The Modern Bestiary: Animal Fiction
From Hardy to Orwell

by

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ABSTRACT

The aim of this study is to explore different kinds of animal fiction written in English literature between 1870 and 1945. Neither an inclusive account nor a survey, it examines both literary technique and thematic substance. Taking Darwin's *Origin of Species* as a significant point of departure, it discusses such authors as Hardy, Kipling, Wells, Lawrence, Orwell, and others, arguing that the great variety of animals we find constitutes a substantial revival in the fortunes of Bestiary art. In the Middle Ages much animal literature was produced, and the burden of this, either as fable or Bestiary proper, was moral instruction. In the modern period we see that this broad moral base remains intact and that animal life forms a natural paradigm to which an age in moral turmoil can turn. This thesis shows that modern British writers, like other men in other times, have turned to the world of animal nature, realistically or figuratively or 'fantastically', to find a better orientation to the world -- to find a more satisfactory view of man's place in nature.

Although the moral base remains consistent, the literary techniques of animal depiction do not. The first part of the thesis, for example, examines "The Socio-political Bestiary" of Kipling and Orwell, and notes that these authors frequently (though not always) rely on highly personified animal characters to embody abstract qualities or ideas relevant to particular political ideologies. Hardy and Lawrence, on the other hand, seek to depict animals as animals, without the overt anthropomorphism implicit in the personified and fablistic manner. These two authors constitute Part II of the thesis, and in endowing their animals
with the lively integrity of beings distinctly 'other' than man, they implicitly argue for an integrated view of all natural life. At the same time, their animals are very deliberately 'used' as symbolic analogues of human situations, and thus bear a thematic significance to the intense concerns held by Hardy and Lawrence. The third section differs considerably from both of the previous parts. Here we analyse three authors (H.G. Wells, David Garnett, and John Collier) all of whom describe different kinds of human/animal metamorphosis whereby the attenuated relationship between man and animal becomes more blurred than usual; animal life here becomes a predominantly negative force by which man's moral and psychological health may be gauged. Whether by scientific vivisection, magical change of form, or rapid evolutionary growth, the animals (or creatures) represent fears and anxieties that lurk beneath a thin veneer of civilization.

The modern Bestiarists represent a wide variety of fictional technique and an equally extensive range of thematic interest. Nonetheless, there is a consistency in the common idea that animals may effectively represent an objectified version of human life and thus serve an obvious educational function. An age in which the Darwinian revolution had demonstrated man's kinship with the animals, and in which traditional social mores came increasingly under attack, could well seek to learn from an animal life unsullied by the intense pressures a technological society imposes.
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If any person thinks the examination of the rest of the animal kingdom an unworthy task, he must hold in like disesteem the study of man.

(Aristotle, *De Partibus Animalium.*)
INTRODUCTION

Man shares the world with many other animals and in the course of history has viewed them in a variety of ways. He has used them for sport, for food, for work, and even for religious symbols. At times, he has even deigned to admit them to his companionship. In all of these roles animals have been vital (if subservient) partners in man's development, and their frequent appearance in literature reflects an obvious importance. Most often, animals have been used for purposes of moral instruction and the most apt example of this is the Medieval Bestiary. This type of literature has a specific and local definition but for our broader needs the Bestiary may be understood as any example of literature in which animals (and birds) play a strategic role in clarifying the human themes an author is interested in. Animals are especially useful in this regard since although many of them are behaviourally close to man they are sufficiently 'other' to embody and objectify human (particularly moral) qualities. In one of the earliest treatises on animals, Aristotle pointed directly to this kind of correspondence:

