval. They do not require planners to address the real prob-
lem, the subservience of the planning profession to dominant political and economic interests.

Piven believes that planners are largely committed to the values of growth and development. For example, this was demonstrated in their support of large scale projects like urban renewal that uprooted thousands of working class poor from the inner city. She claims more communication was not needed to know what these families wanted.

Past failures have also been ascribed to a too narrow scope for planning. As a result, planners have assumed new areas of competence to include not only physical but social and economic issues. Piven believes that this is the more dangerous doctrinal reform. It assumes that the interests of the poor have been overlooked due to planner's preoccupation with land development issues rather than social services. The relationship between economic organization and poverty are ignored while planners focus on the delivery of more and better social services.

The approach to planning utilized in Regina under Ron Clark, its Planning Director, went beyond the traditional reforms to the profession. Regina planners believed that public rather than private interests should be served. They not only utilized citizen participation and an expanded scope for planning, but they also incorporated other approaches. These included policy planning which specified future directions for growth, political intervention whereby planners initiated action and lobbied for the implementation of planning goals, advocacy planning for low income inner city residents (as many inner city policies favored these people), and a short term, issue oriented
approach to ensure immediate quality of life improvements.

The strategies advocated by Clark address the major shortcomings of planning practice. Consequently, this approach to planning provides the best theoretical model for other urban planners to follow. Other theories offered in planning literature have only responded to a few selected limitations.

The following section is a brief examination of theoretical concerns regarding strategies used in Regina, as suggested by planning theorists.

3.2 THEORETICAL CONCERNS REGARDING CLARK'S STRATEGIES

A. Short Term, Issue Oriented

Clark believed that planners should concentrate on alleviating pressing urban problems. However, as Rittel and Webber (1969) point out, planning problems are difficult to resolve as they possess the following characteristics.

First, in order to understand a planning problem, one needs to know how one proposes to resolve it. For example, poverty can be seen as a result of low income, deficiencies in occupational skills or cultural deprivation. Planners chose explanations which are most consistent with their world view, ones that support their values, interests and ideology. Thus, there is no correct definition of what constitutes the problem nor any one "best" solution.

Second, all planning problems are symptoms of higher level problems. For example, crime may be a result of poor housing, which in turn is due to low income, and so on. Rittel and Webber believe that problems should be attacked on as high a level as possible. The higher the level of a problem's formu-
lation, however, the more abstract it becomes, and the more
difficult to resolve. They warn against an incremental approach
as marginal improvements do not necessarily lead to overall im-
provements. On the contrary, by curing some of the more obvious
symptoms, resolution of higher level problems may be made more
difficult.

B. Policy Formation

Clark believed that planning should become more policy
oriented. In reality, this may be difficult to achieve. There
are several factors working against local government policy
making such as:

(a) Subordination to Provincial Government Control - By
virtue of the British North America Act, municipalities are the
concern and responsibility of the provincial governments.
Through special charters or general municipal acts, provincial
governments specify what service functions can and must be per-
formed by municipalities, the structure of municipal decision-
making, terms of office of elected councillors, qualifications
for voters and candidates, and the extent of municipal powers
to raise revenues. In addition, each province has numerous
other statutes and regulations that affect local government
decision-making. (Higgins, 1977)

Local government autonomy is further complicated by a
proliferation of assorted boards, commissions, authorities and
committees. These bodies are usually created for a single pur-
pose by either the provincial government or council itself
(eg. libraries, parks, transportation). They often possess a
degree of independence that places them outside the control of
city council. They frequently result in a duplication and lack of coordination of services. (Higgins, 1977)

Local autonomy is further eroded by the steadily worsening financial situation of municipalities. As an area becomes more urbanized, there are greater expectations and demands for more and higher levels of municipal services. However, by 1974, municipalities were meeting less than half their total expenditures out of their own revenue sources. The remainder was being made up by grants and borrowing from senior levels of government. Financial aid brings with it the imposition of federal/provincial standards, procedures and regulations. (Higgins, 1977)

(b) **Subordination to Federal Government Control** - A wide range of policies and decisions are made by parliament, the departments, ministries and federal agencies. Although local governments are seldom consulted, the effects of these policies can be significant as they produce consequences with which the municipalities must cope. For example, federal control over aviation, navigation and shipping places planning decisions such as the location of airports, port facilities and rail lines beyond the control of local planners. (Institute of Local Government, 1979)

Another type of impact is the physical presence of the federal government. In some municipalities it is the biggest employer, largest landowner and biggest developer. (Higgins, 1977) Also, through its spending power, the federal government can exert influence over local matters over which it has no direct constitutional control. (Institute of Local Government, 1979)
(c) Local Government Structure - The structure of local government itself, according to Fish (1975), works against public policy formation.

First, party politics are discouraged at the local level. In civic elections, candidates often have no explicit and coherent ideology on what policies the city should pursue. This is in contrast to elections at senior levels of government where candidates are expected to articulate their party's program or platform.

Second, the administrative concept of local government is reinforced by its structure. The power and duties of Canadian mayors do not make them strong chief executives. They have no separate powers over matters such as appointments, removal of personnel or budgets. Local councillors serve on a part-time basis giving them little opportunity to become familiar with the day-to-day operation of the civic bureaucracy. Terms of office are short. As local politicians are never far removed from an election, they have little incentive to take a longer view or to consider policies rather than projects.

(d) Weak Position of the Planning Department - At the local level, the Planning Department comes closest to being a policy oriented body. As its function is to plan the future growth of the city, it must, of necessity concern itself with a broad range of issues such as housing, parks, streets, and public works. Therefore, to plan effectively, projects and programs of other civic departments must be coordinated and reviewed. However, line departments are highly protective of their own jurisdiction and often look upon planners with sus-
picion. Moreover, line departments enjoy relative independence from planning controls. (Fish, 1975)

C. Public Participation

An important component of Clark's planning strategy was public participation. Planning theorists such as Arnstein (1969) and Heberlein (1976) warn that participation by itself is not enough as participation can serve different functions. According to Heberlein, it can be: (a) Informational - This is simply an exchange of information either from planners to the public or vice versa. (b) Ritualistic - Public meetings are held because of legal requirements even though neither the public nor planners are interested in such involvement. (c) Assurance - The prime goal is to reassure the public that their views have been heard and they have not been ignored in the planning process. (d) Interactive - This is the only true form of participation. Planners and the public jointly work on a problem to reach a mutually agreeable decision.

Arnstein claims that citizens must not only hear and be heard, but they must have some assurance their views will be taken into account. This involves a redistribution of power. The public must be represented on committees and advisory boards that determine planning goals and policies, allocate resources, and operate programs. She states anything less is merely an empty ritual which allows policy makers to claim that all side were consulted. In the meantime, the status quo remains unchanged.

As well as the function participation can serve, other potential problems are: (a) Those groups which complain the
most are served while those who are quiet, or unable to make their case may be ignored. (b) The views of organized groups are given more weight than opinions of unorganized citizens. (c) The citizens often must initiate the inquiry. (d) Public involvement takes place after opinions have solidified. (e) The public can review and, at best, react to material largely prepared by the bureaucracy. (f) There is little feedback to the public concerning the impact of their suggestions on the agency. (Heberlein, 1976)

To avoid these limitations, Heberlein suggests that the following steps are needed:

(a) The planner must realize that there is no single public. It is composed of a large number of groups with varying interests, needs and desires. Therefore, a planner's task is to identify all the publics affected by a particular issue and actively seek to contact them.

(b) Small group meetings composed of single publics are more useful than large open meetings attended by multiple publics. This ensures that all interests have been represented and it allows a more serious discussion of needs, desires and alternatives.

(c) The public should be contacted at an early stage before issues have crystallized and courses of action have been decided upon.

(d) Public input should be documented. This serves to satisfy various groups that their views were heard, accurately perceived and taken into account. Although they may not be satisfied with the final decision, they will not feel they were
left out of the planning process.

(e) Public involvement should be a continuing effort. This will allow input from more difficult to reach publics. As well, the public will less likely feel they are only reviewing actions taken by an agency.

D. Political Intervention

Clark believed planners should become activists by playing a larger role in decision-making. His style of planning is similar to that used in Cleveland in the early 1970's. Cleveland planners felt that problems confronting the city had little to do with land uses, zoning or issues of urban design. (Long, 1975) Instead, problems had more to do with personal and municipal poverty, unemployment, neighborhood deterioration, crime, inadequate mobility and so on. (Krumholz et al, 1975) Consequently, Cleveland planners opted for a new type of planning.

First, they advocated the interests of the poor, a group which formed a large and growing proportion of the city's population. These people had few, if any, choices, Cleveland planners believed, due to their daily battle with low incomes and poverty. (Krumholz et al, 1975) Cleveland planners were committed to providing them with a wider range of alternatives and opportunities.

By planning for the less advantaged, Cleveland planners recognized there were a multiplicity of interests. They did not seek consensus. Instead, their endorsement or rejection of planning proposals was measured largely in terms of their effect upon the poor.

