Labor Control In Crisis:
The 4L and the Bedaux System
In the U.S. Northwest Lumber Industry
1931-1935

by
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We accept this thesis as conforming
to the required standard

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May 1980
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Abstract

This work is a non-quantitative historical study of industrial relations in the U.S. Northwest lumber industry, 1931-35, a period of economic and legal crisis. The primary materials utilized include the papers of William C. Ruegnitz (President of the Loyal Legion of Loggers and Lumbermen, or 4L, 1924-1937), the St. Paul and Tacoma Lumber Company, and several executives of the Weyerhaeuser Timber Company. Other manuscripts, including the transcript of a Regional Labor Board hearing, as well as personal interviews, newspapers and trade journals, and published contemporary and secondary books and articles, complete the sources.

This thesis revises earlier works in the area and presents two focal points. The first is a discussion of the Loyal Legion of Loggers and Lumbermen, a multi-company federation of client unions active in the lumber industry, 1918-1937. Although, as other writers have pointed out, the 4L was a minority institution in the industry, this thesis finds that the 4L did enroll a number of large operators (including several among the Weyerhaeuser group of companies) who were also active in trade association regulatory efforts, 1931-32. The 4L was enmeshed in a role extending beyond its company union character at the plant, for it was used by operators desiring to give order to a fragmented industry by regularizing wages and hours of work and by integrating lumber workers in a private corporatist configuration. The 4L's advocates attempted to use the organization as an anti-union device in conjunction with Lumber Code agencies under the New Deal's National Recovery Administration (NRA), 1933-35. The Northwest lumber organizational strike wave launched by American Federation of Labor lumber unions in May, 1935, was predicated upon conflicts within the 4L and between the 4L and other labor organizations under the NRA. Evidence is offered that at least a few operators attempted to use conservative-led unions to retain control of the workplace.
This thesis' second focus is a case study in a key theme of twentieth-century labour history: workplace conflicts ensuing from the extension of more direct managerial controls over the work relations and practices of experienced industrial workers in the interests of more effective competitive profit making. (Most historical work in this area has been limited to the nascent, pre-1920, period of scientific management.) The case examined is that of the introduction of the patented Bedaux efficiency system at Willapa Harbor Lumber Mills, 1933-35, a Weyerhaeuser group member of the 4L. Areas discussed include the division of labour in the lumber industry (using planing mill work as an example), the ideology of the Bedaux system and management's arguments in defense of using the same, and the local unionists' ideological and practical resistance to the altered patterns of shop management. The unionists used counter-conceptions of efficiency and Americanism, developed or reinforced in this specific workplace struggle, as part of their culture of insurgency during the 1935 strike and in the formation of the International Woodworkers of America, 1937. In sum, the present study expands and refines knowledge of company labour policy in a key industry during the period 1931-35, and offers a case study which may be of interest to students of the twentieth-century workplace.
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Acknowledgements

No less than a 2" x 6" manufactured in a modern sawmill, this study embodies the labour of many men and women. Its seeds were planted at the University of Rochester, where two then graduate teaching assistants, Leon Fink and Greg Kealey, encouraged my interest in labour history. Some of the secondary literature influencing this work was read in University of British Columbia History Graduate Programme courses conducted 1977-1978 by Professors Norbert Macdonald and Michael Ignatieff. My advisor, Professor Joseph C. Lawrence, read and commented upon the several drafts. All remaining infelicities of analysis and expression are my own.

I hope this thesis does justice to the people from whose lives it was written, especially those men and women, not all of whom are quoted in the text, who opened their homes and their memories to a young stranger interested in their past. They include Wilford Becklund, Oscar Bouffioux, Lester Cadieu, Ray Clemmons, Freeman Cochran, Russell Earley, Bafford G. Floyd, Floyd Jackson, John B. Johnson, Hunter Kennard, Dea C. King, Howard and Maxine Knauf, Paul Lanz, Frank Mason, Fred Mulholland, Suzanne Pavolka, John Sabol, John Vargo, and Leslie Younglove. Bill Wickline and his colleagues at International Woodworkers of America Local 3-9, Tacoma, answered an innocent's questions and passed me along to some of their retired fellow workers. Vern Hull, Bob Christensen, Frank Philicomo, and, especially, Warner Matson, all of the St. Regis Paper Company, provided similar assistance, and permitted me to visit the Company's lumber plant at Tacoma, formerly operated by the St. Paul and Tacoma Lumber Company.

Numerous archivists and librarians coped with requests for the primary materials used in this thesis. I now understand researchers' often expressed gratitude for the aid rendered by Richard Berner, Karyl Wynn, and their
assistants at the University of Washington Manuscripts Division, where the taped memoirs collected in the course of this study will be deposited. Mrs. Stewart Holbrook permitted me to examine her late husband's diaries. Arthur McCourt and Donnie Crespo (and their bottomless pot of coffee) made working at the Weyerhaeuser Company Historical Archives a real pleasure. Ed Jallings of the Wisconsin State Historical Society and T. Lane Moore of the National Archives facilitated requests for copies of materials under their auspices. Special thanks are due to the staff of the University of British Columbia Library, especially George Brandak of Special Collections, Karen Peplow and Alice McNair at Interlibrary Loan, and the souls who wrestled weighty volumes of the _Timberman_ from storage.

Research during the summer, 1979, was facilitated by a University of British Columbia graduate research scholarship. The typing of a skilled worker, Susanna Lee, contributes a nice touch.

My family, Constance Egolf and Barbara King Egolf, helped in many ways. This thesis was almost dedicated to Frank Nadler, Jr., a mensch. The woman to whom it is dedicated would have appreciated the efforts of Norman Lange, Dea King, the Youngloves, and tens of thousands of other Northwestern lumber workers similarly unknown to her, to create a more liveable America.
To the Spirit of

My Maternal Grandmother,

Lillian Nadler Wiesemann King Helgason

1894-1949
Chapter I. Introduction

In the history of American workers, the period 1920-1933 appears as one of quiescence and retreat, with labour organizations being decimated by the three pronged attack of the employers' American plan: open shops, welfare capitalism, and the scientific management of production. The American Plan was designed to strengthen the social and political character of corporate capitalism by creating a more favourable climate of public opinion, "harmonizing" workplace relations, precluding or eliminating non-company sponsored labour organizations, decreasing "inarticulate" modes of worker dissatisfaction such as high labour turnover, and encouraging or forcing workers to attain higher levels of productivity, and therefore, company profitability.¹

The term "labour control" as used in this thesis follows Robert Dunn's 1927 characterization of company unions as "definite devices ... to control and manipulate the labour force and to produce certain results which are considered profitable to the company." It is also applied to the social controls of work accounting and incentive wage systems which were designed to influence workers' behaviour at the point of production and are distinguishable from technological controls inherent in or absent from the tools of production.² The present study examines the phenomena of welfare capitalism and scientific management in the United States Northwest lumber industry, focusing upon the years 1931-1935, a period of economic and legal crisis.

The Loyal Legion of Loggers and Lumbermen (or 4L) is frequently discussed during the following chapters. With the cooperation of the U.S. Army, the 4L was created during World War I to break the power of the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) in the northwest woods. The 4L's forceful methods of organizing (membership was compulsory for all operators and was vigourously pressed upon all workers) were coupled with the concession of the eight-hour day and marked improvements in logging camp sanitation and housing conditions.
Government sanctions were removed at war's end, but the peacetime 4L continued to exist as a multi-company federation of client unions until it was outlawed in 1937 by the National Labour Relations Act. The 4L divided the lumber regions of Washington, Idaho, Oregon, and California into twelve districts for the purposes of selecting representatives to sit at semi-annual 4L Board of Directors meetings. Each plant local (the 4L had no presence in the woods after World War I) elected a three-member workers' conference committee to adjudicate grievances with management; argument and persuasion were the only tools available for workers to press their case, for the 4L membership contracts which they were required to sign bound them to the organization's constitutional provisions prohibiting strikes. Local members within each district met annually to elect a district Board of Directors and to designate one employer and one employee representative to serve on the general 4L Board. Board decisions regarding minimum wage scales, overtime, and working conditions were binding on all members.³

Chapter II and III of this thesis survey company labour policy and the 4L's industrial politics before and during the National Recovery Administration (NRA) period. These chapters have been influenced by Robert Himmelberg, who emphasizes the role of "the secular movement for antitrust revision which extended continuously from the Great War through the 'twenties and early 'thirties" in creating the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA).⁴ Herbert Hoover, during his tenure as President of the United States (1929-33), was willing to allow certain "sick" and natural resource industries, such as cotton textiles, rubber, coal, oil, and lumber, a degree of exemption from the anti-trust laws' prohibition of businessmen's collective setting of operating policies. Hoover, however, because of his own antipathy to cartelization and his sensitivity to public opinion, was unwilling to use his power to aid the trade associations to secure the full measure of legal power with which they desired to establish
binding production and marketing regulations for a given industry. Himmelberg found that the political movement for anti-trust relaxation was concentrated at "segments of industry which shared least in the prosperity of the 1920's;" lumber was prominent among these. The 4L and several of its leading employer elements participated actively in this movement in the Northwest.

Vernon Jensen's Lumber and Labour is a survey of unionism which emphasizes the economic problems of the industry, points out that the 4L was a minority institution after 1918, and notes that its greatest strength during the early 1930's was among pine producers. It should be noted, however, that although the 4L failed to enroll a majority of the industry's productive capacity during the Depression, it did have several well-placed advocates, within, for example the Weyerhaeuser and Shevlin groups, the St. Paul and Tacoma Lumber Company, the Tacoma Lumbermen's Club, the West Coast Lumbermen's Association (WCLA), and the Western Pine Association (WPA). (See Table I, following chapter text). Timber and Men, by Ralph W. Hidy and others, a history of the Weyerhaeuser interests to 1960, presents an oversimplified analysis counterposing government regulations and business freedom in the 1930's, pitting the predominantly Republican Weyerhaeuser management against the Democratic New Deal policies, and minimizes or ignores, as does Jensen, several pre-NIRA Weyerhaeuser group managers' support for the 4L and for industrial self-government under the auspices of regional and national trade associations. An examination of relationships among the 4L and the trade associations and certain operators, including the Weyerhaeuser group and the St. Paul and Tacoma Lumber Company, clarifies the movement for industrial self-regulation in the Northwest and the subsequent regional history of company unionism under the National Recovery Administration.
The New Deal legislation, of course, created not only an experimental self-governing industrial polity, but also legal devices enabling rank and file workers and professional organizers to establish industrial unions challenging the 4L's ethos and institutional integrity. David Brody has argued that "the Depression experience broke down the system of labor control in corporate industry," and that "the open shop might well have remained a permanent feature of American industrialism ... had not the Depression shattered the prevailing assumptions of welfare capitalism." Stuart Brandes claims in his survey of American Welfare Capitalism, 1880-1940, that Brody's argument is "implausible", and asserts that workers eventually would have rejected corporate paternalism in favour of a welfare statist solution to the social problems of industrial society, even in the absence of general economic crisis. Unfortunately, Brandes fails to offer any evidence of the process of formation of a broad working-class movement for statist solutions during the late 1920's and early 1930's which can be distinguished from the influence of the period's general economic collapse. Ultimately, Brandes' argument rests on the dichotomy of individual capitalist and state power and the assumption that working people in the United States would, somehow, inevitably have broken with company unions and other aspects of corporate paternalism and created a political movement for statist solutions that they perceived as being more democratic, equitable and effective than corporate paternalism.

One of the problems to be met when evaluating this Brody-Brandes dispute is that few historical studies have been written of industrial workers in their workplaces and communities during the 1930's. Fresh approaches to this study are readily available. Herbert Gutman, for example, whose work was strongly influenced by the English historian E.P. Thompson and the anthropologists Clifford Geertz and Sidney Mintz, argues that culture must be understood as the system of cognition, goals and behaviour which is used to "'confirm, reinforce,
maintain, change, or deny" a particular social structure's "arrangements of status, power, and identity." Gutman's work examines the cultural base of social conflicts; he argues that recurring industrial conflict in the United States, from 1815 to 1919,

resulted from the fact that the American working class was continually altered by infusions, from within and without the nation, of peasants, farmers, skilled artisans, and casual day labourers who brought into industrial society ways of work and other habits and values not associated with industrial necessities and the industrial ethos.

According to David Montgomery, many of the strikes in the early 1900's were struggles for control of industrial production and involved questions of social and economic power which transcended immediate issues of wages, hours and working conditions. He suggests that the majority of workers' experience of the industrial setting, coupled with their values and efforts to control the working environment (most especially, resistance to managerial controls), was sufficient to precipitate sustained class-consciousness among the rank-and-file. Montgomery has challenged Gutman's use of a "traditional/modern" socio-cultural dichotomy, reemphasized the process of class conflict, and observed that entrants to industrial society "exchanged portions of their traditional culture, not for the values and habits that welfare plans sought to inculcate, but for working-class mores."\(^{10}\)

Norman Clark's *Milltown*, a study of Everett, Washington, from its founding to the massacre of IWW adherents there in 1916, argues that the violent quality of labour relations in the lumber industry during the 1910-1916 period was the result of unbridled capitalist development of the resource frontier, and asserts that the militancy of the IWW period disappeared after World War I because of embourgeoisement resulting from technological changes and a generally higher level of education among workers. Clark correctly noted the appearance of plant managers with engineering degrees, but then concluded,
evidently borrowing a page from the history of automated continuous production industries such as chemical manufacture, that lumber workers became "more technicians than labourers." This characterization is, to say the least, debatable, for lumber workers during the 1970's as well as the 1930's. Clark treats workers' behaviour as a fixed calculus of response to external economic and technological forces, while, like Brandes, failing to elucidate the continuities and discontinuities in workers' own terms for defining and resolving their problems. David Brody has called for shop floor analyses of mass-production industries during the 1930's, to determine the degree of workers' on the job autonomy and whether or not crises in workplace relationships and culture influenced the creation of formal labour institutions. The diversity of production work in the lumber industry is explored here in Chapters IV and V, which focus on the work process in planing mills and offer an in-depth examination of the shop floor, institutional, and ideological aspects of resistance of workers to the installation of the patented Bedaux system of scientific shop management at Willapa Harbor Lumber Mills (Raymond, Washington), a Weyerhaeuser group member of the 4L.

It should be noted at the outset that this study presents little new information on the actual capacity of the 4L and other aspects of company welfare practices to secure operators' hegemony among sawmill workers during the 1920's and early 1930's. This thesis does, however, use previously unused or underutilised manuscript materials to locate the 4L ideologically, programmatically, and institutionally during the years under consideration. The issue of hegemony is one that may best be examined in relation to specific work forces and communities; thus, chapters II and III indicate specific companies and towns where historical research may bear fruit. These chapters also revise the standard discussions of the 4L. Chapters IV and V take the study literally to the shop floor at Willapa Harbor Lumber Mills. Although this
discussion sketches the ideology of the company's general manager, J.W. Lewis, a member of the 4L Board of Directors, and of the counter culture of unionists during the 1933-35 period, it does not present an in-depth analysis of the thinking of pro-4L "loyalist" workers at that mill or other mills. Nevertheless, this section does indicate the feasibility and value of local studies of working class culture and social relations in the middle decades of the twentieth century.

This study finds that the 4L was supported by several large Northwestern lumber companies during the Hoover administration and was drawn into trade association efforts to create a more stable capitalist society. The 4L's ties with operators and trade associations and its corporatist approach to labor integration were themselves incorporated into the NRA Lumber Code-making and adjudicating processes. Within the region, however, attempts were made to use agencies established to adjudicate the Lumber Code regulations to strengthen the 4L against the AFL, while the AFL used elections supervised by the National and Regional Labor Boards to undermine the 4L. Fresh information is presented on lumbermen's responses to the 1935 Northwest lumber organizational strike wave. Chapters IV and V constitute an essay in workplace history examining the conflict between managers and workers regarding shop supervision and control procedures at a major Douglas fir mill during the New Deal. The association of the 4L with deprivations in the standard of living and, in at least one important case, with the deliberate intensification of the work process, made an enhanced rank and file control of labor organizations and of the job conscious goals of insurgent proto-International Woodworkers of America unionists.
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*Data is adapted from "Reports on Fir and Pine Districts," [October, 1931] in SPT Papers/35/4L. M = 1000 bfm; 1 bfm (board foot measure) = volume of wood 1" x 1" x 12".
Chapter II. The 4L and Industrial Self-Regulation, 1931-1932

The communist researcher Charlotte Todes once described the Loyal Legion of Loggers and Lumbermen (4L), the Northwest lumber industry's multi-company federation of client unions, as

primarily an organization of small and middle-sized operators and even among these it is of little consequence. The large-scale operators do not want outside agencies intervening in their relations with the workers.

Although these comments were partially true when written in 1930, the 4L shortly thereafter boasted the enrollment of several of the Northwest's most prominent lumbermen, including a strong contingent from the Weyerhaeuser and Shevlin groups. Of equal importance, the 4L was linked ideologically and programmatically with a movement, centered on the lumber trade associations, to reconstruct industrial capitalism in the Northwest through a series of institutional and legal innovations permitting more centralized economic controls. These programs were composed within but sought to transcend the legal guidelines established by the Hoover administration (1929-1933), which encouraged limited voluntary collective production policy-making by trade associations, especially within the natural resource industries. An examination of the 4L's sponsors and institutional relationships during these years clarifies the early 1930's movement for capitalist reform in the Northwest.¹

Born in 1889, William C. Ruegnitz (President of the 4L, 1924-1937) was one of many reforming engineers of his and the preceding generation (such as Frederick W. Taylor) who were dedicated to designing a more efficient, predictable, and orderly capitalist society. Norman Thomas would have classified him as a proponent of "capitalist syndicalism". A civil engineer by training and ten years experience, Ruegnitz served five years as an Oregon sawmill employment manager and purchasing agent before joining the
4L staff as executive secretary in 1921. His conception of the 4L solution to the "labour problem" drew eclectically from the scientific and personnel management movements and reflected the rhetoric of such welfare capitalist popularizers as John D. Rockefeller, Jr., Mackenzie King, and John Leitch, blending mechanical, accounting, and "human relations" metaphors, set firmly within the ambience of a hierarchical, corporately organized industrial society:

No profitable solution can be arrived at until owners and managers give full consideration to the human machinery of the industry, as well as to the cost sheets and liabilities.... The lumber industry must have the understanding cooperation of its employees.

The nation is moving to socialized production.... directed from within by its natural leaders.... Common problems of employers and employees must be solved, not only by individual companies but by whole industries, organized by associations set up for the purpose.... The 4L ... is gradually effecting a merger of capital and labor in the Pacific Northwest lumber industry on a basis of industrial cooperation.

The 4L, according to Ruegnitz, pooled the resources of its members, financing a single "labor department" for all operators:

questions of wages, hours, annual income, pensions, workmen's compensation, promotion, and retention of employees, and group insurance, all require specialized departmental administration, just as much as sales, finance, engineering, and other overhead requirements2.

This conception of the 4L was structurally similar to the role of the regional and national lumber trade associations, which, collectively financed by numerous companies, provided services in the form of production and marketing statistical surveys, trade extension, forestry and product research and development, and political lobbying. Increasingly through the late 1920's and early 1930's, these functions included formulating policies for the industry as a whole.
Competitive multiplication of facilities created real problems for lumbermen. Progressive rhetoric regarding the "timber trust" notwithstanding, ownership and control in the lumber industry was extremely diffuse; in 1935, the four largest producers of lumber and timber products accounted for only 4.7% of total output. Of 17,647 sawmills included in reports made by NRA authorities, 81% had a capacity of less than 1000 board feet per hour, and 98% had a capacity of less than 10,000 feet. The largest mills concentrated on the West Coast, where timber required substantially larger head saws and subsequent machinery than did that of other regions. Even the largest cluster of interests (those investors and companies collectively referred to as the Weyerhaeuser group) controlled only 10% of regional mill capacity.3

The question of the rate of profit during the 1920's and 30's among mills represented on the Boards of Directors of the 4L and the trade associations is beyond the scope of the present study; suffice it to note that complaints of chronically stagnant markets appeared regularly among lumbermen by the mid-1920's. It is estimated that even in 1925, the decade's peak of lumber production nationally, only 58% of U.S. sawmill capacity was actually utilized. While total annual Douglas fir lumber production increased with some regularity 1921-26, lumber was typically sold at the mill at a loss after 1923 (see Table II).4 Sponsored by the West Coast Lumbermen's Association (WCLA), a concerted voluntary production curtailment and firm price movement was launched in early May, 1928, during the course of which mills layed off night shifts or worked fewer than six days per week. Douglas fir region lumber production was held to about 75% of capacity in 1928-29; the WCLA credited the curtailment movement (coupled with a temporarily expanding lumber market) for causing a price rally during the first six months of 1929. Demand for lumber, however, began an unseasonal decline
Table II: Data on West Coast Lumber Production, Employment, Prices, Profits, Real Wages, and Per Cent of Capacity Used, and U.S. per capita consumption, 1920-40.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Lumber Production (in 1000 $)</th>
<th>Per cent of West Coast Capacity used</th>
<th>Lumber Employment U.S. Total</th>
<th>Per cent of West Coast Lumber Employment (1929=100)</th>
<th>Index of Pacific Coast Lumber Employment</th>
<th>Average Annual Real Wages per Wage Ener</th>
<th>Estimated Douglas Fir Sales Profit or (Losses) at Mill per $</th>
<th>Per Capita Lumber Consumption, U.S. (in foot board measure)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>35,000</td>
<td>10,355</td>
<td>364,247</td>
<td>75,161</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>$1250</td>
<td>34.90</td>
<td>2.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>29,000</td>
<td>7,215</td>
<td>495,932</td>
<td>122,452</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>1639</td>
<td>21.00</td>
<td>(2.15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>35,250</td>
<td>10,613</td>
<td>495,932</td>
<td>122,452</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>1639</td>
<td>21.00</td>
<td>.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>41,000</td>
<td>12,825</td>
<td>495,932</td>
<td>122,452</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>1639</td>
<td>21.00</td>
<td>2.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>39,300</td>
<td>12,024</td>
<td>495,932</td>
<td>122,452</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>1639</td>
<td>21.00</td>
<td>362</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>41,000</td>
<td>13,368</td>
<td>133,904</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>1365</td>
<td>22.40</td>
<td>328</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>39,750</td>
<td>14,289</td>
<td>467,090</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>1365</td>
<td>22.40</td>
<td>.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>37,250</td>
<td>13,482</td>
<td>419,084</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1421</td>
<td>19.40</td>
<td>343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>36,750</td>
<td>13,717</td>
<td>419,084</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1421</td>
<td>19.40</td>
<td>(2.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>38,745</td>
<td>14,169</td>
<td>419,084</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1421</td>
<td>19.40</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>29,258</td>
<td>10,670</td>
<td>198,467</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>1247</td>
<td>17.80</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>19,997</td>
<td>7,494</td>
<td>196,467</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>1247</td>
<td>17.80</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>13,524</td>
<td>4,565</td>
<td>189,369</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>1108</td>
<td>11.50</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>17,151</td>
<td>6,417</td>
<td>189,369</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>1108</td>
<td>11.50</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>18,826</td>
<td>6,419</td>
<td>189,369</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>1108</td>
<td>11.50</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>22,944</td>
<td>7,953</td>
<td>255,230</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>1278</td>
<td>17.20</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>27,626</td>
<td>10,297</td>
<td>323,928</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>1502</td>
<td>19.50</td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>29,004</td>
<td>10,860</td>
<td>323,928</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>1502</td>
<td>19.50</td>
<td>194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>24,755</td>
<td>8,601</td>
<td>323,928</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>1502</td>
<td>19.50</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>28,755</td>
<td>10,693</td>
<td>323,928</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>1502</td>
<td>19.50</td>
<td>203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>31,159</td>
<td>11,698</td>
<td>323,928</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>1502</td>
<td>19.50</td>
<td>203</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources:
2. Ibid., Series L-44.
3. West Coast Lumbermen's Association, West Coast Lumber Facts (Seattle: WCLA, 1941, p. 10.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid., p. 72.
7. West Coast Facts, p. 33.
9. "Tabulations...Presented...With Testimony...of William B. Greeley...Before the Interstate Commerce Commission, August 12, 1931," Tables 5, 8A, 12. (Copy in PTT Papers/196/Production Statistics)
10. West Coast Facts, p. 17.
during mid-summer, 1929, and several new, large mills, such as those of Weyerhaeuser at Longview, opened in the 1929-30 period. The industry's seasonal output pattern was not interrupted until late summer, 1930; throughout the Depression, lumbermen cut prices in an effort to capture diminishing markets. Although the trade associations continued their calls for voluntary curtailment until the enactment of the NIRA, it became quite clear by 1931, that, as the Depression continued to broaden and deepen far beyond the "sick" industries of the 1920's, simple curtailment was unlikely to stimulate a dependable margin of profit for any particular operator or for the industry as a whole; even with complete cessation of production, the lumberman was still met with taxes on timber, plant, and inventories, as well as interest payments and depreciation. The lumber trade association leaders responded by designing an integrated program for industrial self-regulation which they proposed to facilitate and legally enforce through revision of the anti-trust laws.

