REVOLUTIONARY SYNDICALIST INTERNATIONALISM, 1913-1923: 
THE ORIGINS OF THE INTERNATIONAL WORKING MEN'S ASSOCIATION 

by 

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ABSTRACT

Revolutionary syndicalism constituted a variant ideology within the labour movement which advocated direct industrial action, federalist policy of local autonomy, antistatism and a divergent vision of the purpose of labour organizations and the role of labour in modern society. Its repudiation of political action and its categorical insistence upon the autonomy of trade union organizations set it apart from both socialism and communism.

The present study treats revolutionary syndicalism as an international phenomenon and analyzes the efforts to translate syndicalist ideology into an international strategy in the period 1913-1923. It demonstrates that while the impetus of syndicalist internationalism had clearly developed prior to the First World War, divergent strategical perceptions deriving from varying national circumstances divided European syndicalist organizations and prevented the most prestigious of them, the French Confederation Générale du Travail, from condoning pre-war efforts to establish a new and revolutionary trade union International. The French therefore opposed these efforts, urging instead the tactic of revolutionizing the existing reformist trade union International from within. Though most foreign syndicalist organizations saw the policy of the French as a contravention of syndicalist doctrine, deference to and solicitude for the French organization proved decisive in leading the London assembly to temporize about the establishment of a syndicalist International.
The hostility to the war of the great majority of syndicalist organizations reinforced the urgency with which they viewed the need for a genuinely revolutionary labour International. The Bolshevik Revolution and the emergence of communist internationalism, however, opened new prospects and avenues of international action. Seeing in its early forms and slogans their own ideals of decentralization, antistatism and workers' control, most syndicalists initially became firm partisans of the Revolution, while the Bolsheviks, recognizing their revolutionary potential, appealed to the syndicalist organizations to rally to Moscow.

The symbolic fascination exerted by the Revolution in Russia upon the syndicalists prolonged their collective assessment of communist internationalism over several years. Even after the exclusively political character of the Comintern had been made manifest by its second congress in 1920, the attention of the syndicalists remained rivetted upon Moscow, where plans were proceeding for the establishment of a revolutionary trade union International. The organizational principles adopted by the Bolshevik-sponsored Profintern in 1921, including the collaboration of trade unions and communist parties and the subordination of the Profintern to the political Comintern, provoked the final breach with the syndicalists. Ongoing organizational disputes had thus thrown into relief the ideological and strategical divergences between syndicalists and communists. The syndicalists, moreover, had already witnessed the suppression of native syndicalist movement and the installation of a new bureaucratic mechanism of command and a new ruling oligarchy in Russia.

The establishment of the IWMA in December 1922 marked the restoration of syndicalist internationalism to its own path following its deflection by the Bolshevik Revolution. In the larger view, the breach between
syndicalists and communists marked again the schism between political and non-political elements which had earlier come to the First and Second Internationals. By filling in the historical hiatus concerning the origins of the most durable of all anti-authoritarian Internationals, the present study seeks to enhance our understanding of the continuing appeal of the syndicalist conception of labour movement tactics and goals in the early decades of the twentieth century.
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

The following abbreviations of names of organizations are used:

AAUE Allgemeine Arbeiter-Union Einheitsorganisation (Germany)
ACAT Asociacion Continental Americana de los Trabajadores (Latin America)
AFL American Federation of Labor
AIT Association Internationale des Travailleurs (IWMA)
ARCA All-Russian Confederation of Anarcho-Syndicalists
CDS Comité de Defense Syndicaliste (France)
CGL Confederazione Generale del Lavoro (Italy)
CGT Confédération Générale du Travail (France)
CGT-M Confederación General de Trabajadores (Mexico)
CGT-P Confederacao Geral do Trabalho (Portugal)
CGT-SR Confédération Générale du Travail Syndicaliste Révolutionnaire (France)
CGTU Confédération Générale du Travail Unitaire (France)
CI Communist International
CNT Confederación Nacional del Trabajo (Spain)
CSR Comité Syndicaliste Révolutionnaire (France)
FAU-C Freie Arbeiter-Union (Czechoslovakia)
FAUD Freie Arbeiter-Union Deutschlands (Germany)
FS Fagsoppositionens Sammenslutning (Denmark)
FORA Federación Obrera Regional Argentina
FORU Federación Obrera Regional Uruguaya
FVDG Freie Vereinigung deutscher Gerwerkschaften (Germany)
IAA Internationellen Arbeiter-Assoziation (IWMA)
IFTU International Federation of Trade Unions
ISEL Industrial Syndicalist Education League (Britain)
ISNTUC International Secretariat of National Trade Union Centres
IWMA International Working Men's Association
IWW Industrial Workers of the World (United States)
IWW-C Industrial Workers of the World (Chile)
KAPD Kommunistische Arbeiter-Partei Deutschlands (Germany)
KPD Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (Germany)
KPD(S) Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (Spartakusbund) (Germany)
NAS Nationaal Arbeids-Secretariaat (Holland)
NSF Norsk Syndikalist Federation (Norway)
NSV Nederlands Syndicalistisch Vakverbond (Holland)
NVV Nederlands Verbond van Vakverenigingen (Holland)
PCF Parti Communiste Français (France)
PCI Partito Communisto Italiano
PSI Partito Socialista Italiano
RILU Red International of Labour Unions
SAC Sveriges Arbetares Centralorganisation (Sweden)
SDAP Sociaal Democratische Arbeiders Partij (Holland)
SFIO Parti Socialiste Unifié - Section Française de l'Internationale Ouvrier
SLNA Syndicalist League of North America (United States)
SPD Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands (Germany)
UFSA Union Fédérative des Syndicats Autonomes de France
UIL Unione Italiana de Lavoro
USI Unione Sindacale Italiana
USPD Unabhängige Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Germany)
INTRODUCTION

The focus of the following study is upon the ideological and strategical components of revolutionary syndicalism as an international movement in the period 1913 to 1923. It undertakes on the one hand to deal with the interaction of national organizations within a framework of a developing syndicalist internationalism. On the other hand it deals with the collective response of syndicalists to alternate forms of proletarian internationalism, particularly socialist internationalism before the First World War and communist internationalism thereafter. A good deal of attention is therefore given to international syndicalist assemblies and to the role played by syndicalist representatives in the assemblies sponsored by other revolutionaries, particularly the communists, for in these exchanges ideological commitments and strategic preceptions were frequently given their clearest and most forceful expression. While an emphasis upon the ideology of organizations and leaders runs the risk of ignoring the sentiments and views of the anonymous mass of workers, this danger is at least partially offset in the case of syndicalist unions, which by their structure, procedures and commitment to decentralization were designed to encourage a wide latitude of member participation in decision making.

The methodological approach required by a study of the international dimension of syndicalism also runs the danger of paying insufficient attention to the underlying socio-economic matrix shaping ideological
and strategical perceptions. The present work attempts not to lose sight of the global social and economic changes taking place within European society during this seminal period of syndicalist internationalism, and it occasionally focuses attention upon such changes in a specific national context. Yet it does not purport to be primarily concerned with analyzing the precise socio-economic conditions of syndicalist internationalism, still less with presenting a series of such analyses for varying national movements. Certainly such knowledge, especially to the degree that it would permit and encourage fruitful comparative study, would appreciably enhance our understanding of syndicalist internationalism. But with few exceptions the close and careful scrutiny of the implications of the general socio-economic and particular occupational parameters of national syndicalist movements has only been undertaken in recent years, while in some cases it has yet to begin.

Though it does not ignore the role played by syndicalist or kindred organizations in North and South America, the thesis focuses above all upon Europe, whose syndicalist trade unions were decisive in developing and sustaining the impetus of syndicalist internationalism. Moreover, although the emphasis is upon the international movement itself, attention is also directed toward the movement in specific countries, not only to indicate the diversity of circumstances and variety of response of syndicalist organizations, but more importantly to illuminate how certain specific national developments entered into and influenced the larger development of syndicalist internationalism. A major criterion governing the allocation of attention to national movements is obviously the role they played in the international movement. The syndicalist organizations of Holland, Sweden and Germany were the major supporters of syndicalist
internationalism preceding the First World War. The Russian movement had the unique and unhappy experience of confronting the Bolsheviks on the domestic level. The German movement became the centre of post-war opposition to Moscow and articulated most fully the ideological foundation adopted by the syndicalist International founded at Berlin in 1922. Within the context of syndicalist internationalism, these movements therefore demand attention too, though they united far smaller proportions of the national labour force than the major syndicalist organizations of southern Europe.

Reconstructing the origins of the IWMA has primarily been a task of moving from the periphery inward, of working from the evidence left by participating individuals and organizations toward the centre. Any documents pertinent to its pre-history possessed by the IWMA itself disappeared when its papers were seized and presumably destroyed by the German National Socialist government in 1933. Moreover the records of very few syndicalist organizations active in the period between 1913 and 1923 have survived. A notable exception is the Sveriges Arbetares Centralorganisation in Sweden. Included in its papers is a collection of correspondence with other syndicalist unions and organizations dating from 1918 which has proved valuable. My single most important source, however, has been the syndicalist press and that of its adversaries. This is particularly true of the pre-war period. No protocol of the first international syndicalist congress held at London in 1913 was ever prepared. Reconstructing its course has therefore largely been a matter of methodically tracking down the widely conflicting accounts and assessments by participants and spectators which subsequently appeared in the syndicalist press of many nations. Since it constituted the pioneering effort of syndicalist internationalism
and raised many of the issues which later predominated in post-war debates on labour internationalism, the London congress and the controversy surrounding it has been recounted in some detail.

Syndicalist periodicals and brochure literature have proved crucial in the study of the post-war period as well, and again they provide the only detailed sources, though as always to be approached critically, on the international syndicalist gatherings during this period. Communist internationalism is of course richly documented, but quite aside from its polemical literature, even the official protocols of meetings at Moscow must be supplemented by and balanced against the accounts, assessments and perceptions found elsewhere. The published and unpublished memoirs and autobiographies, etc., of syndicalist and non-syndicalist activists have been of exceptional value, as have the correspondence and other material which survives in the archives of individual participants of the libertarian workers' movement. Surviving eyewitnesses of the period under investigation are rare, and I am grateful to Augustin Souchy of Munich and Arthur Lehning of Amsterdam for sharing their memories with me.

I can only acknowledge here a few of the additional varied and numerous debts I have incurred in the course of preparing this study. Research was conducted in Oxford at Nuffield College; in London at the British Library, the London School of Economics and Political Science, and the Trades Union Congress Library; in Paris at the Bibliothèque National, the Institut français d'Histoire sociale, and the Centre d'Histoire du Syndicalisme de l'Université de Paris; in Nanterre at the Bibliothèque de Documentation internationale contemporaine; in Amsterdam at the Internationaal Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis; and in Stockholm at the Arbetarrörelsens Arkiv and at the headquarters of the Sveriges Arbetares
Central organisation. To the staffs of all these organizations I extend my thanks. I happily acknowledge a special debt of gratitude to the Instituut at Amsterdam whose rich holdings, published and unpublished, were indispensable to my research and whose staff proved unfailingly friendly and helpful. I thank Rudolf de Jong of the Instituut not only for putting his father's papers at my disposal, for providing a wealth of clues about potential sources for this and the later period of syndicalist internationalism, but for his encouragement and the lively interest he showed in my research. I am also grateful to Arthur Lehning of Amsterdam who demonstrated similar interest and encouragement and who more than once took valuable time from his own work to discuss mine, and to answer many queries about the founding congress of the IWMA, which he attended, as well as the later history of the organization whose Secretary he was from 1933-1935. I would also like to acknowledge the friendly cooperation of Sven Bodin of the Arbetarrörelsens Arkiv and particularly that of the Executive of the SAC, which enabled me to make the most of my period of research in Stockholm.

My greatest debt is that to Professor Harvey Mitchell, whose generous investment of time, energy, advice and encouragement quickly exceeded the merely professional duties of research supervisor. His critical acumen and historical sensitivity greatly strengthened the thesis. Were the observation not so elementary, I would add that its deficiencies remain my sole responsibility.

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CHAPTER ONE
THE PRE-WAR SYNDICALIST WORLD

While socialist and communist internationalism in the years preceding and immediately following the First World War have received a great deal of attention from historians, the international aspirations and endeavours of a third current within the workers' movement during this period—that of revolutionary syndicalism—have been almost wholly ignored, or at best dealt with only peripherally, in discussions of labour internationalism. The present study is intended as a contribution toward remedying this deficiency. Prior to turning to a discussion of the first formal attempts to establish a vehicle of syndicalist internationalism in 1913, however, something must be said about the background and framework from which syndicalist internationalism emerged. The present chapter seeks to establish this context by discussing, albeit briefly, the doctrine of revolutionary syndicalism, the French Confédération Générale du Travail as the pre-eminent syndicalist labour organization in pre-war Europe, the development of European syndicalism outside France, and the relationship of the syndicalist movement to the existing movement of labour internationalism prior to the war.
I. The Doctrine of Syndicalism

The doctrine of revolutionary syndicalism, or simply syndicalism—to invoke the abbreviated anglicized usage in which the noun subsumes the adjective—developed, primarily in France, in the last years of the nineteenth and in the early years of the twentieth centuries and came to be identified with the policy of the largest French trade union organization, the CGT. Syndicalism was more a guide to and creed of action than a theory. The custodians of its ideology were not theoreticians but active participants in the movement, its militant leaders, who articulated a doctrine but who denied they were theorizing. Men such as Victor Griffuelhes, Emile Pouget and Georges Yvetot considered themselves to be giving expression to the practice of syndicalism as it evolved rather than building a theoretical framework to which it should conform. This was to some degree an exaggeration, but its exponents nevertheless attributed a non-theoretical character to syndicalism as one of its distinguishing traits. Theorizing they considered to be at worst inimical to syndicalism and at best irrelevant. Fernand Pelloutier, who both as an organizer and as a writer contributed more to the patrimony of French syndicalism than any other individual, declared that the labour unions "scoffed at theory, and their empiricism ... is worth at least all the systems of the world, which have precisely the duration and exactitude of predictions in the almanac."3

Despite this anti-intellectual and ostensibly non-doctrinal attitude, a doctrine of syndicalism clearly emerged in France, though, as one might expect of an ideology tied so closely to current practice, it was never a fully developed nor wholly consistent one. The two main and not always compatible expressions of this doctrine lay in the writings of those militant spokesmen of the movement and in the collective decisions
of the CGT itself as reflected in its congress debates and resolutions.

The complete independence and self-sufficiency of the organized labour movement constituted the plinth upon which syndicalist doctrine rested. Its premises lay in the perceived primacy of economic factors in social life, in a strict interpretation of the class struggle, and in a profound faith in the creative potency of the working class. Its corollaries were an insistence upon the revolutionary character of the labour movement, upon neutrality, or even hostility, toward political action, upon the efficacy of direct action for ends both reformist and revolutionary, and upon proletarian internationalism.

Among the various ideological sources from which French syndicalists borrowed, the debt was greatest to Proudhon. Like Proudhon, the syndicalists accepted the hegemony of the economic element, rather than the 'political', as the chief determinant of social arrangements, though early syndicalist ideologues were little given to economic analysis. The preeminence of economic factors in social life they accepted as an axiom. From it flowed implications about the tactics and goals of labour action. They also accepted, like Proudhon, the postulate that labour alone was the producer of social value, a conviction reinforced elsewhere, but which for the syndicalists, unlike the socialists, encouraged conclusions not only about the autonomy but also the exclusivism of the labour movement. Finally they affirmed, with Proudhon, the creative potential of the working class. For the syndicalists, this generative capacity of the workers, translated into action, meant not merely that they could achieve immediate goals by their unmediated action, but that ultimately the workers would be able to abolish the entire economic and social system and replace it by one organized on the basis of the unions. The syndicalists interpreted the dictum of the First International that the emancipation of the
workers must be the work of the workers themselves in a very literal sense.

Unlike Proudhon, however, the syndicalists joined the Marxian socialists in accepting the class struggle, though they gave it a more radical interpretation than any political socialist. The interests of workers and capitalists were indeed clashing and irreconciliable; in view of this fundamental antagonism, labour must wage a militant class war against capital. In contrast to political socialists, syndicalists denied that the class war could properly be prosecuted by political parties for the simple reason that political parties were not class organizations. Even ostensibly labour parties united men of all descriptions and from various classes and were led much more often than not by men who did not belong to the working class. Working class interests were best represented not by heterogeneous political organizations, but by those organizations which united workers precisely in their capacity as workers: the unions. Syndicalism embodied an exclusivism, an *ouvriérisme*, never found in political parties no matter how loudly they proclaimed their identification with the workers.

*Le syndicat suffit à tout!* This syndicalist catchword summed up the self-sufficiency of union organization. The non-politicism which followed from syndical autonomy and self-sufficiency applied both to means and ends. As applied to means, syndicalist non-politicism was not neutrality at all. It meant above all anti-electoralism and anti-parliamentarism. Despite official proclamations of the political neutrality of the CGT, syndicalist ideology opposed the political activities of parties. Electoralism and parliamentarism—characterized by compromise—were inimical to the interests of the workers since compromise tended to undermine the position of opposition and vigilance which the workers must always maintain against
the agents and instruments of capitalism. In this sense political activity was corruptive and nowhere more so than in parliament where even socialist leaders, seduced by the trappings of power and caught up in a process of *embourgoisement*, ceased to represent the interests of the workers and began to assume the values of the bourgeois adversary. At the very least the parliamentary spectacle tended to distract workers from basic issues and divert their gaze from the real path toward their emancipation, which lay in direct action. Nor in terms of ends did syndicalist non-politicism equal neutrality. Syndicalists and socialists alike viewed the state and its appendages as instruments of oppression wielded by the ruling class. But political socialists believed the state merely to be in the wrong hands; that wrested from the control of the exploiting class it could become the means of introducing revolutionary social transformation. The syndicalists envisaged no such possibility. The maintenance of concentrated, centralized political power was incompatible with radical workers' democracy. Anti-statism was an essential attribute of syndicalist ideology. The workers would never be free while the state existed; only when the workers possessed and administered the means of production themselves would their emancipation be achieved. Socialist schemes of state ownership meant no more than an exchange of masters. Projected into the future, syndical self-sufficiency expressed itself as workers' control; this ideal necessitated the dual task of overcoming the Scylla of private capitalist ownership while avoiding the Charybdis of state capitalism. In the broader sense of 'political', then, which applies to any real or ideal system of arranging the social order, a fully developed syndicalism was clearly not politically neutral. On the contrary, it was politically committed and the rival of any political party which sought to capture and utilize state power for its own purposes.
Neither the statutes of the CGT nor the famed Charter of Amiens, in which the CGT in 1906 stated its basic principles, however, expressed direct hostility toward political parties. The statutes pronounced only that the organizations affiliated with the CGT must stand apart from political groups. The Charter repeated this requirement and added that individual members were free to pursue any actions conforming to their philosophical or political views outside the organization, but were expected not to bring such opinions into the union. These declarations served a dual function. The unions sought to organize all workers, irrespective of their political outlook, and the profession of political neutrality served this purpose. Secondly and equally important, the postulate of neutrality provided a defense for the organization itself, a means of holding at bay the socialist factions (or single party in France after 1905), despite the obvious interest the socialists had in capturing it. But the same document at least alluded to the ultimate political commitment of syndicalism by declaring that "the trade union, today an organization of resistance, will in the future be the organization of production and distribution, the basis of social reorganization."  

In the realm of deeds, the corollary of self-sufficiency expressed itself in the best known characteristic of syndicalism: direct action. Direct action meant, simply, that the workers could and would achieve their goals through their own actions, without any intermediaries. These goals could be either immediate objectives—relating to improved conditions—or the ultimate goal of overthrowing the capitalist order and instituting a workers' society, and the CGT recognized both responsibilities. A wide variety of tactics and practices fell under the rubric of direct action. The best known of these were the use of the union label, the boycott, sabotage and above all the innumerable variations of the strike, though it
did not exclude street demonstrations and other forms of mass agitation. The strike remained the ideal weapon and that from which syndicalists expected the most. It embodied all the essential ideals of syndicalist ideology: the strike was intrinsically and exclusively a proletarian weapon uniting and firing its participants in their capacity as workers, thus conforming to the rigid class outlook and pronounced ouvrierism of syndicalism; it satisfied the requirements of the autonomy and self-sufficiency of the union; it was inescapably direct and whatever its immediate purpose, it could always assume the character of a revolutionary act. Just as the CGT was viewed as charged with both reformist and revolutionary objectives, the strike could serve both functions. Even the strike for limited and immediate goals—for wage increases or improved conditions—bore revolutionary implications. If successful it constituted an act of partial expropriation, or at the very least a diminution of capitalist authority. And successful or not, any strike was viewed as enhancing class consciousness, reinforcing proletarian solidarity, and as a lesson in revolutionary apprenticeship. Thus any strike, or other form of direct action, contributed to this preparatory training; to what syndicalist called the 'revolutionary gymnastics' of the workers. So dominant was the role of the strike in syndicalist ideology that there were those who identified syndicalism as the philosophy of the strike.

The strike and other forms of direct action were merely an extension to the realm of tactics of syndicalist insistence upon the autonomy and self-sufficiency of organized labour. The severe exclusiveness of syndicalist ideology dictated that ideally there be no compromise with the existing bourgeois state and society. Syndicalists accepted Marx's dictum that the workers had no fatherland. For them, patriotism rested upon property ownership. The worker owed his loyalty to his class, a loyalty
which transcended national boundaries. Syndicalist anti-patriotism and anti-militarism derived not merely from doctrine, but was reinforced by the reality of economic conflict in France. Frequent recourse to the police and army to control labour militancy confirmed labour radicals in the conviction that the state functioned primarily as a class instrument for the defense of capitalism. Thus the CGT campaigned against both patriotism and militarism. Its propaganda and activities, including attempts to subvert working class conscripts in the army, provoked an alarm and hostility among the bourgeois, which served to reinforce the isolation of the labouring class already fostered by the socioeconomic structure of French society and by the syndicalists' own attitudes.

II. The French Confédération Générale du Travail

A multiplicity of factors account for the emergence and prevalence of syndicalism within the largest organization of French labour. The French revolutionary tradition left a legacy of revolution as the common means of affecting change in society, as well as a vision of incomplete revolution, of changes in forms of government unaccompanied, in the view of an emerging working class, by commensurate economic and social change. This tradition simultaneously imbued militants with revolutionary attitudes and with the conviction that the social revolution remained to be made. Labour could draw upon a tradition which had repeatedly seen workers as the makers but not yet the beneficiaries of revolutionary action. The high cost to labour of the suppression of the Commune of 1871 had discredited the idea of an insurrectionary seizure of power and intensified aversion for the repressive state, but had not destroyed the idea of forceful social transformation. Amongst syndicalists the legacy of direct revolutionary action survived, though its means had been transformed from
insurrection and barricades to direct economic action through union organization.

Workers were confronted by what appeared to be a corrupt, unresponsive and hostile state. The bloody suppression of the June Days of 1848 and of the Paris Commune were only the most dramatic of earlier examples of the repressive state. Only in 1884 did French workers win the legal right to associate, and then only under the strictest supervision. Thereafter unions were not infrequently legally dissolved for the slightest infraction of debilitating regulatory controls. The government's frequent recourse to force to control labour and break strikes and its neglect of social legislation only intensified worker opposition to the state. A parade of government scandals—the Wilson Affair, the Panama Scandal, the Dreyfus Affair—led some to the conclusion that not simply certain individual politicians or governments, but politics in general were corrupt. The spectacle of professed socialists apparently subordinating their original values to personal ambition by carving out careers in bourgeois governments merely confirmed suspicions that even workers' representatives were not immune to the corruptive influence of politics.

Long-lived divisions in French socialism further discredited political action on behalf of labour. Personal and doctrinal squabbles amongst socialist factions predominated into the twentieth century. At least five different factions engaged in internecine combat in the 1890's, each vying for labour's support. These rivalries brought political socialism into disrepute among many and reinforced the tendency of radicals to repudiate political activity in favour of direct action. Only in 1905 did a single French socialist party emerge, but by then the CGT's resolve to remain aloof from all political parties had become firmly entrenched.
Certain more specific ideological influences also helped to shape the character of French syndicalism. Proudhon's influence has been mentioned. Syndicalists drew upon his insistence on the primacy of economic action and the autonomy of labour, his mutualism and federalism. From Auguste Blanqui—though they rejected his appeal for the conquest of political power and revolutionary dictatorship—syndicalists inherited a legacy of action, of revolutionary deeds as far more effective in preparing for the final upheaval than the merely verbal revolutionism they associated with most socialists. Like Blanqui, syndicalists emphasized the importance of subjective components of revolutionary success. Extreme voluntarists, they had little patience with arguments that irreversible historical developments were preparing the final collapse of capitalism. Not the indifferent progression of historical forces but the revolutionary will and the informed conscious striving of labour held the key to revolution. The autonomy of labour meant not that the working class had become the vehicle of inevitable change, but that workers, once sufficiently organized and self-conscious as a class, would have the commitment, capacity and creativity to institute revolutionary change and fashion a wholly new society.

A final ideological impact was not limited to the realm of ideas, but manifested itself in the practical organization and propaganda of the CGT. Around 1895 the anarchists made a concerted effort to carry their message to the workers in the most direct way possible. Many anarchists, noting the futility of terrorist tactics employed in the early 1890's and cognizant of the isolation which the resulting reaction had imposed upon the anarchist movement, began counselling the permeation of workers' organizations as a more effective means of spreading their creed. An influx into the unions followed, and by their devotion and industry anarchist
militants were soon able to exert an influence disproportionate to their numbers. Influenced by Proudhon and more frequently by the Bakuninist wing of the First International, the anarchists were instrumental in reinforcing the distrust of the state and the opposition to political action already present in the French workers' movement. Theoretically the CGT remained as independent of anarchism as of political parties. The 1906 Charter of Amiens declared that the unions "should not concern themselves with the parties and sects which, outside and alongside the unions, may in complete liberty pursue the social transformation." The sects referred to were anarchist groups (primarily 'individualist' anarchists). But the Charter embodied official CGT policy. In practice, its leading militants evidenced a hostility toward political action and the state which exceeded the dictum of simple neutrality.

Economic factors and levels of trade union organization also encouraged the acceptance of syndicalism in France. Economic modernization proceeded only slowly and large-scale industrialization lagged behind that of England or Germany. Though the average size of productive enterprise gradually increased, small- and medium-sized workshops continued to play a conspicuous role in production and continued to exist alongside rarer, geographically concentrated, more highly industrialized enterprises. Industrialized workers frequently remained unorganized, or if organized, were often of reformist inclination. The dispersal of the working population within a decentralized, craft-oriented economy made the creation of large unions difficult. Consequently, an extensive series of small local unions dominated the picture of French union organization in the early twentieth century. Decades of experience in the smaller workshop and the prevalence of small local unions meshed well with the syndicalist vision of a future socialized economy based upon decentralization and producer's
control. Moreover, the relative absence of large powerful unions also
favoured the endorsement of methods of direct action. The lack of
organized strength to negotiate effectively with employers disposed
workers to resort to forms of industrial action and coercion, particularly
as they were confronted in the early years of the century with employers
who were notably intractable, and yet frequently insufficiently organized
themselves to present a strong and sustained defense against workers' action. Thus the direct action extolled and embraced in syndicalist doc­
trine reflected constraints of economic development and union organization.
The prime importance attached to direct action and the allegedly superior élan of the workers was in part the compensatory reaction of a weak trade
union movement. The increasing centralization of French capital undermined
the effectiveness of such tactics and increased the need for stronger union
organization, a fact not lost on some members of the CGT prior to the war.

The CGT emerged as a real force in the French labour movement in
1902, when the Confederation, composed of local, regional and national
union bodies, merged with the Féderation des Bourses, the national organi-
ization linking Bourses du Travail. The Bourses - the first was founded in
Paris in 1887 - were Chambers of Labour uniting members of various trades
in a given locality, serving originally as labour exchanges and soon as
social centres where working class problems were discussed. Ideally,
especially in the view of Fernand Pelloutier, the animating organizational
spirit of the Bourse movement and Secretary of the Féderation from 1895 to
his untimely death in 1901, the Bourses were to fulfill a radical educa-
tional and cultural function for labour. In Pelloutier's vision, the
Bourses were to be the first autonomous labour institutions. They would
counter the manipulating culture of bourgeois society and provide the moral,
technical and administrative education necessary to enable the proleteriat
eventually to construct a society of free men. By Pelloutier's death sixty-five Bourses with a membership of 782 dues-paying local unions were affiliated with the Fédération.

The 1902 merger with the dynamic Bourse movement invigorated the more feeble Confederation. The Confederation had been formed in 1895 to replace an earlier Fédération National des Syndicats, rent by an internal struggle over issues of political and trade union action. Jules Guesde's Parti Ouvrier Français, representing a rather narrow and doctrinaire Marxism, had sought throughout the 1880's to win the support of the unions. Categorically opposed to the general strike, the Guesdists sought a similar condemnation from the unions. In this they failed. From 1892 to 1894 the general strike dominated all issues in trade union congresses. By 1894 advocates of the strike, amongst whom Pelloutier and Aristide Briand were conspicuous, had prevailed. A break-away Guesdist minority, retaining the title Fédération des Syndicats, soon disintegrated. The majority, supported by the Fédération des Bourses, went on to create the CGT. Thus by 1902, when the CGT and the Fédération des Bourses merged, both were wedded to the idea of the general strike and hostile to political action. By 1905, when the various socialist factions achieved an uneasy alliance by uniting in the Parti Socialiste Unifié-Section Française de l'Internationale Ouvrière (SFIO), the CGT's non-politicism was firmly entrenched. The Confederation responded to the realization of socialist unity by enacting its Charte d'Amiens a year later.

The structure of the CGT both reflected and sustained principles of decentralization and federalism. First, the Bourses retained their own national Secretary and held their own congresses, though in 1912 the decision was taken to replace the Bourses by departmental unions in this section of the CGT. The second section was made up of national union federa-
tions, except in rare cases where a union, such as the railwaymen, was itself national. Local union affiliates were expected to join both a Bourse and a national federation if such existed. The CGT was thus primarily a federation of federations. Though confederation and federation officials were naturally able to exert considerable influence, the theoretical locus of power remained that of the local union, which retained its autonomy within the CGT and within its federation. The local union itself determined its dues schedule, the extent and character of benefits, whether a strike should be called, and so on. Moreover, in the biennial congresses of the CGT, votes were taken on a one-union, one-vote basis, regardless of membership. The federalist views of the CGT dictated that each union have equal representation. The average local union affiliate had 200 members in 1914. The small size of the autonomous local union, along with the persistence of small workshops in France, doubtlessly contributed to the vision prized by syndicalists of a future utopia characterized by a highly decentralized system of production and control.

Although the largest and most important of French labour organizations, the CGT united less than one-half of the nation's organized workers. Of the slightly over one million unionized workers in 1912, the CGT claimed over 600,000, but acknowledged that only two-thirds of these were dues-paying members. Organized workers outside the CGT were united in collaborationist employer's unions, in Catholic unions, or more frequently in independent unions and federations.

Nor did the CGT unite only revolutionary syndicalists. Reformists and revolutionaries mingled within its ranks. Anti-political revolutionaries dominated its national offices and were thus able to exert influence in moulding doctrine and determining the tone of the CGT's newspapers and propaganda. But reformists were present in the organization in
large numbers. Some of the largest unions and federations—textile workers, railwaymen, printers—tended to reformism. The reformists, however, did not share a unified outlook. The miners affiliated with the CGT tended to support the socialists, and from the textile workers, especially after the creation of the SFIO, came efforts to win approval of an official policy of collaboration between the CGT and the party. The highly organized and conspicuously reformist printers' federation, on the other hand, staunchly defended the CGT's apoliticism. Nor is it the case that the larger federations were reformist and the smaller revolutionary. Critics of the federalist structure of the Confederation argued that it permitted a large number of small but radical federations continually to dominate the fewer but much larger reformist federations. But while it is true that many small federations, such as the barbers, were markedly radical, reformism did not uniformly prevail among the largest federations. The large metal-workers' and maritime workers' federations were predominantly radical as was the building-workers' federation, usually the largest of CGT affiliates. Moreover, although each federation tended characteristically to be either reformist or revolutionary, in each trade and even in most local unions some measure of countervailing tendency existed. In short, nearly every viewpoint found expression within the CGT.

Despite the presence of considerable numbers of reformists, the official policy of the CGT remained revolutionary syndicalism. The syndicalists continued to hold positions of leadership within the Confederation and continued to provide the lead in propaganda. The state's proclivity toward the use of force against workers and demonstrators had not diminished. Mounting international tension continued to make antipatriotism and antimilitarism issues of lively concern. Moreover, as we saw, reformist ele-
ments were themselves not in accord on various issues. Many of them could agree with the revolutionaries' insistence upon the political neutrality of the CGT. Indeed, the Charter of Amiens embodying this doctrine could and in fact did command a consensus. Passed by an overwhelming majority, the Charter satisfied the revolutionary trade unionist who insisted that the organized labour movement remain aloof from corrupting political action; it satisfied the reformist who did not want the unions distracted from their daily tasks by divisive political issues and for whom it provided a theoretical safeguard against the ascendancy of a militant anarchism; it consoled the convinced socialist by granting that the party had its own role to play and by ensuring the individual's right to pursue whatever political action he wished outside his union.

Thus the leading labour organization in France continued up to the First World War to espouse the doctrines of revolutionary syndicalism. Even the conservative International Secretariat of National Trade Union Centres recognized that only the CGT could properly represent French labour within the international labour movement. To syndicalists outside France, frequently unaware of the strength of reformist elements within it, the CGT represented a source of inspiration, the pioneer and spiritual leader of the movement and its most prestigious representative.

III. Syndicalism Outside France

Although its doctrine found relatively complete articulation first in France, syndicalism was not a peculiarly French but an international experience and phenomenon. Critics of European syndicalism outside France sometimes accused its advocates of seeking to import the ideology of the CGT into alien soil. This criticism, however, ignored the fact that if circumstances in other regions had not fostered among elements of the workers'
movement an indigenous drive toward a similar form of labour expression, the French example would have lacked even inspirational value.\(^{13}\) While the prestige of the CGT made a limited degree of imitation inevitable, contemplation by foreign militants of the professed practice and objectives of the French was generally no more than a means of clarifying their own tactics and goals. Whatever the value of the CGT as an exemplar, the efficacy of the appeal of syndicalism lay in the domestic conditions of labour in areas where it took root. And wherever it took root it was never the mirror-image of French syndicalism, but ultimately the distinctive and unique expression of a specific set of national or regional economic, social, political and historical factors.

The influence of syndicalism beyond French borders had been felt for years prior to 1906, but the real growth of organized syndicalist labour organizations or of syndicalist propaganda groups in Europe came in the period from 1906 to 1912. The role of the mass strike in the Russian Revolution of 1905 reinvigorated the debate over the general strike and methods of direct action which had been raging in the European labour movement for well over a decade. In 1906, in the middle of its 'heroic' period, the CGT had adopted the Charte d'Amiens. Anarchists meanwhile had increasingly entered the labour movement outside France. Syndicalism received a good deal of attention at the 1907 International Anarchist Congress held at Amsterdam, where its merits were discussed in a lively debate between the young French militant Pierre Monatte and the veteran anarchist insurrectionist Errico Malatesta. The congress gave rise both to a short-lived anarchist bulletin and to the more durable Bulletin International du Mouvement Syndicaliste edited by the Dutch militant, Christiaan Cornelissen. These events reinforced the gathering momentum toward the establishment of syndicalist organizations in many places in Europe. The
CGT was soon joined by an increasing number of organized syndicalists elsewhere as existing union associations adopted explicitly syndicalist programs or new syndicalist labour bodies were formed, usually by dissidents who broke with existing social democratic unions. Elsewhere important syndicalist propaganda groups emerged. Within six years the impact of syndicalism made itself felt in a new and distinctive way in at least a dozen European countries, many of which by then harboured syndicalist unions or significant propaganda groups. A survey of the European syndicalist movement outside France cannot be undertaken here. But before cursorily listing some additional cases, a brief look at the examples of four countries—Spain, Italy, Holland and Germany—will provide some idea of the diverse backgrounds from which explicitly syndicalist labour organizations could emerge.

A. Spain. The organization destined to become the largest of all syndicalist bodies emerged in Spain in 1910. As in Italy, which produced the second largest syndicalist association, Spanish syndicalism had a rich tradition of indigenous anarchism to draw upon. Bakuninism had been a conspicuous feature of the Spanish labour movement ever since the brief but remarkably successful visit in 1868 of the Italian engineer Guiseppi Fanelli, dispatched by Bakunin to carry the message of the International to Spain. The Spanish Federation, the result of the first attempt to form a national labour organization in 1870, became a firm supporter of the Bakuninist wing of the First International. Though the government effectively crushed the Spanish Federation over a period of years, anarchism had become firmly entrenched within the Spanish labour movement and was strongly buttressed by a widespread peasant anarchism. As elsewhere, Spanish anarchism passed through a period of individualist terrorism, of 'propaganda by the deed', which made Barcelona in particular a hothouse of
terrorist activity in the 1890's. But anarchism also remained influential within the labour movement, and in fact the indiscriminate reaction of the government against suspected terrorists and ordinary trade union leaders alike only reinforced the identification of the cause of anarchism and that of trade unionism for many workers. Anarchism was sufficiently strong in Barcelona that in 1899 the Union General del Trabajo, the national labour organization created under the auspices of the Spanish socialist party, offered tacit recognition of its failure in Catalonia, the home of the largest labour movement in the country, by moving its headquarters from Barcelona to Madrid.

Although the anarchists' promotion of confrontation tactics thus gained a sympathetic hearing within the labour movement, the main cause of the strike wave which struck Spain and especially Barcelona in the early years of the new century came from the intransigence and provocation of the employers. Between 1901 and 1904 Catalonia witnessed an extensive series of strikes, including a week-long general strike in Barcelona in February 1902. The strikes, frequently accompanied by lock-outs, came as defensive reactions by the workers. The strike wave began in the textile industry in 1901 when employers sought to introduce mechanization and wage-cuts simultaneously. The confrontation in textiles marked only the beginning of an employers' offensive. The recently formed municipal labour federation undertook the general strike of 1902 with the immediate aim of aiding striking metal workers with whom the employers refused to negotiate, but with the more general recognition that the interests of the entire Catalanian workers' movement were under attack. Employers' efforts to discipline the workers' movement also included orchestrated union-breaking, as on the trams in 1904. In a period of high unemployment and widespread use of strike-breakers, the strikes were unlikely to succeed. The govern-
ment's firm and forceful support of the employers ensured their failure. By the end of 1904 the strike wave had receded, union membership had considerably declined, and the municipal labour organization had itself been dissolved (in 1902 following the general strike).

As the task of rebuilding the labour movement proceeded over the next three years, the influence of French syndicalism, already felt in Spain, gradually expanded. The structure of the CGT, with its dual emphasis upon local cross-occupational Bourses du Travail and upon wider union federations, was akin to the basis of organization already favoured in Spain. The CGT's professions of political neutrality also attracted those who sought to cast the net of union organization as widely as possible, encompassing all workers regardless of their personal political convictions. In 1907 socialists and anarchists joined in founding Solidaridad Obrera, a new municipal labour federation in Barcelona. Though anarchists were active within it, they did not dominate it, and the socialist supporters who cooperated in its foundation at least professed to respect the independence from political parties which Solidaridad Obrera proclaimed, primarily as a means of countering the appeal amongst workers of the demagogic Catalan radicalism of Alejandro Lerroux. It also endorsed the class struggle, direct action and the abolition of capitalism. The main emphasis of Solidaridad Obrera, the product of a temporarily chastened working class, however, remained upon the immediate material goals of the workers. The conversion of Solidaridad Obrera from a municipal to a regional federation came in 1908.

Despite its essentially moderate stance, Solidaridad Obrera soon found itself involved in a confrontation even more dramatic than the strikes of 1901-04. Declining economic conditions prompted textile employers to resort to a lock-out in the spring of 1909 preparatory to introducing
new wage-cuts and more onerous working conditions. Solidaridad Obrera officials saw this as the opening phase of a new employers' offensive and resolved to implement a general strike if necessary. The government's call up of reservists in July to be sent to fight in the accelerating colonial war in Morocco proved even more influential in rendering the situation explosive. A general strike of protest began at Barcelona on 24 June, supported not only by Solidaridad Obrera but by many local militants of the socialist and radical parties. It rapidly and spontaneously escalated into a full-scale insurrection which, though it lacked support from other regions of Spain, required the government a week to suppress amidst bitter fighting. ¹⁴

The government's response to the 'Tragic Week'—systematic judicial repression directed largely at arbitrarily chosen victims, including the condemnation and execution of the libertarian pedagogue Francisco Ferrer, whose connections with the insurrection were extremely tenuous—failed to break the labour movement. Its consequences were quite the reverse. In simple numerical terms, the organized labour movement in Catalonia had been in retreat for some years. The government's harsh retribution convinced those who remained active of the need for an uncompromisingly militant national organization to defend workers' interests against both capital and the state. The withdrawal of more moderate figures from Solidaridad Obrera following the 'Tragic Week', moreover, brought the anarcho-syndicalist element to the fore. They were instrumental in providing the lead in the establishment of a national syndicalist organization. Thus Solidaridad Obrera hosted the meeting at Barcelona in October 1910 in which the representatives of various regional federations resolved to establish the Confederación Nacional del Trabajo.
At its first congress in September 1911 the new organization, constituted upon militantly syndicalist principles, could claim to represent 30,000 workers. Despite an ill-starred early history—premature endorsement of a strike wave in 1911 led to a legal ban upon it and the flight of some of its leaders, such as Jose Negre, its early Secretary, who took refuge in Paris—the CNT survived clandestinely, emerged into the open in 1914, and went on to become the largest labour organization in Spain and author of some of the most heroic episodes in labour history.

B. Italy. A separate syndicalist workers' organization emerged in Italy only in 1912 with the establishment of the Unione Sindacale Italiana (USI), though its creation followed years of strife between revolutionaries and reformists, both within the Partito Socialista Italiano (PSI) and within the unions. The conflict had been accentuated following the generalized protest strike of 1904 and the abortive railway strike of 1905. Both groups sought a new national organization of labour and both sought to imprint the Confederazione Generale del Lavoro (CGL), created in 1906, with their own stamp. The reformists prevailed. For the next six years the syndicalists vacillated, uncertain whether to seek to conquer the CGL from within or to withdraw. 15

The Italian syndicalists drew considerable inspiration from their French brethren. A tradition of local Chambers of Labour (the first Camera del Lavoro, established in 1891 at Milan, had been modeled on the Bourses du Travail) fostered the same insistence upon the local autonomy prized by cégétistes. Unlike in France, however, Italian syndicalists were confronted with a unified socialist party of long standing to which most labour activists adhered. Syndicalist criticism within the PSI accelerated after 1906, however, when the PSI refused to endorse the general strike and when the CGT responded to the creation of a unified socialist party in
France with the *Charte d'Amiens*. Amidst a rising anti-parliamentarism, the more radical syndicalists began moving out of the PSI in search of a more suitable vehicle of direct action.

Syndicalists similarly attacked the CGL, both for its approval of political activity and its centralized structure. In 1907 dissidents decided to establish a *Comitato Nazionale della Resistenza* independent of the CGL. The creation of the Committee, which sought to defend union autonomy and propagate direct actionist principles, marked a rejection of the policy of attempting to conquer the CGL from within, though not all syndicalists were prepared to accept this course.

The syndicalists suffered a severe setback the following year. Agricultural workers constituted the largest single group supporting the Resistance Committee. In 1908 the strong landowners' organization of Parma adopted aggressive economic tactics in an attempt to destroy the Parma Chamber of Labour, a syndicalist stronghold, and to counter its growing appeal amongst the landworkers. In response the syndicalists declared a general strike in the Parma region involving nearly 20,000 workers. Led by Alceste De Ambris, a leading syndicalist spokesman and a chief architect of the Resistance Committee, the bitter contest, characterized on the workers' side by a torrent of syndicalist rhetoric and a constant extolling of the virtues of strike action, lasted two months. But while the proprietors won widespread support from other employers in northern Italy by depicting the strike as a test case for revolutionary syndicalism, the syndicalists remained isolated, dependent upon their own meager resources and the militant will of the workers. The CGL offered verbal but no material aid to the strikers. By retaining the allegiance of the sharecroppers and utilizing the volunteer labour of sympathizers the owners were able to continue essential agricultural work. The labourers began
drifting back to work. The strike leaders fled to avoid arrest, De Ambris taking refuge in Switzerland.16

Though it came to be viewed as an heroic episode in the history of Italian syndicalism, the Parma strike had temporarily broken syndicalist momentum and strengthened the hand of those who preferred the policy of transforming the CGL from within. It also completed the process of alienation from the PSI, which formally condemned syndicalism at its 1908 congress and endorsed a mutual action pact earlier made between the PSI and the CGL.

The syndicalist rapprochement with the CGL proved of short duration. By 1910 many of them were convinced anew that continued association with what they saw as the deadening bureaucratism and parliamentarism of the CGL was self-defeating. In December they established the Comitato dell'Azione diretta, which sought to propagate syndicalist principles within the CGL until sufficient strength had been mustered to challenge it openly. As the minority gained support, it also began to demonstrate its independence. When in 1912 it began planning a conference of its partisans, the CGL Executive felt compelled to declare the Committee no longer to be merely a minority organization, but an antagonistic rival, and to pronounce support for it incompatible with membership in the CGL. The Committee responded by vowing to create an autonomous revolutionary labour body.

From Swiss exile De Ambris had simultaneously been conducting a press campaign against the CGL through L'Internazionale, published at Parma. The November congress of the dissidents established a new national syndicalist organization, the USI, headquartered at Parma. Those anarchists who supported mass action hailed the break with the CGL and supported the USI, just as they had earlier supported the Resistance Committee.

Founded at the end of 1912 with a membership of about 80,000, in the
course of 1913 the USI grew to 100,000. Its strength lay in the north, particularly in the Po valley where Parma represented its single strongest branch with around 20,000 members. In occupational composition the USI was above all an agricultural and craft organization. Agricultural labourers constituted over a third of its pre-war membership. Construction workers composed the second largest group. Its appeal amongst strictly industrial workers was more limited, not least because the established CGL had directed its attention to these workers, though the USI enjoyed some success with the metal workers, particularly in Milan. In 1913 the USI's weekly newspaper, *L'Internazionale*, claimed a circulation of 50,000.¹⁷

C. Holland. While in Italy revolutionaries had broken with reformists to create a syndicalist union organization, in Holland the situation was reversed. The oldest Dutch national labour organization, the *Nationaal Arbeids-Secretariaat* (NAS) was created in 1893 in response to the appeal of the 1891 congress of the Second International calling for the creation of national trade union centres by socialist parties. That it originally grouped not only trade unions, but socialist parties, demonstrated the provenance of the NAS. Originally both the anti-authoritarian *Socialistenbond* and its rival, the parliamentarian *Sociaal Democratische Arbeiders Partij* (SDAP) adhered. But reformist tendencies never prevailed in the NAS, which approximated much more closely the policies articulated by Christiaan Cornelissen, who had played an important role in its creation and whose views were already closely akin to the frankly syndicalist position he would soon adopt.¹⁸ The ongoing internecine struggle between the *Socialistenbond* and the SDAP accentuated the growing apolitical proclivity of the union component of the NAS, which soon declared its complete autonomy as a labour organization. The *Socialistenbond*, bowing to this decision, left the NAS
voluntarily, but the SDAP resisted and was expelled in 1896.

The NAS saw itself as a vehicle of class-struggle and above all as a strike machine. Markedly anti-centralist, it advocated a federative union structure with emphasis upon the power and unity of local workers' associations. It was pervaded by a profound suspicion of bureaucracy and the conviction that the NAS should be governed by the workers themselves. This view was encouraged and exemplified by the early administrator of the NAS, Gerrit van Erkel, who considered himself no more than a conduit through which the members expressed their wishes. The NAS frequently utilized the referendum as a means of determining policy.

But an emergent criticism of the NAS, its organizational structure and its approval of frequent and spontaneous strike action, became increasingly outspoken during the last years of the 19th century. The chief critic, Henri Polak of the Diamond-Workers Union, challenged nearly every plank of the NAS platform. Polak, inspired first by the large British, and then the German trade unions, advocated strong centralized unions with large treasuries and highly disciplined memberships. He deplored the practice of the NAS of providing strike assistance to unorganized as well as organized labour and was appalled that it left the determination of policy so much in the hands of the workers. Polak urged instead the creation of a highly centralized national labour federation. Only in this way, in the military vocabulary of Polak, could the workers of Holland be regimented into a powerful battle corps in the international army of labour. This was the ideal Polak believed it necessary "to hammer into the hard dull heads of the Dutch workers." As the Diamond-Workers Union's ideological struggle against the NAS gathered the support of other large unions, a union movement of social
democratic inclination emerged alongside the NAS, whose membership ebbed. After 1903 it plummeted. In that year the NAS and its union rivals jointly supported a railway strike. Resumed in the face of newly-enacted anti-strike legislation, the strike was broken by the police and the army.\(^{21}\) In the mutual recriminations which followed concerning responsibility for the strike failure, the NAS suffered a loss both of esteem and of membership, the latter being nearly halved. The strike also promoted interest in the idea of a new national labour organization along the lines earlier proposed by Polak. The NAS responded to this prospect with defiance and openly invited workers to leave their unions and join the NAS.

When the reformist unions founded the Nederlands Verbond van Vakverenigingen (NVV) in 1905, however, it was the NAS which sustained further inroads upon its membership. Confronted with the NVV, the NAS would never be more than a minority within the Dutch labour movement. The initial success of the NVV, in fact, nearly broke the NAS entirely. By the end of 1906 it could claim a bare 3,000 members, a mere one-quarter of its membership of six years earlier. But this was its lowest ebb. Inspired, perhaps, by the congress of Amiens, the NAS adopted a new syndicalist declaration of principles. Its activists threw themselves into their work with renewed vigour, simultaneously combatting the reformism of the NVV, fending off the attacks of the SDAP, and rebuilding their organization.

By 1913 the NAS had regained a membership of over 9,000. It included federations of metal workers, tobacco workers, municipal workers, tailors and seamen, but the most important constituents were the federations of textile workers and construction workers. The various affiliated organizations published weekly and monthly papers which had a monthly circulation of 76,500, while De Arbeid, the official bi-weekly organ of the
NAS, had a monthly circulation of 32,000.  

D. Germany. Though the syndicalist movement of pre-war Germany united an even smaller proportion of the national trade union population than did that of Holland, it deserves some attention both for the uniqueness of its evolution and for the role which it would later play in the international syndicalist movement. The German movement had its organizational antecedents in local trade union associations which expanded rapidly during the period of Bismarck's anti-socialist laws (1878-1890). A loose federative structure had been built up amongst them during this period which the local unions wished to preserve. In contrast, a strong centralizing tendency emerged in the labour movement with the suspension of the laws. At the instigation of the large central union associations, the Generalkommission of the Freien Gewerkschaften had been founded in 1890 under the direction of Carl Legien as a means of creating a national trade union organization. Its promotion of centralist principles of organization brought it into conflict with the Lokalisten, the sobriquet the supporters of the local unions earned by their anti-centralist attitudes.

The dispute, however, was not merely one of organization. The movement from which the German syndicalists would emerge, ironically, was decidedly political. A question of political commitment divided it from the Freien Gewerkschaften. A great many localists were dedicated supporters of the Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands (SPD) and the local unions had done much to sustain social democracy during the period of formal repression. Localists saw the unions as spheres within which the recruitment of workers into the joint struggle for political and economic emancipation must constantly be pursued. They therefore rejected a purported policy of political neutrality endorsed by the Freien Gewerkschaften. The
emancipation of labour could not be achieved by an excessive preoccupation with the day-to-day concerns of trade unions, by an interest in the Magenfrage alone. But centralist organization, the localists maintained, fostered precisely a concentration of interest upon reformist goals. Thus they invoked the higher tasks of the labour movement in rejecting both the centralization and the profession of political neutrality of the Freien Gewerkschaften. During the 1890's strife reigned in the relationship of Lokalisten and the Freien Gewerkschaften. The latter sought assiduously to reduce the independence of the local organizations and declined to practice much solidarity with them in industrial action. Convinced that they had to depend solely upon their own means, the Lokalisten undertook formally to unite themselves. In 1897 the organization which later (1901) took the name of the Freie Vereinigung deutscher Gewerkschaften (FVDG) was founded upon federative principles. The founding congress made its attitude toward both the SPD and the Freien Gewerkschaften evident by dismissing forms of union organization which hindered the political struggle as "defective and reprehensible."  

But the approximately 18,000 members grouped in the FVDG in 1900 were a tiny minority compared to the massive membership of the Freien Gewerkschaften. In the continuing friction between the two organizations the SPD leadership indicated little inclination to provoke the latter by demonstrating sympathy for the Lokalisten. By 1900 the party press had already evinced considerable antagonism toward the fierce independence of the FVDG. The localists attributed the growing hostility of the SPD towards them to the progressively expanding influence of the centralist unions within the party. Disaffection with the party bureaucracy had been mounting within the FVDG. Many of its members believed the party's exces-
sive concern with parliamentary gains to be diverting it from its original revolutionary goals. When the debate over the general strike and parliamentarism broke out in the German labour movement, many within the FVDG were prepared to opt for the strike and against electoralism. Contacts were established between the FVDG and Dr. Raphael Friedeberg, the erstwhile social democrat then conducting an energetic campaign for the general strike in Germany.

When in August 1904 the Berlin Lokalisten, following a speech by Friedeberg, passed a resolution favouring direct action and the general strike and condemning parliamentarism as an abandonment of the class struggle and a corruption of socialist goals, the wedge between the FVDG on the one side and the SPD and the centralist unions on the other was driven more deeply. But the most dramatic episode of the conflict was yet to come. The 1904 congress of the Second International adopted a resolution calling for propaganda to be made for the political mass strike. A similar resolution committing the SPD to propagate the political mass strike won approval at its congress in September 1905. By contrast, a Freien Gewerkschaften congress four weeks earlier had declared the question of the general strike to be anarchistic and indiscussable.

In an attempt to iron out this inconsistency representatives of the SPD and the centralist unions met in private session in February 1906. The agreement reached demonstrated the predominant influence of the unions upon the party, which felt compelled to declare that it had no intention to agitate for the political mass strike. The party bureaucracy had, in effect, repudiated the decision of its membership. The party and the centralist unions took pains to assure that the accord would not be publicized, but when a copy of the agreement was passed by two concerned social demo-
crats to Fritz Kater, the leading figure of the Lokalisten, the FVDG resolved to unmask this collusion. In June 1906 Die Einigkeit, the FVDG's organ, published the document and the names of its signatories.

The disclosure occasioned great excitement and debate. The SPD reacted swiftly. Its chief organ, Vorwärts, carried an attack upon the FVDG by August Bebel himself, the head of the party, who denounced the publication of the accord as an infamy. The dozens of social democratic newspapers immediately took up the cry of treason, though to many Lokalisten it obviously appeared that the traitors themselves were screaming of betrayal. The 1906 SPD congress denounced the FVDG, expressly for publication of the document, but also for its 'anarcho-socialist' leanings, for the Lokalisten had, at their own 1906 congress, adopted a new program embracing local autonomy and the general strike, though the FVDG did not declare its independence from political parties.

The SPD and the centralist unions were now intent upon destroying the FVDG. The 1907 SPD congress flatly instructed party members affiliated with the FVDG to abandon it and enter the Freien Gewerkschaften. This manoeuvre carried the FVDG to the crisis point. Large numbers of localists were beset by a dilemma of divided loyalties, for despite their criticisms of the SPD, they were often party members of long standing who considered themselves the avant-garde of social democracy in the unions. Their primary opponent had been, not the SPD, but the Freien Gewerkschaften. For some, who had become uneasy with the increasing radicalization of the FVDG, the choice was less difficult. For the radicals, the dictates of the party completed their disillusionment with it.

A specially summoned FVDG congress in early 1908 decided the issue. Kater spoke for those who refused to enter the centralist unions. Invoking
the name of the CGT, Kater urged that the FVDG adopt a program which would be syndicalist in all but name, including the rejection of political parties. The majority rallied to Kater's position. A proposal calling for the dissolution of the FVDG was turned back, though the victory was narrow. Nearly half of the approximately 17,000 Lokalisten bowed to the fiat of the SPD and entered the centralist unions. The FVDG retained only around 9,000 members.

Judged by the organizational standards of the centralist unions, the syndicalists scarcely constituted a group at all, though they continued to be a small but effective thorn in the side of the Freien Gewerkschaften. In 1913 the Generalkommission denounced the FVDG as "a discussion club for anarchists and other counsellors of confusion, in part also for people who for this and that reason had to withdraw from the German labour movement." In that year the FVDG probably grouped somewhat less than the 9,000 members of five years earlier. Amongst the trades enrolled in its ranks were construction workers, dyers, brush makers, musical instrument makers and glassblowers. The FVDG's official organ, Die Einigkeit, had a weekly circulation of 30,000. Although the membership of the FVDG had been considerably diminished by the long-delayed breach with the SPD and the centralist unions in 1908, Germany now had an avowedly syndicalist organization and one which proved to be a keen supporter of syndicalist internationalism.

During the years that syndicalist bodies had emerged in Spain, Italy, Holland and Germany, the movement also advanced elsewhere in Europe. In Belgium in 1910 the Union des Syndicats de la Province de Liège was formed, which in June 1913 began publishing L'Action Ouvrière. Nineteen-ten also saw the creation of the Industrial Syndicalist Education League across the Channel in Britain, which played a significant role in the
'Great Unrest' of British labour from 1910 to 1914. Unlike the major syndicalist organizations on the Continent, however, the ISEL repudiated 'dual unionism', or the tactic of establishing rival revolutionary unions to compete with existing reformist bodies. Instead, it advocated permeating, revolutionizing and amalgamating the large number of trade unions already in existence.\textsuperscript{28}

The radicals in the Norwegian labour movement pursued a similar tactic of 'boring from within'. A resolution adopted in 1911 by the unions of Trondheim--repudiating written agreements with employers and endorsing the strike, the solidarity strike, boycotts, obstruction and sabotage as proper means of struggle--became the rallying point for a powerful and growing minority which threatened to conquer the national labour organization whose centralization and craft-orientation it opposed.\textsuperscript{29} The left-wing of the minority began publishing \textit{Direkte Aktion} in 1912 as an organ of revolutionary unionists and Young Socialists. In Denmark a smaller trade union opposition group, the \textit{Fagsoppositionens Sammenslutning}, published a similar syndicalist journal, \textit{Solidaritet}. Scandinavia also produced the most enduring of all syndicalist labour organizations, still active today, in the Swedish \textit{Sveriges Arbetares Centralorganisation}. The impetus for its creation came both from revolutionary unionists within the social democratically-linked national trade union centre and from the Young Socialists--as in Norway of anarcho-syndicalist inspiration--grouped around the newspaper \textit{Brand}. The failure of the 1909 Swedish general strike provided the occasion. Dissidents within the national labour centre, convinced that its leaders bore responsibility for the strike failure and encouraged by the Young Socialists, broke away to form the SAC in 1910 on explicitly syndicalist lines. Originally
founded with only 500 members, the SAC expanded steadily, especially among workers in construction, lumbering and mining, for the next fifteen years. While in 1906 the CGT had been the only avowedly syndicalist labour organization in Europe, by 1912 it had been joined by trade union organizations and propaganda groups in nearly every part of the continent, not to mention North and South America where various organizations also espoused the doctrine of syndicalism or the kindred doctrine of industrial unionism. The spread of syndicalism together with the internationalist tenet of its creed made it inevitable that syndicalists would turn their gaze beyond their own borders and ponder the establishment of international bonds between these newly-emerging and like-minded organizations.

IV. The Syndicalists and Labour Internationalism

Because they insisted upon the autonomy of labour, the international ideal of the syndicalists remained that of the First International, which they viewed as a genuinely revolutionary International imbued with a libertarian spirit. In short, they identified the First International with its federalist wing, represented first by the Proudhonists and then by the Bakuninists, and not with the centralist, authoritarian General Council, dominated by Marx, which had insisted upon political action, broken the threat of the Proudhonists, and expelled Bakunin and his supporters. After its 1872 congress, Marx, hoping to prevent the capture of the International by his libertarian adversaries, transferred it to the United States, where it died a painless death in 1876. The more active Bakuninist wing, which rejected political and encouraged spontaneous economic action, including the general strike, and which had considerable impact in the Latin countries, survived as an international organization
until 1877.  

The syndicalists obviously placed no faith in the Second International, founded in 1889, which grouped only political parties, early imposed a pledge of political action upon its affiliates, and in 1896 expelled the anarchists. The International Secretariat of National Trade Union Centres, on the other hand, was a strictly labour organization. Its exclusivist and reformist character, however, led many syndicalists to view the ISNTUC's contribution to proletarian progress as more pernicious than beneficial.

The Secretariat assumed a practical and moderate character from the beginning. In deference to the Second International, the Germans of the social-democratic Freien Gewerkschaften consented only to a meeting of the leading officers of the national trade union organizations in the conferences preceding the creation of the ISNTUC, the first of which was held at Copenhagen, where Scandinavian, British, French, Belgian and German officials assembled in 1901. This system of representation was carried over into the biennial conferences of the Secretariat when it was formally created in 1903. Between 1902 and 1903 the Freien Gewerkschaften had acted at their own expense as an informal international union centre. German initiative was rewarded in 1903, when Berlin was selected as the seat of the new organization and Carl Legien appointed International Secretary, a position he held throughout the pre-war period. The ideal of union organization which the ISNTUC soon came to reflect—that of a highly organized, dues-conscious national centre working closely with the socialist party—was that which the German organization embodied par excellence. Most affiliates shared this ideal. The ISNTUC grew steadily from a membership of two million in 1905 to over seven million in 1913, when nine-
teen countries adhered.

The practical and reformist commitment of the new organization was underscored as early as 1904. Legien opposed the request of the CGT that antimilitarism and the general strike be placed on the agenda of the Amsterdam conference scheduled for 1905, replying that such questions lay beyond the province of the conference. The majority of the trade union centrals supported him. The response to this disagreement was two-fold: on the one hand, the CGT boycotted the 1905 conference; on the other, the ISNTUC adopted a German resolution at Amsterdam whereby it excluded from its consideration "all theoretical questions and those which concern the tendencies and tactics of the trade union movement in the individual countries." It declared its concerns to be more practical ones of fostering relations between national union centres, collecting uniform labour statistics, and facilitating mutual support. When the French boycotted the 1907 Christiania conference because their agenda submissions had again been refused, the ISNTUC demonstrated its orientation even more clearly by unanimously accepting a resolution indicating its own support for the Second International and, in effect, formally censuring the anti-political attitude of the French.

Following the Christiania conference the CGT altered its tactics. Its delegates attended the 1909 conference, where they advocated transforming the ISNTUC conferences of a few select delegates into trade union congresses in which unionists could discuss not only the practical questions of organized labour, but the larger issues barred from the ISNTUC meetings as well. This constituted a return to the policy unsuccessfully advocated by the Dutch of the NAS, with French support, at the 1902 Stuttgart conference. Léon Jouhaux, its newly-elected Secretary, explained the position of the CGT:
We want decisions to be made not by functionaries, but by the organizations themselves . . . . Despite the excessive centralization of certain countries, and despite the claim of certain leaders to command their organizations, everywhere that the resolutions of the conference have been discussed, they have been called into question. They would not be challenged if there were congresses. (34)

But Legien argued that only conferences ensured the unity of the international trade union movement, while others insisted that implementation of the French proposal would encroach upon the sphere of the Second International and jeopardize the division of labour between it and the ISNTUC, described as the two arms of the workers' movement. In response, Jouhaux declared:

We do not want to believe that the workers' International is the facade of the socialists' organization, nor that its chiefs are commanded by the socialist general staff. Perhaps for you the political organization is a great ship and the economic organization a little boat in its tow.

For us, the great ship is the union organization; it is necessary to subordinate political action to trade union action. (35)

Despite the efforts of Jouhaux and his fellow delegate, Georges Yvetot, the proposal of the CGT was turned back at Paris in 1909, as it was at Budapest in 1911.

By then the Secretariat's exclusive devotion to reformist concerns and its support for the Second International had brought it into disrepute with many of the syndicalists of Europe. Its character could be altered only if its structure were altered, but this the ISNTUC steadfastly refused to do. By admitting a single trade union central from each country, the national syndicalist organizations as minority movements were barred from membership and their nation represented exclusively by their reformist rivals. By 1907 the only revolutionary member was the CGT, the NAS having withdrawn in protest. The libertarian organizations were not merely barred,
for the Secretariat employed its conferences and its annual report to hurl accusations at them, a practice condemned by Jouhaux at the 1909 conference. In terms of the spread of syndicalist organizations, by 1912 the syndicalists could view the preceding years as a period of international progress. But those organizations were confronted by hostile reformist unions within their frontiers and were without ties abroad. Already in 1909 the NAS had called attention to the isolation of the revolutionary unions, and had asked how long it could be permitted to continue. "We are waiting for France, we know that, but that may well go on so long that in the meantime major interests are neglected." By 1913 the syndicalists were ready to act.
The appeal for an international syndicalist congress came simultaneously but independently from Britain and Holland. The November 1912 issue of the Syndicalist and Amalgamation News, the organ of the British ISEL, discussed the agenda of the League's forthcoming national conferences to be held at London and Manchester. "Not the least important step," it declared, "will be the proposal for the establishment of an International Syndicalist body, similar to that which the political socialists already possess in the shape of the International Socialist Bureau." At the London conference, held November 9-10, Tom Mann, the President of the ISEL, moved a resolution calling upon the League to organize an international congress at the earliest opportunity. In supporting the resolution, Mann argued that the voice of labour could be expressed only by means of such a congress; nothing was more necessary than an assembly "convened on straight-out syndicalist lines." The London and Manchester conference, claiming to represent 150,000 workers, overwhelmingly endorsed the resolution.

The Dutch NAS had created a committee charged with the same task, which in February 1913 issued a circular over the signature of Gerrit van Erkel calling for a syndicalist congress. The Secretary of the ISEL, Guy Bowman, published the British invitation the same month. The thrust of the two appeals was nearly identical. Both lamented the lack of effective supra-national solidarity occasioned by the absence of an international
syndicalist organization. Both damned existing international working class bodies as antithetical to the interests and goals of syndicalists. Of the Second International the British invitation declared:

We cannot be rendered impotent by having our international relations conducted through a body that exacts a pledge of parliamentarism and is composed of glib-tongued politicians who promise to do things for us, but cannot even if they wanted to. We must meet as Syndicalists and Direct Actionists to prepare and develop our own movement for economic emancipation free from the tutelage of all politicians.

Both rejected the ISNTUC, from which, van Erkel asserted, "all revolutionary propaganda . . . is systematically excluded." Bowman observed that it would make little difference if the ISNTUC permitted the presentation of resolutions on such questions as industrial sabotage and antimilitarism, "for the whole of the permanent officials are politicians; most of the delegates are conservative if not absolute reactionaries; and the whole business is controlled by Social Democrats." Revolutionary trade unionists, on the other hand, wanted "a Congress of the rank and file, not of officials. We want to confer on means of action, not merely on pious resolutions. We want common action against war, no parliamentary palaver. We want International Solidarity expressed in Direct Action." While the British called for a congress to be held at London in May, the Dutch circular initiated a canvass of opinion on whether an assembly should be convened in the autumn and, if so, where.

The responses were not long in coming. The Germans of the FVDG expressed ardent support; the summonses were warmly received elsewhere as well, including Austria, Denmark, Sweden, Italy and Spain. A number of organizations, however, shared the opinion of Christiaan Cornelissen, the editor of the Bulletin International du Mouvement Syndicaliste, that the May date proposed by the British was impractical. Cornelissen argued that
the syndicalist principle of decentralized decision-making dictated that participating organizations be permitted ample time to determine and discuss an agenda and instruct their delegates. While he viewed the congress as urgently required, Cornelissen cautioned that an assembly too hastily convened would not benefit the syndicalists, but would squander their efforts and possibly give rise to the charge "that the organizing spirit of our revolutionary movement lacks too much for the material preparation of a congress." 5

I. French Resistance

From one country, however, assent to the congress proposal was not forthcoming, for in France the Dutch and British invitations received a chilly reception. In La Vie Ouvrière Pierre Monatte raised a critical voice which proved to be the opening salvo in a sustained controversy between the advocates of the congress and the policy-makers of the CGT. The debate, conducted primarily in the pages of La Vie Ouvrière and Cornelissen's Bulletin, revolved around questions of international syndicalist policy and labour unity. The ramifications of this question as they entered into the controversy were numerous and involved the purpose of the intended congress, the character of the ISNTUC, the issue of syndicalist isolation outside France and, ultimately, the revolutionary commitment of the CGT itself.

