

CRITICISM AND THE PLAUSIBLE PLAN:
THEORY AND METHOD

by

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B.A., McGill University, 1974
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A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

in

THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES
(School of Community & Regional Planning)

We accept this thesis as conforming
to the required standard

THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

April 1981

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ABSTRACT

When planners evaluate their plans they tend to ask "Does this plan lead to this stated objective?". The thesis argues that one finds only a very partial view of planners' purposes when a planning report is read as if the stated purpose is actually all that the report is about. A stated purpose is only one of the ways by which people demonstrate how they are adapting to a set of circumstances.

First of all this sort of a reading assumes that a planning report is a technical, quasi-empirical document concerned to explain why a certain arrangement of goods and services, is appropriate. By contrast, justification rather than explanation is argued to be the task of planners when they put forth their recommendations. Secondly, this abbreviated view of what a planning report is about assumes that one is concerned mainly with physical objects and hardly at all with the subsisting relations between the individual and society, and between these and the larger ecosystem. To understand these relations, and how to couple the major systems, is argued to be the essential task of planning -- a task which must consider not only the biological, physiological and physical relations but just as importantly the symbolic relations that imaginative man creates. Thirdly, a parsimonious reading of planners' objectives obscures the assumptions that are brought to the planning task. Much of what we do and think is habitual and our habits lie below the threshold of awareness in the course of everyday living. Some bundle of assumptions and habits of thought forms the premises for the plan. The bundle contains, for example, assumptions about the relationship between the planner and client; assumptions about the relationship between persons and nature; habits of thought about what constitutes a planning report; or various metaphors which have slipped into common usage.

The study tries to show that planning is an activity in and of itself which requires its own mode of evaluation beginning within the planning enterprise itself. Evaluation techniques based in empirical fields that are applied to plans reduce planning to something which it is not. In this reductionism planning is mistaken for a poor cousin of empirical fields which can never quite succeed at explanation. In addition, the responsibility of the planner for the plan is clouded because the emphasis in empirical methods is on observation and not on recommendation.

A critical method is presented which demonstrates the sort of approach believed to be necessary to evaluate planning from within planning. It is a method that slows down the reading in order to allow one to do two things in particular. First, it allows one to see how the recommendations of the report are made to appear plausible, since one can cluster together into "codes" what can be and cannot be written in a report. This process tends to support the argument that plans are subject to justification rather than explanation. Secondly, it allows one to identify some of the assumptions brought to the planning exercise, which can be clustered in patterns.

The value of the study, I believe, lies in showing how much is being missed in conventional evaluations, and why that information is central to developing planning as an identifiable activity peopled with responsible planners. In addition, the method contributes to our experience of how to bring assumptions to the surface so that the sensitized planner is in a position to choose, with awareness, whether to retain or to exchange them for others.

CRITICISM AND THE PLAUSIBLE PLAN:
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I wish to acknowledge with thanks the support I received from the members of my thesis committee: Professor Henry C. Hightower who, as chairman, assumed the heaviest task; Professor Harry Lash, Visiting Professor at the University of Ottawa; Professor Lorraine Weir of the English Department, University of British Columbia; Professor Brahm Wiesman, Director of the School of Community & Regional Planning, University of British Columbia; Professor James Wilson of the Geography Department, Simon Fraser University. They all contributed to helping me to carry my ideas forward and to greatly improving their presentation. In addition, I wish to recognize the considerable financial assistance I received from Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation.

Special acknowledgements also go to my parents and a number of very close friends who in various ways helped to make my Ph.D. years happier and more fruitful than they could have been without their care and stimulating companionship.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

When planners evaluate their plans they tend to ask "Does this plan lead to this stated objective?". The thesis argues that one finds only a very partial view of planners' purposes when a planning report is read as if the stated purpose is actually all that the report is about. The early chapters show what is meant by a "partial view" from a theoretical stance, and describe the implications for the evolution of planning thought of mistaking the part for the whole. This leads to the method, presented in Part 3, which demonstrates how one may identify the implicit assumptions that lend plausibility to those explicit purposes.

During the last century there has been a gradual shift in perspective concerning the sort of knowledge that is pertinent to understanding the affairs of humankind and the natural ecosystem. The shift is away from a perspective in which knowledge is "concrete" and "objective" and toward one in which knowledge is "constructed" and "symbolic"¹. This essay is in the spirit of the latter view in which people actively construct their reality as distinct from passively responding according to physical and bioenergetic laws.

¹For a sense of this shift in social thought, see, for example, H. Stuart Hughes, Consciousness and Society (New York: Vintage Books, 1958); in philosophy, Suzanne K. Langer, Philosophy in a New Key, 3rd edition (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976); and in science, Michael Polanyi, corrected edition, Personal Knowledge (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962).

Among those whose work is in the constructivist tradition is Thomas Kuhn. Using historical analysis, he has demonstrated the sociological aspect of a community of scientists in which knowledge is constructed at least in part to conform to shared paradigms. In his 1970 postscript to The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Kuhn limits what he means by the word "paradigm", which is a central concept in his original text, to the idea of shared examples. The components initially assigned to "paradigm" are now placed under the rubric "disciplinary matrix", which also includes "paradigms" in the sense of exemplars. The disciplinary matrix is a constellation of elements which are shared by a community of specialists and which account for intra-group communication and the relative unanimity of professional judgment. Kuhn has chosen 'disciplinary' because it refers to the common possession of the practitioners of a particular discipline; 'matrix' because it is composed of ordered elements of various sorts, each requiring further specification"². Among the components particular to the disciplinary matrix besides exemplars are shared commitments on behalf of a practising group to beliefs in certain symbolic generalizations, models that "supply the group with preferred or permissible analogies and metaphors,"³ and therefore with values. Kuhn's argument is that science, like other activities, is also interpretative and that during "tradition-bound periods" phenomena are interpreted in line with the consensual beliefs of the disciplinary matrix.

The single most important feature of Kuhn's disciplinary matrix is that it serves, for those who work in the field, as a point of reference for what is already accepted in the discipline. I draw from Kuhn the idea of a set of consensual beliefs that have effects for the ongoing activities of a

²Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd edition, enlarged (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), p. 182.

³Ibid., p. 184.

special group and use it in examining the practice of planning. The "periodization" which Kuhn describes whereby "a succession of tradition-bound periods are punctuated by non-cumulative breaks"⁴, and in which the disciplinary matrix has a role, is already a traditional approach in studies of the arts and social sciences. This approach is extended here to the field of human action. The critique presented in chapter 9 is a single study in that framework. It tries to offer a glimpse of a disciplinary matrix. No effort is made to describe the glimpsed disciplinary matrix in the context of an evolving disciplinary matrix.

The notion of a disciplinary matrix which provides both constraints and possibilities for group activity is used here to explore land use planning and more particularly urban renewal circa 1963. The argument is that the works that planners write presuppose a disciplinary matrix and that they could not be written without some conception of what constitutes a planner's "text". Alternatively they would not be recognized as planners' texts unless they contained certain common values, metaphors and conventions of the genre. Indeed, they would appear "ungrammatical" if they failed to exhibit a degree of conformity with previous works in the genre. This raises the question of what it is that the disciplinary matrix consists of for planners, and what particular purposes it is serving. At issue is not whether these consensual models are 'real', 'right', 'rational', and so on, but what role they play in the making of plans.

In the normal course of planning activity, the disciplinary matrix provides ranges within which justification for phenomena appear plausible and natural. It is possible to explore written works from the point of view of plausibility as distinct from the point of view of verifiability according to implicit or explicit models. Justification for this

⁴Ibid., p. 208.

alternative critique of plans that focusses on plausibility begins in chapter 2 with the argument that planners have tended to try to explain the correctness of their plans by relying heavily on 'scientific' reasoning and evidence to show why changes should be made, and why these changes should be made in a certain way. This has turned the spotlight on 'technique' and 'science' in a manner that suggests these are the reasons for plans recommending what they do, instead of being clear that plans are only the results of purposeful persons. However, neither the angle nor the wattage of the spotlight has resulted in plans being explained, which is a mode belonging to empirical science. Rather, confusion between justification and explanation has resulted. One source of this confusion is the ill-defined theme that planning is part 'art' and part 'science'.

Another related source of the confusion is explored in chapter 3: that rational thinking means conscious thinking. The discussion centres on why conscious purpose is assumed to be the only type of adaptive behaviour that planners are engaged in when they plan. The ramifications of this assumption are also considered.

Conscious purposefulness is only a very small representation of the actual range of the adaptive behaviour of persons. Among other things, this concept of rationality excludes the symbolic generalizations and values that, following Kuhn, are part of the disciplinary matrix. In chapter 4 the disciplinary matrix is described as complementary to conscious purpose in the activity of planning.

Part Two outlines three points of departure for a critical method. They are: patterns (chapter 5), analogues (chapter 6), and an expansive approach to reading (chapter 7). Together these begin to describe an attitude toward reading that permits close scrutiny of the way in which meaning is created in a text. The selection of these three for special attention is intended to place the focus of the critical method on bringing

conscious purpose and the habits of thought of the disciplinary matrix jointly to bear on a reading.

The method for critiquing a text that incorporates these points of departure is described in chapter 8. The method inverts the traditional one by beginning within the text itself, instead of, as planning evaluations generally do, beginning with asking if the plan achieves a stated goal. Using the inverted method, one seeks to discover how the written text produces meaning that is plausible and natural. The method is concerned with the meaning of the goal as well as the plan which purports to achieve it.

The method is applied to a few pages from a 1963 planning report concerning urban renewal and appears in chapter 9. The choice of a planning report rather than, for example, a journal article about urban renewal was made because I believe, as Hughes does, that "the most reliable indicator" of dominant ideas "is not what people say but what they do"⁵. It is in planning reports that theory and practice are brought together.

A report dealing with urban renewal was chosen, firstly, because it was a particularly contentious form of intervention, and one used within an identifiable period -- between 1947 and 1969 in Canada.⁶ Secondly, it was chosen because much has been written about its failure as a planned intervention and because reasons for that failure have been identified.

One reason given is "failure to communicate"⁷. When Rose describes the "failure to communicate" thesis he cannot mean it literally: It is impossible not to communicate, for one is always communicating

⁵Hughes, Consciousness, p. 11.

⁶The single term 'urban renewal' is used to cover 'slum clearance', 'urban redevelopment', and 'urban renewal', but does not include 'Neighbourhood Improvement Programs'.

⁷Albert Rose, Citizen Participation in Urban Renewal (Toronto: Centre for Urban and Community Studies, Feb. 1974), p. 67.

something, even when apparently saying nothing. Silence, obfuscation and nonsense syllables are also communication. What Rose appears to mean is that different people involved in the renewal projects he investigated had different ideas about the nature and value of urban renewal. Those involved were communicating incessantly; but the messages were not leading toward consensus. His concern seems to have been that neither 'side' was able to convince the other of the 'rightness' of its views.

The distinction between "failure to communicate" and "failure to convince" is not semantic nit-picking. Consider the following from Rose:

It was reasoned that as a first phase the research programme could explore in some depth the assertion of several reputable social scientists (Robert Weaver, Robert Wood, Hans Spiegel; and, in Canada, the writer of this report) that the threatened breakdown in urban renewal was basically a failure in communication. It had been argued in many communities that the members of the boards and staffs of planning and redevelopment agencies were unable to communicate to the residents of designated urban renewal areas the positive gains which a renewal programme held out not only for the wider community but for the residents themselves. Moreover, elected councillors in municipal government, as well as senior appointed officials who headed such departments of local government as Assessment, Works, Streets, Traffic, and the like, were equally unable to express their roles in non-technical language.

This failure in communication was alleged to rest in the inability of professionally-trained and highly-skilled public servants and elected officials to explain their plans, programmes and the stages of implementation of redevelopment in language that could be understood by the typically modestly-educated and low-income residents of affected neighbourhoods.⁸

Rose shows the differing interpretations by planners, elected officials, citizen group leaders, and others, and concludes:

The first phase of the research project was strongly conclusive in demonstrating the validity of the "failure-to-communicate" hypothesis".⁹

His hypothesis, investigated and shown to be valid according to his statement, leads to the proposition that planners need some skills

⁸Ibid., pp. 67-68.

⁹Ibid., p. 223.

improvement in bringing diverse views together. Indeed, the belief that there was a failure of communication with respect to urban renewal has greatly contributed to the rise of a new goal for planners: to communicate better. This has been institutionalized as a sub-branch of planning in the form of 'citizen participation' which is now the subject of conferences and academic papers.¹⁰ The validation of the hypothesis does not itself imply changing from renewal to another form of intervention, but implies doing a better job of making people see that renewal means "positive gains". For planners, this meant that they need not question the disciplinary matrix which contributed to making urban renewal a plausible recommendation in planning reports.

When we look at the situation as a "failure to convince", on the other hand, we can see that planners were communicating (and communicating very well) a picture of themselves and their role ("to communicate to the residents of designated urban renewal areas the positive gains which a renewal programme held out"). Their inability to convince, however, suggests a very different proposition: the proposition that what is being said needs reflection, not how it is being said. This is a higher order of learning. It involves questioning the habits of thought that make urban renewal a plausible recommendation. It is to this level of reflection that this thesis is directed.

Chapter 10 anticipates a number of criticisms that might be made against the critical method. These are presented in conjunction with a defence of various aspects of the method. In addition, chapter 10 serves to draw the thesis to a close by discussing the place of the perception in the evolving study and practice of planning.

¹⁰See, for example, Environment Council of Alberta, Involvement and Environment. Edited by Barry Sadler (Edmonton: The Environment Council of Alberta, 1977).

Finally, I wish to emphasize two points in particular before moving to the body of the thesis. One is that I am not concerned with urban renewal per se, or attempting to comment on it favourably or unfavourably in this essay. This has been done by many others. Rather, the emphasis is on the production of meaning in planning texts, between readers and writers. The particular case used to demonstrate this is not central to the task.

The second and equally important point is that planners are embedded in a larger social matrix which encourages certain types of thought and action and discourages others. I have no knowledge or feeling that the individual or collective world views of planners are either more or less appropriate than those of other persons working in the public sphere. What I would like to feel, however, is that planners have a wide range of ways available to them for reflecting on their activities -- ways which do not bury under a dazzling array of techniques and theories their reason, vision, ethics, compassion, or responsibility.

PART ONE:

OPENING UP THE PLAN

CHAPTER 2

JUSTIFICATION IN PLANNING

2.1 Introduction

To justify something is to show that it is justifiable or reasonable. Justification in planning refers to the way in which plans are shown to be right, adequate or warranted with reference to some measure of 'goodness' or 'satisfactoriness'. "To speak about satisfactoriness", says Gunnar Olsson, "is therefore not to speak about the actual performance of a particular action, but to give our reasons for performing it."¹ Since action is concerned not only with physical objects, but refers also to ideas about how things should be different, that is, "mental objects which subsist in minds and relations":

there is common agreement that the fundamental rule of human action cannot be that of truth-preservation. Indeed it is the very point of purposive action to change what now is true so that it becomes untrue. Beginning as an invective, it turns into a vision and ends as a thing. . . In the formal work, most attention has. . . been directed towards the principles of satisfactoriness-preservation. Its main purpose is to "ensure that we never pass from a fiat, which is satisfactory for a particular purpose, to a fiat which is unsatisfactory for that purpose. The rules are satisfactoriness-preserving, just as the rules for assertoric logic are truth-preserving".²

¹"Social Science and Human Action or on Hitting Your Head Against the Ceiling of Language," in Philosophy in Geography, eds. S. Gale and G. Olsson (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Publishing, 1979), p. 291.

²Ibid.

The measure of the plan is qualitative and contextual; it can be discussed and felt but neither counted nor referred to the five senses to be validated. Planners seek to justify their prescriptions to their peers, the public, political representatives, and clients.

Justification differs significantly from explanation. In the physical and social sciences one seeks to explain phenomena in the sense of accounting for their existence, their shape, numbers, change, and so on. The phenomena are ultimately palpable. The language of the scientist aims to observe, describe and explain what is now true: it is geared to truth-preservation. Scientists seek corroboration for their explanations among their peers. Prescriptions which may stem from the explanations fall beyond the scientific enterprise, as commonly understood by scientists.

The arguments presented in this chapter are first, that planners' prescriptions rest ultimately on justification (which belongs to the realm of satisfactoriness-preservation), rather than explanation (which belongs to the realm of truth-preservation); second, that planners have tried to mold justification in the image of explanation and in so doing they have obscured the distinction between the two; and third, that one needs to understand the methods of justification qua justification no less than the methods of explanation. The remaining chapters explore some reasons why planners shy away from acknowledging that they are in the business of justification; explore the implications of confusing justification for explanation; and suggest how the methods of justification used by planners may be better understood.

2.2 Why Justification Rather than Explanation

The problem of confusing justification and explanation has roots in the recurrent but ill-defined theme in the planning literature that planning is both 'art' and 'science'. These terms, or approximations, have long

appeared in the definitions of planning, for example, by professional planning associations. In 1929 the Town Planning Institute of Canada's definition was: "Town planning may be defined as the scientific and orderly disposition of land and buildings in use and development with a view to obviating congestion and securing economic and social efficiency, health and well-being in urban and rural communities."³ This Institute, now known as the Canadian Institute of Planners, today defines planning as the planning of the scientific, aesthetic and orderly disposition of land, with a view to securing physical, economic and social efficiency, health and well-being in urban and rural communities."⁴ Similarly, in the United States, the American Institute of Planners defines its purpose as advancing "the science and art of planning".⁵ Individual planners have also expressed the view that planning is both art and science. Thomas Adams said in 1935 that "City and town planning is a science, an art, and a movement of policy. . ."; Barclay Hudson said in 1979 that "most planners would admit that their craft is one of art as well as science".⁶ Perhaps it is safe to say that lurking behind the innumerable definitions of planning that invoke future, intention, knowledge, action, guidance, policy, and so on, there lies a sense of the activity as somehow belonging to both 'art' and 'science'.

³A.G. Dalzell, "The Attitude of the Engineer Towards Town Planning," Journal of the Town Planning Institute of Canada 3 (June 1929): 44.

⁴Canadian Institute of Planners, By-Law 1.6, in Charter, By-Laws and Code of Professional Conduct Handbook, 1979 edition.

⁵See, for example, Journal of the American Institute of Planners 23 (January 1957): 1; Journal of the American Planning Association 46 (October 1980): back cover.

⁶Thomas Adams, Outline of Town and City Planning (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1935), p. 21; Barclay Hudson, "Comparison of Current Planning Theories," Journal of the American Planning Association 45 (October 1979): 394.

The conjunctions used to link 'science' to 'art' are significant. 'And', which is perhaps the most frequently used conjunction in this instance, suggests that 'science' and 'art' are viewed as discrete pools of knowledge and understanding, and that planners dip into both in the practice of their profession. Neither 'art' nor 'science' is clearly defined in the context of these definitions of planning, but one might gather from the literature that, loosely speaking, 'art' refers to the aesthetics of planned environments, and to whatever else is construed as the subjective aspects of plans, particularly values and ethics. 'Art' seems to refer to those aspects of a plan that are unverifiably 'necessary', 'right', 'good', 'valuable', and so on. 'Science', by contrast, appears to refer to the aspects of plans that can be shown by one or more means to be verifiably 'correct', 'efficient', 'necessary', and so on.

The categories are rather slippery but the literature suggests there is at least some understanding of what falls where. Harris makes a clear distinction between 'science' and 'humanism'. His latter category would include generally that which falls into 'art'.⁷ A clear separation also underlies Klosterman's normative planning in which values are to be given better tools to compete against the strong claims that science can make for taking a given action.⁸

Thus, an element in the plan or the process of planning is classed either in 'science' or in 'art'. For example, means have been traditionally associated with science -- that is, one can select the best means to achieve a desired outcome using scientific reasoning; and ends have been associated with non-science -- that is, a reflection of a value. The grounds for

⁷"The Limits of Science and Humanism in Planning," Journal of the American Institute of Planners 33 (September 1967): 324-335.

⁸"Foundation for Normative Planning," Journal of the American Institute of Planners 44 (January 1978): 37-46.

including an element as part of a plan will be sanctioned by reference either to 'facts' (which are viewed as pertaining to 'science') or to values (which are viewed as pertaining to 'art').

While 'art' and 'science' are seen as separate, the literature suggests that it would be more proper to state that they are seen as separate-but-related. For example, Davidoff and Reiner use arguments that they attribute to logical positivists to show the philosophical distinction between 'fact' and 'value', but they then go on to show how the two are nonetheless intimately related.⁹ Another example of the separate-but-related view is Davidoff in which the same assumptions as appear in his 1962 article with Reiner are brought to bear on the theory of advocacy planning.¹⁰ Niebanck too suggests that the dominant view of values is that they are separate from rather than integral to the context of a plan: "The term 'values' is being tossed around these days, as though values were simply another set of variables to be incorporated into a complex planning equation. . ."¹¹

By contrast, if planners were in the habit of using 'both'/'and' -- that is, planning is both art and science -- it would be more difficult to foster the separateness of planning's sources of knowledge.

The assumption implicit in the separate-but-related view is that 'fact' and 'value' emerge from separate sources of knowledge or understanding

⁹"A Choice Theory of Planning," Journal of the American Institute of Planners 28 (May 1962): 103-115.

¹⁰"Advocacy and Pluralism in Planning", Journal of the American Institute of Planners 31 (November 1965): 331-338. Incidentally, in 1979 this was the most frequently cited article on master's planning programs' reading lists for theory of planning courses, while the 1962 article with Reiner also ranks very high.

¹¹Paul L. Niebanck, "The Captivity of the Planning Profession," in The Structural Crisis of the 1970's and Beyond, eds. H.A. Goldstein and S.A. Rosenberry (Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University, 1978), pp. 205-206.

and are later merged in the plan. Can this indeed be so? The remainder of the thesis argues that meaning is dependent on context and that values are integral to seizing the fact in the first instance, to seizing the context, and to making the interpretation. For example, the fact that today a city has 200,000 inhabitants when last year it had 180,000 takes on meanings for the various urban actors depending on the contexts in which they view the fact. It may be taken to mean a larger market for those producing local goods; a different 'feel' to the city for long-time residents; an expanding tax base for council's use; greater difficulty finding housing for those with the least financial flexibility; and so on. Also, different meanings can be understood by a single person who is simultaneously, for example, the local baker, alderman, and long-time resident.

The 'fact' of population increase is interpreted in accordance with some value(s) that the person holds. For example, an expanding market may be interpreted as 'good'; the city as becoming 'too big'; and so on. The fact is not merely a fact. It is a fact in a context. Together both the fact and the context of values allow interpretation.

The quintessential planning problem is choosing the interpretation(s) to put on a fact. Planners may well understand at some level that fact and value emerge together, integrally offering interpretation. However, in the midst of the great uncertainty that this quintessential problem engenders, it is not at all surprising that the hope, if not belief, is sustained that a 'right' interpretation exists. The idea of a 'right' interpretation pits fact against value, and the two are shaped as antagonists. Thus, for example, Davidoff and Reiner approvingly quote Kaplan who speaks of "confronting values with facts".¹² At least two separate things are needed for a confrontation. 'Rightness' in some sense will result from the confrontation, one assumes.

¹²"Choice Theory", p. 108

Planners do not say they are looking for the 'right' interpretation for facts. On the contrary. Referring to Davidoff again, he says clearly in the abstract preceding his article that "The right course of action is always a matter of choice, never of fact".¹³ Even if they do not say they are looking for the 'right' interpretation, Webber suggests that this is what planners are attempting to do because they have not made a distinction between science and planning for themselves, nor have they made it clear to public officials and laymen "who have been led to believe that, through science, planners could tell them what is right and hence what to want".¹⁴

The search for a 'right' interpretation seems to be a basis for seeking to explain rather than justify plans. 'Rightness' can be attributed to what has been derived using 'science'. Correspondingly, explanation carries the sanctity of legitimacy because in science it can be shown to be right or wrong. On the other hand, justification appears to be merely the result of dealing with our divined values. Instead of the precision and certainty of 'right', justification in planning appears as an imprecise, professionally influenced notion of 'good'. Given a choice between emphasizing the artistic aspect of their profession (values, justification) or the scientific aspect (facts, explanation), it is not to be wondered at if a great many planners show a penchant for the cleaner lines of the latter.

2.3 Justification in the Image of Explanation

When we evaluate plans -- our own plans or someone else's, and whether before or after implementation -- we traditionally weigh the plan's goal against several criteria which are roughly of three types: (i)

¹³"Advocacy and Pluralism", p. 331.

¹⁴Melvin M. Webber, "A Difference Paradigm for Planning," in Planning-Theory-in-the-1980's, eds. R.W. Burchell and G. Sternlieb (New Brunswick, N.J.: Center for Urban Policy Research, Rutgers, 1978), p. 153.

knowledge which is deemed to be 'scientific'; (ii) criteria for knowing such as rationality, objectivity, comprehensiveness; and (iii) norms and values believed to be held by the client who pays for the plan and/or the client for whom the plan is intended. The evaluation attempts to answer the question "Does this plan lead to achieving this stated goal?" Whether or not the plan is found to be appropriate is believed to hinge on the answer to that question.

Two assumptions are implicit in the evaluation process which give justification the appearance of explanation. The first assumption is that criteria external to the process of making the plan are sufficient to explain its content and that none of the criteria emerge from the work itself. The criteria exist a-priori. Evaluation thus becomes a uniformly deductive enterprise in which the task is to measure the plan against existing notions of 'right', taken as models.

The second assumption is that these external criteria represent 'objective' knowledge that retains its coherence when transferred to a field of human action. This assumption leaves no room in the evaluation to attribute effect to the planner's vision or sense of the way things ought to be, and hence to his choice of criteria. Yet planners have long since surrendered any notion of being value-neutral, at least in their "espoused theory", to use Argyris and Schön's term.¹⁵ They recognize that their values are evident in plans. But evaluations are conducted as if these did not exist or else were indistinguishable from those of the client. Where do the planner's values go once the planner has admitted that they have effects? Traditional evaluations ignore them, seeming to assume that the planner and the planning process, as process, are without effect. Such

¹⁵Chris Argyris and Donald A. Schön, Organizational Learning (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1978), p. 11.

assumptions would cast the planner in the role of manipulator of 'objective' knowledge, data and processes, and the process itself as neutral.

To mold justification in the image of explanation has had effects for the development of planning. Five effects are discussed in this section: (a) naturalism as explanation; (b) reductionism; (c) planning as synthesis; (d) planning as benign; and (e) searching for the 'right ratio'.

(a) One effect has been to allow the argument to carry that a plan is necessary in order to maintain or to achieve one or more of the external criteria. This attributes naturalness or inevitability to a plan and forms the basis for its explanation. This is, however, a specious argument. Necessity does not reside in things such as scientific knowledge, criteria for knowledge, or human values. Necessity is created by people in the relations that they establish among things.

Let us say that we have decided that 'safe' and 'decent' housing constitutes meeting or exceeding prescribed measurements of structural soundness, square metres per occupant, and so on. We then measure a dwelling and write down the measurements. At this stage they are simply measurements without attribution. The measurements themselves do not represent 'safety' or 'decency'. We then put these measurements into a context. The context is the set of measurements a dwelling must meet or exceed. They are standards that people have developed for various purposes and have agreed define what is 'safe' and 'decent'. We compare the measurements against the standards. Now we have a way of saying that the dwelling we measured does not (let us say) represent 'safe' and 'decent' housing. Now we have a difference -- the difference between what a dwelling should, minimally, be like and what the dwelling we actually measured is like. It is only now that we have necessity. The necessity is to make one accord with the other. Necessity is neither in the measurements nor in the standards but is a function of the relation between them.

When the measurements achieved using the rigour of 'science' are mistaken for the standards achieved using the power of imagination and experience, then the former can be invoked as reasons for needing a given plan and we confuse two orders of things. The plan appears to arise because the measurements demonstrate a shortfall rather than because of the difference between the measurements and the standards that represents values. We mistakenly base our claim for the 'rightness' of the plan on measures which in themselves have no meaning instead of on standards which we determine by exercising value judgments.

(b) Another effect of wanting to turn justification for a plan (because it is believed to accord with ideals) into explanation for a plan (because it is the inevitable route to ideals) is to court reductionism.

Justification is a different class of activity than explanation. While a plan may use descriptive elements from empirical fields such as demography, geography or sociology, any attempt to account for the plan based solely on these descriptive elements will be partial. There will always be a residuum: the residuum is precisely the planners' sense of the way things ought to be which they have, wittingly or not, incorporated in the plan. The 'ought to be' that is incorporated in the plan is not necessarily utopian or visionary. It may be quite pragmatic: for example it may include the planners' interpretation of the political, social, organizational and economic climate into which they introduce their plan.

The difficulty of the residuum is one of infinite regress: 'the way things ought to be' is a qualitative judgment arising from the planners' notions of 'goodness' or 'satisfactoriness'. But 'goodness' and 'satisfactoriness' themselves require justification. Where does the buck stop?

As long as one depends upon externally defined criteria as the sole yardsticks for evaluating plans, one remains deeply entangled in the argument about who is to choose which criteria to pursue (some are incompatible with the pursuits of others); who is to define the criteria;

and who is to choose how to move toward them -- what path to take, what method to use. The planning literature of the past quarter century is witness to the conflict these questions have raised for planners.

Two main solutions have been put forward to escape the tangle and deal with the residuum. One has been to adjust the criteria. For example, among the criteria for knowledge, comprehensiveness was modified to permit incrementalism to be a valid criterion for a plan. Also, absolute rationality was relaxed to "bounded rationality". With respect to values as criteria for judging the validity of plans, the concept of a unitary public interest underwent significant modification in "advocacy" and "radical" planning, for example, where the special interests of groups were not to be buried in some general view of the public interest.¹⁶ Adjusting the criterion which I have called "knowledge which is deemed to be 'scientific'" has involved refining the techniques of data analysis. Krueckeberg¹⁷ and Pack¹⁸ indicate the types and uses of analytical techniques in planning education and practice.

