COMMUNITY IDEOLOGY AND THE IDEOLOGY OF COMMUNITY:
THE OROKAIVA CASE

by

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ABSTRACT

"Community" is a word that suffuses Western discourse. Its use is widespread in both popular and in the more specialized languages of anthropology and sociology. Though rich in meaning, "community" is yet often employed to arbitrarily bind people together 'from the outside'. Thus 'a community', 'peasant communities', and so on, refer to bounded entities that are there.

This thesis begins by taking community as a problem. For though we write easily about, and easily apply, the concept of 'a community', the notion of being 'in community', taking community to refer to a shared or common quality or state of being, is not so easily applied, let alone thought.

What is therefore explored is a notion of community as a process, both generally and in relation to a particular Papua New Guinean people, the Orokaiva. As a process, community is taken to be 'emergent', rather than 'there'. "Community" is subsequently developed as an alternative paradigm of order to the descent-based models of Williams, Crocombe & Hogbin, Rimoldi, and Schwimmer.
The Orokaiva plant emblem, a central symbol of Orokaiva sociality, is focused on. Stemming from a notion of 'emergent community', the interrelated problems of identification, affiliation, ideology, and context are selected and pursued in relation to the Orokaiva plant emblem.

I follow McKellin's (1980) delineation of three ordering principles -- lineality, territoriality, and exchange/commensality -- from Managalase kinship ideology; these same three principles are shown to underlie some Orokaiva notions of plant emblem identification. Taking these ordering principles together with some Orokaiva notions of "substance", a complex of interrelated Orokaiva ideas is delineated. It is this ideational order which is hypothesized as constituting the ideational resources engaged in the indigenous rationalization of Orokaiva sociality.

Some contexts generated by three events -- birth, marriage, and death -- are analysed in the light of that complex of ideas termed an 'ideology of community'. Referred to as 'contexts for community', they suggest some of the possible ways in which the ideational order is utilized to close the ambiguities of sociality and make the phenomenological dimension of "community" visible.

Reliant upon the ethnographic work of others, this thesis is primarily forwarded as a problem-seeking, rather than a problem-solving study. Will "community" ever be found among the Orokaiva?
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INTRODUCTION

I. The Problem Addressed

Twenty years have passed since the publication of Barnes' (1962) succinct critique of the application of African-derived segmentary lineage models to Highland New Guinea societies. In Barnes' wake have followed others, elaborating the initial criticisms made and suggesting ways of overcoming the difficulties encountered (cf. Langness 1964, de Lepervanche 1967, Pouwer 1960, 1966a, 1966b, Salisbury 1964). With the principal exception of research conducted in Irian Jaya however (cf. Pouwer 1960), debate over the descent-centered view of New Guinea social structure has been more or less confined to the Highlands. Reasons for the relative absence of this debate in relation to the more coastal and lowland societies may be found in the history of contact and the anthropological endeavor itself: Earlier coastal and lowland research (cf. Williams 1924, 1936, 1940, Bateson 1958) preceded the impact of the analytical advances of Evans-Pritchard and Fortes regarding unilineal systems, the latter in turn preceding and forming the basis for much of early Highland research (cf. Meggitt 1965, Reay 1959, Salisbury 1956).

All this should not be taken to mean that descent-based models have not been applied—and these not without difficulty—
to lowland and coastal societies. The analyses of the Orokaiva, principally by Williams (1925, 1928, 1930) and Schwimmer (1969, 1970, 1973) are a case in point. Thus we find Williams stating: "The Orokaiva organization very nearly approaches a bilateral system, though in theory it is patrilineal" (Williams 1925: 407; emphasis mine). Schwimmer, too, adopts a qualified descent-based viewpoint in giving equal weight to both "the principle of descent" and "the principle of reciprocity" (Schwimmer 1973: 3). Schwimmer is nevertheless constrained to reconcile the 'ideal', logical outworking of a patrilineal system with Orokaiva behavior: "The Orokaiva are patrilocal and have dispersed patriclans...The basic inheritance rule is patrilineal" (ibid.: 193). But, in regards to the transfer of usehold rights to land,

...departures from patrilineal ideology do not in the least reduce the usefulness of a descent model... providing that we can plausibly regard all departures from the patrilineal rule as random responses to the vicissitudes of life. (ibid.: 96)

The fundamental problem here, as with Crocombe & Hogbin's (1963) and Rimoldi's (1966) approach to Orokaiva social structure, is, in Langness' words, "...the discrepancy between ideology and statistical norms" (Langness op. cit.: 158).

Now Langness states that attempts to deal with this disjunction have been "handicapped" by "preconceptions", such as a unilineal bias (ibid.). More to the point, perhaps, would be to ask why this disjunction between ideology and practice in its
present form should exist at all. Rather than handicapping attempts to deal with it, I would suggest that a "unilineal bias" or, more generally, a descent-centeredness, is the source of the discrepancies themselves. If Williams, Schwimmer, Crocombe & Hogbin, and Rimoldi collectively fail to move beyond a disjunction between descent-based models of social structure, and the actual composition of corporate groups, it is precisely because of a "unilineal bias": The "ideology" delineated from native statements is perceived as one of patrilineality, to the apparent exclusion of alternative meanings.

Now, anthropological analyses of New Guinea social structure can be seen to fall along a line, the endpoints of which we can conveniently distinguish in the following manner. The methodologies employed fall somewhere between (a) fitting an analytic system of logically determined affiliative categories to the discerned social milieu, and (b) allowing the analytic model to reflect as closely as possible the cultural categories, ideas, exegeses, etc.

In adopting the above characterization of anthropology in Papua New Guinea, the aforementioned analyses of Orokaiva social structure would be placed closer to 'point' (a) than to 'point' (b).

The task set for this thesis, however, is to initiate the development of an alternative paradigm of order 'in the opposite direction', i.e., to reappraise the ethnographic corpus with a view to reconceptualizing Orokaiva sociality, giving greater significance
to Orokaiva meanings, symbols and categories.

Since the data collected in previous studies of the Orokaiva was obtained primarily to deal with different kinds of problems, the present study is an exploratory one. The overarching purpose of this thesis is therefore the preparation of a new framework of problems that can guide future field research among the Orokaiva. Towards this end I focus on the Orokaiva plant emblem.

Although emerging from the ethnographic corpus as the central symbol of Orokaiva sociality, the Orokaiva plant emblem has received only cursory and unsystematic attention. The data available on the Orokaiva plant emblem, however, provides a sufficient basis for a systematic re-examination of Orokaiva sociality generally. In constructing a paradigm of order based upon the Orokaiva system of plant emblem classification, a further problem is introduced: The concept of "community".

II. "Community" Defined

The concept of "community" is problematic simply by virtue of its commonality of usage and the attendant multiplicity of definitions surrounding it. Hillary, for example, found ninety-four definitions of "community" in the sociological literature to the mid-1950's (Hillary 1955). Breaking this set of definitions down according to sixteen different concepts, Hillary concluded that, "...beyond the concept that people are involved in community,
there is no complete agreement as to the nature of community" (ibid.: 119). There is, however, another difficulty unobserved by Hilliard. Implicit in Hilliard's analysis, as well as in the definitions reviewed, is the assumption that "community" is something that is "there". Thus the use of the concept with an article (a community, the community) is seldom empirically differentiated for analytical purposes from the use of the concept with a particle (in community, of community). If the concept, "community" is to be of any use, this differentiation must first of all be made explicit.

Gusfield's "critical response" to the use of "community" reflects exactly the opposite bias. Gusfield divides the use of the concept into two broad camps, "territorial" and "relational" (Gusfield 1975: xv-xvi). A territorial usage of "community" generally refers to social interactions within a given physical location, carries the implication of continuity, and invites enquiry concerning change. Such is its meaning in "Community Studies", "Community Power Structures", "The Urban Community", and so on. A relational use of "community" generally has to do with the quality or character of human relationships "...without reference to location" (ibid.: xvi).

The point of contention for Gusfield is this: Whether used to designate a territorially-based aggregate of social actors, or the quality or character of human relationships, the utility of
the concept is severely hampered by its persistent reification; that is, treating "community" as an empirical, rather than an analytical term (ibid.: 12-13).

Gusfield moves on to outline an approach to the concept that views "community" as created, not given; it is a symbolic construction (ibid.: 24-25). The problem of context is correspondingly raised: "When do people define themselves as having important characteristics in common, and when do these become bases for communal identity and action?" (ibid.: 30). "Community" for Gusfield, then, is a "consciousness of kind" (ibid.: 32) which is contextually created through symbolic identification; rejected is a notion of community as an empirical group or entity to which persons "belong" (ibid.: 41).

In the construction of my own 'paradigm of order' for the Orokaiva, I concur with Gusfield concerning the use of "community" as an analytic, but I differ with Gusfield concerning the phenomenon it analyses. Certainly created through the use of symbols, "community" nevertheless involves people involved with one another. Groups, or phenomenal orderings, do come into being. To emphasize the "relational" usage of "community" at the cost of denying the concept's signification of actual social groupings, amounts to a denial of experience.

In a way, Gusfield's own analysis can itself be seen as a symbol of the tension connoted by "community". For there is, I argue, a tension embedded in the distinction between the
phenomenal experience of 'a community' and the notion of being 'in community'. This tension itself "...connotes the dialectic in action..." (Burridge 1969: xix), the process entailed in the emergence of actual phenomenal orderings through a corporate identity with a common symbol or symbols.

The concept of "community" employed in this thesis therefore implies neither "a community" nor being "in community", but both as part of an overall process of sociality. In Chapter One I reiterate the concept of "community" outlined above, but I develop it using the etymological data provided in the Oxford English Dictionary.

III. Community Ideology and the Ideology of Community

Often a metaphorical image "...of virtuous or vicious human associations--depictions of ideals and evils to be sought or to be avoided..." (Gusfield op. cit.: 2), the notion of "community" is at such times incorporated into various ideologies and utopian doctrines, a mythic image of some sought after or avoided social order. No such usage is intended here.

By the use of "community" I do wish to indicate a moral order, a shared moral awareness, an 'invitation to act in certain ways'. The phrase "moral community" is therefore, in the context of this thesis, a redundancy. To be in a community is to accept obligation.
Burridge states: "Only those who live in a moral order need to have reasons for acting..." (Burridge 1969: 163). The implication of this statement is that to talk of "community" is to talk of the rationalizations people give for corporately identifying one with another. Hence, an "ideology of community".

Concerning the ideational order of community, Goodenough has this to say:

The phenomenal order is a property of the community as a material system of people, their surroundings, and their behavior. The ideational order is a property not of the community but of its members. (Goodenough 1964: 11)

The ideology of community is thus individualized, in the mind, non-material.

By contrast, the phrase "community ideology" I take to reference the ideology of community explicitly shared, acknowledged through public identification with a common symbol or symbols. In other words, a consensus of meaning is attained in the formation of a phenomenal ordering.

The composite phrase "community ideology and the ideology of community" therefore communicates a 'to and from' movement of the locus of a sense of community, between the individual and the collective. In Goodenough's words, community as a phenomenal order "...is an artifact of the ideational order of its members..." whereas "...the ideational order is itself affected by the phenomenal order" (ibid.: 12).
"Community" as an overall process thus involves these four interrelated facets of sociality: 'community as a phenomenal ordering', 'a sense of community', 'a community ideology', 'an ideology of community'. To suggest that this process is one of continuous creation and re-creation is to therefore suggest that these four facets of sociality are continually constructed in relation to one another.

IV. Lévi-Strauss, Durkheim, and Community

Without reference to specifics, the Orokaiva system of plant emblem classification might arguably be presented as a particular mode of a more general form of classification involving a relationship between two systems—natural and cultural—of homologous differences (cf. Lévi-Strauss 1963, 1976). In other words, Orokaiva plant emblems might be conceptualized as a Lévi-Straussian totemic system, and analyzed as such. That I do not perform this sort of structural analysis requires comment.

This thesis conceptualizes the Orokaiva plant emblem as a symbol of community and, delineating a series of interrelated beliefs associated with plant emblems, considers how those beliefs might further an understanding of the dynamics of Orokaiva sociality. Lévi-Strauss' analytical approach to totemic classification, however, differentiates systems of belief from systems of action:
Customs lead to beliefs, and these lead to techniques, but the different levels do not simply reflect each other. They react dialectically among themselves in such a way that we cannot hope to understand one of them without first evaluating, through their respective relations of opposition and correlation, institutions, representations, and situations.

(Levi-Strauss 1963: 91)

Such an analysis of Orokaiva plant emblems would consequently exclude from consideration that associated complex of ideas termed an "ideology of community". If our understanding of Orokaiva sociality is to be furthered at all a purely structural analysis of this sort must be rejected; failure to do so would be, in Rohatynskyj's words, a denial of "...the holistic nature of the social process" (Rohatynskyj 1978: 54).

On the other hand, conceptualizing the Orokaiva plant emblem as a symbol of community suggests that the paradigm here employed has its roots in Durkheim. The similarity to Durkheim's thought stems from his theory that the beliefs and practices associated with the totemic object reflected not a worship of the object, but of society. For Durkheim, society is the object of all worship. The totemic emblem, then, symbolizes not so much the totem itself as society (Durkheim 1965: 235-36).

The paradigm of "community" employed in this thesis, however, differs fundamentally with Durkheim's theory on a number of basic points. First of all, contra Durkheim (op. cit.: 140), "community" is not posited as an object of worship, nor is it reified like
Durkheim's "society" (see footnote 4). Similarly, no "sacredness" is here attached to community symbols: The Orokaiva do not treat their plant emblems with any particular reverence (Williams 1930: 127).

For Durkheim, the corporate identification with a totemic emblem communicated a unity of thought and feelings (Durkheim op. cit.: 333). But, having defined community as connoting a sense of community in tension with that sense actualized in some sort of phenomenal ordering, symbols of community are here imbued with the ability to communicate not only unity, but also unity's antithesis; autonomy, or self-willedness. Among the Orokaiva, this antithesis is reflected most clearly in their propensity to 'invent' personal plant emblems, which may thereafter become corporate emblems (Williams 1925:421; 1930:124-5).

Durkheim, faced with individual totems among the Arunta, as well as in other ethnographic sources (cf. Durkheim op. cit: 184), followed Frazer in differentiating "individual totemism" from "collective totemism" (ibid.: 187) and then went on to argue that "both varieties" were interlocked (ibid.: 188) through the idea of the soul:

The totem as the ancestor, is the soul of the individual, but externalized and invested with powers superior to those it is believed to possess while within the organism. Now this duplication is the result of a psychological necessity; for it only expresses the nature of the soul which is double. In
one sense it is ours: it expresses our personality. But at the same time it is outside of us, for it is only the reaching into us of a religious force which is outside of us.

(ibid.: 316-17)

And that "religious force" emanates for Durkheim from society. Nevertheless, Durkheim leaves "individual totemism" and "collective totemism" as distinct systems. This thesis, however, treats both the particularizing and the collectivizing aspects of the Orokaiva plant emblem as one single process.

Finally, Durkheim posited the totem as a symbol of society's moral authority over the individual. As a symbol of community the Orokaiva plant emblem is alternatively viewed in Chapter One as containing both moral and tactical implications, the former referring to normative, reciprocal obligation, the latter referring to the actual political use of plant emblems in the course of daily life. And the tactical use of the plant emblem may oppose its moral implications, though it need not. This last point is the central ambiguity of plant emblem identification contained in the paradigm of community employed.

In Chapter Two I examine the ideational order associated with plant emblem identification. Taking direction from McKellin's (1980) analysis of Managalase kinship ideology, I distill from the Orokaiva ethnography an identical set of ordering principles -- lineality, territoriality, and exchange/commensality -- together with certain emic conceptions of shared "substance". I term the resultant complex of interlocking ideas an "ideology of community". It is this "ideology of community" which arti-
culates the bases for plant emblem identification; it is this ideational order which, too, is forwarded as constituting (at least in part) the cultural forms by which the Orokaiva create their social groupings. Put another way, the native rationalizations brought forward constitute at least some of the significant "...strategic resources [utilized] in the process of social organization" (Scheffler 1965: 294).

In Chapter Three I consider three events which generate contexts for community: birth, marriage, and death. I show how the ideational order presented in Chapter Two demarcates the boundaries of optative plant emblem identification in regards to each event. The 'configurations' (cf. Pouwer 1966a, 1966b, 1974) of lineal, territorial, and exchange/commensal ties of relationships that are indicated for each event articulate the contexts for community: The dynamics of the process of plant emblem group formation are made "visible" through a delineation of the points at which affiliative ambiguities and constraints may emerge for the Orokaiva themselves.

* * *
It is in the light of a perspective which views "community" as continually emergent, that the ethnographic problems of Orokaiva identification, affiliation, ideology and context are selected and framed. And it is the notion of emergent community developed, which constitutes a problem for future field research among the Orokaiva.
Footnotes to Introduction

1. The importance of such identity emblems in the creation of sociality has been recently described for the Koiari-speaking Barai (Barker 1979) and Omie (Rohatynskyj 1978), both peoples neighbouring and having contact with the Orokaiva along the ridges south-east of Mt. Lamington. McKellin's (1980) research among the Managalasi—neighbouring due south, on the southern slopes of Mt. Lamington—also provides valuable clues to the nature of the Orokaiva plant emblem system.

