MAKING THE TRUTH GRAPHIC: 
THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT'S HOME FRONT 
INFORMATION STRUCTURE AND PROGRAMMES DURING WORLD WAR II

by

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ABSTRACT

During the Second World War, the Canadian government could claim only moderate success for its information operations. To begin with, the government had difficulty in 1939 establishing its first-ever, full-scale wartime information agency, the Bureau of Public Information, and providing it with an effective organization and policy. Various outside interests, particularly Canadian newspapers and social scientists, pressed the government to adopt a policy which reflected their particular views on the role of wartime information in a liberal democratic system. After trying out an information policy that rested on facilitating newspaper coverage, the minister of National War Services with responsibility for public information allowed the director of Public Information to expand his activities in an ad hoc manner and to adopt newspaper or social scientific techniques if he saw fit.

This approach satisfied no one and led to a complete reorganization of information work in 1942 and the formation of the Wartime Information Board, the Bureau's replacement, which finally emerged with a policy in 1943. The chief architect of the new approach, John Grierson, wanted to use the social sciences in an integrated media approach that explained how democracy fit into an increasingly complex, technological society. But this was difficult. The WIB could not avoid involvement in conflicting currents of midwar opinion. Orthodox free-enterprisers asserted the primacy of private business
while anyone with opinions to the left of them urged varying degrees of social change. The reformers themselves, however, could not agree on the desirable measures. After barely escaping the crossfire, Grierson resigned in 1944. The new general manager, A.D. Dunton, finally succeeded in setting up a smoothly-run operation that generally followed Grierson's direction. At the same time that the board was explaining democratic procedures to Canadians, however, political interference in its operations demonstrated that the new propaganda techniques could be manipulated for possibly undemocratic ends.

The evolution of official wartime ideology more or less paralleled policy development. The Bureau began by trying to establish a concept of Canadian nationalism that encompassed a mixture of chauvinistic patriotism and a general realization of the outlines of Canadian nationhood. In the wartime context, this meant presenting a view of the enemy, of the allies and of wartime events that would mobilize Canadians to support the government's policies. It also involved trying to define a view of 'Canadianism' that would encompass the ethnic community as well as English and French Canadians. By the middle of the war, it was obvious that this approach had not proved satisfactory. The BPI's successor, the Wartime Information Board could not totally reorient all these operations but did manage to establish new programmes that took a different approach to Canadian nationhood. Basically, these programmes tried to awaken a sense of participation in alienated groups, to take individual needs into account and to provoke discussion about the direction of government policy. The
propaganda operations, however, were not totally reoriented and retained some elements of chauvinistic patriotism. The new system, despite its success in heading off popular discontent, opened the door to manipulation of public opinion.
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INTRODUCTION

During the Second World War, the Canadian government formally entered the propaganda business. By establishing the Bureau of Public Information and the Wartime Information Board, the government publicly undertook the task of marshalling publicity and educational techniques to mobilize the population for wartime activity. This comprehensive institutionalization of the government's wartime powers of persuasion lagged behind Britain, France and the United States. Although the Canadian government had established a small press office during the Great War, it had never produced anything like the comprehensive publicity campaigns undertaken by the famous (or infamous) American Committee on Public Information or the analogous British or French operations. After the war, the Canadian government did not copy to a great extent the developing American government, or even Canadian corporate, practice of maintaining an intermediary public relations office between the press and the decision makers. Canadian government figures preferred to cultivate close relationships with individual newspapermen and to use these connections as an unofficial means of providing information that supported the government. Although several Canadian government departments mounted publicity campaigns during the 1930's, the first great effort at systematically co-ordinating the media to screen, to collate and to present information occurred during the Canadian tour of King George VI and Queen Elizabeth in 1939.

With the formal entry into the propaganda field in
1940, the Canadian government assumed all the trappings of a modern constitutional democracy engaged in total war.¹ A War Measures Act hurried through Parliament in 1914 had given the cabinet the power to issue, without consulting Parliament, orders and regulations "by reason of the existence of a real or apprehended war, invasion or insurrection . . . necessary for the security, defence, peace, order and welfare of Canada . . ."² From 1914 to 1920, the government used this act to institute censorship as well as to infringe upon other civil liberties and to regulate economic undertakings. Unlike the wartime emergency powers given by regular legislative procedure to the governments of Britain and the United States, this unamended Canadian law has never lapsed and provided the basis in 1939 for proclaiming similar restrictions without parliamentary approval. Coupled with the government's power to restrict the dissemination of other points of view, the organization of a powerful wartime information agency turned the situation into a question of the government's tolerance of wartime dissent. Although this study looks mainly at one half of the issue, the promulgation of an official ideology, the real issue at test remains Canada's commitment to wartime democracy.³

In this latter context, 'propaganda' becomes a difficult concept to discuss, particularly in the case of a democratic government that espouses a belief in its citizens' right to hold and to promote a multiplicity of opinions. In large part, the problem grows out of the negative connotation contemporary scholars attach to 'propaganda'. Working after the Great War, Harold Lasswell and Walter Lippman reacted adversely
to institutionalized wartime 'propaganda' because of their dis-taste for the deliberate distortion and manipulation of opinion that they had witnessed during the war. Lasswell, for example, tried to differentiate 'propaganda' from 'education' by setting 'propaganda' apart as an effort to advocate only one solution rather than to stimulate discussion. Many later studies, Jacques Ellul's for example, tend to avoid a concrete definition and to list 'propaganda' as something that a propagandist does. Ellul's main concern rests with repeating the earlier caveats about the dangers of propaganda in a democracy. Democratic propaganda, he notes, is "fettered" by its truthfulness, by its "respect for the human being," by its tendency to look at both sides of an issue, by "the democratic conscience," and by the propagandists' involvement with, rather than manipulation of, the public. All this, Ellul concludes, makes for "ineffectual" propaganda and precludes the possibility of "democratic propaganda" because it prevents the ultimate aim of manipulating individual opinions and actions. If democratic propaganda is to be effective, it must eliminate the traits of democracy and establish a unitary national myth that brooks no minority opinions and "integrates the masses." Hence, beware the claims to democracy of a government which engages in propaganda.

More than apropos, these warnings do help to judge whether or not a government remains democratic, in war or in peace, yet they do not set out a definition of 'propaganda' that proves useful in a case study. A more mechanistic approach can fill the gap. Most efforts to define 'propaganda' isolate the calculated nature of the message prepared by the
propagandist. For example, Terence Qualter's criterion is this "deliberate attempt to form, control or alter" attitudes and actions by the use of the means of communication and has nothing to do with objective truth. In this sense, all the activities of the Bureau of Public Information and the Wartime Information Board surely qualify as propaganda since they aimed to gain support for the government's wartime commitments, domestic and international. The agencies differed from government departments' wartime or peacetime publicity operations only in their scope. While the Victory Loan organizers, for example, could claim to ignore the promotion of political ideology and to consider only bond sales, the savings campaigns had wider implications than that. Yet, the BPI and the WIB remained the only government organizations committed to broad and general propaganda efforts.

How well did they succeed in fitting their tasks into the democratic framework and avoiding the pitfalls outlined by Ellul? Given the circumstances, I would argue that they did a moderately good job. Canadians did not respond with stereotyped patriotism to the outbreak of hostilities in Europe. More removed in sentiment from European politics than ever before, many English Canadians expressed a desire to get on with the job of building a North American nation. French Canadians, afraid of a repetition of the past, the enforced conscription of men for overseas service in 1917, wanted to limit Canadian participation. The organization and the message of the government information agencies increasingly had to take these sentiments into account. The officials found that propaganda reiterating
a unified national myth of Canada at war and a view of an enemy worth fighting just did not work. The diversity of Canadians' opinions prevailed over an enforced concept of 'Canadianism'. As the personnel manning the information organizations evolved, the majority of the staff espoused a different viewpoint. They shared many of the beliefs of the social reformers of the 1930's, those who wanted to use the media to place the alternatives for social action before Canadians. Reflecting this change, new propaganda policies and programmes tried to promote popular consideration of social issues which crossed traditional ethnic and social divisions and to view the war as a stage in the achievement of social goals rather than as an end in itself. The Wartime Information Board founded its new programmes on greater respect for individual needs and desires, the tolerance of differences and the promotion of debate on alternative courses of action.

And yet this new philosophy and these modified programmes contained the seeds of undemocratic manipulation of opinion. The Liberal government of Mackenzie King hired the new propagandists, used them but released most of them at the war's end. From the government's point of view, they had indeed done their job well. They had defused Canadians' discontent and gained the necessary support to prevent disruption of the government's war policies. By convincing Canadians that the government had responded to the popular will, they helped to ensure its re-election in 1945. At the same time, they demonstrated the utility of using tools like the public opinion survey and the integrated media blitz for self-interested
political ends. These tools became a permanent feature of government peacetime 'propaganda' operations, ready to use for possibly undemocratic ends.
PART I
BUILDING THE STRUCTURES:
THEORY AND POLICY OF INFORMATION
"Before waking this morning," Mackenzie King recorded in October 1939, "I was dreaming of someone giving me directions to speak in public and particularly to engage writers to prepare material for radio broadcasts." Getting out war news to Canadians agitated the Prime Minister and merited several entries in his diary during the first years of the Second World War. But it did not disturb King enough to propel himself into establishing an effective information service to recount the government's wartime activities to Canadians in a systematic manner.

Despite the September 1939 scurrying around Ottawa while the government prepared for war, the Prime Minister and those closest to him still hoped to limit Canadian participation in the European struggle. This meant avoiding the precipitous establishment of government agencies, like a wartime information organization, until an evident need existed. Pre-war discussion of the desirability of countering Nazi and Communist propaganda amounted to nothing. During the first week of September, the Prime Minister's advisers recommended that in the inevitable conflict, responsibility for a very limited information service should devolve on the Privy Council Office or the Prime Minister's Office and, therefore, answer to Mackenzie King himself. The government's hesitations were understandable. During the Great War from 1914 to 1918, Canada
had not established any substantive government information service. Lack of experience provided a good excuse for delay during the September crisis.

The government, nonetheless, curtsied in the direction of changed conditions and took preliminary steps. Before the outbreak of war, the cabinet recognized the legitimacy of government intervention by establishing a cabinet sub-committee* with responsibility for "censorship, publicity, recruiting, speakers, propaganda and keeping up the morale of the people." After Canada's declaration of war against Germany on September 10, the cabinet authorized the RCMP to use its appropriations to counter anti-war sentiment in French-language newspapers. For his part, the Prime Minister permitted one of his own secretaries, Walter J. Turnbull, to hire an assistant to help assemble a pool of background information for use in answering press inquiries and for preparing press releases. Government departments received orders to cooperate. Busy with other affairs and reluctant to give up authority, the departments dragged their feet even after constant reminders, exhortations and meetings with Turnbull and his new helper, George Hambleton. The chairman of the cabinet information sub-committee, Norman McLarty, Postmaster General, contributed little to any of this. He antagonized the Prime Minister by suggesting a ministry of information under Charles Dunning,

* PC 2474 set up the sub-committee. The chairman was Norman McLarty, the Postmaster General, and the members were C.G. Power, the minister of Pensions and National Health; Norman Rogers, the minister of Labour; and J.A. Mackinnon, minister without portfolio.
former minister of Finance. King disliked Dunning and opposed any suggestion of a ministry. McLarty also maintained too close a connection with American advertising firms and to those around him, gave every indication of trying to "free himself from the many details."^{10}

However inadequate the set-up, it lasted for several months because whenever Mackenzie King tried to make alternative and more efficient arrangements, political considerations intruded. The Prime Minister's first proposal, to establish a permanent organization under the direction of Leonard Brockington, the recently retired chairman of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, aroused the opposition of some newspaper publishers. Because King did not want to alienate the press at the outset of hostilities, he jettisoned this scheme.\textsuperscript{11} Next, the Prime Minister proposed to appoint J. W. Dafoe, editor of \textit{The Winnipeg Free Press}, as the honorific head of an information bureau staffed by publicity workers from both the Liberal and Conservative party organizations. This cagey scheme to remove a government information service from the political arena halted when the Quebec Premier, Maurice Duplessis, called a provincial election for October 25. Mackenzie King could not afford to present Duplessis with another target for the Premier's election campaign already based on the need for Quebec to resist Ottawa's centralist wartime policies. The Prime Minister rescinded all his provisions and let his staff handle any information work as best they could.\textsuperscript{12}

While Mackenzie King tested the political winds, his secretaries advocated changes. No one wanted to jettison the
concept of a limited government involvement in public information, but Walter Turnbull, J. W. Pickersgill and Arnold Heeney began to press for a more rational efficient structure to "keep the lunatics in leash." Since the government recognized its legitimate place in putting its policies before the public, they argued, a more effective channel must prevent the private media from usurping this function possibly for undesirable ends. They proposed, in conjunction with John Grierson, the government film commissioner, that an information "flying squad" begin preparing reports on press and public opinion as well as soothing potential trouble spots, like French Canada.¹³

The considerable unanimity of influential English Canadians in support of the government's actions during the September crisis had begun to fall apart by November and information policy presented a good target for criticism. Echoing several complaints, Floyd Chalmers, the editor of The Financial Post, charged that the government operated in excessive and unacceptable secrecy while Canadians demanded "the right to make constructive, intelligent criticism in order to prevent . . . those abuses and mistakes and blunders that came so close to losing us the last war."¹⁴ About the same time, the Toronto financier and Conservative, J. M. Macdonnell, commented to his party leader, Dr. R. J. Manion, that "I am absolutely unconvinced myself that it is not possible for a great deal more information to be given."¹⁵ The defeat of Maurice Duplessis in the Quebec election by Liberal, Adélard Godbout, eliminated a major hindrance to federal government war policies. Soon more voices would join the chorus of complaint.
Mackenzie King decided to act. He still wanted to limit the extent of any information organization but decided that practical and political developments had shifted to favour a different approach. He covered his political flank first. He prepared for hostile questions in the House of Commons and assured reporters at a news conference of his concern for full publicity coverage of the government's war policies. Then, in a labouriously written memorandum, King set down his ideas on a diffused information system with limited responsibilities. In King's mind, the cabinet war committee would deal with all questions of information policy, the cabinet committee on public information would concern itself with the organization of the mechanics of information and dissemination and no ministry of information would prove necessary.* King's own staff would constitute a committee to advise on matters of policy and an information adviser, also attached to the Prime Minister's Office, would co-ordinate departmental activities with those of a Bureau of Public Information which would look after general relations with the press. It was all very complicated but in King's mind, prevented the possibility of anyone becoming a Canadian version of Dr. Goebbels. No one but the Prime Minister would serve a co-ordinating function.

* PC 4011½, December 5, 1939 reorganized the cabinet into nine committees from its previous six sub-committees. The war committee was composed of the Prime Minister; the minister of Justice, Ernest Lapointe; the minister of National Defence, Norman Rogers; the minister of Finance, Col. J.L. Ralston; the minister of Mines and Resources, T.A. Crerar; the then government leader in the Senate, R. Dandurand. The public information committee retained the same membership as its predecessor sub-committee.
For a brief time, it appeared as though the Prime Minister had succeeded in formulating a workable plan. As his troubleshooter, King hired L. W. Brockington and gave him the high sounding title of Recorder of Canada's War Effort and Counsellor to the War Committee of the Cabinet. Within King's system of checks and working behind the shield of the Prime Minister's Office, Brockington would not be vulnerable to charges of 'treachery'. For the more public position, director of Public Information, King chose genial Walter Thompson, the CNR publicity man who had made friends with the press as chief information officer during the Royal Tour in 1939. After moving Thompson from his first wartime position as director of Censorship, King provided the authority for him to hire staff and to spend money on publicity. The Conservative party made no noises at all and most of the former critics of the government's deficiencies expressed pleasure, particularly at the appointment of Thompson, the "dean of newsmen." Both Brockington and Thompson agreed with King's pragmatic approaches. Brockington accepted the chore of writing out King's weekly statements to Parliament, of preparing background papers and radio broadcasts and of getting policy proposals ready for the cabinet. The new Counsellor strongly advocated an open approach in providing material to the media and minimal government secrecy as a means of overcoming the newspapers' feeling that the government had tried to choke off the news. He hoped that these measures would improve the government's press relations and would gain more ample and favourable publicity. For his part, Thompson hoped to assure a "sort of arm chair personal
direction" of different phases of information work. He wanted to maintain close personal relations with the newspapers and to improve the government's image by talking candidly about government plans and problems, by gaining access for reporters and by letting them write their own stories.23

Just as the new men settled into their new offices,24 the trouble began. Suddenly, on January 5, 1940,25 from his bed in the Royal Victoria Hospital in Montreal, Walter Thompson resigned. Thompson's assistant, also formerly of the CNR, G. H. Lash, wanted to follow suit.26 In the following weeks, Mackenzie King's decision to call a federal general election as a challenge to charges from Ontario's Premier Mitchell Hepburn on the inadequacies of Canada's war policies delayed a reorganization of the information apparatus.27 On the hustings, the Prime Minister's information policy came in for considerable criticism. Wartime publicity turned into an election issue when Hepburn accused the federal Liberals of using the National Film Board to commission documentary films which glorified the King government.28 Dr. Robert Manion, the federal Conservative leader, began to attack the government's information policy directly. In a campaign speech at Victoria, Manion promised to bring the Canadian people "into the confidence of their government" by getting the press, radio and public speakers to cooperate with an energetic Bureau of Information.29 The assaults did not carry much weight and Mackenzie King won his largest House of Commons' majority ever on March 26. But the public information apparatus still could not get off the ground. G. H. Lash, confirmed as director of Public Information in
February, and his new French associate director, Claude Melançon, were not happy. Lash's attempts to initiate reforms to rationalize the organization of information services and to make them effective got nowhere.  

Despite the dissatisfaction, Mackenzie King refused to implement any suggestion for reform. As the German armies invaded Denmark, Norway and the Low Countries, the Prime Minister's information advisers tried to convince King to reorganize public information operations in order to help avoid public panic as a result of the European defeats. Essentially, they proposed a more centralized system with greater responsibilities in order to overcome the inefficiencies of the earlier organization. After Parliament assembled in Ottawa on May 16, the Senate created a War Cooperation Committee, chaired by the Liberal Senator, C. P. Beaubien, but led by the Conservative Senate Leader, Arthur Meighen. The committee reported on June 25 and recommended that senators take to the platforms of the country in an effort to keep heads cool during the deteriorating military situation in Europe. When his own minister of Justice, Ernest Lapointe, suggested in cabinet that the government do something about French Canadian morale, the Prime Minister pronounced himself amenable but made no positive statement and in fact, vetoed the establishment of a ministry of information.  

Why did the Prime Minister procrastinate? The answer lies in Mackenzie King's contradictory reaction to the government's assumption of a public information function. King retained his contradictory beliefs throughout the war and many
of the vicissitudes of the public information operations resulted from his ambivalent approach. King professed to believe that a rational and educated public constituted the basis for liberal democratic government and that:

the greatest single moral advantage which democracies enjoy over dictatorships in time of war as in time of peace is their reliance upon the spontaneous support of an informed public.

This meant a minimum wartime limit on freedom of the press. Government provisions for informing the public should remain restricted since Parliament had the greatest information function through its public debates. The independent press performed its useful contribution by its criticism so that the government, kept on its toes, reacted to public opinion. Wartime information according to King, should supplement this system and aid in collating and bringing out the facts for the fullest consideration of the private media and the public.

Preferring news to "ooze out by osmosis untouched by human hands," King frequently expressed a personal dislike for the information business. Labouring over scripts for his frequent radio broadcasts and newsreel appearances, King always complained about his inadequate talent and his lack of help. Proclaiming his "loathing" for public appearances, he turned down very few opportunities to broadcast to Canadians, all the while hating "the publicity aspect of the business in connection with anything so grave as war — a sort of self advertising . . ." Because 'propaganda' retained totalitarian connotations for many Canadians as well as for the Prime Minister, he always tried to avoid a situation which could
provoke charges that the Liberals had created a political machine for their own benefit.  

Political pressures are seldom consistent. Cogent political reasons existed in the Prime Minister's mind for the establishment of a more active government information system. Mackenzie King disliked the press. He believed that newspapers distorted his views, aroused unjustified hostility against him and generally made sensational nuisances of themselves. "My own feeling," he remarked, "is that the press has done infinitely more harm than good." The newspapers, he constantly reiterated, even Liberal chains like the Sifton group, represented business interests who wanted to destroy his career. King further believed that domination of the press by big business justified the government's establishment of an apparatus to tell the "truth." The biased press, King insisted, had forced him to keep his own counsel, even when he preferred to "tell all."

These considerations played on the Prime Minister's mind as the military crisis in the spring of 1940 forced the Canadian government to cast aside its belief that the country could fight a limited liability war. The Prime Minister consented to the dispatch of a second division to Europe and to the formation of a Canadian corps under the command of General Andrew McNaughton. At home, King introduced the National Resources Mobilization Act in Parliament on June 18. The bill's most controversial aspect resulted from the power it conferred on the government to force Canadians to join the military and to participate in the defence of the country.
This, the Prime Minister emphasized, had nothing to do with recruiting for overseas service and did not introduce conscription. Men would not serve outside Canada. The expansion of the Canadian war effort in other areas prepared the way for the Prime Minister to accept a less restricted public information service.

(ii)

When the Department of National War Services Act received royal assent on July 12, 1940, the government's public information service both received wider powers and came under new pressures. Fearing that during the 1940 reverses the Tory press might crusade for the adoption of conscription and force open a civil dispute between French and English Canadians, King supported a stronger information organization. He consented to handing over responsibility for public information to the new minister of National War Services, J. G. Gardiner, who had the power to establish a Bureau of Public Information to co-ordinate information services and to "originate or employ other means . . . in the most efficient way for the obtaining of the utmost aid from the people of Canada in the national emergency . . ." The newspapers, advertising firms and adult educators had pressed for a recognition of their particular ideas in the establishment of public information ever since the outbreak of the war, but the expanded organization gave them a greater opportunity to promote their views even though King and his closest advisers would continue to monitor the development of information programmes.
The newspapers quickly exerted greater influence than their rivals over the minister of National War Services and the Bureau of Public Information. When the Prime Minister objected to Gardiner's proposal to take over all government publicity as a plan to make the minister "almost as powerful as Hitler," Gardiner turned to the newspapers as a means of satisfying the Prime Minister and of heading off an embittered Conservative opposition which blamed the Liberals' "propaganda" for the Tory election defeat. Looking for a 'fall guy' in case things went wrong, the minister ordered the director of information, G. H. Lash, to curtail operations and called in a reliable Liberal, D. B. Rogers, editor of the Regina Leader Post, to assess requirements. The report which Rogers presented to the minister on August 4 mirrored the press philosophy of public information.

Canadian newspapers had always held that their interests should take precedence in any government war news policy. Apart from this claim to supremacy by the fourth estate, the press had many specific complaints by mid-1940. While some newspapers appeared satisfied with the government's haphazard policy of press releases, others, mainly the Tory press, accused the government of drying up their sources and creating, in addition to official censorship, a dangerous quasi-censorship over the nation's newspapers. During the deteriorating war situation in 1940, the newspapers demanded the facts straight from the shoulder to prevent government meddling with news, hiding failures behind phalanxes of press officers and avoiding adverse political repercussions. Although
editorialists wanted to convince people of the need for total effort, they would not stomach what they called "selling the public on how wonderful the head of our Government is or what fine gentlemen the cabinet ministers are." Through thick and thin, the newspapers maintained that if the government wanted to get out the "facts", the best means was still to give newsmen better access to sources without increasing the bureaucratization of Ottawa.

With Rogers' support, these claims became government policy. Rogers rested his report on a belief in the doctrine of private enterprise and postulated that the government must allow the free operation of newspapers. The Canadian public did not require more 'spoon-feeding' in wartime than in peace-time and did not lose its ability to distinguish 'hard' from slanted news. Specifically, Rogers supported the demand of the press for greater access to ministers and officials and opposed any extension of the publicity organization unless it promoted this aim. With these measures, he believed that Canadian morale would take care of itself. Convinced, J. G. Gardiner announced, "let the news be released in its own way while it is news." The report satisfied the requirements of muting Conservative and newspaper carping and of keeping a low profile. The director of Public Information, Gardiner ordered, should dismantle any co-ordinating apparatus and stick to the job of gaining easier access for newsmen.

The growing complexity of the domestic and international wartime situation quickly undermined the efficiency of the "new" approach. The Bureau had no means of dealing with
the resentment of French Canada following the manpower registration in August 1940. The BPI, furthermore, had no mandate to explain the December extension of economic controls by the Wartime Prices and Trade Board, the federal government's position during the contentious financial and political discussions of the Dominion-Provincial Conference in January 1941 or J. L. Ilsley's huge budget the following April. Confused by these events, some Canadians wondered about the implications of the Hyde Park Agreement signed in April 1941, by the Prime Minister and President Roosevelt, and about the country's apparent stinginess in forcing the British to pay 'cash on the barrelhead' for war purchases in Canada while the Americans had developed a lend-lease credit system for the United Kingdom.

The newspapers criticized while Gardiner stumbled. The most glaring example of wartime waste remained the BPI, grumbled The Globe and Mail. If news were news in peace and war, the government could not justify the Bureau's existence. Despite a public defence against these charges, Gardiner had also come to view the Bureau's work with a jaundiced eye. He offered no solution. While he thought that centralization of government public relations services might be desirable, it would cause upset and difficulties. With Gardiner's approval, the director of Public Information worked out a submission for the Prime Minister in May 1941. The scheme allowed for an expansion of domestic activities which would cost half-a-million dollars but would provide integrated facilities so that the government would have a better means of explaining its policies to Canadians. Along with a news bureau, Lash proposed
to establish a travelling exhibitions section and a speakers bureau as well as an expanded number of sponsored radio programmes and films. 59

Gardiner's new policy did not save his political skin completely. Mackenzie King had kept a watchful eye on the minister and was far from satisfied with his performance. 60 The Prime Minister believed that Gardiner had fallen between the two jobs, minister of Agriculture and of National War Services. Because Gardiner had never taken control of information work and would "never get down" to organizing it properly, King wanted to find someone with imagination to co-ordinate information work and perhaps to head a separate ministry. 61 According to Ottawa gossip, the Prime Minister began to get rid of the minister in a "twenty-five act tragedy with the throat-slitting in the second last scene but one and the final curtain falling on Mr. King commiserating with the victim's widow." 62 Surreptitiously, the Prime Minister searched for Gardiner's replacement. He decided at dinner on May 12, that John Grierson, the film commissioner, would remain where he was and, eventually, narrowed his search to three candidates: Douglas Abbott, M.P. for St. Antoine-Westmount; Brooke Claxton, M.P. for St. Lawrence-St. George; and J. T. Thorson, M.P. for Selkirk. King ended up juggling the possibility of Abbott and Thorson. Claxton, he decided after a discussion with Ernest Lapointe and J. L. Ralston, had an "unfortunate manner" of promoting his own cause and maintained too close a personal tie with the Prime Minister's staff. 63

Whether consulted or not, Gardiner must have known
about the pending reorganization and decided to cut his losses. At a Brampton, Ontario cattle auction on May 27, the minister announced his retirement as minister of National War Services. He was, said Gardiner, returning to devote his complete attention to his first duty, minister of Agriculture. "Furious" at Gardiner for quitting War Services before he had time to "dope things out," King had to cope with a minor cabinet crisis until he could get his proposed appointment in shape. Anticipating a House of Commons question by Dr. H.A. Bruce of the Conservatives, King made up his mind on June 11. Without telling the prospective minister, King filled in the necessary orders with J.T. Thorson's name and sent them to the Governor General for signature. Thorson found out fifteen minutes before King's public announcement in the House. By making the appointment, King felt that he was rewarding Thorson "a thorough Liberal," and keeping his options open. The Prime Minister knew that the new minister, with one eye fixed on a judicial appointment, would not last long.

Although keenly aware of the close academic connections of his staff, "the intelligentsia by whom I am surrounded," the Prime Minister perhaps did not realize the pressure that this group would put on the new minister to apply social scientific techniques to government operations. Even more oblivious than King, the Conservative party could only view the new appointment as the replacement of one party watchdog by another in the continuing effort to establish "an obedient and menial
government machine" to control the news. But, even some members of the newspaper fraternity had begun to question the ability of the press to keep up Canadians' morale. George McCracken, associate editor of the *Kingston Whig Standard*, suggested to the government that newspapers could not provide the extra drive, energy and activity demanded by short-term morale building. The press had failed, McCracken believed, to stimulate enlistment and to soothe labour unrest, as well as to present accomplishments in industrial production or even to report stories from the battle-field with any fillip to the popular imagination. The politics and economics of the Canadian newspaper business did not encourage any experimentation or changes from a very conventional approach to news. The government should actively assist the press with a more efficient information organization.

Fully aware of the drawbacks associated with a newspaper philosophy of public information, social scientists and their friends inside the government immediately began urging the adoption of educational and social scientific methods by the government propaganda apparatus. This alliance, not a wartime phenomenon, had grown in the years following 1918 as a number of voluntary associations spread across Canada. The meetings of the League of Nations Society, the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, the Canadian League, the Association of Canadian Clubs and the Canadian Radio League provided the occasion for the growth of an extraordinary web of friendships and interconnections. These organizations, self-appointed promoters of a Canadian national consciousness, remained under the
leadership of a relatively small interlocking group. E.A. Corbett, a leader of this intellectual mafia, called their activities part of "the hotel room interpretation of Canadian enterprise." Whenever they found a cause, a "small group of interested people in a hotel room somewhere in Canada" would get together and set up an organization and plan the campaign. It took a standard form. Directed by one or two energetic younger men who mobilized their collective friends, the national organization operated under the patronage of respected 'elder statesmen'. It proved a very effective manner of influencing government policy.

The war gave the network of friends another cause and more and more of its members arrived in Ottawa connected with the government, stretched through politics and the bureaucracy. In the civil service, the web included Norman Robertson and L.B. Pearson from the department of External Affairs; Arnold Heeney, secretary to the cabinet; Walter Herbert, assistant director of Public Information and L.W. Brockington, information adviser to the Prime Minister. The political centre-piece, Brooke Claxton, was joined on the Liberal party side by War Services minister, Joseph Thorson, and Paul Martin, the Liberal M.P. for Essex. Outside the government, E.A. Corbett, executive director of the Canadian Association for Adult Education (CAAE), formed another crucial link as a member,
like Claxton, of almost all the interwar voluntary associations.*

The group tried to influence the direction of the government's policies in several areas, public information not excepted. As involved Canadians, they worried about the developing international wartime situation. After the fall of

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* Others involved in the group included T.W.L. MacDermot, Brooke Claxton's brother-in-law; Norman A.M. MacKenzie, president of the University of New Brunswick; as well as J.W. Dafoe and George V. Ferguson, the editors of The Winnipeg Free Press. Their interconnections show only the tip of an iceberg involving a national network and many other prominent Ottawans.

Of this group, those who had been executives of the League of Nations Society included Norman Robertson, Terry MacDermot, and E.A. Corbett. (see PAC, Henry Marshall Tory papers, League of Nations Society file, various documents; PAC, Charles Clay Papers, various files.)

Those directly and intimately involved in the Canadian Institute of International Affairs: L.B. Pearson, Paul Martin, Brooke Claxton, Norman Robertson, Terry MacDermot, (see Tory Papers, vol. 17, CIIA file) J.W. Dafoe and George Ferguson.


In one project immediately before the beginning of the Second War, Corbett decided to use the facilities of the CPR to distribute books for the CAAE. Associated with the project he managed to involve, Sidney Smith, President of the University of Manitoba; John Grierson, Government Film Commissioner; Norman MacKenzie; J.W. Dafoe; and G.V. Ferguson. (David Armstrong, "Corbett's House: The Origins of the Canadian Association for Adult Education and its Development during the Directorship of E.A. Corbett, 1936-1951," University of Toronto: unpublished M.A. thesis, 1968, p. 91ff).

For a more complete biographical listing, see Appendix A, "Cast of Characters".
France in 1940, twenty "concerned Canadians"* gathered at Ottawa's Chateau Laurier Hotel. While their main discussion resulted in a decision to lobby for closer relations with the United States, the meeting also laid the basis for a critique of public information work based solely on newspapers. Davidson Dunton, the editor of The Montreal Standard, E.A. Corbett and J.W. Pickersgill compiled a memorandum which condemned the failure of government information work to provide leadership, to dampen wartime cynicism, to distribute adequate material and to co-ordinate government activities with voluntary associations and the communications media. Throughout Gardiner's tenure of office, individuals from among the twenty criticized the "dull monotony of routine" which "stamped" information work, as a result of the "unimaginative, lazy, grasping policies" of Gardiner. Claxton bombarded the Prime Minister with solutions to the problems of Canadian morale.

In efforts to convince Joseph Thorson to favour a more active policy, the members of the group associated with the adult education movement differed from those tied in with the

* Several of the key men linking the voluntary association network were at the meeting including Terry MacDermot, Walter Herbert, E.A. Corbett, Brooke Claxton (chairman). Others who attended were J.B. Coyne Sr., Paul Martin, E.J. Tarr, John Baldwin, Captain N. Cavell, J.T. Hacket, K.A. Taylor, A.B. Plaunt, J.W. Pickersgill, J.B. Coyne Jr., Robert Bryce, Leon Lalande, F.R. Scott, Davidson Dunton, Percy Corbett, Raleigh Parkin. Those associated but unable to be present included, Bruce Hutchison, G.V. Ferguson, A.R.M. Lower, Arthur Irwin, N.P. Lambert, Alex Skelton, H.L. Keenleyside, Lionel Roy, R.A. MacKay, (The University of British Columbia Library, Special Collections Division, Alan Plaunt Papers, box 8, file 20, list attached to letter: Plaunt to Baldwin, August 13, 1940.)
Liberal party. From the war's beginning, the adult educators opposed the concept of news as information and offered their services. The task, they believed, lay in helping "public opinion feel its way toward the hope of a new world order." Right off, the adult educators proposed the establishment of the Canadian Legion Educational Services, an organization to promote in-service practical education for the armed forces. "Faith and hope cannot be implanted in men by either exhortation upon or reiteration of the eternal verities alone," they believed. They aimed to provide "understanding of the concrete phenomena of nature and human society." 74

This tenet, the guiding principle of the adult educators' efforts, led them to view the war as a great opportunity for citizenship education based on the principles of sociology and psychology. At a meeting in Ottawa in November 1940, the representatives of the voluntary associations* decided to establish an omnibus organization, the Canadian Council of Education for Citizenship (CCEC), for their respective educational bodies.** Hoping to provide a tandem vehicle to the BPI,

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* Among those attending the meeting were Terry MacDermot, E.A. Corbett (CAAE); Drummond Wren (Workers' Educational Association); J.R. Baldwin (CIIA); James Mess (Association of Canadian Clubs); Robert England (Canadian Legion Educational Services); Wilfrid Bovey (CLES and CAAE); John Grierson, Ross McLean (National Film Board); Gladstone Murray, Peter Aylen, D.W. Buchanan, Hugh Morrison (CBC); G.H. Lash, Claude Melançon, Walter Herbert (BPI); John Robbins (CAAE); Brooke Claxton and Norman MacKenzie.

** These included provincial departments of Education, teachers' federations, the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, the Workers' Educational Association, the Canadian Association for Adult Education and federal government departments interested in education.
Hon. C.H. Blakeney, New Brunswick's minister of Education and the chief mover behind the CCEC, told the director of Public Information that cooperation would "result in a programme that will make your department [into] a powerful instrument [to] mold the lives and thoughts of countless millions of people."

Despite these hopes and the placement of the assistant director of the BPI, Walter Herbert, as CCEC interim secretary and G.H. Lash on the executive, J.G. Gardiner refused to provide any money for a permanent staff. 75

When Gardiner left his War Services job, the educators began more strongly than ever to marshall their arguments. After consulting his colleagues in the CAAE, W.H. Brittain, the vice-principal of McGill University and dean of Macdonald College, presented a proposal to use current social scientific techniques to bolster Canadian democracy. If democratic government were to continue to flourish in Canada, he believed, citizens must have an intense interest in its political processes. No information agency could ignore this need or "potential elements of disunity ... may develop into a real danger to the state." Canadians had demonstrated no view of the war and its aftermath beyond "licking the daylights out of Germany." This lack of understanding of the political and social realities could, believed the social scientists, result in serious unrest if the expected 'better world' did not result from the war. In the long run, propaganda which merely exploited expectations would not work. The idealism of Woodrow Wilson's 1918 campaign to "make the world safe for democracy" had raised unfulfilled hopes and produced disillusionment and isolationism in the
interwar years. Only by understanding realistic objectives, would organized workers, for example, participate fully in "a people's war" and maintain high wartime morale. Furthermore, Canadian leftists wanted to use the wartime situation to promote a peacetime objective of a fully planned economy while right-wingers wanted to get rid of restrictions as soon as possible. From either side, vituperation against "starry-eyed idealists" or "dessicated reactionaries" had begun. Wanting to avoid a Canadian version of the Spanish civil war, the educators tried to build middle-ground opinion by their efforts to promote popular thought about the means of reconciling freedom and security.

Rather than merely facilitate news coverage of domestic events, the educators urged the government to use its information organization for a scientific approach to the media. All the tools existed: motion pictures, radio broadcasts and publications, but the government was still in the position "of the chap who was all dressed up with no-where to go." While the newspapers, lunch clubs and pamphleteers operated as in peacetime, their effect on public opinion remained "haphazard, competitive and localized." The government, they argued, should approach the media systematically in order to reach not only the educated English Canadians who read the newspapers but also the children, the workers, the ethnic community and the French Canadians. If the government commissioned experts to collect and write the material, the adult educators promised to promote the output and to help increase its impact on public opinion. The educators hoped, therefore, that their own activities could
provide the framework within which the government could encourage citizens to read, to listen, to think and to decide.  

Although Brooke Claxton shared many ideas with the adult educators, he always remained most interested in the application of the social sciences directly to party politics. He had used public opinion polling as a means of planning his 1940 election campaign. Furthermore, by making a niche for himself as an information theorist, Claxton hoped to climb his way up to the cabinet. The practical politician surfaced in Claxton's ability to study 'propaganda' without attaching too many values to it. The word, he said, could mean anything "from the nasty effective product of Dr. Goebbels to the spreading of the Christian faith." To differentiate among the various types, Claxton pointed to the ends. 'Bad' propaganda aimed solely at influencing opinion and conduct while 'good' propaganda or 'education' tried to work for the benefit of the person receiving the message. Claxton's statement implies that he was not above deliberately using the government information apparatus actively to promote partisan political causes associated in his mind with the good of the country. On the other hand, Claxton professed that "the full force of the government's information service can only be used to persuade people to adopt a line of policy when that line of policy is something more than government policy." 

Despite this statement, Claxton's activities in public information operations frequently had direct political benefits for the Liberal party. While he wanted Canadians objectively to assess the future, the middle of the road consensus which
Claxton helped the adult educators to build, however, directly aided his own party. Claxton intervened in the CBC to stop broadcasts which he considered too slanted in favour of CCF reforms and detrimental to the Liberal cause. In one instance, he prevented a Conservative, Grattan O'Leary, from addressing the armed forces overseas. In these two cases, Claxton did not prove himself willing to 'put all the facts before the people,' but showed himself a Liberal partisan who made certain that his version of the 'facts' received prominence. As soon as the war ended, Claxton declined to support the adult educators' plans to continue a peacetime information programme. For him, politics appeared more important.

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Despite the fact that J.T. Thorson largely ignored the representations of the educators, they managed to gain considerable influence during his tenure of office. The minister indeed had replied to Claxton's suggestions by telling the M.P. that "you will be interested in knowing" that the cabinet had approved other plans. While Claxton fumed, the minister avoided alienating all the adult educators by expressing himself "in sympathy" with their proposals although he gave no firm commitment to their approach. The minister looked at the work of the present director, G.H. Lash and his associate, Claude Melançon, and liked what he saw. These almost forgotten men had worked steadily at increasing the scope of their work even during the restrictive Gardiner regime. They had perceived a vacuum in public information work and in true
bureaucratic fashion, had set about filling it. They had organized radio broadcasts like the "Carry on Canada" series which completed its first year on the air in February 1941. They also prepared a widely-used reference booklet, *Canada at War*, along with posters, pamphlets and finances for the National Film Board's "Canada Carries On" newsreels. They made their $344,036.39 budget go far beyond merely facilitating newspaper work. Thorson decided to give them a chance to prove their mettle with an expanded budget and secured an extra $2,000,000 for these programmes.

While Lash had previously expanded his activities in a purely pragmatic manner, his new freedom led him towards the type of operation advocated by the social scientists. This change, however, resulted more from his attempt to carve out a role for himself as a spokesman for the government and as a stimulant to public morale than from any belief in the adult educators' theories. He split his Bureau into sections* and organized a series of 'inputs' into the agency by establishing sections to assess the editorial opinion of domestic and foreign newspapers. He also called in some of the social scientists to advise him when he set up an advisory committee on morale comprised mainly of academics and psychologists. The director also studied the means of integrating film circuits, radio broadcasts and pamphlets to achieve greater impact and broader coverage for his output. Lash also tried to gain

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* news and feature, photographs, domestic press, American newspapers, foreign language press and public speaking (See Appendix B).
access to Canadian schools by getting money for the Canadian Council of Education for Citizenship and here again, called upon the educators for assistance. By founding the Committee on Co-operation in Canadian Citizenship as a channel to the ethnic community and by setting up the interdepartmental consumer information committee, Lash recognized the special needs of various segments of the Canadian public. The director also promoted greater internal co-ordination of government information and succeeded in July 1941 in establishing an interdepartmental publicity committee for all departmental information officers.

The associate director of Public Information, Claude Melançon, ran his powerful semi-independent division with the same practical bent. This is not surprising, since both men had worked together at the Canadian National Railways publicity office, at the directorate of censorship and finally at the BPI. Melançon, however, developed his own ideas in order to confront the problems of publicity for Quebec. He wanted to neutralize:

le plus tôt possible ce travail de sape qui menace directement notre effort de guerre, tend a créer une situation très difficile après la guerre et compromet l'avenir de notre minorité de langue française.

Melançon had to try to stop anti-war sentiments from dominating French Canadian public opinion and to provoke positive incentives for French Canadian participation in the war effort. To solve his problems, the associate director advocated greater control over information than his English counterparts would
accept. He wanted stricter collaboration between censors and public relations men to apply the spirit of the censorship provisions of the Defence of Canada Regulations. These measures would, he felt, hamper any 'fifth column' activities in Quebec and keep pro-Vichy propaganda out of Canada. Measures involving the use of personal influence in the church, the universities and the press, he believed, would stop anti-war sermons and root out 'subversive' activities. To balance this negative programme, Melançon advocated appointing French Canadians to government positions and an education campaign led by the 'great man from Quebec,' Ernest Lapointe, to convince French Canadians of the justness of the cause.  

BPI operations soon came in for criticism. Lash had used the social scientists' techniques without adopting their theories and had let them get their foot in the door. He had no long-term policy and publicly complained that his job was "so entoiled in the meshes of red tape of an archaic system of government" that he could not work properly. He told his committee on morale that his work "had no real direction . . . plans can only be made as we move along." This moaning merely gave the social scientists additional ground for complaint about the BPI's general direction and Lash's inability to do his job. E.A. Corbett, the director of the CAAE, undertook to establish a BPI speakers' branch in October 1941. Joined by Terry MacDermot, Corbett toured the provinces and organized provincial speakers' bureaux under the patronage of the lieutenant governors. Thorson immediately alarmed the educators by hesitating before sanctioning the scheme.
MacDermot told L.B. Pearson that the wishy-washy minister would "have to pound the desk" to get the required support. After further delays in financing, E.A. Corbett suggested scrapping the scheme which had only irritated and annoyed many people.

The Prime Minister's staff and Brooke Claxton felt that the French section operated as inefficiently as the speakers bureau. The overwhelming vote against conscription in the April 1942 plebiscite indicated that the Bureau had failed to make an impact on French Canadian opposition to various wartime measures. Claxton specifically pointed out that all newspaper commentators had placed the blame for this failure on the shoulders of J.T. Thorson and by implication on the officials in the BPI.

From the social scientific point of view, the strongest criticism of the Bureau of Public Information came from the committee on morale. This body, organized by representatives of the Canadian Psychological Association in February 1942,* represented the BPI's response to pressure from this strong-willed group. Rather than antagonize them by dismissing their

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* The group called to Ottawa included: J.S.A. Bois of the Montreal Psychological Institute; J.D. Ketchum of the University of Toronto; R.B. Liddy, psychologist with the University of Western Ontario; J.C. Harvey, editor of Le Jour; G. Brock Chisholm of the Department of National Defence.

The committee on morale included R.C. Wallace, principal of Queen's University; J.D. Ketchum; R.B. Liddy; Grace Hyndman; personnel director of General Engineering; H. Massue; W.S. Thompson, publicity director of the CNR; John A. Irving, sociologist from the University of Toronto.
representations for reform, G.H. Lash in true bureaucratic fashion, tried to co-opt them by constituting the committee as an advisory body. The 'co-optees' immediately began agitating for greater authority within the information agency and attacked the system as methodologically unsound. The most active members of the committee on morale, professors J.D. Ketchum and J.S.A. Bois had given serious thought to the problem of information and morale. Ketchum had submitted a memorandum to the Prime Minister in October 1939 and had contributed with Bois to a book, *Civilian Morale*, published in 1942 by the American Psychological Association. Drawing on this experience, the advisory committee began agitating for a 'scientific' approach by the BPI including testing posters on small groups before release and public opinion polling. The committee pointed out that those in the BPI with practical peacetime experience in the media did not possess the "technical and theoretical training" for wartime information work. To supplement the existing structure, therefore, they urged the government to hire more psychologists, sociologists and political scientists.  

Apart from this structural critique, the social scientists created a theory of wartime information based on the findings of their discipline. The government, they said, should keep in mind that an unreached goal is a greater incentive than an attained one. Canadians, therefore, must not fight only to maintain democracy. In promoting recruitment, they suggested that the government remember that since people avoid the unpleasant, the citizens believed the more optimistic statements. If the government publicity presented the war situation
on the bright side, then, it would only provide a rationalization for potential army recruits to stay at their jobs in war industry. Regarding Canada's international situation, the psychologists pointed out that as a dominant individual creates a place for himself, the retiring person withdraws. When the United States, therefore, grew more active in directing the war, Canadians' enthusiasm would decline. In addition, the psychologists' experiments showed that since objective reasoning proved incompatible with strong emotion, the government must take care to guide opinion and to prevent aimless agitation and conflict over controversial symbols. The population, better educated and more realistic than twenty years before, had grown relatively immune to propaganda. Weakening moral sanctions and the experience of the Great War had made natural 'patriotism' difficult to arouse. Propaganda based on personal 'moral' responsibility would not increase involvement in the war. Specifically, the committee on morale recommended that the government undertake a factual information programme to prevent confusion about the effect of domestic and foreign events and combine this with an interpretive long-term perspective. 103

The unfocused nature of public information policy between 1939 and 1942 illustrates the problems of a democratic government that sets up a propaganda apparatus. The government's hesitation to choose a policy resulted mainly from the guilt of ostensible liberal democrats at manipulating public opinion. This meant, for example, that even when Mackenzie King wanted to establish a more effective information apparatus,
he procrastinated because he did not want to give his opponents
the opportunity to attack him for illiberalism. The hesitation
during these three years provided opportunities for various
forces to attempt to mold the direction of information work.
First of all, the newspapers wanted to uphold the tradition of
a free press and to present the news, as they saw it, without
interference by the government. But the press did not seem
capable of providing the encouragement necessary in wartime.
When the director of Public Information took over, he adopted a
pragmatic approach and expanded his activities in areas that he
deemed important. His eclecticism, however, left him open to
criticism by "modernizers," the adult educators and politicians
who understood the potential of social scientific work in pro-
paganda. Obviously, these new techniques had two uses. They
could either further popular understanding of democracy or
serve the ends of politicians in molding opinion for their own
advantage.
Charles Vining began a new assignment on June 1, 1942. Two days earlier, Mackenzie King had announced that Vining, the newsprint controller for the Wartime Prices and Trade Board, would begin a review of the government's information operations. For the first time, nearly three years after the outbreak of the war, the government allowed a complete stock-taking of its public information philosophy, organization and operations. Although commissioned mainly to report on Canadian information requirements in the United States, Vining found it impossible to separate these elements from the operations of a domestic information service. The breadth of his investigation foreshadowed the establishment of a comprehensive information policy for the first time during the war.

Vining did not have far to look for grievances. The Bureau of Public Information's warts showed up everywhere. When the director of Public Information, G.H. Lash, tried to establish an interdepartmental committee to co-ordinate all government information activities, he quickly antagonized some deputy ministers and others "jealous of their prerogatives." Everyone connected with information work felt that Canadian efforts in the U.S.A. left much to be desired, particularly when government publicity consisted of distributing photographs of "an elderly man and an obese dog . . ." a very uninspiring view of the Prime Minister. The criticism mounted in 1942 after
the failure of a late 1941 attempt to convince the government to open information offices in the United States to correct the situation.\footnote{4} The newspapers also echoed \textit{Saturday Night's} comment that "there's not very much wrong and a great deal that is right" with domestic war policies. But there was "an awful lot wrong in the way the story is being told to the public . . . ."\footnote{5} Principally, the press singled out the fact that the government had failed to conciliate Quebec which in the plebiscite on April 27 had rejected conscription. The gap between Quebec and pro-conscription English Canada had widened.\footnote{6} Lending their voices to the criticism, the Liberals associated with the adult education movement complained that the National War Services minister, Joseph Thorson, had turned into "the town joke as well as the town bore," and the government "could not have done worse if it had tried to hide from Quebec that this is our war and tried to conceal from the United States that we were doing anything about it."\footnote{7}

Appointed by Mackenzie King to help solve the government's information predicament, Vining consulted most of the critics. The adult educators, supported by their newsmen friends in \textit{The Winnipeg Free Press}, urged Vining to take a wide view of propaganda rather than to restrict his study to newspaper publicity abroad. Leighton McCarthy, the Canadian Minister to the United States and his staff at the Canadian Legation in Washington took advantage of Vining's two week trip south to voice their opinions. During his tour, Vining met with highly-placed American State Department and information officials, newspaper and public relations men, the directors
of the Commonwealth countries' information services as well as Canadians living abroad. In total, Vining listened to the ideas of about 130 people before presenting his 72 page report on July 10, 1942.8

"This is," Vining emphasized, "a war of the mind and spirit as well as a war of manpower and weapons."9 With this statement, Vining urged the government to give greater weight to domestic morale work. The war, he noted, had entered a stage during which its civilian impact would test morale. Since no one knew "how long or how grim" the war would be, Vining believed that "it may prove that in the last dreadful round, the deciding factor will be the state of mind and spirit of the opposing peoples." Canadians had to cast aside their 'British' manner of viewing information in a secondary light and adopt a more American and German conception of its primary nature "deserving the best talent and ability we can muster for its effective employment."10

Vining's proposed policy rested on a theory of personal influence and of news dissemination, totally ignored the role of education in information work, and downplayed publicity ballyhoo. He wanted to lobby for better morale by arranging information meetings between qualified government spokesmen and influential opinion leaders. True to his background as a lobbyist for the pulp and paper industry, he wanted "a continuing effort with a minimum of commotion." If Canadians adopted brash American publicity techniques in morale building, they could only make themselves look silly.11 Vining, furthermore, saw news as "the implement" to create morale and suggested that
the government should gain a proper appreciation of the impor-
tance of news and put that idea into effect. Required news
coverage, for instance, should govern the timing of announce-
ments. Vining's recommendations bent over backwards to avoid
antagonizing the newspapers. Because editors objected to "high-
sounding" titles, information workers must not have them. Daily
news, he believed, had a far greater impact on morale than book-
lets, bulletins and posters. A mistaken emphasis on these
aspects of information had caused much of the trouble for the
British Ministry of Information and for the Bureau of Public
Information.12

Apart from its return to a news approach, Vining's re-
port involved another turnaround in its consideration of the
interconnection of internal and external activities. Although
he stated that "improvement at home is indispensable to an
improvement in our neighbour's attitude,"13 Vining expressed
his belief in the pre-eminence of external over internal work.
He advocated the absorption of existing domestic activities by
an organization primarily oriented towards administering Cana-
dian publicity operations in the United States.14 While he
differed from every other information planner in this respect,
Vining retained a belief in the importance of an inward report-
ing system. An information effort, "a two-way affair," should
collect material for use in formulating policy by checking
public opinion in order more accurately to plan methods of
approach.15

So that the "tail would not wag the dog," Vining
unveiled plans for a new body, the Wartime Information Board,
to run external publicity and to absorb the Bureau of Public Information. It was obvious, to Vining at least, that a board looking after Canadian publicity for 130 million Americans, should take precedence over the Bureau which did not account for half the government publicity for ten million Canadians. Patterned after the U.S. Office of War Information and the Canadian Wartime Prices and Trade Board, the new agency would include an English-speaking chairman, a French-speaking vice-chairman and members chosen by the ministers of National Defence, External Affairs, Munitions and Supply, National War Services, Labour and Agriculture. To strengthen its interdepartmental nature and increase its authority, Vining preferred to have the board attached to the Prime Minister's Office. The board would have the freedom to enact Vining's other specific recommendations: better news service outside Canada directed by offices in New York and Washington, collaboration with American bodies, better co-ordination among Ottawa departments, better handling of domestic news, less mimeographed material, dismissal of the supernumeraries, appointment of more newsmen, and establishment of an inward reporting service. Thus equipped, the government could achieve the ultimate goal of "centralized planning and consultation but decentralized execution."\(^{16}\)

In its comprehensiveness and lucidity, Vining's study appeared more than adequate, but as a prescription for government strategy it contained flaws. Vining followed the tradition of those who failed to consider communications media apart from newspapers, and left the door open for a lopsided approach. Apart from this, the report took a very narrow-minded view of
domestic information work. Presuming to expand his commission and propose reforms in the internal information establishment, Vining could be faulted for failing to comprehend the federal government's public relations setbacks in French Canada. Placing the Bureau of Public Information's French section in an organization dominated by a concern with external information would hardly encourage more work to change the government's poor image in Quebec. Vining went as far as to imply that (in order to improve Canada's press image in the United States) the government should adopt conscription for overseas service despite Quebec's opposition. This implication reveals the whole thrust of Vining's work: an absorption with Canada-United States relations, to the detriment of an adequate study of Canadian information problems in the domestic and other foreign fields.

Domestic difficulties pushed the Prime Minister towards a quick implementation of Vining's recommendations. Under attack for its policies in French Canada, in labour relations and in manpower, the government had to find a means of fending off the Conservatives who began to smell blood. Praising the realism of Vining's recommendations, Arnold Heeney, clerk of the Privy Council, arranged for a cabinet discussion four days after the report reached the Prime Minister. The minister in Washington, Leighton McCarthy, studied it, supported its implementation and also noted that the root of Canada's problems with her image in the U.S. lay with the domestic situation. The cabinet approved the establishment of the Wartime Information Board in the last week of July and Mackenzie King looked
for a chairman. Vining pushed the candidacy of Victor Sifton, the publisher of *The Winnipeg Free Press*, but Sifton refused because of the threat to his newspaper's independence. When the Prime Minister asked Vining himself, he accepted. The new chairman then convinced Philippe Brais, a member of the Quebec Legislative Council, to accept the vice-chairmanship.

The government's choice of board members and Vining's choice of staff immediately laid the foundation for potential disagreements over the direction of the board's work. Included on the board, L.B. Pearson from the department of External Affairs, Georges Bouchard of the department of Agriculture, R.B. Bryce of the department of Finance and Arnold Heeney, representing the war committee of the cabinet, all maintained close connections with the liberal-minded adult educators and politicians who wanted public information to take an educational bent. T.C. Davis of the department of National War Services sympathized with the educators' approach. Only Henry Borden of the department of Munitions and Supply, H.A. Dyde of the department of National Defence and Elliott Little of the department of Labour were unknown quantities. The new Vining staff appointees arrived from newspapers and large advertising firms, businesses which had not gained much sympathy in Ottawa.* Vining's only

* For the head of external operations, Vining chose Campbell Smart from the Cockfield Brown advertising agency. Fellow advertisers, Leo Casey, the American organizer of the New York World's Fair publicity in 1933; Harry Sedgwick, pillar of private broadcasting and Frank Ryan, former Hudson's Bay Company publicity chief, joined Smart in the External Branch. Newsmen hired included editors such as Davidson Dunton of *The Montreal Standard*, head of the reports branch; David Rogers of *The Regina Leader Post*, chief of the domestic branch; H.L. Garner of *The Peterborough Examiner*, Vining's special aide, and Emile Jean of the *Trois Rivières Nouvelliste*, assistant to the vice-chairman.
real innovation in staffing grew from his appointment of J. Davidson Ketchum, a psychologist, to head the research section of the reports branch.

The chairman soon managed to antagonize almost everyone who dealt with him. Even before the formal announcement of the board, the BPI directors knew "the pot was boiling and did not like the smell." The clash between the old and the new erupted when Vining broke his promise to give G.H. Lash a position on the board. Instead, the chairman asked Lash to take charge of the domestic branch. Despite two interviews with the Prime Minister, the irate director and his associate, Claude Melançon, resigned on September 12. Mackenzie King accepted their resignations reluctantly, unhappy to see the WIB saddled with open conflict at its birth. Lash then proceeded to spread his tale of mistreatment among his newspaper friends. The press which had greeted the WIB with little comment now perfunctorily wished Vining well but criticized the government over Lash's departure. Lash, the newspapers felt, had done a reasonable job, had long promoted many of Vining's own reforms, but still remained the scapegoat for others' shortcomings.

Public musings aside, newspaper owners privately complained that Vining's month-long raid on their editorial rooms had reduced essential staff. Walter Turnbull, King's secretary, asked board member, Arnold Heeney, to have a chat with 'Charlie'. The Prime Minister finally instigated the cabinet to refuse to make any further WIB appointments without an outside recommendation.

Liberal adult educators quickly began to question the
political character of Vining's staff. Hugh Keenleyside, assistant undersecretary in the department of External Affairs, reported that many of the new WIB staff could harm the government politically because of their right-wing beliefs. The CCF would likely object and the appointments would help to convince Canadians that their government had no intention of instituting post-war reforms. Saul Rae, a junior officer in External Affairs, found out that Leo Casey, the WIB's American consultant, had "shady corporate connections" and that overall, the WIB had formed too close a connection with eastern Canadian publicity firms. The educators believed that Campbell Smart, head of the WIB's external branch, remained a "deplorable choice." Brooke Claxton who had used Smart in his 1940 election campaign and Joe Clark, head of armed forces publicity, who worked with Smart at the Cockfield Brown advertising agency had the "darkest view of his personality, training and general suitability." Academics reported reservations about the staff's intellectual calibre. Although they "laughed" at René Perrault, Vining's appointee as head of the speakers section, they objected to his public statement that the University of British Columbia contained a "hot-bed of socialism." When Perrault suggested that George Ferguson, respected editor of The Winnipeg Free Press, was a jailworthy leftist, the academics thought him "utterly ignorant." The department of External Affairs appointed Norman Robertson an alternate board representative so that if L.B. Pearson were absent someone could check the chairman's actions. The general opinion held that the new chairman was "a backside kisser to everybody above him and a sadistic
The liberal civil servants and the adult educators delighted in the story of Vining's come-uppance. Walter Herbert, assistant director of the BPI, had remained without a formal appointment but at Vining's request to help establish the WIB's domestic operations. When Herbert decided he had finished his task he turned down another offer and Vining, afraid of his employee's influence, slandered him to a reporter. The gossip quickly reached Herbert who told Vining the facts of Ottawa life. Private enterprise "wolves" could not knife people in the back with impunity. Everyone compared notes. In Ottawa's club-like atmosphere, "unless you played the game square and straight, everybody got on to you." When Herbert stomped out of the WIB, his powerful friends immediately offered him six other jobs as a practical demonstration of Herbert's lesson.

Once he had settled his staffing problems to his own, if not everyone else's, satisfaction, Vining tried to put his philosophy into practice. He sought to combine his views on unobtrusive public relations, news coverage and an external emphasis. The chairman received a series of memoranda outlining various proposed activities for the board, but he only considered those from E.L. Bushnell of the CBC and Ralph Benoit of the WIB's French-language section both of which bolstered his own ideas. No real definition of the board's functions appeared. Propaganda, Vining told the Canadian Daily Newspaper Association, was nothing more than an "artful and clever" flow of news. Relating this concept to the board, Vining
said that the domestic branch would not issue material in the name of the Wartime Information Board but would encourage other government departments to release news to the press.  

Arranged informally at the highest levels during lunch at the Rideau Club, these leaks would avoid charges of "puffery" for the Liberal government. The domestic branch head, D.B. Rogers, and the external branch director, Campbell Smart, refused to expand their work beyond press relations for fear of "opening a new and perhaps dangerous piece of territory." Only Davidson Dunton, chief of the reports branch, showed himself willing to experiment. His division established a network of correspondents throughout the country who reported regularly on the state of local opinion. Dunton also prepared cabinet submissions requesting authorization for the WIB to proceed with public opinion surveys.