Second, planning in Cleveland was policy oriented. Objec-
tives and policies were formulated for the major issues confront­
ing Cleveland: low incomes, deteriorating and abandoned housing, inadequate public transportation, and lack of priorities for community development. These problems, although not compre­hensive, were chosen as Cleveland planners felt they had an opportunity to influence key decisions in these areas. (Krumholz et al, 1975)

Third, Cleveland planners were activists. They believed that planners should take the initiative by defining what the important issues were and developing recommendations for action. In this way, planners could assume a strategic role in decision­making. Politicians often lack adequate information, a long range perspective, or even clear concepts of what should be done. (Krumholz et al, 1975)

They believed that planners, as well as providing recommenda­tions, should lobby for the positions the planning agency wanted to see implemented. Planners should intervene in all the small decisions leading to the ultimate resolution of an issue. They should also seek out potential allies and show them how their interests are affected. (Krumholz et al, 1975)

This approach to planning appeared to be fairly successful. For example, with regard to transit, Cleveland planners opposed consultant's recommendations for a capital intensive rapid transit system, instead favoring improvements to the local bus system. Their stand, although drawing heavy criticism from the business community, transit officials, environmental and other interest groups, resulted in federal grants being withheld until other, less costly approaches had been more thoroughly evaluated.
The Cleveland planning staff also successfully prevented the Transit System from discontinuing a route connecting several inner city public housing projects. By persuading the mayor to oppose the service cut, the Transit System continued the service. They also opposed plans for a freeway through the City's east side which would have displaced four thousand residents. The Ohio Department of Transportation was forced to utilize another route which followed an unused railroad right-of-way.

In the area of community development, Cleveland planners did not approve the City's making a ten to fifteen million dollar investment on a proposed 350 million dollar downtown office-commercial complex. They maintained the project offered no guarantee of additional property or income tax revenues, there was no firm commitment of jobs, and it would have added to already surplus office space. The planners felt the money could be better spent in the City's decaying inner city neighborhoods. Although city council overrode the planner's recommendations, important questions were raised with regard to similar projects. (Krumholz et al, 1975)

Cleveland planners opposed powerful business, labor and political interests in the course of lobbying for the interests of the poor. Surprisingly enough, they not only survived, but prospered as many of their recommendations were acted upon. (Long, 1975)

The style of planning Clark suggested for Regina was similar to the approach used in Cleveland. Regina planners formulated policies on various aspects of the city, they often advocated the interests of low income inner city residents,
and they utilized an activist orientation to planning. Cleveland planners proved that this type of approach could be successful.
CHAPTER FOUR
BACKGROUND TO REGINA

To gain a better understanding of Regina and the planning issues it confronts, this chapter will provide a brief overview of Regina's historical roots, economy, population, housing demand and local government.

4.1 HISTORICAL ROOTS

Regina was a product of the Canadian Pacific Railway. It was founded in 1882 due to the CPR's decision to use a southern route across the Prairies rather than their originally surveyed northern route. (Brennan, 1980) This meant that Battleford, the former capital of the Northwest Territories, was 225 miles north of the proposed railway line. Regina, on the other hand, lay directly on the route.

Critics proclaimed the townsite had few natural advantages to make it a feasible territorial capital. It was situated on a vast, treeless plain and the only nearby source of water was Pile 'O Bones (Wascana) Creek. (Brennan, 1980) A major factor influencing the CPR's decision, however, was their vast landholdings around what was to become Regina. (Regina Planning Department, 1977A) Considerable profits could be realized by the sale of land and potential difficulties with established business interests in the north would be avoided.

As the CPR was one of Regina's major landowners, they exerted considerable influence over its early development. Streets were laid out in a grid pattern and the general location of the City's commercial and residential areas was determined. (Brennan, 1980)
Regina's population steadily grew as settlers poured into the area attracted by the prospect of profitable grain farming. By 1903, with a population of three thousand, it was incorporated as a City. Two years later, when Saskatchewan became a province, Regina was designated as its capital.

Today, the handicaps of the harsh topography have been largely overcome. A desolate stretch of prairie has been turned into a pleasant urban community due to the resourcefulness of its residents. Wascana Creek, which winds across the City, has been dammed to form an artificial lake situated southeast of the downtown area. There has been an extensive tree planting program and park development. The most well known park is Wascana Center which has two thousand acres of parkland. With its impressive landscaped grounds, as well as marina and picnic sites, Wascana Center is a major tourist attraction. (Dale, 1980)

4.2 ECONOMY

Because Regina lies in the heart of one of the richest wheat growing areas in Canada, the City's economy is heavily dependent upon the agricultural sector. (Regina Planning Department, 1977A) It is an important service and distribution center supplying both farm implements and consumer goods to the southern portion of the province. (Caviedes, 1980) Consequently, almost twenty-seven percent of the City's workers are employed in wholesale or retail trades.

Since the 1960's, there have been attempts to lessen Regina's economic dependence on agriculture. The discovery of underground resources, such as potash and petroleum, have helped strengthen the area's economy. Economic diversification is not
an easy task, however, as Regina is not an attractive location for industry. It lacks proximity to markets, cheap sources of energy, favorable transportation costs, and convenience in securing raw materials. (Regina Planning Department, 1977A)

The second largest source of employment in Regina, after trade, is in administration. This is due to the City's status as a provincial capital. It has become the site of crown corporations and development agencies that operate all over Saskatchewan. (Caviedes, 1980) In 1976, the provincial government employed almost two-thirds the government workers, the federal government one-quarter, and the City the remainder.

4.3 POPULATION

According to the Planning Department (1979B), Regina's rate of population growth has slowed considerably since 1966 to an average growth rate of just over one percent per year. They state this is mainly due to a declining birth rate as well as a decrease in the rural depopulation which occurred in the past decade. In 1979, Regina's population was 154,000. By 2001, the Planning Department has estimated that it will vary from a low of 179,000 to a high of 204,500. The final figure will depend on both future birth rates and economic opportunities available in the City. (Refer to Table 1 for population projections.) Regina's population is a fairly young one. The City has a median age of 26.5 compared to 27.8 for Canada. (Statistics Canada, 1976)

4.4 HOUSING

By 1979, housing demand in Regina was at a very high level.
Table 1
Population Projections for Regina

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Low Fertility</th>
<th>Low Migration</th>
<th>High Fertility</th>
<th>High Migration</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
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<td>1956</td>
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<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Regina Planning Department, 1979B:9

Over three thousand dwelling units, both apartments and single family homes, had been constructed annually in the last few years. The Planning Department (1979B) believed demand was due to the relative youthfulness of the City's population. People of the post-war baby boom era were reaching the 20 to 36 years of age bracket and were establishing households. It was predicted housing demand would drop in the 1980's as this age group was accommodated. (Refer to Table 2 for average annual dwelling unit starts.)
Table 2
Average Annual Dwelling Unit Starts

Source: Regina Planning Department, 1979B:10

4.5 LOCAL GOVERNMENT

Regina was divided into ten wards in 1973. Aldermen are elected from each ward while the mayor is elected from the city-at-large, all for a term of three years. (Leader-Post, May 7, 1977)

Before the ward system was implemented, most aldermen were primarily elected from South Regina. According to Clark (1980), this area tended to be predominantly liberal, professional and upper or middle class. For the most part, council seats before 1973 were occupied by local businessmen, real estate developers and other entrepreneurs. There was little representation from
Northern Regina which tended to be NDP and working class. (Leader-Post, May 7, 1977)

The first election after the ward system, in October 1973, saw the election of seven new aldermen out of a possible ten. (Leader-Post, October 25, 1973) This marked the beginning of greater geographical representation on Regina city council. Clark (1980) believed it also signified a new reform ethic. There was greater concern for issues such as public transit, older neighborhood preservation, downtown revitalization, and affordable housing.

The election in October 1976 appeared to endorse council's new direction as nine out of ten incumbents were returned to office. (Leader-Post, October 28, 1976) The defeated incumbent was an alderman who had served for twenty years. His opponent ran on a campaign that included support for neighborhood preservation and more public involvement in planning. (Clark, 1980)

The October 1979 civic election signified a dramatic rise in the political influence of community groups. A new mayor and six new aldermen were elected, four of whom had been active in community groups in their area. (Leader-Post, October 28, 1979)

The political climate during Clark's tenure as Planning Director appeared to be predisposed in favor of his strategy of planning. This could have been a factor in the acceptance of Regina RSVP by city council. The 1979 election suggested that the implementation of these strategies would confront little opposition. However, Clark stated this support never materialized to the extent it could have.
CHAPTER FIVE
REGINA RSVP

One of the major tasks the Planning Department was involved in under Ron Clark was to formulate a municipal development plan for the City. To this point, there had been no comprehensive plan to guide future growth. Regina RSVP, as the plan was called, was not a traditional land use plan. Instead, it described a new planning process for Regina. It outlined a strategy for public planning, described major and emerging issues, and presented policy goals and objectives to guide the resolution of these issues.