Working with like-minded operators and trade association officials, Ruegnitz and his staff promoted an economic recovery policy emphasizing the industry-wide retention of relatively high wage rates, which, it was argued, would maintain workers' purchasing power and standards of living, while creating a production cost floor beneath which lumber prices could not profitably be reduced. The 4L Board of Directors' constitutional injunction to legislate binding minimum wage and overtime regulations for member mills was an inter-company coordination potential not available to more typical single-enterprise client unions. Furthermore, as Ruegnitz pointed out, the 4L's inclusion of workers gave it a quasi-union status, shielding it from the anti-trust legislation which otherwise frustrated efforts to coordinate production of goods for interstate distribution. It was argued that this use of the 4L would conserve "resources and revenues, to insure
orderly production, balanced with consumption, stability of prices, and a conduct of the business at fair wages and reasonable returns for all concerned." By legitimizing worker-incorporating welfare capitalist institutions as successful vehicles resolving the tensions of industrial America, the 4L promised to retard the development of political or trade union movements circumscribing capitalists' power to manage industry without "outside interference." Although Ruegnitz and several 4L operator members were aware of the 4L's potential as a regulatory device, this promise remained unfilled for several reasons: the problem of maintaining individual company capital values in the face of fierce inter- and intra-regional competition; federal laws; and the desire of operators such as C. Stuart Polson (of the Polson and Merrill-Ring interests) for a "flexible" 4L which would exert minimal control over their practices.  

Several major non-4L operators' wage scales paralleled the 4L minima, and 4L operators regularly exchanged confidential scale information with non-4L companies when wage reductions were impending; it appears that the 4L scale was roughly contoured to a consensus of opinion regarding optimal scales among medium and large operators who favoured relatively high wages adjusted to market conditions and political atmosphere. The practice of independent exchanges of wage information with non-4L operators suggests that the 4L organization was used increasingly as an ideological and public relations device as lumbermen chose repeatedly to reduce wages during the early 1930's; on the other hand, wage-cutting through the 4L undercut the organization's welfare capitalist ambience. The 4L's ambivalent position in these proceedings, and Ruegnitz' desire for prestige as a professional institutional broker, impelled his deliberate alliance forging with trade association leaders, who, in a position similarly semi-independent of their operator constituents, expressed values of coordinating and planning allied
The efficacy of Ruegnitz' vision was limited by the 4L's minority position. At the onset of the Depression, the 4L encompassed less than 20% of the Northwest lumber industry's mill capacity. The reduction of the 4L minimum wage from $3.40 to $3.00 per diem in November, 1930, was followed by a concerted organizational expansion drive. Appealing to lumbermen's paternal responsibility and distaste for unions, Ruegnitz warned that if the 4L attempted to expand

when things begin to pick up, men will reason that organization is being waged in order to hold wages down.... The [immediate] establishment of the 4L at strategic points would insure ... continuous labor stabilization, with the least possible expense, with good results for employers, employees, the communities, and the industry.

Recruiting efforts were aided by several influential industry figures, including E.G. Griggs (President of the St. Paul and Tacoma Lumber Company and of the Douglas Fir Exploitation and Export marketing cartel, and a Director of the United States Chamber of Commerce), A.C. Dixon (President of the Booth-Kelly Lumber Company and the National Lumber Manufacturers Association), M.B. Nelson (President, Long-Bell Lumber Company), Ralph Macartney (Manager, Weyerhaeuser at Klamath Falls), and J.P. Hennessey (President, Shevlin-Carpenter-Clarke, and a former member of the 4L Board). (See Table I on page 9.) Although one Weyerhaeuser subsidiary, the newly created Willapa Harbor Lumber Mills, entered the 4L unaccompanied in May, 1931, most operators approached were concerned that 4L membership contracts would interfere with their own capacity to reduce wages to meet non-4L competitors' production costs; this apprehension both retarded individual affiliations and encouraged interested operators to enter the 4L as a group.

Before the passage of the NIRA, Weyerhaeuser group policy was to allow plant and branch managers discretion in the area of 4L affiliation. J.P.
"Phil" Weyerhaeuser, Jr., committed Potlatch Forests to the 4L because he believed that strengthening the 4L would be a very wise move on the part of the industry. Al Raught, manager of Weyerhaeusser operations at Longview, was less sanguine: he claimed that 4L locals raised "unnecessary" grievances, and that the 4L contract's preference clause impeded foremen's effective placement of workers. Raught concluded that the WCLA might best be responsible for adjudicating wages and hours. F.R. Titcomb (general manager of the Weyerhaeusser Timber Company, 1931-1936) considered the 4L to be a "worthwhile organization" with a "good man at its head," and, partly for labour and broader public relations purposes, advised that Weyerhaeuser be slow to cut wages. He rebuffed Ruegnitz' overtures toward the Weyerhaeusser Longview plant, however, asserting that it was "not sound for us to predict what the minimum wage is going to be," and chose not to be responsible for encumbering any plant with a 4L contract against its manager's wishes. Long-Bell's vice-president and western general manager, John D. Tennant, publicly endorsed industrial self-management and supported the 4L's system of industry-wide firm-wage minima while president of the WCLA (1927-1933), but declined to affiliate his company's Longview mill with the 4L unless Weyerhaeuser did so also. With Raught and Titcomb deferring the Weyerhaeusser-Longview decision to one another, neither that plant nor Long-Bell at Longview joined the 4L until the enactment of the NIRA, when the Weyerhaeuser Executive Committee established that 4L affiliations were company policy.

In November, 1931, however, after several months' negotiations, Potlatch Forests' Clearwater unit, Long-Bell at Weed, Weyerhaeusser at Klamath Falls, the McCloud River Lumber Company, and seven lesser plants did sign 4L membership contracts en masse. A survey of northwestern mills prepared for the October, 1931, 4L Board meeting, presents the only compilation of 4L operator members at any given point in time that I have been able to locate.
As abstracted in Table III, the survey indicated that, before and after the 1931 expansion, 4L plants tended to be of greater capacity than non-4L mills, indicating that Todes and Jensen understated the 4L's support among the larger operators.

Table III: 4L and Non-4L Douglas fir and Western Pine Region Mills with 50M or Greater Eight-Hour Capacity, October and December, 1931.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>October 1931</th>
<th>December 1931</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Active</td>
<td>Down</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Total Capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fir</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4L</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3,208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-4L</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>14,073</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>17,281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pine</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4L</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1,965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-4L</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>4,154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>6,119</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 4L Reports Covering Fir and Pine Districts in Oregon, Washington, and Idaho, [October, 1931], and clipping from Lewiston Tribune, November 17, 1931, both in SPT/35/4L.

With strong organizational contributions by the Weyerhaeuser and Shevlin groups, sixty-five pine operators had met July 22-23, 1931, at Klamath Falls, to merge the Western Pine Manufacturers Association and the California White and Sugar Pine Manufacturers Association and establish the Western Pine Association (WPA). Operators elected as general executives were President B.W. Lakin (President, McCloud River), and Vice Presidents Phil Weyerhaeuser, J.P. McGoldrick, and C.L. Isted (General Manager, Shevlin-Hixon). The WPA's Forestry and Economics Committee, cited by trade journal editors as the "crux" of the organization, exemplifying "the most advanced views of association functions," was authorized to conduct trade surveys, "legally endeavour
to balance production and consumption," and to devise programs such as sus­
tained yield forest management which were considered beneficial to the in­
dustry as a whole. The committee was initially composed of Phil Weyerhaeuser
(as Chairman), McGoldrick, J.D. Tennant, H.K. Brooks (President, Brooks
Scanlon), all of whom were 4L members or friendly to the organization, and
the managers of two southwestern companies. McGoldrick, Isted, and the
Weyerhaeuser group controlled all four of the 4L Board pine employers' seats
in March 1932, indicating the strength of the welfare capitalist industrial
self-government ethos among these lumbermen during these years (See Table
IV, on following page). 12

During the autumn, the 4L's program was explicitly linked to that of the
WCLA. Major Griggs' WCLA production control committee urged the industry to
reduce inventories, enforce firm prices through collective selling agencies,
and adopt a maximum thirty-hour week in order to spread employment among
the mills. WCLA manager William B. Greeley was enthusiastically received by
the October 26 Washington fir districts 4L convention, where he declared that
the WCLA was

ready and willing to put its weight and influence
with the 4L in stabilizing and maintaining wages and
production, to the end of balancing output and demand,
at prices that [would] bring profits for employers and
decent wages for employees.

Major Griggs stressed the need to expand the 4L to better control wages, hours,
and output; on his motion, it was voted to recommend that the 4L Board retain
the current minimum wage structure and declare that a maximum 120 hour working
month be the norm at 4L mills as long as the Depression continued. Greeley
and the 4L conducted a mass meeting of fir lumbermen at Tacoma, November 12,
for the purpose of devising a "production and employment program for the
duration of the emergency." The WCLA manager called for a uniform wage
base and thirty-hour week. After thorough discussion, however, the operators
### Table IV. Employer Members, 4L Board of Directors, November 18, 1929, and March 2-3, 1932.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>November 18, 1929</th>
<th>District</th>
<th>March 2-3, 1932</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A.C. Dixon (Booth-Kelly Lumber Company, Springfield, Ore.)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>H.R. Irish (Silver Falls Timber Company, Silverton, Ore.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M.E. Woodard (Silver Falls Timber Company, Silverton, Ore.)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>F.H. Ransom (Eastern and Western Lumber Co., Portland, Ore.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.B. McMillan (retired; Peninsula Lumber Co., Portland, Ore.)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>J.W. Lewis (Willapa Harbor Lumber Mills, Raymond and South Bend, Wash.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R.H. Burnside (Willapa Lumber Company, Raymond, Wash.)</td>
<td>4 W</td>
<td>C. Stuart Poison (Poison Lumber and Shingle Company, Hoquiam, Wash.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Stuart Poison (Poison Lumber and Shingle Company, Hoquiam, Wash.)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>J.F. Buchanan (Henry Mill and Timber Company, Tacoma, Wash.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J.C. Buchanan (Henry Mill and Timber Company, Tacoma, Wash.)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>D.M. Fisher (Snoqualmie Falls Lumber Company, Snoqualmie Falls, Wash.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D.M. Fisher (Snoqualmie Falls Lumber Company, Snoqualmie Falls, Wash.)</td>
<td>7 W</td>
<td>C.L. Issted (Shevlin Hixon Company, Bend, Ore.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J.C. McGregor (Morrison Mills Company, Anacortes, Wash.)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>(W) Weyerhaeuser or (S) Shevlin Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sig Hoflund (Blackwell Lumber Company, Coeur d'Alene, Id.)</td>
<td>10 W</td>
<td>R.E. Irwin (Potlatch Forests, Lewiston, Id.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11 W</td>
<td>R.R. Macartney (Weyerhaeuser Timber Company, Klamath Falls, Ore.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.L. Issted (Shevlin Hixon Company, Bend, Ore.)</td>
<td>S 12 S</td>
<td>(W) Weyerhaeuser or (S) Shevlin Group</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Minutes, 4L Board of Directors, November 18, 1929, in SPT/26/4L, and Minutes, 4L Board of Directors, March 2-3, 1932, in SPT/41/4L.

**4L Districts**

1. Southern Oregon, West of Cascades
2. Northern Oregon, West of Cascades
3. Columbia River, Oregon and Washington
4. Willapa Harbor, Washington
5. Olympia-Centralia-Grays Harbor, Washington
6. Tacoma, Washington, and Vicinity
7. Seattle, Washington, and Vicinity
8. Everett and Northern Washington, West of Cascades
9. Northeastern Washington (including Spokane), Northern Idaho
10. Southeastern Washington, Central Idaho
11. Northwestern Oregon
12. Southeastern Oregon, and Northern California
Considerable interest was aroused among operators during the autumn by the successful Communist-led two-month strike in defence of a 40¢ per hour base wage at Fraser Mills near New Westminster, British Columbia, and by similar events on the southern side of the 49th parallel. On November 3, the crew of the traditionally low-wage Schafer Brothers Lumber Company Mill #4 at Aberdeen struck when the mill's wage base was reduced to less than $1.50 for a six-hour shift. In quick succession, massed picket lines including members of the National Lumber Workers Union (NLWU, affiliated with the Communists' Trade Union Unity League) and the local Unemployed Citizen's League struck the wage-slashing Wilson Brothers' Aberdeen Plant ($1.75 base) and Schafer's Mill #1 at Montesano; according to Ruegnitz, "practically all the strikers and picketers were American citizens." Following intervention by the 4L (and further NLWU massed picketing to prevent anti-striker discrimination), Schafer's #4 reopened with a $3.00 minimum; the following March, 85% of the crew were still reported to be NLWU members. The Montesano plant raised wages to a $2.50 base, and, repudiating the company union which had originally sanctioned the wage cut, forty-five workers signed a 4L local charter. Ruegnitz claimed the settlement, which occurred in one of the 4L's weakest districts, was "a long step in the direction of stabilization for the industry."14

Writing to Raught and other operators, Ruegnitz pointedly attributed the Grays Harbor strikes to operators' unrestricted power to produce too much at a given time. Owners have a right to do what they please with their property, but the exercise of that right without regard to others brought trouble and losses.

He urged the industry to help the 4L establish a "firm wage position, which with the backing and helping of industry employees, could be made to bring
low wage employers to approved levels." Exactly how this was to be done, if not through strikes, was left unstated. Ruegnitz contrasted the strikes with a 4L Wood Promotion Committee mass rally at Tacoma, where 500 lumber-workers and others had listened to Ruegnitz, Greeley, Griggs and others explain the industry's problems. It is evident that Ruegnitz understood the 4L to be a tool for industrial self-regulation which would facilitate the retention of living wages while educating workers to analytical perspectives of the reforming capitalists. Implicit was the warning that if the 4L failed, lumber would be splintered by a militant anti-capitalist movement. 15

While several other operators developed closer relations with the 4L during 1931, Griggs became disillusioned with the organization. Beset with financial difficulties (the St. Paul's estimated losses for 1931 were over $300,000), evidently unimpressed with the 4L's success among pine operators, discouraged by the 4L's and the WCLA's inability to control wages at Douglas fir mills (by October, the mean non-4L minimum mill wage was $2.42) and by November 4L Board meeting's failure to either sanction a wage cut or adopt his thirty-hour work week scheme, Griggs tendered a sixty-day notice of resignation from the 4L on November 18. According to Stewart Holbrook, then editor of the 4L Lumber News, the resignation was received by the 4L staff as a "shock". Because the "implications and consequences" of the resignation would be "so far reaching" -- the St. Paul bore the reputation of being the peacetime 4L's staunchest proponent -- Ruegnitz refused to inform the Board of Griggs' decision without first personally discussing the matter with him. On December 29, Griggs agreed to withdraw the resignation but reduced the St. Paul's wages 12½% to meet the 4L minima. He declared that the St. Paul's continued 4L affiliation would be contingent upon the Board's reducing the wage minima within three months, which, he said, would allow 4L operators to minimize their losses under the associations' curtailment program, with which
he still "absolutely agreed." Save for J.D. Tennant and Roy Sharp (President, Mountain Lumber Company, Tacoma), the majority of 4L and non-4L operators present at a meeting arranged held January 22, 1932, at Tacoma by the 4L Executive Committee, echoed Griggs' sentiments.16

At the Spring, 1932, 4L Board meeting, which was duly advanced from mid-May to March 2, debate on the wage question raged far into the evening. Employment in the lumber industry was less than 30% of normal; wages at several mills had been slashed to a 20¢ per hour base. Ruegnitz blamed the wage-price decline on overproduction, hostile tariffs, and the "blind competition and lack of unity" of operators outside the 4L. The Tacoma Joint Locals threatened that operator pressure to reduce wages would "impel the formation of an employee organization, with provisions to call strikes to protest wage reductions." Despite initially vigorous worker opposition, a motion reestablishing the minimum at $2.60 was passed 17 to 3, indicating that at least five workers were persuaded to vote with the wage cutters.17

The WCLA and WPA curtailment program probably required little promotion by the spring of 1932, for much of the industry had gone into receivership or was unable to make any profit on sales by this point. Great disparities in operating hours were evident. In April, although the average mill work week was 32.5 hours, the range was from less than twenty to over sixty. On May 28, normally several weeks into the annual peak production period, the American Lumberman noted that Douglas fir prices had "reached such a low level that all mills that [could] possibly afford to do so" were shutting down. By June, West Coast production fell to 19% of capacity. At Tacoma, of over 20 lumber plants, only the St. Paul and three smaller companies remained open.

The Tacoma Unemployed Citizen's League, founded March 23, 1932, claimed 7000 families as members by August (the city's 1929 population had been 106,817). Efforts to economize affected office and supervisory personnel as well as
production workers. The Weyerhaeuser Everett mills ran one-half shifts five days per week with a skeleton crew of skilled men; several foremen were removed from the salaried list and paid on a per diem basis, while office workers doubled up on jobs and devoted their evenings as well as days to company bookkeeping. Early in July, following defaults on bond interest and taxes, Long-Bell cut its western base wage to $2.00. Long-Bell at Weed, Polson Lumber and Shingle (Aberdeen), Schaefer Brothers, Brooks-Scanlon, and Jones Lumber and Inman-Poulsen (the latter two at Portland) -- all among the larger industry operations -- resigned from the 4L to cut wages below the minimum.18

The WCLA admitted that it was experiencing serious difficulties. Citing operators' "individualistic policies," "violations of ethics," and inability to pay dues, the Trustees voted in April to dissolve the organization unless the membership expanded to 60% of industry capacity. By November, however, the membership did increase to 84.5% of the industry -- the highest proportion yet attained in the WCLA's existence. The association's functions, however, were limited to grade supervision and collation of statistics; earlier work to extend markets was abandoned.19

Viewing the crisis in the fir districts, Griggs strenuously demanded another 4L wage cut. As he presented the case to Ruegnitz in mid-summer, "There is not a dollar in the business.... I trust the organization will prove its merit.... otherwise, resignations will be filed;" he demanded that a special session of the 4L Board be called to legislate a scale reduction by August 1. Ruegnitz, who was meeting regularly with WPA Manager David T. Mason to discuss employment conditions, replied that in view of labour's increasing resentment of operator policy, lumbermen would find it "far more profitable...to increase prices and stabilize wages on a $2.50 or better basis... than [to] try to follow low wage operations;" he protested that,
in any event, only a 4L Board majority was constitutionally empowered to schedule extraordinary Board Meetings. Griggs retorted that a number of strong 4L supporters had already gone out of business; he thought ludicrous Ruegnitz' suggestion that workers, under mass unemployment conditions, would retaliate against wage cuts by organizing independent radical unions: "What the men want is work." Despite his misgivings, Ruegnitz polled the 4L Board members, recommending an early August meeting. The majority sentiment urged delaying until September; the Board convened, in fact, at the usual November date. It appears that Griggs' good will had, by this point, been superseded by that of the pine operators as the central factor for the 4L's institutional well-being. 20

The deepening demoralization of lumber consumption, prices, and wages spurred the associations to refine their programs for collective self-regulation. At the semi-annual WPA meeting, August 11, 1932, the Forestry and Economics Committee presented the most sophisticated such pre-NIRA program devised in the lumber industry. On hand for the convention were Greeley, Wilson Compton (Secretary-Manager, National Lumber Manufacturers' Association), Ruegnitz, and members of the United States Forest Service and the Timber Conservation Board. The heart of the proposal (whose prime composer was WPA Manager David Mason) was a call for legal strengthening of the trade associations and for cooperation of the lumber industry with the railroads, banking, farmers, mining, and other interdependent economic sectors. Compton, a leading figure in the anti-trust law revision movement, discussed the relevance of the Appalachian Coals marketing cartel Supreme Court test case for the lumber industry. Ruegnitz, under Griggs' pressure to call another special 4L Board meeting to allow further wage cutting, pointed out that lumber's wages and proportion of normal employment were already among the lowest in the United States. David Mason expressed his antipathy to Fascism,
Communism, and the dole, and argued that secure wages were essential to make the "American plan of doing things ... work better than it has been." He went on to call for long range planning emphasizing timber control and tax reform; sustained yield as a partial solution was, according to Mason, in the public interest, had public approval, and might be used to extract anti-trust law concessions. The Forestry and Economics Committee program, with which Ruegnitz stated the 4L was in "full accord", urged timber and production control, trade extension, spreading the existing work, a uniform wage base, long term planning of public works (a major lumber consumer), laws requiring sustained yield management of public and private forests (which, among other things, would reduce the amount of timber available to non-timber-owning mills), legal discrimination in favour of the railroads, and lower freight rates on the same, a shift of taxation from property in standing timber to a yield tax on logs and lumber (essentially, a sales tax), and legislative revision to facilitate centralized planning in the lumber industry. Concluding, the program called for

legislation authorizing (under appropriate federal supervision) industrial self-government, whereby an appropriate part of any given industry ... may adopt rules of practice binding upon the entire industry.21

The bulk of this program, with the addition of price controls, was incorporated in the NRA Lumber Code and other codes and public works legislations in 1933.

On October 1, Griggs fired off another 4L resignation. Ruegnitz informed him that the wage issue was being reconsidered throughout 4L territory. At Klamath Falls, where a round of wage reductions had begun September 1, 4L employee members had resolved that the Board should consider suspending the wage scale for one year, "leaving it entirely to individual operators and 4L locals to determine the most equitable wage scales possible." Though Griggs
declared the action ought to have occurred at the previous Board meeting, he assured Ruegnitz that the Klamath Falls proposal would "meet the objection we have raised to the organization. There is no other way." Ruegnitz and the 4L staff urged workers to stand in a "united front against further reductions" and "help the high wage operators maintain good conditions." Once again, the line was taken that an upward adjustment of wages in the lumber industry would tend to stabilize prices, thereby benefitting lumber manufacturers, employees, and the community through increased purchasing power of employees, and the State by securing proper return for forest resources.

Reporting to the Washington Fir Districts 4L Convention, October 27, Ruegnitz offered the pithily ambiguous comment that industries "that [paid] less than living wages" were "exploiting employees at the expense of someone." The convention endorsed the principle of spreading work among mills, and opposed reducing the wage scale, while admitting the 4L's inability to control industry wages. In November, the 4L Board, under threat of operator withdrawals, voted to retain the $2.60 daily minimum wage, but suspended the efficacy of the 4L scale for six months, and called upon "each local to set going wages that will allow 4L operations to run in competition with competing concerns." It was resolved to encourage the Federal government to establish a national eight hour day, thus disciplining Southern competition. Ruegnitz' ambivalent position was expressed in his activity. Although he fearlessly spoke in favour of collective stabilization of wages at trade association conventions, his behaviour at the Board meeting was caustically painted by the general manager of Potlatch Forests as that of an "animated Literary Digest, neutral at all times." On New Year's eve, the St. Paul cut to a $2.50 daily wage base; Weyerhaeuser group operations reduced to $2.25. The St. Paul's 4L membership was not cancelled, although Griggs denounced the 4L for its "delays" and "decisions arrived at too late to be of real benefit."
Weyerhaeuser Executive Committee concluded with disgust that "some new organization might serve the purpose better" than the 4L.23

The 4L suffered a complex career during the 1931-1932 period, as it attempted to act as a regionally based organization integrating workers and managers in an industry which included thousands of producing units during a period of market collapse. Ideologically and organizationally, it formed coalitions with lumber trade associations and with some of their leading figures, and participated in the development of programs for industrial self-regulation. By the early 1930's, the 4L was a familiar vehicle available to operators attracted to both company unions and multi-company wage setting, and it is clear that a stronger portion of the industry than suggested by earlier writers did make use of the 4L. Ruegnitz' vision of collective wages and hours regulation within a corporatist ambience, guaranteeing workers' living standards in exchange for their "loyalty," was built into the movement for industrial self-government. The ethos promulgated by Ruegnitz cannot be ascribed to all 4L operator members. More complex than Todes' observation that large operators did not want "outside agencies intervening in their relations with the workers," lumbermen's use of the 4L appears to have varied with their own approaches to labour issues of costs and power within the evolving conditions of lumber production and marketing. (This variety would justify investigation of industrial relations within particular companies, were no other motivation available.) Until November, 1932, the 4L did serve as a short-term brake on the cutting of wages at member mills. Although some workers attempted to work with the 4L to maintain or raise wage levels, the organization's credibility as an instrument facilitating their material security remained vulnerable to operators' curtailment programs and sometimes ruthless attempts to remain solvent. It might be argued that the failure of a greater number of the largest operators -- for instance, the Weyerhaeuser
group as a whole -- to support the 4L more heartily diminished its effectiveness. Since the Weyerhaeuser managers, including those in the 4L, received their wages policy from upper management, and the group's wage cuts were intentionally lagged behind those of the 4L, Weyerhaeuser commitment to the organization would have been balanced by the resentment of other operators who sought more immediate wage reductions, and this might have resulted in even more intense waves of operator withdrawals than that of the spring, 1932. The 4L, of course, was not able to control the great majority of operators, both in the Northwest and in the remainder of the United States, who were not members. For some operators, such as the St. Paul and Tacoma Lumber Company and Potlatch Forests, the driving down of wages coexisted with demands for uniform controls on wages and production, which, it was argued, required legally enforceable regulation by the trade associations. This complex legacy haunted the 4L's experience during the NRA period.
Chapter III: The 4L Under the NRA, 1933-35

While the landslide election of Franklin Roosevelt as President of the United States in November, 1932, was undoubtedly a mandate for a positive federal economic recovery policy, there were probably few, if any, voters who anticipated the convoluted and contradictory qualities of the New Deal's establishment and implementation. The energies released during the New Deal months initially buoyed the 4L but, by 1935, overtook and broke it in the Douglas fir region. The 4L's program was absorbed by the NRA Lumber Code Authority, and the organization secured a rapid expansion among anti-union lumbermen during mid-1933; as one employer member of the 4L Board prematurely crowed, U.S. Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins gave the 4L "a virtual dictatorship of labor standards.... The 4L holds the whip hand as it never has before." The use of the 4L as a corporate paternalist device defining and shaping workers' role in the industrial system was of a complex character. It served as an institutional link between centralized plant management and the socialized adjudication of wage and production issues at the industry and federal agency levels (which were sometimes the same thing under the NRA). The 4L's wage minima were given force of law disciplining northwestern operators' economic activity, and were reinforced by pressure from independent labour organizations. Though the lumber unions' efforts to become effective bargaining agents were unsuccessful under the NRA, there is evidence of rich local activity as unionists worked not only outside and against but also within the 4L, suggesting that at some points the 4L took the aspect of a multi-factioned workers' coalition. The organizing experience and frustrations of local union organizers and rank and file workers under the New Deal gave impetus to an insurgent movement, challenging lumber operators and conservative, compromising union officials alike, when the bulk of the Douglas fir lumber industry was closed down by a general lumber strike during the
summer of 1935.