Vining's operations ruffled almost as many feathers as his treatment of his staff. The press complained that Vining's secret work at high levels did not satisfy the quest for hard news. In Quebec, journalists thought the board's work deliberately favoured the provincial Liberal party. The Prime Minister had to intervene to calm angry newsmen who protested D.B. Rogers' request to hold a story about a riot at Valcartier, the military camp north of Quebec City. Vining's officers antagonized the papers even further by dealing with editors through the business office rather than through the editorial rooms. Newspapers still complained that news arrived first from the wire services before government sources contacted their Ottawa correspondents directly. Vining's
staff made other stupid mistakes. Campbell Smart asked Ernest Bertrand, minister of Fisheries, to participate in a radio broadcast, then forgot to make studio and telephone arrangements. The broadcast was cancelled.\textsuperscript{42}

Several of Vining's own board members undermined the chairman's policy by proposing to extend operations beyond news leaks and lobbying. They met quietly with John Grierson, the government film commissioner, to discuss information work of a wider scope.\textsuperscript{43} The board entertained a proposal that Vining should limit himself to directing operations and should let the board itself decide on policy.\textsuperscript{44} Operating the board as a tour de force, Vining did not always allow the members to consider agendas before meetings, omitted policy decisions from minutes and failed to consult the board before undertaking operations. The board members, therefore, had no alternative but to support Vining's actions and wasted time at their meetings dealing with inconsequential matters.\textsuperscript{45} The board agreed that Vining treated them with a "sans gêne extraordinaire."\textsuperscript{46}

As a result of an unexpected and mysterious illness, Charles Vining submitted his resignation to Mackenzie King on January 27, 1943. A nervous breakdown? Perhaps. Vining had earlier told the Prime Minister of an Ottawa conspiracy associated with Colonel McCormick, owner of The Chicago Tribune, who held a long-standing grudge against Vining for his activities as director of the Canadian Newsprint Association.\textsuperscript{47} Although King accepted Vining's retirement reluctantly, the chairman's board accepted it without comment.\textsuperscript{48}
The appointment of Vining's replacements gave the adult educators their chance to implement a policy of information based on the social sciences. First off, the Prime Minister chose Norman A.M. MacKenzie to take over as chairman. Although a professor of international law and president of the University of New Brunswick, MacKenzie's chief qualifications for the job grew out of his memberships in various voluntary associations interested in popular education. As chairman of the research committee of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, MacKenzie had arranged for the publication of Studies of information dissemination such as Carleton McNaught's *Canada Gets the News* and Florent Lefèbvre's *The French Canadian Press and the War*. MacKenzie had also discussed the use of radio as an educational tool with his friend, A.B. Plaunt, a governor of the CBC, had helped to found the Canadian Council of Education for Citizenship, had worked as regional chairman for the Canadian Legion Educational Services in New Brunswick and had chaired the local Victory Loan committee. Through the voluntary organizations, MacKenzie also maintained close personal contact with a majority of the members of the WIB board. In his new job, MacKenzie would look after the board's policy functions in line with Vining's parting recommendation that the government separate the policy and operational aspects of information.

For the head of the WIB's operations, the general manager, the government appointed a self-proclaimed "expert at
mindbending,"\textsuperscript{54} John Grierson, the government film commissioner. Turning any opportunity to use as a pulpit,\textsuperscript{55} Grierson had begun his study of information years earlier when he moved from the University of Glasgow to study with Walter Lippman at the University of Chicago. He concluded that film formed the best means of shaping public opinion. Returning to Britain in 1927, Grierson produced his first film, "Drifters," commissioned by the Empire Marketing Board to publicize the North Sea herring fisheries and brought the documentary film movement into being. After perfecting his expertise at the British General Post Office film unit, Grierson arrived in Canada in May 1938 to report on the reorganization of the embryonic Canadian government film facilities. Appointed commissioner in 1939, he stayed to organize the National Film Board. Although he had always commented on the overall state of the Canadian government's wartime information facilities, his appointment gave him a fresh opportunity to work out some of his theories.

The foundation of Grierson's theory of information lay in his concept of society. He owed much to Walter Lippman. Disowning the "false and mystical democratic assumption" that a citizen could understand everything that went on around him and through the parliamentary process given an educated and rational guidance to the conduct of the state, Grierson believed that complexity beset all. The world had changed from the simpler society contemplated by the eighteenth and nineteenth century liberal theorists. Because communications had speeded up, horizons had widened and tasks had grown more specialized, the average person could no longer have an
"extended apprehension" of life. Much of the unrest of western society, Grierson concluded, grew "out of the feeling of incapacity" this engendered and from the fact that stimuli to behaviour came "no longer from local pulpits and platforms," but from the great centres of publishing, radio and films. The individual mind had "lost its bearings," and the educational system did not help to get them back. Educators had passed their torch to the men who controlled the public media by "using our techniques to sell things when others were using them to sell ideas." Educators had failed to relate their potential skills to the deeper needs of the times by preparing "a child for community relations which disappeared with the teacher's own youth." By striving still to create a "rational citizen armed to the forelock with good judgement," educators put their function on an "unreal and impossible level," which would "bore democracy to death."

Instead of adopting an elitist philosophy at this point, Grierson moved in another direction. He pointed out that "judgement in knowledge may not be so important as judgement in purpose ... [a] man may know everything about everything and still not know what it is all about." Because it was impossible "to teach the citizenry to know everything about everything, you can give them comprehension of the dramatic patterns within a living society" by the use of imagery and art. Every person, Grierson argued, had the power to order and to evaluate patterns. Educators should concentrate on "instilling a sense of what is growing and what is dying in society" by the use of vehicles like the documentary film.
The emphasis in education, Grierson believed, should shift from teaching 'things' to using the everyday world as perceived by ordinary men to instill a sense of what the wider world comprised. By taking as its subject matter topics like industrial relations, economic stability and conservation, education could pattern the terms of active citizenship. "I like," said Grierson:

to think of democratic life as a very various business with initiative and ideas cropping up all over the place. The vitality of the village life is not in the sweet scenes at the smithy door . . . It is in a world of discourse in which people are all genuinely and cooperatively interested in the same things - in people, children, births, funerals, weather, soil, fields, crops and the latest daft fancies of the local council . . . Babbitt was never quite as dim as he was - and is - painted.59

Education should aim at obtaining the interest and participation of specialized groups in bridging the gap between the citizen and his community. "Our system of communications," Grierson felt, "must provide for a rich flow of living records from which each of us, in our own separate interest learns what the other fellow is doing . . . ."60 Interests crossed national boundaries. Stamp collectors, for example, surrounded the world and proved that "the real internationalism is in the manias we share with each other."61 By using these 'manias', education would come out of the school room and express itself as a force for positive community action.62 Educators had to learn to use the media to organize people in constructive and creative interests.63

By now, it is clear, Grierson had moved in the direction of using education to promote social change. He believed
that his films of social reconstruction during the depression reflected "a powerful force for the public good."\textsuperscript{64} "We were reformers open and avowed," he commented, "concerned . . . with 'bringing alive the new materials of citizenship,' 'crystallizing sentiments' and 'creating those new loyalties from which a progressive ethic well might derive!'\textsuperscript{65} Education must give "realistic leadership" in times of social change. There was, Grierson expanded, nothing so cynical in the 1930's as to "teach a boy that the world is his personal oyster." The values of individual competition, he felt, "may not be the right values or the right virtues today." Grierson believed that society was changing, not exactly from capitalism to socialism, but that it was "entering upon a new and interim society which is neither capitalist nor socialist, but in which we can achieve central planning without loss of individual initiative . . . ." Educators must bring to the public at large a realization of the change so that "public unity and discipline can be achieved without forgetting the humanitarian virtues."\textsuperscript{66}

To Grierson, the war meant that the immediate necessity of implementing his new approach demanded government leadership in public education.\textsuperscript{67} Pointing to the German propaganda successes, Grierson urged governments to realize the significance of education in mobilizing the population and in preaching and maintaining the democratic faith.\textsuperscript{68} It was urgent,\textsuperscript{69} that:

\begin{quote}
under stress of war we articulate the terms of our faith in progressive democracy [that] we learn to integrate the loyalties and forces of the community in the name of positive and highly constructive ideas.
\end{quote}
"A positive and necessary force," propaganda could provide "the patterns of thought and feeling which make for an active and imaginative citizenship in the particular circumstances of our time." The wartime attacks on state propaganda derived from the old school which could not recognize that laissez-faire principles could not operate freely in a complex society. Just as the state at war had to intervene to regulate the economy, it had to conduct propaganda. Governments, Grierson argued:

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cannot take upon themselves the responsibility of planning unless they exercise the power to inform and instruct the people on matters of state. Information services - propaganda if you like - follow inevitably in the wake of government initiative. They are as inseparable as Siamese twins.
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Far from assimilating the totalitarian system of regulation, a democratic information system represented the government's means of explaining its directives and giving an account of its stewardship.

No political ingenue, Grierson did not dismiss the peril of creating public myths, disguising incompetence or reinforcing a political party's image. Democracies faced a paradox: on one hand, a democracy could not avoid wartime propaganda for a total mobilization. On the other, dangers existed. But, said Grierson, these could not disallow the validity of the initial need. Government information had a duty to "strike beyond party differences to the deeper loyalties of civic understanding." Public information should remain "education in a world where the state is the instrument of the public's enterprise."

Before implementing any of these ideas, Grierson had
to clear the decks. The Wartime Information Board was suffering under the heavy hand of the newspapers. When Vining resigned, the press had a heyday. Sarcastic speculation ranged from Judith Robinson's question, "a shortage of aspirin?" to The Moose Jaw Times Herald's belief that the WIB had become the waiting room to sanatoria. Amongst the generally unfavourable comment, some editors pointed out that Grierson's and MacKenzie's appointments proved that an intellectual clique had taken over Ottawa. Where Grierson led, MacKenzie would follow. Shortly after the appointments, the Prime Minister responded to newspaper rumblings and tabled a return in the House of Commons setting out WIB salaries. This really set the pot boiling. Led by The Ottawa Citizen, newspapers from all over the country hotly condemned the cost of supporting the "grand Viziers" of the government's "own fourth estate." What could a "media analyst" do but sit at a desk with clipping shears and mucilage? Self-interest prompted much complaining since the press believed that the WIB paid its newspaper-trained employees more than the publishers could afford. Editorial rooms might lose still more staff.

In the midst of the clamour, Grierson decided that the board could not afford to suffer silently and allow destruction of any opportunity for effective action. Without consulting Mackenzie King who was "damned mad" as a result, Grierson issued a comprehensive, cutting and politically astute reply to all press charges. "It is not done with mirrors" the general manager explained as he laid out his hopes and ambitions for his new job. Very logically, Grierson refuted the criticism.
that board salaries exceeded former pay scales and had escaped an accounting to the "hard-boiled" Treasury Board. If anyone, Grierson quipped, knew "how to burst through these bonds into public whoopee," he wanted the secret. Explaining the accountability of his operation, Grierson compared it both to the National Film Board and to the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. Responsible to a government-appointed board, these bodies were run by experts, accountable to the board members. In the WIB, none of the board members needed information experience since they represented the "what" and not the "how."

Defending the board against charges of running political interference for Mackenzie King, Grierson denied King's interference. The Prime Minister allowed the WIB "full freedom" to follow its "natural path." Grierson claimed that the press, forgetting that this was Parliament's job, had blamed the agency for not solving Canada's problems.  

Grierson's forthright statement diminished criticism of the WIB's objectives and inspired its defenders. The board members did not take offense and the chairman, in fact, told Grierson he was "glad" of the defence and hoped the counter-attack received a "satisfactory reception." Although some newspapers commented that the release contained "too much Grierson and not enough Mackenzie King," the Prime Minister quickly turned this to his advantage. Mackenzie King told the House of Commons that as a demonstration of the board's independence, Grierson had "purposely refrained" from seeking prime ministerial permission. The Tories, in May 1943, tried to promote an investigation into the WIB as an example of
uncontrolled wartime spending. Their motion was quashed. During the July debate on the board's estimates, Mackenzie King cagily tried to deflect criticism by discussing the more uncontroversial aspects of external information work. He left Brooke Claxton, by now his parliamentary assistant, to deal with domestic activities. Imitating Grierson's reasoned and patient tactics, Claxton turned aside the most violent of the Opposition assaults. For example, Claxton pointed out that the board spent only $1 out of every $6,500 of war expenditures, the lowest of any Allied country. Seeing this political support, the board's officers planted favourable stories in newspapers and magazines, while Grierson reiterated his own arguments in speeches across the country. In the months following, their work showed some effect, newspaper criticism died down and Conservatives' attacks showed little enthusiasm. Once Grierson had made his defence, the board set a smooth and efficient pattern of operations that lasted until 1945. Under the internal constitution established after the departure of Charles Vining, the board members assumed responsibility for questions of general policy. The general manager took charge of interpreting and executing these decisions. The board did not retain the power to hire staff and manage expenditures but reviewed these along with the other activities of the general manager. A sensible sharing of responsibility, this arrangement lasted until the end of the war. Although it suggested a few staff activities, the board initiated little work. Instead, the general manager screened and approved his staff's proposals and then passed them on to the board. A
fairly easy interchange between the staff and the board facilitated these arrangements. The members discussed the projects, then almost always approved them and authorized the general manager to apply to cabinet for funds. Once a programme got underway, the responsible staff member forwarded a monthly report of his activities to the general manager for distribution. The board members, by these means, kept themselves fairly well informed, discussed the reports and made suggestions at the following meeting. Under Vining, the board held its meetings twice a month, but MacKenzie called his colleagues together only once a month through 1943-1944, then approximately every six weeks. During the last year of the war, the board gathered at irregular intervals whenever the chairman, who had moved to British Columbia, could arrange to be present. The infrequency of meetings plus the delay in replacing retiring members suggested that the board had grown less important near the war's end. Major decisions were no longer required and only minor supervisory functions remained.

The membership of the Wartime Information Board remained relatively stable from 1943 to the end of the
war*, and firmly under the control of the members closely associated with the voluntary associations of the 1930's. Vice-chairman Brais did not develop into an important voice in decisions, did not attend a majority of the meetings and took a minor part even in decisions regarding information to Quebec. The board justified retaining his "almost functionless" presence citing a need for a French-Canadian representative of high standing. Besides, he did not oppose anything. The other French-Canadian representative, Georges Bouchard, was a former Liberal M.P., assistant deputy minister of Agriculture and a member of the executive of the CAAE. He had lived in Ottawa so long that he was assimilated into the English-speaking bureaucracy.92 Harry Carmichael, the chairman of the Production Board of the department of Munitions and Supply, had little interest in the WIB except to make certain that the information

* For a complete biography, see Appendix A.

Harry Carmichael joined the board coincidentally with the new chairman in February 1943. That was the last change until Col. H.A. Dyde left as the department of National Defence representative in November 1944. Dyde's replacement, Joseph Clark, public relations director for the DND, joined the board only three months later, in February 1945. When Col. O.M. Biggar, director of censorship, resigned concurrently with Dyde, the department of National War Services' place on the board lapsed.

The group of men who sat as the full board for most of the period from 1943 to 1945 included: N.A. MacKenzie, chairman; Philippe Brais, vice-chairman; Arthur Macnamara, assistant deputy minister of Labour; Arnold Heeney, Clerk of the Privy Council; Col. H.A. Dyde, secretary to the minister of National Defence; Harry Carmichael, chairman of the Production Board, department of Munitions and Supply; Georges Bouchard, assistant deputy minister of Agriculture; L.B. Pearson, Canadian Minister to the United States; Norman Robertson, Under-secretary of State of External Affairs; O.M. Biggar, director of censorship; R.B. Bryce, special assistant to the minister of Finance.
disseminated did nothing to alienate major wartime industrial producers. Also self-interested, Arthur Macnamara, assistant deputy minister of Labour, obstructed an absenteeism survey because it might find evidence of inefficiency in his department. A busy man like the others, R.B. Bryce from the department of Finance, took little part in most of the board's operations. O.M. Biggar, representative of the department of National War Services, tried to play watchdog over the WIB expenses but usually received little more than a polite acknowledgement from the rest of the members. The final board member of secondary importance, L.B. Pearson, could not actively participate from his post as Minister then as Ambassador to the United States. Pearson, "a superb publicist," kept up good external press relations.

Because many of the board members did not take an active role, the major influence on WIB policies remained in the hands of the adult educators and their friends, those most closely associated with the demands to apply social scientific techniques to information policy. A small ad hoc association made up of Norman MacKenzie, Arnold Heeney, Brooke Claxton and Norman Robertson made most of the decisions on behalf of the board.* They were usually joined in their discussions by John Grierson, the general manager; Davidson Dunton, the assistant general manager and Grierson's successor in February 1944; and Geoffrey Andrew, the board's secretary.** Although technically

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* See footnote 53.
** Andrew succeeded Clare Moyer, Clerk of the Senate, who had held this job on an interim basis.
employees, the last three could operate as equals within the bounds of their friendship with the board members. Grierson's membership in the voluntary association network had developed soon after his arrival in Canada in 1938 when he assisted in various activities of the Canadian Association for Adult Education. For his part, Dunton had long maintained an association with the others through his participation in the Canadian Institute of International Affairs. In fact, Dunton had participated in the earliest of the CIIA efforts to influence the government in favour of an active information programme. As a friend of Brooke Claxton's, Dunton had worked for his election in the 1940 campaign and in return received a "large flask" for whisky. Previously a master at Upper Canada College, Geoffrey Andrew had worked with Terry MacDermot. By his marriage, to the daughter of W.L. Grant, principal of Upper Canada College, Andrew joined the very active Grant-Parkin-Massey connection which included Vincent Massey, the Canadian High Commissioner to the United Kingdom.

Even amongst this small group, some had more influence than others. Norman MacKenzie took a less active role. As president of the University of New Brunswick then president of the University of British Columbia after mid-1944, MacKenzie did not spend much time in Ottawa.* In the chairman's absence, MacKenzie had accepted the Ottawa job because it combined part-time war service with his university career. He presided at most meetings but was absent from Ottawa in the interim. When he moved to Vancouver, Geoffrey Andrew served as the pipeline to bring him into closer contact with decisions. It proved difficult but Mackenzie King refused to accept MacKenzie's decision to retire so that MacKenzie remained chairman until the end of the war.
Arnold Heeney ran the show. Almost single-handedly, he formulated WIB policy and gained the Prime Minister's acquiescence in board decisions. Because of his availability in Ottawa, Norman Robertson also helped to make many day-to-day decisions especially concerning the board's external role. Claxton, as Mackenzie King's parliamentary assistant responsible for the board from May 1943, had begun unofficially to attend board meetings. As minister of National Health and Welfare, Claxton stopped coming in January 1945, but Col. Terry MacDermot, an officer in External Affairs and his brother-in-law, filled his observer's place. For the most part, Heeney, Robertson and Claxton set out the agendas, worked out the expenses, suggested and approved appointments and programmes.

During the first months of his general managership, Grierson operated two organizations under the same umbrella both reflecting the application of social scientific techniques. The first, the more staid, continued the external, news and reports services established by Charles Vining. Grierson kept a tighter rein on operations than his predecessor demanding "more meat" in reports with the inclusion of fuller explanation of policy implementation and proposed programmes. Among the older sections, the reports branch expanded quickly. It began surveying the labour, U.S., foreign-language and daily press. Branch chief Davidson Dunton expanded the network of board correspondents sending in regular reports on local opinion. Grierson also gained cabinet approval to use the Canadian Institute of Public Opinion to carry out survey research measuring Canadians' attitudes on wartime issues. To improve
working relationships with Canadian newspapers, Grierson toured the country with his new staff member, C.F. Crandall, former president of the British United Press agency. The 'established' section of the board, by May 1943, included several news operations: external services to the U.S., England, Australia, and Latin America; cultural relations, consumer news, reception of foreign guests. The reports services operated a reading and clipping bureau, and wrote a digest of the House of Commons debates; a weekly reference publication for the press, a home press survey, a foreign language press survey, an opinion survey, and briefs for background on specific issues.

While this part of the board operated in a reasonably orderly manner, Grierson also ran a helter-skelter, idea-generating group which no less revealed a social scientific bent. Under the general manager's direction, this section of the board's staff began feeling its way through a mass of projects in order to find the most suitable for the new direction Grierson wanted to follow. These proposals centred around social action projects and media-coordination efforts. Grierson went to Washington right after his appointment to study the operations of the United States' Office of War Information and to see if the Canadians could gain any pointers. He investigated and accepted an offer by Laurence Freiman, an Ottawa department store owner, to organize a better system for distributing the government's graphic material. This was small potatoes compared to the studies which the general manager commissioned on voluntary war workers, art and information,
exhibitions, newspapers' views of information work, newspapers' use of government publicity material, industrial morale, youth morale and consumer information. From these reports, Grierson began to construct his innovative programmes.

From Grierson's takeover in 1943, through Davidson Dunton's general managership in 1944-1945, the Wartime Information Board pursued its objective of trying to reach previously apathetic Canadians. The board's staff argued that departments could not deal with problems independently because of the complexity of the wartime situation. The WIB also aimed its fire at convincing the government to consider the needs of the lower economic and educational strata of society when considering an information programme. The new propagandists wanted to work in an interdepartmental way on programmes designed around functional lines and based on specific issues rather than on general patriotism. Accordingly, they tried to set up information programmes geared to particular fields: economic stabilization, industrial workers, armed forces, consumers, food, rehabilitation and citizenship. The first extension in this direction took place in May 1943 when the department of National Defence turned over its armed forces' publication, Canadian Affairs, to the board. The following month, the board's news services expanded to include a religious information service in English and French. The industrial morale section, established in the spring of 1943 prepared plans for an information campaign directed at factory workers. About the same time, Donald Gordon, the chairman of the Wartime
Prices and Trade Board, extended an invitation to the WIB to assist in gaining greater public acceptance for wage and price control policies.\(^{116}\)

In order to put his programmes into effect, Grierson had to summon all his persuasive power to loosen the government's purse string. Once his staff had drawn up a supplementary budget for $380,000, Grierson presented it to his board on September 13, 1943. His supporting memorandum pointed out that the estimates of $658,000 although approved only the previous July, had provided enough outlay to maintain operations at their first, experimental level. The board, Grierson informed his bosses, had operated throughout the summer of 1943 at a deficit of $11,000 per month. The supplementary budget would rectify the situation by providing for a staff expansion of 43 of whom 19 had already started work.\(^{117}\) Although the board approved the general manager's submission, Grierson could not convince the other departments that an interdepartmental expansion would serve their interests. Outside the Wartime Information Board, the publicity men working for the government feared that Grierson planned to usurp their functions.\(^{118}\)

Denied full support for his request, Grierson approached the Prime Minister by playing on Mackenzie King's political fears. Before he sent over his budget, Grierson had made his needs clear by bombarding the Prime Minister's Office with submissions asking authorization for staff members working without formal appointments.\(^{119}\) Grierson also made use of his reasonably successful relationship with the Prime Minister who had a known affinity for a Scot's burr.\(^{120}\) In addition, the
general manager wrote King a personal letter flattering his leadership and giving hints on the best means of using information work to improve the government's labour relations. After this softening up, Grierson sent along his budget requesting the additional $380,000. In a letter accompanying his submission, Grierson summarized his views relating to domestic information and allied them to the government's current political problem, the rise of the CCF. The danger of the government trusting the newspapers to explain its policies, Grierson pointed out, was compounded by the growing alienation of Canadians from the political system. General public sentiment expressed a "distrust of effecting anything useful through democratic methods." This danger of a spate of social discontents, accompanied increasing support for the socialist party, the CCF, and a drop in public sympathy for the work of the Liberal government. Grierson skillfully wove this political peril into his letter by pointing out that the CCF leader, M.J. Coldwell, and the Conservative House Leader, Gordon Graydon, had both supported the Wartime Information Board in its desire to combat an extremist point of view. By giving the board more money for domestic work, Grierson concluded, the government could "kill two birds with one stone." King could arrange to give his administration the 'break' that had been denied it in the press during the previous twelve months and to relate the government's war effort "to the larger matter of the reputation of Ottawa and parliamentary institutions." The implicit advantage for the Liberal party stood out like a sore thumb.
Grierson's tactic worked. He met with the Prime Minister and the ministers of Trade and Commerce, Agriculture and Justice (J.A. Mackinnon, J.G. Gardiner, and L.S. St. Laurent) to defend his proposal. Ultimately, the war committee of the cabinet formally approved a slightly reduced version of the budget and gave the WIB $370,000 on October 21. Grierson's recommendations for staff appointments received concurrent approval. By his skillful manipulation of Mackenzie King's political fears, Grierson had overcome the departmental opposition and gained the resources to proceed with his functional programmes. Political considerations, however, soon caused Grierson more grief.

The appointment of Norman MacKenzie and John Grierson to run the WIB gave the liberal adult educators control of the information organization. Grierson in his actions and his thinking demonstrated the ability to consolidate all the changes in information theory and in policy since 1939 and to weight this synthesis on the side of progress. He maintained and even strengthened the board's newspaper operations and proved more able than his predecessors at getting out the news. At the same time, he revivified the WIB by applying social scientific techniques and by striving to implement programmes which had their basis in a wider understanding of popular needs. The war situation had changed enough by 1943 that home morale problems could be considered on Grierson's level. The confusion of 1939 and 1940 had abated, the United States and Russia had entered the war as allies and the constant overseas defeats had ended. The necessity of equipping the population for a long,
tedious struggle gave Grierson's theory credibility and his programmes at least qualified support. At the same time, however, by convincing the government of the importance of wartime information and by pointing out its direct and indirect uses to curry political favour for the Liberal party, the Vining-Grierson organization opened the door to opportunities for the government to manipulate news for its own benefit.
CHAPTER III
INFORMATION AND POLITICAL CONFLICT

In the wartime situation, the government could not afford to remain as selective about choosing and giving considerable responsibility to civil servants in complete sympathy with its political aims. In Ottawa, the character of the civil service had changed drastically as the number of public employees, the majority temporary, had increased more than fourfold from 1939 to 1945. While all undoubtedly worked to defeat a common enemy, a certain edginess sometimes came to the surface. Obviously, the new recruits could not leave behind their former associations and beliefs. A microcosm of wartime Ottawa, the Wartime Information Board with its vast majority of temporary workers, exhibited the capital's tension and camaraderie. In many ways, potential conflict showed up more acutely in the Wartime Information Board than elsewhere. With the adoption, by 1944, of a consistent and powerful philosophy of information and an increased institutional strength, the board focused attention on the problems of government involvement in information. These escaped neither scrutiny nor conflict.

The possibility of political differences in the WIB showed up immediately after John Grierson's appointment. The new general manager definitely did not fit into the mould of the traditional bureaucrat. Oakley Dalgleish of The Globe and Mail believed that the "persuasive and commanding, caustic and charming, convincing and alarming . . . earthy and a drawing
room intellectual," Grierson, had the "will and the courage to use purgatives on . . . official Ottawa." Several of the board members and permanent civil servants showed less enthusiasm than Dalgleish about Grierson. Philippe Brais, the vice-chairman, feared that Grierson's radicalism could alienate conservative elements in Quebec. As film commissioner, Grierson had affronted the Quebec Catholic hierarchy by refusing to cut his laudatory film on the Russian war effort to meet their more critical taste. L.B. Pearson warned Norman Robertson, the under-secretary of state for External Affairs, to watch out for "St. John and his disciples." In committee meetings with other civil servants, Grierson inspired mistrust by his ability to answer questions "in smooth words which left one somewhat in doubt" as to their meaning but which "sounded very well . . . ." To keep the impetuous Grierson "in check" between meetings, the board members established a committee that could meet with the general manager between gatherings of the full board.

Some observers believed that the government had made its new appointments with this tension in mind and that if the WIB survived early disaster it could turn into a creative organization. Brooke Claxton thought that Arnold Heeney, the strongest influence on Mackenzie King during the decision about the new management, certainly knew what to expect from his friends Grierson and Norman MacKenzie. Although a temporary WIB appointee like Grierson, MacKenzie had a sound reputation amongst the Ottawa mandarins, an easy going nature and a firm attachment to the belief in the right to free expression.
Sardonically, Brooke Claxton commented that as a mediator, MacKenzie usually dissolved the collision of conflicting forces by finding a "formula that proves to be completely meaningless." A "fruitful fence sitter," MacKenzie, unlike Charles Vining, would keep his temper in difficult situations and would calm those around him. The match of Grierson's enthusiasm with MacKenzie's innate caution, Claxton believed, could keep the general manager working well, if he did not cause a nervous collapse. MacKenzie's role, then, was that of mediating the potential conflict between the liberal radicalism of Grierson who would use the WIB to promote social change and the more traditional liberalism of the board members who felt greater concern with dampening down areas of popular discontent.

A similar uneasiness grew up among the board's officers; it appeared partly as a result of the grab-bag nature of wartime staffing in the government. The predominantly anglophone character of the WIB and of Ottawa was reflected by the general under-representation of French Canadians on the WIB staff. In fact, the heads of the French language section are easily lumped in with a group of other specialists recruited to fill specific needs. Many of these specialists, including the French Canadians, worked in the board for long periods because of the need for their expertise. This group comprised the professional administrators of the budget and the office, the librarian, a professional radio man as well as the heads of the French section and the ministers who ran the religious information section. A few personnel with specialized experience came to work on specific projects.*
* The administrators were:

Gorden S. Hosken, former supervisor of office services for the department of National War Services who took over WIB administration.

Rex Boyd, accounting and budget officer, appointed in the fall of 1944.

A.E. Robertson, formerly of the Washington office of the department of Munitions and Supply, who took over the WIB's distribution section in April, 1944.

The librarian was Miss Mary Currie, formerly the librarian of the Sun Life Insurance Company, who headed the board's library from October, 1942.

Charles W. Tisdall, formerly with the Wm. Orr & Co. radio research firm, joined the consumer information section as an expert on radio research and writing.

The heads of the French section were:

G.R. Benoit, head translator for the Secretary of State's Department then a staff member in the National Selective Service of the department of National War Services. Benoit joined the WIB in October 1942 to take charge of the French section, domestic branch and then moved to the external branch ending up as the WIB representative in Paris.

Major René Garneau, a CBC commentator, was seconded to the WIB in November 1944 as interim head of the French section.

The ministers were:

Rev. John Grant of the United Church of Canada who joined the WIB in December 1943 to take charge of religious information.

Rev. Gregory Lee, assistant curate, St. John's Anglican church, Ottawa, who took over from Grant in March 1945.

The special talents included:

Gilbert Ghwey, former executive assistant to the director of information of the department of National Defence, who took over special duties as a liaison officer in Edmonton with the U.S. Forces stationed in Canada.

Captain Ian Eisenhardt, physical fitness expert from British Columbia, who joined the WIB in 1943 to study information to Canadian youth.
Throughout the war, the most important group of specialists working for the WIB remained the newspapermen. Grierson had not jettisoned a belief that dissemination of news remained a very important function of any wartime information organization. Along with the other specialist groups, newsmen had a relatively low turnover on the board's staff. Journalists, both French and English, served in positions in all sections of the board, wherever a WIB position demanded writing experience. The journalists hired by Herbert Lash for the Bureau of Public Information remained to work for Vining and then Grierson.*

* R.A. Draper, former Financial Post writer, worked in the BPI as a news writer, headed the WIB reference section and left for Time, March 1945.

Laura Beattie, editor in the BPI's consumer programme, headed WIB's consumer services in Sept. 1943.

Maud Ferguson, women's editor, The Calgary Herald, headed BPI's consumer work, but left in Sept. 1943.

A.J. McKenna, executive assistant to the director of Public Information, headed the board's external news service.

D. Frémont, BPI French pamphlet editor remained to edit Nouvelles Catholiques. He had formerly edited La Liberté, Winnipeg.

E. George Smith, senior desk man for the BPI, moved to head the English language news (formerly The Globe and Mail, parliamentary correspondent).

George Hambleton, who began working in information in 1939, remained as an editor for the WIB.

Campbell Moodie remained as head of the WIB's London operation.

Janet Smart remained to do script work.

Bruce West, Globe and Mail columnist and photo editor for the BPI, moved to assist Moodie in London, and then to head Washington operations in July 1945.
They were joined by holdovers from the Vining regime* and by replacements for some who had left with Vining.** Former

* The Vining holdovers were:

Rudel Tessier, appointed January 16, 1943 to prepare reports on the French Canadian press (media analysis, reports branch), was formerly assistant editor, Le Droit.

Paul Reading, former editor of The Calgary Herald, was hired in the external branch to take charge of background information. He had worked in Washington during the early years of the war as the press attaché.

Allan Anderson, executive officer in charge of the Latin American section of the external branch, was formerly travelling South American correspondent for Southam newspapers.

Paul Malone, external branch representative in Canberra, formerly worked for The Vancouver Province.

A.D. Dunton, head of the reports branch, then assistant general manager, May 1943, then general manager Feb. 1, 1944, formerly edited the Montreal Standard.

George McCracken, assistant domestic branch head, then branch head, then external branch head, arrived from the Kingston Whig-Standard.

H.L. Garner, hired as the executive assistant to Vining took over the external branch in January 1943, then resigned April 1943 to return as general manager of The Peterborough Examiner.

Sydney Freifeld, in charge of the news desk in the New York office, formerly research economist and columnist, then employee of the U.S. Office of War Information.

A.R. Sykes, worked in Washington as a press officer, was formerly press gallery reporter in Ottawa.

** Newsmen hired by Grierson included:

J.R. Herbin, hired February 12, 1943, assistant to head of reference section, reports branch, was a copy reader, Toronto Daily Star.

C.F. Crandall, joined February 20, 1943 as adviser to the general manager, was president of British United Press.

Joe Greenblatt, domestic press section, appointed for four months, August 17, 1943, edited The Swift Current Sun.

R.P. Young, hired to head up the external branch, magazine section, worked for The Winnipeg Free Press.

Hiram McCann, hired October 1943 for the food conservation programme, edited Food in Canada.

In addition, A.D. Dunton, as general manager hired:

Donald C. Macdonald, reporter for The Montreal Gazette who had joined the Navy in 1942 and was seconded to the WIB in 1944 to edit Canada Digest.
editors held down many of the most important jobs. Appointed assistant general manager in June 1943 and general manager in February 1944, Davidson Dunton had arrived from the editor's desk of *The Montreal Standard* to set up the reports branch for Charles Vining. C.F. Crandall, president of the British United Press agency, advised Vining on press relations and at Grierson's invitation, headed the external branch for a short period. George McCracken left his job as the associate editor of *The Kingston Whig-Standard* to take a spot as English head of domestic operations. The place of newsmen in both domestic and foreign operations stayed secure.

Under Grierson's direction, the WIB shared less and less the tendency of government departments to use the services of corporate executives on loan for the duration of the war. Grierson's operation became less congenial for corporate public relations executives than Vining's when many public relations men had joined the board. Several of Vining's corporate appointees, furthermore, had extremely close connections with the Liberal party's advertising agencies, particularly Cockfield Brown. Those working for this firm included Vining; Campbell Smart, WIB external branch director; J.W.G. Clark, director of public relations, department of National Defence; and H.E. Kidd, Brooke Claxton's friend and shortly the chief Liberal fund raiser. After the corporate appointees retired from the WIB, Grierson replaced them by newsmen or academics. A few advertising copy writers in the board's lower ranks remained until 1945 but they performed specialized work in the board's radio section. Positions abroad in the board's
external branch appeared as the only preserve left to the public relations men after Grierson took over.* Both J. Hugh Campbell and Harry Sedgwick, respective heads of the Washington and New York operations, remained at their posts until late 1945 and kept with them their assistants who had arrived from the corporate world. Grierson's only appointee from the public relations field, Geoffrey S.H. Carter, joined the staff in October 1943 to organize industrial morale work and later headed the speakers and visitors section.

The declining number of corporate executives highlighted another trend common to the WIB and to the government. The civil service had come to rely increasingly strongly on the expertise of academics, particularly social scientists. The academics in wartime Ottawa formed "as distinct a group as the business men." In the Wartime Information Board, as much as

* John Porter, advertising manager for Simpson's, remained as head of the publicity co-ordinating committee until April 1943. When he left, G.C. Andrew took over.
J. Hugh Campbell, formerly public relations officer of the Canadian Pacific Railroad, headed the Washington office. Harry Sedgwick, Toronto promoter, was hired by Vining to run the New York operation.
Leo Casey, New York organizer of the World's Fair publicity in 1939, was dropped as soon as possible.
Leonard L. Knott, from Editorial Assistants, a Montreal publicity firm, retired in mid-1943.
John Martin, public relations representative of the Massey-Harris company, was not replaced when he retired.
Pierre Ranger, formerly director of publicity, radio station CKAC, Montreal, joined the BPI in 1940 and stayed on.
J.A. Oastler, formerly a British government public relations officer, worked in the Washington office.
Harold Sutherland who operated his own publicity organization in Toronto, worked in the New York Office after November 1942.
Gerald Geldert, formerly the City of Ottawa publicity director, handled travel arrangements for visitors.
anywhere else, the social sciences were gradually becoming "shaped as policy sciences within an administrative framework."\textsuperscript{11} Vining's sole incursions into academe consisted of hiring G.C. Andrew and J.D. Ketchum. Grierson, on the other hand, staffed many important executive positions with his 'idea' men and with educators.* Generally, the academics moving into the board worked in a specialized information activity. These programmes, unlike the domestic news, external and reports branches, reported directly to the general manager. Following Grierson's pattern, Davidson Dunton hired more

* University people hired by Grierson included:

C. Brough Macpherson, hired in 1943 to replace G.C. Andrew as head of the media analysis section, then head of reconstruction information, formerly professor of political science, University of New Brunswick.  
Gregory Vlastos, Queen's University philosophy professor, became the editor of Canadian Affairs, and head of the information to the armed forces programme.  
Malcolm Ross, English professor from the University of Toronto, looked after WIB's background information (Grierson brought him from the National Film Board).  
W.C. Desmond Pacey, English professor of Brandon College, joined the WIB in June 1943 to look after religious information.  
Trevor Lloyd, geography professor at Dartmouth College, joined the board in May 1943 to work on a special project.  
Gordon Rothney, history professor, Sir George Williams College, joined the board and the National Film Board June 15, 1943.  
W.K. Rolph, a graduate student hired August 4, 1943 worked for J.D. Ketchum in the reports branch.  
David Petegorsky, a recent Ph.D. graduate from the University of London, worked in the industrial information section.
The kind of tension that developed between Grierson and his board showed up even more strongly in the relations between the business-oriented and academic-oriented members of the WIB staff. Many Canadian businessmen and their allies in the government could never bring themselves to trust the academics associated with the voluntary associations like the Canadian Institute of International Affairs. At first, in 1939, the issue revolved around the question of neutrality. Gladstone Murray, the general manager of the CBC, scuttled plans for a discussion series involving various members of the Canadian Association for Adult Education and the Canadian Institute of International Affairs because he considered their sentiments isolationist and next to treason. Arthur Meighen, the Conservative leader in the Senate, agreed and suggested that even in 1941, the "international institute school" formed a cohesive group centred around J.W. Dafoe who inspired Canadians to pull back on their support for the war effort. As the war progressed, the voluntary association network became associated in

* Academics hired by Dunton included:

George Edison, lecturer in philosophy at the University of Toronto, who joined the board June 25, 1944 to take charge of reconstruction information.
Lorne T. Morgan, professor of political economy at the University of Toronto, who joined the board in 1944 to look after the research for the economic stabilization information programme.
Martyn Estall, philosophy professor, Queen's University, who joined the WIB June 1, 1944 as head of the press and research section.
R.T. Mackenzie, formerly from the extension department of the University of British Columbia, who took over as assistant editor of Canadian Affairs in May 1944.
the minds of right-wing Liberals and Conservatives with a socialist plot that held even greater dangers for Canada than isolationism. Gladstone Murray convinced Mitchell Hepburn, Liberal Premier of Ontario, that the CIJA, "run" by T.W.L. MacDermot of Upper Canada College, used unconscionable pressure and high political connections to protect 'dangerous radicals' like Frank Underhill, the editor of The Canadian Forum, from losing their jobs.\(^1\) Hugh D. Scully, Canadian Consul General in New York, extended the net even further when he explained to Norman Robertson that Canada should beware of the community of interest among left-wingers in the service of the Canadian and U.S. governments. All these 'new dealers' had gone to the same universities and knew each other well. In the U.S.A., these "professors" were operating under a cloud by 1943. Many Americans believed them guilty of "extravagance and waste of personnel, favouritism, nepotism [and] stopping the war effort to fight among themselves." Scully warned that Canada should try to prevent a similar situation from arising and should avoid too close an identification with the disfavoured U.S. coterie.\(^2\)

In the Wartime Information Board, the departure of many of the temporary employees seconded from business fore-shadowed criticism of the board for its left-wing tendencies. Campbell Smart, the first director of the external branch, went back to work for the Cockfield Brown advertising firm in Montreal. Liberal senator and publisher, W. Rupert Davies, complained in 1944 about the board's failure to keep men like Smart on staff while it hired socialist academics like Professor Gregory Vlastos of Queen's University. Davies argued that
it was "unfair" to give Vlastos "the opportunity of trying to influence our Canadian young men in the armed services" in an anti-business, socialist direction. The Wartime Information Board, Davies stated, should not provide too many openings for the "enemy of the government of the day."16

This criticism of the government and of the WIB reflected a growing social cleavage in Canada. Just as the CAAE had predicted, public opinion had begun to polarize. Free enterprisers were viewing the rise of the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation to the position of the official opposition in industrialized Ontario as proof of a socialist conspiracy. Businessmen began to summon up and to proclaim all their old virtues as a means of warding off the socialist threat.17 They reasserted the laisser-faire philosophy that "we cannot throw back on that mysterious abstraction, the State, responsibilities which properly confront us as individuals," and lobbied the government to modify wartime regulations in order to increase their field of opportunity.18 E.A. Corbett reported in 1943 that a group of Montreal businessmen volunteered to finance the CAAE if the organization undertook an anti-socialist crusade.19 The London Times' Ottawa correspondent commented that Canadians "with left-wing ideas are sometimes regarded as almost revolutionary."20 On the left, speakers began making statements about defeating the plans of businessmen asking for the relaxation of government controls. The reformers firmly believed that "many an employer" had put up with the demands of labour with the idea that "when the shooting's over the 'good old days' will be back again." Well, vowed labour and socialist leaders,
"that's what we're out to prevent."

The left-of-centre elements in the government could not espouse these arguments publicly but privately many of them worked to combat a shift to the right. They had support in high places. The Prime Minister criticized business harshly after the Canadian Manufacturers Association delegation visited him in 1941. He informed them that the country was undergoing "a social revolution as well as an international war," then commented privately that the delegation only saw part of the question because "it was as reactionary a group as I have ever met." King blamed the businessmen for the rise of the CCF by their attacks on the federal government.

Within the WIB, the state-interventionists held their ground. Davidson Dunton, hardly a socialist but a left-wing Liberal, defended his staff from charges of partisanship by citing their competence and telling the critics that "the political opinions of members of our staff are entirely their own business . . . ." The progressives on the WIB staff could never forgive Harry Sedgwick, head of the New York office, for his "wheeler-dealer" promotion of his private radio interests during his work for the government. Sedgwick received a shock when an Ottawa telegram destined for a New York magazine began:

Solo: The President of the Advertising Association

Conspirators on every side Free Enterprise have slandered,
Forgetting that it's given us the world's best living standard
We eat and drink supremely well at Royal York and Rideau,
And no one drives more Cadillacs or bigger ones than we do.
How blind the socialist who plots this way of
life to shatter!
Free Enterprise brings wealth to all - at least
to all who matter.

Chorus:
Then hail we now Free Enterprise,
Extol and give it praise!
The working man must recognize,
That, if in want he lives and dies,
It's just his lack of enterprise -
The enterprise that pays!25

J. Davidson Ketchum, head of the WIB reports branch, had written
this bit of satire but Sedgwick, also president of the Canadian
Association of Broadcasters, champion of free-enterprise broad-
casting, was not amused.26

The progressives fought their opposition in other
government departments that found the social activism of the
WIB hard to swallow. The department of Munitions and Supply,
for example, objected to the whole idea of an industrial infor-
mation section. These civil servants could not accept Grierson's contention that industrial morale resulted from social
and working conditions. To the industry-oriented group, morale
consisted solely of workers' recognizing their "moral responsi-
bility" to the war effort.27 The department of Munitions and
Supply did not want to improve working conditions but only to
hold rallies in each plant to instill a greater sense of
patriotism and moral duty in the workers.28 The board argued
for an information policy which recognized more than the
management side and which incorporated policy issues rather than
just flag-waving.29 The establishment of the industrial morale
section with a programme budget showed at least a partial
victory for the WIB.
Almost without exception, the executives in the domestic programmes viewed themselves as "midwives to a more progressive society," and some were not above leaking confidential information to counter right-wing pressure on the government. J.D. Ketchum moved in 1943 to block efforts by Canadian industry and by M.P.s to convince the government that Canadians did not support economic controls. Industry organized pressure on Ottawa to convince the government that it was losing support because of its control programme. In retaliation, Ketchum and Grierson tried to prevent the government from giving in to "Liberal politicians who probably don't know what they are talking about." Ketchum included a question about the acceptability of controls on a confidential public opinion survey commissioned from the Canadian Gallup poll organization. Discovering that the majority of Canadians supported controls as a fair means of operation, Ketchum acted. Since the Board would not publicize this politically-sensitive finding, Ketchum surreptitiously gave the results back to his friends in the Gallup organization with his personal permission for them to publish the findings. The only proviso placed on the released data was that the results had to appear as though the polling agency itself had thought up the question for its own use.  

(ii)

But the situation was more complicated than right versus left. While the left of centre elements in the government and on the WIB could agree to work together to head off the unrepentant free-enterprisers, they could not agree among
themselves on the extent to which the government had a right to intervene in Canadian life. The leftists working for the board from late 1943 until 1945 ranged from left-wing Liberals to communists and all suspected the others of promoting their own views in WIB material. At times, this dispute threatened to destroy any social action programme before it got underway. Like the right-left confrontation, the roots of the conflict lay deep in the 1930's and the battle itself was complicated by friendships and overlapping personal associations.

The moderate group, the easiest to identify, clung to the left wing of the Liberal party. While not in total sympathy with all the proposals of his young Turks, Mackenzie King recognized that in order to contain the CCF's rise in popularity he had to prevent party reactionaries from blocking progressive measures. Among the Liberals, Brooke Claxton agitated most consistently for the party to respond to the popular feeling for change. "It would be a cinch," Claxton commented in 1941, "for the P.M. to change about his cabinet a little, bring in a few new faces, introduce a positive policy on manpower, stir up the people . . . ." If King waited too long, Claxton predicted that the CCF would "be doing a pretty good job on us soon."31 Claxton's friend, Edgar Tarr, confirmed these judgments remarking that "the attitude of the old [Liberal] stalwarts" in attributing the upswing of CCF support to economic controls "almost makes me weep." "I have been yapping," Tarr complained, "for a long time as to the necessity of positive, progressive action as the only possible means of arresting a too radical swing to the left."32 Liberals must devise and
sell policies that reflected a dual economy, a system of private enterprise and social security, which would satisfy both conservatives and progressives.33

In the WIB, the advocates of his position included Brooke Claxton, Davidson Dunton, Norman MacKenzie and G.C. Andrew. The young Andrew had a typical background. Before joining the board, he worked with the largely-socialist League for Social Reconstruction and had helped to organize the Toronto Civil Liberties Association to protest against the wartime restrictions on civil rights. He maintained close connections with CCFers, Frank Underhill and Andrew Brewin, and at one point attended a CCF caucus. But he never joined the party.34 Like Andrew, the rest of these men wanted the WIB to help create an "open, non-doctrinaire, progressive-minded society." They wanted the extension of the welfare state in a non-radical sense which did not involve a violent overthrow of the economic system but would raise living standards at the lowest level. Because free enterprise conservatives would try to label their liberalism as dangerous radicalism, the left-Liberals kept a wary eye on all those in Canada and in the WIB who held beliefs even further to the left. To bring off the reforms they desired, the Liberals had to avoid getting tarred with the socialist brush. In the WIB, this meant making certain that the socialists did not use the board for their own purposes.35

Yet, the WIB contained a strong socialist contingent. The Liberals, perhaps unconsciously, realized that committed progressives could best convince Canadians that the government would institute reforms and put a new face on government
activities. John Grierson's appointment was the first step and Grierson's 1943 recruitment of academics continued the trend. One of Grierson's first appointees, David Petegorsky, arrived to work fresh from the publication of his doctoral thesis prepared for socialist theorist, Harold Laski, at the London School of Economics. In the preface of his book, Petegorsky stated his belief that "if men are to live, they must have free and easy access to the things that give life . . .". In turn, Petegorsky recruited his fellow LSE graduate student, C.B. Macpherson, a philosophical Marxist.

The bulk of the socialists working for the WIB, however, arrived from Canadian secular and Christian socialist organizations formed during the 1930's. Like the more traditional voluntary associations, the League for Social Reconstructions [LSR], the Fellowship for a Christian Social Order [FCSO] and the graduate committee of the Student Christian Movement [SCM] contained an overlapping leadership. The members of these organizations maintained their associations in the SCM and the FCSO throughout the war in a thriving Ottawa connection. In the WIB, this group included Queen's University Professors, Gregory Vlastos and Martyn Estall, as well as Helen Marsh. In government service, they joined Neil Morrison, CBC director of talks and public affairs; Alex Sim of the CBC's farm department, organizer of the farm forums; and James A. Gibson, who went to work as one of the Prime Minister's secretaries. Helen Marsh's husband, Leonard, prepared the report on social welfare for the committee on reconstruction headed by Principal Cyril James of McGill.
The emphasis among this group remained British rather than Marxian socialism. They more or less agreed with the LSR and the CCF on the need for public ownership of key industries, democratization of industrial and political authority, and extensive social planning and welfare. Vlastos' book, *Toward the Christian Social Revolution*, and Estall's article, "Towards a Christian Revolution: The Marxist Challenge," both espoused a moral rather than a scientific socialist point of view. Marxism challenged them to fulfill the social purpose of Christianity. Nonetheless, some of the ideology of the FCSO had a very 'scientific' Marxist ring to it. The FCSO publication, *Christian Social Action*, stated in 1944 that the organization was working toward "the establishment of a new society based on common ownership of the means of production."

The socialists and liberals in the WIB, in common with many Canadian reform groups, feared communist infiltration. The problem of communism had a more acute impact on the socialists associated with the SCM and FCSO because both organizations suffered through controversies over this question in the 1940's. Eugene Forsey, research director for the Canadian Congress of Labour, left the FCSO in 1944 because he believed that the organization had failed to purge several suspected communists or fellow travellers. As justification, Forsey maintained that he himself had suffered from allegations of fellow-travelling and, therefore, his attitude was not that of "a nervous Victorian old maid towards sex." All these suspicions resulted from the socialists' fear that the communists in Canada were trying to destroy the CCF by working to
undermine its credibility with the Canadian people. To the socialists, the CCF remained a strong contender as an alternative government capable of directing post-war reconstruction as long as the party did not alienate Canadians through an association with the communists. As a result of this type of wrangling, a number of socialists who failed to condemn Canadian communists in scathing tones fell under the suspicion of sympathizing themselves with the communists.

In the Wartime Information Board, general suspicion of communist influence revolved around the information to the armed forces section and the industrial information operation. In the armed forces group, Gregory Vlastos, a committed member of the FCSO, had less fear of joining wholeheartedly with communists than did many other socialists. Vlastos, "a Rotarian of the left," accused Eugene Forsey of "red-baiting" when Forsey threatened withdrawal from the FCSO and "would bend over backwards" to avoid discriminating against anyone. Vlastos, however, filled his information to the armed forces section with suspected communists, including Fred Poland and Gordon Lunan, both later investigated in connection with the Gouzenko affair. Other WIB staffers maintained close connections with Canadians suspected of communist leanings.

The alleged communists associated with the WIB caused a lot of suspicion but little reaction. The liberal group with a 'safe' background, knew that the board operated in a manner "as political as hell." Some of the most extreme leftists "kept sniping" at the system and tried to slip some of their
ideas past the editorial eye of Geoffrey Andrew and Davidson Dunton. The monthly magazine, *Canadian Affairs*, produced by the information to the armed forces section, caused continual battling among the various sections of the staff. The left-liberals, however, edited out sentences which might create difficulties and tolerated suspected communists. According to Geoffrey Andrew, the board's secretary, the "legitimate tension" within the board produced "good creative ideas."  

Despite all the suspicions, the nature of the bureaucratic Ottawa prevented and mediated much potential conflict between the right-wingers, liberals, socialists and communists. As individuals, most of them maintained overlapping associations. Some of the contact resulted from life in the capital city where "there are many areas of formal and informal interaction common to, and at times exclusive to, the bureaucratic elite." Informally, they ate lunch together at the Chateau Laurier and they met in their "formal roles at interdepartmental committees." It is also very important to remember that the 1940's remained an age unrivalled to this day of informal meetings in study groups and voluntary associations. A great number of the old and the new mandarins met outside their professional capacities in the umbrella organizations, the Canadian Institute of International Affairs and the Canadian Association for Adult Education. The membership of these two associations encompassed the whole spectrum of ideological beliefs found in the government. In the WIB, for example, eight members of the board and twenty members of the staff maintained an active association in the CIIA. There they met
others associated with them in their professional capacity.*

* The CIIA branch in Ottawa in 1944-1945 contained four WIB board members and 15 one-time staff members:

**Board members:** R.B. Bryce, A.D.P. Heeney, Norman Robertson and H. Carl Goldenberg (alternate for Munitions and Supply).

**Staff members:** George McCracken, F.W. Park, A.D. Dunton, Donald C. Macdonald (branch secretary), Donald Buchanan, C.F. Crandall, Rene Garneau, David Petegorsky, Pierre Ranger, G.C. Andrew (executive member), Paul Reading, George Benoit, Geoffrey Carter, Walter Herbert.

**Others associated with information:**
John E. Robbins (CCEC), L.W. Brockington, and J.S. Thompson (general manager CBC).
(Source: P.A.C. Charles Clay papers, vol. 14, file 18, membership lists.)

At a conference in Montebello in 1943 other board and staff members participated:

**Board members:** Brooke Claxton, Norman MacKenzie.

**Staff members:** Gregory Vlastos, Bruce Hutchison.

Throughout the war, the CIIA national executive contained many associated with the WIB:

**The CIIA National Council:**
David Rogers, 1940-1942; Brooke Claxton, 1940-1943; Norman MacKenzie, Vice-President, 1942.

**The CIIA Education Committee:**
T.W.L. MacDermot, Brooke Claxton, A.D. Dunton.

**The Research Committee:**
Norman MacKenzie, O.M. Biggar.

Members attending the national conference, 1944:
G.C. Andrew, A.P. Côté, Donald Macdonald, F.W. Park, F.L. Poland.

**Others associated with the public information included:**
(Source: CIIA Annual Reports).
Apart from the CIIA, the leftists had more intimate contact with many of the respected liberals in other voluntary associations of the 1930's and 1940's. Frequently, an honorific board made up of respected liberals kept a benevolent eye on the social activists who, at a lower level in the organization, did most of the work.* Pre-war and wartime personal friendships further blurred the line between board and staff as well as between liberals and those to the left of them.**

* For example:

In the SCM, Norman MacKenzie served as honorary chairman of the SCM of Canada in 1942 after a long association with the organization. There he came into contact with Vlastos, Estall and the Morrisons. J.D. Ketchum, reports branch head in the WIB, was secretary of the SCM history committee during the war.

In the WEA, MacKenzie was nominated to the board in 1943 while Lorne Morgan, head of research for the WIB's economic stabilization programme headed the WEA's research committee.

In the Association for Anglo-American Understanding, Brooke Claxton had worked with Donald C. Macdonald of the armed forces information section.

** Examples include:

Frank Park's acquaintance with Norman MacKenzie when both were in New Brunswick (Transcript of author's interview with Frank Park, Toronto, December 8, 1974).

Norman MacKenzie claims to have introduced C.B. Macpherson to his wife (Transcript of the author's interview with Norman MacKenzie, August 22, 1973).

J.D. Ketchum and Norman MacKenzie had known each other since the founding of the SCM in 1921 (University of British Columbia Library, Special Collections Division, Norman MacKenzie Papers, 1940 correspondence, letter: Ketchum to MacKenzie, August 13, 1940. Ketchum wrote that "I never expected to be able to call a university president 'Larry' . . .").

R.B. Bryce developed first-name relationships with WIB staff members R.A. Draper, Paul Reading, A.D. Dunton, Geoffrey Andrew, David Petegorsky (Department of Finance Records, vol. 4030, file 129W-1B).
The Liberal party's political position appears to have determined how far the official tolerance of the more progressive elements went. The Liberals needed the progressives in order to convince Canadians that the government was responding to the widespread desire for social reform. But whenever the progressives proposed a programme, however neutral, that the Liberals viewed as threatening, official tolerance disappeared. With the Grierson takeover in 1943, the progressives in the adult education movement believed that they would find financial backing for their educational projects aimed at building up a middle-of-the-road consensus and heading off a dangerous polarization in Canadian society. W.H. Brittain, a founder of the CCEC and active member of the CAAE, approached his colleague on the two organizations, Norman MacKenzie. Brittain and E.A. Corbett, director of the CAAE, backed their 1943 request with arguments guaranteed to appeal to the progressive-minded elements in the WIB's domestic operations. Corbett goaded the WIB to action by relating that two Montrealers wanted to sponsor the CAAE if "an anti-socialist bias" underlay any programmes. The threat to progressive ideals and to government policy needed no elaboration.

Despite an initial hesitation, the general manager of the WIB succumbed to the pressure and agreed to help the CAAE finance a series of radio broadcasts. It would have been difficult for Grierson to do otherwise. Some of the most active workers for the radio scheme worked on the WIB staff. David Petegorsky, who later served as head of the WIB's industrial
morale section, had addressed the preliminary meeting to work on the series in December 1942 and ten WIB staff members participated in the final July 1943 meeting planning the large conference at Macdonald College to establish the Citizens' Forum radio broadcasts.* Grierson's plan involved prepared a submission by the CCEC on behalf of the CAAE for $25,000 of the WIB's funds. The money would serve to help organize radio listening groups which accompanied the series. These groups, registered with a secretariat, would discuss the various reconstruction issues posed during the weekly, half-hour, "Of Things to Come" broadcasts. They would also receive supplementary printed material, some of it from the WIB. Since the CCEC had a membership comprising all the provincial departments of Education, a grant to that organization would better legitimate the large subsidy and would shield the WIB from charges of partisanship. While Grierson prepared the brief, it was actually officially submitted to him by C.N. Crutchfield, the CCEC secretary. 52

Due to the Liberal party's position, the scheme collapsed. Arnold Heeney had earlier warned Grierson that the use of government money for financing reconstruction information by a non-government agency might cause objections. Mackenzie King had not yet decided on the government's course in planning

* These were J.D. Ketchum, G.S.H. Carter, David Petegorsky, Donald Buchanan, Robert T. Mackenzie, Frank W. Park, Geoffrey Andrew, Martyn Estall, C.B. Macpherson, Gregory Vlastos. (Archives of Ontario, Canadian Association for Adult Education Papers, series B1, box 3, Report of the Proceedings of a Special Programme Committee of the CAAE, December 1942-January 1943; ibid., Minutes of a meeting in the WIB Boardroom, July 13, 1943.)
the post-war. 53 Before Heeney had an opportunity to prepare
the Prime Minister to receive the request, Gray Turgeon, chair­
man of the House of Commons committee on reconstruction,
received a letter from the WIB's Gordon Rothney who outlined
the project most impolitically. Rothney implied not only WIB
sponsorship of the Ste. Anne Conference planned to launch the
series but also that the meeting would "launch a reconstruction
plan." This direct challenge to the government's authority
raised the ire of the M.P. who informed Mackenzie King. In
cabinet, the Prime Minister took "strong exception," and
instructed the WIB to suspend any further action. After this
gaffe, the CCEC got a token grant but Grierson no longer dared
openly to encourage the adult educators' work. 54

Although the adult educators blamed the cabinet
"reactionaries" for this defeat, the left-Liberals and Brooke
Claxton in particular, showed themselves equally sensitive to
the political winds. The early scuffle had alerted the WIB
staff to move their support of the CAAE underground but a con­
tinuing confrontation over the citizens' forums indirectly
involved many of them, above all those with an SCM and FCSO
connection. 55 Just when the first programme was ready for the
air in early November, Brooke Claxton objected to the "left
wing" slant of the whole project. Both Neil Morrison, the
main organizer; and programme host, Morley Callaghan; Claxton
charged, had drawn up a speakers' roster "lousy" with CCFers.
Alerting the Prime Minister to the political dangers, Claxton
urged greater controls over these socialists who, he claimed,
had set up the broadcasts without adequate surveillance by
'responsible' individuals. Claxton wanted to make certain that the Liberal party's point of view had adequate representation. Given the CCF upsurge in popularity, Claxton believed the citizens' forums to have "utmost political importance" because of their association with post-war social change, a "field the C.C.F. has made its own." Liberals could not afford to let the situation ride and Claxton proposed that Callaghan, Morrison and the whole CBC board 'get the gate.' These were curious words from a Liberal proponent of the right to free speech and of public broadcasting. General L.R. Laflèche, minister of National War Services with responsibility for the CBC, announced that the programme would not go on the air.

The adult educators' battle with Claxton demonstrates the power of the voluntary association network. While Neil Morrison claimed that CBC management and John Grierson had participated in planning the series, the CBC department heads protested political interference at a meeting in Toronto. Sidney Smith, the president of the CAAE and president of the University of Manitoba, telegrammed Claxton to complain and to threaten publicity that would damage the Liberals. E.A. Corbett, the CAAE executive director, visited his own and Claxton's friend, J.W. Dafoe, editor in chief of The Winnipeg Free Press. Like Smith and Corbett, ever believers in free speech, Dafoe's "trigger finger" itched at the threat to freedom of the airwaves. The next day, the Winnipeg paper carried an editorial condemning the government but without naming Claxton. Privately, Edgar J. Tarr, a prominent member of the voluntary association network, told Claxton he ran the
danger of losing many of his helpful and progressive friends
and handing the field over to reactionaries. Terry MacDermot,
Claxton's brother-in-law, advised finding a means of political
not personal attack to bring down the CCF curve. The extent
of the friendships among the members of the voluntary associa-
tions meant that a personal attack would consolidate them in
opposition to the assailant. These arguments had a telling
effect; the "Of Things to Come" series proceeded as scheduled.

During this controversy, the Wartime Information Board
staff watched from the sidelines. Their own organization
waited directly in the line of fire. John Grierson played an
ambiguous role and tried to keep the lid on the controversy and
to work out a compromise. He agreed that the programmes con-
tained potential but felt that the method of presentation left
a lot to be desired. It was a roundabout way of agreeing that
the CCF viewpoint prevailed. This stance fitted in well with
Grierson's belief in the neutrality of public service as well
as his desire to save his own skin. He had, after all, hired
an inordinate number of academics with connections with the
CAAE. Nonetheless, Grierson and his staff managed, during
the middle of the controversy, to sneak a $6,000 grant through
the WIB board for use by the CCEC to support the forum broad-
casts. After this, the officers continued their lobbying on
behalf of the programme.