This chapter describes the public participation program with regard to Regina RSVP. As public input was an important component of Clark's planning strategy, I was interested in how policies outlined in this document were formulated. Chapter Seven analyzes the extent and type of public involvement.

5.1 THE PUBLIC PARTICIPATION PROGRAM FOR REGINA

The title of the municipal development plan, Regina RSVP, signified the Planning Department's desire for an open planning process. It was the public's invitation to become involved in planning their City. As Table 3 illustrates, a major effort was made to secure public input.

The public involvement program began in the spring of 1976 with the opening of a storefront planning office in downtown Regina. The office was an attempt to bring planning out of city hall and put it where it was easily accessible to the public. Citizens could discuss relevant planning issues and
Table 3

Timetable for the Public Participation Program

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Opening of storefront office</td>
<td>Newspaper &quot;Downtown Regina&quot;</td>
<td>Research on issues</td>
<td>Working Document completed</td>
<td>Mailed to government, interest groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seminars to discuss</td>
<td>Newspapers, pamphlets mailed</td>
<td>26 public meetings held</td>
<td>Approval by council in principle of plan by council</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1979</td>
<td>Spring 1979</td>
<td>Oct 1979</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TV program to discuss completed plan</td>
<td>3 public meetings to discuss plan before final approval</td>
<td>Plan passed 3rd and final reading by council</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Derived from Regina Planning Department, 1977B:9

offer their suggestions as to what ought to be done.

That summer, the Planning Department published a newspaper entitled "Downtown Regina" and distributed it to all city residents. The newspaper was designed to stimulate interest and discussion on downtown problems. It raised questions such as whether the downtown should be pedestrian or car oriented, should downtown access be based on the car or bus, and what could be done to improve the physical appearance of the downtown area.

During 1976 and 1977, the Planning Department began to research various city issues. Clark felt there was an absence
of comprehensive information on which to base important planning decisions. The major studies conducted were: (a) an evaluation of recreational facilities and programs, (b) transit and transportation requirements, (c) housing and land development issues, (d) inner city social, economic and housing conditions, (e) airport requirements, (f) plans for a new suburban development in northwest Regina, and (g) areas of future expansion. (Regina Planning Department, 1977A, 1978) As well, shortly before Clark became Director, the City of Regina sponsored an international competition on innovative ways to redevelop CPR yards in downtown Regina, which were to be removed under the Rail Relocation Program.

In 1977, based on the research, a report entitled *A Working Document* was completed. This report was the basis for the municipal development plan. It laid the groundwork for future planning in Regina as issues, policies and public planning were outlined.

Through the policies recommended, the Planning Department presented a clear concept of what Regina should become. This included the following elements: (a) The downtown should be revitalized to become the commercial and cultural heart of the city. This would partly be achieved through the proposed relocation of the CPR yards then in the downtown core. The plan for the area featured park land and open space, housing, commercial development, a convention center as well as traffic and transit requirements. (However, as federal funding for this program was discontinued, these plans never materialized.) Downtown revitalization also depended on the restriction of
large suburban shopping centers, better planned downtown development, and improved environmental quality. (b) Public transit should be promoted and encouraged. (c) Inner city residential areas should be protected from commercial and industrial development. Increased municipal expenditure would be required for housing, open space, services and infrastructure to make the inner city an attractive place to live for people of various income levels. (d) The traditional form of low density suburban residential growth should be challenged as it was a wasteful use of land and services. New suburban development should feature increased density and more variety in housing types. (e) The municipality should take a more active role in alleviating inadequate housing supply, particularly for certain income groups. In order to do so, a comprehensive housing policy was needed. (f) All levels of government should take a more responsible attitude toward Native problems. The municipality should reserve a certain percentage of low cost housing units for Native people, a recreational facility should be built for Native children, and the city and provincial government should employ more Natives. (g) More money should be spent on well designed open space and recreational facilities.

Copies of the Working Document were mailed to all relevant government agencies, community groups, service clubs, and church groups asking for their comments. Seminars were held in the summer of 1977 to discuss the issues in Regina RSVP with civic department officials and business associations.

The Working Document was the basis for a series of public meetings held in every neighborhood in Regina in the fall of
1977. To prepare citizens for the meetings, a newspaper and four pamphlets summarizing issues discussed in the Working Document were mailed to individual households. A questionnaire which invited reactions to the proposals made was included. Most respondents appeared to be sympathetic to policies outlined in Regina RSVP, although only 150 questionnaires were completed. The results are shown in Table 4.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issues</th>
<th>Percentage Favorable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Downtown revitalization</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elimination of long term parking</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restriction of suburban shopping centers</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restriction of commercial development in the inner city</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City should be involved in the supply of housing</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More input from neighborhood groups</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diversification of housing types</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased suburban density</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public transit</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More attention to Native problems</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased parks and recreation budget</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Derived from Regina Planning Department, 1977B:68-70

In November 1977, city council approved in principle policies formulated in the Working Document. These policies would form the basis for Regina's new development plan. In 1979, a thirteen volume comprehensive plan was completed.
A newspaper published by the Planning Department entitled "An Update on Planning in Regina" was delivered to every household in the City. It traced what had happened from the first public meetings in the fall of 1977 to approval in principle by council in December 1978 of the plan and several supporting documents.

The first public discussion of the completed plan took place on a special two hour television program in March 1979. Clark discussed the planning issues in Regina. The public could phone in and ask questions of some of the aldermen and members of the Regina Planning Commission. Three public meetings were scheduled in late March.

The plan passed third and final reading of council in October 1979. This made Regina RSVP the legal plan for the City. According to Clark, Regina RSVP was more than a series of books. It signified a process of citizen involvement, which was not to end with the completion of the development plan. Public input was to play an important role in all planning decisions made in Regina.

Chapter Six looks at inner city planning in order to see how the planning strategies and policies outlined for the inner city, in RSVP documents, were implemented.
CHAPTER SIX
THE INNER CITY

According to the Planning Department, inner city neighborhoods were undergoing decline and instability. This was largely attributed to over-zoning and a decreasing population. The Planning Department felt that the residential character of inner city neighborhoods should be preserved and enhanced.

The purpose of this chapter is to present characteristics and problems of Regina's inner city neighborhoods, how the Planning Department proposed to alleviate these problems, and some of the results achieved. Chapter Seven will analyze the extent to which the planning strategies Clark advocated (short term, issue oriented, policy formation, public participation and political intervention) were put into practice in inner city planning.

Unless otherwise stated, information presented in this chapter is derived from Regina Planning Department documents entitled Regina RSVP: A Working Document (1977A) and Regina's Inner City Strategy (1978).

6.1 INNER CITY CHARACTERISTICS

Six inner city neighborhoods which had experienced problems were identified in planning documents. Four were south of the CPR mainline (Cathedral, Transitional, 11th Avenue East and General Hospital) and two were north (Albert-Scott and Eastview). Refer to Figure 2 for neighborhood boundaries. (Note: Eastview was composed of West Eastview, Eastview and Innismore.)
Figure 2

Inner City Neighborhoods

Source: Regina Planning Department, 1977A: 102
The Planning Department stated these neighborhoods shared the following characteristics:

(a) They were declining in population. Planning documents showed that by 1976, this loss ranged from 14% to 34% of each area's 1961 population. In the same period, the City of Regina's population increased by 25%. (Regina Planning Department, 1978:72)

(b) The average income for each neighborhood was lower than the City average income. In 1971, it was $6805 compared to $8947 for Regina. (Regina Planning Department, 1978:72)

(c) There was a large proportion of non-family households. They made up 44% of inner city households in 1971 compared to 21% for Regina. (Regina Planning Department, 1978:26)

(d) They housed a disproportionately large number of senior citizens and young people between the ages of 20 to 29. In 1971, senior citizens made up 18% of the inner city population compared to 12% for Regina. However, data showed little difference between the inner city and the City average with respect to young adults. They made up 19% of the inner city population compared to 17% for Regina. (Regina Planning Department, 1978:73)

(e) School enrollments were declining. Between 1970 to 1976 there was a 22% decrease in inner city enrollments compared to 12% for suburban schools. (Regina Planning Department, 1978:78)

(f) The density of housing was higher than the City average. There were 6.5 households per acre in the inner city. No figures were given for the City average. (Regina Planning
Residents were more transient. In the inner city, 28% of residents stayed for less than one year compared to 22% for Regina in 1971. (Regina Planning Department, 1978:74)

There was a much smaller proportion of home ownership than the City average. It was 37% in 1971 compared to 60% for Regina. (Regina Planning Department, 1978:75)

These claims were generally well substantiated by Statistics Canada information cited as well as the Planning Department's own data.

6.2 GENERAL INNER CITY PROBLEMS

The following is a description of general problems which the Planning Department believed affected most inner city neighborhoods.

