"FASCISM AND THE FUTURE"

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- i -
"FASCISM AND THE FUTURE"

CHAPTER I.

- Pre-Fascist Italy -

A dictator rules in Italy! One of the great Powers of Europe submits to the enforced paralysis of her peoples' legislative functions. Freedom of speech and of the Press, those criteria of Freedom and Democracy, fought for and bled for in the Nineteenth Century are dead in the land of the Caesars now, in the Twentieth. A new Caesar rules unchecked where Julius inaugurated one-man rule in the Roman Empire, and already counts to his credit nearly seven years of uninterrupted control of Italy. Will he maintain it? Is a new era of Italian History commencing? Has democracy failed? Will his plans plunge Europe into the horrors of another struggle on the heels of the Great War? What is there in his system to commend itself to the modern world, socially, economically or politically? These and many other questions concerning the future of Italy and of the world are being discussed the wide world over. It may be profitable to examine the evidence pro and con, and endeavour in the light of it, not perhaps to answer all these questions finally, but to arrive considerably nearer the
truth concerning them.

To place the Fascist movement in the clearest light and the proper setting it is advisable first of all to glance at Italian political history. Italy's existence as a nation cannot, of course, be dated before the Turin parliament of 1861, when Cavour's lifework ended more or less successfully with the Union of all Italy except Venetia and Rome. Thus, unlike Britain she has had no political experience from which her people could profit, before they were called upon to control the destinies of a great democratic state. Unfortunately the history of the Italian states before Union is barren of the growth of any of those institutions in local government which we are accustomed to think of as valuable in teaching those democratic principles to the electorate and to the elected which both must understand before the State can function. According to G. M. Trevelyan\footnote{G. M. Trevelyan: "Hist. Causes of Present State of Affairs in Italy." Oxford Press, 1923.}, this lack of political experience is due to the traditional method of local government in Italy. Since the advent of the Teuton to the peninsula there has been too large an element of force in town government, from the middle age oligarchy of nobles and single despot to the eighteenth century "podesta."

The tendency has been to accomplish change in government by "rows on the piazza" and not by popular assemblies, with the natural result that Italians of modern times have, in common with the Mexicans or Spanish, too great acquiescence
in disorders, which to a British mind are deplorable and unnatural in political conduct.

The nineteenth century brought union to Italy but, as Cavour well knew, only the beginning of the solution of Italy's problem. There were circumstances in the actual making of Italy which produced new problems. Recognizing the necessity of accomplishing union through the leadership of Piedmont, just as we recognize it in the case of Prussia and Germany, there is, undoubtedly, an element of discord in what Luigi Sturzo calls the "Piedmontization" of Italy. This was particularly true in the South. Economically, racially and geographically a separate people, they have a natural tendency towards suspicion of the North, but this was enhanced by the circumstances of Garibaldi's campaign and subsequent attitude towards Piedmont. Enthusiasm gained ground as Garibaldi's Redshirts progressed from Palermo to Naples, but not enthusiasm for union under Piedmont. For the time being, public opinion, if there was such a thing in so turbulent a maelstrom of conflicting interests, did not look beyond the dictatorship of Garibaldi with a possible federation of Italian states in the distant future. Garibaldi's own intentions were perhaps somewhat vague to himself, but certainly included a further campaign

2. Luigi Sturzo: "Italy and Fascismo." (Faber & Gwyer, 1926.) Chapter I.
in the Papal States and Venetia, before union with Piedmont. Cavour can scarcely be blamed for insisting on the prompt annexation of Naples. Thayer in his "Life of Cavour" 1 makes it abundantly clear that a continuance of Garibaldi's dictatorship, even with the assured friendship of Garibaldi would be hazardous in the extreme. Among many discordant elements, notably between Sicily and Naples, Garibaldi would be unable to keep order, while an attack upon Venetia or the Papacy would spell disaster through international complications. Still it was unfortunate that Cavour's action was hurried and doubly unfortunate that the great man himself did not live to reconcile the South in his own way, for it is evident that the resentment of the people of Sicily and Naples against the annexation has been no small obstacle to real Italian unity. It had the effect of continuing that opposition to Government so characteristic of the South, whether that Government has been Ostrogothic Lombard, French Angevin or Spanish Bourbon. Stillman says "The premature annexation of Naples and the unfortunate necessity for the transfer of the capital to Rome have introduced elements of discord into the kingdom that menace gravely, if not invincibly, the existing political system. The Italy to which Cavour aspired was an enlarged Piedmont, and so far as the differences of nature permitted, he desired to make it a new England; - - - - - the end may yet be well; but there rings in my ears the ominous judgment pronounced by

more than one of those who had a part in the making of Italy - "Too quickly and too easily was Italy made!" 1.

The unfortunate necessity, hinted at above, of occupying Rome against the wishes of the Holy See has been and still is, in spite of subsequent betterment of relations between Church and State, a source of disturbance in Italian political life. When Victor Emmanuel's forces breached the wall of Rome, Pope Pius IX. severed relations with the Government of Italy, wrote the famous "Non expedit" in an attempt to prevent the participation of Italian Roman Catholics in that Government's affairs and as "prisoner of the Vatican" sought to obtain sympathy in his attitude with Roman Catholic Powers. Broadly speaking, this attitude has succeeded only in adding to the already enormous difficulties of the men who have sought, after "making Italy, to make Italians." 2.

To this inexperience of democratic institutions must also be added as a further cause of failure the astounding illiteracy of the Italian people. When Italy was united her people were seventy-five per cent illiterate and, as late as 1911, thirty-seven per cent. Such ignorance is bound to prevent the political consciousness of its people which is the great pre-requisite to the success of a democratic state.

2. Massimo d'Azeglio says "Now that we have made Italy we must make the Italians." P. 125, "Italy" in "Nations of To-day." Ed. John Buchan. Houghton-Mifflin, New York, 1923.
From 1870 to 1914 this struggle for a truly united state has continued. Obstacles have been surmounted but others have persisted and have denied to Italy that experience of a settled government which alone will give confidence in a democratic regime.

For years after union Italy was crushed with the economic burden consequent upon the struggle for freedom and the establishment of the new government. This was not relieved by the Policies of the "Left" after the fall of Minghetti in 1876. The bid for popularity in the abolition of the Grist Tax and the extravagant waste of public funds in bribing constituencies with public works under Depretis, together with increase of armament and aggressive colonial policy in Africa under Crispi produced continued deficits and a financial crisis in 1889. The Italian taxpayer has been described as a most patient animal, but this kind of finance was not calculated to acquire his confidence in the new Democracy. Conditions have been improved by Di Rudini, Giolitti and Luzzatti until Italy learned what a balanced budget really was, but the load of National Debt has never yet ceased to keep Italy near the verge of bankruptcy.

"The Kingdom of Italy started its financial life (1861-62) with a deficit of about £17,600,000. The State being born under those precarious conditions, its task was not limited merely to attaining the balance of the budget. The interest of an enormous public debt
absorbed more than two-thirds of the revenue." 1. The Italian public debt at the time of Italy's entry into the Great War in 1915, was £600,000,000. 2.

A second source of weakness in political affairs originated under Depretis - the system of obtaining parliamentary majorities known as "Traformismo" or Transformism - and has continued in a more or less marked degree to the advent of Fascism. The system is similar to that of the "Bloc" in the French chamber, but, in Italy, has been used most unscrupulously by men, like Depretis, Crispi and Giolitti to retain hold on their own personal power, often at the sacrifice not only of political honesty, but also of much-needed reform for Italy. In their petty political quarrels and readjustments, these men have, without a shadow of doubt, brought discredit upon the whole democratic system in the eyes of thinking Italians.

The result of this Transformism upon the foreign and colonial policy of Italy may well be imagined. There was so little confidence either of the minister in his supporters or of the supporters in the minister, that an unswerving policy was impracticable. Certainly Italy's diplomatic path was far from the "straight and narrow" one. For example her relations with the Central Powers and France with regard to the Mediterranean are extremely complicated. By renewal of the Triple Alliance in 1902 she had again pledged herself to war against France if France "should make a move to extend her occupation or

2. Ibid. P. 398.
her sovereignty under any form whatsoever in the North African territories." 1. In exactly the same year, 1902, Italy signed a secret treaty with France, whereby France might freely develop its sphere of influence in Morocco and Italy in Tripoli. Prinetti of Italy at the same time assures Delcassé of France that in the renewal of the Triple Alliance there is "no stipulation which menaces the security of tranquility of France." 2.

Italy's Colonial policy reveals a similar lack of determination. Attempted expansion in Abyssinia is another case in point. When Crispi determined upon an aggressive policy in Abyssinia he should have supported it adequately, right or wrong. The end of it was that Baratieri, commander-in-chief in Eretria attacked 100,000 Abyssinians with an Italian force of 14,000, and this after having received reinforcements. Crispi was not entirely to blame, nor was Sonnino, his foreign minister. Preoccupied with internal party politics and jealousies, even, it is said, at court, where the friends of the incompetent Baratieri kept that general in his position and even secured his acquittal after Adowa, their hands, as executives of an unstable government were weakened. Crispi fell, after Adowa and, under Di Rudini the colonial policy was abandoned. It is interesting, however, to observe that when that Colonial expansion policy was renewed, it was adopted by Giolitti, not as a statesmanlike move for the benefit of the Italian nation but as a political expedient. The increasing power

2. Ibid. P. 96.
of the Socialists had begun to threaten the control of the older political parties under Giolitti and his adoption of a policy of narrow Nationalism, to include the seizure of more territory in Africa, would, it was felt, unite the anti-Socialist groups and at the same time make a bid for popularity on the plea of national aggrandizement. Sound reasons against the seizure of Tripoli were many. It involved Italy in an expensive war with Turkey and produced strained relations with the Central powers. The sandy wastes so dearly bought have never been able to pay for their administration and protection. It would be absurd to accuse Giolitti and his colleagues of the blindness which the affair seems to indicate. Let us rather accuse them of lack of perspective in permitting their struggle for political supremacy to loom larger than the ultimate good of Italy.

On the other hand it may be shown that in the decade preceding the Great War, the government of Italy had many reasons for optimism. The budgets, especially of Luzzatti (1903-1906) showed surpluses. Peace and the exploitation of water-power as a substitute for imported coal were placing the industries of the North on a firmer basis. Increasing participation of the Italian people in the elections, due partly to increased experience and education and partly to the relaxation of the papal ban in 1913, was tending to reduce that lack of interest in

1. "In 1904 the socialist vote was 300,000 and in 1913 something like a million."
national affairs about which so many Italian writers complain. It was the unfortunate effect of the Great War to revive many of the old obstacles to national progress and also to produce many new ones.

At the outset, the question of entering the Great War or not created the utmost discord among the various political groups. Since the Eighties Italy had been bound by the Triple Alliance to a defensive agreement with Germany and Austria-Hungary against France. Giolitti, whose policy of friendship towards these powers was well-known, having retired temporarily from the political arena, it was Salandra who made the popular declaration of neutrality at the outbreak of war.

Since the Union of Italy in 1861 a large section of public opinion had regarded Italy as incomplete without the return of certain territories in the north and on the Adriatic by Austria, - the Trentino, part of Dalmatia, Trieste and certain islands of the Adriatic. These territories were termed "Italia irredenta" (Unredeemed Italy). The Irredentist cry was now revived and the hoped-for recovery became the basis of some very unedifying bargaining by Italian political leaders with both sides in the War. A furious controversy arose between "Neutralist" and "Interventionist" groups, the latter group demanding participation in the War on the Allied side. San Giuliano and Sonnino, as foreign ministers, sought to open negotiations with Austria leading to concessions in "Italia irredenta" but Austria proved lukewarm. Gradually Interventionist opinion gained ground, as this attitude of Austria...
 persisted. Germany sent Prince von Bulow in an effort to stem the tide. In spite of von Bulow's attempt to tamper with the opposition, an attempt which might have succeeded, but for the force of popular demonstration, against the efforts of the Neutralist opposition, Salandra was finally supported on the question of intervention and Italy entered the War. Though the agreement was secret at the time, it is to be remembered that the Allies had bound themselves by the Pact of London to support Italy's claim to "Italia irredenta."

Efficiency in the management of the war was hindered by the instability of the home government, still in a constant state of flux through political rivalry. At no time during the war period were Italian troops given an adequate supply of munitions. A specially troublesome element existed in the Socialist party, which, unlike the German Socialists, was in opposition to the war. General Cadorna had occasion to complain of the effect of their propaganda on the firing line and authoritative opinion places no small part of the blame for the disaster of Caporetto upon defeatism engendered by the Socialist party. That Italy could present a united front in the face of real peril was fully demonstrated by the splendid effort at Vittoria Veneto in 1918 when the Austro-German forces were driven back, and a real contribution was made towards Allied success.

