THE CONCEPT OF ACTION IN THE WORKS OF J.M.R. LENZ

by

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ABSTRACT

Lenz's concept of action: Handeln, is a pervasive idea in his writings and an obvious preoccupation in his life. Lenz scholarship has tended to follow Goethe and other contemporaries of Lenz in seeing Lenz's activism in practice as mere intrigue, and as a mere obsession when it was commended in theory. Scholars have, at the most, looked for origins for his views, or changes in them, but have generally declined to take them as the serious and coherent statement that they were intended to be. This study views Lenz's ideas on action as a coherent whole that amounts to a credible philosophy of life worth studying for its own sake, and with its parallels in modern psychotherapy.

Lenz's views are inseparable from the Société de Philosophie et de Belles Lettres--the identity of which we find it necessary to clarify--because they were expressed in the context of this society and for its benefit. Its turgid spirit was what provoked Lenz to urge its members to action. Most Lenz scholars to the contrary, one of the society's members: Johann Daniel Salzmann, stands apart from the others in influencing and encouraging the poet in his thinking. Responding warmly to Salzmann's ideas Lenz works out his own philosophical and theological system of salvation through action, in which Goethe's Götz von Berlichingen stands as the model for powerful, spontaneous, altruistic action, creating and expressing the freedom of the individual.
Lenz's deepest interest, though, is not in moral giants and their exemplary action, but in ordinary humanity and the soteriology of any action. It is man's calling to develop morally by learning from the consequences of his actions. Whether good or bad, action is the basis for moral discovery, growth and salvation; as such it is a sacred expression of one's individuality and beyond the reach of judgmental moralising by others. As literary-critic Lenz defends *Werther* against Nicolai's parody, arguing that Werther's life had precisely this sacramental quality. The spontaneity of Werther's actions was matched by his willingness to take moral responsibility for them, and to learn from them.

Freedom of action is freedom to make mistakes and to profit from those mistakes: this, to Lenz, is the gospel of Christ. At the heart of it is the idea of *metanoia*, which is the new mentality, the loftier perspective that comes about through the performance of action that is followed by moral evaluation. *Metanoia* means not the pietistic dwelling on past failures and past wrongdoing, implied by the German equivalent *Buße*, but the sense of freedom to turn those failures to account.

Lenz's first major drama: *Der Hofmeister*, brings the idea of *metanoia* to bear on the fallible nature of human life. The play concerns not so much the cause of the family tragedy: ostensibly the hiring of a private tutor, as the way in which that tragedy is overcome by moral renewal and by the joy of believing that the curse of the past is outweighed by the infinite
possibilities of the future.

In Die Soldaten, the painful and saddening consequences of erring action are barely overcome. But though blame for the disaster is laid at society's door, it is again the individual that is morally responsible. Since it is Marie's and Wesener's actions that are at fault, there is the possibility of their learning from the consequences and experiencing some degree of metanoia. Their predominant reaction is, however, not the joy of renewal but the painful acceptance of suffering, which, in Lenz's view, was one of the highest forms of action, with its own perspective of salvation.
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“Solange man mich nicht eines Bessern belehrt, gehe ich auf
diesen Wege fort und glaube, daß es besser sei, des HERRN Willen zu tun als ihn bloß zu wissen”. Such is J.M.R. Lenz's conclusion to a paper written for delivery to the Strassburg Society for Philosophy and Literature sometime during the period 1772-1774. The essay attempted to lay rationalistic foundations on which to base a system of morality that would satisfy the demand, felt strongly by Lenz and widely shared by his age, for a new activism in human ethical affairs: for aspiration rather than contentment, a striving for further improvement instead of satisfaction with past achievements or indifference to present mediocrity, above all for practical achievements rather than mere theoretical insights. The call to action is heard in philosophical thought, being implicit in Leibniz's system of monadic interaction as well as in Kant's ethical imperative; it is heard in the Church where, under Pietist influence the static and passive nature of Lutheran teaching on the inefficacy of human works for salvation and the need for "faith alone" yielded to a more active concern to bring religion to bear on the practical matters of everyday life, and it is heard in the literary world as men came, with Herder, to see history as drama and drama as history, as the sum of what happens and what people do.

The demand for mere knowledge to be supplemented by action is reinforced throughout Lenz's writings, however, by various theological and psychological arguments, which encourage us to treat
this all-pervasive idea as more than merely a reflection of the mood of the times, as more than Sturm und Drang impatience with the hide-bound traditions of middle-class life, or the inevitable reaction to the complacency that accompanied the Enlightenment's advances in understanding. With Lenz, action, and the moral implications and problems associated with it, are an overriding concern, and one in which the uniqueness of Lenz's thought is largely to be found. There is little in common between Lenz's activism and the uncontrolled, heedless behaviour of Klinger's or Leisewitz' "Kraftkerle", chafing at the limitations to their sphere of action. Lenz does not see action merely as a way to deploy the colossal energies of the genius. As Bertha Huber-Bindschedler points out in her study of Lenz's psychology: "In Lenz war, abgesehen von Goethe und Herder, das kraftgeniale Streben am meisten von allen Stürmern und Drängern vertieft. Der nur affektive, schrankenlose Titanismus war seinem eigenen Wesen fremd." Indeed Lenz consciously rejected such use of one's energies: "Nichts ist aber der menschlichen Natur unwürdiger", he says, "als Handlungen die nach keinem Ziel gehen"(I.483). Nor can Lenz condone merely negative and destructive social criticism or social action. Rather he rejects all action that is not whole-heartedly devoted to the practical improvement of society or the individual. Thus Huber-Bindschedler sums up Lenz's uniqueness: "Lenz begnügte sich aber damit nicht, Bestehendes einfach niederzureißen, sondern machte es sich zur großen Aufgabe, auch Pläne zu Reformen zu entwerfen, also produktive Kritik zu üben, und damit ragt er über alle anderen kleineren Stürmer und Dränger hinaus"(19).
It is often stated that Lenz wished to reform society. What is not so well appreciated is the extent to which Lenz staked all his personal life: his career, his reputation, his happiness, on the hope and belief that men were reformable, and reformable by the likes of him. There were to be reformed, moreover, not by having their minds entertained with profitable ideas, but by being personally challenged in their hearts and feelings, and through an awakening of their moral awareness. Ottomar Rudolf, arriving at a formulation in the conclusion to his book of this fundamental Lenzian purpose, too late though to make much use of it, speaks of the poet's desire to awaken, through his art, the organic morality lying dormant within man; he speaks of Lenz's belief that the proof of literature was in its effectiveness in leading the reader to a new life.

It is our view, too, that action in Lenz is not merely a highly developed idea, but also a way of life, even a religion. His call for action arises out of the conviction that moral goals are realisable for individual and society alike. His literary work of 1771-1776 is itself his own way of working to achieve such goals, it is itself the sort of action that he commends in his theoretical essays.

It has been common to dwell on the often unrealistic nature of much of Lenz's activity, to stress the failure of his aspirations, and to show the failures to be symptomatic of an individual who, lacking "Verstand", as Wieland and Lavater were not slow to notice, fought his battles and strove for his reforms more in the
realm of his own fantasy than in the real world. Critics of Lenz have been all too readily inspired by Goethe's verdict on his former close friend to research his weaknesses rather than his strengths: "So hat er niemanden, den er liebte, jemals genützt, niemanden, den er haßte, jemals geschadet." In the present study we shall not attempt to evaluate the relevance or effectiveness of Lenz's action, partly because this has been done before, but partly also because it is not important here that Lenz's ideas and activities did not bring him personal and professional success. Success is not always a measure of value or relevance; Lenz's vision of the world is not rendered valueless merely by his lack of those qualities of character and personality required for it to make an impact on the real social world with which it was concerned. Lenz may well have suffered from a larger portion of "Disproportion des Talents mit dem Leben" than most poets, especially as he saw his talents as useless except in the context of practical life. But one thing that is often overlooked is that Lenz was well aware of his shortcomings. He knew that his ideas and aspirations outstripped his power to implement them, he was aware of his tendency for his fantasy to form its own image of reality and supplant that truer image that sober reflection subsequently gave him. It is because he is aware of himself that he is able to give literary shape to such personal experiences as he records in *Der Waldbruder* and *Das Tagebuch*. In reality, Lenz knew himself only too well; he had learnt from his Pietist upbringing to monitor his inner life, and had the literary gifts to explore them in the objective medium of poetry and prose.
Whilst being sure, therefore, of his strengths he has a realistic awareness of his weaknesses; in *Pandemonium Germanicum* Lenz makes Goethe say of him: "Leistet er nichts, so hat er doch groß geahndet" (II.276).

It serves little purpose, therefore, to dwell on the discrepancy in his life between his philosophy of action and his lack of practical success, particularly as his philosophy takes fully into account the question of failure, and of action done in error and producing harmful consequences. Our aim is to expound his ideas, not to criticise them or question his suitability to represent them. What interests us is what Lenz consciously and consistently advocates and attempts to put into practice. It is our belief that his views on action that were expressed over the period 1771-1776 do form a coherent whole, and can be studied for their own sake. This approach is in contrast to that which sees Lenz's optimistic activism as a short-lived struggle against a fundamental, overriding irrationalism, produced in him by his Pietist upbringing and fuelled by his extreme sensibility. Werner Wien's study, for example, discerns a development in Lenz's thought from an initial period of irrationalism, strongly coloured by Pietist asceticism, through a period of Leibnizian rationalism, to a new form of his earlier irrationalism. We consider the relativism of this approach harmful to a true understanding of Lenz's ideas. It does not help to see aspects of Lenz's thought merely as stages on the way back to irrationalism and ultimate madness. What should be stressed is what is deliberate and consciously striven after in Lenz, not what happens when things get out of hand, as they did
from late 1776 onwards. Development, anyway, is difficult to trace when the order of Lenz's works is not known for sure, and when works are even mis-identified and wrongly brought into relation with one another: an unfortunate defect of Wien's study, as we shall see in chapter three below. A study of development necessarily presupposes a certainty regarding the chronological order of the works concerned. A different order would demand a different theory of development. With many of Lenz's writings that certainty is, at present, impossible to achieve; and to proceed without it is, with Wien, to come perilously close to adopting an order which makes best sense of the theory of development already assumed, rather than derive a sense of development directly from a given order. By noting consistency in Lenz's thought rather than change, we are therefore on safer ground, especially as the period of Lenz's key writings covers a mere six years: scarcely a long enough period to allow us to talk of the poet's "early" or "mature" thought. We are focussing on recurrent ideas because these can be reasonably expected to represent fundamental convictions and, just as reasonably, to find expression in Lenz's dramatic works—the most valuable items of his literary legacy. Not that the idea of a development or change in the Lenz of the years 1771-1776 should be altogether excluded. There is no doubt that Die Soldaten, as a later play than Der Hofmeister, indicates a maturer poet. We shall comment in our conclusion below on what maturity the play reveals.

This study, therefore, will analyse Lenz's notion of action, as it is discussed in theory, as it is urged on his listeners as
a practical obligation, and as its implications are drawn out in essays and illustrated in dramas. His ideas were first expressed for the benefit of a literary society: the Société de Philosophie et de Belles Lettres in Strassburg (hereafter referred to as Société). It was for the weekly sessions of this group that most of Lenz's essays were produced, indeed it was even to counter the apparently turgid spirit of the group that Lenz was moved to stress his dynamic philosophy. The poet is provoked on more than one occasion into impatient criticism of its practices, and he begins to regard his own activity in its midst in terms of a private mission to the unconverted. He complains of its "Schneckenmoralphilosophie", and declares his resolve "den Leuten Standpunkt ihrer Religion einzustecken". It is to this Société that he makes the pronouncement, quoted at the beginning of this study, that no amount of theorising will replace the need for practical action. The Société will be studied, therefore, as the initial context of Lenz's ideas, as the initial sphere of his activity, and as such a starting point for the reformation of society as a whole. We shall show that he also found in the Société not only a pretext and audience, but also an important shaping influence for his views in the philosophical thinking of one member: Johann Daniel Salzmann. The concept of action will then be studied in specific theoretical essays, beginning with the moral-philosophical writings, where Lenz puts together and expounds a system of moral growth and freedom through action. Being no philosopher, however, and knowing full well how unsystematically his thinking always proceeded, Lenz the theologian develops his thoughts on action most fully in his theo-
logical treatises.

The call to action in our opening quotation, reminiscent of St. James's "Seid aber Thäter des Worts und nicht Hörer allein", reveals the identity, to Lenz's mind, of morality and Christianity, and indicates how both of these come back down to the fundamental principle of action. Religion is action: "des HERRN Willen zu tun"; and action, being the principle of morality, is also religion: "des HERRN Willen zu tun". The problem arises how we are to define the Lord's will which man must be active to perform. In some of Lenz's writings this question does not seem to apply. The morality of action matters less than the fact that action is morality, is religion. He writes: "Ihr werdet gerichtet werden, und seid schon jetzt gerichtet vor Gott, nicht nach dem, was ihr geträumt habt, sondern was ihr gehandelt habt bei Leibes Leben, es sei gut oder böse" (I.509). His demand for action at all costs, whether good or bad, follows the model of Christ's parable of the Pounds: the one who is censured is the one who does nothing: "Nur dem Knecht, der sein noch übriges Pfund anwendet, wird mehr gegeben als er hat--der andere kehr ins Chaos zurück, aus dem er zur neuen Schöpfung hervor hätte gehen können, vergrab es tief im Schweißtuch und sterbe des Todes" (I.504). But action does pose a problem to Lenz; he is aware of the difficulty of harmonising action with morality and with happiness, and of the sometimes tragic consequences of well-meaning human action. It is his belief, though, that such consequences can be overcome by God's grace and by repentance, understood in the literal sense of the Greek word: metanoia.
The theological solution to the problem of action, then, that he works out in his essays, and encapsulates in the imperative: *metanoia*, has important implications for Lenz's dramatic theory, as it is presented in his literary-critical writings. There it also becomes a criterion by which to defend Goethe's *Werther*, and by which also to judge and condemn the literary practice of Christoph Martin Wieland, whose moralism ran counter, he felt, to his notion of free action, and whose light-heartedness discouraged moral striving. The well-meaning, though erring, actions of the individual deserve not an urbane, ironic smile, but compassion and forgiveness, and the encouragement to do better next time. In the dramas *Der Hofmeister* and *Die Soldaten* Lenz tests out his theological solution. There he creates a world in which his belief in *metanoia* comes to bear on the mediocrity of human behaviour in real life, as his naturalistic genius perceives it. He shows that since human beings are responsible agents, true happiness and fulfilment comes by moral and spiritual growth, achieved through the trial and error of active living. For the main characters in these plays such growth is seen in enhanced human relationships and in an acceptance of hardship. Through their action, though erring, Berg and Gustchen, Wesener and Marie learn to love and to suffer. These lessons, once learnt, enable Gustchen and her family to work altruistically on others' behalf.

Work, love and suffering: we shall briefly note in conclusion how these three values find a powerful echo in twentieth-century psychology. The implications of Lenzian "action" have been rediscovered in the contemporary practice of reality therapy and logotherapy.
CHAPTER ONE

The Société de Philosophie et de Belles Lettres

Shortly after arriving in Strassburg in the Spring of 1771, Lenz found his way to a Kosthaus run by the Lauth sisters in what was then the Knoblauchgasse. Here, as Goethe and Jung-Stilling record, he met a circle of ten to twenty friends united by a common enthusiasm for literature and contemporary thought. Jung-Stilling had belonged to this Tischgesellschaft since 1770 and was to stay another year. Herder had just left in person but was undoubtedly still very much present in spirit. Goethe was there, apart from his visits to Sesenheim, for the first four months of Lenz's stay, before returning to Frankfurt. Other Stammgäste included Goethe's friend Lersé, immortalised in Götz von Berlichingen, and Meyer von Lindau, a later friend and correspondent of Lenz's. Throughout the summer months they met over lunch, discussing drama, religion, language, poetry and philosophy, and finding immense enjoyment and stimulation in a highly creative exchange of ideas. The group had found its president in the actuary Johann Daniel Salzmann, an older figure than the others and a fit person to maintain logic and order in the discussions as well as moderation in the consumption of wine. It was also here that Lenz learned, perhaps through Jung-Stilling, of another, more formal literary society that met once a week expressly for the purpose of reading and discussing members' own writings. By the autumn of that year he had also attached himself to that group, known as the Société de Philosophie et de Belles Lettres or Gesellschaft der schönen Wis-
senschaften. The importance of all these gatherings cannot be overstressed. Out of them came, as direct results, Jung-Stilling's autobiography, Lenz's critical, philosophical and religious essays, Herder's essay on Shakespeare published in *Von deutscher Art und Kunst*, and Salzmann's *Kurze Abhandlungen*. Beyond these specific works the Sturm und Drang movement as a whole owes much to those formative and creative discussions in the *Knoblauchgasse* and at the Société.

Lenz's theoretical essays were composed for delivery to the Société; here it was that his ideas were shaped and articulated, and that he issued his stirring call to action. Without the Société his convictions would probably have remained largely unexpressed and much of his work unwritten. It is vital, then, to clarify what the Société was and who were the figures responsible for shaping it, and thereby for influencing Lenz's intellectual development. Surprisingly, a good deal of confusion has reigned until the present day on this score, and on occasion even the Société's existence has been called in question, and this, strangely, by Goethe himself. In Book 10 of *Dichtung und Wahrheit* we find him not only questioning that Lenz was involved in such a society, but apparently questioning as well whether such a society existed. This is a puzzling contradiction, when we see Lenz attesting so strongly to the Société's importance by the number of times he refers to it, and refers his writings and ideas specifically to it. Lenz writes, for example, in 1774 as a preface to his *Anmerkungen über das Theater*: "Diese Schrift ward zwei Jahre vor Erscheinung der Deutschen Art und Kunst und des Götz von Berlich-
ingen in einer Gesellschaft guter Freunde vorgelesen" (I.329).

Goethe, however, looking back on his acquaintance with Lenz, writes: "Bei diesen (Anmerkungen) war es mir einigermaßen auf- fallend, daß er in einem lakonischen Vorberichte sich dahin äußerte, als sei der Inhalt dieses Aufsatzes, der mit Heftigkeit gegen das regelmäßige Theater gerichtet war, schon vor einigen Jahren, als Vorlesung, einer Gesellschaft von Literatur- freunden bekannt geworden, zu der Zeit also, wo Götz noch nicht geschrieben gewesen. In Lenzens Straßburger Verhältnissen schien ein literarischer Zirkel, den ich nicht kennen sollte, etwas problematisch" (X.11).

What are we to make of Goethe's words? Is he querying that Lenz really belonged to a literary circle? Or that he really read his essay to it in 1771? Or is he questioning the very existence of any society that was outside of his own literary world? Whether or not he knows about the Société, he disguises here the exact object of his query in a way that alerts us to the fact that more is at stake, at this point of his autobiography, than merely historical accuracy. There is personal interest in the way he remembers his Sturm und Drang years; if he suggests here that Lenz is in error, or even dishonest in his claims to priority, it is not merely to clear up a factual point, but because he is more concerned, here, with a portrayal of Lenz that will explain the subsequent cooling of their friendship. Goethe sees Lenz as a somewhat misguided opponent, and as an example of the kind of unstable subjectivism that he had put behind him in Werther (X.11; 571, notes 7, 15). He is stung by what he sees as
the provocative nature of Lenz's claim to priority, and takes the provocation personally. Lenz is after all seeking prestige for his own thinking at Goethe's and Herder's expense, and Goethe, for one, is not prepared to grant it. We might expect, though, that he would proceed to refute Lenz's claim by appealing to the known facts of the case: that is, by going into the circumstances under which the ideas of the Anmerkungen were really developed, expanding on the glimpse that he gives us in Book XI of Dichtung und Wahrheit, where he describes the insights of the Anmerkungen as arising out of group discussion at the lunch-time Tischgesellschaft. "Will jemand unmittelbar erfahren," he says there, "was in dieser lebendigen Gesellschaft gedacht, gesprochen und verhandelt worden, der lese den Aufsatz Herders über Shakspeare [sic!], in dem Hefte von Deutscher Art und Kunst; ferner Lenzens Anmerkungen übers Theater" (IX.494). Regardless of the question of Lenz's membership in any other society, it was almost certainly at this Table Society that Herder's and Lenz's essays were born, and Goethe could have made this point. However he chooses rather to question the occasion on which Lenz's assertion of priority is based: that is, to question the likelihood of Lenz's belonging not only to the Tischgesellschaft but also to another society, out of which the new ideas were alleged to have come. Declining to discuss the facts of the case, Goethe sees only dishonesty in Lenz's character. To him, this "laconic preface" was just another instance of Lenz's apparent passion to pursue and attack him, out of Quixotic delusion, and to argue his own priority on fictional evidence. Was Goethe right to suggest
that Lenz's preface was a fiction in rather poor taste?

Actually, if the analysis that Theodor Friedrich made of the Anmerkungen is correct, Goethe was not altogether wrong to question Lenz's claim to priority. But he was wrong to question the likelihood of his membership in the literary society mentioned by Lenz in the preface to his essay. The fact is that Goethe was not in a position to judge whether a literary circle independent of him was a likely part of Lenz's Strassburg circumstances in 1771. He left, after all, in August of that year, and it must have seemed quite conceivable to him in retrospect that Lenz could easily have become active in a society that autumn and winter, and could have written up some of the literary discussion that had taken place in the Table Society before Herder's and Goethe's departure and which Goethe mentions in the passage from Dichtung und Wahrheit quoted above—presenting this material then to the other society, the "Gesellschaft guter Freunde", as a paper of his own.

We need not, then, be led astray by Goethe's comments, and assume that a literary society separate from Goethe's own Tischgesellschaft never existed. Its existence is proved beyond any shadow of doubt by references made to it by other writers than Lenz.

Attention was drawn to the decisive testimony of Jung-Stilling in his autobiography by Karl Kochendörffer as early as 1890, in an article which, if it had been better known, would have prevented much of the confusion that has reigned until today about the nature of the Société. Although Kochendörffer is concerned to clarify
this only in as far as such clarification absolves Goethe of any impious charge of falsehood and confirms his own (Kochendörffer's) prejudice against French culture, he does perform the lasting service of separating much of the fact from the fiction that surrounds our understanding of Goethe's and Lenz's Strassburg activities. His argument for the separate existence of Lenz's "Gesellschaft guter Freunde" and for dissociating Goethe from its literary activities, is clinched, albeit with a slight reservation, by comments Jung-Stilling makes about the Société in a letter to a reader of 1779--a letter which seems to have been hitherto overlooked, even by Kochendörffer, in discussions of the Société. Jung writes: "Als ich zu Straßburg studierte, hatte sich daselbst eine Anzahl edler Jünglinge zu einer Gesellschaft der schönen Wissenschaften zusammen gebildet, ich gerieth in dies angenehme Band und arbeitete fleißig mit ihnen. Der große Dr. G. studierte auch daselbst, und ob er sich gleich nicht mit einlies: so erschien er doch zuweilen bei uns, und munterte mich sehr auf, den lieben Jünglingen zu helfen." Dr. Goethe did know, therefore, of this other society, and cannot be seen in Dichtung und Wahrheit to be questioning its existence. However, since Jung-Stilling is referring here to a time before Lenz arrived in Strassburg, or before he joined the Société, it is quite likely that by the time Lenz joined, Goethe had long since ceased putting in an appearance, and indeed might already have left Strassburg. If they never met at the Société, then, Goethe may indeed not have known of Lenz's involvement with it, at least in 1771, although by 1774, when the Anmerkungen, with their provo-
cative prologue, were sent to Goethe for publication, he would certainly have known.

If Goethe seemed surprised to hear of Lenz's membership in the Société as early as 1771, this is, then, because Goethe himself had stopped coming by the time Lenz joined; it is not, as Kochendörffer suggests, that Goethe spurned the Société altogether and assumed that Lenz would have done the same. This scholar asks us to believe, and to applaud the fact, that it was contempt for French culture that led Goethe to avoid the Société and to consider it inconceivable that the German Lenz might at all have wanted to have anything to do with it either. There is certainly no support for this view. Goethe's reasons for not joining are not known for sure, but it is likely that he would have found little to inspire him in the enthusiastic but probably rather undistinguished and dilettantish discussions and lectures that were held in its midst. We should see it as a Sturm und Drang sub-culture, that was nourished by the latest ideas of the time, but contained amongst its youthful members only a few who, like Jung-Stilling and Lenz, would make their mark on the German literary scene. In comments from more than one source the Société is presented as a group of young thinkers in need of help and encouragement, rather than as a creative body from which someone like Goethe might have derived profit. If he participated at all in it, it would have been merely in an advisory capacity. But that he did maintain contact with it, if in a limited way, is documented in several places. Jung, in his statement quoted above, mentions that Dr. G. did pay them a visit
from time to time, and relates in the same letter how the instalments of his autobiography, which he sent to the Société as they were completed, were passed on to Goethe, who was subsequently to surprise Jung with their lucrative publication. In another instance, Goethe himself writes in September 1771 to Röderer, no doubt the secretary of the group at that time, proposing that the "Gesellschaft" put on a special celebration in commemoration of Shakespeare. Finally Lenz, in his essay "Über Götz von Berlichingen", feels that the Société's links with Goethe warrant their claiming him as one of their own: "Götz von Berlichingen", he writes, "den einer aus unsern Mitteln geschrieben"(I.381-82). Referring again to Götz in a letter to Goethe of February 1775, he speaks of the Société and its shortcomings in a way that suggests that Goethe knew very well what he was talking about (Br.I.89).

What, therefore, was the nature of this society? What was Lenz's involvement in it? Who else were contributing members, and how did Lenz react to their ideas and to the spirit and ethos of the Société as a whole? The importance of these questions, and of assessing the part that the Société played in the formation of Lenz's ideas, becomes apparent as we consider how many of Lenz's theoretical essays were produced for delivery to it. Apart from the Anmerkungen, the question of whose delivery to the "Gesellschaft guter Freunde" Friedrich ably researches, the following essays, including those that are central to the development of Lenz's notion of action, were papers written for delivery at its weekly sessions.
1) "Über Götz von Berlichingen". Apart from the formulae of address: "meine werten Brüder", "meine Herren!", this essay alludes to a local audience familiar to him and to the facilities of the home in which it gathers: "Was könnte eine schönere Vorübung zu diesem großem Schauspiel des Lebens sein, als wenn wir da uns itzt noch Hände und Füße gebunden sind, in einem oder andern Zimmer unsern Götz von Berlichingen, den einer aus unsern Mitteln geschrieben, eine große Idee—aufzuführen versuchten. Lassen Sie mich für die Ausführung dieses Projekts sorgen, es soll gar soviel Schwierigkeiten nicht haben als Sie sich anfangs einbilden werden"(I.381-82). It is not known in which house the Société met.

2) "Verteidigung der Verteidigung des Übersetzers der Lustspiele". This essay alludes to the weekly schedule of meetings held by the Société.

3) "Zweierley über Virgils erste Ekloge d. 6ten 9mbr 1773".

4) "Über Ovid". This work contains enlightening hints as to the ethos of the Société as we can deduce it from Lenz's criticisms of it.

5) "Versuch über das erste Principium der Moral". This contains a reference to an essay by Salzmann delivered to the Société sometime earlier.

6) "Supplement zur Abhandlung vom Baum des Erkenntnisses Gutes und Bösen". This was delivered one week after his "Abhandlung vom Baum des Erkenntnisses", unfortunately no longer extant.

7) The various sections of Meynungen eines Laien. The whole
work, as it was published in 1775, is composed of a long series of individual papers.

8) "Über die Natur unsers Geistes". Other papers were delivered to the later Deutsche Gesellschaft, but do not reflect Lenz's concern with the idea of action and need not concern us here.

The development of Lenz's notion of action takes place, therefore, in the context of this Société's activities. His ideas did not evolve in a vacuum but in response to other ideas, and can only properly be understood, therefore, with reference to the discussion out of which they arose. Anything we can reconstruct of this discussion will help us to understand what it is that Lenz is driving at. The Société was after all not just the first group of people who happened to be exposed to Lenz's ideas, it was the occasion and pretext for their development and delivery. Without its existence there would probably have been no occasion to write most of the theoretical essays in the first place. In at least three instances, it would seem, they were written either to elaborate on a subject already discussed by another member, or to make a direct challenge to the assembled company. The "Versuch", as we will show later in detail, partly recapitulates an earlier paper by Salzmann, partly picks up where that essay leaves off. Meynungen eines Laien and "Ossian fürs Frauenzimmer" [sic!] were apparently produced to counter specific tendencies in the Société. It also seems to have been expected that society members would be contributing members, and that they would all read a paper or a literary creation in turn.
We know from the protocol of the Deutsche Gesellschaft, the successor to the Société, that this was the custom there. If, as is most likely, the same custom prevailed in the earlier Société, this external pressure would have been a further stimulus to the production of Lenz's works. Not, however, that he really needed this pressure. He probably brought far more spontaneous initiative to the activities of the Société than any of the other members, as his tireless labours on behalf of the Deutsche Gesellschaft attest, even if he can somewhat impatiently rebel against the idea of meeting as frequently as once a week (I.473).

Much light could therefore be shed on Lenz's ideas if it were known what others were writing about in the Société. Unfortunately, whilst Froitzheim has supplied us with a complete protocol of the sessions of the Deutsche Gesellschaft, which notes the subject matter of each contribution, we have no such record from the first society, which saw the development of Lenz's notion of action. And by the autumn of 1775, when the Gesellschaft was founded, his interest had partly turned from philosophical, moral and religious concern to literary and socio-political matters, so there is little in the new society that is of relevance to our study.

However there are various sources from which we can gain some idea of the subjects that were debated in the Société and catch a glimpse of its spirit. There are firstly, of course, Lenz's own essays and letters which contain numerous references to his participation in it, references to other members, and to
aspects of it that he disapproves of. Secondly, there are isolated hints in other writers, notably in Jung-Stilling. Thirdly, some of the writings of one important contributor mentioned already: Johann Daniel Salzmann, have survived, and these particularly afford some insight into the ideas that stimulated Lenz's thinking. These writings are his Kurze Abhandlungen über einige wichtige Gegenstände aus der Religions- und Sittenlehre, published in 1776 with Goethe's encouragement and help, but first delivered as papers to the Société from 1772-1774. In considering these as a possible influence on the development of Lenz's own ideas, we must bring them into relation with the letters written by Salzmann to Lenz during the summer and autumn of 1772--letters which have not survived but which we know something about indirectly through Lenz's written replies, and which were important in prompting him to think through certain philosophical and religious ideas. A study of Salzmann, therefore, will be the best introduction to the Société as a whole, since apart from Lenz he is the member about whom we know most (Jung-Stilling had left as early as March 1772).

The Actuary is a figure who looms fairly large in Goethe's Strassburg life and is enshrined in his later memories. We know of him at second-hand from Dichtung und Wahrheit and from letters to him from Goethe, Lenz, Wagner, Michaelis and others, and at first-hand from his own letters to these correspondents and his published essays. Several critics have written about him and his thought, and some have drawn attention to the relationship between his spiritual world and the young Goethe's. Yet no
attempt has yet been made to trace the influence Salzmann might have had on Lenz. Certainly most studies on our poet refer to the passing on of basic elements of Leibnizian philosophy to Lenz by the Actuary during their correspondence of the summer and autumn of 1772, but no attention has been paid to the essays themselves, delivered in 1772-1774, one of which is expressly referred to by Lenz in his "Versuch über das erste Principium der Moral."

It is no doubt because no attention has been paid to Salzmann's writings that scholars have been content to regard the older Actuary in a rather uncomplimentary light, even as somewhat of a thorn in Lenz's flesh. At the root of this misconception is a confusion of his role in the Tischgesellschaft with his different role in the Société. This, in turn, goes back to a fundamental confusion between the two societies. Scholars that have distinguished between the societies have nonetheless assumed that what was true of the Tischgesellschaft was also true of the Société: they have jumped to the unwarranted conclusion, that is, that the Société also was Salzmann's society representing Salzmann's interests.

Again it is probably Goethe's writings, along with Jung-Stilling's, that have encouraged this misconception, although this time through no deliberate obscurantism. Both writers, in well-known passages, describe Salzmann in glowing terms—if, in Jung-Stilling's case, in rather vague ones—as the beloved and respected president of the Tischgesellschaft at the Jungfer Lauths'. He it was who set the tone, who kept things within
the bounds of decorum, who encouraged his younger associates in their literary activities but restrained them when they allowed passion or sensibility to get the better of them. His philosophy, summarised by Goethe in a letter to Susanna von Klettenberg, took its place along with that of others in the discussions around the table. Let us note, though, that what is being described here is Salzmann's role in the Tischgesellschaft, not the Société. Unlike the Société, this "Round Table" was no literary circle founded for the express purpose of sharing ideas. It became the focus for such a decisive encounter of minds purely because Goethe, Herder, Lenz, and Jung-Stilling happened to arrive in Strasbourg at around the same time and to patronise the same eating-place. This, in every instance, is the society that Goethe describes in Dichtung und Wahrheit; and it was over this society that Salzmann presided.

As Kochendorffer, who was the first to draw attention forcibly to the confusion over the two societies and somewhat to clarify matters, pointed out in his article, the literary Société was already clearly distinguished from the Table Society by Jung-Stilling in his autobiography. This work, written much sooner after the event than Goethe's, definitely speaks of a literary society: "Die Gesellschaft der schönen Wissenschaften", not only apart from Goethe but also apart from the Table Society presided over by Salzmann. After speaking of the Tischgesellschaft, and then, a little later, of Goethe's private help in acquainting him with the seminal works of literature of the time, Jung says:
"Es war auch eine Gesellschaft junger Leute zu Straßburg, die sich die Gesellschaft der schönen Wissenschaften nannte. Auch lernte er die schönsten Bücher und den jetzigen Zustand der schönen Literatur in der Welt kennen." Neither here nor in his other reference to the Société in his letter of 1779 quoted above, is Salzmann mentioned.

It might surprise us that Jung-Stilling refers in both cases to the Société as "Gesellschaft der schönen Wissenschaften" and does not use the French title: Société de Philosophie et de Belles Lettres, alluded to by Lenz, in a letter to Goethe of February 1775, where he speaks of "Sociétät", "Schneckenmoralphilosophie" and "Belliteratur". We are not to conclude, however, that Lenz and Jung belonged to different societies, the one oriented towards French literature, and the other towards German. Kochendörffer demonstrates their identity by pointing out that references to Ott, Lenz's close friend, are common to both Lenz's and Jung-Stilling's comments on their societies. We shall also argue below that there is a close resemblance between Lenz's and Jung's criticisms of their societies, which confirms their identity and assures us of a more objective impression of the ethos of this one society. There is, anyway, one occasion on which Lenz himself uses, in a letter to his father, the title that Jung-Stilling uses (Br.I.35).

There is no longer any cause, then, to confuse the Société or "Gesellschaft der schönen Wissenschaften" with Salzmann's Table Society. Not that there were no close links between the two. Jung-Stilling attended both societies from 1771 until his
departure on March 24th 1772, and Lenz joined the Société only a few months after joining the Table Society. Salzmann, as is well known, had attended and presided over the Table Society for many years and was also to support the Société. But the fact that these three figures participated in both societies does not mean that the literary was an extension of the Table Society, catering to the same people, as Rosanow suggests when he writes: "Aus den Briefen (Lenz's to Salzmann of the summer and autumn of 1772) ersieht man schon, daß Lenz sich zu dieser Zeit mit Salzmann befreundet hatte und Stammgast an der Table d'hôte war, die nach den Erzählungen Goethes in naher Beziehung zu dem Salzmannschen Kreise stand oder gar in ihm aufging (Dichtung und Wahrheit ix)." It would be more correct to use the phrase "Salzmannscher Kreis" with reference to the Table Society, for that was clearly his society, as everyone acknowledged. It is by no means proven, however, that we should say the same of the Société.

The importance of such a distinction becomes apparent when scholars, attributing the same role to Salzmann in the Société as he played in the Table Society, allow Salzmann in so doing to be used as a scapegoat for the aspects of the Société that Lenz criticises so impatiently. Kochendörffer's article dissociating Salzmann from the origins of the Société should have warned scholars away from that conclusion, but in fact it has not prevented the fiction of the "Salzmannsche Gesellschaft" from being perpetuated down to the present day. In almost every mention or discussion of Lenz's Société, it is referred to as the "Salzmannsche Gesellschaft", sometimes even quite erroneously as "Salz-
manns Deutsche Gesellschaft". That such a confusion can still reign in so authoritative a work as the "Hamburger Ausgabe" of Goethe's works makes it necessary somewhat to labour the point that what Goethe describes in Dichtung und Wahrheit is the Table Society, not the Société, and that there are no grounds for allotting to Salzmann the same role in the latter as he certainly had in the former. He was certainly president of the Tischgesellschaft, which could justly be called the "Salzmannsche Gesellschaft", but with the weekly literary Société he had quite different links.

An example of the conflicting accounts of the Société's origins in scholars writing as recently as the 1960's is seen in Albert Fuchs' postface to the Metzler reprint of Salzmann's Kurze Abhandlungen, on the one hand, and Titel and Haug's edition of Lenz's selected works, on the other. Fuchs can write confidently in connection with the supposed founder of the Société: "Als Präsident der von ihm gegründeten und geleiteten 'Gelehrten Übungsgesellschaft' hatte Salzmann seine 'Abhandlungen' nur zum Vortrag im Kreise von deren jungen Mitgliedern bestimmt." Titel and Haug, on the other hand, deny that it was Salzmann's society: "der Aktuar Salzmann scheint der Gesellschaft, in der er dann eine bestimmende Rolle spielte, erst später nähergetreten zu sein (der frühest datierte seiner 1776 in Frankfurt erschienenen Vorträge... ist auf den 16. Februar 1772 angesetzt)". This question of Salzmann's role is important to us as we endeavour to assess his influence on Lenz, and the extent to which he is responsible for the ethos of the
Société about which Lenz later expresses considerable dissatisfaction.

Although not a great deal can be known about Salzmann's relations to the Sturm und Drang figures that gathered in Strasbourg in the 1770's, enough is known for us to be able to indicate what influence he had at least on Goethe and Lenz. Salzmann was an older man than all the others, though not quite as old as Goethe estimates in Dichtung und Wahrheit. Rudolf correctly points out Goethe's error in putting his earlier mentor in his sixties at the time of the poet's stay in Strasbourg; the Actuary was then actually forty-eight years of age, which, however, sets his year of birth at 1732, not 1752 as Rudolf says. Whilst, therefore, he was not quite as old a man as it seemed to Goethe looking back, he was a much older man than any in his literary circle, being Goethe's senior by 27 years, Lenz's by 29 and Jung-Stilling's by 18.

It is no doubt the fact that Salzmann belonged to an older generation that has led some critics to imagine a large gulf between his temperament and philosophy of life, and that of his younger associates. Fuchs, for example, in making Salzmann the initiator of the Société, makes him at the same time responsible for what Lenz describes to Goethe in his letter of February 1775 as its "großmütterlichen Gang". Speaking of "le jugement que Lenz, champion, comme Herder, de l'agitation préromantique du Sturm und Drang, porte sur la 'Gelehrte Übungsgesellschaft', le cercle de lecture et de conférences fondé et longtemps présidé par Salzmann", he writes: "Avec la conviction du révolutionnaire,
Lenz se déchaîne contre l'esprit qui y règne selon lui: 'vagues Geschränk von Belleliteratur, wo nichts dahinter ist als Nesselblüten. . .steife leise Schneckenmoralphilosophie, die ihren großmütterlichen Gang fortkriecht'". Froitzheim, before Fuchs, had given a similar impression by the way in which he had differentiated between the Actuary Salzmann and his younger relative Friedrich Rudolf: "Nicht also dem Aktuarius Salzmann, der damals (1775) schon müde, dem neuen Fluge der deutschen Jugend nicht mehr zu folgen vermochte, sondern Friedrich Rudolf Salzmann. . .sind die unter dem Namen Salzmann im Protokoll genannten und im 'Bürgerfreund' veröffentlichten Gedichte und Prosa-Abhandlungen zuzuerkennen". (38-39). We are led to imagine a tired and tedious notary unable to keep up with the active German youth. More recently even than Fuchs, Girard has also made Salzmann an object of Lenz's impatient criticism by identifying him with the aspects and practices of the Société which Lenz dislikes. He writes:

Même les rapports qu'il entretient avec Salzmann et ses amis subissent les effets d'un comportement contra-dictoire. Le 2 décembre 1772, Lenz est accueilli comme membre d'honneur dans la "Société" et remercie ses amis en termes émouvants et quelque peu pathétiques de l'affection qu'ils lui portent. Mais un an plus tard, il s'irrite du caractère trop familier que prennent les rapports entre les membres du cercle, demande d'espacer les réunions et ironise sur les esprits forts qui ont réclamé la suppression de tous les débats théologiques pour se consacrer exclusivement à une activité soi-disant scientifique et littéraire. En février 1775, dans une lettre à Goethe, il condamne la vanité du bavardage désordonné sur la littérature et celle de la philosophie moralisante et sclérose qui se partagent les faveurs des compagnons de Salzmann.
Now the picture is one not of a solidarity of Lenz and the German youth against Salzmann, but a solidarity of Salzmann and the Société against Lenz. But either way we must ask what justification there is in linking Salzmann's name with the aspects and practices of the society that Lenz is concerned to eradicate. Certainly Salzmann was no longer in the full flight of youth, but this is no reason to make him responsible for the Société's lapse into tedious moralising or to assume that his thought and writings served as a brake to the ideas, imagination and activity of one such as Lenz.

This assumption was already made by Froitzheim, basing himself on Stöber: "Salzmann's literarische Leistungen bewegten sich stets in demselben Gleise moralischer Betrachtungen. 'Über die Wirkungen der Gnade, die Liebe, die Rache, über Tugend und Laster, Gemütsbewegungen, Neigungen und Leidenschaften, über Religion und die Glückseligkeit in bürgerlichen Gesellschaften', so lauten die Titel seiner 1772-1776 [actually 1774] vorgelesenen Abhandlungen; kein Wunder, wenn Lenz, der nach dem Fortgang Goethes der geistige Mittelpunkt jener Gesellschaft wurde, in einem Brief an Goethe im Sommer 1775 seinem Unmut über diese Einseitigkeit litterarischer Bestrebungen Ausdruck verlieh"(p.25). As we have seen, Goethe never was the leading light in the Société, and Lenz's letter to Goethe is better dated in February 1775; but Froitzheim is chiefly wrong to assume that Salzmann's subjects would have been ones certain to displease Lenz, notably on account of their recurrent theme.
There is no evidence for this assumption; indeed if anyone, it was Lenz himself who had developed the reputation for ever harping on the same theme. This seems to be the sense of his ironic comments in "Über Ovid" concerning the apparent conspiracy to exclude theological discussion of which he was himself so fond (I.691).

Following Froitzheim, Fuchs understands Lenz to be blaming the degeneration of the Société on Salzmann's tedious philosophising, and calls the collection of essays that appeared in 1776 a "résumé de la philosophie vilipendée par Lenz", seeking however to defend the essays against this charge: "On n'a pas affaire au moralisme de grand'mère asthénique ('großmütterlichen Gang'), dont parle Lenz, et c'est comme en une sorte de plaidoyer anticipé qui réduit à néant un tel reproche, un tel contre-sens, que Salzmann écarte de sa pensée les affaissements de vieille femme". Fuchs goes on to reveal Salzmann's thought to be characterised by power and dynamism, referring quite correctly to such passages in the Abhandlungen as: "Die Liebe ist kein schmächtiges, schwaches und immer duldendes Müttergen, sie muß eine sehr starke Energie und Nachdenken haben". This Fuchs adduces as a defence against Lenz's accusation, and as evidence that he has misunderstood the Actuary. A simpler explanation, however, is that it was not at all Salzmann's philosophising that Lenz had in mind when voicing his criticisms of the Société in this letter to Goethe of 1775 to which Fuchs is referring. He is much more likely thinking of other members, impossible for us at present to identify. It was not that Lenz was
branding as senility what was in fact more a philosophy like his own—he was guilty of no such "contresens"—he simply was not referring to the Actuary at the time.

But viewing Salzmann in this way has become an ingrained habit, leading Fuchs on to describe the Deutsche Gesellschaft as not merely a successor to the Société or even a reformation of it, but as a competitor with it: "Il ne faut pas confondre J-D Salzmann et sa 'Gelehrte Übungsgesellschaft' avec Frédéric-Rodolphe Salzmann, cousin de l'Actuarius, et la 'Deutsche Gesellschaft' in Straßburg qu'il présida après le départ de Lenz, fondateur, en 1775, de cette rivale du cercle de J-D Salzmann". Lenz did become very critical of the Société and founded the Gesellschaft to replace it, but not to rival it; and, as we shall see, it was not a case of pitting the younger Salzmann's Society against the older's. Certainly there are important differences between Salzmann's thought and Lenz's, and even greater differences of temperament; yet the indications are that these were fruitful in stimulating the poet's development rather than stifling it.

Contemporary testimonies to the Actuary's character are all highly favourable. The twenty-one year old Goethe writes enthusiastically to a fellow-student: "Der A. und ich, wir werden uns ehstens copuliren lassen". The month before, he had written to Frl. von Klettenberg, expressing disappointment with the Pietist contacts he had made in Strassburg, but making favourable mention of Salzmann: "Eine andre Bekanntschaft, grad das Widerspiel von dieser, hat mir bisher nicht wenig genutzt...Herr ** ein Ideal
für Mosheimen und Jerusalemen, ein Mann, der durch viel Erfahrung mit viel Verstand gegangen ist; der bey der Kälte des Bluts womit er von ieher die Welt betrachtet hat, gefunden zu haben glaubt: daß wir auf diese Welt gesetzt sind besonders um ihr nützlich zu sein, daß wir uns dazu fähig machen können, wozu denn auch die Religion etwas hilft; und daß der Brauchbarste der beste ist. Und alles draus folgt." Fuchs shows how this call to useful activity was most timely for Goethe, invigorating for him in the aftermath of his Frankfurt illness, and stimulating in contrast to his experience with Pietist religion. Jung-Stilling notes that the two were already "Herzensfreunde" by the time he became acquainted with them at the Table Society. Jung-Stilling was equally impressed by Salzmann, and both poets incorporate affectionate vignettes of the Actuary into their autobiographies. Goethe Writes: "Sein Verstand, seine Nachgiebigkeit, seine Würde, die er bei allem Scherz und selbst manchmal bei kleinen Ausschweifungen, die er uns erlaubte, immer zu erhalten wußte, machten ihn der ganzen Gesellschaft lieb und wert" (IX.359); and Jung-Stilling: "Noch ein vortrefflicher Straßburger saß da zu Tisch. Sein Platz war der oberste, und wäre es auch hinter der Thür gewesen" (Leben, p.275). Evidently the young men valued highly Salzmann's authority and leadership, which was his not only on account of his seniority, but also and particularly because of his appealing combination of firmness and indulgence. Girard suggests that Lenz particularly needed the fatherly support of this "père substitutif": "Moraliste et philanthrope, rationaliste et croyant,
We shall suggest below that Salzmann influences Lenz ideologically as well as psychologically, that Lenz finds in him a powerful stimulus as well as stability, that his ideas therefore prove to be stronger medicine than one might suppose from this urbane portrayal. But it is true that the Actuary was the one to whom Lenz turned for support during the emotional upheaval of his friendship with Friederike Brion in the summer of 1772, and who was able to wean the poet back to a more disciplined approach to his studies through a broadening of his intellectual horizon. Exactly one year before, Goethe, at Sesenheim, had also turned to the Actuary to express the conflict of his feelings, not addressing him, as Lenz does, as a superior: "mein Mentor", "mein Sokrates", but valuing nonetheless his friendly support. Nor, it would seem, were these the only ones to profit from his fatherly care. Froitzheim sees more than mere habit in Salzmann's longstanding patronisation of the Jungfer Lauths' dining-room: "Die früh verwaisten Predigerstöchter, welche eine Kostanstalt anzufangen genötigt waren, fanden an Aktuar Salzmann, 'dem Vater Waisen', wohlwollende Unterstützung" (p. 14). From Stöber's account it would seem that Salzmann had a special affection for children and a concern for their educa-
This topic was not one that he wrote any paper on, however, as Rudolf tells us (p. 86). The notion that he did is based on Stöber's confusion of the Actuary with Friedrich Rudolph Salzmann: it was the latter who delivered a paper to the Deutsche Gesellschaft on 18th July 1776 entitled "Von den Fehlern in der Straßburger Kinderzucht". The Actuary's own essays were all of a more general nature, dealing with fairly broad moral and philosophical topics, which he left it to others to extend to specific social goals. Lenz was one who responded eagerly to this challenge.

Basing themselves, therefore, on Goethe's comments in his letters and autobiography, and on Lenz's correspondence with the Actuary up to the autumn of 1772, scholars of Lenz and of this period always present Salzmann in a most complimentary light. Thereafter, as we have seen, they tend to blame him for the degeneration of the Société that is alleged by Lenz. The reason for this inconsistency is found in the way they fail to distinguish clearly the Table Society from the Société, and attribute to Salzmann the founding and leading of the latter, as well as the former. It is worth while tracing this confusion to its origin.

