

THE DISTRICT OF CHILLIWACK: A CASE
STUDY IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS
OF DECISION MAKING

by

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Abstract

Understanding how government's plan, make decisions and implement policy programmes is of vital concern to the planners who are expected to intervene in society's complex problems and formulate solutions that can be implemented.

A recent model examines political decision making processes and isolates four factors which influence decision outcomes: 1) the roles played by actors in the issue; 2) the nature of the decision making environment; 3) the characteristics of the issue; and 4) the type of planning and intervention strategies used.

The model was used as a framework for examining a decision making episode in the District of Chilliwack, which centered around the issue of community growth in an area that had been circumscribed by the Agricultural Land Reserves.

The model hypothesized that comprehensive, classical planning methods, which are goal-oriented and focus on long-term horizons, are likely to be rejected in decision making processes. This was confirmed in the Chilliwack case, along with the hypotheses that a proposal for change that is ideologically controversial, inflexible, and difficult to predict in its consequences, will likely be rejected. The fact that the Chilliwack plan was easy to programme and had a limited scope of costs and benefits could not overcome its drawbacks, therefore, these hypotheses were not upheld in the case study.

The model's framework provided a useful means of examining and understanding why the particular outcome of the case study occurred. It clarified the inappropriateness of methods and means used by the Chilliwack decision makers and planners in attempting to achieve their goals. Consequently, the study points out that planners need new approaches, skills and knowledge in order to achieve socially acceptable and workable solutions to complex societal problems.

PREFACE

The case study focuses on the District of Chilliwack which is located in the Fraser Cheam Regional District at the eastern extreme of British Columbia's Fraser Valley. During the period covered by the case study, the City of Chilliwack amalgamated with the Township of Chilliwack, in which it was located, and together the two became the District of Chilliwack.

Technically speaking, many references to the District of Chilliwack throughout the study should have referred to this municipal entity as the Township of Chilliwack, since the time frame was prior to the amalgamation date. However, to simplify the situation and avoid the problem of switching between reference to the old township and the new district, all references to the municipal level of government were termed the District of Chilliwack and any references to the city level of government were termed the City of Chilliwack.

Information and data collected for the case study came from the District of Chilliwack, the Agricultural Land Commission, Urban Programme Planners, departments of the B.C. government, the Fraser Cheam Regional District, the Save the Farmland Committee, and private and public organizations.

The data base constituted information from letters, memorandums, reports, statistics, maps, brochures, briefs and from interviews with planners, government staff, and members of the various organizations and departments.

A map of the District of Chilliwack is included in the preface for the reader's convenience in locating specific areas of the district and for clarifying the physical constraints imposed on the community by the Agricultural Land Reserve.

The following list are the abbreviations used regularly throughout the study:

- A.L.R. Agricultural Land Reserve
- C.P.A.C. Community Planning Advisory Committee
- E.L.U.C. Environment and Land Use Committee Secretariat
- F.C.R.D. Fraser Cheam Regional District
- L.M.O.R.P. Lower Mainland Official Regional Plan
- O.C.P. Official Community Plan

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CHAPTER 1

THE CONCEPT OF COMMUNITY DECISION MAKING

INTRODUCTION

Over the past two decades, it has become increasingly clear that society has been planning too much and experiencing far too little application of plans.¹ Incalculable hours of time and sums of money have been wasted on the development of plans and programmes that have been half-heartedly followed by the political or administrative bodies empowered to enact them, or which have eventually been abandoned or shelved upon completion. As well, many plans have failed to produce the desired end result or have actually had pernicious effects.

When plans have failed to be implemented, the blame has frequently been put on the planner's inability to get through to authorities and to communicate persuasively the virtues and attractions of their plans.² Although this is possibly the case in some instances, the real problem may lay elsewhere, since it appears that even some of the best laid plans are easily thwarted.³ The problem seems to lie partly in the matter of governments lacking the will to tackle problems and to put into effect the knowledge and solutions that are known.⁴ There are numerous complex political, social, and psychological interactions that take place in creating this will to intervene and the general ineffectiveness of the planning process may be attributed in large measure to the fact that so little is known about these complicated interactions.⁵ If planning is to be effective, then it must be the planner's

responsibility to understand these complexities and to help create in government systems, this will to intervene.

There is another reason set forth to help explain why planning has been ineffective and why plans have failed to be implemented. This relates to the fact that in the classical decision model, the planning process is divided into four distinct parts: 1) preparation of alternative plans by planners; 2) adoption of one of these plans by deciders; 3) implementation of the chosen plan by administrators; and 4) recycling information concerning the results of implementation to planners who use this information to revise the current plan.⁶ John Friedmann points out that in this classical model, plans are made, but the deciders proceed to actions that are not in accord with any of the plans proposed. Therefore, he proposes that planning must move closer to, and actually fuse with, action. In other words, planners must not simply produce plans, which are really just instruments of action, but rather planning must become an integral part of an organization's decision making and managerial processes, from the early creation of a general framework of action, through to the development of a particular project or programme.

The decision making process has been called the pivotal element linking knowledge and action in any social system.⁷ As a result, it is a key dimension in problem resolution and one which faces the planner continually. Understanding the nature of decision making processes, therefore, should be a prime concern of the planning profession if it expects to effectively deal with and assist in the solving of society's ills.

THE STUDY OF COMMUNITY DECISION MAKING: AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE:

The study of community decision making has, in the past, centered around the concept of 'power'. In this context, power can be conceived as a word which describes the acts of individuals going about the business of trying to move other individuals to act in relation to themselves or to organic or inorganic things.⁸ These studies of community power have been concentrated in the fields of political science, sociology, and to a lesser extent, psychology.

The political scientists have had two basically different positions on the matter of community decision making, in that there has been an 'elitist' philosophy and a 'pluralistic' viewpoint. The elitist philosophy contends that community decision making is carried out by a powerful elite group of people who possess the wealth, social class, and prestige in a community's social milieu. The pluralist philosophy, on the other hand, refutes the idea that there is a ruling elite or class and, instead, sees a system where power is shared among several competing groups.⁹ Each group will have access to a different combination of political resources,¹⁰ and will have some voice in shaping socially binding decisions.¹¹ Both the elitists and the pluralists argue their case from what can be considered a 'structuralist' position; that is, they argue that community decision making is determined by an environmental

structure which is made up of such features as institutions, laws, class levels, political positions and the like. To uncover the shape and form of this structure is to learn what governs community political behavior.¹²

The other position on the make-up of community decision making is a 'process' approach which views structural features as merely a stage for decision making episodes. Here, relevant actors in the situation may be conditioned by the environmental structure in which they are operating, however, they are not necessarily determined by it. This is because their personalities, technical skills, financial wealth and the informal social resources to which they have access can often overcome any limitations the environmental structure normally imposes on the roles or political positions they play.

Sociologists have played as important a role in the study of community power as political scientists and they have generally favored the elitist view.¹³ Their view is frequently referred to as stratification theory which proposes that the pattern of social stratification in a community is the principal, if not the only, determinant of the pattern of power.¹⁴ Stratification studies assert that a single 'power elite' of upper class citizens rules community life and that political and civic leaders are subordinate to this

group, which rules in its own interests. It can readily be seen why the pluralist view is the polar opposite of the elitist position, in that power is not static and rooted in one elite group but is a variable that shifts with time and is shared among different community groups as they compete for the various community resources. There are many cleavages among these plural groups and no one group can be said to represent the 'public interest'. This view acknowledges that wealth, status and authority may influence roles and positions of actors, however, these roles and positions may shift with the balance of power among the groups as each is constrained or constrains through the process of mutual group adjustment.¹⁵ In effect, the pluralist view assumes a much greater degree of equality in the distribution of political power and a dispersed, fragmented, decision making environment.¹⁶

Psychologists' studies in community decision making can really be identified as 'process' approaches to power studies and this view has also been adopted by both political scientists and sociologists. To clarify all these various approaches, it can be said that elitist and pluralist philosophies argue from a structuralist position and the alternative view is labelled a process approach to decision making. This process approach can conceivably be identified with a psychological approach to the community which has been used by some investigators in other disciplines.

Psychology's interest in community decision making has been less prominent than that of the other two disciplines and has evolved from interest in the psychological make-up of influential or important political actors. However, this interest has tended to center on nationally prominent actors rather than those at the local community level.¹⁷ Beyond this kind of personality profile approach, there is an area of psychology which can contribute much to understanding community decision making. This is the social psychology of group behavior, which can provide insight into the different forms of intervention that can be used in any social setting. The prospect of being able to modify behavior, values, attitudes and beliefs in individual and organization activities, lends theoretical support to the prospect of managing larger entities in order to direct urban political systems towards explicit goals.¹⁸

Especially in the vast amount of political science literature, which has described from a variety of theoretical perspectives how political systems work, there has tended to be a concentration on methodological disputes, rather than on attempts to set forth fundamental principles governing community decision behavior. However, these early studies of 'collective' action (as opposed to 'individual' decision behavior), based on the contrasting theoretical perspectives of elitism or stratification and pluralism, formed the basis

from which contemporary behavioral models of decision behavior have grown. 'Behavioral models' seek to duplicate actual real-world decision making, to describe these actions in models of some type, and to predict outcomes in future decision situations.¹⁹ They are in contrast to 'normative models' which can be viewed as statements of how one should act or decide in various circumstances, and which employ prespecified objectives, decision criteria, axioms for behavior and other components of decision situations. These normative models, which specify desirable forms of decision behavior beforehand, can be somewhat artificial unless their prescriptions closely duplicate decision situations in the real world.²⁰

One of the earlier behavioral models of collective action has described the real world policy making process as one which is incremental, in that the community attempts to describe its current ills and possible remedies and then attacks the problem in successive stages over time. In this case, the analysis is always partial and no attempt is made at synoptic or comprehensive analysis of all possible solutions to the problem or their hard-to-measure spill-over effects.²¹ This is the 'disjointed incrementalist' strategy of Charles Lindblom and David Braybrooke and, to some extent, it describes the real world situation, where communities move away from crises incrementally, rather than move

purposefully toward desired targets. However, this model does not completely describe real world behavior, since there have been decisions made by governments and institutions which have not been incremental, remedial or serial, but rather have focused on planned parametric change.²²

There are many different approaches to the study and understanding of policy making processes and the more specific matter of community decision making. The recent work of Roy Burke and James Heaney provides a comprehensive overview of the diverse conceptual frameworks of the numerous theories and models that exist.²³ The present study focuses on one recent behavioral model that has been developed by Richard Bolan and Ronald Nuttall, who have drawn on their own works and that of other theorists in the field of decision making theory. For example, from Floyd Hunter, Robert Dahl and Edward Banfield, they focus on the 'structure of influence' concept which is comprised of the formal structure (the collection of agencies and institutions in a community, their goals and the legal framework which circumscribes their activities and responsibilities) and the informal structure of influence (or the behavior of individuals within the formal structure and the actions they take in order that the elaborate checks and balances of formal decentralization can be overcome by informal centralization).²⁴ In addition, they draw from Robert Hoover's study of historical social movement and change, from John Friedmann's

analysis of varying planning styles, from Braybrooke and Lindblom's incremental planning approach, based on the idea that there are practical limits of rationality in public policy making and from numerous other theorists who have probed into the nature of the planning and decision making process. Before describing their model, a look will be taken at the nature of policy making and decision behavior, as described predominantly by Dennis Rondinelli in a fairly recent paper that deals with the concept of managing urban change.

THE NATURE OF URBAN POLICY PLANNING AND DECISION MAKING

Dennis Rondinelli describes the nature of policy making and also suggests new approaches that are necessary for planners if they are to effectively deal with decision making episodes and manage urban change. He emphasizes the political nature of the process where policies are made through the socio-political resolution of conflict among groups with varying values and goals.²⁵ In this process, groups that stand to gain or lose from the enactment of particular policies elicit responses from each other with respect to their divergent values, interpretations of rationality, criteria, ends and means. Through political interaction and social adjustment, the decisions and priorities of the participants in policy making are ratified, altered, compromised, or rejected. The groups involved in the process would be public or private organizations

which may have specialized personnel, information, technical expertise, analytical skills and influence resources. Essentially, each group pursues its own perceptions and interests and its own conception of what is the public interest.

With each group following its own interests, the difficulty arises in defining the problem concisely, both because policy problems are often complex to begin with and because each group tends to place a different emphasis on varying components of the problem. In this way, each group tends to define the whole problem in terms of a part and then mobilizes support for its own definition of the problem.²⁶ Although no one perception of a social problem is inherently more correct than any other, it falls on the planner to choose among them in deciding how precisely or broadly to define the problem, according to Timothy Cartwright who contends that some perceptions of a problem can be more useful than others for planning purposes.²⁷ This is so because, firstly, the way in which a problem is perceived determines the range of possible solutions to that problem and, secondly, the way in which a problem is perceived determines the kind of strategy that is appropriate for its solution. For these reasons, the effective planner capitalizes on whatever discretion he may have in defining the problem he is to help solve.

Other characteristics of decision making include the fact that policy alternatives are not systematically evaluated, with the best choice being made after the deliberate analysis of the various possibilities. What actually happens is that the final policy is derived out of compromises amongst the various groups' desired courses of action and the chosen alternative(s) will depend in part on which groups are involved in the process and on their influence.²⁹

In the process of determining final policy directions, Rondinelli points out that not only do the policy making participants have limited capacity to evaluate the options comprehensively, but also, when they analyze the facts, information and statistics, they do it subjectively, based on their own interests and ideological predispositions. Another problem in policy making is the long lead and lag times between the moment when the public perceives that there is a problem needing rectifying and the final stage when politicians and civic leaders implement solutions. Political interactions preceding program implementation can take years and even decades of debate and conflict resolution before final policies are developed. Even when a solution is implemented, in many cases it is difficult to evaluate whether or not the policy is effective in correcting the condition it was designed to ameliorate.³⁰

Rondinelli's final proposition on the nature of community

decision making is that policy formulation is carried out under conditions of uncertainty, risk, incomplete information and partial ignorance of the situation in which problems evolve, the resources of interested groups and the effectiveness of proposed solutions. As a result, professional planners and public administrators have done little better than legislators in comprehensive policy analysis.

A MODEL OF COMMUNITY DECISION MAKING

Bolan and Nuttall have developed a model of community decision making that incorporates the elements of both the structuralist and process approaches to the community. As well, combinations of both elitism and pluralism can be accommodated, according to the authors. Essentially, these researchers view the overall process of governing and its consequences, looking at important individual actors, the issue itself and the broader societal environment. It is their contention that the model can be applied in communities of all sizes, although the case studies they used were centered in large metropolitan areas of the United States. They deliberately sought out these large urban areas where they could observe the full range of complex and diverse political behavior, unlike previous research which often tended to dwell on smaller communities, where it was believed that decision making processes could be more readily observed.

