

MARSHALS OF THE *ALEXANDERREICH*

A Study of the Careers of Hephaistion, Leonnatos,
Krateros and Perdikkas

by

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ABSTRACT

It scarcely needs saying that few men, if any, have so dominated the history of their own times as has Alexander the Great; his is a curious hybrid of history and biography. In 1925/26 Helmut Berve took the first step in "decentralising" the history of Alexander by publishing his all-embracing study, *Das Alexanderreich auf prosopographischer Grundlage*, in two volumes, perhaps the most workable and thorough such study in the field of ancient Greek history. But we have not advanced far beyond that first step in the intervening fifty-one years; rather than a stimulus for further study, Berve's work - possibly on account of its thoroughness - has become a crutch for Alexander-scholars, a convenient catalogue of names and facts, too often a substitute for the testimony of the original sources.

When we consider minor individuals, about whom little is known and less has been written, we shall not go far wrong by consulting Berve's reference work; though, it should be noted, even here his interpretations are often marred by poor judgment (see footnotes *passim*). But for the most important figures, the most powerful men in Alexander's empire, we must ask if their careers and characters can be adequately summarised in a mere three to five pages. Clearly they cannot be.

In the cases of the four individuals with whom this study is concerned, Berve's *vitae* are particularly unsatisfactory. Only Hephaistion, who died in 324 B.C., is treated from beginning to end; Leonnatos, Krateros and Perdikkas, who outlived the King, leave much to be commented on. This is especially true of Perdikkas, whose role in the events of 323-321 B.C. was far more brilliant and controversial than his career up to Alexander's death. There are of course the articles of G. Plaumann (*RE* VIII.1 [1912] 291-296, s.v. "Hephaistion [3]") and Fr. Geyer (*RE* XII.2 [1925] 2035-2038, s.v. "Leonnatos [1]"; XIX.1 [1937] 604-614, s.v. "Perdikkas [4]"; and *Supplbd* IV [1924] 1038-1048, s.v. Krateros [1a]), but these are more compressed and, consequently, less inclined toward interpretation; they are also more prone to error than Berve's incomplete entries.

Other modern scholars shed more light on the "marshals of the *Alexanderreich*" - most notably E. Badian, F. Schachermeyr, A.B. Bosworth, R.M. Errington and G. Wirth -, but their works often rely heavily on the material adduced by Berve. Many others are content with mere generalisations: hence Hephaistion is at one time Alexander's foremost commander, at another his incompetent minion; Perdikkas is both middle-aged and in the bloom of youth; Krateros high in Alexander's esteem or a man neglected by Alexander, the generals, even the troops.

Only a fresh study of the primary evidence will help to unravel the mysteries of these men who laboured in the shadow of Alexander and continue to do so in the pages of his historians.

I focus attention on the marshals of Alexander's empire: Hephaistion, Leonnatos, Krateros and Perdikkas. The evidence, subjected to careful scrutiny, yields many new interpretations; often it is baffling. Not all new interpretations are significant, nor every re-interpretation original. But, if I have produced four biographical studies that are internally consistent and - what is more important - based on the evidence rather than on misleading preconceptions, then I have shed new light on Alexander himself.

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TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS

Beloch, <i>GG</i> ²	<i>Griechische Geschichte</i> . (2nd ed.), 4 vols, Berlin and Leipzig, 1912-1927.
Bengtson, <i>Die Strategie</i>	<i>Die Strategie in der hellenistischen Zeit: Ein Beitrag zum antiken Staatsrecht (Münchener Beiträge zur Papyrussforschung und antiken Rechtsgeschichte, Heft 26)</i> , Munich, 1937.
Berve 1-2	<i>Das Alexanderreich auf prosopographischer Grundlage</i> , 2 vols, Munich, 1925-1926.
Breloer, <i>Kampf gegen Poros</i>	<i>Alexanders Kampf gegen Poros</i> , Stuttgart, 1933.
Breloer, <i>Bund mit Poros</i>	<i>Alexanders Bund mit Poros: Indien von Dareios zu Sandrokottos (Sammlung orientalistischen Arbeiten 9)</i> , Leipzig, 1941.
Briant, <i>Antigone le Borgne</i>	<i>Antigone le Borgne: Les Débuts de sa Carrière et les Problèmes de l'Assemblée Macédonienne (Centre de Recherches d'Histoire Ancienne, vol. 10)</i> , Paris, 1973.
Carney, <i>Macedonian Aristocracy</i>	<i>Alexander the Great and the Macedonian Aristocracy</i> , Diss. Duke University, 1975.
Cloch�, <i>La Dislocation</i>	<i>La Dislocation d'un Empire: Les premiers Successeurs d'Alexandre le Grand</i> , Paris, 1969.
Dittenberger, <i>Syll.</i> ³	<i>Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum</i> (3rd ed.), vol. 1, Leipzig, 1915.
Droysen, <i>Hellenismus</i> 1-2	<i>Geschichte des Hellenismus</i> . (3rd ed.), vols 1-2, Basle, 1952.
Ellis, <i>Philip II</i>	<i>Philip II and Macedonian Imperialism</i> , London, 1976.
Fontana, <i>Le Lotte</i>	<i>Le Lotte per la Successione di Alessandro Magno dal 323 al 315</i> , Palermo, 1960.

- Fox *Alexander the Great*, London, 1973.
- Fuller, *Generalship* *The Generalship of Alexander the Great*, London, 1958.
- Granier, *Die makedonische Heeresversammlung* *Die makedonische Heeresversammlung: Ein Beitrag zum antiken Staatsrecht (Münchener Beiträge zur Papyrusforschung und antiken Rechtsgeschichte, Heft 13)*, Munich, 1931.
- Green *Alexander of Macedon*, Harmondsworth, 1974.
- Griffith, *Main Problems* *Alexander the Great: The Main Problems*, Cambridge, 1966.
- Hamilton, *PA* *Plutarch, Alexander: A Commentary*, Oxford, 1969.
- Hamilton, *Alexander the Great* *Alexander the Great*, London, 1973.
- Hoffmann, *Die Makedonen* *Die Makedonen: ihre Sprache und ihr Volkstum*, Göttingen, 1906.
- Jacoby, *FGrHist* *Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker*, Berlin and Leiden, 1923-(in progress).
- Kaerst, *Hellenismus 1-2* *Geschichte des Hellenismus* (3rd edition), Berlin and Leipzig, vol. 1 (1927), vol. 2 (1926).
- Kornemann, *Die Alexander-geschichte* *Die Alexandergeschichte des Königs Ptolemaios I. von Aegypten*, Leipzig, 1935.
- Macurdy, *Hellenistic Queens* *Hellenistic Queens: A Study of Woman-Power in Macedonia, Seleucid Syria and Ptolemaic Egypt (Johns Hopkins University Studies in Archaeology, no. 14)*, Baltimore, 1932.
- Milns *Alexander the Great*, London, 1968.
- Müller, *FHG* *Fragmenta Historicorum Graecorum*, 5 vols, Paris, 1841-1870.

- Niese 1 *Geschichte der griechischen und makedonischen Staaten seit der Schlacht bei Chaeroneia*, vol. 1, Gotha, 1893, repr. Darmstadt, 1963.
- Pearson, LHA *The Lost Histories of Alexander the Great*, New York, 1960.
- Schachermeyr, *Ingenium und Macht* *Alexander der Grosse: Ingenium und Macht*, Graz, 1949.
- Schachermeyr, *Alexander in Babylon* *Alexander in Babylon und die Reichsordnung nach seinem Tode*, Vienna, 1970.
- Schachermeyr, *Alexander der Grosse* *Alexander der Grosse: Das Problem seiner Persönlichkeit und seines Wirkens*, Vienna, 1973.
- Schaefer, *Demosthenes* 3 *Demosthenes und seine Zeit*, vol. 3, Leipzig, 1887.
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- Smith, EHI *The Early History of India (From 600 B.C. to the Muhammadan Conquest, including the Invasion of Alexander the Great)*, 4th ed., revised by S.M. Edwardes, Oxford, 1924.
- Strasburger, *Ptolemaios und Alexander* *Ptolemaios und Alexander*, Leipzig, 1934.
- Tarn, CAH 6 *The Cambridge Ancient History*, vol. 6, Cambridge, 1927, repr. 1964.
- Tarn 1-2 *Alexander the Great*, 2 vols, Cambridge, 1948.

Vezin, *Eumenes von Kardia*

Eumenes von Kardia, Diss. Tübingen, 1907.

Welles, *Alexander and the
Hellenistic World*

Alexander and the Hellenistic World,
Toronto, 1970.

Wilcken

Alexander the Great, G.C. Richards tr.,
with introduction and notes by E.N.
Borza, New York, 1967; first German
publication, 1931.

INTRODUCTION

In spring or summer 337 Philip II took a new wife, Kleopatra, the niece of Attalos.¹ There had been other wives, before and after Olympias, but this marriage was different. It was not merely because Philip married Kleopatra as a matter of policy, on which basis he took all his wives, according to Satyros.² Nor was it because Kleopatra was Macedonian; for there had been Phila the Elimiot.³ According to Plutarch,⁴ Philip loved the girl, but this will scarcely have dishonoured Olympias; possessive and jealous though she was, she had long since transferred her affections to her son. Yet now Philip had taken a wife, young and of noble, Macedonian, descent; the household, the Court, indeed the very State, were thrown into turmoil.

¹ Satyros *ap.* Athen. 13.557D-E = *FHG* III, fr. 5; Athen. 13.560C; Arr. 3.6.5; Plut. *Alex.* 9.6-7; Diod. 16.93.9; 17.2.3; Justin 9.5.8-9; 9.7.12; Ps.-Kall. 1.20-21; Jul. Val. 1.13. For the date see, most recently, J.R. Ellis, *Philip II* 302, notes 3 and 4. P. Green, 87ff., believes the marriage took place in 338 (autumn), for he proposes two children by Philip and Kleopatra, Europe (so Satyros *ap.* Athen. 13.557E) and Karanos (Justin 9.7.3; 11.2.3; seemingly corroborated by Paus. 8.7.7). This date cannot be correct since (1) Philip probably did not return to Macedonia until spring 337, so C.A. Roebuck, "The Settlements of Philip II with the Greek States in 338 B.C.," *CP* 43 (1948) 73-92; cf. A. Schaefer, *Demosthenes* III.37ff., esp. 62-65; see also T.T.B. Ryder, *Koine Eirene*, London, 1965, 150-162; (2) Karanos certainly did not exist, so Tarn 2.260-262; cf. A.R. Burn's review of Tarn's book in *JHS* 67 (1947) 143.

² Satyros *ap.* Athen. 13.557B: ὁ δὲ Φίλιππος αἰεὶ κατὰ πόλεμον ἐγάμεν.

³ Possibly the aunt of Alexander's friend and treasurer, Harpalos; cf. Berve 2.440.

⁴ Plut. *Alex.* 9.6; Satyros *ap.* Athen. 13.557D.

Philip was serious about the girl, this is certain. He changed her name to Eurydike, in the fashion of Macedonian queens,⁵ and he undoubtedly expressed a desire to have a son by her. But as for Olympias, her power at Court was not harmed, even if her *ego*. This power she owed not to the fact that she was Philip's wife - there had been five others, now a sixth - but to her position as mother of Philip's only possible heir; that is to exclude, as must be done, Philine's son, the mentally defective Arrhidaïos.⁶ That Philip should desire another son was not unreasonable, either from a personal or political standpoint. But that he intended to supplant Alexander, who had proven himself able and in many respects his father's son, with an infant son of Kleopatra is unlikely.

⁵ Arr. 3.6.5 is the only source to call her Eurydike. But this will not mean, as Berve 2.213 (citing R. Schneider, *Olympias, die Mutter Alexanders des Grossen*, Zwickau, 1886, 18, 1; the work is inaccessible to me) suggests, that her name was Eurydike before marriage; for this view cf. also Kornemann, *Die Alexandergeschichte* 129, n.83; Hamilton, *PA* 24; but Tarn 2.262, n.1 thinks this is an error on Arrian's part. Eurydike developed into a dynastic name, so G. Macurdy, *Hellenistic Queens* 23-25. It was the name of Philip's Illyrian mother, Eurydike I (Plut. *de liberis educandis* 20 = p.14B; *Suda* s.v. Κάρανος; Libanios, *Argumentum orationum Demosthenicarum* 18); Philip's first wife, Audata, also Illyrian, took the name; see J. Kaerst, *RE* VI.1 (1907) 1326, s.v. "Eurydike (15)"; cf. Arr. *Succ.* 1.22; Ailian, *VH* 13.36. The name was also given to Adeia (or Hadea; Berve 2.12-13, no. 23, s.v. 'Αδέα), daughter of Kynnane (Audata-Eurydike's daughter) and Amyntas Perdikka, when she married Philip Arrhidaïos; see Polyainos 8.60; Kaerst, *loc. cit.*, s.v. "Eurydike (13)"; Douris, *FGrHist* 76 F52 = Athen. 13.560C; the name-change is recorded by Arr. *Succ.* 1.23.

⁶ See Berve 2.385-386, no. 781, s.v. Φύλιππος Ἀρριδαῖος; Kaerst, *RE* II.1 (1895) 1248-1249, s.v. "Arridaïos (4)." For his mental state, Plut. *de fort. Al.* 2.5 = *Mor.* 337D; Justin 13.12.11; 14.5.2; App. *Syr.* 52 (οὐκ ἔμφορα); Porphy. *Tyr.* = *FHG* III, fr. 4; the Heidelberg Epitome 1 calls him ἐπιληπτικός, see the comments of G. Bauer, *Die Heidelberger Epitome: Eine Quelle zur Diadochengeschichte*, Leipzig, 1914, 26-27.

Philip was an astute politician: he could not have considered leaving Macedonia without a mature heir to the throne. So much, at least, will have been apparent to Philip.

The Macedonian aristocracy saw it quite differently. They will have made no secret of their disapproval of Olympias, this Epeirot Medea who had been Philip's wife of twenty years.⁷ And thus it is significant that the cause of the estrangement of Philip from Alexander and Olympias was not his act of marrying Kleopatra but the manner in which the nobility interpreted its meaning. At the wedding-feast it was Attalos, not Philip, who prayed for "*legitimate* heirs for the Macedonians."⁸ And it was surely only when Alexander, justifiably offended by the remark, disrupted the banquet and withdrew into exile, together with his mother, that Philip became truly alienated from wife and son. That the drunken bridegroom turned upon his son in a fit of rage is understandable, especially in the Macedonian context. A sober Philip was awake to the political realities of the situation, and all his actions thereafter, until the time of his assassination, reflect a determination

⁷ Alexander was born about July 356; cf. Hamilton, *PA* 7; thus the marriage dates to 357. For Olympias see Berve 2.283-288, no. 581, s.v. 'Ολυμπιάς; H. Strasburger, *RE* XVIII.1 (1939) 177-182, s.v. "Olympias (5)"; Macurdy, *Hellenistic Queens* 22-46; Tritsch, *Olympias. Die Mutter Alexanders des Grossen*, Frankfurt, 1936, aims at the general reader. Cf. also F. Reuss, "König Arybbas von Epeiros," *Rh. Mus.* 36 (1881) 161ff.; R.M. Errington, "Arybbas the Molossian," *GRBS* 16 (1975) 41, n.1. On the parallel with Medea, Plut. *Alex.* 10.7, quoting Euripides, *Medea* 288; cf. H. Willrich's apt description: "Dies Teufelsweib hat hinglänglich gezeigt, dass sie zu allem fähig war..." (*Hermes* 34 [1899] 175).

⁸ Athen. 13.557D; the story cannot be traced to a source earlier than Satyros; cf. Ellis, *Philip II* 214-215; Plut. *Alex.* 9.7; Ps.-Kall. 1.20-21; Jul. Val. 1.13 speaks of Lysias, clearly a mistake for Attalos.

to achieve stability at home before his departure for Asia.

Philip could have foreseen the dangers of alienating his son, and for this reason alone we may suspect that he had had no intention of doing so. But he had not reckoned - or at least not fully - with the attitudes of the Macedonian nobility and Alexander's own feelings of insecurity.⁹

At this time the Macedonian nobles closed their ranks in response to Philip's union with Kleopatra; this amounted to a realignment of the existing network of affiliations. What these were at the time of Philip's accession, we cannot say, for want of evidence. But Philip undoubtedly owed his position to the support of a powerful and interrelated faction of the aristocracy. Now Attalos himself took to wife one of Parmenion's daughters,¹⁰ the old general no doubt thinking that associations with Attalos would prove beneficial. Another of his daughters Parmenion married to Koinos, son of Polemokrates, later one of Alexander's leading generals.¹¹ Philip's commander, Antipatros,

⁹ Cf. E. Badian, "The Death of Philip II," *Phoenix* 17 (1963) 245-246; Hamilton, "Alexander's Early Life," *G & R* 12 (1965) 120-121. See also U. Köhler, "Über das Verhältniss Alexander's des Grossen zu seinem Vater Philipp," *Sitzb. d. Akademie der Wissenschaften, Berlin*, 1892, 497-514.

¹⁰ Curt. 6.9.18. J. Rufus Fears, "Pausanias, The Assassin of Philip II," *Athenaeum* 53 (1975) 133, n.77, believes that "the alleged marriage of Philotas' sister to Attalus, found in no other source, is...an invention." I find Curtius' information more likely to be true than not, especially in view of the extensive Macedonian marriage-alliances. His evidence about Koinos is corroborated by Arrian; see n.11 below.

¹¹ Curt. 6.9.30. We are told by Arr. 1.24.1 that Koinos, himself a newly-wed, led the *νοτάτοι* back to Macedonia in winter 334/3 and rejoined Alexander at Gordion in spring (Arr. 1.29.4). For Koinos see Berve 2.215-218, no. 439, s.v. *Κοῖνος*.

wed his daughter to Alexandros, son of Aëropos, of the Lynkestian royal house, possibly also at this time.¹² Perdikkas, of the royal family of Orestis, was the brother-in-law of Attalos, son of Andromenes; both took vengeance on Philip's assassin Pausanias.¹³ Another of Andromenes' sons, Amyntas, was intimate with Parmenion's son, Philotas, who in turn was a contemporary and friend of the deposed heir to the Macedonian throne, Amyntas Perdikka.¹⁴ His allegiance Philip had already secured through marriage to his eldest daughter (Amyntas' cousin) Kynnane.¹⁵

This formidable system of affiliations, which was likely more extensive than our sources indicate, must have reinforced Alexander's feelings of isolation; his own personal friends, as far as we can tell, do not appear to have been adherents of this powerful faction.¹⁶

¹² Curt. 7.1.7; Justin 11.7.1; 12.14.1. The name of Antipatros' daughter is not known. See Berve 2.17-19, no. 37, s.v. 'Αλέξανδρος.

¹³ Diod. 16.94.4; cf. Fears, *op. cit.*, n.10; see Berve 2.90, no. 177, s.v. 'Αταλάντη; the fact that she was with the fleet in 321/o could imply, however, that the marriage took place only shortly before that date. See also Berve 2.92-93, no. 181, s.v. "Ατταλος; 2.308-309, no. 614, s.v. Πασσανίας; and 2.313-316, no. 627, s.v. Περδίκκας, and my Chapter 4.

¹⁴ On the relationship of the sons of Andromenes to Philotas, Curt. 7.1.10-11; see Berve nos. 57, 181, 644, 704; see also Berve 2.393-397, no. 802, s.v. Φιλώτας. For Amyntas Perdikka and Philotas, Curt. 6.10.24; cf. Berve 2.30-31, no. 61, s.v. 'Αμύντας.

¹⁵ Berve 2.229, no. 456, s.v. Κυννάνη; Arr. *Succ.* 1.22 (where the form Κυνάνη occurs); Polyainos 8.60 (Κύννα). For the name O. Hoffmann, *Die Makedonen* 219. Macurdy, *Hellenistic Queens* 48-49, dates the marriage to 340, when Kynnane was about 17-18 years old. Ellis, *Philip II* 217, assumes that the marriage belongs to 337/6. But see also Beloch *GG*² 3.2.69.

¹⁶ Hamilton, *G & R* 12 (1965) 120.

And, although recalled from exile through the agency of Demaratos of Korinth, Alexander will have felt even more threatened by his father's intention of wedding Arrhidaïos to a Karian princess and by the banishment of his companions.¹⁷

To an extent, Alexander must have been encouraged by the departure of Attalos and Parmenion for Asia in the spring of 336, and by the impending marriage of his sister, Kleopatra, to her uncle Alexandros of Epeiros;¹⁸ Kleopatra-Eurydike, now several months pregnant, was nevertheless a cause of anxiety. But when, at the actual wedding-ceremony at Aigai in summer 336, Pausanias struck down Philip, at the instigation either of the Lynkestians or of the brooding Olympias herself,¹⁹ Alexander found himself in a precarious situation, entirely dependent upon the whim of this powerful noble faction. It was indeed fortunate for Alexander that

¹⁷ Plut. *Alex.* 10.1-4; Arr. 3.6.5 is less specific. See A.B. Bosworth, *JHS* 93 (1973) 258; Ellis, *Philip II* 218; Badian, *Phoenix* 17 (1963) 245; Hamilton, *G & R* 12 (1965) 121; *PA* 25. See also Berve 2.320, no. 640, s.v. Πυρρόδαρος; Köhler, *op. cit.*, n.9, 502-503.

¹⁸ Diod. 16.91.4; Justin 9.6.1; 13.6.4. See Berve 2.19-21, no. 38, s.v. Ἀλέξανδρος; 2.212-213, no. 433, s.v. Κλεοπάτρα; Kaerst, *RE* I.1 (1893) 1409-1410, s.v. "Alexandros (6)"; F. Stähelin, *RE* XI.1 (1921) 735-738, s.v. "Kleopatra (13)"; Macurdy, *Hellenistic Queens* 22ff., esp. 30-31. P. Green's (97) view of Alexandros' attitude, i.e., that "this recalcitrant young man,...impervious to claims of nepotism and pederasty,...might...find some attraction in an incestuous marriage," is the product of an over-fertile imagination.

¹⁹ H. Willrich, "Wer liess König Philipp von Makedonien ermorden?" *Hermes* 34 (1899) 174-182, concludes that Persian gold induced the sons of Aëropos to instigate the murder of Philip. Badian, *Phoenix* 17 (1963) 244-250, argues that Alexander had every reason to procure Philip's assassination; his arguments are, as Fox (505) points out, Niebuhr's revived (*Niebuhr's Lectures on Ancient History*, tr. Dr.

Attalos and Parmenion happened to be in Asia, and that Kleopatra's child had in fact turned out to be a girl.²⁰ But the nation might very well, as Plutarch says, have looked to the Lynkestians and to Amyntas Perdikka.²¹ Antipatros' action at this moment appears, therefore, somewhat difficult to explain. He presented Alexander to the army, by whom he was acclaimed "King of the Macedonians." Antipatros, however, neither averted suspicion from the sons of Aëropos nor saved them from a trumped-up charge, if such it was;²²

Leonard Schmitz, vol. 2, London, 1852, 307-311); Badian's case for Alexander's guilt is certainly not "conclusive," despite Hamilton's claims (*G & R* 12 [1965] 120, n.6). That Pausanias acted from a purely personal motive is argued by K. Kraft, *Der 'rationale' Alexander, Frankfurter Althistorische Studien*, Heft 5, Frankfurt, 1971; see the reviews by Bosworth, *JHS* 93 (1973) 256-258, and Badian, *Gnomon* 47 (1975) 48-58. J. Rufus Fears, *Athenaeum* 53 (1975) 111-135, also believes that Pausanias acted from a personal motive. Bosworth, "Philip II and Upper Macedonia," *CQ* n.s. 21 (1971) 93-105, revives the charges against the Lynkestians.

²⁰ Satyros *ap.* Athen. 13.557E; the *filia* of Justin 9.7.12.

²¹ Plut. *de fort. Al.* 1.3 = *Mor.* 327C: πᾶσα δ' ὕπουλος ἦν Μακεδονία πρὸς Ἀμύνταν ἀποβλέπουσα καὶ τοὺς Ἀερόπου παῖδας. See J.R. Ellis, "Amyntas Perdikka, Philip II and Alexander the Great: A Study in Conspiracy," *JHS* 91 (1971) 15-24. This otherwise stimulating discussion is marred by a chronological error: Ellis suggests that "Amyntas Perdikka was captured and executed (not, as we now see, because Alexander was simply insecure, but on a genuine charge of treason), and his execution fell, as Justin's order of presentation implies, between the fall of Thebes in October 335 and the beginning of the Persian expedition in Spring 334" (21). Now the date given by Arrian (*Succ.* 1.22) for Amyntas' death is vague, and perhaps due to the epitomator, but it is clear from Arrian's *Anabasis* (1.5.4-5) that Amyntas perished probably during the winter 336/5 (as we should expect); for Kynnane, Amyntas' wife, was offered by Alexander to Langaros, King of the Agriani, in late spring or summer 335, at which time she must have been widowed (Green's theory, 141, about Alexander's "macabre sense of humour" is pure gibberish). See Berve 2.230, no. 460, s.v. Λάγγαρος. Cf. Schaefer, *Demosthenes* III.101, n.3; Macurdy, *Hellenistic Queens* 49; Bosworth, *CQ* n.s. 21 (1971) 103, n.4.

²² For the theory that the Lynkestians were in fact guilty see Bosworth, *op. cit.*, n.19; cf. earlier view of Willrich, *op. cit.*, n.19.

yet, in this manner, he may in fact have been serving his own interests. Perhaps he did not feel secure in promoting the cause of the Lynkestians against a powerful faction from Lower Macedonia; his own position could better be served by Alexander, who had the confidence of the army and who would undoubtedly take vengeance on Attalos. As for Alexandros of Lynkestis, he was spared (doubtless through the coaching of his father-in-law) by being the first to hail his namesake as the new King.²³

The Macedonians were realists: marriages were largely political alliances, the purges that accompanied throne-disputes a deadly game. Hasty realignment followed, and Antipatros abandoned the sons of Aëropos, with the exception of Alexandros, while Parmenion sacrificed his son-in-law, Attalos, at Alexander's behest.²⁴ Support of Alexander became a necessity, but it was not without a certain reluctance; to this, at least, the rumblings of discontent throughout Alexander's campaigns bear witness.

In spite of the purge that followed the assassination of Philip, in which Amyntas Perdikka, Alexander's most dangerous rival, was murdered, the established nobility still occupied key positions in the Macedonian army, especially the adherents of the house of Parmenion.²⁵

²³ Arr. 1.25.2; Curt. 7.1.6-7; Justin 11.2.2.

²⁴ Through the agency of Hekataios, according to Diod. 17.2.5-6; 17.5.2. See Berve 2.148, no. 292, s.v. Ἡκταῖος. But for a different view see Curt. 7.1.3: (sc. Parmenio) ...amicus et ipsi Alexandro tam fidus, ut occidendi Attalum non alio ministro uti mallet. See also L. Edmunds, "The Religiosity of Alexander," *GRBS* 12 (1971) 367.

²⁵ See Berve nos. 295, 554, 802, s.vv. Ἐκτωρ, Νικάνωρ, Φιλώτας. Also Badian, "The Death of Parmenio," *TAPA* 91 (1960) 327-329, and E.D. Carney, *Alexander the Great and the Macedonian Aristocracy*, Diss. Duke Univ., 1975.

These could mount a formidable opposition to Alexander, given the opportunity and the motive. But they also represented an obstacle to the young commanders and friends of Alexander, who are the subjects of this study. Alexander was unfettered by the events and the outcome of the Philotas-affair; it was an "acknowledged turning-point" in his career.²⁶ But, as it represented the decline of the established nobility, it marked the emergence of a new group of ambitious nobles, who were closely associated with Alexander himself. These men had their grievances against the house of Parmenion and its affiliates, and they played no small part in bringing about its destruction. For this reason it is profitable to examine (i) the family of Kleopatra-Eurydike and (ii) the fall of Parmenion's faction.

(i) *The Family of Kleopatra-Eurydike.*

The ancient sources tell us little about Kleopatra-Eurydike or her origins. She was the niece of a certain Attalos, who belonged to the Macedonian nobility;²⁷ this is frequently attested.

²⁶ Badian, *op. cit.*, n.25, 324; Edmunds, *op. cit.*, n.24, 363.

²⁷ Plut. *Alex.* 9.7; Satyros *ap.* Athen. 13.557D; Paus. 8.7.7; the relationship is confused by Diodoros (17.2.3) and Justin (9.5.8-9), who make Attalos Kleopatra's brother, though Diod. 16.93.9 says he was her nephew. Jul. Val. 1.13 has Kleopatra as Attalos' daughter, while Ps.-Kall. 1.20-21 names Lysias (clearly Attalos is meant) as Kleopatra's brother. P. Green's stemma (587) attempts, unwisely, to reconcile the variants by postulating a brother, as well as an uncle, of Kleopatra, named Attalos; but this defeats the purpose of source-criticism. See also Hoffmann, *Die Makedonen* 157.

But there is only one further reference to her origin: Satyros informs us that she was the sister of a certain Hippostratos, as well as Attalos' niece. There is no other explicit statement about her family, though there is much that can be deduced from evidence hitherto disregarded. The clue to the family of Kleopatra-Eurydike rests, I believe, with the identity of a certain Hegelochos, the admiral of Alexander's fleet.²⁸

Quintus Curtius,²⁹ recounting the trial and torture of Philotas, claims that Hegelochos conspired with Parmenion in Egypt, but that Parmenion was opposed to taking action against Alexander while Dareios III was still alive; the incident is generally held to be fictitious. E. Badian, for example, writes: "Curtius...has a story of a plot between Parmenio and Hegelochus (then dead), which Philotas is said to have divulged under torture. Since no charge was in fact brought against Parmenio, it is almost certain that none could be: the plot with Hegelochus must be an effort of later *apologia*."³⁰ Other modern scholars have ignored the story as well, or simply dismissed it out of hand.³¹ But who invented this con-

²⁸ See Berve 1.160-161 and 2.164-165, no. 341, s.v. 'Hγέλοχος; Sundwall, *RE* VII.2 (1912) 2594, s.v. "Hegelochos (1)," is of little use. See Hoffmann, *Die Makedonen* 183, with n.91. On his command of the fleet see H. Hauben, "The Command Structure in Alexander's Mediterranean Fleets," *Anc. Soc.* 3 (1972) 55-65, esp. 56-58; "The Expansion of Macedonian Sea-Power under Alexander the Great," *Anc. Soc.* 7 (1976) 82-87; and also A. Baumbach, *Kleinasien unter Alexander dem Grossen*, Diss. Jena, publ. Weida, 1911, 49ff.

²⁹ Curt. 6.11.22-29.

³⁰ Badian, *TAPA* 91 (1960) 332.

³¹ Rejected by J. Rufus Fears, *Athenaeum* 53 (1975) 133, n.77, it is

spiracy and why? What reason for naming Hegelochos as Parmenion's fellow-conspirator? When Hegelochos is identified, an answer will emerge.

We first encounter Hegelochos as a commander of *σκόποι* at the Granikos River (Arr. 1.12.7; 13.1), where he is subordinate to Amyntas (Berve, no.59), son of Arrhabaios (the executed brother of Lynkestian Alexandros). This connexion is, as I shall demonstrate, more than coincidental in view of the "stranglehold"³² that the established nobility had on principal commands in the army. When Alexander left Gordion in spring 333, he sent Hegelochos to the coast with orders to build a new fleet at the Hellespont (Arr. 2.3.4).³³ After a successful campaign with the fleet, he appears to have handed over naval affairs to Amphoterios, the brother of Krateros, and rejoined Alexander in Egypt in the winter of 332/1.³⁴ He reappears, for the last time, at Gaugamela (Arr.3.11.8),

ignored by the recent monographs of Green, Schachermeyr and Hamilton; Fox mentions Hegelochos (289), inaccurately and without a judgment on the historicity of the incident. Berve treats the matter with caution (2.165).

³² Badian, *TAPA* 91 (1960) 329.

³³ Curt. 3.1.19: *Amphoterum classi ad oram Hellesponti, copiis autem praefecit Hegelochum, Lesbium et Chium COUNQUE praesidiis hostium liberaturos*. The apparent contradiction of Arr. 3.2.6 (seen by Berve 1.161 and 2.32, no. 68, s.v. 'Αμφοτερός) is perhaps explained by Hauben, *Ant. Soc.* 3 (1972) 57, who sees this as "a diarchic fleet command", in which "the head of the marines also functioned as the supreme commander of the whole formation." Thus Amphoterios controlled the purely naval matters, under Hegelochos' direction.

³⁴ Arr. 3.2.3.

an *iliarch* in Philotas' Companion Cavalry. There it seems he may have lost his life; Arrian says nothing further about him, Curtius speaks of him as having died in battle before the Philotas-affair took place (6.11.22: *illum dico Hegelochum qui in acie cecidit*).

It was in Egypt, Curtius says, that Hegelochos conspired with Parmenion. This charge against him warrants investigation. Curtius reports that, through the urging of Koinos, Krateros and Hephaistion, Philotas was tortured in order to gain a confession (6.11.10), though it is clear that the action was intended to extort an admission of Parmenion's complicity in the Dimmos-affair.³⁵ Of Dimmos' crime Philotas, at first, denied all knowledge (*quod ad Dymnum pertinet nihil scio*, 6.11.30), although he admitted that a certain Hegelochos, incensed by Alexander's *Ammonssohnschaft* (*cum primum Iovis filium se salutari iussit rex*, 6.11.23), conspired with Parmenion to murder Alexander. Parmenion, however, approved the measure only if Dareios were dead (6.11.29), and the actual conspiracy came to naught.

Whether Philotas did in fact confess to the Hegelochos-affair or whether it was merely so reported by Alexander's agents, the charge was made: it had equal value for Alexander whether it was exacted under duress or merely invented. But, if Alexander's agents presented a fabricated charge, then *they* must have known something about Hegelochos that made his participation in such a conspiracy plausible. Now Badian alleges that "no charge was in fact brought

³⁵ See Berve 2.142-143, no. 269, s.v. Δύμνος. For the name see Hoffmann, *Die Makedonen* 206.

against Parmenio" (*supra*), but this is not so; for undoubtedly, in the version of Curtius, the charges brought against Parmenion included his alleged dealings with Hegelochos. And charges were clearly brought against him. To Polydamas, the bearer of Parmenion's writ of execution, Alexander says: *scelere...Parmenionis omnes pariter appetiti* (7.2.13). More explicitly, we are told that charges of some sort were used to justify Parmenion's murder by Kleandros and his associates: *Cleander primores eorum* (Parmenion's troops) *intromitti iubet litterasque regis scriptas ad milites recitat, quibus insidiae Parmenionis in regem...continebantur* (7.2.30). It follows that the charges extorted from Philotas were used in condemnation of Parmenion.

The story appears to have some substance; we are reminded of the *epiboule* of Philotas, related by Arrian and Plutarch,³⁶ which also took place in Egypt and was the result of the same grievances. It is clear that Alexander's journey to the oasis of Siwah and his rejection of Philip as his father exacerbated an already uneasy feeling in the Macedonian army.³⁷ But the existence of a hostile faction antedates the *Ammonssohnschaft* and - as is certainly true

³⁶ Arr. 3.26.1; Plut. *Alex.* 48.1-49.2; *de fort. Al.* 2.7 = *Mor.* 339E-F.

³⁷ Berve 2.165 concludes that Hegelochos' naming as a conspirator with Parmenion made him "ein Träger der philippischen Tradition." The matter is brought to a head by the affair of Kleitos; cf. Berve 2.206-208, no. 427, s.v. Κλειτος; also F. Cauer, *Philotas, Kleitos, Kallisthenes: Beiträge zur Geschichte Alexanders des Grossen, Jahrbücher für kl. Philologie*, Supplbd 20 (1894) 38-58; R. Schubert, "Der Tod des Kleitos," *Rh. Mus.* 53 (1898) 98-120; the conflict between old and new is clear from the primary sources: Plut. *Alex.* 50.1-52.2; Arr. 4.8.1-9.4; Curt. 8.1.19-52.

in Philotas' case - we ought to look for the seeds of Hegelochos' discontent in some earlier event. We must ask, who was Hegelochos?


Arrian (3.11.8) tells us that Hegelochos was the son of Hippostratos. The latter name appears only twice in accounts of the period before 336 (Alexander's accession): Marsyas (*ap. Didymos, Demosth.* col. 13.2) names a certain Hippostratos, son of Amyntas, who died in Philip's Illyrian campaign, while Satyros (*ap. Athen.* 13.557D) says that Hippostratos was the brother of Kleopatra-Eurydike.³⁸ The three references to Hippostratos may very well be to one man, the father of Hegelochos; thus Hegelochos' importance to the history of Alexander lies in his relationship to Kleopatra-Eurydike (his aunt). But there are three major objections; none is insurmountable.

The most serious objection is that of K.J. Beloch: "Ein 'Ηγέλοχος' 'Ιπποστράτου befahl bei Arbela eine Ile der Hetaerenreiterei (Arr. *Anab.* III 11,8); aber Kleopatras Bruder kann nicht wohl einen Sohn gehabt haben, der in 331 alt genug gewesen wäre, ein solches Kommando zu führen...."³⁹ But is this actually the case? We have two approximate ages that can be used in the construction of a stemma for the family of Kleopatra. According to Plutarch (*Alex.* 9.6), Kleopatra was still very young when she married Philip in 337: [Κλεοπάτρα], ἣν ὁ Φίλιππος ἡγάγετο παρθένον, ἐρασθεὺς παρ' ἡλικίαν τῆς κόρης. Berve's estimate that she was

³⁸ Marsyas = *FGrHist* 135/136 F17; Satyros = Müller, *FHG* III, fr.5.

³⁹ Beloch *GG*² 3.2.70.

born *ca* 353 appears to suit Plutarch's description; she may, however, have been considered young in comparison with Olympias, who was now in her late thirties. 355-353 B.C. provides a good, conservative, date for Kleopatra's birth. Berve assumes that Attalos, Kleopatra's uncle, was born *ca* 380, thus being a contemporary of Philip II; he could have been considerably older. If we assume, therefore, that Berve's dates are correct (allowing for some slight adjustments) and that Hippostratos was the son of Amyntas (so Marsyas *ap.* Didymos), then the following stemma emerges.



⁴⁰ This cannot be, as Beloch *GG*² 3.2.70-71 (followed tentatively by Green, 587) suggests, Antiochos, for Amyntas, son of Antiochos, was still alive and active at the time of Alexander's Asian campaign (see Berve 2.28-29, no. 58, s.v. 'Ἀμύντας'); it is unlikely that all the sources would have failed to mention that he was Kleopatra's father, especially Arrian, who records the reasons for his flight: 'Ἀμύντας ὁ Ἀντιόχου, ὃς ἔφυγεν ἐκ Μακεδονίας Ἀλέξανδρον, παθὼν μὲν οὐδὲν πρὸς Ἀλεξάνδρου, δυσνοίᾳ δὲ τῇ πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον καὶ αὐτὸς ἀπαξιῶσας τι παθεῖν πρὸς αὐτοῦ ἄχαρι (1.17.9). No source records that Amyntas, son of Antiochos, was Attalos' brother; instead it is deduced that Amyntas, the father of Kleopatra, was dead and that she was the ward of Attalos (Berve 2.94, 213). These are, I believe, more serious objections than

I consider next the arguments of Felix Stähelin. Speaking of the Hippostratos who died in the Illyrian campaign, Stähelin argues: "man könnte ebensogut an Hippostratos, den Bruder Philipps zweiter Gemahlin Kleopatra denken, den Satyros...in einer Weise erwähnt, die uns vermuten lässt, das der Mann sich irgendwie besonders hervorgetan haben muss."⁴¹ Yet, he concludes: "In keinem Falle ist Hippostratos, der Vater des Hegelochos, mit Hippostratos, dem Bruder der Kleopatra, identisch, denn wir wissen, dass Alexander bei seinem Übergange nach Asien die sämtlichen Verwandten seiner Stiefmutter umbringen liess (Justin 11,5,1)."⁴²

Now, it need not be argued strenuously that Justin should not and need not be taken literally. What he says is precisely this: *Proficiscens ad Persicum bellum omnes novercae suae cognatos, quos Philippus in excelsiorem dignitatis locum provehens imperiis praefererat, interfecit*. But Justin paints a very black picture of Alexander, one of whose chief faults was that *non in hostem, sed in suos saeviebat* (9.8.15). Justin's method of denigrating Alexander

Berve's (2.28, n.2) claim that the name is too common. Nor is Arrian's testimony (*supra*) easily reconciled with Justin's claim that Alexander murdered all Kleopatra's male relatives (11.5.1); this remark is probably false, but we might expect that Kleopatra's father, if anyone, would have been foremost among Alexander's enemies.

⁴¹ F. Stähelin, "Die griechischen Historikerfragmente bei Didymos," *Klio* 5 (1905) 151.

⁴² *Ibid.*

is one that employs generalisations and exaggerations: where Justin clearly knows of only one incident or one victim of Alexander's cruelty, he speaks of many. Thus he alludes to the murder of Kleitos in the following manner: *hic* [sc. *Alexander*] *amicorum interfector convivio frequenter excessit* (9.8.16).⁴³ He speaks of many sons of Philip II, though he can name only one (to except, momentarily, the fictitious Karanos): *Genuit ex Larissaea saltrice filium Arrhidaeum, qui post Alexandrum regnavit. Habuit et multos alios filios ex variis matrimoniis regio more susceptos, qui partim fato, partim ferro periere* (9.8.2-3). Likewise, although he names only one brother (the fictitious Karanos, whose existence is contradicted by Justin himself at 9.7.12), whom Alexander put to death, he speaks of *fratres interfecti* (12.6.14).⁴⁴ Thus, when he says *nec suis, qui apti regno videbantur, pepercit, ne qua materia seditionis procul se agente in Macedonia remaneret* (11.5.2), he has one specific victim in mind, Amyntas Perdikka (*tunc Amyntas consobrinus...interfect[us]*, 12.6.14). And, there is only one relative of Alexander's *noverca* (= Kleopatra) who might be described as [*quem*] *Philippus in excelsiorem dignitatis locum provehens imperiis praefecerat* (11.5.1), and he is Attalos (cf. again 12.6.14); *omnes novercae suae cognatos...interfecti* must be another generalisation. There are numerous

⁴³ Cf. the note of Rev. John Selby Watson, *Justin, Cornelius Nepos and Eutropius*, London, 1910, foot of p.88.

⁴⁴ *Fratres*, a rhetorical plural, so R. Lane Fox, 504.

other examples of generalisations and exaggerations for effect; the above-mentioned are, I believe, sufficient to make the point.⁴⁵ I say nothing about the numerous errors in fact.⁴⁶

We need not base our argument solely on the text (and the method) of Justin. According to all the sources that record her death (and these include Justin), Kleopatra and her daughter were the victims not of Alexander but of Olympias.⁴⁷ On Attalos, however,

⁴⁵ Although one might mention the 115 sons of Artaxerxes or the 600,000 Persians at the Granikos (10.1.1; 11.6.11); to say nothing of the fates of the fifty brothers of Dareios, together with their wives and children (10.1.4ff.)

⁴⁶ Justin's description (9.5.9) of Attalos as Kleopatra's brother is the most blatant example; only a textual emendation saves Lynkestian Alexandros from becoming a brother of Alexander the Great (11.2.2); and for the error involving the sending of Parmenion *ad occupandam Persicam classem* (11.10.4) see Berve 2.301, n.3. These are selected virtually at random, but they are representative of the nature of Justin's account of Alexander.

⁴⁷ Plut. *Alex.* 10.7; it was done against Alexander's wishes; Justin 9.7.12 says that she was forced by Olympias to hang herself; Paus. 8.7.7 says that both mother and son were forced onto a fiery vessel. Karanos, as son of Philip and a wife other than Olympias, has again been resurrected. Tarn rightly did away with him (2.260-262, Appendix 9, "Caranus"); he was followed by A.R. Burn, *JHS* 67 (1947) 143. But Karanos has been accepted as the son of Kleopatra (denying, therefore, the existence of Europe) by Niebuhr, *op. cit.*, n.19, 309; Grote 12.8; Droysen, *Hellenismus* 1.70; C. Bradford Welles, *Alexander and the Hellenistic World*, Toronto, 1970, 15; and as Kleopatra's second child by Fox, 503-504, and P. Green, 108ff. and 523-524. That he was the son of another wife, most likely Phila the Elimiot, is proposed by Willrich, *Hermes* 34 (1899) 177; Stähelin, *RE* XI.1, s.v. "Kleopatra," 734-735; Berve 2.199-200, no. 411, s.v. *Κόρανος*, and 2.213-214; Wilcken, 62; Macurdy, *Hellenistic Queens* 54; Niese 1.52; Schachermeyr, *Ingenium und Macht* 84ff.; *Alexander der Grosse* 102, with n.84, 104; Milns, 18; K. Kraft, *op. cit.*, n.19, 24, n.30. Most recently, Ellis, *Philip II* 306, n.54, correctly supports Tarn. The child is clearly meant to be Kleopatra's (the *noverca* of Justin 11.2.3 must be Kleopatra, as Tarn has proved conclusively). The son mentioned by Pausanias is the same child referred to as *filia* by Justin 9.7.12, and this is Europe, so Satyros *ap.* Athen. 13.557E. See also n.1 *supra*.

Alexander did take vengeance, through the agency of a certain Hekataios, and with the acquiescence of Parmenion.⁴⁸

There is no mention of any other male relatives of Kleopatra. Her father and her brother were already dead before she married Philip in 337, and this will explain why Kleopatra is consistently identified not as the daughter of Amyntas but as the niece of Attalos. At this point, we may consider the third objection to the equating of the individuals named Hipposstratos. Berve writes: "Foucart...und Beloch...vermuten eine Identität mit dem von Didymos...erwähnten, im Illyrerkriege...gefallenen H., doch scheint Satyros...ihn 337 als noch lebend vorauszusetzen."⁴⁹ This objection cannot be allowed to stand. Satyros gives no indication about the brother of Kleopatra, whether he was still alive or had already died; nor can any inference be drawn. But the evidence of Satyros may well tell us something about Kleopatra's family-history. Amyntas may have died before his son, Hipposstratos, and Kleopatra (and possibly her mother) would therefore have passed into the custody of her brother until his death in 344/3. At that time Kleopatra, now between nine and eleven years of age, became the ward of her uncle, Attalos. Thus her only two known male relatives who still lived in 337 were the prominent Attalos and

⁴⁸ Diod. 17.2.5-6; 17.5.2; Curt. 7.1.3; see Berve 2.148, no.292, s.v. 'Εκαταῖος. Badian, *TAPA* 91 (1960) 327; Green 119-120.

⁴⁹ Berve 2.185, no.390, s.v. 'Ιππόστρατος. For this Illyrian campaign see F. Wüst, *Philip II. von Makedonien und Griechenland in den Jahren von 346 bis 338* (*Münchener historische Abhandlungen*, Heft 14, 1938) 54-58.

Kleopatra's nephew Hegelochos, who had only begun his career in the army.

Only a literal interpretation of Justin stands in opposition to equating Hegelochos with the nephew of Kleopatra; I believe that the testimony has been shown to be unreliable. The career of Hegelochos, therefore, proves instructive. When Alexander set out for Asia, he left many enemies, potentially dangerous, alive both in Macedonia and within the army; the series of intrigues and conspiracies that followed the death of Philip II is an adequate testimony to this. Alexander could, and did, eliminate his most dangerous political rivals, but he was forced to adopt a policy of conciliation; for the very basis of his power were the Macedonian nobles, who had supported Philip and who had now realigned themselves in accordance with the needs of the new regime. There were some casualties, but Alexander will have been anxious to limit the slaughter. Peace had been made with Parmenion, but Attalos was the price. Nevertheless, numerous members of the "Attalos-faction" remained alive and in positions of power. Alexandros of Lynkestis came to no harm at this time, though he was later arrested for his intrigues. Yet Alexander could have been expected to fear him on account of the execution of Heromenes and Arrhabaios.⁵⁰ Amyntas, the nephew of Lynkestian Alexandros and the son of the executed Arrhabaios, also retained his rank until the arrest of his uncle led, apparently, to his own fall.⁵¹ And so it comes as no surprise that Hegelochos was also left unharmed. Hippostratos had

⁵⁰ See Berve 2.80, 169, nos. 144, 355, s.vv. Ἀρράβατος, Ἡρομένης.

⁵¹ Berve 2.30.

been Kleopatra's brother, but he was long dead and forgotten by the time that the purge took place. Hegelochos presented no challenge to Alexander's sovereignty and the King could ill afford to extend his feud with Attalos to include even Kleopatra's nephew. The Macedonian nobility were too numerous, too influential and too much interrelated to make such an action feasible. We are reminded of Badian's salutary observation that "Alexander could not afford (and had hardly intended) to engage in wholesale slaughter of the Macedonian nobility."⁵²

Opposition to Alexander, resulting from the problems of the succession of 336, continued until the death of Alexandros of Lynkestis, the *denouement* of the Philotas-affair. Friction continued throughout Alexander's reign between the supporters of Alexander and those whom Schachermeyr terms "altmakedonisch gesinnt."⁵³ In the course of this struggle there were many casualties, and, while Hegelochos appears to have died in battle, there is no reason to suspect that he was not hostile to Alexander and not at least capable of plotting against him. If he was in fact the nephew of Kleopatra, the murder of his aunt will have been fresh in his mind in 332/1. Curtius (or his source) did not invent the incident; if Hegelochos was not Kleopatra's nephew, why did he conspire (or rather why was he charged with conspiring) with Parmenion? Vexation at the *Ammonssohnschaft* alone is not an

⁵² Badian, *TAPA* 91 (1960) 335.

⁵³ Schachermeyr, *Alexander der Grosse* 363.

adequate incentive. Now that we have some clue concerning the family of Hegelochos a more plausible motive for his hitherto disregarded conspiracy emerges. Parmenion extricated Philotas from the dangers brought on by his treasonous grumblings in Egypt; very likely, he dissuaded an angry Hegelochos at that time as well.⁵⁴

The scattered references to Hippostratos, as well as the enigmatic conspiracy of Hegelochos, which Curtius did not invent, provide a valuable insight into the origins of Kleopatra-Eurydike. They also add a new dimension to the political circumstances in which the Philotas-affair stands out as the decisive event, and from which there developed a new power-structure within the Macedonian army.

(ii) *The Fall of Parmenion's Faction.*⁵⁵

From the era of Philip II, Parmenion emerged as Macedon's foremost general; powerful within the army, where his family and its adherents held major commands, he was no less influential at the Court.⁵⁶ Born *ca* 400 B.C.,⁵⁷ Parmenion was a mature commander already when Philip came to the throne in 359. We do not know

⁵⁴ Arr. 3.26.1; cf. Plut. *Alex.* 48.4.

⁵⁵ See W. Heckel, "The Conspiracy Against Philotas," *Phoenix* 31 (1977) 9-21.

⁵⁶ Plut. *Apophth. Phil.* 2 = *Mor.* 177C. See Berve 2.298-306, s.v. Παρμενίων; also Berve, *RE* XVIII.4 (1949) 1559-1565, s.v. "Parmenion (1)."

⁵⁷ Curt. 6.11.32; cf. 7.2.33.

exactly what his connexions were with the aristocratic factions and families of Macedon before Philip's marriage to Kleopatra-Eurydike, but it appears that his son, Philotas, was brought up at the Court with Philip's nephew, Amyntas Perdikka; for the two appear to have been very close in age.⁵⁸ What connexions Parmenion had with Alexander and Olympias and their supporters, we cannot say; Philotas is portrayed as one of Alexander's friends, yet his actions will scarcely have endeared him to Alexander.⁵⁹ Undoubtedly, Parmenion, who could not aspire to the kingship himself, supported Philip politically with the same enthusiasm as he did militarily. Thus, when Philip married Kleopatra, Parmenion brought himself into closer alignment with the King by marrying one of his daughters to Attalos; this union will date to summer or autumn 337, that is, shortly after Philip's own wedding.⁶⁰ Probably before Parmenion's departure for Asia in spring 336,

⁵⁸ See Berve 2.393-397, no. 802, s.v. Φιλώτας; there is, as yet, no article in *RE*. Berve (393) assumes that Philotas was Parmenion's eldest son, as he commanded the Companions, and that he was born "nicht lange vor 360, da er anscheinend zu den Jugendfreunden Al.s gehörte." But both his younger brothers, Hektor and Nikanor, held major commands, and thus his birth-date fell more likely between 365-360, which would make him roughly contemporary with Amyntas Perdikka. Probably they were *syntrophoi* at the Court, where they became close friends (cf. Curt. 6.9.17; 6.10.24). See Berve 2.30-31, no.61, s.v. Ἀμύντας.

⁵⁹ Plut. *Alex.* 10.3: the Pixodaros-affair. Whether Philotas was brought in to shame Alexander or whether he was Philip's informant (so Hamilton, *G & R* 12 [1965] 121, with n.4, translating παραλαβών as "taking as witness"), he must have earned Alexander's ill-will.

⁶⁰ Curt. 6.9.18, and see n.10 *supra*.

Koinos sought and obtained the hand of one of Parmenion's younger daughters (possibly the youngest, in view of Parmenion's age).⁶¹ But Parmenion understood that political marriages are not made in heaven: these served his advantage, and he repudiated his relationship with Attalos soon afterward, again to his advantage.

When Philip's assassination brought with it the downfall of Kleopatra-Eurydike and her faction, Parmenion reacted accordingly. Now it was politically expedient to sacrifice his new son-in-law to Alexander's vengeance. This was Parmenion's token of loyalty, and there is no reason to doubt that Alexander was satisfied.⁶² Hostile factions remained within the Macedonian army, but assassination had been an all-too-convenient means of deposing a Macedonian king; nothing could ensure complete security for the new monarch. Alexander had to secure his position by a careful process of liquidation and conciliation; in the case of Parmenion, in the light of his power within the army, he preferred to opt for conciliation.

Six years later there occurred an incident that has been a vexation to historians, ancient and modern: Philotas was tried and executed on a charge of conspiracy, Parmenion was subsequently

⁶¹ Curt. 6.9.30; Arr. 1.24.1; 1.29.4; see n.11 *supra*. The product of this union was a son named Perdikkas; see W. Dittenberger, *Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum* I³ (Leipzig 1915) 552-553, no. 332; Berve 2.312-313, no. 626, s.v. Περδίκκας.

⁶² Diod. 17.2.5-6; 17.5.2; Curt. 7.1.3; see n.24 *supra*. Cf. L. Edmunds, "The Religiosity of Alexander," *GRBS* 12 (1971) 367.

murdered by Alexander's agents.⁶³ Though Alexander's apologists have been, quite understandably, eager to exculpate him, neither Ptolemy, Aristoboulos, nor even Tarn could escape the conclusion that Parmenion's death was "plain murder and leaves a deep stain on Alexander's reputation."⁶⁴ C.A. Robinson Jr. attempted to attach a certain degree of legality to Parmenion's murder, basing his arguments on an alleged Macedonian *lex*, of which Curtius speaks, but his efforts were so futile that even Tarn could not accept his conclusions.⁶⁵ The standard treatment of the affair is now that of E. Badian: a prosopographic study reveals that Alexander had been steadily "undermining Parmenio's reputation" and "extricating himself from the stranglehold of Parmenio's family and adherents,"⁶⁶ and that "Philotas' 'treason'

⁶³ For these events see F. Cauer, *Jahrbücher fñr kl. Philologie*, Supplbd 20 (1894) 8-38; C.A. Robinson Jr. "Alexander the Great and Parmenio," *AJA* 49 (1945) 422ff.; Tarn 2.270-272, App. 12: "The Murder of Parmenion"; Badian, "The Death of Parmenio," *TAPA* 91 (1960) 324-338; Hamilton, *PA* 134-135; Schachermeyr, *Alexander der Grosse* 326-336; J. Rufus Fears, *Athenaeum* 53 (1975) 132-134; E.D. Carney, *Macedonian Aristocracy* 84ff., but especially "The Destruction of the Parmenion Faction," 111-137; and, for a survey of the major views, J. Seibert, *Alexander der Grosse: Erträge der Forschung*, Darmstadt, 1972, 140-141.

⁶⁴ Tarn 1.64; cf. Ptolemy and Aristoboulos, *FGrHist* 138 F13; 139 F22.

⁶⁵ Robinson, *AJP* 58 (1937) 109, based on Curt. 6.11.20:...*legem Macedonum veriti, qua cautum erat ut propinqui eorum qui regi insidiati essent cum ipsis necarentur*.... These arguments were reiterated in "Alexander's Brutality," *AJA* 56 (1952) 169-170.

⁶⁶ Badian, *TAPA* 91 (1960) 329.

was a transparent fabrication."⁶⁷ Badian concludes, therefore, that Parmenion's murder "was not a panic-stricken reaction to an unforeseen emergency; it must be regarded as an integral part of the same scheme, and indeed, in view of Parmenion's position, as its culmination."⁶⁸ Now this "scheme" of which Badian speaks is the calculated "framing" of Philotas by Alexander; in this process, Hephaistion, Krateros, Koinos and Perdikkas "had shown themselves 'Alexander's men' in the decisive test."⁶⁹

A study of the individuals involved in the affair reveals, I believe, something quite different, and Badian demonstrates a reluctance to reach the obvious conclusion: Philotas was the victim of a faction of young commanders who worked for his elimination. They did not acquiesce in Alexander's calculated scheme to destroy Philotas and Parmenion but, rather, they prevailed upon Alexander, with a view to their own advantage, to show no mercy to Philotas. In order to demonstrate this, I take up each of Badian's points.

(1) *Alexander had been "undermining Parmenion's reputation."*

Certainly there are stories that cast Parmenion in an unfavourable light,⁷⁰ but they do so for two obvious reasons: pro-

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 333.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 333.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 337.

⁷⁰ Arr. 1.13.2ff.; Plut. *Alex.* 16.3; Curt. 3.5.1ff. and 6.10.34f.; Plut. *Alex.* 19; Arr. 2.4.9-10; Diod. 17.54.4; Arr. 2.25.2; Plut.

Alexander propaganda and *apologia*. To say that some of these stories "go back to good sources (Ptolemy and Callisthenes)"⁷¹ does not mean that they are true and, unless they can be proved to derive from Kallisthenes, they were surely written after Parmenion's death. Furthermore, any such story that derives from Kallisthenes (and only one can be assigned to him with certainty⁷²) need not be attributed to a deliberate attempt to undermine Parmenion's reputation. Kallisthenes was the official historian of the Panhellenic crusade (Alexander's salesman to the League of Korinth⁷³) and he wrote with the aim of enhancing the reputation

Alex. 33; Arr. 3.18.11. There are cases in which Parmenion's advice is accepted, or in which Parmenion gives good advice: Diod. 17.16; Curt. 3.7.8-10; Plut. *Alex.* 21.9; Curt. 4.10.16-17; Arr. 3.18.11; or cases in which Parmenion performs loyal service: Arr. 1.25.4ff.; Curt. 7.1.3.

⁷¹ Badian, *TAPA* 91 (1960) 328.

⁷² Plut. *Alex.* 33 = *FGrHist* 124 F37. Kallisthenes charges that Parmenion managed affairs badly (deliberately) at Gaugamela. On this see Hamilton, *PA* 89, and Jacoby IID 429-430, who assert, quite rightly as I think, that this passage (indeed the entire hostile portrait of Parmenion) was written after Parmenion's death. Note also L. Pearson, *LHA* 47, who suggests that the evidence that links Kallisthenes with this hostile portrait is questionable. Undoubtedly, he is correct to assume that the stories were "elaborated by later writers." Beloch's (IV² 2.290-306: Abschnitt XV, "Alexander und Parmenion") attempt to see Parmenion as the military master-mind behind all Alexander's major victories is totally unconvincing. Cf. also A.M. Devine, "Grand Tactics at Gaugamela," *Phoenix* 29 (1975) 381, n.21.

⁷³ W.K. Prentice, "Callisthenes, the Original Historian of Alexander," *TAPA* 54 (1923) 74ff.; T.S. Brown, "Callisthenes and Alexander," *AJP* 70 (1949) 233f. on the importance of Greek public opinion; Pearson, *LHA* 22ff.; Jacoby IID 411; and most recently M. Plezia, "Der Titel und der Zweck von Kallisthenes Alexandergeschichte," *Eos* 60 (1972) 263-268, and G. Dobesch, "Alexander der Grosse und der korinthische Bund," *Grazer Beiträge* 3 (1975) 73-149.

of a young and ambitious king who was eager to win credit for himself and not appear to be winning battles through the brilliance of his father's general. Kallisthenes was writing for a *Greek* audience, moreover for Greeks at home; in order to "undermine" effectively the reputation of Parmenion, he ought to have been writing for the Macedonian soldiery to whom alone this was a major concern. Nor would the Macedonian army have tolerated such criticisms, as Kleitos' anger at the poem of Pranichos⁷⁴ or that of Alexander at Kallisthenes' "blame of the Macedonians" demonstrates.⁷⁵ More likely, any notable propaganda hostile to Parmenion was written after his death. *Apologia* and the history of Alexander are inseparable; the apologists felt a great need to justify Parmenion's murder.⁷⁶

(2) "*Alexander had also made considerable progress in extricating himself from the stranglehold of Parmenio's family and adherents.*"

There is an evident decline in the power of Parmenion's house in the years that followed the crossing into Asia. But we

⁷⁴ Plut. *Alex.* 50.8; see Berve 2.327, no. 657, s.v. Πράνιχος and 2.320, no. 639, s.v. Περύων.

⁷⁵ Plut. *Alex.* 53.4-6; see Berve 2.191-199, no. 408, s.v. Καλλισθένης. Cf. also P. Merlan, "Isocrates, Aristotle and Alexander the Great," *Historia* 3 (1954-1955) 76-77.

⁷⁶ As I argue, the effective undermining of Parmenion's reputation during his own lifetime could not have been easily accomplished; certainly Kallisthenes' writings had no effect on the attitudes of the Macedonians toward their commander. The stories must be intended as *apologia*.

cannot fairly attach the blame for this to Alexander. Parmenion's power was somewhat limited by the death of Attalos; and this was done with Parmenion's approval.⁷⁷ Already the monopoly of the Attalos-faction was broken. Another affiliate, Amyntas, son of Arrhabaios, vanishes after the arrest of Alexandros of Lynkestis; this too was done through the agency of Parmenion.⁷⁸ His own sons, Hektor and Nikanor, had died of natural causes before the Philotas-affair took place.⁷⁹ This can hardly have been part of a scheme to weaken Parmenion's power in the army. In fact, if Berve is correct,⁸⁰ Alexander may even have increased Parmenion's power at the beginning of the campaign by appointing Philotas commander of the Companion Cavalry. As for Asandros, he is somewhat of an enigma, but we cannot be sure that he was Parmenion's brother.⁸¹

⁷⁷ See n.24 *supra*.

⁷⁸ Arr. 1.25.4ff.

⁷⁹ Berve nos. 295, 554; for a dramatised version of Hektor's drowning in Egypt, Curt. 4.8.7-9; Nikanor's death, Arr. 3.25.4; Curt. 6.6.18-19.

⁸⁰ Berve 2.393.

⁸¹ Berve 2.87, no. 165, s.v. "Ἀσανδρος"; J. Kaerst, *RE* II.2 (1896) 1515, s.v. "Asandros (2)"; C. Bradford Welles, *Alexander and the Hellenistic World* 39, erroneously calls him Parmenion's cousin. There are four references to him (though Curt. 7.10.12 reads *aelexander* or *alexander* in the MSS.; Schmieder restores *Asander*), but only one identifies him: "Ἀσανδρος ὁ Φιλώτα (Arr. 1.17.7). But Philotas is a common name and Berve, who is normally cautious (2.397-399: "Gleichsetzung mit einem der anderen Träger des Namens ist bei dessen Häufigkeit zu unsicher"), describes Asandros as "anscheinend Bruder Parmenions" (2.87). The case for the identification is, in fact, very weak. Moreover, if Asandros was Parmenion's brother, Alexander's act of recalling him from Sardeis to the main camp in

(3) "*Philotas' 'treason' was a transparent fabrication.*"

We are told by the sources that a certain Dimmos, for an unknown reason, plotted with several others against Alexander.⁸² He divulged the details of his plot, and the names of his fellow-conspirators, to Nikomachos, his lover. But Nikomachos, in alarm, reported what he had heard to his brother Kebalinos, who in turn attempted to inform Alexander. Kebalinos conveyed the message to Philotas, but Philotas failed to inform the King. Seeing that Philotas would not act, Kebalinos disclosed the information to a Royal Page, Metron, who brought the matter to Alexander's attention.⁸³

order to have him eliminated cannot have been politically astute. This could only have revived unpleasant memories and accentuated the sufferings of the house of Parmenion. It is remarkable that his arrival created no recorded sensation in Alexander's camp, although there was a dissident faction in the army, which disapproved of Parmenion's murder (Diod. 17.80.4; Justin 12.5.4ff.; Curt. 7.2.35ff.). Even in Hegelochos' case, which bears only a superficial similarity, there is evidence of discontent. If we make Asandros Parmenion's brother, we create a historical situation that the sources must have suppressed, *i.e.*, the reaction of Alexander's camp to Asandros' arrival.