The other solution has been to adjust the means for determining what constitutes a valid plan. Substantial effort has been spent designing and refining plan evaluation techniques that seek to reduce as much as possible the need for the planner (and the client) to judge the meaning of data. The data is ordered in ways that make it appear to speak for itself. Examples are cost-benefit analysis, the goals achievement matrix, and the planning balance sheet.

¹⁶See Barclay M. Hudson, "Comparison of Current Planning Theories," Journal of the American Planning Association 45 (October 1979): 392, where differing stances towards the public interest in five planning approaches are briefly described.

¹⁷"Practical Demand for Analytic Methods," in Planning Theory in the 1980's, eds. R.W. Burchell and G. Sternlieb (New Brunswick, N.J.: Center for Urban Policy Research, Rutgers University, 1978), pp. 309-340.

¹⁸"The Use of Urban Models," Journal of the American Institute of Planners 41 (May 1975): 191-200.

All this has weakened the sense that there is a planner behind all the technique. The technique's image overwhelms the planner's image, but this cannot have occurred without at least the tacit consent of the planner. My argument is not to reduce the use of technique but to heighten our awareness that there is a very active and very purposeful planner in there too. Once we have affirmed that plans are ultimately the creation of planners and not of external criteria, then we can affirm, with respect to plans, that the buck stops at the planner. Unless the planner's responsibility is evident, planning is reduced to technique and synthesis.

(c) The third way of masking justification as explanation is to regard planning merely as synthesis. The synthesis view of planning has had a long history. Kriesis, writing in the Journal of the Town Planning Institute in 1963, said he thought that the view had long since been discredited and yet examples still persist.¹⁹ The reviewer of Elizabeth Wood's Social Planning writes in the Journal of the American Institute of Planners in 1966 that one of the problems of the book is that Wood "has absorbed uncritically the major plank of traditional social planning -- coordination."²⁰ The same year, in Plan, N.H. Richardson's editorial contains a strong statement against the widely held view "that planning is merely a matter of coordinating and synthesizing the technical skills contributed by a variety of specialists."²¹ As late as 1971 an entire article by Alonso is devoted to getting "Beyond the Inter-disciplinary Approach to Planning".²²

¹⁹"Catch T.P.", Journal of the Town Planning Institute 49 (December 1963): 176.

²⁰S.M. Miller, review of Social Planning: A Primer for Urbanists, by Elizabeth Wood, in Journal of the American Institute of Planners 32 (July 1966): 248.

²¹"Editorial", Plan-Canada 7 (July 1966): 4

²²Journal of the American Institute of Planners 37 (May 1971): 169-173.

Planning-as-synthesis posits planning as the point at which knowledge borrowed from various fields is brought together into a coherent bundle that can serve as a basis for action. It assumes that such borrowed knowledge is constructed within and constructive of a unitary mode of knowing. It does not differentiate among epistemologies.

What is accepted as knowledge in an empirical field is grounded in its ability to explain phenomena according to the rules in that field which establish what is to count as knowledge. Even if we have trouble specifying the epistemology of planning, we can say that it will not be co-extensive with that in empirical fields because human action is oriented toward what can be envisioned rather than toward what exists in our immediate experience. Thus what serves as explanation in the particular spawning field cannot serve the same purpose in the normative field of planning because the conditions for knowing have changed. What is 'fact' in a nomothetic field is only one interpretation of that fact in planning. A plan may be made to appear valid by, for example, employing a particular theory of the market, but the transfer of the theory to the normative context -- planning -- dilutes its epistemological claims. All the planner can do is try to justify his choice of one theory of the market over another. The claim to 'rightness' cannot arise from the market theory as an external criterion. Indeed the particular choice of theory does not 'explain' the plan but, on the contrary, goes some distance towards 'explaining' the planner.

The view of planning-as-synthesis posits knowledge as neutral, sanitized and innocent with respect to context. This, however, contradicts one very simple observation that can be made with respect to the sources from which planners borrow knowledge. Considerable knowledge is borrowed from traditional economics, traditional sociology, geography and mathematics. These are apparently relevant and authoritative fields from

which to borrow. Philosophy, psychology and Marxist economics are introduced, if at all, through the back door. Kinesthetics, hermeneutics and astrology have no place in planning to date. The knowledge chosen is not neutral because the choice is purposeful.

(d) The view of planning-as-synthesis leads to another way in which justification is molded in the form of explanation. Planning-as-synthesis enhances the idea that planning is benign. If planning is synthesis, the planner is a synthesizer or coordinator of some strands of knowledge. In this view, planners do not recognize themselves as generators or preservers of knowledge or spatial relations or ideologies, but rather see themselves as simply middlemen bringing news from the empirical sciences to complex, real world situations. When plans fail, planners can place responsibility at some distance from themselves by attributing the failure to having used the wrong strand of knowledge or technique, or to failing to accept or understand the knowledge in sufficient depth, or to not being provided with the right sort or quantity of knowledge from pertinent disciplines. Indeed, failure confirms the benignity rather than calling it into question: the planner is merely coordinating what he understands is available to be coordinated, and what he thinks he is competent to coordinate. Justification is converted to explanation by the simple expedient of disavowing the planner's own role and responsibility. Piven, who is notable for her directness, decries that disavowal more forcefully perhaps than any planner in the mainstream literature.

"...our past failures are not, as the recent doctrinal reform would suggest, merely failures of oversight, of lack of dialogue or too narrow a technical scope. They have to do rather with the subservience of the planning profession to dominant economic and political interests."²³

²³"Planning and Class Interests," Journal of the American Institute of Planners 41 (November 1975): 309.

(e) Fifthly, the view that planning is made up of art and of science which exist as separate pools legitimates the search for the 'right' ratio of the one to the other. If there is a 'right' ratio, then the 'wrong' ratio can be a reason for the failure of plans.

In the separate pools view, what pertains to art cannot also pertain to science. There is therefore a perpetual tension between the two, since to have more of the one means surrendering some of the other. In principle, some perfect combination of the two exists -- a combination which we should strive to achieve. This view depends for its persistence on the assumption that 'being scientific, and 'being creative' are potentially absolute qualities or, in other words, that there is a 100% scientific approach to a phenomenon or a 100% creative approach. Finding the right ratio for planning implies breaking into the absoluteness of each and creating a new totality constituted of so many parts 'science' and so many parts 'art'. What ratio will be chosen? On what grounds? To what aspects of planning will a particular ratio apply?

A major portion of the planning literature has been dedicated to sorting out the ratio problem. Since the mid-1950's it has dealt with the problem of whether one can plan absolutely rationally and absolutely comprehensively, and if not, what the options are. Once the notion of "bounded rationality" was accepted, the next step was to ask how 'non-rationality' was to be treated in planning models. This led to various versions of incrementalism which are discussed in the literature as reasonable compensation for the loss of full credibility in the rational comprehensive model.²⁴

²⁴Lindblom originally described a method of "successive limited comparisons" which he said described the way public administrators made adjustments "at the margin", but has curiously been left out of "the literatures of decision-making, policy formulation, planning and public administration". See "The Science of Muddling Through," Public

Justification is molded as closely as possible after explanation in this body of literature by arguing logically why it is not rational to pursue absolutes but is rational to pursue modifications of them, which entails making rational arguments for non-rationality. We thus retain the idea of rationality as an absolute, but an unobtainable absolute which requires us to lower our sights. Its opposite is non-rationality. Models of planning seek to be reasonable within these limits that fall on a continuum.²⁵

Discussions of a less than fully rational approach led to new recognition of the intuitive and creative aspects of decision making and plan making. These features had then also to be incorporated into the planning model. It was perhaps Friedmann who made the first major attempt in a model to indicate the relation of "tradition, intuition, and wisdom", which he called "extra-rational thought", to forms of rational thought and the remaining elements of planning models.²⁶ Jantsch, although more concerned with policy sciences at the time, described "rational creative action", in which forecasting, planning, decisionmaking, and action are

Administration Review 19 (Spring 1959): 80. Later, he formulated this more fully as "incrementalism" often called "disjointed incrementalism," in The Intelligence of Democracy, New York: The Free Press, 1965. In 1959, March and Simon described "satisficing" as choosing a 'good' approach rather than holding out for the 'best' as a mode of decision making in Organizations, New York: John Wiley. John Friedmann used the notion of "adaptive rationality" in "The Institutional Context," in Action Under Planning, ed. B.M. Gross, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966. Amitai Etzioni gave us "Mixed Scanning" in 1967, Public Administration Review 27 (December 1967): 385-392; and Bertram Gross proffered "jointed incrementalism" in Management Strategy for Economic and Social Development, Public Administration Division, United Nations, 1970.

²⁵See Friedmann and Hudson for the location of some of the adjustments on the continuum. "Knowledge and Action," Journal of the American Institute of Planners 40 (January 1974): 7-10. For an alternative view of absolutes as paradoxical, see chapter 4 below.

²⁶"A Conceptual Model for the Analysis of Planning Behavior," Administrative Sciences Quarterly 12 (September 1967): pp. 225-252.

embedded. Rational creative action is described as "unfolding in the interaction among [these] four activities. . ." ²⁷

The ratio problem remains for the rational comprehensive (or synoptic) and the incrementalist planning traditions. Some theorists have stepped away from that debate to propose other theories of the planning process. Provided, however, that the 'art'/'science' dichotomy is not resolved in these new theories, the problem of the 'right' ratio will also be encountered there.

"And" is not innocent.

2.4 Justification qua Justification

In the mainstream planning journals little has been said about justification qua justification as the mode appropriate for evaluating planning. However, the view that evaluation has tended to focus too much on 'objective' criteria (including efficiency, an assumed public interest or rationality, for example) and too little on the subjective condition of man is explicit in much recent writing of the so-called "new humanists" and in a radical tradition. ²⁸

The extent of this same concern in planning practice is more difficult to judge since planning reports circulate less widely than journals. One may, however, refer to the Greater Vancouver Regional District "Livable Region" proposals as one case in which the verbalized subjective statements of citizens formed the basis for the Region's plan.

²⁷"From Forecasting and Planning to Policy Sciences," Policy Sciences 1 (1970): p. 32.

²⁸See Friedmann and Hudson, "Knowledge and Action," 1974, p. 7 for a brief description of the "new humanists"; and for an example of a radical approach, see Stephen Grabow and Allan Heskin, "Foundations for a Radical Concept of Planning," Journal of the American Institute of Planners 39 (March 1973): 106-114.

In this case, planning began explicitly from the interpretation of statements.²⁹

In summary, the use of a deductive approach has, on the basis of the foregoing, fostered the idea that plans can be explained by reference to some external, logically defensible notion of 'right' rather than justified by reference to the planner's notion of what is 'right'. The foregoing has also tried to show that a solely deductive approach to evaluating planning always leaves an unexplained residuum represented by the planners' beliefs about how things ought to be at some future time, as well as their beliefs about what exists at present. A predominantly inductive approach which begins with interpreting what is actually said about how things are and ought to be has barely had any press.

The remaining chapters present a justification for a method that allows one to open up a plan to closer scrutiny than traditional evaluation methods permit. The point of this is to allow planners to ask what assumptions lie behind the statements in a plan; to allow planners to question the appropriateness of the assumptions; and to allow planners to be aware of how they justify their plans. Without giving some rein to the inductive, planners as purposeful actors remain only faintly visible in plans, and in that near-anonymity can elect to minimize their responsibility.

The next chapter examines the planner's preoccupation with stated goals which traditionally are the points of departure for plan evaluations. The following chapter tries to show the sorts of things that are missed entirely by traditional evaluations.

²⁹For a description of the planning process involved, see H. Lash, Planning in a Human Way (Toronto: Macmillan Co., 1976) and K. Gerecke, "Towards a New Model of Urban Planning," (Ph.D. dissertation, University of British Columbia, 1974).

CHAPTER 3

CONSCIOUS - PURPOSE

3.1 The Capsule Version

Traditionally, an official, often terse, statement near the beginning of a planning work declares the goal or objective. The report constitutes a statement of means for achieving the declared goal. Evaluation prior to implementation of the plan involves deciding if the means can be expected to achieve the stated goal. Evaluation post-implementation involves deciding if the means have indeed been instrumental in achieving the goal. The purpose of the whole process appears to be to achieve the stated goal. Purpose thereby comes to be defined as the stated 'goal' or 'end' or 'objective', that is, some final end state. This is conscious purpose, the result of logical reasoning.

When plans appear unable to be achieved in accordance with the stated goal, adjustments have been made to the conscious purposes based on logical reasoning. Some types of adjustments were mentioned in the previous chapter. When criteria such as rationality or comprehensiveness were found to be unachievable in practice, their conditions were relaxed using logical reasoning to substantiate the new forms of the criteria. Another adjustment for improving the success rate of plans was to make techniques for evaluating plans more rigorous.

This chapter examines why conscious purpose is assumed to be the only type of purposiveness that planners are engaged in when they are 'doing' planning, and some ramifications of acting on that assumption.

Conscious purpose stated as a goal, or what might be called the "capsule version" of conscious purpose, represents only a single aspect of teleonomic expression. It is what gets through to consciousness and becomes encapsulated in a particular text. It seems to be the sole purpose only because this is what we have said it is, and because we have decided by convention that, in planning, goals are what are announced as such.

These capsule versions, when taken seriously, mask the innumerable purposes at work in the systems that make up the social milieu for planning. It must be stressed that what is masked is not necessarily more of the same sort of purposes. The capsule version is not the tip of the iceberg since one cannot safely extrapolate from the very small portion that lies at the surface as conscious to what lies hidden. While the stated goal may fairly reek of motherhood values, unconscious purposes may turn out to be far less sanguine. For example, and anticipating the critique in chapter 9, the objective of the "Don Planning District Appraisal" is "a long range programme for the improvement of the Don District".¹ Is it quite certain, however, that other purposes did not exist, such as making use of funds recently offered for urban renewal under the National Housing Act?

To assume that conscious purpose is the only purpose there is implies axiomatically that people can be unidimensional with respect to purpose; or that if they do have other sorts of purposes they are irrelevant to a plan; or both. This is adaptation to purpose using logical reasoning. It is qualitatively different from other sorts of adaptiveness such as stem

¹Toronto, City of Toronto Planning Board, Don Planning District Appraisal (Toronto: September 1963), covering letter.

from intuition, habit or image-making. If a question of human affairs is approached using (or thinking one is using) only logic to describe or explain it, one cannot help but impoverish the question in the process. It is like setting out to explain why one is healthy using only logical propositions.

3.2 Causal Explanation

The desire on the part of planners to be 'scientific' was described in the previous chapter. This desire is manifested in the use of versions of scientific method in making plans.

The classic model of scientific investigation practiced in the physical sciences up to about the end of the 19th century seeks causal explanation in an energy or force that is said to make 'A' move toward 'B', for example. This is the model of explanation widely used in planning analysis,² and in social science fields from which planning draws its heuristics such as geography (e.g. gravity model) and economics (e.g. market equilibrium).

There are a number of ways in which such a model is deficient for social investigation. One of these has to do with observer effects.³ The model requires a positive force and an object upon which the force acts. The force is separate from the object, and neither the force nor the object is altered by the researcher's observation, nor is the researcher altered through observing. The fact that there are levels of observation appropriate to specific phenomena (the ability to decentre from what is

²See, for example, Anthony J. Catanese, Scientific Methods of Urban Analysis (Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1972)

³For a clear description of research on observer effects, see W. Lambert Gardiner, The Psychology of Teaching (Monterey, Calif.: Brooks/Cole, 1980), chapter 12.

being observed) is recognized in more recent work in the physical sciences because of relativity theory. Planners do not claim to be objective, but not because a new level of theory has been developed to mediate observer effects and the purposefulness of the planner. Rather, a statement to the effect that the values of the planner and client must be taken into account is almost invariably made. The reduced objectivity is treated as slippage occasioned by certain differences between the objects of pure science and the objects of planning. Then the work is proceeded with as if the values are themselves objectively identifiable and solid.⁴ In this way empirical method is not disturbed. Unidimensionality with respect to the observer and the observed is thereby retained in social science investigations under this version of scientific method.

A second deficiency of the method as it is used is its non-recursiveness. In the classic model there is a direct linear relation between cause and effect. Billiard ball A, by virtue of an observed functional relation, acts on billiard ball B, because of the billiard player's energy. And that is the end point of causal explanation. Billiard ball B, dislocated by having been hit, does not recursively act on A by hitting billiard ball A back in purposeful retaliation, for example, or by hiding. Inanimate physical objects do not behave in purposefully adaptive ways. Clearly things are different in the animate world. First of all, if Mr. A hits Mr. B, Mr. A is using his own energy-as-purpose, no matter how concrete or abstract that may be (a fist, a hit-man, a hex, a tongue lashing). Second, Mr. B will purposefully adapt to the situation, such as by hitting back, running away, praying, etcetera. A linear causal method applied to the animate world is seriously wanting because it does not take recursiveness into account explicitly.

⁴Gunnar Myrdal, Objectivity in Social Research (New York: Pantheon Books, 1969), p. 15.

Urban renewal of the form practiced in the 1950's and 1960's is a broad example of a non-recursive model applied in a social situation. Certain neighbourhoods were analyzed and found to be so deficient according to standards established by politicians, bureaucrats, health officials and planners that parts or all of them were demolished and replaced with structures that met these standards. The chain comprised of

Goal: good neighbourhoods
 Survey: of conditions
 Analysis: these are slum conditions
 Plan: rebuild according to standards

assumes that good neighbourhoods are "caused" by buildings that meet standards. The causal chain cannot accommodate the possibility that residents may not share the belief that buildings that meet standards cause good neighbourhoods, and might therefore act recursively in response to the plan to prevent the changes. The linear plan breaks down under recursiveness. Well-known Canadian examples in which the purposes of residents were at odds with those of planners were the Trefann Court (Toronto) and the Strathcona (Vancouver) renewal plans.

Third, causal explanation has little to say about time. Recent investigations, particularly relating to the second law of thermodynamics, affirm that irreversible, time-dependent processes require alternative methods to those applicable to causality for time-independent phenomena. Prigogine has suggested that the reason time played such an insignificant role in physical explanation until recently is that only one dimension -- change in position -- could be easily mathematized, so that eventually time became identified with the time occurring in motion. As a result, he claims, this impoverished idea of time was incorporated in theoretical physics: "Change is nothing but the denial of becoming; a time is only a

parameter, unaffected by the transformation which it describes".⁵ Further on in this speech he adds that

in this vision, the rest, including man himself, became only a kind of illusion, devoid of fundamental significance, In a sense, the idea was to go away from the changes, from the turmoil of human existence, and to go to an ideal world in which time could not exist. . . . [W]e can no more be satisfied with the view which was much advocated by Einstein, for example, that the basic laws don't know time; that time comes only in at a later stage, through some kind of approximation.⁶

Prigogine goes on to say that thermodynamics is the first formulation of time in physics and that thermodynamics is based on the distinction between processes that are independent of and those that are dependent on the direction of time. It is those processes that depend on the direction of time (heat conduction, for example) for which the term 'entropy' was created to summarize the existence of processes in which a quantity could increase because of irreversible processes. It is only since the 1930's that physicists' interest in these irreversible processes has begun to complement the traditional focus on equilibrium. Previously, "irreversible processes, because of their strangeness, of the fact that time had an arrow, were considered to be a little outside, a nuisance, a way of avoiding to obtain the maximum yield in thermal engines, a subject not worthwhile to be studied".⁷

Investigations with time-dependent phenomena in open systems have occasioned a shift in thinking. Previously order, manifested in equilibrium, was taken to be the natural condition of physical phenomena. Now, a form of disordering (or, order through fluctuation) in out-of-

⁵Ilya Prigogine, "Order Out of Chaos" (University of Texas, Public lecture, 1977), p. 3 of verbatim transcript.

⁶Ibid., pp. 3-4.

⁷Ibid., p. 4.

equilibrium states is recognized as one type of natural condition.⁸ Among the hypotheses founded on the static order of rational mechanics in the social sciences is the hypothesis of equilibrium in neo-classical economic theory.⁹ One could also say that the linear planning model of goal-survey-analysis-plan is a time-independent model that assumes a disequilibrium state at the outset which is treated to convert it to static equilibrium in the classical sense.

3.3 Pervasiveness of Causal Explanation

Logical positivism, the scientific philosophy associated with scientific method, takes as a leading tenet the unity of science.¹⁰ By this assertion, scientific method as developed in the physical sciences is also appropriately used in other fields because underlying the method is a theory of how we know which is asserted to apply universally.

Indeed, according to the philosopher of science, Herbert Feigl, there are two reductionist theses concerning the unity of science principle in the positivist school. The first is based on objective observation and description in objective, rigorous propositions. "In this view, all classifications of the sciences, or divisions of their subject matter, were seen as artificial, valuable at best only administratively, but without

⁸Prigogine, "Order Through Fluctuation," in Evolution and Consciousness, eds. E. Jantsch and C. Waddington (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1976), pp. 93-133.

⁹For a discussion of time in neo-classical economics, see Joan Robinson, Economic Heresies (New York: Basic Books, 1971), chapter 4. For a discussion of Keynes' view of equilibrium as a fiction, see Piero Mini, Philosophy and Economics (Gainesville, Fla.: University of Florida Press, 1974, pp. 255-273.

¹⁰Logical positivism evolved first into logical empiricism, incorporating the leading Pragmatists, and then further to what is now called Analytic and Linguistic philosophy. Here, "logical positivism" is used throughout since it appears to be the commonly used name for the epistemology in its general form.

philosophical justification".¹¹ The second takes a wholly different line. It focusses on the reductions within physics itself which "encourage the idea of a unitary set of physical premises from which the regularities of all of reality could be derived. . . . The most controversial part of this reductionist ideology, however, concerns the realm of organic life and especially that of mind; it concerns, in other words, the reducibility of biology to physics and chemistry and of psychology to neurophysiology -- and (though this is clearly utopian at present) of both ultimately to basic physics".¹²

A method for a unified science relies on a unified epistemology. Based on Kolakowski, Spurling gives three basic postulates of positivism that capture the epistemological claims:

(1) the rule of phenomenalism, the belief that there is no real difference between 'essence' and 'phenomena', so that positivists believe 'we are entitled to record only that which is actually manifested in experience; opinions concerning occult entities of which experienced things are supposedly the manifestations are untrustworthy'. . . . (2) The rule of nominalism, which maintains that 'we may not assume that any insight formulated in general terms can have any real referents other than individual concrete objects'. . . . From this it follows that 'the world we know is a collection of individual observable facts. Science aims at ordering these facts. . . .' (3) Finally, as a consequence of phenomenalism and nominalism, there is the rule that maintains an essential difference between descriptive and evaluative or normative statements, and refuses to call normative statements knowledge.¹³

Accordingly, the process by which testability is governed, the hypothetico-deductive method, determines what is knowledge in any field. That which cannot be confirmed through the method is non-sense or, as it was

¹¹Encyclopedia Britannica, 15th ed., s.v. "Positivism and Logical Empiricism," by Herbert E. Feigl, p. 880.

¹²Ibid.

¹³Laurie Spurling, Phenomenology and the Social World (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977), pp. 76-77, citing Leszek Kolakowski, Positivist Philosophy (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972), from pp. 11-15. Spurling's emphases.

more delicately said later, the remainder has an expressive but not representational function and is more properly the realm of metaphysics.

Barrett says

Positivist man is a curious creature who dwells in the tiny island of light composed of what he finds scientifically 'meaningful'; while the whole surrounding area in which ordinary men live from day to day and have their dealings with other men is consigned to the outer darkness of the 'meaningless'.¹⁴

The crux of the matter for planning lies in the rigid separation between description and evaluation. As Spurling says, the implication of this is that "[p]ositivism is not concerned with how a theory is generated, but only with how it is empirically validated, and worthy to be considered as valid knowledge".¹⁵ A method in which all meaning must be referred to the concrete is stymied in the face of choice and evaluation which not only are the effects of the meaning interpretative of social reality but in the process create meaning in irreversible time.

3.4 The Problem of Language

Any method for describing or explaining human affairs must inevitably concern itself with language. The epistemological foundations of positivism rest on the empirical testability of hypotheses. For a hypothesis to be testable it must be stated in language that is precise and unambiguous. Positivists have dealt with this problem by assuming that (a) "language is the only means of articulating thought" and that (b) "everything which is not speakable thought, is feeling."¹⁶

¹⁴William Barrett, Irrational Man (New York: Doubleday, 1958; Anchor Books, 1962), p. 21

¹⁵Phenomenology, p. 79.

¹⁶Suzanne Langer, Philosophy in a New Key, 3rd ed. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976), p. 87.

To uphold the testability criterion it must be possible to show that what is said or written in words, and what is referred to, are identical and without bias. If this were possible we would all know precisely what is meant when one of us referred to a certain thing. It would be possible to have a description and meaning for the thing sufficiently complete and absolute that there would be no remainder that elicited doubt.

This works quite well in some circumstances.

If I say 'monkey' while we are standing in front of the monkey cage at the zoo, it is fairly clear what I am referring to. In this case the word¹⁷ is used as an indicator of an actual thing which exists in our immediate experience. I am denoting the animal, and the word that I use to do so is sufficiently precise in everyday parlance to signify what I am referring to.¹⁸ We can, without much difficulty, distinguish among signs used as indicators: if I had said 'rabbit' while referring to the monkey I would be absolutely wrong in terms of our conventional use of words. Monkey is the sign of the long-tailed creature in the cage. Nonetheless a monkey is not intrinsically a monkey: this is only the word used by convention by English speakers. To the French speaker it is "un singe"; to the Portuguese speaker it is "um macaco"; and so on.

These are sense messages, often having to do with elementary survival. They have to do with what is in our immediate, or almost immediate, experience. The sign and what they signify are very nearly identical in our experience.

¹⁷A word is used here as an example, but the description applies to all sorts of signs such as marks, sounds, figures, gestures.

¹⁸Words such as house, street, playground, land use map and traffic signal were not used as examples because these belong to the planning vocabulary and have acquired varying definitions and images. A zoologist, on the other hand, might find 'street' a simple example while 'monkey' would be more difficult because of his having extensive knowledge about monkeys.

A word may also be a referent for something that is not present and not able to be seen, smelled, tasted, heard or touched. In this case, the word, used as a referent may be called a symbol. The word 'change', for instance is not a sense message but a symbolic message connoting difference over time. 'Difference' and 'time' are also symbols-as-referents. Most of our expression employs symbols-as-referents rather than signs-as-indicators. Symbols serve "to let us develop a characteristic attitude toward objects in absentia, which is called 'thinking of' or 'referring to' what is not here."¹⁹

No matter how thingish a thing in the material world is we cannot get it into language without incurring some interpretation. One of Kuhn's principal points is that we perceive without interpretation; it is an unconscious activity. But interpretation, which is often unconscious too, is not unconscious in the same way as perception. Yet it has been traditional since Descartes to confound the two.²⁰ Interpretation begins immediately following perception and is an image-forming stage. Some of the images will reach consciousness, some will not. Bateson points out that what comes to consciousness is selected according to one's purposes. It is not a random sampling of what has been perceived.²¹

For example:

The sight of a pothole in front of me when I am cycling is a sign of potential danger. The pothole is not intrinsically dangerous. My perception of the hole gets translated into an image of what will happen

¹⁹Langer, New Key, p. 31.

²⁰Kuhn, Structure, p. 195.

²¹Gregory Bateson, Steps to an Ecology of Mind (New York: Ballantine Books, 1972), p. 432. Note that we can also have images of things or relations for which there is no conventional expression and which will be expressed metaphorically. This is discussed in section 4.3 and more fully in 5.2.1 below.

if the bicycle wheel goes into it. Thus: I perceive the pothole; the image of its potential danger succeeds the perception. If I am an inexperienced cyclist I will consciously swerve. The image came to consciousness. If I am experienced, I can carry on thinking about something else and still miss the hole. The image did not come to consciousness.

The positivist view of language is that if words are sufficiently unambiguous with respect to what they represent, they can be combined into testable propositions. Kuhn argues, however, that even an expression which is supposedly unambiguous such as $f = ma$, Newton's Second Law of Motion, functions in part as a law and in part as a way of defining some of the symbols it deploys.²² The expression is only unambiguous if one disregards the context in which it is used.

Given the difficulties of translating the things of this world into "speakable thought", it should come as no surprise that the positivist criteria leave the planner with a very tiny category of "objective" language and an enormous category of "feeling" into which all other forms of expression falls -- indeed all comment on the condition of mankind which is the stuff of urban planning.

Positivism has a notion of adequate speech as impersonal, de-authored speech, free from individual bias and commitment, speech which copies nature rather than serving to reflect the speaker.²³

3.5 Rationality and Rational Objects

Conscious purpose is purpose held at the level of consciousness. It is rational in the sense that rational means to be endowed with reason, or to exercise reason. The substantive noun for reasoned thought is

²²Kuhn, Structure, p. 183.

²³Spurling, Phenomenology, p. 77.

rationality. It is distinguished from intuition, faith, or habit, for instance, which do not stem from conscious reasoning. Presumably planners would argue for a way of proceeding in practice and research that is in some measure rational, that is to say, uses reasoned thought.

Rationality as reasoned thought is a common sense view of rationality. Theoretical considerations of rationality have drawn planners into knotty problems that have obscured not only the common sense view but also the view that rationality is only one among several ways of knowing. In addition, "rational" has come to refer not only to a way of knowing but also to the objects of knowing. Examples are man ("rational man"), goals, actions, decisions.²⁴

Two points are raised here. The first concerns a major argument of this thesis, which is that conscious purpose, or reasoned thinking, is not the only process with effects that is occurring when one plans. Rather, rational processes are just one type in a context of processes. It is discussed further in the following section and in succeeding chapters. The second point is the subject of this section: that "rational", when applied to objects such as goals, is a normative attribution which is treated as an absolute.