Throughout the debate the French maintained their resistance to the congress proposal to be motivated solely by interests of labour unity. Their participation in a syndicalist congress could only mean the abandonment of the CGT's goal of revolutionizing the ISNTUC from within. The majority of organized workers were affiliated to the IFTU and the attention of the syndicalists ought to be directed to them. To embark upon a separ-
international course was a divisive enterprise; it could only jeopardize the workers' movement as a whole.

The controversy demonstrated that the respective arguments on international policy were conditioned above all by national perspectives. For most non-French syndicalists, locked in bitter struggle with their domestic rivals in the large reformist unions, the leaders of which were the same functionaries who controlled the ISNTUC, the CGT's expectation of 'revolutionizing' the Berlin Secretariat from within was, at best, unrealistic. For them it was evident that the reformists valued unity, nationally and internationally, only on their own terms. The Secretariat secured a degree of international unity only by excluding dissidents (the CGT was the only exception), by refusing to entertain any questions of revolutionary import, and by supporting the Socialist International. The ISNTUC, moreover, had publicly censured the policy of the CGT, and it was dominated, as were the international trade federations, by the Germans, who had made a slogan of the phrase 'The General Strike is General Non-sense'. Did not the ideals and objectives embodied in the Berlin Secretariat constitute a greater threat, despite French claims, to the CGT than the latter did to the ISNTUC? To most non-French syndicalists the ISNTUC was a certain barrier to working class progress; the barrier could not be scaled, as the French believed, but had to be circumvented. By meeting in their own congresses they would simultaneously begin the task of circumventing the ISNTUC and of escaping the domestic isolation which their ongoing struggles with the reformists imposed upon them. A need for self-assertion and legitimization underlay the drive to break this isolation. As revolutionaries, the syndicalists obviously sought no accommodation with their reformist rivals, who dominated the national and international labour
scene and by whom they were constantly vilified. But to identify their respective movements with an organized international revolutionary movement would confer dignity, status and recognition upon them, and be an aid in the struggle to expand them. The same need for self-assertion and legitimization underlay the desire to identify syndicalism as an international movement in contradistinction to a peculiarly French form of organization and practice transplanted into alien soil beyond France.

All foreign syndicalists rejected French claims that the only international policy open to the CGT was to work within the ISNTUC. Some pointed out that there was no contradiction in working both within and without the Secretariat for the establishment of a genuine workers' International. Others saw the continued presence of the CGT in the ISNTUC as a contravention of syndicalist doctrine, which viewed the spread of its principles and practice as a movement from below and not from above, and certainly not through the select conferences of the Berlin Secretariat. By clinging to the ISNTUC and refusing to join the effort to establish the basis for international syndicalist accord, French conduct appeared in the eyes of some of their foreign counterparts as lamentably arriviste. Did the CGT itself seek legitimization and recognition, but by accommodating itself to the dominant international union movement of the reformists?

Before the pre-congress debate drew to a close, the question would arise whether the international policy of the CGT did not demonstrate that French syndicalism had lost much of its revolutionary impetus.

This charge was not without substance. Though the French declared their arguments to rest upon the interests of trade unionism throughout the world, their opposition to the congress was also rooted in a national perspective. The CGT had no large reformist union organization with which
to compete in France, and there was some justification to the charge that the French consistently underestimated the enormous difficulties of pursuing a syndicalist campaign within established reformist unions. But reformist elements constituted a substantial minority within the CGT itself, and the moderates had their own strongly held views on international policy. At the 1908 CGT congress at Marseille the reformists rejected the CGT's international strategy. They argued for a resumption of international relations and urged the CGT's return to the ISNTUC conferences, even if they were only meetings of officials. The reformists indicated, moreover, that it was not impossible that the international issue could bring the CGT to schism. The policy-makers of the CGT could never thereafter ignore the fact that the international policy of the CGT bore serious domestic implications. The conciliatory resolution adopted by the congress nearly paralleled that supported by the reformists. The demand that antimilitarism and the general strike be entered on the ISNTUC agenda was dropped. The CGT would return to the international meetings if the ISNTUC placed the question of holding trade union congresses, instead of conferences of officials, on its agenda. The Secretariat accepted the CGT's agenda submission and the French, in turn, agreed that the 1909 ISNTUC conference be held at Paris. At the conference the CGT proposed that the meetings be converted to trade union congresses, but the French withdrew the proposal when the foreign delegates uniformly opposed it. However unlikely that the ISNTUC would support such an initiative—it had categorically rejected it long before—the CGT's revised strategy had the advantage of meeting the demands of the reformist elements within it who insisted upon French participation in the Berlin Secretariat.

Though in 1909 some cégétistes protested this concession to the
reformists, and revolutionary unionists both within the ranks of the CGT and outside France contemplated a new and distinctly radical departure in international strategy, the tactics of the CGT remained unchanged. For during 1908-09 an international policy had, in effect, begun to coalesce which would satisfy the diverse ideological currents within the CGT. The CGT saw its international future within the ISNTUC, which it would eventually revolutionize; by means of this formula most reformists were placated by the presence of the CGT in the ISNTUC, most revolutionaries by its professed purpose there. Few foreign syndicalists recognized the domestic imperatives which kept the CGT tied to the Secretariat; thus many of them were baffled when the CGT persisted in its fruitless efforts to transform the ISNTUC conferences into genuine trade union congresses, but attacked the efforts of their fellow syndicalists to initiate such congresses outside the Secretariat. By 1913, when the lack of ideological cohesion within the CGT had become more pronounced, its international policy had rigidified. By then the CGT was in a state of crisis. Its membership had peaked in 1911 and had been declining since, although the number of organized workers in France increased. The erosion of popular support strengthened the hand of the reformists, who, noting that the traditionally more radical federations had suffered the greatest membership losses, criticized the organizational weakness of the CGT and its relative lack of concern with the day-to-day issues of trade unionism.

The reformists were aided by a widening split in the revolutionary wing of the CGT. The orthodox revolutionaries continued to defend the entire gamut of the traditional concerns of French syndicalism, and attached more importance to the revolutionary zeal of the workers than to membership figures, though their spokesmen in positions of leadership were gradually
being replaced by representatives of what might be called the 'revisionist' syndicalists. The latter had little use for talk of violence and the general strike, which they viewed as evidence of organizational weakness. Antimilitarism and antipatriotism had their place in the labour movement, but the CGT had devoted too much attention and energy to them. Organization was the prime concern of the revisionists. They saw organizational reform as the only means of countering the increasing concentration of French capital. Economic reality, they maintained, dictated a restructuring of the labour movement. They valued large union organizations with a disciplined membership and urged that the CGT adopt a more centralist policy. In this they stood in direct opposition to the economic decentralization and spontaneous action urged by traditional cégétistes. The position of the revisionists, in short, had many points of contact with that of the reformists. But unlike the latter, they repudiated political action and they remained revolutionary in their goals; they had no desire to see the labour movement integrated into French society. The revisionists were caught up in a dimly perceived paradox: while their faith in revolutionary principles remained unshaken, the new labour strategy they believed necessitated by the realities of industrial change in France implied a recognition of reformist practices. Despite their own convictions, they were contributing to the growth of a reformist attitude which the CGT's later collaboration with the state in the union sacrée during the war would accentuate.

Confronted with a domestic crisis which had thwarted its growth and had accentuated the ideological cleavages within the CGT, the Dutch and British initiatives appeared at a critical time for the French. The CGT had little choice but to cling all the more tightly to an international
policy which had shown that it commanded a consensus among reformists and revolutionaries. The task of defending the CGT's policy was taken up chiefly by the internationally-minded noyau grouped around Monatte's La Vie Ouvrière. Markedly revisionist in outlook, the Vie Ouvrière group were loath to admit that the CGT's international policy owed anything to the reformists. For the revisionists had made the policy hammered out in 1908-09 their own. By 1913 they viewed it, in effect, as an extension of their domestic policy. While the domestic movement had to be restructured along more highly centralized, unified and disciplined lines, and yet retain a revolutionary commitment, the degree of organization achieved in the international movement had to be preserved and extended, but given a revolutionary spirit which it conspicuously lacked. In short, the ISNTUC had to be transformed into a revolutionary forum: this was the task of the CGT. Though convinced that this tactic was both correct and revolutionary, the very scorn with which the Vie Ouvrière group dismissed the suggestion that the CGT's policy owed anything to reformist pressures indicated that this criticism had touched a sensitive nerve. And while La Vie Ouvrière naturally chose to cast its arguments in terms of international labour unity, when it discussed the dangers of national schisms it always spoke in the abstract; it manifested a palpable disinclination to discuss the threat the congress proposal bore for the fragile unity of the French movement itself. Others in the CGT exercised less reserve. Some foreign critics saw in the arguments of La Vie Ouvrière a divorce between practice and principles and attributed it to a form of hypocrisy, while the Vie Ouvrière group, in their turn, tended to view the attitude of the congress supporters as a species of revolutionary immaturity.
II. The Debate

The chief concern of the French was not simply that a syndicalist congress be held, but that it give rise to a revolutionary labour International. To judge by their appeals, this larger aim was the express intent of the Dutch and the implicit goal of the British. On this assumption, Monatte attacked the invitations. It was impossible "for the French movement to share the point of view of our Dutch comrades." Monatte devoted rather more attention to the British proposal. "What we regret above all is the initiative of our English comrades. They are rushing into a futile undertaking." The domestic tactic of the British syndicalists of pursuing their propaganda within existing labour bodies, rather than seeking to create new syndicalist organizations, Monatte claimed, was correct. He believed the older organizations had been singularly rejuvenated in the past few years by this tactic. The British syndicalists ought to pursue an international policy consistent with their domestic policy by seeking to convert and rejuvenate the ISNTUC rather than contemplating the creation of a rival international organization. The British General Federation of Trade Unions could in a few years be won over to the idea of a true workers' international congress and, with the aid of the CGT, would make it prevail in the ISNTUC. If the ISEL "takes another path, it will commit a grave tactical error which will long lie heavily upon the development of trade unionism in Europe and throughout the world."10

Not all proponents of the congress, however, assumed its purpose to be the creation of a new International. In addition to the Dutch and the British, the Germans of the FVDG early signalled the importance they attached to this question by proposing it as a chief item on the congress agenda. "The creation of an autonomous Syndicalist International," Die
Einigkeit declared, "is a necessity for the self-preservation and onward development of syndicalism."\textsuperscript{11} Cornelissen, on the other hand, asked French critics how they could know that the French unions which might participate would wish to establish a new International; that they would not consider international congresses as sufficient links between syndicalist organizations? Other syndicalists welcomed the proposed congress as a means of breaking the isolation in which their organizations found themselves. Alceste De Ambris of the Unione Sindacale Italiana denied the goal of the congress to be the establishment of a new Secretariat in competition with that of Berlin for a simple reason: Secretariats were useless. But the international meetings, the congresses themselves, were important. Only by means of them could the USI escape from the isolation imposed upon it. On the same grounds, a more impassioned response to French resistance came from Belgium. L. Wolter of Liège argued that Monatte failed to appreciate the situation in countries like Belgium and Germany where the syndicalists were forced to withdraw from social-democratic unions in which "their educational needs were thwarted and freedom of thought systematically stifled," and to struggle against "the bad faith and selfish calumnies" of social-democratic labour leaders. Beleaguered within the labour movement in their own countries, the syndicalists were also isolated in the international movement by the very statutes of the ISNTUC. This isolation could be broken if the French, the "elder brothers" from whom the other syndicalists "have drawn all the best of their being," would join and invigorate the proposed congress. By refusing to participate, the French were failing in a duty:

Is it thus that older bothers should act? While you ought to aid us in our work of the purification of the workers' movement, you scornfully reject us: better than that, you ignore us.
Your attitude on this occasion truly makes me think of those successful bourgeois who no longer acknowledge the friends of their youth who are less clever or less well served by circumstances. (12)

The day would come, Wolter warned, when the forces of reaction embodied in the social-democratic unions of neighbouring countries would become a permanent threat to the ideal of social emancipation which inspired the French movement.

But the French position remained unchanged. In Monatte's mind, to convene a syndicalist congress clearly implied the abandonment of the efforts of the CGT to establish a true workers' International through the ISNTUC. The majority of workers would not be represented; the assembly would be "a congress in name only." Were the CGT to abandon the ISNTUC, Monatte argued, the latter would continue to hold its conferences but, with the radical elements removed, the international interests of the workers would no longer be furthered there. 13

The publication of French disapproval did nothing to reduce the persistence of the British. In reply, Bowman declared that the revolutionary minorities could find international expression only in a syndicalist congress. Fears that such a congress would lead to the destruction of workers' unity were unfounded, for that valued unity scarcely existed yet; the syndicalist organizations, moreover, would know how to maintain unity without abandoning their right to discuss working class problems in their own assemblies. As for French resistance, Bowman professed optimism: "We know how our French comrades will act when the time draws nearer." In the face of French opposition, Tom Mann, President of the ISEL, took another tack. Declaring frankly that not merely a congress, but an international syndicalist Secretariat was needed, Mann not only urged Gallic participation, but proposed that the French unions themselves sponsor the
congress, to which British syndicalists would happily adhere. "A glorious opportunity to render a lofty service to the cause of the universal proletariat," Mann asserted, "now offers itself to our French comrades." 14 Since Mann and Bowman had early personal confirmation of imminent French resistance to the proposed congress, 15 it may well be that their arguments were designed less to persuade the leaders of the CGT and the national federations than to secure support from the local union organizations of France.

Cornelissen adopted this approach explicitly and invoked the syndicalist principle of autonomy in support of it. Even before the French had publicly uttered a word on the invitations, Cornelissen, himself involved actively in the French movement, had called attention to its uniqueness and noted the difficulties, given the CGT's position in the ISNTUC, for the former to convene a syndicalist congress. But the national federations and the Bourses du Travail were not confronted with the same problem. Though affiliated with the CGT, they were autonomous, and some of them, Cornelissen added hopefully, were "revolutionary enough in their actions to believe it useful to aid other nations and not abstain from the congress." 16 Once French opposition had become public, Cornelissen responded by placing even greater emphasis upon the principle of union autonomy. "Is the French movement," he asked pointedly, "organized on the basis of the autonomy of local and regional unions or is it not?" The unions should be permitted to make their own decisions and detractors from the proposal ought not "immediately activate bugbears which could provoke an unjustified prejudice against the congress." Cornelissen also applied the argument of autonomy on an international level in relation to the CGT's role in the ISNTUC. He rejected French claims that there was a conflict
for the CGT in working both within and without the Berlin Secretariat for the creation of a workers' international congress. On its own principles, the CGT should work for the realization of a syndicalist congress. It could do so even while continuing its propaganda within the reformist ISNTUC. Monatte considered these two courses of action incompatible, but "what then becomes of the autonomy of the national organizations within the Berlin Secretariat if they do not have the right of working outside for their own conceptions?"^17

These arguments and approaches, intended in part to convince the leaders of French syndicalism and in part to appeal to the local organizations, made little impact upon the former. It was simply a fact, Monatte observed, that in other countries the national syndicalist organizations could not adhere to the ISNTUC, but the CGT could and did adhere, which made its situation crucially different. It sought to realize a true workers' International where genuine labour congresses could be held, even if the syndicalists would be in a minority there. "Do you not believe," Monatte asked, "that we have reasons for asking ourselves if our participation in a syndicalist congress and a syndicalist Secretariat would not make us turn our backs on the great objective we have set for ourselves?"^18

Despite French disapproval the congress movement gained momentum. There remained the questions of determining its date and venue. The Germans appealed to the British to endorse an autumn congress to be held in Holland. Though willing to alter the date of the congress, the British resisted abandoning London as its site. Concurring with objections to a spring date, the Syndicalist, claiming popular foreign support for London, flatly declared that the congress would open there in late September. The ISEL was obviously manoeuvering to co-opt the congress for London.^19
The ploy was successful. Although they had called for opinions on the best site for the congress, the Dutch privately preferred Amsterdam. They were now confronted with the revised British declaration, to which Cornelissen lent his support.20 The Dutch might have contested the move of the ISEL to preempt the congress on the basis of their survey, summarized in the Bulletin. According to its results, sympathy for the congress had been general in every country except France, where the proposal had been received "with much sympathy on the one hand, but with no less opposition on the other." Some organizations, while critical of the ISNTUC, preferred the policy of propagandizing within it. Other French syndicalists had assured the Dutch committee that Gallic opposition was due to the fact that the French unions, while of a revolutionary tendency, were "still excessively dominated by politicians." Of the responses received—from Holland, the United States, Germany, Sweden, Belgium and France—fifteen had expressed a preference on the site of the congress. Britain received a single vote, that of Sweden, while Holland led the poll with six votes. But the Dutch chose not to persist in the face of the British pronouncement: "Before these faits accomplis, the Dutch committee thought it must yield and it has therefore delivered the further work of the organization of the international congress into the hands of the ISEL."21 Doubtlessly disappointed by abandoning their hopes for an Amsterdam congress, the Dutch nevertheless sincerely wished for a successful meeting and even advanced the ISEL £20 towards organizational expenses.22

The ISEL's desire to hold the congress within its country had thus prevailed. But scarcely had the question of venue been settled when things began to go wrong. The main source of difficulties lay within the camp of the British syndicalists themselves. For it was gradually becoming a camp
divided and the close working relationship of its two leading proponents, Mann and Bowman, was dissolving. Both wished to see a successful congress held, but disagreements about domestic strategy, accentuated by differences in personality, were leading to a split within British ranks. The movement, moreover, was experiencing financial troubles and economic considerations likely played a role in prompting Mann to undertake a long speaking tour in the United States, where he soon found himself embroiled in a controversy concerning the IWW's revolutionary tactics. So straitened were the circumstances of the ISEL during this period that it was unable to publish the *Syndicalist* for six months. Bowman, a man of rather autocratic inclinations, unsuccessfully sought in Mann's absence to assert his own predominance in the British movement, alienated many of his colleagues, and was becoming an increasingly isolated spokesman of the native syndicalist movement.  

Burdened by financial difficulties and entangled in an internecine feud, the ISEL found it difficult to fulfill its newly acquired task. Time passed and congress preparations did not proceed. Foreign supporters began to grow anxious. Cornelissen soon reminded the British of the responsibility they had assumed for the success of the congress and the need for an early distribution of its agenda. After another six weeks had passed with no word from London, Albert Jensen voiced the alarm of the Swedish *Sveriges Arbetares Centralorganisation*. "The First International Syndicalist Congress must not run aground," Jensen warned the British. "A failure would be a real retreat for the entire movement." In late July Bowman finally broke the long silence by issuing a circular definitely announcing the congress date and place--27 September to 2 October, Holborn Hall, London--and inviting participation. Though he promised that a
definitive agenda would soon appear, London immediately lapsed into silence again. 24

III. The Debate Renewed

As the congress date drew near and its preparations followed their largely haphazard course, the debate between its advocates and the leaders of the CGT suddenly revived. Writing in the official CGT organ, *La Bataille Syndicaliste*, Jouhaux declared:

> We hope that from this congress, in conformity with the spirit which has animated the League [ISEL] up till now, will come resolutions reinforcing the bonds of solidarity between like-minded workers throughout the world.

> The League has already done much; it can do still more, for England and for other countries, if it does not play the part of an adversary of the organizations already constituted; if its congress applies itself to promoting national workers' unity in countries where it does not yet exist.

> Although for overriding reasons the CGT will not be able to be represented at the sessions of the League, it [the congress] has secured the sympathy of its militants in advance. From within the international Secretariat [ISNTUC] we will work in forms appropriate to the desired objective, to the development of the principles of a trade unionism of direct action. (25)

> Despite his conciliatory tone—it now appeared that the congress would be held regardless of French resistance—Jouhaux's statement in effect gave official sanction to the opposition to the congress earlier voiced by *La Vie Ouvrière*. The CGT would continue to pursue its own policies within the ISNTUC and would abstain from the congress. Only if it pursued goals incompatible with the very need for a syndicalist assembly as perceived by most of its advocates would the congress win French approval.

Finally, Jouhaux's passing allusion to the winning of the sympathy of French militants by the impending congress was scarcely intended to endorse the participation of CGT affiliates. Cornelissen, however, was quick to represent Jouhaux's remarks rather differently. Even if the CGT itself
feared that participation would provoke and strengthen "the reformist minority" within it, or if it abstained "for some other motive," the local union associations had no need to be guided by such considerations. They were autonomous, and it would be no "defect" for the better-known French militants, even Jouhaux himself, to attend the congress with the mandates of such unions.26

A more direct and sustained critique of the attitude adopted by the CGT appeared from De Ambris. Though congress preparations had been somewhat deficient, the need for a meeting was urgently felt wherever syndicalists were in a minority. The USI, De Ambris reported, therefore felt compelled to support it. De Ambris defended the informational function of a congress which would correct the situation in which the various national groups all knew something of the CGT, but very little about the circumstances of syndicalists elsewhere. Secondly, the congress could undertake the task of establishing the practical means by which these national forces could remain in permanent contact and lend assistance to one another. Effective international solidarity was important to counter the adverse action of reformist groups in the ISNTUC and to sustain anti-capitalist struggles, which the reformists either tried to ignore or sought to hinder when syndicalists were so engaged. This could be achieved without requiring the departure of the CGT from the ISNTUC, or the withdrawal of the British syndicalists from their trade unions, or the affiliation of syndicalists in other countries with the reformist central labour bodies. Syndicalism existed in different forms in different countries, De Ambris added, and the relationship between the syndicalists and the national workers' organizations in any country was determined by complex causes "which could not be discussed, still less criticized, in a congress."27
De Ambris believed, finally and most importantly, that the congress should strive "to establish the international physiognomy of revolutionary syndicalism." In nearly every country syndicalism remained a merely local phenomenon scarcely influenced by the French example. But De Ambris did not recommend a blind imitation of the Gallic model. Syndicalism was essentially action and as such was inevitably diverse; it could not be reduced to a single model, nor dogmatically fixed in a series of "sacrosanct" principles. The congress should not attempt to formulate a syndicalist orthodoxy. Certain of its forms, however--direct action, proletarian violence, antimilitarism, the general strike--constituted the common factors of syndicalism. By reaffirming these forms of action on the basis of an internationally shared experience, the congress could provide a valuable service. Syndicalism could then no longer be characterized by its detractors outside France as "an exclusively French 'mode'," which according to them "one seeks to import and implant in other countries by an arbitrary spirit of imitation." Whether the congress would be able to fulfill these and other tasks remained to be seen. But De Ambris saw two possible reasons why the congress might not succeed as well as two loci of responsibility for potential failure:

Perhaps it will be able to be said that it [the congress] will not assume sufficient authority or that its inevitably heterogeneous composition will render solutions most difficult. But whereas in the last case the fault will accrue to the organizers of the Congress, in the first case it is the opinion of everyone that responsibility will rebound to the French comrades who--in abstaining from participating in the Congress--will have appreciably attenuated its importance and value. (28)

De Ambris expressed what many foreign syndicalists felt when he added that the hostility with which the French had greeted the congress proposal had created the painful impression of having been unjustifiably
left in the lurch. Nothing in French arguments appeared to justify their hostile attitude. Monatte had earlier asked if the new Secretariat which the congress would create would be a Secretariat of workers' organizations, as at Berlin, or of groups of opinions, as at Brussels, where the Bureau of the Second International sat. Having declared Secretariats useless, De Ambris could not agree that the congress would necessarily found one. But if a new Secretariat were to be created, it would obviously be one linking together unions of syndicalist tendency. And in reality the ISNTUC fulfilled precisely that role for reformist unions. Non-reformist unions were merely tolerated within it, "like dogs in a church," and then only because they lacked sufficient force to have any influence on its direction. De Ambris found the contention that the presence of the French in London would mean abandoning their declared goal of creating a true International through the ISNTUC devoid of force. No one had asked the CGT to quit the Berlin Secretariat, nor that it adhere en bloc to the congress, but only that the revolutionary French unions, in accord with their rights of autonomy, participate in an individual capacity. Without jeopardizing its work in the ISNTUC, the CGT could thereby indirectly come to know its natural allies and join in the work of coordinating their forces. What was asked was that the CGT not "put a spoke in the wheels of international syndicalist understanding;" that it at least demonstrate some moral support for those who drew their inspiration from it. The work of establishing a true International could proceed equally well within and without the ISNTUC. French participation in the congress entailed a turning away from the self-appointed task of the CGT, and Monatte's argument had merit, De Ambris concluded in a rhetorical flourish, only if the French considered:
the reformist Secretariat of Berlin as the sole and universal Church, the single depository of absolute union truth, indisputable, supreme and eternal, outside of which there is no salvation; in that case there would be no grounds for further discussion, but only for some legitimate astonishment on the part of us impenitent heretics. (30)

De Ambris' provocative critique received a great deal of attention at Paris. Although the French response was simply signed 'La Vie Ouvrière', it was in fact the result of considerable group discussion and many of the leading French syndicalists, including Monatte, Rosmer, Merrheim, Dumoulin, Picart; Voirin, Dumas, and others, contributed to its formulation. The French lamented that recent long discussions with De Ambris had not converted him to their view. They gave short shrift to the benefits he thought might come from a syndicalist congress. Its possible informational value was marginal, since the syndicalist press, and especially La Vie Ouvrière, already fulfilled this function. The hope that the congress could provide the means of mutual aid between national syndicalist minorities the French dismissed as "chimerical." The establishment of the 'international physiognomy' of syndicalism, they conceded, would be an important result and prove as valuable to French syndicalists as to those of other countries. "But can the London congress, as it has been understood and prepared, produce this result? We doubt it." In short, while the possible advantages of the congress were minimal, the dangers it presented, particularly if it led to the establishment of a new International, were great. Noting the syndicalist-reformist split in other countries, the French declared their primary objection to be that the consequences of the creation of a new International would be the accentuation of existing schisms, the hardening of temporary divisions, and possibly the creation of splits where there were none yet. That was "as evident as an axiom; it
requires no demonstration."  

La Vie Ouvrière granted the reformist nature of the ISNTUC, but countered by asserting that the French elected to defend their principles there while suffering its rebuffs because they could not conceive of a workers' International which left the great union organizations of Europe and America outside it. Instead of asking the French to support a new Secretariat, their foreign colleagues should be supporting the CGT by co-ordinating syndicalist action not only in the ISNTUC but in the twenty-eight international trade federations as well. If the French were not left alone to carry the struggle in the international federations, if there were concerted international action, the direction of the federations would be altered. The difficult policy pursued by the French required the greater efforts, but its results would be more significant and lasting.

The French reacted sharply to the suggestion that they had left their foreign comrades in the lurch, but they reserved their harshest criticisms not for De Ambris, but for Cornelissen. La Vie Ouvrière complained that the charge of a retreat on the part of the CGT, of an inclination towards reformism, now appeared from various quarters. Cornelissen's Bulletin, it suggested, had contributed to the "legend" of a retreat of French syndicalism by speaking of purported criticisms of the CGT from French organizations. Cornelissen himself, the French continued, believed in a retreat of the CGT, the origins of which he saw in the overriding desire to deal tactfully with reformist elements within it. The French proclaimed that though they prized workers' unity, it was an absurdity to suggest they were putting the interests of the reformists uppermost. But they did believe that divisions in national movements constituted grave impediments to any serious international movement. In the face of increasingly organized
capital, would such factionalism not ensure the failure of the workers' movement? Regarding the international movement, *La Vie Ouvrière* asserted, Cornelissen "has a private conception which can be judged as narrow, out-of-date, and as no longer responding to the state of the workers' movement in the various countries." The French pointed out that the organizers of the congress had early been informed that the CGT would not participate. But they ignored this warning and persisted in their plans, hoping that in the presence of a [*fait accompli*] the CGT would be morally bound to support the endeavour. The cries of abandonment and of a CGT in retreat were simply the results of the CGT's refusal to yield to this pressure. Perhaps when the congress participants returned from London they would understand the French attitude better and "appreciate our reasons more accurately and sanely." 33

Cornelissen brushed aside the censure of *La Vie Ouvrière*. Amongst French responses to the Dutch survey there were hard words spoken, not against French syndicalism, but against certain of its leaders. Cornelissen felt obliged to report their general complaint, though he had omitted the harshest expression of it--"with all due deference to Monatte or to the other comrades of *La Vie Ouvrière* who read our *Bulletin*." It was not his view which was narrow and out-of-date, Cornelissen argued, but that of the French who desired to confine revolutionary propaganda everywhere to the boundaries of the large union organizations. They failed to appreciate the immense difficulties of conducting such propaganda within the conservative central organizations outside France. Nor did they appreciate that beneath the revolutionaries' insistence upon a congress lay "the hard experiences of real life." Cornelissen now explicitly condemned the views of *La Vie Ouvrière* as "neither corresponding to the current development of
our international syndicalist movement nor as any longer even being par-

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In order to have the last word in the debate before the congress opened, La Vie Ouvrière delayed an issue to respond to Cornelissen's re-
marks. The Vie Ouvrière group insisted that in assessing the merits of the congress proposal they had been motivated not solely by the interests of the CGT, but by those of "trade unionism in the entire world." Incensed that their revolutionary commitment had been impugned, the Vie Ouvrière group countered that Cornelissen himself was not a syndicalist. In an article in La Guerre Sociale the year before, Cornelissen had maintained that since men had interests both as producers and consumers, the trade union as an organization of producers could not, given the complexity of social life, be the sole and sufficient mechanism of a revolution expro-
piating the capitalists and reorganizing the conditions of production and consumption. Citing the article, La Vie Ouvrière registered its own opin-
ion that syndicalism was precisely the belief that "the organization of producers is a sufficient lever of revolution." To the French, therefore, Cornelissen was "all that one could want, except a revolutionary syndica-
list." They would not permit it to be said, "no more by Cornelissen than by whomsoever, that if the French unions do not go to London, that springs from [the fact] that they have repudiated revolutionary syndicalism."35
CHAPTER THREE

THE 1913 LONDON CONGRESS

Unknown to the French, there was at this point a possibility that no congress would be held, and Cornelissen had already rushed to England in an attempt to salvage the jeopardized assembly. Its preparation had continued to be neglected at London. Moreover, labour disturbances had broken out in the capital in support of the dramatic struggle of James Larkin's Irish Transport and General Workers' Union—the nearest kin to a syndicalist union in Britain—against a massive lock-out in Dublin. Bowman now privately suggested that the agitation in London was so great that the congress should either be postponed or held in secret. Cornelissen viewed a postponement as impossible at such a late date and opposed a clandestine congress. But had Bowman invoked the agitation in London in a last-minute attempt to gain time, or to avoid the congress altogether? Were it to proceed, Bowman's organizational bumbling would be plain for all to see. Moreover, events were to show that Bowman was unable to account for the money advanced by the Dutch for congress preparations. And were a congress to be held, Bowman's disagreements with many of the native syndicalists and his growing isolation within the British movement would be made evident. There were sufficient grounds why Bowman might no longer welcome the congress. Indeed, while Cornelissen was en route to London, Bowman wrote him at Paris to say that except for himself and Tom Mann there were no syndicalists in England and that the congress simply could not be held.
Once in Britain, Cornelissen quickly grasped that the agitation prompted by the Dublin strike could prove an advantage in publicizing the work of the congress. Cornelissen's sister-in-law, who assisted in the dissemination of the *Bulletin* in Britain, and her husband, W. Tcherkesov, lived in London. Cornelissen could rely upon their support. He and Tcherkesov sought out a number of syndicalists in the capital, who "heard with indignation that Guy Bowman simply denied their existence." Confronting Bowman in their presence, Cornelissen bluntly told him that if he cancelled the reservation for Holborn Hall, Cornelissen would rent a hall on behalf of the *Bulletin* in which to hold the congress. Bowman did not cancel the reservation, but only the early arrival of the Dutch delegation, which supplied the required funds, secured the hall. Thus the congress which Bowman had striven so strenuously to secure for London would be held there, but ironically only because the last-minute intervention of Cornelissen and the Dutch had succeeded in forestalling his own inclination to abandon or at least postpone it.

The adherent organizations were of course unaware of these last minute developments, though the failure of the promised agenda to appear had naturally been causing concern. Nevertheless, on the eve of the congress there was considerable expectancy and hope, and the congress was anticipated as an event of signal importance for the more 'class-conscious' of the workers. Two days before the assembly convened *Solidaridad Obrera* at Barcelona spoke optimistically of the important work of the congress, and in reporting the conference held by Catalonian syndicalists to select their delegate, the newspaper observed that "the conviction exists in the proletariado consciente that the Congress which will be held at London must be an immense step towards its emancipation." In Berlin, on the day the
congress opened, *Die Einigkeit* declared:

The First International Syndicalist Congress is a great event. It is convoked to erect a landmark on the path of the international proletariat towards its liberation from all economic fetters and intellectual slavery. It should become a symbol of the revolutionary spirit of the *klässenbewussten Arbeiter* and their struggles for socialism. May it do justice in every respect to its high destiny and its momentous tasks. (9)

In view of the strike wave which Britain had experienced in the last few years, from which the syndicalists had received an inordinate share of publicity, as well as the ongoing labour drama in Dublin and the recent announcement of the formation of a British Employers' Defense Union claiming massive fighting funds, the capitalist press in Britain demonstrated an interest in the impending congress. The occasion prompted the Evening News, for example, to publish an article on the eve of the assembly entitled "The New Terror: Organised Effort to Paralyse Society". 10

I. The Participants

With the congress shortly to be convened its delegates began arriving in London and making their way to the small rooms above a cooperative restaurant in Little Newport Street which had been set aside for their reception. The delegates carried the most diverse mandates, some having been mandated by syndicalist educational and propaganda groups, others by local unions, series of local unions, local branches of national unions, local trades councils, union federations, confederations or by national syndicalist organizations. With the exception of the CGT, all the major European syndicalist union organizations—the FVDG, 11 the NAS, 12 the SAC and the USI 13 —had sent delegates. Although the Spanish Confederación Nacional del Trabajo had been banned, José Negre, one of its pioneers living in temporary exile at Paris, represented the Catalanian Regional
Confederation, the most important component of the CNT. While largely efficacious, the campaign waged by the CGT against the congress had not prevented France from being represented. C. Michelet represented the Paris hatters, A. Couture six unions of building workers from Paris, and J.B. Knockaert three independent textile unions. Also from France, though scarcely as a delegate, came Alfred Rosmer to cover the congress for La Vie Ouvrière. Belgium was represented by Mathieu Demoulin, secretary of the Union des Syndicats de la Province de Liège. The Danish Fagsoppositionens Sammenslutning gave its mandate to the SAC delegate, Albert Jensen, who spoke for the Norwegian syndicalists as well, though there was no specifically syndicalist organization in Norway at the time. Despite the domestic confusion surrounding the assembly, the British delegation was the largest. Nine members represented trade-union organizations. The ISEL also sent delegates. Bowman, however, did not represent the ISEL, but elected to fill the open mandate sent by the Brazilian Regional Workers' Federation. Other Latin American workers' groups participating were the Havana Union of Cafe Employees, represented by F. Tomlinson, and two rival Argentinian organizations. The Regional Workers' Confederation had given its mandate to De Ambris, while the Regional Workers' Federation (FORA) was represented by Antonio Bernardo.

Thus twelve countries—Britain, Sweden, Denmark, Germany, Holland, Belgium, France, Spain, Italy, Cuba, Brazil and Argentina—had delegates at the congress. Austria adhered without personal representation. There were also links with Norway (via Jensen), and with Poland. Moreover, though he had no mandate from his organization, George Swasey, campaigning in England for the American IWW, also attended the sessions. Aside from the fact that no leading figure of the CGT was present, many of the most active
and important figures in the European syndicalist movement had assembled in London as delegates. Although they had no mandates, the presence of Cornelissen and of the Russian anarcho-syndicalist Alexander Schapiro, as well as that of Tcherkesov and the fiery Swasey, added luster to the militant composition of the congress.

The question of admission to the assembly and rights within it, however, gave rise to considerable disagreement. The main issue in dispute concerned the rights, if any, to be accorded to delegates representing propaganda and educational groups. While the Germans, supported by Michelet and others, initially argued that only delegates representing workers' economic organizations (trade unions) be admitted to the congress, the Dutch advocated the permissive line that delegates from non-economic organizations have both voice and vote on all issues before the congress. Only after a prolonged discussion was a third course advanced by Demoulin accepted, whereby delegates of propaganda and educational groups which contributed to the diffusion of syndicalist ideas would be admitted to the assembly and allowed to take part in the debates, but without voting rights on resolutions involving material obligations on the part of economic organizations. This decision meant that Dr. Pedro Vallina, representing the Syndicalist Athenaeum of Barcelona, became a "fraternal delegate" with speaking, but without full voting rights, and, more ironically, that the representatives of the ISEL, under the aegis of which the congress was being held, had become largely disenfranchised within it. In sum, once all mandated delegates had arrived, there were thirty-three ordinary delegates representing around sixty labour organizations with approximately 220,000 members, as well as four fraternal delegates.

The assembled delegates were faced with an immense task. There was
no clear consensus about the very purpose of the congress, and despite common recognition of the need to establish international bonds between syndicalist organizations, the momentous question of what form these bonds should take remained to be resolved. Moreover, the attempt to formulate a declaration of principles concerning syndicalist theory and tactics would be no easy task. The congress had been postponed until the autumn to allow participating organizations time to discuss an agenda and instruct their delegates. In the general muddle of preparations, however, an agenda which was no more than a rough compilation of suggestions submitted by various interested groups was hastily assembled only shortly before the congress. The hopes for serious advance discussion of its contents had come to nought. The agenda ranged across a broad number of topics covering theory and tactics, antimilitarism, international scabbing, emigration, international organization, an international newspaper, an international language, and, finally, the religion and morals of the proletariat. It was unlikely from the start that the entire agenda could be dealt with during the congress.

II. The Declaration of Principles and Other Issues

At London, where the First International had been founded nearly fifty years before, syndicalists of Europe and Latin America who considered themselves its true heirs opened the First International Syndicalist Congress on September 27. But from the beginning conflicts began to emerge which would recur throughout the congress. The mandate issue elicited disagreements, as mentioned, and the selection of officers gave rise to the first of the personal clashes which would plague the sessions. Bowman played a leading role in these personality conflicts. Domestic quarrels
had put him at odds with many of the British delegates, and his relations with Cornelissen had been strained to the utmost by the latter's last-minute intervention to salvage the congress. The German and Dutch delegations, thoroughly unhappy with Bowman's mismanagement of preparations, naturally sided with Cornelissen. Bowman's position was rendered further delicate by unresolved questions concerning congress finances. He was not, however, without allies. From the beginning he allied himself with the French delegates and he made an assiduous effort to woo De Ambris. Another member of the Italian delegation, Silvio Corio, lived at London and was on good terms with Bowman. Thus the French and Italian delegations tended to support Bowman as did the Spanish, though more infrequently. These groupings were not definitive, however, and did not rest solely on personal issues, but appeared to be reinforced by a difference in temperament, again not clear-cut, between the syndicalists of southern and northern Europe.

In a three-way contest between Bowman, Jack Wills and Kater, the latter two were elected to the joint presidency of the congress. The assembly also selected Bowman and Cornelissen to act as congress secretaries and to discharge the immense task of providing a running translation of the proceedings. Although he commanded three languages, Bowman did not take his office very seriously and was quickly supplanted as translator by Schapiro. Kater opened the second day of the congress with a presidential address stressing its importance in view of the rapid development of industrial capitalism and commending the general progress of the syndicalist movement. Doubtlessly mindful of the lengthy and cumbersome agenda, he emphasized that the first syndicalist congress should concentrate upon two principal points: first, to formulate a declaration of principles
concerned not merely with immediate benefits, but which attacked capitalism in its essence and unequivocally demanded its ultimate abolition, so that workers would realize clearly the objective of syndicalism; second, to establish an international connection among syndicalist groups in order to provide firm support of the impetus towards the genuine emancipation of the proletariat. "If therefore we succeed only in formulating a declaration of principles for the syndicalist movement and in laying the bases for international accord, we can be content with this double labour."  

If Kater had hoped the assembly would turn quickly to these weighty tasks, he was to be disappointed, for the congress next moved into closed session to discuss a protest lodged against the presidency of Wills. Michelet proceeded to point out that at the time of the election many delegates had been unaware that Wills was a local councillor in one of the boroughs of London. A number of them, including the French and Spanish delegations, Demoulin and Bernardo, had formulated a protest against Wills's election. On behalf of these delegates Michelet declared it impossible that a politician preside over a syndicalist congress. "We are revolutionaries," he asserted. "We do not want the tutelage of politicians." In the extremely animated discussion which followed, Roche supported Michelet's protest on behalf of the Germans: "As syndicalists we are anti-parliamentarians. We would be mocked in Germany if we accept Wills as President. The English should understand our position." Wills, a particularly active militant in the London building trades, sought to vindicate himself. Describing himself as a committed syndicalist, he argued that the position of borough councillor in London did not have a political character, had nothing to do with the formulation of laws, and was not equivalent to a municipal councillor in Paris, as Michelet seemed to believe. A councillor's duties
were strictly administrative and borough government, he contended, was entirely independent of the politics of the British state. "Like everyone here, I am anti-parliamentary," he continued.

But I am not surprised that a protest against my election is raised today. Bowman has provoked it. For there is a serious dispute between the English comrades and Bowman. And before you leave London I want you to know that I have the confidence of my comrades whereas Bowman no longer has it, and that if the congress does not have all the success that it ought to have, he is responsible for it. (32)

Against Wills it was argued that even a mere administrator was a member of the state by virtue of his putting its directives into effect. While stressing that Wills deserved every consideration of the assembly, Michelet insisted that as a matter of principle the protest of the objecting delegates be upheld. But when to facilitate the work of the congress Wills orally tendered his resignation, the Dutch repudiated it. The congress, they maintained, could not accept it. Wills had been elected as a representative of a syndicalist workers' organization. It was of little import if he was also a borough councillor. The Dutch remarked that they could not be as exclusivist as the French and the Spanish in such cases. "We require only one thing—that he march with us in the economic realm. There are some Christians and social democrats in our unions. Will it be necessary to expel them?"

The dispute highlighted a constant and unresolved tension in syndicalist ideology. The non-politicism of syndicalism could be understood in different ways. On the one hand, political action was abjured not only as a waste of energy but as a positive hindrance to working-class progress. Thus, while Wills proclaimed his anti-parliamentarism and tried to minimize the political significance of his position as councillor, Michelet and his supporters saw in his presidency a violation of the principle of the poli-
tical neutrality of syndicalism. The Dutch, on the other hand, considered their own objections to be based upon this principle. Syndicalism sought to organize all class-conscious workers, irrespective of their political or other beliefs. Workers were free to pursue whatever action they wished, including political action, outside their union as long as they did not seek to import their political convictions or concerns into the labour organization itself, where attention was to be focused solely upon the economic struggle. This is what the Dutch had in mind when they argued that to remove Wills from the presidency would be a departure from the syndicalist principle of political neutrality.  

The Dutch felt strongly enough about the issue that when Wills's resignation was accepted by a substantial majority, Markmann stunned the remaining delegates by declaring: "For us the question is whether to proceed with the congress or whether we should return home. We cannot acknowledge that all delegates do not have the same rights and that one of them can be discarded from the presidency." Feathers were unruffled, however, and an accord reached: the British would nominate one amongst them to take Wills's place and the Dutch would remain in London. Jack Tanner was later unanimously elected to join Kater as co-president. With the presidency dispute behind them, the delegates still did not turn immediately to the tasks emphasized by Kater as of prime importance. Resolutions protesting the repressive treatment of syndicalists in Portugal and the British government's use of armed coercion against the Dublin strikers were discussed and passed. Organizational questions consumed more time. Though welcomed as fulfilling an important informational function, the national reports sprinkled throughout the proceedings were even more time-consuming.  

The submission of two reports from France demonstrated the lack of
cohesion within the French delegation. The absence of the CGT meant that no official report was presented from that organization. But Michelet and Couture, both members of the CGT, submitted a written report which manifested an obvious sensitivity to some of the issues raised in the pre-congress debate. The report noted that the French "revolutionary organization was imagined to be at a standstill, but it was not going backwards. It preserved its purely revolutionary aspect and refused to accept the interference of Parliamentarians." French syndicalism remained "a driving force against militarism, patriotism, the State, and capitalism, and anything which prevented the march of the movement." Knockaert, who represented textile unions of Lille, Tourcoing and Roubaix not affiliated with the CGT, took the rostrum to present a contrary view. He upbraided the CGT and the deference it showed the reformists. The unions he represented, Knockaert declared, were not in the CGT because it harboured the local reformist organizations, some of which worked with a local blackleg association. Moreover, they were excluded from the CGT because they could not share its opinions. They advocated fully autonomous organizations which could proselytize for syndicalism among the workers. This was not possible in the CGT. The unions for which Knockaert spoke further evidenced their opposition to the CGT by urging the London congress to work for the creation of an independent Syndicalist International. Michelet and Couture could not share this recommendation.

Only on the fourth day did the congress take up the question of 'Theory and Tactics'. A resolution committee, beginning with a written draft submitted by the Dutch delegation, had spent the preceding evening in formulating a declaration of syndicalist principles. The committee's resolution elicited a lengthy and lively debate in which every delegate
actively participated. Much of the discussion concerned whether and how syndicalists ought to influence the state. Corio wished to eliminate a section asserting "the proletariat can only effectively influence the state by methods of direct action," on the grounds that it might lead the workers to begin to expect things from the state. The state should be ignored, Corio insisted, and attention directed toward securing their demands directly from capitalism. Others opposed Corio's proposed change as untenable. Just as one lived under the economic tyranny of capitalism, one lived under the political tyranny of the state; neither could be ignored. Wills observed that there was some confusion among the delegates between political and parliamentary action. While parliamentary action was to be opposed, direct action could profitably influence the state. If this were not so, what would be the sense of antimilitarist agitation for example? Karl Roche and others contended that although the struggle was an economic one, the possibility of directly pressuring the state ought not be eschewed if it could secure social legislation benefitting the workers. The question of workers employed by various branches of the state also came up.

De Ambris raised another point involving the state. Whereas the declaration asserted that the congress recognized that workers everywhere suffered from "political and economic" slavery or suppression, De Ambris argued that they suffered from capitalist slavery or exploitation, and proposed that the phrase "capitalist system" be employed in lieu of "political and economic" throughout the document. Cornelissen responded that the phrase "political and economic" already and of itself described the oppression of the capitalist system. The discussion on this point was prolonged and De Ambris, arguing fervently and persistently, secured
support from the remainder of his delegation, from the French and others. Although the evolving debate was far from unclouded, it was becoming clear to some delegates that the proposals involved considerably more than a linguistic clarification, for they would have the collective effect of removing all direct references to the essentially anti-statist syndicalist attitude from the statement of principles. Thus C.J. Wesseling declared that the National Federation of Municipal Workers of Holland could not join the new International if the proposed changes were accepted. Bernardo noted with obvious disapproval that at this stage "'Theory and Tactics' was taking a socialist character," by which he meant a non-revolutionary character. In the ensuing discussion the opponents of the changes sought to demonstrate what was really at issue, particularly concerning the alterations De Ambris had been insisting upon. Though not a delegate, Tcherkesov was particularly active. Speaking privately with the French delegation, he pointed out that De Ambris's alteration would avoid any explicit reference in the declaration to the syndicalist attitude to the state. The French thereafter ceased to support De Ambris's proposal. Tcherkesov also spoke to Corio, himself an anarchist of long standing, and sternly repeated this elucidation. With others at work persuading remaining resisting delegates, De Ambris's support rapidly ebbed. Jensen summed up the situation:

Through the exclusion of the phrase 'political and economic' the congress had only spoken out against economic slavery but not against the state. Because of this, one had, in actual fact, placed oneself against one's will on a social-democratic level. It might well be possible to become free of the economic repression of capitalism through the establishment of a social-democratic state. That was not what was wanted. (42)

Instructed to revise the declaration on the basis of the preceding discussion, the resolution committee submitted the following draft:
That this Congress, recognising that the working class of every country suffers from capitalist slavery and State oppression, declares for the class struggle and international solidarity, and for the organisation of the workers into autonomous industrial Unions on a basis of free association.

Strives for the immediate uplifting of the material and intellectual interests of the working class, and for the overthrow of the capitalist system and the State.

Declares that the class struggle is a necessary result of private property in the means of production and distribution, and therefore declares for the socialisation of such property by constructing and developing our Trade Unions in such a way as to fit them for the administration of these means in the interest of the entire community.

Recognises that, internationally, Trade Unions will only succeed when they cease to be divided by political and religious differences; declares that their fight is an economic fight, meaning thereby that they do not intend to reach their aim by trusting their cause to governing bodies or their members, but by using Direct Action, by workers themselves relying on the strength of their economic organisations.

And in consequence of these recognitions and declarations, the Congress appeals to the workers in all countries to organise in autonomous industrial Unions, and to unite themselves on the basis of international solidarity, in order finally to obtain their emancipation from capitalism and the State. (43)

The revised declaration had, in effect, accentuated the anti-statist position of the syndicalists rather than moderating it, and thereby repudiated the changes for which De Ambris had so assiduously struggled. He signalled his defeat by making its acceptance unanimous.

III. The Question of International Organization

The assembly next turned its attention to the major issue of international organization and the normalization of relations between syndicalist organizations. The question which had figured so prominently in the discussions and debates preceding the meeting had finally come before the congress. Everyone was in accord that some kind of permanent linkage ought to be created; there was less unanimity concerning its form. While the agenda bore a recommendation from the German FVDG and the Swedish SAC that
a Syndicalist International be created, other agenda submissions were less
demanding. That of the USI, for example, called only for the "definition of a permanent relationship" between the various syndicalist organizations.

The resolution committee had been working with two proposals on the question of international organization, submitted by the German and Italian delegations. The former called for the establishment of an international Syndicalist Secretariat to have its seat at Amsterdam and its administration in the hands of the Dutch. It also called for a relatively high dues schedule to assure the efficiency of the new International and specified that the dues be independent of the subscription fees to the bulletin which it would publish. The Italian proposal sought the creation not of an International, but only of a committee of relations which would serve to maintain contact between syndicalist organizations, and which would derive its revenue from the subscription to the bulletin alone, which would be kept low. The committee left open the question of the form of body to be created, but proposed that its seat be at Amsterdam under the guidance of the Dutch. Much of the debate turned around the question of the possibility of schisms occurring within the labour movement as a result of the particular form given an international syndicalist organization.

In many of the countries represented—in Germany, Holland and Sweden, for example, and in Italy as well—there had already been a split between the syndicalist and reformist labour organizations. The affiliation of the national syndicalist bodies of these countries with a new and autonomous International was not problematical as it was in countries such as Britain, where the split had not taken place, or in France, where the situation was ambiguous and complicated by the adherence of the CGT to the ISNTUC. The case of France became central to the debate.
The proponents of a formal International at first dominated the discussion. Knockaert delivered an eloquent appeal for its creation, while the German and Dutch delegations sternly insisted upon the necessity of a revolutionary International standing sharply opposed to that at Berlin. Others were less convinced, however, and a few were uncertain that their mandates sanctioned the actual formation of an International. Like Demoulin, Duque insisted on the importance of the new International being radically unlike that of Berlin, but nonetheless favoured the creation of a correspondence committee for the present, suggesting that the question of a formal International be postponed to the next congress. De Ambris vigorously opposed the German proposition. He considered it absurd to want to create a separate International alongside the ISNTUC, particularly in view of the small number of organizations represented at London. Declaring that the French would not adhere and that countries such as Britain where the syndicalists worked within the old organizations could provide no support, De Ambris calculated that a separate syndicalist International would not include at the beginning over 500,000 members. This figure would be insignificant in comparison to the millions represented in the ISNTUC.

Though De Ambris's opposition to the creation of a formal Secretariat came as no surprise, the arguments he employed against it astonished some of his fellow delegates, particularly in view of the scepticism he had expressed in the pre-congress debate concerning the ISNTUC, and the fact that De Ambris himself had been one of the most active promotors of the split in the Italian CGL, which had led to the formation of the USI the year before. Nonetheless, in arguments remarkably reminiscent of those of La Vie Ouvrière, De Ambris maintained that the creation of a rival International would only cause splits within the working-class, especially
in France, and this was best avoided. Citing the case of the hat-makers of France, he pointed out that they were federated, confederated, members of the CGT and of the international federation in their industry. Hence they could not join a new International without breaking their ties with the CGT and their international federation. But since the hat-makers remained autonomous in terms of propaganda activity, there was nothing to prevent them from supporting an international syndicalist committee of information by subscribing to its bulletin. For his part, De Ambris asserted, the London congress had and could only have a single goal: that of creating permanent contact among the syndicalist organizations which could not be represented in the ISNTUC. This required only the establishment of a bureau of information and a bulletin, which would permit the French to adhere as well. Anything further was unnecessarily divisive and a transgression if it meant creating an organization which might be harmful to the work of the CGT in the ISNTUC and might encourage schisms in countries where there were none yet. The French delegates, except Knockaert, supported De Ambris by arguing that the creation of an International in opposition to the ISNTUC would create dangers for working-class unity and specifically for the CGT. Michelet and Couture argued that an accord could be reached between reformists and revolutionaries once the latter were sufficiently numerous to carry the former along with them.46

But De Ambris's solicitude for the ISNTUC failed to strike a responsive chord in such delegates as Bernardo and Jensen. The Germans and the Dutch also found little merit in De Ambris's position. Roche asserted that De Ambris opposed all organization, and pointed to the millions or organized workers who did not belong to the ISNTUC. Had the congress been better organized, there would have been delegates present from as far away
as Japan. "We have come here to found an International," Roche pointedly declared. "If the Italians and the French do not want to proceed with us, well, we will found an International amongst the Germans and the Dutch." De Ambris sarcastically responded that he too wanted to found an International, but with neither the Germans nor the Dutch. The elder Lansink remarked that Holland was loath to be responsible for causing schisms amongst the proletariat, but schisms had long occurred, and within centralist organizations as well. The Dutch sought to create a Syndicalist International only because they believed it would ultimately serve to overcome differences and thereby contribute to the unity of the proletariat; not only would all workers eventually come to it, but all would attain equal fulfillment within it.

The Italian proposal, however, did not lack support in addition to that provided by the majority of the French delegation. The Spanish, who until the final debate had avoided taking sides on the issue, declared in favour of a committee of information and endorsed Duque's suggestion that the question of a Secretariat be postponed to the next congress, the organization of which the resolution put in the hands of the committee to be established. In order to remove doubts, however, Negre asserted that as soon as the International became a fact the tens of thousands of workers he represented would immediately adhere. Bernardo endorsed the Spanish view. Like Negre, he stressed that the body he represented, the FORA, would adhere to a new International as long as it was distinctly revolutionary, as would other labour elements in South America. De Ambris's claim that a new International could expect at best a half-million members was wide of the mark, Bernardo optimistically asserted, since from South American countries alone 600,000 workers were likely to adhere.
Although authorized by the SAC to support the creation of an International, Jensen adopted a rather different approach. Noting that the Germans and the Dutch were astonished that the French and Italians did not understand their position, Jensen observed that it could equally be said that the Germans and the Dutch did not attempt to understand the position of the workers' organizations of other countries. A possible schism in France would have grave consequences. Jensen did not believe the work of the CGT within the ISNTUC to be significant. But he viewed the reaction as particularly severe in recent years in France and questioned the wisdom of risking a schism within the CGT, which would lessen the workers' power of resistance against the government and the employers at a critical time. He therefore proposed that the congress only appoint a committee to administer Cornelissen's Bulletin, and that it defer the question of a more substantial organization to the next congress. With the prospects of securing a majority for their proposal receding, but with assurances that the creation of a formal International would receive wide support at the next congress, the German and Dutch delegations ultimately relented and rallied to the Italian proposal. It would be unfortunate if schisms occurred in France, Kater observed in recalling the German proposal, but it was unavoidable. "The revolutionaries must sooner or later come over to us."49

Though a major step toward mutual accord, the withdrawal of the German proposal did not assure equability in the remainder of the deliberations. No unanimity could be reached on the question of the seat of the committee, or Information Bureau as it would be called. The Germans and the Dutch staunchly supported the proposal drafted in committee which called for the Bureau to be located in Amsterdam and its administration
entrusted to the Dutch, while De Ambris argued mightily and ceaselessly against it. He objected strongly to situating the Bureau in a country as small and little known as Holland. London would not do, for the British syndicalists were themselves obviously divided. The solution, De Ambris maintained, was to assign the Bureau to the Fédération de la Chapellerie in Paris. He called upon all his resources to defend his proposition. Though he cast his arguments in other terms, few delegates failed to realize that De Ambris's real objection concerned leaving the Bureau in the hands of the Dutch. The Dutch, with German support, would be free to work through the Bureau for the creation of a genuine International. Like De Ambris, the majority of the French delegation opposed the establishment of a rival International. To secure the Bureau for Paris would mean putting it into more moderate hands and might also placate the CGT (to which Michelet's Fédération belonged), which had clearly demonstrated its hostility to the idea of a Syndicalist International. For De Ambris, Dutch-German preeminence within the Bureau had to be avoided at all costs.

Most delegates, however, agreed with Bernardo that the reasons why the Bureau could sit in neither Paris (the CGT) nor Berlin (the ISNTUC) were self-evident, and that it therefore should be entrusted to the Dutch. As a last resort, De Ambris now proposed that the voting procedures be altered. To vote by delegate, as had been done thus far, obviously favoured those countries with the largest delegations and the results were not necessarily commensurate with the number of workers represented. He proposed instead that the vote on this issue be taken by nationality. Lively protests were lodged against the proposal. Kater opposed it vigorously, as did Rodriguez Romero, who branded it unacceptable as "contraire au principe fédéraliste," and therefore non-syndicalist. A vote (taken by
delegate) determined that the initial voting procedures be continued. His proposal defeated, an infuriated De Ambris announced his withdrawal from the congress.53

Following further discussion, the delegates voted to create an International Syndicalist Information Bureau which would act as a correspondence centre, foster international solidarity, and organize congresses. Each affiliated country would appoint a correspondent attached to the bulletin which the Bureau would publish and from which it would draw its revenue. The Bureau would sit at Amsterdam under the direction of a committee to be appointed by the Dutch syndicalists. The ten sections of the resolution were accepted unanimously, except that which assigned the Bureau to Amsterdam, which secured nineteen votes against ten for Paris.54 This completed the basic work of the congress. Lack of time prevented the discussion of the question of antimilitarism in the final sessions as had been hoped. In lieu of this, Kater stressed in his closing remarks that syndicalists were mortal enemies of all militarism, and when sufficiently organized in every country they would make war impossible.55 Kater observed that since the congress had been able to deal with only a few points on the agenda, the remaining items would be transferred to the next congress, to be held at Amsterdam.

The manifestations of the congress were not yet complete, however, for in the evening there was a large and enthusiastic public rally at Holborn Hall intended to crown and celebrate the congress. With the exception of Italy, all the countries with delegates at the congress were represented. The declaration of principles was read out and fervently applauded. The firebrand leader of the Dublin strikers, James Larkin, had accepted an invitation to speak if circumstances permitted, but was unable
to get away from Dublin. But there was no lack of spirited speakers who almost seemed to be vying in rebelliousness before the responsive crowd. Bowman was followed to the rostrum by two socialists, Ben Tillett and the Greek M. Drakoulis, but the remaining addresses, in the words of one reporter, "were all pure Syndicalism in various languages." The speakers included Swasey of the USA, Roche of Germany, Lansink Sr., and Markmann of Holland, Romero and Negre of Spain, Tanner and John Turner of Britain, and Michelet of France. Observers and participants alike were stirred by the rally, and the jubilant and spirited climate of international cordiality and solidarity helped to give the troubled congress a friendly conclusion.

IV. Appraisals and Parting Shots

In the wake of the congress the assessments began appearing. Those predisposed to welcome its failure felt fully justified in pronouncing that result and in emphasizing the often disorderly character of the proceedings in support of it. The exponents of social democracy directed none but the most critical words toward the congress. In Britain, Justice, nominally the organ of the British Socialist Party, pointed to the admission of German and Dutch delegates that their tactics included attempts to capture members from social-democratic unions as indicating the "divisionist" character of the congress. The declaration of principles was "a strange mixture of Socialism and Anarchism... In fact, the influence of Anarchism was apparent throughout, though it has taken unto itself the name of Syndicalism." The judgment of the German social democrats was even more severe. The organ of the Freien Gewerkschaften declared the congress to have been "unquestionable a complete fiasco." In its view no significant unions were represented. The declaration of principles "contains nothing
but trite phrases," and the Information Bureau, the Germans predicted, would not be able to collect even the purposefully low subscription fees of its potential members.59

A judgment nearly as harsh appeared from De Ambris. In an angry critique he declared the disappointing congress to have "largely failed in its purpose." The resolution dealing with the composition and seat of the committee "deserves our liveliest protests." To imprison the committee in "a small, almost ignored country like Holland is to condemn it to sterility, especially when one thinks of the shabbiness of thought demonstrated at the congress by the representatives of the Dutch organizations." De Ambris railed against the voting system which had produced this lamentable consequence. The London assembly could no longer be considered a real congress; rather, it must be regarded as "the preliminary meeting of that which tomorrow will be the true international syndicalist congress." If this goal could not be realized for several years, patience would be required. "The important thing in this matter is not so much to act quickly but to act well."60

Another group obviously predisposed to acclaim the failure of the congress were those French syndicalists who had challenged its right to existence from the beginning. Rosmer considered the assignment of reporting it a "grim task;" when its sessions were terminated, his first thought was simple and direct: "Good riddance!"61 The unswervingly critical account he published in La Vie Ouvrière stressed the personal conflicts of the assembly, which he buttressed by reproducing the harshest parts of De Ambris's article. The "blundering operations" of the congress as a whole, Rosmer declared, could only be "prejudicial to international trade unionism, and to syndicalism itself." The results of the congress did not impress
him. The declaration of principles was "not of a dazzling clarity." He predicted that only the German, Dutch and Swedish syndicalists would adhere to the Information Bureau; the Italians were unlikely to join and neither the Spanish nor its French advocates were in any position to provide it much support. The congress failed, Rosmer asserted, for two main reasons. The first was attributable to its very poor preparation. A second and more important reason was that the delegates themselves were divided on fundamental issues. Chief among these was the possibility of creating further schisms within the labouring classes. "For the Germans and also the Dutch, the division of the workers' forces ought to become the rule. Because it exists in their countries, they want it everywhere." Rosmer reiterated the arguments the French had employed before the congress. Though the struggle in countries where social democracy dominated the labour movement was difficult, it was nevertheless necessary to deal with the existing unions there, despite the moderation of their leadership, and win them over to syndicalist ideas. Rosmer professed to see changes in Britain, America and even Germany as demonstrating the correctness of this policy. Hence the French desire to remain in the International Federation of Trade Unions and to preserve the contacts of the CGT with the unions of these countries.

"This is neither the hour to despair nor to change method."

But the hope expressed by La Vie Ouvrière before the congress that once it had been held its participants would appreciate French arguments was not fulfilled. Although the dangers of schisms, especially in France, had played an important role in the discussions of the congress, few delegates accepted the view that the CGT had a serious role to play in the IFTU. In the wake of the debate surrounding the congress, Albert Jensen expressed the majority view when he declared that he found the participation of the
CGT in the IFTU a "more than comic situation" and French arguments in favour of this tactic "exceedingly lame." Its presence there, despite its own claims, did nothing to spread syndicalism:

It is not from the top downwards (via the IFTU) that this transformation takes place, but the opposite, from the bottom upwards by the continuous revolutionizing of the masses. The CGT as an organization has no influence in this direction; it is not the CGT which wins the international masses for syndicalism. On the contrary, its relative organizational weakness is often a serious hindrance to the spreading of our ideas in other countries. No, it is the syndicalist view itself which is so strongly constructed that it draws the masses to itself; and it is due to the advance of the revolutionary militants in their respective countries that these ideas get to be known and make victorious progress, and not at all due to the CGT, much less to its remaining in the old International. (63)

Despite regret that more items on the agenda had not been dealt with, and despite the difficulties of language and personality, the existence of which they made little effort to conceal in their respective reports, the general consensus among those involved in the congress, aside from De Ambris, was that it had achieved significant results. Cornelissen asserted that revolutionary unionists everywhere could be satisfied with its work. Because the large British and American unions were too conservative to adopt a less apathetic existence, and the centralist unions of Europe too permeated with social democracy, it had fallen to the syndicalists to organize an international workers' assembly. If they could retain their lead for a few years, their influence on the development of a workers' International would be great. 64 Attention was directed to the observation in Kater's presidential address that, as a first congress, it could be counted a success if the questions of theory and tactics and international organization were dealt with. "The congress has accomplished this and more cannot in fairness be expected of it," Die Einigkeit observed. 65 As the declaration of principles garnered the criticism of its natural opponents,
it was hailed by its supporters. The congress, Negre asserted, "has marked again with its decisions the true paths toward proletarian emancipation." Bowman declared that the formulation of the "historic declaration of principles" alone justified the existence of the congress. And while the German social democrats were dismissing its "trite phrases," in Sweden Gustav Sjöström, editor of *Syndikalisten*, was praising the declaration for having delivered a clear exposition of the economic content of syndicalism, which the "toothless, political, social-democratic old market women have sought to falsify for the sake of their own worthless wares." 66

But it was the establishment of the Information Bureau or committee of relations to which most supporters pointed as the major achievement of the congress; it was its "most important success" for Bernardo, and of preeminent significance for Negre, for it meant that "in future the scattered revolutionary elements of the different countries will not struggle in vain." For some of them the long-discussed distinction between a bureau or committee of relations and an International was immaterial, a linguistic ploy. Thus Duque, who also saw the creation of the Amsterdam Bureau as the item of central importance in the work of the congress, declared: "For us Spaniards, by reason of our conception of organization and spirit of decentralization, opposed to all functionarianism and professional bureaucratism, the appointment of a *comité d'entente*... established a new organization in the face of the Berlin Secretariat." Duque asserted that the Argentinian, Dutch and German delegations shared the Spanish view that "the revolutionary International has been created." And Jensen of Sweden observed that "whether one calls this Bureau a Correspondence Bureau, a Unity Committee, or whatever, it is nevertheless a fact that the new Red International is a reality," and added: "If one can avoid a fatal split
in France through a difference in name, then all is well."  

Though the creation of the Information Bureau was warmly received by most non-French syndicalists, they were under few illusions about the difficulty and immensity of the task that lay ahead of it. Thus Jensen again:

May we hope for the best from the newly-born one. And may we not exaggerate. The child is no world power, simply because it has been born, but it can become one if we all strongly will it, for all the conditions exist [for its growth]. If we will it, we shall conquer, although after many a bitter struggle.

Similarly, for Negre, the Amsterdam Bureau was "a potent organization of world solidarity," but one which required further strenuous efforts to actualize its potential. If the syndicalists of the various countries worked with all their energies toward this goal, "the surpassing force of revolutionary syndicalism will be demonstrated in incontrovertible form."

For the Germans of the FVDG, the congress had erected the scaffolding for the revolutionary class struggle; it was up to the syndicalist militants to complete the structure.  