⁸² These are named by Curt. 6.7.15: Amyntas, Archepolis, Aphobetos, Demetrios, Theoxenus (= Dioxenos, see Hoffmann, *Die Makedonen* 207), Iolaos, Nikanor, Peukolaos; Berve nos. 64, 161, 190, 260, 387, 558, 637; these are Arrian's (3.26.3) ὅσοι ἄλλοι μετέσχον αὐτῷ τῆς ἐπιβουλῆς. See W. Heckel, *GRBS* 16 (1975) 393-398.

⁸³ Berve 2.142-143, no. 269, *s.v.* Δύμνος; cf. Hoffmann, *Die Makedonen* 206, who rejects Curtius' form, *Dymnus* (6.7.1ff.), on linguistic grounds; Berve 2.143 believes Plutarch's (*Alex.* 49) Λύμνος is a scribal error, Λ written for Δ, though Ziegler's Teubner text retains Limnos; that form is also preferred by Schachermeyr, *Alexander der Grosse* 328ff.; cf. Kirchner, *RE* V.1 (1903) 648, *s.v.* "Dimnos"; Hamilton, *PA* 135. See also Berve 2.279-280, no. 569, *s.v.* Νικόμενος; Kroll, *RE* XVII.1 (1936) 459, *s.v.* "Nikomachos (6)"; Berve 2.203, no. 418, *s.v.* Κεβαλῦνος; Hoffmann, *Die Makedonen* 209; in Plut. *Alex.* 49.4 the mss. read Βαλῦνφ or Βαλεῦνφ; Kroll, *RE* XI.1 (1903) 101, *s.v.* "Kebalinos"; Berve 2.260-261, no. 520, *s.v.* Μέτρων; cf. *RE* XV.2 (1932) 1485, *s.v.* "Metron (2)."

Because Dimnos "conveniently killed himself (or was killed while resisting arrest)"⁸⁴ and because Philotas' guilt could not be proved, Badian concludes that the Dimnos-affair was actually a "fabrication" aimed at implicating Philotas, a plot that was hatched while he was attending to the funeral rites of his brother, Nikanor, who had only recently died in Areia.⁸⁵ Badian reminds us that Plutarch speaks of a conspiracy *against* Philotas. But Plutarch does not say that this conspiracy consisted of the "framing" of Philotas in the Dimnos-affair, as Badian's skilful manipulations of the evidence lead us to believe.⁸⁶ That the Dimnos-affair was meant to "frame" Philotas is unlikely. I consider J.R. Hamilton's refutation simple and adequate: "how could Alexander *know* that Philotas would fail to pass on the information?"⁸⁷ There are, of course, other objections; the complexity of the plot would have made its successful execution extremely difficult.⁸⁸ But the strongest argument against the "fabricated conspiracy" is the understanding of the true conspiracy *against* Philotas. This will,

⁸⁴ Badian, *TAPA* 91 (1960) 331.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 330; Curt. 6.6.19; Arr. 3.25.4.

⁸⁶ Badian does not say so explicitly, but between pages 326 and 330 he carefully leads the reader to believe that, because Plutarch speaks of a conspiracy *against* Philotas, we ought to look for one in the form of a "fabricated" conspiracy in the Dimnos-affair. Cf. T.P. Wiseman, *Phoenix* 27 (1973) 191: "Badian is a master of the controlled inference."

⁸⁷ Hamilton, *PA* 134-135.

⁸⁸ The news of Dimnos' plot, had Philotas not favoured it, would have given him an opportunity to prove his loyalty, so Fox, 289.

I believe, answer the last question raised by Badian's interpretation.

(4) Was the murder of Parmenion the culmination of a well-planned scheme or a reaction to an unforeseen emergency?

Fortune had indeed taken two of Parmenion's sons, but the most critical move, as far as Philotas was concerned, was dictated by military sense. The events that followed Gaugamela made it clear that the nature of the war was to take a drastic change; the pursuit of Dareios and Bessos would require vigour and mobility. Since Parmenion, now seventy years of age, was ill-suited for this type of warfare and since a younger and extremely capable Krateros had been groomed by a series of commands of ever-increasing importance as Parmenion's eventual successor, Parmenion was sent to Ekbatana with the imperial treasures.⁸⁹ On account of the nature of the campaign, he was never recalled and took what we might today call a "desk-job" at Ekbatana, entrusted with the securing of east-west communications. The appointment, while not a demotion, meant a considerable "loss of power"⁹⁰ in relation to the army, but at Parmenion's age such a change of position was inevitable. While he may have resented the change, just as any commander, after a life of service, resents removal from active duty, it was his son, Philotas, who was to suffer most from it.

⁸⁹ Arr. 3.19.7; Hamilton, *Alexander the Great* 90, is one of the few scholars to point out the obvious reason for Parmenion's removal: his age, see n.57. See also Justin 12.1.3.

⁹⁰ Badian's words, *TAPA* 91 (1960) 329, n.16.

Philotas suddenly found himself isolated within the Macedonian army. As a young man he had risen to his position of prominence, no doubt, through the influence of his father.⁹¹ His prestige gave rise in turn to arrogance and licence in speech.⁹² He is portrayed as a friend of Alexander, but probably he was somewhat older, likely a *syntrophos* of Amyntas Perdikka.⁹³ In the Pixodaros-affair, Philip brought Philotas along in an effort to shame Alexander on account of his dealings with the Karian prince; this will scarcely have raised Philotas in Alexander's estimation.⁹⁴ Nor was Philotas among those who were banished by Philip on account of Alexander's intrigues with Pixodaros.⁹⁵ Nevertheless both Ptolemy and Aristoboulos relate that it was on account of the friendship and honour in which Alexander held both Parmenion and Philotas that Alexander overlooked the latter's *epiboule* in Egypt.⁹⁶

⁹¹ So Fox, 287. One wonders if the death of Attalos and the promotion of Philotas were in any way related.

⁹² Themistios, *Or.* 19.229C-D; Plut. *Alex.* 48.

⁹³ See n.58 *supra*.

⁹⁴ See n.59 *supra*.

⁹⁵ Plut. *Alex.* 10.3; Badian, *TAPA* 91 (1960) 327, makes much of this.

⁹⁶ Arr. 3.26.1; *FGrHist* 138 F13 (Ptolemy); 139 F22 (Aristoboulos).

The existence of this so-called conspiracy in Egypt has not been seriously questioned. This *epiboule*, related by Arrian (3.26.1), must be the subject of the first part of Plutarch's account of the Philotas-affair (*i.e.*, chap. 48.4-49.2).⁹⁷ It is at this point that Plutarch speaks of a conspiracy *against* Philotas. Krateros had suborned Philotas' mistress Antigone to inform against her lover; for Philotas had been foolishly arrogant and outspoken.⁹⁸ Krateros, on his part, was motivated by his strong sense of loyalty, for which he came to be termed *philobasileus*, and by his own personal ambition.⁹⁹ But this prolonged espionage¹⁰⁰ revealed little that was not already known: that Philotas had been voicing his objections to the King's orientalisms, particularly the recent *Ammonssohnschaft*, and that he claimed a greater share of the credit for his own military achievements and those of his father. Very likely, he was incited by the resentful Hegelochos, whose grievances have already been discussed. But, while Philotas was acquitted of charges of treason through his father's influence, two points become clear from this disaffection in Egypt: Philotas' enemies were already active and eager to ruin

⁹⁷ As Ziegler's Teubner text indicates and Badian, *op. cit.*, 331, implies.

⁹⁸ Plut. *Alex.* 48.4-49.2; *Mor.* 339E-F; cf. Curt. 6.8.3; Berve 2.42, no. 86, s.v. 'Αντιγόνη; cf. 2.222 and 2.394. See further 'Chapter 3: Krateros.'

⁹⁹ *Philobasileus*: Plut. *Alex.* 47.10; Diod. 17.114.2; cf. Curt. 6.8.2.

¹⁰⁰ Badian, *op. cit.*, 331.

him, and Philotas himself was, in many ways, the author of his own misfortune.

Philotas' activities at the time of Pixodaros-affair will have earned him the enmity of many of Alexander's friends. But he was arrogant as well. The prestigious command that he held was coveted by the younger commanders, who through their connexions with Alexander hoped for greater power. Their envy and the obvious short-comings of Philotas' personality (Themistios uses him as an *exemplum* of αὐθάδεια)¹⁰¹ gave rise to a "conspiracy" against him. The situation is ironic. While Parmenion, through his rejection of the party of Attalos - and this will include the arrest of Alexandros ὁφ Lynkestis - and his loyalty, had won the goodwill of Alexander, his son, Philotas, through his own folly and unpopularity, was to bring on their downfall. Opposition was to come from another quarter. When the news of Dimnos' conspiracy broke, the cards were stacked against Philotas; his licence in speech and the suspicion of earlier treason made his complicity in the affair all the more credible. It appears that Philotas himself did not fully understand his own predicament at the time when the events of the Philotas-affair began to unfold. Certainly his foolish disregard of his father's advice,¹⁰² his arrogance, and his general unpopularity made his ultimate deposition only a matter of time. His political enemies, who had long before begun to work

¹⁰¹ Themistios, *loc. cit.* n.92.

¹⁰² Plut. *Alex.* 48.3: ὑποφύαν εἶχε καὶ φθόνον, ὥστε καὶ Παρμενίωνά ποτ' εἶπεῖν πρὸς αὐτόν, ὃ παῦ, χείρων μοι γίνου.

for his elimination, seized the opportunity presented by the news of Dimnos' conspiracy. Deep-rooted animosities manifested themselves in the form of vigorous prosecution and, in the face of adversity, Parmenion, through whose influence Philotas had escaped an earlier charge of treason, was not there to help him.

When Philotas was confronted with the charge of complicity in the Dimnos-affair, he replied that he had not passed on the information because he had not taken it seriously, a peculiar attitude in a Court where intrigues were common and always potentially dangerous. At another time Parmenion's mere presence might have commuted the charge from treason to negligence. And yet it appears that Alexander was still willing to pardon Philotas on the very ground that the crime had, in fact, been one of negligence.¹⁰³ But at this point his political enemies intervened.

Alexander's young commanders, Krateros, Hephaistion, Leonatos, Perdikkas and Koinos, saw the implication of Philotas in the conspiracy as the perfect opportunity for securing his elimination.¹⁰⁴ Krateros, who had earlier investigated Philotas' activities, now led the assault. He became the spokesman of this hostile faction, and his words will represent the thinking of his associates. Alexander ought to have consulted them on this matter, he said. Philotas would continue to plot against him, but Alexander

¹⁰³ Curt. 6.7.32ff.

¹⁰⁴ Curt. 6.8.4: *Non aliam premendi inimici occasionem aptiorem futuram ratus* (sc. Craterus)....

could not excuse Philotas time after time. Nor would Philotas be mellowed by his kindness. Alexander must guard himself against the enemy within.¹⁰⁵ All Philotas' enemies were convinced that he was involved in the Dimnos-conspiracy, or at least so they said; and now they urged that Philotas should be tortured.¹⁰⁶ When Alexander allowed himself to be persuaded that Philotas must be removed he was not acting entirely against his will. Schachermeyr is quite right to point out that the drastic steps that were taken after Philotas' arrest need not have been taken.¹⁰⁷ But, had Alexander not been strongly influenced by his group of companions, he might well have been content to take less stringent measures and allow the house of Parmenion to lapse into the state of obscurity for which it was destined.¹⁰⁸

Philotas, at any rate, knew who his enemies were when the critical moment came. He pronounced that the bitterness of his enemies had overcome Alexander's goodwill (*vicit...bonitatem tuam, rex, inimicorum meorum acerbitas*: Curt. 6.8.22). And Curtius makes it clear who these *inimici* were: *Secunda deinde vigilia, luminibus extinctis, cum paucis in regiam coeunt Hephaestio et Craterus et Coenus et Erigyus, hi ex amicis, ex armigeris autem Perdiccas et Leonnatus* (6.8.17). These gained most from Philotas' execution,

¹⁰⁵ Curt. 6.8.9.

¹⁰⁶ Curt. 6.8.15.

¹⁰⁷ Schachermeyr, *Alexander der Grosse* 334-335.

¹⁰⁸ One cannot over-emphasise the state of decline of the house of Parmenion already *before* the Philotas-affair.

especially Krateros and Hephaistion, the former being most vigorous in arousing Alexander's hostility toward Philotas, the latter the most vehement of his tormentors.¹⁰⁹ They had all hated Philotas for a long time; Plutarch (*Alex.* 49.8) calls them τοὺς πάλαι μισοῦντας αὐτόν. But since Hephaistion and Krateros had the most influence with Alexander, and emerged as the chief beneficiaries of the affair, we may justly consider them the chief enemies of Philotas. What parts Perdikkas, Leonmatos and Erigyios played in destroying Philotas, we cannot say; nor are their benefits as immediately obvious.

Krateros' opposition to Philotas can be easily understood; he was loyal and ambitious, and in both respects he proved a natural enemy of Philotas. From the time of the *epiboule* in Egypt, he appears to have actively opposed Philotas. Hephaistion, on the other hand, made use of a more subtle power, his personal influence with Alexander. His relationship with Alexander, which grew more intimate as the campaign progressed, made him a rather sinister figure; this I shall demonstrate in my discussion of him. Certainly his unprecedented rise after Philotas' execution is very suspicious.

Two other individuals exemplify the opportunism for which Macedonian politics are famous, Koinos and Amyntas. Both stood to lose more than they could gain. But they turned a potentially disastrous situation to their advantage. In Koinos' case, we

¹⁰⁹ Cf. E.D. Carney, *Macedonian Aristocracy* 124, 127.

cannot be sure if he was reacting to an emergency, or if he had merely shifted his loyalties. Koinos was Philotas' brother-in-law, but he did not support him. It appears that he too plotted against Philotas. When Philotas came to trial before the Macedonian army, Koinos was his most outspoken prosecutor (*Coenus, quamquam Philotae sororem matrimonio secum coniunxerat, tamen acrius quam quisquam in Philotan invectus est: Curt. 6.9.30*). Koinos would gain from Philotas' ruin, but he also knew that his family-connexions with him could prove disastrous. Similarly, Amyntas, son of Andromenes, averted danger by repudiating his relationship with Philotas, who had been his friend.¹¹⁰

When Alexander personally called for the death-penalty before the Macedonian army, the enemies of Philotas won the day. Their efforts secured for them commands of major importance, positions that were to bring them into conflict with one another shortly afterward; for the success of their conspiracy against Philotas only helped to encourage further rivalry. Parmenion was eliminated in fearful haste, a "regrettable necessity";¹¹¹ in the *denouement* of the affair, Alexandros of Lynkestis perished and Demetrios the Bodyguard, suspected of complicity, was replaced by Ptolemy, son of Lagos.¹¹² The "old-Macedonian" attitudes were

¹¹⁰ Curt. 7.1.18ff.; see F. Helmreich, *Die Reden bei Curtius, Rhetorische Studien* 14, Paderborn, 1927, 168-183; F. Granier, *Die makedonische Heeresversammlung* 42-46; W. Heckel, *GRBS* 16 (1975) 393-398: the *regius praetor* of Curtius (Berve no. 65) is the son of Andromenes.

¹¹¹ Badian, *TAPA* 91 (1960) 332, paraphrasing Tarn.

¹¹² Arr. 3.27.5.

no longer strongly represented in the higher ranks, for the commanders were now largely companions of Alexander, or at least men of his temperament. But the old-fashioned element continued to exist in the army; these Alexander suppressed by the formation of a disciplinary squadron after the Philotas-affair, by means of the psychological effects of the Kleitos-affair. Yet mutinies at the Hyphasis and at Opis reminded Alexander that friction between the old and the new was very real.¹¹³

As for Alexander's new strong-men, they form a curious group. They are a group with exceptional abilities and ambitions, coupled with certain vices and deficiencies. They belong to the short-lived generation of Alexander, for they did not outlive him by more than two years. It was left to lesser lights to build the Hellenistic kingdoms, while Alexander's closest friends and most brilliant commanders were the victims of the initial succession-struggle. During their lifetimes they were, to a great extent, hidden from view by the shadow of the great man. In this study, I shed some new light on four of them: Hephaistion, Leonnatos, Krateros, Perdikkas.

¹¹³ See E.D. Carney, *Macedonian Aristocracy*, *passim*.

Chapter 1

HEPHAISTION: *omnium amicorum carissimus*¹

In October of 324 B.C. Hephaistion died at Ekbatana of a fever aggravated by immoderation in food and drink.² He ended his life the dearest of Alexander's friends, the most influential man in the newly-won empire. For Alexander himself, the untimely death triggered an almost boundless display of grief, reminiscent, as he was doubtless aware, of Achilles' sorrow at the fate of Patroklos. Whatever the source of the parallel of Patroklos and Hephaistion, and the claim that Alexander consciously emulated Achilles, who had been his hero ἐν παιδός,³ there is no reason to doubt that the grief was genuine. The accounts of Alexander's reaction to Hephaistion's death were many and varied, as Arrian

¹ Curt. 3.12.15. The basic works are G. Plaumann, *RE* VIII.1 (1912) 291-296, s.v. "Hephaistion (3)"; Hoffmann, *Die Makedonen* 170-171; Berve 2.169-175, no. 357, s.v. Ἡφαίστιον, to which I suggest the following revisions: on p.169 read Justin 12.12.11 instead of XII, 12,1 (the same misprint occurs on p.174); p.169, n.3, read Diog. Laert. 5.1.27 for V,1,12; on p.172 add Diod. 17.96.1; p.173 add Curt. 9.10.6; p.173 refers to Arr. VII,3,2. This should direct the reader to Arr. 7.12.7, where an inopportune lacuna occurs. P. 174 implies that the reading of Justin 12.12.12 is 10,000 talents; it is *duodecim milium talentum*. I am unable to find a passage that corresponds to the faulty reference Ps.-Kall. 3.17 (p.171, n.2). Berve also omits Pliny's (*NH* 34.64) mention of a Lysippean statue of Hephaistion. See also Berve's brief discussion in 1.81-84: "(C) Die grossen Helfer Alexanders"; for Hephaistion in Arrian-Ptolemy see Kornemann, *Die Alexandergeschichte* 242-243; see also Schachermeyr, *Alexander der Grosse* 511-515 and *passim*; cf. *Alexander in Babylon* 31-37.

² Arr. 7.14.1; Plut. *Alex.* 72; Diod. 17.110.8; Poly. 4.3.31; Beloch III² 2.321-322.

³ Arr. 7.14.4.

tells us, and in each case strongly prejudiced by the *phthonos* or *envia* that each author felt for Hephaistion or for Alexander himself.⁴ Alexander's actions were unusual, indeed controversial: these manifestations of grief were not only typical of the oriental despot that he had shown increasing signs of becoming,⁵ but were clear indications that the relationship between Hephaistion and Alexander was, to use one modern scholar's phrase, "not purely Platonic."⁶

I

Hephaistion, son of Amyntor, came from Pella⁷ and, according to Curtius (3.12.15), was educated with Alexander.⁸ But, apart from Curtius' testimony, the tradition that the two were close friends from boyhood is not substantiated by any reliable source;

⁴ In spite of this statement (Arr. 7.14.2), the surviving accounts of Hephaistion's character and career are surprisingly consistent and do not reflect a great divergence of opinion.

⁵ Cf. Plut. *Pelopidas* 34.3.

⁶ Hamilton, *Alexander the Great* 31.

⁷ Arr. 6.28.4; *Ind.* 18.3; *P. Oxy.* 2520, an epic poem on Philip of Macedon, fr.1, line 15, reads:] ναμυντορας·αλλ[....]αυτ[. Lobel's commentary reads: "If ποσ could be read, which I doubt, there would emerge the possibility of a reference to Amyntor, father of Alexander's companion, Hephaestion...", *Oxyrhynchus Papyri* XXX, ed. E. Lobel, London, *Egyptian Exploration Society, Graeco-Roman Memoirs*, No. 44, 1964, 46.

⁸ *cum ipso* [sc. *Alexandro*] *pariter educatus* [est].

nor can it be traced to a primary author of any worth.⁹ Almost all modern scholars accept this boyhood relationship, with the exception of W.W. Tarn, who drew attention to Plutarch's (*Alex.* 10.4) failure to mention Hephaistion among the list of friends who were exiled from Philip's Court in consequence of Alexander's intrigues with the Karian Pixodaros.¹⁰ Tarn also rejected, on the ground that it was a λόγος, Arrian's (1.12.1) remark that Hephaistion crowned the tomb of Patroklos at Ilion, often interpreted as evidence for a long-standing intimate friendship between Alexander and Hephaistion, which was common knowledge already at the time of the crossing into Asia.¹¹ As

⁹ Ps.-Kall. 1.18 and Jul. Val. 1.10 relate that Alexander and Hephaistion sailed to Olympia together as adolescents; Diog. Laert. 5.1.27 mentions letters from Aristotle to Hephaistion. *P. Oxy.* 2520, were it complete, might provide valuable information (see n.7 *supra*).

¹⁰ Tarn 2.57. The passage is considered by Badian, "The Death of Parmenio," *TAPA* 91 (1960) 327, as significant for Philotas' position at the time of Alexander's exile ("...he clearly placed good relations with the king above excessive loyalty to a discredited crown prince"). Arr. 3.6.5 adds Laomedon, the brother of Erigyios, but also omits Hephaistion (and Philotas). Those who accept the boyhood relationship as a matter of faith assume that both Alexander and Hephaistion were educated by Aristotle (as Curt. 3.12.15 and Diog. Laert. 5.1.27 imply); so Berve 2.169; and recently R.D. Milns 23; Fox 56; Green 55; but against the view that Aristotle was Alexander's chief preceptor see A.H. Chroust, *Aristotle*, Notre Dame, Indiana, 1973, 1.125-132, and notes on pp.358-364.

¹¹ Cf. Ailian, *VH* 12.7. R. Lane Fox (113) serves as an excellent example: "Already the two were intimate, Achilles and Patroclus even to those around them; the comparison would remain to the end of their days and is *proof* [my emphasis] of their life as lovers...." More credible is the generally overlooked work of B. Perrin ("Genesis and Growth of an Alexander-myth," *TAPA* 26 [1895] 56-68), where it is pointed out that "the romantic attachment in which the two friends were delighted to pose as Achilles and Patroklos evidently dates from the last years of this period [*i.e.*, after Gaugamela]. But romantic tradition confidently, and in a very telling way, transposes this relationship to the earlier periods" (58).

political propaganda Alexander's visit to the site of Troy will have had great appeal for the Greek city-states; one thinks of Agesilaos' abortive sacrifice at Aulis.¹² But, if Alexander made use of the incident to promote his Panhellenic crusade, he did so through his official historian, Kallisthenes, and Kallisthenes, it appears, did not make Hephaistion the new Patroklos.¹³ Tarn's objections were not well received; they do reveal a need to re-examine the problem.

Tarn drew attention to the work of a certain Choirilos of Iasos, who accompanied Alexander on the expedition and recorded his achievements in the form of an epic poem, in which Alexander appeared as Achilles.¹⁴ Tarn has argued convincingly that the entire portrait of the Achillean Alexander derives from the poetasters,¹⁵

¹² Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.3; Plut. *Ages.* 6.6-11. Cf. G.L. Cawkwell, "Agesilaus and Sparta," *CQ* n.s. 26 (1976) 66-67: "Agesilaus sought, by sacrificing at Aulis as Agamemnon had done..., to give the campaign a grandiose significance, to open as it were a new chapter in the great conflict of East and West." Cf. also J. Rehork, "Homer, Herodot und Alexander," *Beiträge zur alten Geschichte und deren Nachleben, Festschrift für Franz Altheim zum 6.10.1968*, Berlin, 1969, 257-258; G. Dobesch, "Alexander der Grosse und der korinthische Bund," *Grazer Beiträge* 3 (1975) 88, n.34.

¹³ For Kallisthenes see Jacoby, *FGrHist* IIB, no. 124; also IID 411-432; Pearson, *LHA* 22-49; on the propaganda-value see W.K. Prentice, "Callisthenes, The Original Historian of Alexander," *TAPA* 54 (1923) 74-85; T.S. Brown, "Callisthenes and Alexander," *AJP* 70 (1949) 233-234 = Griffith, *Main Problems* 37-38.

¹⁴ *FGrHist* 153 F10a = Porphyrios, Horat. *AP* 357; cf. Berve 2.408-409, no. 829, s.v. Χοῦριλος; Crusius, *RE* III.2 (1899) 2361-2363, s.v. "Choirilos (5)"; Tarn 2.57-58.

¹⁵ Tarn 2.55-62 and 265-270.

and it is not impossible that this fourth-century Eumolpos, whom Porphyrios labelled *poeta pessimus*,¹⁶ and his kind were responsible for the parallel Hephaistion-Patroklos. There can be no thought of Alexander consciously emulating Achilles at this point.¹⁷ Arrian's λόγος very likely belongs to the later tradition, which drew the parallel of Patroklos and Hephaistion from the circumstances of the latter's death. Certainly, Alexander's extravagant grief on that occasion must have been more striking in its similarity to events described in the *Iliad* than any other aspect of his (or Hephaistion's) career. Alexander may well have been conscious of his role as Achilles when Hephaistion died - and this need not imply insincerity on his part -, but in 334 neither Alexander nor his official historian regarded Hephaistion as Patroklos; this parallel belongs to a later romantic tradition.¹⁸

Hephaistion's activities before his wounding at Gaugamela are

¹⁶ *Poeta pessimus fuit Choerilus, qui Alexandrum secutus opera eius descripsit...cui Alexander dixisse fertur, multum malle se Thersiten iam Homeri esse quam Choerili Achillen; see n.14 supra.*

¹⁷ B. Perrin, *op. cit.*; but see A.R. Anderson, "Heracles and his Successors," *HSCP* 39 (1928) 13-14, who thinks that Alexander began his expedition with Achilles as his hero, but that he soon converted to Herakles. In the light of the evidence and the strong romantic elements, I suspect that Alexander's emulation of Achilles is fictitious, though he did consciously imitate Herakles.

¹⁸ Perrin, *op. cit.*, 59-60.

ill attested and derive primarily from the vulgate.¹⁹ We are not told when he became *somatophylax*, but it appears that he replaced the obscure, but not unimportant, Ptolemaios (Berve, no.672), who died at Halikarnassos in the first year of the campaign (see Appendix 1). If this is true, then his early activities are somewhat easier to explain. Loukian provides the first reference to Hephaistion after Arrian's λόγος; he claims as his source a letter of Eumenes of Kardia to Antipatros.²⁰ According to this, Hephaistion gave Alexander an auspicious (though embarrassing for Hephaistion) greeting on the morning of the battle of Issos. He appears next, on the day after the battle, in one of the most popular anecdotes about Alexander.²¹

Among the captives taken after the Persian disaster at Issos were the wife and mother of Dareios III. Hearing that they mourned Dareios as already dead, Alexander sent to them Leonnatos,²² who in-

¹⁹ The evidence of Ps.-Kall. and Jul. Val. 1.10 can carry little weight, nor is there any way to determine the truth about an alleged relationship between Hephaistion and Aristotle (Diog. Laert. 5.1.27). The source of Curt. 3.12.15 is possibly Kleitarchos; Diod. 17.114.1, 3 mentions Alexander's love for Hephaistion and Olympias' jealousy; cf. Loukian, *dial. mort.* 12.4, where Philip is said to disapprove of Alexander's devotion to Hephaistion; cf. also Athen. 10.435A where Alexander's indifference to women prompted Olympias and Philip to send the Thessalian courtesan Kallixeina to their son; see Berve 2.190-191, no. 406, s.v. Καλλιξεῖνα, and Berve 1.10; Plut. *Alex.* 28.3 mentions a gift of little fishes from Alexander to Hephaistion; he read Alexander's letters from Olympias and shared his secrets: Plut. *Alex.* 39.5; *apophth. Al.* 14 = *Mor.* 180D; *de fort. Al.* 1.11 = *Mor.* 332F), but these may refer to late in the campaign.

²⁰ Loukian, *Pro Lapsu* 8.

²¹ Arr. 2.12.6-7; Diod. 17.37.5; 114.2; Curt. 3.12.15ff.; Val. Max. 4.7 ext 2; Itiner. 37; *Suda* s.v. Ἡφαίστιων.

²² Arr. 2.12.5; Curt. 3.12.7-12; Diod. 17.37.3; Plut. *Alex.* 21.2.

formed them that Dareios had in fact escaped from the battlefield of Issos and that Alexander would see to their own safety. On the following morning, Alexander, accordingly, went to visit the Persian women, taking with him Hephaistion, who was taller and more striking in appearance than Alexander himself.²³ The Queen-mother, mistaking Hephaistion for Alexander, prostrated herself in the Persian manner of showing reverence (προσκύνησις). Informed of the error, she feared Alexander's displeasure, but he allayed her fears and, indicating Hephaistion, remarked: "he too is Alexander." The anecdote serves two purposes: to show the magnanimity of Alexander, the great conqueror who allowed even the defeated enemy to retain his former dignity, and to demonstrate that the bond of friendship between the two was so strong that Alexander publicly acknowledged Hephaistion

²³ *Et sicut aetate par erat regi, ita corporis habitu praestabat* (Curt. 3.12.1); cf. *statura et forma praestabat* (Val. Max. 4.7 ext 2); and ὅτι μεῖζων ἐφάνη ἐκεῖνος (Arr. 2.12.6). The scene is depicted in a painting of Veronese at the National Gallery, London. Similar references to Hephaistion's youthful appearance are made by Curtius (7.9.19) and Justin (12.12.11). According to Pliny (NH 34.64), Lysippos (or, as some said, Polykleitos [the younger]) produced a statue of Hephaistion; see H. Rackham's note in *Pliny: Natural History*, Loeb Classical Library, vol. 9, Cambridge, Mass., 1938, 174, note b; cf. Franklin P. Johnson, *Lysippos*, Durham, North Carolina, 1927, 25, 230; K. Gebauer, "Alexanderbildnis und Alexandertypus (D19)," *Mitteilungen des deutschen archäologischen Instituts (Athenische Abteilung)* 63-64 (1938-1939) 67-69, believes he can identify this. He was also portrayed in Aëtion's painting of the marriage of Alexander and Roxane, where he was the best man (νυμφαγωγός), standing to Alexander's right and holding a torch; the description given by Loukian (Aëtion 5) is followed closely by the painting on the north wall of the Farnesina in Rome by "Il Sodoma"; see R.H. Hobart Cust, *Giovanni Antonio Bazzi, The Man and the Painter, 1477-1549*, London, 1906, 135-147; see also A. Hayum, *Giovanni Antonio Bazzi - "Il Sodoma"*, Diss. Harvard, 1968, publ. New York, 1976, 30ff. and 74-75.

as his *alter ego*.²⁴

The story that Alexander bestowed upon Hephaistion the singular honour of choosing a king for the Sidonians also derives from the vulgate. The details of the story need not be repeated,²⁵ for it suffices to say that in this instance Alexander, apparently motivated by his affection for Hephaistion, granted him the honour of creating a king.

From Tyre Hephaistion conducted the fleet to Gaza, a relatively minor command now that Alexander controlled the seas.²⁶ But perhaps the most important reference to Hephaistion's early activities dates to the year 331, when Alexander had moved out of Egypt. The lexicographer Harpokration quotes the historian Marsyas of Pella²⁷ as saying that a young man of Samian or Plataian origin (so *Διήλλος*²⁸) was sent by Demosthenes to Alexander for the purpose

²⁴ καὶ γὰρ καὶ οὗτος Ἀλέξανδρος ἐστὶν (Diod. 17.37.6; cf. Val. Max. 4.7.ext 2; Arr. 2.12.7; *Suda* s.v. Ἡφαιστίων; Curt. 3.12.17). Schachermeyr, *Alexander der Grosse* 512, takes this one step further and sees Alexander as continually striving to bestow honours upon Hephaistion. "Alexander, der in seiner Neigung für Hephaistion niemals genug zu tun glaubte...."

²⁵ Curt. 4.1.15-25; Plut. *Mor.* 340C-D; Diod. 17.47ff., who incorrectly says it happened at Tyre. See Berve 2.3, no. 1, s.v. Ἀβδαλῶνυμος; cf. D. Sohlberg, "Zu Kleitarch," *Historia* 21 (1972) 758-759, with additional literature.

²⁶ Curt. 4.5.10. This must be the Phoenician and Kypriot fleet, which went over to Alexander after Issos. The Greek contingents were still in the north with Amphoteros and Hegelochos. See H. Hauben, "The Expansion of Macedonian Sea-Power under Alexander the Great," *Anc. Soc.* 7 (1976) 82ff.

²⁷ *FGrHist* 135 F2 = Harpokration p.43.8, s.v. Ἀριστίων.

²⁸ *FGrHist* 73 F2.

of effecting a reconciliation. The young man, Aristion,²⁹ gained access to Alexander through Hephaistion. The arrival is dated by an Athenian embassy, which reported his presence at Alexander's Court, to the year 331; Aischines appears to corroborate Marsyas' testimony, but it is possible that Marsyas used Aischines as one of his sources.³⁰ This should not detract from Marsyas' evidence, however, for he proves, upon close examination, to have been a historian of some worth.³¹ And it was Marsyas, not Aischines, who

²⁹ See Berve 2.63, no. 120, s.v. 'Ἀριστῶν; J. Kirchner, *RE* II.1 (1895) 900, s.v. "Aristion (12)."

³⁰ Note the close similarity between Aischines, *In Ctesiphontem* 160 and 162, and Marsyas, *FGrHist* 135 F2, 3, which are preserved by Harpokration.

³¹ For Marsyas see F. Ritschl, *De Marsyis rerum scriptoribus*, Breslau, 1836, later published under the same title as no. XVI of *Opuscula Philologica*, vol. 1, Leipzig, 1866, 449-470; C. Müller, *Fragmenta Scriptorum de rebus Alexandri Magni*, appended to Fr. Dübner's edition of *Arrianus*, Paris, 1846, 40-46; H. Sauppe, "Die neuen Bruchstücke des Hyperidēs," *Philol.* 3 (1848) 647, for the date of Aristion's mission; Fr. Kampe, "Jahresberichte über griechische Historiker," *Philol.* 4 (1849) 130-134; A. Hecker, "Epistola Critica," *Philol.* 5 (1850) 452; R. Stiehle, "Zu den Fragmenten der griechischen Historiker," *Philol.* 9 (1854) 465-466; H. Diels and W. Schubart, *Didymos: Kommentar zu Demosthenes (Papyrus 9780)*, *Berliner Klassikertexte* I, Berlin, 1904; F. Stähelin, "Die griechischen Historikerfragmente bei Didymos," *Klio* 5 (1905) 150-151; O. Hoffmann, *Die Makedonen* 66, 90-92, 210 and *passim*; P. Foucart, "Etude sur Didymos," *Mem. de l'acad. des Inscript. et Belles-Lettres* 38 (1909) 138-145; Berve 2.247-248, no. 489, s.v. Μαρσύας; Jacoby, *FGrHist* IIB, no. 135 and IID 480-484; R. Laqueur, *RE* XIV.2 (1930) 1995-1999, s.v. "Marsyas (8-9)"; C.A. Robinson Jr. (ed.), *The History of Alexander the Great*, vol. 1 (*Brown University Studies* XVI), Providence, R.I., 1953, 166-171, for a translation of the fragments; Pearson, *LHA* 253-254.

provided the additional information that Demosthenes sent Aristion to Hephaistion in particular. As the brother of Antigonos Monophthalmos and of Pellaian origin, Marsyas very likely knew Hephaistion and was in a position to assess his relationship with Alexander; Marsyas was himself, according to the *Suda*, a *syntrophos* of Alexander.³² But again this is not conclusive evidence for Alexander's devotion to Hephaistion, who may merely have been acting in his capacity as *somatophylax*.³³

Certainly, on the basis of the existing evidence, we shall never know the truth about the immortal friendship. We know simply that it came about, undoubtedly at an early date. Tarn's major objection, that Plutarch's list of companions omitted to mention Hephaistion, is not in itself damning. The list is also given by Arrian (3.6.5) and his source appears to be Ptolemy, whose failure to give his political rivals just representation in his account is generally acknowledged by scholars.³⁴ But Ptolemy had nothing to fear from Hephaistion and there is no trace of friction between the two while Hephaistion lived. Yet it is curious that Ptolemy consistently failed to mention Hephaistion's rank as *somatophylax* (a rank that he certainly

³² *Suda* s.v. Μαρσύας. There are two other references to his life: Plut. *Mor.* 182C mentions a legal-dispute in which he was involved (we do not know of what sort, or of the outcome) and Diod. 20.50. 4 says he held a naval command in the battle at Salamis (Kypros).

³³ Although Hephaistion may have brought Aristion to Alexander, Goldstein, *The Letters of Demosthenes*, 1968, 43, n.33, must be correct to reject Badian's proposal that he was Demosthenes' "powerful protector at Court," which is surely to read too much into one fragment of Marsyas (Badian, "Harpalus," *JHS* 81 [1961] 34 = Griffith, *Main Problems* 224).

³⁴ See n.36 below.

held), while in no way detracting from Hephaistion's importance.³⁵ With Perdikkas Ptolemy the historian was ruthless; this has been amply demonstrated by Schwahn and Errington.³⁶ Nor is there any mention of the heroism of Aristonous in India, though Ptolemy claims to have been absent when the battle against the Malloi took place (see Appendix 1). But, if Ptolemy was deliberately silent about the role of Hephaistion - and of the lesser *somatophylakes*, Peithon, Aristonous, Lysimachos -, then the account of the historian-king, in whom Arrian placed so much faith,³⁷ becomes very sinister indeed. Ptolemy named Nearchos, Erigyios, Laomedon, Harpalos and himself as those who were exiled "when Philip dishonoured Olympias."³⁸ The first three were Greeks, and there was a limit to what they could expect to accomplish in a world dominated by the Macedonian nobility; we need think only of the unspectacular career of Eumenes under Alexander.³⁹

³⁵ See R.M. Errington, "Bias in Ptolemy's History of Alexander," *CQ* n.s. 19 (1969) 237-238; H. Strasburger, *Ptolemaios und Alexander*, Leipzig, 1934, 51.

³⁶ W. Schwahn, "Die Nachfolge Alexanders des Grossen," *Klio* 23 (1930) 211-238; Errington, *op. cit.*, 233-242; Strasburger, *op. cit.*, 47, 52-54 does not develop the idea fully.

³⁷ Arr. *Anab.* proem. 2.

³⁸ Plut. *Alex.* 10.4 places the exile after the Pixodaros-affair, which is probably more accurate. Hamilton, *PA* 27 is probably right to assume that Arrian is giving "a general indication of time, sufficient for his purpose"; Schaefer's (*Demosthenes und seine Zeit* III.65-66, n.2) preference for Arrian is not compelling.

³⁹ See Berve 2.156-158, no. 317, s.v. Εὐμένης; cf. Vezin, *Eumenes von Kardia* 12-17; H.D. Westlake, "Eumenes of Cardia," *Essays on the Greek Historians and Greek History*, London, 1969, 319-321, believes that the claim (which he thinks derives from Hieronymos) that Eumenes suffered a disadvantage by being Greek is unjustified. His arguments

For Harpalos Ptolemy appears to have had some compassion: the details of his first flight are vague;⁴⁰ the account of his famous defection to Athens has, unfortunately, been devoured by an inopportune lacuna in the text of Arrian.⁴¹ Whether Hephaistion was deliberately omitted from the list of Alexander's friends cannot be determined. It should be added, however, that Philip did not exile *all* Alexander's friends.

It becomes clear that there is no firm evidence for the view that Hephaistion and Alexander were intimate as youths (though this does not mean that they were not); Tarn was at least right in questioning the value of the evidence on which this assumption was based. And, while it seems impossible - indeed foolish - to deny that this friendship developed at an early date, it is certain that the intensity of this friendship was embellished by the romantic tradition, which transposed the devotion that the two shared in their last years to the early years of the campaign.

are unconvincing, for he uses the examples of Alexander's Greek friends, and their careers show, quite clearly, that, in spite of their connexions with Alexander, they could not attain high office; cf. Badian, *TAPA* 91 (1960) 337; "Nearchus the Cretan," *YCS* 24 (1975) 147-170. Against Westlake's view that Lysimachos was a Greek who rose to power (320) see Hünnerwadel, *Forschungen zur Geschichte Königs Lysimachos von Thrakien*, Diss. Zürich, 1910, 13.

⁴⁰ Arr. 3.6.4-7. See Berve 2.75-80, no. 143, s.v. "Ἀρπαλος, esp. p.76; Badian, "The First Flight of Harpalus," *Historia* 9 (1960) 245-246; against this W. Heckel, "The Flight of Harpalos and Tauriskos," *CP* 72 (1977) 133-135.

⁴¹ Arr. 7.12.7 breaks off with an account of Antipatros' troubles with Olympias and resumes with Hephaistion's quarrels with Eumenes. But at this point Photios' epitome of the *Anabasis* (91, p.68b, 20) reads: ἐν τούτῳ καὶ Ἀρπαλος βασιλικὰ λαβὼν ὥχετο φεύγων χρήματα.

II

A review of Hephaistion's career after the battle at Gaugamela⁴² illuminates his debt to his relationship with Alexander. The events of the Philotas-affair and afterward show that he was not only the chief beneficiary of Alexander's goodwill, but also the skilful manipulator of the King's power of command.

Hephaistion's was, in fact, an unusual career: until the death of Philotas, he held no major military command;⁴³ the majority of his commands were of a predominantly non-military nature, and those that did involve military skill were often conducted in cooperation with a more experienced commander;⁴⁴ and, as it becomes apparent, he owed his promotion more to his relationship with Alexander than to his own ability.⁴⁴ It is

⁴² He was wounded in the army at Gaugamela: Arr. 3.15.2; Diod. 17.61.3; Curtius 4.16.32. For the problem involving τῶν σωματοφυλάκων ἡγούμενος see Appendix 1.

⁴³ Polyainos 4.3.27 records that Hephaistion and Philotas (in this case apparently the son of Parmenion) commanded the forces directly opposed to Ariobarzanes (though Polyainos incorrectly has Phrasaortes [see Berve 2.60-61, 400, nos. 115, 813, s.vv. 'Ἀριοβαρζάνης, Φρασάορτης]), while Alexander led the encircling forces at the Persian Gates. But both Arrian (3.18.4, 7-8) and Curtius (5.4.14-15, 29) relate that Krateros commanded the main force; Diod. 17.68 does not understand the strategy (see further "Chapter 3: Krateros"). No other source mentions Hephaistion in this context, and his appearance with Philotas looks very suspicious. Philotas, son of Parmenion, does not appear to have been left behind with the main force. Arr. 3.18.6 is surely speaking of the *taxiarch* (Berve, no. 803); Curt. 5.4.20, 30 confuses him with the cavalry-officer; on his identity see R.D. Milns, "Alexander's Seventh Phalanx Battalion," *GRBS* 7 (1966) 159-160; against this A.B. Bosworth, "ἈΞΘΕΤΑΙΡΟΙ" *CQ* n.s. 23 (1973) 252-253.

⁴⁴ So C.B. Welles, *Alexander and the Hellenistic World* 47; against Hamilton, *PA* 145; Berve 2.173; Kornemann, *Die Alexandergeschichte* 242.

the last of these points that merits first consideration, for nowhere is Hephaistion's influence more evident than in the Philotas-affair.

The intricacies of the affair I have already discussed in the Introduction: Dimnos' plot was the catalyst that allowed Alexander's younger commanders to work for the elimination of Philotas. And surely it would be naïve to suppose that his destruction and the sudden unprecedented rise of Hephaistion were in no way related. In part, Philotas had himself to blame: he was arrogant. He disparaged the achievements of Alexander, claiming that the Macedonian victories were the work of Parmenion; no less a Macedonian than Kleitos, he did not make light of his own contribution. But his overbearing and impulsive nature was inclined to arouse the hostility not so much of Alexander as of his younger Companions. The *Hetairoi* represented the Macedonian nobility, from whom the King drew his generals and governors, and Alexander's closest associates belonged to this body; they were young and eager for promotion, and consequently jealous of another's success.⁴⁵ Thus, while success came easily to the son of Philip's general, it was not without odium. Alexander's friends had no love for Parmenion's son; Plutarch says they had long hated Philotas (*Alex.* 49.8). Their hostility can be traced, certainly, to Philotas'

⁴⁵ For the *Hetairoi* see Tarn 2.135ff.; Berve 1.30-37; G. Plaumann, *RE* VIII.2 (1913) 1374-1380, s.v. 'ἑταῖροι; G.S. Stagakis, "Observations on the 'ἑταῖροι of Alexander the Great," *Ancient Macedonia*, Thessaloniki, 1970, 86-102.

first rumblings of discontent in Egypt,⁴⁶ although Philotas' role in the Pixodaros-affair may have been the cause of considerable unpopularity.⁴⁷ At the time of the Egyptian *epiboule*, Parmenion's influence had saved Philotas from charges of treason, but Parmenion's power was waning and his retirement became more and more imminent with each success of the ambitious Krateros.⁴⁸ At the time of Dimnos' plot, Philotas was at the mercy of his political enemies: his father was at Ekbatana, his brothers were dead, he was isolated within the Macedonian army.⁴⁹ Command of the Companions was undoubtedly a coveted position, and it is not surprising that Hephaistion, who was by now the first among Alexander's friends, should cherish the hope of becoming his foremost commander; and no unit was used more effectively after Gaugamela than the Macedonian cavalry. The record of Hephaistion's dealings with other individuals shows that he was

⁴⁶ Plut. *Alex.* 48.3-49.2; *Mor.* 339D-F; Arr. 3.26.1.

⁴⁷ Plut. *Alex.* 10.3. Philip II used Philotas as an example of good conduct in a manner intended to shame Alexander. Hamilton (*PA* 26, repeating his views of "Alexander's Early Life," *G & R* 12 [1965] 121, with n.4) may be correct, however, to take παραλαβών to mean "taking as witness" and to assume that Philotas reported Alexander's intrigues with Pixodaros to Philip. In either case, Philotas' role was not one that would win Alexander's friendship. Plutarch's (*Mor.* 339F) claim that Alexander had hated Philotas for seven years thus deserves serious consideration (so Hamilton, *PA* 134); those who were exiled on Philotas' account (if he did in fact betray their dealings with Pixodaros) will have hated him even more.

⁴⁸ See Chapter 3: Krateros.

⁴⁹ Parmenion sent to Ekbatana: Arr. 3.19.7; Hektor's death: Curt. 4.8.7-9; Nikanor's death: Arr. 3.25.4; Curt. 6.6.18-19.

of a particularly quarrelsome nature⁵⁰ and not above maligning others to Alexander, even when this afforded no obvious personal gain.⁵¹ Philotas was to be the first victim of Hephaistion's animosity.

But neither Hephaistion's hatred of Philotas nor his influence with Alexander was sufficient in itself to dislodge Philotas from his command; he was a high-ranking officer, descended from a noble Macedonian family. Nor had Parmenion failed to win considerable popularity and a large following in the army. Yet Philotas' foolish handling of the news of Dimnos' conspiracy gave his political adversaries the perfect opportunity to secure his elimination. That Philotas' guilt amounted in fact to little more than negligence seems virtually certain. Alexander, it appears, was still favourably disposed toward him, and he might well have shown clemency a second time had not Philotas' enemies intervened.⁵²

⁵⁰ Plut. *Alex.* 47.11-12; *Mor.* 337A; Arr. 7.13.1; 7.14.9; Plut. *Eumenes* 2.1-3. Berve 2.173 aptly describes his behaviour as "das Benehmen eines verzogenen Kindes." Cf. Badian, "The Eunuch Bagoas: A Study in Method," *CQ* n.s. 8 (1958) 150: "Even the character and intrigues of the sinister Hephaistion are not illuminated by Arrian-Ptolemy."

⁵¹ Plut. *Alex.* 55.1: Hephaistion said that Kallisthenes had promised to do *proskynesis* but went back on his word. Some scholars believe that Hephaistion lied "to save his own skin" (so T.S. Brown, "Callisthenes and Alexander," *AJP* 70 [1949] 244 = Griffith, *Main Problems* 49); cf. Schachermeyr, *Alexander der Grosse* 384; Hamilton, *PA* 153.

⁵² Alexander says to Philotas: *Faventem habes iudicem, si, quod admitti non potuit, saltem negari potest*, Curt. 6.7.32. This suggests that Alexander was willing to forgive Philotas, if only he could deny complicity. Philotas could not absolve himself entirely, but he did claim that his crime was one of negligence, rather than of conspiracy. Alexander was to some extent satisfied (or at least

As before in Egypt, Krateros was his most vigorous opponent, and his benefit from the destruction of Philotas and Parmenion is clear; but he had already superseded Parmenion, and his success as a commander was based on his ability. What then of Hephaistion's role, which cannot be passed over lightly? How he influenced Alexander's thinking in private we cannot say; undoubtedly Alexander discussed the matter with him, and we may suppose that Hephaistion was not loathe to speak ill of Philotas.⁵³ Certainly Hephaistion was part of the *consilium amicorum*, which Alexander called after his initial meeting with Philotas, when he may still have inclined toward leniency.⁵⁴ Curtius portrays Krateros as the chief spokesman on this occasion, but Hephaistion was among those who voiced the opinion that Philotas must have been guilty of participating in Dimnos' conspiracy (*nec ceteri dubitabant, quin coniurationis indicium suppressurus non fuisset nisi auctor aut particeps*: 6.8.10) and that he should be forced to reveal the names of his co-conspirators under torture (*omnes igitur quaestionem de eo, ut participes sceleris indicare cogeretur, habendam esse decernunt*: 6.8.15). Thereafter, Hephaistion comes to the fore. Once it is decided to take

he was temporarily reconciled with Philotas), though Curtius 6.7.35 was in doubt about Alexander's true feelings: *haud facile dixerim credideritne ei rex, an altius iram suppresserit*. Nevertheless, it is clear from 6.7.1ff. that a lengthy denunciation of Philotas by the generals played no small part in influencing Alexander's decision.

⁵³ Plut. *Mor.* 339F claims that Alexander did not confide in Hephaistion on the matter of Philotas; this is surely incorrect.

⁵⁴ See n.52 *supra*.

action against Philotas, Hephaistion is especially active. His name heads the list of those who came to Alexander's tent during the second watch on the night of Philotas' arrest: *cum paucis in regiam coeunt Hephaestion et Craterus et Coenus et Erigyius, hi ex amicis, ex armigeris autem Perdiccas et Leonnatus* (6.8.17).

In the actual *Philotasprozess*, the trial before the army, Hephaistion is not mentioned; Koinos and Amyntas were outspoken, both eager to repudiate their ties with Philotas.⁵⁵ There was also Alexander, won over by Philotas' enemies. Hephaistion's influence, we may suspect, was on a personal level, and his popularity with the army cannot have been great. True to his nature, he reappears as the foremost of Philotas' tormentors. The Macedonians demanded that Philotas be executed by stoning, but Hephaistion and his associates persuaded that he be tortured first: *Hephaestio autem et Craterus et Coenos tormentis veritatem exprimendam esse dixerunt* (6.11.10). From Curtius' account (6.11.10-18) we gain a picture of the deep-rooted enmity between Philotas and Krateros - the latter appears to have been actively campaigning against him since the disaffection in Egypt⁵⁶ -, but we also see an unfavourable side of

⁵⁵ Koinos was Philotas' brother-in-law (Curt. 6.9.30; cf. Arr. 1.24.1; 1.29.4; Dittenberger, *Syll.* I³ 332; see further my Introduction, n.11). Amyntas and his brothers had been friends of Philotas (Curt. 7.1.11); Amyntas himself had been named by Dimnos as a conspirator (Curt. 6.7.15; 11.38; see W. Heckel, "Amyntas, Son of Andromenes," *GRBS* 16 [1975] 393-398; Badian, "The Death of Parmenio," *TAPA* 91 [1960] 334, n.30); Polemon fled from the camp after Philotas' arrest (Arr. 3.27.1-3; Curt. 7.1.10ff.). See also Granier, *Die makedonische Heeresversammlung* 42-46; recently R. Lock, "The Macedonian Army Assembly in the Time of Alexander the Great," *CP* 72 (1977) 101-102.

⁵⁶ See Chapter 3: Krateros.

Hephaistion; this is corroborated to some extent by the testimony of Plutarch (*Alex.* 49.12), who refers to Philotas' tormentors as τοὺς περὶ τὸν Ἡφαίστιωνα. In view of Hephaistion's later dealings with rivals, and of his obvious gain from Philotas' downfall, we must assume that he was a most formidable opponent and no less responsible for Philotas' demise than Krateros.

One of the blackest chapters in the history of Alexander closed with the execution of Philotas and, in fearful haste, the murder of Parmenion. For Hephaistion a new chapter in his career began with his appointment as *hipparch* of one-half of the Companions, a direct consequence of his role in the Philotas-affair.

III

Arrian relates (3.27.4) that, following the execution of Philotas, the command of the Companion cavalry was divided between Hephaistion and Kleitos the Black, son of Dropides,⁵⁷ since Alexander no longer thought it wise to entrust so important a command to any one person. This may indeed have been the case, but the appointment of Kleitos had its political and military reasons. The popular view that the appointment of Kleitos was a counter-balance to the elevation of unpopular Hephaistion is entirely acceptable; for it was necessary to placate the "old-line" Macedonians, who did not look favourably

⁵⁷ See Berve 2.206-208, no. 427, s.v. Κλεῦτος; W. Kroll, *RE* XI.1 (1921) 666, s.v. "Kleitos (9)."

upon the treatment of Parmenion and his son.⁵⁸ But the dual appointment made good military sense as well. Alexander realised that Hephaistion, whose loyalty could certainly not be called into question, was not equal to the task of commanding the entire Companions; nor is it likely that he would have failed to recognise that the army might resent this appointment, which was so obviously based on nepotism.⁵⁹

How this division of the cavalry worked in practice is unknown, owing to the lamentably vague nature of the evidence. Of Kléitos' activities as *hipparch*, from his appointment to the time of his death, we know nothing.⁶⁰ At the time of his death, Kleitos had been offered the satrapy of Baktria, but it is unlikely that Alexander appointed him originally with the intention of replacing him by means of a further revision of the cavalry.⁶¹ The sources are misleading. Two years of warfare separate Kleitos' promotion

⁵⁸ For the formation of the *ataktói*, a dissident faction that disapproved of the treatment of Parmenion and Philotas, see Diod. 17.80.4; Justin 12.5.4ff.; Curt. 7.2.35ff. Cf. Curt. 8.1.52; Arr. 4.14.2.

⁵⁹ See Schachermeyr, *Alexander der Grosse* 363; Fox 311.

⁶⁰ The poem of Pranichos (Berve, no. 657), if it refers to a historical incident (so Hamilton, *PA* 141), such as the defeat at the Polytimetos River (Arr. 4.3.7; 4.5.2-6.2; Curt. 7.6.24; 7.7.30ff.), cannot mean that Kleitos took part in the affairs at Marakanda or at the Polytimetos, as is suggested by J. Benoist-Méchin, *Alexander the Great: The Meeting of East and West*, Mary Ilford tr., New York, 1966, 81-82.

⁶¹ See especially P.A. Brunt, "Alexander's Macedonian Cavalry," *JHS* 83 (1963) 27-46; G.T. Griffith, "A Note on the Hipparchies of Alexander," *JHS* 83 (1963) 68-76; Berve 1.104-112; Tarn 2.154-167; cf. also Beloch *GG* 3.2.322-352, XXXII "Das Heer Alexanders."

from his death, yet there is no mention of his participation in the campaigns from 330 to 328 B.C. Some scholars attribute his absence to a wound sustained in battle or to illness, though there is no hint of this in the sources.⁶² Possibly an explanation is to be found in the structure of the extant histories of Alexander: the Kleitos-episode is related out of its historical context by Plutarch and Arrian in order that the three great catastrophes (Philotas, Kleitos, Kallisthenes) may be recorded in a sequence.⁶³ Perhaps this format can be traced to the primary sources and, if so, these sources will have begun to conceive of Kleitos as dead, hence omitting him from their accounts of events in which he must certainly have taken part.

Hephaistion's own role also requires an explanation. Never do we hear of his commanding the half of the Companions that had been assigned to him; in fact, in the year 329, when the cavalry was Alexander's main striking force in Sogdiana, Arrian makes no mention of Hephaistion,⁶⁴ while Curtius records only that he was one of the counsellors who came to Alexander's tent before the battle with the Skythians at the Iaxartes River.⁶⁵ During this year it appears that the cavalry was either directly under Alexander's command or, as in the case of the attempted relief of Marakanda and

⁶² Suggested most recently by Fox 311. A previous illness of Kleitos was recorded by Arrian (3.19.8).

⁶³ Kornemann, *Die Alexandergeschichte* 138, assumes that "die Verkoppelung der beiden Katastrophen [*i.e.*, Kleitos, Kallisthenes] in der Umgebung Alexanders erst von der Vulgata und ihr folgend von Arrian vollzogen worden ist."

⁶⁴ Cf. Berve 2.171.

⁶⁵ Curt. 7.7.9.

the battle at the Polytimetos River,⁶⁶ divided into small detachments under minor commanders.

What we learn of Hephaistion's later career as a cavalry-officer confirms our suspicions that his promotion to *hipparch* was owed more to his friendship with Alexander than to his military genius.⁶⁷ In the spring of 328, Alexander moved out of his winter-quarters in Baktria, re-crossed the Oxos River and conducted a "sweep-campaign" against the rebellious Sogdiani. The forces were divided into five parts, with Hephaistion commanding one contingent.⁶⁸ But the project appears to have accomplished little more than to win back several small fortresses to which the rebellious natives had fled; the most important action was fought, in that season, by Krateros against the Massagetai.⁶⁹

⁶⁶ Arr. 4.5.2-6.2; Curt. 7.7.31ff., for a different version. This should not lead us to C. Bradford Welles' conclusion (*Alexander and the Hellenistic World* 40) that Alexander, fearing powerful rivals, sent "incompetents" against Spitamenes.

⁶⁷ For the fallacy that Hephaistion *commanded* the *somatophylakes*, as Diod. 17.61.3 implies, see Appendix 1. On the significance of the rank of *somatophylax* (and similar positions) see Badian's note, *TAPA* 91 (1960) 328, n.14.

⁶⁸ Arr. 4.16.2. The other contingents were commanded by Perdikkas, Ptolemy and Alexander, while Koinos and Artabazos held a joint command; Curt. 8.1.1 speaks of three divisions under Alexander, Hephaistion and Koinos; Curt. 8.1.10 says Artabazos accompanied Hephaistion. Arr. speaks of *stratia*, implying that the entire force was divided into five parts, but a large portion of the army (the infantry-*taxeis* of Polyperchon, Attalos, Gorgias, Meleagros and Krateros, who commanded them, Arr. 4.16.1; 17.1; Curt. 8.1.6) were in Baktria. The main striking force in Sogdiana was the cavalry.

⁶⁹ Krateros against the Massagetai: Arr. 4.16.2-3; Curt. 8.1.6-7; Arr. 4.17.1.

When the columns reunited at Marakanda in the summer of 328, Hephaistion's functions began to be adapted to suit his talents. There is no reason to suppose that he had any extraordinary abilities as a general; his previous military record precludes this, and his later role as a "utility-man" leads to the same conclusion. His first mission in Sogdiana was to synoecize the local settlements,⁷⁰ an assignment that was to guarantee the loyalty of the native population by means of the establishment of garrisons, while it provided Alexander with a network of communications in the region. The repeated use that Alexander made of Hephaistion in this (non-military) capacity - perhaps these were activities that Hephaistion himself enjoyed - becomes apparent from this point onward. In fact, it is the founding of cities, the building of bridges, and the securing of communications that constitute Hephaistion's major contribution to Alexander's expedition.⁷¹

Apart from the synoecisms in Sogdiana, little else is known of Hephaistion's activities before the army moved into India. Curtius (8.2.13) tells us that he was responsible for acquiring provisions for the winter of 328/7; this task Curtius dates to ten days after Kleitos' murder. The remainder of the campaign,

⁷⁰ Arr. 4.16.3.

⁷¹ R.D. Milns¹¹¹² credits Hephaistion with bridging the river (in two places) at Thapsakos, which is interesting in view of his later activities (*e.g.*, bridging the Indus) but is not documented, as far as I can tell, by the ancient sources.

which saw the death of Spitamenes and the capture of the Rock of Chorienes, does not include another reference to Hephaistion.⁷²

When the expedition set out for India at the end of spring 327, Hephaistion and Perdikkas were sent ahead with a substantial force to act as an advance guard, to subdue the area around Pēukelaotis, and to build a boat-bridge on the Indus.⁷³ Berve poses the question, who had the *imperium maius* in this venture?⁷⁴ Nominally, it appears that Hephaistion had it, for Curtius' account of the dealings with Omphis, son of Taxiles, makes no mention of Perdikkas, who must certainly have been present; the details of this are not given by Arrian.⁷⁵ It appears, however,

⁷² There is no mention of Hephaistion's role in the marriage of Alexander and Roxane, painted by Aëtion and described by Loukian, *Aëtion* 5; cf. n.23 *supra*.

⁷³ Arr. 4.22.7-8; 23.1; 30.39.5; 5.3.5; Curt. 8.10.2-3; 12.4, 15; Metz Epit. 48. See V. Smith, *EHI* 53 and 63, who follows the suggestion of M. Foucher, *Sur la Frontière Indo-Afghane*, Paris, 1901, 46, that the crossing took place at Ohind or Und, sixteen miles north of Attock (Atak), which was formerly thought to be the location of Hephaistion's bridge.

⁷⁴ Berve 2.171; cf. 2.314, where Berve suggests "das P. die Fuss-truppen, Hephaistion die Reiter kommandierte." This is not convincing; Perdikkas no longer commanded *pezhetairoi*, his *taxis* had been given to his brother Alketas (Berve 2.22, no. 45, s.v. 'Αλκείτας). Perdikkas was himself a *hipparch* and, if one *hipparchia* was inferior to another (as was the case in the last years of Alexander's reign; cf. Arr. 7.14.10; Diod. 18.3.4; App. *Syr.* 57; Plut. *Eum.* 1.5), then Perdikkas was possibly inferior to Hephaistion in this venture.

⁷⁵ Curtius, who last mentions Perdikkas at 8.10.2, leaves him in limbo, failing to mention him in connexion with Omphis (Curt. 8.12.6; cf. Metz Epit. 48: *magnumque commeatum ab Hephaestione compara[tum in] venit* [sc. *Alexander*]; Curt. 8.12.15). For Omphis (Metz Epit. 49 has Mophis) see Berve 2.369-371, no. 739, s.v. Ταξιάρχης. Berve is not properly cross-indexed, thus neither Omphis or Mophis appears in the alphabetical listing. He is in fact the Indian Ambhi, cf. V. Smith, *EHI* 63ff.

Perdikkas' presence in this, Hephaistion's first major independent command, can be attributed to the need for a competent military man, and to their apparent compatibility. In the late stages of the campaigns, both Hephaistion and Perdikkas had developed strong personal ties with Alexander, and it is not surprising that Perdikkas replaced the dead Hephaistion as Alexander's most trusted general and friend; for the two seem to have been sympathetic toward Alexander's *Verschmelzungspolitik*.⁷⁶

Together with Perdikkas, Hephaistion advanced to the Indus along the Kabul River-valley, subduing some natives who resisted but winning the majority over by negotiation and show of force. At Peukelaotis, however, they found the local ruler, Astes, unwilling to submit, and only after thirty days of siege did they take the city; Astes himself was killed.⁷⁷ By the time that Alexander reached the Indus, Hephaistion had built the boat-bridge and acquired provisions, chiefly from Omphis (Taxiles), for the bulk of the army.⁷⁸

⁷⁶ See "Chapter 4: Perdikkas." For his character see F. Miltner, "Die staatsrechtliche Entwicklung des Alexanderreiches," *Klio* 26 (1933) 52; Schachermeyr, *Alexander in Babylon* 16.

⁷⁷ Arr. 4.22.8; cf. Berve 2.89-90, no. 174, s.v. "Ἀστῆς. Cf. B. Breloer, *Alexanders Bund mit Poros: Indien von Dareios zu Sandrokottos*, Leipzig, 1941, 108-110.

⁷⁸ Arr. 5.3.5; Curt. 8.10.2-3; 12.4; 6, 15; Metz Epit. 48; Fuller, *Generalship* 126-127; Breloer, *Alexanders Kampf gegen Poros (Ein Beitrag zur indischen Geschichte)*, *Bonner orientalistische Studien*, Heft 3, Stuttgart, 1933, 22.