For just as we pointed out resemblances in the physical organs, so in a number of animals we observe gentleness and fierceness, mildness or cross-temper, courage or timidity, fear or confidence, high-spirits or low-cunning, and, with regard to intelligence, something akin to sagacity. Some of these qualities in man, as compared with the corresponding qualities in animals, differ only quantitively: that is to say, a man has more or less of this quality, and an animal has more or less of some other; other qualities in man are represented by analogous and not identical qualities: for instance, just as in man we find knowledge, wisdom, and sagacity, so in certain animals there exists some natural potentiality akin to these.
Within this kind of empirical argument, prompted we should always remember by observation of animal behaviour, we find reinforcement of the traditional pattern of the Aesopic fable in which a human quality is assumed by a particular animal or by a situation that two or more animals play out. The fable is perhaps the most well-known form of Bestiary literature and in it there is the often humorous or ironic spectacle of a human being represented by a creature of an obviously lower status. The function of a fable is to teach some kind of ethical maxim, and drawing upon incidents from natural animal life doubtless made the moral encomium more acceptable and appealing because more aesthetically engaging. Medieval Bestiaries were themselves treatises designed to use incidents from animal life to support Christian teachings, and we see in the Medieval period generally a strong reliance on Bestiary forms of literature for the effective presentation of ideas. An intensely theological age, the Medieval period found this kind of literature appropriate to its needs, and it was not uncommon for priests to rely on it for the precepts they delivered from the pulpit. Yet though the main focus was doubtless on instruction, aesthetic considerations must also have played their part in making Bestiary literature popular. Certainly, the example of Chaucer's "The Nun's Priest's Tale" should dissuade anyone from assuming too easily that Bestiary literature is necessarily low-genre.

As the Middle Ages gave way to the Renaissance the popularity of Bestiary literature declined. It did not die out completely, of course, and P. Ansell Robin has demonstrated how it had a residual impact on the major writers of the English Renaissance. Swift's Book IV of *Gulliver's Travels* as well as
Dryden's "The Hind and the Panther" stand as late examples of the tradition, and it is obvious from these that the Bestiary is not a dead mode for as long as man needs to be shown his arrogance or folly. Nonetheless, as a general and forceful presence, Bestiary literature declined. However, since the latter part of the 19th Century, the Bestiary has once again become evident, though not necessarily, it should be stressed, within the limiting confines of the animal fable or allegory. Serious authors have turned towards the world of animals, and towards the relationship between man and animal, and created what we may call "The Modern Bestiary". This thesis is an attempt to describe the characteristics of this phenomenon as it is reflected in such writers as Thomas Hardy, D. H. Lawrence, Rudyard Kipling, George Orwell, H. G. Wells, and others. Within their prose, all of these writers have turned with renewed vigour to a representation of animals, and through this have sought to present a fuller picture of the world. They have each done this in their own way, and we would scarcely expect such disparate writers as Kipling and Lawrence to share any special similarities of style or theme. Nevertheless, it will be seen that all the modern Bestiarists have relied on their animal characters, symbolic, realistic, or both, to act as analogues by which human predicaments may be presented and clarified. It will be seen that each author's reliance on an animal character serves a particular function within an overall literary design, and that its inclusion necessarily plays upon an implicit correspondence between human and animal behaviour.

Before we proceed to discuss some of the historical and philosophical conditions that gave rise to this revival of Bestiary literature, it is
worthwhile outlining the principle ways that animals may be fictionally depicted. A writer may draw his animals either as abstract 'counters', important only for the general quality they represent, or as real beings evoked with the full force of naturalistic detail. The former manner is often associated with the fable and allegory where the author is not particularly interested in the animal as animal. Usually, in this type of literature an animal is personified, represents an abstract human quality, and is endowed with human speech and ratiocination. A human being is thus made into a 'type' which in its often one-dimensional quality is effectively evoked by an animal.

