UNCONSCIOUS INTENTIONS IN FREUD'S THEORY OF MIND

by

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This thesis examines the question as to whether Freud depended upon a theory of unconscious intentions when he discusses slips of the tongue.

In my thesis I argue that Freud meant to imply that slips are intended unconsciously. This is not to say that he meant that the person who utters the slip performs some prior mental act to utter the slip; rather, the slip is the result of unconscious mental processes which have purpose and meaning, viz. the slip is the result of some mental processes which the speaker in principle could have access to, but of which the speaker is, at the moment of utterance, unconscious. I further argue that Freud believed that most of the seemingly unimportant and insignificant actions which we perform daily are the result of such unconscious mental processes.

My interpretation of Freud contrasts with an interpretation put forth by Gregory Boudreaux, who argues that Freud did not mean to imply a theory of unconscious intentions or purposes. Rather, Freud meant to imply that slips are the result of an automatic action of the organism to discharge a repressed wish. In developing my position concerning Freud's theory of slips I present and argue against Boudreaux's position.

In Chapter I I examine Freud's argument for slips as he presented it in his Introductory Lectures. There Freud argues that most, if not all, slips have a sense, that is,
slips exhibit purpose and meaning for they usually conform to the content of some mental state which the person possessed prior to the slip. I then speculate that this accords with a theory of Intentionality in that mental states are directed at an object (the content of the slip) in a specific psychological mode (desire). The question is then raised as to whether we can then infer that the slip is unconsciously intended.

Boudreaux argues no. He argues that a slip is usually believed to be an 'externally intentional' act and 'externally intentional' acts, though Intentional, are not examples of intended acts because they fail to satisfy two criteria which Boudreaux argues are necessary conditions for intended acts. Boudreaux argues that when Freud describes his case studies by reference to unconscious intentions he is simply referring to the 'internal intentionality' of the organism to respond automatically to repressed wishes. On Boudreaux's model slips are like reflex actions much as the dropping of an object can be the result when a person is startled.

I argue that Freud's argument for slips is not dependent solely on a theory of repressed wishes discharging via primary processes. A slip can also occur as a result of the secondary processes manifesting themselves. However, what if Freud's theory were dependent solely upon repressed wishes discharging via the primary processes. Would Boudreaux's argument be valid?

I argue no, because Boudreaux's two criteria of intended actions are not necessary conditions of such acts. What if
Boudreaux had presented necessary conditions of intended actions, would his argument then be valid?

Again, I argue no, because any criteria which were necessary criteria of an intended action would have to allow that slips might be unconsciously intended. For, slips are similar to, and possibly the same as, many actions which we do maintain are intended. Actions such as those resulting from unconscious desires or unconscious wishes.

Freud is arguing that there are unconscious mental processes which are the result of desires, and that these unconscious mental processes can result in actions and that such actions would be unconsciously intended.
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The following story appeared in a local newspaper:

A Freudian slip may have blown Democratic Washington Senator Henry Jackson's neutrality. Asked outside the White House by reporters to comment on the mounting showdown between U.S. President Jimmy Carter and Massachusetts Senator Edward Kennedy, the will-he-or-won't-he presidential candidate, Jackson blurted "I have not endorsed President Kennedy". Reporters roared with laughter leaving the bemused Jackson wondering just what he had said. 1

Like Senator Jackson most of us probably have suffered the embarrassment of uttering a statement the content of which was contrary to, or other than, that which we consciously intended. At these times there are three possible mental attitudes that we take towards the slip: we recognize the error immediately; we come to realize that an error has been committed, either through the proddings of others or on our own initiative; or, we fail to acknowledge the error at all. If we do admit to the error, we then either drop the matter as trivial, a mere accident, or we search out the reason for our error.

Freud named such phenomena slips because the words uttered are not the words consciously intended by the speaker; nor is the sense, significance or meaning of the utterance that which the speaker consciously intended. For if those words were consciously intended then the utterance would be no mistake, and no slip would have occurred. Further, Freud rejected the view that a slip of the tongue is just a mere accident, dependent on no antecedent cause. Freud believed
that such an attitude contradicted the scientific outlook of
the determination of natural phenomena. Thus, in his classic
work *A General Introduction to Psycho-Analysis*, Freud attempts
to determine the cause of slips of the tongue and argues that
slips are the result of valid mental processes following out
their own purpose, albeit unconsciously. The immediate
question of course is, what does Freud mean?

In my thesis I will argue that Freud meant to imply that
slips are intended unconsciously. This is not to say that
he meant that the person who utters the slip performs some
prior mental act to utter the slip; rather, the slip is the
result of unconscious mental processes which have purpose and
meaning, viz. the slip is the result of some mental processes
which the speaker in principle could have access to, but of
which the speaker is, at the moment of utterance, unconscious.
I will further argue that Freud believed that most of the
seemingly unimportant and insignificant actions which we
perform daily are the result of such unconscious mental
processes. Freud states:

> There is another group of occurrences which is very
closely related to errors....To this class of
accidental performances belong all those apparently
purposeless acts which we carry out, as though in
play, with clothing, parts of the body, objects
within reach; also the omission of such acts; and
again the tunes which we hum to ourselves. I maintain
that all such performances have meaning and are
explicable in the same way as are errors, that they are
slight indications of other more important mental
processes, and are genuine mental acts.2

Some of us account for such phenomena by maintaining
that they are the result of unconscious desires or wishes.
Others account for these actions by attributing their cause to habit; while still others are simply baffled by the phenomena and offer no explanation for their cause.

Freud's argument is that most, if not all, of these type of human actions, originating from within the individual, are the consequence of mental processes. Thus, most of those actions which we perform unaware or unthinkingly are not simply habitual or accidental but rather are the result of unconscious mental processes directed towards a specific goal. Hence, such actions are unconsciously intended.

My interpretation of Freud contrasts with an interpretation put forth by Gregory Boudreaux, who argues that Freud did not mean to imply a theory of unconscious intentions or purposes. Rather, Freud meant to imply that slips are the result of an automatic action of the organism to discharge a repressed wish. In developing my position concerning Freud's theory of slips I will present and argue against Boudreaux's position.

My thesis is divided into five chapters. In Chapter I, I examine Freud's argument for slips of the tongue as he presents it in his manuscript A General Introduction to Psycho-Analysis, a book of lectures introducing the general public to his main theories. Chapter II and Chapter IV examine Boudreaux's argument concerning Freud's theory of slips. Chapter III is a brief survey of Freud's theory of mind as presented in The Interpretation of Dreams. This chapter is meant to give the reader some understanding of Freud's theory of mind. Finally, in Chapter V, I argue that Boudreaux's
interpretation is wrong and that Freud did mean to imply a theory of unconscious intentions.
CHAPTER I

Freud prepared the Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis as a general, introductory text to the new theory of Psychoanalysis. He wrote the manuscript from lectures that he delivered at the University of Vienna between 1915 and 1917. The text itself is composed of 28 lectures divided into three parts. Lectures II, III and IV of Part I discuss 'slips of the tongue'.

These three lectures are entitled "Die Fehlleistungen" or, the English equivalent, "Parapraxes". Freud coined the word 'die Fehlleistungen' from two nouns, which translate literally as 'faulty acts'. The three lectures begin with Freud listing numerous types of parapraxes--slips of the tongue, slips of the pen, misreading, forgetting, mislaying, etc. However, Freud selects slips of the tongue as the class of error which he intends to analyse.

As to why Freud opened his introductory text with an analysis of parapraxes, there are two apparent reasons. First, Freud believed that these simple faulty acts are representative, on a minor scale, of the mental functioning that occurs in more severe manifestations of a neurosis. Secondly, he believed that an analysis of a parapraxis is similar, again on a minor scale, to a psychoanalysis.

It has already been noted that Freud rejected the
simple minded answer that a slip is merely an accident with no antecedent cause. Lectures II, III and IV examine the question of what causes slips of the tongue. And Freud concludes, from this analysis, that it is the logic to the error itself which reveals that the causes of slips are unconscious mental processes.

Freud begins by examining the common general conditions under which one commits a slip of the tongue: one commits a slip of the tongue when tired or unwell, when excited, or when attention becomes diverted. On this model of slips the first two conditions essentially reduce to the third, viz. a slip is always the result of a disturbance of attention, either due to organic or psychic causes. Freud argues that it may be the case that such conditions do facilitate the occurrence of a slip, however, these conditions are never necessary for the slip to occur. Slips occur even when a person is well, calm and rested; and, further, many complicated acts can be performed quite adequately with attention directed not at the act itself but elsewhere. Thus a taxonomy of conditions under which slips occur would probably add little to our understanding of slips.

Freud decided that having failed to determine the cause of slips by examining the conditions under which a slip occurs the next clue, to determining the causes of slips, was to look at the influences which evoke the kind of distortion effected in the slip itself. In other words, what is it that causes this particular word to occur rather than another? Freud noted that the distortions of an intended statement are often
attributed to interchanges, anticipations, perseverations, compoundings, or substitutions. However, Freud believed that such explanations did not explain sufficiently the reason why a particular word was uttered and not another. Again, he maintained that such occurrences simply facilitated a slip, but did not explain it. Freud decided that the next step was to look at the slip itself.

Freud argued that, when the slip was viewed on its own, the slip made 'sense' or had 'meaning', that is, the slip "...could sometimes be considered a proper act, except that it has intruded itself in place of one more intended or expected." As a means of illustration, Freud describes a case in which the President of the Austrian Parliament mistakenly declares, in his opening address, the first session of Parliament for the year closed, instead of opened. Freud asserts that the 'sense' of the utterance is obvious, the President does not want to open the session.

This is an important juncture in Freud's discussion of parapraxes. From examining the possible causes of slips, Freud switches to examining the slip simpliciter; and by doing so, he switches from an examination of causes to an examination of the logic of the utterance itself. The utterance--"Gentlemen, I declare a quorum present and herewith declare the session closed."--is a well formed statement, though, in its immediate context, makes little sense. Clearly, however, a logically possible utterance is not all that Freud means by the slip having 'sense'; for, 'sense' would then hold little explanatory value and the important question for
Freud is what caused the slip. Freud goes on to argue that the sense of the utterance often becomes obvious when a detailed knowledge of the context surrounding the slip is known. For example, in the case of the Austrian President, it is known that he did not want to open the session.

Freud says that when he maintains that a slip makes sense he means that "...the result of the slip may perhaps have a right to be regarded in itself as a valid mental process following out its own purpose, and as an expression having content and meaning." Thus, from the fact that we can hypothesize that the utterance does make sense (to be found in the total context in which it occurs), Freud then wants to suggest that the slip may be an 'intended' act.

All physiological and psycho-physiological conditions could be ignored and attention could be devoted to the purely psychological investigation of the sense, that is, the meaning (Bedeutung), the intention (Absicht) in the errors.

But what gives us the right to regard the slip as the result of a mental process?

Before continuing this line of enquiry, it is first worthwhile to present some information concerning Freud's intellectual background. As a student in Vienna Freud attended lectures given by the philosopher Franz Brentano. Richard Wollheim asserts that studying under Brentano probably influenced the development of Freud's notion that "...every mental state or condition can be analysed into two components; an idea, which gives the mental state its object or what it is directed upon, and its charge of affect, which gives it
its measure of strength or efficacy." The first of these two components of a mental state is obviously traceable to Brentano; this is Brentano's notion of 'Intentionality':

Every mental state possesses in itself something which stands as object, although not all possess their objects in the same way. In a presentation something is presented, in a judgement something is acknowledged or rejected, in love something is loved, in hate hated, in desire desired, etc.

For Brentano all of our mental states are Intentional states; and Intentional states are directed at or are about objects and states of affairs in the world in a specific psychological mode. Now, if Wollheim is right and Freud is maintaining in his psychological theory an hypothesis such as Intentionality, then 'sense' may be his method of indicating that what is mental must be directed at an object or state of affairs. Freud states:

Let us agree once more about what we will understand by the 'sense' of the psychical process. Nothing other than the intention (Absicht) that it serves, and its position in a psychical series. For most of our investigation we can substitute 'sense' also by 'intention' (Absicht), or 'tendency' (Tendenz).