In the battle with Poros, Hephaistion and Perdikkas both commanded cavalry and were directly under Alexander's control on the left wing;⁷⁹ more precise information is lacking. His next mission, against the rebellious cousin of the recently defeated king, the "bad Poros" (Πῶρος ὁ κακός), was conducted in association with another *hipparch*, Demetrios.⁸⁰

In India, as in Baktria-Sogdiana, Hephaistion's duties continued to be primarily non-military. Together with Perdikkas he had founded the city of Orobatis *en route* to the Indus⁸¹ (which he bridged), and gathered provisions from Omphis. After subjugating the "bad Poros," he synoecized a city between the Hydraotes and Akesines Rivers;⁸² later he founded settlements at Pattala and in the land of the Oreitai.⁸³ The latter, named

⁷⁹ Arr. 5.12.2; Curt. 8.14.15. For the battle in general see R. Schubert, "Die Porus-Schlacht," *Rh. Mus.* 56 (1901) 543-562; G. Veith, "Der Kavalleriekampf in der Schlacht am Hydaspes," *Klio* 8 (1908) 131-153; Tarn 2.190-198; Hamilton, "The Cavalry Battle at the Hydaspes," *JHS* 76 (1956) 26-31. See also Breloer, *Kampf gegen Poros* (n.78 *supra*) 51; Fuller, *Generalship* 180-199; esp. 186-187.

⁸⁰ Arr. 5.21.5; Diod. 17.91.2; see Berve 2.134, 345, nos. 256, 684, s.vv. Δημήτριος, Πῶρος. The incident is referred to briefly by Breloer, *Bund mit Poros* (n.77 *supra*) 125, n.2.

⁸¹ Arr. 4.28.5.

⁸² Arr. 5.29.3.

⁸³ Arr. 6.21.5.

Alexandreia, may in fact have been the synoecism of Rhambakia, which Leonnatos completed.⁸⁴

In 326 Hephaistion came to the fore. The army had mutinied at the Hyphasis, no longer willing to proceed ever eastward. Alexander may have felt that Koinos, the spokesman for the war-weary troops, had betrayed him.⁸⁵ Koinos soon died of illness, but Alexander, retracing his steps only grudgingly came to rely more heavily on his bosom-friend, Hephaistion.⁸⁶ On his return to the Hydaspes he found the city that Hephaistion had synoecized on the western banks of the Akesines, though Hephaistion had completed the task and rejoined Alexander before the mutiny at the Hyphasis.⁸⁷ From this settlement the army returned to the Hydaspes, where Hephaistion is next named in Nearchos' list of *trierarchoi*, the men responsible for meeting the expenses of Alexander's Indus-fleet.⁸⁸ Certainly he did not command a ship himself, for, as the army began its descent of the Indus River-

⁸⁴ See "Chapter 2: Leonnatos"; also Hamilton, "Alexander among the Oreitae," *Historia* 21 (1972) 603-608.

⁸⁵ For Koinos' speech: Arr. 5.27.2-9; Curt. 9.2.20; Alexander's reaction, Arr. 5.28.1.

⁸⁶ Koinos' death: Arr. 6.2.1; Curt. 9.2.20. Badian is suspicious of his sudden death: *JHS* 81 (1961) 22; *Studies in Greek and Roman History*, Oxford, 1964, 200. E.D. Carney, *Macedonian Aristocracy*, believes that Alexander now came to regard Krateros as "potentially dangerous" (216) and that "he did not fear [Hephaistion] as he did Krateros" (220); but see my discussion of their relationship below.

⁸⁷ Diod. 17.93.1; Curt. 9.1.35.

⁸⁸ Nearchos, *FGrHist* 133 F1 = Arr. *Ind.* 18.3.

system, with Alexander sailing with the fleet, the main forces were divided into two parts: Hephaistion, with the larger portion of the army and two hundred elephants, marched down the eastern bank, while Krateros with the smaller force descended on the west.⁸⁹ It was Alexander's custom to divide his forces whenever possible in order to subjugate enemy territory more effectively, but this separation of Hephaistion and Krateros had its personal reasons. There had long been rivalries among Alexander's dearest friends, especially between Krateros and Hephaistion, and these frictions erupted into open hand-to-hand combat at some point in the Indian campaign.⁹⁰ Now it had ceased to be a personal affair, for the supporters of each man were on the verge of coming to blows. It seemed that the only way to ease the situation was to keep the two commanders apart as much as possible.

The Indus proved useful. The rivals were given instructions to proceed downstream, each on his side of the river, and to await the fleet, which would join them three days' sail from the point of departure.⁹¹ Two days after Alexander's arrival at the predestined location, Hephaistion continued south toward the junction of the Hydaspes and Akesines, toward the territory of the peoples allied to the Malloi, who had prepared to resist the invader.⁹²

⁸⁹ Arr. 6.2.2; Arr. *Ind.* 19.1-3; Diod. 17.96.1.

⁹⁰ Plut. *Alex.* 47.11-12; cf. Diod. 17.114.1-2.

⁹¹ Arr. *Ind.* 19.3; Arr. 6.4.1; cf. R.D. Milns.227.

⁹² Arr. 6.4.1.

By the time Hephaistion arrived, he found that Alexander (who had sailed ahead) had subdued the tribes of that region and was preparing to march directly against the Malloi; these lived between the Hydraotes and Akesines Rivers.

In order to deal with the Malloi, Alexander devised the following strategy. First the slower troops, the infantry-*taxis* of Polyperchon and the elephants, were transferred to the western bank and placed under Krateros' command, as were the *hippotoxotai* and the force with which Philippos (the brother of Harpalos, the Treasurer) had followed the course of the Akesines River.⁹³ Hephaistion and the troops that remained with him were to march five days in advance toward the confluence of the Akesines and Hydraotes. Nearchos was to sail down the Akesines with the fleet, and Ptolemy was to follow Hephaistion's route after a delay of three days. Alexander meanwhile crossed the desert region between the rivers with the intention of taking the Malloi off guard. He hoped that those of the Malloi who escaped southward would be driven into the arms of Hephaistion, while Ptolemy would lie in wait for those who attempted to escape to the west.⁹⁴ The elaborate strategy proved unnecessary, for Alexander took the Malloi

⁹³ Arr. 6.5.5. A good discussion of Alexander's activities against the Malloi is given by Breloer, *Bund mit Poros* (n.77 *supra*) 29-56; Fuller, *Generalship* 259-263; V. Smith, *EHI* 94ff.

⁹⁴ Arr. 6.5.6.

completely by surprise. They had not expected that the enemy would arrive from the west, through the waterless region. Those who retreated to their chief city, where Alexander was critically wounded, were slaughtered, while those of another town, if they did not find refuge in the marshes, were butchered by the forces of Perdikkas.⁹⁵

The army continued southward, both Hephaistion and Krateros now occupying the eastern bank, since the terrain on the western side proved too difficult for Krateros' troops.⁹⁶ But before the army reached Pattala news came of unrest in the west. Thus Krateros was despatched with the elephants, such Macedonians as were unfit for service (ἀνόμαχοι) and the *taxeis* of Attalos, Meleagros and Antigenes, having been given instructions to police the regions of Arachosia, Drangiana and finally Karmania, where he was to rejoin Alexander.⁹⁷ For Hephaistion it must have been welcome news that Krateros, his most powerful rival, had been sent to the west; for he now became, undisputedly, Alexander's second-in-command.

At Pattala Alexander made good use of Hephaistion's organisational skills, instructing him to fortify the place while he himself sailed to the mouth of the Indus via the west arm of the river.⁹⁸ On his

⁹⁵ Arr. 6.6.6.

⁹⁶ Arr. 6.15.4.

⁹⁷ Arr. 6.17.3; on the error at 6.15.5 see Bosworth, "Errors in Arrian," *CQ* n.s. 26 (1976) 127ff.

⁹⁸ Arr. 6.18.1.

return, he found the task completed and he assigned to Hephaistion the work of fortifying the harbour and building the dockyards at the city, while he himself sailed to the Ocean along the eastern arm of the Indus.⁹⁹ Hephaistion appears to have completed this work by the time of Alexander's return, although it is possible that Pattala harbour, which became the base for Nearchos' Ocean-fleet, was set in final order by Nearchos himself.¹⁰⁰

Hephaistion, however, accompanied Alexander to the west. At the Arabios River, Alexander left him behind with the main force, while he, Leonnatos and Ptolemy ravaged the land of the Oreitai in three columns.¹⁰¹ Hephaistion, it appears, had been instructed to lead his forces to the borders of the Oreitai, where all the contingents reunited.¹⁰² In the land of the Oreitai, Hephaistion made preparations for the synoecism of Rhambakia, while Alexander attended to military matters on the frontiers of Gedrosia. But Hephaistion was soon replaced by Leonnatos and sent to join Alexander, who now prepared to take the army through the Gedrosian desert.¹⁰³ Leonnatos remained behind, for a time, with the satrap Apollophanes, in order to settle affairs among the Oreitai, complete the synoecism of Rhambakia, and prepare for the needs of Nearchos, who would be stopping there *en route*

⁹⁹ Arr. 6.20.1.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁰¹ Arr. 6.21.3; Curt. 9.10.6.

¹⁰² Arr. 6.21.5.

¹⁰³ Arr. 6.21.5; 6.22.3.

to the Persian Gulf.¹⁰⁴

Of Hephaistion's part in the Gedrosian expedition we know nothing, except that he accompanied Alexander. After the ordeal and a rest in Karmania, Hephaistion led the slower troops and the baggage-trains into Persia along the coastal route (παρὰ θάλασσαν). Alexander took the lighter troops through the mountains to Persepolis and through the Persian Gates; Hephaistion must have followed, for the last portion of his march, the waggon-road (ἀμαξιτός) that by-passed the Gates, which Parmenion had used in the winter of 331/0, when he led a similar force.¹⁰⁵ On the road to Sousa, the forces were reunited. And it was at Sousa that Hephaistion reached the pinnacle of his career.

IV

From his role in the Philotas-affair, we gain a picture of Hephaistion as an unpleasant, jealous individual.¹⁰⁶ Perhaps encouraged by his success against the rival Philotas, Hephaistion

¹⁰⁴ Arr. 6.22.3; *Ind.* 23.5-8; Curt. 9.10.7; Diod. 17.104.5-6; 105.8; Pliny, *NH* 6.97; cf. Chapter 2: Leonnatos"; cf. Hamilton, "Alexander among the Oreitae," *Historia* 21 (1972) 603-608.

¹⁰⁵ Arr. 6.28.7; for Parmenion's route around the Persian Gates Arr. 3.18.1; Curt. 5.3.16.

¹⁰⁶ E.D. Carney, *Macedonian Aristocracy* 221: "One forms a picture of Alexander's closest friend which is not attractive. Yet it is easy to see why such a man would be both useful and attractive to Alexander: he was attractive to no one else, and therefore to Alexander alone."

continued to be at odds with leading figures in Alexander's entourage: Kallisthenes, Eumenes, Krateros. Toward the end of his career, as we have seen, there was conflict between Hephaistion and Krateros, who was equally ambitious but more capable. Yet Krateros' meteoric rise was somewhat retarded, reaching a plateau in India, when Hephaistion became a powerful and dangerous rival. There had been friction, and Alexander appears to have kept them apart deliberately. But, while the King professed to love them both dearly,¹⁰⁷ some of the blame for Krateros' less-than-spectacular career after 326 must be attached to Hephaistion's influence and to Alexander's willingness to promote the latter's interests.¹⁰⁸

Hephaistion's dealings with individuals reveal that he was quarrelsome, deliberately incompatible.¹⁰⁹ We do not know the exact nature of his quarrel with Kallisthenes, or why he maligned him. Perhaps Kallisthenes' way of life did not appeal to Hephaistion,¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁷ For Alexander's devotion to Hephaistion: Curt. 3.12.15; Plut. *Alex.* 47.9-10; Diod. 17.114.1-3; cf. Arr. 1.12.1; Ailian, *VH* 12.7; Loukian, *dial. mort.* 12.4 (397). Krateros: *carus in paucis*, Curt. 6.8.2; ὄντινα ἴσον τῇ ἑαυτοῦ κεφαλῇ ἄγει, Arr. 7.12.3; cf. Plut. *Alex.* 47.9-10; *Mor.* 181D; Diod. 17.114.1-2.

¹⁰⁸ Carney, *Macedonian Aristocracy*, suspects Alexander's motives: "...Alexander was careful to balance the duties and honours of Krateros with those of other top men, especially with Hephaistion" (214). "Alexander carefully monitored his activities and consciously played him off against others. Krateros was potentially dangerous... and had to be watched closely" (216).

¹⁰⁹ Carney, n.106 *supra*.

¹¹⁰ Arr. 4.10; Plut. *Alex.* 53. Hephaistion shared many of the sentiments of Alexander's flatterers, who contributed to Kallisthenes' ruin.

who showed an enthusiastic preference for Alexander's orientalisms and was himself given to the same immoderation that at times afflicted the King.¹¹¹ Plutarch tells us that Hephaistion was sympathetic to Alexander's *Verschmelzungspolitik* - which Alexander, no doubt, explained to him and won his support for - and that he was used by Alexander in his dealings with the Persians.¹¹² Perhaps this attitude toward the orientals earned him the disfavour of both Macedonians and Greeks, though his rise to power through Alexander's favouritism was a major cause of hostility; there will have been a number of his contemporaries who encouraged rumours that Hephaistion was Alexander's minion.¹¹³ Perhaps he organised the unpopular *proskynesis*-affair, as modern scholarship likes to assume,¹¹⁴ though Chares of Mytilene, whom Schachermeyr regards as Alexander's "Chef der Kanzlei," would be a more suitable candidate for such work.¹¹⁵ At any rate, Kallisthenes had promised Hephaistion that

¹¹¹ Cf. Ehippos of Olynthos and his work περὶ τῆς 'Αλεξάνδρου καὶ 'Ηφαίστωνος τελευτῆς (or ταφῆς), *FGrHist* 126, which doubtless exaggerated their vices.

¹¹² Plut. *Alex.* 47.9-10.

¹¹³ Ailian, *VH* 12.7; Justin 12.12.11; Loukian, *diat. mort.* 12.4 (397); Diod. 17.114.3; cf. Tarn 2.319-326, Appendix 18: "Alexander's Attitude to Sex," esp. 321.

¹¹⁴ Droysen, *Hellenismus* 1.312; Berve 2.171; Schachermeyr, *Alexander der Grosse* 383; Hamilton, *Alexander the Great* 105; PA 153; Wilcken 169; Welles, *Alexander and the Hellenistic World* 41; Green 375-376.

¹¹⁵ Schachermeyr, *Alexander in Babylon* 17-18; 34.

he would perform *proskynesis* - or so, at least, the latter claimed - but went back on his word. Hephaistion wasted no time in maligning Kallisthenes, once the sycophant, Demetrios, son of Pythonax, had brought Kallisthenes' defiance to Alexander's attention.¹¹⁶ We cannot say to what extent he carried his hostility, but he will scarcely have done anything to enhance Kallisthenes' already declining popularity. Kallisthenes, however, made little or no effort to redeem himself.

The accounts of Hephaistion's quarrels with Eumenes are lost from the manuscripts of Arrian and Curtius.¹¹⁷ Plutarch, in his *Life of Eumenes*, speaks of two separate occasions on which they disagreed. The first instance involved the allotment of living-quarters: Hephaistion gave the quarters previously assigned to Eumenes to the flute-player Euioi.¹¹⁸ This was clearly an arrogant gesture on Hephaistion's part and an affront to the Greek Eumenes, a man of no mean station. This incident is presumably one that is lost from Arrian's manuscript, for it took place at Ekbatana, precisely the historical context in which the *lacuna* occurs.¹¹⁹ The

¹¹⁶ Plut. *Alex.* 55.1. For Demetrios, son of Pythonax, see Arr. 4.12.5; see also Berve 2.134-135, no. 258, s.v. Δημήτριος. See Hamilton, PA 153.

¹¹⁷ Arr. 7.12.7 breaks off with the quarrels of Antipatros and Olympias, and resumes with the reconciliation of Hephaistion and Eumenes (τούτω τῷ λόγῳ ὑποπτήξαντα Ἡφαίστιωνα συναλλαγῆναι Εὐμενεῖ, οὐχ ἐκόντα ἐκόντι); the actual quarrel itself is lost. Curt. 10.4.3 breaks off at Opis and resumes with the account of Alexander's death, 10.5.1ff.

¹¹⁸ Plut. *Eum.* 2.1; cf. Berve 2.155-156, no. 315, s.v. Εὐίος. Euioi was himself a source of trouble, for he quarrelled with Kassandros over the boy Python (Berve 2.339, no. 678, s.v. Πύθων), so Plut. *Mor.* 180F.

¹¹⁹ See n.117 *supra*.

second quarrel, again the result of a relatively minor issue, involved a gift or a prize (περὶ δωρεᾶς τιμῆς); Plutarch does not give the details.¹²⁰ The quarrels evoked Alexander's anger, first against Hephaistion (who appears to have instigated them) and later against Eumenes, and it appears that ever since the first incident the two were at odds with one another; for the cause of the enmity must be sought in the struggle for power within the army, and in the unpleasant nature of Hephaistion. Fortunately for Eumenes, the animosity and Hephaistion were short-lived; nevertheless, Eumenes was careful to avert any suspicion that he favoured Hephaistion's death by proposing that honours be granted to him posthumously.¹²¹

Most revealing, however, are the accounts of Hephaistion's stormy relations with Krateros. The two had worked together against Philotas, a common enemy; now ambition for power and Alexander's favour led inevitably to jealous rivalry. In the early stages of the campaign there had been less conflict: Krateros had been steadily proving himself the most likely man to replace Parmenion,¹²² Hephaistion was busily ingratiating himself with Alexander. Both were dear to the King, and he used them according to their abilities: Krateros for important military assignments and for dealings with Greeks and Macedonians

¹²⁰ Plut. *Eum.* 2.4. Cf. Vezin, *Eumenes von Kardia* 16-17; Berve 2.156-158, no. 317, s.v. Εὐμένης; Kaerst, *RE* VI 1083-1084; for his later career see H.D. Westlake, "Eumenes of Cardia," *Essays on the Greek Historians and Greek History*, New York, 1969, 313-330.

¹²¹ Arr. 7.14.9; cf. Diod. 17.115.1.

¹²² See Chapter 3: Krateros.

(for he was very "traditional" in his thinking), Hephaistion for organisational work, both in conquered territory and at the Court. But, as Hephaistion's aspirations extended to higher commands in the army, jealousy erupted into open hand-to-hand fighting, with the supporters of each ready to join in the fray.¹²³ Undoubtedly this accounts for the fact that Hephaistion and Krateros were seldom in the same camp together (for any length of time) after 326.

The incident in India, where Hephaistion and Krateros came to blows, is instructive. We are told that Alexander rode up and openly reproached Hephaistion, calling him a madman if he did not know that "without Alexander he would be nothing."¹²⁴ This was not the case with Krateros, whom Alexander chided in private; for Krateros was not one to be dishonoured before his own troops, and before the *Hetairoi*. Alexander recognised the value of Krateros to the King and to the army, and, undoubtedly, he was pained by the friction between Krateros and Hephaistion. His relationship with the latter, on the other hand, was a much more personal one; ruffled feathers could be smoothed over in private. And probably he understood that Hephaistion's nature was largely to blame. Now two individuals are more aptly characterised than are Hephaistion and Krateros by the epithets φιλαλέξανδρος and φιλοβασιλεύς.¹²⁵

¹²³ Plut. *Alex.* 47.11.

¹²⁴ Plut. *Alex.* 47.11: 'Αλέξανδρος ἐλοιδορεῖ τὸν Ἡφαιστίωνα φανερώς, ἐμπληκτον καλῶν καὶ μαινόμενον, εἰ μὴ συνίησιν ὥς, εἴαν τις αὐτοῦ τὸν Ἀλέξανδρον ἀφέληται, μηδὲν εστίν.

¹²⁵ Plut. *Alex.* 47.9-10; *Mor.* 181D; Diod. 17.114.2.

In view of Hephaistion's rivalry with Krateros and the previous downfalls of Philotas and Kallisthenes, the somewhat unspectacular last years of Krateros under Alexander suggest that Hephaistion's influence with Alexander had again been at work. We cannot say what would have happened had Krateros actually become Regent of Macedonia in Antipatros' place. But, for Hephaistion in Asia, the base of Alexander's integrated empire, Krateros' departure for Europe left him without a serious rival as Alexander's dearest friend and foremost general.¹²⁶

V

Sousa in the spring of 324 saw not only the clearest manifestation of Alexander's *Verschmelzungspolitik* in the mass-marriages between the Iranian and Macedonian nobilities, but also the culmination of Hephaistion's unusual career. Already he had become the army's most important officer, for he commanded the first *chiliarchia* of the Companions.¹²⁷ Very soon he would be crowned for his exploits on the campaign, along with the other members of the Staff (the *somatophylakes*).¹²⁸ But now he received, at the mass-marriages, what must be regarded as the greatest honour of his career, no less than a share in the empire.

¹²⁶ For Krateros' departure see Arr. 7.12.3-4; cf. Chapter 3: Krateros. The ambitious and somewhat unscrupulous Perdikkas, however, lurked in the shadows.

¹²⁷ See Appendix 2. Arr. 7.14.10.

¹²⁸ Arr. 7.5.6.

For Alexander the marriage to Rhoxane, in spite of the strong romantic tradition that it had been a love-match, had been the first experiment in political marriage; Philip II had exploited political marriages to their fullest, and now Alexander secured the goodwill of the stubborn Sogdiani by marrying one of their race.¹²⁹ In 324, firmly established on the throne of the Great King, Alexander sought to legitimise his own position by marrying the Achaimenid Stateira, daughter of Dareios III.¹³⁰ To Krateros he gave Amastris, daughter of

¹²⁹ Alexander had given his first thoughts to political marriage in 337, at the time of the ill-advised communications with Pixodaros (Plut. *Alex.* 10). At the Iaxartes River, some two years before his marriage to Rhoxane, he rejected a union with the daughter of the Skythian king (Arr. 4.15.1-5). For the marriage to Rhoxane see Arr. 4.19.4-20.4; Plut. *Alex.* 47.7; *Mor.* 332E, 338D; Curt. 8.4.21-30; Metz Epit. 28-29; Zon. 4.12, p.296, 6; Strabo 11.517. For the political motives Plut. *Alex.* 47.8; cf. Curt. 8.4.25. See Hamilton, *PA* 129-130; on the marriage M. Renard and J. Servais, "A propos du mariage d' Alexandre et de Roxane," *Antiquité Classique* 24 (1955) 29-50; Tarn 2.326; but see Schachermeyr, *Alexander in Babylon* 22: "man gewinnt den Eindruck, als ob sich Roxane im Liebesleben Alexanders gegenüber den neuen, aus Staatsrason geschlossenen Ehen recht wohl zu behaupten wusste." See Berve 2.346-347, no. 688, s.v. 'Ρωξάνη. Alexander held both her father and brother in great honour, see Berve 2.292-293, no. 587, s.v. 'Οξυάρτης; 2.186, no. 392, s.v. 'Ιτάνης. Rhoxane was, one might add, with the exception of Alexander's mistress Barsine (whose son Herakles is now accepted by P.A. Brunt, "Alexander, Barsine and Heracles," *Riv. di Fil.* 103 [1975] 22-34, against Tarn, "Heracles, Son of Barsine," *JHS* 41 [1921] 18ff., and 2.330-337; cf. Berve 2.102-104, 2.168, no. 353, s.v. 'Ηρακλῆς, who accepts his existence), the only woman to bear children by Alexander; that is to omit his fictitious children by the Indian queen Kleophis (Berve, no.435) and Thalestris the Amazon.

¹³⁰ Plut. *Alex.* 70.3; *Mor.* 329E-F; Diod. 17.107.6; Justin 12.10.9-10; Arr. 7.4.4 (from Aristoboulos) mistakenly calls her Barsine. Berve 2.363-364, no. 722, s.v. Στάτειρα. Tarn 2.334, n.4, followed by Hamilton, *PA* 195, thinks Barsine was her official and correct name (against Berve, *loc. cit.*); this view is shared by Schachermeyr, *Alexander in Babylon* 22 (though not repeated in *Alexander der Grosse*).

Dareios' brother, Oxyathres, a bride worthy of the King's most capable commander.¹³¹ But to Hephaistion he wedded Drypetis, the sister of his own bride Stateira, for, according to Arrian, "he wished his children to be the first-cousins of Hephaistion's children."¹³² By marrying Stateira, Alexander had strengthened his claim to the rule over Asia - and clearly the marriage must have had great popular appeal for the Persians, who hoped to see the grandsons of Dareios on the throne¹³³ -, but he also conferred upon Hephaistion, who married his new sister-in-law, more than just the honour of relationship by marriage: this was a legitimate, though lesser, claim to a share in the empire.

Whatever the exact nature of Alexander's plans for Hephaistion - and it is doubtful that these included making him *chiliarchos* in the Persian sense of *hazarapatis*¹³⁴ - they were never fully realised.

¹³¹ See Arr. 7.4.5; Memnon, *FGrHist* 434 F4. Berve 2.24, no. 50, s.v. "Ἀμαστρίς; Wilcken, *RE* I.2 (1894) 1750, s.v. "Amastris (7)." Berve 2.291-292, no. 586, s.v. 'Οξυδάτης. See also Macurdy, *Hellenistic Queens* 60, 107.

¹³² Arr. 7.4.5: [Ἀλέξανδρον] ἐθέλειν γάρ οἱ ἀνεψιοὺς τῶν παίδων γενέσθαι τοὺς Ἡφαιστιῶνος παῖδας. For Drypetis see Arr. *loc. cit.*; Diod. 17.107.6; cf. Curt. 10.5.20. Berve 2.148, no. 290, s.v. Δρυπητῖς. For her death (along with her sister) at the hands of Rhoxane and Perdikkas Plut. *Alex.* 77.6.

¹³³ Alexander strengthened this claim by marrying also Parysatis, daughter of Artaxerxes III Ochus, who had ruled Persia before Dareios III. See Berve 2.306, no. 607, s.v. Παρύσατις. Arr. 7.4.4. For the family-connexions see O. Neuhaus, "Der Vater der Sisygambis (und das Verwandschaftsverhältniss des Dareios III Kodomannos zu Artaxerxes II und III)," *Rh. Mus.* 57 (1902) 610-623.

¹³⁴ See Appendix 2; also P.J. Junge, "Hazarapatis," *Klio* 33 (1940) 13-38; E. Benveniste, *Titres et Noms Propres en Iranien Ancien*,

The only honours that Arrian claims were accorded to him were the crowning (along with the other *somatophylakes*) and the distinguished marriage to Drypetis, both at Sousa. From Sousa Hephaistion led the bulk of the infantry to the Persian Gulf, while Alexander sailed down the Eulaios River to the coast.¹³⁵ From the mouth of the Eulaios he followed the shoreline of the Persian Gulf and turned upstream into the Tigris to the place where Hephaistion had taken the army; it was Hephaistion's last command.¹³⁶ Together they proceeded to Opis, and from Opis to Ekbatana; it was now autumn 324 B.C.

At Ekbatana Alexander offered sacrifice and celebrated athletic and literary contests.¹³⁷ There were bouts of heavy drinking, and shortly thereafter Hephaistion fell ill with a fever.¹³⁸ We do not know the precise nature of his ailment; even Plutarch, who gives the most detail, is vague.¹³⁹ Invariably,

Paris, 1966, 51-71. Schachermeyr, *Alexander in Babylon*, 31-37; I find his conclusion somewhat unconvincing: "Der Unterschied zum Reichsverlierer des persischen Hazarapatis lag also darin, dass der Chiliarch Alexanders überhaupt keine dauernden und fixen Befugnisse zu eigen hatte, dass er nichts war, solange ihm der Herrscher keinen Auftrag gab, dass er aber als vollwertiger alter ego des Herrschers auftreten konnte, sobald ihn dieser mit einem diesbezüglichen Auftrag und einer diesbezüglichen Vertretung betraute" (36).

¹³⁵ Arr. 7.7.1.

¹³⁶ Arr. 7.7.6.

¹³⁷ Plut. *Alex.* 72.1 says that some 3000 artists had arrived from Greece; cf. Arr. 7.14.1; Diod. 17.110.8 (dramatic contests only).

¹³⁸ The heavy drinking was exaggerated by Ehippos of Olynthos, *FGH Hist* 126, and played down by Aristoboulos, ¹³⁹ F62 = Arr. 7.29.4.

¹³⁹ Plut. *Alex.* 72.1-2.

Hephaistion's death is linked with heavy drinking: Arrian implies that the drinking-bouts were the cause of Hephaistion's illness, Diodoros is more explicit, but Plutarch does not specify the cause of Hephaistion's fever, only that immoderate eating and drinking were the proximate cause of his death.¹⁴⁰ Ephippos of Olynthos, in his scandalous pamphlet περὶ τῆς 'Αλεξάνδρου καὶ 'Ηφαιστίωνος τελευτῆς, will have attributed it solely to barbaric drinking-habits.¹⁴¹ At any rate, it was on the seventh day of his illness that Hephaistion died (so Arr. 7.14.1). The only other details are supplied by Plutarch, according to whom, Hephaistion disregarded the strict diet imposed by his doctor Glaukos (Glaukias in Arr. 7.14.4), who had gone off to the theatre.¹⁴² Eating a boiled fowl and drinking a great quantity of wine, Hephaistion heightened his fever and died;¹⁴³ news of his deteriorating condition reached Alexander at the stadium, where he was watching the boys' races, but he returned too late and found Hephaistion already dead.¹⁴⁴

¹⁴⁰ For the accounts of his death: Arr. 7.14.1ff.; Diod. 17.110.8; Polyainos 4.3.31 (incorrectly, it happened at Babylon!); Justin 12.12.11; Arr. 7.18.2-3; Epiktetos 2.22.17; Plut. *Alex.* 72; *Pelopidas* 34.2; Nepos, *Eumenes* 2.2; Appian, *BC* 2.152.

¹⁴¹ For Ephippos of Olynthos see Jacoby, *FGrHist* no. 126, and IID 437-439.

¹⁴² Plut. *Alex.* 72.2. See Berve 2.112, no. 228, s.v. Γλαυκίας.

¹⁴³ Plut. *Alex.* 72.2.

¹⁴⁴ Arr. 7.14.1.

From the accounts of what followed it is virtually impossible to separate fact from fiction. Arrian provides a catalogue of λεγόμενα, but his criteria for discerning what is reliable and what is not - when indeed he does make such an attempt - amount to little more than accepting what is honourable in a king's behaviour and rejecting what is not; in this respect he recalls the rather naïve basis for his trust in Ptolemy's *History*, which he related in the prooemium.¹⁴⁵ Alexander's grief was excessive; on this point all the sources concur, but there were some who thought it noble that he should display his sorrow, others who found it

¹⁴⁵ Arr. 7.14.2-10. In the prooemium Arrian says that he based his history on the works of Aristoboulos and Ptolemy, whom he judged to be the most reliable of the historians of Alexander "because Aristoboulos had accompanied Alexander on the expedition, and Ptolemy, in addition to campaigning with him, was a King himself, and it would have been more despicable for him to lie than for anyone else" (prooem. 2). Arrian did not ignore Alexander's faults, it is true, but he coupled his criticisms of his hero with whole-hearted (often excessive) praise not only of his virtues but of his readiness to repent of his crimes (e.g. 4.19.6; 4.9.1). On the whole there is a reluctance to accept stories that cast Alexander in a bad light, and the attitude prevails that, if we are to judge Alexander's character, we must base this on all the evidence, not on a portion of it: ὅστις δὲ κακίζει Ἀλέξανδρον, μὴ μόνον ὅσα ἄξια κακίζεσθαι ἐστὶ προφερόμενος κακισέτω, ἀλλὰ σύμπαντα τὰ Ἀλεξάνδρου εἰς ἓν χωρίον ξυναγαγών ... (7.30.1). For a useful discussion of Arrian's attitude to his subject see J.R. Hamilton's "Introduction" in Aubrey de Sélincourt's Penguin translation, *Arrian: The Campaigns of Alexander*, Harmondsworth, 1971, 17-34, though Hamilton's comment (*Alexander the Great* 20) that Arrian, "a Stoic himself, ... avoided the doctrinaire condemnation of Alexander popular in Stoic circles," falls short of expressing Arrian's willingness to make excuses for Alexander (or, at least, to overlook what is unpleasant).

unfitting for Alexander or for any other king. Those who saw in Alexander's grief an emulation of Achilles reported that he shaved the manes of his horses and his mules, tore down city-walls, and lay upon the corpse of his Patroklos, refusing food and water; the last point is at least typical of Alexander.¹⁴⁶ Magnificent, indeed ostentatious, were the funeral arrangements, some of which were later cancelled at the instigation of Perdikkas, who conveyed Hephaistion's body to Babylon.¹⁴⁷ In his role as Great King, he ordered that the sacred fire of Persia be extinguished until such time as Hephaistion's last rites had been taken care of.¹⁴⁸ Such were the honours accorded the dead

¹⁴⁶ For Alexander's excessive grief and the agreement of the sources see Arr. 7.14.2; for different attitudes toward the display of emotion, Arr. 7.14.3. The emulation of Achilles: Arr. 7.14.4 (he also cut his own hair); Aelian, *VH* 7.8; Plut. *Pelop.* 34.2 (horses' manes, demolished walls), cf. *Alex.* 72.3. For his refusal of food and drink, Arr. 7.14.8. Cf. Alexander's behaviour after Kleitos' death, Arr. 4.9.1ff.; Plut. *Alex.* 51.10-52.1; Curt. 8.2.1ff.

¹⁴⁷ For the funeral pyre: Justin 12.12.12; Diod. 17.115.5 (both put the cost at 12,000 talents); Arr. 7.14.8 (10,000). Diod. 17.115.6 speaks of the slaughter of 10,000 sacrificial victims; for the cancellation of Hephaistion's monument see Diod. 18.4.2 (who wrongly calls it the pyre, which had already been completed; see *Diódoros of Sicily*, vol. 9, Loeb Classical Library, Cambridge, Mass., 1935, R.M. Geer tr., 21, n.1); cf. Badian, "A King's Notebooks," *HSCP* 74 (1967) 200-201. According to Plut. *Alex.* 72.5 the work was to be undertaken by Stasikrates (Deinokrates? see Berve, nos. 249, 720), who had offered to shape Mt. Athos into a giant likeness of Alexander. See Hamilton, *PA* 202. For Perdikkas' instructions to take the body to Babylon, Diod. 17.110.8; it is not mentioned by Arrian.

¹⁴⁸ For the sacred fire see Diod. 17.110.8. Schachermeyr, *Alexander in Babylon*, "Das persische Königsfeuer am Hofe Alexanders," 38-48, esp. 47.

Hephaistion. But there were stories of Alexander's anger.

Blame was cast on Glaukias the physician - though Alexander

had earlier trusted with his own life the doctor, Philip of

Akarnania¹⁴⁹ - and on the healing-god Asklepios: Glaukias

was cruelly executed, and the temple of Asklepios at Ekbatana

raised.¹⁵⁰ On the Kossaians too, a barbaric people to the west

of Ekbatana, Alexander vented his anger.¹⁵¹ And, not sur-

prisingly, history was quick to discover prophesies of Hephaistion's

¹⁴⁹ The story of Philip of Akarnania is a popular one, and part of the hostile portrait of Parmenion: Arr. 2.4.9-10 = Aristoboulos, *FGrHist* 139 F8; Curt. 3.6.1-13; 6.10.34-35; Justin 11.8.5-9; Diod. 17.31.4-6; Plut. *Alex.* 19; Val. Max. 3.8 ext 6; Seneca, *de Ira* 2.23.2; Itiner. 28-30; Ps.-Kall. 2.8; Jul. Val. 2.24; Zon. 4.9 p.289, 3. See Hamilton, *PA* 49-50; Berve 2.388-389, no. 788, s.v. Φύλιππος.

¹⁵⁰ According to Arrian 7.14.4, Glaukias was hanged, though Plut. *Alex.* 72.3 claims he was crucified (apparently confused by Berve 2.112: "Er wurde nach [Hephaistions] Tode auf Al.s Befehl gekreuzigt, wie Arrian...berichtet"; unless Arrian uses ἐκρέμασε to mean "crucified" [see *LSJ* s.v. κρεμάννυμι], Plutarch's verb ἀνασταυρόω is normally used of crucifixion. Arrian claims that Glaukias was executed for giving bad medicine, which may be the "official version," so Berve, *loc. cit.*, and Hamilton, *PA* 200. That Alexander did in fact execute Glaukias does not seem unlikely, for he was known to interfere in the business of physicians (cf. his advice to Pausanias the doctor of Krateros on how to treat his patient with hellebore [Plut. *Alex.* 41.7], or his letter to Peukestas' doctor, Alexippos, congratulating him on his healing talents [Plut. *Alex.* 41.6]; and it is not surprising that we know the names of several other doctors in Alexander's entourage, see Berve 1.79-80). For the temple of Asklepios see Epiktetos 2.22.17; but cf. Arr. 7.14.6: οὐκ ἐπιεικῶς κέχρηται μοι δ' Ἀσκληπιός, οὐ σώσας μοι τὸν ἐταῦρον ὄντινα ὕσον τῇ ἐμαυτοῦ κεφαλῇ ᾔγων.

¹⁵¹ Arr. 7.15.1ff.; Diod. 17.111.4ff.; Polyainos 4.3.31.

death.¹⁵² The "Son of Ammon" sent envoys to Siwah to inquire if Hephaistion should be worshipped as a god; the prudent father replied that he should be revered as a hero.¹⁵³

- ¹⁵² Arr. 7.18.2 = Aristoboulos, *FGrHist* 139 F54. The seer Peithagoras prophesied the deaths of both Alexander and Hephaistion (cf. Appian, *BC* 2.152). The prophecy was given to Apollodoros, his brother, who feared both Hephaistion and Alexander. Had he also found Hephaistion difficult to deal with?
- ¹⁵³ Arr. 7.14.7: envoys are sent to Ammon. Arr. 7.23.6: the response comes that he should be revered as a hero; cf. Plut. *Alex.* 72.3, but incorrectly that he should be deified Diod. 17.115.6; Justin 12.12.12: *eumque post mortem coli ut deum iussit*; Loukian, *Cal.* 17. The hero-cult of Hephaistion is alluded to by Hypereides 6.21: καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦς τοῦτων οἰκέτας ὥσπερ ἥρωας τιμᾶν. Cf. P. Treves, "Hyperides and the Cult of Hephaestion," *CR* 53 (1939) 56-57; E. Bickerman, "Sur un Passage d' Hypéride," *Athenaeum* 41 (1963) 70-85; C. Habicht, *Gottmenschen und griechische Städte*, Munich, 1956, 28-36. But P.M. Fraser, in his review of Habicht, *CR* n.s. 8 (1958) 153f., does not think the allusion to Hephaistion is so obvious. See Hamilton's comments, *PA* 200-201, where these views are summarised; the notion that Alexander sought to introduce his own deification by means of Hephaistion's hero-cult antedates Habicht, see Kornemann, "Zur Geschichte der antiken Herrscherkulte," *Klio* 1 (1901) 65, who makes a good case for this. Arr. 7.23.6-8 relates that Alexander was willing to forgive Kleomenes (Berve, no. 431) his crimes in Egypt if he saw to a hero's shrine there.

For small likenesses of Hephaistion made by the *Hetairoi* see Diod. 17.115.1. The lion of Hamadan (Ekbatana) may be the one surviving monument to Hephaistion; for this see H. Luschey, "Der Löwe von Ekbatana," *Archaeologische Mitteilungen aus Iran* 1 (1968) 115-122, esp. 121-122. Cf. Fox (435): "centuries later, when Hephaistion had long been forgotten, the ladies of Hamadan would smear the nose of their lion with jam, hoping for children and easy childbirth. Hephaistion ended his fame as a symbol of fertility."

Chapter 2

LEONNATOS: εἰς τῶν ἐταίρων¹

Leonnatos, according to the testimony of the *Suda*, was a relative of Eurydike, the mother of Philip II, hence an adherent of the Lynkestian royal house;² he was a *syntrophos* of Alexander and his Pellaian origin is corroborated by Arrian (*Anab.* 6.28.4; *Ind.* 18.3). His father's name is not certain, though there is a tendency to favour the twice-attested Anteias.³

¹ See Berve 2.232-235, no. 466, s.v. Λεοννάτος, to which I suggest the following revisions: p.232 (first line) for Arr. IV,28,4 read 6.28.4; p.233 Hegesias (Müller, *FHG*, fr. 3) is now Jacoby, *FGrHist* 142 F5 = Dion. Hal. *de Comp. Verb.* 18 p.123-126R; p.234 "vgl. Onesicr. frg. 26" is now *FGrHist* 134 F28 = Pliny, *NH* 6.97; add Arr. *Ind.* 23.8; for Leonnatos' crowning at Sousa, add Arr. *Ind.* 23.6 and 42.9; Ailian, *VH* 9.3 makes Leonnatos fond of hunting (not, as Berve states, fond of wrestling); for his extravagant importing of sand, or more precisely powdery dust, for wrestling add Pliny, *NH* 35.167-168; Athen. 12.539D (from Phylarchos or Agatharchides of Knidos) = *FGrHist* 81 F41 and/or 86 F3; Leonnatos is not named by Ps.-Kall. 3.31, but rather Jul. Val. 2.3 (Leontas) may refer to Leonnatos (cf. Berve 2.233, n.3 "Ps. Call. II,2"?); p.235 Curt. X,7,9 should read 10.7.8; his satrapy of Hellespontine Phrygia is more accurately derived from Arr. *Succ.* Ia.6 and Ib.2. For the name see Hoffmann, *Die Makedonen* 168-170, who holds that the proparoxytone accentuation (i.e., Λεόννατος) is preferable etymologically. See also F. Geyer, *RE* XII.2 (1925) 2035-2038, s.v. "Leonnatos (1)."

² *Suda* s.v. Λεόννατος = Arr. *Succ.* fr.12; cf. Curt. 10.7.8: *stirpe regia genitus*. For Eurydike's connexions with the Lynkestian royal house see G. Macurdy, *Hellenistic Queens* 17; A.B. Bosworth, "Philip II and Upper Macedonia," *CQ* n.s. 21 (1971) 99-101; see also Geyer (n.1 *supra*) 2035.

³ So Hoffmann, *Die Makedonen* 170; Geyer 2035 passes over the problem; Berve 2.232 is non-committal.

But there is no way of determining which of three forms is correct; for each of these appears to derive from a different primary source. All forms are found in Arrian: *Anab.* 6.28.4 (Aristoboulos, *FGrHist* 139 F50) gives the patronymic as 'Αντέου, which has the support of "Ανθους in *Succ.* Ia.2 (= Photios, *Bibliothēke* cod. 92, p.69, originally from Hieronymos or perhaps Diyllos⁴); *Anab.* 3.5.5 (certainly Ptolemy⁵) reads 'Ονάσου; *Indike* 18.3 (Nearchos, *FGrHist* 133 F1) Εὔνου.⁶ It was on account of his upbringing, his family-background, his size and his beauty, the *Suda* claims, that Leonnatos reached a position of honour. Certainly his family-ties will have made him eligible for the company of the *Hetairoi*, who Tarn assumes were drawn primarily from the ranks of the Macedonian aristocracy.⁷ In this respect Leonnatos is of interest, for he represents a man who accompanied Alexander, in the first instance, as εἰς τῶν ἐταίρων.⁸

⁴ "Αντους is given by Berve 2.232 and Hoffmann, *Die Makedonen* 170; A.G. Roos' Teubner text (Leipzig, 1967) has "Ανθους. Douris is also a possible source for Arrian's τὰ μετὰ 'Αλέξανδρον, but, on the uncertainty of source-criticism in this case, see Bosworth's brief remarks ("The Death of Alexander the Great: Rumour and Propaganda," *CQ* n.s. 21 [1971] 129-130).

⁵ So Kornemann, *Die Alexandergeschichte* 128, 137, 252; Strasburger, *Ptolemaios und Alexander* 34.

⁶ Hoffmann, *Die Makedonen* 170: "dann müsste aber in der Indike Εὔνου aus der ionischen Dialektform 'Αντέω oder 'Αντέω ver- derbt sein, und das ist nicht gerade wahrscheinlich."

⁷ Tarn 2.138.

⁸ Arr. 2.12.5; Curt. 3.12.7 (*ex purpuratis*; cf. Arr. 4.12.2).

The first historical record of Leonnatos dates to the time of the death of Philip II: he is named, along with Perdikkas and Attalos (apparently the son of Andromenes), among the *somatophylakes* who pursued the assassin Pausanias.⁹ Berve is certainly correct to assume that the *somatophylakes* here are intended to be the hypaspists,¹⁰ for the elite group of *somatophylakes*, who numbered seven in 325 (and were presumably seven throughout the campaign¹¹), did not include either Leonnatos or Perdikkas from the start,¹² nor was anyone by the name of Attalos ever known to have been a member of that unit; the son of Andromenes certainly was not.¹³ On the other hand, Droysen's suggestion that the *basilikoi paides* are meant is rejected by Geyer.¹⁴ Perdikkas was certainly too old, as was Leonnatos himself, to belong to the Pages; it is doubtful that any one of them commanded that unit.¹⁵

⁹ Diod. 16.94.4.

¹⁰ Berve 2.233, n.1.

¹¹ Cf. Berve 1.26; for a full discussion see Appendix 1.

¹² See Appendix 1; Leonnatos was appointed *somatophylax* in 332/1; Perdikkas was one by the time of the Philotas-affair (330).

¹³ See Berve 1.27 for a complete list; cf. Berve 2.92, no. 181, s.v. "Ἀττάλος".

¹⁴ Droysen, *Hellenismus* 1.70; Geyer, *RE* XII.2 (1925) 2035.

¹⁵ For the *basilikoi paides* see Berve 1.37-39, "c) Die königlichen Pagen"; cf. Arr. 4.13.1; Ailian, *VH* 14.48; Curt. 5.1.42; Diod. 17.65.1.

Under Alexander, Leonnatos does not appear until the year 333. After the battle at Issos, Alexander captured the women of Dareios III, including his wife and his mother.¹⁶ These women had been misled by rumours and believed that Dareios was dead. In order to free them from unnecessary sorrow, Alexander prepared to send to them a certain Mithrenes, the former satrap of Sardeis, who spoke Persian.¹⁷ But he quickly changed his mind and sent instead Leonnatos, fearing lest the sight of a traitor would only further increase the women's anguish.¹⁸ Undoubtedly the sensation created by Leonnatos' arrival was not unlike that described by Curtius (3.12.9-12), with the terrified women supposing that the appearance of armed men at their tent meant certain death, but the story, which was related in (we may suppose) a less elaborate fashion by Aristoboulos and Ptolemy, has been embellished considerably

¹⁶ Arr. 2.12.4-5; Curt. 3.12.4ff.; Diod. 17.37.3; Plut. *Alex.* 21.2. See Berve 2.356-357, no. 711, s.v. Σισύγγαμβος (Dareios' mother; Diod. 17.37, Σισύγγαμβος); 2.362-363, no. 721, s.v. Σιότιτρα (sister and wife of Dareios). For the family-background of Sisygambis see O. Neuhaus, "Der Vater der Sisygambis (und das Verwandschaftsverhältniss des Dareios III Kodomannos zu Artaxerxes II und III)," *Rh. Mus.* 57 (1902) 610-623.

¹⁷ Curt. 3.12.6-7; see Berve 2.262-263, no. 524, s.v. Μηθρήνης. See A. Baumbach, *Kleinasien unter Alexander dem Grossen*, Diss. Jena, publ. Weida, 1911, 39-40; on his later career as satrap of Armenia, under Alexander see P. Julien, *Zur Verwaltung der Satrapien unter Alexander dem Grossen*, Diss. Leipzig, publ. Weida, 1914, 27-28.

¹⁸ Curt. 3.12.7-12.

by Curtius.¹⁹ Quite possibly Curtius based his version on that of Kleitarchos, who recorded Hephaistion's visit to the Persian Queen²⁰ and likely related Leonnatos' activities as well. At any rate, Leonnatos achieved his purpose, assuring the women that Dareios lived and that Alexander would attend to them personally. Perhaps Alexander deliberately chose an important member of the company of the *Hetairoi* for such a mission of diplomacy; perhaps, however, the incident reflects something of Leonnatos' character - which the sources have otherwise left somewhat colourless - and his ability to handle such situations.

Curtius' description (3.12.7) of Leonnatos as *ex purpuratis* must be the equivalent of ἕνα τῶν ἐταύρων,²¹ but he is said to have arrived *cum paucis armigeris* (Curt. *loc. cit.*), and these must be explained. They are described as *armati* (Curt. 3.12.8, hence "armed bodyguards"), which suggests that they were hypaspists. If this is so, then Leonnatos, who apparently held no independent command in the early stages of the campaign, may have held roughly the same rank that he held in the summer of 336, that is, a lesser

¹⁹ *FGrHist* 138 F7; 139 F10; Strasburger, *Ptolemaios und Alexander* 29; Kornemann, *Die Alexandergeschichte* 114.

²⁰ Arr. 2.12.6-8; Kornemann, *Die Alexandergeschichte* 114, 124; Jacoby IID 503; but Strasburger, *Ptolemaios und Alexander* 29, thinks 'perhaps Aristoboulos.'

²¹ Berve 2.233.

commission in the hypaspists.²² In that case, those who accompanied Alexander as *Hetairoi* most likely did not fight as a unit - there is only one instance in which they may have done so, and this is vaguely defined²³ - or constitute a formal body, as Tarn suggests,²⁴ but were distributed throughout the ranks as officers of higher and lower rank. Perdikkas by now commanded his own *taxis* of *pezhetairoi*,²⁵ but Attalos, who only later became a *taxiarch*, may also have been a lesser officer in the hypaspists at this time; Attalos must certainly have belonged to the *Hetairoi*.²⁶

That Leonnatos and Philotas (Parmenion's son) took part in the capture of Batis at Gaza is doubtful. The Batis-episode

²² Berve 2.233, with n.1.

²³ Arr. 1.6.5; though these are possibly the Companion Cavalry, just as the *somatophylakes* in this instance may refer to the hypaspists.

²⁴ Tarn 2.138.

²⁵ See 'Chapter 4: Perdikkas'; cf. Berve 2.313-316, no. 627, s.v. Περδίκκας, esp. 313. He was already a *taxiarch* in Alexander's Triballian campaign of 335 (Arr. 1.6.9).

²⁶ Attalos: see n.12 *supra*. He was Perdikkas' brother-in-law (though the marriage could belong to the time of the succession of 323), see Berve 2.90, no. 177, s.v. Ἀταλάνη. For his membership in the ranks of the hypaspists see Berve 2.92, n.3; for the likelihood of his being one of the *Hetairoi* [Amyntas, his brother, certainly was] see Berve 1.31. If my theory is correct in the cases of Attalos and Leonnatos, this would make Nearchos' rank as chiliarch of the Hypaspists more plausible (Nearchos was also an *Hetairos*); this is doubted by Badian, "Nearchus the Cretan," *YCS* 24 (1975) 150-151.

(Hegesias via Dionysios of Halikarnassos²⁷) is notoriously unreliable and has been convincingly rejected as fiction by Tarn and B. Perrin.²⁸

Leonnatos became *somatophylax* in Egypt in 332/1, replacing Arhybbas, who had died.²⁹ He is the first recorded appointee to the office, though it is likely that Hephaistion replaced Ptolemaios (Berve, no. 672, see Appendix 1), who died at Halikarnassos in the first year of the campaign. How his appointment to the *somatophylakes* affected his status as a member of the hypaspists can only be surmised; probably he ceased to be a member of that unit, for he will not likely have held the high rank of *somatophylax* and yet have been inferior in authority to Nikanor, the commander of the hypaspists.³⁰ The *somatophylakes*, we may suppose, fought in the immediate vicinity of the King - this, at least, their name and origin imply - unless they were given special commands in another sector. Hence Leonnatos, who held no independent command before the campaign in Sogdiana, is not mentioned by the sources, except in non-military situations.

²⁷ Hegesias, *FGrHist* 142 F5 = Dion. Hal. *de Comp. Verb.* 18 p.123-126R.

²⁸ B. Perrin, "Genesis and Growth of an Alexander-myth," *TAPA* 26 (1895) 59-68; Tarn 2.265-270, Appendix 11: "The Death of Batis."

²⁹ Arr. 3.5.5, who gives the form Ἀρρύβας; see Berve 2.85, no. 156, s.v. Ἀρύβας; for the name, which is Epeiros, see Hoffmann, *Die Makedonen* 176-177, who prefers Ἀρύβας on the basis of inscriptional evidence. See also Appendix 1.

³⁰ Berve 2.275, no. 554, s.v. Νικάνωρ.

In the affairs of Philotas, Kleitos and Kallisthenes, therefore, we see the non-military activities of the *somato-phylax* Leonnatos. In Curtius' account of the Philotas-affair, he accompanies Perdikkas, Krateros, Hephaistion, Koinos and Eřigyios (and some others, unnamed) to Alexander's tent shortly before Philotas' arrest.³¹ Probably he was one of Philotas' vigorous opponents, who conspired against him once the news of Dimnos' treachery became known, but we cannot say if he was one of Philotas' tormentors; certainly he was not one of the obvious beneficiaries of the affair. He is not heard of again until the Kleitos-episode, again in the account given by Curtius.³²

Leonnatos' role in the struggle that resulted in Kleitos' death, as described by Curtius, has caused some difficulties. According to Curtius, when Alexander assailed Kleitos, Perdikkas and Ptolemy attempted to restrain him, while Lysimachos and Leonnatos took away his spear; all appear to have acted in their capacities as *somatophylakes*. But Curtius' version appears to be vitiated by the testimony of Plutarch (from Chares of Mytilene³³),

³¹ Curt. 6.8.17.

³² Curt. 8.1.46.

³³ Schachermeyr, *Alexander der Grosse* 364. Athen. 7.277A = *FGrHist* 125 F9 informs us that, according to Chares, Alexander was fond of apples. The throwing of apples in the version of Plutarch argues at least for an eye-witness source. Chares gave information of this sort (*i.e.*, from daily Court-life), and the detail about the apples (though hardly a firm basis for evaluation) may suggest him as a source. See Kornemann, *Die Alexandergeschichte* 249; R. Schubert, "Der Tod des Kleitos," *Rh. Mus.* 53 (1898) 98-120; T.S. Brown, "Callisthenes and Alexander," *AJP* 70 (1949) 240, isolates Kallisthenes but does not recognise Chares. Cf. Pearson, *LHA* 50-61.

which is preferred by most modern scholars.³⁴ According to Plutarch, it was a certain Aristophanes, termed σωματοφύλαξ, who disarmed Alexander (though the weapon in this case was a dagger: 'Αλέξανδρος...τὸ ἐγχειρίδιον ἐζήτει. τῶν δὲ σωματοφυλάκων ἐνδὸς 'Αριστοφάνους φθάσαντος ὑφελέσθαι, *Alex.* 51.5-6). Now it is a matter of some dispute who this *somatophylax* was, for there was no known member of the elite corps named Aristophanes. The name was emended by Palmerius to read "Aristonous" (a known member of the *somatophylakes*³⁵), and it is a simple and sensible emendation. Berve's rejection of it as "nicht nur reine Willkür, sondern auch sachlich falsch"³⁶ in favour of an actual Aristophanes, who was a member of the hypaspists (to whom the term *somatophylakes* was at times applied³⁷), has been shown to be incorrect by K. Ziegler.³⁸

³⁴ Brown, *AJP* 70 (1949) 237; Hamilton, *PA* 139; Schachermeyr, *Alexander der Grosse* 362ff.; Berve 2.207-208; Kornemann, *Die Alexandergeschichte* 248-251. But Schubert, *Rh. Mus.* 53 (1898) 99, points out "eine Verschmelzung von zwei verschiedenen Originalberichten."

³⁵ Berve 2.69, no. 133, s.v. 'Αριστόνους; for the names see Hoffmann, *Die Makedonen* 171; also Kaerst, *RE* II.1 (1895) 967-968, s.v. "Aristonous (7)." Cf. W. Hülnerwadel, *Forschungen zur Geschichte Königs Lysimachos von Thrakien*, Diss. Zürich, 1910, 10. See also Hamilton, *PA* 143.

³⁶ Berve 2.69, n.2; cf. 2.74, no. 136, s.v. 'Αριστοφάνης.

³⁷ Berve 1.28, n.1; Tarn 2.135-142; see Appendix 1.

³⁸ K. Ziegler, "Plutarchstudien," *Rh. Mus.* 84 (1935) 379-380.

He pointed out that in the very sentence in which Aristophanes is described as *somatophylax* Plutarch speaks of the *hypaspistai*, whom Alexander summoned; it is doubtful that Plutarch used two different terms to apply to the same unit within the same sentence. According to the "corrected" version of Plutarch, therefore, it was Aristonous the Bodyguard, and not Lysimachos and Leonnatos, who disarmed the King. But is this actually the case?

To determine who did what is such a chaotic instance is not possible. But it also is not true that Curtius' version is vitiated by that of Plutarch. Plutarch's version involves the removal of Alexander's own dagger, which was the first weapon that he might be expected to reach for, if he carried it on his person. The wording of the Greek in this case makes it unlikely that this was a case of Aristonous taking the dagger from Alexander; indeed, it would have been a rather comic scene. Plutarch says that Alexander searched for his dagger (ἐζήτει), but Aristonous had anticipated the events (προέσσαντος) and removed (ὑπελῆσθαι) it. Now, unless we are to imagine Alexander groping in vain at his waist for the weapon, which Aristonous, like some light-fingered thief, had dexterously snatched away, we must assume that the dagger lay nearby and that Aristonous, with forethought, had taken it out of harm's way. Quite different, and in no way contradictory, is the account given by Curtius, in which Alexander, in need of a weapon, snatches a spear from one of the bodyguards (*Alexander rapta lancea ex manibus armigeri*: 8.1.45). This then is the weapon that Leonnatos and Lysimachos wrested from Alexander, who was now incensed by the insolence of Kleitos. Certainly all the *somatophylakes* were

present at the banquet, as Plutarch implies, and as we should expect.³⁹ Very likely each one attempted, in his own way, to avert the disaster, but we are not in a position to say who did what.

Leonnatos, according to Arrian (4.12.2), ridiculed the abortive attempt to introduce *proskynesis* at the Macedonian Court. Arrian writes: ἀλλὰ συγῆς γὰρ γενομένης ἐπὶ τοὺς λόγους ἀναστάντας Περσῶν τοὺς πρεσβυτάτους ἐφεξῆς προσκυνεῖν. Λεοννάτον δέ, ἓνα τῶν ἐταύρων, ἐπειδὴ τις ἐδόκει τῶν Περσῶν αὐτῷ οὐκ ἐν κόσμῳ προσκυνῆσαι, τὸν δὲ ἐπιγελάσαι τῷ σχήματι τοῦ Περσοῦ ὡς ταπεινῷ· καὶ τούτῳ χαλεπήναντα πότε Ἀλέξανδρον ξυναλλαγῆναι αὐτοῦ. Berve believes that the man in question is not Leonnatos the Bodyguard (though Arr. 2.12.5 calls him ἓνα τῶν ἐταύρων), since Arrian refers to him in all other instances (where he is specifically identified) as ὁ σωματοφύλαξ (e.g., 4.21.4; 4.24.10; 6.9.3; 6.22.3), once he has related that Leonnatos became a Bodyguard (3.5.5). Therefore, Berve concludes, this Leonnatos is the son of Antipatros of Aigai, the same Leonnatos whom Nearchos named as one of the *trierarchoi* at the Hydaspes River.⁴⁰ I find Berve's equating of this Leonnatos with the one of Arrian's *proskynesis*-episode unconvincing.

³⁹ Plut. *Alex.* 51.11.

⁴⁰ Berve 2.235, no. 467, s.v. Λεοννάτος. Cf. Arr. *Ind.* 18.6 = Nearchos, *FGrHist* 133 F1. He is not the son of Antipatros the Regent, who was from Paliurāa

Berve's argument is too dogmatic and over-simplifies Arrian's use of terminology: "Dass es sich nicht um den gleichnamigen Somatophylax...handelt..., zeigt *deutlich* [my emphasis] der erklärende Zusatz Arrians...ἓνα τῶν ἑταίρων."⁴¹ But there can be no talk of consistent or inconsistent usages in Arrian: Arrian does not apply the epithet ὁ σωματοφύλαξ to Leonnatos until 4.21.4 (that is, after he has related the *proskynesis*-episode), nor does this epithet derive from the same source as the phrase ἓνα τῶν ἑταίρων. Both passages in which Leonnatos is described as a member of the *Hetairoi* derive from writers other than Ptolemy, who is clearly responsible for the designation of him as *somatophylax*.⁴² Thus it is perfectly reasonable to find Leonnatos referred to as a member of the *Hetairoi* at 4.12.2, even though he became *somatophylax* at 3.5.5 (one does not exclude the other).⁴³ Furthermore, if we are to confine the argument to what is, and what is not, explicitly stated in the sources, we cannot say with certainty that Antipatros' son, Leonnatos, was a member of the *Hetairoi*; Berve's guess that he was may be correct, but that is implicit.⁴⁴

⁴¹ Berve 2.235.

⁴² For the sources of Arr. 2.12.5 see notes 19 and 20 *supra*. For Arr. 4.12.2 see Kornemann, *Die Alexandergeschichte* 142, who thinks chapters 10-12 comprise "Einlagen...aus anderen Quellen"; cf. Strasburger, *Ptolemaios und Alexander* 40, who categorises chapters 10-12 as λεγόμενα.

⁴³ The *somatophylakes* were all *hetairoi*, though only seven *hetairoi* were *somatophylakes*. G.S. Stagakis, "Observations on the ΕΤΑΙΡΟΙ of Alexander the Great," *Ancient Macedonia*, Thessaloniki, 1970, 86-102, exaggerates the difficulty.

⁴⁴ Berve 1.31.

More important is the historical situation. The man who laughed at the spectacle of Persians grovelling before Alexander was a man of rank, to whom the act of prostration was abhorrent and who must certainly have regarded the Macedonian king as *primus inter pares* and Persians as inferiors. This will have been true of Leonnatos the Bodyguard, who was of the highest nobility. Alexander's anger was short-lived, as we are told; he might have dealt more severely with a lesser individual. Now none of these points rules out Leonnatos, son of Antipatros, but he must be regarded as the less likely candidate. Arrian's use of the phrase ἓνα τῶν ἐταίρων, which does not rule out Leonnatos the Bodyguard, will more likely refer to him than to the obscure and once-attested son of Antipatros. The latter's temporary disfavour with Alexander would scarcely be significant.

The same story is told by Curtius (Kléitarchos?) about Polyperchon, though in a more sensational form,⁴⁵ while Plutarch substitutes the name of Kašsandros, the eldest son of Antipatros the Regent.⁴⁶ Curtius is certainly wrong, on the basis of his own testimony. Polyperchon was not present when the *proskynesis* scene took place. Arrian tells us that Polyperchon, Attalos and Alketas were left behind with Krateros in Sogdiana to complete the subjugation of Paraitakene, while Alexander moved south into Baktria;

⁴⁵ Curt. 8.5.22.

⁴⁶ Plut. *Alex.* 74.2-5; cf. Hamilton, *PA* 206. See Berve 2.201-202, s.v. Κάσσανδρος.

it was in Baktria that the conspiracy of the Pages was uncovered (Arr. 4.22.1-2). Since Aftalos, Alketas and Krateros, with whom Polyperchon had left Alexander's camp, were informed of the Pages' conspiracy by letter (Plut. *Alex.* 55.6) and since their departure from the main camp is dated by Curtius (8.5.2) to before the *proskynesis*-episode, it appears that Polyperchon was not present when Alexander attempted to introduce *proskynesis* and could not have ridiculed it.⁴⁷ Plutarch's failure to mention Polyperchon among those who were informed by letter is perhaps explained by Polyperchon's separate mission to Bubacene, of which only Curtius speaks.⁴⁸ Polyperchon, therefore, should not be connected with this incident; Curtius has confused him with Leonnatos, who certainly was present. As for Kassandros, son of Antipatros, his participation in the affair must be the product of later writers, influenced by the antipathy of Kassandros and Polyperchon, and by the tradition that Alexander was hostile to Antipatros and his sons.⁴⁹

Thus, while Leonnatos, son of Antipatros of Aigai, is remotely possible as the man named by Arrian in the *proskynesis*-episode, he is unlikely; there is no reason to suppose that this

⁴⁷ Berve 2.326 believes that "die Tatsache [*i.e.*, Polyperchon ridiculing the Persians] selbst ist nicht zu bezweifeln, zumal sie zu dem starr makedonischen Charakter des P. stimmt...." See "Chapter 3: Krateros," n.75.

⁴⁸ Curt. 8.5.2.