A. Over-Zoning

Inner city zoning regulations allowed large areas of commercial and industrial development in predominantly residential areas. As a result, planning documents identified three types of development trends occurring in the inner city. They were:

(a) Massive Redevelopment - The Transitional neighborhood was classified a massive redevelopment area. During the 1960's, it was zoned residential business to allow further expansion of the downtown area. Consequently, it experienced intense development pressure as zoning allowed a mixture of commercial, office and residential development at high densities.

The majority of its residents were now non-family households, the average household size was 1.7, 92% were tenants and
they were either young (20-29) or senior citizens.

(b) **Declining Neighborhoods** - These areas were characterized by deteriorating housing, a decreasing population and low income levels. It was believed zoning encouraged decline as it allowed industries, warehouses, offices, high density housing, and commercial developments in these largely residential districts.

(c) **Stable Neighborhoods** - This type of neighborhood was identified by stable income levels, non-family and family units, a high proportion of homeowners, good quality housing, and little pressure for redevelopment. These areas were zoned residential two-family which only allowed duplexes and single family homes. Refer to Figure 3 for the location of each trend.

In summary, the Planning Department believed over-zoning was a major factor contributing to the decline and instability of the inner city. This exerted two types of development pressures on inner city neighborhoods. South of the CPR tracks, zoning allowed business, commercial and high density housing to intrude into low density residential neighborhoods. North of the tracks, industrial zoning allowed a large area of warehouses and industrial uses. (See zoning map, Figure 4) Only small portions of the inner city were protected by low density residential zones even though single family housing was the predominant land use. (See land use map, Figure 5)

Although the Planning Department believed the downtown must be given room to expand, they believed growth could occur in two non-residential areas. These were: (a) under-utilized land in
Figure 3

Development Trends in the Inner City

Source: Derived from Regina Planning Department, 1978:90-92
Figure 4
Inner City Zoning
1976

Source: Derived from Regina Planning Department, 1978
Figure 5

Generalized Inner City Land Use

1976

Source: Derived from Regina Planning Department, 1977A:25
the western portion of the downtown and (b) vacated CPR rail yards to the north of the downtown once rail line relocation had occurred.

B. Declining Population

Another major factor believed to contribute to inner city decline was a decreasing population, particularly after World War II, as middle class families moved to the suburbs. Census data cited showed that from 1941 to 1971, Regina's inner city population steadily decreased from nearly 49% of the total city population to 14%. (Regina Planning Department, 1978:87)

Whereas once the inner city had been a relatively stable area, planning documents now indicated a shift to non-family households, transients, a high proportion of tenants, and low incomes. While Clark acknowledged the vital role of the inner city in accommodating low income residents, he believed the inner city should be revitalized to attract all income levels.

C. Decreasing Housing Stock

Another problem identified was decreasing housing stock. This was largely attributed to speculation caused by over-zoning. Consequently, large commercial and office developments were replacing moderately priced accommodation for low income people. Clark believed this problem was particularly serious as Regina had one of the lowest vacancy rates in Canada.

Planning documents provided no figures on the extent of housing demolition in the inner city. However, Table 5 indicates that in all inner city neighborhoods, most recent investment was for non-residential development.
Table 5
Investment in Inner City Neighborhoods (1971-76)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>% of Investment in Housing</th>
<th>% of Investment in Non-Residential Uses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cathedral</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transitional</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Hospital</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th Avenue East</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastview</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albert-Scott</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Derived from Regina Planning Department, 1978:13

D. Deteriorating Housing

According to the Planning Department, the inner city had a large portion of its housing stock in poor condition, particularly in areas undergoing decline and massive redevelopment. It was believed investors had little interest in maintaining residential properties as they would soon be demolished and replaced by more profitable developments.

Poor quality housing stock was also attributed to the high proportion of low income homeowners in the inner city. They could not afford to maintain their homes.

There was a lack of data in planning documents to indicate the extent of poor housing in the inner city (other than information contained in Table 6 and Figure 6). Nor were any criteria cited on how poor housing quality was determined.

E. Deficiency of Services

Clark believed that the City placed a high priority on
Table 6

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Housing Conditions in Inner City Neighborhoods</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Victoria East (Includes Cathedral 11th Ave E)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age of Buildings % Built Before 1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Housing Needing Rehabilitation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Derived from Regina Planning Department, Inner City Re-Development Programs for Regina, undated:31

accommodating new suburban growth. As a result, the majority of municipal expenditures went to the construction of suburban infrastructure, parks, schools and libraries. He claimed inner city services only received funding if the work in the suburbs was completed. No figures comparing municipal and inner city spending were cited.

F. Lack of Open Space

In 1976, a consulting firm named Lombard North was hired by the Planning Department to survey open space in inner city neighborhoods. They found that the inner city had an average two acres of open space to one thousand people. In suburban areas, it was slightly over ten acres per thousand population. (Regina Planning Department, 1978:77) Inner city open space was found to be unattractive due to poor landscaping, drainage problems, litter and heavy traffic. As well, recreational facilities were inadequate.
Figure 6
General Areas of Poor Housing

Source: Derived from Regina Planning Department, undated: 14
G. **Lack of Parking and Poor Street Conditions**

Another problem identified was severe parking problems, particularly on streets near the central business district, and in areas of rooming houses, shopping facilities and industry. As well, many streets were said to be in poor to fair condition.

Evidence to support these claims was a random survey of city streets conducted by the Planning Department the morning of October 8, 1976. Survey results showed that parking problems were evident on over half the streets surveyed. Most streets had minor or major cracks. (Regina Planning Department, 1978: 18, 28, 35, 45, 53, 65)

H. **Increasing Crime and Social Problems**

The Planning Department stated there was a high incidence of social problems in the inner city. One problem identified was youth-related (e.g., vandalism, drugs, lack of jobs and recreational facilities). In addition, there was a mixed reaction by many inner city residents to the recent influx of Native people. Planning documents indicated Natives experienced problems of discrimination, a high level of unemployment, low incomes, and lack of skills.

It was believed increasing crime rates in this area were a good indication of the high incidence of social problems but there was no documented evidence to support these claims.

6.3 **NEIGHBORHOOD SPECIFIC INNER CITY PROBLEMS**

Specific problems found in each neighborhood are illustrated in Table 7.

Through a series of community workshops in 1976, the Plan-
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Neighbourhood Problems</th>
<th>Cathedral</th>
<th>Transitional General Hospital</th>
<th>11th Ave. East</th>
<th>Eastview</th>
<th>Albert Scott</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Absentee Landlords</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to Decision Making</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daycare</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development Intrusions</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lighting</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Litter</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natives</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parks &amp; Recreation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provision of Transit</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior Citizen Facilities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Streets</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traffic &amp; Parking</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zoning</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Regina Planning Department, 1977A:104
ning Department worked with neighborhood groups in the General Hospital, Albert-Scott and Cathedral areas to identify local concerns. The Planning Department acknowledged that the table was not complete due to the lack of dialogue with residents in other areas. Consequently, problems in these communities were determined solely by Regina planning staff.

6.4 POLICY OBJECTIVES

The Planning Department believed that residential areas in the inner city should be preserved. These areas provided relatively inexpensive rental housing and less costly homes for purchase by low income families. Their central location reduced transportation costs as they were close to downtown services and employment opportunities. Finally, it was felt that the inner city had amenities not found in other suburban areas such as large trees on residential streets and houses of varying and distinctive architecture.

Policy objectives for the inner city were:

(a) To maintain the inner city neighborhoods as residential areas for a variety of income levels,

(b) To provide for more citizen involvement in planning decisions made in the inner city, and

(c) To improve the general quality of life in the inner city. (Regina Planning Department, 1979A:69)

6.5 INNER CITY STRATEGY

To achieve these policy objectives, the inner city strategy consisted of the following elements: neighborhood planning, Inner City Advisory Group, neighborhood improvement, housing,
landbanking, and an intergovernmental strategy. The following is a description of these strategies. Tangible results achieved with regard to each strategy are summarized in section 6.6.

A. Neighborhood Planning

Neighborhood planning was a process where local residents, businessmen, aldermen and government officials worked together to define and resolve neighborhood problems. According to Clark, new civic programs, major housing developments and rezonings had seldom been discussed at the community level. Consequently, misunderstandings or opposition to proposed developments often resulted in confrontation between residents and the civic bureaucracy.

Neighborhood planning attempted to prevent confrontation through a process of continuous dialogue. Government officials were made aware of local priorities and residents were able to recommend alternative solutions for their area.

Neighborhood planning involved the following steps: (a) a community association, organized by residents, identified general problems, (b) council designated an area as a neighborhood planning area, (c) with the aid of planning data, a technical report outlining physical, social, and economic conditions of the neighborhood was prepared and a site office was established, (d) local issues and problems were further defined through meetings, surveys and research, and (e) a neighborhood plan, prepared by residents, was presented to city council. Once council approved the plan, it was implemented as funds became available. Neighborhood planning in Regina had a distinctive feature in that resident associations were contracted by the City
to prepare the plans. The role of the Planning Department was to provide advice and resources, such as staff and funding, and to coordinate the involvement of city departments to initiate dialogue with residents.