The November, 1932, suspension of the 4L wage contracts did nothing to resolve the lumber industry's economic problems. The fresh round of wage cutting which ensued, however, did revive interest in the 4L system. In a "rather warm 4L meeting" at Klamath Falls, workers unsuccessfully argued against the reduction of Weyerhaeuser's base to $2.00; similar cuts were made at Shevlin and the majority of other active mills, most of which were operating part time.

Phil Weyerhaeuser (who, in January, 1933, had been elected Weyerhaeuser Timber Company executive vice-president, and president of Willapa Harbor Lumber Mills and other subsidiaries), was said to be "very keen to get the fir manufacturers together and increase the [4L's] membership." He immediately feared that his company had gone too far in encouraging the rapid downward trend in wages.... I am very anxious [he wrote] ... that we lend ourselves to a movement vigourously to stabilize wages at some point, literally, to my mind, the higher the better.

Under B.W. Lakin's leadership, the larger Klamath mills increased their minimum wage to $2.40 per day. At the March 16-17, 1933 WPA annual convention, familiar themes were reiterated. Phil Weyerhaeuser blamed the Depression on a general "failure of leadership" and "lack of organization," and Tennant and Ruegnitz suggested adopting the six-hour day and increasing wages. Upon the motion of Shevlin-Carpenter-Clarke president J.P. Hennessey, "the principle of the 4L was endorsed," and non-members were urged to affiliate. Several 4L members were elected to key offices. Macartney became president; J.P. McGoldrick, northwestern vice-president; Isted, treasurer. The three directors-at-large included Tennant and Phil Weyerhaeuser. A high level labour policy committee was created, composed of Mason, Macartney, Lakin and McGoldrick. Thus, on the eve of the New Deal, the 4L's advocates remained solidly entrenched in the WPA. (See Table V, p. 31.)

The possibility of disbanding the 4L if it failed to attract a large
Table V  Employer Members, 4L Board of Directors, June 21, 1933, and April 12-13, 1934.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>June 23-24, 1933</th>
<th>District</th>
<th>April 12-13, 1934</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R.H. Burnside (Pacific States Lumber Company, Astoria, Ore.)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Dean Johnson (Pacific Spruce Corporation, Toledo, Ore.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M.C. Woodard (Silver Falls Timber Company, Silverton, Ore.)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>H.R. Irish (Silver Falls Timber Company, Silverton, Ore.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F.H. Ranson (Eastern and Western Lumber Company, Portland, Ore.)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>M.H. Jones (Jones Lumber Company, Portland, Ore.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John F. Buchanan (Henry Mill and Timber Company, Tacoma, Wash.)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>J.F. Buchanan (Henry Mill and Timber, Tacoma, Wash.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David M. Fisher (Snoqualmie Falls Lumber Company, Snoqualmie Falls, Wash.)</td>
<td>W7</td>
<td>W</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J.P. McGoldrick (McGoldrick Lumber Company, Spokane, Wash.)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Kenneth Morrison (Morrison Mills, Anacortes, Wash.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.L. Billings (Potlatch Forests, Lewiston, Id.)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>J.P. McGoldrick Lumber Company, Spokane, Wash.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R.R. Macartney (Weyerhaeuser Timber Company, Klamath Falls, Ore.)</td>
<td>W10</td>
<td>W</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.L. Isted (Shevlin-Hixon Company, Bend, Ore.)</td>
<td>W11</td>
<td>W</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.L. Isted (Shevlin-Hixon Company, Bend, Ore.)</td>
<td>S12</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The District 8 seat was held at the January, 1934, 4L Board meeting by L.M. Reichmann (Weyerhaeuser Timber Company, Everett, Wash.), giving the Weyerhaeuser group five employer seats at that session.

Source: Minutes, 4L Board of Directors Meeting, June 13 and 14, 1933, in SFT/46/4L.
Minutes, 4L Board of Directors Meeting, April 12-13, 1934, in CHE/2/4L.

number of new members had been raised early in the year. Canvassing the fir operators' estimation of the 4L, Mason and Ruegnitz found strong support for the restoration of firm wage minima, implemented by a 4L-type organization's contracts and cloak of lawfulness. Objections were raised regarding 4L dues and structure. Charles Ingram (assistant general manager, Weyerhaeuser Timber Company), J.W. Lewis and C.L. Billings, for example, desired an industry wage-setting board, but objected to plant grievance committees, complained that the 4L staff strengthened workers' hand against management, and charged that Ruegnitz gave "more excuses than facts" and needed "a boss to tell him
what to do." Ingram proposed that the 4L staff be reduced in number and closely supervised by the Board, and that all references to overtime, field officers, and local conference committees be deleted from the 4L constitution: in short, "leaving entirely to the individuals how they prefer to carry on their own organization, with the exception of designating how the employees would be represented on the wage boards." In April, the Weyerhaeuser managers' recommendations circulated in a revised draft constitution, which one employee Board member (who joined the AFL in July) branded as a strong bid to secure the entire Weyerhaeuser group.

The 4L's reorganization was overtaken by events in Washington, D.C. Senator Hugo Black's bill, providing for a national maximum thirty-hour work week, was passed by the Senate April 6. On April 12, Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins' substitute proposal was presented, enabling "a national board to grant limited exemptions to the thirty-hour limit and for industry boards to fix minimum wages." Beginning April 13, Ruegnitz regularly took pains to assure Perkins that the 4L was organized "for the very purpose contemplated in the proposed establishment of industry wage boards." On April 25, Ruegnitz and Mason flew to Washington to lobby against the Black Bill and to "insist on the injection of 4L conference ideas" into the Perkins measure. At Washington, Mason and Wilson Compton worked together, as they had since at least 1931, to devise a "policy and plan for promoting 'industrial self-government.'" They were joined by Greeley, who had been instructed by the WCLA to lobby against uniform government regulation of wages, hours, and production, and to work for laws "which would give industry greater power and freedom to deal with all of these questions by cooperative action among its own members." Compton and Greeley accepted Mason's and Ruegnitz' suggested "section 7-a, an alternative to the original Perkins bill;" the proposal was enthusiastically received by a Mr. Battle of the U.S. Department
of Labor, who on May 3, endorsed and forwarded it to the House of Representatives Labor Committee. With over 300 plans submitted to the Department of Labor by May 9, it is not clear what the Mason-Ruegnitz proposal's contribution was to the final form of the NIRA's Article 7, which, as summarized by Bernard Bellush,

"accorded employees the right to organize and bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and the freedom to join a labor organization, and required employer compliance with provisions for maximum hours of labor, minimum rates of pay, and other working conditions approved by the President."

It is clear, however, that Ruegnitz aggressively sought to augment his organization's position vis-à-vis the trade associations and the new order.5

The NIRA was presented to Congress on May 17; the same day, Greeley, Mason, and Ruegnitz met Perkins, who, as the 4L man informed his constituents, "spoke with approval regarding 4L methods and achievements." According to Mason's less sanguine version of the encounter, Perkins told them that "the 4L savors too much of the 'company union' and that labor needs protection, but [she was] willing to accept the 4L 'temporarily' on its record." This divergence of interpretations of the NIRA's intent marked the following years of the 4L's life.6

The jubilant Ruegnitz declared that the NIRA was "the kind of plan the 4L and trade associations have preached and tried to practice," and, fearing recognition of nascent AFL unions by federal Labor Boards which "really don't know the 4L and its methods", he asked the Weyerhaeuser, Long-Bell, and St. Paul interests to promote new 4L affiliations before the NIRA became law. They required little urging. The WCLA trustees, on Tennant's motion and Ingram's second, had resolved, on May 16, to support the 4L "or a similar organization" to fulfill the NIRA's collective bargaining and minimum wage provisions. On May 22, the Weyerhaeuser Executive Committee authorized the
management "to have any of the plants of the company and of any subsidiary company not now members of the [4L] organization join the same." May 23, the House of Representatives Ways and Means Committee reported out the AFL version of Section 7(a), outlawing businessmen's power to compel workers to join company unions or to refrain from joining organizations of their own choosing. Newly elected WCLA President E.W. Demarest (Pacific National Lumber Company, Seattle) warned the Tacoma Lumbermen's Club that the AFL would organize the Northwest if the 4L failed to gain support. May 25, Charles Ingram, saying there was "no alternative," instructed the managers of the White River Lumber Company and the Weyerhaeuser plants at Everett and Longview to sign 4L contracts. The next day, the NIRA passed the Senate, and with provisions for control of wages and hours of production, it was signed as law on June 15. Long-Bell followed Weyerhaeuser into the 4L; the 4L's membership trebled by December, embracing 134 operators (including one at Rapid City, South Dakota) and 10-11,500 workers. Ruegnitz boasted that the 4L had enrolled 30% of all lumber workers in the districts in which it was established.7

During May and June, the NLMA composed and the regional associations approved a tentative Code. Following a series of hearings and revisions, the code was signed by President Roosevelt August 19, 1933. To administer the Code, a Lumber Code Authority (LCA) was incorporated by industry representatives, with John D. Tennant as President and Greeley and Mason as executive secretaries for the Douglas fir and Western Pine Divisions. (Mason was appointed executive officer of the LCA, June, 1934). The major features of the Code (which covered over 400,000 workers at 36,000 forest products establishments) dealt with the control of wages, production, prices, trade practices, and forest conservation. The LCA gathered quarterly data regarding inventories, production, shipments, orders on file, probable future demand, and
other factors, on the basis of which quarterly national production quotas were set and distributed among the regional Code divisions and thence allocated to individual factories, mills and camps.

Even while the NIRA was being designed, workers sought to use 4L locals to enhance their standards of consumption, or, in some cases, attempted to vote their locals out of existence. A few examples will indicate the tone of these months. On May 26, the Brooks-Scanlon 4L local asked management for a 20% wage increase and denounced Ruegitz' assertion to Perkins that he was a "labor leader;" general manager H.K. Brooks urged the 4L staff to stay away from the Bend area, asserting that their visits would merely "agitate conditions." The workers of the newly created 4L local at the Red River Lumber Company, Westwood, California, promptly demanded a voice in the company town's housing and working conditions, and called for the removal of the company's personnel manager.

At the St. Paul and Tacoma 4L local meeting, June 14, the visiting secretary of the Wheeler-Osgood sash and door factory 4L local denounced the St. Paul's chairman, W.C. Campbell, for his actions as chairman of the May 15 Tacoma Joint Locals meeting, where Campbell had allowed the passage of motions denouncing the operators for holding excessive power in the 4L and demanding secret balloting on all substantive issues by the membership at large and at Board meetings. Campbell stood his ground and refused to abdicate his seat on the 4L Board. The St. Paul Local asked the District Board to grant a 50¢ per hour minimum wage. A seven-member committee which was appointed to discuss wage differentials with management included five men who soon appeared as activists in the AFL; two of these, Norman Lange and Ed Lohre, served terms as presidents of the St. Paul's AFL and subsequent International Woodworkers of America (IWA) locals. Lange circulated an anti-4L petition and presented it at the regular 4L local meeting June 20. After Lange and E.G.
"Spike" Griggs II (nephew of Major Griggs, and his successor in 1933 as President of St. Paul) exchanged some sharp words, Griggs agreed to allow a general meeting on company property June 29 to discuss the 4L's future under the NRA. At the mass meeting, Ruegnitz repeatedly claimed that Frances Perkins has assured him personally that the 4L "would receive recognition" from the NRA. Lange argued with the company officials, seeking to hold an employees-only meeting. The meeting broke up in pandemonium, and Lange led 100-400 workers -- the accounts vary -- to the Tacoma Carpenter's Hall for a rump meeting. The following day, labour presses around the States learned that Ruegnitz' claims of 4L recognition were branded "Absolutely False" by the U.S. Labor Department. July 1, 225 St. Paul workers met and passed a motion of withdrawal from the 4L. 10

Beginning June 10, Long-Bell and Weyerhaeuser-Longview launched an intensive 4L organizing drive; company officials presided at rallies, and foremen distributed membership applications. The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) later determined that several workers refusing to join the 4L were discharged. On June 12, the two companies raised wages, Weyerhaeuser establishing a $2.40 daily base. June 16, 400-600 workers met to establish an AFL local for the Kelso-Longview area; the local, which was said to be the AFL lumber workers' largest, claimed to have over 700 members within three weeks. By mid-August, the "formation of the A. F. of L. union had made considerable headway, and its members resented the activities of the foremen on behalf of the 4L." Allegations of "improper solicitation" and "coercion [sic] of the worst type" persisted, as did the checking-off of 4L dues. 11

The AFL Central Labor Councils (CLC's functioned as city or county coordinating body) and state apparatus worked to mobilize federal power against what they perceived as a solidifying 4L-trade association nexus. They urged AFL President William Green, Frances Perkins, and U.S. Senators
and Congressmen to preclude authorization of the 4L ("a mutual admiration society...owned and controlled by the employers") as an NRA collective bargaining agency. These efforts, however, bore little fruit; anti-4L successes attained were the result of local efforts in cooperation with the NRA Regional Labor Boards, created to ensure compliance with Section 7(a). These gains were not consolidated until 1935.

The 4L Board met at Portland, June 22-23; the Weyerhaeuser and Shevlin groups were again heavily represented (See Table V). Though leaving the 4L staff and conference committee structure intact in order to receive the benefits of the NIRA, the Board did create an eight member supervisory executive committee, whose employer members were Billings, Lewis, Isted, and Dean Johnson. A 32½¢ per hour interim minimum wage was adopted, to be effective until the Lumber Code was endorsed by Roosevelt; wages would then be raised to a 42½¢ per hour base. The 4L wage became the Northwestern Lumber Code wage. Vigorous strikes occurred in July in the Klamath Falls and Grays Harbour Districts. The breadth of union activity pressed operators to raise wages to the new 4L minimum by early August, giving credit to the 4L Locals for negotiating the increase and, they hoped, discouraging the development of an even greater ferment. This pattern remained typical of the period through the 1935 lumber organizational strike wave.

In September, five trade associations representing the Douglas fir lumber, logging, shingle, plywood, and sash and door manufacturers created a Joint Committee on Labor, empowered to provide a first review of alleged violations of wage, hours, and "right-to-organize" provisions of the Code. The Joint Committee was composed of three representatives of each of the five associations; the WCLA's sub-committee included George T. Gerlinger as Chairman (President of the Willamette Valley Lumber Company, and a long time friend of the 4L), Roy Morse (Long-Bell), and Spike Griggs. Both the Joint Committee
the 4L utilized WCLA and Western Pine field auditors to examine the records of companies in their jurisdiction as an aid to composing and readjusting minimum wage scales. The Joint Committee's stated policy was that under the lumber code, all employees have the right to organize or to not organize, as they please, and that in either case their rights under the Code must be guarded in every possible way by the agency of the Lumber Code Authority.

The Longview LSWU promptly scored the Joint Committee as a "side-tracker to keep the men from having their complaints acted upon" and established the practice of taking complaints directly to the Seattle Regional Labor Board.\(^{15}\)

The 4L general and local organizations linked the Lumber Code apparatus with plant personnel management and with rank-and-file workers. In September, 1933, for example, an AFL committee at the St. Paul and Tacoma called upon Spike Griggs, who was a member of the Joint Committee on Labor, "to discuss wages of semi-skilled and skilled labor, but without any facts or figures they did not get very far." The St. Paul 4L local was rather better supplied with "facts and figures," for its secretary, 1920-35, was Harry Naubert, the company timekeeper. Naubert examined his books and learned that about sixty men were, according to Code differentials, being underpaid. Naubert notified the plant 4L conference committee and they, in turn, brought the discrepancies to the attention of Spike Griggs, who authorized wage increases and posted notices crediting the plant committee for the adjustment.\(^{16}\)

It should be noted that not all managers were fully pleased with industrial relations in the 4L. One 4L field officer was accused of being a stool pigeon for Weyerhaeuser's for whom he had been a timekeeper. Ruegnitz typically suggested that operators grant wage increases through 4L conference committees to give workers a felt sense of participation in their own governance; those operators who failed to observe the 4L minimum and differentials were threatened with expulsion from the 4L's capitalist-syndicalist order.
This raised difficulties for one lumberman who joined the 4L at Ralph Macartney's behest; he complained that

Practically all meetings with employers and employees amount to simply a row wherein the employees criticize and condemn some employers and they are continuously talking about more wages... and everything in the world that employees might want with little consideration as to the employers' needs or desires.

He concluded that employers, if united, could defeat radicals; 4L conference committees and the reciprocal obligations of the 4L ethos were less easy for employer members to combat, especially with unions pounding at the gates.

At Snoqualmie Falls, the local conference committee worked on new wage scales with the management, and devised a family medical plan with a local doctor; even after enactment of the NIRA, a field officer reported that "some [4L] preference demands ... were met by the management," and, after a layoff, "the crew that stayed on the job were hand-picked as far as possible out of 4L men." At another company town, the Bridal Veil Lumber Company's Bridal Veil, Oregon, the 4L was used much less consciously as a work-force shaping and integrating device. The management evidently failed to discriminate in favour of 4L members, took "the attitude that the 4L [was] an organization of the employees," and "missed the significance of the cooperative set-up of the 4L." The company's 1933 July 4th picnic was not given over to the 4L, nor was the organization credited with community hall repairs which were directed by the local officers, who were described as the "natural community leaders," toward whom a group of "anti-social Swedes" directed derogatory remarks (the local had enrolled only about 45% of the company's workers when these complaints were made). The 4L was here functioning as little more than an anti-union fraternal club for a minority of the work force who fulfilled the 4L's notions of community responsibility. It is evident then, that the life of the 4L at any given point was influenced by varying management policies, intercompany antipathies, and intra-work force divisions, probably along
social lines compounded by organizational loyalties. 17

The Districts 4, 5, and 6 4L Board meeting, December 18, passed employee resolutions on themes including adoption of a national six-hour day and a thirty hour week, equal LCA allotments of operating time to all operations, seating of workers on all northwestern LCA agencies adjudicating Code labour provisions, and support for the Old Age Pension Bill advocated for ten years by the Fraternal Order of Eagles, a nation-wide worker-oriented organization. Of interest to historians of the workplace was a motion preferred by the St. Paul 4L local through Freeman Cochran, a carpenter and, after the 1935 lumber strike, recording secretary of the lumber workers' Tacoma District Council. This resolution dealt with contract labour -- that is, workers, especially at dry kilns, storage yards, and wharves and rail shipping docks and, in the woods, fallers and buckers, whose work was typically paid for by the board foot; the sense of the resolution makes it also applicable to efficiency systems utilizing incentive wages. The motion declared that contract labour was "not in accord with the expressed intentions of the President of these United States" nor with the NIRA's "effort to put men back to work;" furthermore, it continued,

the use of contract labor has been the cause of laying off of men who need employment, speeding up of labor beyond endurance and necessity, without the corresponding increase in pay per operation.

After "considerable discussion," the recommendation that the 4L Board abolish piece work in the logging and lumber industry lost. It is clear that some workers within the 4L were taking the offensive to modify some aspects of shop management procedures. In September, 1934, almost identical wording was used by Willapa Harbor Lumber Mills unionists in their discussion of the Bedaux system at that plant. 18

The 4L Board meeting, January 23-24, 1934, raised the 4L minimum to 45¢
Phil Weyerhaeuser noted that workers and operators "stood divided for a long time" on the issue: a real problem for the Weyerhaeuser group, which appeared to be the "spearhead" of an AFL organizing drive abetted by a program of wages, hours, and working conditions demands and Regional Labor Board supervised elections. On February 15, the LCA turned down the 4L's request for a regionally prorated general Code wage increase, deferring the matter until other industries granted similar increases and a stronger market for lumber developed. 19

At Longview, over 1,200 workers petitioned the Seattle RLB for representation elections. With the urging of J. B. Fitzgerald, secretary of the Joint Committee on Labor, the 4L impotently protested the scheduled election. In February and March, 1934, 80% of the votes at Longview and the White River Lumber Company were given to AFL candidates. Similar results occurred during the year at Potlatch Forests, Snoqualmie Falls, and elsewhere. AFL memberships by May ranged from 25% to 85% at Weyerhaeuser group mills. Organizational membership, however, was not a reliable index to worker sentiments; at Weyerhaeuser-Everett, 700 of 1000 workers held 4L cards, but 600 petitioned for an RLB election. Charles Ingram complained that the AFL and the 4L used the situation to competitively campaign for the expansion of benefits. 20

It bears emphasis that the AFL at some points infiltrated the 4L; in May, 1935, for instance, the Morison Mills 4L local chairman, vice-chairman, and third conference committee member were all said to carry AFL cards. Following the elections at Longview, Weyerhaeuser and Long-Bell formulated a common policy of continued support for the 4L, meetings with minority organizations and individuals, and refusal to extend the dues check-off from the 4L to the AFL; they also rejected AFL demands for a written contract, wage and hours adjustment, and the employment at machinery of only union certified skilled men. By summer, union officers were centering their RLB appeals on the 4L
contract's dues check-off, which Ruegnitz and the Weyerhaeuser managers believed central to the continued vitality of the 4L.20

On March 21, the NRA accepted the 4L's proposal for creating national and regional employer-employee lumber Code compliance committees, as part of a program giving the LCA "full authorization to handle trade practices and labor complaints 'in the first instance.'" March 25, the same day that the Labor Complaints Committee regulations were adopted by the LCA, President Roosevelt presented his settlement of a threatened auto strike. He allowed manufacturers to meet with minority representatives, and, furthermore, stated that

the government makes it clear that it favors no particular union or particular form of employee organization or representation. The government's only duty is to secure absolute and unqualified freedom of choice without coercion, restraint, or intimidation from any source.

The AFL business agent at Longview was immediately concerned that the LCA's compliance power would be used to give the unions the "skids":

We can find no way of keeping 4L representatives from the labor committee in view of the recent rulings handed down by Roosevelt.... It is possible that a decision might be made classifying the 4L as not a company union.

The 4L's advocates sought to take advantage of the ambiguous federal labour policy to strengthen their organization against the AFL. On March 15, Ruegnitz asked Hugh Johnson, chief administrator of the NRA, "to give full credit to the earnest industry and N. R. A. cooperation displayed by the 4L," and referred him to Wilson Compton, who had been appointed trade association specialist on the NRA Industrial Advisory Board. Following the July, 1934, electoral defeat of the 4L at Potlatch Forests, C. L. Billings wrote furiously to David Mason, now executive officer of the LCA:

We think it was reasonably clear [in earlier correspondence] that we wanted the heat turned away from
us in any way that it could be -- whether by an endorsement of the 4L, or a clean claim of neutrality, or a repudiation of the A. F. of L. claims.

Ruegnitz and Billings finally achieved some success when they collared Hugh Johnson at Portland, July 16, on his way to denouncing the Longshoremen's general strike at San Francisco. They secured his written word that

The duty of the N. R. A. is to see that men are represented by their own freely chosen representatives. The Administration will not favor any particular form of organization --- neither the American Federation nor another. The question in each case is simply one of fact --- whom do the men choose?

The statement was given a full page in the 4L Lumber News.