Bolan and Nuttall break down the process of political interactions that occur in community decision making into four elements, each of which affects the final outcome in some manner. These elements are: 1) the characteristics of the actors involved in the decision making process; 2) the socio-political environment that surrounds the policy development process; 3) the kind of planning strategies that are developed to deal with the issue; and 4) the nature or characteristics of the public issue at question. Their quantitative analysis was centered on the first two of these elements in their study of urban expressways in Boston and New York, of high school redevelopment in Pittsburgh and finally, of the city of Boston's effort to develop a new hospital. The last two elements of their research were held constant, that is, the nature or characteristics of the public issues and the kind of planning and intervention strategies employed in the issue. They developed a number of hypotheses on all of these elements which purport to explain the relationship between the relevant characteristics of each element and the final outcome of the issues' decision making process.

It is the intent of the present case study to focus on these last two elements in the model as a means of understanding the nature of a community decision making episode that occurred in the District of Chilliwack, located at the eastern end of British Columbia's Fraser Valley. Since it is of prime concern to the planner to understand and deal with

planning and intervention strategies and because the nature of the issue at Chilliwack was clearly an important component in the decision making process, the present case study focuses on these two elements of the Bolan and Nuttall model.

The issue at Chilliwack has been centered around the development of a community plan for the district and was touched off in the early 1970's by the creation of the Agricultural Land Reserves (A.L.R.) in the province. Of primary concern to the present examination is to discover how the planning and intervention strategies (Bolan and Nuttall's Variable Set 3) and the nature of the issue (Variable Set 4) affected the final outcome of the decision making process. It is seen that these two elements, out of the four, are variables that planners may be able to influence more readily in their work situations than either the characteristics of the actors or their roles in the policy making process or the nature of the decision field characteristics. Therefore, examining the issue and the planning strategies appears to be more relevant to this study than focusing on the roles or the decision environment. Where these latter two Variable Sets were deemed to provide additional insight into understanding the Chilliwack case, they were used. The next section looks at the model's postulates and some additional aspects of the model which were useful in clarifying the nature of the Chilliwack case study.

THE HYPOTHESIS OF THE BOLAN AND NUTTALL MODEL

Variable Set 3: Planning and Intervention Strategies

The model proposes that in general the manner and degree to which a public issue is seen and understood will influence the decision outcome. The amount of information collected, the way it is introduced and the actors involved in presenting it, all affect the decision outcomes. The hypotheses, which are outlined below, have been paraphrased from the Bolan and Nuttall model and set out in the present manner for the purposes of this study. First, there are the planning strategy hypotheses:

1. 'Planning position' - it is hypothesized that where planning is attached to a power centre (rather than to independent and advisory planning bodies), it will be more influential in guiding public decision making.
2. 'Planning method' - it is hypothesized that where problem solving is of an incremental or opportunistic nature (rather than of a comprehensive classical method), it is more likely to guide or direct public action.
3. 'Planning type' - it is hypothesized that where planning deals with the immediate, focuses on means and deals with selective and narrowly strategic information (rather than looking to a long-term time horizon, being goal oriented and focusing on comprehensive and complex information systems), it is more likely to guide action.

Secondly, there are the action or intervention strategies' hypotheses:

1. It is hypothesized that action strategies which little disturb the status quo are more likely to be adopted by a political system than are actions designed to bring about social change by redistributing resources and changing existing institutional and organizational structures (i.e. reallocating wealth or power).

2. It is hypothesized that action strategies designed to change individual circumstances tend more toward action than programmes that attempt massive changes in aggregate societal behavior.

In essence, the three variables at work with respect to action strategies are:

- efforts to reallocate the distribution of resources
- efforts to change individual or societal behavior.
- efforts to change institutions and organizations

Variable Set 4: Characteristics of Public Issues

The model postulates that generally, positive action can be expected where proposals are easily predictable in their consequences and are easily accomplished both economically and administratively and generally lie within a social value or preference field. The specific hypotheses that deal with the characteristics of the issue are:

1. It is hypothesized that if the ideological content (i.e. basic values) of a proposal for change does not create a lot of conflict by clashing with widely-held values, there will be a greater tendency toward positive action; but on the other hand, should a proposal seriously conflict with widely held values, then there will be a tendency to reject it.
2. It is hypothesized that proposals that influence relatively few people in a manner of limited intensity and with limited benefits are more likely to be accepted; however, proposals affecting a lot of people with a substantial measure of intensity with respect to both costs and potential benefits are usually rejected.
3. It is hypothesized that proposals which are flexible and reversible and can be changed at a later time, if proven inappropriate or in need of modification, are more likely to be accepted; than proposals that are irreversible or inflexible over time (e.g. urban expressways as opposed to social welfare programmes.)

4. It is hypothesized that programmes that are to be carried out through a single agency or relatively few individuals and which entail few external coordination problems are more likely to be adopted than are proposals involving much coordination among a large and dispersed number of autonomous groups in order to carry them out - this is largely because of the uncertainty that the proposal will actually be carried out as proposed.
5. It is hypothesized that proposals which are easily predictable in their consequences and which have minimal risks, will have positive decisions reached on them providing other factors are favorable also. Where proposals have high risks and uncertain consequences, political systems are more likely to hesitate to act.
6. It is hypothesized that where an issue can be clearly communicated and subsequently understood by those actors who will deal with it, it will be more likely to be acted upon; on the other hand, proposals and issues which are abstract and require sophisticated powers of conceptual reasoning are more likely to be rejected because they are not communicated well.

There are other aspects of the model which are relevant to understanding decision making processes and the most important to the present study include the dimension of time and the number and nature of the decision making groups that act in an issue. This latter dimensions deals with the fact that for any particular issue there may be more than one group of decision makers acting on the matter and these groups are not always located just within the community. For complex issues, there may be any number of networks of groups which operate independently of each other and make decisions on the issue or parts of it. As a result, outside influences may, at times, significantly affect an issue in a manner not anticipated or desired by local decision makers.

The time dimension is also recognized as a very significant factor in decision making processes. Since the political interactions that make up decision processes involve long lead and lag times, many changes can occur over the policy making period in knowledge relevant to the issue's resolution, in the goals being advocated, in the nature of the actors or groups involved, and in any other number of areas that can affect an issue's final outcome.

The model also focuses attention on the 'dependent variable', which is the decision outcome. Of concern to Bolan and Nuttall is the fact that many community studies see decision outcomes as all-or-nothing propositions. In other words, either a proposal was accepted or rejected. However, since final decisions are reached largely through bargaining and negotiation, they are usually compromises. The model, therefore, sees both means and goals, which are the essential ingredients of any plan, as lying along a continuum. This continuous scale allows the charting of the original goals or means in an issue in relation to the final goals or means and ranges from their complete acceptance at one extreme to their complete rejection at the other end. Original goals and their means can operate independently of each other over the course of an issue in the sense that a goal may be ultimately retained, but its means is rejected. It can also work the other way, where an original goal is changed or redefined but the original means is still used. In addition, the model assists in the understanding that goals and means go through periods of

clarity and ambiguity and that the final outcome may occur when either or both of them are clear, merely unsettled, or completely ambiguous.

It is the intention of the present study to examine these aspects of the model to assist in clarifying these important factors in decision making processes. In addition, the model's two Variable Sets will be used as a framework for determining how the nature of the Chilliwack issue and how the planning strategies used to solve the community's problems affected the outcome of the decision making process.

CHAPTER II

THE CASE STUDY: THE DISTRICT OF CHILLIWACK AND A

COMMUNITY PLAN

ESTABLISHING THE AGRICULTURAL LAND RESERVE IN CHILLIWACK

The issues in the Chilliwack case study evolved out of the establishment of the Agricultural Land Reserves throughout the province by the British Columbia government. The general procedure for setting up these reserves involved co-ordinated efforts by municipalities, Regional Districts, the Provincial Department of Agriculture, and the British Columbia Agricultural Land Commission. It was the intent of the legislators establishing the reserves that initially each municipality should be permitted to retain a five year supply of land out of the A.L.R., to allow for immediate growth in its' urban area.³²

The manner in which the A.L.R. boundaries were established in Chilliwack occurred in the following way. The Fraser Cheam Regional District (F.C.R.D.), in which Chilliwack was situated, received from the Department of Agriculture an initial draft proposal of the A.L.R. boundaries in their Regional District. The F.C.R.D. was supposed to make adjustments to this plan, if necessary, based on their area's needs and then submit this modified plan to the Land Commission for its approval. The F.C.R.D. allowed Chilliwack the complete freedom to define the A.L.R. within its municipal boundaries, while it looked after all other areas of the Regional District. The A.L.R. plan resulting from the combined efforts of the F.C.R.D. and Chilliwack went to the Land Commission, where adjustments were made, and then on to the Environment and

Land Use Committee Secretariat of the Provincial Government for further perusal. This department insured the A.L.R. plans did not conflict with the immediate objectives of other government resource departments, for instance with the concerns of the Forestry Department. Finally, the plan received the approval of the Provincial Cabinet's Environment and Land Use Committee (E.L.U.C.) before being returned to the Land Commission where it was officially designated as the legal A.L.R. plan for the Fraser Cheam Regional District.

The Fraser Cheam Regional District A.L.R. plan was officially designated December 16, 1973 and essentially from that time up to the present the District of Chilliwack has been struggling to solve a number of growth-related planning problems in their community.

EARLY CONFLICTS OVER THE AGRICULTURAL LAND RESERVE BOUNDARY

After receiving the Department of Agriculture's initial A.L.R. proposal, Chilliwack officials identified thirty-six areas where the proposed plan conflicted with either local development commitments or with the Lower Mainland Official Regional Plan (L.M.O.R.P.) objectives.³³ The L.M.O.R.P. had been used by Chilliwack up to that time, together with Chilliwack's own zoning bylaw, as the community's means of directing growth.

These thirty-six conflict areas constituted about 2300 acres and Chilliwack wanted approximately 2146 acres of this for residential and commercial uses and about 130 acres for industrial purposes. The remainder was planned for use either as a wildlife conservation habitat or for public recreation. Chilliwack planners and politicians felt that these areas were essential for the proper development of Chilliwack, therefore, when they submitted their A.L.R. proposal to the Land Commission (as part of the F.D.R.D. plan) they requested that the 2300 acres be excluded from the final A.L.R. plan.

Most of these thirty-six conflict areas had either urban or industrial land use designations under the Current Stage Maps of the L.M.O.R.P. This document also had Long Range Maps which showed the urban areas of Chilliwack extending far into the district's farmland, but this was obviously an unacceptable growth pattern by Land Commission standards. Therefore, on the basis of the Current Stage Maps, Chilliwack officials felt it was reasonable that these thirty-six areas be allowed to develop for urban uses.

The Land Commission, however, had a different view on the matter. There were only seven of these thirty-six areas that were developed for urban uses to the extent that they were lost to agriculture for all time. Of the remaining areas, eight were entirely in farm use, seventeen were

partly being used for agriculture, two were vacant and the last two were rural-residential holdings. Under these circumstances, it was impossible for the Land Commission to allow the outright exclusion of the entire 2300 acres, however, they did allow approximately 1287 acres to be excluded and retained the remaining 1014 acres.

These thrity-six areas can really be broken down into one of twelve general physical areas of Chilliwack. Table 1 illustrates these twelve areas and specifies the number of acres under dispute in each one. In other words, Table 1 illustrates the number of acres requested for exclusion by Chilliwack and the actual number that the Land Commission eventually excluded. The first six areas in the Table, that is, Sardis through to and including the Fraser River area, constitute that section of the district that is frequently referred to as the 'urban corridor'. It is the main expanse of urbanization which extends from the boundary of the Fraser River in the north through the former City of Chilliwack and on down south including: the newly developed commercial areas around the Vedder Road interchange (consisting in part of the Cottonwood Corners Shopping Mall); the long established urban area at Sardis; and finally, Vedder Crossing, at the southern end where the Canadian Armed Forces base is located. The total amount of land Chilliwack wanted removed from the A.L.R. in the urban corridor amounted to approximately sixty percent of the total 2300 acres, or

TABLE 1

FARMLANDS DISPUTED BY CHILLIWACK IN THE DEPARTMENT OF
AGRICULTURE'S AGRICULTURAL LAND RESERVE PROPOSAL

- Acres Requested for Exclusion by Chilliwack and Acres
Excluded by the Commission

	<u>ACRES REQUESTED FOR EXCLUSION BY CHILLIWACK</u>	<u>ACRES REQUESTED BY THE LAND COMMISSION</u>
1. SARDIS	246	112
2. CHILLIWACK MOUNTAIN	249	128
3. VEDDER ROAD INTERCHANGE	501	197
4. SOUTHERN URBANIZED AREA*	334	237
5. NORTHERN URBANIZED AREA**	23	23
6. FRASER RIVER AREA***	46	15
7. MAJUBA HILL	333	333
8. RYDER LAKE AREA	234	0
9. PROMONTORY ROAD AREA	180	180
10. YARROW	52	29
11. GREENDALE	10	10
12. ROSEDALE	93	23
	<hr/>	<hr/>
TOTAL ACRES	2,301	1,287

* This area is located North of Freeway 401 and extends North to the City of Chilliwack's boundary; it includes lands near the airport.

** This area is located North of the City of Chilliwack's boundary on Fairfield Island.

*** This area is located on the Fraser River and needed for industrial use.

1399 acres. The Land Commission excluded 712 acres from the corridor. Of the remaining six areas illustrated in Table 1, which includes acreages in the southern uplands of the district (i.e. Majuba Hill, Ryder Lake and Promontory Road Areas), in the two westerly communities of Greendale and Yarrow and in the easterly village of Rosedale, there had been 902 acres requested for release. There the Land Commission excluded 575 acres.