B. Inner City Advisory Group

The Planning Department suggested an Inner City Advisory Group, composed of approximately twelve members including community group representatives, businessmen, and inner city aldermen, be formed to: (a) provide a public overview of problems and future directions for the inner city, (b) monitor community issues and evaluate the municipality's performance in dealing with them, (c) coordinate and communicate among neighborhood associations, (d) provide liaison with downtown groups such as the Downtown Authority, (e) provide information to the community, and (f) be a vehicle of communication between neighborhood associations and city council.

C. Neighborhood Improvement

According to the Planning Department, many services in the inner city were in need of upgrading (e.g. inadequate park space, deteriorating water and sewer lines, poor housing stock). The Neighborhood Improvement Program (NIP) offered federal and provincial funds for improving infrastructure, housing and recreational facilities. It was to be one of the major means for obtaining financial backing for inner city revitalization.

In 1978, the federal government discontinued NIP programs. NIP was replaced by the Community Services Grant Program, which meant considerably less money was available. The Planning
Department began a new program, the Neighborhood Improvement Area Program (NIA), which utilized available federal funds in order to continue neighborhood improvement in the inner city.

Eligibility for the NIA program was dependent upon the following criteria: a large stock of housing in need of repair, major environmental problems, and an active community association which was interested in being involved. A new improvement area was to be designated by the Planning Department every two years.

D. Housing Programs

The Planning Department's housing policy included the following elements:

(a) Research - It was felt that an information base on housing and land development issues should be established in order to develop a sound inner city housing policy. Research was to include an examination of land ownership patterns on Regina's periphery, building costs and profits of major contractors, major developers and speculators who operate in Regina, and an overview of the development process.

(b) Housing Coordinator - It was recommended that a housing coordinator be hired to communicate with other departments, analyze housing stock, review housing policies, obtain funding, evaluate existing programs, and coordinate inner city housing policy.

(c) Programs - Clark claimed there were two major concerns with regard to inner city housing. First, there was a lack of adequate accommodation for special needs groups such as senior citizens, Natives, low income families, and single adults (although not supported by any evidence). Secondly, housing
stock was considered to be of poor quality in many areas. Table 8 summarizes the recommended housing projects.

Table 8

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Problem Area</th>
<th>Project</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Seniors</td>
<td>Highrise projects deemed suitable (although more effort to provide a variety of housing types and to disperse housing in different areas)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natives Low income</td>
<td>Non-profit and co-op housing Rental subsidy agreement between province and CMHC to reduce rental costs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single low income</td>
<td>Hostels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle income homeowners</td>
<td>AHOP funds which provide financial aid for new homeowners should be extended to existing housing. This would encourage young families to buy older homes in the inner city.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor housing stock</td>
<td>Promote use of federal and provincial rehabilitation funds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decreased population</td>
<td>Infill housing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Derived from Regina Planning Department, 1978

E. Landbanking

The Planning Department believed the City of Regina should acquire strategic parcels of land in the inner city. In this way, non-profit and cooperative housing groups could obtain land at reasonable prices, undesirable commercial and business intrusions could be prevented, and land could be provided for innovative residential development.

The federal and provincial governments offered financial
aid for landbanking. It was recommended that government agencies be approached by the City with specific proposals for buying inner city land.

F. **Intergovernmental Strategy**

Clark recognized that many socio-economic measures needed to revitalize the inner city were beyond the mandate of the Planning Department. He therefore suggested that public and private agencies should be approached to undertake projects. For example, it was recommended that both senior and municipal levels of government could be asked to create jobs for Native people and low income groups. A planner was already working with the provincial Department of Social Services to ensure that social service policy adequately reflected the needs of Natives in the inner city. CMHC and private organizations such as churches, clubs and unions could be approached for funding for low cost housing.

6.6 **INNER CITY ACHIEVEMENTS**

This section describes the extent to which Clark's planning strategies were put into practice in the inner city. It should be noted that the Planning Department's major task during 1976 to 1980, while Clark was Director, was to formulate Regina RSVP. Clark left at a time when the plan was just beginning to be put into effect. As well, this study covers a relatively short time period. Keeping these limitations in mind, inner city achievements included the following:

A. **Neighborhood Planning**

Neighborhood planning was first initiated in the General
Hospital area in 1976, the Cathedral area in 1977, and Albert-Scott (North Central) area in 1979.

In all three communities, residents were concerned about inadequate services and facilities, lack of park space, and youth-related problems such as vandalism and drugs. Also, in the General Hospital area, residents were concerned about the construction of a fourteen storey medical complex as it would involve the demolition of thirty-six homes. In the Albert-Scott area, racial tensions were a major problem as nearly fifty percent of the population was of Native ancestry.

Through the neighborhood planning process, residents could have a direct input into area planning in addition to functioning as a lobby on council to alleviate local problems. For example, the General Hospital community association was successful in convincing council to re-examine the proposed hospital expansion in their area. Consequently, a modified proposal was made which consisted of a four storey health center and eighteen townhouses.

Council approved both the General Hospital and Cathedral area plans in 1979. The North Central plan was presented to council in October 1980.

The Planning Department actively supported the neighborhood planning process. When residents in the Cathedral area requested neighborhood planning designation from council, the Planning Department provided the association with financial aid to begin organizing community support for the concept. (Leader-Post, December 14, 1976:6) They also provided grants to help pay the cost of materials and rent so that site offices
could be established in both the Cathedral and General Hospital areas. (Leader-Post, June 4, 1977:35)

B. Zoning

Through neighborhood planning, the Planning Department and community associations worked together to amend old zoning regulations in each inner city neighborhood. The new zoning bylaw was adopted by council in March 1978. The following is a summary of the major zoning changes.

(a) New Inner City Zones - The new zoning bylaw made a distinction between inner city and suburban residential areas. Zones in the inner city had smaller site requirements to accommodate development on existing twenty-five foot lots. Also, some zones allowed conversion of existing single family homes into multi-family uses. (Regina Planning Department, 1979B)

(b) Transitional Neighborhood Zoning - In the Transitional area, new zoning allowed higher density housing and mixed use developments at a ratio of eighty percent residential to twenty percent commercial.

(c) Permitted and Discretionary Uses - All zones were composed of permitted and discretionary uses. Permitted uses were compatible in their specific zone. They required only a building permit and had to meet parking and site regulations. Discretionary uses were usually compatible in their particular area. However, conditions of approval were sometimes required to lessen potentially negative impacts. As a result, they required council's approval before a building permit was issued. This allowed public agencies and the affected community group a chance to voice their concerns. (Regina Planning Department,
(d) Parking - Parking requirements were determined by the use and, in some cases, by the zone of a particular development. Fewer parking spaces were required for rehabilitated buildings to encourage both the re-use of existing buildings and the use of public transit. Also, instead of providing all the required parking, developers could pay money to the City to provide municipal parking, upon council's approval. (Regina Planning Department, 1979B)

C. Inner City Advisory Group

The Inner City Advisory Group was never formed. Clark believed this was largely due to the fact that community associations were fairly new and were struggling to become established. It was a major task to identify and resolve their own neighborhood concerns let alone develop a coordinated approach to the inner city. According to Ann Peck, a senior planner, this has only begun to happen recently, particularly with regard to inner city housing and heritage preservation.

D. Neighborhood Improvement

Two communities in Regina's inner city were neighborhood improvement areas, North Highland in 1975 and Albert-Scott in 1977. Extensive improvements were made to infrastructure and services, making both neighborhoods more viable and attractive to inner city residents.

Because NIP funds were cancelled in 1978, the Planning Department began its own program, the Neighborhood Improvement Area Program (NIA). Several inner city neighborhoods were
studied in order to identify which should receive initial funding. The Cathedral area most closely met requirements for the program and residents had produced a neighborhood plan which provided the basis for the use of NIA funds. As a result, it was designated the first NIA area. (Regina Planning Department, 1979B)

E. Housing

(a) Infill Housing - The aim of the infill housing program was to increase the amount of housing in the inner city, make efficient use of the existing municipal infrastructure, and to provide housing for low income, senior citizens, and family households. (Regina Planning Department, 1979B)

In 1977, the provincial government announced a program of inner city land acquisition in cooperation with the City. Once the land was acquired, Saskatchewan Housing Corporation (SHC) was to work with the City and local community groups to develop new housing on the sites. By the fall of 1978, several housing sites were acquired in the 11th Avenue East, General Hospital and Albert-Scott neighborhoods. Low rental senior citizen apartments were planned for the Albert-Scott and General Hospital areas. The latter project was to be built in conjunction with a senior citizen center and a ten family townhouse project. Because SHC owned land and was negotiating for property in other communities, several more housing projects were to be under construction in 1980. It was hoped the infill housing program would act as a catalyst for other developers and residents to upgrade or redevelop in the inner city. (Regina Planning Department, 1979B)
(b) **Rehabilitation** - The federal Residential Rehabilitation Assistance Program (RRAP) was available in two areas of the City, North Highland and Albert-Scott. The Planning Department hoped to introduce RRAP into the Cathedral and General Hospital areas in 1979. A provincial Residential Assistance Program (RAP) and a senior citizen home repair program also provided funds. They were actively promoted by the Planning Department. In November 1979, the City of Regina and provincial government initiated a Home Repair Advocacy Program to encourage interest in home repairs and to explain the available assistance programs.