An example of slipping from the contextual use of rationality to the absolute may be helpful. Simon reaffirmed the contextual nature of rationality with his "bounded rationality". According to this principle,

The capacity of the human mind for formulating and solving complex problems is very small compared with the size of the problems whose solution is required for objectively rational behavior in the real world -- or even for a reasonable approximation to such objective rationality.²⁵

²⁴The distinction between "reason" and "rational" is broached briefly by Bolan in "Mapping the Planning Theory Terrain", in Planning in America, ed. D.R. Godschalk (Washington, D.C.: American Institute of Planners, 1977), p. 26.

²⁵Herbert A. Simon, Models of Man (London: John Wiley, 1957), p. 198.

Friedmann starts off with the principle of bounded rationality (attributed variously to March and Simon on p. 226, and to Simon on p. 234) which he describes as meaning "that a decision can be no more rational than the conditions under which it is made; the most that planners can hope for is the most rational decision under the circumstances".²⁶ To this point, rationality in Friedmann's description is contextual. What is rational is restricted by and dependent on the circumstances. He then identifies what he says are two basic forms of bounded rationality: functionally rational thought which is "rational with respect to the means only", and substantially rational thought which is "rational with respect to both the ends and means of action" (p. 236). His two categories describe ways to classify rational thought with respect to the objects of that thought, that is, means and ends, rather than in a context. Accordingly, he can determine if the means, or means/end combination, are rational, which in this case means 'right' or 'proper'. He has subtly slipped from using "rational" as a contextual term that might describe an action within a set of circumstances to using "rational" as an absolute term that one can assign, or withhold from assigning, to the means or ends of planning.

(It must be mentioned that determining the use and thus the sense of "rational" has not been the work of planners particularly. It has been the preoccupation of many fields since Descartes. Discussions of rationality in economics and organization theory have been particularly influential for planners.)

There is a world of difference between the contextual and absolute uses of "rational". Treatment of a relative term as if it were an absolute term always ends in paradox. We are faced with the question of whether

²⁶John Friedmann, "Conceptual Model," p. 235. Emphasis in original.

something is either rational or irrational. (These statements apply also to "objectivity", "better", and so on.) What may be rational in one circumstance or from one perspective can always be found to be irrational from another. For sports fans it may be rational to tear down houses to put up a stadium. For the residents of those houses it may be quite irrational. It can never be resolved absolutely by any facts that may be proffered that soccer is rational and houses are not, or vice versa. It can only be shown to be rational within a particular context; change the context and what is rational changes.

Rationality is only what we define it to be. The economist, for example, depends heavily on a definition of rationality and will say that individuals act rationally when they maximize their self-interests. From the point of view of the economist, a person maximizes his own interests when he buys the thing he prefers more, rather than something he prefers less. (How the individual came to have particular preferences rather than others is said by economists to lie outside their domain.) So far this is quite logical. The difficulty enters when we see this person as more than economically motivated. He may choose not to buy the thing he prefers because it is the last one in town and his mother needs it more than he does. Or he may choose not to buy the one he prefers because it comes in an aerosol can and he is concerned about the ozone layer which is reputed to be damaged by the use of aerosol cans. Or, he may choose not to buy the beverage he prefers because he has changed to a religion that frowns on drinking that beverage. Has he stopped preferring it and therefore the rationality criterion holds? Or has he superimposed a value that he ranks higher than his economic rationality, thereby changing the context?

What is rational and what is irrational depends on how we bound the context. Its definition is always instrumental and suited to our purposes. It will depend on how we believe the context should be bounded, and within

that, how individuals should behave. When a researcher begins with a model of what is rational, imposing this on the data to see how well the data can predict that model of rationality, it is not at all difficult to come up with the sort of answers that correspond to one's purposes. Particularly vivid and pertinent examples of the instrumentality of such an approach abound in theories which use the claim of innateness to make phenomena such as human violence, white male intelligence relative to the intelligence of others, female docility, or the socio-economic status of blacks appear rational. "All these claims", says Gould, "have a common underpinning in postulating a direct genetic basis for our most fundamental traits."²⁷ However, no evidence exists to support the argument that traits are "coded into our consciousness by genes; they may be inculcated equally well by learning."²⁸

In the meantime, the political popularity of such theories, convincingly clothed in the language of science, almost guarantees their use in fields devoted to governing change. Newman's Defensible Space (1972) is a case in point.²⁹ He takes the theory of man's innate territorial aggressiveness (he calls it "latent territoriality" on page 3), popularized by Lorenz, Ardrey and Morris³⁰ as the justification for designing environments "hardened" against crime. We are to understand that it is rational to design spaces to counteract these barely disguised animal instincts. Hillier delivers a devastating critique of Newman's work arguing

²⁷Stephen Jay Gould, Ever-Since Darwin (New York: W.W. Norton, 1979), p. 238.

²⁸Ibid., p. 257.

²⁹Oscar Newman, Defensible Space (New York: Macmillan Co., 1972).

³⁰Konrad Lorenz, On Aggression (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1966); Robert Ardrey, The-Territoriality-Imperative (New York, Atheneum, 1966); Desmond Morris, The Naked Ape (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967).

first that the territoriality theory has long been discredited as yet another behavioural universal that fails to explain the historical and ethnographic evidence, and second that "by associating the scientific approach with statistical manipulation and reference to borrowed theories" Newman obscures the "social reasoning behind the very built forms he is criticising" which "originated in precisely the same kind of debate about the use of design to achieve social order and control."³¹

There are many examples of the guises under which so-called innate human characteristics are turned into the bases for prescriptions for social action. The models may seem to be rational (endowed with reason) from the perspective of those whose purposes are served. However, they are politically rational ("right", "proper"), not scientifically rational (endowed with reason).

3.6 The Mind/Body Split

We are in the habit of assuming that the mind is a means to achieve the goals of the body. A set of arguments follows from this assumption. First, mind and body are related only for utilitarian reasons. They are autonomous working parts. Utilitarian purposes for forms of expression such as art, music, metaphor, love, tears, joy, play, ritual, religion, dreaming, fantasy, poetry, and so on, cannot be verified using positivist tenets. We assume, therefore, that if they are apparently without purpose they are not rational. If they are not rational they should not be given consideration

³¹Bill Hillier, "In Defence of Space," Royal Institute of British Architects Journal 80 (November 1973), p. 543. For other examples of the territoriality theory in the planning literature see two articles by Barrie B. Greenbie: "What can we Learn from Other Animals?: Behavioral Biology and the Ecology of Cities," Journal of the American Institute of Planners 37 (June 1971), pp. 162-168; and "Social Territory, Community Health and Urban Planning," Journal of the American Institute of Planners 40 (March 1974), pp. 74-82.

when formulating goals since one's objective is to set rational goals. Therefore these forms of expression are irrelevant to discussions and descriptions of goals.

Langer argues that the habit of using the mind/body split assumption is fostered by wide acceptance of the bio-genetic theory of mind that "traces all wants and aims of mankind to some initial protoplasmic response."³² This genetic fallacy is extended to language and other symbol-using forms of expression which are seen as simply more sophisticated means for adapting to basic biological needs such as food, shelter, procreation and security. The trouble with this theory, Langer points out, is that symbol-using has such a wide margin for error that it is a very poorly adapted means for achieving biological needs. One illustration of the poor fit between symbolic expression and mere survival is that communication in which signals are not intrinsic to their referents permits lying. This is Rappaport's point.

Lying seems possible if and only if a signal is not intrinsic to its referent. Lies are thus transmitted by symbolic communication and symbolic communication only. Although there seems to be some limited use of symbols by infrahuman animals, man's reliance upon symbolic communication exceeds that of other animals to such an extent that it is probably for man alone that the transmission of false information becomes a serious problem.³³

The cat is better equipped to achieve its biological needs with its simple meows, purring and leg-rubbing than man is with all his complicated symbolic language that has so little to do with basic survival. Indeed it may get in the way of basic survival.

If symbolic communication has not evolved as a means to survival, is it reasonable to assume that symbolization is itself a need? Langer favours

³²Langer, New-Key, p. 28.

³³Roy A. Rappaport, "Sanctity and Adaptation," Co-Evolution Quarterly (Summer 1974): 59.

this hypothesis and supports its plausibility with accounts of four activities that in a rationally adapted species would not be so widespread: the love of magic, the love of ritual, our serious attitude toward art, and dreaming during sleep. Dreaming, as she says, "presents us with things we do not want to think about, the things which stand in the way of practical living."³⁴

If Langer's argument is correct, it is necessary to expand the category of needs to include symbolization as a need itself, rather than a means to some ulterior need. In this case, the assumption with which we began -- that the mind is a means to achieve the goals of the body -- is false and the remainder of the argument crumbles. It becomes necessary to consider the place of so-called non-rational forms of expression in human affairs.

To some degree, planners have always retained an interest in introducing intuition and apparently non-rational behaviour in their models and practice. The official definitions of planning have accommodated 'art' as an element of planning as described in chapter 2. However, the integration has never been theoretically successful because of the simultaneous acceptance, however loosely, of positivist tenets which demand a split between mind (emotive forms of expression) and body (empirically verifiable forms of expression). What does not seem to be recognized in the literature is that the split is inherent in the positivist epistemology. No amount of ad hoc tinkering on the part of planners will permit their reunion within the positivist model.

The mind/body split has been the subject of an enormous literature. It is the grand-daddy dichotomy that justifies as logical a chain of others, for example the art/science split (see chapter 2) and the means/end split.

³⁴Langer, New Key, p. 38

This latter dichotomy has, of course, been discussed at length by planners³⁵. However, planners' arguments do not seem to recognize that separating ends and means, just as separating art and science, is a hard-programmed habit of thought grounded in the dominant epistemology. An argument against working in this mode was made many years ago by Margaret Mead who is paraphrased here by Bateson:

Before we apply social science to our own national affairs, we must re-examine and change our habits of thought on the subject of means and ends. We have learnt, in our cultural setting, to classify behavior into 'means' and 'ends' and if we go on defining ends as separate from means and apply the social sciences as crudely instrumental means, using the recipes of science to manipulate people, we shall arrive at a totalitarian rather than a democratic system of life.³⁶

3.7 Another Epistemology?

One of the difficulties of moving to another epistemology is the relation that has developed subtly and pervasively between logical positivism and the notion of what it is to be 'scientific' whereby the latter is co-extensive with the former. In this relation, if one rejects the positivist's empiricism one automatically rejects a scientific approach. But this is not an either/or situation: to eschew the positivist's view of science for the normative activity of planning is not to discount its applicability in other fields. Indeed, the problem does not lie with science as an activity but with the limited view of science planners work with.

To approach planning from a stance that does not reify conscious purpose at the expense of unconscious purposes is one of the principal arguments underlying the aspects of a critical method presented in chapters

³⁵See, for example, Edward Banfield, "Ends and Means in Planning", International Social Science Journal 11 (March 1959): 361-368.

³⁶Bateson, Steps, p. 160.

5, 6, and 7. Before moving to that discussion, a description of the disciplinary matrix as the seat of much of unconscious purpose is presented in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 4

THE DISCIPLINARY MATRIX

4.1 Both Descriptive and Prescriptive

In the previous chapter we explored the source of the assumption in planning that human affairs proceed according to conscious purposes and that this is the way they should proceed. It is difficult to untangle whether the scientific and philosophical justification preceded the normative imperative, or vice versa. This problem of untangling description and prescription is also at the heart of questions about the existence and effects of a disciplinary matrix.

Once a group shares a belief, it is regularly used as the starting point for describing phenomena. For example, a common belief among planners was that a "city is not a single, monolithic unit, but is composed of individual, identifiable parts."¹ The parts were identified functionally, and one functional part was the residential neighbourhood unit. For those planners who held the functional view, this belief about the city generally served as a datum rather than an hypothesis in their descriptions of cities. Standardized description is one, but not the only effect of the belief. This descriptive activity is overlaid by a "sanctifying" activity whereby the very certification of the belief by the group accords to it a

¹Gilbert Herbert, "The Organic Analogy in Town Planning," Journal of the American Institute of Planners 29(August 1963):206.

normative imperative. The belief in functional units becomes entrenched as "the neighbourhood unit principle". One is expected to adhere to the principle if one is a member of the group and in this way some order is achieved so that the group and its work can be distinguished from that of others. It is therefore more than simply a belief with consequences for the ensuing description. It also belongs to the class of beliefs exercising normative claims against the development of knowledge among members of the group.

It is not possible to distinguish the descriptive role of the belief from the prescription to share the belief. The neighbourhood unit principle becomes an exemplar in the sense Kuhn gives it in the Postscript.² The student learns the exemplar and when to apply it at the same time as learning to be a planner and learning to be a member of the group of planners. Prescription and description are simultaneously active: attempting to claim that one is operative to the exclusion of the other is paradoxical in the way that applying rational and irrational to an object of our knowing is paradoxical. It is not a question that a belief is either prescriptive or descriptive, but that it is in some degree both.

This chapter is devoted to describing the dual role of the disciplinary matrix as both the class of consensual beliefs that allows day-to-day planning to proceed (its descriptive role); and as a member of the class of things that go into the practice of planning. It is the member which unreflectively adapts to information in ways that preserve the homeostasis of the belief system (its prescriptive role).

There are two ways in which the connotation of "disciplinary matrix" is modified somewhat in this study from Kuhn's very brief description. The word "disciplinary" should not be restricted to connoting an academic

²Kuhn, Structure, p. 187.

discipline but rather made richer by joining to it the more general meaning associated with "discipline" -- "a system of rules of conduct."³ The second modification concerns "matrix". The emphasis should be placed on its meaning "an embedding or enclosing mass."⁴ The reason for these modifications is to suppress the notion that the disciplinary matrix is composed of discrete elements and to express it as a constellation of relations in which patterns can be identified.

4.2 Both Metaphor and Metaphoric

The disciplinary matrix is a locus for the beliefs held by planners about individual organisms, human society, and the larger ecosystem. The beliefs are "sanctified" by their very acceptance as group-shared beliefs.

. . . sanctity is the quality of unquestionable truthfulness imputed by the faithful to unverifiable propositions. As such it is not ultimately a property of objects, or putative objects, but of discourse about them.⁵

With reference to our previous example, it is not the validity of the neighbourhood unit principle that is sanctified but the assertion that it is valid. The assertion is a statement (verbalized or not) about the principle. Sanctity is not claimed to belong to the principle itself but to what is said or believed about it.

The propositions that Rappaport speaks about are "unverifiable" in the sense that in the constructivist view of knowledge, it is possible to make choices about or to interpret validity, objectivity, usefulness, consistency, and so on, but ultimately these remain as choices or interpretations and cannot be verified absolutely.

³The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 3rd ed. revised (1970) s.v. "Discipline."

⁴Ibid., s.v. "Matrix."

⁵Rappaport, "Sanctity," p. 60, emphasis in original.

Sanctification of messages as beliefs is adaptive but does not mean that the messages are true. Adaptation is not dependent on "truth". However, Rappaport argues that since a minimum degree of social order is necessary, therefore the "acceptance of messages as true, whether or not they are, contributes to this orderliness" and "it may even be claimed that belief, insofar as it results in non-random actions which lead to predictable responses, creates orderliness by creating truth."⁶ The beliefs that we claim as part of the disciplinary matrix appear to fall into that class of messages "the validity of which is a function of the belief in them."⁷

The beliefs are communicated via shared models, analogies, metaphors, values and other interpretative relations that are used without explicit reference to their assumptions. They have become habits or conventions.

A belief of course is not directly observable. We can only attempt to say what beliefs are held by a group by reference to the behaviour of planners or by reference to the statements planners make about what they are doing or will do. In this sense, the disciplinary matrix is metaphoric: it is a mode for translating beliefs into shared relations that have effects. It is a metaphor for the sharing of certain beliefs so that work can proceed and as such is a statement about the class of things actually shared. It is a metaphor for what is sanctified. In other words, the disciplinary matrix is both metaphoric and a class of relations, some members of which are metaphors.

⁶Ibid.

⁷Ibid. Rappaport citing Gregory Bateson, "Conventions of Communication: Where Validity Depends Upon Belief," in Communication, eds. Jurgen Ruesch and Gregory Bateson (New York, W.W. Norton, 1951).

4.3 A Metaphor is a Relation

The position taken here is that metaphor only occurs as a relation. It is not a fixed entity. Metaphor is a function of shared conventions and of levels of reference. There are no metaphors per se.⁸

For example:

If I speak of a teacher in whom I have lost confidence as a "melted guru", it will make no sense to someone who does not know the word "guru" and therefore assumes that a guru -- whatever it is -- is like ice and really can melt. Similarly, saying that fanatical joggers suffer from narcissism of the tendons requires shared conventions to be comprehensible. Everything can be interpreted metaphorically by moving to another level of reference. When I say I am going to take a walk, this appears entirely matter-of-fact and indeed is so in the standard course of events. However, given a special frame of reference -- for example, a planning board meeting -- taking a walk may represent catharsis because I am feeling anxious, angry or fed up. From the point of view of someone else at the meeting, my walking out may represent intolerance for the democratic process. At any rate, taking a walk in this context has little in common with the prosaic sort of walk beyond the fact that in both cases I propel myself with my legs.⁹

⁸Colin Turbayne, The Myth of Metaphor, revised edition (Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 1971), p. 18.

⁹Metaphor seems particularly resistant to definition, if the growing literature on the subject is indicative. Marshall McLuhan says on page 13 in The Gutenberg Galaxy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1962; Mentor Books, 1969):

Language is metaphor in the sense that it not only stores but translates experience from one mode into another. Money is metaphor in the sense that it stores skill and labour and also translates one skill into another. But the principle of exchange and translation, or metaphor, is in our rational power to translate all of our sense into one another. In Our Own Metaphor, (New York: Knopf, 1972) M.C. Bateson says on page 285: "Each person is his own central metaphor." One of the several senses in which she means this is: "Any kind of representation within a person of

It may appear from the above that metaphor is everything and therefore meaningless. But this would be incorrect. Metaphoric meaning is constrained by the level of reference or, more precisely, the bounding of the system within which one is exchanging information.

A bear that I am looking at as an organism bounded at its fur is not metaphoric; Winnie-the-Pooh in his exploits with the "hunny pot" is metaphoric. The split-level bungalow on the 60 by 100 foot lot is not metaphoric; the residential development comprised of split-level bungalows and named "Bungalow Heaven", or for that matter, "Cedar Acres", is metaphoric.

Content (bear; bungalow) and context (with "hunny pot"; with evocative name) are discussed more fully in the next section.

Since metaphor is a case of presenting one sort of thing in terms of another, metaphoric meaning is also constrained by the need to share social conventions by which one can distinguish the sort-crossing.

Ice melts; gurus do not. Individuals can be narcissistic because they can be self-conscious; tendons cannot be self-conscious.

Metaphoric meaning is also constrained by conventional use.

"Interest" acquired from lending money, for example, has lost its metaphoric impact since it is now an entirely commonplace or conventional term in this context. Conventions are one form of code used in human communication. They are discussed in section 4.5.

something outside depends on there being sufficient diversity within him to reflect the relationships in what he perceives . . ." This view is discussed further in section 6.7 below. Metaphor and Thought, edited by Andrew Ortony (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979) contains twenty-one papers dealing with the questions "What are metaphors?" and "What are metaphors for?", including papers by Max Black, Thomas Kuhn and Donald Schön. My judgment is that the most useful way to see metaphor is as a relation that is made meaningful contextually. More is said about metaphors, models, analogies and other interpretative relations in chapter 6.

The types of constraints which are to be discussed are not discrete even though they are described sequentially in what follows. They should be described simulataneously but the requirements of linear presentation do not permit this.

4.4 Content and Context

Work in linguistics, information theory, systems and non-mechanistic cybernetics shares at least this: that the meaning of a given bit of information is always found in the information-plus-context relation and not "in" the bit of information itself.^{10, 11} For example, the letter 's' as a speech sound or phoneme in the English language requires that it be combined with other phonemes to at least the level of a morpheme, such as 'ist', in order to be meaningful. Simply as 's', in the context of the English language, it is an indicator. For the morpheme to have meaning, it must be combined to the level of at least a word, for instance,

¹⁰See, for example, Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics (London: Peter Owen, 1964), p. 102; John R. Searle, Speech Acts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), p. 16; Anthony Wilden, System and Structure (London: Tavistock, 1972), p. 184. C.S. Holling, "Resilience and Stability of Ecosystems," in Evolution and Consciousness, eds. E. Jantsch and C. Waddington (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1976), p. 81; Gregory Bateson, Steps, p. 402.

¹¹Anthony Wilden and Tim Wilson give the following definition of information in "The Double Bind," in Double Bind, eds. C.E. Sluzki and D.C. Ransom (New York: Grune & Stratton, 1976), p. 268.

Information may most simply and adequately be defined as "variety" imprinted on a matter-energy base. In itself it has no meaning or signification and is not intrinsically distinct from "noise". For a given goal-seeking subsystem, however, information will represent structured or coded variety, and noise, unstructured variety. As a general rule, the more complex the system, the wider the range and the types of variety it will employ as information. The distinction between energy and information is thus neither objective nor subjective as such; it is systemic. Another, perhaps more easily grasped, description of information is given in section 5.8: Gregory Bateson's information as "a difference that makes a difference."

'ventriloquist'; a word to a sentence -- "Charlie McCarthy's friend was a ventriloquist"; a sentence to a discourse -- a series of sentences.

Each more encompassing level provides a context within which meaning is possible for the more restrictive level's content, or "text". At the same time, the more encompassing level provides a structure which is less rigid and with more room to choose among alternatives than the more restrictive level provided for its text. The sentence is context to the word; the word is context to the morpheme. The ways that the word can be combined with others to form sentences offers more choices than the combinations of morphemes to words or letters to morphemes.¹²

Meaning is impossible without context. It is the context that determines the constraints and possibilities of meaning. Wilden is careful to note the difference between meaning and signification.

The meaning is not simply the use, as Wittgenstein put it, but the use in terms of an end and in relation to a real context. Signification may or may not be involved in a real context, for it can create its own context. . . . Meaning thus may or may not involve signification. Meaning is mainly concerned with both/and differences, signification with distinctions, some of which are either/or oppositions.¹³

Thus we can describe a 'bit' of information in exquisite detail but we cannot say what it means until it has a context. This is an essential difference between description and explanation or justification. Context is the effect of system bounding at at least one degree more encompassing a level -- a level which can give meaning to the phenomenon being described. A specified context, or a context which is jointly understood by communicators, is necessary so that we know whether we are talking about a

¹²There are, after all, a finite number of letters used in the English language (and most others), and a roughly definite number of words at a given period, while the number of possible sentences is, for our intents and purposes, infinite.

¹³Wilden, System and Structure, p. 184.

bear-as-organism or a bear-as-metaphor. In the former case, the bear is simply signified and may be described, but as such has no context. In the latter, the bear is set in context with a hunny pot and has meaning for anyone who has learned that bears like honey. Similar statements could be made about bungalow-as-dwelling-unit and bungalow-as-safe-haven.

Levels of reference for system bounding may be hierarchically ordered as shown in the language example. Meaning is then a function of the hierarchy. However, there are many situations where hierarchy is not at work, that is, in which there is no single highest level or monitor. The term "heterarchy" can be used where the lower level system is co-extensive with an individual or a group of individuals. In such cases, the lower order system has purposes of its own so that

Whereas most men are willing to accept such axioms as "the shortest distance between two points is a straight line" as the basis for certain of their behavior, they are likely to be more dubious about accepting calls to fight in distant wars, or production quotas the rationale for which they do not understand and do not believe to be in their own interest (i.e., in accord with their own purposes).¹⁴

Sanctification of rules at a higher level is an important ordering relation so that the purposes of the lower levels are not enhanced by contravening the rules. Sanctity, as Rappaport sums it up, "helps to keep subsystems in their places."¹⁵ In terms of the disciplinary matrix, the sharing of certain beliefs sanctifies them and in most instances gives them pecking-order power over the purposes of individual planners, acting as planners who are members of a class.

¹⁴Rappaport, "Sanctity," p. 61. On heterarchies, see also Douglas R. Hofstadter, Gödel, Escher, Bach (New York: Basic Books, 1979; Vintage Books, 1980), p. 134.

¹⁵Rappaport, "Sanctity," p. 61.

4.5 Codes as Operators

Communication theorists tell us we do not communicate "directly" but "mediately". Between the sender and the receiver of a message are codes (sets of rules or constraints) that if shared by the sender and receiver will provide contextual meaning for the message (the actual words). A code may be as simple as conventional usage. For instance, an apple is called "apple" by convention, not because of any intrinsic relation between the word and its referent. Or a code may be relatively complex such as the code of etiquette for addressing dignitaries.

If the code is not shared (as for example between an English speaker and a French speaker, neither of whom speaks the other language), no message gets through. In this example, the English and French languages are codes. If these two people are face-to-face, other codes such as gestures and tone of voice may convey some part of the message.

Earlier, metaphors were described as depending for their meaning on a shared understanding of the terms of the metaphor by the sender and the receiver. Consider this sentence: "Slum clearance -- a new attack on this cancer of urban life -- is long overdue."¹⁶ Senator Croll is of course speaking metaphorically. The metaphor is "a slum is a cancer". For the metaphor to have effect as a metaphor, one condition is that the code of conventional use of these words (slum, cancer) be shared by both Croll and his readers. His message is understood in the context of the shared code of conventional usage of the words "slum" and "cancer" and on the understanding created by the metaphor -- the juxtaposition of words not traditionally found together until approximately the middle of this century. The metaphor now provides a code for sharing meaning about the nature of slums. The



¹⁶Senator David A. Croll, "The Objectives of Redevelopment in Canadian Cities," Community-Planning-Association-of-Canada-Review 6(December 1956), p. 146.

metaphor ("a slum is a cancer") acts as an operator on the content (slum), which is an operand, so to speak.

Operators are obviously a different type of thing than operands. First of all they are functions rather than entities, by definition. Secondly, they appear to be created at a less conscious level and to be used without explicit consciousness.¹⁷

Take a simple example of the code as operator. If I say to someone, "You turkey!" and I do not smile while saying it, the person I am addressing may get very angry. However, if I smile at the same time as saying it, the phrase becomes a phrase of endearment. Smile or no smile sets the context for the statement and is crucial to the meaning of the statement. I do not consciously make the appropriate facial gesture to establish the meaning. It occurs from some other level which is not involuntary yet is not conscious.¹⁸

The code is an operator on the "bracketed" phrase:

 (You turkey!) OR  (You turkey!)

It may be illustratively helpful to cite the example of sacrament from Gregory Bateson.

The Catholic view of the sacrament, which asserts an identity between the wine and the Blood, is the way that level of your mind [the less 'conscious' level at which primary-process thinking takes place] functions. If you become a Protestant and protest that the wine has no corpuscles in it, you are talking, from a Catholic point of view, complete nonsense. On the other hand, you are making a wide general statement about the nature of man and about yourself -- namely, you are asserting, as a Protestant, 'I

¹⁷Gregory Bateson has remarked that "although you don't have to be asleep to produce metaphors, when you are asleep you can produce practically nothing else . . ." Cited in M.C. Bateson, Our Own Metaphor, p. 297.

¹⁸The smile is only one code in the context: the tone of voice, prior discussion, the relationship of sender to receiver, and so on are some other aspects that contribute to deciphering the message. The example here is of course not fully specified. It certainly assumes a non-pathological relationship between the sender and receiver.

am going to handle my religion totally at a conscious level.' This excludes from your religion about three-quarters of yourself, because you aren't all at the conscious level, and you create, in fact, a secular religion.¹⁹

For the Catholic, "the wine is the Blood" is a metaphor. The code is religion, which as operator brackets "the wine is the Blood". For the Protestant, this is a simile. Enormous problems are created if the sender and the receiver interpret the context of a message differently.

Similarly, we get into difficulties by failing to distinguish the operator (the code) from the operand (the message) in a given situation. The Catholic who refers to what is in his wine glass at a dinner party as blood has a context problem. The context for the wine has changed from sacred celebration to secular celebration. Metaphorically the wine is no longer blood but merriment. Metaphors, analogies, models and other interpretative relations in this essay are codes functioning as operators.

4.6 Disciplinary Matrix as Context for Codes

Seen from one level, the disciplinary matrix is a class of things. It is the class of beliefs planners communicate via metaphors, models and other habits of thought about the three major systems -- individual organism, human society and the larger ecosystem. The things in the class which is called the disciplinary matrix are codes functioning as operators on messages as described above. Thus, when the neighbourhood unit principle flourished, a model neighbourhood was clustered around an elementary school and had a hierarchically ordered street pattern. Actual neighbourhoods that planners dealt with were viewed through the screen of this model neighbourhood.

This is one role of the disciplinary matrix: allowing day-to-day work to proceed in neighbourhood planning based on consensual beliefs. The

¹⁹Cited in M.C. Bateson, Our Own Metaphor, p. 297.

disciplinary matrix which ultimately represents beliefs is the context for the specific codes which are the models, analogies, metaphors, and so on. It constrains the sorts of interpretative relations that it can accommodate. Not just any will do. New interpretative relations are admitted to the disciplinary matrix by the group, in the usual course of events, if they are in some way adaptive to its goals. For example, the model of the planner-as-expert appears to be accepted²⁰, whereas the model of the planner-as-responsible appears not to be, as argued in chapter 2.