In contrast to this style is the mode of representation in which an animal behaves realistically and without any overt interference from the author. This method is clearly based on the biases of fictional realism which demand that humans, animals, as well as inanimate objects, be evoked accurately and as they really are. Naturalism, as propounded by Emile Zola, sought to go further than this and to represent reality as objectively perceived. One offshoot from this was such Animal Naturalists as Sir Charles Roberts and Ernest Thompson Seton, both of whom sought to present animals almost as objects in the natural laboratory, without any interfering anthropomorphism. In this kind of representation, the fablistic habit of personifying animals was to be eschewed in favour of a supposedly less anthropocentric form. However, it should not be assumed that because an author depicts his animals as they really are that he escapes an implicit frame of moral reference. In so deliberately drawing animals as animals, such people as Roberts and Seton expose their own anthropomorphism, and it becomes quite plain as one reads their stories that we are offered a great
deal more than objective Natural Science.  

In describing the two principle modes of depicting animals we see that each represents a strong tendency, either towards the more abstract or the more real. It is also apparent that there is no hard and fast line which separates these tendencies; any example of Bestiary literature is likely to partake of both though there will probably be a leaning toward one or the other. This is nowhere more apparent than in the modern Bestiarists. Part I, for example, looks at Rudyard Kipling and George Orwell both of whom rely on the older forms of the fable and allegory. But at the same time each on several occasions tried to go beyond these forms and to present animals as vital and natural in their own right. Similarly, Thomas Hardy and D. H. Lawrence seek to evoke animals naturalistically, especially Lawrence, and yet both make them serve often extreme anthropomorphic functions. A horse like St. Mawr, for example, is very definitely only a horse, but under the pressure of Lawrence's themes and intensities he comes to represent a life-force which relates to human beings. In the third and last part of this study humans are often turned into animals, or vice versa, and whereas this is done realistically, the innate implausibility of the occurrence exerts an unreal and 'fantastic' pressure. In this world of composite beasts, the animals (or creatures) are described naturalistically but operate within a human context in which they can sometimes speak and think humanly.

The three parts of this study attempt to group authors not only by their stylistic tendency but also by their thematic similarities. In focusing upon Kipling and Orwell we will discuss what we may call
the "Socio-Political Bestiary." Using animals as masks to indicate 'types' of human character provides a useful vehicle for the presentation of political argument. Kipling and Orwell seem to occupy polarized political perspectives, and yet both stem from the same kind of background and were largely conditioned by the same social ethos. Both wrote out of profound socio-political beliefs and found in notions of the Empire motives for political action. What is of special interest is that they should have made such ready recourse to Bestiary literature for the expression of their political ideas. Part I then juxtaposes these two Bestiarists and attempts to gauge the qualities and characteristics of their animal depiction.

Part II focuses on Hardy and Lawrence. It is at once apparent that neither of these writers could have found the artificiality of the fable suitable to their intense human concerns. Both wrote out of a commitment to and love for the natural world, and both struggled with the broadly moral problems that the dichotomy between Nature and civilization presented them with. For Hardy, this took the form of open and frank sympathy with animals which suffered the same cruel fate as did man within a Nature indifferent to the welfare of her inhabitants. At the same time, he saw in the fair and humane treatment of animal life a moral hope; he perceived a direct correlation between man's inhumanity to man and his inhumanity to animals. Lawrence, on the other hand, saw the relationship between man and animal, particularly on the instinctual level, as close (though by no means identical) and saw one of the roots of modern man's problems as an inability to reach his own animal self. By frequently juxtaposing human and
animal behaviour and thereby effecting an analogous relationship, Lawrence
draws the reader's attention to bear upon the question of what man is in
his most natural and instinctual state and thus what forces operate to
'de-nature' him. Also, as well as providing Lawrence with thematic armatures,
animals give him the welcome opportunity to paint in words as fully as he
can delightful animal behaviour. Both Hardy and Lawrence then, show a
strongly positive attitude towards animals and they argue that animals are
endowed with qualities before which man's 'divine' reason seems pale or
inadequate for life. Because of this broad similarity and because both have
a tendency to elevate their literary animals into "Natural Symbols", Hardy
and Lawrence may fruitfully be seen together.