F. **Landbanking**

The City, in cooperation with the provincial government, began acquiring land in inner city neighborhoods. Land was purchased in the General Hospital, 11th Avenue East, and Albert-Scott areas.

G. **Intergovernmental Strategy**

The intergovernmental strategy was utilized to a limited extent by the Planning Department. This mainly consisted of assigning a planner to work with the provincial Department of Social Services on its Policy Advisory Board. Clark stated that the limited use of this strategy was due to the fact the Planning Department, under him, was just beginning to get established.

The Planning Department was largely successful in implementing their strategies in the inner city. Neighborhood plans were developed in three inner city areas, a new zoning bylaw was devised and passed which recognized the predominantly
residential character of inner city communities, a neighborhood improvement program was begun in the Albert-Scott area and other neighborhoods were studied for their eligibility for funding, infill housing was built, and inner city land was publicly acquired. The only two strategies that met with limited success were the Inner City Advisory Group and the intergovernmental strategy.
According to the Regina Planning Department (1977A:54),
"... the traditional interaction between planning, the public and elected officials has produced several lessons:

1. We now know that public decisions are made on specific issues, with conflicting interests, and not in a holistic, abstract way, as implied in the traditional master plan.

2. We now know there are tremendous limitations in thinking about the future, as implied by the traditional master plan.

3. We now know that no one expert can or should have the right to direct the community, as implied by the traditional role of the planner.

If these lessons are in fact correct, then the dilemma of planning is to facilitate an integrated process in which pressing urban issues are better communicated, maximum public dialogue is fostered and where action, in the form of responsive public policy, is taken."

The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the extent to which the strategies of short term action, issue orientation, policy formation, public participation, and political intervention were put into practice in inner city planning. In addition, the public participation program with regard to Regina RSVP will be examined. The following questions are addressed:

**SHORT TERM, ISSUE ORIENTED ACTION**

A. To what extent was planning short term, issue oriented?

B. How well were problems substantiated by research and documented evidence?

C. Did Regina planners attempt to expand the scope of planning beyond physical concerns?

D. Were the solutions recommended to alleviate these problems more than the traditional technical and reactive response criticized by Clark?
POLICY FORMATION
A. What mechanisms did Clark suggest to facilitate policy planning at the local level and how successful were they?
B. To what extent was inner city planning policy oriented?

PUBLIC PARTICIPATION
A. What was the extent and type of public involvement with regard to the formulation of policies outlined in Regina RSVP?
B. Was public input an important component of inner city planning?

POLITICAL INTERVENTION
A. To what extent were Regina planners activists?
B. What role conflicts did this create?

Lastly, conclusions are drawn with respect to the major limitations, constraints and strengths of the planning strategies used in Regina.

7.1 SHORT TERM ISSUE ORIENTED ACTION
A. Extent to Which Planning was Short Term, Issue Oriented

Planning in Regina was based on short term and issue oriented action. Regina RSVP planning documents, rather than describing future land uses, outlined major and emerging issues confronting the City. The topics discussed were: rail re-location, downtown, the inner city, suburban growth, transportation, housing and land development, Natives, and open space and recreation.

Inner city revitalization was a major issue in Regina. Planning staff and community groups identified inner city problems which were to be addressed.
B. How Well Issues Were Substantiated by Research

Gerecke's 1971 study of the Canadian urban planning profession showed that research had a low priority for most planning agencies. Clark was critical of the nature of past planning practice in Canada. He maintained planning in Regina should move beyond the traditional model. Yet, although a program of research was proposed, it was not a major element of his planning strategy. For example, with regard to the inner city, most of the problems identified were not substantiated by research.

Table 9

Documentation of Inner City Problems

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Problems Identified</th>
<th>Problems</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Problems Identified</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Well Documented</td>
<td>1. Zoning and development intrusions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Population characteristics (decreasing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>population, nonfamily households, transient,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>low incomes, tenants, large number of seniors)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Lack of open space</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some Evidence</td>
<td>1. Deteriorating housing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Lack of parking, poor street conditions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Evidence Cited</td>
<td>1. Decreasing housing stock</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Lack of affordable housing for particular groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Number of absentee landlords</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Deficiency of services in inner city (suburban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>versus inner city municipal expenditures)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. Increasing crime and social problems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6. Native problems of unemployment, lack of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>skills, inadequate housing, low incomes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Derived from Regina Planning Department, 1977A, 1978, 1979A

C. Scope of Planning

The scope of planning in Regina was broadened beyond the traditional physical concerns. Inner city problems identified in planning documents included physical, economic and social
issues. Despite the short period of time Clark was Director, there was an attempt to address most of these problems. The only exception was unemployment, and addressing it would have required greater use of the intergovernmental strategy to lobby for inner city jobs.

D. Solutions Recommended to Alleviate Inner City Problems

Clark was critical of the typical approach to planning with its reliance on physical solutions. The following is a brief analysis of recommendations made by Regina planning staff with regard to the inner city problems identified (as outlined in Tables 10, 11 and 12).

(a) Physical Problems - Zoning, housing programs and neighborhood improvement were the major tools recommended to deal with the physical aspects of inner city decline. Although these are the traditional means available to planners, they have been criticized as being ineffective in achieving any long term improvements. According to Hason (1977), zoning does not stop the decay of inner city areas nor does it maintain the character of neighborhoods. It does not address problems of real estate speculation, slums or housing shortages. All it can do is allocate the use of urban land in a rational and efficient way. Nor, some critics argue, can the NIP program seriously improve neighborhoods due to the insignificant amount of money allocated to it. (City Magazine, September 1975)

Local government planners are limited in making basic improvements as they do not have the means to bring about structural change. Furthermore, senior levels of government, with greater revenue sources, frequently formulate policies and
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Physical Problems</th>
<th>Recommendations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Over-Zoning</td>
<td>New zoning bylaw</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Declining Population</td>
<td>Infill housing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inadequate Supply of Housing</td>
<td>Establish information base on inner city housing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hire a housing coordinator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Draft a demolition bylaw</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Infill housing and landbanking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Request CMHC to extend Graduated Payment Mortgage Program to existing homes in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>older neighborhoods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor Quality of Housing</td>
<td>Promote use of federal and provincial rehabilitation programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deficiency of Services</td>
<td>Neighborhood Improvement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of Open Space</td>
<td>Landbanking for open space</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of Parking</td>
<td>Specific regulations dealing with parking in new zoning bylaw</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor Street Conditions</td>
<td>Neighborhood Improvement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inadequate Public Transit</td>
<td>Public awareness program promoting transit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Establish senior interdepartmental committee to implement policy recommendations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>of Transportation and Transit Study (eg. bus lanes, shelters, express buses)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Derived from Regina Planning Department, 1977A, 1978, 1979A

programs which are applicable to the city (eg. RRAP, NIP). The actions of local planners are largely restricted to implementing these programs. However, long term effects are seldom possible as complex urban problems cannot be solved by single purpose programs. At best, such programs result in cosmetic changes.
Lasting solutions may require fundamental changes in policy goals and directions with respect to social and economic issues which are outside the competence of local government.

Given these constraints, Regina planners made effective use of the planning mechanisms available to them. They were able to initiate improvements to inner city facilities and infrastructure, encourage the City to become involved in landbanking, increase the supply of low cost housing, promote inner city home repair, and implement a new zoning bylaw which restricted commercial and industrial development in residential areas.

(b) Economic Problems - Although city planners have little power to influence national economic policies regarding poverty or unemployment, they can support programs which benefit the poor. Regina planners recommended the implementation of a variety of low cost housing projects. A home repair advocacy program was initiated to encourage interest in home repairs and to explain the available assistance programs. Public transit was favored over a car oriented transportation system. As a result, improvements such as new buses, increased frequency at rush hours, express buses, and exclusive bus lanes provided a reasonably attractive and moderately priced form of transportation.