Indirect evidence suggests that the incident increased
the Liberals' suspicion of the more progressive civil servants
and caused Grierson's resignation from the board on January 10,
1944. Many of the general manager's proposals remained stuck
in cabinet or had been stalled by departmental opposition.\textsuperscript{67} The initial hesitation felt by many Ottawa insiders about Grierson's appointment had intensified. After the citizens' forum battle, it is unlikely that Brooke Claxton would repeat his 1942 declaration that "if John Grierson is a dangerous character, it is high time we had more characters . . . who do things . . . without thought of the political consequences . . ."\textsuperscript{68} Apart from Claxton, businessmen grew even more convinced that the information apparatus plotted along with the CBC and CAAE to downgrade the free enterprise system.\textsuperscript{69} Even various wings of the adult education movement had come to view each other suspiciously. The moderate reformers in the CAAE believed that it remained as important "not to be led by the nose by any other interest [CCF sympathizers] as [not] to be subservient to the government that happens to be in power."\textsuperscript{70} Seeing the writing on the wall, Grierson submitted his resignation. It was accepted with such alacrity that it appears Grierson had correctly judged the situation or that he had informally been asked to resign. Although appointed a "special adviser" to the WIB, this status had no meaning. Four months after he left, he applied for a trip to England. It was denied; his job was finished.\textsuperscript{71} The government wanted someone 'safer' in the politically-loaded WIB position.

The atmosphere of wartime Ottawa had changed by 1944. While the government continued to hire social scientists, academics and progressives, they no longer held full favour. Brooke Claxton and the left-wing Liberals resolved ever more firmly to try to get the government to draw up and to publicize
projects for post-war reconversion. Only by these means could the Liberals halt the leakage of their political support to the CCF.\textsuperscript{72} The quietness of Grierson's resignation and the absence of any later public controversy indicates that the Liberals also learned other lessons. They still believed that adequate controls over the progressives working in the government could serve the cause of building a more progressive post-war society, but felt that progressives working for the government should not be given too public a role.\textsuperscript{73}

The situation in the Wartime Information Board illuminates the difficulty of establishing a neutral, government-run information organization in a liberal democracy and certainly in Canada. The problem showed up acutely when the government established an adequately-financed, well-organized apparatus run by social scientists with the theoretical and practical knowledge to manipulate public opinion. Obviously, everyone on the political spectrum in Canada in 1944 saw the potential advantage of using the system to work for a particular viewpoint. This is the reason that the Conservatives basically and consistently opposed any great expansion of the information system. Yet this opposition is suspect. There is evidence that the Conservatives were worried about maintaining the political and economic status quo in the face of popular thinking as much as they were interested in preventing government use of an information organization for its own political advantage. For its part, the opposition to the left of the government perceived that by working within the information organization to promote popular sentiment for social reform, it was
legitimizing the public position of the left-wing political organizations. As soon as the party in power, the Liberals, recognized the strength that control of the public information apparatus gave them, they cashed in. They used their position as the government to try to prevent any other group from capitalizing on the power of the information organization. At the same time, they saw that they could identify ostensibly objective comment with their political, subjective needs.
CHAPTER IV
THE FLOWERING AND THE DEMISE
OF THE WARTIME INFORMATION BOARD

When Grierson resigned, his work to promote the social side of morale had bogged down. The food conservation information programme was stuck in the cabinet largely because the minister of Agriculture, J.G. Gardiner, feared a slur on the achievements of Canadian farmers.\(^1\) Grierson's plans for an economic stabilization information programme to support wage and price controls were getting nowhere. The general manager had overcome the opposition of Donald Gordon, the chairman of the Wartime Prices and Trade Board,\(^2\) only to run into a veto by J.L. Ilsley, the minister of Finance. Although Grierson had secured an order in council approving the economic stabilization work, the minister halted its implementation because of his qualms about arguing a contentious issue with public money.\(^3\) Earlier, departmental opposition from the department of National War Services had forestalled Grierson's plan to establish an ethnic information service and a youth information programme.\(^4\) Similarly, Grierson's proposed industrial information programme had run into trouble with the departments of Munitions and Supply and of Labour.\(^5\)

For Grierson's successor as general manager, the WIB board members, without hesitation, recommended Davidson Dunton who, they believed, would prove trustworthy and who would 'unstick' the blocked programmes. A newsman, Dunton would maintain efficient press operations. In addition, during
Vining's term, Dunton had proven his ability to develop programmes when he ran the reports branch. Under Grierson, Dunton had successfully organized many of the WIB's other operations. More importantly, as a tried and true member of the voluntary association network, Dunton knew everyone necessary to facilitate his work. Most importantly, because of his previous active support of the Liberal party, the government did not have to worry that the new general manager would get involved in politically explosive situations.

Recognizing that under proper control, Grierson's information theories had value to the country, Dunton did not revert back to a newspaper-oriented approach to government information operations. He continued promoting policies that reflected Grierson's line of thinking. In general, Dunton avoided making theoretical statements setting out his ideas while adhering to his belief that information should remain the job of experts given a free hand within the bounds of established government policy.

During the last eighteen months of the war, the problem of maintaining civilian morale occupied most of Dunton's attention. Canadians' enthusiasm flagged. "Is it important whether the individual works hard or not?" remained the most important question for the WIB to answer. The government information operations had to find remedies to stop the declining recruitment figures and the falling war production. The civilian population believed that their own sacrifices lay behind and that the armed forces' trials lay ahead. This attitude threatened the operation of the government's essential wartime
policies such as rationing and wage and price controls. At the end of the war, this fall back could lead to severe resentments between the soldiers and the workers. The problems remained troublesome even after the heavy troop casualties following the D-Day invasion of Europe on June 6, 1944.10

Dunton took over where Grierson left off, particularly in the application of social scientific methods to isolate areas or groups where discontent appeared strongest. Dunton's research branch developed several sophisticated means of gathering opinions. Grierson had successfully persuaded the cabinet to allow the WIB to carry out survey research and public opinion polling through the Canadian Opinion Company, a subsidiary of the Canadian Institute of Public Opinion, set up to carry out private, mainly government, work.11 The WIB believed that in order to proceed with an information campaign, it was necessary to possess an accurate picture of Canadians' views.12 Accordingly, the WIB regularly commissioned polls with large samples of more than one thousand respondents. A close relationship developed between J.D. Ketchum, head of the WIB's reports branch, and Arthur Porter, the CIPO's Canadian director. While working out the surveys, they helped each other develop adequate methodology including working the questions, coding the replies, and analyzing the results. Frequently, the WIB would analyze its own results or get the CIPO's coded questionnaires and reanalyze them for the board's own purposes.13 Tabulated by geographic region, economic rank, age, sex, education and occupation, the WIB used the results in the publication, Information Briefs, for circulation throughout the
government and in the "WIB Survey", a more confidential docu-
ment, numbered and distributed to those on a special list. The
WIB general manager also prepared various memoranda to the cabi-
net incorporating survey and other material. The WIB encouraged
the CIPO to publish much of the material collected for the
government. But this had to appear as though the Gallup organi-
zation itself had collected the data. Because of the political
fracas which would result if the Conservatives knew of the close
tie up between the WIB and the CIPO, the information agency
refused to allow the company to publicize the connection between
the two in any way.  

For further accuracy, the public opinion surveys were
collated with other reviews of Canadians' thinking. Perhaps the
most sensitive of these, the WIB countrywide system of corres-
pondents, reached its peak of efficiency under Dunton in 1944.
Beginning with Vining and expanding with Grierson, the reports
branch confidentially requested individuals from all over the
country to write weekly or bi-monthly on local reaction to
various issues, particularly those concerning the post-war.  
Recruited on a largely personal basis, the correspondents
included projectionists on the National Film Board's film cir-
cuits and the writers' war committee of the Canadian Authors'
Association. Reports had arrived from more than 140 communi-
ties in Canada by the end of 1944. Many of these weekly
letters were drivel, but some of the WIB's recruits possessed
considerable insight into their local communities. From
these dispatches, the branch put together a confidential week-
ly and a monthly summary edition of "Field Reports" which
analyzed the letters by topic to discover general attitudes regarding government programmes, particularly areas of discontent. In the weekly edition, quotations from letters gave the actual line of comment with the correspondent identified by his community. The WIB received another sensitive input, extracts from censored letters. These censorship intercepts received careful scrutiny by the reports branch which used them anonymously to illuminate problems of morale in several reports. The board also continued to analyze the daily, weekly and foreign press as well as the radio.

Although the government did not make a practice of using the WIB's information collecting facilities to aid the Liberal party, these occasionally proved politically useful. The "Field Reports," for example, generally indicated where political support for the government was weak or strong. The CIPO had proven its utility as an accurate assessor of probable election results during the 1943 Ontario election campaign. This did not go unnoticed. On at least one occasion, the Prime Minister's Office requested the WIB to include a particular question, although this demand came through Brooke Claxton, by far the most consistent political user of the WIB's results. Claxton asked privately for age breakdowns on political preferences and as minister of National Health and Welfare, requested information on opinion about the implementation of family allowances. The memoranda which Dunton submitted to the cabinet frequently analyzed the political implications of shifts in Canadians' public opinions.

Dunton, however, usually used the public opinion
surveys to argue in favour of an expansion of the WIB's domestic programmes. Each of the WIB surveys recommended a means of dealing with an information problem which the opinion analysis had revealed. Frequently, it appears as though the findings of the surveys were used to bolster a previously agreed-upon approach. If the survey did not support the prejudices of the WIB staff working on a particular report, the findings were not included. Once Dunton had used the WIB's reports branch surveys to demonstrate forcefully that a morale problem existed in a specific field, he presented submissions to cabinet asking approval for a proposed remedial information programme. Then, the WIB used the surveys to analyze current levels of information and knowledge, and indications of particular aspects which required emphasis, to draw up the specific plan of attack.

To build up his case for WIB expansion, however, Dunton had to cancel one programme. The food conservation information proposals which Grierson had pioneered remained mired in departmental and cabinet opposition. Dunton dropped the programme rather than spend his energies trying to redeem it and risk the establishment of a permanent opposition to the rest of the board's plans. All the work was not lost. Once the programme staff wound up their activities on May 8, 1944, their experience and preparatory work formed the basis for an expanded consumer news service. The radio experience of this section eventually led Dunton to create a Wartime Information Board radio service in October 1944 to provide supporting radio scripts for all WIB undertakings.
As soon as he had rid himself of the food information albatross, Dunton pressed forward in areas where government policies needed support because of the state of civilian morale. Grierson's first proposals for WIB aid to the government's wage and price controls had encountered opposition but Dunton met with the minister of Finance, J.L. Ilsley, in early February and salvaged the proposals as well as the huge $757,000 budget. After the five month campaign ended in September 1944, the general manager gained authorization for an extension. Dunton also managed to smooth over the troubles besetting the industrial information programme. Gathering together a group of deputy ministers in March 1944, Dunton received approval to institute a morale programme. A quickly-established interdepartmental committee set up shop and by the end of May an industrial morale campaign was in full swing. The last big information campaign, the rehabilitation and demobilization information programme aimed at aiding both troops and civilians adjust to the post-war situation. It was planned in the fall of 1944 and moved into operation early in 1945.

Running a tidy shop, Dunton tightened up the board's organization and gave these new functionally-based operations a general structure. At the top, each programme originated in the regular meetings of an interdepartmental committee. Once the cabinet approved the committee's submissions, forwarded via the WIB, the formalized committee directed the policy of the programme. The committee for each programme was composed of the publicity directors of concerned departments as well as representatives of the CBC, National Film Board and the WIB who
were the executing agencies. While the committee ostensibly decided on the specific shape of the programme, the Wartime Information Board exerted the most powerful influence in determining the committee's decisions. The chairman and secretary both worked for the WIB. Below this main committee, various sub-committees dealt with particular publicity aspects of the programme: research, advertising, film and radio. Each sub-committee also contained a number of WIB executive officers as well as media specialists. Once each sub-group prepared proposals for its particular aspect of the programme, the main committee discussed and usually approved them. After this, the advertising proposals went before a cabinet sub-committee on advertising. This sub-committee, established late in 1943, was set up to protect the cabinet's discretionary power in allocating advertising money, traditionally a source of political patronage. During Dunton's tenure, the WIB turned into a coordinating agency which hired staff members for, or assigned existing workers to, a specific information programme. Nominal-ly, each officer working for the programme had an assignment in a WIB section.

This smoothly-functioning organization gave the WIB a much greater influence over government policy. Because of the interdepartmental nature of the high-level members of the WIB board, the organization could call upon their influence to overcome departmental opposition. The Wartime Information Board used its influence in the programme committees to run the information programmes its own way. This meant down-grading the publicity co-ordinating committee. This committee,
established during the time of the Bureau of Public Information, had gone through a considerable evolution. Originally con-
ceived as a means by which the BPI and the WIB could obtain some co-ordination of publicity, its 1944 meetings turned into gossip sessions about trends in Canadian morale. The Wartime Information Board, responsible for calling and for chairing the meetings, was able to establish its programmes without using the publicity co-ordinating committee and, much to some departments' chagrin, quit calling the committee together regularly.

The Wartime Information Board found that it could influence policy in other ways. The systematic study which the sub-committees of each information programme brought to bear on the problems of information in a specific field meant that ambiguities in government directives showed up more easily. The access of the board to statistical breakdowns of public irritants also provided considerable influence. The WIB was always quick to point these out and to suggest remedies. In rehabilitation information work, for example, the interdepa-
mental committee had to discuss the interpretation of rehabili-
tation legislation in order to give a proper presentation to the public. The committee members agreed that they were free to decide that a particular problem of interpretation would involve more than a question of information. When this hap-
pened, they drew it to the attention of the appropriate authority. Afterwards, if the problem were not solved to the committee's satisfaction, they would submit their arguments to the cabinet. They always bolstered their contentions by point-
ing out that regulations for administering reconstruction or
rehabilitation measures could not receive adequate publicity until made more specific.35

Through his administrative skills, the general manager also began operating de facto information programmes using the WIB domestic news services if he knew that a direct approach would not gain cabinet approval. Given the previous conflict, the WIB would have severely tempted fate by asking cabinet to approve a full-scale reconstruction information programme. Grierson's poor tactics during his efforts to bolster the work of the Canadian Association for Adult Education and the Canadian Council of Education for Citizenship, precluded any further attempt. Dunton tried another tack. He hired a University of Toronto economist, Dr. Lorne Morgan, plus a group of Morgan's graduate students to do research and to put together background papers once the government had decided on its reconstruction policies. The board then distributed their work to interested individuals and organizations. No large-scale advertising campaign was contemplated but the high repute of Morgan's work gained wide indirect publicity for the releases he produced.36 Dunton also used the adult educators' services and the citizens' forum radio broadcasts for this purpose. He continued the WIB subsidy to the CCEC which in turn distributed the board's material through the provincial school systems. The citizens' forum broadcasts and the CCEC both distributed thousands of copies of the WIB's informational series, Canadian Affairs, which dealt mainly with the post-war prospects.37 The WIB also used its connections through other voluntary organizations like the Workers' Educational Association to publicize
the government's reconstruction policies. All the while, the Liberals on the board's staff made certain that the outgoing material did not favour the CCF political position on reconstruction. Geoffrey Andrew further advised the CCEC to make no money grant to the citizens' forums but only to support the forums with printed material. It was safer that way. Brooke Claxton continued to cast a wary eye on CCEC's expenses and deplored the organization's lack of policy.

Dunton's information to the armed forces section also occupied a curious position in the board's structure. This section consolidated all the board's work dealing with the armed forces. It underwent a very ad hoc expansion. The department of National Defence, in May 1943, requested the board to take on the editorial responsibility for Canadian Affairs, a public affairs magazine distributed overseas. The WIB later established a home edition of the journal, a servicemen's forum radio show and the magazine, Canada Digest. Like the functionally-based programmes, this section engaged in direct publicity work. It also had very close connections and overlapping staff with the rehabilitation information programme. Its audience, however, consisted only of servicemen and its funding remained the responsibility of the department of National Defence.

While Dunton succeeded in attacking many areas where morale problems existed, he could not solve the continuing quandary of providing a comprehensive French-language information service to the largest group of Canadians suffering from low morale. The board's managers held no antagonism toward
French Canada and tried to apply a bilingual policy as they understood it. The means of establishing a French information service, however, had puzzled the board from its beginning in 1942. The board members did not know how to 'cope' with Quebec and besides in many French and English minds, the war effort was an English Canadian effort. The French Canadian vice chairman, Philippe Brais, had lost interest in the board's work. Although the bilingual Dunton and the board's parliamentary spokesman, Brooke Claxton, were both Montrealers with strong sympathetic attachments to French Canada, neither felt capable of tackling the establishment of an information service to Quebec. Georges Benoit who filled the French section head's job in the domestic branch failed to provide any initiative. Benoit could not get along with his boss, A.D. Dunton. A gregarious man, Benoit set about tasks impulsively, and haphazardly. Although very busy, the general manager himself took over most of the management of the French section. It took all the section's energy just to get out the news.

The threat of controversy always compounded the problems of any federal government programme dealing with the war effort in Quebec. The WIB was no exception. The dangers associated with French language information operations had shown up early in the board's life. Shortly after the board began preparing a religious publication, *Nouvelles Catholiques*, the fuss began. Toronto Baptist minister, T.T. Shields, berated the board in May 1943 for producing "Catholic propaganda." Shields' attack provided an opening for French Canadian nationalists to accuse the government of putting on two faces, one for Quebec's
French Catholics and the other for the rest of the country. Although the board found defenders in the Quebec press and the storm soon blew over, the incident appears to have scuttled any major board undertaking aimed specifically at Quebec. For personnel and political reasons, therefore, federal information work to Quebec never really developed fully. In many instances the board made efforts not to single out French Canada for special treatment. All material for the functional programmes originated in English and the board's staff then translated and adapted it into French versions. When Benoit tried to expand his French section into a branch, nothing happened. The French section, denied any initiative in formulating domestic programmes, began spending most of its time preparing propaganda for broadcast overseas to France. Despite a board directive asking Benoit to spend more time on domestic activities, he side-stepped this request and continued working mainly in the external field. When Benoit followed up his real interests and left for Paris in November 1944, the new section head, Lorenzo Masson, did not undertake a more vigorous programme.

While setting up his programmes, Dunton's sober management kept the board's staff and public relations on a generally even keel. The board members no longer viewed their role as that of providing a check on the actions of an impetuous general manager. Back in British Columbia, Norman MacKenzie busied himself with his university and left Dunton, Arnold Heeney and Brooke Claxton in Ottawa to make most of the decisions. The board's staff morale remained high. Dr. Lorne Morgan, head of
the reconstruction information programme, in the board "work-house" was busy "writing speeches, booklets, question-and-answer items, radio broadcasts, trouble-shooting, advising, cajoling, threatening, coaxing, pleading, god-damning, go-to-helling, and having a hectic time generally." In Parliament, the board received no special treatment. Dunton's 1944 estimates had a less thorough scrutiny than Grierson's even though they represented a $300,000 increase. Without much conviction, the Opposition trotted out their familiar arguments against public information work. When the House of Commons Public Accounts Committee planned an investigation of the board's expenditures, there was no fuss.

The conscription crisis of 1944, however, raised charges of political partisanship on the part of the WIB. Mackenzie King fired his minister of National Defence, J.L. Ralston, because Ralston did not agree with King's stand that men conscripted under the National Resources Mobilization Act should not serve overseas. The board's contribution in the consequent political battling consisted of printing and distributing a November 8 speech by Mackenzie King. In this radio address, the Prime Minister appealed for volunteers to step forward from both the general population and from the ranks of the men conscripted for home defence. King also defended the government's policy of voluntary enlistment for overseas service. Originally Dunton had opposed the board's printing the speech fearing that the WIB would get involved in the political controversy and damage its reputation. He was right. The pro-conscriptionists seized upon the board's intervention and complained
that the government agency had acted to aid the Liberal party. The former WIB chairman, Charles Vining, told Dunton to resign if Ralston's statements setting out the need for conscription did not receive equal treatment. Taking advantage of the newspaper and public criticism, the Conservatives in the House of Commons questioned the Prime Minister about the board's role. Mackenzie King, at Claxton's urging, strongly denied any political interference in the board's work and reiterated that his earlier speech had not rebutted Ralston's arguments but had only appealed for volunteers. He further pointed out that his statement on Ralston's resignation had received no publicity through the Wartime Information Board. With this defence, Dunton's good connections paid off.

Expecting an election in 1945 and wanting to prevent government agencies from aiding the Liberals, the Conservatives kept the controversy alive. Less than a month after the Prime Minister's December 4 statement to the House of Commons, the Conservative Premier of Ontario, George Drew, revived the issue. By this time, the board had arranged with the Canadian Council of Education for Citizenship to distribute pamphlets throughout Canadian schools. Naturally, King's speech reached the public schools of Ontario. Taking great offence, Drew notified Ontario school principals not to accept any material for distribution to students except from Queen's Park. In his weekly radio series, Drew amplified his reasons. The ban, he told his audience, resulted not from the conscription material directly. The director of Education had examined copies of WIB pamphlets distributed by the CCEC and found that they contained
political propaganda which supported the Liberal government in Ottawa. Obviously, the delicate minds of Ontario children should be protected.

Dunton promptly denied any improper interference by his staff in Ontario’s schools. The Canadian Affairs pamphlet series to which Drew objected had most successfully appealed to various voluntary organizations and school systems as a means of stimulating thinking and discussion. The Canadian Affairs issue on Ontario had, in fact, resulted from a request by an Ontario government civil servant, the provincial Agent-General in London. The 'mistakes' that history professor Donald Creighton had made in the pamphlet, Dunton had discovered, consisted of a single typographical error. Publicly, Brooke Claxton, minister of National Health and Welfare, and John Robbins, secretary of the Canadian Council of Education for Citizenship, lined up with Dunton. Although the Liberals optimistically viewed this weak attack as "the last gasp of a dying Toryism," Drew had made his point. He had warned the government against expecting the WIB to take too active a role in supporting Liberal policies in the approaching election.

Dunton and his board members remembered this incident during the spring campaign and remained very detached. Between the time that King announced his election and the June 11 voting day, the Allies won their victory in Europe. This turned Canadians' eyes to the post-war and, happily, the Liberals had chosen a campaign platform which emphasized the new social order to follow the war. As proof, the Liberals cited the family allowance measures announced in the 1944 Address from the Throne
and due to begin in July 1945. In choosing this stance, the government demonstrated a thorough mastery of the lesson learned between the citizens' forum contretemps and the election campaign. The Wartime Information Board stayed out of it all. Norman MacKenzie told his board colleagues that WIB publication of any politicians' addresses would prove "unsound." Not totally able to free themselves from partisan connections, however, the board decided to publish the Prime Minister's addresses as head of government but not as head of the Liberal party. The only WIB contribution to the flood of election material, a Canadian Affairs special issue, had space very carefully apportioned to the various parties' use. Each party could outline its platform at a varying length depending upon its numerical strength in the House of Commons. At one point, the Prime Minister's Office requested 5,000 copies of a WIB brochure lauding the success of economic stabilization under the Liberal administration. Intended to sell the policy, not the Liberals, use of the pamphlet could have proven political dynamite for the board. After considering the request, the economic stabilization information committee and the board avoided the issue by replying that no extra booklets existed.

Once the Liberals felt safe, after fending off the Conservatives and the CCF and winning the June election, they did not hesitate to interfere in the operations of the WIB. Shortly after the election, H.E. Kidd, publicity director of the Liberal federation, protested to Brooke Claxton about the WIB's plans to send Gratton O'Leary, arch-Tory publisher, overseas to speak to the armed forces in a WIB-sponsored
rehabilitation information programme. O'Leary, Kidd stated, "has condemned us, our ideas and our political faith ... if it be convenient to send him out of the country what's the matter with Siberia . . ." Claxton agreed with Kidd's assertions. Although it is not clear, Claxton appears to have brought the incident to the attention of the Prime Minister. As a result the cabinet told the board that the plans had not been properly worked out and cancelled the programme. While the cabinet did not directly censure the board since Army headquarters in London had suggested O'Leary's name, several of the board's staff members could not contain their fury. Donald Macdonald of the demobilization information programme felt that the speakers' tours comprised a very important part of his work. Contact with prominent Canadians, he believed, might change the cynical attitude of the men awaiting repatriation. Instead of learning about opportunities awaiting them at home, many soldiers, "blew three years' pay in a month . . . being carried in dead drunk off the streets at night." Given problems like these, Macdonald expostulated, "picture the omniscience of a cabinet rendering judgement in Ottawa! Either they do not know; or if they know, it is criminal folly."}

Presented with a prima facie case to embarrass the government, the other political parties did nothing. A WIB staff member, probably Donald Macdonald, told the tale to Eugene Forsey, research director for the Canadian Congress of Labour. In turn, Forsey relayed the story to Conservative Arthur Meighen and to several CCF Members of Parliament. Despite this ammunition, the opposition did not publicize the
affair. Dispirited by their recent defeat, neither the Conservatives nor the CCF wanted immediately to take up the cudgels. Because the House of Commons was not in session, the Liberals had time before the next sitting to spirit off or to destroy all the pertinent documentation.

(ii)

As planning for peace began, the government had to reconsider its role in a liberal democratic country of providing information to its citizens. When the allied armies gained the upper hand in late 1944, the WIB began to consider the issue and to prepare submissions for the cabinet. Davidson Dunton, in a November memorandum, began the task of defining a peace-time role for government information. Dunton remarked that in a democracy, in peace as in war, citizens needed the facts to judge a situation since "their support for participation in national measures is determined by their convictions." During the war, Dunton argued, stretching the point somewhat, that the government information organizations had operated on the:

principle that in a democracy it is both wrong and unnecessary to attempt to exhort, cajole or bamboozle people into acceptance of precepts laid down by a power above.

The government, therefore, had given its information agencies the mandate to give Canadians the facts so that they would understand the needs and would draw the "right conclusions." With the peace, complex issues would not disappear and the government could never revert to pre-war catch-as-catch-can news services. Complicated national measures, the proposed social security schemes for example, would still depend for
their success on public understanding. In concluding, however, Dunton acknowledged the problems of the government's maintaining a domestic peacetime information service because of fears that this agency would serve as an instrument of political management.68

During the nine months between Dunton's proposals and the final cabinet decision, the information board's sections debilitated. Many board activities wound down in late 1944. The Prime Minister kept a close watch over the board's expenses, feeling that many wartime programmes had grown unnecessary.69 After V-E Day and the Liberals' victory in the June 11 election, the staff began leaving the board to return to peacetime jobs. Davidson Dunton returned as editor of *The Montreal Standard* on August 15 and turned the general manager's position over to the WIB secretary, Geoffrey Andrew.70 Only the board's external branch carried on unencumbered by the domestic shutdown.71

The government was making a *de facto* acknowledgement that it had no business with a co-ordinated peacetime domestic information policy. Leading the proponents of this point of view, the newspapers feared that the board had established itself so firmly that it would remain as a peacetime rival.72 When the war ended and Japan surrendered in August 1945, the weight of editorial opinion even more strongly opposed any continuing service. A government press survey reported that in a symposium on the post-war, only eight out of 21 individuals favoured continuing information work at home.73 Newspapers which had defended the board during the war now urged its dismemberment.74
The only support for a continuing domestic information service grew out of the WIB's client organizations, particularly the Canadian Association for Adult Education. These groups wanted to maintain some national network of communications for promoting education for social change. The department of Labour and the labour movement also viewed peacetime information as a positive force on the domestic front. In short, the weaker groups in Canadian society supported the board's peacetime existence. To propagate their ideas, the stronger elements in the media and the government did not need the forum which the board provided and, therefore, opposed its continuation.  

The government puttered. A small committee in January, took charge of preparing the board's recommendations to cabinet. After studying reports from the board's representatives abroad, the fate of the British and American information systems and comments from Ottawa departments, the committee reported in February 1945 recommending continuance of some form of information system. By the time the Wartime Information Board made its formal recommendations to the government, the war in Europe had ended and newspaper opposition to a continuing service had grown very vehement. The board gave in and did not recommend a continuing home service. Dunton embodied this decision in a submission as one of his final acts as general manager. After considering the matter twice, the cabinet on September 28 approved an order in council setting up the Canadian Information Service.

This truncated organization had a mandate only to provide an external information service, and the remaining Wartime
Information Board domestic activities gradually wound down. The CIS arranged for booklets and films honouring the services that volunteers had provided during the war. A trimmed-down post-war planning section remained to answer questions and to continue a series of reference studies. Once these remnants of the WIB's work finally quietly disappeared in December 1945, only the rehabilitation information programme sponsored by the department of National Defence remained. This last vestige of the WIB's domestic operations stayed in business until the spring of 1946.

The disappearance of the Wartime Information Board is not surprising. Of all the Canadian wartime agencies, the WIB had not held the most-favoured child status. It had taken until John Grierson assumed control in 1943 for the government information operation to gain any coherent or consistent philosophical or programmatic basis. Only after Davidson Dunton became general manager in 1944 did the board obtain any security within the organization of government. Dunton had strengthened the wartime information establishment, designed and executed politically-sensitive programmes, fended off criticism and prepared the plans for the board's post-war future. The government had only given the board considerable responsibilities when headed by a 'safe' man who could be relied on to tell the 'truth' but not to rock the boat. Furthermore, once the demoralized opposition could not protest vigorously, the Liberal party had shown that it was not above using the government's information apparatus for its political advantage. It appears as though it was the luck of the draw which kept the board's hands clean.
Although essentially selling 'Liberal' activities in reconstruction and rehabilitation, the board managed in the public's eye to remain identified with 'government' policy and avoided getting caught up in political squabbles. But the administrative and theoretical side of wartime information operations is only part of the story.
PART II:
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THEMES
CHAPTER V
DEFINING CANADA'S PLACE IN THE WAR, I: BATTLING THE ENEMY

While information theory and policy set the bounds of Canadian wartime ideology, creating a nationalist message remained the ultimate goal of the Bureau of Public Information and the Wartime Information Board. Information officers realized that in order to unite Canadians behind the war effort, they had to use the war itself as a unifying symbol. ¹ Trying to sustain support for battles fought thousands of miles away, the members of the government and their subordinates had to emphasize the country's total contribution by Canadians of all descents.² In establishing an emotional feeling for Canada at war, the Prime Minister generally set out the 'line' followed by those who prepared other material.*³ The message itself, exemplified in a widely distributed BPI brochure, stressed that the war brought about "sharing together in common experience, working and striving together in great causes . . . ."⁴

Nationalist sentiment, however, revolved around several axes. One of these, a nationalism based on chauvinistic patriotism, tried to keep Canadians' emotions stirred up. National spectacles of the 'bread and circuses' variety, Reconversion Week in September 1941, for example, demonstrate this form most vividly. Proclaimed by the Governor General, it was

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* In many ways, Mackenzie King's statements constitute the most easily collected expressions of official wartime ideology. The information agencies reprinted and distributed millions of copies of them and frequently used them as the basis of their own work.

125
a week of rededication of:

our lives and principles . . . in honour of
those who on land, sea and in the air are the
defenders of our country . . . .

To promote popular participation, the BPI arranged for hundreds
of thousands of copies of inspirational printed material, as
well as news-reels, radio addresses, speeches, sermons and mili-
tary honour guards. A mass rally on Parliament Hill set the
pattern for similar gatherings across the country. The pro-
gramme included hymns, patriotic songs and the explosion of
three land mines at one minute intervals to symbolize the three
years of war. Grandiose attempts at public spectacles like
this one recurred until the end of the war.  

Politicians, government officials and the information
agencies also strove to create a second form of nationalism, a
popular sense of nationhood. Emphasizing the country's past
and future, the leitmotif of this variation remained the place
of the war in the advancement of the Canadian nation. From
1939 to 1942, it too took a traditional form and frequently is
indistinguishable from the chauvinist sentiments. On its own,
it might appear as a homiletic describing the war as the mid-
wife to a new social order 6 or a general plea for post-war
unity to preserve the gains in "strength and stature" that the
war had brought. 7 Naturally, the nationhood theme placed con-
siderable emphasis on the role of the federal government as a
national institution and on Ottawa's understanding of the rea-
lity of Canadians' problems. In their emotional nature and
commitment to arousing an emotional sense of 'Canadianism',
these two nationalist variations owed little to the rationalist principles of liberal democratic thought. They drew instead on the most manipulative aspects of propaganda and owed much to the precedent set by George Creel's American Committee on Public Information in the Great War which used simplistic slogans and formulas to create support for war.

While these two streams of 'Canadianism' appear throughout the war, they first arose in the September 1939 attempts to mobilize national resolve by answering the question "What are we fighting against?" Like the rudimentary state of information organization in September 1939, this first theme grew from a 'gut reaction' to the outbreak of war. It was closely tied to chauvinistic nationalism and reflected the traditional way of arousing public emotions in preparation for battle by defining an enemy. It also served to lay the foundation for the nationhood or national unity emphasis by its efforts at minimizing dissent over the declaration of war through stressing that Canada had not chosen this course but was forced into it by a cruel and diabolical enemy. In adopting this tactic, the government and its information organization presented a view of the enemy with a guaranteed popular appeal. At its crudest level, the message followed in the footsteps of popular tabloids like *Hush*, "the magazine with a heart," which filled its pages with horror stories of enemy atrocities. Canada, the Prime Minister explained, was fighting to prevent "a descent into a new and terrible age of
barbarism." Later, when Japan joined the enemy, King re-
iterated that the Axis nations were not "forced into war. They
were not drawn into war. They were themselves the aggressors.
They made war of their own choosing and at their own time." 

Throughout the war years, the Canadian information
apparatus emphasized the war against Nazi Germany. Although
government propaganda dealt with all the enemy nations in turn
as they entered the war, the message concentrated strongly on
creating the impression that Germany remained the most dangerous
of Canada's opponents. Canadian interpretations, however, did
not stress the culpability of all German people. The Canadian
government and its information organizations set the blame for
the war on the shoulders of Hitler and the Nazis. Pamphlets,
speeches and newspaper releases, in fact, took some care to
refrain from assigning the guilt for the war to all Germans.
Announcing the imminence of a Canadian declaration of war after
the German invasion of Poland, Mackenzie King blamed the ap-
proaching battles on the German chancellor who was "aggressive,
vviolent, deceitful and possessed with a lust for conquest." 

Inside Germany, the Prime Minister explained to Canadians, a
single party had gained power, not only political control but
total dominance over the bodies and minds of many German people.
This control, gained through subterfuge by using the Germans'
fear of communism, had allowed the Nazis to turn Germany into
a military machine. The Nazi party identified itself with the
state, and Hitler then turned his attention to the outside world
and with internal support for his international opportunism
promised to restore German glory lost by the earlier war and
by the Treaty of Versailles. To Germans, Hitler's international techniques of intimidation appeared successful as he 'righted' old wrongs and incorporated 'German' territories or 'Germanic' peoples into the greater Reich. These triumphs increased his support at home; more Germans joined the Nazi party and accepted his reliance on 'Force' and opposition to 'Reason'.

In rhetoric, combining the belief in Nazi culpability and this historical interpretation, the Canadian view turned the war into an eschatological struggle. In Mackenzie King's speeches, the war grew into a battle between the Nazi forces of darkness and the democratic forces of light. The war raged between "the pagan conception of the social order which ignores the individual and is based upon the doctrine of Might and a civilization based upon the Christian conception of the brotherhood of man with regard for the sanctity of contractual relations and the sacredness of human personality." "If we do not destroy what is evil," the Prime Minister warned, "it is going to destroy all that there is of good." As the Phoney War turned into Blitzkrieg in the spring of 1940, the biblical nature of the conflict took a larger place in Canadian propaganda. American playwright, Robert Sherwood, in a broadcast and BPI pamphlet, equated Naziism with a barbarism that forced men to abandon humanity and to assume the status of beasts. In democracies, only the "spiritually diseased" sympathized with the Nazis and the rest actively hated "the inhuman oppressor." The German adoption of 'total war' carried the battle into homes, hospitals, schools and churches. This slaughter of civilians served no purpose but "total destruction."
Although the struggle between good and evil had continued from the Creation, it had assumed a fearsome shape in which the possibility of the extinction of freedom arose.\textsuperscript{16} To American novelist, James Hilton, the blitzkreig should epitomize for Canadians "the unique and terrifying climax to which modern scientific technique has pushed an age-long struggle."\textsuperscript{17}

In Quebec, this strictly moral question received considerable emphasis throughout the war. At the instigation of the government, Cardinal Villeneuve, the Catholic Archbishop of Quebec, preached that "as a murdering and sacrilegious potentate," Hitler represented the "very organization of evil. His adversaries and victims represent patriotism and right."\textsuperscript{18}

A 1942 BPI pamphlet, \textit{Ils veulent détruire l'église de Dieu}, described anti-Christian indoctrination of young Germans, showed priests standing amidst their ruined churches and exhorted "Hitler est l'anti-christ! Enfants de DIEU DEBOUT!"\textsuperscript{19} Government releases sermonized that "la nouvelle 'bible' des soldats nazis leur enseigne la haine du christianisme." On the other hand, "nos soldats sont de vrais êtres humains . . . ."\textsuperscript{20}

While used elsewhere, the atrocity and racial persecution stories had a particular place in Quebec. Ernest Lapointe, the minister of Justice, told French Canadians about the massacres of Roman Catholic clergy. French Canadians, Lapointe concluded, should support the war effort because if the Nazis invaded Canada they "surely would not respect our clergy any better than the Polish priests . . . ." If they knew, Canadian information officers did not place any emphasis on the extermination of European Jews in Nazi death camps. Anti-semitism had
remained one element of Canadian wartime opinion which the government did little to reduce by recounting anti-Jewish atrocities.21

Without a direct application to Jews, Mackenzie King did set out the threat lying behind Nazi racial theories. The Prime Minister told Canadians that Hitler posited that the "nordic race," the chosen people, alone had the 'right' to rule the world and to establish their hegemony by any chosen means. Nazi racism and militarism were woven together since, to the Nazis, the superiority of the master race involved its ability to "dominate by brute force." Twisting the argument, King contended that Nazi 'superiority' masked a very real inferiority which forced the Nazis to eliminate comparisons by wiping out all that was best in conquered Europe. "From the day Hitler achieved power in Germany," the Prime Minister reported to Canadians, "the concentration camp became a symbol of Nazi domination. In the conquered countries as in Germany itself, the unspeakable tortures of the concentration camp have been used by Hitler to end opposition to the single master race." In order that the superior people might have food, the conquered countries starved. Attendant disease made mass extermination of 'inferiors' easier. Resistance to the Nazis led to massacres. King told Canadians about the instances of German massacres of hundreds of civilians as vengeance for the murder of a single German soldier. The Nazis committed these "brutalities and savageries not as incidents in the heat of battle . . . but as the deliberate instrument of Hitler's racial policy."22

The official Canadian view of the war used all these
arguments in order to convince the population to mobilize to prevent the realization of the major Nazi objective, world domination. As the anti-Nazi themes moved away from their more hysterical beginning, the projection of a Nazi thirst for conquest grew into the pre-eminent view of German motivation. After the 1940 German victories, the formation of the Triple Axis by Germany, Italy and Japan made it easy for the Canadian view to include an image of the Germans conniving to rule the world. By holding out "specious hope of collaboration", Hitler tried to get subject peoples to support his efforts. It was all part of the plot. Since the Nazis would not gain satisfaction from anything less than ruling the world, Canada had turned into a prize of war to be captured as the Nazis moved from Norway, the Faroe Islands, Greenland and Newfoundland. Because of Hitler's limitless ambition, the National Film Board told its audiences, "there is no portion of the globe which he would be more likely to covet than this Dominion of Canada. There is no other portion of the earth's surface which contains such wealth as lies buried here . . . ." The NFB portrayed the centre of the forces of darkness and of subversion as the Munich Institute, a spy centre from which the Nazis plotted the subversion of the western world. This subversion and the spread of totalitarianism abroad and at home, the Canadian government reiterated, would not end until the total defeat of Germany.

As the war progressed, Canadian optimism about the prospects of an Allied victory grew stronger. During the worst period of 1940, Mackenzie King predicted that the military setbacks had hardened the national will and this fierceness held
out hope for the future. Over-extended German supply lines meant that an economic blockade could threaten German supplies to conquered territories and, therefore, contained an element of weakness. The entry of the U.S. in 1941 bolstered the feeling of ultimate victory and as Allied troops began to get the upper hand in Europe in 1943, the Canadian government began to gloat a little in its German propaganda themes. The Nazi "dream" of world conquest had turned into a "nightmare". Canadians' efforts, the government still urged, should not slacken because of this. The issue of the life or death of civilization had yet to gain a final decision on the battlefield. As the war ended, the Canadian government heaped the blame even more strongly on the Nazi leaders. The NFB produced a film, Guilty Men, which showed the gory revenge taken by various peoples on the German oppressors. When the Nazi leaders who had not committed suicide went on trial before an international court at Nuremberg for their war crimes, the film glorified the trial into an affair totally in keeping with the democratic conception of justice and contrasted this treatment with the criminals' wartime atrocities.

Although the Germans absorbed most of the propaganda fire, Italy also received hard-line treatment. Expecting the Italian attack on France in June 1940, Mackenzie King had warned Canadians of the probability that Italy would join Germany to carve up a conquered France. As long as Italy remained neutral, however, so did the Prime Minister's prose. When Italy invaded her neighbour on June 10, 1940, Canadian propaganda quickly adopted a vitriolic tone. Mackenzie King told Canadians
that "with a callousness and treachery second only to that of Hitler . . . Mussolini, the dictator who holds the Italian people in thrall, has chosen when he believes to be the psychological moment to strike . . ." The Italian leader had only declared war, King told Canadians, "in order to satiate his lust for conquest, and . . . for such glory as calculated duplicity and treachery can bring."

In its use of historical interpretation to justify judgements, the Canadian government's propaganda followed the pattern established for Germany. Italy, a nation which barely eighty years before had produced such liberal democrats as Mazzini, Cavour and Garibaldi, had betrayed the help and encouragement of the English peoples in the struggle for Italian unification. The countries of the British Commonwealth, furthermore, had welcomed Italian immigrants. In addition to betraying this assistance, the stab in the back in 1940 came from a former ally whose troops had fought beside Canadians from 1914 to 1918. Italy had turned its back on the past. The rise of the Fascist dictatorship during the 1920's and 1930's signalled the repudiation of the humanistic ideals of the Italian Renaissance. Italian creations in art, music, literature and religion had come to count for nothing.

Yet, Canadian propaganda did not apply its judgements to all Italians and excluded the bulk of the people from the blame heaped upon their leaders. As a poor people exploited by their aristocracy, the Italians had grown restless. The Fascist party, taking advantage of this unrest, had deceived the masses into believing the party would reform their
situation. Once Mussolini had gained power, however, he began an opportunistic series of imperial ventures which led eventually to his declaration of war. Canadian government releases, therefore, included no slurs on the Italian people or on the Italian leadership of the Roman Catholic church. Instead, the government tried to prove that gullibility was the Italians' sole fault by citing the loyalty to the allied cause of Italian immigrants in Canada.\(^{33}\)

The picture of Italy did not change much as the war progressed. The Italian declaration of war, Mackenzie King told Canadians, had relieved suspense and had moved other nations, notably the United States, to firm up their alliance with Britain. The Prime Minister predicted that Italy, the vulnerable enemy, could not long withstand the strain of the war. The Italians' military setbacks in Africa and Greece shortly after Italy entered the war lent credence to the Canadian theme that the Italian soldier did not have his heart in battle. In his New Year's Eve address to Canadians in 1940, King repeated that "... Italy is not the real enemy. The real enemy today is Nazi Germany."\(^{34}\) Further Italian defeats in early 1941 strengthened this contention that the Italians were "led into war" and that neither the number of soldiers nor modern equipment made up for their "lack of fighting spirit." According to the Canadian interpretation, the defeats had severely discredited the Fascists; the "basic Italian love of Liberty" was returning and Italians remained Axis partners only because Mussolini's force remained stronger than the will of King Victor Emmanuel and the Pope.\(^{35}\) When the Allies invaded Sicily
in July 1943, the Italian resistance movement overthrew and hanged Mussolini. This action further vindicated the government's interpretation of Italy's place in the war. The consequent German occupation of Italy put the Italian people in the same position as the rest of occupied Europe. The Canadian propaganda themes began depicting the Italians as deserving of the same sympathy as other Europeans under the Nazis' heels. In Canadian eyes, Italy, like all of conquered Europe, awaited liberation and freedom.

Of the anti-enemy propaganda, that concerning Japan took on the most complex shading. Explaining the Japanese declaration of war in 1941, the Canadian information officials based their interpretation of Japan's place in the war on inherent Japanese racial characteristics. With the Japanese, no common western cultural root or influential immigrant community in Canada prevented racial slurs. In fact, Canada had a history of racial prejudice against orientals, and propaganda took a racist twist without threatening Canadian cultural premises or alienating a segment of the population whose efforts could prove useful to the war effort. A National Film Board production, *The Mask of Nippon*, set the outline of the Canadian view of Japan even in its title. The whole film expressed the idea that the racial traits of the Japanese led to a duality in their 'character' which made them unreliable. 'On one hand, the Japanese, an ambitious and industrious people, trained their children as a master race. On the other hand, their capability of committing suicide and cold-blooded murder showed that they held all life in contempt. As a race, the Japanese could practice deceit and
treachery in such a manner that their every action held a double meaning. Even in their home life this racial duality manifested itself. The Japanese combined a love of beauty with the warlike nature of the Samurai. Japan wanted Canada's natural resources, would stop at nothing to get them, and had allied itself with Hitler's plots by joining the Axis in 1940 and by its attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941. The government also justified its northern projects by citing the danger of a Japanese invasion. Only in declaring war did the true face of Japan emerge from behind the mask.

The Canadian view of Japan entered another phase when, by 1944, victory in Europe appeared assured. Again the propagandists tried to provide an image of what to fight against as a means of instilling enthusiasm for the Pacific war. By this time, however, Canadians had lost most of their enthusiasm for the fight. Government information material emphasizing the preeminence of the European War had done its part in convincing Canadians that their war would end with Germany's surrender. Canadians, especially French-Canadians, believed that Canada should not take a large part in the war against Japan.

In efforts to overcome this sentiment, government publications set out an historical rationale for Canada's stepping up the fight against Japan. In the Canadian Affairs series, H.L. Keenleyside, former member of the Canadian Legation in Japan, presented a comprehensive explanation of the reasons for the war in the east. For one thousand years before 1853, Keenleyside explained, Japan had remained isolated from the outside world. After it opened its doors to the west, the country fell
under the sway of a group of men who manipulated the Japanese people to suit their military and economic purposes. After 'restoring' the emperor and putting him under their influence in 1867, this clique used his position as a god of the Shinto religion to create a united nation and to gain obedience from the people. Once they united the country, the leaders engaged Japan in four wars of aggression. Political leadership of the country had changed from these cynical 'liberals' to "men whose minds had been warped . . . . without wisdom or wide experience . . . . with a smattering of western culture." The political leaders remained tools of a military, industrial and bureaucratic elite who enforced their rule on the Japanese people by forcing "absurd beliefs . . . down their throats." While inculcating the gospel that Japan had a mission and that the highest good was to die for the emperor, the country's rulers suppressed any opposition and forced the people to conform to their dictates. All the while, the Japanese people had no share in the growing industrial wealth of the country. A few wealthy families gained most of the income and poor Japanese had to sell their daughters for $4.00 during the 1930's. Abroad, the Japanese proved cruel conquerors, perpetrated the rape of Nanking in 1937, fostered the sale of opium in conquered territories and expanded their rule throughout Asia.

Keenleyside used these arguments to prove his contention that Canada had to fight to the finish with Japan and had a duty to break the hold of the aggressive elements over the Japanese people. If Japan were not utterly defeated, the country would continue as "the cancer of the Pacific," and the
militarists would rise again to cause another war. Even a negotiated settlement which did not deprive the Japanese of all their conquests might fail since the Japanese would use their remaining territory to regain possession of China and India in their search for world domination. As long as the Japanese remained strong enough to wage war, they continued to present a threat to civilization. As a Pacific power, Canada had to confront this challenge directly and put up a strong effort to defeat the Japanese.\textsuperscript{42}

Events, however, managed to forestall most large-scale publicity efforts aimed at selling Canadians on increasing the commitment to the war against Japan. When government information officers began to plan a campaign to convince Canadians of the need to continue the fight in the east, A.H. Newman, the representative of the department of Munitions and Supply on the publicity co-ordinating committee, told his colleagues that "things [are] being done in connection with the Japanese war that were not done for the European war but they are very much on the secret list."\textsuperscript{43} The atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki proved him right.

The government's information campaigns concerning the enemy remained very much tied to the traditional chauvinist technique of using the opponent to inspire unity and a fighting spirit. The theme did not change much from 1939 to 1945,\textsuperscript{44} possibly because it appeared to convince Canadians who generally accepted the government line. The Wartime Information Board reported in 1943 that "Canadians are now well sold on the war: they want the Axis defeated . . . ."\textsuperscript{45} When Italy surrendered
late in the summer of 1943, the WIB discovered "little bitterness against the Italians as compared with hatred of the Germans." Problems of gaining public support only began to appear when war-weary Canadians did not wholeheartedly endorse continuing a strong effort against Japan after Germany surrendered. But even some information officers shared this sentiment. Anti-enemy propaganda owed little to the rationality inherent in liberal-democratic doctrine. Perhaps necessary in wartime, irrational popular hatred of the enemy could turn into a liability if carried too far.
'Canadianism' as promoted by the information agencies involved more than defining the enemy. The BPI and WIB provided Canadians with an interpretation of the general course of military events and of Canada's allies. Placing the Canadian nation in this context, however, proved much more difficult than defining Canadian nationalism as patriotic opposition to tyranny. It also involved combining chauvinism and an appeal to a sentiment of nationhood in a mixture which would appeal to opinionated and conflicting segments of the Canadian public. Nonetheless, the Bureau of Public Information and the Wartime Information Board continued to express a nationalistic view in the interpretation of military events and of the place of each ally.

The government set the emphasis on nationhood in September 1939 by pointing out that Canada had declared war in her own right and on her own behalf. Throughout the war, official sources reiterated that Parliament, as the representative of the Canadian people, had decided to go to war. While the government made this point throughout the country, the message was nowhere more strongly put than in Quebec. On a speaking tour of the province in 1941, the deputy minister of National War Services, Major General L.R. Laflèche, rhetorically asked
his French-speaking audiences, "pourquoi sommes-nous en guerre?"

He then answered emphatically that:

**disons immédiatement que le Canada n'est pas en guerre parce que l'empire brittanique est en guerre. Certes nous combattons dans un même élan et d'un même coeur aux côtés des autres nations de l'empire, mais notre statut de particulaire dans la communauté des nations brittaniques n'a pas été déterminant de notre participation au présent conflit . . . . En formulant notre déclaration de guerre . . . . nous avons affirmé, à la face du monde, comme nation souveraine qui seule peut décider de sa destinée . . . 2**

The message did not change as the war progressed. In publicizing Canada's billion dollar loan to Great Britain in March 1942, Mackenzie King answered criticism that Canada had made no arrangements similar to the American Lend-Lease programme which gave American arms in return for bases on British territory. "Not only," reiterated the Prime Minister, "are we sharing as a full partner in the struggle" by paying for all military supplies used by Canadian forces, but also by helping to supply Britain with equipment, munitions and other wartime essentials. Not a lease nor a loan to Britain, this was "a direct contribution by Canada to the cause of Freedom." In concluding, the Prime Minister pointed out that "in the enthusiasm of our satisfaction that the United States has resolved to throw the decisive weight of its material aid into the struggle," Canadians should not "discount the magnitude of the material contribution and the contribution in manpower which the people of this Dominion are making." 3

In many instances, the nationalistic propagandizing consisted of making sure that Canada's contribution to the
allies received adequate news reporting. The problem of Canadian efforts getting less exposure than the other allies' most frequently occurred after the end of 1941 in actions taken jointly with the United States. Because of the position of the operations as international ventures, it seemed better to gain publicity through newspaper stories engineered by the information agency rather than through policy speeches by members of the government. This practice followed the general principle that the swifter Canada publicized her official position the better the government could explain international events before conflicting interpretations appeared from other allied sources. As far as the United States was concerned, the Canadian government tried to release its material before American public relations 'pizzazz' stole Canada's thunder and overshadowed Canada's contribution. Accordingly, in several meetings between the WIB and American authorities, the two countries worked out arrangements so that Americans would not send out news of Canadian developments before their release to Canadian newspapers.

Concerning defence installations in northwestern Canada, for example, a WIB officer in Edmonton worked to correct public misconceptions both in Canada and in the United States "as to the extent of Canadian participation and agreements between the two countries as to post-war use," of the defence facilities. Sometimes, the WIB tried to prevent publicity on the activities because of embarrassment at the government's failure to initiate or to pay for major projects. In general, however, the board arranged for National Film Board productions and access for reporters to northern developments. In line
with the nationalist message, the WIB extolled the north as a trove of hitherto untapped resources which could help produce Canadian prosperity in the post-war years. Canadians and foreign, recognized these conferences as 'news events' since the meetings exerted "no impact whatsoever on world opinion save through a press relations policy." Extending this to the domestic scene, Canadian information officers tried to make certain that Canada's minimal part in the conference received full national coverage. Towards the end of the war, the Canadian information officials grew more and more concerned about the national presentation of international issues since the conferences had grown more political and less strategic. It also became very difficult to gain public enthusiasm for international meetings because, by this time, they ceased to be novelties and because news of significant decisions was never released. Officials feared that the loss of a sense of public 'participation' in the meetings might lead to a loss of popular support for these decisions.

Similar news management techniques put forward Canada's national position in the allied military ventures. The most spectacular failure to publicize Canadian military exploits occurred after allied forces, mainly Canadians, raided occupied France at Dieppe in August 1942. Canadian information officials
did not emphasize Canada's role in a concerted manner and American newsreels shown across Canada aroused considerable hostility by their depiction of the raid as an American venture. This information fiasco led to renewed determination that Canada's war effort gain its due, particularly in the next Canadian military action, the invasion of Sicily on July 10, 1943. In an evaluation, Davidson Dunton spelled out the WIB's achievement since "the mention of Canadians in the first news of the invasion engraved on the mind of the world the fact that Canadian troops are taking part." If, Dunton remarked, the news of Canadian participation had arrived later than the first word of the engagement, the impression would have been weaker. Since the WIB had kept the Prime Minister aware of the impending fighting, Mackenzie King was able to steal a march on Churchill and Roosevelt in issuing his statement. News agencies in Canada and around the world snapped up King's comments and gave them greater prominence than if the British or American leaders had simultaneously issued releases on the invasion.

Taking the publicity success of the Sicilian invasion as a precedent, the WIB tried to keep on top of military events so that Canadian leaders could emphasize for newsmen the part that Canada played in the overseas fighting. The board also pressed for a larger number of Canadian war correspondents to cover the progress of the Canadian troops in battle and helped to arrange for the distribution of their reports to the media.

Reporting to the war committee of the cabinet on the preparations for the invasion of Europe, Dunton said that he tried to ensure "due attention to Canadian participation in preparations
for news coverage" from Supreme Allied Military Headquarters. Both the cabinet and the WIB were concerned that communications arrive directly in Ottawa rather than via Washington so that the Prime Minister could make an early announcement when Canadian troops went into action. After the invasion, the board arranged for special couriers to fly dispatches and photographs to Ottawa for efficient and comprehensive distribution.

The nationalistic news interpretation of the war did not diminish as victory neared. The WIB warned the cabinet and began planning in the fall of 1944. At the same time, the information officers remained wary of a premature indication of imminent victory that might undermine a continuing war effort. While the 1944 plans proved too optimistic, the WIB by April 1945, had decided to use the European victory to reinforce the government's call to nationalism by drawing attention to the continuing war against Japan and by promoting the need for a continuing national will to solve the problems of post-war reconversion. As the German surrender approached, the WIB staff monitored all radio broadcasts so that the Prime Minister could make his announcement on a pre-arranged hook-up from San Francisco while attending the United Nations founding conference. After King's broadcast on May 8, 1945, the Board released 150,000 words worth of historical summaries, speeches, etc. After the first atomic bomb landed on Hiroshima, the board's officers issued an announcement by C.D. Howe, minister of Munitions and Supply, stating that "it is a particular pleasure for me to announce that Canadian scientists and Canadian institutions have played an intimate part and have been
associated in an effective way with this great scientific development."^{19}

This appeal to national pride, however, began to leave something to be desired by the mid-war years. Anglophobes complained that the emphasis on Canadian military participation led the public to believe that Canadian troops were being sacrificed on the battlefield to save British soldiers.\(^{20}\) In general, however, the reaction to the invasion of Sicily in mid-1943 highlighted a schizophrenic mentality. Canadians, angry that the other allies and particularly the United States did not mention the role of Canadian forces, still did not like the massive news build-up in Canada. "And they say the Americans bray," one observer commented.\(^{21}\) The exaggerations of earlier military news releases had created a very critical audience not vulnerable to the brouhaha of military prowess and victory parades.\(^{22}\) People who like patriotic spectacles watched victory parades whether they subscribed to the attached victory loan promotions or not and those who bought bonds did so regardless.\(^{23}\) WIB observers consistently noted a general feeling "that the public is told nothing except what is thought to be good for it . . . ." Glowing news reports of military campaigns followed by reports of reverses and the magnification of some small local success proved, some believed, that the government did not trust their ability to analyze the news.\(^{24}\) Canadians greeted the D-Day invasion soberly and unexcitedly. After the rapid western advances had aroused enthusiasm, the population again retreated to their earlier indifference.\(^{25}\) The country broke out of its shell on May 8, 1945, V.E. Day, but again the
organized celebrations largely flopped as Canadians took to the streets to express their joy.  

(ii)

Providing Canadians with an interpretation of the war, however, involved more than painting a general picture. It also meant finding the proper mixture of chauvinism and a sense of nationhood to give an evaluation of each particular ally. To design these themes, however, the government had to take care not to tread on toes. In the case of England, for example, Canadians of strong imperial sympathies objected to Canadian propaganda which did not emphasize Canada's reliance upon Great Britain. During the 1940 rout culminating in the French surrender, Arthur Meighen, former Prime Minister and Conservative senator, accused the BPI of "assisting in the present effort to load responsibility for our failure [on Britain] and to undermine that sentiment and devotion [to Britain] which is essential to our very life at this present hour." On the other hand, French Canadian nationalists opposed any hint that Canada fought for other than her own survival. "Si nous voulons rester canadiens," argued Georges Pelletier, editor of Le Devoir, "il s'agit de ne plus tarder de réagir . . . Si nous n'agissons . . . nous ne serons plus même des quality niggers . . . dans l'empire brittanique." Steering a middle course, Liberal Canadian nationalists like George Ferguson of The Winnipeg Free Press wanted "to hear a few more voices raised . . . lauding the achievements and qualities of our fellow countrymen." Government information, Ferguson felt, should
start on the assumption that Canadians should not be "asked to compare themselves with the English."²⁹

To satisfy all these sentiments, or at least not to antagonize any group too severely, government publicity drew attention to the essential place of Canadian aid to the British while expressing a calculated admiration for the British war effort. Before the 1940 Blitzkreig, the Canadian descriptions of Britain remained factual and reserved with little hysteria or emotionalism.³⁰ As France crumbled and the war perspective shifted to Britain's desperate defence from a Nazi invasion, Canadian propaganda changed direction. The civil service and the cabinet decided to play upon the fact that the United Kingdom held a special place in Canada as the 'mother country' for English Canadians and as the country receiving "the actual shock of the attack of the totalitarian powers upon the democracies of the world." The government remained fully aware that the important Canadian contribution to the war did "not carry with it the dramatic conditions" of the British who lived "in the actual firing line." Because of the strong interest in British conditions, the appeal of British suffering remained "a very potent one" for spurring further Canadian sacrifices.³¹

The image of Britain in Canadian rhetoric grew more emotional. Yet at the same time, the importance of the Canadian place in the war was never forgotten. When Mackenzie King anticipated the surrender of France and appealed for Canadians to stay calm, he emphasized the importance which the European disasters had placed on Canadian participation. He vowed in supporting Britain that:
this nation with all the strength of its youth, the wealth of its resources and the idealism of its freedom will proudly accept its new responsibility. We are the bridge between the old world and the new; the bridge which joins the freedom of the North American continent with the ancient freedom of Britain which gave it birth. . . . 32

Emotional appeals for aid to Britain, however, at times tended to overshadow this extension of Canadian national feeling. Later, in 1941, as the German bombing of London and the stoic resistance of the British had captured the imagination of Canadians, Mackenzie King's speeches immediately picked this up.

"The scene of devastation," he preached:

in bombed out areas such as the one surrounding St. Paul's Cathedral and covering a vast part of the city of London is truly appalling. Those scenes must be ever present in the minds of the men and women of Britain. They relate to the past but they are even more terrifying in what they disclose of a possible future. . . . 33

The National Film Board documentary, The Second Year of War, commissioned by the director of Public Information, included some spectacular photography of the flickering light cast by burning buildings on the dome of St. Paul's. The film-makers knew that this approach must provoke a sympathetic and emotional response from Canadians of British ancestry. 34 In Quebec, Major General L.R. Laflèche told audiences that Britain alone stood "entre la liberté des démocraties et l'hégémonie allemande."
The "dernier rampart contre la barbarie," the British fought "avec un courage farouche et admirable . . ." and personified "les espoirs de tous les peuples encore libres." 35

Throughout the British 'citadel-of-freedom' period from 1940 to 1943, British symbols gained a particular potency in Canada. The monarchy had a particular place. Mackenzie King's
speeches told Canadians of "the nobility of soul which we see revealed as Their Majesties with smiling courage share amid scenes of cruel devastation, the dangers and the sorrows . . . " of life in London. Along with King George VI and Queen Elizabeth, Winston Churchill, the British Prime Minister, inspired idolatry and for many Canadians embodied British drive and will to resist. After Churchill's 1942 visit, the Bureau of Public Information issued a pamphlet reprinting his speech to the Canadian House of Commons and including effectively emotive photographs.

Although these emotional appeals to British symbols did not disappear, they always included nationalist phrases which grew stronger as the war progressed. The Prime Minister concluded his description of bombed London by stating that:

it is in this light that Canada's contribution to the cause is best understood. The most casual visitor to Britain . . . could not fail to realize that the Canadians are numbered among her defenders, nor how grateful the people of Britain are for their presence.