4.7 Disciplinary Matrix as Code: The Paradox

Seen from another level, and in a second role, the disciplinary matrix is no longer ultimately a class of things. Rather it is itself a member of a class of those things that go into the activity of planning. Other members of the class are, for example, conscious purpose, as discussed in the previous chapter, and non-language-based experience such as intuition, one's sense of beauty, simplicity, rhythm, and so on. The disciplinary matrix shifts from a context role to a content role. It is the code championing replication, order and the status quo in a context of several codes.

In its consensual role and seen from within, the disciplinary matrix is coherent and complete. But when it is seen as a device for maintaining the status quo, and when it is seen from a level of reference that encompasses several other components of planning: its coherence and

²⁰While this point is much argued, and is rejected in the radical concept of planning by Grabow & Heskin, "Foundations," and reversed in the advocacy planning of Davidoff, "Advocacy and Pluralism," the claim is implicit in Friedmann, "Planning as a Vocation," Plan Canada 6(April 1966):99-124 and Plan Canada 7(July 1966):8-25; and Retracking America (New York: Anchor Press, 1973); and in any number of articles and books concerned with planning technique and the professional comportment and education of planners.

completeness are jeopardized. The reason is that whatever information is brought to it is translated in terms of existing patterns of thought. For example, the disciplinary matrix may include accepted metaphors of pathology such as "cancerous", "malignant", or "tumescant". However, whether these metaphors should be part of the disciplinary matrix is a question about the meaning of such metaphors for planning. Normative questions must be posed at a higher, more inclusive level where other possibilities can be identified. When they are posed at the more inclusive level, the seemingly valid metaphors of pathology may seem invalid.

A paradox is created for the planner, who cannot ignore the dictates of the disciplinary matrix as a context for codes if he wants to get any work done, and yet must ignore its dictates if he wants to question its beliefs and hence the sorts of problems and solutions it permits as consistent. Heavy reliance on the disciplinary matrix as a guide to practice leads to a reduction of information ("difference") in the professional group. On the other hand it cannot be dispensed with entirely, as we see in the next section. Like conscious purpose, alone it is not sufficient either to practice or to understand the practice of planning.

4.8 Habits of Thought are Here to Stay

The way to relax the paradox of a disciplinary matrix, which is necessary on the one hand to establish some order, and yet, on the other, by its opacity moves the planning system toward over-coherence, is to ensure that the disciplinary matrix, as a subsystem, does not control the larger system -- the whole planning act. We need a critique that derives from the union of sanctity, experience and logics. That is, to borrow Wilden's term, we need to conduct our criticism eco-logically. As long as the attitudes hidden in the disciplinary matrix remain outside a critique, we work at a very high level of generalization, as exemplified in the declared purpose of

a given planning report, and are unable to untangle the implications of a plan. Making them a part of a critique, we give ourselves more room in which to choose the beliefs that we will continue to endorse and those we will no longer endorse.

The disciplinary matrix is not a construct that is forever fixed. It can and does shift according to our goals and understanding. But as long as we are unaware that the disciplinary matrix is instrumental in guiding our descriptions and prescriptions we are being used by it rather than using it.²¹ We are caught in the trap of tacitly assuming that habits of thought are engraved in stone and of mistaking the content for the context, or the map for the territory.

There is no question of ridding ourselves of all habits of thought. That is not possible: life would be chaotic if every thought and act had to be made consciously or analyzed critically in each circumstance as if patterns did not exist. Nor is getting rid of habits of thought even desirable. Nonetheless, this desire is frequently implied. It is based on the notion that the proper condition of information is orderly and that habits of thought -- the metaphors, the ideologies, the world views and so on -- that are laid onto otherwise ordered information by many minds are sources of disorder and confusion. They are assumed to bar us from precise, objective thinking. We need to clear them away so that we can uncover the natural order. By contrast, habits of thought are argued here to be forms of order -- patterns we use to sort disordered information into order -- and to be necessary in some form and to some extent.

Reddy describes theories of order and disorder in communication. He argues that what he calls the "conduit" metaphor, which is a metaphor for the use of language itself, represents the dominant way of viewing

²¹Turbayne, Myth of Metaphor, p. 22.

communication. It posits perfect communication as the "natural" condition. According to the conduit metaphor of communication, information is transferred as if bodily from one person to another, or from book to person, and so on. Conceptualizing communication in this way, he says, is "largely determined by semantic structures of the language itself."²² We talk about 'getting thoughts across', 'putting concepts into words', 'giving someone an idea of what one means'. By this view, we claim that we have a communication problem and that it could be solved if we could find ways to improve the transferring process. Thus miscommunication is an aberration that needs correction; sufficient improvement would produce harmonious communication.

Reddy challenges this view, using what he calls the "toolmakers paradigm" in which miscommunication is not an aberration but rather a tendency inherent in the system which can only be counteracted by continuous effort. The fact that we can communicate at all is the wonder of the toolmakers paradigm.

In terms of the conduit metaphor, what requires explanation is failure to communicate. Success appears to be automatic. [In the toolmakers paradigm] things will naturally be scattered, unless we expend the energy to gather them. They are not, as the conduit metaphor would have it, naturally gathered, with a frightening population of wrong-headed fools working to scatter them.²³

The conduit metaphor implies that there is a perfect state of mutual understanding from which we have fallen and to which we are ever doomed to aspire. We are called upon by moral imperative to sharpen our good intentions and become "better" communicators. But what is "better"? Who is to say what "better" is? "Better" for whom? For example, in situations

²²Michael J. Reddy, "The Conduit Metaphor," in Metaphor and Thought, ed. Andrew Ortony (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. 285.

²³Ibid., pp. 296-297.

maintained by authoritarian control the least communication downward is the best communication from the point of view of those with power.

The assumption of betterment implies that we could eliminate conflicting views, and achieve harmony, if only we could rise above our ideologies and conventions. Rather, I would agree with Culler and Derrida that:

Freeing ourselves from our most pervasive ideology, our conventions of meaning, 'makes no sense' because we are born into a world of meaning and cannot even shun its demands without thereby recognizing them. And even if we could we should find ourselves amidst a meaningless babble, deprived of 'la lumière du sens' which makes discussion possible. What we must do is to imagine freeing ourselves from the operative conventions so as to see more clearly the conventions themselves.²⁴

The following three chapters are propaedeutic to a critical method for analyzing planning texts. The purpose of such a method is to open the possibility of seeing the content and context of the disciplinary matrix. It does not set out to change the disciplinary matrix. Ideally it would provide ways to ask about the disciplinary matrix.

²⁴Jonathon Culler, Structuralist Poetics (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975), p. 252.

PART TWO

THE PLAN AS SUBJECT

CHAPTER -5

PATTERNS

5.1 Introduction to Part Two

Traditionally, planning evaluations try to answer this question: "Does this plan lead to this stated objective?" In chapter 2, the principles against which plans are measured were outlined. These were all external to the plan itself. In chapter 3 I argued that evaluations are carried out at a high level of abstraction whereby the stated objective is assumed to be the only objective there is in a report and thus the only one there is to evaluate. Next, habits of thought associated with the planner's disciplinary matrix were discussed to show that these habits of thought are active: that is, they play a role in the choices planners make about what they will prescribe in their planning reports.

In this part, three points of departure are outlined that would permit conscious purpose and habits of thought to be considered jointly in a critique. Each of the three aspects calls attention to the tendency to reduce planning to some other discipline, to a method, mechanism, analogy or cause. The first chapter begins with a description of the process of reductionism and goes on to consider ways one might view the phenomena with which planning is concerned in terms of patterns of information rather than objects; the second chapter addresses the use of analogues; and the third, the production of plausibility. These three do not complete a framework.

They should be read as propaedeutic to a critical method, a method that would begin within planning and would treat the act of planning as an irreducible core.

5.2 Mistaking Hypotheses for Data

Sutherland describes reductionism as "the assumption that the truth about an entity can be derived from knowledge acquired about its parts."¹ He goes on to describe extensions of reductionism. Assumptivism results from an author failing to note his assumptions and to mention that they are "actually hypotheses which he simply chooses to accept rather than test."² The extension of assumptivism is analogic invention which is a "conceptual device designed to call attention to isomorphisms, and to engineer the attempt to induce causality."³ Finally, expediency is a kind of "a posteriori reductionism" which he says is usually defended on the grounds of needing a solution, but, either the appropriate techniques are not available, or the use of the appropriate techniques would be inefficient or economically infeasible.⁴

A pervasive reductionism revolves around the use in planning of knowledge borrowed from other fields. As described in sections 3.2 to 3.6, the use of positivist epistemology and methods of investigation assumes that causal explanation is possible and appropriate for the organic and social world. This remains, however, an hypothesis, whether or not it is stated as such. Epistemological assumptivism is assumptivism par excellence.

Systems analysis as it is used most widely in planning is also reductive at least to the extent that it is based on the mechanistic cybernetic model which relies exclusively on a negative feedback circuit to

¹John W. Sutherland, A General Systems Philosophy for the Social and Behavioral Sciences (New York: Braziller, 1973), p. 92.

²Ibid., p. 117. ³Ibid., p. 123. ⁴Ibid., p. 127.

explain system performance. The purposefulness of the modeller and those modelled is absent. The failure of systems modelling thus far in planning suggests some severe cases of analogic invention. To Lee's seven sins of large-scale models -- hungriness, hypercomprehensiveness, grossness, and so on,⁵ -- we might add analogic overinventiveness.

Expediency is at the core of reductionism in planning, although the term is probably too pejorative. Few techniques or theories have been developed specifically for the fields of social action (as opposed to empirical fields such as sociology, geography and economics), and fewer still for planning qua planning. Under pressure to produce solutions to complex and ill-defined problems, planners have quite rightly scoured many fields for clues as to how to proceed. Unfortunately, however, the clues are often converted to hypotheses and the hypotheses to data.

Under the umbrella of reductionism, but keeping in mind Sutherland's extensions, let us look at an example of the process of converting hypotheses to data within a causal epistemology.

Take 1: In the classic scientific model associated with mechanics, (1) a force is sought. It is (2) external to the phenomenon being studied and, ineluctably, the phenomenon is (3) caused by the force to alter its place (or rate of motion, composition, size). The phenomenon is thus (4) determined by an external force. This change in the phenomenon occurs in (5) a closed system. The end result of the string of changes, of which this change in the phenomenon is but one, is (6) equilibrium.

Take 2: Now consider a case of this model applied to economics which is concerned with social rather than physical occurrences. Our case will be to predict how many dwelling units will be constructed next year in Canada. The economist begins with an implicit assumption that (1) a force

⁵Douglass B. Lee, "Requiem for Large-Scale Models," Journal of the American Institute of Planners 39(May 1973):163-178.

exists. The force is self-interest. It is (2) external to the phenomenon being studied, the housing market, and (3) causes supply and demand to fluctuate. Self-interest is assumed to reside in people as part of their nature.⁶ Since self-interest is part of one's nature, one is (4) determined in one's action to that extent. The boundaries of the system will vary according to the extent of the analysis, but the system will certainly be (5) closed at some point at which reliable prediction seems possible, given the complex interaction of fiscal and monetary conditions, existing stock, demographic trends, expectations of the population, government policies, and so on. These variables are traditionally analyzed in terms of a market which, if left to its own devices, would eventually be driven toward (6) equilibrium. Since equilibrium is not a state economists actually expect to be achieved, it is regarded rather as a mind's eye model against which to measure market performance.⁷

⁶For example, this assumption is found in Jack Hirschleifer's textbook, Price-Theory and Applications (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1976), p. 10: "It is true that, observing facts as they really are, the economist normally finds it useful to operate on the premise that individuals seek their own advantage. . . . That this is a main truth about human activity it would be absurd to deny."

⁷See, for example, Paul A. Samuelson and Anthony Scott, Economics, 3rd Canadian edition (Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1971), pp. 56-61; and the Dictionary of Economics, eds. G. Bannock, R.E. Baxter, and R. Rees (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972), s.v. "Equilibrium": "The concept of equilibrium is a very general one, which can be applied to any situation which is characterized by a set of interacting forces." Equilibrium, it should be noted, was originally introduced to economics by Léon Walras in 1877, in Elements of Pure Economics (Homewood, Ill.: Richard D. Irwin, 1954), p. 84:

"To this end, we shall suppose that the market is perfectly competitive, just as in pure mechanics we suppose, to start with, that machines are perfectly frictionless."

Walras identified actions in the market, whereby changes in demand by consumers were offset by changes in supply by producers, and the early physicists' descriptions of mechanical forces. Joan Robinson (Heresies, p. 4) notes that there has been one case observed in real life which corresponds to the Walrasian conception of equilibrium -- in a prisoner of war camp. In Economic Philosophy (Harmondsworth: Pelican, 1964), p. 77, she speaks of equilibrium having an appeal because it suggests the hum of a perfectly running machine. Her observation hints at the subject matter of the next chapter.

Take 3: The economists' prediction about dwelling completions is used by planners to prescribe action with respect to such things as housing conversions, demolitions, government programs, construction approvals. When one works back through the process of borrowing knowledge, the action will be found to be based essentially on a set of hypotheses from nineteenth century mechanics. The hypotheses have been turned into data, forming the starting point for further analysis, explanation, justification, prediction. Nowhere in the planning literature do authors say that equilibrium in economics, which they are borrowing, is simply an hypothesis which they choose to accept rather than test.

What began as an analogy between physical nature and socio-economic phenomena via equilibrium in mechanics and positivist epistemology has subtly, and with enormous consequences, been transformed into data for mainstream economics and planning. In the conversion process, physical and social phenomena have been treated alike. One datum is that equilibrium is the natural state of economies. Another is that self-interest is a natural force.⁸

5.3 Against Determinism

Determinism is a crucial notion to pick from the housing example for further comment. Social actors functioning in the economic sphere are implicitly defined as determined by the force of self-interest, a natural force which can be accommodated but not escaped. It is assumed to be innate; its analogue is the natural force in classical mechanics. When the

⁸It is irresistible to recount here Carl Sagan's story about astronomers and the planet Venus because it shows the droll side of analogic inventiveness. As he tells it, astronomers realized that Venus was wrapped in a blanket of vapour. The assumption was thus made that Venus was a damp planet. If it was damp, there could well be swamps. And if swamps, there could well be dinosaurs. PBS Television, "Cosmos Series," 19 October 1980.

economic principles discussed above are transferred to and applied analogically in planning, the assumption of determinism is likewise transferred. The epistemology of planning is to that extent the epistemology of conventional economics and classical mechanics. The planner too may assume that self interest is innate.

If social occurrences are theorized to be determined by natural, ineluctable causes in the manner of physical phenomena, and if explanation is sought in these forces, where is the responsibility of individuals for their well-being on the planet? They cannot be responsible for a system whose dictates are beyond their control. Through epistemological error, people come to believe they are indeed determined and unable to exercise a significant degree of free will.⁹

A fundamental reason for seeking other modes of inquiry for the world of social action is the lack of responsibility posited for clearly purposeful actors, a supposition which causal explanation enhances through its requirement for objective phenomena and external forces. Common sense tells us we are not atoms or billiard balls. Planning is, arguably, much more than a metaphoric application of borrowed hypotheses. It is a highly purposeful activity: not only does a single plan burst with signs of adaptive behaviour, but planning as an institutionalized activity is itself a social adaptation to the environment we perceive. This thoroughgoing purposefulness and concomitant responsibility is always obscured by evaluations that rely on the verifiability of objective phenomena within a causal epistemology.

⁹W. Lambert Gardiner presents a description of socio-economic relations among individuals who perceive themselves as determined and those who acknowledge both determinism and free will in "On Turning Development Inside-Out or (better) On Not Turning Development Outside-In in the First Place" (Bariloche, Argentina: December 1980), mimeographed. Similar ideas are presented in his article, "The Consumer and the Conserver" (Montréal: GAMMA, July 1976).

5.4 Inverting the Question

The problem becomes how to begin to develop a critique for planning that uses principles from the animate world. Certain ideas being developed in and among a number of fields facing similar concerns appear useful. It will of course be vital to treat these as only clues for proceeding and to guard against their application to planning analogically and without awareness.

In the first place, it seems probable that questions about the living world have been asked the wrong way round. For example, we are in the habit of asking questions such as "Does this plan lead to this stated objective?". The formulation focusses on causality and on external criteria against which the plan is measured. The criteria have been established beforehand and have been claimed to be 'right' or 'good', or perhaps inevitable, as in the case of innate human characteristics. There is no room to explore the criteria within the evaluation. This approach implies a hierarchy of explanation downwards from criteria external to the system, criteria that some of us choose and define to suit ourselves.

If, however, we ask "How is it that these prescriptions are plausible?", the focus shifts to how the plan is justified and why it seems to be reasonable, natural and plausible within a context of relations. The relations themselves are made explicit. The plan is not measured against pre-determined criteria. The way plausibility is produced is what justifies the plan. The hierarchy is inverted so that one works upwards from the structures and relations to justify the plan.¹⁰

¹⁰The idea of the inverted hierarchy is drawn mainly from Gregory Bateson, Steps, pp. 426-439 and pp. 448-465.

5.5 Structure

By inverting the question, oppositions such as free will and determinism can be accommodated. An identified structure is the embodiment of both constraints ('determinants') and possibilities ('free-will'isms') in relation to an adaptive, selecting organism. The selection which is made by the organism is neither random, nor is it determined. Thus, in the critique the researcher refuses to make man either the sole cause or solely the effect.

Consider the English language as an example of a structure. The English speaker who randomly selects a series of letters (or non-letters), to form a combination which does not exist as a word in the language will only be understood if the message accompanying that word is sufficiently complex that redundancy permits the hearer to decipher that one word in the light of its context. On the other hand, the same English speaker selects from a range of possible words to make himself understood. For example, in the sentence, "He rarely goes out", "rarely" could be replaced by several similar words such as "infrequently" or "seldom" while retaining the sense of the sentence. Or the syntax could be altered: "He goes out rarely", "Rarely does he go out".

The structure within which these possibilities and constraints are elaborated is form; it is not substance. Similarly a plan can be seen as what has been selected by purposeful actors from among a structure of constraints and possibilities -- what will and will not be understood, possible, plausible.

5.6 Open Systems

An open system interacts with its environment. Each system -- for example, an English speaking person -- that is in a non-determined yet non-random relation with a structure -- for example, the English language -- is in

a two-way interaction. The systems are simultaneously structured and structuring. That is, they feed back to the structure which may itself be altered as a consequence. An example is language, which is not static but gradually altered by its speakers.

All living and adaptive systems are open systems.¹¹ A system, depending on its complexity, interacts with many structures and with many other systems.

For example, the English speaker using the structure of the language represents one relation. If I am the speaker I am simultaneously interacting with my biological structure (if I have laryngitis I will perhaps use more gestures than speech), with structures of perception (I will note that my plan has been rolled up in the corner rather than left taped to the wall), with the structures of cultural convention (I will smile when I greet my client rather than frown, since smiling in such circumstances is conventional). And when I meet my client, I am simultaneously interacting with the conventions of greeting and with another highly complex system, another person.

From the point of view of communication of ideas such as in plans, systems are not concrete and absolute but the results of bounding the pathways of information. The following quotation from Bateson makes clear why the study of the communication of ideas requires a quite different approach.

Ecology has currently two faces to it: the face which is called bioenergetics -- the economics of energy and materials within a coral reef, a redwood forest, or a city -- and, second, an economics of information, of entropy, negentropy, etc. These two do not fit together very well precisely because the units are differently bounded in the two sorts of ecology. In bioenergetics it is natural and appropriate to think of units bounded at the cell membrane, or at the skin; or of units composed of sets of

¹¹Wilden, System and Structure, p. 36.

conspecific individuals. These boundaries are then the frontiers at which measurements can be made to determine the additive-subtractive budget or energy for the given unit. In contrast, informational or entropic ecology deals with the budgeting of pathways and of probability. The resulting budgets are fractionating (not subtractive). The boundaries must enclose, not cut, the relevant pathways.

Moreover, the very meaning of "survival" becomes different when we stop talking about the survival of something bounded by the skin and start to think of the survival of the system of ideas in circuit. The contents of the skin are randomized at death and the pathways within the skin are randomized. But the ideas, under further transformation, may go on out in the world in books or works of art. Socrates as a bioenergetic individual is dead. But much of him still lives as a component in the contemporary ecology of ideas.¹²

5.7 Non-Mechanistic Cybernetics

Early cybernetics described systems with governing devices which monitored the environment of the system and, through negative feedback, adjusted the system to conform to an initial "setting". This is the state to which the system will always revert using the same circuitry of effects. The classic example is the thermostat. Such a system will never perform beyond a narrow range set for it and performance is controlled by a regulator. It is an open system in the sense that the control circuit is energized by changes in the environment; but the circuitry is closed in the sense that a disturbance is corrected through the regulator so that "events at any position in the circuit may be expected to have effect at all positions on the circuit at later times."¹³ Its goal is maintenance; it cannot ask about the appropriateness of this goal.

By contrast, the non-mechanistic open system is not fixed in a circuitry determined from an initial setting. In addition to negative feedback which operates in the direction of equilibrium and system

¹²Bateson, Steps, pp. 460-461.

¹³Ibid., p. 404.

maintenance, there is positive feedback which "can increase differentiation, develop structure and generate complexity."¹⁴ In terms of the communication of ideas, the system's interaction with its environment is not mediated by a regulator circuit that provides only one route to the final state. It can achieve a state through many different routes. The adaptation is purposeful and ultimately oriented to survival. It sets goals and it can ask about the appropriateness of those goals. It applies to persons and to human groups.

5.8 Information-Processing Systems

It is helpful to regard open, adaptive systems as information-processing systems. First of all, what is meant by information? Bateson defines information as "difference which makes a difference". He describes it by starting with Korzybski's well-known statement that "the map is not the territory". Bateson asks:

What is it in the territory that gets onto the map? We know the territory does not get onto the map. . . . Now, if the territory were uniform, nothing would get onto the map except its boundaries, which are the points at which it ceases to be uniform against some larger matrix. What gets onto the map, in fact, is difference, be it a difference in altitude, a difference in vegetation, a difference in population structure, difference in surface, or whatever. Differences are the things that get onto a map.

. . . A difference is a very peculiar and obscure concept. It is certainly not a thing or an event. This piece of paper is different from the wood of this lectern. There are many differences between them -- of colour, texture, shape, etc. But if we start to ask about the localization of those differences, we get into trouble. Obviously the difference between the paper and the wood is not in the paper; it is obviously not in the wood; it is obviously not in the space between them, and it is obviously not in the time between them. (Difference which occurs across time is what we call "change".)

A difference, then, is an abstract matter.

¹⁴Magoroh Maruyama, "Toward Cultural Symbiosis," in Evolution and Consciousness, eds. E. Jantsch and C. Waddington, p. 200.

. . . when you enter the world of communication, organization, etc., you leave behind that whole world in which effects are brought about by forces and impacts and energy exchange. You enter a world in which "effects" -- and I am not sure one should still use the same word -- are brought about by differences. That is, they are brought about by the sort of "thing" that gets onto the map from the territory. This is difference.¹⁵

He goes on to make the point that when we seek causes in the world of energy and matter, we expect them to exist and to be "real". By contrast, in the world of information and communication "nothing -- that which is not can be a cause. . . . The letter which you do not write can get an angry reply."¹⁶

There is always a context within which the system is adapting through exchange of information. The context provides structure for the system's content. There is a hierarchy of "differences" between system and structure such as "that between a cell and a tissue, between tissue and organ, organ and organism, organism and society."¹⁷ The system is some set of possibilities drawn from the structure of the context which, together with the system's existing characteristics, make the probabilities of selecting and/or adapting to information not random. The information exchanged varies with the system, and varies the system: for example, information about comfort or discomfort may be exchanged via gestures or speech or rashes; or information about cycles may be exchanged via hibernating or flowering or puberty.

Explanation is always negative in the open system. The "negativeness" is based on the constraints of the organism plus its environment. In this sense, the explanation is not determined (positive), but the result of selections made by adaptive organisms from among non-random possibilities (negative). At a high level of organization, such as

¹⁵Bateson, Steps, p. 451-452.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 452. ¹⁷Ibid., p. 458

is characteristic of the person or groups of people, the system has a great diversity of possible responses to information. In other words, the structures constraining the responses can be assumed to have less preponderance over the person than would be the case for a snail, for example.¹⁸ Within the complex structure of the conduct of human affairs, purposive human beings cannot attribute responsibility (cause) to the forces of 'human nature'. Effect is immanent in the systems and their relations, and is not lodged beyond in some "other".

Both the patterns of thought identified with the disciplinary matrix and conscious purpose are needed to understand how plausible planning texts are produced. These features stemming from cybernetics and information theory will be important for shifting from a causal mode of inquiry which focusses on concrete objects to one based on information in which the focus is the adaptiveness of the information for the system which produces it.

¹⁸Wilden, System and Structure, p. 239.

CHAPTER 6

ANALOGUES

6.1 Analogues and Coupling

Analogues are crucial to the formation of planners' prescriptions for how the major systems -- the individual human being, human society, and the larger ecosystem -- should be coupled. Coupling refers to linking one system with another. Analogues are cases of coupling, so that the manner in which planners undertake to couple these systems reflects their understanding both of the use of analogues and of the relations among the major systems.

At the root of planning is the effort to understand these systems so that the coupling effected by planners will provide adaptive advantages. One premise used in this study is that adaptiveness is ultimately directed toward the goal of survival of the human species, but refers to all

the processes by which organisms or groups of organisms maintain homeostasis in and among themselves in the face of both short term environmental fluctuations and long term changes in the composition and structure of their environments.¹

A second premise is that the unit of survival is the organism-plus-environment.² Thus the coupling reflects an understanding of the relations among these systems with respect to survival.

¹Rappaport, "Sanctity," p. 54.

²Bateson, Steps, p. 451.

For example: A janitor at a Canadian university was convicted of arson. His reason for setting fires was to keep students from walking on the floors he had just cleaned.³ The janitor adapted to the coupling of him-plus-task with acts of arson. The manner in which person-plus-social task were coupled may have been built on the implicit assumption that the person is a machine, that he can do the same task repeatedly without pathologically altering his perception of his environment.

Or, consider the goal-survey-analysis-plan sequence in the previous chapter. The residents of Trefann Court, for example, adapted to the coupling of them-plus-neighbourhood by rejecting the planners' plans. The manner in which residents-plus-neighbourhood were coupled may have assumed that the residents were incidental in determining the future character of the neighbourhood.⁴

Since coupling is a relation, it is neither in the janitor nor in the floor-cleaning task but rather it is the form of the relation between floor-cleaner and floor-cleaning. In the case of the urban renewal area, the coupling is not in the neighbourhood or in the residents, but is the form of the relation between them. A trace of the nature of the coupling as proposed by the planners and as understood by the residents could be found in the plan and in other communications among the residents and planners.

Coupling is a meta-term; it sets the rules for the units being coupled. It refers to the relation between the components. As a set of rules it is more than just information. It is communication between at least two systems. In any communication there are recursive effects for both the systems involved.

³CBC Radio, "News," 7 July 1980.

⁴These examples illustrate coupling of systems but do not claim to prove the assumptions behind the coupling.

Let us next look at analogues in a general sense as ways of beginning to understand the unfamiliar. The succeeding sections describe some particular analogues and some difficulties in using them because of the nature of the coupling they imply. Ideally we would want to find an analogue for planning that allows us to investigate conscious and unconscious purposes and the recursive effects of coupling -- all in terms of "difference" rather than substance.

6.2 Using and Being Used by Analogues

A man desiring to understand the world looks about for a clue to its comprehension. He pitches upon some area of commonsense fact and tries if he cannot understand other areas in terms of this one. This original area becomes then his basic analogy or root metaphor.⁵

To understand the unfamiliar, we choose something familiar upon which we build hypotheses about how that unfamiliar something works. We use what we know about the familiar thing as an analogue to try to expand our understanding of the unfamiliar thing. Based on a comparison of the two, we look for isomorphisms. We may say that a guru is like ice with respect to their common capacity to change from solid to "unsolid" forms. The greater subjectivity associated with whether or not a guru has indeed ceased to be a guru versus whether ice has indeed changed to water of course weakens the analogy. The crudeness and precision of analogues are the subject of these sections.

Analogues may occur in the form of metaphor or analogue model, which is a sustained, spelled-out metaphor.⁶ Analogues are extraordinarily useful because of structural similarities found among a wide variety of

⁵Stephen Pepper, World Hypotheses (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1942), p. 91.

⁶Max Black, Models and Metaphors (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962).

things in the world. In fact this may be the way we acquire all new cognitive knowledge. Langer says "Really new concepts, having no names in current language, always make their earliest appearance in metaphorical statements."⁷ Commonsense is the beginning of understanding; refinement comes later.

The way in which the metaphor is used in the process of refinement of knowledge is of the utmost importance. It must be used with awareness that it is indeed an analogue and not the thing itself. It can supply plausible hypotheses but not proofs. Separate corroboration is needed. There seem to be at least three potential pitfalls, all interrelated, awaiting users of a relatively successful analogue. They are all pertinent to a critique of planning.

(a) First is the belief that the successful analogue is the only one that appropriately applies in a given circumstance. Pepper has prepared an extensive argument showing why such a belief is dogmatic. He has shown that several root metaphors exist, each of which supports a world hypothesis approximately equivalent to the others in terms of power to explain phenomena.⁸

One example of a root metaphor is "machine". It is a root metaphor in the sense that a review of the analogues underlying successful hypotheses about how things in the world work points to the repeated occurrence of metaphors which share the common quality of "machine-ness". Root metaphors support a repertoire of local, more specific metaphors for use in particular investigations -- for instance, the hydraulic analogue used to describe the

⁷Langer, New Key, p. xi.