(c) Social Problems - To a certain extent, Clark relied on physical solutions to alleviate inner city social problems. It was believed that poor, inadequate and overcrowded housing was one of their major causes. (Regina Planning Department, 1978:5) However, improved housing, by itself, will do little to change underlying problems of discrimination, poverty and
### Table 11
**Inner City Economic Problems and Recommendations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic Problems</th>
<th>Recommendations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>The federal and provincial governments should be asked to create jobs in the inner city.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Income</td>
<td>Purchase property for public housing through federal/provincial programs, Request CMHC to redirect terms of GPM program to needs of low income families, Request provincial government to assist in development of co-op housing, Encourage private groups to sponsor housing projects, Lobby CMHC for a single person hostel, Priority for public transit</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Derived from Regina Planning Department, 1977A, 1978, 1979A

### Table 12
**Inner City Social Problems and Recommendations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social Problems</th>
<th>Recommendations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lack of Daycare</td>
<td>Neighborhood Improvement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime and Social Problems</td>
<td>Work closely with provincial Department of Social Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natives</td>
<td>Low cost housing, Native sports complex, City and provincial government should employ more Natives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth</td>
<td>Neighborhood Planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to Decision-Making</td>
<td>Neighborhood Planning, Inner City Advisory Group</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Derived from Regina Planning Department, 1977A, 1978, 1979A
The Planning Department did go beyond a physical approach as they recommended that a planner continue to work with the provincial Department of Social Services. In addition, access to decision-making was to be improved through neighborhood planning and an Inner City Advisory Group. Although this group was never formed, neighborhood plans outlining community problems and solutions were developed by community associations in the General Hospital, Albert-Scott and Cathedral neighborhoods.

7.2 POLICY FORMATION

A. Mechanisms to Make Planning More Policy Oriented

Planners have been criticized for adopting a technical approach to planning as they have left the formulation of public policy objectives to politicians. As a result, it has been claimed that planning has reflected consensus and acceptance of a corporate or utilitarian view of the city. (Kaplan, 1969) Clark believed planning should move away from its reactive and regulatory approach and become more policy oriented. Consequently, an important task of planners was to formulate goals for future growth.

Planning documents outlined two mechanisms for facilitating policy planning in Regina:

(a) Policy Secretariat - The Planning Department suggested a policy secretariat be formed within the structure of local government. Its task would be the formulation of urban policy and coordination of civic programs to complement policy goals. However, this idea was resisted by city council.
(b) Public Participation - Clark believed the public should become more involved in the planning process. For example, through neighborhood planning, community groups could develop policy objectives for their particular areas.

While both a change in local government and public input are important, they are not enough to ensure a more responsible municipal role in policy making. This is due to the provincial control of local government. Provinces specify the service functions to be performed by municipalities, the structure of municipal decision-making, and most importantly, how revenue is to be raised. In recent years, there has been a trend towards less local autonomy due to an inability of municipalities to meet total expenditures out of their own revenue sources. This has meant a financial dependence on senior levels of government who, in turn, specify how the money is to be spent.

(Higgins, 1977)

B. Policy Goals in Regina

Planning decisions in Regina were made in light of long-term goals and objectives which were clearly outlined in Regina RSVP. With regard to the inner city, the policy goals were:

(a) To maintain inner city neighborhoods as residential areas accommodating a variety of income levels.

(b) To provide for more citizen involvement in planning decisions.

(c) To improve the general quality of life.

Table 13 illustrates how planning recommendations were to achieve these goals.
Table 13

Inner City Planning Goals and Recommendations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Goals</th>
<th>Recommendations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| To maintain the residential character of inner city neighborhoods | Housing programs  
|                                                | Landbanking                                       |
| More citizen involvement                        | Neighborhood planning  
|                                                | Inner City Advisory Group                         |
| Improve the quality of life                      | Landbanking for open space  
|                                                | Neighborhood improvement  
|                                                | Intergovernmental strategy to resolve economic and social problems |

Source: Derived from Regina Planning Department, 1977A, 1979A

7.3 PUBLIC PARTICIPATION

This section will analyze public participation from two perspectives - both the public participation program in developing policies for Regina RSVP, the overall growth management strategy for Regina, and the extent of citizen involvement in inner city planning.

According to Heberlein (1976), to achieve good public involvement, rather than just good public relations, planners must:

(a) identify and contact all the publics affected by a particular issue,

(b) meet individually with each group to ensure their views and concerns are understood,

(c) contact the public at an early stage,

(d) document public input, and

(e) ensure that public involvement is a continuing effort.
Applying Heberlein's criteria, the following conclusions can be made concerning public participation in the RSVP program and inner city planning.

A. Public Involvement - Regina RSVP

(Information in this section is derived from Regina RSVP: Public Participation Program, 1977B:5-10.)

(a) The Planning Department both identified and actively sought out a range of groups with varying interests concerning Regina's future growth. City council, the Regina Planning Commission, local and provincial government departments, community associations, business clubs, interest groups, and individual households were sent information on Regina RSVP, which outlined the important planning issues and suggested recommendations.

(b) The Planning Department met individually with groups representing a particular interest. Seminars were held with the civic bureaucracy and with business groups such as the Building Owner's and Manager's Association and the Downtown Businessmen's Association. A series of twenty-six public meetings were arranged on a neighborhood basis to hear concerns at the community level. Questionnaires were distributed at each of the public meetings. In addition, attempts were made to reach the general public. A storefront planning office was opened in the downtown area and three general meetings were held, along with a number of television and radio programs.

(c) The Planning Department did not initiate public participation at an early stage of the planning process. The public was invited to comment once the issues, solutions and
policy objectives in Regina RSVP were determined. Planning staff presented a future model for Regina based on higher density residential growth, more reliance on public transit, and downtown revitalization to make it the center of retail activity. The public was left in the position of reacting to the proposals made rather than initiating their own.

Secondly, although Regina RSVP did offer three alternative models of growth, the evidence presented supported the Planning Department's position. The first alternative assumed all new residential growth would be low density suburban, the second assumed growth would be suburban with varying densities, and the third assumed half of new growth would be in the inner city with the remainder being built at a higher density in the suburbs. The last alternative was clearly favored as it was shown to make the most economical use of land, facilities and municipal expenditures. Research was not conducted on the implications of the other models in order to give the public a real choice.

Finally, residents lacked any decision-making power to guarantee that their views would be taken into account as they were not represented on any policy committees or advisory boards.

Heberlein (1976) distinguishes between different functions of public involvement. It can be used to exchange information, to reassure people their views have been heard, to meet legal requirements, or it can be interactive as planners and the public work together. Regina RSVP public involvement was informational rather than interactive.

(d) Heberlein states documentation of public comments is important as it assures the public their views were heard and
considered. Public input regarding Regina RSVP was recorded in a planning document entitled Regina RSVP: Public Participation Program. Questionnaire results as well as comments from government agencies, interest groups and the public were recorded.

The next section looks at the extent to which Heberlein's last criterion, that public involvement must be a continuing process, was followed.

B. Public Involvement in Inner City Planning

Clark was successful in ensuring that public participation played a large role in planning decisions made in the inner city. Through neighborhood planning, community associations were given a significant amount of decision-making power. Residents identified neighborhood problems, recommended programs and policies, and developed neighborhood plans which outlined future development in their area. Neighborhood planning in Regina was unique as citizens, rather than planners, made the final recommendations.

In addition to neighborhood planning, the Planning Department sustained citizen involvement in the inner city through the following mechanisms:

(a) workshops to discuss community problems with residents in the Cathedral, General Hospital and Albert-Scott neighborhoods,

(b) consultation with community groups to prepare a new zoning bylaw,

(c) community group grants to the Cathedral and General Hospital areas to help defray the costs of materials and rent so that neighborhood site offices could be established,

(d) periodic delivery of planning publications to individual
households to keep citizens informed of current planning issues. However, one problem with public input was that only neighborhoods with organized resident groups were involved in the planning process, as illustrated in Table 14.

Table 14

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Citizen Involvement in Neighborhood Planning Process</th>
<th>Transi-Cathedral</th>
<th>General Hospital</th>
<th>11th Ave East</th>
<th>Albert-Scott</th>
<th>East-Scott View</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1976 Workshops</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighborhood Planning</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIP</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Group Grants</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Derived from Regina Planning Department, 1978

This may have been due to the limited resources of the Planning Department and the short time period examined.

7.4 POLITICAL INTERVENTION

A. Evidence of an Activist Approach to Planning

(a) Initiation of Planning Action - The Planning Department was very successful at influencing public policy in Regina. A major measure of their success was the acceptance by council of Regina RSVP which outlined both a strategy for planning and a model for what Regina should become.

(b) Advocacy Planning for Inner City Residents - Clark placed a high priority on problems faced by inner city residents,
in particular low income families, senior citizens and Natives. In the past, these people have been largely ignored. Federal policies in North America have been biased in favor of suburban growth. (Downs, 1979) For example, mortgage credit has been more easily available in new suburban areas rather than older neighborhoods. Federally supported housing clearance programs in the 1950's and 60's often destroyed sound inner city housing stock. At the same time, suburban communities frequently made a concerted effort to restrict entry to a relatively homogeneous group of middle class residents. Low income families were excluded by means of restrictive zoning, building codes and neighborhood opposition to subsidized housing. By stressing the needs of inner city residents, Clark was representing a group that had been left to fend for themselves in the past.