If Fuchs, Rudolf and Froitzheim can make Salzmann the president of the Société, and responsible for its tone and activities, it is because of August Stöber's account in his early record of the Actuary's life. Stöber's sources, however, comprise little more than the writings we still have at our disposal today. He lists them at the beginning of his book as
Dichtung und Wahrheit, Jung-Stilling's autobiography, Salzmann's obituary by Engelhardt, his literary remains, including his essays, letters and papers, and a few pages of hand-written information given to Stöber by two scholars of the Strassburg library. We might think that there would be important new material in Salzmann's Nachläß (unfortunately destroyed during the war of 1870-71) that would make Stöber's account vital to our understanding of Salzmann and the Société. However a close study of the pages that describe the Société indicates that very little indeed of the information given cannot be easily deduced from Goethe's and Jung-Stilling's writings alone. The statement, for example, concerning Salzmann's language preference: "Die deutsche Sprache übte er in Rede und Schrift am liebsten; allein auch die französische hatte er sich auf eine für jene Zeit ausgezeichnete Weise angeneignet", is simply based on the evidence of his written works and on Goethe's description, in Book 11 of Dichtung und Wahrheit, of Salzmann's fine command of French. Stöber simply puts together references from all his sources and then gives a final colouring to the resulting composite picture. The unreliability of such a collage becomes apparent when he defines the Société itself:

Schon zu Anfang der sechziger Jahre, hatte Salzmann eine gelehrte Übungsgesellschaft (Footnote: Diese Gesellschaft führte nach und nach verschiedene Namen: Stilling nennt sie Gesellschaft der schönen Wissenschaften, das später von Lenz geführte Protokoll: Gesellschaft zur Ausbildung der deutschen Sprache) gestiftet, an welcher, ausser den studierenden Jünglingen der Tischgesellschaft, auch andere junge Männer, von des Vorsitzers liebenswürdigem Charakter und vielseitigen Kenntnissen angezogen, Antheil nahmen. Hier wurden nicht nur, durch gemeinschaftliche Geldbeiträge, die neuen Erscheinungen in verschiedenen Gebieten der Literatur angeschafft und von den Mitgliedern gelesen und besprochen, sondern auch eigene Arbeiten geliefert und be-

The source of most of these comments can easily be traced, but what concerns us about this composite picture is that it mixes Jung-Stilling's references to the Société and Goethe's references to Salzmann as member of the Table Society, with the protocol of the later Deutsche Gesellschaft of which, as we have seen and as Froitzheim long ago pointed out, Salzmann himself was not even a member. Stöber, then, evidently did not know any more than we do about the Société, and had a deficient understanding of what he did know. His view of Salzmann's role as founder of the Société is contradicted, anyway, by what he later wrote about it in his book: Johann Gottfried Röderer von Straßburg und seine Freunde, and so proves itself to have been merely an assumption on his part, not rooted in fact. As he shows in the later book, the literary Société de Philosophie et de Belles Lettres was founded in the 1760's by students, with the encouragement of certain university lecturers. It is Friedrich who establishes for us the continuity between this early society and those of the 1770's (the Gesellschaft being a re-formation of the Société, which is to be identified with the student Société of the previous decade). Stöber says in his second book that Friedrich Rudolf Salzmann was one of those students who belonged to the Société in the '60's. If indeed a
Salzmann founded it, would this not much more likely have been the younger?

The confusion of the Actuary with his younger cousin is, however, the first of Stöber's definite and critical errors, as Froitzheim pointed out. Other errors, again pointed out—somewhat gleefully—by Froitzheim, are his mis-location of the Jungfer Lauth's Kosthaus in the Krämergasse instead of Knoblauchgasse, his claim, when publishing the protocol of the Deutsche Gesellschaft, to be using an original manuscript, when he was only using a copy, his addition to it of headings of his own composition, and his mistaken dating of three of Lenz's letters to Salzmann.

We are led astray, therefore, if, with Fuchs, we follow Stöber in imagining a "Gelehrte Übungsgesellschaft" (Stöber's phrase) founded and presided over by Johann Daniel Salzmann, our Actuary. The possibility that someone other than the Actuary was responsible for the Société's genesis and development becomes less unlikely as we consider the links that we do know him to have had with it. These date from 16th February 1772 onwards: the occasion on which he presented the first paper in the collection published in 1776. From then on, the other papers which we know about he delivered, on average, at a rate of two a year till the summer of 1774. It is more than likely that others were produced and delivered during this time, which were not published with the others, as the delivery of two unpublished essays to the Deutsche Gesellschaft in 1776 suggests. This evidence of his activity in the Société is reinforced by referen-
ces in Lenz that indicate Salzmann's links with it. They come during Lenz's correspondence with the Actuary from June to October 1772, and are clearly distinguishable from references to the Table Society; the latter is described separately and unambiguously as the "Tischgesellschaft" (letters 9, 19), and "die Lauth'sche Gesellschaft" (letter 16), after the Lauth sisters who operated the dining room, and again by Lenz several months later, in a letter to his brother Johann Christian (letter 39), as a company of devotees to the true sciences: "Jetzt bewohn ich ein klein Zimmer allein, speise täglich an einem Tisch wo einige meiner Freunde mitessen (die einzigen die in Straßburg Liebhaber der ächten Wissenschaften zu seyn sich nicht schämen)."

The Société, on the other hand, he refers to separately in this same letter (39) as "Societat" and in a letter to his father (17) as "eine Gesellschaft der schönen Wissenschaften", the same title as the one that Jung-Stilling uses in his autobiography. This is clearly the society that Lenz is speaking of in an important letter to Salzmann of 5th, 6th or 10th August 1772. We shall quote the passage in full as it gives some indication of what Salzmann's links were with the Société, and how Lenz views its purpose:

Wollen Sie meine letzte Übersetzung aus dem Plautus lesen, so fordern Sie sie unserm guten Ott ab, denn ich glaube schwerlich daß sie so bald in der Gesellschaft wird vorgelesen werden. Sie haben mir keine Nachricht gegeben, wie sie mit der letztern gegenwärtig zufrieden sind. Ver- nachlässigen Sie diese Pflanzschule Ihrer Vaterstadt nicht, theurer Freund, vielleicht könnten wohlhätige Bäume draus gezogen werden, auf welche Kindeskinder, die sich unter
ihrem Schatten freuten, dankbar schnitten: auch dich hat er pflanzen helfen. Es sieht noch ziemlich wild und traurig in Ihrer Region aus--aber der erste Mensch ward in den Garten Eden gesetzt um ihn zu bauen" (Br.I.28-29).

Lenz is away on his employers' service, unable to attend the meetings of the Société in person, but keen to remain in touch. The beginning of this passage is quite straightforward: we know that Lenz's Plautus translations were exposed to the Société before being passed on by Salzmann to Goethe, who was eventually to have them published. And Ott was a longstanding member who particularly sought Lenz's friendship. The second sentence is somewhat mystifying: to whom does the second "sie" refer? Grammatically it should refer back to "Gesellschaft", or more correctly, in view of the plural verb, to its members. "Mit der letzteren" could refer to the previous Plautus translation, in which case Lenz is asking how it was received by the company. However, on account of the "gegenwärtig", it is more likely that "mit der letztern" refers to "Gesellschaft", so that Lenz is seeming to ask how pleased everyone currently is with the Société. This prompts him to urge Salzmann not to neglect it. Whilst this makes good sense, we have good reason to assume that Lenz is in fact inquiring about Salzmann's own satisfaction with the Société, not how the others are satisfied with it. It is not uncommon in Lenz to find the polite form of the second personal pronoun without a capital letter. Daunicht noticed this as he was searching for possible anonymous articles by Lenz in the Frankfurter Gelehrte Anzeigen and Teutscher Merkur; he writes: "Sogar die abwechselnde Klein- und Großschreibung des
Personalpronomens "Sie" in der Anrede ist ein eigentümliches Lenzzeichen (Footnote: vgl. Brief an Lavater, Sept. 1775, die "Vertheidigung des Herrn Wieland" u.ö.). That Lenz should be asking after Salzmann's own feelings towards the Société makes better sense as a prelude to his plea to Salzmann, that begins in the next sentence, not to neglect the Société. It seems that the fact that Lenz has not heard much about it from him leads him to think that the Actuary has not been attending its functions. Moreover the earnestness of Lenz's plea indicates that this was no idle or polite inquiry. Salzmann has obviously not been totally satisfied with the Société, and may already have hinted that he might not remain in membership. Afraid that it might disintegrate, Lenz stresses that more than ever it needs the Actuary's support, and that it needs to be regarded more in terms of a mission field than as a place where one can already expect a budding and blossoming of the spirit.

That Lenz values Salzmann's participation is still evident in November 1775, when the Deutsche Gesellschaft was founded. Lenz, to whom credit for the founding is usually given, did not secure Salzmann's full participation in the new society--his name is not included in the membership roll published by Froitzheim--but the sessions were held, at least in Lenz's time, in the Actuary's house, and it was to the Actuary that papers were to be first submitted. Lenz writes later to Salzmann from Weimar: "Grüßen Sie die deutsche Gesellschaft"(Br.II.42), and the Actuary, obviously well-informed, replies: "Die Gesellschaft
bestehet noch auf gutem Fuß, jetzt sind die Versammlungen bis in den Jänner eingestellt und werden alsdann bei Mag. Blessig, welcher indessen Pädagog worden ist im Kloster fortgesetzt werden" (Br.II.63). Since Salzmann also continued to submit papers to the Gesellschaft, there is really little evidence that his involvement in 1775-76 was any less than in 1772. If he did participate less in 1775, it was most likely on grounds of ill-health, to which Lenz refers in a letter of this same period, and because his work was beginning to be so demanding as to require the addition of an assistant (Br.II.45).

Both Lenz's valuing of Salzmann's support and the latter's limited ability to lend it, give a different picture from the typical one that has come down to us, of a Lenz frustrated by the conservative character supposedly given by Salzmann to the Société, supposedly of Salzmann's own founding and leading. As Kochendörffer also shows, if the Société were Salzmann's own achievement, one might have expected Lenz to allude to this, rather than describe it simply as "diese Pflanzschule Ihrer Vaterstadt"; and if Salzmann were the leading figure who set the tone in it, it is not so likely that he would need to be urged not to neglect it. The end of the quotation above indicates Lenz's sense of mission for the Société in the city and surroundings of Strassburg, which he views as somewhat of a cultural backwater. The fact that he feels it natural to point out the value of the Société's goals to the Actuary comes more naturally if it is not to its founder and leader that he is speaking. And the evident respect with which Lenz speaks makes
it harder still for us to believe that Lenz is frustrated by Salzmann in particular.

A second letter to Salzmann, which Freye and Stammler tentatively date in mid-September 1772, gives a further reference to the Actuary's involvement in the Société, shows Lenz's readiness to accept Salzmann's judgment with respect to other members, and hints at Lenz's critical stance towards them: "Ist Ihre Abhandlung schon vorgelesen? Und wie haben sich Ott und Haffner das letztemal gehalten; ich zähle auf Ihr Urtheil davon" (letter 19). That Lenz is referring to the Société is clear. He mentions Ott in other letters in connection with it, and the paper by Salzmann that he inquires about is almost certainly the one entitled "Über die Rache", and delivered to the Société on 17th September, a fact that would confirm Freye/Stammler's dating of the letter. As to the reference to Ott and Haffner, Lenz seems to be inquiring how the delivery of their latest papers went. How did they manage? Did they put up a good performance? We cannot say whether there is any deeper purpose in Lenz's question, but we can take note that here he is consulting with Salzmann about two other members. At this point at least, it is not Salzmann himself that our poet is calling into question.

If Lenz directs a complaint against any specific member of the Société, it is in fact against the first of these two other members mentioned. There are stronger grounds for viewing Ott as a cause of Lenz's frustration than for seeing Salzmann in this
way, although even this complaint against Ott is a quite personal matter, and is mollified by Lenz's obviously good friendship with this associate. Lenz writes to Salzmann: "Ich sehe, daß mein guter Ott mich nicht versteht und durchaus glaubt, wenn ich nicht lustig bin, müsse ich unglücklich seyn. Benehmen Sie ihm doch dieses schlechte Zutraun zu mir, welches in der That mich schamroth machen muß. . .Ich fürchte, weil ich an ihn jetzt nicht mehr mit lachendem Mund schreiben kann, sein gar zu gutes und empfindliches Herz wird glauben, ich sey niedergeschlagen und ich bin es doch niemals weniger gewesen als itzt" (letter 19). It is possible that Lenz's unwillingness to account for his state of heart at every turn, is linked to his complaint directed at the Société in "Über Ovid": "wir werden zu bekannt und familiär mit einander, jedermann sieht dem andern auf die Finger, menagiert den andern weder mit der Feder noch mit der Zunge, dagegen uns eine halbjährige Zusammenkunft in den gehörigen Grenzen der Entfernung und Höflichkeit von einander erhalten würde, die wir uns nun einmal von selbst zu beobachten nicht versprechen können" (I.473). In both cases, Lenz resists too intimate an acquaintance with his fellows, and it may be that the degree of familiarity expected by Ott was also an expectation in the Société as a whole. Lenz had already written to his father reporting on his activities in the Société and mentioning its undue liking for self-importance in its formal relations: "Nach Straßburg schicke ich von Zeit zu Zeit kleine Abhandlungen an eine Gesellschaft der schönen Wissenschaften, die mich zu ihrem Ehrenmitgliede erwählt
hat, und die davon mehr Aufhebens macht, als mir lieb ist"
(letter 17). Such familiarity is disagreeable to Lenz, who
has chosen Salzmann as his sole confidant, and had already
asked of the Actuary à propos his affair with Friederike Brion:
"Es ist gut, daß Sie meinen freundlichen Ott nicht mit meiner
Thorheit umständlich bekannt machen"(letter 10). A further
letter to Salzmann speaks of Ott's immaturity, and again re­
quests his mentor's confidence: "Zeigen Sie diese Stelle meines
Briefes nicht meinem guten Ott—wenn er nicht noch Jüngling
wäre, wenn er die Stufe der Weisheit erstiegen hätte, würde
ich über diesen Punkt nicht gegen ihn zurückhaltend seyn"
(letter 15).

Again, therefore, we are led to dissociate Salzmann from
the shortcomings of the Société, rather than to implicate him
in them, despite the fact that he seems to be now an important
contributing member. Exactly how important and influential he
was cannot be known. Knowing his eminently likeable character
and his talent for inspiring restraint and decorum without
stifling the liveliness of the group, we must presume that if
he was able to spare much time for the Société at all, he would
have exerted some influence, and in some way left his mark.
Froitzheim quotes Haffner's "Akademische Antrittsrede" as a
testimony to Salzmann's character and social gifts. If it is
to the Société and not to the Table Society that he is referring
(and there is no evidence that Haffner did belong to the latter:
indeed since his parents were inhabitants of Strassburg he would
more likely have been fed at home), then this passage does give us an additional glimpse of life in its midst: "An dem Ruder unseres Fahrzeuges saß er wie ein Steuermann, Einheimischen wie Fremden durch vollendete Humanität, durch die ganz einzige Liebe und Güte seines Charakters längst bekannt und allen teuer. Dieser lenkte unsern Lauf, pflegte uns vor Klippen zu warnen und wußte die stürmischen Wogen jugendlicher Gemüter zu beruhigen".

In contrast to the wealth of documentation proving Salzmann's involvement in the Société from 1772 on, there is no reference to his support of it before then. This lack may, of course, be due to the fact that one of the key people likely to refer to him and to have had his references preserved—namely Lenz—was himself not yet involved in the Société. But Jung-Stilling was; yet writing of the period prior to his hurried departure in May 1771—a time at which Lenz had barely arrived in Strassburg—he mentions Salzmann, as we have seen, in connection with the Table Society and with Goethe, but not in connection with the Société. Finally, as Kochendörffer and Friedrich point out, if the Actuary had been an active participant in the Société in the Spring and Summer of 1771, as he was to be from the following year on, he would, with the other members, have had advance knowledge of Jung-Stilling's forthcoming marriage. That he did not know of it before Stilling's return, seems indicated by Goethe's profession, recorded in Stilling's autobiography, himself not to have known of it, even after the event. Since Salzmann was in close and regular contact with Goethe that summer, it is hard to imagine him not telling his "Herzensfreund", if he himself had known.
The evidence does not encourage us, therefore, to see Salzmann as the originator and continuing inspiration for the Société in such a way that he might be held accountable for its alleged degeneration, and therefore answerable to Lenz's criticisms voiced in his letter to Goethe of February 1775 and his essay "Über Ovid". That Lenz is critical of the Société is indisputable; it is, after all, disbanded in the autumn of 1775, Lenz being the chief instigator of the new Deutsche Gesellschaft. But Salzmann has by now by no means faded out of the picture. Apart from his not renewing formal membership, the Actuary was, in every other way, closely involved with it: lending his home as a meeting-place, receiving papers destined for delivery at the sessions, and offering a paper of his own. That Lenz evidently sought his cooperation in the Gesellschaft shows the respect he still had for him, and if, eventually, the sessions switched from his house to von Türckheim's, this happened after Lenz had left for Weimar. Finally, knowing of Goethe's respect for Salzmann, and probably knowing that he was in the process of having the Actuary's essays published, Lenz is unlikely, in a letter to Goethe, to refer in such derogatory terms to the intellectual activity in the Société if it is as clear to Goethe, as it is to Froitzheim and Fuchs, that it is indeed Salzmann's activity that Lenz has in mind when he speaks of a: "vagues Geschnarch von Bellitteratur, wo nichts dahinter ist als Nesselblüten...steife leise Schneckenmoralphilosophie, die ihren großmütterlichen Gang fortkriecht"(Br.I.89).
What exactly these derogatory remarks are aimed at, we shall discuss below. But whatever they mean, Salzmann is an unlikely target from them. The charge of familiarity, levelled in "Über Ovid" is, as we have seen, more likely aimed at other members than at the Actuary, with whom Lenz chose to have a special relationship. The "vagues Geschnarch von Belliteratur" in no way describes Salzmann's works as we know them, as they deal exclusively with moral philosophy. Not that he was not versed in literature as well; his library was one that Lenz borrowed from, and we read that Friederike Brion was happy to read Salzmann's copy of *Tom Jones* (Br.I.64). Lenz also reports to him enthusiastically on his reading of Winckelmann. However the Actuary's preoccupation was chiefly with philosophy and philosophers, notably Bayle and Leibniz. As to the reference to "französische Liqueurs" a few lines later in the letter to Goethe: "Und nun stürm ich mit Ossians Helden hinein das alte Erdengefühl aufzuwecken, das ganz in französische Liqueurs evaporirt war", there is no reason to attach this image of decadence to Salzmann, who, according to Goethe in *Dichtung und Wahrheit*, was known rather for his firmness in respect to drinking. Speaking of the students of the Table Society Goethe writes: "nur mußten sie ihr gewöhnliches Weindeputat nicht überschreiten. Daß dies nicht leicht geschah war die Sorge unseres Präsidenten, eines Doktor Salzmann" (IX.359).

There remains the reference to "sanfte leise Schneckenmoralphilosophie". Froitzheim, writing in 1888, stresses the patriotic
and political aspect of Lenz's founding of the *Deutsche Gesellschaft*, quoting at length his essay in praise of the expressiveness of the German language compared with the French. We may not, however, conclude that Lenz had completely turned his back on moral philosophy because now only literary and socio-political subjects interest him. If this were so, then Salzmann would naturally become a target for his criticism. However that this is not the case is indicated by the fact that in the new society, under Lenz's leadership and secretaryship, there continue to be essays on moral philosophy, one of which was by Salzmann himself and entitled: "Von der Glückseligkeit in bürgerlichen Gesellschaften". A certain Herr Breu also delivered one: "Moralische Empfindungen", and Schlosser spoke once on the subject: "Skizze meiner Vorstellungsart der Moral". Two other essays published in the society's journal: "Der Bürgerfreund" are on similar subjects: "Lob der Freundschaft" and "Über den Werth des guten Herzens", and several lectures and essays in the same journal, which bore on its cover the motto "Geselligkeit, Verträglichkeit, Religion", were devoted to religious questions. It is not, therefore, that moral philosophy as such was tedious to Lenz, nor does he complain of it because it is not a literary or socio-political subject; for the answer to "Schneckenmoralphilosophie" was *Meynungen eines Layen*, itself a non-literary and non-socio-political work. Evidently though, there was in the *Société* a great deal of mediocre philosophising and moralising, which Lenz, who professed not to have much aptitude for philosophy at the best of times,
found disagreeable. Whether Salzmann's papers on moral philosophy were ones that Lenz is likely to have found tedious is a question that will be answered in the following chapter, negatively, by a direct study of the Kurze Abhandlungen.

The trouble with the Société was not Salzmann, therefore. Indeed, having eliminated the Actuary as the cause of Lenz's dissatisfaction with the Société, we are now in a better position to establish just what did provoke him. Probably unlike most of the membership, Lenz had ambitions for the group, and it is for this reason that he was bound to feel frustrated when those ambitions were not being realised. One other member, though, seems to have had similar goals to Lenz and therefore similar criticisms of the Société. His comments enable us to understand Lenz's reactions more clearly. Jung-Stilling, after mentioning in his autobiography the circle of friends to which he had belonged in 1771: "Goethe, Lenz, Leose [sic!] und Stilling machten jetzt so einen Zirkel aus, in dem es jedem wohl ward, der nur empfinden kann, was schon und gut ist", alludes immediately afterwards to their differences of religious opinion: "Stillings Enthusiasmus für die Religion hinderte ihn nicht auch solche Männer herzlich zu lieben, die freier dachten als er, wenn sie nur keine Spötter waren." All four characters, whilst meeting mostly at the Table Society, were also connected with the Société; Lersé and Stilling were members already, Goethe was an associate, and Lenz was to join probably that autumn (1771). Stilling's observation, though, of the free-thinking but generally tolerant character of this circle is backed up by a later
passage which, not being intended for public consumption, expresses more explicitly a certain concern for his friends' spiritual welfare. He writes in a letter to a reader of 1779:


That Jung-Stilling is speaking this time of the Société is clear, the presentation of his autobiography in the form of a series of "Vorlesungen" indicates that the "Straßburger Gesellschaft" was indeed the Société and not the Tischgesellschaft, of which, of course, he was also a member, but at which free discussions rather than formal papers were the order of the day. Of particular interest, however, are the terms in which Jung-Stilling characterises the Société. In matters of religion its members were weak in faith, and in need of reminders that divine Providence could still be personally experienced. In matters of literature they favoured "den leichten wizelnden französischen Geschmack." We are struck by the similarity to Lenz's own criticisms of the same group of people three years later. He also complains of their "Unglauben", and tells Goethe that it was to counter this unbelief that he had written Meynungen eines Laien:

"Daher fieng ich an ut vates den Leuten Standpunkt ihrer Religion
einzustecken, das itzt unter viel Schwürigkeiten vollendet ist, die Erfolge wird die Zeit lehren" (Br.I.89). It was from the same motive that Jung-Stilling had written his autobiography; what he calls "Glaubensgrund in der Religion" and Lenz calls "Standpunkt ihrer Religion", is in both cases a commitment to active faith in God, which, in Jung-Stilling's case, meant seeking to follow God's leading in everyday life, and in Lenz's case meant working actively for the kingdom of God on earth. We might wonder why there is no evidence of any special friendship between these two members who would have overlapped in both Société and Table Society by several months, considering that they both adopted an evangelistic stance towards their colleagues. Nowhere, however, does Lenz mention Jung-Stilling, and the latter displays no special inclination for our poet as he does for Goethe. No doubt Lenz was still quite a minor figure in Strassburg at the time Jung-Stilling left in March 1772, and had not yet developed his religious ideas to a point at which there might have been much for the two to discuss. Perhaps also Jung-Stilling was too much of a "Kopfhänger" for Lenz, who was later to use this colloquial designation of Pietists to refer, in annoyed terms, to the founders of the Philanthropin at Dessau, who were offering him a position. In 1772 we still find Lenz making appeal to the leading of Providence in discussing his career prospects with his father, which indicates at least some basis for agreement with Jung-Stilling. But he was most likely as little disposed as Goethe was to associate any further with Pietists and Pietism—these had
become too intellectually constricting for his liking, and above all too remote from the arena of practical life in society.

Notwithstanding, Lenz shares one further opinion of the Société with Jung-Stilling. In the latter's case it is a mere observation, in Lenz's case a criticism. Jung-Stilling aims at a "flowery, romantic" style for his autobiography, because that, he feels, would be most pleasing to readers given to the "leicht-wizelnden französischen Geschmack". Lenz seems to be referring to the same thing when he describes his Ossian translation to Goethe as an intended corrective to the influence of decadent French culture: "Und nun stürm ich mit Ossians Helden hinein das alte Erdengefühl in ihnen aufzuwecken, das ganz in französische Liqueurs evaporirt war" (Br.I.89). Such decadence, combined with religious unbelief, and a predilection for inanity and sleepy philosophising on moral and literary topics, all gives Lenz the overriding conviction that his colleagues need to be shaken up, to be committed to faith, to live out of the deeper regions of their natures, discarding the superficial banter of French culture and getting back to the old "Erdengefühl": the vital forces that it is a religious obligation to cultivate and to harness for altruistic ends. To Lenz the key model for this kind of living was Goethe's Götz: "Da konnte Götz nicht durch dringen, der beyden gleich abspricht", he laments, referring perhaps to the effect of the play itself on his fellow society members, perhaps also to the effect of his own diatribe
against un-Götzian living in his essay "Über Götz von Berlichingen"—either way Lenz shows he was disappointed that the new spirit of Goethe's hero had made no impact on anyone other than himself. It had failed to break the cycle of unbelief and lack of commitment. But Lenz has not given up hope, but has rather redoubled his efforts: "Daß wirs ausführen können was ich mit ganzer Seele strebe, auf Heyd und Hügel Deine Helden wieder naturalisiren." Lenz wants and expects change; Götzian living becomes for him the goal of religious renewal, the means to it being his own theological and literary writings: Meynungen and "Ossian". He had already linked Götz and Christian living in his essay on that hero. Götz, being a model for altruistic action as the way of personal fulfilment, is also presented as the Light of the World: "Ein Mann der weder auf Ruhm noch Namen Anspruch macht, der nichts sein will als was er ist...immer weg geschäftig, tätig, wärmend und wohltuend wie die Sonne, aber auch eben so verzehrendes Feuer [cp.Hebrews 12,29], wenn man ihm zu nahe kommt—und am Ende seines Lebens geht er unter wie die Sonne, vergnügt, bessere Gegenden zu schauen, wo mehr Freiheit ist, als er hier sich und den Seinigen verschaffen konnte, und läßt noch Licht und Glanz hinter sich" (I.381). Götz, as we have said, is a perfect incarnation of the active altruistic philosophy propounded by Salzmann. For his part, Lenz conceives him in terms of his theology, or more correctly Christology, of altruistic involvement, of which more will be said in chapter three below.

Theology, though, is one subject of Lenz's next complaints concerning the organisation and ethos of the Société. They come
as a prelude to his essay "Über Ovid" and reflect something of the spirit of the complaints expressed in the letter to Goethe. His frustration with the group in general is implicit in the number of bones he finds to pick, and in the highly ironic tone of the whole: the Société is attempting too much, the meetings are too frequent, there is too great a familiarity amongst the members, the decision made in his absence to extend the group's activities to discussion of all branches of knowledge is absurdly unrealistic, for even the limited goals of the Société will never be reached anyway. Explicitly his frustration is expressed in words crossed out in the manuscript: "Sozietät ja Pfui! Sozietät! was geht mich die Sozietät an?" His heaviest sarcasm is reserved, however, for his attack on the ban the Société has imposed on theological discussion:

Also nur noch ein halbes Wort von der andern Einrichtung, die wir verabredet, daß ins künftige auf uns und unsere Nachkommen die Theologie von allen unsern Vorlesungen ausgeschlossen, bleiben solle, denn sagt mir doch, ihr lieben Leute, was hat der liebe Gott mit unserer Sozietät zu tun? Ich kann mich über nichts mehr ärger und verwundern, als wenn man überall heut zu Tage unsern lieben Herrn Gott hinbringt, gleich als ob der sich um was bekümmerte. Laß die Leute, die sich so schwach fühlen, daß sie in den Bedrängnissen des Lebens überall nach einer Gottheit umsehen müssen, die ihnen ex machina zu Hilfe kommen soll, daß die meinethalben an ihren lieben Herrgott glauben, soviel sie wollen, aber es schickt sich doch meiner Seele nicht, davon in honetter Gesellschaft zu reden. Wir freie Geister wenigstens, denen die Mama alle Morgen Essen kocht und die doch auch in der Welt was erfahren haben und das Ding verstehen müssen, wie man ohne Herrgott drin zurecht kommen kann"(I.474-75).

Evidently the long series of papers that constitute Meynungen eines Laien, as well as the shorter essays that adopt the stance
of theologian, had, in the long run, become tedious to the group, had become examples of those "so wichtigen und weitläufigen Vorlesungen" he alluded to earlier, and he sees the ban on theology as an attempt to silence him. To get his own back he demands a revocation of the decision to include scientific treatises which, he argues with all the urgency of his whimsical rhetoric, would be far more tedious than anything hitherto. To Lenz, theology means urging his hearers to religious commitment: "den Leuten Standpunkt ihrer Religion einzustecken"; what it does not mean is a mere system of religious ideas. Lenz's theology needs an audience, or more correctly a congregation. Like Jung-Stilling he considers the Société to be weak in religious faith and commitment, and his active reformatory zeal in its midst is chiefly aimed at bringing its members back to active Christianity as he understands it. Lenz's ambition, of course, in endeavouring to influence the Société, is ultimately to influence society as a whole. It was probably through the first that he influenced and became known in the second, if we are to believe his claim in a letter to his father: "Wenigstens schmeichelt mir die Freundschaft einer ganzen Stadt . . . so sehr, daß ich sehr vorteilhafte Anträge von andern Orten wie mich dünkt mit Recht ausgeschlagen habe" (Br.I.142). He believed himself influential in the limited society of Strassburg, his ambition was to touch society at large. Several letters speak of his grandiose plans for affecting society (Letters 66, 80, 99, 130), and others testify to his sense of being involved in
matters vital to humanity as a whole: "Seine Reisen sind für die Menschheit wichtig", is Wieland's ironic comment. For the time being, though, the Société is for him a congregation which may be persuaded to listen to him preach "ut vates", and with which a start can perhaps be made. Goethe's Götz Lenz considered as God's gift to Germany, and he urged: "laßt uns den Charakter dieses antiken deutschen Mannes erst mit erhitzter Seele erwägen und wenn wir ihn gut finden, uns eigen machen."

The play, says Lenz, may have failed to exert any influence on society at large, but let us, in our Société, learn its lessons and be changed into Götz's likeness. In that way, mankind at large may be inspired to follow our example of Götzian living: "dann eingeladen alles was noch einen lebendigen Odem in sich spürt—das heißt Kraft Geist und Leben um mit Nachdruck zu handeln"(I.380-82). Another image in a letter to Salzmann shows that it was as early as 1772 that Lenz envisaged this exemplary and reformatory role for the Société: "Vernachlässigen Sie diese Pflanzschule Ihrer Vaterstadt nicht, theurer Freund, vielleicht könntten wohlthätige Bäume draus gezogen werden, auf welche Kindeskinder, die sich unter ihrem Schatten freuten, dankbar schnitten: auch dich hat er pflanzen helfen. Es sieht noch ziemlich wild und traurig in Ihrer Region aus--aber der erste Mensch ward in den Garten Eden gesetzt um ihn zu bauen"(Br.I.28-29). Salzmann, to whom Lenz appeals, is already Lenz's model, spreading the first glimmerings of enlightenment around him, as a letter of the same period expresses: "Wenigstens glänzt eine angenehme
Morgenröthe des Geschmacks in Straßburg um Sie herum"(p.46).
Just how much dawned on Lenz as a result of his acquaintance with Salzmann will be documented in the following chapter.
CHAPTER TWO

The Influence of Johann Daniel Salzmann on Lenz

We have said that Salzmann's essays were all of a general nature, dealing with fairly broad moral and philosophical topics which he left it to others to extend to specific social goals. Indeed they work out a dynamic philosophy of personal spiritual and intellectual development as a foundation and justification for active social involvement. Whilst the subjects of the six essays range from the "Effects of Grace" to "Love", "Revenge", "Virtue and Vice", "Affections, Inclinations and Passions" and finally "Religion", the principle underlying all these is the same, and can be stated quite briefly. Salzmann writes in "Über Tugend und Laster": "Der Mensch ist ein Geschöpf, welches nicht in allem Betracht selbständig und frey, aber auch nicht auf allen Seiten abhängig ist. Der Gebrauch oder Nichtgebrauch seiner Geisteskräfte kommt auf ihn selbst an, und diese Kräfte vermehren sich durch Übung. Wir können daher schließen, der Mensch sey von dem Schöpfer bestimmt, sich durch Versuch und Übung seiner Fähigkeiten, immer mehrere Selbständigkeit, Freyheit und Vollkommenheit zu verschaffen."

Elsewhere he adds happiness to the list of qualities man is destined to achieve and enjoy, and stresses the cardinal point of his philosophy: that it is for the benefit of mankind as a whole that these qualities must be achieved, not for man apart from his fellow-man: "Wir behaupten hier feyerlich, daß wir keine andere moralische Größe der Handlungen erkennen, als diejenige, welche die wahre Größe und vorzügliche Würde der Mensch-
heit, nemlich die allgemeine Freiheit, Selbständigkeit, Glückseligkeit und Thätigkeit begünstigt und befördert" (p. 116). These essential ideas are developed in every essay, and we can be sure that they were ones that Salzmann would have expressed again and again in the open discussion of the Tischgesellschaft, and for which, no doubt, he would have become known. A year and a half before the first essay was delivered, we find Goethe highlighting the same qualities of the Actuary's thought: "daß wir auf diese Welt gesetzt sind besonders um ihr nützlich zu seyn, daß wir uns dazu fähig machen können, wozu denn auch die Religion etwas hilft; und daß der Brauchbarste der Beste ist."

Development of one's personal life through altruistic interaction with the world around: this is the philosophy of life that emerges from each essay, whatever the specific argument may be. It is explicit in the first essay, in which it is argued that God's Grace operates to restore order and harmony in the human psyche, through the sensations a man receives from the objects around him, for it is the ordered psyche that is able truly to love, to find happiness and to give happiness to others. That God's Grace is necessary for man is seen to be evident from the state of perdition in which he finds himself, a state which consists in the inability to use his powers aright to create either his own or others' happiness. The disorder in his psyche is due to the atrophy of his powers of understanding: his "Verstand". When this is restored to its rightful rule over the other powers of the soul and mind: over memory, imagination,
sensibility, passion, and when it is exercised with energy and effort, then love and general happiness become possible. Grace is described, therefore, as God's initiative in a process which only man can perform, but which, through the hard work of seeking to increase his powers of understanding, it is in his power to perform, and indeed he must perform. God's initiative, consisting of the in-built mechanisms for individual and general improvement, whose operation Salzmann describes as God's continual creation, is accessible to all men. It is not directly applied to certain men: to believers, to the elect, but to all who seek to develop their powers. Salzmann has no use for supernaturalism, nor for any denial of human nature. Neither Pietist spirituality nor asceticism, nor indeed, rationalistic subtleties have any place in his system. The truth is close to all men, it is even common sense, and totally immanent. It places a high premium on effort, action and human responsibility, and its goal is the happiness of individual and society.

The sensualist principle, which Salzmann establishes in this essay, and summarises thus: "daß durch die schönen und erhabenen Empfindungen, die sie (sichtbare und fühlbare Gegenstände um uns herum) in uns erregen, die erste und vornehmste Fähigkeit unser Geistes, nämlich der Verstand einen genügsamen Schwung erhalte, mithin nach und nach durch Übung und Bearbeitung die Fertigkeit erlange, eines jeden Gegenstandes wahren Werth zu bestimmen und folglich den übrigen Seelenkräften ihre wahre Richtung zu geben" (pp.24-25), he then applies, in the other essays,
to specific moral concepts. He indicates what role revenge and passion should play, and what love, virtue and religion should consist of. Love, for example, arises naturally out of our dependence, for our personal development and happiness, on objects around us, supremely on fellow-man. Revenge, like all punishment, creates fear and works counter to the creation of happiness through development of one's powers, so love, instead of revenge, must perform the service of deterring evil, but it must be a firm, powerful love, for "die Liebe ist kein schmächtiges, schwaches und immer duldendes Müttergen, sie muß eine sehr starke Energie und Nachdenken haben" (p.67). To acquire such love is certainly beyond men's powers at present. But, he asks, "sind deren Fähigkeiten und Empfindungen nicht alle einer fast unumschränkten Ausdehnung und Erweiterung fähig?" (p.70). To acquire it, all that is needed is application on our part.

Virtue, in the fourth essay, has to be seen in its etymological sense, as courage or strength; it is the effort that is required to direct all our powers to the furtherance of general happiness. Vice, on the other hand, is "ein Unkraut, das von selbst wächst" (p.92). The vicious are those who do not take the trouble to be virtuous. As for "Affections, Inclinations and Passions," the last of these have no place in Salzmann's thought. Not that they lack energy and strength, but they are misdirected energy, upsetting the harmony of the psyche. The other two emotions, however, are "an sich kostbare Geschenke des Himmels, um unter den lebenden Geschöpfen das Feuer der Thätigkeit und Wirk- samkeit zu unterhalten" (p.100).
Religion, finally, is defined as "Kenntnis, Empfindung und Anwendung der Anstalten, welche die Gottheit sowol in der Schöpfung als auch in dem Zusammenhang der Begebenheiten zu unserer höher Existenz und selbständigen moralischen Vervollkommnung gemacht hat" (p.150). Religion gives us the history of God's provisions to help man along the path of moral improvement to perfection and happiness: such provisions are the revelations of the Law, of the One God and of eternal life. Religion also provides motivation and stimulus to persevere along this road. Christian dogma is only of value in as far as it encourages man to strive after the true end of religion, which is love and happiness.

The drives towards perfection, happiness, and union with the perfection and happiness outside of oneself (love), the sense of man's potential: the unlimited possibilities of perfection that are open to him—these are ideas Lenz has in common with Salzmann. But for both, it is a question of putting such ideas into practice, of getting on with the job. To Salzmann this means a clarification of one's ideas and then working "mit Energie und Nachdruck" for general happiness. Whilst salvation comes through rational clarification, it does not come through mere knowledge; the development of "Verstand" only has sense if it leads to vigorous, altruistic action. But in the process, there is for the individual: independence, freedom, the image of God, and a heightened sense of his existence. Lenz, seeking for the same things, will find them at least in theory, in very similar ways.
It is the essay "Über die Liebe" which Lenz refers to in his own paper "Versuch über das erste Principium der Moral". The reference comes during his discussion of the relationship between the individual's sense of his powers, and the human beings around him. He sees love for fellow-man rooted in the realisation that without him one's powers are useless. He goes on: "Mich über diese Materie weiter auszulassen würde sehr überflüssig sein, da ich Sie nur auf die unter Ihnen allen noch unvergessene Abhandlung des Herrn Salzmann verweisen darf" (I.490). The fact that Lenz can refer to the other's essay without needing to name it, and in such terms as "unter Ihnen allen noch unvergessen", may be important in any attempt to date Lenz's "Versuch". What we do know is that "Über die Liebe" was delivered on 5th March, 1772, and that Lenz was absent from Strassburg for most of the summer and autumn of that year. The choice of a date for his own work, therefore, seems to be either that same spring, or alternatively after December 1772. However we also hear that he sent in essays to be read at the Société, from his temporary location in Fort-Louis and Landau. Whether this was one of them, we cannot tell, although the various rhetorical devices interspersed throughout the work might indicate that Lenz intended to read this one himself. The terms of the reference, therefore, make it seem most likely that he is writing within a year of Salzmann's paper, possibly within three months. For our purposes, the point is that Lenz himself has far from forgotten the other's essay, indeed he is conscious of
its argument as he writes his own. It is also quite possible, and even not unlikely, that he had Salzmann's text before him as he wrote, or that he had recently re-read it. This becomes evident when a comparison is made both of the subject-matter and of the phrasing of the two essays.

Lenz's work begins by condemning the "Einheitssucht" in the "republic of scholars": the desire to trace every phenomenon back to one principle. Such a practice can only give rise to sectarian strife as each maintains his principle in the face of others. Instead of this, Lenz argues for the multiple basis of concepts such as beauty and morality. To him, morality is based on the twin principles of the "Trieb nach Vollkommenheit" and "Trieb nach Glückseligkeit". Perfection he defines in terms of the consciousness of one's human powers: "Der Trieb nach Vollkommenheit ist also das ursprüngliche Verlangen unsers Wesens, sich eines immer größern Umfanges unserer Kräfte und Fähigkeiten bewußt zu werden"(I.488). Such human powers comprise both those of the spirit and those of the body, but, says Lenz, it goes without saying that the latter must be subordinated to the former. The resulting harmony within the psyche amounts to the highest beauty as well as the highest good. But "good" is no final state in Lenz; he has no room for the idea of finite perfection. Instead, everything that is good is perfectible, not perfect, for only God can be that. So un-fallen Adam, whilst being good, was still in need of greater perfection: "Gut, m.H., hieß bei den ersten Menschen, fähig zur Vollkommenheit, aber noch nicht vollkommen, denn sonst würden sie nicht gefallen
sein. Alle Geschöpfe, vom Wurm bis zum Seraph, müssen sich vervollkommnen können, sonst hörten sie auf endliche Geschöpfe zu sein, und würden sich nach dem Platonischen Lehrbegriff ins unendliche und allervollkommenste Wesen verlieren" (I.490). In this paragraph are contained the seeds of Lenz's theological ideas on the question of original sin and human destiny. The re-interpretation of Adam's state as one no longer of innocence but of primitivity, and the re-defining of Adam's sin as the first necessary step for him to take in the direction of perfection, autonomy and freedom of action, are quite characteristic of Lenz, and will be developed in the theological essays. At this point we may note the dynamic framework of perfectibility within which morality operates.

Lenz goes on to find a third instinct in man, not so basic as the others, but one performing an auxiliary function: "Der Trieb--uns mitzuteilen". Like Salzmann's altruistic urge, Lenz's is also there to encourage the development of one's powers: "Wir suchen alle Fähigkeiten und Kräfte, deren wir uns bewusst sind, auch andern um uns herum fühlbar zu machen und eben dieses ist das einzige Mittel, dieselben zu entwickeln und zu erweitern" (I.490). There is great stress in Lenz, however, on the consciousness of one's existence and one's powers. The individual needs his fellow-man not merely to develop his own powers, but also to make him conscious of them. Without fellow-man there is not only arrested development, there is also horror: "Die meisten, die größesten und fürtrefflichsten unserer Fähigkeiten liegen tot, sobald wir aus aller menschlichen Gesellschaft fortgerissen
uns völlig allein befinden. Daher schaudert unserer Natur für
nichts so sehr, als einer gänzlichen Einsamkeit, weil alsdenn
unser Gefühl unserer Fähigkeiten das kleinstmögliche wird.
Sehen Sie hier die Weisheit des Schöpfers, sehen Sie hier den
Keim der Liebe und aller gesellschaftlichen Tugenden auf den
ersten Grundtrieb nach Vollkommenheit gepfropft" (I.490). With
the reference to love, the link is established to Salzmann's
essay, to which Lenz now refers.

Following this reference, Lenz, in Salzmannian style, then
extends his principle of development and awareness of one's
powers to the specific concept of friendship. The only true
basis for this form of the altruistic instinct is the recipro-
cal sense of perfection two friends enjoy: "Wahre Freundschaft
beruht also einzig auf das wechselseitige Gefühl unserer Voll-
kommenheit, oder, um jetzt menschlich zu reden, auf das wechsel-
seitige Gefühl unsers Bestrebens nach Vollkommenheit" (I.491).
We are tempted to translate this into Sturm und Drang terms, as:
true friendship is only possible between geniuses, or when they
relate as one genius to another, as Lenz goes on to imply:
"Wahre Vollkommenheit kann also niemand gehörig schätzen, als der
sie selber besitzt." Lenz does add a disclaimer in parenthesis,
however: "Bedenken Sie, daß ich hier von lauter Idealen rede."

The ensuing definition of happiness, the instinct for which
is the second basic drive in ethical man, leads Lenz to emphasise
that we can only be truly happy when our spirits are continually
in motion. The idea of rest, championed, in Lenz's view, by
Rousseau, is not only inimical to human perfectibility and
happiness, it is even a physical impossibility: "Der Zustand
einer absoluten Ruhe hat, wie die Physiker lehren, in unserer
Welt keine Statt, die Ruhe der Materie selbst ist eine entge-
gengesetzte Bewegung gleicher Kräfte, die sich unter einander
aufheben." Absolute rest belongs not to this created world,
which is ceaselessly active in self-development; it can only
be imagined in a place where the processes of life are as yet
unbegun—in the past, therefore, for the future holds nothing
but continuing development. For the place to which rest must
be consigned, Lenz finds Milton's image of "Chaos and old night"
the most appropriate. Only a state of motion is fitting for
man with his dynamic drives: "Der höchste Zustand der Bewegung
ist unserm Ich der angemessenste, das heißt derjenige Zustand,
wo unsere äussern Umstände unsere Relationen und Situationen
so zusammenlaufen, daß wir das größtmöglichsteste Feld vor uns
haben, unsere Vollkommheit zu erhöhen zu befördern und andern
empfindbar zu machen, weil wir uns alsdenn das größtmöglichstes
Vergnügen versprechen können, welches eigentlich bei allen Men-
schen in der ganzen Welt in dem größten Gefühl unserer Existenz,
unserer Fähigkeiten, unsers Selbst besteht"(I.492-93). Lenz de-
mands only space and freedom to move, grow, develop, act and dis-
cover. It is in conformity with this demand that he will later
refuse the fixed boundaries of a moral code. Morality is no pre-
scription of certain acts, it is the authorisation to participate
in a free process of perfection.

The earlier definition of friendship in terms of the drive
to perfection is now matched by a definition in similar terms of
such vices as voluptuousness, arrogance and avarice. In each case the practicant fails either to develop his powers, or even to be aware of them. And in no case does he find happiness.

The belief that happiness comes according to our striving for perfection Lenz calls faith: a moral or natural faith, that has always been held from Enoch to the Psalmist and to Socrates. It is, however, faith in a process which could not work without God. With the mention of God the essay quite suddenly changes,—before even Lenz announces the change and as if Lenz has only been waiting for this moment—-from being a philosophical to a theological and religious work. The principle, just established, of finding encouragement in one's personal development by altruistic involvement in one's neighbour's, continues to be advocated, but now not merely as an idea to be understood, but as an imperative to be obeyed:

Hören Sie was wir tun müssen, hören Sie es, merken Sie es, dies ist der fruchtbareste Teil meiner Principien. Wir müssen suchen andere um uns herum glücklich zu machen. Nach allen unsern Kräften arbeiten, nicht allein ihre Fähigkeiten zu entwickeln, sondern auch sie in solche Zustände zu setzen, worin sie ihre Fähigkeiten am besten entwickeln können. Wenn jeder diesen Vorsatz in sich zur Reife und zum Leben kommen läßt, so werden wir eine glückliche Welt haben. Jeder sorgt bloß für des andern Glück und jeder wird selbst glücklich, weil er um sich herum Leute findet, die für das seinige sorgen. Diese beständig wachsame und wirkende Sorgfalt für den Zustand meines Nebenmenschen wird auch das beste Mittel sein, hier in dieser Welt meine Fähigkeiten zu entwickeln, meine Vollkommenheit zu befördern"(I.496).

Lenz does not need to be reminded that this vision of social harmony is remote from contemporary reality, but it only needs human action to make it real: "Frisch an die Arbeit, meine
Brüder, die ihr Mut genug habt, Menschenfreunde zu sein. ... strebt einzig und allein darnach besser zu werden und eure Nebenmenschen um euch herum nicht allein besser, sondern auch glücklich zu machen!" (I.496) To the objection that such a task is impossibly difficult, Lenz replies with theological arguments based on the teaching of Christ concerning the fulfillment of the Law, seeking the kingdom of God, and, most importantly, the prospect of eternal life: "welch ein Zustand kann alle in uns liegende Menschenkräfte mehr entwickeln, erhöhen und vervollkommnen als die unmittelbare anschauende Erkenntnis des, der da wohnet in einem Licht, da niemand zukommen kann" (I.499). We shall examine Lenz's theological views, as they relate to the concept of action, more fully in the next chapter. Here we shall merely note that they serve to support and confirm the dynamic principle of striving for perfection and consciousness of one's powers, and lead up to the evangelical zeal of the conclusion: "Was helfen aber diese Spekulationen, wenn sie nicht ausgeübt werden. . .Solange man mich nicht eines Bessern belehrt, gehe ich auf diesem Wege fort und glaube, daß es besser sei, des HERRN Willen zu tun, als ihn bloß zu wissen."

Such is the argument of Lenz's essay. Salzmann's, as we briefly saw, covers similar ground; a closer comparison of the two will show how similar. Salzmann's opening paragraph announces a proposition which Lenz will echo: "daß Gott nichts anders von uns fordere, als daß wir uns die Mühe geben sollen uns durch die Liebe glücklich zu machen" (p.31). Lenz says: "ich habe schon
vorhin gesagt, daß ich in der Tat das Reich Gottes auf Erden für nichts anders als das beständige Bestreben aller Menschen einander glücklich zu machen, halte" (I. 497). Salzmann goes on to stress that the nature of love has been so misunderstood and misrepresented by philosophers and theologians, and so impoverished as a practical virtue, that it is high time that its true stature were recovered, and that it be seen once again to be the sum of all virtues: the essence of the Law and the Prophets. Defining happiness as the modulation of pleasant feelings that we receive through contact with the beauties and perfections of the external world, and love as the reciprocal communication of pleasant feeling, like Lenz's "Trieb uns mitzuteilen", Salzmann then lays great stress on the important role of the world around, notably fellow-man, in the development and useful deployment of our own powers. We need fellow-man for our own self-awareness and happiness, and it is in this sense that it can be said: "Ein Mensch kann in gewissem Verstande des andern Gott seyn" (p. 36). General happiness is created when all men work for the development of each other's perfection and growth, for then they will find their own development furthered: "Denn alle Schönheiten und Vollkommenheiten, welche wir mit schöpferischer Kraft entwickelt haben, stralen wieder auf uns zurück" (p. 39).

Salzmann thus stresses a harmony of altruism and enlightened self-interest. To this idea Lenz responds warmly, it forms the point of contact between the one's concern for love and the other's concern for happiness. The state most conducive to love,
according to Salzmann, is also the state, Lenz feels, in which personal happiness can thrive; to both thinkers it is the ordered psyche that creates such a state. A direct comparison of the relevant passages from the two essays shows Lenz's debt to the other man. Salzmann had stressed the need for "Verstand" to rule the other powers of the soul if love and happiness were to be possible, and writes of these ordered powers: "dieselben, in immerwährender Rücksicht auf den Zusammenhang des Ganzen, zu entwickeln, zu erwärmen und zu erweitern suchen". Lenz, substituting "Vernunft" for Salzmann's "Verstand", expands this to: "Wir sind also nur alsdenn wahrhaft glücklich, wenn wir in einem Zustande sind, in welchem wir unsere Vollkommenheit auf die leichteste und geschwindeste Art befördern können, das heißt, in welchem wir die Fähigkeiten unsers Verstandes, unsers Willens, unserer Empfindungen, unserer Phantasie, aller unserer untern Seelenkräfte, hernach auch unserer Gliedmassen und unsers Körpers immer mehr entwickeln, verfeinern und erhöhen können und zwar in einer gewissen Übereinstimmung der Teile zum Ganzen, in einer gewissen Harmonie und Ordnung, welche unsere Vernunft, die von allen Vorurteilen befreit ist und die höchste Oberherrschaft über alle unsere übrigen Seeßenvermögen erhalten hat, selbst lehren wird" (I. 494). Salzmann expresses the harmony of altruism and personal development as "der Hang unserer geübten Seele, vermöge dessen wir nicht nur unsere eigene Fähigkeiten und Vollkommenheiten, sondern auch diejenigen, die in unsern Mitmenschen verborgen liegen, immermehr zu entwickeln, zu verschönen, zur Voll-
kommenheit des Ganzen einzuleiten" (p.44). Lenz duly argues, placing a little more emphasis on the enlightened self-interest: "Diese beständig wachsame und wirkende Sorgfalt für den Zustand meines Nebenmenschen wird auch das beste Mittel sein, hier in dieser Welt meine Fähigkeiten zu entwickeln, meine Vollkommenheit zu befördern" (I.496).