⁸"Root metaphor" is of course itself a metaphor, as a friend pointed out to me. A root metaphor is a metaphor for a root metaphor which is a metaphor for

pumping or priming of the economy⁹, or the computer used as an analogue to describe the brain. Thus the root metaphor is "machine" and two members of the repertoire are the hydraulic pump and the computer.

Pepper's world hypotheses are like any hypotheses except with respect to their scope: they cannot reject as irrelevant any facts that are brought to them. Their claims to explanation are unrestricted in terms of subject matter. Pepper calls the world hypothesis associated with the machine "mechanism". It can be either of the lever/push-pull sort for which action is immediate, or the electromagnetic field sort, for which action is at some distance.¹⁰ A restricted hypothesis belonging to the unrestricted world hypothesis of mechanism is that the economy functions like a pump so that priming it with public sector spending, for example, will produce a smoother flowing economy. A restricted hypothesis of the electromagnetic field sort would be the gravity model which hypothesizes an attraction of shoppers to shopping centres, where "attraction" is similar to gravitational force. A world hypothesis evolves from the corroboration acquired in testing the machine-like metaphors.

When we assume that only one world hypothesis is capable of generating valid tests we are easy prey to dogmatism. "One of the commonest devices of dogmatism is the appeal to certainty. Dogmatism may be defined as a demand for belief in excess of the evidence for it."¹¹ Having identified four approximately equivalently adequate world hypotheses in a work in 1942, and a fifth in 1966,¹² Pepper urges that no one assume that

⁹Black, Models and Metaphors, p. 214.

¹⁰Pepper, World Hypotheses, p. 187.

¹¹Stephen Pepper, Concept and Quality (LaSalle, Ill.: Open Court Publishing Co., 1966), p. 3.

¹²Pepper thinks the fifth might possibly be a re-working of one of the first quartet, "contextualism". Concept and Quality, p. 2.

because a phenomenon can be described in terms of one world hypothesis, that it cannot also be described relatively adequately in terms of four others.

His admonition is all the more true for restricted hypotheses. For instance, in the case of the gravity model and the attraction of shopping centres there is no reason to suppose that this is the only or even the best description. It certainly does not appear likely ever to produce explanation since this would require an identity between a shopping centre and a mass in the gravitational sense. Evidence generated using any single hypothesis as to why shoppers go to one place rather than to another is by no means conclusive; searches in other avenues may still be fruitful.

This eclectic approach is not intended to advocate a cynical attitude that claims we can never know anything, nor an attitude which claims that to look at a phenomenon from one angle is as good as from another. What Pepper is arguing, and an argument running through this thesis, is that meaning lies not in the single piece of evidence but in the context which we decide upon for it. The way much evidence concerning something comes together is the source of its meaning. Pepper says it well:

For many men the resort to dogmatism results from an apprehension that knowledge might have no firm basis, and that if everything is somewhat doubtful (or, more precisely, dubitable) no knowledge is secure. But even if this were the conclusion from the evidence, we should find that we did not have anything very serious to fear. For the conclusion that everything is dubitable is not the conclusion of utter skepticism. It does not signify that we know nothing. This, as we showed, is simply inverted dogmatism. The trend of the evidence was toward something very different, namely, toward the conclusion that, though any single item of evidence is dubitable, the presence of great masses of evidence is highly confirmed. What doubt, or any other cognitive activity, always . . . brings us back to is the realization that some sort of probably pretty rich and complicated thing is being cognized.¹³

The variety and richness of the potential sources of knowledge permit us to follow various pathways toward corroboration. Dogmatism merely

¹³Pepper, World Hypotheses, p. 319.

closes off pathways, impoverishing the diversity of what is. Our search for corroboration, wherever it may lie is suffocated.

World hypotheses have a high degree of autonomy, in the sense that the paradigms Kuhn describes have autonomy. "No one of them can be the judge of the others."¹⁴ They are members of the same class, that is, the superclass of modes of corroboration. The categories of one do not overlap with those of another. Consequently they can only be judged against some measure beyond themselves. But since world hypotheses exclude nothing from their purview, Pepper can only call for "reasonable eclecticism in practice"¹⁵ by which one might understand him to be advocating a judicious, undogmatic use of all the evidence available from the various, conflicting sources.

Root metaphors and "pure" world hypotheses are perhaps theoretically important. However, we are only indirectly concerned with them in planning. In practice we encounter the repertoire of more local analogues and restricted hypotheses -- that is, those hypotheses associated with a particular root metaphor that form a world hypothesis when put together. The important points are to recognize, first, that when the presuppositions of restricted hypotheses are investigated seriously they lead toward one of possibly five theoretically "pure" world hypotheses, and, second, that an analogue from one world hypothesis cannot legislate over another one from a different world hypothesis.

(b) A second potential pitfall associated with using analogues is habit. It is the well-worn metaphor, or model, that has slipped into habitual use that is problematic for expanding knowledge once the first flash of fruitfulness of the metaphor has been realized. Metaphors in use are even difficult to detect because users become accustomed to the

¹⁴Ibid., p. 330. ¹⁵Ibid.

vocabulary and processes of thinking associated with them. The processes have sunk below the threshold of awareness in the daily course of events, and we cease to recognize the presence of metaphor or to seek other ways to see the material.

Turbayne claims that a metaphor has three stages.¹⁶ Initially the juxtaposition seems inappropriate, such as calling streets "arteries". Objections are made in this phase that only organisms have arteries; cities do not. In the next phase, this insistence on the literal meaning of each of the terms permits them to come together as metaphor. Turbayne calls this the "moment of triumph" when we pretend with awareness, that indeed streets are arteries. At this stage almost no one is taken in by the new metaphor. In the third phase the metaphor is "hidden or ceases to be one".

We are particularly concerned here with hidden metaphors, first, because they can lead to confusion between the territory (literal) and the map (metaphor or analogue); and second, because in a successful metaphor the focal word of the metaphor ("streets") is redefined to some degree. (Regarding the second point, Kuhn has argued that redefinition has taken place for $f=ma$. See 3.4 above.) Our conventional knowledge of arteries, which may well be that they are simply conduits, is transposed to streets, which then become more fully identified with moving substances from one place to another. This partial redefinition conforms with Black's "interaction metaphor."¹⁷ The two subjects, streets and arteries, are "active together". To speak of a major street does not convey the same meaning precisely as to speak of a major artery. When we speak of "streets", we may vaguely picture them as tree-lined. When we say

¹⁶The following is drawn directly from Turbayne, Myth of Metaphor, pp. 24-26.

¹⁷Max Black, "Metaphor," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (1954-55): 285.

"arteries" the focus falls on movement. Certainly we have no picture of trees along arteries. Habitual use of "arteries" alters our view of an important aspect of the city without our conscious awareness.

The machine metaphor has been common since Descartes and Newton. The machine model ("the world is a machine") has inestimably influenced the on-going description of the things of this world. As the story goes, Descartes quite literally dreamed in 1619 that his machine model, or geometrical model, could be extended to every subject except the mind or soul.¹⁸

Turbayne and others have argued that the use of the model of the machine to explain the things of the world (including "mind" on many occasions), has become conflated with the activity called science. The machine as a central analogue for science has been elevated to the position of myth, Turbayne claims. Myth conveys "truth", not hypotheses. It has become one of the great cases of being used by metaphor. The habit of using it is so profoundly intertwined with our commonsense way of thinking, speaking and acting that we do not recognize that we are using mechanistic metaphors when for example, we talk of "implementing" a plan, of social or environmental "impacts", of an action as "counter"-productive, or of "fine-tuning".

(c) A third potential pitfall is to become enamoured of a metaphor because of its current appeal. Analogic models in particular appear to maintain a degree of currency with what is being invented and with what is of current concern. For example, when the telephone exchange was invented, the brain was compared to it. Like a telephone exchange, the brain seemed to be the focus for messages from various parts of the body and the control

¹⁸Turbayne, Myth of Metaphor, pp. 66-68; Georges Poulet, "The Dream of Descartes," Studies in Human Time, trans. by Elliott Coleman (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1956), pp. 50-73.

centre for messages back to the parts. This analogy was made obsolete by the invention of electronic computers.

An example from planning activity, and in the organismic rather than mechanistic sphere, are the metaphors of pathology applied to neighbourhoods and other parts of cities. Before the cause and treatment of tuberculosis were well understood the attributes of this disease were commandeered to describe urban conditions. By the 1950's the disease to be dreaded had shifted from tuberculosis to cancer, and a new spate of metaphors relating to cancer were applied to the city: "To look at the section of any plan of a big city is to look at the section of a fibrous tumor", said Frank Lloyd Wright in 1958.¹⁹

6.3 The Organic Analogue

The unifying thread running through the various interpretations of "organic" in planning is its derivation in the "world of living things, from the animal or vegetable kingdoms: it has profound undertones of life -- birth, growth, change, ultimately death -- in contradistinction to inanimate, or inorganic, matter."²⁰ Herbert describes several forms of the analogue that appear in planning literature. He shows how each version is partial, and even contradictory due to that partialness, with respect to a full philosophy of organism such as that developed by Whitehead. To his analysis of partialness one could add two further limitations of the organic analogue as used in planning.

The first is that the image of organism brought to planning seems devoid of consciousness, unconsciousness, purpose or mind. The image is a benign one. Our reading of the analogy thus focusses on aspects such as

¹⁹See Susan Sontag, *Illness as Metaphor* (New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 1977), especially pp. 74-80.

²⁰Herbert, "Organic Analogy", p. 198.

physical structure; the body's major systems -- respiratory, cardiovascular, reproductive, and so on; the processes associated with life and death, growth and decay, health and disease; and the physiological rather than symbolic symbiosis between man and environment. When "planning" and "organism" are brought together as the two terms of a metaphor, it appears that purposiveness and symbolizing are not images associated with the terms, nor are they created by the juxtaposition. The rendering of the analogue depicts planning's task to be arranging material conditions to enhance the physical survival and comfort of organisms. The planned arrangements are presumed to be safe from counter-purposes by simply not granting purposefulness to organisms. In this view, coupling planning (planner-plus-plan) with those planned-for can be achieved while ignoring the recursive effects of information on individuals.

The other limitation is associated with the notion of cosmic integration which underlies all organic metaphors.²¹ It begins from the premise that all knowledge is essentially integrated. As we consider the fragments of knowledge that come to our attention, it is our task to find their places in the integrated whole which exists whether or not human beings can identify that wholeness at any particular time. We are therefore embarked on a path leading inexorably toward the ideal: total integration. The longing and striving for this ideal end point are inherent in an hypothesis such as "order" which supports and is derived from the analogue. The ideal of order pervades planning literature.²² The orderly utopian

²¹Pepper, World Hypotheses, pp. 280-314.

²²Two authors who have closely examined the ideal of order in planning are Richard Sennett, The Uses of Disorder (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1970), and Constance Perin, Everything in its Place (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979). Among others, Jane Jacobs in The Death and Life of Great American Cities (New York: Modern Library, 1961) and D.L. Foley in "British Town Planning: One Ideology or Three?", British Journal of Sociology 11 (September 1960): 211-231, have considered this ideal indirectly.

state assumes that what we strive for is actually what we strive for. It is the idea that we can realize harmony as a single maximized value in some absolute and perfect state where order and abundance, rather than disorder and scarcity, reign. When the apocalypse arrives the striving will end because integration will be complete. The confusion in this view lies in believing that some quantity (abundance of. . .) eliminates some quality (striving for. . .). If this was the case, then it would also be the case that something could exist independent of the processes that generated it, or maintained it, or valued it. It would be something absolute, eternal, fully formed and immutable.

Perfection is terrible, it cannot have children.
Cold as snow breath, it tamps the womb. . . .²³

Absence of integration is information in the form of "difference": it is the difference between total integration in the ideal, symbolized state and the degree of integration presumed to have been achieved. This particular "difference" is critical in human affairs. Our ability to imagine other, more "perfect" states permits us to propose and to seek to create those states. However, since the organisms in the analogue-in-use do not have a symbolizing capacity, information relating to the striving for integration is lost if we forget that "organism" is merely an analogue and does not account for people in their real lives.

6.4 The Machine Analogue

The machine as an analogue was touched upon earlier with reference to causality (section 3.2 and 5.2), and with reference to habit in using analogues (section 6.2).

²³Sylvia Plath, "The Munich Mannequins," in Ariel (London: Faber & Faber, 1976), p. 74.

Wariness when using machines as analogues in the investigation of phenomena of the living world is called for particularly with regard to the energy that is said to cause a phenomenon to function. It is generally acknowledged that the energy that causes inanimate phenomena to move, alter form, and so on, is not the same sort of energy involved in the warring of one group of people against another group, for instance, or the feeling of falling in love. Nonetheless, the machine metaphor has been held intact when applied to phenomena in the living world by hypothesizing a psychic energy that parallels physical energy. It has been repeatedly claimed overtly and covertly that some sort of energy exists to cause people to war and to love. This energy has had a variety of names such as psychic force or "élan vital". Power, as used in physics and engineering, has been

bootlegged into psychological thinking to refer to "strength" of emotions or "vigor", or the opposite to "fatigue" or "apathy". We speak of the energy of loving or hating, and of the transformation of energy from "genitals" to "love", blithely unaware that we are jumping from one realm to a radically different one.²⁴

The application of mechanistic metaphors to explain human and social phenomena leaves an unexplained residuum -- the "causal" factor whose analogue in the machine is energy. When the brain was compared to a telephone exchange, for instance, the role of the person working the telephone, the telephone operator, was unaccounted for in the analogy.²⁵ Public funds or other incentives are sometimes used to "prime" the economy via the construction sector.²⁶ The energy that makes the economy "move", in this metaphor, appears to be the dollars and incentives. However, the

²⁴Rollo May, "Gregory Bateson and Humanistic Psychology" in About Bateson, ed. John Brockman (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1977), p. 89.

²⁵Gordon Rattray Taylor, The Natural History of the Mind (London: Secker & Warburg, 1979), p. 50.

²⁶Economic Council of Canada, Toward More Stable Growth in Construction (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1973).

persons with their hands on the pump handle are unaccounted for in the analogy. This is not to say that the involvement of government people is not recognized but that the recursive effects on the system of economy-plus-government which experienced the priming is unacknowledged -- such as the expectation by the actors that if the economy could be primed once in this way it could be primed again. A pattern of priming has developed. The machine analogue does not take into account the purposefulness of the actors in such systems.

6.5 The Purposive Act as Analogue

Twenty-five years after Pepper proposed his four relatively adequate world hypotheses as those predominant in intellectual endeavours, he proposed a fifth: selectivism.²⁷ The root metaphor is the goal seeking purposive act. This root metaphor has the great advantage of incorporating unconscious, habitual, reflex, and "felt quality"²⁸ acts with acts of conscious purpose. On the other hand, despite Pepper's repeated use of "organism" as well as "man", the purposive act appears to describe the selectivism of people only. He calls the goal seeking purposive act "the act associated with intelligence", "one that may go on in the full illumination of consciousness", and one that has been "submitted to a detailed conceptual analysis in behavioristic terms". "Here, then, is an ideal opportunity to see how a set of effective and well elaborated concepts come to apply to a qualitative structure lived through in a man's immediate experience".²⁹ Man, the intelligent organism, is set apart from the larger ecosystem in this world hypothesis. The hypothesis does not, it

²⁷Pepper, Concept and Quality.

²⁸Ibid., p. 17.

²⁹Ibid., pp. 17-18

appears, extend to the ecology of the forest or to the life-cycle of salmon or to the migration pattern of cariboo herds. On its own, therefore, it will be a deficient analogue for investigating or proposing the coupling of man and society to the natural environment. The residuum is the adaptiveness of all the nonhuman, living world, as well as the bridge between that and man's purposive acts.

Nonetheless, if there is one root metaphor on the ascendancy in the planning and policy fields it is this one. The purposive act shares the neo-pragmatic philosophy that lies behind what Prost describes as the "sciences of action".³⁰ The so-called sciences of action aim to avoid arbitrariness in political decisions by devising a "science" for choosing and achieving goals in the political sphere and in business and industry. They appear in various manifestations as cost-benefit analysis, PPBS, operations research, linear programming, and input-output analysis, for example. At the base of these approaches is the idea that objects of social life present problems that require solving. They can be solved using scientific techniques that reveal "facts". The "facts" can then be aligned in such a way that they will point to the "best" solution based on general criteria concerning the interests of the society, in the case of public sector decisions, or in the interests of the firm, in the industrial case. However, the sciences of action make use of a limited range of Pepper's types of selective "acts" which are themselves limited. From among those "acts", conscious purposiveness, and, in particular, the conscious purposiveness of experts, is paramount.

³⁰Robert Prost, *Emergence des sciences de l'action*, (Montréal: Faculté de l'Aménagement, Université de Montréal, June 1979). Mimeographed.

6.6 The Linguistic Analogue

Modern linguistics began early this century with Saussure's synchronic study of language. Previously, linguistics had focussed, diachronically, on the changes in language over time. Saussure's work marked the beginning of searches for patterns in language in use. Language was recognized as a structure that offered a range of possibilities to the user rather than simply a set of rules to be applied. The fascination with the structure of language is largely accounted for by the way one is able to use it: one selects from a whole range of possible combinations of words. One does not learn a set of phrases, as if by rote. Rather, one "knows" the language and selects certain combinations according to one's purposes to express what one wishes.

This is what I am doing while writing this page. I do not need to know all the words of English nor all the possible combinations of words. I do not even need to know, consciously, the rules for constructing sentences. Nonetheless, I am still knowing when I had written an ungrammatical sentence. (sic)

This particular structure was revelatory in its early days. It differed from that of machine and from the structure of organisms as they were understood at the time.

For a number of reasons, language is an analogue with apparent promise for studying social phenomena: one uses language, among other sign systems, to indicate purpose; it is learned; one uses it intuitively and consciously; it is symbolic; it works in patterns rather than digitally (on/off). The study of language structure has already inspired a great variety of work in anthropology, sociology, the culture of "everyday" such as fashion and food, literature, poetry, psychoanalysis.³¹ The analogue

³¹See, for example, the work of Claude Lévi-Strauss in anthropology, Garfinkel and Goffman in sociology, Roland Barthes, the New Critics in literary criticism, Roman Jakobson, Jacques Lacan, to name but a few.

is evident in the recent planning and policy work of Donald A. Schön in articles such as "Framing and Re-Framing the Problems of Cities,"³² in which he calls for a "policy-analytic literary criticism", and "Generative Metaphor: A Perspective on Problem-Setting in Social Policy."³³

It is a fashionable analogue, and like any such analogue it is easy to slip into using it to explain other cultural areas without awareness that one is 'mistaking the mask for the face'. Culler demonstrates instances of this in his analysis of studies by Barthes, Lévi-Strauss and several literary critics.³⁴ He shows that linguistics applied metaphorically in these works is descriptively interesting but poor in explanatory power. He claims this is because the "competence" of actors in their cultural setting to produce meaning in their myths and their reading is unaccounted for.

Readers and writers of literature recognize a discourse as belonging to a certain genre, for instance, or as being of greater or lesser value, and so on, given experience with other written works. The reading of a work is not a linguistic exercise but an act of communication between reader and writer in which both come to the work either to read it or to write it with "an amazing repertoire of conscious and unconscious knowledge".³⁵ This repertoire vastly exceeds simply a knowledge of language. It is "competence" in the use of this repertoire when one approaches a literary work or a myth that is unaccounted for when the linguistic analogue is applied directly, according to Culler.

He calls the critical method he proposes "poetics" to distinguish it from other critical methods. Poetics intends to fuse the recognition that

³²Paper presented to the York University Conference on Urban Innovation, June 1978. Mimeographed.

³³In Metaphor and Thought, ed. Andrew Ortony, pp. 254-283.

³⁴Poetics, pp. 32-109.

³⁵Ibid., p. 113.

language is the base of literature with recognition that the reading and writing of literature entail broad cultural and experiential relations and in this way to avoid reductionism. Linguistics is used where possible but not as a metaphor.

"Competence" is not universally accepted as capturing the whole residuum in metaphoric applications of the linguistic analogue. Fish, who also proposes an approach to literature based on the language analogue, agrees in principle with Culler concerning "competence". However, since "competence" is usually taken to mean that postulated in Chomsky's transformational grammar (which is true, for example, in Culler's case), Fish argues that "competence" is insufficient to account for all the responses which he finds in a critique.

It should be noted however that my category of response, and especially of meaningful response, includes more than the transformational grammarians, who believe that comprehension is a function of deep structure perception, would allow. There is a tendency, at least in the writings of some linguists, to downgrade surface structure -- the form of actual sentences -- to the status of a husk, or covering, or veil; a layer of excrescences that is to be peeled away or penetrated or discarded in favor of the kernel underlying it. This is an understandable consequence of Chomsky's characterization of surface structure as "misleading" and "uninformative" and his insistence (somewhat modified recently) that deep structure alone determines meaning.³⁶

Let us consider the analogue as used by Schön. The importance of problem-setting, as opposed to problem-solving, in social policy fields is not widely recognized, says Schön. Problem-setting, he says, is a form of story-telling. However,

"story" does not necessarily connote a narrative of the "Once upon a time..." variety. Yet it is a narrative account of some phenomenon, an account in which temporal sequence is central. Explanatory stories are those in which the author, seeking to

³⁶Stanley E. Fish, Self-Consuming Artifacts (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), pp. 404-405. Arguments against the use of "competence" alone to explain texts come from many quarters, including from the structuralists associated with the review Tel Quel. Culler (pp. 241-254) summarizes his understanding of their argument against Chomsky's "competence" and then attempts to dismantle it.

account for some puzzling phenomenon, narrates a sequence of temporal events wherein, starting from some set of initial conditions, events unfold in such a way as to lead up to and produce the phenomenon in question. A diagnostic/prescriptive story gives an explanatory, narrative account of some phenomenon in such a way as to show what is wrong with it and what needs fixing.³⁷

The analogy to fiction, such as the short story or novel, is evident. But Schön wants us to realize that these stories are not fictional accounts to the teller. They are reports of story-tellers' perspectives on problems. The story-telling involves the use of "generative metaphors".

Generative metaphors are special sorts of metaphors on two counts. First, Schön distinguishes them based on two approaches taken to metaphor: one is the analysis of metaphors as figures of speech, and the other their analysis as things "central to the task of accounting for our perspectives on the world".³⁸ The latter sort is a generative metaphor, that is, a case in which a perspective on one thing is carried over to another domain.³⁹ Elsewhere he distinguishes "decorative" from "operational" metaphors such that the latter term seems also to describe "generative metaphor".⁴⁰ And in another situation, he uses "deep" metaphor apparently synonymously with generative metaphor.⁴¹ How to draw the line separating

³⁷Schön, "Generative Metaphor", p. 281, footnote 11.

³⁸Ibid., p. 254.

³⁹In "Generative Metaphor," Schön categorizes Max Black's article on "Metaphor" as having to do with "metaphor as a species of figurative language which needs explaining, or explaining away", and thus in a separate tradition from his. This is surprising since Black's "interaction view of metaphor" seems very close to his description of generative metaphor as "a certain kind of product -- a perspective or frame, a way of looking at things -- and as a certain kind of process -- a process by which new perspectives on the world come into existence".

⁴⁰Martin Rein and Donald A. Schön, "Problem - Setting in Public Policy Research," in Using Social Research in Public Policy-Making, ed. C.H. Weiss (Lexington, Mass: D.C. Heath, 1977), p. 241.

⁴¹"Generative Metaphor", p. 267.

figurative from generative metaphors, and surface from deep metaphors, depends in part on his second point.

Generative metaphors have a normative component. He gives an example of a housing official who might describe housing stock as "decaying" and who would then try to find ways to "arrest decay" which might include the insulation of healthy neighbourhoods from the decaying one. Schön goes on to say that the fact

that we are dealing with a generative metaphor becomes clear if we observe that the metaphor sets the direction of remedial action in the very process by which it selects out events and explains them. Once we have been able to see houses as diseased or healthy, a whole set of prescriptions present themselves for action.⁴²

If generative metaphors have been fairly described, it will require the greatest care not to slip into attributing to them energy that causes persons to act because of the "normative component". Schön's generative metaphors are created by persons to bring into juxtaposition opposing conditions such as decaying and healthy, and to highlight the difference between them. The difference is information and people may act on the difference for their own goal seeking, adaptive purposes. However, the metaphors cannot in themselves cause people to act.

What seems to be missing in Schön's work is an explicit link between language and the intentions or purposefulness of people, with respect to the use of language to communicate.

Thus, for example, the speaker who knows the meaning of the sentence "The flower is red" knows that its utterance constitutes the making of a statement. But making a statement to the effect that the flower is red consists in performing an action with the intention of producing in the hearer the belief that the speaker is committed to the existence of a certain state of affairs, as determined by the semantic rules attaching to the sentence.⁴³

⁴²Rein and Schön, "Problem - Setting," p. 241.

⁴³John Searle, "Chomsky's Revolution in Linguistics," in On Noam Chomsky, ed. G. Harman (New York: Anchor Books, 1974), p. 29.

Moreover, since Schön's work is liberally sprinkled with Chomskyan terminology -- "deep", "surface", "generative", "competence"⁴⁴ -- it seems likely that an implicit theory relating metaphors to persons' intentions is absent rather than simply hidden.

6.7 Another Analogue?

A method for critiquing planning texts should help the researcher to identify the analogues in use so that one is not taken in by them -- either by assuming that the analogue is the thing itself (which would be like assuming that the map is the territory), or by assuming that only a single analogue is valid. The method should also help to trace the hypotheses entailed in analogues so that one does not mistake them for data.

As the discussion of metaphors showed, there is always a very important residuum from the territory that is unaccounted for in the map. The residuum is something like what it is to be human and to be embedded in and creating complex symbolic relations. As tentative as it will be for now, it may be helpful to explore the whole person as a potential analogue, or metaphor, for understanding the coupling of the major systems.⁴⁵ The "whole person" does not of course refer to the stripped down physiological organism, but the human being that bridges the gap between "all reality out there, and all perception in here".⁴⁶ This is the human being that both feels and knows, both consciously and unconsciously.

⁴⁴"Competence" does not appear in the printed works I have seen by Schön but was used in lectures given by him at the University of British Columbia, November, 1979. Also, I have found no explicit reference to Chomsky in Schön's work.

⁴⁵The idea that "we are our own central metaphor" is due to M.C. Bateson, Our Own Metaphor, chapter 15.)

⁴⁶Gregory Bateson, "Afterword," in About Bateson, ed. John Brockman (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1977), p. 240.

The value of the total human being as analogue is suggested by Bateson. He notes that

this imposition has, at least in the past, conferred adaptive advantages with respect to social and ecological factors by permitting men to use their total organisms, and not simply their consciousness, as analogues in their attempts to understand nature. The narrowly defined and often destructive purposes which are to be found in consciousness are thereby, if not overcome, at least "put in their places" by being included in a larger structure which includes materials drawn from non-rational as well as conscious processes. While the unconscious does not contain information concerning ecological systems, the structure of the total mind, of which the unconscious and affective are parts, resembles that of ecological systems, whereas the structure of consciousness alone does not. Thus analogues of ecological systems constructed from the materials of the non-rational as well as the rational have a "structural wisdom" that analogues built from consciousness alone would not be likely to possess.⁴⁷

We always attend to the world from our own perspective, from the stance of human beings, and not from that of machines, animals, languages, acts, and so on. It is from the perspective of ourselves as persons that we study any system, and from our perspective that we prescribe the coupling of the major systems. When one uses the analogues of machine, animals, acts or languages to understand human affairs such as planning, one focusses on a very few features that are thought to be analogous to that activity. One seems to be looking at the world from the perspective of a machine or an animal or language or act, as if the remainder of the self did not exist. One then applies the metaphor to a coupling situation. In the process one objectifies both terms of the metaphor (e.g., slum, cancer) and the metaphor itself, as if the metaphor was not the creation of human beings to begin with, a metaphor created from our perspective.

The isomorphism one is able to recognize beyond oneself when creating a metaphor depends on there being sufficient diversity in oneself to receive the representation.⁴⁸ Without sufficient diversity one could

⁴⁷Rappaport, "Sanctity," p. 64.

⁴⁸M.C. Bateson, Our Own Metaphor, p. 295

not recognize the pattern. That is, what is greater cannot be represented in what is lesser. The metaphor is simply bringing that pattern to our awareness. Hence, using ourselves instead of objects as metaphor is quite possible, and would allow exploration of unfamiliar phenomena to remain grounded in the human context.

A second potential advantage of coupling through the analogue of ourselves might be that one is challenged to confront the notion that human beings stand somehow outside of, and in a relation of dominance to, nature, matter and whatever else is not classified as human consciousness. The separation of mind and body, person and ecosystem, insists on a Cartesian ego as a "central clearing-house", as McLuhan put it. Consciousness is made the reference point for all knowing. If, however, the "I" that knows is also the "I" that creates the world rather than simply records it and responds to it, and if the "I" is not only bioenergetic but also an "I" participating in the "ecology of ideas": then the "I" that effects coupling appears to do so in the light of ideas which have been chosen because they are adaptive and conserving of something rather than because they are the uniquely possible results of conscious thought. The chooser is then an ecologically embedded, not separate, ensemble, yet with purposes of his or her own.

CHAPTER 7

EXPANSIVENESS

7.1 "Leaving Unobscured the Vast Darkness"

When planners write about what they want to do, are doing, will do or think should be done, they write with a purpose. In general terms, the purpose is to persuade others that the goal they describe and the pursuit of that goal are plausible according to the arguments they will provide. For example, in a planning report the declared purpose may be to propose a new land use arrangement. Justification begins with arguments as to why the current arrangement is inappropriate, shows how a new arrangement could be achieved, and concludes with why the proposed arrangement will be better. Various indices are identified against which the argument and the conclusions can be measured, such as the square metres of green space provided, the number of dwelling units brought up to standards, the change in welfare benefits paid out before and after, and so on. It appears to be a straight-forward message which can be read and assessed relatively objectively. At this level of analysis, the critical reader assesses the data, the indices, their appropriateness in terms of a range of alternatives, and their proper application according to certain rules.