⁴⁹ Plut. *Alex.* 74.2: Μάλιστα δ' Ἀντίπατρον ἐφοβεῖτο καὶ τοὺς παῖδας, ὧν Ἰδίας μὲν ἀρχιλοιοχός ἦν, ὃ δὲ Κάσανδρος ἀφῆκε μὲν νεωστί....

is not the *somatophylax*, to whom Arrian refers in all other cases.⁵⁰ He incurred Alexander's displeasure, though only briefly, as Arrian implies and as we may deduce from Leonnatos' career.⁵¹ Badian (followed by Hamilton⁵²) speaks of this incident as "retard[ing] his advancement" and believes that Leonnatos "rehabilitated himself by outstanding courage," whereby Badian must refer to the heroism against the Malloi.⁵³ But Alexander's anger must have been very short-lived, for Leonnatos' military career, which had only begun in the spring of 327 (*i.e.*, just before the experiment with *proskynesis*), suffered nothing adverse when the army set out for India at the end of spring of that same year.⁵⁴

⁵⁰ Arrian mentions no other Leonnatos in the *Anabasis*. The name is only twice attested in this period, but it is known in later times; cf. Hoffmann, *Die Makedonen* 168-169, n.75. See also Badian, *TAPA* 91 (1960) 337, n.34, who rejects Berve's identification with Leonnatos no.467.

⁵¹ In the case of Polyperchon, Curtius says that his disfavour lasted some time: *Polyperconti quidem postea castigato diu ignovit*; 8.6.1.

⁵² Hamilton, *PA* 54.

⁵³ Badian, *TAPA* 91 (1960) 337: "...Leonnatus seems to have incurred the king's displeasure by contributing to the ridicule that killed the attempt to introduce *proskynesis* among the Macedonians. This must have retarded his advancement. When he rehabilitated himself by outstanding courage and loyalty, his rise was rapid, culminating in the great honor he received at Susa."

⁵⁴ The affair of the Pages, and the arrest of Kallisthenes, occurred in Baktria in 327 (Arr. 4.22.2); the *proskynesis*-episode must have been shortly before this, and after the marriage of Alexander and Roxane. Cf. Berve 2.346-347; "Die Verschmelzungspolitik Alexanders des Grossen," *Klio* 31 (1938) 152-153 = Griffith, *Main Problems* 120-121; Brown, *AJP* 70 (1949) = Griffith, *Main Problems* 49; Fox 320ff.

If we are to single out any event that may have won back the King's favour for Leonnatos, we might consider his part in the affair of the Pages. According to Curtius, Eurylochos, the brother of Charikles, brought the news of the Pages' conspiracy to Alexander through the agency of Ptolemy, son of Lagos, and Leonnatos.⁵⁵ Arrian does not mention Leonnatos, only Ptolemy, who was doubtless eager to win for himself sole credit for the disclosure.⁵⁶ We know nothing further of his activities in this connexion:

Leonnatos' first military command dates to the spring of 327 and, therefore, chronologically before the conspiracy of the Pages. This amounted to the leadership of the forces that besieged the "Rock of Chorienes" by night, a task that Leonnatos fulfilled in rotation with his fellow-*somatophylakes*, Perdikkas and Ptolemy.⁵⁷ We know nothing else about this command, but it marks (as far as we can tell) Leonnatos' entry into the military sphere. When the army left Bactria for India, with Hephaistion and Perdikkas sent to the Indus,⁵⁸ Leonnatos and Ptolemy emerged

⁵⁵ Curt. 8.6.22. See Berve 2.159, 407, nos. 322, 824, s.vv. Εὐρύλοχος, Χαρίκλῆς; cf. T.S. Brown, *AJP* 70 (1949) 240ff.; J. Seibert, *Untersuchungen zur Geschichte Ptolemaios I. (Münchener Beiträge zur Papyrusforschung und antiken Rechtsgeschichte, Heft 56)* Munich, 1969, 18-19.

⁵⁶ Arr. 4.13.7. Cf. Berve 2.152-153, 191-199, nos. 305, 408, s.vv. Ἐρμόλαος, Καλλισθένης. See Seibert, *loc. cit.*; Strasburger, *Ptolemaios und Alexander* 40; Kornemann, *Die Alexandergeschichte* 143.

⁵⁷ Arr. 4.21.4. Cf. F. von Schwarz, *Alexander des Grossen Feldzüge in Turkestan*, Munich, 1893, 21-23, 83ff.; Fuller, *Generalship* 244-245.

⁵⁸ Arr. 4.22.7; 30.9; 5.3.5; Curt. 8.10.2-3; Metz Epit. 48; V. Smith, *EHI* 53, 63.

as prominent commanders of that segment of the army under Alexander's personal leadership. Both were wounded in the territory around the Choes River,⁵⁹ though not seriously, for each commanded one-third of Alexander's forces in the campaign that drove the Aspasiens into the hills; Leonnatos' forces included the *taxeis* of *pezhetairoi* under the command of Attalos, son of Andromenes, and Bálakros.⁶⁰ While Ptolemy relates the activities of his own division in some detail, we know little about Leonnatos' forces other than that they were equally successful in driving the Aspasiens from their positions in the hills and bringing about their defeat.⁶¹ Leonnatos had, at least, proved himself a competent commander.

At the Hydaspes River, Alexander faced Poros with his entire force and, since he had more experienced military men at his disposal, he used Leonnatos in a lesser capacity. Curtius names Leonnatos as an infantry-commander, together with Antigones and Tauron,⁶² and says that he crossed the Hydaspes some

⁵⁹ Arr. 4.23.3.

⁶⁰ Arr. 4.24.10. Cf. Berve 2.101, no. 201, s.v. Βάλακρος. Kaerst, *RE* II.2 (1896) 2816, s.v. "Balakros (4)."

⁶¹ Arr. 4.25.3.

⁶² Curt. 8.14.15. Cf. Berve 2.41, 371-372, nos. 83, 741, s.vv. Ἀντιγένης, Ταύρων.

distance upstream from the main camp that faced Poros' army. But Berve has correctly maintained that a comparison of the texts of Arrian and Curtius reveals that Curtius has mistaken Leonnatos for Seleukos, and that the company of infantry in question are, in fact, the hypaspists.⁶³ Other than this, there is no mention of Leonnatos in the battle against Poros.

Presumably his activities were similar to those of Ptolemy, with whom he shared the rank of *somatophylax* and whose earlier military career was somewhat similar.⁶⁴ But this is of little help, for we know only that the *somatophylakes*, Perdikkas, Ptolemy and Lysimachos, crossed the Hydaspes in the same triakonter as Alexander;⁶⁵ of the other *somatophylakes* Arrian says nothing, though Hephaistion, as *hipparch*, certainly crossed the river at the same time.⁶⁶ Curtius, on the other hand, is of little use, for he greatly exaggerates the role and importance of Ptolemy in this battle.⁶⁷ We must assume that, as *somatophylax*, Leonnatos

⁶³ Arr. 5.12.1ff. Berve 2.233.

⁶⁴ Berve 2.329-335, no. 668, s.v. Πτολεμαῖος. Seibert, *Untersuchungen zur Geschichte Ptolemaios* (n.55 *supra*), omits this part of Ptolemy's career entirely. Leonnatos and Ptolemy appear together in a number of instances during these years: Curt. 8.1.46; Arr. 4.21.4; Curt. 8.6.22; Arr. 4.23.3; 4.24.10; 4.25.3; Curt. 8.14.15; Plut. *Mor.* 344D; Arr. 6.28.4.

⁶⁵ Arr. 5.13.1. But cf. Berve 2.172, n.1.

⁶⁶ For a discussion of the battle in general see the literature cited in "Chapter 1: Hephaistion," n.79.

⁶⁷ Curt. 8.13.17-27.

accompanied Alexander when he crossed the Hydaspes and that he fought among the troops that were directly under Alexander's control, namely, the cavalry-units of Hephaistion and Perdikkas and the *ile basilike*.⁶⁸

In the march to the Hyphasis and back we hear nothing of Leonnatos. His name reappears in the list of some thirty *trierarchoi* at the Hydaspes River in late 326, some three or four months after the battle with Poros.⁶⁹ These thirty were given trierarchies of the Attic type, that is, they were responsible for meeting the expenses of fitting out a triereme.⁷⁰ But he did not command a ship; this is clear from the roles of some of the other *trierarchoi* and from Leonnatos' activities near Pattala.⁷¹ Since he was among the forces that habitually accompanied the King, he very likely sailed down-river with him

⁶⁸ Arr. 5.16; Curt. 8.14.15.

⁶⁹ Arr. *Ind.* 18.3-10 = Nearchos, *FGrHist* 133 F1. For a discussion of the chronology of Alexander's expedition see Beloch III² 2.304-322, "Die Chronologie der Feldzüge Alexanders," esp. 320. The departure of the fleet and the land-forces is dated by Strabo 15.692 (= Aristoboulos, *FGrHist* 139 F35) to "a few days before the setting of the Pleiades" (πρὸ δύσεως πλειάδος οὐ πολλὰς ἡμέρας).

⁷⁰ See most recently H. Hauben, "The Expansion of Macedonian Sea-Power under Alexander the Great," *Anc. Soc.* 7 (1976) 91; U. Wilcken (188) suggested that this had a further consideration: "to give a personal interest in the enterprise to his immediate followers." See also Berve 1.165-166.

⁷¹ E.g., Hephaistion and Krateros, who commanded the land-forces in the descent of the Indus. For Leonnatos' activities see below.

as far as the confluence of the Hydaspes and the Akesines and later accompanied him by land in the campaign against the Malloi, who lived between the Akesines and Hydraotes Rivers.⁷²

It was in this campaign against the Malloi that Leonnatos played one of his most noteworthy - though again disputed - parts. Alexander had taken the Malloi by surprise, marching through the desert that lay between the rivers, rather than marching north, as the Indians themselves anticipated, from the junction of the rivers.⁷³ When the Malloi withdrew to their main city and Alexander sought to inspire his war-weary Macedonians by being the first to scale the city-walls, near-disaster struck. Very few of the Macedonians managed to join Alexander at the top before the ladders gave way, and Alexander, seeing that he was cut off from his troops, leapt from the walls inside the city, where he was wounded by an enemy missile.⁷⁴ Several of his followers rushed to his aid, though it is not clear from the sources exactly who these were. One is certain: Peukestas, who was made an eighth *somatophylax* for his part in saving the King's life.⁷⁵ The others

⁷² Arr. 6.2.3ff.; Curt. 9.3.24.

⁷³ Arr. 6.4, esp. 6.4.3; Curt. 9.4.15ff. is ignorant of Alexander's strategy. See Fuller, *Generalship* 259-263; Wilcken 190; Hamilton, *PA* 176; V. Smith, *EHI* 98ff.; Breloer, *Alexanders Bund mit Poros: Indien von Dareios zu Sandrokottos*, Leipzig, 1941, 29ff.

⁷⁴ Arr. 6.8.4-13.5 for a full account of Alexander's activities; cf. Curt. 9.4.26-5.30; Diod. 17.98-100.1; Plut. *Alex.* 63; *Mor.* 327B; 341C; 343D; 344C-D; Strabo 15.701; Justin 12.9.3-13; Oros. 3.19.6-10; Itiner. 115-116; Metz Epit. 76-77; Ps.-Kall. 3.4.12-15; Zon. 4.13, p.299, 16; Iulian. *conv.* 331A; cf. Hamilton, *PA* 176ff.; Kornemann, *Die Alexandergeschichte* 82-85.

⁷⁵ Berve 2.318-319, no. 634, s.v. Πευκέστας; Hoffmann, *Die Makedonen* 177-178; Arr. 6.28.3-4.

pose problems. Aristonous and Ptolemy are named, but the former is mentioned only by Curtius, while Ptolemy himself (against the testimony of Kleitarchos) said that he was not present at the battle.⁷⁶ Three others are named in connexion with the incident: Habréas and Limnaios (= Timaeus), who were both killed,⁷⁷ and Leonnatos, who for his heroism was crowned at Sousa by Alexander.⁷⁸

Both Habreas and Leonnatos are disputed, as Arrian tells us: ὑπὲρ Λεοννάτου δὲ οὐκέτι συμφέρονται οὐδὲ ὑπὲρ Ἀβρέου τοῦ διμοῦρτου (6.11.7). But this does not mean, as Berve suggests, that "[Limnaios] wird von einem Teil der Überlieferung (Plut. 63; *de fort. Alex.* 1.2 p.327B; II.13 p. 344D) an Stelle des auch nicht sicher bezeugten Leonnatos (nr. 466; Arr. VI,11,7) beim Kampf um die Mallerstadt genannt."⁷⁹ Plutarch (*Alex.* 63; *Mor.* 327B) does fail to mention

⁷⁶ Curt. 9.5.21: *Ptolomaeum, qui postea regnavit, huic pugnae adfuisse auctor est Clitarchus et Timagenes; sed ipse, scilicet gloriae suae non refragatus afuisse se, missum in expeditionem, memoriae tradidit.* Cf. Arr. 6.11.8; 6.5.6-7; Kornemann, *Die Alexandergeschichte* 82-85. See also R.M. Errington, "Bias in Ptolemy's History of Alexander," *CQ* n.s. 19 (1969) 235, 239.

⁷⁷ Berve 2.5-6, no. 6, s.v. Ἀβρέας; Kirchner, *RE* I.1 (1893) 110, s.v. "Abreas"; Hoffmann, *Die Makedonen* 222; he is named only by Arrian, whom Droysen, *Hellenismus* 1.368-369, follows; cf. Schachermeyr, *Alexander der Grosse* 455; Kornemann, *Die Alexandergeschichte* 254. Limnaios (Plut.), Timaeus (Curt.), see Berve 2.237, no. 474, s.v. Λιμναῖος; Niese 1.143; n.3; Hoffmann, *Die Makedonen* 147.

⁷⁸ Curt. 9.5.15, 17 (with Peukestas, Aristonous, Timaeus); Plut. *Mor.* 344D (with Ptolemy, Limnaios); not mentioned by *Mor.* 327B (only Ptolemy and Limnaios); Arr. *Ind.* 19.8 = Nearchos, *FGrHist* 133 F1 (with Peukestas); Arr. 6.9.3; 6.10.1-2 (with Peukestas, Habreas); 6.11.7 (his role is not attested by all sources). And cf. Arr. *Ind.* 23.6; Arr. 7.5.5, where he is crowned, in part for saving Alexander's life.

⁷⁹ Berve 2.237.

Leonnatos, but he does not substitute Limmaios for Leonnatos (in fact, they appear together in *Mor.* 344D). What does happen instead is that Limmaios-Timaeus of Plutarch-Curtius replaces Habreas, who is known only to Arrian (Ptolemy and/or Aristoboulos).⁸⁰ But, when Arrian says that there was no agreement on the matter of Leonnatos (ὕπὲρ Λεοννάτου δὲ οὐκέτι συμφέρονται), he must mean that Leonnatos was not named by every work that he consulted; this is indeed true of the *extant* authors. If the extant records reflect accurately their primary sources, then this means that Arrian's sources were not unanimous on the subject of Leonnatos among the Malloi. If there was a dispute about individuals, it involved Limmaios and Habreas, both of whom were killed in the battle. Certainly, it will have been easier to confuse the names of the obscure dead than of a wounded, but living, hero.⁸¹

From the city of the Malloi to the junction of the Akēsines and Hydraotes, and thence to Pattala, Leonnatos accompanied Alexander by ship. In the first instance, this will have been on account of his wounds, in the second, because he belonged to *eos...*, *qui comitari eum* [sc. *Alexandrum*] *solebant*, whom Curtius speaks of as accompanying Alexander by ship.⁸² At Pattala, Leonnatos, now recovered from his wounds, led a force of one thousand

⁸⁰ See n.77 *supra* for references. For the confusion of Habreas and Limmaios (Timaeus) see my groupings in n.78 *supra*, where it is clear that there is no confusion of Limmaios for Leonnatos (against Berve 2.237).

⁸¹ For the dispute concerning Ptolemy see n.76 *supra*.

⁸² Curt. 9.8.3.

cavalry and eight thousand hoplites and *psiloi* along the shore of the island (which formed the delta of the Indus) while Alexander took the fleet to the Ocean via the western arm of the river.⁸³ With Alexander returning upstream, Leonnatos now retraced his steps to Pattala. From there he accompanied the King, by land, along the eastern arm of the river as far as a great lake, where he remained in charge of his own troops and those ships with their crews, ~~that~~ Alexander left behind as he took a smaller detachment to the Ocean.⁸⁴ When Alexander returned, Leonnatos, it seems, led the land forces back to Pattala.

Having reached the Ocean, Alexander now gave thought to returning to the West. Presumably his native informants had told him that the region to the west lacked water, and so he sent Leonnatos ahead to dig wells along the route that the army was to follow.⁸⁵ When he had completed this task, Leonnatos awaited Alexander on the borders of the land of the Oreitai; this was late in the summer of 325.⁸⁶ Reaching the Arabios River, Alexander left the bulk of the army under the command of Hephaistion and, dividing the rest of the army into three parts (as he had done against the Aspasiens two years earlier), under the command of Ptolemy, Leonnatos and himself, he moved south of the Arabios into

⁸³ Arr. 6.18.3.

⁸⁴ Arr. 6.20.3.

⁸⁵ Curt. 9.10.2.

⁸⁶ Beloch III² 2.320.

the territory of the Oreitai, who had not submitted to him. By means of a vigorous "sweep-programme," like the one he had employed in Sogdiana in 329, Alexander ravaged the land and subdued the Oreitai.⁸⁷ The columns of Ptolemy and Leonnatos reunited first with Alexander and then with Hephaistion's troops. In one body they proceeded to Rhambakia, where Hephaistion was left to settle the city, while Alexander took a force to the Gedrosian border, where the Oreitai and the Gedrosians were preparing to resist.⁸⁸ When these had been overcome without much difficulty, Alexander sent Leonnatos, together with Apollonophanes, whom he had appointed satrap of the area, to Rhabakia, presumably with instructions to send Hephaistion ahead to Gedrosia. But Leonnatos, with the Agrianes, some archers and cavalry, and a force of mercenary cavalry and infantry, was ordered to remain in the land of the Oreitai (ἐν Ὀρείταις),⁸⁹ with the following instructions: τό τε ναυτικὸν ὑπομένειν ἔστι' ἂν περιπλεύσῃ τὴν χώραν καὶ τὴν πόλιν ξυνοικίζειν καὶ τὰ κατὰ τοὺς Ὀρεΐτας κοσμεῖν (Arr. 6.22.3). Hamilton⁹⁰ has argued convincingly that not only does ἐν Ὀρείταις

⁸⁷ Curt. 9.10.6-7; Diod. 17.104.5-6; cf. the similar strategy in Sogdiana, Arr. 4.16.1-3; Curt. 8.1.1ff.

⁸⁸ Arr. 6.21.5-22.2.

⁸⁹ Arr. 6.22.3.

⁹⁰ J.R. Hamilton, "Alexander among the Oreitae," *Historia* 21 (1972) 605-606.

mean "among the Oreitai" but the use of the definite article in τὴν πόλιν ξυνοικίζειν refers to the city mentioned previously (*i.e.*, Rhambakia, which Hephaistion had begun to synoecize⁹¹), and not another city, as was formerly thought.⁹²

Sometime between Alexander's departure and the arrival of Nearchos with the fleet, Leonnatos won an impressive victory over the Oreitai, who had risen against him. According to the partisan account of Nearchos, he inflicted upon the enemy heavy casualties: "he killed six thousand of them, and all their leaders."⁹³ And of his own forces Leonnatos lost only fifteen cavalymen and a handful of infantry; Apollophanes the satrap fell in the battle.⁹⁴ When Nearchos arrived at the shore near Rhambakia,⁹⁵ Leonnatos had prepared provisions for his Ocean-voyage. He also exchanged troops with Nearchos taking with him those men who, on account of their laziness, had caused or might cause disciplinary problems on the fleet.⁹⁶ After Nearchos' departure, Leonnatos put everything in

⁹¹ Arr. 6.21.5.

⁹² Wilcken 199; see also the literature cited by Hamilton, *op. cit.*, 603, n.1, though I am baffled by the reference to Droysen III.2, p.233 (I find that Droysen, *Hellenismus* 1.391, appears to agree with Hamilton that Leonnatos finished Hephaistion's work at Rhambakia: "die Kolonisation der neuen Stadt zu vollenden").

⁹³ Arr. *Ind.* 23.5 = Nearchos, *FGrHist* 133 Fl.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.* On the fate of Apollophanes see Badian, "Harpalus," *JHS* 81 (1961) 21.

⁹⁵ Arr. 6.22.3; cf. *Ind.* 23 = 133 Fl.

⁹⁶ *Ind.* 23.8: καὶ τῶν ναυτῶν ὅσοι ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ βλαβεῖν ἐφαινοντο Νεάρχῳ.

order among the Oreitai (as he had been instructed) and set out for Gedrosia by land. The news of his exploits had already reached Alexander by letter,⁹⁷ but it is uncertain where Leonnatos himself rejoined Alexander; perhaps it was in Karmania, though possibly only at Sousa.

Sousa marked the high-point in Leonnatos' career under Alexander. He was awarded a golden crown in honour of his courage in India and his victory over the Oreitai.⁹⁸ Presumably he took a Persian bride in the marriage-ceremony at Sousa, though we have no record of this; nor is there any mention of his bride. Whoever she was, she was doubtless repudiated by Leonnatos shortly afterward, and, unlike Amastris, the Persian bride of Krateros, she had no known history under the *Diadochi*.⁹⁹

When Alexander died suddenly in Babylon, Leonnatos emerged as one of the strong-men of the succession-crisis: together with Perdikkas and Ptolemy, he belonged to οἱ μέγιστοι τῶν ἱππέων καὶ τῶν ἡγεμόνων, as opposed to those lesser lights, [οἱ] μετ' ἐκείνους.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁷ Curt. 9.10.19.

⁹⁸ Arr. *Ind.* 23.6; 42.9; *Anab.* 7.5.5. It is doubtful that he was crowned a second time when "Hephaistion and the other somatophylakes" were crowned (7.5.6).

⁹⁹ Berve 2.24, no. 50, s.v. "Αμαστρίς; cf. Wilcken, *RE* I.2 (1894) 1750, s.v. "Amastris (7); and also my Chapter 3: Krateros.

¹⁰⁰ Arr. *Succ.* Ia.2.

In the debate that followed, in which the supporters of Perdikkas proposed that Rhoxane's as-yet-unborn child (if indeed a son was born) should inherit the kingdom, it was suggested by Peithon, one of the Bodyguard, that Leonnatos share with Perdikkas the guardianship of the child, on the ground that both were of royal stock (*stirpe regia genitos*: Curt. 10.7.8).¹⁰¹ But when the common soldiery, incited by Meleagros, declared for the feeble Arrhidaios, whom they hailed as King under the title Philip III, Leonnatos led the cavalry, the backbone of Perdikkas' support, outside the city of Babylon, while Perdikkas himself remained within the city in the hope of winning over the infantry. But Perdikkas' stay was brief, owing to the hostility of Meleagros, who had convinced the confused Arrhidaios that Perdikkas must be killed, and he soon rejoined Leonnatos and the cavalry.¹⁰² At this point our knowledge of Leonnatos' activities in the struggle for power at Babylon breaks off, for his cause was essentially that of Perdikkas, who dominates the ancient sources.¹⁰³ But, whatever Leonnatos' hopes were - and his earlier naming as a guardian together with Perdikkas (whose ambitious designs Leonnatos was intended to keep in check) suggests that he could have hoped for considerable power -, he must have been disappointed by the outcome.

¹⁰¹ Cf. Justin 13.2.13-14.

¹⁰² Curt. 10.7.20; 10.8.4.

¹⁰³ That Leonnatos whole-heartedly supported Perdikkas' regency is doubtful, but the high-ranking officers will have been unanimous in their opposition to Meleagros and Philip Arrhidaios. For a full discussion, with the modern literature, see Chapter 4: Perdikkas.

Perdikkas, once he had overcome Meleagros, became the *de facto* ruler of the Asian empire, for he had both the figure-head, Philip Arrhidaios, and the royal armies firmly under his control; there was no further talk of special authority for Leonnatos once the cavalry and infantry had been reconciled.

In the settlement of 323 (the much-debated *Reichsordnung* of Babylon), Leonnatos was left somewhat out in the cold. A strong supporter of Perdikkas (at least in the struggle with Meleagros), he must have been dissatisfied with the satrapy of Hellespontine Phrygia, despite its strategic location.¹⁰⁴ Did Perdikkas, in fact, think that Leonnatos would act in his interests? If so, he was quickly disappointed, for Leonnatos began immediately to intrigue against Perdikkas and the marshals of the empire. He had been contacted by the sister of Alexander, the widow of Alexandros of Epéiros, Kleopatra, through whom he hoped to gain power; for she had offered her hand in marriage, perhaps at Olympias' instigation, and such a marriage carried with it a serious - possibly "legitimate" - claim to the throne of Macedon.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰⁴ Arr. *Succ.* Ia.6; Ib.2; Curt. 10.10.2; Diod. 18.3.1; and 18.12.1 (where "Philotas" is written instead of Leonnatos); Justin 13.4.16. Consider R.M. Errington's remarks: "Leonnatus acquired a crucial satrapy in exchange - which Perdikkas could scarcely deny him - but his subsequent career shows his thwarted ambition, and his later disloyalty to Perdikkas may have originated in this rebuff" ("From Babylon to Triparadeisos: 323-320 B.C.," *JHS* 90 [1970] 57).

¹⁰⁵ Plut. *Eumenes* 3.8-9. For Kleopatra see Berve 2.212-213, no. 433, s.v. Κλεοπάτρα; Stähelin, *RE* XI.1 (1921) 735-738, s.v. "Kleopatra (13)." See also Macurdy, *Hellenistic Queens* 30ff., esp. 36-37; Droysen, *Hellenismus* 2.37; Geyer, *RE* XII.2 (1925) 2037; Errington, *op. cit.* 60.

Leonnatos certainly was not content to play "second fiddle" to Perdikkas. When he received orders to aid Eumenes in wresting his satrapy of Kappadokia from Ariarathes, he had already formulated his plan to overthrow Perdikkas.¹⁰⁶ Undoubtedly he was encouraged by the insubordination of Antigonos, satrap of Phrygia, who refused Perdikkas' instructions that he also should support Eumenes; nor will he have failed to recognise that Perdikkas did not have the strong backing of the generals. Peithon, Ptolemy, Philotas, Antigonos, all were seditious.¹⁰⁷ But with Eumenes Leonnatos miscalculated, thinking that he would find in him a willing ally. It is difficult to say whether Eumenes was loyal to Perdikkas from the start or if he was forced into his camp by the circumstances.

Renewed turmoil in Greece offered Leonnatos his pretext for crossing the Hellespont and seeking the throne; for Antipatros, blockaded at Lamia in Thessaly by Leosthenes and his forces, sent Hekataios of Kardia to summon both Krateros and Leonnatos to Greece.¹⁰⁸ Now, it appears, Leonnatos made a serious error, for he attempted to persuade Eumenes to cross into Europe with him, ostensibly in aid of Antipatros, in reality to win the Macedonian throne for himself.

¹⁰⁶ Plut. *Eumenes* 3.4-5.

¹⁰⁷ For Peithon's designs in the upper satrapies see Diod. 18.4.8; 18.7.1-9. Ptolemy's opposition to Perdikkas' regency can be seen in the succession-debate, Curt. 10.6.13-16; Justin 13.2.11-12; for his fear of Perdikkas' intentions Diod. 18.14.1-2. Philotas was removed from his satrapy (Justin 13.6.16) on account of his loyalty to Krateros (Arr. *Succ.* 24.9-11). For Antigonos' insubordination see Plut. *Eumenes* 3.4-5.

¹⁰⁸ Plut. *Eum.* 3.6; Diod. 18.12.1 (see n.104 *supra*); 18.14.4-5; Justin 13.5.14-15.

He revealed to Eumenes the details of his correspondence with Kleopatra, but in this matter he misjudged Eumenes, who had no intention of joining forces with him on account of his arch-rival Hekataios. While Alexander lived, Eumenes had denounced Hekataios, urging the King to depose him and restore *eleutheria* to the Kardians. Now he feared that Antipatros would kill him in order to please Hekataios.¹⁰⁹ Therefore, during the night, Eumenes and his forces slipped away from Leonnatos, bringing the news of Leonnatos' designs to Perdikkas.¹¹⁰ Disappointed in his hopes of winning Eumenes' support, Leonnatos crossed into Europe without awaiting Krateros; but fortune was not with him. He fell on the battlefield at Krannon in Thessaly, as did his Greek opponent Leosthenes.¹¹¹ Antipatros may indeed, as Justin claims, have welcomed the death of Leonnatos.¹¹²

¹⁰⁹ Plut. *Eumenes* 3.8-10. Vezin, *Eumenes von Kardia* 27-28, argues that Eumenes, as a Greek, was not eager to assist in suppressing this most recent Greek uprising. Vezin (28) suggests that "Leonnats übereilte Offenheit ihn nicht als den Mann erwies, solch eine Absicht zu verwirklichen." Macurdy, *Hellenistic Queens* 36-37, describes Leonnatos as "impetuous and easily carried away by enthusiasm," but he did have the support of Olympias and her daughter (the family of Alexander still counted for something), and he was himself related to the royal house; thus his bid for power could not be taken lightly.

¹¹⁰ Plut. *Eum.* 3.10; Nepos, *Eum.* 2.4-5, claims that Leonnatos planned to kill Eumenes when he could not persuade him. Perhaps it was from Eumenes' report that Perdikkas first gave thought to marrying Kleopatra for political advantage.

¹¹¹ Plut. *Phokion* 25.5; Arr. *Succ.* I.9; Diod. 18.15.3; Strabo 9.434; Justin 13.5.14. Cf. Berve 2.236-237, no. 471, s.v. Λεωννάτης. On the Lamian War see A. Schaefer, *Demosthenes und seine Zeit* III.359ff.

¹¹² Justin 13.5.15.

"Kurz, aber glänzend ist die Rolle, welche L[eonnatos] unter Al[exander] spielt, und sie stellt ihn in die Reihe der ersten Heerführer seiner Zeit." Thus Berve (2.235) summarises Leonnatos' career. He was a potential unfulfilled. For the Successors of Alexander the Great his death was perhaps a timely one: there were already too many such men of ambition and ability. As a personality, Leonnatos (as he is depicted by the sources) lacks colour. Those who took the trouble to record such things relate that he was fond of wrestling and gymnastics; others ascribe to him a passion for the hunt.¹¹³ If he was opposed to the oriental practice of *proskynesis*, which he regarded as demeaning, he was not equally contemptuous of Persian luxury and ostentation, though this extravagance was most visible in his pursuit of sport and warfare. Basically, he was a soldier and a man of action, about whom the *Suda* aptly says: "he attained a share of honour (τιμή) in accordance with his upbringing, his family-background, and the beauty and stature of his body."¹¹⁴

¹¹³ Plut. *Alex.* 40.1; Pliny, *NH* 35.167-168 (wrestling and gymnastics); Athen. 12.539D = Phylarchos, *FGrHist* 81 F41 and/or Agatharchides of Knidos, 86 F3; Aelian, *VH* 9.3 (hunting); cf. n.1 *supra*. See also Hamilton, *PA* 106.

¹¹⁴ *Suda*, s.v. Λεοννάτος. Cf. Hamilton, *loc. cit.*

CHAPTER 3

KRATEROS: φιλοβασιλεύς¹

Krateros was a soldier and a patriot, loyal to his King, faithful to his Macedonian origins.² Throughout Alexander's reign he won the respect and devotion both of the King and the army through an unusual combination of ability and loyalty. Yet he did not attain greatness, even when the moment presented itself. As a personality he appears to have been somewhat uninspired, and his reluctance to make a bid for supreme power after Alexander's death may well betray a certain unsuitability for statesmanship. But he gained quickly a reputation as a soldier, and, among Alexander's new commanders, he was undoubtedly the best.

¹ Information on Krateros can be found in the following sources: F. Geyer, *RE* Supplbd IV (1924) 1038-1048, s.v. "Krateros (1a)"; Berve 2.220-227, no. 446, s.v. Κράτερος, though the accent should be oxytone (Κρατερός); cf. Hoffmann, *Die Makedonen* 155. I suggest the following revisions to Berve's article: p.220 read Curt. 3.9.8 instead of III,9,7; p.222 Plut. *Alex.* 48 is more precisely 48.7; for Curt. VI,8,3ff. read 6.8.2ff.; Arr. IV,4,3 should read 4.3.3; Plut. 55 is *Alex.* 55.6 (and cf. Arr. 4.22.2 for the date); add Arr. 5.12.1; p.224 for Arr. *Ind.* 19 read *Ind.* 19.1, 3; add Diod. 17.96.1; Arr. VI,5,5 should read 6.5.7; for "Hie" read "Hier"; p.226 Curt. VIII,8,2 should be 6.8.2; also the following more precise references to Plutarch's *Alexander*, p.226, line 6, 47.9; line 13, 41.5-7 and 47.10, line 19, 47.11-12; line 29, 41.5; line 30, 40.4-5; also p.226, line 17, *Eumenes* 6.3. For Krateros in Arrian-Ptolemy see Kornemann, *Die Alexander-geschichte* 245-246.

² Plut. *Alex.* 47.9-10.

I

Krateros, son of Alexandros, came from the mountainous canton of Orestis.³ Of his family-background very little is known: his mother's name was Aristopatra,⁴ Amphoterios (later Alexander's admiral) was his brother.⁵ Presumably the family belonged to the high nobility of Upper Macedonia, for Krateros was one of the most influential members of the *Hetairoi*.⁶ But, since we do not know the names of any other relatives - by blood or by marriage -, it is impossible to determine anything further about the position of Krateros' family in relation to the other noble houses of Orestis and Macedonia.

Neither Berve nor Geyer suggests a date for Krateros' birth, though Berve rightly considers Amphoterios the younger brother.⁷

³ For his father's name: Arr. *Ind.* 18.5; Arr. 1.25.9; cf. also P. Perdrizet, "Venatio Alexandri," *JHS* 19 (1899) 274. For Orestis Arr. *Ind.* 18.5.

⁴ Strabo 15.702 = *FGrHist* 153 F2 (a letter from Krateros to his mother).

⁵ For Amphoterios see Berve 2.32-33, no. 68, s.v. 'Αμφοτερός; Kaerst, *RE* I.2 (1894) 1977, s.v. "Amphoterios (4)."

⁶ Curt. 6.8.2ff.; 6.8.17; 6.11.10; 9.6.6. On the *Hetairoi*, G.S. Stagakis, "Observations on the *Hetairoi* of Alexander the Great," *Ancient Macedonia*, Thessaloniki, 1970, 86-102, creates more problems than it solves. Krateros did not become *somatophylax*, and this may imply that his family was of lesser importance (cf. Berve's comments 1.25-26); certainly three of the *somatophylakes* created by Alexander had connexions with royal houses: Perdikkas, Leonnatos, Ptolemy.

⁷ Berve 2.32.

This can be reasonably inferred from Krateros' rank. And, while it is hazardous to guess when Krateros was born, it appears that he was considerably younger than the foremost generals of Philip II: Attalos, Parmenion, Antipatros.⁸ Krateros' promotion was quick and steady, and this suggests that he was a younger man with ability, rather than a middle-aged man whose career prospered only when Alexander came to the throne. Perhaps he was born after 370 B.C. Later cases of ill health will be ascribable to the effects of wounds and hard campaigning rather than to old age.⁹

Krateros' story is predominantly military, and it is full of accomplishment. We hear nothing of him before 334, nor is it possible to determine if he took part in Alexander's European campaigns. But he must have commanded from the very start of the Asiatic expedition his own τάξις of πεζέταιροι, probably comprising troops recruited from the region of Orestis.¹⁰ He

⁸ Berve 2.94, no. 182, s.v. "Ἀττάλος, born ca 380, but perhaps earlier; see my "Introduction." 2.298-306, no. 606, s.v. Παρμενίων, born 400 B.C.; 2.46-51, no. 94, s.v. Ἀντίπατρος, born 398.

⁹ Krateros' wounds: Plut. *Alex.* 41.5; Arr. 4.3.3; ill health: Plut. *Alex.* 41.6-7; Arr. 7.12.4.

¹⁰ The evidence for Krateros' τάξις (φάλαγξ): Arr. 1.14.2-3; likely Arr. 2.8.4 and Curt. 3.9.8; Arr. 3.11.10; Diod. 17.57.3; Curt. 4.13.29, in error; Arr. 3.18.4; Curt. 5.4.14; 6.4.2; Arr. 3.23.2; 4.22.1.

first appears as *taxiarch* at the Granikos River, where he is stationed on the left side with the infantry-battalions of Philippos and Meleagros.¹¹ By the following year, Krateros had gained in authority, commanding all the infantry on the left wing at the battle of Issos; but even so he was subordinate to Parmenion, who had supreme command over all the forces on the left.¹²

Early in 332, during the protracted siege of Tyre, Krateros and Perdikkas were entrusted with the command of the besieging forces in Alexander's absence;¹³ Polyainos records one instance when a Tyrian sortie was effectively countered by Krateros' troops.¹⁴

¹¹ Krateros' battalion appears twice in Arrian's description of the battle-array at the Granikos (1.14.2, 3). A.B. Bosworth, "Errors in Arrian," *CQ* 26 (1976) 126, is probably right to suppose that Ptolemy and Aristoboulos gave conflicting accounts and that "Arrian has absorbed both versions without reconciling the contradiction." According to Arr. 1.14.2, Krateros' battalion was placed between Koinos' and Amyntas' on the right side; 1.14.3 places him on the left side with Philippos and Meleagros, which is more likely (cf. Roos' Teubner text, Leipzig, 1967, 32; R. Köpke, *Jahrbücher für cl. Philologie* 99 [1869] 263; J.G. Droysen, *Kleine Schriften zur alten Geschichte*, Leipzig, 1894, 2.222-223 = "Alexanders des Grossen Armee," *Hermes* 12 [1877] 242).

¹² Arr. 2.8.4; Curt. 3.9.8. Krateros is regulary on the left side, and this points in favour of Köpke's and Droysen's (n.11 *supra*) preference for Krateros' position on the left side at the Granikos (Arr. 1.14.3), as opposed to the right (1.14.2). He commands the left with the fleet at Tyre, Arr. 2.20.6; Curt. 4.3.11; and with the land forces at Gaugamela, Arr. 3.11.10; Curt. 4.13.29; Diod. 17.57.3.

¹³ Curt. 4.3.1. Arr. 2.20.4 does not mention this, but that is hardly surprising since the command was held jointly by Krateros and Perdikkas, the latter a victim of Ptolemy's bias. See R.M. Errington, "Bias in Ptolemy's History of Alexander," *CQ* n.s. 19 (1969) 237, though he thinks this may "conceivably be an omission of Arrian's."

¹⁴ Polyainos 4.13; cf. Berve 2.220.

When Alexander had prepared a formidable fleet, Krateros and the Kypriot king, Pnytagoras, commanded the left wing in the naval assault on Tyre.¹⁵ In the military sphere, there is no further mention of Krateros until 331 and the battle of Gaugamela, where, as at Issos, he led the infantry-divisions on the left wing but was again subordinate to Parmenion.¹⁶

After Gaugamela Krateros' advancement was steady and rapid. On the road from Sousa to Persepolis, in the land of the Ouxians, Krateros was given his first independent command over a portion (*i.e.*, other than his own *taxis*) of the army. When the Ouxians refused to allow Alexander passage through their territory, he took a picked force along one of the lesser-known roads and fell upon them, as they were unprepared for an attack from that quarter. He had sent Krateros ahead to occupy the heights, to which he assumed the Ouxians would flee. They did in fact retreat to the hills and large numbers of them were butchered by Krateros' troops.¹⁷ From this point onward, Alexander regularly divided his forces, usually entrusting the larger, and

¹⁵ Arr. 2.20.6; Curt. 4.3.11.

¹⁶ Arr. 3.11.10; Diod. 17.57.3; but Curt. 4.13.29 is in error: *in laevo Craterus Peloponnesium equites habebat Achaeorum et Locrensiū et Malieon turmis sibi adiunctis*; cf. Berve 2.221, n.1, this is an error for Philoxenos (no. 442).

¹⁷ See Arr. 3.17.4ff.; Diod. 17.67 and Curt. 5.3.1-16 make no mention of Krateros' role. Cf. J.F.C. Fuller, *Generalship* 226-228; A.T. Olmstead, *History of the Persian Empire*, Chicago, 1948, 519; Sir Aurel Stein, "An Archaeological Journey in Western Iran," *Geog. Journal* 92 (1938) 313ff. Cf. also Strabo 11.13.6 (C524); 15.3.6 (C729).

slower, portion of the army to Krateros.¹⁸ Later in the campaigns, when Hephaistion, Perdikkas, Ptolemy and Leonnatos acquired more importance, they also held independent commands; nevertheless, those tasks that involved the greatest risk and responsibility were, for the most part, reserved for Krateros.¹⁹

Some five days after the defeat of the Ouxians, Alexander's army reached the Persian Gates, where they found the road barred by Artabazos' son Ariobarzanes, satrap of Persis.²⁰ Since he had

¹⁸ For Krateros' independent commands: Metz Epit. 35, 59, 60; Polyainos 4.13; Curt. 4.3.1; Arr. 3.17.4ff.; Curt. 5.4.14-16, 29, 33-34; 5.6.11; Arr. 3.21.2; Curt. 6.4.2, 23-24; Arr. 3.25.6, 8; Curt. 6.6.25, 33; Arr. 4.2.2; Curt. 7.6.16, 19; 7.9.20-22; Arr. 4.17.1; Curt. 8.1.6; 8.5.2; Arr. 4.18.1; 4.22.1-2; 4.23.5; Curt. 8.10.4; Arr. 4.24.6-7; 4.28.7; 5.12.1; 5.18.1; 5.21.4; Diod. 17.96.1; Arr. 6.2.2; 6.4.1; 6.5.5, 7; Arr. *Ind.* 19.1, 3; Curt. 9.8.3; 9.10.19; Arr. 6.15.5, 7; 6.17.3; 6.27.3; 7.12.3-4.

¹⁹ Against the Ouxians: Arr. 3.17.4ff.; against Ariobarzanes: Arr. 3.18.4ff.; Curt. 5.4.14ff.; against the Massagetai in Bactria: Curt. 8.1.6; Arr. 4.17.1; at the Hydaspes: Arr. 5.12.1; Curt. fails to mention Krateros' important role; policing the satrapies to the west: Arr. 6.17.3; cf. Curt. 9.10.19.

²⁰ For the time-interval see Diod. 17.68.1; cf. Curt. 5.3.17, with an apparent textual problem, since Curtius says that Alexander entered Persis on the third day, but reached the "Gates" on the fifth; see F. Schmieder's notes, *Quinti Curtii Rufi: De Rebus Gestis Alexandri Magni*, vol. 2, London, 1825, 1089. Complete accounts of the battle at the Persian Gates: Arr. 3.18.1-9; Curt. 5.3.16-5.34; Diod. 17.68.1-69.2; Polyainos 4.3.27; the beginning of an account is given by Plut. *Alex.* 37.1-2 (cf. Hamilton, *PA* 96-97); also Strabo 15.3.6 (C729). See Sir Aurel Stein, *op. cit.* n.17; Olmstead, *loc. cit.* n.17; Fuller, *Generalship* 228-234. For Ariobarzanes see Berve 2.60-61, no. 115, s.v. Ἀριοβαρζάνης; Polyainos mistakenly has Φρασαδότης (Berve 2.400, no. 813, s.v.), the later satrap of Persis; cf. Kaerst, *RE* II.1 (1895) 833, s.v. "Ariobarzanes (4)."

with him a considerable force and since Alexander had been unable to take the pass on the initial assault, inquiries were made concerning an alternate route.²¹ There was, of course, the waggon-road through the plain, by which Parmenion was leading the baggage-trains and the heavily-armed troops into Persia, but it was longer and Alexander feared that a delay would allow the Persians sufficient time to remove the treasures from Persepolis, which lay beyond the "Gates" and the Araxes River.²² Therefore, learning of a difficult encircling path, Alexander led a chosen force to Ariobarzanes' rear and left the rest of his troops at the foot of the "Gates" under the direction of Krateros.²³ He had been given instructions

²¹ The figures vary: Curt. 5.3.17 has 25,000 infantry with Ariobarzanes; Diod. 17.68.1, 25,000 infantry and 300 cavalry; Arr. 3.18.2 has 40,000 infantry and 700 horse. Curt. 5.3.22-23 is over-dramatic about Alexander's setback (*tunc haesitabat deprehensa felicitas, nec aliud remedium erat, quam reverti qua venerat*), but this springs from a tendency to see this event as the Persian Thermopylai (cf. A.R. Burn, *Alexander the Great and the Middle East*, Harmondsworth, 1973, 121-122).

²² Arr. 3.18.1; Curt. 5.3.16. According to Curt. 5.5.2 and Diod. 17.69.1, Alexander learned of the treasure after he had cleared the "Gates." Surely his choice of the shorter mountainous route suggests that he hastened to Persepolis for the very purpose of capturing the treasure (so Schachermeyr, *Alexander der Grosse* 286; Olmstead, *op. cit.* n.17, 519ff.; cf. Droysen, *Hellenismus* 1.227, who gives equal emphasis to Alexander's pursuit of Dareios).

²³ Arr. 3.18.4 says the information came from prisoners; Plut. *Alex.* 37.1-2; Diod. 17.68.5-6; Polyainos 4.3.27; Curt. 5.4.10-13 speak of a Lykian *boukolos*, a Persian Ephialtes, part of the Thermopylai-motif. Curt. 5.4.14; Arr. 3.18.4, for the battle. Diod. 17.68 has misunderstood the strategy completely or so greatly compressed his account as to make Alexander's purpose impossible to understand; Polyainos (4.3.27) must be wrong to say the camp was left under the command of Hephaistion and Philotas.

to attack Ariobarzanes if he turned to deal with Alexander's force. If, however, Alexander reached the rear of Ariobarzanes' position undetected, Krateros was to await the trumpet-signal, whereafter both divisions of the army would attack the "Gates" simultaneously.²⁴ This is in fact what happened, and Ariobarzanes' men, hemmed in by the cliffs, were virtually annihilated.²⁵ The road to Persepolis lay open for Alexander; Krateros brought up the rest of the troops through forced marches.²⁶

Persepolis fell. Looting and slaughter exceeded the norm. It was not much later that Alexander conducted a thirteen-day campaign into the interior of Persia, leaving the bulk of the army behind with Parmenion and Krateros.²⁷ Probably it was their task to set in order the ravaged city and to arrange for the removal of the treasures; Persepolis had not yet endured the final outrage at the hands of Alexander and the Athenian courtesan Thaïs.²⁸

²⁴ Arr. 3.18.4-5; Curt. 5.4.14-16.

²⁵ Arr. 3.18.9 says that Ariobarzanes and a few horsemen escaped; Curt. 5.4.33-34 says that he was killed before Persepolis (which is contradicted also by Arr. 3.23.7; cf. Berve 2.61, n.3); if he was not killed, it is curious that he received no honours from Alexander, who held his father, Artabazos, in high esteem.

²⁶ The Araxes River (Curt. 5.5.3; Strabo 15.3.6 [C729]): it was bridged by Koinos, Amyntas and Philotas (Berve, no. 803), while the battle was being fought with Ariobarzanes, so Arr. 3.18.6, not later by Alexander himself as Curt. 5.5.3-4 and Diod. 17.69.2 say. For Krateros' forced marches to Persepolis see Curt. 5.4.34.

²⁷ Curt. 5.6.11.

²⁸ Curt. 5.7.2-10; Diod. 17.72; Plut. *Alex.* 38.2ff.; Athen. 13.576D-E = Kleitarchos, *FGrHist* 137 F11; cf. Strabo 15.730. Tarn 2.47-48 rejects the Thaïs-story as a fiction; for a more critical discussion

It is doubtful, however, that Krateros took part in the actual transporting of the treasures to Ekbatana, a task given to Parmenion.²⁹ Some units of the *pezhetairoi* did remain behind to guard the treasure,³⁰ but Krateros' *taxis* likely did not. Krateros appears to have set out with Alexander from Ekbatana toward the Kaspian Gates and, when Alexander hastened after Dareios and his captors, Krateros led the slower forces eastward from the Kaspian Gates and awaited the return of Koinos and his party, who had been on a foraging mission.³¹ Parmenion's orders to march north into Hyrkania, through the territory of the Kadousians, once he had brought the treasures to Ekbatana, were apparently rescinded, and the divisions of the army that had served as Parmenion's escort

see E.N. Borza, "Fire from Heaven: Alexander at Persepolis," *CP* 67 (1972) 233-245; for a discussion of Persepolis in relation to Greek politics see Badian, "Agis III," *Hermes* 95 (1967) 170-192; cf. G. Wirth, "Alexander zwischen Gaugamela und Persepolis," *Historia* 20 (1971) 617-632; "Dareios und Alexander," *Chiron* 1 (1971) 149-150; Schachermeyr, *Alexander der Grosse* 289-290, with literature cited in notes 334 and 336; Hamilton, *Alexander the Great* 89 and *PA* 99-101; Fox, 236; P. Green, 318ff., borders on fantasy. See also Berve 2.175, no. 359, s.v. *Θαῖς*; Fiehn, *RE* VA.1 (1934) 1184-1185, s.v. "Thais."

²⁹ Arr. 3.19.7; cf. Berve 2.304. Berve 2.221 assumes that he helped Parmenion convey the treasures to Ekbatana.

³⁰ Alexander left Ekbatana, taking with him τὴν φάλαγγα τὴν Μακεδονικὴν ἔξω τῶν ἐπὶ τοῖς χρήμασι ταχθέντων, Arr. 3.20.1.

³¹ Koinos' foraging party: Arr. 3.20.4; 21.2. Krateros took the slower troops without forced marches (μὴ μακρὰς ὁδοὺς ἄγοντα, Arr. 3.21.2).

returned to Alexander under the command of Kleitos, who had recovered from illness in Sousa.³²

The campaign in the north-east saw Krateros emerge as Alexander's foremost general, and for some three years he had no serious rivals. While Alexander hurried after Bessos and his accomplices, the murderers of Dareios, Krateros and Erigyios commanded one-third of the army each. But Erigyios' task was merely to lead the baggage-trains along the easiest path to Hyrkania, while Krateros took the *taxis* of Amyntas, son of Andromenes, the archers and some of the cavalry against the Tapourians.³³ Curtius claims that Krateros was left behind to guard Parthiene against invaders (*ut ab incursione barbarorum Parthienem tueretur*, 6.4.2), but this is misleading; Krateros' mission was clearly to patrol and set in order Parthiene, since Alexander had no time to deal with the natives *en route*. Thus Krateros and Erigyios reunite with Alexander at Zadrakarta in Hyrkania, Krateros bringing with him Autophradates, satrap of the Tapourians, whose fate is to be decided by Alexander.³⁴

When news came that Satibarzanes, satrap of Areia, had

³² Parmenion's orders: Arr. 3.19.7; cf. Hamilton, *Alexander the Great* 90; Schachermeyr, *Alexander der Grosse* 295; Berve 2.304; Droysen, *Hellenismus* 1.237; Niese, 99f. There is, at least, no evidence that Parmenion carried out these orders. For Kleitos' instructions see Arr. 3.19.8; see also Berve 2.206, no. 427, s.v. Κλεῦτος. He had rejoined Alexander by the time of the Philotas-affair, Arr. 3.27.4.

³³ Arr. 3.23.2; cf. Curt. 6.4.2.

³⁴ Arr. 2.23.6; Curt. 6.4.23-24 has "Phradates"; see Berve 2.221; 2.96-97, no. 189, s.v. Αὐτοφραδάτης; Kaerst, *RE* II.2 (1896) 2608, s.v. "Autophradates (2)." Arr. 3.24.3, he surrendered of his own accord; this must have been a direct consequence of Krateros' activities.

gone over to Bessos, who had now assumed the tiara and the title of Artaxerxes, Alexander hastened to deal with him.³⁵ But Krateros' role is difficult to ascertain, owing to the conflicting accounts of Arrian and Curtius, the only extant sources to treat the matter. According to Curtius, Krateros was left behind at Artakoana, which he besieged in Alexander's absence, but which he allowed Alexander the honour of taking.³⁶ In Arrian, it is Alexander who arrives at Artakoana first, while Krateros again brings up the rest of the army at a slower pace.³⁷ The version of Arrian is, in all probability, more reliable, since Artakoana lay a great distance to the east of Zadrakarta and Alexander's more mobile troops will have reached the city some time before Krateros and the rest of the army arrived.

II

It was at this point that problems developed within Alexander's camp. Nikanor, son of Parmenion and commander of the hypaspists,

³⁵ Hans-Werner Ritter, *Diadem und Königsherrschaft: Untersuchungen zu Zeremonien und Rechtsgrundlagen des Herrschaftsantritts bei den Persern, bei Alexander dem Grossen und im Hellenismus*, Munich, 1965, 27-28.

³⁶ Curt. 6.6.24, 33.

³⁷ Arr. 3.25.6, 8; Berve 2.221-222 prefers Arrian, as does Geyer, *op. cit.* n.1, 1039. Cf. Droysen, *Hellenismus* 1.262; Niese 1.110; Schachermeyr, *Alexander der Grosse* 313; Hamilton, *Alexander the Great* 93.

had died of illness in Areia.³⁸ Parmenion himself had been left behind at Ekbatana, and the family, which had had so much influence in the Macedonian army, had suffered a great decline. But it was worse than that: Philotas, the commander of the Companions, had foolishly become involved in the abortive conspiracy of a rather obscure Macedonian named Dimmos.³⁹ For Krateros this was welcome news; for the brother of Dimmos' associate (and lover) had given damning testimony against Philotas, whom Krateros had hounded and hated since Egypt.⁴⁰ Krateros was by now the King's strong right hand, and protecting the King from treason - for this is how he interpreted Philotas' role - had its personal advantages.

In Egypt Philotas had voiced his opinions rather loudly, and tactlessly, especially his annoyance at Alexander's recent *Ammonssohnschaft*. This had been the cause of Hegelochos' bitterness, who may in fact have aroused latent hostilities within Philotas.⁴¹

³⁸ Arr. 3.25.4; Curt. 6.6.18-19. See Berve 2.275, no. 554, s.v. Νικάνωρ.

³⁹ Berve 2.142-143, no. 269, s.v. Δύμνος. For the literature on Dimmos' conspiracy see "Introduction (ii) The Fall of Parmenion's Faction."

⁴⁰ Kebalinos, whose brother Nikomachos was Dimmos' lover. See Berve 2.203, 279-280, nos. 418, 569, s.vv. Κεβαλῖνος, Νικόμαχος. For the disclosure see Curt. 6.7.21ff.

⁴¹ Arr. 3.26.1; cf. Plut. *Alex.* 48.4-49.2. For Hegelochos' conspiracy see Curt. 6.11.22-29. On the authenticity of the affair see "Introduction (i) The Family of Kleopatra-Eurydike"; against this view Badian, *TAPA* 91 (1960) 332; J. Rufus Fears, *Athenaeum* 53 (1975) 133, n.77; for the Egyptian *epiboule* see also F. Cauer, "Philotas, Kleitos, Kallisthenes," *Jahrb. f. kl. Philologie*, Supplbd 20 (1894) 8ff.

Arrian does mention Philotas' *epiboule* in Egypt (3.26.1), and, while his intrigues with Hegelochos went undetected, they were part of "treasonous activity" to which Krateros and those loyal to Alexander objected. Arrian gives no details of this Egyptian conspiracy but it appears that it is identical with the affair described in some detail by Plutarch in his *Life of Alexander* and the *De fortuna Alexandri*.⁴² Among the spoils taken by Parmenion at Damaskos was a young Macedonian girl named Antigone.⁴³ She became Philotas' mistress and to her Philotas unwisely expressed his opinions, claiming that Alexander's victories had been won through his efforts and those of Parmenion, that the *Ammonssohnschaft* was an insult to the Macedonian nobility.⁴⁴ But those things that Philotas had told her, by way of bragging or complaining, Antigone entrusted to a friend and, ultimately, the news reached the ears of Krateros.⁴⁵ He wasted no time in bringing

⁴² Plut. *Alex.* 48.4-49.2; *de fort. Al.* 2.7 = *Mor.* 339D-F.

⁴³ For references to Parmenion at Damaskos see Berve 2.301. For Antigone's capture at Damaskos: Plut. *Alex.* 48.4 (where it is stated that she was originally from Pydna); *Mor.* 339D (from Pella). According to the latter version, she had crossed from Pella to Samothrake (for the worship of the Kabeiroi? see Hamilton, *PA* 2; Kern, *RE* X.2 [1919] 1399ff., esp. 1423-1437, s.vv. "Kabeiros und Kabeiroi (1)"), where she was captured by Autophradates (Berve 2.96, no. 188). Antigone: the name occurs among the Macedonian nobility, so Hoffmann, *Die Makedonen* 216, who does not mention the *hetaira*; see Berve 2.42, no. 86, s.v. 'Αντιγόνη (*Mor.* 339D-F has 'Αντιγόνα); U. Wilcken, *RE* I.2 (1894) 2404, s.v. "Antigone (7)"; A. Wiedersich, *Prosopographie der Griechen beim Perserkönige*, Diss. Breslau, 1922, no. 19a (only the abstract is available); Hamilton, *PA* 133.

⁴⁴ Plut. *Alex.* 48.5; *Mor.* 339D; Beloch IV² 2.290-306, follows up these arguments with very little success.

⁴⁵ Plut. *Alex.* 48.6; *Mor.* 339E-F.

the matter, and Antigone, to the King's attention. And, while Alexander forgave Philotas his outspokenness, Krateros remained suspicious of him and kept him under surveillance, using the girl as his informant.⁴⁶ How long this "prolonged espionage"⁴⁷ lasted is unknown, though it undoubtedly did not span the years between the disaffection in Egypt and the Dimnos-affair; indeed, Antigone's information, which cannot have revealed much that was not already known about Philotas, may well have disappointed Krateros' hopes of building a case against his rival. But, when the opportunity presented itself, Krateros and his associates were quick to press their advantage.

The conspiracy of Dimnos had been exposed by Kebalinos. But Dimnos could not be taken alive, and he could not be used to indict Philotas.⁴⁸ Alexander, it appears, had made no firm decision on how he would deal with Philotas' negligence; for clearly negligence was all that could be proved.⁴⁹ The real decision on how the matter of Philotas' involvement in the affair

⁴⁶ Plut. *Alex.* 48.7-49.1. For this conspiracy *against* Philotas (ὁ μὲν οὖν Φιλώτας ἐπιβουλευόμενος οὕτως ἡγνόει καὶ συνῆν τῇ Ἀντιγόῃ, 49.1), in which Badian (*op. cit.*, 326) attempts to find support for his arguments concerning Dimnos' conspiracy, see Hamilton, *PA* 135.

⁴⁷ Badian's phrase (*op. cit.*, 331), but he regards this as part of Alexander's conspiracy against Philotas.

⁴⁸ Badian, *op. cit.*, 331: "Dimnos conveniently killed himself (or was killed while resisting arrest)...."

⁴⁹ This was in fact the one charge to which Philotas admitted his guilt (...*culpam, silentii tamen, non facti ullius*..., Curt. 6.7.34).

was to be handled must have been the one forced by Alexander's friends when a council was held to discuss it. Krateros spoke first and most effectively, for he was dear to Alexander and exceedingly hostile to Philotas.⁵⁰ Whether or not Krateros was attempting to disguise his ill-will toward Philotas with a show of piety, as Curtius claims, is debatable; for Krateros had already gained in power and importance as a result of Parmenion's relegation to Ekbatana.⁵¹ He was, most likely, sincere in both motives: he earnestly desired to protect Alexander from insidious elements and he sought to ruin Philotas on account of a genuine personal hatred. Perhaps friction had developed between the two when it became clear that Krateros was rapidly developing into Parmenion's successor but, by the time of the Philotas-affair, Krateros had little to fear from Philotas or Parmenion. In this respect, his role in the affair is much less complicated and less sinister than that of the unaccomplished Hephaistion.⁵²

Krateros' speech was to the point and, from the standpoint of the younger commanders, who owed so much to Alexander's favour, perfectly reasonable. Alexander could not go on excusing Philotas

⁵⁰ For his relationship with Alexander: Arr. 7.12.3; Plut. *Alex.* 47.9-10; Diod. 17.114.1-2; and in this instance Curt. 6.8.2.

⁵¹ Curt. 6.8.2: *Erat Craterus regi carus in paucis, et eo Philotae ob aemulationem dignitatis adversus....* 6.8.4: *Non aliam premendi inimici occasionem aptiorem futuram ratus odio suo pietatis praeferens speciem.*

⁵² See 'Chapter 1: Hephaistion.'

forever, nor would Philotas cease to plot against Alexander. Beware the enemy within, warned Krateros. And he had not forgotten the threat of Parmenion: the father would not endure the son's execution.⁵³ Clearly Krateros understood what was at stake, what could be gained by Philotas' removal. But his condemnation of Philotas served better the wishes of his accomplices in the conspiracy *against* Philotas. All were hostile and unyielding. By the time that Philotas' enemies met, during the second watch on the night of his arrest, Alexander had been strongly influenced, by Hephaistion in private, by Krateros in public.⁵⁴ An unusual unanimity prevailed among Alexander's young commanders, united against a common enemy. To Alexander and to the army they denounced Philotas. Koinos and Amyntas repudiated their earlier ties: it was as much a personal defense as a prosecution of Philotas.⁵⁵ The whole affair is aptly summed up by Philotas' bitter pronouncement: *vicit...bonitatem tuam, rex, inimicorum meorum acerbitas*.⁵⁶

III

For the next two years Krateros was unchallenged as the foremost of Alexander's generals: Hephaistion had only begun his rise

⁵³ Curt. 6.8.7.

⁵⁴ See "Chapter 1: Hephaistion."

⁵⁵ See my comments in "Amyntas, Son of Andromenes," *GRBS* 16 (1975) 397: "salvation clearly lay in the repudiation of his relationship with Philotas."

⁵⁶ Curt. 6.8.22; cf. Plut. *Alex.* 49.8.

to power with his promotion to *hipparch*, Parmenion, who had already ceased to be an obstacle before his death, had been eliminated as a consequence of the *Philotasprozess*.⁵⁷ In Baktria-Sogdiana, as earlier in Hyrkania and Areia, Krateros had supreme authority over the army while Alexander led smaller detachments on special missions. Thus, while Alexander subdued the rebellious outposts along the Iaxartes River, Krateros began besieging the largest of these, Kyroupolis. When Alexander had dealt with the other six cities, he returned to Kyroupolis and found the siege-work well underway; under the King's leadership the city was taken, though both Alexander and Krateros were wounded.⁵⁸ In the brief skirmish with the Skythians, who lived north of the Iaxartes, we know nothing of Krateros' role. He is named by Curtius as one of the counsellors who came to Alexander's tent before the battle,⁵⁹ but he is not mentioned in the accounts of the actual

⁵⁷ Hephaistion's promotion: Arr. 3.27.4. Parmenion's death: Arr. 3.26.4; Curt. 7.2.11ff.; Diod. 17.80.1, 3; Plut. *Alex.* 49.13; Justin. 12.5.3; Strabo 15.2.10 (= C724); cf. Justin 12.6.14; Arr. 4.14.2; Curt. 8.1.33, 52; 8.7.4.

⁵⁸ Kyroupolis: Arr. 4.2.2; Curt. 7.6.16 (Krateros' siege); Arr. 4.3.1; Curt. 7.6.20 (founded by Kyros the Great); Arr. 4.3.1-4; Curt. 7.6.19-21 (captured by Alexander). For Krateros' wounding by an arrow see Arr. 4.3.3; Alexander is seriously wounded, Arr. 4.3.3; Plut. *Mor.* 341B incorrectly places it in Hyrkania; Curt. 7.6.22 says Alexander was wounded at the town of the Memaceni (after the fall of Kyroupolis). For Kyroupolis see Wm. Geiger, *Alexanders Feldzüge in Sogdiana, Programm der K. Studienanstalt zu Neustadt*, Schuljahr 1883-1884, 21-23; Fr. v. Schwarz, *Alexander des Grossen Feldzüge in Turkestan*, Munich 1893, 10-12; 51-54; W.W. Tarn, *The Greeks in Bactria and India*, Cambridge, 1938 (2nd ed. 1951), 476; Fuller, *Generalship* 234-236.

⁵⁹ Together with Erigyios and Hephaistion, Curt. 7.7.9-10.

battle.⁶⁰ It seems likely that he remained with the bulk of the army on the south bank of the Iaxartes, while Alexander with a select force crossed the river to deal with the Skythians.

When the force that had been sent to relieve Marakanda met with unexpected disaster at the Polytimetos River,⁶¹ Alexander was forced to hurry south in order to deal with Spitamenes; Krateros followed with the remainder of the army at a more restrained pace (*modicis itineribus*).⁶² It was not a glorious role, but Alexander was not one to grant his commanders such opportunities for glory.⁶³ Nevertheless, when the occasion arose, Krateros proved his worth.