The third part is concerned with three writers who purposely intermix
human and animal qualities in an implicit discussion of what distinguishes
man from the other animals and what forces are at work which tend towards
man's bestialization. H. G. Wells, David Garnett, and John Collier all
address these issues, though very much in their own ways, and all show man
and animal in an uncomfortably close relationship. Indeed, so close is it
that the distinctions are almost negligible, and at times one may modulate
into the other. In a reliance on such far-fetched notions as animal
metamorphosis, whether by Ovidian magic or by the manipulations of scien-
tific dissection, Wells and Garnett seek to suggest something about the
precarious state of humanity and to uncover psychological fears about the
inhuman beast that may still lurk beneath modern man's sophisticated surface.
John Collier's ironic suggestion that a female chimpanzee is more capable
of human love and compassion than a 'modern' woman similarly stresses the
inherent sense that on the evolutionary and moral time-scale human regression is more than possible, especially perhaps in the modern era. By using animals that in one way or another suggest modern man's shortcomings, the writers of Part III exhibit a thematic unity and constitute an important, and I hope interesting, aspect of this study.

We might at this point properly ask why there should have been a renewed interest in Bestiary literature within the past century. In a sense this is an unanswerable question, or at least one that would prompt many answers, each applicable to a single author. Nevertheless, we may suggest that beginning in the late 19th Century a profound change took place in the way that man sees himself in relation to the rest of Nature. The predominant attitudes of the Christian era stressed the uniqueness of man rather than his kinship with the rest of the animal kingdom. Man's spiritual essence as conceived by Christian theology distinguished man almost completely from the other animals. After all, animal worship was one form of paganism that a Monotheistic religion would naturally wish to suppress, and the suggestion that man was merely an animal would have jeopardized the concept of an angel-like soul. Despite such obvious and happy exceptions as St. Francis of Assisi, the predominant idea, largely unchallenged, was that there was an irrevocable gap between man and animal and that this gap was the result of either the God-given soul or the God-given faculty of reason.

These concepts of the Soul and Reason as embodiments of the divine spark were to become strenuously challenged, particularly in the post-Darwinian intellectual era. With the publication of Darwin's Origins of
Species (1859), the Evolutionist principles that had been gathering strength throughout the century emerged into full and irrefutable reality. The widely-held view that man was irrevocably separated from the beasts by virtue of his spiritual endowments received a severe blow. Of course, the idea of ethically disinterested Science had been established long before 1859, and we know from such thinkers as Montaigne that notions of man's kinship with the other animals were not new.

Darwin, however, together with T. H. Huxley, was the first to offer satisfactory proof that man evolved and that the animals were his cousins.

The most overt change in sensibility occurred in man's view of the act of creation. The principle of Natural Selection had introduced a mechanistic quality of chance that stood in direct opposition to the concept of a beneficent Deity, wisely controlling the fate of man. Nature was, in empirical fact at least, quite arbitrary and favoured none but the strong and the fit. From this observation arose the inevitable question: What then distinguishes man from the animals? Subsumed within this question is a larger one: What then is man, and what is his place, or function, within Nature? On the first question, Darwin was quite explicit; the distinction between man and ape was not of 'kind' but of 'degree'. The stunning realization, bitterly debated both then and now, was that man is merely an animal who has evolved out of a 'lower' life-form. In the popular imagination, these ideas doubtless became divorced from their scientific contexts, and there arose the fallacious notion that man had descended from an ape. In more elevated circles, the Church hierarchy for example, Darwinism was to have profoundly disturbing effects, and was to force traditional theology
into rethinking its position on the divine purpose for man, who, we must remember, was created in God's image. That the Church was finally capable of adapting is admirably demonstrated in the work of Père Teilhard de Chardin. 11