If 'sense' does qualify as Freud's way of indicating that that which is mental must have an object at which it is directed, then from the fact that an utterance makes sense in a specific context, we may be able to infer that there possibly is a mental state directed at making the utterance. In other words, if Freud is delimiting the mental by some such notion as Intentionality, then what Freud is saying is that if an utterance makes 'sense' in a specific context, then it is reasonable to assume a mental state directed at that utterance. For example, in the case of the President
opening the session of Parliament Freud appeals to the fact that the President had stated before the incident the belief that nothing good could be achieved in the forthcoming session. Thus, the slip has its requisite Intentional state; viz. a psychological mode (desire) directed at a state of affairs (not to open parliament). However, the important question is whether we can then infer that the mental state does cause the slip?

In summary, Freud argues that the conditions in which the slip occurs (the person is tired, excited, etc.) and the influences which determine the kind of distortion effected in the slip (resemblances between words, etc.) merely facilitate a slip by pointing out a path which it can take. However, a person requires both a purpose in order to determine the choice made, and some force to propel him along that path.

From examining the context in which the slip occurs one can often arrive at a sense for the slip, that is a reason, purpose, or intention which the slip fulfills. This implies that there was a possible mental state corresponding to the content of the slip existent in the person who made the slip. However, whether such a mental state can then cause the slip is the important question.

II

Freud maintains that the mechanism of slips is the mutual interference of two different intentions (Absichten), and even in most cases where the slip conveys nothing intelligible, the slip can be explained in terms of this
mechanism (according to Freud probably always). But how does one ascertain the disturbing tendency, especially in cases where the slip conveys nothing intelligible?

Well, in all cases the tendency interfered with is always unmistakable, because the person who commits the slip knows and acknowledges it. Consider the case of Senator Jackson who, even though he had not realized that he uttered 'President', if asked what he thought he had uttered would have replied 'Senator'. Thus, for a slip to be acknowledged there must be a clear sense of the 'intended' utterance interfered with.

Freud asserts that doubt and hesitation arise only with regard to the interfering tendency. In a number of cases, such as in the incident concerning the President of the Austrian Parliament, the second tendency is also very obvious; in fact, the subject in these cases usually, if questioned, will admit that what resulted as the slip is really what the person wished to say, yet rejected saying. Other cases, however, are more questionable. And Freud admits that a direct proof for the suspected meaning cannot be obtained if the subject refuses to affirm the hypothesis that there was a rejected statement. In these cases we are forced to look at other indications in order to confirm our hypothesis.

Freud classes slips into two groups. In the one group, it is easy to determine the interfering 'intention' and the 'intention' interfered with. All you do is ask the person what they had wished to say. If this coincides with your
hypothesis then your examination is complete. In the other group, the person does not acknowledge that he had in fact wanted to say something similar to the slip. This can be for any number of reasons. The subject may disagree with the interpretation saying that the slip was only an accident (Freud, of course, would not accept this); the subject may not even acknowledge the slip; or, the subject may acknowledge the slip but due to its unintelligibility no one may be able to postulate a meaning.

One question immediately arises. Does Freud mean that the interfering tendency was an 'intention' of the same sort as the tendency interfered with? Well, we have already noted that Freud is using the words 'Absicht' (intention), 'Sinn' (sense), 'Bedeutung' (meaning) and 'Tendenz' (tendency) interchangeably. At the beginning of the fourth lecture Freud introduces yet another word 'Intention' (intention), which he then seems to use interchangeably with 'Absicht' and 'Tendenz'. He uses any of these three words whenever he refers to the 'intention interfered with' or the 'interfering intention'. Thus from the vocabulary itself it is impossible to determine whether there is any conceptual difference between the two intentions.

However, Freud asks himself a similar question: "...what kind of tendencies are these which bring themselves to expression in this unusual way by interfering with other intentions?" Freud decides to examine three groups of slips in answering this question. In the first case there is an authorized speech and a repudiated speech; the speaker is
aware of both before the slip. In the second case, it is only after the slip has occurred that the speaker realizes that he had, in fact, actually considered the interfering utterance prior to the slip, and then rejected it. In the third case, the speaker refuses to acknowledge that he had actually rejected, prior to the slip, the interfering utterance. Freud wants to argue that these three groups are similar, even though in the third group the speaker refuses to acknowledge the interfering tendency. Why does Freud consider the three groups similar?

Well, Freud says that: "...(my) interpretation includes the assumption that tendencies of which a speaker knows nothing can express themselves in him and that (one) can deduce them from various indications." He then goes on to say:

Let us presently dwell on this, what unites the three groups, what is common to the three mechanisms of slips of the tongue. In both of the first groups the disturbing tendency (Tendenz) was recognized by the speaker; in the first group add to this that it (the tendency) announced itself immediately before the slip. In both cases they have been, however, driven back (zurückgedrängt). The speaker has determined not to put it into words, and then the slip of the tongue occurs; that is to say, the forced back (zurückgedrängte) tendency (Tendenz) is then put against his will into an expression, since it alters the expression from his authorized intention (Intention), by mixing with it or by simply taking its place. This then is the mechanism of slips of the tongue.

From my standpoint, I can also bring the process in our third group into perfect harmony with the mechanism described here. I need only to suppose that these three groups are distinguished by the different extent to which an intention (Intention) is forced back (Zurückdrängung). In the first case the intention (Intention) is present and makes itself known to him before the utterance of the
speaker; not till then, does it (i.e. the intention) recoup in the slip of the tongue. In the second group the rejection is more far reaching; the intention (Intention) is already no longer observable before the remark. Remarkably, that will not in the least thereby keep it from taking part in giving rise to the slip. Through this behaviour, however, the explanation for the third group is made easy. I will be so bold, to suppose, that a tendency (Tendenz) can also still manifest itself, which since a long time, possibly since a very long time, has been forced back (zurückgedrängt), has eluded observation and is denied directly for that reason. But leaving the problem of the third group on the one side; you must draw the conclusion from the observations in the other case, that the suppression (Unterdrückung) of the present intention (Absicht) to express anything is the indispensable condition that a slip of the tongue take place."

Thus, concerning the difference between the 'interfering intention' and the 'intention interfered with' the following can be concluded: The reason that one intention or tendency is rejected is that it conflicts with another intention or tendency. After rejection, we then have an 'authorized intention' and a 'rejected intention'. The latter can exist unobserved in the speaker. That is, there can exist in a person an unconscious tendency to some action.

In summary we can say that slips have the following aspect to them:

(1) They are the result of unconscious mental phenomena in which meaning and purpose can be recognizable (i.e. slips are the result of unconscious Intentional states).

(2) They arise from the mutual interference of two different intentions or tendencies.

(3) For one intention to interfere with another intention, the interfering intention must have been rejected.

It would seem that, according to Freud, mental processes of
which a person knows nothing can result in a slip of the tongue. Does Freud want to maintain that there is an unconscious prior intention to utter the slip? Or, is he simply maintaining that there is an unconscious mental process which causes the slip, and thus we can say that the slip is unconsciously intended?
CHAPTER II

In this chapter I begin my discussion of Boudreaux's interpretation of Freud's argument for slips. Boudreaux argues against the position that Freud's theory of slips is a theory of unconscious intentions, purposes or motives. Boudreaux is sympathetic to the position which holds that a slip is the result of a rejected wish, viz. slips are the result of a reflex action of the organism caused by the rejection of a wish, much as the dropping of an object can be the result of a reflex action of the organism caused by being startled. However, Boudreaux does acknowledge two problems with this interpretation. First, Freud often describes his case studies of slips by reference to unconscious intentions, which seems to indicate that Freud did have a theory of unconscious intentions. Secondly, rejection of a wish cannot be a sufficient condition for a slip, for rejection of wishes often occur with no resultant slip. In this chapter I will be concerned solely with an aspect of the first of these two problems.

Boudreaux maintains that when Freud says (in his case studies) that his patient unconsciously intended a slip, we normally assume that Freud means that the slip was intentional. However, in what sense is the slip intentional? Boudreaux argues that, generally, we have come to believe Freud to mean that the slip is intentional in the sense that the speaker expressed some message to a listener, although the
message was hidden and the speaker was not consciously aware of expressing that message. Boudreaux names this the 'external sense of intentionality'. But, is the slip itself, the actual words used, an intended act?

Boudreaux argues that the usual justification given for assuming an act of intending in these cases is that the intentionality can be inferred from the beliefs of the speaker, viz. because we know that the person held certain beliefs and because of certain actions that he performed (i.e. the slip) we can then infer the intentionality of the act. However, Boudreaux argues that the only intentionality that we can infer from the existence of beliefs which the speaker holds is Intentionality (as we attributed in Chapter I to Brentano) and, further, this Intentionality is not sufficient for an act of intending. Why is it not sufficient? Well, it is not sufficient because an externally intentional action (which has the property of being Intentional) fails to satisfy two criteria which Boudreaux maintains are necessary for an act of intending.

The justification that Boudreaux puts forth for Freud using 'unconscious intentions' in describing his case studies will be examined in Chapter IV.

I

According to Boudreaux, Freud's argument for slips of the tongue being unconscious mental processes is the following. Slips are not random or chance occurrences. They result from the combination of two different statements
that the person 'wished to' or 'intended to' utter, namely the distorting speech and the distorted speech. The former is the speech repudiated by the speaker before the slip; the latter is the speech that would have been made were it not for the slip. In some cases of slips the subject recognizes both the distorting speech and the distorted speech before the slip; while in other cases, the subject will not admit to holding the distorting speech at all. To reconcile this difference between the cases, Freud presents, what Boudreaux has called, the argument from the continuum. The argument states that there are three possible situations which can arise as a result of the slip and that the similarity between the three cases is such that even when the subject will not admit to holding, and then rejecting, the distorting speech before the slip, one can hypothesize a rejected speech in that case as well.

In the first case, the speaker is aware of both the distorting speech and the distorted speech before the slip. He has observed himself rejecting the one, and then, reproducing it as the slip. In the second case, it is only after the slip has occurred that the speaker realizes that he had actually considered the distorting speech prior to the slip, and then, rejected it. In the third case, the speaker refuses to acknowledge that he had considered the distorting speech before the slip, let alone rejected it. However, the similarities between the three cases are such that it is reasonable to assume a rejected speech in the third
case as well, ". . . only here we must say that it is unconsciously wished for."¹

Such is Boudreaux's characterization of Freud's argument for unconscious mental processes which result in a slip. Two points about this characterization will now be noted; however, a more extensive discussion of each of the points will be delayed until a later chapter.

First point: Boudreaux states that Freud's argument for slips is that slips arise from the combination of two different statements which the person wished to or intended to utter. It may be the case that to wish and to intend are conceptually equivalent for Freud, but this fact is not obvious from the textual content of Freud's argument for slips. Nor, does Boudreaux present an argument to substantiate such an assertion.

Second point: Boudreaux characterizes the argument in such a way that, in the third of the three cases, the rejected speech is unconsciously wished for.² However, nowhere does Freud make such an assertion.

Having presented Freud's argument, Boudreaux proceeds to discuss a number of the interpretations presented in the literature concerning whether the slip was intended. On the one side Boudreaux groups those that assert that Freud's argument is relying on unconscious intentions, purposes and motives. Boudreaux lists F. Siegler, D. W. Hamlyn, Ilham Dilman and A. C. MacIntyre as proponents of this position, which is not to say that they support such an argument, only that
that they believed that Freud did subscribe to some such notion.

For example, although Frederick Siegler maintains that Freud was proposing a notion of unconscious intentions, he also then argues against such a position both because Freud's argument, according to Siegler, fails to entail a notion of unconscious intentions and because any notion of unconscious intentions is meaningless. Siegler states: "Freud considered himself to be engaged in a scientific enterprise in which he attempted to adduce evidence in support of a conclusion, viz. that errors such as slips of the tongue are intentions although the intention is unconscious." Simply, Siegler asserts that Freud argued that behind many, and probably most, slips there lay two desired speeches and from the existence of these two desired speeches, Freud then inferred that the slip was intended. Boudreaux maintains that this is a stronger argument than that actually asserted by Freud, because what Freud asserted was that behind most slips there are two intended or wished for speeches and the slip resulted from a combination of these. Thus, according to Boudreaux, the existence of the two intentions does not have to imply that the slip itself was intended.

The argument that asserts that Freud's argument is not one of unconscious intentions, purposes and motives maintains that the existence of the two wishes does not imply that the slip was intended. Slips do sometimes result from wishes, but that does not show that the slip is intended. Nor, did Freud mean it to show that. Rather, the three cases
that Freud presents show that there was a wish or intention prior to the slip which was rejected by the speaker, but it was the rejection that caused the slip and not an intention on the part of the agent. Slips are caused by some prior event in the same way that seeing a face at the window causes one to drop a tray. Robert Shope is the proponent of this interpretation of Freud.