During the latter months of 1934, the Weyerhaeuser group began rethinking its labour institution policy. While Weyerhaeuser managers, with the bulk of the remainder of the Northwest lumber industry, favoured the retention of a collective mode of wage and hour regulation by operators themselves -- there was some fear that these functions, the basic ones of the NIRA, would be enforced by the federal government, if not by industrialists -- the price maintenance clauses of the Code had come increasingly into disfavour by September. It was claimed that enforcement against "chiselers" was ineffective, and that minimum prices placed undue restrictions on the capacity of especially efficient operations to effectively compete. In November, the Weyerhaeuser interests and others pressured the WCLA to suspend its price enforcement activities. Labour law conditions shifted during the autumn. The NLRB ruled in the Houde case in September that the victor of an employee representation election was to be the worker's exclusive bargaining agent under Section 7(a). Long-Bell and Weyerhaeuser-Longview were found guilty by the Seattle Regional Labor Board, November 6, of violating 7(a) by virtue of granting the 4L, but not the AFL, the dues check-off, and also, as summarized by Ruegnitz, "failure to meet employee representatives, failure to pay Code wages, discharge of
A. F. of L. members, refusing to hear them, and otherwise discriminating against the AFL. Thus, Code enforcement itself was weakening at the same time as the unions were finding increasing support in the form of Labor Board decisions. Phil Weyerhaeuser opposed the voluntary withdrawal of the 4L check-off, for such action would undermine the 4L while rousing other operators' resentment. Favouring uniform labour conditions as he had since 1931, he argued that a NLRB ruling disallowing company contributions to the 4L would affect all operators, while still facilitating industry-wide economic regulation through wage-fixing by AFL contracts. There was concern that unsanctioned strikes by local unions, such as had occurred in sympathy with the Longshoremen at Longview in June, 1934, weakened the value of AFL contracts as devices for controlling labour in the absence of the 4L. Phil Weyerhaeuser suggested that, to alleviate this, Weyerhaeuser ought to encourage the AFL "to take such steps as will result in their forming an [industry-wide] international homogeneous union," if that development was not initiated by the unions themselves.22

Early in January, 1935, the Weyerhaeuser Executive Committee and plant managers discussed the labour issue, and determined to withhold election compliance unless this was specifically ordered by the NLRB. It was thought that binding agreements might become expedient when the courts or further legislation had clarified the duties and responsibilities of elected employee representatives. Phil Weyerhaeuser suggested that, in the interim, "nothing be done ... to unnecessarily antagonize" the unions and federal labour agencies.23 The general thrust of these decisions was, through delaying actions, to prevent a union-Labor Board alliance from encumbering the Weyerhaeuser group with competitive restrictions in the post-price control era, at least until federal law was clearly revised to transform the unions into labour disciplining devices on the 4L model.
Vernon Jensen states that, after November, 1934, "nothing further" came of the Longview discrimination cases. On April 1, 1935, the NLRB did, in fact, order that Long-Bell's and Weyerhaeuser-Longview's check-off and employer financial contributions be removed from the 4L or granted to the AFL, and that these plants recognize the AFL union as exclusive bargaining agent. J.D. Tennant, still President of the LCA, declared that the order "would have a disastrous effect for the 4L." His opinion as expressed to Mason may be taken as indicative of his expectations of industrial relations under the Code:

The decision of the Labor Board is, I think, the most atrocious thing that has ever come out of Washington .... You, of course, know the effort that I have put forth toward undertaking to assist the National Recovery Administration along all lines and I would dislike very much to be forced to vary from that position now.... I would dislike very much to have our company placed in the position to combat a ruling of the National Labor Relations Board even though I do not feel they have any jurisdiction; at the same time, there is a limit to where we can go in permitting such decisions to control our action.... If there is any one in the N. R. A. who has its interest at heart, they will certainly temper this decision.24

In mid-March, the AFL Executive Committee awarded jurisdiction over all lumberworkers to the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners, reputed to be the AFL's strongest, and, perhaps, most conservative craft union. Events thereafter moved swiftly. On March 23, the Northwest Council of Sawmill and Timber workers set May 6 as a strike deadline, demanding a written contract, exclusive bargaining rights, the six-hour day and thirty-hour week, overtime and holiday pay, modified seniority, vacations with pay, a base wage of 75¢ per hour, and mediation and contract revision clauses. By April 12, the Carpenters promised lumberworkers that a strike, backed with $1.50 per day strike benefits, would be called to force the Longview companies to comply with the NLRB order. With cooperation of the 4L and WCLA, these companies appealed the order to the NRA compliance committee. Weyerhaeuser Executive Committeeman Laird Bell, less hostile to unions than were most
lumber executives, suggested that

In order to give [the NRA] compliance and control division any opportunity to withhold precipitate action... we invite negotiations with unions immediately stating that this is done in deference to national board and pursuant to receiving requests from any employee:

By April 19, demands were served at Olympia, Portland, Tacoma, and other points, and the first isolated walkouts began. Four days later, an NLRB election order was served for the Willapa Harbor Lumber Mills. While holding the election orders in abeyance, Weyerhaeuser and Long-Bell opened discussions on May 1 with Abe Muir, the Carpenters representative assigned to service the lumber unions. On April 29, the 4L Fir Wage Board belatedly recommended that the 4L Board of Directors raise the minimum wage to 50¢ per hour; because of its 4L contract, Weyerhaeuser felt bound to concede the 50¢ hour to the unions, and was willing to grant the union recognition as bargaining agent for its own members, and, probably as a concession to the NLRB's order, withdraw the check-off from the 4L while denying it to the AFL. Outside arbitration clauses and a shorter than forty-hour week were similarly denied. In short, the Longview operators were willing to grant no more to the AFL than was already required under contract with the 4L.

E.P. Marsh, U.S. Department of Labor mediator, advised Weyerhaeuser on May 2 that Muir lacked clear control of the impatient local unions, which had been built up during the preceding two years largely through the determination of local activists. The Carpenters' representative appeared to be restraining strikes at Weyerhaeuser group mills at Raymond, Snoqualmie, and Everett pending negotiations. By May 7, however, these points had struck, and Muir, admitting that he had no control at Everett, advised Weyerhaeuser not to attempt to operate its mills there. Two days later, Muir accepted the operators' contract conditions, but the 4L-Muir settlement was rejected by the rank and file. (It is conceivable that Muir was planning to use rank
and file pressure to force a better agreement, but evidence is lacking on this point.) By mid-May, with almost all fir mills and camps from the Portland vicinity north closed by picket lines, about 30,000 workers were on strike. 26

Employers "Mutual Protection" groups were organized in all fir districts by April 16, and formulated a program of not accepting union demands, meeting with non-employee union representatives, instigating a lockout, or negotiating collectively, and rejecting all written agreements mentioning a union or proposing the closed shop or dues check-off; it was hoped that the unions would collapse of their own accord. All rumours were investigated by a central office, maintaining the morale of the anti-union united front; the virulently anti-union editor Carl Crow handled strike bulletins and news-releases for 500 mills in Oregon and Washington. Operators at Tacoma, where Spike Griggs chaired the initial meetings, were admitted to be depending on the 4L to combat the strike. 27 The informal operators' committee was pleased to note that the Longview negotiations, against which they had remonstrated, were "past history", and concluded that

the present plan of indifferent waiting and individual action was working out very nicely....It was felt that anything which would put up resistance to the unions or give them something to fight would be at variance with the program of acquiescence which had worked out so successfully.

Although "some few" operators felt "very much put out" by the new 4L scale, the concensus was that "no better arrangement" was feasible. They were, however, quite pleased to note that Muir had split with more militant unionists such as Norman Lange of Tacoma, who was expelled from the Carpenters. On May 27, the Supreme Court's Schecter decision outlawed the NIRA. Three days later, the Longview locals voted 9-1 to accept the 40-hour week, a 5¢ per hour raise, and union recognition, which appeared to be the most favourable settlement available without government sanction. 28
By June 3, an estimated 7-8000 strikers returned to work. On June 5, however, insurgents with Communist support met at Aberdeen to form the anti-Muir Northwest Joint Strike Committee, and reiterated the original demands for the 75¢ hour, thirty-hour week and closed shop. On June 6, mills at Longview and elsewhere were again closed by massed pickets. At the suggestion of John Blodgett, past president of the NLMA, Ruegnitz facilitated meetings of workers from the Bridal Veil Timber Company, Westfir Lumber Company (Westfir, Oregon), and various Tacoma mills with the governors of Oregon and Washington, soliciting State protection for workers who desired to work behind picket lines (the leader of the Tacoma employees delegation, then a millwright and trimmerman at the Gange Mill, believed that he was resisting Communist unionism). The Governors obliged, providing state police and National Guard occupations at Bridal Veil, Westfir, Longview, Aberdeen-Hoquiam, Tacoma, Everett, and other points. Oregon Governor Clarence Martin and his Washington counterpart Charles Martin called upon "all good Christian people" to preserve workers' "right to work" in the face of "professional Communists." A long series of strikers' parades, massed picketings, violent confrontations, and tear gassings ensued. In the midst of all this, Ruegnitz lamented to David Mason that "the original intentions for the NIRA were quite different from what it has actually done."29

On June 24, Muir ordered the Longview strikers to return to work, and, cutting off an important source of financial aid for recalcitrants, revoked the original Longview local charter and established new locals more amenable to his leadership. Similar tactics were used elsewhere, especially at Tacoma and Aberdeen. Mill executives were reported to endorse the reorganization. On July 3, Phil Weyerhaeuser advised F.E. Weyerhaeuser, President of the Weyerhaeuser Timber Company, that a withdrawal from the 4L at all fir plants was desirable; he did not think the company "could refuse recognition of the
union in some way in the future.... The 4L has done us no good whatsoever and is completely dead at our plants." He concluded that negotiating a written agreement after the strikers had returned to work would strengthen the position of the conservative unionists.

Meeting at Aberdeen July 11, lumbermen developed a standard strike-terminating agreement which provided for a 50c per hour minimum wage with increases at higher brackets, the forty-hour week, willingness to meet with individuals or representatives of any legal organization, negotiation with committees of U.S. citizens employed at least one year, and no discrimination against former employees save in cases of "assault, violence, threats, or intimidation" -- which last could be broadly interpreted. Although specific terms varied from mill to mill, this was approximately the basis upon which the strike ended by mid-August. A discussion of the months between the end of the strike and the formation of the IWA in 1937 lies beyond the scope of this thesis. Suffice it to note, however, that the IWA Columbia River District Council's reputation for conservatism may have been encouraged in part by the union recognition policies of the Weyerhaeuser Timber Company. On August 6, 1935, 4L field officers reported that supporters of the insurgent Longview union were facing difficulties being reinstated in their former jobs. The first Weyerhaeuser group lumber union contract was signed at Longview October 30, 1935, according to F. T. Titcomb, "only because we had a responsible group with which to deal." Phil Weyerhauser defended the contract on the grounds that it would exclude radicals from the mills.

Disciplinary values were clearly embodied in the first saw mill agreement between St. Paul and Tacoma Lumber Company and Sawmill and Timber Workers Union #2664, signed March 15, 1936. According to the Agreement's preamble,

The general purpose of this Agreement is: to develop harmony, cooperation between employer and employee,
and to provide for the operation of the plant... in a manner which will further to the fullest possible extent the safety of the employees, economy of operation, quality and quantity of output, elimination of waste, cleanliness of the plant, and protection of property. The duty of the employer and employees is to cooperate fully, individually and collectively for the advancement of such conditions is recognized.

Under "Hiring and Discharge", the agreement stated that

The employer has the right to hire, suspend, or discharge any employee. On request of employee, he agrees to state reasons for suspension or discharge. Violation of any of the employer's posted rules shall be cause for immediate suspension or discharge.

Review of a worker's suspension and discharge was to be adjudicated by plant committees and could be appealed to the union and the company's top management; the balance of judgment, however, rested with the company: "If upon investigation by the management it finds that such employee was unjustly suspended or discharged, he shall be reinstated without loss of time." Among the "Causes for Immediate Discharge" were:

- Disobedience
- Neglect of duty
- Refusal to comply with employer's rules
- Disorderly conduct
- Dishonesty
- Fighting in plant or on plant premises
- Reading of books, magazines, or newspapers while on duty except where required in line of duty
- Failure to report to work without bonafide reasons
- Intimidation and/or molestation of any individual or group of employer's employees.

Regarding promotions, it was declared that "The employer will be the sole judge as to the ability, efficiency, and merit of the employee." Union members did, of course, gain some concessions, including the five-day, forty-hour week, time and one-half pay for overtime work, seven unpaid holidays, recognition of seniority in layoffs, and non-discrimination against union members by virtue of union activities, and recognition of the union as bargaining agent for its own members. It is clear, however, that the union entered a binding contract
permitting the company a wide latitude of judgment in exercising disciplinary powers at the shop floor; reading union broadsides on the job would be an immediate cause of discharge, as would such forms of rank-and-file struggle as work slowdowns, wildcat strikes, refusal to cooperate with efficiency engineers, or forceful peer pressure on non-unionists. 32

Several points are clear regarding the 4L during the NRA period. Early in 1933, the organization was in the throes of a financial and constitutional crisis: operators attempted to reconstruct a less expensive organization which would refrain from intervening in their plant management policies. The proposal and enactment of the NIRA altered the 4L's conditions of existence; Ruegnitz, the Weyerhaeuser Executive Committee, trade association executives, and others worked to ensure the 4L a secure place in the new order, backed with the elements of state power granted the trade associations as adjudicators of the Lumber Code. There is thin but firm evidence that key figures such as J. D. Tennant and C. L. Billings expected to manipulate the NRA Code agencies to resist unionism, strengthening the effective corporatist labor institutions that had been proposed in the lumber industry during the Hoover administration. Industry elements favouring the 4L used neutralist or anti-union institutions and persons, such as the Joint Committee on Labor, Hugh Johnson, and the Governors or Oregon and Washington, to combat the federal Labor Boards and the AFL and insurgent unions (it appears that David Mason was careful not to officially compromise his position as executive of the Lumber Code Authority). There is also some evidence that when the 4L was broken in the fir districts by the 1935 strike, operators were inclined to negotiate with conservative unions which they believed would serve as disciplining devices in the absence of the 4L.
It is also evident that the 4L encompassed anti-union employees (including, probably, first line supervisors), and AFL or proto-AFL workers who used the organization to press for material concessions and an element of control over shop management procedures and wage forms. Although the numbers of lumber workers enrolled in AFL locals remained small until May, 1935, certain tools useful for rank-and-file union movements, including voting for representatives, debate (both in formal meetings and, certainly, between 4L and AFL factions in the community and on the shop floor), and presentation of testimony and argument before tribunals, were becoming available by 1933. It took only the promise of adequate strike funds to trigger a section of lumber workers into movement; once mobilized, many of them split from the Carpenters, who offered no greater substantive gains that did the 4L, and relied for financial aid on other unions (notably the Longshoremen), public relief, and traditional forms of assistance in crisis such as kin networks and credit from neighbourhood grocers.

Vernon Jensen claims that lumber operators who failed to accept the original Longview agreement negotiated by Abe Muir were responsible for the failure of a standard industry-wide contract to emerge from the 1935 strike (Phil Weyerhaeuser, interested since at least 1931 in conservative labour organizations as a device for industrial standardization and regulation, might have agreed). According to Jensen, most operators' militant opposition to unions, coupled with liberal use of police and militia, and the operators' "holding out against any settlement with the union, opened the way for left-wing elements to enter the labor scene." Referring to the split from Muir, Jensen concludes that the "problem of leadership could have been resolved in time, once stable relations were established." Jensen's concern for "stable" institutionalized industrial relations elided the fact that loggers and lumber workers rejection of the Longview settlement in May and again in June,
1935, was a rejection not only of imputed bureaucratic "outside leadership," but also of a return to work on conditions little different than those available from the regionally and industrially indigenous leadership of the 4L. As the following chapters indicate, institutional insurgency was coupled in at least one important case with a struggle for power at the shop floor, which compounded the drive for at least a marginal increment in workers' degree of control of industrial life.
Chapter IV. The Bedaux Crisis at Willapa Harbor Lumber Mills, 1933-35; I: The Company, the Work Process, and the Bedaux Ethos

Much attention has been given in recent historical literature to managerial attempts to exert controls over workers' activities at the point of production. Research in the area has focused upon this phenomenon as it appeared during the period 1890-1920, giving particular attention to the basic metal, armaments, railroad shops, and textile industries of the northeastern and midwestern United States. David Brody has pointed out the need to extend shop floor analyses to the mass production industries of the 1930's, to determine the degree of workers' on-the-job autonomy, and the extent to which crises in the workplace effected the formation of formal labour organizations.¹ The 4L and group insurance were used by operators with the explicit intent of encouraging greater "efficiency" among the work force. Writing to a colleague in 1927, William H. Turner of the Willapa Lumber Company (absorbed by the Willapa Harbor Lumber Mills in 1931) noted that

There is always a small percentage of men who want to bring petty grievances before the management, and for a period of time I went along listening to these things. Later, it occurred to me to beat them to it by putting the 4-L organization to work policing the crew and the plant, and the result was a very decided change in spirit and efficiency.²

At some plants, 4L and non-4L alike, the drive for greater efficiency and predictability was abetted by the use of work accounting and incentive wage plans such as the patented system developed by Charles E. Bedaux. The present chapter and the one following examine workers' response to the revision of shop management at a particular plant during the New Deal. It becomes evident that the locale and plant specific social relations and organization of work, and available institutions, values and ideologies (such as interpretations of the purpose of the New Deal) gave form to the workers' movement against installation of the Bedaux system, 1933-35, at Willapa Harbor Lumber Mills
(WHLM), a subsidiary of the Weyerhaeuser Timber Company.

At the WHLM, worker-management conflict developed during the mid-1930's not only over questions of hours, wages, and recognition or defense of collective bargaining institutions. Nor was it the result of the juxtaposition of the cultures of new industrial workers and the disciplinary rigours of industrial society, as suggested by Herbert Gutman's classic essay on "Work, Culture, and Society in Industrializing America". Rather, the creation of the lumber workers' union at Raymond intersected with and was forged in the resistance by workers, who had come of age within industrial capitalism, to a particular social method for lowering unit costs of production. Resistance was informed by conceptions of appropriate workplace relations and the process of resistance was in turn incorporated as memory into the culture of unionism in the district.

The WHLM was created as a corporate entity May 6, 1931, when the Weyerhaeuser Timber Company (WTC) financed the merger of the greater part of the assets of several companies and their subsidiaries based at Raymond and South Bend, Washington, located in Pacific County, about twenty miles south of Aberdeen; the four were the Willapa Lumber, Raymond Lumber, Lewis Mills and Timber, and the WTC and its subsidiary the Western Brokerage and Land Company. The new company owned 190,000 of Pacific County's 271,000 privately held acres of timber, and, because of locational factors, was expected to cut most of the County's 115,720 acres of government owned timber. When purchased, the mills (which provided Weyerhaeuser with processing facilities for its already extensive holdings in the County) were down or approaching the point of receivership. The WHLM's mills were capable by 1933 of sawing about 600,000 board feet of lumber per eight hour shift, one of the six greatest mill complex capacities in the Douglas Fir region. While local enterprise included two other saw-mills of moderate capacity (which remained closed 1931-32),
three or four shingle mills, and an extensive oyster fishery and canning indus-
	ry, the WHLM, with a mill and camp work force of over 1000 men, immediate-
ly became the largest single employer in Pacific County.  

The man recruited as general manager of the new company, J.W. Lewis, had
managerial experience for both Weyerhaeuser and Long-Bell at Longview, and
also at Long-Bell's Lake Charles, Louisiana, operations. Before the merger,
the Willapa Lumber Company had been a member of the 4L; Lewis promptly signed
4L contracts for the WHLM's remaining mill units. From 1931-35, he served
periodically as a member of the 4L Board, and, in 1933, he accepted a post as
one of the four employer members of the 4L Board Executive Committee. During
the period of the NRA Lumber Code formulation, Lewis was a member of the WCLA's
Logging Labor Committee; he subsequently served as one of the fifteen members
of the fir trade associations' NRA Joint Committee on Labor. Thus, Lewis was
significantly involved in the northwestern lumber industry's formal inter-
company networks for regulating the labour costs of production during the
early 1930's.  

Neither Raymond nor South Bend were company-owned towns, and the WHLM's
economic primacy did not give it full control of community mental and political
life. When the WHLM was formed, the staunchly Democratic South Bend Willapa
Harbor Pilot commented that "This one merger will make South Bend boom again..."  

It is the salvation of the lumber and timber business
to have this big corporation take hold, double capacity,
and put into effect its wonderful selling organization.

A year later, however, the Pilot castigated the Weyerhaeuser company as a
"big timber octopus" that could force workers to accept "any rate of pay that
it may dictate," and snidely suggested that the WHLM would refuse to pay its
taxes. In the summer of 1933, the paper's editor claimed that he had always
considered the 4L to be a company union, and advised workers to join the AFL
and demand $3.00 for a six hour day.
Lewis, as did Weyerhaeuser group managers generally during this period, favoured the maintenance of wage rates at figures which, in the context of the lumber industry, were set at a relatively high base, "commensurate," according to Lewis, "with the public interest." Following the November, 1931, Trade Union Unity League strike against the cutting of base wages to less than $2.00 per day at Aberdeen, the West Coast Lumberman (organ of the WCLA) quoted a "prominent Willapa Harbor lumberman" -- probably Lewis or a member of the Weyerhaeuser hierarchy -- to the effect that "if all mills have to pay at least $3.00 per day to their men, the management will think twice before it dumps its products on eastern markets at suicidal prices." Although daily wages at the WHLM did reach a low of $2.25 per day during the last months of the Hoover administration, the company's average hourly wages remained above the mean for the northwestern lumber industry as a whole. Lewis used the central economic role of the WHLM in Pacific County, its contribution to the revitalization of the local economy and policy of paying above-average wages, and local small business dependence upon the continuation of the company payroll, as strong debating points in his efforts, at the local community and federal agency levels, to legitimize resistance to unionism and to reduce unit labour costs through the rationalization of the shop management and work processes. 7

Shortly after assuming the WHLM managership, Lewis increased the combined output of the two Raymond mills from 325,000 to 400,000 board feet per day, largely by speeding up the mill conveyor chains to their full capacity. A plant modernization program improved the interdepartmental transport systems and brought closer physical integration of departments such as dry kilns, storage sheds, and planing mills. By September, 1933, Mills "W" and "R", located beside one another in Raymond... were connected by runways and operated as one unit. This combination, by making it possible to allocate orders to
the best unit adapted, to transfer between units remanufacturing developments, to divide logs as to species and sizes best suited for a particular mill in conjunction with a general overhauling and speeding up of power, transfer, and manufacturing equipment which was made by the new company ... resulted in greatly increased capacity of these plants.

The average hourly capacity was expanded in this manner from 49,207 in 1931 to 61,031 b.f.m. for the first eight months of 1933. 8 Late in 1933, encouraged to do so by the Weyerhaeuser general management at Tacoma, Lewis adopted the Bedaux system of shop management, a "scientific" method for controlling labour processes, incorporating a complex incentive wage formula based on allegedly precise accounting for individual and departmental productivity. 9

Knowledge of pre-Bedaux work processes and shop relations is essential for understanding the impact of the Bedaux system at WHLM. Although the broad contours of mass production and marketing methods had developed at the industry's more substantial enterprises by the end of the nineteenth century, subdivision of labour processes and subordination of work to machine pacing and the control of central management has been a gradual and uneven development. 10 Andrew Friedman's distinction between "Responsible Autonomy" and "Direct Control" as forms of managerial strategy is helpful for interpreting the impact of the Bedaux system:

The Responsible Autonomy type of strategy attempts to harness the adaptability of labour power by giving workers leeway and encouraging them to adapt to changing situations in a manner beneficial to the firm. To do this top managers give workers status, authority and responsibility.... The Direct Control type of strategy tries to limit the scope for labour power to vary by coercive threats, close supervision, and minimising individual worker responsibility.11

The May, 1920, 4L Bulletin's discussion of labour relations at the St. Paul and Tacoma Lumber Company provides a helpful synoptic expression of the ethos of "Responsible Autonomy" in large-scale, loosely managed lumber mills:

The May, 1920, 4L Bulletin's discussion of labour relations at the St. Paul and Tacoma Lumber Company provides a helpful synoptic expression of the ethos of "Responsible Autonomy" in large-scale, loosely managed lumber mills:
[The St. Paul mills] had been operated for years without a definite labor policy. Because of its size and the number of employees, it had been impossible for the executive to have personal relations with all the workers. The handling of the human element had been left to the disposition of the many foremen and superintendents, without, however, any effort being made for their guidance. [Major Griggs, President of the St. Paul] was surprised at the amount of knowledge [the 4L representatives] had about the St. Paul and Tacoma plant.... His crew is content that he make the policies, but in their hearts they know who makes the lumber and it was with pleasure [the representatives] heard from him how they had told the general manager facts about his operations that he did not know.

Complaints were raised at the St. Paul to the effect that the management had only a vague idea of what was being produced in the plant from day to day. In 1925, for example, the sales manager declared that the company "simply must have a more comprehensive statistical department so that we can know what we are doing." The same vagueness of central control of shop activity was evident at the St. Paul and Willapa Harbor during the early 1930's.12

The matrix of authority, job structures, production processes, and workers' autonomy at lumber plants during the 1930's was complex. Raphael Samuel has noted that, in Mid-Victorian Britain,

the industrial revolution, so far from abridging human labour, created a whole new world of labour intensive jobs.... The labour process was dependent upon the strength, skill, guidance, and sureness of touch of the individual worker rather than upon the simultaneous and repetitive operation of the machine.

This was no less true of steam and electrically powered lumber plants in the twentieth century United States, contrary to Norman Clark's assertion that, after 1920, a "new technology" caused lumberworkers to become "more technicians than laborers."13 Much of the physical labour of handling lumber between machines within sawmills had been eliminated by 1900 with the installation of systems of conveyor chains and live rolls; draft horses were typically replaced with trucks, electric locomotives, cranes, and self-propelled
lumber carriers for purposes of in-plant transportation by the mid-1920's. Varying degrees of physical strength, agility and responsible judgement were, however, still required of workers in all sections of lumber plants. Planing mills, vital departments of most large northwestern manufacturers during the 1930's and, at the WHLM, the initial point of the Bedaux installation, provide an illustrative case.

As indicated by Table VI, skill demands varied widely at a large planing mill during the 1930's, although the bulk of the jobs performed exacted few daily demands upon the workers' technical knowledge and creative judgement.