Nor to the Argentinians of the FORA had the congress been a failure; quite the reverse: they considered it a large success and were confident that from the work it had initiated would come a new, "purely worker and anti-statist" International. The congress was doubly rewarding for La Protesta, for it was not only an important step forward internationally, but it also constituted a great moral and doctrinal victory over the FORA's domestic rival, the Regional Workers' Confederation. For the latter had given its mandate to De Ambris, and in the absence of the large reformist union organizations (amongst which La Protesta included the CGT), De Ambris alone had represented the reformist tendency at the congress. In the end De Ambris had had "to bite the dust of a complete rout." But if this were
not enough, *La Protesta* had even more startling news with which to mark its victory over its domestic opponent. Because it was late in reporting the congress, it was able to include the disturbing news that within a month of his appearance there, De Ambris had been elected to the Italian parliament. Small wonder, *La Protesta* implied, that against the clearly anti-statist interpretation supported by the FORA at the congress, De Ambris, "who was on the eve of being elected a deputy and by consequence of forming part of the state, struggled with real energy."69

In Amsterdam the Dutch began the work of the International Bureau. A provisional committee issued over Markmann's signature a call for the syndicalist organizations to adhere: "Forward on behalf of revolutionary and international syndicalism. We have full confidence in being supported by the revolutionary syndicalists in all countries."70 In the early months of 1914 a permanent committee headed by van Erkel and Markmann was established. As the Bureau prepared to launch its bulletin, Cornelissen terminated his own *Bulletin* on March 22, and offered his assistance to that of the Bureau. The first issue of the Bureau's publication, which took the same name as Cornelissen's *Bulletin International du Mouvement Syndicaliste*, appeared with the date 1-5 April 1914. The editorial duties remained primarily in Cornelissen's hands.71 In introducing the first issue, Markmann spoke with confidence in the ability of the *Bulletin* to overcome the inevitable difficulties attending all new works and of its enabling the Bureau "to continue in an ever more energetic and systematic fashion the propaganda of the principles of syndicalism and of our tactic of revolutionary struggle within the international workers' movement." But the new *Bulletin* was to be as shortlived as peace in Europe. The first issue offered reports from Germany, Portugal and England. The last report of the
seventeenth and last issue, appearing at the end of July, dealt, ironically, with the Balkans. 72

V. Conclusion

The significance of the 1913 congress has been little remarked and the virtual silence with which it has been passed over broken only occasionally by an acknowledgement of its existence. 73 Yet it bore a significance which should not be overlooked and which relates to the post- as well as to the pre-war period. In the first place, the congress served to underline the degree to which syndicalism had become an international movement by 1913. De Ambris's earlier desire that the congress become an affirmation of syndicalism as an international and not merely a French "mode" was indeed realized, even if in a manner which De Ambris could not fully commend. Moreover, the form which this affirmation took is instructive. As the first international articulation of the principles of syndicalism, the declaration unanimously endorsed at London indicated clearly that its formulators viewed the libertarian elements in the syndicalist matrix not simply as incidental, but as integral components of the syndicalist creed. This is especially evident in the case of anti-statism. The London declaration explicitly condemned the state and saw its destruction as much as an objective of syndicalism as the abolition of capitalist exploitation. Though the CGT professed the same goal, its 1906 Charte d'Amiens, by contrast, made no explicit reference to the state. To judge by the debate in London, the syndicalists assembled there would not have accepted the Charte d' Amiens, often considered the classical statement of revolutionary syndicalism, as an adequate expression of their viewpoint. And in fact the Charte was above all a document of compromise, a formula designed to shield organ-
izational unity from the perils of ideological dissonance. As an attempt to bridge doctrinal differences and neutralize the effects of the ideological dissent which characterized the history of the CGT, the Charté may well be considered a classical expression of French syndicalism. But in the absence of the CGT, the major syndicalist organizations represented in London were organizationally independent of the reformist and political elements in the labour movements of their respective countries. They spoke for the revolutionary syndicalists alone. If the Charté d'Amiens is the classical expression of pre-war French syndicalism, the London declaration may equally be considered the classical expression of pre-war syndicalism, beyond French borders. And the London declaration demonstrated the degree to which the syndicalists of Europe viewed syndicalism as being essentially anarcho-syndicalism. This doctrinal determination had its corollary ten years later when the International Working Men's Association was founded. The 1922-23 founding congress made the anarcho-syndicalist foundation of the new International explicit. The IWMA was fully justified in looking back upon the London congress as the pioneering effort of syndicalist internationalism.

In organizational terms, the congress had been a step towards a Syndicalist International, though a faltering one. The syndicalists gathered at London took the internationalism of their creed seriously and they insisted that labour internationalism return to the revolutionism which had attended it birth fifty years earlier. The IFTU, wedded to reformism and the Second International, could not fulfill this task, and few delegates accepted the arguments of the CGT in this respect. Nor did any of the independent syndicalist union organizations of Europe accept the argument of the CGT that the task of syndicalism outside France was the permeation
of existing reformist unions. The London congress nevertheless demonstrated considerable solicitude for the CGT. The delicate internal situation in France was discussed with sympathy in London, and with far more candour than it had been in the pages of La Vie Ouvrière. The decision to delay the establishment of a Syndicalist Secretariat and to settle temporarily for the creation of an Information Bureau owed more to the desire to avoid a split in French labour than to any other factor, though the CGT felt unable to acknowledge the solicitude and deference shown it. The compromise solution on the question of international organization, moreover, contributed to the note of frustration woven through the reports of some of the congress supporters. The need for legitimization and self-assertion had not been fully satisfied. Though they could describe the congress as an advance for the syndicalist movement, they recognized that it had not been a full, but at most a half, step forward.

Those delegates who predicted that the split in France would eventually come were correct, though it came in circumstances which they scarcely could have foreseen. In the wake of war and revolution, moderates and revolutionaries found cohabitation in a single CGT impossible, and the international question played a crucial role in the rupture which followed. In international policy, however, neither group would carry the apoliticism of their pre-war creed to its logical conclusion, the former taking refuge in the resuscitated, reformist IFTU, the latter in the highly politicized Red International of Labour Unions, the trade union appendage of the Communist International. It would remain to the non-French syndicalists to pursue the establishment of a revolutionary trade union International free of political tutelage. The debate over the nature of the Comintern and the RILU and the question of international allegiance would preoccupy the syn-
The syndicalists of Europe in the post-war period. Events demonstrated that the issues surrounding the 1913 congress served as a prelude to those which predominated in post-war debates on labour internationalism. The syndicalists, in advance of the Bolsheviks, had proclaimed the need for a new and genuinely revolutionary International. The Bolshevik Revolution and the emergence of communist internationalism, far from provoking the creation of a Syndicalist International, actually acted to delay it, if also to accentuate its libertarian basis. The London congress had served notice of the necessity perceived by many syndicalists that they chart their own course, nationally and internationally. But ten years passed before the syndicalist flotilla assembled and set sail in international waters.
CHAPTER FOUR

WAR AND REVOLUTION: THE APPEAL OF MOSCOW

The momentous upheaval wrought in Europe by the outbreak of world war was accompanied by a climacteric within the collective conscience of the radical left everywhere on the Continent. The effects of the emotionally charged crisis would be felt for years. The damage to the Second International, widely discredited by the open support of the war by nearly every socialist party in belligerent nations, proved irreparable.

But it was not only among political socialists that the crisis of conscience was felt. Except for a small dissenting minority from the start, the French syndicalists, similarly stirred by a long-dormant patriotism, heeded the call of national defense, and found themselves joining in the 'union sacrée'. The major national syndicalist organizations connected with the London congress, however, remained faithful to their conviction of the primacy of the class struggle and its attendant anti-nationalism. Only in Italy did the appeals of nationalism, accompanied by irredentism, seriously and visibly convulse the syndicalist camp when De Ambris and his supporters, unable to convert the USI en bloc to an interventionist stance, led about a third of its members out of the organization. Elsewhere, despite the occasional presence of a vocal minority of pro-war syndicalists, the majoritarian position remained one of opposition to the war and the syndicalists could easily demonstrate the baselessness of the later Bolshevik blanket accusation that the trade union leaders had betrayed the
workers by supporting the war.

Despite the attempts of the Syndicalist Bureau in Holland to continue functioning as a centre of communication after August 1914, the conditions imposed upon Europe by war, and not least the censorship of the post, made it impossible to maintain contact with the syndicalist forces. The Dutch committee itself had to endure the domestic embarrassment of seeing Cornelissen, with whom it had been on intimate terms, return to Holland shortly after the outbreak of hostilities and begin a campaign for Dutch intervention in the war. Cornelissen added his name to that of other anarchists and anarcho-syndicalists in the famous 'Manifesto of the Sixteen' which appeared in December of 1914 urging support for the Allies. The manifesto, which for most libertarians evidenced the apostasy of the signatories, particularly that of the venerable Kropotkin, and which drew disavowals and critiques by such noted figures as Malatesta, Schapiro and Rudolf Rocker, was widely repudiated by the syndicalists.

I. Renewed Attempts

Its functions rendered impossible of fulfillment, the syndicalists' International Bureau faded, possibly with the assistance of the Dutch government, out of existence. The Dutch syndicalists, likely sensitive to the responsibility with which they had been charged by their assembled colleagues in 1913, did not, however, wish to abandon the work begun at London whose urgency and crucial importance was now accentuated by the revulsion they felt for the war. In January 1917 the NAS managed to initiate the circulation of an appeal, signed by the two Lansinks, calling for the revolutionary organizations of all countries to participate in a new congress to be held after the war. Appalled by the savagery and suffering
of the capitalist and imperialist inspired war, the NAS castigated social democracy and the reformist trade unions which had not acted to prevent the catastrophe, but adopted a stance of national defense and thereby sacrificed the internationalism of the proletariat. Thus the NAS called for the creation of a revolutionary International to combat nationalism, militarism, capitalism and imperialism. The task of preventing future wars fell to the syndicalist organizations. The NAS lamented that the syndicalist movement had previously been inadequately organized internationally and that the 1913 congress had won insufficient sympathy from the revolutionary workers of all countries. But, the circular continued, the syndicalists had called attention to the "pernicious" influence of social democracy and the reformist unions, the "reactionary influence" of which had prevailed within the international movement. "There must be a stop put to this influence." Toward this end the NAS called for an international congress of revolutionary syndicalists at war's end. In war-time conditions the circular did not get far, but it was noted in the radical labour press of the Scandinavian countries and Germany.

Even with the war over, the immediate post-war conditions of turmoil and disorganization prevented the syndicalists from quickly proceeding with their international plans. In November 1918 the Dutch repeated their appeal, and in the first post-war conference of the FVDG (December 1918) the Germans expressed a readiness to proceed with an international meeting. The Scandinavians were similarly inclined, and a conference of delegates from Norway, Denmark and Sweden was held at Copenhagen, 20-22 February 1919. Passport difficulties prevented the Dutch and the Germans from attending. The conference decided that an international congress should be prepared by the Dutch, and that if the NAS was unable to arrange it,
the Danes would accept the responsibility. In response to the Copenhagen decision, the NAS in May 1919 issued another invitation, over the signature of the younger Lansink, summoning delegates to a congress to be held at Amsterdam in August for the purpose of establishing a syndicalist International which would divorce the workers from a treacherous reformism and combat the causes of war. When it became clear that the Dutch government would not permit revolutionary delegates to enter Holland, the congress was postponed and the Amsterdam site abandoned in favour of Copenhagen. The Danes, however, encountered similar problems and the congress was rescheduled for the spring of 1920 in Sweden, but the Swedish government also refused to permit a revolutionary assembly to be held on its soil.

The post-war conditions in which the syndicalists sought to continue their international endeavours were far different from those obtaining before the war. On the very eve of the war, the syndicalists, with the notable exception of the CGT, had made their first faltering steps at the London congress to oppose the IFTU not merely on ideological grounds, but from a sounder organizational base as well. The continued pursuit of this goal was urgent, for the IFTU was rather quickly reconstituted after the war. Conjointly with the February 1919 International Socialist Conference at Berne, which represented a portion of those earlier affiliated with the Second International and which sought to create a new Socialist International, an International Trade Union Conference was held in which the decision was taken to establish a new IFTU. This was done in July at a meeting held at Amsterdam and attended by representatives of thirteen European countries and the American Federation of Labor. The new IFTU, or the 'Amsterdam International'--which took that city as its seat--represented over seventeen million workers.
But events in Russia since 1917 converted the question of the international allegiance of the European (and world) left into a vastly more complicated one than it had been before the war. The Bolshevik Revolution and its consequences opened new avenues of international action and caused leftists of all hues to reconsider their goals and tactics. Like all revolutionaries, the syndicalists of Europe had to confront and come to terms with the reality of revolution and the still evolving Bolshevik ideology.

The initial response to the Bolshevik Revolution, when measured by the heterogeneous nature of syndicalist opinion, varied enormously. To those syndicalists who had abandoned their erstwhile anti-militarism and thrown their support behind a patriotic war, the Bolshevik victory and the withdrawal of Russia from the war could not be welcomed and, indeed, struck many as nothing less than treasonous. This was the majoritarian opinion of the CGT, which was supporting the union sacrée and which would emerge from the war with an all but openly reformist position. In the pages of its publications, the Bolsheviks were denounced as "deux douzaines de démagogues" and-as tyrants, Lenin as a "pseudo-revolutionary" and a "traitor," and the activities in exile of the deposed Kerensky described not only as aiming at the salvation of Russia but also at "le triomphe de notre commun idéal." Writing in early 1919 in an article entitled "Allons-nous vers le Bolchevisme?," Pierre Dumas, Secretary of the Fédération des Travailleurs de l'Habillement, in effect summed up in retrospect the majoritarian opinion in France to the Revolution and Russia's withdrawal from the war: "Thousands of French soldiers have paid with their life for what the great majority of people call 'the Russian betrayal'." The minority interventionist group in Italy saw in Lenin's victory a challenge to the national-
ism which the war had brought them to recognize and embrace. For De Ambris, the communist Revolution threatened the curious amalgam of nationalism and supranational class solidarity which he had been compelled to develop:

It is precisely my belief that the class struggle should be understood as a beneficial element of social progress . . . which will lead to the true emancipation of the working class, not through authoritarian communism, but through an internationally integrated libertarian trade union association which does not exclude but presupposes the existence and the free and harmonious development of all nations. (11)

Within those syndicalist organizations which had maintained greater doctrinal consistency and which had opposed the war, however, the response to the Revolution was one of jubilant enthusiasm. "A world of tyranny and slavery . . . is collapsing," Tierra y Libertad (14 November 1917) declared at Barcelona. "The world is being swept by the revitalizing breath of the advancing social revolution!" Syndicalist groups everywhere in Europe rushed to declare their solidarity with the Revolution. Armando Borghi, who had opposed De Ambris' attempt to convert the USI to the interventionist stance and who became its main leader after the secession of the pro-war faction, recalled the reception of the Revolution: "We made it our polar star. We exulted in its victories. We trembled at its risks . . . . We made a symbol and an altar of its name, its dead, its living and its heroes."13

The generally favourable reception of the Revolution among western syndicalists is not difficult to understand. Information about the nature of the Revolution continued to be slight, but in its early forms and slogans the syndicalists could easily detect the basis of a close kinship between their own conceptions and the shape the Revolution appeared to be taking. The organization of factory committees and the call of 'All power to the Soviets' seemed to the western syndicalists to embody their own
ideals of local autonomy and anti-statism. This perceived affinity was reinforced by Lenin's *State and Revolution*, one of the few sustained (if uncharacteristic) formulations of Bolshevik ideology abroad in the early post-revolutionary period. *State and Revolution* repudiated the social democratic conviction that the state could be infiltrated and captured by gradualist tactics and emphasized that tendency of Marxism which called for the sudden destruction of the state in a revolutionary upheaval. Social democratic theorists in the West, who viewed themselves as the custodians of Marxist orthodoxy, regarded *State and Revolution* as something other than Marxism and some dismissed it as 'Blanquism with sauce tartare'. On the other hand, it appealed to the syndicalists who had always contrasted their revolutionism with reformism. Nor were they repelled by the customary dogmas of state socialism of the Marxism with which they were familiar, since Lenin stressed the need for a transitional state only. The proletariat required "only a withering away State--a State, that is, so constituted that it begins to wither away immediately, and cannot but wither away." The transitional proletarian state "must begin to wither away immediately after its victory, because in a community without class antagonisms, the State is unnecessary and impossible." At London in 1913 the syndicalists had emphasized their anti-statist position, and they could welcome Lenin's assertions that "while the State exists there can be no freedom. When there is freedom there will be no State," and that "we do not at all disagree with the Anarchists on the question of the abolition of the State as a final aim." Alfred Rosmer, in recalling the impression made in the West by *State and Revolution*, wrote that:

this Blanquism and its sauce was an agreeable revelation for the revolutionaries situated outside orthodox Marxism, for the
syndicalists and anarchists. Such language had never issued from the mouths of the Marxists whom they knew. They read and re-read this interpretation of Marx to which they were not accustomed. (15)

Though the war had put an end to the Syndicalist Information Bureau established in Holland, it also acted as a spur to renewed international efforts after the war. With the exception of the CGT, the refurbished IFTU found little sympathy in syndicalist organizations, which viewed the war as having irrefutably demonstrated the bankruptcy of reformist trade unionism. Unlike the pre-war period, however, the syndicalists no longer found themselves alone in the effort to establish a new and revolutionary International, for in the spring of 1919 Moscow formally proclaimed itself the centre of revolutionary internationalism. The impetus of syndicalist internationalism was, in effect, deflected by the Russian Revolution, and by the creation, first, of the Third International and, second, of the Red International of Labour Unions. Could the syndicalists find their own international aspirations fulfilled at Moscow? The assessment of the course of the Revolution and of communist internationalism became urgent and unavoidable issues confronting western syndicalists.

II. Syndicalism in Russia and the Revolution

If the anarchists and syndicalists of the West who welcomed the Revolution were to experience some difficulty in reaching a final judgment concerning it, it was scarcely surprising. The various groups of libertarians in Russia were similarly questioning their own attitudes to the unfolding events of Revolution and the increasing ascendancy of the Bolsheviks.
After the February Revolution, the libertarian elements in Russia, including the syndicalists, for whom the first revolution stood in obvious disparity with the social revolution they desired, were, along with the Bolsheviks, the only radical groups in the country which advocated the overthrow of the Provisional Government. This unnatural and somewhat uneasy alliance was buttressed by the return of Lenin and the coloration he was giving to Bolshevik ideology at the time. For the domestic libertarian movement, in short, as for the foreign movement, the Lenin of 1917 appeared much closer to their own position than he had ever been.

The very day of his arrival at Petrograd, Lenin began predicting the substitution of a republic of workers' soviets for the newly installed bourgeois government. Nor did he make any mention of any Constituent Assembly, of which the anti-politicals would of course disapprove. The next day he announced his 'April Theses' to the social democrats, which declared the situation in Russia to be one of transition from the first bourgeois state of revolution to "its second step, which will place power in the hands of the proletariat and the poorest strata of the peasantry." The 'Theses' reiterated Lenin's formulations of the day before, and called for the abolition of the army, as well as the police and the bureaucracy, and for the establishment of a regime of soviets in lieu of a parliament. The social democrats, wedded to the idea of a long intermediate bourgeois state which had to precede the workers' revolution, were astounded. One of them (I.P. Goldenberg) exclaimed that "Lenin has now made himself a candidate for one European throne that has been vacant for thirty years--the throne of Bakunin! Lenin's words echo something old--the super-annuated truths of primitive anarchism." The social democrats were not alone in perceiving Lenin as now hovering somewhere between Marxism and anarchism.
A great many of the libertarian elements in Russia could not escape the same conclusion. Lenin's subsequent sharp declarations in favour of the immediate investiture of workers' control and of the transfer of estates to the peasants further reinforced the appearance of a close kinship between the libertarians and the Bolsheviks.\footnote{18}

The indigenous syndicalist movement in Russia was bolstered in the summer of 1917 by the establishment in Petrograd of a voice and a vehicle of propaganda in the form of a newspaper, \textit{Golos Truda (The Voice of Labour)}, as the organ of the Union of Anarcho-Syndicalist Propaganda. \textit{Golos Truda} had, in effect, been transplanted from New York City. There it had been the weekly of the Union of the Russian Workers of the United States and Canada. Its editor, Maksim Raevskii, preceded it to Russia, where he was joined by two more Russian refugees who had worked with \textit{Golos Truda} in New York, Bill Shatov and Voline, the pseudonym of V.M. Eikhenbaum. They were joined on the new editorial staff by Alexander Schapiro, now returned to Russia after twenty-five years abroad, and by the young G.P. Maximoff, who had participated in the February Revolution.

\textit{Golos Truda} began publication in August of 1917 and before long had reached a circulation of 25,000 in Petrograd.\footnote{19} In its first issue it declared itself opposed to Bolsheviks, Mensheviks, and all political parties,\footnote{20} and called for a revolution which would be "anti-statist in its methods of struggle, syndicalist in its economic content, and federalist in its political tasks," whereby a free federation of "peasant unions, industrial unions, factory committees, control commissions, and the like in localities all over the country" would be substituted for the centralized state.\footnote{21}
Within two months Golos Truda offered an assessment of the Bolshevik program. Voline saw it as having moved closer to that favoured by the libertarians, particularly on the questions of workers' control and the disposition of the land. But the Bolsheviks, Voline observed, had still not jettisoned enough of their Marxism. They still supported a Constituent Assembly, the nationalization of land, the preeminence of Bolshevik leadership in the workers' movement and in the Revolution. And though they realized the potentiality of a genuine social revolution, they still sought not to destroy the state but merely to seize it. Voline nonetheless saw the ideological rapport between the Bolsheviks and the libertarians as increasing.

The syndicalist group organized around Golos Truda threw itself into propagandizing and proselytizing with much vigour and energy. Translations of western syndicalists, such as Pelloutier, Yvetot, Pataud and Pouget, Cornelissen and others, as well as tracts by Bakunin and Kropotkin, were turned out in its printing plant, and its supporters were especially active in the factory committee movement.

The factory committees had arisen spontaneously with the February Revolution and soon spread to all the industrial centres of Russia. The syndicalists naturally attached great importance to them and strove to increase decentralization in the industrial system by means of them. They were preferred to the unions themselves, which sought to assert control over the committees, were often dominated by Mensheviks, and which the syndicalists dismissed as reformist. The syndicalists had appreciable success in capturing segments of the factory committee movement in the South, in Moscow, and in Petrograd, where Shatov and Maximoff were quickly elevated through the committees to become energetic members of the Central
Council of Petrograd Factory Committees.

But the Bolsheviks were also active amongst the factory committees and with even greater success, not least because of their greater attention to principles of organization, which the syndicalists were less inclined to cultivate. The kinship which the syndicalists saw between themselves and the Bolsheviks during this period, however, led the former to take some satisfaction that it was the Bolsheviks, and not the Mensheviks, who were coming to ascendancy in the labour movement.

The uneasy alliance between the libertarians and the Bolsheviks continued throughout the Kerensky period and the libertarians played a role both in the July uprising and in the October Revolution. The alliance, however, did not long survive the Revolution itself. The announcement of a Soviet Government and the immediate creation of a (wholly Bolshevik) Soviet of People's Commissars quickly drew libertarian criticism against the first signs of the centralization of power, as did the Declaration of Rights which endorsed the creation of independent national states within Russia.

The initial labour policy of the Bolsheviks with its great emphasis upon factory committees and workers' control, though not pleasing to all libertarians, did not alienate the Russian syndicalists. But this short-lived policy was soon displaced by one stressing the 'centralisation of workers' control' by subordinating the factory committees to state controlled trade unions. This move was initiated at the Bolshevik dominated First All-Russian Congress of Trade Unions in early January, and while the syndicalists present vigorously opposed these decisions, they had largely ignored the trade union side of the labour movement, now dominated by Bolsheviks, and were but a small minority within the congress.
The mounting withdrawal of libertarian support from the Bolsheviks was mitigated somewhat by the suppression of the Constituent Assembly, but the uncertain reconciliation was breached again with the treaty of Brest-Litovsk which all libertarians, the syndicalists included, opposed as a concession to imperialism. They recognized that Russia could not continue normal military action against Germany, but preferred guerilla warfare deep within the country to a surrender to German expansionism. 24

As the libertarian-Bolshevik relationship continued to deteriorate, the main locus of activity shifted to Moscow. When the Bolsheviks moved the government there, Golos Truda followed suit and began publishing at Moscow. The new capital was already a centre of libertarian influence and there were numerous anarchist centres in the city. The most important of these was the 'House of Anarchy', the main headquarters of the Moscow Federation of Anarchists. The Federation had raised and armed several thousand 'Black Guards' in anticipation of guerilla warfare with the Germans, but also to defend themselves against the hostility of the new regime and of the 'Red Guards'. The existence of armed bands of anarchists constituted a threat which the Bolsheviks could not ignore. Under the pretext of suppressing 'banditry', the government made its first serious open move against the libertarian opposition during the night of 11-12 April, when the Cheka and the Red Army raided numerous anarchist centres in Moscow. In a few places, particularly at the House of Anarchy, there was fierce resistance and 40 anarchists were killed and hundreds captured. In the wake of the Moscow action, further raids against anarchists were conducted in other cities and many libertarian publications, including Golos Truda, were suppressed. The Bolsheviks had in fact been hampering its publication and distribution since their seizure of power. 25
The syndicalists, however, continued their organizational endeavours and condemned the terrorist campaigns launched by some extremist anarchists and Left Social Revolutionaries (elements from these groups in September 1918 bombed the headquarters of the Moscow Committee of the Communist Party, killing a dozen members and wounding many more), as anachronistic and counter-productive.

Although attempts to unite the entirety of the Russian libertarian movement—a daunting task indeed—had come to nought, the syndicalists were somewhat more successful within their own smaller sphere. In August 1918 the first All-Russian Conference of Anarcho-Syndicalists was held at Moscow and at the same time a successor to Golos Truda appeared with the title Vol'nyi Golos Truda (Free Voice of Labour). The new journal was in the hands of the left-wing of the syndicalist movement (its editors were Maximoff, M. Cherkeres and Efim Iarchuk). In both the congress and the pages of the new organ the Bolshevik policies were subjected to scathing criticism.

The congress repudiated nearly the whole of Bolshevik policy. It called for the abolition of the Soviet of People's Commissars and reiterated the demand for a federation of free soviets. It urged the syndicalists to work within the local soviets, but only those in which a "free and creative" labour was still possible. On the economic front, the 'state capitalism' of the Bolsheviks was denounced and Lenin's 'war communism' repudiated. In lieu of Bolshevik land policy, the congress pronounced in favour of autonomous peasant communes; against Bolshevik industrial policy, the dominance of state-guided trade unions was rejected in favour of a return to workers' control and the factory committees abandoned by the communists.26
The syndicalist critique both before and after this congress naturally centred around the introduction of centralization by the Bolsheviks in the guise of the dictatorship of the proletariat. The 'statizing' tendencies of the Bolshevik regime were continuously assailed. The regime was condemned for the "statization" of industry (Voline); for enslaving the workers again by introducing "a new 'statized' morality" (Maximoff?); indeed, for "statizing the human personality" (Trud i Volia). A lengthy critique of the regime's 'state capitalism' in Vol'nyi Golos Truda at the time of the syndicalist conference, probably by Maximoff, conceded that the Bolsheviks might have had good intentions, that concern for human misery might have moved them, but that not even the best of motives could reach fruition if the centralization of power was introduced. To the syndicalists, the course of the Revolution was demonstrating once again the axiomatic character of that proposition. Critiques of the policies of the regime as 'state capitalism' were scarcely welcomed by the communists, however, and Vol'nyi Golos Truda was quickly suppressed.

The syndicalists nonetheless continued their labours. Now painfully aware of the consequences of their earlier neglect of organizational questions and cognizant of the error of having originally been content to work too much in tandem with the Bolsheviks, the syndicalists began striving for greater independence and for wider and more intimate links among syndicalist groups. A second Anarcho-Syndicalist conference held in November 1918 turned its attention to these issues. It promulgated the usual syndicalist policies, including a call for the "general expropriation of the expropriators—including the state." To correct organizational deficiencies, the conference resolved to intensify its propaganda among the factory workers and to establish an All-Russian Confederation of Anarcho-Syndicalists to
which Maximoff and Iarchuk were appointed as officers. The syndicalists' attempt to retrenchment, however, was another case of too little and too late, and their position could not move beyond a defensive one against the mounting anti-libertarian campaign of the Bolsheviks. They recorded no appreciable numerical success in expanding their movement within the factories, though the persistence of their appeal among the workers in general increasingly disconcerted their Bolshevik opponents. The plans of the Confederation to hold a third syndicalist conference in Moscow in the spring of 1919 were rendered impossible by the conditions of repression.

III. Foundation of the Communist International

There was a congress held at Moscow in the spring of 1919, but of a rather different kind than that the Russian syndicalists had envisaged. It was sponsored by the Bolsheviks and marked the foundation of the Third or Communist International (CI).

Lenin had been contemplating the foundation of a new International since the outbreak of the war. Though never very content with the organizational form of the Second International and cognizant of the moderation of many of its leading figures, he had worked actively within it for years. The conduct of many of the leading socialists upon the outbreak of war dismayed him intensely and he was shocked by the voting of war credits by the German SPD. From that moment the resurrection of the old International became completely unacceptable to Lenin and he shortly began propagating the call for the creation of a purified and genuinely revolutionary International which would unite the left-wings of the social democratic parties. At the international socialist meetings at Zimmerwald (1915) and Kienthal (1916), the policies pursued by Lenin and Zinoviev of converting the war into a civil, class war, and of waging a concerted attack
upon the right and center of the existing socialist parties by the left, united in a new International, were rejected by the moderates and remained the minority position.

Upon his return to Russia, Lenin immediately reiterated the necessity for a Third International in his 'April Theses'. The Bolshevik Party made the demand a postulate of its official policy. The immediate task of imposing some order upon a chaotic Russia in the months following the overthrow of the Provisional Government, and of defending the Revolution in a country plunged into civil war and subjected to a hostile blockade, prevented the Bolsheviks from directing any attention to the creation of a Communist International for some time.

The decision that the time had come to implement their international policy was influenced by several factors. There was the growing conviction among the Bolsheviks that the Allies were, in the immediate post-war period, inclined neither to withdraw their troops from Russia, nor to end the blockade of the country, nor to respond seriously to Bolshevik overtures for a negotiated end to intervention. If there had been any reluctance to launch the CI for fear of jeopardizing the possibility of negotiations with the Allies, the force of this consideration rapidly ebbed in the face of apparent Allied intransigence. Moreover, the obvious revolutionary climate of post-armistice Europe played an important role in convincing the Bolsheviks that the time had come to act and act quickly. The need to coordinate the impending revolutionary wave prompted the Bolsheviks, who expected the revolutions of central Europe soon to be carried to communist lengths, to initiate plans for the summoning of the founding congress of the CI. In addition, the formation of a communist party in Germany (the KPD(S), founded at the very end of 1918) further encouraged the Bolsheviks in their
course. The latter believed that the existence of an independent communist party in the most highly industrialized nation of Europe to be a *sine qua non* for the success of a Communist International. Finally, the actual timing of the Bolshevik move probably owed more to the calling of an international socialist conference to meet in Switzerland to work for the renewal of socialist unity (this was the Berne conference held in February 1919, but originally planned for January at Lausanne) than to any other factor. Lenin naturally feared that the great majority of the European proletariat would be captured by the reformists, the socialist 'traitors', if the Second International were resurrected. The immediate creation of the CI, or at least the announcement of its imminence, constituted the counter-stroke with which to minimize this threat. Thus when the news of the calling of the Berne conference reached Moscow, the preparations for the founding of the CI acquired a new urgency.  

Within this framework of events there issued from Moscow a somewhat hastily prepared invitation to 39 specified leftist organizations and "trends" to attend the first congress of the Communist International. The invitation briefly described the aims and tactics of the proposed International. The disintegration of the entirety of European civilization was imminent if capitalism was not quickly destroyed. This was to be done by the immediate seizure of state power by the proletariat and the implementation of the dictatorship of the proletariat to oversee the nationalization of the industrial, agricultural and monetary structures of society. Parliamentarism was denigrated, although only indirectly. In the new proletarian state there would be no "parliamentarianism, but self-government of the masses by their elected organs . . . . Its concrete form is given in the regime of the Soviets or of similar organs." There was no explicit repu-
diation of parliamentarism, however, as a legitimate communist tactic in
the pre-revolutionary stage. But the invitation was not in any sense an
outline of tactics for a protracted struggle. It mirrored the Bolshevik
anticipation of an imminent series of cataclysmic revolutions and empha­
sized only that "the basic methods of struggle are mass actions of the pro­
etariat right up to open armed conflict with the political power of
capital." The rejection of socialists of the right and centre was made
explicit.

Though directed primarily to the left socialists, the invitation
was not directed solely to them. The Bolsheviks were clearly aware of the
revolutionary potential within the labour movement which the socialist
parties did not represent. The syndicalists obviously fell into this
category. Their rejection of socialist reformism, if not their anti­
statism, aligned them with the Bolsheviks and the latter recognized that
syndicalism constituted a revolutionary force which they could not ignore.
Article ten of the invitation made it clear that the syndicalists would be
welcomed within the CI:

On the other hand, it is necessary to form a bloc with those
elements in the revolutionary workers' movement who, although
they did not formerly belong to socialist parties, now stand by
and large for the proletarian dictatorship in the form of Soviet
power. Chief among these are the syndicalist elements in the
workers' movement. (31)

Thus with their first act in the quest to establish the Comintern, the
Bolsheviks had already begun their attempt to woo the syndicalists. The
same motive before long would play a central role in the creation of the
Red International of Labour Unions as well.

The first congress of the CI opened in early March at Moscow. Only
in the course of the meetings was it definitely decided that the assembly
would constitute the founding congress of the Comintern. A genuinely representative meeting was impossible in isolated Russia and very few of the delegates had come from beyond the Soviet frontiers expressly for the congress. Representation from western Europe was scant and apparently only two or three of the delegates from the West had any definite authority to speak to the issue of the establishment of an International on behalf of legitimate socialist or communist organizations. Ironically, the most important of these, Hugo Eberlein of the German KPD(S), had been instructed by his party to oppose the creation of an International, though not on any point of principle, but rather as premature. It was Eberlein who observed pointedly that what was missing at the congress was the whole of western Europe. The majority of the delegates said to speak on behalf of movements outside Russia constituted a motley collection of leftist prisoners-of-war and foreign radicals whose presence in Russia was either fortuitous or a matter of individual initiative. The Bolsheviks, however, believed that circumstances precluded any delay in the formal creation of an International. Since the composition and voting procedures of the congress ensured Bolshevik predominance, Eberlein's reservations were an obstacle which they could easily, if somewhat reluctantly, overcome.32

The general themes embodied in the documents of the first Comintern congress were essentially a continuation of those reflections which Lenin had been developing since the outbreak of World War, but now given distinctive coloration by the realities of the Bolshevik seizure of power, the regenerative stirrings of the Second International witnessed at Berne, and the quasi-revolutionary climate in much of Europe. The call for the violent seizure of power by the proletariat and the forceful destruction of the bourgeois state was repeated, but even greater emphasis was placed upon
the tactics to be adopted towards the non-left socialists and the need to split with them. Attention focused upon the repudiation of nearly everything the Berne conference had accepted, including support for the League of Nations and the democratic principles endorsed by the Branting resolution. The necessity of the dictatorship of the proletariat was vigorously defended against the rejection of any kind of dictatorship by the Berne conference. Stress was placed upon the economic centralization to be instituted by the proletarian dictatorship, but there was little said or even implied about political centralization or the role of the communist party in the new society. On the contrary, "proletarian democracy . . . begins at once to prepare for the complete withering of any kind of State."

Direct mass action was emphasized throughout and parliamentarism denigrated, though never explicitly repudiated. Even the "revolutionary use of bourgeois parliaments, must be subordinated to . . . methods of mass action leading logically to direct clashes with the bourgeois State machine in open struggle." 33

The congress appealed to workers everywhere to struggle against the "yellow strike-breaking international" which the Berne assembly strove to create, and to warn their comrades "against this lying and fraudulent international." In the 'Manifesto of the Communist International to the Proletariat of the Entire World', the congress summarized the goals of the Comintern:

Our task is to generalize the revolutionary experience of the working class, to cleanse the movement of the disintegrating admixtures of opportunism and social-patriotism, to mobilize the forces of all genuinely revolutionary parties of the world proletariat and thereby facilitate and hasten the victory of the communist revolution throughout the world.

Just as in the original invitation, the congress reiterated the necessity
of forming a bloc with those elements in the workers' movement which were revolutionary but which stood outside the socialist parties, "e.g. certain elements in syndicalism." 34

IV. The Syndicalists vis-à-vis Moscow: Assessing Bolshevik Internationalism

The appeal of the Russian Revolution to syndicalists abroad had an inevitably compelling character, but the wave of enthusiasm which frequently ran though their midst did not fully dispel all reservations. How would the syndicalists respond to the direct and explicit appeal to them being made in the name of a new and revolutionary International? The lure was a powerful one for syndicalists who had long demanded the creation of a genuinely revolutionary International, some of whom had already set out to create one themselves. Though the great majority gave verbal support to the Revolution, and often identified with it, doubts lingered as they struggled to arrive at a definitive judgment from the bits and scraps of information which seeped into the West. The highly centralized and political character which the Bolsheviks would eventually give to the Revolution was not immediately apparent, though syndicalists might well instinctively recoil from the demand for the seizure of power and the dictatorship of the proletariat. These postulates inevitably elicited qualms among a few, but for most the wave of revolutionary enthusiasm swept all hesitation aside. Warned by the veteran libertarian Domela Nieuwenhuis that proletarian dictatorship would become dictatorship by a political party, the enthusiasts in the Dutch NAS replied that dictatorship for Lenin meant the establishment of administration by workers' councils. "We knew in those days--1918--no fear. Hope overpowered everything." 35
Trotsky's observation in the invitation to the first CI congress that syndicalists largely supported the proletarian dictatorship was well-founded, precisely because few of them conceived it as the institutionalized power of a political party.

What, after all, did the dictatorship of the proletariat entail? The Bolshevik ideology of the Comintern clearly stressed direct mass action and denigrated parliamentarism. Such goals were in accord with those of the syndicalists. And if the Bolsheviks called for the seizure of state power, they did so ostensibly only to destroy the state. The proletarian dictatorship was intended to achieve this destruction. The rapid disappearance of the state was an objective to which the syndicalists themselves were committed. If they had reservations about the means, about the dictatorship itself, its mere suggestion in the light of the reality of revolution in Russia prompted syndicalists, along with many others, to reconsider the question of the organization of post-revolutionary society. The Revolution revealed one of the weakest links in syndicalist revolutionary thought and profoundly challenged the complacent assumption that a well-organized expropriatory general strike could bring down the state and deliver its industrial structure into the hands of the workers. The civil war and foreign intervention in Russia made evident a greater degree of resistance on the part of the foes of revolution than syndicalists had been inclined to credit them. The deficiencies of the visionary syndicalist classic, Pataud's and Pouget's *Comment nous ferons la révolution*, became increasingly evident. Beginning with a not unrealistic account of mounting industrial unrest in a time of economic difficulty which led to a clash with troops and the creation of a revolutionary situation, Pataud's and Pouget's vision passed to a general strike of
exceptional solidarity and efficiency, the seizure of land and factories, the dissolution of the government with remarkable ease, and, finally, the defeat of foreign invaders not by the armed masses but by a handful of defenders employing highly advanced weaponry. Events in Russia made patent the fanciful character of the latter part of this vision. Perhaps, then, the Bolsheviks had the key; perhaps the expedient of a workers' dictatorship to safely initiate the new society of communal freedom and equality was a temporary prelude to the stateless society. The question was of overwhelming import to syndicalists, and one which would not be quickly or easily answered.

The creation of the CI and the attempts to re-establish the Second International raised questions which were shared by the leftist movements of every country in Europe. But though the Second International was not formally reconstituted for some time, and though the question of international allegiance split the socialist parties of Europe, within the sphere of organized trade unionism the West had an initial advantage. For while the CI was concerned first and foremost with securing the allegiance of political parties and had not yet created a trade union arm, the pre-war labour arm of the Second International, IFTU, had been reconstituted in July 1919 and had already enrolled millions of workers, the vast majority of whom remained under the tutelage of moderate socialist trade union leaders.

But for those syndicalists who had rejected the pre-war IFTU, the new Amsterdam International had scant attraction. The very structure of the new International prevented them from adhering, and they were not interested in doing so. For the non-French syndicalists, the choice between Amsterdam and Moscow scarcely arose. In 1919 the question was, Moscow,
yes or no? Thwarted in their effort to convene a post-war conference of their own, during 1919 the syndicalist unions, rapidly expanding since the end of the war, made their first tentative judgments concerning the appeal Moscow had directed to them. They did so individually, without formally consulting their fellow organizations and without direct exposure to the communists at Moscow.

Although in 1919 the syndicalists predominantly viewed the CI with approval, gradual variations in this appraisal were beginning to emerge. Enthusiasm for Moscow tended to be more readily sustained among the syndicalists of southern than of northern Europe. In Italy and even more in Spain identification with Moscow was reinforced by a tendency to perceive their own countries as comparable in certain important respects to Russia; as existing on the fringes of European society, as economically backward, and as equally capable of making the revolutionary leap from industrially underdeveloped peasant societies to a free socialist order.

In Spain the Revolution had elicited an enthusiasm and expectation among the workers of the CNT perhaps unparalleled in Europe. Despite the slowly accumulating evidence that the Bolshevik ideals shaping the Revolution were distant from the persisting anarchosyndicalist substratum upon which the CNT rested, the increasing hostility which some Spanish anarchists were beginning to feel toward the Bolshevik regime, and the anxiety of some CNT moderates that an excess of revolutionary zeal might lead to precipitate action which would imperil the entire organizational structure of the CNT, the popular enthusiasm for and commitment to the Revolution in the immediate post-war period were scarcely deterred.

A congress held at Madrid in December 1919 determined the international policy of the CNT. The CNT had been expanding rapidly in the
preceding year-and-a-half, which contributed much to the climate of ebullient optimism in which the 437 delegates representing around 700,000 workers met. The CNT sheltered a myriad of ideological elements spanning an arc from out-and-out anarchists to semi-reformist moderates. The debate on the question of the Comintern consequently elicited a multiplicity of opinions. Given the CNT's traditions of anti-politicism, decentralization, and emphasis upon spontaneous mass action, much of the debate inevitably centred upon questions of centralization and the role of the communist party in Russia.

The lack of reliable information about the course of events in Russia contributed to the ambiguity which prevailed in the congress. Some measure of this ambiguity is revealed by the resolutions advanced. One proposal opposing the Allied blockade of Russia declared that "the Russian Revolution embodies, in principle, the ideal of revolutionary syndicalism," while another on the Comintern declared that "the ends which it pursues are fundamentally opposed to the anti-authoritarian and decentralizing ideal" proclaimed by the CNT. The juxtaposition of these proposals brought one delegate to call for clarification on the grounds that while the Russian Revolution was based upon Marxist principles, those of syndicalism were Bakuninist, and prompted another to ask, "has the Third International not been born of the Russian Revolution?"  

One who thought he could clarify the confusion was Hilario Arlandis. Arlandis argued that the Revolution did indeed embody the ideals of the CNT and that the second resolution was simply mistaken. By means of its second Bolshevik stage, Arlandis contended, the Russian Revolution had adopted "a complete reform of its socialist program" which brought it into accord with the ideals of the CNT. Some of the cenetistas present claimed
that the Bolshevik Revolution had the sole objective of firmly establishing state socialism and that it was guided by "essentially Marxist elements" who were staunch adversaries of the libertarian communism which the CNT embraced. "This is an error," Arlandis claimed, "and I am going to demonstrate it with proofs." The proofs were the theses of the first Comintern congress which Arlandis brandished and which he proceeded to defend, beginning with the dictatorship of the proletariat. The theses, though they said little about political centralization, clearly emphasized and endorsed the principles of economic centralization and in this respect sharply diverged from the position of the CNT. Here Arlandis, who would later emerge as one of the leading spokesmen for the movement of communist-syndicalism within the CNT, proved himself willing to side with the Comintern. He directly challenged the traditional CNT emphasis upon economic decentralization. Many of the cenetistas, Arlandis asserted, envisaged a system of spontaneous production by locally-administered affinity groups. To do so was to consider the question as "primitive revolutionaries" without taking into account the technical and economic complexity of the problem. "Today," Arlandis declared, "it is necessary to be realists," and to recognize that the revolution would founder without economic centralization. Rather than condemning the Bolsheviks as centralizers for introducing discipline into work and into the system of production and distribution, the cenetistas should acknowledge their realism. For Arlandis, economic centralization was "absolutely necessary . . . we cannot work in any other way." On the international issue Arlandis recommended not only that the congress unanimously affirm the CNT's solidarity with the Russian Revolution, but that it similarly endorse the "conditional or unconditional" affiliation of the CNT with the Comintern
"because it combines all our aspirations."  

Eleuterio Quintanilla attacked this conciliatory position. Dedicated to the traditional revolutionary conceptions of Spanish syndicalism, Quintanilla saw clearly that the Bolshevik Revolution in no way mirrored those ideals. For syndicalists, a mass revolution could be channeled only through the revolutionary unions. In contrast, Quintanilla observed, the Bolshevik Revolution was conducted and directed by a political party.

This is the concept of the classical revolution . . . the Marxist revolution, and because it is, the federalists, the Bakunian Internationalists, men who agree unanimously with the libertarian judgment and spirit, have on the terrain of principles . . . of tactics . . . and of class actions themselves always combatted this concept which we consider authoritarian . . . centralist . . . castrating . . . [and] as leading away from genuine revolutionary direction and significance, which expresses itself in the definitive and efficient intervention of the people, of popular representation, in revolutionary movements. (38)

Quintanilla similarly repudiated the Bolshevik dictatorship in favour of a popular defense of the revolution. If, as Quintanilla conceded, revolutions inevitably required a degree of coercion, it should not be in the hands of any party or government, but only in those of the syndical organizations. Syndicalists could not applaud the form of coercion exercised in Russia. "The dictatorship, put in the hands of a government, however revolutionary it may be, is always a danger to genuine revolutionaries, is always a danger for the revolution itself." The true defense of the revolution should be a popular one: "The armed sindicados themselves ought to constitute the guard of the revolution; the sindicados themselves, that is to say, the armed people themselves." (39)

Though tainted with politicism, the Russian Revolution was also a social revolution, and for this reason and this reason alone the CNT should support it, Quintanilla asserted, but it should under no circum-
stances affiliate with the CI. "The Third International! What tempests this problem is stirring up in the revolutionary camp!," Quintanilla exclaimed. He agreed that the Comintern was a revolutionary organization which sought to generalize the principles at the basis of the Bolshevik Revolution. But for precisely this reason the CNT had to repudiate it. "The Third International, comrade delegates, is not a specifically syndicalist organization; the Third International, comrade delegates, is a specifically political, profoundly political, essentially political organization." The CNT could not affiliate with it without simultaneously abandoning the ideal of the proletariat and its own integrity.

The CNT properly belonged within a syndicalist International and this is what Quintanilla envisaged. He told the assembly that he would vote:

to maintain the integral personality of the Confederation, seeking the means of strengthening it in an alliance with the rest of the syndicalist organizations of Europe, constituting the Third International, yes; but the pure and specifically syndical Third International, which preserves our personality as workers, which follows the tradition of the First International and which represents, in conclusion, the hope of the world of labour and which will be the firm and efficient basis of the possibility of that to which we aspire: the syndicalist civilization, which will be the civilization of the future. (41)

Although a Quintanilla much more than an Arlandis spoke from the traditional standpoint which encompassed the majority of cenetistas, his indictment of the Bolshevik Revolution and the CI made as little impression in the pro-revolutionary, pro-Bolshevik atmosphere of the congress as did the latter's defense of economic centralization. For it was the radical wing in the CNT, those whose ultimate commitments Quintanilla well represented, which temporarily identified with the Revolution and which agitated most fervently for the CNT's entrance into the Comintern. For
the enthusiasts, the euphoric embrace of the Revolution succeeded in sweeping all reservations aside. They were not unaware of the ideological dissonance into which their revolutionary fervour had carried them, but sought to minimize its import. Thus Eusebio Carbo, whose credentials on the libertarian wing of the CNT were impeccable, described Quintanilla's oration as "brilliant," but added that "we cannot be bewildered by the ABC and the chorus of virgins which accompanies it." True, to sanction proletarian dictatorship was to invoke the state, the historic adversary, the political cause of workers' slavery. Were syndicalists therefore not the natural enemies of the dictatorship? "From the point of view of principles, yes; from the point of view of urgent, undeferrable reality, no." With that, Carbo lapsed into rhapsodic incantation:

We justify the dictatorship, we admire the dictatorship, we long that the dictatorship come, and we long for it, we admire it, we justify it and we cherish it because the very ones who now oppose it, justify it when it stretches out to keep infamy and injustice enthroned. Conversely, if it has to be employed in order to establish the reign of justice in a definitive form in the world, we sing of it, we desire it; for that, we admire and we love the dictatorship of the proletariat. (42)

In the end, the radicals easily succeeded in winning support to affiliate with the CI, though the less enthusiastic moderates were able to qualify the entry as provisional. The final resolution reflected the ambivalence within the CNT. It declared the CNT to be "a firm defender of the principles which animated the First International, supported by Bakunin." It further declared that the CNT adhered provisionally to the Comintern until an international congress held in Spain could lay down the foundation of "the true International of the workers." In another resolution, the congress declared the ultimate objective of the CNT to be libertarian communism.43
In Italy, too, the Bolshevik Revolution had aroused great enthusiasm among the syndicalists. This was not true, of course, of the syndicalists who had seceded from the USI and adopted a pro-war stance, for the Revolution had threatened the war effort and challenged their nationalism. But among those who had remained within the USI, the response was much more positive. With the secession of the interventionists and other inroads upon its membership in the early war years, the USI had been reduced to about 30,000, but in the later part of the war it progressed and by May 1918 grouped around 50,000 workers. But already by 1918 the attitude of the USI towards events in Russia was no longer one of uniform approval. Reservations were mounting in the minds of some members, including its influential leader, Armando Borghi. Borghi's reservations found expression in response to the demonstrations of uncritical approval of Lenin's every move by *Il Soviet*, a newspaper newly founded at Naples by Amadeo Bordiga. "When Bordiga explains," Borghi wrote:

> that the Soviets must renounce expropriations - at least in part - because the state is considering doing this gradually, I grimace and glance around . . . . The dictatorship which we will never approve will be this one, is certainly this one . . . . It is still a matter of assaulting the central government, seizing this organ and gradually decreeing expropriation. Ah, here falls the ass and also the dictatorship of the proletariat." (45)

Nevertheless, in 1918 very substantial support for the Revolution persisted within the USI and even Borghi's reservations had not crystallized into opposition to the Bolshevik regime. The seeds of disagreement were there, but they would not blossom into schism for three years. Sufficient ambivalence remained, however, to engender a lengthy debate on the question of adherence to the Comintern after its formation became known. The debates, as usual among syndicalists, centred around the political character of the CI. By June 1919 the USI had resolved to join. The syndicalists were par-
particularly attracted by the unsparing condemnation of reformism which the CI articulated. Moreover, the Comintern's call to unite all revolutionaries--and its direct appeals to western syndicalists--led the USI to believe that it could affiliate while maintaining its autonomy; that its independence from political tutelage would be respected. At a congress in December 1919 the USI, rapidly expanding and now claiming over 300,000 members, reiterated and formalized its intention to join the CI.  

Even in France, despite the early hostility of the CGT majority to the Bolsheviks, the question of the international allegiance of the syndicalists was not a closed one. It is true that anti-Bolshevik sentiment was widespread and that ideological differences were cited as justification for opposition to Bolshevism and the CI. Adolf Hodée, Secretary of the Fédération Nationale des Travailleurs de l'Agriculture, represented these tendencies when he wrote that "we remain profoundly libertarian and idealistic, at a time when people speak only of dictatorship and of materialism. It is therefore a moral gulf which separates us from Bolshevism . . . . As for ourselves, let us follow our path by disengaging ourselves from these depressing influences." And it is true that the leadership of the CGT emerged from the war with a markedly reformist stance and that Jouhaux, still its Secretary, was preparing to take the CGT into the Amsterdam International where he would become Vice-President. There were nevertheless strong currents within French syndicalism which approved and identified with the Russian Revolution and the Bolsheviks. These sympathies were bolstered by the publication of Lenin's *State and Revolution* in France in early 1919. Its appearance there corresponded with the holding of the first Comintern congress and from that date sections of the syndicalist press took up the question of adherence to the CI. The anarcho-syndicalist *Le Libertaire*,
revived after the war, played a leading role in this discussion. Its attitude toward Bolshevism was generally positive, though given to occasional criticism, and its support for the Revolution in Russia complete. Similarly, *La Vie Ouvrière* reappeared on 30 April 1919 in newspaper form and quickly established itself as the leading and most forceful supporter of the Revolution and the CI. On 8 May a Committee for the Third International was formed. On its Executive sat a wide variety of dissenting syndicalists. Included among them were Rosmer and Monatte, the pre-war opponents of any attempt to form a revolutionary International at the London congress and defenders of the CGT's role within the IFTU. Disillusioned by the union sacrée and impressed with the reality of the Russian revolutionary achievement, Rosmer and Monatte now opposed the IFTU, worked for the CGT's entry into the CI, and were themselves moving toward communist party membership. Following the CGT's Lyon congress in September, the growing minority organized themselves as the Comité Syndicaliste Révolutionnaire, an internal opposition dedicated to enrolling the CGT in the CI.

Enthusiasm for the Bolsheviks tended to ebb earlier among certain syndicalist groups of northern Europe, which had less cause to identify their own countries with Russia. The shift in attitude toward Moscow on a widespread basis was first evident in the organizations of Sweden and Germany, where geographical proximity kept the syndicalists better informed on events in Russia than were many of their foreign counterparts. Following the abortive rising of the communist Spartakusbund at Berlin in January 1919 and the first congress of the CI in March, the Swedes of the SAC had concluded that the Bolsheviks represented nothing more than another variant of the social democracy they had long repudiated. In July 1919 the Swedes wrote their Dutch colleagues to propose that the question of Bolshevism and
Spartacism be placed on the agenda of the syndicalist congress being planned. "It is after all," the SAC Executive observed, "the pure social democratic tactic; that is, the conquest of state power in order to realize socialism by means of it through decrees and laws." 48

The German FVDG had been banned during the war, a number of its most active militants placed under house arrest and its publications suppressed, although Kater had made every effort to keep some kind of communication alive during the war years, only to see each attempt thwarted by the government. Nevertheless, various units of the organization had managed to survive clandestinely and the FVDG was quickly revived following the armistice. At its first post-war conference in December 1918 the German syndicalists pointed with pride to the fact that, given the conduct of the other labour organizations during the war, the FVDG was the only workers' organization in the country which did not have to readjust its conceptions with the return of peace. 49

The disposition of the left in Germany, however, was very different than it had been preceding the war. The FVDG had been confronted before the war with a unified socialist party whose principles it had opposed. Indeed, the FVDG had itself severed its final ties with the SPD in 1908. In post-war Germany, socialist unity had been broken and there were already ultra-left parties established with which the syndicalists had much in common. The KPD(S)--the Spartacists--for example, spurned parliamentarism, supported the principle of organizational federalism and advocated direct mass action. The syndicalists could readily approve these policies. This mutually perceived kinship led to an informal alliance between the FVDG, which actually recommended that its members join the parties on the far left, and the ultra-left groups--at least the KPD(S)--which recognized the
revolutionary potential of the syndicalists and gave some thought to trying to harness it.

This alliance could not last, however, and before long profound ideological differences which the appearance of affinity had initially concealed came to the fore. The Spartacists initiated the divorce by declaring that insofar as syndicalism repudiated political parties it was incompatible with communism, and by banning syndicalist propaganda within the ranks of the KPD(S). The party was in the process of shifting its own policies toward the approval of parliamentary action and of working within existing trade unions. In view of this gradual transformation, the policies of the FVDG, now rapidly expanding, were apparently shedding the appearance of an asset and assuming that of a threat. The KPD(S) was soon attacking the syndicalists as no more than "an angry brother of the opportunist trade unions."\textsuperscript{50}

The attacks upon the FVDG did not go unanswered and the ideological disparities between the syndicalists and the left socialists were thrown into relief. The syndicalists were soon dismissing the USPD and the KPD(S) as simply more social democratic parties and contrasting the state communism of the Spartacists with the \textit{freiheitlichen} communism of the FVDG. The FVDG's earlier recommendation that its members join the left socialist parties was now seen as an error. By September 1919 Kater was declaring that one could not be both an independent socialist and a syndicalist. The rejection of party membership was formalized by the syndicalists at their 1921 congress.

In December 1919, the same month that the CNT decided to adhere to the CI and the USI reaffirmed a like decision, the German syndicalists made their repudiation of Comintern policies explicit in their 12th congress. In addressing the meeting, Rudolf Rocker, who had returned to Germany in
1918 after twenty-five years of exile to become the movement's leading theoretician, articulated the position which the congress would in essence adopt. The earlier flirtation with the leftist parties was repudiated and the FVDG's independence of all political parties affirmed: "Als Organization haben wir mit politischen Parteien nichts zu tun." Rocker similarly repudiated the concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat and opposed to it the idea of social revolution. State power even in the form of an allegedly emancipatory dictatorship was rejected:

Created as an instrument of repression against the wide masses of people, it can never become an instrument of emancipation for the working class. Not dictatorship from above, but revolutionary mass action from below, will open the gateway to freedom to the proletariat. To him who understands by the 'Dictatorship of the Proletariat' nothing other than the investiture of a would-be revolutionary government, we contrast with it the principle of social revolution: Here [lies] State dictatorship! Here [lies] social revolution and the vanquishing of the State! There is no third way. Now each may decide.

And to the objection of one delegate that the dictatorship fulfilled the necessary role of educating the masses, Rocker replied, "I was always of the opinion that dictatorship and education were as different from one another as water and fire."52

The 1919 congress marked an important step in the development of the German syndicalist movement and of the movement internationally. Domestically the congress dispelled the ideological haze in which the FVDG had been groping and formally converted the organization into the Freie Arbeiter-Union Deutschlands (FAUD) with an explicitly syndicalist platform. The rapidly expanding organization could now claim over 110,000 members represented at the congress by 109 delegates. The international significance lay in the facts that the FAUD was early emerging as a profound critic of the Bolshevik Revolution and that its congress had approved a
resolution calling for the FAUD to join the NAS in convening a syndicalist congress for 1920. Bernard Lansink, Jr. had attended the FAUD congress as a fraternal delegate from the NAS. The firm stand taken by the FAUD against the principles of the Comintern, however, did not prevent it from being informally represented at the second CI congress, to which other syndicalist and industrialist organizations had sent delegates as well. In the second congress, which opened its sessions in July 1920, syndicalists and communists would formally meet together for the first time to discuss revolutionary tactics and international strategy.
CHAPTER FIVE

THE ISSUE JOINED

The second congress was actually the first important meeting of the CI, since its predecessor had been an entirely unrepresentative and makeshift affair. Moreover, the outlook of the Comintern had altered in the fifteen months since its inception. In the interim the revolutions in Central Europe had failed. Since the Bolsheviks chose to interpret these events as no more than preliminary skirmishes en route to the final and inevitable revolution, they were not unduly dismayed by the failures. Something of the aura of spontaneous revolutionary enthusiasm of the founding congress survived in the second congress, where the delegates joyfully noted the advance of the Red Army against the Poles, which they hoped would provide the spark for revolutions in Poland and Germany. But the Bolsheviks had drawn conclusions from the earlier revolutionary failures in Germany and Hungary, as well as from their own revolutionary victory. The emphasis was now wholly on the strategy of revolutionary organization within the international struggle. While the founding congress had primarily fulfilled a propaganda function, the second congress would serve, above all, purposes of organization. The success of their own revolution against all odds had convinced the Bolsheviks that they not only could but must generalize from their own revolutionary experiences as a model applicable everywhere. Chief among the principles derived from this model was the crucial role of the communist party in wielding absolute
central control over the revolutionary process. Centralization and discipline became the watchwords of revolutionary tactics. And just as the party had played the crucial guiding role in the domestic revolution, the Bolsheviks intended the CI to play the centralizing and guiding role in the international revolutionary struggle.

The emphasis upon organization also required the Comintern to adopt an unambiguous policy on the tactics to be pursued in the trade union movement. The first congress had not dealt with this question in a clear fashion. The Bolsheviks had advanced no resolution of their own on this issue, and neither a proposal rejecting work within reformist unions nor a resolution insisting upon the necessity of so doing had been adopted.

By the time the second congress was held, however, the issue had become crucial. By 1920, membership in trade unions throughout the world had trebled since before the war. In western Europe the majority of unions remained within the shelter of social democracy and millions of members were enrolled in the lists of the resuscitated IFTU, or Amsterdam International. The Bolsheviks now deemed it imperative to win the masses away from the social democrats by working within the reformist organizations. Lenin, who had castigated the ultra-left communists in "Left-Wing Communism: An Infantile Disorder," clearly enunciated there the need to win the workers in the reformist unions to the revolution. Similarly, Zinoviev, the head of the Comintern, had declared prior to its second congress that:

The Amsterdam International . . . is now a far more serious adversary of the Communist International than the Brussels International Bureau of the Second International . . . . If the Second International still has any support in the labour movement, it is only in the trade unions that we have not yet been able to win . . . to crush the Amsterdam International . . . is the most important task of the proletarian revolution. (2)

These questions—the role of the communist parties and the policies
to be adopted toward the trade unions—would become two of the principal items of debate in the congress. The position taken by the Bolsheviks on them made a confrontation between the communists and the syndicalist and industrialist delegates inevitable. The decision of the Bolsheviks to imprint the CI irreversibly with their own programme meant that the time had come to disabuse the syndicalists of their ideological aberrations. On the eve of the second congress, Zinoviev declared that the CI "will have to put an end to all Syndicalist prejudices" on such questions as the role of the communist party. "It will have to separate the Communist wheat from the Syndicalist weeds."³

I. The Syndicalists at Moscow: The Second Comintern Congress

There were over 200 delegates at the second Comintern congress. Of the 169 deliberative votes, 136 represented communist parties and organizations. The Bolsheviks assigned 64 votes, or 38 percent, to their own national party, and supplemented this by allotting sufficient votes to 'safe' delegates to ensure themselves of a reliable majority. They clearly intended to preclude the possibility of their views failing to prevail. But the Bolsheviks had made it clear that the syndicalists would be welcomed. Their circular convening the second congress expressly stated that the invitation "also extended to all groups of the revolutionary syndicalists" and to the IWW unions.⁴ Thus there were various syndicalists present. Included in the French delegation was Alfred Rosmer as a delegate of the Committee for the Third International. He would support the CI and become an active and important officer within it. The French delegation also included as observers the anarcho-syndicalists Marcel Vergeat and Bertho Lepêtit, who represented the minority syndicalist movement in
France, and who would never see their homeland again. The Spanish CNT dispatched three delegates to Moscow, but only one, Angel Pestaña, the editor of *Solidaridad Obrera*, succeeded in making his way to Russia. Augustin Souchy of the FAUD interrupted a lengthy fact-finding trip within Russia to attend the congress. In Britain the pre-war syndicalist organizations had not survived the war, but during the war itself there had grown up a radical leftist movement which was nearest kin and heir to the syndicalist legacy. This was the anti-war, anti-parliamentary Shop Stewards' Movement in which many syndicalists were active. Included in its delegation was Jack Tanner, co-president of the 1913 syndicalist congress who, along with Ramsay, represented the London shop stewards. Gallacher and Clarke represented the Scottish shop stewards, while J.T. Murphy held the mandate of the national organization. The IWW, which like the European syndicalist movements had greeted the creation of the Comintern with mixed emotions, also sent a delegation.

The syndicalist delegates were to experience some rude shocks at the second congress when the Bolsheviks unveiled the organizational principles they intended to impose upon the Comintern. The distribution to the delegates of Lenin's *Left-Wing* Communism and Trotsky's *Terrorism and Communism*, where centralization, discipline and the repressive dictatorship of the proletariat were stressed, was an early sign of the direction the congress would assume.

Even before the congress opened, a clear omen for the syndicalists appeared at a session of the Executive Committee of the Comintern to which they were invited. The Bolsheviks had already taken steps towards the creation of a trade union International of their own to work jointly with the CI by establishing a Provisional International Council for this pur-
pose. The objective of the Executive Committee meeting was to announce the creation of the Provisional Council and to secure support for its work. The proposed labour International, which would formally appear as the Red International of Labour Unions (RILU) a year later, was designed to be the instrument by which the CI would combat the Amsterdam International and simultaneously secure the support of syndicalist organizations and groups. The policies which the Provisional Council were to pursue reflected the tactics the Bolshevik leadership had been developing. This would inevitably elicit fears among the syndicalists. In addition to proclaiming the creation of the Provisional Council, the document drafted by Lozovsky and presented for the approval of the delegates endorsed the dictatorship of the proletariat, the seizure of power, working within the reformist unions by creating communist cells, and the collaboration of the Provisional Council and the CI.

The syndicalists present immediately protested against the policies and phrasing of the document which had unexpectedly been thrust upon them. Tanner rejected the demand that the revolutionaries work within reformist unions and declared such a national policy inconsistent with the simultaneous intention of splitting the labour movement internationally. Moreover, he rejected the concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat which bound it to the communist party. The only acceptable dictatorship was one of the organized workers, and not of a political party. Tanner extended this argument to the conquest of power as well. Souchy's objections were even more far-reaching. Like Tanner, he disavowed working within reformist unions. As for the dictatorship and the conquest of power, he pointed out that the FAUD opposed such principles. It endorsed communism, but with neither dictatorship nor dictators.
Pestana, in joining in the critique of the document, noted that the CNT had formally adopted the goal of 'libertarian communism'. Pestana in particular condemned a paragraph in the document which referred to the betrayal of the unions embracing "apoliticism" during the war, which had become the "lackeys of imperialist capitalism and have played a fatal role in retarding the final emancipation of the workers." He pointed out that only the CGT deserved this reproach; that it was precisely the political unions--those which maintained connections with the socialist parties--which had supported the war and thus aided the capitalists. He was seconded by Rosmer, who cited the example of the severe judicial repression suffered by the IWW for its anti-war attitude. The Bolsheviks grudgingly agreed to alter the offending passage, but this was never done.8

In later sessions, presided over by Lozovsky, the same questions--the dictatorship, the conquest of power, relations with the communists and with the CI, working within the reformist unions--continued to dominate the discussions. At one point Tanner and Souchy unsuccessfully introduced a counter-proposal, supported by Pestana, advocating not the seizure of power but the violent overthrow of the state and of capitalism and the establishment of a provisional dictatorship of the workers' organizations. It also called for an international congress of revolutionary trade unionists to determine future policy.9 But though the Bolsheviks and their supporters were able to turn back this challenge, the syndicalists and revolutionary industrialists were sufficiently forceful to prevent the Bolsheviks from imposing their own policies totally. On the question of relations with the CI, for example, the collective opposition staunchly refused to abandon the autonomy of a labour International, and hence rejected the view of the Central Committee of the All-Russian Trade Unions
that the proposed International "enter the Third International as one of its sections," since "the Communist International ought to be the Etat-Major of all the revolutionary organizations of the proletariat."  

Dissatisfied with the course of the meetings, the Bolsheviks moved to stifle dissent. Despite the fact that the relationship of the Provisional Council and the proposed labour International to the Comintern was precisely the point at issue, Lozovsky decreed that only delegates of union organizations which had already affiliated with and been accepted by the CI could participate in subsequent discussions. The majority of the opposition in consequence withdrew from the sessions. This manoeuvre ensured that Lozovsky's document would be accepted, since of the remaining delegates (those of Russia, Italy, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Georgia, along with Rosmer of France and Pestaña of Spain) only Pestaña had not signed it. In the end the Spaniard, who felt obligated to accept it since the CNT had voted to adhere to the CI, also added his name, but only with the stipulation that the CNT reserved the right of final judgment, particularly on the items referring to the dictatorship of the proletariat, the conquest of power and relations with the communists. Since the congress itself was now due to convene, the further sessions of the Provisional Council were postponed until the congress was over.

When the congress itself began, the syndicalists were in for even greater buffeting. Any illusions about the CI fostered by the first congress as a loose alliance of co-existing groups of disparate ideology united mainly by their revolutionary commitment were quickly dispelled. The theses on the role of the communist party in the revolution, drafted and introduced by Zinoviev, the president of the CI, spelled out clearly the Bolshevik view of the overarching preeminence of the party. The
theses declared that the Comintern:

decisively rejects the view that the proletariat can accomplish its revolution without having an independent political party of its own. Every class struggle is a political struggle. The goal of this struggle, which is inevitably transformed into civil war, is the conquest of political power.

Syndicalist policy was explicitly repudiated:

The propaganda conducted by the revolutionary syndicalists and adherents of the . . . [IWW] against the necessity for an independent workers' party objectively therefore helped and helps only to support the bourgeoisie and the counter-revolutionary 'social-democrats'. In their propaganda against a communist party which they want to replace by trade unions alone or by formless 'general' workers' unions, the syndicalists come close to the avowed opportunists . . . . The revolutionary syndicalists and the IWW are anxious to fight against the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, but they do not know how. They fail to grasp that without an independent political party the working class is a body without a head.

Revolutionary syndicalism and industrialism mark a step forward only in comparison with the old, musty, counter-revolutionary ideology of the Second International. But in comparison with revolutionary Marxism, i.e. with communism, syndicalism and industrialism are a step backward. (12)

Revolutionary success required a party "built on foundations of iron proletarian centralism;" its tasks could be fulfilled neither by workers' councils nor trade unions. The revolutionary experience of the party in Russia had demonstrated the validity of the demand for "iron military discipline in its own ranks;" that the revolution could not succeed without "the strictest discipline, without complete centralization."13

Even preceding indications of mounting Bolshevik intransigence had not led the syndicalists to expect such a direct and uncompromising attack. Zinoviev's introductory speech, which closely paralleled the theses he had drawn up, unleashed a furor of protest from them. Tanner took the rostrum to challenge the value of the very existence of a workers' political party. He pointed out that the work of the Shop Stewards' Movement in Britain, which emphasized the revolutionary importance of factory commit-
tees, had to be conducted in the face of the Labour Party, whose leaders were often the same men who struggled against them as trade union officials. He pointedly questioned whether the dictatorship of the party was quite the same thing as the dictatorship of the proletariat. The most conscious and competent minority of the workers' movement, Tanner maintained, could provide the guidance required without forming a political party. Did the Bolsheviks believe they had only something to teach the West and nothing to learn from it? Tanner argued that some autonomy ought to be left to individual movements. His opinion that while the Second International had lacked character and been too formless, the Third was swinging too far the other way in its dogmatism, was voiced by others as well.  