Boudreaux is sympathetic with Shope's interpretation, which essentially maintains that slips are caused by the rejection of a prior wish to utter a contrary statement. However, Boudreaux does believe that this interpretation falls short on two counts. One, Freud does frequently speak of unconscious thinking, reasoning, planning and intentions; this interpretation does not address that fact. Secondly, the rejection of the wish seems to be a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for the slip. For instance, one of the two contrary speeches could be rejected and a slip not occur. Thus, rejected wishes do not have to manifest themselves, because the rejection sometimes is successful and no slip occurs. So, it is wrong to say that the rejection of the wish causes the slip. There must be some other factor involved.

II

Boudreaux next attempts to extend and modify Shope's interpretation by addressing these two problems. He deals first with the problem that Freud in his case descriptions often calls slips 'unconsciously intentional'. And Boudreaux
attempts first to prove that the usual justification given for an act of intending in these cases is not satisfactory.

Boudreaux maintains that generally the public assumes that a slip is 'externally intentional', and by externally intentional Boudreaux means:

It (the slip) is external in the sense that the slip is used to communicate some message to a designated listener. It is intentional in the same sense as ordinary modes of verbal communication, except that the message contained in the slip is hidden or disguised, and the speaker is not consciously aware of trying to communicate that message to his listener.4

Boudreaux then questions whether this is an act of intending.

Boudreaux argues that the interpretation that states that there is an act of intending, because Freud describes his case studies that way, is justified by the claim that the agent's beliefs imply the act of intending. For example, consider the following case: A doctor is in consultation with one of his female patients. Unbeknownst to the patient, the patient's husband has entered into a conspiracy in which the doctor has permitted the husband to eavesdrop on the consultation at the door of the doctor's office. During the summing up at the end of the consultation the doctor in addressing the patient says, "Goodbye, sir"; thus, mistakenly referring to the husband and not the wife. The argument then maintains that if the doctor had not believed that the man was hiding behind the door, he would not have made the mistake of addressing the statement to him. Thus, an adequate description of the situation requires reference to beliefs and this permits the inference to the act of
intending. Is this really an act of intending?

Boudreaux argues that this sense of intentional is not the strong sense of intending required of an act of intending. Having noted that in some cases of Freud's examples beliefs are important to Freud's notion of intention and that this notion of intention is usually interpreted as external intentionality, Boudreaux then argues:

But in what sense does reference to an agent's beliefs imply intentionality? It does so at least in the sense that the situation is non-extensional. What Boudreaux is saying, here, is that when the report of a mental state is non-extensional then the mental state implies Intentionality.

For example, intensionality-with-an-s is the property of a statement whereby it fails to satisfy certain tests for extensionality, viz. it is non-extensional. It has been argued that Intentional states have the characteristic that when reported they are intensional. For example, the report that

Lois Lane loves Superman.

is intensional, because from the fact that Superman was Clark Kent we cannot infer that

Lois Lane loves Clark Kent.

The first is true because it accurately reports the content of Lois Lane's love and the second is false because it does not accurately report the content of Lois Lane's love. The report of the mental state (here love and in our case belief) is intensional, i.e. non-extensional, because it is impossible
to substitute into the sentence of that report the co-referring expressions, Clark Kent and Superman, and maintain the truth value of the sentence. The mental state is called Intentional. Thus, according to Boudreaux, this is the extent to which philosophers have justified the inference from a belief to an act of intending. There is the further question, of course, whether an externally intentional act having the property of being Intentional is an act of intending. And, Boudreaux answers no to this question.

III

This last question is similar to one that we raised in Chapter I. Can an Intentional state consisting of the psychological mode of belief or desire be sufficient to result in an act of intending? Boudreaux argues that even though the description of a situation requires reference to beliefs and thus to the intentionality (i.e., Intentionality) of the act, it does not follow that a correct description then makes reference to the mental act of intending. To demonstrate that simple reference to the beliefs of a person are not sufficient to establish the mental act of intending, Boudreaux presents two criteria for the strong sense of intending which he believes are probably necessary in any mental act of intending. The two criteria are:

(A) For a given behaviour of a particular type, in order for any particular instance or token of that type to be intentional, at least some tokens of that type must generally be preceded by the mental act of intending on the part of the agent who performs that token (bit of behaviour).
(B) In order for an act to be intentional, the following condition must be true: if the agent had felt that the action or the goal to be achieved, could have been performed in some more rational manner, or achieved in some more efficient way (than the way he did use), then he would have attempted to achieve it in that way.

Boudreaux argues that criterion A does not specify sufficient conditions for an act to be intentional. Criterion A specifies only a necessary condition of intentional acts: If an act is intentional, then at least some tokens of that type of behaviour must generally be preceded by a mental act of intending. According to Boudreaux, slips of the tongue fail this condition of intentionality for the following reasons: Slips are externally intentional. In order for an externally intentional act to be an instance of an intentional act under criterion A, some slips must be preceded by mental acts of intending. Such mental acts would have to be unconscious. But no sense can be given to the notion that one formulates intentions unconsciously. So, slips cannot be an instance of an intentional act on criterion A.

Why can no sense be given to the notion that one formulates intentions unconsciously? Well, first, there is no argument for the philosophical claim that one formulates intentions unconsciously and, secondly, such an argument would not establish whether Freud believed in unconscious intentions.

Is criterion A a necessary condition of an intentional act? I think not. There are many instances of intentional acts where the agent held no prior intention to perform as
such, nor in similar circumstances would the agent ever hold the prior intention. For example, consider the following case: John is a man who abhors violence. One day, while walking his dog in the neighbourhood park, a complete stranger stopped John and said, "You certainly have an ugly dog." Upon hearing these words, John immediately hit the man in the nose. Questioned as to why he hit the man, John replied that the man hurt his feelings and so he hit him. Further questioning revealed that John does not usually go around hitting persons who hurt his feelings, but this time he did. John admitted that it was silly behaviour, something that he had never done before and would never do again. But, even so, John maintained that it was an action he meant to do while he was doing it. We should want to call this action intentional. Criterion A, however, would rule it out as an intentional action, as the behaviour was not preceded by a mental act of the relevant kind. Moreover, and this is the important point, no behaviour of that type need ever be preceded by such a mental act on the part of John.

Criterion B is slightly different from A. Boudreaux attributes the inspiration for B to a thesis set out by R. S. Peters in his book *The Concept of Motivation*. In that book Peters does not discuss intentions *per se*, instead his discussion focuses on human action. For Peters the paradigm case of a human action is an action done to bring about an end. Peters holds that the concept of human action is inseparable from that of intelligence:
We can therefore say that a man is doing something efficiently, correctly, and so on, if he knowingly varies what he does in accordance with changes in the situation conventionally singled out as the goal and the conditions perceived as relevant to attaining it.

Boudreaux extends Peters' thesis of the necessity of efficient means and rational behaviour for human action to the realm of intentional action. Criterion B requires that for an act to be intentional the following must be true: if the agent had felt that the action could have been performed in some more efficient way, then he would have attempted to achieve it in that way. I do not propose to analyse Peters' thesis of human action nor to examine whether Boudreaux's extension of Peters' thesis to the realm of the intentional is reasonable; rather, I intend to examine criterion B to determine if it is a necessary condition of intentional acts. (Obviously it cannot be a sufficient condition of intentional action, as there are many goals which one intends to achieve and then fails to achieve because of choosing the wrong means, even though one felt that appropriate means were used.) However, before determining whether B is a necessary condition of an intentional action, we should examine more closely what Boudreaux is saying in B.

What first strikes one in reading B is the phrase 'if the agent had felt'. Does Boudreaux mean that if a feeling arises before or during the action, then that feeling is similar to an intuition which prods one to consider alternative means of achieving one's end? Or, does the feeling that might arise, arise from a preceding consideration of alternatives
and the resultant feeling is, simply, an indication of one's approval for one of many competing options? The latter answer might automatically rule against unconscious intentions, and probably does rule against much behaviour which we putatively call intentional. The former answer would seem to indicate that criterion B is not a necessary condition for an intentional action, as the criterion applies to only those instances of intentional actions in which a person has a certain feeling.

Boudreaux maintains that B does not automatically rule against unconscious intentions; for, B requires only that if the agent had felt that he could achieve his goal in some other more efficient manner then he must attempt to achieve it in that way, and with unconscious intentions it might be the case that the agent never has such a feeling. This application of B seems to indicate that Boudreaux is using 'felt' in a manner similar to the above notion of intuiting. But, if that is how Boudreaux is using B, then B must be true of only some intentional actions. Consider the following intentional action: I intend to close my office door. To satisfy the condition of this intention, I simply push away from my desk, stand up, walk the few paces to the door and close it. Consciously, I consider no options, nor do I feel that I should. Criterion B would not be a necessary condition of this intentional action on this interpretation of that criterion. What of the interpretation under which the 'feeling' is a result of a rational consideration
of options?

Well, besides arguing that B does not automatically rule against unconscious intentions, Boudreaux also maintains that B is important because "...it demonstrates that intentional behaviour requires some consideration of options." If B does require some consideration of options then it is obvious that 'felt' is not being used in the above sense of 'intuiting'; rather, the feeling arising must be the result of the consideration of alternatives. But, if this is the meaning that Boudreaux wants to attach to B, then B seems to rule against some putatively intentional behaviour. For instance, the above case of John and his dog. This seems to be an example where we would want to maintain that John punching the stranger in the nose was intentional. As well, the above example in which I close the door would also be a case in which the action seems to be intentional. However, in both these cases there was no consideration of options; thus, B would be contravened and, on B, the actions would not be intentional.

A further criticism of B is that Boudreaux wants to use B in such a way as to entail that all intentional actions have to be rational. Well, obviously, such is not the case. There are numerous examples of actions in everyday life where the person performs the action intentionally but with no consideration of the consequences that action will have on other goals that the person might hold. For example: The person who intentionally eats a banana split yet is on a diet. Or, the person who wants to live a long
healthy life, yet intentionally smokes a pack of cigarettes a day, etc.

IV

I began this chapter by outlining Boudreaux's characterization of Freud's discussion of slips. I then began an analysis of Boudreaux's argument concerning that discussion. Boudreaux maintains that interpretations of Freud's argument concerning slips of the tongue can be grouped into two opposing camps. In general, the one side maintains that Freud did rely on some notion of unconscious intentions in his explanation of slips. Essentially, this interpretation states that Freud meant us to infer the act of intending from two factors: the existence of the two wished for statements and the existence of the slip itself. The opposing interpretation maintains that Freud did not rely on any notion of unconscious intentions; rather, Freud was arguing that slips are caused by the rejection of a wish, much as a person can be caused to drop an object when startled, viz. the slip is merely the result of a reflex action of the organism.

As pointed out, Boudreaux is sympathetic with the latter of the two interpretations, however, he realizes that there are two obvious problems with it. In this chapter we discussed only the first of these two problems, that Freud's language of description in his case studies is such that he does talk of unconscious intentions; and thus, if we want to maintain that Freud did not rely on unconscious intentions, how do we explain Freud's descriptive language.
As a technical device of his own making Boudreaux introduces the term 'external intentionality', viz. the slip is intentional in the sense that the speaker expressed some message to a listener, although the message was hidden and the speaker was not consciously aware of expressing that message. Boureaux then argues that when Freud says that a patient intends a slip we usually take him to mean something such as external intentionality. Further, Boudreaux maintains that, when Freud says that a patient intends a slip, the usual justification put forth, philosophically, for maintaining that the act was intentional is an inference concerning the beliefs of the speaker. However, Boudreaux argues that this Intentionality is not sufficient to establish the strong sense of an act of intending. To prove this assertion Boudreaux presents two criteria which he maintains, at least one of which, must be a necessary condition of an act of intending. Externally intentional acts which are Intentional fail both criteria. Thus, an externally intentional act, such as a slip, is not an intended act.

My criticism of Boudreaux's position rests on the inadequacy of his criteria of intended acts. Thus, Boudreaux, though he has demonstrated that slips might be Intentional, has not demonstrated that they are not acts of intending. And, the further question still has to be answered--what did Freud mean when he says that a patient unconsciously intends a slip? This question will be addressed in Chapter IV.
CHAPTER III

The interpretation of dreams is the royal road to a knowledge of the unconscious activities of the mind.¹

Freud's Project for a Scientific Psychology was one of his first major efforts in the area of psychological theory. In this manuscript Freud attempted to explain psychological processes in terms such that they correlated to undiscovered processes in the neurophysiology of the body. Freud never published this work, in fact, Ernest Jones asserts that Freud attempted to destroy it.² It was only after Freud's death that the manuscript was published.