The impact of Darwinism helped to bring about, I argue, a renewed human concern with man's relations to the other animals. One result is the array of Bestiary literature this thesis is concerned with. This literature did not always rely on a direct use of Darwinian ideas, and sometimes it attempted to deride them. Nor should it be too easily assumed that all of a sudden modern man began to doubt the very real intellectual advantages that he enjoys over the other species. Furthermore, it is probable that Darwinism was only one of the revolutionary changes that brought about a re-examination of man's place and purpose in the world. One need only think of the work of Freud, Nietzsche, Fraser, and Marx to feel convinced that there were many social forces operating to undermine traditional views of life, and to create an intellectual temper characterised by anxiety and insecurity. Consider too the impact of advancing technology and then later its apotheosis in the Great War.

In all, the Modern period suggests itself as an epoch of profound transition, where the old mores, under the precipitous effect of a vigorous new Science, were no longer unquestionably valid. And in an uncertain age where general unease was frequently accompanied by bestial atrocities, or the fear of them, the question of man's relation to the other animals readily assumed a multiplied importance. Is it any wonder that many artists of the period should have had recourse to the world of animal nature, both for moral guidance, and for a redefined sense of what it means to be human? Not
all the artists of this study sought consciously to do this, but all of them made their contribution.

Despite the obvious importance of figures like Darwin, this thesis is not principally concerned with an enquiry into the history of ideas as it is reflected in literature. I mention these ideas here only to suggest the historical backdrop against which the Bestiary of the modern period was played. Of course, some authors, and one immediately thinks of Thomas Hardy and H. G. Wells, were directly influenced by Darwinism and therefore some account of this influence must be taken. But this is only secondary. Rather, this thesis is a study which attempts to discuss the literary qualities and characteristics of The Modern Bestiary, incorporating only such sources and influences that seem essential to this purpose. I do not attempt to catalogue all examples of the Modern Bestiary in English fiction, but rather offer a study of its major achievements.
PART I: RUDYARD KIPLING and GEORGE ORWELL:
THE SOCIO-POLITICAL BESTIARY

Demades, a famous Greek orator, was once addressing an assembly at Athens on a subject of great importance and in vain tried to fix the attention of his hearers. They laughed among themselves, watched the sports of the children and in twenty other ways showed their want of concern in the subject of the discourse. Demades, after a short pause spoke as follows: 'Ceres one day journeyed in company with a swallow and an ell'. At this there was marked attention and every ear strained now to catch the words of the orator.

(Attributed to Aesop.)
Bestiary literature has a strong background in political statement. In Aristotle's *Rhetoric* we find the first recorded account of an Aesopic fable and Aristotle's reference to it suggests the political nature of the lesson which the fable describes.\(^1\) He remarks that "fables are suitable for addresses to popular assemblies"\(^2\) and derives from this the idea that political truths may be happily enforced through this didactic literary form. Proof that Aesop himself was a political activist, executed by the Delphinians because of the seditious nature of his fables, is inconclusive. But whether or not we concur in Ernest Rhys's view that Aesop went to his death for telling "too feelingly the fable of the Ox and the Frog",\(^3\) it is certainly true that the animal fable may effectively 'mask' and conceal political personages and events within the character(s) of an animal.