In the spring of 328, Alexander moved out of his winter-quarters at Baktra and crossed the Oxos River, leaving behind the *taxeis* of Polyperchon, Attalos, Gorgias and Meleagros, all under the command of Krateros.⁶⁴ Their instructions were to prevent further defection among the Baktrians and to crush those who

⁶⁰ Arr. 4.4.1-9; quite different is the account of Curt. 7.8.6-9.17; for an analysis see Fuller, *Generalship* 237-241.

⁶¹ Arr. 4.3.6-7; 4.5.2-6.2; Curt. 7.7.30-39; cf. 7.6.24. See Berve 2.38, 200-201, 256, 380-381, nos. 75, 412, 504, 768, s.vv.
'Ανδρόμαχος, Κάρανος, Μενέδημος, Φαρνούχης.

⁶² Curt. 7.9.20. For Alexander's relief of Marakanda: Arr. 4.5.3-6.5; Curt. 7.9.20-21; Itiner. 39; Metz Epit. 13. Krateros arrives with the rest of the army, Curt. 7.9.22.

⁶³ E.D. Carney, *Macedonian Aristocracy* 216, is perhaps overly suspicious in believing that "Alexander carefully monitored [Krateros'] activities" because K. was "a potentially dangerous leader of opposition and had to be watched closely."

⁶⁴ Arr. 4.16.1 does not mention Krateros, though it is clear from Arr. 4.17.1 that he was supreme commander; this is corroborated by Curt. 8.1.6.

had already rebelled.⁶⁵ But, while Alexander and the mobile troops conducted a sweep-campaign in Sogdiana, the rebel Spitamenes, supported by the horsemen of the Massagetai, attacked the smaller Macedonian garrisons in Baktria.⁶⁶ Learning of this, Krateros and his troops pursued the Massagetai to the edge of the desert, and there defeated them with fairly heavy casualties.⁶⁷

We do not know exactly what Krateros accomplished in Baktria after this battle, only that he remained in the region for quite some time. He was not present at Alexander's camp when Kleitos was murdered, for this took place at Marakandain in late summer or early autumn 328; Krateros did not return to Sogdiana until Alexander

65 τούτους μὲν παρήγγειλεν [sc. Ἀλέξανδρος] τὴν τε χώραν ἐν φυλακῇ ἔχειν, ὥς μή τι νεωτερίσωσιν οἱ ταύτη βάρβαροι, καὶ τοὺς ἔτι ἀφεστηκότας αὐτῶν ἐξαίρειν, Arr. 4.16.1.

66 On the *phrourarchos* Attinas (Curt. 8.1.3-5; cf. Arr. 4.16.4-5, who does not mention his name); on Zariaspa-Baktra, where the sick were left behind, including Peithon, son of Sosikles, and the harpist Aristonikos (Arr. 4.16.6-7). See Berve 2.95, no. 185, s.v. Ἀττινᾶς, though Berve's conclusion about Attinas is over-cautious: "Sein weiteres Schicksal ist nicht bekannt." He must have been killed: Arr. 4.16.5 says that he was taken prisoner, Curt. 8.1.5 says that he was killed in battle. Even if he was captured first, it is likely that he was killed; cf. Berve's conclusion on Peithon's fate (below). See Berve 2.68, no. 132, s.v. Ἀριστόνικος (to which add the omitted reference Plut. *Mor.* 334E-F); cf. Kaerst, *RE* II.2 (1895) 961, s.v. "Aristonikos (4)"; see also Berve 2.311-312, no. 622, s.v. Πείθων; Berve, *RE* XIX.1 (1937) 222, s.v. "Peithon (5)"; Berve 2.359-361, no. 717, Σπιταμένης; Kahrstedt, *RE* IIIA.2 (1929) 1815, s.v. "Spitamenes."

67 Arr. 4.17.1-2 says 150 casualties out of a total of 1000; Curt. 8.1.6 claims that the Massagetai fled but that Krateros slew 1000 of the Dahai. There is some confusion in Curtius between the victories of Krateros and Koinos; see n.70 below.

had moved to Nautaka, and then only at the height of winter.⁶⁸ Shortly after Kleitos' death, Koinos led Amyntas, son of Nikolaos, into Baktria, establishing him as satrap there; the position had been assigned previously to Kleitos, Artabazos having relinquished it on account of old age.⁶⁹ But Koinos did not replace Krateros as director of affairs in the region. Probably he met with Krateros and, on Alexander's instructions, took under his command Meleagros' *taxeis* of infantry, with which he waged a decisive campaign against the Massagetai and caused wide-spread disaffection among the followers of Spitamenes.⁷⁰ From Koinos Krateros will have learned the details of the Kleitos-episode, though we cannot say how he reacted to the news. Both Koinos and Krateros maintained the traditional values of Macedon, that is, they shared Kleitos' sentiments, but, while Koinos later became the spokesman for the Macedonian soldiery at

⁶⁸ Arr. 4.18.1-2; this is corroborated by Curt. 8.4.1, who says that when Alexander moved out of his winter-quarters in spring (cf. Arr. 4.18.4) he had stayed there only a little over two months: *tertio mense ex hibernis movit exercitum*. Cf. Beloch III² 2.319.

⁶⁹ Curt. 8.1.19; 8.2.14; Arr. 4.17.3 (who does not mention Kleitos' appointment); cf. Berve 2.82-84, no. 152, s.v. 'Ἀρτάβαζος; Judeich, *RE* II.1 (1895) 1299-1300, s.v. "Artabazos (3)"; Beloch III² 2.147-149, with stemma on 151. Berve 2.30, no. 60, s.v. 'Ἀμύντας; Kaerst, *RE* I.2 (1894) 2007, s.v. "Amyntas (18)." Berve 2.206-208, no. 427, s.v. Κλεῖτος; Kroll, *RE* XI.1 (1921) 666, s.v. "Kleitos (9)"; cf. Cauer, *op. cit.* n.41, 46-47, 57 (regarding Kleitos' appointment as genuine, cf. Berve 2.206); Droysen, *Hellenismus* 1.299; R. Schubert, "Der Tod des Kleitos," *Rh. Mus.* 53 (1898) 119; Schachermeyr, *Alexander der Grosse* 364.

⁷⁰ Arr. 4.17.6-7; Curt. 8.1.6, who does not mention Koinos' victory but claims that Krateros crushed all resistance in Baktria (*quorum clade totius regionis finita defectio est*); apparently the two victories have been compressed into a single event.

the Hyphasis River, we have no evidence that Krateros ever took a stand in opposition to the King.⁷¹ Of Krateros' role after his meeting with Koinos we know nothing, only that he and Koinos rejoined Alexander at the winter-quarters at Nautaka (Sogdiana) in very late 328 or early 327 B.C.

In early 327 B.C.,⁷² Krateros remained with Alexander in Sogdiana, witnessing the marriage to Rhoxane (of which he doubtless disapproved in private) and the capture of the Rock of Chorienes; in the latter campaign, Krateros possibly directed affairs under Alexander's leadership during the day, while Perdikkas, Ptolemy and Leonnatos supervised the night-operations.⁷³ But, when Alexander moved south into Baktria, Krateros remained behind with the *taxeis* of Polyperchon, Attalos and Alketas (Perdikkas' brother) in order to deal with Haustanes and Katanes, who continued the resistance in Paraitakene; Haustanes was captured, Katanes killed, Polyperchon sent on to subdue the region

⁷¹ Kleitos was "altmakedonisch gesinnt," so Schachermeyr, *Alexander der Grosse* 363; cf. Arr. 4.8.4ff.; Curt. 8.1.22ff.; Plut. *Alex.* 50-51. Badian is suspicious of Koinos' sudden death, which followed so closely his opposition to Alexander: "Alexander the Great and the Loneliness of Power," *Studies in Greek and Roman History*, Oxford, 1964, 200; "Harpalus," *JHS* 81 (1961) 22 = Griffith, *Main Problems* 212; cf. "The Death of Parmenio," *TAPA* 91 (1960) 338, n.37. Similar instances of ill-advised opposition to Alexander: Arr. 4.12.2 (Leonnatos, see n.75 below); Curt. 8.12.17 (Meleagros). On Krateros' traditional attitudes: Plut. *Alex.* 47.9; see also E.D. Carney, *Macedonian Aristocracy* 216.

⁷² Arr. 4.18.4; Curt. 8.4.1; Beloch III² 2.319.

⁷³ Arr. 4.21.4.

that Curtius calls "Bubacene."⁷⁴ In their absence, Alexander failed in his attempt to introduce *proskynesis* and, shortly thereafter, "uncovered" the conspiracy of the Pages, the details of which were reported to Krateros, Attalos and Alketas by letter.⁷⁵ Some time after the conspiracy, Krateros and his troops rejoined Alexander in Baktria, whence the army set out for India.

At the beginning of spring 327, Krateros accompanied Alexander to Alexandria of the Kaukasos and thence to Nikaia and the Kophen.⁷⁶ When Hephaistion and Perdikkas led the advance force to the Indus, Krateros first remained with Alexander as the main army followed the course of the Choes River. But the heavy infantry and the siege-equipment crossed the river with great difficulty and made slow

⁷⁴ Curt. 8.5.2; this mission is not mentioned by Arrian.

⁷⁵ Curt. 8.5.22. That Polyperchon ridiculed the *proskynesis*-affair is incorrect (against Berve 2.326: "die Tatsache selbst ist nicht zu bezweifeln, zumal sie zu dem starr makedonischen Charakter des P. stimmt..."). Arr. 4.12.2 contradicts this, naming Leonnatos (cf. Geyer, *RE* XII.2 [1925] 2035, and Badian, *TAPA* 91 [1960] 337, n.34, who identify him as the *somatophylax*, against Berve 2.235, no. 467, s.v. Λεοννάτος). On Curtius' own testimony (8.5.3), Polyperchon was absent, for he left with Krateros, Attalos and Alketas (details given by Arr. 4.22.1). The news of the Pages' conspiracy (*i.e.*, after the *proskynesis*-episode) was sent by letter to Krateros, Attalos and Alketas (so Plut. *Alex.* 55.6); was the failure to mention Polyperchon merely an oversight, or does this mean that he was absent in Bubacene at the time (Curt. 8.5.2)?

⁷⁶ Arr. 4.22.3: ἐξήκοντος ἡδὲ τοῦ ἡρος. Cf. Beloch III² 2.319. They reached Alexandria in ten days (Arr. 4.22.4); Nikaia and the Kophen (4.22.6).

progress through the mountains, and Alexander left them behind to follow at a slower pace, presumably under Krateros' command.⁷⁷ Probably they did not reunite with Alexander until they reached Andaka, where Krateros was left with instructions to subdue those neighbouring cities that had not submitted voluntarily; his main force will have consisted of infantry, though the ranks of the *pezhetairoi* were depleted, Alexander taking with him the *taxeis* of Attalos and Koinos, while those of Kleitos, Meleagros and Gorgias had accompanied the advance force to the Indus.⁷⁸ From Andaka Krateros led his division to Argaiion, where Alexander again left him behind; this time with instructions to fortify the main wall, to settle those of the neighbouring peoples who so wished in the city, and to leave behind also such Macedonians as were unfit for service (*ἀπόμαχου*).⁷⁹ Having done this, Krateros led his troops and the siege-equipment into the land of the Assakenians, where he rejoined Alexander.⁸⁰ From here he appears to have remained with Alexander until the army reached Embolima; which lay

⁷⁷ For Alexander's route along the Choes and through the mountains see Arr. 4.23.2. His dividing of forces at this point must correspond to Curt. 8.10.4 (*Cratero cum phalange iusso sequi*), which appears to refer to the time before Alexander's arrival at Andaka.

⁷⁸ Andaka: Arr. 4.23.5; Curt. 8.10.5 (?): *Iam supervenerat Craterus. Itaque, ut principio terrorem incuteret genti nondum arma Macedonum expertae, praecipit ne cui parceretur, munimentis urbis quam obsidebat incensis*. The description appears to suit Andaka. For Koinos and Attalos see Arr. 4.24.1; for Kleitos, Meleagros and Gorgias Arr. 4.22.7. For the "Swat Campaign" see Fuller, *Generalship* 245ff.; Sir Aurel Stein, *On Alexander's Track to the Indus*, London, 1929, 41ff.

⁷⁹ Arr. 4.24.6-7.

⁸⁰ Arr. 4.25.5.

near Aornos. Here Krateros was left with a portion of the army and instructions to gather provisions at Embolima, which Alexander intended to use as his base of operations against the Rock.⁸¹

From Aornos, where Krateros is unattested, the main force advanced to the Indus, which Perdikkas and Hephaistion had bridged, and thence to the Hydaspes, where Poros awaited the Macedonians with a sizable force. In the battle with Poros - Alexander's last great battle - Krateros' role was similar to that at the Persian Gates. He was to hold the attention of Poros and his troops while Alexander attempted an encircling manoeuvre; if Poros turned to deal with Alexander, Krateros was to cross the river and attack his rear, if Poros remained in place, Krateros was to join battle after Alexander had engaged the enemy.⁸² In these simplified terms, Krateros appears to have played an unspectacular part; it was not, however, one without responsibility, and this is perhaps why it was entrusted to him and not to someone else.

One is tempted to see in the battle the beginnings of Krateros' decline,⁸³ but this is to deny the importance of Krateros' division

⁸¹ Arr. 4.28.7.

⁸² Arr. 5.12.1, 18.1. Curtius does not mention Krateros, but his account is highly unsatisfactory. For an analysis of Krateros' position see Fuller, *Generalship* 189; on the Hydaspes-battle in general see the literature cited in Chapter 1: Hephaistion, n.79.

⁸³ Carney, *Macedonian Aristocracy* 214: "...we see that Alexander never gave him a prominent role to play in battle once Krateros had distinguished himself...against Spitamenes' rebels...."

to the success of Alexander's battle-plan. Nevertheless, there is a noticeable decline in Krateros' importance after the defeat of Poros: we hear of the fortification of Nikaia and Boukephala,⁸⁴ of a foraging expedition conducted with Koinos near the Hydraotes,⁸⁵ and of open conflict with Hephaistion.⁸⁶ Hephaistion, fond of Alexander (*philalexandros*); here surely is the explanation for the sudden check to Krateros' brilliant career. The struggle for power and Alexander's affection had led inevitably to rivalry, and this manifested itself in the form of hand-to-hand combat some time after the battle at the Hydaspes. Alexander himself was forced to intervene. Soon he found it necessary to keep them on opposite banks of the Indus, but the advantage appears to have shifted to Hephaistion, who commanded the larger force.⁸⁷ On either side of the river, they descended the Indus in stages, but it was Hephaistion who figured in Alexander's elaborate strategy against the Malloi;⁸⁸ a year earlier the task might have been entrusted to Krateros. In the accounts of the Mallian campaign Krateros

⁸⁴ Arr. 5.20.2.

⁸⁵ Arr. 5.21.4.

⁸⁶ Plut. *Alex.* 47.11-12. For a full discussion see Chapter 1: Hephaistion. See also Plut. *Mor.* 337A.

⁸⁷ Arr. 6.2.2; *Ind.* 19.1.

⁸⁸ For the descent of the Indus river-system see Arr. 6.2.2, 4.1, 5.5, 5.7; *Ind.* 19.1, 3; Diod. 17.96.1. See also B. Breloer, *Alexanders Bund mit Poros: Indien von Dareios zu Sandrokottos*, Leipzig, 1941, 29-56, for the Mallian campaign; cf. Fuller, *Generalship* 259-263; Chapter 2: Leonnatos. R.D. Milns 227.

is not named, though Curtius relates that, when Alexander returned critically wounded to the junction of the Akesines and Hydraotes Rivers, it was Krateros who acted as the spokesman of the *Hetairoi*, begging him not to risk his life unnecessarily.⁸⁹

But the power that Krateros had lost in the main army he never regained. His last recorded mission in India was the fortification of the capital city of King Mousikanos, whereafter he was sent westward through Arachosia and Drangiana with instructions to police the satrapies and rejoin Alexander in Karmania.⁹⁰

⁸⁹ Curt. 9.6.6-14; he continued downstream, 9.8.3.

⁹⁰ There is a textual problem at Arr. 6.15.5, where Arrian writes καὶ Κρατερὸν μὲν ἐκπέμπει αὐτοῖς εἶναι τῇ στρατιᾷ δεξιᾷ τῆς Ἀραχωτῶν καὶ Δραγγῶν γῆς. This precedes the account of Krateros' activities in the kingdom of Mousikanos (6.15.7), whereafter it is reported a second time that Krateros was sent out (6.17.3). F. Schmieder, in his edition of Arrian (Leipzig, 1798), bracketed the words δεξιᾷ τῆς Ἀραχωτῶν καὶ Δραγγῶν γῆς, believing them to be an intrusive scribal gloss; subsequent editors (notably C.G. Krüger, Berlin, 1835; F. Dübner, Paris, 1846; A.G. Roos, Leipzig, 1967) have followed suit. Bosworth, "Errors in Arrian," *CQ* n.s. 26 (1976) 127-129, challenges Schmieder's interpretation and suggests instead that the first reference to Krateros' departure is a doublet taken from another source. Presumably Arrian failed to reconcile the incongruities of the accounts of Aristoboulos and Ptolemy, for which Bosworth argued cogently (*ibid.* 125) in the case of the error at 1.14.1-3. The first departure has the support of Justin 12.10.1-2, though this does not mean that Krateros' departure should be placed before his fortification of Mousikanos' capital; in that event we should be forced to posit another error in Arrian in order to explain away this one. Arr. 6.15.4 says that Krateros' forces were transferred to the left bank of the Indus, the right bank being too difficult for the troops to follow; does ἐκπέμπει αὐτοῖς (6.15.5) mean that they were sent back to the right side of the river (this would be the sense provided by Schmieder's deletion)? Or does it mean nothing if no destination follows the verb (so Bosworth 129)? Bosworth's suggestion is at least equally plausible: "That a doublet existscan hardly now be doubted. Schmieder's sarcastic question, 'who would believe that Arrian after so few words forgot what he had just written?', is easily answered. The man who could place Craterus' battalion in different positions of the battle line, in consecutive paragraphs of his narrative of the Granicus, was perfectly capable of an inept doublet of Craterus' mission through Arachosia" (129).

IV

Thus Krateros, with the *taxeis* of Attalos, Meleagros and Antigenes, some of the archers, all the elephants and the *apomachoi*, moved westward, policing Arachosia and Drangiana, which were reported to be in a state of unrest.⁹¹ The ring-leaders of the uprising - Arrian names Ordanes,⁹² Curtius has Ozines and Zariaspes⁹³ - were arrested and brought in chains to Alexander, who was by this time in Karmania.⁹⁴ Stasanor, satrap of Areia and Drangiana, may very well have been summoned to Karmania by

⁹¹ Arr. 6.17.3; cf. Justin 12.10.1: *Itaque ex magna desperatione tandem salutis redditus Polyperchona cum exercitu Babyloniam mittit, ipse cum lectissima manu navibus conscensis Oceani litora peragrat*. There are inaccuracies, but Justin appears to be speaking of Krateros' mission to Karmania, on which Polyperchon may also have gone. Polyperchon had accompanied Krateros in the past (Arr. 4.16.1; 17.1; 22.1; cf. Curt. 8.5.2) and did again in 324 (Arr. 7.12.4; Justin 12.12.8-9, cf. Bosworth, "Errors in Arrian," *CQ* n.s. 26 [1976] 129, n.65). For Polyperchon with Attalos (possibly his relative, so Berve 2.235 and Hoffmann, *Die Makedonen*, 156, n.59) Arr. 4.16.1 (where Meleagros is also named); with Amyntas, brother of Attalos, Curt. 5.4.20, 30. With Antigenes, Justin 12.12.8-9. See further Berve 2.235-236, no. 654, s.v. Πολυπέρχων. News of the revolt was probably brought to Alexander by his father-in-law (Arr. 6.15.3; see Berve 2.292-293, no. 587, s.v. Ὀξύαρτης).

⁹² Berve 2.293-294, no. 590, s.v. Ὀρδάνης. Arr. 6.27.3.

⁹³ Curt. 9.10.19; for Ozines see Berve 2.282, no. 579, s.v. Ὀζίνης, who Berve believes should not be identified with Arrian's Ordanes (n.92 *supra*); Droysen, *Hellenismus* 1.377, prefers Arrian's testimony; Badian, "Harpalus," *JHS* 81 (1961) 19, wonders if they were in fact different people. For Zariaspes see Berve 2.162-163, no. 335, s.v. Ζαριάσπης. For their fates see Curt. 10.1.9.

⁹⁴ Arr. 6.27.3: ἤδη δ' εἰς Καρμανίαν ἤκοντος Ἀλεξάνδρου. Cf. Strabo 15.2.11 (C725). I have not been able to see Anton Miller's "Der Rückzug des Krateros aus Indien," *Festgabe für L. v. Spindel*, Würzburg, cited by Berve 2.227 (no date).

Krateros *en route*.⁹⁵

After Karmania there were further honours, but Krateros never fulfilled the promise that his early career had held out. At Sousa he wed Amastris, daughter of Dareios' brother, Oxyathres.⁹⁶ She was indeed a worthy bride, but of lesser importance than Drypetis, Alexander's new sister-in-law, who was given to the rival Hephaistion.⁹⁷ There is, however, no record of a crown at Sousa.⁹⁸

Then, from Opis, Alexander sent home the veterans, 10,000 in number, under the leadership of Krateros, to whom he gave instructions to assume the regency of Macedon in place of Antipatros; the latter was to report to Alexander in Babylon with reinforcements. This move has vexed historians, who suspect a

⁹⁵ Arr. 6.27.3. For Stasanor see Berve 2.361-362, no. 719, s.v. Στασανωρ. Badian, *op. cit.* (n.93) 18, incorrectly maintains that he was detained at Alexander's Court. Arr. 6.29.1 says that he was sent home shortly afterward; cf. A.B. Bosworth, "The Death of Alexander the Great: Rumour and Propaganda," *CQ* n.s. 21 (1971) 123, n.3.

⁹⁶ Arr. 7.4.5, who has Ἀμαστρίνη (for this form cf. Steph. Byz. s.v.). See Berve 2.24, no. 50, s.v. Ἀμαστρίς ("Ἀμῆστρίς in Polyainos 6.12); U. Wilcken, *RE* I.2 (1894) 1750, s.v. "Amastris (7)"; for her later career see Macurdy, *Hellenistic Queens* 107ff. See also Berve 2.291-292, no. 586, s.v. Ὀξυάθρης; cf. Strabo 12.3.10 (C544).

⁹⁷ For Drypetis see Berve 2.148, no. 290, s.v. Δρυπητις; cf. Chapter 1: Hephaistion.

⁹⁸ This does not coincide well with Geyer's observation: "Der beste Beweis für das unbedingte Vertrauen, das der grosse König zu K. gehabt hat, ist wohl der Befehl, eine bedeutende Truppenmacht mit den Kampfuntfähigen und die Elefanten vom Indos...nach Karmanien zu führen, und glänzend hat K. dieses Vertrauen gerechtfertigt" (*RE* Supplbd IV (1924) 1046).

sinister motive on Alexander's part and are troubled by the slow progress of Krateros' return-march: by the time of Alexander's death, some nine months later, Krateros' forces had not advanced beyond Kilikia. But an explanation for this can be found in the account given by Arrian, which I quote in full: Κρατερῷ δὲ τούτους τε ἄγειν ἐκέλευσε καὶ ἀπαγαγόντι Μακεδονίας τε καὶ Θρᾷκης καὶ Θερταλῶν ἐξηγεῖσθαι καὶ τῶν Ἑλλήνων τῆς ἐλευθερίας. Ἀντίπατρον δὲ διαδόχους τοῖς ἀποπεμπομένοις ἄγειν Μακεδόνας τῶν ἀκμαζόντων ἐκέλευσεν. Ἔστειλε δὲ καὶ Πολυπέρχοντα ὁμοῦ τῷ Κρατερῷ, δεύτερον δὲ ἀπὸ Κρατεροῦ ἡγεμόνα, ὥς εἴ τι κατὰ πορείαν Κρατερῷ συμπίπτει, ὅτι καὶ μαλακῶς τὸ σῶμα ἔχοντα ἀπέπεμπεν αὐτόν, μὴ ποθῆσαι στρατηγὸν τοῖς ἰόντας (7.12.4).⁹⁹

The reason for Krateros' tardiness is spelled out by Arrian: he was ill - critically ill, we may say -, and Alexander himself had misgivings about whether Krateros would survive the march to Macedonia.¹⁰⁰ For this reason he designated Polyperchon as Krateros' successor in the event that Krateros should die before reaching his destination. And what was true of the physical state of Krateros will have applied, to a lesser or greater extent, to his veterans;

⁹⁹ Cf. Justin 12.12.8-9 (he was accompanied by Kleitos, Gorgias, Polydamas, and Antigenes; also included is the obscure Amadas, Berve 2.24, no.49, s.v.). See also Curt. 10.10.15; according to Plut. *Phokion* 18.5, Krateros was to offer Phokion the revenues from one of four Asian towns; Berve 2.403.

¹⁰⁰ Niese 1.69; Droysen 1.419; Berve 2.225 draw attention to Krateros' illness, but the notion that this accounts for the slow progress of Krateros' veterans is only developed fully by Hamilton, *Alexander the Great* 144-145, who argues most effectively for a less sensational explanation of Krateros' journey to Kilikia. Undoubtedly, Krateros followed a comfortable route, that leading along the coast. Cf. R. Lane Fox 429.

they will have been in no mood for forced marches. Thus the march-rate of Krateros and his veterans could be expected to be considerably slower than that of the slowest division of the army under normal circumstances. There was also the matter of periodic delays caused by Krateros' condition, and the possibility that they remained for some time in winter-quarters.¹⁰¹ Thus, when Alexander died in the summer of 323, Krateros and his troops had not advanced beyond Kilikia; but they were not lingering there, crippled by indecision.¹⁰² This was only the case once Alexander had died and the fate of the empire, and of Krateros himself, hung in the balance.

¹⁰¹ Cf. Hamilton, *Alexander the Great* 145. Cf. Berve 2.225.

¹⁰² Badian, "Harpalus," *JHS* 81 (1961) 34ff. = Griffith, *Main Problems* 224ff., believes that Alexander feared the power of Antipatros and sought to depose him. Krateros lingered in Kilikia because he was unwilling to bring the matter to a head and challenge Antipatros' position. Griffith, "Alexander and Antipater in 323 B.C.," *PACA* 8 (1965) 12-17, concludes that Krateros had orders not to enter Macedonia until Antipatros had left, for Alexander felt that the disgruntled veterans would have an adverse effect on the new recruits. It does not seem likely, however, that Alexander would leave Macedonia, even temporarily, without a leader (especially in this politically turbulent time). P. Green, always eager for a novel interpretation, is at his best and worst in his discussion of Krateros' mission: I find utterly fantastic the notion that "it is very probable that at some point in his journey he [Kassandros] met Craterus and did a private deal with him, since when Alexander died, a year later, the veterans were still no nearer home than Cilicia" (460); he may be correct, however, in suggesting that Krateros' mission may have had propaganda-value for Alexander: a new political programme for Greece under new leadership (hence the emphasis on ἡ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐλευθερία, Arr. 7.12.4), see Green 459. Slightly different is the belief that Krateros' regency was to mark a shift away from Antipatros' oligarchic tendencies, so Wilcken 222. If Alexander did have hostile intentions toward Antipatros, it is unusual that he sent to Macedonia men who were hostile to himself (i.e., the disgruntled veterans) and leaders who carried

When Alexander died suddenly in Babylon, Krateros was left in political limbo: by the King's orders he was the designated successor of Antipatros as regent of Macedonia. But Antipatros' replacement, whether it was prompted by Alexander's fear of his growing power in Europe or by Antipatros' old age, was a delicate matter even while the King lived. With Alexander dead, Krateros was trapped between theory and reality, or, to use Schachermeyr's apt terminology, between *Staatsrecht* and *Faustrecht*.¹⁰³ Antipatros, if anyone, was secure in his position; Krateros knew that. For the moment, there was some hope in Babylon, but this was quickly dispelled.

A.B. Bosworth quite rightly labels the matter of Krateros' enigmatic *prostasia* "one of the most vexed questions of Hellenistic scholarship."¹⁰⁴ Indeed, modern interpretations of it cover the whole spectrum of possibilities, from the view that it was the

on the old Macedonian tradition (Krateros, Polyperchon, Gorgias, Kleitos the White). And why did they linger in Kilikia, of all places? Curtius' claim that Krateros had orders to put Antipatros to death (*credebant etiam Craterum cum veterum militum manu ad interficiendum eum missum*, 10.10.15) is unfounded and forms part of the rumour that Antipatros, fearing for his life, was responsible for Alexander's death. See Bosworth, "The Death of Alexander the Great: Rumour and Propaganda," *CQ* n.s. 21 (1971) 112-136, who provides some good arguments concerning the purpose of the *Ephemerides*. But the general lack of preparation for the succession-problems suggests that Alexander's generals were not party to a plot against the King. Krateros certainly gained nothing from it.

¹⁰³ Schachermeyr, *Alexander in Babylon* 149ff.

¹⁰⁴ Bosworth, *op. cit.* (n.102) 129.

highest honour in the empire to utter disbelief in its existence.¹⁰⁵

As an academic exercise, the so-called "succession-problem" holds a certain fascination, and it does not want for innovative solutions.

But it is merely an academic exercise, and there has been a tendency to overlook one fundamental point: the *prostasia* was never realised, nor was it ever intended to be.¹⁰⁶

For our purposes, it is of little consequence what the *prostasia* was meant to represent in legal terms; though it is quite clear that, if Perdikkas remained in control of Hephaistion's *chiliarchia* and took no additional (higher) office, Krateros, as the guardian of the inept King Arrhidaios, was Perdikkas' superior *de iure*.¹⁰⁷ But Krateros' rank of *prostates* was nothing more than an office demanded by the phalanx, which the cavalry were prepared - or, at least, so they indicated - to accept. In order to understand Perdikkas' relationship to Krateros, and Krateros' role in the succession-struggle, we need to be, as Badian says, "less concerned with the legal cloak than with the naked political reality."¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁵ See Appendix 2: Hephaistion's *Chiliarchia*.

¹⁰⁶ Recognised by Errington, *JHS* 90 (1970) 55: "...we can readily assume that the Perdiccans did not intend Craterus ever to adopt this newly created post, for in the final settlement after Meleager's death they reverted to their original arrangement of making him share Europe with Antipater: and there is no doubt that the Perdiccans were responsible for that arrangement."

¹⁰⁷ See Appendix 2.

¹⁰⁸ Badian, *Studies in Greek and Roman History*, Oxford, 1964, 267.

It would be rash, however, to suggest that the *prostasia* was a fiction, that it was not part of the compromise at Bayblon. The evidence points to an office, created in theory but never allowed to exist. The phalanx had demanded that the cavalry accept Arrhidaios as King; disillusioned with the impetuous Meleagros, they longed for their trusted commander, Krateros, to protect Arrhidaios' interests.¹⁰⁹ Quite understandably the office was associated with Arrhidaios, whom the conservative infantry revered as the last male descendant of Philip II, and with Macedonia.¹¹⁰ And it is not surprising that Perdikkas should agree to such an arrangement, at least for the moment: Krateros was absent in Kilikia, Arrhidaios in Perdikkas' control. *Faustrecht* prevailed in Babylon. The commander of Hephaistion's *chiliarchia* was supreme commander of the army, and Perdikkas used his position to crush the insidious. Arrhidaios proved a convenient pawn in

¹⁰⁹ So W. Schur, "Das Alexanderreich nach Alexanders Tode," *Rh. Mus.* 83 (1934) 140; who defines the *prostates* as "der Vertreter und Hüter der Rechte und Interessen eines mündigen Individuums."

¹¹⁰ F. Miltner, "Die staatsrechtliche Entwicklung des Alexanderreiches," *Klio* 26 (1933) 48, believes that the sole mention of Arrhidaios means that Krateros' office applied only to one half of the empire - the old Macedonian homeland -, and not to the Asiatic realm, which was marked out for Alexander IV. This conclusion is unnecessary. At the time of the compromise, Arrhidaios was the only living candidate for the kingship, Alexander IV being as yet unborn. For Meleagros' acclaiming of Arrhidaios see Curt. 10.7.7ff.; Justin 13.3.1ff.; App. *Syr.* 52 (πρόσω τοῦ Φιλίππου γένους); Diod. 18.2.4; Arr. *Succ.* Ia.1. Perdikkas' power in Krateros' absence is brought out by Nepos, *Eumenes* 2.2: *aberat enim Craterus et Antipater, qui antecedere hunc videbantur, mortuus erat Hephaestio....* For the *prostasia*: Arr. *Succ.* Ia.3, 7; Ib.4; cf. Justin 13.4.5: *regiae pecuniae custodia Cratero traditur.*

Perdikkas' hands; and there was no more talk about the *prostasia*.

For the time, there was nothing for Krateros to do but wait in Kilikia. He had already recognised the futility of attempting to wrest Macedonia from Antipatros now that Alexander was dead. Perdikkas, meanwhile, had made himself *de facto* ruler of the Asiatic sphere, and Krateros' discharged veterans, we may be sure, were in no mood to return to Babylon in order to decide the issue.¹¹¹ And even now Perdikkas dealt the crippling blow by revoking, with the assent of the army, the orders that Krateros should replace Antipatros in Macedonia.¹¹²

Krateros might well have remained an outsider, had not the outbreak of the Lamian war on the Greek mainland forced Antipatros to summon both Leonnatos and Krateros to Greece.¹¹³ Antipatros'

¹¹¹ Krateros likely heard the details of the settlement at Babylon from Philotas, who had been sent out as satrap of Kilikia, and his arrival there (perhaps in the company of the other satraps bound for the west) was only shortly before Antipatros' appeal for help. From Philotas he learned of the phalanx's wish that he assume the *prostasia* of Arrhidaios, but also the details of the cancellation of Alexander's instructions, including Krateros' mission to Macedonia (*infra*). Errington, *JHS* 90 (1970) 61, suggests that the "Macedonian veterans would be unlikely to oppose the chosen representative of the sons of Philip and Alexander in civil war." It is surely rather a case of war-weariness on the part of the veterans than of a reluctance to favour Krateros over Perdikkas. Schur, *Rh. Mus.* 83 (1934) 145, somewhat unfairly deprecates the *Kleinmut* of Krateros. But Krateros was not an adventurer, rather a conservative, over-cautious individual.

¹¹² Demonstrated convincingly by Badian, "A King's Notebooks," *HSCP* 72 (1967) 201-204.

¹¹³ Diod. 18.12.1, where Philotas is incorrectly named as the satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia (cf. 18.14.4, where the message is brought by Hekataios of Kardia to Leonnatos); Diodoros, who was speaking of Kilikia earlier, wrote Philotas by mistake. Cf. Plut. *Eum.* 3.6.

appeal included, in all probability, an offer of marriage to his eldest daughter Phila, a woman now in her early thirties but of exceptional qualities.¹¹⁴ This is suggested by the fact that, before his return to Macedonia, Krateros took pains to find a suitable husband for his bride of Sousa, the Persian Amastris.¹¹⁵ From what we know of Krateros' character, it is not surprising that he should willingly repudiate Amastris, but he did find a worthy husband for her in Dionysios, tyrant of Herakleia in the Pontus.¹¹⁶

¹¹⁴ J. Seibert, *Historische Beiträge zu den dynastischen Verbindungen in hellenistischen Zeit* (*Historia Einzelschriften*, Heft 10) Wiesbaden, 1967, 12, n.6, who notes that a similar offer was made when Antipatros summoned Leonnatos (Diod. 18.12.1). See Berve 2.382, no. 772, s.v. Φύλα, who assumes that she was born before 350, since she had a younger sister who married Lynkestian Alexandros in 337/6 (Curt. 7.1.7; Justin 11.7.1; 12.14.1; cf. Diod. 17.80.2). Beloch, *GG*² 4.2.126-127, thinks that Alexandros' daughter was older than Phila (an unknown, by name, fourth daughter); according to Diod. 18.18.7, Phila was older than both Eurydike and Nikaia (Berve nos. 321, 552). By Diodoros' description, unless Alexandros' wife had died, Sheatoo was younger than Phila (cf. Plut. *Demetrios* 14, 27, for Phila's age). I see no reason, however, to postulate a fourth daughter; Alexandros' wife could have been Nikaia. Phila, according to Antonios Diogenes (*ap.* Photios, *Bibliothèque* 111B), had been the wife of Balakros (Berve 2.100, no. 200); this is rejected, for no good reason, by Beloch, *GG*² 4.2.127, n.3. See further Hoffmann, *Die Makedonen* 221; Macurdy, *Hellenistic Queens* 58-69, esp. 60; and also Tarn's eulogy in *Antigonos Gonatas*, Oxford, 1913, 17-18; also Droysen, *Hellenismus* 2.51; Kaerst, *Hellenismus* 2.19.

¹¹⁵ For details on Amastris see n.96 *supra*. For the date of her union with Dionysios of Herakleia see Seibert, *op. cit.* 12-13.

¹¹⁶ Strabo 12.3.10 (C544); cf. Diod. 20.109.6; Berve 2.144-145, no. 276, s.v. Διονύσιος.

I see no evidence (*contra* Badian¹¹⁷) that Krateros was deliberately slow in responding to Antipatros' call. It must have taken a considerable time for the message to reach Krateros in Kilikia, and when it came it was already well into winter. Like Leonnatos, Krateros departed for Europe some time in the spring, and he had considerably farther to travel.¹¹⁸ Over the winter he appears to have augmented his forces, for, in addition to the 10,000 veterans, Krateros brought to Europe 1000 Persian archers and slingers, and 1500 horse.¹¹⁹ It is also likely that Kleitos, who had until this time been in Krateros' camp, set about organising a fleet, perhaps also in accordance with Antipatros' instructions.¹²⁰

Leonnatos' arrival in Greece belongs to late spring or early summer, and it was shortly after Leonnatos' death (ὁλύγῳ δὲ ὕστερον χρόνῳ, Plut. *Phokion* 26.1) that Krateros joined Antipatros in Macedonia.¹²¹

¹¹⁷ Badian, *HSCP* 72 (1967) 202: "for a time Craterus refused to come to the aid of the hard-pressed Antipater in Thessaly." More misleading is the version given in "Harpalus," *JHS* 81 (1961) 41 = Griffith, *Main Problems* 231: "Yet Craterus hesitated. For several months, even after the outbreak of the Lamian War and the desperate plight to which it soon reduced Antipater, he did nothing to help him, leaving Leonnatus to go to his death."

¹¹⁸ Diod. 18.14.4-5. If we may use Leonnatos' case for comparison, Antipatros' messenger may not have arrived until spring 322; unless we are to assume that Leonnatos was also reluctant to come to Antipatros' aid and had to be summoned a second time (Diod. 18.12.1).

¹¹⁹ Diod. 18.16.4.

¹²⁰ For Kleitos' activities see Diod. 18.15.8; Plut. *Demetrios* 11.4; Droysen, *Hellenismus* 2:39-40; Beloch, *GG*² 4.1.75; cf. Berve 2.209, no. 428, s.v. Κλεῦτος.

¹²¹ For the chronological problems see Chapter 4: Perdikkas.

There he may have been formally engaged to Phila, as Niese suggests, though there is no evidence for this.¹²² The advent of Krateros greatly augmented the Macedonian fighting force, but Krateros willingly yielded the supreme command of the troops to Antipatros.¹²³ Together with those who had originally been with Leonnatos, the Macedonian forces numbered 40,000 infantry, 5000 cavalry and 3000 archers and slingers.¹²⁴ With this force, Krateros and Antipatros won a decisive victory at Krannon, and thereafter broke the Greek alliance by taking the Thessalian cities one by one, thus forcing widespread defection from the Hellenic cause and peace-treaties with individual cities (τὰς κατὰ πόλιν διαλύσεις).¹²⁵ The army moved as far south as Boiotia, where negotiations took place between Antipatros and the Athenians. According to Plutarch's *Life of Phokion*, Krateros favoured invading Attica on the ground that the Macedonian forces were being maintained at the expense of the Boiotian allies, while the Athenian enemy had its territory untouched. But Antipatros, for the sake of Phokion,

¹²² Niese p.207.

¹²³ καὶ τοῦ πρωτεύου παραχωρήσας ἐκουσίως Ἀντιπάτρω, Diod. 18.16.5.

¹²⁴ For Krateros' forces see Diod. 18.4.1 (cf. Diod. 17.109.1; Arr. 7.12.3); Diod. 18.12.1; 18.16.4; more generally Plut. *Phokion* 26.1 (μετὰ πολλῆς δυνάμεως); for Leonnatos' troops see Diod. 18.14.4-5 (20,000 infantry, 1500 cavalry); for all the forces combined Diod. 18.16.5.

¹²⁵ Diod. 18.17.7; for the victory at Krannon see Arr. *Succ.* 1.12; Plut. *Demosth.* 28.2; *Phokion* 26.1; Diod. 18.17. For the Lamian (Hellenic) war in general see Droysen, *Hellenismus* 2.26-52; Kaerst, *Hellenismus* 2.14-19; Niese 1.200-212; Beloch, *GG*² 4.1.68-78; Schaefer, *Demosthenes* 3.351ff.; Tarn, *CAH* 6.454-460; Cloché, *La Dislocation* 20ff.; and Hans-Joachim Gehrke, *Phokion: Studien zur Erfassung seiner historischen Gestalt (Zetemata, Heft 64)* Munich, 1976, 77ff.

overruled him.¹²⁶ Munychia was, nevertheless, garrisoned on the twentieth day of Boëdromion (Sept. 17, 322 B.C., so Beloch, *GG*² 4.1.76).¹²⁷ Thereafter Antipatros and Krateros returned to Macedonia, where they celebrated the latter's wedding to Phila; Antipatros is said to have heaped honours and gifts upon Krateros and prepared for his "return to Asia" (τὴν εἰς Ἀσίαν ἐπάνοδοσιν συγκατεσκεύασεν).¹²⁸ But Diodoros may be in error at this point, for Krateros and Antipatros soon left to deal with the Aitolians, the only participants of the Lamian war that remained unconquered.¹²⁹ The campaign against the Aitolians does not appear to have been a reaction to an unexpected emergency, but rather a deliberate act of policy by Antipatros. Therefore, it is doubtful that he planned to send Krateros back to Asia shortly after his wedding. For what purpose? He had not yet learned of Perdikkas' intrigues, and he believed that he had secured his goodwill through the marriage-alliance with Nikaia.¹³⁰ There was no place for Krateros in Asia that would not be a source of trouble.

¹²⁶ Plut. *Phokion* 26.4; Gehrke (n.125 *supra*) 87-88.

¹²⁷ Plut. *Phokion* 28.2-3; *Demosth.* 28.1; *Camillus* 19.10. Cf. Schaefer, *Demosthenes* 3.391 (16. Sept.); see also Berve 2.259, no. 513, s.v. Μέγυλλος; cf. Diod. 18.18.5.

¹²⁸ Diod. 18.18.7. It is hard to believe that Antipatros, who now seemed to be on friendly terms with Perdikkas - he had not yet heard of his intentions to marry Kleopatra, the sister of Alexander the Great -, was encouraging Krateros to claim the *prostasia* of Arrhidaïos' kingdom. This position, if anything, appears to be closely linked with Macedonia rather than Asia (cf. Arr. *Succ.* Ib.4; Ia.7; Curt. 10.7.9).

¹²⁹ Diod. 18.24-25.

¹³⁰ Berve 2.274, no.552, s.v. Νικαία; cf. Chapter 4: Perdikkas.

From the account given by Diodoros (18.25) it appears - and it is certainly likely - that Krateros was the chief prosecutor of the war against the Aitolians; undoubtedly he employed experience gained in the east with Alexander to his advantage. It was now the height of winter, and Krateros had built shelters for his troops, forcing the Aitolians, who had foresaken their cities for the highlands, to hold out against the elements and a shortage of food; for it appears that Krateros controlled the lines of communication.¹³¹ But events in Asia were to extricate the Aitolians from this grave situation and to lead Krateros to his doom.

Antigonos Monophthalmos, satrap of Phrygia, alarmed by the growing power of the ambitious Perdikkas, contrived the latter's ruin by bringing news of his intrigues with Kleopatra. For Perdikkas, who had earlier secured Antipatros' friendship by marrying (or at least summoning to Asia for the purpose of marriage) the regent's daughter, Nikaia, now aspired to the throne of Macedon itself. And he hoped to achieve his purpose by marrying Alexander's sister.¹³² Such was the news that Antigonos bore to Antipatros and Krateros in Aitolia, and it was seasoned with a vivid account of the senseless murder of Kynanne by Perdikkas' brother, Alketas.¹³³ Events in Asia took precedence over

¹³¹ Diod. 18.25.1.

¹³² See Chapter 4: Perdikkas.

¹³³ Arr. *Succ.* 1.24: ἀνεδίδαξε τε καὶ τὸ τῆς Κυνάνης ἐτραυφήσας πάθος. Cf. Arr. *Succ.* 1.22-23; though the incident is not mentioned by Diodoros.

the punishment of the Aitolians. Peace was made and attention re-directed toward the east.¹³⁴

Krateros departed from Macedonia for the last time in the spring of 321, leaving behind Phila, who now carried the son he was not destined to know.¹³⁵ Crossing the Hellespont, he found that Eumenes' army stood between him and the Perdikkas forces, who were making their way to Egypt and Ptolemy. Neoptolemos, hostile to Eumenes, under whose authority Perdikkas had placed him, soon deserted to Krateros, an auspicious beginning.¹³⁶ But, while Neoptolemos may have judged rightly the mood of Eumenes' troops and their devotion to Krateros, he sadly under-estimated the generalship and psychology of the Greek; for Eumenes had no intention of revealing to his forces with whom the issue was to

¹³⁴ Peace with the Aitolians: Diod. 18.25.5; Justin 13.6.9 less precise (*facta cum Atheniensibus pace*), adding that Pölyperchon was left in charge of Europe; he dealt effectively with the Aitolians, Diod. 18.38.7. For the decision to go to war against Perdikkas see Arr. *Succ.* 1.24; also an alliance was made with Ptolemy (Diod. 18.25.4; cf. 18.14.2). Cf. Seibert, *Untersuchungen zur Geschichte Ptolemaios' I.* (*Münchener Beiträge zur Papyrusforschung und antiken Rechtsgeschichte*, Heft 56), Munich, 1969, 96ff.

¹³⁵ Also called Krateros, born after his father's death (perhaps in June or July 321, so Seibert, *Beiträge zu den dynastischen Verbindungen* [n.114 *supra*] 13, n.7). See Berve 2.226; Tarn, *Antigonos Gonatas*, Oxford, 1913, *passim*; H. Pope, *Foreigners in Attic Inscriptions*, Philadelphia, 1947, 107.

¹³⁶ Berve 2.273, no. 548, s.v. ΝΕΟΠΤΟΛΕΜΟΣ. He may have been a relative of the Epeiros royal house, cf. Hoffmann, *Die Makedonen* 202, n.119. See Diod. 29.1-30.3; Arr. *Succ.* 1.26 says that he was lured away; Plut. *Eumenes* 5.

be decided.¹³⁷ Sooner Krateros gasped out his life on the battlefield, the victim of a nameless Thracian or of his own horse's hoofs.¹³⁸ That the much-glorified Eumenes found him semi-animous defies credulity, and it conjures up the image of Alexander's tender, but utterly fictitious, moments with the dying Persian king.¹³⁹ One can see the hand of Douris of Samos at work, and what makes the scene more unlikely is that Eumenes had only shortly before overcome his arch-rival Neo-

¹³⁷ Nepos, *Eum.* 3.5-6; Plut. *Eum.* 6.7 (Eumenes had told his troops that they would be fighting against Neoptolemos and a certain Pigres, perhaps a local dynast); Arr. *Succ.* 1.27. See Vezin, *Eumenes von Kardia* 43ff. Schubert, *Quellen zur Geschichte der Diadochenzeit*, Leipzig, 1914, 139ff., following the account of Diodoros (18.29-32, from Hieronymos), disbelieves the version that Eumenes was afraid that his troops would desert if they learned that they were fighting Krateros, ascribing it to Douris. Schubert goes to great lengths to disprove the claims of Krateros' popularity with the army. But Krateros could not have failed to develop a reputation, through his own successes and his connexions with Alexander. Certainly both Neoptolemos and Alketas were reluctant to aid Eumenes - Alketas not even joining the army of Eumenes, Plut. *Eum.* 5.3 -, and both, significantly, were commanders of Macedonian infantry. See below for Neoptolemos' desertion. For Plutarch's version (*Eum.* 6.8-11) of Eumenes' dream about the aid of Demeter see Vezin (130), who thinks it is a late element, and Schubert (167-170), who traces it to Hieronymos.

¹³⁸ Plut. *Eum.* 7.5-6 claims he was wounded in the side by a Thracian and fell from his horse; Arr. *Succ.* 1.27 says a Paphlygonian; Nepos, *Eum.* 4.3-4, does not specify. Diod. 18.30.5 alone dis-sents, saying that he was thrown by his horse and trampled. Nevertheless he perished unrecognised (ἀγνοηθεὶς ὃς ἦν συνεπατήθη καὶ τὸν βίον ἀλόγως κατέστρεψεν); perhaps Hieronymos attempted to make Krateros responsible for his own death, absolving Eumenes of blame. Plutarch says that a certain Gorgias (Berve 2.114, no. 235) recognised the fallen commander.

¹³⁹ Recognised by U. Kühler, "Ueber die Diadochengeschichte Arrian's," *Sitzb. d. Akademie der Wissenschaften, Berlin*, 1890, 584; Schubert,

ptolemos in a bloody hand-to-hand encounter.¹⁴⁰ That he was remorseful and treated Krateros' body with respect is another matter.¹⁴¹

Quellen zur Geschichte der Diadochenzeit, Leipzig, 1914, 142.

- ¹⁴⁰ Nepos, *Eum.* 4.2: *ab hoc aliquot plagis Eumenes vulneratur*; cf. Justin 13.7.8: *mutuis vulneribus acceptis*; Plut. *Eum.* 7.7-12; Diod. 18.31. Justin 13.7.5, 7 writes Polyperchon where Krateros is clearly meant.
- ¹⁴¹ Plut. *Eum.* 7.13; *Suda* s.v. Κρατερός = Arr. *Succ.* fr. 26; Nepos, *Eum.* 4.4: *amplo funere extulit ossaque in Macedonian uxori eius ac liberis remisit*. Thus Macurdy comments: "[Phila] was then hurried...into another marriage so speedily that when the body of Craterus, sent to her by Eumenes for burial, arrived, she was already married to a youth of barely eighteen years" (*Hellenistic Queens* 61). But Diod. 19.59.3 states that Eumenes kept the bones of Krateros and only when he was on the point of dying gave them to Ariston to convey to Phila (316/5 B.C.). But Schubert, *Quellen zur Geschichte der Diadochenzeit*, Leipzig, 1914, 141, who wishes to deny that Hieronymos recorded any honours accorded to Krateros by Eumenes, says that this was done at Antigonos' behest, since Phila was now his daughter-in-law. At any rate, the fact that Eumenes took some care to preserve Krateros' remains must be regarded as significant.

Chapter 4

PERDIKKAS: Successor and Failure¹

"...es konnte gewiss mit Recht gesagt werden, dass nur in Alexander die Einheit des Reiches gewesen, dass sie ohne ihn oder einen grösseren als ihn unmöglich sei...."
 - Droysen, *Hellenismus* 2.6.

"In Perdikkas hat Alexander eine Persönlichkeit erkannt, die ihm an Temperament, Begabung und Ehrgeiz, wie überhaupt an Format, irgendwie noch am nächsten zu stehen schien."
 - Schachermeyr, *Alexander in Babylon* 16.

"Perdikkas, dessen besondere Vertrauensstellung bei Alexander uns Gewähr sein darf, dass er Alexanders Absichten verstand und teilte, hatte zuerst in Babylon versucht, die völlige Reichseinheit...zu gewährleisten...."
 - F. Miltner, *Klio* 26 (1933) 52.

"Perdiccas, of the princely line of Orestis, was brave and a good soldier; he was probably loyal to Alexander's house, and meant to keep the empire together; but he saw that someone must exercise the actual power, and he meant it to be himself. He was, moreover, unconciliatory and inordinately proud, and probably difficult to work with."
 - W.W. Tarn, *CAH* 6. 462.

History has not made it easy for us to understand Perdikkas.

To a great extent this is due to the enmity of Ptolemy, son of Lagos, and Perdikkas' unsuccessful campaign against him. But, if Perdikkas had won, the course of history could not have remained un-

¹ For Perdikkas' career until 323 see Berve 2.313-316, no. 627, s.v. Περδίκκας. I suggest the following revisions: p.313, for Plut. 15 read Plut. *Alex.* 15.4-5; de f. Al. II, 11 p.341E should read (*de fort. Al.*) *Mor.* 342D-E; and for the discussion of Perdikkas' role at Myndos and Halikarnassos add Arr. 1.21.1 and Diod. 17.25.5; Diod. 94.4 is a reference to 16.94.4. On p.314 add Curt. 8.1.48 and 8.14.5; Arr. V,12,1 should read 5.12.2. On p.315 read Plut. *Eum.* 1.5 and add Appian, *Syr.* 57, for Hephaistion's hipparchy. On p.316 add Plut. *Eum.* 2.2 and Nepos, *Eum.* 2.1. See also F. Geyer, *RE* XIX.1 (1937) 604-614, s.v. "Perdikkas (4)." Cf. Kornemann, *Die Alexandergeschichte* 247; Hoffmann, *Die Makedonen* 153, 168.

changed.

I

Perdikkas, son of Orontes, like his later rival Krateros, came from Orestis;² according to the testimony of Curtius he was an adherent of the Orestian royal house.³ Two other members of his immediate family are known: a brother, Alketas, who became *taxiarch*, probably of the battalion that Perdikkas had commanded,⁴ and a sister, Atalante, who married Attalos, son of Andromenes.⁵ By virtue of his aristocratic descent he belonged to the company of the *Hetairoi* and was later enrolled in the elite corps of the *somatophylakes*.⁶

² Son of Orontes: Arr. 3.11.9; 6.28.4; *Ind.* 18.5. From Orestis: Arr. 6.28.4; Diod. 17.57.2 (implied by: τὴν τῶν Ὀρεστῶν καὶ Λυγκηστῶν τάξιν..., Περδύκκου τὴν στρατηγίαν ἔχοντος); Arr. *Ind.* 18.5 (who says that Krateros was also from Orestis).

³ Curt. 10.7.8: *stirpe regia genit[us]*. See F. Geyer, *Makedonien bis zur Thronbesteigung Philipps II.*, Munich and Berlin, 1930, 82-83; Droysen, *Hellenismus* 1.62. Meleagros' remark about Perdikkas (Curt. 10.6.20) can only be intended as an insult: *Nihil dico de nobilioribus quam hic [sc. Perdicca] est*.

⁴ Berve 2.22-23, no. 45, s.v. Ἀλκέτας; Hoffmann, *Die Makedonen* 153; Kaerst, *RE*¹ I (1894) 1514-1515, s.v. "Alketas (5)." For his command of Perdikkas' *taxeis* Droysen, *Hellenismus* 1.62 (cf. Berve 2.22); but Berve 2.209, n.2, holds Anspach's view (*De Alexandri Magni Expeditione Indica*, Progr. Duisburg 1901-3, 2.11.141), that Kleitos the White commanded Perdikkas' battalion, as "möglich, aber nicht zu erweisen."

⁵ Berve 2.90, no. 177, s.v. Ἀταλάντη; Kaerst, *RE*¹ II (1896) 1894-1895, s.v. "Atalante (5)"; cf. Kaerst, *RE*¹ II (1896) 2158, s.v. "Attalos (5)."

⁶ For the *Hetairoi* see Plut. *Alex.* 15.3-4; for the *somatophylakes* Appendix 1.

Perdikkas is first mentioned by the historians as a *somato-phylax* on the day of the assassination of Philip II (summer 336); together with Leonnatos and Attalos he pursues and kills Pausanias, Philip's assassin.⁷ But, as we have seen in the case of Leonnatos, these *somatophylakes* were most likely the hypaspists and not the seven-man elite; Welles' suggestion that they were Alexander's personal Bodyguard, and not Philip's, is unconvincing.⁸ The proponents of the theory that Alexander himself contrived the assassination of his father have attempted to see in Perdikkas, Leonnatos and Attalos agents of the Crown Prince, who killed Pausanias in order to ensure his silence; but we do not know the exact nature of their relationships with Alexander,⁹ nor is it certain that Pausanias was actually

⁷ Diod. 16.94.4. See most recently J. Rufus Fears, "Pausanias, The Assassin of Philip II," *Athenaeum* 53 (1975) 111-135. Cf. Berve 2.308-309, no. 614, s.v. Παυσανίας.

⁸ See Chapter 2: Leonnatos. For the view that these *somatophylakes* were hypaspists see Berve 2.92, n.3; 2.233, n.1; 2.308; 2.313; confused by Errington, *CQ* n.s. 19 (1969) 236. See also Appendix 1. That they were Alexander's Bodyguard: C. Bradford Welles, *Diodorus of Sicily*, vol. 8, Loeb Classical Library, Cambridge, Mass., 1968, 101, n.2. But cf. Schachermeyr, *Alexander der Grosse* 100, n.81.

⁹ Hamilton, "Alexander's Early Life," *G & R* 12 (1965) 122: Pausanias was killed, "significantly, by three close friends of Alexander. The prince was taking no chances; Pausanias knew too much." Cf. Welles, *loc. cit.* and *Alexander and the Hellenistic World* 15; Green 108: "The three young noblemen who pursued and killed Pausanias... were all close and trusted friends of Alexander." We cannot be sure of this. Pausanias, Leonnatos, Perdikkas were not *all* from Orestis, as is often repeated (most recently Green 108); Leonnatos was Lynkestian (so Geyer, *RE* XII.2 [1925] 2035; wrongly called Orestian by Berve 2.232; recognised by Fox 505). Leonnatos was a *syntrophos* of Alexander (*Suda*, s.v. Λεοννάτος) but he was related to Philip II. We do not know when Perdikkas became a close friend (but Plut. *Alex.* 15.3-4 may support this; I do not see why Fox 505 supposes that Perdikkas may have been "middle-aged")); as for Attalos,

killed while attempting to escape.¹⁰ One is tempted to draw inferences: Perdikkas was a young man, presumably in his early twenties,¹¹ at the time of Philip's death; he appears in the next year as a *taxis*-commander in the Illyrian campaign against Kleitos and Glaukias.¹² But rapid promotion need not always be a cause for suspicion, only when it appears to be unwarranted. And Perdikkas was never anything short of able, though Ptolemy's *History* endeavoured to make it seem otherwise.

Modern scholarship has only recently become sufficiently sceptical of Arrian's faith in Ptolemy as a historian. In the

it is fairly safe to assume that he was the son of Andromenes, but we cannot date his marriage to Atalante with any certainty. If Perdikkas and Attalos were already brothers-in-law at this time - which I doubt -, then we might suppose that they belonged to the opposing faction, since Attalos' brother, Amyntas, was known to be a close friend of Parmenion's son, Philotas. Furthermore, these close friends of distinguished background make it difficult to credit the notion of Badian *et al.*, that Alexander was "isolated" at Court by the banishment of his comrades as a result of the Pixodaros-affair.

¹⁰ *P. Oxy.* 1798 = *FGrHist* 148 appears to say that Pausanias (?) was arrested and executed, so Wilcken, *Sitzungsb. der wissenschaftliche Akademie, Berlin*, 1923, 151-157. Rejected by Welles, *op. cit.*, 101, n.2. It was revived by Bosworth, "Philip II and Upper Macedonia," *CQ* n.s. 21 (1971) 94: "...the papyrus then is unreliable evidence, but that does not mean that Diodorus' account of Pausanias' death should be taken without question." Against Bosworth see Green 524, n.65; "he [Paus.] is not in fact named in this text, and the person referred to could equally well be a brother of Alexander the Lyncestian."

¹¹ Berve 2.313; cf. "unter Al. erscheint er in seiner frischesten Manneskraft." K. Kraft, *Der "rationale" Alexander* (Frankfurter *Althistorische Studien*, Heft 5) 1971, 35.

¹² Arr. 1.6.9.

1930s W. Schwahn and H. Strasburger adumbrated the matter of Ptolemy's bias,¹³ particularly against Perdikkas, but the era of W.W. Tarn and C.A. Robinson Jr. took comfort in the apologetic tone of the "official version," and Arrian (Ptolemy) was preferred at all costs; only with the publication of R.M. Errington's important article, "Bias in Ptolemy's History of Alexander," has Ptolemy's method of denigrating Perdikkas (and his supporter Aristonous) been fully recognised.¹⁴

¹³ W. Schwahn, "Die Nachfolge Alexanders des Grossen," *Klio* 23 (1930) 228-229; Strasburger, *Ptolemaios und Alexander* 47: "die wohlüberlegte Verschwigung dieser Tatsache [*i.e.*, Perdikkas' assumption of the Chiliarchy of Hephaistion]...."

¹⁴ Errington, *CQ* n.s. 19 (1969) 233-242. Arrian's failure to mention that Perdikkas was a "Bodyguard" of Philip II is inconclusive (as Errington admits, 236), though this is not a reference to the elite *somatophylakes*. Errington isolates other instances of Ptolemy's bias. At Thebes it is alleged that Perdikkas' lack of control over his troops led to the attack on Thebes; thus the responsibility for Thebes' fate was Perdikkas'. There is no mention in Arrian of Perdikkas' command at Tyre, or of his wounding at Gaugamela. Nor does Arrian tell us when Perdikkas became *somatophylax* (see Appendix 1). The most obvious distortions are Arrian-Ptolemy's failure to mention that Alexander gave his signet-ring to Perdikkas and the claim that no one replaced Hephaistion as commander of his Chiliarchy. The cumulative effect of this evidence is overwhelming, and Errington is undoubtedly correct, but I make some suggestions concerning some smaller points. For the ultimate fate of Thebes, the responsibility was still Alexander's; in fact, Arrian attempted to pass it off as a decision of Alexander's Greek allies (1.9.9). For the ill discipline of Perdikkas' troops see Arrian's account of the battle at Halikarnassos (1.21.1), which has the support of Diodoros 17.25.5. And, in some cases, Arrian-Ptolemy is our only source for the activities of Perdikkas in the later stages of the campaign: 3.18.5 against Ariobarzanes; 4.16.2, he commanded one of five divisions of the army (Curt. 8.1.1 says there were only three units, commanded by Koinos, Hephaistion and Alexander); 4.21.4 at the Rock of Chorienes; and, most notably, Perdikkas' independent mission against the Malloi, 6.6.4-6.

To determine the truth about Perdikkas' early career is, therefore, no easy task. But the reader who has guarded himself against Ptolemy's distortions discovers in Perdikkas an active and capable commander. In the battle with the Illyrian chiefs, Glaukias and Kleitos, Perdikkas perhaps exercised his first command over *pezhetairoi* from Orestis and Lynkestis.¹⁵

His part in the capture of Thebes has doubtless been distorted by Ptolemy (see n.14 *supra*), who claimed, contrary to the testimony of Diodoros, that Perdikkas' troops acted without Alexander's orders.¹⁶ Perdikkas' role, as described by Arrian, appears to have been somewhat heroic, nor was Amyntas, son of Andromenes, reluctant to bring up his Tymphaian *taxis* in support of the Orestians and their leader, who was critically wounded in the battle.¹⁷ Whatever the truth be concerning the action taken by Perdikkas' troops, it is clear that Alexander took no disciplinary measures against him, for Perdikkas continued to command his *taxis* when Alexander crossed into Asia. At the Granikos River he was stationed between the hypaspists of Nikanor and the battalion of Koinos,¹⁸ roughly the same position that he occupied at Issos and Gaugamela.¹⁹

¹⁵ Arr. 1.6.9; for the make-up of the *taxis*, Diod. 17.57.2.

¹⁶ Arr. 1.8.1-3; Diod. 17.12.3.

¹⁷ For Amyntas' support see Arr. 1.8.2; Perdikkas' wound 1.8.3.

¹⁸ Arr. 1.14.2.

¹⁹ Arr. 2.8.3; Curt. 3.9.7 (Issos); Arr. 3.11.9; Curt. 4.13.28: *post eum* [sc. Coenon] *Orestae Lyncestaeque sunt positi* (Gaugamela). The battalions of Koinos and Perdikkas have changed position.

After a relatively easy victory at the Gránikos, Alexander encountered stubborn defenders at Halikarnassos. In an abortive attempt on Myndos he took with him the infantry-battalions of Perdikkas, Amyntas and Meleagros; but the place could not be taken in the initial assault and Alexander, having brought no siege engines or ladders, was forced to withdraw.²⁰ Perdikkas is mentioned a second time in connexion with Halikarnassos: two of Perdikkas' men, motivated by drunkenness and *philotimia*, led an unauthorised assault on the city-walls. Soon the Macedonian forces became embroiled in the struggle but, unlike Thebes, Halikarnassos did not fall on this occasion. The failure of this assault was explained by the historians in part by the drunkenness of Perdikkas' men, but also by the fact that Perdikkas and not Alexander was responsible for it.²¹

During the siege of Tyre, Alexander conducted a raid on some neighbouring Arabs, leaving the siege-operations under the joint command of Krateros and Perdikkas; only Curtius relates this.²² Krateros' role is corroborated by Polyainos, and it is likely therefore that Arrian's failure to mention the joint command is again ascribable to Ptolemy's bias.²³

²⁰ Arr. 1.20.5; Fuller, *Generalship* 202.