It is with the utmost regret, however, that the student of Italian affairs examines post-war conditions. A combination of circumstances seems to have overwhelmed poor
Italy and forced her to the very lowest ebb. Her crippled finances again brought her to the edge of the abyss. As in all countries engaged in the war, her people suffered from the cessation of the mushroom war industries. The blow, however, which plunged Press and people into universal gloom was the so-called "betrayal" of Italy's interests by Allied statesmen. The Pact of London was by this time, of course, public property, through the unkind offices of Lenin and the Bolshevik central committee. Flushed with the victory of Vittoria Veneto, Italian nationalism began definite plans to secure more than was actually agreed upon in the Pact of London - notably Fiume. As this would have been treading upon the toes of Jugo-Slavia, the Conference of Versailles refused to consider the Italian claim. It is not to the purpose to weigh here the arguments on each side of this well-known controversy. The results upon Italy do concern us. They were somewhat increased by the theatrical behaviour of Orlando, head of the Peace delegation at Versailles, who, at one point in the discussion, withdrew from the Conference. This convinced the Italians that the war had been in vain. The tremendous national discontent expressed itself in the Press and in public demonstration. To the Socialist party the whole affair was a vindication of their stand in regard to intervention, and seems to have acted upon their minds like strong wine. Strikes were called on flimsy pretexts which added to the general confusion. Ex-service men found it dangerous to appear in public. D'Annunzio seized Fiume and held it as a little republic throughout the year 1920,
as a gesture of contempt and defiance of the politicians of the Peace Conference. The tendency to apply the Bolshevik remedy to these conditions increased. The red flag became increasingly evident and the Dictatorship of the Proletariat was loudly advocated. It is over the significance of this period that Fascist and Anti-fascist controversy has raged most strongly. The Fascist points to the danger of revolution, as in Russia, averted by the remedial violence of the Fascist bands. The anti-Fascist claims the absolute collapse of the militant Socialist movement through the very failure of its own organization, as in the case of the failure of the workers to make good their operation of the occupied factories, and through the correct action or inaction of Giolitti in the autumn of 1920, when he managed on agreement with the Workers unions. These claims and counter claims will be examined later. The fact seems to be that there has been a great deal of mistaken enthusiasm and incompetence on the side of both the Government and its opponents. Nitti's attempts are a case in point. After the fall of Orlando in the summer of 1919, Nitti became Prime Minister. Almost at once he found himself handicapped with the necessity of pleasing the Socialists and the new Catholic "Partito Popolare", who were almost as extreme in their views as the Socialists, in order to hold control of the Chamber. The result was, that instead of displaying a firm hand in the domestic crisis, he tried to "kill with kindness" and actually issued amnesties to political offenders among the Socialist workers.
of the North.

Giolitti's return, after the fall of Nitti in June, 1920, gave promise of improvement. He opened negotiations with Jugo-Slavia for settlements arising out of difficulties of the Peace Conference and put an end to the absurd situation in Fiume. In domestic affairs he made a determined effort to rescue the descending lira by economy and reduction of expenditure, and a settlement of difficulties with the Communist occupiers of the factories. But there is ample evidence that the political situation at Rome was not as it should have been. The following quotation from the epilogue of Janet Penrose Trevelyan's "Short History of the Italian Peoples" ¹ will sum up for us this feeling of dissatisfaction:— "For the central government seemed to have abdicated its powers, and as Bonomi followed Giolitti and Facta followed Bonomi the hand of authority grew ever feeble and Parliament fell into even greater disrepute. It was Italy's fate that, at this juncture no inheritor of Cavour's tradition arose to uphold the authority of law and to show that strong government was compatible with liberty of speech and person." How it fared with "Liberty of speech and person" will appear with the introduction of Fascism into Italian life.


2. Luigi Villari: "The Fascist Experiment." Chapter on Pre-Fascist Italy. (Faber & Gwyer, London, 1926.)

3. Luigi Sturzo: "Italy and Fascismo." (Faber & Gwyer, 1926.) Chapter I.


5. W.R. Thayer: "Life and Times of Cavour." (Houghton-Mifflin, Boston, 1911.)


9. Roberto Cantalupo: "Fascism in Italian History." (Foreign Affairs, Oct. 1925.)


Whatever, then, be the final estimate of the value of the present Fascist regime in Italy, it will be apparent to the reader that Italy was in dire need of a remedy for conditions which beset her in the post-war period. "With what governmental theory, machinery and practice Italy was endowed in the three years after the war, she must surely have been engulfed in economic chaos if no change had come in the years then approaching." 1. Besides the prostration of the country's finances, other causes added to the general gloom. There was the feeling of disappointment at the share of the nation in the fruits of victory; the three hundred per cent increase in the cost of living; high rents and complete lack of lodging in the cities; the poor quality of bread and the lack of such commodities as sugar and butter; these and lesser burdens were born by workers forced to gaze at the spectacle of newly created magnificence presented by the war profiteers spending their mushroom wealth. In such an atmosphere revolutionary propaganda becomes epidemic, especially where the healing influence of a wise and strong administration is lacking. In Italy appeared the Communist and

Fascist. To couple these in one yoke would cause a metaphorical shudder to ripple the spine of the orthodox Fascist who has been taught to regard Fascism as the Crusade which saved the holy land of Italy from the ravages of Bolshevism. Says Mussolini: "It was useless to attempt to blaze a trail by fine words, by sermons from chairs. It was necessary to give timely, genial recognition to chivalrous violence. The only straight road was to beat the violent forces of evil on the very ground they had chosen." 1 Benito Mussolini is described as the "one ray of light in the dark days of Communism." 2 On the other hand Count Sforza, Foreign Minister in the Giolitti Cabinet, belittles the menace. "In my first address to parliament I stated that Bolshevism must live and die of itself, without pressure from abroad and after I had facilitated a mission of Italian Socialists to Russia, the attractiveness of the Russian myth diminished considerably." 3 It is according as one reads the work of Fascist or Anti-Fascist that the situation appears serious or normal. The truth seems to be that the post-war labour troubles were deplorable and destructive but not of a lasting nature nor of sufficient strength to threaten the existence of the State.

The Socialists appeared in Italy at first in the South where "Fasci" of labourers were formed of those who

2. A. Cortesi: "The Tide that Swept Italy's Fascisti to Power." (Current History, Jan. 1923.)
3. Count Carlo Sforza: "Italy and Fascism." (Foreign Affairs, Volume 3. April, 1925.)
protested peacefully against the burden of debt and taxes which followed the bank failures of the eighties, the costly colonial ventures and the tariff war with France of 1887. These peaceful Fasci were attacked by the police, following a mistaken policy of repression on the part of the central government. An organization along Marxian lines appeared in 1892. In 1896 there were Bread Riots which spread to the North and resulted in tyrannical efforts at repression. The moderate leader Turati was at this time sentenced to twelve years penal servitude. Giolitti, in 1902, abandoned this reactionary policy, proclaimed the equal rights of Labour with Capital and welcomed Turati into Parliament. In 1913 there were fifty Socialist deputies, and four hundred Socialist communes throughout Italy. It was the post-war election of 1919, however, which caused an outbreak of jubilation. The Socialist Party emerged with one hundred fifty-six deputies, much to the embarrassment of Nitti, who was faced with the task of gathering together a cabinet. The success of the Socialists produced the situation outlined in Chapter I - the fluttering of the Red Flag, insults to war veterans, seizure of land by the peasants and an increase in the number of strikes. Nitti appears to have done little to curb the activities of the extremists. The Socialist deputies made matters no easier for him by adopting a policy of non-participation. He was forced to rely upon the hundred members elected by the "Partito Popolare", a party of Catholic origin, to remain in power at all. The Liberal parties were scandalized, too,
by the behaviour of the Socialists, who left the Chamber as the King entered it to make his speech and re-entered when it was over, singing the Communist "Internationale" and "The Red Flag." To cope with the disturbances Nitti's most effectual effort seems to have been to instruct army officers to avoid insult by not appearing in public in uniform and to grant an ill-timed amnesty to deserters and shirkers against whom cases were pending in the courts. 1.

The Partito Popolare, already referred to as constituting the main support of Nitti's Cabinet, is a post-war party, originally organized by the priest Luigi Sturzo. Sturzo was a Sicilian parish priest at Caltagirone. He became interested in the political future of his race and, after occupying with success certain local government offices conceived the idea of forming a party to "moralize" politics - a very wide field for work in Italy. His party

1. It is only fair to Nitti to point out that he and his friends have attempted to justify his action or lack of action (See Nitti's "Dynamic Italy" in "These Eventful Years," Encyclopaedia Britannica Inc. 1924) on the following grounds -
(a) He unwillingly accepted the premiership in an admittedly difficult period of Italy's history.
(b) His amnesty was intended to prevent banditry by those who were offenders against the law.
(c) His foreign policy was one of peace in order to secure economic recovery.
(d) He was actually responsible for encouraging the Socialist deputation to Russia, which weakened the chances of Communist Revolution.
(e) His fall was due to the passage of a law abolishing the bread subsidy - a necessary law in order to prevent budget deficit.
was successfully launched and obtained wide influences, chiefly through the efforts of the parish priests, returning no less than one hundred members in the elections of 1919. It has thus been a dangerous rival to the Fascist party and has only been deprived of power by the military rule of Fascism and the enforced exile of Sturzo. The programme of the Popular party constitutes a "midway course between revolutionary socialism and reactionary stagnation." ¹ It offers many socialistic reforms, but intends to obtain them by a constitutional appeal to the electorate. Thus it abhors both the revolutionary and unconstitutional methods of Communists and Fascists and at the same time the Traforismo methods of the Italian Liberals.

It was in this election of 1919 that Fascism made its first attempt to appeal to the Italians for political support and received a most overwhelming defeat. A glance at the beginnings of the Fascist movement will explain how it achieved public notice soon after this election. Mussolini himself had followed a somewhat unsettled career, first as a school teacher in Reggio Emilia, then as a wandering student in Switzerland whence he was expelled as an unwelcome political agitator. Socialism claimed him in these early years. His father had been an influential Socialist of the county of Predappio, Northeastern Italy. Benito merely obeyed the ancestral urge when he agitated against the departure of troops from the province of Forli to the Libyan War and was imprisoned for a year. This

². See Chapter I. page 7
occurred in 1910. In 1912 at the Socialist Congress in Bologna he attacked the Parliamentary Group and its attempted ministerial intrigues "like an enraged bull," and thereby became a recognized leader of the Revolutionary group as well as Editor of the "Avanti," their organ. In 1914, unable to convert all Socialism to a Nationalist outlook and entry of Italy into the war, he was forced to give up the "Avanti." Almost at once he began what was to be the mouthpiece of his ideas — the "Popolo d'Italia", first published on November 15, 1914. He played a small part, which he himself exaggerates in the outcry for intervention. "My first article in the Popolo d'Italia," he says, "turned a large part of public opinion toward the intervention of Italy in the war, side by side with France and England." He carried out his principles bravely, however, as a corporal in the Bersaglieri, until severely wounded by the accidental explosion of a bomb and invalided home. Amid the general post-war depression, he added his voice to that of the Nationalists in their opposition to what they regarded as a profanation of dearly-bought victory. As a result of this feeling among ex-combatants, Mussolini was able to organize the first of the Fascists the "Fasci di Combattimento", merely a group, or club of ex-service men, demanding respect for the soldier's achievements and uniform and Italy's share in the victory. Like many veterans organizations it seems to have been inoculated with some of the serum of discontent at the

2. B. Mussolini: "Autobiography." (Scribners, 1928.)
prospect of a prosaic return to civil life. Mussolini, in retrospect, sees in this early organization the germs of a great national purification. I doubt that the Mussolini of 1919 saw any such thing. The most sympathetic reader of Fascist literature on the history of their movement cannot avoid the impression that Mussolini was a masterly opportunist and that the Fascists themselves were among those most surprised at the outcome of their own development. 1. It will be to our advantage to examine some of the causes which appear to have led to this development.