When making its decision on these thirty-six individual areas of land, the Land Commission considered the agricultural capability of the properties, the adjacent land use patterns and the existing urban services. Each area was treated individually and was not retained or excluded solely on the basis of the lands' capability for agricultural production nor only on its affinity for urban development. For example, the Land Commission excluded from the northern urbanized area one hundred acres of fine Class 2 land, which is the second highest rating given under the Canada-wide system of classifying the capability of soils for agricultural production. This Canada Land Inventory System has seven classes with Class 1 lands being capable of producing virtually any common cultivated crop, from vegetables and berries to grains and fodder crops, because of optimum soil and climate combinations. Each successive class is only able to produce a more restricted range of crops right through to Class 7 lands, which have no agricultural capability and constitute rocky land forms or

small unmappable water bodies. Class 2 lands such as this one hundred acres would be capable of producing a wide range of regional crops, similar to Class 1 lands, only with some differences in variety due to minor restrictions of soil or climate. Although this was technically some of the best farmland in Chilliwack, it was already sewered and was adjacent on two sides to existing residential development. Therefore, it was released.

On the other hand, the existence of services and adjacent urban areas did not necessarily guarantee the exclusion of an area. For instance, properties at the Vedder Road Interchange in the area of the Cottonwood Corners Shopping Centre had been included in a relatively new sewer district and Chilliwack wanted these lands out of the A.L.R. for commercial, light industrial and residential uses. This Sewer District No. 10 had been formed by three major property owners in the area partly to correct sanitation conditions at a milk processing plant and a frozen food plant at the insistence of the Provincial Department of Health. Fraser Valley Frosted Foods Limited and the Fraser Valley Milk Producers Association, in early 1972, joined the Sardis Land and Development Limited, which had been working toward the establishment of a sewerage system and treatment plant for its properties around the interchange since 1967. The construction of the sewers took place mainly after the establishment on December 21, 1972,

of the 'land freeze' as the Provincial Order-in-Council, which was the forerunner of the Land Commission Act, was commonly called.

The properties in question in the Sewer District had the main trunk lines in place but were not all serviced by the individual lateral lines. Essentially what happened was that the Land Commission refused to exclude those properties which had not been irreversibly damaged for agriculture, even though the trunk lines were readily accessible to some of these lands. The milk and food plants and the shopping centre lands were excluded from the A.L.R., but the fact that there was no 'substantial commencement', that is, no physical work which alters the land such as road or drainage construction, foundation excavations, concrete slabs and similar improvements, on adjacent properties meant that the Land Commission refused the exclusion.³⁴ This refusal was a serious setback, not only for the three property owners who expected to be relieved of some of the cost of the sewerage system when the trunk lines reached residential development, but also for Chilliwack officials who saw this part of the community as a critical expansion area of various uses.

In general, the Land Commission excluded a large proportion of the properties requested for release in the area north of the freeway, however, the opposite was the case south of the freeway where the policy was to keep the

Sardis farmlands in tact. In the southern upland areas of Chilliwack, the Commission released all 333 acres as requested on Majuba Hill, directly south of Yarrow, and all of the 180 acres in the Promontory Road area further east. However, the Commission refused to exclude any of the 234 acres in the most easterly upland area of Ryder Lake but the village areas of Greendale, Rosedale, and Yarrow were all allowed some further lands for growth. The final result was that 1287 acres were released and 1014 acres were retained by the Land Commission.

CHILLIWACK'S RESPONSE TO THE FINAL AGRICULTURAL LAND RESERVE PLAN

Despite the fact that the Land Commission had excluded almost 1300 acres from the land reserves prior to the final designation of the A.L.R. boundaries in the area, Chilliwack planners and elected officials were very upset when the final plan was revealed. In the months following, Chilliwack officials claimed that the Land Commission had not allowed their area a five year supply of land for growth and, at best, they were given a three year supply.³⁵ They felt that their own A.L.R. proposal had been ignored by the Land Commission. It was their contention that the Land Commission should have held a public hearing before establishing the final A.L.R. plan and the Commission's failure to do so meant that incorrect procedures had taken place. This, however, was not the case since the

legislation allowed for public input into the process only during the time when each Regional District was establishing its A.L.R. proposal.

Elected Chilliwack officials perceived that the A.L.R. plan would not only make planning difficult for them, but would stop growth altogether in their community.³⁶ As a result, they discussed their land dilemma with the Land Commission. The suggestion was made that Chilliwack develop a community plan which would more clearly define the direction and type of development envisioned for the community's future. It was the Land Commission's expectation that such a plan would reflect the growth options for Chilliwack given the constraints of the A.L.R., especially with respect to the higher capability valley lands.³⁷ It had been pointed out to Chilliwack that there were alternative growth options to that of building on the excellent valley farmlands, namely in the southern upland areas of the community. Although some of these lands were still in the A.L.R., they were of a lower agricultural capability and the Land Commission indicated a willingness to consider the exclusion of these lands if and when Chilliwack needed them for growth.

This situation, or 'land crisis' was forcing Chilliwack for the first time to really take an active role in the planning of their community. Up to that point in time, they had depended on the L.M.O.R.P., their own basic zoning by-laws, and the market place, to dictate their community's

planning policies. This was a time when potentially they could take the major step toward really examining their local values, needs, goals, resources and options in order to come up with a community plan which reflected not only the uniqueness of their local physical, economic, and social environment, but also the changing attitudes towards planning and environmental matters that were occurring at various levels throughout the province.

CHILLIWACK'S FIRST COMMUNITY PLAN: THE DEVELOPMENT PLAN 1976

After discussions between Chilliwack officials and the Land Commission, it took fifteen months for Chilliwack to develop a plan which was completed by early 1976. It was known as the Development Plan 1976 and was based on three factors: the land use patterns already in the community, the L.M.O.R.P., and the 1970 Chilliwack Zoning By-Law.³⁸ It was a document that was produced by Chilliwack's Planning Department and had no public input into its formulation.

The Development Plan focused only on the Urban Corridor of Chilliwack and was intended for urban-oriented uses only. It was basically a land use document which designated all lands within the corridor into one of the following categories; single or multi-family residential, core commercial, commercial, industrial and airport. The Planning Department did not advocate upland development to replace growth in the valley and actually posed a number of reasons why this was not a viable alternative,

mainly relating to development costs. The plan was designed to serve both as a long-range, thirty year planning document and also as a short-term, ten year detailed development plan.

In order for the plan to be implemented, lands would have to be removed from the A.L.R. in the following three stages: between 1976 and 1982, 585 acres would have to come out; from 1983 to 1990, 430 acres were required; and from 1991 onward, 619 acres must be removed. This was a total of 1,634 acres, of which 1,560 acres were at the time in agricultural use.

The Development Plan did not reflect a new approach by the planners and elected officials toward community planning in Chilliwack. It was essentially a plan which perpetuated past and existing land use patterns another thirty years into the future. It did not deviate significantly from the L.M.O.R.P., with the exception that it was operating at a more detailed scale and that it accommodated approximately six times more industrial land in the community than the L.M.O.R.P. had!

CHILLIWACK APPLIES TO REMOVE LANDS FROM THE AGRICULTURAL LAND RESERVE

The next step by Chilliwack officials upon completing the Development Plan, was to apply to have the needed lands removed from the A.L.R., or in their words, they were making application for approval of a land use plan for Chilliwack over the next thirty years and not the immediate release from the Agricultural Land Reserve of 1800 acres of land.³⁹ The figure of 1800 acres

was quoted in this instance since the Development Plan area actually covered 1834 acres. It was originally anticipated that only about 1634 acres of this would have to come out of the A.L.R., but the final figure as reflected in Chilliwack's first exclusion application, rested at approximately 1720 acres.

Chilliwack's first exclusion request went to the Land Commission in April, 1976, and the Mayor of Chilliwack supported the request with a number of statistics and the facts. For instance, it was pointed out that their district contained 65,000 acres and 50,000 of these were in the A.L.R., 3,000 were in undevelopable steep slopes, and another 3,000 were in Indian Reserves. This left Chilliwack with only 7,200 developable acres, of which 75 percent were upland areas with steep escarpment approaches and which were physically separated from the existing urban development. The Mayor made it clear that both the Indian Reserves and the A.L.R. protruded into the urban development area, creating both cost and physical barriers to the extension of urban services. In addition, urban-rural conflicts were supposedly high where farmland was intruding into urban development. It was pointed out that Chilliwack was experiencing an average growth rate of 6 percent per annum, and at that rate, there was only a three year supply of residential land left. He did acknowledge that the hillsides were adaptable for residential purposes, however, these upland areas could not accommodate commercial or industrial uses which would place restrictions on the district's tax base and growth of employment opportunities.⁴⁰

Chilliwack's exclusion request generated much concern both in the public and private sectors throughout the province. Locally, it caused the creation of a vocal organization calling itself the 'Save the Farmland Committee'. Formed by Chilliwack farmers and concerned citizens, the group organized public meetings to protest the exclusion of the area's farmland. Other private groups from labour, churches and agricultural institutions also protested Chilliwack's request. Various Provincial Government departments also had to have a say in the matter. The concerns expressed by all these groups are dealt with in detail in Chapter 4.

It was the Provincial Government's Environment and Land Use Committee (E.L.U.C.) that dealt with Chilliwack's application, since A.L.R. exclusion requests that are made by local governments are adjudicated by this body and not the Land Commission. The latter makes final decisions in the case of individuals requesting land out of the A.L.R. but not in the case of a municipality's application, where the Land Commission can only make a recommendation.

When E.L.U.C. released their decision, November 25, 1976, it was a confirmation of the values of the Land Commission Act for only 16 acres of the 1720 were excluded. According to one newspaper writer, Chilliwack's Mayor was hopping mad and talking about separating from the rest of the Province.⁴¹ However, it did

not take long for Chilliwack officials to regroup their forces because approximately six months later they applied for the exclusion of 382 acres from the A.L.R. This was a toned-down version of the first request and was aiming mostly at having those lands removed which were in Sewer District No. 10.

The Mayor's brief to the Minister of the Environment pleaded Chilliwack's case on the grounds that the release of these serviced properties would provide area for a modest growth in the community, thereby accommodating places to work and enabling the development of residential facilities on sewered lots, in order to utilize the land in a more economical manner than was possible in unsewered areas.⁴²

A change in the office of the Mayor in November of 1977 did not alter Chilliwack's official position on the A.L.R., since the new Mayor had the same view as his outgoing colleague. It was the new Mayor's opinion that even before the A.L.R. was established, Chilliwack had planning problems resulting from the restrictive barriers created by the railway, highway, and hydro corridors which traversed the district, as well by the area's Indian Reserves. To him, what was a difficult situation before the A.L.R., was made worse as a consequence of it. His view was that all planning in place prior to the A.L.R. was no longer valid.⁴³

Despite Chilliwack's second exclusion attempt, they were unsuccessful. In late January, 1978, E.L.U.C. announced the refusal of the government to exclude any of the 382 acres.⁴⁴

STUDIES ON DEVELOPMENT IN CHILLIWACK'S UPLAND AREAS

When E.L.U.C. refused Chilliwack's first 1720 acre exclusion application, it did confirm that the Province was willing to assist Chilliwack in a study to determine urban suitability, development costs, and market feasibility for residential development of the upland areas. The Chairman of the Land Commission worked with the Ministry of the Environment and the Department of Municipal Affairs and Housing to try and get the study under way quickly. The Province's Resource Analysis Branch carried out a detailed resource analysis of the Chilliwack Mountain, Ryder Lake and Promontory Ridge areas. This technical information on the physical characteristics of the hillsides was to serve as a data base in the development of Chilliwack's upland areas. By the Spring of 1978, the report covering such areas as basic geology, surface drainage, underground water and climate had been released. Chilliwack Mountain and the Ryder Lake areas were found to be geologically complex and variable, however, the gentle slopes were stable enough for development. Consequently, those parts of Ryder Lake which were in the A.L.R. would provide the best development areas.

The second part of the project was to be a preliminary study designed to determine the feasibility and cost of developing a working model or analytical process which would evaluate the costs and benefits of the urban development of lands both in and outside the A.L.R. It was anticipated that the Chilliwack uplands and the lowland A.L.R. would serve as a case study, but that the methodology would ultimately serve any area of the

province. The upland data base can now be used by Chilliwack, but the feasibility study awaits completion of the second stage which is the development of the working model.

Prior to this official approach to the study of the upland areas of Chilliwack by the Provincial Government, there had been two reports done respecting development there. A preliminary study by the Dunhill Development Corporation in October, 1976, made a comparative analysis of the cost of developing 800 acres of lowland A.L.R. properties located adjacent to the urban corridor and 800 acres in the uplands, of which 320 acres were in the A.L.R. and 480 acres were outside. It was found that the costs of providing essential services showed only a 30% to 40% difference in favor of lowland development, assuming a density of four dwelling units per acre in both the uplands and the valley. The report concluded that to achieve the same development economics per upland, as lowland unit, would require increasing the density from four units to between 5.6 and 6.3 units per acre in the uplands.⁴⁵

Chilliwack's Planning Department also put together a report on hillside development in 1976. The planners dealt with the uplands strictly from the perspective of development at rural densities of either 1.25 acre lots or 2.0 acre parcels. Their rationale for using rural densities was that higher densities would require an urban designation on the L.M.O.R.P. and consequently the installation of sewers. They concluded that utilizing the hillsides would cost Chilliwack approximately twenty-three million dollars more than accommodating that

development of the lowlands. In addition, upland development would only support about 3,000 dwelling units with a population of approximately 11,000 people. With the community's estimated population growth rate being in the six percent per annum range, the planners had determined that only six years of growth could be accommodated in the uplands.⁴⁶

MEETINGS BETWEEN CHILLIWACK AND GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS

Throughout 1977 and 1978, Chilliwack officials met on a number of occasions with either the Land Commission or E.L.U.C. officials, in order to try and convince them of the seriousness of Chilliwack's land problem and to try and negotiate a reasonable solution. Chilliwack officials simply did not feel that the community was financially capable of solving its problem alone. This view was shared by people on all sides of the Chilliwack issue. The former Minister of Agriculture, who had been responsible for the creation of the Land Commission Act, had stated at the time of Chilliwack's first exclusion application that it had been his government's intention to subsidize agriculturally-based communities like Chilliwack, so they would not have to depend on development-generated revenue.⁴⁷ A spokesman

for the Save the Farmland Committee stated at the time of Chilliwack's second application, that the Agricultural Land Reserve was a provincial resource for which the government should be responsible and that a financial commitment on the government's part toward the A.L.R. would reduce the tendency of municipalities seeking land exclusions in order to build a tax base to support services.⁴⁸ The Chairman of the Land Commission felt that if society in general was going to accept the policy of preserving agricultural land, it was a necessity to equalize taxation structures across the province between those areas with agricultural land and those having industrial land outside the A.L.R.⁴⁹ Even the Minister of Municipal Affairs stated in early 1977 that municipalities whose growth prospects had been limited deserved all the consideration the government could give them.⁵⁰

Despite talk of the necessity of the Provincial Government providing some sound financial solutions to problems such as those Chilliwack was experiencing, there was little coming Chilliwack's way as far as the district's officials and the various government bodies had proved to be extremely unsatisfactory from the Planning Director's perspective. He felt the talks were more or less being used by the government

departments as a means of simply letting Chilliwack officials air their grievances and get their complaints off their chests.⁵¹ There was some bitterness expressed by the planning staff toward the Provincial Government's treatment of Chilliwack. It was the opinion of the Assistant Planner that Chilliwack had been intentionally discriminated against. He was quoted as saying:

"Perhaps the most significant fact brought out in the application (for the exclusion of the 380 acres) is that if guidelines to the Land Commission Act were applied to Chilliwack as they were applied elsewhere in the province, this application and, indeed, the original application, would never have been needed. One indeed must suspect that perhaps Chilliwack was singled out for this treatment because of political factors".⁵²

A feeling akin to helplessness surfaced occasionally in various Chilliwack officials, along with their anger toward provincial policies, which had affected their community over the years. Even before the A.L.R., there were the fragmenting effects of the rail, highway, and hydro corridors. Then came the L.M.O.R.P., which had dictated the community's direction of development since the 1960's. Finally, the A.L.R. was destroying the established growth pattern and this policy reversal was considered autocratic and something that would be expected in a dictatorship.⁵³

Chilliwack officials were understandably disheartened by the situation in which they found themselves, however, they had not been ignored by the provincial authorities and were being given consideration in their dilemma. Some

concessions had been made in the form of minor releases of land from the A.L.R. which are discussed in Chapter 4, and the first stages of the province's study was completed. In mid-1978 Chilliwack politicians invited the Commissioners from the Land Commission to go out and look firsthand at their land situation and the Commissioners went. The Commission body asked Chilliwack officials to present a bare-bones plan of the lands that were absolutely essential for community growth. This was not an official application to exclude farmland such as the previous two applications had been, but it was an official report to the Land Commission on the 521 acres that Chilliwack officials felt should be seriously considered for eventual release. The result of this exchange was that the Commissioners said they would give fair consideration to exclusion applications made by individual land owners in Chilliwack and would view each request on the basis of its own merits.