This is a "scientifically" inspired reading -- one that argues for the proposed arrangement on the basis of hypotheses derived in the nomothetic disciplines. This "scientific" reading (which is partly

encouraged by the writing style, the presentation of the arguments, the genre, the aura of the professional-as-technical-expert, and so on) is usually necessary but always insufficient to account for the meaning produced between writer and reader. To leave the critique at that point would be to reduce planning to the sum of the indices used. Such reductionism would leave planners with barely a claim to a profession since the planner's role would appear to be to collect data and subject it to technical analysis using techniques drawn mostly from other fields. Second, a reading of this sort, by itself, encourages the belief that a planning prescription can be scientifically determined (a contradiction in terms) rather than what it is: a purpose with a well worked out justification.

If indeed the rearrangement of land uses amounted to the reshuffling of objects in space, the critique would properly focus on observation skills rather than prescriptive skills. The task would be to know about the world of matter in which order is determined by fundamentals such as the laws of conservation of mass and energy. But such laws do not determine the arrangement of social phenomena (although they determine whether buildings and bridges stand up), and we know of no comparable fundamentals that do determine their arrangement.

While such a critique can account for the measurements made against indices, it cannot account for the choice of those indices, or for the planners' assumptions about man, society, their environment and their interrelations that are implied by those choices. Such an accounting requires other levels of analysis. The proposed critique would have the reader search not only the traditional sites of evaluation such as indices, but also others that will be described in the following chapter.

A short critique of the report is, however, impossible. One arrives instead at a work larger by several-fold than the original. This is inevitable because the original message will be found to have been written

in shorthand. The shorthand is possible because writers can make assumptions about what they share with their readers. The critique entails among other things deciphering the shorthand so that one can inquire into just what it is that is assumed to be shared and therefore self-evident.

A principal reason for making expansiveness a feature of the critical method is to provide an alternative to naming and classifying as a way of understanding. This is one way to understand. There are, however, other ways, and recognizing patterns in complex relations is one of them. Traditional evaluations are parsimonious; the focus is on a minor range of declared objects. Yet from this impoverished view many seem to think they understand the processes of planning human affairs. There is an anecdote about Bertrand Russell and Alfred Whitehead related to what Bateson calls our tragic desire to think we understand things.

Russell had been Whitehead's student and collaborator on the Principia and, when Whitehead had gone to Harvard, Russell came to give a lecture in one of the big auditoria, on a hot August night, and all the professors and the professors' wives turned out to hear the great man. The great man lectured on the quantum theory, which has never been a very easy subject. . . . Russell laboured to make the matter clear. . . and finally sat down sweating. Then little Whitehead rose to his feet, with his falsetto voice, "to thank Professor Russell", he squeaked, "for his brilliant exposition and especially. . . for leaving unobscured. . . the vast darkness of the subject".¹

7.2 The Referendum Syndrome

Writing that has as its purpose unabashedly to persuade is substantially more restricted in its possible meanings than, for example, a classic work of literature. Barthes says that "the more plural the text, the less it is written before I read it".² By contrast, the more

¹G. Bateson quoted in M.C. Bateson, Our Own Metaphor, p. 302.

²Roland Barthes, S/Z, trans. Richard Miller (New York: Hill and Wang, 1974), p. 10.

restrictive the possibilities for meaning, such as in the highly purposeful planning text, the more the reader takes on the role of consumer to the author's role of producer. A commonly held principle of information theory is that "the more probable the message, the less information it gives".³ Clichés, as Wiener says, are less illuminating than great poems. There are fewer places for readers to insert themselves in the work to produce their own meaning, and to break open the compactness which seals the assumptions from ready access. The work is so tightly woven before the reader comes to it, and the meaning that the reader is intended to take so predictable, that "he is left with no more than the poor freedom either to accept or reject the text: reading is nothing more than a referendum".⁴

In such situations, the text becomes a contractual object of exchange between reader and writer. "What should the narrative be exchanged for? What is the narrative 'worth'?", Barthes asks.⁵ (A planning report may be exchanged for 'x' months of salary; a successful doctoral dissertation may be exchanged for one doctoral degree.)

The goal is to break open the text through an expansive reading in search of what Barthes calls the "modest plural" which the critical reader can evaluate (an evaluation that is a continuous and contextual process which implies learning), rather than simply offering the reader the proposition of accepting or rejecting it (a proposition that is a discontinuous and object-specific event which implies minimal learning).

³Norbert Wiener, The Human Use of Human Beings, 2nd ed., revised (New York: Doubleday, 1950; Anchor Books, 1954), p. 21.

⁴Barthes, S/Z, p. 4.

⁵Ibid., p. 89.

7.3 The "Modest Plural"

The ostensible purpose of a report does not exhaust the purposefulness of the report. The presumption that a complex message such as a planning report can be "about" only one thing, such as a land use arrangement, derives from one of two beliefs: either that it is possible to write completely objectively or, if this is not possible, that whatever else is contained in the message is irrelevant.

Since complete objectivity is not achievable, according to the arguments presented in earlier chapters, we are concerned with the second belief: that purposes that are not declared as such in the report are irrelevant. Fish discusses an example from literature of a sentence which apparently does not say anything when subjected to the usual questions such as "what does this sentence mean?", "what is it about?", or "what is it saying?". Of it he says

Of course, this difficulty is itself a fact -- of response; and it suggests, to me at least, that what makes problematical sense as a statement makes perfect sense as a strategy, as an action made upon a reader rather than as a container from which a reader extracts a message. The strategy or action here is one of progressive decertainizing.⁶

Statements of this form have effects that are relevant for understanding reader/writer relations. Texts abound with these instances of meaning produced in apparently oblique ways.

Can any of the content be defined as irrelevant? Yes, because the critiquer also has purposes. But there is a price. For example, one could define as irrelevant the author's choice of "rarely" rather than "seldom" in any cases that occur in the report, or more broadly, all the content that belongs to linguistics as the science of language. One could define one's purpose to be to understand why an urban renewal plan was a plausible and

⁶Fish, Self-Consuming Artifacts, p. 384.

acceptable recommendation on the part of planners. One could also say that one's purpose is to understand how planners view man, society and the larger ecosystem, and their coupling, because one believes that this is necessary to understand the plausibility of urban renewal. One cannot cut off meaning that relates to these purposes. To say that part of what is written is irrelevant requires that one ask immediately, "Irrelevant to whom?".

7.4 Multiplicative Information

A further reason for making expansiveness central to the critique is that information is multiplicative and fractionating rather than additive.

A planning report follows more or less this pattern: problem statement; historical background to the problem; data; data analysis; proposed solution(s). The traditional view is that the problem is the barrier to be surmounted. The three middle sections of the report "add up" to the proposed solution. Thus the final section, which overcomes the problem barrier, is an outcome of summing up the previous sections. The analytical process adds up to, creates, or produces a solution. The writers have produced a solution; the reader reads the solution.

What is missing from this view is facilitation -- the fact that people selected some information for the report while not selecting other information; and that the information was ordered by people in one way and not in any number of other possible ways. An analogue is being used that excludes the purposefulness of the writers. "Information is multiplicative", says Wilden, "because each 'bit' affirms some 'thing' at the same time as it does not affirm some -- undefined -- other 'thing'."⁷ The bit of information that gets through to become the solution is the remainder from the infinite number of possibilities that did not get

⁷System and Structure, p. 38

through. The solution, which is negative information, is the difference that has been selected (by whatever means and for whatever purposes) from among all the possible differences. Thus, by the time one gets to the proposed solution one has, in effect, cast away many, many bits of information that were not chosen. Open systems are self-corrective; they are "always conservative of something."⁸ If information is selected on the basis of system survival, what systems' survival have governed the choices? All the information that would potentially help one to answer this question lies anterior to the proposed solution.

There is a world of meaning in what has not been chosen. Why were many of these alternatives not followed? These are the sites where the meaning of the solution is being produced by writers. It appears that this is where the critique must work -- among the probabilities. Meaning, explanation, critiquing are not therefore amenable to summary, despite the common metaphor about summing up a message. The meaning will be found by the critical reader to be stretched across the text and not at the beginning, the middle or the end.

7.5 A Correct Reading?

The final justification to be given here for expansiveness concerns the "I" which approaches the text as already a plurality of meaning.⁹ As the writer's writing is guided by his purposes, his particular synthesis of experience, understanding, and so on, so too the reader's reading. The reader does not come as an empty vessel to the text. Consequently, different readers say that they find different meanings in a single text. The argument then ensues as to which of the meanings is the "correct" one.

⁸Bateson, Steps, p. 429

⁹Barthes, S/Z, p. 10

This is frequently argued at the scale of the text as a whole because of the referendum syndrome described above. The debaters proceed on the assumption that there can be only one correct reading.

Can there be a single correct reading? If the answer is yes, then one assumes, first, that the meaning is in the words written on the page and not in the relations among reader, writer, text, their context, and the experience of reading. Second, one assumes that meaning is "simply folded into a work (implicated) so that it can then be unfolded (explicated) by a technician of language processes", as Scholes says.¹⁰ But of course meaning is not in the words but in the complex set of relations and cannot be wholly seized by a reading. That is why Barthes speaks of the "modest plural". The best we can do is to try to expose the modest plural and to try to find the direction of (rather than the truth about) the specified and non-specified purposefulness of the author-plus-text-plus-reader. The question is: Among the patterns of defamiliarized assumptions and conventions can one recognize what this system is conservative of?

¹⁰Robert Scholes, Structuralism in Literature (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974), p. 147.

PART III

THE PLAUSIBLE PLAN

CHAPTER-8

METHOD

8.1 Justification for the Method

The making of a normative and ideological goal, and its pursuit, seem natural is the major thing happening in a planning report. Perhaps because this is the case, the focus of evaluation is, as discussed above, always the declared goal while the vehicle for declaring it, the writing, is assumed to be silent background. Borrowing the sense of Reddy's "conduit metaphor" for the use of language, one could say that language appears simply to transfer the thoughts of planners to readers of their reports. Language, then is a tool in the service of thought and not, through the manner of its use, creative of meaning. As such, it is "ordinary" because it appears simply to bring thoughts to us that make sense. However, as Fish says, this is its meaning because "by making easy sense it tells us that sense can be easily made and that we are capable of easily making it. He says

Such language can be called "ordinary" only because it confirms and reflects our ordinary understanding of the world and our position in it; but for precisely that reason it is extraordinary (unless we accept a naive epistemology which grants us unmediated access to reality) and to leave it unanalyzed is to risk missing much of what happens -- to us and through us -- when we read and (or so we think) understand.¹

¹Self-Consuming Artifacts, p. 390.

The critique will focus on information truly as "difference", the difference between what is apparently ordinary and plausible and what, at closehand, is extraordinary. It is in this gap, this "difference between", that the reader experiences the meaning of the text.

Why does the critique focus on the reader and reading? We are looking for manifestations of the planner's view of the world -- of man, society, the larger ecosystem, and how they should be coupled. A planning text is one such manifestation. It is the planner's "theory-in-use", to use Argyris and Schön's term, and allows one to look simultaneously at the planner's views toward both systems and coupling. However, we do not wish to "look at" these in some abstract manner but rather with reference to "real" persons, readers who affect and are affected by those theories-in-use. A reader reads, and in the reading experiences a modest version of that world view. It is the thinking and feeling reader whom we wish to put in relation with the thinking and feeling planner. This is quite different from traditional evaluations in which planners and plans are "judged" against abstract models of how the world should be.

A reader does not "capture" the planners' view in its totality either from reading one or many reports. To assume this is possible implies a static reader and static writer. Nor does the reader capture the traces of the world view of a single bioenergetic author, or authors. As Bateson points out, the bioenergetic person does not locate the boundaries of ideas or of information. The view is mediated by the planners' disciplinary matrix. To repeat Barthes' point in 7.5, the "I" which comes to write the report and to read the report is to some extent already formed, already a plurality of meaning.

8.2 Dividing Up the Text²

Since the method aims to "break open" the text, so to speak, so that the reader has elbow room in which to work with the connotations, the first requirement is a way to divide up the text that slows down the reading. The way the text is divided up for study in this method is by separating the text into fragments that may vary from a single word to several sentences. The usual grammatical units such as phrases or sentences are not respected. Fragments may also be graphics, photographs, tables, maps, and so on that appear in the original.³ The fragments are taken for commentary in precisely the sequence in which they appear in the original text, and nothing is left out. "Text", the inclusive term used for the document as a whole, refers to all that is printed, written or drawn.

The delimitation of a fragment will depend on the connotation and experience suggested to the reader. A stretch of text should propose at most a few meanings for discussion in the commentary that follows. Thus, fragments form the level of "primary contact with the text, at which items are separated and sorted out so as to be given various functions at higher levels of organization."⁴

The problem confronted in the critique is how to deal with fractionating, or multiplicative, information. Once one begins a critique, one is aware of many different levels of meaning in counterpoint: meaning plays on meaning; one fragment "flies" toward another or toward others, or to the text as a whole; there are cumulations; there is always process, the linking and re-linking of connotations. The possibilities for, and

²This section closely follows Barthes, S/Z, pp. 11-15

³A "fragment" corresponds to Barthes' "lexia", except that the unit it describes is not restricted to words as such.

⁴Culler, Poetics, p. 202.

constraints on meaning production are scattered across the whole text. From the point of view of this close critique, it is evident that meaning could not be summed up neatly at the end of the reading.

8.3 Mediating the Message: Codes and Naturalization

The message between sender and receiver, that is, the words that are actually written down on the page, is always mediated by codes. (See sections 4.5 to 4.7 for the earlier discussion of codes.) A code is qualitatively different from the message. As described previously, it is a set of rules that are negative in that "they do not amount to a positive control of what an organism, a person, or a population is required to do. Rather they define the limits prescribing what -- in any given system -- one may not do".⁵ The "naturalness" of meaning arises from accepting these constraints and from functioning, usually without awareness, within them.

The idea of identifying certain codes and using them to aid a critique of planning texts was originally inspired by Culler's and Barthes' works.⁶ Codes appear to be useful devices for identifying, discussing and keeping track of "shorthand" references found when reading a text. The focus for the code selection for this critique was always on the sorts of ideas, knowledge, objects or relations to which planners refer to make their reports seem plausible. Codes having to do with plot or action or characters, which may be common in literary criticism, seemed to be inapplicable for a planning document.

The selection of the seven codes used here arose from the conjunction of several things. Of first importance was a reading of Barthes' *S/Z* in which he applies codes in critiquing a short story by

⁵Wilden and Wilson, "The Double Bind," p. 268.

⁶Culler, *Poetics*; and Barthes, *S/Z*.

Balzac. His method is followed closely here, although his codes are not. Still, one of his codes, the referential code, was conceptually intriguing. However, Culler argues, successfully I think, that Barthes' referential code is rather unsatisfactory as it stands because he used it mainly to bring out references to proverbial wisdom and culturally stereotyped knowledge, whereas referentiality is richer and more important than that. For one thing, it is the seat of ideological references. Since the purpose of a planning report is to be a plausible social document it is, in Derrida's phrase, "not much orphaned".⁷ That is to say, because of its social parentage it corresponds closely to an already known and legible "reality". Planning works refer incessantly to the ideological and epistemological foundations of their parents. Therefore, it seemed that an expansion of this sort of a code was necessary.

Thus, a second influence was Culler's five levels of "vraisemblance", or naturalization, which greatly expands Barthes' idea of the referential code. Three of the codes found here were modelled on these levels of "vraisemblance": "The Real", "Cultural Conventions" and "Genre Conventions". In passing, Culler notes that Barthes' work lacks "any code relating to narration (the reader's ability to collect items which help to characterize a narrator and to place the text in a kind of communicative circuit)".⁸ In part, it was this comment which suggested yet another code: "Writer, Reader, Writer, . . .".

Thirdly, Wilden's discussion of the term "opposition"⁹ suggested the value of identifying this mode of thinking, particularly in the light of Sch n's emphasis on the place of mirror-opposites in problem-solving.

⁷Jacques Derrida, Marges de la philosophie (Paris: Minuit, 1972), p. 376, cited in Culler, Poetics, p. 132.

⁸Poetics, p. 203.

⁹System and Structure, passim.

Fourthly, the choice of each code was greatly influenced by my particular understanding of the planning disciplinary matrix and especially as it is manifested in the planning report genre. This led directly to the creation of a code which would show how discipline-related references were used in building plausibility.

Fifthly, by basing my definition of "code" in communication theory, I came to identify the chosen codes differently, I believe, than Barthes and Culler. Their codes are repositories, or as Barthes says, anonymous voices informing the text. My understanding is that they are therefore, akin to positive controls of the 'thou shalt' form. By contrast, my codes are devices of communication. They mediate the message in a 'thou shalt not' form as described by Wilden at the beginning of this section.

Finally, a procedural matter: I was conscious of keeping to a small number of codes so that they were easily remembered and evidently different from one another. As it happens, the codes which came out of these reflections and an initial perusal of the report to be critiqued, are the ones appearing here. That is, while their definitions were modified and made firmer during the critical process, there did not seem to be a need to replace any or add others.

The choice of these particular seven codes will of course constrain the identification of connotations. As in any choice of a "difference that makes a difference", the very selection leaves many that were not selected. The codes chosen are ones that I understand to be active in this planning report. They handle appeals to social mores, to measures of factualness, to everyday reality, to theoretical exegeses, to either/or and analogic thinking; and they point to ways in which the medium is the message for readers and writers.

Nonetheless, the codes selected create a focus for the reading and discourage focus elsewhere. An effort to compensate somewhat for the

emphasis on pre-selected codes is made by "digressions", which are floating commentaries not tied to a particular fragment and which are interspersed in the commentary. Digressions are discussed more fully following an outline of each of the codes.

8.4 The Codes

Each fragment will be associated with one or more codes which are seen to constrain and to make possible the meaning of the fragment for the reader.

An example can be given: A unit of text that describes the subsequent ordering of the report is associated with the code which is here called "Genre Conventions" (see number 53 in the critique). This code limits the possibilities concerning form and content of a planning report. The report is "natural" to the extent that it proceeds according to some form which is expected, based on the writer's and reader's experience with the genre. The existence of Genre Conventions as a code postulates a generalized concept of what constitutes a "grammatical" planning report, that is, one whose form and content are already in some sense known to the reader. The model of the grammatical report constrains what is possible and not possible while remaining within the bounds of a planning report. In the report-plus-reader system, a degree of self-regulation occurs to the extent that the conventions of planning reports are what the reader expects to find as he reads this particular report, and that expectation enhances the possibilities of finding in it what he expects to find. Similarly, in the report-plus-writer system, the writer begins his task with a form of report already given, to some extent. Even if the boundaries are not known precisely, there is a clear enough sense of them so that a work which is not sufficiently compliant will be unrecognizable as a planning report.

Another example: The authors refer to the need for both "public and private redevelopment". (See number 46 in the critique.) In this case, "public" and "private" are set in opposition to one another; redevelopment appears to be construed as either public or private, where sources of money to carry out actions form the axis between the poles of public and private. "Oppositions" is used in the critique for such references. The task of the critical reader is to defamiliarize the various coding conventions by pointing to them in their roles of making meaning possible.

The codes are not mutually exclusive; they apply to different contextual levels at which meaning is possible. For example, fragment 16 reads: "It is desirable that". In the commentary two codes are used. One is "Genre Conventions" since this phrase connotes the impersonal mood, a common form used in reports to convey objectivity. The other code is "Writer, Reader, Writer,..." which refers to relations between authors and readers. In the context, this phrase also connotes a sense more akin to threat than desire. The association of a fragment with one or more codes will bear on the sort of naturalization understood to be functional in that situation.

8.4.1 The Real

The Real is the code of information that seems entirely natural, based on the evident structure of the "real world". For example, in fragment 26 the authors write that there are 41,615 residents in the area. To arrive at a precise count of individuals seems such a basic and simple operation that one does not question the intelligibility of the act. Information is given at a high level of detail which, as detail, is assumed to be non-controversial.

Nonetheless the information in this code is still presented as "difference" -- what gets onto the map from the territory. As such, the

Real applies at some level of analysis to all the fragments. The Real is what we believe; and what we believe is real in its consequences. It is no less so because it is described for these purposes under codes such as "Genre Conventions" or "Oppositions".

8.4.2 Oppositions

This is the code of the either/or, the common, often habitual, use of binary logic and typified in the form, 'A'/Not A'. It is encountered in planning texts in ways that deny "goodness" or "rightness" or "value" to one state while investing the denied quality in the reverse state. A well documented example is "neighbouring" in slum clearance, urban redevelopment and renewal areas. In their pre-clearance state, areas were denied any value worth preserving with respect to neighbouring. They were denied any value by not noticing any neighbouring. All the value was expected to emerge in the future imagined state of the area. Somewhat later it became evident that the pre-clearance state was not necessarily devoid of value and that the post-renewal state was not necessarily invested solely with value.

Schön has described cases in which planners and policy makers have operated on the basis of oppositions.¹⁰ For example, a statement that the housing in an area is inadequate according to some set of indices may suggest the goal of making the housing adequate according to those same measures. Indeed it would appear inconsistent in the planning report genre not to propose a solution for each inadequacy noted. By the same token, what is not noted as a problem does not become a focus in the solution.

In the Oppositions Code there is a penchant for mirror reversal. The process is reactive: the response is formulated on the same level as that to which it responds. The motion established is like that of a pendulum.

¹⁰"Framing", pp. 11-33; "Generative Metaphor", pp. 260-268.

8.4.3 Cultural Conventions

The emphasis of this code is to make the normative appear natural. The code includes references to proverbs, prejudices, general ideological beliefs. It refers to "'a body of maxims and prejudices which constitute both a vision of the world and a system of values'". Their use in a planning text is metonymic: "an action is justified by its relation to a general maxim, and 'this relationship of implication functions also as a principle of explication: the general determines and thus explains the particular ...'".¹¹

Metonymy describes relations of contiguity or association. Scholes identifies three kinds of association:¹² (i) things habitually found together in familiar contexts (streets, cars); (ii) things thought to be logically related by cause and effect (cars, traffic jams); and (iii) things thought to be logically related by whole and part ('What's good for General Motors is good for the nation'). Thus when the authors write that "the study ... envisages the gradual improvement of most of the area by the residents themselves" (number 15), they refer to a Cultural Convention -- in this case the liberal ideological belief that a person would 'put his house in order' if the institutional environment encouraged this behaviour. The general maxim explains a cause/effect process.

8.4.4 The Symbolic

The emphasis of this code is to state or confirm normative judgments, using relations of similarity or analogy. As in the case of "The Real", at some level the whole report is metaphoric and belongs in this

¹¹Culler, *Poetics*, p. 144, including citations from Gérard Genette, *Figures-II* (Paris: Seuil, 1969), pp. 73-75.

¹²Scholes, *Structuralism in Literature*, p. 20.

code. However, further distinctions can be made for the purposes of the critique. For example, the authors use an analogy between redevelopment and economic theory to explain how the private participation portion of the redevelopment will work. (See number 48.) This is part of The Symbolic, but the reference is understood to be more specifically a reference to a theory and hence is placed in the Code of Indices. In several cases of this sort both the more specific "Indices" and also "The Symbolic" will be used.

8.4.5 Indices

The emphasis of this code is to make normative judgments appear law-abiding. Here, justifications may refer to more technical sources of corroboration than those included in Cultural Conventions or The Symbolic. The ideology inherent in the goal and the goal pursuit is less readily recognizable because the references are stated in technical or quasi-technical language.

The term "indices" is used here to include those models, theories and other hypothesizing and corroborating devices that form guidelines against which something in the planner's domain is measured.

It is common in planning reports to use indices from a variety of fields. Those used, and the way they are used, give a sense of the planner's 'reading' of the knowledge field in general, and of the spawning discipline from which the index is drawn in particular. The index may be drawn, for example, from economics, sociology, psychology, architecture, law; or from planning's own stock of theoretical and practical knowledge; or from some branch of the physical sciences; or derive from the epistemology of science. An example of a (mis)application of scientific method concerns the availability of so-called "incubation" space for new industries (see number 28) in which an observed phenomenon is posited as a cause. An example of transportation planning as an indicial source is number 25 in

which the district is described as being "in the path of high volume peak traffic movements on traversing arteries".

8.4.6 Genre Conventions

A genre is a specific sort of channel. The message sent or received could not be produced in the same manner within another genre. It actually prescribes certain possibilities of meaning. The mediation it prescribes is also a code.

A range of expectations about what is reasonably expected to be found in the work comes into play at the time one approaches the work, whether to write it or to read it. We approach a representative of a genre mindful of all other examples of the genre we have encountered or heard about. The 'mindful' model permits the writer or reader to recognize the natural and the deviant while proceeding through the text (e.g., Expected in the planning report genre: problem-solution sequences; Unexpected: jokes). The reader begins with a posture toward the genre. From the moment of initial contact with the work, there is an instrumental framework constraining what can be read. For example, the reading of metaphors in the planning report genre will differ from that in poetry. In the planning report we resist giving "incubation" the connotation of "womb" whereas in reading a poem we may not be so restrained.

As well as written forms, the planning report frequently contains iconic forms -- such as maps and photographs; numerical forms -- such as tables and equations; and graphic forms -- such as drawings and graphs. The non-written forms that are used are also aspects of the genre.

8.4.7 Writer, Reader, Writer, . . .

This code collects items that refer either to the writer or to the reader or that signify the nature of the relationship between them. The

people who are directly affected by the proposals of the report are included here as readers -- that is, residents of the Don Planning District, bureaucrats and elected officials of various governmental levels.

A continuous name was given to this code to reflect the mix up between who is author and who is reader. In the context of representative government, the authors, who are representatives of government, are theoretically residents of the district and thus also readers; and the residents, who have theoretically told the authors what to write are, in theory, writers. In practice, a report may be written to make clear the distinction between authors and various categories of readers. The focus is on the ways in which writers and readers define themselves and are offered in definition by others, via the communication of the planning report which is both written and read.

8.5 Digressions¹³

As the analysis proceeds there will be occasional digressions from the meanings proposed by specific fragments to discuss the production of meaning from other stances. For example, the statement of the date of the report, "September 1963" (number 3), is assigned to The Real. In addition, however, the reader's knowledge of the date affects the whole reading. The relative opacity or transparency of the ideological references will depend not only on the particular reader but also on the time since the report was written. The difference in time between writing and reading is both braided into the text and floats over the text presenting ideas that are not necessarily in the report but are only implied by the reading of a 1963 report in 1980. Digressions thus give the critical reader room to comment on the production of meaning unconstrained by the selected codes.

¹³The term 'divagations' from Mallarmé is used by Richard Howard in the preface to Barthes' S/Z, p. x, to name what are here called 'digressions'.

8.6 Choice of Text

The report entitled "Don Planning District Appraisal" was selected for a number of reasons. A text was sought that:

1. was not current, because it is easier to recognize and acknowledge habits of thought that are at some distance from oneself.
2. dealt with a subject sufficiently widely commented upon that comparisons could be made between this critique and the studies of others. Urban renewal was selected as the general subject.
3. was the work of practicing (as opposed to theoretical or academic) planners because it is here that theory and practice meet, and because these works are addressed to those beyond the profession to legislators, bureaucrats and, in some cases, to the public.
4. was not edited by non-practicing planners as a refereed journal article describing a plan might be.
5. apparently represented "enlightened" professional thinking in its era to avoid claims that one had chosen a text in bad faith to show a minor variant of planning practice. Toronto was clearly the preferred city from which to select a report for the Canadian context since a large portion of all slum clearance, urban redevelopment and renewal projects in Canada from 1947 onwards were carried out there, including a special joint project on urban renewal by Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation, the Ontario Department of Planning and Development, and the City of Toronto Planning Board.¹⁴

The Don Planning District was chosen since a number of different types of projects were undertaken in the area and since there is

¹⁴Toronto, Advisory Committee on the Urban Renewal Study, Urban Renewal: A Study of the City of Toronto (Toronto: 1956).

considerable academic and journalistic commentary on these projects.¹⁵

The 1963 report is thoroughly embedded at about midpoint in a series of reports that began with the first slum clearance project in 1947 in Regent Park North and continues up to the Neighbourhood Improvement Project era.

It is important to stress that urban renewal per se is not the subject of the critique. It does not attempt to judge the merits or demerits of urban renewal. That has been discussed at length elsewhere. The focus is on the meanings expressed in the planning reports that made urban renewal a plausible planning action.

A critique of the first few pages of The Don Planning District Appraisal of 1963 follows.

¹⁵See for example, Albert Rose, Regent Park (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1958); Rose, Citizen Participation in Urban Renewal; Alison, Hopwood and Albert Rose, "Regent Park: Milestone or Millstone?", Canadian Forum 29 (May 1949): 34-36; Graham Fraser, Fighting Back (Toronto: Hakkert, 1972).

CHAPTER 9CRITIQUE

9.1 Codes and Abbreviations

The following abbreviations are used for the codes.

<u>CODE</u>	<u>ABBREVIATION</u>
The Real	REAL
Oppositions	OPP
Cultural Conventions	CULT
The Symbolic	SYM
Indices	INDEX
Genre Conventions	GENRE
Writer, Reader, Writer, . . .	WRW

9.2 The Critique

A. The Report Cover

(1) "DON Planning District Appraisal"

- * SYM. What is an "appraisal"? It seems to connote assessment, determining exchange value, as in a real estate appraisal, or an appraisal of works of art or jewels. Value is assessed against some index or group of indices. The indices against which the value of the district is measured are revealed later. See 24,26,27,28,29,30. Analogy to marketable commodities.