2. But see Schwimmer 1981.

3. For a summary of this classification see Hillary (1955: 114-15).

4. Compare with Durkheim's notion of "Society": "Undoubtedly a society is a being, a person. But this being has nothing metaphysical to it. It is not a substance more or less transcendent; it is a whole composed of parts". (Review of Ludwig Gumplowicz, "Grundrisse der Sociologie" in Revue Philosophique, 20 (1885): 632, translated and reprinted in Durkheim 1973: xx)

5. It is not suggested that the Orokaiva themselves conceive the ideas brought together as a unitary system of explanation; nor do I wish to imply that the Orokaiva "...segregate these ideas as a separate subsystem within their culture" (Scheffler 1965: 39). As for the ideas themselves, I have had to rely on what was contained in the ethnography, reserving further elaboration until future field research.
Chapter One

Conceptualizing Group Formation among

the Orokaiva
Chapter One

I. Introduction

While exploring the Mambara River in 1893, Sir William MacGregor and his party were greeted with shouts of "orokaiva! orokaiva!" from those who wished to be friendly (Williams 1930: 3). Soon thereafter, the word "orokaiva" came to stand for most of the people of the Northern District (now Oro Province).

Winifred N. Beaver, while defending the use of the "orokaiva" label on the basis of linguistic affinities, acknowledged a lack of congruence between the colonial administration's and the native Papuans' view of socio-cultural division:

Most people, if, indeed, a thought is given to the matter at all, are inclined to class each tribe, perhaps each village, as something totally apart or distinct... But, as a matter of fact, nearly ninety per cent of the tribes of the (Kumusi) Division can, I think, be correctly classed as a single race. These tribes extend from the Yodda Valley to the sea, and northward to the Papuan Boundary, and in referring to them it is convenient to adopt the term (admittedly incorrect) "Orokaiva", but it is a general and popular one.... All these tribes speak dialects more or less closely affiliated to the Binandele language, and have been placed in the same language group.

(Beaver 1916: 48)

The colonial imposition of "order" onto what was (and is) indigenously perceived of as something quite different fore-
shadowed subsequent anthropological work among the Orokaiva. Research by Williams (1925, 1930), Crocombe & Hogbin (1963), Rimoldi (1966), and Schwimmer (1970, 1973) has yielded four 'paradigms of order'. What will be argued in this chapter is the inability of these models to portray Orokaiva sociality as accurately as it might be. More specifically, it will be shown that each model seeks to order "groups" that are taken to be "there" (Wagner 1974) in a manner that, to varying degrees, veils the processual nature of Orokaiva sociality.

Both Rimoldi's and Crocombe & Hogbin's paradigms are delineated from their rather specific and summary studies of Orokaiva land tenure; I deal with these two paradigms first. I then turn to what I believe are the two more important paradigms, Williams' and Schwimmer's respectively.

II. Crocombe & Hogbin's, and Rimoldi's Paradigms

Burridge has made the point that, having defined man as an orderly creature, anthropologists "...find a certain orderliness--but we cannot do this without ascribing purpose" (Burridge, 1973: 121; emphasis mine). Thus Crocombe & Hogbin (1963) and Rimoldi (1966) observe an orderliness among the Orokaiva, its purpose being understood to be the ordering and transmission of rights related to land. I do not contend with these authors' observation
of orderliness, for that is certainly present. Nor need the
purpose for this orderliness be questioned. Rights to land do
exist, and claims to land must be made on the basis of some
criteria. Claims to land are recognized. And once recognition
is given to a claimant's petition that claim should enjoy the
support of corporate sanction.

What I do wish to contend with is the way in which Crocombe
& Hogbin and Rimoldi portray Orokaiva orderliness. Both studies
model Orokaiva sociality in terms of discrete, segmental units,
the reality of which is denied by their own data.

a) Crocombe and Hogbin

Crocombe & Hogbin identify a nested set of four units:
clans, comprised of subclans, comprised of lineages, which, finally,
can be further broken down into sub-lineages (Crocombe & Hogbin
op. cit.: 16-17). The term "clan" refers to:

...the large patrilineal Orokaiva descent
groups, each of which claims descent from
a common ancestor but cannot trace it in
fact. Each clan has a common name and a
common plant emblem...,

(ibid.: 16)

Crocombe & Hogbin use the term "sub-clan" to refer to
"...a local branch of a clan (i.e. within a particular village
or a cluster of neighbouring hamlets)" (ibid.: 17). As for the
last two divisions:

A sub-clan is usually divided into a number of lineages each of which has a distinctive name and an erahu (plant emblem) which is distinct from that of the clan as a whole...some lineages are further divided into sub-lineages.

(ibid.)

A closer examination of the 'criterion for membership' suggests itself. Crocombe & Hogbin classify individuals into these groupings according to the names that the Orokaiva share in relation to others: "In conversation the Orokaiva often refer to the jawo (name) and speak of the members of one clan as embo jawo vahai (people of the same name)" (ibid.).

The Orokaiva refer to the sub-clan by the same term: they "...distinguish sub-clans when necessary by adding the name of the village in which they are located" (ibid.).

Crocombe & Hogbin identify patrilineal descent as the sole basis for sharing a group name and a plant emblem. However, exceptions to the 'rule' of patrilineality in regards to inheritance are numerous (ibid.: 14-16; 21-23), such that, in the village of Inonda, "...inheritance was not so direct in fact" (ibid.: 41). Nevertheless, cases where membership to a particular group cannot be accounted for on the basis of patrilineal descent are referred to as "deviant relationships" (ibid.).
b) Rimoldi

Rimoldi's analysis of Orokaiva sociality involves two principal groupings (pace Crocombe & Hogbin's paradigm of four 'groupings'): "clan" and "lineage". Concerning the "clan", Rimoldi writes:

Every Orokaiva person is recruited by birth to the clan of his father. All members of this descent unit claim but cannot trace common descent from a usually eponymous ancestor; they do not always share the same plant emblem (erahu) commonly held by patrilineal groups. (Rimoldi op. cit.: 32; emphasis mine)

Unlike Crocombe & Hogbin (op. cit.: 16), Rimoldi argues that the clan may not share a single plant emblem, an observation Williams also made (Williams 1925: 420).

Rimoldi further designates what Crocombe & Hogbin called a "sub-clan" (Crocombe & Hogbin op. cit.: 17), and what Williams called a "clan-branch" (Williams 1930: 114), a "lineage":

Each lineage in our sample at Sivepe retains a name said to have been transmitted from some remote patrilineal ancestor and each shares a distinctive plant emblem associated with its identity as an agnatic group. (Rimoldi op. cit.: 50)

Though presented as a straightforward ordering into "clans" and "lineages" according to a rule of patrilineal descent, Rimoldi's own data suggests Orokaiva sociality cannot be so easily accounted for.
The members of the Jegese clan of Sivepe are divided, according to Rimoldi's paradigm, into four named lineages. These lineages are Bepehupa, Sesewopa, Berekipa, and Arehu. (ibid.: 37).

When asked how the Sesewopa lineage obtained its name (for Sesewo is the erahu of the Bepehupa lineage), Rimoldi's informant(s) "suggested" that the group

...was descended from a Bepehupa woman and that the new lineage referred to its ancestress by the name of the erahu of her group, i.e. as Sesewoja, and themselves became known as Sesewopa. (ibid.: 110; emphasis mine)

The account of the Bepehupa lineage thus reveals a violation of the agnatic principle.

Consider, now, the Berekipa lineage:

Both the name 'Berekipa' and their own erahu, the simboro plant, were adopted (in circumstances which we could not obtain) from the so-called 'people' of both the mother of the senior householder, and of the patrilineal ancestor of the other householders. (ibid.)

The ambiguity of origin is highly evident in this case, since it is left undetermined which rationalization (the mother of the senior householder or the patrilineal ancestor) is associated with which symbol (clan name or plant emblem).

The Arehu lineage also uses the plant emblem 'simboro grass', "...in addition to their own topu (fig?) tree emblem" (ibid.).
Schwimmer records an incident that appears to have some bearing here.

Some hae [erahu] become unusually popular, like topu, a tree name which became a hae after a Sivepe woman died by falling off a topu tree. She was given the necronym Topu-gori, after which all her descendants adopted topu as a hae.  

(Schwimmer 1973: 196)

Rimoldi makes no mention of any lineal connection between the Arehu lineage and their erahu, topu. If, as Schwimmer states, this erahu or hae became "unusually popular", it is not unreasonable to suppose no lineal connection exists.

What the analysis of Rimoldi's and Crocombe & Hogbin's paradigms reveals is a disjunction of the sort long recognized for Highland societies (cf. Barnes 1962, Langness 1964, de Lepervanche 1967), a disjunction between the logical outworking of patrilineal descent on the one hand, and the composition of the actual phenomenal groupings on the other.

III. Williams' Paradigm

that the above divisions were not hard and fast. Many of the above tribes could be further divided into "minor groups", e.g. the Sangara could be divided into distinct halves, the Kombu-Sangara on the east and the Ato-Pekuma on the west (ibid.: 151). In addition to recognizing a number of internal divisions, Williams stated that:

...we may not regard the nine tribes as so many water-tight compartments. Dispersal and migration have brought about some blending, and it is not always easy to draw the line between any two of the nine. There are undoubted affinities, for instance, between the Aiga and their neighbours the Hunjuvarehu (of the Wasida tribe) on the south, and also between the Aiga and Binandele of the River Mambara on the north.

( Ibid.)

Notwithstanding some "partial blending" of tribes, Williams summarizes the following criteria by which one tribe can be distinguished from another: 1. a common territory, 2. certain idiosyncrasies of custom (e.g. dress), 3. a distinct dialect, and 4. its common enmities (ibid.: 156). The fourth criterion Williams considered primary; tribes are defined by who they are not with regards to conflict.

However, there is yet a fifth criterion having to do with amity, the sharing of a common name:

In the largest groups, as we see them, there is no recognition within the group itself of a common name; but as we descend the scale we reach a point where such a name comes into use, where the members of
the group are able to say "We are so and so". Among the Orokaiva we reach this stage when we come to the tribes. They are in fact the largest units which are consistently able to name themselves. I would suggest therefore that the use of a common name, implying as it does a recognition of amity, is a very essential factor in the individuality of the tribe.

( Ibid.: 160)

If a common name is one of the essential criteria for determining tribal definition, it might then be asked what the criteria for sharing a name itself might be. To anticipate, Williams' ordering of the "smaller groupings" of Orokaiva society beg the same question, a question which will become the basis for an extended analysis of the Orokaiva plant emblem.

Williams was unable to find a suitable native term for what he called a "clan".

Among the Aiga the nearest approach seems to be the expression embo-javo, lit. 'man-name'; but this might stand in another context for the man's personal name. Among the Binandele there is a more definite term, oro-be, 'the true oro' (the usual meaning of oro is men's house). In the Sangara dialect a word araha stands for either a village clearing or a clan.

( Ibid.: 101)

Williams opened his discussion of the constitution of the clan by stating that it "...is a fairly well-defined group" (Ibid.). As such it is "patriarchal in constitution; it develops directly from the family, in which the father is undisputed master" (Ibid.). But, having said this, Williams immediately moved into
a discussion of clan formation, a discussion which throws the whole question of "definition" into a new light: "As the multiplying family merges into the clan it is not always easy to set a limit or a definition" (ibid.: 102). Shifting to an examination of the dynamics of clan formation, Williams again focused on the symbolic aspects of group definition, the sharing of a name: "...when the descendants of one man come to be known regularly by a distinctive name, it may be said that they constitute a new clan" (ibid.). Related to this process of group definition is the plant emblem (in the Aiga dialect, heratu), from which the clan name may or may not be derivative (ibid.: 122-123).

Now, new clans form continually (ibid.: 102); and, in the main, this process is conditioned ecologically. The Orokaiva are, first and foremost, horticulturalists, their principal staple crop being taro (Colocasia sp. and Xanthosoma sp.). In the absence of fertilizers, the Orokaiva continually require new garden land, either previously ungardened, or old garden land that has been left fallow for some time. A consequence of this form of horticulture is that garden land frequently becomes distant enough to warrant families "hiving off" to form new settlements. More recently, Schwimmer notes that, though living together in more enduring villages, families still maintain "garden houses" in order to remain conveniently closer to their gardens (Schwimmer 1973: 89). New settlements may also form as
the result of 'inter-clan' quarrels (embogi), or the fear of sorcery (Williams 1930: 102).

For whatever reason though, the formation of a new settlement (often only a nuclear family) initiates the process of clan formation. As Williams observed:

So long as they retain their original clan name the settlement can only be regarded as an offshoot; but when they wax in numbers and begin to be known by a separate name, they become ipso facto a new clan.

(ibid.)

So far, Williams' data suggests a system whereby patrilineages are continually segmenting primarily in response to ecological demands. However, Williams found Orokaiva children to be on such intimate and friendly footing with their maternal relatives that they were "very ready" to identify themselves with their maternal relatives vis-à-vis maternal plant emblems. As adults, too, Williams found the Orokaiva using both maternal and paternal heratu (ibid.: 114). Williams consequently qualified his 'unilineal bias' by noting that "...the system, although patrilineal in theory, was almost bilateral in effect" (ibid.: 94). Further into his discussion, Williams remarked that: "...clan exogamy is not a hard and fast rule" (ibid.: 131), e.g., men and women of the same clan often married (ibid.: 132). Williams thus found the outworking of a rule of patrilineality violated with respect to the use of heratu, clan exogamy, and the resultant clan memberships.

* * *
The role of plant emblems in the definition of social groups has also been shown to be part of Crocombe & Hogbin's and Rimoldi's paradigms. Little has been said up to this point though, about the Orokaiva system of plant emblem classification per se. In examining Schwimmer's paradigm, the complexity of the relationship between hae or heratu (I use both, as both mean "plant emblem"**) and social groupings, as well as the central place of plant emblems in the process of Orokaiva group formation, will begin to be more clearly seen.

IV. Schwimmer's Paradigm

Schwimmer's schema for conceptualizing Orokaiva social groupings is again somewhat different from those paradigms already considered. Schwimmer employs Rimoldi's delineation of the lineage as his departure point:

It is certainly true that we find important units intermediate between the extended family and the local clan group...But the term 'lineage' might be deceptive unless we define it more closely. (Schwimmer 1973: 194)

Because the four Jegase 'lineages' in Sivepe reveal no strict adherence to patrilineality in their composition, Schwimmer prefers the designation "clan segment" (ibid.). As for the "clan" designation itself, Schwimmer states:
...the fact that these groupings together call themselves a clan (*javo wahai*) does not imply the actual existence of agnatic connection. The term means 'one name', and that is all they share, except for uterine links which buttress the social relations between them.

(ibid.: 196; emphasis mine)

Once again we find the sharing of a common name stressed as a crucial criterion for membership. But it is this very criterion which creates problems for Schwimmer's analysis, as I shall now attempt to demonstrate.

Schwimmer, having identified 'clans' and 'clan segments', turns next to Orokaiva plant emblem (*hae*) classifications.

... the term *hae* is frequently used to describe a social group made up of persons sharing a *hae*, and that the group to which it is applied is not the clan (*javo wahai*) but a smaller formation often about the same size as a 'clan segment' or 'lineage'. As such, they are probably the basic larger unit of Orokaiva social structure.

(ibid.: emphasis mine)

The above distinction is highly problematic, for Schwimmer also notes that: "Clan and personal names are commonly plant names and often the *hae* of a clan and its name are identical" (ibid.: emphasis mine). Williams, too, suggested that, because just over forty-four per cent of his sample list of clan names and their *heratu* corresponded (e.g. Eugahu/Euga, Hojavahije/Hojava, etc.)
...I think the clan and its heratu come into being simultaneously and in this manner: an individual secedes from the parent clan and his family grows into an independent clan. This clan becomes known by its founder's name and adopts for emblem a plant bearing the same name, or one similar to it.

(Williams 1930: 122)

How can hae groupings then be distinguished from clans?

Since plant emblem identification enters in at every level of inclusion, 'clan', 'clan segment', 'sub-clan', 'lineage', and so on, how are we to make sense of this multitude of cross-cutting identifications? More specifically, how do we decide when those sharing a hae constitute a 'clan', 'clan segment', etc.? Differentiation of Orokaiva society on the basis of shared names indeed becomes problematical.

How problematic the sharing of names can be is best illustrated through a consideration, given the above discussion, of Schwimmer's assertion that:

In contrast to the clan and clan-segment... the plant emblem group alone has the nature of a true kinship group.

(Schwimmer 1973: 197)

There are two pertinent issues touched upon in the quotation above: a) the distinction that Schwimmer makes between two kinds of groupings (clan and clan segment/plant emblem group); b) Schwimmer's reference to "the nature of a true kinship group" in characterizing the normative implications that sharing a plant emblem has. These issues are now considered in turn.
V. Plant Emblem Groupings

The distinction Schwimmer makes between "the clan and clan-segment" on the one hand, and the "plant emblem group" on the other, is questionable on several counts. Schwimmer has already stated that the clan name is an important symbol of political identification (ibid.: 196). But he has also pointed out that "...often the hae of a clan and its name are identical" (ibid.; emphasis mine). Williams proposed that the clan and its heratu "...came into being simultaneously" (Williams 1925: 419-20; emphasis mine). If these statements are taken together with the problems of differentiation encountered in the other paradigms, there seems reasonable cause to doubt the validity of the distinction Schwimmer wishes to make.

On the other hand, all four paradigms appear to be in agreement on at least one point: No matter how Orokaiva society is perceived to be organized, plant emblems are involved at all levels of inclusion (save for "tribal" divisions made by Williams). I would therefore propose the following 'working' proposition: All Orokaiva groupings are plant emblem groupings.