Lenin took some offense at the charge of dogmatism--("This expression is quite out of place here")--and dismissed it by remarking that there was no need for an International if the individual parties were free to make their own decisions. To Tanner's advocacy of a non-political guiding minority, Lenin responded that "there is in reality no difference between us. That minority can be nothing but what we call a party. If this minority is really class conscious, if it is able to lead the masses, and is capable of solving every question, it actually becomes a party." But for it to do so, it "must organize itself, create a solid organization, impose a discipline based on the principles of democratic centralism. Then you have the party."  

Pestaña also challenged the theses, declaring that "to designate revolutionary tendencies, as for example the Syndicalist movement, as reactionary, is too elementary. It is a mistake." But unlike Tanner, Pestaña emphasized another dimension of syndicalist revolutionary ideology and stressed, not the guiding elite, but the spontaneous mass character of
a revolutionary uprising. The Russian Revolution was one thing, the Bol­shevik seizure of power quite another. "Prove to me that it was you, that it was your party that made the revolution, and then I will believe all that was said and will work to obtain what was proposed." The affirmation that the revolution in the various countries was contingent upon the existence of a communist party he dismissed as "gratuitous" and as belied by history. "The revolution . . . is not [and] can not be the work of a party. A party does not make a revolution;" it does nothing more than organize a coup, "and a coup d'état is not a revolution." History demonstrated that from the French Revolution onward revolutions were made without parties (at which point Trotsky shouted, "You forget the Jacobins!"). Workers in other countries may wish to unite in political parties, but not in Spain.

For Pestaña, the revolution:

is the result of many causes, whose origins are found in a greater cultural condition of a people, in the disparity which is generated between its aspirations and the organization which commands and governs it.

The revolution is the manifestation, more or less violent, of a spiritual condition favourable to a change in the norms which govern the life of a people, and which, by a steadfast labour of several generations . . . emerges from the shadows at a given moment and sweeps aside, without compassion, all obstacles which are opposed to its objective . . . .

The revolution is the result of an evolutionary process . . . and there is not any party which can arrogate to itself the privilege of being the only one which has created this process.

The communist party, Pestaña continued, was a requisite neither to the making nor the maintenance of the revolution; nor was the seizure of political power requisite to the liberation of the workers. "You did not make the revolution in Russia alone," he declared to the Bolsheviks, "you cooperated in its making and you were fortunate enough to gain power." Trotsky responded to the syndicalists in general and to Pestaña in
particular. Precisely because he knew the value and necessity of the party, Trotsky observed, and because he saw on the one hand an opportunist like Scheidemann in Germany who accepted the use of political power and on the other the syndicalists who "not only want to struggle against their bourgeoisie, but who, unlike Scheidemann, want to decapitate them," he found it extremely important to demonstrate to the syndicalists the indispensability of the party. The work of the minority syndicalists in France was praiseworthy, although they simply did not realize that the non-political revolutionary minority they esteemed would inevitably have to become the communist party. "It was the presentiment of future development which caused these Syndicalists to play a revolutionary role in France, in spite of their prejudices and illusions." And there would have to be a communist party in Spain too. "Comrade Pestana says that he does not wish to touch upon the question, that he is a Spanish Syndicalist and is not willing to deal with politics. This is extremely interesting. He does not wish to speak of the Communist Party in order not to offend against the Revolution." But revolutions could not be wholly and simply spontaneous. Decisions had to be made, and only the party could fulfill this task. Trotsky illustrated his argument by way of an example:

To-day we have received a proposition from the Polish Government asking for peace. Who is going to decide upon this question? We have the Council of People's Commissaries, but that Council must be under a certain control. That control cannot be exercised by the unorganized working masses. We therefore have to summon the Central Committee of the Party and have it formulate an answer to this proposition . . . . The same refers to the agrarian problem, to the food questions, and to all others. Who is going to solve these problems in Spain? It will be the Communist Party, and I am certain that comrade Pestana is going to be one of its members. (22)

Zinoviev, the author of the theses, granted that while a revolution could not be a wholly calculated affair, the party was still necessary to
propagandize and prepare for it in advance. "We should say to every working man and revolutionary Syndicalist who is a sincere sympathiser with the Proletarian Revolution - and I am well aware that Comrade Pestaña is one of them - that we must not wait for the Revolution to come and take us by surprise."²³

The theses also drew a response from Souchy, who attacked their dogmatism on a broad front. Rather than beginning with:

theoretical preconceived propositions . . . . Our theories should only be the conscious development of the tendencies and forms of struggle used by workers against the bourgeoisie . . . . no attempt should be made to direct this movement towards another goal, by starting from a theoretical point of view, by saying this movement is not Communism. By abandoning the experimental method and busying ourselves with the doctrinal method, we shall not be able to create a fighting International . . . . we should attempt to choose the living spirit of the working class movement, the spirit which is not found in the heads of the theoreticians but in the hearts of the workers.

Souchy combated Zinoviev's implication that syndicalism was 'a semi-bourgeois movement.' This was hardly what the bourgeoisie thought in view of fear with which they viewed it and the persecutions to which they everywhere subjected it. The existing movement compelled the bourgeoisie to recognize the dangers of syndicalism, "whilst they have no fear at all of the political parties."²⁴

The political party and not anti-parliamentarism was the legacy of the bourgeoisie. The communists sanctioned parliamentary methods when the most advanced elements of the proletariat were growing progressively anti-parliamentary, as demonstrated not only the the syndicalists and industrialists, but by the majority of the German communists as well. It was wiser to pay heed to what was really happening in the revolutionary labour movement than to set out "from a theoretic and doctrinaire point of view to bring in parliamentarism under the pretext that it is good for propaganda after
having put it out of doors to the sound of trumpets." Souchy further disputed Zinoviev's suggestion that the trade unions had no program for revolution and would be unable to reorganize the economic life of society. But who, Souchy asked, should organise the economy? "Some bourgeois elements which we organised into parties, who are not in touch with ... economic life or rather those which are near the sources of production and consumption?"25

But the efforts of the syndicalist and industrialist minority were unavailing against the large pro-Bolshevik majority in the congress. Zinoviev's theses easily won approval. Not only during the debates on the role of the communist party were the syndicalists subjected to ideological chastisement, for throughout the congress the admonitions were repeated. In the theses dealing with parliamentarism, drafted by Bukharin, the anti-electoral doctrine was explicitly and none too kindly condemned:

'Anti-parliamentarianism' on principle, that is, the absolute and categorical rejection of participation in elections and in revolutionary parliamentary activity, is therefore a naive and childish doctrine which is beneath criticism, a doctrine which is occasionally founded on healthy disgust with paltry parliamentary politicians, but which is at the same time blind to the possibility of revolutionary parliamentarianism. Moreover, this doctrine is frequently connected with a false idea of the role of the party, which pictures it not as the centralized vanguard of the workers, but as a decentralized system of loosely-connected groups. (26)

The introduction to these theses specified that the IWW and the revolutionary syndicalists (as well as the German KAPD), as genuinely revolutionary but anti-parliamentary groups, were their targets. The IWW representative on the committee dealing with the parliamentary theses combatted them unsuccessfully there, while when they came before the full assembly, Gallacher and Souchy attacked them as opportunist. They lamented that the Comintern sought to resurrect the old debilitating policy of parliamentar-
ism. "There are two policies," Gallacher declared. "There is one which calls forth in the masses a feeling of subservience to all kinds of democratic phrases, the other keeps alive the revolutionary spirit in the masses . . . . The Third International is now face to face with the alternative. Either it goes the way of subservience or the way of fighting."

Souchy admitted that the arguments that parliamentarism instilled a lethargy in the workers and turned them away from genuinely revolutionary methods were old, but they had to be advanced in view of the "absurdity" of the CI Executive in recommending to the delegates that "old and hackneyed [policy] . . . dressed up here as new." The policy recommended as "'new revolutionary parliamentarism'" was nothing more than "the old mistakes of Social Democracy in its infancy, which at that time held exactly the same views now advocated here. You are in search for new arguments in support of the old worn out parliamentarism." Souchy returned to his indictment of the doctrinaire nature of the Bolsheviks with new vigour:

You are Marxists, and that is sufficient; you are theoretically prejudiced, dogmatic. The Marxists have imbibed the idea of parliamentarism with their mother's milk; with these dogmatists parliamentarism is bred in the bone and will therefore be expressed [not] only in their thinking but in their feelings and wishes. With these dogmatists parliamentarism is rooted not in their consciousness in the region of logic but in their subconsciousness in the region of psychology. Therefore when the revolutionaries today speak of the application of parliamentarism, we have before us not a means of fight logically evolved but a psychological phenomenon; they attempt to prove by means of logic their preconceived notions to be the best. We must therefore look for the roots of the 'new revolutionary parliamentarism' not in logical arguments but in dogmatic prejudices. It is therefore an opportunist illusion, but in no way a fighting means of communism in the hands of the revolutionary workers.

To recommend parliamentarism would have the regrettable consequence of driving away those revolutionary workers who were anti-parliamentary and who, when assessed against those that might be attracted by this policy,
"are much more important for the social revolution." 29

The syndicalists found themselves similarly chastised in the theses on the tasks of the Comintern, drafted by Lenin, which, in the section concerned with 'correcting' policy, specifically repudiated the views of the Shop Stewards and the IWW and urged communist groups in Anglo-Saxon countries to explain "the incorrectness of their views." Lenin also called attention to the theoretical cleavage among the anarchists on the question of the dictatorship of the proletariat and Soviet power, and urged communists to work wholeheartedly to help wean the workers' groups from anarchism and to win them for the Comintern. 30

The proceedings of the congress were making clear that as eager as the Bolsheviks were to secure the support of all revolutionary groups, and particularly of the syndicalists, they would nonetheless insist that the desired collaboration be on Bolshevik terms. This was as evident in the treatment of the trade union question as on any other. The committee considering this question was headed by Karl Radek, whom Pestana described, not without justification, as an "antisindicalista rabioso." Even Rosmer, much more sympathetic to the Bolsheviks that the other syndicalists on the committee, found the dogmatic attitude of Radek and his colleagues dismaying; they had in his opinion decided in advance simply to ignore the observations of any dissidents. Thus the opposition, among whom numbered Tanner and Ramsay of England, Pestana of Spain, Souchy of Germany, and John Reed of the United States, could make little headway within the committee. The call for close collaboration between communists and syndicalists and the demand to work within the reformist unions drew the greatest protest from the syndicalists. Rosmer, who agreed with the policy of avoiding splits and working within the reformist unions, nonetheless considered this
section of the theses to be "formulated so brutally, so summarily, that it could only offend and certainly not convince." The opponents of the theses vigorously combatted them not only in committee but also on the floor of the congress. In introducing the theses to the assembly Radek lamented that some delegates demonstrated:

a tendency towards the syndicalist movement, a movement which has taken a stand against the proletarian government and against the dictatorship of the proletariat. We regard Syndicalism as a passing malady of the revolutionary workers. We therefore endeavor to approach it, to combine with it whenever possible and to carry on our struggle shoulder to shoulder with it. But at the same time we must point out to them all the follies of their ideology. (32)

Despite the efforts of the opposition in the ensuing prolonged discussion, during which Radek demonstrated his penchant for personal invective, the theses were accepted by the assembly.

The proposed statutes of the CI elicited further strife. The syndicalists and industrialists especially opposed the attack upon the autonomy of the union movement embodied in article 14 which read, in part, as follows:

Trade unions adhering to the communist platform and organized internationally under the leadership of the Communist International, shall form a trade union section of the Communist International. These trade unions shall send their representatives to the world congress of the Communist International through the communist parties of the countries concerned. (33)

The article also called for the exchange of representatives between the Executive Committee of the CI and the proposed labour International. John Reed lamented that "according to the new statutes, even the International of the Youth is more autonomous than the Trade-Union International seems to be." The syndicalists and industrialists sought to have this section omitted from the statutes and not voted upon at that time, but as usual their efforts failed. (34)
The endorsement of article 14 jeopardized the work of the Provisional Council of the RILU which resumed after the congress had closed. Initially Pestaña alone represented the syndicalist view in the renewed meetings, for some delegates had already left and only the delegates of Russia, Bulgaria, France (but Rosmer was supporting the Bolsheviks) and Spain took part. The remainder of the opposition—particularly the Shop Stewards, the IWW and Souchy—were boycotting the sessions since Lozovsky's earlier refusal to let them participate in its discussions. Lozovsky furthermore refused to allow any modification of the requirements that only such unions which accepted the dictatorship of the proletariat and the conquest of power could be admitted to the trade union congress in preparation. Pestaña now declared it useless, in view of article 14, for him to continue in the discussions, since the CNT would not support the proposed congress unless trade union autonomy were respected. Lozovsky accused Pestaña of exaggeration, but relented somewhat. He urged that the preparatory work continue and that the proposed congress itself decide the disputed questions. Pestaña agreed to continue working with the committee, but warned it to harbour no illusions that the CNT would change its attitude.

A more conciliatory approach was adopted when Lozovsky left the committee and turned the chairmanship over to Tomsky of the All-Russian Trade Union Executive. Lozovsky had repulsed every effort of Pestaña's to have the congress held outside Russia. In Lozovsky's absence, the committee accepted a proposal from Pestaña that the congress be held in Russia only if efforts to prepare it in Italy or Sweden failed (though in the event such efforts were apparently never made). Tomsky also permitted an alteration in the conditions of admission to the proposed congress whereby labour organizations which practiced the class struggle would be invited even if
they had not formally endorsed the proletarian dictatorship and the seizure of power. In view of this modification, the committee dispatched Pestañá to invite the excluded syndicalists to join again in the preparatory work of the committee. This they consented to do.\textsuperscript{35}

If most syndicalists were disillusioned with the course the congress itself had taken and were now left with few doubts concerning the intensely political character of the Comintern, they still harboured hopes for the creation of a revolutionary labour International which the RILU was designed to become, for the conception behind it seemed more closely to correspond to the type of International which the syndicalists envisaged and which the 1913 London congress had laboured to create. In consequence, the syndicalists were reluctant to turn their backs on the prospects of a revolutionary trade union International, even if from the first all evidence clearly suggested that the Bolsheviks meant the RILU to be subordinate to the Comintern, just as trade union movements ought to be subordinate to domestic communist parties. The syndicalists, in short, wished to share in the revolutionary work of the Russian Revolution on an international scale as labour movements, but not at the price of yielding to political control and sacrificing the autonomy they so dearly cherished. Thus Lozovsky's promise that the work of the Provisional Council was in fact 'provisional', that the impending labour congress would itself determine the RILU's relationship to the CI and with communist parties in the various countries, partially rekindled their hope and made them willing to work toward its realization, though most did so with rising forebodings.

In fact the syndicalists who returned to the organizational committee did not waver in their earlier refusal to sign the proclamation for the coming congress as incompatible with their views. Of the syndicalists and
industrialists, aside from Rosmer, only Pestaña put his signature to it, though he did so reluctantly and with express reservations. The document declared its support for the dictatorship of the proletariat, the creation of communist cells within existing unions, and an interchange of delegates between the Comintern and the Provisional Council. It went on to proclaim:

That it is the duty of the working class to organize its trade unions in a strong revolutionary class organization which, along-side the political organizations of the proletarian Communist International and in strict liaison with it, can deploy all its force for the triumph of the social revolution and of the universal Republic of the Soviets. (36)

A latecomer to the sessions was Armando Borghi of the USI who arrived at Moscow too late for the Comintern congress itself. His stay there would be brief, since news of the occupation of factories in Italy would send him rushing homeward. During his short stay, however, Borghi was dismayed by the conception he encountered of the subordination of the labour organizations to the communist party within the planned RILU, and despite being pressured to sign the proposed statutes, he refused to do so, and persuaded Pestaña to strike his signature from them as well. 37

In addition to the ideological cleavages between the Bolshevik-dominated Third International and the syndicalists, accentuated by the Bolsheviks' mounting preference for pontification to discussion, the disillusionment which many libertarian delegates felt in Russia was naturally heightened by the increasingly repressive policies the Bolsheviks had been adopting toward the native anarchist and syndicalist movements. Rumours of the oppression endured by the domestic libertarian movement were confirmed personally for some delegates not only through conversations with such anarchist residents in Russia as Emma Goldman and Alexander Berkman, but by others directly involved in the native syndicalist movement. The
Russian syndicalists had obviously not been invited to the CI congress, but Alexander Schapiro—a veteran of the 1913 London congress—and others took advantage of the meetings to confer with foreign syndicalists on the state of the movement in Soviet Russia, to express their misgivings and fears to such delegates as Souchy, Pestaña, Borghi and the Frenchman Lepetit. The Russians entrusted to the syndicalist delegates two appeals from their own organization to the world proletariat. One concerned the war with Poland, the other the persecution of the Russian libertarians. Moreover, most of the syndicalist delegates also paid the ritual visit to Dmitrov, near Moscow, to discuss the situation with Kropotkin, and to hear his critiques of the Moscow regime and his defense of the libertarians.

Thus most syndicalist delegates attending the second Comintern congress departed Russia with heavier spirits than they had upon arrival. The congress had served to accentuate the profound differences between the Bolsheviks and themselves, hitherto glossed over by the general enthusiasm for the Revolution and the fact that Bolshevik ideology itself had only slowly been shifting and hardening between 1917 and the second congress. The opportunity to observe revolutionary Russia at first hand and the increasing awareness of the Bolsheviks' harsh policy toward domestic libertarian dissent further served to temper and dispel much of the enthusiasm they had carried with them to Moscow. Even the hopes for a genuinely revolutionary labour International, thwarted for many years among the syndicalists, were muted by the realization of the unlikelihood that the Bolsheviks would permit the proposed RILU to assume a genuinely independent character.

The disillusionment was clearly signalled by the refusal of many syndicalist and industrialist delegates to put their signatures to Bolshe-
vik policy statements. It was signalled in other ways as well. Before his departure, Borghi wrote the Secretary of the Comintern declaring that the USI reserved judgment regarding the theses accepted by the second congress. Vergeat and Lepetit never had the opportunity to report personally to their comrades in France, for they perished on the homeward journey, though they had already expressed their disappointment in letters home. Pestana spoke for more than himself when he recalled his fading hopes that an autonomous revolutionary labour International would emerge from Moscow: "All my beautiful illusions came to fall one by one, withered and dead, like the petals of the rose fall when they lack the sap of the plant."

II. The Syndicalists in Quest of Unity:
The 1920 Berlin Conference

The unfulfilled desire of the syndicalists to hold a post-war conference among themselves received fresh impetus with the announcement of Moscow's intention to hold the founding congress of a new trade union International in 1921. The centre of syndicalist planning now became Berlin, where proximity to Russia kept the native syndicalists better informed than most of their foreign counterparts. The Germans of the FAUD had endorsed a resolution calling for a syndicalist conference in 1920 at their 1919 congress, when they had outlined their attitude towards collaboration with the communist party and the dictatorship of the proletariat. Moreover, many of the visitors and delegates moving to and from Moscow passed through Berlin, which fostered much discussion of the Russian situation and gave the Germans the opportunity to begin making plans with the more sympathetic of these travellers. Pestana, for example, paused in Berlin on his way back to Spain to discuss plans for a syndicalist assembly with the leaders
of the German movement, as apparently did Borghi.\textsuperscript{44}

In consequence, an international syndicalist conference was scheduled for Berlin, December 16-21, 1920. The calling of the conference, organized by the FAUD, was attributed to the joint recommendation of the German, Dutch, Swedish, Italian and Spanish syndicalists.\textsuperscript{45} The conference report acknowledged the 1913 London congress, its work destroyed by the war, as its predecessor, and described the task of the conference as that of seeking an accord among syndicalists on the international question and particularly on the forthcoming RILU congress, then scheduled for May 1921.\textsuperscript{46}

Delegations with full voting rights represented seven countries: Germany--FAUD (Kater, Rocker, Souchy, Max Winkler, Franz Barwick and Theodore Plievier); France--Comité Syndicaliste Révolutionnaire (Victor Godonnéche and Jean Ceppe); Sweden--SAC (Franz Severin); Holland--NAS (B. Lansink Jr. and E. Bouwman); the United States--IWW (George Hardy); Argentina--Federación Obrera Regional Argentina (Tom Barker); and as a late-comer, Great Britain--Shop Stewards' and Workers' Committee Movement (Tanner). The Germans also held a mandate from the small Czechoslovakian syndicalist organization. In addition the conference received testimonies of sympathy from the Danish Trade Union Opposition Group and the Norwegian Syndicalist Federation. The conference claimed to represent around a million workers.\textsuperscript{47}

Although the second CI congress had thrown down a doctrinal challenge to the syndicalists, the Berlin conference did not represent a concerted effort to defend their ideology. A striking feature of the conference, on the contrary, was the persistent enthusiasm for Moscow and the degree to which theoretical differences between communists and syndicalists
were muted in the proceedings, despite the efforts of some delegates to call attention to them. There were a number of reasons for this. In the first place, two of Moscow's potential critics were not represented at Berlin. The USI, the most recalcitrant organization involved in the recent occupation of the factories in Italy, was still recovering from this dramatic encounter, and Borghi himself had been in jail for over two months when the Berlin conference met. In Spain, Governor Anido's counter-offensive against the CNT in Catalonia had commenced in late November and a great number of its leaders had been arrested. Two weeks before the conference opened, three dozen leading cenetistas were transported to imprisonment on the island of Minorca, where they would remain for well over a year. As for Pestaña, after leaving Berlin he had gone to Italy where he was imprisoned for two months. Released to return to Spain, he was immediately imprisoned there, four days before the Berlin conference opened. It would be some time before he would be able to publicize his negative impressions of Moscow widely within the CNT, now driven underground. The Berlin conference received communications from the USI and the CNT explaining that domestic repression prevented them from sending delegates. On the other hand, two organizations represented at Berlin were already pledged to the RILU Council. The British Shop Stewards' Movement had earlier adhered, and although a staunch critic of communist policy at Moscow, at Berlin Tanner faithfully reflected the new orientation of his organization. The French CSR had similarly affiliated with the RILU Council.

The Comité Syndicaliste Révolutionnaire (CSR) had grown out of the attempt of the minoritaire syndicalists to organize themselves after the CGT congress of Lyon in September 1919. The CGT had emerged from the war with a decidedly reformist position and with a leadership hostile to Moscow, despite considerable sympathy for the Russian Revolution among its member-
ship. For the minoritaires the commitment to the Revolution was complete, as was the commitment to the Bolshevism which, at this early stage, they identified as being anti-parliamentarian and decentralist--as being in many respects akin to their own revolutionary syndicalism. While the majoritaires were reluctant to abandon the cooperation with the state which the circumstances of war had encouraged, and began espousing the achievement of their goals as a long and gradual process, the minoritaires identified themselves with a Blanquist insurrectionism which they also identified with the Bolsheviks, and urged, not cooperation with the state or revolution as prolonged process, but the sudden seizure of the state and the investiture of an ill-defined dictatorship of the proletariat. Many minoritaires saw the revolution in France as imminent.

The estrangement between these factions was deepened in 1919 by the handling of a strike wave in France in the first half of the year, and especially by the last-minute cancellation by the CGT leadership of a strike set for 21 July and originally intended to counter allied intervention in Russia, as well as by the plans of the leadership to take the CGT into the resuscitated IFTU. The majoritaires were able to turn back the challenge of the minoritaires at the Lyon congress, but this setback encouraged the latter to organize themselves. They began to do so under the leadership of Monatte, Monmousseau, Pericat, Tommasi and others. The resulting CSR, an amalgam of dissidents composed of anarcho-syndicalists, 'pure' syndicalists, and communist-syndicalists, was held together more by mutual opposition to the majoritaries and by the desire to carry the CGT into the Third International than by agreement on any further positive program.

In the course of 1920 the favourable attitude of the minoritaires
towards the Comintern had been shaken by the policies adopted at the second CI congress, as well as by the controversy surrounding the attitudes of the vanished Lepétit and Vergeat. Discordant notes began to be heard within the CSR. Nevertheless, its supporters were confronted by the unified opposition of the majoritaires, and their own desire not to split the CGT remained strong. The policies enunciated at the second CI congress had a dual effect at the 1920 CGT congress held at Orléans in September. On the one hand, the equivocation of the minoritaire response to those policies prevented a clear and unambiguous statement of their own position. Their resolution called upon the CGT to adhere to Moscow, and to be prepared to work with a political organization if it were genuinely revolutionary; but it simultaneously insisted that the CGT maintain its own autonomy. On the other, the policies adopted by the CI allowed the majoritaires to accuse Moscow of attempting to subvert syndicalist independence. The majoritaires easily won the day by a margin of three to one. This did not break the minoritaire threat, although dissension within its ranks over Comintern policies and the treatment of Russian syndicalists by the Bolsheviks was mounting. The majoritaires then passed to the offensive. In November 1920 the Confederal Committee of the CGT decided to give constituent federations and union associations authority to expel CSR members.

The CSR had already adhered to the RILU's Provisional Council, and the French delegation sent to Berlin was intent on preventing the conference from jeopardizing the work of the new organization at Moscow. Moreover, the French delegates present did not represent the current within the CSR slowly emerging as that most akin to the remaining European syndicalists, but rather that generally identified as communist-syndicalist.
What the French communist-syndicalists feared most about the Berlin conference was that it might create a separate syndicalist International. The CSR delegates had come to Berlin first and foremost to prevent that possibility.\textsuperscript{51}

The All-Russian Trade Unions were also represented in a fraternal capacity. The organizers had invited the Russian unions to participate in the conference and S. Belinsky, accompanied by a secretary, appeared on their behalf as well as representing the Provisional Council of the RILU.\textsuperscript{52} Belinsky's attitude toward the conference was essentially one of hostility, for he held the view that it had no right to existence; that the right to make decisions concerning the international movement belonged solely to the coming congress at Moscow.\textsuperscript{53} The French delegates of the CSR were inclined to support this view.

The immediate fears of the French delegates that a serious move might be made at the conference to found a rival International proved unfounded, for although a wide variation in attitudes concerning the prospective RILU was expressed, only Severin of Sweden declared explicit support for a syndicalist International.\textsuperscript{54} Indeed, all the remaining delegations, apart from the Germans, explicitly rejected the idea of the creation of more than one revolutionary trade union International. Nevertheless two currents of opinion emerged during the conference. The first, represented chiefly by the SAC and the FAUD, stressed the disparity between the ideals of syndicalism and the policies pursued in Russia and advocated by the CI, and sought to ensure that these differences not be too readily ignored in the prevailing enthusiasm for the Revolution and the Comintern.

The second, exemplified above all by Belinsky and the French, attempted to slight these differences, to minimize and even disparage
theoretical questions, and to insist that the entire issue could simply and inevitably be seen as a choice between the Amsterdam and Moscow Internationals. Tanner, though he complained of the disruptive tactics pursued by the Russians in the conference, consistently supported Belinsky. Hardy and Barker were also inclined to Belinsky's view. The NAS delegation displayed divergent attitudes. Bouwman by and large supported Belinsky and echoed him throughout the conference, while Lansink occupied an intermediate position, but one nearer the Germans than the French. Despite the mass of support for Moscow in the conference, the majority of the delegations nevertheless insisted that they had come to Berlin in order to formulate a common platform amongst syndicalists and industrialists with which to participate in the RILU congress. Thus the bid of Ceppe of the CSR at the very beginning of the conference to reduce the five-point agenda to the simple format of Moscow or Amsterdam was rejected.

But in their efforts to prevent the assembly from pursuing the question of the differences which might stand between the syndicalists and Moscow, Belinsky, Bouwman and the French persisted in casting all questions in the Moscow or Amsterdam mould. Despite the fact that Moscow had declared categorically for economic centralization, when the Germans contrasted their federalism with the centralism pursued in Russia, Belinsky dismissed this issue, remarking that time must not be wasted on "matters of secondary importance." The main issue was simpler. The delegates had only to decide whether they supported the revolutionary class struggle. If they were reformists they should decide for Amsterdam; if revolutionaries, for Moscow. If they opposed capitalism they had to accept the proletarian dictatorship. "There is no intermediate course." Moreover,
Belinsky complained, the Germans too often invoked the word 'politics' against him. Politics were inevitably involved in the economic struggle, as the civil war and allied intervention in Russia demonstrated. It was "very dangerous and in conflict with reality" to separate political and economic action. The trade union International which would emerge from Moscow would also have to participate in political action. Belinsky quickly added, however, that the RILU was quite distinct from the CI. The conditions of admission to the latter did not apply to the unions seeking entry to the RILU, for its only conditions were the acceptance of the revolutionary class struggle and the proletarian dictatorship. 

The French délégation was staunchly pro-Moscow. The original response of the CSR to the conference invitation, Godonnèche told the assembly, was to decline, for fear that it sought to create an "Anarchist Trade Union International". He cautioned the delegates not to establish any committee which might work against Moscow. Although the questions of the dictatorship, the state and communism were not completely settled within the CSR, its constituent elements were agreed in repudiating party politics and shared the view that the organization of a new social order could be accomplished only on the basis of revolutionary syndicalism. Godonnèche claimed that the attitude of the CI towards the trade unions differed from that towards communist parties. The CI did not intend that communist parties intervene in the union movement. Therefore, Godonnèche concluded, all revolutionary labour centrals could participate in the RILU.

The French supplemented their position with a written declaration which they recommended for conference approval. It opened by dispelling any thought that the CSR would support an initiative to found a revolution-
ary International apart from Moscow. Just as the CSR united disparate elements, such elements could also be accommodated internationally in the Moscow organization, which would take the character given it by the revolutionary syndicalists. But first they must join. The important thing at present was the establishment of a revolutionary labour International, and therefore "to set aside all secondary questions of doctrine upon which we cannot 'a priori' reach accord." In describing the CSR's own program, the declaration faithfully mirrored the disparate composition and ambiguous attitude of that body, though it muted the increasing discord within its ranks. The CSR was committed to the class struggle and to direct action; the unions had an expropriatory role to fulfil in the revolution: the reorganization of the economy was their "natural function." Though affiliated with Moscow, the CSR intended to submit itself to no political party. On the other hand, it would be unjust to compare the Russian Communist Party, which had played a truly revolutionary role, with the opportunistic and reformist parties of other countries. In revolutionary circumstances, the CSR was prepared to cooperate with a party which would demonstrate in deed its commitment to the destruction of wage-slavery and the exploitative system. Godonnèche advised the conference that since the CSR was already pledged to the RILU, there was on this issue no further question for it, but only the ardent wish that the assembly decide in favour of Moscow.

The French delegates' attitude of uncritical support for Moscow was shared by Jack Tanner, who arrived late at Berlin. Tanner explained that the Shop Stewards' movement was already affiliated with the RILU Council. He advised the conference to go to Moscow, urging the necessity of building a united front of revolutionaries since international capital-
ism had now united against the revolution. "We should join the Moscow International, even if we are not in agreement with everything Moscow wants of us."63

None of the remaining delegations adopted the unqualified stance of Tanner and the French. All spoke against the reformist Amsterdam International. None spoke against participation in the RILU congress, but they voiced reservations and considered it important to find a common basis on which to go to Moscow. Hardy declared that the IWW could not accept the theses of the CI, particularly that referring to the permeation of reformist unions. It sought an International of economic organizations, free from all political organizations and especially from a political International such as the Comintern. But the IWW did not want to struggle against Moscow; it wanted a single economic International and that together with Moscow. Barker pointed out that the FORA repudiated the dictatorship of a party. An essentially Bakuninist organization, it expected nothing from the state, nor from a state coup; nor did it make much difference to the FORA if a state denoted itself proletarian. The buttresses of the social revolution had to be the industrial organizations of the workers. In Barker's opinion, a party dictatorship existed in Moscow because Russia was only eight percent industrialized. The realization of the social revolution in highly industrialized countries would be the task of the industrial organizations and not political parties. But Barker expressed a weariness with theoretical questions. He personally repudiated the use of either Marx or Bakunin as guides, but added the curious declaration that he was a Marxist in economic questions and was "for Moscow but against the state." The Bakunin-Marx question had been discussed ceaselessly in Argentina in the last year, Barker stated, and there finally came a time when one wished to "be finished
with all theory," a course which he recommended to the conference as a means of clearing the way for the creation of real international bonds.  

In the face of such widespread inclination to gloss over the differences between the syndicalists and Moscow, German and Swedish attempts to call attention to them met resistance. When Winkler, speaking for the FAUD, contrasted syndicalist federalism with the centralism advocated in Russia; when he raised objections to the International at Moscow, where a party dictatorship reigned; when he insisted that syndicalists strove not for a social order under a new state, but for one organized from below through the union movement, he drew opposition. Bouwman quickly repudiated the German viewpoint, declaring that they still clung to a narrow syndicalist position. They wanted to create "a syndicalist International. In point of fact, they want an anarchist trade union movement." For the Germans the need to establish a theoretical and practical foundation which could provide clarity and determine the attitude to the RILU congress was paramount. Towards this end, Kater submitted the declaration of principles drawn up by the 1913 London congress as representing the position of the German delegation on the international question. But since the declaration explicitly declared that the union movement be organized on the basis of autonomous unions, the Germans were thereby stipulating that the prospective International recognize the federalist basis of organization, which was the basis upon which they had organized the FAUD in 1919.

Belinsky attacked the "antiquated" declaration as ignoring the changes which had occurred in the last seven years. The real and current issue was the choice between Amsterdam and Moscow. Hardy also objected that the German resolution was an obstacle to going to Moscow. Bouwman later resumed the critique of the Germans which Belinsky had initiated.
Winkler had opened the conference by declaring its purpose to be to work for a single International of revolutionary unions. By incorporating the federative organizational form and speaking only of a syndicalist International, Bouwman asserted, the German resolution contradicted this purpose. The current problem was to choose "between the left and the right;" the conference could not, like the Germans, "clutch like grim death to obsolete resolutions." Bouwman recommended that preference be given to the Dutch declaration, which spelled out the principles which the NAS believed must form the foundation of a revolutionary trade union International. The nine-point statement stressed the class struggle, the abolition of capitalism, international solidarity and direct economic action. It asserted that "the arrangement and regulation of production and distribution is essentially the task of the unions of each country," and insisted that the International be wholly independent of every political party.

Speaking for the NAS, Lansink agreed that there should be a single labour International, but advised the necessity of being clear about what was actually revolutionary. Purportedly revolutionary political parties were not always so. The Dutch experience had demonstrated that the working class and the revolution must themselves be international in the face of international capitalism. In the splintered workers' movement in Holland, the practice of the minority NAS sometimes deviated from its principles as a consequence of its insufficient strength. But there was no revolutionary model applicable to all countries; what served in Russia need not always serve in Holland. Lansink defended the conquest of economic but not of political power by direct action, and emphasized that the administration of production and distribution be in the hands of the trade unions. The ques-
tion of power in the transitional stage was not a question of theory, but of practice. If the general strike did not suffice, the workers must and would have recourse to other weapons. Although the NAS was federalist, Lansink declared the issue of decentralization to be a national question; each nation must order itself in conformity with "its own progression of development and its own possibilities." The Amsterdam International was out of the question, but before the syndicalists go to Moscow they must ask, Lansink insisted, what Moscow wanted of them. In particular, they must determine whether Moscow subscribed to the view that the trade unions had an autonomous task to fulfill or whether the RILU should be subordinated to the political Comintern. Lansink declared himself ready to go to Russia, but proposed that the conference first create a committee to enter into negotiations with Moscow to seek agreement on a common tactic to be pursued in the RILU founding congress.

The French delegation, however, had no interest in participating in the formulation of a common syndicalist program, but only in ensuring that the organizations represented at Berlin attend the RILU congress. Godonnèche and Ceppe therefore declared at the end of the second day that they had to return to France, and proposed that a vote be taken to decide if the organizations present would go to Moscow. The affirmative vote was unanimous. Their objective achieved, the French left Berlin.

Though he had voted to go to Moscow, the SAC delegate had no inclination to set aside theoretical questions. Describing himself as a "freedom-loving socialist" who would have nothing to do with state socialism, Severin had no qualms about declaring that he had come to Berlin to work for a syndicalist International. Severin forcefully contrasted the position of the Swedish syndicalists with that of the Bolsheviks: He
stressed that the SAC insisted upon the self-responsibility of the workers, while in Russia the state determined leadership within the factories. The state calling itself the Dictatorship of the Proletariat did not differ in its methods from the bourgeois state; both sought to institute their social policies by legislation and decrees from above. The Swedish syndicalists simply did not share the belief that a new society could be erected through the conquest of political power. But the tactic of the Third International was precisely that government power should be seized by communist parties. This meant the utilization of the trade unions as no more than simple instruments. For the SAC, however, the trade unions were much more than mere tools in the hands of a political party. The Swedish syndicalists would in no way subordinate themselves to the political International at Moscow, nor to any political International. It was imperative that the syndicalists not go to Moscow unprepared; that they have clarity and unity in their own ranks first. This was all the more important, Severin insisted, since the Russian trade unions were far from being organizations of class struggle like those represented at Berlin; on the contrary, they were simply state organizations lacking even the right to strike. In consequence, only the unity of the syndicalists would make it possible for their viewpoint to be effectively advanced at Moscow.

Bouwman attacked Severin's view as pure anarchism. To strive for a purely syndicalist International would only heighten confusion and encourage schisms, contrary to the purpose of the conference. Belinsky predictably rejected the Swedish view as obsolete, but Severin's sharp declaration in favour of a syndicalist International had apparently given the former pause, for he now argued that in the absence of the French it would be best if no committee be appointed at all by the conference. Later he
specified that he was opposed only to a committee which would seek to negotiate with Moscow. And when Kater announced that the Germans were prepared to support the Dutch declaration in lieu of their own, Belinsky also endorsed it, but cautioned against interpreting its defense of trade union independence too narrowly. He reiterated that the union movement must be organizationally independent, but added that "unity in spirit with the revolutionary parties is necessary."^70

A committee (Hardy, Lansink, Plievier) appointed at Lansink's suggestion to formulate the position of the conference submitted a resolution which closely followed the Dutch declaration. A lengthy discussion ensued when Hardy, erroneously predicting that the IWW would sanction the proletarian dictatorship, proposed that the first point of the resolution, which endorsed the revolutionary class struggle, be amended to include 'and the dictatorship of the proletariat'. Belinsky, Bouwman, Tanner and Barker all declared support for the amendment, while Severin and the Germans vigorously opposed it. In the course of the discussion, however, Hardy, Bouwman, Tanner and Barker all declared that they were opposed to dictatorship by a political party. Rocker opposed any dictatorship through the violence of the state and declared that the German delegation would accept no formulation which could establish an impression of dictatorship, since this was a bourgeois invention dating from the French Revolution. Severin also categorically rejected the use of the word, since dictatorship assumed the power of the state. Belinsky, for his part, denied that party dictatorship existed in Russia.

Since 'dictatorship of the proletariat' did not specify whether power should be in the hands of a party or of industrial organizations, and since there were widespread disavowals of party dictatorship, a search for
alternate phrasing began. Severin eventually proposed that the expression 'the power of the working class' be employed. Of voting delegates, only Tanner rejected the proposal, since the Shop Stewards had already accepted the proletarian dictatorship, though he added that they were opposed to any form of political domination. Souchy noted that the last FAUD congress had explicitly rejected proletarian dictatorship. If the phrase were retained it would be impossible for the Germans and the Swedes to go to Moscow. To declare for the dictatorship would give the impression that the conference favoured a system identical to the one in Russia; the Germans wanted no such thing. The German delegation therefore endorsed Severin's proposal, which prompted Belinsky to declare the Germans and Swedes to be "actually reformists."

The fifth point of the committee's resolution, defending the autonomy of the International, also elicited disagreements. Belinsky proposed to modify it to read that the trade union International was 'organizationally autonomous', but 'conducts its actions in consultation and cooperation with the Third International'. Only Tanner supported this change, while the remaining delegates favoured a modification proposed by Kater which specified the conditions under which the International could act in common with political parties, but which preserved its independence. Finally, an amendment proposed by Tanner, declaring that the organizations attending the RILU congress would recognize its decisions as binding, was defeated.

In its final form the declaration which the delegates unanimously accepted (Belinsky being a fraternal delegate only), except for Tanner who voted against points 1 and 5, read as follows:

1. The Revolutionary Trade Union International [RTUI] adopts without reservation the point of view of the revolutionary class struggle and the power of the working class.
2. The RTUI strives for the destruction of the economic, political and intellectual regime of capitalism and of the state. It strives for the establishment of a free communist society.

3. The working class is able to destroy the economic, political and intellectual slavery of capitalism only through the most severe application of its economic means of power, which finds its expression in the direct revolutionary action of the working class. Only by this means can its goal be attained.

4. The RTUI further adopts the viewpoint that the arrangement and regulation of production and distribution is the duty of the trade union organizations of each land.

5. The RTUI is completely autonomous and independent of every political party. If the RTUI undertakes an action with which political parties or other organizations declare themselves in agreement, or vice-versa, then the execution of this action can be carried out jointly with these parties or organizations.

6. This conference urgently summons all revolutionary syndicalist and industrialist organizations to take part in the congress convened by the Provisional Council of the RILU to meet at Moscow on 1 May, and to found there a united revolutionary trade union International of all the revolutionary workers of the world. (74)

Against the earlier advice of the French and Russian delegations, the assembly also unanimously approved a motion from Kater which, in accord with Lansink's earlier proposal, established a committee to continue the work of the conference. The International Syndicalist Information Bureau, to which Rocker, Tanner and Lansink were appointed, had the joint tasks of informing syndicalist and industrialist organizations not represented at Berlin to the conference's work and decisions, particularly of the final declaration, and of entering into consultation with the RILU Provisional Council on the policies to be pursued in the RILU congress. The Bureau was to sit at Amsterdam with Lansink as its Secretary.

After the usual protest resolution against the persecution of syndicalists, the conference closed. It did so, according to Souchy, with the highest hopes of having created the beginnings of a revolutionary labour International, and with the commitment to carry this initiative further at Moscow. But Souchy himself had experienced the difficulties of seeking to modify policies embraced by the communists at Moscow. He therefore
had no illusions about the arduous nature of the syndicalists' task, and anticipated a sharp confrontation on the issue of the role of the unions between the anti-statist syndicalists and the communists. Moreover, the more radical members of the centralist unions would also be represented in the RILU congress. Souchy predicted that at Moscow the ideological question would unleash "a fierce combat. Whether the idea of revolutionary syndicalism will emerge victorious from this struggle remains in the future." 76

Although its declaration stipulated the minimal conditions to which the Berlin assembly believed a labour International must conform, the goal of providing syndicalist unity for participation in the RILU congress had only been tenuously fulfilled. The terms of the declaration implied a degree of unity which in reality did not exist among syndicalist organizations at the end of 1920. A notable feature of the Berlin gathering, which found no expression in its declaration, was the degree to which a substantial number of participants wished to ignore the disparity between syndicalist and communist ideology. The enthusiasm for the Révolution and the Bolsheviks who presided over it encouraged the complacent conviction that common ground could be reached with the communists. Confronted with this attitude, the delegates of the FAUD and the SAC found it no easy task to remind their colleagues of the differences dividing them from the communists. By now the Germans and Swedes had few doubts that the communists in Moscow were seeking anything less than an ideological hegemony over the whole of the revolutionary movement. They realized that theoretical questions could not be dismissed; that syndicalist ideology must either be defended or sacrificed. And in fact the willingness of some syndicalists to minimize theoretical questions was not reciprocated by the Bolsheviks.
They would categorically reject any talk of separating economic from political action. Nor would they entertain the notion of management of production by trade unions. A month after the Berlin conference, Lenin declared the determination of industrial leadership by the workers rather than by the communist party to be "syndicalist nonsense" which "must go into the waste basket." Above all, the Bolsheviks had no intention of allowing the RILU any significant degree of independence from the CI. The Berlin declaration itself did nothing to alter Bolshevik plans. Not the theses endorsed there, but the relative lack of unity demonstrated at Berlin, dictated the subsequent strategy of the Bolsheviks toward the syndicalists and industrialists.
As an attempt to set forth a common policy to pursue in the RILU congress, the theses which issued from the Berlin conference implied a greater degree of agreement on the issue of a labour International than in reality existed among syndicalist organizations. The Berlin theses effectively anticipated the issues upon which syndicalists and communists would meet in headlong collision at the founding RILU congress, which had been postponed from May to July of 1921 in order to correspond with the third congress of the CI. The lack of unanimity at Berlin, however, betokened the lack of consensus among the various national syndicalist bodies concerning international policy. In fact, in none of the syndicalist organizations had this question been fully resolved in early 1921. The question was further confused by the fact that some of the organizations subscribing in whole or in part to the theses of the Berlin conference such as the USI, the CNT, the CSR and the British Shop Stewards, were already pledged to Moscow. Moreover, the conditions of repression endured by some syndicalist groups—the CNT was forced to lead a wholly clandestine existence at this time—made it difficult to give thorough discussion and appraisal to the international question within their national organizations.

For its part, Moscow lost little time in indicating its attitude towards the Berlin conference and the Information Bureau it had appointed. Shortly after the conference, Belinsky assailed in print those participants
most critical of Moscow, the Germans and the Swedes, as insignificant sectarians whose movements would soon disappear. Where syndicalism survived in its "pure" form, it united "only miserable groups of fanatics and hermits." While he lamented the affirmation of trade union autonomy by the conference, Belinsky noted with satisfaction that no step had been taken at Berlin toward the creation of a syndicalist International and that the delegates had agreed to attend the RILU congress. He therefore confidently concluded that the conference constituted "the last convulsions of the old syndicalism."¹ When the Syndicalist Information Bureau sought to enter into relations with the RILU Provisional Council, the latter simply ignored its communications. A greater demonstration of consensus at Berlin might have prompted the RILU Council to be more conciliatory. As it was, the RILU adopted a policy of divide and conquer rather than recognizing the Bureau in any way.

Yet the Bolsheviks were not entirely free to dictate to the syndicalists. The intensification of Bolshevik persecution of Russian libertarians in the period preceding the RILU assembly inevitably aroused suspicions. Neither this mounting persecution, nor the betrayal and destruction of Makhno's anarchist army in the Ukraine, nor the brutal suppression of the Kronstadt rising, could do anything but heighten critical resistance to the Bolsheviks in some quarters of the European syndicalist movement.

I. The Russian Syndicalists Beleaguered

As the Bolshevik Revolution unfolded, the Russian libertarians were compelled to select one among several courses open to them. They could adopt the course of uncompromising opposition as expressed in unstinting criticism and terrorist tactics. This was the path of a small minority
such as the Underground Anarchists. On the other hand, they could fully support the Bolsheviks, either by simple conversion, or on the grounds that the paramount consideration was the defense of the Revolution, for which purpose ideological differences had to be set aside. Many libertarians of various persuasions adopted this course, as exemplified by Bill Shatov, earlier a member of the syndicalist Golos Truda group, who soon decided that criticism was temporarily out of place and ended by serving the Bolsheviks long and well. A third position was that of a rough neutrality whereby open collaboration with the regime was avoided, but a critical tenor maintained; armed resistance was eschewed as a contribution to the counter-revolution.  

The Russian syndicalists by and large adopted the latter course. For a brief period they had hoped that Bolshevik goals were not too distant from their own. But as the genuine character of the regime began to emerge and the persecutions to mount, the syndicalists grew increasingly critical of the Bolsheviks and began a desperate and belated attempt to establish a more resilient organizational structure to counter the highly organized Bolshevik campaign directed against them in the factories and workshops.

The most vocal and active of the syndicalists were those who spoke through Vol'nyi Golos Truda and who had organized the All-Russian Confederation of Anarcho-Syndicalists (ARCAS) late in 1918. Prominent in its executive were such figures as G.P. Maximoff, Sergei Markus and Efim Iarchuk. The syndicalists paid the price for having sought to organize so belatedly, for the Bolsheviks, once in power, could turn the full apparatus of the state against them, as against all of their domestic opponents. Vol'nyi Golos Truda was banned. The conditions of repression made a third congress of the ARCAS planned for the spring of 1919 impossible. Although this did
not elicit open resistance, the syndicalists grew more outspoken in their strictures of Bolshevik policy. The Cheka now began turning its attention to them and their leaders were subjected to frequent arrest. Maximoff, for example, was taken into custody six times between 1919 and the spring of 1921, and harrassed by many searches.³

Yet the syndicalists were undeterred. They continued to maintain a publishing house at Moscow, under the guidance of Alexander Schapiro, which specialized in the works of western syndicalists and turned out the occasional bulletin.⁴ They also pursued as best they could their organizational efforts. If they were unable to expand significantly their membership figures, they nonetheless scored some successes in their propaganda work and in their audacious anti-Bolshevik campaign. In the spring of 1920, the All-Russian Congress of Food-Industry Workers adopted a resolution drafted by Maximoff and proposed by the ARCAS which condemned the Bolsheviks for having instituted a regime leading to a "total, unlimited and uncontrolled domination over the proletariat and the peasantry, to a frightful centralism carried to the absurd, after having murdered everything in the country which was living and free, and all spirit of independent initiative." The resolution characterized the proletarian dictatorship as "in reality a dictatorship of a party and even of a few individuals over the proletariat, a dictatorship applied through the most ferocious means, appropriate only to despotism." The iron discipline applied to labour and production had completely enslaved the proletariat and introduced "something never seen before in the history of human servitude."⁵

The persistent receptivity to syndicalist propaganda only reinforced the government's resolve to root it out. The Bolsheviks in fact considered the syndicalists as the most dangerous threat of the native libertarian
movement. The Central Committee of the party distributed a circular letter to its branches in the spring of 1921 detailing the dangers posed by the libertarians and the need to restrict further their activities. It singled out the ARCAS as the group "deserving the greatest attention." The circular expressed concern not only about the syndicalists' influence with the workers, but also about their propagandizing in the Red Army, their efforts to exert influence through the instructors' units of the adult education system, and their successes amongst youth groups, especially communist youth groups. Syndicalist "penetration" was largely responsible for "the differences of opinion which lately appeared within the organization of the Russian Communist youth." This work was, in effect, creating an internal party opposition. The section on the syndicalists continued:

And, finally, the group resolved not to cease its revolutionary struggle against the Communists, not to forego the tactics of General Strike, even when applied toward the Soviet government. It recognizes only the free Soviets, possible only outside the framework of dictatorship . . . . We draw the attention of the Party to the activity of this organization as being the most disintegrating one, tending to undermine the morale of the vacillating members of our own organizations for the purpose of winning them over to their own ranks. In case the counter-revolution succeeds even temporarily, this Anarcho-Syndicalist organization is liable to play a very active role. (6)

In the face of increasing Bolshevik severity the syndicalists were at a loss as to how to protest the persecutions against them, and were also concerned that the Bolsheviks would move against their last instrument of mass propaganda, their publishing outlet, which was receiving a very large number of requests for literature throughout Russia. They had met with syndicalist delegates to the 1920 CI congress to apprize them of the circumstances of the Russian syndicalists and to transmit documents to them for publication abroad. But they believed they could do more when
Alfred Rosmer, who had remained at Moscow after the congress, called upon Schapiro at the syndicalist printing house, 'Golos Truda'. Their discussion dealt with the relationship of the syndicalists to the regime and especially to the communist party, and with the syndicalists' concern to protect their publishing activity. Rosmer had considerable international prestige in syndicalist circles. Though he supported the Bolsheviks and had been elevated to the Executive of the CI, Rosmer retained some sympathy for the more recalcitrant syndicalists. The Russians therefore saw in him a sincere advocate of their case. They had already drafted a protest for the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party, but put little faith in its efficacy. A protest lodged with the CI itself, they hoped, might serve not only to reduce persecution and to lessen the threat of an overall ban on their propaganda activities, but might also serve to call into question the pro-Bolshevik sympathies of many of their foreign counterparts, a task they considered of greater urgency and importance. Rosmer agreed to submit to the CI Executive a declaration of the Russian syndicalists stating their position. Rosmer believed an accord could easily be reached and "anticipated with delight an understanding which would have felicitous effects in the syndicalist movement in every country." Rosmer's optimism was mistaken, however, for he had underrated the tenacity of the syndicalists and inflated the willingness of the Bolsheviks to reach a negotiated understanding. When Maximoff and Iarchuk submitted the ARCAS statement to Rosmer, he was surprised and dismayed by its defiant tone. He refused to submit the document to the CI unless it was rewritten, its attacks on the communist party omitted, its polemical tone abandoned. Maximoff and Iarchuk reluctantly agreed to redraft the statement.
Before a new statement could be prepared, the situation had changed dramatically. The Bolsheviks had been pursuing a very changeable policy towards the Ukrainian anarchist Makhno and his anarchist army, enlisting his aid in the Civil War when necessary and attempting to crush his movement when possible. Despite these chameleon tactics (which included sending Cheka agents to assassinate Makhno, Trotsky's outlawing of the Makhnovtsy, and months of Bolshevik-Makhnovtsy armed conflict), Makhno again proved willing to join forces with the Red Army against Wrangel's Crimean offensive in the autumn of 1920. As a condition of his cooperation, Makhno stipulated an amnesty for all anarchist prisoners and full freedom of libertarian propaganda, save advocacy of the violent overthrow of the Bolshevik regime. The Bolsheviks agreed. A few imprisoned anarchists were freed and resumed their activities, including preparations for an Anarchist Congress to be held at Kharkov.

The agreement and the respite it offered the libertarians were of short duration. A month later, Wrangel's offensive broken, the Bolsheviks immediately turned upon the Makhnovtsy. Makhno's military leaders in the Crimea, who had just shared victory with the Red Army, were seized and summarily slain, while Trotsky ordered his troops to attack Makhno's Ukrainian headquarters. At the same time, raids against libertarian organizations were conducted throughout the country and the Cheka arrested the delegates, including Iarchuk, assembled at Kharkov for the Anarchist Congress.

In the light of these events, Maximoff, the only member of the ARCAS Executive then at liberty, prepared a new draft of the syndicalists' statement for Rosmer. The new draft questioned the disparity between the CI's professed desire to work with the syndicalists of Europe and commun-
ist persecution of Russian syndicalists. Instead of seeking an accord with the domestic syndicalists, the Russian Communist Party "pursues undeviatingly its terroristic tactics" which rendered the circumstances of the Russian libertarians "incompatible with the honor of the Comintern." Rosmer evinced little sympathy for the conditions in which the statement, which he found even more sharply expressed than the original draft, had been formulated. He categorically refused to submit it to the CI without substantial revisions in form and content. Seeing no alternative and still eager to get a statement before the CI, the syndicalists agreed. They transmitted a milder version, drafted by Maximoff, Schapiro, and others of the 'Golos Truda' group, to Rosmer who submitted it to the CI Executive. But the imposition of further restrictions on their printing activity feared by the syndicalists was already beginning. Early in 1921 Lenin, uneasy about the continuing appeal of syndicalist propaganda, proscribed the works of Fernand Pelloutier and some of those by Kropotkin and Bakunin.

At about the same time one of the ARCAS documents entrusted to the syndicalist delegates to the 1920 CI congress appeared in the West. The appeal, published in *Le Libertaire* (7-14 January 1921), concerned the intervention of the western powers in the Russian Civil War. It urged the workers of the West to do all they could to hinder Allied efforts to crush the Revolution and to send supplies to their beleaguered comrades. In the course of their appeal, the Russian syndicalists declared that:

notwithstanding the persecutions which we suffer from the socialist government, notwithstanding our complete disagreement with the party in power, notwithstanding our rejection of the dictatorship of the proletariat, and party dictatorship—especially, a dictatorship which has been one of the large factors in causing economic chaos and the demoralization of the
political life of the country, notwithstanding all that—we send you an ardent appeal to support Russia in its struggle against the world bourgeoisie.

But though they could appeal for help in defending the Revolution, the Russian syndicalists did not refrain from also issuing a warning:

Comrades: we ask you to fulfill your duty in regard to us, the duty of universal proletarian solidarity. Put an end to the domination of your bourgeoisie just as we did here. But do not repeat our mistakes: do not let state communism be established in your countries... Down with the bourgeoisie and the State, the proletarian State included! (13).

Rosmer notified the syndicalists in February that the CI Executive had considered their statement and would return to the question at its next meeting, to which a representative of the ARCAS would be invited. The joint meeting was never held. In the beginning of March mounting unrest in the Petrograd area flared into insurrection at Kronstadt. The libertarian character of the rebels' demands prompted the Bolsheviks to move against anarchists and syndicalists everywhere. Simultaneously with the brutal suppression of the Kronstadt rising, the Cheka initiated mass arrests of libertarians throughout the country. Maximoff and Iarchuk, the latter having been released not long before, were again arrested and the 'Golos Truda' printing offices locked up. To the syndicalists, the arbitrary arrests of their leaders in the spring of 1921 constituted the Bolshevik reply to the declaration they had submitted to the CI through Rosmer. (15)

II. Preparing for the RILU Congress

Though solidarity with the Russian Revolution remained the watchword for the great majority of western syndicalists as the first RILU congress approached, evidence of the increasingly autocratic nature of the
Bolshevik regime, exemplified not least by its persecution of the Russian syndicalists, caused considerable disquiet. This was nowhere more evident than in Germany, where geographical proximity kept the syndicalists of the FAUD better informed of Russian developments than many of their more distant colleagues. Moreover, the early emergence of an active domestic communist party had led to a conflict between syndicalists and communists in advance of most other European countries. The FAUD rejected collaboration with the communists and the dictatorship of the proletariat as early as its 1919 congress. Within the ranks of the German syndicalists there was considerable opposition to any kind of participation in the Moscow meeting. Recent events in Russia accentuated that opposition. An extraordinary national conference convened in March 1921 to deal with the international question approved the work of the FAUD representatives in the earlier Berlin conference and selected a delegation to attend the RILU congress. Yet, despite the argument that it was essential to work together with their foreign comrades in support of the Berlin theses, no clear consensus could be established over attendance. In typically syndicalist fashion the question was put to the entire membership by referendum, with the result that the majority opposed participation in the RILU congress. In consequence the Bolsheviks were spared the embarrassment of hosting a delegation from an organization which was proving to be one of their severest critics. Moreover, although the position of the FAUD was clearly sanctioned by its membership, its failure to comply with the decision taken at Berlin to attend the RILU congress provided its opponents with a polemical weapon.

The question of participation in the congress also reverberated through the NAS of Holland. In the wake of the Berlin conference, the
issue of the proposed RILU, until then relatively subdued, was propelled into vocal and prominent controversy, and centred around Bouwman and Lansink, the NAS delegates at Berlin. Shortly after the conclusion of the Berlin conference, Bouwman published an article commending it as a step forward for the pro-Moscow revolutionary unionists; defending Belinsky's position throughout its sessions; favouring the dictatorship of the proletariat; and attacking the German and Swedish delegations for their insistence upon a strict interpretation of an independent labour International and for their resistance to the dictatorship. "To say that one is against the dictatorship and the violence of the State," Bouwman wrote, "is to confess that one lacks the courage to accept the logical consequence of the revolutionary struggle of the working class." His article opened a lengthy debate and in the early months of 1921 the pages of De Arbeid were filled with articles by Bouwman, Lansink and others. When Lansink and van den Berg refused to become members of the delegation which the NAS Executive decided to send to Moscow, the RILU Council launched an attack on them in a call directed to the workers of the NAS. The Council denounced Lansink, the chief official of the NAS and Secretary of the International Syndicalist Bureau, as an opportunist. Along with van den Berg and their supporters he had sabotaged the decision of the Berlin conference and "stabbed the syndicalist movement in the back." In the end, the delegation of Bouwman, Thomas Dissel and C. Kitsz which the NAS dispatched to the RILU congress was more favourably disposed towards Moscow than the membership of the NAS as a whole.

In Italy, as in Spain, the major syndicalist organization was affiliated with the CI. Although its Secretary, Armando Borghi, had returned deeply disturbed by his experiences in Russia and had staunchly
refused to sign the RILU Council's statement of policy, the USI had nevertheless announced its intention to join the RILU following Borghi's return to Italy. The attention of the USI upon Borghi's return, however, was directed almost exclusively to the factory occupation movement. The most recalcitrant organization involved in the movement, the USI opposed attempts to negotiate an end to the occupations. Borghi's adamant criticism of the settlement engineered by the government and the CGL alarmed the government, which soon arrested and imprisoned him.

If Borghi's behaviour displeased the established powers in Italy, his earlier conduct in Moscow had also failed to endear him to the leaders of the CI. The CI was eager to capture the USI, but naturally considered its ideological stance in need of correction, particularly following Borghi's refusal to sign the RILU documents. Within a few months of Borghi's return and imprisonment, Zinoviev, in a letter to the Italian socialist Serrati, commended the revolutionary spirit of the USI but dismissed its leadership as confused. This was followed by an open letter to the Italian working class, signed by Zinoviev, Bukharin and Lenin, which again attacked the leadership of the USI which "tens of thousands of revolutionary proletarians" followed "by mistake or by ignorance." Speaking in the name of the CI, the authors recommended their own "systematic approach in revolutionary work," which included not only a merciless struggle against reformists, but also "a constant propaganda among the labouring masses who are oriented toward syndicalism and anarchism in order to illuminate [their] errors to them." These attacks did nothing to improve the relationship between the USI and Moscow. Although the USI, exhausted by the struggle of the occupations and with its Secretary in jail, had been unable to send a delegate
to the Berlin conference which followed shortly after Zinoviev's attacks upon its leadership, it nevertheless welcomed this evidence of syndicalist resistance to Moscow and endorsed the decisions of the conference. The USI's mandate to its RILU delegation incorporated the theses approved at Berlin. In the absence of the still incarcerated Borghi, the USI selected Nicolo Vecchi, who had directed the syndicalist factory occupations in Verona, and Lulio Mari to represent it. The USI Executive would have reason to regret these choices, for whatever their attitudes before leaving Italy, events would demonstrate that at Moscow neither delegate could resist the Bolsheviks.

Circumstances in Spain prevented any open and thorough discussion of the question of the international affiliation of the CNT. Locked in fierce and simultaneous combat with their rivals in the 'free' unions, the employers and the government, the organizational structure of the CNT reeled under this combined onslaught. Severe government repression had driven the CNT underground and nearly the whole of its surviving leadership languished in prisons. Formally affiliated with the CI, the CNT's delegate to the 1920 congress had reluctantly worked with the RILU Provisional Council. Pestana's reservations were such that while homeward bound he had paused in Germany to cooperate in the planning of the Berlin conference. His critical views toward Moscow were not widely known in Spain prior to the RILU congress, however, for he had been immediately incarcerated upon his return. He remained imprisoned for many months and did not begin to publish the report of his Russian experiences until the autumn of 1921.23

Within the CNT there was a small minority of communist-syndicalists who not only, like the great majority of cenetistas, joyfully welcomed the Bolshevik Revolution, but perceived the organizational principles of Bol-
shevism more accurately and in large part accepted them. Hilario Arlandis had already been urging the case of centralization within the CNT as early as the 1919 congress. Some of the most important of these communist-syndicalists, such as Andrés Nin and Joaquín Maurin, both teachers and journalists, were newcomers carried into the CNT by their identification with the Bolshevik Revolution and their perception of the revolutionary ethos of the syndicalist organization. As such they were largely unburdened by the ideological legacy of most cenetista leaders and unfettered in their willingness to embrace an ideology at variance with the traditional dictums of the CNT.

Although the attitude of the communist-syndicalists was not widely shared in the CNT, they were rapidly coming into ascendance within the organization in the period preceding the RILU congress. They were sustained in their efforts by the uncritical popular enthusiasm for the Russian Revolution. More importantly, the virtual vacuum created at the leadership level by the wholesale imprisonment of established cenetista chiefs catapulted the most active of the new figures into prestigious positions. The rise of Nin and Maurin was meteoric. The suppression of Solidaridad Obrera had left Lucha Social as the main CNT journal in Catalonia. This was the principal communist-syndicalist organ and was edited by Maurin, who by the spring of 1921 had become the most prominent member of the illegal committee of the Catalanian Regional Confederation. By that time Nin had become the acting General Secretary of the clandestine CNT National Committee.

Although state repression had prevented the disorganized CNT from sending a delegate to the Berlin conference, the organization had indicated its support for the conference by post. The composition of the CNT dele-
gation to the RILU congress, however, was determined by the communist-syndicalists. Whether by chance or design, seven of the ten representatives who attended the secret meeting of the CNT in April 1921 at Lérida, where _Lucha Social_ was published, were communist-syndicalists. They selected the four-member delegation from their own ranks. It included Nin of the National Committee as well as Maurin, Arlandis and Jesus Ibáñez of the Catalanian, Levantine and Asturian Regional Confederations respectively.

At the initiative of Arlandis, who thought the libertarians should have some representation, Gaston Leval was later named to join the delegation by the Catalanian anarchists. The unrepresentative character of the Lérida meeting soon came under criticism from other _cenetistas_ who complained that the regional confederations had been selectively invited and challenged it as having been rigged by the communist-syndicalists, though its composition may have been the fortuitous result of the chaotic circumstances in which the CNT was operating. In any event, the mandate formulated at Lérida clearly instructed the delegates to combat any attempt to subordinate the unions at the RILU congress.

In fact, at the congress itself the Spanish communist-syndicalists endeared themselves to Rosmer, who had been set the task of defending the Bolshevik position on the relationship between the RILU and the CI. Pleasantly surprised to find that the Spanish delegates, except Leval, shared his views, Rosmer described them as a "great comfort" to him. That Rosmer felt in need of consolation was in large part due to the French delegation, the composition of which he found far less satisfactory.
Though the French delegates at the Berlin conference had demonstrated considerable enthusiasm for accommodation with Moscow, those most eager for affiliation with the RILU among the minoritaire syndicalists were not able to exert much influence on the selection of the CSR delegation to be sent to Russia. The delegation appointed was not wholly united in outlook, so that Rosmer and the Bolsheviks could count on some willing collaborators, such as Godonneche, among them. Nevertheless the delegation as a whole was instructed to oppose any attempt to politicize the RILU. The majority of the delegation took the defense of this mandate as imperative and in consequence constituted a thorn in the side of the Bolsheviks and a source of despair to Rosmer.²⁷

The remaining organizations represented by personal delegates at Berlin all (with the exception of the FAUD, as noted) sent a delegation to the RILU congress: Severin, the representative of the Swedish syndicalists at Berlin, was included in the three-man SAC delegation to Moscow, while Tom Barker again represented the Argentinian FORA. The IWW, represented by Hardy at Berlin, sent George Williams as its delegate to Moscow, although there had been some opposition in its 1921 congress to sending any delegate at all.²⁸

III. The RILU Congress

The issues most hotly contested at the RILU congress when it met in July were precisely those which had triggered most debate in the sessions of the RILU Provisional Council the year before: namely, the questions of working within the reformist unions and of the relationship between the unions and national communist parties. The latter issue, cast on the international level, presented itself as the question of the appropriate
connection between the proposed RILU and the CI, and thus became symbolic of the difference dividing syndicalists and communists.

Although the Bolsheviks were slow to develop a clear position on the trade union question, the policy they finally adopted stood in stark contrast to their attitude towards communist parties. Eager schismatics when it came to the creation of parties, the Bolsheviks embraced quite another tack when it came to the labour unions. Whereas they had insisted upon the necessity of leftist elements withdrawing from the old socialist parties and purging themselves of all opportunist elements so that only the most dedicated and disciplined remained in the new communist parties, they condemned any effort to apply a similar policy within the labour movement. This was the logical result of their conception of the party as the avant-garde of the revolution. As the "most advanced, most class-conscious, and hence most revolutionary part" of the working class, the party was the spearhead of the revolution; as such, it had to be purified, to be fashioned of unalloyed metal. But the spearhead was of little value without the shaft; the party could not function properly without close contact with the masses. The chief arena of this contact was within the labour movement and above all within the trade unions. Consequently the Bolsheviks, political schismatics par excellence, became great advocates of labour unity. The tactic of withdrawal from reformist unions they condemned as simultaneously isolating the revolutionary workers from the masses and leaving the more pliable majority in the hands of reformist union leaders. The Bolsheviks urged instead a policy of remaining within the reformist unions and seeking to transform them by the tactic of revolutionary cell-building, ultimately to capture the masses of workers by appropriating existing organizational structures and bringing them under revolutionary
To many syndicalists and industrialists, however, precisely the impossibility of making progress within the reformist organizations had necessitated the creation of their own revolutionary unions. To the syndicalists the conduct of the reformist unions during the war had demonstrated yet again the futility of hoping they could be prompted to do anything more than espouse revolutionary rhetoric, if that. In many cases the reformist organizations were among the most bitter adversaries of the syndicalists and industrialists. To work within such organizations could only lead to the corruption of the fighting spirit of the revolutionary workers. The syndicalists and industrialists had long denied that a political party could ever be the **avant-garde** of the revolution. If there was such an **avant-garde**, it could be found among the revolutionary workers themselves. To ask them to lose themselves in the reformist unions was equivalent to asking the communist parties to dissolve and send their members into the opportunist parties. In their quest for ideological hegemony over the whole of the revolutionary movement, the communists never fully appreciated the magnitude of ideological sacrifice which they expected the syndicalists and industrialists to perform so readily.