Even as the film, The Second Year of War, showed its scenes of the devastation, the soundtrack intoned that Britain could not survive without Canadian aid. More and more emphatically, the government drew attention to Canadian assistance: military, training, food, munitions and financial. The pro-British elements in Canada began to feel the strength of the nationalist sentiment which the war had begun to evoke. For example, one neo-imperialist complained in 1942 that in New Brunswick "Britain seems to be the common target for fault. Why she does not do this or that. She is slow, she is run by fools . . . ."
Another observer commented that "in every broadcast . . . the Canadian part is stressed . . . so often that Canadians . . . ask if the Imperial [British] airmen are resting on their laurels . . . ."\textsuperscript{42}

The nationalistic element grew even stronger after Canadian families felt the war first-hand. Towards the end of the conflict, the National Film Board's John Bull's Own Island summed up Britain's place in the war and forecast its future. The film pointed out that the British approached peace with trepidation. In an unsubtle comment on the class-system, the film reminded Canadians that while the 'playing fields of Eton' had produced wartime leaders, the existence of this leisured aristocracy contributed to a miserable life for the bulk of the British workers. Because of the destruction of British industry, many faced an ever rougher time. Britain had lost her monetary reserves to North America and, therefore, would have difficulty financing post-war reconstruction, even the social security system, which remained "a promise" for an uncertain future. Somewhat anomalously, the film prophesied that the courage that had carried the British through the war would help them to survive "in tomorrow's world."\textsuperscript{43}

Nationalism also played a prominent role in the government's explanations of the wartime position of France. Once that country surrendered in June 1940, the information provided to Canadians had to steer its way through a difficult situation. Canada, until November 1942, maintained diplomatic relations with the German puppet regime, the Vichy government which operated under the leadership of Marshall Pétain. During this
period, the Free French of General Charles de Gaulle formed part of the allied military forces as a government-in-exile. The Canadian government had to explain this carefully. To give de Gaulle laudatory publicity in Quebec would start a dangerous domestic controversy between supporters of the Free French and Quebec's anti-British nationalists who accepted the Vichy regime.

Trying to chart a course through this touchy issue, Canadian information themes emphasized the sorrow associated with a conquered France. Ernest Lapointe, minister of Justice, expressed these sentiments in October 1940 during an emotional radio address, "appel aux Français," a message from New France to the motherland, which emphasized the ties of sympathy binding the two 'Frances' despite the defeat. Listeners' responses indicated that this approach worked so well that in a later speech, L.R. Laflèche called on French Canadians to become in fact "la 'Nouvelle France'." "Faisons foi au sang de nos aieux," immigrants from the 'Ancienne France', exhorted Laflèche. As for the 1940 forced cession of northern France to the Germans, "pour nous canadiens français, la restauration de l'intégralité territoriale de la France signifie beaucoup plus que le rétablissement de frontières"; it meant the re-establishment of Quebec's spiritual and cultural touchstone. Only when Paris was free again, Laflèche declared, "ce jour-là le Canada français aura retrouver son centre de gravité." According to Laflèche, the war imposed a duty on French Canada, "porter haut les traditions de culture et de civilisation française." "Intensifions notre vie française," he preached.
Once Canada broke off its relations with Vichy in 1942, the Canadian government grew more hostile to the puppet government. Releases pointed out that the "Hero of Verdun," Marshall Pétain, though he had battled the Germans during the Great War, had not proved himself incapable of treasonous collaboration with them during the present conflict. Even Pétain's Great War heroics had shown him a pessimist and defeatist, since he had engaged the Germans at Verdun in 1916 only after receiving a direct order from Marshall Foch, his superior officer. The Canadians also contended that since 1919, Pétain held direct responsibility for the French armies that had collapsed disastrously in 1940. In order to further discredit Pétain in the eyes of the French Canadian Catholics, the government also pointed out that the Catholic hierarchy in France had taken an anti-Vichy stance and that Pétain had retaliated by passing anti-clerical legislation.

The complement to the attack on the Pétain myth included glorifying the French resistance. Eminent French exiles toured Quebec, lecturing on the conditions underlying the French collapse and on life in occupied France. The WIB also arranged for scare techniques, pamphlets recounting atrocities perpetrated in German-dominated France, and a weekly radio programme, "Les Yeux sur l'Europe," describing repressive conditions in occupied Europe revealed through underground channels, escaped persons and clandestine newspapers. Another radio and newspaper serial, based completely on the French resistance movement, dramatized the perils for guerillas operating against the Germans. As soon as the allies
liberated France, the Wartime Information Board brought these heroes of the resistance to Canada to meet representative groups, tour historic sites and address rallies. The visit of these "Maquis" made such a favourable impression that the National War Finance Organizers in Quebec asked them to assist in the up-coming Victory Loan campaign.  

The Canadian government also used nationalism as a means of overcoming domestic discord surrounding the place of Russia in the war. At first a neutral nation, Russia did not figure prominently in official government information releases. Fearing communist propaganda, any mention of Russia before 1941 largely stressed the "communist conspiracy" to disrupt Canadian life. After the Russian-German neutrality treaty of 1941 the government withheld significant comment and only after Germany assaulted the U.S.S.R. in June 1941 did the government have to find a means of reconciling earlier comments with Russia's new position as an ally. The French Canadians, especially the Catholic Church, remained hostile to accepting Russia's bona fides. Rural Ontario and some businessmen shared this skepticism.  

Although the presentation of Russia took these sentiments into account, it gradually evolved over the war years. At first, the official position portrayed Germany's attack not as the pillaging of an innocent victim but as part of Hitler's plan for world domination. Whatever Canadians' opinions on the philosophy of the U.S.S.R.'s rulers, Mackenzie King explained, "however strongly some of Russia's international activities may be condemned today... it is not Russia which is a threat
to freedom and peace." The allies could, however, use the war on the eastern front to their own advantage. "Every day in which Russian resistance holds German aggression," remarked the Prime Minister, "it is a day contributed to the cause of freedom." Many Canadians, by 1942, had begun to express an admiration for Russian 'guts' and to wonder whether they had previously received misinformation from anti-communists involved with German agents to weaken the allied war effort. The growing leftward shift of Canadian public opinion in 1943 both accentuated sympathy for Russia and benefitted by association with it. Accordingly, the government changed its own view of Russia and actively supported the Aid to Russia campaign and the Council of Canadian-Soviet Friendship. In a broadcast from the Canada-Soviet Friendship rally in Toronto, Mackenzie King reiterated the government's desire to build "lasting goodwill" with Canada's northern neighbour.

The Canadian information apparatus began to praise certain equalitarian aspects of Russian society. Films glorified the important role of Russian women as an example for women all over the world. The Soviet Union and its labour record received considerable favourable mention in industrial information publications of the Wartime Information Board. Late in the war, one WIB labour publication quoted Charles Jarman of the British National Union of Seamen when he said that "British seamen are determined that when the war is won, the close unity created with the Soviet Union shall continue." When the adult educators had made their influence felt in Canadian information work, one NFB film produced by John Grierson praised the
exemplary 'education for citizenship' which the U.S.S.R. pro-
vided for its young soldiers. This film appeared to further
increase Canadians' sympathy for Russia. Calgary businessmen
commented that the Russians built up their country during the
1930s while "we were letting our boys ride the rail." The shift in opinion, however, did not satisfy all
elements of Canadian opinion. Some French Canadians, notably
Philippe Brais, head of the Victory Loan Association in Quebec,
and the Roman Catholic hierarchy, objected to John Grierson's
laudatory treatment of Russia in his NFB production "Our Nor-
thern Neighbour." The switch from official disapproval to
commendation of the Soviet Union also alienated vigorous Cana-
dian anti-communists such as Professor Watson Kirkconnell of
McMaster University. Kirkconnell took exception to the removal
of his critical appraisal of Russia from the second edition of
his pamphlet, Canadians All, looked askance at the League for
Canadian-Soviet Friendship, and objected to the shift in the
government presentation which made the U.S.S.R. into "a
glorious and all virtuous ally." The nationalist twist to Canada's official view came
out in a few specific instances. Mentioning the common northern
frontier of Canada and the U.S.S.R., Mackenzie King suggested
that both countries could work out mutually-aided approaches
to northern development. This naturally would benefit Canada.
News releases described the assistance which Canadian raw
materials, especially metals and food, had provided to the Red
Army offensives. The Canadian government, in 1945, conceived
of itself as an international mediator. Although some Canadians
remained skeptical about Canada's ability to get along with Russia after the war, the government decided to publicize its contention that the Canadian public's developing sense of international responsibility must include accommodating the Soviet Union and her allies.  

Nationalism in Canada's position vis-à-vis the United States involved promulgating the official view of Canadian nationhood in the North American context. Before the U.S. went to war in December 1941, Canadians held reservations about the logic of American neutrality. Yet, the Canadian government did not castigate the Americans for their position. Instead, to dampen domestic anti-Americanism and to prevent the United States from becoming unsympathetic, Canadian government publications praised American assistance to 'the fight for freedom.' The publicists used U.S. aid to justify their interpretation of the war. The righteousness of the struggle against Germany, they pointed out, was gradually breaking down U.S. neutrality and the United States turned into the symbol of the allies' 'new friends.' Pre-eminent among these, President Franklin Roosevelt gained a very positive place in Canadian rhetoric for his active support following the Italian entry into the war on June 10, 1940. "His heart," Mackenzie King told Canadians, "and the hearts of his people have always beaten in sympathy with ours." The lack of criticism of the Ogdensburg Agreement in August 1940 indicated that the government publicity had struck the right note. When Britain and the United States signed the Lend-Lease Agreement in early 1941 exchanging
American destroyers for rights to construct bases on British soil, Mackenzie King renewed his argument. He told Canadians that:

the unanswerable logic of events has brought home to the American people the realization that their future development, their security, the survival of the democratic way of life, are bound up inseparably with the defence of Britain and the defeat of aggression.

American aid, he believed, had brought "fresh hope and renewed resolution"\(^74\) to Canadians and would prove of "decisive importance" as an act "of the world's conscience" and as a condemnation of "the wanton aggressors."\(^75\)

Frequently, official publicity mentioned the community of interest shared by the two North American nations. Early in the war, the Canadian government used the phrase 'North American' to describe public reaction to European events. Canada and the United States, King warned in 1940 would share the same fate in the event of an Axis victory in Europe.\(^76\) The North American view underlay explanations of the arrangements for Canada-U.S. cooperation. Of these undertakings, the Ogdensburg Agreement in August 1940 to set up the Permanent Joint Board on Defence constituted the first 'North American' venture. The agreement, King told Canadians, benefitted both countries which shared "a common interest" and "a reciprocity in defence" and gave proof to the world of the harmonious international relations that all nations should strive for.\(^77\) The following year, the two governments turned their attention to reciprocal economics and Mackenzie King and President Roosevelt signed the Hyde Park Agreement on April 20, 1941 providing for reciprocal
defence purchases and expenditures. Various joint committees including the Raw Materials Coordinating Committee established in May 1941, the Joint Economic Committee set up in June 1941 and the Joint War Production Committee which first met in November 1941, completed the formation of the joint wartime planning 'community'. As well, the official rhetoric presented operations like the Alaska Highway as evidence of the two countries' "great enterprise" and "vast achievement" in solving common problems. All these ventures would, the government said, form "the enduring foundations of a new world order based on international understanding, on mutual aid, on friendship and goodwill." Striking a more self-interested note, the government also explained them as providing a shield behind which the Canadian war effort could proceed unimpeded.

When the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, the place of the North American community in Canadian publicity grew even more prominent. With their declaration of war, the Americans had become not only friends but "brothers in arms in the defence of common liberties." One Wartime Information Board release described how the "undefended border" grew "still more nebulous." The joint committees proliferated. Canada joined the Combined Production and Resources Board on November 10, 1942 and participated in the Joint Agricultural Committee set up on March 15, 1943. Some Canadian government publications even attacked Canadians skeptical about the altruism of the American financing of the development in the Canadian north. A WIB writer, Trevor Lloyd, explained in his Canadian Affairs article that fears of an American takeover of
the north stemmed from a misguided "possessive" attitude.  

This type of laudatory publicity about Canada's southern neighbour caused some difficulty. Many Canadians resented the apparent American prominence in wartime events as portrayed through perfected American publicity techniques. An American newsreel treatment of the Dieppe Raid of August 19, 1942, which ignored the important Canadian contribution almost caused a riot in a Toronto theatre. Canadians felt it unjust that Americans claimed credit for all the victories and played up U.S. army officers "like Hollywood movie stars." While the pro-American stance in Canadian information material alienated some Canadians, it also helped to increase others' identification with the Americans and to strengthen a popular sentiment that Canada's destiny might well lie with the United States.

For the government information operations, the best means of dealing with these opposing sentiments remained putting forward a view of Canada's separate nationhood. Before the Americans went to war, Canadian rhetoric always included a sly dig at U.S. neutrality by pointing out that Canada fought not only for itself or for Britain but for "North American civilization." Canadian 'national mindedness', the government reminded its people, saw "no refuge in national isolation." After the U.S. declaration, Canadian information material always emphasized the relatively grander proportions of the Canadian effort. Amidst all the Canadian praise for American generosity to the allies, government releases stated that Canada remained "the only one of the co-belligerent nations that has
not found it necessary to accept lend-lease" from any source, that paid cash for American purchases and that met all debt payments on time.\textsuperscript{88} When their elaborate publicity set-up seemed to give the Americans all the credit for joint defence installations, the war cabinet authorized the information programme to publicize Canadian interests.\textsuperscript{89}

The Canadian government publicity, furthermore, did not subsume all other relations with the allies into a continual public support of the Americans. The Canadian government, especially the Prime Minister, put forward the view that the country had its own position in international affairs. From the beginning of the war, Mackenzie King emphasized the place of Canada as "the bridge" joining the "new freedom" of the United States with "the ancient freedom of Britain."\textsuperscript{90} The special relations existing between Canada and her closest neighbour, the Prime Minister reiterated, did not weaken Canada's ties with Britain, but exemplified Canada's special links with each. As the ties among the English-speaking world grew closer, the place of Canada as the linch-pin grew stronger and should "well be a legitimate source of pride to all Canadians."\textsuperscript{91}

Throughout the war, the government maintained an interpretation of wartime events and of each major ally which retained a nationalist perspective in its mixture of chauvinism and of a sense of nationhood. The BPI and the WIB formulated news management techniques that publicized Canada's role as a military arsenal and as a participant in battlefield ventures. By varying the mixture according to the changing wartime situation and the circumstances of each ally, the government managed
to propagate a view of the war which satisfied the majority of the Canadian public. The Liberals' political opponents occasionally objected to the glorification of the Canadian war effort as a ploy to bolster the Liberal government, and Mackenzie King frequently felt that his government's publications portrayed the war as Churchill's-Roosevelt's crusade. Nothing much came of these rumblings, however, and the nationalist mixture continued as the basis for publicizing Canada's position as a belligerent.
'Canadianism' also meant trying to integrate potentially disaffected groups into a Canadian 'way of life.' The government and the information agencies believed that this could only be accomplished by protecting national unity from internal subversion. But restrictions on civil liberties might provoke complaints and opposition from articulate and organized civil liberties groups. Officials, furthermore, wanted to define a 'nationalism' that included the non-English and non-French population and would overcome ethnic divisions and any remnants of the nativist sentiment that caused divisions during the Great War. 'Canadianism' in this context proved impossible to achieve.

Even before the outbreak of war, the Canadian government imposed censorship to protect the country from internal subversion. Restrictions on the freedom of the mails, cables, publications and radio, the Canadian government believed, remained necessary to eliminate security leaks, the encouragement of the enemy's subversive activities and the dissemination of ideas which might adversely affect morale. The government felt it imperative to impose national censorship in order to prevent over-zealous authorities at lower levels of government from usurping and possibly abusing this power. The federal government, therefore, proclaimed its right on September 3, 1939 "in
the interests of national defence or public safety to examine all communications and publications and to modify or dispose of them in the manner best calculated to promote those interests."4

The invocation of the Defence of Canada Regulations on that date imposed a system of censorship which lasted until the surrender of Japan in 1945.*5

* For the first months of the war, censorship fell under two sets of regulations, the censorship regulations invoked September 1, 1939 as part of the War Measures Act (P.C. 2481) and the Defence of Canada Regulations set up by order in council (P.C. 2483) two days later. In January 1940, the censorship regulations were revoked and censorship fell under the Defence of Canada Regulations. (see W.H. Kesterton, A History of Journalism in Canada, Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1967 p. 247 and M. Pope, Soldiers and Politicians: the Memoirs of Lt.-Gen. Maurice A. Pope, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1962, p. 141) At first, censorship operations remained under the direction of a censorship co-ordinating committee responsible to the Secretary of State. The committee supervised the censorship of the press, publications, radio, mail and cables. The actual censorship operations, however, were performed by the government department most involved (i.e. postal censorship was performed by the Post Office, radio by the CBC etc.) The government appointed J. Walter Thompson, publicity director of the Canadian National Railways as director of censorship and chairman of the committee on September 3. Members of the committee who attended its first meeting after their appointment on September 5 included: Col. M.A. Pope, cable censor from the department of National Defence; Lt. Col. R.P. Landry, broadcasting censor from the department of Transport; L. Clare Moyer, press censor, English from the Secretary of State's department; Oswald Mayrand, press censor, French from the Secretary of State's department; J.A. Sullivan from the Post Office; and the chairman, Walter Thompson. These committee members changed within a short time. Claude Melançon replaced Mayrand after the first meeting. Others attending the meetings included censors not given status as departmental representatives. They included: F.E. Jolliffe, chief postal censor; J.S. Roe, chief examiner of publications (department of National Revenue); G.H. Lash, executive assistant to the director of Censorship; C.J. Hanratty, deputy press censor. (WIB Records, vol. 11, file 7-1-10A, Index: Censorship activities, chronological report, n.d. [July 1940]). In December 1939 Walter Thompson left and Col. Maurice Pope took his place as chairman. In August 1941, the department of National War Services took responsibility for the committee. When Pope relinquished the chairmanship in May 1942, O.M. Biggar replaced him in May 1942. The last director of censorship, Wilfrid Eggleston, a journalist and former press censor,
The philosophy and practice of Canadian wartime censorship invited close cooperation with government information operations. The censors liked to think that they exercised only nominal control over the public media. The Censorship Coordinating Committee distributed directives to radio stations and newspapers. Prompted by various government departments, the authority of these directives lay between a mandatory restriction and a suggestion. The censors did not use their statutory power to compel newsmen and broadcasters to submit all material. Instead, they asked for stories and scripts on a voluntary basis and advised whether publication of a particular item would result in prosecution under the Defence of Canada Regulations. Editors and radio station managers, in effect their own censorship monitors, considered whether publication of a particular item would damage the Canadian war effort. Hoping that this approach could develop into "more than a negative thing," the censorship administrators tried to hire veteran newsmen as censors so that the government could benefit from the advice of men who experienced both situations. There was a close link with government information operations when the first director of Censorship, J. Walter Thompson, left his job to establish the Bureau of Public Information in December 1939. His subordinates in the censorship operations, Claude Melançon and G.H. Lash, took over in January 1944. (Wilfrid Eggleton, While I Still Remember: A Personal Record, Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1968, p. 268; PAC, Pierre Casgrain papers, vol. 10, copy: P.C. 6561, August 26, 1941.) Regional press Censorship offices operated in Halifax, Montreal, Toronto and Vancouver (Eggleston, pp. 259, 261). For a full history of censorship operations see Gillis Purcell, "Wartime Press Censorship in Canada," University of Toronto: MA Thesis, 1946.
followed him. The newsmen turned censors did not abandon their belief in the 'right to know' but they announced their affirmation of the newspaper credo that legitimate wartime criticism must be maintained.

Operationally, the censors and the Bureau of Public Information maintained very close relations. It was the second director of Censorship, Col. Maurice Pope, who alerted the Bureau of Public Information in early December 1939 that the British First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill, had announced the arrival of Canadian troops in Britain. Walter Thompson thereupon released his own stories. The press censors branch officers worked in an unofficial capacity as BPI field workers and the censorship committee and the Bureau shared a photographer. Unofficial cooperation extended to suggestions by the chief English press censor, Wilfrid Eggleston, of writers for public information's pamphlets. For its part, the BPI submitted all its releases to the censors in return for priority treatment. Despite these close ties, however, the Censorship Coordinating Committee did not invite the director of Public Information to join in its deliberations until March 1941. Organizational connections grew even closer in August 1941 when the Censorship Coordinating Committee and the Bureau of Public Information came under the same roof in the department of National War Services and reported to the same associate deputy minister, T.C. Davis.

The close links between censorship and information did not mean that either of these two activities could overcome the political considerations which frequently hindered their work.
Most of the difficulties grew out of Canada's close ties with the United States, neutral from 1939 to 1941. The continuing free flow of news and opinions in the U.S. media across the Canadian border gave Canadians access to material which the government wanted suppressed. Although the U.S. allowed "subversive" Nazi, Communist, pacifist or radical periodicals to continue publishing, the Canadian censors felt little compunction in banning these. The censors, however, did not know how to handle the sensationalized stories of war destruction and atrocities from German news agencies which appeared in the mass circulation anti-British or even pro-British U.S. press. Due to the newspapers' influence, the censors hesitated to chance the political consequences of banning them from Canada, or to forbid importation of American newsmagazines using pessimistic commentary. The censors' political dilemma grew most acute during the defeats of 1940. Ultra-patriotic Canadians demanded an interdict upon any American publication critical of the British or Canadian war effort. The Conservative leader in the Senate, Arthur Meighen, took particular exception to The Saturday Evening Post and the Hearst daily, The Chicago Tribune. Although Meighen's counterpart in the House of Commons, R.B. Hanson, took up the cry, the government feared that a ban on these important U.S. publications would alienate American sympathies for the allied war effort. The censors believed it impossible to stop offending news at the border and urged the Canadian government to release suppressed stories already published in the U.S. The effects of sensationalist reporting would wear off, the censors believed, and the pessimistic American views of the
British predicament could make Canadians both more determined and more realistic.\textsuperscript{18} Many Canadians supporting the censors against the Tories' attacks thought the Conservatives' views ill-considered.\textsuperscript{19}

While the censors tried to cope with these political complications, the Bureau of Public Information provided little assistance. The censors believed that an active publicity campaign to refute the objectionable material in the U.S. press would reduce the pressure for banning the publications. Since Christian pacifist journals imported from the U.S. had little political whallop, the BPI did try to enlist the aid of Canadian churches in nullifying the impact of these American magazines.\textsuperscript{20} Despite the censors' suggestions, the director of Information did not counter the U.S. isolationist press' "allegations and slanders."\textsuperscript{21} G.H. Lash, appointed early in 1940, received these proposals, acknowledged them, and forwarded the names of newspaper subscribers for RCMP surveillance. Afraid of provoking greater anti-Canadian tirades in these powerful American newspapers, Lash did not challenge their facts or opinions directly by issuing any pamphlets or releases even to Canadians.\textsuperscript{22}

In spite of the BPI's failure to refute questionable United States' imports, the censors made an effort to assist the Bureau in assuring Canadian unity by suppressing domestic subversive publications. The most frequent instances of censorship occurred in Quebec to prevent French-English antagonism\textsuperscript{23} over actions like the British military moves against the French fleet in June 1940. The censors also asked newspaper editors to refrain from publishing any news items or articles which
might cause ill-feeling. When the government interned Mayor Camilien Houde of Montreal in August 1940 for opposing the registration of manpower, the censors tried to prevent the publication of all the circumstances. The story came out despite the censors' efforts and the English-language papers criticized the censors for creating antagonism between French and English.

The problem of 'subversive' foreign publications in French Canada grew more perplexing after the fall of France. Formerly imported without difficulty, French newspapers grew suspect because of their support of Marshall Pétain's Vichy regime and their anti-British stance. Vichy, however, was not an enemy country in 1940 and many Catholic newspapers with large Quebec readership had moved from occupied Paris to Vichy-controlled Limoges and maintained the right of admission to Canada. The censors forced Canadian customs officers to read each issue of every French periodical and to decide on the question of admissability on an individual basis. Unprotected by international diplomatic considerations, the less influential Quebec newspapers supporting the Vichy regime were seized or suppressed. Despite the censors' recommendations and outside complaints, the most outspoken Quebec newspaper to question the Canadian war effort, Le Devoir, continued to publish unimpeded throughout the war. Although the cabinet considered suppressing this journal, no action was taken because the government feared the outcry which this course would provoke. In a demonstration of their even-handed treatment, the censors recommended the suppression of the fundamentalist Christian newspaper, The Gospel Witness, because of its attacks on French Canada and the
Catholic Church. Afraid of political consequences, the cabinet again refused to act.²⁹

Wanting to combat pro-communist Canadian newspapers, the censors made proposals to complement the Bureau's work with ethnic groups.³⁰ On the censors' advice, the acting Secretary of State, Rt. Hon. Ernest Lapointe, prohibited on November 21, 1939, the publication of the Toronto communist newspaper, The Clarion.³¹ Other communist papers disappeared under the censors' axe but reappeared under new mastheads, kept a low profile and published until the war's end.³² The censors again insisted that periodical readers in the department of National Revenue, plough through all Canadian radical and pro-Soviet newspapers. Even after Russia joined the allies in 1941, ideologically-based communist newspapers could not publish or enter Canada, although the 'regular' Russian press gained admission.³³ Again, the censors suggested that the Bureau of Public Information publicly refute the legal but radical press which might undermine support for the war effort by hints that the government supported profiteers and exploited workers.³⁴ The Bureau did very little to follow up the recommendations except to keep an eye on ethnic groups of a left-wing nature.³⁵

Information officials showed no particular interest in the public's right to information as a right per se. In the case of strategic troop movements and industrial innovations, the information officials and the censors agreed on the necessity for suppression.³⁶ Occasionally, however, the director of Public Information released hitherto restricted information without notifying the censors. When the censors blue-pencilled
this material, the newspapers protested vigorously. These were the exceptions. Usually, the director of public information aided the censors in keeping the lid on unauthorized information released even by cabinet ministers in public addresses. The director of Public Information did not press for a more open information policy, but commiserated with the censors over these leaks. Since "the public of Canada would be quite satisfied to be deprived of detailed and specific information . . .," Lash made no comment about the political advantages for the government.

The influence of those who preferred strict censorship of military activities strengthened throughout the war. A 1942 reorganization of the censorship apparatus gave the department of National Defence the opportunity to press for stricter controls over the operation of the press and radio.* Small advisory committees dealing with specific subjects formulated censorship policy. Prodded by the representatives of the armed forces, the advisory committees began urging more prosecutions under the defence regulations, clamping down on publishable information, and stopping cabinet ministers from giving out information. The director of Public Information did not

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* In May 1942, Oliver Mowat Biggar took over the job of director of Censorship and turned the Censorship Coordination Committee into the Censorship Advisory Committee which held meetings only at the request of a departmental representative to decide on a specific issue. The Censorship Advisory sub-committees made most of the decisions. These included committees dealing with service intelligence, security, foreign exchange control, publication of statistical information, commercial intelligence and reading of publications. The director of Public Information belonged to some of these committees as a member and attended the meetings of others when required.
emphasize the right of the Canadian people to access to some of the restricted material but believed that "teeth should be put in censorship." The only exceptions, in the director's view, should occur when a large local population knew of a suppressed story. The censors displayed more concern for the people's 'right-to-know' than the director of public information. Because of the docility of Canadian newspapers and lack of criticism of the censorship regulations, the censors could gain no support for their position and usually had to submit to the military's veto.

The formation of the Wartime Information Board in September 1942 did little to relieve the military's successful pressure to tighten up censorship. The directors of intelligence in the department of National Defence gained the right to screen all National Film Board productions for security infractions. At the military's insistence, even news stories already published in Great Britain or the United States did not appear in Canada. The military prohibited publication of well-known events, such as the stories of the Japanese balloons floating over western Canada in the spring of 1945. Similarly, the military objected to ministers' revelations in the House of Commons. Even Mackenzie King, the Prime Minister, ran afoul of the military and of censorship when he revealed to the House that Japanese and Chinese Canadians were serving in the Canadian army. The press censors worked hard to dissuade the navy from requesting the cabinet to change censorship policy so that the censors would have the authority to prevent publication of news before it appeared in print. To forestall the
censorship advisory committee from recommending this change, the press censors argued that this regulation would serve no purpose but to alienate the goodwill of an already cooperative press. 51

Amidst this effort at tightening up security, the Wartime Information Board took little effective action to ensure the public's 'right-to-know'. While the military pressed for stricter controls, the Wartime Information Board did not even send a representative to censorship committee meetings until three months after the WIB began operating. The WIB concerned itself mostly with salary quibbles over services shared with censorship and with maintaining a link between the censorship operations and the Canadian press. 52 Although the press censor, Wilfrid Eggleston, most vigorously opposed the military's claims of security risks, 53 the WIB occasionally supported him and demanded release of information. In October 1943, the WIB pressed for full coverage of the operations of German U-boats in the St. Lawrence in order to prevent public panic. The navy finally agreed but hedged this acquiescence with safeguards giving naval intelligence a veto over all news stories. 54 When the Wartime Information Board argued in February 1943 that Canada should follow American practice and cease censoring east coast weather reports, 55 it took the military a full year to give permission for the change. 56 Despite repeated requests that the WIB use prisoner of war escape stories as a means of raising public morale, the military refused. 57 Many news stories prepared by the Wartime Information Board had to undergo protracted and contentious scrutiny by the military before
In large part, the WIB's inability to balance the military influence on the censorship operations resulted from a conscious decision. The board's officers opposed a 1943 proposal that the Wartime Information Board take on responsibility for supervising the censorship operations. A.D. Dunton, the assistant general manager, believed that the resulting beneficial co-ordination would not outweigh the inevitable suspicion that the WIB would aid the government in suppressing embarrassing incidents. Since, Dunton concluded, the success of both censorship and public information work depended on public trust, the proposed amalgamation would destroy the effectiveness of both operations.

The most important positive activity undertaken by the Wartime Information Board in cooperation with the censors and with military authorities consisted of a publicity campaign to stop careless talk. George McCracken of the Board's domestic branch aided the Censorship Advisory Committee to map out the poster and radio blitz. At the request of the censorship authorities, the WIB helped design display cards for all radio studios warning broadcasters to avoid disclosing damaging information, and anti-gossip cards for railway cars, planes, stations and public washrooms. The WIB used its contacts among commercial advertisers to find sponsors for anti-gossip radio announcements and persuaded the Bell Telephone Company to mail warnings against "loose talk" along with customer accounts. In working with the censorship authorities, the WIB believed it necessary not only to restrict information dissemination but
also to educate the public and the press about what they could safely repeat. In this instance, the board wanted to maintain a secure position in the campaign's design in order to ward off the military's desire to use slogans and statements which interfered with the public's right to know. This concern stemmed from the board's fear that publicity that pointed out restrictions would harm morale.61

In many ways, the censors' operations overcame public suspicion. Although no one questioned the institution of censorship in 1939, civil libertarians remained alert to the danger that censorship might impose a creeping totalitarianism in Canada. They alerted the Prime Minister to the fact that "unless criticism emerged in the ordinary clichés of the day," strict application of the censorship provisions would stifle any questioning of government policy. Practice, in fact, proved to this group that the government remained sensitive to the political repercussions of stifling criticism and the freedom to take issue with government policy remained a generally unchallenged principle.62 The government also successfully handled the media's concern that censorship would hinder their reporting of 'hot' news. Some incidents caused trouble, the Mayor Houde affair, for example. Generally, however, newspapers heralded the suppression of allegedly communist or anti-war journals and only complained when the government infrequently investigated responsible journalists.63 The threat that newspapers would make censorship into an issue for use by the Conservatives against the Liberal government prevented the censors from taking action to keep the lid on many stories which the
government would have liked kept quiet.

While censorship operations enjoyed considerable success in avoiding political skirmishes over their activities, the failure of the public information officers to press for the public's 'right-to-know' meant that Canadians did not receive all relevant wartime information. Many news items and articles which legitimately could have appeared without damaging the Canadian war effort were not published. Canadian newspapers inclined toward the road of least resistance. Almost all the Canadian press men leaned over backwards to make certain that they cooperated as much as possible with official censorship regulations. On their own judgement, one editor reported, Canadian newspapers frequently suppressed news and opinions to which censorship and military authorities would take no exception. In 'one-paper' towns, where the single newspaper faced no danger of getting 'scooped', the editor usually suppressed any doubtful news item rather than take the time to obtain a censor's ruling. To compound this situation, both the Bureau of Public Information and the Wartime Information Board failed adequately to defend Canadians' right to information. The military's pressure to withhold news usually overcame others' objections. When censorship operations closed up shop after the surrender of Japan, Davidson Dunton, general manager of the Wartime Information Board, told the retiring chief censor, Wilfrid Eggleston, that the censors had done "a superb job." In their efforts to assure Canadians' access to information, the censors perhaps merited the kudos, the information officers did not.
Anti-subversive information work had a more positive and a more open side to it than the restraints imposed by wartime censorship. Immediately after the declaration of war in 1939, government information operations undertook anti-fifth column and anti-rumour publicity campaigns, although never with sustained fervour. The government was forced into efforts at defining the enemy at home by the fear that enthusiastic citizens groups might begin finding Nazis behind every tree. This undesirable cloak-and-dagger zeal quickly showed up in some Canadian police forces' checks on 'subversive' groups. The British Columbia Provincial Police, for example, immediately investigated the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation in the province and prompted the Deputy Attorney General to consider prosecuting several CCF members of the provincial legislature.66

In Edmonton, a candidate for the Board of Education election in November 1939 urged censoring schoolbooks mentioning Germany in order to eradicate "enemy activities in our midst."67 To contain this sort of hysteria and to guide public opinion, the Bureau of Public Information began anti-subversive information work during the allied reverses in the spring of 1940.

This publicity, condemning groups considered subversive by the department of Justice, treated those with Canadian roots more harshly than those of alien origin. In a Bureau of Public Information release, journalist James Oastler, presented a questionable interpretation of the government's suppression of the Jehovah's Witnesses. Oastler justified banning the sect on
the basis of activities "definitely detrimental to Canada's war effort." According to him, the beliefs of these "religious zealots tended towards animosity and hatred." Through their financial power, the Jehovah's Witnesses mobilized their resources to visit homes across Canada and, if allowed:

opened a portable gramophone and played recorded speeches which bitterly denounced religions, churches, business and the flag.

The Witnesses' activities left in their wake "disunity where all had been peaceful and happy before . . ." Apart from this appeal to religious prejudice and patriotism, the BPI release haughtily dismissed the sect as of no merit, the brainchild of a "haberdasher" from Pittsburgh.68 Only Adrien Arcand's National Unity Party, an indigenous French Canadian organization with a super-nationalist point of view, received as vehement a treatment. Oastler portrayed Arcand himself as the "anaemic, hollow-cheeked editor of a Montreal newspaper and self-styled Fuehrer . . . ."69

The strongest attacks on enemy aliens occurred during the allied defeats in the spring of 1940 when restraining xenophobia grew most difficult. Bureau of Public Information releases warned Canadians about the growth of a German fifth-column movement in Canada. This Deutscher Bund, however, had withered in 1939 when the leaders were arrested. Although the "leaders walk slowly around internment camps," the release warned "... every true Canadian must be on his guard for the fifth columnist who may have escaped the net."70 These scare tactics could not but reflect suspicion on every Canadian with a German name. The Bureau also sponsored some radio speakers
who attacked the German population. Canadian public relations specialist Alistair Grosart told how "a drunken Nazi" had called the CBC after a previous broadcast to curse at the patriotic message. Grosart volunteered, he told his audience, to take the man through munitions plants and to demonstrate the magnitude of Canada's effort. Then, said Grosart, "I'll take you through some more guarded gates, - the gates of a camp where you'll find a lot more Nazis like yourself . . . . They're in there wondering why Der Fuehrer is such a long time in coming to get them out."71 Direct attacks on ethnic groups in Canada did not get out of hand. To prevent the trouble and discrimination which had plagued enemy aliens during the Great War, the Bureau of Public Information organized its Canadians All broadcasts and booklet. The radio series included a programme praising the German72 and Italian Canadians.73 The government, however, worried considerably less about offending the Japanese.74

A more subtle anti-subversive information campaign, however, replaced the concentration on either the disloyalty or loyalty of various racial and ethnic groups. The committee on morale established by the director of Public Information sent one of their members, John A. Irving, to the United States to study anti-subversive activities. When Irving returned from his visit in the spring of 1942, he recommended that the BPI undertake a programme of public information to counteract rumours which undermined the war effort. Modelling his plan on similar public and private ventures in the United States, Irving suggested that the Bureau set up an apparatus to collect,
to collate, to analyze and to deny such rumours. Shortly after Irving's return, the Canadian Joint Chiefs of Staff independently supported his suggestion by requesting the bureau to undertake this type of operation. Another member of the committee on morale, J.D. Ketchum, argued that anti-rumour work could foster unity among Canadians and reconcile antagonistic ethnic groups by pointing out the falsity of issues separating them.

Things did not work out as expected. The cabinet shelved the proposal for a BPI operated service but in the summer of 1942, a private group, The Canadian Column, began operating a rumour clinic in Montreal. The Canadian Column's rationale for combatting rumours stemmed from the same root as the earlier xenophobic anti-fifth column activities. Hitler's espionage system, their argument ran, had kept him informed of the Canadian war effort and "powerfully, insidiously and with the unwitting aid of Canadian citizens, Hitler is using a weapon fashioned and truly tried in all the invaded countries of Europe . . . ." Rumours, deliberately planted and nurtured by Nazi agents, undermined the war effort and weakened the will to fight. The Canadian Column argued that the "hundreds of false and vicious rumours" floating around the country proved that "Hitler's technique is now being applied to Canada." On their own initiative, this group began collecting rumours and distributing denials to Canadian newspapers. These rumours included those which sought to prove that the British were not doing their part, that Canadian hospitals used beef blood in transfusions, that the German navy could land in the St. Lawrence,
and that Quebec had accumulated a surplus of gasoline while the rest of Canada suffered a shortage. Canadian Column releases always ended with a plea for citizens not to repeat undenied rumours but to transmit them to The Canadian Column for a published and authoritative denial. 81

Political pressure and the desire to head off witch-hunting by private citizens led to a renewed government interest in the operation. When Charles Vining organized the Wartime Information Board in the fall of 1942, he announced his desire to combat rumours and to carry on the work of the BPI in this field. 82 Despite this announcement, other WIB board members hesitated to support private rumour clinics with government money. 83 Vining himself wanted to provide encouragement but no traceable financial assistance 84 in order to control the rumour clinics without giving them an opportunity for claiming government backing for possible harassment. Already, the Montreal group were extending themselves and demanding stricter censorship or closing down of the nationalist Montreal daily, Le Devoir. 85 In order to establish some sort of check, the WIB proposed that if the clinic referred rumours to the WIB in Ottawa, officers would investigate and return detailed denials for publication. 86

This step, however, did not decrease the pressure on the WIB chairman, Charles Vining, to take more vigorous action to deny rumours. Whispering in the autumn of 1942 included popular stories that the Dieppe Raid, a plot against French Canadians, had decimated Quebec regiments because the British refused to stop the attack although they knew that a spy had
warned the Germans.\textsuperscript{87} One very detailed rumour flew around Quebec that the government had arranged for the assassination of Ernest Lapointe, the minister of Justice, because he had opposed conscription.\textsuperscript{88} Apart from this pressure, the chief postal censor, F.E. Jolliffe, gave Charles Vining a lecture about the growing urgency of combatting industrial rumours. According to Jolliffe, one of the most destructive popular misconceptions involved a story that Toronto defence plant workers smoked marijuana and held wild parties in factory buildings.\textsuperscript{89}

Finally responding, the Wartime Information Board moved towards establishing a formal apparatus for investigating and contradicting rumours. J.D. Ketchum of the board's reports branch tried to get private individuals confidentially to report rumours to the Board.\textsuperscript{90} The board also collected more information about the operation of rumour clinics in the United States.\textsuperscript{91} Pressed by the Board's vice-chairman, Philippe Brais, who was also a good friend of the organizers of The Canadian Column, Vining decided to give the private group further public support\textsuperscript{92} by integrating The Canadian Column's work into his new anti-rumour activities. To spare the WIB the expense of setting up its own rumour-collecting service, Vining asked The Canadian Column to forward lists of rumours to Ottawa. In return for this service, the Board agreed to provide expense money.\textsuperscript{93} With this minimal assurance, The Canadian Column made plans to expand its group of 30 client newspapers and to entrench itself as a government consultant for the WIB's $400 per month. Accepting these terms, the board put through the necessary cabinet submission under the signature of the Prime
Rumour-countering activities in the first months of 1943 grew more scientific. One WIB memorandum studied rumours as a product of emotional forces and their use as a release of emotional steam. The report concluded that the frequency of rumours died down as authentic information grew more adequate and highly publicized. In order to study the spread of rumours from their original date, language and city of origin, the board's officers began collating rumours and classifying them in conjunction with categories set up by the U.S. Office of War Information. The WIB suggested that the rumour collection committees across the country pay particular attention to grudge rumours which caused disunity and resentment among Canadian ethnic groups. The board also wanted to study fear rumours which exaggerated the strength of the enemy; curiosity rumours which might cause panic buying or selling of rationed material; pipe-dream rumours which inspired false confidence in an allied victory and pro-Axis rumours which bolstered defeatism. Three-month summaries of rumours analyzed their types. From October to December 1942, for example, the 190 rumours broke down into:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Rumour</th>
<th>Number (Total)</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Animosity to allied groups</td>
<td></td>
<td>58.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>anti-government</td>
<td>(37)</td>
<td>20.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>anti-armed forces</td>
<td>(27)</td>
<td>14.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>anti-British</td>
<td>(15)</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>anti-French Canadian</td>
<td>(12)</td>
<td>6.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>anti-Business</td>
<td>(10)</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>others</td>
<td>(6)</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2. **Enemy activities and home weakness** (59) 32.6%

   - enemy activities (33) 18.2%
   - fifth column (21) 11.6%
   - Canadian disasters (5) 2.8%

3. **Speculation Re: forthcoming events** (21) 11.6%

   - rationing and shortages (7) 3.9%
   - selective service (7) 3.9%
   - taxes (3) 1.6%
   - miscellaneous (4) 2.2%

4. **Pro German**

   (3) 1.6%

In a change from its earlier standoffishness, the WIB enlisted government departments to provide The Canadian Column with accurate answers to counter specific rumours.

The information officers, however, soon discovered that even scientific evaluation of rumours did not outweigh the disadvantage of using private patriots to collect the raw material. The clinic in Montreal pestered the board to provide "rumour stickers" for advertisers who sponsored its newspaper releases. When The Canadian Column asked for WIB assistance to establish a radio programme, Davidson Dunton who handled relations with the group cried for "help." The board still did not want to create an uncontrolled force. The Canadian Jewish Congress complained that The Canadian Column's denial of the story that Jews ran black markets in rationed goods had only created an impression that supported the rumour. The Canadian Column's work degenerated into sheer silliness. The clinic, for example, published a denial of the story that the armed forces froze badminton birds in the spring to ensure a supply. If this were not bad enough, the denial explained the utility of badminton as a training exercise for improving the
co-ordination of RCAF pilots. Appalled at these developments, the WIB staff complained to Dunton that the organization not only spread "undesirable propaganda" but was "retailing inaccurate information."104

After an unsuccessful effort at cutting financial contributions to the rumour clinic,105 the WIB began deliberately delaying the payment of the subsidy hoping this would discourage the group from continuing. Finally, in November 1943, the board obtained authorization to cut off the connection with The Canadian Column, which did decide to wind up operations. When the final releases went out on November 30, 1943, the information officials in Ottawa heaved a sigh of relief.106

(iii)

Although cement for a feeling of nationhood appeared as a by-product in the anti-subversive information campaigns, the public information agencies undertook another accompaniment to anti-subversive operations by setting up an appeal to the Canadian ethnic community. This programme grew out of a traditional concern for the 'Canadianization' of citizens of alien origin. Ottawa's particular wartime concern related to the government's fear that as Canadians with sentimental ties outside the country, ethnic groups continually faced exploitation by foreign governments.107 In particular, the information organizations tried to design campaigns which stopped any growth of communist influence, and complemented the picture of external events. The BPI sponsored lectures in 1940 by Tracy Phillips, a former British Foreign Office adviser on Eastern Europe108 who
visited and spoke to various communities of eastern European origin. In addition, the BPI arranged film showings, news releases, as well as pamphlets to inspire the ethnic groups with a sense of Canadian identity. At the suggestion of the department of National War Services, the cabinet approved subsidies for the "loyal" segments of the foreign-language press and concealed them in the RCMP estimates. The War Services' officials also tried to secure private and government advertising for these newspapers.

The information campaign tried to counter interference from abroad and to prevent racial splits and antagonism by convincing the ethnic community as well as French and English Canadians that the existence of a distinctive ethnic population posed no threat to Canadian nationhood. The best illustrations of this approach, the Canadians All pamphlet, was commissioned from Watson Kirkconnell of McMaster University. Directing its message at all Canadians, the pamphlet explained that even in 1941 Russian communism as well as German and Italian fascism looked for converts in Canada among the ethnic population. In a section on international conspiracies, the pamphlet tried to destroy this influence by explaining that both communism and fascism worked for the destruction of the British Empire and that despite their opposing philosophies, the two systems "worked hand in hand against the Allied cause." Kirkconnell furthermore pointed out that the dictatorships of Moscow and Berlin offered little difference in their extinction of individual rights and of nationality in conquered territories or in their technique of creating minority problems in allied
Kirkconnell tried to dampen anti-ethnic sentiments and inter-ethnic quarrels through his anti-racist arguments. The population of Canada, he explained, was 98% European and of similar racial stock. The fact that these Europeans differed in their country of origin or differed in their language did not constitute a difference in race. "To the scientist," Kirkconnell went on:

race is simply and solely a matter of physical characteristics . . . . Just as we classify our cows as Aberdeens or Guernseys or Holsteins by their bodily types and not because they moo in a certain fashion . . .

Race did not count. In Canada, therefore, no European national group was "alien". Obviously, no superior race existed despite the preaching of "evil-hearted men," and Canadians should "never assume that our fellow Canadians of any origin are by nature [sic] unworthy of our sympathy, respect and good will . . . ."112

The unity-based message did not exclude ethnic groups with an enemy alien origin and tried to contain hatred and suspicion of Italian and German Canadians. One of the broadcasts stressed the loyalty of German ethnic press and the historic roots of German settlement in Canada. Germans, the script optimistically pointed out, had been among the first to enlist in all three branches of the Canadian armed forces and contributed to all patriotic funds.113 The radio series also praised Italian Canadians and their place in Canadian life. Narrator Watson Kirkconnell told radio listeners that Canadian-Italians had for eighteen years suffered "unscrupulous
and unremitting propaganda," by pre-war operations of fascist agents in Canada. Unwilling to prevent this before 1940, the government could claim no credit for the continuing loyalty of the Italian immigrants who had resisted all foreign blandishments. For this steadfastness, all Canadians should take pride in the Italian community despite "the shadow that the Fascist conspiracy has, for many persons, cast upon their whole group."\textsuperscript{114}

The Bureau of Public Information also tried to inspire ethnic identification with a sense of Canadian nationhood. Here too, the same message went out to native-born Canadians. The Canadians All script writers expounded the idea that the greatness of the country depended on all citizens accepting the principles of fellowship so that out of the war "the golden metal of true Canadianism will emerge."\textsuperscript{115} For a truly strong nation, the broadcasts preached, Canadians had to "widen the range of our nation-building to include . . . a fuller knowledge of your fellow Canadians and particularly those who are not of your race or creed."\textsuperscript{116} For super-patriotic English Canadians, the BPI stressed that the enlistment rate in the Prairie ethnic community surpassed that of native-born citizens.\textsuperscript{117} In another attempt to defuse suspicion of the 'aliens,' the Bureau arranged for French and English translation and release of excerpts from ethnic newspapers. The message: the ethnic community supported the war effort. English language newspapers supported the right of the foreign-language press to publish throughout the war.\textsuperscript{118}

Despite this measure of success, potential organizational and ideological conflict over the conduct of ethnic
information campaigns began to emerge. Although the director of Public Information prepared and distributed information material to the ethnic community, the department of National War Services set up a Nationalities Branch in 1941 to deal with the wartime activities of ethnic groups. To advise both the director of Information and the Nationalities Branch, the department created an advisory committee, the Committee on Cooperation in Canadian Citizenship in December 1941. Because of the prestige of its members and the pressure they applied, this committee became the driving force in ethnic information. In some respects, the committee's recommendations retained the earlier focus on 'Canadianism' as the only element common to various ethnic groups. The committee's most active members, Tracy Philipps and Watson Kirkconnell, injected their vigorous anti-communist views into the discussion over the direction of ethnic information proposals. Carried along by Philipps and Kirkconnell, the committee tried to help ethnic groups, the Ukrainians for example, settle the ideological split between anti- and pro-communist sympathizers. The committee served as a government reference section to answer enquiries about the "ideological background" of ethnic organizations and prepared detailed reports on communist-fascist feuding after Germany had attacked Russia. The committee complained almost a year after its founding, however, that "our straw, our raw material is . . . so colourless, so scanty and so belated . . ." that it could not compete with the established ideological interests.

It grew all too apparent that much of the problem stemmed from the committee's anti-communist bias. A split in
jurisdiction highlighted the philosophical differences when the Wartime Information Board took over the BPI's ethnic information function in the fall of 1942 while the Nationalities Branch and the Committee on Cooperation in Canadian Citizenship remained under the aegis of the department of National War Services. Tracy Philipps antagonized WIB officers by putting the government in the right-versus-left squabbling of the ethnic community. He was too obviously anti-communist at a time when Russia had joined the allies after the German attack in June 1941. Even Prime Minister King did not hesitate to appear on the platform at Aid-to-Russia rallies. The first chairman of the Wartime Information Board, Charles Vining, refused to have anything to do with the Committee on Cooperation in Canadian Citizenship. For Vining, this decision proved itself correct when the ethnic press began a sustained series of attacks on Philipps just after the formation of the WIB. Communist sympathizers among the ethnic community in Canada made certain that members of the government learned about an article in the American periodical, The New Republic, labelling Philipps a Nazi sympathizer and former intimate of the pro-appeasement Cliveden set in England. Although forced to retire somewhat from the public eye, Philipps retained an influential position in the Nationalities Branch. Vining did authorize the WIB to invade the field of ethnic information and to begin keeping track of ethnic opinions by setting up a foreign language press clipping service.

This situation grew even more confusing as the problem of providing ethnic information and promoting national sentiment
remained unsolved. The organizers of the Victory Loan drives reported to the WIB that despite a low quota for ethnic contributions, the campaigns had elicited an even lower response. Publishers of ethnic newspapers complained to the government that neglect of the ethnic community had led to a sympathetic audience for subversive influences. One German-Canadian publisher estimated that about 75% of the German-speaking population favoured Germany though quietly and harmlessly. As a pro-ally spokesman, the newspaper's circulation dropped. WIB studies indicated the ideological split among ethnic groups had hardened so that the right-wing Poles, for example, felt closer to right-wing Ukrainians than to left-wing Poles.

Despite its decision in April 1943 to make a new start in solving these problems, the WIB could not escape the ideological wrangling. John Grierson shared the feeling that Philipps and Kirkconnell had too close an association with anti-communist red-baiting. In a brief recommending no subsidy for a proposed ethnic newspaper under Kirkconnell's patronage, Grierson remarked that Donald Cameron, a member of the Committee on Cooperation and head of the extension department of the University of Alberta, assessed Kirkconnell's influence as "inflammatory." When Philipps made anti-Soviet speeches in May 1943, Grierson quietly investigated his official status to find a means of shutting him up. The general manager also tried to undermine the position of the Nationalities Branch and of Philipps by meeting with and supporting the Canadian Unity Council, an alliance of ethnic organizations opposing Philipps' tactics. The Council told the WIB that the Committee on
Cooperation in Canadian Citizenship and particularly Tracey Philipps had not done a proper job and had failed to "meet the needs of the situation." Philipps, they complained, believed that he should have a "guardianship" over the "helpless and divided" ethnic groups and lead them into the Canadian community. This irritating and patronizing attitude antagonized ethnic citizens even further when combined with an uncompromising anti-communist crusade. Under Philipps' influence, the Nationalities Branch created "bitter resentment" by not including any new Canadians on its advisory committees and, thereby, publicly affirming ethnic inferiority. Seizing on the issue, the ethnic press stepped up the crusade to eliminate Philipps' and Kirkconnell's influence from ethnic information.

Grierson tried to untangle the situation but failed. He wanted L.R. LaFlèche, the minister of National War Services, to get rid of Philipps and remove an obstacle to the Canadian unity. The minister accepted the argument that the government should not abandon the ethnic groups to communist agitators and refused. Grierson also tried to influence the Prime Minister's advisers to support his position. By January 1944, however, Grierson himself had come under a cloud as a man with too close an association with left-wing elements. His arguments failed and the Wartime Information Board decided to close down almost entirely any initiatives in the field of ethnic information.

Grierson's withdrawal highlighted the WIB's most noticeable failure in its ethnic activities. Prejudice against orientals, long a feature of Canadian public opinion, had
It surfaced in wartime as the official racially-based explanation of Japan's place in the war.* The wartime reaction of white Canadians to the native Japanese population also strongly reflected racial prejudice. Fear of subversion strengthened this xenophobia, especially in British Columbia, where public opinion forced the government in February 1942 to displace Japanese Canadians from B.C.'s coastal areas to internment camps in the interior. The government did little to dampen anti-Japanese sentiments. In fact, arguing that its first task was to get the job done, and "if necessary override a democratic principal [sic]," the WIB refused to hire a Canadian Japanese for its reconstruction information research programme. Although the WIB did not get involved in the controversy surrounding the internment operations, a certain amount of the racial prejudice rubbed off in the board's pamphlets dealing with Japanese Canadians. A.R.M. Lower, an historian writing on the oriental issue in Canada, noted in his WIB-sponsored article that while the Chinese Canadians were "unobtrusive and likeable," the Japanese were not. Lower reported that Japanese Canadians had "a knack of getting themselves disliked." They were aggressive. They had large families. Their young people went on to university where the "good showings of many of them created . . . enemies as well as friends." Lower concluded that of all the ethnic groups, the Japanese constituted the "real riddle," and the government might have to deport them after the war.144

* See chapter V, pp. 13 ff.
Canadians, by the end of the war, do not appear to have moderated their negative view of Japanese Canadians or, indeed, of the ethnic community. One-half the Canadian population expressed an unwillingness to live beside a Japanese family. Poorer and less-educated Canadians showed an even higher level of intolerance. Interestingly, those who objected to Japanese Canadians did not justify this attitude on economic grounds, but rather because they disliked "foreigners" in general and did not believe they could become "good Canadians." The WIB officers analyzing this public opinion concluded that the best way to promote acceptance of the Japanese and, by inference, of other ethnic communities would be to capitalize on a "latent" body of goodwill. For the ethnic communities, the WIB recommended dispersal over the country and particularly a move to the cities as a means of lowering their profile and promoting assimilation.

Overall, anti-subversive and ethnic information programmes failed to create an acceptable nationalistic 'Canadianism.' Censorship and restrictions on civil liberties certainly could not provide it. They remained incompatible with the acceptable liberal-democratic view of the war, and the government always felt defensive about them. Furthermore, the acquiescence of Canadian newspapers with government policy meant that most Canadians had no idea of the extent of censored opinion and, therefore, no chance to protest. As for the more positive side of anti-subversive information, the WIB had to stop its aid to the anti-rumour groups in order to prevent a witch-hunt that would have damaged its unity efforts. Finally,
although the information agencies succeeded in blunting an irrational prejudice against ethnic groups from damaging the war effort, this meant jettisoning a great emphasis on the integrationist message. The popular reaction to Japanese Canadians showed that nativism had not disappeared but merely hibernated.
As war approached in the late summer of 1939, the Canadian government had the memory of scars left by the divisions created by World War I very much in mind. During the first few months of the war, the cabinet worked hard to create national support for the war from Canada's French and English communities. In the special session of Parliament called to authorize Canada's declaration, Mackenzie King promised no repetition of the crisis that split them in 1917. The pledge of no conscription for overseas service gained the government reasonably solid support in Quebec. Soon, Premier Maurice Duplessis' call for a Quebec election on October 25, 1939 challenged this unity. The federal Liberal government could not but view Duplessis' claims for greater provincial autonomy and his platform based on French Canadian national feeling as a threat to a united war effort. Actively intervening in the campaign, the federal ministers from Quebec helped to secure the defeat of Duplessis' Union Nationale party and the election of the provincial Liberals led by Adelard Godbout. Mackenzie King publicly hailed the results as proof that "the people of Quebec are at one with their fellow Canadians of other provinces [and] that a united Canada shall cooperate at the side of Britain and France."

The establishment of the Bureau of Public Information in December 1939 did not remove the unity problem nor did it provide for an effective presentation of the war issues in
Quebec. The Prime Minister immediately urged his officials, for the most part neophytes in government, to do a "better" job in selling the war to Quebec. Haphazardly, the BPI began by asking the French press censor to send out official photographs to French-language newspapers. The Bureau also distributed unexciting French press releases of general information on military affairs and ministerial pronouncements. An independent French section of the Bureau grew up in the first months of 1940 after Claude Melançon, formerly the chief press censor, moved to the BPI as associate director of Public Information. The Bureau perceived the problem of "propaganda" in French-speaking Canada as "one apart" and consequently, Melançon developed his own ideas and programmes.

Despite the formation of the French section, the Bureau's response to the 1940 collapse of France left much to be desired. As the whole rationale for the Canadian war effort changed from the supply of war material into an active provision of troops, supplies and articles of war, English Canadians rose to the call but French Canadians remained reluctant to abandon their desire to limit the war effort. Québécois particularly disliked the National Resources Mobilization Act of June 1940 for its authorization of a registration of all available workers and its provision that all unmarried men between the ages of 21 and 45 were liable for military service within the country. The minister of Justice, Ernest Lapointe, ordered Camillien Houde, Mayor of Montreal, interned for opposing the act, and the Prime Minister foresaw the "... possibility of riots and serious difficulties throughout the whole province of Quebec."
No civil disobedience occurred but Le Devoir, the influential Montreal daily, continued its criticism of government policy and anti-war sympathies remained unchecked. Government supporters were getting discouraged.

Yet, the cabinet neither acted nor gave the Bureau of Public Information authority to undertake a vigourous information effort in Quebec. Lapointe had urged during the 1940 crisis that the government needed to undertake a public information job in French Canada. Despite the Prime Minister's assurance that work could begin immediately, nothing was done. Several months after France's surrender, Lapointe again complained that little publicity originated in French for circulation in Quebec "where it was most needed." He also argued that publicity alone would not suffice unless the government acted to increase French Canadians' roles in the war effort by giving them more jobs in war industries. Once more Mackenzie King agreed but his only action consisted of forwarding Lapointe's recommendations to the minister of National War Services, J.G. Gardiner. After several more cabinet discussions of the desirability of federal publicity in Quebec, still no programme emerged.

Although unstated, the cabinet's fear of allowing civil servants to undertake the politically sensitive task lay at the root of the inaction. Both the Prime Minister and Ernest Lapointe preferred to use their own prestige as the best means of appealing to Quebec. As France crumbled in 1940, Mackenzie King addressed all Canadians, but particularly the Québécois, and appealed for them not to allow "passionate feeling to degenerate
into unreasoning hysteria." Among Lapointe's many similar messages, the most famous, his much-acclaimed address in May 1941, warned his Quebec compatriots not to succumb to Nazi-inspired hatred of English Canada. Lapointe worked harder than any other government figure to create wartime unity.

While the politicians made speeches and carried out their individual efforts to maintain unity, the BPI's French section papered Quebec. Mounting inexorably, the Bureau's releases numbered 179,023 pieces for the seven months from April 1, 1941. In the following year, 498 releases and 256,194 pieces reached Quebec newspapers from the BPI's writers, while the Bureau also distributed 93,994 copies of 751 releases on behalf of other government departments. The content remained standard: military stories, announcements regarding the regulation of consumers' goods, ministers' statements on national and international developments. In addition to these bulk distributions, the BPI prepared special newspaper articles for labour editors, religious editors, general news and opinion columns. These features covered the biographies of war leaders and special observances, "la Fête de Dollard et de la Jeunesse Héroïque," for example. French Canadians received millions of BPI pamphlets. In January 1941 alone, the Bureau mailed out 1,675,000 booklets and pamphlets including 680,786 sent to schools. The BPI's average monthly mailing in 1941 comprised approximately 450,000 brochures.

Despite the aim, the BPI's French-language activities frequently did not consider French Canadians' sensibilities. To begin with, many French pamphlets, news releases, film scripts,
poster captions and speeches originated as straight translations from an English text. To a lesser degree, the translation function operated in reverse. The Bureau's employees provided English versions of speeches delivered by eminent French Canadians. The BPI also tried to draw French Canada into the war by encouraging participation in the spectacles such as Reconsecration Week.²⁵ Despite the supposed expertise in French-language information work, however, the BPI served only a minimal role in designing either recruiting or other special information campaigns for Quebec.²⁶

Apart from translations, the French-language output frequently appealed to Quebec particularism rather than to a broader pan-Canadian feeling. Although Melançon's section sponsored radio broadcasts emphasizing Canadian unity in the face of the Nazi menace,²⁷ the usual message appealed to traditional French Canadian symbols. The BPI decided to print the speeches of Major General L.R. Laflèche delivered in French Canada during late 1940 and early 1941. The resultant pamphlet, Devoirs du Moment, cited French Canadians' duty as Catholics to bring to the war effort "les salutaires enseignements de notre foi."

Trying in every possible way to associate the Quebec hierarchy with the war, Ernest Lapointe used quotes from the influential church newspaper, L'action catholique, in his speeches while the BPI arranged broadcasts by the French Catholic Archbishop, Cardinal Villeneuve,²⁸ and masses conducted by Quebec bishops. This French Catholic involvement in the Quebec information programme, the cabinet feared, might raise objections from Canadian Protestants. The Catholic hierarchy itself believed that some
BPI suggestions contained a sentiment "quelque peu équivoque qui . . . risque de diviser les esprits au lieu de les unir."29

The bureau also appealed to French Canadian racial pride. "La guerre," General Laflèche reiterated, "est un mal et un fléau, mais lorsque l'enjeu est notre existence même, la race canadienne française se dresse comme un seul homme pour la défense." Laflèche declared himself "fier d'appartenir à une race" which had bred men like Dollard des Ormeaux, Montcalm and the heros of Courcelette and Vimy. These men, examples for the current generation, proved that "il n'existe pas de plus braves soldats que les soldats canadiens français . . . ." French Canadians should hark back, then, to "les solides vertus de notre race" in supporting the government's wartime activities.