By adopting the above proposition I do not mean to unconditionally deny the existence of such categories as "clan", "clan branch", etc.. It is nevertheless my contention that, if any advances are to be made in understanding and modelling Orokaiva sociality, attention must be focused on the primary symbol
Four paradigms of sociality have been considered: Williams', Crocombe & Hogbin's, Rimoldi's, and Schwimmer's. The period these four paradigms span is over four decades; could the variations observed between paradigms be therefore explained as a reflection of social process? Not pertinently so. Notwithstanding the inevitable changes brought about by first Britain's and then Australia's colonial administration, what makes these four paradigms comparable apart from any inquiries into organizational transformations over time is that they all arrive at the same point. For when each paradigm is set against the data there is revealed a disjunction between what is identified as patrilineal descent on the one hand, and practice on the other. Thus the sharing of a name is consistently taken to be indicative of a group that is "there"; and the various permutations of name sharing a reflection of different sorts of groups (clans, lineages, etc.). Each paradigm, to varying degrees designates patrilineal descent as an organizing principle governing the identification with, and transmission of, names. And in each paradigm an explanation based on patrilineal descent is found lacking. Not only do incidents, such as the Sivepe woman who died falling out of a *topu* tree, give rise to new plant emblems; there is also a propensity for Orokaiva individuals to take to themselves an individual *hae* (Williams 1925: 421; 1930: 124-25). Cultural
innovation as part of the process of Orokaiva sociality is by and large excluded from the considered paradigms of order. Recourse to patrilineal descent also fails to account for the fact that Orokaiva individuals hold and maintain identification with a number of plant emblems at any given time. Schwimmer records that, in the village of Sivepe, "...most individuals have about five hae in regular use. I recorded forty-two hae in a population of one hundred and thirty-five" (Schwimmer 1973: 196). We see, then, a significant plurality of identifications available to each individual.

With regards to filiative transmission, Schwimmer states:

Theoretically, a person passes on his father's, but not his mother's hae to the next generation so that the hae would form an agnatic group. 

(ibid.)

This statement can be compared with Williams:

The heratu of the father is passed on by inheritance, whereas that of the mother is not normally handed down beyond the generation of her offspring. 

(Williams 1930: 114)

Presumably, Schwimmer assumes that the father's hae is used to the exclusion of the mother's. But Williams observed that "...a man uses both the paternal and the maternal heratu" (ibid.). To suggest that "...the hae would form an agnatic group" is therefore erroneous, irrespective of whether or not maternal hae are transmitted "beyond the generation of her offspring".
We find the above 'rule' of transmission in any case qualified by Schwimmer himself: "...there were in fact several cases of uterine transmission for more than one generation, especially where marriages were uxorilocal" (Schwimmer 1973: 196). Taken together with Williams' data (see above), it might therefore be more accurate, following Firth (1957), to characterize the filiative transmission of Orokaiva plant emblems as ambilateral, i.e., both mother and father are feasible for hae identification "...but some selectivity is possible, with difference of emphasis" (Firth op. cit.: 216).

I have suggested that, in order to move beyond the explanatory limitations of the existing paradigms of order, we begin by recognizing all Orokaiva groupings as plant emblem groupings. Since plant emblems appear to enter in at all levels of inclusion (save the "tribe"), adopting this proposition allows the analysis to side-step the problems associated with differentiating different kinds of plant emblem groups according to the categories "clan", "clan branch", "lineage", and so on.

I would now make a further stipulation, that attempts to conceptualize plant emblem groups as descent groups be abandoned, for we may conclude from the above discussion that hae are not properly idioms of descent.

The assertion that Orokaiva plant emblems are not properly idioms of descent, and that plant emblem groups are not descent
groups, parallels Rohatynskyj's analysis of Omie plant emblems. Rohatynskyj noted that Omie anie designations appear on the surface equivalent to descent-ordered clans:

Anie, as a cultural construct, lends itself most readily to this equivalence as it incorporates the aspect of identity, in that each adult becomes socially identified with a given anie; solidarity, in that people having common political interests and rights in land, often co-resident upon that land, are thought of as sharing an anie; and continuity through the generations, in that anie are available to the individual as a result of a filiative tie.

(Rohatynskyj op. cit.: 35; emphasis mine)

The Omie, says Rohantynskyj, understand that their plant emblem system of classification could be employed to create the reality of a descent-based social order (ibid.). However,

...this feature of the anie as operating in Omie social organization is held as a logical possibility that can be exploited only in verbal presentation. The real limitations of the concept, that is its actual organizational limits are quite different and a great deal more complicated.

(ibid.: 36)

It would appear that Orokaiva hae, like Omie anie, are apparently capable of being presented as 'looking like' a descent construct, inasmuch as they incorporate aspects of identity, solidarity, and continuity. But, again like anie, the actual engagement of hae for the purposes of social identification and the delineation of sociality is both different and "a great deal more complicated."
And the way towards penetrating that complexity? Through a closer examination of the symbolic nature of name sharing, particularly plant emblem names. I choose this course of investigation because, being grounded in the cognitive and ideological definitions of Orokaiva social relations, it promises to take us further in understanding something of the dynamic, processual nature of Orokaiva group formation, and the relation of plant emblems to that process.

As an entry into this form of analysis I should like to turn to the second issue mentioned above, and examine what Schwimmer means when he says the plant emblem group "...alone has the nature of a true kinship group" (Schwimmer 1973: 197). We can approach this problem by first considering the context in which the "nature of a true kinship group" is invoked. Schwimmer describes how, though he was able to obtain a sizable list of people who lived in Sivepe and surrounding villages around 1915, he could not learn anything about how these people were genealogically related.

However, informants were able to tell me the hae of these ancestors, and these hae proved to be the only evidence for statements that A and B 'must have been closely related' or 'cannot have been closely related' ...Therefore we should not be surprised that the hae occurs prominently in the Orokaiva marriage rules with regard to incest and exogamy. (ibid.)

Concerning the relationship between hae and exogamy and incest, Schwimmer equates sharing a hae with siblingship:
A rule that was expressed to me often and forcibly was that people should not marry if they share a paternal or maternal hae. If two people are identified with the same plant...they are siblings; they cannot possibly be anything else. (ibid.: 206)

The point I would like to make here is that Orokaiva siblingship, and by extension Orokaiva 'kinship', is primarily discussed by Schwimmer as a normative system, as opposed to a genealogically defined grid. That is, he is focusing on the rules and regulations which actors should follow if their behaviour is to be accepted by other members of society as proper. This normative system is associated with a set of symbols—kinship terms, hae, clan names (in general, names that are shared)—and meanings (cf. Schneider 1971: 37). What is therefore being referred to when hae are claimed to demonstrate the "true nature of a kinship group" is the moral content of these symbols of sociality.

I wish to focus on the moral content of hae symbolism; I shall sum up and explain why. The transmission, sharing, and acquiring of hae has been shown to be complex, as well as central to understanding Orokaiva sociality. I have argued that defining Orokaiva groupings by employing terms such as 'clan', 'lineage', etc. according to the criterion of patrilineality is an inadequate and far too static approach to dealing with Orokaiva sociality: the utility of descent-constructs must be challenged in their application to the Orokaiva.

Wagner, in fact, has challenged the very existence of
groups in the Highlands of New Guinea:

Is there something about tribal society that demands resolution into groups? Or is the notion of "groups" a vague and inadequate description of something that could better be represented in another way?

(Wagner 1974: 102)

Wagner goes on to say:

Since the notion of the group is our own, the problem finding such criteria [for determining when such a concept is applicable and when it is not] rests with us. Since a deliberate collective focus, a sense of common participation and awareness, lies at the core of our notion (and of our motives for finding groups) our criteria ought to emphasize this factor.

(ibid.: 104)

It is notions such as 'a deliberate collective focus', 'a sense of common participation', a 'sense of common awareness' which lie at the heart of that semantic domain invoked by the word "moral". It is these notions which are at issue in the idea of a sense of community. We can, therefore, rewrite to say that an assemblage of people have a sense of community when they perceive a shared moral awareness of, a collective acceptance of, and conformity to, moral obligation to each other.

Introducing this notion of "community" requires some explanation. What does "community" mean? Can a notion of community be applicable to the Orokaiva? It is these two questions that I turn to in the final sections of this chapter.
VI. The Meaning of Community

Perhaps the best entry into a discussion of the semantic universe signified by the word "community" is an etymological one. In Latin, the accusative form of "community", communitatem, "...was merely a noun of quality from communis, meaning 'fellowship, community of relations or feelings'; but in medieval Latin it was, like universitas, used concretely in the sense of a 'body of fellows or fellow townsmen', and this was its earliest use in English" (O.E.D.: community). The word "community" did not, in fact, take on the connotations of a 'quality or state' in the English language until two hundred years later, in the sixteenth century (ibid.).

What can thus be seen (but shall not here be accounted for) is an interesting semantic movement in the use of "community". Beginning in the Latin as a "noun of quality" connoting the quality of social relationships (a sense of community is here implied) the use of the word then shifted to connote actual social groups (the phenomenal order of community). The etymological development of "community" in the English has, however, displayed exactly the opposite trend: moving from a solely phenomenological connotation (in the 14th century "community" referred to e.g. a state, or organized society) to include the abstract sharing of certain qualities or characteristics (1878: the community of character; 1875: the community of interests and feelings; 1561: community of power) (O.E.D.; see also
Williams 1976: 65). It was in the 16th century that these two semantic domains began, and continue, to be expressed by the one word "community". A closer look at these two semantic domains will nevertheless reveal that, far from co-existing harmoniously, the notion of community as a quality or state of being and the notion of community as a phenomenal ordering exist together in a relationship of tension.

Invoking a sense of community suggests a shared consciousness of some quality(-ies) or state(s) of being. As such, one need not apprehend him/herself totally in the other, but only in regard to what is shared. A sense of community is thus negated by the apprehended absense of any shared quality(-ies) or state(s) of being. Finally, invoking a sense of community can be done independent of any spacial and temporal considerations --it is spacially and temporally unbounded.

Turner's notion of "communitas" indicates the experiential limits a sense of community can realize:

...The bonds of communitas are anti-structural in that they are undiffer-entiated, equalitarian, direct, non-rational (though not irrational), I-Thou or Essential We relationships, in Martin Buber's sense.

(Turner 1974: 47)

Taking "community" to signify a phenomenal order implies that the community may be consciously apprehended "from the outside" in terms of the individual actors that comprise it,
independent of whether or not there is "internally" (or indigenously) perceived a shared sense of community. "Community" as a substantive, concrete entity is invariably associated with some sort of organizing, structuring principle(s) and/or spacial and temporal constraints.

A sense of community, therefore, stands in opposition to community as a phenomenal order with respect to the oppositions unstructured/structured, undifferentiated/differentiated, spacially and temporally unbounded/spacially and temporally bounded. But, as has been shown, both semantic domains are encompassed according to conventional English usage by the one word, "community". Community, then, effectively connotes neither one domain nor the other; rather, "community" connotes a process incorporating both aspects of sociality in a relationship of tension, a tension in perception. It is a process akin to that expressed by Burridge for European or Western society:

The ordered stabilities of given roles, statuses and identities are in dynamic tension with the instruction to abandon current boundaries, enter a communitas or antistructure, and remake the moral- ities.

(Burridge 1979: 160)
VII. The Orokaiva Plant Emblem as Symbol of Community

The question that immediately comes to the fore is: Can such a notion of community, implying a process of sociality involving the movement between a "consciousness of kind" and the realization of that consciousness or 'sense of community' in a phenomenal ordering, be applicable to the Orokaiva? I would like to show that the concept "community" developed here is applicable to this Papuan people, that the concept "community" constitutes a useful approach to the re-evaluation of Orokaiva social organization and especially the role of Orokaiva plant emblems in that process of social organization.

If Schwimmer's ethnography is correct, the Orokaiva equate siblingship, or at least the moral imperatives associated with siblingship, with the sharing of hae (Schwimmer 1973: 206). We can therefore say that hae, as symbols of sociality, communicate the moral imperatives associated with siblingship; there is a common awareness of something shared which has moral implications for the conduct of social relations. Since Schwimmer has extended the association of hae and siblingship to say that a plant emblem group "alone has the nature of a kinship group", and since the "nature" of a kinship group has to do with the normative expectations of membership, we can generalize to say that Orokaiva plant emblem identification has moral implications (cf. Bloch 1971). That is to say, plant emblems communicate
moral expectations. And the sharing of hae symbolizes a collective acceptance of, and conformity to, moral obligations one to another. We can therefore say that sharing a plant emblem communicates a sense of community.

But the word "community", as already argued, also connotes a phenomenal order. Is this, too, evidenced by the ethnography? Here we can identify the notion of community as a phenomenal order with what Williams meant by the Orokaiva "sympathy group". Characterized, ideally, by an atmosphere of "concord and restfulness" (Williams 1930: 315), members of the sympathy group conform to such virtues as liberality, industry, helpfulness, a good-tempered nature, and so on (ibid.: 316-21).

The criteria for community then, includes, firstly, a sense of community: a culturally shared "internal" sense of participation in, and moral awareness of, obligations one to another. Secondly, this internal consciousness is made visible to the outsider by its symbolic expression, through events, and through the indigenous rationalizations (ideologies) offered by the actors to explain both symbols and events.

In discussing the composition of Orokaiva sympathy groups, Williams observed that, though typically synonymous with the "clan-village unit", the actual composition of the group was "... not hard and fast: it may fluctuate with circumstances ...", e.g., when disputes arose (ibid.: 310). Once again, the
fluctuating nature of Orokaiva groupings is remarked upon. And it is this flux which, taken together with the fact that individuals ascribe to more than one hae, suggests that there is also a tactical dimension to hae identification (cf. Bloch op. cit.).

In isolating a tactical dimension to hae identification it must be kept in mind that to enumerate the various hae an individual lays claim to is not to enumerate ipso facto the "groups" to which an individual "belongs". Hae identification is not automatically synonymous with affiliation to a hae grouping. It is, rather, in their use that hae as symbols of community make people's affiliations explicit. I return to this topic again in Chapter Three.

* * *

The observation that Orokaiva groupings are continually in a state of flux suggests that Orokaiva sociality is better understood as "emergent", rather than "there". And emergent sociality is here best conceptualized, I would argue, as a process involving a relationship of tension and conflict between a sense of community on the one hand, and the phenomenal order of community on the other.

Furthermore, the Orokaiva plant emblem constitutes a symbol of community. By virtue of having both tactical and moral im-
plications, **hae** identification is thus seen as expressive of the tension invoked by "community". That is, if a designated number of Orokaiva individuals share a particular **hae**, this cannot be taken as an automatic indication that all (or any of) these people will crystalize into some sort of phenomenal collective under that **hae**; for, as has been stressed, each will have alternative **hae** (that some or all will not share) that they may "choose" to use instead.  

I have argued for an analytic conceptualization which views Orokaiva sociality as emergent community, and the Orokaiva plant emblem as a symbol of community. Along what lines, and according to what constraints, does community therefore emerge among the Orokaiva? This returns us to a question asked earlier: What are the bases for **hae** identification? It is this question that Chapter Two addresses.
Footnotes to Chapter One

1. Interestingly, this form of greeting is still found among the Maisin of Collingwood Bay, Oro Province, P.N.G. (John Barker 1982: personal communication)

2. The first linguistic surveys by E.W.P. Chinnery and W.N. Beaver (1916) were adopted by Williams (1930: 1). Further refinements of the linguistic scene have been made (cf. Wilson 1969a, 1969b, Dutton 1971, Wurm 1975), but for the purposes of this thesis Williams' map (see map I) together with Schwimmer's (see map II) will adequately represent the geographical and linguistic boundaries of the Orokaiva.

3. The claim that the Orokaiva have a name for the "clan" in the abstract agrees with Schwimmer (1973: 196) but not with Williams (1930: 101).

4. From both Chinnery & Beaver's (1916) and Williams' (1930) accounts, it is evident that, prior to pacification there was a great deal of intertribal warfare (isoro), the principle raison d'être for migration and its "blending" consequences.

5. It was standard colonial policy to organize the native population into more permanent settlements; such settlements facilitated, among other things, taxation, census taking, cash cropping, labour recruitment, and native patrol in general (cf. Legge 1956, Mair 1970, Murray 1912).

6. In contrast to Williams' use of the Aiga word, heratu, for the plant emblem, Schwimmer uses the Wasida term, hae.

7. This is not to imply that hae groupings are ambilaterial, and thus ramages (Firth op. cit.: 219). I only adopt the term "ambilaterial" as a means, in the absence of more complete data, to provisionally classify the filiative transmission of hae in practice.

8. I am not challenging the validity of patrilineal descent inasmuch as it designates a category of people; I am challenging the notion that Orokaiva society is patrilineal in its organization into groups.
Footnotes to Chapter One continued:

9. It should be kept in mind that what appears to be choice "in theory" may not be choice "in fact" (Scheffler 1966: 550). The empirical problem here remains one of assessing the ecological and/or political constraints on theoretical choices in regards to hae identification in the process of community formation (see also Sahlins 1965).
Map I

Map of part of the Northern Division of Papua showing tribal divisions of the OROKAIVA

Williams 1930
Chapter Two

The Orokaiva Plant Emblem: Towards an Ideology of Community
Chapter Two

I. Introduction

One of the implications stemming from our analysis in Chapter One is that Orokaiva plant emblems, as symbols of community, do not signify well-defined phenomenal orderings. This is because social identification and affiliation as expressed through hae symbolism is not, pace Schwimmer (1973: 175) "...an automatic result of filiation", but potentially ambiguous. As Burridge observed for the Tangu:

Though the manipulation of people in relation to categories results in temporary ambiguities, individuals have the opportunity to exercise their talents and earn recognition for them. Membership of a formal descent group would impose impossible limitations. (Burridge 1969: 70)

The affiliative ambience of the Orokaiva individual is, like that of the Tangu, one of potential ambiguity. And it is within this ambience of potential ambiguity that the political dynamic of Orokaiva sociality is to be found.