Freud's next major effort in psychological theory was The Interpretation of Dreams. This manuscript, considered by many to be his 'magnum opus', was finished in 1899 and published in 1900. In the manuscript Freud investigates the source and function of dreams in the psychology of man. In developing this theme Freud presents a theory of mind which he believed encompassed abnormal, as well as, normal mental functioning. Here, Freud no longer expresses the belief, as he seems to in the Project, that mental processes will eventually be correlated with neurophysiological processes. However, the hope of such a correlation seems to linger behind Freud's descriptive terminology. It is in The Interpretation of Dreams that Freud first presents to the public his theories of the Unconscious, primary and secondary processes, and repression in a systematic framework. And, it is these concepts
which dominate Freud's theorizing until the 1920's. After 1920 Freud does not abandon the concepts, however, they do come to play a subordinate role to Freud's concern with the development of the personality.

As Boudreaux's argument rests, to a large extent, on his interpretation of Freud's account of the primary and secondary processes and their relation to both repression and the Unconscious, it will be these concepts with which I will be primarily concerned in this chapter. And, as *The Interpretation of Dreams* is the first place that Freud publicly discusses the concepts and it is the only place in which the primary and secondary processes are so fully discussed, it is this text that I will examine.

However, before beginning such an investigation, it is worthwhile outlining very briefly Freud's intellectual background, before he embarked on a career in psychology. For Freud's view of the mental was engendered not only by his clinical practice, of which he gives such rich description in his manuscripts, it was also engendered by the scientific and philosophic milieu in which he matured.

I

Freud's training was as a scientist, specifically a neurologist. His immediate teachers in this field were the scientists Brucke, Meynart and Exner. These men were the promoters of a positivist, strictly scientific approach to the study of neurophysiology and neuropsychiatry. They indulged in, what some termed, brain mythology, producing
vast speculative constructions of how the mind functioned in the neurophysiology of the body. One of the most obvious indications of the influence of these men on Freud is Freud's Project for a Scientific Psychology.

As well as his scientific training, Freud was early attracted to the field of philosophy. He once even expressed the opinion that had it not been for finances he would have preferred to pursue a career in the discipline of philosophy. In fact, one of his first major publications (he had already published articles on neurology in scientific journals) was a translation into German of one volume of Joan Stuart Mill's collected works. As already noted, Freud also studied under the philosopher Franz Brentano, attending lectures once a week for three years. As well, Freud was influenced by other philosophers for in his manuscripts reference is made to Aristotle, von Hartman, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche for insights into the psychology of man and for confirmation of ideas similar to those which Freud developed on his own.

To what extent this background came to shape Freud's view of the mental is, of course, purely speculative and not the subject of this investigation. No matter, some obvious conjectures can be made. As already noted, his neurology teachers probably influenced Freud's speculation on the mechanisms of the mind. Beyond this immediate influence, Freud's early scientific and philosophic training instilled in him a belief in the inviolability of science. And, for Freud, this meant the need for verification of any hypothesis
and, most importantly, that all phenomena are subject to laws
of cause and effect. This, no doubt, also influenced the
writing of the *Project*, with its goal of attaining a correlation
of psychical processes with physical processes. Though Freud
did come to admit that such a correlation was probably
impossible to establish (and this is one reason, supposedly,
that he rejected the Project), Freud, at least at the time
of the *Introductory Lectures*, had not abandoned the belief
that the mental realm was as much subject to the laws of
causality as the physical realm. The problem for Freud, then,
was to describe a realm which one could not perceive directly,
and yet, still maintain a grounding in scientific principles.

To achieve this end, Freud presents this theory of mind
using particular metaphors, viz. Freud speculates on what
physical constituents the 'mechanism' of the mind would be
similar to if one assumed certain functions for the mental.
Freud, in fact, presents a series of metaphors to explain the
psychology of dreams and, also, normal psychological
functioning. Each metaphor builds on and further expands the
previous metaphor.

A further consideration to keep in mind, while we
analyse Freud's theory, is that Freud was often inconsistent
in the use of many terms and concepts, at one time using one
word for a concept, and at other times another. Freud also
would often change a concept slightly while using the same
word. Freud readily admits to this inconsistency in some of
his work, and he attributes it to sloppiness. However, this
cannot be the sole reason for the inconsistency; for, Freud exhibited the rigor and preciseness required of a highly trained researcher in his neurological publications. The inconsistency is probably partially due to Freud's need to exercise his imagination by extending concepts into new directions.

Anyway, the crux of the matter for us is, because Freud considered this theory of the mind to be simply 'scaffolding', he often did not follow some of his conjectures through to a logical conclusion. Thus, when a hard analysis is applied to some of his speculations, Freud's theory often shows up lacking. One must never forget that Freud was expounding a metaphor, grounded in his scientific view of the world, while looking for the appropriate fit of that metaphor to a possible reality.

II

The remainder of this chapter will be concerned with outlining Freud's theory of mind, as presented in The Interpretation of Dreams. Before beginning our examination, a brief overview of some of Freud's basic assumptions will be invaluable to an understanding of his model.

Freud believed that two psychic laws underlay the functioning of the mental. And, it is probably these two principles of psychology which leads Freud to postulate a dual division of the mental, for Freud invisions the mental as an 'apparatus' composed of two systems, a primary system and a secondary system. The systems are so named
because the former predates the latter on an evolutionary time scale. Such a dual division of the mental is not without precedent in Western Philosophical tradition.

Freud called the basic psychic law the principle of constancy. Out of this law evolves Freud's unpleasure principle. According to this principle all organisms attempt to remain in a steady state. Any excitation, which is an increase in energy in the system, is unpleasurable. Wishes are the psychic stimulant to movement, and all wishes are ultimately aimed at the release of excitation. On its own, such a maxim seems untenable, and many have argued just that; for, much behaviour seems to increase tension rather than reduce it. Freud attempts to account for these paradoxical situations by postulating a second axiom. This axiom governs only the secondary system and it involves the conservation of energy. The secondary system attempts to conserve energy in order to maximize the efficiency of the mental apparatus. Thus, a partial solution is given for the paradox that the organism does not always behave such that it immediately decreases excitation and, also, the stage is set for psychic conflict. The secondary system, in attempting to conserve energy, often must censor much of the behaviour 'wished for' by the primary system and performs much behaviour which, at face value, increases or, at least, does not diminish excitation immediately in the overall system.

With this brief overview of the psyche, let us begin our examination of *The Interpretation of Dreams*. Chapter VII,
"Psychology of the Dream Process", is divided into six sections, each dealing with a portion of the dream process and, more importantly, the mental apparatus behind that dream process. As already mentioned, Freud presents a series of metaphors in developing his theory of mind. Paul Ricoeur divides Freud's presentation into three episodes. In the first, the psychical apparatus is depicted spatially as functioning in both a progressive and regressive direction. In the second, the apparatus is pictured as an evolving system with a temporal dimension. Finally, the apparatus is presented as having force and conflict. Let us begin by examining the first episode.

The mental apparatus functions like a compound instrument with a sensory end and a motor end. Freud, here, was thinking of the psychical apparatus being similar to a microscope or camera and the psychical locality being the place where the image is formed. Stimuli from external or internal sources enter at the sensory end, travel through the apparatus to the motor end and cause innervation (i.e. transmission of energy into an efferent system). Freud believed that stimulus in the system normally travelled from the sensory end to the motor end. Freud also believed that it was reasonable to assume, though not necessary, that the components of the apparatus stand in a spatial relation to one another.

Freud called the sensory end of the mental apparatus the 'perceptual system'. Here, stimuli are received and a
'trace' is left of that perception. The trace can subsequently cause a memory. The system which receives the memory-traces cannot, itself, retain any such traces; for then, Freud believed, the perceptual system's functioning would be interferred with. Memory-traces are 'stored' in the 'mnemic system'.

Freud states that 'memory' is the function relating to 'memory-traces'. Does he mean that memory is that state of consciousness arising from memory-traces? Prima facie such would seem the most reasonable assumption. For example: Stimuli leave traces in the mind and these memory-traces are registered on the mnemic elements of the mnemic system. When suitable stimuli within the mental apparatus excite these mnemic elements, the corresponding memory-traces registered there on, either give rise to new states of mind, such as memories, or else modify states of mind which are in the main due to other causes.

However, we have Freud declaring: "...our memories—not excepting those which are most deeply stamped on our minds—are in themselves unconscious." Freud seems to be treating memory synonymously with the mnemonic system, as a storehouse of memory-traces. However, saying that memories are themselves unconscious is counter-intuitive, for we treat memory itself as a conscious state. This is one example of Freud's lack of hard analysis.

As already noted, fundamental to Freud's theory of mind is his unpleasure principle which leads Freud to assume
that the mental apparatus seeks to minimize excitation in its system. All behaviour is the result of a wish, a wish to decrease excitation. And, dreams are no exception. This in turn leads Freud to the conclusion that if a dream is unrecognizable as a wishfulfilment by the dreamer, then there must exist some mechanism which hides or disguises the actual intent of the dream. Freud argues for the existence of this mechanism by an analogy. This is an important step, for Freud is beginning to divide the psyche.

The analogy goes: Society exhibits dynamics similar to those that we witness in the mental apparatus. For example, "...where two persons are concerned, one of whom possesses a certain degree of power which the second is obliged to take into account. In such a case the second person will distort his psychical acts or, as we might put it, will dissimulate." The weaker of the two agents is thus forced by social circumstance to alter his intended pronouncements; for, if he does not, the stronger of the two will suppress, completely, any further pronouncements. Consequently, the weaker agent becomes adept at speaking in allusions in place of direct references, presenting his objectionable ideas in the guise of innocuous phrases or images, or otherwise completely refraining from certain references. However, in attempting to avoid the stronger agent, the weaker one still attempts to present clues to his audience of the real meaning of his distorted allusions. Thus, with this analogy, Freud begins to argue for two psychical systems, one of which submits
the activity of the other to criticism, which involves the latter's exclusion from consciousness. The critical agency stands like a screen between the agency being criticized and consciousness.

Freud attempts to give substance to this speculation by asserting that a censor is observable in some dreams. Freud maintains that many people experience during a dream the sudden almost conscious declaration—'But this is only a dream!' Freud believed that this assertion in the dream is aimed at reducing the importance of what has just been experienced and at making it possible to tolerate what is to follow. The censor has been taken unaware by the dream, which is expressing the wish of the censored. The censor is too late to repress the wish, so now he must de-emphasize it.

Freud assigns the functions of these two opposing agencies to the components of the mental apparatus. The criticizing agency, the censor, is intricately connected to our waking life, hence, Freud placed it at the motor end of the mental apparatus. He named the components of the mental apparatus which encompasses the censoring function the 'preconscious', as the contents of this system can enter consciousness without further impediment. The criticized agency Freud named the 'Unconscious'. He placed it behind the preconscious, so that the contents of the Unconscious cannot enter consciousness without first passing through the preconscious.

This concept, the Unconscious, is completely new. Up
to now the property of being unconscious when attributed to
something meant lack of attention upon that thing by
consciousness. Thus, ideas which were unconscious simply
were not being 'attended to' or not being 'thought about' by
the conscious system of the mental apparatus. This sense
of unconsciousness has been termed the 'descriptive
unconscious'. However, the new notion of unconscious means
that attention cannot have access to certain ideas (=wishes)
which exist 'in' the mental apparatus. This notion of
unconscious is intricately dependent upon the concept of
censorship.

We, thus, have two notions of unconscious (and Freud
admits to both). Contents (ideas, wishes, thoughts) of
the preconscious system are unconscious, i.e. consciousness
is not attending to them, but these contents are readily
accessible to consciousness. The contents (wishes) of the
Unconscious system are also unconscious in the sense that
consciousness is not attending to them. However, these
contents are also inaccessible to consciousness unless a
person goes through a psychoanalysis. This latter sense of
inaccessibility to consciousness Freud also referred to as
unconscious.12

Freud, so far, has devoted his exposition to an
explanation of the 'scaffolding' behind the mental apparatus.
Freud now uses this scaffolding to explain dreams. The cause
of dreams is 'regression' of excitation (i.e. thoughts, ideas,
wishes) in the apparatus. It is worthwhile examining Freud's
concept of regression, for regression is important to our understanding of the primary processes.