²¹ Arr. 1.21.1-3; cf. Diod. 17.25.5; Fuller, *Generalship* 200-206. See the comments of C. Bradford Welles, *Diodorus of Sicily*, Loeb Classical Library, vol. 8, Cambridge, Mass., 1963, 189, n.2.

²² Curt. 4.3.1.

²³ Polyainos 4.13. Cf. Errington, *CQ* n.s. 19 (1969) 237. See also Fuller, *Generalship* 206-216.

Whether acting on Alexander's orders or on his own initiative, Perdikkas had a tendency to come to the fore. When the army departed for Asia, Perdikkas was said by Plutarch to have declined Alexander's gifts, preferring to share the King's fortune;²⁴ this he did, in some respects perhaps more than any man. Thus, in success as in adversity, he is conspicuous, in spite of Ptolemy's calculated omissions. At Gaugamela he seems to have thrown himself whole-heartedly into the fray and was wounded.²⁵ Then, in the beginning of 330 B.C., his *taxis* was the only one that Alexander took with him in the encircling manoeuvre at the Persian Gates.²⁶

²⁴ Plut. *Alex.* 15.4-5; cf. *Mor.* 341E.

²⁵ Curt. 4.16.32 (along with Koinos and Menidas); Diod. 17.61.3 (with Hephaistion and Koinos); Arrian 3.15.2 mentions Hephaistion, Menidas and Koinos, but does not name Perdikkas. See Errington, *loc. cit.* n.23 *supra*.

²⁶ Arr. 3.18.5. Ptolemy is certainly the source of this passage, as the emphasis given to his role (3.18.9) in capturing the wall (found only in Arrian) indicates. But see J. Seibert, *Untersuchungen zur Geschichte Ptolemaios I. (Münchener Beiträge zur Papyrusforschung und antiken Rechtsgeschichte, Heft 56)*, Munich, 1969, 8-10, who debates the issue and argues that there is no good reason to identify the Ptolemy of this passage with the son of Lagos (against Berve 2.330). Ptolemy is not identified by patronymic, but Seibert's conclusion must be regarded as short-sighted, especially in view of the fact that only Arrian gave this information in which a certain Ptolemy distinguishes himself. That Perdikkas had not yet given up his *taxis* is clear; cf. R.D. Milns, "Alexander's Seventh Phalanx Battalion," *GRBS* 7 (1966)159, against Tarn 2.143. Of the other *taxiarchs*, Krateros and Meleagros had remained at the foot of the "Gates" (Arr. 3.18.4), while Polyperchon (Curt. 5.4.20, 30), Amyntas, Koinos and Philotas (not the son of Parmenion, so Milns, *loc. cit.*; Berve 2.397; *contra* Bosworth, *ΑΣΘΕΤΑΙΡΟΙ*; *CQ* n.s. 23 [1973] 252-253) were bridging the Araxes River.

What part Perdikkas played in the controversial affair of Philotas must be deduced from Curtius, the only author to mention him. According to this source, Perdikkas came to Alexander's tent on the night of Philotas' arrest in order to discuss what was to be done; he accompanied Hephaistion, Krateros, Koinos, Erigyios and Leonnatos.²⁷ Likely, he was part of the *consilium amicorum*, which had met with Alexander earlier that day and had urged that Philotas not be spared: in short, he was a party to the conspiracy *against* Philotas.²⁸ The advantages that Philotas' downfall brought to Hephaistion are visible in his sudden rise from obscurity; Krateros' activities and benefits are clearly documented, as is Koinos' hostility toward his brother-in-law.²⁹ But what of Perdikkas? Unlike Ptolemy, he did not become *somatophylax* as a result of the affair; for Curtius makes it clear that he was already a member of the Bodyguard-elite at the time of Philotas' arrest.³⁰ He did not become *hipparch* as did Kleitos and Hephaistion (Arr. 3.27.4), but continued as *taxiarch* for a time;³¹

²⁷ Curt. 6.8.17.

²⁸ Curt. 6.8.1ff. See Chapters 1 and 3 for more detailed discussions. See also my article, "The Conspiracy *against* Philotas," *Phoenix* 31 (1977) 9-21, and its substantially revised form in the Introduction.

²⁹ For Hephaistion's career see Chapter 1. For Krateros see especially the versions of Plutarch and Curtius (for details see Chapter 3); for Koinos' hostility see Curt. 6.8.17; 6.9.30-31.

³⁰ For Ptolemy's promotion to *somatophylax* see Arr. 3.27.5; for Perdikkas, who appears to have replaced Menes (Arr. 3.16.9, cf. Appendix 1), Curt. 6.8.17: *ex armigeris autem Perdiccas*.

³¹ This appears to be his rank at Curt. 7.6.19, 21.

nor did he enjoy the great influence that Krateros exercised for almost three years after the deaths of Philotas and Parmenion. But Perdikkas must have gained in power just as his colleagues (or, rather, co-conspirators) had, for, when Hephaistion died, Perdikkas came to the fore and was, both before and after Alexander's death, the most influential of his generals. He had gained steadily in authority but his development has been obscured by the pre-eminence of Hephaistion and Krateros, and by Ptolemy's sinister "official history."

He had become *somatophylax* shortly after the battle at Gaugamela, following Menes' appointment as *hyparchos* of Kilikia and Phoinikia (see Appendix 1), but continued, for a time, to command his infantry-*taxis*. Thus he was both *taxiarch* and *somatophylax* at the Persian Gates and in the first campaigning season in Sogdiana (329 B.C.). In Sogdiana, the *taxiarchs* Meleagros and Perdikkas besieged one of the seven fortresses that had been established along the Iaxartes River by Kyros the Great; Krateros was performing a similar task at Kyroupolis.³² But in the following season Perdikkas was promoted to *hipparch*, leading one of five divisions that swept through Sogdiana; the *pezhetairoi* of Orestis and Lynkestis were entrusted to his younger brother, Alketas.³³

³² Curt. 7.6.19, 21 (Perdikkas, Meleagros); Arr. 4.2.2 (Krateros).

³³ Arr. 4.16.2 (the other four divisions were commanded by Alexander, Hephaistion, Ptolemy and Koinos-Artabazos); Alketas first appears as *taxiarch* at Arr. 4.22.1; see n.4 *supra*.

As *somatophylax*, on the other hand, he occupied a seat near the King at the fateful banquet at Marakanda in late summer 328. Together with Ptolemy, he attempted to restrain the King, who was incensed by Kleitos' frankness; they were aided, in vain, by Lysimachos and Leonnatos.³⁴ In the military sphere, three of these *somatophylakes* - Ptolemy, Leonnatos, Perdikkas - conducted the night-operations against the Rock of Chorienes early in the spring of 327 B.C.³⁵

As the army set out for India, Perdikkas was overshadowed by Hephaistion, who had acquired prestige and authority rapidly ever since he contributed to Philotas' demise. Together with Hephaistion, Perdikkas was sent with an advance force to the Indus, which they were to bridge.³⁶ It appears that Hephaistion was, at least, the nominal commander of this force, though quite clearly Perdikkas was the more experienced military man. If we may judge from Alexander's selection of Perdikkas as Hephaistion's successor and from the lack of friction between the two, it seems that Perdikkas and Hephaistion shared Alexander's attitudes and were generally compatible. For this reason, and because Hephaistion needed the support of a competent commander, Perdikkas accompanied him to the Indus.³⁷ *En route* they won over the natives and subdued

³⁴ Curt. 8.1.45, 48; for Lysimachos and Leonnatos see 8.1.46. For the reliability of Curtius' version see Chapter 2: Leonnatos.

³⁵ Arr. 4.21.4; cf. Fuller, *Generalship* 243-245.

³⁶ Arr. 4.22.7; Curt. 8.10.2.

³⁷ See the discussion in Chapter 1: Hephaistion.

Peukelaotis, whose ruler Astes held out stubbornly.³⁸ By the time Alexander arrived at the Indus, Perdikkas and Hephaistion had brought the natives under Alexander's sway, gathered provisions from Omphis (Taxiles),³⁹ and bridged the river by means of what clearly was a boat-bridge.⁴⁰ On their way they had also fortified a city called Orobatis, in which they left an armed guard.⁴¹

From the Indus, Perdikkas appears to have accompanied Alexander and the main force to the Hydaspes, where, when the battle with Poros took place, he crossed the river in the same triakonter as Alexander, Lysimachos, Ptolemy and Seleukos.⁴² In the actual battle he commanded one of the hipparchies directly under Alexander's control, the main striking force against Poros.⁴³

³⁸ Arr. 4.22.8. See Berve 2.89-90, no. 174, s.v. Ἀστης.

³⁹ Curt. 8.12.6; 8.12.15; Metz Epit. 48. Only Hephaistion is named, but Perdikkas must have been present. For details on Omphis see Berve 2.369-371, no. 739, s.v. Ταξιλης; V. Smith, *EHI* 63ff. and Chapter 1: Hephaistion, p.64, n.75.

⁴⁰ See Curt. 8.10.2 for a description. Arr. 5.7.122 relates that Aristoboulos and Ptolemy did not explain in what manner the river was bridged, but Arrian supposes that boats were tied together to form a bridge.

⁴¹ Arr. 4.28.5.

⁴² Arr. 5.13.1.

⁴³ Arr. 5.12.2 (cf. 5.13.1); Curt. 8.14.15. See Fuller, *Generalship* 180-199, esp. 186-187; B. Breloer, *Alexanders Kampf gegen Poros (Ein Beitrag zur indischen Geschichte)*, *Bonner orientalistische Studien*, Heft 3, Stuttgart, 1933. For further bibliography see Chapter 1: Hephaistion, p.66, n.79.

After his victory at the Hydaspes, Alexander turned his attention to the Kathaioi at Sangala, where he entrusted the left wing to Perdikkas, who commanded his own *hipparchia* and the *taxeis* of the *pezhetairoi*; but Arrian, who reports Perdikkas' battle-position, tells us only what Alexander did on the right and says nothing further about the left.⁴⁴ The Sangala-campaign was a particularly bloody one, and the numbers of Alexander's wounded were high, among them the *somato-phylax* Lysimachos;⁴⁵ it must have been detrimental to the morale of the troops, who had undergone hardships in the recent battle with Poros. But Perdikkas, who escaped being wounded, was sent out with a light-armed force to ravage the region around Sangala.⁴⁶

We hear nothing further of Perdikkas until after the mutiny at the Hyphasis, which was in part a direct consequence of the bloody campaigning of 326. Shortly thereafter Koinos, who had been the spokesman for the disgruntled soldiery, died of illness at the Hydaspes.⁴⁷ Many of Alexander's original commanders had died by this time: Parmenion and his sons, Amyntas, son of Andromenes, Erigyios, Kleitos, and now Koinos. And even the more con-

⁴⁴ Arr. 5.22.6. For an analysis of the campaign see Fuller, *Generalship* 255-258; cf. B. Breloer, *Alexanders Bund mit Poros: Indien von Dareios zu Sandrokottos*, Leipzig, 1941, 75ff. and 223.

⁴⁵ Arr. 5.24.5.

⁴⁶ Curt. 9.1.19.

⁴⁷ Arr. 6.2.1; Curt. 9.3.20 says that he died near the Akesines. For his career see Berve 2.215-218, no. 439, s.v. Κοῖνος.

servative leaders began to decline, as Alexander turned to his most trusted friend Hephaistion. No doubt it was through Hephaistion's urging that Alexander gave less authority to Krateros, to whom he joined the traditionally minded Polyperchon, Gorgias, Kleitos the White and Attalos, the mainstays of the phalanx.⁴⁸ New leaders emerged, notably Ptolemy and Leonnatos, and to a lesser extent Lysimachos.⁴⁹ But quite clearly Alexander placed greater faith than before in the steady and loyal Perdikkas.

In the campaign against the Malloi, Perdikkas accompanied Alexander through the waterless region between the Akesines and Hydraotis Rivers and then took a special force against one of the Mallian towns. This town he captured, killing those inhabitants who did not manage to escape into the marshes.⁵⁰ When he reunited with Alexander in the assault on the main Mallian stronghold, he commanded a portion of the army, which Arrian (Ptolemy) implies was, through its sluggishness, responsible for Alexander's critical wounding there.⁵¹ The near-fatal wound that Alexander

⁴⁸ This group will also have included Meleagros, later the mouth-piece of the short-sighted phalanx in the succession-debate. For the missions of Krateros, Polyperchon, Gorgias and Attalos see my groups in Chapter 3: Krateros, 144, n.91.i.

⁴⁹ For Leonnatos see Chapter 2: Leonnatos, 102ff.; for Ptolemy see Berve 2.329-335, no. 668, s.v. Πτολεμαῖος; J. Seibert, *Untersuchungen zur Geschichte Ptolemaios' I. (Münchener Beiträge zur Papyrusforschung und antiken Rechtsgeschichte, Heft 56)*, Munich, 1969 is of limited use. For their commands in India see Breloer, *op. cit.* n.44 *supra*, 220-221. See Appendix 1 for the career of Lysimachos.

⁵⁰ Arr. 6.6.4, 6.

⁵¹ Arr. 6.9.1-2.

sustained against the Malloi can scarcely have been Perdikkas' responsibility, though it may well reflect the increasing reluctance of Alexander's troops to emulate his daring and recklessness; and, if this is a case of Ptolemy detracting from Perdikkas' reputation, it does not deserve serious consideration, for Ptolemy, by his own admission, was not present at the battle.⁵² According to one branch of the tradition - Arrian does not name his sources in this case -, it was Perdikkas who cut the arrow from Alexander's body; others say it was Kritoboulos, a doctor from Kos.⁵³ The truth of this matter can not be known, but what is important is that, after Alexander was taken downstream by ship to the junction of the rivers, Perdikkas completed the subjugation of the region before rejoining the main force.⁵⁴

Curiously, this is where our information for Perdikkas' military career under Alexander breaks off. Although he became, with the departure of Krateros, Polyperchon, Attalos and Meleagros

⁵² Curt. 9.5.21; Arr. 6.5.6-7; 6.11.8. See Errington, *CQ* n.s. 19 (1969) 239; Kornemann, *Die Alexandergeschichte* 82-85; and Breloer, *Bund mit Poros* (n.44 *supra*) 29-56.

⁵³ Arr. 6.11.1, the sources are not named (οἱ μὲν...οἱ δέ). For Kritoboulos see Curt. 9.5.25; Arrian has Kritodemos, which is surely an error. Both are said to have come from Kos (which in itself suggests a confusion of names), but Kritodemos is unattested, while Kritoboulos is known from other sources. According to Arrian, *Indike* 18.7, he was a *trierarchos* at the Hydaspes. See Berve 2.228, nos. 452, 453, s.vv. Κριτόβουλος, Κριτόδημος, though Berve regards Arrian's version as correct. But Arrian must certainly be wrong; Kritodemos did not exist.

⁵⁴ Arr. 6.15.1; he subdued the Abastanoi. See Smith, *EHI* 104; Breloer, *Bund mit Poros* (n.44) 48, 223-224.

for the west, the second most influential man after Hephaistion, there is not further record of his activities. Smaller operations were entrusted to Ptolemy and Leonnatos, larger ones to Hephaistion. Yet, when Hephaistion died and Alexander soon afterward, there was no one more powerful in Asia than Perdikkas himself.

II

At Sousa in 324 Perdikkas wedded the daughter of Atropates, satrap of Media, as part of Alexander's mass-marriage between the Macedonian and Iranian nobilities.⁵⁵ At Sousa also he was crowned, along with the other *somatophylakes*.⁵⁶ But his greatest honours came later in the year, when Hephaistion drank himself to death at Ekbatana. Hephaistion indeed was irreplaceable, owing to the personal nature of his relationship with Alexander, but the King found in Perdikkas at least some of those qualities that he valued in Hephaistion: undoubtedly there was a strong personal bond, but Perdikkas' later striving to maintain the unity of the empire suggests that he also understood Alexander's policy of fusion.⁵⁷ Thus, it was to Perdikkas that Alexander en-

⁵⁵ Arr. 7.4.5. Her name is not given. See Berve 2.91-92, no. 180, s.v. Ἀτροπατήνης. Cf. Justin 13.4.13.

⁵⁶ Arr. 7.5.6.

⁵⁷ See Schachermeyr, *Alexander in Babylon* 16; F. Miltner, "Die staatsrechtliche Entwicklung des Alexanderreiches," *Klio* 26 (1933) 52. For Hephaistion's attitude toward the Persians see Plut. *Alex.* 47.9-10.

trusted Hephaistion's corpse, which he was instructed to convey to Babylon and prepare for burial.⁵⁸ It is significant that Arrian-Ptolemy, who mentions the funeral-pyre of Hephaistion, says nothing of Perdikkas' role.⁵⁹ And there was more than just this honour: Perdikkas was advanced to Hephaistion's command, to the first *hipparchia* or *chiliarchia* of the Hetairic cavalry, though the unit, out of reverence to the dead Hephaistion, retained the name "Hephaistion's Chiliarchy" even when Perdikkas commanded it.⁶⁰ It was more than a mere cavalry-command, for it implied a position as Alexander's second-in-command; hence, when the office was later conferred upon Seleukos by Perdikkas, Justin writes: *summus castrorum tribunatus Seleuco, Antiochi filio, cessit.*⁶¹

Then Alexander died. The army in general was not prepared for this disaster; to this the confusion of the subsequent years bears ample testimony.⁶² But Perdikkas himself could scarcely

⁵⁸ Diod. 17.110.8. For Hephaistion's death see Chapter 1, esp. 81-86.

⁵⁹ Arr. 7.14.8 speaks of the pyre at Babylon. For the suppression of this information see Errington, "Bias in Ptolemy's History of Alexander," *CQ* 19 (1969) 239.

⁶⁰ Arr. 7.14.10 = E1 in Appendix 2, where other *testimonia* are recorded. It was called "Hephaistion's Chiliarchy" in order to "distinguish it from other chiliarchies," so G.T. Griffith, "A Note on the Hipparchies of Alexander," *JHS* 83 (1963) 74, n.17.

⁶¹ Justin 13.4.17; cf. earlier where Perdikkas as *chiliarchos* and Meleagros as *hyparchos* are described as follows: *castrorum et exercitus et regum cura Meleagro et Perdiccae adsignatur* (13.4.5).

⁶² Against Bosworth, *CQ* n.s. 21 (1971) 112-136, esp. 134-136.

have hoped for a better position: since Hephaistion's death he had become Alexander's closest personal friend; he was by far the most influential of the generals⁶³ and of the *somato-phyllakes*, who had by this time developed into a powerful *clique*;⁶⁴ supreme military power was his by virtue of his *chiliarchia*. His prestige was further enhanced by the significant gesture of Alexander, who on his death-bed and in the presence of the other generals handed to Perdikkas his signet-ring, a fact that Ptolemy the historian took pains to suppress.⁶⁵ According to the *Liber de Morte*, Alexander also entrusted to Perdikkas his wife, Rhoxane, with instructions that he should marry her.⁶⁶ Rhoxane's role at

⁶³ Nepos, *Eumenes* 2.2, draws attention to the reason for Perdikkas' ascendancy: *aberat enim Craterus et Antipater qui antecedere hunc videbantur; mortuus erat Hephaestio....*

⁶⁴ For the composition and development of the *somatophyllakes* see Appendix 1: The *Somatophyllakes* of Alexander. Note that the most powerful men among the cavalry after Alexander's death were reported by Arrian (*Succ.* Ia.2) as: Perdikkas, Leonnatos, Ptolemy, Lysimachos, Aristonous, Peithon, Seleukos, Eumenes. Only the last two were not *somatophyllakes*, though Seleukos had commanded the "foot-guard" (the hypaspists), while Eumenes was the "chief secretary."

⁶⁵ Curt. 10.5.4; cf. 10.6.4-5; Justin 12.15.12; Diod. 17.117.3; 18.2.4; Nepos, *Eumenes* 2.1; Metz Epit. 112. Ptolemy fails to mention not only the ring, but also the care of Hephaistion's body, which was entrusted to Perdikkas (see n.59 *supra*), and Perdikkas' elevation to Hephaistion's *chiliarchia*, which Ptolemy underhandedly denies, Arr. 7.14.10. Cf. Strasburger, *Ptolemaios und Alexander* 47; W. Schwahn, "Die Nachfolge Alexanders des Grossen," *Klio* 23 (1930) 223; Errington, *CQ* n.s. 19 (1969) 239-240.

⁶⁶ Metz Epit. 112, 118.

the time of Alexander's death is heavily romanticised by the *Liber de Morte*,⁶⁷ but the suggestion that she marry Perdikkas is in itself not entirely unlikely. It was only when the conservative phalanx violently opposed Rhoxane's child in particular and Alexander's policy of fusion in general that a union with her ceased to be a viable means of gaining power. Still she remained a valuable commodity; though it was the unborn child that mattered, not the woman.⁶⁸

Droysen's claim that the empire could be maintained only by an Alexander or by a greater man yet must certainly be correct.⁶⁹ And perhaps it was Perdikkas' fatal error that he attempted to follow Alexander's policy, the "idealised" (by ancient standards) state and the concept of *Reichseinheit*. In this respect, Ptolemy was more pragmatic and less an idealist, but he was also less to be admired. But Perdikkas had not taken full account of the conservative Macedonian phalanx and their desire to return to the state of Philip II. They could not endure a second Alexander, if indeed such a man was to be found,

⁶⁷ Metz Epit. 101-102, 110 and especially 112: *at Rhoxane magno cum clamore capillos sibi ipsa scindens conata est ad Perdiccae pedes se advolvere. hanc Holcias excepit et eam ad Alexandrum adduxit. ille dentibus frendens cum se iam in extremo spiritu videret, eam complexus osculari coepit dexteramque eius tenens in dexteram Perdiccae indidit nutuque commendationem fecit. deinde cum morte opprimeretur, oculos eius Rhoxane oppressit animamque eius ore suo excepit.* For Rhoxane's life see Berve 2.346-347, no. 688, s.v. 'Ρωξάνη.

⁶⁸ For her pregnancy: Curt. 10.6.9; Justin 13.2.5; cf. 12.15.9; Arr. *Succ.* Ia.1; Ib.1. Metz Epit. 70 mentions an earlier son of Alexander and Rhoxane, who died at the Hydaspes River.

⁶⁹ Droysen, *Hellenismus* 2.6.

and they showed their determination to return to the traditional ways by demanding as their King a man whom no rational thinker could have considered: Arrhidaios, a mentally deficient son of Philip II by the Thessalian Philine. That his mother was a dancing-girl, or a harlot, from Larissa is, almost certainly, a fabrication; Arrhidaios' mental state was not.⁷⁰ Fontana's doubts are ill advised: Arrhidaios was present in Babylon at the time of Alexander's death, and Perdikkas could scarcely have overlooked him had he not been totally unfit to rule.⁷¹

Things went wrong for Perdikkas from the beginning, though everything appeared to be in his favour. He had the support of

⁷⁰ For Philine (Philine) see Satyros' account of Philip's wives, *FHG* III (Müller) 161 = Athen. 13.557B-D; for her alleged lowly birth see Justin 9.8.2 (*saltatrix*); 13.2.11 (*scortum*); Athen. 13.578A; Plut. *Alex.* 77.7 (ἐκ γυναικὸς ἀδόξου καὶ κοινῆς φιλήνης). Beloch, *GG*² 3.2.69, followed by G.T. Griffith, "Philip of Macedon's Early Interventions in Thessaly (358-352 B.C.)," *CQ* n.s. 20 (1970) 70-71 and Ellis, *Philip II* 61, thinks she was clearly of a good family, probably the Aleuadai. See also C. Ehrhardt, "Two Notes on Philip of Macedon's First Interventions in Thessaly," *CQ* n.s. 17 (1967) 297; W. Schwahn, "Die Nachfolge Alexanders des Grossen, II," *Klio* 24 (1931) 312; Niese 1.191, n.5. For Arrhidaios' ailment see App. *Syr.* 52 (οὐκ ἔμφονα); Justin 13.2.11; 14.5.2; Diod. 18.2.2 (ψυχικοῖς δὲ παθέσι συνεχόμενον ἀνιάτοις); Plut. *Alex.* 10.2; 77.7-8; *Mor.* 337D = *de fort. Al.* 2.5; Heidelberg Epit. 1 (ἐπιληπτικός); Porphyr. Tyr., *FGrHist* 260 F2. According to Plutarch (*Alex.* 77.8) his mental condition was induced by drugs given to him, while he was still a child, by Olympias. Curt. 10.7.4-6: the manner in which Peithon speaks of Arrhidaios suggests that he was a pathetic character. See further Hamilton, *PA* 217; Berve 2.385-386; no. 781, s.v. Φίλιππος Ἀρρίδατος; Hoffmann, *Die Makedonen* 134.

⁷¹ Fontana, *Le Lotte* 128ff. and 128, n.20; cf. Badian's review in *Studies in Greek and Roman History*, Oxford, 1964, 263-264; Errington, *JHS* 90 (1970) 51, n.23.

at least one of his fellow-*somatophylakes*, Aristonous.⁷² Peithon, it appears, may also have been a supporter in the early going.⁷³ But Perdikkas faced an unusual problem: he could not be acclaimed King and rule securely as long as Rhoxane carried the potential heir; he could not act as regent for a child as yet unborn;⁷⁴ and an *interregnum* was out of the question, owing to the mood of the army.⁷⁵ Whatever title Perdikkas was to take as ruler, he was anxious that it should be sanctioned by the army. At the urging

⁷² Berve 2.69, no. 133, s.v. Ἀριστόνοος; see also Appendix 1. For his support of Perdikkas see Curt. 10.6.16-18. Like Perdikkas he was loyal to the house of Alexander and, faithful to the end, he perished in 316 (Diod. 18.50-51.1). Like Perdikkas he was the victim of Ptolemy's bias: see Errington, "Bias in Ptolemy's History of Alexander," *CQ* n.s. 19 (1969) 235.

⁷³ Berve 2.311, no. 621, s.v. Πεύθων. Although he was soon among those who worked to undermine Perdikkas, he appears to have supported him immediately after Alexander's death, though perhaps only on the condition that his power be limited by attaching Leonnatos to him as his colleague. See Curt. 10.7.4-8; cf. W. Schur, "Das Alexanderreich nach Alexanders Tode," *Rh. Mus.* 83 (1934) 133, 139-140.

⁷⁴ For Perdikkas' dilemma see Errington, "From Babylon to Triparadeisos (323-320 B.C.)," *JHS* 90 (1970) 50, who points to the "possibility of the child's exploitation by anyone unscrupulous enough among Perdikkas' opponents who was prepared to depict Perdikkas as a usurper." In fact, according to Curtius 10.6.21, Perdikkas was accused by Meleagros of planning to usurp power through the regency of Rhoxane's child.

⁷⁵ The army had two main objections to Perdikkas' proposal that the Macedonians should await the birth of Rhoxane's child: their more immediate concern was for pay and discharge from duty (so Schwahn, *Klio* 24 [1931] 308; Errington, n.74 *supra*, 51), but they were, at the same time, opposed not to Perdikkas' personal ambition (Badian, n.71 *supra*, 263, rightly refuting Fontana, *Le Lotte* 121: "Causa principale fu l'opposizione a Perdikka, ritenuto colpevole di aspirare al trono; concause evidenti le gelosie personali e il desiderio di dominio degli altri generali") but to

of Aristonous, he was offered the kingship; who could deny that Alexander had marked him out as his successor? But Perdikkas unwisely put the army to the test, hoping that, by feigning reluctance, he would have the crown virtually forced upon him. This, at least, is Curtius' depiction, which draws heavily on a Roman precedent.⁷⁶ Again Perdikkas

Perdikkas' enthusiasm for Alexander's *Verschmelzungspolitik*. To deny this fact is to make light of the inner resentment of the troops, who mutinied at the Hyphasis River and at Opis, for their King's orientalisms and for those who supported him in his designs.

⁷⁶ Curt. 10.6.18: *haerebat inter cupiditatem pudoremque et, quo modestius quod spectabat appeteret, pervicacius oblaturos esse credebat*. The date of Curtius has been a subject of debate. Most recently J. Rufus Fears has attempted to challenge the *terminus post quem* non of 224 or 227 A.D. (that is, the fall of the Parthian empire), "Silius Italicus, *Cataphracti*, and the date of Q. Curtius Rufus, *CP* 71 (1976) 214-223 (see also his extensive bibliography, 215, n.7). D. Korzeniewski, *Die Zeit des Quintus Curtius Rufus*, Diss. Köln, 1959, argues for a date in the early empire, during the reign of Augustus. Between these two works fall numerous discussions of the problem (see the bibliographies of E.I. McQueen, "Quintus Curtius Rufus," in *Latin Biography*, ed. T.A. Dorey, London, 1967; J. Seibert, *Alexander der Grosse, Erträge der Forschung*, Darmstadt, 1972, 30-31, to which add A. Grilli, "Il 'Saeculum' di Curzio Rufo," *La Parola del Pasato* 168 [1976] 215-223, Vespasian), among which is that of G.V. Sumner, "Curtius Rufus and the *Historia Alexandri*," *AUMLA* 15 (1961) 30-39. Sumner makes a convincing case, suggesting that the author of the *Historia Alexandri* is identical with the Curtius Rufus of Tacitus, *Annales* 11.20-21, and the rhetorician named in the index to Suetonius' *de Grammaticis et Rhetoribus*, and that Curtius lived and wrote during the reigns of Gaius (Caligula; hence the clever word-play *caliganti mundo*, Curt. 10.9.4) and Claudius. But Errington (*JHS* 90 [1970] 51, n.23) wonders if Curtius "might have been embarrassed to seem to echo in his book - which the historian emperor might well read - contemporary rumours

had miscalculated, for the hesitation encouraged only further dissension. His opponents were quick to point out that Perdikkas sought the crown through Rhoxane's son, that he would follow the example of the great Philip, who usurped the kingship from the legitimate heir, Amyntas Perdikka, his nephew.⁷⁷

An illegitimate son of Alexander, Barsine's child Herakles, was scorned by the army, as was Nearchos, who suggested him;⁷⁸

Rhoxane's potential son was unpopular with the army, whether

of Claudius' own incapacity..., as well as the notoriously similar way in which he became emperor." Perdikkas' reluctance to accept the crown is therefore reminiscent of Tiberius' actions. If Curtius wrote before Tacitus, the latter may have read and been influenced by him. Tarn 2.92 says of Curtius disdainfully: "He can make epigrams which might pass for Tacitus on a day when Tacitus was not feeling quite at his best." Tarn quotes some examples (2.92, n.1), but a most interesting line of Curtius is quoted by Errington (57) without comment: *nam et insociabile est regnum* (10.9.1), which is now recognised by Grilli (218) as Tacitean: *antiquas fratrum discordias et insociabile regnum aestimantes* (*Annales* 13.17).

⁷⁷ Curt. 10.7.21. See Berve 2.30-31, no. 61, s.v. 'Ἀμύντας. For Philip's usurpation see Ellis, *Philip II* 45ff. and 250, n.10, also "Amyntas Perdikka, Philip II and Alexander the Great (A Study in Conspiracy)," *JHS* 91 (1971) 15-24.

⁷⁸ Curt. 10.6.10-12; he is mentioned as a possible candidate by Justin 12.15.9. Justin 13.2.7 makes Meleagros bring Herakles into the discussion; Nearchos is more likely, for he was a relative, having married the daughter of Barsine and Mentor (*sic* Arr. 7.4.6; Memnon should be read, Berve no.498). See Berve 2.269-272, no. 544, s.v. Νέαρχος; cf. Lehmann-Haupt in Papastavru's *Amphipolis: Geschichte und Prosopographie* (*Klio*, Beiheft 37) Leipzig, 1936, 97-137, no.61; W. Capelle, *RE* XVI.2 (1935) 2134; Badian, "Nearchus the Cretan," *YCS* 24 (1975) 168-169: "The army, reluctant to wait for the legitimate offspring of Alexander's marriage to an Oriental princess, was by no means willing to consider the succession of a semi-Oriental bastard." For Barsine see Berve 2.102-103, no. 206, s.v. Βαρσίνη; cf. also Berve 2.168, no. 353, s.v. 'Ηρακλῆς. In favour of his existence, see now P.A. Brunt, "Alexander Barsine and Heracles," *Riv. di Fil.*

Perdikkas alone or a college of guardians acted in his interests.⁷⁹ Then the unexpected happened: the common soldier called out for Arrhidaios, for the family of Philip II.⁸⁰ And it was at this juncture that Perdikkas lost control of the situation completely; for Meleagros, a *taxiarch* from the beginning of Alexander's Asiatic campaign, saw in the advocacy of the inept Arrhidaios a means of acquiring power for himself.⁸¹ Undoubtedly, Perdikkas also saw in Arrhidaios a useful pawn, but the

103 (1975) 22-34, and Badian (*supra*) 167, n.51, against Tarn, "Heracles, Son of Barsine," *JHS* 41 (1921) 18ff., and 2.330-337.

⁷⁹ The joint guardianship of Rhoxane's child is suggested by Peithon, who realises that the army is now suspicious of Perdikkas' designs and hopes to win the phalanx back to Perdikkas' policy by limiting his power. Thus Leonnatos is proposed as co-guardian, while a similar arrangement is sought for Europe (Antipatros and Krateros); Curt. 10.7.8-9; cf. Justin 13.2.14, who has Perdikkas, Leonnatos, Krateros and Antipatros all acting as guardians for the unborn child. See the comments of W. Schur, "Das Alexanderreich nach Alexanders Tode," *Rh. Mus.* 83 (1934) 133, who sees Leonnatos as "ein wirksames Gegengewicht."

⁸⁰ Curt. 10.7.1: *quidam...Macedonum ignotus ex infima plebe.*

⁸¹ In Curtius' version, Meleagros seems to be acting on his own when he incites the army, but the accounts of Diod. 18.2.2-3 and Justin 13.3.1-2 (both drawing on Hieronymos) suggest that Meleagros - Justin includes Attalos - was sent to the phalanx by the cavalry and that he betrayed the latter. This might be an attempt to justify Meleagros' punishment, who, according to Diod. 18.4.7, was charged with plotting against Perdikkas: ὡς ἐπιβουλήν κατ' αὐτοῦ [sc. Περδίκκου] πεποιημένον ἐκόλασε. Cf. Schachermeyr, *Alexander in Babylon* 113, 125; also G. Wirth, "Zur Politik des Perdikkas 323," *Helikon* 7 (1967) 291.

initiative had unexpectedly been taken from him. Encouraged by the phalanx, Meleagros had the support of its leaders, with the exception of Perdikkas' brother, Alketas.⁸² A wave of irrationality carried Meleagros to the fore, and he acted decisively, challenging Perdikkas' supremacy with a show of arms. Perdikkas withdrew to the chamber that housed Alexander's body, supported by a mere six hundred men, but Meleagros had incited the mob, who burst through the barricades and forced the Perdikkan party to quit the city.⁸³ The cavalry thus hastened from Babylon under the leadership of Leonnatos, for Perdikkas remained within the city, hoping to re-assert his authority over the infantry.⁸⁴ He had been a *taxiarch* himself, and his battalion of the *pez-hetairoi* was now led by Alketas; doubtless he had some followers among the upper ranks of the phalanx. But Meleagros instigated his assassination, acting in the name of King Philip Arrhidaios, and Perdikkas, who foiled the attempt, now thought it wise to

⁸² Attalos, son of Andromenes; Philotas the *taxiarch* and later satrap of Kilikia, Berve nos. 181 and 803 (= 804; they are surely identical). For a full discussion of their roles see Appendix 3.

⁸³ Curt. 10.7.14: Meleagros assumes the initiative by becoming self-appointed guardian of Arrhidaios; Curt. 10.7.16: Perdikkas withdraws with 600 followers; Curt. 10.7.17-20: the cavalry are driven from the city and encamp on the plains under the leadership of Leonnatos. This is followed closely, but in abbreviated form, by Justin 13.3.3-6; cf. Diod. 18.2.3-4.

⁸⁴ Curt. 10.7.21; implied by Justin 13.3.7-8.

abandon the city and rejoin Leonnatos.⁸⁵

For the moment it looked as if Meleagros had conducted a successful *coup*. But the army soon came to regard him as an opportunist and a demagogue, and they regretted having risen against the marshals of the empire; doubtless their enthusiasm for Arrhidaios waned as they recognised in him a front for the ambitions of Meleagros.⁸⁶ Furthermore, the cavalry now intended to force the issue, cutting off the food-supply. Curtius' description of the resulting confusion among the townspeople and the deterioration of conditions in Babylon is more appropriate to a protracted siege than to this stand-off of scarcely one week; starvation was simply out of the question.⁸⁷ Morale suffered nevertheless. Disillusioned with Meleagros and the pathetic Arrhidaios, they began to negotiate with the Perdikkans.

⁸⁵ Curt. 10.8.1-4. Justin 13.3.7-8 mentions the assassination bid, ascribing it to Attalos (see Appendix 3), but he does not mention Perdikkas' flight from Babylon; instead Perdikkas appears to win the phalanx over with a passionate appeal and a denunciation of civil war (13.3.9-10); cf. 13.4.1: *haec cum pro singulari facundia sua Perdicca perorasset, adeo movit pedites, ut probato consilio eius dux ab omnibus legeretur*. See Wirth, *Helikon* 7 (1967) 291, without critical comment; but cf. Schachermeyr, *Alexander in Babylon* 125-126: "So haben wir bei Iustin mit gewaltigen Kürzungen zu rechnen."

⁸⁶ For their regrets and anger at Meleagros: Curt. 10.8.5-8; for the disillusionment with Arrhidaios see Curt. 10.8.9: *et ex comparatione regis novi desiderium excitabatur amissi*. Cf. Curt. 10.7.5, where the army is said to favour Arrhidaios out of pity. Appian's (*Syr.* 52) description also shows that Arrhidaios' acclamation was an irrational and emotional act.

⁸⁷ See Appendix 3, n.29.

According to Plutarch's *Life of Eumenes*, it was Eumenes who proved particularly effective in reconciling the feuding factions,⁸⁸ and, as a Greek, he may have acted as an "impartial" go-between; though it is clear from Arrian's *Successors* and from later events that he was far from a disinterested party.⁸⁹ The actual liason between factions was conducted by Pasas the Thessalian, Perilaos (= Perillos), and Damis the Megalopolitan.⁹⁰ To them Perdikkas responded that he would accept the demands of the infantry - by which we shall take the recognition of Philip Arrhidaios to be meant - only on the condition that the phalanx surrender the authors of the discord.⁹¹ That Perdikkas sought the sanction of the phalanx for the elimination of Meleagros is clear,⁹²

⁸⁸ Plut. *Eumenes* 3.1; cf. Vezin, *Eumenes von Kardia* 20-21; Cloche, *La Dislocation* 12; see also the references cited n.89 *infra*.

⁸⁹ Plut. *Eumenes* 3.1 says that he favoured the cavalry but remained impartial; Arr. *Succ.* 1a.2 names him among the leading cavalry-officers. See also Droysen, *Hellenismus* 2.8; Niese 1.94; Vezin, *loc. cit.*

⁹⁰ Berve 2.306-307, no. 608, s.v. Πάσας; 2.317, no. 630, s.v. Πέριλλος (for the name see Hoffmann, *Die Makedonen* 212); Curt. 10.8.15 reads *Amissus*, which Hedicke emended to *Damyllus* in his Teubner edition (Leipzig, 1908); he is followed by Rolfe, *Quintus Curtius: History of Alexander*, vol. 2, Loeb Classical Library, Cambridge, Mass., 1956, 542-543. *Amissus* is otherwise unknown (though Berve 2.25, no. 53, accepts him as genuine); *Damyllus* is unattested; but *Damis* is a more common name, and a known Megalopolitan. See Berve 2.115, no. 240, s.v. Δάμις. Perhaps *Damis* has been corrupted to *Amissus* here; cf. Niese 1.245, n.3.

⁹¹ Curt. 10.8.15.

⁹² Niese 1.194, n.2: "die Auslieferung der Empörer, also auch des Meleager...."

but Meleagros was himself actively involved in the negotiations and understandably concerned for his own well-being. By this time, Perdikkas (perhaps through the agency of Eumenes - if we may assume co-operation between the two at this early time⁹³) had secured the goodwill of the *taxiarchs*, most notably Attalos, son of Andromenes.⁹⁴ Their own distrust of Meleagros' ambitions will have played no small part in causing them to realign themselves with the Perdikkan party. But Meleagros, sensing their opposition, indicated a willingness to relinquish his "control" over Arrhidaios to the more popular and respected Krateros - if the *prostasia* is not, in fact, an invention of Douris of Samos⁹⁵ -, though he demanded to be accepted as *tertius dux*.⁹⁶

⁹³ Droysen, *Hellenismus* 2.8: "Er [sc. Eumenes] begann mit dem und jenem von den Führern anzuknüpfen und zum Frieden zu reden," by which he certainly means the *taxiarchs*, since the *hipparchs* had abandoned the city. Cf. Cloche, *La Dislocation* 12: he shared Perdikkas' loyalty to the Royal House.

⁹⁴ For details see Appendix 3.

⁹⁵ Schubert, *Die Quellen zur Geschichte der Diadochenzeit*, Leipzig, 1914, 139-149, traces the accounts of Krateros' overwhelming popularity to Douris. Arrian's account of Krateros' death is certainly from Douris (*Succ.* 1.27; fr. 26 = *Suda* s.v. Κρατερός), and the mention of the *prostasia* (which is echoed by Justin 13.4.5: *regiae pecuniae custodia Cratero traditur*) may also derive from Douris; see W. Schwahn, "Die Nachfolge Alexanders des Grossen," *Klio* 23 (1930) 229-230; also 235: "Auffällig ist bei Justin die vielfache Übereinstimmung mit Arrian.... Sie sind allein durch eine gemeinsame Quelle zu erklären; diese kann nur der vielgelesene und oft zitierte Douris sein, auf den Arrian direkt... zurückgeht."

⁹⁶ Curt. 10.8.22; Justin 13.4.5; Arr. *Succ.* 1a.3.

For the moment, Perdikkas was willing to concede: there was no difficulty in accepting Arrhidaios, who would easily be manipulated once free of Meleagros' influence. As for Krateros, his absence would give Perdikkas sufficient time to secure his own position.⁹⁷ More troublesome was the presence of Meleagros, now Perdikkas' lieutenant (ὑπαρχος).⁹⁸ It is no accident that the final settlement at Babylon resembled in no way the conditions of the compromise; for Perdikkas had no intention of acceding to the wishes of the phalanx, beyond the recognition of Arrhidaios. He would indeed be King, but Perdikkas meant to rule through him. The decisive act would be the elimination of Meleagros, and in this matter he must have the support of the *taxiarchs*. Meleagros had been a bitter enemy in the days that preceded the reconciliation, and he continued to be a threat; it is not unlikely that Perdikkas encouraged rumours that Meleagros was plotting against him.⁹⁹ But Perdikkas was careful to attach a show of legality to Meleagros' elimination, and he called for a lustration of the army, in the name of Philip Arrhidaios and on the pretext of punishing the seditious.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁷ See Chapter 3: Krateros.

⁹⁸ Arr. *Succ.* Ia.3.

⁹⁹ Curt. 10.9.7: *Perdicca unicam spem salutis suae in Meleagri morte reponebat*. For rumours of Meleagros' plotting: Diod. 18.4.7; cf. Curt. 10.9.8ff.

¹⁰⁰ Curt. 10.9.11ff.; Justin 13.4.7; cf. Diod. 18.4.7.

With the King and the army firmly in his grip, Perdikkas crushed the ringleaders of the uprising; the *taxiarchs* acquiesced in the liquidation of Meleagros; the army, thunderstruck by the show of power and, to an extent, satisfied with the recognition of Philip Arrhidaios, accepted Meleagros' death as necessary for the welfare of the state: *nam et insociabile est regnum*.¹⁰¹ Perdikkas had taken the first step in recouping his losses. Power was now once again securely in his hands.

III

In the name of the King, though doubtless in consultation with the generals, Perdikkas allotted the satrapies.¹⁰² The most important regions went, not surprisingly, to the most powerful of Perdikkas' "supporters." But there was another consideration: Perdikkas found it desirable to remove from Babylon those generals with the greatest influence. It proved to be a futile

¹⁰¹ Curt. 10.9.1. For Meleagros' end see Curt. 10.9.20-21; Arr. *Succ.* Ia.4-5; Justin 13.4.7-8 does not mention Meleagros' death, but it is clear that his description of Perdikkas' acting *ignaro collega* suggests that Meleagros' elimination was part and parcel of the lustration of the army. Diod. 18.4.7 places his death after the allotment of the satrapies and the cancellation of Krateros' orders, surely an error.

¹⁰² Diod. 18.3.1-3; Justin 13.4.10-23; Curt. 10.10.1-4; Arr. *Succ.* Ia.5-7; Ib.2-7. See also Schachermeyr, *Alexander in Babylon* 142-144.

exercise; for, while Perdikkas worked to establish a strong central government, the generals made use of their regional resources to plot a course of separatism - none more vigorously than Ptolemy in Egypt.¹⁰³

At the Court, Perdikkas retained those men whom he felt he could trust: Aristonous, the only *somatophylax* not awarded a satrapy, Alketas, Perdikkas' brother, Attalos, son of Andromenes, to whom he had betrothed his sister Atalante, and Seleukos, son of Antiochos, whom he now advanced to the command of the *chiliarchia*.¹⁰⁴ Nor had he forgotten Rhoxane, whose child - if male - was to be recognised as *symbasileus* with Arrhidaios, though the latter was clearly intended to rule until the former came of age.¹⁰⁵ In accordance with Rhoxane's wishes, therefore, he stage-managed the murder of the Achaimenid Stateira and her sister Drypetis.¹⁰⁶ Plutarch depicts it as an act of jealousy, but Rhoxane was educated in the ways of court-intrigue and she meant to secure her own position

¹⁰³ Ptolemy appears from the outset to have favoured a wide distribution of power, a policy that would lead inevitably to the disintegration of the empire; cf. Curt. 10.6.15; Justin 13.2.12. Paus. 1.6.2 portrays Ptolemy as the instigator of the division of the satrapies, which suits both Ptolemy's character and his policies as satrap; cf. Droysen's appraisal, *Hellenismus* 2.13. See also Wirth, *Helikon* 7 (1967) 316ff. and the rather sterile conclusion of Seibert, *Untersuchungen zur Geschichte Ptolemaios' I.* 38, based on a rigid analysis of the sources.

¹⁰⁴ For Aristonous see p.180, n.70 *supra*, for Alketas, Attalos and Atalante Appendix 3, and Appendix 2 for Seleukos and the Chiliarchy.

¹⁰⁵ See Badian, *Studies in Greek and Roman History*, Oxford, 1964, 264.

¹⁰⁶ Plutarch, *Alex.* 77.6.

and that of her unborn child: as long as Perdikkas chose to pursue Alexander's policies of unity and fusion, she could not allow Stateira or her sister to remain as potential rivals.¹⁰⁷ That Perdikkas acted as her accomplice in this affair suggests, however, that he had not considered the Achaimenid women as political tools, probably because he had already pinned his hopes on the effective manipulation of Arrhidaios. Rhoxane's child might prove useful - chiefly because of his paternity -, and Perdikkas meant to keep him firmly in his control. But, like Rhoxane, he was content to eliminate any potential rivals, or persons whom contenders for the throne might exploit in the future.

Perdikkas' career is an unfortunate tale of lofty ideals combined with excessive ambition and political short-sightedness. He showed a determination to keep the empire intact, and for this idealism - though it was motivated by a quest for personal glory - he is to be admired. Yet his own ambitions blinded him to the political reality and he failed largely through his mismanagement of vital issues. This will become evident.

¹⁰⁷ For Stateira and Drypetis see p.80 *supra* and Berve 2.148, no. 290, *s.v.* Δρυπητις, 2.363-364, no. 722, *s.v.* Στατειρα. The time of the incident is fixed by the fact that Rhoxane had not yet given birth; she was seven months pregnant at the time of Alexander's death (see Hamilton, *PA* 216). According to Plutarch (*Alex.* 77.6), who attributes the act solely to Rhoxane's jealousy, Stateira and Drypetis were summoned by means of a forged letter (ἐξηπάτησεν αὐτὴν ἐπιστολῇ τινὶ πεπλασμένῃ παραγενέσθαι), whereafter they were murdered and their bodies thrown into a well and covered over. Cf. Schachermeyr, *Alexander in Babylon* 22, n.33. There is no mention of the fate of Parysatis, Alexander's other royal bride.

He had recovered his position as the guiding force in Babylon, but only by compromising his ideals: had Alexander's son been acceptable to the Macedonians, he might have ruled as Rhoxane's husband, as the "King's" adoptive father. Nevertheless, he had made good the situation by wresting from Meleagros control of Arrhidaios; but here too he had incurred the suspicion of his colleagues.¹⁰⁸ These men he attempted to appease by means of the satrapal allotments, in part a concession, but also a plan to remove any threat from the Court.¹⁰⁹ Here too he undermined his cause, for the division of the satrapies led only to the disintegration of the empire; Alexander had been careful to keep the provinces in the hands of lesser men.¹¹⁰ For the time, at least, Perdikkas will have been happy to see the departure of the generals from Babylon. He now turned his attention to the consolidation of his own position.

As a last act of the Macedonian assembly, before the dispersal to the satrapies, Perdikkas freed himself of the burden of Alexander's plans, as they were set out in the *Hypomnemata*.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁸ Arr. Succ. Ia.5.

¹⁰⁹ See Seibert, *Untersuchungen zur Geschichte Ptolemaios' I.* 28.

¹¹⁰ Badian, "Harpalus," *JHS* 81 (1961) 24: "It is worth noting that, having dealt with his excessively formidable subordinates, the King took care to see that their places were taken by unimportant men."

¹¹¹ For the authenticity of the *Hypomnemata* and the plans contained therein see most recently Badian, "A King's Notebooks," *HSCP* 72 (1967) 183ff., against Tarn 2.378-398, who believes they are a

Therefore, he called the army together in order to cancel, with a show of legality, Alexander's instructions. This had a two-fold purpose: firstly, it freed Perdikkas of any possible future charge of having failed to carry out Alexander's final instructions and, secondly - what is more important -, it cancelled Krateros' orders to replace Antipatros as regent of Macedonia, orders that, according to Diodoros (18.4.1), were recorded in the *Hypomnemata*.¹¹² Again there is a strong indication that Eumenes had already allied himself with Perdikkas, for it was Eumenes, as Royal Secretary, who had prepared the *Hypomnemata*, and he may well have revealed to Perdikkas the possibility of negating Krateros' instructions by asking the army to reject the "future plans" as a whole; certainly the army was openly opposed to these extravagances.¹¹³ Thus, in one vote, the army set aside the grandiose plans for further conquest, extravagant buildings and Hephaistion's pyre, and, with these, Krateros' orders to replace Antipatros.¹¹⁴ Perdikkas was now ready to seek an alliance with the ruler of Macedonia.

late forgery. See also Schachermeyr, "Die letzten Pläne Alexanders des Grossen," *Jahreshefte des Österreichischen archäologischen Institutes* 41 (1954) 118-140 (with pertinent bibliography, 118-119) = Griffith, *Main Problems* 322-344, who argues that the plans are genuine; against this view F. Hampl, "Alexanders des Grossen *Hypomnemata* und letzte Pläne," *Studies Presented to D.M. Robinson*, Washington University Publications, 1953, vol. 2, 816-829 = Griffith, *Main Problems* 307-321.

¹¹² So Badian, *HSCP* 72 (1967) 201-204.

¹¹³ For Eumenes' role see also Badian, *ibid.* 204.

¹¹⁴ Diod. 18.4.6.

Having robbed Krateros of his legal designation as the successor of Antipatros, Perdikkas now gave his attention to securing the goodwill and support of the old regent of Macedon. These negotiations are not recorded in their historical context, but Diodoros gives us an insight into the circumstances surrounding Antipatros' betrothal of his daughter Nikaia to Perdikkas. He writes: ὁ δὲ Περδίκκας πρότερον μὲν ἦν κεκρικῶς κοινοπραγίαν Ἀντιπάτρω καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὴν μνηστείαν ἐπεποίητο μήπω τῶν κατ' αὐτὸν πραγμάτων βεβαίως ἐστερεωμένων· ὥς δὲ παρέλαβε τὰς τε βασιλικὰς δυνάμεις καὶ τὴν τῶν βασιλέων προστασίαν, μετέπεσε τοῖς λογισμοῖς (18.23.2). From this passage it is quite clear that Perdikkas entered into negotiations with Antipatros when his own position was not yet secure, before he had taken control of the "royal armies and the *prostasia* of the Kings." Now the reference to the "royal forces" cannot be accurate, for it is certain that Perdikkas commanded them from the start by virtue of his *chiliarchia*.¹¹⁵ But the *prostasia* may well - and very likely does - refer to the time of the birth of Alexander IV, Rhoxane's son; for Diodoros speaks of the *prostasia* of the "Kings" (τὴν τῶν βασιλέων προστασίαν), not just of Arrhidaios, with whom alone the enigmatic *prostasia* of Krateros is linked.¹¹⁶

¹¹⁵ Curt. 10.10.4; Justin 13.4.5; Diod. 18.3.1 (παραλαβὼν τὴν τῶν ὅλων ἡγεμονίαν). As chief commander he conducted the lustration of the army: Justin 13.4.7ff.; Arr. *Succ.* Ia.4; Curt. 10.9.7ff.

¹¹⁶ See Chapter 3: Krateros, esp. 148-151 *supra*.

At that point in time Perdikkas was formidable: he was *epi-meletes* for Philip Arrhidaios, *prostates* (or guardian) for Alexander IV, and *strategos* of the imperial forces in Asia; but Krateros' position had become weak indeed.¹¹⁷ Before the birth of Alexander's son, however, Perdikkas had isolated Krateros in Kilikia and was himself in a precarious state, having incurred the suspicion of the Macedonians in Babylon through his treacherous elimination of Meleagros.¹¹⁸ But Antipatros too was prepared to deal: even if he had favoured Krateros' cause in Asia, he was in no position to secure the *prostasia* for him; there was the matter of the Lamian war, and he wanted Krateros in Europe. Thus he sanctioned Perdikkas' supremacy in Asia and bound him to a political alliance by promising his daughter Nikaia.

Perdikkas' negotiations with Antipatros must belong, therefore, to the period of instability at Babylon. One of those who brought Nikaia to Perdikkas in the following year was Iolaos, the girl's brother, who had been present at Alexander's death.¹¹⁹ It is quite possible that Perdikkas, after the allotment of the satrapies and the cancellation of Krateros' orders, sent Iolaos to his father to report the developments in Babylon and to convey

¹¹⁷ See Errington, *JHS* 90 (1970) 61; cf. Schur, *Rh. Mus.* 83 (1934) 144ff.

¹¹⁸ Arr. *Succ.* Ia.5.

¹¹⁹ See Berve 2.184, no. 386, s.v. 'Ιόλαος; Arr. *Succ.* 1.21 has the form 'Ιόλλας, for which see Hoffmann, *Die Makedonen* 207-208.

his wish for a marriage-alliance.

Now there were additional problems in the empire: the upper satrapies, where Alexander had settled the Greek mercenaries, were in a state of revolt, a direct consequence of Alexander's death.¹²⁰ Accordingly, Perdikkas sent out Peithon, formerly one of the *somatophylakes*, who had been allotted Media and now showed the first signs of seditious intent. His army, augmented by contributions from the other satraps (in accordance with Perdikkas' instructions), overcame the Greek force partly by deceit.¹²¹ Whether the ensuing slaughter of the Greeks who had surrendered was indeed ordered by Perdikkas at the outset of the campaign is difficult to determine.¹²² In view of Perdikkas' growing dependence on Eumenes, the annihilation of the Greek force was scarcely good politics. It is possible, however, that Peithon's troops got out of control and that the blame for the slaughter devolved upon Perdikkas. This disturbance in the east.

¹²⁰ Diod. 18.4.8; 18.7.1: ζῶντος μὲν τοῦ βασιλέως ὑπέμενον διὰ τὸν φόβον, τελευτήσαντος δὲ ἀέστησαν. Tarn's attempt (*CAH* 6.455-456) to link the disturbances in the east with the Lamian war can be no more than speculation. The rebels, who numbered 20,000 foot and 3000 horse, were led by Philon the Ainianian (Diod. 18.7.2; cf. Berve 2.392, no. 798, *s.v.* Φίλων). See also Beloch, *GG*² 4.1.67; Niese 1.199-200; Droysen, *Hellenismus* 2.24-26; Kaerst, *Hellenismus* 2.12-13.

¹²¹ Diod. 18.7.3. Perdikkas gave Peithon 3800 troops and sent instructions to the eastern satraps to supply a further 10,000 infantry and 8000 cavalry. Peithon persuaded a certain Letodoros to desert, thereby throwing the Greeks into confusion (Diod. 18.7.5-7). See Berve 2.237, no. 473, *s.v.* Λητόδωρος (though not "Griechen unbekannter Abkunft"; Diod. 18.7.5 calls him an Ainianian); see also 2.311, no. 621, *s.v.* Πείθων.

¹²² Diod. 18.7.5, 8-9. This version is generally accepted at its face-value; see references n.120 *supra*. But see also Cloché, *La Dislocation* 19-20.

In the west, Antigonos and Leonnatos had been sent out to their satrapies with instructions to aid Eumenes in conquering his satrapy of Kappadokia, which had been by-passed by Alexander.¹²³ Antigonos, hostile and suspicious from the start, defected from the Perdikkas cause and refused aid to Eumenes. Leonnatos, on the other hand, bolstered his army over the winter of 323/2 and joined Eumenes in the spring.¹²⁴ At that point, however, Hekataios, tyrant of Kardia, arrived with an urgent appeal from Antipatros, asking Leonnatos to come with all haste to Europe; for he was besieged in Lamia by the Hellenic forces under Leosthenes.¹²⁵ For Leonnatos it was the perfect pretext for seeking the throne. He had already had communications with Olympias, the unyielding foe of Antipatros, and had received from her daughter Kleopatra, Alexander's sister, a promise of marriage.¹²⁶ So much he confided

¹²³ Plut. *Eum.* 3.4. For Ariarathes' independence in Kappadokia during Alexander's lifetime Diod. 18.16.1. See Berve 2.59-60, no. 113, s.v. 'Αριαρθένης; Vezin, *Eumenes von Kardia* 26ff.; Briant, *Antigone le Borgne* 146ff. See also Chapter 2: Leonnatos.

¹²⁴ For Antigonos' refusal to give aid see Plut. *Eum.* 3.5; for Leonnatos' dealings with Eumenes Plut. *Eum.* 3.5ff.

¹²⁵ Hekataios' appeal: Diod. 18.14.4-5; Plut. *Eum.* 3.6. See Berve 2.149, no. 294, s.v. 'Εκαταῖος.

¹²⁶ Plut. *Eum.* 3.9; cf. Macurdy, *Hellenistic Queens* 30ff.; for further details see the references cited in Chapter 2: Leonnatos, 114, n.105 *supra*. Also Seibert, *Beiträge zur dynastischen Verbindungen* 20.

to Eumenes, with whose support he hoped to gain the throne. But Eumenes, whether wary of Leonnatos' impetuosity or sincerely devoted to the Perdikkan cause, rejected the appeal on the ground that he feared that Antipatros would betray him to his arch-enemy Hekataios.¹²⁷ Therefore, he slipped away from Leonnatos' camp during the night, leaving Leonnatos to take his chances in Europe.¹²⁸

The episode has great significance for Perdikkas, for it was surely through Eumenes that he first came to regard Kleopatra as a means of gaining supreme power. Eumenes, deserted by Antigonos and Leonnatos, appealed to Perdikkas for help and divulged the details of Leonnatos' intrigues. For the moment, there was nothing to be done about him; but events in Greece brought the matter to a speedy conclusion. Perdikkas moved to join Eumenes for an invasion of Kappadokia; it was late spring or early summer 322.¹²⁹

The Kappadokian campaign would give Perdikkas an opportunity to gain prestige: he would complete the conquest of Alexander's empire and punish Ariarathes for his refusal to submit. As he

¹²⁷ Plut. *Eum.* 3.8. If this was in fact the reason given by Eumenes to Leonnatos, it is surprising that Leonnatos did not offer him support against Hekataios in order to win his support against Antipatros. The knowledge of Leonnatos' dealings with Kleopatra can only have come down to us through Eumenes himself (via Hieronymos); Diodoros, however, says nothing of this.

¹²⁸ Plut. *Eum.* 3.10; cf. Nepos, *Eum.* 2.4-5, who claims that Leonnatos planned to kill Eumenes when he failed to win his support.

¹²⁹ *I.e.*, not long after Leonnatos' departure for Greece.

moved westward, Krateros now also abandoned Kilikia in answer to Antipatros' call; whether the two actions were in fact related cannot be determined.¹³⁰ In Kappadokia Perdikkas won a decisive victory over Ariarathes, whom he captured and cruelly punished.¹³¹ Since there were only two decisive battles, Perdikkas will not have spent a great deal of time in Kappadokia.¹³² Thereafter, he instructed Eumenes to settle affairs in Armenia, which had been thrown into confusion by Neoptolemos,¹³³ while he himself directed his attention to Pisidia.¹³⁴ Here the

¹³⁰ Diod. 18.16.4. Errington, *JHS* 90 (1970) 61: "It is therefore difficult to believe that Perdikkas' approach to Cilicia on his way against Ariarathes in Cappadocia was not the final stimulus which drove Craterus into supporting Antipater." Cf. Schwahn, "Die Nachfolge Alexanders des Grossen," *Klio* 24 (1931) 331-332; Badian, "Harpalus," *JHS* 81 (1961) 41.

¹³¹ Diod. 18.16.1-3, according to whom Ariarathes had 30,000 infantry and 15,000 cavalry; cf. 18.22.1; Appian, *Mithr.* 8; Arr. *Succ.* 11; Justin 13.6.1-3, who conflates the Kappadokian and Pisidian campaigns. Ariarathes was impaled (Arr. *Succ.* 11) along with his relatives (Diod. 18.16.3). See M. Cary, *A History of the Greek World from 323 to 146 B.C.* (2nd ed.), London, 1951, 11. Plut. *Eumenes* 3.13 says only that he was captured. Vezin, *Eumenes von Kardia* 29.

¹³² Arr. *Succ.* 11 (δυσὶ νικῆσας μάχαις); Diod. 18.16.2 says that 4000 of Ariarathes' men were killed, more than 5000 captured.

¹³³ Plut. *Eum.* 4.1; see also Berve 2.273, no. 548, s.v. Νεοπτόλεμος. Perhaps Perdikkas was already distrustful of Neoptolemos; cf. Droysen, *Hellenismus* 2.58.

¹³⁴ Diod. 18.22.1. Droysen, *Hellenismus* 2.57, is right to place this campaign in the summer of 322, immediately after the Kappadokian affair, and to regard it as a move on Perdikkas' part toward Antigonos, who had been guilty of insubordination. Errington's attempt to place the Pisidian campaign in 321 disrupts the logical pattern of events (*JHS* 90 [1970] 77); nor is it in any way convincing. See also Briant, *Antigone le Borgne* 216ff.

Isaurians and Larandians had risen against and killed Alexander's satrap Balakros, son of Nikanor.¹³⁵ These cities Perdikkas took without great difficulty, and they proved a source of plunder for his men. Victorious in the field and offering lucrative rewards to his soldiers, Perdikkas now enjoyed his greatest success.¹³⁶

It was at this time that Antipatros' daughter Nikaia was brought to Asia by Iolaos and Archias.¹³⁷ But Perdikkas, who had found a marriage-alliance with Antipatros' family desirable in 323, now had second thoughts. To make matters worse, Kleopatra, Alexander's sister, had arrived in Sardeis, having been sent out (no doubt) at the instigation of Olympias.¹³⁸ Eumenes may have had a hand in the affair: Leonnatos had opened his eyes

¹³⁵ Diod. 18.22.1. This occurred shortly before Alexander's death; cf. Berve 2.100; P. Julien, *Zur Verwaltung der Satrapien unter Alexander dem Grossen*, Diss. Leipzig, publ. Weida, 1914, 20; A. Baumbach, *Kleinasien unter Alexander dem Grossen*, Diss. Jena, publ. Weida, 1911. Berve 2.100-101, no. 200, s.v. Βάλακρος; he had been one of the *somatophylakes* of Alexander (see Appendix 1). Not impossible is Berve's suggestion (2.100) that he may have been married to Antipatros' daughter Phila (see Chapter 3: Krateros, 152, n.114 *supra*).