In addition to the talks, Chilliwack officials were having during 1978 with agencies outside their community, they were beginning to plan again from the inside their district. Discussions were started by the Planning Department with the Council on the matter of developing a community plan. This would be an Official Community Plan (O.C.P.), by which they could get some funding from the Department of Municipal Affairs for its development.

CHILLIWACK DEVELOPS AN OFFICIAL COMMUNITY PLAN

By October of 1979, Chilliwack had retained a private planning consulting firm to develop the O.C.P. One of the first steps taken by the Consulting Planners was that of requesting the Council to appoint an Advisory Committee which would work with the consultants in developing the O.C.P. They asked that ten to fifteen people be appointed who were representative of the Chilliwack Public on one or more of the factors of occupation, geographic location within the community, and special interest (such as recreational pursuits or conservationist interests).

The consultants were satisfied with the Community Planning Advisory Committee (C.P.A.C.) the Council got together, since the members well represented the physical expanse of the community, including all of Chilliwack's areas of urban concentrations. In addition, the C.P.A.C. included people in occupations such as farming, real estate, general business, and also included a former Chilliwack Planning Committee member, a man engaged in a farm support business and three women homemakers from distinct geographic areas. It was the purpose of the C.P.A.C. to assist the consultants in clarifying Chilliwack's community planning issues. From the beginning it was stressed to the C.P.A.C. members that individually they were to funnel public information and views back to the whole committee, thus allowing the Chilliwack public to be heard.

To further insure that Chilliwack citizens had an opportunity to discuss their community's development issues, a series of public information meetings were held in June, 1980. Three meetings were held, one each in Chilliwack City, Yarrow, and in Rosedale. Based on the views expressed by the C.P.A.C. and members of Chilliwack's public at the June meetings, it strongly came out that the citizens saw Chilliwack as an agricultural community and wanted to protect it as such. There was no desire to see the district turn into a commuter satellite of the greater Vancouver area, but rather there was a strong desire to retain the local identity of each of Chilliwack's small urban centres and protect the rural life-style which had typified their agricultural community.⁵⁴

It was becoming clear for the first time what Chilliwack citizens in general were thinking. In the sense that they valued their farming heritage and wanted to protect a rural life-style, the earlier voice of the Save the Farmland Committee had well represented the public view. However, the concerns of the public covered a broader spectrum of issues than just farmland protection for there were some very real economic and physical planning problems to be addressed. There was the matter of employment and the Chilliwack economy. In their district, jobs had been concentrated over the years in the two industries of agriculture and public administration (including the military base). The trend in the past decade toward

growth in only the service sector of Chilliwack's economy, especially in the areas of trade, finance, insurance, and real estate, meant that local employment opportunities were becoming less rather than more diversified and were concentrating in a lower income employment sector.⁵⁵ Another major concern in the community was the matter of retail-commercial development and over the months this issue turned out to be one of the most controversial, even more so than the matter of agricultural land.⁵⁶ Retail activity had been shifting away from the downtown area of the City of Chilliwack and into newer commercial areas such as the Cottonwood Corners Shopping Centre. In addition, Chilliwack had an over-abundance of retail floor space for the size of its population. The community would therefore have to clarify the direction commercial development should take over the next decade. The other issues concerned the transportation requirements for the district, the needs of a population that was becoming increasingly elderly, the requirements of the agricultural industry which was the community's backbone and, of course, the long standing concern over space for residential growth and industry.⁵⁷

Input into the process of developing the O.C.P. came over the months not only from the C.P.A.C., but also from Chilliwack's Planning Department, the Mayor, the Council's Planning Committee, and its other committees when appropriate, individual council members, other members of the public representing specific interests such as agriculture and, of course, the Consulting

Planners. At the time of this study, the O.C.P. has been drafted with its goals, objectives, policies and means having been ratified by the C.P.A.C. and the Council. It must now be presented to the Chilliwack public for their final perusal and input before being officially adopted as the community plan.

It has been just over eight years since the 'land freeze' started a significant chain of events related to community planning in Chilliwack. The A.L.R. sparked a land crisis for the district's planners and officials which pushed them into a search for solutions to economic and physical growth problems in their community. The next two chapters will examine the process of political decision making that occurred both inside the district's boundaries and outside of the community which ultimately affected the course of policy making and conflict resolution that was followed in the Chilliwack case.

CHAPTER 3

AN EXAMINATION OF CHILLIWACK'S EARLY DECISION MAKING PROCESS

INTRODUCTION

Prior to examining the case study in its entirety, a brief review will be made of the relevant model Variable Sets in relationship to the initial event of Chilliwack producing the Development Plan. This examination is considered necessary in view of the fact that the early decision making carried out by the Chilliwack planners and politicians tended to be conducted as though the issue was a purely local phenomenon, even though there must have been little doubt that there would be spillover effects that would influence areas beyond the district's boundaries. Focusing on this early part of the issue will provide a better understanding of how the Chilliwack decision makers viewed their local planning problem and the possible solutions. The models Variable Sets dealing with Planning and Intervention Strategies and the Characteristics of Public Issues will be examined, with a view to better understanding why Chilliwack was advocating the proposal that they were.

After theoretically examining in isolation Chilliwack's position on their Development Plan, the focus will be returned to the overall decision making process and the conflict resolution that took place with respect to the Chilliwack issue. At this point, the theoretical model will again have its hypotheses examined, along with other model considerations posed by Bolan and Nuttall, in order to understand the final decision outcome.

The first set of hypotheses to be examined, with respect to Chilliwack's choice and promotion of the Development Plan 1976, is the Variable Set dealing with the attributes of the issue.

CHARACTERISTICS OF PUBLIC ISSUES

Ideological Content

The first hypothesis relating to how public agenda characteristics may influence decision outcomes deals with the ideological content of a proposal for change. Essentially, it is theorized that if there is little conflict over the basic values implicit in a proposal, there will be a tendency toward positive action on the plan. Although we know that there ultimately was conflict over the ideological content of the Development Plan, when it was revealed to the general public, there was obviously little conflict over its values at the local political level. It was prepared by Chilliwack's own Planning Department and then revealed to the local politicians. There was only one elected councilman who was opposed to the plan which meant it could be readily adopted and pursued by the decision makers. The plan represented a realistic compromise between the A.L.R. and the community's need for land for urban growth.

Over a period of thirty years the Development Plan required the removal of what was considered a small percentage (3%) of the total amount of farmland in Chilliwack's A.L.R.

The land would not be removed all at once but in three ten-year phases. This was seen as a small sacrifice for local farmland in turn for an orderly and efficient urban growth pattern, which would both cost less to service and would provide more amenities for the area than if growth took place with the A.L.R. in tact.

The main alternative to the Development Plan was that of directing urban growth away from the valley farmland and into the hillsides of the southern area of the district. This was an ideologically unattractive plan as far as Chilliwack officials were concerned. At one ideological level, this proposal represented a complete swing away from established land development patterns in the district and was heavily laden with a philosophy that expected sacrifice from the few for the benefit of the many. In other words, Chilliwack officials saw their community as an area that already was straining to meet local financial commitments through the existing tax base and a hillside development plan, designed essentially to preserve valley farmlands for the benefit of future B.C. citizens, would over-tax the districts economic resources. This would happen in at least two ways. Firstly, providing services to this area would be more expensive to the community than servicing the valley lands and would mean a burden on the local taxpayers and, secondly, revenue would be lost to the district since industry could not be located in the hills and local decision

makers believed there was no land available in the valley for this type of use. The high ideal of preserving farmland for future generations, therefore, had little appeal to the politicians who had to deal with the district's immediate growth and economic problems.

Costs and Benefits

The second hypothesis deals with the distribution of costs and benefits that are likely to occur if action is taken on a particular proposal. Where proposals involve a wide and broad distribution and intensity of costs and benefits, they are more likely to be rejected in the political process. Looking at the Chilliwack issue in its broadest context reveals that the potential impact of the community's situation was of a considerable scope and this will be discussed in detail in Chapter 4. However, the decision makers at Chilliwack viewed the Development Plan within a narrow community context, as could be expected, and therefore saw it differently. It was perceived as a plan which would benefit all local area citizens by making their community a better planned and serviced urban area, all at a cost that could be managed by the local tax base. Not only would the plan benefit the urban areas of the district, but it would also benefit the agricultural community by reducing rural-urban conflicts, at least according to the Planning Department.

The hillside plan, on the other hand, had little to recommend it from the perspective of the Chilliwack planners and politicians. To them, it was all drawbacks and no benefits. For example, the price of housing units that could be provided there were seen as being beyond the range of the middle income families who were the main market for new housing in the district. At the same time it would be the general community that would have to pay through increased taxes for the high cost of servicing the upland areas. Furthermore, a hillside plan would not accommodate industry and would not be able to meet the time requirement of allowing immediate growth areas for urban expansion, since the uplands would take some time to develop for residential uses.

Flexibility of Action

This particular variable is especially appropriate to the Chilliwack issue, since all physical development plans are inflexible and irreversible over time and it is only those programmes that deal with such issues as reorganizing institutional or government structures or introducing social programmes that are truly flexible. It was the fact that irreversible physical growth was going to occur in farming areas in Chilliwack that was at the heart of the issue and which was eventually opposed at the general public level. However, Chilliwack decision makers welcomed physical growth, especially if it could be transformed into economic

terms such as a growing tax base generated especially by commercial and industrial expansion. The model's hypothesis that inflexible plans are more likely to be rejected, therefore, did not hold true because the Chilliwack politicians sanctioned this traditional long-range planning approach.

Programming Action

This variable deals with the problem of carrying out the proposal. The model hypothesized that where programs involve a great deal of co-ordination among dispersed and autonomous groups, they are likely to be rejected. For Chilliwack, this was not the case, because the Development Plan was relatively easy to research and put together and it also could ultimately be co-ordinated and implemented through their existing municipal departments. On the other hand, the hillside development proposal involved many complexities and implementation would entail co-ordinating a number of different factors. For example, an uplands development programme would require extensive technical and physical data on the southern slopes, feasibility studies of potential site areas and extensive negotiations with the Provincial Government on the matter of financial assistance, since Chilliwack officials could not conceive of being able to finance such a program alone. The external coordination problems of following this proposal were a considerable deterrent to the local decision makers.

Risks and Uncertainty

The hypothesis here states that where risks are high and consequences uncertain, there is a hesitancy to act. For the hillside development proposal it is understandable that the decision makers would perceive it as a risky proposal. There was a good deal of uncertainty about the plan's ability to meet Chilliwack's need for affordable housing, to support the population growth expected in the area, or to even be co-ordinated and implemented. Using scarce tax revenue for this kind of plan was risky. By contrast, the Development Plan proposed for the valley lands was viewed with a feeling of certainty about the consequences. By following the physical development pattern laid out for the next 30 years, Chilliwack's various land needs would be met. This tidy, phased development would assist the district in meeting a number of community goals ranging from a local public transportation system to the provision of recreational parks along waterways.

Ease of Communication

This variable relates to the fact that when issues require abstract powers of conceptual reasoning and are difficult to communicate well, they are more likely to be rejected than issues that can be clearly perceived and understood by the actors who will have to deal with them. Chilliwack's Planning Department put together a straight

forward proposal that employed a traditional approach to community development. Essentially, it was a plan that focused on controlling the physical location of future development and was presented in the form of a comprehensive master land use plan. As such, it was easily communicable to the politicians who had to deal with it. On the other hand, pursuing a hillside development plan would involve clarifying such issues as controlling the number of persons moving to Chilliwack, since the planners perceived that the hillsides could only accommodate 10,000 people or about five years of population growth for the community. As well, there was the thorny issue to justify and cope with relating to the higher costs of both the homes and basic services in an upland growth programme. In short, the hillside proposal was going to be difficult to sort out and present clearly to the local decision makers and was understandably avoided as a real alternative for community growth.

An examination will now be made of the model's second Variable Set where the hypotheses deal with planning and intervention strategies.

PLANNING STRATEGIES

The first hypothesis relates to 'planning position' in which attachment to a power center is theorized to be more influential in directing public decision making than are independent and advisory planning bodies. Chilliwack could

be expected to proceed in their decision making process with relative ease since the district's planning position was attached to a power center. In other words, planning came out of the Planning Department which was ultimately attached and responsible to the elected council or power center. The community's planning function was, therefore, in a position of strength and was not merely in an advisory position that did not have much real power.