(2) "City of Toronto Planning Board"

- * WRW. The appraisal is authored by an institution whose existence is explicitly sanctioned by government, and whose performance is implicitly endorsed. Connotes monolithically held beliefs, in contrast to those put forward by a single individual as author. Power, by appointment, to recommend.

(3) "September 1963"

- * REAL. A point in time. The planning report is a slice of "what is" at a moment of time in a shifting socio-political context. It rapidly becomes a historical document. The point of transfer from 'active' to 'historical' is understood in a general way by practiced readers by comparing the socio-political contexts for the area at the report date and current date.
- ** GENRE. A report without a date would be difficult to read. The context for the report is what might be "known" or what might be expected up to the date. Without a date, the reader must construct the context from the writing.

I TIME AND DIFFERENCE

What can a 1980 reader read in a 1963 planning report? The differences are striking. The report appeals to the social mores, to the legal embodiment of intentions, to ideology, and to the disciplinary matrix of planners of the period in which it is written. Planning periods, in this respect, are brief. We speak of the literary Renaissance or Romantic period for which the years of duration are given in triple digits. Planning periods are more ephemeral at the level of the text. True, they reflect the taste of the age at a high level of abstraction. The text floats in a thin

gruel of moral purposes such as 'order' and 'improvement' which continue to inform planning over generations. But this is not sufficient sustenance for proclaiming plans. The gruel must be boiled down to something stronger, something more nearly tangible which will support the means by which the general purposes can be realized. With a meagre 17 years between writing and reading, the differences between what could then be written and can now be written seem acute. Phrasings surprise us, seeming bald or over-garnished, too formal or too graphically metaphoric for the genre today. They are pale sophistication beside our newly hardened categories. Besides bringing time to the text from the outside, we also encounter time references inside which bounce us back out to our own time. For example, we are often told in the text that the comprehensive planning period spans twenty years. Out to 1983 -- which, as it happens, is nearly here (and which as it happens or was made to happen, narrowly misses Orwell's Year of the Parody of Statist Order). Can we envision that plan accommodating us in today's world? Can we give credibility to that vision of 1963 knowing what we know today and having experienced what we have since its writing? In short, how seriously can we read an old report?

(4) The base map as report cover graphic

* REAL. The base map will serve to situate the Don Planning District for those conversant with some of the major thorough-fares and open spaces of Toronto when the boundaries of the area are given. The map is directly verifiable by simple observation.

** GENRE. A map, the typical tool of the planner, enhances the expectation of what is to follow. It implies that traditional planning practice and the genre are not going to be transgressed.

The base map is colourless and textureless, presenting from an elevated perspective details of man's activity on the land but without any sign of those people. It is an uninterpreted legacy of past activity.

B. The Letter of Transmittal

(5) The Letterhead.

* WRW. The report comes packaged with a letter of sanction and endorsement from a list of prominent individuals of the community who comprise the Board. Connotes influence signified through a practice not unique to planning: those who serve the community are accorded status by placing their names on letterheads. Agreement or disagreement with the report's content on the part of readers is acceptance of or challenge to the judgment of those whom community leaders hold in esteem. Status of endorsers with respect to readers.

** CULT. Designation within the Board. Those listed on the left of the black perpendicular line are the status members, some of whom have titles. To the right of the line is one name, that of the Commissioner of Planning and Secretary-Treasurer. The name is written in larger and bolder type; the title is spelled out in full. In the context of bureaucratic practice, he is the 'worker' and overseer and is deferential to the governing board listed at the left yet in a position of substantial authority within broad guidelines.

*** CULT. Those whose sex is not designated are, by convention, men; the one woman on the board is identified as a woman.

(6) "We are pleased to present this study of the Don Planning District."

* WRW. "We", the Board and Commissioner, speak with one voice.

(No. 19)

- ** OPP. There is a "we" and a "not-we" in the author and reader respectively. Since the letter of transmittal is not addressed to anyone in particular, the "not-we" is undefined and may be presumed to be everyone whose name does not appear on the covering letter. Does "we" include the staff of the Planning Board who, if they did not perhaps write the report, contributed information? Readers with any knowledge of any bureaucratic structure may legitimately wonder precisely who "we" are. See numbers 19 and 20.
- (7) "It is the fifth to be published in the series of appraisals which will eventually cover the City's 25 planning districts. The appraisals for the Annex, Rosedale, Deer Park and Downtown Districts have been published. Studies of the Yorkville, West Harbour and Eglinton Districts are in preparation."
- * INDEX. Thoroughness of the undertaking. Seriousness. Comprehensiveness stretched over space.
- ** SYM. Why are the forerunners to this report mentioned in the letter? Have the completed appraisals led to outcomes desired by the Planning Board? Is this an appeal to precedent?
- (8) "Before the Planning Board makes its final recommendation"
- * WRW. Power of the Board to recommend the destiny of the district for the next 20 years. See numbers 17, 26, 29.
- (9) "a short and less technical summary of the main issues and proposals"
- * OPP. Technical/Lay. There is a technical text and a non-technical summary, both of which can say essentially the same thing. The technical knowledge of the planner brought into play to do the appraisal is in some sense either inaccessible to, or of little interest to (or both), the residents of the Don.

- (10) "will be distributed to residents of the Don District and others who have an interest in the area."
- * INDEX. That those who live in the area should be told about what is going to happen before it happens refers to a diffuse 'text', or tenet, in the planning sphere.
- (11) "There will be opportunities for consideration of the proposals by individuals and local groups and discussions of the implications of the report at forthcoming public meetings."
- * INDEX. Theory of participatory democracy.
- ** WRW. The words "consideration" and "discussion" indicate what the Planning Board wants from those who read the short and less technical summary and/or those who come to public meetings. Syntactically, a number of words could have been chosen ranging over a continuum from, let us say, debate/argument to comment/approval. If one envisions the continuum as a vertical stack of potentially appropriate words, the choice of "consideration" and "discussion" appear semantically acute. They neither invite disagreement, nor do they demand approval. They appeal to the rational individual for approval as opposed either to demanding approval or to proceeding without informing. The tenor sought for the public meetings is suggested: it should be rationally discursive and by implication not belligerent.

II WRITTEN AND ORAL

The written is a conservative form of communication. It holds still in the sense that the words are still there when one refers back. One writes conscious of referral over time. Compare writing and face-to-face oral communication. Writing lies on the page and can be produced privately and at leisure. The reader is active with

reference to words and a page. By contrast, face-to-face oral communication is more thoroughly social and immediate. We must respond to the rapidly fading voice. It is multi-textured. Persons are active with respect not only to the words, but to tone of voice, accent, posture, attire, size, shape, complexion, silence, gestures of body and face, including the ones psychologists say are so quickly effected that, for their interview interpretations, they must be filmed by highspeed cameras and played back slowly. So subtle. So layered. So embedded. The oral is radical in the fundamental sense of the word of going to the root. We convey meaning from a point where intellect and emotion are not yet severed. The layers propose the redundancy of meaning, the masks and openings, the consistencies and inconsistencies which, in writing, are proposed by sources that are long on conception and re-construction but short on perception and immediacy. The public meeting invokes the oral but, according to the authors, it is to be an oral discussion of what has already been written. This is a rule for rational discourse in public meetings. One brings the oral to the written. Persons wishing to present the view that the report says more or says less than what it appears on the surface to say, must frame this commentary either at the same level of abstraction as the text (and come across as a counter-ideologue), or at a minute level of detail stripped of its context (and come across as a nit-picker). A public meeting calls for critique of the written by the oral. It pits a relatively impermeable and authoritative form against a porous and fragmentary form. The conservative against the radical. Tension. The public meeting conducted as an extension of the written, plants the referendum syndrome of accept/reject in new inimical soil. The chairperson is masterful who does not seal the

meeting against dissent thereby making a mockery of discourse, and yet feels at the end of it all that the fragmentary oral has actually pierced the massive block of the written.

- (12) "The Planning Board is anxious that its proposals for the Don District have wide public review and understanding before final recommendations are made."

* WRW. Keenness to be heard: authors to readers.

** CULT. That rational people basically think alike is suggested. Once the proposals are read and understood, readers will see that their own rationality accords with the rationality of the proposals. Agreement is expected on the grounds of rationality. The reader is not invited to provide information that will materially alter the plan. The reader is expected to understand.

- (13) "In considering this study of a rather complex district,"

* OPP. Complex/simple. Measuring this district against some imagined model of a simple district?

** WRW. Confirming the Planning Board's ability to deal with complexity. Warning the reader to restrain himself from facile criticism of the study.

- (14) "two points call for some emphasis. First, that the Appraisal presents a long range programme for the improvement of the Don District. The requirements of public discussion, deliberations by City Council, of further detailed work and financing, suggest that the proposals can only be implemented over a considerable period of time."

* INDEX. "Long range" -- associated terminologically with military, business and industry where various ranges of forecasts and plans serve efficiency goals. Long range connotes comprehensive management and far-sightedness.

- ** OPP. There will be measures for recognizing improvement, to distinguish future (good) conditions from existing (not good) conditions. Gradual improvement is envisioned but with an end-state (improved) which is in opposition to current state (unimproved).
- *** CULT. Proverbial wisdom that improvement doesn't happen quickly. 'Good things take time'. 'Rome wasn't built in a day'. (See 15,39,48,52.)
- **** WRW. If it were not for the constraints of public discussion, City Council deliberations, etc., the Planning Board would act expeditiously.
- (15) "Second, that the study, while sounding a cautionary note about conditions in the District, envisages the gradual improvement of most of the area by the residents themselves. Many proposals for public action are designed to improve the area and create a better environment, and thus give encouragement to residents to renovate their properties."
- * CULT. Liberal conventional wisdom that people would 'put their houses in order' if the physical environment encouraged this behaviour. It will be basically a 'bootstrap operation'. Public intervention is necessary but only as stimulus to individuals to carry on the task of improvement. Belief in the efficacy of limited political incentive to start the ball rolling. Question: Are residents and landowners synonymous?
- ** INDEX. Decision theory's 'Prisoner's Dilemma'.
- *** INDEX. Theory of environmental determinism is evident in the juxtaposition of improving (changing) the area with the (constant) residents. This fragment is in relation with numbers 31 and 38. Guttenberg has noted that in 1953 "slum" was defined in Words and Phrases as ". . . an overpopulated part of the city inhabited by the poorest people, destitute or criminal classes", but by the 1966-67

edition had been redefined as ". . . an area which does not provide an environment. . . in accord with accepted standards of neighbourhood life". "The stigma of the slum", says Guttenberg, "is shifting from the people to the environment".¹

**** INDEX. The climate for private investment in local real estate will be a measure of improvement.

(16) "It is desirable that"

* GENRE. A person "desires" or finds something "desirable". There are no persons speaking in or referred to directly in this report -- only committees, a statistical population, a private sector, and government. Since the report is impersonal, an 'it' desires. Form used to suggest objectivity.

** WRW. A phrase was apparently needed to say that writers think directly concerned readers should read this report carefully. Alternatives might have been: should, ought to, have to, must. The form chosen is overtly non-authoritarian but in context (see also no. 17), demands that readers read or else they risk surrendering certain rights.

(17) "those most directly concerned study the contents of this report very carefully. It will be the basis for the Planning Board's final recommendations to City Council, whose decisions will establish the plan for the Don Planning District."

* WRW. Warning! This is the first and last call for comment. Beyond this the fate of the Don is effectively sealed in a long range improvement programme sanctioned explicitly or by default by those concerned with the District. Signifies part of the chain of

¹Albert Z. Guttenberg, "The Social Uses of City Planning," Plan Canada 9 (March 1968): 9.

relationships through the decision process: Planning Board →
Others → Planning Board → Council (Nos. 33, 52)

** OPP. Refinement of the "not-we". Or so it seems. There is a technical report and a non-technical summary. This is the technical report. The authors ask those most concerned to study this report and one wonders if "those most concerned" are other technically adept readers such as other professionals who have overlapping mandates.

(18) Signature.

* GENRE. Signed by the highest ranking responsible (as opposed to nominal) member or employee of the sponsoring institution, in this case the Chairman.

** WRW. The nominal author of the letter and the report. Readers have a choice: to believe the Chairman actually wrote the report (a fiction sustained in conjunction with vesting responsibility in roles rather than persons); or to imagine the "we" contingent of ghost writers behind the Chairman (who are left nameless because they are not overtly responsible for report content.)

C. Acknowledgements

(19) "In the course of making this appraisal, the staff of the City of Toronto Planning Board consulted"

* OPP. Expansion of the "we" to include staff as interviewers. They are potentially identifiable as persons, by simply asking any staff member to say who worked on this project. OPP: we/not-we, and semi-anonymous/fully anonymous. See no. 20.

(20) "many individuals, associations, organizations, elected representatives and officials."

* OPP. Further refinement of 'not-we' but who these persons are and what they said in interviews remains fully masked. Filed information? Private or publicly available information?

** WRW. The authors have a wide network of contacts.

(21) "The information and the views they expressed on planning issues in the district, and their reactions to the preliminary analysis of problems, were most valuable in helping formulate the proposals contained in this appraisal. The Planning Board acknowledges with gratitude the co-operation, assistance and thoughtful consideration they so willingly gave."

* INDEX. Consultative process used in producing the plan. Appraisal should provoke little surprise for those who have been consulted is connoted.

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37	PROPOSED ZONING-----	118

* INDEX. The chapters named in the table of contents follow a process of explanation that begins with what the problem is, moves to a historical and general role definition of the district, then to data collection and analysis by function, finally arriving at the proposed general plan. Accords with the known linear planning model.

E. Chapter-I

(23) "Conditions, Problems, Solutions (A Summary)"

* GENRE. Mode of organization.

** SYM. Analogue to the "executive summary" of business and professional consulting reports of the era.

- (24) "The Don Planning District has a very central position in Toronto: the intersection of Parliament and Carlton is about one mile from Yonge and Queen,"
- * SYM. Assessment of value. Measure: centrality.
- * REAL. Local knowledge of an intersection conventionally considered important and strategic.
- (25) "and it is in the path of high volume peak traffic movements on traversing arteries."
- * INDEX. Technical terms used to confirm centrality known through simple observation in previous fragment.
- ** OPP. Is the district "in the path" of the traffic or is the traffic "in the path" of the district? Similarly, do the arteries "traverse" the community or does the community "traverse" the arteries? Perspective selected suggests opposition: districts that are valued for themselves (e.g. central business district; suburban residential districts) and districts that, from a comprehensive view, are subordinated to the broader dictate of providing for through traffic or for expansion of the central business area. Residentiality as residuum: see nos. 27 to 32.
- *** INDEX. Urban ecology. 'Zone of transition' between core and 'inner ring' of 'stable residential districts'.
- (26) "It is at present mainly a residential area, accommodating 41,615 people. The Appraisal Study indicates that the District will continue to be predominantly residential for the assumed planning period of twenty years, and that the population will expand to about 49,000."
- * REAL. The precise count of 41,615 people is in semantic exchange with "about 49,000" such that the precision of the former lends credibility to the latter.

- ** INDEX. "Residential" -- attribution to the district. How determined? Zoning? By attribution based on appearance, feel, land use ratios? Once categorized as "mainly residential" certain models of what a residential district should be like become operative.
- *** INDEX. "Twenty years" is the voice of comprehensive planning stretched over time.
- **** OPP. Current use/Future use. Residentiality as residual: see nos. 25, 27 to 32.

III STAYING WITH THE GENRE

The genre of the planning report compels a critique beginning within the genre rather than one that is found to work for some other medium. Criticism, perhaps because it is so closely associated with the creative arts such as literature and film, risks being applied in ways that equate a plan with other visual or written forms. Parallels may be sought in the story-telling form, for example. But stories imply a hermeneutic element, a personal interpretation, that in part defines the genre. The report genre resists all such interpretation, submerging as far as possible the hermeneutic and personal since the interpretative, particularized elements oppose the purpose of objectivity. Whether the genre should do so is another question.

Characters: may be developed for the purpose of making a story but how often one hears from story-tellers that the characters begin to make the story. Internal combustion. A light hand on the reins of authorship. Planning reports do not have characters, though they may have people abstracted (nos. 11, 16, 29, for example) and expressed in quantities (nos. 26, 35, for example) and in roles (no.

31), including the author role (no. 18). Presdestiny. Tight hand on the reins.

Action: Reading a story is being in a process of action from beginning to end. Reports do not have action in process but only description of past action or future action. The reader contacting the text is located in the lull between past and future as if process in the subject area had ceased. To critique planning reports through the mesh of another genre subverts the purposes of authors and bypasses the genre itself as a generator of meaning.

- (27) "The other uses, which are not strictly local, have limited expectations of expansion -- industry within established zones, east of River Street and between Shuter and Queen, east of Parliament; offices and institutions will continue to gravitate toward Jarvis Street, and to some extent, Sherbourne. The Wellesley and Princess Margaret Hospitals and research facilities form a distinct complex that will be more intensively developed and will extend into the surrounding area".
- * SYM. Benign change expected for 20 years. Planning goal will be to manage the natural processes (such as "gravitating", staying "within established zones", realizing "limited expectations", extending) associated with industry, offices and institutions.
- ** INDEX. The standard zoning hierarchy has been inverted by implying no particular protection for the residential area from, albeit modest "expectations of expansion" on the part of industry, business and institutional uses.
- (28) "The key fact about industry in the Don is that of a comparatively static industrial shell; that is, established factories, within which new companies come and go. This incubator character of industry does not create significant demands for industrial land."
- * INDEX. The critical phrase is "does not create significant demands for industrial land". What does not create demand? The incubator character of industry. What is incubation? New industry birthing

in old factory shells. This is a tautology, which can serve as a definition of 'incubation' but not as a statement open to testing since it is already true by definition. The well known example of a tautology is Molière's doctoral student who stated that the reason why opium put people to sleep was because of its dormitive principle. Here, the reason why industrial activity will not expand is because of the incubation principle. Incubation, an observed phenomenon, has been raised in one swoop to become a cause. Bateson suggests that the premature elevation of data, hypotheses and heuristic devices to laws among social scientists is linked to the high value set on induction to the exclusion of deduction, and on prediction. But, as he says, "prediction is a rather poor test of an hypothesis, and this is especially true of 'dormitive hypotheses'".²

- ** SYM. Industrial development analogized to organismic system which is analogized to a mechanical system via "scientific method".
- *** SYM. Assessment of value. Measure: Usefulness of the district for industry.
- **** INDEX. "Incubator" as a metaphor for new industries trying to become established in cheap, out-of-the-way, out-of-date quarters was already part of planning terminology, having appeared in major American planning studies and in Jane Jacobs' The Death and Life of Great American Cities.³

(29) "The key fact about offices in the Don is that no major thrust of downtown offices -- e.g. finance, legal and accounting -- can be

²Bateson, Steps, p. xx.

³(New York: Modern Library, 1961), pp. 195-199.

expected to extend to Jarvis Street in the next twenty years. New office development in the Don District will be confined mainly to small-scale business and professional services, government and institutional offices."

- * SYM. Assessment of value. Measure: Usefulness of the district for offices.

- ** OPP. Reputable/Disreputable. The "downtown" prestigious activities of finance, law and accounting are named in juxtaposition with "Jarvis Street" (not with The Don or "the district") which is locally known as the street which is antithetical in all respects to finance, law and accounting: the street of the poor, of criminals, and of the homeless and unaccounted for. The prediction that the downtown activities will not move into the Don in twenty years is naturalized by symbolic contrast.

- *** INDEX. The offices will not "thrust" themselves upon the district which by contrast is connoted in earlier fragments -- and will be also in later -- as submissive and as a residuum vis-à-vis these predominantly male and prestigious professions. The option to reject the district appears to rest with the prestigious activities. Land use is Victorian patriarchal mores? See no. 32.

- **** CULT. Small-scale: what is implied? Most law and accounting offices are small-scale and are professional services.

- (30) "The growth in these will represent a 67% increase over existing office floor space."

- * INDEX. Precision of projection methods over twenty-year range.

- (31) "The key fact about institutions in the Don is that those that occupy most of the land -- e.g. the welfare, religious and recreation group -- Salvation Army services, counselling and family aids, old and young persons' clubs and churches; and the government group, e.g. the Juvenile Court and the National Employment Service, provide a city-wide service, but are (or will be) strongly anchored in their service to the district population. The hospital group,

which has a regional base, is the conspicuous exception to this rule." (emphasis in original text)

* SYM. 'Politesse' is signified in the oblique reference to the character of the inhabitants who make more use of services such as welfare, the juvenile court and the employment service than do those in other parts of the city. By analogy, semi-technical terms such as 'local' and 'regional base' are linked with the socially needy (pejorative) and the medically needy (non-pejorative).

** INDEX. The linear relation. Since the services for the socially needy are used more by people who live in the district than by those who live outside, proportionally, therefore the services are not taking up more space than they 'should'. Services for the medically needy over the region do not take up too much space either because they take up less space (less by how much we are not told) than the local activities. Suggests planners know the appropriate ratios for such activities given socio-economic analysis of the area.

(32) "The other users of land -- recreation, schools and shopping -- are closely tied to, and greatly influenced by, the needs of the residential population of the district."

* INDEX. The residential character of the district explains the existence and nature of these land users. The residential neighbourhood appears to throw up dependent activities as if automatically by some inner energy or efficient causality. What about the purposefulness of the school board, the parks department people, and the proprietors of the pubs, the pawnshops, and the 5-and-dime's? Neighbourhood unit theory.

** OPP. (Second-order)Dependence/Independence. Traditional home-related (women's and children's) activities are dependent on the district which in turn is dependent on other higher and better users not pre-empting it.

(33) "The continued dominance of housing in the Don"

* INDEX. Logic. Process of elimination of possibilities. Assessment of value against other uses indicates that the determining (independent) uses (i.e. industry and business) are not going to take over the area in the next two decades and that the dependent uses, by definition, cannot. Therefore, the assessment that the Don will remain residential appears to have been reached by default of encroaching uses. Non-decision; or is it? Unsaid is that for a district in 1963 to receive federal funds for urban redevelopment the land should be put to the highest and best use. The highest and best use has been established by the summary analysis to be primarily residential. The legislated conditions have been met. The plan is plausible.

(34) "leaves as the central question of the Appraisal:"

* GENRE. Grammatical for planning report to have an objective or "central question".

** OPP. Central/Peripheral. Apparently the central question is "how to improve the district" (no. 35) and the peripheral question was "how to qualify for federal money to improve the district", which was brought to a close in number 33.

(35) "how can residential conditions in the district be improved for the 40,000 to 49,000 people who will live in the area in the next 20-year period?"

* OPP. Improved/Unimproved. There will be indices against which to measure improvement.

** OPP. We/They. Impersonal phrasing of 'we desire improvement for them'.

IV TRANSPARENCY AND ENIGMA

When a problem-solver by profession solves a problem, the presentation of the solution must be such that the problem neither looks too simple to have warranted professional attention (squandering) nor so difficult that it has not actually been solved. The line is a thin one. The tension set up by the possibility of the author falling off one end or the other is strung out in various fragments of the text where complexity is noted (no. 13) or inferred (no. 9), with hints that a solution was found (nos. 15, 35, 17), and is only fully diffused when the solution is given (beginning with no. 41).

- (36) "and as a corollary of this -- what City policies are implied by the future needs of the residential areas?"

* INDEX. The process is linear: one decides the improvements needed and then decides policies so that the improvements can be made to come about.

- (37) "In addition, there is a question that is relevant to the planning of any district in the City: what pattern of development will best meet the requirements of growth and change, as well as stability?"

* OPP. A "pattern of development" is to be decided upon that counters the current pattern of development (de-development? deterioration?) This apparently automatic current pattern functions without the effort of planners, but does not meet the requirements of growth, change and stability. Going downhill/Going uphill.
Automata/Purposeful.

** INDEX. Laws of nature. Growth, change and stability have requirements which must be met. They make demands. Where do they get the energy to make demands? The energy is inherent. The social/material analogy.

*** INDEX. "Will best meet" connotes an efficiency goal.

(38) "It is an unfortunate fact that much of the housing in the Don is deteriorating, or in danger of decline. One area in particular -- bounded by Gerrard, Shuter, Jarvis and Ontario Streets -- contains, in addition to a high proportion of houses in poor physical condition, a marked concentration of social problems."

* REAL. Two sets of information are represented as 'difference':
deteriorating housing and social problems.

** CULT. A relationship of cause and effect is implied by noting the association of things commonly found together: deteriorating housing and social problems. The culturally conventional causal relation maintains just these differences and confines the context to the district itself via the two differences noted. The reduction allows the explanation for the poor conditions to be successfully contained within the district, and for this zeroing in to appear natural.

*** OPP. The metonymy that leads to believing the problem is contained within the district enforces the fictitious boundary separating "district" from "non-district". Implies a closed system in which positive feedback (poor housing causes social problems causes poorer housing . . .) is driving the system ever closer to "death". The proposals to reverse the process (nos. 41 to 49) are mirror opposites of the factors seen to be at the root of deterioration in the system in the first place. Only minor adjustments are proposed for the district's (the system's) environment.

(39) "The Appraisal presents a comprehensive, long-range strategy designed to halt decline and to set the area on the path of steady improvement."

* GENRE. What is the alternative to the word "comprehensive" in such a sentence? ("Long-range" is already implied in comprehensive and

comprehensive is implied in long-range.) At the time, the arguments about the impossibility of being comprehensive in planning had thrown up its antithesis -- incrementalism. But does 'incrementalism' sell, so to speak? The connotations are jerky, piecemeal, uncoordinated, partial. Comprehensive, on the other hand, implies control, efficiency, coordination, resoluteness. The planner who was unprepared to use either term would have to justify an alternative. Comprehensive is expected. There are virtually no semantic alternatives, even giving "strategy" no modifier at all.

** OPP. Looked at on another level, the alternative to a comprehensive, long-range strategy might be no action, which is of course still a "difference". Action/No Action. However, once a public body such as the Planning Board has acknowledged problems exist, no action is no option.

*** INDEX. Metonymic association of "strategy" with (i) "halt decline" and with (ii) "set the area on the path of steady improvement" links strategy with causality. The technical expertise of the professional to make strategies that cause improvement is connoted.

(40) "The elements of this strategy are:"

* INDEX. A strategy is a composite of elements. Reference: model of planning. Elements are concrete and measurable.

(41) "home improvements and rehabilitation;"

* OPP. Run down/Run up.

** WRW. Should I know the distinction between improvement and rehabilitation or should I know that the use of the terms together is merely emphatic?

(42) "enforcement of by-laws on housing standards;"

* OPP. To recommend as an element of a strategy "enforcing" what is already in force suggests that the by-laws are not now being enforced. This apparent absence of enforcement implies a judgment about these by-laws: that they are inadequate, irrational, or at least in some way inappropriate. (In Chapter 3,II (i)A - "The Enforcement of Standards by Sound By-laws", the authors mention that "in some respects the City's Housing Standards By-law, passed in 1936 is incomplete and inadequate.") There is a crucial absence here in the summary: a statement that the existing by-laws are inappropriate and that it is a new set of by-laws that are to be enforced. The implication is that the new by-laws will be logically consistent with the goals for the district. Inconsistent by-laws/Consistent by-laws. The new by-laws will then allow enforcement to proceed rationally: enforce that which is in force/do not not enforce that which is in force.

** INDEX. Rational behaviour is logically consistent.

(43) "elimination of non-conforming uses;"

* OPP. See no. 42; the principle is the same. In fact Fig. 15 shows "Compatible Non-Conforming Uses in Improvement Areas", and the note reads: in relation to proposed zoning.

(44) "rehabilitation of houses, with public assistance;"

* OPP. "With public assistance" sets this element apart from no. 41. The source of the money is the axis of antithesis.

** CULT. Money is euphemized to "assistance" in the culture to take the edge off the suggestion that public assistance entails giving

out money. Giving out money is welfare-ism. Forestalling accusations.

(45) "essential public improvements such as street trees, off-street parking;"

* OPP. What are unessential improvements? These will not be named in the report.

** GENRE. In the genre it is natural to be concerned only with the essential. Unessential changes are unexpected.

*** INDEX. The essentialness of trees and parking are references to ideals of planning: to beautify (trees), to bring order (cars put away).

V A TIP OF THE HAT

Trees and parking can only appear insignificant tucked between publicly-assisted housing rehabilitation and public and private redevelopment. Why are they here? Why are they prefaced by "essential" while the other elements stand on their own, unqualified? In chapter 2 the roots and mandate of planning were described as falling in art and science, and the argument was made that interpretation of this among planners seemed to favour the view that these were separate and separable. It was also suggested that the bias lay toward attempting explanation rather than justification because explanation carries a mantle of legitimacy through its association with scientific verifiability. An example supporting this suggestion has (by chance?) come to hand. The reader of my reading of the report will have noticed the fragments referring repeatedly to verifiable measurements, efficiency goals, incentives, means of control, and a myriad of other indices used in the spirit

of explaining why the Don will remain a primarily residential area. Indeed, the bias was toward showing the Don as remaining residential residually; the authors were not, from my reading, setting out explicitly to justify why it should (or should not) remain residential. It would be residential by default and in the light of empirical evidence. (That the authors were actually engaged in justification is another point; what I think they thought they were doing was explaining.) Fragment 45 appears to be the first reference to aesthetics. (There will be two more, 49 and 51, which appear in lists of changes to be made, and number 54, the General Land Use Proposals map, which stands on its own as an example of the aesthetic without qualification.) If all the preceding had to be explained, would not trees and parking also have to be explained, and the more so since by comparison to the massive changes projected they seem so puny? How better than to claim them as essential, which leaves them at least open to be proved so, rather than leaving them unqualified and in the realm of aesthetics which by cultural convention risks the attribution of unessential.