¹³⁶ Laranda was taken without difficulty (Diod. 18.22.2), though Isaura held out for three days (18.22.4). For the self-immolation by fire of the Isaurians see Diod. 18.22.4-5; Justin 13.6.2-3. For the booty see Diod. 18.22.8, disagreeing with Justin 13.6.1: *victor nihil praemii praeter vulnera et pericula rettulit*.

¹³⁷ Diod. 18.23.1; Arr. *Succ.* 21; Justin 13.6.4-6. Iolaos had perhaps been sent to Macedonia for the purpose of bringing Nikaia to Asia; see pp.195-196 *supra*.

¹³⁸ Arr. *Succ.* 21: ἀλλά γε καὶ Ὀλυμπιάς ἢ Ἀλεξάνδρου μήτηρ ἔπεμπε παρ' αὐτὸν κατεγγυωμένη τὴν θυγατέρα Κλεοπάτραν. Cf. Justin 13.6.4.

to Kleopatra's potential, and Eumenes, who urged Perdikkas to marry her in place of Nikaia, may have corresponded with the scheming Olympias, encouraging her to send out her daughter.¹³⁹

Kleopatra would tempt Perdikkas to ruin. Already he had begun to formulate a new policy, one that he hoped would win for him the throne. With the "Kings" securely in his possession and the army favourably disposed towards him on account of his recent successes in Kappadokia and Pisidia, Perdikkas was prepared to take two final steps to the kingship: union with Kleopatra and the ceremonious return of Alexander's body to Macedonia. What army would oppose the man returning to Macedonia with the son of Philip II, the wife, son and sister - indeed, the very body - of Alexander himself?¹⁴⁰

But it was Perdikkas' fate that things should go drastically wrong at the critical moment: he was not destined to rule. The almost contemporaneous arrivals of Nikaia and Kleopatra were most inopportune. In fact, Nikaia's very presence was an indication of changing events: the Macedonians had been victorious in the Lamian war, Antipatros' power restored. And he meant to achieve stability by wedding Phila to Krateros, Nikaia to Perdikkas.¹⁴¹ By rejecting

¹³⁹ On the basis of Arr. *Succ.* 21, the initiative is always given to Olympias, acting out of hatred for Antipatros.

¹⁴⁰ At this time Arrhidaios (Berve 2.80, no. 145) was still preparing the funeral waggon with the intention of taking the body to Egypt. See details *infra*.

¹⁴¹ It does not follow, however, as Errington (*JHS* 90 [1970] 61-62) wishes to conclude, that "by being brought into a family connexion with Antipater (and indirectly with Craterus) Perdikkas might peacefully be made to accept a more equitable arrangement (in Asia) for Craterus. G.M. Cohen, "The Marriage of Lysimachus and Nicaea," *Historia* 22 (1973) 355, is rightly sceptical of the power of such alliances.

Nikaia now, Perdikkas would certainly invite civil war.¹⁴²
 But there was also the matter of the rebellious Antigonos,
 satrap of Phrygia and friend of Antipatros.¹⁴³ What Per-
 dikkas needed was time, enough time to settle affairs in
 Asia to his satisfaction.¹⁴⁴

Against Antigonos he attempted to use tactics similar
 to those employed with great success against Meleagros: he
 hoped to remove him under the guise of legality.¹⁴⁵ But
 Antigonos, who knew well the designs of Perdikkas, made no

¹⁴² Diod. 18.23.3; the sentiment at least is expressed by
 Justin 13.6.5; see also Macurdy, *Hellenistic Queens*
 37-38; Vezin, *Eumenes von Kardia* 39; cf. Beloch, *GG*²
 4.1.83.

¹⁴³ For Antigonos see Berve 2.42-44, no. 87, s.v. 'Αντίγονος.
 He belonged to the older generation (born ca 380); cf.
 Kaerst, *RE* I (1894) 2406, s.v. "Antigonos (3)." See
 also Briant, *Antigone le Borgne*, Paris, 1973.

¹⁴⁴ To this time belongs the restoration of the Samian
 exiles, a matter referred by Antipatros to the "Kings"
 and carried out by Perdikkas in the name of Philip
 Arrhidaios; Diod. 18.18.6, 9. Perhaps Perdikkas re-
 ceived news of this from Iolaos and Archias, when they
 brought out Nikaia. See also Chr. Habicht, "Samische
 Volksbeschlüsse der hellenistischen Zeit," *MDAI(A)* 72
 (1957) 152ff.; "Der Beitrag Spartas zur Restitution von
 Samos während des Lamischen Krieges," *Chiron* 5 (1974) 45-
 50; R.M. Errington, "Samos and the Lamian War," *Chiron* 5
 (1975) 51-57, who insists (unwisely) on his revised chrono-
 logy, set out in *JHS* 90 (1970) 75-77; E. Badian, "A Comma
 in the History of Samos," *ZPE* 23 (1976) 289-294.

¹⁴⁵ Diod. 18.23.3-4.

attempt to clear himself of the charges brought against him - for clearly he was guilty of insubordination in the Kappadokian affair - and fled from his satrapy.¹⁴⁶ He had, however, seen enough of Perdikkas' dealings with the Macedonian women to know that Perdikkas' marriage to Nikaia was merely a front, intended to keep Antipatros satisfied for the time. Whatever Antigonos suspected about Perdikkas' designs he presented to Antipatros and Krateros as fact, and he spiced the information with a highly dramatised account of the fate of Kynnane, which he had learned of *en route* to Europe.¹⁴⁷

Kynnane indeed represented the unexpected, but Perdikkas lost control of affairs when he failed to act decisively on the matter of Nikaia and Kleopatra. After a brief hesitation, which could not have failed to attract attention, he married Nikaia, hoping to forestall a confrontation with Antipatros.¹⁴⁸ As for Antigonos, it proved difficult to mete out punishment, which he clearly deserved, without earning the suspicion and resentment of the other satraps; on this matter the Meleagros-

¹⁴⁶ Diod. 18.23.4; 18.25.3; Justin 13.6.7-9; Arr. *Succ.* 24.

¹⁴⁷ For Perdikkas' designs see Droysen, *Hellenismus* 2.59: "seine Absicht war, den Satrapen von Phrygien, dem aus dem fernen Aegypten nicht so bald Hilfe kommen konnte, zu überrennen, sich dann durch Vermählung mit Kleopatra offen als Gegner des Antipatros zu erklären...." See Briant, *Antigone le Borgne*, 145ff., esp. 153ff. For Antigonos' dramatisation of the Kynnane-episode see Arr. *Succ.* 24 (ἐκτραγῳδῆσας).

¹⁴⁸ Justin 13.6.6; Diod. 18.23.3; Arr. *Succ.* 21 says that Eumenes urged him to marry Kleopatra, Alketas advocated Nikaia; Perdikkas chose Nikaia for the time.

affair proved instructive.

The summer and autumn of 322 saw an exodus of leading Macedonian women from their homeland to the vicinity of Perdikkas and the royal army. Atalante, Perdikkas' sister, we may assume, was the first, perhaps joining her brother and her intended husband, Attalos, in Pisidia.¹⁴⁹ Then, in early autumn, Nikaia's departure was followed closely by that of Kleopatra.¹⁵⁰ Nor did the plans of Antipatros and Olympias go unnoticed by another Macedonian princess, the daughter of Philip II and the Illyrian Audata-Eurydike, Kynnane, a woman of indomitable spirit.¹⁵¹ She had been married by her father to the innocuous Amyntas Perdikka, rightful heir to the Macedonian throne; but he had lived like an exile in his own land,

¹⁴⁹ For the marriage of Attalos and Atalante see Appendix 3: The Relationship of Attalos and Perdikkas.

¹⁵⁰ For Nikaia and Kleopatra see Berve 2.274, no. 552, s.v. Νικάια (cf. Beloch, *GG*² 4.2.127) and 2.212-213, no. 433, s.v. Κλεοπάτρα. For Perdikkas' dealings with these women see Macurdy, *Hellenistic Queens* 37-38; Cloché, *La Dislocation* 51-53; Seibert, *Beiträge zur dynastischen Verbindungen* 13-16 and 19ff.; Briant, *Antigone le Borgne* 174-175; Errington, *JHS* 90 (1970) 63ff., who accepts the date given by the Babylonian Chronicle for Perdikkas' death (320 B.C.) and postpones Nikaia's arrival in Asia to summer 321.

¹⁵¹ Droysen's description is worth quoting: "Sie hatte das wilde illyrische Blut ihrer Mutter; sie zog mit in die Kriege; Abenteuer und Kriegsfahrten waren ihre Lust, und mehr als einmal nahm sie am Kampf persönlich teil; in einem Kriege gegen die Illyrer erschlug sie mit eigener Hand deren Königin und trug durch ihr wildes Eindringen in die Feinde nicht wenig zur Entscheidung des Tages (*Hellenismus* 2.60). See Polyainos 8.60, s.v. Κύννα.

deprived of his title and bound to allegiance by Kynnane, who proved more than his match in character and in deed. After Philip's death, Amyntas was executed on charges of conspiracy; perhaps he had been incited by Kynnane, who, though loyal to her father, will have preferred that her husband rule in place of her half-brother Alexander.¹⁵² Now in 322, as she saw Antipatros and Olympias intriguing with Perdikkas, she was determined to exert her influence and secure for herself and for her daughter Eurydike a share of the power.

Again Philip Arrhidaios proved to be Perdikkas' undoing. Kynnane saw the futility of vying for a union with Perdikkas: Antipatros could offer political advantages, and Kleopatra had more prestige than her half-sister.¹⁵³ Therefore, she resolved to by-pass the negotiating parties and to undermine their plans by wedding her daughter Eurydike to Arrhidaios. Antipatros was not eager to see Kynnane leave Macedonia - doubtless he was already troubled by the recent departure of Kleopatra -, and he left a force to bar the Hellespont. But the warrior-princess had surrounded herself with a small but efficient mercenary-force with which she broke through Antipatros' guard. When the word of her coming reached Perdikkas, he sent Alketas with orders to dissuade her, by force if necessary.

¹⁵² For Amyntas Perdikka see the Introduction; see also Arr. *Succ.* 22.

¹⁵³ Like Alexander, Kleopatra was the child of both Philip and Olympias.

Kynnane was not one to be dissuaded; defiant, she was cut down by Alketas' men in full view of the Macedonian army. Surely this was not how Perdikkas had envisioned Alketas' mission.¹⁵⁴ The army mutinied and demanded that Kynnane's purpose be fulfilled, that Eurydike be led to Arrhidaios.¹⁵⁵ What support Perdikkas had gained in the past year was now quickly eroding. His officers grew increasingly suspicious of his aspirations, the common soldier was alienated by his acts of barbarity.¹⁵⁶

Now things began to deteriorate rapidly. Antigonos sought refuge with Antipatros and Krateros, warning them of Perdikkas' intention to march on Macedonia.¹⁵⁷ Ptolemy, who had long feared Perdikkas' intervention in Egypt, made an alliance with the *strategoi* in Europe, who now abandoned their Aitolian war in mid-winter 322/1 and prepared to cross into Asia.¹⁵⁸ Polyperchon held Europe.¹⁵⁹

¹⁵⁴ It is generally held that Perdikkas instigated Kynnane's murder: so Droysen, *Hellenismus* 2.61; Niese 1.214; Vezin, *Eumenes von Kardia* 36; Cloché, *La Dislocation* 55. Beloch, *GG²* 4.1.83 even has her murdered by Perdikkas himself; Welles, *Alexander and the Hellenistic World* 53, thinks Perdikkas was incited by Kleopatra. I prefer Macurdy's suggestion that "Perdiccas saw the fatal stupidity of his brother's act..." (*Hellenistic Queens* 50).

¹⁵⁵ For the Kynnane-episode: Polyainos 8.60; Arr. *Succ.* 1.22-24.

¹⁵⁶ Meleagros, the Greek mercenaries, Ariarathes, now Kynnane.

¹⁵⁷ Diod. 18.23.4, 25.3-4; Justin 13.6.7-9; Arr. *Succ.* 1.24. Cf. Vezin, *Eumenes von Kardia* 37; Kaerst, *Hellenismus* 2.21, for Perdikkas' intention to march on Macedonia.

¹⁵⁸ Diod. 18.14.2; 18.25.4; Justin 13.6.9; Seibert, *Untersuchungen zur Geschichte Ptolemaios' I.* 64ff.

¹⁵⁹ Justin 13.6.9.

Perdikkas, meanwhile, abandoned Nikaia and openly courted Kleopatra, sending Eumenes with gifts to Sardeis, where she had taken up residence.¹⁶⁰ Antigonos' defection had been followed by that of Asandros, the Karian satrap, and now Menandros of Lydia also took flight.¹⁶¹ Perdikkas knew that a confrontation with Antipatros and his allies was inevitable, and he meant to bolster his position by marrying Kleopatra before he took the field and marched on Macedonia.

¹⁶⁰ Arr. *Succ.* 1.26; Eumenes' visit to Kleopatra follows Polemon's attempt to retrieve Alexander's body (1.25), but the phrase ἐν τούτῳ shows that the events were contemporaneous. Perdikkas was still hoping to recover the body and to march on Macedonia with both the funeral-car and Kleopatra. See R. Engel, "Zur Chronologie von Perdikkas' Massnahmen am Vorabend des ersten Koalitionskrieges 321 v. Chr.," *Rh. Mus.* 115 (1972) 215-219. The "gifts" to Kleopatra appear to have included turning over to her the satrapy of Lydia, for Menandros is described as δι' ὀργῆς ἔχων Περδίκκην ὅτι τὴν μὲν ξατρατείαν ἣν εἶχεν αὐτὸς Κλεοπάτρῃ ἐπιτέτροφε (Arr. *Succ.* fr.25, sect. 2). Seibert, *Beiträge zu dynastischen Verbindungen* 21, is too brief to be useful; see, however, Vezin, *Eumenes von Kardia* 40-41. Beloch, *GG*² 4.1.86, n.6, thinks the marriage did not take place on account of Kleopatra's unwillingness; cf. Cary, *A History of the Greek World from 323 to 146 B.C.* (2nd ed.), London, 1951, 12: "...she was as good a wrecker as her mother, and preferred, like Queen Elizabeth, to have many lovers so that she might disappoint them all." Droysen, *Hellenismus* 2.62, is probably right to say that she accepted Perdikkas' proposition ("die Königin gab sofort ihre Zustimmung"); but there was not sufficient time for the marriage to take place. She was favourably disposed toward the Perdikkas (Arr. *Succ.* fr.25, sect. 6), though she repudiated her *philia* - for this remained the extent of her relationship with Perdikkas - once her intended husband had died in Egypt (Arr. *Succ.* 1.40).

¹⁶¹ Arr. *Succ.* 1.26; fr.25, sect. 2; cf. Engel, *op. cit.* n.160 *supra*.

But at this point the bottom fell out of Perdikkas' carefully conceived scheme: Arrhidaios had completed the funeral-car in Babylon and had begun to transport the King's body to Egypt.

It would be rash to deny that Alexander had requested burial at the oasis of Ammon; on this point the sources concur.¹⁶² But Arrhidaios (not the King), who spent almost two years overseeing the funeral-arrangements, was surely instructed by Perdikkas that there would be a change in plans: Alexander's body would be taken to Macedonia, not Egypt.¹⁶³ We can only assume,

¹⁶² Diod. 18.3.5; Justin 12.15.7; 13.4.6; Curt. 10.5.4. Paus. 1.6.3 does say that the body was destined for Aigai, but this was in accordance with Perdikkas' change of policy (Μακεδόνων τοὺς ταχθέντας τὸν Ἀλεξάνδρου νεκρὸν εἰς Αἰγὰς κομίζειν); there is no mention of Alexander's wishes here. Cf. Arr. *Succ.* 1.25, where Arrhidaios acts against Perdikkas' wishes (παρὰ γνώμην... Περδίκκου); the matter is completely misinterpreted by R.M. Geer, *Diodorus of Sicily*, Loeb Classical Library, vol. 9, Cambridge, Mass., 1947, 19, n.4. Seibert, *Untersuchungen zur Geschichte Ptolemaios I.* 110-111, also supposes that there is a contradiction between Pausanias' account and the version given by Diodoros, Justin and Curtius. For Perdikkas' change of policy see Droysen, *Hellenismus* 2.67, n.2, placing Pausanias' testimony in the proper light. The most thorough discussion is that of Schübert, *Quellen zur Geschichte der Diadochenzeit*, Leipzig, 1914, chap. 13: "Der Streit um Alexanders Leiche," 180-189; see also Badian, "A King's Notebooks," *HSCP* 72 (1967) 185-189; Errington, *JHS* 90 (1970) 64-65; Beloch, *GG*² 4.1.86-87. Tarn 2.355-356, predictably, disbelieves Alexander's wish to be buried at Siwah, ascribing these reports to Ptolemy's propaganda; less dogmatic is the account given in *CAH* 6.467.

¹⁶³ For Arrhidaios see Berve 2.80, no. 145, s.v. Ἀρρίδαῖος; Kaerst, *RE* II (1896) 1249, s.v. "Arridaios (5)." He is not, as Justin 13.4.6 wrongly states, to be identified with Philip Arrhidaios, but later one of the guardians of the "Kings" (Arr. *Succ.* 31; Diod. 18.39); for the funeral-car see Diod. 18.3.5; 18.26-29; Arr. *Succ.* 1.25. Diod. 18.28.2 says that Arrhidaios' preparations took almost two years, a fact that seriously undermines Errington's attempts to revise the chronology of this period (*JHS* 90 [1970] 75-77).

as Perdikkas himself did, that there had been collusion between Ptolemy and the satrap of Babylonia, Archon; it was symptomatic of widespread disaffection among the officials of the empire.¹⁶⁴ News came to Perdikkas that Arrhidaïos had turned southward and was making for Egypt. But a force headed by the sons of Andromenes, sent out to retrieve Alexander's body, proved inadequate; for Ptolemy had marched out in full force to meet Arrhidaïos' procession and escort it to Egypt.¹⁶⁵ Significantly, none of the satraps between Babylonia and Egypt made an effort to intercede.

Robbed of his most valuable tool, Perdikkas abandoned all thoughts of marching against Antipatros. The haste of Antipatros' preparations had caught Perdikkas in an awkward situation: he had not yet completed the prerequisites for his march on Europe; neither Kleopatra or the King's body were in his possession. Thus he had already turned his attention to Egypt, where Ptolemy had been increasing steadily in power; news of the "body-snatching" only further emphasised his need to secure Asia first.¹⁶⁶

¹⁶⁴ See Arr. *Succ.* fr. 24, sect. 3. One would like to know where the *chiliarchos* Seleukos and Peithon, satrap of Media, were at this time and how they reacted to the incident.

¹⁶⁵ Diod. 18.28.2ff.; Arr. *Succ.* 1.25; Paus. 1.6.4; cf. Curt. 10.10.20. For the sons of Andromenes see Arr. *Succ.* 1.25 (Polemon only) and fr. 24, sect. 1 (both Attalos and Polemon). Cf. Badian, *HSCP* 72 (1967) 189, n.34.

¹⁶⁶ Diod. 18.25.6; Justin 13.6.10-13; Arr. *Succ.* fr.24, sect. 1. Seibert, *Untersuchungen zur Geschichte Ptolemaios I.* 110ff. Perdikkas had other grievances against Ptolemy: his execution of the *hyparchos* Kleomenes and his expansionist war against Kyrene.

Some realignments were made for the sake of security:

Philotas, a known supporter of Krateros, was deposed from the satrapy of Kilikia as Perdikkas entered that territory; there too provisions were made for the fleet, and Dokimos was despatched to Babylon with orders to replace Archon, suspected of complicity in the Arrhidaaios-affair.¹⁶⁷ Eumenes held the western front: his domain was enlarged to include Lykia, Karia and Phrygia, which had been abandoned by Nearchos,¹⁶⁸ Asandros and Antigonos respectively, and doubtless he kept a

¹⁶⁷ For Philotas see Berve 2.397, nos 803 and 804, s.v. Φιλώτας. Berve, *RE* XX.1 (1939) 177-178, s.v. "Philotas (2)"; 179, nos 7-9; P.Schoch, 179-180, no. 10 and 180, no.11; Arr. *Succ.* fr. 24, sect. 2: ἐπιτήδειον τοῖς ἀμφὶ Κρατερὸν. For Dokimos and Archon see Arr. *Succ.* fr.24, sect. 4-5; cf. Berve 2.86-87, no. 165, s.v. "Ἀρχων"; Kaerst, *RE* II (1896) 564, s.v. "Archon (5)"; Berve 2.147, no. 285; s.v. Δόκιμος; Kaerst, *RE* V (1905) 1274, s.v. "Dokimos (4)."

¹⁶⁸ Lykia was joined to Greater Phrygia after 330 and is usually given to Antigonos in the satrapy-lists: Arr. *Succ.* Ia.6, Ib.2; Curt. 10.10.2; Diod. 18.3.1; App. *Syr.* 53; though Justin 13.4.15 gives Lykia and Pamphylia to Nearchos, who had ruled it from 333 to 330. See Berve 1.276 opp.; Baumbach, *Kleinasien unter Alexander dem Grossen*, Diss. Jena, publ. Weida, 1911, 57 and 57, n.2, who believes that Justin is wrong concerning the satrapy in 323; Nearchos was later a supporter of Antigonos (Diod. 19.19; cf. Polyainos 5.35), and he may have controlled Lykia under Antigonos' direction; cf. Droysen, *Hellenismus* 2.16; Schachermeyr, *Alexander in Babylon* 144, n.91. See also Julien, *Zur Verwaltung der Satrapien unter Alexander dem Grossen*, Diss. Leipzig, publ. Weida, 1914, 17; Berve 2.269-272, no. 544, s.v. Νέαρχος, esp. 271; Capelle, *RE* XVI.2 (1935) 2134; Niese 1.197, n.2; Badian, "Nearchus the Cretan," *YCS* 24 (1975) 169, n.58; Lehmann-Haupt in J. Papastavru, *Amphipolis: Geschichte und Prosopographie* (*Klio* Beiheft 37) Leipzig, 1936, 137.

For Eumenes' territory see Justin 13.6.14-15; Plut. *Eum.* 5.1-2; Nepos, *Eum.* 3.2; cf. Diod. 18.25.6; 18.29.1.

watchful eye on Kleopatra in Lydia.¹⁶⁹ Under his command were placed also Neoptolemos, satrap of Armenia, and Alketas.¹⁷⁰ From the coast of Kilikia, Perdikkas despatched Sosigenes the Rhodian and Aristonous, his most faithful supporter throughout the war, to Kypros in order to deal with Ptolemy's allies there.¹⁷¹ At the same time, Attalos, who had now married Atalante, was ordered to accompany the army to Egypt with the fleet; in the present turbulence, Perdikkas thought it best to keep his sister in the camp.¹⁷²

Dokimos secured Babylon without difficulty, defeating in battle Archon, who soon died of a fatal wound.¹⁷³ Meanwhile, Perdikkas marched to Damaskos, where he probably replaced the satrap of Syria, Laomedon, a boyhood friend of Alexander who had gone over to Ptolemy,¹⁷⁴ and awaited reinforcement (likely headed by Peithon, satrap of Media). From here he made his

¹⁶⁹ See 207, n.160 *supra*.

¹⁷⁰ Justin 13.4.15; Diod. 18.29.2; Arr. *Succ.* 1.26; Plut. *Eum.* 5.2-3.

¹⁷¹ Arr. *Succ.* 24, sect. 6. Aristonous was to be *strategos*; Sosigenes *nauarchos* (Berve 2.369, no. 737, s.v. Σωσιγένης); Medios the Thessalian *xenagos* (Berve 2.261-262, no. 521, s.v. Μηδιος); and Amyntas *hipparchos* (Berve 2.26, no. 56, s.v. Ἀμύντας; cf. Kaerst, *RE* I [1894] 2007, s.v. "Amyntas [20]"). The Kyprian allies of Ptolemy were Nikokles, Nikokreon, Androkles and Pasikrates (Berve nos 567, 568, 73, 610). See Briant, *Antigone le Borgne* 205; Niese 1.219.

¹⁷² Justin 13.6.16 incorrectly says Kleitos; cf. Beloch, *GG*² 4.1.87, n.3. The women in camp included also Rhoxane and Hadea-Eurydike.

¹⁷³ Arr. *Succ.* fr.24, sect. 5.

¹⁷⁴ Berve 2.231-232, no. 464, s.v. Λαομέδων.

assault on Egypt.

In the west Perdikkas experienced further difficulties. Neoptolemos, long an enemy of Eumenes, abandoned the Perdikkan forces and joined Krateros' army; Alketas, perhaps stinging from a reproach over the manner in which he handled the affair of Kynnane, refused to serve under Eumenes, protesting that his Macedonians would not go into battle with the illustrious Krateros.¹⁷⁵ Nevertheless, Eumenes and his troops were victorious, though Perdikkas was never to learn the news.¹⁷⁶

The Egypt against which Perdikkas led his forces had been carefully prepared for the confrontation by Ptolemy, who realised from the start that war with Perdikkas was a strong possibility; he had spent the two years after the settlement at Babylon fortifying his satrapy and winning the loyalty of his followers.¹⁷⁷ Perdikkas, if indeed he did try to win support among his generals through gifts and promises (so Diod. 18.33.5), was less successful; as Beloch rightly remarks, "Perdikkas hatte nie die Gabe besessen, sich bei seinen Untergebenen beliebt zu machen" (*GG*² 4.1.88).

At first he made a daring assault on Kamelōn Teichos ("The Fort of the Camels"), but failed to take it by storm. The following

¹⁷⁵ Plut. *Eumenes* 5.3; but see Schubert, *Quellen zur Geschichte der Diadochenzeit*, Leipzig, 1914, 139-149, chap. 11: "Die Berichte über Krateros."

¹⁷⁶ Diod. 18.33.1 says that Perdikkas heard and was encouraged by the news of Eumenes' victory. But this is contradicted by Diod. 18.37.1 (cf. Plut. *Eum.* 8.2-3), who says the news arrived in Egypt 2 days after Perdikkas' murder. See Chapter 3: Krateros, 157-159 *supra*.

¹⁷⁷ Diod. 18.33.3-4.

night, he broke camp and marched upstream from Kamelōn Teichos to an island that lay opposite Memphis. But here Perdikkas made a grave error, for, in attempting to reach the island, his troops were subjected to great hardships and danger owing to the unexpected swiftness and depth of the Nile at that point. Only a small number crossed to the island successfully, and the bulk of the army found it an impossible feat; many were drowned in the attempt. What made matters worse was that Perdikkas, who had reached the opposite bank, had too few men to assault Memphis and was forced to re-cross the treacherous river. In all, according to Diodoros (18.36.1), some 2000 lives were lost, including some prominent commanders (ἐν οἷς καὶ τῶν ἐπιφανῶν τινες ἡγεμόνων ὑπῆρχον), though none of these is named. It was as much as the army was willing to endure from Perdikkas, whom they held responsible for their present miseries. He had failed for the last time. The foremost of his generals, including Peithon and Seleukos, conspired against him during the night and murdered him as he slept.¹⁷⁸ With him died the last hope for the empire as Alexander had envisioned it.

¹⁷⁸ For the account of Perdikkas' campaign against Ptolemy see Diod. 18.33-37 (the only extensive account); also Arr. *Succ.* 1.28; Plut. *Eum.* 8.2-3; Justin 13.8.1-2; see Seibert, *Untersuchungen zur Geschichte Ptolemaios I.* 118-128 for an analysis of the accounts. For his death: Arr. 7.18.5 (it was prophesied by the seer Peithagoras); Nepos, *Eum.* 5.1; Justin 13.8.10; 14.1.1; 14.4.11; 15.1.1; Diod. 18.36.3; Paus. 1.6.3; *Suda s.v.* Περδίκκας; Heidelberg Epit. 1; cf. G. Bauer, *Die Heidelberger Epitome: Eine Quelle zur Diadochengeschichte*, Greifswald, 1914, 34-36.

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APPENDIX 1

The *Somatophylakes* of Alexander the Great¹

W.W. Tarn introduced his discussion of "Alexander's Macedonian Troops" with the following judgment on Arrian's primary source: "Ptolemy knew everything about it [*i.e.*, the constitution of the army], but he knew it too well...and evidently he mentioned various things without giving such description or explanation of them as would be needed by a writer nearly 500 years later."² As in most military matters, Arrian's account, although generally recognised as the best that we possess, is marked by an ambiguous and inconsistent (often anachronistic) use of military terminology. The case of Alexander's *somatophylakes* is not exception, for on this point Ptolemy's history is of particular significance: he was himself a member of the Bodyguard. But, while the unsatisfactory and fragmentary nature of the extant sources makes a dogmatic approach unwise, there is scope for a reconstruction of the list of *somatophylakes* during the reign of Alexander.

Arrian (6.28.4) gives the only complete list of the Bodyguard in Alexander's lifetime: εἶναι δὲ αὐτῷ ἐπὶ εἰς τότε σωματοφύλακας, Λεοννάτον Ἀντίου, Ἡφαιστίωνα τὸν Ἀμύντορος, Λυσίμαχον Ἀγαθοκλέους, Ἀριστόνουν Πεισαίου, τούτους μὲν Πελλαίους, Περδίκκην δὲ Ὀρόντου ἐκ

¹ On the *somatophylakes* see H. Droysen, *Heerwesen und Kriegführung der Griechen*, Freiburg, 1889, 116-117; F. Lammert, *RE* IIIA.1 (1927) 991-992; H. Berve 1.25-30; Tarn 2.135-142, esp. 139-142; Hoffmann, *Die Makedonen* 167-179.

² Tarn 2.135.

τῆς Ὀρεσιτίδος, Πτολεμαῖον δὲ Λάγου καὶ Πεύθωνα Κρατεῦσα Ἑορδαίους· ὀγδοὺν δὲ προσγενέσθαι αὐτοῖς Πευκέστην τὸν Ἀλεξάνδρου ὑπερ-
 ασπίσαντα. The naming of all seven *somatophylakes* was occasioned by the creation of the eighth, and special, office for Peukestas, the man who saved Alexander's life in the battle with the Malloi in India. It is unfortunate that this list, included in the account of the events of the year 325, has led some scholars to assume that some members of the unit were appointed only shortly before 325; this at least is held for Lysimachos, Peithon, Aristonous. An examination of the names and careers of all known *somatophylakes* suggests a somewhat different arrangement.

From the ancient sources Berve has collected a list of no less than fourteen individuals who were thought to have held the office during Alexander's lifetime. Nevertheless, while the unit underwent a number of changes in personnel, it consisted very likely of seven members originally: this is suggested by the process of replacing individuals who are no longer *somatophylakes* (thrice attested in Arrian³) and by the creation of an exceptional eighth office to accommodate the heroic Peukestas. Admittedly, there is no formal list of the original seven *somatophylakes*, and Berve believes that the reconstruction of such a list of originals is seriously hampered by "die Wahrscheinlichkeit, dass wir nicht einmal die Namen sämtlicher Leibwächter in der ersten Zeit kennen";⁴ that

³ Arr. 2.12.2, Menes replaces Balakros; 3.5.5, Leonnatos replaces Arhybbas; 3.27.5, Ptolemy supersedes Demetrios.

⁴ Berve 1.27.

is, that the names of all originals have not been preserved even in scattered references. This is indeed a possibility - Berve might more usefully have spoken of "eine Möglichkeit," since "Wahrscheinlichkeit" is unduly pessimistic - and it must always remain in the foreground, but a list of probable original members can, I think with some justification, be drawn up from the existing evidence.

Of the fourteen names of individuals designated by the sources as *armiger*, *custos corporis*, σωματοφύλαξ and σωματοφύλαξ βασιλικός,⁵ three, clearly, cannot have held the office from the beginning, while a fourth, very likely, did not hold it at all. Menes, son of Dionysios,⁶ replaced Balakros, son of Nikanor,⁷ who had been appointed satrap of Kilikia in 333 B.C. (Arr. 2.12.2). Leonnatos succeeded to the position left vacant by the death of Arhybbas in Egypt in 332/1,⁸ and Ptolēmy, son of Lagos, replaced Demetrios, suspected of complicity in the so-called "conspiracy

⁵ The terms could apply to members of the "Bodyguard-proper" (the elite), but also to the larger group, the foot-guard or *hypaspistai*, as Tarn (*loc. cit.*) and Berve (1.122ff.) have shown. Diod. 16.94.4 and 17.61.3; Arr. 3.17.2 and 6.28.4 provide examples of the different usage.

⁶ See Berve 2.257, no. 507, *s.v.* Μένης; Hoffmann, *Die Makedonen* 171.

⁷ Berve 2.100, no. 200, *s.v.* Βάλακρος; Hoffmann, *Die Makedonen* 175-176.

⁸ Berve 2.85, no. 156, *s.v.* Ἀρύββας; Arr. 3.5.5, *mss.* have Ἀρρύβας, but for the name see Hoffmann, *Die Makedonen* 176-177. See also "Chapter 2: Leonnatos.

of Philotas" (Arr. 3.27.5).⁹ The fourth, Ptolemaios, son of Seleukos,¹⁰ whom Arrian (1.24.1) calls ἓνα τῶν σωματοφυλάκων τῶν βασιλικῶν, must be, as K.J. Beloch suggests,¹¹ so termed by confusion with another Ptolemaios (patronymic unknown, Berve, no. 672), who was killed during the taking of Halikarnassos and was called σωματοφύλαξ βασιλικός (Arr. 1.22.4). The two cannot have been identical since Ptolemaios, son of Seleukos, did not die until the battle of Issos, whereafter it is recorded that his successor was a commander of a *taxis*, with no mention of the rank of *somatophylax* (Arr. 2.12.2).¹² Of the three non-original members, only two, Leonnatos and Ptolemy, retained their offices beyond 330 B.C.; Menes was subsequently appointed *hyparchos* of Kilikia, Syria and

⁹ Berve 2.329-335, no. 668, s.v. Πτολεμαῖος. Arrian's comment that Ptolemy was rewarded for his loyalty to Alexander (in the flight from Philip's Court) by being appointed *somatophylax* anticipates the events described at Arr. 3.26.1-27.5 (3.6.6). For Demetrios see Berve 2.135, no. 260, s.v. Δημήτριος; Hoffmann, *Die Makedonen* 172-173.

¹⁰ Berve 2.335-336, no. 670, s.v. Πτολεμαῖος; Hoffmann, *Die Makedonen* 173-175.

¹¹ Beloch III² 2.327 (against Berve 2.335-336, n.3): "Verwechslung mit dem Somatophylax Ptolemaeos, dessen Tod vor Halikarnassos kurz vorher berichtet wird..." provides a sound reason for assuming that Ptolemaios (670), especially in the light of his later appearance as *taxiarch*, was not *somatophylax*. Less convincing is Beloch's charge that "es wäre doch sehr merkwürdig, wenn es damals 2 Somatophylakes namens Ptolemaeos gegeben hätte." There were in fact two *somatophylakes* named Ptolemaios during the course of the campaign.

¹² It is not necessary to suppose, as R.D. Milns ("Alexander's Seventh Phalanx Battalion," *GRBS* 7 [1966] 160, n.10) does, that Ptolemaios, son of Seleukos, was both *somatophylax* and *taxiarch*.

Phoinikia in 331 (Arr. 3.16.9).¹³

The early replacement of Arhybbas, Balakros and Demetrios, along with the death of Ptolemaios (672), creates a strong presumption that these four were members of the *somatophylakes* from the beginning of the expedition and, on account of their importance deriving from their aristocratic affiliations rather than their personal relationships with Alexander, they presumably held the rank already in the time of Philip II.¹⁴ Thus Berve observes:

¹³ A. Baumbach, *Kleinasien unter Alexander dem Grossen*, Diss. Jena, publ. Weida, 1911, 65, n.3; 72; P. Julien, *Zur Verwaltung der Satrapien unter Alexander dem Grossen*, Diss. Leipzig, publ. Weida, 1914, 62, n.2; 67; see now A.B. Bosworth, "The Government of Syria under Alexander the Great," *CQ* n.s. 24 (1974) 53-64.

¹⁴ We cannot say with any certainty what the roles of the *somatophylakes* were under Philip II; the importance of the unit under Alexander appears to be owed, in part, to the historian Ptolemy, who was himself a member of that unit. Likely, Philip's *somatophylakes* developed out of the machinery of the heroic monarchy (cf. C.F. Edson, "Early Macedonia", 22, 30-31 and *passim*, and G.S. Stagakis, "Observations on the ἑταῖροι of Alexander the Great," 86-102, in *Ancient Macedonia*, Thessaloniki, 1970). They were a refinement of the "retinue of nobles who rode with the king in battle" (Tarn 2.137) and, as such, they were undoubtedly chosen on the basis of their family-backgrounds and the duties performed by their fathers and forefathers. Tarn's suggestion (2.141) that the term *somatophylax* to Arrian and Ptolemy "designate[d] a few great officers, the so-called Bodyguards, who formed Alexander's personal Staff" is not entirely appropriate to Alexander and cannot be indicative of the rank in Philip's time. There can be no doubt that the *somatophylakes*, who are mentioned in the earliest references in Arrian, were inherited from Philip by Alexander (against Berve 1.26: "der ganz persönliche Charakter des Amtes verlangte eine freie Ernennung nur durch den König, die dieser sicher alsbald nach seiner Thronbesteigung vollzog"). In theory the new king will have had the right to choose his own Bodyguard, but at Alexander's accession he must have felt the need to maintain the goodwill of the nobility, whom Philip's *somatophylakes* represented. But there can also be no doubt that the *somatophylakes* owed their importance, as a unit, to the importance of the men who held the office and to the history written by one of their number.

"...dass nur Vertreter des höchsten Adels diese Würde erlangen konnten, die zunächst vielleicht bestimmten Geschlechtern vorbehalten war und deshalb auch später eine feste, unveränderliche Zahl ihrer Vertreter, also gleichsam einen *numerus clausus* aufwies (1.26)." And the particular attention that is given to the changes in personnel in the early years of the campaign suggests that no other changes were made in the constitution of the Bodyguard at this time involving the three as yet unidentified occupants of the remaining positions. It is not impossible, therefore, that three of the final seven regular Bodyguards were, in fact, originals and, consequently, not promoted to that rank by Alexander.

Five individuals remain to be considered: Hephaistion, Perdikkas, Peithon, Aristonous and Lysimachos. Of these Hephaistion is the most enigmatic; traditionally Alexander's dearest friend, of his early rank and activities very little record survives (see Chapter 1). The famed boyhood friendship derives primarily from the vulgate;¹⁵ indeed, in the important list of friends who were exiled on account of the Pixodaros-affair shortly after Philip's marriage to Kleopatra-Eurydike, Hephaistion's name is conspicuously absent.¹⁶ Furthermore, Tarn has correctly assigned the parallel that

¹⁵ Ps.-Kall. 1.18 and Jul. Val. 1.10 mention Hephaistion and Alexander sailing to Olympias together as teenagers; Diog. Laert. 5.1.27 (misprinted by Berve 2.169, n.3) mentions letters from Aristotle to Hephaistion; Curt. 3.12.15 describes him as *cum ipso* [sc. *Alexandro*] *pariter educatus*; two famous anecdotes concerning Sisygambis and the election of a new king for Sidon are products of the vulgate. For complete references see Berve 2.169-175, no. 357, s.v. Ἡφαίστιων and my Chapter 1: Hephaistion."

¹⁶ Plut. *Alex.* 10.4; Arr. 3.6.5.

made Hephaistion Patroklos to Alexander's Achilles to the poetasters, Choirilos of Iasos and the like,¹⁷ for the parallel was clearly more visible in the circumstances that surrounded Hephaistion's death than in the early years of the campaign.¹⁸ Hence Arrian's λόγος (1.12.1) that Hephaistion crowned the tomb of Patroklos at Ilion merits little attention as evidence for the early boyhood friendship.

Undoubtedly the friendship began at an early age (it is difficult to say precisely when), but when Alexander acceded to the throne, if the *somatophylakes* did in fact number seven at that time, all seven offices were already occupied by men of Philip's choosing; if Hephaistion was Alexander's dearest friend from childhood, it is unlikely that he belonged to Philip's Bodyguard. Similarly, it is unlikely that he became intimate with Alexander as a result of being *somatophylax*; his entire career indicates that he derived his rank from his relations with Alexander, not his friendship from his rank.¹⁹ Thus it is safe to assume that Hephaistion's promotion to the *somatophylakes* could have come only when one of the existing members needed to be replaced. Leonnatos' replacement of Arhybbas is the first one on

¹⁷ Tarn 2.55ff. and 78; Jacoby, *FGH Hist* 153 F10, 11.

¹⁸ The Achilles *imitatio*, Arr. 7.14.4. The entire Achilles-Alexander element derives from the poetasters (Tarn, *loc. cit.*) and hence also the correlation of Hephaistion and Patroklos. Cf. B. Perrin, "Genesis and Growth of an Alexander-myth," *TAPA* 26 (1895) 56-68.

¹⁹ Note particularly Plutarch (*Alex.* 47.11), where Alexander reminds Hephaistion that "without Alexander he would be nothing."

record, but it is not the first opportunity for such a replacement. Very early in the campaign the opportunity for Hephaistion's appointment presented itself in the death of Ptolemaios (672) at Halikarnassos. It is no coincidence that shortly afterward Hephaistion makes his first entry into history that does not derive from the poetasters. Two instances, the visit to the captive Persian Queen after the battle at Issos and the alleged admitting of Aristion to Alexander's Court,²⁰ cast Hephaistion in a role that befits both friend and Bodyguard. Berve's suggestion that Hephaistion commanded the "Leibhypsipisten (auch σωματοφύλακες genannt)"²¹ seems a desperate solution to a problem with as much simpler answer. This view is based on the assumption that, since Kleitos commanded the cavalry bodyguard, the *hembasilike*, Hephaistion commanded the equivalent infantry-division, the *agema* of the hypaspists. But it has been shown by Tarn and Milns²² that there was no division of the hypaspists who formed the *Leibwache*, rather the entire company of hypaspists were Alexander's footguard, and these were commanded by Parmenion's son,

²⁰ The story of Sisygambis and the mistaken identity: Arr. 2.12.6f.; Diod. 17.37.5; 17.114.2; Curt. 3.12.15ff.; Val. Max. 4.7 ext 2; Itiner. 37; *Suda*, s.v. Ἡφαίστιων. Marsyas of Pella, *FGH Hist* 135 F2, is the source of the story concerning Aristion. Cf. Aischines 3.162. Badian's view that Hephaistion was Demosthenes' "protector at court" is discussed and rejected by Goldstein, *The Letters of Demosthenes*, 1968, 43, n.33.

²¹ Berve 2.170.

²² Tarn 2.148; R.D. Milns, "The Hypaspists of Alexander III - Some Problems," *Historia* 20 (1970) 186-195.

Nikanor.²³ I see no evidence to link Hephaistion with the hypaspists at Gaugamela or at any other time.²⁴ Diodoros' (17.61.3) description of Hephaistion as τῶν σωματοφυλάκων ἡγούμενος proves somewhat difficult. It appears unlikely that the Greek can be taken to mean "fighting first among the bodyguards," which C. Bradford Welles ruled out for other reasons.²⁵ And, since the *somatophylakes* in this case cannot be the hypaspists, Diodoros must have (mistakenly) supposed that Hephaistion commanded the seven-man Bodyguard-elite; that this unit had a leader, or even fought as a formal division, seems improbable. But, if Diodoros does refer to the seven-man unit, then his information may verify my suggestion that Hephaistion was already a member of the *somatophylakes* by the time of the battle of Gaugamela. Berve's charge that "ausdrücklich wird er von Curt. VI, 8, 17 unter den Hetairoi, nicht unter den Somatophylakes genannt"²⁶ need not present unnecessary difficulties. The matter is resolved by J.C. Rolfe's apt translation of *ex amicis* as "from the company of his friends," for clearly Hephaistion's importance as one of Alexander's

²³ Pointed out by C. Bradford Welles, *Diodorus of Sicily*, vol. 8, Loeb Classical Library, Cambridge, Mass., 1962, 294-295, n.1.

²⁴ Arrian's account of the battle with Ariobarzanes at the Persian Gates (3.18) mentions a force commanded by Amyntas, Koinos and Philotas (not Parmenion's son). When Polyainos (4.3.27) speaks of Philotas and Hephaistion together in this battle, he appears to mean Philotas the cavalry-officer, implying that Hephaistion also commanded cavalry. The account is unreliable. Cf. Curt. 5.4.20, 30; Berve 2.170. The incident cannot refer to the *taxiarch* Philotas, or imply that Hephaistion commanded infantry.

²⁵ Welles, *loc. cit.*

²⁶ Berve 2.170, n.2.

friends and a member of the *Hetairoi* was greater than his rank as *somatophylax*.²⁷

Perdikkas' appointment to the *somatophylakes* has at times been debated, quite needlessly. He was not one of the Bodyguard-proper from the beginning, for when Diodoros (16.94.4) speaks of τῶν δὲ σωματοφυλάκων...ἐν οἷς ὑπῆρχεν καὶ Λεοννάτος καὶ Περδίκκας καὶ Ἀττάλος he is certainly referring to the larger division of *somatophylakes*, the hypaspists.²⁸ The wording of this account of the death of Pausanias reveals that these men were foremost among a greater group that constituted only a portion of the *somatophylakes* (οἱ μὲν attended to the body of Philip II, οἱ δέ, the group including Perdikkas, Leonnatos and Attalos, pursued the assassin), not an appropriate description of the seven-man unit. We know that Leonnatos did not become *somatophylax* until the death of Arhybbas, while Attalos, presumably the son of Andromenes,²⁹ never held the office at all. Perdikkas, like Leonnatos, attained the rank during the course of the campaign, but, since he suffered a partial *damnatio memoriae* at Ptolemy's hand, there is no exact record of his appointment in Arrian,³⁰ to whom alone of the extant sources this information was of interest. The date of his promotion

²⁷ J.C. Rolfe, *Quintus Curtius, The History of Alexander*, Loeb Classical Library, Cambridge, Mass., 1962, 75.

²⁸ Berve 2.92, n.3; 233, n.1; 313.

²⁹ Welles, *op. cit.*, 101, n.2.

³⁰ See R.M. Errington, "Bias in Ptolemy's History of Alexander," *CQ* n.s. 19 (1969) 233-242; cf. W. Schwahn, "Die Nachfolge Alexanders des Grossen," *Klio* 23 (1930) 211-238 and Kornemann, *Die Alexandergeschichte* 247.

is certainly fixed by the promotion of Menes. Diodoros (17.61.3) speaks of Perdikkas as *strategos* at Gaugamela (*i.e.*, distinct from Hephaistion who was already *somatophylax*), while Curtius (6.8.17) calls him *armiger* at the time of the Philotas-affair, linking him in this office with Leonnatos, whose appointment is dated by Arrian. Between the two falls the appointment of Menes as *hyparchos*. Thus, just as Menes had earlier succeeded Balakros as *somatophylax*, so Perdikkas now succeeded Menes.

The dates of appointment of Lysimachos, Aristonous and Peithon are unknown, though the general tendency, for no apparently compelling reason, has been to consider that they held the office only a short while before their mention in Arrian (6.28.4). But, in the list of the seven *somatophylakes*, there remain three vacant posts of which the original holders' names have not been preserved. I suggest that Lysimachos, Aristonous and Peithon were not appointed during the course of the campaign, that they did not replace officers whose names have not survived. One wonders how three individuals could remain relatively obscure throughout the campaign, how the dates and reasons for their promotion to what, in the second half of the campaign, was a position of great importance, could remain so totally mysterious. It appears more likely that these three were appointed as young men in the time of Philip II and on account of their affiliations with the Macedonian nobility. Their relative obscurity is explained by this and the fact that, although the power of the *somatophylax* was significant, as the events of the succession of 323 B.C. showed, only those who developed strong personal ties with Alexander (most notably Hephaistion, Perdikkas

and Ptolemy; to a lesser extent Leonnatos) distinguished themselves in the King's lifetime.³¹

*Test Case: Lysimachos, son of Agathokles*³²

The careers of Peithon, Aristonous and Lysimachos under Alexander are very much similar, though Lysimachos' later importance in the history of the *Diadochi* makes him the most interesting. The following account of the early career of Lysimachos will, I believe, prove wholly consistent with my comments on his position as *somatophylax*; it will also provide some additional arguments. Thus, I use the career of Lysimachos before 323 as a "test-case" for my theory concerning the original constitution of the Body-guard.

It is a curious fact of history that the Successors of Alexander were neither his greatest generals nor, with the exception of Ptolemy, son of Lagos, his dearest friends: these were, for the most part,

³¹ On the suppression of Aristonous' role as Bodyguard see Errington, *op. cit.*, 235; Aristonous was a supporter of Perdikkas, see Berve 2.69, no. 133, s.v. Ἀριστόνους.

³² Details can be found in Berve 2.239-241, no. 480, s.v. Λυσίμαχος. I list some *addenda* and *corrigenda*: on page 239, line 1 (of the article) read Arr. *Succ.* Ia.2 for *Succ.* 2; line 4, read *Demetr.* 44 instead of 45; p.240, lines 13-14, add Seneca, *de Clem.* 1.25.1 and Loukian, *dial. mort.* 14.4 (397); Curtius' discussion of Philippos' death is imprecisely referred to as "VIII,2,34" it should read Curt. 8.2.33-39 and especially 35-39. In note 2 "Vgl. auch Porphyry. Tyr. a.a.O. δορυφόρος..." add also Paus. 1.9.5; p.241, line 4, read Arr. 7.5.6; line 7, read Arr. 7.3.4. See also Hoffmann, *Die Makedonen* 171-172; F. Geyer, *RE* XIV.1 (1928) 1, s.v. "Lysimachos (1)" and Kornemann's appropriately brief discussion of Lysimachos in Arrian-Ptolemy (*Die Alexandergeschichte* 255).

dead by 321/0 B.C.³³ What we know of Ptolemy's career in the later stages of Alexander's expedition derives primarily from his own *History*; on the activities of the other Successors under Alexander we are considerably less enlightened. This is particularly true of Lysimachos. There are few undisputed facts: he was the son of a certain Agathokles, and the brother of Philippos (Berve, no. 774) and Autodikos (187), though a third brother, Alkimachos (47), is not positively identified; he was *somatophylax* (Arr. 6.28.4) and, as such, was wounded near Sangala in India (Arr. 5.24.5) and later crowned at Sousa (Arr. 7.5.6); he was present at Alexander's death, but in the succession of 323 B.C. he appears to have been regarded by Arrian (or Photios, his epitomator) as inferior to the great generals, including Ptolemy, Leonnatos and Perdikkas;³⁴ he received Thrace as his satrapy; and he died at Koroupedion in 281 B.C. The rest is far from certain.

³³ Parmenion and his sons, Nikanor and Philotas, were dead by 330, as was the *taxiarch* Amyntas, son of Andromenes (see W. Heckel, "Amyntas, son of Andromenes," *GRBS* 16 [1975] 393-398; "The Conspiracy Against Philotas," *Phoenix* 31 [1977] forthcoming; E. Badian, "The Death of Parmenio," *TAPA* 91 [1960] 324-338; "Alexander the Great and the Loneliness of Power," *AUMLA* 17 [1962] 80-91 = *Studies in Greek and Roman History*, Oxford, 1964, 192-205, esp. 193-197). In 328 Kléitos the Black was murdered at Marakanda (Cauer, *Jahrb. f. kl. Phil.* Supplbd 20 [1894] 38-58; Schubert, "Der Tod des Kleitos," *Rh. Mus.* 53 [1898] 98-120; Kornemann, *Die Alexandergeschichte* 248-251; T.S. Brown, "Callisthenes and Alexander," *AJP* 70 [1949] 236-240); Erigyios, a boyhood friend, died shortly before. Koinos died of illness in 326, Hephaistion in 324, as did Harpalos (Badian, "Harpalus," *JHS* 81 [1961] 16-43). Meleagros fell victim to Perdikkas' treachery and his own folly in 323. 322 saw Leonnatos' death in battle, while Perdikkas and Krateros perished somewhat ignominiously in 321/0 (see literature cited by J. Seibert, *Alexander der Grosse*, Darmstadt, 1972, 175-177).

³⁴ Arr. *Succ.* Ia.2: Perdikkas, Leonnatos, Ptolemy are termed οἱ μέγιστοι τῶν ὑπέρων καὶ τῶν ἡγεμόνων, Lysimachos is classed among τῶν μετ' ἐκείνου.

Lysimachos must have belonged to the Macedonian aristocracy: Arrian (*Indike* 18.3) states that he was from Pella, Plutarch (*Demetrios* 44) makes him *homophylos* with Demetrios Poliorketes, and Justin describes him as *inlustri quidem Macedoniae loco natus* (15.3.1; cf. Paus. 1.9.5). The testimony of Porphyrios of Tyre (ap. Euseb. Arm. = *FGrHist* 260 F3.8; Müller, *FHG* III, fr. 4,4), which makes Lysimachos a Thessalian from Krannon, is misguided and based on the information of Theopompos (ap. Athen. 6.259F-260A = *FGrHist* 115 F81), who claims that a certain Agathokles of Thessaly came to Macedonians as a slave of Philip II and gained considerable influence διὰ τὴν κολακεῖαν. Theopompos' scandalous characterisation of Agathokles scarcely inspires confidence: he did not speak highly of Thessalians who had dealings with Philip of Macedon.³⁵ But there is little reason to assume that Agathokles the Thessalian and the father of Lysimachos were the same man (so Geyer, *RE* XIV.1 [1928] 1), quite apart from the improbability that Lysimachos and his brothers would have gained such prominence had they been the sons of a slave. More plausible is Berve's outright rejection of this identification (2.239) and Hünérwadel's observation that no charge was ever brought against Lysimachos by the sources (or by his political enemies, as far as we can tell) concerning his alleged Thessalian origin or his father's flattery.³⁶

³⁵ Consider Theopompos' denigration of Thrasydaïos the Thessalian, a *tetrarch* who acted as Philip's ambassador to Thebes in 338 B.C.: μικρὸν μὲν ὄντα τὴν γνώμην, κόλακα δὲ μέγιστον.

³⁶ W. Hünérwadel, *Forschungen zur Geschichte Königs Lysimachos von Thrakien*, Diss. Zürich, 1910, 13. H.D. Westlake, "Eumenes of Cardia," *Essays on the Greek Historians and Greek History*, London, 1969, 320, disagrees; but cf. Hoffmann, *Die Makedonen* 171-172.

Moreover, the position of Agathokles' son, Philippos, as Royal Page (a rank restricted, according to Curt. 5.1.42, to *principum Macedoniae liberos*)³⁷ excludes any possibility that Agathokles was not of aristocratic descent.

In all likelihood, therefore, Alkimachos, son of Agathokles, was Lysimachos' brother. This man had attained prominence already under Philip and, after the battle of Chaironeia, went with Antipatros on an embassy to Athens, where he was voted *proxenos*.³⁸ In 334 Alkimachos disappears from the history of Alexander after being sent to overthrow the oligarchies in the Aiōlic and Ionian cities of Asia Minor and to replace them with democracies (Arr. 1. 18.1-2). Both Alkimachos and his father appear to have been men of considerable rank under Philip, and it is likely that the family was firmly entrenched in the Macedonian Court before Alexander's accession. And, although the family had close connexions with the King of the Macedonians - Lysimachos was *somatophylax*, Philippos a Royal Page, Autodikos a *somatophylax* of Philip Arrhidaios³⁹ -, Lysimachos and his brothers do not appear to have had strong personal ties with Alexander or to have been promoted through their relationships with him. Lysimachos, as I have mentioned, appears to have been one of the three surviving *somatophylakes* whom Alexander

³⁷ On the Royal Pages see Arr. 4.13.1; Ailian, *VH* 14.48 (an institution of Philip II); Diod. 17.65.1. See further Berve 1.37-39: "c) Die königlichen Pagen."

³⁸ On Alkimachos see Berve 2.23, no. 47, *s.v.* Ἀλκίμαχος. For his proxeny, Jensen (ed.), *Hypereides*, fr. 77; cf. *IG* II² 239.

³⁹ Arr. *Succ.* I.38; see Berve 2.95, no. 187, *s.v.* Αὐτόδικος.

had inherited and not personally appointed to the office.⁴⁰

The historians of Alexander the Great have been niggardly in their documentation of the early career of Lysimachos. Q. Curtius (8.1.13-17) first mentions him in the context of the lion-hunt in the forests of Bazeira in Sogdiana (328 B.C.). A lion of unusual size rushed at Alexander, and Lysimachos, presumably in his capacity as *somatophylax*,⁴¹ attempted to intervene on the King's behalf. Alexander, however, ordered Lysimachos aside and killed the beast with his own spear, reminding Lysimachos, all the while, of his misadventure during a lion-hunt in Syria.⁴² Curtius (8.1.15) gives the only credible version of Lysimachos' wounding by a lion: *Lysimachus enim quondam, cum venarentur in Syria, occiderat quidem eximiae magnitudinis feram solus, sed laevo humero usque ad ossa lacerato, ad ultimum periculi pervenerat*. The story became grossly distorted. Curtius claims that in his time the story was common that Alexander had exposed Lysimachos to a lion, though Curtius himself did not believe it (*fabulam quae*

⁴⁰ The other four originals had been replaced on account of death or removal from office: Arhybbas, Balakros, Demetrios, Ptolemaios; Berve, nos. 156, 200, 260, 672.

⁴¹ Pausanias (1.9.5), who gives a distorted version, does refer to Lysimachos as *δορυφόρος*, which may be intended to be the equivalent of *σωματοφύλαξ*. Cf. Berve 2.240, n.2.

⁴² Presumably the Sidonian lion-hunt, in which Krateros took part, is meant. The hunt was commemorated by Lysippos' composition (Arcyon Salis, *Leuenkampfbilder des Lysipp*, Berlin, 1956, 36-37; Franklin P. Johnson, *Lysippos*, Durham, N. Carolina, 1927, 226-228, with n.107 on p.227; Lippold, *RE* XIV.1 [1928] 61, s.v. "Lysippos"; see also P. Perdrizet, "Venatio Alexandri," *JHS* 19 [1899] 273-279), dedicated by Krateros the son at Delphoi (see Tarn, *Antigonos Gonatas*, Oxford, 1913, 213, n.145).

obiectum leoni a rege Lysimachum temere vulgavit ab eo casu quem supra diximus ortam esse crediderim: 8.1.17). Curtius' dates are far from certain,⁴³ and we cannot be sure whether or not he had the works of Seneca, the Elder Pliny and Pausanias in mind when he levelled this criticism.⁴⁴ The varied and intriguing details of the elaborated versions, which find Lysimachos caged with a ferocious lion, will, to a certain extent, have been the work of the Roman rhetoricians; but they did not invent the story. If Curtius belongs to the earliest days of the empire, then the *fabula* of Lysimachos will have been taken from earlier, lost sources. Ultimately, one suspects the early Hellenistic perpetrators of myth, Douris of Samos and the like. Plutarch (*Demetrios* 27.3) relates the lion-story in a very humorous context, comparing Lysimachos' scars, sustained while he was caged with a lion, with the bites on the neck of Demetrios, inflicted by the flute-girl Lamia. Immediately preceding this anecdote is a reference to Lynkeus of Samos, who attended and described in detail a dinner-party given by Lamia in honour of Demetrios.⁴⁵ Now, according to Athenaios (4.128A-B), both Douris and Lynkeus were students of Theophrastos of Eresos⁴⁶ and contemporaries

⁴³ On the much-disputed date of Q. Curtius Rufus see the most recent discussion of J. Rufus Fears, "Silius Italicus, *Cataphracti*, and the Date of Q. Curtius Rufus," *CP* 71 (1976) 214-223, with extensive bibliography, and esp. 215, n.7.

⁴⁴ Seneca, *de Ira* 3.17.2, with a veiled reference at 3.23.1; also *de Clem.* 1.25.1; Pliny, *NH* 8.54, Lysimachos strangles the lion; Paus. 1.9.5; cf. also Justin 15.3.7-8 (tears out the lion's tongue); Loukian, *dial. mort.* 14.4 (397); Plut. *Demetr.* 27.3.

⁴⁵ Plut. *Demetr.* 27.2; Athen. 3.101E; 4.128A-B.

⁴⁶ Athen. 8.337D and *Suda*, s.v. Λυγνεύς, Douris and Lynkeus were brothers.

of Lysimachos and Demetrios. Of the content of Douris' historical work we are reasonably well informed;⁴⁷ Lynkeus is more elusive, though it appears that his work was rich in the scandalous gossip of dinner-parties.⁴⁸ And dinner-parties, such as the one described by Lynkeus, will have been the source of, and the inspiration for, much of the gossip concerning the *Diadochi*,⁴⁹ and especially the stories about Demetrios, Lamia and Lysimachos.⁴⁹ Douris of Samos, on the other hand, is known to have been one of the sources for Plutarch's *Life of Eumenes*; his *History* covered the period in question and tended to be somewhat sensational. Of course, neither may have been the source - perhaps Lysimachos, for an unknown reason, circulated the story himself - but there is a strong probability that the author who invented or, at least, promulgated the story that Lysimachos was caged with a lion was a contemporary, or near-contemporary, of the Diadoch; Phylarchos, for one, is not above suspicion.⁵⁰

⁴⁷ See Jacoby, *FGrHist* IIA, no. 76, for the fragments; IIC, Leiden, 1963, 115-131. J.G. Droysen, *Kleine Schriften zur alten Geschichte*, Leipzig, 1894, 2.207, first suggested Douris as the source of the lion-story.

⁴⁸ See Körte, *RE* XIII.2 (1927) 2472-2473, s.v. "Lynkeus (6)."

⁴⁹ Cf. Athen. 6.246E; 6.261B; 14.614F-615A; Plut. *Demetr.* 27.3, all anecdotes illuminating Lysimachos' character.

⁵⁰ See esp. *FGrHist* 81 F12, 29, 31.

From the notoriously unreliable account of Justin we gain some insight into how the story may have been elaborated. Lysimachos was reputed for his cultivation of the philosophers - Onesikritos of Astypalaia, a pupil of Diogenes, was present at Lysimachos' Court⁵¹ - and already in 324 he had been given the funerary horse of the Indian philosopher Kalanos, whose student he had been (Arr. 7.3.4). Lysimachos' devotion to philosophy became proverbial,⁵² and the story developed that he pitied greatly the philosopher-historian Kallisthenes, whom Alexander had caged like a wild animal.⁵³ Lysimachos, who is said to have been a student of

⁵¹ Plut. *Alex.* 65.2. On Onesikritos' life and work see T.S. Brown, *Onesikritos: A Study in Hellenistic Historiography*, University of California Publications in History, vol. 39, Berkeley, 1949, 1-23; also Jacoby, *FGrHist* IIB, no. 134; IID 468-480; L. Pearson, *LHA* 83-111. According to Plutarch (*Alex.* 46.4), Onesikritos read Lysimachos the fourth book of his *History*, which included the tale of Alexander and the Amazons. Lysimachos remarked: "Where was I when all this happened?"

⁵² Against this view, Jacoby IID 470; according to the *Hypomnemata* of Karystios (*ap.* Athen. 8.610E) Lysimachos drove the philosophers out of his kingdom.

⁵³ On the various versions of Kallisthenes' death: Plut. *Alex.* 55.9; Chares, *FGrHist* 125 F15, says that he died of obesity and a disease of lice; Ptolemy, 138 F17 = Arr. 4.14.3, says that he was killed by hanging; Aristoboulos, 139 F33 = Arr. 4.14.3, claims that he was imprisoned and thereafter died of illness. See Berve 2.197, no. 408; cf. T.S. Brown, "Callisthenes and Alexander," *AJP* 70 (1949) 247-248; A.H. Chroust, *Aristotle*, vol. 1, Notre Dame, Indiana, 1973, 47 and 304-305. That he was a historian, and not a philosopher at all, is again brought to our attention by Badian, *The Deification of Alexander the Great*, Colloquy 21, Center for Hermeneutical Studies in Hellenistic and Modern Culture, Berkeley, 1976, 1; cf. Kroll, *RE* X.2 (1919) 1674-1726, esp. 1676, s.v. "Kallisthenes (2)." On his lack of philosophical training see A.B. Bosworth, "Aristotle and Callisthenes," *Historia* 19 (1970) 407-413.

Kallisthenes as well,⁵⁴ attempted to give him poison in order to remedy his plight. For this act, according to Justin, he was caged together with a lion, which he killed by tearing out its tongue (15.3.3-8).⁵⁵ What cast further suspicion on this account is the charge that Lysimachos was himself guilty of similar cruelty (conduct befitting a tyrant), for he mutilated and encaged Telesphoros the Rhodian, merely because he made a tasteless joke about Lysimachos' wife, Arsinoë, who was prone to vomiting.⁵⁶ As a result, the lion-story, now removed from its historical context (it takes place neither in Syria or Bazeira), explains Lysimachos' treatment of Telesphoros and is itself explained in terms of Alexander's cruelty to Kallisthenes. In fact, Alexander's caging of Lysimachos becomes canonised as one of the three great examples of Alexander's cruelty, together with the murder of Kleitos and the punishment of Kallisthenes, in the works of the Roman rhetoricians. The kernel of truth that can be extracted from the accounts of Lysimachos' encounter

⁵⁴ Justin 15.3.3-6. Chroust, *op. cit.*, 305, n.171, assumes that Lysimachos was foiled in his attempt to poison Kallisthenes; he accepts, rather naïvely, the story of Lysimachos' punishment.