The safe convenience which animal characters provide was widely used in the medieval period. The Bestiaries themselves, of course, sought to present Christian truths more effectively by couching them in a less austere way. Other works, however, used the same 'masking' device for more overt political purposes. *A Song of the Times*,\(^4\) for example, sought to use the beasts of the field allegorically to express concern over the unfair system of taxation. Similarly, William Langland uses the fable of the cats, rats, and mice in the Prologue to *Piers Plowman* to introduce an obvious political tension.\(^5\) At the other end of the political spectrum there is John Gower's *Vox Clamantis* in which a nightmare is envisioned describing Wat Tyler's attempt to overthrow the ruling Lords of the land. The characters in this work are represented by various animals and birds, with Wat himself as the untrustworthy jay.\(^6\)
In all of these works, and others of less overtly political intentions, the writers' interest in using animals is turned towards evoking particular social and political circumstances. There is little attempt, for example, at detailed investigation into the particularities of human psychology. Animal characters are especially useful for this kind of literature since, while saving the author from censure or libel they also attract the reader's amused attention and avoid the technical problems caused by creating human characters. Writers who use animals in this way usually have preconceived ideas of the attitude or criticism they wish to communicate, and to this extent such literature tends to be dogmatic. Thus, if the author wishes to criticise a politician's deceitful actions, he may use a fox as his representation and the well-known emblematic qualities of this animal are thereby invested in the man. For the reader, the aesthetic appeal is heightened by the humorous identification between a man and an animal of lesser value. The subtlety of this kind of humour, or the pointedness of the political critique, would obviously depend upon the artistic merits of the writer.

In the modern era, Rudyard Kipling and George Orwell were both writers of political literature and both had frequent recourse to the Bestiary. Kipling's *Jungle Books* as well as a host of short stories such as "The Mother-Hive", "A Walking Delegate", "The Maltese Cat", "The Dog Hervey", and many more, all tend to reinforce the attitudes and convictions with which Kipling's name has become synonymous. Similarly, a work like *Animal Farm* reflects Orwell's political consciousness and reveals that the technique of employing personified animals for political reasons is as valid for our
society as it was for any other.

Interestingly, both Kipling and Orwell were partly brought up in the Imperial Far East. This background was to produce in each very strong political attitudes. Kipling was a conservative thinker and a believer in the practical and moral virtues of the Empire. Orwell served the Empire that Kipling supported but found it corrupt; as a consequence he became a socialist and an anti-imperialist. Regardless of this antinomy in political affiliation, Kipling and Orwell were both men of strong moral feeling. To Kipling, the Empire was the best way to ensure the greatest political and economic stability; to Orwell, socialism best served the human qualities of liberty and justice. For both, the realities of political life were forced through and exaggerated by the complex and often disconcerting situations they faced in India and Burma respectively.

This common background led, I argue, to temperamental conditions most conducive to Bestiary literature. In being engaged political writers, Kipling and Orwell tended to be more preoccupied with social and political themes than with the kind of psychological realism which characterises much 19th century fiction. Consequently, animal 'types' were very useful shorthand means by which situations could be most simply and pungently expressed. This idea consorts well with the moral and simplified qualities that fablistic animals best typify and with the moral bases which Kipling and Orwell believed in. Additionally, we should suggest the effect that the peculiarly symbolic quality of the Eastern view of animals would have produced. It would have been impossible for either writer to be unaware of the profoundly religious and symbolic sense of animals that Hindus and Buddhists have.
The political, moral, and environmental qualities that Kipling and Orwell shared predisposed them to write Bestiary literature of fablistic and allegorical kinds. Interested as they were in presenting political ideas, it was this type of simplifying technique that was most appropriate for the maximum clarification of their respective points of view. Thus, in style we shall see that their animals are very often personified 'counters' which represent particular human qualities. However, this is not uniformly so and we should not assume a complete lack of naturalistic detail. After all, the predominant fictional attitude demanded some amount of realism and consequently in a work like *Jungle Books*, animals are used allegorically but often described naturalistically. Similarly, in Orwell's *Burmese Days*, as well as essay-stories such as "Shooting an Elephant", we see animals that are wholly realistic yet which embody symbolic, abstract qualities. Even in *Animal Farm* the animals are occasionally described in ways that convince us of their physical animalness; the extreme allegorical formality of *Animal Farm* represents the culmination of Orwell's earlier animal usages all of which deliberately strive for naturalistic authenticity.