Regression occurs when an excitation which has been flowing in the preconscious meets 'resistance'. The resistance is a combination of three factors: the energy possessed by the thought, the censorship of the thought by the preconscious, and the attraction of the thought by the Unconscious.

All 'thoughts' possess energy as thoughts are excitations in the system. The preconscious, in its censoring capacity, is constantly evaluating thoughts that already exist in the preconscious to determine whether such thoughts should be repressed. Freud is unclear as to whether it is the amount of 'energy' which the thought possesses which allows an evaluation by the preconscious, or whether the preconscious evaluates the quality of the energy. Freud is completely obscure on the point. But anyway, the energy of the thought relates to whether the thought will meet with resistance. This resistance arises from the preconscious when the preconscious evaluates its contents, for with some contents (ie. thoughts, wishes, ideas) the preconscious is unsure as to whether it should censor them or not. As well, the Unconscious creates a resistance in the preconscious by attempting to 'pull' acceptable thoughts into its realm of influence in order to use these acceptable thoughts as vehicles for 'forcing' unacceptable thoughts backward into the Unconscious.

This movement from the preconscious to the Unconscious
Freud termed regression; so named, because the normal movement of excitation in the apparatus is from perceptual system, through the Unconscious and preconscious, to consciousness or motor movement. The excitation (thought of the preconscious) proceeds to and stimulates the mnemonic elements containing the memory-trace of the preconscious thought and of any repressed wishes associated with the preconscious thought. These stimulated memory-traces then send excitations of the original perception, and any associated repressed material, backward to the perceptual system where the excitation appears as an hallucination. This process generally happens only during sleep when normal stimulation in the system has decreased (i.e. excitation moving from perceptual system to motor end). Freud states: "We call it regression when in a dream an idea is turned back into the sensory image from which it was originally derived." This regressive mechanism occurs not only in dreams, it occurs in psychosis as well as ordinary thinking.

Intentional recollection and other constituent processes of our normal thinking involve a regressive movement in the psychical apparatus from a complex ideational act back to the raw material of the memory-traces underlying. In the waking state, however, this backward movement never extends beyond the mnemonic images; it does not succeed in producing an hallucinatory revival of the perceptual images.

This, according to Ricoeur, completes the first episode concerning the mental apparatus. Freud has given a mental 'scaffolding' which imparts to the mental a spatial orientation. This, however, is only an auxiliary representa-
In order to further the idea that the apparatus is composed of distinct systems which function in determined directions, \textsuperscript{15} All of Freud's major concepts for his theory of mind have been introduced—Unconscious, preconscious, wishes, regression and psychic conflict. Each of these themes will now be more fully developed by presenting the mental apparatus from a slightly different angle from that which he just used. In the second episode Freud speculates on the evolution of the mental.

As was noted earlier, inertia is the principle which underlies the behaviour of the mental apparatus. All behaviour is aimed towards the maintenance of a steady state. When excitation arises in the system a wish occurs; a wish to remove the excitation and return to the original level of inertia. Hypothetically, what would be the most efficient means for an apparatus to achieve this goal? Freud believed that such an apparatus should work basically on a reflex principle, for then, any sensory excitation impinging upon the apparatus could be promptly discharged along a motor path. Why does the apparatus choose one path of discharge rather than another? It becomes established by an experience of satisfaction.

Life initially confronts the mental apparatus in the form of major bodily needs, such as hunger, etc. Stimuli of this sort are not momentary, but exert a constant pressure on the apparatus until the need is satisfied. An experience of satisfaction occurs when the stimulus causing
the unrest ceases. Now, fundamental to this experience is
the perception of satisfaction, "...the mnemonic image of which
remains associated thenceforward with the memory-trace of the
excitation produced by the need." Our mental apparatus
has now become imprinted, so that, confronted with the
same type of stimuli it immediately attempts satisfaction
by seeking that image which is registered in its memory,
and thus, re-establishing the situation of the original
satisfaction.

The impulse to re-establish the situation of the original
satisfaction is what Freud called a wish. The reappearance
of the perception of original satisfaction is the fulfilment
of the wish. Thus, memory-trace₁, the memory of the original
discomfort, and memory-trace₂, the memory of the experience
of the removal of that discomfort, become permanently
associated in the mnemic system and form the psychic grounding
for a wish.

The mode of thinking of this early apparatus was
regressive, and being regressive this primary thought
process ended in hallucination:

Nothing prevents us from assuming that there was
a primitive state of the psychical apparatus in which
this path was actually traversed, that is, in which
wishing ended in hallucinating. Thus the aim of
this first psychical activity was to produce a
'perceptual identity'—a repetition of the percep-
tion which was linked with the satisfaction of the
need.¹⁷

But reality forces the primitive thought activity into a more
expedient secondary one. The wish has been temporarily
appeased by the hallucination but the mental apparatus is
still in a state of unrest because the stimulus is still present (e.g., hunger) and the apparatus must achieve satisfaction by other means. The wish is repeated, and finally, for reasons unknown, the mental apparatus retards the regression at the stage of the mnemonic image and other paths are explored, one of which leads to the 'desired perceptual identity being established from the external world.'

Out of this retardation of the regression and establishment of an alternate path to wish-fulfillment arises a second system, the system which controls voluntary movement. For the first time, the apparatus makes use of movement for purposes remembered in advance. But this secondary process, thinking, is nothing but a roundabout path to wish-fulfillment. Freud states: "Thought is after all nothing but a substitute for a hallucinatory wish; and it is self-evident that dreams must be wish-fulfillments, since nothing but a wish can set our mental apparatus at work." And in the Unconscious, where the primary processes are found, there is no other activity than that of attempting to fulfill wishes.

The primary processes and the secondary processes are referred to as the modes of thinking of the primary system and the secondary system respectively. According to Freud, however, the two processes are fundamentally different in nature. The secondary processes can be conscious and through them we can exercise voluntary control over our actions. The primary processes, on the other hand, can never be conscious and we can exert no control over them.
Secondary processes, then, encompass what we normally refer to as thinking. However, the thinking of the secondary processes can take place in the absence of consciousness: "...the most complicated achievements of thought are possible without the assistance of consciousness."19 Consciousness (attention) is available in only limited quantities and may be diverted from one thought to some other thought; the neglected thought can then continue to unfold in the preconscious. Alternatively, a train of thought may lead to an idea which will not bear criticism. Attention is then diverted, though the train of thought may spin itself out and at some later stage be attracted to attention again. "Thus, if a train of thought is initially rejected (consciously, perhaps) by a judgement that it is wrong or that it is useless for the immediate intellectual purpose in view, the result may be that this train of thought will proceed, unobserved by consciousness."20

A train of thought which is 'neglected' by consciousness is one which has not sufficient energy to attract attention; and a train of thought which has been 'suppressed' (unterdrücken) is one from which the necessary energy to attract consciousness has been withdrawn. The thought either remains in the preconscious where its energy level is too low to attract consciousness or the thought regresses to the Unconscious.

This concludes the second episode. The mental apparatus now has a temporal dimension along with its spatial dimension.
The concepts introduced in the first episode have been both expanded upon (e.g., the wish) and, in some cases, altered significantly (e.g., regression now is the 'mode of thinking' of the primitive apparatus). Though censorship has been discussed, the theory of repression (verdrängen) has yet to be fully developed. This is the purpose of the third episode.

Besides the principle of constancy, which underlies the activity of the secondary system no less than the wishful impulses of the primary system, we also noted that there is a principle of the conservation of energy. The apparatus has only a limited amount of energy available, and to prevent a breakdown of the apparatus this energy must be used discriminately and efficiently. The primary system is directed toward immediate release of energy to diminish excitation in the apparatus; the secondary system inhibits the discharge of the excitation until it 'has concluded its exploratory thought activity' and then it releases the inhibition and damming-up of the excitations and allows them to discharge themselves in movement. Thus, the secondary system in attempting to construct a 'thought path' to reality sends out and withdraws energy in a limited degree, in order to conserve energy.

Just as the experience of excitation is to be avoided, so also, the memory of that experience is to be avoided. Both promote unpleasure, and unpleasure is the operating principle of the apparatus. Thus, there is an inclination in the primitive apparatus to drop the 'memory' of the
experience of the excitation for, if the memory was revived, it would provoke unpleasure in the apparatus. The memory of unpleasure is itself easily avoided, because it, unlike the perception, possesses little, or at least not enough, energy to attract consciousness. Freud states that: "This effortless and regular avoidance by the psychical process of the memory of anything that had once been distressing affords us the prototype and first example of psychical repression." 21

According to Freud, the unpleasure principle prevents the primary system from bringing anything disagreeable into its 'thought'. For example, if there were a perceived danger and the apparatus discharged this perception by a motor movement (eg. running), then the mnemic image of excitation is dropped and, of course, no mnemic image of satisfaction is registered. One question immediately arises. Without a mnemic image which alerts to danger and details the type of reflex actions to be performed, how can the apparatus know that such-and-such is dangerous or that such-and-such action will alleviate the danger? My guess is that Freud would appeal to some inherited 'instinctual patterns' to which the apparatus reacts; however, Freud does not here address the question.

On Freud's view, only those stimuli which eventually cause an hallucination in the primary system, an hallucination which is a visual representation of satisfaction, leads to the registering of a wish or idea. Thus, an interesting point of his model is that only satisfaction-producing
experiences can leave memory-traces which can be recalled. (Freud states that only wishes are in the Unconscious. The status of ideas and thoughts is not all that clear. Ideas and thoughts seem to arise from wishes; and when an idea or thought is repressed, it is the wish attached to the idea or thought which is repressed.) Apparently, there are a whole class of distressful experiences which have been immediately satisfied by motor movement and of which one would have no recallable memory-traces (if there even is a memory-trace).

Freud believed that the secondary system, for efficiency, must have complete access to all memory-traces laid down by experience. The secondary system energizes, or cathects, these primary memory-traces in such a way as to minimize, or completely avoid, the development of unpleasure. And here lies the key to the whole theory of repression (verdrängen): "...the second system can only cathect an idea if it is in a position to inhibit any development of unpleasure that may proceed from it." Any idea which could evade this criticism, would be inaccessible to the second system, as well as the first. According to Freud, however, no idea can be completely suppressed; for, the idea, iteself, 'is what informs the second system of the nature of the memory concerned and of its possible unsuitability for the purpose which the thought process has in view'.

The secondary system does not attempt a 'perceptual identity' between the energized memory and reality, as did the primary system; rather, the secondary system attempts
to establish a 'thought identity' between the memory of the experience and reality. However, an exact identity is prevented because of the criticism exercised by the secondary system on the ideas of the primary system. The secondary system aims at freeing itself, and its thinking processes, from exclusive regulation by the unpleasure principle. The unpleasure principle, though at first beneficial in the primary system, is now a hindrance at establishing thought identity. Thus, the secondary system attempts to restrict the development of 'affect in thought-activity' to a minimum, just enough, in fact, to act as a signal.

Freud believed that the primary processes were "... present in the apparatus from the first, while it is only during the course of life that the secondary processes unfold, and come to inhibit and overlay the primary ones; it may even be that their complete domination is not attained until the prime of life." Due to this late appearance of the secondary processes, 'the core of our being, consisting of unconscious wishful impulses, remain inaccessible to the understanding and inhibition of the preconscious'.

III

Our main problem is to come to some understanding of what Freud means by the primary and secondary processes. Freud argues that these two psychic processes are fundamentally different in nature. The primary processes are regressive; they are automatically controlled by the unpleasure principle; consciousness can have no access to them; their function is
to discharge wishes thus reducing excitation in the system.
The secondary processes are progressive; though they are
to an extent by the unpleasure principle, they are
controlled mainly by the purpose of conserving energy; they
evolved after the primary processes; they conserve energy
by inhibiting indiscriminate discharge of energy by the
primary system; they perform the function of conscious
thinking.

One might be tempted to equate the secondary processes
with consciousness, for we often equate consciousness and
thinking or, at least, some might want to argue that thinking
can only occur with conscious awareness. But such is not
the case in Freud's model. And this is not simply an over­
sight on the part of Freud. Consciousness plays but a minor
role in Freud's theory of mind, at least in relation to
the role that the unconscious plays. It is not until the
last section of Chapter VII of The Interpretation of Dreams
that Freud even assigns consciousness, as a system, to the
mental apparatus. There are two reasons for the perfunctory
role that consciousness has. First, The Interpretation of
Dreams is concerned mainly with dreams, and dreams are
primarily a part of unconscious reality and the primary pro
processes. Secondly, one must understand the view of the
mental which Freud was arguing against. This view asserts
that consciousness is the mental. Freud wants to maintain
that unconscious mental processes are not a contradiction
in terms. Unconscious mental processes are as important as,
if not more important than, conscious mental processes. Freud states that "...the unconscious is the true psychic reality..." Thus, we have Freud maintaining that consciousness is none other than that of being similar to a sense organ for the perception of psychical qualities and, also, maintaining that there is unconscious thinking (ie. when consciousness is not attending to preconscious thoughts).