The most extreme conduct on the part of the Socialists was the seizure by Turin metal-workers of the factories in which they worked. This action was taken in the summer of 1920, during the administration of Giolitti, who had succeeded the incapable Nitti. By his supporters, Giolitti's conduct in dealing with the situation is described as masterly. He remained inactive at Bardonecchio in the Alps and refused to lift a hand to interfere. "The movement lasted a few days," says Count Sforza, "and died a natural death. It died from non-resistance." 2. Other writers, however, hint broadly at secret efforts of Giolitti to control the situation. Colin R. Coote, writing for "19th. Century" says - "it is now freely asserted and seems highly probable that he (Giolitti) instructed the General Staff to assist the Fascisti, to supply them with arms, and to allow

1. An enquiry in detail into the early Fascist programme follows in Chapter III., page 32.
2. C. Sforza: "Italy and Fascism." (Foreign Affairs, April, 1925.)
members of the army and police to join them." 1. "The parliamentary Government" says 'The Round Table', "bowed to the storm." "The crisis produced the growth of a private army of young ex-service men." 2. Whatever be the secret history of the "crisis", it is beyond dispute that Giolitti entered, on September 20th, 1920, into negotiations between masters and men at a joint meeting held in Rome, where he earned the disapproval of Capital by promising to back a Government bill to "organize industry on the basis of active intervention by the workers in the technical and financial control and in the administration of industry." 3. The Avanti hailed this outcome - "It is a victory, not only for the metal workers but also for Signor Giolitti. Control means collaboration, and, if it is seriously carried out, it will inevitably lead to the workers becoming interested co-operators with capitalist directors." 4. The evidence does not support either the "masterly inactivity" theory of Giolitti's supporters or the theory of the Fascists that the revolutionary movement was crushed by their Crusade. There were other sound reasons for the collapse. In the first place, the occupants of factories boycotted by engineers, technicians and managers could not run the factories. They could not even sell stock on hand.

4. Ibid.
to a public who had been warned by the owners that sales would be considered illegal. This deprived the workers of confidence, already weakened by the unfavourable reports from their deputation to Russia, in their ability to establish the "dictatorship of the proletariat." This lack of confidence soon produced a split in the Socialist ranks. On January 15, 1921, at the Leghorn Conference, Minotti Serrati of the "Avanti" succeeded in heading a strong group called the Unitarian Communists who disclaimed all approval of any connection with the Russian method. Among many reasons for their action was the unanswerable one that Italy could never survive, like Russia, the ostracism of the capitalist states who were supplying her with grain, coal and iron. There seems little room for doubt that even if the existence of a Communist crisis in Italy be admitted, its collapse was complete at the opening of 1921. The basis for the Fascist claim that an economic crisis persisted throughout the period from 1921 to 1922 does not appear to be sound. Salvemini quotes this extract from Giorgio Mortara's "Prospettive economiche", 1923, pp. 16 and ff: "In spite of all obstacles, and in spite of the political disturbances that preceded the peaceful revolution of October 1922, the economic activity of the country has strengthened steadily during the course of this year. Agriculturalists, in spite of the poverty of the harvest, have succeeded in keeping supplied certain notable channels of export, and have reopened others. --- The electrical industry has been restored to vigour. The industries
concerned with the manufacture of raw materials and agricultural and pastoral products continue to pick up.

Railway transport is being slowly reorganized: For two years now Italy has done without the help of foreign capital on which she still relied in 1919 and 1920." 1. Salvemini also quotes figures showing a continued increase in savings deposited by Italians at the rate of 2,202 million lire per annum from 1919 to 1922.

This meant that the raison d'etre of Mussolini's "Fasci di Combattimento" had vanished. Then let the Fascist Movement have a new raison d'etre! It must be admitted that the one adopted was no windmill. Nor does Mussolini's mode of attack exhibit the blindness of Cervantes' hero. Fascism became the germ of a national uprising when Mussolini began to preach the reform of the Italian administration.

I say that Mussolini did not in this instance tilt at windmills. By that I mean that the administration of Italy had given proof, and continued to give proof in the post-war period, of incapacity. Giolitti's, the Neutralists' return, was in itself, a sign of the failure of great leaders to appear in Italian politics. No.

2. Ibid. P. 108. Figures from "Annuario Statistuo Italiano."
statesmanlike measures appeared, to cope with budget deficits, strife in industry, housing problems. Instead, every effort is bent to secure personal power—"Traformismo!" 1. Giolitti's great desire was to secure a Nationalist "bloc" with which to defy the Socialists who had continued their policy of non-participation. It is possible that the singular freedom from interference enjoyed by the Fascisti in the spring of 1921 was due to a desire on Giolitti's part to foster those Nationalist sympathies which Mussolini was loudly proclaiming. The elections of May 15 produced little change, the Socialists and Communists together losing only 17 seats. Giolitti then executed the move for which he is notorious and permitted Bonomi to replace him as Premier. The administrations of Bonomi and Facta proved ineffectual in removing discontent. "Some idea of the prevailing parliamentary chaos may be gathered from the fact that since the armistice, with one exception, no law of importance has passed through the chamber." 2. There was thus plenty of sympathy for a "party of discontent." The recruits gained by Fascism during this period show this clearly. The Round Table thus summed them up—"honest and generous youths estranged from Socialism by its coolness to the war; university students, convinced they were the intellectual aristocracy; demobilized army officers;

1. See Chapter I., p.7
impoverished intellectuals; well-to-do intellectuals hostile to the Socialists." According as disgust grew with the continued failure of the government to function, so the popularity of Fascism grew. It began to absorb Nationalist elements and as it did so, the aims of the movement were accommodatingly adjusted. Close sympathy was maintained with D'Annunzio, who had seized Fiume in September 1919, by way of protest at governmental weakness in not securing it for Italy. The "Popolo d'Italia" poured forth criticisms of the Liberal jugglers at Montecitorio and praise of the Fascist "party of order" for saving Italy from "subversive" elements. They had "earned the thanks, not only of "capitalists" and landlords, who, in some districts, were in suspiciously close relations with the Fascist warriors, but also of the community in general." From November 21, 1920, when public indignation was aroused by the murder of the councillor and veteran Giordani in the very town hall of Bologna, until the elections of May 1921, a desultory warfare raged between Communist and Fascist, characterized by plenty of savagery on both sides.

3. Though Salvemini is an Anti-Fascist, his summary of losses in this period seems most fair, based as it is upon official Fascist figures and also upon a report appearing in the reliable "Corriere della Sera," generally admitted to be the most unbiased (before it came under Fascist control in 1925) of Italian newspapers. Salvemini says of the period from October 1, 1920, to October 30, 1922, "We are justified in conjecturing that, if the actual number of Fascist dead was 302 instead of the 216 given by the"Corriere," then the numbers killed by the Fascists must likewise be proportionately increased from 406 to round about 600 ----."
Though, as already indicated, the Socialists lost few seats in this election, the Fascists appeared in parliament for the first time with 31 seats, including one for Mussolini.

The work which brought Fascism to power, however, was not to be the ordinary constitutional method of obtaining votes. Fascism claims, but has never established, that it rules by the will of the Italian nation. Mussolini chose, or was forced to adopt, the method of the coup d'état. The Italian political arena has always presented such scenes as was then enacted.

"The kind of politics that the Italian race understands is the politics, not of the lobby or the polling-booth, but of the piazza. They want something dramatic — theatrical." 1 At Milan on October the fifth, 1922, Mussolini said, "In Italy there exist two governments, a fictitious one, run by Facta, and a real one run by the Fascisti. The first of these must give way to the second." 2 We are forced to believe him. With apparent impunity, in the same year, the Fascisti had burned the offices of the "Avanti," destroyed the premises of numerous Socialist clubs, and, by a semi-military mobilization of its "squadristi" crushed a general strike of the Alliance of Labour in record time! Let Mussolini himself describe the arrangements for the campaign which

followed: "I called to Milan on October 16th. a general who was saturated by real Fascist faith. I made a scheme of military and political organization on the model of the old Roman legions. We created — a slogan, a uniform and a watch-word. I knew perfectly the Fascist and the anti-Fascist situation in every region of Italy. I could march on Rome along the Tyrrhenian Sea, deviating toward Umbria. From the south the compact formations of Publie and Naples could join me. The only obstacle was a hostile zone, which centred in Ancona. I called Arpinati and other lieutenants of Fascism and ordered them to free Ancona from Social-communist domination. The town, which was known to be in the hands of anarchists, was conquered by manoeuvres carried out in perfect military fashion. There were some dead and wounded. Too bad! But now the remnants of the anti-Fascist forces were destroyed. Anti-Fascism was now concentrated in Rome; it was driven back to its barrack on Montecitorio, where parliament sat." ¹ On October 24th. a final conference of 40,000 Fascists gathered at Naples. Two days later, Facta resigned after failing to secure the King's consent to declare martial law and defend Rome with the army. After a conference with various party leaders, the King now sent for Mussolini and entrusted him, on October 30th. with the task of forming a government. 90,000 Blackshirts were permitted to parade through the streets of Rome and Mussolini declared to them from a balcony, "To-day Italy has not only a cabinet but a Government, a strong Government,

such as she has needed for many years past, but never obtained." With characteristic energy, he was able to gather and address on November 2nd, the new cabinet, which combined Fascist, Nationalist, Democratic and Catholic elements. The coup d'Etat is consummated and Italy rather breathlessly awaits the next step.

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CHAPTER III.

- The Theory of Fascism -

Every great political movement in history has had its theoretical basis. One of the characteristics of past history has assuredly been that the event has been preceded by a psychological birth and growth of the idea which led to it. The Liberalism of the 19th. Century, for example, had its theory expounded by John Locke and Rousseau; Socialism its Karl Marx; Anarchism its Proudhon. This is not to say that the exponent of the idea is responsible for its birth, but rather that he expresses in clearest form an idea which is born of existing conditions. Fascism appears from its history to present a reversal of this historical process. Action appeared first. The theory then arrived, altering at various stages, until it finally appears in its complete form with the establishment of Fascism in complete control of the state of Italy. Thus the idea or theory of the movement seems to be a gradual evolution dependent rather upon the progress of events and exigencies of the moment than upon the basic convictions of its leaders. Those responsible for its theory present themselves as apologists, whose explanations leave us with many unexplained blanks in the history of the growth of Fascism. An examination
of this evolutionary process will help us to estimate the value of the ultimate theory to emerge.

The Fascists do not publish their early programme now, but neither do they deny its existence. I feel perfectly safe in presenting the summary of its contents given by Don Sturzo, leader of the Popular Party:— "The main heads of Mussolini's Programme of 1919-20 were: the national constituent assembly to be understood as an Italian section of the international constituent assembly of the peoples; the proclamation of the Italian Republic; the decentralization of the executive power; the restriction of the functions of the state to the civil and political direction of national affairs; the abolition of the Senate and of the political police, an elective magistrature independent of the executive; abolition of all caste titles such as Prince, Duke, etc.; abolition of conscription; general disarmament and prohibition of the manufacture of war materials; freedom of thought, of conscience and of religion, of association, of the Press, of propaganda; of agitation, individual and collective; winding up of industrial and financial limited liability companies, suppression of banks and stock exchanges; a census of personal wealth and the confiscation of unproductive capital; banishment of parasites that do not make themselves useful to society; the grant of the land to the associated peasants; abolition of secret diplomacy; an open international policy inspired by the principle of the solidarity of the peoples and their independence in the confederation of States." ¹. A careful examination will

¹. Luigi Sturzo: "Italy and Fascismo." (Faber & Gwyer, London, 1926.) P. 100.
reveal that this programme contains a good deal of Communism especially in its relation to banks and industrial corporations; a sprinkling of Socialist Internationalism in two references to the Italian people's international position among "the peoples"; something of the Liberalism of John Stuart Mill in the limitation of the scope of the State and the emphasis placed upon the freedom of many things including the press; and finally some of the ex-soldiers' dissatisfaction with post-war diplomacy and war profiteers. There is no fairer or less passionate Anti-Fascist than Don Sturzo; furthermore his account tallies with that of Sforza in its main lines and with many other summaries or references. One may recognize, too, the generous and journalistic hand of Mussolini. The programme is a net, of sufficient capacity to sweep the sea of political discontent and capture all its wanderers. It was propounded in March of 1919 on the occasion of the organization of Fascism. Mussolini at this stage must secure followers. These he apparently hopes to obtain from the Revolutionary-Socialists and ex-combatants.

From the theoretical point of view it bears no relation to the present-day Fascism, unless it be a relation of opposites. There is no Republic. The title of Prince has recently been conferred on D'Annunzio by the influence of the Duce himself. There exists an almost complete centralization of all power in the hands of the Fascist State by reason of its latest law relating to

1. Sforza: "Italy and Fascism." (Foreign Affairs, April, 1925.)
Communes 1, Liberty of the press 2, of association 3, and of propaganda do not exist but have been abolished by Fascism. Capitalism is recognized as essential to welfare 4.

In 1920, as we have seen 5, Mussolini was influenced by a rapprochement with the Nationalists and a possible sympathetic treatment from Giolitti and the industrial capitalists. Thus it became necessary to discard his international and Social revolutionary doctrines. From this period of Fascism the emphasis is placed upon the failure of the central government, its weakness, and the need for reform in both domestic and foreign policy. The concrete result of this change of platform is the immense spread of Fascist membership and an alliance with the Nationalists. The "Blue Shirts" accompanied the Black-shirts to the gates of Rome and a formal alliance took place soon afterward. There were, it is true, a few recruits in 1919 from the ranks of the Socialist parties, but these men are, for the most part, associates and followers of Mussolini, many of them high in the Fascist administration to-day. The failure to appeal to Socialism was probably one of the causes of the revision of Fascist aims.