Secondly, there is the 'planning method' variable. The hypothesis related to this function suggests that problem solving that is incremental or opportunistic in character is more likely to guide or direct public action, than are comprehensive classical planning methods which focus on identifying and quantifying the interdependent relationships among the various social, economic, institutional, environmental, etc., systems that are operating in a community. The planning method chosen by Chilliwack was classical and comprehensive in character and identified interdependencies among many planning issues or social problems in the district. However, this method is qualified by the fact that they did not carry out any extensive quantifying of these relationships and, in fact, some of the plan's back-up data was outrightly erroneous and generally slim. In other words, Chilliwack's approach was somewhat of a half-hearted classical planning method which identified

the various inter-dependent systems but failed to quantify their relationships.

The third variable under planning strategies is 'planning type'. It is theorized that long-term, goal-oriented planning which focuses on complex and comprehensive systems of information is less likely to guide public action, than is planning which deals with the immediate, focuses on means and deals with highly strategic information. Chilliwack's plan certainly had a long-term focus, although the plan was designed to solve their immediate growth problem and therefore also had a short-term focus. It was also goal-oriented, focusing on the end product of an efficiently planned community but stating little about how the numerous goals were to be achieved. It is unclear about the means to be used to achieve such goals as the minimizing of the urban-rural conflicts that existed in the district; bringing industry to the area once the Development Plan provided the land for this use; providing a local public transit system; developing parks and recreation areas around the municipality's waterways; and the retention of the old downtown Chilliwack City core as the primary business and cultural center. The impression exists that the decision makers perceived that, by adhering to the physical development plan, these goals would somehow automatically be achieved in due course.

ACTION OR INTERVENTION STRATEGIES

Of primary concern to this variable is whether or not the action strategy chosen would disturb the status quo to any great extent by redistributing resources, changing individual or societal behavior or changing institutions and organizations. It is hypothesized that action strategies which little disturb the status quo or that are designed to change individual behaviour, rather than aggregate societal behaviour, are more likely to be adopted by a political system. The Development Plan put forth by Chilliwack was designed solely to maintain the status quo. The plan took the existing land use patterns, rounded them out and filled them in and then allocated some new areas for those uses which were short of land. The Development Plan was actually challenging a new policy direction that the Provincial Government had taken through the implementation of the A.L.R. because Chilliwack wanted to return to the long standing urban growth pattern of developing agricultural land. Chilliwack's plan, therefore, did not require that established individual and societal behaviour be changed nor that the district's institutions and organizations modify their behavior to any significant degree. The district was intent on returning to the status quo that had been disrupted by the Provincial Government and local decision makers perceived the alternative of intensive hillside development, which would force individual and organizational behaviour changes, as a last resort option.

SUMMARY

With respect to how the Chilliwack decision makers perceived the public issue characteristics, it was seen that the Development Plan was ideologically sound for it was opposed by only one councilman. It represented a logical compromise between the extreme position of no further growth onto agricultural land, which the A.L.R. dictated, and the opposite extreme of unfettered urban expansion into farming areas. The plan was perceived to be a proposal that would benefit all Chilliwack citizens by providing a well planned physical environment and related urban amenities at a cost that could be born by the local revenue structure. That the proposal was inflexible over time, since it was planning irreversible physical growth, was apparently no reason for the Chilliwack officials to reject it as the model hypothesized would be the case. The local decision makers were actually welcoming physical growth, especially the kind that assisted in substantially bolstering their tax base. Finally, the Development Plan was easy to programme, appeared to have minimal risks and uncertainties for the Chilliwack area, and was easy to communicate to those who would have to deal with it.

On the second Variable Set that deals with planning and action strategies, it was shown that the Chilliwack community was in a good planning position to put together

and carry out a plan, since the Planning Department was attached to the municipal council or power center. That the planning method chosen was at least in part a comprehensive classical approach, together with the fact that they were planning with a long-term, goal-oriented focus, should have mitigated against acceptance of the plan, according to the model. However, in Chilliwack's case, this was not true. Finally, the action or intervention strategy employed in the Chilliwack situation attempted to maintain the status quo and as such, according to the model, it was an approach that would be more likely to be adopted by a political system. This proved to be the case with the Chilliwack politicians.

CONCLUSION

Looking at the Chilliwack issue strictly from the perspective of the district's decision makers and those planners who had to deal with it, gives a fairly clear picture of why these policy makers took the position on the matter that they did. The Development Plan that they prepared and hoped to implement met, from their perspective, most of the criteria as outlined in the hypotheses on issue attributes and this would tend to propel the proposal toward acceptance. Of the six hypotheses, the plan rated positively on five of them. With respect to the action strategy chosen by the Chilliwack planners, it was seen to be one which would little disturb the status quo, and therefore, it

was readily able to be adopted by the politicians.

The fact that the Development Plan was in the style of a comprehensive classical method of planning, with a long-term, goal-oriented focus, should have mitigated against its acceptance by the politicians according to the model. However, this was not the case with respect to the Chilliwack decision makers.

Overall, the plan was perceived positively by the planners and politicians, however, ultimately it had to be scrutinized by the general public and the other government bodies that would eventually form part of the decision making process. Although the Chilliwack planners and politicians appeared to be dealing with this issue from the perspective that it was a purely local phenomena, this was not so. The next section will examine the conflicts that arose once the plan was revealed and how the model relates to the final outcome of the issue.

CHAPTER 4

THE CHILLIWACK ISSUE WITHIN THE MODEL'S FRAMEWORK

THE NATURE OF THE OPPOSING FORCES

We have examined the Development Plan in terms of the model's hypotheses only from the perspective of the plan's proponents. Overall, it was a satisfactory plan from their point of view. However, the plan had not been presented to the Chilliwack general public at any stage of its development and there was no apparent opposition to the proposal, until it was revealed in its final form. It was at this point that the local Chilliwack decision making network was expanded beyond the confines of the local politicians and their planning staff.

A very vocal opposition to the plan arose in Chilliwack in the form of the Save the Farmland Committee. Their voice was really the only local public viewpoint that got aired and this group, in combination with the Chilliwack politicians and planners, represented a more balanced local decision making network, consisting of the views of both the paid and elected officials and the general public. This local unit of decision makers, made up of both opponents and proponents of the plan, was not the only network operating to affect the issue. Outside of the community lay other decision making networks which would have their input into the Chilliwack issue. There were three kinds of outside networks operating. Firstly, there were the private independent groups such as labor, church and agricultural organizations that rallied against the plan. Secondly, there were the interdependent government departments that voiced strong opinions on the Development Plan, and finally, there was

E.L.U.C., that autonomous committee of the Provincial Government's Cabinet that would ultimately affect the plan. These outside decision making networks, together with the opposing forces in the community itself, were critical to the final outcome of the overall decision making process. With the involvement of these external decision making groups and networks, the Chilliwack issue was clearly more complex than a local community matter.

THE BASIS FOR OPPOSITION

The main thrust of opposition to the Development Plan centered predominantly on the Variable Set dealing with Characteristics of Public Issues and more specifically on the hypotheses related to 'ideology' and to 'risks and uncertainty'. The Chilliwack issue was steeped in conflict over the basic values implicit in the proposal and there was considerable uncertainty about the various consequences this community plan would have on other planning matters, both locally and outside the Chilliwack area. Before focusing on the ideological conflicts and the other planning issues, it is relevant to examine how various organizations defined the Chilliwack issue.

A Definition of the Issue

The issue tends to confirm the point expressed by Dennis Rondinelli in his paper on the characteristics of urban policy making. He pointed out that few issues are defined in the same

way by all who participate in the policy making process. Generally, each interested organization will place a different emphasis on a different component of the problem.⁵⁸ Basically, the two opposite minded organizations in the Chilliwack case were the Land Commission and the Chilliwack Council. The former really had to define the issue as the preservation of farmland, since its mandate was to protect and preserve the province's scarce resource of agricultural land. On the other hand, the Chilliwack Council saw the issue as community growth, since naturally it was Council's job to keep the area economically healthy and growing. There were other definitions of the issue, or rather, emphases placed on different components of the problem. For instance, the Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing was concerned about how the release of so many acres from the A.L.R. would affect the demand for urban land throughout the entire Lower Mainland.

Generally, what happens in the process of political policy making is that each individual group involved tries to mobilize support for its own definition of the problem. This was most clear with respect to the Save the Farmland Committee, which rallied support for its position that farmland should not be released from the A.L.R. in order for the Development Plan to proceed. The group mobilized significant support at its public meetings, both from within and outside Chilliwack, and made its voice of opposition to the plan clearly heard. The group's definition of the issue ran parallel to the Land Commission's

point of view, however, it went further and into the issue of life-style in the community. Not only was this group concerned about not destroying non-renewable resources such as farmland, but it also wanted to see the continuance of Chilliwack's agrarian life-style, which represented open space, increasing farming activity, no pollution or traffic jams and the overall positive quality of life that could be experienced in a community with a smaller population.

There were different ways to define the Chilliwack issue. The divergent emphases placed on various components of the problem by participating groups were bound to make a final solution, that was satisfactory to all, difficult to achieve. Having reviewed the main definitions of the problem, it is possible to align these points of view on the Chilliwack issue with the hypotheses respecting the Characteristics of Public Issues. As stated previously, most of the opponents to the Development Plan were against it mainly on the basis of ideology or the fact of the uncertainty of the consequences of the proposal.

Ideological Conflict Within the Community

To reiterate the hypothesis on how the ideological content of a proposal for change influences the decision outcome, it is theorized that if there is little conflict over basic values implicit in a proposal, there will be a greater tendency toward positive action. However, should a proposal seriously conflict

with widely held values, then there will be a tendency toward rejection of the proposed action. The essence of the situation is, according to the model, that communities are not likely to cut off widely held social values.

It has already been discussed how the official decision makers in Chilliwack viewed the Development Plan. To the politicians and planners it was ideologically sound, representing a realistic compromise between the A.L.R. and urban growth. Since the Chilliwack public had not been involved in the development of the community plan, their values and ideological stance on the issue had not been heard by the local politicians. It was not until the plan was complete and publicly unveiled that it became abundantly apparent to the Chilliwack planners and politicians that there was a discrepancy between their ideological position and that of other citizens in the community. The ideological basis of the Chilliwack issue centered around British Columbia's changing view of land use priorities. Whereas the concept had long existed that farmland should make way for the various more important and intensive urban uses, society's viewpoint was changing. The agricultural sector of society was being given equal status with, and frequently precedence over, the urban sector. The values behind the position of Chilliwack's officials acknowledged the overriding importance of economic growth for the district, by means of the easy physical development of residential, commercial and industrial activities in the community. Those citizens who spoke out

on the issue were not against development per se, however, they valued the ideal of environmental protection and were adamant that Chilliwack's physical and social environment be preserved in the future process of community growth.

Amongst the ranks of Chilliwack's officials, there was one voice that aligned with the viewpoint of the Save the Farmland Committee. The dissenting councilman had the view that people have a great responsibility to be good stewards of all non-renewable resources and, that in a world of hungry people, farmland was too valuable a resource to build on. Of additional concern to him was the style of life that would exist in a Chilliwack with twice the population, since it was for open space that people had come to the district and they did not want the congestion that goes along with increasing populations.⁵⁹

At the same time that the councilman was objecting to the plan, the Save the Farmland Committee was also protesting. However, it was not known for certain whether this group's voice represented the predominant view of Chilliwack's citizens, or whether the general public was actually aligned with the politicians' viewpoint. This was not to be found out until a few years later when public input was finally incorporated into the community's planning process. In the meantime, the Save the Farmland Committee, being predominantly made up of local Chilliwack citizens, was the only community voice. This group espoused the values of the district's agrarian life-style

and the potential achievement of the goal of increasing farming activities in Chilliwack and, finally, at the larger scale, the goal of self-sufficiency in food production for the province. These were some of the values that this group, at least, were not willing to see cut off.

Ideological Conflict Outside the Community

Outside of the local decision making network, there were other networks which had a voice in the issue. The Land Commission for example, which stood for the basic value of preserving farmland, took the stand that the 1700 acres which was requested for removal from the A.L.R. should not come out because these lands had a wide range of farm cropping possibilities and were some of the best agricultural lands in Canada. On the other hand, the Land Commission did have a compromise position in the Chilliwack issue since the Commission body would consider removing the less valuable A.L.R. lands in the district's southern hillside areas in order to allow urban growth on these poorer capability soils. These A.L.R. lands would provide space for residential development in addition to those hillside properties that were not in the A.L.R. Other compromises by the Land Commission included the recommendation that 16 acres of valley lands be excluded from the A.L.R. and the Commission's willingness to give favorable consideration to industrial proposals, of significance to local agriculture, in a seventy acre area of Chilliwack. It was the Commission's view that it was

necessary to encourage agriculturally-oriented industries to locate in Chilliwack to support the farm community.

There were other organizations which also concentrated on opposing the plan based on the agricultural capability of the Chilliwack lands. For instance, the British Columbia Institute of Agrologists viewed the blanket release of such a large acreage, most of which was devoted to productive commercial agriculture, as completely unjustified.⁶⁰ The British Columbia Federation of Agriculture Advisory Committee, which was made up of farmers and acted in part as an advisor to the Land Commission, strongly recommended against the release of the land even on a thirty year basis, as this quote from their brief to the Land Commission reveals:

"It has been said many times before that Chilliwack is located on the wrong place because the land was too good to be put under concrete and blacktop; why keep doing it? Let us stop with that NOW before it is too late."

It was the Federation's view that planning should be done with the next generations in mind and that planners should avoid taking top quality soil out of food production.

These groups, which questioned the inherent values in the Development Plan, also had some strong criticism of Chilliwack's past and present planning sense and efforts. The Save the Farmland Committee condemned the community for having allowed strip development to spread out along the highways from the urban core and for having given in to the developers, who lobbied over the years to have agricultural lands rezoned for urban uses. This

resulted in a hodge-podge of spot zoning development and no community planning, with the end result being high costs to the taxpayers to service these developments. The group pointed out that the alternatives to the community for growth were infilling, higher densities and development of the numerous acres in the district's upland areas.

The B.C. Institute of Agrologists were critical of Chilliwack's proposal because it appeared to be going ahead without thorough planning of the area and without serious investigation of development possibilities on the lower capability lands in the vicinity.⁶² The Federation of Agriculture felt the Chilliwack Council should plan for high density housing on already available lands and should focus on development of the mountain slopes. This group also pointed out that there was a large area south of the district's boundaries, in the area of the Cultus Lake Provincial Park, that could support extensive residential development. On the northerly side of this Columbia Valley area there would be 3,000 to 4,000 acres of land which could be provided with independent sewer and water systems.