In the first section of this chapter I argue that, if the Orokaiva plant emblem is construed as a symbol of community, and if Orokaiva community is subject to flux as a result of affiliative ambiguity, the structure of this ambiguity can be penetrated through an analysis of the indigenous exegeses associated with hae identification.
I begin my delineation of an Orokaiva 'ideology of community' by first examining the ways in which hae identification is indigenously explained, or rationalized. Reviewing Williams' original material on Orokaiva plant emblems, I suggest that the data presented can be formally divided according to three ordering principles: lineality (hae designates an ancestor or predecessor), territoriality (hae designates a locality), and exchange/commensality (hae designates a big-man or leader). None of these three forms of rationalization are sufficient in themselves for the explanation of community formation among the Orokaiva; rather they are shown to be interrelated.

The form and direction of my analysis of Orokaiva plant emblem rationalizations is derived from McKellin's analysis of Managalase kinship ideology:

Lineality, territoriality, and commensality and exchange are three criteria which compose the Managalase concept of kinship. Criteria of recruitment, group membership, and inheritance are defined by the conjoining of these concepts. The ideological premise of kinship is that kinsmen share ajide [strength] and siru [moisture, fluid or flesh]. The ties of ideology are thus based on the polythetic relations among each of these principles in turn; territoriality becomes lineality through the ties of exchange and commensality with ancestors and predecessors who are also consociates. The tie of siru or ajide is consistent, though its source is different in each domain.

(McKellin 1980: 232)

Following McKellin, I analyse Orokaiva notions of "substance". I argue that the principles of lineality, territoriality and exchange/commensality formally order Orokaiva ideas about the
transmission and sharing of "substance". I then move beyond the data proper to suggest that the Orokaiva themselves may be conceptualizing the sharing of hae in terms of shared "substance".

I therefore forward the proposition that the conjoining of the principles of lineality, territoriality, and exchange/commensality through the Orokaiva notions of how hamo, ahihi, and ivo are shared constitutes an 'ideology of community'. And it is this ideational order, I argue, which informs the process of sociality among the Orokaiva.

II. Social Flux

Historically, the Orokaiva have exhibited a great deal of demographic movement (Chinnery & Beaver 1916), stemming from a combination of inter-tribal warfare, inter- and intra-group conflict, the exigencies of a horticultural economy, and, graphically illustrated by the explosion of Mt. Lamington in 1951 (cf. Belshaw 1951, Keesing 1952, Schwimmer 1969, 1977), natural disasters. From a diachronic perspective, then, Orokaiva sociality can be seen to be characteristically temporal and fluctuating. Similarly, from a synchronic perspective, it is not uncommon to witness within a village the simultaneous operation of both fission and fusion processes in the formation of social groupings (Schwimmer 1972: 14). As a consequence, the categories 'clan', 'sub-clan', 'lineage', etc. do not easily apply to Orokaiva groupings.
The prevalence of social flux in New Guinea societies has made description difficult. By conceptualizing Tairora society "as an organized flow", Watson attempts at a more meaningful explanation of Highland's social systems characteristically termed "loose" or "flexible" (see, for example, Cook 1966, Kaberry 1967, van der Leeden 1960, Watson 1965, Pouwer 1960, 1966a, 1966b, du Toit 1964, for the use of labels "loose" and "flexible").

Focusing on the flux of persons from place to place, and group to group, Watson succinctly asks: "Is the struggle primarily for land or is it for people?" (Watson 1970: 120). Among the Tairora (located in the eastern portion of the Central Highlands), one finds big-men who, in competing for persons, seek to maintain networks large enough to compete in ceremonial exchanges, as well as to defend and/or assert themselves militarily (ibid.: 119). The results are quite heterogeneous groups with respect to any criterion of kinship and/or descent.

Schwimmer argues that the 'struggle for persons', complemented culturally by the availability of potential affiliative options, is an integral aspect of Orokaiva sociality (Schwimmer 1972: 14).

And the entry into this realm of affiliative options?

Here Watson also provides the direction, by asking

...how and why the Tairora manage to be a "kin-oriented" society with a semblance of descent-based grouping: e.g., what is the real emic or semantic component of their place-named groupings that I have herein termed "sib" and "tribe" and have generally identified with descent?

(Watson op. cit.: 119; emphasis mine)
What I am suggesting is that something of the dynamics of affiliative options among the Orokaiva can be understood through an investigation into the "semantic component" of hae in their symbolization of community. In support of this suggestion I turn to further ethnographic data, this time from amongst the neighbouring Koiari—speakers of Oro Province.

Williams observed that, like the Orokaiva, the Koiari of the Sogeri Plateau employ plant emblems (Idi). Idi, like hae, are used in their representative form as marks of identity (to mark passage along a trail, or through someone's land) as well as to identify food displayed for a feast (Williams 1932: 55-6; 1925: 410, 413).

More important, however, is what Williams observed when he inquired of individuals what their Idi were:

...there is no little vagueness regarding the plant emblems, and the plain fact is that many a man is quite unable to name his Idi if you ask him. It is only after thrashing the matter out in full discussion that a group of informants are prepared to give definite answers, and then the doubt remains whether their answers are reliable. Some groups, it would appear, have alternate Idi, for different informants on different occasions have given names which failed to agree, while in other instances two plants were named as alternatives at one and the same time.... The existence of such alternatives may point to minor groups, but on such points I was unable to obtain any satisfaction. (ibid. 1932: 55-56).

Williams concluded from the vagueness with which the Koiari responded to his enquirés that: "The people seem both ignorant
and indifferent regarding their _idi_" (ibid.: 56). Further re-
search among the culturally similar Barai (Barker 1979) however,
leads to quite different conclusions.

In analysing group formation among the Barai, Barker de-
scribes a highly complex and elaborate system of cultural
"idioms of relatedness", one class of which is the plant emblem,
_ani_. Now the _ani_ is a shrub or plant which the Barai (incorrectly)
say only grows on the hunting ground associated with a man, and
is subsequently used by him as a symbol of identity (Barker op.
cit.: 38). But in addition to this: "_Ani_ appears in a number
of forms, as a reflection of recruitment, status, and as a symbol
referring to named social units" (ibid.).

If one looks at the nature of the status rules used as a
rationale for the use of _ani_, one of the first observations is
that they provide for some degree of social maneuvering; they
"...demonstrate the highly flexible attitudes towards the in-
corporation of men" (ibid.: 100).

This "flexible attitude" is reflected in the four different
glosses the Barai give for their principle status rule, _omi ahui_
_ ja ruave_. This statement the Barai glossed as: a) a boy comes
out of his father's line, b) a boy comes out of his father's
body, c) a boy retraces his father's gardens, and d) a boy
receives food from his father (ibid.: 102). In focusing on this
"rule", Barker also discusses the range of meaning that "father"
(omi, which is used interchangeably with asoi, both "demonstrative" forms of "father") has for the Barai:

The man who controls a garden is asoi or omi of that garden. However asoi is also a nettle-leafed shrub which 'stings'. This 'hitting' or 'biting' is a characteristic of the father's control over his land and his children and perhaps over others. The big-man in oratory is forcefully referred to as 'father'.

(ibid.: 100-101)

Finally, and this brings us back to Williams' conclusion that the Koiari are "ignorant and indifferent" concerning their plant emblems, Barker observes the political import of public identification:

...it is not until the issue of membership arises that a named group can be formed. In this way at Thiro are [village] the question of 'which group do you belong to ...' presented the young men with an insoluble problem. It became a matter of which big-man was within earshot of the proceedings. Each big-man was capable of presenting plausible reasons as to why 'X' was an 'A' by manipulating the recruitment status rules.

(ibid.: 139; emphasis mine)

The above observations clearly reveal several points: They highlight the ambiguous membership status of individuals; the creative use of metaphors of identification (for that is how affiliation with a big-man is expressed); the necessity of definitional ambiguity for the political process; the emergent nature of Barai sociality.

I suggest that in their investigations of plant emblems, both Williams (1932) and Barker (1979) observed a similar sort
of phenomenon. Barker's grasp of the political import that a public identification with a specific plant emblem has, is exactly what Williams failed to recognize; yet an identical conclusion can be read from Williams' data.

Among the Buang, we again confront a society which, like the Koiari-speaking (cf. Dutton 1971) groups already discussed, displays a political strategy in the verbalization of identification. Individuals consistently assign themselves, and others, in a highly "variable" fashion, expressing exclusive affiliation with various dgwa (territorially-based groupings), i.e., in one context with 'A', in another context with 'B', and perhaps in yet another context with 'C' (Sankoff 1972: 555):²

It would appear that Buang social organization represents an extreme case of a pattern already well described for New Guinea -- that of a highly flexible social system which permits manipulation by individuals to suit their own ends, and in which individual choice does not upset the system; rather, it is an important part of the system.

(iband.: 560-61)

Placing the manipulation of emic categories of inclusion/exclusion within the social system, rather than seeing such manipulation as deviation from "normal" usage, constitutes an important step towards the analysis of Orokaiva hae in their capacity as symbols of community. Reflected, initially, in the observation that Orokaiva individuals characteristically claim more than one hae, the nature of affiliative choice among the Orokaiva can be further penetrated through an inquiry into the
range of meanings available for the rationalization of hae identification. This is the principal conclusion of this section.

III. Lineality, Territoriality, and Exchange/Commensality

The data presented in this section demonstrates the variable way in which the Orokaiva rationalize their identification with specific plant emblems. This variability is nevertheless subject to certain structural constraints which, I argue, can be formalized according to three interrelated principles: lineality, territoriality, and exchange/commensality.

In delineating these three principles from the data we need to first deal with the assertion, made initially by Williams (1925: 414; 1930: 117) and accepted by Schwimmer (1973: 196), that the hae (ideally) refers only to an ancestor. This interpretation is suspect on a number of counts.

Williams claimed that, throughout the whole of Orokaiva society, people often used the words ahije and evobo when they spoke of their plant emblem (Williams 1930: 112, 117). These two words Williams glossed as "ancestor" (ibid.: 117). The word ahije, in addition to being glossed as "ancestor", is also glossed by Williams as "grandparents (paternal and maternal); grandchildren; descendants; sister's children" (ibid.: 109). The denotative range of ahije is thus far wider than simply "ancestor".

Another qualification of Williams' interpretation is the nature of that interpretation itself. Rohantynskyj, in comparing
Omie plant emblems with Williams' data, makes the point that:

Williams' formulations concerning the functioning of the plant emblem among the Orokaiva groups, careful as they are, remain suspect due to his tendency to explain practices as rude survivals of former pristine forms...

(Rohatynskyj op. cit.: 37; emphasis mine)

Something of this practice is evidenced by Williams' conclusion concerning Orokaiva plant emblem origins:

There is in my mind little doubt as to how the system came into being... The clan's heratu originates from the individual heratu of its leader or ancestor; and the individual heratu is some plant which serves as a token of identity because it bears the name of its owner.

(Williams 1930: 128-29; emphasis mine)

Though providing a great deal of evidence contrary to this conclusion, Williams appears to be suggesting that initially the system of plant emblem classification was far more coherent and logical; a conclusion we may, I believe, safely set aside.

a) Lineality

Below are two examples in which an ancestor is given by the native as the origin of a plant emblem.

(i) ...a man of the Aiga clan Jahari, whose heratu is Saga, declares that Saga was a man of flesh and blood, and gives, with confidence, a genealogy in which he proves him to be his great-grandfather.

(ii) So we find two widely separated branches of the clan Samanahu [original heratu: the tree samana].... Both sections ...told the same tale of Samana. He was their common ancestor... one who, as it chanced, acquired his
name from the fact that he was brought to birth under a samana tree.

(Williams 1925: 416)

Since Williams suggested that instances of this sort "could be multiplied" (ibid.), I designate examples (i) and (ii) as illustrating a genre of native explanation or rationalization from which can be formally delineated the principle lineality. The chief criterion for inclusion in this genre is any indication of genealogically-based connection. I include in this genre the native explanations that 'such-a-hae was my father's', '...my mother's', or any other rationalization involving transmission of identification from the parents' or higher generations.

b) **Territoriality**

Williams also recorded a few rationalizations that ran counter to his stress on the equation of hae with an ancestor.

I list three examples below:

(i) A fugitive section of the Serugahiji clan, making its way northward towards the River Mambara, settled for some time in a place of abundant sago, and thereafter abandoned the original heratu; Tuivira, and adopted Ambe, or sago.

(ii) A clan of the Tain Dawara named Giriri had for its original ancestor, one Bono. But they were constantly using a certain hardwood called Giriri for building, and consequently took this for their heratu and their clan name.

(iii) The Gonini clan of the Tain Daware have for their heratu, Gonini, and occupy four villages. In one of these, Sivariri, there is growing a large tree of the same name, and its inhabitants have taken this species [sivariri] for their heratu.

(ibid. : 416)
The above three examples, I suggest, are representative of a genre of native rationalization which links the identification with a *heratu* or *hae* to a specific locale. Unlike the two examples illustrating the principle of lineality, no ancestor is posited as first acquiring the name -- later to become a *hae* -- by virtue of his or her association (birth, or some incident like the women falling out of a *topu* tree (see Chapter I)) with some tree or plant. The *heratu* appears in this genre to come into being through a corporate acceptance of it.

But such a *heratu*, rationalized by reference to some locale, can surely come to be transmitted to the next generation. And if so, its subsequent rationalization could plausibly involve the principle of lineality, the *heratu* itself being associated with an ancestor. This sort of transformation is in fact implied in example (ii) under *lineality* and reveals an important process: the interlocking of territoriality and lineality.

Identifying the interlocking of these two principles among the Orokaiva is consistent with similar findings elsewhere. De Lepervanche, for example, stressed the territorial basis of alignments and argued that native statements identified by the anthropologist as evidencing "descent" would be better understood as political statements having a territorial basis (de Lepervanche 1967). Strathern, reflecting on the same problem in the analysis of New Guinea Highlands social systems, sums up:

*Given the importance of territoriality and co-residence in the definition of 'operant*
groups'...we should expect to find some sort of locality ideology in the cultural sphere, as well as a descent or kinship ideology. One possibility indeed...would be for a **partial fusion of descent and locality ideology** to develop, which would bring ideology more closely into alignment with transactional patterns.

(Strathern 1973: 26; emphasis mine)

In essence, the "partial fusion of descent and locality ideology" appears to be what is occurring among the Orokaiva in their rationalizations of hae identification. But is this "partial fusion" or interlocking an attempt upon the part of the Orokaiva to bring "ideology" into closer alignment with transactional patterns? Although an interesting question, it nevertheless reflects the problem of disjunction between ideology and practice. Our concerns here, however, are with the principles engaged in the indigenous identification with plant emblems. Towards this end, one final principle needs to be delineated, that of exchange/commensality.

c) **Exchange/Commensality**

Orokaiva notions of exchange are certainly the best documented aspect of their culture, due to Schwimmer's study, *Exchange in the Social Structure of the Orokaiva* (1973). Although impaired by its continuous lapses into the "language of descent", Schwimmer's analysis makes a significant contribution in its focus on exchange as a fundamental principle governing Orokaiva social relations.

Recognizing that the Orokaiva do not form concrete, enduring alignments Schwimmer focused primarily on relationships of trans-
action, rather than on units, demonstrating how elements such as land, taro, coconut and areca serve to mediate these relationships and make them intelligible.

Schwimmer, however, never gave attention to the question of whether exchange as an organizing principle enters in as a conscious rationalization for the sharing of a name, plant emblem or otherwise. Williams' data indicates that there is a correlation between exchange and commensality on the one hand, and corporate identification and affiliation under one name on the other.

...all the underlings of any 'big-man' will be known to others under his name. In the Sangara dialect there is a word tekahoka, of which I do not know the literal meaning, but which appears to stand for a 'following'. When, at a gathering of the clans for war, or for some peaceful ceremony, the several parties make their appearance each following in single file behind its leader, a cry will go up, 'Here come the people, the Tekahoka, of Embuja, of Ehari, of Andari'! --whoever the big-man might be.

(Williams 1930: 103-4)

The Orokaiva use a number of terms to refer to their 'big-men', but two of them have particular relevance here. These terms are embo-javoari and embo-penjavo. Williams glossed embo-javoari as "the man who gives the name". The second name Williams suggests is a contraction of embo-peni-javo, literally "man-big-name": "The implication is that the real chief is the man who gives his name to his followers, i.e., the man by whose name they are collectively known" (ibid.).
Among the Orokaiva, as is the case among the majority of New Guinea societies (cf. Berndt & Lawrence 1971) leadership is built upon networks of exchange/commensal relationships (Schwimmer 1967: 59; 1973: 133). In the absence of a genealogical connection between the big-man and his tekahoka, Williams' data indicates that social identification can be rationalized on the basis of exchange/commensality.

Williams provides another example which makes explicit the link between heratu identification and exchange/commensality.

A clan may discard an old heratu and take the synonymous plant of a new leader. Thus a very old man tells me his heratu was formerly Tumena (a variety of taro), but nowadays it is Bari, because his son Barigi, an ex-sergeant of Native Police (made famous by C.A.W. Monckton) has taken his place as leader of the clan. (ibid.: 123)

The data presented above illustrates, I would argue, a genre of native rationalization from which can be formally delineated the principle exchange/commensality.

***

I have argued for the delineation of three principles -- lineality, territoriality, and exchange/commensality -- from Orokaiva rationalizations of plant emblem identification. In the next section, I argue that the sharing of "substance"
is governed by the operation of these same three principles.

IV. **Lineality, Territoriality, and Exchange/Commensality**

Several analyses of New Guinea social organizations have focused on metaphors of relatedness (e.g. one blood, one semen) derived from native theories of procreation (cf. Barker 1979; McKellin 1980, Rohatynskyj 1978, Strathern 1972, Wagner 1967). The analysis presented in this section focuses primarily on Orokaiva beliefs concerning the sharing of three kinds of "substance", ahihi, hamo, and ivo. Given the limitations of the data, however, a link cannot be properly established to any native theory of procreation.