Ideally the Bolsheviks sought unity of outlook between communist-dominated unions and communist parties everywhere. On the international level, this ideal envisaged not a separate trade union International, but a single Communist International of which the revolutionary unions would merely form one section. This ideal was clearly embodied in the statutes of the CI, promulgated in 1920, which spoke unambiguously of the international trade union organization as a mere section of the Comintern and...
directed the revolutionary unions to secure representation therein through their national communist parties. Only belated recognition of the impossibility of securing widespread union support for such a scheme induced the Bolsheviks to initiate measures to establish a separate international body in which to group revolutionary unions and with which to appease defenders of syndical autonomy. This was the task of the RILU Provisional Council, which called for a separate trade union International. But a separate organization did not, for the Bolsheviks, entail autonomy. The scheme of the Provisional Council called for a labour International which would work side-by-side and in strict harmony with the CI, as well as for an exchange of representatives between the Council and the CI Executive. In contrast, the mandates to the syndicalist and industrialist delegates all expressly instructed them to oppose any efforts to subordinate the unions or to politicize the RILU; to struggle, in the words of the Berlin theses, for a trade union International which was completely autonomous and independent of every political party.

Before the communists and revolutionary unionists could come into conflict on these substantive issues, they clashed on procedural points. The Bolsheviks had no intention of permitting a genuine opposition to develop within the congress and took steps to ensure that they and their sympathisers constituted a large voting majority. This they easily achieved by controlling both the distribution of votes and the work of the credentials committee. By these means the Bolsheviks added to their own large block vote (represented by the Russian trade unions and those of satellite states such as the Ukraine) hand-picked delegates said to represent the miniscule revolutionary labour movements of such places as Korea and Palestine. They further manipulated the electoral balance by admitting sympa-
thetic delegates who represented minorities of major reformist unions and apportioning votes according to the number of unionists these delegates claimed to represent. Thus of the sixteen votes allotted to Germany, eleven went to pro-Bolshevik delegates said to represent the minority of the German 'Free' Trade Unions, affiliated with Amsterdam, while the remaining five votes went to independent revolutionary union organizations. Similarly the IWW, once considered by the Bolsheviks as the only revolutionary labour organization in the United States, received only three of the sixteen American votes, the remainder being apportioned to assorted, largely pro-Moscow delegates with dubious credentials. Protests lodged with the credentials committee rarely did any good. By these techniques the Bolsheviks emasculated the voting strength of their opponents. "The credentials committee decided the course of the whole Congress," the IWW delegate declared. "Everything was cut and dried. As for the delegates from the revolutionary labour bodies who attended, they might better have stayed home."

Dismayed by this engineered majority, a number of delegates supported a general protest lodged by the Spanish delegation against the distribution of votes within the assembly. The protesters challenged the allocation of votes to questionable minorities as well as to obscure and dubious labour movements in such places as Bukhara and Java. Such a system of representation, they did not hesitate to say, had created a "fictitious" majority "to frustrate the truly revolutionary tendencies of international syndicalism" and to force decisions upon the congress which could not be accepted by many of the workers of the West. Votes ought to be apportioned instead on the basis of the past and present conduct of legitimate labour organizations. If this were done, the syndicalist
organizations of the West which represented genuine revolutionary forces would rightfully be able to make their influence felt in the congress. But the same fictitious majority condemned ensured the easy dismissal of these points.

The opposition was no more successful when the congress came to more substantive issues. Thwarted in advance by the creation of a spurious pro-Bolshevik majority, the effectiveness of the minority was further reduced by its own divisions. Moreover, the communists strove assiduously to woo the delegations of the larger syndicalist organizations, especially those of Spain, Italy and France, though their efforts were largely resisted by the latter group.

Despite the various means employed to ensure results compatible with Bolshevik goals, the opposition remained sufficiently forceful to turn the sessions of the congress into scenes of bitter struggle. The communique sent from Moscow by the communists tried to mask the fierce dissent within the congress by presenting a picture of harmonious cooperation among the delegates. Far more accurate were the recollections of the British communist, Harry Pollitt, who wrote:

What battles were fought at that Congress! ... Coats were flung off, arms waved in the wildest gesticulations, hard names flew all over the place while the discussion on the first draft programme went on ... Several delegates raised stormy protests against politics being allowed in the trade unions at all. One felt that at any moment the speakers would resort to blows. (33)

The question of the relationship of the RILU to the CI triggered many of these scenes. The Bolsheviks insisted that the RILU work side-by-side with the CI and in strict liaison with it. This integral connection was decried by the syndicalist delegates as incompatible with syndical autonomy. Early in the congress Lozovsky had sought to undermine the
syndicalist position by bluntly declaring that "this theory of autonomy and of independence should be condemned by our congress . . . . Politics is a concentration of the economy and it is necessary for the class struggle; moreover, in a general way all class struggle is a political struggle." Any attempt to return to the position of the Chart e d'Amiens was "incontestably reactionary." 34

The main burden of persuading the syndicalists to accept the Bolshevik formula calling for an intimate linkage between the RILU and the CI fell to Rosmer and Tom Mann. The Bolsheviks had originally intended Zinoviev, the head of the Comintern, to share this task with Rosmer, but on the eve of the RILU congress Zinoviev realized that the syndicalist delegates were not at all well-disposed towards him and abruptly abandoned his plans to participate in it, 35 whereupon Mann was selected to assist Rosmer. The choices were shrewd, for the esteem which the two men carried within the international syndicalist movement could not but add weight to their appeals for a close relationship between the syndical and political Internationals. Their task was nonetheless a daunting one.

Rosmer argued that the Third International, like the First and unlike the Second, had been designed to unite both parties and unions. He maintained that the entry of the USI and the CNT into the CI indicated that the syndicalists had no objections on principle to the coexistence of political and labour bodies in the same International. But the CI had decided to create a labour International to unite not only those workers' organizations which were in full accord with the program of the Comintern, but also those which accepted only its essential principles. Therefore the present issue of the relations between the RILU and the CI was not a theoretical one, but only a question of practical organization, though it
did raise other problems, notably that concerning relations between trade unions and political parties. On this point the Bolsheviks had been much misunderstood. Despite the view widely disseminated outside Russia, the Russian communists had never held that the unions should be subordinated in any way to the communist party. They strove, just as naturally and legitimately as any other party or group, to exercise a predominant influence in the unions, but never to subordinate them.36

Traditional syndicalism had also been misunderstood. The Charte d'Amiens had not sought to guarantee the political neutrality of the CGT. Historically the Charte sought to keep the CGT on a revolutionary course and had been directed against those groups within it which would either have had the CGT pursue a simply reformist trade union policy or tie itself to the opportunistic socialist party. The CGT had never been politically neutral, for it had followed its own course of revolutionary politics. "In reality, before the war the CGT had been a true political party, but of an entirely original and special form." 37 The CGT had declared its independence from political parties in 1906 because at that time there had been no revolutionary party. The situation was radically different now that there were communist parties, though not all syndicalists realized it yet. The CSR in France realized it, however, for it had declared itself willing to work with a truly revolutionary party. Thus the Charte d'Amiens, properly understood and interpreted, was no barrier to collaboration between the unions and the party.

On the international terrain, therefore, the problem was simply one of determining the appropriate form of relating the two revolutionary Internationals. On the basis of principle there could be no objections to an intimate relationship between the RILU and the CI. Fears that direct
and permanent links between them would subordinate the labour International only indicated a lack of confidence in the strength of the RILU. As a powerful organization in its own right, it could never become a mere instrument of the CI. To clinch the argument, Rosmer declared the suggestion that the RILU would be dependent upon the CI to be the propaganda tactic of the IFTU, itself linked to the Second International.

The real question, Rosmer maintained in reverting to a favourite communist theme, was precisely the choice between Amsterdam and Moscow. The issue admitted of no other formulation. The RILU Council had already been operating for a year and the CI had never sought to encroach upon its authority. To advance arguments of union autonomy as a weapon against the linkage of the RILU with the CI would be to succumb to bourgeois machinations to keep the revolutionary unions and parties separated and mutually hostile. Against an increasingly organized bourgeois, the proletariat must methodically group and organize its forces. In accepting a formal connection between the RILU and the CI, the workers were doing no more than that; the question of syndical subordination did not enter into it. 38

In supporting Rosmer, Mann spoke of his syndicalist background. He justified his support of formal relations between the RILU and the CI precisely on the basis of his anti-parliamentarism. As a syndicalist, Mann asserted, he had long opposed workers' parties because of their reliance upon parliamentary action. He had always sought to demonstrate to workers that their problems were preeminently economic in nature and best resolved by direct economic action. But he had also been willing to learn from experience and to change his opinions if the facts required it. The circumstances of economic and political life, greatly altered since before the war, dictated a modification in attitude towards forms of workers'
organization. He was convinced more than ever that parliamentarism in no way alleviated the situation of the workers. If the CI accepted parliamentarism in this sense he would be duty bound to reject it. But he had always allowed one exception to his opposition to parliamentary activity; namely, "when one enters parliament in order to destroy it." This was the position of the CI, which did not concern itself with palliatives. Since the RILU sought the destruction of the capitalist state, Mann declared, he was ready to accept completely the cooperation of the two Internationals in the manner of Rosmer's proposal. 39

Speaking for the opposition, Williams of the IWW, Barker of the FORA, Arlandis of the CNT, Sirolle of the French delegation, and Mayer and Bartels of independent German unions combatted the position elaborated by Rosmer and Mann. They argued that the revolutionary unions and the RILU could and should stand alone; to sanction the interference of political parties in the industrial movement was a course fraught with danger. They cited the example of France to demonstrate that the unions were more revolutionary than the communist party. What guarantee was there that the CI would not become as reformist as other political organizations? The minority fiercely defended both the independence of the union movement from national communist parties and the autonomy of the RILU.

A number of speakers, including Murphy of Britain and Tzyperovitch and Lozovsky of Russia, defended the intimate link between the CI and the RILU and denied that it constituted any threat to union autonomy. Lozovsky took advantage of his rebuttal to assail the Berlin conference for having presented its declaration "as a Bible which the RILU congress must accept." He submitted the theses, "the commandments of the syndicalist Testament," to acrid criticism. The expression 'the power of the working class'
favoured at Berlin Lozovsky dismissed as either equivalent to the dictatorship of the proletariat or an empty phrase. Defining politics as "nothing other than the active opposition of one class to another," Lozovsky rejected the separation of economic and political action as nonsensical. The fundamental defect in syndicalist thinking was the inability to discern "the politics of the economy." Lozovsky reserved his greatest wrath for the fifth thesis, requiring the complete independence of a trade union International from all political organizations. It evidenced "an absolute ignorance of the most elementary truths of the class struggle." Its sinister purpose, Lozovsky averred, was to preclude the possibility of cooperation with Moscow.

Even those syndicalists inclined to support the Bolsheviks found this dogmatic condemnation dismaying. Bouwman of the NAS had amply demonstrated his leanings toward Moscow during and after the Berlin conference. Yet he warned the assembly not to react to the syndicalists in general and the Berlin assembly in particular in an excessively doctrinaire manner. While he believed the RILU should accept the "spiritual leadership" of the CI, he considered it a mistake to accept the proposed RILU statutes without a critique. If the assembly failed to take "an intelligent view" towards the Berlin conference, an independent syndicalist International might well come to be founded. Bouwman therefore warned the Bolsheviks against considering their own views "as a dogma."

A number of representatives, including French, Spanish and German delegates, had earlier proposed adjournment of the explosive question until the CI congress, which was holding simultaneous sessions and which had the trade union question on its agenda, had debated it. This, they argued, would enable the RILU delegates to judge the true intentions of
the CI. Their opponents turned this demand against them, however, by pointing out that to await the decision of the political parties in the CI was a curious request from non-political syndicalists. That the RILU assembly could discuss its issues separately was proof of its independence from the CI. A last-minute attempt by the German dissidents to postpone the vote on the resolution on RILU-CI relations failed.⁴³

In the end, despite the protests of the minority, the Bolshevik-sponsored resolutions were easily accepted. That pertaining to the relations between the RILU and the CI declared that:

the logic of the present class struggle requires the most complete unification of the forces of the proletariat and of its revolutionary struggle and thus establishes the necessity of close contact and of an organic connection between the various forms of the revolutionary labour movement, and above all between the Communist International and the Red International of Labour Unions, and that it is also highly desirable that every effort be made at the national level towards the establishment of similar relations between the communist parties and the Red trade unions. (⁴⁴)

The resolution proceeded to describe the Comintern as the "avant-garde of the revolutionary labour movement in the entire world," and called for "the closest possible bonds" between it and the RILU. It emphasized that those links be of "an organic and technical character," based upon the common deliberations of the two bodies and upon reciprocal representation between their executive organs. It further affirmed the necessity of a "close and real connection" between the revolutionary unions and the communist parties in applying the joint decisions of the RILU and the CI.⁴⁵

A counter-proposal took the form of a resolution from Lemoine of the French delegation affirming the unqualified independence of the RILU and its refusal to acknowledge the CI as its "moral leader." It further insisted upon continuing efforts to ensure an effective "liaison" between RILU and CI, but in a form in which neither would be subordinated to the other. The
proposal gained a majority of the French vote and the support of a number of independent German unions, the FORA, the NAS, the IWW and the SAC.\textsuperscript{46}

Given the composition and organization of the congress, there was never any real danger that the Bolshevik view would fail. However, the large majority by which the resolution on RILU-CI relations was accepted --285 to 35--could not have been achieved without the support of a number of delegates from syndicalist organizations. The French, for example, were split: Tommasi had spoken for the Bolshevik resolution in the main debates while Sirolle had spoken against it; and Tommasi and Goëddonneché affixed their signatures to its text. So too did Nin and Maurin of the Spanish delegation, which at the last moment swung its support behind the Bolshevik proposal.\textsuperscript{47}

The remainder of the official work of the congress constituted a series of affirmations of Bolshevik policy. Minority objections were repeatedly swept aside. In the committee dealing with workers' control the CNT delegate contested a resolution acknowledging the communist party as the inevitable vanguard of the revolution. Citing national differences, the Spaniard maintained that only in some countries would the party inevitably provide the initiative. In Spain, with large revolutionary unions and a miniscule and divided communist party, the syndicalists should maintain the revolutionary lead. "We do no ask that only the ... syndicalists be the revolutionary vanguard; what we request is that it not be set forth that it will be exclusively the communist party .... We call for a collaboration of all revolutionary forces, but we raise our voices against all exclusivism."\textsuperscript{48} The amendment was crushed in committee. The policy of working within reformist unions also won approval, though a dissenting statement was read in the congress signed by the CNT, the USI, the NAS, the
IWW, the FORA, the CGT-M, the FORU, by five German unions, by members of the French delegation, by Gordon Cascaden of Canada and others. Despite this show of mass dissent, Lozovsky later dismissed the opposition on this issue as "a few mischief-making souls who seek theoretical forms for their pessimism and their powerlessness." The dictatorship of the proletariat was endorsed throughout the resolutions. A section on the aims and tactics of the trade unions sharply condemned the "errors" of trade union neutrality and independence, pronounced it the duty of the unions to struggle "against the ideology of neutralism," and reaffirmed the need for an "organic link" between the unions and the communist parties. The RILU statutes adopted formalized the 'organic link' on the international level by directing the Central Committee of the RILU to send representatives to the Executive Committee of the CI.

IV. The Opposition in Disarray

In the face of the synthetically reinforced pro-Bolshevik majority in the congress, the minority could only hope to weld together a unified opposition to put its position as strongly as possible. In this it failed. The minority proved indecisive, ambiguous in purpose, and faulty in organization. Many of the delegates of what may loosely be called the opposition found themselves, like Buridan's ass, torn between conflicting objectives. The lure of the proletarian revolution in Russia remained strong. Moreover, the communists strove assiduously to woo the delegates of the larger syndicalist bodies. The dissidents valued labour unity and hoped that all revolutionary unions could be united in a single labour International. At the same time they sought to defend syndical autonomy against the centralizing imperatives of the Bolsheviks who demanded that the RILU fall into step
behind the CI and that the unions embrace the repugnant policy of collaboration with communist parties. For some delegates the issue was further embittered by the threat to their own organizations from the reformist unions, which they were being asked to join. The confusion into which the opposition was thrown by the course of the congress found expression in a series of conflicting statements which began issuing from the ranks of the minority as the congress neared its end.

In light of the opposition's internal divisions, the expression of dissent was hardly uniform. The Bolsheviks were prepared to tolerate its milder forms for their own purposes. One statement declared that although the syndicalists had been overwhelmed in the congress, they were nevertheless united to the majority "by the same revolutionary fire and the same belief in the triumph of the proletariat." They had "not been satisfied by all the decisions of the Congress, and . . . new mutual concessions will be necessary." But at that point the expression of dissent ended. They exhorted other syndicalists to remain within the RILU and rejected all thought of working outside the Moscow organization. Only within the RILU, "which has been formed in the revolutionary furnace of the Communist International," can "your autonomy . . . be preserved and your independence ensured." That the declaration amounted to 'sanctioned' dissent is evident from its content, by the absence of any critical observations concerning the dubious representation in the congress, and by the fact that it bore the signatures not only of Nin, Mari, Sirolle, Bouwman, and others, but of such staunch pro-Bolsheviks as Mann and George Andreytchine--both elevated to the RILU Executive. It was of course reproduced in Bolshevik publications.52

The less pliant opposition in the assembly, which included some of the signatories of the above statement, found itself compelled by the un-
shakeable Bolshevik control of the congress sessions to hold a series of clandestine counter-meetings in hotel rooms at night. There various delegates from Germany, Holland, Scandinavia, France, Italy, Spain, South America, the United States, and Canada groped for a common response to the policies the Bolsheviks were forcing through the congress. The existence of these semi-secret sessions was soon discovered by the outraged Bolsheviks.

The delegates of the independent German unions were the first to act to unite the dissidents. In an appeal to the minority delegates, the Germans challenged the artificial majority in the congress which submitted autonomous labour organizations to the bidding of the CI. The domination of the RILU by cell groups instead of independent organizations made it a "farce." They called upon the minority to unite on a common course, and to join together for mutual defense in the event that the RILU leadership took disciplinary measures against the dissidents. "The aim and purpose of our opposition," the declaration continued, "shall be to transform the fictitious [RILU] into a real International and to fight against all reformist, opportunist and other tendencies inimical to the movement, and to provide for its practical revolutionary character." In the interests of labour unity the Germans recommended that all efforts of working within the RILU be exhausted before the possibility of a second revolutionary International be considered. The circular fell into the hands of an enraged Lozovsky who read it, as one delegate put it, "as though it was the height of treason to indulge in such views." 53

The assembled dissidents, however, never reached the desired common ground. Their clandestine sessions were made difficult by language problems. More important, the attempt to unite the opposition came only late
in the congress. Only two meetings were held before the conclusion of the congress and several thereafter. By that time the delegates were beginning to leave Moscow. The Spanish and Italian delegations (the USI delegates had arrived late and missed most of the proceedings of the congress) joined the opposition with the declaration that they endorse an internal opposition only, and did not wish to work for the creation of a second revolutionary labour International of any kind. Bartells of the Allgemeine Arbeiter Union Deutschland, on the other hand, argued that an external Information Bureau should be created for those organizations which could not join the RILU. Some urged the necessity of a clear statement from the opposition to challenge the picture of harmonious accord which the Bolsheviks were communicating to the outside world, while Williams argued that a unified opposition resolution must be presented within the congress itself. The uncertain Dutch delegates curiously declared that since they did not know if the NAS would join the RILU, they could not be associated with the opposition. They nevertheless proposed that the Berlin theses be used as the basis for an opposition statement to be drafted by an appointed committee, though this suggestion did not win unanimous approval.

The policy of permeating existing reformist unions endorsed at Moscow proved to be a major stumbling block to the unity of the opposition. The opposition was united in seeking a revolutionary labour International free of political influence. The congress had not required the dissolution of the French CSR and the Spanish CNT, and was ambiguous in its attitude toward the Italian USI. Consequently these delegates, representing the largest syndicalist organizations, were content to build an internal opposition to work for the autonomy of the RILU. The delegates of the smaller radical organizations, on the other hand, were confronted with the demand
to disband their unions. The Germans lamented the command "that revolutionary organizations dig their own grave." Thus these delegates were more readily disposed to consider a renunciation of the RILU on the grounds of its political domination and an appeal for a separate International, or at least an organized external opposition. Williams of the IWW took this position. The delegates of the SAC, which had earlier appealed for a syndicalist International at the Berlin conference, also supported it. The Germans and others were inclined to support it as well. The position of this section of the opposition was determined, in Williams' words, "by more than a mere consideration of affiliation with a political party, but also from a standpoint of self-preservation." They argued that the creation of an internal opposition was hopeless in view of the illicit majority the Bolsheviks could always command as long as the RILU sat at Moscow. In those circumstances it was futile to imagine that congress decisions would ever be determined "by a discussion on principles." Only the creation of an external opposition could preserve the independence of existing organizations and prevent a political faction from monopolizing the revolutionary labour movement.56

Minority statements inevitably reflected these tactical disparities. Such was the case with the 'Manifesto to the Revolutionary Syndicalists of the World', which explained that the opposition, forced into a minority by a defective system of representation, had felt compelled to hold a conference among themselves following the RILU congress. The signatories proclaimed their "profound conviction that the power and prestige of the [RILU] will not be augmented, but on the contrary will be diminished, if it remains under the influence of, or subordinated to, the Third International." Therefore it was necessary to create an "organization of resis-
tance" to be composed of elements "from within and for the moment from without" to struggle for the RILU's categorical independence from all political organizations. Though communist parties had loftier goals than the social democracy associated with the IFTU, the syndicalists had encountered at Moscow the same political striving to exercise an "exclusive and indisputable hegemony" over the fighting organizations of the working class. To counter this proclivity, described as theoretically unjustifiable and practically disastrous, the syndicalists sought to unite their forces firmly within the RILU and defend there the fundamental interests of the working class against the encroachments of political parties. The manifesto directed the USI to establish relations between syndicalist organizations within and without the RILU in order to maintain connections between them and to initiate preparations for a syndicalist conference. Signed by Mari, Relenque, Maurin, Severin, Barker, Williams and others, the equivocal document clearly attempted to appease both wings of the opposition.

A second 'Manifesto' advanced the startling claim that to defend their principles within the RILU, the syndicalists had formed an 'Association of all the Revolutionary Syndicalist Elements of the World'. The Association purported to include the CNT, the USI, the CSR, the IWW, the SAC, the NAS, the FORA, as well as five German labour organizations and groups in Denmark, Norway, Canada and Uruguay representing 2,774,500 workers. The statement further announced the election of a Bureau to sit at Paris which would link member organizations together, organize propaganda and arrange conferences.

In fact, however, the fragile unity of the opposition crumbled before the delegates had even left Moscow and the Association never progressed beyond this document. Even the initial consensus that a minority declara-
tion was necessary following the congress soon dissolved. The resistance of the delegates from Holland, Spain and Italy to RILU policies had been steadily receding and they eventually agreed that no opposition manifesto should be published. Instead they issued a statement repudiating the minority documents as incompatible with revolutionary unity. The statement pointed out that the support of the NAS for the syndicalist Association and its Bureau had been included without the consent of the Dutch delegation, and while the Italian and Spanish delegations had joined it "in principle," they were retracting their support. The counter-statement granted that the USI might fulfil an informational role for syndicalist organizations, but did not endorse the earlier directive that the Italians begin preparations for a syndicalist conference.  

The Bolsheviks obviously had reason to be pleased with these three delegations which, by the end of the RILU congress, had become firm supporters of Moscow. Vecchi and Mari would return to Italy and launch a campaign to bring the USI into the RILU. Similarly, the Spanish delegates, with the exception of Leval, were transformed from critics of the RILU to staunch proponents of the CNT's continued affiliation with Moscow. Before they left Moscow Arlandis declared that "we are syndicalists who have profited from the lessons of the war and of the Russian Revolution. We place ourselves within the framework of the general ideas of the Communist International." And Nin would later recall the impact of their experiences at Moscow upon him and Maurin. Prior to going to Moscow the CNT had provided a "refuge" for them, but once in Russia they were led to the conclusion that "so-called revolutionary Syndicalism" had become "obsolete in this century."  

The Dutch delegates, faithful to their mandate, had actually voted
against the Bolshevik RILU-CI resolution. In their report to the NAS, however, they claimed that the opposition had forced the Russians to make important concessions; that it had prevented the RILU from falling under the tutelage of the CI (though, apparently sensitive to the dubiety of this claim, they granted that the actual resolution, depending upon one's motives, could be interpreted differently). They emphasized the danger that following the Moscow congress another trade union International might be created, but added that a syndicalist International would be impossible since neither the USI, nor the CNT, nor the CSR would support it. Although their mandate did not allow them to enroll the NAS in the RILU, they assured the RILU leadership before leaving Moscow that they would work energetically for such affiliation in Holland.

Even with the more recalcitrant French delegation the Bolsheviks were able to secure a belated success. Some weeks after the congress closed some of the leading officials of the RILU and the CI met with a number of the dissident members of the French delegation in an attempt to conciliate their differences. In the course of the meeting Sirolle, Gaudeaux, Gaye and Labonne affirmed the necessity of syndical autonomy, but declared themselves to favour affiliation with the RILU and a policy of internal opposition. A document emanating from the meeting rejected syndical subordination, but acknowledged the need for coordinated action and recommended reciprocal representation in the governing organs of the two Internationals. As for the coordination of communist parties and unions in the national sphere, the statement declared each country to be free to determine the most feasible procedure for this according to its own circumstances. Finally, the declaration called upon the CSR to select delegates to send to the Central Committee and the Bureau of the RILU.
The composition, procedures, and distribution of votes in the RILU congress made it a foregone conclusion that its results would correspond to Bolshevik policies. Although the Bolsheviks obviously preferred to describe the decisions of the congress as the result of compromise, they had not been required to make a single major concession to the opposition. The structure of the congress, moreover, enabled the Bolsheviks to achieve their victory despite the ironic fact that the syndicalist and industrialist delegates alone represented mass revolutionary organizations outside Russia. Although even a united minority could not have overcome the built-in advantages the communists enjoyed in the congress, the Bolsheviks secured their success more readily in the face of an indecisive and fragmented opposition. Hopes that the syndicalists and industrialists would unite on a common platform proved largely groundless. True, certain organizations represented at Berlin—the SAC, the IWW, the FORA, even the NAS—refused at Moscow to vote for the Rosmer-Mann resolution on RILU-CI relations. But the objective of the Berlin conference of unifying the syndicalists had not been realized. The minority agreed on the need to defend syndical autonomy, the chief issue in the congress, but it disagreed on how that autonomy should be interpreted and how it was best defended. A number of delegations chose to give to it an interpretation quite remote from that in the minds of the framers of the Berlin theses. To judge by the proceedings of the RILU congress, Bolshevik confidence at its conclusion that they had scored a great ideological victory over the syndicalists appeared well-warranted.
CHAPTER SEVEN

SYNDICALIST DEFIANCE: THE BREACH

Though the syndicalists were unable to avert an ideological defeat at the hands of the Bolsheviks in the sessions of the RILU congress, they were nevertheless able to win a victory at Moscow in the summer of 1921 on an issue which the Bolsheviks considered an entirely domestic issue concerning the Russian Communist Party alone. This involved securing the release of a group of Russian libertarians under lock and key in a Bolshevik prison.

I. Liberating the Libertarians

The great majority of the leading figures of the Russian libertarian movement had been taken into custody at the time of the Kronstadt rising. A number of syndicalist delegates to the RILU congress learned of these arbitrary imprisonments by making contact with the survivors of such groups as 'Golos Truda', or through conversations with Emma Goldman and Alexander Berkman who were living in Moscow at the time. Some weeks before the congress convened the question of political prisoners had been raised at a meeting of the French delegates. They agreed that the issue should be raised with the Bolsheviks. Those delegates most anxious to see the CSR enter the RILU maintained that as the issue was political, a 'political' result should be obtained, and they agreed to pursue the question with the Russians. Thus Rosmer and Tommasi undertook this task, but nothing came of it.¹
When no results were forthcoming, members of the French and Spanish delegations met with Dzerzhinsky, the head of the Cheka, to inquire why certain political prisoners were being held. At one point Dzerzhinsky burst out to Gaudeau, "This is the Cheka within the Cheka: you are interrogating me." Though Dzerzhinsky consented to a review of a list of prisoners, he later responded that every person on the list was being held for legitimate reasons.

The question assumed a new urgency when on the eve of the RILU congress thirteen libertarians in Taganka prison declared a hunger strike to the death. Among the thirteen were such noted figures as Mark Mratchny, Voline—earlier a co-editor of Golos Truda—and Maximoff and Iarchuk, both officers of the ARCAS. Incarcerated without charges since March, their protests ignored, the thirteen decided that their last hope lay in taking advantage of the presence of foreign syndicalists at Moscow by a dramatic action advertising their plight. They voted unanimously for a hunger strike and notified the Cheka, the Executive of the Soviet, the communist party, and the RILU and CI Executives of their action.

The news also reached the syndicalist delegates who decided to raise the issue in the RILU congress. They were dissuaded by the Russian trade union leaders, who were anxious to avoid a public discussion of the question. Instead the syndicalists appointed a committee composed of one delegate from each interested country to broach the subject directly with Lenin. In the meeting Lenin enunciated the usual Bolshevik line that the only libertarians imprisoned in Russia were criminals and counter-revolutionaries, and declared it a matter of personal indifference if all the political prisoners perished in jail. Nevertheless he agreed to discuss the question with his colleagues.
The response came in a letter to the syndicalist deputation from Trotsky. He suggested that western syndicalists, some of whom played "a very important and positive role in the revolutionary movement," were not aware of the difference between those Russian anarchists who supported the dictatorship of the proletariat and those who conducted counter-revolutionary activities under the pretense of being revolutionaries. Some of the imprisoned had committed criminal acts and the lives of communist workers would be endangered by their release. Moreover, the Soviet government would not yield to the pressure of foreign delegates which the hunger strike sought to encourage. Having said that, however, the government proceeded to yield to such pressure, for Trotsky went on to say that the Bolsheviks, "free from any spirit of revenge" and prompted solely by "considerations of revolutionary expediency," agreed to the release and deportation of the hunger strikers.4

The Cheka delayed further action by again raising objections and denying the presence of anarchists in Russian prisons. But under the threat of making the question a major issue in the RILU sessions, the syndicalists won Bolshevik consent to another private meeting. (At one point Arlandis actually challenged Bolshevik persecution of the libertarians from within the congress, which brought a furious Trotsky flying forward. Grasping Arlandis violently by the lapels, Trotsky cried, "I should certainly like to see that happening to you, petty-bourgeois that you people are!"5) Schapiro and Berkman had been requested by the hunger strikers to represent them, and they, together with Leval, Arlandis, Sirolle and Gaudeaux, met with Lunacharsky in the Kremlin. An agreement resulted from the tense meeting that the prisoners be released and deported and that their families be allowed to follow them. Signed by the entire delegation, except Berkman
who objected to its terms and opposed deportation on principle, the document was communicated to the enfeebled Taganka prisoners who accepted its terms and ended their fast.6

The agreement to avoid publicity on the question of the libertarians by not making it a subject of open discussion in the congress was forcefully breached in the last meeting of the RILU assembly. As the meeting drew to a close, Lozovsky turned the podium over to Bukharin who, in the name of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party, launched a long and blistering attack on the prisoners in particular and the Russian anarchists in general, whom he denounced as bandits and counter-revolutionary conspirators. This breach of trust together with Bukharin's calumnies outraged the syndicalists and the meeting was thrown into tumult. The syndicalists nominated Sirolle to reply to Bukharin, but Lozovsky steadfastly refused him the floor. The machinations of the chairman to prevent Sirolle's reply so inflamed the assembly that even some of the Russian communist delegates added their shouts to the syndicalists' protests. The Bolsheviks called in a detachment of Red Army soldiers to quell the disturbance, which only further enraged the delegates and heightened their protests. Berkman braced himself for a rush on the platform, but after thirty minutes of complete chaos Lozovsky felt compelled to put it to a vote whether a reply should be heard. The majority demanded that the floor be given to Sirolle, who emotionally denounced the duplicity of the Bolsheviks and rebutted Bukharin's attack on the anarchists. Sirolle invited the assembly to hear Schapiro put the case of the Russian syndicalists, but he was not allowed to speak.7

A number of the syndicalist delegates who remained at Moscow following the congress continued their labours on behalf of the Taganka prisoners, though some, notably the Spanish delegation with the exception of Leval,
dissociated themselves from these efforts following Bukharin's open attack upon the anarchists.\footnote{8} In September the prisoners were released. The expulsions began in November. For the first time the Russian workers' government began deporting revolutionaries. The majority of the men and their families were expelled in January. Supplied with the passports of Czecho- Slovakian prisoners-of-war and sent to the West, they were refused entry at the German border. They gained admission only when Fritz Kater intervened and the FAUD accepted responsibility for the exiles while in Germany.\footnote{9} There a Russian anarcho-syndicalist organization in exile was later established.\footnote{10}

Aside from the galling episode of the Taganka prisoners, the Bolsheviks had good cause to be content with the RILU congress. They had every reason to believe they had secured the allegiance of the largest syndicalist bodies, those of Spain and Italy; that they would win the French CSR as well, and that some of the smaller organizations such as the Dutch NAS would soon come into the fold; in short, they had every reason to believe that their ideological and organizational victory over the syndicalists was all but complete. That victory soon proved largely hollow.

II. Repercussions of the RILU Congress

News of the decisions taken in the RILU congress elicited a storm of protest within the syndicalist movement in the West. In France the CSR immediately and publicly disavowed Godonnéche and Tommasi for having exceeded their mandate by signing the resolution on RILU-CI relations.\footnote{11} In Spain a month later a plenum of the CNT forcefully rebuked the communist-syndicalists in its delegation by adopting a resolution which stood in stark contrast to that passed at Moscow.\footnote{12} In the longer run, few syndicalist organ-
izations escaped a prolonged internal controversy concerning the RILU, a dispute which was particularly pronounced in France, Italy and Holland.

In the midst of these disputes the German syndicalists initiated steps to unify the opposition to Moscow. The first national congress of the FAUD to follow the RILU congress met in October at Dusseldorf. Fraternal delegates of the NAS (Lansink), the SAC (Casparsson) and the IWW (Williams) joined with representatives of the FAUD in formulating a resolution, endorsed by the Dusseldorf assembly, calling for the convocation of an international syndicalist congress in Germany. This step they declared necessitated by the failure of the RILU congress to establish a labour International free of political influence. The resolution instructed the International Syndicalist Bureau to prepare a congress for the spring of 1922. It also specified that the first five points of the Berlin theses would serve as the basis of the proposed congress. The decision was described as taken by the representatives of the IWW, the Dutch, Swedish, German and Czecho-lovakian organizations, and as endorsed by telegram by the USI.13

The international question was actually far from resolved within the USI. Having accepted the decisions of the RILU congress, Vecchi and Mari returned to Italy intent on persuading the USI to accept them as well. The nature of the RILU-CI link established at Moscow, as well as the RILU's expectation that the USI join the CGL and work in close collaboration with the Partito Communista Italiano, however, appalled the USI Executive. In October, just prior to the Dusseldorf meeting of the FAUD, the USI Executive met at Milan to discuss the international question. Vecci recommended that the USI join the RILU and that the Italian syndicalists cooperate fully with the PCI. The Executive rejected this position, endorsing instead a resolution from Borghi proposing that the USI support the RILU only if another congress
were held outside the Soviet Union in which the RILU-CI relationship could be debated anew, a demand already advanced by the CSR. It also approved a resolution from Alibrando Giovanetti and others insisting upon the complete autonomy of the USI. Subsequent discussions between Borghi, Giovanetti and Gervasio of the USI Executive and representatives of the PCI and the RILU did nothing to alter the position of the USI.  

Undaunted, Vecchi turned to the offensive. Funded by Moscow, he launched a new newspaper at Verona, Internazionale, designed to continue his campaign against Borghi and to drum up support for the RILU. But his attempt to capture the USI for the RILU was easily turned back at the fourth USI congress (March 1922), in which the international question dominated. In the sessions Borghi attacked the Soviet regime and dismissed the RILU as no more than an appendage of Bolshevik state power. He called for an autonomous syndicalist International. Vecchi again urged affiliation with the RILU, but against him Giovanetti argued for a counter-proposal which reaffirmed the traditional principles and methods of syndicalism, especially the absolute autonomy of the unions, rejected the RILU as strictly subordinate to the communist party, and stipulated the conditions which the USI required of a labour International. At the close of debate, Giovanetti's resolution prevailed by 75 votes to 18 for Vecchi's. The decisions of the assembly drew not only the wrath of Internazionale, but of Lozovsky as well.  

Elsewhere the controversy continued. The minoritaires in France were thrown into disarray by the results of the RILU congress. Immediately following the Moscow meeting, the annual CGT congress met at Lille at the end of July. Events at Moscow had accentuated the differences amongst the minoritaires and there was little accord in their meetings held on the eve of the Lille congress. The minoritaires were content to support a reso-
ution which reaffirmed the complete national and international independence
of the unions from all political groups and called for the departure of
the CGT from the IFTU and the International Labour Office. On the positive
side it did no more than suggest that the CGT's affiliation with the RILU--
"on the express condition that its statutes respect the autonomy of the
syndical movement"--would not violate the Charte d'Amiens. On the other
hand, the threat of union subordination to Moscow proved to be one of the
strongest weapons of the majoritaires who, after an especially tumultuous
congress, carried the day by the narrow margin of 1,556 to 1,348.

Following Lille, minoritaire and majoritaire alike tended to view
a split as inevitable. It came at the end of the year. In the following
months the leaders of the CSR devoted themselves to building up the new
confederal organization, called the CGT Unitaire (CGTU), which by the middle
of 1922 could claim more members than its spurned parent organization.

The leaders of the libertarian wing of the minority initially dominated the
CGTU. Their ascendancy came both through their own efforts and through the
indecisiveness of the pro-Moscow forces following their temporary rift with
the Bolsheviks. The Bolsheviks were doubly dismayed; not only had a schism
not been avoided, but the attitude adopted by the new CGTU could scarcely
be welcomed at Moscow. Thus when Lozovsky appealed to the CGTU in March
1922 to dispatch representatives to Moscow to assist in preparations for the
second RILU congress, the CGTU declined. It replied that it was sending a
delegation to the Berlin conference organized by the FAUD, now scheduled
for June.

The efforts of the RILU received even sharper rebuffs elsewhere.
In accord with the Berlin theses, the SAC had sent a delegation to the RILU
congress. But the critical position adopted at Berlin by the SAC, along
with the FAUD, had drawn the ire of the Bolsheviks. Further evidence of this hostility occurred at Moscow, where in the sessions of the CI congress Zinoviev accused the German syndicalists of pursuing the "Scheidemannist line," and characterized the Swedish syndicalists as "typical Centrists, wobbling between Moscow and Amsterdam." 21

The RILU nevertheless continued its overture to the Swedish syndicalists. In an appeal directed to them in December 1921, Lozovsky insisted that those who had not yet accepted the necessity of proletarian dictatorship were "prisoners of out-of-date formulas." Any attempt to renew the efforts of the Berlin conference to establish a syndicalist International would be "a declaration of war against Moscow." On the other hand, to remain without international links would be equivalent "to the suicide of the Swedish syndicalists." 22 Thus the only realistic course for the SAC was to enter the RILU. The SAC responded that Lozovsky's claim of support from the majority of syndicalists for the proletarian dictatorship was no more than a delusion. It added that the relationship between political parties and unions stipulated in the RILU's statutes "transgresses fundamentally against the essential principles of syndicalism. Such a connection is unacceptable to us under any circumstances." 23 Some months later (May 1922), the SAC Executive declared that, if the next SAC congress reaffirmed the organization's declaration of principles, "the question of affiliation with the RILU falls automatically." The fact that only five of its 425 local organizations had declared in favour of Moscow, and then only on the condition that the foreign syndicalist organizations also adhered, indicated the small measure of support the RILU had won within the SAC. 24

Before 1921 ended the IWW had similarly repudiated the RILU. After studying Williams' report and examining the documents of the Moscow congress,
the IWW Executive declared in December that it regarded affiliation "with this so-called International as not only undesirable but absolutely impossible." In enumerating the reasons for its decision, the Executive included the unrepresentative nature of the RILU congress; its express condemnation of IWW policy and tactics; its approval of 'boring within' tactics; the political character of the RILU, which was "in fact the Communist Party, thinly disguised;" and the impossibility that the IWW could work together with the domestic communist party. Though it rejected the RILU, the Executive nonetheless affirmed the international interests of the IWW, declaring itself prepared to "welcome proposals for the international affiliation that are not in conflict with our principles and policy, and do not call upon us to sacrifice our autonomy."²⁵

Nor were the Argentinians of the FORA pleased with the results of the Moscow meetings. They showed their displeasure by greeting the call for a syndicalist congress emanating from the FAUD's Dusseldorf assembly with warm approval in _La Protesta_, by vigorously criticizing the politicized RILU, and by openly repudiating Tom Barker, who had carried the FORA's mandate to Moscow.²⁶

The generally negative syndicalist response to the RILU congress soon drew critical fire from the communists. The syndicalist support upon which the RILU leaders had counted now seemed to be slipping through their fingers. In a series of Moscow-sponsored periodicals they mounted an attack on the syndicalists.²⁷ The German Heinrich Brandler, a RILU official, summed up the communist interpretation of events. The RILU and the CI, Brandler wrote, had assumed the Latin syndicalists to be revolutionary and readily incorporable into the international struggle for the dictatorship of the proletariat. But the activities of the syndicalists in France and
Italy had compelled a radical revision of the attitude of the RILU and the CI. The majority of the syndicalist delegates at the RILU congress, Brandler claimed, had declared in a personal if not an official capacity for affiliation with the RILU and had promised to work towards that end. Although the communists had demonstrated immense patience, they now discovered the anti-politicism of Latin syndicalists to be increasing instead of declining. In France, Brandler pointed out, the CGTU Executive had dared to pass a resolution condemning the persecution of militants not only by capitalist governments, but by any government whatever, a scarcely veiled indictment of the Soviet regime. Although the CGTU had not joined the RILU, Brandler also condemned it for accepting domestic policies which were not in accord with those of the RILU and of the communists. The CGTU and the USI had both called for the annulment of the RILU statutes requiring an exchange of representatives between the RILU and CI. This was no question of mere form, Brandler asserted, but a declaration of war upon "the communist conception of the proletarian tasks of the class struggle." Consequently, "this question ceases to be debatable."28

If the syndicalists were transforming themselves "wittingly or unwittingly into instruments of the counter-revolution," the communists, Brandler asserted, were obliged to lead the battle against them. There was yet another possibility. The syndicalists could form their own International. If they did so and were actually able to repel capitalist aggression by methods of struggle "which they consider as revolutionary and which we consider as defective," there was nothing to prevent communists and syndicalists from working together and mutually supporting one another even if they were grouped in separate Internationals. In reality, this was a tactical ploy and the last thing the RILU wanted. Brandler indicated that
the suggestion was not intended seriously by immediately proceeding to recommend that the communist parties of France, Italy and Spain begin an anti-syndicalist campaign without delay. Such a strategy would be an ideal prelude to the next congresses of the CI and the RILU, where the attitude towards the syndicalists of the different countries would have to be seriously reconsidered and clarified. 29

The syndicalists pushed ahead with their own plans. An international conference planned by the French and Italians for Paris in June was now transferred to Berlin. 30 On the eve of the conference a Bulletin International des Syndicalistes Révolutionnaires et Industrialistes appeared which responded to the communist press campaign against the syndicalists. Events in Russia, the Bulletin maintained, provided "eloquent proof" that political parties "are certainly capable of conquering political power, but have not the slightest capacity . . . for the economic and social reorganization of society." The assertion of the necessity of seizing the state apparatus and maintaining it during a transitional period rested upon "an absolutely incorrect hypothesis and upon an ideology of purely bourgeois origin." 31

The Bulletin also challenged communist insistence upon a single front of workers. To the extent that it was progressive, the labour movement was composed of groups and tendencies which varied in their degree of development. Just as an individual passed through stages in his evolution, the mass workers' movement divided into diverse units differing in their stage of development. The assumption that a united proletariat had immense power was only true of a period of struggle when workers were united in their goals. In a period of calm an artificial unity among those who differed in outlook could only have "a paralyzing influence upon the liberating ideas of the working class." Had not the great majority of German
workers been united in the centralist unions before the war? But "that unity signified simply the spiritual death of the movement and the total impossibility of action." Thus only the independently organized syndicalists who opposed an artificial and paralyzing unity actively worked against the war when it came. Only in the revolutionary will did one find the key to the unity of the workers; an artificial unity stifled revolutionary zeal. Had not the recent creation of the CGTU demonstrated that the majority of French workers preferred schism to a false unity? Leaders of reformist unions and political parties prized an artificial organizational unity as a means of augmenting their power over the masses. Thus there had been the recent and unedifying sight of politicians of various persuasion gathering around the same table at Berlin in an attempt to unite the Second, the Two-and-a-half, and the Third Internationals. The syndicalists on the other hand denied that unity could be achieved "by politicians who aspire to exercise power over the workers. A true single front of the proletariat can be established only by the exclusion of all political parties." The Russian Communist Party had demonstrated its attitude towards unity by brutally persecuting and suppressing revolutionary groups within its own country. Unity in the revolutionary struggle demanded some degree of mutual tolerance among revolutionary forces. In this respect:

The tactic of the Russian Bolshevik Party ... ought to be stigmatised as reactionary. The existence of several revolutionary groups does not paralyse revolutionary efforts, but, on the contrary, by the free play of forces which free association renders possible, revolutionary initiative is greatly increased. (32)

What should be the response of the syndicalists on the international question? The RILU had pursued its Janus-like policy toward western syndicalists, treating them as brothers-in-arms with whom an accord should be reached and simultaneously denouncing them as the counter-revolutionary
enemies of the workers. "In one hand the olive branch, in the other the bloody sword." The Bulletin argued that even if after their impending conference the syndicalists decided to make a last attempt to reach accord with the communists by entering the RILU on the condition that both its centralist and federalist "branches" retained liberty of action, an international Syndicalist Bureau would still be necessary to act as a counterweight against the direct organ of the centralist branch, namely, the CI. Alternately, if the syndicalists decided not to join the RILU or if the latter's rejection of autonomy made unity impossible, a Syndicalist Bureau would be necessary to unify the syndicalists and to prepare for the creation of a truly revolutionary International. Whatever course the syndicalists chose, then, some form of syndicalist organization would be indispensable. It would be nothing less than "suicide" if the imminent syndicalist conference failed to attach the greatest importance to the creation of such an organization. Bouwman's warning at Moscow that the failure of the RILU congress to take the Berlin conference seriously and to treat the syndicalists less dogmatically might lead to the creation of a second revolutionary labour International appeared to be moving towards fulfillment.

III. The June Conference

The syndicalist organizations assembled at Berlin in June claimed to represent over 1,400,000 workers. This represented the sum of the memberships of the CGTU (represented by Totti, Lecoin and Besnard), and FAUD (Rocker, Kater, Souchy), the USI (Borghi, Bonazzi, Negre), the CNT (Diez, Gonzalez), the SAC and the NSF (both represented by Jensen). The conference also recognized a delegation from the Russian Syndicalist Minority composed of the deported Mratchny and Schapiro, who had earlier voluntarily
left Russia. The organizers had also invited the All-Russian Trade Unions to send a delegation and their representative, Andreyeff, arrived just after the conference had begun. Each country was allowed one deliberative vote with the exception of Russia, which was allotted two—one for the centralist unions and one for the syndicalist minority. At the beginning of the conference the French delegation declared its intention to abstain from all votes taken, since the first congress of the CGTU was to be held at St. Etienne in fewer than two weeks and only the congress could determine the policy of the new organization. The mandate of the delegation therefore limited its activities to those of an informational nature.

The situation in France had changed considerably since the break with the CGT. The early libertarian predominance in the CGTU had been increasingly challenged not only by the communist faction centred around Tommasi, Rosmer, Godonnèche and La Lutte de Classe, but more importantly by the syndicalists grouped around Monatte, Monmousseau, and La Vie Ouvrière. The latter had recovered from their earlier rift with Moscow and Monatte and Monmousseau were moving steadily towards the communist outlook, not least as a result of Lozovsky's assiduous efforts to woo them and to urge them to move against the libertarians. On the eve of the St. Etienne congress it was uncertain what policy the CGTU would adopt towards Moscow.

If the pro-RILU forces were experiencing a resurgence in France, across the Pyrenees they were suffering a gradual but unquestionable rout in the CNT. At the time of the 1919 Comedia congress the identification of the cenetistas with the Russian Revolution had been complete and the esteem in which the Bolsheviks were held all but unassailable. By June 1922 the prestige of the Bolsheviks had plummeted. The genuine character of the Soviet regime had been emerging and the centralizing dictates of the CI
recognized. Pestaña's critical reports on his Russian experiences had appeared. Moreover, the forceful repression of the government which had left the CNT crippled had recoiled upon the revolutionary expectations of the cenetistas. The response to these factors was the re-emergence and accentuation of the anarcho-syndicalist principles which were the mainstays of cenetista ideology. News of the decisions taken in the RILU congress served only to heighten the reaction against Moscow and to reinforce the necessity felt by most cenetistas to repudiate the error made in 1919, now seen as an ideological aberration occasioned by the revolutionary enthusiasm fired by the Russian Revolution. Thus it was with profound regret and dismay that a leading CNT militant later looked back at the Comedia congress and declared that although the delegates had not intended to betray their convictions, "the immense majority behaved like true Bolsheviks." 37

Against the mounting anti-Moscow sentiment, the continuing efforts of the communist-syndicalists on behalf of the RILU were reduced to a rear-guard action conducted primarily in the pages of La Lucha Social. Their efforts were further hindered by the release of large numbers of previously confined CNT leaders. The originally rapid elevation of members of the communist-syndicalist faction facilitated by the mass arrest of cenetista leaders was reversed as the released militants were restored to their previous positions of authority. The showdown on the international question came at a CNT plenum held at Zaragoza in June 1922, and somewhat hastily convened, in part to permit the CNT to dispatch a delegation to the Berlin conference.

The Zaragoza plenum passionately challenged the conduct of the Nin-Maurin delegation at Moscow. Only Arlandis appeared to defend the delegation of which he had been a part. His task was impossible. Leval sub-
mitted a written report in which he attacked the conduct of his co-delegates, while Pestana discussed his experiences in Russia in an address highly critical of Moscow. The plenum endorsed a resolution from Galo Diez protesting the repression exercised by the Soviet regime against the Russian people. Another proposal from Manuel Buenacasa demanding the immediate and complete separation of the CNT from Moscow would have been accepted save for the technical question of whether a plenum could reverse the decision of a congress. In the end the assembly readily voiced approval of the CNT's withdrawal from the Moscow International in principle, and called for a referendum to decide the question. Conditions prevented the referendum from being held and the Zaragoza meeting marked the final breach between the CNT and Moscow. But before the deliberations came to an end, the assembly accepted Buenacasa's suggestion immediately to name a delegate to attend the Berlin conference. Due to their late departure from Zaragoza, Diez and Avelino Gonzalez arrived at Berlin only on the last day of the conference.

The work of the Berlin conference was disrupted in the second day by the arrival of the delegate from the Russian trade unions. The assembly had been discussing the persecution of revolutionaries throughout the world and had before it a resolution submitted by Schapiro protesting such persecution in Russia by the Soviet government when Andreyeff arrived. In detailing the repression in Russia, Mratchny cited examples in which the leaders of the Red trade unions and the government through the Cheka had worked together to suppress dissent in the labour movement. If the Red trade unions were 'red', Mratchny declared, "it is with the blood of the workers and the peasants which they continue to shed in order to preserve their power;" he added that "it is impossible to know where the unions end
and where the government or the Cheka begins. I assert that those who are at the head of the [labour] organizations, often do the work of the Chekists."

These charges drew fiery protests from Andreyeff who declared his support for the Russian government. The Russian trade unions, he asserted, supported the terrorist tactics employed against the bourgeoisie and all its "agents," regardless of the revolutionary titles they used. "We are partisans of the red terror and of the dictatorship of the proletariat." Nevertheless he demanded to be recognized solely as representing the Russian trade unions, and not the Soviet government, and he insisted that the conference rule Mratchny's remarks inadmissible. A number of delegates pointed out that if he represented only the trade unions, he need not take offense at criticisms of the Soviet government. If he chose to defend the government, he should be prepared to be distressed. As syndicalists assembled in conference, they would not renounce their right to criticize exploitative governments, including the Russian. The situation was further inflamed when Andreyeff turned to the offensive: "You present yourselves as accusers of the Russian government; you demand explanations of it whereas it is you who should be rendering accounts. What have you done to enable us to establish a truly communist regime? . . . You, the Italians, the French--what have you done for Russia, for its famine?" To this Borghi quickly retorted that it had been the Italian communists who had caused the revolution to fail in Italy by transforming it into an electoral question, while Souchy charged the Bolsheviks with spending huge sums of money to subsidize communist newspapers in every country instead of directing these funds to the relief of Russian famine victims.

In the end the entire issue of persecutions was referred to com-
mittee where Andreyeff found the going no easier than he had in open session. After having heard the delegations of the Russian Syndicalist Minority and the All-Russian Trade Unions, the committee chairman, Besnard, put the following questions three times to Andreyeff:

1. Does the All-Russian Trade Unions accept a formal commitment to demand of the Russian government the release of all syndicalists and anarchists imprisoned for their ideas?
2. Will it further require that these comrades be allowed to freely conduct their revolutionary activities in the unions on condition that they do not combat the Russian government by force of arms?

When Andreyeff equivocated at length and declined a definite answer, the committee recorded that the All-Russian Trade Unions dissociated itself from the issue. Andreyeff's attitude on this question made a strong impression on the remaining delegates. For some it constituted the proverbial last straw in their relations with Moscow, a final confirmation of the impossibility for revolutionary syndicalists to work with the communists in the RILU. Preceded by a long series of accumulating differences, it put the seal to their mounting conviction that they had no choice but to follow their own international course.

Andreyeff himself soon quit the conference. By obvious pre-arrangement a German, one Wurster, and the Italian Vecchi appeared at the next session and demanded admission as representatives of the Union Hand- und Kopfarbeiter (Gelsenkirchen), a RILU affiliate, and the USI minority. In accord with the conditions of admission accepted at the beginning of the conference, the credentials committee recommended that Wurster and Vecchi be admitted not as delegates, but only as guests. Although upon his arrival Andreyeff had been apprised of the resolution on admissions and had voiced no objection to it, he now insisted that Wurster and Vecchi be admitted as delegates with at least a consultative vote. Against his vote
the assembly accepted the recommendation of the credentials committee. Andreyeff, still smarting from the confrontation on the issue of Soviet repression, seized this opportunity to abandon the conference. He inveighed against the assembly, asserting that it did not want to exchange views with those who were not anarchists. Turning to the French and Italian delegates, he declared that "the RILU will go over the heads of the present leaders of the CGTU and the USI in order to organize the French and Italian workers' movements according to its own directives," and stalked out of the conference with Vecchi and Wurster.

With Andreyeff's departure, the assembly adopted no resolution on persecutions at all. The delegates realized that their refusal to seat Vecchi and Wurster gave Andreyeff, embittered by the issue of persecutions, a pretext for quitting the conference. Certain that the Russians would send a representative to the St. Etienne congress and cognizant of how near the communists stood to capturing the CGTU, Totti and Lecoin appealed to the conference to make "a concession to the French syndicalists" by not putting any persecution resolutions to a vote. The remaining delegates reluctantly acceded to this request.

Turning to the more positive work of the conference, the assembly accepted a ten-point declaration dealing with the principles and tactics of syndicalism which had been drafted by Rocker and modified only minimally in committee. The remainder of the conference concerned the organization of an international Bureau and the question of relations with Moscow. The delegates manifested little sympathy for making further overtures in the hopes of reaching an accord with the RILU. Borghi spoke of the conditions the USI had stipulated for a labour International. "With or without Moscow, even against Moscow, revolutionary syndicalism must organize
itself." Albert Jensen reported on a referendum held within the SAC which had pronounced for an independent syndicalist International. Schapiro envisaged two possibilities of further negotiations with Moscow; the conference could pose some minimal conditions which a duplicitous RILU might shrewdly accept, or it could pose conditions of such severity that it was certain in advance that the RILU would refuse them. But the first course would be a betrayal of syndicalism; the second merely a demagogic ploy, "and we can never allow ourselves this Bolshevik luxury." Rather than either negotiating with the RILU or declaring war upon it, Shapiro believed the best procedure to be to "keep on our own course."47

In Rocker's view, a syndicalist International was inevitable, "for an existence in common with Moscow will become insufferable even for those who are still filled with false hopes. In the meantime we will lose time and pessimism will infiltrate our ranks." Only the French delegates, the uncertain situation in the CGTU uppermost in their minds, supported continued negotiations with Moscow, and proposed that an alternate set of statutes be drawn up for the consideration of the RILU. The French adopted this position not least for general tactical reasons ("A refusal [by Moscow] in such a case would be of great importance," Besnard observed).48

The resolution drafted by a committee headed by Jensen and adopted by the assembly, however, made no mention of further negotiations with the RILU, the principles and statutes of which, the document declared, prevented it from welding together the revolutionary workers of the world. Consequently, it continued, the conference had appointed a provisional Syndicalist Bureau charged with preparing an international congress of revolutionary unions for November, and with communicating the decisions of the conference to the RILU Executive in the hope that its affiliates would
participate in the congress, though the syndicalists could scarcely have believed the RILU would endorse such an invitation. The Bureau was to sit at Berlin and have a member from each affiliated country, including Rocker as Bureau Secretary and German representative, Borghi for Italy, Pestaña for Spain, Jensen for the Scandinavian countries and Schapiro for Russia. The CGTU delegation affirmed the hope that the Bureau would have a French representative after the St. Etienne congress.

The Spanish delegation, having arrived while the creation of the Bureau was under discussion, put the position of the CNT bluntly. Diez immediately declared the affiliation of the Spanish organization with the RILU to have been the work of "a few politicians" who had not consulted its members. The CNT sought an absolutely autonomous International and wanted nothing to do with Moscow. Even if every other syndicalist organization joined the RILU, the CNT would oppose it alone. Put au courant the course of the meetings, the Spaniards declared their support for the work of the conference and endorsed its resolutions on behalf of the CNT.

The atmosphere of the June conference was thus far different from that held at Berlin eighteen months earlier. In December 1920 only the doubts of the Swedish and German delegates had been raised against prevailing enthusiasm for Moscow and the ardent desire to reach an accord with the communists in the founding congress of the RILU. In the interim there had been the disillusionment with the RILU congress itself and the controversy it had engendered, including campaigns in the communist press against the more resolute syndicalist organizations, which had made such bodies as the USI, the CGTU and the NAS arenas of sharp internecine struggle. Moreover, the continuing persecution of libertarians in Russia had been abundantly documented, and the syndicalists had witnessed the spectacle of a workers'
government busily deporting revolutionaries.

While in some syndicalist organizations of Europe, notably the NAS and the CGTU, the question of international allegiance had not yet been resolved, by June 1922 the SAC, the FAUD, the USI and the CNT had called for the creation of an independent syndicalist International. In so doing the latter two bodies had served notice that the Bolsheviks' earlier delight in their important victories in Italy and Spain had been premature and ill-founded. On the international level the June conference marked the final rupture between the syndicalists and the communists. That the breach was definitive was signalled in several ways. The final resolution made no provisions for mutual negotiations between the syndicalists and the RILU and stipulated no changes in the RILU as the price required to ransom syndicalist support. The conference, in short, rejected the RILU as a failure beyond redemption. Moreover, the syndicalists assembled at Berlin decided to christen the June meeting a 'Preliminary Conference'; that is, to declare it a step toward the creation of a syndicalist International.

The irrevocable character of the break was perhaps most compellingly demonstrated by the conference's declaration of principles. The resolution amounted to an unequivocal assertion that the major lesson of the Russian Revolution was the need for a forceful reaffirmation of syndicalist principles. The declaration rejected political parties, parliamentarism, militarism, nationalism and centralism; it endorsed the absolute autonomy of economically militant organizations uniting manual and intellectual workers; direct action; the federalist organization of economic and social life; the abolition of all state functions in society; and the ultimate goal of a voluntarily-organized free communism.52

If the unequivocal anti-statism of the declaration were not suffi-
cient to distinguish the syndicalist position, the principles expressly repudiated the proletarian dictatorship enshrined in Bolshevik ideology. While two or three years earlier in the full flush of revolutionary enthusiasm many European syndicalists were prepared to seek some accommodation with the idea and practice of the dictatorship, to sing rhapsodic songs of praise to it, and to hail Lenin's *State and Revolution* as a revelatory document, the syndicalists gathered at Berlin in 1922 were unanimous in pronouncing it an indisputable evil incompatible with their doctrine. The second point of the credo which they endorsed insisted:

> that together with the monopoly of property, the monopoly of power must also vanish, and that the state in every form, even in the form of the so-called 'Dictatorship of the Proletariat', can never be an instrument for the liberation of labour, but always only the creator of new monopolies and new privileges. (53)

In introducing the resolution to the assembly, Rocker declared the proposition advanced by Engels and accepted by Lenin ("and a certain number of syndicalists") that the state would disappear with the disappearance of classes from society to be "nothing more than a sophism masking the facts." The establishment of a Bolshevik 'commissarocracy' in Russia had demonstrated that the state could serve not only to defend existing classes, but also to create new privileged strata in society. In reality, nothing imperilled a revolution more than dictatorship. Syndicalists, Rocker asserted, were enemies of dictatorship precisely because they were partisans of revolution.54

Since the dictatorship had been embraced by the RILU and endorsed throughout its statutes, its repudiation at Berlin made a rapprochement between the RILU and the syndicalists all but impossible. But the Russian experience had not only instructed the syndicalists in the sources of threats to a revolution. It had also taught them how immensely complicated would be the task of making their principles prevail on the chaotic morrow of
revolution, a point which Mratchny and Schapiro, who had witnessed the Russian revolutionary drama first-hand, took pains to emphasize. Thus in endorsing direct action, the syndicalists eschewed an easy reliance upon the efficacy of the general strike. The declaration of principles described the "social general strike" as the highest expression of direct action, but also pointed out that it constituted only the "prelude to the social revolution." But here too the Bolshevik tactic was directly condemned, for the syndicalists described themselves as "enemies of all organized violence in the hands of any revolutionary government." They recognized that the revolution would require a violent defense, but the administration of that defense must be completely in the hands of the people themselves, through their economic organizations. Any other course would jeopardize the entire revolution. "The defense of the revolution [must] be entrusted to the masses themselves and their economic organizations, and not left to any defined military organization, or any other organization, which stands outside the economic associations." 55

Although the declaration of principles incorporated little that was new--indeed, the argument was advanced that the course of the Russian Revolution had demonstrated precisely that there was no need to do so--the tenor it took was the inevitable result of the Russian experience. But the declaration which won unanimous support at Berlin, including that of the French, who despite their abstention declared it their duty to defend its principles at St. Etienne, was not merely a reaffirmation of faith, though it was surely that; it was also a defiant declaration of independence from Moscow. The few and scattered voices of syndicalist dissent of two years earlier had become a chorus. The syndicalists had finally and irrevocably rejected the CI and its appendage, the RILU. The communist bid to reap a
mass harvest of syndicalist support had failed. Six months later the same declaration of principles would be unanimously adopted as that of a new syndicalist International.

IV. The CGTU and a Bolshevik Concession

Although the June conference indicated that the foundation of a syndicalist International was all but an inevitability, and demonstrated that the majority of European syndicalist organizations lay beyond the grasp of Moscow, there remained a very important prize to win--the CGTU.

The early ascendency of the libertarian wing of the French syndicalists in the councils of the CGTU had alarmed Moscow that it had not only lost the CGT but would also lose the CGTU. That such fears were well-grounded was evidenced in March 1922 when the CGTU Executive issued a statement which amounted to a refusal to recognize the communist party as different from any other aspiring to the exercise of power. With the Russian persecutions clearly in mind, the statement declared the CGTU to be "the resolute adversary of all unnecessary violence which does not have as its goal to defend the revolutionary conquests of the proletariat, which it confuses with no party government." To remove all doubt on the position of the Executive, the declaration asserted French syndicalism to be "anti-statist by essence and by definition" and the unyielding opponent "of every form of government, whatever it may be." 56

A concerted effort to counter this threat came from Moscow. In May the Russian-sponsored _La Lutte de Classe_ appeared under the direction of Rosmer to combat the libertarians and rally support within the CGTU for the RILU. _La Lutte de Classe_ spoke for the communist-syndicalists who preferred that the CGTU accept the RILU statutes as originally elaborated. But the
leaders of this faction realized that they lacked support for such a decision at St. Etienne. Their only hope lay in reaching an accord with the larger and more influential group of syndicalists centred around *La Vie Ouvrière*, who were largely uncritical supporters of the Russian Revolution and of Moscow, but who opposed the subordinating statutes of the RILU as they stood. The communist-syndicalists were willing to make concessions if necessary to the Monatte-Monnousseau faction of *La Vie Ouvrière*, lest the CGTU be lost entirely to them and enrolled in a syndicalist International. They were assisted in this by Lozovsky's persistent overtures to the *La Vie Ouvrière* faction and his proddings to make common cause with the communist-syndicalists against the libertarians. By the spring of 1922 this union had been cemented. Thus when the CGTU Executive declared its intent to participate in the June conference, it drew fire from both quarters. Lozovsky himself intervened to challenge the right of the CGTU to go to Berlin at all prior to the St. Etienne congress and to suggest that the issues contested by the syndicalists should properly be discussed only in the second congress of the RILU. The Executive replied that the CGTU intended to participate in the Berlin conference in an informational capacity before determining its own national and international orientation. It had the right to do so without seeking the permission of the RILU. Given its informational purpose, its delegation would neither vote nor undertake formal commitments at Berlin.

In accord with its mandate, the CGTU delegation did not vote for any of the resolutions accepted by the Berlin conference. But its fears that the withdrawal of the Russian delegation would be exploited against the conference and against the libertarians in the CGTU were quickly realized. Two days before the St. Etienne congress, *La Vie Ouvrière* published a de-
claration by Andreyeff, Vecchi and Wurster denouncing the conference. The exclusion of the organizations represented by Wurster and Vecchi ("the most important group" of the USI) proved that the conference had no intention to try to unite all syndicalist organizations. Instead of seriously striving to overcome mutual difficulties and working to unite all revolutionary forces around the RILU, the conference sought to destroy "the united revolutionary trade unionist front" and to create a new labour International completely dominated by anarchist sects. Andreyeff and his colleagues had withdrawn from the conference convinced, they asserted, that the syndicalist organizations would themselves find the means to unite with the revolutionary Russian unions and the RILU.60

Maurice Chambelland, a La Vie Ouvrière stalwart who had attended the conference, but left when Andreyeff withdrew, counter-signed the statement. The same issue of La Vie Ouvrière carried a lengthy critique of the conference by Chambelland who dismissed it as an enterprise of international schism convoked by the "most determined adversaries of the RILU and the Russian Revolution." Chambelland repeated the charges of the Andreyeff declaration, but also went beyond them. Whereas Andreyeff had been careful not to mention the persecution issue explicitly, Chambelland emphasized it, and likely for tactical reasons. Although the libertarian wing had grown increasingly critical of the course of the Russian Revolution, considerable support and sympathy for the Revolution survived within the CGTU. To portray the libertarians as its enemies provided their opponents with a powerful weapon. Thus in discussing the presentation of the resolution of the Russian Minority at the conference, Chambelland wrote:
The trial of the Russian Revolution began! It seems moreover that this was the principal object of the Conference, if one judges by the ardour which Schapiro, Borghi, Souchy and Lecoin--the latter a consultative delegate!--exhibited in swooping upon the delegation of the Russian [Trade Union] Central, which was roundly abused.