This emphasis on "race" involved the government in creating a very dangerous mixture of tradition and barely disguised French Canadian nationalism. Laflèche told French Canadians that they had always exercised "une influence stabilisatrice" in Canada because of their attachment to tradition. "Le bastion sur lequel sont venus se briser successivement tous les courantes idées subversives," the province formed, "l'ancre de la confédération . . . ." For Quebec to exercise this influence, its people had to remain tough since, as Laflèche affirmed, "depuis trois siècles ils ont su lutter qu'ils ont survécu." Yet Québécois stayed "une race jeune, une race pleine de sève et plein de feu," because French Canadian courage remained "trempé dans la lutte que nous avons livrée pour notre survie." Survival, Laflèche urged, lay in the fact that Québécois were not "une race ultra-moderne. Je chéris davantage le
titre de gloire que nous on légés de nos aieux . . . ." Laflèche's appeal had dangerous implications for the very unity he tried to promote. This narrower French Canadian nationalist feeling in federal material threatened to stir up nationalist feeling opposing the war and to open up the possibility of English Canadians accusing the government of preparing two messages: one for Quebec and another for the rest of Canada.

This danger, in fact, did appear to have some basis in fact judging by the reaction of English Canada to the BPI's sporadic and ineffective efforts to defuse anti-Quebec sentiments. In one effort to disprove English Canadians' suspicions of French Canada, the director of Public Information, G.H. Lash, tried to refute charges that Quebec had not done its share. These allegations, Lash pointed out, were "unfair and untrue," since Quebeckers constituted a large number of military reserves and French Canadian sailors formed one-third of the Canadian Navy. Incredibly, the director also tried to convince the skeptical English that French Canadian newspapers were the first to suggest compulsory military service. In view of the evident opposition to conscription in Quebec, these statements had little effect apart from convincing English Canadians that the government hid the truth. Premier Aberhart of Alberta, for example, opposed any special treatment that would cement unity between Quebec and the rest of Canada. He feared federal government publicity might arouse "the dormant sectionalism which has wrought such havoc in the past . . . . Why should Quebec speak? Why not British Columbia, Manitoba, Ontario, and the other provinces?"
The ineffectiveness of the effort to assure a united French and English war effort grew very evident after August 1941. The German puppet regime at Vichy led by Marshall Pétain leaped over the barrier of Canadian postal censorship and beamed broadcasts directly to French Canada. Because of widespread French Canadian sympathy for the Vichy government, the minister of Justice, Ernest Lapointe, refused to allow a vigorous anti-Vichy propaganda campaign.*33 These programmes contributed to the agitation of French Canadian public opinion during crucial months. The Canadian government had undertaken its first large-scale recruiting drive coincidentally with the first broadcasts34 and a few months later, on November 26, Ernest Lapointe died. With his death, the government lost the man whose personal prestige had eased the path in gaining Quebec's support for the war. Finally, the Prime Minister decided late in the year to ask Canadians to release his government from the 1939 pledge not to institute conscription for overseas service. After his announcement of a plebiscite on the question, Mackenzie King grew increasingly worried as voting day, April 27, 1942, grew nearer. The government feared that the Vichy broadcasts had stirred up Quebec sufficiently that they would assist in demonstrating a great difference in voting between French and English Canada.35

The Vichy broadcasts also upset the government because they used arguments to undermine the war effort that the BPI

* See chapter VI, p. 12 ff. for the place of France in Canadian propaganda and chapter VII, p. 7 for the censors' regulation of Vichy's printed material.
had prepared in order to gain French Canadian support. Expectedly, Vichy radio justified collaborationist French policies and fulminated against the British. The appeal to French Canadian nationalism and use of the teachings of the French Canadian Catholic clergy, however, most distressed the Canadian government. The broadcasts castigated the decadence of pre-war France which had turned from the true church and towards republicanism after the French revolution. Losing the sanctity of the family, the French people became materialists. The defeat of France represented God's punishment. France, the programmes argued, had to recapture the principles which had inspired the seventeenth century principles that had kept the French Canadians true to their civilization. Quebec had a mission, according to Vichy radio, to help France recover her lost soul. In addition, the Vichy broadcasters included the teachers of many French Canadian intellectuals who had studied in France.

Vichy's activities aroused a positive response in Quebec. When the head of the Roman Catholic Order of Stanislas arrived from unoccupied France to preach in Montreal, he spoke to large enthusiastic congregations. French Canadian newspapers, even La Presse and L'Action catholique who sympathized most strongly with the federal war effort, published Vichy officials' comments that the Québécois "ont toujours été ce que nous devrons être . . .". It appeared as though Vichy broadcasts and domestic anti-war sympathizers mutually inspired each other. Grant Dexter of The Winnipeg Free Press believed that Radio Canada contained many pro-Vichy sympathizers, including Augustin Frigon, the assistant general manager, who hampered
the efforts of anti-Vichy French Canadians to gain broadcast
time over the public network. The government could do nothing,
because to fire these men would have "the instantaneous result
of unifying Quebec in defence of the status quo. It would be
regarded as an attack on Quebec . . .".41

The political implications of the situation baffled
the government but still did not lead to cabinet authorization
of an organized public relations campaign to modify Quebec
opinion.42 The BPI undertook no publicity on the conscription
issue during the plebiscite campaign in the early months of
1942. The Bureau, however, did send T.W.L. MacDermot to orga­
nize a speakers' bureau in Quebec and MacDermot explored the
possibilities. He reported after conversations with Cardinal
Villeneuve, Lieutenant Governor Fiset and Premier Godbout that
all these men, trying to protect their positions as leaders in
French Canada, minimized the probability of trouble in Quebec.
The Lieutenant Governor, however, did oppose any visible federal
information effort during the plebiscite campaign as a possible
aggravation and a target for nationalist groups. Fiset advised
that any BPI work in Quebec operate through the provincial
government departments. MacDermot concluded that "the atmos­
phere is super-charged with strong feelings" and responsible
leaders felt "that their backs are to the wall, but they have
no wall."43

The months following the April 27 plebiscite on con­
scription provided further evidence that deteriorating rela­
tions between Quebec and the rest of Canada threatened wartime
unity. The vote on conscription had made the split startlingly
evident. The tally showed that 82.3% of the citizens of 'loyal' Ontario favoured releasing the government from its promise not to impose conscription for overseas service. This compared to 27.1% of the voters in Quebec and an overall average of 69.1% in the English-speaking provinces. One observer of Quebec's wartime attitudes reported that the BPI's activities had accomplished little. Fatalistically, French Canadians believed "irritating propaganda" to be as much a fact of life as death and taxes. To Quebec's newspapers, Ottawa's French translations represented a lack of good faith, a failure to take Quebec's ideas into account and the miscarriage of the federal government's efforts adequately to gain support for national programmes. In the BPI's committee on morale, Major J.S.A. Bois, a Montreal psychologist, reported that his rumour studies revealed "a state of latent war" existing between French and English Canada. In French Canada, Bois found anti-English rumours to indicate that "the Germans may be bad and dangerous, but the English are near and still held to be the enemies of whatever the French hold dear." The recently established polling organization, the Canadian Institute of Public Opinion, sent the government a confidential release of its post-plebiscite poll in Quebec and showed the gap between French and English Canadians even wider than in April. L'Action catholique laid the responsibility for Quebec's alienation "on those who forge opinion," as did The Globe and Mail and the Winnipeg Tribune. Ultimately, all these comments charged that the information agencies had not done the job of unifying the country behind the war effort.
Aware of this failing, government officials proposed several remedies: a personal intervention by Mackenzie King, an intensive educational campaign in Quebec and drawing more Quebecois into war work, particularly information. When the Prime Minister handed responsibility for overall publicity to the Wartime Information Board and appointed Philippe Brais as vice-chairman, Ottawa insiders like Brooke Claxton felt that changes were in the air. At the first meeting of the new board, the members decided to take action "at the earliest possible moment" to deal with morale in French Canada, and authorized the establishment of a French news section. Mackenzie King took to the airwaves to explain to French Canada, following the allied invasion of French North Africa, that the Canadian government had broken off with Vichy in November 1942 because of its collaborationist posture. He warned of "Nazi propaganda" from Vichy radio and its disruptive influence.

Despite this promise of a new beginning, the old school triumphed. The head of the WIB's French-language operations, Georges Benoit, followed steadfastly in the footsteps of his predecessors. He believed that indirect and readily accessible propaganda meant sports events and other entertainments as the medium for the message. He advocated that the propaganda agency use censorship to stamp out contradictory opinion. If implemented, this would have alienated Quebec more completely. For his programmes, he advocated the traditional articles on the 310th anniversary of Trois Rivieres and speakers, Abbé Maheux, for example, to extol the virtues of old Quebec on intermissions of the Metropolitan Opera broadcast. But men like Maheux
preached only to the converted.\textsuperscript{60} As for information about external events, releases like "Corsica", "Soirée musicale canadienne à Rio," the anniversary of the death of Louis Pasteur\textsuperscript{61} and a radio series on British civilization\textsuperscript{62} remained bits and pieces containing little consistent interpretation of war events. Only special broadcasts by newspaper editors on the war work of Quebec women or of provincial regions\textsuperscript{63} infrequently provided this perspective.

The WIB continued to emphasize the role of the church by publishing articles and arranging spectacles. "Tout autorité vient de Dieu"\textsuperscript{64} expounded one of these. The French section also encouraged the French Catholic religious crusade "For Victory and Peace" by arranging a troop detail, radio recording and filming.\textsuperscript{65} The WIB's major religious publication, \textit{Nouvelles catholiques}, reached 45,000 French-speaking Catholics on a semi-monthly basis. As uncontroversially as possible, the magazine reprinted articles from the Canadian Catholic press on wartime issues. Apart from this, the board regularly sent out "inspirational cartoons" to all Quebec newspapers.\textsuperscript{66}

The 'bits and pieces' caused no objections but the WIB's appeals to Catholicism raised the spectre of further disunity. Despite the innocuous nature of \textit{Nouvelles catholiques}, the paper drew the ire of Toronto Baptist preacher T.T. Shields, who accused the WIB of "pulling the Pope's chestnuts out of the fire" instead of explaining the war to French Canada.\textsuperscript{67} Responding to these charges, Protestant fanatics wrote irately to the board complaining about the Catholic church, "an anti-Christ and a political whorehouse." The WIB chairman,
N.A. MacKenzie, thought the letters amusing. Nonetheless, they underlined the tenuous position of the WIB's promoting information to Quebec through the churches. The board's efforts to co-opt the curés increased the possibility of WIB material being used to undermine the war effort. Many curés preached violently against other priests who allowed "the Virgin to be violated on the altar of propaganda."

Despite the dangers and the hackneyed nature of the traditional publicity, nothing changed. When Benoit suggested various reforms, the execution of his ideas lay outside his competence. He suggested, for example, that the government give French Canadian companies more contracts. Other approaches he advocated, including his suggestion of a concerted campaign to convince French Canadians that they fought for Canada and not for the British Empire, just did not work out. Benoit advocated giving private rumour-killing groups the lead in attempting to gain French Canadians' confidence. When attempted, this failed. Benoit did have some practical ideas about using the emotional impact of film to shock French Canadians into a greater appreciation of the horrors of war and about salving their sensibilities by including French segments in the Kraft Music Hall and other popular radio programmes. All these suggestions, however, contained the kernel of the same condescending air which had alienated French Canadians in the previous years. When it came to anything as modern as using the facilities of L'Institut de sociologie de l'Université de Montréal, however, Benoit demurred.

The reasons for the uninnovative nature of the French
language operations are easy to find. Partly, Benoit failed because he lacked personnel. He continually complained about the board's refusal to supply adequate staff. The board, however, hesitated to expand due to the fear of the possible consequences: charges that the federal government produced one message for Quebec and another for the rest of the country. Apart from the news work, "stimulating the flow of official information," and the religious publications, the WIB still translated most French material from an English original. Under the WIB regime these translations included the whole range of subjects covered in English as well as adaptations of English language NFB films. Benoit's occasional protests about this state of affairs bore no results.

The anti-Vichy programme begun by the WIB in the last months of 1942 demonstrates the success that publicity specifically prepared for Quebec might have enjoyed. In part, this campaign also undermined the influence of nationalists who opposed the war. The board tried to minimize the French Canadian sympathy for unoccupied France by showing the Vichyburns as selfish collaborators with a cruel enemy. This direct presentation appealed directly to the ordinary Québécois. In the efforts to undermine the claim of Vichy and the nationalists to represent the 'true' French spirit, the WIB sponsored lectures by prominent French exiles on "La spiritualité de la résistance française," for example. This counter-propaganda managed to rouse more interest and enthusiasm than any other wartime French-language activity.*

*See chapter VI, p. 12ff. for more about the place of France in Canadian propaganda.
While the WIB had this one success in Quebec, the board's explanations about French Canadians to the English could not show even this result. For English Canadians, the occasional broadcast on unity did not have much impact. One panel discussion between Professor John Humphrey, Hugh Maclennan and Emile Vaillancourt attributed the isolation of Quebec to English Canadians' "Quebec problem mentality" and to French Canadians' difficulties in finding jobs outside the province. Vaillancourt told English listeners that Québécois could not feel the same attachment to Britain and the war due to their differing national background. French-speaking Canadians' applause for anti-war sentiments, Vaillancourt explained, resulted from their need to defy those in other provinces who slandered Quebec. 80 John Grierson put this message even more bluntly. In a public address in 1944, Grierson castigated the "messianic self-certainty" of the English Canadian "minority." The English hated the French, Grierson told his English-speaking audience, because the French Canadians would not "speak or think or believe like the Anglo-Saxon." 81 Considering the extent of the bad feeling, Grierson's lecture was too little and too late.

The conscription crisis of 1944 showed the ultimate failure of the unity campaign. The crisis broke when Mackenzie King forced the resignation of J.L. Ralston, minister of National Defence, for supporting conscription for overseas service. During this first stage of the crisis, the Wartime Information Board took no part in the public debate but served as the eyes and ears of the government. Davidson Dunton reported to the cabinet that whatever the government's actions, French Canada
awaited conscription with "cynical resignation." Dunton also reported that all English-language newspapers ultimately supported conscription but some attacked the government delay as pandering to Quebec. Despite these reports, the government did not allow the WIB to do anything. In fact by the fall of 1944, many government publicity operations, apart from the WIB had given up and were preparing English-only releases. The WIB's only public action was to print 100,000 English and 48,000 French versions of the Prime Minister's speech rebutting Ralston's pro-conscription arguments. When the Conservatives found out that 100,000 of these pamphlets found their way to the National Liberal Federation, they complained bitterly. Privately, board employees advised a cabinet committee to try to drum up volunteers for overseas and, thereby, remove some of the pressure. Led by the new minister of National Defence, General McNaughton, the committee dreamed up impractical schemes like getting the curés, the most adamant opponents of conscription, to work for the government. Geoffrey Andrew, secretary of this committee and a more realistic observer of events, managed to stop the schemes stillborn. Nonetheless, Mackenzie King reversed his position on November 23 and informed Parliament that since enough volunteers for overseas had not come forward, the government had instituted conscription for service abroad.

Although the Liberal party survived without a mass defection of Quebec members, the conscription issue put the last nail in the coffin of the unity campaign. The Wartime Information Board had long known that it had failed to effect a
reconciliation of French and English but public opinion surveys in February 1945 noted that the vast majority of the population felt that the racial split had worsened. Both French and English respondents cited the conscription question as the single most divisive wartime issue that symbolized "without clarifying, the cleavage between the two cultural groups." The English felt that the French did not pull their weight and the French felt betrayed by the English-dominated federal government. As the two groups fired past each other, the one ignored the grievances of the other. The hope and desire of compromise had diminished as the issues grew more sharply defined. Government information had failed to create a common feeling of nationhood between the two cultural communities due to the timidity of politicians, and the unimaginative and traditional message that failed to appeal to French eyes, ears and minds.
The continuing difficulties in French Canada sympto-
mized the failure of information policies to create a sense of national unity. The chauvinistic approach to nationalism had not worked to create the desired 'Canadianism.' The vague sense of nationhood promoted by the information agencies also had failed to present an image of war events, of the enemy and of a multicultural country that satisfied all Canadians. Critics began to appear during the European defeats in 1940. "What we need," one observer told the director of Public Information at that time, "is to restate at once our democratic ideals . . . . Our people must fully realize that they also must help and quickly by a profound . . . reformation."¹ Twenty influential members of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs passed a similar message on to the government. "A democratic spirit," they felt, "must infuse the wartime instruments of regimentation or the war will be lost on the home front . . . ." They suggested that "without a dynamic of our own, capable of evoking a firm loyalty and self-sacrifice, we shall with diffi-
culty resist the dynamic force of the fascist creed." For Canada, they concluded, "the dynamic can be found in a common national purpose to create a genuinely democratic society."² Brooke Claxton objected to the government's use of scare tactics to promote a wartime national spirit. A sinister enemy and a witch hunt for fifth columnists, he believed, would not "make democracy an effective and dynamic force."³
More critical voices joined the chorus urging the government to adopt an alternative to the traditional unity message. Observers noted in 1942 that most Canadians felt left out of the war effort and had grown lackadaisical about their individual wartime tasks. The information agencies' promotion of a 'narrow' and 'negative' view, the war to "beat Hitler," had done its task too well. Once the United States had joined the conflict and most Canadians foresaw an eventual victory, they got apathetic. They were more interested in the post-war future than in the immediate war news. Every segment of Canadian society wanted social changes and the idea of the 'People's War' began to take shape. Farmers, for example, rejected the view of a war for freedom and expressed their belief that they were fighting for a better way of life. Agreeing that the depression must never be repeated, the Canadian Chamber of Commerce pointed out that "when workers are adequately housed and no longer haunted by fear of unemployment, the foundations will have been laid on which we can build more ambitiously for social welfare . . . ." The Chamber still maintained that these welfare measures were acceptable only if they did not place too great a burden on business. Most Canadians believed that the government should replace or augment its traditional unity message with a practical vision of the future.

Those who pressed the government for the establishment of an information organization based on social scientific principles, also pushed most strongly for information programmes which recognized the public mood. The Canadian Association for Adult Education adopted the idea of wartime change as its own.
The participants in the CAAE's Macdonald College conference in December 1942 decided that the opportunity for education regarding social reforms had greater potential than in a generation. The adult educators believed they could "build a more dynamic popular conception of our war effort . . . in terms of the new world which can emerge from the war if there is an enlightened and effective national will to that end." Information work, they urged, must abandon its detachment from the "urgent necessities of the moment" and try to educate the population about "the process through which a better society might evolve." 10

Faced with a threat of the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation, some Liberals quickly realized that they must incorporate the desire for democratic reform in their party and government programmes. The CCF, like the CAAE, found the wartime climate of opinion an ideal chance to promote the party's platform of social change and progress. 11 By mid-war, CCF speakers predicted "the end of privilege" before even the wealthiest Canadian audiences. 12 The national leader, M.J. Coldwell, in appealing for a 'yes' vote in the 1942 conscription plebiscite told Canadians that faith in democracy would only arise from a popular conviction that victory would "really bring security and freedom." 13 Fearing the popularity of the CCF, the left-wing Liberals also made vigorous speeches about the 'people's world' following the 'people's war'. Even the Prime Minister, at one point, told the Canadian Manufacturers Association that the war had become "a social revolution as well as an international war" despite the "blindness in human
beings which caused them to see only one side of the question."
Mackenzie King believed that the government had to take popular feeling into account and tell even "reactionary" manufacturers the truth. Among the Liberals, Brooke Claxton agitated most consistently for policies that reflected the popular desire for social programmes. Embarking on a one-man information crusade, Claxton made speeches telling Canadians that some Liberals understood their desires. He argued that "the answers of elderly bank presidents, tame economists and reactionary politicians" would not do. If the federal government were to mobilize Canadians, Claxton argued, it had to convince them that "something better will come from victory," in terms of a definite commitment to a defined social policy. Government information agencies should demonstrate the "driving force" of this decision since "no social order can establish itself without an educational campaign." Obviously, government information work could serve the ends of the Liberal party.

As a final impetus to redefining a wartime democracy, the government increasingly perceived signs that unless Canadians could agree on a vision of the future, social unrest might fracture the country's unity.* Mostly Liberals, those who worried about the polarization of opinion looked for a means of promoting a middle of the road philosophy. These men supported a progressive view of society but wanted to head off left-wing extremists as well as reactionaries for a smooth transition from war to peace that would leave room for social reforms. For its part, the CAAE believed that most Canadians

* See chapter IV, pp. 80-83 for a more detailed discussion.
did not want a return to unrestricted free enterprise. At the same time, however, the Association depended on corporate donors and could not support anti-business sentiments unequivocally. The CAAE, therefore, frequently couched its middle of the road ideas in an "appeal to the best minds" for public service.

Edgar Tarr, a prominent member of the voluntary association network, told his friends that "the desirable thing is to make use of the pressures of war to bring about commitments which will lessen the chances of reactionaries gaining the day and keeping the world in an unholy mess." Polarization would continue, Tarr believed, as long as the war organization remained "largely an organization of the classes asking the masses to respond without giving them any say . . . ." The middle road would only appear once this situation changed or appeared to change. Several voluntary associations concerned about the situation formed the Canadian Youth Commission which tried to build an educational programme not only to prevent negative consequences but also "to furnish a channel through which youth may make its own distinctive contribution to shaping the future of democratic society in Canada." The Youth Commission volunteers wanted to build up a consensus to allow for a proper and progressive economic and social development. E.A. Corbett of the CAAE also urged action to avoid revolt and to provoke a "wide and thorough-going discussion . . . ." of contemporary issues.

Again Brooke Claxton promoted government awareness of the situation. If nothing happened to stop the polarization, Claxton predicted trouble with both French Canada and with organized labour. "Outmoded conceptions of the place of the
common man," Claxton commented, "don't stop the changes but they
do make them explode in different directions." The government
had to wake up from its "dream world," and allow organizations
like the Wartime Information Board to work to rectify things.
In a memorandum to the organizers of the Canadian Youth Commiss-
sion, Claxton encouraged their efforts to build up a consensus
and to convince Canadians in a "restless search for advance" not
to "obscure the distance we have already come." Claxton's
speeches emphasized the non-ideological nature of Canadian pro-
gress in his own effort to dampen down the polarizing opinion.
The war, he told his audiences, was not fought "by theorists who
believed exclusively in private enterprise or socialism or capi-
talism or any other 'ism'." It was fought by soldiers who be-
lieved in "getting the job done in the shortest possible time
and in the most sensible way . . . ." In the post war years,
Claxton argued "we can't have a country where there is no
security but we can't have security in a country where there is
no opportunity . . . ." Canadians should see extremists "for
what they are, that is as masters of prejudice and intolerance
who are going to use those weapons in an effort to steal poli-
tical power." Claxton's ideal Canadians stood firmly in the
political centre "doing the fighting not the talking . . . ." Naturally, they would all vote Liberal.

Under John Grierson's direction, the Wartime Information Board quickly took the lead in using information to promote
awareness of democratic possibilities and to head off unrest.
It is hardly surprising, given that Grierson's whole philosophy
of information had an activist basis.* Summing up his own analysis, Grierson believed that the "patriotism is enough period" when the "flags flew and the bands blared" had long since ended. The threat to self-preservation following the defeat of France that had inspired this approach to information work had worn off in its appeal. Following this, the "finger of scorn period" when the government "bullied" the population into supporting the war effort by citing the contributions of various allies had also lost its effect. Information services had then come up with a "Back the Attack" approach involving an emphasis on war events and an appeal to the desire for revenge. While still effective, Grierson believed that the negative nature of this would leave the population facing the peace with unrealistic expectations. He believed that he could work out "a more realistic conception."²⁹

Since information work involved "making people aware of what the war effort involved," it meant supplying a moral imperative in a war that followed on the heels of ten years of hard times. Information officers had to realize that men would not follow blindly and had to bind publicity content with a demonstration of the means by which the war contributed to the fulfillment of basic needs like food and shelter. Canadians would not fight to return to the old way of life. Governments had to show their desire for change by putting their case with meaning. This involved facing the psychological problems of motivation resulting from industrial transfers, inadequate

* See Chapter II, pp. 51-56.
recreation, poor health services and substandard housing. Government information would have no effect at all unless it was combined with practical solutions to these problems. Only these solutions would promote a sense of common purpose and equal participation. Individuals, then, would gain an understanding of their relationship to the total social picture and an appreciation of post-war potentialities. The government should use its information organization to assist in a "spring cleaning" of citizens' attitudes and to present a new "working faith."

Grierson's staff and board shared his ideas. The men who ran the domestic information organization not only believed in using the social sciences in information work,* but also held that these techniques should accommodate the need for democratic reform. The WIB chairman, N.M. MacKenzie, warned that unless the government instituted a policy of reform, Canada was headed "straight for the totalitarian state." The head of the WIB reports branch, J.D. Ketchum, told his superiors that:

much of the public's willingness to work and sacrifice during the war is directly due to a realization that Canada is playing a vital part in winning it. A comparable force after the war can only be created through giving Canadians a vision of their country, its people and its possibilities.

"Mere oratory," Ketchum warned, would not convince the population. Canadians needed graphic and detailed explanations in order to envision the "permanent challenge."33

* See chapter I, pp. 26-30 for the adult educators' ideas on the social sciences and government and chapter IV, pp. 104 ff. for their application to wartime information work.
The WIB began to use the social scientific techniques in order both to justify their interpretation and to define a new sense of nationhood. The Wartime Information Board could not ditch all the old-style national unity campaigns based upon chauvinism and the concerns associated with a traditional sense of 'Canadianism'. But the board did begin studying means of putting out a "new nationalist" approach more closely related to public opinion. This new attempt at promoting a sense of nationhood would take current issues into account, concerns which cut across traditional ethnic and social divisions. The WIB recognized that while Canadians' ability to absorb masses of facts remained limited, this confinement did not apply to information specifically requested.34

The board's first public opinion surveys in 1943 revealed that a set of issues indeed did cut across the traditional divisions. Canadians' top priorities lay in finding out more about the government's plans for after the war. The WIB discovered that the public's interest in the armed forces and war production had reached a saturation point. Canadians, the board concluded, demonstrated an intelligent interest in broader questions and were no longer "fooled by the injunction to win the war first before talking about the peace."35 In general, the board believed that the people wanted a greater feeling of participation. Surveys also revealed that the public had second thoughts about the honesty of government releases; over 50% believed that some war news contained distortions.36 Any new material would have to tell the truth. Canadians, however, would not reject government requests for sacrifices, as long as
these were essential and fairly distributed. Numerically, most of those who did not understand the war effort came from among Canadians with low incomes and low educational levels. Isolating some groups further, the WIB researchers believed that more information could assist in alleviating the isolation of French Canadians, non-Anglo-Saxons, workers and soldiers. The board's studies hinted that this isolation could be broken by publicity emphasizing the positive goal of a better post-war future.

Continued monitoring of Canadian public opinion in 1944 revealed that public apathy and lack of confidence in post-war plans had grown even stronger with the increased certainty of victory. The Wartime Information Board decided that only a restatement of Canada's commitments and objectives might concentrate Canadians' minds on total victory. The government's job consisted of convincing the population that unconditional surrender remained necessary. This involved continuing the anti-enemy and war events publicity. At the same time, the information workers believed that they must step up their efforts to convince labour that the job had not ended. Similarly, they found that Canadians wanted to know the truth about the difficulty of the post-war years: that six times as many jobs had to be found as in 1939, that trade conditions would remain difficult, that wartime restrictions would not be lifted immediately. These conclusions strengthened the resolve of the WIB that the board should not confine information services "like the undertaker to past events" but should set forth the pros and cons of national problems in order to promote discussion and
future rational decisions. This meant, in effect, advising the government of the public impact of various policy alternatives rather than passively explaining government policy. At the same time, they decided more fully to explain the role of the federal government in planning the future.

The drawn out fighting in Europe in late 1944 and early 1945 produced anxiety without resolution on the home front. The better world after the war, the WIB found, appeared more dubious than ever to "anything but cheerful" Canadians. Fearing even more complacency and a tremendous let-down after victory in Europe, the information officers began suppressing most of their patriotic slogans. The Victory Loan campaign in the spring of 1945 used "Invest in the Best" and "Say Thanks with Bonds" for catchwords. These phrases, hoped the organizers, would appeal to individual self-interest and the desire to bring the men home quickly by using bond returns. As well, public opinion indicated a lack of interest in the Asian war, assistance to liberated countries and the continuance of economic controls after the war. Canadians, however, still maintained a very strong interest in the post-war reconstruction and rehabilitation measures and the WIB proceeded to appeal to this interest.

Following up on these analyses of public opinion, the WIB designed a message that tried to build a sense of nationhood by creating a feeling of participation. C.B. Macpherson of the board suggested that persistent press criticism downgrading the government and the civil service might persuade Canadians "that centralized bureaucracy is in control." Then, the population would lose its capacity for active democracy. The board did
not want to reiterate the Four Freedoms, the Magna Carta and the British North America Act in civics course fashion. Instead, the officers designed more specific instructions to explain to ordinary citizens how to work for the laws they wanted. Explaining the role of pressure groups, the WIB pointed out that except for the publicly-owned radio system, a few men owned most of the newspapers and radio stations. In practical terms, ordinary Canadians had to organize in order to pressure the media owners to publicize their cause so that the government would take note of it. Citizens, a WIB manuscript stated, "are passive in governing our country unless we become part of organized public opinion." At the same time, participatory democracy implied tolerance and use of the "comradeship learned in war . . . ." Cooperation could accomplish things.

The Wartime Information Board also altered its more general material to capture the spirit of democratic change and social progress. During the 1930s, the board explained, "Society had no vision. Society saw no meanings, held no ideals . . . ." The war, however, provided new opportunities and had "rekindled the flame of a great and prosperous Canada." This promise would only be fulfilled if citizens preserved the wartime advances and carried them to fullness by forgetting the differences of the thirties and by cooperating. This progress showed the incorporation of both capitalism and socialism in the modern state and the marriage of planning and individual initiative in creating a prosperous future.

This general form of appeal to Canadians' sense of nationhood still was not enough. As "mid-wives to a more
progressive society," the WIB officials had to avoid criticism and to stimulate public interest by preparing specific programmes "as defensible and as factual as possible." To begin with, Grierson interpreted the trend of public opinion as demonstrating that the WIB had to secure public cooperation with the various economic control regulations. Dr. David Petegorsky proposed an industrial information programme to overcome labour's suspicion of the government's generalized statements about labour relations. Most of the board's staff believed that all these proposals had to relate to the post-war since "over-optimism and over-pessimism" about the economic future would cause more problems than any other.

All the board's work aimed to overcome this difficulty. The main efforts at incorporating a new national point of view applied the board's analysis either to a particular segment of the population or to a specific subject. The board originated food and consumer, economic stabilization, industrial, armed forces, reconstruction and rehabilitation information programmes to deal with the morale problems of the latter part of the war. All these programmes set about building support for government activities not on the basis of wartime events and symbols but on the basis of debate and understanding. Educationally-oriented, the programmes rested on the assumption that if Canadians understood the reasoning behind government policy, they would support it. By a judicious selection and dramatization of the facts, the WIB tried to stimulate thinking and discussion of current issues. The board also tried to explain the interrelationships binding society with government policy, particularly for the
post-war period. All these programmes included a participatory message or mechanism that tried to awaken a sense of belonging and of responsibility. In its purest form, the new message provided the means to adapt liberal democracy to a complex technological society. It could help individuals to understand and, more importantly, to judge events, policies and programmes. At the same time, depending on the application of social scientific techniques, the 'new nationalism' could serve a dangerous and insidious manipulative purpose for the government in power.
CHAPTER X
APPLYING THE NEW NATIONALISM:
WARTIME RESTRICTIONS

After studying public opinion, the Wartime Information Board arranged to show Canadians how wartime controls fit into the context of Canadian democracy and the interconnection of economic interests. Both sections of this programme, the consumer side and the economic stabilization side, broke down the appeal to include a participatory message for businessmen, housewives, tradesmen, farmers and school children.

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The government had a two-fold reason for trying to convince the public to accept restrictions on food and consumer goods. First of all, voluntary limitations on domestic consumption would allow the country to devote more production to the war effort by cutting down on imported goods and by easing inflationary pressure as excess income competed for scarce items. Secondly and for the same reasons, the government had to convince Canadians to accept rationing of the scarcest items. Tea, coffee, sugar, butter and gasoline went on the ration in 1942. Meat and liquor joined the list later. Generally, each portion allowed for a generous per capita consumption. At the lowest point, meat rationing reached one to two and one-half pounds per person per week depending on the cut and the gasoline available still provided fuel for
2,160 miles of pleasure driving per year.¹

Canadians' failure to limit consumption, nonetheless, began to cause the government concern by 1943. Despite the large publicity establishment of the Wartime Prices and Trade Board, the enforcement organization which allotted Canadian production, the Canadian public feared that the right to an essential food supply had disappeared. The government had to deal with pressure on food production due to increased demand, unfavourable crop conditions and the shortage of farm labour. The rationing system had also run into trouble. While many French Canadians openly expressed the belief that "rationing was for the English only," large numbers of English Canadians covertly cheated on rationed items and anticipated expanded ration lists by buying in bulk.² Government analysts feared that agitation would grow more acute if Canada experienced inflationary rises in food prices because of the pressure of swollen consumer buying-power against any food item that even patriotic citizens refused to forego. Public apathy to rationing and food regulations might foster not just small scale cheating but widespread black-marketeering that would erode public respect for government regulations. Once begun, the cycle would reinforce itself as the government tried to save its programmes and further annoyed the public. Government nutritionists, furthermore, argued that Canadians must understand and practice good eating in order to keep healthy and to maintain a high level of efficient production as well as to withstand the physical, nervous and emotional strains of war. Home economists believed that the public consumed
available food ignorantly and indifferently. A programme of food conservation, education and persuasion, therefore, could improve the efficiency of Canadians' food consumption, remove an irritant and gain support for rationing and the overall food policy.3

Called in to help the WPTB, the Wartime Information Board concentrated on awakening a sense of necessity, of responsibility and of fairness. This, the board hoped, would cast no aspersions on farmers' achievements and would encourage no demands for an expansion of food production.4 "Freedom," the board emphasized, "is dependent on each person's willingness to take no more than his rightful share."5 At the same time, the programme tried to inspire confidence that although stores would not always carry every food commodity, the food supply would retain its general pre-war features.6 Food conservation information also tried to convince consumers to substitute an item in abundant supply for one in short stock and to curtail consumption to satisfy only immediate needs. To combat recurrent shortages, curtailment had the greatest prominence in the summer of 1943.7 Emphasizing that the ration met nutritional requirements, WIB releases exhorted that "Your share is no more than this!" Moving from curtailment to substitution once the shortages ended, the releases tried to help housewives understand the best use of available food items.8

* See chapter IV, pp. 1 and 6.
As the conservation message moved to a broader range than food, the information applied the curtailment and substitution message to many consumer goods. The WIB asked car drivers to save wear on their tires by the proper use of brakes. For fuel conservation, the releases advised Canadians that "an extra sweater now will save coal later," and that pulling blinds on unused rooms would save 10% of the home fuel consumption. Clothing received particular attention. Releases advised men to rotate their suits and women to "discover new wear and new charm in old clothes" by remaking them into fashionable new outfits. As a means of removing the stigma of recut clothing, the WIB publicized the remake fashion centres supervised by radio broadcaster and home economist, Kate Aitken. In general, the messages tried to promote thriftiness by urging "don't buy two when one will do!".

For food conservation information, the WIB for the first time varied the general message by regionalizing approaches and by taking established consumption pattern into account. WIB officers tried to stop releases that urged fish-eating maritimers to curtail their consumption of beef. Special handouts for food retailers gave ideas on preventing waste and of handling perishable commodities. To encourage substitution, the organizers asked retailers to promote plentiful foods, seasonal fresh fruit for example, in order to prevent pressure on canned supplies. The WIB also requested food advertisers to relate their product promotions to the general overall food supply and to avoid creating artificial
shortages by careless advertising. Restaurants also received the word to reduce waste and spoilage. The WIB told students about their duty to give food to poorer nations, to clean off their plates and to plant victory and community gardens. The WIB provided housewives with information on good eating that resulted from long-term buying. In addition, all these groups learned about the interconnections between governments, producers, processors, distributors, retailers, restauranteurs and consumers in making conservation work.¹²

The conservation campaign organizers tried to mix patriotism and news. Releases called for patriotic drivers not to demand more gasoline because "Canadian tanks need that gasoline as they crash through weakening German lines." In addition, Canada had more food to use than most countries and Canadians could supply this necessity with less hardship than any Europeans. Pamphlets displayed photographs of emaciated children's hands reaching for food and a text describing European starvation as a result of deliberate Nazi strategy. Food became a test of Canadians' ability to demonstrate the resolution needed to solve a specific problem, to apply a conservationist outlook to human needs. At home, this meant building a better country by scientific nutrition.¹³ In order to remove the alien character of the government's doling out life's essentials, information workers tried to point out instances of patriotic rationing in the country's past. Both French and English Canadians could look back to Jacques Cartier's rationing of supplies and the United Empire Loyalists' portioning out their goods as examples of sharing for
the benefit of all and for the "salvation" of Canada. As for voluntary sharing, the information releases recounted the story of 'Hungry Year' in Upper Canada, the toughest that the Loyalists endured. They survived because the military garrisons shared their ration with the nearly-starving civilian communities. "We don't think in terms of Upper Canada, or only of Canada," the WIB release concluded, "the whole world faces a hungry year" and Canadians should "share down to their last biscuit, if need be, with the starving peoples who need help so desperately." 14

The WIB tried to make conservation and rationing into news. Believing factual information would provide an insight into the food situation, good or bad, the WIB's experts tried to distribute a daily news item for the CBC news and for the national wire services. On the curtailment side, news items might help housewives estimate sugar requirements for home canning. 15 For substitution, the releases might describe the nutritional value and cooking methods of cabbage. 16 This news-based approach required considerable organization. News about the availability of perishables received a regional treatment for greatest accuracy in terms of local conditions. If the WIB's sources indicated that an item would be plentiful, the food organizers prepared a week-long feature treatment. They made certain that the product would be available by alerting wholesale distributors in advance, then sent out short items and recipes to radio stations, newspapers and retailers. 17 The food information officers kept the media in touch with the whole food conservation strategy by sending out copies of the
WIB publication, *Consumer Facts*, a summary of all food regulations, news and an explanation of the relationship between price and supply. The news treatment justified rationing tea and coffee by explaining the relationship of restrictions with the supply picture. Information news releases also set out the instructions regarding ration books and the changes in allotted supplies of rationed goods. The news reported that apportioning fuel had saved 400,000,000 gallons from 1942 to 1945 and had made this available overseas despite vastly expanded wartime requirements.

Frequently, conservation and rationing 'news' contained a large mixture of exhortation, cajoling and admonishment. "Yes," radio bulletins advised, "you've been saving all the paper you can . . . but . . . some people haven't been as conscientious as you and your family . . ." Unlike Europeans, Canadians could still get consumer goods, like shoes. But millions of children in France could not get shoes. Since "winter is raw and bitter over there now and French houses are cold . . ." Canadians should try to aid the French and should make do with hand-me-downs. Descendants of a pioneer race which had withstood deprivations, Canadians should "take it" and not complain about these minor wartime inconveniences. Cajoling played a large part in getting support for rationing. When the government reinstituted meat rationing in 1945 to increase exports, releases assured consumers that after the first few weeks of getting used to the idea, Canadians could adapt because they had proven their mettle and "all would end well". When articles went off the ration, the WIB
calculatedly praised consumers but pointed out that Canadians had not really suffered. The publicity made much of each little 'victory' to hold out the carrot and the promise that increased cooperation would soon lead to a more plentiful supply of other goods. By praising consumers for their "unselfish support;" information officers hoped to squeeze the utmost cooperation from them.  

As the end of the war approached, the government stressed the need for voluntary consumption restrictions in order to ease the transition into peace. The consumer information releases pointed out that:

if we start bidding against each other for scarce goods, we weaken the value of our Canadian dollar. So let's make what we have do - let's keep every [possible] dollar out of circulation...  

The consumer information service continued its warnings that goods would remain in short supply. One release, for example, informed radio listeners that a continuing building materials' scarcity for private construction meant continued restrictions on civilian housing. When the WIB found that Canadians would accept post-war belt-tightening if restrictive measures remained connected to food supplies for Europe, the consumer information service emphasized this aspect of Canadian food shortages. The WIB also tried to enhance the marital bliss of Canadian servicemen by preparing cookbooks to help the war-brides in cooking Canadian meals.

Thousands of restless servicemen returning in the summer of 1945 provided the final challenge to the consumer information service. This time, inflation provided the main
worry. WIB releases described in great detail the danger of servicemen spending money to buy restricted goods on the black market. Publicity explained that servicemen had spent a lot of time in countries accustomed to the routine use of black markets to obtain scarce or rationed goods. In order to maintain the price levels of restricted goods, the WIB asked civilians to assist in explaining the rationing system to the returned men. This way, Canadians could assure the success of the rationing system in ensuring that all citizens received their share of restricted goods.  

By the end of the war, the government received heartening evidence that the WIB had consolidated Canadians' sentiments behind the government's food and rationing policies. A Wartime Prices and Trade Board opinion survey revealed that in June 1944, the vast majority of Canadians supported the principle of rationing although they might have objected in smaller numbers to the regulations enforcing the ration of specific items. In Quebec, where 25% of the population did not favour punishment for illegal activities connected with restrictions, the margin in favour remained surprisingly high. This strong support continued through 1945 when another opinion poll could find only 7% of the whole population who thought that rationing had been poorly and unfairly administered. Even French Canada had not repudiated the distribution system. The majority did not see rationing:

as a serious hardship and its continuance, even its extension to other items, would not seem intolerable to most people, always provided they knew and approved the ends to which this was the means.
Quebec, however, demonstrated a reasonably strong opposition to continuing the rationing system in order to supply Europe with food. 33

(ii)

Food and consumer goods publicity tied in very closely with another aspect of the government's wartime restrictions, the economic control measures. In a radio broadcast on October 18, 1941, Mackenzie King announced a series of measures to restrict wage, price and profit increases. Reluctantly, the Prime Minister accepted the department of Finance's argument that controls constituted the only means of assuring a stable wartime economy. In unemotional terms, King's broadcast explained that the government had expanded the original economic controls of 1939 in order to keep down inflation which threatened peace of mind and undermined the war effort. Boiling the choice down to a question of guns or butter, the government had chosen guns yet wanted to afford poorer citizens protection against the upward thrust of prices. The 1941 situation threatened to parallel the rampant inflation of the Great War when faulty controls led to currency and commodity speculation and a resultant loss of confidence in the economy by the bulk of the population. This previous fiasco led in turn to disunity and to post-war social unrest. 34

Public support for stricter controls deteriorated severely in the following two years. The Wartime Prices and Trade Board, primarily responsible for supervising the controls, grew alarmed at the public's pressure on the system.
Farmers demanded higher prices for agricultural products; wage earners and industrial workers pressed for higher salaries; consumers and householders paid inflated black-market prices for regulated goods; and business firms and landlords tried to increase their returns. A survey conducted in September 1943 discovered that support for controls by the non-farm population had dropped to 69% from 80% since February 1943. In Quebec, the decline showed even more dramatically as urban support for controls fell from 75% of the population to 48%. Complaints centred around the high cost of food coupled with wages frozen at a level too low to maintain consumption patterns. Most Canadians also suspected that big business was not suffering equally with the rest of the country. Many complaints, in fact, resulted from this feeling that the government enforced price controls less rigidly than wage freezes.  

The Wartime Information Board used these findings to argue for an educational campaign to demonstrate the value of economic stability. To the cabinet, the WIB argued that the pressure on controls proved public underestimation of the vital need for success. Those opposing controls did not understand:

their own self-interest in the maintenance of economic stabilization, the interdependent nature of price and supply regulations, wage ceilings. . . and the responsibility of all individuals to participate in making the policies effective.

Falling support for economic stabilization, the board argued, was related to allied military successes in the 1943 invasions of Sicily and North Africa which weakened "the spirit of self-denial." Apprehensions about the post-war period intensified
the pressure as Canadians tried to hoard for a post-war depression.\(^{36}\) Hidden in these arguments, the WIB implied that the success of these Liberal controls compared favourably to the failure of the Conservative-Union government from 1914-1918 and that publicity would allow the Liberals to take a backhanded slap at their present Conservative opponents. The collapse of economic stability, furthermore, would also jeopardize rationing and savings drives and erode government support.\(^{37}\)

Although the government authorized the WIB to proceed to attack the problem, a conflict of interests delayed the economic stabilization information programme. Earlier, Donald Gordon, the WPTB chairman, felt that his board could not make a general appeal to the nation but was irritated that "labour and agriculture were getting in his way."\(^{38}\) Later trying to satisfy his own public relations branch and expecting unemployment problems, Gordon dragged his feet. After the WIB found that unemployment would not have as widespread an effect as predicted, the board overrode Gordon's objections.\(^{39}\) But J.L. Ilsley, the minister of Finance, hesitated to use government money to argue a contentious issue\(^{40}\) and the departments of Labour and Agriculture did not want to antagonize farmers and union men. Only after the WIB promised not to cast aspersions on these two interests did the government's fear of economic difficulties get the programme going.\(^{41}\)

The board designed a programme that took into account "the individual citizen as consumer,"\(^{42}\) and that emphasized the

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\(^{*}\) PC 9746, 23 December 1943.
"concept of the participant citizenship and social responsibilities of the individual in an attempt to secure his cooperation." The economic stabilization information committee tried dealing "with the citizen in his relationship to his local community, his responsibilities as a member of that community and the things he can do locally to help fulfil the national purpose." Adopting Grierson's approach to information, the committee prepared its brochures with an eye to individual groups: farmers, wage earners, industrial workers, consumers and retailers. At the same time, the committee tried to demonstrate to individual interests the inter-relationship among their economic lives.

To make the campaign more than an old-style patriotic appeal, the committee tried to prove that the demands of industrial workers for higher wages did not result from a lack of patriotism but from a concrete feeling of not belonging to society, and the unsatisfactory state of labour-management relations.* The committee tried to avoid abstract exhortations to gain support for the wage control policy. Instead, the campaign tied all wage control information to additional information about policies to improve labour relations. Similarly, the committee suggested that economic stabilization information for lower income groups bear some relation to the government's policies to raise sub-standard wages, and to grant a cost of living bonus. To avoid "preaching to the people," the WIB tried to show "the people why it is in their own interests to

* See Chapter XI for more details of industrial information activities.
take part in the discipline of not asking for higher prices, . . . etc." It tried not to scare them but to demonstrate the adverse effect of rising prices.46

The information officers believed they must argue their case by taking a frank and open approach, unlike the minister of Finance and the Wartime Prices and Trade Board who thought that detailed explanations of controls would complicate administrative functions.47 Instead, the committee argued that Canadians understood the practical aspects of economic management better than ever before. The depression and the wartime controls themselves had given the public "a very personal connection" with government intervention in the economy by virtue of daily experience. The committee, therefore, requested government permission to publicize the means by which the cost-of-living index operated as an indicator of inflation and the gauge for wage and price increases. The committee argued that greater public support would result from showing Canadians instead of "keeping them in a cloud of darkness."48

Winning the point, the economic stabilization information committee published a major brochure, *Canada's Wartime Measures for Economic Stability to Keep Down the Cost of Living*. Truthful to an extreme, the brochure even explained the real reason for the campaign: the government's fear of civil unrest if economic stabilization measures failed. Appealing to a sense of common outrage, the pamphlet explained that wartime inflation would leave the majority of the citizens with a reduced standard of living while speculators made exhorbitant profits. If this occurred, "everyone would suspect others of
"profiteering," general distrust would wreck national unity and war activities would suffer from bickering and class rivalry. A successful policy, pointed out the pamphlet, would "leave Canada in a position to meet the problems of post-war reconstruction with far more success than if inflation were present." If the aggravated situation following the Armistice in 1918 recurred, the pamphlet warned, Canada would suffer another economic collapse and a depression comparable to the 1930's. Economic stabilization policies avoided these dangers and remained an essential national goal.\(^{49}\)

The economic stabilization information committee tried to keep their message consistent with other political aims and considerations. The information officers always emphasized the post-war aspects of controls in order to reinforce government proposals for peacetime reconstruction, and to prevent demands for higher wartime economic returns.\(^{50}\) Since a lavish campaign could defeat its own ends, the committee made an effort to demonstrate economy by including "no embellishment indicative of unnecessary expense."\(^{51}\) The committee drew no detailed parallels between economic stabilization in the United States or Great Britain but did compare, to the delight of the Liberals, the current Liberal record from 1939 with the Conservative attempt from 1914-1918.\(^{52}\) To prevent unions and farmers from protesting, the information men did not emphasize subsidies supporting agricultural prices and avoided undue association with business management.\(^{53}\) Trying to limit public anxiety, the committee downplayed the word "inflation" and for it substituted "rising prices".\(^{54}\)
The strategy set, the economic stabilization information committee drove home the importance of and the reasons for economic controls. The committee secured a message from the Prime Minister in which King told Canadians that:

on the home front, the battle against inflation is the most critical of all. The winning of this battle will contribute much to the winning of the war. It will contribute more than all else towards the solution of post-war problems.

The committee explained that the government and the public had more money to spend; workers increased wages by overtime pay and farmers received higher returns. Despite taxes and voluntary savings, Canadians' disposable income had still risen from $4,200,000,000 in 1939 to $7,000,000,000 in 1943. Floating around, this money constituted an inflationary threat when it competed for scarce goods and services. The committee also pointed out that while some unjustified price rises occurred because of this excess income, most other prices increased in an acceptable fashion as manufacturers allowed for higher production costs. The cost of imported materials, for example, could not come under the government's purview nor could the price of their substitutes. Even labour costs pushed inexorably higher as a result of uncontrollable factors: absenteeism, high employment turnover and employees' inexperience. Despite these imperfections, the committee assured Canadians that the government had strictly supervised mark-ups and wage increases to assure overall stability. The controls prevented "the hardships and injustices of inflation." by taking "into account everyone's ability to pay" and by distributing "the burden of war finance fairly." Canadians with
fixed incomes would not get caught in the squeeze of rising prices, and would not allow others to use a rise in prices "as an excuse" to demand higher incomes. 55

To create a favourable initial impression, economic stabilization publicity emphasized the benefits of price control. These restrictions, the campaign material explained, protected the consumer by putting a ceiling on the cost of commodities, rents and service charges. 56 Manufacturers, the public learned, had willingly absorbed many higher production costs and cut out frills as had retailers when manufacturers had proven unable to hold prices down. "Only as a last resort," the committee told Canadians, did manufacturers and farmers receive government subsidies to defray increased costs for imported material or for other unavoidable price increases. Even here, the consumer benefited most by paying lower prices and by an equitable distribution of price increases over the whole tax-paying public. The information programme also focused on the widespread benefits of stable rents during the wartime housing shortage. 57

The information officers moved very carefully in explaining wage controls and taxation, the bugbear of organized labour. First of all, the WIB demonstrated that wage and salary controls prevented upward pressure on the cost-of-living and yet provided upward wage adjustments in hardship cases. Distribution controls assisted in allocating manpower fairly. The economic stabilization brochures pointed out that since wages and salaries accounted for an average of two-thirds of production costs, the government had
to control them by economic stabilization legislation or prices would climb. The economic stabilization committee emphasized that for the first time in history, income taxes comprised the bulk of federal government taxation revenues and financed the war on the basis of a graduated tax system which took into account family size and ability to pay. Taxes, the committee argued, prevented excess spending from forcing up prices and complemented the Victory Loan drives in providing funds and reducing purchasing power. The new tax system, a progressive measure, produced greater social equality in Canada than ever before, particularly since the excess profits tax ensured that corporations also paid their proportionate share of war costs. The whole control structure, the argument concluded, proved that "equality of sacrifice" underlay the government's war financing.58

In a quintessential example of their mid-war nationalism, the information officers tried to demonstrate the interconnections and common interest of all economic groups in making certain controls worked. Since labour, manufacturers, landlords, farmers and salaried workers, each appreciated the ceilings on the others' incomes each "in turn must accept controls on their [own] products for the common good."59 Posters depicted a circle of men each pointing to his neighbour and saying "sure inflation control is swell for him."60 If one profession got a raise, the message reiterated, everyone would want one and would end up with no comparative advance.61 To raise a sense of "joint effort and joint responsibility in a common cause," the WIB warned that:
selfishness on the part of any single
group will jeopardize not only the
welfare of the Canadian community. . .
but . . . will inevitably react against
the interest of the group responsible.

Finally, the organizers stated that four years of war had shown that planning for maximum efficiency in all sectors had achieved:

a stability in the living of Canadians
who, under the impact of war's demands,
have learned that there is no indepen­
dence in a working democracy.

This realization, hopefully, would lead toward peacetime cooperation and sharing in "a common objective" of working out reconversion "national in its scope and international in its responsibilities."62

The economic stabilization information committee prepared a special pitch to the two most discontented sections of the Canadian public, labour and agriculture. For labour, the committee concentrated on an explanation of the economics of work, the necessity for wage controls, and an appeal to unselfish motivation.63 This included a considerable effort to gain support for the cost-of-living index, the peg for allowable wage increases, such as the wage bonuses granted in February 1944. At the same time, the economic stabilization committee warned that the government would cancel all wage adjustments based on the cost-of-living bonus if unions pressed so strongly for money that inflation threatened.65 To reassure labour of the government's good intentions, the information officers publicized the establishment of war labour boards that gave the workers a say in rectifying injustices by permitting upward
wage adjustments. For agriculture, the information officers tried to demonstrate to farmers that controls secured both their standard of living and their costs. Agriculture benefitted most from stability because it always suffered most severely during the depressions which followed inflationary periods. Apart from this, the economic stabilization committee argued that farmers ought to control inflation as a "responsibility for the common good of all," particularly because they received a boost in agricultural prices in 1944. The committee also praised farmers for not contributing to inflation beyond the 1944 increases and for doing their part in providing necessary anti-inflationary public opinion.

The economic stabilization information committee also gave manufacturers a pat on the back for their willingness to accept lower profits while trying to increase production. Convincing businessmen to support stabilization measures consisted of citing facts and figures, particularly those showing that price controls in Canada had limited cost-of-living increases more successfully than in other allied nations. The WIB also warned business that any deflationary period would leave it with goods on hand worth less than production cost. If manufacturers and distributors did not accept the price ceilings with good grace, successful requests for exceptions would "morally" bind the Wartime Prices and Trade Board to expand its dispensations of relief. The inflationary cycle would continue.

As they developed all their arguments, the information strategists geared the economic stabilization information
campaign to changing wartime conditions. The first barrage of information in January 1944 followed a graded pattern. The first simple advertisements suggested that during 1944, a critical year, Canadians should not waste their energies on chiselling and trying to circumvent economic controls. The second series of pamphlets and advertisements pictured the controls as practical responses to the changing wartime economy. The third wave presented an "inflation is poison" theme, and preceded the special appeals to various sections of the population. The final stage of the campaign related the need to control inflation to the post-war future. The inflationary problems which had caused struck and unrest in 1919 "must not happen here again." After a re-evaluation in September 1944 when the certainty of an overseas victory threatened to sabotage public support for the controls programme, the committee dropped the emphasis on wage controls and concentrated on the need for stable prices. Unless the government pressured Canadian business, the committee believed, the drastic post-war rise in prices would lead to a public outcry. Throughout 1945, the campaign stressed the advantages of a peacetime extension of controls. This involved convincing returned servicemen, in particular, of the utility of price maintenance and emphasizing that the peace should not bring a return to inflated prices or to support for the black market.

Obviously, the economic stabilization information campaign maintained a very close connection with the consumer conservation publicity. If the public refrained from spending more than necessary on consumer goods, there would be less
pressure on prices. Similarly, WIB publicity urged Canadians to "invest in victory" and put the dollars saved by careful conservation into war savings bonds. By these means, Canadians could help to assure a sensible rise in the cost-of-living that would bridge the gap between war and peace. "Think of a better way," the releases asked "to reward the men who have fought and died than solid support with our Canadian dollars of the victory that they have struggled so valiantly to achieve."  

Throughout the life of the economic stabilization information programme, the WIB's public opinion surveys indicated that the campaign had at least halted the erosion of public support for controls. The success of the controls must have accounted for much of the continuing support. The Canadian cost-of-living rose only 3% from 1941 to 1944,* compared to a 30% increase from 1914 to 1918. The comparative success appeared even more important because inflationary pressure had grown during the second war when the country devoted 50% of its resources to the war effort compared to 10% in the earlier war. Problems with labour and agriculture remained, although business appeared satisfied. A public opinion poll in April 1945 indicated that the public still did not support wage controls as strongly as price controls. And yet 87% of those polled indicated their belief that the government had done a fair or a good job in keeping the economy stable. Significantly, only 61% of the respondents believed that the government had successfully controlled war profiteering. A wind-up

* Food had increased by 8%, clothing by 2%, rents by 1% and fuel and lighting had not increased in cost.
survey in July 1945 found that a majority of the population favoured permanent economic controls, particularly of prices, and that the wage controls had increased in popularity.\textsuperscript{77} This was a striking indication of the success of the government's policy of wartime restrictions. The educational techniques and truthfulness not only managed to head off unrest and political crises over the operations of wartime restrictions but had convinced the bulk of the population that the government should continue its economic arbitration into the peace.\textsuperscript{78}
To the Wartime Information Board, a national point of view meant not just 'selling' wartime restrictions but also trying to instill a sense of belonging in alienated citizens. The explanations of wartime restrictions did allow for differing economic interests but the board considered that in some cases this was not enough. The WIB, however, did not propose to begin more chauvinistic efforts like the information programmes for the ethnic community and for French Canada. The new 'group' programmes for servicemen and for industrial workers would differ from the information on wartime restrictions by responding to the issues that these elements of the population viewed as important. The programmes also tried to provoke thought and discussion about these issues so that servicemen and workers would understand and participate in decisions about their own future.

(i)

John Grierson believed an industrial morale programme necessary to contain discontent and to channel labour's desire for reform into constructive projects. If radical leaders capitalized on the situation, he foresaw social and political disruption of the war effort and of the reconstruction period. Unhappy when Mackenzie King announced wage controls in October 1941,¹ industrial workers began attacking the government with vigour following the resignation of the director of the National
Selective Service in November 1942. Steelworkers strikes at Sydney, Nova Scotia and at Algoma, Ontario in January 1943 provided a graphic demonstration of labour's complaints about the freezing of substandard wages and about high tax rates and tax deductions from pay cheques. Labour, furthermore, asked for more detailed explanations of the government's post-war employment policies; male workers feared layoffs as supply requirements changed and worried about the competition of the thousands of women in wartime industry. As uneasiness grew, employers felt the pinch of increased absenteeism and high turnovers.

At the same time, a growing body of opinion interpreted every labour demand as irresponsible and hostile to military operations overseas. The WIB came to believe in the necessity of interpreting "the legitimate requests of labour as something that was very directly related . . . to the benefit of the armed forces." Similarly, because workers made the most noise about post-war changes, the WIB felt that the government had to respond or lose credibility.

A pilot information campaign for coal workers provided the WIB with a model for a general industrial information strategy. Presented by WIB officer David Petegorsky, the submission argued that the solution to the morale problem was not a simple appeal to patriotism and a sense of responsibility but depended upon practical considerations: housing, health, transportation, safety, nutrition. Only some of these factors could be cured by an intensive public information blitz; others required changed working conditions to suit demonstrated needs. Straying into policy recommendations, the WIB told the cabinet
that the information campaign would not work "unless it is firmly based on the recognition that labour is dissatisfied . . . with the government's labour policy as a whole." The government had to recognize that labour was frustrated at "not being adequately consulted either in the making of public policy or in its administration." In any intelligent handling of the problem, the best morale booster would be consultation by means of labour-management committees to settle industrial grievances. On the strictly informational side, workers had to understand changes in war strategy and consequent shifts in war production. Workers had to see these changes not as industrial dislocations but as steps toward ultimate victory.

Many officials in government and in industry found this argument hard to swallow. The department of Munitions and Supply, for example, believed the most efficient industrial information reiterated patriotic themes, which shamed workers into more efficient production. "So long as self-interest is the dominant factor in war work," many officials thought, "dissatisfaction will be greatly magnified in the minds of the workers." These officers also wanted to deal with specific morale problems in a particular fashion rather than attempt an all-inclusive campaign. This anti-labour bias had shown up in earlier attempts to create contempt for workers who stayed home from their jobs and in lectures which failed to appreciate workers as equal partners in the struggle. Because workers walked out of these meetings by the hundreds, these critics of the Griersonian approach found themselves outnumbered on the committee for industrial information. The committee, under the
aegis of the Wartime Information Board, began its more broadly-based campaign.  

The industrial morale section began by trying to give workers a broader knowledge of and pride in labour activities. *Labour Facts*, the news publication, commented in September 1944 on the formation of a central labour council in Costa Rica, on the USSR's support for a world labour committee, on union condemnation of racial discrimination in Britain, on reconstruction in Latin America and on the appeal of labour leaders for Indian independence. National news included stories about the publication of the first Chinese-language edition of the B.C. Lumberworker, the efficiency of handicapped workers, the success of the labour daily, *The Glace Bay Gazette*, the history of labour newspapers in Canada and the art show of the B.C. Labour Guild. WIB pamphlets told how labour had overcome the tremendous initial German advantage in armaments in one of "the greatest military and INDUSTRIAL [sic] achievements in history," and had broken many industrial records. Translating one day's barrage of a million shells into the output of 100,000 workers from one eight-hour shift, the WIB tried to give workers an idea of the required effort. Finally, the WIB publicized soldiers' praise of Canadian war materiel as "the best in the world." This was all accomplished, the WIB reported, with fewer days lost by strikes than during the 1914-1918 war.

To overcome workers' alienation, the WIB strongly promoted the merits of factory labour-management committees. Continuous consultation between workers and managers, the WIB believed, would lead to labour's feeling a sense of importance.
in the greater cause. In its releases and brochures, the industrial morale section argued that these committees improved efficiency, conserved material, reduced absenteeism, maintained morale, increased production, utilized skills and promoted employees' welfare. The committee, a tool of neither labour nor management, could evolve into a "joint venture for the promotion of their common purposes." At the same time, the board tried to avoid workers' skepticism by disclaiming that the committees could cure all problems. Trying to tell the truth as much as possible, pamphlets frankly pointed out to the workers that "committees will fail when honest and sustained effort . . . is not forthcoming."  

The industrial morale section worked to ease the path of women who had joined the wartime labour force. Cartoons of the 'Rosie-the-Riveter' variety praised and poked fun at women working in formerly male occupations. More seriously, the WIB publicized the particular industrial accomplishments of women in industry such as a record established by two women aircraft riveters who had had no previous working experience. The industrial information officers demonstrated the magnitude of the women's contribution by releasing 1944 figures which showed that 41,000 women had joined the armed forces, while 1,000,000 women formed 22% of the workforce. The number of women in industry swelled to 41% of all industrial workers compared to 27% in the pre-war period.  