Melpa food names provide a point of entry. Arising out of the sharing of food, the sharing of that food's name as a reciprocal term of address among the Melpa suggested two questions to Strathern:

*First, what are the Melpa ideas about how food is produced, i.e. what is the substance of food, and, second, how is it that the sharing of food creates a new identity between persons which is similar to the identity of relationship expressed in the use of reciprocal kin terms?*

(Strathern 1977: 504)

One of the conclusions which Strathern arrives at, is that the Melpa equate the sharing of food grown upon ancestral territory with the sharing of "grease" (semen, milk) as a
Source of common substance:

The metaphor of a person as a plant conveys both the sense of origins and being rooted in a particular place, and the sense of drawing sustenance from an [ancestral] place... food is ancestrally provided. In eating it one is simply using external sources of sustenance which are also internally passed down through the bodily 'grease'... of one's parents. (ibid.: 506-7)

Strathern stresses that the Melpa believe their ancestral spirits play an active role by watching over the land and either supporting or diminishing its fertility; food is the substance of ancestors (ibid.: 507).

Salisbury observed a similar complex of ideas among the Siane. Enquiring into Siane ideas concerning ancestral korova or 'spirit', he learnt that this spirit could come from the blood or milk of the mother, the father's semen, food eaten during childhood which contained spirit from the land on which it was grown, from pork, from a name, or from proximity to objects which symbolized korova (Salisbury 1964: 170).

An examination of the Orokaiva data reveals a number of insightful convergences that suggest a complex of ideas among the Orokaiva similar to those mentioned for the Melpa and the Siane: the association of ancestral spirits with garden land, the transmission of spiritual substance through the mediation of both the land, food grown on the land, pork, as well as through the sharing of food.
a) Hamo and Ahihi

Williams recorded that the Orokaiva believed the spirits of the dead (sovai) repaired to specific localities of sovai-ta-na: "...almost every one of the clan of the Aiga could name its own [sovai-ta-na]. They take the form of some well defined feature such as a hill, rock, or pool" (Williams 1930: 280). Schwimmer, on the other hand, records the Orokaiva belief that the spirits of the dead take up residence "...in the garden he or she was cultivating at the time of death" (Schwimmer 1973: 92). Furthermore, these ancestral spirits are believed to play a vital role in the forming of children, what Schwimmer calls the "transmigration of souls".

In the analysis of Orokaiva beliefs concerning ancestral spirits, Schwimmer recounts the following event, which began with the death of a man called Jarata:

Jarata's spirit stayed on the land he had been cultivating at the time of death. Some six years later, Jarata's brother lent this land for a season to Gilford, the husband of a classifactory sister. Gilford's wife became pregnant at the time. When the infant was born it was named by the man who had lent the land, and was given the name of the dead brother Jarata. As far as I understand, the effect of this act of naming was to attach the ahihi of Jarata (1) to the infant, Jarata (2). (ibid.: 93; emphasis mine)

Schwimmer glosses ahihi as "spirit" (ibid.). And, as the above example illustrates, it is the initial association with
the ancestral land that forms the rationale for the infant sharing Jarata(l)'s ahihi. This sharing is also clearly indicated in an Orokaiva post-natal ritual (ibid.: 92), discussed in detail in Chapter Three.

In addition to ahihi, a child also requires hamo, which Schwimmer glosses as "a combination of supernatural protection and nutrient strength" (ibid.: 94), a substance necessary for forming the body. At birth, this hamo, like ahihi, is obtained from an ancestor through the mediation of the land (ibid.).

If we turn to Schwimmer's discussion of the mediative role of taro, we find the argument that taro has all the characteristics of an object of mediation "...in the sense in which the term was used in the discussion on land" (ibid.: 111). The Orokaiva believe that a taro has a spirit life so long as the top is still attached (ibid.: 114). When a man gives raw taro with the tops still on, the Orokaiva believe the "...spirit substance transferred ... is derived from his ancestors who are present in the land and in the tops of the taro (ibid.: 122). If this is the case, then, as with land, the "spirit substance" derived from taro should be that of ahihi, the same spirit substance a child derives from the land on which it was born (ibid.: 92-3).

In addition to ahihi, we also see recorded that taro "...is symbolic of strength; it is preferred to other staples because it is believed to build stronger men" (ibid.: 122).
Thus the giving and sharing of taro appears to also involve the giving and sharing of *hamo*, an extrapolation reinforced by the fact that the taro given is always 'garden grown' (ibid.: 116); that is, grown on ancestral land, and hence imbued with both *ahihi* and *hamo*.

I therefore suggest that the Orokaiva conceptualize relationships established through exchange and commensality in terms of the sharing of *ahihi* and *hamo*.

b) *Ivo*

Turning to the sharing out and eating of pork among the Orokaiva, another "substance" is observed.

The difference between taro and pork is that taro is regarded as a staple food to keep men alive, whereas pork is regarded as a food of special power enabling men to succeed in tasks of great difficulty...

Pork has a special power or *ivo*, (ibid.: 144)

Schwimmer focuses on the Totoima myth as the "charter" for this belief. In this myth, the son of Totoima (a half man/half pig being) cut up his body, and shared out the pieces among men. Totoima's body was eaten, causing men to multiply and fill the land. As a consequence of this act of distribution, Schwimmer concludes that "...*ivo* did not come from the mere eating of the meat, but from the sharing out, followed by the eating" (ibid.). Commensality, then, is also conceptualized in terms of shared *ivo*. 
Coconuts also mediate the sharing of *ivo*:

...the coconut is in general identified with *ivo* communicated by the dead to the living. The coconuts of a dead leader are thought to contain his *ivo* in a form which is communicable, not to his kinsmen to whom these coconuts are taboo, but particularly to his affines...the most crucial communication occurs in the large-scale mortuary feast....

(ibid.: 164-5)

Thus coconuts mediate the sharing of *ivo* in much the same manner as taro in its creation of *hamo* ties. That is, the sharing of *ivo* vis à vis coconuts can be formally ordered according to both the principles of lineality and exchange/commensality.

The analysis of shared "substance" is summarized in figure (a) below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Shared Substances</th>
<th>Territoriality</th>
<th>Lineality</th>
<th>Exchange/commensality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hamo</td>
<td>LAND</td>
<td>TARO</td>
<td>TARO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahihi</td>
<td>LAND</td>
<td>LAND</td>
<td>TARO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivo</td>
<td>COCONUT</td>
<td>PORK, COCONUT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure (a)

Thus far, the emic bases for Orokaiva sociality have been demonstrated to be Orokaiva notions of shared *hamo*, *ahihi*, and/or *ivo*. However, the link has yet to be made between
these substances, and hae or heratu. This link cannot be satisfactorily established empirically from the existing data. Nevertheless, I contend that this link can be at least hypothetically deduced from the data in hand. Since the indigenous references made to ancestry, land, and big-men in the rationalization of hae identification can be formally ordered to yield the three principles of lineality, territoriality, and exchange/commensality, and since these principles can be seen to be emically grounded in the indigenous notions of hamo, ahihi, and ivo, then, by extension, we can hypothesize that the Orokaiva may indeed by conceptualizing the sharing of hae in terms of shared hamo, ahihi, and ivo. I diagram this argument in figure (b) below.
V. Towards an Ideology of Community

The interlocked principles of lineality, territoriality, and exchange/commensality, together with Orokaiva notions of *hamo*, *ahihi*, and *ivo*, constitute, I would argue, the essential core of that Orokaiva idea complex which is manipulated through the tactical employment of *hae* in the creation of Orokaiva community. At the same time, it is these ideational resources which demarcate the boundaries of *hae* identification.

Now, establishing *hae* as a symbol of community required *hae* identification to have moral implications. If the rationalization of *hae* identification is conceptualized emically in terms of shared "substance", then the sharing of "substance" should carry moral implications for the Orokaiva themselves. The following analysis demonstrates that the sharing of *hamo*, *ahihi*, and *ivo* in fact does carry with it certain normative expectations.

Turning first to the mediating role of land, what is observed is that it establishes the potential conjoining of man and spirit, and man and man, in a relationship of moral obligation, one to another. As among the Melpa, Orokaiva spirits of the dead play an active role in looking out for the care of the land. An explanation given Schwimmer for the death of the child Jarata was: "...the mother did not look after the land properly".

The assumption here is that if the garden where the child obtains what we call his soul is well tended, then
the child's body will also grow well....
(\textit{Schwimmer} 1973: 93)

This "intimate connection" between the individual and the spirit of the garden "...endures to some extent throughout life" (ibid.). Thus the "...cultivator works not only to 'survive' but also to repay that ancestor the debt he has incurred by being given a body" (ibid.: 95).\footnote{1}

When the rights to tracts of land are transferred from one to another, an intimate bond is established between the two parties, which appears to be based on the recognition of shared spirit "substance":

\begin{quote}
In the case of land, we have seen that the owner strongly identifies himself with the lineage spirits believed to be resident on the land. The land is part of him, just as his ancestors are a part of him. By transferring the land to another person he causes that other person in turn to identify himself with the land. He is thus magically imbued with the spirit of the donor and (ideally) compelled to behave as though he owed the owner quasi-filial allegiance. (ibid.: 109-10; emphasis mine)
\end{quote}

Ideologically, it is through the sharing of the spiritual substance of the land (in this case, it would seem, \textit{ahihi}) that the two parties are conjoined together in a relationship of moral obligation.

\textit{The role of hae} in symbolizing this sort of moral relationship is clearly seen in the following incident. In 1966-67 some families migrated from Garomi to the neighbouring
village of Sivepe.

One of the men who received a taro garden started using the donor's plant emblem when working in that garden, thus emphasizing the closeness of the bond with the donor's family. [This action was regarded] ...as entirely proper and highly sympathetic behavior, though totally voluntary.

( Ibid.: 102-3; emphasis mine)

We see in this last passage not only the moral aspect of the relationship as symbolized by the identification with the donor's hae, but the tactical aspect of this identification as well, underscored by reference to the voluntariness of the action.

As for establishing that the sharing of "substance" in a relationship based on exchange/commensality results in the creation of moral obligations, we note that "objects", such as taro:

...have a special potency in attracting partners and that this potency is believed to be due to the presence of the donor's spirit in the gift object and the transfer of that spirit to the recipient through the mediation of the object.

( Ibid.: 122)

Ideologically, exchange and commensality result in the mutual sharing of one or the other's "spirit". It would appear that the Orokaiva think about relationships established in this manner in terms of shared "substance". Carrying the reasoning further, if the mediation of taro and pork is identical to that of land, then, ideologically, the exchange/sharing
of these foods must (ideally) "compel" the parties involved
to behave morally one towards another (cf. ibid.: 110).

With respect to exchange/commensality, Williams provides
an insightful characterization of hae usage.

Another man nurses some resentment against
a nearby village. If he were bidden to a
feast there he would go, but with his
heratu in his armllet; and when the wooden
dish of savory taro was placed before him,
he would wave it aside, or lay his heratu
upon the food to show that he could not
accept the hospitality of those who had
wronged him. Then the offender would be
put to shame and punished, and be sorry for
what he had done.

(Williams 1930: 116; emphasis mine)

In the above incident, a man makes his grudge public through
the public display of his hae or heratu, thus communicating
the difference between himself and his hosts, a difference
underscored by his refusal to share in the eating of taro.

A similar incident is recorded in connection with the
sharing of pork:

If a person has broken off social relations
with a close relative in anger, by showing
this relative his plant emblem, then re-
lations can be restored only if the angry
man is persuaded to 'throw his plant emblem
away'. If he does this the person to whom
the plant emblem has been shown will sacrifice
a pig.

(Schwimmer 1973: 146; emphasis
mine)

We see in these last two cases the moral implications of hae
revealed through their employment as symbols expressing the
absence of moral obligation. We see also their tactical em-
ployment, for in both instances the option was there, either
The sharing of the substances hamo, ahihi, and ivo on the one hand, and plant emblems on the other, have both been shown to be formally structured in terms of the three interrelated principles of lineality, territoriality, and exchange/commensality. And since both Orokaiva plant emblems and hamo, ahihi, and ivo are integral to the indigenous rationalization of sociality, I have proposed as a hypothesis the conclusion that native rationalizations of hae identification are emically grounded in the indigenous concepts of hamo, ahihi, and ivo. The resultant complex of ideas I have termed an 'ideology of community' for the Orokaiva.

In Chapter Three I show how this ideational order can be applied to three events -- birth, marriage, and death -- in order to articulate the points at which the ambiguities, options and constraints of Orokaiva social identification and affiliation can occur within the contexts these three events create.
Footnotes to Chapter Two

1. Prior to pacification contact between the Wasida Orokiava and the Managalase appears to have been restricted to fighting (Schwimmer 1973: 123-24).

2. See also Keesing (1968, 1971) for a similar emphasis on the contextual definition of social identity and affiliation.

3. See also Williams (1930: 105) for further examples of this genre of rationalization.

4. Williams also recorded the Aiga terms embo-be, 'a proper man'; and embo-peni, embo-pajirari, embo-paitukairi, and embo-saikabada. These last four terms Williams stated as meaning "no more than 'big or important man'" (1930: 104). Schwimmer found the Wasida using the term keari embo, 'a man of knowledge', or embo dombo keari, 'a man of great knowledge' (1967: 53-4). Rimoldi records the term kiti jigari embo, 'the man who moves first' (1966: 30).

5. Schwimmer (1974) describes an identical system of food names in connection with Orokaiva "friendship", but to make a different point.

6. Schwimmer (1981) equates ahihi with the Aiga term asisi, described by Williams (1928, 1930). Williams' account is consistent with Schwimmer's on this point: both the living and the dead possess asisi or ahihi (see esp. Williams 1930: 260-84). For earlier accounts of Papuan beliefs concerning "soul-substance" see Chinnery 1919 and Rivers 1920.

7. In Chapter Three I qualify the relationship between an individual and a particular ancestor. The point that relations between the living and the dead involve normative expectations is maintained.
Chapter Three

Birth, Marriage, Death: Contexts for Community
Chapter Three

I. Introduction

The vagueness and hesitancy with which Sogeri Koiari and Barai individuals responded to Williams' and Barker's attempts at eliciting their group affiliations, revealed the tactical implications of plant emblem identification. Additionally, Williams' and Barker's observations point to the indigenous importance of context as a variable affecting plant emblem identification.

Taking the position that Orokaiva sociality is emergent requires attention be given to events, and the contexts those events generate. The importance of "context" — by which I mean social interaction informed by a scheme of symbolic classification (cf. Huber 1980: 44; Wagner 1981: 37) — and the perspective that views social groupings emerging out of those contexts, has been well established for Melanesia (cf. Scheffler 1965, Keesing 1968, de Coppett 1981). Keesing juxtaposes an emphasis on the contextual definition of social identity to a notion of society "...composed of groups":

We should concentrate instead on the multiplicity of social categories and roles to which our subjects assign one another, and on the way these are sorted out according to situation and groups are crystallized from social categories.

(Keesing 1968: 84; emphasis mine)
Having taken the Orokaiva plant emblem as the principle symbol of Orokaiva sociality, a symbol of community, what follows is a consideration of the ways in which the Orokaiva might identify themselves with hae within a given context.

Events, social relationships, and their rationalizations might thus be thought of as the "ingredients" of community (Burridge 1979: 134). With respect to the Orokaiva, community becomes most clearly "visible" -- i.e. as a phenomenal ordering -- when events require hae identification and its rationalization to become explicit, and so (temporarily) fixed with respect to affiliation.

Having accomplished a delineation of the complex of ideas associated with the indigenous rationalizations of hae identification, I now turn to an analysis of three events -- birth, marriage, and death -- which generate contexts for community.

The relational ties of shared "substance" associated with the events of birth, marriage, and death, are sorted out from the ethnographic corpus according to the principles of lineality, territoriality and exchange/commensality. The "lines" of relationship (cf. Keil 1980) suggested by these principles are subsequently shown to cross-cut or overlap each other, thus revealing the points at which ambiguities of identification and affiliation might arise for the Orokaiva themselves.
The events of birth, marriage, and death, in requiring hae identification to become visible, temporarily "close" affiliative ambiguities while at the same time providing for social realignments through the manipulation of affiliative options. Importantly, birth, marriage, and death also serve to create new ideological bases for subsequent social alignments and realignments.

* * *

Among the Orokaiva, the living and the dead do not live totally separate lives; nor do the dead live in a totally distinct world of their own. As has already been mentioned, sovai-ta-na are associated with specific geographical locations and features; the Orokaiva frequently have encounters with sovai (Williams 1930: 267-87); the ancestral spirit or "substance" (asisi, or ahihi) plays an essential role in the growth and life of the individual (Schwimmer 1973: 92-5). McKellin makes a similar observation for the Managalase.

Once a person dies he may not be directly considered part of a social group but he remains a member of the Gemeinschaft, the commensal community in which he previously lived and worked. Though he takes up a new residence after death, he still participates in the ongoing relations of the members of his community.

(Mckellin op. cit.: 155)

To consider the contexts for community among the Orokaiva therefore requires a perspective that incorporates two
"planes" of sociality: between the living; between the living and the dead.

The emergence of sociality among the living thus necessarily involves a consideration of the relationship between the living and the dead (cf. de Coppett 1981). This division of sociality into two planes of relationship will be seen as relevant primarily in relation to "birth" and "death". Hae, inasmuch as they symbolize the sharing of "substance" between the living and the dead, highlight the points of intersection between these planes.

II. Birth and Community

A child...cannot be viewed as an independent variable in the formation of his kinship attitudes; he does not simply move through the world cathecting to relatives on his own, but is manipulated here, as in other parts of the world.