Chambelland accused Lecoin of exceeding his mandate in this respect and charged the entire French delegation with having done so in supporting the exclusion of Vecchi. The St. Etienne congress, he added ominously, would take note of this. Though he had left the conference before discussion of the agenda had even begun, Cambelland recorded that it was probable that the conference had drawn up an ultimatum to present to the RILU which the latter could not possibly accept, and that the French delegation had violated its mandate by supporting this ultimatum. He then proceeded to denounce this imaginary "manoeuvre" of the French delegation and dismissed the conference as "a fiasco and a conclusive demonstration of incompetence."61

The charge that the French delegation had exceeded its mandate at Berlin was repeated at the St. Etienne congress62 along with the charge that the conference had initiated its work by placing the Russian Revolution on trial. Nor was the attack upon the June conference limited to its French opponents. Schapiro had predicted at Berlin that the RILU would make apparent concessions at the CGTU congress; that it would promise the CGTU its autonomy; that it would "throw one or two bones to the syndicalist Cerberus."63 Lozovsky himself carried the bones from Moscow to St. Etienne. In a written message he assured the French that the organic link between the unions and the communist party was not mandatory, and that each country remained free to determine this relationship itself. In a personal appearance, Lozovsky made an appeal for the RILU and remonstrated against the Berlin conference before vanishing to foil the French police.64 Present as
fraternal delegates of the USI and the CNT, Borghi and Diez later outlined the positions of their own organizations and defended the Berlin meetings. Both pointed out that their organizations had adhered to the CI in solidarity with the Russian Revolution and before they had realized the statist and dictatorial character the Bolsheviks would give it. As Borghi put it, "we had embraced the shadow of Moscow." Both called for an autonomous revolutionary International towards which they believed the Berlin meeting had been a first step. Borghi, seeking to counter Lozovsky's address, pointed to the disparity between it and the position articulated in communist literature and the theses and resolutions of Moscow. He also attempted to neutralize the recurrent implication that those who opposed Moscow were opponents of the Revolution. The Italian syndicalists, he declared, did not condemn revolutions simply because they were not the revolutions which they sought, but they also would not abandon their right to criticize. "We are neither the enemies nor the judges of the Russian Revolution; but neither are we blind men who want to ignore the truth."65

The libertarian wing of the CGTU, however, was fighting a losing battle. Two main resolutions on the international question were offered, those of Monmousseau and Besnard. Monmousseau's called for the adherence of the CGTU to the RILU provided that the statutes of the latter respected the autonomy of French syndicalism, and it spoke against article 11--directing the RILU to send representatives to the CI Executive--in particular. Besnard's called for a labour International completely free of connections with any international political organization, spoke expressly against an exchange of representatives such as that adopted between the RILU and the CI, and authorized the CGTU to send delegations to both the second congress of the RILU and the proposed Berlin congress to work for such an Interna-
During the congress the more than 130 delegates who were members of the Parti Communiste Français and who controlled 300 votes were assembled and instructed to support Monmousseau's motion, though many were partisans of the La Vie Ouvrière group anyway. This combination of communists and the Monatte-Monmousseau group, aided by the inroads in libertarian support sustained by the characterization of them as enemies of the Russian Revolution, assured a victory for Monmousseau's motion, which secured 743 votes to 406 for Besnard's proposal. The statutes which Monmousseau proposed for the CGTU were carried over those elaborated by Besnard by a similar margin. The composition of the new Executive left the guidance of the CGTU wholly in the hands of the La Vie Ouvrière group.

The defeated minority responded immediately by declaring their intention to defend the principles of syndicalism against the introduction of politics into the CGTU represented by the Monmousseau motion. A Comité de Défense Syndicaliste (CDS) soon appeared as an internal opposition within the CGTU. It sought to organize resistance to the CGTU at every level in the hope of reconquering it and thereby preventing the betrayal of French syndicalism. The CDS therefore insisted that the individuals and groups supporting it remain within the CGTU. "Each must fully realize that syndicalism cannot be wrested from the hands of those who have just led it to the deceitful abdication of St. Etienne by struggling from outside, by quitting the CGTU." The CDS articulated an international policy as well. Since the syndicalist organizations of Italy, Spain, Germany, Scandinavia and elsewhere had declared against the RILU, the CDS would enter into close relations with the Provisional International Syndicalist Bureau at Berlin, which it considered "an International Committee of Syndicalist Defence." Though he claimed to discount the importance of the CDS, an angry Lozovsky called for its immediate destruction. Writing to Monatte,
he insisted that the CDS be attacked "'with fixed bayonets'," that not a single issue of L'Humanité, La Vie Ouvrière, or La Lutte de Classe appear without continuing the assault. 68 Despite their victory at St. Etienne, however, the delicate situation in France prevented the pro-Moscow forces from mounting a full-scale offensive, and the CDS, though subjected to much criticism, continued its work of consolidating opposition within the CGTU.

The CGTU nevertheless proceeded to fulfil the directives of St. Etienne. At the second congress of the RILU which began at Moscow on 19 November the CGTU requested, the RILU Executive recommended, and the assembly unanimously accepted a resolution suppressing article 11 of the statutes and replacing it with one which permitted the RILU Executive, when "circumstances demanded it," to make agreements with the CI Executive, to hold joint meetings with it, and to issue appeals and organize joint actions with it, as well as making a few other minor changes. The changes were obviously in no way substantial. The very resolution embodying them affirmed the "unconditional necessity of the leading role of the communist party in every country and of the Communist International in international measures." 69 Nevertheless the CGTU accepted this gesture as satisfactory and joined the RILU. 70

The decisions taken in the second congress concerning article 11 also had repercussions in Holland where the issue of international orientation had continued to reverberate through the NAS. The referendum being conducted on this question in Holland while the June conference met at Berlin involved three different options and proved inconclusive. 71 The lack of a clear decision prompted the NAS Executive to take another referendum which put the options between the RILU and an independent syndicalist International more bluntly. The majority accepted the following resolution:
1. That the NAS does not join the RILU;
2. That the NAS Executive communicate without delay with the union organizations which support the Berlin declaration in order jointly to summon an international congress and to establish an independent revolutionary Trade Union International;
3. That should the RILU of Moscow be prepared to assume an autonomous and independent character, the NAS is willing to work for the merger of both Internationals in a world-organization of the revolutionary union movement. (72)

Shortly after the RILU assembly, Lozovsky hastened to Amsterdam to inform the NAS Executive that article 11 had been stricken and the RILU's formal connection with the CI cancelled. The NAS Executive had long been split on the international question with the pro-Moscow group in the minority. They now argued that the alteration in the RILU statutes created a new situation which invalidated the results of the referendum. Lansink and others, on the other hand, maintained the change to be one of form only, and certainly not in keeping with the spirit of the referendum resolution. The NAS, they held, was obligated to honour the referendum and cooperate in the creation of a revolutionary International on the basis of the Berlin declaration. The Berlin congress was now less than a week away, having been postponed from November to 25 December in order to learn the results of the RILU congress. In a special session of the NAS Executive on 20 December, the majority (7-6) supported a resolution from Dissel that, in view of the RILU decisions, the NAS's delegation oppose any effort at Berlin to found a separate International. Instead it was to urge the existing Syndicalist Bureau to enter negotiations with Moscow on the principles which could unite all revolutionary unions, and which would be put to the third RILU congress, in which all organizations represented at Berlin must participate.

By means of alterations which were no more than cosmetic in the statutes of the RILU the communists had in effect executed a last-minute salvage operation with the NAS. This, together with their earlier success
with the CGTU, constituted some compensation for the reversals they had suffered by the earlier loss of the USI and the CNT. But they sought more than that; above all they wanted to stifle an independent labour International and hoped at least that the alterations in the RILU statutes might serve this purpose. Pointing to the RILU's acceptance of the changes proposed by the CGTU, the second RILU congress appealed to workers belonging to syndicalist organizations to follow the French example and join the RILU. The congress asserted its conviction that the workers, whatever their political disposition, would join the RILU either with their leaders or against them if they tried to prevent affiliation. In particular, it proposed that the Berlin congress "renounce all attempts to split the international revolutionary labour movement" and join the RILU. But before 1922 ended an autonomous revolutionary trade union International had been founded as the joint product of syndicalist tenacity and communist inflexibility.
CHAPTER EIGHT

THE CREATION OF THE IWMA

The International Syndicalist Bureau transmitted the decisions of the June conference to the RILU Executive together with a letter calling attention to the invitation extended to the organizations affiliated with the RILU to participate in the forthcoming syndicalist congress, which would seek "a common struggle against the two scourges of the working class—Capitalism and the State." The RILU flatly rejected the proposal. "Our time is too meagerly allotted," Lozovsky replied, to "squander" it on such a frivolous undertaking. The June conference had set itself up in judgment upon the Russian Revolution and had mistreated the Russian trade unions. Moreover, he went on, the syndicalist congress was a schismatic enterprise designed to unite only like-minded organizations, unlike the impending second congress of the RILU to which divergent revolutionary organizations were invited not to be judged, but to find the basis for common action. The RILU Executive counselled the Syndicalist Bureau, "in all comradeship," to abandon its attempt to found yet another International.

On behalf of the Syndicalist Bureau, Rocker renewed the invitation. He pointed out to the RILU Executive that the essential question was how a single revolutionary trade union International could be achieved. If the RILU's repeated professions of concern for a united front were legitimate, and not simply a handy formula, its goal was identical to that of the Bureau. Given the divergent conceptions of communists and syndicalists on the funda-
mental principles of revolutionary unionism and the role of political parties, an understanding could be reached only on the basis of mutual tolerance. The RILU could accuse the syndicalists of seeking to unite like-minded organizations in congress, but in reality the founding congress of the RILU had more clearly borne the character of an exclusivist assembly dedicated to implanting a policy of state communism within the workers' movement. "We are against sectarian and party-linked Internationals," Rocker wrote. A united International would need to encompass three groups with different views: those who, like the Russian trade unions, accepted the complete subordination of a labour International to the CI and a similar subordination of national union organizations to communist parties; those who accepted the 'organic link' between a trade union International and the CI and the system of mutual representation between unions and parties at the national and international level; and those who, like the syndicalists, demanded the complete independence of the unions from parties nationally and internationally. Only formal recognition of the right of union organizations to determine their relationship with political parties would make coexistence possible. Since the second RILU congress was to meet before the Berlin congress, it could, by abandoning the schismatic policy it had pursued from its creation, pave the way towards proletarian unity. If it ignored this opportunity to act in the interests of workers' unity, the RILU congress would thereby sanction a split in the international movement. In that case the Berlin congress would be duty-bound to establish strong links between national syndicalist movements, which could no longer remain without an international organization. Thus the Bureau advised the RILU Executive, "in all comradeship," to give up its schismatic tactics and to take up the cause of revolutionary unity. "We confidently await your reply, and
we like to assume," the letter concluded, "that the revolutionary spirit
will finally attain its rights over party spirit." No reply appeared, for
at this point the RILU Executive broke off the correspondence. When the
Berlin congress convened on 25 December 1922, no RILU affiliates were
present.

I. The Founding Congress of the IWMA

Over thirty delegates assembled at Berlin for the congress, which
claimed to represent over two million workers. Fifteen countries had
either personal representation at, or links with, the meeting. Deliberative votes were allotted to the FAUD (represented by Kater, Souchy, Ritter,
Schuster, Kettenback, Bittner, Hundt and Schlisch), the USI (Giovanetti,
Gradi), the SAC (Severin, Lindstam), the NAS (Dissel, van Zelm, Schenk),
the NSF (Smith), the Danish Syndikalistik Propagandaforbund (Manus), the
FORA (Abad de Santillan, Orlando), and the CGT-M (Rocker). The CGT-P which had sent its consent, was also recognized as a full member of the congress,
as were the IWW-C, whose delegate (Montaca) arrived only after the congress
was over, and the CNT, whose delegates were arrested before they reached
Berlin. A representative of the FORU arrived too late to participate in
the congress. Consultative votes were allotted to a number of organizations,
including the CDS (Besnard, Lemoine), the Allgemeine Arbeiter-Union Ein-
heitsorganisation (AAUE) (Pfempfert, Allmer), the Russian Syndicalist Minor-
ity (Schapiro, Iarchuk), and the Czechoslovakian Freie Arbeiter-Union
(Novak). Lansink of Holland and Rocker of Germany were also apportioned
consultative votes as representatives of the International Syndicalist
Information Bureaus created in December 1920 and June 1922, respectively.

The work of the assembly was complicated by the fact that, although
it had been postponed to December to permit assessment of the decisions of the second RILU congress, the results of the latter had not yet officially appeared. The delegates knew only that the original paragraph 11 of the RILU statutes governing the relations between the RILU and the CI had been altered, but they were unaware of the exact changes made at Moscow. In most countries represented, however, the break with Moscow was already complete, and most delegations had been expressly instructed to work for the foundation of a new and autonomous revolutionary International. Moreover, the delegates could point to articles which had begun appearing in the communist press in which Lozovsky and other communist chieftains had intimated that the statute alterations had been insignificant changes to appease the syndicalists, and thus did not modify the working relationship between the RILU and the CI. In one of the most damning of these articles, Lozovsky wrote of the striking of paragraph 11:

The decision taken, however, not only does not exclude a permanent collaboration of struggle between the Communist International and the Trade Union International, but on the contrary formally prescribes it. Only the forms of this permanent collaboration have been modified. Instead of establishing an organic link between the two organizations by statute, action committees will be established for the application of decisions taken in common. This concession to prejudices will without doubt bring the syndicalist workers more intimately into harmony not only with the Red International of Labour Unions, but also with the Communist International. It is in this sense, and in this sense alone, that the concession we have made must be understood. (6)

Few delegates believed that the cosmetic alterations made at Moscow had in any degree assured the independence of the RILU, and nearly all were prepared to proceed forthwith to the creation of a syndicalist International. The delegations of the CDS and of the NAS were the exceptions.

The French delegates were in a delicate position. Unlike the other major delegations present, Besnard and Lemoine did not represent an autono-
mous labour organization. The CDS was an organized minority within the
CGTU. It had been at the request of the CGTU that the RILU statute altera-
tions had been made. Though they had been defeated at St. Etienne, those
organized in the CDS hoped to prevail within the CGTU. They repudiated
the policy of breaking with the parent organization, which had itself broken
from the CGT only a year earlier, and advocated a policy of unity among
revolutionary labour groups, nationally and internationally. On the other
hand, the CDS supported the establishment of a fully autonomous revolu-
tionary International which would be dedicated not only to the overthrow of
capitalism but to the destruction of the state as well. At Berlin, Besnard
and Lemoine proved initially reluctant to proceed to the creation of another
International. They did not believe the suppression of paragraph 11 to
have significantly altered the relationship of the RILU and the CI, but
argued that this could best be demonstrated to the workers by the decisions
of the RILU congress itself, about which more needed to be known. They also
insisted that a new International must work for a united front amongst all
revolutionary unions, including those affiliated with the RILU, and pre-
vailed upon the congress to accept a resolution calling for further negotia-
tions with the Moscow trade union International.

The position of the NAS delegation was far less ambiguous. It
alone played an unequivocal role of opposition within the congress. For the
NAS delegates the suppression of paragraph 11 had been crucial, and their
mandate rested upon this change in the RILU statutes. The NAS delegation
firmly opposed the creation of a new International and called upon the Syn-
dicalist Information Bureau immediately to enter into negotiations with the
RILU to facilitate the affiliation of the syndicalist organizations with
Moscow. Dissel maintained the proper course to be to build a syndicalist
opposition with the RILU which, by conquering it, would assure the estab-
lishment of a revolutionary International free of all party influence. No
other delegation (not even that of the CDS) shared this view, which they
considered unrealistic. The Dutch position in the congress was complicated
by the presence of Lansink, a dissenting member of the NAS Executive, who
attended not as a member of the NAS delegation, but as a representative of
the International Syndicalist Bureau founded in 1920. Lansink claimed to
represent the viewpoint of the NAS majority, which had voted in a referen-
dum to reject affiliation with the RILU in favour of founding an independent
trade union International. He dismissed the hope of converting the RILU
from within as illusory.

The presence of Lozovsky in Berlin at the time of the congress
raised the possibility that the assembly could learn the precise nature of
the RILU decisions from its commandant himself. The French and Dutch
degolutions recommended that Lozovsky be permitted to attend the congress.
Against the vote of Argentina, the assembly accepted a proposal from Schap-
iero that a representative of the RILU be allowed to present a declaration
of unlimited length before the congress.\(^7\) Lozovsky, however did not avail
himself of this opportunity and the decision remained without results.

But for most delegates the RILU had already sufficiently demonstrated
its character. In reporting the activities of the International Bureau,
Rocker noted that every national syndicalist organization which the Bureau
had been able to reach in Europe and America, with the exception of France,
had expressed its desire to build an autonomous syndicalist International.\(^8\)
The report noted the correspondence exchanged between the Bureau and the
RILU Executive and the latter's rejection of participation by RILU affiliates
in the Berlin congress. Nor could the report of the other undertakings of
the Bureau redound to the credit of Moscow and the RILU in the eyes of
the syndicalists. The first of these concerned Lozovsky's refusal to ac-
cept a proposal from the Bureau urging joint action on the part of the RILU
and the syndicalist organizations to boycott Italian goods and impede traf-
fic into Italian harbours in the wake of the fascist victory in Italy and
the accompanying attack upon the Italian workers' movement. The second
corresponded the efforts of the Bureau to win the release of Schapiro from
Bolshevik imprisonment. Despite assurances of an unhindered return to
Russia following the June conference at Berlin, Schapiro, a member of the
International Syndicalist Bureau, had been arrested at Moscow for having
publicized abroad the repression of Russian libertarians. The Bureau in-
itiated a campaign to secure his freedom. In response to pressure from
western syndicalists the Bolsheviks released and, at the suggestion of the
RILU and the All-Russian Trade Unions, expelled Schapiro from Russia.9
Rocker and others, particularly the Italian delegates, argued that Moscow's
attitude in these cases provided further evidence of the need for an inde­
pendent syndicalist International.

Though the question of the syndicalists' position vis-à-vis the
RILU elicited a prolonged discussion, it can be easily summarized. The
assembly noted the call of the RILU congress that the syndicalists assembled
at Berlin renounce the creation of another International and join the RILU.
On behalf of the NAS delegation, Dissel endorsed this appeal, and Lemoine
of the CDS proposed a resolution calling for further negotiations for union
with the RILU. A series of delegates raised voice after voice in opposi­
tion to Dissel and Lemoine. In essence they argued that the suppression of
paragraph 11 had not altered the character of the RILU; that provisions
were made throughout its statutes for close ties with the communist party;
that the organizations represented wanted nothing more to do with Moscow; and that the creation of an independent International could no longer be delayed. They often pointed to conflicts with the communists in their own countries as demonstrating the impossibility of working with the communist-dominated RILU.

The FAUD, Ritter declared, repudiated any further unity negotiations with the RILU, which served only to provide an economic basis for the communist party. "We have a socialist goal, not a radical bourgeois one like the RILU. Whether capitalism is private or state-based, in both cases it leads to economic monopoly and wage slavery." Syndicalists rejected dictatorship as incompatible with social revolution. "The RILU wants the dictatorship of the proletariat," Ritter continued, "but every dictatorship--including this one--depends inevitably upon wage slavery and the exploitation of the workers. Only when the workers are not in possession of the means of production can they be subjected to a dictatorship."\(^{10}\)

The Czechoslovakian syndicalists, Novak asserted, expected the Berlin congress to create an autonomous International. They regarded the RILU not as a "socialist revolutionary organization, but an instrument of political power for the suppression of libertarian socialism."\(^{11}\) The Swedish syndicalists, Severin insisted, would under no circumstances join Moscow; nor would they brook any further delays in the founding of a syndicalist International. The Argentinians pointed out that their mandate bound them to create a new International and forbade them to consider further fruitless discussions with the RILU. Santillan declared this to be the view of the Mexican and Portuguese organizations as well. Schapiro avowed that union with the RILU would contradict the syndicalist principles established by the June conference and, in an allusion to the second RILU congress, added
that "nothing has happened since which would justify an alteration in these principles." Moreover, to permit the RILU to continue as the sole International of revolutionary workers, Schapiro insisted, would deal the death-blow to syndicalism in Russia. By finally establishing their own International syndicalists would no longer "be hemmed in by the machinations of party communism." Smith reported that in Norway the communists had not only refused proposals for undertakings in common, the last being an offer of joint action against the Italian reaction, but worked to secure the dismissal of syndicalist workers from their jobs. It was impossible to work together in an International with those who in Russia expelled syndicalists from the country.

The Italians asserted that the question of union with Moscow could no longer arise for the USI. As organs of the power apparatus of the state, the Russian unions could not provide the basis for a revolutionary labour International. Giovanetti and Gradi assailed communist tactics in Italy, where Mussolini had come to power two months earlier. Communist efforts to divide it, Giovanetti charged, had contributed to the failure of the movement of the occupation of the factories in 1920. When the fascist reaction had begun to rain blows against syndicalism in Italy, the communists had launched an attack upon the proletariat, so that the syndicalists had been "beset by a fascism on two fronts." When the syndicalists, "on their knees," directly beseeched their cooperation, Gradi declared, the communists, who had always placed the interests of the party above those of the revolution, had declined. "The revolution knocked on the door three times in Italy and it was always turned away by the communists." Only when the divisive policy of the communists had helped the fascists to secure victory and all but smash the trade union movement had the communists suggested
joint action, "as if one were to challenge a crippled invalid to a race with a train." Rejecting the "timorous tactics" recommended by France and Holland, the Italian delegates called for the immediate creation of a syndicalist International.  

Amidst the declamatory chorus rejecting further delays, the most impassioned pleas for a final break with Moscow came from Rocker. Besnard had urged that the new International be given a broad foundation, that it be prepared to work jointly with unions affiliated with the RILU. Only in this way could the united front, which neither political parties nor the RILU could achieve, be attained. The French syndicalists could join such an International. But first the decisions of the RILU congress had to be shown to the workers in black and white. Only then would they realize that the RILU remained dependent upon party communism, and that Moscow, and not the syndicalists, worked against the united front.

Rocker firmly dismissed any prorogation. "How long should we wait? How long can we wait?" he exclaimed. "One allows himself to be fooled once, to be fooled twice; but he who permits himself always to be fooled, remains a fool. (Applause.) Therefore a clear decision must be taken here once and for all." The decisions of the RILU congress had not been released prior to the Berlin assembly because they were intentionally ambiguous and embodied a policy designed to prevent syndicalist unity. Moreover, not paragraph 11 alone, but the entire character of the RILU was at issue. "Does anyone believe the mental attitude of the men of Moscow to be altered by the deletion of paragraph 11? This deletion sprang from necessity and not from their own inclination." The united front of the proletariat arose naturally when the practical necessity of struggle required it, and not as a result of theoretical resolutions. This had been demonstrated in Germany.
when members of the centralist unions had stood together with the syndicalists in the general strike which had foiled the Kapp putsch. Only the communists had been prepared to work against the united front by opposing the general strike. Moscow had played the same game in the struggle of the Italian syndicalists for survival. "We must finally declare clearly: the Third International and the RILU are not organizations of the revolutionary proletariat, they are agencies for the foreign policy of the Russian government." Revolutionary honour and morality forbade the syndicalists to continue their association with those who were imprisoning or exiling Russian syndicalists. Unlike the RILU, the new International must be able to accommodate all revolutionary unions. If one sought a dictatorial socialism which forced its ideology on the masses from above, the CI and the RILU were appropriate organizations. "But if we maintain that every creative force must evolve from the womb of the people, that the reorganization of society must proceed from below upward, that the final aims of socialism must be a cultural question of which the highest form of expression is the class struggle, then there can be no match for us with the RILU." Like Giovanetti before him, Rocker condemned Moscow for attempting to capture the workers' movement by financial means. The Red International no longer won influence through sympathy for the Russian Revolution, but through lucre. Never had the workers' movement experienced an outrage of this kind until Moscow's money had injected "concentrated disgrace, shame and corruption" into its veins.

Rocker cautioned the Dutch and French that compromise with Moscow would put them in opposition to the syndicalists of Germany, Italy, Spain, Scandinavia and South America. They would also be sanctioning the policies and tactics of the Russian rulers:
If you unite with Moscow, you are jointly responsible for all the repression which Russia practices against our comrades; you are jointly responsible that a handful of men are today selling Russia to international capitalism; you are jointly responsible for the quivering lips, for the death-cries from the hell of Bolshevism. If you make this contract, you must underwrite it with the blood of your consciences. Reflect on this, comrades of Holland and France! (17)

Dissel was right, Rocker continued, that circumstances required a decisive struggle against world reaction. But that struggle led not towards Moscow, as Dissel believed, but away from it. In 1871 following the defeat of the Paris Commune, Bakunin had observed that the centre of the international reaction was not Paris, but the Berlin of Bismarck and social democracy, both of which sought the Pan-Germanization of Europe. Similarly, the seat of reaction today was not Rome or Madrid, but Moscow. The Russian regime sought the Pan-Russification of the labour movement by gathering all its elements into its hands. "Therefore," Rocker concluded, "my final words are: Break, break once more and break again and again with the powers of reaction in order to elucidate the independence of revolutionary syndicalism." 18

Rocker and other non-Dutch delegates expressed amazement that the NAS Executive had chosen to ignore the results of the referendum of its members. 19 Lansink also attacked the position of his fellow NAS executives. The striking of paragraph 11 had been no concession, but only an attempt to prevent the foundation of a syndicalist International. Further discussion with Moscow would be superfluous. The dependence of the RILU upon the CI was undeniable. Lansink recalled being present at a discussion of the united front by the Central Committee of the RILU at Moscow. The discussion adjourned with the express understanding that the RILU had to await the decision taken on this question by the Central Committee of the CI. Com-
unist domination of the RILU precluded any hope of transforming it from within. The RILU and the IFTU were both Marxist organizations, and Lansink predicted that within a decade they would be united in a single centralist body.

But if we want to go from Berlin to Amsterdam, we do not need to make the great detour through Moscow.... We want a unified International. The prerequisite for this, though, is a unified idea. We do not find this idea in the RILU, and therefore as the representatives of the syndicalist idea, we must build a proper International. (20)

The NAS delegation doggedly defended its position. Given the alteration in the RILU statutes, Dissel maintained, the position of the Executive accurately reflected the will of the majority of NAS members. If Ritter's wholesale rejection of proletarian dictatorship were a universal criterion, the Dutch of the NAS would not be acknowledged as syndicalists, for they recognized the dictatorship of, but not over, the proletariat. The NAS delegation accepted the Berlin declaration of 1920 which called for the establishment of a trade union International free of all political influence. The RILU alterations, Dissel implied, had brought the RILU into conformity with this requirement. Hence the striking of paragraph 11 was crucial. Dissel assailed the Germans for refusing to participate in the founding congress of the RILU and thereby violating the decision of the 1920 Berlin conference. He further lamented the current attack upon the RILU in the absence of a representative to defend it. The RILU, he maintained, remained quite independent of the Russian government. Dissel urged the delegates to appreciate and accept the Dutch position.

No one in the assembly shared the view of the NAS delegation. The resolution the Dutch submitted contrasted sharply with that presented by the SAC. The latter noted that the very resolution embodying the change in
the RILU statutes openly declared that the CI must play the leading role in the international sphere, claimed that the RILU willingly subordinated itself to the CI, and rejected the appeal of the second congress to the syndicalist organizations assembled at Berlin as a misrepresentation of the facts. All votes, except that of the NAS, were cast in opposition to the Dutch resolution, whereupon Dissel announced that the NAS delegates would no longer take part in the discussions or decisions of the assembly. During the next session they withdrew from the congress.

A resolution from the German, Italian, Swedish, Norwegian, Danish and Argentinian delegations calling for the foundation of a syndicalist International won unanimous approval. Syndicalist efforts to found an autonomous International of revolutionary unionists, frustrated for ten years since the first attempt at London, had come to fruition. At the same time the attempts of the communists to unite the whole of the revolutionary workers' movement under their international tutelage came to failure. To polygot refrains of 'The International', the split between libertarian and political socialist which had come to the First and Second Internationals came to the Third.

The final resolution on the RILU, which embodied the resolution founding the IWMA, incorporated Swedish, Italian and French submissions. It noted the refusal of RILU affiliates to participate at Berlin in efforts to find a basis for accord and condemned Lozovsky's "absolutely sectarian behaviour" toward western syndicalists as the inevitable consequence of Soviet repressive measures against the indigenous syndicalist movement. The decisions of the second congress had in no way changed the character of the RILU. The subordination of syndicalism to political parties found expression in all of its statutes; the alteration of a single paragraph deceived
no one. Those so-called syndicalists who sanctioned the appeal of the second RILU congress to syndicalist organizations had become Moscow's agents, "syndicalists in the tow of the Communist International" who sought to subordinate the syndicalist movement everywhere to communist parties. Therefore the congress had, in accord with the mandated instructions of a number of the European and American organizations, founded a syndicalist International independent of all political parties and governments. The resolution passed unanimously and consultative delegates of the AAUE, the CDS, the Russian and Czechoslovakian syndicalists, and Lansink also all expressed their approval.

Prior to the original vote establishing the new International, however, Besnard had declared CDS participation in its foundation to rest on the condition that its earlier resolution on relations with the RILU be taken into consideration. The French now declared that the CDS "attached itself morally" to the Berlin International with the understanding that the latter sought to unite all revolutionary workers dedicated to overthrowing capitalist society and the state. It must seek to produce a united front with the revolutionary organizations which remained outside it. Nearly all delegates could accept this declaration, for in calling for the creation of a new International, most had noted that it could work with other organizations from case to case. But the French insisted not only that the congress take formal notice of their declaration, but that it instruct the new International to make a final approach to the RILU in a last effort to achieve international harmony. The resolution embodying this proposal required that the approach be made on the basis of the last letter of the International Syndicalist Bureau to the RILU, and provided that if the RILU
Executive rebuffed this overture, an approach to RILU affiliates be made directly.  

This proposal elicited very little sympathy among remaining delegates, who believed any further approach to the RILU to be futile, to be at best "an empty gesture." The Argentinians opposed it with particular vigour. The FORA had earlier rejected the decision of the June conference that the Syndicalist Bureau transmit the decisions of the conference to the RILU and invite RILU affiliates to participate in the Berlin congress. In attacking the French proposal, Santillan now submitted a declaration on behalf of the FORA sharply rejecting further transactions with Moscow. No affiliate of the RILU had the appropriate character to participate in the new International, which should concern itself solely with those revolutionary organizations which had completely broken with Moscow. The new International must combat the RILU with the same vigour with which it should combat the IFTU. An "irreducible enemy" of single fronts based on compromise, the FORA urged the Berlin International to forego the search for coexistence and a concern with greater numbers, to devote itself instead to ensuring the revolutionary principles of the new organization. As Santillan later put it, the FORA believed the unity of the proletariat to be "a metaphysical illusion," that all negotiations with the dictators of Moscow "would be a comedy destined to complete failure." The Argentinian delegation therefore counselled the CDS to abandon diplomatic manoeuvres which could only undermine its own position and deliver the French proletariat "to the acolytes of Moscow." An appreciation of the difficult domestic situation of the CDS nevertheless convinced the reluctant delegates to endorse the French resolution. Only the FORA delegates refused their
assent by abstaining.

Before this issue had finally been resolved, however, the assembly proceeded to the task of drawing up the statutes of the new International. This work was not without incident, but a recurring difficulty lay not in the differences between the delegates, but in outside interruptions by the police. The congress was a mobile affair, held clandestinely at changing sites in an attempt to elude the police. These efforts were unavailing, however, and the police, who "steadily hunted" the participants, on three occasions located the assembled delegates and interrupted the congress for the purpose of conducting passport checks on foreign delegates and spectators. In the last of these interruptions the police arrested 13 people, including at least three delegates (Giovanetti, Gradi, Orlando). This caused considerable turmoil. But before the final appearance of the police, the delegates had completed the discussions on the statutes.

II. Statutes of the IWMA

An introduction to the statutes elaborated at Berlin noted that capitalism, which had faltered following the World War and the revolutions in Russia and Central Europe, had again passed to the offensive. Two main factors accounted for its resurgence: first, the disorganization and weakness of the working class, which lacked clarity about its objectives; second, the degeneration of the Russian Revolution into a merely political revolution. The syndicalists viewed the establishment of state capitalism in Russia as the political perversion of an economic revolution which had sought to destroy capitalism altogether. Without going into specifics (though in 1921 Lenin's New Economic Policy had been introduced), the con-
gress asserted that the Bolsheviks had re-established capitalism in Russia. "Capitalist Bolshevism," by introducing a system as exploitative and dominating as that of any other bourgeois regime, had thereby fulfilled one of the chief aims of international capitalism. Only a unified fighting organization embracing the revolutionary workers of all countries constituted a defense against the concerted attack upon the workers by "exploiters of all kinds." Neither the IFTU nor the RILU fulfilled this goal. The first was "lost in reformism" and class collaboration in the expectation that a peaceful revolution would be achieved "with the consent and approval of the bourgeoisie." The second accepted the communist party as the supreme arbiter of revolution and endorsed the dictatorship of the proletariat. But the dictatorship, in theory and practice, was no more than a statist system which thwarted the expropriatory drive and denied the sovereignty of the working class. It became thereby "the iron dictatorship of a political clique over the proletariat." Hence the need for a true International organized on the basis of syndicalist principles. As a statement of those principles, the congress endorsed the ten-point declaration adopted by the June conference.

On a motion from Giovanetti, the congress adopted the name of the First International as that of the new organization. The delegates considered the resurrection of the title of the International Working Men's Association (IWMA) to be particularly appropriate, for it emphasized that the new International was not a union of political parties like the Second and Third Internationals, but an international association of revolutionary workers. It also stressed the federalist basis upon which the International rested. The statutes stipulated that congress decisions were not binding
upon an affiliate which rejected a decision in its national congress. Alternately, if three affiliates contested a decision, it would be subjected to a referendum of the collective membership of the International. These provisions and the discussion of voting rights again emphasized the federalist basis of the International. The Italian delegation, supported by Lansink, proposed that voting rights be based upon the membership of affiliated organizations, but yielded on this question to the Germans and Schapiro, who insisted that the federalism of the IWMA required not the "formal democracy of the centralist trade unions," but a recognition of the equal rights of the smaller affiliates. The congress unanimously accepted the principle of one country, one vote.

The statutes specified the aim of the IWMA to be the strengthening of existing syndicalist organizations and the creation of new ones dedicated to the destruction of capitalism and the state. It sought to sharpen the class struggle and to oppose the repressive practices of governments against militants devoted to social revolution. The International also undertook to study working class problems in order to develop and direct the international movement, to assist in economic and other conflicts with the enemies of the working class, and to organize material and moral support for the movement in those lands where it remained in the hands of the economic organizations of the proletariat. The statutes further declared that the IWMA would vigorously oppose any attempts by political parties to gain control of the unions. The statutes provided that the IWMA could, on a temporary basis, undertake action in common with other trade union and revolutionary workers' organizations. The other organizations referred to, however, were never intended to include political parties, and the statutes were later altered to make this exclusion explicit. A final
clause declared that the IWMA would not intervene in the trade unions of any country, except when an affiliated national organization so requested, or when the latter deviated from the guiding principles of the International.\(^{39}\)

III. The Membership of the IWMA

The membership of the IWMA came almost entirely from Europe and Latin America. In Europe the FAUD, the USI, the SAC and the CNT quickly affiliated. The question of international affiliation was determined by referendum within the NSF and the CGT-P. The Norwegians voted unanimously to join the IWMA, while in Portugal 104 unions voted to adhere to the IWMA against six for the RILU.\(^{40}\) The international question was more laboriously and tumultuously resolved in Holland and France.

In Holland the contest between pro-Moscovites and the pro-Berliners within the NAS continued unabated. Lansink returned from Berlin determined to rally support for the IWMA and to combat the entry of the NAS into the RILU, while the official NAS delegation, which had withdrawn from the Berlin congress, returned equally determined to defend Moscow and to prevent the affiliation of the NAS with the IWMA.\(^{41}\) The question was argued at length in the NAS congress held in March-April 1923. The dispute centered primarily around the significance of the alterations in the RILU statutes. Souchy, the Secretary of the IWMA, addressed the congress on behalf of the Berlin International, but noisy disruptions on the part of the pro-RILU forces prevented him from completing his discourse. They were unsuccessful, however, in a bid to replace Lansink as editor of *De Arbeid* with a candidate of their own. The congress, in which approximately half of the NAS
unions were represented, endorsed affiliation with the RILU by the narrow
margin of 99 to 84 for the IWMA with nine abstentions. The decision of the
congress was to be submitted to a referendum.42

The issue of international affiliation had been raging for over two
years within the NAS when in May 1923 its members were polled on the ques­
tion for the third time. The result was a defeat for the IWMA, which
received 6,489 votes against 7,302 for the RILU. The dissident minority,
however, categorically refused to be subjected to the politicized RILU.
Schism threatened. To avert it, the NAS Executive, after consulting with
the RILU, decided not to adhere to Moscow for the moment but to work to
preserve the unity of the NAS, a decision it proposed to put to yet another
referendum. Rejecting this proposal as a ruse inspired by Moscow, the
dissidents declared that they could no longer remain within a communis­
dominated NAS. In June 1923 they gathered at Utrecht to found a new nation­
al organization, the Nederlands Syndicalistisch Vakverbond (NSV), which
founded a new newspaper, De Syndicalist, and which called for the organiza­
tions opposed to Moscow to break with the NAS: "You must not delay any
longer! Do your duty as true revolutionaries, as libertarian communists,
as organized syndicalists!"43 The NAS, which had been the first to call for
the creation of a genuinely revolutionary trade union International at the
end of the war, found itself torn asunder by the international question.
At its first congress in November 1923, the NSV claimed eleven national
labour federations and 150 local organizations and had won 8,000 of the
22,000 members formerly organized in the NAS. At the same congress the NSV
resolved to enter the IWMA.44

Once the referendum in the NAS gave a final decision on the inter­
national question, the break between the pro-RILU NASites and the minority
had been immediate. By contrast, relations between the dissidents and the CGTU majority in France followed a protracted and desultory course before ending in irrevocable schism. This was due in large part to the great importance which the minority attached to labour unity, especially as the French workers' movement had recently experienced the trauma of schism when the CGTU broke from the CGT. Although the CDS adopted a position of unequivocal opposition following the St. Etienne congress, it also repeatedly cautioned its supporters to remain within the CGTU, which it hoped to recapture. And at the Berlin congress, the CDS delegates had persuaded their reluctant colleagues to endorse a resolution leaving open the question of continued relations with the RILU in the hope of aiding the CDS in its national work.

But the task of the new minoritaires was rendered increasingly difficult by the conduct of the communists within the CGTU. Following Mmonmousseau's accession to leadership at St. Etienne, and after the second RILU congress, he and his colleagues initiated steps to convert the CGTU into a communist fiefdom. In March 1923 the Executive formally enrolled the CGTU in the RILU, and measures were taken to exclude non-communists from positions of authority within the CGTU and to ensure the monopolization of propaganda activities in communist hands. Moreover, the Parti Communiste Français busied itself creating a party-administered network of 'Syndical Commissions' (mainly propaganda groups) within the CGTU. When the minority objected, the CGTU Executive quaintly replied that since the Commissions had been established by the party and not the unions, they did not concern the CGTU. These manoeuvres elicited protests from various quarters of the minority. In May the CDS published a manifesto sharply condemning the political actions of the CGTU. The powerful Fédération du
Bâtement, which had been independently represented at the Berlin congress, but which largely supported the CDS, vehemently rejected the tactics of the communist-syndicalists and called for a return to revolutionary syndicalism. The pressure of the minority made relations between the CGTU and the PCF the chief issue in the November 1923 Bourges congress.

The congress was a turbulent affair with lines sharply drawn. Early in the sessions Besnard complained that "the minority has no other rights than paying its dues and being insulted." The minority reiterated the traditional claim that 'le syndicalisme se suffit à lui-même'. Its resolution declared, in part, that "syndicalism, being the natural and concrete expression of the class-movement of the producers, contains in a latent and organic state all the elements of organization necessary for ensuring the life of the new society." The revolution "will be strictly economic or it will not be proletarian." Syndicalism sought not only the abolition of capitalism, but "the disappearance of the political state . . . . Syndicalism to be effective must be autonomous. It should not allow itself, therefore, to be drawn into any International committed to the acceptance of a political doctrine." Emboldened by the predominance they had achieved since St. Etienne, the defiant majority showed little interest in conciliation. A message from the RILU declared that "the party created the [Syndical] Commissions of its own accord and it is not obligated to account for them to anyone." The concept of union autonomy it dismissed as "anti-proletarian and anti-revolutionary," and the declaration, purporting to be a document of unity, characterized the leaders of the minority as "enemies of the working class, irresponsible careerists." Monmousseau endorsed the dictatorship of the proletariat and flatly declared himself a "defender of the Communist Inter-
national." Though the majority professed to pay homage to the traditions of French syndicalism, its resolution diverged sharply from them by virtually sanctioning the collaboration of the CGTU and the PCF:

The Congress of Bourges regards as dangerous that interpretation of the Charter of Amiens which refused to consider the social revolutions other than as a purely economic conception . . . . It rejects, therefore, the theory that syndicalism is superior to everything else and all-sufficient, a theory which contradicts the daily experience of the revolutionary movement throughout the world; and it believes that syndicalism should solicit the collaboration of all other revolutionary forces for the accomplishment of its mission. (49)

The international question was inextricably bound up in the congress debates. The Executive strongly defended the affiliation of the CGTU with the RILU on the basis of the changes in the latter's statutes. Besnard read a message from the IWMA and combatted the position of the Executive, but unsuccessfully. The attitude of most delegates was summed up in a sentence which Semard hurled at Besnard: "C'est votre droit d'aller à Berlin, mais c'est notre devoir de défendre Moscou."50 The Bourges congress proved a signal victory for the communist-syndicalists. Despite the brusque and hostile manner of their treatment, the minority again placed labour unity to the fore, declaring their allegiance to the CGTU, though this did not prevent them from issuing sharp criticisms of the Bourges decisions.

Shortly thereafter the IWMA itself sharply rebuked the tactics of the French minority. It had already declared the resolution on continued relations with the RILU which the CDS had persuaded the Berlin congress to accept a dead letter. Shortly after the IWMA had been founded, Premier Poincaré made good French threats to compel German compliance with reparation requirements by sending French troops in to occupy the Ruhr (11 January 1923). The IWMA-Secretariat responded not only by appealing to the French and German workers for action, but by addressing invitations to the
IFTU and the RILU to attend a conference to determine joint international action against the occupation. Neither Amsterdam nor Moscow replied. The IWMA Bureau then condemned both Internationals and declared that, in view of the failure of the RILU to respond on so serious a question, it considered the resolution of the Berlin congress as "automatically rejected" by the RILU.\(^{51}\) The first conference of the IWMA, held at Innsbruck in December 1923, endorsed the decision of the Bureau. The conference also passed a resolution on the situation in France, which declared that the conciliatory attitude adopted by the Berlin congress regarding the CDS:

has been completely fruitless. The situation has become more difficult ever since and the moral decadence of revolutionary syndicalism in France has grown greater. In our opinion this state of affairs must be attributed in large part to the indecision and the lack of ideological clarity of our French comrades who, notwithstanding the good will and the honesty of their intentions, have still not realized that opposing conceptions cannot be confounded. The vain longing to want to fuse revolutionary syndicalism, in the name of an abstract ideal of unity, with the reformist aspirations of Amsterdam or with the vehement dictatorial desires of the Moscovite tendency, or to wish to reconcile them, must lead inevitably to a complete abandonment of the ideas and methods of revolutionary syndicalism, as the bitter experiences of the last years have demonstrated. The experience of the future will not be better. We are convinced that this recognition by the revolutionary proletariat of France, despite all present obstacles, will be its compass and its guide for the future.\(^{(52)}\)

As 1924 progressed, an increasing number of minoritaires came to view the quest for unity at any price as untenable. Relations between communists and syndicalists suffered a severe setback at the beginning of the year when on 11 January in a tumultuous meeting at the maison Syndicat, rue de la Grange-aux-Belles in Paris, communist gunmen suddenly drew pistols and opened fire on their unarmed opponents, killing two dissidents, Poncet and Clos.\(^{53}\) The attack outraged the minority, but the statement issued at the time by the CGTU clearly indicated the communist domination of the governing organs of the union. The CGTU declared that while it deplored these events
and reproved "incitements to violence," it had "neither the right nor the duty to exercise a censure upon external groups, on their program and their objectives." The RILU issued a statement placing responsibility upon the leaders of the minority. The RILU expressed its confidence that the "syndicalistes conscients" of the minority would not "follow the new schismatic manoeuvres of the representatives of the IWMA who want at any price, by the crumbling of the revolutionary forces, to create their French section."54

A CGTU committee of inquiry composed of both majoritaires and minoritaires eventually concluded that the individual directly responsible for the murders was a CGTU official and a member of the PCF.

The murders of Poncet and Clos further embittered relations within the CGTU. The situation continued to deteriorate throughout 1924. From the side of the minoritaires came pointed criticisms of the CGTU and open acts of insubordination. From the majoritaires came violent verbal attacks and swift action when insubordination was carried too far. Thus when the Departmental Union of the Rhone defied the central organization by electing a Secretary who was not a CGTU member, the central office supervised the hasty creation of a loyal union structure in the area.

In October the minority called for a conference to determine its course. Some, like Besnard, called for a complete break with the CGTU and the establishment of another national union organization. Besnard envisaged three possibilities for the minority. They could unite with the CGT, but it had ceased to be a proletarian organization and was no more than an organ of the French government, just as the CGTU was an agency of the Russian government. They could opt for partial or total autonomy, but this was at best a precarious and provisional response, and not a solution to the crisis of French syndicalism. (A number of union organizations in France had, at the time of the schism in the old CGT, refused to
stay either in the CGT or to join the CGTU, preferring instead to remain autonomous.) The third and best alternative, Besnard argued, was to found a third CGT. He concluded by rephrasing a slogan of pre-war syndicalism: "Plus un sou, plus un homme pour la C.G.T.U." The situation was further inflamed by the appearance of an article by Albert Treint attacking the minority. That the attack came from Treint's hand the minoritaires found particularly rancorous, since they held Treint morally responsible for the Grange-aux-Belles murders. Even before the minority conference met, the Syndicat Unique du Bâtiment de la Seine, with biting criticisms of the communist-syndicalists and citing the Treint article as one of its reasons, broke with the CGTU.

The minority conference held in early November united not only CGTU dissidents but a number of autonomous organizations. It adopted the intermediate path of autonomy, which Besnard had characterized as precarious and provisional. But the Union Fédérative des Syndicats Autonomes de France (UFSA), which the conference founded as a means of loosely linking anti-CGT and anti-CGTU unions, was intended to be provisional. It sought "to provide a rallying point for all the discontented elements of the syndical world, which, by provoking serious defections from the existing confederations, would compel their leaders to abandon their respective policies in favour of a program of class unity based upon the antipolitical provisions of the Charter of Amiens." In this goal the UFSA signally failed. Aside from the initial cost to the CGTU, neither of the two national organizations lost members to the UFSA. On the contrary, the loosely organized UFSA began to lose members. The minority had suffered a steady decline in strength since St. Etienne and the UFSA showed no signs of being able to reverse the trend. By 1926 its membership had dwindled.
Concerned with the plight of syndicalism in France, the IWMA's Paris Action Committee began publishing *La Voix du Travail* as an official IWMA monthly in mid-1926. The review served to propagate the ideals of the IWMA in France as well as providing a mouthpiece for those in the UFSA who were determined to regroup the syndicalist forces on a more solid basis. Many UFSA leaders now shared the view which the IWMA had long held—that the quest for unity would be the undoing of French syndicalism. They now saw the course of autonomy which the UFSA had adopted as a terrible blunder, as an aid to their opponents, and began agitating for the creation of a third CGT. Lucien Huart, for example, lamented that autonomy had not brought fruits, that it had rendered united action impossible, and had cost the unions members. He added:

> Have we not been victims of our loyalty? We had a multitude of scruples vis-à-vis men who had none. We are too engrossed, we still preoccupy ourselves much too much with that which can instruct or make unitarians and confederates. We have believed in Unity, we have sacrificed the very future of our organizations to this chimera. The duplicity of our adversaries now being a fact amply demonstrated, we have at present the right to destroy our bridges behind us. (60)

The third CGT, which took the name CGT Syndicaliste-Révolutionnaire (CGTSR), was founded in November 1926. The 'Motion d'Orientation' adopted in the constitutive congress of Lyon (the *Charte de Lyon*) was intended as a modernized *Charte d'Amiens*. Eighty unions joined the CGTSR, which itself immediately joined the IWMA. The Syndicalist International finally had a French section, but it was a weak branch and survived its infancy only with regular subsidies from the IWMA.61

Additional IWMA affiliate in Europe included organizations in Austria, Denmark, Belgium, and Switzerland. In addition to the Russian Anarchosyndicalist Minority, Eastern Europe was represented by the Federation of
Autonomous Unions in Bulgaria, the Anarcho-Syndicalist Trade Union Opposition in Poland, and by a Rumanian anarcho-syndicalist propaganda organization.

Latin America represented the second major sphere of the IWMA. The most important of its Latin American affiliates was the FORA of Argentina. The struggle between communists and libertarians had been particularly bitter in Argentina and the FORA's opposition to Moscow was complete. The FORA took the objections raised by its delegates at Berlin against the resolution for further negotiations with the RILU with utmost seriousness. Acceptance of this resolution by the IWMA's founding congress prompted a FORA congress in March 1923 to consider only provisional affiliation with the Berlin International. Only when the IWMA declared the resolution null and void at its Innsbruck conference in December 1923 did the FORA accept unqualified affiliation. The affiliation of the Mexican CGT, the FORU of Uruguay and the IWW-C also came in 1923-1924. Later Latin American affiliates included national organizations in Brazil (Federacao Regional Operaria Brasileira) and Paraguay (Centro Obrero Regional del Paraguay), and various other associations, either propaganda groups or local union bodies, in Bolivia, Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, Guatemala, Cuba, Costa Rica and Salvador.

The major Latin American members of the IWMA also joined the Asociacion Continental Americana de los Trabajadores (ACAT), created at the initiative of the FORA and the CGT-M. Its constitutive congress in May 1929 declared the ACAT to be a direct actionist organization which sought the destruction not only of capitalism, but of the state as well:

The ACAT considers the free man in the free society its highest ideal, and advocates its realization by means of the revolutionary suppression of the state apparatus and of the capitalist economic organization simultaneously, in the conviction that the
abolition of one and the perpetuation of the other leads inescapably, as experience has already demonstrated, to the restoration of the order of things whose destruction had been desired. (63)

Augustin Souchy attended the congress in Buenos Aires on behalf of the Berlin Secretariat, and the ACAT resolved to enter the IWMA en bloc.64

The International also maintained contacts with organizations in Asia, particularly in Japan, China and India, but only in Japan did it have a formal affiliate. The sole North American member was the Marine Transport Workers' Industrial Union. It joined belatedly in 1935 only when the IWW, of which it was a member, repeatedly declined to do so. Prior to the Berlin congress, the IWW had signalled its intention to send a delegation. The IWW's 14th congress, however, reversed this decision by adopting a neutral stance and declaring that it would enter neither the Moscow nor Berlin Internationals, but would maintain friendly relations with both.65 The IWMA long and unsuccessfully sought to reach an understanding with the American organization.66 In total, the Berlin International had affiliates in thirty-one countries, fifteen in Europe and fourteen in Latin America, between 1923 and 1939.67

At the beginning of 1923, however, the IWMA had only just been born. Its gestation had been long and troubled. Ten years had passed since the first serious efforts to found an autonomous revolutionary labour International at London in 1913. The syndicalists had then viewed the IFTU, dominated by the social democratic centralist unions, as their primary international rival. The impetus of syndicalist internationalism, however, had first been blocked by the outbreak of war, then deflected by the Bolshevik Revolution and the emergence of communist internationalism. The rupture between syndicalists and communists represented not only a breach in the
revolutionary wing of the international workers' movement, but the restoration of syndicalist internationalism to its own independent path. Syndicalists now found themselves confronting not only the resurrected, reformist IFTU, but the highly politicized RILU as well. The new IWMA, the practical, organizational expression of the long-thwarted international strivings of the syndicalists and of their conviction that the war and the post-war years had demonstrated the need for a forceful and uncompromising reaffirmation of their principles, thus emerged as the implacable foe of both Amsterdam and Moscow.
CONCLUSION

The emergence of the IWMA in 1922 marked but the last chapter in a history of divisions between political and non-political socialists in the international labour movement which stretched back over half-a-century. The first open breach had come fifty years earlier when Bakunin and his supporters had been expelled from the First International. The same rupture occurred within the Second International with the expulsion of the anarchists in 1896. Though much less frequently noted by historians, the split between political and non-political elements which had come to the First and Second Internationals also came to the Third. The rupture in 1922 between the syndicalists and the RILU, the appendage of the CI, and the establishment of the IWMA at the end of the year, constituted that breach. The creation of the IWMA attests to the durability of the appeal of libertarian ideology amongst widely scattered elements within the international workers' movement.

The establishment of the IWMA, however, clearly did not come simply in response to the establishment of a politically dominated RILU, as has sometimes been suggested. Prior to the First World War the syndicalists were consciously seeking to find international organizational expression. At a time when the Bolsheviks were still content to work within the Second International, the syndicalists had already appealed for a new and genuinely revolutionary International. The continuity of the syndicalists' international efforts is evident from the fact that all the major syndicalist organizations represented at the London congress of 1913 were represented
at the founding congress of the IWMA at Berlin ten years later. Far from provoking the creation of a syndicalist International, the Bolshevik Revolution and the emergence of communist internationalism actually acted to delay it, if also to accentuate its libertarian basis.

The London congress constituted the pioneering effort of syndicalist internationalism not only in organizational terms, but in ideological clarification as well. The first international declaration of principles which issued from London in 1913 explicitly condemned the state, demanding the destruction of the political as well as the economic structure of capitalism. The syndicalists assembled at London, in short, viewed syndicalism as being essentially anarcho-syndicalism. This doctrinal determination received fuller expression ten years later with the creation of the IWMA on an explicitly anarcho-syndicalist foundation. Unlike the pre-war CGT, moreover, the IWMA declared not its official neutrality vis-à-vis political parties, but its opposition to such parties. The IWMA carried the implication of syndical self-sufficiency to its logical conclusion. The diverse modalities of the structure, composition and outlook of its membership deriving from its specific historical circumstances imposed ideological constraints upon the CGT. Unhindered by such constraints, the syndicalists united in the IWMA were able to articulate the position of revolutionary syndicalism in a more complete and uncompromising form, shorn of the ambiguities and inconsistencies of the official policy of the pre-war CGT as expressed in the Charter of Amiens. Equally important in accounting for the vigour and sharpness with which the IWMA enunciated its position was the fact that the syndicalists were by then involved in a fierce ideological conflict with the communists and had witnessed what appeared to them to be the corruption of an economic revolution in Russia by a political faction.
That syndicalist efforts antedated those of the Bolsheviks meant that with the creation of the Third International relations between communists and syndicalists, though naturally coloured by varying national circumstances, were inevitably viewed from an international perspective. For the former, the obvious question was whether the syndicalists and industrial unionists could be incorporated into the framework of communist internationalism. For the syndicalists the question became whether Moscow could construct a revolutionary labour organization within which they could find their international aspirations fulfilled. Initially the advantage lay with the communists. Although Russia remained isolated and besieged, the Bolshevik seizure of power had provided the communists with a shelter within which they could prepare, launch and sustain the structural core of their International. The syndicalists, eager to proceed quickly with their own international plans after the war, found themselves by contrast confronted by hostile governments whose apprehensive defensiveness in a period of revolutionary turmoil thwarted these endeavours. More important in favouring communist efforts, the symbolic fascination initially exerted by the Russian Revolution upon revolutionaries in the West provided the Bolsheviks with a tool which they could and did exploit to the full in their efforts to achieve an ideological and strategic hegemony over the whole of the revolutionary movement. When issues of revolutionary organization were broached, however, the ideological divergences between syndicalists and communists emerged with full force.

Principles of organization represent the point at which revolutionary theory and practice intersect. The wide latitude of mutual tolerance and co-existence characteristic of differences which remain in the realm of theory dissolve when questions of organization become the focus of
attention. The incompatibility of theoretical divergences, which in this process assume ever sharper expression, is revealed. In short, the fact that organizational disputes rest upon organization's mediational function between theory and practice ineluctably propels theoretical differences into their most acutely conflicting, antinomic forms. To varying degree, both the Bolsheviks and the syndicalists had experienced this phenomenon within their own spheres prior to the war. Within the Russian social democratic movement organizational questions concerning the nature and composition of the party had shown previously co-existing theoretical divergences between Mensheviks and Bolsheviks to be incompatible, as demonstrated by the breach between the two at the 1903 congress which gave rise to their respective titles. Differences between the CGT and most foreign syndicalist union associations, on the other hand, were thrown into relief by a discussion of organization, this time on the level of international trade unionism, in the controversy of 1913.

Within the larger area of revolutionary internationalism following the war, the attempt to translate ideology into international strategy inevitably brought to the fore those questions of organization which precipitated the conflict and subsequent breach between syndicalists and communists. Initially, however, organizational considerations remained in the background. The inescapably appealing character of a revolution with whose early forms and slogans they could readily identify compelled syndicalists to declare their solidarity with it and prompted some syndicalist organizations formally to align themselves with the CI, whose first congress remained nearly mute on questions of trade union organization or the role of the communist party. Bolshevik strategy was itself still evolving as they sought to consolidate and preserve revolutionary victory in Russia while
anticipating the rapid spread of international revolution which they deemed necessary to sustaining the domestic revolution.

The success of their own revolution and the failure of those elsewhere prompted the Bolsheviks to give greater attention to international revolutionary strategy as protracted struggle. Recognition that revolution beyond Russian borders would be difficult to achieve in the face of a resurgent capitalism reinforced the idea of the preeminent role of the communist party, already embedded in Bolshevik theory, in such a strategy. The organizational corollaries of Bolshevik theory--the permeation of reformist unions, the organic connection between unions and communist parties, and, on the international level, the subordination of the RILU to the CI--which clearly began to be unveiled in the summer of 1920 inevitably elicited resistance from those syndicalists who had not acquiesced to communist leadership under the spell of the Russian Revolution. Once the emphasis on organizational questions had underscored ideological conflicts, syndicalist resistance steadily mounted. Thus the syndicalist conference of 1920, though pervaded by the persistent enthusiasm for Moscow among many of its participants, stipulated the minimal syndicalist conditions for a revolutionary labour International and rejected proletarian dictatorship as exercised by a political party. The June conference of 1922, following the disillusionment of the founding RILU congress in which organizational issues predominated, went further. Its wider and more categorical repudiation of the policies of the RILU constituted the decisive breach between syndicalists and communists on the international level. Communist efforts to overcome this breach by making merely formal and insubstantial changes in the organizational relationship between the RILU and the CI were only partially successful. Syndicalist disaffection with Moscow culminated in the
foundation of the IWMA at the end of 1922.

The repression of libertarian tendencies within the Russian labour movement paralleled and reinforced the ideological divergence starkly disclosed by the polemic on questions of organization. A variety of converging motives in addition to the simple dictates of doctrine—the need to centralize the defense of a revolution under attack by armed counter-revolutionaries, the need to revive and strengthen a besieged economy by imposing discipline upon a working class in spontaneous rebellion against the demands of production, the need to break the challenge to party bureaucracy from an internal 'Workers' Opposition'—compelled the Bolshevik leadership to suppress all libertarian dissent within and without the communist party. But while the domestic syndicalists appeared as a disruptive threat where the defense of revolution and consolidation of party power constituted the goal, foreign syndicalists appeared as potential allies where the goal remained the promotion of revolution against western capitalism. For the Bolsheviks the apparent incompatibility of suppressing the syndicalists of Russia while appealing to those of the West for unity of action dissolved in a matrix of revolutionary expediency. For most western syndicalists, receiving not only the appeals but the deported representatives of their Russian brethren, such unity of action could only constitute a breach of revolutionary morality. While they could point to instances in the West, in Germany, Italy and elsewhere, which appeared to demonstrate that nothing more than communist opportunism lay beneath Moscow's promotion of the united front, they saw the suppression of the Russian libertarian movement as the most compelling proof of the spuriousness of such rhetoric.

Despite the vast ideological gulf which separated them, the breach between syndicalists and communists came later than the major splits which
divided the leftist parties of the West into socialist and communist rivals. A number of factors were involved. Although the social democratic parties expanded rapidly immediately after the war, they lacked internal unity. The strain of a prolonged war had accentuated the pre-war tensions and therefore the prospects of schisms within them even before the intervention of Moscow, as the formation of the break-away USPD in Germany demonstrates. Thus internally riven, the socialist parties of the West were particularly vulnerable to the attacks of the newly-created CI. Already opposed to the western parties, and thwarted in their efforts to convene an international assembly of their own, the syndicalists were irresistibly drawn toward Moscow in the immediate post-war struggle between a new, Bolshevik-sponsored, revolutionary International and the effort of western socialists to resuscitate a discredited Second International. The syndicalists could readily approve Moscow's attack on the socialist leaders of the West as traitors and opportunists, which only seemed to second their own earlier indictment.

The Bolsheviks, moreover, initially directed their attention to the domain of political parties. Driven by their conviction of the crucial strategical necessity of fashioning purified communist parties elsewhere comparable to that which had successfully seized power in Russia, the Bolsheviks first imposed their organizational demands, symbolized above all by the twenty-one conditions of admission to the CI adopted in the summer of 1920, upon the socialist parties of the West. Numerous European socialists, especially many who had been active in the socialist movement prior to the war, though they could oppose allied intervention in Russia and combat the anti-bolshevik propaganda campaigns of western capitalism, nevertheless remained wedded to the socialist traditions of their own nations and organizations, espoused a democratic socialism, were appalled
by the violence and terror widespread in Russia, and had already repudiated the Bolshevik model of revolution as inapplicable in the economically more advanced and politically more liberal nations of the West. Once it became clear that no compromise could be achieved, the internal struggles within socialist parties rapidly led to a series of schisms. By early 1921 the leading parties of Europe had been torn asunder and a permanent rivalry between socialists and communists had emerged.

The breach between the syndicalists and Moscow, on the other hand, did not come for well over a year. Political schismatics par excellence, the Bolsheviks' strategical perceptions made them great advocates of trade union unity. Thus while they advanced their demands of political organization as bluntly as possible in the summer of 1920, they simultaneously undertook to construct an international labour organization to provide Moscow with a firm footing within as wide a compass of the trade union movement as possible. They particularly hoped that the revolutionary potential of the syndicalist movement could thereby be harnessed by the communists. The announcement of plans to establish a revolutionary trade union International enabled many syndicalists to transfer their persisting enthusiasm for Moscow from the CI to the impending RILU. Despite the exclusively political character given the CI by its second congress, Moscow remained the cynosure of the syndicalists who had sought the establishment of a revolutionary labour International since 1913. Their hopes of sharing in the work of the Russian Revolution on an international level while preserving their own autonomy were dashed only by the RILU congress of 1921, when the imposition of Moscow's organizational demands upon the revolutionary trade union movement soon revealed compromise to be impossible, just as it had been shown to be impossible a year earlier in the political movement
of western socialism.

The international consolidation of the resistance to Moscow of the syndicalist movement, frequently beleaguered by hostile governments in the West and often internally disrupted by communist noyautage, took another year. But as the June conference of 1922 clearly illustrated, syndicalist opposition to Moscow had become definitive. The Bolsheviks had failed with the syndicalists where they had succeeded even with the left-communists. Having drawn them to Moscow, the Bolsheviks were still confronted with the task of winning the unqualified support for the organizational principles of the CI of many left-communists who aspired to a revolutionary transformation which would not duplicate that in Russia. The Bolsheviks eventually succeeded in securing the obeisance of the left-communists for one reason above all: by the time the revolutionary wave in post-war Europe had receded, only that wrought by the Bolsheviks survived as a model of successful revolution. This observation lacked all force for the syndicalists, however, who by then viewed the Revolution in Russia as the preeminent exemplar of a failed revolution.

Long highly attuned to the bureaucratic and oligarchic tendencies of political organizations, including purportedly proletarian parties, the syndicalists came to see the emergence of Bolshevism as irrefutable proof of the fatal dangers inherent in such organization. The syndicalists had earlier perceived the steady diminution of the revolutionary commitment of pre-war social democratic parties as the inevitable accompaniment of the proliferation of political offices and party posts and of an increasing preoccupation with electoral-parliamentary exigencies. Thus they argued that the 'new revolutionary parliamentarism' espoused by the CI constituted no safeguard against the bureaucratization and domestication of communist
parties operating within a framework of capitalist parliamentarism. The evolution of western communist parties largely sustained this judgment. They saw in Russian Bolshevism, on the other hand, a confirmation that the seizure and utilization of state power by a revolutionary party led not to radical workers' control and administration but to the extension of a new bureaucratic mechanism of command and the installation of a new ruling oligarchy.

Convinced anew that politics was not a reconciliatory and unifying but a divisive and destructive factor in the modern workers' movement, the syndicalists of the IWMA drew the boundaries between the domain of politics and that of economics and social reconstruction as sharply as possible. This invigorated doctrinal reaffirmation, however, involved its own tensions and its own potential strategic limitations. While on one level the IWMA tacitly acknowledged the political intent of syndicalism by categorically rejecting the classical position of neutrality, on another it forcefully reaffirmed the old dichotomy between economic and political action, repudiating with heightened conviction all that appeared to pertain to the latter. The syndicalists persisted in identifying the political with the entire complex mechanism of elitist control, and particularly with the manifoldly corrupting, obfuscating and subordinating dynamics of the political parties and governing institutions of a social order reticulated around a framework of bourgeois hegemony. The intensity of this identification prevented the syndicalists from making the simple affirmation that in the broadest sense economic and political action formed an indiscernible unity. Others in the revolutionary movement, such as those who led the German AAUE, equally committed to direct economic action and equally opposed to party organization and domination and to association with the International at Moscow, did not hesitate to insist upon the indivisible unity of
Thus the syndicalists' unyielding insistence upon the dichotomy between the economic and the political terrain tended to confine their perception of theoretical and strategical parameters. The immediate post-war years constituted a period of extraordinarily fertile, if polemic-ridden, theoretical discussion about the conditions, means and goals of revolutionary social transformation. In general terms, the syndicalists' increasingly categorical rejection of any conception or action which might be interpreted as political militated against the possibility of a fruitful interchange with others on the revolutionary left who also wrestled with the vexed question of achieving comprehensive change which could abolish capitalist society and yet produce a system of social relations unlike that installed in Russia. To invoke a less hypothetical, more immediate example from the realm of practice, while the IWMA made provisions for working jointly with other organizations in certain circumstances, it explicitly refused to consider joint campaigns, however temporary, with political parties, even though such campaigns need not have involved the syndicalists in electoral or parliamentary activity. This doctrinal rigidity limited the IWMA's field of effective action. Its policy of 'dual unionism', of maintaining separately organized syndicalist unions, ran the risk of leaving the syndicalists cut off from the dominant currents of the trade union movement in nearly every country. Its refusal to consider even temporary actions with parties on the left, in which many of the most active unionists were enrolled, threatened further to isolate the IWMA within the larger workers' movement.

Delayed by the syndicalists' prolonged flirtation with Moscow, the timing of the foundation of the IWMA proved propitious neither for the wider workers' movement nor for the syndicalist movement tout court. By
formally splitting its revolutionary wing, the conflict and subsequent breach between syndicalists and communists further fragmented an international labour movement whose potential resistance to an emerging mass movement of extremism on the right had already been undermined by the division between moderates and radicals.

Though it finally provided a sanctuary for those union organizations which could accept neither the reformism of the IFTU nor the Bolshevized RILU, the formation of the IWMA at the end of 1922 came at a less than optimal time for the syndicalist movement itself. Their revolutionary ethos had made the syndicalist unions disproportionate beneficiaries of the influx into the unions which had accompanied the radicalization of the labour force produced by the disruptions of war and buttressed by the example of a workers' revolution in Russia. Correspondingly, the subsequent exodus from the unions in the period of post-war disillusionment frequently hit the syndicalist unions harder than others. The tide of revolutionary sentiment had ebbed by the end of 1922. By then the membership of most syndicalist union associations had crested and receded.

The infant IWMA, moreover, confronted a post-war world in which capitalist rationalization had attained unprecedented dimensions, which harboured not only socialist but well-established communist rivals, and in which new socio-economic forces unleashed by the war had paved the way for the emergence of an aggressive fascism. Before the new International could even stabilize its footing, its affiliates began to fall victim to the international reaction well under way in the West. Already crushed by an authoritarian government in Russia, a like fate soon befell many syndicalist organizations in the West. At the very foundation of the IWMA the USI writhed in its fascist-administered death-throes. Within a year the mili-
tary dictatorship imposed by Primo de Rivera in Spain forced the CNT into years of clandestinity. And these are but the earliest examples of the repression of IWMA affiliates by hostile governments.