Table VI: Occupations at the St. Paul and Tacoma Lumber Company
Planing Mill, December 1, 1930. Classified by Level of Skill and Autonomy at Work

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number at Title</th>
<th>Wage /dien</th>
<th>Number in Category, and % of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. Foreman</td>
<td>$8.06</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant Foreman</td>
<td>6.85</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Filer</td>
<td>7.28</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knife Grinder</td>
<td>6.42</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repair Man</td>
<td>6.42</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head Grader</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grader (Nights)</td>
<td>5.60</td>
<td>7 4.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Filer's Helper</td>
<td>4.80</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Checkers [tallymen?]</td>
<td>4.60-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machine Tenders</td>
<td>5.12-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motor Tender</td>
<td>4.80</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resaw Feeder</td>
<td>4.76</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graders</td>
<td>4.60</td>
<td>35 24.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. Transfer Operators</td>
<td>4.52</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timber Sizer</td>
<td>4.52</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oiler</td>
<td>4.20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feeders</td>
<td>4.20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lumber to Planer [carrier driver?]</td>
<td>3.60</td>
<td>25 17.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. Trim Saw Operators</td>
<td>3.88</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racksman</td>
<td>3.56-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transfer Brakemen</td>
<td>3.60</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offbearers</td>
<td>3.60</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laborers</td>
<td>3.40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dividers [boys]</td>
<td>2.36</td>
<td>76 53.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from "St. Paul and Tacoma Lumber Company Wage Scale of Sawmill Operations, December 1, 1930," in SPT Papers/197/ Comparison of Wage Scales. For levels of skill and autonomy, I have relied on sources cited at footnote 13.
At the apex of the formal planing mill hierarchy, the foreman was responsible for supervising the processing of stock according to sales or inventory needs, ensuring production quantity and quality, scheduling major repairs or technical innovations in cooperation with the plant superintendent and master mechanic (head of maintenance), training and placing workers, and enforcing shop discipline -- a task whose interpretation varied widely among foremen. At least a few mill foremen opposed the diminution of their sphere of responsibility implicit in the personnel management movement. The planer foreman at the Clear Fir Lumber Company, Tacoma, a 4L operation of moderate capacity but technically advanced, argued in the West Coast Lumberman that personnel officers were superfluous: "the proper man to do the hiring is the man who actually has the responsibility of getting the job done." Foreman typically exerted some influence in selecting workers to be retained during seasonal or cyclical layoffs. Thus, in at least some cases, 1930's foremen still performed certain roles which overlapped with those of personnel managers, and, with unionization, came into tension with collective working agreements.16

Without romanticizing the world of the planer worker, it is evident that the stereotype of the authoritarian "driving" foreman ought not be applied uncritically to all industrial workplaces; the foreman's work must be examined within a particular socio-cultural context. For example, if a foreman who had been promoted from the ranks attempted to break up a group of the more autonomous workers found socializing during working hours, he might be shrugged off by his erstwhile workmates with a reminder of his own proclivities for "slacking" on the job. If a foreman had poor rapport with the work crews, they might deliberately break or jam machinery (for instance, by improperly feeding planers) or simply slow their work in an attempt to diminish the department's and the foreman's production record; such slowdowns were especially feasible in large mills where a tally was not recorded, by
human or mechanical means, of specific workers' and machines' output. 17 On
the other hand, David Montgomery has noted, à propos pre-scientific manage-
ment factories, that "foremen and gang leaders themselves frequently organized
their subordinates deception of higher management." 18 At the St. Paul and
Tacoma Lumber Company, 75% of the production workers had been paid through
the Emerson incentive wage system in 1920, but straight hourly wages were
reintroduced shortly thereafter; the company subsequently utilized welfareism,
Americanization schemes, and the 4L as methods for worker pacification. During
the depression, the St. Paul planer foreman quietly advised his crews to work
slowly in order to gain a few precious hours extra monthly wages. Toward the
same end, he kept the planing mill running "full blast," doing excessive, and,
from the sales' department's perspective, unprofitable "blanking;" that is,
running lumber destined for remanufacture as flooring, siding or trim through
planers for squaring and regrading, when no orders on the books required
blanked material. 19

As in other mass production workplaces, the most highly skilled occupa-
tions at planing mills were those of maintenance men and craftsmen such as
the planer repairman (whose technical innovations were typically embodied in
machine design by capital goods firms) and the saw filer and knife grinder,
who were responsible for keeping cutting tools in effective condition. The
grinder prepared knives according to models and blueprints indicating width,
thickness, and pattern of cut for a variety of products including silo stock,
bull-nose stepping, shiplap, bevel, and tongue-and-groove ceiling and siding,
flooring, and a wide assortment of wainscoting and other trim items, as well
as surfaced dimension and other stock. The filing and grinding rooms, ana-
logous to the tool rooms of machine shops, were set apart from the main mill
floor, reinforcing the status distinction of skilled workers while providing
them with adequate work space. The machine maintenance crew was completed
by an oiler and motor tender.

Depending upon the size of the mill, setup men, or the grinders themselves, changed and adjusted planer knives as necessary according to the progressive dulling of cutting edges and changes in the dimension and pattern of the planed product. A survey conducted for the 1930 Sawmill Engineering Conference found only one mill in the Northwest which followed a preset schedule for grinding and changing knives. Although the lack of rigid scheduling was partially attributable to technological and sales considerations such as the varied stresses associated with manufacturing a variety of products and the irregular quantities of material processed per order, the point to note is that the more highly skilled planer workers enjoyed considerable autonomy in organizing their own irregularly paced tasks, while working within the overriding controls of orders booked by the sales department and the progress of material through the processes of production.

What was the actual process of planing lumber? Following the 1931 merger, the WHLM dry kiln unstacker -- a structure housing a mechanized system of chains which unloaded lumber from dry kiln cars and carried it past graders who evaluated it by quality standards before it was sorted and stored -- was connected to the dry lumber planing mill by the construction of a 500-feet long storage shed (See diagram, page 64). A bridge crane extending the length of the shed was used to transport lumber from the unstacker sorting chains or dry storage to the planing mill end of the shed. A series of dead (gravity) rolls extended from each of the dry planing mill's three planers at a gradual slope upward into the dry shed. (The WHLM Raymond plant included a green planing mill contiguous to one of the two head mills; processes were similar to those at the dry planer, although orders for patterned stock were never run from green lumber, which was susceptible to warping and splitting as it dried). Loads of lumber appropriate to the order at hand, sorted according to size
and grade, were carried by the bridge crane to the planer end of the storage shed and deposited upon dead rolls at the proper machine. The hook-on man, who set the shoes of the crane lift mechanism in position beneath each stack of lumber before lifting, unhooked the shoes when the lumber was properly placed and set blocks if necessary to prevent the premature rolling of lumber into the mill.

At WHLM, a single feeder served each planer or moulder. To plane a stack of lumber, the feeder released the dead roll blocks, allowing the lumber to descend to the side of his machine. Each piece of lumber was hand placed.
sap side up onto a series of live rolls which passed the lumber into and through the planer, where knives, set in whirling cylinders, chipped flakes of wood from the material processed to produce a smooth finish or cut the sides and face of the stock to pattern. An offbearer or "divider," generally an older worker or an underaged boy, stood behind each planer and, grasping the planed material as it debouched into a trough, flipped alternate pieces onto either of two sloping tables down which it slid to either of the two graders who worked behind each machine. The graders evaluated each and every piece of product according to quality and size, used an electric circular trim saw to cut out portions bearing defects, and "pigeonholed" the sorted material in the appropriate slot of a three-tiered bank of temporary storage compartments located behind each planer. 21

Graders had greater decision making responsibility than did other direct operatives at the planing and moulding machines, and often functioned as straw bosses at head mill green lumber chains or dry kiln chains. At large mills, a head grader was responsible for training new graders and certifying their competence. After the craftsmen, the head grader was typically the most highly paid planing mill worker, and he cooperated with the inspectors of the West Coast and Pacific Lumber Inspection Bureaus to see that orders were filled in accordance with standards set by the regional trade associations. Within the planing mills, if lumber was not being properly finished, the graders or head grader called this fact to the attention of the set-up men, who changed or adjusted the planer knives to correct the problem. 22 It is clear that lumber companies' reputations for observing quality standards depended in good part upon the discrete judgement of a variety of men who worked within the shops. The disruption of the responsible autonomy of graders under the Bedaux system at the WHLM was one of the triggering elements giving specific form to the initial lumber union impulse at Raymond in 1934.
Behind the planers, when four to six pieces of material had accumulated in a given pigeonhole, pullout men working behind the racks placed them on sawhorses, tied each end, and hand piled the bundles on blocks to make up loads for a lumber carrier to transport to dry storage and shipping sheds. At the WHLM, this procedure was modified in 1933 when George Cleveland, the dry planer foreman, invented a device dubbed the Cleveland-Willapa bundle trimmer (serviced by a six-man crew) which compressed sets of random length material delivered from the sorting racks, trimmed the tied bundles square, and stamped each piece with the company trademark. The result was a standardized product, attractive to retailers and carpenters, eliminating much of the squaring of board ends which had formerly been done at construction sites. According to Leslie Younglove, who was a dry planer grader at the WHLM during the Bedaux experiments and the first president of the Raymond lumber workers local, Cleveland also developed the idea and technology for producing eased edge lumber (lumber with the edges slightly beveled to reduce slivering) and also invented the splitter -- a planer which ripped 2"x8" dimension into two 2"x4"'s which were then surfaced and given eased edges. It is not certain that these last two developments were actually Cleveland's inventions. It is evident, however, that Cleveland was admired by Younglove as a foreman who combined his supervisory role with craftsmanship and inventive genius.²³

Offbearers, tiers, and general labourers such as floor sweepers were the least paid planing mill workers, performed jobs with little content but much monotony, and had little opportunity to exercise self-direction at work. (Feeders are a partial exception to this, for they were sometimes encouraged by machine tenders to learn to set up their own machines). Speed and agility were essential attributes of offbearers and pullout men, for lumber would be scratched and dented (lowering its grade and price) if allowed to pile up, and machines were not shut down for the benefit of workers unable
to maintain pace with the flow of lumber — which became a source of grievance when the pace of work was intensified at WHLM under the Bedaux system. Howard Knauf, a life-long planing mill worker, recalls that, before his promotion from offbearing to feeding planer,

time used to drag.... They needed somebody to be a feeder on the planer so they asked me if I would like to do that. I says, "I sure would." That was a change from somebody pushing me until I got the chance to push somebody else. You work behind the planer and the guy over feeding the planer he had to push you, he had the control over you a little bit. So I liked [becoming a feeder] because I could push the guy on the other side and of course it wasn't nasty or anything like that, but if there was something I had to do or if I wanted to slow up a little bit ... there was no one pushing me. Where on the other side if I wanted to slow up I couldn't because the stuff kept coming anyway so you had to keep working.24

Technically advanced high-speed planers introduced at some mills during the 1920's and 1930's actually increased the ratio of unskilled and semi-skilled workers to craftsmen. A high speed planer introduced at the St. Paul and Tacoma in 1928, for instance, was serviced by one feeder, two graders, two trimmers, three rackers, two loaders (who prepared carrier loads), and one-third of the time of a set-up man.25

The more highly skilled planing mill jobs were learned over a period of months or years through an informal and irregular training system. While hiring at the larger mills during the 1930's was typically the province of a centralized personnel office, transfers and job promotions were at least partially influenced by workers' competitiveness or respect for one another's seniority and by their attitudes and behaviour within the plant work structure and informal social networks, as well as by the foreman's perception of a worker's competence and capacity for greater responsibility.26 The deferential regard with which ambitious young workers considered their more skilled mentors, their own desire for greater autonomy in work, as well as the esteem with which craftsmen regarded one another's ability, coexisted with status
tensions and personal animosities. For some workers, it did provide an intra-departmental cohesion and discipline balancing the division of labour and the hierarchy of skill, and suffused the workers' culture with values resistant to being "pushed" by other men, the way one might push a piece of rough stock into a planer. At the WHLM dry planer, the resulting sense of shop solidarity supported the resistance of the foreman and the planer workers to time studies and the systematic reorganization of shop procedures which management attempted to introduce during the 1933-1935 period.

Depression era discussions of methods for intensifying the labour process were instituted within the Weyerhaeuser group at least as early as 1931. The topic was broached during May that year at the third annual Sawmill Engineering Conference, at which representatives of three efficiency consulting firms had outlined the features of their respective systems. Weyerhaeuser executives were evidently most attracted to the Bedaux system, which was broadly derivative of the Taylorism of the 1890-1920 period. The Charles E. Bedaux Company, established in 1916, had become by the 1930's a multi-national consulting firm with branch offices in cities as diverse as Berlin, Stockholm, Milan, Paris, Sydney, New York, Chicago, and Portland; the international headquarters were variously at London, Amsterdam, and Paris. The firm's better known American clients included Swift and Company, Campbell Soup, DuPont, General Electric, Eastman Kodak, Levi-Strauss, Crown-Zellerbach, and B.F. Goodrich. At its height, the Bedaux system was used by 720 companies to control the labour of 675,000 workers. According to Daniel Bell, the system came into general disfavour in the United States during World War II as a result of union hostility and the disclosure that the company's founder, Charles Bedaux, an American expatriate, was collaborating with the Nazis.

Ideologically, the Bedaux Company's self-promotion bore certain affinities with that strand of corporate thinking which sought to create a more
effective industrial capitalism through trade associations' collection and scientific analysis of "facts" for the purposes of cooperative industrial nationalization and self-regulation. The Bedaux Company promised prospective lumber clients that its methods would increase production 44% per day, while improving grade, decreasing unit costs 20% and raising wages 15%. Display ads placed prominently in the *Timberman* during the summer, 1931, lumber industry wage cutting drive avered that the Bedaux system offered a "more humane and logical method of reducing labor costs" than did traditional "arbitrary" wage cuts based upon the (implied) ignorant opinion of old-style managers, while circumventing the large investments required by the technical modernization of plant and equipment.

In line with the broader managerial efficiency movement, Bedaux proposed to eliminate workers' "waste time." Time study analyses would be used to "rationalize" work, so that a full eight hours of labour time, with some allowance for fatigue (usually guessed at), would be devoted to production. Bedaux time studies and work records, users were informed, were created "primarily ... to give the management a direct picture, an exact picture of the amount of work which each man in a plant is doing," in order to determine "the exact amount of each man's eight hours that is being profitably utilized in getting out the product which the plant is turning out." Countering charges made by unionists, Bedaux representatives disclaimed responsibility for the speeding-up of machinery, declaring that the Bedaux system simply allowed the use of machinery at full capacity, while leaving the pace of machine operation to the plant management:

Bedaux is a method of measuring labor power by a fair and scientific method and then coordinating it with the maximum capacity of the plant's machinery. The Bedaux system is not a matter of driving men, it is a matter of working the department in such a way that the lost time and the waste time will be eliminated.
Daily records would facilitate the centralized planning of production and worker placement, enabling management to "equalize the amount of work required by each man along the line." As late as 1934, the more enthusiastic proponents of Bedaux methods, when addressing potential clients, couched their claims for the system's efficacy in the vibrant terms of reforming workers' mores that had been associated with the scientific management and welfare capitalism movements since the 1890's. The system was presented as a set of tools for intervening in the behaviour expressing workers' own attitudes and thoughts regarding their work. Representatives claimed that where no premium wage plans or allied systems of work control were used by management, a worker would continue to draw his hourly pay, whatever it may be, without any particular incentive to get out as much production as possible, other than his natural loyalty to the firm.

Bedaux wage incentives would allegedly develop the "wholehearted and intelligent cooperation of the individual employee," and improve "morale, by establishing a happy relationship between workers and management." The "cooperation of all labour" would be "enlisted" with premium payments for production in excess of hourly standards.

Bedaux has shown the way to convert hidden losses and waste into increased earnings that can be shared between employers and employees. The morale of the personnel is placed on a higher plane under this method.

Lumbermen were assured that "foremen appreciate Bedaux because it lightens supervision problems"; they "know what they are doing [and] act with intelligence"; "workers like it because they are rewarded with a daily premium for intelligent effort." Declared one enthusiastic advocate in inspired, reforming, quasi-evangelistic tones strongly reminiscent of F.W. Taylor's remarks upon his own system,
[Bedaux] controls are more or less a matter of keeping the men on their toes and to promote progress, aggressiveness and thought.... We want to encourage thrift, diligence, and aggressiveness in every worker.... The people who do not want to make progress and will not adapt themselves to new conditions are people that we are going to have to eliminate from the organization... and make room for some person who has the possibilities in them that are going to contribute to the kind of workmanship and production that you want. We want the best effort in this community -- we want to pay for that effort -- we want to get results, and we want to make progress.... We do not want loafers, wasters, and unthrifty people.

In sum, the firm proposed to reshape industrial shop life by providing its worldwide clients with select factory labour forces imbued with the values of competitive individualist market actors who, by being "put into business" for themselves through the mechanism of incentive wages, would allegedly be saved from the degradation of alienated labour -- and their own customary work norms:-- while happily facilitating the reduction of unit labour costs and in the long run conforming to the capitalist elite's need for a "loyal" workforce.

The first west coast installation of the Bedaux system was at Jantzen Knitting Mills, Portland, in 1925. During the summer of 1928, at the beginning of the WCLA's serious drive to curtail lumber production, a 4L plant, the Silver Falls Timber Company of Silverton, Oregon, became the first northwestern lumber mill to adopt the system. As an aid to labour discipline at Silver Falls, the Bedaux system was complemented by laying off the night shift (associated with curtailment) and by manipulation of family economic insecurity. As the mill foreman reported in 1931, "When we took off the night shift we kept the married men and now hardly anyone quits." Silver Falls President Myron Woodard, a member of the 4L Board, claimed that, as a result, his workers became "more contented and [took] a greater interest in their work." Work accounting, enforced by the fear of unemployment, effectively heightened managerial control of the workers' activity; as one 68 year-old drying yard lumber piler noted,
It used to be that you could look around the yard and see the boys sitting down when the foreman wasn't near.... It was the same in every mill [department] I ever worked in.... They can't do that any more.

At Silver Falls, it was found that even under the Bedaux system, younger men did less work than did the older men, suggesting that during the early years of the Depression, the younger married men were either in jobs that were less systematized and, hence, contained a greater amount of "lost time", or they had not learned the older men's habits of intensive work under severe economic insecurity.

In practice, when they had the opportunity to express themselves, foremen and production workers took less pleasure in the "happy relationship" created by the Bedaux system then did the accountants. A 4L field officer observing the Bedaux installation at an Oregon sawmill noted in 1936 that while planing mill costs had been reduced 15%, the workers' "'upset' range[d] all the way from uneasiness to mental 'bloody murder.'" In a widely publicized strike beginning September 19, 1934, the killing gangs of the Portland Swift plant demanded the suspension of the "infamous speed up 'Bedaux systems,'" declaring that "Chicago stockyard standards will not suffice for the people here." A spontaneous anti-Bedaux strike wave swept non-unionized southern textile mills during the spring, 1929, and repeated strikes -- some of them wildcats -- were waged against the system at Ohio rubber plants from 1934 to 1936. The WHLM chief electrician, who had worked under the Bedaux system at Long-Bell, presciently warned J. W. Lewis that

Bedaux methods tend to destroy morale and loyalty because no worker will believe that this system is brought here for his own benefit.... We cannot, especially at this time, overestimate the value of loyalty and harmony.

A case study of the Bedaux crisis at WHLM presents an opportunity to examine an issue of broad concern to workers not only during the 1930's but throughout
the twentieth century: the interaction of modern shop management practices and an entrenched shop culture combining elements of craft pride, mechanized and alienated labour, and patterns of shop and broader community solidarity.
Chapter V. The Bedaux Crisis at Willapa Harbor Lumber Mills, 1933-35; II: The Ideology and Practice of Workers' Resistance

The Bedaux system's wide vogue in the 1930's did not enhance its acceptability for workers at Willapa Harbor Lumber Mills; a close examination of the anti-Bedaux struggle at Raymond allows us to consider the mentality and social relations of one group of activist workers during the New Deal. Although local unionists conceded that the company's wages were among the best in Northwestern mills, they assumed a posture of trenchant opposition to management's program for altering shop supervision and work procedures. The local union's collective moral sense was informed by values of diligence, efficiency, and a proper day's work, whose practical application at the point of production conflicted with the individual acquisitiveness and corporate profitability valued by the Bedaux promoters. David Montgomery's observation that most workers viewed union recognition as a means to aiding them in shop floor struggles appearstrue for the Raymond lumber workers' AFL Federal Labor Union (FLU) #19446 in 1934-35. The WHLM workers also sought to manipulate state power to the end of challenging management's new approach to resolving its competitive problems. At the same time, the established union and federal bureaucracies modified the activities of the local workers and FLU leadership.¹

Willapa Harbor Lumber Mills had lost $750,000 during its first two years in business, and manager J.W. Lewis was undoubtedly interested in making the best possible advantage of the rising market for lumber which had developed during the first months of the New Deal. Moreover, the Bedaux system promised to make the greatest physically possible use of the WHLM's existing work force (which was working short hours under the LCA production quotas) and antiquated machinery. Lewis believed that the Bedaux system was "one of the best controls ... of business available," and, in the Autumn of 1933, invited the Bedaux Company to install its system of work accounting at WHLM.²
Application of the Bedaux system at the WHLM was begun November 20, 1933, when Bedaux Company executives and personnel, including Edwin J. Hayward, the field engineer assigned to the project, outlined the system's principles and methods for the benefit of the management and foremen. All WHLM mill workers were given written notice that the system was to be installed because management believed it to be very important that we know more about our business. This system gives us a detailed check on the items produced by sizes [ , ] grades and manufacture ... [and] gives us a more complete cost on the various items.

Though the circular made no mention of time studies or the incentive wage features of the Bedaux system, it did promise that machinery would not be speeded up and that daily wages would not be reduced. For reasons which are not clear, but, perhaps, derived from the desire to absorb the production of the already speeded up head mills, time studies were initiated at the dry planing mill. To facilitate the precise accounting of lumber passed through each planer, moulder-matcher, and trim saw, piece counters and lineal foot meters were ordered for installation on these machines. Because Hayward thought that personnel known to the planermen would be of aid "in selling ... the idea that the measurements are made in impartial fairness," several mill workers were detailed to assist the engineer.  

Time studies began December 2. Hayward immediately noted the operatives' "interest and curiosity" and intense "nervousness under observation." Rather than appreciating the "impartial fairness" of the process, Earl Younglove, a dry planer grader and the WHLM FLU's first corresponding secretary, later recalled the workers' resentment of the humiliating time studies:

Everybody that was around there was very bitter against the idea of having somebody stand over them, looking around their necks, that never saw a sawmill in their life; as a matter of fact, they don't know a one by four from a one by six. They had to ask you. Still they asked you, and made a time-study of your job.
On December 19, planer feeders began submitting daily production reports; by January 4, complete daily records were being collected from several crews. Daily lineal foot reports, keyed to numbered boards hung over each machine, were first posted publicly two weeks later. Because output levels were lower than management desired, an "educational program" was conducted to elicit fuller "cooperation" from the planer crews. During the spring, the planing mills were introduced to incentive wages.4

Certain of Hayward's activities were directed to revision of the work process. At the Evans stackers and unstackers -- machines which loaded green lumber onto and removed dry lumber from dry kiln cars -- he intervened in the organization of the less skilled workers' labour, which had formerly been in the province of foremen, straw bosses, and the work groups themselves. He suggested ways for more evenly distributing the unstacker chain work load, and urged the men pulling lumber from the chains to allow graders and the kiln car transfer men (operators) to spot kiln cars at the unstackers; thus, the lumber pullers' work cycle was stripped of some of its variety and irregular work breaks. To make matters worse, the unstacker was speeded up, and the pulling crew was reduced from eight men to six. A man being trained by the engineer to operate the unstacker in such a manner as to produce a smooth sheet of lumber seemed unable, and, perhaps, was unwilling to learn the prescribed methods. Declaring that one of his principal problems was "getting the kiln crews to forget the old methods," Hayward placed the kiln department under more intense supervision.5

Timing of jobs was extended to all other departments. Meters were installed at the head mills at all saws and live rolls; the head saw crews were observed for full eight hour shifts. Lift meters emplaced at the dry storage shed bridge crane counted the number of loads moved per shift. Hub odometers were installed on lumber carriers, and counters set into their lift mechanisms.
Time-study men accompanied the carrier drivers on their daily rounds, and also observed the rail shipping car loaders. By February, 1935, incentive wages were established through most of the plant.  

The charter of FLU #19446 was installed with 27 members on April 5, 1934. Plant union activity and shop floor resistance to the Bedaux system, which were centred at the WHLM's dry lumber sections, undercut the 4L as an institution securing worker quiescence and corporate integration at Raymond. Early in July, 1934, F.C. Beckman, a popular planing mill set-up man and, since 1924, perennial district employee representative on the 4L Board of Directors, complained to a visiting 4L field officer that the "Bedaux system was burning the men up and they were being told by outsiders [i.e., AFL activists] that if the 4L was any good they would stop it." Beckman got the "blunt of the blow," and insisted that although he was "still 4L and still believe[d] in it... two years would be required to overcome the ill feeling ... caused by this Bedaux mess and I am not going to be active until there is a chance to do some good."

The Bedaux system's palpable impact upon job content and workers' dignity was one reason for this locus of unionism: under Bedaux controls, the graders' occupational status became a conundrum. Their relative degree of autonomy within the plant occupational structure was affected; furthermore, because the machinery was generally speeded up, lumber was inadequately trimmed and graded at the head mills, and the planer graders lacked sufficient time to properly inspect the lumber. Their PLIB certifications were threatened, as their percentage of correctly graded lumber declined significantly.  