(Wagner 1967: 100)

a) Children and Ancestors

Among the Orokaiva, the conception and birth of a child initiates a series of actions or events -- some ritual, others not -- which initiate the social and physical equipping of the individual for entry into community participation. These events are here analyzed in terms of the lineal, territorial, and exchange/commensal components that can be delineated from them. Taken together, these components delimit
the context of birth, revealing the various lines of relationship between the living, and between the living and the dead, within which the newborn is situated.

After birth, the first social alignments to take place are at once lineal and territorial, established through the ritual initiation of a relationship between the child and some deceased.

Transmigration is effected by a ritual performed shortly after the birth of an infant. The parents take the child to the land where the spirit of the deceased is believed to reside. They seek the spirit by placing leaves of a fragrant plant called mo in a creek which runs through the land. When the spirit is thought to have entered the leaves the parents address it thus: 'You are dead now. We shall look after the land and we shall look after the baby so it will become big and strong. Then this child will look after the land'. The wife, in preparation for this rite, has brought the baby to the garden in a string bag, and has also brought a stick. When she arrives in the garden, she places the stick in the ground and hangs the baby in its string bag from the stick. After the ritual by the water, she drops some of the leaves by the stick, then takes the baby, the bag and the rest of the leaves and returns home with her husband. The custom is for the husband to say at night: 'I hear the baby crying'. He is expected to go back to the garden and talk to the baby that is believed to be in the stick, telling it that the parents will now look after it and there is no need to cry. He should then take the stick, with the 'baby' inside it, to his home.

(Schwimmer 1973: 92)

In Chapter Two it was noted that the hamo of the deceased is believed to pass to the child through the mediations of the land (and the digging stick utilized in the ritual
illustrated above). Additionally, the ahihi or asisi of the deceased is acquired by the child through the mediations of the land (and some fragrant leaves called mo). ¹

I have been careful to say "some deceased" because it is not at all clear from the above ritual as described that a genealogical tie between child and deceased is a prerequisite to formally appropriating the deceased's hamo and ahihi. Although the data is scanty, the implication is that, rather than requiring a genealogical tie, the ritual in question provides for future territorial claims on the basis of a created lineal tie of shared ahihi and/or hamo between the child and the deceased associated with that territory.

Schwimmer argues that the ritual in question establishes a relationship based on exchange between the living and the dead.

The land is identified with the ancestor who gave the infant its body. The cultivator works not only to 'survive' but also to repay that ancestor the debt he has incurred by being given a body.

(ibid.: 95; emphasis mine)

But a garden plot is quickly exhausted; eighteen months is the average season of use, followed by four to fifteen years of fallow (Rimoldi 1966: 15-18). Schwimmer himself notes that...

... it may be rightly argued that every couple cultivates, at one time or another, a large number of plots, and that only some of these plots are linked to their cultivators through post-natal rites performed in respect
of themselves or their children. (Schwimmer 1973: 94)

Schwimmer counters this objection by arguing that every garden is associated with sovai to whom someone is always responsible. Ultimate responsibility to ancestral sovai rests with the 'father of the ground', or enda mama, that individual who has the strongest claim to the land (ibid.). If a transfer of use is arranged, the person(s) to whom the use-right is transferred is responsible to the donor for the care of the sovai, which involves making food offerings (ibid.; cf. also Williams 1930: 284). Recall, though, the argument that the individual has a responsibility to that particular ancestral sovai to whom he is linked by ties of shared hamo and ahihi.

Schwimmer's arguments concerning the nature of the relationship between the living and ancestral sovai thus fall short of clearly distinguishing the 'service' owed that deceased with whom one is initially ritually associated, from the 'service' done to a whole host of sovai in the course of one's life.

The interpretation that the 'service' done to sovai constitutes an exchange between the living and the dead, veils further implications of the data. There is an apparent indigenous 'indifference' concerning which sovai food offerings are made to. This 'indifference' suggests that what is perhaps
more important to the Orokaiva is the building up of potentially realizable claims to land (on behalf of one's children through post-natal rites, and on behalf of oneself through 'service' to sovai) which can be indigenously rationalized in terms of a commensally based substance tie, ritually established with the sovai of that land. Involved here would be some knowledge of the names of previous users, whose sovai now inhabited that area. Ritual service to the sovai associated with a territory can thus be seen as providing the ideological underpinnings for future action, e.g. territorial claims.

Having argued for a relationship between the building up of potential claims to land and ritual service to the dead from ego's perspective, we must also consider the potential claims on ego himself.

If ties to land on the basis of a commensal relationship between ego and sovai provide for ego's entry into the arena of competitive production, it is also the case that such associations establish potential claims upon ego when still a child. In the "Jarata" case discussed in Chapter Two, ego (Jarata (2)) was named by his classificatory mother's brother, the brother of the deceased Jarata(1) whose sovai resided upon the land cultivated by Jarata (2)'s parents at the time of ego's birth. Schwimmer (1973) stated that the naming of Jarata (2) by his classificatory mother's brother attached the ahihi of
Jarata(1)'s sovai to the infant Jarata(2). But the actual service to the sovai of Jarata(1) must have fallen to Jarata(2)'s father. Thus,

Jarata's brother, in lending his plot to his classificatory brother-in-law, simultaneously passed on the spirit of his dead brother, resident on that plot.  

(ibid.: 172)

As for the child,

If Jarata(2), a member of the Jegese clan, had survived, he would have been closely identified with the lineage of Seho of which Jarata(1) was a member.  

(ibid.)

The Jarata case, I would argue, reveals the establishment of competing claims upon Jarata(2) by both paternal and maternal kinsmen, and illustrates the political implications that sharing ahihi and hamo with an ancestor has. I say "competing claims", for Jarata(2)'s "identification" with the Seho "lineage" of which Jarata(1) was a member should not be read as constituting automatic recruitment into a group. Rather, the tie of lineality -- shared ahihi and hamo with Jarata(1) -- sets up an affiliative option among others which may or may not be realized in the course of ego's life.

b). The Tato Relationship

A closer examination of Orokaiva customs of naming is warranted. When it appears a child will live, "...some person
is asked to stand godfather or godmother to the child, who is to take his or her name" (Williams 1930: 96). The reciprocal term that designates this relationship is "tato". The name given, however, may be that of someone already dead (ibid.); the Jarata example is a case in point.

Tato do not stand in any specific relationship to each other prior to entering this relationship. Williams noted that, of the tato relationships he recorded, the elder stood to the younger as either ahijé (father's father, mother's father), mama (father's brother), nobo (in general, any maternal male of mother's generation) and simbo (cross-cousins, real or classificatory).

The tato relationship has associated with it a number of mutual obligations.

At the child's birth his tato brings firewood for the comfort of mother and child...Continual presents of food are given, and the elder tato will take an interest in and make a pet of the younger. It appears that it is his special duty to make the perforations in the child's ears and nose. Return presents of food are made by the child's father; and it will stay from time to time in the elder tato's house and give him some assistance in his garden.

(ibid.: 96-7)

In essence, the obligations described above resemble those associated with the avunculate relationship found throughout Papua New Guinea, and bear comparison with a similar relationship found among the Omie.
Among the neighbouring Omie, there exists a relationship paralleling the tato, the ajume. Men generally have as their ajume a maternal relative, though instances where the ajume was a paternal kinsmen were observed (Rohatynskyj op. cit.: 136-37). Like the prestations of food surrounding the tato relationship, the ajume brings fresh meat, fruit, and vegetables to the mother while she is still pregnant. This food is seen as "...directly contributing to the development of the child within her" (ibid.: 139). The various services rendered are looked upon as initiating the elder ajume's claim upon the child, in competition with the claims of the father (ibid.).

Like the elder tato too, the elder ajume names the child at about one year of life. During the Omie naming ceremony, certain "red" foods (bore) are prepared and given by the child's paternal group to the elder ajume and other maternal kin (ibid.: 147). Symbolic of male vitality and "extreme spiritual power", bore is also used in offerings to ancestral spirits (aru'ahe) (ibid.: 166).

Bore then, is by definition a food prepared for the aru'ahe. It must be assumed that the consumption of this dish by living men, the hire [mother's brother] ajume of the boy being named, is on behalf of the spirits that they are in association with i.e., the boy's maternal ancestral spirits. The propitiation of the maternal spirits of the young boy by his father, and the acceptance of the offering by the hire/ajume on behalf of these spirits, signals an agree-
ment to maintain a harmonious relationship between the father, his son and his wife's people both living and dead.

(ibid.: 166-67)

The Orokaiva idea that foods such as taro, coconut and pork are imbued with ancestral substances (ahihi, hamo, ivo) suggests that the exchanges of food between paternal and maternal kinsmen in the context of the tato relationship establishes a set of ties between the living and the dead, which is similar to the Omie case. The Jarata case, however, suggests that the name itself, that is, the bestowal of a name by the senior tato on the child, identifies the latter with the "spirit" of the present, or previous, name-holder.\(^5\)

What is of ultimate concern here are the ways in which the sharing of hae between tato can be rationalized. The data brought forward implies that the sharing of "substance" between the elder and the younger tato can be rationalized either on the basis of exchange/commensality, or on the basis of lineality. These two principles are here intertwined. For if the surrounding prestations provide for a rationalization of hae identification based upon exchange/commensality, the sharing of "substance", in conjunction with a shared name, could provide the basis for rationalizing hae identification in terms of lineality.\(^6\)

Recently, Schwimmer has shown that hae passed down from parents to children have a territorial association.\(^7\) In
connection with territorial ties, the Jarata case raises a relevant question: Is it always necessary for the younger tato to have an existing, or prior, association, through the parents, with a territory to which the elder tato has ties? Such an association in connection with the tato relationship is not recorded by Williams. However, the data does imply the establishment of a tie between the younger tato and the lands of the elder. Williams recorded that the younger tato spends time with the elder tato, helping in his gardens (Williams 1930: 97). The younger tato would likely thus become familiar with the elder tato's territorial claims, and perhaps become acquainted with the knowledge upon which those claims were based. A young man "customarily" spends time with his maternal kin, and while doing so would become acquainted with and use their hae or heratu (ibid.: 114).

The tato relationship thus initiates a series of ties to the child in competition with the claims of filiation. In theory, such a competitive claim could arise whether or not the elder tato stood as a paternal or a maternal kinsmen to the younger.8

In short, as a boy matures and begins to hunt and fish and make his own gardens, rights to hae and claims to territorially based resources on the basis of hae identification will vary according to whether or not his tato is a paternal or a
maternal kinsmen, and whether or not his family of orien-
tation is residing uxorilocally or virilocally.

c) **Lineality, Territoriality, and Exchange/Commensality**

Concerning the ideological bases for hae identifications, the foregoing discussion has indicated the ways in which the created relational ties of "substance" might be rationalized.

Taking the analyses of Orokaiva post-natal rituals and the tato relationship together, a complex configuration of lineal, territorial, and exchange/commensal "lines" of relationship emerges. The relationship between elder and younger tato revealed an intertwining of lineal and exchange/commensal principles: The sharing of hae between tato could be rationalized in terms of either principle.

Additionally, post-natal ritual, ongoing food offerings to sovai, and the prestations surrounding the tato relationship, can be seen to establish commensal ties with ancestors and predecessors who have a territorial association.

Thus the two planes of sociality intersect: Relational ties among the living intersect those relationships that the living have with the dead. As a consequence, through ties of exchange and commensality "...with ancestors and predecessors who are also consociates..." (McKellin op. cit.: 232), not only can ties of territoriality become ties of lin-
eality; it can be equally seen that lineal ties can become territorial ties.

* * *

The social interaction that emerges as a consequence of birth can thus be seen to develop a number of often competing claims upon a boy-child. Conversely, as a young man begins to cultivate, exchange, and consider marriage, the relational ties of "substance" that have "accumulated", together with their optative rationalizations, will provide the ideological underpinnings for hae identifications in subsequent contexts.

III. Marriage and Community

a) The Problem with 'Rules'

Neither Schwimmer (1973) nor Williams (1930) are entirely successful in bringing order to Orokaiva marriage 'rules' and forms. That is to say, their attempts at fitting the data together into a coherent picture have met with limited success. Compounding these problems in conceptualization are certain misrepresentations of Williams' data by Schwimmer; as an entry into Orokaiva marriage I touch this issue first.
According to Schwimmer, Williams

...quotes three conflicting sets of rules, given to him by informants...[1] According to some informants the clan was an exogamous group. [2] According to others, marriage within the clan was permissible, but marriage was prohibited between persons sharing a plant emblem. [3] A third rule quoted to Williams was that marriage was prohibited between du (i.e. real or classificatory siblings) but permitted and common between cross-cousins.

(Schwimmer 1973: 197)

Schwimmer's paraphrase of the first 'rule', that of clan exogamy, is essentially correct. According to Williams:

"Some witnesses have said it is not permissible for a man to marry a woman of his own clan" (Williams 1930: 132).

Schwimmer's paraphrase of the second 'rule', however, constitutes an erroneous picture of Williams' data. First of all, Williams' informants did not combine statements concerning clan endogamy with the prohibition against marriage between those sharing a plant emblem. This prohibition is in fact associated with the statements concerning clan exogamy; it constitutes one of two native explanations given for why a man should not marry a woman of the same clan:

...a witness said that if a man and wife of the same clan happened to quarrel they would both find themselves calling the name of the same heratu...; and the neighbours overhearing would shake their heads or turn up their noses at the idea of marriage between two of the same clan.

(ibid.)

As for the 'rule' of endogamy, this was applied to both clan and village by some informants, without any reference to
It has been stated ... that in a village where there happens to be a number of attractive girls it is a wise thing for the young men of that village to marry them and keep them at home. And this precept was made applicable to the clan itself by some informants....

(Schwimmer 1973: 199)

Schwimmer's paraphrase of the third 'rule' is similarly problematic. Although Williams' informants did express "... repugnance at the suggestion of marriage with a du or 'sister' ..." (ibid), they did not couple this sentiment with any statements concerning marriage between "cross-cousins".

Now "cross-cousin" is acknowledged by Schwimmer (1973: 199) as a summation of the gloss Williams gives for the term simbo: "child of father's sister; children of all tata [father's sister; females of father's clan and generation; maternal uncle's wife]; children of the mother's brother; children of all nobo [mother's brother; males of mother's clan and generation], i.e. cross-cousins (Williams 1930: 109). Schwimmer, however, further errs in stating:

Williams notes that simbo marriages were extremely common in the communities he studied (1930: 132), but does not seem to have been told of the preferential rule [of bilateral cross-cousin marriage]

(Schwimmer 1973: 199)

What in fact Williams did say is this:

Marriage is common between first cousins, though in no recorded instance did these belong to one and the same clan. We may probably assume that marriage of first
cousins within the clan is forbidden, although the general rule of clan exogamy is often disregarded.

(Williams 1930: 132)

Nowhere in the whole chapter on marriage (Chapter IX of Orokaiva Society) does Williams ever mention "simbo marriages" or even "cross-cousins". And although one might infer that Williams meant cross-cousins because he records parallel cousins as having sibling terminology applied to them (ibid.: 109-11), any positive assertion that he did is unsubstantiated conjecture.

b) The Problem of 'Marital Eligibility'

Before considering Williams' data afresh, one further problem (or, rather, set of problems) needs to be considered, the problem of marital eligibility.

Schwimmer, taking Williams as his departure point, develops further the meaning of "simbo".

The primary meaning [of simbo] is not cross-cousin... the two terms do not entirely share the same field of reference. Simbo is an arrangement of marriage. A simbo may be established when a boy's parents bring part of a bridewealth to the parents of the girl they want their son to marry.... In a secondary sense, the word simbo also refers to that category of consanguines with which betrothals of the kind just described can be properly made.

(Schwimmer 1973: 199)
This "category of consanguines" mentioned above is comprised of "...either cross-cousins in the strict sense, or consanguines with whom kinship can be traced neither wholly in the patriline, nor wholly in the matriline" (ibid.). But Schwimmer defines a "consanguine" as traced by the Orokaiva "...through a chain of linkages based on filiation, or a shared clan name, or common birth in a distant village" (ibid.: 203; emphasis mine). One is left to wonder what is being traced by the Orokaiva themselves in their application of "simbo" and 'consanguine' ('kinsman'?).

In another place, Schwimmer states: "The best translation of simbo would probably be: potential preferential marriage partner" (ibid.: 1974: 65). And, from yet another angle; Schwimmer states: "In general ... a simbo is someone with whom one does not share a hae..." (ibid. 1973: 206). And in an article on "friendship", Schwimmer argues that a simbo relationship can be established "...between non-kin who are engaged in an appropriate enterprise" (ibid. 1974: 66).

To sum up Schwimmer's data, simbo can apparently mean:

(a) an arrangement of marriage.
(b) potential, preferential marriage partner.
(c) a category of consanguines (including cross-cousins) with whom betrothals can be properly made.
(d) someone with whom one does not share a common hae.
(e) a non-kin "friend".
In meanings (a), (b), and (c) the relative sex between ego and alter is implied to be opposite, but in meanings (d) and (e) the relative sex between ego and alter is left unmarked, i.e. ego and alter can either be two men, a man and a woman, or two women (cf. ibid. 1974).

Notwithstanding the plethora of meaning Schwimmer attributes to "simbo", he yet attempts to restrict its meaning in distilling a marriage 'rule' on the basis of its use.

...there is an explicit rule of preferential bilateral cross-cousin marriage. All informants were agreed that the most proper marriage partner is one who is addressed as simbo before marriage...

( Ibid. 1973: 199)

Taking the foregoing discussion of simbo together with the evidence of Schwimmer's misrepresentation of Williams' data, it would appear that the presence of an "explicit rule of bilateral cross-cousin marriage" should be viewed with some doubt.