Yet the International founded at Berlin, the smallest of the three post-war labour Internationals, proved to be remarkably durable. Though harassed and beleaguered, the IWMA, indebted to no government, dependent solely upon the material and human resources of the libertarian workers' movement, frequently subjected to the most adverse of circumstances, began a career in 1922 which has stretched over half-a-century and which has earned it the distinction of being the longest-lived of all anti-authoritarian Internationals. Like all attempts to create a libertarian International, the IWMA has sought to deal with the central problem of reconciling "human solidarity and personal freedom." Its durability is attributable to the fact that it is by conception and practice anchored in the trade union movement. Thus the syndicalist unions provided the IWMA with an abiding and resilient structural foundation which no purely anarchist International, given anarchism's deep antagonism to any form of organization beyond the local group, has been able to attain. While this required dealing with the day-to-day interests of trade unionists, which syndicalist activists recognized as one of their tasks, it simultaneously provided an organizational basis for sustaining syndicalist ideals of radical social transformation. The IWMA fulfilled this function on the international level. No organized movement in the workers' tradition has been as deeply committed as syndicalism to both the right and the capacity of the producing masses to self-administration. The formation of the IWMA provided a vehicle and a voice for keeping alive within the international workers' movement the ideal of a free producer in a free society.


The Charter of Amiens is reproduced in appendix A.


See appendix A.


9 Briand provides a good example of the type of career transition which so dismayed syndicalists and deepened their hostility toward parliamentarism. In the early 1890s he was one of the leading advocates of the general strike and a staunch antimilitarist. Tens of thousands of his pamphlet, La Grève générale et la révolution (Paris: Allemane, n.d. [1900]), were distributed during the 1901 Montceau miners' strike. But Briand first became a socialist and a deputy, then abandoned the socialist party, which hampered his political career. In 1910 he became Président du Conseil and proceeded to break a national railway strike by arresting the strike committee and mobilizing 15,000 railwaymen into the army.

10 Ridley, p. 72.


12 The great diversity of the French socialist tradition, along with varying conditions in differing trades and personal predilection, which entered into the complex, variegated, overlapping network of ideological forces within the CGT can be illustrated by a brief look at the ideological antecedents of a largely random sampling of CGT activists. First, the national officers: Victor Griffuelhes, a leather-worker, headed the CGT from 1902 to 1908. Before becoming a revolutionary syndicalist, he had run for political office in Paris as a Blanquist. His successor, the only reformist Secretary of the CGT (for a few months in 1909), was the typographer Louis Niel, who until about 1906 had been an anarchist. Léon Jouhaux, match-maker and docker, originally an anarchist, succeeded Niel and continued to head the CGT after the First World War. The Deputy Secretary of the CGT from 1901 to 1908, Emile Pouget, earlier a shop-clerk, was also an anarchist. On the Bourses side of the CGT, Pelloutier shifted from Guedist socialism toward anarchism. His successor, the typographer Georges Yvetot, who headed the Bourses section from 1901 to 1918, was an anarchist, as was the Deputy Secretary from 1898 to 1908, Paul Delesalle, earlier a machinist. On the other hand, Pierre Coupat, head of the mechanical workers' federation from 1901 to 1909, was a reformist and a 'Possibilist' (a supporter of the socialist political movement which advocated gradual rather than revolutionary change). Alexandre Luquet, Secretary of the hairdressers' federation, though not a union reformist, was a political socialist. The head of the textile workers' federation after 1903, Victor Renard, the leading supporter of union-party political collaboration, was a life-long Guesdist. In contrast, Auguste Keufer, the leading spokesman of the reformists and Secretary of the printers' federation from 1886 to 1920, though himself a member of the SFIO, staunchly defended the apoliticism of the CGT. Keufer was also
a disciple of Auguste Comte and active in French and international positivist associations. The leader after 1904 of one of the most radical of federations—the metal workers'—Alphonse Merrheim, had begun as a member of Guesde's party, then become an Allemannist (Jean Allemane headed a largely Blanquist party) before passing to revolutionary syndicalism. The propagandist Pierre Monatte, founder in 1909 of the influential La Vie Ouvrière, also began as a Guesdist before passing through anarchism to revolutionary syndicalism. Examples could be multiplied, but these few should suffice to illustrate the complex and dynamic interplay of ideological influences permeating the activist element within the CGT.

Although the CGT was not alone in providing inspiration. The American Industrial Workers of the World played a similar role. Founded in 1905 at Chicago, the IWW soon repudiated political action in favour of revolutionary industrial unionism. Its example had some influence in Europe, notably in Britain and Scandinavia. The influence was sometimes direct, for a number of European militants had worked actively within the IWW before returning to resume their activities in Europe. Three diverse examples will suffice. James Connolly, though he never completely repudiated political action, worked in the IWW before returning to Ireland to become active in the Irish Transport and General Workers' Union and a leading figure in the Dublin strike and lockout of 1913, the most dramatic of all encounters in the labour unrest which convulsed the British Isles in the pre-war period. Edmondo Rossoni similarly worked within the IWW and became a leading militant in the Italian syndicalist movement. Martin Tranmael, the house-painter who became the undisputed leader of the radical union opposition in Norway prior to the war, had spent five years in the radical labour movement in America and applauded the establishment of the IWW before his return to Norway.


17. The circulation figure is that given in the report of the USI to the 1913 Syndicalist Congress as recorded in the Dutch syndicalist paper, De Arbeid, 8 October 1913.


20. Quoted from Polak's brochure, Federatie van vakverenigingen, in de Jong, p. 46.

21. By far the most comprehensive account of the strike is A.J.C. Rüter's De Spoorwegstakingen van 1903 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1935), which, despite its title, includes an extensive discussion of the Dutch labour movement in the decade preceding the strike.

22. The circulation figures are from the report of the NAS to the 1913 Syndicalist Congress, as recorded in De Arbeid, 8 October 1913. I have also utilized the typescript report of the NAS to the 1922 founding congress of the IWMA, which includes a brief survey of the history of the NAS and membership figures for 1894-1922. International Working Men's Association (AIT-IAA) Archive, I A, File 1, Congres - Berlin 1922, Internationaal Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis, Amsterdam.

23. Quoted in Fritz Kater, Freie Vereinigung deutscher Gewerkschaften Berlin: Kater, 1912), p. 9. This sometimes impassioned brochure by one who was intimately involved in the entire history of the German syndicalist movement is a valuable introduction to its pre-war development. See also Kater's later pamphlet, Die Entwicklung der deutschen Gewerkschaftsbewegung (Berlin: Die Einigkeit, 1912). Hans Manfred Bock's detailed study, Syndikalismus und Linkskommunismus von 1918-1923 (Meisenheim: A. Hain, 1969) deals with the origins of the FVDG, pp. 23-34 ff. W. Kulemann's much older Die Berufsvereine (Jena: Gustav Fischer, 1908) 2:45 ff., 96-108, is still

The FVDG published Friedeberg's address: Parlementarismus und Generalstreik (Berlin: Die Einigkeit, n.d. [1904]). It later appeared in French, Swedish and Hungarian.

In reference to the reaction of the SPD newspapers, Kater (Freie Vereinigung, p. 22) wrote: "Sie befolgten damit die bekannte Taktik des fliehenden Diebes, der seinen Verfolgern dadurch zu entrinnen sucht, dass er selbst am lautesten ruft: Halt ihn!" For the centralists' attitude toward their relations with the localists, see Paul Umbreit, 25 Jahre deutscher Gewerkschaftsbewegung 1890-1915 (Berlin: Generalkommission der Gewerkschaften Deutschlands, 1915).

Correspondenzblatt der Generalkommission der Gewerkschaften Deutschlands 23 (25 October 1913):657. As Kater noted in 1912 (Freie Vereinigung, p. 22), in no country were the obstacles confronting the syndicalists as great as in Germany, where the SPD and the Freien Gewerkschaften could muster over 125 daily and weekly newspapers and countless agitators against them.

The circulation figures of Die Einigkeit are taken from the 1913 report as recorded in De Arbeid, 8 October 1913. The FVDG also published Der Pionier, whose weekly issues dealing with a wide range of topics of libertarian interest were not infrequently confiscated.


Industrial unionism as I use the term here is akin to syndicalism in that both doctrines repudiated political action and maintained that the revolution would be carried through by the labour unions by means of direct action and that the union organization would provide the framework for the future society freed from capitalism and the political organization of the state. Industrial unionism also required that all workers in a given industry be organized in a single union for that industry. It therefore opposed craft unionism. While syndicalists frequently also advocated union-
ization by industry, industrial unionism sometimes diverged from syndicalism by advocating centralization within industrial unions and also in the union administration of the future society. The IWW provides a good example of an organization which advocated industrial unionism, though there were supporters of decentralization within it. Henceforward, I use the phrase 'industrial unionists' or 'revolutionary industrialists' to refer to supporters of the doctrine sketched here, and particularly its revolutionism, and not simply to advocates of union organization by industry, which includes many reformist unionists.

32 Lewis Lorwin has written that "the first anticipation of syndicalist ideas may be found in the discussions and resolutions of the First International between 1868 and 1872 and especially in those of its Bakuninist sections between 1872 and 1876." Lorwin adds, however, that "in its definite historic form . . . syndicalism was elaborated between 1895 and 1904" in France. Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, 1930, s.v. "Syndicalism". On the idea of the general strike in the First International, see Robert Brécy, La Grève générale en France (Paris: Études et Documentation Internationales, 1969), chap. 1.


34 L'Humanité, 1 September 1909. This issue contains a compte-rendu of the ISNTUC conference.

35 Ibid.

36 At the 1911 Budapest conference the CGT attempted to win a change in this rule. The French delegates supported the IWW's bid for entry into the ISNTUC, which not much earlier had admitted the American Federation of Labor as the representative of the United States. The CGT maintained both should be admitted, but the conference decided to retain the AFL and bar the IWW. See Paul Brissenden, The I.W.W.: A Study of American Syndicalism (New York: Columbia University, 1920), pp. 273-5.

37 L'Humanité, 1 September 1909.

38 De Arbeid, 27 November 1909.
NOTES: CHAPTER TWO

1 All dates cited in this chapter, unless otherwise specified, refer to the year 1913.

2 The Syndicalist and Amalgamation News (hereafter, SAN), December 1912.


4 Die Einigkeit (Germany), 22 February; Wohlstand fur Alle (Austria), 26 February; Solidaritet (Denmark), 1 March; Syndikalisten (Sweden), 1 March; L'Internazionale (Italy), 1 March; Tierra y Libertad (Spain), 24 February. The latter effusively greeted the summons, writing in part: "Spanish and American workers:
- you who realize that you live subjected to a usurping oligarchy;
- you who work for wages which claim to justify the capitalist plunder of the fruit of your labour by the so-called right of accession;
- you who anxiously desire to free yourselves by yourselves, without submission to leaders who end up being bad shepherds; you who aspire to local, national and international workers' solidarity without the avaricious rates of the dues [-collecting labour] society; you who consider those dues as the tribute which nourishes the leaders and the moneybox in which justice is hoarded, and which converts that which by essence must be expansive and disinterested into excessive covetousness; you who in consequence duly find yourselves prepared to make the sacrifice of your liberty and your life for the emancipation of the world proletariat; you who scorn every minimal program as a traitorous and cowardly abandonment of the positive, rational and scientific ideal of emancipation - to the Syndicalist Congress of London!"

In the United States both the Industrial Workers of the World and the Syndicalist League of North America welcomed the congress proposal. William Z. Foster's SLNA identified with the CGT, tended to favour craft unionism, and opposed the dual unionism of the IWW, with which Foster had broken in 1912. Foster promoted the congress, in which he hoped the SLNA would be represented. Syndicalist (Chicago), 1 February. But the SLNA was short-lived and the Syndicalist itself disappeared in September 1913. The IWW's Industrial Worker (Spokane, Washington) identified syndicalism above all with craft unionism and contrasted it with the IWW's industrialism (9 January):
- "The I.W.W. is not a syndicalist organization, though many regard it as such. It is an industrial union.... In international affiliations the I.W.W. is more closely allied with the revolutionary syndicalists than any other body...Still it is well to understand from the outset that the I.W.W. represents a higher type of revolutionary labor organization than that proposed by the syndicalists."
Taking note of the congress proposal, the Industrial Worker, 3 April, again remarked upon the superiority of the IWW's industrialism, but recommended the congress, adding: "Let its most important work be the formation of a connecting link between the revolutionary syndicalists and industrialists of all countries." The Industrial Worker dismissed the ISNTUC as a "farce," but observed that the official position of the IWW on the London congress would have to await its annual convention in September.

5 Bulletin, 16 February.

6 The general debate on the international question can be followed in XVIe Congrès National Corporatif (Xe de la C.G.T.) (Marseille: CGT, 1909), pp. 60-79, 153-66. Intimations of schism were however avoided on the congress floor. A letter of Alphonse Merrheim to Monatte, 7 October 1908, is illuminating in this respect. Merrheim was chiefly responsible for the resolution accepted at Marseille. In discussing the work of the committee charged with dealing with the international question, he wrote:


7 Léon Robert, a participant in the Marseille debates, criticized the decision made there and called for a change in La Voix du Peuple, 26 September-3 October. Travailleur du Bâtiment, the journal of the building-workers, traditionally a radical group in the CGT, pondered the creation of a separate International grouping revolutionary unionists in May 1909. See also Les Temps Nouveaux, 23 July 1910. The Dutch broached the same subject in De Arbeid, 27 November 1909. The French sought to dissuade them. In La Vie Ouvrière, 20 December 1909, p. 336-38, Monatte argued unenthusiastically that the American Federation of Labor, which had just entered the ISNTUC, could induce the Germans to transform the latter into a genuine workers' International.

Thus A. Luquet of the Fédération des Coiffeurs de France argued that the international endeavours of the foreign syndicalists were not to be welcomed because their success would lead to opposition to the ISNTUC, which in turn would lead to a serious rupture within the ranks of the organized workers in France. L'Humanité, 4 March.

La Vie Ouvrière (hereafter, VO), 20 February, p. 254.

5 April.

Cornelissen in Bulletin, 9 March; De Ambris and Wolter (mistakenly called Walter) in VO, 5 April, pp. 404-06.

VO, 20 March, pp. 377-78.

Bowman in SAN, March-April; Mann in VO, 5 April, pp. 434-35.

Alfred Rosmer had attended the London ISEL conference on behalf of La Bataille Syndicaliste and as a fraternal delegate of the CGT. He and Léon Jouhaux had also been present at the Manchester conference. SAN, December 1912. The proposal that the ISEL organize an international congress was first endorsed at both conferences. At that time Jouhaux and Rosmer apparently told Mann and Bowman that neither the CGT nor its member federations could be represented at such a congress. VO, 5 September, p. 267.

Bulletin, 8 December 1912.

Ibid., 9 March, 6 April.

VO, 5 April, pp. 406-07.

Die Einigkeit, 5 April; SAN, March-April.

Bulletin, 6 April.

Ibid., 15 June.


W. Tcherkesov, the Georgian anarchist exile living in London, offered a thumbnail sketch of Bowman during this period: "Bowman, half-English, half-French, quite an 'esprit bouevardier', a despotic man, wanted the entire movement for himself and kept in his hands. He quarreled with the young syndicalists, scorned them, and stood alone." From a conversation with Nettlau, ibid. The rift among the British syndicalists eventually led to a schism, with Bowman retaining control of an increasingly sectarian and strident rump ISEL, now devoted to dual unionism, and Mann becoming identified with the new League for Industrial Democracy. The ideological differences between the later ISEL and the League are discussed in Holton, pp.
Holton, however, says very little about the personal quarrels in which Bowman so largely figured.

24 Cornelissen, Jensen and Bowman in Bulletin, 15 June, 27 July and 3 August, respectively.

25 30 August. Two weeks before Jouhaux's article appeared, Solidarity, an IWW weekly published at Cleveland, Ohio, published an article entitled "What Game is Jouhaux Playing?" in which André Tridon suggested that the French government had left Jouhaux undisturbed when it had arrested other CGT officials in relation to antimilitarist demonstrations because of Jouhaux's opposition to the London congress. Tridon's article soon came to the outraged attention of VO, 20 September, pp. 331-32. Although VO did not mention it, Tridon was wrong in claiming that Jouhaux did not receive the attention of the authorities in relation to the campaign against the three-year military service law. In March 1913 he was arrested and held for ten days. See La Voix du Peuple, 30 March-6 April; Georges and Tintant, 1:107.

26 Bulletin, 7 September.

27 VO, 5 September, p. 263.

28 Ibid., pp. 264-65.

29 Ibid., 5 April, p. 407.

30 Ibid., 5 September, pp. 266-67.

31 Ibid., 20 September, p. 370.

32 Ibid., 5 September, pp. 269-70.

33 Ibid., pp. 268, 273.

34 Bulletin, 21 September.

35 VO, 20 September, pp. 367-70.
NOTES: CHAPTER THREE

1. All dates cited in this chapter, unless otherwise specified, refer to the year 1913.


3. According to Tcherkesov. Nettla, MS, p. 605.

4. Ibid.


6. Der Pionier, 15 October. In the same article, Karl Roche, one of the German delegates, wrote that Cornelissen had gone to London "und machte dem Genossen Bowman Feuer unter die Sohlen. Das war," Roche added, "ein schweres Werk."

7. The agenda arrived only in time to allow participating organizations to publish it as the congress convened at London.

8. 25 September.

9. 27 September. In Holland, on the other hand, De Arbeid (17, 20 September) cautioned against expecting too much from a first congress.

10. 26 September. The London correspondent of the Manchester Guardian, 24 September, for his part, argued that a syndicalist congress "appears as a complete act of futility" on the grounds that the syndicalists regarded trade union action merely as the "revolutionary gymnastics" designed to train the workers for the revolution and that such 'gymnastics' "cannot be made the subject of study or regulation at an international congress." Unaware that the native ISEL had initiated the plans for the congress, the reporter added: "I do not know who may have inspired the idea of the Congress, but as the French workmen have now begun to value a good organisation with plenty of members and a solid banking account higher than the general revolutionary strike, it may be supposed that the moving spirits at the meeting will be the Spaniards, or some other such disorganised nationality."

11. The best list of delegates and organizations represented, though it is incomplete, is that published in Die Einigkeit, 11 October. An earlier and slightly different "proof copy" of the delegates' list survives in the Jack Tanner Papers, Box 5-2, Syndicalism 1912-20, Nuffield College, Oxford. The German delegation included Karl Roche, Karl Windhoff, and the FVDG's executive officer, Fritz Kater, whose "deep sonorous voice" and habit of speaking reminded the Daily Herald, 1 October, of a Lutheran pastor.
The Dutch delegation, all of the NAS: Thomas Markmann, Seamen's Union; Bernard Lansink Sr., textile workers; Bernard Lansink Jr. and Gerrit van Erkel, building-trades workers; C.J. Wesseling, municipal workers; and A. van der Hagen and A. van den Berg, cigar-makers and tobacco workers.

The Italian delegation, in addition to De Ambris for the USI, included Silvio Corio representing the Parma Trades Council and Edmondo Rossoni representing the Bologna Trades Council and the Syndicalist Union of Milan.

The Spanish delegation, in addition to Negre, included J. Suarez Duque, mandated by thirteen unions of various type of Corúña, and José Rodriguez Romero, who represented three unions of agricultural workers and bootmakers of Alayor and Mahon as well as an Alayor women's union. Rodriguez Romero delivered a well-received discourse acclaiming the equal rights of women at the congress.

A fourth French delegate, Louis Perrin, representing the Vichy Bourse du Travail, arrived late for the congress. He attended its sessions only irregularly and was not issued a congress card.

The Danish organization, in giving its mandate to Jensen, had decided to direct its resources toward agitation in lieu of financing its own delegate. Solidaritet, 4 October.

The British delegation: Jack Tanner and Albert Crook, Hammersmith Engineers; A. Butcher, Bermondsey branch of the National Union of Railwaymen; E. Howell, Bristol Operative Bricklayers; A. Jones, Forest Gate Shop Assistants; Frank Lemaire, London Society of Compositors; F. Garnier, London Cooks; J.V. Wills and S. Edwards, the Bermondsey and Leicester Trades Councils, respectively.

Both Argentinian organizations professed direct action principles, but while the Confederation maintained a simply apolitical stance, the FORA was imbued with a thoroughly anti-political and markedly anarchist outlook. Despite their respective titles, the FORA was the larger of the two and it dismissed the Confederation as "without federations and scarcely with adherents." On behalf of the Confederation, De Ambris unsuccessfully challenged the admission of the FORA to the congress. La Protesta, 8 November and 29 October. In 1914 the two organizations merged, but unity was short-lived. See Victor Alba, Historia del movimiento obrero en America Latina (Mexico: Libreros Mexicanos Unidos, 1964), Chap. 9.

The Austrian Free Trade Unions Association had designated Jaroslav Schebesta to represent them, but was unable to raise the funds to finance his trip from Vienna. Schebesta sent an explanation of his inability to attend along with a report on the Austrian situation to the congress, which was published in Wohlstand für Alle, 8 October. Financial difficulties may also have kept A. Wroblewski of the Polish Revolutionary Trade Union Group, which submitted an item concerning syndicalist morality to the agenda, from the congress.
Upon arriving in London in the spring, Swasey had immediately contacted Bowman, but the absence of an official decision of the IWW prevented him from answering Bowman's query whether the IWW would send delegates to the congress. Letter from Swasey, Industrial Worker, 22 May.- Nor did the IWW's convention (supra, pp. 298-9, n. 4) supply Swasey with an answer. The fact that Tom Mann opposed the IWW's dual unionism during his American tour in 1913 may have diminished the IWW's interest in an international congress sponsored by the ISEL. At any rate, a pressing internal debate diverted the IWW's attention from the international question. The bitterly contested struggle between centralizers and decentralizers completely dominated the IWW conference when it met from 15 to 29 September, and no decision was taken on IWW representation at London. Swasey therefore attended the London congress in an unofficial capacity.

An official report of the congress was never prepared and no documents, except the tentative delegates' list and the provisional agenda in the Tanner Papers, appear to have survived. Consequently, reports and/or discussions published by participants in the congress must be relied upon. Those I have been able to locate are listed here. The congress was reported by a number of its official delegates in various journals: in Argentina by Bernardo in La Protesta (29 October, 5-8 November); in Spain by Negre in Solidaridad Obrera (9 and 16 October; but see also 20 November); in Italy by De Ambris in L'Internazionale (11 October); in France by Duque in Les Temps Nouveaux (18 October); in Holland by Lansink Jr., and van Erkel in De Arbeid (4, 8, 11 and 15 October) and by Markmann in De Nederlandsche Zeeman (1 and 15 December); in Germany in Die Einigkeit (11 and 18 October) and in Der Pionier (15 October) by Roche; in Sweden in Syndikalisten (11 and 18 October) and in the special Christmas issue (hereafter Julnummer); in Denmark in Solidaritet (11 and 18 October, but see also 25 October); and in Norway in Direkte Aktion (11 and 25 October) by Jensen; and in Britain by Bowman in SAN (December). The congress was also reported or commented upon by other participants or observers: in Spain by Tarrida del Marmol in Tierra y Libertad (15 October); and in France by Tcherkesov in Les Temps Nouveaux (18 October), by Rosmer in VO (20 October, pp. 449-60), and by Cornelissen (C. Rupert) in La Bataille Syndicaliste (27 and 30 September, 1, 3 and 5 October); and by the latter in the Bulletin (12 October; but see also 19 October and 2 November). There were other reports by interested but non-participating groups; for example, the Austrian Wohlstand für Alle (29 October). Finally there is the British press in general, and though all the major newspapers reported the congress, their coverage is neither particularly informative nor reliable. The fullest coverage in Britain was given by the radical Daily Herald (29-30 September, 1-3 October), but even this is scanty and sometimes erroneous.

On the mandate issue in general, see especially Solidaridad Obrera, 16 October; but also Syndikalisten, 11 October, and La Protesta, 29 October. A number of issues were discussed in relation to the mandate question. At one point a British delegate proposed that no one be admitted who was not a member of the organization he represented. In view of the split in the British ranks, this may have been a manoeuvre to prevent Bowman from filling the open mandate sent to London by the Brazilian Regional Workers'
Federation. As it was, Bowman had difficulty convincing the mandate committee that he had a legitimate mandate from the Brazilian organization. Die Einigkeit, 11 October.

23 The ISEL delegates: Evelyn Lilyan, secretary of its London branch; Gaylord Wilshire, editor of the militant Wilshire's Magazine; and Charles Roberts, a journalist. Vallina briefly recalled the congress in Mis Memorias (Caracas: Tierra y Libertad, 1968) p. 133. Vallina remembered the closing session as having been held at the Jewish Anarchist Club, in which Rudolf Rocker was active, but this session was more likely an informal gathering. The congress was not covered by the anarchist paper, Freedom, however, though the October issue reproduced the declaration of principles endorsed there. The congress is also recalled in Jensen's "Memoarfragment" (unpaginated), Jensen Archive, Arbetarrörelsens Arkiv, Stockholm.

24 The figure of 220,000 is Rosmer's estimate. VO, 20 October, p. 453. Rosmer gave no indication of how he arrived at this figure, but of European organizations in 1913 the USI had around 100,000 members, the NAS around 10,000, the FVDG less than 9,000, the SAC 3,700, the Belgian organization represented by Demoulin nearly 1,000, the Danish FS 500-600. It is difficult to say how many workers the Spanish represented, but Negre's claim personally to represent 60,000 (De Arbeid, 15 October) is certainly too optimistic.

25 The "Provisional Agenda" survives in the Tanner Papers. Among the submissions to the agenda, the Brazilians called upon the congress to consider what attitude should be adopted by European syndicalist organizations to the question of the emigration of workers to such countries as Brazil where "special laws are in force which deny to foreign workers the right to unite for their emancipation, and place them entirely at the mercy of the Police, who arrest, beat and deport them," while from Holland came a proposal "that the congress discuss the possibility of preventing International Scabbing," which discussion was to include the international general strike. The typograpers of Coruña wanted the congress to consider "what means are best, and most likely, to show tangible results for neutralizing the perturbing effects created by machinery in all trades." Germany, Spain, Sweden, Holland and Belgium called for a pronouncement of the issue of anti-militarism, while on the question of international organization remarks and proposals were recorded from Cuba, Sweden, Holland, Italy, Spain and Germany. On the question of an international newspaper, a Spanish proposal suggested that the "New Red International" found a paper with translating branches in every country, while the Dutch called for a private session to discuss the management of Cornelissen's Bulletin and the Swedes recommended that if, as they hoped, an international syndicalist organization were established, the editorship of the Bulletin be transferred to it. (The Dutch and Swedish organizations had the right to make these suggestions, since they contributed significantly to the finances of the Bulletin. It was financed by the NAS of Holland, the CGT of France, the SAC of Sweden and the FVDG of Germany, and also received the occasional gift from the IWW. It was produced in French, Dutch, German and English and most of the work was done by Cornelissen, his wife and sister-in-law. See Cornelissen,
"Strijd, lief en leed," pp. 439-440.) In order to surmount the linguistic barrier and further improve working class unity, proposals were also made concerning the creation of a workers' international language. The Dutch proposed Esperanto while the Swedes suggested that the congress select either Esperanto or Ido, depending upon which had "the most linguistic advantages." (The Swedes were in fact great proponents of Ido and the editor of Syndikalisten, Gustav Sjöström, later (8 November) much lamented the failure of the congress to act on this point of the agenda. In an interview given to the Pall Mall Gazette, 27 September, Bowman made his opinion concerning the relative linguistic merits of the two languages clear. In discussing the congress agenda, he remarked: "Then there is the question of an international language. Some of the delegates propose that Esperanto should be adopted, and some Ido. I am not much in love with Ido because one cannot swear in that language." Finally, a Polish group wanted the congress to discuss a revolutionary morality and religion which must be cultivated as the major factor in the development of the syndicalist movement. This morality and religion, the Polish statement declared, was entirely evolutionary and naturalistic. "The whole mass of the oppressed moves forward on the lines of evolution and organises itself syndicalistically in a natural manner. It is, so to say, a biologically inevitable organisation." The syndicalist movement "is a natural elementary force that can be stopped as little as a flood or a prairie fire; or rather in its functioning, it is organised as the origin and migration of a shoal of fish." The ultimate maxim of revolutionary morality was a simple one: "EVERY DEED THAT LEADS TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF OURSELVES [the oppressed] AND HUMANITY IS GOOD. EVERY DEED THAT MILITATES AGAINST OURSELVES AND HUMANITY IS BAD." Syndicalist morality was higher than that embodied in Christianity, "since, for us, to exploit another or to renounce our development is a crime." Similarly, the syndicalist religion was higher than the Christian religion:

"The social enthusiasm, the clear seeing revolutionary impetus of the human mind and heart, the great ambitions of the human-will, which gather themselves together for Revolutionary achievement--these are all expressions of the new religion of the proletariat, which lends to the happiness of man on earth, and thus distinguishes itself from the Christian religion; it also supersedes the latter by virtue of its higher faith in the possibility of human happiness."

It should be noted that, as in the case of the Polish contribution, some of the submissions on the agenda came from organizations which were not represented in the congress itself.

26 The financial question revolved around who was responsible for reimbursing the Dutch the £20 advanced to Bowman for the preparation of the congress. A committee assigned to review the matter reported in closed session that Bowman had submitted no receipts for expenses and that no conclusion could be reached concerning the disposition of the deficit. No decision was made in this tumultuous session, though the British delegation entered a vigorous protest against Bowman. On the final day of the congress, the representatives of the London branch of the ISEL, aware of the claims for reimbursement lodged by the Dutch, disclaimed all responsibility for its organization. Bernardo observed in La Protesta, 6 November, that the closed session had made evident "the very bad conduct of Bowman". Die
Einigkeit, 18 October, was marginally more charitable: "But it is here expressly emphasized that material dishonesty may not be credited to Bowman. In financial matters people like Bowman are harmlessly cut off from the world. They spend money so long as there is some, and when it is gone the trust in providence and let the creditors do as they please." Bowman himself later complained that the organizers had been short of funds and observed that "had the I.S.E.L. stopped because of money considerations the Congress could not have been held at all". SAN, December. But he neglected to add that he himself had proposed its cancellation, or at least its postponement; nor did he mention the £20 advance from the Dutch.

27Rosmer to Monatte, mercredi matin [1 October], Monatte Archives, Institut français d'histoire sociale, Paris.

28Among other things, Bowman accused Cornelissen of distorting translations and of trying to manipulate the congress. The Dutch and German delegations on the one hand and the Italians and some of the French on the other proved temperamentally indisposed towards one another. Disparate conditions of economic development and labour organization amongst the countries represented may have played a role. Although it was the largest organization represented, the Dutch and the Germans apparently did not take the USI represented by De Ambris, for example, very seriously; they treated it, according to Rosmer (letter to Monatte, jeudi soir [2 October] Monatte Archives) as a "quantité négligeable". The Daily Herald, 1 October, also noted the Bowman-Cornelissen split which corresponded broadly to national differences, and attributed the slow progress of the congress to the "strong individualism of the delegates." Rossoni, as "coquet comme plusieurs femmes," was given to castigating the Germans and the Dutch. They in turn took him for a fool, and Rosmer opined that they were not far wrong. De Ambris developed a "véritable haine" for Kater. Rosmer to Monatte, 1 October. Rossoni, Michelet and other Latin delegates habitually interrupted the proceedings. At one point an exasperated Windhoff exclaimed: "Les Français, les Espagnols et les Italiens parlent tout le temps... Les Allemands et les Hollandais sont les seuls qui discutent convenablement." VO, 20 October, p. 451. The provocation was not wholly one-sided. The Daily Herald, 1 October, observed that Karl Roche perambulated the congress floor and interjected comments which had the result of "often raising the ire of his French comrades." The Spanish delegation, for the most part, avoided being drawn into the personal disputes and sought at times to soothe their colleagues and call attention back to the more serious work of the congress. And no one "ne fut plus surpris ni attristé par cet antagonisme que Cornelissen." VO, 20 October, p. 451. Though these divisions were clearly felt in the congress, they can be unduly emphasized, and Rosmer's claim (ibid., pp. 450-51) that from the beginning two inalternable groups came into being which formed opposing blocs on all issues of the congress is a gross exaggeration. Divisions within the congress are also discussed in Nettlau MS, p. 605.

29Schapiro was not only a veteran of the 1907 Amsterdam International Anarchist Congress, like Cornelissen, but was also a member of the International Bureau which the congress had appointed.
The congress opened on a Saturday, but there was no meeting on the following Sunday, when many of the delegates may have attended a public reception in their honour planned by Wilshire and his wife at their home, 'Heathside', at Hampstead. Daily Herald, 27 September. Van Erkel of the NAS's Federation of Building Trade Workers, however, was in Trafalgar Square addressing British construction workers in a mass meeting where the relative merits of syndicalist and traditional trade unionism were being debated, and where he was loudly cheered after explaining the syndicalist idea of class war. De Arbeid, 4 October. Taking advantage of their presence in London, the three members of the Spanish delegation, along with Bernardo, Vallina, Tarrida del Marmol and Vincente Garcia, travelled to Brighton to visit Kropotkin, who enjoyed great prestige within the libertarian workers' movement. For accounts of the visit, see Tierra y Libertad, 8 October; Solidaridad Obrera, 9 October; La Protesta, 6 November.

La Bataille Syndicaliste, 1 October.

The fullest accounts of the presidency dispute are to be found in Solidaridad Obrera, 16 October; Syndikalisten, 18 October; and VO, 20 October, pp. 453-55. The quotes are from VO.

Although in France the Charte d'Amiens guaranteed individual members of the CGT complete liberty to engage in political action, union officials were discouraged from doing so. Nonetheless, the incongruous situation arose wherein members of the CGT's Confederal Committee actually sat as socialists in the Chamber of Deputies. Only in 1911 were the CGT statutes altered to prevent the candidature of officials.

VO, 20 October, p. 455. The Dutch were not alone in threatening to leave the congress. On several occasions, especially when personal disputes came to the fore, various small groups of delegates threatened to withdraw.

The fullest account of the reports is that given in De Arbeid, 4, 8 and 11 October.

Manchester Guardian, 1 October.

De Arbeid, 11 October. Rosmer, who certainly did not share Knockaert's views, granted that he had been "magnifique" in his speech and noted that the Germans were delighted with it. "Knockaert est leur homme." Letter to Monatte, 2 October. According to Les Temps Nouveaux, 18 October, the organization at Lille represented by Knockaert had been expelled for its revolutionary tendency from the national textile federation, a markedly reformist body within the CGT.

Daily Herald, 2 October; see also Syndikalisten, 18 October.

De Arbeid, 8 October.

Wesseling in ibid.; Bernardo in La Protesta, 5 November.
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41 Tcherkesov’s role is discussed in Nettlauf MS, pp. 605-6.

42 Syndikalisten, 18 October.

43 San, December. Rosmer noted that the déclaration was the work of a French delegate. VO, 20 October, p. 456. But while Couture, a member of the resolution committee, may have put the finishing touches to the document, it does not deviate greatly from the original draft submitted by the Dutch and reproduced in De Arbeid, 3 September. Tanner opened the final day of congress by emphasizing that the declaration specifically precluded political action of any kind, contrary to a misconception in the London press. Morning Advertiser, 3 October. His correction was obviously elicited by the Daily Chronicle’s confused article, 2 October, which claimed that the declaration “was worthy of note because it admitted the trade union view of the importance of political action” (which prompted Jensen to quip: “Political-parliamentary syndicalism! That is the latest sensational news!” Syndikalisten, 18 October.) The British press in general had difficulty following the proceedings of the congress, particularly because of the language problem which made the Tower of Babel analogy inevitable and popular. Moreover, the British press did not quite know how to react to the motley collection of radicals assembled for the congress. Even the Manchester Guardian, 30 September, thought it worthwhile to record that in the smoke-filled congress hall “the one woman had her revolutionary cigarette with the rest.” A better example is provided by the Daily Mirror, 1 October, whose reporter interviewed two delegates who voiced their opinions that the coming revolution would be violent and bloody. During a break in the sessions, the curious reporter trailed the delegates. His report continued:

“These men with their desperate creed adjourned to a tea-shop. The Daily Mirror noticed the following repasts:

Tall, gaunt-looking man wearing black wideawake hat - Large glass of milk and two currant buns.

Another delegate, also wearing wideawake hat - Sausage and mashed.

Third delegate, with fierce moustache and sombrero hat - Two eggs on macaroni.”

Whatever the reporter believed revolutionaries were in the habit of eating, he found these fares “incongruous.”

44 “Provisional Agenda,” Tanner Papers.

45 The best sources on the discussion of the question of international organization are those found in De Arbeid, 15 October; Les Temps Nouveaux (Duque), 18 October; Syndikalisten, 18 October; and La Protesta, 7 November.

46 La Bataille Syndicaliste, 5 October; La Protesta, 7 November. Duque thought very little of this expectation of Michelet and Couture: “C’est le même argument que nous présentent les social-démocrates quand ils parlent de s’approprier l’Etat, sans jamais compter que, malgré leur majorité, ils seraient forcés de faire la révolution.” Les Temps Nouveaux, 18 October. The case of Couture illustrates the effect the crisis in the CGT had upon the international views of some of its radicals. In May 1909 in
Travailleurs du Bâtiment Couture proposed, in opposition to CGT's policy, the creation of an independent International for revolutionary unions. In 1913 he argued against the creation of such an International because it would jeopardize the unity of the French organization.

47 VO, 20 October, p. 449.
48 La Protesta, 7 November.
49 Syndikalisten, 18 October.

De Ambris had originally intended to propose London as the seat of the Bureau until his experience in the congress revealed to him the deep divisions amongst the British syndicalists. But his proposal to entrust the Bureau to Michelet's Fédération in Paris amazed Rosmer. Letter to Monatte, 2 October.

51 SAN, December. Bowman defended De Ambris's proposal here, but falsely added that the majority of delegates preferred Paris.

52 VO, 20 October, p. 457.

53 De Ambris had been unhappy with the voting procedures from the beginning. Later in the day Rosmer encountered De Ambris, who following his withdrawal from the congress had had a dinner "avec un fiasque pour lui tout seul. Il est tres gai. . . . Mais il est enragé contre Cornelissen et contre Kater! Il souhaite leur mort pour la paix du monde et le progrès du syndicalisme." Letter to Monatte, 2 October.

54 The resolution is reproduced in full in Die Einigkeit, 11 October.

55 Der Pionier, 15 October.

56 Manchester Guardian, 3 October. On the meeting, see also the Morning Post, the Daily Chronicle and the Daily Herald, all 3 October. La Protesta, 8 November presents the glowing but not atypical response of a congress delegate (Bernardo). The following telegram from Larkin was read at the meeting: "Regret cannot be with you in the body. I appeal to comrades to send ammunition. Bring fighters here. Masters admit they are on their marrow-bones. We are unconquerable. Hope comrades will not hesitate in well-doing." Morning Post, 3 October.

57 Thus the conservative Morning Post, 3 October, already most uneasy by what it saw as the misdeeds of syndicalists beneath the labour strife of recent years in Britain, asserted that because of the differences and disruptions of the proceedings "little light has been thrown on the ideas for which the Syndicalists stand." The somewhat more perceptive New Statesman, 4 October, noted that the position of the congress "with regard to Parlia­mentarism, the organization of Trade Unions and the value of direct action was quite clearly and definitely expressed." Other leftist papers in Britain which condoned political action--the Labour Leader, the Clarion, the
Socialist—simply ignored the assembly. The newspaper of established British trade unionism, the Daily Citizen, refrained from criticizing the congress, but also did nothing to publicize it, its day-to-day coverage of the meetings running in total to seven sentences.

58 11 October.


60 Quoted in VO, 20 October, p. 460, from L'Internazionale, 11 October.

61 Rosmer to Monatte, 2 October.

62 20 October, pp. 449, 458-9. Note that in its Zurich conference in September 1913 the ISNTUC changed its name to the International Federation of Trade Unions. G. Dumoulin attended the conference on behalf of the CGT. In reporting the conference, Dumoulin did not mention the London congress, but allowed to it, as well as to the domestic pressures which kept the CGT in the IFTU: "Désespérer, aller ailleurs, compromettre notre unité nationale parce que le Secrétariat de Berlin est réformiste! Ce serait gravement nous tromper, ce serait faire fausse route et laisser sans contrepoids les idées qui ne sont pas les nôtres. Dans cette Internationale, notre syndicalisme révolutionnaire ne peut pas se diminuer, il ne peut que pénétrer chez les autres. . . . tout en constatant que le Secrétariat international ne correspond pas à nos idées, je suis revenu de la Suisse avec cette forte impression que notre C.G.T. y était à sa place". La Voix du Peuple, 5-12 October.

63 Syndikalisten, Julnummer.

64 Bulletin, 12 October, 2 November.

65 18 October.

66 Negre in Solidaridad Obrera, 9 October; Bowman in SAN, December; Sjöstrom in Syndikalisten, 8 November.

67 Bernardo in La Protesta, 5 November; Negre in Solidaridad Obrera, 16 October; Duque in Les Temps Nouveaux, 18 October; Jensen in Syndikalisten, 18 October.

68 Jensen in Syndikalisten, 18 October; Negre in Solidaridad Obrera, 9 and 16 October; the FVDG in Die Einigkeit, 18 October.

69 8 November. De Ambris's election naturally caused considerable disquiet within syndicalist circles in Italy. De Ambris argued that he sought election only for the immunity of a deputy which would permit him to return to Italy and that his platform was an anti-parliamentary one. The workers around the syndicalist stronghold of Parma supported him despite the fact that the organ of the USI, L'Internazionale, remained doctrinally constant and repudiated syndicalist candidacy for any purpose (25 October). Many foreign syndicalists also considered De Ambris's strategy to be a mistake.
See, for example, Jensen in *Syndikalisten, Julnummer*. De Ambris never attended parliament following his election, except for the day Italy declared war.

De Ambris, however, was later instrumental in splitting the USI and withdrawing a substantial minority when he and his supporters found themselves unable to convince the organization to accept an interventionist stance. De Ambris fully supported the war and adopted a fiercely nationalistic position. After the war he led the Unione Italiana de Lavoro (UIL), which had its origins in the 1914 secessionists from the USI. De Ambris not only sympathized with the fascists, frankly declaring that only his position as Secretary of the UIL prevented him from formally joining them (*L'Internazionale*, 28 June 1919), but he even drew up the agrarian platform for the second congress (May 1920) of the party. See Adrian Lyttleton, *The Seizure of Power* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1973), pp. 51-2.

Impressed with D'Annunzio's occupation of Fiume, De Ambris attempted to persuade the UIL to adopt political action in support of D'Annunzio. Failing in this, he went as an individual to Fiume, joined forces with D'Annunzio and drew up the 'Carta del Carnaro', a scheme to introduce the principles of syndicalism at Fiume, which D'Annunzio issued. See Renzo De Felice, *Sindacalismo rivoluzionario e Fiumanesimo nel carteggio De Ambris-D'Annunzio* (Brescia: Morcelliana, 1966). With Mussolini's rise to power, De Ambris was willing to give the fascists a chance (*L'Internazionale*, 4 November 1922), but the attack on the syndicalist organizations followed quickly and many syndicalist leaders were imprisoned or forced into exile. De Ambris and other remaining syndicalists made a last and unsuccessful attempt to salvage syndicalism in Italy at the end of 1922. Hounded by the fascists, De Ambris was soon forced to flee. He was deprived of his citizenship in 1926 and died in exile eight years later.

The career of another Italian delegate at the London congress, Edmondo Rossoni, was somewhat different. When the split in the USI occurred, Rossoni was in America, but he supported De Ambris' interventionist position. Later active in the UIL with De Ambris, he opposed the latter's attempt to bring the UIL to support D'Annunzio politically as a violation of syndicalist principles, and was able to consolidate the leadership of the UIL after De Ambris' departure for Fiume. By 1921 the question of the response to fascism was beginning to split the UIL. Rossoni, who continued to oppose political ties, was instrumental in founding a new organization, the Italian Confederation of Economic Unions. Other of its leaders, however, were pro-fascist. Within a few months Rossoni was converted to the idea of an alliance with the fascists. The final phase of his apostasy came early in 1922 with the formation of the National Confederation of Syndicalist Corporations as an arm of the Fascist Party. Rossoni was elected to head it and joined the Party. This became the official labour body of the fascist state, and Rossoni remained at its head until he moved to the Fascist Grand Council in 1929.

The initial work of the Bureau, however, was not to be smooth. Bowman had promised to send all the papers and documents of the congress to the Dutch delegation by 8 October to be turned over to the Bureau. He had failed to do so, however; nor had he responded to later attempts of the Bureau to have the documents, and particularly the addresses of all organizations involved in the congress, remitted. The Bureau finally
resorted to publicly appealing via Cornelissen's Bulletin, 14 December, to their British comrades "to assist us to remind Guy Bowman of his duty of conforming to the decisions of the congress. By his conduct he renders the functioning of the Bureau particularly difficult."


72 Strictly speaking, there were eighteen issues. The eighteenth, dated 1 January 1915, attributed the disappearance of the Bulletin to wartime conditions.

73 A welcome exception is Christian Gras, who discusses the congress in his Alfred Rosmer, pp. 86-97. Gras, however, is concerned above all with Rosmer's career and is largely content to accept Rosmer's account of the course and significance of the assembly.

Nettlau suggests, without going into specifics, the intervention of the Dutch authorities. Nettlau MS, p. 607.

The Germans were also intent on continuing the international work begun at London and had given some attention to it at the 11th FVDG congress (May 1914). But both Die Einigkeit and Der Pionier were suppressed in August 1914. The FVDG then began publishing a weekly Mitteilungsblatt, which was suppressed after 43 numbers. The syndicalists, and especially Kater, persisted with Rundschreiben an die Vorstände und Mitglieder aller der Freien Vereinigung deutscher Gewerkschaften angeschlossenen Vereine, which began appearing in June of 1915. It was in this organ that the NAS circular was reproduced (1 February 1917). In May 1917, after 47 issues, the Rundschreiben was also suppressed.

NAS (Lansink and Lansink) - SAC, 23 November 1918. Sveriges Arbetares Centralorganisation Archive, Serie EXIII, "Korrespondens med Internationale Arbeiter-Assoziation," I, 1918-1930. Henceforward, all references to this collection, in the Arbetarrörelsens Arkiv, Stockholm, will be cited as SAC Archive, EXIII-I.

The meeting is reported in Der Syndikalist, No. 4 (1918) which Kater founded after the war and which became the official organ of the German syndicalists.

Ibid., 22 February 1919; "Internationaler Revolutionär-Syndicalistischer Kongress," 10 May 1919, SAC Archive, EXIII-I.

The delegates at the Copenhagen Conference: Denmark, Einar Petersen, P. Nielsen and Malting; Norway, Alfred Madsen and Ole Storaa; Sweden, Franz Severin and Knut Israelsen. Albert Jensen was seated as a guest. The conference suggested the following agenda for the proposed congress: 1) Program and tactics of syndicalism: a) the struggle for the control or administration of industry and agriculture; b) attitude toward the League of Nations, militarism and workers' and soldiers' councils. 2) Attitude toward labour contracts and toward the freedom of mobility of agricultural workers. 3) Establishment of an International Bureau and the appointment of an International Secretary. Der Syndikalist, 22 March 1919. The NAS made two further agenda proposals: 1) Attitude of the syndicalist union movement toward the existing International; 2) International legislation regarding conditions in the factories and workshops and general working conditions. "Internationaler Revolutionär-Syndicalistischer Kongress," SAC Archive, EXIII-I.
In addition to the Scandinavians and the Dutch, syndicalist organizations in Germany, Belgium, Spain, Italy and Argentina declared their intention to participate in the congress. On support for the assembly and the difficulties in preparing the congress: NAS and SAC correspondence, 24 June to 20 November 1919. SAC Archive, EXIII-I. See also Diego Abad de Santillan, "La Asociación Internacional de los Trabajadores: su historia, sus ideas, su porvenir," La Revista Internacional Anarquista 1 (15 January 1925):63.

The NAS urged its fellow syndicalist organizations to participate in a revolutionary capacity in this meeting. NAS - SAC, 24 June 1919, SAC Archive, EXIII-I.

Marcel Laurent, "La Résurrection de Kerensky," La Clairière, 1 August 1918; Dumas' article is in the same journal, 1 May 1919. The degree to which the reaction to the events in Russia was contingent upon the prospects of the war effort is well illustrated by Cornelissen. Active again in the French movement, Cornelissen responded severely to the attempted insurrection in Russia in July 1917 by publishing an article in La Bataille, 25 July 1917, entitled "Les 'Pseudo'-révolutionnaires," which appellation designated Lenin and his colleagues. The Russian Revolution had brought to the fore certain elements which denoted themselves 'revolutionaries', "mais qui, par leur inconscience des proportions dans la vie réelle et par leur naïveté enfantine en matière sociale, méritent tout au plus le nom d'irresponsables." Cornelissen concluded that:

"On peut avoir pitié des 'pseudo'-révolutionnaires à condition qu'ils soient de bonne foi. Mais leurs actes ne deviennent pas, par là, excusables.

Celui qui, actuellement, ne comprend pas qu'il faut résister aux armées de l'autocratie jusqu'à ce que l'Allemagne et l'Autriche fassent elles-mêmes leur révolution à l'exemple de la Russie, celui-là - tout en s'appelant révolutionnaire - peut être accusé en Russie de trahison, non seulement à la Révolution russe, mais à nous tous, au monde entier, à toute la civilisation moderne."

When the Bolshevik Revolution itself came, however, Cornelissen was not wholly displeased. The events in Russia then earned an equivocal article (ibid, 28 November 1917) and Cornelissen was confident things would go well after the Constituent Assembly met. He added that "la réorganisation de la défense nationale, en même temps la défense de la démocratie mondiale contre les attaques de l'autocratie, seront assurément parmi les premiers tâches qu'assumera la jeune république russe." But at the end of the year, in an article entitled 'Monarchie ou maximalisme' (ibid., 26 December 1917), he railed against Marx as idiotic and anti-scientific. Less than three weeks later (ibid., 15 January 1918), when it appeared that the Russians and Germans would be unable to reach an accord on peace terms, the Russian government earned a favourable article. But when the news of Brest-Litovsk reached Paris, the Bolsheviks were again branded as traitors and pseudo-revolutionaries. Thus in 'La capitulation de Lenine-Trotsky' (ibid., 21 February 1918), Cornelissen wrote that "la trahison russe est un fait accompli.... La défaillance russe a évolué en trahison tout à la cause même de la révolution russe." How, asked Cornelisson, could "ces incapables de Petrograd" ever have been able to refer to the French revolution-
aries of 1789 who had, after all, defended their country? Cornelissen added that:
"il nous semble que, d'ores et déjà, tous les révolutionnaires des deux mondes qui ont une conception nette de leur tâche devront hautement déclarer qu'ils rejettent toute assimilation de leur idéal libertaire et communiste avec les agissements insensés et intéressés des social-démocrates marxistes de Petrograd."

Thus Cornelissen ended up where he had begun in July of 1917, convinced that the Bolsheviks were cut off from the realities of real life. In 'Karl Marx et les Marxistes' (La Clairière, May 1918), he wrote:
"Les bolcheviks marxistes n'ont pas compris qu'en voulant forcer l'évolution sociale comme ils l'ont fait, ils peuvent compromettre le socialisme international et toute l'œuvre immense déjà accomplie par la révolution russe. Ils risquent de perdre tout par leur fanatisme dogmatique et par leur manque de connaissance de la vie réelle."

12 Quoted in Gerald Meaker, The Revolutionary Left in Spain, 1914-1923 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1974), p. 103. Solidaridad Obrera, the chief syndicalist organ, expressed solidarity with the Russian Revolution, like Tierra y Libertad, but demonstrated more caution in celebrating it for lack of sufficient information on its course. Ibid., pp. 103-8.
18 In each case, however, Lenin qualified these declarations made in the spring of 1917. The transfer of the land to the peasants was a temporary expedient; the land itself was to be nationalized in a form to be determined
by a Constituent Assembly. Similarly, workers' control for Lenin did not mean workers' ownership. He noted in an article in Pravda that attempts to coordinate the Bolsheviks and the syndicalists had followed from the position he had enunciated on workers' control, but he denied that he would accept, for example, the transfer of the railways to the railswermen. See Goldberg, pp. 34-6. But the Bolshevik slogans had much more currency than the qualifications appended to them. Maximoff (p. 346) wrote of the early Bolshevik slogans:

"Wouldn't realization of those great slogans lead to the triumph of anarchist ideals, to sweeping away of the basis and foundation of Marxism? Wasn't it natural for anarchists to be taken in by those slogans, considering that they lacked a strong organization to carry out these slogans independently?"

19 Maximoff, p. 345.
20 Voline, p. 243
21 Quoted in Avrich, p. 140.
22 Voline's assessment appeared in a series of four articles in October 1917. See Goldberg, pp. 41-3. The 20 October issue declared that "if the 'Power of the Soviets' does not become, in reality, a statist power of a new political party, then and only then will the new crisis be able to become the last, to signify the beginning of a new era." In the same issue, the Union for Anarcho-Syndicalist Propaganda published a declaration asserting that since its interpretation of the phrase 'All power to the Soviets' differed from the Bolsheviks'; since it did not believe in a revolution which began by seizing power; since it rejected political action of the masses under the control of a political party; it evaluated "the present movement negatively." Nevertheless, the Union declared that it would support any revolutionary action if it was a mass action. "We cannot separate ourselves from the revolutionary masses, even if they follow neither our path nor our appeals, even if we foresee the failure of the movement.... Consequently, we consider it our duty to always participate in such a movement, seeking to communicate to it our meaning, our idea, our truth." Quoted in Voline, pp. 190-3.

23 See Avrich, pp. 166-9. Shatov and Maximoff caused considerable excitement in the congress, the former by attacking the trade unions as "living corpses," the latter by asserting that the syndicalists were better Marxists than the Bolsheviks or the Mensheviks, an allusion to Marx's claim that the workers must emancipate themselves (ibid., p. 167). Up to this point, the syndicalists had had difficulty in determining the true nature of Bolshevik labour policy. Thus only a month before the congress, an anarcho-syndicalist journal (Rabochaia Mysl') in Kharkov had written: "The Bolsheviks have separated themselves more and more from their original goals and all the time have been moving closer to the desires of the people. Since the time of the revolution, they have decisively broken with Social Democracy, and have been endeavoring to apply Anarcho-Syndicalist methods of struggle." Quoted in ibid., p. 143. On the role of opposition in the congress itself, see "Résolutions du groupe anarchosyndicaliste au ler

The syndicalists were so loosely organized that it is difficult to assess their strength. Maximoff (p. 366) estimates the number of organized anarcho-syndicalist workers at 88,000 at the time of the congress, but adds that this figure "may safely be increased two or three times in order to form an adequate idea of the actual sweep of the movement." Avrich (p. 167n) writes:

"The unions in which the Anarcho-Syndicalists had a significant influence were the bakers, the river transport, dock, and shipyard workers, the Donets miners, the food-industry workers, the postal and telegraphy workers, and, to a lesser degree, the metal and textile workers and the railwaymen."

24 On Golos Truda's opposition to a peace with Germany, see Voline, pp. 213-4. Golos Truda advocated an organization of labour in lieu of the Constituent Assembly. It saw two chief dangers in a Constituent Assembly: if the Bolsheviks did not have a majority and if they did. Ibid., pp. 205-10.

25 Voline, p. 246n.

26 "Résolutions de la Ie Conférence des anarcho-syndicalistes réunie à Moscou (25 août-1er septembre 1918)," in Skirda, pp. 95-8.

27 See Avrich, pp. 191-4. Maximoff (p. 353) wrote that "the great masses of people were rapidly assimilating Anarcho-Syndicalist slogans of an economic as well as a political nature. Thus, for instance, the slogan of 'The Third Revolution' and 'Free Soviets', brought forth by the Anarcho-Syndicalists in the newspaper 'Volny Golos Trouda' rapidly gained the sympathy of the working people. They actually became the general demand of the revolutionary masses, as witnessed by the Kronstadt rebellion." Maximoff's position vis-à-vis Bolshevism is discussed in Anthony D'Agostino, Marxism and the Russian Anarchists (San Francisco: Germinal Press, 1977), Chap. 5.

28 "Résolution sur la situation économique de la Russie, adoptée à la Ile Conférence des Anarcho-Syndicalistes, réunie à Moscou. (25 novembre-1er decembre 1918)," in Skirda, p. 99.


32 Ibid., pp. 5-7; Hulse, pp. 17-20; Lazitch and Drachkovitch, pp. 58-65, 77-8.

33 Degras, I:14, 23.

34 Ibid., pp. 28, 38, 23.


36 Confederación Nacional del Trabajo, Memoria del Congreso celebrado en el Teatro de la Comedia de Madrid, los días 10 al 18 Diciembre de 1919 (Barcelona: CNT, 1932), pp. 341-2, 345-6. The latter delegate had already declared (p. 346):

"A mi juicio, la adhesión incondicional a la revolución rusa, que se propone en el dictamen, no está en consonancia con nuestras aspiraciones. La revolución rusa, hoy por hoy, tiene muchos defectos; encarna, más que nada, el principio marxista y nosotros, los sindicalistas revolucionarios, tenemos como base los principios bakunistas. La revolución rusa, hasta ahora, no ha conseguido implantar más que una especie de comunismo, una especie de socialismo que mata las energías individuales."


38 Ibid., p. 357.

39 Ibid., pp. 359-60.

40 Ibid., p. 362.

41 Ibid., p. 363.

42 Ibid., pp. 363, 365.

43 Ibid., p. 373.

44 Charles Bertrand, "Revolutionary Syndicalism in Italy," pp. 249-50.


46 The original decision was reported in Guerra di classe, 28 June 1919. The congress report and membership figure is to be found in the same newspaper, 7 January 1920.

47 "Les Communautés agraires in Russie," La Revue du Travail 1 (15 November 1919):120.

48 SAC to NAS, 22 July 1919, SAC Archive, EXIII-I.
The conference is reported in Der Syndikalist, No. 4 (1918).

Die Internationale, eine Wochenschrift zur Praxis und Theorie der Marxismus, No. 5-6 (1919), p. 6. The KPD(S) followed up by publishing a pamphlet on Syndikalismus und Kommunismus (Berlin, 1919) in which F. Brandt attacked the former and defended the party, the dictatorship of the proletariat and centralization in industrial life. See also, Bock, Chaps. 4, 6.

Rocker at this time was in the middle of a long career as a writer and activist which earned him an international reputation in libertarian circles unparalleled since his death in 1958. Born in Mainz of working class parents in 1873, Rocker was orphaned before his teens. He was educated by Carmelites, who turned him over to an orphanage, from which he fled. In his youth he worked as a cabin boy and experimented with a number of apprenticeships—cobbler, tailor, cooper, saddler, brush-maker, carpenter, etc.—before becoming a bookbinder. Active in the SPD, Rocker was soon associated with the Jungen, the radical left faction. In 1891 he attended the Brussels congress of the Second International, which witnessed a duel between anarchists—led by the famous Dutch libertarian, Domena Nieuwenhuis—and the political socialists, during which Rocker was converted to anarchism. Reputed involvement in illegal anarchist propaganda in Mainz compelled Rocker to flee to Paris, thus initiating a long period of exile. In 1895 he moved to Britain. Though a Gentile, Rocker there learned Yiddish in order to participate fully in the strong anarchist movement amongst immigrant East End Jews in London. So successful was he that in 1898 he was made editor of Der Arbeiter Fraint, the Jewish anarchist newspaper. He remained editor until 1914. In 1907 Rocker participated in the International Anarchist Congress at Amsterdam and was named, along with Malatesta and Schapiro, to the post-congress Secretariat. Five years later Rocker was a chief figure in the victorious strike of the predominantly Jewish East End sweatshop workers. He spent the war in various British internment camps as an enemy alien, and later recorded his experiences there in Hinter Stacheldraht und Gittern (1925). Released in Holland in March 1918, Rocker and his family took shelter with Nieuwenhuis until they were able to return to Germany in November. He drafted the declaration of principles presented at the founding congress of the FAUD. An early critic of the Bolshevik regime (in 1921 he published Der Bankrott des russischen Staatskommunismus), Rocker was one of the leading opponents of affiliation with the CI and the RILU within the international syndicalist movement. The declaration of principles adopted at the international syndicalist conference in June 1922 came from his hand, and in December 1922 he was named to the three-man Secretariat of the newly formed Syndicalist International, a position he held for over a dozen years. The period 1922-1933 was spent in propaganda work, in international lecture tours, and in research and writing. During these years Bolshevismo y anarquismo (1922), Anarquistas y rebellen (1924), Die Rationalisierung der Wirtschaft und die Arbeiterklasse (1927), Ideologia y tactica del proletariado moderno (1928) and other works appeared. In 1933, following the Reischstag fire, the Nazis moved against their opponents on the left. The headquarters of the Syndicalist International were seized. Rocker and his wife barely managed to escape to Switzerland with little more than the manuscript of his magnum opus, Nationalism and Culture (published in New York in 1937). A last period of exile in France, England and
the United States began. Rocker travelled extensively in the United States campaigning against the Nationalists in the Spanish Civil War, as well as writing The Truth about Spain (1936) and The Tragedy of Spain (1937).

Amongst the later works of the prolific Rocker were Anarcho-Syndicalism (1938), La influencia de las ideas absolutistas en el socialismo (1945), Zur Betrachtung der Lage in Deutschland (1947), Pioneers of American Freedom (1949) and Max Nettlau - el Herodoto de la anarquía (1950). He died at Mohigan Colony, New York, his home for twenty years, in 1958.

Rocker's autobiography exists in typescript in the Rocker Archive, Internationaal Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis, Amsterdam. An abbreviated version—Aus den Memoiren eines deutschen Anarchisten (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1974)—has been edited by Magdelena Melnikow and Han Peter Duerr. See also, Margaret Vallance, "Rudolf Rocker - a Biographical Sketch," Journal of Contemporary History 8 (July 1973):75-95.


53Der Syndikalist, No. 1 (1920).
NOTES: CHAPTER FIVE

1 Lewis Lorwin, The International Labor Movement (New York: Harper, 1953), pp. 61-2. The number or organized workers had increased from fifteen million in 1913 to forty-five million in 1920.


3 Communist International, No. 11-12 (June-July 1920), pp. 2133-4.

4 Debras, 1:109, 103-4.

5 Born in Ratibor in Upper Silesia in 1892, Souchy was active in anarchist circles, particularly Gustav Landauer's group in Berlin, by the age of twenty. After spending the war-years in Sweden working with the SAC, Souchy returned to Germany where he became active in the FAUD. For many years he edited Der Syndikalist. His six-month trip to Russia in 1920 resulted in one of the earliest studies of labouring life under the Bolshevist regime, Wie lebt der Arbeiter und Bauer in Russland und der Ukraine? (1921). Named in 1922 to the first Secretariat of the IWMA along with Rocker and Schapiro, he remained its chief Secretary for ten years until the seizure of IWMA headquarters by the Nazis forced him to flee to France. Throughout the Spanish Civil War he worked with the CNT, charged particularly with handling the organization's foreign relations. With Franco's victory Souchy returned to French exile. In 1942 he managed to reach Mexico. For eight years he travelled throughout Latin America and was especially active in the libertarian workers' movement in Mexico and Cuba. In 1950 Souchy returned to Europe. He subsequently worked with the trade union movement in a number of underdeveloped countries in Africa, Central America and the Caribbean, as well as studying the kibbutz movement in Israel. Souchy authored numerous studies including Colectivaciones: la obra colectiva de la revolucion espanola (1937) and Nacht Uber Spanien (1948). See Rocker, Aus den Memoiren eines deutschen Anarchisten, pp. 361-4; Bock, p. 442.

6 Debras, p.185; Angel Pestaña, Memoria que al comité de la Confederación Nacional del Trabajo presenta, de su gestión en el II Congreso de la Tercera Internacional, el delegado Angel Pestaña (Madrid: Nueva Senda, n.d. [1921]), pp. 28-9.

7 Pestaña, Memoria, p. 30.

8 Ibid., pp. 30-2, 36-7. The document is reproduced in ibid., pp. 25-8, and in Compte-rendu du Conseil International des Syndicats Rouge pour la période de 15 juillet 1920 – à 1-r juillet 1921 (Moscow, 1921) (hereafter Compte-rendu du CISR), pp. 20-2. See also Rosmer, Moscou, p. 61. Pestaña (p. 37n) described the duplicity of the Bolsheviks in not making the agreed change as the "unpardonable treachery" of Lozovsky.

9 Pestaña, Memoria, p. 33; Compte-rendu du CISR, p. 17.


13. Ibid., p. 133.


15. Second CI Congress, p. 70.


18. Pestaña, Memoria, pp. 52-3.


23. Ibid., p. 86.

24. Ibid., p. 76-7.

25. Ibid.


28. Ibid., p. 296. Souchy was correct to point out that there was little innovative about the 'new revolutionary parliamentarism' espoused by the Bolsheviks, and to draw a parallel between it and "Social Democracy in its infancy." The Bolsheviks, committed to revolution by mass action, defended participation in parliament, but only a participation which would primarily serve purposes of agitation. The early German social democrats, also committed to revolution through the action of the workers outside of parliament, defended parliamentary participation on the same grounds. Their 1874 congress adopted the following resolution, with only three opposing votes: "Die Sozialdemokratische Arbeiterpartei verharrt gegenüber den jetzigen politischen Gestaltungen Deutschlands in ihrer durch die Parteiprinzipien gebotenen Stellung und beteiligt sich an den Reichstagswahlen und durch ihre Vertreter an den Reichstagverhandlungen wesentlich
nur zu agitatorischen Zwecken." Quoted in Suzanne Miller, *Das Problem der Freiheit im Sozialismus* (Frankfurt: Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 1964), p. 96. As late as the 1890s, the German SPD was still pursuing a policy of "pure opposition" in the Reichstag, which it utilized "more as a platform of agitation than a legislative organ." Carl Schorske, *German Social Democracy, 1905-1917* (New York: Harper, 1972), p. 7. But the SPD soon succumbed to the rituals of parliamentary politics. The syndicalists saw nothing in communist-parliamentary dogma, despite its rhetoric, which would prevent communist parties from ultimately following the same course. The history of communist parties in western Europe eventually sustained this judgment.

29 *Second CI Congress*, pp. 296-7.

30 Degras, I:126-27.


32 *Second CI Congress*, p. 317.

33 Degras, I:166.

34 *Second CI Congress*, p. 373; see also Pestaña, *Memoria*, pp. 67-8. On the trade union issue, as on the other substantive issues on the congress, the syndicalist opposition could make no headway. In the first place, though the syndicalists and industrialists had been invited to participate, they found themselves involved in an assembly intended above all for representatives of political parties. In the second place, the opposition found itself balked at every turn by the general and uncritical enthusiasm of the majority of delegates for the Russian Revolution. The Bolsheviks, in quest of hegemony over the revolutionary movement, were easily able to turn to good account the wave of radical popularity upon which they rode. In an article not otherwise critical of Moscow, John Clarke, a Shop Stewards' and Workers' Committee delegate, wrote: "One could not elude the ever intruding suspicion that every item brought forward was presented for unqualified acceptance, and as one watched the proceedings and observed how little the most skilfully conducted opposition influenced the crowd of Bolshevik-worshippers present, one could be righteousness excused for suggesting the 'cut and dried' policy was mainly responsible for the 'success' of the Congress." *Worker*, 18 September 1920.

35 Pestaña, *Memoria*, pp. 69-72. Earlier Pestaña had declared to Lozovsky that a trade union congress held in Russia would be of little value since "the excessive influence of the Russian Communist Party would be as prejudicial to the Conference as is the manzanilla tree to him who sleeps in its shade." Ibid., p. 41.


37 Armando Borghi, *Mezzo secolo di anarchia (1898-1945)* (Naples: Edizioni Scientifiche, 1954), p. 244. Borghi believed Pestaña to be too much under Tomsky's influence. He was impressed with Souchy's seriousness
and learning, but the fact that Rosmer had signed the document, advanced
to help Borghi to do the same, meant little to him since he saw that Rosmer
had been captured by the Bolsheviks. Ibid., pp. 235-6. Borghi reported
his experiences in Russia in Guerra di classe, 15 October 1921, as well.

There was apparently some duplicity on the part of the Bolsheviks
to get Pestana to sign the proposed statutes of the RILU, which gave im-
mense authority over the trade unions to the communist parties of each
country. When discovered, it not surprisingly prompted Pestana to point
out that there were limits to his good faith. See Pestana, Memoria, pp.
77-81; Pestana, Consideraciones y juicios acerca de la Tercera Internacional
to sign the proposed statutes. Guerra di classe, 15 October 1921.

38 See Emma Goldman, My Disillusionment in Russia (London: Daniel,
800, Goldman commended Pestana and Souchy as having "the clearest minds"
of the various syndicalist delegates she and Berkman encountered. "These
two men were entirely with the Revolution and sympathetic with the Bolshe-
viki. They were, however, not the kind who could be féted into seeing
everything in roseate colours. They came as earnest students of the situa-
tion, desirous of getting the facts at first hand and of observing the
Revolution in action."