The appeal to force and to the political weariness of Italy had, as we have seen, its result in the successful
"March on Rome." For a time thereafter Mussolini seems uncertain. He secured from the legislature a year's freedom of action in which to reestablish order. The passage of a new electoral law followed which makes it possible for the party holding the largest number of elected candidates (provided that number be greater than twenty-five per cent of the total number of seats) to obtain two-thirds of the seats - a complete working majority. These moves convince us that Mussolini intends in 1923 to keep up a show of Constitutionalism, and at the same time to rule Italy.

The murder of Matteotti, or rather the storm of indignation which it aroused, in all probability set the compass course of the Fascist ship of state. Matteotti, a Socialist deputy, had proved himself one of the ablest of the opposition, and, Fascism's opponents say, was preparing an indictment of the Fascist methods in the 1924 elections. He was murdered (or killed in a struggle) by close associates of Mussolini himself. Mussolini fought with his back to the wall but he fought well, and his opponents, weak as they were against the Fascist Militia, failed to unite against him. The outcome of this struggle and of his experience in office is a veritable code of laws directed towards the concentration of power in the hands of himself as Premier and the Fascist heads as the Grand Council of Fascism.

This new entrenchment in the advance of Fascism

1. For fuller description of this affair See Chapter IV.
2. Sturzo: "Italy and Fascismo." P. 185.
3. See page 35 above for examples.
needed consolidation and protection on its theoretical side, especially from the flanking fire of its critics abroad. A Mussolini without watch-words, catch-phrases and grandiloquent utterances would not be a Mussolini. Mussolini has no reputation as a thinker. The new Fascist doctrine of the state comes to us from Alfredo Rocco, Minister of Justice and Dean of the Faculty of Law in the University of Padua. It is in the form of an address delivered at Perugia on August 30, 1925. The address has received the complete endorsement of Mussolini and is universally regarded by both Fascists and Anti-Fascists as the official statement of the doctrine of Fascism. In his letter of endorsement Mussolini assures Signor Rocco and the world that "Fascism has a doctrine." With our doubts thus removed, we feel that we are examining Fascism's clearest and most concise statement of its own basic theory.

Signor Rocco's introduction is not calculated, at first, to increase our confidence upon this point. "It is true," he says, "that Fascism is, above all, action and sentiment and such it must continue to be." We are soon reassured, however - "But Fascism is thought as well and it has a theory -----." My object in introducing these quotations is not flippant, but to convey the impression obtained from all approaches to the theory of Fascism, namely that the theory is secondary, an adjunct, a coat which is tailored to fit the full grown body of

2. Ibid. Page 391.
Fascism which the revolution and political adjustments have produced.

Signor Rocco then shows in detail how Liberalism, Democracy and Socialism are "atomistic", i.e. based upon the doctrine that the state exists for the individual, defending his rights as against that state, whether for political and social reasons, as in Liberalism, and Democracy, or for economic reasons as in Socialism, which aims to protect the interest of a particular class. Fascism claims to have discovered a new outlook. "For Fascism, society is the end, individuals the means, and its whole life consists in using individuals as instruments for its social ends." 1. "In other terms, Fascists make of the individual an economic instrument for the advancement of society, an instrument which they use so long as it functions and which they subordinate when no longer serviceable." 2. I am irresistibly reminded of the Persian Xerxes on his return through the stormy Aegean. Fearing that the extra weight of his soldiers will endanger the vessel, he appeals to their loyalty and they "subordinate" themselves into the stormy waters. Surely this is not a new doctrine. "It is really the Hegelian conception of the divine and omnipotent state with a slight change in terminology." 3. Hegel supplied a doctrine for Prussian autocracy. Rocco, Giovanni Gentile 4 and others

2. Ibid. P. 404.
have supplied a doctrine for a Fascist despotism. It is utterly beside the point to argue as to whether it is "benevolent despotism." A political theory must stand or fall according to the basis of sovereignty or supreme power in the state. The existing social system may be altered or abolished by that power at will.

Problems to be met by the Fascist State are next dealt with by Rocco. Those with which he deals are referred to as "of Liberty, of Government, and of Social Justice." "We, too," he says, in regard to Liberty, "maintain the necessity of safeguarding the conditions that make for the free development of the individual;" and again - "Fascism does not look upon the doctrine of economic liberty as an absolute dogma." Apparently, as between Liberal and Fascist states the motive alone differs. The former preserves the individual for his own good and the latter preserves him for the good of the State. To assume, in the second place, that Liberal and Democratic states look upon Liberty as "an absolute dogma" is fallacious. Where the Liberty of any individual interferes with the welfare of others, it is not permitted. If it were, the result would, of course, mean a return to barbarism.

Government is to be "entrusted to men capable of rising above their own private interests and of realizing the aspirations of the social collectivity considered in its unity and in its relation to the past and future." Signor Rocco is no fool and has besides some knowledge of
past history. He is therefore not ignorant of the fact that no perfect system has as yet been evolved for the choice of such godlike individuals as he describes. The pitfall from which Democracy escapes and from which Fascism can not escape, is that which yawns for the state which has made the wrong choice.

Next Signor Rocco bewilders the reader with this statement in regard to the problem of Social justice:— "The chief defect of the Socialistic method"—" lies "in that it will not recognize that the most powerful spring of human activities lies in individual self-interest—". On another page I read this:— "Hence the necessity, for which the older doctrines make little allowance, of sacrifice, even up to the total immolation of individuals, in behalf of society." The explanation of this apparent conflict is that Signor Rocco is arguing, in the first case in favour of the Fascist Syndicalist system with its use of Capital and in the second case in justification of war. That his premises clash need produce in us, his readers, merely a feeling of condolence. Signor Rocco began an impossible task. However, Social justice is to be obtained by Fascist Syndicalism. "It embodies a scheme for dealing with Trade Unions that must make Mr. Baldwin's "Die-hards" sick with envy." In brief, the services of capital are to be retained and strikes are to be prevented. The system has much to recommend it, but it rests on the general weakness of placing too much

of the responsibility for social justice upon the all-powerful state. 1. The scheme reflects the influence of Syndicalism, (not Fascist but Socialist) and of Sorel upon Mussolini and Fascism. In tracing the influences which have affected the life of Mussolini, Mr. William Kilborne Stewart states:- "This Syndicalist phase -- -- has left such a permanent impress on Mussolini's mind, that an adequate appreciation of it is necessary to the understanding of Fascism as a whole." 2. Now Fascist syndicalism has adopted Sorel's idea in so far as the structure of the Workmen's Syndicates are concerned. In this at least Mussolini has been faithful to the ideas of his early career. The resemblance ceases here, however. The Fascist Syndicate is not free. The right to strike is not allowed to it, nor sabotage, which is punishable under new laws. The right of a Syndicate to exist is dependent upon "recognition" by the state. 3. Hence the supremacy of the Fascist Corporative State is not threatened by the organization of Labour.

The speech of Signor Rocco closes with an account of the "historical value" of Fascism, and is based upon this statement:- "While, therefore, in other countries, such as France, England, Germany and Holland, the general tradition in the social and political sciences worked

1. For fuller discussion see Chapter IV., page 48.
3. For full description of recent Fascist law see Chapter IV.
in behalf of anti-state individualism, and therefore of liberal and democratic doctrines, Italy, on the other hand, clung to the powerful legacy of its past, in virtue of which she proclaims the rights of the state, the pre-eminence of its authority and the superiority of its ends.¹ Then follows a host of quotations from Aristotle, Dante, Machiavelli, Vico, Cuoco and Mazzini to prove his point. As the reader is aware ², the present account agrees in the main with Signor Rocco's statement. As to whether Italy is in an advanced stage of development or a retarded one, is another matter. But Signor Rocco has spoiled even this argument with this assertion - "The Liberal-democratic-socialistic ideology has so completely and for so long a time dominated Italian culture that, in the minds of the majority of people trained by it, it has assumed the value of an absolute truth, almost the authority of a natural law."³

In general, Fascist theory aims at a justification of autocratic or oligarchic rule. It "proclaims that the great mass of citizens is not a suitable advocate of social interests."⁴ "Natural intelligence and cultural preparation are of great service in such tasks."⁵

(If Alfredo Rocco wrote this with Mussolini in mind, one

2. See Chapter I. for survey of Italian History.
4. Ibid. Page 405.
5. Ibid. Page 405.
wonders if a chuckle rose in the throat of the excellent Minister of Justice! fasism must therefore stand before the world as other autocracies have stood. The attempt to show a new development, a new system, falls to the ground. Farther yet from possibility is the hope that Fascist theory offers anything to the rest of the world. "Thanks to it," says Signor Rocco, "Italy again speaks to the world and the world listens to Italy;" but he is not supported by his colleagues, almost all of whom look upon Fascism as a purely Italian movement.
CHAPTER III.  

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CHAPTER IV.

- Domestic Policy of the Fascists -

As already indicated, Mussolini's attempt to conciliate the opposition lasted until the summer of 1924, when the murder of Matteotti produced a crisis in his career, and led to a very apparent change in his domestic policy. A very brief examination of the Matteotti affair will help to make clearer the reason for this change.

Giacomo Matteotti was secretary to the Unitarian Socialist Party and one of the fearless opponents of Fascism. On May 30, 1924, he undertook an indictment of Fascist methods by a speech in the Chamber of Deputies. He was known to have collected data on the recent election, which, Anti-Fascists claim, had been unfairly conducted. He had moreover been the publisher of an exposure of Fascist methods. On June 10, he disappeared. On August 16, his body was found in a wood fourteen miles from Rome. In the meantime the police had arrested Dumini, a disreputable Fascist, Marinelli, Treasurer of the Fascist Party, Filipelli, editor of a Fascist paper, and Cesare Rossi, chief of the Fascist Press Department. Finzi, Under-Secretary

1. Chapter III. above.
2. Luigi Sturzo: "Italy and Fascismo." P. 169.
for the department of the Interior was suspected of complicity and resigned. Both Finzi and Rossi wrote memorials which, though not universally believed, placed the blame upon Mussolini. On December 1, 1925, the Examining Judges found that Marinelli and Rossi had given orders for abduction only, and in accordance with an Amnesty of the previous summer, were set free because they were guilty of a "political crime" which was not murder or manslaughter. At the same time, the examining judges found that the others were to be tried for "unpremeditated manslaughter" with a maximum penalty of twelve years imprisonment. The public trial took place and resulted in the condemnation of three men, including Dumini, to six years imprisonment. The above-mentioned amnesty cut off four years from this sentence and all three were set free two months after condemnation, that is to say, in May of 1926.

Long before this eventuality, Mussolini had begun his counter-attack against the storm of criticism which had been aroused. On the 24th. of June he obtained a vote of confidence from the Senate, after a diplomatic speech. The opposition, in the Chamber of Deputies, which, of course, amounted to only one-third of the chamber drew up an indictment of Fascism and its leader and then decided to remain away from the sessions. In this way, they played into the hands of their opponents. The press was first muzzled on July 8th, by a decree.

1.) Salvemini: "Fascist Dictatorship." P. 290.
2.)
giving prefects the right to suppress, after two official warnings, the publication of any newspaper. To silence criticism of the existence of the huge Fascist Militia or "Blackshirt" army, Mussolini had them swear allegiance to the King and thus put them on a National footing, side by side with the regular army. Goaded by the indictment of De Bono, his former Head of Police and the resultant inquiry ordered by the Senate; infuriated by the constant attacks of the press, not yet rendered helpless, Il Duce made a sensational speech in the Chamber on January 3, 1925, in which, after denying various charges of his opponents, he says, "Well, here, before this assembly, before the whole Italian people, I declare that I take upon myself, I alone, the political, moral, and historical responsibility of all that has befallen." This speech may be taken as the true division point between Mussolini's early attempts at compromise and his present-day attitude of supreme indifference to the rights of the opposition. Opinions vary as to the forces which influenced him. An article by an anonymous author who claims first hand knowledge of Fascism, states that the Matteotti murder forced Mussolini to rely on his extremists led by Farinacci, who used violence. The reforms which followed were a means of escaping these rough companions by tightening the hand of authority over the State. H. G. Wells, in an extravagant article pictures Mussolini

1. Sturzo: "Italy and Fascismo." Page 196.
2. "F": "Achievements of Fascism." (Foreign Affairs, July, 1926.)
as "afraid of truth which walks by day." "Away with them! Nitti, Amendola, Farni, Misuri, Matteotti, Salvemini, Sturzo, Turati! Away with all these men who criticize and watch and wait." Luigi Villari, most prominent among the Fascist propagandists, says, "This speech marked a turning point in the Government's policy and in the political situation. The menace to have recourse to strong measures was no empty threat, as the opposition knew that Mussolini was not going to stand any nonsense." 2.