To build up a sense of community, the industrial information campaign tried to defuse potential conflict between industrial workers and other Canadians. The industrial morale
programme promoted and publicized soldier-labour exchanges especially soldiers' speeches praising workers' accomplishments and pledging support for labour's post-war demands. During visits to army camps, workers lived a serviceman's existence, talked 'casually' to the military men like Major General F.F. Worthington, rode in tanks, fired weapons and took tours. The WIB quickly picked up and published the remark of one enthusiastic worker that:

if we didn't realize it before, we all know we're in one battle, one war. It's one job and we're all trying to build a better world from now on.25

The industrial information service also sent the labour press stories about battle conditions in order to give workers a better understanding of the soldiers' situation overseas. The broadcast of testimonials on the quality of Canadian military equipment also served to try to mitigate the hostility of Canadians towards industrial workers. The WIB tried to convince those outside industry that the work of "John Smith, civilian, . . . is vastly important . . . ."28

Publicity distributed to workers frequently supported other information campaigns. The WIB, for example, prepared information releases on the subject of industrial health which complemented the efforts of the department of Labour. These included anti-venereal disease posters and explanations of ways of preventing industrial accidents. The rate of absenteeism and occupation disease dropped drastically, the board reported, when a staff doctor supervised working conditions, examined staff and taught health education. To assist in the work of
the economic stabilization information programme, the industrial morale section explained the control system.  

Support for the government's reconstruction policies, the most important function of the industrial morale section in the latter part of the war, resulted from the WIB's lack of a mandate to mount a full-scale reconstruction information programme. Knowledge of the government's social policies for the post-war years was essential, the WIB believed, in order to remove one of the greatest causes of industrial dissatisfaction. The wartime sacrifices of working men, the WIB told labour, would result in peacetime benefits as long as labour exercised responsibility in making demands on the national future.

Because unions greatly feared a return to the depression, the WIB mobilized its forces to provide reassurance. Labour Facts promoted the statement by C.D. Howe, the minister of Reconstruction, that the government planned no production cutbacks and that production of some items would increase at the end of the war. When some layoffs occurred, the WIB published reassurances by Arthur Macnamara, assistant deputy minister of Labour, that most industries still required skilled and unskilled workers. If business stuck to its post-war plans, the WIB told workers, surveys indicated enough jobs to go around because the strong pressure for consumer goods and services would bolster employment. At the same time, the industrial information section tied high post-war production levels to overseas aid. By supporting assistance programmes, workers could retain their jobs and prevent the disruption of trade. Not trying to arouse unjustified optimism, the board told labour
that unemployment difficulties would remain, largely in communities with an abnormally high wartime industrial emphasis, and that many women wished to remain on the job after the conflict in competition with men. On the other hand, the industrial information programme explained the government's intention of working to correct unemployment on a regional basis by identifying susceptible communities and by planning public works and housing projects to offset layoffs. Labour publications also emphasized that stepped up participation in the Pacific War would ease the transition from war to peace. After the German surrender, releases promoted war production for the eastern war and the potential contribution of Canadian workers.

Apart from giving details of employment policies, the industrial information section publicized specific post-war social and economic measures. Howe's endorsement of peacetime joint production committees. In a special labour-oriented treatment, the WIB explained that the family allowance scheme would assist parents to meet heavier expenses and diminish inequality of living standards. WIB publications gave full play to the economic policies of the department of Reconstruction and the interconnections between the government's intention of expanding job security by encouraging exports, domestic consumption and public and private investment. Reconstruction activities that directly benefited the working man included war service grants, family allowances, agricultural and fishing subsidies and housing loans. As the stream of returning servicemen grew larger, the industrial information section performed its final task of
assuring their reintegration into the industrial structure. Frequent articles praised the spunk of disabled veterans who underwent retraining and returned enthusiastically to work.\(^42\)

The WIB pointed out numerous examples of union-management cooperation to ease the return of all servicemen into the industrial establishment. The problem, naturally, was reinstating veterans with full seniority while retaining newer employees. Nonetheless, the WIB demonstrated that it could be overcome,\(^43\) particularly if servicemen were prepared and if the unions supplemented government efforts.\(^44\)

The wartime industrial information programme had mixed results. Undoubtedly, the WIB's efforts did expand the range of knowledge available to the working man. Labour leaders expressed their satisfaction with the WIB news services and the keen demand by unions and the labour press for the industrial information publications and releases indicated that they struck a responsive chord.\(^45\) A survey of public opinion in January 1944 revealed that 60% of the population (70% of the workers) believed increasing rates of absenteeism were not totally the workers' fault.\(^46\) Nonetheless, the relationship which the industrial morale section had tried to create between government and labour morale caused considerable difficulty. The section tread on toes when it recommended that the government institute policy reforms to improve working conditions. The other government departments believed that the WIB exceeded its mandate in making these proposals and blocked WIB schemes such as a survey of industry to recommend policies to cure the growing problem of absenteeism.\(^47\) David Petegorsky also had to
overcome the opposition of unsympathetic civil servants in order to gain approval for an information campaign to sell unions on the utility of labour-management committees. A WIB public opinion survey commissioned and carried out in the early summer of 1945 showed that the public shared the civil servants' misgivings. Most Canadians, according to the survey findings, believed that labour unions needed no more power in order to work for their members. At the same time, the population displayed a very high level of ignorance about the role of labour. Obviously, labour information work had not cleared away enough problems that the WIB could claim total satisfaction.

(ii)

By mid-war, the growing restiveness of the armed forces paralleled that of the industrial workers. Despite General McNaughton's January 1943 assurance that the morale of Canadian troops abroad remained high because they served "a cause higher than themselves," WIB officers possessed evidence to the contrary. Gregory Vlastos, editor of the armed forces magazine Canadian Affairs, found "little enthusiasm for the war," no concrete convictions about the war and no positive incentive, only the negative motivation of defeating the Nazis. "Only if they have something beyond fighting to fight for" would soldiers continue the battle. Consequently, servicemen had "fewer hopes or more confused hopes than they might justifiably have."

Existing sources of news, the Canadian Press or the CBC overseas services, had not adequately kept the troops abroad in touch with Canada. The information chief of the department of
National Defence, Joe Clark, reported that servicemen did not seek security but looked for "a chance to do something."^52 After his 1944 trip to the military establishments in England, Vlastos discovered an almost unanimous opinion that "if Canada can do so much in wartime why can't she do as much or more during peace?" He attributed the interest and unrest to the higher educational level and heightened social awareness of the contemporary servicemen compared to the men who went to war in 1914.^53

Under this impetus, the department of National Defence, in May 1943, turned over to the board responsibility for a regular pamphlet series, *Canadian Affairs*, modelled on the British Army Bureau of Current Affairs' publications. To explain various aspects of current national and international topics, the WIB commissioned eminent Canadians to contribute articles and then included discussion questions to stimulate the servicemen to come to their own conclusions about the issues. The information to the armed forces section also organized the Servicemen's Forum radio series originating in military, naval or air forces centres at home or abroad. The panel of participants chosen by the producer, R.G. Allen, and the WIB organizer, Donald Macdonald, discussed the topic, prepared a script and then recorded the result. The board also sponsored a speaking tour of Canadian bases abroad by the director of the Canadian Association for Adult Education, E.A. Corbett, and educator Robert Westwater, to help maintain a more direct contact between the men overseas and conditions in Canada.\(^54\) Finally, *Canada Digest* tried to keep servicemen informed by reproducing
articles from Canadian magazines and other popular sources.

The WIB's major difficulty in designing themes for armed forces' distribution grew out of troops' entrenched cynicism. The servicemen feared mind-bending propaganda and refused to listen to or to read material that they suspected of making "everything back home look rosy." Apart from this difficulty, the information men discovered that at least one-third of the men started reading government releases with the presumption that everything was biased. This mistrust led them to express anti-government sentiments even more strongly. One lieutenant reported to the WIB that "'Down with King' is the utmost sophistication that reigns in our bull sessions." The WIB discovered that men from each different occupational background suspected the government of favouring the others. Servicemen held the forces' educational officers in contempt as "absolutely incompetent with no knowledge of or interest in the function and methods of education." One officer reported to the WIB that an education conference in Rome was "just a cynical excuse for an orgy." The board found, furthermore, that to instill a concept of citizenship and of the wider issues of the war, information material had to overcome the men's interest in learning a narrowly-defined trade skill.

The Wartime Information Board's information to the armed forces section believed that taking this skepticism into account would prove the best method of dealing with it and of reducing its impact. While treating servicemen as intelligent individuals, the editor of *Canadian Affairs*, Gregory Vlastos, insisted on keeping away as much as possible from "high-
sounding phrases", sticking closely to the facts and presenting the issues of the war in simple forthright terms.\textsuperscript{59} \textit{Canadian Affairs} tried to win servicemen's trust and support by establishing a consistent record of straightforward objectivity and by diminishing the government's reputation for dishing out sales talk. To "disarm the satirist", the WIB avoided articles written by government officials and presented opposing views on controversial subjects. This tactic implied choosing authors for \textit{Canadian Affairs} articles from the complete range of political opinion.\textsuperscript{60} By inciting discussion, Vlastos further hoped to reduce suspicions of bias.\textsuperscript{61} The questions for debate following the articles tried to put forward "real problems" which would stimulate "intelligent discussion from all the people . . . in whose hands lies the future of our country."\textsuperscript{62}

The presentation of party platforms during the 1945 general election provided the best example of the policy of putting forward all sides of an issue. Board officials firmly believed that inadequate knowledge by servicemen of the election issues could make the whole democratic procedure a "sad farce" and further discredit the "already unpopular process of politics."\textsuperscript{63} Trying to find an equitable and impartial means of placing the issues before servicemen overseas, the \textit{Canadian Affairs} editors finally came up with a reasonable answer. They brought out a special edition of the magazine devoted to the various platforms written by the parties themselves. The editors allocated space in the magazine in the same proportion as the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation provided free time for political broadcasting. This formula provided the Liberals
with 3,200 words, the Progressive Conservatives with 2,850 words, the CCF with 2,500 words and the Labour Progressive Party with 500 words. The WIB published this particular issue in greater numbers than usual so that there was at least one copy for each three service personnel.

The WIB officers tried to use honesty as a tool to reinforce servicemen's connection with their homeland. To begin with, WIB brochures reiterated that "the servicemen's future depends on the nation's future." Accordingly, one of the constant purposes of the overseas editions of both Canadian Affairs and Canada Digest remained disseminating news of Canadian events. These publications tried to fill the gap between the formal educational and vocational material and the popular service newspapers such as The Maple Leaf. In each Canadian Affairs issue, the "Home Front News" section reprinted news such as cabinet pronouncements and changes in regulations.

In more detailed fashion, each Canadian Affairs pamphlet filled in the servicemen's knowledge about a single aspect of Canadian happenings. The WIB aimed at dealing in a "realistic" and "sensible" manner with topics of general interest. The pamphlets had two purposes: first, they tried to relieve civilian-military conflicts by explaining civilian wartime accomplishments to the forces; secondly, the series attempted to convince servicemen that the home-front leaders took the military needs into consideration. Each issue of Canadian Affairs imparted knowledge which, hopefully, would diminish a particular prejudice. To interpret the place of universities during the war, for example, the WIB asked Principal R.C. Wallace of
Queen's University to "help dispel the idea of academic isolationism." The overseas edition of the magazine dealt with the various geographic areas of Canada, health insurance plans, housing proposals, the role of immigration, of women and the place of various occupations as well as occasional international topics. Once the war ended in Germany, the Canadian Affairs articles turned their slant to the more immediate needs of the Canadian occupation forces and dealt with such subjects as the place of occupied Germany and veterans' organizations in Canada.

Apart from this, the WIB tried to create "citizen soldiers" with a grasp of their community responsibilities. Proceeding from the assumption that war was ninety-eight per cent boredom magnifying "petty details," the WIB tried to reduce the importance of "over-salted porridge" and "to restate in vital terms the momentous issues for which the fighting men can accept the irritations and privations incidental to war." As the editor of Canadian Affairs put it, the establishment of citizenship education was:

something unprecedented in our recent history.
To find anything like it, one must go back three centuries to Cromwell's army organized on the principle that the good soldier is he who knows why he fights and loves what he knows.'

The editors hoped that Canadian Affairs might, through the education process, help servicemen come alive to social problems and apply themselves to finding solutions. Some military brass opposed these plans. They still believed that "subject matter must concentrate on training, on fitting them [troops abroad] for battle," and on teaching soldiers to think "along
directed lines." The forces' education officers joined with the WIB to argue that it was "psychologically unsound" and "impossible to put the mind of a soldier into cold storage during training and expect to bring it out again during operations." The obvious dissatisfaction in the ranks bolstered the WIB's case considerably and gained the military authorities' approval. 73

Once the obstacle to citizenship training disappeared, the board began with a subtle effort to slant soldiers' thinking towards the need for change. This progressive bias did not appear as a deliberate omission or distortion of facts but rather through a judicious selection of topics presented to servicemen. Gregory Vlastos aimed not "to dispense comfort but to stimulate thought and prepare eventual participation" in the democratic process. 74 After his 1944 visit to the troops overseas, Vlastos urged the board to combat army cynicism by issuing an "invitation to get into the planning circle, and face the future with a sense of democratic responsibility." 75 Putting forward this idea in a practical way, Vlastos urged a civics citizenship section in *Canadian Affairs*. He thought that a series on equality of opportunity to show what had been and what could be done in the areas of public education and health would bring servicemen to appreciate the necessity for more improvements. 76 The information to the armed forces section also wanted to tackle some traditional social prejudices and approved an article on women during and after the war because such a discussion "would tend to liquefy some over-rigid notions in the matter." 77 *Canadian Affairs* authors, purporting to discuss
measures in an unbiased manner, often left their progressive slips showing. E.A. Corbett, for example, in his article on the future remarked upon the forces' interest in social change. He then extrapolated from this the sentiment that troops "also demand that security of livelihood be provided for every citizen along the lines of the Beveridge report . . .," recommendations for comprehensive state medical and social insurance in the United Kingdom.  

Complaints from manufacturing and business interests and the refusal of the editorial staff to change its approach provides some proof of the WIB's success in provoking thinking in a progressive vein. One article, for example, raised the objection of the secretary-treasurer of the Canadian Woollen and Knit Goods Manufacturers that it cast slurs on working conditions in woollen mills. Geoffrey Andrew, the general manager of the WIB, defended the offending article as having a basis in fact.  

In another incident, Lorne Pierce of Ryerson Press tried to take up a board offer to publish opposing viewpoints in Canadian Affairs and asked that the WIB distribute a pamphlet by Charlotte Whitton opposing family allowances. Earlier, the WIB had published an article by Dr. G.F. Davidson, "Canada Plans Security," outlining the reasons in favour of various social measures. The board refused to implement Pierce's request on the grounds that it would not distribute anyone else's pamphlets and that the topic of Davidson's effort was social security not family allowances.  

The WIB also emphasized that progress could only result from a national effort. Consequently most of the Canadian
Affairs articles dwelt on the role of the federal government and the need for this government to retain some of its wartime powers to bring about a more equitable peacetime society. Only the national government, the series argued, had the resources to deal with 'national problems'. The majority of servicemen and civilians, Canadian Affairs told its readers, supported the federal government's contention. The editors reported that a discussion among 70 servicemen revealed that only one opposed continued federal government intervention in regulating areas hitherto left to private enterprise. "The other men," reported the editor, "turned on him and sounds of boos and hoots rang through the chilly building." The editor then used this demonstration to support his own conclusion that:

the men as a whole realized this [maintaining an adequate wartime and post-war standard of living] through government action was a problem for everybody and were prepared to discuss it with a view to arriving at the best solution for all not just each man for himself.  

The WIB considered that its information to the armed forces activities had enjoyed considerable success. Naturally, some servicemen complained. Overseas distribution of the WIB's publications remained spotty, particularly when Canadian Affairs arrived with the monthly allotment of paperback novels. The reputation of army education officers also left much to be desired.  

In general, however, the officers working in the information to the armed forces section believed that Canada Digest, Servicemen's Forum and particularly, Canadian Affairs had managed to serve their purpose of defusing armed forces' resentments. The circulation of Canadian Affairs gradually
climbed and in late 1943, a home edition supplemented the original overseas edition. The technique of encouraging "comments, suggestions and constructive criticism," the editorial committee believed, had helped to overcome the servicemen's feeling of isolation from civilian and home events. In his trips abroad to test service reaction, the head of the information to the armed forces section, Gregory Vlastos, found keener interest, "close intelligent reading," and appreciation all the way from the Chief of Staff to the buck privates. Vlastos attributed the success to the nationalistic tone and to the educational approach. These were the two elements shared with the labour information programme in the new nationalist effort in information work. Workers and soldiers could see how they fit into a Canada at war.
Ultimately, the WIB always wanted its programmes to reflect the government's post-war plans. Public pressure for reconstruction information came from provincial governments, business and labour. Public opinion polls consistently demonstrated the realization that the public understood that "the problems of war and peace are closely interwoven and that effective planning must consider both periods." Canadians, fearing a post-war depression, expressed enough skepticism about post-war plans, that the government feared potential unrest. Although the WIB wanted to take advantage of the "lively interest" in reconstruction, the government feared the controversy that might result and refused to allow the board to undertake a programme which might antagonize business or labour and threaten national unity. Despite its aspirations, the WIB saw a "worse than gloomy" picture of its chances to eliminate this public skepticism.

Firmly believing that the government had to act, the officers of the WIB worked to circumvent the government's prohibition. Privately, WIB representatives helped to design the reconstruction information work undertaken by the Canadian Association for Adult Education. The CAAE used the Canadian Affairs pamphlets to complement their radio discussion series, Citizens' Forum, and made the pamphlets available to the schools, the Canadian Congress of Labour and the YMCA. Using its research

* For an example of this controversy see chapter III, pp. 94-98.
section, the WIB answered letters inquiring about government plans. After Lorne Morgan took over from C.B. Macpherson, the section published regular Post-War Planning releases, analytical summaries of reconstruction legislation for distribution to the media as background material. This research also found its way into the economic stabilization information programme in order to demonstrate the interconnections between wartime controls and post-war stability. These papers also served as background for the National Film Board whose productions revealed the implications of reconstruction plans. The labour and armed forces information sections popularized much of the reconstruction research for their clientele. Convinced that reconstruction and rehabilitation were "inextricably intertwined," the research section provided most of the basic factual material for the rehabilitation information programme. The Post-War Planning Information releases, therefore, grew into more than reference material for internal circulation and frequently appeared verbatim in newspapers.

Like its other new programmes to strengthen a sense of Canadian nationality, the reconstruction information mixed idealism and realism. It obviously pointed to the future and related all issues, current and past, domestic and international, to the reconstruction period. The WIB tried to avoid arousing the escapism and unjustified expectations which had destroyed the peace following 1918. Reconstruction information, as evidenced by the research section, displayed an almost fanatic belief in an accurate presentation of the facts. People could
draw their own conclusions. At the same time, the Wartime Information Board tried to reassure Canadians. The board issued press releases citing the statement by Principal James of McGill, chairman of the advisory committee on reconstruction, that he was investigating the means of ensuring full employment and increasing the standard of living. Canadian Affairs publicized a promise by Ian Mackenzie, minister of Pensions and National Health, that the government believed workers to be a "great industrial Army" for peacetime service. WIB articles spoke of "L'aurore de la periode la plus brillante" since Canada possessed "tout ce qu'il faut pour fournir au monde ce dont il a besoin." Another WIB release quoted Mackenzie King's belief that due to government plans for employment security, reconstruction would not lead to a depression. Specifically, the WIB assured Canadians that government reconstruction planning begun shortly after the outbreak of war would proceed first of all to assist veterans' civil re-establishment; secondly, to facilitate economic reconversion; and thirdly, to provide insurance against unemployment, sickness, old age and special disabilities.

Successful reconstruction, the WIB always emphasized, depended on federal intervention in the economy. Accordingly, the reconstruction planning section summarized the recommendations of the advisory committee headed by Principal James which advocated detailed federal government planning of the economy to assure industrial growth. Business, the James report concluded, must accept the fact that both labour and government had an inescapable role in post-war economics. The federal
government could not avoid using its taxing powers to promote full employment. The WIB also tried to make certain that the public understood the need for a pre-eminent federal role during the Dominion Provincial Conference beginning on August 6, 1945. Implying that provincial governments had an obligation to go along with the federal proposals, the WIB releases emphasized the need for national solutions to assure "the welfare of the people of Canada." The board stated that Ottawa's aim remained gaining provincial cooperation with federally-declared priorities.

Explaining the federal role, the WIB emphasized the importance of the new department of Reconstruction. Established in June 1944, this agency would co-ordinate public works and other projects for the post-war years. When the minister of Reconstruction, C.D. Howe, tabled his white paper setting out the government plans, the WIB related the provisions to national employment and opportunities. *Post-War Planning Information* reported that the department worked for a "smooth orderly transition" from war to peace and for a "high stable level of employment." While the department would strive to minimize dislocations resulting from cancellation of war contracts, the WIB did not try to hide the uneven distributions of these disruptions but predicted that these setbacks could be overcome with solid support from the public.

The WIB publicized the government's intention to proceed on all fronts to assure economic stability. For agriculture, WIB releases noted policies for "strengthening the position" of farmers, by assisting "intelligently planned" farm
production to find foreign markets. Apart from exports, the government also assured farmers of a continuous publicity effort to increase Canadian consumption of home-grown produce. At the same time, the WIB related this plan to the rest of the government's national economic measures by pointing out that agricultural prosperity depended on the success of other reconstruction measures including research into industrial uses for farm products, federal agricultural re-establishment, farm credit schemes and social measures. For business, the WIB explained that the government planned to decrease taxation by amending the Income Tax Act and the Excess Profits Tax Act. At the same time, the government made it easier to write off capital expenditures and depreciation in order to promote expansion. Other measures to aid business and to stimulate employment included export assistance, price-stabilizing credit mechanisms, direct subsidies and government purchases.

Apart from the economic measures, the WIB's post-war planning section calmly explained controversial proposals for social measures. To allay fears of social insecurity, the government allowed the WIB to publicize these plans as "a considerable part" of the reconstruction programme. Unemployment insurance coverage had begun in 1941 and extended assistance to old age pensioners and mothers became available about the same time. In addition, the WIB made available an analysis of Dr. Leonard Marsh's investigation of the "whole problem of social security . . . ." The Marsh report, prepared for the advisory committee on reconstruction and presented in March 1943, proposed that the government undertake children's allowances,
contributory survivors' and funeral benefits insurance, extension of unemployment insurance, health insurance, income maintenance for the disabled and contributory and non-contributory old age pensions. To reduce opposition to the report, the WIB presented it as "simply an analysis and a recommendation of how incomes can be maintained." To satisfy business, the WIB release noted that "without special measures calculated to maintain employment, the proposed social insurance structure will have no solid foundation." 33

Publicity for the family allowance scheme shows the problems of selling social legislation. In the speech from the throne on January 27, 1944, the Governor General announced that the government would pay monthly sums to all Canadian mothers for the benefit of their children. A controversial proposal, these payments aroused opposition in English Canada as a sop to Quebec and as a bonus to the large families of people who would not fight for Canada. 34 Marshalling arguments in favour of the scheme, the WIB contended that Canadians ought to support family allowances to ensure that children of large, low-income families did not suffer disadvantages. Children's needs should have "a special claim upon the nation." 35 The new department of National Health and Welfare produced special material and dispatched it to editorial writers, teachers, ministers, health care workers and influential citizens. Relating the scheme to post-war progress, the WIB explained that the allowances were "a simple, fair and effective way to ensure a greater measure of well-being to Canadian citizens of the future." 36 The WIB's radio service continually praised the success of the various
stages of the implementation of the allowances. As registration of children began in early 1945, the board tried to head off the criticism that lower-income parents would not use the money wisely. "Experience shows," explained the announcements, that most parents "put their children's needs first and that they can be trusted to spend the allowances [on essentials] and not on luxuries." A survey of Prince Edward Island children demonstrated that many students stayed home from school "for the simple and tragic reason that they didn't have the clothes to wear to keep them warm . . . ." Family allowances, the board argued, would eliminate many of these instances of shocking poverty.

The WIB also demonstrated the benefits of indirect social assistance. The unrest following the 1918 armistice had, in some part, resulted from housing shortages. The Liberal government set up and publicized its housing programme in order to avoid this dislocation. The reconstruction information section helped to show the government's concern by setting out the studies of housing needs made by advisory bodies. The provision of housing, one Post-War Planning Information bulletin pointed out, served not only to provide shelter but also to raise the national living standard. Again, the WIB emphasized the federal initiative to co-ordinate provincial and municipal planning and building, so that piecemeal growth would stop and low-income groups would benefit. The National Housing Act set the stage for the implementation of the housing measures which combined needed social assistance and economic pump-priming.
While the government kept the WIB reconstruction activities restricted, it did permit one massive publicity operation. This programme, the rehabilitation information campaign, resulted from steadily mounting public pressure. The officers of the Alberta Command of the Canadian Legion reminded the government:

with extreme regret, [of] the conditions which existed following the conclusion of the war of 1914-1918 when unemployment among ex-servicemen reached alarming proportions and when men who had served their country faithfully and well were obliged to accept charity in lieu of the democratic right to earn a living.

These servicemen had also played a role in the severe labour unrest in 1919. Demands for rehabilitation measures and information grew out of Canadians' belief that the war was a struggle for a better world. When the Prime Minister recognized the "moral responsibility" of the government for the men who fought for their country, the WIB capitalized on this to argue that the public believed the government would not treat discharges fairly. The government also feared that an apparent failure of rehabilitation measures would prove "ruinous politically" as discontent grew.

The WIB, therefore, had no difficulty in gaining support in principle for a rehabilitation information programme, but found it more challenging to get the campaign off the ground. It was not difficult to publicize the existing measures, planned since 1939, in Canadian Affairs, or to set up an interdepartmental committee on demobilization and rehabilitation information. Shortly after the committee prepared its first pamphlet, however, the military authorities argued that
talk of demobilization would divert attention from immediate military needs. It took another memorandum to cabinet in January 1945 to spell out even more explicitly the desire for rehabilitation news and the potential for unrest. When finally in operation, the programme explained both to service-men and to civilians specific measures for a smooth transition to 'civvy street' and publicized other reconstruction measures.

The Wartime Information Board began by making Canadians aware of the facts. This meant explaining the "first-in, first-out" principle that governed demobilization, except in extenuating circumstances. The task also involved making the population aware of re-establishment provisions for jobs, allowances, unemployment insurance, medical care, pensions, land grants and retraining. Rehabilitation information officers made special efforts to update their material whenever the government changed the regulations. The WIB told servicemen that the department of Veterans Affairs welcomed suggestions and inquiries as a means of filling gaps in the legislation. A booklet, Back to Civil Life, distributed to men awaiting discharge, consolidated all the provisions. For those unlikely to use the pamphlet, the CBC and the rehabilitation information committee produced the 'Johnny Home Show,' a comedy series by Johnny Wayne and Frank Schuster. Each episode pointed out in humorous fashion existing aid for a particular difficulty. Special films tried to fill any gaps that the other efforts missed.

In order to work rehabilitation procedures for the maximum benefit of the discharges, information officers
promoted cooperation between servicemen, the public, military officials and civilian administrators. WIB pamphlets warned those involved in rehabilitation administration not to create resentment that could lead to the failure of their work. Other releases warned about bottlenecks and tried to cut through officers' indifference, and officials' red tape. Behind the scenes, the WIB strove to clear up "un-coordinated . . . irresponsible . . . self-interested . . . incoherent" administration and complained particularly about the department of Veterans Affairs' inconsistent interpretations and "unfailingly bureaucratic" approach. Popular dissatisfaction would give critics specific cases as weapons against the government.

Publicly, the WIB defused the 'repats' resentment at the comparatively easy wartime civilian life by frankly admitting the situation and by hinting that this comparative ease meant an easier readjustment for returned men. Canada's successful and united participation in the war led to a renewal of hope for the future and wartime planning techniques that could lead to peacetime progress. With a government attuned to the possibilities of an industrial export economy, the former servicemen and the civilians could belong to a 'new Canada' based on wartime experience and progress. To quiet veterans' fears, the WIB tried to assure them that their place in the community remained secure and cited the unanimous desire of Canadians to assist them. Specifically, the WIB encouraged citizens' committees, CBC programmes for women, and special appeals for housing shared with veterans. The WIB also tried to warn newspapers to avoid calling criminals with service records
Heading off friction involved a certain amount of psychological manipulation. While the Canadians avoided an over-emphasis on the "sob-sister" emotionalism of the American rehabilitation programmes, nonetheless, they took into account the problems of reintegrating soldiers into the social fabric. The WIB wanted to make the population aware and tolerant of personal difficulties without anticipating them. The rehabilitation information men avoided arousing too many expectations. Even the private advertising agencies agreed that servicemen needed a dose of 'self-help' philosophy that did not present 'too rosy' a picture of Canadian conditions. Soldiers, the WIB said, must realize that their "romanticized anticipation" would not fit "the more tawdry reality." They should not end up feeling that everyone had changed and no one understood their problems. As for civilians, the WIB reminded them that soldiers had lived a strictly hierarchical life which had possessed a simplicity lacking in civil society. Families of returned men also had to consider that four years of war had disrupted personal life which also had to be rebuilt. For filing clerks who returned as colonels, most civilian jobs would prove boring. While downplaying the probability of these difficulties, the WIB also mentioned that rehabilitation counsellors were available if problems arose.

By far the most important practical aspect of rehabilitation information work consisted of aid in the economic reintegration of veterans. The WIB had to tread a fine line between the department of Veterans Affairs' predictions of a 'sellers'
market after the war due to the backlog of savings and demands" and the department of Labour's reluctance to promise an automatic job. The information committee decided, in general, to strike a hopeful note re-emphasizing the individual's responsibility for his own economic re-establishment. The WIB prepared information about trades and retraining in specific skills. The best means of doing this, the committee decided, was to publicize individual case histories detailing difficulties as well as achievements. The reconstruction series of Canadian Affairs and the rehabilitation film programme provided specific information in simple form to give servicemen 'the facts' about the peacetime plans of Canadian business. The information officers felt that this would provide the background for a personal decision about a future occupation.

In addition, the WIB provided a detailed explanation of economic changes and current economic trends. Accordingly, the board encouraged servicemen by pointing out the examples of Canadian industrial growth which resulted in an increased number of available peacetime jobs. On the labour side, the rehabilitation committee explained that in spite of the spectacular nature of wartime strikes, Canadian labour had demonstrated responsibility and had gained more for workers with less time lost in striking than in the years before the war. As for the increased government economic intervention, the information officers tried to point out the benefits which accrued from direct taxation, such as sales taxes, and increased income taxes. "Unless someone is bold enough to do away with all kinds of governments, there will have to be taxes of one kind or another,"
the pamphlets stoically advised. Furthermore, taxation had turned into an element of fiscal policy, "a tool to encourage or discourage saving" as well as to promote the expansion of business. Progressive income taxation took marital status, income and expenses into account so that the burden of paying for expanded government services fell equitably on all Canadians. Temporary measures such as the Victory Loans had raised money without placing too heavy a burden on posterity for wartime expenses. Economic controls had maintained the purchasing power of Canadians' incomes.

Apart from explaining the economic aspects of rehabilitation to servicemen, the WIB also drove the message home to the general public. News releases amplified the 'key man' discharge policy from the armed forces so that the bulk of the veterans would find jobs waiting. In particular, the government believed it important that prospective employers know what had been done to fit servicemen for their return to peacetime occupations. At the same time, the WIB wanted to convince employers that it might be desirable to "make every effort to employ a little beyond ... legitimate requirements . . . ," and possibly below their standards of quality. According to the rehabilitation information committee's guidelines, employers should not treat servicemen as "special problems," and yet each man should receive individual consideration according to his particular skill. The WIB also suggested an effort to head off antagonism between former servicemen and those who remained in industrial establishments throughout the war. Again, case histories served as the medium for the message. The WIB radio
service, for example, sent out a script telling of a returnee who went back to his job as a fireman and found that his union had paid his pension contributions and his employer had retroactively increased his salary.  

Apart from reconstruction information with a domestic slant, the WIB enlightened Canadians about post-war international prospects and diminished opposition to Canada's strong international commitments. With the government's approval, the WIB pointed out the international aspect of much reconstruction planning. The various United Nations conferences became illustrations of the interdependence of the post-war world, and demonstrations of the meaning of international security and Canada's role in achieving it. When the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration met in Montreal in September 1944, the WIB sought to foster the belief that UNRRA's donations to war-torn countries would stimulate the Canadian economy as well as alleviate distress abroad. The WIB presented the UN's Bretton Woods agreements as measures assuring international monetary and economic stability. The WIB focussed most strongly on the Dumbarton Oaks meeting and the San Francisco conference to set up a post-war security organization. At San Francisco, teams of Canadian information officers tried to cover all news events concerning the country and to release stories to Canadian journalists before leaks complicated explanations of the official Canadian position. The WIB held daily press conferences with L.B. Pearson present to explain developments and the
Canadian delegation's activities. 86

Throughout, the WIB tried to convince Canadians that
the country must independently support international arrangements
in order to assure a lasting peace. Although this slant raised
questions from those opposed to a strong nationalist emphasis,
the WIB kept stirring up debate. The board asked "Is Canada in
a position to make up its own mind in world affairs? What did
Canada stand for in the last peace treaty? Did it have a voice
of its own...?" 87 While Canada must play an independent
role, the WIB also argued that the country could never isolate
itself and that the life-style of all depended upon the inter-
national economic and political connections represented by the
United Nations. This international organization, while not per-
fected, represented the government's recognition that the world
would not have peace "merely by wishing for it" or by their
individual efforts. 88

The WIB explained why the new organization could suc-
ceed where the League of Nations had failed. To begin with, the
member nations had to agree to take military action against
 aggressors. To assuage the ardent nationalists' objections to
Canada's exclusion from permanent membership on the Security
Council, the body which would make this decision, the WIB ex-
plained that Canada had a chance for occasional representation
on a non-permanent basis and could augment its UN influence by
its close ties with the United States and the Commonwealth. By
espousing the objective of creating a higher world standard of
living, the WIB explained that the United Nations had a major
advantage over the League. By increasing the social
responsibilities of its members through its intermediate international organizations (the International Labour Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization, the Economic and Social Council, the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development), the UN was working for the elimination of poverty and the decline of world tensions.  

In all of this, the WIB kept a unique role for Canada firmly in the public mind. At home as well as abroad, Canada tried to create the image of itself as the 'great mediator' in disagreements between Britain and the United States on post-war international issues such as the regulation of aviation or financial arrangements. The WIB's reports of international meetings emphasized that the Canadian government evolved proposals on its own and not in concert with the 'Empire' or with the United States. Canada's self-appointed task, L.B. Pearson reported over the CBC, was "to remove the causes of international friction and international dispute." It would not serve the country's interests to shuck responsibilities and status by accepting permanent representation on the Security Council as part of a larger Commonwealth delegation. The country had to continue on her path of developing complete independence in foreign concerns. By following this tradition in the post-war world, Canada's independent voice and vote at international meetings would not have "the rank of a Salvador or a Liberia," said Pearson, but would create "a special place reflecting her considerable power and her special contribution to victory."  

Ultimately and ironically, the new nationalist interpretation of Canada's post-war role led to a re-evaluation of
the causes of the war. Formerly, the given consensus had centred around the idea that the League of Nations had failed to prevent the world conflict because of the lust for conquest shown by Germany, Italy and Japan. In its efforts to justify Canada's post-war international commitments, the WIB admitted this earlier premise had omitted some elements of truth. According to the new interpretation, the Allies' consent to the partition of Czecho- slovakia in 1938, the crime of Munich, turned into a betrayal of the principles of the League of Nations which had encouraged the dictators in their aggression. Those who had accepted this arrangement had to accept a share of the blame for the breakdown in international order and for the war. Concerned about limiting military and financial commitments, Canada had done nothing when Germany "raped Czechoslovakia" and had endorsed the Munich agreement. The past mistakes were clear by 1945 and only the future would tell whether the world had learned the lesson and whether Canadians would take on their share of the world's social, economic and political development.  

(iv)

The reconstruction information programmes, domestic and international, mirrored the new nationalist approach in the same manner as the WIB's other efforts. The officers worked very hard to answer specific questions about government policy in a truthful manner, to awaken interest and participation in the democratic process and, to force the government to clarify its policies for better public explanation. Above all, however, the reconstruction information work sought to capture and to express
the public's desire for a change and for social and economic progress. The WIB officers saw reconstruction information as the major vehicle for a reasonably unambiguous expression of their own progressive educational and social philosophies. It gave them an opportunity to present their version of the facts which under normal circumstances might have remained buried or distorted by various interests within and without the government.

While public opinion polls outlined the general success of the reconstruction information work, the federal election of 1945 was in part the final test (and the ultimate public opinion survey). The cabinet only allowed the WIB to follow through with its 1943 change and to set forth a 'new nationalism for political reasons'. The Liberal government, while worried about the possibility of social unrest, also greatly feared that Canadians might choose the CCF as the most compatible political party to govern the country in the post-war years. Any information effort, therefore, which explained the progressive rationale of the existing government's programmes could not but strengthen the image of the Liberals as architects of a new progressive society in any forthcoming election campaign. When Mackenzie King called an election for June 11, 1945, the party chose as its slogan the main theme which the WIB had pushed for over two years: Building a New Social Order for Canada.95 The hand of Brooke Claxton, an ex-officio member of the Wartime Information Board, and his friends could not be concealed. At the polls on election day, the Liberals won 41.3% of the popular vote compared to the Conservatives' 28.5% and the CCF's 14.7%. In an election post-mortem, Davidson Dunton
reported that WIB sources attributed the Liberal success to the
government's convincing Canadians of the sincerity of its econo-
mic and social policies for post-war stability as well as the
solidity of its wartime accomplishments. 96
Selling the war had turned into selling the peace. Wartime propaganda had evolved from the 'Canadianism' of traditional national myths into a view of the post-war years founded on the possibilities of democratic government. This evolution reflected the changes in both organization and philosophy. Originally, blitzkreig and total war had spoiled the government's plan to limit the organization and scope of its wartime information work. As the government scrambled to work out policies for mobilizing all the nation's resources, it intruded more and more on Canadians' lives and needed a farther-reaching information apparatus to explain its activities. The first new approach consisted of supplementing the dissemination of news to the population. But information work was more than encouraging the press. Gradually, the Bureau of Public Information created an information organization which tried to use all the media available. The unco-ordinated and eclectic nature of these undertakings, however, spurred criticism. An increasingly vocal group of adult educators urged the government to undertake propaganda based on the principles of popular education to make Canadians debate the possibilities for action to create a better society.

The reorganization of information operations and the formation of the Wartime Information Board gave the reformers their chance. Although the first chairman of the WIB, Charles Vining, tried to reinstitute a policy of strictly limiting domestic information activities, this changed after his
premature retirement. Then, the WIB became the home of a group of "parched idealists" who had itched to throw themselves into a cause. Led by general manager, John Grierson, the officers of the Wartime Information Board fought for a policy of information that would use the media as a means of promoting education and discussion within the limits of the agency's propagandistic intent to create support for the government's war policies.

Within and without the board, this role stirred debate. Occasionally, politicians tried to use the propaganda operation to their own advantage and the bulk of the WIB officers themselves slanted their output as much as possible on the reformist side of an issue. When John Grierson left the board, Davidson Dunton, a 'safe' man took over and ran the operation smoothly until the war's end. By now a fairly well-established bureaucracy, the board remained committed to selling the peace as a means of gaining support for the war.

Throughout their existence, the information agencies, like those of every nation at war, tried to create a sense of attachment to the country. Originally, the Bureau of Public Information tried to create this nationalist sentiment by creating a sense of 'Canadianism', a counterpart to the Americans' use of the 'American way of life'. The BPI produced material for public consumption which relied heavily on spectacles to evoke and to demonstrate this chauvinistic feeling. The officers created an image of an enemy so ruthless that Canadians had no choice but to unite to make war against threatening tyranny. At the same time, the bureau worked out a thematic presentation of war events to emphasize Canada's important
role vis-à-vis her allies. In addition to these efforts to unify the country, the bureau also began to try to integrate ethnic groups into the national myth and to ensure unity between French and English Canadians.

Although the Wartime Information Board could not discontinue producing variations on these themes, it was obvious that this work had failed to convince the population that 'Canadianism' consisted of parades and speeches about 'beating the Nazis.' Allied military successes in 1943 led to an emotional let-down and a rise in apathy. Subversive groups did not appear to threaten unity. With ethnic groups, the efforts to impose an undefined 'Canadian' nationality had caused resentment by their patronizing tone. As for French Canada, a unifying national myth had proved impossible to find. The government's 1942 plebiscite asking permission to cancel the pledge not to institute conscription for overseas service had driven open a rift between French and English Canadians. The issue had become so sensitive that the cabinet refused to allow the information agencies to undertake any new approach. The limited and unimaginative work of the BPI and the WIB did little to bridge the gap between English and French differences over Canada's wartime role.

The adult educators in the WIB, critics of the BPI's limited philosophy of information, also foresaw new morale problems and tried to work out new information programmes to meet them. The old concept of 'Canadianism', they felt, had failed to gain popular support for essential government programmes, had alienated important segments of the public, especially
workers and soldiers, and had not halted a growing polarization of opinion between those favouring social reform and those committed to the status quo. In order to maintain unity in the face of this situation, they argued that the war must be seen to be a 'people's war.' From their perception of popular attitudes, they concluded that the government must convince the population that concrete measures for post-war reconstruction embodied provisions to assure broadly-based prosperity and social equality. While the WIB could not take any initiatives in French-language or ethnic information work, it did receive support to begin operations on new fronts. As a result, the consumer, economic stabilization, labour, armed forces, rehabilitation and reconstruction information programmes took shape with a new message. These campaigns bolstered the government's policies by enlarging popular debate about their benefits and about their relationship with progressive social measures. The WIB also tried to bring home to various alienated groups a feeling that they could, as individuals, participate in determining the development of Canadian government and society. Finally, the WIB strove to create a vision of the possibilities in Canada for a society which would provide adequate housing, social security and economic prosperity.

As Canadian information policies and programmes evolved, they shared many problems and solutions with the information agencies of Great Britain and of the United States. Should the government adopt an information policy which turned the wartime operations into service agencies to assist the privately-run
media, especially the newspapers? All three operations had to
deal with press opposition to their work especially at the
beginning of the war. They also had to face the difficulties
associated with the co-ordination of their own work with that
of the publicity departments of other government departments
and with zealous military censors.

All three agencies adopted mass public opinion sampling in order to determine the propaganda needs at a particular time. All prepared similar variations on the anti-Nazi message. All believed that they could only consolidate support for the war by telling their citizens the truth.

There were, nonetheless, important differences. Organizationally, Canadian agencies bore no similarity to the British Ministry of Information that operated from 1939 to 1945. Canadian civil servants and the Prime Minister remained determined not to set up a ministry along the British lines. They believed the MOI to be "a disaster of heavy weight officialdom — and . . . of inefficiency." In his 1942 report on the Canadian information system, Charles Vining continued a scathing rejection of a British model in any Canadian reorganization. He argued that the British had no conception of the importance of information and, accordingly, hired second-rate personnel who did bad work. Vining pointed out a severe organizational bottleneck resulted because the government gave the ministry of Information authority over other departments' information work without establishing an inter-departmental body to provide high-level official contact among the various agencies involved. Accordingly, the other departments did not cooperate with the
ministry and severely hampered its operations.  

While the prejudice against the American organizations did not exist, the similarities remained no more than superficial. Even in 1939, Norman McLarty, Postmaster General and chairman of the cabinet sub-committee on public information, and the Prime Minister, Mackenzie King, expressed admiration for the U.S. government publicity organization. Responsible to the president, the organization encompassed a complicated liaison system with various federal agencies. When the director of Public Information, G.H. Lash, studied the American organization in February 1942, he admired the "wider powers" and extensive funding granted to their domestic information system. Charles Vining and the Prime Minister both expressed approval of the June 1942 reorganization of U.S. Wartime Information agencies into the Office of War Information. When King, in turn, authorized a reorganization of information operations, the Wartime Information Board copied the OWI as its organizational model. Responsible to the head of government, the WIB was divided like the OWI into domestic, external and research branches and subdivided into functional sections.

The American agency, however, suffered setbacks in 1943 which left its domestic branch a shambles, in no way like the expanding operations of the WIB. Fearing that the press agency of the Roosevelt administration would erode its powers and firmly believing that the American privately-owned media could inform the public adequately, the U.S. Congress cut off almost all funding for the OWI's domestic branch. Until the end of the war, the OWI had neither the mandate nor the money to carry out
policy research and to establish its own information programmes. With no support from the President, the OWI had even more trouble than the MOI or the WIB in gaining cooperation from other government agencies. The WIB possessed its board composed of important officials from outside the information organization who could and did use their influence to cajole cooperation from other government departments and who provided access to the cabinet. Also, in the publicity co-ordinating committee, the WIB had the opportunity to discuss information activities with the heads of the information sections of other government organizations. The Americans set up no such bodies and their domestic information apparatus remained hamstrung until the end of the war.

Although the Canadian organization outwardly shared the form but not the substance of the OWI, the Wartime Information Board remained closer in its philosophy of information to the British ministry. This situation had a lot to do with the political currents in the three countries. In the United States, public opinion shifted to the right, particularly after the liberals lost Congressional seats in the 1942 elections. Social conservatives had gained strength and increasingly voiced their dislike of Roosevelt and his New Deal social policies. In consequence, official information philosophy in the United States could not gain approval to expand its activities beyond facilitating the news, that is providing releases and assistance to the major newspapers and privately owned media. The other prong of the American philosophy rested on the postulate that government information agencies did not have a role as social
animators and should, therefore, not attempt to 'educate' the public about controversial issues. Academics and intellectuals working in the OWI resigned en masse in 1943. They complained that the OWI had fallen into the clutches of advertising men who sold the war as they sold Coca Cola without making any effort to present deeper issues or to stimulate Americans' thinking about them. Consequently, nothing like the WIB's new nationalist programmes appeared in the United States and the OWI concentrated only on gaining public support "to make the world safe from fascism," and to preserve the 'American way of life.' The emphasis remained tied to the presentation of a chauvinistic and monolithic national myth.

In Britain, as in Canada, a growing sentiment favoured social reforms and increased government intervention in the economy. While both the MOI and the WIB did emphasize the need to defeat 'the forces of evil,' their purpose included other approaches to mobilize the population to continue the fight. In both countries, the intellectuals eventually gained an important role in designing information themes. British information officers pioneered the educational pamphlet series published by the Army Bureau of Current Affairs. This series aimed to present the pros and cons of various wartime and particularly post-war concerns, for example, the role of the government in establishing a comprehensive social security system. Much of the material had a slant in a distinctly reformist direction and attempted to stimulate thought and discussion by the population at large. This development directly paralleled the work of the Wartime Information Board's last programmes.
Although like the others, the Wartime Information Board wound up its domestic activities in 1945, this work did have a continuing influence upon Canada. The shape and even the existence of the post-war Liberal government owed something to the work of the Wartime Information Board. By convincing Canadians that the existing government had adopted wartime and post-war measures to assure material satisfaction and social equality, the WIB undermined the opposition to the Liberal government and sold Canadians on the political status quo. By hiring as officers in the WIB many of those who sympathized with or who supported the CCF, the Liberal government legitimized itself as a tool of reform and ironically, used these officers to help undermine CCF popular support. This was done with some forethought. Brooke Claxton, a prime mover in supporting the new nationalist information programmes, knew full well that a strong WIB could serve this purpose. The Liberals, in fact, adopted many of the techniques of the WIB to set up their election campaign in 1945. Furthermore, the government retained much of its involvement in regulating the lives of Canadians in the post-war period and also kept on departmental information officers to explain these policies and programmes. At the beginning of the war, the government feared its publicity workers. The Bureau of Public Information and the Wartime Information Board had demonstrated the utility of a continuing programme of information.

Basically, however, the bureau and the board could claim only moderate success. Certainly, they had managed to dampen down some areas of domestic unrest. At the same time,
they failed to conciliate French Canada and to contain prejudice against ethnic groups. The 'new nationalist' information activities achieved the most solid success in mobilizing Canadians behind a vision of social progress and in gaining support for the war. At the same time, they contained perhaps the most equivocal contribution of the Wartime Information Board by demonstrating the utility of social scientific techniques. Showing the merits of public opinion sampling combined with an integrated media blitz, the WIB opened up the door to cynical manipulation of the democratic process for political gain.

Although the WIB's staff largely left the government service, they continued, as individuals, to have an influence on the development of Canadian cultural and national institutions. John Grierson moved out of the country in 1946 under a cloud because of a vague connection with some of those implicated in the Gouzenko affair. He returned in the late 1960's to serve as an adviser to the Canadian Radio and Television Commission. Davidson Dunton, Grierson's successor as the WIB general manager, resurfaced in 1946 as the chairman of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. At the instigation of Brooke Claxton, the government cut off support for the adult education organizations which had helped in spreading the new nationalist message. Education for social action would have to find money elsewhere since the government did not need the services of the social activists anymore. The various adult education organizations met in Kingston in 1946 to found a Joint Planning Committee to work out a continuing social animation programme. Ultimately, the commission, a victim of the prosperity of the 1950's,
failed. Some of the WIB's staff moved into jobs as researchers for labour unions, some served as officers of the adult education bodies, some went into politics and some returned to the universities. The investigations of the Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters and Sciences, provided an opportunity for many of 'the boys' to get together again in 1949 and to rehash the problems of national cultural development. This reunion gives a clue to the most lasting contribution of the men associated with wartime information. Their work in the WIB constituted just one episode in their continuing efforts to build up Canadian national feeling and cultural institutions, a job which they began in the voluntary associations of the 1920's and 1930's and continued through to their support for the operations of the Canada Council.

But all this lay in the future. David Petegorsky, head of the WIB's industrial morale section, assessed the more immediate impact in a valedictory speech to labour leaders. The war, he pointed out, had affected thinking about communications and education in training men with skills needed for the armed forces, in teaching civilians the techniques for war jobs and in educating Canadians about the meaning of the war. This last, Petegorsky believed, had the most revolutionary possibilities. The only alternative to government coercion remained voluntary cooperation gained by convincing the population of the benefits of economic controls as well as reconstruction and rehabilitation measures. To do this part of its job, the WIB had used all the media of communications to develop "a wide network of channels of communications to many groups." The network...
included the National Film Board, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation and privately owned newspapers and radio stations. This development, Petegorsky felt, had important implications for democracy. Because of their greater access to information about the government's workings and about the issues facing their society, Canadians had a better opportunity of participating in and of judging their future directions. The complex society had grown more comprehensible.

In continuing, Petegorsky demonstrated the means by which this wartime experience could assist in the achievement of the peacetime aims of various elements of Canadian society. He particularly emphasized this utility for groups which had previously not had practice in placing their ideas before a wider public. The labour movement, for example, could follow the WIB's lead in developing its information programmes on several levels. Unions could bring general information to their members and by using new techniques of communications could educate a hitherto unreachable segment of the union membership. Additionally, labour leaders could provide specialized information to the members of specific unions about the potential for achieving their objectives. Modern techniques could do the job in promoting an understanding of the economics of a particular industry and stimulating discussion about labour's place in that situation. Thirdly, labour could use the WIB's example to do a vast public relations job to put its position before the Canadian public. The war had changed Canadian thinking about information. Whether Canadians; labour men, adult educators, ethnic groups or social reform movements had "the social vision
and intelligence to grasp and utilize the theories for their benefit" remained to be seen.¹⁵
INTRODUCTION

1 Clinton Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship: Crisis Government in the Modern Democracies, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1948, pp. 3-14, 288-307. These sections discuss extraordinary war measures and establish criteria for these sorts of "constitutional dictatorships." This is, of course, a very subjective topic especially considering the degree to which a democratic government is justified in expanding its wartime powers.


6 Ibid., pp. 239-241.

7 Ibid., pp. 246, 251-252.

8 Terence Qualter, Propaganda and Psychological Warfare, Studies in Political Science, New York: Random House, 1962, p. 27. It might even be possible to use Qualter's definition of psychological warfare to describe the activities of the Canadian propaganda agencies. He defines psychological warfare as "propaganda tied in and coordinated with military, political and economic strategy and policy." (ibid., p. 103).

There are many different approaches and case studies of propaganda available. To avoid extended discussion, I have been arbitrary in my selection. For other examples, see: Ralph Block, "Propaganda and the Free Society," Public Opinion Quarterly, 4:XII, (Winter, 1948-1949), pp. 677ff. for a study of the American Office of Wartime Information as a political instrument. For an explanation of the work of public relations, see Leila L. Sussman, "The personnel and Ideology of Public


NOTES

CHAPTER I

1 Public Archives of Canada [PAC], William Lyon Mackenzie King Papers, J13 Series, diary, 11 October 1939.

2 For examples, see *ibid.*, 21 September 1939; *ibid.*, 14 December 1939; *ibid.*, 21 April 1941.

3 For the government's activities during the first months of the war, see J.L. Granatstein, *Canada's War: The Politics of the Mackenzie King Government*, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1975, pp. 42-71. King shuffled his cabinet and made the necessary preparations to protect his political position but refused, for example, to commit himself on the extent of Canadian participation until Britain and France had made their needs known.


King Papers, J4 Series, Vol. 230, file 2213, p. C155794, memo prepared by King, 21 September 1939. The Prime Minister considered J.W. Dafoe; B.K. Sandwell, editor of Toronto Saturday Night; Grant Dexter, Ottawa correspondent for the Winnipeg Free Press; L.W. Brockington; Charles Bishop of The Ottawa Citizen; Oscar Boulanger, M.P.; Walter Turnbull and George Hambleton of the PMO. For King's contact with the Conservatives, see: Douglas Library Archives, Queen's University, Norman Lambert Papers, diaries, 25-28 September 1939. (My thanks to Professor J.L. Granatstein for providing a copy of these pages.) For King's backtracking, see: King Papers, J4 Series, Vol. 230, file 2213, p. C155832, copy PC 3108, 12 October 1939; Lambert diaries, 12 October 1939; Dafoe Papers, Series A, Vol. 11, letter: Dafoe to H.M. Cassidy, 30 September 1939; PAC, Department of External Affairs Records, G1 Series, Vol. 1940, file 764, letter: O.D. Skelton to Vincent Massey, 14 October 1939; King Papers, J4 Series, Vol. 230, file 2213, p. C155750, memo by King, n.d. [early October 1939].
Included in this group were: Arnold Heeney, the principal secretary in the PMO; the other secretaries Walter Turnbull and J.W. Pickersgill, as well as John Grierson. See: King Papers, J4 Series, Vol. 230, file 2213, p. C155856, memo: Heeney to King, 10 November 1939; ibid., p. C155853, memo: Turnbull to Heeney, 8 November 1939; ibid., Vol. 155, file 1345, p. C111174, summary of a discussion, 15 November 1939 between Heeney, Grierson, Pickersgill and Turnbull; ibid., Vol. 230, file 2213, p. C155854, copy of a letter: Grierson to Turnbull, 2 November 1939.

Chalmers criticism was reported in The Globe and Mail, 24 November 1939 (AO clipping, 3751); see also Liberal columnist Charles Bishop in The Ottawa Citizen, 18 November 1939 (found in King Papers, J4 Series, Vol. 230, file 2213, pp. C155863ff.).


Toronto, The Financial Post, 9 December 1939 (AO clipping 3072); The Toronto Telegram, 9 December 1939 (AO clipping, 3871); Toronto, The Globe and Mail, 22 December 1939 (AO clipping, 3871).

23 Ibid., J13 Series, diary, 5 December 1939.


25 King Papers, J4 Series, additional, Vol. 413, file 3989, letter: Walter Thompson to King, 5 January 1940.


28 On March 4, Hepburn banned a March of Time newsreel, Canada at War, which he claimed contained pro-Mackenzie King propaganda aimed at influencing voters. The charges were not totally unsubstantiated, but the government rebutted the assault. Ontario's Provincial Treasurer, Harry Nixon, temporarily resigned because of Hepburn's action. See: King Papers, J4 Series, Vol. 273, file 2791, p. C188279, memo: Turnbull to King, 1 April 1940; AO, Prime Minister's Office Records, Mitchell Hepburn Papers, Correspondence 1940, private, censor board file; McKenty, pp. 213-214.

For press reaction, see: Toronto Daily Star, 5 March 1940 (AO clipping 1502); ibid., (1506); Fort William, The Times-Journal, 6 March 1940, (AO clipping 1519); The Hamilton Spectator, 6 March 1940 (AO, clipping 1522A); Toronto, The Globe and Mail, 7 March 1940 (AO clipping 1565); Toronto Daily Star, 6 March 1940 (AO clipping 1536); The St. Thomas Times Journal, 6 March 1940 (AO clipping 1527); The Winnipeg Tribune, (clipping in Hepburn Papers); The Hamilton Spectator, 7 March 1940 (AO clipping 1553); The Ottawa Citizen, 11 March 1940 (AO, clipping 1689); The St. Thomas Times Journal, 11 March 1940 (AO, clipping, 1689).

29 Manion Papers, Vol. 100, press clipping file, speech at Victoria, B.C., 20 February 1940.

31 King Papers, J4 additional series, Vol. 413, file 3989, memo: L.W. Brockington to the PM and members of the war committee, 15 May 1940.


33 PCO Records, Series 7c, Vol. 1, minutes: cabinet war committee, 9 May 1940.


36 Ibid.; King Papers, J13 Series, diary, 8 December 1939.


40 Ibid., J13 Series, diary, 2 September 1939; ibid., 8 May 1940; ibid., 14 May 1941; Pickersgill interview.

41 House of Commons, Debates, p. 857, 18 June 1940.
42 King Papers, J13 Series, diary, 30 May 1940; House of Commons, Debates, 8 July 1940, p. 1399.

43 Canada, Statutes, 4 George VI (1940), Ottawa: King's Printer, 1941, Chapter 22, Section 5(d). J.G. Gardiner received authorization to assume responsibility for the director and associate director of Public Information in PC 3333, 19 July 1940 (King Papers, J4 Series, additional, Vol. 413, file 3989, copy: PC 3333, 19 July 1940).


The academics first submission arrived from J.D. Ketchum, University of Toronto psychologist in October, 1939 (King Papers, J4jSeries, Vol. 230, file 2213, pp. Cl55828ff., memo by J.D. Ketchum, 3 October 1939).

45 King Papers, J13 Series, diary, 28 June 1940; ibid., 3 July 1940; The Ottawa Citizen, 12 July 1940 (AO clipping, 3238).


48 This contention received specific mention on several occasions throughout the war. One publisher told the PM that the press was the "heavy artillery of public information" (King Papers, J1 Series, Vol. 322, letter: W. Clark to King, 21 December 1942). Lionel Bertrand, MP and President of the rural press association of Quebec, believed the press to be an "essential tool to the progress of the nation" which could unlike radio, explain wartime policies in a lasting form (House of Commons, Debates, 1943, pp. 1461-2). See also: Toronto, The Globe and Mail, 3 February 1943 (AO clipping, 8789); WIB Records, Vol. 13, file 8-10-1, memo by C.F. Crandall, 25 March 1943.
49. The Toronto Telegram, 23 September 1940 (AO clipping, 3911); ibid., 22 October 1940 (AO clipping, 4194); ibid., 2 June 1941 (AO clipping, 2275); Toronto, The Globe and Mail, 24 November 1939 (AO clipping, 3751); ibid., 18 November 1940 (AO clipping, 4491).

50. The Toronto Telegram, 28 August 1942 (AO, clipping, 7132).


54. Ibid., pp. 144ff.

55. Dafoe Papers, Series A, Vol. 12, memo: Grant Dexter to Dafoe, 28 November 1940.


57. House of Commons, Debates, 1941, pp. 1333-1338.


59. WIB Records, Vol. 20, file 11-3-17, letter: T.C. Davis to Norman Robertson, 17 April 1941; King Papers, J4 Series, additional, Vol. 415, file 3981, memo: G.H. Lash to PM, 6 May 1941; ibid., J1 Series, Vol. 304, pp. 257601ff., letter: J.G. Gardiner to King, 8 May 1941. The current budget of the BPI before the expansion was $404,762.42.

60. PCO Records, Series 18, Vol. 5, file D-24, memo: 31 July 1940; PAC, Brooke Claxton Papers, Vol. 44, King file, letter: Claxton to King, 29 November 1940; Manion Papers, Vol. 9, letter: Manion to King, 13 December 1940; Dafoe Papers,

J.W. Pickersgill, I., 1939-1944, p. 222; Dafoe Papers, Series A, Vol. 12, memo: Grant Dexter to Dafoe, 20 May 1941.

Ibid.

PCO Records, Series 7C, Vol. 4, meeting 85, minutes: cabinet war committee, 9 May 1941; ibid., Series 18, Vol. 5, file D-47-1, memo: PM to Heeney, 12 May 1941; Pickersgill, I., 1939-1944, p. 223; King Papers, J13 Series, diary, 12 May 1941; ibid., 14 May 1941; ibid., 16 May 1941; ibid., 22 May 1941; ibid., 26 May 1941.

St. Thomas, Times Journal, 27 May 1941 (AO, clipping 2181).

Dafoe Papers, Series A, Vol. 12, memo: Grant Dexter to Dafoe, 30 May 1941.

King Papers, J13 Series, diary, 4 June 1941; ibid., 11 June 1941.


WIB Records, Vol. 12, file 8-2-1, memo by George McCracken, 13 November 1941; see also Dafoe Papers, Series A, Vol. 12, letter: Dafoe to T.A. Crerar, 23 May 1941.

Either the subsequent canvass of influential politicians had an effect or the men had the gift of prophecy. A month later Prime Minister King and President Roosevelt signed the Ogdensburg Agreement setting up the Permanent Joint Board on Defense. And nine months later the Hyde Park Agreement provided for closer economic ties (University of British Columbia Library, Special Collections Division, Alan B. Plaunt Papers, box 9, file 1, "A Programme of Immediate Canadian Action," 17-18 July 1940; Granatstein, pp. 127-129; pp. 142-145).

Claxton Papers, Vol. 135, CIIA file, notes: n.a., n.d. [These are mixed with material from mid-July 1940].