To draw attention to similarities of language and subject-matter in the two thinkers is, of course, not necessarily to prove the direct influence of the one upon the other. Discussion of the phenomenology of the soul: the different states of the mind that are produced during the acts of perception and knowing, and the various psychological powers: the "Seelenkräfte", that must harmonise if there is to be true insight or 'genial' artistic creation, was a favourite occupation throughout the Enlightenment period, an intellectual exercise that anyone could indulge in. The stress on the development of human powers found a particularly warm response amongst the Sturm und Drang generation. Goethe tells us in Dichtung und Wahrheit:

Wir haben von dem gutigen Schöpfer eine Menge Seelenkräfte, welchen man ihre gehörige Kultur, und zwar in den ersten Jahren gleich, zu geben nicht verabsäumen muß, und die man doch weder mit Logik noch Metaphysik, Latein oder Griechisch kultivieren kann: wir haben eine Einbildungskraft, der wir, wofern sie sich nicht der ersten besten Vorstellungen selbst bemächtigen soll, die schicklichsten und schönsten Bilder vorlegen und dadurch das Gemüt gewöhnen und üben müssen, das Schöne überall und in der Natur selbst, unter seinen bestimmten, wahren und auch in den feineren Zügen zu erkennen und zu lieben. Wir haben eine Menge Begriffe und allgemeine Kenntnisse nötig, sowohl für die Wissenschaften als für das tägliche Leben, die sich in keinem Kompendio erlernen lassen. Unsere Empfindungen, Neigungen und Leidenschaften sollen mit Vorteil entwickelt und gereinigt werden.
Diese bedeutende Stelle, welche sich in der "Allgemeinen deutschen Bibliothek" vorfand, war nicht die einzige in ihrer Art. Von gar vielen Seiten her offenbarten sich ähnliche Grundsätze und gleiche Gesinnungen. Sie machten auf uns rege Jünglinge sehr großen Eindruck (IX.353-54).

We can, of course, include Lenz among the "rege Jünglinge" that read such passages with enthusiasm, and it is certain that Salzmann was not the only one who might have introduced Lenz to such ideas. Both his and the Actuary's thought could, therefore, be merely running parallel at this point, without it being a case of the one influencing the other. Apart, however, from the hint given us by Lenz's explicit reference to Salzmann, it becomes apparent from the close structural relationship between the two essays that Lenz is here consciously being led by Salzmann's ideas, seeing in them just the moral-philosophical arguments that he needed to back up his theological and religious convictions.

The further parallels between the two works, then, are as follows: both Lenz and Salzmann begin their essay with a criticism of all existing thinkers on the topic: Salzmann because they have not understood or represented love aright, Lenz because they have not recognised the multiple source of human initiative: the twin principles underlying morality. To both writers, philosophers shoot far beyond the mark; Salzmann: "Die Philosophen? ja diese finden ihre Glückseligkeit nirgend anders, als in dem unendlich Großen und unendlich Kleinen; sie messen lieber den Himmel als die Erde, worauf sie herum gehen" (pp.31-32); Lenz: "Plato zog seine Linie in die Sphären, Diogenes in den Kot. . .Keinem
Both writers locate happiness in the use of intellectual and physical powers, as well as in self-awareness, Salzmann's "Empfindungen unserer eigenen Existenz" (p.35), and Lenz's "Gefühl unserer Existenz" (I.493). In both essays it is then stated that these powers lie-dead when the individual is cut off from his neighbour; Salzmann says: "Die Menschen sind nicht bestimmt in der Welt allein zu leben. Unsere Sinne würden zu gar nichts dienen, wenn außer uns nichts wäre: und unsere Geisteskräfte liegen todt und vergraben, bis sie durch die äußern Ge-
genstände. . . belebet und auseinander gelegt werden" (p.35); and Lenz: "Die meisten, die größten und fürtrefflichsten unserer Fähigkeiten liegen tot, sobald wir aus aller menschlichen Ge-
sellschaft fortgerissen uns völlig allein befinden" (I.490). Both essays then acknowledge the wisdom of God in causing love to be bound up with social duty, personal fulfilment and happiness; Salzmann states "daß die wahre Liebe der einzige richtige Weg zur wahren und vollkommenen Glückseligkeit sey, und daß also der gütige Urheber unseres Wesens unsere Bedürfnisse, unsere Pflich-
ten und unsere Glückseligkeit ganz nahe mit einander verbunden habe" (p.45); Lenz writes: "Sehen Sie hier die Weisheit des Schöp-
fers, sehen Sie hier den Keim der Liebe und aller gesellschaft-
lichen Tugenden auf den ersten Grundtrieb nach Vollkommenheit gepfropft" (I.490).

Both essayists then digress to criticise Rousseau, Salzmann because he disagrees with the ideal of primitivism, which seeks
to evade unhappiness, and Lenz because he cannot accept Rousseau's ideal of rest. Salzmann also finds no room for the concept of rest. "Ruhe ist Unthatigkeit" (p. 51), he pronounces in the next essay, which is no mere tautology since "Untätigkeit" in Salzmann's system, as in Lenz's, means decadence. It is the awareness of contemporary decadence that leads Salzmann, after he has expounded the theory of love, to lament at the discrepancy between theory and current practice: "Allein wer wird diesen hohen Grad der Liebe erreichen können! Wir haben so viele Hindernisse zu überwinden!" (p. 45) But, he urges, "Nur frisch an die Arbeit: man muß den Muth hier nicht sinken lassen" (p. 46). Lenz, at the same point in his essay, likewise laments: "Aber--ach diese Welt ist keine solche Welt... Es ist schwer--es ist unmöglich", only to echo Salzmann's very call: "Frisch an die Arbeit, meine Brüder, die ihr Mut genug habt" (I. 496). Both essays then end by locating the striving towards happiness, love and perfection in an eternal framework. If man's high destiny is not reached in this life, the prospect of life after death gives hope of the ultimate fulfilment; Salzmann speaks of the "gegründete Hoffnung, daß diese seelige Beschäftigung noch jenseits des Grabes fortduaern und die reichste Belohnung unserer... hier wohlangewandten Seelen- und Leibeskräfte... die niemals versiegende Quelle aller unserer sowol gegenwärtigen als zukünftigen Glückseligkeit sein werde" (p. 47). Lenz, of course, is ever ready to lift the discussion up to the theological level: "Das größeste und letzte Motiv, das uns unsere Religion zur Vollkommenheit gibt, ist die Aussicht in ein ewiges Leben... als worin die
höchste Glückseligkeit besteht" (I.499).

The evidence all points to Lenz giving an enthusiastic reception to ideas that he was perhaps predisposed by temperament to embrace. Not only did they provide a philosophical basis for an activism in social affairs, but they also harmonised the obligation to act for the good of one's neighbour with the individual's desire to live out life to its full potential. They gave him the sense that if activism had now to be worked out in theological terms, it was at least morally and philosophically right.

That Lenz's thought was moulded and inspired by Salzmann's seems apparent from our comparison of the essays. It will not be the only time that Lenz enthusiastically embraces others' ideas, even to the point of taking over their wording. Friedrich, in his study of Lenz's Anmerkungen übers Theater, shows its "Schlußanmerkung" to be not only in agreement with Herder's essay on Shakespeare in Von deutscher Art und Kunst, but also modelled in detail on it. "Mit dem prinzipiellen Standpunkt hat aber Lenz auch die Anlage des Ganzen herübergenommen," Friedrich tells us, and goes on: "Die Verwandtschaft geht aber noch weiter, sie betrifft auch Einzelheiten." He concludes: "So ist also die Schlußanmerkung nach Inhalt und Form nichts als eine verkleinerte, zum Theil erweiterte Nachbildung von Herders Shakespeare-Aufsatz." Lenz evidently followed his models quite closely. Yet to suggest that his "Versuch" was "nothing but" an imitation of Salzmann's essay would be to do it an injustice. For what seems, in the other case, to have been a polemical attempt to bring his Anmerk-
ungaen up to date, and yet still appear to have priority over Herder on a fairly technical matter, is, in this case, rather an enthusiastic, and acknowledged, identification with a thinker whose ideas were of vital importance to him and to which he would repeatedly return. Moreover, Lenz makes certain important modifications to Salzmann's system, and much is revealed by the differences.

The chief of these is the extra emphasis placed on self-consciousness, that was briefly noted above (p. 58). Whilst both Salzmann and Lenz identify happiness with the agreeable feeling of one's existence, communicated by fellow-man, such self-consciousness takes the more dynamic form, in Lenz, of a sense of his powers. Salzmann's "Gefühl unserer Existenz" is expanded to Lenz's "Gefühl unserer Existenz, unserer Fähigkeiten, unser Selbst" (I. 493). The Actuary speaks of the agreeable feelings that come through rational discrimination, Lenz speaks of the agreeable consciousness of one's rational powers. Happiness he defines as the pleasure of knowing one's potential, and it is for such knowledge and pleasure that the individual needs his neighbour: "Ist das Gefühl unserer Fähigkeiten nicht das, was unsere ganze Glückseligkeit ausmacht? . . . Wahre Freundschaft beruht also einzig auf das wechselseitige Gefühl unserer Vollkommenheit" (I. 491). Not only happiness, though, comes from such self-consciousness, but also perfectibility. Being perfectible is of no use unless one is conscious of it; perfection cannot come except through insight into one's perfectibility: "Der
Wollüstling fühlt bloß seine Sinnlichkeit. Er würde erschrecklich böse werden, wenn man ihm anschauend und lebendig zu erkennen gäbe, daß er höhere Fähigkeiten habe" (I. 493). In the striving after happiness and perfection, it is not who you are, but knowing who you are, that is the key. To explain the current decadence of man, Salzmann argues that people do not make the effort to give and to receive happiness. Lenz agrees, but traces this lack of effort back further to a general unawareness of the personal potential the individual has and can fulfil through effort. Salzmann urges his hearers to strive for perfection, by holding out to them the incentive of happiness and social harmony. To Lenz the bonus in perfection, as well as the means to it, is the increased self-consciousness, the ability to apply to oneself Hamlet's meditation: "what a piece of work is man!"

The most urgent requirement in society is, then, a renewed consciousness of the lofty destiny, which man has the potential to reach. Supported by God, man is on the road to perfection, attainable by the development and exercise of human powers: to become aware of this is to take the first step towards reaching it. To act towards this end we have to know what man is, what he is capable of. Sadly, we are not aware of our lofty calling; little is accomplished towards the perfection of man and society because the sights are set too low, the possibility of advancing higher is not envisaged. In the theological essays Lenz will stress that salvation can only come, therefore, through a renewal of consciousness, through a higher mentality that will transcend
the limitations of the ordinary human mind; to denote this change, Lenz will use the Christian notion of *metanoia*.

Does the need for such a change, however, indicate a fallen humanity? Salzmann, in his otherwise deistic conception of man and God, does use the Judaeo-Christian idea of an initial fall, whereby man, originally made in God's image, lost that image, but is destined now to recover it. The loss of the image had a radical effect on humanity. Salzmann speaks of the "Strome des allgemeinen Verderbens" (p. 46): the current of human perversity against which love has strenuously to work its way. Lenz, more explicitly Christian than Salzmann, the deistic philosopher, nonetheless is less willing than he to admit that what is called original sin was not in man from the day of his creation. The perfection of Adam, the image of God, was no ultimate perfection: "Gut, m. H., hieß bei den ersten Menschen, fähig zur Vollkommenheit, aber noch nicht vollkommen, denn sonst wären sie nicht gefallen sein" (I. 490). Lenz, as we shall see from the theological essays, was consistently at pains to portray Adam as subject to the same process and destiny of perfection as contemporary man. Indeed, since he stands right at the beginning of human destiny, he is far behind eighteenth-century man who, with his gains in self-awareness and independence of action, must think not of returning to primitive Adam, but on to a future and higher destiny of continuing perfection. This conception of Adam does not allow Lenz to entertain the idea of a radical fall from man's intended state, nor is there in conse-
quence much room for the idea of a depraved humanity ("Ver-
derben"). Lenz voices his disagreement with Salzmann on this point in a letter of October 1772: "Das Eine bitt' ich mir aus, nicht so verächtlich von dieser Welt zu sprechen. Sie ist gut, mein Gönner, mit allen ihren eingeschlossenen Übeln" (Br.I.57).

The world is on its way to perfection, not back to Paradise; and if perfectible Adam was to progress towards that goal, he also had to turn his back on Paradise. Unlike Salzmann's, therefore, Lenz's Heilsgeschichte is linear, not circular; it has to be understood as a gradual journey, that began in the Garden of Eden, towards a fulfilment of human destiny. The Actuary's concept of restoration of a lost image was too backward-looking for Lenz: it involved confession of failure and renunciation of Adam's action. Later, Lenz's prometheanism will take a somewhat humbler form, but he is consistently reluctant to allow the curse of the past to trouble his aspirations for the future.

Is this understanding of Lenzian theology in contradiction, therefore, to the views the poet expresses to Salzmann in a letter of October 1772: "So viel ist klar dabey, daß durch die Offenbarung seiner Gnade in Christo Jesu, er nichts anders abzwecken will, als unsere Wiederherstellung in den Stand der Unschuld, welche gleichsam die weiße Tafel ist, welche hernach beschrieben werden soll, und aus diesem in den Stand der Glückseligkeit" (Br.I.53)? Here he seems indeed to advocate a return to square one in order to reach final happiness. However, as we
shall see in the next chapter, it is later that same month that Lenz undergoes a sort of conversion, which is accompanied by a slight shift in his views. From this time on, strangely, the notion of "Schuld" and "Unschuld" disappears from his theological thinking. The Heilsgeschichte traced in the "Versuch" corresponds to this post-conversion theology, which, incidentally, supports the argument for dating the essay after his return to Strassburg in December 1772. The tone of these letters of that autumn suggests, anyway, that they are Lenz's first attempt to think through the question of happiness. He is more self-conscious about his philosophising than he seems to be in the "Versuch", complaining of his inability to pursue a line of philosophical reasoning for more than a few minutes and confessing himself to be a philosopher manqué: "ich hasche immer nach der ersten besten Wahrscheinlichkeit, die mir in die Augen flimmert, und die liebe, bescheiden nackte Wahrheit kommt dann ganz leise von hinten und hält mir die Augen zu. Eine lange Kette von Ideen, wo eine die andere gibt, bis man, wenn man eine Weile gereist hat, die letzte find't und sich seines Zieles freuen kann, ist für meine Seele eine wahre Sklavenkette" (Br.I.56). Nonetheless he does attempt in the "Versuch" such a philosophical journey, even if, as he freely confesses, the leaps in his thought indicate an emotional rather than rational logic: "Meine philosophischen Betrachtungen dürfen nicht über zwo, drei Minuten währen, sonst thut mir der Kopf weh. Aber wenn ich einen Gegenstand fünf, zehnmal so flüchtig angesehen habe, und finde, daß er
noch immer da bleibt und mir immer besser gefällt, so halt' ich ihn für wahr, und meine Empfindung führt mich darin richtiger als meine Schlüsse" (Br.I.59). Lenz's beliefs were a compound of philosophical notions and religious convictions. The two were complementary, he tells Salzmann in the letter reporting his conversion: "ich bin jetzt...zu einer Überzeugung gekommen, wie sie mir nötig war, zu einer philosophischen, nicht bloß moralischen. Der theologische Glaube ist das complementum unserer Vernunft" (Br.I.65). It is in the spirit of this conviction that the "Versuch" was written, where it is also stated: "Der theologische Glaube...ist, wenn ich mit Baumgartenschen Ausdrücken reden soll: Complementum moralitatis" (I.499). For Lenz, philosophy and religion had the same object: the imitation of Christ in altruistic action. Christ's life was "eine lebendige Rede, oder vielmehr ein redendes Leben, welches, wenn wir es anschauend erkannt, wir nicht unnachgeahmt lassen können" (I.498).

Apart from the question of the goodness or perversity of the world, the correspondence with Salzmann brings out further differences of opinion between the two correspondents. The Actuary follows Leibniz in adhering to the notion of "continual creation", whilst Lenz argues for the Biblical doctrine of God's upholding of the universe. The problem involved is that of imagining a timeless God working in time. Salzmann argues: "Zum wenigsten ist das Geschäft eines Augenblicks und nachherige Unthätigkeit in Gott viel schwerer zu begreifen, als in ewiger
und unveränderter Ordnung fortgeehende Wirksamkeit", for God is "ein Wesen. . .welches bei einer unendlichen Thätigkeit auch unveränderlich ist" (pp. 10-11). For this same reason Salzmann excludes anything other than an indirect and natural working of God in the world. There can be no personal experience of God's hand such as the Pietist Jung-Stilling describes, no special favours shown by God towards certain humans, just as there could be no one act of creation in history followed by a God "resting on the seventh day". Lenz argues, on the other hand, for a historical working of God, for the possibility of a super-natural, direct influence of God on man; for theism, therefore, not deism: "nur müssen wir das Übernatürliche nicht für unnatürlich halten, oder aus der Welt verbannen, in der Gott nach einem Höhern Plane arbeitet, als unser kurz­sichtiger schielender Verstand übersehen kann" (Br. I. 64). Salzmann's natural theology took too little account of the divine mystery, but also too little account of the direct possibilities of grace, the direct working of the Spirit of God in man, indispensable to Lenz's conception of genius and genial action.

A third point of difference is that Lenz feels himself closer to Shaftesbury than he felt Salzmann was: "Eine Lieblingsidee haben Sie, mein Theurer, und das freut mich, weil ich auch eine habe. . .Die Ihrige ist--die Liebe--und die Meinige, die Schönheit. . .So viel ist gewiß, daß die letztere die einzige Idee ist, auf die ich alle andern zu reduzieren suche. Aber es muß die ächte Schönheit seyn, die auf Wahrheit und Güte ge-
grundet ist" (Br.I.57-58). The preoccupation with harmonising beauty and morality certainly keeps Lenz busy for a while; in the "Versuch" he seems to be making a comment on the side to Salzmann when, if only for a moment, Lenz, taking Salzmann's essay on "Liebe", uses its argument to make a point about "Schönheit": "Es muß in unserm Bestreben nach Vollkommenheit eine gewisse Übereinstimmung aller unserer Kräfte zu einem Ganzen, eine gewisse Harmonie sein, welche eigentlich den wahren Begriff des höchsten Schönens gibt. Sehen Sie nun, daß die Linien des wahren Schönens und des wahren Guten im strengsten Verstande, in einen Punkt zusammen laufen?" (I.489) The harmony of one's powers was Salzmann's recipe for the state in which love became possible, as well as development towards perfection. The theological essays also contain references to the "highest beauty" and to "subjective and objective beauty", but the essay in which they were no doubt most fully worked out is no longer extant. However the difference to Salzmann's thinking, implied by this aesthetic concern, is clearly less great than Lenz leads us to think. Whilst, as a poet, he is naturally concerned for aesthetics, he is also very interested in "Liebe", as his essays also indicate, and he can write to Salzmann, articulating his fundamental agreement with him: "ich fühle eine Affinität zu Ihnen, die ganz erschrecklich ist" (Br.I.58). The many other expressions of Lenz's sense of making common cause with Salzmann entirely disprove the argument, from this same letter, that Lenz is hostile to the Actuary's particular interest. Dollinger, for instance, writes: "Homme de
lettres jusqu'aux moëlles, il n'avait apparemment jamais goûté les homélies de Salzmann. Dès 1772, il lui écrivait sur un ton frisant l'impertinence: 'Vous avez une idée favorite etc.' Il ne nous laisse aucun doute sur le sentiment que lui inspirait 'l'idée favorite' du respectable Actuarius.\(^9\) Dollinger's view of Lenz and his relationship to Salzmann is coloured, unfortunately, by his disapproval of Lenz's prejudice in favour of German over French. The many letters that have survived between the poet and his mentor up to as late as December 1776, show that Lenz never had anything but the highest regard for Salzmann and his ideas.

We do know that Salzmann was not uncritical of Lenz; it is clear from Lenz's letters confessing to his friend his love for Friederike Brion that the Actuary thoroughly disapproved of the affair, as of Lenz's neglect of his studies. And, in a literary matter, Salzmann could not approve of the language Lenz uses in his Plautus translations. But in the latter case Goethe himself defended the translations, defending at the same time, incidentally, his own use of popular language in \textit{Götz von Berlichingen}; and in the other case Lenz willingly submitted to his friend’s sage counsel. He writes to his father in June 1772: "Salzmann--o wenn ich einen so erfahrenen liebenswürdigen Mentor nicht hier zur Seite gehabt, auf welcher Klippe würde ich jetzt nicht schon schiffbrüchig sitzen?"(Br.I.23) To Lenz, Salzmann always remained a kindred spirit, from 1772 when he wrote to the Actuary about Spalding:"es macht wenigstens Ver-
gnügen zu finden, daß Andere mit uns nach demselben Punkt visieren" (Br.I.38), to 1776, when Salzmann writes to Lenz about his last essay delivered at the Deutsche Gesellschaft, speaking of it in a way that suggests he was sure of Lenz's warm approbation: "Doch ist meine letztere ohngedruckte Abhandlung über allgemeine oder gesellschaftliche glückseligkeit un vergleichlich gerathen und wenn ihr mir gut wort gebt so schick ich's euch. Sie ist in der gesellschaft gelesen und sehr approbirt worden" (Br.II.35).

Throughout Lenz's work there are several ideas expressed that may indicate Salzmann's influence, and at least prove that their thought ran parallel. Lenz's first specific discussion of Salzmann's ideas comes in a letter of September 1772: "Guter Sokrates! "Ohne mich nicht ganz glücklich"--Fürchten Sie sich der Sünde nicht, einen jungen Menschen stolz zu machen, dessen Herz noch allen Passionen offen steht und durch Zeit und Erfahrung nur noch sehr wenig verbollwerkt ist? Da ich so tief in Ihr System geguckt, da ich weiß, daß Ihre Religion die Glückseligkeit ist--so konnte mir kein größeres Compliment gemacht werden, als, daß ich im Stande sey, mit etwas beizutragen" (Br.I.44-45).

If we reconstruct the quotation: "Ohne mich nicht ganz glücklich" in the form in which Salzmann probably used it, we should have something like: "ohne dich kann ich nicht ganz glücklich sein": surely a fragment of his philosophy of happiness through interaction with one's fellow-man. This is the "System" expressed in "Über die Liebe" and used by Lenz in his "Versuch". Lenz's contribution to the system consists of four observations, all of which Salzmann would have responded favourably to, but one
of which particularly shows Lenz's belief in the practical reality and relevance of the system. His optimistic observation that we can, in this world, fulfil our potential for happiness—something which perhaps Salzmann was not so sure of—is filled out by his emphasis in a later letter that the kingdom of God is not merely an idea: "das Reich Gottes, wovon Christus immer red't, ist nicht allein in jenem Leben zu hoffen, denn er selbst hat uns im Vaterunser beten gelehrt 'dein Wille geschehe im Himmel, wie auf Erden'. Wenn's Glück gut ist, bin ich noch immer ein heimlicher Anhänger vom tausendjährigen Reiche, wenigstens glaub' ich gewiss, daß der Zustand unserer Welt nicht immer derselbe bleiben wird. Und christlich-physisches Übel muß immer mehr drin abnehmen, wenn das Moralische darin abnimmt" (Br.I.57).

There remains, to be sure, the problem of evil, which seems to Lenz to knock down his house of cards. Salzmann, whose recent illness is the reminder to Lenz of the problem of evil, has suggested a solution along the lines of Enlightenment theodicy: illness might be "das Fegfeuer unserer Tugend" (Br.I.45). Lenz suggests that at least it enables us per contraria to appreciate health. We shall find this line of reasoning repeated frequently, that we only discover good by learning not to do bad, that morality is suggested to us by the consequences of immorality.

Both Salzmann and Lenz believe that the human mind, if it is to be able effectively to love (Salzmann) and to acquire freedom from determining factors (Lenz), must not seek to avoid the painful aspects of existence but to embrace them and overcome them:
"Unser Geist muß stark genug seyn, alles dieses mit gleichem Muthe zu ertragen" ("Über die Rache", p. 67). "Denken heißt nicht vertauben—es heißt, seine unangenehmen Empfindungen mit aller ihrer Gewalt wüten zu lassen und Stärke genug in sich fühlen, die Natur dieser Empfindungen zu untersuchen und sich so über sie hinaus zu setzen" ("Über die Natur unsers Geistes"; I. 575). The doctrine of human striving leads both to reject the Lutheran dependence on God alone for any improvement: "(Die Ausleger der Religion). . . lügen gradezu, daß der Mensch etwas zu seiner Besserung beytragen könne. Nach ihrem Begriff muß Gott alles von innen und aussen bey uns thun" (Salzmann, p. 74). "Sollen wir aber nichts zu Verbesserung unsers Zustandes tun, hör ich Sie fragen. Sollen wir Gott versuchen und lauter Wunder von ihm erwarten?" ("Versuch" I. 495). Man's salvation depends on his own efforts, and God has given him various means of keeping these alive; for Salzmann it is our affections and inclinations: "Beide sind an sich kostbare Geschenke des Himmels, um unter den lebenden Geschöpfen das Feuer der Thätigkeit und Wirksamkeit zu unterhalten" (p. 100). For Lenz this service is performed by human concupiscence: "Die Konkupiszenz ist dem Menschen zur Glückseligkeit notwendig, eine Gabe Gottes. . . Die Triebfeder unserer Handlungen ist die Konkupiszenz" (I. 501-2). The way to vice and unhappiness lies, for both thinkers, in "Trägheit". Indeed, inactivity dehumanises man, lowering him to primitive levels of creation; to Salzmann it is as much as "uns unter die andern Thiere herabsetzen, welche das wirklich sind, was sie seyn und
werden können" (p. 152); to the idle, Lenz cries: "Warum willst
du zur Pflanze oder Mineral zurückverwesen" (I. 504)? Both con-
demn speculation and mere observation: Salzmann's dictum: "wir
sollten keine bloße Zuschauer in der Welt seyn, sondern an
allem, was darinnen ist und vorgehet, Antheil nehmen, und nach
dem Maße unserer Kräften selbst handeln", will be the moral of
1.1. Lenz's play Die Freunde machen den Philosophen. We have sug-
gested some of the main theological differences between the two
men: a comparison of Salzmann's use of the image of a ship navi-
gating between sand-banks and reefs, with Lenz's use of the same
image shows how much Lenz felt the need to supplement Salzmann's
philosophy of self-help with a dependence on God's grace.
However both have the same attitude towards the Bible, which is
"nur Geschichte der göttlichen Offenbarungen", not revelation
13. itself.

In general, therefore, Lenz shows himself to be well-cate-
cchised in the central tenets of Salzmann's philosophy of life.
The Actuary's scathing indictment of passion finds an echo in
Lenz's resolve, stated in his "Lebensregeln", that he must not
allow love to turn into a "sich wider Vernunft, Ordnung und Gott
empörende Leidenschaft"; and it is entirely in the spirit of
Salzmann's advocation of tolerance: "Alle Dinge in der Welt
haben hundert Seiten und jeder Mensch hat seinen eigenen Stand-
ort, woraus er sie betrachtet. Folglich kann einer nicht eben so
sehen wie der andere, wenn er nicht in denselben Gesichts-
punkt gestellt wird" (p. 3), and quite in his spirit of practical
utilitarianism: "daß der Brauchbarste der beste ist", that Lenz writes to his father in September 1776: "Die Welt ist groß mein Vater, die Wirkungskreise verschieden. Alle Menschen können nicht einerly Meinungen oder vielleicht nur einerly Art sie auszudrücken haben. So unvollkommen das was man in jedem Fach der menschlichen Erkenntnis modern nennt, seyn mag, so ist es, wie Sie selbst mir nicht ganz absprechen werden, jungen Leuten doch nothwendig, sich hinein zu schicken, wenn sie der Welt brauchbar werden wollen" (Br.II.37).

It need not be denied, of course, that others contributed to moulding Lenz's thought. He had, after all, studied philosophy under Kant at Königsberg, and through him become acquainted with the main currents of eighteenth century thought, as represented especially in Baumgarten, whose Metaphysica was a standard text in Kant's courses, and Rousseau, whom the professor greatly admired. Kant's own philosophy of 1768-71 was: "die freie Erkenntnis des Menschen, seiner Bestimmung, der Ursachen und Ziele seines Daseins, der ihm verliehenen Kräfte und der Stellung, die ihm die Natur bestimmt hatte." It is interesting, though, that whilst we hear that Lenz, who apparently was known to neglect lectures as a rule, never missed one of Kant's, he never mentions him. It is Salzmann, on the other hand, whom he addresses as his "Mentor", his "Sokrates"; it is his ideas of powerful, active love, fulfilment of human potential for happiness, and tireless social concern that fire Lenz's enthusiasm and lead him to view society as a whole, and the Société in particular, as a sphere for their practical realisation.
More than his ideas expressed on paper, however, it was Salzmann's personal influence over his younger acquaintances, at a time when such influence was badly needed, that was most widely and most lastingly felt. The malaise from which the whole Sturm-und-Drang generation suffered is sketched by Goethe in *Dichtung und Wahrheit*. He writes: "Man kennt jene Selbstquälerei, welche, da man von außen und von andern keine Not hatte, an der Tagesordnung war, und gerade die vorzüglichsten Geister beunruhigte" (X.7). The characteristics of this *mal du siècle* he lists as intense self-examination, an alliance of the strictest moral demands on oneself with the greatest carelessness and eccentricity of behaviour, the uncertainty whether the inner turbulence was to be approved or condemned. Four members at least of this generation knew and corresponded with Salzmann, not only Lenz, whom Goethe saw as a striking example of the tortured spirit, but also Wagner, Goethe himself, and Lenz's friend Ott. To all these the Actuary was, as it were, a physician to their souls, exorcising the daemon of Werther and directing their activities to useful goals. Lenz actually calls his mentor "mein sanfter freundlicher Arzt" (Br.I.30), for it was Salzmann who helped him to overcome the anguish he felt over his affair with Friederike Brion, and encouraged him, successfully, to return seriously to his studies. We have seen how impressed Goethe was by Salzmann's advocation of useful activity. We get a glimpse of the sort of thing that Goethe might have heard the Actuary say, from a passage in the essay on "Gemüthsbewegungen, Neigungen und
Leidenschaften", which shows his attitude towards mis-directed emotional energies:

Es ist unläugbar, daß starke und heftige Empfindungen, sie mögen nun wahr oder falsch seyn, auch starke und heftige Handlungen verursachen. Es handelt also ein von Leidenschaften bezwungener Mensch öfters mit vieler Energie, seine Absichten breiten sich weit aus, und seine Handlungen haben mächtige Folgen. Allein was ist Energie in unsern Kräften, wenn sie nicht alle in gleichem Grade gestimmt sind, wann wahre und richtige Vernunft den geringsten Antheil daran hat; was helfen Absichten, wann wir uns ein falsches Ziel vorstecken, und was heißen große und mächtige Folgen, wann sie sich nicht auf die Vermehrung der Summe, der allgemeinen Vollkommenheit und Glückseligkeit beziehen?" (p. 114)

The correct balance of one's powers under the rule of reason—not the unbridled Sturm und Drang of the emotions—Salzmann sees as the only condition for active, altruistic endeavour. He describes such love in action in a passage strikingly prophetic not only of Goethe's Götz but also of Lenz's appreciation of that hero expressed in his paper "Über Götz von Berlichingen". It is worthwhile quoting the passage in full, since its main images of love as a young man, handsome and powerful, a support to the weak and a terror to the evil, and as the sun, warming and animating, are echoed by Lenz: "Und so hätten wir denn die Liebe zu einem erhabenen Jüngling ausgebildet, welcher einen schönen, geübten und zur Empfindung fertigen Geist in einem wohlgebauten und geschickten Körper trägt, und, durch den Ruf seiner mit Verstand geleiteten Empfindsamkeit und unaufhaltsamen Stärke des Muthes, zur erwärmenden und belebenden Sonne für seine Freunde, seine Mitbürger, seine Landsleute und die ganze Menschheit, zur Stütze der Schwachen, zum Trost der Elenden und Unglücklichen, zum
Schrecken der Bosheit und zum geschäftigen Werkzeug der göttlichen Liebe und Gnade geworden ist" (pp. 43-4). Lenz, fired by the example Goethe has created of such genuinely altruistic and fulfilling action, will write in 1774:

> Sehen Sie da ist der ganze Mann, immer weg geschäftig, tätig, wärmend und wohltuend wie die Sonne, aber auch so verzehrendes Feuer, wenn man ihm zu nahe kommt—und am Ende seines Lebens geht er unter wie die Sonne, vergnügt, bessere Gegenden zu schauen, wo mehr Freiheit ist, als er hier sich und den Seinigen verschaffen konnte, und läßt noch Licht und Glanz hinter sich. Wer so gelebt hat, wahrlich, der hat seine Bestimmung erfüllt, Gott du weißt es wie weit, wie sehr, er weiß nur soviel davon als genug ist ihn glücklich zu machen. Denn was in der Welt kann wohl über das Bewußtsein gehen, viel Freud angerichtet zu haben (I. 381).

Both Goethe and Lenz seek that altruistic way of utilising their energies that was closed to Werther: Goethe by involvement in political and industrial life, Lenz bydevoting himself, through his writing, to the moral and spiritual improvement of society. Both owe much to Salzmann for the re-orientation of their attentions, in Goethe's case away from the introspective religiosity of the particular Pietists he had met in Strassburg—surely an unwholesome influence on a generation already inclined, as Goethe told us in Dichtung und Wahrheit, to "Selbsttheobachtung" and the resulting "undermining" of one's inner life—and in Lenz's case away from the sole preoccupation with his own unhappiness. He repeatedly confesses such unhappiness, but we can be sure, as sure as Lenz and all who knew Salzmann, what the Actuary's answer would have been. Salzmann, as a true child of his century, prescribes discipline, order, a harnessing and directing of human
energies, an imposition on the self of rules and boundaries as the precondition for real growth and development. At first Lenz responds somewhat petulantly to such a course of treatment: "Wie, mein liebenswürdiger Führer, ich sollte wie ein ungezähmtes Ross allen Zaum und Zügel abstreifen, den man mir überwirft? Wofür halten Sie mich? Ach jetzt bekomm' ich einen ganz andern Zuchtmeister. Entfernung, Einsamkeit, Noth und Kummer, werden mir Moralen geben, die weit bitterer an Geschmack seyn werden, als die Ihrigen, mein sanfter freundlicher Arzt" (Br. I. 30). But already in September, he can write: "Ihre weisen Rathschläge über einen gewissen Artikel meines Herzens, fang ich an mit Ernst in Ausübung zu setzen" (Br. I. 39). Salzmann suggests useful activity to Lenz in the form of working for a Law degree. The latter, knowing that he did not have the disposition to immerse himself in a profession which would not allow him to speak directly to his fellow-men, confesses: "In der Jurisprudenz habe ich nur noch eine kleine Sayte in meiner Seele aufgezogen, und die gibt einen verhekert leisen Thon" (Br. I. 39). He responds rather to the message of Salzmann's theoretical essays and to the idea of working to influence society. Such activity is the way out of depression and into a sense of personal fulfilment, just as, according to his essay "Über die Natur unsers Geistes", it is the way out of determinism into freedom. We should not, therefore, see activity in the social and moral spheres as a sign in Lenz of compulsive insecurity, but as a valid way of overcoming destructive tendencies in the emo-
tions. Lenz knows that he needs such a way, and feels that it is right for social, moral, theological and philosophical reasons. His optimistic resolutions, and the development of his theory of action, both encouraged by his mentor, do give him, accordingly, a vitality that will impress others. Kayser, writing to Röderer in 1776 after receiving a copy of certain of Lenz's poems, exclaims: "O Lenz! Lenz! Lenz! Lenz! könnt' ich dich durch die Winde herreißen lassen, wenn mir so oft Kraft und Muth und Theilnehmung fehlt!" And three days before, he had written to the same Röderer of Lenz: "Dank ihm für alles, was er an uns, an mir! thut. Ich bin mein lebelang an wenig Menschen auf diese Art gehetzt gewesen, als ich schon unsichtbar an Lenzen." They do not, however, drive away the symptoms of his malaise; these remain alongside his practical aspirations and in perpetual tension with them. It is no doubt for this reason that not only Lenz himself, but others also found Salzmann's friendship and support of lasting value. Ott, writing to Salzmann in 1780 from Vienna, and complaining of his lonely lot, says: "Sie haben recht, es liegt Faulheit in dem Wimmern, Abscheu für Anstrengung in diesem Kleinmuth. Ich will mich bestreben die Wiener zu gewinnen, die ich nicht liebe, will herzlich über die Abwesenheit aller meiner Freunde weinen und doch Mann bleiben." The passage speaks eloquently of Salzmann's influence over his younger friends, and his approbation of strength and effort. People did not find in Salzmann a sop to their feelings, but an earnest stimulus to overcome them
and bend them to useful goals. Similarly, Wagner writes to Salzmann three years after this: "ich will Ihre Lehre beherzigen: mich herabzustimmen." Salzmann's writings preach strength and striving; his personal advice, though, to those who surrender too freely to striving and allow it to become passion, is moderation.

Of all the Sturm und Drang generation, Jung-Stilling seems least affected by the Actuary. He speaks of him in a kindly enough way, but whether it was because the malaise of the time had not succeeded in disrupting the security of his Christian faith, or whether he could not respond to Salzmann on account of the latter's religious scepticism, he adds to the vague deference of his literary portrait of the Actuary: "Sein Platz war der oberste, und wäre es auch hinter der Thür gewesen," merely a passing acknowledgement of his supportive role. The reference comes in a letter to Lersé of 6th March 1780, in which he reviews the fortunes of his former friends from the Tischgesellschaft: "Ein Kleeblatt vom Lauth'ischen ehemals merkwürdigen Tisch ist noch Übrig: Goethe, Du und ich. Die andern alle sind entweder--Werkeltagsmenschen oder ihr Feuer ist schon verraucht. Salzmann--gehört nicht in diese Reihe, er war ruhiger Beobachter und Freund, in dessen Schoß wir spielten."

It was those who needed Salzmann and became personally acquainted with him, that were the ones most affected by him. In Lenz's case, as we have indicated, Salzmann's influence was decisive. He was a mentor both on a personal and on an intellectual level.
Not only did he provide stability and common sense at a time of great instability, but it was also out of Salzmann's philosophy, in the context of the Société, that Lenz's philosophy of activism arose. Unlike Salzmann, though, Lenz was no real philosopher, as he freely admitted, and feeling, as the Lutheran pastor's son that he was, that commitment to action comes only through religious renewal, he developed a theology of action which it will be our task in the following chapter to analyse.
CHAPTER THREE

The Theological Case for Lenz's Concept of Action

Lenz had already studied theology at Königsberg for almost three years, and was on the point of taking his final examinations, when he suddenly packed his bags and left the town in company with the Barons von Kleist. Exactly why their company and their service seemed more important to him than completing a degree, he never mentions. Whilst we find him, one year later in Strassburg, tackling the required reading for Jurisprudence instead of completing the theology degree there, he is unenthusiastic about the change, as he writes to Salzmann: "Jurist muß ich doch werden, wenn mir anders die Theologie nicht verspricht mich zum Pabst von Rom zu machen" (Letter 14). In his next letter he speaks of his "zur andern Natur gewordenes Lieblingsstudium" (Letter 15), by which, as we are told in a letter of a few weeks later, Lenz means Christian theology: "Ich bin also jetzt ein guter evangelischer Christ, obleich ich kein orthodoxer bin. Kann ich in meiner Überzeugung weiter kommen, so will ich dem Gott dafür danken, der es weiß, daß dieses das Lieblingsstudium meiner Seele ist und ewig bleiben wird" (Letter 27). He goes on however: "Doch hoffe ich, niemals Prediger zu werden." Evidently the subject itself was what attracted him, not the profession, and this probably not for the reason given in a letter to his father: that he found difficulty in the pulpit projecting his voice--
since to Salzmann he describes his one sermon delivered at Sesenheim rather as "ein Impromptu, das gut genug ausfiel" (Letter 16). Rather, it is as an informed writer that he feels himself best equipped to speak to the world; not as a qualified professional, but as a spokesman for the laity, for as such he can both speak to the general public and address criticism to "die Herren Theologen". Eventually he did again matriculate in theology, this time at Strassburg university, 1. no doubt, as Rosanow suggests, to allay his father's, and perhaps Salzmann's, Röderer's and Pfenninger's concerns regarding his career, but it is unlikely that, if he had not been called to Weimar, he would have entered the Church. After his dismissal from Weimar his various plans for a career included writing and educating, but never preaching.

There is no lack of documentation to support Lenz's profession that theology was his favourite study. Besides his creative writing: his plays, poems, translations of Plautus and Shakespeare, and besides his literary criticism, which took the form of several reviews in literary periodicals, as well as papers delivered to the Société, he maintained a consistent output of theological treatises from the private discussions with Salzmann in 1772 to the publication of Meynungen in 1775. Salzmann himself had, in "Über die Liebe", challenged theologians to make a better case for the value of active love; such a challenge could not fail to arouse Lenz, the "candidate in theology", and the theological works delivered to the Société
should be seen as a reply to this challenge. 1773 was probably the year in which theology preoccupied him most, and no doubt most of the essays date from then or arose out of the ideas that crystallised in that year. Daunicht suggests that a trace of this preoccupation with theology is perhaps felt in Lenz's growing friendship with Goethe: "Anregungen gingen genügend von beiden Partnern aus, wofür vielleicht die theologischen Aufsätze Goethes den Beweis liefern können." This scholar also identifies two anonymous articles in the Frankfurter Gelehrte Anzeigen of 1773 as being from Lenz's pen, since they clearly share the same characteristic style of his theological papers. Of the first article: "An einen unsrer Mitarbeiter" and "Antwort" of 11th June, Daunicht notes: "die große Rolle, die dazu die religiöse Stellungnahme zu spielen hat, der Hinweis auf Paul, den der Verfasser gibt: das alles weist auf Lenz. Er mühte sich derzeit noch, religiöse Gedankengänge in dieser Weise auf das Leben zu übertragen" (p.33). Of the second article: "Von der Orthodoxie" of 16th July, he writes: "Man vergleiche nur die Aufsätze, die Lenz für die Straßburger 'Sozietät' im Jahre 1773 schrieb, wie lebhaft, wie sensibel, vorführend und doch rednerisch dort sein Stil ist. Die religiöse Ansicht entspricht ebenfalls ganz und gar der Lenzens" (p.34). Other articles which Daunicht attributes to Lenz, such as the review of Herder's Älteste Urkunde des Men- geschlechts on 23rd August 1774, would testify to the continuing productivity of his "Lieblingsstudium". There are probably many more contributions by Lenz, Daunicht feels, hidden among the many
anonymous articles of this journal, and he concludes: "Vor allem die theologischen Kritiken sind der Beachtung wert" (p. 46).

It hardly comes as a surprise, therefore, to hear Lenz complaining in 1775 about the Société's ban on theological papers. His highly ironic question: "was hat der liebe Gott mit unserer Sozietät zu tun?" (I.474) underlines his conviction of the importance of the link between religion and other literary activities. From October 1772 on, when he opposed his key idea of "Schönheit" to Salzmann's notion of "Liebe", Lenz repeatedly sought to harmonise the aesthetic concern in his writing with his theological-philosophical convictions. In the "Versuch" he had proposed that the characteristic of a truly moral mind be "Eine gewisse Harmonie, welche eigentlich den wahren Begriff des höchsten Schönen gibt", and he goes on: "Sehen Sie nun, daß die Linien des wahren Schönen und des wahren Guten im strengsten Verstande, in einen Punkt zusammen laufen?" (I.489) The missing theological essay: "Vom Baum des Erkenntnisses" was apparently concerned "mit der objektiven und subjektiven Schönheit" (I.501), an idea which is briefly mentioned at the end of the first "Supplement" and once in "Stimmen des Laien", as "die Gesetze der höchsten objektiven Schönheit, oder vielmehr der von Gott geordneten Natur--die in Christo Jesu realisiert wurden" (I.505), and as the imperative: "nur das Schöne außer uns bis zu Gott hinaus aufzusuchen" (I.547, 526). Two other important statements reveal how closely linked Lenz felt his literary work and his religious convictions to be. For his theological magnum opus
he makes the impressive claim: "Die Meynungen eines Layen sind der Grundstein meiner ganzen Poesie, aller meiner Wahrheit, all meines Gefühls", and in a letter to Lavater of 1780 he wistfully exclaims: "Wie nah grenzen doch oft Geschmack und Religion aneinander, wie nah und innig sind sie miteinander verbunden, wie weisen die Fehler gegen den ersten so sicher auf Fehler gegen die letztere" (Br.II.180).

We would do well, therefore, to take the theological writings as an important statement of Lenz's beliefs, not looking at them merely from the point of view of their origin, as Rudolf does when he points out Lenz's indebtedness to Spalding and Jerusalem; nor seeing them merely as evidence that Lenz's whole life was underlain by a strong current of Pietist irrationality; as Wien would have it; but treating them rather as a theology: as a system of ideas about God, revelation, the Bible, the Mosaic Law, Christ, Grace and the teaching of the New Testament, which are understood and exeged by Lenz from the Bible in such a way as to present his own coherent picture of man, his nature and destiny. From what Lenz says above about his Meynungen, which work Girard calls a synthesis of all his theological views, we can reasonably expect that the picture of man under God, presented here, will be reflected somehow in his dramas and literary-critical writings; it will be our task in the succeeding chapters to ascertain how far this is so. Since an attempt has already been made to systematise and put into chronological order
the ideas presented in the theological essays, namely in Wien's study: "Lenzens Sturm- und Drangdramen innerhalb seiner religiösen Entwicklung", it will first be necessary to point out the main defects of his approach and correct errors he makes in identifying and ordering the works under study.

It was briefly announced in the Introduction above that our approach was to follow the consciously formulated ideas that run through Lenz's writings, and not insist that he can only be properly understood if we ignore these and regard the irrational impulses as the truer ones. The latter method is Wien's, and numerous studies since his adopt a similar psycho-analytical approach which, in some instances, has led to fruitful observations, but when followed exclusively distorts the general outlines of the picture we have of Lenz. Wien defines his approach thus: "Wenn wir daher...einem entwicklungsmäßigen Fortschritt innerhalb dieses seines religionstheorethischen Denkens auf die Spur kommen wollen, so werden uns das stereotype Thema und der bewusste Zweck dieser Schriften am wenigsten zu sagen haben. Vielmehr müssen wir uns an die unwillkürlichen kleinen Veränderungen halten, durch die Lenz sein Thema Schritt für Schritt ein wenig verrückte, wenn wieder einmal die vernünftige Theorie seiner subjectiven Impulsivität nicht standgehalten hatte, wir werden auf das gewissermaßen gerade nicht zum Thema Gehörige, absichtslos Mitgegebene zusehen haben, kurz: unser Interesse hat nicht das programmatisch Objektive, sondern das Programmwidrige, unbewusst Subjektive zu betreffen" (p.16). The problem, as we have said, is that any concept of "entwicklungs-
mäßiger Fortschritt" and "kleine Veränderungen" demands firstly a certainty as to the correct order of the essays between which the development is to be discerned. Since there has rather been confusion on this point, for which the source can be sought earlier than Wien's thesis, and since the confusion has not yet been adequately dispelled, it is important to re-examine what evidence there is concerning the ordering and identification of the theological works, and to make what corrections can be made. The second problem with Wien's approach is that a preoccupation with "kleine Veränderungen" leads into a study of less and less tangible characteristics, so that in the end it is not the changes of content that count but the more and more elusive changes of tone. He gives himself away when he complains that the Meynungen are written so clearly that it is hard to read between the lines: "gerade diese Vorzüge machen nun die "Meynungen" für unsern speziellen Zweck: nämlich aus etwaigen subjektiven, unmittelbar-spontanen Äußerungen zwischen den Zeilen der objektiven Darstellung die Spuren eines latent weiterwirkenden irrational-religiösen Grundverlangens herauszulesen, in ausnehmendem Maße unergiebig" (p.43). When he comes to "Stimmen des Laien" the same problem recurs, in even more acute form. The particular importance of this work lies "nicht im Was des Gesagten, sondern nur in ihren Stimmungswerten, im Wie und Warum des Vorgebrachten" (p.61). This leads him to postulate the existence of an esoteric meaning
private to the author, behind the exoteric sense intended for public consumption; but a clear differentiation of these two levels, he readily admits, would demand a great deal of the scholar, since it would require an analysis of "jede einzelne Bemerkung auf die Gefühlstöne" (p.61). It is our belief that if any reliable information can be gained from such a method it is of little help in clarifying and appreciating Lenz's specific message to the Sturm und Drang generation.

To discover the source of one of Wien's major errors, concerning the identification of the essays, we have to go back to Blei's edition of Lenz's complete works, published in 1910. There, Blei makes the quite unwarranted assumption that the untitled manuscript that begins: "Welches ist die erste von allen Lehren" (Blei IV.31), which Rosanow had referred to by Lenz's own description within the text, as "Meine Lebensregeln", is to be identified with the essay Lenz read to the Société and followed with three "Supplemente" and subsequently published in 1780 in the volume entitled Philosophische Vorlesungen für empfindsame Seelen: namely, "Vom Baum des Erkenntnisses Gutes und Bösen". But already Rosanow, who was the only Lenz scholar of this century to have seen a copy of this volume and therefore to have read the otherwise missing essay "Vom Baum des Erkenntnisses", had clearly distinguished it from the "Lebensregeln" when he wrote "Lenz berührt hier viele sittlich-theologische Fragen, ähnlich denen, die er in seiner größeren Handschrift "Meine Lebensregeln" zu lösen sich bemüht hat"
(p.476, note 143). Rosanow lists the contents of this collection of essays as: "Baum des Erkenntnisses Gutes und Bösen" (pages 1-14); "Erstes und zweites Supplement zur Abhandlung vor acht Tagen" (pages 14-28); "Drittes und letztes Supplement" (pages 29-35); appendix: "Einige Zweifel über die Erbsünde" (pages 36-50), and "Unverschämte Sachen" (pages 51-72). It is clear that the "Baum des Erkenntnisses" was a far shorter work than the "Lebensregeln", occupying the same number of pages as the first two supplements. The description that Lenz himself gives in the first supplement of his essay in no way tallies, as Titel and Haug were the first to point out, with the contents of the "Lebensregeln". Lenz writes: "Ich nannte sie Baum des Erkenntnisses Gutes und Bösen: dieser Titel mußte Sie befremden, da die Abhandlung nicht darauf antwortete und ich Sie nur mit der objektiven und subjektiven Schönheit unterhielt, nicht mit der Rechtfertigung Gottes, daß er den Baum unsers vermeinten Elendes ins Paradies gesetzt, welches eigentlich doch das Ziel war nach dem ich schoss.