The Chilliwack Development Plan was ideologically very unpopular among groups both inside and outside the community, but this was not the only basis on which opposition rested. In addition, there was uncertainty about the consequences of the plan and the risks inherent in it.

Opposition to Risks and Uncertainties

This hypothesis theorizes that uncertainty clearly affects the decision making process. Bolan and Nuttall contend that this is true not only in political systems but in other more tightly controlled group circumstances as well. Where risks are high and consequences are uncertain there is a hesitancy to act; however, where consequences are easily predictable and risks minimized (and all factors are favorable), positive decisions may readily be reached. As discussed in Chapter 3, Chilliwack officials viewed their Development Plan with a feeling of certainty about its consequences. The physical development of the community was clearly structured and laid out for the next 30 years. The politicians perceived that adherence to this growth pattern would allow the attainment of a variety of economic and social goals for the district.

Despite positive feelings by Chilliwack's decision makers about their proposal, there were some government departments that expressed concern over consequences the Development Plan could have. The main concern was the impact on the demand for urban land in the Lower Mainland Region. Accordingly, officials in the Department of Municipal Affairs felt that the proposal should be examined not in isolation, but in the context of demand for land for urban purposes throughout the Fraser Valley. There were lands in other municipalities that were either being developed or were soon to be developed. These lands were not in the A.L.R. and were located in varying amounts in Abbotsford.

Matsqui, Mission, Maple Ridge and Langley Township. Just the previous year, for example, over 1200 acres had been redesignated to an URBAN 1 category in the Lower Mainland Official Regional Plan at Matsqui. This community, located less than twenty miles west of Chilliwack, was mainly going to use the land for housing.

Officials in the Department of Highways had a considerable amount of uncertainty about the consequences the proposal would have on the linkages between the local community road systems and the freeway. Increasing development would mean more use of the freeway as part of the urban road system for local trips, which would restrict through traffic on the freeway. This being the case, there would be pressure for a replacement highway which would have to be negotiated through Indian lands. Such a replacement would be very costly to the province in dollars and in loss of prime agricultural land, at the rate of about twenty-five acres per mile. Urban development, however, that took place in the southern upland areas would not generate too many local trips on the freeway.

Personnel in the Water Resources Service were very concerned about the proposal because a significant portion of the area under consideration was in either the Fraser River flood plain or could be flooded by the district's internal creeks and sloughs or by the Vedder River in the southern part of the community. In some areas it was known how much land fill would be required for floodproofing, but in other areas it was extreme-

ly difficult to estimate the need. Filling the land as well as overcoming bearing problems for buildings and underground services could be expensive. The problem was a real financial consideration with respect to the urban growth the Development Plan would generate, because the government was even then making damage payments in the community as a result of the previous winter's flood.

These issues were some of the risks and uncertainties the Development Plan generated and the resultant costs, financial and otherwise, would have to be borne by both the private and public sector. Chilliwack officials had based their proposal only on their point of view, which to some extent could be expected, however, there were broader implications to the proposal and these general consequences were the focus of other agencies involved in the decision making process.

Criticism of the Planning Method

Another significant area of opposition to the Development Plan focused on the hypothesis that is concerned with whether a comprehensive or incremental method of problem solving is used. It was determined previously that Chilliwack had basically used a classical, comprehensive planning method which centered on the creation of a long-range physical growth plan designed to control, over a thirty year period, the location of land uses and the amount of land allocated for each use. However, the planning data base that was prepared and used was slim and

questionable.

For example, the Planning Department developed population growth figures to justify the amount of agricultural land which was to be removed from the A.L.R. It maintained that the community was growing at an average rate of 6% per annum and that the combined population of the district and Chilliwack City would have increased from the 1976 figure of 37,055 people to 90,000 people by the year 2000.⁶³ A closer examination of this 6% figure revealed that it was based on the district's net housing gain from 1971 to 1976, rather than on the area's actual population growth during that time. The cyclical nature of the housing market does not provide a particularly reliable basis for predicting a community's growth rate, since short term periods of both under and over development may distort the long term pattern. This was in fact the case for Chilliwack, which had a yearly average net housing gain between 1971 and 1976 of 6%. However, these housing starts peaked dramatically in 1976 and fell back to less than half that rate in 1977, then dropped again in 1978.⁶⁴ By the summer of 1977 there was a problematic state of overbuilding in both the housing and commercial markets.⁶⁵ The 6% growth rate figure used to justify the Development Plan's population figures was distorted and unrealistic and was questioned early on by the Environment and Land Use Committee Secretariat.

The Secretariat also had considerable input into the decision making process of the Chilliwack issue. It pointed out that the

Statistics Canada Preliminary 1976 Census data indicated that Chilliwack's average annual growth rate since 1971 had been 3.3% and that, when compared to annual growth rates in other areas of the Fraser Valley, this figure was moderate. For example, Abbotsford was growing at 5% per year, Mission at 8.7% and Langley at 12.7%.⁶⁶ Another aspect of the data base, which lent doubt to the credibility of the position taken by the Chilliwack decision makers, was that of the amount of land that was immediately available for residential infilling. Chilliwack officials claimed that, when establishing the A.L.R., the Land Commission had not allowed their community a five year supply of land, which was the amount supposed to be left outside the A.L.R. around all urban centers to be used for immediate growth. At best, it was claimed, Chilliwack got a three year supply. The Secretariat estimated that there would be approximately 330 acres needed for residential development in the community between 1976 and 1981 at the growth rate of 3.3%. This growth could be accommodated by the available 650 acres of vacant land, including both non A.L.R. infilling properties and existing partially developed hillside areas. After that time there were the remaining undeveloped upland areas that could house an additional 60 years of population growth.⁶⁷

Another point on which the Secretariat was critical of Chilliwack's position was something of an ideological consideration. It related to Chilliwack's desire for industrial land, the provision and development of which would bolster the community's tax base. It was pointed out that not all Fraser Valley

communities could expect to have extensive industrial development and at the time there was not a heavy demand for industrial land in Chilliwack. The Secretariat cited a phone survey, carried out by the Industrial Locations Section of the Ministry of Economic Development, which was directed at railway companies, industrial developers and real-estate agents. It had been found that relatively few enquiries were received from industries wishing to locate in the Upper Fraser Valley. In addition, the fact remained that there were other areas of the Fraser Valley that could accommodate the development of non-agricultural related industries.

The preceding examples illustrate the unsoundness of the ideological and factual foundation developed by Chilliwack planners and politicians in order to support their community plan. Although the Planning Department had taken a comprehensive planning approach to their problem solving, it had failed to support the plan through even some of the most basic data. In this sense, the planning method used could be criticized for its serious fundamental information gaps and these flaws were focused on by other organizations in the decision making process.

Summary

There were conflicts over the plan based on its ideology as expressed by organizations both in and outside the community. The intended move by Chilliwack officials to further urbanize some of the best agricultural lands in Canada was unacceptable

to many individuals and organizations, especially since there appeared to be alternative growth options for the area. Of additional concern and a focus for criticism were the risks and uncertainties associated with the plan. The Chilliwack proposal would have had repercussions outside the local area which were not considered or appreciated by the decision makers in the community. There were other Fraser Valley communities which would have been affected by the release of the Chilliwack lands. There were also financial and environmental considerations related to the local road networks and the problems associated with development in flood plain areas. Another factor to be considered was the effect on other communities' A.L.R. lands that such a precedent-setting release of farmland would have. The granting of Chilliwack's exclusion request would have tended to encourage other areas of the province to apply for release of land from their A.L.R.'s. The financial and environmental implications of this Development Plan spread beyond Chilliwack's borders and opponents to the plan focused in on the broader consequences and costs of such a proposal.

There was one final government decision making unit that had to act in the Chilliwack issue and the nature and importance of the role played by the Environment and Land Use Committee of the Provincial Cabinet will now be discussed.

THE ROLE OF VETO POWER

This government decision making unit was critical to the outcome of the controversy surrounding the Development Plan. The model can help in the understanding of the role this agency played, therefore, a digression must be made back to the theory of Bolan and Nuttall.

One of the Variable Sets in the model, which is not a primary focus of the present study, deals with the roles that individuals involved in the decision making process play. Bolan and Nuttall determined that there are a number of these process roles and that these roles can be ranked in terms of their importance to the final outcome of the issue. Using the average of their four case studies they found that the strongest correlations between 'individual actor roles' and 'importance to the issue' went to the individuals holding the 'Veto Power' and 'Mediator' roles. The other roles and their correlation rankings can be seen in Table 2.⁶⁸ It was found in the four case studies that those actors who possessed veto power were usually in government positions. The Veto Power role, along with the third most important role which was that of 'Public Leader', were positions with formal authority for granting or denying official approval of a project and, therefore, possessed central roles in the decision making process. In the model's four case studies these roles were perceived or ascribed roles, rather than official or predetermined roles.

TABLE 2

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN ACTOR ROLES AND IMPORTANCE TO ISSUE

	All Cases	Inner Belt	Manhat- tan Ex- press- way	Pitts- burgh High Schools	Affil- iated Hosp- ital Center
Veto Power	.42 ^b	.42 ^b	.55 ^b	-	.70 ^b
Mediator	.38 ^b	.46 ^b	.43 ^b	.45 ^a	.47 ^b
Public Leader	.35 ^b	.49 ^b	.30 ^b	-.02	.66 ^b
Community Knowledgeable	.34 ^b	.41 ^b	.19	.33	.48 ^b
Expert on Process	.29 ^b	.33 ^b	.13	.56 ^b	.38 ^b
Initiator	.27 ^b	.49 ^b	-.04	.06	.61 ^b
Coalition Maker	.20 ^b	.36 ^b	.13	.06	.52 ^b
Judge	.20 ^b	.33 ^b	.12	-.15	.38 ^a
Technical Expert	.10	.09	.03	.20	.27

^a Significantly different from 0.00 at the .05 level

^b Significantly different from 0.00 at the .01 level

This role of Veto Power existed in the Chilliwack issue, however, it was not held by one individual actor. Rather, it was virtually a predetermined role that was held by the Environment and Land Use Committee. This Provincial Government unit was the organization that conclusively stopped action on the Development Plan. Although its official authority did not lie in granting or denying direct approval to the community plan itself, it had indirect veto power over the plan by refusing to exclude the required urban development lands from the A.L.R. E.L.U.C. allowed only 16 acres adjacent to residential development to be excluded from the A.L.R. and retained all of the remaining farmland that was needed by Chilliwack to pursue the Development Plan. E.L.U.C. was of the opinion that five years of residential growth could be accommodated through infilling and that additional development could be accommodated in the uplands. In general, it was felt that alternatives for residential and industrial development existed elsewhere in the Fraser Valley, without encroaching on Chilliwack's high capability agricultural land. E.L.U.C., in refusing the application to exclude these lands from the A.L.R., also made it quite clear that the province was willing to assist Chilliwack in a study to determine urban suitability, development costs and market feasibility for residential development of the upland areas.

In the same sense that Bolan and Nuttall determined there was a Veto Power role played by individual actors in their four case studies, it is clear that an organization played this role.

in the Chilliwack case. This role was a predetermined or official role rather than one which this organization took for itself or had ascribed to it during the decision making process. In the model, the individual actor's roles were ascribed or were perceived by other actors in the process. Bolan and Nuttall found that the Veto Power role holder was in a government position and in Chilliwack's case, it was actually a government agency with formal authority to grant or deny official approval. Having this power gave E.L.U.C. a central position in the decision making process, but the exact motivation behind E.L.U.C.'s decision cannot be known. Whether E.L.U.C. was acting solely to uphold the official government position to preserve agricultural land, as exemplified by the A.L.R., or whether it was responding to the strong opposition forces to the Development Plan, is not known. Whatever its motivation, E.L.U.C. was a decisive component in the outcome of the decision making process.

THE COMPROMISE ASPECT OF DECISION OUTCOMES

Bolan and Nuttall point out in their model that past studies of community decision making episodes have tended to focus on the issue outcome in simple 'yes' or 'no' terms, that is, a plan or proposal was either favorably decided upon or was turned down. However, it is pointed out that outcomes are usually the result of extended bargaining and are usually compromises of some sort and thus are not pure decisions to adopt or reject. This was the case at Chilliwack where concessions were made to the community in the years following E.L.U.C.'s refusal to exclude

the 1700 acres from the A.L.R. Only a few months later, E.L.U.C. allowed the removal of eight acres from the Chilliwack A.L.R. against the advice of the Land Commission. This parcel was on a major road access near the airport and was intended for use as a new car dealership. The application to exclude this land was supported by the local M.L.A. at Chilliwack who was a member of the political party which was in power in B.C. at the time.⁶⁹ The Minister of the Environment at the time indicated the decision was made because the soil was gravelly and of lesser quality, however, the truth was that the land was quite capable of agricultural production and had been producing barley in the previous year's growing season.⁷⁰

Although the Cabinet was apparently willing to carry on a bargaining and compromising process with Chilliwack, it was not willing to allow the wholesale release of large tracts of farmland. Community officials had made their second exclusion application for the release of some 382 acres, but E.L.U.C. refused to release any of this land from the A.L.R. It was the hope of the Chilliwack decision makers that a compromise could be reached which would allow immediate growth in the valley lands, especially in and around the lands affected by the controversial Sewer District No. 10. Although the Provincial Cabinet had twice refused to exclude these lands, it eventually compromised and released the 129 acres of Sewer District No. 10 that was serviced by the trunk lines. These lands were adjacent to Chilliwack's major shopping center, Cottonwood Corners, and

were slated for residential and commercial uses.

Another major compromise was reached in the Chilliwack issue, but this time it was the Land Commission that conceded. This concession further assisted the community in the critical area of sewerage the district, by allowing the extension of the trunk sewer main in Sewer District No. 10 into the southern part of Chilliwack. The sewer main would extend south from the 129 acres discussed above, through segments of the A.L.R., and end at the Canadian Forces Base. In addition to linking up the base, this main would service the business districts at Sardis and Vedder Crossing in the southern segment of Chilliwack's urban corridor. With the sewer extending that far south, the way was being paved for the future extension of this main line into the southern hillside areas.