Ibid., Vol. 44, King file, letter: Claxton to King, 4 May 1941; Ibid., Vol. 20, Th-W file, letter: Claxton to J.T. Thorson, 19 August 1941.

McGill University Archives, Redpath Library, Wilfrid Bovey Papers, box 2, file 169, memo attached to letter: Robert England to Bovey, 21 November 1940.


Brittain arranged for Liberal Senator, Leon Mercier Gouin and Montreal Star proprietor, J.W. McConnell to support his submission and to help him get a meeting with Thorson in September 1941 (McGill Archives, Vice-Principal's Papers, box 53, file 16, letter: W.H. Brittain to T.W.L. MacDermot, 13 June 1941; Ibid., letter: L.M. Gouin to J.T. Thorson, 27 June 1941; Ibid., letter: J.W. McConnell to T.C. Davis, 1 August 1941; Ibid., letter: Brittain to J.T. Thorson, 2 September 1941; Ibid., draft report of a meeting with Thorson, 20 September 1941).

The educators' ideas can be found in: AO, Workers' Educational Association Papers, Drummond Wren's files, file 53-5-1, letter: Drummond Wren to G.H. Lash, 21 November 1941; WIB Records, Vol. 14, file 8-20-2, memo by W.H. Brittain enclosed with a letter: Ian Eisenhardt to John Grierson, 9 June 1943 (This is the original Brittain memorandum of 1941); McGill Archives, Vice-Principal's Records, box 53, file 16, memo attached to letter: W.H. Brittain to F.S. Rivers, 7 July 1941; WIB Records, Vol. 14, file 8-20-1, letter: E.A. Corbett to John


78. WEA Papers, Drummond Wren's files, file 55-5-1, letter: D. Wren to G.H. Lash, 21 November 1941.


81. Claxton Papers, Vol. 179, speeches, "Information and Morale in Wartime..."

82. WIB Records, Vol. 7, file 12-14-1, letter: Claxton to Grierson, 2 June 1943.

83. See Chapter 3, p. 100; and Chapter 4, p. 118.


For the post war decision see: WIB Records, Vol. 2, file 1-2-34, minutes: Wartime Information Board, 9 April 1945 (the WIB referred the question of peacetime funding to "members of the government" [Claxton?]. The grant was refused by the cabinet (ibid., Vol. 14, file 8-20-3, memo: A.D.P. Heeney to G.C. Andrew, 15 September 1945). See also PAC, H.R.C. Avison Papers, Vol. 5, file 27, director's report, 21 November 1945; WIB Records, Vol. 14, file 8-20-1, letter: E.A. Corbett to G.C. Andrew, 17 November 1945 (Corbett suggests Claxton's connection with the failure to get funding).


86. Ibid., Vol. 137, conscription file, letter: Claxton to George Ferguson, 24 October 1941; McGill Archives, Vice-Principal's


89 PCO Records, Series 7C, Vol. 4, meeting 102, minutes: cabinet war committee, 12 August 1941.

90 Ibid., Series 18, Vol. 5, file D-27-1, letter: 'Lash to King, 22 December 1941; WIB Records, Vol. 6, file 2-1-5, memo: Lash and Melançon to the committee on public information, 12 April 1940.


93 King Papers, J4 Series, additional, Vol. 413, file 3989, n.p., submission: Lash to King, 6 May 1941; PAC, Department of Munitions and Supply Records, Vol. 124, file 3-C12-1, minutes: preliminary meeting of interdepartmental publicity committee, 14 July 1941; ibid., Vol. 125, file 3-C12-1, minutes: publicity coordinating committee, 28 October 1941; ibid., 16 December 1941; ibid., copy: PC 145, 9 January 1942.


96 Toronto, The Globe and Mail, 4 November 1941 (AO, clipping, 3800), a quote from Lash's speech at Galt, Ontario, 31 October 1944.

97 WIB Records, Vol. 12, file 8-2-2, minutes: committee on morale, 8 May 1942.

98 AO, Canadian Association for Adult Education Papers, Series A1, box 1, letter: E.A. Corbett to C. Dallard, 3 November 1941;
E.A. Corbett, We Have With Us Tonight, pp. 187ff.; University of Saskatchewan Archives, Extension Department Records, box 164, report by T.W.L. MacDermot, n.d. [February 1942].


103 WIB Records, Vol. 12, file 8-2-2, memo by J.S.A. Bois, 4 March 1942; ibid., memo by J.D. Ketchum, 31 March 1942.
CHAPTER II

1Toronto, The Financial Post, 30 May 1942 (Archives of Ontario [AO], Department of the Provincial Secretary, press clipping, 6157).


The same thing happened when Lash set up an interdepartmental consumers' information committee. When Lash tried to formalize the body, Byrne Hope Saunders of the WPTB refused to hand over her own power of initiating consumer publicity (Munitions and Supply Records, Vol. 142, file 3-1-22, minutes: interdepartmental consumer information committee, 23 August 1942; ibid., 23 July 1942).


4The minister of national war services, J.T. Thorson had commissioned Charles Vining to make a study which recommended offices in the U.S.A. (PAC, Privy Council Office [PCO] Records, Series 18, Vol. 5, file D-27-1, report by Charles Vining, 9 September 1941; ibid., memo: N. Robertson to PM, 18 September 1941; ibid., Series 7C, Vol. 5, meeting 105, minutes: cabinet war committee, 2 September 1941; ibid., meeting 108, 18 September 1941).

Some said the plan failed because of President Roosevelt's opposition (ibid., meeting 112, 15 October 1941; ibid., meeting 115, 6 November 1941; ibid., 12 November 1941).


10 Ibid., pp. 56, 32.

11 Ibid., p. 41.

12 Ibid., pp. 42, 45, 48, 54. See also The Windsor Star, 17 September 1942 (A0 clipping 7319).


14 Ibid., p. 59.

15 Ibid., p. 62.

16 Ibid., p. 55.


18 Stacey, pp. 405-406.


King Papers, J1 Series, Vol. 321, telegram: Heeney to Philippe Brais, 26 August 1942. The membership of the board was ratified by PC 8099 and PC 8100 which also provided authority to hire staff (External Affairs Records, G2 Series, Vol. 2252, file 4310-40C, part 1, copies of PC 8099 and PC 8100).


For an example see The Ottawa Citizen, 27 August 1942 (AO clipping 7113); Toronto, The Globe and Mail, 28 August 1942 (AO clipping 7129).


External Affairs Records, G2 Series, Vol. 2252, file 4310-40C, part 2, telegram, H.L. Keenleyside to L.B. Pearson, 16 September 1942; ibid., memo: Saul Rae to Norman Robertson, 16 October 1942; ibid., memo: H.L. Keenleyside to N. Robertson, 16 November 1942; ibid., G1 Series, Vol. 1978, file 973, letter: John Grierson to N. Robertson, 27 October 1942. The group which objected to Vining's appointments remained anonymous in Keenleyside's memorandum but are easily identified as: Norman MacKenzie, president of the University of New Brunswick; Sidney Smith, president of the University of Manitoba; E.A. Corbett and T.W.L. MacDermot of the CAAE; Joe Clark, publicity director of the Department of National Defence, and Brooke Claxton.


Dafoe Papers, Series A, Vol. 13, memo: Grant Dexter to Dafoe, 24 October 1942.


The Windsor Daily Star, 17 September 1942.


Transcript of author's interview with G.C. Andrew, Vancouver, 18 and 24, August 1973, p. 3.


42 Ibid., Vol. 16, file 8-53-1, letter: Campbell Smart to Ernest Bertrand, 8 November 1942.


47 King Papers, J1 Series, diary, 18 November 1942.


50 Canadian Institute of International Affairs, Annual Report, 1940-1941, Toronto: CIIA, 1941.


John Grierson, "Metropolitan" from a review, The City, by Ralph Steiner and Willard Van Dyke, in Hardy, p. 220.


Ibid., p. 236.
62 Claxton Papers, Vol. 147, speech by John Grierson to the CAAE convention, Winnipeg, 30 May 1941; see also Hardy, p. 286.


66 Claxton Papers, Vol. 147, speech by John Grierson to the CAAE convention, Winnipeg, 30 May 1941.


71 WIB Records, Vol. 6, file 2-1-3, "The Necessity and Nature of Public Information."

72 Ibid., Grierson statement, "It is not Done with Mirrors."


74 The Toronto News, 6 February 1943; The Moose Jaw Times Herald, 15 February 1943.

75 The Toronto Telegram, 28 January 1943, called the changes a bust up and predicted more resignations (AO clipping 8734). The Halifax Chronicle blamed the cabinet for not delegating enough authority (1 March 1943).

76 The Trail Times, 15 February 1943; The Ottawa Journal, 19 February 1943.
The Sydney Post-Record, 20 February 1943; The Victoria Daily Times, 15 February 1943; The Halifax Chronicle, 1 March 1943; The Windsor Star, 3 March 1943.

Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Debates, 1943, p. 208 (This contains the original request).


PAC, Department of Labour Records, Vol. 913, file 8-9-114, minutes: publicity coordinating committee, 30 March 1943.

MacKenzie interview, p. 29.

MacKenzie Papers, unsorted clipping file, The Ottawa Citizen, 3 April 1943.


House of Commons, Debates, 1943, pp. 1838-1839; The Montreal Gazette, 6 April 1943.

Howard Green, a Vancouver M.P., proposed an investigation by the Public Accounts Committee. Although during the debate the Conservatives made much of the board as a political vehicle (House of Commons, Debates, 1943, pp. 201ff.) most of the Tories' arguments appeared to be procedural. (See also ibid., p. 2807, a speech by CCF. M.P., T.C. Douglas; ibid., p. 2827, a speech by J.G. Diefenbaker; and ibid., p. 2856, a speech by J.S. Roy).

See ibid., 1943, pp. 4704-4709, for King's speech, and pp. 4709ff. for Claxton's. Arnold Heeney had originally suggested the line of defense (WIB Records, Vol. 1, file 1-2-14, minutes:
Wartime Information Board, 10 May 1943) and Grierson had drafted
the speeches (ibid., Vol. 7, file 2-14-1, draft speech: n.d.).
Claxton pointed out that the information to war expenditures
ratio in Australia was $1:$4,000; in the United States $1:$906;
and in Britain $1:$615.

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88 WIB Records, Vol. 9, file 4-1-1, letter: G.C. Andrew to
Eleanor Godfrey, n.d. [Spring, 1943]; ibid., Vol. 14, file 8-24,
letter: A.D. Dunton to F.C. Mears, 22 May 1943; ibid., Vol. 15,
file 8-33, letter: W.A. Craik to John Grierson, 21 May 1943.

89 Ibid., Vol. 1, file 1-2-13, "Press Survey from March 24,
1943," The Ottawa Citizen actually gave editorial support as
did The Brantford Expositor, The Saskatoon Star-Phoenix, The
Peterborough Examiner, and The Winnipeg Free Press. After
Claxton's speech, the Tories lost more support for their charges
(WIB Records, Vol. 15, file 8-26-1, clipping The Winnipeg Tribune,
14 July 1943; ibid., Vol. 7, file 2-4-1, letter: Claxton to
W.L. Clark, 23 July 1943; House of Commons, Debates, pp. 4729-30).

90 WIB Records, Vol. 1, file 1-2-11, minutes: Wartime Infor-
mation Board, 22 February 1943.

91 Ibid., Vol. 3, "Annual Report of the Wartime Information
Board, 1945."

92 MacKenzie interview, p. 32.

93 For an example see WIB Records, Vol. 4, file 1-2-18,
minutes: Wartime Information Board, 13 October 1943; ibid.,
Vol. 4, file 1-42, letter: J. Grierson to O.M. Biggar, 30 June
1943.

94 Andrew interview, p. 41; Pearson Papers, Vol. 2, Robertson
file, letter: Pearson to N. Robertson, 30 June 1943.

95 David P. Armstrong, "Corbett's House: The Origins of the
Canadian Association for Adult Education and its Development
During the Directorship of E.A. Corbett, 1936-1951," University

96 University of British Columbia Library, Special Collections
Division, Alan Plaunt Papers, Box 8, file 20, list attached to
letter: Plaunt to J.R. Baldwin, 13 August 1940.

97 Claxton Papers, Vol. 28, 1940 election file, letter;
Claxton to R. Fowler, 6 April 1940.

98 Andrew also belonged to many voluntary associations and
had some contact with the others prior to the war (MacKenzie
Papers, 1940 correspondence, circular letter signed by Andrew and
others [February 1940] concerning civil liberties).


PCO Records, 7C Series, Vol. 12, minutes: cabinet war committee, 21 January 1943.


Ibid., Vol. 1, file 1-2-14, minutes: Wartime Information Board, 10 May 1943.


Ibid., Vol. 14, file 8-2-1, memo: B.T. Richardson to J. Grierson, 22 April 1943.

Ibid., Vol. 15, file 8-3-5, memo: Walter Abell to J. Grierson, 6 March 1943.

Ibid., Vol. 11, file 8-1, memo: D.W. Buchanan to J. Grierson, 17 February 1943.


Ibid., Vol. 1, file 1-1-4a, memo: 19 April 1943.
Ibid., Vol. 12, file 8-2-1, memo: n.a., n.d., [David Petegorsky to Grierson, February-March 1943]; ibid., Vol. 1, file 1-2-13, appendix "D", to minutes: Wartime Information Board, 12 April 1943.

Ibid., Vol. 6, file 2-1-3, memo: Ian Eisenhardt to Grierson, 29 April 1943.

Ibid., Vol. 9, file 3-16, memo: Maude Ferguson to Grierson, 14 June 1943.


Ibid., Vol. 1, minutes: Wartime Information Board, 13 September 1943.

Ibid., Vol. 7, file 2-4-6, minutes: publicity coordinating committee, 5 October 1943; ibid., 19 October 1943.

Ibid., Vol. 6, file 2-1-3, memo: G.C. Andrew to Brooke Claxton, 13 September 1943.


Ibid., Vol. 7, file 2-16, letter: Grierson to King, 9 October 1943.

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CHAPTER III


2 Toronto, The Globe and Mail, 5 February 1943 (Archives of Ontario [AO], Department of the Provincial Secretary, press clipping 8815).


7 University of British Columbia Library, Special Collections Division, N.A.M. MacKenzie Papers, 1940 correspondence, letter: J.R. Baldwin to MacKenzie, 2 February 1940.


AO, Records of the Prime Minister's Office, Mitchell Hepburn Papers, general correspondence, private, CBC file, memo: n.a., 3 April 1941. The story was that R.S. Lambert, a CBC consultant also employed by the CAAE, was told that "if he takes legal action against Frank Underhill, the Canadian Institute of International Affairs (run by friends of Frank Underhill, particularly Mr. MacDermot, principal of Upper Canada College) will break off its affiliations with the Adult Education Association which employs Lambert."


WIB Records, Vol. 8, file 3-5, letter: Rupert Davies to Davidson Dunton, 23 August 1944.


Author's interview with G.C. Andrew, Vancouver, 24 August 1973, transcript. Andrew remarked that it was the same man who founded The Intelligence Digest.


AO, Workers Educational Association Papers, Wren file, #286, Villeneuve speech, November 1944.

King Papers, J13 Series, diary, 5 May 1941.

Ibid., 21 October 1943.
24 WIB Records, Vol. 8, file 3-5, letter: Dunton to Rupert Davies, 4 October 1944.


26 Andrew interview, transcript, p. 55.

27 WIB Records, Vol. 12, file 8-2-1, letter: Grierson to Claxton, 17 June 1943; ibid., minutes: committee on industrial morale, 11 June 1943.


31 Claxton Papers, Vol. 31, Ferguson file, letter: Claxton to George V. Ferguson, 27 November 1941.

32 Ibid., Vol. 67, Tarr file, letter: Tarr to Claxton, 31 August 1943.

33 Ibid., Vol. 31, Ferguson file, letter: Claxton to George V. Ferguson, 5 October 1943.


37 Author's interview with C.B. Macpherson, Toronto, 9 December 1974, transcript.

38 PAC, H.R.C. Avison Papers, Vol. 13-14 contain the FCSO and SCM files.

39 Horn, p. 31.


43 PAC, Eugene Forsey Papers, uncatalogued FCSO file, letter: Forsey to National Secretary; ibid., letter: Forsey to Cameron, 22 February 1944; see also Avison Papers, Vol. 13, file 73, letter: Brooks to H.R.C. Avison, 19 June 1943; ibid., Vol. 13, file 93, letter: Jean Morrison to H.R.C. Avison, 18 August 1942.


45 Andrew interview, transcript, p. 9; Macdonald interview; Horn, pp. 210-211; Forsey Papers, uncatalogued FCSO file, letter: Eugene Forsey to Gregory Vlastos, 14 January 1941.
Royal Commission, Report, pp. 123ff.; pp. 163ff.; Macdonald interview. Macdonald said that Frank Park, also of this section, was a known communist with a continuing membership in the party and that Poland was a dupe for others. When Park left the WIB he served as executive director of the National Council for Canadian-Soviet Friendship.

This was true of the industrial morale section which maintained cordial relations with Drummond Wren and John Wigdor suspected of fellow-travelling while working for the Workers' Educational Association (Irving Abella, Nationalism, Communism and Canadian Labour; The CIO, the Communist Party and the Canadian Congress of Labour, 1935-1956, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973, p. 93; The Financial Post, 14 September 1946; ibid., 28 September 1946).

Andrew interview, pp. 9-10; author's interview with Lorne T. Morgan, Vancouver, August 1973, p. 74; Macdonald interview; WIB Records, Vol. 8, file 3-5, memo: A.D. Dunton to F.W. Park, 3 April 1945 (Park tried to put together a Canadian Affairs issue on Poland which Dunton axed as not a "Canadian affair.")

Porter, "The Bureaucratic Elite...," p. 496.


Ibid., letter: E.A. Corbett to J. Grierson, 18 March 1943; ibid., n.a., n.d., [Corbett to Grierson, April 1943].

Ibid., Vol. 14, file 8-20-1, memo: Malcolm Ross to Grierson, 28 April 1943; ibid., memo: D.W. Buchanan to Grierson, 29 April 1943; ibid., 8-20-3, letter: Grierson to C.N. Crutchfield, 14 May 1943. It was more or less decided that the WIB would provide a secretary to the CCEC from among Gregory Vlastos, George Edison, David Petegorsky, C.B. Macpherson or Malcolm Ross, The actual submission is in the WIB Records, Vol. 14, file 8-20-3, memorandum enclosed with letter: C.N. Crutchfield to J. Grierson, 8 July 1943.

Ibid., letter: A.D.P. Heeney to John Grierson, 1 July 1943.

Grierson to W.H. Brittain, 12 October 1943; ibid., letter: C.B. Macpherson to W.H. Brittain, 15 November 1943.

55 AO, Canadian Association for Adult Education Papers, Bl Series, box 3, letter: H.R.C. Avison to Watson Thompson, 6 August 1943. For other versions of this controversy see: R.G.A. Mackie, "Citizens' Forum: Its Origins and Development, 1943-1963," University of Toronto: unpublished M.A. thesis, 1968, pp. 46ff.; and R. Faris, The Passionate Educators: Canadian Voluntary Associations and their Adult Educational Broadcasting from 1919-1952, Toronto: Peter Martin, 1975. The same-time WIB staff on the advisory committee included David Petegorsky, Donald Buchanan, George Edison and Gregory Vlastos. The others were H.R.C. Avison (chairman); Alex Sim (Macdonald College); Sandy Rand (University of Manitoba); and Neil Morrison (CBC) [Mackie, p. 43].

56 Claxton Papers, Vol. 31, Mrs. G.V. Ferguson file, letter: Claxton to Mary Ferguson, 23 December 1943; King Papers, J4 Series, Vol. 326, file 3440, p. C226109, memo: Claxton to PM, 5 November 1943. Claxton claimed that while no Liberal had been consulted about the opening programme, J.L. Cohen, noted left-winger would appear. In later broadcasts, CCFers, David Lewis, J.W. Noseworthy, F.R. Scott and M.J. Coldwell were asked to participate. Paul Martin was the only Liberal approached (Claxton Papers, Vol. 133, CBC file, part 2, memo: n.a., n.d. [Claxton to King, early November 1943]).


59 Claxton Papers, Vol. 133, CBC file, letter: Neil Morrison to Claxton; ibid., minutes of a meeting, 9 November 1943.

60 Ibid.; telegram: Sidney Smith to Claxton, 9 November 1943.


63 Ibid., MacDermot file, letter: T.W.L. MacDermot to Claxton, 29 November 1943; ibid., letter: Claxton to MacDermot; 8 December 1943; ibid., 23 December 1943.
64. Ibid., Vol. 133, CBC file, part 2, letter: Grierson to Augustin Frigon, 6 November 1943.


67. See Chapter IV, p. 102.


70. Ibid., letter: W.H. Brittain to E.A. Corbett, 7 December 1943.


73. Ibid., Vol. 62, Pearson file, telegram: Claxton to Pearson, 9 June 1944. Claxton warned Pearson about appointing too many CCF supporters to the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration due to "the possible effect on Canadian public opinion."
NOTES

CHAPTER IV


2 Ibid., Vol. 1, file 1-2-20, minutes: Wartime Information Board, 6 December 1943.


5 Ibid., Vol. 12, file 8-2-1, minutes: committee on industrial morale, 19 July 1943.

6 Author's interview with J.W. Pickersgill, Ottawa, 21 February 1974, transcript, p. 78.


8 For a rare expression of Dunton's views see: King Papers, J1 Series, Vol. 323, p. 274650, reprint from The Montreal Standard, 9 May 1942.

9 WIB Records, Vol. 7, file 2-4-6, minutes: publicity coordinating committee, 25 January 1944.
Ibid., minutes: publicity coordinating committee, 6 January 1945.


Ibid., letter: J.D. Ketchum to O.J. Morris, 26 September 1944; ibid., letter: G.C. Andrew to Wilfrid Sanders, 5 November 1945.


Ibid., Vol. 2, Monthly Reports, J.D. Ketchum, "Research Section," October 1943; ibid., November 1943; PAC, Canadian Authors' Association Papers, Vol. 5. This volume contains the reports sent to the WIB by the writers' war committee. The locations were compiled from the WIB's Field Reports, which excerpted the reports, analyzed them.

For the more ridiculous ones see: Canadian Authors' Association Papers, Vol. 5, report by Mrs. Linnie Coghill of Kingsville, 18 May 1943.

For copies of the "Field Reports" see: WIB Records, Vol. 27. For a description of their use see: ibid., Vol. 2, Monthly Reports, J.D. Ketchum, "Reports Branch," June 1943.

Ibid., October 1943; ibid., November 1943.

Ibid., Vol. 27, "Field Reports," 28, 5 January 1944. This indicated that farmers were not pleased by CCF comments on communal farming.

Ibid., Vol. 12, file 8-7A, letter: Arthur Porter to J.D. Ketchum, 11 August 1943. The CIPO had shown the growth of CCF strength prior to the election.
Ibid., letter: J.D. Ketchum to Arthur Porter, 30 March 1944; ibid., letter: Claxton to Dunton, 30 March 1944.


Ibid., letter: J.D. Ketchum to O.J. Morris, 4 March 1944; ibid., Claxton to Dunton, 30 March 1944.


Ibid., letter: J.D. Ketchum to O.J. Morris, 4 March 1944; ibid., Claxton to Dunton, 30 March 1944.

King Papers, J4 Series, Vol. 376, file 3944, pp. C266781ff., memo: A.D. Dunton to members of the cabinet. This was particularly true around the time of the 1945 election.

WIB Records, Vol. 4. This file contains the WIB Surveys; ibid., Vol. 27. This file contains the "Field Reports;" ibid., Vol. 3, Wartime Information Board, "Annual Report, 1945."


Ibid., Vol. 2, file 1-3-1, Monthly Reports, 1944, Laura Beattie, "Consumer Information Service," May 1944; ibid., September 1944.

Ibid., Vol. 10, file 6-2-22, minutes: economic stabilization information committee, 14 February 1944.

Ibid., Vol. 11, file 8-2-A, memo: David Petegorsky, 22 February 1944; ibid., file 8-2-C, minutes: industrial information committee, 3 April 1944.

Ibid., Vol. 6, file 2-1-22, copy: submission 274, 11 December 1944; ibid., copy: minutes of the Treasury Board, 4 January 1945.


For the story of this committee see: External Affairs Records, G2 Series, Vol. 2252, file 4310-40C, part 1, copy of
PC 145, 9 January 1942; PAC, Department of Munitions and Supply Records, Vol. 141, file 3-G1-5; PAC, Department of Labour Records, Vol. 914, file 8-9-14, minutes: publicity coordinating committee, 2 February 1943.


35 Ibid., Vol. 10, file 6-3-1, minutes: demobilization and rehabilitation information committee, 14 March 1945; ibid., memorandum to cabinet, 10 June 1945; ibid., memorandum to cabinet, 6 February 1945.


37 PAC, H.M. Tory Papers, Vol. 17, CCEC file, minutes: executive committee of the CCEC, 13 March 1944. The WIB made a civilian edition of Canadian Affairs available to the CCEC, WIB Records, Vol. 2, file 1-228, minutes: Wartime Information Board, 6 September 1944 (The meeting approved a $10,000 grant); ibid., "Annual Report," 1945; 28,000 copies of Canadian Affairs went to schools through CCEC; 15,000 to Citizens' Forums, 15,000 to teachers and to the CAAE.


39 WIB Records, Vol. 9, file 4-1-1, memo: G.C. Andrew to J.D. Ketchum, 19 December 1944.

40 Ibid., Vol. 14, file 8-20-3, memo: Andrew to Dunton, 20 June 1944.

41 Ibid., memo: G.S.H. Carter to Dunton, 3 August 1944.


43 Andrew interview, p. 17; ibid., p. 44; MacKenzie interview, p. 33.

44 Ibid.

46 L'Action Catholique, 28 May 1943, Le Canada, 28 May 1943.

47 WIB Records, Vol. 12, file 8-2-2, letter: George McCracken to G.H. Sallans, 16 January 1943; Andrew interview, p. 44.


51 Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Debates, 1944, pp. 3578ff.

52 WIB Records, Vol. 7, file 2-14-1, letter: Claxton to Dunton, 6 March 1944.


54 WIB Records, Vol. 18, file 2-16A, letter: Dunton to Heeney, 6 December 1944.


56 House of Commons, Debates, 4 December 1944, p. 6753; ibid., p. 6805; King Papers, J4 Series, Vol. 377, file 3945, p. C260858, memo: Claxton to King, 4 December 1944.

57 Ibid., J4 Series, additional material, Vol. 414, file 3990, clipping from The Globe and Mail, 16 December 1944; The Globe and Mail, 5 January 1945 (AO clipping 18616).

58 The Toronto Daily Star, 5 January 1945 (AO clipping 18619).

59 Ibid.; The Globe and Mail, 6 January 1945 (AO clipping 18632); J.W. Pickersgill Papers (private collection in possession of Hon. J.W. Pickersgill), letter: Pickersgill to George Brown, 6 December 1944. (My thanks to Hon. J.W. Pickersgill for supplying a copy of his letter.)

60 Granatstein, pp. 402ff.


66 WIB Records, Vol. 8, file 3-5F, memo: D. Macdonald to F. Park, 17 July 1945. Several WIB staff members wanted to resign but were talked into remaining by Norman MacKenzie (MacKenzie interview, pp. 30-31).

67 PAC, Arthur Meighen Papers, Vol. 222, file 40, pp. 144722ff., letter: Eugene Forsey to Meighen, 11 July 1945; ibid., letter: Forsey to Meighen, 17 July 1945; ibid., letter: Meighen to Forsey, 17 July 1945. All that Meighen did was to show the information to J.M. Macdonnell, a Conservative M.P.

68 WIB Records, Vol. 5, file 1-2-1, memo by A.D. Dunton, 22 November 1944; see also: King Papers, J4 Series, Vol. 377, file 3945, p. C260866, memo: Heeney to PM, 6 January 1945; ibid., p. 260860, memo: Heeney to PM, 8 December 1944.


72 The Toronto Telegram, 23 June 1944; ibid., 6 January 1945 (AO clipping 18636); The Ottawa Journal, 4 December 1944 (AO clipping 18270).


WIB Records, Vol. 2, file 1-2-31, minutes: Wartime Information Board, 8 January 1945. The members were Dunton, Heeney, Andrew, MacDermot, and Pickersgill.


NOTES

CHAPTER V

1 Public Archives of Canada [PAC], Brooke Claxton Papers, Vol. 44, W.L.M. King file, letter: Claxton to King, 29 October 1941.


3 W.L.M. King, "The Issue," W.L.M. King, Canada at Britain's Side [CBS], Toronto: Macmillans, 1941, p. 40 (text of radio broadcast 27 October 1939, distributed by the information apparatus); see also: James Hilton, "Address," Department of National War Services, Director of Public Information, Let's Face the Facts, Ottawa: King's Printer, 1940, p. 27.

4 Watson Kirkconnell, Canadians All: A Primer of National Unity, issued by the Director of Public Information under authority of the Minister of National War Services, Ottawa: King's Printer, 1941; see also: Ministère des services nationaux de guerre, service de l'information, Devoirs du moment: extraits des discours prononcés par le major-général L.R. Laflèche, D.S.O. depuis son retour au Canada en août, 1940, Ottawa: Imprimeur du roi, 1941; speech by G.H. Lash quoted in The Financial Post, 8 November 1941 (AO, Department of the Provincial Secretary, newspaper clippings, 3680); Claxton Papers, Vol. 178, speeches miscellaneous 1940-1946 file, speech "Effects of the War on the Economy and People," n.d.; Department of National War Services, Bureau of Public Information, Real and Fruitful Unity: An Address by the Rt. Hon. Ernest Lapointe Delivered over Radio Canada, May 14, 1941, Ottawa: King's Printer, 1941.

letter: Lash to Thorson, 29 August 1941; PAC, Privy Council Office [PCO] Records, 7C Series, minutes: cabinet war committee, 2 June 1943.


National Film Board of Canada, Salute to Victory, Canada Carries On, produced by Stanley Hawes, 1945.


W.L.M. King, "Canada at Britain's Side," CBS, p. 1 (text of a radio broadcast, 1 September 1939); see also Department of National War Services, Director of Public Information, Let's Face the Facts, Ottawa: King's Printer, 1940, p. 10.


W.L.M. King, "Canada Enters the War," CBS, p. 9 (speech made in the House of Commons, 8 September 1939).


19 Ibid.


23 W.L.M. King, "Labour and the War," CBS, pp. 149-150 (radio broadcast, 1 September 1940).

24 Ibid., The World Encircling Danger," ibid., p. 321 (address at Winnipeg, 10 July 1941).

25 National Film Board of Canada [NFB], Quebec: Path of Conquest, Canada Carries On, produced by R. Spottiswood and F.R. Crawley, 1942.


27 W.L.M. King, "Nothing Matters Now but Victory," CFFF (speech opening the Third Victory Loan, 16 October 1942); ibid., "National Unity and National Survival," ibid., p. 149 (broadcast 24 April 1942); NFB, Mosquito: Canada's Fighting Sea Fleas, Canada Carries On directed by Sidney Newman [?] and N. Read [?], 1944.


29 Ibid., "Four Years of War," CFFF, p. 278 (CBC broadcast, 10 September 1943).

31 W.L.M. King, "New Situations and New Responsibilities," CBS, p. 117 (broadcast, 7 June 1940).

32 Ibid., "Italy Enters the War," CBS, pp. 123-124 (broadcast, 10 June 1940).


36 The Gates of Italy; Wartime Information Board, Reports Branch, "The Fall of Italy," Information Briefs, 17, 20 September 1943.


40 Ibid., "The Real Meaning of a Total War Effort," CFFF, pp. 84-85 (House of Commons address, 26 January 1942); ibid., "The Defence of Canada," ibid., pp. 122ff. (House of Commons address, 25 March 1942); NFB, Look to the North, Canada Carries On, directed by James Beveridge, 1944.

41 WIB Records, Vol. 4, "WIB Survey," 65, June 1945. According to the survey made in April 1945, only 45 percent of the population thought that Canada should take as active a role in the east as in Europe. This figure had declined from 76 percent a year earlier. In Quebec, 71 percent of the population favoured sending only volunteers to Japan.


43 WIB Records, Vol. 9, file 4-2-2-1, minutes: publicity coordinating committee, 19 June 1945.
Ibid., Vol. 8, file 3-5-1, minutes: information to the armed forces advisory committee, 9 January 1945.


46 Ibid., "The Fall of Italy," Ibid., 17, 20 September 1943, p. 3.

NOTES

CHAPTER VI

1 Department of National War Services, Bureau of Public Information, Canada's Contribution to the Fight for Freedom: Speech by the Rt. Hon. W.L.M. King, Prime Minister of Canada at a Dinner in his Honour by the Associated Canadian Organizations of New York City, 17 June 1941, Ottawa: King's Printer, 1941.

2 Ministère des services nationaux de guerre, Service de l'information, Devoirs du moment: Extraits des discours prononcés par le major-général, L.R. Lafleche, Ottawa: Imprimeur du roi, 1941, pp. 19-20 (speech at Quebec City, 21 March 1941).

3 Department of National War Services, Bureau of Public Information, What Canada is Doing: A Tribute to the Canadian People, a Statement by the Rt. Hon. W.L. Mackenzie King to the House of Commons, 25 March 1941, Ottawa: King's Printer, 1941.


6 Ibid., Vol. 19, file 10-2, minutes of a meeting: 19 August 1943; Ibid., Vol. 1, file 1-1-4a, minutes of a meeting: 29-30 June 1943.

7 PCO Records, 7C Series, Vol. 14, minutes: cabinet war committee, meeting 269, 17 November 1943.

8 WIB Records, Vol. 9, file 3-5-1-1, memo: 14 December 1943.


15 Ibid., Vol. 15, file 8-4-4A, letter: Hume Wrong to G.C. Andrew, 22 September 1944; ibid., N. Robertson to A.D. Dunton, 21 September 1944; King Papers, J4 Series, Vol. 374, file 3929, p. C259398, memo: A.D. Dunton to Cabinet, 18 September 1944.


17 Ibid., Vol. 15, file 8-4-4B, memo to the PM, 3 May 1945; ibid., Vol. 4, file 1-4-1, memo: A.D. Dunton to G.C. Andrew, 3 May 1945; King Papers, J4 Series, Vol. 374, file 3929, p. C259450, memo: A.D. Dunton to PM, 7 May 1945.


19 Ibid., Vol. 7, file 2-8-9, draft statement, n.d., [August 1945].

20 Ibid., Vol. 15, file 8-26-1, letter: Irene King to Ministry of War Information, n.d. [July 1943].

22 Ibid., R-Z file, letter: Frances Turner to A.D. Dunton, 13 June 1943; ibid., letter: Francis Turner to A.D. Dunton, 11 April 1943.

23 Ibid., letter: Frances Turner to A.D. Dunton, 8 May 1943; ibid., letter: F. Turner to A.D. Dunton, 16 May 1943.


26 WIB Records, Vol. 15, file 8-4-4A, telegram: G.W. McCracken to A.D. Dunton, 8 May 1945.


31 King Papers, J4 Series, additional material, Vol. 413, file 3990, letter: T.C. Davis to N. Robertson attached to memo: Robertson to King, 25 April 1941.

32 Bureau of Public Information, New Situations and Responsibilities, I Canada's War Effort Viewed in Relation to the War Effort of the Allied Powers, II Italy's Entry into the War: Broadcasts by the Rt. Hon. W.L.M. King, 7 June 1940 and 10 June 1940, Ottawa: King's Printer, 1940.


34 NFB, The Fight for Liberty: The Second Year of the War, directed by James Beveridge, 1941.
Devoirs du moment, speech of L.R. Laflèche at Quebec City, 21 March 1941; speech of L.R. Laflèche at Paincourt, Ontario, 1 July 1941.

W.L.M. King, "Till the Hour of Victory," CBS, p. 274 (broadcast, 1 June 1941); see also: W.L.M. King, "Servitude or Freedom," CFFF, pp. 14-15 (speech at the Chateau Laurier, Ottawa, 17 September 1941).

Department of National War Services, Bureau of Public Information, Churchill in Ottawa, Ottawa: King's Printer, 1942.

W.L.M. King, "Servitude or Freedom," CFFF, p. 15.

NFB, The Fight for Liberty.


WIB Records, Vol. 11, file 7-1-9, Censorship Report 32.847 (UK); intercepted letter, 26 March 1942.


PAC, Ernest Lapointe Papers, Vol. 24, file 82, letter: Lapointe to J.L. Ralston, 30 September 1940.


Ibid., Vol. 23, file 81. This file contains all the congratulations.

Devoirs du moment, p. 16 (speech of L.R. Laflèche at Montreal, 1 February 1941).

Ibid., p. 22 (Laflèche at Quebec, 21 March 1941).

51. Ibid., Vol. 2, Monthly Reports, December 1943, G.R. Benoit, "French Language Operations," ibid., file 1-3-1, Monthly Reports, 1944; for example, Paul Vigneaux lectured on "La spiritualité de la résistance française," and "Le mouvement ouvrier en France de septembre 1939 à septembre 1943;" Yves Simon spoke about "La source secrète du succès de la propagande raciste."


54. Ibid., Vol. 2, file 1-3-1, part 6, Monthly Reports, February-March 1944; G.R. Benoit, "French Language Operations."


57. WIB Records, Vol. 11, file 7-1-9, censorship report, #31, 878 (UK); intercepted letter, 6 February 1942; ibid., Vol. 25, dead file, report by Dorothy Dumbrille, 15 March 1943.

58. W.L.M. King, "Germany Attacks Russia," CBS, p. 312 (statement, 22 June 1941).


60. Ibid., R-Z file, letter: Frances Turner to A.D. Dunton, 28 August 1943.


70 *Information Briefs*, #60, 28 May 1945; WIB Records, Vol. 4, WIB Survey, 63, May 1945 (50 percent of those in Quebec and 30 percent of those outside expressed doubt about maintaining amicable relationships with the USSR).


72 W.L.M. King, "Italy Enters the War," *CBS*, p. 126 (broadcast, 10 June 1940).


76 W.L.M. King, "Labour and the War," *CBS*, p. 149 (broadcast, 1 September 1940).


82. Wartime Information Board, "Canada-United States Cooperation," Reference Papers, 3 (8 April 1943); see also updated versions, ibid., 17 (20 November 1943); ibid., no number (April 1945).


85. Ibid., censorship report, CAN 33,557 (UK), 16 September 1942.


87. W.L.M. King, "The Defence of Common Liberties," CFFF, pp. 222, 225 (address to the Pilgrims' Society, 2 December 1942); WIB Reports Branch, Reference Section, Reference Digest, 6 (1943), pp. 20-27.

88. WIB, "Canada and Lend Lease," Reference Papers, 8 (12 June 1943).

90 Wartime Information Board, Defence Projects in Northwest Canada, Ottawa, King's Printer, 1944 [?]; W.L.M. King, "Labour and the War," CBS, p. 150 (broadcast, 1 September 1940); W.L.M. King, "World Encircling Danger," DBS, p. 322 (speech, 10 July 1941); W.L.M. King, "Canada and the Fight for Freedom," CFFF, pp. 8-9 (Mansion House speech, 4 September 1941).

91 W.L.M. King, "Canada-United States Joint Defence - The Ogdensburg Agreement," CBS, pp. 171, 177 (House of Commons' speech, 12 November 1940); for an indication of how the rhetoric contrasted with the reality see: J.L. Granatstein, "Getting on with the Americans," The Canadian Review of American Studies, p. 9.


93 King Papers, J13 Series, diary, 14 November 1941; ibid., 2 June 1941; ibid., 29 October 1942.
NOTES

CHAPTER VII


3 Toronto, The Globe and Mail, 27 November 1939 (Archives of Ontario [AO], Department of the Provincial Secretary, clipping 3771); G.D. Conant, Ontario's Attorney General issued instructions to provincial legal authorities to prevent the distribution of subversive literature.

Public Archives of Canada [PAC], J.S. Dafoe Papers, correspondence, July-December 1939, letter: Dafoe to George Ferguson, 3 September 1939; see also Cook, M.A., p. 86.

4 Censorship Coordinating Committee, Handbook, March 1940, p. 5.

5 PAC, Pierre F. Casgrain Papers, Vol. 10, copy of PC 6571, 26 August 1941. In 1938, PC 531, of March 14, set up a committee to draw up plans for wartime censorship. The censorship regulations resulted from PC 2481, 1 September 1939; see also Canada Censorship Coordinating Committee, Handbook: Press and Radio Broadcasting Censorship, Ottawa: King's Printer, March 1940, p. 5. The appropriate Defence of Canada Regulations included:
   11 - Radio Censorship
   12 - Means of Secret Communication
   13 - Telegraph Censorship
   14 - Control of Postal Communications
   15 - Control of Publications (including film)
   16 - Provisions for safeguarding information useful to the enemy.
   17 - Communications with Enemy Agents
   18 - Photography
   39 and 39A - Causing Disaffection
   39B - Right of Criticism safeguarded
   62 - Offenses by Corporations and Associations
   63 - Penalties


11 Ibid., memo: press censors to Lash, 5 July 1940; ibid., letter: W. Chevalier to G.H. Lash, 18 November 1940.


13 London Free Press, 3 September 1941 (AO clipping 3186).


15 Eggleston, pp. 261-262.


19 University of British Columbia Library, Special Collections Division, Alan Plaunt Papers, box 8, file 20, letter: A.B. Plaunt to A.N.K. Hugesson, 25 July 1940.


21 Ibid., letter: W. Eggleston to Walter Herbert, 14 June 1941; Ibid., letter: W. Baldwin to Walter Herbert, 16 June 1941.


23 Casgrain Papers, Vol. 10, censorship file, part 4. There were 14 investigations from 1940 and part of 1941 regarding French language newspapers on morale and unity grounds. This compared to 13 for the English language press, 7 for the U.S.A. and 2 for the ethnic press.

24 WIB Records, Vol. 11, file 7-1-8, 'unnumbered censorship directives, n.d. [June 1940].


26 Casgrain Papers, Vol. 10, censorship file, part 3, memo: censors to Casgrain, 7 November 1940.


28 Casgrain Papers, Vol. 11, censorship file, part 5, memo: censors to Casgrain, 6 November 1941.


31 WIB Records, Vol. 11, file 7-1-8, censorship directive #31, 21 November 1939; see also Cook, M.A., p. 204.
Kesterton, p. 248.

Casgrain Papers, Vol. 10, censorship file, part 3, memo: censors to Casgrain, 8 June 1940. The papers checked included:
- Hlas L'Udu - Slovak, Toronto
- Jiskra - Czech, Toronto
- Glas Pracy - Polish, Toronto
- Vapaus - Finnish, Sudbury
- Pravda - Serbian, Toronto
- Farmasky Zhitya - Ukranian, Winnipeg
- Narodnaja Gazeta - Ukranian, Winnipeg
- Slobodna Misao - Croatian, Toronto
- The Canadian Tribune - English, Toronto
- The Advocate - English, Vancouver
- The MidWest Clarion - English, Winnipeg

See also: WIB Records, Vol. 11, file 7-1-10A, minutes: censorship coordinating committee, 19 September 1941; Casgrain Papers, Vol. 10, censorship file, part 4, memo: censors to Casgrain, 3 December 1941.


See later section in this chapter.

For a record of censorship directives along this line see: WIB Records, Vol. 11, file 7-1-8. These directives forbade publication of rumours of military engagements (Directive #49, 20 June 1940) or of the formation of Defence Industries Limited (Directive 21A, 16 October 1939) or of reports of sabotage (Directive 21, 18 October 1939).


Ibid., minutes: censorship advisory committee on statistical information, 13 May 1942.

Ibid., minutes: censorship advisory committee on security, 5 June 1942.
359

43 Ibid., minutes: censorship advisory committee on intelligence and security, 22 July 1942.

44 Ibid., minutes: censorship advisory committee on service intelligence, 24 June 1942.

45 Purcell, pp. 2-3.

46 Johnston Papers, Vol. 4, reel M-63, minutes: censorship advisory committee on intelligence and security, 26 February 1943.

47 WIB Records, Vol. 7, file 2-6-1, letter: L.P. Duff to Secretary of State for External Affairs, 19 May 1943; ibid., Vol. 9, file 3-5-1-1, minutes: censorship advisory committee on the publication of military information, 12 April 1944; Eggleston, p. 264.

48 Ibid., file 2-6-1A, censorship directive 2D, 2 April 1945; ibid., censorship directive 10D, 12 March 1945.

49 Ibid., 12 April 1945.

50 Ibid., Vol. 9, file 3-5-1-1, minutes: censorship advisory committee on the publication of military information, 9 February 1944.

51 Ibid., minutes: censorship advisory committee on the publication of military information, 12 April 1944.

52 See ibid., Vol. 7, file 2-6-1.

53 Ibid., Vol. 9, file 3-5-1-1, minutes: censorship advisory committee on the publication of information, 15 December 1943; ibid., 9 February 1944.

54 Department of External Affairs Records, G2 Series, Vol. 2252, file 4310-40C. This file contains the report on these negotiations.


56 Ibid., Vol. 9, file 3-5-1-1, minutes: censorship advisory committee on publication of military information, 12 April 1944.

57 Ibid., memo: A.D. Dunton to joint intelligence committee, 23 November 1943; ibid., minutes: censorship advisory committee on the publication of military information, 15 December 1943.

Ibid., Vol. 7, file 2-6-1, memo: Dunton, 8 October 1943.

Ibid., Vol. 15, file 8-35-1, letter: W.A. Rundle to Grierson, 19 April 1943; ibid., memo: Ralph Foster, 5 August 1943.

Ibid., Vol. 1, file 1-2-13, appendix A, G.W. McCracken, 7 April 1943.

Alan Plaunt Papers, box 10, file 1, copy of a letter to W.L.M. King, n.d. [November 1939]. This letter was sent to the Prime Minister by a provisional group set up in Winnipeg and then distributed to like-minded individuals across the country to gain their support. The Winnipeg group included Professor A.R.M. Lower, Rev. Lloyd C. Stinson, Mrs. W.F. Osborne, Alister Stewart and Professor David Owens; for the full story see: Cook, M.A., pp. 95, 103.


WIB Records, Vol. 12, file 8-2-1, memo: G.W. McCracken, 13 November 1941; see also: Kesterton, p. 245; Purcell, pp. 2-3.

Eggleston, p. 278.


Provincial Museum and Archives of Alberta, Premier's Papers, file 1115, Broadside, "Canada at War: Nazi Propaganda in our Schools," November 1939.


Ibid., releases for July-August 1940.

The Toronto Telegram, 20 July 1940 (AQ clipping 3320); for background on the Deutscher Bund see: Jonathan Wagner, "The


73 Ibid., script: "Canadians All," 30 April 1941.


76 Ibid., Vol. 12, file 8-2-2, minutes: committee on morale, 19 June 1942.

77 Ibid.


79 McGill University Archives, Redpath Library, F. Cyril James Papers, box 2, Canadian column file, letter: T.E. Ryder to James, 22 July 1942. The members of the Canadian Column Board included: F. Cyril James, Principal of McGill; Paul Vaillencourt of the Canadian Red Cross; Hon. Mr. Justice C. Gordon Mackinnon; Paul Fournier, President of the Montreal Trades and Labour Council; Lieut. Col. W.C. Nicholson, Vice-President of the Canadian Legion; Hon. Wilfrid Bovey, Legislative Councillor.

80 WIB Records, Vol. 12, file 8-5-C, news release: 1 August 1942; see also: Ibid., news release: 19 September 1942.

81 Ibid., press release: 1 August 1942.

82 Toronto, The Globe and Mail, 6 October 1942.

83 WIB Records, Vol. 12, file 8-5-1A, letter: J.W.G. Clark to Charles Vining, 7 September 1942; Ibid., letter: Harold Connolly to Vining, 8 September 1942; Ibid., Vining to H. Connolly, 20 November 1942; Ibid., F.P. Healey to Vining, 6 October 1942; Ibid., Dunton to F.P. Healey, 13 November 1942.
Ibid., file 8-5-1D, letter: D.B Rogers to Gillis Purcell, 28 October 1942; ibid., letter: A.E. McConnell to J.L. Ralston, 31 October 1942; ibid., Rogers to A.E. McConnell, 16 November 1942. (D.B. Rogers of the WIB turned down A.E. McConnell's suggestion that the WIB collect pledges not to spread rumours.)

Ibid., file 8-5-2, letter: Ken. H. Olive to A.D. Dunton, 10 November 1942.


Ibid., letter: Ken H. Olive to Dunton, 1 October 1942; ibid., file 8-5-1C, letter: Claude Morin to Director, Rumour Clinic, 24 September 1942.

Ibid., letter: C. Holmes to Ken Olive, 29 September 1942.

Ibid., Vol. 7, file 2-6-2, letter: F.E. Joliffe to C. Vining, 10 November 1942.


Ibid., file 8-5-1A, report: 19 November 1942.


Ibid., Vol. 12, file 8-5-1F, memo: n.d. [Spring, 1943?].


Pro axis rumours were the least common (ibid., file 8-5-1F, memo: WIB to rumour collection committees, Spring, 1943).

Ibid., report: December 1942.


101. Ibid., Vol. 12, file 8-5-2, letter: Rita McCutcheon to Dunton, 16 March 1943.


104. Ibid., memo: J.D. Ketchum to A.D. Dunton, 12 November 1943.

105. Ibid., letter: P. Brais to J. Grierson, 3 April 1943.

106. Ibid., letter: K. Olive to J. Grierson, 24 November 1943.


110. Ibid., Vol. 35, newspaper file, memo: T.C. Davis to J.G. Gardiner, 26 March 1941; PCO Records, 7C Series, Vol. 4, minutes: cabinet war committee, 3 April 1941.

111. Department of National War Services Records, Vol. 35, newspaper file, letter: T.C. Davis to Pierre Casgrain, 27 August 1941; Ibid., memo: Davis to M.A. Mosley, 14 April 1942; Ibid., letter: T.C. Davis to members of the Cabinet, 22 September 1941.

112. Watson Kirkconnell, Canadians All: A Primer of Canadian National Unity, issued by the Director of Public Information, Ottawa: King's Printer, 1941, pp. 13ff.

114 Ibid., script: "Canadians All," 30 April 1941.

115 Ibid., script: "Canadians All," 23 April 1941.

116 Ibid., script: "Canadians All," 16 April 1941.

117 Canadians All, p. 16.


119 The membership of the committee was: Chairman - Professor G.W. Simpson, European Advisor - Tracy Philipps, Liaison Officer with foreign-language groups - Dr. J. Kaye, Members - Professor H.F. Angus, Hon. C.H. Blakeney, Maj. J.S.A. Bois, Maj. D. Cameron, Dr. S.D. Clark, Robert England, J. Murray Gibbon, Professor Watson Kirkconnell, Mrs. R.J. McWilliams, Mrs. O.D. Skelton.


125 Ibid., memo: Campbell Smart to Charles Vining, 8 September 1942.


127 Ibid., letter: T.C. Davis to Donald Cameron, 25 November 1942; Ibid., letter: George Simpson to T.C. Davis, 17 November
1942; Department of National War Services Records, Vol. 35, Foreign Language Section file, letter: T.C. Davis to Norman Robertson, 26 October 1942.


129 Ibid., letter: David B. Mansur to A.D. Dunton, 23 December 1942.

130 Ibid., letter: Humphrey Mitchell to Norman Senior, 28 December 1942.

131 Ibid., Vol. 13, file 8-9-2, memo: A.D. Dunton to J. Grierson, 17 February 1943. Dunton had spoken to Frank Dojacek, publisher of Canadian Farmer (a Ukrainian paper), The Canadian Voice (Croatian) and Der Nord Wester (German).

132 Ibid., memos: T. Philipps to A.D. Dunton, 7 February 1943; 19 February 1943; ibid., letter: T. Philipps to J.S. Thompson and J. Grierson, 11 May 1943.


135 Ibid., memo: Gordon Hosken to J. Grierson, 14 May 1943.

136 Ibid., letter: J. Grierson to L.R. Laflèche, 28 October 1943; ibid., letter: Canadian Unity Council to J. Grierson, n.d. [November 1943].

137 Ibid., file 8-9-1, special report for the press censors, 29 November 1943; ibid., memo: J.Grierson to A.D.P. Heeney, 30 November 1943; ibid., mimeo copy: Paul Porensky to The Montreal Gazette, 8 November 1943; ibid., special report for the chief press censors of Canada, 20 December 1943. A translation from La Vittoria, Toronto, called Kirkconnell "a professional anti-Soviet red-baiter and pro-fascist who supported Horthy's fascist regime in Hungary."

138 Ibid., Vol. 1, file 1-2-19, minutes: Wartime Information Board, 2 November 1943.

139 Ibid., Vol. 13, file 8-9-2, letter: Grierson to N. Robertson, 28 December 1943.
Ibid., Vol. 1, file 1-2-19, minutes: Wartime Information Board, 10 January 1944; ibid., letter: G.C. Andrew to C.H. Payne, 12 January 1944.

R.C. Brown and G.R. Cook, Canada 1896-1921: A Nation Transformed, Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1974, pp. 86-71. This discusses restrictions on oriental immigration as a result of anti-Japanese riots in Vancouver,


WIB Records, Vol. 4, WIB Survey #66, June 1945. This survey was conducted in April 1945.
NOTES

CHAPTER VIII


5 Ibid., Vol. 2, Monthly Reports, 1939-1940.

6 Ibid., Vol. 12, file 8-2-2, minutes: committee on morale, 8 May 1942.


10 Ibid., mémoire de François Hone, 20 juillet 1940.

11 PAC, Privy Council Office Records, 7C Series, Vol. 1, minutes: cabinet war committee, 9 May 1940.

12 Lapointe Papers, Vol. 31, file 136, mémoire de François Hone, 20 juillet 1940. This memo also went to Claude Melançon and J.G. Gardiner, Minister of National War Services.
13 Ibid., Vol. 24, file 82, letter: Lapointe to J.L. Ralston, n.d. [late September 1940]. Lapointe sent a copy of this letter to the Prime Minister.

14 Ibid., letter: King to Lapointe, 20 October 1940.


16 Bureau of Public Information, New Situations and Responsibilities: I Canada's War Effort Viewed in Relation to the War Effort of the Allied Powers; II Italy's Entry into the War: Broadcasts by the Rt. Hon. W.L. Mackenzie King, Friday, June 7 and Monday, June 10, 1940, Ottawa: King's Printer, 1940.


19 In April, 1940, Claude Melançon's section distributed 10 news stories to weeklies, 10 to dailies and one exclusive to La Presse, as well as translating 11 British releases and distributing 30 press photographs (WIB Records, Vol. 2, Monthly Reports, 1939-1942). In the months from April to October 1941, the Bureau distributed 326 French releases (53 to dailies, 87 to weeklies, 153 to both, 20 to a special list and 13 to radio for its total of 179,023). In addition, the Bureau sent out 120 exclusive stories to Quebec and 69 to other newspapers. The releases distributed for other departments included:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Releases</th>
<th>Pieces</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Munitions and Supply</td>
<td>431</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salvage</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National War Services</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Cadet League</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Defence</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wartime Prices, Trade Board</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

20 Ibid., "Report of the Activities of the French Section for the Month of January 1-31, 1941." This schedule "closely followed for a good many weeks," included:

Monday - Lettre à Prosper (weeklies)
         Pétit Courrier d'Europe (weeklies)
         Coup de Clairon (daily for La Presse)
         Pour la Victoire (daily for Le Soleil)
         mats for dailies

Tuesday - article for labour editors
          article for religious editors
Tuesday - Coup de Clairon
          Pour la Victoire

Wednesday - Womens page article
            Translation of captions
            Coup de Clairon
            Pour la Victoire

Thursday - Le Canada en Guerre (weeklies)
           L'Opinion des Autres (both)
           Coup de Clairon
           Pour la Victoire

Friday - Ebonoids for weeklies
         Special features

Saturday - Munitions and Supply list of contracts

21 Ibid., Report, March 1941.

22 Ibid., May 1941.

23 Ibid., January 1941. Titles for the year included:
O Canada
Notre Nouvelle Epoque
Oui Veut l'Ordre Nouveau
Pourquoi Nous Mobilissons
Servitude ou Liberté
Aveux ou Nationale Socialisme
Devoirs du Moment
Rom Mordet
Le Canada Francais et la Guerre
La Pologne Martyre
Nos Raisons de Combattre

24 Ibid., March 1941.

25 Ibid., September 1941. This followed the standard pattern with letters to mayors, the lieutenant-governor, and schools and special newspaper features and war retrospectives.


27 Ibid., see various monthly reports. In June 1940, for example, Premier Godbout of Quebec, Cardinal Villeneuve and Ernest Lapointe spoke to French Canadians on "Canadian Unity and the War Effort."

28 Ministère des services nationaux de guerre, Service de l'information, Devoirs du moment; Extrait des discours prononcés par le majeur-général, L.R. Lafleche depuis son retour au Canada en août, 1940, Ottawa: Imprimeur du roi, 1941, p. 13 (speech

29 Privy Council Office Records, 7C Series, minutes: cabinet war committee, 20 January 1941. Mackenzie King axed a BPI printing of a special prayer book on the grounds that it would "raise a religious issue!" see also: Lapointe Papers, Vol. 35, file 163, letter: Cardinal Villeneuve to Lapointe, 3 September 1941. Cardinal Villeneuve refused to read the reconsecration proclamation "du haut de la chaire."

30 Devoirs du moment, pp. 3-4 (speeches by Lafleche at Montreal, 11 October 1940, and at Ste. Hyacinthe, 29 September 1940).

31 Toronto, The Globe and Mail, 7 April 1941, report of an address by G.H. Lash (Archives of Ontario [AO], Department of the Provincial Secretary, newspaper clippings, clipping 1614).


33 Lapointe Papers, Vol. 24, file 82, memo: J.L. Ralston to Lapointe, 27 September 1940, enclosing a memo: 18 September 1940; ibid., letter: Lapointe to Ralston, 30 September 1940.

34 For a description of the campaign see: Granatstein, pp. 201ff.


38 Ibid. He was invited to preach by the Montreal Sulpicians and the Vichy Consul General.


40 WIB Records, Vol. 26, file 12, memo: Rudel Tessier to Charles Vining, 12 September 1942; Claxton Papers, Vol. 137,
memo: n.a. to Dejean, 10 November 1941.


42 The BPI pressed for action in late 1941 but got nowhere (see Lapointe Papers, Vol. 24, file 82, memo: Claude Melançon to Lapointe, 10 November 1941); G.H. Lash, the director, tried to remedy some damage by speaking in English Canada of the damage done in France by insincere and selfish politics (see London Free Press, 3 November 1941, AO clipping 3781).


44 For a more complete description of the campaign and the breakdown of votes see: Granatstein, pp. 218-228.


46 WIB Records, Vol. 12, file 8-2-2, minutes: committee on morale, 4 June 1942.

47 Ibid., file 8-7A, CIPO, "Confidential Report of a Recent Survey in Quebec," July 1942. Among the more revealing results were the answers to the following questions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>French</th>
<th>English</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Would Canada be in the war if she were not part of the British Empire?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>yes</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>81%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>undecided</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you support conscription for Canada?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>yes</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>undecided</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Should conscription be passed exempting Quebec?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>agree</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>disagree</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>undecided</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is Canada doing its utmost to win the war?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>yes</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no answer</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
48 Ibid., reprint of an editorial from L'Action Catholique, 17 August 1942.


53 King Papers, J4 Series, Vol. 358, file 3831, p. C247557, report by Marcel Cadieux and Paul Tremblay to Norman Robertson, 6 May 1942. (This was passed on to the PM.); for similar suggestions see: ibid., p. C247545, memo: J.W. Pickersgill to King, 26 June 1942; WIB Records, Vol. 12, file 8-2-2, minutes: the committee on morale, 19 June 1942.


60 Ibid., Vol. 7, file 2-14-1, memo: conversation of Brooke Claxton with Phil Côté and Elizabeth Armstrong, 28 May 1943.


67 Ibid., Vol. 4, file 1-4-9, clipping, no publisher, no date [August 1943?].

68 Ibid., letter: Alweida M. Bonner to N.A.M. MacKenzie, 8 September 1943; ibid., N.A.M. MacKenzie to G.C. Andrew, 10 September 1943.

69 Ibid., Vol. 7, file 2-14-1, memo: conversation of Brooke Claxton with Phil Côté and Elizabeth Armstrong, 28 May 1943.

70 Ibid., Vol. 26, file: suggestions for more effective propaganda, memo: G.R. Benoit to P. Brais, 23 September 1942.

71 Ibid., Vol. 7, file 2-14-1, letter: J. Grierson to B. Claxton, 11 January 1944.

72 Ibid., Vol. 12, file 8-2-2, letter: George McCracken to G.H. Sallans, 16 January 1943.


74 Andrew interview; interview with Allan Armstrong, Ottawa, 6 November 1974; interview with F.W. Park, Toronto, 8 December 1974; interview Donald C. Macdonald, Toronto, 9 December 1974.


76 Ibid., Vol. 10, file 6-2-7, letter: G.C. Andrew to Ross McLean, 4 April 1944.

77 Ibid., Vol. 12, file 8-5-1D, special report, #6, 15 February 1943.

78 Ibid., Vol. 26, file 12, memo: Rudel Tessier to C. Vining, 12 September 1942.


81 Pearson Papers, Vol. 10, speech by John Grierson, n.d. [1944?].

82 King Papers, J4 Series, Vol. 354, file 3808, p. C244811, memo: A.D. Dunton to members of the cabinet, 6 March 1944; ibid., p. C244815, memo: A.D. Dunton to members of the cabinet, 2 October 1944; ibid., A.D. Dunton to members of the cabinet, 6 November 1944.


84 WIB Records, Vol. 7, file 2-4-5, minutes: national campaign committee, meeting #139, 6 November 1944.


86 See Chapter IV, pp. 115-117 for a full description of this furor.

87 PAC, A.G.L. McNaughton Papers, Vol. 255, file 892-10, minutes: cabinet committee on recruiting, 6 November 1944; ibid., 10 November 1944. The members of the committee were: J.G. Gardiner, Minister of Agriculture, Chairman; Humphrey Mitchell,
Minister of Labour, General Laflèche, Minister of National War Services, Gen. McNaughton, Minister of National Defence.


For a complete version of the crisis see: Granatstein, Chapter 9, pp. 333ff. or C.P. Stacey, pp. 441-474.