Frank Mason, who tied at George Cleveland's bundle trimmer during the Bedaux installation, recalls that "the peons that do all the pulling and sweeping never made cents." Although the graders were able to make a bonus of about $4.00 per week (partly because they developed the practice of tapping their trim saw meters whenever planer feeders were engaged in clearing broken
lumber from their machines), Earl Younglove's brother Leslie did not believe the layoffs and general speedup associated with the system "to be fair for the workers for the whole." Earl Younglove, observing the impact of the Bedaux system upon the capacity of older workers to work "efficiently," noted in February, 1935, that the company went to the extent of paying all the skilled men a good bonus and working the common labor to the point of disability, so that old men cannot really do their work well. I could name you several men down there that are working in that plant that are well along in age who can't do their work efficiently any more, and there are several fellows that have been put out down there because they couldn't move fast enough.8

The unionists undoubtedly pointed to the effects of the Bedaux system on older workers not only in order to advance the demand for a more moderate pace of work for all workers, including themselves, but also because their conception of the moral/social bounds of the workplace community included an almost proprietary right of workers to a secure job dignified by its essential position within the productive system — a proposition not incompatible with either corporate paternalism or the responsible autonomy mode of management, but one which, defining the community as including mature workers, was endangered by management's intentional intensification of the work process.

Ray McAndrews was a rail shipping shed car loader, vice-president of both the Raymond CLC and FLU#19446, and, after the 1935 strike, chairman of the WHLM grievance committee. Early in 1935, he observed that piece work was "the easiest and most logical way to reduce the real wages of the employee," and, counterposing a notion of a "fair day's work" to Bedaux's crusading redefinition of optimal productivity, charged that "an efficiency system ... weeds out the men who are not capable of doing a little more than a day's work."

Other union activists emphasized the Bedaux system's disruptive influence on intra-work group relationships. Paul Fowler, a green planer worker, observed that the Bedaux system "seemed to tend to bring confusion between the fellows."
It meant generally working against the other fellow and caused considerable strife." Dea C. King, who worked at the bundle trimmer during the Bedaux installation, pointed out that under the Bedaux system, one of a pair of workers might receive more of a bonus "than the other one, and it makes the other man mad." Arguing from the more egalitarian, cooperative, worker-oriented counter-conception of "efficiency," King noted that "Any man that is mad on the job, or mad at somebody else because he made more bonus, isn't at the best of his efficiency at work."  

At least one foreman was a victim to the plant reorganization. As early as April 17 (about the time the FLU was chartered), Hayward had informed J.W. Lewis that George Cleveland, the dry planer foreman, was devoting his time to perfecting the bundle trimmer, rather than assisting with the Bedaux installation. (Not surprisingly, Leslie Younglove states that Cleveland "liked the workers real well ... got along fine with the union ... and didn't care whether or not Weyerhaeuser liked him.") On August 15, Cleveland was relieved of his foremanship and replaced by a man familiar with Bedaux methods, who worked more conscientiously with Hayward to intensify labour utilization than had the passively-resistant Cleveland.  

In this rather tense atmosphere, the FLU became vessel and vehicle for the workers' mood of resistance. The FLU sought to create and draw upon ties with national institutions to advance their shop floor struggle. During August, 1934, the unionists petitioned the Seattle RLB with a representation election request. It was the intention of the unionists that, if they won the election, the elimination of the Bedaux system would be one of the first demands raised. Despite repeated requests from the FLU and regional AFL organizer Roland Watson, the RLB's director simply pointed to his full docket and promised to hold an election as soon as possible.  

During the summer, the American Federationist (journal of the AFL)
carried articles describing the successful anti-Bedaux strike by an Ohio rubber FLU, which resulted in the removal of the plant manager who had supervised the system and chaired the local company union. Armed with this information, on August 29, a committee of fifteen workers from various WHLM departments informed Lewis of their dissatisfaction with the Bedaux methods. In the course of a "mighty hot" discussion, Hayward, perhaps intending to undercut the FLU's rank and file support, claimed that AFL President William Green was "a good friend of Mr. Bedaux and indorses [sic] and approves of the system." In September, Hayward restudied the planer and kiln departments in search of "unfair" applications of the incentive wage system. The same day, Earl Younglove wrote to Green, noting that the Raymond workers "were about to go on strike" against the "un-American, demoralizing, slave-driving" system:

Our local voted 100% against the Bedaux System but we are not strong enough [to fight it] ourselves as yet being a young organization. The men themselves even 4L's members have gotten together & plan a walkout in protest against the unfairness of the rotten Bedaux system. We feel that a letter from you personally to show the men how you feel about the system would aid us [in our organizing efforts], because the entire plant heard Mr. Hayward say that Mr. Green indorses the Bedaux system. Absurd if you know anything about it.12

"Quite a lot of talk of strike" was heard at the mill during this period; as one unionist recalled, "everyone thought we would not object to a strike." Without solicitation, the Raymond CLC, which had been chartered August 31, 1934, offered the lumberworkers to "support any strike absolutely." The FLU, however, declined the CLC's generous offer of a general strike call.13

It appears that more militant response to the Bedaux system was restrained in the Autumn, 1934, by several factors: financial weakness, unconfident local leadership, and AFL pressure. The lumber workers' savings and local credit had been drained during the prolonged 1934 longshore strike.
Under A.F. of L. rules, FLU 19446 would not be eligible for financial aid until April, 1935. AFL organizer, Rowland Watson, both on his own judgement and as a result of explicit instructions from William Green, urged the FLU executive to "hold the boys down and don't do anything so there would be a strike," and advised patience pending the RLB election. Green did provide some much needed moral aid; on September 7, he wrote to Earl Younglove, declaring that

> the American Federation of Labor does not approve and does not support the system. If anyone has made the statement to you that I do endorse and approve the system, it is wholly unfounded and has no basis in fact. Your union is quite right in its position of opposition...

Earl Younglove replied that FLU #19446 was

> indeed surprised and overjoyed with the data that you sent to us regarding the Bedaux system. The information will do much to cement the dubious to our cause.... The Bedaux system is just cause for a strike but I believe we should be prepared & if we do not get any action we have in mind plans for next spring when the lumber market is most always on the upgrade.

The agents of the A.F. of L. restrained the local militancy, but their servicing of the local, and Green's talismanic signature, probably contributed to the growth of the FLU during late 1934.

A handbill distributed at the plant September announced that a workers mass meeting would be held to formulate a collective position regarding the Bedaux system. Lewis met again with the kiln and planer crews late the same day. Certainly cognizant of the gelling Weyerhaeuser group objections to NRA Lumber Code minimum prices, Lewis pointed out that WHLM wages were among the highest paid in the industry, and warned that the company's business prospects for the season were precarious. He argued that higher productivity per worker (as facilitated by the Bedaux system) might circumvent extended layoffs during the winter months.
Unimpressed with Lewis' admonitions, the workers proceeded with their mass grievance meeting. Contrary to the expectations of many in the assembly, no strike vote was taken; instead, the sponsors had determined to petition the Weyerhaeuser head offices while waiting for the RLB's election. Resolutions adopted emphasized the point that a moderate pace of work was the right of all industrial workers. Drawing upon images of degraded labour that were the cultural heritage of American workers as a whole, the lumber workers declared that the Bedaux system, contrary to management's promises, had created speedup conditions "on a par with the so-called sweatshops." Men were "compelled to labor beyond reasonable physical endurance to keep their machines clear of accumulated lumber [and] to do additional work whenever there [was] a slack period in the regular work assigned." The speedup was enforced with rituals of humiliation: the worker was required to "make up any overloading of his machine by increased labor activities or be criticised for lack of efficiency." Finally, the assembled workers declared that the Bedaux system, by facilitating the production of a greater quantity of lumber with a smaller workforce, was "not in keeping with the employment plan of President Roosevelt," and was, therefore, "contrary to the National Recovery Act." Thus, the perceived goals of the Roosevelt administration were yoked to the ideology of Responsible Autonomy, and used by the mobilized workers at Raymond to legitimate their resistance to managerial innovation.

The resolutions concluded with a "friendly" but "positive demand" that "normal, reasonable working conditions be established, which will ensure the laborer a chance to render a reasonable service under favorable conditions." Those present voted 188 to 1 to adopt the resolutions and submit copies to the WTC offices at Tacoma, the Washington State Department of Labor and Industry, NRA Headquarters at Washington, D.C., and William Green. The numbers in attendance at the meeting are particularly significant, for only 89 men were then
working under the Bedaux incentives, and the remainder were responding to the time-studies in their departments or were, as J.W. Lewis noted, "dependent entirely upon hearsay and rumor for their judgement;" the strong attendance was, then, testimony to the vitality of the workers' communication networks and their resistance to the degradation of their working lives. During the week following the mass meeting, 82 workers petitioned the Seattle RLB in the name of the FLU, again requesting a representation election. It is apparent that, at this point, although the union activists provided a point of coalescence for the workers' mood of resistance, rescindence of the Bedaux system was of greater active concern for the rank and file than was the demand for the institutionalization of collective bargaining through a recognized A.F. of L. local.17

Examination of the active participants in the mass grievance meeting indicates their positions at certain shop floor and community nexus. The meeting was opened by the FLU's president, Leslie Younglove. Dr. Frederick F. Irwin, Raymond's chiropractor who regularly treated local athletes and lumberworkers with sprained backs, was unanimously elected "impartial chairman." Irwin was a frequent speaker at local Democrat Party and Townsend Old Age Pension Club functions. The first day of the 1935 strike, Irwin was elected an honorary member of the Sawmill and Timber Workers Union; he spoke at various strike support meetings, argued that local small business was dependent upon labour prosperity, and called for community cooperation with the strikers. George Cleveland, Gordon King (a Raymond 4L activist during the 1920's and '30's, and, in 1934, foreman of a WHLM sawmill, and, later, plant supervisor), and Leo Johnson (Leslie Younglove's neighbour, and knife grinder at the green planing mill) were selected as a "temporary committee to recognize all those who wished to speak" and to tabulate votes. Leslie Younglove, Paul Fowler (a green planer worker) and three men whose occupations
have not been identified -- Douglas Rains, Joe Leonard, Tom McAndrews, -- were elected to present the workers' grievance to management. Persons making and seconding nominations to the committee included Ralph Nelson and Vernon Dunning (graders behind the dry kiln unstacker, and friends with the Youngloves; Nelson and Irwin were both Mormons and were close friends), Glen Fykerud (Leslie Younglove's partner when grading flooring), Henry Orkney (who fed the planer behind which Fykerud and Leslie Younglove graded during the Bedaux installation), Earl Younglove, and William Stairs, Douglas Rains, and Tom McAndrews and his brother Ray (who loaded cars at the rail shipping shed and had recently been elected the CLC's vice-president). Leslie Younglove was unanimously elected chairman of the grievance committee, after having been nominated for this position by Fykerud and seconded by Dunning.  

Two points regarding these electoral proceedings are readily evident. First, at least two foremen, one of whom had lost his position because he failed to cooperate with Hayward, lent support to the resistance movement. Their presence helped to define the struggle as one in defence of the indirect production controls previously practiced, and may have helped to attract some of the more conservative, "loyal" workers to the local movement. The second point to note is that prominent leadership or support positions were assumed by several men tied by familial, work group, or leisure bonds, among whom graders were particularly prominent. Graders were the most highly skilled workers directly tied to machine processes at the kiln chains and planing mills, which were, not incidentally, those departments where shop floor resistance was most remarked upon in Hayward's reports.

The resistance to the Bedaux system at the WHLM was formally led by workers who had come of age within the pre-Bedaux local industrial system, and for whom grievance committee positions or union officerships represented the formalization of positions of leadership within the existing workers' community.
The WHLM superintendent stated in February, 1935, that he knew of no transients in the company's employee; a large number of the mill workers had been district residents for "some time." The September, 1934, committeemen possessed Anglo or Irish surnames and were persistent residents of the district. The Youngloves had lived in the Raymond vicinity about 23 or 24 years; Paul Fowler, 9 years; Joe Leonard, 23 or 24 years; the McAndrews, 10 years; Dea King, about 25 years. These men had all been employed by the WHLM's predecessor companies, or were hired shortly after the merger.19

With their mandate to seek the rescindence of the Bedaux system, the grievance committee met with Lewis and Turner. In the words of Paul Fowler,

we did not immediately gain anything. We were instructed by the management that we would proceed with the Bedaux system, that [it] was very beneficial to them in checking over their plant and that they would proceed with it.

The locus of power to determine the proper pace of work was clearly perceived by both management and the grievance committee as the central point at issue; Joe Leonard asked Lewis who was to determine when the men were overworked. Lewis replied, "'We will,' meaning the management." Again, Leonard asked Lewis whether "in his opinion didn't he believe that a man was competent to judge after he had worked all day in a mill whether he was overworked or not and [Lewis] said no, he didn't." Lewis advised the committeemen that anyone who didn't like his job could quit; the unionists declared that they hardly considered Lewis' attitude to be an invitation to serious collective bargaining.

Lewis defined the public interest as including the WHLM's use of the Bedaux system. On September 12, he circularized the WHLM workers with a statement later published in the local press, arguing that "Willapa Harbor [had] been more fortunate than other districts," and that it was "necessary, if we are to stay in business, to utilize our facilities for the good of the greatest number of people." The WHLM would, therefore, continue to give the Bedaux system what Lewis construed to be a "fair trial."20
The workers did extract one minor concession. On September 17, a notice was posted over Hayward's signature at the mills, stating that the productivity ratings of three planer offbearers who had proven absolutely unable to earn a premium would thereafter be posted in black rather than red figures. The pace of work, however, remained unaltered, and the implementation of wage incentives continued.

Shop resistance continued pending the anticipated RLB election. The kiln men complained that, although they were working harder, their unit earnings had been reduced. Hayward castigated the lumber pullers' work habits and failure to make "progress," and what he avered was a lack of coordination and "intelligent direction" among them; he proposed that a straw boss be introduced at the unstacker, that output standards for all work not directly paced by machinery be raised (that is, cutting the piece rates), and that the work load be further "rebalanced." Hayward, noting that the kiln men's time was nearly-one-fourth "lost," ignored the mass protests, and proposed to increase the kiln men's earnings by speeding up the machinery, which, he reported to Lewis, would "improve the morale in the department" as monthly premiums rose.

Hayward noted that the men behind the planers "consider[ed] one machine to be their own, rather than [working] for the unit as a whole;" they refused to move from planer to planer, "balancing" their work, as pileups developed. While bunk loaders cleared saw horses of accumulated lumber, the pullout men stood idle, rather than aiding pullout men at other racks, or the loaders, with their work. Hayward was mystified: the men were paid the same standard rates and premiums, so there was, he thought, "no logical reason for their attitude." It appears that the workers were securing brief rest periods not only for themselves, but also for the other members of their work groups, while limiting each man's production, and hence, the seasonal layoffs which were being made permanent by the Bedaux speed up system. The workers'
resistance to Hayward's notions of the optimal flow of production may be evidence of an agreement across the planer task groups (which included a strong proportion of the anti-Bedaux activists) to limit the tempo of work and preserve their jobs. Management's logic of wage incentives and speedups was countered by the workers' logic of full employment, moderate pace of work, and minimization of overt central controls of their work.

The Bedaux crisis was intertwined with broader issues of Weyerhaeuser group labour policy. On December 6, Charles Hope of the Seattle RLB solicited Lewis' cooperation in preparing for an election. Ingram, Lewis, Al Raught (of Weyerhaeuser-Longview), Ruegnitz, and the Weyerhaeuser labour relations counsel discussed the issue and determined to seek a delay; Lewis wrote Hope a brief letter claiming that an election was unnecessary. Although the Weyerhaeuser managers had cooperated with RLB elections at other mills, a stand was taken at the WHLM, partly, it seems, because, by the end of 1934, the 4L was clearly the electoral loser and the AFL was making a strong drive, with the support of Labor Boards decisions, for exclusive bargaining rights. Furthermore, Lewis was personally obdurate. Management's task, according to Lewis, was to ensure investment security, "handle employees efficiently and humanely," retain stockholder control of the enterprise, and aggressively work to expand the firm's market. He contended that the Weyerhaeuser group, by providing 4L employee representation, insurance, relatively high wages, and good working conditions, was doing more for workers than were most operators. He asserted that written agreements with AFL unions were not an essential attribute of collective bargaining, and would, in practice, bind only the operator. Finally, Lewis declared that granting the closed shop would result in increased production costs, even if no change in wage scales was negotiated: the plant manager "would wake up to find that his business was being run by walking delegates rather than his foremen." Lewis concluded that the Weyerhaeuser
group might best adopt a policy of militant non-cooperation with the FLU's. Lewis' opinions were undoubtedly based in good measure upon his recent difficulties with reducing the labour costs of production; his case was made cogent by the complete suspension of LCA price controls in December, 1934. It is interesting to note that Lewis did not believe his free hand in altering the pace of work to be incompatible with paternal responsibilities, which seem, for him, to have centred on individual income issues.

On January 11, 1935, an FLU #19446 committee met again with the WHLM management and requested recognition of the union for bargaining purposes; the company again refused to make a positive commitment. The Seattle RLB conducted a hearing at Raymond on February 15-16, to determine whether the union's election request was legally enforceable. The union presented an election petition signed by 255 4L, AFL, and unaffiliated workers out of a total payroll of 415 at the Raymond plant. The pro-election testimony centred upon the workers' desire to create a recognized agency to negotiate for removal of the Bedaux system. The hub of the issue was whether the 4L-Bedaux nexus ought to be condoned or broken. In revealing expressions of the unionists' identification of the 4L with the speed-up, Leslie Younglove declared that at some Oregon mills,

They have had them install the [Bedaux] system; it is there for about a year and a half; the boys work a great deal harder; their working capacities increase about one-third and their pay is not increased at all, and the boys are given a bonus to speed up the work, then after they get through, out goes the 4-L [(sic)] and the boys are still working hard, and they don't get any bonus.

ROWLAND WATSON: You mean out goes the Bedaux.

More damaging legally was evidence that a promotion tendered Leslie Younglove for a head gradership was revoked during the autumn because Younglove refused to change his affiliation to the 4L. On the basis of the hearing, the RLB ordered that the election be held.
While appealing the RLB's election order to the NLRB, WHLM's contract with the Bedaux Company was terminated. Weyerhaeuser complained that labour costs per thousand board feet had actually increased markedly since the first half of 1933; since installation fees were to be prorated according to the reduction of labour costs, the Weyerhaeuser Timber Company claimed that it owed nothing for the Bedaux Company's services. The Bedaux Company attributed the WHLM's cost increase to an increase in small orders, the NRA's limitation of working hours (which, it was alleged, forced the company to spread work among less skilled, less productive workers), and the increased demand for products such as ceiling and flooring which demanded more of the head sawyer's highly paid labour time and a greater amount of handling at the shipping department. (The basis for payments was also faulty, for hourly wages had increased 60% under the NRA.) Despite these objections, the contract was cancelled during early March.

The role of workers' resistance in the contract cancellation is not clear. The union's encouragement of resistance at the shop floor level may have resulted in a slight magnification of production costs. Chet King suggests that the removal of the Bedaux system was encouraged by a strike or the threat of strike; written evidence, however, on this point is lacking. As has been noted, the Weyerhaeuser Timber Company desired not to cause antagonism to the unions and the NLRB. The election question, however, was already removed from regional auspices, so removing the Bedaux system from the WHLM would not have had a marked effect on the NLRB; indeed, the April 23, 1935, NLRB decision, which endorsed the RLB's election call, made no mention of working conditions, but, rather, focused solely upon the formal question of restraints upon the workers' right to join representative organizations of their own choosing.

Once again, Lewis urged Ingram to ignore the election order and to refuse to bargain with any units of the newly created LSWU. The company secured an
extension of the compliance deadline to May 15, and prepared to secure a federal injunction against the NLRB. On May 6-7, Raymond's particular antagonisms were subsumed by the great 1935 organizational strike wave. On June 5, Ray McAndrews was elected vice-president of the insurgent Northwest Joint Strike Committee. The 1100 members of Raymond Sawmill and Timber Workers' Union (STWU) voted, with but 30 dissents, to affiliate with the Joint Strike Committee; liaison personnel included the September, 1934, grievance committeemen Leslie Younglove, Fowler, and Leonard. Dea King, first financial secretary of the Raymond STWU, became chairman of the IWA's first constitutional committee, and was a prominent member of the IWA's "white," anti-Harold Pritchett block. The point to note here is that several of the local and district secessionist leaders (the Grays-Willapa District Council of the STWU led the break-off from the Carpenters to form the IWA) learned their role as unionists in a struggle for the retention of marginal job control against the WHLM's efforts to centralize control of the shop work process.

There is evidence that they made this experience part of the industrial lore of the district, blending their experience with reports (for instance, in the American Federationist) of workers engaged in similar struggles elsewhere. A capsule history of the Raymond STW local, printed in the Labor Day, 1936, issue of the Timberworker (published at Aberdeen but serving loggers and lumber workers throughout the Northwest) noted that FLU #19446's charter members' resolve [to build their union] was fostered by the Bedaux system, [whose purpose] was to eliminate as many men as possible and to get as much work from the men as time would allow.

The following year, the Timberworker noted that organized labour objected to a proposal that the Duke of Windsor's American tour be conducted by Charles Bedaux, for the latter had "invented a killing speedup system and [was] an anti-labor fascist." The Willapa Harbor Pilot, by this point a popular front
oriented newspaper, similarly condemned the Duke's poor choice of tour guide. The IWA's early reputation for rank and file militancy was based not only on distaste for bureaucratic unionism, as Vernon Jensen argues, but also included a strong orientation to industrial job control — even if this only meant freezing the quality of work at the level of responsible autonomy and rejecting more overt forms of control. It seems probable that the credibility of the anti-AFL insurgence which appeared widely during the 1935 strike was borne not only upon a diffuse ethos of participatory democracy, but for some workers, was impelled by the tensions created by the intensification of labour exploitation, which was compounded by the 4L issue. The Communist-endorsed Seattle Voice of Action gave extensive publicity to the Joint Strike Committee, but from 1933 to '35 also gave frequent notice to speed-up grievances in general and to the Bedaux system in particular. By 1936, known leftists attained strong positions within both the Raymond STWU (whose executive, save for King, was "red") and the Grays-Willapa Harbor District Council.²⁹

Workers' resistance to the Bedaux system at the WHLM was informed by counter-conceptions of the workers' work in industry — emphasizing "efficiency" as individual and group competence in producing goods of quality, rather than a simple notion of minimization of unit costs for a maximum quantity of production — which coexisted during the 1935 strike with appeals to the democratic rights of rank-and-file American workers and which were strengthened, if not actually created for themselves by the Raymond lumber workers, in the struggle against the "modern scientific" methods of the Bedaux system.

At the WHLM, the demands for rank-and-file union control were nourished from the same cultural complex which supported the anti-Bedaux efforts to preserve the integrity of shop work groups and informal friendship networks and the values of job control, solidarity, and respect for skill and competent workmanship, which these personal networks sought to perpetuate. A press
communique from the Raymond lumber union executive, announcing their local's affiliation with the Joint Strike Committee, declared that

Local Sawmill and Timber Unions throughout the northwest have united in an attack upon the dictatorship of Abe Muir. The general belief is that Mr. Muir has disregarded the rights of American citizens to have a rank and file vote in an American organization.

Again, responding in late June, 1935, to the WHLM's attempt to engineer a back-to-work movement among the strikers, the union gave notice that we are not anarchists or communists but American citizens.... [the strike] is the only weapon we have to force the financiers to recognize us as a group of men with an American right of independence[,]

and went on to note that the LSWU initiation oath, which had been in use since 1881, was "made at Independence Hall, Pennsylvania, ... and [was] nothing to be ashamed of." Earl Younglove denounced the Bedaux system as an "unAmerican, slave-driving" method of management. This concept of the "rights of Americans" was, then, used to support demands for greater rank and file control of the job and the union, although the larger principle of capitalists' competence to operate industry in the interests of working people, and the related issue of the appropriate politics to be endorsed by the IWA (as expressed most forcefully in the debates on the issue of Communist membership), remained very much moot points during the years and decades following the 1935 strike. Regarding the Communist Party, Dea King has commented that he
didn't like the philosophy. The first thing that we talked about when we talked about that old thing was Stalin and his gang over in Russia and we didn't want our country run by a dictator over here and that included the companies. The companies was wanting to dictate.30

In this instance, the ultimately national-chauvinistic concept of "Americanism," while used to press for collective bargaining and control of the job, may, especially when combined with opposition to Stalinism, have served to limit demands for or active interest in one or another mode of industrial socialization.
During the 1935 strike, 1100 persons attending a strike support meeting at Raymond May 27 were addressed by the chiropractor Irwin, Raymond Mayor Fred Tregaskis, Rowland Watson, and John C. Stevenson, who was elected King County Commissioner in 1932 with the endorsement of the Seattle Unemployed Citizen's League. Stevenson, in a speech anticipating his gubernatorial nomination by the Washington Commonwealth Federation in July, 1936, appealed for the unity of farmers, small business, and lumberworkers, castigated the region's large lumber and aircraft companies as the "biggest thieves in the United States", and, noting that lumber workers' wages were lower than most other workers save for the needle trades and Southern blacks, called upon the Townsend Old Age Pension Clubs, Technocrats, veterans, and labour unions to work for the cooperative redistribution of the nation's wealth and to "prosecute the present strike to a definite conclusion." Irwin was roundly applauded when he quoted Abraham Lincoln: "Labor was here first, and capital is only the fruits of labor." 31

During the 1935 strike, the Raymond unionists used their community roots to good effect. Early in May, "at union request, 20 strikers were sworn in as Raymond police and patrolled to forestall any violence." Leslie Younglove and Fred Baker (president of the Willapa Harbor Shingle Weavers local and vice president of the Northwest Shingle Weavers' Council) defended their unions' concurrent strikes at a special meeting of the South Bend Kiwanis Club; seeking to cement small business support, Younglove noted that 65% of union dues remained in Pacific County. Partly to retain union custom -- it will be recalled that the WHLM mill force at Raymond totalled 25% of the city's male population over fifteen years of age -- local merchants supported the strikers with extensive credit. With contributions from farmers and small businessmen, the Raymond lumber union operated a soup kitchen, announcing with pride the alliance which J.W. Lewis undoubtedly viewed with misgivings: "We appreciate
the spirit of the community: that if we do not win we will all go down
together." In late June, concerned that the National Guard intervention at
Tacoma would be replicated at Raymond, the lumber strike committee again
appealed for community solidarity against the operators: "Remember trouble
never starts in any strike until the big interests call in armed guards to
terrorize the workingman and the community in which he lives." 32

Joint efforts by the sawmill workers and the Shingle Weavers have already
been noted; other instances of inter-union cooperation appeared during the
1935 strike. The Aberdeen press reported that Raymond

beer parlors were called upon to limit sales of
beverages to workers who appear to have "had enough"
and every precaution [was] being taken to see to it
that the rule was enforced.