It should be clear by now why Kipling and Orwell resorted so frequently to the Bestiary. But it will not do to suggest that this tendency was determined wholly by the pragmatic forces of political need. Both writers liked animals! This is not to suggest, of course, that their inclusion within literature implies sentimentality. Many readers and critics still seem to believe that the use of fablistic animals presupposes such an attitude, and that works which employ animals as central protagonists are by definition less serious than those which employ humans. This presup-
position may well be true—the great examples of fiction (excluding perhaps Moby Dick) are in this sense anthropocentric—but it would be false to compare the greatest examples of realistic fiction with animal fables and allegories which by their nature are so different in style and intent. When we read the animal literature of Kipling and Orwell we must view it by the standards which such literature demands. Similarly, and this is especially so with Kipling, we must not confuse the presupposition of sentimentality with its actual presence. For both writers we must be sensitive to the not inconsiderable craft of depicting animals within the demanding limitations of the fable and allegory.

**RUDYARD KIPLING**

As much as any writer of his generation, Kipling captured within the broad range of his stories a striking conception of wild and domestic animal life. This is particularly true of the *Jungle Books* which have become an accepted classic of their kind, and which have an appeal wider than the phrase 'children's animal stories' suggests. But Kipling's literary interest in animals is not narrowly restricted; throughout a long writing life his use of animals to focus the reader's attention towards broad and often socio-political themes remains consistent.\(^8\)

Dr. J. K. Jamiluddin has outlined some of the qualities of the Indian conception of animal life that Kipling would have been aware of.\(^9\) In everyday Indian life it was impossible to remain unaware of the peculiarly strong symbolic value that Indians put on certain animals. The cow, the elephant, the cobra, and many more, were all considered divinely important and
representative of certain values. Animals were an important part of Indian religion, and it is unlikely that Kipling would have been ignorant of the striking symbolic qualities attributed to them. Similarly, India in the late 19th Century was still very much a frontier country in which the conquest of wild animal nature was far from complete. Snakes and big cats were still a threat to communities isolated from the large cities. Both as a boy, and then later as a journalist, Kipling would have been aware of these forces present in India.

Direct experience of the Indian conception of animal life would not have been the only formative influence on the young Kipling. He would also have had easy access to the rich Indian tradition of the animal fable as it is reflected in the Pancha-Tantra. The purpose of this fable tradition, similar to the Aesopic variety, is to elucidate an ethical maxim through a simple demonstration of animal life. Doubtless, Kipling's nurses and servants would have related to him the very many animal stories common to the strong oral folk-lore tradition of India. But Kipling's knowledge of Bestiary literature would not have been restricted to the Indian traditions. Like many Anglo-Indian children, he was sent back to England for his education and he records in his autobiography that there he became familiar with such moralistic animal tales as Mrs. Gatty's Parables from Nature.

We have noted already that Bestiary literature most often has a moral edge, and thus to an intensely moral man like Kipling this kind of literature had an obvious appeal. The various moral qualities of integrity, duty, action, love, etc., are represented very forcefully by the animals of such stories as "Garm - A Hostage", "Below the Mill-Dam", "The Maltese
Kipling's animal stories also reinforce some of his more overt attitudes, especially in politics. Take for example his well-known insistence on the necessary role and value of the British Empire. There is no escaping the fact that Kipling was an imperialist, but it is important to realise that he considered the rule of Empire a temporary moral duty, implying neither racial nor cultural superiority. In recent years, the work of Bonamy Dobree, Louis Gilbert, and Shamsul Islam, has done much to clarify Kipling's view of Empire, and in the light of these studies it is evident that literary history has played fast and loose with Kipling's reputation.  

Kipling's insistence on the role of Empire, together with the corollary of an anti-democratic viewpoint, manifests itself in Kipling's animal fiction. Stories such as "A Walking Delegate", "The Mother Hive", and once again the *Jungle Books*, exemplify such points of view with great clarity.