⁵⁵ For the different versions see n.44 *supra*.

⁵⁶ Athen. 14.616C: κακῶν κατάρχεις τήνδ' ἐμοῦσαν εἰσάγων. Seneca, *de Ira* 3.17.3-4, describes the cruel punishment: *...cum oris detruncati mutilatique deformitas humanam faciem perdidisset; accedebat fames et squalor et inluvies corporis in stercore suo destitui; callosis super haec genibus manibus....* Athenaios was fond of such stories as well: cf. the case of Sotades of Maroneia, the *kinaidologos*, who, according to the account given by his son Apollonios, insulted first Lysimachos and then Ptolemy Philadelphos, and consequently was sunk into the deep in alleaden jar by Ptolemy's admiral, Patroklos (14.620F-621A).

with the lion is disappointing: Lysimachos once killed a lion of extraordinary size in Syria, but was severely mauled in the process; on a second occasion, in the Bazeiran woods, Alexander prevented him from making a similar mistake.

That the Lysimachos of Plutarch's version of the *proskynesis*-episode (*Alex.* 55.2) is not the son of Agathokles has been needlessly debated;⁵⁷ Berve (2.241, no.481) correctly recognised that this is Lysimachos, Alexander's Akarnanian tutor, the victim of Chares' hostility.⁵⁸ It is puzzling, however, that Berve does not credit Lysimachos' role in the Kleitos-episode ("die Rolle, welche man ihm, freilich mit Unrecht,...zuschrieb..."),⁵⁹ as related by Curtius (8.1.46). There is no good reason to disbelieve Curtius, as I have argued at length in my discussion of Leonnatos (Chapter 2); I do not repeat these arguments. To determine who did what in such a chaotic instance is not possible. But it is also not true that Plutarch's report vitiates that of Curtius (as Berve argues), for the former concerns the removal of Alexander's own sword, while the latter involves a spear, which Alexander had taken from one of the *somatophylakes*.⁶⁰ It appears that in Plutarch's version all the *somatophylakes* were present (51.11), as we should expect. Presumably they did not stand idly by as Aristonous alone attempt to restrain the King. Very likely each one attempted, in his own way, to avert the disaster. But, since Curtius (and probably his source) named Lysimachos in the company of Leonnatos, Perdikkas and Ptolemy

⁵⁷ See Hamilton, *PA* 14, 153-154; Pearson, *LHA* 57.

⁵⁸ Berve 2.241; Hamilton, *loc. cit.*; Pearson, *loc. cit.*

⁵⁹ Berve 2.240, though he accepts that Lysimachos was *somatophylax*.

⁶⁰ Curt. 8.1.45: *Alexander rapta lancea ex manibus armigeri....*

(all of whom were already *somatophylakes*), he was doubtless aware that Lysimachos was *somatophylax* at the time.

Not long after the affair of Kleitos, Lysimachos' younger brother, Philippos, the Royal Page, accompanied the King some five hundred *stadia* on foot, refusing to mount the horse of Lysimachos, who rode nearby. Remaining ever at the King's side, both in the pursuit of the supporters of Sisimithres and in the skirmish that followed, Philippos finally collapsed and expired in the King's arms. This story is told only by Curtius (8.2.35-39) and Justin (15.3.12). It is preceded in Justin (15.3.10-11) by a similar story, in which Lysimachos remains at Alexander's side in India when all others have fallen behind; but this is surely a doublet.⁶¹ The story is further complicated. Appian (*Syr.* 64) and Justin (15.3.13-14) relate that Lysimachos - here a hypaspist, which in the Indian campaign is entirely impossible - was wounded by Alexander's spear as Alexander leapt from his horse. He began to bleed profusely and the King, for want of proper bandages, placed his diadem on Lysimachos' head in an attempt to stop the bleeding (*diadem sibi demptum rex adligandi vulneris causa capiti eius inponeret*: Justin 15.3.13). That Aristandros (who vanished from the accounts of Alexander, probably with the end of Kallisthenes' historical work) or any other seer prophesied that this act signified that Lysimachos would himself become King defies all credulity.⁶²

⁶¹ Recognised by Berve 2.240, n.4.

⁶² See Berve 2.241, n.2; 2.62-63, no. 117; A. Fränkel, *Die Quellen der Alexanderhistoriker*, Leipzig, 1883, 171ff. and C.A. Robinson Jr., "The Seer Aristander," *AJP* 50 (1929) 195ff.; *contra* Hamilton, *PA* 4.

This tale of Lysimachos' wound is a later invention, as is Aristoboulos' claim (*FGrHist* 139 F54 = Arr. 7.18.5) that the seer Peithagoras predicted Lysimachos' victory over Antigonos at Ipsos; both are creations *ex post facto*.

What evidence remains for the early career of Lysimachos is straight-forward enough. Near Sangala in India some 1200 of Alexander's troops were wounded, among them Lysimachos the *somatophylax* (Arr. 5.24.5). He had earlier boarded a thirty-oared vessel at the Hydaspes, before the battle with Poros, though his role in the actual battle is not attested (Arr. 5.13.1); presumably he fought in the immediate vicinity of the King. When Alexander decided to sail down the Indus River-system to the Ocean, Lysimachos was one of those from Pella charged with a trierarchy in the Attic fashion (Arr. *Ind.* 18.3 = Nearchos, *FGrHist* 133 F1). He is named by Arrian in the only complete list of the *somatophylakes* (6.28.4).

Perhaps there is some truth to the stories that Lysimachos was a student of philosophy, for Arrian (7.3.4) makes him a disciple of Kalanos. The Indian philosopher, sensing that his death was near, went to his own funeral pyre. The people of Nysa had given him a splendid horse to ride, but Kalanos was too weak and gave the animal to Lysimachos. Probably Lysimachos discoursed with Onesikritos, another devotee of Kalanos and also Alexander's helmsman, whom he undoubtedly knew and who later read his *History* at Lysimachos' court. How he reacted to Alexander's treatment of Kallisthenes, we cannot say.

At Sousa in spring 324, Lysimachos and the rest of the Bodyguard were crowned by Alexander, though, unlike Leonnatos, Lysimachos appears to have earned no special distinction (Arr. 7.5.6). Very likely, he was a bridegroom at Alexander's mass-marriages, though the name of his Persian bride is unknown; nor is there any clue about her fate. Lysimachos may have repudiated the marriage after Alexander's death, although it is worthy of note that in 302 B.C. he married (albeit only for a brief time) Amastris, whom Krateros had married at Sousa but repudiated in favour of Antipatros' daughter, Phila.⁶³

According to Pseudo-Kallisthenes (3.32), Lysimachos, Ptolemy and Perdikkas (Metz Epit. 103 includes the enigmatic Holkias, Berve, no. 580) were summoned to Alexander's death-bed; this may be true. But the claim that Alexander commanded Lysimachos to advance to Thrace (*proficiscere...in Thraciam*: Metz Epit. 111) is fabrication. Similarly, any belief that he was allotted Thrace because he was the best qualified to subdue and rule it (*quasi omnium fortissimo*: Justin 15.3.15)⁶⁴ or that Alexander envied him his abilities as a commander (so Ailian, *VH* 12.16; 14.47a) must be dispelled: such judgments are based on hindsight, not on the evidence for Lysimachos' activities under Alexander.

⁶³ See U. Wilcken, *RE* I.2 (1894) 1750; s.v. "Amastris (7)"; also Berve, no. 50, s.v. "Ἀμαστρίς".

⁶⁴ For Thrace see Justin 15.3.15; Ailian, *VH* 12.16; 14.47a; Diod. 18.3.2; Arr. *Succ.* Ia.7, Ib.3, I.10; Curt. 10.10.4; Justin.13.4.16; App. *Syr.* 53; Paus. 1.9.5; Metz Epit. 111.

There remains one thorny problem: how old was Lysimachos when he died? His age at Koroupedion is given variously as eighty ([Loukian], *Makrob.* 11), seventy-four (Justin 17.1.10) and seventy (Appian, *Syr.* 64). One is immediately attracted to the testimony of [Loukian], who claims as his primary source the worthy Hieronymos of Kardia.⁶⁵ But [Loukian] may not be quoting his sources accurately,⁶⁶ and the macrobian list, which admits only octogenarians, may have exaggerated Lysimachos' age slightly. If [Loukian] can be shown to misrepresent the testimony of Hieronymos, then we must abandon the source-critical approach; for we know neither what Hieronymos himself wrote nor which sources Justin and Appian used. We must, therefore, judge Lysimachos' age in the light of the evidence that we have accumulated; and this suggests that he was older. If he was *somatophylax* already in Philip's day, then he was probably somewhat older than Alexander, although Justin's date for Lysimachos' birth, 355 B.C., could still stand as the extreme lower limit.

Appian's seventy years are certainly wrong. By this reckoning Lysimachos would have been too young to have been one of Philip's *somatophylakes*: thus he must have been appointed during the course of the campaign, probably in the early 320s. And this is unlikely.

⁶⁵ On Hieronymos see Jacoby, *FGrHist* 154; IID 544-547; T.S. Brown, "Hieronymus of Cardia," *AHR* 52 (1946-1947) 684ff.

⁶⁶ See the edition of A.M. Harmon, *Lucian*, vol. 1, Loeb Classical Library, Cambridge, Mass., 1913, 229, notes 1 and 2; yet he finds only three errors, all in section 10. See, however, Berve, who doubts [Loukian] on the ages of Ptolemy (2.330) and Seleukos (2.351, n.5).

We know of no *somatophylax* whom he replaced (or could have replaced), nor do we know the time of, or reason for, his appointment. Furthermore, at this stage of the expedition, Alexander had begun to develop the *somatophylakes* into his personal military "Staff," since four of his trusted friends - Hephaistion, Ptolemy, Perdikkas and Leonnatos - had been appointed to the office.

How then are we to account for the sudden appointment of the youthful (by Appian's dating) and untried Lysimachos? If there is indeed an explanation for this, then it must be one that applies equally to Peithon and Aristonous, whose careers are remarkably similar to that of Lysimachos. Whom did they replace? When were they appointed? And why?

The study of the evidence for the early career of Lysimachos must lead, inevitably, to disappointment. The historians of Alexander have left little record of Lysimachos' activities: few details illuminate his career; the man is all but devoid of characterisation. In fact, there is little in the sources, apart from a handful of references in Arrian, that is not contaminated by the hindsight of historians. The most frequently attested episodes derive from late sources, and these transpose a familiarity with the cruel and miserly Diadoch onto the inconspicuous *somatophylax* of Alexander. What little information appears likely to be true is, unfortunately, of very limited interest and value. There is one explanation: Lysimachos attained his rank before Alexander's accession, his fame and power after, and as a result of, Alexander's death.

We may be encouraged by the careers of Philip's other *somatophylakes* (Arhybbas, Balakros, Demetrios, Ptolemaios, Aristonous and Peithon), who were relatively insignificant under Alexander. The first four, but for the fact that they died (Arhybbas, Ptolemaios) or were replaced (Balakros, Demetrios), are nothing more than names. Peithon and Aristonous are virtual mirror-images of Lysimachos, once his history is stripped of the late and unreliable elements.⁶⁷ Ptolemy does not mention Aristonous' heroism against the Malloi, but Ptolemy was not present at the battle (as he himself says),⁶⁸ and it is doubtful that he suppressed much else concerning Aristonous' uneventful career before 323 B.C.

Thus a study of Lysimachos' early career appears entirely consistent with my views on the *somatophylakes*. There were only as many *somatophylakes* as are named by the sources. A man's affiliations with the Macedonian nobility determined, in part, his eligibility for the office. The unit comprised seven members in the beginning, as it did in the end, for the creation of the eighth member (temporarily), Peukestas, was unusual; it occasioned in fact the only complete list of the *somatophylakes*, which might

⁶⁷ See Berve, nos. 133, 621, s.vv. Ἀριστόνους, Πεύκων.

⁶⁸ See R.M. Errington, "Bias in Ptolemy's History of Alexander," *CQ* n.s. 19 (1969) 235-236; Curt. 9.5.21: *Ptolomæum, qui postea regnavit, huic pugnae adfuisse auctor est Clitarchus et Timagenes; sed ipse, scilicet gloriae suae non refragatus afuisse se, missum in expeditionem, memoriae tradidit.* Cf. Arr. 6.11.8.

otherwise not have been recorded. That this list appears under the events of the year 325 is owed to the unprecedented appointment of Peukestas and implies nothing about the dates of promotion to the rank of *somatophylax* of Peithon, Aristonous and Lysimachos. In his capacity as *somatophylax*, a man did not attract much attention, unless he was wounded, performed some act of bravery, or was involved in some activity worthy of recording. In the later years of the campaign, some of the *somatophylakes* became Alexander's foremost commanders, but the lesser members of the unit remained in the shadows. Ultimately, what won renown was not a man's rank, but his ability.

APPENDIX 2

Hephaistion's *Chiliarchia*(1) *Testimonia*

A) Evidence for the Chiliarchy in Persia:

A1 = Aischylos, *Persai* 302-305:

Ἄρτεμβάρης δὲ μυρίας ἔππου βραβεὺς
 στύφλους παρ' ἀκτὰς θείνεται Σιληνιῶν
 χῶ χιλίαρχος Δαδάκης πληγῇ δορὸς
 πήδημα κοῦφον ἐκ νεῶς ἀφήλατο.

A2 = Herodotos 7.81: τοῦτοῦ ὦν τοῦ στρατοῦ ἥρχον μὲν οὗτοι οὗ περ
 εἰρέαται καὶ οἱ διατάξαντες καὶ ἐξαριθμήσαντες οὗτοι ἦσαν καὶ
 χιλιάρχας τε καὶ μυριάρχας ἀποδέξαντες, ἑκατοντάρχας κτλ.

A3 = Xenophon, *Inst. Cyr.* 2.1.23: ἄλλα δὲ προύφαινε τοῖς μὲν ταξιάρχους
 ὥς τοὺς κρατίστας δόξαντας τὰς τάξεις παρεσκευάσθαι χιλιάρχους
 ἔσεσθαι....

A4 = Xenophon, *Inst. Cyr.* 3.3.11: Οὕτω δὲ πρῶτον μὲν ἐξώπλισε τὴν
 στρατιὰν καὶ κατέταξεν ὥς ἐδύνατο κάλλιστά τε καὶ ἄριστα, ἔπειτα
 δὲ συνεκάλεσε μυριάρχους καὶ χιλιάρχους καὶ ταξιάρχους καὶ λοχαγούς.

A5 = Xenophon, *Inst. Cyr.* 4.1.4: Χρυσάνταν δὲ ὥς καὶ ἐργάτην τῶν πολεμικῶν
 καὶ φρόνιμον καὶ ἄρχεσθαι ἱκανὸν καὶ ἄρχειν χιλιαρχίᾳ μὲν ἦδη τιμῷ.

- A6 = Xenophon, *Inst. Cyr.* 7.5.17: ὥς δὲ τὸ τοῦ ποταμοῦ οὕτως ἐπορσύνετο, παρηγγύησεν ὁ Κύρος Πέρσαις χιλιάρχους καὶ πεζῶν καὶ ἱππέων εἰς δύο ἄγοντας τὴν χιλιοστὺν παρεῖναι πρὸς αὐτόν,...
- A7 = Xenophon, *Inst. Cyr.* 8.6.1: τοὺς μέντοι ἐν ταῖς ἄκραις φρουράρχους καὶ τοὺς χιλιάρχους τῶν κατὰ τὴν χώραν φυλακῶν οὐκ ἄλλου ἢ ἑαυτοῦ ἐβούλετο ἀκούειν. Cf. Xen. *Inst. Cyr.* 8.6.9.
- A8 = Xenophon, *Oecon.* 4.7: καὶ οὐ μὲν ἂν φαίνονται τῶν φρουράρχων καὶ τῶν χιλιάρχων καὶ τῶν σατραπῶν τὸν ἀριθμὸν τὸν τεταγμένον ἔκπλεων ἔχοντες καὶ τούτους δοκίμοις ἵπποις τε καὶ ὄπλοις κατεσκευασμένους παρέχωσι, κτλ.
- A9 = Plut. *Themistokles* 27: ὁ δ' οὖν Θεμιστοκλῆς γενόμενος παρ' αὐτὸ τὸ δεινόν, ἐντυχάνει πρῶτον Ἀρταβάνῳ τῷ χιλιάρχῳ, λέγων "Ἕλλην μὲν εἶναι, βούλεσθαι δ' ἐντυχεῖν βασιλεῦ περὶ πραγμάτων μεγάλων καὶ πρὸς ἃ τυγχάνοι μάλιστα σπουδάζων ἐκεῖνος.
- A10 = Plut. *Themistokles* 29.2: ἔτι δὲ Ῥωξάνης ὁ χιλιάρχος, ὥς κατ' αὐτὸν ἦν ὁ Θεμιστοκλῆς προσιών, καθημένου βασιλέως καὶ τῶν ἄλλων σιωπῶντων, ἀτρέμα στενάξας εἶπεν....
- A11 = Nepos, *Conon* 3: [sc. *Tithrausten*] *chiliarchum*, *qui secundum gradum imperii tenebat*.
- A12 = Arr. *Anab.* 3.21.1: οὗτοι ἀπήγγειλαν ὅτι Ναβαρζάνης τε, χιλιάρχης τῶν ξὺν Δαρεΐῳ φευγόντων ἱππέων, καὶ Βῆσσος ὁ Βακτρίων σατράπης....
- A13 = Diod. 18.48.5: ἡ δὲ τοῦ χιλιάρχου τάξις καὶ προαγωγὴ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ὑπὸ τῶν Περσικῶν βασιλέων εἰς ὄνομα καὶ δόξαν προήχθη, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα πάλιν ὑπ' Ἀλεξάνδρου μεγάλης ἔτυχεν ἐξουσίας καὶ τιμῆς, ὅτε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Περσικῶν νομίμων ζηλωτῆς ἐγένετο.

B) Evidence for the military nature of the Chiliarchy:

B1 = Arr. *Tact.* 10 = Ailian *Tact.* 9.6: τοῦτο δὲ διπλασιασθὲν γύγνεται χιλιαρχία, [ἀνδρῶν μὲν] τεσσάρων καὶ εἴκοσι καὶ χιλίων, λόχων δὲ τεσσάρων καὶ ἐξήκοντα, καὶ ὁ ἐπὶ τούτῳ χιλιάρχης.

B2 = Hesychios, s.v. χιλιάρχος· χιλίων ἄρχων.

B3 = Curt. 5.2.2-3: *praemiaque proposuit [sc. Alexander] de virtute militari certantibus nova; qui fortissimi iudicati essent singulis militum milibus praefuturi erant - chiliarchas vocabant - tunc primum in hunc numerum copiis distributis: namque antea quingenariae cohortes fuerant....*

C) Evidence for Chiliarchies in Alexander's Army:

C1 = Arr. 1.22.7: καὶ ἐν τούτοις (*i.e.*, among those who died at Halikarnassos) Πτολεμαῖός τε ὁ σωματοφύλαξ καὶ Κλέαρχος ὁ τοξάρχης καὶ Ἀδαῖος ὁ χιλιάρχης.

C2 = Arr. 3.29.7: Πτολεμαῖον δὲ τὸν Λάγου ἀποστέλλει τῶν τε ἐταίρων ἵππαρχίας τρεῖς ἄγοντα καὶ τοὺς ἵππακοντιστάς ξύμπαντας, πεζῶν δὲ τὴν τε Φιλῶτα τάξιν καὶ τῶν ὑπασπιστῶν χιλιαρχίαν μίαν καὶ τοὺς Ἀγριᾶνας πάντας κτλ.

C3 = Arr. 4.24.10: τὴν δευτέραν δὲ μοῖραν Πτολεμαίῳ τῷ Λάγου ἄγειν ἔδωκε, τῶν τε ὑπασπιστῶν τῶν βασιλικῶν τὸ τρίτον μέρος καὶ τὴν Φιλίππου καὶ Φιλῶτα τάξιν καὶ δύο χιλιαρχίας τῶν τοξοτῶν κτλ.

C4 = Arr. 4.30.5-6: ἐς δὲ τὴν ὑστεραίαν Νεάρχόν τε καὶ Ἀντίοχον τοὺς χιλιάρχους τῶν ὑπασπιστῶν ἐκπέμπει· καὶ Νεάρχῳ μὲν τοὺς

Ἄγριᾶνας τοὺς φιλοῦς ἄγειν ἔδωκεν, Ἀντιόχῳ δὲ τὴν τε αὐτοῦ χιλιαρχίαν καὶ δύο ἐπὶ ταύτης ἄλλας.

C5 = Arr. 5.23.7: ὁ δὲ [sc. Ἀλέξανδρος] Πτολεμαῖον τὸν Λάγου ἐπιτάττει ἐνταῦθα, τῶν τε ὑπασπιστῶν αὐτῷ δοὺς χιλιαρχίας τρεῖς καὶ τοὺς Ἀγριᾶνας ξύμπαντας καὶ μίαν τάξιν τῶν τοξοτῶν.

C6 = Arr. 7.14.10: See E1.

C7 = Arr. 7.25.6: παραγγεῖλαι δὲ τοὺς μὲν στρατηγοὺς διατρίβειν κατὰ τὴν αὐλήν, χιλιάρχας δὲ καὶ πεντακοσιάρχας πρὸ τῶν θυρῶν.

C8 = Arr. *Succ.* Ia.3: See E2.

C9 = Arr. *Succ.* Ib.3: See E3.

C10 = Curt. 5.2.2-3: See B3.

C11 (?) = Athen. 12.539E = Phylarchos, *FGrHist* 81 F41 (cf. Agatharchides of Knidos, *FGrHist* 86 F3): ἦν γὰρ αὐτοῦ ἡ σκηνὴ κλινῶν ρ', χρυσοῦ δὲ κίονες ν' κατεῦχον αὐτὴν [sc. Ἀλέξανδρος].... καὶ πρῶτον μὲν Πέρσαι φ' μηλοφόροι περὶ αὐτὴν ἐντὸς εἰστήκεισαν πορφυραῖς καὶ μηλίναις ἐσθῆσιν ἐξησηκμένοι· μετὰ δὲ τούτους τοξόται τὸν ἀριθμὸν χίλιοι, οἱ μὲν φλόγιαν ἐνδεδυκότες, οἱ δὲ ὑσγίνοβαφῇ, πολλοὶ δὲ καὶ κυάνεα εἶχον περιβόλαια. προειστήκεισαν δὲ τούτων ἀργυράσπιδες Μακεδόνες πεντακόσιοι.

D) Evidence for Hazarapatis:

D1 = Hesychios s.v. ἄζαραπατεῖς· οἱ εἰσαγγελλεῖς παρὰ Πέρσαις.

D2 = Photios, *Bibl.* 72 p.42a = Ktesias, *FGrHist* 688 F15, sect. 46:

Βασιλεύει δὲ Σεκυνδιανὸς καὶ γίνεται ἄζαβαρίτης αὐτῷ Μενοστάνης.

For ἄζαβαρίτης read ἄζαραβίτης, so Schachermeyr, *Alexander in*

Babylon 32, n.62; Jacoby IIIC 469.

D3 = Ailian, *VH* 1.21: ἔφατο οὖν πρὸς αὐτὸν ὁ χιλιάρχος ὁ καὶ τὰς ἀγγελίας εὐσκομίζων τῷ βασιλεῦ καὶ τοὺς δεομένους εἰσάγων.... Cf. Nepos, *Conon* 3, A11.

E) Evidence for the Chiliarchy of Hephaistion:

E1 = Arr. 7.14.10: οὐκ οὐδὲ ἄλλον τινα ἔταξεν ἀντὶ Ἡφαιστιώνος χιλιάρχον ἐπὶ τῇ ἵππῳ τῇ ἐταιρικῇ Ἀλέξανδρος, ὥς μὴ ἀπόλοιτο τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ Ἡφαιστιώνος ἐκ τῆς τάξεως, ἀλλὰ Ἡφαιστιώνος τε ἡ χιλιarchία ἐκαλεῖτο καὶ τὸ σημεῖον αὐτῆς ἠγεῖτο [τὸ] ἐξ Ἡφαιστιώνος πεποιημένον.

E2 = Arr. *Succ.* Ia.3: Περδίκκην δὲ χιλιαρχεῖν χιλιarchίας ἥς ἦρχεν Ἡφαιστιών (τὸ δὲ ἦν ἐπιτροπὴ τῆς συμμάχης βασιλείας).

E3 = Arr. *Succ.* Ib.4: Περδίκκας δὲ τὴν Ἡφαιστιώνος χιλιarchίαν [ἐτέτακτο].

F) Evidence for the Hipparchy of Hephaistion:

F1 = Plut. *Eumenes* 1.5: [Εὐμενῆ] καὶ τὴν Περδίκκου παραλαβεῖν ἵππαρχίαν, ὅτε Περδίκκας ἀποθανόντος Ἡφαιστιώνος εἰς τὴν ἐκεῖνου προῆλθε τάξιν.

F2 = Diod. 18.3.4: Σέλευκον δ' ἔταξεν ἐπὶ τὴν ἵππαρχίαν τῶν ἐταίρων, οὗσαν τὴν ἐπιφανεστάτην· ταύτης γὰρ Ἡφαιστιών πρῶτος μὲν ἠγήσατο, μετὰ δὲ τοῦτον Περδίκκας, τρίτος δ' ὁ προειρημένος Σέλευκος.

F3 = Appian, *Syr.* 57: τοσαῦτα μὲν περὶ τῶν Σελεύκῃ προμαντευθέντων ἐπυθόμην· γίγνεται δ' εὐθύς Ἀλεξάνδρου μεταστάντος ἡγεμῶν τῆς Ἰππου τῆς ἐταρικήης ἧς δὴ καὶ Ἡφαιστίων ἡγήσατο Ἀλεξάνδρῳ καὶ ἐπὶ Ἡφαιστίωνι Περδίκκας.

G) References to the command of Hephaistion's Chiliarchy/Hipparchy:

G1 = Curt. 10.8.11: ...*equites qui sub Perdicca essent*....

G2 = Curt. 10.8.23: *Igitur Meleagro cum phalange obviam egresso, Perdicca equitum turmas antecedens occurrit.*

G3 = Curt. 10.10.4: *Perdicca ut cum rege esse copiisque praeesset quae regem sequebantur*

G4 = Justin 13.4.17: *Summus castrorum tribunatus Seleuco, Antiochi filio, cessit.*

H) Evidence for the Chiliarchy in the time of the *Diadochi*:

H1 = Arr. *Succ.* Ia.3: See E2.

H2 = Arr. *Succ.* Ib.4: See E3.

H3 = Heidelberg Epit. 1.4 (= *FGrHist* 155 F1): τὸν δὲ ἑαυτοῦ υἱὸν Κάσανδρον ἀπέδειξε χιλιάρχον [sc. Ἀντίπατρος].

H4 = Diod. 18.39.7: [sc. Ἀντίπατρος] παρέζευξε δὲ τῷ Ἀντιγόνῳ χιλιάρχον τὸν υἱὸν Κάσανδρον, ὅπως μὴ δύνηται διαλαθεῖν ἰδιοπραγῶν.

H5 = Arr. *Succ.* I.38: Κάσανδρον δὲ τὸν ἑαυτοῦ παῖδα χιλιάρχην τῆς Ἰππου, τῆς δυνάμεως δὲ τῆς πρόσθεν ὑπὸ Περδίκκῃ τεταγμένης Ἀντίγονον ἡγεμόνα ἀπέφηνε.

H6 = Diod. 18.48.4: (Kassandros' relationship to Polyperchon)

τὸν δ' υἱὸν Κάσανδρον χιλιάρχον καὶ δευτερευόντα κατὰ τὴν
ἐξουσίαν.

H7 = Plut. *Phokion* 31.1: ἐπεὶ δὲ Ἀντίπατρος ἀποδείξας Πολυ-

πέρχοντα στρατηγόν, Κάσανδρον δὲ χιλιάρχον κτλ.

(2) *The Problem*

With the exception of Antipatros' role as *strategos autokrator* of Europe, no part of the "compromise" at Babylon has given modern scholars less trouble than Perdikkas' designation as *chiliarchos*. Typical is R.M. Errington's assessment of that position in the *Journal of Hellenic Studies*: "The remainder of the compromise is now comparatively straightforward. Perdikkas' position was fully understood by Arrian and it creates no difficulty: he was to be 'chiliarch of the chiliarchy which Hephaestion had commanded'; and Arrian further defines this as 'supervisor of the whole kingdom.' The command of Hephaestion's chiliarchy implied the Grand Viziership, and this has generally been recognised. The Persian Grand Vizier was effectively the second-in-command of the whole Persian empire after the King: Perdikkas as Macedonian chiliarch was second-in-command of the whole Macedonian empire, clearly including Europe. With an idiot king Perdikkas was effectively in the position which Alexander had indicated for him, recognised as the most powerful single individual in the empire."¹

¹ Errington, *JHS* 90 (1970) 56.

A.B. Bosworth, to the best of my knowledge, is the first person to question the traditional views concerning Perdikkas' rank as *chiliarchos*.² His arguments are, however, too brief to be effective. I propose, therefore, to re-examine the evidence for the chiliarchy and for Perdikkas' rank after Alexander's death.

The view that the Chiliarchy of Hephaistion was the equivalent of the Persian office of *hazarapati*- (D1-3), the officer who was second to the King in authority (A11), has found almost universal acceptance.³ It is based on two sources. Photios' epitome of Arrian's *Successors* (τὰ μετὰ 'Αλέξανδρον) contains a remark, which

² A.B. Bosworth, "The Death of Alexander the Great: Rumour and Propaganda," *OQ* n.s. 21 (1971) 131-133. The matter may have been adumbrated by G.T. Griffith, "A Note on the Hipparchies of Alexander," *JHS* 83 (1963) 74, n.17.

³ Thus we have the following comments: "Die Chiliarchie, die Perdikkas in Babylon bestätigt wurde, bedeutet zwar an sich nur das Kommando über die erste Hipparchie der Hetairenkavallerie, also an sich einen militärischen Rang; mit ihm hatte jedoch Alexander das persische Amt des Grosswesirs, des Ersten nach dem Grosskönig im Reich..., verschmolzen" (H. Bengtson, *Die Strategie* 66). "Wenn also Alexander einen Hipparchen seiner Hetairenreiterei, den Hephaistion, zum Chiliarchen ernannte, so lag darin sicher eine Nachahmung persischer Hofsitte" (Brandis *RE* III.2, 2276). "Hier spätestens ward er [Hephaistion] zum Chiliarchen und damit zum ersten Würdenträger des Reiches ernannt" Berve 2.173. "Die beherrschende Figur der frühesten Diadochenzeit ist kraft seiner amtlichen Stellung und seiner machtvollen Persönlichkeit Perdikkas, der Erste unter den Leibwächtern, seit Hephaistions Tode mit der Wahrnehmung der Geschäfte des Chiliarchen betraut.... Das war nach den einleuchtenden Darlegungen von Brandis, Plaumann und Berve nichts anderes als ein Grosswesirat, das Alexander in Anlehnung an persische Regierungstradition für seinen Seelenfreund Hephaistion geschaffen hatte" (W. Schur, *Rh. Mus.* 83 [1934] 130. For the *hazarapati*- see P.J. Junge; "Hazarapatis," *Klio* 33 (1940) 13-38; E. Benveniste, *Titres et noms propres en iranien ancien*, Paris, 1966, 51-71; also Schachermeyr, *Alexander in Babylon* 31-37.

A.G. Roos rightly places in parentheses⁴ - for it is surely a gloss -, explaining that "to chiliarch the chiliarchy of Hephaistion" meant to have the "guardianship of the entire kingdom" (τὸ δὲ ἦν ἐπιτροπὴ τῆς ξυμπάσης βασιλείας; see E2). This is simply a deduction, perhaps even from the other source in question, Diódoros, who tells us (18.48.5) that in 319 B.C. Antipatros revived the Chiliarchy for his son, Kassandros, and thus made him "second in authority" (H6). This is further explained by Diodoros, and his words are worth quoting in full:

ἡ δὲ τοῦ χιλιάρχου τάξις καὶ προαγωγὴ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ὑπὸ τῶν Περσικῶν βασιλέων εἰς ὄνομα καὶ δόξαν προήχθη, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα πάλιν ὑπ' Ἀλεξάνδρου μεγάλης ἔτυχεν ἐξουσίας καὶ τιμῆς, ὅτε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Περσικῶν νομίμων ζηλωτῆς ἐγένετο. διὸ καὶ Ἀντίπατρος κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν ἀγωγὴν τὸν υἱὸν Κάσσανδρον ὄντα νέον ἀπέδειξε χιλιάρχον.

The most vehement advocate of this theory of the Chiliarchy of Hephaistion is Schachermeyr. Chiliarchies and chiliarchs of a purely military nature existed within both Persian and Macedonian armies (A1-8; B1-3; C1-11), and Schachermeyr does not deny this. These, furthermore, if we are to believe Ailian the Tactician and Arrian (see B1), were natural developments from existing Macedonian units (cf. also B3). But Schachermeyr will not accept that Hephaistion's Chiliarchy was any such military division. Hephaistion was appointed *chiliarchos*, after the Persian custom of naming a

⁴ Roos, (ed.), *Flavius Arrianus II: Scripta Minora et Fragmenta*, Leipzig, 1967, 255.

hazarapati-, and his rank was nothing less than "the second after the King," Alexander's *Mitkönig*.⁵ Yet Schachermeyr raises two points: Alexander was not the man to delegate authority to others ("Alexander war ein fanatischer Selbstregierer," 34), and Hephaistion never exercised his authority as Chiliarch. Or are we to assume that Hephaistion merely acted as an εὐσάγγελλεύς? For this is how Hesychios and Aitíāns define the *hazarapati*- (Dl, 3), and this is precisely the function of Tithraustes, the *chiliarchos* of Nepos' life of Konon (All). What of Chares of Mytilene, Schachermeyr's *Chef der Kanzlei*?⁶ And what reliable evidence is there to support the claim that Hephaistion, as Chiliarch, organised the *proskynesis*-episode? If Hephaistion was the second man in the empire, it was because he was the first in Alexander's heart (see Chapter 2). When Hephaistion died he was Alexander's dearest friend, his foremost commander (by virtue of his command of the first hipparchy; see Fl-3), and husband of Alexander's sister-in-law, Drypetis. Surely, from what we know of the *chiliarchos* of the Persian system from other Greek writers, Hephaistion could not have been flattered by this rank of "glorified errand-boy." The view that the commander of Hephaistion's Chiliarchy was Alexander's *hazarapati*- is a speculative one, but it cannot be disproved. Nevertheless, it is possible to determine from the existing evidence what the true importance of the Chiliarchy was after Alexander's death and whether or not (in terms of *Staatsrecht*) it gave Perdikkas any important legal powers.

⁵ *Alexander in Babylon* 36: "gleichsam ein Ersatz-Alexander."

⁶ *Ibid.* 34-35.

The argument *ex silentio* will always have its detractors, but it is an effective means of introducing the problem of Perdikkas' command of Hephaistion's Chiliarchy. Only Photios and Dexippos (in their epitomes of Arrian's *Successors*) tell us that Perdikkas commanded the Chiliarchy of Hephaistion; note that *neither* says that he became *Chiliarchos*. Curiously, Diodoros, who fully understood the meaning, significance and origin of the Chiliarchy in Alexander's empire, did not know of Hephaistion's role as the Chiliarch (not even in Book 17, which derives from a different source), nor of Perdikkas, Hephaistion's successor. That is, Diodoros, on whom scholars rely for the theory that the Chiliarch was the Persian *hazarapati*-, knows only that Perdikkas became *epimeletes* and that Hephaistion had commanded the most renowned (ἐπιφανεστάτη) hipparchy.

Now it is quite clear that the *hipparchia* and *chiliarchia* were one and the same, that the terms were used synonymously. And G.T. Griffith's salutary remark, that the unit was "Hephaistion's Chiliarchy" because it was intended to be "distinguish[ed]...from other chiliarchies," suits both Arrian's description of Hephaistion's chiliarchy (E1) and the promotion of officers from one hipparchy to the next, as related by Diodoros, Appian and Plutarch (F1-3). Arrian's remark (7.14.10 = E1) that the command of Hephaistion's Chiliarchy of the *Hetairic* cavalry was left vacant after the latter's death has generally been regarded as incorrect. The inaccuracy is due to Ptolemy's bias.

When Alexander died suddenly in Babylon, the conduct of the affairs of state fell to the most powerful men in the army (the

megistoi, as Arrian, *Succ.* Ia.2, calls them): the *somatophylakes*, Eumenes and Seleukos, who were the most important hipparchs after Perdikkas (Fl-3), and, from the infantry, Meleagros (see Appendix 3). Now it is natural that the foremost of these individuals should be Perdikkas. Krateros, who may well have been immensely popular with the army (or, at least, with the infantry),⁷ was in limbo in Kilikia, and he can hardly have been a serious contender. What is more, if Arrian (7.12.4) is correct, Krateros was in ill health; Alexander, when he had sent him away to Macedonia, had also sent Polyperchon with instructions to take over command of the troops under Krateros, should the latter be unable to fulfil his mission.

At any rate; it is quite clear that Perdikkas was unquestionably the most likely candidate to direct affairs after Alexander's death. To him Alexander had given his ring, and there is no reason to doubt this.⁸ As Hephaistion's successor to the command of the first *hipparchia* (= *chiliarchia*), he was the most important military figure; undoubtedly he was also foremost among the Bodyguard. But

⁷ Badian, *Studies in Greek and Roman History*, Oxford, 1964, 265, reminds us that Krateros' popularity was likely exaggerated by the sources "for the greater glory of his conqueror Eumenes." This view goes back to Schubert, *Die Quellen zur Geschichte der Diadochenzeit*, Leipzig, 1914, 150-179; in contrast consider the earlier view of Vezin, *Eumenes von Kardia* 53, that the soldiers were "gemeinsam ergrimmt über den Fall ihres Abgottes Krateros."

⁸ For the ring: Curt. 10.5.4; 10.6.4-5; Justin 12.15.12; Diod. 17.117.3. Less probable is the story that Alexander, when asked to whom he left his kingdom, replied τῷ κρατύστῳ (Diod. 17.117.4; cf. Curt. 10.5.5; Justin 12.15.8; Diod. 18.1.4); his looks very like an afterthought.

Perdikkas was faced with a dilemma: would he become King, or regent for Rhoxane's unborn son?⁹ He could not legally seize the throne - though he did have Alexander's signet ring, for what it was worth -, nor could he be sure that Rhoxane's child would prove to be a boy. Thus he preferred to have the kingship "forced upon him!" Confident in his supremacy, Perdikkas waited for the army to decide the issue for him. But he had not reckoned with - for what sensible Macedonian noble could have? - the sudden acclamation of Arrhidaios, a bastard and a half-wit.

The struggle that ensued between cavalry and infantry need not be discussed here. Perdikkas led the former division by virtue of his command of Hephaistion's Chiliarchy. Had this office been of greater significance, the Macedonians could not have failed to recognise their obligation to follow Perdikkas. Quite clearly, Perdikkas, as "Chiliarch" (and I use the title with a certain amount of misgiving), had no legal right to handle the reins of the state. Nevertheless, when a compromise was reached, in which Philip Arrhidaios was recognised as King and Rhoxane's son as a *symbasileus*, Perdikkas was given no new title, but rather he kept his old rank of *chiliarchos*. Meleagros was to be his second-in-command (his *hyparchos*), an arrangement that is echoed by Justin's words: *castrorum et exercitus et regum cura Meleagro et Perdiccae adsignatur* (13.4.5). A higher office, the

⁹ For Perdikkas' dilemma see especially R.M. Errington, *JHS* 90 (1970) 49-53.

prostasia, was marked out for Krateros, though it was never intended to be exercised. Perdikkas quickly liquidated Meleagros on charges of treason and consolidated the power into his own hands. Freed from Meleagros' interference, Perdikkas became *epimeletes* for Arrhidaios, the chief executive officer of the inept King. On this note, Curtius, whom Schachermeyr, I think rightly, traces to Kleitarchos, ends his account of the *stasis* at Babylon.¹⁰

I doubt whether Perdikkas could legally have acted as regent for an acclaimed King -albeit a half-wit - who was fully mature. The question of Rhoxane's child remained suspended. Perdikkas had need of a more powerful position than Chiliarch of the cavalry. This was made possible by the need to direct affairs for Arrhidaios. Thus Perdikkas became *epimeletes* and *hēgemon* for the new King; as such, he directed his armies and assigned the satrapies. That Perdikkas did not act as regent for Arrhidaios is clear from Diodoros (18.2.4), who tells us that the newly created satraps were to obey "the King and Perdikkas." It was a curious joint-command in which Perdikkas was Arrhidaios' inferior *de iure* but superior *de facto*. At this point, Perdikkas relinquished the command of Hephaistion's chiliarchy to Seleukos, who became his foremost commander. Justin (13.4.17) says: *summus castrorum tribunatus Seleuco, Antiochi filio, cessit*, and this is explained by Appian and Diodoros (F2-3), who equate this with the command of the first hipparchy, hence the Chiliarchy of Hephaistion.

¹⁰ Schachermeyr, *Alexander in Babylon* 92-104.

Then, with the birth of Alexander IV, Perdikkas assumed the regency for Rhoxane's son and became *epimeletes* and *prostates* for the two "Kings."

Perdikkas appears to have exercised powers as *epimeletes*, *prostates* and *hegemon*, though in the case of the mercenaries' revolt in the Upper Satrapies he granted greater military power to Peithon, and in the case of his war against Ptolemy, Antipatros and Krateros, he made Eumenes the equivalent of *hegemon* or *strategos*. Following Perdikkas' death in 320, the new *Reichsordnung* at Triparadeisos saw the first effective organisation of the entire empire. At this time Antipatros became the *de facto* ruler, as *epimeletes*, and took possession of the Kings. The military functions that Perdikkas had controlled were given to Antigonos, who now became *hegemon*, while the rank of *chiliarchos* (undoubtedly command over the Chiliarchy of Hephaistion) was reserved for Antipatros' son Kassandros. (H3-5). At this point Diodoros (18.39.7) is instructive: "As general of the royal army (στρατηγὸν τῆς βασιλικῆς δυνάμεως) he appointed Antigonos ...but he attached his own son Cassander to Antigonos as chiliarch so that the latter might not be able to pursue his own ambitions undetected."¹¹ Arrian's *Successors* 1.38 further defines Kassandros as χιλιάρχης τῆς ἑπίου, and relates that the forces commanded by Antigonos were those formerly attached to Perdikkas.

The fate of Seleukos is explained by the *Heidelberg Epitome*. Here the allotment of the satrapy of Babylonia to Seleukos and

¹¹ R.M. Geer (tr.), *Diodorus of Sicily*, Loeb Classical Library, vol. 9, Cambridge, Mass., 1947, 123.

the appointment of Kassandros as *chiliarchos* are placed side-by-side. I take this as an indication that Seleukos no longer held the Chiliarchy of Hephaistion but relinquished it to Kassandros, and that Kassandros' relationship to Antigonos was similar to that of Seleukos to Perdikkas. By now the title, "Hephaistion's Chiliarchy", may have become defunct. Perhaps this was due to changes in the army, which may have accompanied the gradual dismemberment of the empire. Also, it is likely that the distinction that Hephaistion's name had given to the *chiliarchia* had now become meaningless. When in 319 Kassandros was given the rank of *chiliarchos* to Polyperchon, who had now become regent, he immediately rebelled. Diodoros' estimation of the office was clearly based on some misinterpretation, either of his own or on the part of his source. But perhaps this assessment is not so far from the truth as the modern interpretations of it. Diodoros, after all, does not say that the Chiliarch was a *Mit-könig*. The commander of Hephaistion's Chiliarchy after Alexander's death was never more than the foremost commander within the army, and, except for the short period when Perdikkas was Chiliarch and the affairs of the succession unsettled, the Chiliarch was subordinate to some higher official. He was never supreme commander of Asia. Neither Perdikkas nor Kassandros, both men of ambition, found Hephaistion's Chiliarchy a worthy or desirable office.

APPENDIX 3

The Relationship of Attalos and Perdikkas

οἱ δ' οὖν Μακεδόνες πυθόμενοι τὰ περὶ τὸν Εὐμενῆ κατέγνωσαν αὐτοῦ θάνατον καὶ τῶν περὶ αὐτὸν ἐπιφανῶν ἀνδρῶν πεντήκοντα, ἐν οἷς ἦν καὶ Ἀλκίας ὁ ἀδελφὸς τοῦ Περδίκκου. ἀπέκτειναν δὲ καὶ τῶν φίλων τοῦ Περδίκκου τοὺς μάλιστα πιστοτάτους καὶ τὴν ἀδελφὴν αὐτοῦ Ἀταλάντην, ἣν ἦν γεγαμηκῶς Ἀτταλὸς ὁ τοῦ στόλου τὴν ἡγεμονίαν παρεληφώς (Diod. 18.37.2).

Amongst the most prominent supporters of Perdikkas, son of Orontes, were his brother Alketas and Attalos, son of Andromenes, their brother-in-law.¹ That the latter was an unwavering supporter of Perdikkas has not been challenged, nor that his career was advanced by the prestige of the *chiliarchos* at the time of Alexander's death.² Crucial to the understanding of Attalos' career, therefore, is the date of his marriage to Atalante, for which we have only the ambiguous testimony of Diodoros (*supra*).³ And, while modern scholars claim that the

¹ For details see Berve 2, nos. 45, 181, 627, s.v. Ἀλκίας, Ἀτταλός, Περδίκκας. Cf. also Kaerst, *RE* I (1894) 1514-1515, s.v. "Alketas (5)"; *RE* II (1896) 2158, s.v. "Attalos (5)"; Geyer, *RE* XIX.1 (1937) 604-614, s.v. "Perdikkas (4)."

² Note particularly Berve 2.93: "[Attalos] blieb im Hoflager Al.s, wo seine Stellung durch das hohe Ansehen, welches nach Hephaistions Tode Perdikkas, sein Schwager..., vor allen anderen genoss, sich anscheinend hob."

³ See Berve 2.90, no. 177, s.v. Ἀταλάντη; cf. Kaerst, *RE* II (1896) 1894-1896, s.v. "Atalante (5)"; Hoffmann, *Die Makedonen* 157, n.60.

marriage cannot be dated, they have had a tendency to assume that it was contracted during Alexander's lifetime.⁴ There is, however, a case to be made for a later date, one that will give us cause to reconsider Attalos' role in the last years of Alexander's reign and in the struggle for power that followed the King's death.

Those who favour an early date for Attalos' union with Atalante find support in the testimony of Diodoros (16.94.4), whossays that the *somatophylakes* Perdikkas, Leonnatos and Attalos pursued and killed Pausanias, the assassin of Philip II. Typical is the comment of C. Bradford Welles: "Pausanias was from Orestis, and so were two of his slayers, while Attalus was Perdikkas's brother-in-law."⁵ But we cannot be sure that Diodoros is speaking of the son of Andromenes - though there is a

⁴ Thus we have C. Bradford Welles (*Alexander and the Hellenistic World*, Toronto, 1970, 15) implying and P. Green (*Alexander of Macedon*, Harmondsworth, 1974, 108) stating that he was Perdikkas' brother-in-law at the time of Philip's death (336). E. Badian, "The Death of Parmenio," *TAPA* 91 (1960) 335, suspects that the relationship between Perdikkas and Attalos may have influenced the trial of the sons of Andromenes, after the Philotas-affair; I have myself echoed these suspicions in "Amyntas, Son of Andromenes," *GRBS* 16 (1975) 393, n.5.

⁵ Welles, *Diodorus of Sicily*, vol. 8, Loeb Classical Library, Cambridge, Mass., 1963, 101, n.2. Leonnatos was in fact not Orestid, as Welles (following Berve 2.232, no. 466) suggests, but Lynkestian, through his relationship to Eurydike, the mother of Philip II; see my comments on p.87, n.2, and also F. Geyer, *RE* XII.2 (1925) 2035, and *Makedonien bis zur Thronbesteigung Philipps II.*, Munich and Berlin, 1930, 83; cf. Fox 505. As for Attalos, his identity is far from certain. For the problem of these *somatophylakes* see Appendix 1.

strong possibility -, nor does it necessarily follow, once this identification has been made, that their association at this time means that they were already related. Whether Perdikkas played any part six years later in securing the acquittal of the sons of Andromenes - of whom the eldest, Amyntas, was implicated in the so-called "conspiracy of Philotas" by the testimony of Dimnos and Nikomachos,⁶ while the youngest, Polemon, fled the camp after Philotas' arrest⁷ - remains a mystery.

A review of Attalos' career proves helpful.⁸ After their acquittal in the trial that followed the arrest of Philotas, there is no further mention of the sons of Andromenes in the accounts of the next two years; apart from Arrian's brief notice that Amyntas was killed during the siege of a small town

⁶ Curt. 6.7.15; 6.11.37-38. See my discussion, *GRBS* 16 (1975) 393, n.5, and 394-395, following Badian's suggestion, *TAPA* 91 (1960) 334, n.30.

⁷ See Berve 2.322, no. 644, s.v. Πολέμων; for his flight Arr. 3.27.2-3; Curt. 7.1.10; 7.2.1.

⁸ Berve 2.92-93, no. 181, s.v. "Ατταλος. Berve must be wrong, however, to identify the Attalos of Curt. 8.13.21 with the son of Andromenes. This Attalos, described by Curtius as *aequalem sibi* [sc. *Alexandro*] *et haud disparem habitu oris et corporis*, is not the famous taxiarch (cf. the mistaken identification of H. Bardon in his Budé text, *Quinte-Curce: Histoires*, vol. 2, 366, n.2). Apart from the fact that it is historically impossible that Attalos, the taxiarch, remained in camp disguised as Alexander (as R. Schubert, "Die Porus-Schlacht," *Rh. Mus.* 56 [1901] 467-468, recognised), the description of him by Epit. Metz 58 as *Attalum quendam* suggests that this was accertain person who looked like Alexander and happened to be called Attalos.

shortly after his exoneration (3.27.3). Of Polemon and Simmias we hear nothing further during Alexander's lifetime, though the former reappears in the history of the Successors.⁹ But Simmias, who commanded Amyntas' *taxeis* at Gaugamela while his brother was on a recruiting-mission in Macedonia,¹⁰ was probably the second oldest and the logical successor to Amyntas' post.¹¹ He vanishes from our records completely. Two years after the family's brief disgrace at Phrada, Attalos is found at the head of Amyntas' battalion.¹² The curious fact that Attalos alone attained high office after 330 B.C. might appear to argue for the influence of Perdikkas. Again the argument turns upon whether Attalos and Perdikkas were already brothers-in-law at this time.

⁹ See Arr. *Succ.* 1.25; fg. 24.1ff. See no 28 *infra*.

¹⁰ For his mission see Diod. 17.49.1; Curt. 4.6.30; his absence from Gaugamela is mentioned by Curt. 4.13.28; there is a textual corruption at Arr. 3.11.9, for which see A.B. Bosworth, "Errors in Arrian," *CQ* n.s. 26 (1976) 125.

¹¹ See Berve 2.353-354, no. 704, s.v. Σιμμίας, who does not comment on his mysterious disappearance.

¹² Arr. 4.16.1.

But Perdikkas is not the only individual who could have intervened on behalf of the sons of Andromenes, if, in fact, anyone did. Berve (following Hoffmann)¹³ may be correct in assuming that Polyperchon, son of Simmias, and Andromenes (both of Tymphaian origin) were related; if this is so, then Polyperchon may have supported the latter's sons at the time of the *Philotasprozess*. Simmias probably died, or perhaps left the army, while Polemon's youth and disgraceful flight from Alexander's camp will account for his failure to attain higher office before 323.

As for Attalos, he is first mentioned as leader of an infantry-battalion in Baktria in 328; here he appears with Krateros, Gorgias, Polyperchon and Meleagros. In the following spring, he campaigned in Sogdiana with Krateros, Polyperchon and Alketas, where he received by letter the news of the Pages' conspiracy in Baktria.¹⁴ In the next two years he is mentioned once more in the company of Alketas (Perdikkas' brother), but more often in association with Krateros, Koinos, Polyperchon and Meleagros, the tradition-conscious leaders of the phalanx.¹⁵

¹³ Berve 2.325-326, no. 654, s.v. Πολυπέρχων; cf. Hoffmann, *Die Makedonen* 156, n.59.

¹⁴ Arr. 4.22.1; for the news of the Pages' conspiracy, Plut. *Alex.* 55.6.

¹⁵ With Alketas, Arr. 4.27.5; with Koinos, Arr. 4.24.1; Meleagros, Arr. 4.16.1; 5.12.1; 6.17.3; Krateros, Arr. 4.16.1 (implied by 4.17.1; see Chapter 3); 4.22.1; 5.12.1; 6.17.3; Polyperchon, Arr. 4.16.1; 4.22.1; implied by Justin 12.10.1 (to be taken with Arr. 6.17.3, cf. Bosworth, *CQ* n.s. 26 [1976] 129, n.65).

In 325 B.C. he accompanied Krateros, Meleagros, Antigenes and Polyperchon westward to Karmania via Arachosia and Drangiana.¹⁶

A clue to the nature of Attalos' relations with Perdikkas can, I believe, be found in the testimony of Justin, who appears to have combined two primary sources: Kleitarchos and Hieronymos of Kardia.¹⁷ Shortly after Alexander's death, dissension arose between the leaders of the cavalry and the phalanx over the matter of the succession: the cavalry-officers, notably Perdikkas, favoured the as-yet-unborn son of Rhoxane - he would, of course, require a regent -, the phalanx opted for the mentally deficient Arrhidaios, whom they were already hailing as King, under the title Philip III.¹⁸ There is a consistent tradition that Meleagros, a *taxis*-commander throughout Alexander's reign and the most important of the remaining leaders of the infantry, supported Arrhidaios' cause most vehemently.¹⁹ Justin, however, adds an interesting detail: he says (13.3.2) that the supporters of Perdikkas sent Meleagros and a certain Attalos to the infantry in order to win them over, but that they neglected their duties and took up the cause of the phalanx instead. (*legatos ad mitigandos*

¹⁶ Arr. 6.17.3. For Polyperchon see Justin 12.10.1; see also n.15 *supra*.

¹⁷ Schachermeyr, *Alexander in Babylon* 120ff., against R. Schubert, *Die Quellen zur Geschichte der Diadochenzeit*, Leipzig, 1914, 115, who maintained that Hieronymos alone was the source.

¹⁸ Berve 2.385-386, no. 781, s.v. Φίλιππος Ἀρριδαῖος; the fullest account is given by Curt. 10.7.1ff.; cf. Justin 13.2.6ff.; Diod. 18.2-4; Arr. *Succ.* 1.

¹⁹ Berve 2.249-250, no. 494, s.v. Μελέαγρος.

eorum animos duos ex proceribus, Attalum et Meleagrum mittunt, qui potentiam ex vulgi adulatione quaerentes omissa legatione militibus consentiunt). Justin goes on to say that this Attalos sent men to murder Perdikkas (*Attalus ad interficiendum Perdiccam ducem partis alterius mittit...percussores*), but that these men lacked the resolve to carry out their mission (13.3.7-8).

Justin's Attalos (apparently unknown to Berve)²⁰ must certainly be the son of Andromenes, as the phrase *ex proceribus* implies; also, as a phalanx-commander like Meleagros himself, he would be a suitable candidate for such an embassy. But his role in the events of 323 has, unfortunately, been coloured by the preconception that Attalos was already Perdikkas' relative and staunch supporter. Thus G. Wirth supposes that Attalos' name was included in this passage for dramatic effect.²¹

Schachermeyr believes that Attalos, son of Andromenes, was in fact sent to the phalanx, but that Justin suffered a *lapsus memoriae* and ascribed to him actions taken by Meleagros alone.²² Attalos, he argues, would not have instigated the murder of his own brother-in-law; Justin must be in error. Schachermeyr concludes that Justin made the mistake "da [er] bei Trogus wohl kaum vermerkt fand, dass Attalos ein Schwager des Perdikkas gewesen sei...."²³ The argument is fallacious. Did Justin also

²⁰ Berve 2.92-93 does not go beyond Alexander's death in his discussion of Attalos, although he normally includes important details from the period of the succession.

²¹ Wirth, "Zur Politik des Perdikkas 323," *Helikon* 7 (1967) 291, n.37.

²² Schachermeyr, *Alexander in Babylon* 125.

²³ *Ibid.*

suffer a *lapsus memoriae* when he said that both Attalos and Meleagros betrayed the Perdikkans, encouraged by the adulation of the mob? Meleagros is singled out by all the sources because he was the most important of these legates sent to the infantry (Justin names only two, but Diod. 18.2.2 implies that there were more), and because he was liquidated by Perdikkas on account of his intrigues and his "treason." Now, as it happens, it does not matter terribly much whether Attalos or Meleagros instigated the attempted murder, though, if it was the former, we should have virtual proof that he was not yet married to Perdikkas' sister. What does matter is that both Attalos and Meleagros were actively supporting the cause of the conservative phalanx, which is exactly what we should expect. And it is totally wrong to argue that Attalos *could not* have acted in opposition to Perdikkas because he was his brother-in-law. We know only as much as Diodoros tells us: that, at the time of her death in 320 B.C., Perdikkas' sister, Atalante, was Attalos' wife (18.37.2). Knowledge of this union has, however, prejudiced our interpretation of Attalos' role in the succession-struggle.

I raise one further point before offering a re-evaluation of the evidence: why was Atalante present in her brother's camp when he campaigned against Ptolemy in Egypt? Certainly it was not the Macedonian custom to bring sisters along on campaign. And it would be difficult to imagine that Attalos summoned her from Macedonia to the main theatre of the war in order that he

might see the wife from whom he had been separated for some ten to fourteen years. Koinos, we may be sure, did not bring Parmenion's daughter on the expedition with him: she remained at home, raising their son Perdikkas.²⁴ There is only one plausible reason for Atalante's presence: she had only recently been summoned to Asia by Perdikkas in order that she might marry Attalos. It was a political union, much like (though on a smaller scale) the marriage-alliances that Perdikkas himself sought by bringing to Asia Minor Nikaia and Kleopatra.²⁵ Atalante's marriage to Attalos concluded an earlier agreement between Perdikkas and the son of Andromenes.

When Alexander died, the most prominent leaders of the phalanx (Krateros and Polyperchon, along with Gorgias and White Kleitos) were absent in Kilikia; Koinos had died shortly after he espoused the cause of the common soldiery at the Hyphasis. The remaining taxiarchs included Meleagros, Philotas, Attalos and Alketas. Judging from the hostility of the phalanx towards Perdikkas, Alketas' influence cannot be regarded as significant, and, when Perdikkas and his supporters were forced to withdraw from Babylon, Alketas could scarcely have remained

²⁴ For Koinos' marriage to Parmenion's daughter see Curt. 6.9.30, supported by Arr. 1.24.1; 1.29.4. See also W. Dittenberger, *Syll.*³ 332, where the son, Perdikkas, is named, and Berve 2. 215-218, no. 439, s.v. Κοῦνος, and 312-313, no. 626, s.v. Περδίκκας.

²⁵ Diod. 18.23; Justin 13.6.4-7; Arr. *Succ.* 1.21, 26. See Chapter 4; Perdikkas.

behind. There is no reason to suppose that the other three favoured Perdikkas' policy; Meleagros certainly did not, while Philotas remained faithful to Krateros and was later deposed from the satrapy of Kilikia by Perdikkas.²⁶ Attalos belonged to this conservative faction as well: he had been a friend of the other Philotas, Parmenion's son, and was in the late stages of the campaign associated with those taxiarchs who opposed Alexander's *Verschmelzungspolitik*.²⁷ These men put up a united front against Perdikkas, who attempted to preserve the unity of the empire and Alexander's policy of fusion. Attalos, by virtue of his family-connexions and his leadership of the conservative *pezhetairoi*, very likely shared the sentiments of the common soldiery, whom Meleagros had incited. Only in 321 B.C. does he appear as a supporter of Perdikkas, together with his brother Polemon.²⁸

We are told that, not long after the rift occurred between the cavalry and the infantry, Perdikkas effected a reconciliation.

²⁶ Justin 13.6.16: *Cilicia Philotae adempta Philoxeno datur*; cf. Arr. *Succ.* fg. 24.8-12; see also Berve 2.397-398, no. 804, s.v. Φιλώτας. He must be identical with the taxiarch, Berve no. 803.

²⁷ For their opposition to Alexander's policies see Plut. *Alex.* 47.9-10 (Krateros); Curt. 8.5.22ff. (Polyperchon); Curt. 8.13.17-18 (Meleagros); and Curt. 9.3.3-16, 20; Arr. 5.27.2-28.1 (Koinos). Cf. Niese 1.194, n.1: "Attalos [war] mit Meleagros eng verbunden und [bekleidete] sicherlich neben ihm ein hohes Amt."

²⁸ Arr. *Succ.* fg. 24.1ff.; cf. 1.25, where Polemon alone is mentioned. See Badian, "AKKing's Notebooks," *HSCP* 72 (1967) 189, n.34.

The cavalry had cut off the grain-supply to the city, and the infantry was not of one mind about which course of action to take: should the matter be decided by arms or diplomacy?

Suspicion prevailed, and the ill will of the troops soon turned against Meleagros, whom they held primarily responsible for their predicament.²⁹ We are told that the negotiations were carried out by Pasas the Thessalian, Amissos of Megalópolis and Perilaos (Perillos),³⁰ but we are not told who the peace-makers among the infantry were. Meleagros was given, for the moment, the rank of *hyparchos* - in essence, he was Perdikkas' lieutenant -, but he was soon liquidated without much opposition.³¹ I suggest therefore that the key to Perdikkas' success in achieving this reconciliation, and in eliminating the troublesome Meleagros, was his ability to win the support of Attalos, who doubtless had a considerable following in the phalanx.

²⁹ Curt. 10.8.5 says that the soldiers were angry with Meleagros because he instigated the attempted murder of Perdikkas. This would argue against Justin's (13.3.7) claim that Attalos was responsible, but it does not alter the fundamental fact that Attalos was nevertheless a supporter of the phalanx against the leaders of the cavalry. Niese (*loc. cit.* n.27 *supra*) is probably wrong in believing that Attalos instigated the murder, though he correctly draws attention to Attalos' close connexions with Meleagros. Attalos may well have read the changing mood of the army and exploited the bad feeling towards Meleagros. For the mood of the army see Curt. 10.8.9; for their deliberation on a course of action 10.8.12. Curt. 10.8.12 surely exaggerates the conditions in Babylon (*itaque inopia primum, deinde fames esse coepit*), after only one week's siege (Curt. 10.10.9).

³⁰ Berve 2.25, 306-307, 317, nos. 53, 608, 630, s.vv. Amissos, Πάσας, Πέρυλλος. On these individuals see further Chapter 4.

³¹ For Meleagros' death see Diod. 18.4.7; Arr. *Succ.* 1a.4; Justin 13.4.7-8; Curt. 10.9.7-21, esp. 20-21.

In order to seal this political alliance, Perdikkas offered his sister, Atalante, to Attalos as wife. She was summoned some time later and arrived in Asia Minor in order to complete the arrangement and consummate the marriage. When Attalos was sent out with the fleet, she remained with her brother and, ultimately, shared his fate.³² For Attalos, the choice of this alliance was a costly miscalculation: the union with Atalante bound him to a losing cause. After an unsuccessful attempt to rally Perdikkas' disenchanted veterans,³³ he combined forces with Alketas against Antigonos. Unsuccessful in the field, Alketas committed suicide; Attalos, who fell into Antigonos' hands, perished in the fortress in which he was confined.³⁴

³² For Attalos and the fleet see Briant, *Antigone le Borgne* 212-213. Atalante was murdered by Perdikkas' political enemies when they received news of Krateros' defeat by Eumenes, Diod. 18.37.2.

³³ For this episode see Arr. *Succ.* 1.33, 39; cf. also Diod. 18.37.3-4. R.M. Errington, "From Babylon to Triparadeisos: 323-320 B.C.," *JHS* 90 (1970) 67, n.131, and Briant, *Antigone le Borgne* 278, n.6, rightly identify the Attalos of Arr. *Succ.* 1.33 as the son of Andromenes, against Berve 2.95, no. 184, s.v. "Ατταλος."

³⁴ The defeat of Alketas and Attalos by Antigonos: Diod. 18.44ff.; 18.50.1. Alketas' death: Diod. 18.46.7; Justin 15.1.1; Attalos' death: Diod. 19.16.