(46) "public and private redevelopment."

* OPP. Public/Private: the source of money is the axis (no. 44).

** INDEX. Terminology of planned social change. Development, as used in no. 37 in the phrase "pattern of development", implied any sort of alteration to the area. Redevelopment, as used in the relevant legislation and planning literature of the period, means building on a site that has previously been developed. Prior to redevelopment there must be demolition. The absence (which makes a difference) of the expression that describes the step of destruction connotes identity between development and redevelopment, whereas development

is the class and clearance-plus-redevelopment is a member of the class.

- (47) "In areas of publicly-initiated redevelopment great emphasis is placed on (a) the need for a comprehensive programme based on the coordination of the goals and activities of the planning, housing, health, welfare and development agencies, and (b) the need for new housing and facilities to meet the requirements of the population in the area."

* OPP. Publicly initiated redevelopment/Comprehensive private rebuilding. See no. 48.

** INDEX. Public redevelopment is to occur through a direct appeal to the reasonableness and good intentions of the many agencies involved. (Compare this to the indirect appeal to reason via incentives for private redevelopment, no. 48.) Implies that the goals of public agencies can be coordinated because they already have a common end which is, approximately, the improvement of the conditions of life for citizens. Selective bounding of systems: big system selected to support the assumption that public agency goals could be harmonious; small system (relatively) selected for deciding actions based on that assumption.

*** WRW. The people of the district are a population, a statistical term. A population is an aggregate of discrete entities for which the operative consideration is likeness.

- (48) "During the next twenty-year period, two areas in particular will prove attractive to comprehensive private rebuilding -- the area between Wellesley, Bloor, Sherbourne and Parliament; and Homewood Avenue and adjoining culs-de-sac. The complete rebuilding of these areas, under the proposed standards, would produce a total of 4,500 new dwelling units. This represents about 15% of the total private apartment development expected in the entire City by 1980. The Appraisal proposes measures designed to promote a high standard of development."

- * REAL. Specifying sub-districts.
- ** INDEX. Post-Keynesian economics (see no. 47). The redevelopment is to be guided by publicly arranged incentives -- "standards". Comprehensive private rebuilding has occurred when all private landowners in the specified areas have responded alike to the incentives. Private comprehensiveness results from 'rational economic man' operating in response to the Keynesian supplement to the Smithian 'hidden hand'.
- *** INDEX. Precision of projection methods -- about 15% of total apartment development to 1980. (No. 30)
- **** CULT. Subtle relation between "15%" and "entire" connoting extensive private apartment building is a value to be sought after. If "entire" is omitted, the sentence becomes merely a factual statement.
- (49) "Other specific proposals in the Appraisal include a playfield and community centre north of Wellesley; the extension of parking facilities for Riverdale Zoo; the expansion of the Duke of York, Lord Dufferin and St. Martin's school sites and the reorganization of senior school facilities within the district into two schools -- Winchester, north of Carlton, and Lord Dufferin or Park, south of Carlton; for the Parliament Street shopping district -- off-street parking facilities for 170 cars, a street rehabilitation programme and a specific proposal for rebuilding to create an attractive focal point at Parliament and Gerrard. Transportation proposals include the widening of Sackville and Sumach, between Wellesley and Gerrard, Wellesley from Parliament to Sumach, and of Huntley, Selby, Linden and Earl. They also provide for the establishment of parking bays on Selby, Linden and Earl; a new local street pattern north of Wellesley between Sherbourne and Parliament to be introduced as rebuilding occurs and the extension of bus services, east along Wellesley to serve hospitals, an increasing residential population and the Riverdale Zoo.
- * REAL. The massiveness and density of detail is difficult to grasp. It is metonymy run wild "in which the parts totally obscure the whole."⁴ Barthes calls this stringing of element upon element

⁴Wilden, System and Structure, p. 49

"indirect language". It succeeds by achieving a level of detail that blocks access to concepts.

The best way for a language to be indirect is to refer as constantly as possible to things themselves rather than to their concepts, for the meaning of an object always flickers, but not that of the concept.⁵

Culler goes on to note that "this referential function. . . produces descriptions which seem determined only by a desire for objectivity and thus leads the reader to construct a world which he takes as real but whose meaning he finds difficult to grasp."⁶ The context has faded away.

** WRW. Reader invited by writer to take this myriad of parts as evidence of comprehensiveness.

VI STRIPPED-DOWN WRITING

A notion of the appropriate writing style has developed along with the genre, and is a mark of the genre. It is writing for the job, to inform. It should be logically ordered, pragmatic, no frills or fifty dollar words. The assumption is that this carries the message to the reader without room for (mis)interpretation. The conduit metaphor. This thesis has been a challenge to that assumption. It asks the reader to consider the possibility that as much subtlety can be built into a technical-sounding report as any other piece of writing. The difference is that, as I believe Marcuse says somewhere, it is so much more insidiously subtle because it appears so rational and forthright. Both the writing and reading of such material are set up in distinction to what one writes and reads off

⁵Roland Barthes, Essais critiques, (Paris: Seuil, 1964), p. 232, cited in Culler, Poetics, p. 194.

⁶Ibid.

the job, where these may bring pleasure. There is no joy intended in a planning report, and no joy derived. It is the dark side of an otherwise enjoyable activity. It entails abandoning our lives in order to profess our profession.⁷

(50) "The judgments made by the Appraisal on the future role of the district and on development trends"

* INDEX. The authority of scientific data analysis. Either by intent or by syntactical error, the judgments are made to appear to arise out of the Appraisal itself as if automatically ('the ghost in the machine') and not to be the judgments of human beings -- specifically the authors.

** WRW. Science, not the Chairman of the Planning Board, is speaking to the reader. The author merely provides the hand that writes it down.

*** CULT. By the association effected by the construction of the sentence, judgments on the future role of the district and judgments on development trends are made to appear as the same order of things. That offers two possibilities for meaning: that they both arise from the data, or both arise from judgments. Given the paradigmatic loading on 'science' as opposed to awareness of making judgments to this point, the reader may understand that the former is implied.

(51) "are expressed in the General Land Use Proposals. The main features of the Plan are indicated in the accompanying map (Fig. 1). The structure of uses is clear -- a residential district -- bounded by various types of commercial uses on the west, north-west, and south;

⁷ Richard Brown inspired the sense of this sentence with his hope for a poetic for sociology that "would not demand of us that we abandon our profession in order to profess our lives..." in A Poetic for Sociology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), p. 234.

by industry in the south-east, and parkland or private open spaces on the north and east -- and focussed internally on a commercial shopping district on Parliament Street, centred at Gerrard. Residential densities are highest on the west side of the district, near Jarvis and Bloor, and Jarvis and Dundas. The high quality, low density office area -- suitable for institutional and government offices -- extends along the length of Jarvis and along Sherbourne from Earl to Gerrard, and merges with the hospital-research complex, which extends along Wellesley between Jarvis and Sherbourne. A local shopping area to serve high density development in the north-west is provided on Wellesley between Bleeker and Ontario; Allan Gardens and Moss Park will serve both office and higher density residential areas. One major parkland addition -- a playfield and community centre site -- is shown immediately north of Wellesley, conveniently located for the residential community north of Carlton. The zoning proposals arising out of the General Land Use Plan are outlined in the final chapter of this report."

- * REAL. See no. 49. The description is somewhat lightened by the map. It is two-handed reading: one hand to follow the tour on the map, the other to mark the place in the text.
- ** OPP. Disorder/Order. "The structure of uses is clear..." Where there is now disorder, there will be order in the future.
- *** GENRE. Level of abstraction. The signs of human beings are there but breathing human beings shriek their absence, as in no. 49. The most personal concept stated is "residential community", but even that remains a crosshatched area on a planimetric projection.
- **** INDEX. The neighbourhood unit principle, fully explicated with articulated boundaries, open spaces, institutional sites, local shops, and an internal street system.
- (52) "Appraisal proposals involving public expenditures will require more detailed follow-up studies, and should be programmed in relation to city-wide capital improvement needs."
- * INDEX. Legislative authority. The context for this sentence is conspicuous by its absence: federal government approval under the National Housing Act.
- ** SYM. Delay and prioritizing symbolize resistance to the possibility that what is planned for the district converges exactly with what is

allowable according to the NHA. Convergence would swallow the Planning Board's claim to separateness from government. The absence of context mentioned above also resists convergence.

- (53) "The main proposals emerging from the Appraisal Study will be presented in detail in each chapter of this report, and summarized in the final chapter -- The General Plan."


* GENRE. Expected order of presentation. Grammatical to do the analysis first and then to show how the proposals have been generated by the preceding analysis.

F. General Land Use Proposals (Map), -Fig. 1

- (54) The map.

* GENRE. The map is the imagined end product of a fully implemented plan -- what the Don should look like, as far as land use is concerned, after the incentives, new by-laws, etc. have been in place for several years. In general, a map is an iconic form involving actual resemblance between the signifier and what is signified. But there are two important spaces for meaning associated with a map. One is the choice of 'differences' that are mapped. The other is the style of the cartographer. The style is what the imitator of the actual applies to the production of the icon. In this case we are at a third level of abstraction. First is our perception of the territory itself. Next is the 'real' land use map -- the one that is representative of what exists now in 1963. Then there is the map reproduced here which presents future land uses. In the 'real' land use map, all the street and blocks of structures are shown. The corners are sharp 90° angles; there is a great deal happening in the map. The style of the future land use

is quite different: the street structure is simplified; the houses and buildings are left out altogether; the different land uses have rounded edges so that they slip smoothly into the spaces and soften the harshness of the street grid.



PLAN NORTH CITY DISTRICT

APPROPRIATE

CITY OF TORONTO PLANNING BOARD

⑤

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CITY OF TORONTO PLANNING BOARD

129 ADELAIDE STREET WEST, TORONTO 1, PHONE NO. 367-7182

Commissioner of Planning and Secretary-Treasurer: M. B. M. LAWSON

September, 1963.

⁶We are pleased to present this study of the Don Planning District. ⁷It is the fifth to be published in the series of appraisals which will eventually cover the City's 25 planning districts. The appraisals for the Annex, Rosedale, Deer Park and Downtown Districts have been published. Studies of the Yorkville, West Harbour and Eglinton Districts are in preparation.

⁸Before the Planning Board makes its final recommendation ^{9a} short and less technical summary of the main issues and proposals ¹⁰will be distributed to residents of the Don District and others who have an interest in the area. ¹¹There will be opportunities for consideration of the proposals by individuals and local groups and discussions of the implications of the report at forthcoming public meetings. ¹²The Planning Board is anxious that its proposals for the Don District have wide public review and understanding before final recommendations are made.

¹³In considering this study of a rather complex district, ¹⁴ two points call for some emphasis. First, that the Appraisal presents a long range programme for the improvement of the Don District. The requirements of public discussion, deliberations by City Council, of further detailed work and financing, suggest that the proposals can only be implemented over a considerable period of time. ¹⁵Second, that the study, while sounding a cautionary note about conditions in the District, envisages the gradual improvement of most of the area by the residents themselves. Many proposals for public action are designed to improve the area and create a better environment, and thus give encouragement to residents to renovate their properties.

¹⁶It is desirable that ¹⁷those most directly concerned study the contents of this report very carefully. It will be the basis for the Planning Board's final recommendations to City Council, whose decisions will establish the plan for the Don Planning District.

(signed)

¹⁸W. Harold Clark
 Chairman

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

¹⁹In the course of making this appraisal, the staff of the City of Toronto Planning Board consulted ²⁰many individuals, associations, organizations, elected representatives and officials. ²¹The information and the views they expressed on planning issues in the district, and their reactions to the preliminary analysis of problems, were most valuable in helping formulate the proposals contained in this appraisal. The Planning Board acknowledges with gratitude the co-operation, assistance and thoughtful consideration they so willingly gave.

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²²DON - PLANNING - DISTRICT - APPRAISAL

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CHAPTER - I²³CONDITIONS, PROBLEMS, SOLUTIONS----- (A SUMMARY) -----

²⁴The Don Planning District has a very central position in Toronto: the intersection of Parliament and Carlton is about one mile from Yonge and Queen, ²⁵and it is in the path of high volume peak traffic movements on traversing arteries. ²⁶It is at present mainly a residential area, accommodating 41,615 people. The Appraisal Study indicates that the District will continue to be predominantly residential for the assumed planning period of twenty years, and that the population will expand to about 49,000.

²⁷The other uses, which are not strictly local, have limited expectations of expansion - industry within established zones, east of River Street and between Shuter and Queen, east of Parliament; offices and institutions will continue to gravitate toward Jarvis Street, and to some extent, Sherbourne. The Wellesley and Princess Margaret Hospitals and research facilities form a distinct complex that will be more intensively developed and will extend into the surrounding area.

²⁸The key fact about industry in the Don is that of a comparatively static industrial shell; that is, established factories, within which new companies come and go. This incubator character of industry does not create significant demands for industrial land.

²⁹The key fact about offices in the Don is that no major thrust of downtown offices - e.g. finance, legal and accounting - can be expected to extend to Jarvis Street in the next twenty years. New office development in the Don District will be confined mainly to small-scale business and professional services, government and institutional offices. ³⁰The growth in these will represent a 67% increase over existing office floor space.

³¹The key fact about institutions in the Don is that those that occupy most of the land - e.g. the welfare, religious and recreation group - Salvation Army services, counselling and family aids, old and young persons' clubs and churches; and the government group, e.g. the Juvenile Court and the National Employment Service, provide a city-wide service, but are (or will be) strongly anchored in their service to the district population. The hospital group, which has a regional base, is the conspicuous exception to this rule.

³²The other users of land - recreation, schools and shopping - are closely tied to, and greatly influenced by, the needs of the residential population of the district.

³³The continued dominance of housing in the Don, ³⁴leaves as the central question for the Appraisal: ³⁵How can residential conditions in the district be improved for the 40,000 to 49,000 people who will live in the area in the next 20-year period? ³⁶and as a corollary of this - what City policies are implied by the future needs of the residential areas? ³⁷In addition, there is a question that is relevant to the planning of any district in the City: what pattern of development will best meet the requirements of growth and change as well as stability?

³⁸It is an unfortunate fact that much of the housing in the Don is deteriorating, or in danger of decline. One area in particular - bounded by Gerrard, Shuter, Jarvis and Ontario Streets - contains, in addition to a high proportion of houses in poor physical condition, a marked concentration of social problems.

³⁹The Appraisal presents a comprehensive, long-range strategy designed to halt decline and to set the area on the path of steady improvement. ⁴⁰The elements of this strategy are: ⁴¹home improvements and rehabilitation; ⁴²enforcement of by-laws on housing standards; ⁴³elimination of non-conforming uses; ⁴⁴rehabilitation of houses, with

public assistance; ⁴⁵essential public improvements such as street trees, off-street parking; ⁴⁶public and private redevelopment. ⁴⁷In areas of publicly-initiated redevelopment great emphasis is placed on (a) the need for a comprehensive programme based on the co-ordination of the goals and activities of the planning, housing, health, welfare and development agencies, and (b) the need for new housing and facilities to meet the requirements of the different elements of the population in the area.

⁴⁸During the next twenty-year period, two areas in particular will prove attractive to comprehensive private rebuilding - the area between Wellesley, Bloor, Sherbourne and Parliament; and Homewood Avenue and adjoining culs-de-sac. The complete rebuilding of these areas, under the proposed standards, would produce a total of 4,500 new dwelling units. This represents about 15% of the total private apartment development expected in the entire City by 1980. The Appraisal proposes measures designed to promote a high standard of development.


⁴⁹Other specific proposals in the Appraisal include a playfield and community centre north of Wellesley; the extension of parking facilities for Riverdale Zoo; the expansion of the Duke of York, Lord Dufferin and St. Martin's school sites and the re-organization of senior school facilities within the district into two schools - Winchester, north of Carlton, and Lord Dufferin or Park, south of Carlton; for the Parliament Street shopping district - off-street parking facilities for 170 cars, a street rehabilitation programme and a specific proposal for rebuilding to create an attractive focal point at Parliament and Gerrard. Transportation proposals include the widening of Sackville and Sumach, between Wellesley and Gerrard, Wellesley from Parliament to Sumach, and of Huntley, Selby, Linden and Earl. They also provide for the establishment of parking bays on Selby, Linden and Earl; a new local street pattern north of Wellesley between Sherbourne and Parliament to be introduced as rebuilding occurs and the

extension of bus services, east along Wellesley to serve hospitals, an increasing residential population and the Riverdale Zoo.

⁵⁰The judgments made by the Appraisal on the future role of the district and on development trends, ⁵¹are expressed in the General Land Use Proposals. The main features of the Plan are indicated in the accompanying map (Fig. 1). The structure of uses is clear - a residential district - bounded by various types of commercial uses on the west, north-west, and south; by industry in the south-east, and by parkland or private open spaces on the north and east - and focused internally on a commercial shopping district on Parliament Street, centred at Gerrard. Residential densities are highest on the west side of the district, near Jarvis and Bloor, and Jarvis and Dundas. The high quality, low density office area - suitable for institutional and government offices - extends along the length of Jarvis and along Sherbourne from Earl to Gerrard, and merges with the hospital - research complex, which extends along Wellesley between Jarvis and Sherbourne. A local shopping area to serve high density development in the north-west is provided on Wellesley between Bleeker and Ontario; Allan Gardens and Moss Park will serve both office and higher density residential areas. One major parkland addition - a playfield and community centre site - is shown immediately north of Wellesley, conveniently located for the residential community north of Carlton. The zoning proposals arising out of the General Land Use Plan are outlined in the final chapter of this report.


⁵²Appraisal proposals involving public expenditures will require more detailed follow-up studies, and should be programmed in relation to city-wide capital improvement needs.

⁵³The main proposals emerging from the Appraisal Study will be presented in detail in each chapter of this report, and summarized in the final chapter - The General Plan.



54 GENERAL LAND USE PROPOSALS

- | | | | |
|--|---|--|--------------------------|
| | OFFICES, INSTITUTIONS & APTS. | | LOCAL SHOPPING |
| | RESIDENCES, OFFICES & INSTITUTIONS IN RESIDENTIAL BUILDINGS | | DISTRICT SHOPPING CENTRE |
| | HIGH DENSITY RESIDENTIAL | | PARKS & OPEN SPACE |
| | MED. HIGH DENSITY RESIDENTIAL | | INDUSTRY & WAREHOUSING |
| | MED. LOW DENSITY RESIDENTIAL | | NEW SCHOOL |



9.4 List of Digressions

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CHAPTER 10DISCUSSION

10.1 A Sensitizing Device

This concluding chapter deals with two matters: first, in this section, with the critique as a demonstration of the perspective described in the preceding chapters, and second, in the next section, with the place of such a perspective in the study and practice of planning.

Fragment by fragment scrutiny demonstrates the richness of connotation in the text. By contrast, the parsimony of a reading that takes the "capsule version" to be the full statement of planners' goals becomes more fully evident. But a number of criticisms might be raised against this method. Some of the most likely ones will be considered here.

The overriding objection, of which each of the following is a different dimension, is likely to be that the method steers one away from the palpable plan where solutions to pressing problems are laid out. It may be correctly claimed that the perspective suppresses those things with which the planner traditionally works -- cost constraints, by-laws, diverse client and customer values, power clashes, development permits, traffic -- and instead turns the analyst's attention toward something called "plausibility". Plausibility, having no definite form, and, being neither something to strive for nor something to avoid remains only something to be aware of.

Parts One and Two of the essay presented theoretical arguments for focussing on the network of relations in order to understand the justification

for a text, rather than on chains of cause and effect in order to understand the explanation for it. Now that the critique has been presented, we can ask if it successfully shows that the network of relations has effects for the planning enterprise which are at least as significant as the answer to the evaluator's question, "Does this plan achieve this stated goal?". In response, it should be said again that the critique works at a different level of concern than traditional evaluations. It is a meta-evaluation; it does not ask about the order of things but about our beliefs about the order of things.

A principal objection may be that the critique produced using this method is overly subjective. Indeed it is subjective but whether it is overly so needs particular consideration. I believe it can be shown that the method uses an "acknowledged and controlled subjectivity" which does not negate its value as a method.¹

Earlier chapters have attempted to show that we are inevitably concerned at all times with both objectivity and subjectivity, rather than with one or the other. One is not 'good' and the other 'bad'. A critique will reflect the analyst's personalized version of the text. Yet the text is also a bundle of social constraints which are collectively constructed and which the analyst is not free to interpret in just any way at all. One recognizes the connotations by referring also to our lived world; they are simultaneously social and personal, not the subjective creations of an individual. They are held intact by collective agreement that these represent relations in the world.

¹With Fish, who says in defence of his affective criticism method, I would say:

The procedure usually offered is to regard the work as a thing in itself, as an object; but as I have argued above, this is a false and dangerously self-validating objectivity. I suppose that what I am saying is that I would rather have an acknowledged and controlled subjectivity than an objectivity which is finally an illusion" Self-Consuming Artifacts, p. 407.

Against the view that the commentaries are impressionistic I would respond by stating that they are detailed assertions. The assertions may of course be refuted and replaced with others. They will still be assertions and not impressions.

Another objection may be that while traditional evaluations seem parsimonious by comparison, the leap has been made from too little 'flavour' to too much. Consider, however, what the critique is attempting to point to. First, it permits both the practice and theory of planning to be engaged simultaneously. Thus the connotations of a single fragment are referred to a number of codes. Fragment 11, for example,² refers to the theory of participatory democracy in which citizens are assumed to be capable of rational judgment about individual subjects as well as about the ensemble of subjects presented at formal elections. In addition, fragment 11 refers to the relations between readers and writers in the context of planning practice -- how the plans are to be considered by readers.

Second, it pre-supposes an ideology-bound analyst and an ideology-bound text, and the analyst's task is to try to make the ideological film less transparent. The connotations are innumerable. It is an on-going and unfinishable task because we cannot ever escape our own ideology, but can only change it. As we change, our reading of the text changes. The more closely the analyst's views correspond with those in the text, the greater the difficulty with recognizing the connotations because the text will appear denotative (as if it were pointing to facts) rather than connotative (as if it were pointing to relations). A frugal critique of this sort would warrant caution. This raises the question of whether one can fruitfully critique one's own work. To some extent, the answer to that question must depend,

²Fragment 11: "There will be opportunities for consideration of the proposals by individuals and local groups and discussions of the implications of the report at forthcoming public meetings."

first, on one's willingness to step back from the assumptions implied by one's statements in order to experience them afresh by bringing them back to the threshold of awareness. Second, it depends on one's courage to swap the comfort of habit for the relative insecurity of the new.

The objection may be brought that the critique does not lead to any conclusion. Strictly speaking, this is correct. If it did lead directly to a conclusion it would have failed to remain within the spirit of searching for the rules by which justification becomes plausible. What is justifiable in one set of circumstances may not be justifiable in another. We cannot conclude. Conclusions attempt to make everything stand still, to freeze the relations, and we are brought back to the 'referendum syndrome'. However, the critique does offer leads to patterns of information which point up attitudes toward man, society and environment and how these should be coupled, as understood by readers. (A full examination of patterns has not been included with the critique. Only an initial listing of some repertoires is presented.) The patterns therefore offer access to those consensual beliefs which we take to be so natural and entirely plausible that they are generally below the threshold of our awareness. Once brought to the surface, one can reflect upon them and choose to retain or change them. Choice cannot be escaped. The individual patterns found in the critique may also be compared with those elucidated by other methods. For example, the pattern which has been called "benefactorism" could be compared with studies of the area by Rose or Fraser, or studies of other areas such as by Gans, or broader studies of the subject, for example, by Gans or Dahl.³

³Rose, Citizen Participation; Fraser, Fighting Back; Herbert Gans, "The Human Implications of Current Redevelopment and Relocation Planning," Journal of the American Institute of Planners 25 (February 1959): 15-25; Herbert Gans, "The Failure of Urban Renewal," Commentary (April 1965): 29-37; Robert Dahl, Who Governs? (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961).

Yet another criticism may be that one has substituted for the external model against which a plan may be evaluated, an 'internal' structure against which plausibility is measured. To this I would say that there are structures, not structure, and that they embody both constraints and possibilities: they do not present a fixed vision of how a plan must be. Besides providing constraints which were spoken of earlier as being of the "thou shalt not" variety, they also provide latitude for the possibilities of imagination and creation. The reader encounters the idiom that has been constructed within the interwoven structures. By taking the plan as subject, planning is critiqued in its own terms, and those terms, we find, lead us to an array of codes as structures, codes of the 'everyday' and of the 'intellectual' spheres. The codes as structures permit a vast transposition of fragments from what in traditional evaluations are usually considered to be all part of "The Real" -- that is, considered to describe a relatively fixed and invariable world. A fine-combed reading builds up connotations in a number of codes concerned with relations rather than 'realities', dispelling the illusion that we are dealing with law rather than rule.

Finally, how much of one text needs to be critiqued, or how many texts need critiquing to demonstrate that a pattern really is a pattern? The method is concerned to show how plausibility is produced and the processes by which this occurs. It does not provide evidence for a particular meaning. It is, in Fish's terms, a "sensitizing device". Used as such we are helped to "leave unobscured the vast darkness" of how we go about coupling man, society, and the larger ecosystem.

10.2 Evolving Theory and Practice

Chapter 1 began by noting a major current of thought devoted to considering in a new light how we know and how we communicate what we know. In chapters 2 to 7 I have tried to show why planners also need to consider

these questions in a new light. In brief, the reason is that planners work with the arrangement and rearrangement of, or the relations among, things, ideas and persons. These relations are rarely fixed and immutable; they are constructed, so to speak, from our understanding of and beliefs about how the world works and ought to work. The tendency in planning has been to objectify these things, ideas and persons, and to try to explain their existing and proposed arrangements by reference to objective criteria. I have argued that this approach is no longer either convincing or successful.

To look at planning in terms of relations rather than objects requires more than superficial adjustments. One must begin with the epistemology of planning to effect a reorientation. The reassessment is beginning. Hudson, for example, refers to "a growing literature in the area of 'critical theory'" which is concerned with matters relating to planning epistemology.⁴ However, a number of paths are possible.

Efforts to study relations have been launched in many fields and it is hard to know which work in which fields is pertinent to give clues for proceeding in planning. In all cases, however, it seems that one comes to communication in one form or another: the physiological and verbal communication of our understanding of relations. A communications orientation distinguishes one domain central to the reorientation.

Another foundational domain, from my point of view, is "adaptiveness". Major portions of the thesis have been devoted to showing that analogic application of hypotheses of various types to planning results in reductionism whereby planning is denied an irreducible core, and partly because of this, the responsibility of the planner for the plan is heavily shrouded. Thus, the perspective I have chosen for a critical theory and method involves, most importantly, the purposefulness (conscious and

⁴Hudson, "Current Planning," p. 395.

unconscious) of adaptive, goal-seeking persons. The adaptiveness of symbolizing persons is missing, for example, from the common organismic analogue and from the newly popular linguistic analogue.

Planners, whose task it is to couple whole persons in an ecosystem, cannot risk separating the adaptiveness of persons from the adaptiveness of the rest of the living ecosystem. For this reason, I have adopted Bateson's non-mechanistic cybernetics as an approach which seems capable of helping to clarify the adaptiveness of persons with respect to assumptions, or the adaptiveness of a professional group with respect to a disciplinary matrix, or the adaptiveness of facets of the ecosystem.

A wide-ranging discussion of adaptiveness in the planning field is forthcoming, I expect. We have just about exhausted the ways to go around the subject by turning attention to absolutes such as rationality, to accusatory ideological debate, to quantification as a way to get answers to social stalemates, and so on. Once one questions the correctness of trying to explain human action and looks instead to justifying, I believe one is led to consider adaptiveness. After all, when all is said and done, the only way one can decide, for example, that the classical economist's description of land rent is better than the Marxist economist's is to accept the premises of one rather than the other. And what are premises? Are they not the assumptions we begin with when we approach a question? But why do we have to start with any assumptions at all? Because we cannot, apparently, swim about in a totally unstructured soup of possibilities. How do we get our assumptions? We learn them from others whose culture we share, and we also devise new ones or new constellations suited to ourselves. Some assumptions survive for a long time; others have short lives. Their duration depends on their adaptiveness to our purposes. Those that work for us survive; those that do not, are changed for ones that do.

Consideration of adaptiveness leads directly to the sort of critique proposed here -- a critique in a reflective mode. Overall, the thesis has been an effort, first, to describe and to support theoretically a view of adaptive persons justifying their plans because they are plausible; and second, to demonstrate by use of a critical method how one may recognize adaptiveness in ways which allow one to ask why certain assumptions and habits of thought are adaptive to the ongoing activity of planning. The method will be helpful for studying more deeply the assumptions of an era, or the evolution of an assumption over a long period.

Principally, the critique offers a way to use the perspective of the early chapters to acquire a larger measure of self-awareness and therefore self-criticism for planners as we go about our work, and in particular, a greater awareness of: our use of assimilated ideas (e.g., from economics); our use of metaphor (e.g., organism; cancer); our use of cultural appeal (e.g., helping the helpless); and our stances (e.g., 'we' versus 'they'). The value lies in becoming aware of the relations one normally takes to be entirely natural and certain. In awareness one has choices.

In conclusion, it is evident that critical analysis is an unstabilizing activity, especially for those who feel they have finally managed to sort out how the world works and how it ought to work. This unstabilizing effect is both its principal value and the reason why it is, and will continue to be, widely resisted. However, wherever useful debate is threatened by the "referendum syndrome", critical analysis of assumptions may be the only way onward. Of course there is a paradox: in order to introduce critical analysis to the disciplinary matrix one must first take the step of questioning the adequacy of the disciplinary matrix, which act is itself to make a critical analysis.

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