In any case, Il Duce weathered the storm by depriving Italy of many of what she had been taught to regard as her liberties. To replace these liberties which, according to Fascism, the Italian does not want, appears the Corporative State. Under the Ministry of Corporations, with Mussolini himself at the head of it, are to be three huge unions of Confederations, one for employers, one for professional men, and a third for workmen. These unions are in turn subdivided into fifteen national Confederations, six for employers, three for professional people and six for workmen. These National Confederations are to represent the various great divisions of Labour and Capital - Industry, Agriculture, Commerce, Maritime and Aerial Transport, Land and Internal Transport, and Banking. Each National Confederation is in turn to consist of Federations,

1. The references by name are to various political opponents of Fascism who have met death, violence and exile at different times.
2. Luigi Villari: "The Fascist Experiment." Page 86.
fifty-seven in all, according to the published Scheme. ¹

Thus the National Confederation of Employers of Industry contains six federations, - Miscellaneous, Chemical, Silk, Cotton, Mechanical, and Metallurgical. Finally the primary syndicalist associations of the first grade are subdivisions of these Federations and are organized variously according to geographical regions. To coordinate the work of the federations and to form a connecting link to the Ministry, representatives are sent from employers', professionals' and employees' federations to form Corporations. For example, Corporation A may have representatives from metallurgical employers, metallurgical employees and from the professional federation of engineers. Thus all Labour, Professions, and Capital are to be centrally controlled.

In order to understand how complete is that control, the following points should be noted ².:

(These are laws of Italy passed by the Senate on March 11, 1926.)

(1) No association will be competent to make agreements or contracts relating to labour unless they are legally recognized by the Ministry.

(2) Syndicalist associations may be formed if they represent 10 per cent of employers, employees or professional men in their district.


²."Recent Legislation in Italy." (International Conciliation Publication, No. 223. Page 432.)
(3) Recognized associations are empowered to levy contributions, which are collectable like taxation from all in their category in the district, whether members or not.

(4) Officers of each organization (a president and Secretary) can hold office only if agreeable to the Ministry. The organizations are also subject to regulation and supervision of the Prefect of the Province. The Ministry is given power even to supersede all officers and committees, with an appointed commissioner.

(5) Collective agreements concluded by recognized organizations are binding upon all workers of the class to which the agreement relates, or in other words to non-members as well.

(6) Strikes and lockouts are prohibited, and organizers of such are punishable by fine or imprisonment.

(7) All Labour disputes must be dealt with by the district Courts of Appeal, sitting as Industrial Courts, with 3 magistrates and 2 experts. Conciliation must be attempted before judgment and arbitration may be used.

It thus appears that Fascism may suit itself as to character of Syndicalist Association, personnel of its officers, and, in brief, the entire control of Labour and Capital, once it can secure the necessary organization. Employers, however, are at present fighting shy of a system which will deprive them of independence. "They have
subsidized Fascism in order to break the power of Labour, not in order to accept its discipline over themselves." ¹

The workers also object on the ground, first, that their new secretaries must be persona gratae to the Prefect and Ministry and secondly, that the contribution is compulsory even for men who may not be permitted to join. ²

On the other hand, it is argued by proponents of the scheme that it provides, under a protecting State control, the means of avoiding class war and its resultant economic distress. Further, since the publication of the so-called "Charter of Labour" it can be seen that the Corporative State is intended to raise the status of the workingman. He will have the right, by articles 15 and 16 to a weekly rest on Sunday and on annual paid holiday, and by articles 17 and 18 to continuous labour in accordance with his contract and in case of breach an indemnity proportionate to years of service. Accident prevention and insurance are to be established and improved. Insurance against illness is to be established and that against unemployment improved. Finally there is to be a nation-wide State organization to provide recreation, education and general beneficent assistance to the workers of both sexes (the Dopolavoro movement).

The Round Table of December, 1928, sums up the

² "Fascist Reforms in Italy." (Round Table, March, 1926. Vol. 16.)
present situation very fairly:-

(1) 4,000,000 are now enrolled in the Fascist Confederations, but -----

(2) No Corporations exist, probably because employers are hanging back.

(3) 3 or 4 decisions to date of the Labour courts have been in favour of workmen.

(4) Italy now leads the world in advanced social legislation.

(5) Employers are wary because they fear that private ownership is in danger, in spite of Fascist assertions to the contrary. Thus -----

(6) The Fascist Corporative state as yet resembles Heine's Artisan, with body and "no soul."

By the Law of May 17, 1928, the elections are to depend upon this new organization. Directing committees of the federations and Fascist Cultural Associations are to draw up a list of 1000 candidates. But Mussolini out-Napoleons Napoleon I. with the further provision that the Grand Council of Fascism shall choose from this list, or from its own a list of 400 candidates as to whose election the voters (over 21) will say yes or no.

The above-mentioned Grand Council of Fascism has only recently been legalized (September, 1928), though it has had unofficial existence since the organization of the

1. Round Table. "Italy in 1928." December, 1928. No. 73.
party. Its legalization is Mussolini's reply, first to the opposition argument that it had no legal existence and thus could not function and, secondly, to the oft-repeated criticism that he had not provided for his successor in dictatorship. Thus, on the death, or retirement of Mussolini, the appointment of his successor is to be in the hands of this Grand Council. In general the move is criticised, not only because dictatorships are held to depend on personality, not appointment, but also because the Grand Council's power is almost unlimited (under Mussolini) and extends to a possible limitation of the prerogative of the Crown. Many critics see in it a dangerous hint of a return to the earlier Republican ideas of Mussolini. As it now exists it is composed of all Ministers, heads of the National confederations and of Fascist Cultural Associations, Presidents of Chamber and Senate, Secretaries and past Secretaries of the Fascists, and the "quadrumvirate" of generals who led the "March on Rome," but these are all subordinate to Mussolini and hold their positions at his pleasure. Says one writer, "it (the Grand Council) had no will or power or function except as an enlargement of his personality."

Though the Fascist Corporative State may be regarded as an interesting experiment, another group of laws recently promulgated by the Fascist government cannot be

1. H.R. Spencer: "Political Developments in Italy." (American Political Science Review. February, 1929. Vol. 23.) The law constituting the Grand Council also gives them power to interfere with succession to the throne - a very handy weapon to procure the obedience of the monarch to the desires of Fascism.
described as either new or interesting. They aim to extend the power of the central government by centralizing local government and, secondly, by destroying the rights of individuals.

The first-mentioned group includes the law relating to Podestas and to Prefects. The Podesta Law substituted for elected officers a "Podesta," appointed by the central government in all communes of less than 5000 people. Thus at one stroke 7337 communes out of 9148 in all Italy lost their elective councils and officials. The Prefects Law extends the already vast power of the prefect over the province. He may nominate a consultative body to assist the Podesta of a commune in his province and exercises supervisory powers over all public services except those relating to War, Navy, Aviation and Justice.

The second group makes legal certain attacks upon Liberty which had already been in process through the agency of the Fascist Militia. It includes the law against Secret Societies, the Press Law and a law to limit the Anti-Fascist activities of Italians abroad.

The Secret Societies Law, which appears to have been levelled at Freemasonry 1 provides for government inspection of membership and regulations. It is believed by Anti-Fascists to furnish a means for securing names of Fascism's opponents, who will thus be marked down for persecution.

1. Freemasonry has been practically eliminated from Italy by the Fascists, first to curry favour with the Roman Catholic Church, its opponents, and secondly because they supported Liberalism.
The Press Law follows the decrees of 1924 which were provoked by the Matteotti Press campaign, and establishes complete control of the press. The law places responsibility upon a Director, editor or sub-editor who must be recognized by his district Court of Appeal. Two offences cancel this right to recognition. The journalist must register with this court. The joker of the system appears in the fact that the Prefect has Plenary power to decide as to what constitutes an offence. (Article 3 of Municipal and Provincial Law.) "What are people complaining about?" asked Signor Mussolini, "apart from the fact that it is not permissible to criticize Fascism, the Regime, or the Government, the Italian Press is the freest in the world." This is not the first time that Mussolini's utterances have proved his opponents' case. The result has been to utterly silence the opposition press. Two or three Communist journals now appear, stripped of all comment. Is there a value in criticism, in opposition? If so, Mussolini is blind to it, or afraid of it. This extract appeared in the Popolo d'Italia of December 30, 1925: - "To-day, among the things for which there is no room in Italy, must be included the Opposition." 

Italians outside Italy, or on visits merely to

1. "Italy in 1928." (Round Table. December 1928. No. 73.)
2. "Fascist Reforms in Italy." (Round Table. March, 1926. Vol. 16.)
foreign parts must also be circumspect. The penalty of loss of citizenship and property awaits him, if, in the judgment of a Fascist Commission, he is guilty of an act which may affect the good name and prestige of Italy.

There remains to be mentioned what, in many ways, is the most singular set of laws ever introduced into and passed by a legislature. They relate to the Premier and, in brief, make his position legal, and himself responsible only to the King; make him independent of an adverse vote of the Chamber; and lastly, fix punishments for any offence "by word or act" against his person! A dictatorship indeed! In view of Mussolini's new status and of the King's coronation oath to support the Sardinian "Statuto" of 1848, many are beginning to wonder how long the Crown will suffer itself to be a pawn in the great chess-game of Fascism.

In the economic field, it is natural to suppose that such a regime would attain its greatest success. At the opening of the Second Empire in France, Napoleon was able, in a similar situation politically, to inaugurate an era of tremendous industrial and commercial prosperity. The difficulty of reconciling various interests in a democratic country is often insuperable. In Italy Mussolini has solved this problem, by creating an autocratic government. Sturzo points out that such a government can so easily make and change laws that there is danger of
too much interference. There is no denying that democratic states avoid such errors by criticism and adequate opposition. Mussolini's greatest efforts have been aimed at making Italy more self-supporting and at balancing the budget. Let us deal with each in turn.

A writer in New Republic regards the attempt to make Italy independent of importation of food-stuffs and raw materials as "the pursuit of an impossible objective." With statistics and information, based upon McGuire's authoritative work on "Italy's International Economic Position," compiled at the request of the American Institute of Economics, he points out that, by the utmost effort in drainage, irrigation and use of fertilizer, production can never reach such a stage as to materially affect Italy's adverse trade balance. "La Battaglia del Grano" was the Fascist name for a mass effort, assisted by a battery of experts, to "produce more and consume less" grain, particularly wheat. Little result was obtained economically, though the creation of a myth and reason for industry is said to have increased Mussolini's hold on the agricultural class. At the same time Mussolini, with the same objective, has increased food tariffs and this merely means a rise in cost of living for all classes. Signor Nitti has estimated

4. Nitti: "Dynamic Italy." (These Eventful Years. Encyclopaedia Britannica Inc. 1924.)
that Italy's need of imported food amounts to 225 lbs. a head per year.

"In industry," says Luigi Villari, 1. "Improvement has been even greater," and he quotes numerous figures to show increase of production of motor-cars, textiles and agricultural implements. To decide on the value of this production, however, we must take into account that only one important raw product in most of these industries is found in Italy, and that is labour. Her mineral resources are sulphur, nitrates and building stone. For her textile industries she produces silk. In 1925 she imported 11,000,000 tons of coal to run her factories. She has always had an adverse trade balance, and it has been increased, not decreased, by the growth of manufactures. As against 117,000,000 lire immediately after Italy became a nation, the excess of imports over exports just before the war had reached one billion lire. 2. Again a high tariff is necessary to keep the metallurgical industries going, and in consequence the agriculturalists pay high prices for agricultural equipment. Fascism has done no more to encourage water-power developments than past governments but any effort towards this end is bound to benefit Italy, as it means a reduction in the importation of coal, a fact which is properly appreciated by Mussolini. Now this adverse trade balance which Fascist economists are trying to reduce or prevent plainly indicates the ultimate ruin of Italy.

2. "Italy's Economic Nationalism." (New Republic. February 16, 1927.)
unless other services can produce the necessary balance, to equalize the income and outgo. Otherwise foreign loans, public and private, would continue until the peak of possibility had been reached.

To remove this state of affairs, Mussolini has encouraged increase of shipping services by building of merchant marine until Italy stands sixth in the world. ¹. He has encouraged tourist trade, but it has, as yet, shown no great increase. Over the greatest external source of credit, namely, the remittances of Italians who are earning money abroad, he, of course, has no great power, and, owing to the United States Quota law, and decrease of demand for South European immigration in Argentine, Canada and Australia, these remittances have gone down since the war.