Generalizing from Orokaiva marriage 'rules' as analysed, the delimitation of a "marriageable" category opposed to a "non-marriageable" category appears to be of limited utility in analysing Orokaiva marriage; the Orokaiva themselves do not appear to set clear boundaries in relation to marital eligibility and ineligibility.
Orokaiva Marriage and Hae Identification

Given the present study's emphasis on the Orokaiva plant emblem, the following question suggests itself: To what extent are Orokaiva marriages a reflection of the indigenous manipulation of multiple *hæ* identifications in accordance with the ordering principles of lineality, territoriality, and exchange/commensality?

In addition to his comments concerning *simbo*, Schwimmer makes some statements regarding *hæ* in connection with marriage:

Those who were related to the same distinctive *hæ* would cooperate in marriage and mortuary payments and maintain a strict exogamy rule.

( Ibid.: 196; cf. also 1974: 59)

...the *hæ* occurs prominently in Orokaiva marriage rules with regard to incest and exogamy.

(Ibid. 1973: 197)

A rule that was expressed to me often and forcibly was that people should not marry if they share a paternal or maternal *hæ*.... If two people are identified with a plant in this way they are siblings.

(Ibid.: 206)

These passages indicate that (a) *hæ* are employed to differentiate the 'marriageable' from the 'non-marriageable' and (b) *hæ* groups emerge in the context of marriage as wife-givers in opposition to wife-takers for the purposes of exchange. There are other issues here, e.g. Orokaiva notions of "siblingship", but for now I would like to focus on the oppositions wife-giver/wife-taker and marriageable/ non-
marriageable.

A return to Williams' data concerning clan exogamy is warranted. Below are the two native explanations given for why intra-clan marriage should be avoided.

(a) If a girl married a man of her own clan, where, it was asked, would the pay or brideprice come from?

(b) ...a witness said that if a man and wife of the same clan happened to quarrel they would both find themselves calling the name of the same heratu...

(Williams op. cit.: 131)

If those sharing a hae co-operate to make bridewealth payments, as Schwimmer suggests they do, then we can see how both rationalizations might be based on the same assumption, i.e. girl and man, man and wife, would share a common plant emblem.

Nevertheless, Williams found clan endogamy to be quite prevalent. Two such marriages, recorded by Williams, are presented below.
Williams discovered a series of classificatory 'transformations' accompanying the above two marriages:

Tangoro called Kiriga mama [F, FB, men of F's clan and generation] until the latter married Tangoro's sister, when he called him nabori [sister's husband; an affinal term]. Now Tangoro has married Kiriga's daughter and therefore calls him atova [wife's father]. It will be noted that the wives are of the same clan as their husbands.

(Williams 1930: 132)

Williams states that the above two marriages "...were not regarded with any disapproval" (ibid.). Why not?

By way of argument, we can begin with the hypothesis that there is an underlying consistency to Orokaiva statements concerning 'clan' exogamy, and the endogamous marriages recorded above. Perhaps the above two marriages complied with the above two statements: (a) there was someone to pay the brideprice, and (b) husband and wife did not have any heratu in common. Given multiple hae identification, the attainment of both these conditions appears plausible. That these two marriages occurred between individuals recognizing the same 'clan name' and an associated heratu does not, moreover, necessarily deter from this suggestion. If Orokaiva communities emerge around a big-man, a embo-avoari -- "the man who gives the name" (ibid.: 104) -- under his principal hae, this is not to say that the hae identifications of the constituent members of that collectivity are negated.
In short, what might have occurred in the above two marriages is a 'realignment' of hae identifications, such that wife-givers could oppose wife-takers for the purposes of exchange.

The above interpretation would be consistent with the findings of McKellin for the Managalase. Here the agan

...is the basic social unit of exchange. The mixed criteria of lineality, territoriality, and exchange/commensality join to define the agan in feasting situations, either as part of the productive feasts of the agan, the maturity feasts or the large exchanges given for affines. In each of these contexts the identity of the agan is determined by the composition of the opposing agan; i.e. wife-givers--and wife takers. Exchange, as a defining principle, does not produce a neat set of groups in opposition. This results from the potential dual affiliation of an individual to the agan(s) of either parent.

(McKellin 1980: 238-39)

Marriage within the Managalase agan is considered "disruptive and dangerous":

Not only do the two risk death from the re-joining of siru [moisture, flesh] and ajide [strength, power] established through lineal or territorial relations, their marriage forces co-operating members of an agan to become affines with exchange rather than commensal relations.

(ibid.: 211)

Nevertheless, marriages within an agan do occur (ibid.: 214); and these 'intra-agan' marriages are accom through a 'readjustment' of plant emblems or aza (ibid.).
McKellin's illustration of what such a 'readjustment' looks like is given below.

A, B, C, D, E, F, and G represent grandparental aza (cf. ibid.: 237). The above example illustrates the dropping of the girl's paternal affiliations; the bridewealth is then paid to a representative of the girl's maternal affiliations, i.e. a mother's brother (ibid.: 214). Thus AB and AE avoid being opposed as wife-giver to wife-taker.

Williams recorded another accepted Orokaiva marriage that resembles the preceding Managalase 'problem'.
Williams writes:

In this case Kotutu and Haremi are bitepemi [elder brother; all males of the speaker's clan and generation who are senior to him] and biteambo [younger brother; all males of speaker's clan and generation who are younger to him] to one another, and Hotata is iai [daughter] to her husband.

(Williams 1930: 132)

The Managalase processes of social realignment -- whereby individuals become 'marriageable' or, for that matter, 'non-marriageable' -- suggest that what needs to be investigated is whether or not the Orokaiva do manipulate hae identification in relation to marriage.

If the Orokaiva do manipulate hae for the purpose of creating marital eligibility or ineligibility, the problem then becomes one of determining the degree to which this manipulation stems from the strategic exploitation of lineal, territorial, and exchange/commensal 'lines' of shared ahihi, hamo and/or ivo.
d) **Lineality, Territoriality, and Exchange/Commensality**

The preceding discussion suggests two possible configurations of lineal, territorial, and exchange/commensal ties for the context of marriage.

In considering the examples of Orokaiva 'intra-clan' marriage, one of the major implications is that exchange as an organizing principle will oppose ties of lineality and territoriality in the opposition of wife-givers to wife-takers, in much the same way as it can for the Managalase (McKellin op. cit.: 238-39).

At another level, the individual's potential dual affiliation with maternal and paternal kinsmen *vis-à-vis* maternal and paternal *hae*, suggests that exchange may serve to reinforce the "intersection" (cf. Wagner 1967, 1969) of lineal and/or territorial ties (through either bride or groom) with ties of commensality. That is, since both bride and groom potentially share *hae* with both their maternal and paternal kinsmen (see Chapter Two), affines who in other contexts may identify with different *hae* may choose (if the choice is there) to identify with a common *hae* in order to stand as either wife-givers or wife-takers.

**IV \ Death and Community**

Although there is some data that would suggest mortuary activities might be on the wane (Crocombe 1967), Schwimmer
witnessed, but did not describe, a quite sizable mortuary feast in 1967 (Schwimmer 1973: 164). The only detailed account of Orokaiva mortuary activities is Williams' (1930). These proceedings Williams divided into five "stages".

(1) **First come the ceremonies of actual burial which are followed by the widow's seclusion...**

(2) **The widow emerges from her seclusion and assumes the jacket which is the special sign of mourning...** [There occurs at this time a feast, called *pusu-ijuka*]

(3) **The widow discards her mourning jacket, and the other mourners give up the voluntary taboos they have undergone...** After a protracted general taboo on the food supplies, there follows,

(4) **An important ceremonial feast and dance, accompanied among the northern tribes by a dramatic performance.**

(5) **The last of the mortuary ceremonies is the ritual disposal of the paraphernalia of this dance and drama....**

(Williams 1930: 210; emphasis mine)

Here death initiates a series of contexts in which relations between the living and the dead are very much to the fore. It will therefore be argued that death provides for the intersection of both planes of sociality (the living; the living and the dead) which articulate the contexts out of which may crystallize particular orderings of people sharing a hae.

Among the Orokaiva, death is recognized by the cessation of breathing. When a man dies, the **sovai** that he becomes is believed to hover nearby and lurk about the village (ibid.: 269). These **sovai** can take on various forms, such as a cuscus, bird, pig, and so on (ibid.: 270).
The mourning that follows death is, in the words of Williams, "exuberantly" conducted: The corpse is embraced and people jostle each other to be near it; men and women fling themselves about and go into shaking fits in their grief; bits of glass or knives are taken up by some of the mourners, who cut and gash themselves while others will chew poisonous roots, or beat themselves with clubs, or, occasionally, attempt (and sometimes accomplish) suicide in their grief (ibid.: 213-14).

When the corpse is ready to be buried an "elderly man" stands over it and makes some sort of eulogy. Williams provides us with the "essence" of one these eulogies:

'Go now to a good place, not an evil one; go to the road of sunshine, not to the road of the rains; go where there are neither mosquitoes nor march-flies, but where there are pigs in plenty and taro in plenty. Send us pigs and send us taro, and we shall make a feast in your honour, and payment to those who have mourned for you.

(ibid.: 214-15; emphasis mine)

The feasting that follows has in part the purpose of placating the sovai; additionally, small platforms (harau) are built, upon which small offerings of taro, areca nut, tobacco, and other foods are placed for the sovai (ibid.: 284-85; see also the above discussion of food offerings in connection with birth). In the above 'address' the deceased
is invoked as one who helps, sending taro and pigs, thus the living and the dead co-operate. The relationship between the living and the dead is, then, indigenously acknowledged as more than a lineal tie, it is also a relationship of exchange and commensality (cf. McKellin op. cit.: 155-56), a point already touched upon in the above discussion of birth and community.

a) The Pusu-Ijuka and the Naterari Feast

As Williams' summary (see above) shows, there are two principal feasts initiated by death. Some months after the pusu-i\(\text{\textit{\textcolor{red}{j}}\text{\textit{\textcolor{red}{u}}}}\)uka (described below), a "protracted general taboo" on food supplies is taken up. This taboo is marked by the public display of a carved post or naterari, which represents the deceased's plant emblem. (Williams 1925: 412-14; 1930: 225-29).

The pus\(\text{\textit{\textcolor{red}{s}}\text{\textit{\textcolor{red}{i}}}}\)ijuka is a feast marking the end of the widow's (or widower's) seclusion. The name "pusi-ijuka" derives from the mourners' custom of smearing themselves with mud, from which they got the name pusu embo, or 'muddy-men' (ibid. 1930: 211).

The feast on this occasion is called pusu-i\(\text{\textit{\textcolor{red}{j}}\text{\textit{\textcolor{red}{u}}}}\)uka, lit. 'the counting of the mud', i.e. the reckoning by which the pusu-embo...are paid for their efforts at the funeral. The people of the deceased husband provide the bulk of the provisions for this feast, but they are assisted by the people of the widow. All
the mourners who paid the deceased the final compliment of bedaubing themselves with mud, of wailing, or of digging his grave, are entitled to receive their 'payment'; but relatives on both husband's and wife's side will contribute.

(ibid.: 218; emphasis mine)

We see, then, that both the deceased's consanguines and affines make payment to the *pusu embo*. But what is the relationship of the *pusu embo* to the deceased? Here we have little to go by. Williams recorded that, at the burial of a woman, she stood in the relationships of *aja* (mother, mother's sister, all females of mother's clan and generation; elder woman in general), *tata* (father's sister, female of father's clan and generation; maternal uncle's wife), *imboti* (wife's mother; female of the preceding generation within the wife's clan; wife's father's sister), *du*, and *hovatu* (wife's sister; female of wife's clan and generation; brother's wife or female of her clan and generation) to the young men who acted as gravediggers, "...and they came from six different villages" (ibid.: 214).

Clearly, both the deceased's consanguines and affines also take part in the mourning proceedings as *pusu embo*, and so stand as recipients at the *pusu-ijuka*.

There is another level of exchange which also occurs at this time:
Apart, however, from this paying of the nondescript body of mourners to which both groups contribute, it is evident that on the occasion of the gorukari [the coming out of seclusion] the people of the deceased husband make some payment of food to those of the widow.

( Ibid.: 218-19; emphasis mine)

Two levels of prestation are therefore associated with the pusu ijuka: Payment by the "people" of the widow(er) and the deceased to the pusu embo, and by the deceased's "people" to his or her affines.

Williams provides us with much less detail concerning the feast associated with the naterari post, other than to say that the food taboo is imposed upon the "village", and especially on the coconuts (Ibid.: 226). Schwimmer, somewhat more specific, states that at this mortuary feast coconuts "...are the principal object of mediation between the plant emblem group of the deceased and the village which has provided services to that deceased at the time of death" (Schwimmer 1973: 164; emphasis mine). Further along, however, Schwimmer states that the recipients of the mortuary coconuts are the deceased's affines (Ibid.).

It can be seen how Schwimmer's account of the naterari feast parallels Williams' account of the pusu-ijuka: Both accounts generally indicate two levels of exchange:
A (a) Schwimmer: hae group → 'those who provided services' i.e. mourners.

(b) Williams: deceased & → mourners (pusu embo)
  widow's group

B (a) Schwimmer: deceased's → affines
  "kinsmen"

(b) Williams: deceased's → affines
  "people"

figure (a)

Focusing on the first exchange, A, I would like to suggest the following: The people of both the deceased and the widow(er) who contribute to the 'payment' of the pusu embo, or those who provided 'services', constitute a hae community that has "crystallized" out of the mortuary context. It may be that those who identified with the deceased's hae when he was living join in contributing their coconuts and other sorts of food to the feast. Then again, given the ego-centered nature of hae groupings, and the concomitant multiplicity of hae identifications an individual may have, what may be occurring is the identification of the deceased with a hae community which has desired to number the deceased among them. In either case there appears to be an initial ambiguity as to who will identify with the deceased.

The consanguineal and affinal relations of the deceased who make payment to the pusu embo thus constitute an emergent community in contrast to the pusu embo. Within the context of death this "nondescript" (ibid.: 218) group of
mourners acts as a social catalyst in the crystalization of a community: Who will pay the mourners?

Turning to exchange B, between the deceased's "kinsmen" or "people" and the deceased's affines, the nature of the relationship between the deceased -- now a sovai possessing asisi or ahihi -- and the living, is argued by Schwimmer to be symbolically mediated by the coconuts given at a mortuary feast.

The coconuts of a dead leader are thought to contain his iwo in a form which is communicable, not to his kinsmen to whom these coconuts are taboo, but particularly to his affines. (Schwimmer 1973: 164)

Concerning the question 'whose coconuts?', Williams' account states that the naterari taboo is placed on the village's coconuts (Williams 1930: 206). Again, I would argue that those who identify with the naterari, which represents the deceased's hae (or perhaps a hae identified with the deceased), are the contributors to this feast. So, inasmuch as the naterari taboo is recognized, the coconuts donated under this taboo can indeed be thought of as, in the above case, the "leader's".

Now, the iwo of the deceased, according to Schwimmer's account, comes to be shared by the deceased's "affines". but at the same time those who recognized the naterari taboo identified with the deceased. The implication is that, through the exchange (B) the naterari donors ("consanguines"?)
establish an exchange/commensal tie of shared *ivo* with the *naterari* recipients ("affines").

b) **Summary**

Death among the Orokaiva initiates a series of events two of which are the *pusu-ijuka* and the *naterari* feasts. Both these events generate contexts for community, contexts for the emergence of definite *hae* groupings.

Both the *pusu-ijuka* and the *naterari* feasts reveal two levels of exchange. At the first level, the deceased's "people" and the widow(er)'s "people" conjoin to identify with the deceased by cooperating in the payment of the mourners, or *pusu embo*. At the second level, exchange B, the deceased's "people" and the widow(er)'s "people" appear differentiated, in that the exchange opposes them. At the same time, however, the deceased's affines and consanguines create relational ties of shared *ivo*. By both sharing *ivo* with the deceased, the donors and recipients participating in exchange B thus (in theory) establish an exchange/commensal basis for community in the future, while differentiating themselves in the present.

The two levels of exchange that underlie the *pusu-ijuka* and the *naterari* feast may be seen as the expression of an essential tension inherent in the emergence of community. As a result of death, as with birth and marriage, ambiguities
are required to be (at least temporarily) resolved. To join the ranks of the pusu embo or claim hae identification with the deceased, to identify with the deceased's, or with the widow(er)'s, "people", these are the principle choices that come to the fore. And the hae groupings that emerge reveal the decisions made. Yet, in the final feast given (the naterari), the ivo that is shared between the living, as well as between the living and the dead, serves to open the ambiguities again, and invite new social alignments.

Although the associated ties of lineality and territoriality can only be speculated upon in this context, the intersection of both planes of sociality with respect to shared ivo suggests a complex configuration of lineal, territorial, and exchange/commensal "lines" similar to that delineated from the context of birth.

* * * *

In generating a context for community, a death draws closer, and renews the bonds between, the living and the dead. During mortuary rituals the deceased (sovai) are called upon to witness the proceedings; offerings of food to the sovai are made; and in the associated dances and dramas sovai are hailed to attend and be present while sovai are impersonated (Williams 1930: 230-59). The hae groupings that therefore emerge, become consociates with the dead
through ties of lineality and exchange/commensality, each hae grouping forming with the dead "...one communal Gemein-
schaft" (McKellin op. cit.: 156).
Footnotes to Chapter Three

1. The presence of water in Schwimmer's description seems assumed, and thus problematic if the description is taken to be representative of this sort of ritual. Williams records a number of soval habitations as being streams or pools, but water is not the only habitation of soval (Williams 1930: 265-87).