These compromises indicate that the Chilliwack issue did not have a clear cut yes or no outcome, as the model suggests would be a rare occurrence. Essentially, the decision making process continued in a bargaining and negotiation stage between the Provincial Government and the community decision makers with the latter making some gains. The Development Plan was for the most part turned down, but not one hundred percent. The concessions made to Chilliwack were true compromises by E.L.U.C. in the area of issue ideology and were not decisions that were reached because of factors such as new information modifying a decision maker's stand. In other words, the properties at Chilliwack did not change in capability for agricultural produc-

tion from the time of inclusion in the A.L.R. until the time of release by the Cabinet. Clearly, these farming areas were good agricultural lands but were sacrificed by the Provincial Government in the process of negotiations and decision making in the Chilliwack case.

Despite the fact that the Provincial Cabinet had veto power in the decision making process, it still engaged in the process of compromise, whereas other groups involved in the decision making process, such as the Save the Farmland Committee, were unwilling to compromise at all. This group criticized the Provincial Government at every move. It also levied such serious charges against Chilliwack officials as collusion, conflict of interest and possible political patronage in the alliance of municipal authorities and developers in their persistent and continuous applications for the release of farmland from the A.L.R.⁷¹ The position of the Land Commission was essentially a no-compromise stance on the matter of removing lands from the A.L.R., however, the Commission made concessions which were aimed at assisting Chilliwack in meeting its growth needs, without irreversibly damaging the valley farmlands.

In conclusion, the model's point on the compromise aspect of decision outcomes is well taken and substantiated by the Chilliwack case. Although the Provincial Government appeared to completely turn down the Development Plan, events in the months following the initial refusal prove that the government engaged with the district in a period of extended bargaining.

The negotiation period saw compromises being made by E.L.U.C., resulting in concessions to Chilliwack on the issue.

There is one final area that the model recognizes as important in understanding the dynamics of community decision making and that is the issue of time. This aspect will now be focused on and discussed relative to the Chilliwack case.

THE BALANCE OF DECISION MAKING OVER TIME

Although the model does not explicitly involve the time dimension, the relevance of this factor is clarified by Bolan and Nuttall and points about how it could be incorporated into the study of community decision making are made. They point out that theoretically a trajectory of each case over time can be plotted, which will show how the balance of forces tending toward action on a plan, versus those resisting action, line up over the course of an issue. As discussed in Chapter 1, plans are made up of goals to be achieved and the means to achieve them and in the course of decision making either or both of these elements may be modified or adjusted. As discussed earlier in this chapter, decision outcomes cannot be viewed as simple acts of adoption or rejection of a plan. They are actually compromise positions reached by those involved in the decision making process, as a result of negotiations and subsequent modification of goals and means on both sides.

In the course of decision making there are group forces

acting both within themselves and upon each other to affect the ultimate issue outcome. Bolan and Nuttall believe that a time trajectory can assist in understanding how the balance of forces line up at a given point in time, change over time, and ultimately bring about a decision outcome. Figure 1⁷² represents the basic decision outcome field which they developed and illustrates that there are four basic quadrants into which a final outcome may fall. The upper right hand quadrant represents the unqualified adoption of both the original goals and means of an issue and the lower left quadrant represents their complete rejection. The other two quadrants illustrate how outcomes may reflect a rejection or acceptance of only part of the original goals and means. Figure 2⁷³ represents a more detailed conceptual framework for analyzing decision outcomes and illustrates how the balance of forces were aligned in the Chilliwack case and where the final decision outcome fell. The path of the arrow depicts the change in the balance of forces over time.

In the initial stages of Chilliwack's case, the Development Plan had been formulated by the Planning Department, was approved by the local politicians and was heading toward the Zone of Unqualified Acceptance, as shown in Figure 2. Once the plan was publicized, however, opposition forces began to question both its goals and means and this propelled the issue back into the Zone of Total Ambiguity. During this period the following events took place: the Development Plan was scrutinized by government and private groups; E.L.U.C. refused

FIGURE 1: FIELD OF POSSIBLE DECISION OUTCOMES





FIGURE 2: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING DECISION OUTCOMES



TIME TRAJECTORY FOR
CHILLIWACK CASE STUDY

to allow the exclusion of farmland from the A.L.R.; the Provincial Cabinet and the Land Commission made concessions to Chilliwack; and the district turned to the production of the Official Community Plan. The goals of the Development Plan were partly accepted and partly rejected in the process of formulating the O.C.P., and the means to attain the goals were either modified or were actually developed for the first time. Some goals were different from earlier goals, in the sense that they were clarified, and others were outrightly rejected or replaced. For example, the goals of commercial and residential growth onto the valley farmlands were rejected and replaced with the goals of increasing residential densities and of developing the southern upland areas, along with the goal of reducing commercial expansion altogether. As well, the original goal of carving out expansive new tracts of industrial land was replaced with the goal of upgrading, servicing and amalgamating the existing stock of industrially-zoned land. Other goals such as the eventual provision of an urban transit system remained the same. What these changes meant was that the issue ended up in the Zone of Means Ambiguity. In other words, the final outcome was largely similar with respect to the original goals, but was substantially different or ambiguous with respect to the means.

The final outcome of the Chilliwack case is illustrated by the point of the arrow, which is just on the positive side of the goals continua. This point represents the fact that

most of the original goals were still present, although the main means for achieving these goals, by excluding large acres of farmland from the A.L.R., was rejected. The arrow's trajectory represents the time of the Chilliwack issue between 1975, when the Development Plan was started, and 1979, the year during which the Official Community Plan was started. The subsequent event of developing the O.C.P. could also be plotted in the same manner, indicating how this segment of the issue fared over time and what its eventual outcome was. Essentially, the matter of developing the O.C.P. has moved from its starting point in the Zone of Total Ambiguity, through the phase of clarifying means and goals and is presently heading toward the Zone of Unqualified Acceptance. The O.C.P., however, still has to be accepted by the general Chilliwack public and some relevant Provincial Government departments.

The means of developing the O.C.P., used by the consulting planning group, was more comprehensive than earlier planning approaches. The involvement of the C.P.A.C., the Chilliwack Council and Mayor, the Planning Department, the Council's Planning Committee and relevant members of the public, in the twice monthly O.C.P. planning meetings, was a far different approach from that used in formulating the Development Plan 1976, where most activity took place behind the doors of the Planning Department. The inclusion of the views of Chilliwack's citizens right from the start of the process, when public meetings were held, was the opposite of the 1976 method which

excluded citizen participation altogether.

Although the O.C.P. may still be rejected, the likelihood of this happening has been reduced by including the public in the initial stages of policy making, where major conflicts in values, priorities, goals, means and ends can be worked out early on, unlike the previous situation where conflict resolution began after the Development Plan was unveiled. The long period of bargaining, negotiation and compromising that followed the revelation of the 1976 proposal included opposition from many official bodies and not just the general public. During this time, the balance of forces opposing the plan outweighed the efforts of the plan's proponents and propelled it toward rejection. Opposition voiced by Chilliwack citizens alone, mainly through the activities of the Save the Farmland Committee, brought the issue to the attention of the general public and quickly created anti-Development Plan feelings. Prior consultation with Chilliwack citizens would likely have averted this harsh confrontation situation, which set back the Planning Department's efforts and undoubtedly harmed its credibility, along with that of Chilliwack's politicians, in the eyes of the Provincial Government decision makers. For not only were Chilliwack politicians and planners going against a provincial policy to preserve farmland, but they were also proposing a planning programme that was unacceptable to many of their own citizens. Overall, the Chilliwack case tends to support the value of public participation in the early stages of community policy making.

SUMMARY

In the first two sections of this chapter, discussion was centered on the types of decision making networks that were operating in the Chilliwack case and the basis for opposition to the Development Plan developed by these decision makers. Private organizations, government departments and the Provincial Cabinet all opposed the plan. Opposition was centered around three out of a number of factors which the model hypothesizes are likely to affect the outcome of community policy making. These were the ideological and value considerations inherent in the plan, the risks and uncertainties of such a proposal and the factual and statistical basis of the planning method.

The opposition to the plan culminated when E.L.U.C. refused to exclude farmland from the A.L.R., which was necessary to the implementation of the proposal. E.L.U.C. played a significant role in the issue outcome in that they held a position of Veto Power and this role, according to the model, has been linked with formal authority usually in government positions.

The final outcome of the Development Plan issue was found to be, as the model suggested, not a clear cut yes or no decision. Elements of compromise, on the part of the Provincial Government toward Chilliwack, occurred throughout an extended period of bargaining and negotiation during which time the district continued to strive to attain their original goals.

Finally, it was shown how the balance of forces in decision making episodes, such as the Chilliwack case, can change over time, propelling an issue toward positive resolution one moment and then forcing plans or programs toward rejection at other times. The model provides a method of plotting the decision making process over time and of determining how the final goals and means in a plan are different or similar to those held initially. The model's conceptual diagram illustrates both the relationship of the original to the final goals and means and the trajectory of each case over time. In the Chilliwack issue, the balance of forces, which were resisting the Development Plan, finally forced its abandonment by Chilliwack officials and planners.

CHAPTER 5

THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE MODEL FOR COMMUNITY PLANNING

THE MODEL'S USEFULNESS AS A CASE STUDY FRAMEWORK

In examining the Chilliwack issue from the perspective of the Bolan and Nuttall hypotheses, two focuses were used. Although Bolan and Nuttall developed their hypotheses with the view to explaining issue outcomes, the present case study also used them to examine in isolation one segment of the overall issue. This first examination dealt with the event of Chilliwack formulating its Development Plan and the second focus examined the eventual outcome of the entire decision making process. The model's hypotheses were helpful in assisting an understanding of both this one event and the general issue outcome. Overall, the premises inherent in the model were predominantly supported in both instances.

A comparison will now be made of how the various hypotheses supported the event of formulating the Development Plan and reflected the overall outcome of the issue. The Variable Set dealing with the nature of the characteristics of public issues will be evaluated first and then the Variable Set regarding planning and intervention strategies. Finally, the other aspects of the model that were used in the present study will be examined.

The Hypotheses on the Characteristics of Issues

The model had theorized that plans or programmes are more likely to be accepted than rejected if they were ideologically not controversial, had a limited scope of both costs and

benefits, were flexible and reversible over time, were easy to accomplish (both economically and administratively), were easily predictable in their consequences and were easy to communicate. To the Chilliwack politicians and planners, the Development Plan was ideologically sound, in that it reflected a compromise between preserving farmland and allowing urban expansion. It also had no apparent high costs and was perceived as being beneficial. As well, it was easy to implement, understand and communicate and it had predictable consequences. Therefore, the action taken by the Chilliwack decision makers in accepting the Development Plan and attempting to implement it, was the kind of behavior that was predicted in five of the six hypotheses.

Where the Chilliwack officials did not follow the behavior anticipated by the model, was in regard to the Development Plan's flexibility. The idea that proposals are more likely to be accepted if they can be modified or reversed later on did not hold true. It must, however, be acknowledged that the inherent nature of what they were dealing with was inflexible, that is, physical urban growth is irreversible by its very nature. In this sense the Chilliwack officials could not be expected to oppose natural community growth, however, they did have the option of turning down the inflexible programme that was to manage urban development in their area over a long-range thirty year period. There were undoubtedly other more flexible means of managing Chilliwack's growth than that of an irreversi-

ble land use plan, however, the district's decision makers did not seriously pursue other options.

If the Chilliwack officials had been the only decision makers affecting the issue, the Development Plan may possibly have been implemented. However, in examining the issue from the point of view of the other groups and organizations involved, a different perspective surfaced and this opposing view ultimately affected the issue's final outcome. The hypotheses worked equally well in explaining the other attitudes which affected the issue. For example, in the same way that Chilliwack officials viewed the inherent values of the Development Plan as completely acceptable, other organizations found the plan ideologically reprehensible. These public groups and government departments could not justify the removal from the A.L.R. of some of the best farmland in all of Canada. The other hypotheses in this Variable Set that were relevant in viewing the perspectives of the opponents in the issue were those dealing with the intensity of the costs and benefits of a programme, with the plan's flexibility and with the predictability of its consequences. Chilliwack's officials viewed the plan as having some benefit locally; it would not upset the established growth pattern, it would allow developers to continue building as before, and it would permit the expansion of public services as the district could afford them or as they were required. However, to the outsiders in the issue, there were few benefits seen in the proposal and potentially considerable costs. The

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plan's possible consequences, both economic and environmental, spread far beyond the district's boundaries. It was a risky proposal since not all of these effects, or the scope of their eventual impact, could be easily predicted. The Development Plan's effects on urban development elsewhere in the Fraser Valley, on Chilliwack's own local roadway network and on other community's attitudes toward their respective A.L.R.s, were only some of the concerns raised with respect to the possible implementation of the plan.

The final two hypotheses in this Variable Set, relating to the ease of implementing and communicating a programme, were not relevant in analyzing the opposition's viewpoint. These two hypotheses only reflected how Chilliwack's officials viewed the Development Plan and it was shown that they valued the proposal on both these bases.

The Hypotheses on Planning and Intervention Strategies

On the basis of the Variable Set dealing with how planning strategies and action or intervention strategies affect an issue, the model's hypotheses assisted in clarifying how Chilliwack's officials viewed their situation and how the final issue outcome developed. The planning strategies hypotheses showed that Chilliwack was in a good 'planning position' and, therefore, was readily able to carry out the formulation of their Development Plan through the Planning Department, which was responsible directly to the district's power center, or

Council. However, Chilliwack's 'planning method' and 'planning type' eventually worked against them because opponents in the issue focused criticism on these factors. The hypothesis on the 'planning method' dealt with the way in which problem solving is carried out; whether it is by a comprehensive, classical method or by an incremental approach. The 'planning type' hypothesis concentrated on whether a programme dealt with immediate concerns and focused on means and selective information or whether it had a long-term time horizon, was goal-oriented and focused on complex information systems.

For the Chilliwack decision makers, their comprehensive development proposal, with its goal-oriented focus, was completely acceptable because it confirmed past development standards and clarified the district's land use pattern for another thirty years into the future. However, opponents to the proposal objected to it for precisely the same reasons, because they could not condone any further erosion of the district's excellent agricultural land by urban expansion, especially the hundreds of acres required over the plan's implementation period. Opposition forces made it clear that there were incremental planning methods available to help solve Chilliwack's growth needs, such as the better utilization of the community's existing urban lands through infilling and allowing higher densities for new residential development. There was also the possibility of encouraging agriculturally-oriented industries,

which could be permitted in the A.L.R., as one means of solving the district's desire for revenue-producing industry and the basic prospect of better utilizing the existing areas of industrially zoned lands. Finally, there was the option of developing Chilliwack's poorer capability lands, thereby leaving the highly productive soils under the protection of the A.L.R.