Undoubtedly, the unionized bartenders actively aided this effort to maintain
strike discipline. More explicit inter-union cooperation appeared in a show
of strength July 5, 1935, when the local Longshoremen, 1000 members of the
STW, and the auxiliary Women's Council of Organized Labor paraded downtown
Raymond in memory of labor martyrs on the first anniversary of Bloody Thurs-
day, the date of the killing of two Longshore strikers at San Francisco. 33

Thus, J.W. Lewis' call for a free hand in directing the policies of the WHLM
on the grounds that the towns in which it operated were dependant upon the
company's continuing capacity to extract a "reasonable" rate of profit, was
met with collective resistance to the new managerial representatives of the
absentee owners, in a pattern analogous to that which Herbert Gutman found
in certain Pennsylvania, Ohio and Illinois small industrial and coal mining
towns during the 1870's and 1880's. Mass meetings, ritual parades, union
self-policing, and alliances with prominent left-liberal politicians who
called for community solidarity against the "big interests" all were used in
efforts to isolate the WHLM and broaden the union's effective base of support. 34
The Raymond unionists' rhetoric bears comparison with that found in a series of letters to the editor of the Aberdeen Daily World; the letters appeared after Sawmill and Timber Workers Union #2507 of that city broke with Abe Muir and had its charter revoked, followed by the chartering of a local led by more conservative unionists and the occupation of the Aberdeen mill districts by Washington National Guardsmen. Some of the letters allude to a parade of 4000-6000 strikers and sympathizers, many of whom carried large American flags, conducted after the beginning of the occupation. It may be noted in passing that one of the larger Grays Harbor 4L operations, Polson Lumber and Shingle Company, used the Bedaux system, and other lumber and plywood mills used similar patented efficiency systems. Women often worked at plywood plants, which struck with the loggers and lumberworkers, and one of the insurgents' demands was for equal pay for men and women doing the same work. Since many of the letters cited were published anonymously, their actual authors' identities are obscure, but since, as published, their ideological substance became available for use by the population of Grays Harbor, it may be assumed that their content represented real divisions of opinion among working people favouring and opposing the strike.

One anti-union letter writer called for the teaching of patriotism in the schools, stressing "soul-filling marches" and the virtues of "duty, integrity, and loyalty." An "Onlooker" asked if a man who returned to his old job during a strike was a "scab". Another asked if "the Communists are going to tell us Americans what to do and what not to do," and called upon workers to "stand up for our rights as American citizens," returning to work was said to be preferable to accepting relief. A "Workingman's Wife" declared that the strikers' jobs no longer belonged "to them now any more than they do to some man that never saw the inside of a mill." A "Worker" declared that he "would rather be called a weak sister and working than be called weak headed and idle," and
called upon lumber workers to "wake up and think for themselves." A man who went to work behind picket lines declared that he had "some self-respect and that's more than a lot of people have who aren't supporting their families but are letting others do it," and urged the strikers to be "man enough" to return to work. Thus, for the anti-strike writers, mature and rational dignity was associated with earning one's own living, a high valuation of the duty of working, and anti-Communism.

On the other hand, a female strike sympathizer objected to the paternalist notion that employers should "say what they will do and like meek children we're supposed to lie down and take it." George Brown, a striker, asked "Why should we taxpayers pay for protection to scabs?" and scored "weak men in a labor union who are ready to drop out because they haven't the good old American fighting spirit." A "Well Wisher" similarly stated that strike breakers made life "hard for those with backbone to stand up for their rights, and praised those with manly principal enough to turn down the big dollar and stand true to their demand, a recognition of the workers' union... No, buddy, just because you got scared of your job is no sign we are licked.... The militia came to fight against poor, hard working men and women whose only weapons are their steel backbone, their work worn hands and a plea for justice, and the troops haven't alarmed them in the least.

The letter concluded that the law and militia were "used as instruments by those who have the capital" and that strike-breakers were traitors against "respectful American working people who are seeking to gain a better American standard of living." Women paraders referred to "our flag which is 'our' flag and always will be" and stated that it represented the battle for the right of "better conditions for the laboring class." For one of the marchers, Mrs. Josephine Ramiskey, the paraders were "real American working people" and "respected citizens of our city;" scabs, on the other hand, were "trash" who had to work under the protection of militia and hired gunmen and run themselves
"ragged trying to take a legitimate worker's job." "A Poor Man's Wife" declared that any woman who was "so money crazy she would encourage her husband to scab I cannot think of her as one-hundred per cent American" but only as a "vampire"; the strikers were "willing to suffer a little to see better working conditions for all." An Aberdeen "Union Mother" believed that any man who took another's job was "nothing but a robber.... If my husband ever tried to go to work now, I would brain him, if he had any brains. But, thank God, I have a 'man'." This fourth generation American reminded readers that the "so-called 'foreigners'" striking were "'true-blue"; responding to an anti-union letter writer, she argued that the flag was "more our flag than yours, for while [the paraders were] being loyal to their fellow men, you are not being loyal to either."35

As at Raymond, the Aberdeen strikers and their sympathizers used nationalist ideology and the notion of respectable, intelligent, "manly" determination to defend insurgent unionism as a struggle for the extension of "American rights" and dignity to working people, and to urge solidarity within rank-and-file controlled unions which permitted but transcended individual consumerist acquisitiveness. The notion of property-holding in the job not only by individuals but by the union community, is hinted in the Aberdeen letters. At Raymond, this was taken a step further, to the right to comfort and dignity in work; to be American was to not be driven to work like a slave. This reality of conflict in modes of relations -- direct control versus intelligence, adult dignity, and responsible autonomy at work -- fuelled the capacity to wage a protracted struggle against the Bedaux strike, and lent particular vigour to the quality of union life in Pacific County. Following the 1935 strike, Willapa Harbor Lumber Mills resumed work August 9, one of the last plants to reopen; with 1600 members at strike's end, the Pacific County Sawmill and Timber Workers local clearly became a force to be reckoned with in the local milieu.
The course of the County's subsequent labour and political history certainly bears investigation.

The shift from direct to indirect structures of managerial control at Willapa Harbor Lumber Mills created a sharp dissonance between the working environment and the ideals of experienced industrial workers. As a change in the workplace flowing unambiguously from a conscious choice made by management, carried out by identifiable agents, such as the engineer Hayward, whose professional task was to heighten the extraction of labour power from industrial workers, the introduction of the Bedaux Company's system of shop controls was a social act eliciting a social response by workers in the form of shop resistance and a union whose leaders were among those men most directly affected by the system. It might be hypothesized that the decision to carry out resistance through formal meetings and petitions directed to company and government authorities was a practice specific to "Americanized", upwardly mobile semi-skilled workers such as the planer graders. This point, too, is worthy of further investigation not only for Washington sawmills, but for all American industry in the 1930's.

While the desire to establish institutions at Raymond embodying a shift of power to the workers was clear, the quality of relationship with management was less certain. The evident ambiguities of the unions' ideological defences — manliness, Americanism, enhanced standard of living — permitted both broad coalitions within the unions, as had also been the case with workers' use of the 4L as a pressure organization under the NRA, but also opened possibilities for intra-union political factionalization. For some workers, a strong militant union was, perhaps, the means to recreate responsible autonomy at the point of production within industrial capitalism. The goal for others, if the later history of the IWA may be taken as indicative, was not only resistance to direct management controls, but some form of socialized or syndicalist control of the productive system.
Chapter VI. Conclusions and Some Unsolved Problems

This study revises earlier discussions of industrial relations in the U.S. Pacific Northwest lumber industry, 1931-35. It finds that the system of anti-union private corporatism promoted by William Ruegnitz and the 4L during the Hoover administration, with support among several well-placed lumbermen and trade association officials, was itself incorporated by quasi-federal agencies administering the NRA Lumber Code. During the NRA period and after, it was not clear whether the state would be used to secure a semi-private corporatist, a liberal collectivist, or a non-capitalist form of industrial relations. The 4L did, however, seek to secure its position through the use of government sanctions: federal law in 1933, and State military force in 1935. Its efforts were thwarted both by the development of alternative institutions with a broader base of support, and by operator disaffection with the 4L's efficacy. The WPA Forestry and Economics Committee 1932 program was given legal effect by the NIRA; the history of the industry's politics under the Lumber Code should be explored to clarify the problems of devising and enforcing regulations for the industry: hardly a minor theme for the region, given the economic primacy of forest products in the Northwest.

The extent to which the 4L's operator members before and during the NRA conceived of its uses in the same manner as did Ruegnitz is for the present unresolved. Evidence has been presented indicating the existence of disagreements within and outside the 4L regarding proper modes of industrial relations, which did affect the fortunes of the 4L and its antagonists. We find, for example, Phil Weyerhaeuser appearing to move in 1935 from private corporatism to a form of liberal collectivism which, by written contracts and management recognition of conservative unionists, sought to maintain predictability and employer control at the point of production. Perhaps future work will clarify the content and implications of this issue.
It is evident that although wages declined in the Northwest lumber industry during the early 1930's, a section of welfare capitalist entrepreneurs, managers, and organization officials responded not by abandoning welfarist policies, but by developing programs which expanded upon them, pressing for power to establish a set of businessmen's governing institutions which would regulate economic activity in the alleged interests of industrial capitalist society as a whole. Labour self-organizing did occur during the pre-New Deal years; the strikes at Grays Harbor and the organizations of unemployed workers are cases in point. It is not clear, however, that the NIRA's Section 7(a) was not a prerequisite for the prolonged process of establishing, defending, and nurturing local lumber unions in 1935 and later; stated another way, it is possible that the improvements in wages and partial economic recovery which occurred in the summer of 1935, combined with repression of unions (as had occurred in 1917), would have been sufficient to preserve, and, indeed, enhance the AFL's private corporatism in the absence of the Regional Labor Board's pro-union interpretations of 7(a). Thus, in the absence of either cynical a priori notions regarding the passivity of American workers, or Steward Brandes' Whiggish faith in the victory of democratic unions and the welfare state against corporate paternalism, it would appear that the AFL's interjection of a fairly friendly Section 7(a) into the NIRA allowed northwestern lumber workers the time to gain experience in building cohesive organizations. Definitive conclusions, however, will not be attained in this area until more is known about the social and cultural history of northwestern workers in the 1930's, especially in the area of capacity to sustain anti-private-corporatist activities. It will also be recalled that, according to the National Labor Relations Board, Long-Bell and Weyerhaeuser did engage in anti-AFL discrimination. This suggests that while Section 7(a) provided unionists with much needed encouragement and with opportunities to openly organize (in the instance of election campaigns, for example), and, perhaps,
discouraged publicity-conscious lumbermen from wholesale repression of unionists, any final exploration of the breaking of the 4L in the Douglas fir regions will have to consider the role of dedicated local activists such as the Norman Lange and the Raymond unionists. Furthermore, the social and cultural sea which sustained them and with which they worked to build their unions' mental and social structures should also be examined. One element of this local experience was, of course, the issue of deliberate degradation of work. The evidence presented in this thesis appears to support Brody's contention that the Depression undercut worker's material interests in the preservation of welfare capitalism. One is still curious to learn more about the 20% of workers at Longview who voted for 4L representatives in the March, 1934, RLB election at that city. Intensive collection of oral memoirs might prove helpful here, and may also help to elucidate the role of insurance, recreation, and other forms of welfare capitalist activity in developing a "loyal" subordinate workforce.

Vernon Jensen's account of *Lumber and Labor* asserts that the juxtaposed individualism of capitalist resource developers and frontier workers nourished the IWW, and that this imputed legacy of conflicting individuals underlay the resistance of lumber workers to the Carpenters' bureaucratic control of their union from 1935 to the founding of the IWA in 1937. Jensen's thesis regarding the roots of the IWW's militant anti-capitalist fluorescence is debatable. David Montgomery, for example, has found that workers' control issues raised by the IWW were endemic to workplace culture and conflicts throughout the United States, 1890-1920. Another observer, federal arbitrator E.P. Marsh, in his official report on the 1935 lumber strike to Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins, contended that the dispute between the insurgent Northwest Joint Strike Committee and Carpenters' agent Abe Muir was attributable to the influence of
Communist National Lumber Workers Union activists who dissolved their organization in April, 1935, joined the AFL, and subsequently offered strong support for the Joint Strike Committee. Other than Marsh's insulting treatment of insurgents as unthinking dupes, the point to note is that although workers with backgrounds in anti-capitalist organizations did provide a key element of experienced assistance for the anti-Muir forces, support for the Joint Strike Committee was founded upon a legacy of struggle between lumber workers and managers on both income and workplace power and work process issues during preceding years, which the Muir-Longview settlement did nothing to resolve. A vote against the Muir settlement was a vote against a return to institutionalized relations formally similar to the 4L's private corporatism. The Raymond case indicates that for one key group of unionists who went on to create the IWA, the issues at hand were not simply a greater share of the product of production, but also of a greater recognized share of power to determine the process of production. As has been noted, there was an ambiguity around this issue of control, admitting a range of interpretations from resistance to speedup at the shop floor to full-fledged syndicalist or, one assumes, given the unionists' rhetoric, democratic state control of industry.

The destruction, during the 1917-23 period, of the IWW as an effective force in the Northwest and the rise of Stalinist sectarianism, limited the availability of popularly acceptable radical ideologies, other than that of the democratic rights of Americans, with which to counter the right of private capital to control the process of production. Community studies of popular culture in lumber districts during the 1920's may be useful for determining the reasons for the greater support for left leaders among loggers and longshoremen than among mill workers. As Alan Dawley's study of Lynn, Massachusetts, during the industrial revolution demonstrates, the use of "equal-rights," anti-authoritarian ideas by American industrial workers was hardly unique to western
Washington State in the 1930's. The problem here for the historian of working class culture is to determine the extent to which notions of American rights have been associated with labor interests during periods of open shops and relative quiescence such as the 1920's as opposed to floating in the general American cultural milieu, to be used as prescriptive norms in periods of social and institutional conflict. The present thesis does not resolve this issue, but studies of working-class fraternal clubs, veterans groups, the values taught in schools and Americanization programs, and the exemplary value of mass media publicity given, for example, the use of national symbols in effective general strikes such as those at Toledo, San Francisco, and Minneapolis in 1934, may be a useful place to start.

Addressing the scientific management of work, Daniel Nelson has characterized the Taylor system in particular as being fundamentally a "comprehensive answer to the problems of factory coordination." He goes on to argue that the emphasis placed by Frederick Taylor on his system as a method of labour control was overstated for polemical and publicity purposes, and he claims that the notion that Taylorism effected a "radical revision of the worker's role...is both inappropriate and misleading." The impact of the scientific management movement upon management personnel themselves, however, in no way obviates the process' impact as a social process for the intensification of central management control over workers' activities. Even if it is conceded that Taylor's decision to emphasize that his methods were useful for countering workers' restriction of output was based solely on publicity motivations, this would still reinforce the point that those industrialists attracted to his methods and those of subsequent systematizers such as Charles Bedaux, were deeply interested in altering workers' patterns of work. As has been demonstrated in the present study, workers at
Willapa Harbor Lumber Mills perceived the Bedaux System to be such a potent threat to the relative benefits they received within the responsible autonomy mode of industrial control that a large segment of the workforce mobilized to offer shop floor and more formal varieties of resistance. This Pacific County, Washington, experience signals the need to be cognizant of social, institutional, and ideological factors informing and informed by workers' responses to disruptive post-1920 innovations in the process of production. As has been noted, the Bedaux system's clients among 4L mills included the Silver Falls Timber Company (located in Silverton, Oregon, a company town), the Polson Lumber and Shingle Company (in the small, multi-company industrial twin cities of Aberdeen-Hoquiam in Washington), and Long-Bell (in the company built town of Longview, Washington, dominated by two large producers, where many of the events discussed in this thesis occurred). Even in the absence of suitable manuscript sources, intensive use of newspapers and oral memoirs may provide useful comparative studies of the conjunction between company unionism, scientific management, and workers' self-organization. (A further product of such studies would be a social history of a particular industrial efficiency company.)

For the management at Willapa Harbor Lumber Mills, resistance to unionism was clearly bound with principled antipathy to surrendering any portion of the power to determine work processes. The developments at Raymond suggest that historians of industrial relations would do well to look for shop conflicts in any plant where management expresses similar claims that after union recognition the manager "would wake up to find that his business was being run by walking delegates rather than his foremen." Willapa Harbor planing mill foreman George Cleveland might add as an aside that historians should also be prepared to find cases at least as late as the 1930's wherein first line supervisors' sense of appropriate modes of industrial production control were
in closer accord with those of "walking delegates" than with general management's.

One further example of the conjunction between the work process and labour relations institutions may be cited. In March, 1919, a 10% wage cut was announced at the St. Paul and Tacoma Lumber Company. The 4L local appointed a 25-member committee to confer with the management and tell the men in charge they would personally guarantee through the 4L that the plant would break even on costs, if the management would stop this talk about wage reductions. They posted notices all over the place signed by the secretary of the Loyal Legion local calling on every 4L man to use every effort in his power to cut costs and to increase his personal efficiency. The concerted action of the local reduced losses from 24.4% in February to 9% in March and increased the cut 9% while doing so.5

Almost sixty years later, Howard Knauf, who worked for fifty-one years in the massive planing mill owned by the St. Paul and now operated by the St. Regis Paper Company, recalled of work in pre-union decades, that

It was a wonder we did it at all but then you either did it or you didn't stay there. You didn't have a union or anything to back you up. The 4L was there and they cracked the whip and said "you do it or out" so there was no horseplay then. If you did horseplay, you had your work done first. You never shut a machine down because you couldn't keep up. You did it one way or another and that was all there was to it. And that was a funny thing, today if they're coming a little bit fast they shout "Hey, hey, shut her down" and that was it and they would shut her down . . . nobody did like that around them days.6

Chapter III of this thesis briefly discussed the St. Paul's first union working agreement signed in March, 1936. Mr. Knauf's comments (and those of workers at Aberdeen and Raymond) raise questions which should be addressed in future studies of the lumber industry. To what extent did (and do) codified work regulations conform to shop practices? At what point do pride in workmanship, the sense of dignity, and the desire for self-direction intersect with
managerial demands under various forms of industrial relations institutions, and at what points do they precipitate conflicts? In what way have work content and values varied with age, ethnicity, particular jobs, and plant specific work and authority structures from the 1920's to the present? Why do managers choose to adopt or reject specific mechanisms of control? There are, of course, other problems which should be investigated, such as the inter-relations of fraternal groups, churches, political parties, and formal and informal ethnic community institutions with the pattern of shop relations in particular mill communities. The Raymond case suggest that methodologies by Herbert Gutman and others for studying nineteenth-century industrial communities may well be applicable to their twentieth-century counterparts.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFL</td>
<td>American Federation of Labor Papers, Wisconsin State Historical Society.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Am.Lbr.</td>
<td>American Lumberman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHI</td>
<td>Charles H. Ingram Papers, Weyerhaeuser Company Historical Archives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CW</td>
<td>G. Corydon Wagner Papers, University of Washington Library Manuscripts Division.</td>
</tr>
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<td>&quot;4L BD, Date&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;Minutes, 4L Board of Directors Semi Annual Meeting, Date&quot;</td>
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<td>FRT</td>
<td>F.R. Titcomb Papers, Weyerhaeuser Company Historical Archives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holbrook Diaries</td>
<td>Stewart H. Holbrook Diaries, in Stewart H. Holbrook Papers, University of Washington Library Manuscripts Division.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IWA</td>
<td>Harold Pritchett-International Woodworkers of America Papers, University of British Columbia Library Special Collections.</td>
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<td>JPW</td>
<td>J. P. Weyerhaeuser, Jr., Papers, Weyerhaeuser Company Historical Archives.</td>
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<td>PCLC</td>
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<td>SPT</td>
<td>St. Paul and Tacoma Lumber Company Papers, University of Washington Library Manuscripts Division.</td>
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<td>Timb.</td>
<td>The Timberman.</td>
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<td>WCL</td>
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<td>WSFL</td>
<td>Washington State Federation of Labor Papers, University of Washington Library Manuscripts Division.</td>
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<td>WTC Letterbooks</td>
<td>Weyerhaeuser Timber Company Outgoing Letterbooks, Weyerhaeuser Company Historical Archives.</td>
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</table>

*Manuscripts are cited by Collection Title/Box Number/File Name or Number. Interviews are cited by name of interviewee, and, where multiple interviews were conducted, by date.
Notes

Chapter I.

1. For example, Irving Bernstein, The Lean Years (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1960).


5. Ibid., p. 76, and passim.


In Canada, Shevlin-Carpenter-Clarke also owned the Carpenter-Hixon Co. of Blind River, Ont., and the Shevlin-Clarke, Co. of Fort Frances, Ont. Brooks Scanlon conducted operations at Eureka, Montana; Foley, Fla.; and Vancouver, B.C. The Weyerhaeuser group included the Victoria Lumber and Manufacturing Company, Chemainus, B.C. Adams River Lumber Company of Chase, B.C., was controlled by the McGoldrick interests.


While the lumber industry has not been reputed for sharing a position at the leading edge of technical and managerial innovation with, for example, railroads, textile, steel manufacturing and fabricating, auto, or chemical production, examination of the work process in sawmills may still be a useful contribution to understanding the experience of industrial workers during the twentieth century. According to the 1929 Census of Manufactures, the lumber industry employed 419,084 wage earners, more than any other in the U.S. save cotton goods and foundry and machine shop products: United States Bureau of the Census, Fifteenth Census, Manufactures, 1929, Vol. II (Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1935), p. 34. Of 174,903 industrial wage earners in Washington State in 1929, 40,220 were engaged at sawmills and independent planing mills: ibid., Vol. III:2, p. 1217.

Chapter II.


2. For Ruegnitz' background, see 4L Bulletin, June, 1925, p. 9. For the background, see Edwin T. Layton, Jr., The Revolt of the Engineers (Cleveland: Case Western Reserve University, 1971); David T. Noble, America by Design (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1977), Chapters


The 4L uses the vertical principle of organization and stresses the mutual interest of managements and men in companies as well as the industry as a whole. This is the natural grouping of interests.

At this point, the 4L was under a strong attack by AFL lumber unions.

I follow here Colin Crouch's treatment of "private corporatism" as a system of industrial relations characterized by employer controlled labour organization, insistence on order, without state participation or countervailing sources of power, with administered wage systems, wherein conflicts are "dealt with through an established system of established rights" rather than conflicting interests: Colin Crouch, Class Conflict and the Industrial Relations Crisis (London: Heinemann Educational Books, 1977, pp. 35-36.

Students of paternalist iconography should consult WCL, October, 1930, p. 35. In a full page article headlined "Shop Committee Idea No Longer an Experiment," J.H. Bloedel claimed that the shop committee's August, 1930, sanctioning of a wage cut -- the first such cut by a major fir operator during the Depression -- had not "impaired that fine spirit of cooperation and good will between employees and management that has existed in our organization during all these years." The article discusses the company's annual picnic, which had been organized and paid for by the shop committee (company union), and features a prominent photograph of J.J. Donovan holding the male winner of the picnic's baby show.


4. Large operators such as the St. Paul and Tacoma, McCormick, and the Weyerhaeuser companies, with integrated operations including timber lands, mills, steamships, and wholesale and retail yards, may have been able to realize profits by charging market prices for logs cut from their own timber and sold to themselves, as well as on lumber sold from their own yards. Hidy, et al., passim; Todes, pp. 54-69.


9. Quotations: W.C. Ruegnitz to E.G. Griggs, August 8, 1930; W.C. Ruegnitz to 4L Operator members, August 10, 1930, both in SPT/30/4L.


For the pre-NIRA policy, see F.R. Titcomb to J.P. Weyerhaeuser, Jr., September 24, 1931, and F.S. Bell to F.R. Titcomb, September 23 and November 17, 1931 in JPW/1/Wage Schedules. J.P. "Phil" Weyerhaeuser, Jr., a "new businessman" of the Gerard Swope type, had evidently developed an appreciation for welfare capitalist measures such as recreational facilities and small bunkhouses (to minimize opportunities for IWW meetings) as early as 1925, when he was appointed manager of Potlatch Lumber, the Weyerhaeuser group operation at Clearwater, Idaho. In the early 1920's, he had worked at another Weyerhaeuser operation, the Edward Rutledge Lumber Company, whose manager (until 1928) was Huntington Taylor, a 4L advocate who had been a member of the Weyerhaeuser anti-IWW welfare-capitalist Labor Committee during World War I. Hidy, et al, pp. 253, 322, 422, 436, 518, 520. John P. Weyerhaeuser, Sr., who worked with Taylor, appears to have approved of the University of Washington sociologist Carleton Parker's logging camp welfare schemes, which were incorporated into the wartime 4L's program: see John P. Weyerhaeuser to H. Taylor, November 22, 1917, in JPW/4/Labor. For Swope, see Kim McQuaid, "Young, Swope, and General Electric's 'New Capitalism': A Study in Corporate Liberalism", in American Journal of Economics and Sociology, XXXVI:3 (Summer, 1977), pp. 323-34.