Briefly then, primary processes attempt discharge of wishes; while secondary processes, by repression (verdrängen), either inhibit the discharge of these wishes completely or allow a discharge of a distorted form of the wish created by the surreptitious action of the primary processes.
In Chapter II we noted that Boudreaux must explain why Freud often states that a person intends a slip, if Boudreaux wants to maintain that Freud does not rely on unconscious intentions in his argument concerning slips. Boudreaux's explanation involves two parts. We examined the first part of that explanation in Chapter II and found it lacking. There, we noted that Boudreaux attempts to demonstrate that the philosophical argument which justifies Freud meaning an act of intending, when Freud says that a person intends a slip, is insufficient, according to Boudreaux, because it depends upon an inference from the beliefs of a person to the 'intentionality' of the act. Such an inference demonstrates only that the slip, or externally intentional act, is Intentional and not that it is an act of intending. It is not an act of intending because an externally intentional act does not satisfy either of Boudreaux's two criteria of an act of intending.

Chapter II concluded with my arguing that Boudreaux's two criteria for an act of intending are not necessary conditions of an act of intending. As the two criteria are not necessary for an act of intending, Boudreaux does not show that the philosophical argument, which would justify Freud meaning an act of intending, is insufficient. Of course, just because Boudreaux is wrong does not mean that it is a good argument. Nor would the success of Boudreaux's
argument have established what Freud meant when he described a patient as having an unconscious intention. What Boudreaux believed that Freud meant, when Freud talks of unconscious intentions, is the second part of Boudreaux's explanation and it is the subject matter of this chapter.

In Chapter III we concentrated on four concepts of Freud's theory of mind, namely, the Unconscious, primary and secondary processes, repression and wishes. Wishes, for Freud, were the basic motivating force of the mental apparatus. Because some wishes are unacceptable to the secondary processes, those wishes are repressed. When repressed, these wishes automatically attempt to force their way into consciousness via the primary processes of the mind. Boudreaux argues that slips are the result of such repressed wishes discharging via the primary processes. Thus, according to Boudreaux, in so far as Freud speaks of unconscious intentions, Freud means the intentional aspect to be a reflex action of the organism to automatically discharge a wish. Boudreaux names this reflex action the 'internal intentionality' of the organism.

There are four important parts to Boudreaux's argument. First, slips result from the automatic discharge of wishes via the primary processes. Thus, the rejected intention which results in the slip must be a repressed wish. Second, as slips result from wishes discharging via the primary processes, the slip is not an act of intending according to criterion A, as criterion A requires some behaviour (of the
sort being considered) to be preceded by a mental act of intending. Nor would the slip be an act of intending according to criterion B, as there is no consideration of options; and, as there is no consideration of options, the slip cannot be an act of intending for it would then fail to satisfy criterion B. Third, Boudreaux argues that his interpretation of the slip being a result of the primary processes discharging is the only interpretation of Freud's theory of unconscious processes that is consistent. Fourth, even though Boudreaux's interpretation is the only consistent interpretation of Freud's theory of unconscious processes, it is inadequate in explaining satisfactorily Freud's argument for slips of the tongue, specifically, because Freud errs in his theoretical development of that argument.

I

Boudreaux believes that Freud's theory of mind relates to Freud's theory of slips in the following manner. Freud postulated that organisms strive to keep in a state of minimum excitation. Any divergence from this state of inertia is perceived as unpleasure. Freud also speculated that the human organism once functioned at a purely reflex action level. That is, the mental apparatus upon being stimulated by internal or external sources reacted spontaneously and automatically with motor movement to rid itself of that stimulus and attain, again, its previous level of inertia. There were no consideration of options on the part of the organism, simply, an automatic response to the stimuli. Thus,
the motivating force, in fact the only force, in this 'primary system' is the wish to eliminate unpleasure.

Such a system, of course, was inadequate to cope with environmental changes and thus, for unspecified reasons, an adaptive mechanism began to overlay the primitive mode of 'thinking'. So, the secondary system evolved. For the first time the mental apparatus thought ahead by considering options; it thus could now choose the most efficient path to its goal. However, the goal remained the same, i.e. the maintenance of inertia.

The evolution of the secondary system created a new problem. The goal of immediate wish-fulfillment by the primary system was frequently at odds with the planned course of action of the secondary system. The secondary system had to waylay many of the rash wishes of the primary system. Further, because the wish of the primary system was often completely at odds with the planned action of the secondary system, 'repression' occurred.

Repression is the blocking from consciousness of certain unacceptable wishes. When a wish of the primary system is unacceptable to the secondary system then the satisfaction of that wish would cause unpleasure and it is automatically repressed by the secondary system. Even though repressed, the wish still attempts to discharge. The primary system must find alternative means of discharging the wish. "The apparatus (and not the person) learns that the impulse can be redirected onto an alternative wish-satisfying object."¹
Freud used the term 'unconscious' in at least three senses. One of those senses was termed 'systematic'; and, it is in the systematic sense that Freud originally presents his technical concept the Unconscious. The Unconscious is the system whose contents are wishes not admissible to consciousness. The organism has repressed these wishes and the agent, unless psychoanalysed (and even then sometimes not), cannot be aware of them. Of course, the repressed wishes do sometimes force themselves through to consciousness.

Boudreaux gives the following scenario:

...the organism wishes for X; but because the wish is unconscious in the systematic sense, a straight forward attempt at (or hallucination of) X could bring further pain; accordingly, the wishful impulse is (automatically) redirected onto some surrogate X. Call this surrogate X'. X' is associatively related to X. At some time in the past the organism has learned that X' will in some relevant sense serve for X. Thus, there occurs motor activity aimed at X'. This process whereby wishful impulses are redirected Freud calls the primary process.  

By now, it should be obvious as to the force of Boudreaux's argument--slips are the result of repressed wishes discharging. Thus, when one of the two original, contrary wishes was rejected by the one making the slip, the rejected wish was repressed into the Unconscious. The repressed wish, then, attempts automatic discharge via the primary processes; and, if successful, a slip occurs. This new interpretation is slightly different from the one with which Boudreaux originally sympathized; for, the slip is no longer the result of the rejection of a wish (like the dropping of an object can be the result of being startled). Rather, the slip is
the result of the repression, into the Unconscious, of a rejected wish and the subsequent discharge of that wish by the primary processes.

Can one still construe the slip, of this new interpretation, as intended? According to Boudreaux obviously not, for there is no unconscious mental act of intending according to either of Boudreaux's two criteria of an act of intending. For example, assume that a slip of the tongue is the result of the primary system discharging, that is, an unconscious wish discharges. According to criterion A there is no mental act of intending, because the wish is discharged automatically. There can never be a mental act of intending. Criterion B requires some consideration of options, it requires the selection of the most efficient means of attaining the goal. But in the realm of the primary system, there is no consideration of alternatives, the wish simply discharges.

How does this new interpretation fare against the charge that Freud speaks as if slips are acts of intending? Well, according to Boudreaux, the apparatus does have the intention of communicating a proposition or a message, and the slip does communicate it. But, as we noted in Chapter II, this external intentionality is not a sufficient condition for a mental act of intending. Boudreaux states:

...Freud does not explain the slip in terms of the motives of the agent; he explained it by saying that the wish, repudiated, seeks discharge. Its discharge consists in the utterance of the relevant message. It was not the agent's motive or intention to utter that message, for that is just the intention that
he repudiated; it simply found expression anyway, and the goal was achieved.  

This purposiveness of the apparatus, to maintain a state of inertia and thus minimize unpleasure by automatically discharging, is what Boudreaux calls the 'internal intentionality' of the apparatus; and it is, Boudreaux maintains, the intentionality that Freud is referring to when he speaks of 'unconscious intentions' in his case studies.

This is Boudreaux's answer to the first of the two criticisms which he raised concerning the interpretation that slips of the tongue are caused by the rejection of a wish (ie. Shope's interpretation). Boudreaux's answer has resulted in Boudreaux presenting a new interpretation which states that slips are the result of a 'repressed' wish discharging via the primary processes. There is intentionality but it is the purposefulness of the apparatus and not an act of intending on the part of an agent. The mechanisms of repression and discharge are a result of the internal intentionality of the apparatus.

What of the second criticism of Shope's interpretation, viz, the rejection of a wish cannot be a sufficient condition for a slip, simply, because it is possible that the rejected wish never discharges itself, and thus, there must be other factors besides the rejection which determines the resultant slip. Boudreaux maintains that his new interpretation, ie. that slips are the result of the primary processes discharging, is not affected by this second criticism. The primary-secondary
process distinction of Freud's theory of mind sufficiently accounts for the repudiation and subsequent discharge of contrary wishes. And, though Freud does not explicitly talk of the primary processes when he discusses slips of the tongue, Boudreaux believes that Freud meant his theory of slips to be encompassed by those processes.

II

We have just noted that Boudreaux wants to argue that a slip caused by a repressed wish discharging via the primary processes cannot be an act of intending because such behaviour fails to satisfy either of his two criteria of an act of intending. Thus, if Freud meant that a wish was discharging via the primary processes when he talks of slips, which is what Boudreaux wants to maintain, then Freud could not mean an act of intending. However, in Chapter II I argued that Boudreaux's two criteria of an act of intending are not necessary conditions for an act of intending. Consequently, Boudreaux has failed to demonstrate that a slip resulting from a wish discharging via the primary processes is not an act of intending. Of course, the failure does not demonstrate an act of intending. If Boudreaux had presented adequate conditions for an act of intending would his argument have been successful? In this section I will argue no, simply, because Freud did not mean all slips to be the result of repressed wishes discharging.

Freud's argument for slips, as characterized by Boudreaux, is that there is a continuum of possible cases, and of those
possible cases three typify the range of the continuum. In the first case, there is an intended speech and a repudiated speech; the speaker, before the slip, is aware of both. In the second case, it is only after the slip has occurred that the speaker realizes that he had, in fact, actually considered the interfering utterance prior to the slip, and then, rejected it. In the third case, according to Boudreaux, the speaker refuses to acknowledge that he had actually rejected, prior to the slip, the interfering utterance. Thus, Boudreaux states that Freud is arguing that: "...there is such a similarity between all relevant aspects of the three cases that it is reasonable to hypothesize a repudiated speech in the third one as well; only here we must say that it is unconsciously wished for." As discussed earlier, Boudreaux is using unconscious here to mean 'systematic unconscious', viz. the organism automatically 'represses' an idea into the Unconscious where the primary processes attempt to discharge it. Does Freud want to invoke his theory of the primary processes in his discussion of slips of the tongue?

It is my contention that Freud did not obviously intend his theory of slips of the tongue to be necessarily dependent upon his theory of primary processes, and their attempted automatic discharge of repressed wishes.

In Gesammelte Werke, the German edition of Freud's collected works, Freud uses 'verdrängen' as the technical word for 'repression'. Freud never uses this word in his discussion of slips of the tongue. (Refer above to the two
translated passages of Chapter I pp. 13 - 14) Freud uses 'rückdrängen', 'Zurückweisung' or 'Unterdrückung' to indicate the forcing back, rejection and suppression of an intended utterance. Also, as was emphasized by Boudreaux and as indicated in the discussion of Freud's theory of mind, repression is an automatic reaction of the organism in which 'consciousness' has no play. But, again referring to the above two translated paragraphs, it is obvious that Freud believed that in, at least, the first two types of slips it is the agent who consciously rejects the intended speech and it is not an automatic mechanism of the organism:

In both cases they have been, however, driven back (zurückgedrängt). The speaker has determined not to put them into words...

Obviously, it is the speaker who has consciously determined not to say one of the intended utterances. Further, I believe that Freud intended the same in the third type of slip as well:

I will be so bold, to suppose, that a tendency can still manifest itself, which since a long time, possibly since a very long time, has been forced back (zurückgedrängt), eluded observation and is denied directly for that reason.