Ich hab Ihnen gezeigt, daß die Konkupiszenz, das Streben nach Vereinigung, den Fall unserer ersten Eltern verursacht" (I.501). The aesthetic concern ("objektive und subjektive Schönheit"), which is reflected in Lenz's choice of opening motto for the volume of Philosophische Vorlesungen: "Allein du wirst auch die Natur/Voll sanfter Schönheit sehn--/Wohl dir, daß du geboren bist" (Ewald von Kleist), and is picked up again at the end of the first supplement, is completely absent from
the "Lebensregeln". That there is an overlapping of subject-matter otherwise between the two works need not make us doubt that they are quite independent. The "Lebensregeln" do express doubt about original sin, and do discuss "unverschämte Sachen", but, as we shall see, the same ideas recur in almost everything Lenz wrote, and it is for this reason that we are opting for a study of recurrent rather than changing ideas.

Finally, the case against identifying these two essays is clinched by the fact that the title of the one is actually referred to in the other. At one point in the "Lebensregeln" Lenz writes in parenthesis: "siehe meine Abhandlung von der Konkupiszenz und von unverschämten Sachen" (Blei IV.56). From a similar parenthesis in "Meine wahre Psychologie" it is clear that the essay on concupiscence is the same as the "Baum des Erkenntnisses": "siehe meine Abhandlung vom Baum der Erkenntnis des Guten und Bösen und der Konkupiszenz" (ibid., p.30), and from the list of contents of the Philosophische Vorlesungen, we know that the "Unverschämte Sachen" served as an appendix to the "Baum des Erkenntnisses".

This error of Blei's was unfortunately not restricted to his edition, but has been perpetuated in Wien, and, in the 1970s, in Rudolf, despite Titel and Haug's warning in their edition of 1966. It is particularly unfortunate in Wien's thesis, since it undermines much of his argument and calls into question the value of his approach. First of all, the mis-identification obliges Wien to see the work "Meine Lebensregeln" as an "Abhand-
lung", that is, as an essay designed to be read to the
Société with a degree of unity and evenness of tone as befits
such an occasion. The fact that such unity is lacking, that
"es stellt sich... seine Schrift auch noch nicht als folgerichtige
und in sich geschlossene Abhandlung dar" (p.19),
leads him to view the work as a very early one: "Die Schrift
ist spätestens 1771 verfaßt, jedenfalls noch vor dem Friederikenerlebnis
und den darauf bezüglichen Salzmannbriefen, denn
erst in diesen wird Lenz tiefer in die Welt der Leibnizischen
Philosophie eingeführt, die hier noch so eigentümlich vage und
unselbständig bleibt. Auch der noch ganz predigthafte Ton,
das ständige Argumentieren mit Bibelzitaten statt mit Vernunftgründen
weist auf die frühe Entstehungszeit hin" (p.18). It is
important for Wien to date the work very early since its contents
appear to mark, for him, the first stage of Lenz's religious
development: his alleged rejection of the inherited
Pietistic notion of rebirth, and his acceptance, instead, of
ascetic rules of life. The absence of any reference to Leibniz
and the concentration on Biblical exegesis seem to Wien to
clinch this view. And whilst he does admit the likelihood that
Lenz wrote it at intervals, and that other essays, particularly
"Über die Natur unsers Geistes", might well have been written
before the first was finished, he does view it as a work designed
to sustain an integrated argument, so that any changes of position
within the work will be seen to be developments in the logic
of the argument. He feels he has to explain the switches in
subject and purpose between its various sections as development in Lenz's thinking, and sees great significance in those changes: in the way, for example, "der Katechismus erweitert sich zum Weltbild" (p. 22). However not only are the "Lebensregeln" not the "Abhandlung vom Baum des Erkenntnisses", but they are not even an "Abhandlung", but much more likely a personal notebook, to which Lenz contributed diverse personal meditations over a period of time. The content is of a far more intimate nature than any of the essays, and it is inconceivable that Lenz, who, if Wien is to be believed, betrays his personal problems "zwischen den Zeilen", should bluntly expose all his private resolutions concerning chastity and self-discipline to the critical ear of the public, not just in the Sociétè but also to anyone who cared to buy a copy of Philosophische Vorlesungen, in which, if the "Lebensregeln" were the "Abhandlung vom Baum des Erkenntnisses", they were later to be published. The notebook appearance of the manuscript supports our conclusion: the size of writing, the intensity of the ink, change from paragraph to paragraph. Such a work we would not expect to be a carefully shaped and logically consistent piece of writing, nor to reflect the full scope of Lenz's philosophical thinking. The possibility therefore that it could just as easily have been written in 1774 as in 1771, although 1773 would be the most likely date, is confirmed by our observation that reference is made in it to the real essay "Vom Baum des Erkenntnisses"; it cannot have been both a subsequent work and a
prior one. And that it must have been written after January 1773 is proved by the hitherto overlooked fact that Lenz quotes, in the "Lebensregeln", from Goethe's Brief eines Pastors, which was published in that month. He it was, of whom Lenz writes: "Was ist von der Stelle eines sonst vortrefflichen Schriftstellers zu halten: 'Und verflucht sei der, der einen Dienst Abgötterei nennt, dessen Gegenstand Christus ist'?

The question of the dating of "Vom Baum" we cannot answer exactly, but scholars generally date the theological writings in 1772-1774. We can at least make a definite ordering of the three works under discussion. The original title of the first of the "Supplemente", a title that Wien, following Blei, seems not to have been aware of, was "Supplement zur Abhandlung vor acht Tagen". "Der Baum des Erkenntnisses", therefore, was immediately followed by the "Supplemente", not, as Wien believes, written very much earlier. The interval between them was one of only one week: the normal interval between the sessions, and hardly enough time for a major shift in Lenz's religious views to intervene. Indeed all that Lenz says in the supplements indicates that he is still in complete agreement with what he had written, or at least read, a week before. It was sometime after these two occasions that both "Meine wahre Psychologie" and "Meine Lebensregeln" (or at least that part of them in which the reference to the essay occurs) were written. We are now in a position, therefore, to correct Wien's ordering of the theological works. Whilst he begins with the "Lebensregeln" and
places "Über die Natur unsers Geistes" and "Entwurf eines Briefes", also, before the Salzmann correspondence in the autumn of 1772, followed then by Meynungen, "Versuch", "Über Götz", the "Supplemente" and finally "Stimmen des Layen", it is our belief that the correspondence with Salzmann comes first of all the theological writings that have survived, that the "Versuch" arose immediately out of this, and that the main theological works all come after that in 1773, namely: "Der Baum des Erkenntnisses", the "Supplemente", "Lebensregeln", followed later by "Über Götz", and eventually the complete Meynungen and "Stimmen", published in the Spring of 1775. This new order prevents us from agreeing with Wien's analysis of Lenz's religious development. Not that we would suggest a different line of development, but that since there was no significant interval between the theological writings, there can have been no gradual but significant change or development, such as Wien suggests, in the convictions expressed. The "irrationalism" of the phase that produced the "Lebensregeln" was not an early, immature dependence on the Pietist legalism of his home background, from which Lenz was removed by his study of Leibniz under Salzmann's guidance, and to which he would return later when his new-found philosophical optimism began to slip. Rather, all his theological preoccupations belong to the same central period of his Strassburg days, and reveal not successive convictions but different aspects of a religious view that remains in essence unchanged. If this is so, then these
consistent religious convictions provide a firm reference point for Lenz's literary works. Rather than build on the shifting sands of Wiens "kleine Veränderungen" we prefer to base our consideration of these works on the rock of "das programmatisch Objektive": the ideas to which Lenz repeatedly returns.

Approaching the theological writings in this way, we discover that one overriding concern governs Lenz's understanding of Christian doctrines. Whether he is dealing with the concept of the merits of Christ, original sin, the atonement, Law and Grace, faith, Christ's teaching in the Sermon on the Mount, the Second Coming, eternal life, or the Last Judgement, Lenz's concern is to interpret them in such a way as to give a primary role to human endeavour, to the individual's responsibility and ability to participate actively in his own salvation. He is very sensitive to any teaching that obviates human effort, and he banishes it from his system. A study of one of the more recurrent concepts: the doctrine of Christ's merit, his Verdienst, will illustrate this concern, and will show, moreover, that in this matter there is, at bottom, little change or development to be discerned from one writing to the next.

The concept of Christ's merit is in itself a complex one and has been variously interpreted down the centuries. It is not surprising if we find Lenz repeatedly puzzling over its meaning, and feeling much surer about what it does not mean, than about what it does. The concept of Verdienst attempts to formu-
late the significance of Christ's work: that is, his perfect life and his death, and its role in human salvation. Did Christ live and die for man's sake, as an example and warning? or for God's, as an appeasement of divine wrath? The modern answer is that it was both for man and for God: "Christi Leben und Sterben dient nicht nur zur Offenbarung der Liebe Gottes für die Menschen, sondern hat Wert auch für Gott selbst, als unerläßliches Mittel heiliger Versöhnung mit der Menschheit. Gott ist in Christi Werk auch sich selbst gegenüber." Whilst both of these aspects are acknowledged at one time or another by Lenz, he generally emphasises the first: that Christ's work was for man's sake. What fluctuation there is in his views is seen in the correspondence with Salzmann.

In the second letter to Salzmann in which Christ's Verdiest is discussed, Lenz announces that he will remain true to his original explanation of it, which is "daß, nach dem Ausdruck der Bibel, alle bisher begangenen Sünden der Menschen auf ihn gelegt werden, daß er sie trägt (was kann dies Anderes heissen, als daß alle üblen Folgen der Sünde auf ihn gelenkt worden? Darin bestand sein Leiden)--Wir sollen nur glauben, daß Gott uns um seinetwillen gnädig sey" (Br. I.55). Salzmann questions this proposition, prompting Lenz to reply: "Sie haben mich unrecht verstanden, wenn Sie glaubten, ich ließe Gott die üblen Folgen der Sünde auf den Mittler lenken, blos um seine strafende Gerechtigkeit zu befriedigen. Leibnitz glaubt dieses;
er sagt, es ist eine Convenienz, die ihn zwingt Gutes zu be-
lohnen und Böses zu bestrafen. Ich denke aber, es geschieht
blos um unsertwillen" (p.59). Christ's death is now not a
propitiation of God but a warning to men of the consequences
of further sinning. Yet once again Lenz's views change, and
in what seems to be an illustration of the new philosophical
bent of his Christian faith accompanying his announcement in
late October 1772: "Ich bin ein Christ geworden", he now comes
closer to agreeing with Leibniz that Christ's death was after
all for God's sake. He goes back on his view that "die Idee
eines Verdienstes, und war es auch des vollkommensten, wider-
spricht der allervollkommensten Barmherzigkeit Gottes, als wel-
che nicht braucht erst durch ein Verdienst sich die Vergebung
unserer Sünden gleichsam abfodern und abzwingen zu lassen"(p.66).

God being God and evil: being evil, any removal of sin which
did not indicate a judgement upon it involved a philosophical
contradiction, feels Lenz, and amounted to an encouragement to
evil. On the other hand: "diese übeln Folgen der Sünden einer
ganzen Welt, auf einen dritten Gegenstand lenken, das konnte
Gott, das wird der Vernunft nicht schwer zu begreifen, das war
das einzige Mittel, Sünde zu vergeben, ohne sie zu strafen"(p.66).

Evil is a real problem, and had to be dealt with in a real way,
not merely symbolically. Christ's death, therefore, was really
an atonement for sin, not merely a demonstration of the love of
God in suffering with man, nor merely a warning of the mortal
consequences of sin, although it is still not to be seen as
punishment. We might think that Lenz would now be satisfied with a doctrine that appealed to him both theologically and philosophically. He continues, on occasion, to speak of Christ as "Sühnopfer," and of his sacrificial blood in a way that recalls the orthodoxy of his Pietist upbringing: "Selbst wenn du fällst, Mensch—ist ihre (der Gottheit) hülfreiche Hand ausgestreckt, wallt ihr göttliches Blut dir zum Sühnopfer entgegen." The harmonising of new-found philosophical convictions with the beliefs he was brought up with is only apparent, however. In the long run, Lenz could not accept that Christ's merit consisted in his sacrificial, atoning death. Speaking in "Lebensregeln" of the Old Testament sacrifices, Lenz says: "Allerdings waren und können sie mit als Vorbilder des leidenden Christus und seiner empfindsamen, liebetätigen Aufopferung seiner selbst gelten, aber nicht als seiner Genugtuung, Büßung, Ausmerzung unserer Sünden durch die von Gott auf ihn geschickte Pein und Strafen. Dies ist eben der Begriff, den Jesaias widerlegt wenn er sagt, wir hielten ihn für den der von Gott gestraft, gemartert ward—aber nein, er ist freiwillig um unserer Sünde willen gestorben" (Blei IV.38). The idea that God imposed upon Christ the penalty for man's sin, so that man might thereby be acquitted of his guilt, is irreconcilable, Lenz feels, with the mercy of God. Orthodoxy has always traced this forensic aspect of Christ's death back to the sin offerings of the Old Testament, and seen in these the type of the supreme sacrifice of Christ for human sin. Lenz does not dispute that
these Mosaic sacrifices were understood, by those who practised them, as expiation of sin, but denies that God had instituted them for this purpose, or indeed for any purpose. In the introduction to *Meynungen* he expresses his doubts on this score: "Sind die Opfer göttlichen Ursprungs? Ich weiß nicht, ob darüber schon was gründliches ist gesagt worden, und doch hat diese Untersuchung den wichtigsten Einfluß in die ganze Gestalt der Religion, daher ist auch die Lehre vom Ver- dienste unsers Erlösers und Herrn noch immer in so dunklem Licht und so vielen einschläfernden und schädlichen Missdeut- ungen ausgesetzt, oder wird--gar weggeworfen!" If, Lenz argues, the Old Testament sacrifices were not intended by God to be understood as expiatory, we are under no obligation to understand Christ's *Verdienst* in the same way. Not that the very idea of blood sacrifices has to be rejected, for even if these are not effective as sin offerings, they are nonetheless a powerful picture of the serious consequences of evil: "da dieser Brauch den grösten Eindruck auf die Moralität und Gemüths- ruhe der Menschen machte; so behielt Gott selbst dieselben bey, gab ihnen göttliche Autorität" (ibid.). Christ's death, then, like the animal sacrifices, was meant as a warning to man. This view is consistently represented in Lenz, from as early as 1772, when he writes to Salzmann: "Ich denke aber, es geschieht blos um unsertwillen, weil, (wenn) auf das moralische Übel kein phy- risches Übel, als eine Strafe folgt; wir lieber Böses als Gutes thun würden" (Br.I.59), to "Lebensregeln" in 1773, when Lenz
says: "Die Opfer waren aber nicht bloße Vorbilder, sondern sie hatten auch eigentümlichen, unmittelbaren Nutzen, dem Volk ein gewisses Grausen, einen gewissen Schrecken für die Sünde beizubringen. . .Eben diesen Nutzen hat auch zufälligerweise die Aufopferung Jesu Christi" (Blei IV.38), to March 1774 when Lenz writes to Lavater: "Ich habe eine Schrift von Ihnen gelesen die den Titel führt...Keine Versöhnung geschieht ohne Blutvergießen....ich sag Ihnen nichts von den schönen Sachen die ich drin gefunden—selbst die Hauptidee die vielleicht manchen kalten Grübler erwärmen....aber mir gefällt es nicht, daß Sie unseren Gott wollen sterben lassen, weil es so seyn muß und in dem ganzen Naturreich alles Leben durch Tod eines andern erhalten werden muß.

Wie wär es, wenn wir den Tod Christi vielmehr als ein Symbol und Vorbild von den Erfolgen unserer Mor- und Immoralität ansähen" (Br.I.69-70)? Christ's Verdienst consists then, in the exemplary nature of his death, it is symbolic, not forensic, demonstrating rather than performing anything. This view Lenz shares with his close friend and fellow-theologian Röderer, who writes in a joint letter with Lenz to Lavater in June 1774: "Die Opfer waren kein Vorbild auf Christum—aber Christus war ein Gegenbild der Opfer....Das Leiden Christi ist ganz und gar symbolisch"(Br.I.76).

Why should Lenz need to interpret the doctrine of Christ's merit in this way? His further references to Verdienst illustrate the point with which we opened this discussion, namely:
that Lenz is constantly at pains to interpret Christian doctrines in such a way as to allow a decisive role to human initiative in the achievement of his own happiness. The trouble with the orthodox understanding of Christ's merit was that in describing the suffering of Christ as punishment borne to atone for the guilt of man, and borne by Christ instead of man, it not only insisted upon the fact of human depravity, about which Lenz also has serious reservations, as will be shown below, but also on the insufficiency of any human effort in the achievement of salvation. Christ alone accomplished what guilty man could not accomplish, and man's only effective participation in this work is "by faith alone". Lenz was totally indisposed to accept this view of man, and this doctrine of salvation, for it seemed neither to encourage human efforts at moral self-improvement, nor even to permit them. Instead, the doctrine of Christ's merit seemed an encouragement and excuse for doing nothing, for "Trägheit". In the "Supplemente" Lenz lists "Ergreifung des Verdienstes Christi" along with the false and ineffective responses to Christ's call to action (I.509), and in the "Lebensregeln" rejects the notion of Christ's "Verdienst: "insofern als die Ergreifung desselben in einem bloß unnötigen Vertrauen auf dieses Verdienst besteht, welches nicht allein falsch, sondern zugleich ein sehr gefährlicher Irrtum, den nur die menschliche Trägheit und Bösartigkeit erfinden konnten" (Blei IV.37). Speaking of the same doctrine in the "Versuch", Lenz says: "Dieses legen viele ihrer Faulheit zu einem
Polster unter und glauben das beste sei, nichts zu tun. Er-schröckliche Erklärung die unsere ganze Religion umwirft und der Absicht Gottes gerade entgegen läuft" (I.498-99). The doctrine is not meant to discourage human action, rather it is meant, Lenz feels, to encourage it, by liberating man from the paralysing curse of sinful past actions, freeing him for effective action in the present and future. Thus in a letter to Salzmann: "Wir sollen nur glauben, daß Gott uns um seinet-willen gnädig sey; dies soll uns also nicht mehr beunruhigen, nicht mehr zurück halten an unserer Besserung mit allen Kräften unserer Seele zu arbeiten, weil das Alte alles vorbey" (Br.I.55). Christ's merit is communicated particularly through the Eucha-rist to the one who has faith, enabling and encouraging him to achieve spiritual and moral goals: "Wenn wir diese Hülffsmittel alle, die uns die Gnade darbeut, annehmen, bon ca, es soll nicht dabey bleiben" (ibid.). These goals are subsequently listed as the love and imitation of Christ, devotion to God as the source of all truth, goodness and beauty, and doing his will, which consists in: "wie er ganz Liebe und Wohlthätigkeit gegen das menschliche Geschlecht, so kein größeres Glück kennen, als An-dere glücklich zu machen " (ibid.,p.67). The "Lebensregeln" confirm that Lenz viewed the imitation of Christ as consisting principally in altruistic service: "unser ganzes Ich dem Besten des gemeinen Wesens aufzuopfern mit der schönen gewissen, fels-senfesten Hoffnung, daß wir dabei mehr gewinnen als verlieren werden, welches der eigentliche Glaube ist" (Blei,IV.39). But
only when the curse of the past has been lifted is man free to imitate Christ in this way; Christ's death, therefore, gives man this freedom, its importance lies not in satisfaction of divine wrath against human sin, but solely, for Lenz, in removing the impediments to human moral achievement. The "Lebensregeln" summarise what we have noted about Christ's Verdienst thus far:

What concerns Lenz most of all is freedom to act in the present, rather than paying past debts. Remorse for past sin, like Cain's, paralyses present ability. It was precisely to remove the need for remorse that Christ died: "damit du nicht nöthig habest zu bereuen. . .um durch das Gefühl von der Freudigkeit und Freyheit aller Gewissensbisse sein Leben ganz auszuleben. . .nach diesen alten ewigen Gesetzen zu leben, ohne daß uns das .15. alte begangene einmal drüber einfällt." Thus the message of
Meynungen matches that of "Lebensregeln", and also of the earlier "Supplemente": "ihr habt einen Gott, der mißlungene Versuche nicht mit dem Tode bestraft, sondern mit Leben, ewigem Leben, wenn sie nur fortgesetzt werden" (I.508). Remorse: "Kopfhängen" as the Pietist practice of it was called, is unacceptable to Lenz for both theological and practical reasons; in a fragment of his play written against Wieland in the manner of Aristophanes: Die Wolken, he reserves some of his irony for one such "Kopfhänger", the Pietist woman who is overcome with remorse at having surrendered her virtue. In the context, the advice given her by Socrates/Wieland: "Die Reue ist die allerniederschlagendste Leidenschaft der menschlichen Seele, die sie aller ihrer Kräfte benimmt und zum fernern Guten untüchtig macht", is pernicious, but it is not in itself different from Lenz's theological conviction, and it is typical of Lenz's critical stance towards Pietists that he makes the penitent Pietist reject it, with the lament: "Ewig muß ich diese Sünde beweinen." To Lenz on the contrary, one of the main purposes of Christ's work was to give us: "die Freiheit vor dem Angesicht Gottes zu handeln wie wir wollen."

If the Pietist has a deficient understanding of Christ's merit, she also has a view of sin which Lenz cannot share. For if Christ died to satisfy God's need to punish sin, then sin must be seen as an offence against God: as sin, therefore, and not merely as failures with respect to oneself or to fellow-man. The doctrine of original sin is one that Lenz can no more accept
in its orthodox formulation that he can the doctrine of Verdienst, and for the same reasons. A study of references to Erbsünde will show what Lenz's interpretation is, and how, once again, it safeguards for him his desire for freedom of action.

Like that of Christ's merit, the doctrine of original sin has been variously interpreted in the Christian Church, now in terms of man's relationship to God, now in terms of the moral and psychological effects by which sin is expressed in the individual. In the Western Middle Ages, sin was regarded "mehr nach ihrer ontischen Zuständlichkeit als in der Gottesrelation", whilst in the Reformation it was seen "ganz in theozentrischer Perspektive als verkehrtes Verhältnis des Menschen zu Gott." Lenz, in conformity with Enlightenment ideas of moral perfectionism, views it in terms of its moral and psychological effects on man, but as a stage only, if a necessary one, in the moral history of man. He never denies sin altogether, but he is at pains to call it by any other name. In the correspondence with Salzmann original sin is seen as resulting from "angeborene Trägheit" or "das böse Beispiel", and as consisting in "der unrechtmäßige übelübereinstimmende Gebrauch der Fähigkeiten" (Br.I.55). In the first "Supplement" it is again "Trägheit" and also "Furchtsamkeit", leading to "Ungeduld" (I.504); in the "Stimmen" it is "Unbestimmtheit". All of these circumlocutions emphasise that Lenz saw sin as a paralysis of the individual's efforts and abilities, as he
writes, for example, in the first "Supplement": "So versteckt sich noch hinter diese Begierde nach dem Außerordentlichen unser Erbschaden, die zwei Bleigewichte der Materie die unsre emporstrebende Velleität herabziehen, Trägheit und Furchtsamkeit, die eine will nichts tun, die andere nichts hoffen" (I. 504). Such paralysis does affect man's relationship to God, as Meynungen will argue, but its seriousness lies above all in its consequences within human life. Sin is evil not because it offends against divine justice, but in so far as it has "Folgen". It is a practical and psychological rather than moral and spiritual matter.

The secularisation of this concept is shown in the way Lenz sets the question of sin's origin into a framework of natural philosophy rather than theology. The statement in "Lebensregeln" that Adam's Fall was "der notwendige Gang nach dem ewigen und einzigen Gesetz der Natur... der Anstalten Gottes" (Blei IV. 55), is elaborated most fully in Meynungen, where, in the prefatory letter, the fictitious clergyman (surely Lenz's deliberate counterpart to Goethe's "Pastor***") writes thus to his colleague:

Sie wissen z.B. wie sehr ich immer am Dogma von der Erbsünde zweifelte, und doch konnte ich nie die Sache ganz wegwerfen. Ich hab sie immer als Realität angesessen, und... gewünscht, daß ein redlicher, erfaherner scharfsinniger Mann, so weit es möglich wäre, die Natur des Menschen, die Bestimmung aller seiner Triebe und Fähigkeiten, und das Verhältnis, in dem wir mit Gott und der Natur stehen, untersuchen möchte. Dies, deucht mich, wäre der Ort, davon auszugehen wäre, um zu bestimmen, was Erbsünde ist,--der Name ist freylich
Original sin, says Lenz, is rooted in the nature and psychology of man, and has always been there. It is not a result of the Fall, but the Fall was rather an instance of it. Being built into man, sin is therefore necessary for fulfilment of human destiny. The "Laye" accordingly represents the same view; interpreting the principle of original sin as the workings of a "Weltseele" who, like the devil in the Book of Job, cooperates with God to achieve the higher purposes of God, he concludes: "Jetzt haben Sie, wann Sie wollen, Principium für die Erbsünde, wann Sie sie so nennen wollen. Ich nenne sie Natur... Die Natur hat ihre Zwecke, der wahrhaftig freye Mensch die seinigen, und Vereinigung dieser Zwecke giebt das vollkommenste Ganze" (p.177). Laying the blame for original sin on Nature is no gnostic declaration of the evilness of Nature, in Lenz's thinking. The identification of the two amounts more to an up-grading of sin, than to a down-grading of Nature. However to Lenz, Nature is inadequate on her own. She is not evil but she is limited, and man's destiny is to rise up from her to God. Since relationship to God, in whom lie the goals of perfection and happiness, is central to human destiny, sin is also seen as "Vernachlässigung des Verhältnisses, in welchem wir mit der Gottheit stehen"(p.175). But without sin, there would be
no awareness of our relationship to God, of the other-ness of God, and therefore of the growth and development that is required if we are to reach God. Sin is therefore seen as a device to give man a sense of direction in his evolution: "Die Sünde--der physisch damit verknüpfte Tod, waren also die einzigen Mittel, wodurch die Gottheit ihren ganzen Abstand von ihm, ihm zu fühlen geben konnte" (ibid.).

To summarise, then, Lenz's view of sin and its relation to human action: firstly it consists in an abandonment of effort and moral striving, whether out of indolence, timidity or the lack of a sense of destiny. Secondly, it is serious in so far as it has evil consequences, which hamper further active human development; it was to take care of these consequences that Christ came. Thirdly, the sense of moral guilt that accompanies it is a useful device to remind man how far short he is of the goal of perfection after which he is to strive. Lastly, original sin is older than the Fall, being Nature itself. In the form of concupiscence it is a force which, as we shall see below, challenges the active, ordering powers of man and keeps them in perpetual activity.

If sin, then, is neither guilt before God, nor an avoidable misfortune for man, but rather a fact, if a problematical one, of human psychology but indispensable to human moral evolution, then there is no room for the orthodox interpretation of Christ's merit as restoration of fallen Adam, nor for Christian remorse at the existence of sin. Lenz is quite sure about this point:
"Die Absicht seiner Sendung (Christi) war nicht das menschliche Elend zu verbessern und wieder herzustellen, wie es die Theologen gemeiniglich vorstellen, und das durch Adams Sündenfall zertrümmerte Haus gleichsam wieder zusammenzuflicken, das ist nicht wahr. Es ist in Gottes Regierung durch Adams Sündenfall gar kein Fehler, keine Lücke vorgegangen, die hernach wieder musste redressiert werden"(Blei IV.55).

What, then, is the meaning to Lenz of the "Fall"? On this matter he has written probably more than on any other, devoting to it not only much of "Lebensregeln" and Meynungen but also the published volume containing: "Der Baum des Erkenntnisses" with its appendices on original sin and concupiscence, and its supplements dealing with the importance of God's prohibition in the Garden of Eden. Although we do not have the key essay: "Der Baum des Erkenntnisses", we know from the context in which the reference to it in "Lebensregeln" occurs what Lenz's argument was. Elaborating on the brief statement in the earlier "Versuch" that "Gut... hieß bei den ersten Menschen, fähig zur Vollkommenheit, aber noch nicht vollkommen"(I.490), Lenz explains: "Adam und Eva waren mitnichten im Stande der Unschuld vollkommene Menschen, das ist nicht wahr, das ist ein übel schiefverstandener Ausdruck der Schrift, denn daß sie nach dem Bilde Gottes geschaffen waren, schließt gar nicht Weisheit, Heiligkeit und Gerechtigkeit in sich, sondern bedeutet nur, daß sie sich von dem Tier durch eine vorteilhaftere Bildung unterschieden, in welcher sie fähig waren, Gott in seinen Werken zu
erkennen, das ganze nach dem vollkommenen Spiel seiner harmonischen Verhältnisse einzusehen, wie Gott" (Blei IV.55). Adam and Eve were primitive and limited, not already complete and perfect; they stood little higher than animals, distinguished from them by their potential rather than by any actual superiority. If they were to rise higher, though, it must be through their own efforts, and by a stimulation of their desires without which there could be no motivation to achieve anything. The Garden of Eden provided that stimulus to human concupiscence, to the desires of the flesh, gratifying these desires and giving man a sense of pleasure in existence. Enjoyment, however, was not the whole purpose of man's existence, but rather action—he needed the challenge of the unproductive soil and the hardship of life outside the Garden, to enable him to deploy his powers and, like God, impose order on chaos. Why, though, the prohibition, and the banishment from the Garden as a punishment? Lenz answers: "Dieses in eine Strafe ihrer Lüsternheit und der draus entstehenden Wollust, die durch ein Verbot geweckt wurde, zu verwandeln war eine besondere Weisheit Gottes (siehe meine Abhandlung von der Konkupiszenz und von unverschämten Sachen) um dem Menschen dies Geschenk sich aufs innigste zu vereinigen, das nur der Segen des Ehestandes war, erwünschenswerter und angenehm er zu machen, dadurch, daß er es selten, rar und kostbar machte" (Ibid., pp.55-56). Adam's disobedience was not intrinsically evil, but it was good for him to think it was, for in addition to the reason we noted earlier in Meynungen that he thereby
gained a sober appreciation of God's superiority, which established in him "den Ton und das rechte Verhältnis," and the sense of "nicht bloß in die Breite, sondern auch in die Höhe empfinden" (p. 175), he also learnt thereby that human desire, which is the mainspring of human action, is all the stronger as it is left unsatisfied. The "Supplemente", to which Lenz directs us, develop this point and preach an asceticism which is never completely absent from any of Lenz's work.

What, though, is the meaning of Konkupiszenz, which we have translated as "human desire" and which must be ascetically resisted? As a theological term it normally refers to the sexual desire awakened in Adam after his eating of the forbidden fruit. Lenz shows at the beginning of the first "Supplement" that what he had talked of in his prior essay was this desire for sexual union: "das Streben nach Vereinigung", and in many other passages it is clear that the most pressing form of desire was, to Lenz, sexual desire. His "Lebensregeln" concentrate heavily on permissible and inadmissible conduct with respect to the other sex, and indicate that, in his view, any form of sexual satisfaction must be "nur der Segen des Ehestandes", being even in marriage more of a weakness than a strength (Blei IV.57). For in any circumstance, he feels, it is desire that is the source of strength and energy, not its gratification. The prominence of the sexual problem in Lenz may be a reason for us to conclude, with Wien, that at least the "Lebensregeln" were written: "aus der Qual seiner Pubertätssnöte heraus"; however,
Lenz does also use the term *Konkupiszenz* in a more general sense, as desire for all that brings happiness: "Genuß kann kein Vergnügen bringen, ohne zuvor begehrt zu haben. Nur der Hunger kann die Mahlzeit würzen, Köche können den Wert der Speisen nicht erhöhen sondern nur den Appetit unser Magens" (I.501). "Concupiscence", as the desire without which there cannot be the happiness of gratification, becomes, as such, a precious possession: "die herrlichste aller Gaben Gottes."

Is it therefore a sin? asks Lenz, slipping into the Pauline style that marks this supplement. He replies: "Das sei ferne! Nur ihre zu ungeduldige Befriedigung war es." Desire motivates man in his active striving for happiness, it is "die Triebfeder unserer Handlungen... der Keim unserer Tätigkeit." It cannot in itself be a sin, although its unrestrained indulgence is. A number of arguments from the field of physics are brought in, in the "Supplement", to illustrate why this should be so.

Lenz believes that man is destined for freedom of action, not merely to enjoy his freedom but to use it to perform feats of altruism in imitation of Christ. But such freedom only becomes accessible when the human psyche is under a certain tension, namely the tension between desire and resistance to desire: "nur bei dem Streit dieser beiden entgegen wirkenden Kräfte konnte sich seine Freiheit im Handeln, seine Selbstwirksamkeit, seine Velleität äußern" (I.502). Desire was first aroused by the sensual pleasures available to Adam in the Garden, but
the most effective stimulus of desire was performed by God's negative decree: "Thou shalt not eat. . ." The prohibition was the counter-force needed to set desire in motion, just as "in der ganzen Natur alle Kräfte nur entgegen wirken." He goes on: "Alle Aktion ist Reaktion, wir erfahren dies täglich, wo kein Stoß, da keine Bewegung, wo kein 'primus movens' und 'agens', da bleibt alles ruhend und leidend." God's decree was this "erste Stoß gleichsam, den Gott freien Wesen gab, die handeln sollten;" it was the 'vis centrifuga' that stimulated the 'vis centripeta' of human concupiscence. As for the threat of death that accompanied it, this was God's way of saying that satisfaction of desire will weaken it, so that eventually desire itself will die, and with it man as a free being: "ihr begehrt, wünscht, hofft nichts mehr, ihr kehrt in Staub und Verwesung zurück, ihr sterbt des Todes." If, on the other hand, its force is resisted, then it will grow "Stunde für Stunde, Tag für Tag, in Ewigkeit", becoming "dies Lebensfeuer. . .das unser Prometheus vom Himmel brachte", permitting free action and giving divine pleasure.

The moral of Genesis 3, and Lenz's ascetic advice to his hearers is: "Geistige Vergnügungen gesucht, des Fleisches Geschäfte getötet" (I.504). The same advice is repeated elsewhere: "Überhaupt ist's gut das Fleisch zu kasteien und zu kreuzigen, damit der Geist wachsen und sich bilden könne"; the imitation of Christ consists in the endeavour: "des Fleisches Geschäfte zu töten und den Geist in uns wachsen und zunehmen zu lassen", for Christ's incarnation was to show men "daß sie hauptsächlich auf
die Welt gesetzt seien, um in dem Gefäß ihres Körpers ihren unsterblichen Geist zu bilden, zu erweitern, zu erhöhen" (Blei IV.63,67,69). There must certainly be a curbing of the desires of the flesh, but beyond that, and more importantly, there needs to be an active pursuit of things of the spirit. For whilst the flesh gives a fundamental stimulus to human life, the purpose of existence is to get beyond it, beyond the raw substance of human creation, to the form imparted by spirit and by morality. So it was for Adam and mankind with him and so it is for the individual, who, like Adam, has to face his own Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil, but, unlike Adam, learn to resist the temptation to eat of the fruit of physical satisfaction, being able instead to set his desire on higher things: on moral living, on the imitation of Christ, on God himself. It is out of this conviction that Lenz wrote his private "Lebensregeln", based on the earlier essay with its supplements intended for the public. And the same conviction will later underlie Meynungen and "Stimmen". As the "Rules of Life" put it: "Was ist der Hauptgrundsatz und Regel der fortgehenden Schöpfung? Die unaufhörliche unendliche Verwandlung der Materie in Form oder die unendlich fortgehende Bildung alles Materiellen zur Form bis zum Geist hinauf, welcher die höchste Form ist."

So Christ after his Ascension was "ganz Geist, ganz Aether" (Blei IV.54,68).

At this point we may stop and wonder how the emphasis on spirit alone can be reconciled with the earlier stress laid on
the desires of the flesh, particularly as they both seem to be credited with the same function. Whereas earlier, concupiscence was "die Triebsfeder unserer Handlungen", now, Lenz says, "die tätige Kraft in uns ist unser Geist." As for human desire, the "rule of life" is now "nicht zu begehren, sondern zu lieben" (Blei IV, 62, 63). Powerful desire is not now to be met with powerful restraint but is to be transformed by the power of the spirit into the higher impulse of love. To Lenz's mind, there is nothing wrong with concupiscence, but there is nonetheless something higher, to which it must aspire. Eventually spirit, having transformed the desires of the flesh, will take over the motive force which they exerted, and so, under the developing rule of spirit, the individual will reach a higher moral plane, gaining freedom of will and action, and the ability to perform "Handlungen über das Gesetz, über die Regel des Rechts"(I.509). Concupiscence, as a source of initiative in man, has a subordinate function only. It was man's most precious possession before he developed "spirit", and since then is overruled by spirit. Since it is also shared by the beast, any return to the domination of concupiscence is a regression, undoing the progress made in development up to freedom, to creativity and to God: going counter, therefore, to human destiny.

To summarise the argument from the point of view of Lenz's concern to establish a theological justification of action: God, in order to bring Adam beyond the level of the beast, which passively enjoys and suffers in total subjection to its condition,
placed him in a garden whose sensual delights were calculated
to arouse his desire and set him going on the quest for happiness. If the quest was to be perpetuated, desire also needed
to be perpetuated, not satisfied, so the order was given:
Thou shalt not eat. Adam's disregard of this order was culpable only in its hastiness: there were other ways of encouraging human activity. But it was good for Adam to think he had done wrong, because this gave him an idea of the direction in which he ought, indeed, to develop. The banishment from the garden gave him the opportunity, and forced upon him the necessity, to become active for his own survival and betterment. Eventually, the development in his physical life led to a development of his spiritual life, but this, as we shall now see, could only be brought about by the giving of the Law.

Lenz's interest in the role of Law derives from his acquaintance with the writings of the Göttingen orientalist and theologian Johann David Michaelis, and with his own familiarity with the letters of St. Paul. It is evidenced by the considerable space he devotes to the Law in the "Supplemente" and in Meynungen. Clearly, if man is given freedom of action, the existence of divine law restricting that action needs to be accounted for. If we have "die Freiheit vor dem Angesicht Gottes zu handeln wie wir wollen," how can such apparent antinomianism be reconciled with God's giving of the Law? Lenz sees the need to answer two questions: firstly, do laws that circumscribe the sphere of human action, prohibitions therefore, undermine freedom
of action? Secondly, do prescriptive laws destroy human ini-
itiative and creativity?

We saw that the first law, the prohibition in the Garden,
functioned as a counter force to the force of human desire,
keeping it under tension and not allowing it to be killed by
immediate satisfaction. By stimulating desire: the mainspring
of action, Law also stimulated human action. But action was
still limited to the provision of man's physical needs; it ex-
pressed "Sorge für seine Erhaltung, Genuß, Tätigkeit, Ge-
schlechterneigung und innigste Vereinigung mit seinesgleichen."
Lenz goes on: "jetzt ging aber der Geist und Founder Teils
noch leer aus. . .durch wen konnte der seine Bildung erhalten?
Daher mußte Moses das Gesetz geben" (Blei IV.56). The function
of the Law was once again to limit the expression of man's phy-
sical appetites, so that room was left for spirit to develop.
For still it is solely by denial of the flesh that any progress
can be made towards freedom and God. Lenz believes that sexual
release is accompanied by a loss of spirit: "da der Same der
Menschen eigentlich das Vehikel ihrer Geister ist" (Ibid., p.33).
Moreover, satisfaction of sexual desire leads to "Erschöpfung",24
destroying the active powers in man that are the expression of
"Geist". It was to prevent such disastrous reversals of human
destiny that the Mosaic Law was given. Its purpose was primari-
ly to regulate physical life, preventing anything that might
lead to a diminution of human powers. The great legislators:
Moses, Christ, and the Apostles, were therefore "Ärzte des
menschlichen Geschlechts." Lenz cites, in support of his view, Exodus 15:26: "Denn ich bin der Herr, dein Arzt". Of the laws that regulated physical life, he says: "was ists anders als Medecin für Leib und Geist, Verhütung der Zerrüt-tung unserer Maschine" (pp. 193, 198, 200). Both prohibitive and prescriptive laws were meant, at the time, to work towards creating and preserving congenial conditions for the development of spirit, and with it, the unfolding of human potential.

Of the two types of law, though, it was the prohibitions that predominated, for these alone permitted and encouraged free action by a restraint of physical desires. Such is the argument of the second "Supplement"—one with which the Meynungen agree (pp. 190, 191):

Was der Baum des Erkenntnisses im Garten, das ist uns das Gesetz, welches verbietet, das heißt, unserer Kon-kupiszenz die gehörigen Einschränkungen zur allgemeinen Glückseligkeit gibt. Von der Art sind die zehn Gebote, sowohl die welche wir zur Norm beibehalten, als die dem jüdischen Volk insbesondere gegeben wurden, ingleichen alle bürgerlichen Gesetze die der Geist der Gesellschaft zur Beförderung ihres Wohlstandes erfunden und denen wir uns unterwerfen, so bald wir an diesem Wohlstande Teil nehmen. Die Gesetze also überhaupt sind die Ursachen aller unserer Handlungen so wie es das erste Gesetz oder Verbot Gottes im Garten von der ersten Handlung war, sie sind aber nur die gelegenheitlichen nicht die wirkenden Ursachen davon, die liegen bloß in unserer Willensfrei-heit, welche durch jene nur in Bewegung gesetzt wird. Da aber alle Gesetze eigentlich nur verneinen, Handlungen verbieten, die die allgemeine Glückseligkeit stören, so gibt's eigentlich nur zweierlei Handlungen, gesetzwidrige, die dem Verbot grad entgegenlaufen, oder ethische, die über das Gesetz erhaben, die allgemeine Glückseligkeit nicht nur nicht stören, sondern befördern und stufenweise erhöhen, diese haben eigentlich allein in den Augen Gottes einen Wert" (I. 505-6).

Law gives man a minimum standard of behaviour, which he ignores
at his peril, for to do so would bring not guilt but consequences unpleasant to him and a destruction of his happiness. Rather, man will see this minimum standard as a challenge to exceed it, and thus exercise his freedom of will and action. These ethical actions that exceed the basic requirements of the Law, which can be recognised by the feeling of happiness accompanying them, are those that Christ came to teach—they represent the "Evangelium". To regard the gospel as requiring the abolition of Law is no more justifiable in Lenz's mind than it is in St. Paul's, whose argument he now follows: "Wie hebt denn nun dies Evangelium das Gesetz auf? Das sei ferne. Ohne Gesetz wäre kein Evangelium möglich—folglich auch keine Glückseligkeit." Lenz's concept of freedom of action will never be divorced from the concept of Law, of obeying God's will, of imitating Christ. The antinomianism of some of his statements is only apparent. Whilst man is free to do what he likes in imitation of Christ, he is still bound to observe the minimum standards set down by the Law. Indeed these reveal to him what scope he has for free action: "Nur das Gesetz zeigt uns die Verhältnisse in denen wir uns befinden, und nur diese können Handlungen einen Wert und den sie begleitenden Empfindungen ein Vergnügen beiliegen" (I.507).

Far from taking away freedom of action, negative law outlines the sphere within which free action is possible. Its purpose is not to tie down a humanity that has frustrated the plan of God and cannot be relied upon to act aright; rather it
introduces the next stage in man's development up to active autonomy: "Es bildet den Menschen bis zu dem Punkte, da er zu leben anfängt—und darnach läßt es ihn laufen" (p. 192).

What, though, about prescriptive laws: those that command certain actions? As Lenz repeatedly emphasises, these are very few. He gives only one example of a law prescribed by God: the decree demanding the death of any person or beast which sheds human blood. All other laws are negative: "müßen negativ seyn, sie zeugen uns, was wir unterlassen müssen, falls wir uns nicht in Schaden und Unglück verwickeln wollen" (p. 191). When the great legislators: Moses, Christ and the Apostles appeared to give a positive law, this was "nichts als Hülse zu einem oder dem andern negativen Gesetze, daß uns die Unterlassung dieser Sünde erleichterte" (p. 192). The reason that prescriptive legislation has no place in God's economy is that it is incompatible with human freedom; if the law orders us to perform some action, we are hardly free to perform it: "Was wir zu thun haben, kann uns kein Gesetzgeber vorschreiben, oder er macht uns zu Klötzen und Blöcken, zu Maschinen und Rädern, die herumgedreht werden müssen, weil sie nicht von selber laufen können. Das mag der Fall wohl beym politischen Gesetzgeber seyn, der die Seele seiner Staatsmaschine ist, der das unbehelfsame Volk mit Gebiß und Zaum regiert wie ein Knabe den Elephanten—aber beim moralischen Gesetzgeber, der freyhandelnde selbständige Wesen bilden will, ist ers nicht und kann es nicht seyn" (p. 191). Attempts have nonetheless been made to prescribe
moral action; Lenz enumerates, in his second "Supplement", certain legalistic actions, "die weder unser noch ander Glück befördern und also lieber Untätigkeit als Handlungen heißen mögen (wie das Beten, Fasten, Almosengeben der Pharisäer)"(I.506), and sees a contemporary counterpart in "den heutigen Moralsystematikern...die uns so schön nach Zoll und Linien zu berechnen wissen, was recht gehandelt sey, so und nicht anders"(p.192). From slavery to legalism only Christ could save us, who came to heal a "bis in die Knechtschaft der Moralsysteme verirrte menschliche Geschlecht"(p.193). Just as satisfaction of desire was hostile to the development of human potential for action, so moral codes are hostile to the exercise of free action and run directly counter to the gospel of freedom introduced by Christ. How important this point was to Lenz is seen in the fact that he devotes the whole of "Stimmen des Laien" to the question of moral systems. We shall discuss this question fully when we discuss the "Stimmen". The position Lenz adopts on moral codes will then, in the next chapter, be brought into relation with his utterances concerning whether he or any other author should aim to propound a certain moral teaching in works of literature; it will be seen that the view he represents in the literary-critical essays entirely matches that expressed in his theological framework. At present, we shall note two other points, repeatedly emphasised by Lenz, concerning the relationship of freedom, action and morality.
Lenz has said that beyond the minimum standard laid down by the negative laws, there is freedom to act at will. However in his hierarchical framework some actions are loftier than others because they give proof of greater spiritual autonomy. How can the better actions be distinguished from the lesser ones, and indeed from wrong actions, against which the negative commands cannot entirely protect man? Lenz's emphatic answer is that morality is an experimental matter, discerned, as it were, by trial and error, not by the prior study of a code. For, once again, right and wrong are seen by Lenz not as absolute values by the standards of God's justice, but according to their consequences to man. Those that increase happiness are right, those that diminish it are wrong. The starting-point is once again the drive towards happiness, of which the Meynungen give a repeated reminder: "Religion soll uns glücklich machen, sonst nehmen wir sie nicht an" (p. 173), and "die Religion soll uns weder fromm noch gelehrt ganz allein machen, sondern glücklich" (p. 176). Lenz goes on: "Und soll sie das, so muß sie empfunden werden, denn Glückseligkeit besteht in Empfindung" (p. 173). With this, the theme is announced that is developed in the introduction to the Meynungen and is used as a basis for the exegetical discussion of Genesis. Feeling: Empfindung, is Lenz's equivalent to the traditional conscience. It monitors not guilt and innocence, but happiness and unhappiness. It is no transient movement of the psyche, but rather a mature conviction based on reflection: "Empfindungen sind geord-
netes in Verhältnis gebrachtes Gefühl, Gefühl das gewissen Vorstellungen untergeordnet ist, Gefühl unserer Seele" (p. 173). Feeling often needs to base itself on faith, but faith is of little use unless what is believed is also felt: "Es ist besser wenig zu glauben, aber das, was man glaubt, in seinem ganzen Umfang zu empfinden, als alles zu glauben und nichts zu empfinden" (p. 174). In the second "Supplement" Lenz has already commended Empfindung as the guide to good and bad actions; those that exceed the law "haben eigentlich allein in den Augen Gottes einen Wert und sind von ihm mit den reinsten und himmelschsten Empfindungen vergesellschaftet worden, deren Dauer wir in der Tat Seligkeit nennen mögen" (I. 506). The principle is "daß man Handlungen tue, die solche Empfindungen hervorbringen." But is such feeling an infallible guide to morality? Lenz feels that it is, even though it may be ignored: "Glaube nur nicht der du das Gesetz verachtest, du könnest jemals wahre Empfindungen der Glückseligkeit herausbringen, Dissonanz bleibt Dissonanz du magst dein Ohr noch so sehr zu überreden suchen" (I. 507). With such a guide to right and wrong both primitive man (Meynungen) and contemporary man ("Supplement") are equipped to act in such a way as to further their own development towards their destiny.

Man, using his Empfindung, judges from the consequences of his actions whether they were good ones or not. That the consequences always reflect the moral nature of the action is one of Lenz's firm convictions. It appears to him to be the overriding principle in mankind's early history: "Besonders ist es, daß in
der ganzen Haushaltung Gottes moralisches Übel, Verletzung der von Gott eingerichteten Verhältnisse immer mit dem physischen in gleichen Schritten geht" (p.178). Already in Die Landplagen he has portrayed natural disasters as God's judgement on godless men, just as Pastor Lenz had delivered and published, several years earlier, a sermon insisting that the fire that devastated the Livonian village of Wendeln was divine punishment for its inhabitants' evil ways. To Salzmann Lenz had written: "Christlich-physisches Übel (physical evil permitted by God as a warning consequence of wrong-doing) muß immer mehr drin abnehmen, wenn das Moralische darin abnimmt" (Br.I.57). Such a firm belief in the correlation between human moral life and human fate will make it impossible for Lenz not to conclude personal guilt from the eventual disappointment of his ambitions, which he experienced at Weimar, and later in Livonia, when every sphere of fruitful activity seemed closed to him. At this stage, however, at which all his best work is being accomplished, the belief appears to hold no problems. All that he reads in the history of the patriarchs shows him: "daß sich die Menschen ihre Ideen vom Recht und Unrecht hierinnen selber machten—and selber machen müssen, die Vorsicht winkte ihnen nur durch die physischen Erfolge ihrer Handlungen ein Gesetz für derselben zu" (p.193). So it was with Cain, whose anguish following the murder of Abel interpreted to him clearly the meaning of the physical punishment laid on him: "Welche Empfindung von seinem Unrecht muste diese physische Strafe in ihm
zurück lassen, zugleich welche Empfindung des Verhältnisses, das er verletzt hatte" (p.179). Like all men, Cain had to abstract his own moral ideas from events; this was "die beständige Oekonomie Gottes im alten und neuen Testamente...Die Gott- heit hat durchaus nie unterrichtende Wunder thun, nie vom Him- mel herab reden wollen" (p.181).