39 Maximoff, p. 440.

40 Kropotkin discussed with Souchy the need to re-establish communal
councils in Russia. George Woodcock and Ivan Avakumovic, The Anarchist
Prince: A Biographical Study of Peter Kropotkin (London: Boardman, 1950),
pp. 418-9. Beach of the IWW and Tanner also called upon Kropotkin.
Solidarity, July 1920. In Mezzo secolo di anarchia, pp. 240-1, Borghi
reported a visit he and Pestana made to Dimitrov, and Kropotkin's declara-
tion of support for the domestic syndicalists against those anarchists who
were supporting the Bolsheviks. Kropotkin professed his support for syn-
dicalism to Emma Goldman. See Living My Life, II:864. In My Disillusion-
ment in Russia, p. 100, Goldman wrote that Kropotkin "had come to think
that syndicalism was likely to furnish what Russia most lacked: the chan-
nel through which the industrial and economic reconstruction of the country
may flow. He referred to Anarcho-Syndicalism. That and the co-operatives
would save other countries some of the blunders and suffering Russia was
going through."
In May 1920 Kropotkin declared: "I believe the syndical-
ist movement ... will emerge as the great force in the course of the next
fifty years, leading to the creation of the communist stateless society."
Quoted in Avrich, p. 227.

41 La Guerre di classe, 15 October 1921. It should be pointed out
that not all syndicalists or industrialists left the congress disillusioned.
Some delegates of the Shop Stewards' movement underwent something of a con-
version in Moscow, a transformation worked mainly under the direct influ-
ence of Lenin. Gallacher recalled the experience in Revolt on the Clyde
(London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1936), chap. 11, and in The Rolling of the
Thunder (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1947), chap. 1, and Murphy in New
Horizons (London: John Lane, 1941), chaps. 8-10. The Executive of the Shop
Stewards' Workers' Committee movement decided upon provisional affiliation
with the RILU Provisional Council in September 1920. Solidarity, October 1920. When Murphy returned to England in December, he bore with him the funds to found a British bureau of the RILU, which was done within a matter of weeks. Walter Kendall, The Revolutionary Movement in Britain, 1900-1921 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969), p. 262ff.

42 *La Vie Ouvrière*, 3 September 1920; *Le Libertaire*, 12 and 22 December 1920; *Le Midi Rouge*, January 1921. These letters were, however, ambivalent, and it was unclear whether the two men were prepared to support or oppose the CSR's affiliation with Moscow. The ambiguity of their attitude and the mysterious circumstances surrounding their disappearance generated considerable debate in France. See Annie Kriegel, Aux origines du communisme français, 1914-1920, 2 vols. (Paris: Mouton, 1964), II:767-87.

43 Pestana, Consideraciones y juicios, p. 15.

44 See *Le Libertaire*, 10-17 February 1922 and Guerra di classe, 22 January 1921. Rudolf Rocker recalled how deeply depressed Pestana was in Berlin following his return from Russia, both because his own hopes had been dashed and because he had yet to face the unhappy task of informing his Spanish comrades that their expectations were groundless. "Es ist fast wie ein Mord," Rocker recorded Pestana as saying, "Hoffnungen zu vernichten, die so hochgespannt waren und die gerade in Spanien einen so mächtigen Widerhall fanden, weil man glaubte, dass die Russische Revolution das Signal für unsere eigene Befreiung sei." Rocker, Aus den Memoiren eines deutschen Anarchisten, p. 348.

45 Der Syndikalist, No. 51/52 (1920).


47 Ibid., p. 2. According to I.A.A.: 10 Jahre internationaler Klassenkampf (Berlin: Internationale Arbeiter-Assoziation, n.d. [1933]) (hereafter, IAA: 10 Jahre), p. 4, the Portuguese syndicalists also communicated their assent to the conference. The rough figure of one million workers represented includes only those organizations with representatives present, but, obviously, not the All-Russian Trade Unions.

48 The standard work on the factory occupation movement is Paolo Spriano, L'occupazione della fabbriche, settembre 1920 (Turin: Einaudi, 1964), but see also Gwyn A. Williams, Proletarian Order (London: Pluto Press, 1975), chaps. 9-10. Also worth considering is Martin N. Clark, "Factory Councils and the Italian Labour Movement," (Ph.D. Thesis, University of London, 1966), chaps. 6-7. For the role and attitude of the USI, these works should be supplemented by Bertrand, "Revolutionary Syndicalism in Italy," chap. 10, and Borghi's Italia tra due Crispi and Mezzo secolo di anarchia.

49 Bericht-1920, p. 2. The CNT and the USI together represented at least another million workers.

51 Pierre Monatte later (at the 1921 minoritaire congress at Lille) confided to Souchy that he had dispatched Godonnèche and Ceppe to the Berlin conference with the specific aim of preventing at any price the creation of a syndicalist International. See the *Bulletin International des Syndicalistes Révolutionnaires et Industrialistes*, No. 1 (16 June 1922), p. 17.

52 A number of persons were seated as guests, including Pogonsky of the German delegation, Mrs. Hirny of the Russian Communist Party, and Milan Michailoff of Paris, a member of the Parti Communiste Libertaire. Another Russian named Grebelskaja also appeared at the congress. *Bericht-1920*, p. 2; *Der Syndikalist*, No. 51/52 (1920); *De Arbeid*, 1 January 1921.


54 Delegates reported the conference in a number of newspapers: Souchy in *Der Syndikalist*, No. 51/52 (1920) (Souchy's report appeared in Italian in *Guerra di classe*, 22 January 1921); Bouwman in *De Arbeid*, 1 January 1921; Tanner in *Solidarity*, 7 January 1921; Barker in *Worker*, 15 January 1921; and Godonnèche in *La Vie Ouvrière*, 14 January 1921. In their reports neither Souchy, Bouwman, Tanner or Barker mentioned expression by the Germans of a desire to form a separate International. Godonnèche, however, claimed that in response to Hardy's query whether the purpose of the meeting was to establish a labour International apart from that at Moscow the German delegation responded in the affirmative. But a German participant maintains that at this time the Germans had not decided in favour of a separate International. Augustin Souchy to the author, 27 February 1976.

Souchy's and Bouwman's reports, though written from quite different perspectives, together constitute the best account of the proceedings of the conference.

55 Despite some sharp exchanges, relative harmony prevailed in the first half of the conference. But in the middle of the sessions, the meeting was thrown into disarray by a blistering attack upon Souchy launched by the Russian delegation, which had just been joined by one Grebelskaja. The dispute was prolonged and involved, but in essence the Russians accused Souchy of playing a double game by participating in the work of the RILU Provisional Council the previous summer as well as in the work of the Berlin conference. Souchy denied these accusations and was defended by the German delegation, which at the end of the conference expressed their complete confidence in Souchy and declared that the FAUD bore the full responsibility for the policies he pursued at Moscow. *Solidarity*, 7 January 1921; *Der Syndikalist*, No. 51/52 (1920); *De Arbeid*, 1 January 1921.
Despite his position as General Secretary of the IWW, Hardy's views were scarcely those of the organization he represented, but were rapidly undergoing a transformation which would carry him into the communist party. Immediately after the Berlin conference, Belinsky handed Hardy and Barker invitations to go to Russia. In Russia, Hardy met Lenin and assured him that he believed in a disciplined party and would work for the communist party upon his return to America. Hardy, *Those Stormy Years* (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1956), pp. 133-7. Back in the United States Hardy worked for the affiliation of the IWW to Moscow. His term of office expired in 1921. In early 1922, Hardy was expelled from the IWW by his local union for violations of the IWW constitution and for working against the organization. *Industrial Solidarity*, 18 March 1922. He then joined the communist party and worked for the Anglo-Saxon Section of the RILU in Europe: "It was felt that my experience had equipped me to help to overcome the anarchist and syndicalist prejudices widespread in the international trade union movement and this was made my special task." Hardy, *Ibid.*, pp. 131-3, but his memories are clouded by hostility and his account frequently at variance with accounts written at the time. Like Hardy, Tom Barker later found the organization he represented at Berlin at odds with him. In the wake of the founding congress of the RILU, which he attended as the representative of the FORA, the FORA disavowed Barker. *La Protesta*, 4 July 1922.

The conference agenda proposed by Lansink dealt with the exchange of opinions, the policies advocated by the various organizations on the international question, the attitude to be adopted towards the Amsterdam and Moscow Internationals respectively, and a compilation highlighting the main ideas advanced. *Der Syndikalist*, No. 51/52 (1920).

The German declaration is reproduced in *ibid.*, and in *Bericht-1920*, pp. 4-5.

The Germans were in fact in an awkward position. They wished to stress their objections to the creation of a highly centralized state in Russia and simultaneously to emphasize that a centralized industrialist organization such as the IWW had more in common with the syndicalists than it did with the Bolsheviks. Thus Winkler stressed that between the syndicalists and industrialists there were only differences in detail—in the development of variations in each country in the structure
of their organizations and so on—but not in principles and tactics. In the goals they sought and in the means of attaining them there was full accord between the syndicalists and the industrialists. Der Syndikalist, No. 51/52 (1920). Hardy had already observed that the IWW was not a syndicalist organization, but was composed of syndicalists, communists and anarchists, and was best described as a revolutionary organization of industrial workers. De Arbeid, 1 January 1921.

66 De Arbeid, 1 January 1921.
67 Bericht-1920, p. 3.
68 Der Syndikalist, No. 51/52 (1920); see also De Arbeid, 1 January 1921.
69 De Arbeid, 1 January 1921; see also Der Syndikalist, No. 51/52 (1920).
70 De Arbeid, 1 January 1921.
71 For the committee's resolution, see Bericht-1920, p. 7; for an account of the ensuing discussion, see Der Syndikalist, No. 51/52 (1920), but especially De Arbeid, 1 January 1921.
72 The phrase Severin proposed was "der Macht der Arbeiterklasse." Der Syndikalist, No. 51/52 (1920). This was infelicitously translated as "the domination of the working class" in Solidarity, 7 January 1921, and Worker, 15 January 1921. But other interested parties rightly took Macht to convey the meaning of 'power' or 'authority' (or possibly 'power and authority'), rather than domination', as demonstrated by the rendering given it in Dutch ('macht', De Arbeid, 1 January 1921), Italian ('potere', Guerra di classe, 22 January 1921), and Spanish ('poder', La Protesta, 29 May 1921).
73 De Arbeid, 1 January 1921.
74 Der Syndikalist, No. 51/52 (1920).
75 There was some difference of opinion following the conference regarding the actual mandate of the Bureau. The British Shop Stewards' movement was already affiliated with the RILU Council, and Solidarity, 7 January 1921, declared the Bureau to have been "appointed to act solely for information purposes." The official Bericht (p. 9), drawn up by Bureau Secretary Bernard Lansink, Jr., of the NAS, however, clearly stated that the Bureau was also charged with seeking an understanding with the RILU Council ("... sich mit dem Rat der Roten Gewerkschaft-Internationale in Moskau ins Einvernehmen zu setzen.")
76 Der Syndikalist, No. 51/52 (1920).
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Belinsky's article, "Die Konvulsionen des Synikalismus," appeared in Die Rote Gerwerkschafts-Internationale, No. 1 (15 January 1921), which itself was published with Der Kommunistische Gewerkschaftler. Belinsky described the supporters of Moscow in the Berlin conference as its "left wing," its critics as its "right wing." The doctrine of the latter he alternately characterized as conservative or reactionary. Belinsky's main target, the German syndicalists, replied in an article entitled "Die Konvulsionen des Syndikalismus oder die Konfusionene des Herrn Belinki," Der Syndikalist, No. 5 (1921).

See Avrich, pp. 196ff; Goldberg, pp. 49ff.

Maximoff, p. 362.

Rosmer visited Schapiro at the printing shop, and recalled that the main publishing ambition of the syndicalists was to produce a Russian edition of Pelloutier's Histoire des Bourses du Travail. Rosmer, p. 141.


The document is reproduced in Maximoff, pp. 454-61.

Berkman, "Diary: Russia 1919-1921" (7 March 1920), Berkman Archive, Internationaal Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis, Amsterdam.

Reproduced in Maximoff, pp. 446-9.

Rosmer, p. 142.

Maximoff, p. 442.

The document is reproduced in ibid., pp. 449-53. It concluded by addressing three questions to the Executive Committee of the Third International:

1. What is the attitude of the Comintern toward the Anarchists and Syndicalists?
2. Is the Comintern of the opinion that the resolutions and tactical line adopted in relation to the Anarchists and Syndicalists of Western Europe are also valid in regard to the Anarchists and Syndicalists of Russia, Ukraine and other Soviet Republics?
3. What does the Comintern intend to do in order to put a stop to the persecution of Anarchists and Syndicalists by the Communist Party of Russia and Ukraine who by pursuing their terroristic policy, compromise the Comintern in the eyes of the proletariat of Western Europe?

Avrich, p. 225.
A second, more detailed ARCAS document handed to the syndicalist delegates in 1920 calling for a protest from the West against Bolshevik persecution of the libertarians in Russia never appeared in print. The document published in *Le Libertaire* is reproduced in Maximoff, pp. 445-6.

Indeed, the Kronstadt Provisional Revolutionary Committee, unaware that they were both already in prison, requested that Voline and Iarchuk be sent to Kronstadt to work with it. Goldberg, pp. 187-8.

Maximoff, p. 443. Rosmer presents a very different account of his dealings with the syndicalists. In introducing his *Moscou sous Lénine*, Rosmer remarks that his memories of this period were "so precise and so certain that the errors I might have made could only have been tiny errors of detail" (p. 23). Yet his memory seems to have failed almost completely regarding his encounters with the Russian syndicalists, for he recalls only the initial meeting with Schapiro at the 'Golos Truda' printing shop where it was agreed that the syndicalists would draw up a statement for Rosmer to submit to the CI. He goes on to say that there were no further meetings, since Sasha Kropotkin called on behalf of the syndicalists to cancel a subsequent appointment, and Rosmer claims not to know why. But he was perfectly happy to speculate: "It was not too difficult to imagine what had happened," he writes. "There was a discussion and the varying points of view and tendencies had collided . . . finally, it was the most narrow-minded, the most quarrelsome and vindictive who had prevailed. The decision was stupid . . . their attitude deprived the Revolution of valuable cooperation on more grounds than one, but it was even more harmful to themselves" (pp. 142-3). Rosmer does not recall having met with the syndicalists at least three times after the original meeting, sometimes with Schapiro and/or the Dutch communist Jansen present. Nor does he remember that he twice insisted that the offending document be rewritten. He also appears to have forgotten that he submitted it to the CI Executive Committee, of which he and Jansen were members, and that he later communicated with the syndicalists. These negotiations extended from the summer or autumn of 1920 to February 1921. This lapse by a "precise" and "certain" memory is extraordinary. If Sasha Kropotkin called to cancel a further meeting arranged by Schapiro, this may well have been after the arrests in the spring of 1921 when the officials of the ARCAS were no longer free. The syndicalists had, moreover, already taken the mass arrests as the answer to their declaration.

Western syndicalist organizations, especially those nearest to Russia, had obviously not been unaware of the repression directed against their Russian comrades, but had generally refrained from reacting publicly while the Russian Revolution struggled for survival against the perils of civil war and a western blockade. But the repression had reached such a pitch in the spring of 1921 that some groups believed it impossible to remain silent any longer. At the end of April the International Syndicalist Bureau began to canvass syndicalist organizations on the issue. Circular, 30 April 1921, SAC Archive, EX111-1. The issue would take more dramatic form once the foreign syndicalist delegates reached Moscow.

Der *Syndikalist*, Nos. 10 and 11 (1921).
Thus only the FAUD of major European syndicalist organizations expressly refused to send a delegation to the RILU congress. All other major syndicalist organizations were represented except the Confederação Geral do Trabalho of the Portuguese syndicalists. As early as the summer of 1920 the Portuguese CGT had explicitly disavowed any kind of cooperation with communist parties:

"The [CGT-P] is revolutionary in its objectives and in its means. In conformity with the resolutions of its national congress it refuses to collaborate with bourgeois organizations as well as with political parties, whatever their methods and goals may be. [The CGT-P] refuses to acknowledge the communist party as a revolutionary organization which can be allowed the administration of production. It holds the view that the complete socialization of the land through the peasants, of the mines, factories, workshops, etc., through the workers, must be undertaken. By no means can this goal be achieved by a political party, including the communist party" (quoted in IAA: 10 Jahre, p. 5).

Nonetheless the CGT-P did dispatch a delegate to the RILU congress, but he arrived only after the congress had closed. See the letter from the CGT-P to the USI, 20 May 1922, in the Bulletin International des Syndicalistes Révolutionnaires et Industrialistes. (hereafter, BISRI), No. 2-3, (August 1922).

De Arbeid, 8 and 15 January 1921. Bouwman's article was reprinted elsewhere; for example, in Argentina in La Protesta, 29 May 1921 and in the Spanish communist-syndicalist Lucha Social (in a series between 23 April and 18 June 1921).

Compete-rendu du CISR, pp. 157-60; see also Lansink's preceding article in Het Volk, 21 March 1921.


Ibid., 13 and 27 November 1920.

In November Pestaña published Memoria que el comité de la Confederación Nacional del Trabajo presenta de su gestión en II Congreso de la III Internacional, and in March 1922 the second part of his report under the title Consideraciones y juicios acerca de la Tercera Internacional.

This is the conclusion of Gerald Meaker, The Revolutionary Left in Spain, for which on the communist-syndicalist movement during this period see chap. XIII.

Lucha Social, 27 May 1922.

Though Rosmer added that Arlandis, whom Rosmer believed to be "easily influenced, sometimes let himself be carried away by the 'pure syndicalists' and caused us some anxiety." Rosmer, p. 192.

The remainder of the French delegation included Tommasi, Henri Sirolle, Michael Relenque, Jean Gaudeaux, Labonne, and Albert and Claudine

28 Hardy, pp. 143-4. Hardy, a firm supporter of Moscow, viewed the choice of Williams as having "turned out disastrously" since Williams could not accept the RILU as it came to be constituted and supported measures to build an international revolutionary opposition to Moscow. But Hardy was quite wrong when he described Williams as having "kept almost mum" at the RILU congress. On the contrary, the Bolsheviks and their supporters found Williams far too vocal and insistent in his opposition to the course of the sessions, and questioned whether he was actually representative of attitudes in the IWW. They believed someone such as Bill Haywood, also in Russia at the time of the congress and a proponent of Moscow, would have made a better IWW delegate. Souvarine to Monatte, 9 August [1921], Archives Monatte, p. 320. But Haywood was in Russia because he had 'jumped' the bail his fellow 'Wobblies' had laboriously collected for him and was at that time largely without honour within the IWW.

29 From the theses on the role of the party as adopted by the CI congress of 1920. Degras, 1:128.


31 Williams, p. 9.

32 Lucha Social, 3 May 1922; Williams, pp. 23-4; Bulletin du Premier Congrès International des Syndicats Révolutionnaires (hereafter ISR-Premier Congrès) No. 5 (July 1921), pp. 10-2.


34 ISR-Premier Congrès, No. 4 (13 July 1921), pp. 4, 3. Lozovsky lamented that the position of the Charte continued to be defended 15 years after its formulation: "Le monde est bouleversé, seule la Charte d'Amiens reste immuable."

35 Rosmer, p. 190.

36 ISR-Premier Congrès, No. 6 (July 1921), pp. 14-6.
Ibid., p. 17.

Ibid., p. 17-21.

Ibid., No. 5 (July 1921), pp. 12-5. J.T. Murphy (The "Reds" in Congress (Manchester: British Bureau, Red International of Trade and Industrial Unions, n.d.), p. 14) wrote that Mann's "speech was looked for with eagerness, because of his long association with Syndicalism. His speech was undoubtedly a surprise to his syndicalist colleagues." But one may in fact doubt that at this stage in the proceedings Mann's speech came as a surprise to anyone. Be that as it may, Mann had much earlier expressed his opinion that there were no significant differences between syndicalism and communism. In the first issue (30 April 1919) of the resurrected La Vie Ouvrière, Mann demonstrated his life-long readiness to disregard doctrinal subtleties in favour of revolutionary pragmatism: "Bolchevisme, spartakisme, syndicalisme, tout cela signifie la même chose sous les noms différents: la direction complète de l'industries tout entière par les travailleurs eux-mêmes, sur la base d'une coopération véritable et de l'entier contrôle de toute la richesse ainsi créée . . . . Mon sentiment, c'est que le bolchevisme est notre mouvement, la spartakisme est également notre mouvement, et le syndicalisme est aussi notre mouvement. Chacun d'eux étant virtuellement le même, qui cherche à le détruire est notre ennemi. Nous devons être préparés à le dire et à agir en conséquence."


ISR-Premier Congrès, No. 6 (July 1921), pp. 1-2; see also the Swedish newspaper, Syndikalisten, 3 September 1921.

Bouwman, Dissel and Kitsz, Het congres der RVI, pp. 5-6; see also ISR-Premier Congrès, No. 7 (July 1921), p. 7.

Bouwman, Dissel and Kitsz, Het congres der RVI, pp. 5-6; Rosmer, p. 191; ISR-Premier Congrès, No. 7 (July 1921), pp. 18-19.

Résolutions et statuts adoptés au Ier Congrès International des Syndicats Révolutionnaires, Moscou: 3-19 juillet 1921 (Paris: Librairie du Travail, 1921) (hereafter, ISR - Résolutions), p. 17. Even Rosmer found the language of this resolution, which was to be the end result of "ces pénibles débats," as handed to him in its final form by Lozovský, as "inutilement et dangereusement provocant." But the only concession he could win was to make the relations between the parties and unions at the national level recommended as "highly desirable" instead of obligatory. Rosmer, p. 192. In fact this was not much of a concession, since elsewhere this relation was not spoken of as merely desirable. The statutes adopted, for example, made it a condition of admission to the RILU that unions accept "l'accord complet" with the national communist party. ISR - Résolutions, p. 66.

ISR - Résolutions, p. 17.
In his address in the main debates, Arlandis declared that the Spanish delegation was bound by mandate to defend the independence of the RILU. The experience of decades taught that the autonomy of the syndical movement was essential. Today the CI was doubtless revolutionary. "But what guarantees do we have that it will not abandon the revolutionary path tomorrow; that it will not become opportunist?" Only the working class itself could establish a new social regime. "That is why we must above all defend our independence with all our powers and not permit any political party whatsoever to submit us to its will." The delegates must have had difficulty following Arlandis' labyrinthine logic, however, for in his peroration he declared his discourse to be only a declaration of principle, but that in practical terms his delegation completely supported the Rosmer-Mann resolution, which accorded with their mandate. Ibid., No. 5 (July 1921), p. 15. The delegation proceeded to vote for the resolution which breathed not a word about union autonomy and Nin and Maurin signed the document on behalf of the Spanish delegation. The exception in their delegation was Leval, who remained in steadfast opposition. Spanish support for the RILU-CI resolution was one of the greatest surprises of the sessions for the remaining syndicalists. See, for example, Tanner's article in Industrial Solidarity, 24 September 1921.

Lucha Social, 24 June 1922.

ISR-Premier Congrès, No. 15 (July 1921), pp. 6-7.

ISR-Résolutions, p. 6.

Ibid., pp. 28-30, 69.

Bulletin of the Executive Committee of the Communist International, No. 1 (8 September 1921), pp. 37-8. Murphy also included it in "Reds" in Congress (pp. 16-7) as representing the position of the syndicalists in the congress.

Williams, p. 31. Williams reproduced the German statement, pp. 31-2. See also, Bouwman, Dissel and Kitsz, Het congres der RVI, pp. 6-7; ISR-Premier Congrès, No. 11-12 (July 1921), pp. 26-7 and No. 14 (July 1921), pp. 14-5.

Williams, p. 27; Bouwman, Dissel and Kitsz, Het congres der RVI, pp. 607, 21.

On the directives of the RILU to the labour organizations of France, Spain and Italy, see ISR-Résolutions, pp. 53-5.

Williams, pp. 28-31.

"Manifeste aux syndicalistes-révolutionnaires du monde," SAC Archive, EXIII-1; reproduced in Michel Relenk, Travaux du camarade Michel Relenk au congrès de l'I.S.R. de Moscou, seul resté fidèle à la conception
du syndicalisme révolutionnaire français et à son mandat (Paris: Coster, n.d. [1921]), pp. 6-10.

58 "Manifeste aux syndicalistes-révolutionnaires du monde," SAC Archive, EXIII-I; reproduced in Williams, pp. 32-4.


60 Quoted in Gras, Alfred Rosmer, p. 226.

61 Quoted in Meaker, p. 397.

62 Bouwman, Dissel and Kitsz, Het congres der RVI, pp. 6-8, 21, 23.

63 ISR-Premier Congrès, No. 16 (July 1921), p. 16.

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2 Ibid., p. 143.


8 Gaudeaux, p. 157.


10 Beginning in March 1923 the committee, in cooperation with the International Working Men's Association, published a newspaper in Germany, *Rabočij Put* (The Workers' Way), for clandestine dissemination in Russia.

11 *L'Humanité*, 16 July 1921. The meeting between the dissenting faction of the French RILU delegation and the officials of the RILU and the CI and the statement which issued from it (see Chap. 6) came in response to the 'Manifesto of the Nineteen', published in *L'Humanité*.

12 *Lucha Social*, 27 August 1921.

13 Der Syndikalist, No. 42 (1921). This congress of the FAUD, the thirteenth of the German syndicalists, is also notable for having taken the exceptional step of endorsing a resolution barring membership in political parties as incompatible with the autonomy and freedom of decision required of the federalism embraced by the FAUD.
14 On the Executive meeting see Guerra di classe, 15 October 1921; see also the statement in the same paper (5 November 1921) following the USI-PCI-RILU discussions.

15 Internazionale began appearing on 3 December 1921.

16 For the report of the congress, see Guerra di classe, 25 March 1922. Vecchi's and Giovanetti's resolutions can be found in Ugo Fedeli, "Breve storia dell'Unione Sindacale Italiana," Volontà 10 (30 September 1957), from which I reproduce that part of Giovanetti's resolution laying down the USI's requirements for a revolutionary Trade Union International (pp. 651-2):

"1) Azione diretta e rivoluzionaria di classe per l'abolizione del padronato e del salariato;
2) Esclusione assoluta di qualsiasi legame con l'Internazionale commissara e con qualsiasi altro partito o aggruppamento politico, e completa autonomia e indipendenza sindacale da questi organismi di parte;
3) Esclusione dell'Internazionale sindacale di quei sindacati o aggruppamenti sindacali maggioritari che aderiscono all'organizzazione gialla di Amsterdam anche se per tramite delle Federazioni professionali;
4) Limitazione dell'attività e della direzione dell'Internazionale sindacale ai problemi e nell'azione di carattere internazionale;
5) Intese eventuali temporanee con altre organizzazioni sindacali e politiche proletarie potranno essere stabilite volta per volta per determinate azioni internazionali d'interesse della classe lavoratrice."

For the criticisms of Internazionale, see the issue of 1 April 1922; for those of Lozovsky, see La Correspondance Internationale, 22 April 1922.

17 Labi, pp. 202-3.


19 Wohl (p. 280) gives the figure for July 1922 as 350,000 for the CGTU and 250,000 for the CGT.

20 CGTU, 1er Congrès tenu à St. Etienne du 25 juin au 1er juillet 1922, pp. 11-2.


22 Arbetaren, 7 January 1922.

23 Ibid., 23 January 1922.

24 Ibid., 16 May 1922.
Industrial Solidarity, 17 December 1921.

La Protesta, (on FAUD congress) 17 December 1921; (on RILU) 24-29 June 1922; (on Barker) 4 July 1922.

A few of many possible examples will suffice. Thus, see the articles in Die Rote Gewerkschafts-Internationale against Williams of the IWW and the October 1921 meeting of the FAUD (No. 8, 12 November 1921), and against the Russian (Nos. 10 and 11, 15 and 31 December 1921) and Mexican (No. 12, 15 January 1922) syndicalists. The attack was similarly conducted in certain national newspapers subsidized by Moscow, such as Vecchi's Internazionale and La Lutte de Classe, a paper established in France in May 1922 for Rosmer, Godonnèche and Tommasi.


Ibid., p. 16. The BISRI, No. 1 (16 June 1922), p. 14, observed of Brandler's article: "Une déclaration de guerre a posteriori, c'est bon à savoir!"

See the correspondence between the FAUD, the NAS, the SAC, the USI and the CGTU, 21 April to 31 May 1922, SAC Archive, EXIII-I. The low value of the German mark was one factor in the decision to shift the site of the conference from Paris to Berlin.

BISRI, No. 1 (16 June 1922), pp. 3-4.

Ibid., pp. 3-10, 12.

Ibid., pp. 13, 21.

Ibid., Nos. 2-3 (August 1922), p. 15. A number of syndicalist organizations were conspicuous by their absence at Berlin. Not least of these was the NAS. The dispute within the NAS on the question of international allegiance had been accentuated by the return of the Dutch delegation from Moscow with a recommendation in favour of the RILU and the launching of a campaign to secure the entry of the NAS. The international issue had been considered by a special congress held in Arnhem in March 1922 when the decision was made to hold a referendum within the NAS on the question. The NAS wrote the assembled syndicalists at Berlin that since it was in the process of conducting its referendum at the time of the conference, the NAS was unable to accept the invitation to participate in its deliberations. Similarly, the CGT-P wrote to say that since its annual congress in which the international question would be decided was to be held in July, and because of financial reasons, the Portuguese syndicalists could not participate in the conference. They nonetheless added that if the conference provided the possibility of "an International under the control of no politicians' International," the CGT-P would likely support it. Finally, the IWW informed the conference that the IWW had learned of the conference too late to send a delegation. The lengthy letter included
a biting critique of the RILU, outlined the position of the IWW, and manifested considerable hope for and confidence in the work of the conference. The letters of the CGT-P, the IWW and the NAS are reproduced in ibid., pp. 17-21.

35 Ibid., p. 15, 4. This August 1922 issue of the BISRI contains a compte-rendu of the conference and reproduces various documents pertaining thereto. A Dutch seamen's organization, Eendracht, was represented by one Wolfson, admitted with a consultative vote. Wolfson explained (p. 5) that Eendracht did not belong to the Dutch Transport Workers' Federation (led by Bouwman and affiliated with the NAS) because the Federation was "controlled by communist politicians."

36 Lozovsky to Monatte, January 1922 and 15 May 1922, Archives Monatte, pp. 336-47; see also Wohl, pp. 281-3.

37 Buenacasa, p. 89.

38 Lucha Social, 24 June 1922; Buenacasa, pp. 111-2.

39 BISRI, Nos. 2-3 (August 1922), p. 6.

40 Ibid., pp. 6-7.

41 Ibid., p. 8; Der Syndikalist, No. 25 (1922); but see especially Le Journal du Peuple, 18 July 1922. The French delegation reported the conference in this paper, 17-19 July 1922.

42 "That was the end," Souchy recalled much later of Andreyeff's negative attitude on the question of the persecution of libertarians in Russia. It was only after this "that we decided to go our own way. And that was to break with the RILU and also with Moscow." Augustin Souchy to the author, 8 and 27 February 1976.

43 Der Syndikalist, No. 25 (1922); BISRI, Nos. 2-3 (August 1922), p. 7.


45 BISRI, Nos. 2-3 (August 1922), pp. 7-8. In addition to the resolution relating to Russia, the committee had prepared a general protest against persecutions and one pronouncing support for the Italian militants who were suffering not only from governmental repression but from marauding bands of fascists. Ibid., p. 18. One of the USI delegates, Bonazzi, had been attacked in his home and stabbed by fascists the week before the conference. Ibid., p. 5. Earlier, in March 1921, the Milan home of Borghi and his companion, the poetess and militant Virgilia d'Andrea, had been burned by fascists. Borghi, Mussolini Red and Black (London: Wishart, 1935), p. 7.

50. Ibid., pp. 14-5. Berlin was selected as the seat of the Bureau only over the initial objections of the German delegation. In response to the FAUD's stern criticisms of Bolshevik policy, a campaign of vilification had been mounted against it as a counter-revolutionary organization. Kater and Rocker argued that to locate it at Berlin would only supply the RILU with a propaganda weapon against the Bureau. Since France was out of the question, Kater and Besnard urged the Italians to accept the Bureau. But Borghi rejected this as far too risky; so deplorable was the situation in Italy that the lives of USI militants were daily in peril.

51. Ibid. Diez (p. 14) give some indication of the wrath felt by many within the CNT concerning the conduct of the Nin-Maurin delegation at Moscow when he declared that at the CNT's Zaragoza conference "we rose up unanimously against this affiliation of the CNT with the RILU; and we disavowed the delegates who went to Moscow without having been authorized to do so, their duty having been to remain at their posts during the persecutions; but they were afraid, and while thousands of militants were being assassinated, they were betraying them [at Moscow]."

52. The declaration of principles is reproduced in appendix B.

53. Der Syndikalist, No. 25 (1922).

54. BISRI, Nos. 2-3 (August 1922), p. 9. Rocker specifically indicted Lenin's State and Revolution as a chief factor which had led "a certain number of revolutionary syndicalists, especially in France, to undertake a 'revision' of their ideas." Ibid., p. 8.

55. Der Syndikalist, No. 25 (1922).


58. L'Humanité, 10 June 1922.

59. Le Journal du Peuple, 14 June 1922; L'Humanité, 14 June 1922.

60. La Vie Ouvrière, 22 June 1922. Among other things, the declaration denounced the presence at Berlin of delegates of the Russian Syndicalist Minority, a minority which "has never existed." The Syndicalist Bureau replied to the declaration point by point in BISRI, Nos. 2-3 (August 1922), pp. 21-2.
La Vie Ouvrière, 22 June 1922. Chambelland claimed that the French delegation had voted against the admission of Vecchi and Wuster. The report of the conference in Der Syndikalist, No. 25 (1922), stated specifically that the French did not vote on this question. The French delegation itself denied having voted on any issue whatsoever. Le Journal du Peuple, 19 July 1922. The Andreyeff declaration, counter-signed by Chambelland, quite falsely claimed that the workers' and syndicalists' press had been excluded from the conference except for the German anarchist and syndicalist press. In fact, the assembly decided to bar press representatives and made, with the consent of the French delegation, but one exception: namely Maurice Chambelland of La Vie Ouvrière. BISRI, Nos. 2-3 (August 1922); Le Journal du Peuple, 18 July 1922.

For criticism at St. Etienne of the Berlin conference and the French delegation's role there, see for example Semard's remarks in La Vie Ouvrière, 7 July 1922.

63 BISRI, Nos. 2-3 (August 1922), p. 12.

Lozovsky's speech is reprinted in La Vie Ouvrière, 7, 14 and 21 July 1922. Lozovsky later resumed his attack on the Berlin conference in Frankreich und die französische Arbeiterbewegung in der Gegenwart, Bibliothek der Roten Gewerkschafts-International (hereafter, BRGI), vol. 13 (Berlin: Führer-Verlag, 1922). There he again advanced the false claim that Andreyeff had been given only a consultative vote in the "anarcho-syndicalist comedy" at Berlin while the Russian Syndicalist Minority had been given a deliberative vote (p. 75). The latter was composed solely of ten "emigrants" and their families (p. 74). There too Lozovsky again disparaged that article in the Berlin declaration condemning the use of organized violence by revolutionary governments. And just as at St. Etienne, Lozovsky again attacked the German syndicalists, this time dismissing them as "pacifists and political vegetarians" (p. 68).

65 Borghi's and Diez's addresses are reproduced in Le Libertaire, 7-14 July 1922.

66 L'Humanité, 28 and 30 June, 1 July 1922.

67 For the declaration of the minority at St. Etienne, see BISRI, Nos. 2-3 (August 1922), p. 32. For the appeal for the creation of the CDS and its policies, see Le Journal du Peuple, 9 July 1922, and numerous articles thereafter.

68 Lozovsky to Monatte, 27 July 1922, Archives Monatte, pp. 350-2. Lozovsky also railed against the CDS in Frankreich, (pp. 112-4), where among other things he exclaimed: "Aber diese ganze Organisation, ihre Formen, ihre Gründe und ihr Ursprung sind ein Schulbeispiel grösster Heuchelei und Demagogie."

69 For the resolution and the changes in the RILU statutes, see BRGI, No. 16 (1923), pp. 62-4. The changes in no way altered the practical relationship between the RILU and the CI. Nin, at the time Lozovsky's chief
lieutenant in the RILU, later wrote (Las organizaciones obreras internacionales) that "l'adoption de cet accord mit fin à nos différends avec le syndicalisme révolutionnaire français. La concession était, au fond, de pure forme. Immédiatement après le Congrès fut formé un Comité d'action, comprenant des représentants des deux Internationales." Quoted in Rosmer, Moscou, p. 257.


The three possibilities of the first referendum were, in short: 1) that the NAS enter the RILU and seek to redress syndicalist grievances therein; 2) that the NAS enter the RILU on condition that article 11 be cancelled and that minorities from reformist unions no longer be allowed to adhere; and 3) that the NAS not adhere to the RILU, but enter instead into relations with the syndicalist organizations which accepted the 1920 Berlin theses for the purpose of forming an independent syndicalist International. The results (De Arbeid, 1 July 1922) were: 1-1,948, 2-1,702, 3-2,198.

This resolution won 5,826 votes against 4,458 for affiliation with the RILU. Ibid., 12 August 1922.

Ibid., 23 December 1922. The Executive had earlier been split by 9-6, the ratio by which the Executive recommended the creation of an independent International and entry into the RILU, respectively, at the extraordinary Arnheim congress in March 1922. Ibid., 25 March 1922. The pro-Moscow faction assured that the mandate given the Berlin delegates would be observed to the letter by appointing, despite the close 7-6 decision, only long-standing members of its own group to the delegation.

NOTES: CHAPTER EIGHT

1 The letter (1 July 1922) is reproduced in BISRI, Nos. 2-3 (August 1922), p. 40.

2 Lozovsky's letter (28 July 1922) is reproduced in Der Syndikalist, No. 34 (1922).

3 The Bureau's letter (12 August 1922) is reproduced in ibid.

4 The reports of the number of workers which the congress could claim to represent, whether they had personal delegates in attendance or not, range from De Arbeid's (13 January 1923) 2,106,100 to Alarm's (20 January 1923) 2,313,600 (in both cases, youth groups are excluded). But even the most moderate of these reports is too high. The figures given by De Arbeid are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Workers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FORA</td>
<td>200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IWW-C</td>
<td>40,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGT-M</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNT</td>
<td>800,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGT-P</td>
<td>150,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USI</td>
<td>500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSF</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAC</td>
<td>32,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

But the figure for the FORA represents its membership before it split (see Alberto Belloni, Del Anarquismo al Peronismo (Buenos Aires: A. Peña Lillo, 1960), pp. 29 ff.;) and only one section (the 'FORA of the Vth Congress') of the previous organization attended the Berlin congress and eventually entered the IWMA. The 120,000 attributed to the FAUD is certainly too high for late 1922, and the figures given for the USI and the CNT may be challenged as somewhat inflated, to cite but a few examples. A more realistic estimate is that the congress may have represented 1,500,000 workers.

5 The FAU-C was affiliated with the FAUD. Additional organizations given consultative status included the Anarco-Syndikalistiche Jugend of Germany (Hessberg, Stein), the Fédération du Bâtiment of France (Couture), and the Fédération des Jeunesses Syndicalistes de la Seine. The delegations of three Dutch organizations were seated as guests: Roodeveldt, Ultee and Dornbosch represented the Federatie van Bouwvakarbeiders and the Federatie van Metaalarbeiders, and Kolthek the Socialistische Partij Holland, which was not an ordinary political party, but rather an anti-parliamentary group formed in response to legislation in Holland which made voting compulsory. Bart de Ligt represented the International Anti-Militarist Bureau. Representation in the congress is discussed in Der Syndikalist, Nos. 1-2 (1923); De Arbeid (13 January 1923); Rocker, "Revolution und Rückfall," pp. 225-6; Abad de Santillan, "La AIT," part 3, La Revista Internacional Anarquista 1 (25 March 1925):108.

6 Lozovsky's article was published in a Soviet journal and was not intended for foreign consumption. It was translated, however, and published...
in Paris in *Le Peuple*, 24 December 1922. Another article noted by the syndicalists was that of RILU official Fritz Heckert, who in reporting the second RILU congress in *Die Rote Fahne*, 23 December 1922, wrote of the creation of joint action committees by the RILU and the CI: "It is to be hoped that in not too long a time a lasting and inseparable union between the Comintern and the RILU will grow up anew from this alternate [form of] alliance."


8 *Der Syndikalist*, No. 1 (1923). This, of course, was before the NAS Executive reversed its position on the eve of the congress. The IWW originally signalled its intention to send delegates, but its most recent congress had decided to remain without international affiliation.

9 Ibid. The responses of the RILU and the IFTU to the Bureau's proposal on behalf of the Italian workers appear in ibid., No. 40 (1922). Schapiro had left Russia voluntarily in December 1921 in the company of Emma Goldman and Alexander Berkman, but with the intention of returning. Before leaving the West, he had been assured by Chicherin, the head of the Soviet Foreign Office, that his return to Russia would be without difficulties. The Bureau immediately appealed for international labour action to win Schapiro's release (as in the circular published in *Le Libertaire*, 6-13 October 1922, and in many other papers). After being released, Schapiro discussed his imprisonment in reports to *Der Syndikalist*, No. 51 (1922) and *Le Libertaire*, 1-8 December 1922. The same issue of *Der Syndikalist* carried a letter (dated 12 October 1922) from Lozovsky to Sandomirsky noting the role of the RILU and the All-Russian Trade Unions in recommending Schapiro's expulsion from Russia.

10 *Der Syndikalist*, No. 2 (1923).

11 Ibid.

12 Ibid., No. 3 (1923).


14 *Der Syndikalist*, No. 2 (1923).

15 Ibid. This charge was not without foundation. Syndicalists and radical members of the centralist unions spearheaded the general strike against the Kapp putsch (March 1920). The SPD and the USPD (Independent Socialists) supported the strike. The KPD initially opposed it. Only when it became clear that the strike was actually being carried through did the KPD desperately reverse itself and race to catch up with the workers, but it did so too late to permit the national party (though not some of its local organizations) from playing a leading role in the defeat of the putsch. Thus the leaders of the national communist party—the vanguard of the proletariat—showed themselves to be out of step with the labour movement at the high-water mark of mass workers' action in post-war Germany. On the

16 Der Syndikalist, No. 2 (1923).

17 Ibid.

18 Ibid.

19 If the FAUD leaders attempted such a thing, Rocker averred, they would simply be removed from office. Schapiro observed that while the communists usually urged unionists to affiliate with Moscow over the heads of their leaders, they had accomplished the same goal in Holland through the leaders and against the will of the members. Pfempfert of the AAUE flatly dismissed the resolution Dissel had lain before the congress as "one of the well-known sabotage maneuvers. . . . one of the customary diplomatic tricks" of the Moscow dictatorship. Ibid.

20 Ibid., No. 3 (1923).

21 Ibid. The NAS delegation made the charge that the congress had abandoned the Berlin Declaration of 1920 one of the central points in its report. De Arbeid, 13 January 1923. But the delegation reserved its main attack upon the congress until just prior to the NAS congress in which the international question was to be debated. It then unequivocably recommended the affiliation of the NAS with the RILU. Ibid., 17 and 24 March 1923.

22 The Dutch and Swedish resolutions can be found in Der Syndikalist, Nos. 2-3 (1923), respectively; that of the Dutch is also reproduced in De Arbeid, 13 January 1923.

23 The Norwegian syndicalist organ, Alarm, 6 January 1923, attuned to the demands of history, thought it worthwhile to record that the syndicalist International had been created at 11:20 p.m., Wednesday, 27 December 1922.


25 Der Syndikalist, No. 4 (1923).

26 Resolutionen - 1922, pp. 5-6; Le Journal du Peuple, 13 January 1923; La Protesta, 31 January 1923.

A number of governments attempted to impede the travel of known militants around the time of the congress. Albert Jensen, for example, was to have been a member of the SAC delegation, but the Swedish government refused to grant him a passport. Le Libertaire, 23-30 March 1923. Foreign delegates and observers, moreover, had to enter Germany either under false pretenses or simply illegally, without visas. The best written account of the ongoing conflict with the police is to be found in three letters written from Berlin to Alarm (6, 13 and 27 January 1923) by Smith. Smith maintained the concern about passport violations to be no more than a device enabling the German government to attempt to wreck the congress. He was highly critical of Richter, the social democratic Chief of the Berlin police, who authorized operations against the assembly. The Dutch delegation implied (De Arbeid, 13 January 1923) that police harassment and surveillance of the congress was the reason for their withdrawal. The first police intrusion, however, likely provided the Dutch with a pretext for withdrawing, since they had already declared that their resolution having been defeated, they would take no further part in the discussions or decisions of the assembly.

As a young man, Arther Lehning attended the founding congress of the IWMA, of which he would later become Secretary. Over fifty years later he still recalled the dramatic scenes caused by the police intrusion in the meetings. The final appearance of the police in particular, when they arrested over a dozen of the assembled libertarians, caused an enormous upheaval. Tempers flared and open resistance to the police was averted only by the intervention of the stolid leader of the FAUD, Fritz Kater, who succeeded in calming the assembly. Lehning and Bart de Ligt had travelled from Holland to Berlin for the meeting and had succeeded in crossing the border on the pretext of spending a holiday in Germany. Noting this information on de Ligt's visa, the police demanded that he explain his presence at a revolutionary congress. "Well," de Ligt sardonically replied, "some people amuse themselves one way on holiday, and others another." Interview: Arthur Lehning, 19 March 1976, Amsterdam. Emma Goldman attended the congress and wrote of the interruptions by the police. Letter to Carl Newländer, 12 January 1923, Goldman Archive, Internationaal Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis, Amsterdam.

Many of those arrested were Russian libertarian refugees. The FAUD organized protests to win the release of those being held. Within two weeks Giovanetti, Gradi and Orlando were released. On police intervention, see also Le Journal du Peuple, 17 January 1923.

Statuts de l'Association Internationale des Travailleurs (Courbevoit: AIT, n.d.), p. 4-5. As its title indicates, this French edition contains only the statutes and not the further resolutions of the congress. For the declaration of principles, see below, appendix B.
The Italian delegation proposed at the 1922 congress that the IWMA be permitted to undertake joint actions with political organizations as well, but the delegates agreed with Orlando of the FORA that the sphere of common action not extend to political parties. *Der Syndikalist*, No. 5 (1923). The statutes as they had been modified by 1935 specifically declared that even provisional agreements for joint action were never "to be concluded with political parties, that is, with organizations which accept the State as a system of social organization." Statuts adoptés par le congrès constitutif de l'A.I.T. Berlin, décembre 1922. Modifiés par le IVe congrès de l'A.I.T. Madrid, 1931 et par le Ve congrès de l'A.I.T. Paris, 1935 (Limoges: AIT, n.d.), p. 10.

The statutes also instructed the IWMA to publish an information bulletin for the workers' press and a review to deal with theoretical and tactical questions. The first of these began appearing on 1 April 1923 as the Presse-Dienst herausgegeben von dem Sekretariat der IAA. It also appeared in French (Service de la Presse), English (News Service), and soon in Spanish (Servicio de la Prensa). The different language editions were not always identical in content. The review appeared between March 1924 and January 1926 as Die Internationale: Organ der Internationalen Arbeiter-Assoziation (hereafter, *Int-IAA*). Its place was taken by *Die Internationale: Zeitschrift für die revolutionäre Arbeiterbewegung, Gesellschaftskritik und sozialistischen Neuaufbau*, published by the FAUD (hereafter, *Int-FAUD*) between November 1927 and February 1933. For six months in 1938 the IWMA published *Internationale: Organe de l'AIT*.

A number of other resolutions, dealing with revolutionary tactics, workers' control and factory councils, cooperatives, and unemployment, were published with the IWMA statutes. They were not, however, formally enacted by the congress. The report of the CDS in *Le Journal du Peuple*, 17 January 1923 explained:

"L'irruption brusque de la police qui arrêta presque tous nos camarades russes, les délégués argentins et italiens, ne permet pas de ratifier par un vote de pure forme, d'ailleurs, toutes les thèses présentées. Néanmoins, et en raison de l'accord antérieur et complet qui s'est manifesté au cours de la discussions, il y a de considérer les thèses comme ayant été adoptées par le Congrès."

*Le Journal* noted that the congress had also discussed the organization of unions, women in the unions, and the syndicalist youth. The full agenda can be found in *La Protesta*, 16 March 1923.

On the NSF: *Service de la Presse* 3 (1 May 1923), p. 1. There had been considerable discussion within the CGT-P on the international question. The internal debate (with which a controversy on the powers of the organization's Confederal Committee became entangled) can be followed in the
CGT-P daily, *A Batalha*, especially from 11 March 1923 on. The decision of the Confederated Committee to adhere to the IWMA and to hold a referendum on the issue is reported on 5 April. On 13 April, *A Batalha* printed the old and new statutes of the RILU and in subsequent issues (through 18 April) it analyzed the changes in the RILU statutes, compared them with those of the IWMA, and concluded by declaring unequivocably for the latter. There then appeared from the partisans of the RILU, who had already attempted to block the Confederated Committee's decision, a 'Manifesto of the Twenty-One', which attacked the decision to join the IWMA as having been made superficially, "and with great ignorance and no less sectarianism" (27 June). At the same time, M.J. de Sousa began a lengthy rejoinder (which continued through 14 July) in which he accused the 21 of seeking to import French communist-syndicalism into Portugal, invoked at length the criticism of Moscow made by Pestaña and Borghi after their visits to Russia, defended as correct the position taken by the French dissident minority, and argued rightly that the decision to adhere to the IWMA was only the "natural and final result" of the decisions already made on the international question by the CGT-P's earlier Corvilha congress. The pro-RILU faction was routed in the subsequent referendum, reported on 22 July.

41 The respective reports of the IWMA congress in *De Arbeid* by Lansink (13 and 20 January 1923) and the NAS delegation (13 January; 17 and 24 March 1923) were written from very different perspectives. The February and March issues carry numerous articles by various persons on both sides of the issue. The most sustained piece of argumentation appeared in a 64 page brochure, *Internationale verbindingen van het N.A.S.: Berlijn of Moskou?* (Amsterdam: NAS, 1923), in which the President of the NAS, Lansink, and its Secretary, Thomas Dissel, defended the IWMA and the RILU respectively. On NAS militants (such as E.J. Bouwman and Dirk Schilp) in the Dutch Communist Party, the party's complicated trade union policy in the early 1920s, and its attitude toward the NAS, see A.A. de Jonge, *Het Communisme in Nederland* (Den Haag: Kruseman, 1972), esp. pp. 36-9. The international controversy in the NAS is recalled by one of the leading disputants in Dirk Schilp, *Dromen van de Revolutie*, esp. Chap. 13.

42 A compte-rendu of the congress appears in *De Arbeid*, beginning with the issue of 14 April 1923. Prevented from putting his case at the congress, Souchy advanced it instead in two articles, *Ibid.*, 28 April and 19 May 1923. The congress was also reported in *Service de la Press* 2 (15 April 1923), pp. 2-3.

43 Quoted in *Service de la Press* 11 (5 July 1923), p. 1, from the first circular of the NSV. The NAS referendum result is contained in *De Arbeid*, 2 June 1923. The response of the remaining NAS Executive can be traced in the summer issues of the same newspaper. A communist-syndicalist looks back on the schism two years later in the postscript to A. Losofsky, *De Balans van vijf jaar werken: Geschiedenis de R.V.I. (met naschrift van E.J. Bouwman* (Amsterdam: NAS, 1925). The constitutive meeting of the NSV at Utrecht is reported in the first issue of *De Syndicalist*, 30 June 1923. Those who remained in the NAS, incidentally, did not find affiliation with the RILU tolerable for long. The NAS entered the RILU in 1925. The 1927 congress of the NAS, however, resolved to withdraw. At the same time, a
number of its leading militants also broke with the Dutch Communist Party. See Schilp, pp. 111-2.

44 The NSV congress is reported in De Syndicalist, 1 and 8 December 1923. Lansink represented the NSV at the IWMA's Innsbruck conference at the end of the year. Servicio de la Prensa, supplement to 19 (30 December 1923), pp. 2-3.

45 Marie Guillot spoke for all the 'minoritaires' when at the 1923 Bourges congress of the CGTU she said: "Depuis des mois (c'est en juin qu'ils naquirent) je voyais les syndicalistes battus dans les syndicats, découragés par une coalition communiste qui ne respectait ni les services rendus au mouvement syndical, ni l'esprit syndicaliste; qui bousculait par des combinaisons ingénieuses faussent le jeu des assemblées générales, les militants qui ne voulaient pas se plier aux directives d'un Parti." La Vie Ouvrière, 23 November 1923. The communist consolidation of power in the CGTU is discussed in David Saposs, The Labor Movement in Post-War France (New York: Russell, 1931), pp. 61-9.

46 La Vie Ouvrière, 23 November 1923.

47 Quoted in Saposs, pp. 67-8. The resolution, however, did not demand entry into the IWMA. Strictly speaking, there was more than one minority position in the Bourges congress. I am concentrating upon the strongest of these and that from which the eventual French affiliate of the IWMA would emerge.

48 La Vie Ouvrière, 23 November 1923.

49 Quoted in Saposs, p. 69.

50 La Vie Ouvrière, 23 November 1923.

51 For the letter of the IWMA to the RILU and the subsequent statement of the IWMA Bureau, see News Service 1 (1 April 1923), p. 1.

52 Quoted in Abad de Santillan, "La AIT," part 3, p. 110.

53 The events of 11 January 1924 are reported from the libertarian viewpoint in Le Libertaire, 12 January 1924 and following, while the communist view is put in L'Humanité, 12 January 1924 and following.

54 La Vie Ouvrière, 18 January 1924.

55 Le Libertaire, 6 October 1924.

56 Bulletin Communist, 6 October 1924.

57 The 'minoritaires' charged Treint with at least provoking the murders of Poncet and Clos, and probably of directing them. There are a number of articles on the question in Le Libertaire, 11-30 October 1924. The issue of 30 October carried the claim of two witnesses that Treint had given the signal for the fusillade during his inflammatory speech.
58 Ibid., 29 October 1924.

59 Saposs, p. 71. The conference was reported in Le Libertaire, 2-8 November 1924. In "Ein Blick in den revolutionären Syndikalismus Frankreichs," Int - IAA, No. 4 (January 1924), pp. 13-9, Schapiro condemned the intermediate policy of the UFSA and challenged the courage of the French syndicalists. He again criticized the path taken by the French minority in 1924 in the Swedish theoretical journal, Syndikalismen, October 1926, in the fifth part of a series he wrote on "Den franska syndikalismens förfallsperiod," pp. 185-90.

60 La Voix du Travail, 15 November - 15 December 1926.

61 The constitutive congress of the CGTSR was reported in its new paper, Le Combat Syndicaliste, December 1926, January 1927. The 'Motion d'orientation' is reprinted there and can also be found in Les Buts et l'organisation du syndicalisme révolutionnaire (Limoges: CGTSR, n.d.), together with Besnard's comments on the new 'Charte'. Financial records in the Albert de Jong Papers, AIT, I 1928, show that the IWMA gave the CGTSR subsidies of 26,000 francs and 1,500 goldmarks between December 1926 and April 1928, partly to underwrite the costs of publishing La Voix du Travail, which the IWMA ceded to the CGTSR in April 1927. The IWMA's 1928 congress voted to continue aid to the CGTSR (Int - FAUD, No. 6 (April 1929), p. 22), but it is uncertain how long it continued to receive subsidies. The IWMA's Taetigkeit der Internationalen Arbeiter-Assoziation, 1933-1935 (n.p.: IAA, n.d.), p. 13, noted that the CGTSR was more or less regularly paying its international dues. The Centre d'Histoire de syndicalisme de l'Université de Paris possesses a mémoire de maîtrise (1974) on "La Confédération Générale de Travail Syndicaliste Révolutionnaire: a travers son journal 'Le Combat syndicaliste' (1926-1927)," by Samuel Jospin.

62 The Argentinians reacted quickly to the news of the concession made to the CDS concerning further negotiations with the RILU. The first installment of the report of the congress began appearing in La Protesta on 31 January 1923. La Protesta's criticisms began immediately (1 February: "Las vacilaciones de los sindicalistas revolucionarios;" 2 February: "Consecuencias del neutralismo sindicalista;" etc.). For weeks thereafter La Protesta directed a steady stream of criticism against the IWMA. It maintained (24 February) the resolution on further negotiations with Moscow to involve "noting less than a sacrifice of the principles and the tactics of the new International."

The critical eye of La Protesta, 10 March, noted a striking parallel which no one in the Berlin congress had thought to voice: "The congress of Berlin did not want to deal less gently with Besnard than that of Moscow with Monmousseau, and it vied with the Bolsheviks in concessions to the French syndicalists. All the delegates at Berlin who approved the declaration of the French minority have to one degree or another personally violated their sentiments and convictions. The same thing was done at Moscow [by the communists]." But La Protesta realized that given the FORA's unyielding opposition to the RILU and the IFTU, only the IWMA offered an acceptable international shelter. Thus when the FORA congress of March 1923 decided to conduct a referendum on the question of conditional affiliation with the IWMA, La Protesta itself considered the caution of the Foristas
excessive. It observed (7 April): "In our view, the congress ... should have accepted conditional adherence to Berlin, explaining its attitude in the second congress of the International. This adhesion would by no means compromise the FORA's own ideology, for until the next congress our organization would be the minority within the IWMA opposed to the vacillations of European syndicalism." All doubt about the FORA's formal relations with the IWMA were removed when the International declared the resolution of "revolutionary unity" (on further negotiations) adopted at Berlin a dead letter. The FORA viewed this and the sharp declaration of the IWMA's Innsbruck conference against the united front as having salvaged the International, just as it viewed the large loss of support by the French minority during the years it strove for unity in France as confirmation of its own view and, further, as the fulfillment of the prediction its delegation had made to the CDS delegates at Berlin in December 1922.

64 Ibid., pp. 21-3, 13.
65 Industrial Solidarity, 2 December 1922. The IWW specifically cited the approval of sabotage and violence by the syndicalists' June conference as preventing the IWW's entry into the IWMA. Industrial Solidarity remarked that the IWW's decision constituted the reply of American industrial unionists "to the invitations of both the Syndicalists and the Communists to join their circus," and added: "Undoubtedly this stand will reopen controversy between the European groups and the I.W.W." Industrial Solidarity had earlier (23 September) carried an account of the St. Etienne congress of the CGTU and the June conference at Berlin by 'T.M.', a 'Wobbly' recently returned from Europe. T.M. obviously found it difficult to follow the complexities of the European labour movement and his account of the June conference is quite confused. Of the Berlin meeting he noted that the Russian "anarchists," having learned diplomacy from the communists, had two representatives of the "anarchist" minority present. T.M. added: "With all these Communist and Anarchist 'minorities' a fellow gets dizzy in the head."

66 As late as 1933 the IWMA published a brochure in English (The International Working Men's Association (I.W.M.A.): Its Purpose - its Aim - its Principles (Berlin: IWMA, n.d.)) intended for dissemination in the United States which spoke directly to the issue of IWW-IWMA relations. The 1934 IWW congress decided to distribute the brochure to its members for purposes of discussing possible affiliation with the IWMA. IWW to the IWMA, 21 November 1934, Taetigkeit IAA, 1933-1935, p. 98. That affiliation never came.

Another organization with which the IWMA for a time stood in close relationship was the AAUE of Germany. The AAUE represented a series of factory committees and saw a federalist organization of such committees, and not trade unions, as the basis of future society. Like the FAUD, the AAUE advocated class war, direct action and the general strike, and opposed the state and state socialism. It opposed party dictatorship, but accepted the dictatorship of the producing class through a council system and accepted the violence such dictatorship involved. Though it had little use for the activities of political parties, it was not anti-political and emphatically rejected the distinction between political and economic action. It consi-
dered all forms of direct action, from the smallest wage struggle to the general strike, as political acts. Franz Pfempfert attended the 1922-1923 and 1925 congresses of the IWMA for the AAUE and in both instances outlined the position of his organization vis-à-vis the FAUD. Der Syndikalist, No. 2 (1923); Int _ IAA, No. 5 (June 1925), pp. 26-7. The AAUE and the FAUD attempted to negotiate a merger, but never succeeded in overcoming their differences. The AAUE is discussed in Bock, chap. 7. See also, Denis Authier and Jean Barrot, La Gauche communiste en Allemagne, 1918-1921 (Paris: Payot, 1976), chap. 14. Otto Rühle, a leading figure of left-communism in Germany, was the main theoretician of the early AAUE. See his "Die Revolution ist keine Parteisache!," and "Die Räte," in Frits Kool, ed., Die Linke gegen die Parteiherrschaft (Olten-Freiburg: Walter, 1970), pp. 329-37, 534-7.

The IWMA still survives and is presently headquartered at Limoges, France. Originally headquartered at Berlin (original Secretariat: Augustin Souchy, Alexander Schapiro and Rudolf Rocker) until forced out of the country after Hitler's rise to power, the International was shifted in April 1933 to Madrid, in June 1934 to Barcelona, in August 1935 to Paris, and in November 1938 to Stockholm, where it spent the war-years.
This frequently expressed one-dimensional view of the formation of the IWMA as simply reactive betokens a lack of familiarity with the pre-war international endeavors of the syndicalists. See, for example, Max Nomad, "The Anarchist Tradition," in Milorad M. Drachkovitch, The Revolutionary Internationals, 1864-1943 (Stanford: Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, 1966), pp. 87-88; William Z. Foster, History of the Three Internationals (New York: International Publishers, 1955), pp. 323-24; Lewis Lorwin, Labor and Internationalism, pp. 559-61.

Georg Lukács made this point, within the context of the ideological and organizational disputes between the Bolsheviks and various representatives of left-communism, as early as 1923. See Geschichte und Klassebewusstsein, Georg Lukács Werke (Neuwied and Berlin: Hermann Luchterhand) II (1968): 471 ff. For an appreciation of Lukács's role in historically locating these factional disputes in the post-war period, see Miklos Molnár, "Problemes d'order ideologique," in Charles L. Bertrand, ed., Situations révolutionnaires en Europe, 1917-1922 (Montreal: Centre Inter-universitaire d'Etudes Européennes, 1977), pp. 141-50.

See Albert S. Lindemann, The 'Red' Years (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Note: Only sources cited in the thesis appear in the bibliography.

Organization of the bibliography:

A. Primary Sources
   I. Unpublished
      1. Archives
      2. Manuscripts
      3. Interviews and Correspondence
   II. Published
      1. Newspapers and Periodicals of the Workers' Movement
      2. Proceedings, Documents and Reports of Congresses, Institutions and Delegates
      3. Additional Documents
      4. Eyewitness Accounts: Memoirs, Autobiographies, Diaries, Correspondence, etc.
      5. Informational, Polemical and Theoretical Works by Contemporary Activists

B. Secondary Sources
   I. Articles
   II. Books
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APPENDIX A

THE CHARTER OF AMIENS

Endorsed by the CGT (830 votes to 8) at its 1906 congress. Reproduced in Henri Dubief, Le Syndicalisme révolutionnaire, pp. 95-6.

The Congress of Amiens reconfirms article 2 of the CGT constitution. The CGT unites, outside all political schools, all workers conscious of the struggle to be conducted for the disappearance of the wage-earning and employing classes.

The Congress considers this declaration to be a recognition of the class struggle which, on the economic terrain, places the workers in revolt against all forms of exploitation and oppression, material and moral, exercised by the capitalist against the working class.

The Congress gives precision to this theoretical affirmation by the following points:

In its day-to-day demands, trade unionism seeks the coordination of workers' efforts, the increase of workers' well-being by the realization of immediate gains, such as the decrease of working hours and the increase of wages, etc.

But this task is only one aspect of the work of syndicalism; it prepares for complete emancipation, which can only be realized by expropriating the capitalist class. It sanctions the general strike as its means of action and it maintains that the trade union, today an organization of resistance, will in the future be the organization of production and distribution, the basis of social reorganization. The Congress declares that this double task, the day-to-day and the future task, derives from the position of wage-earners which weighs upon the working class and which charges all workers, whatever their political and philosophical opinions and inclinations, with the duty of belonging to the essential organization, the trade union.

In consequence the Congress affirms, regarding individuals, the complete liberty of the unionist to participate, outside his union, in those forms of struggle conforming to his political or philosophical views. It limits itself to requesting that he, in exchange, not introduce into his union the opinions he holds outside it.

Regarding organizations, the Congress maintains that since economic action must be conducted directly against the employers for syndicalism to achieve its maximum effect, affiliated organizations as trade unions should not concern themselves with the parties and sects which, outside and alongside the unions, may in complete liberty pursue the social transformation.
APPENDIX B

THE PRINCIPLES OF REVOLUTIONARY SYNDICALISM


1. Revolutionary syndicalism is that movement of the working classes founded on the basis of class-war, which strives for the union of manual and intellectual workers in economic fighting organizations in order to prepare for and practically realize their liberation from the yoke of wage-slavery and state oppression. Its goal is the reorganization of the whole of social life on the basis of free communism through the collective revolutionary action of the working classes themselves. It adopts the point of view that only the economic organizations of the proletariat are appropriate for the realization of this task and turns therefore to the workers in their capacity as producers and generators of social value, in opposition to the modern political labour parties, which for constructive economic aims are out of the question.

2. Revolutionary syndicalism is the unqualified opponent of all economic and social monopolies and strives for their elimination by means of economic communes and administrative organs of industrial and field workers on the basis of a free council system which is subordinate to no political power or party. Against the politics of states and parties it sets the economic organization of labour; against the government of men, the administration of things. For this reason it does not aspire to the conquest of political power, but the elimination of every state function from the life of society. It is of the opinion that together with the monopoly of property, the monopoly of power must also vanish, and that the state in every form, even in the form of the so-called 'Dictatorship of the Proletariat', can never be an instrument for the liberation of labour, but always only the creator of new monopolies and new privileges.

3. The task of revolutionary syndicalism is two-fold: on the one hand, it conducts the daily revolutionary struggle for the economic, intellectual and moral improvement of the workers within the present social order; on the other, its principal goal is to prepare the masses for the independent administration of production and distribution and the taking charge of all sections of social life. It is its conviction that the organization of an economic order, which is founded in its entirety upon the producers, can not be regulated by government resolutions and state decrees, but only by means of the alliance of all manual and intellectual workers in each separate branch of production, through the assumption of the administration of every individual operation by
the producers themselves, specifically in the form that the individual groups, workshops, and production operations are autonomous members of the universal economic organization which methodically shapes the whole of production and general distribution on the basis of reciprocal agreements and in the interests of the general public.

4. Revolutionary syndicalism is the adversary of all centralist endeavours and organizations, which are borrowed from the state and the church, and which systematically stifle independent initiative and individual thought. Centralism is the artificial organization from the top downwards, which transfers as a whole the regulation of the affairs of all to a few individuals. By this means the individual becomes a puppet that is guided and controlled from above. The interests of the general public must quit the field for the privileges of a few individuals, variety for uniformity, personal responsibility for an inanimate discipline, education for training. For this reason revolutionary syndicalism stands upon the basis of federalist union; that is, an organization, from below upwards, of the voluntary federation of all forces on the basis of mutual interests and common convictions.

5. Revolutionary syndicalism repudiates all parliamentary activity and all collaboration in legislative bodies. Not even the widest possible franchise can temper the yawning contradictions in modern society; the entire parliamentary system has as its sole purpose to lend the appearance of legal right to the rule of the lie and of social injustice and to induce the slaves to imprint the seal of the statutes upon their own slavery.

6. Revolutionary syndicalism rejects all arbitrarily drawn political and national boundaries and sees in nationalism only the religion of modern states, behind which hide the interests of the possessing classes. It recognizes only natural regional differences and demands for every group the right to be able to regulate its own affairs in joint agreement with all other economic, regional, or national associations.

7. On the same grounds revolutionary syndicalism opposes militarism in every form and considers anti-militarist propaganda as one of its most important tasks in the struggle against the existing system. Pertaining first of all to that end is the refusal of the individual in relation to [the military service of] the state, and, especially, the organized boycott of the workers against the production of military equipment.

8. Revolutionary syndicalism stands upon the basis of direct action and supports all struggles of the people which are not in conflict with its objectives of the abolition of economic monopoly and the despotism of the state. It recognizes the strike, the boycott, sabotage, and so on, as its weapons. Direct action finds its highest expression in the social general strike, which syndicalists see simultaneously as the prelude to the social revolution.

9. Although syndicalists are the enemies of all organized violence in the hands of any revolutionary government, they do not fail to recognize that the decisive struggle between the capitalist present and the free communist future will not occur without conflict. They accordingly recognize violence as a means of defense against the violent methods of the ruling classes in the struggle for the possession of the factories and the fields by the revolutionary people. Just as the expropriation of the factories and the land must in practice be effected and directed on the path of social reorganization by the revolutionary economic organizations of the workers, so also must the defense of the revolution.
be entrusted to the masses themselves and their economic organizations, and not be left to any defined military organization, or any other organization, which stands outside the economic associations.

10. Only in the revolutionary economic organizations of the working class lies the means to its liberation and the creative energy for the reconstruction of society in the direction of free communism.