For Titcomb, see F.R. Titcomb to W.C. Ruegnitz, July 29 and September 30, 1931, in WCR/2/42; F.R. Titcomb to Executive Committee, September 19, 1931, to Managers, March 7, 1932, and to J.P. Weyerhaeuser, Jr., all in JPW/1/Wage Schedules. As Titcomb pointed out, there was danger in "moving down too fast and fermenting trouble. . . . It is much more difficult for large operators to cut wages;" it took "real backbone . . . as well as the necessity for being very closely affiliated with the manpower in the operation." F.R. Titcomb to Wilson Clark, March 22, 1932 in JPW/1/Wage Schedule.

11. *Lewiston Tribune*, November 17, 1931, clipping in SPT/35/4L.

12. The Weyerhaeuser pine operations had not previously been trade association members; during early summer, 1931, Macartney's proposal that a Klamath Basin district association be formed was received favourably by George S. Long and F.R. Titcomb; Macartney to C.H. Ingram, June 20, 1931, and C.H. Ingram to R.R. Macartney, July 5, 1931, both in CHI/IA/Klamath Falls; see also W.C. Ruegnitz letters to A.L. Raught and C.H. Ingram, July 7, 1931, in WCR/3/7.

F.K. Weyerhaeuser chaired the WPA organizing Committee: *Am.Lbr.*., August 1, 1931, p. 31. For the WPA founding convention, see ibid., August, 1931, pp. 22, 30-32; and *Timb.*, July, 1931, p. 99; and August, 1931, pp. 24, 60-64.


For operators' interest, see C.L. Billings to W.C. Ruegnitz, November 20, 1931, WCR/2/21; W.C. Ruegnitz letters to J.D. Tennant, November 7, 1931, (copy), to F.R. Titcomb (copy), September 26, 1931, and to E.G. Griggs, November 18, 1931, all in SPT/55/4L.


The 4L Employees' Wood Promotion Committees, financed 2/3 by the trade associations, originated in Bend, Oregon, in 1928, a few months after the 4L at that town had been seriously challenged by a Socialist Labor Party union in the aftermath of a Brooks-Scanlon wage cut. Subsequently, until it left the 4L in 1932, that company was slow to cut wages, but spread work among long-employed married men. The contrasting models of labour relations -- 4L corporate paternalism vs. wage cuts and left unions -- were clearly juxtaposed in Ruegnitz' mind. W.C. Ruegnitz to 4L Operator Members, September 12, 1927, in SPT/18/4L; W.C. Ruegnitz to 4L Board of Directors, November 12, 1929, in SPT/26/4L; *Am.Lbr.*, March 21, 1931, p. 48; H.K. Brooks to W.C. Ruegnitz, April 25, 1931, in WCR/1/6.


21. Timb., June, 1932, p. 81, and August, 1932, p. 40. Am.Lbr., June 11, 1932, p. 44, and August 20, 1932, p. 22-23 (emphasis in original); "Minutes, 4L Districts 11 and 12 Convention, September 20, 1932," p. 4, in SPT/41/4L. Mason Diaries, June 14, July 22, and August 11, 1932. For the Appalachian Coals case, see Himmelberg, pp. 151-53, 188, for Compton, ibid., pp. 103, 156, 177; the Forestry and Economics Committee was more aggressive in mid-1932 than the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, which was temporarily muting its position on legal changes; ibid., pp. 131, 134, 161. For a proposed Douglas fir marketing cartel, see Timb., July, 1932, p. 15, 17, 24.
The Timber Conservation Board was appointed by President Hoover November, 1930; it was comprised of the U.S. Secretaries of Commerce, Interior and Agriculture, past and current trade association officials, and private and government foresters. According to the WCL, January, 1931, p. 20, it was

not expected that the Board will attempt to frame any broad national forestry policies but it would compile the important facts of production conditions and trends in the forest industries, analyze and interpret them and develop therefrom recommended policies and programs of public and private action, which may secure and maintain economic balance between production and consumption of forest products.

The trade journals are a good starting point for examining the antecedents of the 1932 WPA program. For the contributions of Compton, Mason, Greeley, Major Griggs, Phil Weyerhaeuser, the Timber Conservation Board, and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, see, for example, WCL, April, p. 22, May, p. 29, September, pp. 14-15, all 1930; January, p. 30, June, p. 44, August, p. 19, December, p. 40, all 1931; and July, 1932, p. 10; Timb., February, 1928, pp. 86-87, July, p. 97, October, pp. 17-18, November, p. 151, and December, p. 36, all 1931; Am.Lbr., September 13, 1927, p. 49; June 29, 1929, p. 15; October 15, 1930, pp. 1, 30-33; July 4, p. 38, July 18, p. 56, August 1, p. 27, August 15, p. 31, August 24, p. 48, October 31, p. 25, and November 21, p. 30, all 1931; January 9, p. 24, February 6, p. 23, February 20, p. 42, March 27, pp. 44-46, June 11, pp. 1, 40-41 and 44, and August 20, p. 31, all 1932. See also Himmelberg, pp. 104, 127-135, 143-44, 159.

22. E.G. Griggs to 4L Board of Directors, October 1, 1932, W.C. Ruegnitz to E.G. Griggs, October 4, 1932, and E.G. Griggs to W.C. Ruegnitz, October 5, 1932, in SPT/41/4L.


Chapter III


3. Quotations: R.R. Macartney to C.H. Ingram, February 1 and 3, 1933, in CHI/1/Klamath Falls; J.P. Weyerhaeuser, Jr., to A.W. Clapp, February 8, 1933, in JPW/1/Clapp; E.G. Griggs to W.C. Ruegnitz, February 6, 1933, in WCR/2/7; WCL, April, 1933, pp. 11-12.


5. Quotations: Himmelberg, p. 198; W.C. Ruegnitz to Frances Perkins, April 13, 1933, in WCR/3/14; Minutes 4L Local #3, April 27, 1933, in WCR/3/58; Mason Diary, April 27 and May 2 and 3, 1933; R.D. Brown to WCLA Trustees, April 24, 1933, in SPT/49/WCLA; Bellush, pp. 14-15.

See also Himmelberg, pp. 190-92, 196-8; Holbrook Diary, April 25, 1933; Mason Diary, April 24 and 25, 1933; W.C. Ruegnitz to All 4L Locals, May 1, 1933; W.C. Ruegnitz to 4L Board of Directors, April 15 and May 9, 1933, W.C. Ruegnitz to 4L Members, June 15, 1933, all in SPT/46/4L.

6. Quotations: W.C. Ruegnitz to 4L Board of Directors, May 7, 1933, in SPT/46/4L; Mason Diary, May 17, 1933; W.C. Ruegnitz to All 4L Board Members and Local Officers, April 5 and May 2, 1933, in SPT/46/4L. C.H. Ingram to J.P. Weyerhaeuser, Jr., May 16, 1933, in JPW/1/W.

See also: Bernstein, New Deal, p. 34; W.C. Ruegnitz to C.H. Ingram, April 7, 18 and 23, 1933, in WCR/3/14; W.C. Ruegnitz to C.H. Ingram, May 11, 1933 and C.H. Ingram, letters to W.H. Peabody and A.L. Raught, May 25, 1933, in CHI/1/4L; W.C. Ruegnitz to E.G. Griggs II, May 27 and June 1, 1933, and Minutes, 4L District 6 Board Meeting, December 18, 1933, in SPT/57/4L; Loren Slade to W.C. Ruegnitz, May 18, 1933, in WCR/2/30; 4L Lumber News, November 1, 1933, p. 6.

8. Loehr, pp. 100-102; Mason Diary, June 6, 1934; the Lumber Code is printed in Am.Lbr., September 2, 1933, pp. 26-38.


10. Loren Slade to W.C. Ruegnitz, May 16, 1933, in WCR/2/20; Minutes of the 4L Meeting, Local 16:6, June 14, 1933, in WCR/3/58; Tacoma Labor Advocate, July 7, 1933; Tacoma News Tribune, July 1, 1933; H.S. McIlvaigh to Frances Perkins, June 29, 1933, and Federated Press release, June 30, 1933, both in PCLC/20/6.


12. H.S. McIlvaigh letters to William Green, June 16, 1922, and to C.C. Dill, June 13, 1933, both in PCLC/20/6. H.S. McIlvaigh to William Green, June 24, 1933, in PCLC/20/1; William Green to H.S. McIlvaigh, June 15, 1933, in PCLC/5/4; and Tacoma Labor Advocate, June 16, 23, and 30, 1933.


14. E.G. Griggs II to W.C. Ruegnitz, July 11, 1933; W.C. Ruegnitz letters to W.B. Greeley and to 4L Members, July 1, 1933, all in SPT/46/4L; W.B. Greeley to E.W. Demarest, July 15, 1933, in SPT/199/Joint Committee; F.E. Weyerhaeuser to J.P. Weyerhaeuser, Jr., July 31, 1933, in JPW/1/F.E. Weyerhaeuser; E.G. Griggs to All Employees, July 29, 1933, in SPT/149/Memos; WCL, August, 1933, p. 6.

15. W.C. Ruegnitz to All 4L Operator Members, September 18, 1933, and "Minutes, 4L District 6 Board, December 18, 1933", pp. 1-2, both in SPT/46/4L; M.T. Owre to W.C. Ruegnitz, February 21, 1934, in WCR/2/15; West Coast Lumbermen's Association Information Department Circular, March 22, 1934, in SPT/199/Joint Committee on Labor; Thomas J. Linton to James Taylor, October 6, 1933, in WSF/7/39.


18. "Minutes, 4L District 4, 5 and 6 Board Meeting, December 18, 1933", p. 5 and passim, SPT/18/4L.


R. Hallidy to J.P. Weyerhaeuser, Jr., October 2, 1934, in JPW/2/Industry Code; Timb., September, 1934, p. 52; October, 1934, pp. 10, 24-26, 52-53; November, 1934, pp. 10-11; December, 1934, p. 92; C.H. Ingram to Plant Managers, December 21, 1934, in CHI/2/Labor; C.H. Ingram to W.C. Ruegnitz, June 11, 1934, in CHI/2/4L; J.P. Weyerhaeuser, Jr., to F.E. Weyerhaeuser, December 1 and 11, 1934, in JPW/2/Regional Labor Board.

23. WTC Executive Committee, Minutes, January 7-8, 1935 (Weyerhaeuser Archives); J.P. Weyerhauser, Jr., to managers, January 14, 1935, in JPW/3/Labor.


25. Jensen, chap. 9, unless otherwise noted, is the source on which discussion of the 1935 strike is based.

The conservative reputation of the Carpenters nationally cannot, of course, always be read into their local unions. UBCJA Local #562, Everett, and the Central Labor Council of the same city, resolved about February 20, 1935, that President Roosevelt and the Congress, in order to "inaugurate more just and scientific methods of wealth, production, and just distribution thereof," thereby precluding "a very probable period of strife and bloodshed," ought to immediately socialize industry, banking, and transportation. And ... to insure peace and tranquility, pass adequate unemployment insurance, old age pensions, a two year moratorium on all debts except to the government, and other necessary social measures.

Copies of the resolution were forwarded to Roosevelt, Congressmen, the Presidents of the Washington, Oregon, California, Idaho, and Montana, and all Washington state Central Labor Councils. During the 1935 lumber strike, Everett was a center of insurgent unionism; the Central Labor Council voted to call a general strike if their city was occupied by the National Guard. The radicalisation of the Everett skilled workers should be investigated. Copy of resolution in PCLC/7/7.

J.P. Weyerhaeuser, Jr., to F.E. Weyerhaeuser, April 12, 1935, in JPW/3/FEW; Laird Bell to J.P. Weyerhaeuser, Jr., April 12 and 13, 1935, in JPW/3/Laird Bell.


The 4L Fir Wage Board employer members were Roy Morse (Long-Bell), Spike Griggs and E.S. Downing (Western Lumber Company): 4L Lumber News, May 1, 1934, p. 7.


30. Ibid., June 25 and 29, 1935; J.P. Weyerhaeuser, Jr., to F.E. Weyerhaeuser, June 26 and July 3, 1935, both in JPW/3/FEW.


33. Jensen, p. 185. For the early IWA period, see ibid., chaps. 10-13.

Chapter IV


2. W.H. Turner to Dean Johnson, March 21, 1927 (copy) in SPT/17/EGG.


The Lewis Mills, organized 1923, had never paid a dividend; Willapa Lumber paid only one dividend (6%) during its productive life, 1906-31: "RLB-Willapa Transcript," p. 269 (Lewis), pp. 301-2 (Turner).

In 1929, the population of Pacific County was 14,970, including 5,420 male wage earners 10 years of age and older; 2,200 (including 1,024 at saw and planing mills) were employed at 61 manufacturing establishments; another 1,078 worked at logging camps. The population of Raymond in 1930 was 3,828, including 1,597 males 16 and older; South Bend's population was 1,798. In December, 1934, the WHLM employed 392 workers at the Raymond lumber plant, and 95 at the South Bend mill; another 82 worked at the company shingle mill.


Hidy et al, p. 423, note that in April, 1931, C.L. Lewis was unwilling to affiliate his operations -- Lewis Mills and Timber and Raymond Lumber -- with the 4L. Although C.L. Lewis was retained as vice-president of the WHLM, J.W. Lewis, as general manager, had the authority, under Weyerhaeuser group practice, to decide the affiliation question. The fact that he chose to do so thus indicates an active interest. Hidy et al, pp. 423-24, ignore J.W. Lewis' pro-4L position before the passage of the NIRA, and imply disinterest.

6. Willapa Harbor Pilot, April 30, 1931; May 19, June 2 and 29, 1932 and July 13, 1933.

7. WCL, December, 1931, pp. 38-39. The "dumping" referred to appears to be that attributed by Ruegnitz to the Schaeffer Brothers Lumber and Shingle Company of Aberdeen and Montesano, one of the operators against whom the
TUUL strike was directed; W.C. Ruegnitz to E.C. Griggs, November 30, 1931, in SPT/35/4L.

Wages at the WHLM were reduced to $2.25 per day on December 31, 1932: J.W. Lewis to C.H. Ingram, February 9, 1933, in CHI/1C/Willapa Harbor; Interview with Leslie Younglove, July 14, 1979; "RLB-Willapa Transcript," pp. 228, 260 (Lewis).

Ruegnitz cited the Grays Harbor district as being notoriously individualistic and competitive, and attributed district radicalism to the lack of alternative (i.e., 4L) leadership; he was evidently pleased with the WHLM consolidation and Lewis' pro-4L policies: W.C. Ruegnitz to J.W. Lewis, March 29, 1933, in WCR/3/11.

For Lewis' continuing favourable attitude to 4L and, especially, to a uniform industry wage base, see R.E. Daniels to W.C. Ruegnitz, October 2, 1931, in WCR/1/18; W.C. Ruegnitz to R.P. Scott, July 21, 1932, in WCR/1/18; Holbrook Diary, December 5, 1932; J.W. Lewis to C.H. Ingram, April 19, 1933, in CHI/1C/4L; W.D. Smith to W.C. Ruegnitz, January 4, 1934, in WCR/2/31; WCLA questionnaire regarding Lumber Code continuation, Spring, 1935, in CHI/3/Code. "RLB-Willapa Transcript," J.W. Lewis to Our Employees, September 12, 1934 (Respondant's Exhibit "A"); ibid., pp. 259-60, 268 (Turner), p. 296 (Lewis); Raymond Advertiser, January 17 and April 18, 1935.


According to the U.S. Bureau of the Census, Fifteenth Census, Population, Vol. V (USGPO, 1933), pp. 504 and 506, the 454,503 persons employed in the U.S. lumber industry in 1930 included:

31,731 owners, managers, and foremen
1,161 engineers, draftsmen, and other professionals
15,937 bookkeepers, clerks, stenographers, etc.
64,529filers, sawyers, and other skilled trades
and 341,145 operatives, laborers, truck drivers, etc.

In 1929, 44.6% of total sawmill rated horsepower was produced electrically; in 1936, 28% of all Pacific Coast mills with a daily capacity of 100 $ or greater (as listed in the WCLA's Handbook and Directory of the Western Timber Industries) relied exclusively on electrical power, and another 49.3% used some combination of electric and steam power: Van Tassell and Bluestone, pp. 23 and 71.

14. Van Tassell and Bluestone, passim.
Retired lumber workers interviewed for this study all made this point: see, for example, Knauf, Cadieu, Cochran, Mulholland, Johnson, Clemons, and Younglove Interviews.

15. The following discussion of planing mills, except where otherwise noted, is synthesized from H.B. Oakleaf, Lumber Manufacture in the Douglas Fir Region (Chicago: Commercial Journal Company, 1920), pp. 84-108, 116-130; U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Job Descriptions for the Lumber and Timber Products Industry (Washington: USGPO, 1939), passim; Knauf Interviews; and for practices specific to the WHLM during the 1930's, the Younglove and Mason Interviews.

Van Tassell and Bluestone, p. 71, note that planing mills and dry kilns were reported to be in use in 1936 at 32.5% and 11.7%, respectively; of Pacific Coast mills of 1-49 $ capacity; 77.7% and 29.8% of mills with 50-99 $ capacity; and at 90.5% and 72.2% of mills with a daily capacity of 100 $ or more.

16. Bob Merry, quoted in West Coast Lumberman, September, 1931, p. 44; Younglove Interview.

See also David Montgomery, "Immigrant Workers," p. 107. Nelson, Managers and Workers, chap. III, is a useful introduction to the pre-1920 factory foreman's role, but his argument that foremen and industrial managers were more strongly affected by industrial reform than were workers is overstated; idem, "The New Factory System," is a fine case study of the impact of unions and the industrial welfare movement upon shop relations at the turn of the century. For the personnel management movement, see Nelson, Managers and Workers, pp. 148-162; Henry Eilbert, "Personnel Management."

17. Knauf Interview, February 22, 1979. By the late 1930's, most St. Paul and Tacoma foremen were recruited from the ranks: Mulholland Interview.


20. Timb., May, 1930, p. 64.

21. Heart-side up feeding would result in raised grain. The compartments were gauged to hold four to six pieces of material four to twenty feet in length, with short lengths at either end of the racks, and lengths increasing to the central twenty foot position.

22. Younglove Interview.


According to Frank Mason, untied stock was brought by carrier to the bundle trimmer, where two men placed loads on a sloping table whose rolls carried the material to a series of stops at the trimmer end of the table. A man stood at either side of the trimmer proper; together they lifted the loose stock from the table into the trimmer and, after tying the bundle, one man operated the trimmer saws by stepping on a button control which caused a saw to trim the front end of the bundle evenly. The bundle then automatically dropped onto a belt and carried forward to a stop appropriate for cutting the bundle to standard length. The rear end of the first bundle and the front of the subsequent bundle were trimmed simultaneously as the operator activated the foot control. The completed bundles were ejected onto belts from which another pair of men made up carrier loads for transport to storage.

For discussion of the pre-scientific management creative activities of foremen, see Nelson, Managers and Workers, p. 42; Braverman, p. 132; David Noble, America By Design, Chap. III. Trade journals carried occasional articles describing inventions developed by foremen and superintendents (e.g., 4L Lumber News, October 1, 1933, p. 17) although engineering departments were becoming characteristic of large firms such as the WTC by the 1920's; see references to O.H. Onstad in Hidy et al., pp. 406-409.


27. WCL, June, 1931, p. 36; Timb., July, 1931, p. 47. The efficiency firms represented were the C.A. Marston, George S. May, and Charles E. Bedaux Companies.


29. See previously cited works by Galambos and Himmelberg.


Chapter V


Transcript," p. 185 (Earl Younglove).


5. "Bedaux-Willapa," February 14 and 20, March 6, April 10, 17, and 18, and August 7 and 14, 1934, all in CHI/2/Bedaux.


See also the comment in the 4L Lumber News (February, 1933), p. 2: "The greatest obstacle today to a uniform grade is the quantity production craze. The present speed mania makes grading more or less a game of hit or miss."

8. Mason Interview; "RLB-Willapa Transcript," p. 185 (L. Younglove), and p. 187 (E. Younglove). The Mason, King, and Younglove Interviews, when discussing the Bedaux system, all volunteered the point that graders were able to "cheat."


13. Raymond Advertiser, September 6, 1934; "RLB-Willapa Transcript," pp. 11, 44, 77, and 95 (Watson), pp. 23, 29, and 32 (Fowler), p. 194 (E. Younglove), pp. 75-76 (Kraus), pp. 160-61 (McAndrews), and p. 227 (Meek).

15. Leaflet reproduced in J.W. Lewis to Our Employees, September 12, 1934, Respondant's Exhibit "A", "RLB-Willapa Transcript;" see also Lewis' comments in Raymond Advertiser, January 17, and April 18, 1935.


Not incidentally, the A.F. of L. launched a general strike of 500,000 textile workers in the eastern United States September 1, 1934, whose major demand was the abolition of the speed-up and stretch-out.


For evidence that the Raymond lumber workers' executive was aware that the Bedaux system was also used in textile mills, see "RLB-Willapa Transcript," p. 191 (E. Younglove). This information would have been included in documents enclosed with William Green to Earl Younglove, September 7, 1934, in AFL/25/Federal Union #19446; if the Raymond unionists were not already aware of the same.


See Montgomery, "Immigrant Workers," for the argument that industrial workers' shop culture was distinct from the work habits of pre-industrial peasants and artisans, and stood in opposition to modes of behaviour considered appropriate by managerial reformers. Montgomery argues that, after 1890, new industrial workers were acculturated to the work culture of the experienced workers, rather than to the management's notions of time-discipline; see also Mathewson, op cit, p. 109; Mathewson, Chap. V, provides examples of "Restriction and the Fear of Unemployment," especially pp. 86-87, 98, and 102; and ibid, pp. 165, 167, for William Leiserson's comments on the economics of the restriction of output.

17. J.W. Lewis to Our Employees, September 12, 1934, Respondant's Exhibit "A", "RLB-Willapa Transcript."


Foremen didn't like the Bedaux system at Long-Bell or Polson either: see Lewis Hallett to J.W. Lewis, October 19, 1933, and L.G. Pauze to J.W. Lewis, October 19, 1933, both in CHI/1/Willapa Harbor.


J.W. Lewis to Our Employees, September 12, 1934, Respondant's Exhibit "A", "RLB-Willapa Transcript."


Nelson, Managers and Workers, p. 49, observes that systematizing engineers typically equated the absence of formal co-ordination with the lack of any system in the work process.


27. NLRB, Decisions and Orders Vol. II, pp. 405-407; King Interview.

For the 1935 strike, see Jensen, op. cit., Chap. IX.

On May 15, 1935, the WTC again refused to allow an election to be held at the WHLM, and charged that the NLRB was violating Amendments 4, 5, and 10 of the U.S. Constitution, that the NLRB had no jurisdiction in the case, and charged that all employees as of April, 1935, had since discontinued their employment (i.e. were on strike) and were, therefore, ineligible to vote: W.E. Heidinger to National Labor Relations Board, May 15, 1935, in JPW/3/Labor.


30. South Bend Journal, June 4 and 28, 1935; King Interviews.


32. South Bend Journal, May 10 and 17, and June 24, 21, and 28, 1935; Raymond Advertiser, June 6, and August 15, 1935; Younglove Interview.


36. For the IWA, see Jensen, chapters 10-14.

Chapter VI.


5. 4L Bulletin, May, 1920, pp. 3-4. The St. Paul was still using the Emerson efficiency system at this point; it was abandoned by June, 1919, when Mr. Knauf was hired by the St. Paul.

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Wilcox, Clair. 

Personal Interviews

Cadieu, Alfred "Les", at his home, Tacoma, Washington, June 1, 1979. Mr. Cadieu, a boom man for the St. Paul and Tacoma Lumber Company and the St. Regis Paper Company, was President of his Boom Men's local union, and a member of the first International Woodworkers of America Executive Board.

Clemens, Ray, at his home, Tacoma, Washington, January 1, 1980. Mr. Clemens was the Recording Secretary of Lumber and Sawmill Workers Union 2664, Tacoma, 1935-36, and was a saw filer for the St. Paul and Tacoma Lumber Company, 1929-1944.

Floyd, Mr. B.G., at his home, Tacoma, Washington, January 2, 1979. Mr. Floyd worked as a mill wright and trimmerman for several lumber mills at Tacoma from the 1920's-60's, and was spokesman for the Tacoma 4L employees' delegation soliciting National Guard intervention at Tacoma during the 1935 strike.

Jackson, Floyd, at his home, Tacoma, Washington, January 1, 1980. Mr. Jackson worked as a boom man at several mills in Washington and California, 1920's-1960's, including the St. Paul and Tacoma Lumber Company, and was active in union affairs, holding offices as recording and financial secretary for several locals.
King, Dea Chester, at his home, Raymond, Washington, January 4, 1980. Mr. King worked at Willapa Harbor Lumber Mills during the 1930's, held several offices in local and district unions, and served as a member of the Washington State Legislature, 1945-65.


Younglove, Leslie, at his home, Shelton, Washington, July 17, 1979. Mr. Younglove was the first President of the Raymond lumber workers' union, 1934-35; he worked at several logging camps and timber and plywood mills in the Raymond and Shelton districts, 1916-1965, usually as a grader.

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