The thrust of this emphasis on morality as an empirical matter is that once again it removes restrictions on human freedom of action, for initially it does not matter how a man acts. The important thing is that he should act, because in so doing he will learn to avoid those actions that he discovers to be wrong, and develop a higher moral sense by process of elimination. If this is the way God intended man to develop, then clearly the Fall can no longer be seen as a reversal but, as Lenz sees it, as the first step of discovery; so with every subsequent episode in Biblical history. It was only when man had learnt to judge for himself that the second stage in God's history of salvation could begin: the coming of Christ and the initiation of the Kingdom of God: "Sehen Sie aber jetzt die Weisheit Gottes nicht allein gerechtfertigt (das Wort ist arm) sondern in ihrer vollen Herrlichkeit—daß er Christum den Boten aller Freude in und außer unsrer Welt—erst da in die Welt schickte, als der Geist des Menschengeschlechts sich durch mannigfaltige lange Erfahrungen ein allgemeines Gesetz—eine so ziemliche Idee von den Pflichten jedes Individui zur Glückselig- keit des Ganzen, gebildet hatte" (I.508). Still the principle
is that morality is only discovered in action: "Wer den Willen tut meines Vaters im Himmel, der wird sehen, ob meine Lehre von Gott sei," but the main emphasis is not now on the discovery of morality but on living out an intense life of action in imitation of Christ; a switch is made from negative to positive: "von der negativen Glückseligkeit des Gesetzes zur positiven Glückseligkeit des Evangeliums" (I.508).

With this we reach the "Stimmen des Layen", which mark the climax of Lenz's appeal for active commitment to the Christian faith. It is here that he seeks to counter the religious indifference in his fellow Society members, of which he complained to Goethe in the letter of 1775 that we quoted earlier. He attacks their "Unglauben", if somewhat self-consciously (p.208), with a strong plea for faith and for commitment to the truth of the Bible, and sets about the task: "den Leuten Standpunkt ihrer Religion einzustecken", by reminding them of the main points of Christianity. He discusses the importance of revelation and the mode of Biblical revelation, arguing that God reveals most to those who are most subject to his will; he describes Christ's incarnation as the ultimate example of obedience to God, showing that the greater the submission, the greater the reward of exaltation, and urges his hearers not to be put off by the existence of evil, which, though it diminishes man's happiness here and now, and is unavoidable, does not destroy but merely holds back for a while the current of human happiness. Lastly Lenz defends the authority of the evangelists and apostles, and the divine
inspiration and character of the Bible. Great stress is laid, therefore, on "Dependenz von Gott" (p. 204), and it might seem that under grace man is less free to live out an intense personal life than under law. However it is not dependence on God that destroys human freedom, but slavery to moral systems, as the second "Stimme" argues.

The question Lenz addresses here is: "Kam Christus auf die Welt, uns ein moralisch System zu lehren, das heißt, uns in seiner Lehre ein moralisches Ideal eines vollkommenen guten verständigen, artigen--kurz--eines Extramenschen zu geben? (p. 217)"
The importance of this question derives from the urgent need for some moral guide to light our way through the thicket of the human psyche, through: "eine unendliche Menge von Begierden, Bedürfnissen, Charakteren, Sentiments, Entschlüssen, Nichthandlungen." Lenz adds: "Mir schwindelts, wenn ich dran denke, daß Philosophen waren, die moralische Systeme fürs Ganze erfinden wollten." Taking as his text Christ's saying from the Sermon on the Mount: "Ihr müßt nicht glauben, ich sey kommen, euer Gesetz, eure Propheten aufzulösen, sondern zu erfüllen" (p. 219), he suggests that Christ is here opposing a straight performance of the law not to an abolition of the law but to its transformation into a moral system; Christ came: "nicht...euch euer Moralsystem heraus zu drechseln, sondern zu erfüllen, zu thun und wer's Herz dazu hat, der thue mir nach." The law, that is: right action, is not meant to be taught but to be done, again it is not a prescriptive system but an obligation to act. Lenz
gives four reasons why he disapproves of moral systems. Firstly, to someone who desires to become virtuous, a moral system tends more to be a discouragement than a spur. It paralyses him with its daunting demands instead of stimulating him to do his best. Secondly it tends to turn those who do aspire to practise it into hypocrites. Thirdly, moral ideals are designed to make it easier for man to live morally, they allow man to rest in the limited confines of the system; but, Lenz asks, "sollen wir denn ruhen, meine Herren?—Verflucht sey die Ruhe und auf ewig ein Inventarium der tauben Materie, aber wir, die wir Geist in Adern fühlen, ruhen nur dann, wann wir zu noch höherm Schwunge neue Kräfte sammeln, wenn wir freiwillig zu sinken scheinen, um weit über den Gesichtskreis der gewöhnlichen Sterblichen empor zu steigen" (p. 225). Lastly, they paralyse action by distracting man from performance to evaluation. "Werden sie uns," Lenz asks, "nicht eben dadurch, daß sie uns bey der Qualität unserer Handlungen zu lang aufhalten, an der Quantität, an der größern Anzahl unserer guten Handlungen Schaden thun?" Spontaneous action is alone effective; moral evaluation before the event not only hinders action, but also brings a self-consciousness that soon degenerates into complacency, egotism and pride.

The conclusion reached, then, in the second "Stimme" is that Christ cannot have come to give a complete "inventory" of moral actions to rival that of the Pharisees, nor to set an ideal example of right action. For no moral system can take account of the perpetual change and development which is man's
destiny. Certainly Christ made moral demands, but to Lenz the question is: "ob sie zusammen gestellt ein moralisch System heraus bringen, oder ob sie nur mit Fleiß so nachlässig hingeworfen scheinen, um dem Menschenverstande einen Wink zu geben, es sey für freye Geister, die in ihrer Wirksamkeit immer fortschreiten und fortschreiten sollen, kein allgemeines Moralsystem möglich, oder wenigstens müsse es so weit und groß seyn, daß alle möglichen Modifikationen, wenn sie nur nach der Analogie der angegebenen Grundlinien gezogen sind, hinein passen, um das Gemälde abwechselnd und dadurch desto anmuthiger und vollkommener zu machen? (p. 227)" Man needs not a complete moral code to follow, but merely hints to encourage him to use the resources he already has to act according to principles he knows by instinct. For, as the third "Stimme" argues, Nature has already given man a moral system, adequate for his self-improvement, and no other system is necessary: "warum wollen wir aus Liebe zum Sonderbaren, uns ein ander System erklägen, als uns aus allen Zeiten und Orten, aus der ganzen Natur zuwinkt. Jeder Mensch bringt sein Maß von Begierden und Kräften, seine Harmonie und Übereinstimmung von Begierden und Kräften, sein Moralsystem mit sich auf die Welt, und nach Maßgabe des Gebrauchs, den er von denselben macht, erhöhet und verbessert sich dasselbe unaufhörlich. Wir werden alle gut geboren, und das bessere und schlimmere unserer Handlungen und unseres Zustandes hängt lediglich von uns selber ab" (pp. 229-30). A Rousseauistic conclusion, and indeed Lenz now reminds his hearers of the "simplicity" of
natural morality taught by that "obstinate Diogenes of Geneva" (p. 231).

Yet how is it that if true morality is so "natural", it should be so widely misunderstood and so widely neglected? Why should Rousseau's call for a return to the simplicity of nature have become, in a phrase that again parodies St. Paul: "den Deutschen ein Ärgernis und den Franzosen eine Thorheit?"

Lenz's answer contains, despite his great admiration for Rousseau, once again a disagreement with him. Just as, in the "Versuch", Rousseau is chided for advocating Ruhe because it was not conducive to active human development, so now his advocacy of Einfalt is shown to be wanting in that it fails to take the goal of human existence into account, which is not adequately revealed in Nature alone. What is needed is divine revelation, which alone can show man what the law of Nature is, namely: "eine Fortsetzung der Schöpfung, Regeln, nach welchen Gott uns geschaffen, weiter ausgedehnt, nach welchen wir uns jetzt selber fortschaffen und unsre Existenz erhöhen können" (p. 232). Just as the Old Testament, which Lenz calls not revelation but the history of revelations, is a history of the measures God took to teach and encourage man to press on with his moral self-development, so Christ's teaching was meant to give a further revelation of the direction in which man was to develop, and to spur him on beyond the particular stage already reached, teaching him that any "rest" on the way was incompatible with his destiny. Revelation does not replace Nature, but
orientates it. It gives man a sense of direction and the motivation to make progress. Revelation is, then, a new way of thinking, it is, in Lenz's terminology, μετάνοια.

With the frequently repeated motto: μετανοεῖτε Lenz encapsulates all that he believes about basic human goodness, and man's lofty destiny. Already in the second "Supplement" he has explained his interpretation and translation of Christ's call to repentance. He wrote there: "Μετανοεῖτε—nicht tut Buße (das Wort hat ein böser Dämon in unser deutsches Wörterbuch gebracht) sondern verändert euren Sinn, erhebt ihn" (I.508). Basing himself correctly on the root meaning of the compound Greek word, he repeats his definition in the "Stimmen", stressing the force of the prefix: "μεταμετανοεῖτε überweg über alle eure vorigen Meinungen von Vollkommenheit und Glückseligkeit, überweg über euer non plus ultra, über euer Ideal selbst, und unaufhörlich überweg, so lang ihr noch weiter könnt. Das Heraufsehen ist nicht gefährlich, nur das Herunter sehen ists" (p.227). Repentance does not mean, he says, dwelling penitently on past sin, like the Pietist woman of Die Wolken, for, thanks to God "der mißlungene Versuche nicht mit dem Tode bestraf, sondern mit Leben, ewigem Leben, wenn sie nur fortgesetzt werden," the past no longer matters, but only the new possibilities held by the future. What is vital is to know, by revelation, that man's destiny is to climb ever higher and that he is capable in himself of doing so. If Lenz needs to stress
this message so earnestly it is because he feels that man has contented himself instead with mediocrity. He asks, using again his own circumlocution for repentance: "Ob Christus das vergeblich gesagt: Ich bin gekommen, die Sünder zur Erhebung ihrer Seele zu Gott zu rufen, nicht die Gerechten, die nemlich alles schon sind oder zu seyn glaubten, was sie seyn sollen? (p.227)" For whilst Christ's revelation does no more than clarify to our minds what is already present in our nature, nature is powerless to proceed with its destiny unless this is perceived and deliberately sought by the human mind with its freedom to will its own development or to choose to neglect it. Alongside Lenz's emphasis on Nature is his urgent appeal to the responsible mind of man, which must itself allow and encourage Nature to operate in its destined way. If the individual fails to rise to any higher stature, it is because his mind cannot first conceive of that higher level to which it must strive. The effectiveness of our actions and scale of our achievement are limited only by our ability to conceive of them: "Grad in der schlechten Meynung, die wir von uns haben, liegt die Ursach, daß wir's nicht können"(p.231). The keynote on which this essay, then, closes is that of faith: faith in oneself, faith in one's potential, faith in one's lofty destiny. It is faith that enables one to move mountains, not by means of a miracle but by so furthering one's ability to act that eventually even the greatest actions are within one's competence. If original sin consists in a lack of a sense of destiny, undermining any ability
for virtuous action, faith is belief in human destiny, empowering the individual: "Glaube beschwingt, befacht, entzündt unsere Kräfte alle... ist thun" (p. 239). So faith, like every other article of Lenz's religion, comes down to the principle of action for the purpose of human moral development. The "Lebensregeln" fully share this conviction, defining faith as something "die sich in Taten äußert," and going on: "darin besteht die Vortrefflichkeit aller Tugend und tugendhaften Handlungen, daß sie sich auf Glauben gründen, das eben gibt unserem Geist die Stärke zu wachsen und sich zu bilden bis in Ewigkeit, daß wir noch nicht alles wissen was wir sein werden, damit wir uns desto eifriger anstrengen mehr zu werden als wir sind. Und wer's nicht glauben will, daß Jesus auferstanden, der laß es bleiben, es ist nicht nötig daß er's glaubt, wer ein Vieh bleiben will, esto" (Blei IV.64).

Returning to the beast, to Milton's "Chaos and old night", to determinism, or advancing to divine heights of freedom and moral stature: these are the two options open to man. If he chooses the second he must pit against the force of inertia, of concupiscence with its urgent demands for satisfaction, of subhuman nature, of the "Weltseele", the force of his free human powers, aided by God, exercised by action, stimulated by ascetic restraint of concupiscence, developed by "Geist", which is "der prometheische Funke", "der Hauch von Gott", and orientated towards altruistic service: "tun, handeln, tätig sein mit Geist und Leib wo es am meisten nützlich sein, Heil bringen kann zur
Ehre Gottes an den Menschen und so von Form zu Form übergehen ins ewige Leben" (Ibid., pp. 61-2). Even Lenz's eschatology is transformed into a doctrine of further striving: the blessed as they continue on through the mansions of God, the damned as they have to return by transmigration of their soul to the imprisonment of another body beyond which they again have an opportunity to strive. The Last Judgement occurs therefore at every man's death, God judging him "nach seiner Absicht und nach der Anstrengung seiner Kräfte, nicht nach seinem Schicksal" (Ibid., p. 43), for, as the "Stimmen" re-emphasise: "Grad die Mühe die Anstrengung unserer Kraft ist, was uns die Religion oder die Kunst glücklich zu seyn, verstehen lehrt" (p. 235).

We may remind ourselves at this point of one point of disagreement between Lenz and Salzmann. The latter questions Lenz's firm conviction, expressed in one letter of October 1772, that God made good more difficult for man to perform than evil in order to keep him active. Salzmann, more closely dependent on Leibnizian philosophy than Lenz, believes that the force of inertia: the cause of evil, is weaker than the force of active good, which can be relied upon to maintain the upper hand. Lenz insists, however, that there is only one force: the "vis activa", the "vis inertiae" being no actual force but neglect or resolution of the force of action. Since the choice is between activity and inertia, naturally, Lenz feels, it will be activity that will demand effort and hence be more difficult to perform
than non-activity. "welche in Wirksamkeit und Thätigkeit zu setzen, allemal in unserm Belieben steht oder nicht" (Br.I.61). To Salzmann, the dynamic nature of human life is a given quantity: life is like that; to Lenz it is a moral obligation and a potential only. Whereas Salzmann stresses action as a means of conscious participation in a natural process, to Lenz the process itself cannot at all operate unless man is actively willing it. Life is like that only if we make it so, only if we force ourselves to expend effort, for "Positio ist allemal schwerer als negatio; wirken schwerer als ruhen, thun schwerer als nicht thun." An earlier letter to Salzmann reveals that Lenz was dissatisfied with the insufficient room that Leibniz had left to human freedom and individuality. To describe God's continuing creation as a current that swept all along in its irresistible course left little for man to do individually towards his development (Br.I.51-52). Lenz suggests instead that God has merely implanted natural powers and abilities in man, which it is his responsibility then to use and develop. This not only safeguards human autonomy but absolves God, Lenz feels, of any responsibility for the existence of evil. If human moral achievement is now man's work, so is human evil. God gives us our "Zustand" (I.495), and our natural equipment for developing spirit and achieving moral freedom, it is then up to man to use the powers he is equipped with, improve his condition, and further his own creation. For whilst the process of action is a natural one, it is not one that can be left to
itself, not something given in a pre-determined world order. Lenz asks not for insight into the dynamic nature of the world, but obedience to a moral obligation.

The reward for performance of this obligation of action is not only the happiness that comes with developing spirit, and moral stature, but it is also freedom. Lenz's desire for freedom and belief in it, implicit already in his discussions with Salzmann, becomes a burning issue in the theological writings of 1773 and the "Götz" essay of 1774-1775(?). The question: "Ist der Mensch frei?" is addressed in the short essay entitled: "Entwurf eines Briefes an einen Freund der auf Akademien Theologie studiert"(Blei IV.20ff). Lenz distinguishes metaphysical from moral freedom, explaining that the former implies a freedom from all determining conditions: "Metaphysische Freiheit wäre, wenn ein endliches, oder geschaffenes Wesen außer den ewigen und notwendigen Gesetzen denken und handeln könnte, die der Schöpfer denkenden und handelnden Wesen vorgeschrieben." Such freedom is impossible, says Lenz, and to insist on it is to misunderstand the determining force of Nature, for "die Natur geht und wirkt ihren Gang fort, ohne sich um uns und unsere Moralität zu bekümmern." However moral freedom is possible, not that it is everywhere a reality, but that it is a goal to which man must strive. Its attainment consists in pitting ourselves against the forces around that determine us: "den uns entgegenwirkenden Kräften unsere Kraft entgegensetzen und nach Verhältnis der angewandten Anstrengung oder Tugend uns immer wieder in höhere Regionen schwingen."
Even though we shall never get beyond the reach of the forces acting upon us, for "überall bleiben die ewigen notwendigen göttlichen Gesetze, die all unsere Wirksamkeit einfassen", nonetheless, within the framework laid down by God, there is freedom. In the later "Stimmen" Lenz writes: "Frey sind wir, aber frey vor Gott, wie Kinder unter den Augen ihres liebreichen Vaters frey scherzen und spielen dürfen, kehren wir ihm aber den Rücken, so rennen wir in den Tod, und die Freyheit, die uns von dort entgegen winkt, ist kalt und grauenvoll, ist der Wink des Chaos und der alten Nacht."

Man creates his freedom, then, by his own efforts, by his resistance to determining forces. Freedom is no already given quantity. The same conviction is forcibly expressed in the essay "Über Götz von Berlichingen". Lenz begins it by portraying man as a prisoner in a mechanistic universe: "als eine vorzüglich-künstliche kleine Maschine, die in die große Maschine, die wir Welt, Weltbegebenheiten, Welتلäufte nennen besser oder schlimmer hineinpaßt" (I.378). There is little that is inspiring about such an existence: "denn ein Ball anderer zu sein, ist ein trauriger niederdrückender Gedanke, eine ewige Sklaverei, eine nur künstlichere, eine vernünftige aber eben um dessentwillen desto elendere Tierschaft." Life must be more than this, indeed to become aware of man's subjection is to realise that on the contrary, "handeln, handeln die Seele der Welt sei, nicht geniessen, nicht empfindeln, nicht spitzfändeln, daß wir dadurch allein Gott ähnlich werden, der unaufhörlich handelt und unauf-
hörlich an seinen Werken sich ergötzt... daß diese unsre handelnde Kraft nicht eher ruhe, nicht eher ablasse zu wirken, zu regen, zu toben, als bis sie uns Freiheit um uns her verschafft, Platz zu handeln: Guter Gott Platz zu handeln und wenn es ein Chaos wäre das du geschaffen, wüste und leer, aber Freiheit wohnte nur da und wir könnten dir nachahmend drüber brüten, bis was herauskäme--Seligkeit! Seligkeit! Göttergefühl das!" The exalted tone is due to Lenz's excitement at discovering in Goethe's hero a living embodiment of his most deeply-felt religious and philosophical convictions. Götz fits perfectly into his scheme of fulfilment of human destiny, devoting himself tirelessly to altruistic action, winning if not complete political freedom from oppressive forces, then certainly moral freedom, and developing to lofty, Christ-like heights of moral stature, with its reward of happiness: "am Ende seines Lebens geht er unter wie die Sonne, vergnügt, bessere Gegenden zu schauen, wo mehr Freiheit ist, als er hier sich und den Seinigen verschaffen konnte, und läßt noch Licht und Glanz hinter sich. Wer so gelebt hat, wahrlich, der hat seine Bestimmung erfüllt, Gott du weißt es wie weit, wie sehr, er weiß nur soviel davon als genug ist ihn glücklich zu machen"(I.381). Götz shows us how to become free.

One further essay: "Über die Natur unsers Geistes" underlines the same message. Lenz begins once again with the observation that man is not independent of determining forces, however shocking it might be to realise this: "Wie denn, ich nur ein Ball der Umstände? ich? ich gehe mein Leben durch und finde
diese traurige Wahrheit hundertmal bestätigt" (I.572). It is true, the realisation expressed in "Entwurf eines Briefes", that "wer dem Menschen die Dependenz von der Natur abspricht, der hat ihn noch nie recht angesehen" (Blei IV.22). It is our pride deceiving us if we assert: "das tatst du, das wirktest du, nicht das wirkte die Natur." However, if freedom is not a present reality, might it not be a future one? Might there not be in the human soul: "ein Bestreben ein Trieb. . .sich zur Selbständigkeit hinaufzuarbeiten, sich gleichsam von dieser großen Masse der in einander hangenden Schöpfung abzusondern und ein für sich bestehendes Wesen auszumachen. . .sich über die Welt die sie umgibt zu erhöhen und einen drüber waltenden Gott aus sich zu machen"? Man's destiny is to create his own freedom, but how is this to happen? Lenz sees two ways in which the human soul can achieve its freedom in the face of determining forces, particularly when these forces are ones that bring pain and unhappiness; firstly by the power of Geist, by one's inner strength: "durch innere Stärke den äußern unangenehmen Eindrücken das Gegengewicht zu halten" (I.574). This is the truly liberating function of thought: not to anaesthetise one's feelings against the pain of determining circumstances, but to meet the pain head on and find one's way through it to new understanding: "So, möchte ich sagen erschafft sich die Seele selber und somit auch ihren künftigen Zustand. So lernt sie Verhältnis der Dinge zu sich selber--und zugleich Gebrauch und
Anwendung dieser Dinge zur Verbesserung ihres äußern Zustandes finden. So sondert sie sich aus dem maschinenhaft wirkenden Haufen der Geschöpfe ab und wird selbst Schöpfer."

The stress on ways to cope with "raging pain" is no unique characteristic of this essay. The strength advocated by Salzmann, as well as by Lenz, for active living, is not necessarily the strength of a sovereign Prometheus; it can also be that of a humiliated Christ, submitting to God's will, or to the hostility of others. Salzmann had written in "Über die Rache": "Unser Geist muß stark genug seyn, alles dieses mit gleichem Muthe zu ertragen. . .wir müssen hierinnen der Gottheit ähnlich werden, welche mitten unter der empfindlichsten Plagen, die sie über die Menschen zu ihrer Besserung ausstreut, dennoch dieselben im ganzen ihre ununterbrochene Güte und Wohlthätigkeit empfinden lässet"(pp.67-8). In the "Stimmen", Lenz, commenting on Christ's advocation of "turning the other cheek", points out: "Nur der sich stärker als der andere fühlt, kann mit kaltem Blute ihm den andern Backen auch darreichen"(p.237), and the same is true of poverty of spirit as commended in the Beatitudes: "zu der Armuth des Geistes gehört viel Geist, viel Kraft"(p.234). After what he has written in "Über Götz", Lenz can obviously not rule out the appropriateness of hitting back in some situations: "mit eisernen Arme dazwischen schlagen wie Götz, wenns noth thut und der Adler mehr zu fangen hat als Mücken"(p.238), but in everyday life the active strength that is more often required is that of the humble. So Christ
becomes, in the second part of "Über die Natur unsers Geistes", the model for winning moral freedom through humble, self-sacrificing action.

If man is determined by circumstances, so the argument runs, he can become free less by thinking: by independence of spirit, than by acting to change his circumstances. It might be thought that Christ's life of suffering was rather passive, considering that, in Lenz's words, "er lebte um zu leiden und zu sterben" (I.576). However choosing his circumstances in this way, and the most painful ones at that, constituted the highest action: "Er handelte—er veränderte seine Lage—aber immer tiefer hinab." Christ was aware of his lofty destiny but, being divine, did not need to exalt himself to reach it. His willingness to suffer the humiliation of a shameful death, "ohne sich seiner hohen Bestimmung nach verteidigen zu können," becomes a symbol to man, showing him what human perfection is and what it must entail: "Zugleich hat er uns ein Symbol geben wollen, was den vollkommenen Menschen mache und wie der nur durch allerlei Art Leiden und Mitleiden werde und bleibe." Action is suffering. As it was with Christ who "made himself of no reputation", so it was with Götz who was also "ein Mann der weder auf Ruhm noch Namen Anspruch macht, der nichts sein will als was er ist: ein Mann" (I.381); so it must be with the follower of Christ, as the "Lebensregeln" also affirm: "So ging Christus uns vor, erniedrigte sich selbst bis zur Knechtsgestalt, bis zum Räubertot, je
mehr er war, desto mehr musst' er seinen Glanz verbergen. . .

So müssen wir dem vollkommensten der Menschen nachahmen, je mehr wir sind, für desto minder uns ausgeben, ja auch für desto minder uns selber halten" (Blei IV.40-41). 

Demut is for Lenz one of the "rules of life", and that it was more than a passing conviction is testified by a diary entry made by Lavater on the subject of Lenz. Lenz's impromptu sermon delivered at Sesenheim in 1772 had as its subject the perils of Hochmut. We may wonder how to reconcile such self-effacement with all that Lenz writes elsewhere about man's exaltation to divine heights of moral and spiritual stature by an active furthering of his own creation. But to Lenz the lofty destiny he believes in for man does not consist in abasement but comes about as a result of abasement.

"Über die Natur unsers Geistes" closes with the observation that Christ who was active in self-sacrifice on behalf of others, was also the one who rose from the dead and ascended to heaven: "Denn seine Auferstehung und Auffahrt sind nur Fortsetzung dieses selben großen Plans zu leiden und zu handeln" (I.577). Christ's pattern of exaltation as a reward for active submission to God and to the evils permitted by him, is for our benefit: "um uns zu zeigen, daß je weiter diese Unterwerfung, diese Ergebenheit, diese Dependenz von dem Willen der Gottheit gehe, desto herrlicher der Lohn sey, der unser warte, daß alle die Einschränkungen unserer zeitlichen Glückseligkeit, die durch die Vermehrung und Ausbreitung des Menschengeschlechts und
seiner guten und bösen Begierden, guten und bösen Thätigkeit nothwendig geworden waren, uns an unserm innern und geistigen und zugleich ewigwährenden und unveränderlichen Glücke nicht den geringsten Abbruch thätten, sondern vielmehr als Dämme anzusehen wären, durch welche der Strohm der Glückseligkeit nur darum eine Weile aufgehalten zu werden schiene, damit er hernach desto gewaltsamer und überschwänglicher auf uns zuströmen könne, und wir hernach in vollem Maass glücklich und trunken von Seligkeit und Wonne den Himmel im Busen tragen möchten."

Action means, then, not necessarily immediately successful, triumphant action, but it does mean free action, which will eventually reap its reward of triumph and happiness. Freedom is achieved, this essay argues, and freedom is maintained, by actively choosing and changing one's own circumstances.

With this essay we have been brought through the full range of Lenz's thoughts on freedom and action and are now in a position to bring together the main strands of his argument. Two questions concern Lenz: that of human freedom from determining forces, and that of morality. It is stress on the priority of action that constitutes Lenz's answer to both of these questions. In view of the determining forces on man: forces of habit and of society, as portrayed at the beginning of the "Götz" essay, and "Über die Natur unsers Geistes", forces of Nature as analysed in Meynungen, coupled with the tendency to inertia underlying the whole world of matter, man cannot claim that he is free qua man. He is not "metaphysically" free but can become "morally"
free ("Entwurf eines Briefes"), and in so doing begin to fulfil human potential. He becomes free by exercising his free will in action; action is the exercise of one's will and constitutes freedom. The mind of man, therefore, imposes its will on the forces of the flesh, of Nature, and on all determining circumstances, and both gains and deploys its freedom by actively ordering these circumstances to its higher ends. This is, to Lenz, action: the implementation of decisions made by spirit over the forces of nature. Whilst he uses the terminology of natural philosophy: "vis centrifuga, vis centripeta", and whilst he speaks of natural drives and the law of Nature which has always contained implicitly what Christ taught explicitly, the system of Nature is subordinate to the system of spiritual development, where man gains and exercises freedom of action to rise to ever greater heights of moral stature and fulfil his potential by ultimately acting in imitation of God. Alongside the dynamic, rhythmical system of Nature is the linear process of moral progression towards God. With Lenz, instincts and natural drives are at the same time moral obligations: "empfindlich und tätig sollen wir sein, beides sind edle Instinkte der Natur" (Blei IV.44). The realisation of the potential inherent in human nature is something for which man is morally responsible: such realisation is what Lenz means by handeln.

The second question: concerning morality, is a little more complex. Lenz is asking: how can I be truly free to act if I am bound to obey a moral code, if it is prescribed to me what
acceptable actions are? He does not dispute the necessity for some moral guidance, describing God's revealed law, notably the Ten Commandments (which he calls the Ten Prohibitions) as the minimum standard, above which all human action must take place. It outlines, so to speak, the area within which human action will be right, a function performed also by the New Testament imperative, expressed in the "Versuch", of imitating Christ, having the mind of Christ, following him above all in altruistic action: "wir müssen suchen andere um uns her glücklich zu machen." If action observes these moral boundaries, then there are no other restrictions on it. Indeed, not only are there no restrictions, but there are God's "Hülfsmittel", to encourage Christ-like, altruistic action: these are the strength and motivation communicated to man through faith. In Lenz's realm of grace, therefore, it is the individual's freedom to discover what actions are better ones by judging from the consequences. Those that bring greater happiness will be seen to be morally preferable. Morality cannot be prescribed, then, since it is discovered individually in action.

Lenz anticipates the objection that learning by trial and error could be a tragic and discouraging process if the mistakes made are serious ones. He points out that it was to remove the evil consequences of wrong actions that Christ came. His Verdienst lifts the curse of the past and guarantees the working of the process of experimental morality. Action need not be hindered, then, by doubts and fears about its correctness, but may
proceed, and must proceed, with impunity. When mistakes are made, there must be not remorse but a new mentality, a new ability to conceive of higher actions, a new perception of the sublime heights of human destiny.

In conclusion, it must be said that whilst all Lenz's preoccupations are moral ones, whilst he asks himself repeatedly the question: how do I behave in order to be happy?, and whilst, as we shall see, his literary and literary-critical work is all highly ethical in content, his answer is nonetheless a rejection of moralism and moralising. Life comes first, then moral discovery. Man is not to concern himself too much with the morality of his actions but rather he is to act spontaneously and energetically, seeking not the satisfaction of moral rectitude but rather the happy consequences that will indicate that he has acted aright. A moralistic attitude towards others does no good either, he feels, but rather there should be unjudging acceptance of the spontaneous action performed by others as a reflection of their individuality, for "Jeder Mensch bringt. . .sein Moralsystem mit sich auf die Welt." That this conclusion has important implications for Lenz's literary work is suggested by the parallel formulation: "Jeder Mensch hat seine Kunst in sich" (Ibid., p. 240). The principle of artistic individuality that the Lenzian artist observes when portraying his subjects is a correlative to that moral and religious individuality that man receives from God. The rejection of prescribed artistic norms parallels the rejection of a prescribed
moral code. It will be our task in the following chapter to analyse the ways in which the religious and moral notion of action, free from the shackles of moralism, is expressed in Lenz's literary-critical work.
CHAPTER FOUR

The reflection of Lenz's theology and moral philosophy in his literary-critical writings

Lenz's theological writings are, as we have said, summed up in the lengthy published work: Meynungen eines Layen. It would not be unnatural to assume that this work reflects and perhaps influences the preoccupations Lenz entertained in the literary and literary-critical field, and indeed the author himself confirms such an assumption, as we know from a note published by Blei: "Die Meinungen eines Laien sind der Grundstein meiner ganzen Poesie, aller meiner Wahrheit, all meines Gefühls (in margin: mein Ohrküssen) der aber freilich nicht muß gesehen werden" (Blei IV.283). What does Lenz mean by "Grundstein meiner ganzen Poesie", and why must it remain out of sight?

The second question at least can be quickly answered. The attitude of secrecy cannot mean that he wished no one to read his Meynungen, for they were published soon after their completion, and the number of times Lenz alludes to them and angles for an opinion on them shows what store he set by their publication. What he does conceal, however, is his authorship; only twice, in letters to Herder (Br.I.216) and to his brother Johann Christian (letter 29), does he lift the veil of anonymity. Why conceal his authorship of this particular work? Are we to assume that Lenz was shy of becoming known for his theological
ideas: for his equation of original sin and nature, his view that man's moral and religious development consisted in finding it all out for himself, judging right and wrong from the physical consequences of his actions, and for his rejection of moral ideals and moral systems as guides to human conduct? Or was it not rather that he wished to conceal not his responsibility for these ideas but their seminal link to his works of fiction. The syntax of his statement: "Die Meynungen sind der Grundstein meiner ganzen Poesie, der aber freilich nicht muß gesehen werden", gives us to understand that what must remain hidden is the fact that the Meynungen are a corner-stone to his poetry and his deepest convictions; the author of the Hofmeister, Menoza and Soldaten must not be seen to be the layman responsible for these opinions.

Surprising as this attitude may sound at first, it is actually quite consistent with Lenz's literary theory as expressed in his essays, recensions and polemical writings against Wieland. The principle emphasised there, as we shall later show in greater detail, is that it is the business of the poet not to philosophise, not to set his works into his own personal, philosophical, moral or religious framework, not to put across a view of life of his own, but to portray real life as it is and according to its own laws; the principle that: "Der Dichter weiset anschauend und sinnlich, wie es ist, aufs höchste wie es nach gewissen gegebenen Umständen sein kann, der Philosoph sagt wie es sein soll"(T.H.438). To be a poet is one thing, to be a philosopher another; only a mixing of philosophy and poetry is intolerable.
To be sure, the *Meynungen* are hardly philosophy, but Lenz felt them to be sufficiently seminal to his whole attitude to life and poetry that they needed to be kept well apart from his dramas purporting to show life as it presents itself, not life as the poet understands it.

The point behind Lenz's concealment of his authorship of the *Meynungen* happens, then, to be one of the main points that link this work to his literary and critical writings. The *Meynungen* stress that the individuality of man, with his freedom of action unshackled by a prescribed morality, whether in the form of a moral system or a moral ideal, with his freedom to discover right and wrong experimentally and to fail without the consequences of his failure needing to be tragic, is a sacred feature in a world created by God. The sacredness of life as it is was earlier expressed in a comment in "Entwurf eines Briefes" (Blei IV.24), in which Lenz agrees with Leibniz that God has created this world as the best of all possible worlds if only in the sense that it, not some utopian world that ought to be, is the one on which man has to base all his search for truth. It is the best not because God chose it out of a number of possible worlds, but because, from our point of view, it is the only one we have to go on. No imagined order, even a morally ideal one, can be of any use to us, but only life in its present reality. Zierau's anticipation of utopia in *Der Neue Menoza*: "Wenn die goldenen Zeiten wiederkommen," is countered by the Prince's, and Lenz's rebuff: "Die stecken nur
im Hirn der Dichter, und Gott sei Dank... Solang wir selbst
nicht Gold sind, nützen uns die goldenen Zeiten zu nichts".
Not that present reality will not develop and progress towards
the ideal. The Prince does not exclude the idea of a golden
future, as the culmination of the present process of growth
and advance. But reality is for Lenz always in the present
moment, never in a future or possible moment.

Just as the world as it is, then, is sacred in its indivi-
duality (the message of the Meynungen), so the poet must re-
spect that individuality when he goes to work to paint "tableaus
of the human race." If he is to portray the world as it is,
then there is no room for any correction or touching-up of
reality in the work of art. Human life must correct itself, in
obedience to drives inherent in man: the drives towards per-
fection, happiness, a heightened sense of being. It is not the
business of the poet to do that correcting, although he must
show that it is possible and commend it as desirable.

It is in the Anmerkungen übers Theater that Lenz argues
most fully for an observance by the poet of the sacred individu-
ality of his object. Far from being merely a reckless rejection
of Aristotle's dramatic unities, as Goethe described it in Dicht-
ung und Wahrheit, or a glorification of the promethean freedom
of the poet-creator, as scholars have popularly viewed it, this
essay, as Britta Titel has carefully shown, whilst certainly
celebrating the creative genius of the poet, actually emphasises
the limits to his creativity, and the obligations under which he
goes to work. In the foreground of Lenz's thoughts is the strong conviction that the real art of poetry has been lost. Certainly it can still be seen in Shakespeare's dramas, but French works, particularly Voltaire's, but even to some extent Rousseau's, and contemporary German plays based on the French models, have missed the essence of poetry as imitation of nature.

Poetry, firstly should not obey the whims of the imagination, for "Der wahre Dichter verbindet nicht in seiner Einbildungskraft, wie es ihm gefällt, was die Herren die schöne Natur zu nennen belieben, was aber mit ihrer Erlaubnis nichts als die verfehlte Natur ist" (I.336-7). The circular dilemma, as Lenz sees it, of anyone who attempts to differentiate between nature and beautiful nature is expressed in the "Versuch": "Herr Batteux schwur hoch und teuer das erste Principium aller schönen Künste gefunden zu haben. Ahmet der schönen Natur nach! Was ist schöne Natur? Die Natur nicht wie sie ist, sondern wie sie sein soll. Und wie soll sie denn sein? Schön" (I.486).

To seek to extrapolate a concept of beautiful nature out of nature plain and simple is to lose touch with reality, it is "zehn Jahre an einem Ideal der Schönheit zu zirkeln, das endlich doch nur in dem Hirn des Künstlers, der es hervorgebracht, ein solches ist" (342). The Meynungen reiterate that such a search can lead the poet astray into untruthful forms of art: "Denn die Natur ist es nicht, die uns auf krumme Wege führt, die Supernatur ist es, die schöne Natur, die das Ding besser verstehn will,
als Gott und alle seine Propheten, die Kunst. Der Mensch ist nicht zur Kunst gemacht." Aesthetic norms must not originate in the mind of the subject but in the individuality of the object: "Was ist Grandison, der abstrahierte geträumte, gegen einen Rebhuhn, der da steht?" (341) The main argument against such ideals of beauty or truth of nature as they are created in the imagination of the poet is that the characters created by the poet tend to be mere reflections of the latter's own self. Such, Lenz feels, were many of the dramatic heroes of the day: "Daher sehen sich die heutigen Aristoteliker, die bloß Leidenschaften ohne Charakteren malen (und die ich übrigens in ihrem anderweitigen Wert lassen will) genötigt, eine gewisse Psychologie für alle ihre handelnde Personen anzunehmen, aus der sie darnach alle Phänomene ihrer Handlungen so geschickt und ungezwungen ableiten können und die im Grunde mit Erlaubnis dieser Herren nichts als ihre eigene Psychologie ist." (341) But dramatic art, thinks Lenz, should be anything but a mere expression of the poet's subjective states of mind and heart, and that Lenz feels particularly strongly on this point is indicated by his willingness to criticize even Rousseau: "Für den mittelmäßigen Teil des Publikums wird Rousseau (der göttliche Rousseau, selbst--) unendlichen Reiz mehr haben, wenn er die feinsten Adern der Leidenschaften seines Busens entblößt und seine Leser mit Sachen anschaulich vertraut macht, die sie alle vorhin schon dunkel fühlten, ohne Rechenschaft davon geben zu können, aber das Genie wird ihn da schätzen, wo er aus den Schlingen und
Graziengewebe der feinern Welt Charaktere zu retten weiß."

(341) To chart the movements of the human heart has its uses, but when this is pursued so exclusively that the hero's wholeness of character is disturbed, then the poet has lost "die individuelle, die unekle, immer gleich glänzende, rückspiegelnde (Kenntnis)." (341) He has a general understanding of human nature, just as a moral idealist has a systematised understanding of human moral obligations, but he has lost a sense of the uniqueness of an individual human being, and his plays or novels will have limited appeal because they will portray more what the poet knows than what his object is. The uniqueness he needs to discover for his characters ("die individuelle") and the three dimensional consistency ("die immer gleich glänzende") can only come from a firm faithfulness to real life models ("die rückspiegelnde"); no artificial synthesis will produce compelling human characters. Individuality, then, does not mean subjectivity but its opposite. As Britta Titel stresses: "Lenzens Individualismus ist nicht subjektiver Natur, hat nichts mit individueller Willkür, nicht mit schrankenloser Selbstdarstellung zu tun, sondern zeigt sich im Gegenteil streng gebunden an die Individualität der Gegenstände." The principle of artistic imitation Lenz calls "Rückspiegelung". "Den Gegenstand zurückspiegeln", he says, "das ist der Knoten, die notadicritica des poetischen Genies." (336) "Rückspiegelung" is in Titel's words: "eine entschlossene Hinwendung zur Wahrheit der Natur, die aller erklügelten Kunst unendlich überlegen,
allein die Quelle echter Kunst abzugeben vermögend erscheint" (13). Lenz has earlier described the basis of poetry, imitation of nature, as imitation: "aller der Dinge, die wir um uns herum sehen, hören, etcetera, die durch die fünf Tore unsrer Seele in dieselbe hineindringen." (333), and commented that even animals can to some extent imitate in this way. However "Rückspiegelung" means not a mechanical copying, demanding at the most a merely technical skill; it is: "nicht das, was bei allen Tieren schon im Ansatz—nicht Mechanik—nicht Echo." (336) Rather it means a penetrating understanding of the object, coupled with the genial ability to portray it in its totality. Such understanding Lenz calls "durchschauen"; it differs from ordinary understanding in that by seeing through an object, it sees everything about it at once. It does not need to put several successive impressions together to obtain a full idea of its object, but has an immediate grasp of its totality. This, Lenz says in "Entwurf eines Briefes" (Blei IV,21), is the way God knows and understands. Human beings, on the other hand, mostly have nothing more than a rational ability to understand consecutive impressions, says Lenz on Sterne's authority: they have only: "die Gabe zu vernunfteln und Syllogismen zu machen", they do not even have the gift of "Anschauen". (I.334), possessed also by angels and spirits. But amongst humans there are the geniuses who have this gift: "Wir nennen die Köpfe Genies, die alles, was ihnen vorkommt, gleich so durchdringen, durch und durch sehen, daß ihre Erkenntnis denselben Wert, Umfang, Klar-
heit hat, als ob sie durch Anschau oder alle sieben Sinne zusammen wäre erworben worden. Legt einem solchen eine Sprache, mathematische Demonstration, verdrehten Charakter, was ihr willt, eh ihr ausgeredt habt, sitzt das Bild in seiner Seele, mit allen seinen Verhältnissen, Licht, Schatten, Kolorit dazu." (336)

Genius is needed, then, not to create a personal vision of the world, not to construct a world according to subjective standards and values, but to grasp and reproduce the world as it is: "Er nimmt Standpunkt—und dann muß er so verbinden. Man könnte sein Gemälde mit der Sache verwechseln." (337) The true poet is like a painter who cannot help viewing his subject from a particular vantage-point. But once that point has been chosen, then the subject itself will determine how the work of art ("Gemälde") will appear. The only subjective element is the degree of clarity and intensity with which the poet will view his subject: "es kommt freilich auf die spezifische Schleifung der Gläser und spezifische Größe der Projektions­tafel an." (335-6) Human creativity is not a prism which filters and distorts images of the world—Lenz uses the word prism for Aristotle's principles of poetry, which he disparages; it is rather a lens which clarifies and magnifies those images, casting them up on a screen for all to see in their truth and detail. The test of the true poet is his ability "eine Figur mit eben der Genauigkeit und Wahrheit darzustellen, mit der das Genie sie erkennt." (342) As Titel summarises: "Der Ausdruck
'Standpunkt nehmen', in der allein dem Kontext entsprechenden Weise verstanden, meint also nicht mehr und nicht weniger als eine Garantie für objektgemäße Darstellung" (15). Titel goes on to point out that Lenz saw even the choice of a "standpoint" as no arbitrary and subjective matter, but "daß es dabei gerade um den angemessenen Standpunkt geht, von dem aus sich der Gegenstand am tiefsten und eigentlichten erschließt" (ibid.). To adopt the correct "standpoint" the poet must put himself in the position of his object and adopt its own point of view. Speaking of the need for poetic portrayal of genuinely autonomous characters, Lenz says: "Ha aber freilich dazu gehört Gesichtspunkt, Blick der Gottheit in Die Welt." (343). "Gesichtspunkt" is the poet's ability to see through the eyes of his object. As Titel again explains: 

Von Relativismus ist hier nichts zu finden, und das beweist sich gerade da, wo nun Lenz selber von einer Mannigfaltigkeit von Gesichtspunkten spricht; wenn er es etwa gegen die Gräfin La Roche für das 'Geheimnis' des Dichters erklärt (er redet von sich als 'Comödien-schreiber'), sich 'in viele Gesichtspunkte zu stellen'; denn er fährt fort: 'und jeden Menschen mit seinen (=dessen!) eigenen Augen ansehen zu können!' Die Vielfalt der Gesichtspunkte gründet allein in der Vielheit der Gegenstände, nicht in der Pluralität der Perspektiven, und so dient sie gerade der angemessenen Erfassung des Gegenstandes; nur darum muß der Dichter sich 'in viele Gesichtspunkte' stellen, damit er jeden aus seinem wahren Gesichtspunkt erblicke." (16-17)

To the same correspondent (Sophie La Roche) Lenz writes on another occasion: "Wer nur eines jeden Menschen Gesichtspunkt finden könnte; seinen moralischen Thermometer; sein Eigenes; sein Nachgemachtes; sein Herz (Letter 55). Running through
all Lenz's literary theory, as through many of his letters, is the same concern as that expressed in his theological essays; the concern for understanding, acceptance, tolerance of the individual, the rejection of all pre-conceived ideas, all prejudices, all moral judgements on the individual, for truth is found in the particular, not in the general: "Jeder Mensch hat seine Kunst in sich", and "jeder Mensch bringt sein Moral- system mit sich auf die Welt."

The philosophical basis for the sacredness of individuality is given, in this essay, in several passages that closely reflect the philosophical statements made in other works we have already looked at: in the Götz essay particularly, but also in the theological essays. The desire for poetic imitation is shown to be rooted in human freedom and autonomy:

"Wir sind, m.H., oder wollen wenigstens sein, die erste Sprosse auf der Leiter der freihandelnden selbständigen Geschöpfe, und da wir eine Welt hie da um uns sehen, die der Beweis eines unendlich freihandelnden Wesens ist, so ist der erste Trieb, den wir in unserer Seele fühlen, die Begierde's ihm nachzutun" (I.333). This desire is seen as no promethean usurping of the place of God, but as God-ordained; the Almighty created man to reflect and share his free creativity: "Der Schöpfer sieht auf ihn herab wie auf die kleinen Götter, die mit seinem Funken in der Brust auf den Thronen der Erde sitzen und seinem Beispiel gemäß eine kleine Welt erhalten." (337) The poet creates not according to his own whims and fancies, but in full accord with
the real world as God has created it. So the unity in his own work will reflect the unity in creation, and will not derive from artificial rules: "Gott ist nur Eins in allen seinen Werken, und der Dichter muß es auch sein, wie groß oder klein sein Wir-
kungskreis auch immer sein mag. Aber fort mit dem Schulmeister, der mit seinem Stäbchen einem Gott auf die Finger schlägt."(345). Aristotle's prescription of rules for dramatic unity has no place if the poet goes to work in imitation of God.

It should be noted that the mention of God is no idle one in this essay, but that it reflects the Heilsgeschichte traced in the Meynungen. Aristotle belonged, like the patriarchs of the Old Testament, to the age of Law; humans, then, were still bound by external circumstances, they had not yet acceded to the realm of grace, of freedom of action, of the "positive happiness of the gospel". Their poetry was consequently concerned not with human motives but with human subjection to fate: "Da ein eisernes Schicksal die Handlungen der Alten bestimmte und regiert, so konnten sie als solche interessieren, ohne davon den Grund in der menschlichen Seele aufzusuchen und sichtbar zu machen " (341). Poetic practice also was governed by law, by rules for unity and for dramatic effect on the spectator. Aristotle was the "Schulmeister" (Cp. St. Paul's description of the Law as "Zuchtmeister," Gal.3,24), disciplining poets not yet come of age. But we are now, says Lenz, in the age of Grace, of freedom, of divine revelation; we now have "Gesichtspunkt, Blick der Gottheit in die Welt, den die Alten nicht haben konnten, und wir zu unserer Schande nicht haben wollen " (343). Aristotle,
living before Christ, could not be expected to understand human freedom and autonomy, the divine "spark" in man, which Christ came to bring man ("Supplement"). His poetics are no longer relevant therefore, unless we choose to go back on the Christian revelation of man's greatness in partnership with God, which, says Lenz, we can only do to our shame. The modern poet living in an age of freedom will make sure that his characters also reflect true humanity; they will be "Charaktere, die sich ihre Begebenheiten erschaffen, die selbständig und unveränderlich die ganze große Maschine selbst drehen, ohne die Gottheiten in den Wolken anders nötig zu haben, als wenn sie wollen zu Zuschauern" (343). It is not that humans since Christ are no longer dependent on God, no longer need him: for "Was wäre unsere Welt?" asks Lenz in "Stimmen", "ohne die beständige Einmischung und Einwirkung der Gottheit." Whilst he advocates a submissive participation in God's nature, he rejects the slavery to all that the classical gods stood for. Though man is still under God, he is free under God: "Ja frey sind wir, aber frey vor Gott, wie Kinder unter den Augen ihres liebreichen Vaters frey scherzen und spielen dürfen" (Ibid., p.204) -- free to live out life intensely, to discover happiness and right for himself, free from being judged by an external code of values, and free to be appreciated for himself and according to his own standards.

The Anmerkungen argue, then, for freedom for poets from the prescribed rules of an Aristotle, but also freedom for dramatic characters from the function of serving as mere illustrations in
some metaphysical system. Just as the sovereign creativity of the poet is harmed by the prescription of aesthetic norms, so the sacred individuality of dramatic characters is harmed if they are not allowed to be simply what they are. Lenz does not, at this point, explicitly attack the practice of using drama as a vehicle for moralising judgments, but the ground is prepared for such an attack. Dramatic characters are not to be subordinated to any other concern; they are not to be a mere reflection of the poet's own psychology, nor constructs of his imagination, nor should they exemplify certain moral propositions. They exist for their own sakes, as living re-creations of true humanity. If the poet passes judgment on his characters, or on anyone else's, he has destroyed their independent life, their truth to life; he has strayed from his primary calling of creating life; he has become, instead, a philosopher. This is the argument developed by Lenz in his later essay: "Verteidigung des Herrn Wieland gegen die Wolken."