Thus, in the absence of raw materials and with an unfavourable trade balance which no economic reform has as yet been able to destroy, Italy is driven towards increased labour and cheaper labour to enable her to compete with more favourably situated nations. In other words, Mussolini must continue to preach energetically his well-known doctrine of hard work. "If Italian Labour will be content with a low enough standard of living, with long enough hours and with hard enough work, it may just be possible for Italian industry to gain and keep export

¹. Knight, Barnes and Flugel: "Economic History of Europe in Modern Times." (Houghton-Mifflin. New York, 1928.) "In 1925 Italy held sixth place, having nearly doubled her tonnage in 12 years."
markets and to diminish the trade deficit."¹ Trouble ahead for Il Duce! Not only must he reconcile capitalists to reduced profits, but he must reconcile to a lower standard of life those same syndicalist workmen who are expecting wondrous things of the new regime!

The problem of over-population does not help to supply this remedy. Excess of births over deaths in Italy amounts to over 400,000 ². This has been partly helped by emigration to foreign countries. But "about three-quarters of Italian emigrants return ³. The colonies "can in no manner provide for the excess of her population."⁴ Hence an annual increase of 300,000 must be provided with subsistence. It is very difficult to reconcile Mussolini's well-known policy of state encouragement of large families with this cold, hard fact. The probability is that this policy is due, not to cold, hard, fact "but to the cultivation of a myth, the truculent nationalism (of words) which may be necessary to the support of his regime in Italy.⁵

The second of Fascism's objectives has been achieved, in so far as it is possible to ascertain. The budget has developed a most satisfactory surplus, thanks to the work of De Stefani in reforming the system of collection so as

¹. "Italy's Economic Nationalism." (New Republic. Feb. 16, 1927.)
². Nitti: "Dynamic Italy." (These Eventful Years.) P. 635.
³. Ibid.
⁴. Ibid.
⁵. For further discussion, see Chapter V., page 77.
to gather in the vast number of tax evaders; thanks also
to the excellent work of his successor Volpi, in
arranging the settlement of the United States and British
war-debts. 1. Volpi announced a surplus of 417 million
lire in 1925, and of 2268 million lire in 1926. 2. Many
Anti-Fascists accuse the Fascist department of Finance of
juggling figures, or of acquiring a budget surplus by
robbing the treasuries of the Communes, whose deficits
would not be so widely known. On the other hand, an
apparently well-informed writer 3., in a frankly critical
article in "Foreign Affairs" states:— "That Italian
finance has been placed on a sound basis cannot be
denied.
" Sturzo, a writer without bitterness, but still an Anti-
Fascist, gives much praise to Fascist Finance, referring
to Volpi's "striking success" in war-debt settlement, and
also to the common-sense attitude towards Reparations.
His one great criticism, that of failure to stop inflation,
has since been rendered innocuous by reduction of paper
money to the extent of $2\frac{1}{2}$ billion lire on August 31, 1926,
and the stabilization of the lire round 90 to the pound, 5.
in 1927. Public confidence in the Government policy has

1. Volpi: "Italy's Financial Policy." (International
2. Ibid. Pages 451, 456.
3. "F": "Achievements of Fascismo." (Foreign Affairs, July,
1926.)
4. Sturzo: "Italy and Fascismo." P. 152.
5. Volpi: Ibid. Pp. 451, 458. This stabilization and
subsequent return to the gold standard has been criticised
on the ground that the lira was rated high in order to
show or attempt to show superiority to the franc, -- --
a political move with bad economic results. Robert Littel
in an article "Venice" (New Republic, March 20, 1929), says,
"The franc is 25 to the dollar, the lira 18; a difference that
keeps foreigners from buying. -- -- 9000 fewer tourists
came to Venice in May, 1918, than in May, 1927."
been shown by the subscription to the Lictor's Loan in 1926, a government security to provide for the funding of the floating debt. "Three million persons subscribed amounts exceeding 3,000,000 lire. Italian emigrants abroad participated in the subscription to the extent of over 200 million lire." 1 Thomas W. Lamont, American economist, states, in regard to the above-mentioned juggling, "I am satisfied that the central government exercises close supervision over municipal budgets and municipal financing, and that the improvement in municipal finance has measurably paralleled that in central government finance." 2 The balanced budget is based upon very high taxation and, as yet, Fascist Ministers have not used their budget surpluses to reduce the rate which still amounts to 20% of the income. Instead, it has been devoted to "reconstruction purposes and the defense services." 3 As in connection with Italy's economic policy we noted that hard work alone, with decreased return, would secure a favourable trade balance, so, now, we realize that Italy's finances are on a firmer basis through the tremendous effort of the Italian tax-payer.

Opinions seem fairly favourable towards the reform "fascistissima" as Mussolini calls the Gentile Educational

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2. Thomas W. Lamont: "Italy's Social and Economic Progress since 1922." (Survey Graphic, March, 1927.)
reform. The original reform was initiated under authority of a law of December 3, 1922, by Giovanni Gentile, one of Fascism's philosophers. Referring to this reform, Professor Marraro of Columbia University gives high praise: "Her educators have vitalized the Italian school and with, Italian culture." 1. It is true that Gentile had been working in preparation for this reform long years before Fascism, but that does not detract from the credit of Mussolini, who gave him a free hand to carry it out.

Centralization of elementary schools under the state, standardization of teachers' qualifications, and a state examination were much-needed reforms in elementary education.

A most interesting reform in secondary education is that which provides for the free education of those, only, who are proven by examination to be fit for it. The remainder must pay their way through the private institutions. The curriculum provides for increased Latin studies and for religious instruction, probably to conform to Mussolini's well-known policy of conciliation towards the Vatican.

To raise the standard of the universities, a general withdrawal of State support from all but twenty-four of the better institutions came into effect. All

degrees from these selected universities are of the same standing, with a state examination.

Naturally there was a good deal of opposition from discharged officials and teachers - numbering hundreds; also from universities suddenly deprived of the means of existence. "Briefly the reforms weighed too heavily on most people to be passed by any parliament. All the resources of absolute power and of a government established by the sword rather than by parliamentary votes, were required to enforce this policy of educational reform." 1

As might be imagined, possessing such a motive force, the educational system has its Fascist side. All officials, including Board of Education members, heads of faculties, and rectors of the universities are to be appointed through the Government. Thus the political element, always out of place in educational institutions, is introduced. Even the outward and visible signs of Fascism are provided for. The Roman salute is obligatory upon students and professors, in school and out.

It is as yet difficult to say how far the new Concordat of February, 1929, will affect the Gentile Reforms. One thing is certain, and that is, that religious education will be compulsory not only in the elementary, but in the secondary schools as well, a thing never contemplated by Gentile, who never agreed to religious education for its own sake, but as a necessary foundation for the enlargement of the pupil's mind in philosophy.

1. Giuseppe Prezzolini: "School and Church under Fascism." (Survey Graphic. March, 1927.)
The Rome Correspondent of the Manchester Guardian sends news of an inter-Governmental and Papal commission, which has been set up to study future reform, including that of education. It may well be, as he says, that "Signor Gentile's education reform has become a thing of the past." 1.

The fact will have been noted in this brief survey of educational reform that religious instruction has again found a place in Italian public schools --- a very evident gesture of friendliness to the Vatican. Gentile advocated the reform because he believed religious instruction a proper approach to History and Philosophy, Fascism welcomed the idea as a means of reconciliation with the Church, and the Church accepted it with its characteristic attitude, in the belief that half a loaf is better than no bread.

In 1904 Mussolini said, "God does not exist; science has proved the absurdity of religion ----." 2. In 1921, the leader of the Fascists said, "I am convinced that the Latin tradition and the tradition of Imperial Rome is alive to-day in Catholicism." 3. From the "March on Rome" to the present day, Mussolini has assiduously sought the Pope's approval and a closer touch with the Church, for two main reasons, to secure first the defeat of the Popolari 4. and secondly the powerful aid of the Church

1. Manchester Guardian. March 1, 1929.
3. Ibid.
4. For early history of the party see Chapter II.
both at home and abroad for the Fascist regime.

Three months after the march on Rome, Mussolini expelled the Popolari from his cabinet. In 1923 the Pope consented to the dismissal of Don Sturzo from office - a partial concession only - and also forbade priests to be members of a political association. After the 1924 elections and the Matteotti murder the fate of the Popular Party was sealed, for the time being.

Because of her political usefulness to his regime, Mussolini continued to woo the church. By establishment of religious instruction in the elementary schools, and a concerted attack on the common enemy, Freemasonry, by reestablishment of religious ceremony in affairs of state and even by his own attendance at church services, Il Duce persisted in his blandishments. Again and again, his less far-seeing followers undid his work. The Catholic Trade Union Clubs had to share the fate of the Communist and the Church was especially interested in this experiment of Socialism beneath its wing. After the elections of 1924, Popular Party voters were maltreated by Fascist bands in Brianza and the Pope was roused to the extent of sending 50,000 lire for relief. Farinacci, Secretary and storm centre of the Fascist party so far forgot himself as to publicly insult Cardinal Gasparri, whereupon the Pope presented the Cardinal with a medal as a mark of confidence.

For years the Fascists have hoped and the Anti-Fascists have scoffed. Rumour has chased rumour concerning an early settlement. Opinion abroad considered it
impossible for the most part or, at least, many years remote. Henry R. Spencer \(^1\) refers to the "manifest hopelessness of the regimes finding a solution of the ancient problem of Roman Church and Italian State."

They are, he says, two absolutisms which it is impossible to couple together. Ludovic Novdeau \(^2\) sees two mighty obstacles; first the fact that the church is international and could never retain her influence abroad, if coupled to a Nationalistic movement like Fascism; secondly Fascism's ill-treatment of her child, the Popular Party.

The impossible has come about! Now in the spring of 1929, we hear through the Press of the signing of an agreement ending the sixty year "imprisonment" of the popes. The pope interviews a reporter of the Associated Press and tells him how glad he has been to receive congratulatory messages from Roman Catholic friends abroad! The private railway car of "Pio Nono" is resurrected from its museum, dusted, photographed, and made ready to bear the present pope on a tour of Italy, the land of the "conquerors" of the papal States. The terms of the settlement are publicly known to include extended territory in the Imperial City, a large indemnity for the papal States, originally taken in 1860 to 1870 while Italy was achieving nationhood. Though the actual terms of the settlement of February 11th. will not be published until the middle of April, 1929,

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sufficient has been made known officially in a
communique of February 11th. to enable correspondents to
hazard a guess as to its effects. Adam Day, in the
American Nation 1., sums up the main provisions as
follows:-

(1) Institution of Canon Law in the courts of Italy.
(2) Roman Catholicism becomes the state religion as in
Spain.
(3) Permanent institution of religious teaching in the
schools.
(4) Legalization of religious marriages.
(5) Civil enforcement of church edicts.
(6) Sovereignty over slightly enlarged territory
including, roughly, the Patrimony of St. Peter.
(7) Indemnification - about $105,000,000.

There is, of course, in any pact with Italy, a
danger that the Papacy will become a national and Italian
institution, just as it became a French one in the
seventy years of the "Babylonish Captivity," with a
consequent lessening of its influence abroad. This will
be especially true in France where opposition and even
fear of Mussolini is most intense. 2. Mr. Day 3. points

   Feb. 20, 1929.
2. From the London "Observer." Feb. 17, 1929. (Paris
   Correspondent.) "On the other hand the Radicals, who
are no friends of Italy, view, with some apprehension,
the added power which the Treaty has given to Italian
imperialism. - - - M. Jacques Seydoux points out in
the Petit Parisien this morning, that the Papacy will
soon show a reaction from its present enthusiasm for
Italy, for, unless it does so, there will certainly be
a check to the remarkable progress which Catholicism,
alone of all religions, has made in other and especially
in English-speaking countries."
out that Cavour always stood for "a free church in a free state," while Mussolini has bound state and church together. It will be interesting to see which programme will work out to the best advantage. As to the institution of canon law in Italian courts, it is too early to prophesy. In one way, it seems a retrograde measure, involving a return to an outworn system, discontinued in every country in Europe, including Spain, the former stronghold of the Inquisition. In another way, it adds strength to Mussolini, since the canon law is to be administered by the civil courts. From the Vatican point of view, the "Observer" reports an official article in the "Osservatore Romano" in these words, "The Roman Question never was political but always religious and the Pope settled it as the supreme head of the church on earth, in order to continue his mission with full liberty and independence."

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The foregoing chapter will have shown the great need of a sane and settled foreign policy on the part of Italy's government, in order to avoid war. War, especially with those powers, upon whom she depends for raw materials and foodstuffs, would be suicidal, if only the financial problem be considered. Another need, also is abundantly clear to Mussolini, if to no one else, and that is the need of colonies. In one of his more moderate speeches in the Senate he says: "It is not possible to condemn a people like the Italian people to vegetate. I believe that the states with which Italy was allied in the Great War will come to see that Italy's legitimate claims must be met." That the case of Italy is unfortunate in her colonial expansion cannot be denied. As a young nation, she was not awake to the passing opportunities in Africa, as the other powers partitioned that continent in the dying years of the 19th. Century. The case of Tunis, for example, shows a singular lethargy on the part of her statesmen and people.