B. Role Conflicts

Political intervention, or activism, was possibly one of the Planning Department's strongest and most effective strategies. Regina planners took a leadership role by defining the important issues and recommending future courses of action. As Clark stated,

"Planning should not just be a rubber stamping. It should be a control process to protect the public interests."

"It is up to the Planning Department to point out the directions the city should take to get the best combination of living conditions for the money available." (Leader-Post, December 28, 1976)

It can be argued there are two potential problems with regard to political intervention. First, policy formation can be said to be the prerogative of politicians as their special
competence is to provide leadership. Their task is to arbitrate between conflicting interests and come to choices, for which they alone are accountable. However, politics by its very nature is incapable of generating long range goals. Political decision-making is partial, short range and opportunistic. (Friedmann, 1966) Through research and analysis, planners are more able to realistically assess present decisions in terms of future consequences. As a result, they have a unique and potentially influential role to play in decision-making. Because of their specialized competence, they are able to offer policy makers information and policy recommendations.

Secondly, it can be argued there is an inherent conflict between political intervention and public participation. The former assumes planners should point out future courses of action while the latter involves more public involvement in the planning process. It brings into question what role planners should play. They can become: (a) educators as they convince the public of the superior merits of their plans, (b) technicians as they implement the desires of the majority of the public, (c) negotiators as they try to compromise between professional planning goals and the public's wishes, or (d) advocates for the interests of a particular group.

None of these roles forecloses the possibility of one aspect of political intervention, lobbying for the implementation of planning goals. However, who should formulate these goals does present a conflict. Table 15 illustrates the dilemma.

The only roles where the two strategies are compatible are negotiator and advocate. The negotiator role is unrealistic
Table 15
Who Formulates Planning Goals?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Planning Role</th>
<th>Political Intervention Planner Formulates Goals</th>
<th>Public Participation Public Formulates Goals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Educator</td>
<td>X</td>
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as it assumes planners can find consensus. In reality, no matter what the final decision is, planners will never please everyone. Therefore, they must make value choices on which groups to support and work with these groups to formulate and implement planning action. These groups will not necessarily always be the same as they may vary with the circumstances and planning decisions to be made.

With regard to Regina RSVP, the Planning Department assumed an educative role as planners decided the goals. The public's role was a fairly minor and reactive one. In this case, the conflict between the two strategies was not resolved. However, in inner city planning, both planners and inner city residents worked together to formulate goals and lobby for their implementation. Planners were advocates and there was no role conflict between the two strategies.

7.5 LIMITATIONS, CONSTRAINTS AND STRENGTHS
Planning in Regina under Clark was the antithesis of the
passive, apolitical and conservative approach claimed by critics to have characterized much of the planning profession. The following is a summary of the major limitations, constraints and strengths of planning in Regina.

A. Limitations

Clark (1980:227) claimed planners "must not merely respond to the initiatives of concentrated interests in the private sector, but must attempt to place the initiative in the hands of the public where it belongs." He was successful in doing this with the exception of public involvement regarding Regina RSVP. In this case, the public's role was a reactive one. Professionals predetermined the agenda by conceptualizing the problems and defining the terms for their resolution.

Secondly, there was a lack of research and documented evidence on many inner city problems or on viable growth alternatives as discussed in Regina RSVP. Therefore, the public had little real choice in growth management strategies to be followed.

Finally, Clark's strategies present a potential conflict between political intervention and public participation. Both strategies cannot be implemented when planners assume either an educator or technician role. The case study on public involvement with respect to Regina RSVP demonstrated the inherent difficulties.

B. Constraints

Although planners may actively strive towards having more than a marginal influence on city building, there are constraints
which may limit the effectiveness of their role.

Clark felt that planners should become more policy oriented. However, there are several obstacles that work against policy development at the local level. Because municipalities are creatures of the provincial government, their responsibilities can be expanded or reduced at any time. The trend has been to a reduction in local authority due to the proliferation of special purpose bodies and the ever-increasing financial dependence on senior levels of government. As well, both the federal and provincial governments own significant amounts of land in most urban centers. Large scale projects built on this land can have far-reaching effects.

Another constraint is the fact most planning actions are ameliorative. To have any long term effects, planners must strive to do more than correct immediate problems. They should address the underlying social causes rather than the symptoms of urban dysfunctions. Resolution of problems on a more fundamental level, involving structural changes in society, is necessary if planners want to have more than a marginal impact. But, there is a gap between reality and theory. Local planners have little influence on national or provincial policies and their legitimacy has been limited primarily to technical matters.

C. **Strengths**

Clark's intended style of planning was, to a large extent, implemented in Regina. The following summarizes the major strengths of his approach.

By taking a short term, issue oriented approach to planning
Regina planners ensured that inner city neighborhoods experienced some immediate improvements. New low cost houses were constructed, older ones were rehabilitated, and community services were upgraded. By comparison, conventional approaches lead to a planning process which places great emphasis on producing a "master" plan delineating future land uses. The plan tends to be treated as the once and for all solution and can result in a considerable lapse of time before any actions are implemented.

Regina planners did not limit themselves to physical issues. There was an attempt to address social and economic concerns as well, through both programs that planners supported and the use of an intergovernmental strategy. Although there was limited use of this strategy due to the relatively new position of the Planning Department under Clark, he felt it was a viable course of action to be pursued. Many government agencies appeared willing to discuss policy positions on various issues affecting the city. For example, Clark stated the provincial Social Planning Secretariat shared policy documents on issues such as poverty which the Planning Department could critique.

Planning in Regina moved well beyond a technical and reactive approach as decisions were made in the context of long term goals and objectives. In the process, Regina planners, through the policies they recommended for the inner city, became advocates for the interests of low income inner city residents. These people have frequently been ignored in the planning process as federal and provincial programs primarily aid middle class suburban homeowners.
The Planning Department was committed to citizen input into the planning process. A major mechanism for achieving this was neighborhood planning whereby citizens defined community concerns and made the final recommendations for resolving them. The Planning Department provided resources and lobbied city council for financial aid so that community groups could formulate and implement area plans. Public involvement was a continuous process. Through a storefront planning office and publications delivered to households, citizens were kept aware of the current planning issues in Regina.

Regina planners were not afraid to take the initiative in recommending future courses of action. As a result, the Planning Department assumed an influential role in Regina as they gained both public and political acceptance of policy recommendations outlined in Regina RSVP. Through council acceptance of RSVP documents, the Planning Department was successful in introducing a new planning process to Regina based on short term action, issue orientation, policy planning, public participation, and political intervention. Clearly a new strategy for Canadian urban planning was implemented.

7.6 SUMMARY

Gerecke's research showed that Canadian urban planning is primarily an administrative practice. It emphasizes the preparation and administration of comprehensive plans, zoning and subdivision regulations. It has a strong physical orientation, discourages citizen participation and, for the most part, is reactive. Planners seldom initiate proposals as they rely, instead, on elected officials to determine planning goals.
Gerecke's research offered a challenge to the planning profession. Whether planners take up this challenge depends on the interpretation of their role. If they are satisfied to play a passive and technical part in city development, there is no need for change in the profession. However, if planners believe they should have a more active and aggressive voice in the formulation of public policy and, consequently, a more influential role in decision-making, then there is indeed a need for change.

Planning literature has pointed out the inadequacies of the rational comprehensive model and it has offered new theories to make up for shortcomings in this model. The recommended reforms have been either more communication or an expanded scope for planning. Regina planners incorporated policy planning which provided the directions for future growth, with activism to ensure planning goals were implemented, with short term action to achieve immediate quality of life improvements, along with public participation and an expanded scope for planning. As they went well beyond the basic reforms to planning, and were successful in implementing their strategies in Regina, this approach to planning should be used by other urban planners in Canada.

7.7 FURTHER RESEARCH

Regina Planning Department documents were very well written. They summarized the history of planning and development in Regina, thus putting into context the new approach to planning advocated for the City. Implications for growth, a strategy for public
planning as well as the issues were clearly outlined. However, planning documents did not resolve potential problems associated with some of the recommended strategies. First, there is an inherent conflict between public participation and political intervention as it brings into question the role of the planner. For example, should planners rely on professional judgment to formulate planning goals, should they be spokesmen for the majority viewpoint, or should they be advocates for particular interests? Secondly, Clark did not research alternative growth management strategies. Although research can expand the choices available, how extensively should planners search for alternatives? Lastly, the difficulty of policy planning at the local level and the limited tools available to planners pose constraints which limit the effectiveness of local planning. These problems are common to all planners and require further study.

Planning schools also have an important role to play in the future approach to planning practice. Planning education should stress the values and purposes of planning as well as technical competency. It is not enough to equip planners with the technical tools of the profession. More important than how we plan is an understanding of who and what we are planning for.
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