If Lenz saw in Aristotle a schoolmaster laying down the law on poetics, he rebelled against the same practice of literary hegemony maintained, as he felt, by Wieland. It is, however, as a modern-day Socrates, not as a contemporary Aristotle, that he sees the older poet. For in addition to dictating matters of artistic taste Wieland was seen also, by his mocking, worldly wisdom, to deny that anything was sacred, especially the individuality of dramatic characters. He was felt to be
judgmental, intolerant alike of poets, their literary creations, and the issues they were devoted to. It was following Wieland's scornful ridiculing of the Anmerkungen that Lenz saw in him his arch foe and launched an acrimonious campaign to overthrow his tyranny in matters of art and taste.

Initially Lenz's criticisms followed those of Goethe as expressed in the latter's Götter, Helden und Wieland. This work, which was published by Lenz without Goethe's knowledge, chided Wieland for a certain lifelessness and stuffy style in the Teutscher Merkur and an overall blasé attitude in all his writings. As Daunicht points out, Lenz makes what seems to be a clear sideswipe of his own at Wieland's soporific journal in a passage from his essay "Über Ovid" delivered to the Société in July 1775: "Dafür ist er (Ovid) aber auch Meister im Erzählen, nur daß er wie er selbst vom Merkur erzählt auch einen hundertäugigen Argus am Ende in sanften und tiefen Schlaf damit bringt, da wir doch vom Dichter verlangen, daß er uns erwecken und beleben, mit neuem prometheischen Feuer entzünden und inspirieren soll, so daß wir unsere Existenz zehnfach fühlen" (I.478). The concerns for human moral striving, for self-development, for freedom and spontaneity of action were felt to be absent in Wieland. Lenz writes in July 1775 to Sophie La Roche: "Er (Wieland) glaubt den Menschen einen Dienst zu erweisen, wenn er ihnen begreiflich macht, ihre Kräfte seyn keiner Erhöhung fähig."

In Lenz's essay in "defense" of Wieland, he disparages the latter's Socratic wisdom, which consists "in der Zufriedenheit—ein süßes Wort—das aber, wenn man's herunter hat, im Magen krümmert—
im Aufgeben aller Rechte der Menschheit, Zusammenlegen der Hände in den Schoß. ... Übrigens gewisse Versicherung, daß uns diese Weisheit, diese Mäßigung unserer Begierden und Wünsche im Himmel tausendfach werde belohnt werden, was die Herren Religion schimpfen" (I.441). The theological essays made it clear that man's lofty destiny requires a continual striving for self-development, a constant discontentment with the way things are. The impetus for development was provided by desire which, far from needing to be moderated, had to be stimulated and maintained with all its force. True religion, says Lenz, involves a heightening of concupiscence. That desire here means the concupiscence of the theological essays: that desire which is sacred to youth, the desire to experience love, in its highest form, towards the other sex, is made clear in the following paragraph where Lenz condemns Wieland's mockery of Werther: "Der Jüngling, der noch dem ersten Stempel der Natur (ha, gewiß dem Bilde Gottes) getreu; für den Trieb, der eben darum der heiligste sein sollte, weil er der süßeste ist, auf den allein alle Güte der Seelen, alle Zärtlichkeit für gesellschaftliche Pflichten und Beziehungen, alle häusliche, alle bürgerliche, alle politische Tugend und Glückseligkeit gepfropft werden kann. ... einen solchen Jüngling lächerlich machen zu wollen?" (441-2) To mock such desires, described here as the source of morality and pleasure just as concupiscence was described as the source ("Keim") of human activity and excellence (502), is to contradict God's way of creation: "Wie nun, daß wir den letzten Keim aller
Moralität, alles Genusses, den Gott in unsere Natur gelegt, herausreißen wollen, den Glauben und die Hoffnung auf Entzückungen, die eben durch die Leiden, Zweifel und Ängstigungen vorbereitet werden müssen, um ihren höchsten Reiz zu erhalten" (443).

Apart from this basic opposition between Lenz's sense of the sacredness of striving and aspiration, and Wieland's blasé mockery of it, other specific criticisms are developed in this "Defense", all of which have to do with intolerance. Lenz begins the essay by suggesting that for too long Wieland has ruled as "dictator" over public artistic taste, furthering his own cause and oppressing other artistic points of view. He has exercised a "monopoly" over the reading public, against which Lenz calls for free enterprise: "Erlauben Sie mir, Ihnen zu sagen, daß Poeten als Kaufleute anzusehen sind, von denen jeder seine Ware, wie natürlich, am meisten anpreist. Wie ungerecht, wenn da einer aus ihren Mitteln entscheiden, die letzte Stimme geben soll" (428). Exceptional qualifications are required in anyone who aspires to make aesthetic judgments on others, to pronounce an "Endurteil" on a poet, as Wieland had done on both Goethe and Lenz. One needs to be a "Herodot, Solon, Lykurg... Demokrit und Pythagoras", to have such qualifications. Later in this essay Lenz attacks Wieland's ridiculing of his anti-Aristotelean drama, arguing that the issue is not one of rules and unities but of truth and expression, and no one person is able to pass a verdict on that: "Die Hauptsache wird immer die
Wahrheit und der Ausdruck des Gemäldes bleiben, von der ein Mensch allein nie urteilen kann, besonders wenn ihm Leiden-
schaften die Augen verdunkeln " (440). You cannot judge truth; at least, no one individual is able to judge it. For truth is many-faceted, it has many "points of view", and can only be perceived and evaluated collectively.

Yet Wieland was not the only one to preside as judge over others, in Lenz's opinion and experience. Nicolai too, with his journal: Allgemeine deutsche Bibliothek, had set up a tribunal for judgment of literary works, at which no appeals were allowed, and which employed "hireling" critics with no real pastoral concern for the literary public. Lenz's concerted attack on the intolerance of critics might lead us to ask whether he is not being as intolerant and as judgmental as they. Indeed, being intolerant of intolerance Lenz does wrap himself in a contradiction: However he is most careful to point out that it is not Wieland and Nicolai as poets that he opposes: he is not merely giving as good as he gets. He makes a point of reminding his readers how much he admires Wieland's Musarion, seen from a purely poetical point of view (438), and refrains from ever accusing Wieland of immorality, for to do this would be to make himself guilty of the moralising with which he charges Wieland. He does indeed express the fear that the reading public might take Wieland's aesthetic sensuality as a philosophy of life (Letter 103), and insists that the other poet make it clear that in his writing he is "nichs
weniger als gefälliger komischer Dichter" (438) and is not appealing for "Anwendung". Otherwise Lenz has nothing negative to say about Wieland qua poet.

Likewise of Nicolai he writes: "Man messe mir hier nicht zu viele Widrigkeit gegen diesen Mann bei, den ich als Buchhändler und anfänglicher Liebhaber und Beförderer der deutschen Literatur, auch in seinem N. (Sebaldus Nothanker) als unterhaltenden Romanendichter schätze—sobald er aber Kunstrichter, Herr aller Herren werden will, mit allen seinen aufgeblasenen Anmaßungen verspottet und verlache" (435). Nicolai's and Wieland's only fault is that they desire to be both poet and critic at the same time; with their own literary productions they also prescribe their own aesthetic norms and impose their own moral convictions. In Lenz's terminology they thereby become "philosophers".

The distinction Lenz draws between philosopher and poet is an important one, since it provides the basis for literary discussion in other essays as well. The difference is that between description and prescription: "Der Dichter weiset anschauend und sinnlich, wie es ist, aufs höchste wie es nach gewissen gegebenen Umständen sein kann, der Philosoph sagt wie es sein soll" (438), and, he might have added, "wie es nicht sein soll", for criticism as well as prescription involves a moralism which should, he considers, be absent from poetry. Speaking of Wieland's Musarion, he goes on to express the concerned hope that Wieland is indeed playing poet and not philosopher: "Nun hoffe ich doch
in aller Welt nicht, daß Herr W. verlangen wird, alle junge Amadisse, das heißt, edle junge Gemüter, die mehr als eine bloß sinnliche Liebe suchen, sollen und müssen durch eben die Klassen gehen, die der Held seines neuesten komischen Gedichts durchlaufen ist?" (438) Despite this expressed hope, however, Lenz is convinced that Wieland exceeds his poetic brief, and puts on the mantle of Socrates in order to mock at human weaknesses:

"Sobald er sich aber neben Sokratessen stellt, und doch der Hauptheld seines Stückes eine lächerliche Rolle spielt, so müssen wir dafür ärger warnen, als für das korrosivste und beschleunigendste Gift, das jemals von einem Menschenfeinde in den Eingeweidien der Erde ist zubereitet worden. Mag man mir immer einwenden, er habe an diesem Charakter nur die Schwachheiten lächerlich machen wollen, so sind an einem solchen Charakter auch die Schwachheiten ehrwürdig, und verdienen eher die Tränen des Menschenfreundes, als das Gelächter von Leuten, die solche Schwachheiten zu begehen niemals im Stande waren, weil sie sich in Ansehung dieses Lasters nie den geringsten Zwang angetan " (438-9),

Mockery is, to Lenz, a form of moralising, it makes the mocker seem morally superior, and rejects the behaviour it mocks as futile. It is just such intolerance that makes Lenz so bitter. The wisdom which knows all the answers without having seriously encountered the problems is, to him, no wisdom. The weak and fallible, those who encounter the problems of existence and are shipwrecked on them, deserve sympathy and understanding, not moral judgment. To mock Werther, for example, is to be indifferent to the social chaos that drives a Werther to cultivate, instead, the human heart, it is to mock the noblest and most sacred movements of the heart, it is even to sacrifice the
heart itself wherein lies the divine spark given to man. To cultivate the heart, on the other hand, is to gain both one's soul and the whole world: "Bleibt Meister eurer Herzen, und ihr bleibt Meister der Welt. Verachten könnt ihr sie mit all ihrem Gewirr äußerer Umstände und Zwangsmittel, die nur Zwangsmittel für Sklaven sind, die den Adel des Funkens nicht kennen, der in ihnen lodert, und der die Verheißungen der ganzen Erde hat." (446).

Why this particular defense of Werther against the verdict of the "philosophers"? Goethe's hero is seen by Lenz as having a superior wisdom to that of his mockers, since he lives and dies not according to external, borrowed principles, abstracted from someone else's life, but according to the light given him by his own experiences and sensibility. Werther fulfils, though tragically, Lenz's ideal of discovering moral truth experimentally. He acts according to the dictates of his heart, and his heart teaches him wisdom from the consequences of those actions. The key is: "aus den Abdrücken nicht aus der Luft gehaschter, sondern bewahrter Erfahrungen menschlichen Lebens (dem echten Probierstein wahrer Dichter) weise zu werden." (448) Against Wieland/Socrates, against philosophy and all facile moralising, Lenz claims the freedom to learn one's own lessons through personal experience.

This rejection of Wieland as philosopher is reiterated frequently in other writings. The formula: "Ich liebe Wieland als Menschen, ich bewundere ihn als komischen Dichter, aber ich hasse
ihn als Philosophen " (425), is echoed in a letter to Lavater (#72): "Wieland der Mensch wird einst mein Freund werden—aber Wieland der Schriftsteller, das heißt der Philosoph der Sokrates—nie." His remark to Sophie La Roche in a letter of 1775(#63): "Er (W.) soll uns nicht Philosoph und Lehrer des menschlichen Geschlechts seyn wollen, und seine Sachen für das geben, was sie sind", is paralleled in an article in the Frankfurter Gelehrte Anzeigen of that same year: "Gern wünschen wir...daß man in Dichtungen von der Art künftig alle Moral wegließe, und sie für das gäbe, was sie sind...Ein Bild ist ein Bild, und eine Predigt eine Predigt." The principle is that poets describe, they do not prescribe, otherwise they are philosophers or even preachers, as a poem of January 1776 summarises:

Nur bitt' ich, halte man Poeten
Nicht für Apostel und Propheten,
Und sagen sie, sie wären es,
So peitscht den falschen Sokrates.  (I.162)

One further passage should be mentioned, which Daunicht alone published, and which he dates around April or May 1776. It is from the fragment entitled: "Über die Launigten Dichter", and again brings together the distinction between poetry and moralising with the mention of Wieland's writings: "Man vergißt so oft, daß es nicht genug wiederholt werden kann, daß der Dichter niemals Sachen beschreibt wie sie seyn sollten, sondern wie sie sind. Je trefflicher der Dichter, desto mehr muß er sie in der Verbindung nehmen wie sie am besten wirken, nie wie sie seyn sollten, denn in dem Augenblick, wo er Bilder der Moral mahlt,
12.

Examples of Lenz's determined rejection of moralistic literature abound, such as these lines in Menalk und Mopsus:

Doch die Moral ist das, was Schwefel bei den Weinen, Verdirbt sie zwar, doch macht sie besser scheinen
Und blendet dem Volk die Augen. (I.184)

A further remark in a letter of May 1775 to Gotter: "Ist das erhört, einen Roman wie eine Predigt zu beurteilen", brings us to Lenz's most insistent plea for a final separation of literature, particularly Goethe's novel about Werther, and all moralising. This plea is contained in the "Briefe über die Moralität der Leiden des jungen Werthers": a work written in defense, this time intended as a genuine defense, of Goethe against Nicolai's mocking parody, and against the charge of subverting public morals by commending Werther's passion and suicide as an attractive example to follow. The basis of Lenz's defense is the rejection of any confusion between life and art; Goethe's Werther contains no programme for real life, no more than any other poetry does, except in as far as it sets an example of free independent action in obedience to the promptings of the heart.

The first letter picks up from the "Verteidigung" the principle of aesthetic autonomy. Just as there the work of art was to be evaluated solely on the basis of "Wahrheit" and "Ausdruck", not on a moral basis, so here the critic must bring to bear only "das echte Gefühl alles dessen was Schön Groß Edel in der Natur oder in den Künsten ist." (I.383). He is to see Werther's
sorrows "nur als Produkt des Schönen", for "das Schöne ist nur das Gute quintessenziiert" (384), and only beauty gives pleasure. Let us not worry ourselves about morality, says Lenz, for a work of art is meant to please; if it pleases, then it is a work of beauty, and if a work of beauty, then a moral work. Insisting that after this principle is stated there is nothing more to be said, Lenz goes on to reject the suggestion that Werther is a subtle justification of suicide, on the grounds that poets are not people to whom we can attribute general moral statements: "Warum legt man dem Dichter doch immer moralische Endzwecke unter, an die er nie gedacht hat" (384). Lenz's surprised tone indicates not that this moralistic approach to poetry was something new or rare, for it was most common throughout the Enlightenment period; but rather it indicates how strongly Lenz believed, contrary to the Enlightenment, in the self-sufficiency of a work of art: its independence of all extra-aesthetic purposes. As it was stated in the "Verteidigung", to generalise the individual cases, presented by a poetic work, into a universal moral principle is to transform poetry into philosophy and mistake the author's purpose: "als ob der Dichter sich auf seinen Dreifuß setzte, um einen Satz aus der Philosophie zu beweisen" (384). The work's significance lies in its individuality not in its universality; this is true of Goethe's Werther: "nichts mehr und nichts weniger als die Leiden des jungen Werthers wollt' er darstellen" (385), as it was true of his own published dramas. Lenz explains:
"Man hat mir allerlei moralische Endzwecke und philosophische Sätze bei einigen meiner Komödien angedichtet, man hat sich den Kopf zerbrochen, ob ich wirklich den Hofmeisterstand für so gefährlich in der Republik halte, man hat nicht bedacht, daß ich nur ein bedingtes Gemälde geben wollte von Sachen wie sie da sind und die Philosophie des geheimen Rats nur in seiner Individualität ihren Grund hatte. Ebenso sucht man im neuen Menoza einen Ausfall auf die Religionsverbesserungen, da der neue Menoza unter den Umständen doch nicht anders reden und handeln konnte, wenn er einige Persönlichkeit behalten wollte." (385). How true this characterisation of his own works is, we shall examine in the following chapter. But whether or not the principle of individuality is maintained in practice against the principle of "moralische Endzwecke" and "philosophische Sätze", in theory it is fairly consistently maintained. Lenz reiterates that poetry is a question of "das Herz und die Imagination meiner Leser zu fesseln", not "nach der Moral fragen." Not, adds Lenz, that Werther is amoral, for, to quote his young friend: "es ist sehr viele Moral drin." However the morality of the work consists not in a specific moral generality stated deliberately by the author, but in its "moral effect on the heart": "Laßt uns also einmal die Moralität dieses Romans untersuchen, nicht den moralischen Endzweck den sich der Dichter vorgesetzt (denn da hört er auf Dichter zu sein) sondern die moralische Wirkung die das Lesen dieses Romans auf die Herzen des Publikums haben könne und haben müsse." (386). Lenz asks us to distinguish
a rational, moralistic purpose from an emotional moral edification. In place of the intellectual moralism of a Wieland (whose journal was responsible for the view that Lenz's own 13. dramas were morally and philosophically tendencious), Lenz puts forward a theory of moral improvement by an appeal to deeper levels of human consciousness than the merely intellectual. His fictitious correspondent in these letters is made to cling to the view that literature affects the reader by giving examples for him to follow, that Werther, therefore, will incite others to consider suicide, that the reader comes to the work with the expectation of being thus affected. But literature has not so simple a relation to the reader, its effect is aesthetic, not moral, although being aesthetic it is, indirectly, morally improving as well: "Als ob das eine so unbekannte noch nie erhörte Wahrheit sei, daß niemand sich aus einem Roman eben zu bekehren sucht, sondern ihn liest, weil und solange er ihm gefällt...daß jeder Roman der das Herz in seinen verborgendsten Schlupfwinkeln anzufassen und zu rühren weiß, auch das Herz besser muß, er mag aussehen wie er wolle" (392-3).

In the Anmerkungen it was said to be an achievement by Rousseau of limited value only, "wenn er die feinsten Adern der Leidenschaften seines Busens entblößt und seine Leser mit Sachen anschaulich vertraut macht, die sie alle vorhin schon dunkel fühlten, ohne Rechenschaft davon geben zu können" (341), and it was stated that the greatest literature will portray genuine human characters that transcend this contemporary sentimental pre-
occupation with feelings and emotions. Now, however, Lenz seems to contradict the earlier statement by putting this secondary interest into first place: "Eben darin besteht Werthers Verdienst, daß er uns mit Leidenschaften und Empfindungen bekannt macht, die jeder in sich dunkel fühlt, die er aber nicht mit Namen zu nennen weiß. Darin besteht das Verdienst jedes Dichters" (393). Werther is now seen as a Rousseauistic embodiment of the psychological preoccupation with sentiment and passion. But if Goethe performs a similar service to that performed by Rousseau—and Lenz does admit grounds for comparing them: "In der Tat haben die Schicksale des St. Preux und Werthers beim ersten Anblick einige Ähnlichkeit" (397)—his hero Werther does also fulfil Lenz's requirements for heroic character. The passage that praises Werther's heroism reads very much like the adulation of Götz in Lenz's essay "Über Götz von Berlichingen". Just as Götz was "ein Mann der weder auf Ruhm noch Namen Anspruch macht, der nichts sein will als was er ist", so Werther is praised for "deine Genügsamkeit mit dir selber und den Gegenständen die so eben um dich sind, deine gänzliche Freiheit von allen Prätentionen, törichten Erwartungen und ehr- süchtigen Wünschen" (399). As Götz was the man of action: "Immer weg geschäftig, tätig, wärmend und wohltuend wie die Sonne", so Lenz commends Werther's "edlen emporstrebenden feurigen Geist...immerwährende Tätigkeit, die selbst durch die Leidenschaft die alles in Untätigkeit hinstarren macht, nicht gehemmt werden konnte, die sich bis zuletzt noch in den furchtbarsten
Ruinen erhielt." And as Götz faced death with courage and resolution: "vergnügt, bessere Gegenden zu schauen, wo mehr Freiheit ist, als er hier sich und den Seinigen verschaffen konnte," so Goethe has placed in Werther, "einen jungen mutigen lebervollen Held auf die Bühne, der weiß was er will und wo er hinauswill, der den Tod selbst nicht scheut, wenn er ihn nur auf guten Wegen übereilt, der im Stande ist sich selbst zu strafen wenn er es wo versehen haben sollte... und, als Simson unter dem ihn erschlagenden Gewicht hinstürzte, noch immer bewies daß er Simson war."

To Lenz's mind, the basis of the similarity between Götz and Werther is their common independence, their successful resistance to external determining forces, their self-sufficiency. Neither Götz nor Werther need to be told what to do, they listen only to the promptings of their hearts and act spontaneously. As Lenz had said in his "Verteidigung", Werther demonstrates that wisdom comes with action and derives from personal experience: "Leidet erst so viel als Werther," he urges his correspondent, "tut erst so viel, lernt erst soviel einsehen und übersehen" (400). The heroic Werther, as opposed to the sentimental Werther, was tailored to a Germany that, unlike Rousseau's France, for which La Nouvelle Héloïse was written, was paralysed by "steife Sitten" which had stifled spontaneity and action. Werther was written for a society: "wo man ein ewiges Gerede von Pflichten und Moral hört und nirgends Kraft und Leben spürt, nirgends Ausübung dessen was man hundertmal demonstriert hat und
immer wieder von neuem demonstriert, wo man in den eisernen
Fesseln eines altfränkischen Etikette alle seine edelsten
Wünsche und Neigungen in den berauchten Wänden seiner Studier-
stube vorsichtig ersticken läßt und so bald sie sich melden,
irgend ein System der Moral dagegen schreibt " (398). Again
we recognise the central ideas that occupy Lenz: the rejection
of moral theorising in favour of practical action, the con­
viction that true living consists in conjuring the desires
and aspirations of the heart, not exorcising them with some
sterile moral system as a precautionary measure against un­
foreseen consequences.

Is Lenz, then, preaching after all some philosophy? Does
not Werther exemplify after all some valuable moral stance?
The contradiction is indeed there. Contrary to his rejection
elsewhere of the importance of "Anwendung" in a literary work,
he now describes Werther as "ein Bild, meine Herren(!), ein
gekreuzigter Prometheus an dessen Exempel ihr euch bespiegeln
könnt und eurem eigenen Genie überlassen ist, die nützlichste
Anwendung davon zu machen " (396). Genius will tell us, pre­
sumably, that Werther is no example of suicide, but that he is
an example of freedom and strong independence of spirit. We
are not to apply anything of Goethe's novel to our own situa­
tion but we are to take to heart the message that there are
resources for noble striving towards lofty goals within the
human heart, that the individual contains his own destiny in
his heart. If this is a "philosophy", it is communicated,
thinks Lenz, more to our heart than to our mind. It is not an
intellectual proposition to be held in theory but an aesthetic form—"ein Bild"—that penetrates to the very seat of our active powers and brings them into action. The specific statements made in the novel cannot be abstracted from their context and taken away as general propositions, as critics have done to them: "Die Stelle die soviel Skandal gibt, wo Werther der Vernunftvorschriften in der Liebe spottet, man solle seine Zeit einteilen u.s.f. wie ekelhaft klingt sie in dem Munde eines Stutzers, eines Säuglings und aller Rezensenten die diese sogleich damit auftreten lassen—und wie ganz anders in Werthers Munde " (400). Such ideas expressed by the hero only have sense in their context, as spoken by Werther, and since the context is unique, there will hardly be any real situation to which they might also apply and to which they might be transferred. If there is to be an effect on the reader, and Lenz does direct us to what he calls "die moralische Wirkung auf die Herzen", it is the effect of the whole, of the "Bild" or "Gemälde", not of the "philosophy" of any parts.

The same point is made in a footnote, printed by Titel and Haug, to Wagner's translation of Mercier's Nouvel essai. Here as well Lenz chafes at the public's insistence on taking the actions of literary characters as possible modes of behaviour in real life: "Eine der größten Hindernisse aller Wirkungen eines Gedichts aber ist, wenn der Leser die darin vorkommenden Rollen für sich oder andre austeilt" (I.667). But did not Lenz himself do precisely this in the essay "Über Götz von Berliching-
en", when he suggested that the members of the Société each take a role and act out Goethe's play as "eine schöne Vorüb hung zu diesem großen Schauspiel des Lebens"? (381) However in that case the suggestion was merely to act out the play, not to become a Götz in real life. The public, complains Lenz, has a tendency to wish to act out the actions and events of a play in real life. It will remain dangerous, therefore, to publish works such as Goethe's Werther and Prometheus, "so lang das deutsche Publikum moralische Abhandlungen und Gedichte zu vermischen schwach genug ist" (667). Poetry is meant to move us, he says, and by so doing to inspire our actions with "Mitleid und Liebe", not with a self-destructive passion. He concludes: "Wenn wird man einmal anfangen mit fester Seele bei den Meisterstücken un serer Künst ler vorüberzugehen, und sich ungestört von ihnen entzücken zu lassen, ohne sich Leidenschaften zu seinem Verderben zu überlassen?" (667) It is by "Entzückung" that man is inspired and improved by literature. The salutory effect of a work is on the reader's heart, it does not present a "moral" to be perceived rationally and carried out to the letter in real life. Titel and Haug summarise it thus: "Selbst wo Lenz die Dichtung--wie z.B. die Wielands durchweg--nach moralischen Gesichtspunkten beurteilt, hat das mit dem Moralismus seiner rationalistischen Gegner nicht das mindeste zu tun. Auch die 'Moralität' ist in diesem Fall eine Angelegenheit der 'Empfindungen' und 'Sensationen', der Wirkung 'auf die Herzen des Publikums'--weshalb es
The point is once again that there are no general moral laws which human behaviour must obey. The poet must no more prescribe certain courses of action than God does, but by appealing to the heart of the reader he can encourage him to seek that same individual intensification of human existence that his characters display. Thus, Lenz's literary theory reflects his moral-philosophical thought—an observation that Titel and Haug make briefly but, unfortunately, do not take any further, when they note: "Die Werther-Briefe. . .rücken damit unmittelbar neben die 'Verteidigung des Herrn W. gegen die Wolken' als eine aktuelle Applikation von Lenzens moral-philosophischer Reflexion" (668).

The "Werther-Briefe" indeed reflect in many respects the moral philosophical ideas of the other essays. To Lenz, Werther exemplifies the concept of free, active self-development, the replacement of moral maxims by a new morality of the heart, the sacredness of individuality beyond the reach of moralistic evaluation. He embodies that living-out of life commended in the Götz essay and justified metaphysically in the "Versuch", "Supplemente", "Stimmen" and "Über die Natur unsers Geistes". He is not so much seen as a model of altruism as Götz was, but lives free of external constraint, discovering for himself what potential there is in his own heart for heightened existence, listening to his own heart, not to moral guidelines, and learning...
from his own actions what is right and what is wrong. In his discussion of Goethe's *Werther* Lenz gives expression, as he does frequently in his writings, to the tension between the wisdom that comes through personal experiences and self-awareness, and that which is learnt from others. Learning from others may save the individual from having perpetually to learn by his mistakes, it may therefore save him much pain, embarrassment and tragedy. But real learning comes through action and the ensuing awareness of one's actions, because only thus does the individual hold his destiny in his own hands, only thus is there freedom, autonomy, development of his potential. Just as in the real world man must learn his own lessons in his individual existence, so literary characters who are to "reflect" real human characters, learn their own lessons, exemplifying no general and universal truths, for all to observe and make their own. We must neither expect any general "morals" or "philosophy" from literature, nor criticise literature on the basis of any external "moral". If literary characters are to be an example to us it is in their uniqueness, their independent action, their self-sufficiency. Whilst this is indeed itself a "moral", it is the only one that Lenz admits.

If the individual can be trusted to discover and live out a morality of the heart, this must indicate a belief in the essential goodness of man. Various studies have shown how such a belief owes much to Rousseau, who had encouraged a belief in the soundness of the human heart. However in Lenz it owes
most of all directly to the New Testament conception of man under grace. Whilst Titel and Haug are correct to relate the ideas in the "Werther-Briefe" to Lenz's moral philosophy, we must remember that his philosophy is always set into a theological framework, even in such a philosophically-sounding essay as "Versuch Über das erste Prinzipium der Moral". Belief in man is belief in the redeeming power and example of Christ. The "Promethean spark" that is the human potential for freedom, development, divine creativity and happiness, the spark which contemporary middle-class Germany had lost but which Götz manifested to them, was kindled in man by Christ, so the First Supplement tells us. Christ is "unser Prometheus", and his salvation consists in development of the Promethean powers inherent in man. Werther is a Promethean figure, experiencing the lofty possibilities of free human existence, yet he is called: "ein gekreuzigter Prometheus"—he experiences like Christ the suffering as well as the sublimity of human existence. Yet, as in "Über die Natur unsers Geistes", suffering is redemptive, it is followed by exaltation, if not in this life, then surely in the next. Because of Christ, salvation has come to human striving; even where there is suffering and failure, there is redemption. The Age of Grace means that the strivings of the human heart are predestined, ultimately, to succeed. To Lenz, Christ and the Christian experience mean a new freedom, optimism and hope of a glorious destiny that is the "gospel" to a mankind still enslaved by impotence,
narrowness of vision, and the legalism and moralism incarnated by Wieland. Werther, giving us a vision of expanded horizons, wider perspectives, enhanced possibilities for the human soul, gives us an example of metanoia.

To Goethe, of course, this essay on his Werther would have been an embarrassment. Not only did it attempt to keep Werther alive when his author had killed him off—and with him a dangerous tendency to cultivate intensity of feeling—but its style is stamped with a disturbing mixture of "exhibitionism and criticism", with an ineffectual posturing that prevents it from ever becoming the devastating counter-attack on Wieland or the powerful defense of Goethe that he intended it to be, and tends to illustrate all too well Goethe's famous verdict on Lenz pronounced in Book 14 of Dichtung und Wahrheit: "So hat er niemanden den er liebte, jemals genützt, niemanden den er hasste, jemals geschadet." In this study, however, this is beside the point, for whether or not this essay is good criticism, it gives revealing insights into an important trend in Lenz's preoccupations. No longer, namely, does he champion strength and powerful, effective action, as he had done in his essay in praise of Götz von Berlichingen. Though Götz exemplified the ideal of Action, he is a character who finds no counterpart in Lenz's own literary work. It is rather Werther, with all his failings, who stands as a model for Lenz's own characters. Lenz has announced significantly in this essay: "So sind an einem solchen Charakter auch die Schwachheiten verehrungswert "(438).
After his initial interest in the ideal of free and powerful Action, we now find him dwelling on the problems involved in any action. Götz was an inspiring model, but in reality humans are not like that. They do not know how they should act right and in their own interests. Spontaneity often leads them astray and they taste the often bitter consequences of error. Lenz's preaching of metanoia, though it is meant to spur man on to higher moral goals, presupposes a particular concern with the fallible and with the mistakes they make. Lenz's characters are ones who have something to repent of, who can rise because they have fallen.

This is no new idea in Lenz's theoretical works. The correspondence with Salzmann of 1772 showed Lenz to be dwelling on the subject of human sin and its consequences rather than on the greatness of human potential as manifested in the figure of Götz. But it is reflected in his later literary works far more clearly than the idea of "Charakteren, die sich ihre Begebenheiten erschaffen, die selbständig und unveränderlich die ganze große Maschine selbst drehen." Even the fallible, however, have personal responsibility for their actions. If it is they who acted wrongly it is also they who must take the consequences of their action; it is also they, moreover, that can and must learn from these consequences. All action, Lenz thought, whether right or wrong, can and must be turned to account. Only by action and experience is moral growth possible. This was Lenz's interpretation of the Fall, as he presented it
in Meynungen. All human action, from Adam's on, was necessary if man was to make moral progress. It need not surprise us that Lenz's two main dramas follow Adam's pattern of a Fall followed by achievement of insight, which, through *metanoia*: the consciousness of higher modes of action, brings the individual a step nearer to his ultimately lofty potential. *Der Hofmeister* is Lenz's most enthusiastic presentation of the idea of *metanoia*. Freedom of action is freedom to make mistakes and freedom to derive spiritual and moral profit from those mistakes.

In *Die Soldaten* *metanoia* is not put forward quite so optimistically. As Lenz there explores the often tragic consequences of erring human behaviour, he shows to what extent freedom of action, which is still maintained behind the pretense of making society a determining force, necessarily entails suffering. Individuals are responsible for the suffering they bring upon themselves. To err is their prerogative, to suffer the consequences their fate. Their only attitude can be one of acceptance. To others around them the only response can be compassion. In *Die Soldaten* the lessons learnt are bitter, but they are lessons. *Metanoia* is painful, but it still exists.
"Ein Ball anderer zu sein, ist ein trauriger niederdrückender Gedanke, eine ewige Sklaverei, eine nur künstlichere, eine vernünftige aber eben um dessentwillen desto elendere Tierschaft" (I.378). With these lines from the essay: "Über Götz von Berlichingen" a theme is announced that runs through the first two acts of Der Hofmeister. These acts consist largely of a discussion between the Geheimer Rat, the Major his brother, and the reactionary Pastor Läuffer, father of the hapless tutor about whom the debate is carried on. Against the Major's unreflecting insistence on the value of employing a private tutor rather than sending his son to public school, and against the Pastor's weak defense of his son's qualification to be that tutor, on the grounds that the scarcity of suitable employment for a young man in his son's position makes him a beggar who cannot afford to be a chooser, the blunt advice of the Geheimer Rat is that the tutor Läuffer should be thrown out on his ear. Not only does private education pander to the conceit of the nobility, he says, not only is it contrary to change and enlightenment, but above all it is degrading to the tutor; all Läuffer can expect is futility and bondage: "Die edelsten Stunden des Tages bei einem jungen Herrn versitzen, der nichts lernen mag, und mit dem er's doch nicht verderben darf, und die übrigen Stunden, die der Erhaltung
seines Lebens, den Speisen und Schlaf geheiligt sind, an einer Sklavenkette verseufzen; an den Winken der gnädigen Frau hängen und sich in die Falten des gnädigen Herrn hineinstituíeren; essen, wenn er satt ist, und fasten, wenn er hungrig ist, Punsch trinken, wenn er p-ss-n möchte, und Karten spielen, wenn er das Laufen hat. Ohne Freiheit geht das Leben bergab rückwärts, Freiheit ist das Element des Menschen wie das Wasser des Fisches, und ein Mensch, der sich der Freiheit begibt, vergiftet die edelsten Geister seines Bluts, erstickt seine süßesten Freuden des Lebens in der Blüte und ermordet sich selbst" (II. 25). Läuffer's position as tutor evidently corresponds to the more general picture Lenz paints in the essay on Götze, particularly in the opening paragraph (I. 378), of man determined by his circumstances. Läuffer is dependent on his father for financial support ("unsere Eltern geben uns Brot und Kleid"), he has returned from a not too distinguished university career ("unsere Lehrer drücken in unser Hirn Worte, Sprachen, Wissenschaften"), he hears of an opening as tutor to the Major's son ("es entsteht eine Lücke in der Republik wo wir hineinpassen"), it is at his father's behest that he takes the job ("unsere Freunde, Verwandte, Gönner setzen an und stoßen uns glücklich hinein"), and finally, and disastrously, he slips into an erotic involvement with Gustchen ("irgend ein artiges Mädchen drückt in unser Herz den Wunsch es eigen zu besitzen, es in unsere Arme als unser Eigentum zu schließen, wenn sich nicht gar ein tierisch Bedürfnis mit hineinmischt"). The picture
painted in the essay is intended to be uncomplimentary, yet the reality of Läuffer's situation is obviously more uncomplimentary still. There is not only the heated argument about the value of the job he has taken, but also the very shabby nature of his affair with Gustchen. Läuffer is not only a ball, tossed around by others: his father, the Major, the Major's wife, even Leopold his pupil, but morally also he is at the mercy of his own lower desires. He seems to offer no resistance to concupiscence, neither with Gustchen nor, absurdly, with the peasant girl Lise. We have to call him a seducer, though the term does too much credit to his weak-willed, weak-principled nature. Läuffer slides into the affair with Gustchen out of a combination of weakness and indolence.

The fact that the tutor is both a plaything of circumstances and a victim of his lower nature is no coincidence. The Geheimer Rat points out that one leads to the other: "Ohne Freiheit geht das Leben bergab rückwärts." A human being in bondage to circumstances can no longer remain a human being, but is reduced to the level of basic appetites. Läuffer is forced to give up the right to live by his own principles, and receives in return little more than food and drink. Little wonder, the Geheimer Rat would have said if he had known at this point what was to transpire between the tutor and his pupil Gustchen, that his sexual appetite was also to demand compensation for the loss of freedom. Moral degradation is the real
danger in a tutor's position. Deprived of the chance to use his powers for the general good and to increase his own happiness, a person loses all "Feuer, Mut und Tätigkeit" (30), he loses "den Adel seiner Seele" (26), which is educated man's ability to live and act by his own principles. Events then prove the Geheimer Rat's opinion to be right. Läuffer loses all will-power and principle, and only partially recovers it when he is shocked into it by the conviction that he has caused Gustchen's death.

However, the Geheimer Rat's opinion is a diagnosis of Läuffer rather than a prognosis. Läuffer lacks will-power from the beginning. The real thrust of the Geheimer Rat's remarks is that though Läuffer's situation is against him, though he is an example of determined man, pushed by family and circumstances into an insignificant job, with the attraction of a wife with whom to share "eine selige Zukunft" - to become a small cog in the huge machine of the world, he is aware of the degradation his job forces him to undergo, but does nothing about it other than complain. The exhortation to Götzian living in the essay assumes that it is within man's powers to break out of one's determining circumstances. Determinism can be overcome by character. Läuffer is in unfortunate circumstances, but the fact that he does nothing to break out of them but accepts indignity after indignity shows weakness of character rather than misfortune. The whole of the first scene of Act II is designed to prove the correctness of the Geheimer
Rat's opinion of Läuffer: "Er ist ein Tor und hat alle sein Mißvergnügen sich selber zu danken". (24). One would have to be a fool to give up one's best years to a job that brings no job satisfaction, no sense of worthwhile accomplishment and next to no pay, and to bind oneself in slavery to the whims of a conceited master and mistress. Beyond the picture of the wretchedness of a private tutor's situation is the folly of anyone who would put up with it. Certainly the situation is hostile to general happiness, but it is in Läuffer's, and the Major's, power to change it. They have their priorities, however, and choose not to. Läuffer's attachment to Gustchen motivates him to put up with his degradation, and the Major's concern with prestige and upholding feudal values, and his insistence that his daughter will marry into the highest family in the land and therefore need an exclusive education, motivate him to go on employing a tutor he really cannot afford.

The Geheimer Rat's picture of Läuffer's folly is strengthened by the inability of the unenlightened Pastor to come up with any better argument in defense of private tutors than: "Ich bin auch Hauslehrer gewesen". (28). The more he defends his son the weaker his case becomes, and he is reduced to such feeble platitudes as: "Man kann nicht immer seinen Willen haben," "es ist in der Welt nicht anders;". (27), "es müssen doch bei Gott auch Hauslehrer in der Welt sein". (27) and "wie können Sie mir das beweisen?". (28) When he has made the tactical mistake of assuming that the Geheimer Rat had also had a private tutor, his only response to being corrected on this point is "da ist
aber noch viel drüber zu sagen", and "ich meinerseits bin Ihrer Meinung nicht " (28).

Both the Pastor and his son lack determination and independence not because of their social position but because of their attitude towards it. It is not his situation that has transformed Läuffer into what he is. At the beginning of Act I, he is hardly known for any principled determination, subsequently to be eroded by the nature of his job; he is known rather for his familiarity with Leipzig's coffee houses, and for his "galanterie". His interest in dancing, shared by the Majorin and Graf Wermuth, symbolises the superficiality of his concerns. Läuffer always was a shallow character.

It is Lenz's emphasis on the character of Läuffer, or rather on his lack of it, that leads us away from taking the title: Der Hofmeister oder Vortheile der Privaterziehung as an announcement, even an ironic one, of the play's real theme. Since Erich Schmidt's famous dictum it has been agreed that the comedy was hardly written to warn against the perils of employing a private tutor, even though the other private tutor in the play: von Seiffenblase's, has as pernicious an influence on others as Läuffer, and even though Fritz returns us to the theme by his remarks in the concluding lines of the play. The succession of events do not all serve to underline this "Sentenz", denied even by Lenz himself (I.385); the student scenes and Wenzeslaus episode draw attention away from the tutor problem, focussing it rather on the problem of concupiscence. And the
seduction scenes themselves indicate that it is not the situation of Läuffer so much as the character of Läuffer, and indeed that of Gustchen and Major, that is the real source of the tragedy. Läuffer seduces Gustchen as weak-willed good-for-nothing; not because he is a tutor but because he is that sort of tutor.

In Act II Scene 1 Läuffer refers, in his letter to his father, to "Aussichten in eine selige Zukunft" (31). Scene 2 then lets us see what sort of future he has in mind. Here he is languishing in unrequited love for Gustchen, and wallowing in self-pity. By Scene 5 events have taken their course, the appeal to Gustchen's compassion has done its work and Läuffer has slid into the role of substitute lover for Fritz. Gustchen kisses Läuffer, thinking of Fritz, or more accurately, thinking of her own role as the girl deserted by Fritz. She, of course, has long practised role-playing. Steeped in the world of popular classics of literature she finds a precedent for her actions and others' in Shakespeare, Gellert and Rousseau. Her first words in the play establish Romeo and Juliet as the model for her relationship with Fritz: "Glaubst du denn, daß deine Juliette so unbeständig sein kann:" Fritz picks up the theme and toys with the idea of being a Romeo, Gustchen brings in Gellert to suggest a more realistic alternative to Romeo's killing himself for love, and so the game goes on. By Act II Scene 5 it becomes apparent that in using Läuffer as an Ersatz-Romeo she is stretching the model quite considerably, but as
Juliet she still abandons herself to reveries in which she tries out the various postures of the forsaken lover. It is hard to blame her for doing this. Conditions in the Major's household are not conducive to wise and stable behaviour. Her parents despise each other and fight over their children, so that Gustchen, being caught in the rivalry between them, has no natural relationship with either. Her mother dislikes her for Graf Wermuth's interest in her and seeks to establish her own intimacy with the Graf by making indiscrete revelations to him about the Major. Her father dotes on her to the extent of seeing in her the person he wishes her to become rather than her real self. After Fritz's departure she has no friends either--apart from Läuffer--and living in isolation in the country with no other moral guide than her books of literature, she not surprisingly develops a propensity for role-playing, rather than living spontaneously or by principle. She is much more than Läuffer a victim of her circumstances, and yet after her flight from home and months of suffering, she does come to grips with life at first hand and abandons all posturing. Though her situation becomes like that of the Prodigal Son, she never slips into that posture, but acts spontaneously and following her deepest feeling. Before her flight the superficial rhetoric of "O Tod! Tod! warum erbarmst du dich nicht!" (40) comes easy to her. Later, when the conviction comes to her that she has caused her father's death, and when she is really facing her own death, if not from the exhaustion following child-birth
then by suicide, her words express genuine horror and despair:


The opposite development is to be seen in Läuuffer. At the beginning of the play he shows no sign of any propensity for role-playing. If he does find himself playing the role of general factotum it is because he is forced into it and is too weak to resist, not because he likes it. By the second act, however, he has slipped into playing Gustchen's game. To win her sympathy he strikes a tragic posture, asserting that he will request the Major to remove from her the object of her hate and revulsion, that is: Läuuffer, and ends: "Ich muß sehen, wie ich das elende Leben zu Ende bringe, weil mir doch der Tod verboten ist--" (32). After the seduction this more general posturing turns into contemplation of a specific, and ominous, model: "Es könnte mir gehen wie Abälard" (41). Gustchen, in the printed version if not in the manuscript version, immediately grasps the implications of this model and suggests instead Rousseau's happier version: "Hast du die neue Héloïse gelesen?" At this point the scene ends and we never see them together again, but the damage is done. By damage we mean, of course,
Gustchen's pregnancy, but also the fact that Läuffer has now slipped into Gustchen's way of looking for second-hand models of behaviour. Läuffer, who should be Gustchen's tutor, is the one who has learnt from his pupil to allow his behaviour to be determined by foreign models rather than by personal conviction. Having already been forced by his position as tutor to give up his freedom, he now begins voluntarily to abandon any sense of individual destiny and see himself as destined to follow a path that others have laid out before him. In Act II Scene 5 the idea has only just struck him, and will perhaps be forgotten. However when shocked into an awareness of the consequences of his act of seduction, it comes back to him, and in the desperation of remorse he abandons himself to the model.

Läuffer's castration has been a rock of offense since the day the play was published. Was it necessary for Lenz not to be content merely with alluding to the castration of Abelard but to make his tutor go out and actually perform the act? and as if this was not enough, then to spend whole scenes discussing the value of the act? What was Lenz's intention in making Läuffer do this? Are we to see it as one valid solution to the problem of concupiscence? Or is it to be seen as a tragic act of mistaken remorse? Or is it an act of crass folly, like all of Läuffer's actions?

We know of Lenz's own agonising over the problem of dealing with sexual desire. In addition to the preaching of ascetic resistance in the essay on the "Tree of Knowledge," the private
document: "Meine Lebensregeln" enumerates ways of disciplining one's desires. And a further comment, published by Blei, speaks of Lenz's belief in the value of pipe-smoking to control desire: "Immer habe ich bemerkt, daß unter den Tobaksrauchern die gutartigsten Leute sein. Das setzt eine gewisse Stille und Zufriedenheit des Geists voraus, in der man sich bloß hinsetzt, um zu geniessen, und jede Pause in unserer Seele ist uns heilsam, in der sie sich ein wenig zurechtlegen kann und Ordnung in ihre Begehrungskräfte bringen."

It is evident that Wenzeslaus, with his own "rules for living" is articulating much that was of concern to Lenz. And in doing so he does bring to focus some of the ideas and attitudes expressed in the student scenes as well. Läuffer is not the only one with the problem of concupiscence, nor is Wenzeslaus the only one with clear ideas on how it is to be dealt with. Fritz and Patus's student friendship comes to a crisis when Patus compromises Rehaar's respectability and his daughter's honour by climbing into her bedroom at night. Though he does later spring into action and challenge Patus to a duel for dishonouring Rehaar himself, Fritz's immediate response is to preach him a sermon on the wrongness of following his desires: "Ein Mann, der gegen ein Frauenzimmer es so weit treibt, als er nur immer kann, ist entweder ein Teekessel oder ein Bösewicht; ein Teekessel, wenn er sich selbst nicht beherrschen kann. . .oder ein Bösewicht, wenn er sich selbst nicht beherrschen will " (71). As it turns out, Patus seems to be not even a "Teekessel"; he insists he
has not actually touched the girl, and Fritz knows that despite the aggressive exterior Päatus does not have what it takes to make a real seducer. The same cannot be said of von Seiffen-blase, whose persistent attentions to Frl. Rehaar culminate in a major attempt to abduct her. He and his tutor, with their persistent, calculating attempts to take advantage of others, are the only real Bösewichte in the play. Läuffer himself is a "Teekessel", concupiscent out of weakness rather than out of malice. He is so easy a prey to temptation that moral maxims and rules of life all prove too hard for him. He rejects the path of ascetic spirituality laid out before him by Wenzeslaus, preferring the warmth and human companionship of marriage to the naive, simple-hearted Lise. Läuffer, then, is quite incapable of resisting concupiscence, and it is for this reason that his castration is to be seen as the act of futility that he senses it might be: "Ich weiß nicht, ob ich recht getan " (80). Wenzeslaus shoots wide of the mark when he sees it as the hallmark of spiritual greatness. It was done indecisively and out of moral impotence, and alters nothing of Läuffer's problems of self-control. Having slid helplessly into the seduction of Gustchen, he falls equally helplessly a prey to the charms of Lise. Castrating himself does not make up for his lack of principle, and prevents him from ever again acquiring real self-control. Moral impotence is not corrected by sexual impotence. Above all it is an act of weakness because it was done out of a fatalistic sense that what had to happen to Abelard had to happen to him. Mis-
trustful of his own moral judgment he follows Gustchen in identifying with a literary model, and even then is not sure whether he should have done even this.

Lenz does, however, allow him a limited happiness, if, to our minds, a derisory one. Castration and celibacy were no solution and had to be shown to be so. Not only does castration not solve the problem of concupiscence — only self-control or marriage can do that, in Lenz's view — but it is reduced to the absurd by Wenzeslaus' extravagant praise. It becomes a fanatic act, associated with the grossest excesses of religious sects. In marrying Lise, Läuffer is opting for love and humanity, and that must always be preferable to life-denying fanaticism. Wenzeslaus recognises he has been mistaken in Läuffer: "Das müßt' ein ganz ander Mann sein, der aus Absicht und Grundsätzen den Weg einschläge, um ein Pfeiler unserer sinkenden Kirche zu werden" (97). At least Läuffer has the sense to refuse this role. He opts instead for a limited happiness that matches the limitations of his ambition. The message of the theoretical essays was that greater happiness and fulfilment and greater moral stature are achieved by resistance to concupiscence. The vital energies of the individual are sapped and dissipated by easy satisfaction of desire. Läuffer always chose the easy way, and as a result can conceive at the end of the play of no higher happiness than marriage to Lise: "Komm zu deinem Vater, Lise, seine Einwilligung noch, und ich bin der glücklichste Mensch auf dem Erdboden!" (97) With Läuffer, we
have now the impression that we have come to the end of the story. His happiness is fixed at the level of humble married life, so humble that there will be affection instead of marital love, and chickens to feed and raise instead of children. With Gustchen and Fritz and their families, the ending is quite different.

Gustchen’s role-playing does not, as we have seen, survive the test of harsh experience. Dire poverty and the trauma of childbirth while estranged from her family, with only a blind old woman to help her, bring her to depths of humiliation and despair. Her guilty conscience, which had first caused her to flee her home and her father, and then to dream that she would be the death of her father if she did not let him know she was still alive, finally drives her to attempted suicide as she imagines, in the delirium of weakness, that the Major is already dead. Her death, she feels, is required by justice. With this she reaches the lowest point of her humiliation, and it is at this point that chance intervenes to save her. Her father appears, snatches her from death and responds to her plea for forgiveness with a torrent of affectionate abuse that expresses his joy at recovering her and his complete willingness to forgive. From being a lost sinner Gustchen now becomes a penitent one, with a bitter experience to look back on but much the wiser for the experience. Like the penitent woman at the end of Faust she is now a means of grace to save other sinners. With a new sensitivity to the moral dangers facing a young woman,
she, with her father and the Geheimer Rat, befriend Jungfer Rehaar, compromised earlier by Pätsus and now in danger of being abducted by von Seiffenblase, and save her from a fate similar to her own.