2. Traditionally, an Orokaiva might have three types of names: (a) a nick-name or "small name" (javo isapa); (b) the name of a slain victim of murder, either bestowed or acquired; (c) a "name proper" (javo be), which is that of a person's tato (cf. Schwimmer 1973: 78; Williams 1930: 97, 175-77). It is this last name, the javo be, and the relationships it represents that is of interest here.

3. The analysis deals only with the male tato relationship, as this is the relationship primarily discussed by Williams and, inasmuch as the Jarata case is a tato relationship, by Schwimmer.

4. The name given is not the ajume's, but some other. Rohatynskyj's analysis suggests that what is important is not the name itself so much as the relationship that name is understood to signify. The Orokaiva material, however, indicates that the javo be has itself a territorial association.

5. Significantly, the Omie word aru'ahe, in addition to being glossed "spirit of the dead", is also glossed "spirit of the living individual" (Rohatynskyj op. cit.: 211). Both Orokaiva and Omie belief systems, then, contain the notion that both the living and the dead have some sort of spirit "substance" (asisi and aru'ahe respectively).

6. This would be especially relevant if the tato was established between a child and an ancestor, vis-à-vis the sharing of that ancestor's name (Williams 1930: 96).

7. Schwimmer records that when a boy can walk his parents take him to the land to which they have claims (gardening claims as well as claims to hunt and fish). There for the first time the child is shown the hae associated with that land (Schwimmer 1981: ms).
Footnotes to Chapter Three (cont'd)

8. Rohatynskyj observes that, where the ajume is a paternal kinsmen, "...it is usually the result of a close marriage or poor affinal relations" (Rohatynskyj op. cit.: 178). Whether or not this is the case among the Orokaiva remains an ethnographic question.

9. Now, one cannot marry both cross-cousins, so the use of "bilateral" in this context is itself confusing. What Schwimmer was probably trying to say is that either a matrilateral or a patrilateral cross-cousin is a preferred marriage partner. "Ambilateral" would in this case be more accurate than "bilateral".

10. The importance of siblingship as an organizational mode in New Guinea societies (as well as other Oceanic societies, cf. Marshall (ed) 1981) is now axiomatic (cf. Burridge 1959, 1969, Kelly 1977). Of siblingship among the Orokaiva, however, almost nothing is known. That the Orokaiva apparently think of siblings as sharing hae (Schwimmer 1973: 206) and simbo as not (ibid.) leaves a number of unanswered questions, e.g.: If a father and his son -- or for that matter any set of individuals spanning more than one generation -- share hae, can they then be thought of as siblings? Can (and do) they use sibling terminology? Besides the "sibling" and simbo categories, do hae enter in as determinants of other kin categories?

11. As it now must be, though prior to pacification a practice general to the Northern District was the construction of a dripping pit, which may or may not have been followed by a burial of the remains (cf. McKellin 1980). Burial is now done outside of the village, but during Williams' stay the Orokaiva were still burying the corpse beneath their houses, as well as 'hanging them out to dry', despite administrative protests (cf. Williams 1930: Plates XXVII, XXVIII).

12. I assume the mortuary ceremonies given for a woman involve social alignments not qualitatively different from those associated with a deceased male. The intensity of the mourning is identical (Williams 1930: 214); and widowers go into seclusion as well (ibid.: 217).

13. In the light of previous discussion, I recognize this category as an ambiguous one.
Chapter Four

Summary and Conclusions
I. **Summary**

In Chapter One the principal problem addressed by this thesis was laid out: How can we best conceptualize and subsequently analyze Orokaiva sociality? Four 'paradigms of order' were considered, Crocombe & Hogbin's, Rimoldi's, Williams' and Schwimmer's. In each case, there was revealed a disjunction between what has been identified as patrilineal descent on the one hand, and the actual organization of Orokaiva society into 'groups' ("clan", "clan-branch", "lineage", "sub-lineage") on the other. This disjunction was shown to be most apparent in relation to the sharing of a common name, primarily a plant emblem or hae name.

Since plant emblems or hae appeared to play a role in demarcating the 'group' at each identified level of inclusion, the following proposition suggested itself: All Orokaiva groupings are plant emblem groupings. If we accept this proposition, I argued, it follows that an analysis of this central Orokaiva symbol of sociality will provide an entry into the ideological components of Orokaiva sociality relevant to Orokaiva group formation generally.

Having encountered with each 'paradigm of order' a general disagreement as to what the actual alignments are, adopting the above proposition allowed the analysis to jump out of the ideology/practice disjunction and move towards a consideration of the meanings attached to the sharing of hae.
as such. This move was furthered by the conclusion that Orokaiva plant emblems do not properly constitute idioms of descent; plant emblem groups, therefore, should not be thought of as descent groups.

The problem of Orokaiva sociality came to this: If the Orokaiva employ plant emblems in symbolizing their corporateness and sociality, and if this corporateness cannot be adequately accounted for in terms of the orderings "clan", "lineage", and so on, what model will?

Disassociating hae or heratu, and any groupings that share hae from the 'problematic' of descent opened the way for a closer analysis of the social implications sharing a hae has among the Orokaiva. The moral content of hae symbolism was subsequently delineated, while the nature of hae identification itself -- revealed most clearly in instances of plural hae identification and the invention of personal hae -- suggested a corresponding tactical component.

In constructing a paradigm that would begin with the Orokaiva plant emblem, and articulate the dynamic and fluctuating nature of Orokaiva sociality in terms of plant emblem identification, I turned to the concept of community.

In both the Introduction and Chapter One I developed the notion of community as a particular kind of process. One of 'tension and conflict', this process involves a 'to and from' movement between two poles of sociality: A shared
quality or state of being -- that is, a sense of something shared -- on the one hand, and the realization of that "consciousness of kind" in some sort of phenomenal ordering, on the other.

As a paradigm that could begin with the Orokaiva plant emblem, the concept of "community" as developed was found to be particularly apt. By having both moral and tactical meaning, hae or heratu as symbols of community reflected the tension contained in the process of community itself: The presence of both moral and tactical meaning indicated the potential for 'tension and conflict' -- an uncertainty -- associated with hae identification in the formation of phenomenal orderings.

In Chapter Two I explored the bases for hae identification, with a view towards understanding something of the indigenous ambiguities and options of Orokaiva sociality. I began by arguing that the fluctuating nature of Orokaiva sociality indicates the potential for ambiguity and optation with respect to affiliation. Moreover, potential ambiguity and optation was argued to be, not a cultural aberration, but integral to the process of Orokaiva sociality.

Since hae or heratu appeared to be the central symbol of Orokaiva sociality, the principal symbol whereby social collectives are differentiated and individuals are collectivized, focusing on the ways in which hae identifications
are rationalized revealed an important complex of inter-related ideas. I designated this idea complex an 'ideology of community'. And it was this 'ideology of community' that revealed something of the structure of Orokaiva affiliative ambiguities and options.

I showed that there are three ordering components or principles -- lineality, territoriality, and exchange/commensality -- which are interrelated in a variety of ways. Though appearing to stand together by virtue of the fact that each is delineated from a range of indigenous rationalizations given for hae identification, these three structuring principles were shown to be further linked through a connection with Orokaiva notions of "substance" -- hamo, ahihi, and ivo -- and the principal elements -- land, taro, coconuts, and pork -- which mediate the sharing of those "substances". At the emic level, the sharing of hae appeared to correspond to Orokaiva notions of shared "substance".

In Chapter Three, I turned to examine some of the contexts for community generated by the events of birth, marriage, and death. These events, I argued, initiate the emergence of explicit hae groupings, or communities. Social interaction -- between the living, and between the living and the dead -- generated by birth, marriage, and death, was analyzed in order to delineate the most evident configurations of lineal, territorial, and exchange/commensal ties of "substance" associated with each event. Following from that
idea complex termed an 'ideology of community', these configurations represented the cultural parameters that shape and constrain the social alignments emerging as hae groupings in each context.

The birth of a child was shown to initiate a series of contexts serving to culturally equip that child with a network of "substance" ties. These ties I argued, provide the ideological basis for subsequent social claims upon, and social claims by ego. In the process of culturally equipping the child, hae identifications and affiliations should thus come to the fore.

At birth, the initial social alignments of a child were shown to be lineally and territorially established with the parents, as well as with some ancestor or predecessor. That is, apart from ties of filiation, post-natal ritual provided for future territorial and/or affiliative claims by creating a lineal tie of ahihi and/or hamo between the child and some territorially-associated sovai.

Birth was shown to further initiate an ongoing ritual 'service' (performed either on behalf of one's children, or on behalf of oneself) of food offerings to sovai. These ritual food offerings, together with the prestations surrounding the tato relationship, represented the establishment of exchange and commensal ties between the living and the dead. I therefore argued that the intersection of relational ties
among the living with those relationships that the living have with the dead, result in a complex configuration of lineality, territoriality, and exchange/commensality: Through ties of exchange and commensality with the dead, "substance" ties of lineality and territoriality intersect in such a way that a lineal tie can become a territorial tie, and vice versa.

Orokaiva behavior in relation to marriage can be conveniently summed up in the word "variable". Both Williams (1930) and Schwimmer (1973) attempt a delineation of the 'rules' of Orokaiva marriage practices. But neither analyst moves beyond the delineation of marriage 'tendencies'.

In order to penetrate the ambiguities and options associated with Orokaiva marriage, I began by correcting Schwimmer's more serious misrepresentations of Williams' data. Through a critical examination of Schwimmer's data on the meaning of simbo, I questioned Schwimmer's assertion of the presence of "an explicit rule of preferential bilateral cross-cousin marriage", and I argued against any attempt at delineating clear-cut categories of "marriage-able" and "non-marriage-able" persons.

I next considered the degree to which the 'ideology of community' informs the whole question of marital eligibility/inelegibility, and the emergence of hae groupings opposed as wife-givers to wife-takers. Data was brought to-
gether that suggested Orokaiva marriage can be better understood through an enquiry into the strategic manipulations of hae or heratu.

Two principal configurations suggested themselves; that, in the context generated by marriage, exchange as an ordering principle might (a) oppose ties of lineality and territoriality in the opposition of wife-givers to wife-takers, or, at another level, (b) reinforce the "intersection" of lineal and/or territorial ties of "substance" (through either bride or groom) with ties of commensality.

Two contexts which a death generates among the Orokaiva are the pusu-ijuka and the naterari feasts. I showed how both feasts parallel each other in regards to two levels of exchange: (a) the "people" of the deceased conjoin with the "people" of the widow(er) to make prestations to the mourners or pusu-embo; (b) the deceased's "kinsmen" or "people" make prestations to the deceased's "affines". Both levels of exchange, I argued, generate a context from which crystallizes a community making identification with the deceased, or identifying the deceased with them.

Two different, though certainly not discrete, hae groupings were therefore shown to emerge during both the pušu-ijuka and the naterari feasts. Conjoined in making prestations to the mourners, the "people" of the deceased
subsequently differentiated themselves from the deceased's "affines" at the next level of exchange, while at the same time creating ties of shared ivo between the two parties, and between themselves and the deceased.

Thus the events of birth, marriage, and death serve to "close" affiliative ambiguities by requiring hae identifications to become visible; at the same time, new ties of "substance" are created, complicating old ties.

Discerning a social process that sees the events of birth, marriage, and death "closing" affiliative ambiguities while simultaneously creating the conditions for subsequent ambiguity and hae realignment, supports the contention that Orokaiva sociality is best viewed as contextually emergent. Moreover, the notion of "community" that was developed in Chapter One, together with the 'ideology of community' delineated in Chapter Two, has been shown in Chapter Three to provide further insight into the affiliative constraints and flexibilities of Orokaiva social organization.

II: Conclusion

I conclude this chapter, and thesis, by considering one final implication of the Orokaiva system of plant emblem classification: The question of ontology and the category of
"person" in relation to that of "community".

Lévi-Strauss, in differentiating "totemism" from the plane of "religion", quotes approvingly Tylor's observation that the relationship between totemism and religion "...has been exaggerated out of proportion to its real theological magnitude" (Tylor 1899: 144, quoted in Lévi-Strauss 1963: 13). Burridge notes, however, that it is "...just this idea of a specific organizational matrix imprisoning a particular mode of thought that has kept the problem alive" (Burridge 1973a: 179). Burridge sees in "totemism" a problem of "disentangling"

(a) the phenomena of organization; (b) the principles or sets of relations which, lying behind the phenomena, form a system; and (c) an ontology which must in some way relate those principles. (ibid.; emphasis mine)

Notwithstanding the thinness of the data on Orokaiva notions of "substances", such as hamo, ahihi, and ivo, it is precisely this data which indicates an ontology (though not systematized as such), a set of ideas having to do with the nature of being (cf. Burridge 1973b), underlying hae identification.

Now, this thesis has mainly considered shared "substance" as a basis for sharing hae. But it is also the case that the Orokaiva frequently "invent" personal hae for themselves (Williams 1925: 421; 1930: 124-5). This observation would seem to imply that Orokaiva notions of "substance", while culturally constituting together with hae a cultural concept of "community", at the same time point
to a cultural concept of the "person".

I do not wish to suggest that plant emblems symbolize any more than an aspect of "the person" among the Orokaiva: personal names (cf. fn. 2, Ch. II), for example, may also have some bearing here (cf. Geertz 1977). On the other hand, the observation that hae operate to symbolize both "person" and "community" is, I would argue, consistent with -- indeed, is a reflection of -- the general form of Orokaiva life.

Read's enquiry into the concept of the "person" among the Gahuku-Gama of the Eastern Highlands, produced this assessment:

...the ground of obligation is not conceived to lie in human nature as such, either, that is, in the nature of the agent himself or in the nature of other men as men; it resides, rather, in the nature of the ties which link them socially to one another ...there is no explicit separation of moral categories from the social context: the moral order and the social order are not differentiated conceptually.

(Read 1955: 281; emphasis mine)

The Gahuku-Gama, then, fail to "...distinguish an ethical category of the person"; that is, they do not grant the person an intrinsic moral worth, but rather a contextual worth (ibid.).

In Williams' chapter on Orokaiva morality (1930: 308-33), essentially the same picture of the Orokaiva person emerges as that for the Gahuku-Gama. Williams found a marked difference
in behavior towards "...fellow men and men who are not fellows", i.e. an "intra-group" morality antithetical to an "extra-group" morality. If a man was expected to display a good temper, dignity, courtesy, and so on within the "sympathy group", he was equally expected to behave treacherously, be objureate, truculent and at times blood-thirsty with those outside the "sympathy group".

That the Orokaiva do not differentiate the moral order from the social order is well-expressed by Williams in his summary of "intra-group" morality:

There is little, if any, idea of a self-centered righteousness. On the contrary, each virtue implies agent and reagent. Not incontinence, for instance, but adultery is condemned, because a right of possession has been infringed; not gluttony, but greed, because others must suffer by it.

(ibid.: 322; emphasis mine)

The point I am trying to make is simply this: If Orokaiva community is created in the event through the ordering of ideas about "substance" and of symbols (hae or heratu) communicating those ideas, then the Orokaiva "person" is so created as well. Huber's analysis of the Anggor pig hunt makes precisely the same point:

In killing a pig, the Anggor man becomes, momentarily, the fulcrum of the community. By his act he carries the community a step forward in time, through the cycle of chants leading to sanindo hoeli [an elaborate festivity]. He, himself, becomes the point of reference from which the consti-
tuent contrasts of the village are defined...He makes the structures of whole and parts momentarily visible in a certain way which starts from his own position in the community...he precipitates the community and thus precipitates himself as a social person.

(Huber 1980: 53; emphasis mine. cf. also Wagner 1981)

Both "person" and "community", then, have no a priori existence for the Orokaiva apart from events, apart from action, apart from praxis, which serve to create both. And, in their emergence, "person" and "community" mutually determine each other. It is therefore apt that Orokaiva plant emblems should serve to symbolize both "person" and "community".

One final observation. During initiation, Orokaiva youths have imparted to them a set of behavioral ideals which Williams conveniently labelled the "otohu ideal", after the ornamental insignia associated with these ideals (cf. Williams 1930: 203-6; 323; cf. also Schwimmer 1973: 177-82; Beaver 1920). A person who conforms to these injunctions -- one "...who did not quarrel, did not beat his wife or children, ...did not steal..." (ibid.: 204) -- and other expectations -- "...to be diligent in the garden, in hunting and fishing; and to be generous and helpful..." (ibid.: 205) -- is otohu or otohu-embo.
Yet, in apparent contrast to the moral expectations that the Orokaiva have for each, Williams wrote:

On the whole, one is struck by a high degree of personal freedom. For... the native is left to do a good deal as he likes; so much so that one man, whatever his status, is reluctant to answer for another, to lay down what he will or should do. 'He himself', he will say, with a certain inflection of the voice that dismisses all responsibility.

(ibid.: 326)

As I have tried to show, these two aspects of Orokaiva life illustrated above are reflected in the nature of **hae** identification itself. And it is the combined moral and tactical dimensions of **hae** identification which provide the cultural constitution of the Orokaiva "person" through **hae** identification with its particular dynamic. For, intrinsic to **hae** identification is the dilemma of constraint, of containing self-willedness within the ambience of moral obligations (cf. Leroy 1979, Burridge 1969, 1979), such that the tactical employment of **hae** remains a moral usage. The alternative is autonomy, and the negation, transendence, or transformation of the moral, and so the social, order.

* * * * *
**Map II**

- Boundary
- Mountain Ranges
- Rivers
- Roads

**Census Divisions**

1 - Waria
2 - Binanderere
3 - North Coast
4 - Aiga
5 - Sohe Popondetta
6 - Poponetta
7 - Saiho
8 - Hujara
9 - Kokoda
10 - Wawonga
11 - Musa
12 - Managalase
13 - Oro Bay
14 - Dyke Ackland Bay
15 - Cape Nelson
16 - Collingwood Bay

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