From the perspective of the overall issue, the Development Plan did not meet the model's criteria as a proposal that would likely be adopted. It had a long-term time frame and a single goal-oriented focus that concentrated on regulating Chilliwack's physical growth. The plan did not deal with means, for the plan itself was the only means of reaching the goal of growth management. Not only was the plan criticized for the above described reasons, but also because of the questionable data base on which it rested. Overall, there was serious opposition to the Development Plan based on the planning strategies and they eventually helped propel the proposal to defeat.

The model's hypotheses on action or intervention strategies dealt with the degree to which programmes disturb the status quo and force changes in societal behavior. The model contends that action strategies which little disturb the status quo, rather than those which cause massive social change by redistributing resources (i.e. wealth) and by changing existing institutional or organizational structures (i.e. power), are more likely to be adopted. With respect to the attitude of the

Chilliwack officials, this was true because their plan was designed solely to maintain the long existing status quo of converting farmland to urban uses. In actuality, Chilliwack's decision makers were trying to return to this old status quo which the province had upset by establishing the A.L.R. The politicians were rejecting this social change, which had reallocated the control of their land wealth into the hands of the Land Commission, and were actually attempting to regain power over their precious resource. Therefore, as the model suggested should be the case, a status quo oriented plan was adopted by Chilliwack's officials.

In the case of the opposition forces, there was a rejection of the old status quo and an attempt to insure that there was not a continuation of the unacceptable land use patterns of the past. The opposition was attempting to protect the new order of land use that had been established and Chilliwack's disruptive planning intentions were rejected by the other groups in the decision making process. In the sense that Chilliwack was disturbing the new status quo, their plan was rejected as the model suggested would be the case.

The hypotheses in these Variable Sets were for the most part good predictors of the outcome of the Chilliwack case study. Both the characteristics of the issue itself and the planning and action strategies used by the community's officials, affected the decision making process predominantly in

the manner predicted by the hypotheses.

Additional Relevant Factors in the Model

The first additional aspect of the model was a factor that was included because it had important conclusive effects on the outcome of the issue, even though it arose from one of the other two Variable Sets which were not examined in this case study. This factor related to the roles that are played in decision making episodes. Bolan and Nuttall have ascribed these roles to individuals in their case studies, however, it was very apparent in the Chilliwack case that one of the most important roles in their model was played by an organization. The Veto Power role that the Environment and Land Use Committee played was instrumental in bringing about the final outcome of the issue. E.L.U.C. did not necessarily cause the end result, since there were many other forces working together in the issue, but undoubtedly some of the values and viewpoints that surfaced in the process affected the final position taken by E.L.U.C. The support of E.L.U.C. was critical to the position taken by Chilliwack's officials since the Land Commission had been unsympathetic to their viewpoint, however, the community's decision makers were unable to gain an ally in their fight for control over their farmlands.

Although Chilliwack was repeatedly refused in their major applications for the exclusion of lands from the reserve, their persistent efforts to reach their goals netted them some

gains. This fact illustrates a second aspect brought up by Bolan and Nuttall in their model. They point out that few decision making episodes end in a clear cut 'yes' or 'no' position, in that a plan or programme is either entirely rejected or completely accepted. Some concessions were eventually granted to the community by both the Provincial Cabinet and the Land Commission in the form of the exclusion of some lands from the reserve, through government assistance in evaluating the alternative upland development option, and by the Land Commission granting Chilliwack permission to run sewer lines through the Agricultural Land Reserve.

Although Bolan and Nuttall treated the time dimension in their model in a rather informal manner, this factor also proved to be useful in analyzing how the component forces in the issue moved it in various directions over the length of the decision making period. This aspect of the model helped emphasize the fact that, in general, policy making entails the steps of initially establishing a proposal, or, ideally of identifying various alternatives, then going through negotiations, reevaluation and compromise, and finally at some point, making a commitment to one or another form of action. If necessary, at this point the whole process may have to begin again, which is what happened in Chilliwack's case. The time dimension also clarified the fact that both original goals and means can be completely changed, or left as is, over the course of an issue or that either of them can be modified to

one degree or another. Generally in Chilliwack's case, it was shown that the original goals survived, but that the means for achieving them had been rejected and that new means had to be sought.

As was pointed out in Chapter 1, much of the future success in solving the many complex problems facing today's society is dependent on understanding how we plan and make decisions and why some plans work and others do not. The Bolan and Nuttall hypotheses assisted in clarifying how the decision making process worked in the Chilliwack case study. There were a number of ways in which the ideological predispositions of the community's officials hindered their success in finding acceptable planning strategies and this helped force their desired proposal toward defeat. Some of the factors that can be pointed out in this case study are that the Chilliwack planners and politicians:

- did not acknowledge an important Provincial Government attitude to land use that was replacing old views and were not willing to assimilate new behavior patterns.
- did not recognize the broad implications of their planning activities and the serious consequences that could result in areas outside their district.
- failed to develop an objective attitude toward their community in order to realistically seek and examine alternative goals and means.
- did not recognize the potential in their area's resources - particularly their land resources - for utilization in solving their economic concerns.
- oriented their thinking predominantly to economic matters and failed to recognize that there were social and environmental factors to be considered.

- failed to consider the views of the community's citizens on their own future.
- were unable to develop a sound background of information and facts on which to base a plan and analyzed the data base that was produced from a perspective which supported their preconceived interests.
- did not recognize the negative implications of their planning proposals on their own community.
- failed to recognize the true nature of their planning issues and consequently proposed a simple and inadequate solution to a complex problem.

Having reviewed the Chilliwack case study and the factors involved in the issue and its decision making process, our attention can now be focused on the implications of these results for planners and the planning process.

THE PLANNING IMPLICATIONS OF THE CHILLIWACK CASE STUDY

The Nature of Decision Making

It would appear that the Chilliwack decision makers were not particularly unusual in their approach to policy making, since they displayed most of the common characteristics of community decision making behavior that have been outlined by Dennis Rondinelli and which were described in Chapter 1. The very nature of these process traits would seem to preclude rational policy making, however, their frequent occurrence really makes them an integral part of most planning processes. Recognizing their limiting aspects can be a first step to overcoming the restrictions they have on decision making. Academic works such as the Bolan and Nuttall model can have some practical

value for planners in the field in assisting the planning profession's understanding of the inherent nature of the processes which affect the success of their planning activities. The failure by planners to judge the outside social, psychological and political environment in which they are planning will undoubtedly hinder their 'inside' plans. The Bolan and Nuttall model provides a useful framework for analyzing the forces at work in the community which can affect decision outcomes in issues which are already in progress, or in cases where a matter of planning may become an issue. Especially in the latter case, preventive measures may avoid time-consuming conflicts if they are put to use early in the decision making process. The model should be able to be used as a predictive tool for evaluating how the nature of an issue or a potential planning strategy will likely affect the decision making process in a given community. Of course, in this case there must be an understanding of the community's socio-political environment and of the characteristics of the organizations and relevant individuals that make up the decision field in which the issue will be dealt with. Bolan and Nuttall address these critical factors in the other two Variable Sets of the model.

Returning to the nature of decision making as viewed by Rondinelli, the Chilliwick study provided confirmation of many of the characteristics of this process, such as its socio-political nature where conflict resolution takes place among groups with divergent interests, rather than where

policy making is carried out by intellectual and deliberative choice. In addition, decision making takes place in an environment where power resources are fragmented and where various dispersed groups have control over specialized personnel, information, technical expertise, analytical skills and influence resources. With each group pursuing its own conception of the public interest, complex interactions can occur at all stages of the decision making process. Chilliwack's case revealed such a fragmented multitude of organizations, each with its own point of leverage that was used to influence the process. At times the Chilliwack officials found themselves almost powerless, as their discretionary powers for administering their local resources were usurped by higher government levels.

Rondinelli's point that policy problems are complex, amorphous and difficult to define concisely was fairly evident in Chilliwack's case, where different emphases and definitions of the problem surfaced throughout the decision making process. Eventually, even Chilliwack's officials refocused their major concern with farmland to the matter of commercial expansion in the district. Another point about the long lead and lag times, which characterize political interactions and policy making, is most evident in Chilliwack's case. If the community's recently developed Official Community Plan is passed and ready for implementation by the end of 1981, eight years will have passed since this community first became aware of their land

problem.

The final characteristics covered by Rondinelli deal with the statistics and facts used in decision making and how they are interpreted. It was pointed out that each participant not only has a limited evaluation capacity, but also usually interprets quantitative data subjectively through preconceived specialized interests. Add to this the fact that policy planning is carried out under conditions of incomplete information and partial ignorance of the effectiveness of proposed solutions and it becomes abundantly clear how risky and uncertain decision making can be. Chilliwack's Planning Department was limited in its ability to produce sound facts and information and their data base, with its errors and misleading conceptual arguments, attests to the fact that smaller communities frequently lack the professional expertise required in solving major problems. Chilliwack's politicians readily accepted a plan that appeared to represent an easy solution to the area's needs and consequently had little desire to search for alternative policies.

The recognition by planners of these inherent characteristics of community decision making will only be a mere start in overcoming them or in restricting the intensity of their negative effects. What planners would seem to need under the circumstances are new skills and knowledge to make them more effective in their work environment. It is becoming increasingly apparent to planning theorists⁷⁴ that the complex nature

of policy planning demands that planners have skills that go beyond those needed for research, quantitative analysis and traditional plan making. The next section will discuss some of these knowledge and skill requirements that planners need to effectively deal with the issues that arise in the complex political system in which they operate.

Planning Skills Required in Decision Making Processes

Bolan and Nuttall define the areas of skill that planners need to be trained in as social process skills. The knowledge that will be required will center around understanding human and organizational behavior. Planners will not only need to look outside to a community's social and political networks, but they will also need to look inside themselves and better understand how their own behavior or abilities can either help or hinder their success in planning episodes.

Since most of the skills that will be necessary to planners are not taught in planning institutions, it will be necessary for students of planning to avail themselves of the required knowledge elsewhere, at least until such information is included as part of regular training programmes. In addition to having the skills, the planner will have to calculate the opportunity of implementing the knowledge in any particular planning episode or job situation. Many work settings simply do not allow or encourage other than traditional approaches to problem solving, which is not to say that changes are impossible to

bring about, however, the planner must realize that there may be built-in role expectations in a job which may hinder the use of new planning methods. Since the planner has traditionally been the technical expert, the overseer of certain laws, the advice-giver, the model-maker, the statistician and analyst, and any number of other roles, politicians and their supporting bureaucrats may frequently not be ready to accept a planner who wants to organize community groups, use small group decision making, manage resource coalitions, and the various other techniques of policy making intervention. In such cases, the planner will either have to sell the new approach or find a work setting where such skills can be put to use.

Rondinelli outlines what some of the skills and knowledge areas are that planners will need. His list is shown in Table 3.⁷⁵ Applying some of these skills to the Chilliwack case, reveals how the decision makers and planners there did not come close to avoiding the types of problems that can arise in planning episodes. Some of the 'missing' skills and methods were blatantly absent and others were less obviously so. The following list expands on some of the aspects in Table 3 and clarifies what these skills could mean to the betterment of planning processes:

1. Advocacy and organizing ability - allowing the successful inclusion of the public in decision making processes, thus avoiding 'after-the-fact' public opposition.
2. Information collection, quantitative analysis and

TABLE 3

SKILLS AND KNOWLEDGE NEEDED IN URBAN POLICY MAKING

Persuasion and manipulation
Information collection and communication skills
Client analysis
Mediation and negotiation skills
Resource mobilization ability
Advocacy and organizing ability
Interpersonal relations
Small group decision making
Organizational behavior
Intragroup dynamics
Social psychology
Coalition management
Entrepreneurial experience
Techniques of conflict resolution
Socio-political exchange processes
Opportunity cost analysis
Quantitative analysis and forecasting techniques
Contingency Analysis
Performance evaluation
Simulation, gaming, and strategy design

forecasting techniques - allowing the development of good data on which to base planned action.

3. Objectivity and communication skills - allowing realistic conclusions to be drawn from background data and the successful transmission of critical information, be it optimistic or otherwise, to politicians or the public.
4. Persuasion and manipulation - inducing the acceptance of new attitudes, approaches and planning programmes.
5. Resource mobilization ability - allowing the gathering together and utilization of individual and organizational economic, intellectual and physical resources in problem solving.
6. Small group decision making - allowing the use of group settings in order to include the views and proposals of both public and private community representatives.
7. Coalition management - allowing the use of dispersed organizations, groups and government departments in programme development, implementation and ongoing management.
8. Social psychology - allowing a better basic understanding of community group behavior and the social forces which can hinder or may be used to assist decision making processes.
9. Intragroup dynamics - allowing the understanding of the individual components of groups, in order to effectively utilize group dynamics in policy formulation.
10. Interpersonal relations and organizational behavior - the most basic skills for the planner to allow the continual understanding of the individual and collective behavior that faces her or him almost daily.

The Chilliwack issue was a complex and controversial planning matter which required a fresh approach and open-minded attitude to land use concerns and problem solving. The community's planners and politicians were unable to muster up

either and instead adopted the view that social change could be avoided and that traditional planning methods were all that was needed in policy formulation. Eventually their approach was rejected. However, the consulting planners that were ultimately hired by the community to sort out its planning direction, gave some policy making intervention techniques a try in their development of the Official Community Plan and have employed some incremental planning methods to solve the district's land and growth problems. Whether their approach will result in the successful implementation of the O.C.P. is yet to be determined, but up to now their methods have allowed the community as a whole to be informed on the matter and involved in the process of policy formulation. In this sense alone there should be little, if any, opposition to the plan at the local level, which was a considerable hindrance to the earlier Development Plan.

In conclusion, the Bolan and Nuttall model provided a useful framework for studying the Chilliwack case and shed considerable light on why the issue outcome came about as it did. As a means for planners to analyze existing or potential planning issues and decision making processes, the model has value. It could be used in an informal manner without entailing extensive quantitative analysis which may be impossible under everyday working conditions or it can be used as a research technique in more academic and controlled conditions. The model's predominant emphasis on the conditions under which support for

planned social change arise is a critical factor for planners today, when their efforts at solving community problems are increasingly under attack by the public which has been affected by many planning programmes. If, as the model suggests, planning techniques are ultimately unable to survive the decision making process which accompanies planning issues, then attention must be focused more on the nature of this process and on means of problem solving that are more acceptable. The Bolan and Nuttall model provided a useful framework for analyzing the limiting effects of the planning methodology used in the Chilliwack case study, and for clarifying the nature of the decision making process and how it brought the issue to its final conclusion.

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