Apparently, the reason that the tendency is denied is that it has been a long time since it was rejected; and, of course, repression has nothing to do with a time factor. The organism, in repression, automatically represses an idea or wish and this repression is not influenced by time. This last sentence of Freud indicates to me that Freud could easily be interpreted to mean that the speaker rejected the statement but has, for
whatever reason, forgotten the rejection. The reason for forgetting could be repression, but Freud does not address the problem.

Freud states that what differentiates the different types of slips is, specifically, "...the different extent to which an intention is forced back (Zurückdrängung)." On this translation, it reads as if there are different degrees of rejection. Now, whether Freud means a range of 'forcing back' up to and including 'repression' is uncertain. As stated, the German word used here is 'Zurückdrängen' which would indicate that if Freud had meant a range he did not necessarily mean it to include repression. Further, a more literal translation of this phrase would say, "...the different, far reaching forcing back of an intention." This could indicate a time element again, viz. the more time to elapse since a rejection increases one's propensity to forget the rejection. However, I do not believe that that is what Freud meant. What he did mean, though, is ambiguous. I want to maintain that this ambiguity sides with the interpretation that slips can be the result of both repressed wishes discharging and, also, rejected non-repressed wishes manifesting themselves. Freud's theory of slips is not dependent solely on the former.

III

As noted in my Introduction to this chapter, Boudreaux argues that Freud erred in the general structure of his argument for slips of the tongue. To demonstrate the
weakness of this assertion of Boudreaux, I will present what Boudreaux perceived as the major weakness of Freud's argument.

According to Boudreaux, Freud's argument is that slips of the tongue occur due to the automatic discharge of a repressed wish. Further, Boudreaux believed that one of Freud's principal goals was to achieve a consistent, overall theory of mind. Thus, as Freud's theory of primary processes is a theory in which repressed wishes are automatically discharged and as Freud has no other theory to account for the automatic discharge of a wish according to Boudreaux, then the rejected wish of primary processes must be a repressed wish. However, as Boudreaux notes (and as we noted in section II of this chapter) Freud's account of slips of the tongue is inconsistent with the claim that slips of the tongue are the result of the primary processes discharging. For, in the first case the man remains conscious of his wish and, according to Boudreaux: "If the man remains conscious of his wish, then it does not function according to the primary processes..."¹¹ (Boudreaux is arguing that only the first case is inconsistent with the claim that slips of the tongue are the result of the primary processes discharging.)

The fallacy in this argument of Boudreaux's is that discharge of a wish via the primary processes is not the only method of manifesting an unconscious wish in Freudian theory. An unconscious wish can also manifest itself via the secondary processes. As was pointed out in Chapter III, the secondary
processes can unfold without the aid or assistance of consciousness. There we noted Freud saying that "...the most complicated achievements of thought are possible without the assistance of consciousness." Thus, a rejected idea (=wish) could continue to exist in the preconscious and, at some later time, be attracted to attention (or consciousness) again by appearing as a slip. Repression does not have to occur. In fact, in The Interpretation of Dreams Freud notes that a slip of the tongue could arise from the preconscious: "...composite structures and compromises occur with remarkable frequency when we try to express preconscious thoughts in speech. They are then regarded as species of 'slips of the tongue'."

Because Boudreaux looks at rejected wishes as repressed wishes, he views Freud's argument as an argument concerning repression. Thus, for Boudreaux, the odd case, the case that does not conform to the three (remember, he represents the second case as an example of a case of repression) is the first case. However, if you look at the argument for slips from the point of view that Freud must have looked at it--starting from clinical observations and then attempting to fit it to theory--the odd case is the third case. Thus, we have Freud saying: "...leaving the problem of the third group on the one side..." Primary processes probably play a part in the third case. However, the first and second cases need not involve repression. Freud indicates this by the words that he uses--zurückdrängen, Unterdrückung and
Zurückweisung—rather than verdrängen. Further, such an interpretation is not inconsistent with his theory of mind. Whether it is philosophically sound is another question.

IV

In section II of this chapter we examined Boudreaux's reason as to why Freud often states that a person intends a slip. Boudreaux believes that what Freud meant was that slips are the result of repressed wishes discharging via the primary processes of the mind. Thus when Freud says that a slip is unconsciously intended Freud is referring to the 'internal intentionality' of the apparatus and not an act of intending on the part of an agent. I rejected this conclusion of Boudreaux's for two reasons. First, Boudreaux's two criteria for an act of intending are not necessary conditions of such acts, thus Boudreaux has not established that slips, even if they are the result of repressed wishes discharging, are not also intended acts. Secondly, Freud is not committed to slips being the result of repressed wishes discharging.

In section III Boudreaux states that Freud's theory of repression is the only theory of Freud's that adequately and consistently explains Freud's theory of slips. However, even Boudreaux notes that Freud's theory of slips is inconsistent, if it is explained only in terms of repression. Thus, according to Boudreaux, Freud must have erred when he outlined his theory of slips.

I argue that Freud's theory of repression may have
something to do with slips, but Freud was ambiguous on the issue and, obviously, he did not depend solely on repression as the motivating force for slips. I gave two specific reasons as to why slips may have little to do with repression. First, Freud says that a person consciously rejects the wish that eventually appears as the slip. Repression, however, is an automatic mechanism of the organism, not subject to an agent's control. Thus, a rejected wish does not automatically result in a repressed wish. Secondly, Freud in his discussion of slips never states that a slip is the result of a repressed (verdrängen) wish.

I also argue that discharge of a wish via the primary processes is not the only method of discharging a wish; wishes can also manifest themselves via the secondary processes. Finally, whether or not Boudreaux's interpretation of Freud is the only philosophically consistent interpretation, it obviously is not Freud's intended meaning.
CHAPTER V

In Chapter IV I rejected Boudreaux's conclusion that slips are solely the result of repressed wishes discharging via the primary processes. This, in turn, led me to reject Boudreaux's argument that when Freud described a slip as being unconsciously intended Freud meant that the slip was the result of the 'internal intentionality' of the mental apparatus to automatically discharge a repressed wish, and thus, Freud did not mean to imply the existence of an unconscious mental act of intending. Boudreaux also maintained that conscious acts such as judgements and the selection of alternatives are carried out by the secondary processes in Freud's theory of mind and these secondary processes can have nothing to do with the processes which result in slips of the tongue. I, in turn, argued that Freud's theory of mind does not preclude slips manifesting themselves via the secondary processes. However, what if Boudreaux were correct and Freud did mean that slips are solely the result of the primary processes discharging repressed wishes? Would Boudreaux's assertion that slips are not unconsciously intended then be valid?

In Chapter II we determined that Boudreaux's criteria for an act of intending were not necessary conditions for such acts. Thus, on his criteria, even if slips were a result of the primary processes discharging repressed wishes, Boudreaux failed to demonstrate that slips were not unconscious
intentions. However, we left the question unanswered as to whether slips, if they were the result of primary processes discharging a repressed wish, could then be considered to be unconscious intentions. In this chapter I am going to examine that question. And, I will begin the examination by looking at what we might intuitively consider an unconscious intention to be. But before proceeding, let us momentarily consider Boudreaux's argument for a clue as to where to begin our analysis.

The force of Boudreaux's argument centered on his assertion that a slip could not be an unconscious intention because the slip is simply a result of a reflex reaction of the apparatus to a stimulus, a repressed wish; in much the same way as the upward movement of the lower leg is considered the result of a reflex reaction of the organism when the knee is struck by a reflex-hammer. We would never consider this latter to be an intended action of the person performing the behaviour, and so, we should never consider a slip to be an intended action either.

No matter how appealing this argument appears, there does seem to be a significant difference between an action resulting from a nervous reflex caused by an external stimulus and an action resulting from a 'psychic reflex' caused by an internal stimulus such as a wish. And, it is this difference which we shall now explore.

In this section I intend to examine some of our
intuitions concerning the concept of intention. I will offer no explicit theory of intending; rather, I will appeal to cases of putatively intentional actions as a guide to other similar actions which we would then consider intended. To begin I will present two different cases involving similar looking actions, one of which is deemed intended and the other unintended.

Inge, the heroine of these two examples, is at the doctor's office for her annual check-up. Part of the doctor's examination involves a test of the nervous system. The doctor instructs Inge to sit on an examination table with her legs dangling. With a small hammer he strikes one of her legs just below the knee-cap. This results in a sudden, upward movement of her lower leg. Most would not consider this spontaneous movement to be caused by Inge. Instead, we would consider such behaviour unintended, caused by the hammer stimulating a reflex reaction in the nerve and muscle system of the leg.

The second example, again involving Inge, presents us with a similar looking action of the lower leg. One day while sitting in her Chemistry class, Inge sensed a cramp in one of her feet. To relieve the cramp Inge decides to raise her lower leg quickly. That decision is followed immediately by the movement of the lower leg upward. The action performed looks exactly the same as the action observed in the doctor's office. Yet, it seems reasonable to assume that, in this case, the mental decision to kick the lower leg upward is the cause
which results in the leg moving upward. And, in contrast to the first case, most would be hesitant to call this movement a reflex reaction of Inge's nerve and muscle system. Further, we would not consider the upward movement of the leg unintended, but rather intended. The question which immediately arises is—what leads us to classify the one action as intended and the other action as unintended?

Prima facie, the difference between the two actions appears to derive from the difference between the nature of the causes of the two actions. And, what constitutes that difference? Well, in the first example the cause is external to Inge. Further, her mental state, other than acquiescence to the examination, has no bearing on the upward movement of the lower leg. In fact, everything else being equal, Inge might just as well have been asleep or unconscious. From this single example the following generalization about unintended actions seems reasonable: an action is unintended, if that action is caused by a force external to the person performing the action. John Mackie maintains a somewhat similar position concerning unintended actions: "What I am in a literal sense physically compelled to do is not an intentional act of mine under any description—for example, if someone much stronger than I pushes my hand, or if I remain where I am because I am tied up."²

In the second case, however, Inge's mental state directly influences the raising of her lower leg, and thus, the cause of the movement appears to be internal to Inge.
What inclines us to call this latter action intended? Is it because the cause appears to originate in Inge? Or, is it because the cause derives from a conscious state?

Many would call actions caused by internal forces, with no intervening conscious state, unintended. They argue that such actions are unintended because the agent has no conscious influence over the stimuli causing the action. Desires are often cited as such forces. However, some desires obviously do give rise to intended actions. One becomes hungry; the hunger gives rise to a desire for food; one goes to the kitchen and eats. But, on the model of intention just introduced, the desire simply causes the conscious state which in turn causes the intended action. Thus, the action's being intended derives from the conscious state and not because it is preceded by the internal stimulus of hunger and the desire for food. Such a model would entail that all intended actions resulting from desires are in fact caused by an intervening conscious state or a conscious state accompanying a desire. If that conscious state is absent, then the action is unintended and caused directly by the desire. But, are all intended actions preceded by and accompanied by a conscious state? Consider the following case.

Ludwig has been in his study all day, absorbed in reading the Brothers Karamazov. The supper hour has passed unnoticed by him. As twilight appears through the study window, a general restlessness begins to permeate Ludwig's concentration. He moves to another chair near his desk. Still
the restlessness persists. On his study desk rests an apple, placed there earlier in the day by Ludwig. Unconsciously, Ludwig grasps the apple and takes a bite. Suddenly, the lateness of the hour and his gnawing hunger breaks through to awareness and it dawns on Ludwig that he is absolutely starving. The taste of the apple broke his concentration and made him aware of his hunger.

Was the picking-up and biting of the apple an intended act? Or, was it a reflex action, that is a habit of sorts, like turning on the light automatically when entering a familiar room, or applying the brakes as a cat darts in front of your car? No matter what your opinion concerning the intentional status of these actions, picking-up and biting into the apple does not conform easily to such cases. For the action was not a result of a pattern of behaviour established over a period of time (assuming, of course, that Ludwig had not established such a behaviour pattern). And, the action was preceded by no conscious state to perform, though the action itself required a degree of intelligence or, let us say, mental effort to perform.

Is it reasonable to assume that such an act is intended? Might it not be argued that no one would unconsciously pick-up an apple and eat it? There must have been some conscious awareness on the part of Ludwig to perform the action. Either that, or might we not call the intention an intention-in-action? That is, an intention that is formed as the action is performed. Much like the action of John, in Chapter II,
when he struck the man who insulted his dog. However, Ludwig's case is different from that case, for Ludwig had no conscious awareness of picking-up and biting the apple, while John was fully conscious of hitting the man. But, even in John's case, John did not know why he hit the man, he just hit him. Let us look at another example.