Lenz deals frequently with the concept of repentance, and defines it, as we have said above in Chapter 3, as a change of mentality: "Metanoeite - nicht tut Buße...sondern verändert euren Sinn, erhebt ihn, trachtet von ganzem Herzen, das Geschehene zu verbessern—und alsdenn 'glaubet an das Evangelium', ihr habt einen Gott, der mißlungene Versuche nicht mit dem Tode bestraft, sondern mit Leben, ewigem Leben, wenn sie nur fortgesetzt werden" (I.508). It is at the ending of Der Hofmeister that Lenz gives the fullest illustration of metanoia, and it affects not only Gustchen but also the Major, the Geheimer Rat, Pätsus, his father and even Fritz himself, though there is little in his case to repent of. In the Major, metanoia takes the form of repentance from his desire that Gustchen should marry a "General or statesman of the highest rank". Like Gustchen the Major has to undergo a period of suffering, in which his cherished ideal gradually fades before his eyes. The loss of his daughter's beauty and happiness following her fall, then the news that she has run away with Läuffer, and finally the fruitlessness of the search for her, drive him to despair and it is all the Geheimer Rat can do to prevent him from abandoning his family and ending his life in the service of the Russian army. Beyond despair, however, he gains a new sensitivity to suffering.
His aggressive pride in his daughter is replaced by compassion and humility. When he goes to Gustchen's rescue he is prepared to identify with victims of misfortune, whether he finds his daughter or not: "Ein Weibsbild war's und wenn gleich nicht meine Tochter, doch auch ein unglücklich. Weibsbild" (69). The pretentiousness of marrying Gustchen off to a nobleman is shunned, though it is deeply rooted in him and returns to torment him: "Freier für meine Tochter... Ist er von Adel... O sie sollte die erste Partie im Königreich werden. Das ist ein vermaledeiter Gedanke! Wenn ich doch den erst fort hätte; er wird mich noch ins Irrhaus bringen" (101). Repenting of his overweening ambitions he also repents of his refusal to follow the Geheimer Rat's advice and give his children a public education. He has no more illusions on this score, even though he has no idea how girls of Gustchen's age should otherwise be educated. But discussion of that issue belongs to some other occasion: "Davon wollen wir ein andermal sprechen", says the Geheimer Rat, expressing the feeling that a new beginning is possible and that the future is open for progress and development.

The misfortunes suffered by the family have affected the Geheimer Rat in a strange way, and revealed an unexpected inconsistency in his character. When he hears of his son's imprisonment his immediate response is no longer one of practical concern, and a clear perception of what needs to be done. His rational approach to the question of the Major's employment of
Läuffer and to the emergency of Gustchen's disappearance, becomes, in the case of his own son's emergency, a fatalistic submission to the punishing hand of God: "Der Himmel verhängt Strafen über unsre ganze Familie" (55). The rationalism returns when he is told by Seiffenblase of old Pätus's harshness towards his son, and counters the tutor's defence of old Pätus's action with the assertion: "Gegen die Ausschweifungen seiner Kinder kann man nie zu hart sein, aber wohl gegen ihr Elend" (55). Rather than take active steps himself, however, to help Fritz in his misery, his only reaction is to submit again to what he sees as divine justice: "Es ist ein Gericht Gottes über gewisse Familien; bei einigen sind gewisse Krankheiten erblich, bei andern arten die Kinder aus, die Väter mögen tun, was sie wollen" (56). His form of repentance runs directly counter to that urged by Lenz. His impulse is to do penance rather than to do some active good to set right what has been done wrong: "ich will fasten und beten"; he slips into self-incrimination: "vielleicht hab ich diesen Abend durch die Ausschweifungen meiner Jugend verdient" (56), instead of "believing in the gospel" and in a God "der mißlungene Versuche nicht mit dem Tode bestraft, sondern mit Leben, ewigem Leben, wenn sie nur fortgesetzt werden." The freedom that the Geheimer Rat preaches elsewhere has now given way to the Pietist doctrine of election. He resolves to go and plead with God rather than redeem his son from prison. Small wonder, then, that it is soon his turn to be reading a letter enumerating the follies of his own son, just like Pastor Läuffer earlier.
The Geheimer Rat's main limitation is that his role as philosopher and commentator often leaves little room for his role as participant in the action. He abounds in practical wisdom, but at moments of crisis he often does nothing. This is not to say that his problem is the same as Strephon's in *Die Freunde machen den Philosophen*: that he is namely a "bloßer Beobachter " (II.323), a philosopher only. He does actively restrain the Major in times of panic and despair, he does suggest a likely source of information on the whereabouts of Gustchen or Läuffer, and he does take the initiative in rescuing Jungfer Rehaar from the unscrupulous Seiffenblase. But he does nothing to save his own son, and when Gustchen is sighted attempting to drown herself, his weak reaction: "Gott im Himmel! Was sollen wir anfangen " (69), is as useless as the Graf Wermuth's helpless : "Ich kann nicht schwimmen." It is the Major who has the energy to act spontaneously. His impulsiveness may make him shoot and wound Läuffer, or rush off to become a peasant, or die in the Turkish wars, but it also enables him to save Gustchen's life. In the words of the "Supplement" again, "ihr werdet gerichtet werden und seid schon jetzt gerichtet vor Gott, nicht nach dem, was ihr geträumt habt, sondern was ihr gehandelt habt bei Leibes Leben, es sei gut oder böse"(I.509).

*Der Hofmeister* is about people who do things, not about people's ideas, nor about the people who have them. Life is action, thought Lenz, not knowing or moralising; consequently those characters who have knowledge or who moralise are not really
part of the drama. Wenzeslaus is a minor and comic figure
because he does very little. He merely represents an idea
that has a basis of sense but is carried so far as to become
nonsense. His actual freedom of action is limited, at his own
acknowledgement, to a very narrow sphere. He can make much
noise about personal freedom, and does manage to save Läufer
the first time from attack, but the "halb Dutzend handfester
Bauernkerle" (53) with whom he threatens to defend his freedom
are never there when they are needed. And after the Geheimer
Rat has offered Läufer the compensation of a bag of money for
the Major's assault on him in the schoolteacher's house, Wen­
zeslaus contents himself with the very much milder threat:
"Ich will ihm einen Brief schreiben, dem Herrn Major, den er
nicht ins Fenster stecken soll " (68). Wenzeslaus' ideas are
considered by Läufer and presented to the reader for consider­
ation, but finally have no effect on the tutor. He will not
become a born-again pillar of the Church, not because he re­
jects the idea on principle, but because he is too weak to re­
sist temptation in the form of Lise. Life proves to be too
strong for the old pedant's moralising. Läufer cannot see his
self-castration as a saintly act; he refuses the role of second
Origen and marries Lise instead.

The Geheimer Rat, true to his name and profession, also
abounds in ideas and advice but experiences very much less than
the other main characters and participates less than they in the
moral drama of the play. He cannot for a long time find it in
him to forgive Fritz, and when he learns of Seiffenblase's calumny and is reconciled to his son, he makes only a feeble attempt to apologise to him and ask his forgiveness, and leaps in immediately with an excuse: "Ich seh, ihr wilde Bursche denkt besser als eure Väter. Was hast du wohl von mir gedacht, Fritz, aber man hat dich auch bei mir verleumdet" (98). Metanoia in his case is limited to a certain awareness that life is not as simple as he thinks and he would have others think. His trust in a rational world and in his own rational precepts has been shaken, but that is as far as it goes. While the others find and actively experience the acute joy of reconciliation, his function is rather to orchestrate the reconciliation.

His orchestration, however, plays a vitally important role in creating and intensifying the spirit of metanoia in Act V. The Geheimer Rat may be on the surface less a man of action than a man of ideas, and he may have failed to influence others, even by his ideas, but he has already come across as something of a busy-body, wanting to supervise Gustchen's transportation from the scene of her attempted suicide, but receiving the Major's rebuke: "Was geht sie Euch an? Ist sie doch Eure Tochter nicht. Bekümmert Euch um Euer Fleisch und Bein daheim " (70). We now find him carrying out behind the scenes an intrigue that does influence the course of events and powerfully shapes the dénouement. It is important to note the way in which he calls the cues in the last two scenes of the play. His manner in de-
laying giving the information that will set anxious minds at rest seems, at first sight, highly tantalising, not to say cruel. Fritz, who has received no replies to his letters to his father, and fears he has been disowned, wastes no time upon arrival at Insterburg in seeking his father's forgiveness, but the Geheimer Rat is strangely indifferent to Fritz's need to hear his forgiveness expressed in so many words. The anxious question: "Haben Sie mir vergeben?" (98), being answered merely by an ambivalent: "Mein Sohn!", is intensified by the Prodigal Son's admission: "Ich bin nicht wert, daß ich Ihr Sohn heiße." Still the Geheimer Rat refuses to respond to the moral intent of Fritz's words, and instead of giving the absolution that is being asked for, suggests only changing the subject: "Setz dich: denk mir nicht mehr dran." In a few minutes the scenario is repeated. The Geheimer Rat's question: "Aber was führt dich denn nach Hause zurück, eben jetzt da?" brings Fritz to the real cause of his anxiety: "Fahren Sie fort--O das eben jetzt, mein Vater! Das eben jetzt ist's, was ich wissen wollte. . . Ist Gustchen tot?" Once again the Geheimer Rat evades the question and diverts the conversation to the subject of Jungfer Rehaar. Ascertaining that Pätsus has a particular concern for her, he sends him in on cue to the antechamber in which the girl is waiting, to be reunited with her. Fritz's renewed plea for information is then rebuffed again, which drives Fritz almost to breaking-point: "O mein Vater, wenn Sie noch Zärtlichkeit für mich haben, lassen Sie mich nicht zwischen Himmel und
Erde, zwischen Hoffnung und Verzweiflung schweben. Darum bin ich gereist; ich konnte die qualvolle Ungewißheit nicht länger aushalten. Lebt Gustchen? Ist's wahr, daß sie entehrt ist?" (99) The Geheimer Rat's cunning reply successfully maintains the fiction of Gustchen's death until Fritz has reached the lowest depths of despair, at which point he sends his son into the antechamber to an ecstatic reunion with Gustchen. In the last scene, the game is played once more, this time with the Major: "Weiβt du was Neues, Major? Es finden sich Freier für deine Tochter--Aber dring nicht in mich, dir den Namen zu sagen " (101). By asking the Major to give his consent to the marriage without knowing who the suitor is, the Geheimer Rat causes him to ask himself, finally, the question whether it is after all important who his daughter marries, and at this point the door is opened and Gustchen has the cue to walk on with Fritz. There remains one more reunion to stage-manage: that between Pātus and his father, and the general rejoicing is complete.

Such delay tactics make for excellent drama. The suspense created and the way it is created, are important elements in the atmosphere of comedy that informs these scenes. But there is another reason why the Geheimer Rat insists on prolonging the uncertainty and, in Fritz's case, the agony. In each case his tactic serves to draw out a full confession, the reward for which is then the joy of reunion. With Fritz it tests his feelings towards Gustchen and elicits an acknowledgement of guilt.
The confession of guilt towards his father: "Ich bin nicht wert, daß ich Ihr Sohn heiße" (98) is followed by one of guilt towards Gustchen: "Schuldig war ich, einzig und allein schuldig. Gustchen, seliger Geist, verzeihe mir! . . .Ich habe falsch geschworen " (100). With Päts us it tests his feelings towards Jungfer Rehaar; his pretence of "Ich? Nein, ich habe sie nicht gekannt " (99), is comically transformed to the correct admission: "Ja, ich habe sie gekannt", a comic reversal of Läuffer's switch from the honest to the dishonest answer in Act I Scene 3: "Non Madame. . .Oui Madame " (14). With the Major the tactic serves to draw out the admission that he has been wrong to insist on a marriage into high society for Gustchen: "Das ist ein vermaledeiter Gedanke! Wenn ich doch den erst fort hätte; er wird mich noch ins Irrhaus bringen " (101). In each case suspense makes the characters that undergo it more human. It brings them to a moral awareness of their attitudes and actions, and to an honest confession, which in turn enhances the spirit of metanoia. With Fritz it sharpens the joy of reunion by sharpening the pain that precedes it. With Päts us it crystallises his feelings towards Jungfer Rehaar and makes him take responsibility for dealing openly and honestly with her. With the Major it makes sure that he is fully cured of his vain and pretentious ambition, so that his happiness can be unflawed.

When human beings are brought to their knees and their self-delusion is replaced by humility and honesty, then they are fit to receive joy and happiness. It is in this light that we must
now interpret what seems at first sight, a rather nasty jibe by the Geheimer Rat at Gustchen's suffering. Gustchen, protesting against his reference to Fritz as: "den bösen Buben", pleads: "Da mein Vater mir vergeben hat, sollte Ihr Sohn ein minder güttiger Herz bei Ihnen finden?", to which the Geheimer Rat replies: "Er ist auch noch in keinen Teich gesprungen" (88). Can he really be saying that Fritz will only be forgiven when he too has reached the rock bottom of suicidal despair? As a quick retort it cannot be taken quite as literally as this, but it does reflect the Geheimer Rat's insistence on full repentance, even abasement, as a prerequisite for the unbounded happiness of metanoia. His reluctance to act on hearing the news of Fritz's imprisonment and flight seems now to have a deeper reason than that he is someone more prone to philosophising than to acting. Fritz was not yet ready to be forgiven and saved from his misery because he had not yet come to the end of himself. He had not yet fully learnt his lesson. The Geheimer Rat had stressed, to Pastor Läuffer, the freedom and personal responsibility that he believes all men should have: "Freiheit ist das Element des Menschen wie das Wasser des Fisches" (25), and to the Major he had argued Fritz's freedom to learn and grow not in subjection to a private tutor: "Laß ihn nur.—Seine lustigen Spielgesellen werden ihn minder verderben als ein galonierter Müßiggänger " (13). By implication, Fritz should now be left to face the consequences of his actions, whether pleasant or unpleasant. Events should be left to take their course, until such time as he is
brought to a realisation of his error and to metanoia. To be sure, the Geheimer Rat does not express this reason for his inaction at the time the bad news of Fritz reaches him, and it is hard to reconcile this concern now for Fritz to learn his own lessons, even the hard way, with the self-accusing resignation he showed then. His lapse into Pietistic fatalism is a clear inconsistency in his character. But the desire to bring people to a point of full repentance as they taste the full consequences of their action is, as we have seen, a consistent feature of the Geheimer Rat. He is quite merciless in pushing Fritz, in Act V, to a full confession of the error against which he had spent the whole of Scene 6 of Act I warning him: "Ich habe geschworen, falsch geschworen" (100), and we can well believe that he would also have been merciless enough to leave Fritz to his fate on the principle that "Gegen die Ausschweifungen seiner Kinder kann man nie zu hart sein" (53). However the end of the play shows that behind the sternness there is benevolence in the Geheimer Rat. The abasement he insists on is followed by exaltation.

His retort to Gustchen, however, does more than reveal his own attitude towards the timing of forgiveness. It also establishes a direct link between his role and the parallel role played by chance in the play. His delay tactic is also found in the course of events. He will only act to forgive and save Fritz when his son has become penitent to the point of despair, in the same way that, as chance would have it, Gustchen was
brought to the rock bottom of penitent despair before she was saved. It is only when her compassion for her father has become a sense of guilt at having wronged him and when the humiliation of her suffering has become real humility, that her father arrives to rescue her from the death to which she has already thrown herself. With the Major, likewise, it is only when he has reached the point at which he can be human and compassionate enough to spot misfortune and suffering in others, whether they be his daughter or not, that he is reunited with Gustchen. When he goes to her rescue he does not know whether it is she or not. It suffices that she is a victim of misfortune: "Ein Weibsbild war's und wenngleichen nicht meine Tochter, doch auch ein unglücklich Weibsbild--Nach, Berg!" (69) Chance also makes Patus and Fritz win the lottery, but only after Fritz has stood up for honour and justice and Patus has become honest and mature enough to admit he has mistreated Rehaar.

Hebbel saw only arbitrariness in the operation of chance in this play. "Die Menschen im Hofmeister", he said, "finden sich zusammen, wie König und Dame und Bube im Kartenspiel zusammen kommen, und ihr Schicksal ist dann am Ende auch ein Kartenschicksal, eine rohe willkürliche Combination des Zufalls. Freilich mag auch im Zufall Providenz seyn, doch ist es eine Providenz, die wir nicht zu erfassen vermögen." Chance is, however, not inscrutable but clearly linked to moral justice. After human beings have acted out of folly or weakness and tasted the bitter fruits of their actions, chance comes in to turn the en-
suing moral insight into salvation and new life. But it is careful to intervene on their behalf only when they have reached their lowest and humblest point of submission and awareness of their need and their failings—when they are namely at their most human.

Chance is therefore a saving force, not, as Oehlenschläger will have it, a force for harm as well. Describing Läuffer as a "Ball der Umstände" he sees him as a ball rolling at random, and ascribes the family disaster to the fact that Läuffer happens to roll onto the scene. Moreover the happy ending is haunted, he says, by the shadowy presence of "Zufall", conjured by Fritz's final words: "Wenigstens, mein süßer Junge! werd ich dich nie durch Hofmeister erziehen lassen." If chance was responsible for bringing Läuffer onto the scene, chance, thinks this critic, cannot be trusted to act any more favourably in the future. But this is to fall into the old error exposed by Erich Schmidt of blaming the Hofmeister for everything, now under the name of "Zufall". The play clearly shows that the tragedy was not simply caused by the existence of Läuffer as private tutor. The tutor issue is beside the point. The blame is shared by all concerned, not only by Läuffer but also by the Major and by Gustchen, and, one might also say with Oehlenschläger, by the Geheimer Rat, who, ironically, could have prevented the tragedy from happening by taking Läuffer on as teacher in the public school, though what we know of Läuffer makes it hard for us to blame the Geheimer Rat for not
wanting him in the school either. The point is that the whole ethos of the play is not one of chance happenings over which humans have no control, but one of personal responsibility for actions and events. The moral renewal of the ending implies moral responsibility for the disaster. The events that occur genuinely by chance are saving events, or form part of the pattern of suffering and abasement leading to salvation. Läußer is given, by chance, the wrong information regarding Gustchen's death, but this brings him for the first time face to face with his wrong-doing. Not until the Major found and wounded him did he express any remorse whatsoever at his seduction of Gustchen--his explanation to Wenzeslaus of Graf Wermuth's furious pursuit of him was the shallow one that: "er ist eifersüchtig auf mich, weil das Fräulein ihn nicht leiden kann" (54). His preoccupation is with himself and his newfound freedom: "O Freiheit, güldene Freiheit!" (57), not with Gustchen's fate, and even when he admits his wrong-doing his repentance amounts to little more than a refusal to allow Wenzeslaus and his peasant bodyguard to pursue and punish the Major and his brother for disregarding the sanctity of the school building they had broken into, before he lapses back into concern for his own safety: Wenzeslaus "Wo ist das Otterngezüchte? Redet! Läußer "Ich bitt euch, seid ruhig. Ich habe weit weniger bekommen, als meine Taten wert waren. Meister Schöpsen, ist meine Wunde gefährlich?" (67). Not until he recognises his child and hears that its mother was seen committing suicide does he realise
what he has done to her. Chance is linked with moral justice, which requires, here, Läuffer's punishment to bring him to moral awareness and repentance, as moral justice will require Gustchen's rescue at the last moment as a reward for completed repentance and acquired moral insight. The other instances of chance shaping the action belong likewise in the area of salvation.

We are in full agreement with Oehlenschläger, therefore, when he observes: "Auffälliger kommt noch Zufall als dramaturgisches Lenkungsprinzip zum Zuge, wenn es nun darum geht, von dieser Position aus die Figuren wieder zueinander zu führen." Chance is an agent of reconciliation, and this, as is not the case with the Geheimer Rat, in a genuine sense. The many reunions could have taken place without the Geheimer Rat, but not without chance. The Berg family happens to be in Königsberg and able to save Fräulein Rehaar from abduction by Seiffenblase. This enables her to be reunited with Pätus who comes to Insterburg with his friend Fritz. Marthe happens to be old Pätus's mother, which means that by being involved in caring for Gustchen's child she also becomes reconciled to her own family, and links the two families together. Fritz and Pätus happen to win the lottery just at the right time and just when they have come to show a certain maturity and sense of responsibility. Lenz does not portray chance as an arbitrary force but identifies it with moral justice; it operates in harmony with human response. Humans are responsible for the bad, chance is
then responsible for turning the bad into good, but only after
the humans have come to a realisation of their wrong-doing.
The pattern laid down in this play is of:
SIN—SUFFERING—INSIGHT—SALVATION--METANOIA--HAPPINESS.
Lenz leads people to the brink of disaster, and even into disas­
ter, then through disaster to salvation—a salvation that
not only takes place as a result of new, moral awareness but
also consists in moral renewal. Instead of Oehlenschläger's
"Handlung nach dem Prinzip 'Zufall'", we would describe the
plot as rather: "Handlung nach dem Prinzip 'Metanoia'."

We return, then, to Hebbel's objection: "Freilich mag auch
im Zufall Providenz seyn, doch ist es eine Providenz, die wir
nicht zu erfassen vermögen." The workings of chance are not,
as we have seen, inscrutable, but can they be seen as the work­
ings of Providence? It must be answered that the whole develop­
ment of the plot implies a benevolent God. What appears in the
play as chance takes on the aspect of divine grace. The reli­
gious dimension is, moreover, not just implied, but it is di­
rectly expressed in this play by the use of religious language
and through patterns of suffering and redemption that are also
at the heart of Lenz's understanding of Christianity as he pre­
sents it in the theoretical essays. An examination of Läuffer's
and Gustchen's fate will serve to illustrate the religious di­
mension of the play.

The question to be asked is why chance/Providence steps in
to save Gustchen but not Läuffer. At first sight it seems that
there is considerable similarity between the fates of Läuffer and Gustchen, and one would expect, therefore, to see a similar dénouement. Both characters are overwhelmed by a sense of guilt: Gustchen because she has sensed her father's death in a dream, and Läuffer because he is given to believe that Gustchen is dead. In this, both characters are alike in being mistaken. Gustchen attempts suicide to punish herself for causing her father's death, but is saved at the eleventh hour. Läuffer castrates himself as a punishment for bringing about Gustchen's death, but no one saves him from his act. Why the difference here?

In reply it should be noted that Lenz has been treating Läuffer and Gustchen differently ever since the flight from the Major's home. He saves us from having to agonise over Läuffer's castration and its tragic implications by making him remain the comic figure that he always was, at a time when he has been turning Gustchen into a tragic one. Läuffer is a comic character from beginning to end because he is a born loser. The situations that he gets himself into never cease to be ridiculous. Never taking events into his own hands and influencing the action for his own good, he is a clown, tossed around and battered by events, abused verbally by the Geheimer Rat and Wenzeslaus, and struck physically by Leopold, his pupil, and by the Major's bullet. His lines at the beginning of Act V Scene 3 have gone down in literary history as probably the most comically grotesque of all lines: "Ich weiß nicht, ob ich recht getan—ich habe mich
kastriert" (80), and lest we should still think of attaching any value to it, his action loses its last shred of seriousness by its association with the worst excesses of religious fanaticism advocated by Wenzeslaus. In his indecisiveness and his complete inability to perform any truly moral action, he is incorrigible, and a fit character for one of Lenz's Plautus comedies. Not so Gustchen. She is made to bear the tragic theme of the unmarried mother, seduced and abandoned to wretchedness and suffering. As such she takes her place alongside Goethe's Gretchen and Wagner's Evchen. But in another sense as well she moves into the realm of tragedy. Lenz marks her out for the sort of suffering and humiliation in which he saw a Christian equivalent of tragedy. Her situation comes, as we shall see, to illustrate "das hohe Tragische" as it is described in Pandemonium Germanicum.

Der Hofmeister is itself, of course, a comedy. Though Lenz speaks of it, in a letter to Salzmann, as his "Trauerspiel" he terms the printed version a "Komödie", having, however, toyed in the manuscript version with the title: "Lust- und Trauerspiel" (II.717-718). Modern scholarship has ably researched the ambivalence in Lenz between comedy and tragedy, and the tendency towards what was then the new genre of tragi-comedy. Of all Lenz's definitions of comedy and tragedy, the one most relevant to his own work is that found in "Rezension des neuen Menoza". By this definition Der Hofmeister is quite definitely a comedy: "Ich nenne durchaus Komödie nicht eine Vorstellung die bloß
Lachen erregt, sondern eine Vorstellung die für jedermann ist" (I.418). But he goes on significantly: "Daher müssen unsere deutschen Komödienschreiber komisch und tragisch zugleich schreiben, weil das Volk, für das sie schreiben, oder doch wenigstens schreiben sollten, ein solcher Mischmasch von Kultur und Rohigkeit, Sittigkeit und Wildheit ist. So erschafft der komische Dichter dem tragischen sein Publikum " (419). Our play is certainly one for everyman, and in Act IV there is ample illustration of the principle of "komisch und tragisch zugleich schreiben." Alongside the comic absurdity of Läuffer and Wenzeslaus and the aggressive antics of the Major, is the quiet anguish of Gustchen. Her dilemma will eventually be overcome but it does move a long way towards tragedy.

This is not to say, of course, that Gustchen has anything to do with those Promethean heroes of tragedy advocated by Lenz in the Anmerkungen über das Theater. The literary theory developed there is less relevant to Lenz's work than it is to Shakespeare's or Goethe's. The emphases laid there on the poet and poetic imitation, on the one hand, and on poetic characters on the other, apply, respectively, to Sturm und Drang Genies in general, as Lenz conceived them, and to Shakespearean and Goethean characters. He himself produced no "Charakterstück" with characters: "die selbständig und unveränderlich die ganze große Maschine selbst drehen, ohne die Gottheiten in den Wolken anders nötig zu haben, als wenn sie wollen zu Zuschauern"(I.343). Nor does Lenz, in his own practice, adhere to the distinctions
he draws between comedy and tragedy. Though he talks in the Anmerkungen in conventional, dualistic terms of "Komödie" and "Tragödie", his practice is more in terms of "das Komische" and "das Tragische": not genres therefore, but elements that could both be found in one drama. It is when questioned in Pandemonium Germanicum about "unser heutiges Trauerspiel" that he replies in terms of "das hohe Tragische."

The scene in question from Pandemonium goes on, most illuminatingly, to define the tragic element of today as the suffering and death of a God: "geht in die Geschichte, seht einen emporsteigenden Halbgott auf der letzten Staffel seiner Größe gleiten oder einen wohltätigen Gott schimpflich sterben. Die Leiden griechischer Helden sind für uns bürgerlich, die Leiden unserer sollten sich einer verkannten und duldenden Gottheit nähern. Oder führtet ihr Leiden der Alten auf, so wären es biblische, wie dieser tat (Klopstock ansehend), Leiden wie der Götter, wenn eine höhere Macht ihnen entgegenwirkt. Gebt ihnen alle tiefe, voraussehende, Raum und Zeit durchdringende Weisheit der Bibel, gebt ihnen alle Wirksamkeit, Feuer und Leidenschaften von Homers Halbgöttern, und mit Geist und Leib stehn eure Helden da" (II.275-6). Lenz neither creates such tragic characters himself, nor does he imagine himself doing so. Klopstock, Herder and Lessing say of him: "Der brave Junge. Leistet er nichts, so hat er doch groß gehandet." It is Goethe, who has already produced what were, to Lenz's mind, the gigantic tragic figures of Werther and Götz, who rises to the challenge: "Ich will's leisten." Reference has already been made, in Pandemonium, to
Werther and to the controversy surrounding the book, and we know from Lenz's essay: "Über die Moralität der Leiden des jungen Werthers" that he thought of Goethe's tragic hero as a "gekreuzigter Prometheus". When he writes here: "Die Leiden unserer sollten sich einer verkannten und duldenden Gottheit nähern", he is surely thinking of the *Leiden des Jungen Werthers*. Although, then, Lenz himself creates no character that fits the lofty description given here, there is one important way in which this passage has a vital relevance to *Der Hofmeister*. The Christian imagery is unmistakable, apart from the overt reference to the Bible. Tragedy now has the mythological background not of pagan antiquity but of the Jüdäo-Christian tradition, and in particular, of New Testament Christianity. Since Lenz sees Christ as a suffering hero, and suffering heroism as Christian, he tells his hearers to write dramas about Biblical heroes, or to make their dramatic heroes into Christ-figures. The essence of tragedy is now not blind submission to "iron fate" as it was in antiquity (*Anmerkungen*), but identification with the suffering and death of Christ: "einer verkannten und duldenden Gottheit." Tragedy is still suffering and humiliation, but it is set in the Christian context of the suffering of Christ which was followed, as the essay "Über die Natur unser Geistes" makes clear, by resurrection and new life: "Zugleich hat er uns ein Symbol geben wollen, was den vollkommenen Menschen mache und wie der nur durch allerlei Art Leiden und Mitleiden werde und bleibe. Denn seine Auferstehung und Auffahrt
sind nur Fortsetzung des selben großen Plans zu leiden und zu handeln" (I.577). Christ was made perfect through suffering, says St. Paul (Heb.2,10), whom Lenz paraphrases here. His sufferings, then, are in symbolic relationship to Gustchen's. She too comes to moral and spiritual maturity by suffering, followed by exaltation. Her fate follows the pattern of Christ's.

The difference between Läuuffer's and Gustchen's fate is expressed, accordingly, in religious language. Läuuffer, as we have said, sacrificed himself after the horrifying conviction came over him that he had not only brought Gustchen to depths of misery but also driven her to a suicide that also entailed the death of her father, drowned as well while attempting to rescue her. The only chance of salvation seems to him to consist in cutting off the member that caused him to sin, and devoting himself to a life of asceticism: "Vielleicht könnt' ich itzt wieder anfangen zu leben und zum Wenzeslaus wiedergeboren werden " (82). "Wiedergeburt": the Pietist door to eternal life, seems a possibility for the tutor, but temptation proves too strong. At the very moment that he is throwing himself on his knees in prayer, Lise comes in, and his moral resolve collapses. He rejects Wenzeslaus's way of salvation, and settling down to the earthy life of marriage to a peasant-girl, with little more than farmyard duties to challenge them, he satisfies himself with an earthly, rather than heavenly happiness: "ich bin der glücklichste Mensch auf dem Erdboden" (97, my underlining). Not having walked the tragic path of suffering or been able to abide
by any moral resolve, his end is as farcical as his beginning.

For Gustchen, a higher perspective opens up. Like Läufer she is brought to a point of despair, but unlike him she knows exactly what she must do. In leaving Marthe to contact her father she is following her deepest feelings, and trusts God for the outcome: "Gott wird mir sein" (65). After she loses the last shred of the self-reliance that makes her say: "ich hab Kräfte wie eine junge Bärin" (64), and is finally in a position of utter helplessness, God intervenes in the form of the Major. The suffering is over, she finds forgiveness, and repentance gives way to sanctification; having found grace she becomes a means of grace to others. The Major summarises to Fritz her spiritual pilgrimage: "O sie hat bereut. Jung', ich schwöre dir, sie hat bereut, wie keine Nonne und kein Heiliger. Aber was ist zu machen? Sind doch die Engel aus dem Himmel gefallen--Aber Gustchen ist wieder aufgestanden" (102). Whilst Läufer sacrifices himself but fails to become a born-again pillar of the Church, Gustchen comes through the near-death of attempted suicide to experience resurrection, which in turn leads into a vista of heaven. In contrast to Läufer's: "ich bin der glücklichste Mensch auf dem Erdboden", is Fritz's declaration: "O was hab ich von einer solchen Frau anders zu gewarten als einen Himmel" (102, my underlinings). The Major then picks up this theme and brings us back to Lenz's definition of metanoia already quoted above: "Ja wohl ein Himmel, wenn's wahr ist, daß die Gerechten nicht allein hineinkommen,
sondern auch die Sünder, die Buße tun." One of the key imperatives of metanoia was "glaubet an das Evangelium", that is: believe that "ihr habt einen Gott, der mißlungene Versuche nicht mit dem Tode bestraft, sondern mit Leben "(508). The Major also has repented: "ihr zur Gesellschaft", he says, and goes on: "und darum macht mich der liebe Gott auch ihr zur Gesellschaft mit glücklich. " (102). Happiness, says Lenz in the "Supplement", is what it is all about: "Bedenkt daß ihr auf der Bahn der Glückseligkeit steht, auf der euch euer Vater will" (I.508).

The concept of metanoia is not therewith exhausted. Implicit in it is the idea of infinite openness to future growth and moral and spiritual development: "μετάμεταφέρω überweg über alle eure vorigen Meinungen von Vollkommenheit und Glückseligkeit, überweg über euer Non Plus ultra, über euer Ideal selbst, und unaufhörlich überweg, solang ihr noch weiter könnt. Das Heraufsehen ist nicht gefährlich, nur das Heruntersehen ist's"(I.545). The Major's metanoia consists first and foremost in the realisation that there are higher ideals than marrying his daughter into high society. Happiness does not consist in giving her an exclusive education to prepare her for an exclusive career: "ich hab für meine Torheiten und daß ich einem Bruder nicht folgen wollte, der das Ding besser verstand, auch Buße getan " (102). At its very basic level metanoia means a change of mentality. The Major reaches a new understanding of the follies of private education. Renewed in under-
standing, as well as in compassion and humanity, he finds a happiness that he did not know before.

The question then arises whether it was not necessary for the Major and Gustchen to have sinned and suffered, in order for them to experience and communicate to others the joyful metanoia of Act V. Lenz would certainly have been aware of the fine line drawn between the doctrine of grace and the heresy, answered by St. Paul, of saying: "Shall we not sin that grace may abound?" (Rom.6:1) But he does come up close to this line in the way he intensifies the concept of metanoia in the last scene. We have the feeling at the end of the play that the happiness more than outweighs the earlier sorrow, that the whole experience has been not a near-tragedy but a positive learning experience, and that the ones who have been through the experience are the ones who are now better off. Forgiveness comes so easily that the tragic wrongfulness of everyone's behaviour fades before the general excitement of reconciliation and new moral and spiritual insight. The ethos is that of the New Testament, but not necessarily as Pietism had taught Lenz to understand it. In his references to Pietists what prevails is penitence and penance without the transcendent dimension of metanoia. He uses, in referring to Pietists, the slightly derogatory nickname of the day: "Kopfhänger", and makes the Pietist woman say in his skit on Wieland: "ewig muß ich die Sünde beweinen". Lenz's metanoia is based rather on Christ's words taken from the same context as the Parable of the Prodigal Son, a parable that Schöne found to be central
to the structures of Lenz's life and works: "There is more joy in heaven over one sinner that repents than over ninety-nine that need no repentance" (Lk.15,7, my underlining). It seemed almost an advantage to have been a sinner. We are reminded of Martin Luther's difficult notion of "pecca fortiter", which can only be understood if we expand it to mean that one must sin vigourously in order to be able to repent vigourously and thereby become an object of divine grace. It is in this Reformed tradition that Lenz writes in two isolated notes: "Ein Guter ist nichts, wenn er es nicht aus einem Bösewicht geworden ist", and "Eine Seele ohne starken Trieb zum Laster ist nicht wert, fromm und gut zu sein" (Blei IV,284). Being evil is an indispensible prerequisite for becoming good. The Sturm und Drang Major is a striking example of energetic wrong-doing, turning into equally energetic repentance and doing good. His confession of sin leads to a vision of heaven, and it is his reference to the righteous, to sinners, to repentance and heaven that points us to Christ's words: "Ja wohl einen Himmel; wenn's wahr ist, daß die Gerechten nicht allein hineinkommen, sondern auch die Sünder, die Buße tun". It is Fritz, however, who most closely reflects the spirit of "more joy" by his declaration: "Dieser Fehltritt macht sie mir nur noch teurer--macht ihr Herz nur noch englischer " (102). The child that is the fruit of Gustchen's sin is to him "unendlich schätzbar" (my underlinings). Metanoia does not merely right wrongs, or restore matters to their former state. It transcends the issue in question and
opens out unlimited perspectives of happiness for the individual. Even Pähus does more than merely restore himself to his father's favour. He returns his father's money with the words: "hier ist's zurück und mein Dank dazu: es hat doppelte Zinsen getragen, das Kapital hat sich vermehrt" (103).

But Lenz stops short of saying that all that happened, happened for the best. There is no eighteenth century theodicy here that would justify evil as being part of God's overall controlling. Gustchen and the Major were not passive subjects in an ordered world that ordered their fall as well as their subsequent restoration, for central to the concept of metanoia is the idea of freedom. Personal repentance implies a personal responsibility for one's actions. Old Pähus lays great stress in his confession, even more so than the Major and Gustchen, on the fact that he is to blame for the evil suffered in his family: "Ich habe sie aus dem Hause gestoßen...ich habe ärger gegen sie gehandelt als ein Tiger--Welche Gnade von Gott ist es, daß sie mir noch verzeihen kann, die großmütige Heilige! daß es noch in meine Gewalt gestellt ist, meine verfluchte Verbrechen wiedergutzumachen...Ich will's der ganzen Welt erzählen, was ich für ein Ungeheuer war" (101). Human beings, as portrayed in this play, are all like old Pähus. If they act wrongly it is in their power to pick up the bits and carry on. A voluntary change of heart is all that it takes to overcome evil and tragedy. To a very limited extent even Läuuffer fits this pattern, doing rather drastic penance for his wrong-doing
but then salvaging some of his life and happiness and investing it in marriage to Lise.

We have said that this play is about people who do things. It is not primarily about an idea nor about events or circumstances. People act deliberately but thoughtlessly and impulsively. When brought face to face with the consequences of their actions, they realise their error and their folly and take personal responsibility, expressed in repentance and the seeking and giving of forgiveness. Their actions derive from their character, and their fate is to a large extent—although it does also owe much to Grace—a matter of their own deciding. Lenz saw the same sense of moral freedom and responsibility in Werther: "Goethe stellte einen jungen mutigen lebenvollen Held auf die Bühne, der weiß was er will und wo er hinauswill, der den Tod selbst nicht scheut, wenn er ihn nur auf guten Wegen übereilt, der im Stande ist sich selbst zu strafen wenn er es wo versehen haben sollte" (1.398-399, Lenz's underlining). Lenz speaks here of Werther in Götz-like terms. Though there is no Götzian heroism about the Major or Gustchen, there is the seed of what we might call "Götzianism", the essence of which is spontaneous action out of the core of one's being. "You, not circumstances, should be the origin of your actions", proclaims Lenz in his essay on Götz. More so than in Die Soldaten, as we shall see in the next chapter, Der Hofmeister tries to avoid conveying any sense of fate or determinism that would make the individual an unwilling victim of circumstances. No one is
a "Ball der Umstände" unless, like Läuffer, he chose to be one.

So circumstances are not really a problem. The play is not about a problematic situation but about a number of people acting rather foolishly, but coming to themselves and facing the future morally and spiritually renewed. But if the actions were foolish they were nonetheless sacred, not only because they became the elements out of which salvation is forged, but also because they expressed the sacred individuality of the agent. In Lenz's view, one's identity is bound up in one's actions: we are what we do. In this sense, the play does reflect a major preoccupation of the Anmerkungen. Though there are no truly heroic characters in the play, the principle of "character rather than fate" is still upheld. To the ancient Greeks, says Lenz, this was blasphemy: "Da nun fatum bei ihnen alles war, so glaubten sie eine Ruchlosigkeit zu begehen, wenn sie Begebenheiten aus den Charakteren berechneten, sie bebten vor dem Gedanken zurück" (I.357-8). But to contemporary Christian man salvation and damnation are to be found not in "iron fate", nor in an impersonal chance, but in the character and the actions of the individual. With a benevolent God underwriting human failure the tragedies in the events of human life can be overcome by individual moral renewal and replaced by the infinite possibilities of metanoia.
Die Soldaten: Personal Responsibility

or Social Conditioning?

Der Hofmeister arose out of the same context as Lenz's theoretical essays, that is, it reflects his conviction of individual moral freedom and responsibility and his belief in the Christian virtues of metanoia and forgiveness, and in their power to overcome tragedy. The tone of evangelical certainty in the essays delivered to the Société is reflected in the spiritually confident and optimistic ending of the play. Die Soldaten, on the other hand, though it reflects a system of beliefs, arose out of experiences of real life, and the problems it raises, in as far as these problems are social ones, remain largely unresolved. Tragedy is barely overcome, and the suggestions for social change that are made hardly attack the root of the problem. Die Soldaten is just one of several major works that resulted from Lenz's complex involvement in the relationship between his erstwhile patron: the older of the Kleist brothers, and Cleophe Fibich, daughter of a Strassburg jeweller. The actual affair, or what we must presume to be such, is documented from Lenz's point of view in his "Tagebuch", with the names Scipio and Araminta substituted for those of Kleist and Cleophe, and, no doubt, with one or two other minor inventions. "Moralische Bekehrung eines Poeten", which gives important clues to Lenz's state of mind in the aftermath of the Cleophe affair, is a retrospective confession to Cornelia
Schloesser of the folly of his infatuation with Cleophe, and
the sequel to Die Soldaten: the essay "Uber die Soldatenehen",
is a second attempt at solving the problem that he considered
to underlie the Fibich/Kleist affair: namely, that of the in­
compatibility between marriage and the life of a soldier. Lenz
came away from this affair with new insights into the social
problems caused by the soldier class, and, on a more personal
level, with a rueful sense of how easily he had been deceived
by Cleophe's coquettish ways. But he also came away with new
convictions about the determining role of circumstances. If
Der Hofmeister seemed bent on proving that humans are respon­sible for what happens to them, Die Soldaten seems designed to
show that much of what happens to humans lies outside their
control. The problems of characters in the earlier play were
largely personal and could be solved on a personal level. As
Fritz pointed out at the end of Act V, the causes of the family
trauma were the moral failings of "Schwachheit" and "Torheit".
In Die Soldaten, however, the personal element, though it by no
means disappears, is pushed into the background, and social fac­
tors governing the actions of the individual are brought to the
fore. The idea of fate, anathema to Lenz at the time of the
theoretical essays, is made to take up a prominent position on
the scene in the form of social circumstances. The word used
most frequently to describe Marie is the adjective "ungläücklich".
"Unavoidable circumstances" is then the answer the play seems to
give to the question underlying it: why do disasters like the
Wesener family's happen.

The question to what extent Marie is really a victim of circumstances is a complex one, and it is this that will be examined in detail. Lenz is certainly aware that some structures of contemporary society do nothing but lay traps for the individual as he or she seeks to live life intensely, following the promptings of ambition and imagination. One such structure was the existence of an unmarried military class in contact with civilian life. But Lenz is also aware, and cannot help but show, that social circumstances are not the only ones that have a bearing on the fate of the individual, and if an inquiry is to be made into the reasons for people's actions, this inquiry must take everything into account: not only social but also personal circumstances.

The new attention to circumstances is presented, in allegorical form, in the preface to "Moralische Bekehrung", where, as navigator and explorer, it is Lenz's purpose: "die Baien, Landspitzen und andere Unregelmäßigkeiten der Küste... und jeden andern Umstand mit der pünktlichsten Sorgfalt anzuzeigen" (I.254). Nothing will be learnt without a study of real circumstances, and without a full realisation of the fact that circumstances determine human life and fate. In the essay "Über die Natur unsers Geistes" Lenz gives expression to this realisation: "Wie denn, ich nur ein Ball der Umstände? ich? ich gehe mein Leben durch und finde diese traurige Wahrheit hundertmal bestätigt" (I.572). The revolt against determinism, staged in
"Über Götz von Berlichingen", appears now to have been fruitless, for, as if to add insult to injury, the further realisation strikes Lenz that not only are our errors and failings determined but also our virtues: "Immer wenn ich meinen gegenwärtigen Zustand mit allen seinen wunderbaren Verhältnissen überdenke, meine ich, ich sei durch meine Umstände gezwungen das zu sein was ich bin, also nicht aus mir selber gut und der Gedanke peinigt mich" (I.278). It is with this thought that Lenz begins the twelfth meditation in "Moralische Bekehrung", a meditation that could well be described as containing Lenz in a nutshell, for it is one in which we can recognise several recurrent themes. What is characteristic, however, is not the reluctant recognition of determining forces but the way in which this determinism is stated but then questioned. For Lenz goes on: "Es ist wahr daß das Unglück uns empfindungsvoller macht aber das Glück macht uns mit alledem doch nicht unempfindlich wenn wir es von uns selber nicht schon sind. Ja ich möchte sagen wenn uns das Unglück empfindlicher für das macht was uns selber widerfährt so sollte das Glück ein gutartiges Herz empfindlicher für andere machen." Circumstances play a role in determining our character and actions, but, after all, they do no more than accentuate what is already there by nature. Behind the determining play of circumstances there is also a core of virtue or vice: there is also "Herz". Humans are still personally responsible, therefore; their moral disposition is not just an accident of circumstances. It is with some relief that Lenz comes to this conclusion, for the alternative was in-
tolerable to him, as a sentence from the sixth meditation makes clear: "Doch ist's mir unerträglich, daß die guten Bewegungen die ich in meinem Herzen fühle, nicht mein sondern des Zufalls, nicht freiwillig, sondern mir abgenötigt sind" (I.271).

But if humans are still responsible for what they are, they are not always responsible, Lenz goes on in the twelfth meditation, for what happens to them. Fate is outside our control, and sometimes beyond our comprehension, and it is presumptuous to pretend otherwise. The self-confident demand in the Anmerkungen: "Du sollst mir keinen Menschen auf die Polter bringen, ohne zu sagen warum" (I.359), is now described as "unerträglicher Stolz", and the scornful rejection of classical conceptions of "blindes Fatum" and "eisernes Schicksal" is now transformed into its opposite: "Die Alten und selbst Socrates glaubten an ein Fatum dem sie sich unterwarfen und wir allein wollten uns keinen andern Schicksalen unterwerfen als die wir uns allenfalls selbst zuschicken würden wenn wir Götter wären?" Humans suffer often through no fault of their own, and at such times patience and resignation are in order, and submission to God. But it is Lenz's belief in a just God that makes it impossible for him completely to dissociate fate from justice. His belief in the justice of events never detaches itself from the seemingly agnostic stance that we find in Die Soldaten, just as in this meditation it is tacked on in parenthesis to his approval of agnostic resignation: "Ist es
nicht besser ich resigniere mich, sehe das Unglück für das an
was es ist, unvermeidlich (wenn ich es nicht verdient habe)"
(my underlining). If I deserve my fate by having acted wrongly
I am responsible for my own misfortune and cannot claim that
it was inevitable. The key question in the play is precisely
the extent to which Marie deserves her fate and the extent to
which it is inevitable. Is she a victim of social circumstan-
ces over which she has no control, or do circumstances do no
more than bring out what she already is by nature? The two
views are represented by the Padre Eisenhardt on the one hand
and Desportes on the other. In the Padre's view: "eine Hure
wird niemals eine Hure, wenn sie nicht dazu gemacht wird"(II.
192). Desportes justifies himself with the opposite opinion:
"Kann ich dafür, daß sie so eine wird. Sie hat's ja nicht
besser haben wollen" (237), and "es ist eine Hure vom Anfang an
gewesen"(239). The whole play is a discussion of these alter-
natives, not merely on a conscious level as characters debate
the issue and articulate at the end what has happened, but also
on the silent level of character and action. Much takes place
that is not talked about and the tension of the play lies in
the discrepancy between what is talked about and what actually
happens.

Several modern scholars have underlined the predominant
role of chance and fate in Die Soldaten. McInnes notes Lenz's
desire to make society into the bogey that is to be blamed for
the evils of the play: "Es ist alles daraufhin angelegt, ein
Gefühl dafür zu wecken, daß die tatsächlich gegebenen gesell-
schaftlichen Umstände eine unpersönliche, determinierende Macht außerhalb menschlicher Einwirkungen darstellen—eine Art von Fatalität also, die, weil unpersönlich und zufällig, auswegslos ist." This is certainly the gist of the Gräfin's and Obrist's words in the final scene, particularly in the first version. Though they suggest a possible solution, their response to the tragedy is mainly a helpless shrug of the shoulders. "Was kann man da machen?" asks the Obrist, and goes on with the new sense of fate and inevitability expressed in "Moralische Bekehrung": "Es ist das Schicksal des Himmels über gewisse Personen." He describes the downfall of Wesener's house as "unvermeidlich" (changed in the second version to "unwiederbringlich" to accentuate the finality of the disaster) and, like the Gräfin for whom Marie is "das unglückliche Schlachtopfer", thinks of the social evil of an unmarried soldier in terms of the pagan myth of Andromeda. The second version of the scene represents a slight attenuation of the crassness of their ideas and proposals, but the sense of helplessness is increased as the Obrist and Gräfin are made to disagree on the solution proposed. Oehlenschläger points out that a classical sense of fate also pervades the earlier scene in Act II in which, while Marie plays a boisterous game with Desportes of catch-me-if-you-can, the old Grandmother hobbles across the stage as "Zufallsparze", ominously counting off the stitches of her knitting and summing up the inevitability of the coming tragedy in the words of the song: "Ein Mädele jung ein Würfel ist".
The idea deliberately conveyed is, therefore, one of unavoidable misfortune. The "Junge Graf" describes Marie to his mother as a helpless victim of circumstances, innocent but fated to fall into the wrong hands: "Eben ihr Unglück—wenn Sie die Umstände wüßten; ja ich muß Ihnen alles sagen, ich fühle, daß ich einen Anteil an dem Schicksal des Mädchens nehme—und doch—wie leicht ist sie zu hintergehen gewesen, ein so leichtes, offenes, unschuldiges Herz—es quält mich, Mama! daß sie nicht in bessere Hände gefallen ist " (293). The Gräfin knows that there is more to her son's plea for compassion than meets the eye, but when he returns to the theme of her misfortune and urges once again: "Nur noch ein Wort, eh' ich reise. Es ist ein unglückliches Mädchen, das ist gewiß", she can only heartily agree: "Ich glaub dir's mehr, als du mir es sagen kannst." She repeats these same sentiments two scenes later when she pays Marie a call. Although she does chide Marie for misplaced ambition, foremost in her speech are the ideas of Marie's innocence and misfortune: "Sie sind unglücklich; aber Sie können sich damit trösten, daß Sie sich Ihr Unglück durch kein Laster zugezogen. Ihr einziger Fehler war, daß Sie die Welt nicht kannten " (225). Eventually"Ihr Unglück"becomes "unser Unglück" (238) as Marie's flight from the Gräfin's home brings disaster to her family and grief to her patroness. However despite all that Marie has brought upon herself and others, in the final scene she is still, in the Gräfin's words: "das beste liebenswürdigste Geschöpf." If we are to believe the
Gräfin, the soldiers are the only villains of the piece. The reason given for the tragedy is that aristocratic army officers, lacking all marital responsibility and the stability of a wife and family, are allowed to rampage through civilian society, victimising fathers, daughters and suitors. Since it was thought that soldiers would be ineffective as soldiers if they had marital responsibilities, there was seemingly no solution to the problem. Young girls were fated to be sacrificed to the insatiable appetites of the military.