It was snatched from beneath the very nose of Italy by France, although it was already extensively colonized by Italians. The comparative worthlessness of her present colonies, Eretria, Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, has been shown.

In a sense it may be said that there is no Fascist foreign policy. It is Mussolinian. Though Il Duce holds, nominally, many portfolios, there is no doubt that his heart is in one department, which he has looked after from the first - the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

There is strength in the Mussolinian foreign policy and there is weakness. A wholesale condemnation or a wholesale approval seems to me impossible.

The strength of his policy lies in the continuation of the moderate, conciliatory policy of his predecessors in office. Prezzolini says, "there was not a single move of a revolutionary character in Mussolini's foreign policy except the transference of the Ministry from the Palazzo della Consulta to the Palazzo Chigi." "The foreign policy of Fascismo is merely Italy's traditional policy dramatized" is Mr. James G. McDonald's neat summary of the situation.

In nothing is this so clearly shown as in his dealings with Jugo-Slavia and the Adriatic problem.

1. See Chapter I.
3. McDonald: "Fascist Foreign Policy." (Survey Graphic. March, 1927.)
Giolitti saw the danger of any threat to Italian control of the Adriatic. Hence the treaty of Rapallo and the attack on D'Annunzio in Fiume. Mussolini merely went farther on the same route. He succeeded in January, 1924, in obtaining a treaty with Jugo-Slavia, by which Italy annexed Fiume, but gave Jugo-Slavia sufficient right to preserve her commercial outlet to the Adriatic. The treaty of Tirana between Italy and Albania, November 27, 1926, though it caused what amounted to an uproar in Jugo-Slavia and France, because it apparently aimed at Italian control of Albania, is now regarded as a move towards Italian security in the Adriatic. It is true, as numerous commentators point out, that the treaty might make easy the annexation of Albania and consequent penetration of the Balkans and, after the 1914 experience, it is universally recognized that "to upset the Balkans is to play with fire." 1. On the other hand, Jugo-Slavia, because of her 1921 invasion of Albania, does not come into court with clean hands; and Mussolini's official interpretation of the treaty as involving no such scheme of annexation must stand until the contrary appears.

It is perhaps natural, because of France's consistent support of Jugo-Slavia and the Little Entente, that Franco-Italian relations are in a condition of strain. France, quite naturally, fears any move towards Italian

expansion, because it may upset the status quo, either in the Balkans or in the Mediterranean. She also feels that any colonial expansion of Italy must be at her expense. Possibly, if there is such a thing as a diplomatic conscience, it reminds her of the seizure of Tunis. In discussing a possible accord between Italy and France, Henri de Jouvenel points out that "in such a partnership, Italy would supply the partner and France would supply the colonies." 1. Italy, also quite naturally has the feeling of having been left out of the distribution of colonies. The Peace Conference left her dissatisfied. She is inclined, therefore, to look with envy upon France's mandates, particularly Syria, and to compare France's lack of increase in population with her own huge annual gain. "The truth is," says Arthur Pound, 2 in an article entitled "The Feud of the Latin Sisters," "that Italy, in the pride of surging youthful nationalism wants to go somewhere, anywhere, and France, diplomatically and unobtrusively, arranges that there shall be no place for Italy to go."

A further strain has been introduced into Franco-Italian relations because of the presence in France of Italian political exiles. These, according to Italy, are deliberately encouraged by the French. The shooting

of the Italian Vice-consul in Paris by the Communist, Sergi di Modugno is a case in point. A French jury found him guilty of nothing more than a common assault and his sentence was a light one. The consequence was that many Anti-French demonstrations took place which received official approval from Fascist headquarters. The result has been that the French frontier and French relations have been most difficult. For much the same reason, Turkey has felt uneasy. 70,000 square miles of Anatolia were originally promised to Italy by the treaty of St. Jean de Maurienne. Subsequently denied this sphere of expansion, because of the failure of Russian consent, Italy has never ceased to look in the direction of Asia Minor.

There are, however, no other persistent enmities involving Italy. The Spanish accord in 1923 ended a long trade rivalry between two states with similar products, and in spite of French alarm at the time, has never reached the stage of an Anti-French alliance in the Mediterranean. With Hungary, Rumania, Switzerland, Turkey and Germany, Mussolini has achieved commercial

1. The Paris Correspondent of the "London Observer," December 7, 1928, reports:— Public opinion has in fact been impressed by the attempted anti-French demonstrations that took place in the vicinity of the French Embassy in Rome and elsewhere in Italy and by the bitter and even menacing commentaries on the Modugno case made in the Fascist newspapers."
treaties and friendship. First of all the Allies, Italy, under his guidance, recognized the Soviet. A commercial treaty aiming at possession of the Black Sea trade was the result. "Though it is possible for the cynic to find, in each of these treaties, reasons to argue that Italy is seeking a vantage point from which to bribe or coerce her neighbours to make territorial or other concessions, the general effect as a whole has been, without question, to make more secure the peace of Europe." 1. It is true that the League of Nations is tolerated, but not loved, in Italy, but it is also true that Italy pledged herself as one of the guarantors of Locarno. This move, which immensely advanced the prestige of Italy was one of several very definitely pacific efforts of Mussolini. At the outset, on the reparations question, for example, he had advocated a reasonable attitude towards Germany in the matter of payments to be made. Later, when Poincare invaded the Ruhr to enforce treaty obligations, Italy "sent no troops into the Ruhr and only a handful of engineers who were subsequently withdrawn." 2. The above-mentioned treaty with Switzerland, September 20, 1924, was one of the most advanced moves towards perfect arbitration arrangements in Europe. The "provision that

1. J.G. McDonald: "Fascist Foreign Policy." (Survey Graphic. March, 1927.)
the Permanent Court should exercise a compulsory jurisdiction in equity as well as in law, went beyond anything that had been inserted in any previous arbitration treaty." 1. Thus Mussolini disposed of a certain ill-feeling engendered because of petty border incidents at Lugano and Ponte Tresa. On May 4, 1928, Mussolini, in a communication to the American Ambassador, welcomed the Kellogg Pact for outlawing war in these words:— "I hardly need to assure you that Italy, adhering to the policy which she is constantly following, has welcomed with lively sympathy this initiative and offers very willingly her cordial collaboration toward reaching an agreement." 2. At the same time there is an apparent lukewarmness towards disarmament questions which is not only inconsistent, but, in some quarters, alarming. Mussolini's policy of increasing army, navy and air force is well known. 3. In reply to the invitation of United States to a naval disarmament conference in 1927, "the Italian Government stated that because of the unfavourable geographical position of Italy, it could not expose itself without great risks to a binding limitation of its armaments." 4.

Thus far, the strength of Mussolini's foreign policy has been indicated. His bombastic utterances are

1. Ibid. P. 268.
3. For Mussolini's speech on this question, see below, page 78.
his principal weakness. They are very numerous, and their effect upon other nations, as observed in the press, would be comical if we could forget how easily Europe exploded in 1914. I have selected what I consider to be the gem of the collection, an extract from Mussolini's address to the Chamber in May, 1927:

"The duty of Italy is to perfect all her armed forces, land, sea and air. We must be able, at a given moment, to mobilize five million men. We must be able to arm them. We must strengthen the navy and make our air force so powerful that the roar of its engines will drown every other noise in the country, and the shadow of its wings darken the sun. Then, on that day, some time between 1935 and 1940, at a crucial point in European history, we shall be able to make our voice felt and our rights recognized for good and all." 1

One cannot help wishing that the sound-drowning capacity of Mussolini's air force were in a higher state of efficiency to-day. On another occasion he was carried by a flotilla to Tripoli, where he struck an attitude and mouthed an imperialistic speech, which caused months of comment as to his future intentions in the press the wide world over. In February, 1926, he volunteered, in the Senate, to march beyond the Brenner, and if necessary, renew the conquest of Germany. He had been roused by comments in the German press on Italian oppression in the

German Tyrol and, in particular, by proposals to boycott Italian goods. Herr Stresemann's reply was moderate and explanatory, the only reply possible for a defenceless nation.

It is noteworthy that Mussolini goes farthest where he feels safest, not only in the above-mentioned affair with Germany, but in the well-known quarrel with Greece—"the Corfu Crisis." This matter went beyond words. While conducting an investigation of the Greek-Albanian frontier on behalf of the Conference of Ambassadors, the Italian, General Tellini and his staff were murdered in September, 1923. Mussolini sent Greece a severe ultimatum at once. The apologetic Greek reply was not accepted because it did not at once and completely accede to all the terms of the ultimatum, and Mussolini immediately sent a fleet to bombard and occupy Corfu. The bombardment has been explained by Mussolini as being due to the failure of the Greek commandant to display a flag of truce. When the League of Nations, appealed to by Greece, was disposed to interfere, Mussolini, with full knowledge of the League Covenant, makes this curious statement, "I respect the aims of the League, but deny that there is anything in the pact providing for intervention in such cases as the present, which touches the honour of Italy." 1. The matter was eventually referred to the Conference of Ambassadors by the League, Greece

and Italy having acknowledged the competence of that body to settle the dispute.

How shall we estimate speeches and actions such as these? "For our part," says the New Statesman, "we believe that this speech (see page 78) is one of his periodical explosions of gas, designed to tickle the ears of faithful Fascists." Mr. E. W. P. Newman in the Contemporary Review, warns us as follows, "It must be remembered, however, that the Italians are a people, full of imagination and enthusiasm, and that, for this reason, Signor Mussolini employs eloquence and show as the means best calculated to appeal to the character of the Italian masses." There is nothing in Mussolini's conduct of foreign affairs to oppose this view. "Even the Corfu incident does not really convict Mussolini of a bellicose policy. -- Mussolini was simply practising the accepted method by which a great power coerces a weak state."

All this may be true. It is easily seen, for example, that Mussolini's security and that of Fascism depends a great deal on the success with which he feeds the spirit of Nationalism. Accordingly he fosters national pride by telling Italians how great their nation is and will be, and how mighty are the Roman traditions behind them. Indirectly, he increases their energetic

3. J. G. McDonald: "Fascist Foreign Policy." (Survey Graphic. March, 1927.)
support of his projects, makes them work with a vision. As Luigi Villari expresses it, "Signor Mussolini has given an entirely new complexion to Italy’s foreign relations, and the people feel the "Mussolini touch' in this field as in other aspects of Italian political life." 

Yet, as the dangerous crisis of the Matteotti affair has shown, there may come a time when the leader of the Fascists is not so strong and so secure as he is at the present moment. In such a case, his words may prove to be more potent than they at present appear. Mussolini is creating what Jouvenel calls "a perilous atmosphere." In this he is assisted by the Fascist Press. Jouvenel quotes an article from L’Impero of February 5, 1927, to illustrate the type - "We wish the last few friends that France has in Italy would forget their stinking 'Latin brotherhood' once and for all." The weakness, nay, danger, lies in the possibility that the fires Mussolini is kindling may get beyond his control. "F", an anonymous writer in Foreign Affairs, sees in this nationalistic tendency the reason for the resignation of Contarini, the efficient Under-secretary of Foreign affairs. "It is," he says, "a source of unstability and disquietude;" and he sees a "disquieting parallel between Italian policies

1. Luigi Villari: "The Fascist Experiment."
As has been pointed out, Italy's foreign policy is, to a great extent, guided by her need for colonies. She now has a population nearly equal to that of Great Britain and three million greater than that of France, with a higher birthrate than either. The density of the population is double that of France. Yet, in comparison with Britain's 13,000,000 square miles and France's 4,000,000 square miles of colonies, Italy possesses a beggarly 800,000 square miles! When the poverty of resources in Italy is again brought to mind the justice of the Italian contention appears. Professor Marraro, in commenting on the distribution of colonies, says, "Peace that is based on ignorance - feigned or true - of the vital needs of a people, cannot last. Such an artificial settlement will result, not in peace, but in war." There have been hints, suppositions - nothing more - of an Italian desire to expand, possibly into the Balkans, which might lead to a European war, or into Anatolia which might mean war with Turkey, or into Abyssinia, which might lead to the annexation of that country against her will. The Albanian Treaty and the Abyssinian affair got as far as the League of Nations Council. Then the smoke blew away, but the smouldering goes on. There seems one hope of

clearing the air and that is by a redistribution of mandated territories so as to include Italy. France, for example, might well give up Syria. The Druses hate her and she has had nothing but trouble as her reward. It is much to be regretted that Italy's attitude towards the League of Nations does not tend to encourage its effort towards a peaceful solution of one of Italy's vital problems.
Chapter V.