This example involves a dream. Imagine that you are sound asleep dreaming of a childhood playmate whom you were constantly at odds with. In the dream you are embroiled in a discussion with him and he is making you exceptionally irritated. Suddenly, you can no longer control yourself and you strike at him with your fist. A scream awakens you! You have just punched your wife. Did you unconsciously intend to hit her? A Freudian might come up with an affirmative answer, but only after pursuing a psychoanalysis and delving into your personal history. It is not important for us whether you intended to hit your wife or not. What is important is that you were in a state of sleep which most would consider to be an unconscious state. And, while in that state of sleep you did intend to hit someone, thought possibly not your wife. Maybe you had an unconscious desire to hit the playmate whom you never did hit?

No matter, you argue, such an act would not be an intention. It is merely a desire or at most an impulse which has manifested itself as a dream. Essentially it is an hallucination in one's sleep, nothing more; an hallucination in which you desire to do something which you consciously o
do not intend to do.

You obviously did not consciously intend to hit your wife, nor did you consciously intend to hit the antagonist of the dream. Though you may well have wanted to hit either one or the other. But, then, that is the point. Some desire is being expressed which is unconscious but which you, the dreamer, in principle, could have access to.

No you argue! If anything, it is merely an impulse which may have existed all these years; but still only an impulse, and nothing more.

We sometimes observe in ourselves, but more often in others, impulsive actions which seem unintended rather than intended. Usually it takes a great deal of self-reflection to acknowledge such actions in one's own behaviour. And, even when the impulse is acknowledged, the motivation behind the behaviour is seldom determined or curtailed. We often maintain that the motivation is due to some unconscious desire.

Common examples can be found amongst persons who have little or no control over their appetite for food, alcohol, drugs, etc. Such persons often feel impelled to eat or drink just as if they were under some external duress to eat or drink. As already noted there is often a conscious state which recognizes the impulse. Thus, it cannot be the lack of the conscious state which makes us want to call such actions unintended; rather, it is the lack of control over the impulse. The impulse is like an external force to the person performing
the action. Thus, we are inclined to call such actions the result of unconscious desires but we do not want to admit that such acts are intended because they lack the consent of consciousness.

Well, Freud wanted to call such behaviour intended. Mainly because he believed that such behaviour was the result of unconscious mental processes. Mackie formulates Freud's use of intention most lucidly:

If we follow Freud, or Plato, in comparing the mind of an individual to society, we can recognize an action as the fulfilment of a desire that has indeed arisen within the agent as a human being but that may nevertheless be outside the boundaries of his central personality or ego or self. That is an intentional act of the human being may not be an intentional act of the parliament of co-conscious motives which ordinarily works as a whole and acknowledges as its own the thoughts and actions that originate anywhere within it.  

The view of intentional which seems to be emerging is one where most, if not all, behaviour arising from internal forces is intended and all behaviour produced by external force is unintended. But, it is not all behaviour arising from internal forces that we want to maintain is intended. It is only that behaviour caused by mental processes, either conscious or unconscious, in conjunction with internal forces that we want to call intended. To an extent Western philosophy has attempted to restrict the class of intended actions to being necessarily the result of conscious states. And mainly because, as Freud notes, Western philosophy equates the mental with consciousness. However, such a classification obscures the status of many actions which do not fall easily
into the classification. Such as the actions which we have been examining. Usually, the difference between the conscious mentally caused action and the, so called, unconscious mentally caused action has been recognized by referring to the latter as caused by unconscious desires while referring to the former as simply intended. However, Freud wants to maintain that there are unconscious mental processes which are the result of wishes and these unconscious mental processes can cause actions and such actions would be intended.

II

An important influence on Freud in the development of his psychological theories was the observations which he made in his clinical practice. In attempting to determine the cause of a patient's illness Freud often noted that the behaviour exhibited by the patient and the beliefs admitted to by that patient did not coincide. Freud found that if he would suggest to the patient beliefs more suitable to the behaviour exhibited and which conformed to the personal history of the patient and if he could then convince the patient of the truth of these beliefs, the symptoms often disappeared. Thus he concluded that much of the symptomatic behaviour of his patients was caused by beliefs of which the patient was unaware, and by determining and changing these beliefs Freud maintained that he could alter their behaviour.

Freud went on to speculate that many illnesses, which up to then had been considered solely somatic in origin, were in fact a direct result of unconscious mental processes.
These were mental processes which he believed existed in the person and caused the behaviour, but of which the person was consciously unaware. In the fourth of his Introductory Lectures Freud defines what he means by mental process:

*Everything that can be observed in mental life will be designated at one time or another as a mental phenomenon. It depends, however, whether the particular mental phenomenon is directly due to bodily, organic or material agencies, in which case it does not fall to psychology for investigation; or whether it arose directly from other mental processes, behind which at some point the succession of organic agencies begins. We have in mind the latter state of things when we describe a phenomenon as a mental process...*^4

Consciousness is not mentioned.

Freud became more convinced that actions can result from mental processes of which the person is unaware as he came to be more involved in other fields of psychology, especially the more esoteric areas such as dream analysis and hypnosis. He believed that cases from these two fields proved conclusively that there can be mental processes of which a subject is unaware and which can cause that person to perform an action.

This belief, that there are unconscious mental processes, along with three other convictions, 1) that all mental states are Intentional, 2) that all organisms strive to maintain a steady state and 3) that the mental realm is as much subject to the laws of cause and effect as the material realm, might be said to be the conceptual cornerstones of Freud's theory of mind. It is easy to see, then, why consciousness played such an ancilliary role in his psychic model.
Intentionality, as noted in Chapter I, is the doctrine that all mental states are directed at an object or state of affairs in a specific psychological mode. Whether Freud held such a doctrine is of course speculative. But, that some such doctrine influenced his theory seems a reasonable conjecture. For, Freud studied for about three years with Franz Brentano, the modern proponent of the doctrine. Further, when discussing 'intentional' in his four lectures on slips Freud uses the German words 'die Tendenz', 'die Absicht' and 'die Intention', the latter of which is seldom used in German except in technical philosophic manuscripts, often to denote Intentional. This was the German word that Brentano used. If we refer back to Chapter III, we should remember that a wish can only be registered on the mind if it were directed at the elimination of excitation or reduction of unpleasure. Thus, in Freud's theory, all mental states are Intentional for all mental states are fundamentally directed at the elimination of excitation in the psychological mode of desire.

As wishes are the psychic equivalent of desire, in Freud's theory, the mental system is directed at the state of affairs of minimizing excitation by wishing. Historically, the human organism first contained only a haphazard system of reacting to stimuli. This, as we remember, was the primary system. Previously experienced actions which had successfully discharged excitations were remembered, wished for and repeated when similar excitation impinged upon the organism. Thus at first the system, as Boudreaux indicates, is a type
of reflex system. However, not a reflex system where nerves contract muscles, rather a reflex system depending upon memory and wishes, i.e. a 'psychic reflex' system. A more efficient system was obviously required and such a system came to overlay the primary one. This secondary system inhibited the wishing of the primary system for immediate satisfaction. And the secondary system performs the functions that we essentially attribute to thinking. But, thinking is nothing but an extension of wishing and, according to Freud, it can lead to actions in the absence of a conscious decision to perform those actions.

It is easy to understand why Boudreaux so readily equates wishing and intending (Chapter II, pp. 2-3), for Freud used intending, wanting and wishing interchangeably in his _Introductory Lectures_. For example, at times in his discussion of slips, Freud states that slips arise through the interference of two different intentions: "...they originate through the co-operation—perhaps better: against one another's two different intentions." At other times Freud attributes the source of slips to the interference of two impulses: "...the slip is the expression of the conflict between two incompatible impulses." And, still at other times Freud attributes the slip to wants: "The meaning and intentions of the slip is that he wants to close the session." All of this is not to argue that Freud did not differentiate between conscious and unconscious intentions. It was his belief that it was man's evolutionary fate to
bring as much into consciousness as possible. However, it was also his belief that many, and probably most, of man's actions, such as slips, were the result of unconscious mental processes, processes which he referred to variously as desires, wishes or intentions.

So far as we know, a psychic apparatus possessing only the primary process does not exist, and is to that extent a theoretical fiction; but this at least is a fact: that the primary processes are present in the apparatus from the beginning, while the secondary processes only take shape gradually during the course of life, inhibiting and overlaying the primary, whilst gaining complete control over them perhaps only in the prime of life.8

Thus, according to Freud, primary processes can cause intended actions, albeit unconsciously intended actions. This is not to argue that Freud maintained that there is a prior unconscious mental act of intending to perform some act; rather, it is only to argue that there are unconscious mental processes which have purpose and direction and which result in acts, which are, hence, intended unconsciously.

III

In this chapter I have attempted to establish two points. First, we do admit to a sense of unconscious intention. We allow for such a meaning in actions which we say are the result of unacknowledged desires or which we say are impulsive. Secondly, Freud is using his sense of unconscious intention pretty much in this way. Further, he believes that such events are genuine mental acts, possibly 'psychic reflexes', but mental none-the-less. Thus actions such as slips and those contentious actions, such as we discussed earlier in this
chapter, are the result of genuine mental processes but unconscious ones. Freud refers to them as unconscious desires, wishes or intentions.

In conclusion, even if Boudreaux were correct that slips are solely the result of the primary processes discharging repressed wishes, this does not preclude the possibility that Freud meant that they are unconscious intentions. In fact, from all the evidence, it is apparent that Freud meant that slips are unconsciously intended.
CONCLUSION

In Chapter I we examined Freud's argument for slips as presented in his Introductory Lectures. There Freud argues that most, if not all, slips have a sense, that is, slips exhibit purpose and meaning for they usually conform to the object of some mental state which the person possessed prior to the slip. We then speculated that this accords with a theory of Intentionality in that mental states are directed at an object (the content of the slip) in a specific psychological mode (desire). However, from the fact that a person may possess an unconscious Intentional state of desire directed at performing an utterance, can we then infer that the slip is unconsciously intended?

Boudreaux argues no. He argues that a slip is usually believed to be an 'externally intentional' act and 'externally intentional' acts, though Intentional, are not examples of intended acts because they fail to satisfy two criteria which Boudreaux argues are necessary conditions for intended acts. Why then does Freud describe his case studies by reference to unconscious intentions?

Boudreaux argues that when Freud describes his case studies by reference to unconscious intentions he is simply referring to the 'internal intentionality' of the organism to respond automatically to repressed wishes. On this model, slips are like reflex actions much as the dropping of an object can be the result when a person is startled.
I argue that Freud's argument for slips is not dependent solely on a theory of repressed wishes discharging via primary processes. A slip can also occur as a result of the secondary processes manifesting themselves. However, what if Freud's theory were dependent solely upon repressed wishes discharging via the primary processes. Would Boudreaux's argument be valid?

I argue no, because Boudreaux's two criteria of intended actions are not necessary conditions of such acts. What if Boudreaux had presented necessary conditions of intended actions, would his argument then be valid?

Again, I argue no, because any criteria which were necessary criteria of an intended action would have to allow that slips might be unconsciously intended. For, slips are similar to, and possibly the same as, many actions which we do maintain are intended. Actions such as those resulting from unconscious desires or unconscious wishes.

Freud is arguing that there are unconscious mental processes which are the result of desires, and that these unconscious mental processes can result in actions and that such actions would be unconsciously intended.
Enunciation


Chapter I

1. der Fehler: mistake, error, fault
die Leistungen: performances, acts

2. Freud, p. 33.


4. Ibid, p. 34.


6. Intentionality: I will use this capitalized version to denote an Intentional State, in the sense that Brentano uses the word. When I use single quotation marks to enclose intend or intention (eg. 'intend'), I mean to imply that the exact meaning of the enclosed words is ambiguous.


10. Ibid, p. 58.
Chapter II


2. Refer to page 42 to understand the force of this criticism. I explain that Freud has at least two notions of unconscious. It is Freud's technical sense of unconscious which Boudreaux is using here. Refer also to page 63.


Chapter III


5. above p. 84.


7. This is what Freud later calls the pleasure principle.


12. I will use the capitalized *Unconscious* to signify Unconscious System and the lower case unconscious to signify an absence of consciousness.


15. Ricoeur, p. 106.


17. Ibid, p. 566.


Chapter IV


3. above p. 24-25.


5. Ibid, p. 2.


12. Freud, Complete Psychological Works, 5:593.

Chapter V
1. Freud, Complete Psychological Works, 5:497.
6. Ibid, p. 56.
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