WIB correspondents reported that French Canadians felt accused of disloyalty if they went on strike while English workers' strikes were not seen in that light (WIB Records, dead file A-E, R. Everson, "Montreal Report," #2, 16 January 1943). A year after his incarceration, Mayor Howde remained a martyr in Quebec (ibid., #15, 17 May 1943). English Canadians complained about Quebec's slackness in supporting the war effort, "God what illiterates," one Montrealer commented. "mention the war to one [French Canadian] and he'll spit at you..." (ibid., Vol. 23, file 25-18, part 2, censorship file #15305/42).

WIB Records, Vol. 4, WIB Surveys file, WIB Survey #55, February 1945. In this survey, conducted in late 1944, 69 percent of all Canadians interviewed said that feelings between the two groups were worse than before the war while only 7 percent said they were better. In a 1943 survey, 34 percent felt they were worse and 16 percent better. Conscription was the most important factor in these worsening relations (50 percent of the English and 25 percent of the French isolated it). The total effect of the war (including conscription) accounted for 58 percent of the English and 44 percent of the French opinion that relations had worsened. Among the French, however, intolerance and lack of equality ranked almost as high as the war at 41 percent. Only 2 percent of the English respondents thought this was important.
NOTES

CHAPTER IX


2 University of British Columbia Library, Special Collections Division, Alânn Plaunt Papers, box 9, file 1, "A Programme of Immediate Canadian Action," 17-18 July 1940.


6 University of Saskatchewan Archives, Extension Department Files, box 117, "Five Minute Newscast," National Farm Radio Forum, 9 November 1942.

7 Ibid., box 119, letter: E.H. Bilodeau to Rupert Ramsay, 21 December 1942.


11 University of British Columbia Library, Special Collections Division, Angus MacInnis Memorial Collection, box 54, file 14, letter: Angus MacInnis to A.G. Holmes, 16 February 1941.

12 PAC, Agnes Macphail Papers, Vol. 9, file 22, speech notes: "That New World," speech by Macphail at Timothy Eaton Memorial Church, 5 May 1941.


14 PAC, W.L.M. King Papers, J13 Series, diary, 5 May 1941.


Claxton Papers, Vol. 26, Canadian Youth Commission file, draft programme, January 1943.


Ibid., Vol. 31, Ferguson file, letter: Claxton to G.V. Ferguson, 5 October 1943.

Ibid., Vol. 2, Canadian Youth Commission file, memo: Claxton to R.E.G. Davis, 28 February 1944.

Ibid., Vol. 178, speeches, miscellaneous, 1940-1946, speech, n.d.

Ibid., Vol. 181, speeches 1945, broadcast by Hon. B. Claxton over station CFCF, Montreal, 14 February 1945.


Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, Programme Archives, "National Film Board: Mirror of a Nation," Project 68, tape 671210-7; Claxton Papers, Vol. 147, speech by John Grierson to the Canadian Association for Adult Education convention, 30 May 1941; PAC, Department of External Affairs, Records, G2 Series, Vol. 1978, file 963, "The Nature of Propaganda;" see also: ibid., "Notes on the Psychological Factor in Administration and the Relation of Public Information to Public Morale," attached to memo: John Grierson to Norman Robertson, 27 October 1942.

32 University of British Columbia Library, Special Collections Division, N.A.M. MacKenzie Papers, unsorted clippings file, clipping from The Montreal Star, 19 March 1943; ibid., clipping from the Victoria Daily Times, 28 April 1944.


35 WIB, Reports Branch, "Information Wanted," Information Briefs, 8 (17 May 1943); ibid., "Information Wanted II," in ibid., 11 (27 December 1943).

The surveys indicated the breakdown as:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>April</th>
<th>October</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Plans for after the war</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Price and wage control</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour relations and organization</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manpower and selective service</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farm production and problems</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taxes and finance</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life in other parts of Canada</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women in war work</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The armed forces</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary services</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Production of munitions</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>210%</strong></td>
<td><strong>255%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No choice made</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N.B. Information surveys confirmed the avidity of this desire for more information on post-war plans as well as its cross-cutting social position and the military situation (WIB Records, Vol. 7, file 2-14-1, memorandum attached to letter: John Grierson to Brooke Claxton, 3 June 1943).


Those having a "clear idea" of Canada's war contribution were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>55%</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>41%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>21-29</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>30-49</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>50 and over</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Status</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public School</td>
<td>Upper Class</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School</td>
<td>Middle Class</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College</td>
<td>Lower Class</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


40 WIB Records, Vol. 7, file 2-4-6, minutes: publicity coordinating committee, 15 June 1943; ibid., 6 July 1943. The board insisted despite the opposition of the National War Finance Committee.

41 Ibid., Vol. 9, file 4-2-2, memo: R.W. B'audwin to Davidson Dunton, 16 January 1944; ibid., Vol. 7, file 2-4-6, minutes: publicity coordinating committee, 25 January 1944.

42 Ibid., 4 March 1944; ibid., Vol. 9, file 4-2-2, memo: n.a. [Rielle Thompson], "Realism in Information," n.d. [March 1944].

43 Ibid., Vol. 7, file 2-4-6, minutes: publicity coordinating committee, 3 April 1944.

44 Ibid., 9 January 1945.


47 Ibid., Vol. 24, file 34-176, minutes: meeting on domestic information, 12 November 1943.


50 Andrew interview.

51 CAAE Papers, B1 Series, box 3, minutes: CCEC executive committee, 19 June 1943.

NOTES

CHAPTER X

1 Wartime Information Board, Canada at War, 45, 1945, pp. 142ff.


3 WIB Records, Vol. 9, file 3-16, memo: Adrian Head to K.W. Taylor, 31 May 1943; ibid., Vol. 2; ibid., Vol. 9, file 3-6-2, memo: summary and preliminary budget [ca. April 1943]. A WIB survey showed 48 percent of Canadians opposed sending food to Europe if it meant rationing at home.

4 Ibid., Vol. 1, file 1-2-19, minutes: WIB, 18 November 1943.

5 Ibid., Vol. 9, file 3-16, memo by Anna Speers, n.d. [July 1943]; ibid., memo: food conservation information programme, n.d. [July 1943].

6 Ibid., Vol. 9, file 3-16, speech by Anna Speers to the Canadian Association ofAdvertisers, Toronto, 29 October 1943.

7 Ibid., file 3-6-2, memo: summary and preliminary budget [ca. April 1943].

8 Ibid., file 3-16, memo: Anna Speers, n.d. [July 1943].

9 Wartime Information Board, Consumer Information Service [CIS], "Don't Jam on the Brakes," in Consumer Radio Service; 19 February 1945.


11 Ibid., "It All Depends On Us," in ibid., 25 September 1944.

12 WIB Records, Vol. 9, file 3-16, Speers' speech, 29 October 1943; Wartime Information Board, Food Conservation Information Committee, Food is Everybody's Business, Ottawa: King's Printer, 1944.


Wartime Information Board, Consumer Facts.

WIB, CIS, "Off the Ration at Last," Radio Service, 2 October 1944.

Ibid., "News Digest," in ibid.


Ibid., "Twenty Thousand Tons," in ibid., 9 October 1944.


Ibid., "It All Depends On Us," in ibid., 9 October 1944.


Ibid., "Off the Ration at Last," in ibid., 2 October 1944.

Ibid., "It All Depends On Us," in ibid., 25 September 1944.

Ibid., "Shortage of Building Materials," in ibid., 2 October 1944.


Ibid., Monthly Reports, April-June 1945, Laura Beattie, "Consumer Information Section."
31 WIB, CIS, "Banish Blackmarkets," Radio Service, 10 September 1945.

32 WIB Records, Vol. 7, file 2-3, "A Nationwide Survey of Canadian Attitudes Towards Wartime Ceilings and Rationing," June 1944. Butter, then sugar, tea, gasoline and alcoholic beverages topped the list of items Canadians disliked having rationed. Highest on the list, butter, was unacceptable to 30 percent of the Maritimers and 25 percent of Quebecers. Of the Ontario population, 10 percent opposed gasoline rationing and 7 percent alcohol.

33 Ibid., Vol. 4, "WIB Survey," 58, March 1945. The poll showed that 72 percent thought the government had done a good job, 19 percent a fair job and 7 percent a poor job. Furthermore, 78 percent would put up with shortages to supply Europe with food; (65 percent in Quebec and 72 percent of lower income population).


35 For the survey design see: WIB Records, Vol. 12, file 8-7A, letter: J.D. Ketchum to Arthur Porter, 17 August 1943; ibid., 23 September 1943; ibid., letter: Wilfrid Sanders to J.D. Ketchum and A.D. Dunton, n.d. [September 1943]? For some complaints see: ibid., Vol. 25, dead file, A-E, letter: Millicent Davis to A.D. Dunton, 1 May 1943. The survey questions and results were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Approve</th>
<th>Disapprove</th>
<th>Undecided</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>September 1943</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>69% (78)</td>
<td>20% (22)</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quebec</td>
<td>48% (62)</td>
<td>30% (38)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All outside Quebec</td>
<td>77% (83)</td>
<td>16% (17)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 1943</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>80% (85)</td>
<td>14% (15)</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quebec</td>
<td>75% (82)</td>
<td>16% (18)</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All outside Quebec</td>
<td>82% (86)</td>
<td>13% (14)</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


37 Ibid.; ibid., Vol. 7, file 2-4-6, minutes: publicity coordinating committee, 31 August 1943.

38 Ibid.

39 Ibid., Vol. 10, file 6-2-22, minutes: economic stabilization information committee, 2 February 1944.

40 Ibid., minutes: economic stabilization information committee, 28 December 1943; ibid., Vol. 7, file 2-4-6, minutes: publicity coordinating committee, 4 January 1944.

41 Ibid., Vol. 10, file 6-2-22, minutes: economic stabilization information committee, 28 December 1943.

42 Ibid., minutes: 14 February 1944; ibid., Vol. 7, file 2-4-6, minutes: publicity coordinating committee, 4 March 1944; ibid., Vol. 10, file 6-2-22, minutes: economic stabilization information committee, 29 September 1944; ibid., Vol. 2, file 1-2-29, Monthly Reports, October 1944; ibid., Vol. 7, file 2-4-6, memo: A.D. Dunton to R.A. Draper, 18 December 1944; ibid., Vol. 10, file 6-2-22, draft minutes: economic stabilization information committee, 18 April 1945.

43 Ibid., Vol. 10, file 6-2-22, minutes: economic stabilization information committee, 25 April 1944.


45 Ibid., Vol. 10, file 6-2-22, minutes: economic stabilization information committee, 30 May 1944.


47 Ibid., Vol. 7, file 2-4-6, minutes: publicity coordinating committee, 4 January 1944.
48 Ibid., Vol. 10, file 6-2-7, memo: n.a., 22 May 1944.

49 Wartime Information Board, Economic Stabilization Information Committee, Canada's Wartime Measures for Economic Stability to Keep Down the Cost of Living, Ottawa: King's Printer, June 1944, p. 6.

50 WIB Records, Vol. 7, file 2-4-6, minutes: publicity coordinating committee, 4 January 1944.

51 Ibid., Vol. 10, file 6-2-22, minutes: economic stabilization information committee, 16 May 1944.

52 Ibid., minutes: economic stabilization information committee, 15 January 1944.

53 Ibid., minutes: economic stabilization information committee, 29 March 1944; Ibid., 7 June 1944.

54 Ibid., minutes: 29 March 1944; Ibid., 11 April 1944.

55 Canada's Wartime Measures..., pp. 1, 4.

56 Ibid., p. 4.


59 Canada's Wartime Measures..., p. 4.


61 Canada's Wartime Measures..., p. 23.


63 Ibid., file 6-2-22, minutes: economic stabilization information committee, 11 April 1944.

64 Ibid., file 6-2-10, labour speech, n.d. [1944].

Ibid.

Ibid., draft speech outline on economic stabilization for agricultural speakers, n.d. [1944]; see also: Canada's Wartime Measures..., p. 5.


Ibid., file 6-2-10, Morgan speech, 28 July 1944.


Ibid., minutes: economic stabilization information committee, 19 September 1944.


Ibid., "It All Depends On Us," in ibid., 9 October 1944.

Morgan speech, 28 July 1944; Canada's Wartime Measures..., pp. 22-23.

WIB Records, Vol. 4, "WIB Survey," 60 (April 1945). The question and results were:

Here are some of the things Canada has tried to do as part of her war effort. Will you tell me whether you think we have done a good or a poor job in:

1. Setting up rationing; plans to distribute things fairly  
   Good  72%  Fair  19%  Poor  7%  Don't Know  2%

2. Keeping prices, wages and costs from rising  
   60%  27%  11%  2%

3. Preventing war profiteering  
   37%  24%  24%  15%
Ibid., "WIB Survey," 67 (July 1945). The respondents were asked whether they approved or disapproved of the permanent adoption of:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Approved</th>
<th>Disapproved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Guaranteed prices for farmers</td>
<td>78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Price control</td>
<td>73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Rent control</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Excess profits taxes</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Wage and salary control</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Restrictions on installment buying</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Controls, however, had spottier support than indicated since Quebec was more diffident in its support and western Canada more in favour. The middle class and better-educated also tended to support continued controls more strongly.

NOTES
CHAPTER XI


5 Ibid., Vol. 1, file 1-2-13, minutes: Wartime Information Board, Appendix D, 12 April 1943.

6 Ibid., Vol. 12, file 8-2-1, memo: D.W. Petegorsky to J. Grierson, 29 September 1943 (sent to Cabinet).

7 Ibid., Vol. 11, file 8-2-A, memo: D.W. Petegorsky to A.D. Dunton, 14 February 1944.

8 PAC, Department of Munitions and Supply Records, Vol. 141, file 3-11-1, letter: H.H. Webb to G.K. Sheils, 4 April 1944.


10 Ibid., Vol. 12, file 8-2-1, memo: Coordinator of Production, May 1943; Department of Munitions and Supply Records, Vol. 141, file 3-1-11, memo: G.K. Sheils to Berry, 10 March 1944.

12 Ibid., memo: D.W. Petegorsky to John Grierson, 20 September 1943; Ibid., notes on an interview with Grace Hyndman, Director of Personnel, General Engineering Company, 6 March 1943.

13 Ibid., minutes: committee on industrial morale, 11 June 1943.


15 Industrial Production Cooperation Board and Wartime Information Board, Victory in the Making, Ottawa: King's Printer, 1944, pp. 4-5; Labour Facts, II:2 (15 February 1945).

16 Ibid., I:11 (5 December 1944).

17 Ibid., I:6 (15 July 1944).

18 Ibid., I:8 (15 September 1944); ibid., II:1 (15 January 1945); ibid., II:2 (15 February 1945).

19 Ibid., I:7 (15 August 1944).


22 Ibid., II:1 (15 January 1945).

23 Ibid., I:11 (15 December 1944).

24 Ibid., I:8 (15 September 1944).

25 Ibid., I:6 (15 July 1944); ibid., I:11 (15 December 1944).

26 Ibid., I:7 (15 August 1944).

27 WIB, Radio Service, 12 February 1945.

28 Ibid., 25 February 1945.

29 WIB, Labour Facts, I:11 (15 December 1944); ibid., II:7 (15 July 1945).

30 Ibid., II:3 (15 March 1945).

Ibid.


Ibid., II:2 (15 February 1945).

Ibid., I:7 (15 August 1944).

Ibid., I:6 (15 July 1944); Ibid., II:3 (15 March 1945).


Ibid., II:7 (15 July 1945); Ibid., II:8 (15 August 1945).

Ibid., I:11 (15 December 1944).

Ibid., II:2 (15 February 1945).

Ibid., II:3 (15 March 1945).

Ibid., II:4 (15 April 1945).

Ibid., II:5 (15 May 1945).

Ibid., II:6 (15 June 1945).


Reasons given to justify absenteeism were:

- Too many taxes: 29%
- Overwork: 16%
- Sickness: 11%
Dull jobs 2%
Bad management 1%
Working conditions 1%
Total 60%

47 Ibid., Vol. 12, file 8-2-1, letter: J. Grierson to Arnold Heeney, 10 November 1943.

48 Ibid., memo: D. Petegorsky to A.D. Dunton, 4 February 1944.

49 Ibid., Vol. 4, WIB Survey, 69, (August 1945). The results were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total Sample</th>
<th>29-29</th>
<th>30-49</th>
<th>50+</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unions do not need strengthening</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unions need strengthening</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undecided/Don't Know</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


51 WIB Records, Vol. 4, file 1-6-1, memo: editor to editorial board, 22 June 1943; ibid., Vol. 8, file 3-5-1, report by Gregory Vlastos, n.d. [August 1944]; ibid., Vol. 4, file 1-6-1, memo: George McCracken to AAGC, 2 September 1943; ibid., Vol. 7, file 2-4-6, minutes: publicity coordinating committee, 4 July 1944; ibid., Vol. 9, file 3-5-2, memo: Donald Macdonald to Rex Boyd, 1 May 1944.

52 Ibid., Vol. 7, file 2-4-6, minutes: publicity coordinating committee, 25 January 1944.

53 Ibid., minutes: publicity coordinating committee, 1 August 1944; Gregory Vlastos reported that 47 percent of the forces had a high school of equivalent education compared to 13 percent in 1914-1918 and that 90 percent were native-born Canadians compared to 50 percent in the previous war.

54 Ibid., Vol. 20, file 11-17-3, report by E. A.A. Corbett, 11 August 1944.

55 Ibid., Vol. 8, file 3-5-1, report by F/L Gregory Vlastos, n.d. [August 1944]. Vlastos made a trip overseas in order to assess the services' information needs.


59 Ibid., Vol. 4, file 1-6-1, memo: editor to editorial board, 22 June 1943.


62 "Meet Canadian Affairs," Canadian Affairs (Canadian edition), I:1 (1 January 1944), p. 5. Since the WIB contracted for the articles outside the government, the policy of promoting discussion did not cause trouble. Each issue contained a disclaimer announcing that the articles did not reflect the government's views (see: Canadian Affairs (overseas edition), I:10 (15 September 1943, p. iii). In the interest of accuracy, however, the WIB made certain that all articles received close scrutiny by all government departments concerned (WIB Records, Vol. 8, file 3-5-1, minutes: information to the armed forces advisory committee, 21 November 1945).


64 Ibid., Vol. 2, minutes: Wartime Information Board, 9 April 1945. For the file on this issue: see: ibid., Vol. 8, file 3-5G.

65 Ibid., Vol. 8, file 3-5-1, report: Gregory Vlastos, n.d. [August 1944].

66 Ibid., Vol. 5, file 2-1-1, memo: Murray Tevlin to R.A. Draper, 5 October 1943; ibid., Vol. 8, file 3-5-1, minutes: Editorial Advisory Board of Canadian Affairs, September 1944.


68 University of Saskatchewan Archives, VCC. Fowke Papers, file xix(g), letter: Gregory Vlastos to V.C. Fowke, 6 April 1944; see also: author's interview with F.W. Park, Toronto, 8 December 1974, transcript.
69 WIB Records, Vol. 8, file 3-5, memo: Gregory Vlastos to Grierson, 12 July 1943.


71 Ibid., Vol. 8, file 3-5-1, memo: Gregory Vlastos to J. Grierson, June 1943.


73 Ibid., Vol. 8, file 3-5-1, minutes: editorial advisory board of Canadian Affairs, 28 July 1944.

74 Ibid., Vol. 4, file 1-6-1, memo: editor to editorial board, 22 June 1943.

75 Ibid., Vol. 8, file 3-5-1, report: Gregory Vlastos, n.d. [August 1944].

76 Ibid., Vol. 8, file 3-5, memo: G. Vlastos to J. Grierson, 12 July 1943.

77 Ibid., Vol. 8, file 3-5-1, minutes: information to the armed forces committee, 18 January 1945.


81 "Fighters Think Ahead," Canadian Affairs (Canadian edition), 1:2 (1 February 1944), p. 3.


85 Ibid., October 1943; ibid., Vol. 8, file 3-5, letter: J. Grierson to Brig. Booth, 23 December 1943.

86 Ibid., Vol. 2, file 1-2-27, memo: Gregory Vlastos to G.C. Andrew, 13 July 1944.
NOTES
CHAPTER XII

1 Public Archives of Canada [PAC], Wartime Information Board [WIB] Records, Vol. 8, file 2-22, letter: R.A. Sharwood to Ross Tolmie, 20 April 1945. (The vice-president of CIL urged reconstruction information to avoid pressure on government programmes); Provincial Museum and Archives of Alberta [PMAA], Premier’s Papers, file 1216, report: n.a., 12 July 1943. (This report urged a working committee to plan reconstruction); Public Archives of Nova Scotia, A.S. Macmillan Papers, document 18, n.d. (This proposed a Nova Scotia Reconstruction Committee); Public Archives of Manitoba, W. Sandford Evans Papers, Evans' speech proposing adoption of the Bank of Montreal annual report, 29 January 1943; University of British Columbia Library, Special Collections Division, N.A.M. MacKenzie Papers, unsorted material, recommendations of the New Brunswick Committee on Reconstruction, 23 June 1944; Archives of Ontario [AO], Workers' Educational Association Papers, Drummond Wren file 8-11, letter: Drummond Wren to Ernest Bushnell, 27 January 1942; AO, Canadian Association for Adult Education Papers, B1 Series, box 5, "Report of the Proceedings of a Special Programme Committee of the CAAE,: December 1942 - January 1943.

2 Wartime Information Board, Reports Branch, "Information Wanted," Information Briefs, 8 (17 May 1943), pp. 1-3. In a national sample in the last week of April, 45 percent of the respondents placed reconstruction information as the topic they most wanted to know about. The second most listed subject, wage and price control, was chosen by 29 percent; see also: "Information Wanted," in ibid., 23 (27 December 1943), p. 1. The WIB's October survey showed that 57 percent (a 12 percent increase) wanted information about post-war plans.


5 For an example of these diverging views see the testimony before various reconstruction committees found in their reports. Public Archives of Nova Scotia, Province of Nova Scotia, Royal Commission on Provincial Development and Rehabilitation, "Proceedings," 1943, 5 volumes.
6 CAAE Papers, Series A-1, box 1, letter: George Edison to H.R.C. Avison, 18 August 1943.


8 See Chapter III for a more complete discussion of the philosophic and membership overlap between the CAAE and WIB. For the civilian role of Canadian Affairs see: WIB Records, Vol. 8, file 3-5, letter: Edgar Smee to Andrew, 5 November 1945 (on the use by YMCA); ibid., letter: Eugene Forsey to G.C. Andrew, 27 December 1945 (on the use by CCL); ibid., letter: J.E. Robbins to G.C. Andrew, 13 February 1945 (on the use by CCEC and request for republishing).


10 Ibid., Florence King, "Reconstruction Information," November 1943.

11 Ibid., G.C. Andrew, "Domestic Branch Summary," December 1943.


14 Ibid., Vol. 9, file 3-16, memo: J.F. Parkinson, 18 August 1943.


9-6-1-9, memo: n.a., n.d. [May 1944].


20 WIB Records, Vol. 17, file 9-6-2-8, letter: D.G. Tyndall to M.E. Urquhart, 1 September 1945; ibid., file 9-6-2-5, letter: Murchison to J.B. Thwaites, 19 October 1945.


24 Ibid., Vol. 17, file 9-6-2-11, press release: opening remarks by the Prime Minister of Canada, Ottawa, 6 August 1945.


27 "Dominion-Provincial Conference on Reconstruction," in ibid., 9 (28 July 1945); see also: "Supplement to Dominion-Provincial Conference on Reconstruction," in ibid., 9A (11 August 1945).


29 "Supplement to Reconstruction Planning," in ibid., 4B (30 April 1945); see also: Department of Reconstruction, Employment and Income with Special Reference to the Initial Period of Reconstruction, Presented to Parliament by the Minister of Reconstruction, Ottawa: King's Printer, April 1945.

30 WIB, "Agricultural Reconstruction," Post-War Planning Information, 7 (25 July 1944); see also: "Supplement to Agricultural Reconstruction," in ibid., 7A (26 October 1944).


37 Wartime Information Board, Radio Service, 5 March 1945, p. 7; see also: ibid., 26 February 1945, p. 8; ibid., 12 March 1945, p. 9.

38 Ibid., 12 March 1945, p. 9.


40 PMAA, Premiers' Papers, file 1216, brief: The Alberta Provincial Command of B.E.S.L. to the Province of Alberta, September 1943; see also: E.A. Corbett, We Have With Us Tonight, Toronto: Ryerson, 1957, pp. 200ff.


42 Ibid., Vol. 577, file 3945, p. C260786, memorandum to members of the Cabinet, 17 January 1944.


44 Ibid., Vol. 8, file 3-5, letter: J.W. Pickersgill to A.D. Dunton, 17 April 1944.

46 WIB Records, Vol. 6, file 2-1-2-2, submission: 11 December 1944. This submission for funds was made under the authority of PC 8096, 17 October 1944. The programme got its staff in December.


49 WIB Records, Vol. 10, file 6-3-1, memorandum: interdepartmental committee on rehabilitation information to the Cabinet, 24 January 1945.

50 Ibid., Vol. 7, file 2-4-6, minutes: publicity coordinating committee, 17 October 1944.

51 Ibid., Vol. 10, file 6-3-1, minutes: demobilization and rehabilitation information committee, 8 November 1944; ibid., minutes: 25 April 1945; ibid., file 6-3-5(a), minutes: film subcommittee of the rehabilitation information committee, 5 February 1945.

52 Ibid., Vol. 10, file 6-3-1, memo: "Demobilization and Re-establishment in Civil Life of Men and Women from the Armed Services on the Termination of Hostilities in Europe," n.d.


56 Ibid., file 6-3-5(a), minutes: film subcommittee of the rehabilitation information committee, 9 April 1945; WIB, "John Kaye - Student," Radio Service, 4 March 1945.


58 WIB Records, Vol. 10, file 6-3-1, memo: William Strange, n.d. [1944]; ibid., letter: G.C. Andrew to A.D.P. Heeney, 31
March 1945.


60 Ibid., file 8-14-A, mss: "Canada Today and Tomorrow," n.d. [1945]; ibid., Vol. 10, file 6-3-1, minutes: demobilization and rehabilitation information committee, 31 January 1945; National Film Board of Canada, This is Our Canada, Canada Carries On, produced by Stanley Jackson, 1945.

61 WIB Records, Vol. 10, file 6-3-1, draft speech, n.d. [1945]; ibid., memo: William Strange, n.d. [1944]; WIB, "It's Up To Us," Radio Service, 5 March 1945; WIB Records, Vol. 10, file 6-3-8-1, minutes: subcommittee on radio of the rehabilitation information committee, 10 April 1945; ibid., file 6-3-8, memo: Elizabeth Long to Andrew Cowan, 9 April 1945; ibid., file 6-3-7, minutes of a special meeting: demobilization and rehabilitation information committee, 11 September 1945; ibid., file 6-3-1, minutes: demobilization and rehabilitation information committee, 4 July 1945; ibid., Vol. 13, file 8-14B, mss: "First Impressions;" ibid., Vol. 10, file 6-3-1, minutes: demobilization and rehabilitation information committee, 7 February 1945; E.A. Corbett, "Future for Fighters," Canadian Affairs (Canadian edition), 1:2 (1 February 1944), p. 19; WIB, Canada in the Last Six Years, Ottawa: Wartime Information Board, 1945; WIB Records, Vol. 8, file 3-5E, mss: "You Can't Turn the Clock Back by just Changing your Suit...," n.d. [1945].

62 Ibid., minutes: 22 November 1944; 18 April 1945; ibid., file 6-3-5(a), minutes: film subcommittee, 19 April 1945.

63 Ibid., minutes: demobilization and rehabilitation information committee, 6 December 1944; ibid., 28 February 1945; ibid., file 6-3-5(a), minutes: film subcommittee, 19 April 1945; Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, Programme Archives (Toronto), disc 450502-1D, "The Soldiers' Return," talk by J.D. Ketchum, 2 May 1945.

64 WIB Records, Vol. 10, file 6-3-1, minutes: demobilization and rehabilitation information committee, 22 November 1944; ibid., minutes: 29 November 1944; ibid., minutes: 5 January 1945; ibid., minutes: 14 February 1945.

65 Ibid., Vol. 8, file 3-5E, mss: "You Can't Turn the Clock Back By Just Changing your Suit...," n.d. [1945]; ibid., file 8-14A, mss: "What's Been Going on at Home," n.d. [1945]; Department of Pensions and National Health, Back to Civil Life, Ottawa: King's Printer, 1944.
WIB Records, Vol. 10, file 6-3-1, minutes: demobilization and rehabilitation information committee, 12 April 1945; ibid., file 6-3-8-1, report #3: CBC rehabilitation programme committee, 11 December 1944; ibid., Vol. 8, file 3-5E, mss: "You Can't Turn the Clock Back...;" ibid., Vol. 10, file 6-3-5(a), minutes: film subcommittee, 16 April 1945.

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Ibid., Vol. 8, file 2-5-1, minutes: editorial advisory board, 1 September 1944; ibid., Vol. 10, file 6-3-8-1, report #3: CBC programmes committee, 11 December 1944.


Ibid., Vol. 10, file 6-3-5(a), minutes: film subcommittee, 5 February 1945.


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Ibid., file 6-3-1, minutes: demobilization and rehabilitation information committee, 22 November 1944; see also: Brooke Claxton Papers, Vol. 6, for some weekly releases from the WIB.

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82 Ibid., Vol. 5, file 2-1-1A, memo: "Advance Publicity Regarding the San Francisco Conference," n.a., n.d. [March 1945].

83 Ibid., Vol. 6, file 2-1-2-2; letter: Bryant Mumford to A.D. Dunton, 2 October 1944.

84 Ibid., Vol. 2, file 1-3-1, part 6, R.A. Draper, "UNRRA Conference, Montreal," Monthly Reports, 1944; ibid., Vol. 9, file 4-2-1A, news release: 8 September 1944.


92 WIB Records, Vol. 7, file 2-4-16, excerpts from a CBC broadcast, 29 April 1945.

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King Papers, J1 Series, Vol. 381, p. 341213, memo: A.D. Dunton to members of the Cabinet, 18 June 1945.
NOTES

CONCLUSION

1 Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, Program Archives (Toronto), Reference 671210-7, "The NFB: Mirror of a Nation," project 68 series, broadcast 10 December 1967. This quote originated in an interview with Sydney Newman.


3 Calder, pp. 584-585; Briggs, pp. 82-83; Weinberg, pp. 202ff.; pp. 242ff.

4 Calder, p. 542; Weinberg, pp. 256ff.

5 Weinberg, p. 228; Briggs, p. 167.

6 Public Archives of Canada [PAC], W.L.M. King Papers, J4 Series, Vol. 230, file 2213, pp. C155853ff., letter: J. Grierson to Walter Turnbull, 27 November 1939 attached to memo: W. Turnbull to A.D.P. Heeney, 8 November 1939; ibid., pp. C155755-762, memo: King, 5 December 1939; ibid., J1 Series, diary, 14 May 1941 (King's frustration with information work did cause him to consider a ministry but with much more limited authority than the British MOI). See also: Briggs, p. 161 for an historian's assessment.


12 Calder, pp. 607-619. This is a discussion of public support for the Beveridge Report; Briggs, p. 210 discusses the reformist views of J.B. Priestley in his postscript series.

13 Ibid., p. 587.

14 Among them, public opinion polling, an integrated media campaign, and material which answered the questions of specific groups (see: J.L. Granatstein, Canada's War: The Politics of the Mackenzie King Government, 1939-1945, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1975, pp. 382ff.).

15 Archives of Ontario, Workers' Educational Association Papers, Drummond Wren's files, file 53-11, speech by D. Petegorsky, "Let the Workers Know," given to the Maritime Labour Institute, Dalhousie University, 7 May 1945.
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Gen. A.G.L. McNaughton Papers
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Robert J. Manion Papers
Arthur Meighen Papers
L.B. Pearson Papers
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Address Broadcast by the Rt. Hon. W.L. Mackenzie King, April 24, 1942. Ottawa: King's Printer, 1942.

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APPENDIX A

Cast of Characters

Anderson, Allan. South American correspondent for Southam Press; began work for WIB in 1943 as executive officer in charge of Latin American Section; remained to work for Canadian Information Service after the end of the war.

Andrew, Geoffrey C. Housemaster at Upper Canada College; began work with WIB 15 December 1942 as head of media section, Reports Branch; acting secretary then secretary of the WIB from 10 May 1943; head of domestic operations mid-1944; general manager in August 1945; first director of the Canadian Information Service 1945; assistant to the President, University of British Columbia (N.A.M. MacKenzie, q.v.), 1946.

Angus, Professor Henry F. Chief, economics division, department of External Affairs; member of the BPI's committee on cooperation in Canadian citizenship 1941-1942.

Armstrong, Allan H. Architect; navy lieutenant, seconded to WIB's Information to the Armed Forces Section, 1944.

Aylen, Peter. CBC programme liaison officer with the WIB; member of the publicity coordinating committee and the demobilization and rehabilitation information committee; director of the CBC International Service, 1945.

Badgley, F.C. Director of the Canadian Government Motion Picture Bureau, 1939.


Beattie, Laura. Free lance journalist with nutrition specialty; editor in the BPI's consumer programme and later WIB executive officer in charge of consumer information.

Benoit, Major Georges Ralph G. Head translator, department of the Secretary of State; director of mobilization department of National War Services; appointed WIB executive officer October 1942; head of French language information and external operations until 1944; WIB representative in Paris, 1944.

Biggar, Oliver Mowat, K.D. Patent attorney, Ottawa; director of censorship from July 1942 to January 1944; member of the WIB board from November 1943 until 1945.

Blakeney, Hon. C.N. Minister of Education, New Brunswick; member of the executive Canadian Council of Education for Citizenship, 1941; member of the BPI's committee on cooperation in Canadian citizenship, December 1941.

Bois, Major J.S.A. Psychologist at the University of Montreal; on loan to the army (1942?); appointed to the BPI's committee
on morale 8 June 1942; member of the committee on cooperation in Canadian citizenship.

Borden, Henry. Toronto business executive on loan to department of Munitions and Supply; appointed a member of the WIB board, September 1942; resigned February 12, 1943; represented the department of Munitions and Supply.

Bouchard, Georges. Former Liberal M.P.; appointed assistant deputy minister of Agriculture; appointed to the WIB, September 1942; remained a board member until 1945.

Boyd, Rex D. Appointed head of WIB accounting and budget October 1944; member, demobilization and rehabilitation information committee, January 1945.

Brais, F. Philippe. Member of Quebec Legislative Council; minister without portfolio, 1940-1944; member of the National war finance committee; deputy chairman WIB, September 1942 - September 1945.

Brittain, Dr. W.H. Vice-Principal of McGill University, Dean of Macdonald College; member of the executive committee of the Canadian Council of Education for Citizenship; member of the advisory committee of citizens' forums of Quebec.

Brockington, L.W. Former chairman of CBC Board of Governors; rejected candidate for director of Public Information, September 1939; appointed recorder of Canada's war effort and counsellor to the war committee of the cabinet, 21 December 1939; member of the advisory civil service committee of public information, 1939-1940; moved to England in 1942 to work for the British Ministry of Information.

Bryce, Robert B. Economist; special assistant to the minister of Finance; member of the WIB board from September 1942 to September 1945; member stabilization information committee, committee on industrial morale.

Buchanan, Donald W. CBC director of public affairs until his resignation and liaison officer with the BPI; joined the National Film Board as assistant Government Film Commissioner and organized wartime film circuits; seconded part time to the Wartime Information Board, 1943 and organized displays.

Bushnell, Ernest. CBC supervisor of programmes; worked closely with the WIB and advised Charles Vining and his successors on radio programming.

Cameron, Donald. Director of the department of extension, University of Alberta; member of the BPI's committee on cooperation in Canadian citizenship, December 1941-1942.

Campbell, J. Hugh. CPR publicity officer; WIB representative in Washington, October 1942-August 1945; returned to CPR.
Carmichael, Harry J. General manager of General Motors Oshawa plant; coordinator of production of the department of Munitions and Supply; appointed a member of the WIB board from 12 February 1943 until 25 September 1945.

Carter, Geoffrey S.H. Head of publicity for Toronto General Trusts; appointed WIB executive officer in charge of speakers' committees, 27 October 1943.

Casgrain, Pierre François. Secretary of State from 10 May 1940 until 14 December 1941; responsible for the director of censorship.

Casey, Leo. Publicity director of the New York World's Fair; appointed U.S. adviser to the Wartime Information Board in September 1942; resigned under pressure, June 1943.

Cawthorn-Page, A.L. Public relations man for the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company; director of publicity for the Wartime Prices and Trade Board; member, publicity coordinating committee, economic stabilization information committee.

Charpentier, Fulgence. Chief press censor for Canada (French) from early 1940; director of censorship from 1 January 1945.

Clark, Gregory. Journalist; host of a CBC radio show on rehabilitation promoted by the Wartime Information Board.

Clark, J.W.G. Advertising executive working for Cockfield Brown; director in chief, public relations of the armed forces; member of the publicity coordinating committee from time of his DND appointment; later, the department of National Defence representative on the WIB board from 9 April 1945.

Clark, Dr. S.D. Member of the committee on cooperation in Canadian citizenship, December 1941-1942.

Claxton, Brooke. Elected in 1940 as Liberal M.P. for St. Lawrence-St. George; parliamentary assistant to the President of the Privy Council from 6 May 1943--12 October 1944 and as such ex-officio member of the WIB board; minister of National Health and Welfare from 13 October 1944 - 11 December 1946.

Connolly, J.S. Newspaperman; editor of publications for the BPI in 1941.

Corbett, E.A. Executive director of the Canadian Association for Adult Education; member of the executive of the Canadian Council for Education in Citizenship, 1941; head of the speakers' section (BPI) from January 1941 - June 1941.

Côté, J.B. Free lance writer for the BPI and the WIB.
Cowan, Andrew. CBC special assistant for re-establishment programmes; formerly overseas correspondent until February 1945.

Crandall, C.F. General manager British United Press; loaned to the Wartime Information Board in early 1943 as adviser to the general manager on press relations.

Currie, Mary. Business librarian, Sun Life Insurance Company; WIB librarian from 19 October 1942.

Davis, Mr. Justice T.C. Associate deputy minister of National War Services from 1940; responsible for the operations of the Bureau of Public Information until September 1942; member of the Wartime Information Board from 9 September 1942 until 9 November 1942; appointed Canadian High Commissioner to Australia.

Déchêne, Joffre. National Film Board officer seconded to the WIB; member of the publicity coordinating committee.

Doré, Dr. Victor. Member of the executive of the Canadian Council of Education for Citizenship.

Draper, R.A. Writer for The Financial Post; news writer for the Bureau of Public Information; edited Canada at War; headed WIB reference section; left the WIB for Time, March 1945.

Dunton, A. Davidson. Editor of The Montreal Standard; appointed WIB executive officer; 28 September 1942 in charge of the Reports Branch; took over home and foreign press relations in February 1943; assistant general manager from June 1943; general manager from February 1944; resigned in September 1945 and returned to The Standard; chairman of the CBC Board of Governors, 1946.

Dyde, Col. H.A. Military secretary to the minister of National Defence; member of the WIB from September 1942 to January 1945; resigned to practice law.

Edington, A. WIB officer in charge of administration for some specialized programmes.

Edison, George. Lecturer, department of ethics, Trinity College, Toronto; appointed to the WIB, 25 June 1944 as the first coordinator of reconstruction information.

Edison, Marnie. Took over the WIB radio service in January 1945.

Eggleston, Wilfrid. Press officer for the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations; press censor from 1 November 1939; chief press censor (English) from April 1940; director of censorship from 1944-1945.

Eisenhardt, Capt. Ian. Physical fitness expert; prepared a study for the WIB in 1943 on youth information.
England, Robert. Educator; member of the committee on cooperation in Canadian citizenship, 1941; director of the nationalities branch, department of National War Services, 1943.

Estall, Dr. Martyn. Professor of philosophy, Queen's University; joined the WIB, 1 June 1944 as chief of the press and research section; left WIB in September 1945 to work for the Canadian Association of Adult Education.

Farquharson, R.A. Chief of news staff, Bureau of Public Information; managing editor of The Globe and Mail, 1944.

Ferguson, Maude. Women's editor of The Calgary Herald: worked in the BPI's consumer service and headed it after the departure of L.L. Knott, 1942; worked for the WIB until September 1943.

Feilden, Mrs. M. Reporter for The Winnipeg Free Press; editor for the WIB from 25 June 1943; worked in external news operations; wrote weekly column for eastern Canadian farm newspapers.

Freifeld, Sidney. Research economist and free-lance journalist in London and Rome; appointed to the WIB, 23 November 1942; in charge of news desk operations in New York.

Freiman, Laurence. Of the A.J. Freiman Department store, Ottawa; appointed to the WIB for four months from 26 March 1943 to study posters.

Frémont, D. Editor La Liberte, Winnipeg; French pamphlet editor for the WIB from 28 October 1941 to edit Nouvelles Catholicques.

Gardiner, James Garfield. Minister of Agriculture, 28 October 1935 to 15 November 1948 and minister of National War Services responsible for the Bureau of Public Information, 12 July 1940 to 10 June 1941.

Garneau, Major René. CBC broadcast commentator and overseas war correspondent; seconded to the WIB in the spring of 1944; head of the French section after the departure of Georges Benoit (q.v.) in October 1944.

Garner, Harold L. Publisher of The Petersborough Examiner; assistant to Charles Vining (q.v.), September 1942.

Geldert, Gerald M. Publicity director of the city of Ottawa; appointed to the WIB in November 1942; handled WIB travel and arranged and escorted foreign visitors.

Ghwey, Gilbert. Executive assistant to the director of information for air, department of National Defence; appointed special WIB representative in northwestern Canada, 21 April 1944.

Gibbon, J. Murray. Member of the committee on cooperation in Canadian citizenship from December 1941.
Girouard, Jacques. Formerly of La Presse, Montreal; deputy chief censor of publications (French), 1940.


Goldenberg, H. Carl. Director general, economics and statistics branch, department of Munitions and Supply; attended WIB board meetings as the alternate for Harry Carmichael (q.v.).

Grant, Rev. J.W. In charge of the WIB's religious information programme from December 1943.

Greenblatt, Joe. Editor of The Swift Current Sun; appointed a WIB feature writer, 17 August 1943-October 1943.

Grierson, John. Canadian government film commissioner from 18 October 1939; general manager of the WIB from February 1943-February 1944; resumed film commissioner's job until 1946 when he left Canada for UNESCO.

Hambleton, George. European staff correspondent for the Canadian Press; joined the Prime Minister's Office after the outbreak of war to act as press officer; remained to work for the BPI and edited the "Home Front News" in Canadian Affairs as well as the WIB's cable and air mail service.

Hanratty, C.J. CNR public relations officer who became the first deputy press censor (English) and from January 1940 was chief (English) censor; retired in mid-1940 due to illness and was succeeded by Wilfrid Eggleston (q.v.).

Heeney, Arnold D.P. Principal secretary to Mackenzie King (q.v.) until March 1940; then clerk of the Privy Council and first secretary of the cabinet and war committee of the cabinet; member of the WIB board representing the PCO from September 1942 until September 1945.

Herbert, Walter. Secretary and public relations director of the National Liberal Federation; assistant director of the Bureau of Public Information from early 1940; resigned 27 August 1942 but remained with the WIB on a temporary basis until 21 September 1942; after he left the WIB, Herbert, as secretary of the Canadian Committee, supplied information to American troops stationed in Canada; appointed director of the Canada Foundation in June 1945.

Herbin, J.R. Copy reader for The Toronto Star; joined the WIB, 12 February 1943 as assistant to the chief of the reference section in the reports branch; acting chief of reference section from May 1944.

Hosken, Gordon S. Supervisor of officer services for the department of National War Services; business manager of the WIB from 17 May 1943.
Hyndman, Grace. Director of personnel, General Engineering Company (Canada), Toronto; member of the BPI's committee on morale from April 1942 - September 1943.

Irving, John A. Graduate student, department of psychology, University of British Columbia; served as research secretary of the committee on morale during the summer of 1942.

Jean, Emile. Managing editor of Le Nouvelliste, Three Rivers; assistant to Philippe Brais (q.v.) and assistant head of the domestic branch, December 1942 - February 1943.

Kaye, Dr. V.J. Acting secretary of the committee on cooperation in Canadian citizenship from December 1941.

Keenleyside, Hugh L. Officer of the department of External Affairs; member of the advisory committee on public information, December 1939 to July 1940.

Ketchum, J.D. Associate professor of psychology, University of Toronto; member of the committee on morale, April 1942 - September 1943; WIB officer, September 1943 to 30 June 1945; head of the reports branch.

King, Miss Florence. Worked for the Ontario Travel and Publicity Bureau; assistant to the director of misplaced industries in the department of Munitions and Supply; joined the WIB, 16 December 1942; pro-term head of reconstruction information, 30 July 1943 - February 1944; researcher in reconstruction information until 30 September 1944.

King, W.L.M. Prime Minister of Canada during Second World War; his office retained direct responsibility for government information operations from September 1939 until the transfer of the Bureau of Public Information to the department of National War Services in July 1940; he reassumed direct responsibility for information when the government formed the Wartime Information Board in August 1942.

Kirkconnell, Professor Watson. Member of the committee on cooperation in Canadian citizenship from December 1941.

Knott, Leonard. President of Editorial Associates Ltd. of Montreal (public relations consultant); coordinator of consumer information for the Bureau of Public Information 1942; appointed executive officer of the WIB, 27 January 1943; left within six months.

LaFlèche, Leo Richer. Deputy minister of National War Services from June 1940; minister of National War Services from 6 October 1942 - 17 April 1945; appointed Canadian ambassador to Greece.

Landry, R.P. Officer with the department of Transport; radio broadcasting censor from 1939 to 1945.
Lapointe, Hon. Ernest. Minister of Justice and Attorney General from 23 October 1935 to 26 November 1941; acting Secretary of State from 26 July 1939 to 9 May 1940 with responsibility for censorship.

Lash, Herbert. CNR public relations department; assistant to Walter Thompson (q.v.) in censorship operations, September - December 1939; assistant director of Public Information, December 1939 - January 1940; acting director of Public Information, January 1940 - February 1940; director of Public Information, February 1940 - September 1942; resigned from government information work on 11 September 1942 after the organization of the Wartime Information Board.

Lee, Rev. J.G. Anglican assistant curate of St. Johns Church, Ottawa; head of the WIB's religious information section from March 1945; edited Canadian Churches and the War.

Legg, Stuart. Film maker who worked with John Grierson (q.v.) in Great Britain; came to Canada to work for the National Film Board; editor of the "Canada Carries On" film series from 1941.

Liddy, Professor R.B. Professor of philosophy and psychology at the University of Western Ontario; served on the committee on morale from April 1942; elected vice-chairman.

Little, Elliot Mortimer. Director of National Selective Service; appointed a member of the WIB at its inception and represented the department of Labour; resigned as director of National Selective Service and hence from the board on 3 December 1942.

Lloyd, Trevor. A geography professor at Dartmouth College; joined the WIB for three months in May 1943.

McCann, Hiram. Editor of Food in Canada; wrote the master booklet for the food conservation information campaign; appointed executive secretary of the projected food conservation information programme, October 1943; left the board in March 1944 when his contract was not renewed and the programme was cancelled.

McCacken, George W. Associate editor of the Kingston Whig Standard; appointed WIB executive officer in 1942; appointed head of the domestic section of the Reports Branch; later head of external operations.

MacDermot, T.W.L. Headmaster of Upper Canada College; helped organize the BPI speakers' bureau in early 1942; attended WIB meetings on an ex-officio basis in late 1944; a member of the committee that investigated the post-war role of government information.

Macdonald, Donald C. Reporter with The Montreal Gazette; joined the navy; seconded to the WIB as editor of Canada Digest,
1944; organized Servicemen's Forum radio series and worked in the information to the armed forces section until 1946.

McKenna, Arthur. Parliamentary correspondent for the Canadian Press, The Wall Street Journal and the Ottawa bureau chief of Reuters; executive assistant to the director of Public Information, 1942; news and feature writer, external branch of the WIB, 1943; head of external news section, 15 September 1943.

Mackenzie, Robert T. Extension department of the University of British Columbia; seconded from the department of National Defence to the Wartime Information Board; assistant editor of Canadian Affairs, May 1944; later professor of sociology at the London School of Economics.

MacKenzie, Norman A.M. President of the University of New Brunswick; appointed chairman of the WIB, 12 February 1943; president of the University of British Columbia, 1944; retired as WIB chairman when the board ceased operations.

McLarty, Norman A. Postmaster General, 23 January 1939 - 18 September 1939; appointed chairman of the cabinet subcommittee on public information, 30 August 1939; chairman of the cabinet committee on public information, 5 December 1939; responsibility for information removed when the Bureau of Public Information became part of the new department of National War Services in July 1940.

Macnamara, Arthur. Assistant deputy minister of Labour; a member of the Wartime Information Board from 25 January 1943 until the board closed down in 1945.

Macpherson, C. Brough. Political science professor at the University of New Brunswick; appointed to the WIB in June 1943 to replace G.C. Andrew as head of the media analysis section; head of the reconstruction information section from November 1943 until mid-September 1944; appointed at the University of Toronto.

Malone, Paul. Reporter for the Vancouver Province; appointed WIB executive officer, 14 December 1942; seconded for duty with the Canadian High Commission in Canberra as the WIB representative in Australia, 1943.

Mansur, David. Assistant to the chairman of the National War Finance Committee; member of the publicity coordinating committee.

Martin, John. Public relations head of the Massey Harris company; secretary of the interdepartmental publicity committee and coordinator of government advertising from the summer of 1942 until the establishment of the WIB; left the government shortly after the WIB was set up.

Masson, Lorenzo. Replaced Georges Benoit as head of the French language section of the WIB in November 1944.
Melançon, Claude. Worked for the public relations department of the Canadian National Railways with G.H. Lash (q.v.) and Walter Thompson (q.v.); appointed the first French language press censor in September 1939; joined the Bureau of Public Information in December 1939; associate director of Public Information from February 1940; resigned from government service, 11 September 1942.

Moodie, Campbell. Seconded from the department of National Defence; BPI and later WIB representative in London.

Morgan, Lorne T. Professor of political economy at the University of Toronto; joined the WIB in the summer of 1944 to take charge of research and writing for the economic stabilization information programme; headed the post-war planning information programme from September 1944 until he left the board in June 1945.

Morrison, Neil. Sociologist with the extension department of McGill University; joined the CBC as a programme supervisor in the talks and public affairs department; established Citizen's Forum radio broadcasts; a member of the information to the armed forces committee.

Moyer, L. Clare. Clerk of the Senate; temporarily first English language press censor from 3 September 1939; interim first secretary of the WIB from September 1942 until April 1943.

Murray, D. Bruce. Head of the BPI speakers' section for a few months in 1942.

Newton, T.F. Lecturer in English at McGill University; appointed an executive officer to work in the New York office of the WIB in 1943; in charge of Canada's relations with the United Nations' Information Organization and associate chairman of the UNIO; acting head of the New York office in 1945; remained in the government service as an officer in the department of External Affairs.

Oastler, James A. Worked for the British government in New York; wrote free lance articles for the BPI in 1940; appointed assistant to the head of the Washington office of the WIB on 1 October 1942.

Olive, K.A. Chairman of the Rumour Clinic Committee of the Canadian Column in Montreal, 1942-1943.

Owen, I.M. Acting head of the WIB's religious information section in September 1943-1944.

Pacey, W.C.D. United Church minister and professor at Brandon College; joined the WIB, 25 June 1943; prepared a newsletter for churches and headed the WIB's religious information section until September 1944; head of the department of English at the University of New Brunswick.
Park, Capt. F.W. Lawyer from New Brunswick; seconded from the department of National Defence to the WIB, October 1943; assistant editor of Canadian Affairs; headed the information to the armed forces section from October 1944 until mid 1945.

Payne, C.H. Deputy minister of the department of National War Services and responsible for the BPI from July 1940 until September 1942 and the formation of the WIB.

Pearson, L.B. Canadian minister and ambassador in Washington; appointed a member of the WIB in September 1942; remained on the board until the WIB ceased operations in 1945.

Perrault, R.B. Appointed executive officer of the WIB in September 1942; resigned when John Grierson became general manager in 1943.

Petegorsky, David. Professor of political economy at Antioch College, Ohio and assistant director of public relations and research from the emergency committee for Jewish affairs; joined the National Film Board in October 1942; joined the WIB, February 1943; head of the industrial morale section, April 1943 - August 1945.

Phillips, Tracy. Former adviser to the British Foreign Office; appointed as adviser to the director of Public Information, 3 December 1942; served as European Adviser to the committee on cooperation in Canadian citizenship from December 1941 until September 1942; worked with the Nationalities Branch of the department of National War Services.

Pickersgill, J.W. Secretary to Prime Minister Mackenzie King (q.v.); informal adviser during the establishment of the first information organization, 1939-1940.

Pilon, Capt. J.R. WIB officer seconded from the department of National Defence in September 1944 to edit the French portion of Canada Digest and to serve as editor of Affaires Canadiennes.

Poland F/L Fred. Served in the directorate of Air Intelligence in 1943 and was seconded to the WIB in 1944 to work in the information to the armed forces section.

Pope, Col. Maurice. Army officer; appointed cable censor in September 1939; director of censorship from December 1939 until May 1942; military representative of the war committee of the cabinet in Washington and Canadian chairman of the joint chiefs of staff.

Porter, Arthur. An American from the Gallup organization who took charge of the Canadian Institute of Public Opinion in 1942 and carried out the WIB's public opinion surveys.

Porter, John C. Advertising manager of the Robert Simpson Co.; appointed executive officer of the WIB in September 1942 as head of the technical branch; later chairman of the publicity
coordinating committee and assistant to the general manager; returned to Simpson's in April 1943.

Ranger, Pierre. Director of publicity for radio station CKAC in Montreal; appointed to the BPI, 16 December 1940 to work in the French section; French news editor for the WIB.

Reading, Paul. Press attaché at the Canadian Legation in Washington; appointed executive officer of the WIB, 15 March 1943; in charge of background information for external operations.

Rivers, F.S. First permanent secretary of the Canadian Council of Education for Citizenship from the summer of 1941; principal of the Ottawa Norman School, 1 September 1942.

Robertson, A.E. Administrator in the Washington office of the department of Munitions and Supply; took charge of the WIB's distribution section in April 1944.

Robertson, Norman. Under-secretary of the department of External Affairs; appointed the department's alternate member of the WIB board, 8 September 1942; attended meetings until the WIB's incorporation into the Canadian Information Service reporting to his department.

Rogers, David B. Editor of the Regina Leader Post; at the request of J.G. Gardiner (q.v.), minister of National War Services, Rogers reported 4 August 1940 on the proposed direction of the government's public information work; appointed head of the WIB's domestic branch in September 1942; resigned after John Grierson (q.v.) was appointed general manager in February 1943; returned to his newspaper.

Rolph, W.K. Graduate student; hired by the WIB, 4 August 1943 to assist in preparing Canadian Churches and the War; worked in the reports branch; left the WIB to teach history at the University of Western Ontario in September 1944.

Ross, Malcolm. Received Ph.D. in English literature from Cornell, 1941; director of distribution for the National Film Board, 1942 - 1945; brought to WIB for a short time in 1943 by John Grierson (q.v.).

Rothney, Gordon. History lecturer at Sir George Williams College; worked for a few months in the reconstruction information section of the WIB from 15 June 1943.

Ryan, Frank. Manager of the radio and media department of the Cockfield Brown Advertising Agency; director of the Hudson's Bay Company public relations broadcasting; appointed deputy chief of the WIB's external branch, September 1942; resigned after John Grierson's (q.v.) appointment in February 1943.

Sedgwick, Harry. President of the Canadian Association of Broadcasters and of radio station CFRB in Toronto; hired as a WIB executive officer in September 1942; took charge of
the WIB's New York office; remained in the position until 1945.

Simpson, George W. Professor of history at the University of Saskatchewan; appointed chairman of the committee on cooperation in Canadian citizenship, December 1941; adviser to the department of National War Services, Nationalities branch after the formation of the WIB.

Smart, Campbell. Director of the Cockfield Brown Advertising Agency; appointed head of the WIB's external operations in September 1942; resigned when John Grierson (q.v.) took over as general manager in February 1943.

Smith, E. George. Parliamentary correspondent of The Globe and Mail; hired as a news editor by the Bureau of Public Information in July 1942; executive officer of the WIB, 1942-1945 and ran the news desk for external operations.

Sutherland, Harold. Former photo editor of the Toronto Star and head of a commercial photographic studio in Toronto; appointed 23 November 1942 to take charge of the graphics section of the WIB office in New York.

Thompson, Dr. J.S. President of the University of Saskatchewan; general manager of the CBC, 1943-1945.

Thompson, Walter S. Director of public relations for the Canadian National Railways; appointed chief censor of Canada in September 1939; first director of Public Information from November to 8 December 1939 when he resigned.

Thorson, J.T. Liberal M.P. for Selkirk; appointed minister of National War Services, 11 June 1941; responsible for the Bureau of Public Information until its absorption by the WIB in September 1942.

Turnbull, Walter J. Secretary to Prime Minister Mackenzie King; informal adviser on public information until the department of National War Services assumed responsibility in July 1940.

Vining, Charles. President of the Newsprint Export Manufacturers Association in Montreal; newsprint administrator for the Wartime Prices and Trade Board; reported on public information to Mackenzie King in September 1941; prepared another report recommending the disbanding of the BPI and the formation of the WIB on 10 July 1942; first chairman of the WIB from September 1942; resigned 27 January 1943.

Vlastos, S/L Gregory. Philosophy professor at Queen's University; seconded to the WIB from the RCAF, 9 June 1943; edited Canadian Affairs and headed the information to the armed forces section until he returned to Queen's University, 15 August 1944.

Wallace, R.C. Principal and Vice Chancellor, Queen's University; chairman of the BPI's committee on morale from April 1942 until the formation of the WIB in September 1942.
West, Bruce. Features writer with The Globe and Mail; photograph editor with the Bureau of Public Information, 1940-1941; joined the WIB in 1942 to coordinate work with the National Film Board; moved to the WIB's London office in October 1943; acting head of the Washington office, 1945.

Young, R.P. Reporter for the Winnipeg Free Press; headed the WIB's magazine section from October 1943.
APPENDIX B
PUBLIC INFORMATION

Expenditure since Inception to September 9, 1942

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1939-40</th>
<th>1940-41</th>
<th>1941-42</th>
<th>1942-43 to Sept. 9/42</th>
<th>Outstanding Commitments</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Salaries and Living Allowances</td>
<td>$ 7,435.85</td>
<td>$ 73,106.49</td>
<td>$150,709.83</td>
<td>$ 73,275.82</td>
<td>$ -</td>
<td>$304,607.99</td>
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<tr>
<td>Travelling Expenses</td>
<td>1,204.20</td>
<td>4,561.82</td>
<td>14,221.80</td>
<td>7,527.13</td>
<td>73,275.13</td>
<td>31,882.88</td>
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<tr>
<td>Motion Pictures</td>
<td>7,097.06</td>
<td>135,783.18</td>
<td>286,710.95</td>
<td>41,283.86</td>
<td>129,094.87</td>
<td>599,969.92</td>
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<tr>
<td>Radio</td>
<td>995.37</td>
<td>3,724.96</td>
<td>11,963.65</td>
<td>3,349.14</td>
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<td>20,033.12</td>
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<td>Photographs and Mats</td>
<td>439.05</td>
<td>11,023.16</td>
<td>43,007.26</td>
<td>30,679.15</td>
<td>729.15</td>
<td>85,878.35</td>
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<td>Pamphlets</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>116,527.00</td>
<td>143,067.67</td>
<td>18,853.69</td>
<td>93,581.10</td>
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<td>Posters and Art Work</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8,565.05</td>
<td>35,502.48</td>
<td>10,086.73</td>
<td>39,606.77</td>
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<td>Printing and Stationery</td>
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<td>33,764.28</td>
<td>44,539.24</td>
<td>8,950.33</td>
<td>12,199.03</td>
<td>103,347.93</td>
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<tr>
<td>Public Speaking</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5,318.44</td>
<td>5,949.27</td>
<td>2,077.54</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>13,345.25</td>
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<td>Canadian Council of Education for Citizenship</td>
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<td>8,000.00</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5,000.00</td>
<td>13,000.00</td>
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<td>Committee on Moral</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>1,986.73</td>
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<td>1,986.73</td>
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<td>Unemployment Insurance</td>
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<td>218.66</td>
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<td>218.66</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cost of Living Bonus</td>
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<td>2,662.66</td>
<td>3,148.43</td>
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<tr>
<td>Overseas Publicity</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>2,347.68</td>
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<td>19,668.00</td>
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<td>Committee on Cooperation in Canadian Citizenship</td>
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<td>766.50</td>
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<td>Overseas Journalists</td>
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<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>1,211.83</td>
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<td>38,812.24</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>83,523.34</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>TOTALS</strong></td>
<td>22,278.41</td>
<td>415,215.90</td>
<td>787,574.73</td>
<td>222,951.38</td>
<td>329,257.43</td>
<td>1,777,277.96</td>
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## Appendix C

Wartime Information Board, Expenses and Estimates, 1942-1946

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>'41-'42</th>
<th>'42-'43</th>
<th>'43-'44</th>
<th>'44-'45</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
<th>Decrease from '44-'45</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Actual</td>
<td>Actual</td>
<td>Estimate (revised)</td>
<td>Actual</td>
<td>Estimate</td>
<td>% spent 1st 6 months</td>
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<td>Salaries</td>
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<td>$327,700</td>
<td>$293,629</td>
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<td>Travel</td>
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<td>75,000</td>
<td>43,080</td>
<td>65,000</td>
<td>96</td>
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<td>Motion Pictures</td>
<td>286,711</td>
<td>677,143</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>840</td>
<td>10,000</td>
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<td>Radio</td>
<td>11,964</td>
<td>20,437</td>
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<td>7,804</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>13</td>
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<tr>
<td>Photos</td>
<td>43,007</td>
<td>97,188</td>
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<td>100,171</td>
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<td>Pamphlets</td>
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<td>Posters</td>
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<td>Stationery</td>
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<td>Public Speaking</td>
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<td>6,007</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>6,716</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>65</td>
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<tr>
<td>C.C.E.C.</td>
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<td>100</td>
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<tr>
<td>Comm. on Morale</td>
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<td>Overseas Publicity</td>
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<td>81,076</td>
<td>129,300</td>
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Totals: 787,575 1,473,747 953,000 753,030 995,707 109 799,000 20% reduction 196,707

Appendix C
Organization Chart, Wartime Information Board
November 1943