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At the commencement of this survey, I indicated certain questions which are being asked by modern political thinkers of all nations in regard to the Fascist rule in Italy. Fascism, evidently, is not being ignored. It is not the attempt of an individual to seize power in order to gratify his own desires. In all the criticism which has been hurled at Mussolini, I have yet to find a hint that his personal interests are the motive power behind his activities. One cannot pay the same high tribute to all his followers. "Mussolini, of course, means well; where he is wrong is in believing that in a political system where not the slightest means of control is left, men can be made virtuously to resist certain temptations." It was so with Napoleon III. that dictator most often used in comparison with Mussolini, who found himself at war with Prussia without adequate forces or equipment because of the dishonesty of his officials. A dictatorship is forced to rely, to a greater or less extent, according to the personality of its head, upon a bureaucracy.

But the personality at the head of Fascist Italy is a remarkable one. "Mussolini is bold, physically and spiritually. He is the wilful man of action, direct, swift, sure and wise, very wise." ¹ It seems to be true that he is theatrical, that he frequently acts a part for interviewers. The Roman salute, the black shirts, the Napoleonic scowl, the public petting of lions, and his oft-repeated motto, "Live dangerously", are all part of his collection of theatrical "props", to be used either for the sensation-monger from abroad or the drama-loving Italians at home. "Like the Roman Emperors, to succeed he must provide a good circus." ² In this category, it seems to me, as part of the means he adopts to keep up the faith of his Italian followers, his frequent chauvinistic utterances and dramatic moves in foreign affairs must be placed. Any other interpretation would brand him a fool, or the weak tool of foolish followers and the description does not fit Il Duce. The very fine article by William Kilborne Stewart ³, "Mentors of Mussolini," not only gives us an idea of the origin of many Mussolinian theories but also a comprehensive summary of the character of the man himself. Mr. Stewart shows how Nietzsche's Doctrine of the Superman must have appealed to Mussolini who is quoted as follows: - "My programme is work, discipline, unity;

1. Lincoln Steffens: "Stop, Look, Listen!" (Survey Graphic. March, 1927.)
2. Beal: "Italian Fascism Developing a New Phase." (Current History. May, 1925. Vol. 22.)
action not talk nor theory" and again, of Liberty, "A man in Italy doesn't want it. It is not an end." ¹.

Machiavelli is another favourite of Mussolini. In his mind "Machiavelli has triumphed over Marx and Sorel." ². Machiavelli's "Prince" is incarnated in some degree in Il Duce: "Good strategy," remarks Mussolini, "is calculation and audacity." ³. The influence of Sorel is not entirely gone, for, like him, Mussolini is at work supplying a "myth", the myth of a greater Italy, to be seen for example, in the creed supplied to the Balilla, the Italian Boy Scout. ⁴. This myth is to supply the "élan vital" to the Italian people, with which he will guide them to success in every field. From Pareto, Professor at the University of Lausanne, at whose feet Mussolini sat long before Fascism was dreamed of, he imbibed his hostility to Liberalism and Democracy and from William James, his disregard of fixed principles, his opportunism. "Every programme," says Mussolini, "should be carried only to the right point." ⁵. How far Mussolini's actions bear out the teachings of his "mentors", the reader is in a position to judge.

Let us next ask ourselves what Mussolini has accomplished in his six years of rule, economically, or socially. Joseph Caillaux, the well-known finance minister and past premier of France has said in an article

². Ibid.
³. Ibid.
⁴. Ibid.
⁵. Ibid.
the title of which speaks for itself, "Europe must unite - or die!". "First of all, each country has work to do at home, to balance and more than balance its budget, and to close the door against loans in any form whatsoever. Next, there must be a universal return to the gold standard with the necessary precautions and by suitable stages. - - - - - This great step accomplished, Europe will once more possess a healthy currency and a sane and well-balanced economic activity will follow." ¹

It is early yet to decide that Mussolini has done his part to enable Europe and Italy to recover pre-war stability. If we take Volpi and Mussolini at their word, we must conclude that no less than wonders have been performed. It is admitted, however, that Italy is an extremely poor country, in practically everything save Labour and observers seem to have difficulty in believing completely in her miraculous recovery. Budgets are notoriously easy to adjust. It is true, however, that Fascism has had conspicuous success in settling war debts in both England and America, and that, so far, at least, its critics have nothing of a very definite character on which to base their disbelief in the financial success which Fascists claim for themselves.

Economically, Mussolini is struggling, as we have seen, with the problems of a large surplus population and an adverse trade balance, problems that are not new to

¹ Caillaux: "Europe Must Unite - or Die!" (World's Work. November, 1926.)
Italy and have never been solved. Italy's salvation appears to lie in her people's capacity for uncomplaining Labour, and Italy's "Superman" will succeed in so far as he can maintain the surprising energy and "will to work" which exists in Italy at the present time.

None know better than Mussolini that this is impossible unless Fascism can justify its existence by a general betterment of conditions, especially among the labouring classes. Hence the above-mentioned 1. Charter of Labour and the new "Dopolavaro" movement. The latter is a government-encouraged movement to provide for recreation and interest outside the actual working hours. Some thousand Dopolavaro centres have been established 2. throughout Italy, in which for a small fee (5 shillings a year in Genoa) the workman is entitled to various privileges, half-railway fare, half-price at the theatre and free entrance to art galleries and museums. He is eligible also to enter into various recreational activities with the other members. It need hardly be added, that membership is open only to supporters of the Fascist regime. Whether Mussolini can thus direct the attention of his people away from the lower wage scale or higher taxation which he seems bound to adopt, remains to be seen. "They cannot be happy when they are hungry and cold, and even a dictator cannot distribute among his people corn which is not raised and coats which are not

1. Chapter IV. Page 5
2. Yeats-Brown: "Welfare Work in Fascist Italy."
   (Spectator. October 16, 1926.)
made." 1. This is not to say that the workers alone must work for less. Another of Mussolini's great problems is the necessity of conciliating capital so as to bring them willingly into the "Corporative State" and at the same time to reconcile them to decreased profits. "There is a theory which finds favour with the democratic press, that Mussolini is a puppet in the hands of the capitalists and generals. Such a theory is crude, and contrasts badly with the impression which Mussolini's personality has left on most men and on the masses; and what is more, it credits capitalists and generals with a far greater measure of intelligence than they have merited." 2. On the whole, it may be said of the Fascist regime under Mussolini that it appears to be working whole-heartedly for the good of Italy and has met with a certain measure of success. The expense of the vast bureaucracy, including the officers of the National Fascist Militia is probably more than offset by its value in efficiency. Democratic opponents of the regime cannot but acknowledge that the undisputed sway of Mussolini accomplishes very speedily what many democracies would be forced to leave undone.

Let me hasten to add, however, that budgets which balance and trains which run on time can never, in themselves, justify Fascism. Material gain cannot justify moral or intellectual loss. Even if it be admitted that

2. Kathleen Macmillan: Final Chapter to Prezzolini's "Fascism." (Methuen, London, 1926.)
freedom and democracy, as demonstrated by Crispi, Giolitti and the rest had failed Italy in the post-war crisis, it is surely absurd logic to base upon that failure a eulogism of the Fascist regime. The one may develop, in the same length of time, more evils than the other. There is no question, for example, that Fascism, like any other dictatorship, is having a stultifying effect. It is so easy to allow others to do your thinking for you. Of what value is independent thought in any case, when not only the Press but vocal expression as well, is denied by law? Will this atmosphere produce, in the next generation, a Croce or a Ferrero? On March 24, 1929, Italians had their first "election" under the new system and voted an overwhelming "Yes" to a list of 400 candidates chosen for them by the Fascist Grand Council. These 400 will enter a legislature which has no real power. Where is Italy to obtain its political education? Not in its local affairs which are under the control of appointed "Podestas" or Prefects. The Democracy of Athens failed before the military force of Sparta, but before it went it produced a Periclean Age. An Italian would chuckle at a comparison between his own enlightened nation and the ancient state of Sparta, but it might startle him to ask just what existed in the present system to prevent him from becoming a Helot in the service of the Fascist chosen ones!

Perhaps Nitti gives the correct answer, - "As for the Italian dictatorship, which is violent and imperialistic,
if it does not end in war, it will end in revolution; ----."  

I have in front of me a press clipping, in which Mussolini is quoted as saying, - "Let no one waste his time speculating on what will become of Fascism when Mussolini is gone. -- -- Fascism shall be established in Italy as a permanent institution."  

For this permanence he relies upon two things, the Fascist Grand Council and the education of the young. The Balilla of to-day will be the Premier of to-morrow, perhaps. How can he? It is the essence of dictatorships that not one has ever successfully provided for its permanence, for the very existence of a dictatorship depends upon the extinction of rivals. Again and again we come across tributes to the amazing popularity of Mussolini. His is that personality which has held Fascism and Italy together. There have been four attempts to assassinate Il Duce. After Mussolini - what? According to plan, the Fascist Grand Council is to appoint his successor; but the moment that successor is appointed, he becomes possessed of unlimited power under the Fascist constitution and a military force to boot! There is no testing period, and no training school. After Mussolini - what?

The sum and substance of the Fascist political system, in spite of the nebulous cloak cast about it by

Gentile and Rocco, is revealed as despotism. I sat, an interested listener, in a hall in Vancouver, British Columbia, at a lecture on Mussolini, in which the speaker, who had often visited Italy, painted a glowing picture of the uplifted social life of that country since the advent of Fascism. There were no more strikes, no lockouts. A word from Il Duce and his faithful squadristi, his militia, would see to it that the wheels of industry were kept turning. Agriculture, public works, railways, all received new life at his touch. As the lecturer went on, the enthusiasm of his audience increased until at the close, it burst forth into this expression, heard on all sides—"What we want, in this country, is a Mussolini!"

No doubt, in each case, it was "the other fellow" or "the government" who needed Il Duce's services, but, at the same time, the thing persisted in my mind as a criticism of existing democracy. Every man or woman at that lecture was a voter, who had exercised again and again, his more or less cherished right of franchise. If, on the one hand, they were expressing a considered opinion, then, to be consistent, they would surrender that franchise forthwith. On the other hand, if, as is more likely, they were making a superficial judgment on insufficient data, then, of what nature is our Democracy resting as it does upon the judgment of such sheep as these?

Has Fascism anything to offer to other states

1. See Chapter II. on the Theory of Fascism.
outside Italy? The answer, it seems to me, is that it has much but rather of a negative than a positive character. Above all things, in order to avoid either a Giolitti or a Mussolini, let us seek for ways of fostering a political consciousness, for education and simplification in the complicated processes of governing a modern state; so that at least ninety per cent of the vote of the nation would be registered at the polls; so that the vote could be depended upon to be intelligent and not the result of a meaningless slogan or the appeal of a special interest or group. The evolution of democracy is not nearly complete but let us not return in our disgust to the worse evils of a despotism. 1.

What are the dangers of Mussolinian despotism? To the individual, loss of liberty, political and intellectual as we have seen. To the nation, and to other nations, the danger of war. I have attempted to make it clear that Mussolini does not want war. 2. Statements like the following 3. cannot but be misinterpreted however - "I declare to you that when these cannon thunder, it is really the voice of the Fatherland that speaks. It is then that we should humbly bare our heads.

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1. "Even Lord Bryce, staunch friend of the democratic principle in government as he was, wondered in his last great work, "Modern Democracies", if self-government was to endure." Frank O. Lowden: "Too Much Government." (World's Work. December, 1926.)

2. See Chapter V. on foreign policy.

We need land, for we are too numerous for our present territories." Mussolini may be driven to war, as was Napoleon III. in 1870, by the necessity of supporting his regime. Again, who is to guarantee that he upon whom the mantle of Elijah descends will carry on the work of Elijah? He has said that the programme of Fascism will go on and yet has made it possible that the programme will end in disastrous war.

The question as to whether the Fascist political system has anything to offer to the outside world may, I think, be fairly answered in the negative. It will remain, as prominent Fascists freely admit, a purely Italian movement.

There is, however, a great deal of interest manifested by the press in the social experiments of Fascism, particularly in connection with the Corporative State and the Dopolavoro Movement. Mr. Bruno Roselli of Vassar College presented to the recent Conference of the National Council of Education in Vancouver, British Columbia, the case for the latter \(^1\), and ended his discourse with an invitation, on behalf of Italy, to Canada, to further investigate Dopolavoro with a view to the introduction of some of its features into the country. The movement is barely two years old. The Fascist Corporative State is not yet functioning. Mr. Roselli's invitation is perhaps premature, but these

\(^1\) For description see above, page 87a
experiments are vastly interesting and if they achieve even a measure of success, they are helping to solve one of the greatest problems of our day, the social welfare of the industrial worker.

The part, it seems to me, of the intelligent observer of Fascism is to withhold all sweeping condemnation or praise. Admire its vital energy and the new "will to work" with which it inspires Italy. Blame its violence and its suppression of the freedom of a nation. With the new spirit of international good will, let us look upon the new experiences of an interesting people with an intention to accept and profit by whatsoever is found to be worth while in the future of Fascism.
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