Lenz's conclusion, whilst not putting forward any really helpful proposals, was not meant as an admission of defeat but rather as a plea for action. Lenz was gratified that Herder saw the play from the side he intended it to be seen, that is: "von der politischen", because it was written out of a desire to bring society to think morally about itself, and to provide an impetus for social change. This picture of a family disaster, in which the father is devastated financially, and the suitor has killed himself after murdering the seducer of the daughter, who, the second version allows us to believe, has not only been reduced to such wretchedness that she will never again regain her respectability, but could also have been physically violated by her seducer's servant--this picture of "irrevocable" disaster is meant to inspire compassion on the victims and outrage against the perpetrators. A public evil has been exposed and must be dealt with. So outspoken an attack on the status quo did Lenz consider his play to be, and so relevant to the actual state of affairs in Strassburg, that he went through moments
of panic as he thought of the possible reprisals against him from the local garrison. He went to great lengths to obtain that publication be postponed or even cancelled, and tried hard to guard his anonymity, even to the extent of persuading Klinger to claim authorship of the play. As it happened, the publication of Die Soldaten passed virtually unnoticed by the public; there were no repercussions either to this or to the ensuing paper: "Über die Soldatenehen", which did not even find a publisher. For as well as bordering on the absurd, the play's overt message, expressed in the concluding scene, fails to do justice to the facts of the action.

It was Hebbel who first expressed the feeling that far from being an innocent victim Marie chose her fate and deserved all she got: "ihr Unglück bringt keine tragische Rührung in uns hervor, denn wir empfinden zu lebhaft, daß es schon einmal ihr Glück gewesen ist, daß es unter anderen Umständen ihr Glück wieder werden kann, daß worauf Alles ankommt, ihr Geschick in keinem Mißverhältnis zu ihrer Natur steht." The Grafin's aristocratic belief in human goodness causes her to underestimate the extent to which Marie brings the disaster upon herself by willful manipulation of others. She never was "das beste liebenswürdigste Geschöpf". If she was a victim it was more of her own selfishness than of other people's, as a study of her actions will show.

The picture of childish petulance, with which the play begins, is continued in Scene 3 where Marie, faced with her father's veto on an evening at the theatre with Desportes, and not
being able to have her way by contradicting him, decides to disobey him behind his back. We can sympathise with her frustration at being deprived of pleasures that appeal so strongly to her spirited imagination, but this does not make her the "unschuldig Mädchen" that the Padre has in mind when he speaks out in Scene 4 against the corrupting influence of the theatre. The commentary on the action given by Eisenhardt, the Obrist and the Gräfin, runs parallel to the events of the play but is never quite a direct parallel. Marie is not the idealised maiden of whom they appoint themselves protectors, any more than we can see, in Wesener, the truly "wachsamen Vater" envisioned by Eisenhardt (193). In Scene 5 Marie triumphantly presents her father with a fait accompli. She has been to the theatre, despite Wesener's interdict, and has had a grand time. The lie that it was all an unplanned accident is her only response to the angry disgust expressed by Wesener, who goes on to show that in his doting favouritism towards Marie he is the one largely responsible not only for spoiling her but also for creating the unkind rivalry between Marie and her sister Charlotte: "Halt's Maul, Marie hat ein viel zu edles Gemüt, als daß sie von dir reden sollte, aber du schalusierst auf deine eigene Schwester; weil du nicht so schön bist als sie, sollst du zum wenigstens besser denken " (195). To Wesener Marie has "ein viel zu edles Gemüt." Lenz shows us however not nobility of heart but only spontaneity. And what comes spontaneously to Marie is not just a spirited enthusiasm for exciting experiences, but an ability to lie instinctively when she senses that her own interests are
in danger. Surprised by the Gräfin while holding a rendezvous with Mary in the Gräfin's garden, her immediate defence is: "Ach gnädige Frau--es war ein Verwandter von mir--mein Vetter, und der hat nun erst erfahren, wo ich bin--". (252). When Jungfer Zipfersaat brings the news that Desportes has fled and Marie is faced with the possibility of losing him, her instinct again tells her to spin another yarn, this time to Stolzius. He must be led to believe that despite appearances Marie's heart is constant. This lie is a bit more difficult than the others to phrase convincingly and Charlotte's help is needed. The desire behind this fabrication is that which motivates all her actions: the desire to keep all her options open. She must ensure that Stolzius is there to fall back on if Desportes eludes her. But as long as there is hope of winning Desportes, then that will be the better option.

This opportunist concern for her fortune Marie has learnt from her father, as she even acknowledges to Desportes: "er liegt mir immer in den Ohren, ich soll mir mein Glück nicht verderben " (206). The strict stand Wesener took on the issue of Marie going to the theatre with Desportes is relinquished quite readily when he convinces himself that Desportes is honest in his intentions. His naivety in taking the verse addressed to Marie as a serious statement of the soldier's feelings is comic: "(liest noch einmal) Du höchster Gegenstand von meinen reinen Trieben. (Er steckt die Verse in die Tasche). Er denkt doch honett, seh' ich " (196). But this is all that it takes to persuade the foolish Wesener that here is a genuine opportunity
for social advancement: "Kannst noch einmal gnädige Frau werden, närrisches Kind. Man kann nicht wissen, was einem manchmal für ein Glück aufgehoben ist." (197). The decision to compromise his principles entails other deceits. To prevent gossip Madam Weyher must chaperone Marie on her ongoing visits to the theatre, and Desportes must be led to believe, though it is not quite clear what Wesener stands to gain from this, that the visits are made contrary to her father's will and without his knowledge. As for Stolzius, he must be handled carefully: "Du mußt den Stolzius nicht sogleich abschrecken, hör einmal--Nu, ich will dir schon sagen, wie du den Brief an ihn einzurichten hast" (197).

The response to Desportes' advances becomes, therefore, a programme jointly worked out by father and daughter. The "ich" of Marie's earlier utterances in Act I becomes the "wir" of Act III: "Papa, was sollen wir anfangen? Der Desportes ist weg-gelaufen?" (213) But before she places herself fully in her father's hands she is given the chance to make one responsible decision of her own. Left alone in her room, with a thunderstorm brewing outside, she has a moment of insight into the two options open to her: to follow her natural feeling and remain true to Stolzius, or to follow her father's leading and pursue the social value of "Glück". The group of words: "Glück", "Unglück" and "unglücklich" are, as we have already noted, the most recurrent words used to describe Marie, but they also speak of a clearly social rather than personal value. "Glück", as Wesener uses the word, means a secure, respectable and even enviable
place in society. Even the Gräfin uses it in this way. As Wesener bends his energies to winning for Marie a higher place in society, the Gräfin can conceive of no greater sin than to put in jeopardy the respectable place she already has. "Armes Kind", she says, "wo dachten Sie hin, und gegen welch ein elendes Glück wollten Sie alle diese Vorzüge eintauschen... einem so unglücklichen Hasardspiel zu Gefallen Ihr ganzes Glück, Ihre ganz Ehre, Ihr Leben selber auf die Karte zu setzen " (226-7).

The very frequency with which "Glück" is used in this play shows that it has become a cliché with little of its original meaning left. To Lenz, the concept it denoted was also a cliché, devoid of true human vitality, and he includes it in his list of the humdrum stages of life against whose mechanical fixity he rebels in "Über Götz von Berlichingen": "es entsteht eine Lücke in der Republik wo wir hineinpassen—unsere Freunde Verwandte Gönner setzen an und stoßen uns glücklich hinein" (378, my underlining). Against the superficial patterns of human life in society, Lenz sets the creative power of original action. He is convinced that unless we follow the divine example of action: "all unser genuß all unsere Empfindungen, all unser Wissen doch nur ein Leiden, doch nur ein aufgeschobener Tod sind " (379). In a moment of insight the Gräfin herself realises that "Essen, Trinken, Beschäftigungen ohne Aussicht, ohne sich selbst gebildetem Vergnügen, sind nur ein gefristeter Tod " (232). Lenz's conclusion in the essay: "Ha er muß in was Besserm stecken, der Reiz des Lebens", is echoed by the Gräfin: "Was behält das Leben
für Reiz übrig, wenn unsere Imagination nicht welchen hineinträgt." Concern for a secure place in society shows up its own superficiality next to concern for the more personal values of "Handeln" and "Imagination".

Fleetingly, but instinctively, Marie realises the contradiction between this over-riding concern for the social value of "Glück", and the personal value of love: "Gott! was hab' ich denn Böses getan?--Stolzius--ich lieb' dich ja noch--aber wenn ich nun mein Glück besser machen kann--und Papa selber mir den Rat gibt " (197). Sensing the wrongness of choosing the social concern over love, but not being willing to face up to her moral responsibility, she lapses into a fatalism that is tinged with reckless bravour. If heaven disapproves heaven may strike her dead. Looking out at the threatening sky she abandons herself to fate: "Trifft mich's, so trifft mich's, ich sterb nicht anders als gerne." She has failed to take a decisive opportunity to act on a conviction truer than any others represented to her--she is the only character in the play to talk of love as a valid factor in marriage relationships, but nonetheless chooses to give up the love for Stolzius that she knows, in return for the love from Desportes that she only assumes. And to choose Desportes' love is really to choose the attitude of those around her towards society; it is to accept that social values are more important than personal ones.
As Marie now responds to Desportes' attentions she picks up the crudeness of speech cultivated by the soldiers. At Desportes' suggestion she now sees Stolzius as "der grobe Flegel... der Grobian" (207). At the same time she affects a haughtiness appropriate, she thinks, to one entering the aristocracy: "(mit nachlässigm Ton) Guten Morgen, Jungfer Zipfersaat, Warum hat Sie sich nicht gesetzt?" (212) This pose is quickly abandoned, of course, when she is told of Desportes' flight, and the familiar form takes over again in her reply: "Was redst du da?" But from now on her peers are no longer good enough for her. Her estrangement from her class and former friends is complete when she is taken out in aristocratic style by Mary in his horse and carriage and fails to recognise Mary's servant Kaspar, actually her former lover Stolzius. As Marie's reputation suffers, tongues begin to wag. To Stolzius' mother she is a "Soldatenhure" (211), to Charlotte an "Alleweltshure" (195) and "Soldatenmensch" (219). "Wissen Sie denn auch, meine neue liebe Freundin", asks the Gräfin, "daß man viel, viel in der Stadt von Ihnen spricht?" (225) But Marie, well-catechised by her father, always has a justification. Her answer to the Gräfin: "Ich weiß wohl, daß es allenthalben böse Zungen gibt", faithfully reflects Wesener's insistence that it is all idle gossip: "Was das ein gottloses verdammtes Gered'... aber das sind die gottsvergessenen Neider--" (213). His concern not to scare Stolzius away too abruptly is also an attitude that Marie can further turn to her
own account. The justification for accepting Desportes' attentions is that it would be impolite to give a blunt refusal: "Ich kann doch so grob nicht sein und es ihm abschlagen. Ich sag' Ihm, er hat getan wie wütend, als ich's nicht annehmen wollte" (196). In the same way there are always good reasons for accepting Mary's advances: "Soll ich ihm denn die Präsente ins Gesicht zurückwerfen? Ich muß doch wohl höflich mit ihm sein, da er noch der einzige ist, der mit ihm korrespondiert. Wenn ich ihn abschrecke, da wird schön Dings herauskommen." (219). Marie knows how to manipulate ideas to her own advantage. Her mother feels that it is wrong for her to go out with Mary, Marie manages to make it look as if it would be wrong to do otherwise: "Wenn wir den Mary beleidigen, so haben wir alles uns selber vorzuwerfen" (219). As she manipulates others emotionally by her tears and tantrums, so she tries to do the same with the Gräfin by a display of false modesty, designed to make a good impression and elicit sympathy: "Ach, gnädige Frau, ich weiß wohl, daß ich häßlich bin" (226). To a considerable extent Marie is successful in her manipulation. The Gräfin sees through her pretense but remains convinced of her fundamental innocence. But Lenz does not allow us to share the Gräfin's opinion. To show how much she is deceived in Marie, he juxtaposes scenes 8 and 9 of Act III. In the first of these scenes, the Junge Graf pleads for compassion on Marie: she is "ein so leichtes, offenes, unschuldiges Herz." The Gräfin agrees and promises to ensure
that she will come to no harm. Scene 9 begins, however, with Marie not suffering misfortune but creating it, by seizing opportunities to play off one suitor against another. Mary has not been seen for three days and must be brought to task for neglecting her. Marie plans to make him jealous by encouraging the attentions of the Junge Graf who, though he is said to be committed to another, could be made to look like a serious suitor. The ruse is successful, as we discover at the beginning of Act IV, and Mary is firmly baited. However Marie's opportunism never rests. At the very moment that she is speaking of the Junge Graf's interest in her, the Gräfin arrives to speak to her. Marie is extremely flustered, not because she is mystified why the Gräfin should visit her nor because she senses she is to be chided for her cultivation of the officers' friendship. Having no inkling of the Gräfin's feelings about her, she assumes, from the evidence of the Junge Graf's interest, that she might well be meeting her future mother-in-law. So she goes down in person to meet her visitor, apologising profusely for the disorder in the home and expressing great delight at the Gräfin's gracious attention to her. Gradually her visitor's intentions become clear, however; Marie is not only being told that the Junge Graf is not for her, but also being taken to task for her conduct towards the soldiers. So she falls back on a justification of herself and Desportes, designed, if to achieve nothing else, at least to defend her reputation with the Gräfin: "Ich habe nur einem zuviel getraut, und
es ist noch nicht ausgemacht, ob er falsch gegen mich denkt"
(226). As the Gräfin brings her to realise the vanity of her
hopes, her scheming ceases for a while. When she again takes
her pursuit of happiness into her own hands, it will be a
despairing last attempt to salvage something of her hopes and
ambitions, which she will not give up until she has reached
the rock bottom of degradation and despair.

Alongside the stress on fate and circumstances, therefore,
are the disturbing reminders that Marie and Wesener, far from
being innocent victims and caught up in a social dilemma bigger
than themselves, are very much to blame and deserve all they
get. The question whether the soldiers are responsible for
Marie's fall, or she herself, is a very moot point. From We­
sener's encouragement to her to pander to nobility, to her
calculating use of her sexuality to attach people to her, to
her appearance at the end as a prostitute, there are but short
logical steps. The evidence abounds that Marie, aided and a-
betted by her father, always had all the makings of a "Hure".

Lenz does not only make us aware of this point, but he
makes Marie and Wesener aware of it as well. Marie is hardly
swept off her feet by a bewildering succession of fateful events,
not knowing why things are happening to her and what it is that
she is doing wrong. She does have a conscience that makes her
morally aware and which, on the one decisive occasion described
above, she chooses to ignore: "Gott! was hab'ich denn Böses ge-
tan?---. . .aber wenn ich nun mein Glück besser machen kann". On
another occasion she chooses to follow it. The letter to Stolzius that will make him think that Marie's heart is constant she tears up with the explanation: "Soll ich ihm denn vorlügen?" (215) Marie willed her fate, as even the Gräfin realises: "Ich habe alles getan das unglückliche Schlachtopfer zu retten--sie wollte nicht." (244).

With these words the Gräfin reminds us that efforts have been made not just to save Marie but also to teach her. This "victim" had to be brought to understand the reality of her situation, and to learn the lesson that there was no hope of her marrying into the aristocracy, and especially no hope of marrying an army officer. The lesson had to be learnt, moreover, not just on the level of her understanding but above all it should become a conviction of her heart. The Gräfin had had to admit failure on this point: "Wenn ich etwas ausfindig machen könnte, ihre Phantasie mit meiner Klugheit zu vereinigen, ihr Herz, nicht ihren Verstand zu zwingen, mir zu folgen " (232). Her role in the play has been to moralise and show Marie an alternative life-style. In this she parallels Wenzeslaus in Der Hofmeister. In both plays there is a central scene in which one of the main characters, who has escaped from a situation of wrong-doing, retreats to the house of a person who represents to him an alternative mode of living. But he finds himself unable to identify with that other mode, rejects it and departs. Thus Läuffer studies Wenzeslaus' option but finally rejects it and is expelled from the pedant's home. Marie studies the Gräfin's
option and she too rejects it and leaves. She has failed to learn by reason and moralising, and must go out and learn by experience.

The Gräfin not only realises, however, that her method of teaching was ineffective, but she also questions whether she has the right to teach lessons: "Ich weiß nicht, ob ich dem Mädchen ihren Roman fast mit gutem Gewissen nehmen darf. Was behält das Leben für Reiz übrig, wenn unsere Imagination nicht welchen hineinträgt. Essen, Trinken, Beschäftigungen ohne Aussicht, ohne sich selbst gebildetem Vergnügen, sind nur ein gefristeter Tod" (232). Marie is under a delusion but it is a sweet one, which she should perhaps be allowed to keep, especially when the only alternative is "Beschäftigungen ohne Aussicht". Marie does keep it and is brought by it to the verge of disaster. But she does thereby come to her own personal understanding of her actions and their moral significance, coming to that understanding by exploring to the full the consequences of those actions. It is one of Lenz's fundamental convictions that man learns best by acting, then evaluating the action in the light of its consequences. That way one gains a genuinely personal moral awareness that is forged by experience rather than imposed on one or accepted at second hand.

This is indeed what happens with Marie. She listens to others' convictions but does not make them her own. While others, like Junger Zipfersaat, moralise: "Da sieht Sie, wie die Herren Offiziers sind. Das hätt' ich ihr wollen zum voraus sa-
gen " (213), Marie goes her own way to learn her own lessons. For a while she consents to the Gräfin's remedy, but when it frustrates her, she takes matters into her own hands again. Lenz makes us see Marie's point of view in this. We can censure her for pursuing the unreliable Desportes, but can we blame her for not being satisfied with the alternative of "Beschäftigungen ohne Aussicht"? The Gräfin's only solution: to shut Marie up within the four walls of her house and garden, is no solution because it is a denial not only of her vitality and imagination but also her individuality and human freedom. Nothing but Marie's disastrous flight to Philippeville and Armentières will bring her to a crisis realisation of her own delusions.

So her sufferings depicted in Act V become necessary, and already we can sense the patterns of wrong-doing, suffering and metanoia laid down in the theoretical essays and illustrated already in Der Hofmeister. Suffering brings Marie to herself in a way that reason and moralising cannot do. Humans will only learn through crises, can only learn this way, for crises strip away the overlaid veneers of social prejudice or pretense and serve to penetrate deeper to the real nature of people and relationships. The scene in which Wesener and Marie are reunited is in itself ambiguous. It is not fully clear whether we are to regard it as the lowest depth of disaster, as the father and daughter are cast headlong from their pretentious aspirations to nobility, down to the bottom of the social ladder, where they
are surrounded by their own class again and carried bodily off
the scene as mere objects; or whether on the other hand McInnes
is right when he says: "Es scheint mir, daß Lenz hier nicht ein
Ende, einen Zusammenbruch darstellen will, sondern die Möglic-
heit eines Neubegins ins Auge fasst...Vater und Tochter er-
scheinen hier nicht länger als Menschen, die von Illusionen ver-
blendet sind, sondern als Individuen, die sich durch Selbstbe-
trug, falsche Hoffnungen und alle Arten von Verzweiflung hin-
durch neu kennengelernt haben." The emphasis in the play on
Marie's learning a lesson, however, and the three scenes that
show Marie and Wesener suffering the humiliation of their down-
fall, combine to give, in our view, a definite glimpse of *meta-
noia* in this scene. Whilst the disaster cannot be down-played,
it is not quite as bad as it might be, and something has been
gained.

We only disagree with McInnes, therefore, when he insists
that Marie has become a prostitute in fact as well as in ap-
pearance. He bases his understanding on Wesener's reference
to the stagnation in his business: "Mein Handel hat auch nun
schon zwei Jahr gelegen" (239), and assumes that Wesener has
spent the two years looking for Marie who, during that time,
could not have stayed alive on her own except by the profits of
prostitution. However the two-year period refers more naturally
to the period following Desportes' flight and encompassing
Marie's fruitless attempts to recall Desportes to herself, her
flirtations with Mary, the Junge Graf and no doubt others as
well, and her obviously lengthy residence at the Gräfin's house. The stagnation in Wesener's affairs could well be attributable to the losses that not only he but also the Zipfersaats sustained on Desportes' account and which Wesener rashly underwrote in order to uphold Desportes' reputation. It makes much more sense to see all the remaining scenes following Marie's disappearance as taking place within a shortish time span, perhaps of only one or two weeks. This is still enough time for Marie to have become changed by her misery and poverty beyond her father's recognition.

Marie has not actually become a prostitute, though she has sunk to a level at which she might easily have become one, had she not been found by her father. Lenz does convey a sense that though she has fallen very far, her father finds her in the nick of time to prevent her falling further, or even committing suicide, and so in the end she gets off rather lightly. Things are not as bad as they could be; according to the Obrist she does not seem to have been violated by Desportes' servant, and Wesener's financial ruin could be set right by a charitable gift from the Obrist. There is a definite hint of salvation in the air which, being linked to moral renewal as we shall see below, is also a hint of metanoia. Though the disaster cannot be down-played, Lenz cannot help leaving some room for the salvation and second chance that he so passionately believed in.
As in Der Hofmeister the father is searching for the daughter who has been reduced to a state of weakness and despair, but he will not find her until both have come to a certain degree of penitence and humility. In Act V Scene 1, Wesener shows that he has no more illusions about Desportes, nor about his own financial ability to underwrite losses sustained on his account. He is at the end of his own resources, and, like Gustchen, can only trust God. However he still has the pride to refuse to take the faster and more expensive post-coach to Armentières: Marie has cost him enough already and he will pay no more. Marie, meanwhile, is heading for the same destination, but coming from Phillipeville, and is discovering the bitterness of hunger and the Prodigal Son's regret that she does not have even a drop of wine that was in such plentiful supply at home. In Scene 4, at Armentières, Marie has no further to fall. She can only keep herself alive by begging and is hardly in a fit state even to recognise her father. So it is up to Wesener to find and save her. As in Der Hofmeister, however, the reconciliation cannot take place until he has the compassion to identify with real hardship. Like Peter's denial of Christ he protests three times, each time more vigourously, that he will have nothing to do with the woman who asks alms of him, seeing in her only a street prostitute, not a victim of misfortune. As the woman sighs deeply and walks away, Wesener relents, remembering Marie and that she could be in the same plight. He gives her money, but still in a patronising way: "Da hat Sie
einen Gulden—aber bessere Sie sich." The woman, uttering the despairing words: "O Gott! was kann mir das helfen?", breaks down and weeps, not only because the money will not take her far, but because it is sympathy she needs, not sermons. It is only when Wesener is prepared to offer this, by offering to take her into his home, that the recognition and reunion takes place. So, like Marie, Wesener is punished for his pride and rewarded for his humility. He can now identify with what he thinks is a common slut, whereas before he had wanted his family to identify only with nobility. Since both have now reached rock bottom, the only direction things can go is upwards. Along with the ecstatic joy of reunion comes, as McInnes says: "die Möglichkeit eines Neubeginns".

It is true that this is not the end of the play. Lenz's final scene takes us away from the personal drama and sets it, rather unconvincingly, in the context of social circumstances. Lenz had not made a serious attempt to do this at the end of Der Hofmeister. There was only a fleeting reminder of the pernicious role of private tutors, which was outweighed by the strong emphasis on the joy of reunion. In Die Soldaten the glimpse of joy is immediately pushed aside by a reminder of the sorrow. Lenz wrote the play to draw attention to the sorrow and to lay responsibility for it at society's door. We have seen, however, that in practice he cannot substantiate the charge against society. Whatever the causes of human tragedy, Lenz instinctively sees individuals as personally responsible.
His concern for realism and for taking the world as it is makes him very conscious of the mediocrity of human behaviour. There is indeed an inevitability about events, as the grandmother's song implies, but it is rooted rather more in the failings of human character than in surrounding circumstances. What Lenz says of the philosophy of the Geheimer Rat: namely, that it was based "nur in seiner Individualität"(I.385), is more true of Marie's fate. It is grounded not so much in the structure of contemporary society as in her individuality. Lenz shows an inability, therefore, to portray genuinely social problems. The avowed intention, expressed in a letter to Sophie La Roche, of: "die Stände darzustellen, wie sie sind" (Br.I.115) is certainly fulfilled in the play, but it does not capture the full significance of Marie's experiences. Bruce Duncan to the contrary, she and Wesener are not"artificial constructs that are indistinguishable from the socio-economic forces that mould them". They do experience personal guilt and show a degree of personal metanoia. It is part of the uniqueness of Lenz's approach to see the personal dimension in every social problem. Even the crudest of Lenz's characters have some kind of a personal conscience. Mary can recognise his own share of responsibility for Marie's flight and openly declare: "Ich bin schuld an allem " (223). Desportes, too, has his moments of remorse. He separates himself from the hubbub at Frau Bischof's concert and admits to his own unease: "Ihr Bild steht unaufhörlich vor mir " (237). Like Marie earlier, though, he rejects the promptings of
feeling and conscience, and justifies himself by choosing to see in Marie nothing but a social type. She is merely "so eine": "Kann ich dafür daß sie so eine wird."

This is not to say, of course, that there is no conflict between the needs of the individual and the claims of society. But if there is a social problem, it is not so much the existence of an unmarried soldiery as the rigidness of the social class structure that does not permit upward movement. What McInnes calls Marie's "Wille zur Selbstverwirklichung" comes into conflict with this structure. Marie believes and wants to believe Desportes' tantalising assertion: "Sie sind für keinen Bürger gemacht" (206). Self-realisation, as she dreams it, means becoming what her father also wishes for her, when he says: "Kannst noch einmal gnädige Frau werden, närrisches Kind" (197). In Lenz's system of personal development this rise in social standing should be possible. The "μετα! μετα!" of Lenz's metanoia implies a crossing of boundaries, it speaks of a potential for infinite, not limited development (545). However Marie knows that in reality the only answer to Desportes' dazzling suggestion is: "Nein Herr Baron, davon wird nichts, das sind nur leere Hoffnungen mit denen Sie mich hintergehen" (206). "Selbstverwirklichung" for the middle class stops at the upper boundary of that class. Society is a determining force, and Lenz means us to see that. He stops short of stating it in the play, however, choosing instead to pick on the question of a celibate soldiery. And even when the conflict between the aspirations of
the individual and the determination of the class structure is clearly implied, as it is implied by the Gräfin's sympathy for Marie's need for "Aussicht", the point of the play is still not that Marie should not marry Desportes because he is a nobleman but because he has no serious intention of marrying her. Marie is deluded and reduced to misery not because of Desportes' class or profession but because of his dissolute character. Mary, for his part, sees no problem in his marrying Marie, though he too is a nobleman and soldier (228). Class seems to be as unimportant as profession therefore. The Junge Graf, who seems to belong to the garrison as much as anyone else, is himself engaged to marry Fräulein Anklam; and Desportes' father has reputedly been pushing his son into an unwelcome marriage. There seem to be plenty of exceptions to the social rules, asserted, in the play, to be binding.

Personal factors prevail, then, over social factors. The answer to the question why things like this happen is really that humans will fall a prey to social evils if they put social values before personal ones. Marie and Wesener were deceived by their own concern for establishment in a prestigious social position. To this extent their problem is personal and requires a personal solution. Is there nothing, though, that can be done by society to prevent a recurrence of such misfortune? The Obrist's solution of institutionalising prostitution for the benefit of the army and for the protection of civilians is a totally unrealistic one; and the further idea, that formed the basis of
"Über die Soldatenehen": namely that soldiers will fight better if they are married because they will be fighting for an idea and a cause, rather than merely for a profession, though it is a more practical one, would do little to alleviate the problem illustrated in Die Soldaten. The problem goes deeper than social structures, because, as in all Lenz's works, it has to do with personal relationships, with a wrong concern for prestige and a right concern for the human values of sensitivity, humility and forgiveness. Consequently the thrust of the play is not merely to encourage the public to think socially, but to call it back to these values and to inspire compassion on the victims of misfortune within society, even though their misfortune is due as much to their own folly as to their social circumstances.

So social change would be no exhaustive solution, and we have already seen that moralising was no way of helping others either. It is true that there is a lot wrong with Marie and Weesener, and Lenz intends us to see this. The Gräfin is right to diagnose overweening self-interest as the root of Marie's troubles; however to diagnose is not to cure. The Gräfin's moralising failed to change Marie, for moralising and laying down moral systems establishes too great a gulf between the real and the ideal. There was something about moralising, thought Lenz, that was in itself patronising and aristocratic, and contrary to nature. Marie's confinement to a rigourous moral diet of conversation with the Gräfin and her daughter only, and a series of
meaningless occupations to fill her time, had to fail because it was an impossible attempt to pin ideal behaviour onto real. It was Lenz's conviction: "daß zum gut und artig seyn, auch nothwendig das seyn gehöre" (Br.I.182). Any moral advance must begin, says Lenz, with life as it is. Marie must be allowed to live her own life and learn her own lessons, and by this process alone acquire the wisdom and maturity to act in a way conducive to real happiness--not, as the Gräfin says to her: "wider dein eigen Glück". For those who, like the Gräfin, have a concern for her fate, the correct attitude is not one of moralising, but is one of "Herabhaltung" and "Mitleid"--words which in Lenz have to be understood in terms of their very basic, literal meaning.

"Herablassen" is another Lenzian theme enshrined in the twelfth meditation of "Moralische Bekehrung". Discussing the question of sensitivity to the fortune and misfortune of others, he says: "Freilich ist es schwer für einen Glücklichen sich den Zustand Unglücklicher und ihre Empfindungen lebhaft vorzustellen aber er kann es doch auch ohne eigene Erfahrung durch Teilnehmen und Herablassen vorzüglich aber durch gute Dichter lernen" (I.278). Good poets can best perform the function of acquainting humans with the circumstances of others far below them on the ladder of fortune. To Lenz, this con-descension, not understood in the patronising sense of which he was aware and which he shunned (I.270), is a moral imperative rooted in the conviction of one's own failings: "Für nichts ist mir so bange als Hochmut und
Humility has always been a favourite theme of Lenz's, even though it is held in balance by his concern with aspiration and ambition. He preached at Sesenheim on the perils of "Hochmut" and devotes pages of his "Lebensregeln" to the subject of "Demut". The practical implication of humility is the con-descension commended in "Moralische Bekehrung": "Cornelia laß uns beide uns zu den Menschen herabhalten" (I.271).

Con-descension also respects the individuality all humans possess and which all others must regard as sacred. Writing about the same time to Sophie La Roche Lenz says: "Könnten aber Personen von Ihrem Stande, Ihren Einsichten, Ihrem Herzen, sich jemals ganz in den Gesichtskreis dieser Armen herabniedrigen, anschauend wie Gott erkennen, was ihnen Kummer, was ihnen Freude scheint, und folglich ist, und ihren Kummer... auf die ihnen eigenthümliche Art behandeln. Ach! das große Geheimnis, sich in viele Gesichtspunkte zu stellen, und jeden Menschen mit seinen eigenen Augen ansehen zu können! (Br.I.115)." "Anschauend wie Gott": the parallel is important to notice. To Lenz, "Herablassen" and "Herabniedrigen" reflect Christ's compassionate identification with erring and suffering man as described in "Über die Natur unsers Geistes": "Dessen Blick in die geheimsten Schlupfwinkel aller menschlichen Herzen drang, ihr Elend da herausshob und es an seinen Busen beherbergte. Dessen göttliches Mitleiden das ganz unglückliche Gewebe jeder Menschenseel..."
durchdrang und mit den Pharisaern wütete und fürchtete, mit Ischariot bereute und verzweifelte" (I.576-577).

Ultimately, then, the Gräfin, unable to capture Marie's "Herz", can only suffer for her and with her. We have glimpses of this suffering identification after Marie takes her fate into her own hands and flees: "Wie die Frau Gräfin haben sich zu Bette gelegt vor Alteration? . . .Es tut uns herzlich leid, daß die Frau Gräfin sich unser Unglück so zu Herzen nimmt" (237-8). In the final scene the compassion required of her exceeds her strength: "Haben Sie die beiden Unglücklichen gesehen?" she asks the Obrist, "Ich habe das Herz noch nicht. Der Anblick tötete mich", to which the Obrist replies: "Er hat mich zehn Jahre älter gemacht " (245). Lenz knew that compassionate identification was not easy; it had to be relieved by periods of admiration. Lenz needed models to look up to as well as the lowly to suffer with, as the fifth meditation makes clear: "Von jedem Tier können wir was ablernen und so auch von jedem Menschen. Und doch kann ich nicht süß dazu sehen, solche elende läppische Kreaturen um mich zu haben und keinen Busen zu wissen wo ich ausruhen kann" (I.270).

Though Lenz was aware of the spiritual demands it made on him, the direction of his work established in Die Soldaten and continued, particularly, in Die Kleinen, was nonetheless towards compassionate identification with the lowly, with ordinary erring humanity. His compassion on Marie is shown in the way he makes her an attractive character, full of charm and
naivety. However she is attractive because she is real, not because she is innocent. Büchner responds to this concern for naturalistic portrayal, making his own Lenz say: "Idealismus ist die schmählichste Verachtung der menschlichen Natur. . . . Man senke sich in das Leben des Geringsten." Unlike Büchner, though, Lenz has firmly religious reasons for practising naturalism. It was his belief that we should accept human beings as they are, with all their mediocrity and misery, because this was the way Christ dealt with them: "Christus lebte nach einem Plan um allgemeiner Gesetzgeber zu werden. . . . er hatte sich in einen Standpunkt gestellt das Elend einer ganzen Welt auf sich zu konzentrieren und durchzuschauen", he had written in "Über die Natur unsers Geistes" (576). To do otherwise than accept humans as they are is to practise hubris: it is to pre-empt the divine prerogative of judging, punishing and correcting humanity, a prerogative exercised, even by God, only as a last resort, and only in conformity with human choice. Stolzius, as his name implies, may well represent that erroneous and ultimately futile pride that refuses to suffer and can only condemn and destroy. His role as betrayed lover corresponds to that of Fritz. But contrary to Friz, who by his willingness to accept and forgive, acted as a moral reference point in that play, Stolzius chooses to avenge Marie and destroy himself rather than do anything to help her. Criticising the shortcomings of the moral order, he feels compelled to take the cause of justice into his own hands: "Müssen denn die zittern, die Unrecht leiden
und die allein fröhlich sein, die Unrecht tun!...Herein Stolzius!" (238) He takes action under intense provocation, and at the point at which his sufferings become intolerable. Lenz knew that the way of suffering exemplified by Christ demanded the impossible of ordinary humans: "Gott, daß du uns nicht mehr solchen Proben aussetzest, sie übersteigen die menschlichen Kräfte. Unser Stolz unser Stolz, das einzige Gut das du uns gegeben hast um uns selbst dadurch dir nah zu bringen--wir können ihn so ganz nicht aufopfern " (577). Stolzius, himself a "niedrige, verachtete, zertretene Knechtsgestalt" (577), proved himself unequal to the test and applied his own personal solution of revenge. Salvation only comes, however—in Die Soldaten as in Der Hofmeister—through forgiveness and compassionate suffering. The corollary of the belief that humans should have the freedom to act in their own unique way and learn their own lessons by first-hand experience, is that there should be forgiveness and compassion for them when they go wrong.
CONCLUSION

In Die Soldaten Lenz comes to his most realistic perception of the precariousness of human action. Like Marie, human beings will jeopardise their happiness by pursuing their own course of action to the end. Instead of acting freely and powerfully in their own and others' interests, as Götz had done, human beings act ignorantly and foolishly, bringing suffering upon themselves. They have no guidelines for their actions, and though they gain some moral insights from the consequences of their actions, it is a moot point whether the insight gained outweighs the suffering involved. The final scene of the play no longer breathes an enthusiastic confidence that the future will be better, it no longer holds out the vista of a heaven that is reached by a straightforward process of repentance and a new mentality. It is a mark of Lenz's greater maturity that he no longer has simple answers to the important question how to harmonise freedom and wisdom in human action. The Gräfin can suggest wisdom only at the expense of freedom. Marie, for her part, finds freedom, it seems, only by sacrificing wisdom. There is no equivalent, in this play, to Fritz, with his sound moral instincts that enable him, most of the time at least, to do the right thing on impulse. Nor does Lenz have a simple answer to the equally important question how to deal with failure and error, once committed. The saddening consequences of error are not waved away with a flourish, as they
were at the end of *Der Hofmeister*.

The play is not primarily designed to illustrate the Lenzian ideal of *metanoia*; its strength lies in its portrayal of the real, it represents Lenz's naturalistic genius at its best. Yet behind the real, the ideal is, as we have seen, still present nonetheless, but present as something requiring verification rather than merely affirmation. We have the impression in *Die Soldaten* that Lenz's ideas on learning and growing through exercising freedom of action are being brought to bear, or tested out, on the real world as he had observed it in the officers' mess of the French garrison and in the streets and homes of the city. Here, of all the answers that Lenz entertains in his essays to the problem of evil, the one most appropriate is found to be that of suffering. What overcomes evil is, this time, not powerful action à la Götz, nor is it repentance as practised by Gustchen and Berg, nor love and forgiveness, best exemplified in Fritz, but it is the suffering that is held up in "Über die Natur unsers Geistes" to be the hardest and purest form of action.

We have argued in this study of Lenz's concept of action that there is a fundamental coherence in his views: that his various pronouncements on freedom of action, personal responsibility for one's actions, moral growth through evaluation of one's actions, the wrongness of imposing value judgments on others, the perpetual striving for an active improvement of one's own and one's neighbour's conditions, and the strength,
courage and willingness to accept and embrace suffering when suffering needs to be borne—all these pronouncements amount to a coherent and credible philosophy of life. Throughout Lenz's work we are brought back in particular to the three values of work, love and suffering. "Frisch an die Arbeit!" urges Lenz following Salzmann, meaning by work the tireless striving for general happiness and improvement that is the "first principle of morality". Of love, he writes in the "Supplemente": "Wenn ihr mit Menschen- und Engelzungen redet, und könnt weissagen, und lasset euren Leib brennen--und habt der Liebe nicht, so seid ihr tösendes Erz und klingende Schellen", meaning, by love, not only the altruistic action that Salzmann had described as the essence of love, but also the sensitivity to human needs that in Berg's and Wesener's case was displaced by social ambition; it means also the compassion that refrains from judging others, but instead allows them the freedom to err and to learn in their own unique way. The third value of suffering finds in Christ its most compelling exponent. With Christ, thought Lenz, suffering also was action because it was consciously and deliberately accepted and borne: "Er handelte--er veränderte seine Lage--aber immer tiefer hinab, bis er mit dem tiefsten beschloß, schimpflicher Tod".

It comes as confirmation, not necessarily of the correctness, but at least of the coherence of these views, to find them also combined in more recent schools of psychotherapy.
Viktor Frankl, in his *Introduction to Logotherapy*, draws the same distinction as Lenz between thought and knowledge, on the one hand, and action on the other, and stresses the same three key values as Lenz, when he writes: "Logotherapy, keeping in mind the essential transitoriness of human existence, is not pessimistic but rather activistic. . .Instead of possibilities, I have realities in my past, not only the reality of work done and of love loved but of suffering suffered". The meaningfulness of this sort of action is based, as it is with Lenz, on the belief that tension and striving are better for man than satisfaction and rest. We read that: "according to Freud's homeostasis principle, the ultimate goal was to obtain that kind of full gratification which would restore the individual's equilibrium in bringing all his desires to rest". Not so, says Frankl, echoing Lenz's main objection to Rousseau's ideal of rest: "Man's search for meaning and values may arouse inner tension rather than inner equilibrium. However, precisely such tension is an indispensible prerequisite of mental health. . .what man actually needs is not a tensionless state but rather the striving and struggling for some goal worthy of him". Also underlying the meaningfulness of action is the conviction that man can gain some freedom from the conditioning forces on him, and for this reason can grow and experience *metanoia*: "To be sure, a human being is a finite thing, and his freedom is restricted. It is not freedom from conditions but it is freedom to take a stand towards the conditions. Man is not fully con-
ditioned and determined, but rather determines himself whether he gives in to conditions or stands up to them... By the same token, every human being has the freedom to change at any instant;... one of the main features of human existence is the capacity to rise above such conditions and transcend them... Man ultimately transcends himself".

Such transcendence is, to Frankl and to Lenz, a moral obligation, for which the individual is alone responsible, as he is responsible for all his actions: "Logotherapy sees in responsibility the very essence of human existence... That is why a logotherapist is the least tempted of all psychologists to impose value judgments on the patient". It is not for others, but for the individual to judge his own actions, a fact also stressed in Reality Therapy. William Glasser in his book: Reality Therapy: A new approach to psychiatry, writes: "If we do not evaluate our own behaviour, or having evaluated it, we do not act to improve our conduct where it is below our standards we will not fulfill our need to be worthwhile". For all three thinkers, the past is no longer a curse. The question is what to do in the present and with the present, bearing in mind the possibilities for the future.

Lenz, of course, is no psychotherapist; nor does he consciously seek after such twentieth-century concepts as meaning and mental-health and the need to be worthwhile. However, his ideals of happiness, heightened self-awareness and fulfilment of human potential are perhaps not far removed from the psycho-
therapist's goal; his methods of reaching those ideals are, at any rate very similar. Lenz, as we have seen from his essays and best dramas, could not but fully applaud Frankl's re-discovery of the belief that "Man is responsible for what to do, whom to love, and how to suffer".
FOOTNOTES

Introduction

1. Jakob Michael Reinhold Lenz: Werke und Schriften, ed., Britta Titel and Helmut Haug, I (Stuttgart: Henry Goverts, 1966), 500. Except where stated, references will be to this edition and will follow the quotation in parentheses as, e.g. I.500.


t erwecken und weiter zur Entfaltung bringen".

4. For Wieland's and Lavater's comments, see Richard Dau­

5. "Aus meinem Leben: Dichtung und Wahrheit", Book 14, in Goethes Werke X (Hamburger Ausgabe), 8. Except where stated, references will be to this edition and will follow the quotation in parentheses as, e.g. X.8.


g Stammler, I (Leipzig, 1918, reprinted Berlin: Lang und Co., 1969), 89. References will be to this edition; they will give either volume and page number (e.g. Br. I.89), or the letter number given by Freye/Stammler (e.g. letter 41). They will also follow the quotation in parentheses.

8. James 1:22. It is no mere coincidence that Lenz's thought should echo St. James's in this exhortation to practical action. Luther, in his desire to purify the Church of any idea of salvation by works, warned believers away from this "epistle of straw" (Introduction to his 1522 edition of the New Testament, in D. Martin Luther, Die gantze Heilige Schrifft Band III (Munich: DTV, 1974, 241*). It is partly in reaction to the Lutheran emphasis on "faith alone" that the eighteenth-century's activism, and within it, particularly Lenz's, must be understood. Not that there are any direct allusions to St. James in Lenz; it is St. Paul's letters that Lenz takes as his model, but he supplements Paul's emphasis on justification through faith with James's stress on works.
Chapter One


4. Printed in G. Stecher, Jung-Stilling als Schriftsteller, Palaestra 120 (Berlin, 1913), p. 27.


7. Goethes Briefe I (H.A.), 126.

8. For a clarification of the mis-identification of this work, see pp.105-07 below.

9. Lenz, Briefe I. 89; "Ossian" is no longer extant.

10. See Johann Froitzheim, Zu Straßburgs Sturm- und Drangperiode 1770-1776 (Straßburg, 1888), pp. 33-53.

11. Hohoff is mistaken in thinking that there is such a record; Hohoff, p. 25.

12. For Goethe's encouragement, see Goethe's letters to Salzmann of 6th March 1773 (Briefe I.141) and 5th December 1774 (Goethes Briefe II (Weimar, 1887).213).

13. Dichtung und Wahrheit, H.A. IX. 359f, 366ff. For the letters see August Stöber, Der Aktuar Salzmann (Frankfurt, 1855).

15. For Goethe's passage, see note 13 above. For Jung-Stilling's see J.H. Jung-Stilling, Heinrich Stillings Jugend, Jünglingsjahre, Wanderschaft und häusliches Leben (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1968), p. 275. This work is hereafter referred to as Leben.


17. Jung-Stilling, Leben, p. 282

18. This letter and the criticisms contained in it are discussed more fully below, pp. 46-53.


21. Fuchs, Abhandlungen, p. 4*.

22. T.H. I.647.

23. H.A. IX.359. Goethe was never quite sure of Salzmann's age (see Goethes Briefe III (H.A.).211).

24. Rudolf, p. 85. This is no doubt no more than a misprint.


27. Fuchs, "La Pensée", p. 255.


30. Goethes Briefe I (Weimar, 1887), p. 248, letter dated 10th September, 1770. Goethe might have forgiven Lenz for his use of the same image to describe his relationship to Goethe in his essay: "Über unsere Ehe" (See Dichtung und Wahrheit, H.A. X.11).


32. Fuchs, "La Pensée", p. 255.


34. Girard, pp. 63-64.

35. Goethe's letter to Salzmann of 12th June, 1771. See also Goethes Briefe I (H.A.), 122: "Behüt mir Gott meine lieben Eltern, Behüt mir Gott meine liebe Schwester, Behüt mir Gott meinen lieben Hrn. Aktuarius."

36. Stöber, Salzmann, p. 36.


38. Stöber, Salzmann, p. 17.

39. August Stöber, Johann Gottfried Röderer und seine Freunde (Colmar, 1886).

40. Friedrich, p. 15.

41. Froitzheim, pp. 33, 35.

42. See the "Protokoll" in Froitzheim, pp. 33-53.

43. Lenz, Briefe I, pp. 20, 33, 40, 84.
44. Daunicht, "Wieland", p. 34.

45. Froitzheim, p. 25.


47. See Froitzheim, pp. 52-53. Subsequently the society moved to Magister Blessig's rooms; see Lenz, Briefe II, p. 63.


50. Stecher, p. 27.

51. These readings constitute, incidentally a third group of contributions to the sessions of the Société that we know about and that are preserved for us. The other two groups are, of course, Lenz's works and Salzmann's essays.

52. Lenz, Briefe I, p. 35: "Was für eine Stelle mir also dereinst der Vater im Weinberge anweisen wird, weiß ich nicht . . . ich werde keinen Wink der Vorsehung aus der Acht lassen."


Chapter Two

1. Salzmann, Abhandlungen, p. 92. References will be to this edition and will follow the quotation in parentheses.

2. See chapter one above, note 31.

3. See letter to Salzmann discussed on page 38f. above.

4. See especially T.H. I.488. The M.S. of this essay also shows no evidence of having been folded for dispatch by mail.

5. The tone of his theological convictions might indicate that the essay was written after Lenz's "conversion" in Landau in October 1772, described in letter no. 27 (Briefe I.65).

6. I.492. For Lenz's disagreement with Rousseau, see Norman R. Diffey, "Lenz, Rousseau and the Problem of Striving", in Seminar, X, 3 (September, 1974), pp. 165-180. See also our conclusion, note 2.

7. P. 38. The underlinings in this and the next few quotations are mine.


10. Goethes Briefe I (H.A.), 141-144, 596.


14. Blei IV.34.

15. Kronenberg, Kant (Munich, 1897), p. 60, quoted in Rosanow, pp. 51-52.


17. Ibid., pp. 49-50.

18. 23rd December, 1780; in Stöber, Salzmann, p. 103.

19. Ibid., p. 78.

20. In Dr. August Langmesser, Jakob Sarrasin (Zürich, 1899), p. 133.
Chapter Three


7. T.H. I, 695.

8. In Rosanow, p. 475.

9. This equation of the "Lebensregeln" and "Vom Baum des Erkenntnisses" is also found in Girard, *Genèse* and in David Price Benseler, "J.M.R. Lenz: An indexed bibliography with an introduction on the history of the manuscripts and the editions", Diss. University of Oregon, 1971.

10. Blei IV.58; Goethe's *Werke* XII (H.A.), 223.

11. According to Wien (p. 17), the first supplement came "erst später".


15. Ibid., pp. 201-2.


21. In the first "Supplement", Lenz follows Romans 7 quite closely.

22. T.H. I.502-505. This argument is reinforced in "Meine wahre Psychologie" (Blei IV.30-31), and "Lebensregeln" (Ibid., p. 47).

23. See *Meynungen*, pp. 192, 201.

24. *Meynungen*, pp. 194, 182, 183, 200. Except where stated, subsequent page references will refer to *Meynungen*, and will follow the quotation.


29. Ibid., pp. 229-30.
Chapter Four

1. Girard (p. 125) is right to stress the importance of Meynungen as a published work, but wrong to describe it as the only moral-theological work to be published during Lenz's lifetime. The other works were those published in 1780 in Philosophische Vorlesungen für empfindsame Seelen (see above pp. 105-106).


3. T.H. II.132, Cf. also p. 117: "Ich nehme die Menschen lieber als sie sind, ohne Grazie, als wie sie aus einem spitzigen Federkiel hervorgehen."

4. Lenz understood Wieland to be saying the opposite: to be proclaiming that "unsere Kräfte seyn keiner Erhöhung fähig" (Br. I.116).


10. Lenz is fully aware of the heart's tendency to let him down. He often writes about this experience, when his heart is dead and he is drained of all sense of the divine and the transcendent: "wenn wir, bei Erschöpfung unseres inneren Sinnes, das ganze Irdische und Sterbliche unserer Substanz inne werden" (I.446). Cf. also the end of "Stimmen": "gewisse Situationen unseres Lebens, wo alles für uns verloren zu sein scheint, wo wir uns so gar nichts mehr denken, wo wir unsere ganze Unbestimmtheit, das traurige Los der Menschheit, ich möchte das ihre Erbösünde nennen, aufs höchstes fühlen" (I.569).

12. Daunicht, "Wieland", p. 85. Text reconstructed from a torn original manuscript.


Chapter Five


2.Blei IV.286. See also Gert Mattenklott, Melancholie in der Dramatik des Sturm und Drang, (Stuttgart, 1968), for a discussion of the theme of tobacco-smoking in eighteenth-century thought, in his analysis of Der Hofmeister, pp. 162-64.

3.Friedrich Hebbel, Tagebuch I.1471.


5.Ibid., p. 768.

6.Albrecht Schöne, Säkularisation.

7."Esto peccator et pecca fortiter, sed fortius fide et gaude in Christo (Be a sinner and sin strongly, but more strongly have faith and rejoice in Christ)", Letter to Melanchthon, Epistolae M. Lutheri (Ienae, 1556), i.345.
Chapter Six


2. Oehlenschläger, p. 776.

3. 20th November, 1775, Br.I.145.


5. McInnes, Die Soldaten, p. 104.

6. Loc. cit.; also p. 67, note to p.54 line 15f.


8. McInnes, Die Soldaten, p. 110.

9. Blei IV.40ff; see also chapter three note 27 above.

10. Quoted in Die Soldaten: Erläuterungen (Reclam) p. 57.
Conclusion


4. Ibid., p. 131f.

5. Ibid., p. 111.


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