Kipling's moral and political ideas coincide with his views on society, social order, and law. His most common insistence concerns the need for law to regulate human behaviour. This perhaps stems from his early experience with cruel psychological instability, and perhaps it was this that led Kipling to be so conscious of what Alan Sandison has called "the wider Necessity which has decreed that man shall live forever at the edge of the pit, snatching his identity from the limbo of non-existence which lies at..."
Thus, Kipling's life-long desire to ally himself with such in-groups as Masonry, Mithraism, Empire, and even the Wolf-pack, strikes one as a constituent part of his very personality. In a rather different context, Noel Annan has suggested that Kipling should be seen within the framework of 19th Century Sociology, since his principle interests lay in uncovering the social bases of human life and happiness rather than in exploring human psychology and human interaction.

In the *Jungle Books* we find a detailed exploration of Kipling's view of a society controlled by a subtle system of law. The jungle is an environment that is offered to the reader as a moral paradigm, and within this the animals exemplify character 'types'. We discern in Kipling's greater interest in social ideas and themes an interest that is peculiarly susceptible to Bestiary literature, and especially the fable. Animal personification is entirely appropriate to the needs of an artist who is not primarily concerned with human individuality, since the simplified human trait exemplified in an animal constitutes the idea that he wishes to propose without the often cumbersome interference of real human beings. This may constitute a criticism of Kipling, and certainly many critics have remarked on his failure to create fully-rounded characters. But put in the perspective of his controlling social, moral, and political ideas, his constant recourse to Bestiary literature, and its attendant mode of personifying animals, should be seen as a tactical and entirely appropriate method.

Nor should it be assumed that a reliance on Bestiary forms of literary
expression necessarily implies inferior literary quality. The moral and
socio-political perspectives from which we must view Kipling's animal
fiction are not the only ones available to us. We must remember that
Kipling considered himself an artist before anything else. In fact, two
of his animal stories, "The Bull that Thought", and "Teem - A Treasure
Hunter", deal very directly with the concept and value of art and artistry.
Kipling's father was an artist, and Kipling himself frequently stayed with
the Burne Jones' to whom he was related. Kipling wrote many of his stories
with painstaking care and artistic craftsmanship, and it is this qualitative
aspect of Kipling's Bestiary that has been ignored. I do not mean to imply
that Kipling's animal stories are always uniformly successful or that they
are wholly free from sentimentality. What may be challenged is Edmund
Wilson's assertion that Kipling's "increasing addiction ... to animals" necessarily implies degenerating literary qualities.

In Kipling's fiction for children we find very forceful examples of
his extensive reliance on Bestiary literature. We should first say that
the line between adult and children's literature is sometimes notoriously
thin, and this is especially so with Kipling. For Kipling is unique in
that his ideas often have a way of manifesting themselves implicitly,
irrespective of the more ostensible themes. Thus, in the Jungle Books,
which on the surface are a children's romance of animal and jungle life,
the larger concerns of Social law and of Empire become evident as alle-
gorical presences. It should be added that it is in the subtle nature of
Kipling's art for allegory to be felt as implied idea without ever
actually being deliberately allegorical in the full sense. In a work like
Dryden's "The Hind and the Panther", animals represent either the church of Rome or the church of England. In the *Jungle Books*, however, animals embody abstract qualities while at the same time retaining a sense of their animal selves. In this way, Kipling's animals are not merely lifeless allegorical symbols, and they cannot be thus reduced.

Although Kipling's *Just So Stories* were not published until 1902, it is this sample of his Bestiary that a reader is first likely to encounter. These simple narratives have no greater pretensions than to entertain and instruct young children, but it is worthwhile pointing out that even in this most elementary of Kipling's works the characteristic moral viewpoints are there. A good example of the technique may be found in "How the Camel Got his Hump". Through a vivid evocation of the animal's inherent laziness, Kipling gives an anatomical explanation for the emergence of its hump. To make up for the work that the Camel has not done, a magician creates its hump in which water can be stored, thus allowing the Camel to work for longer periods without rest. In addition, Kipling makes it plain that hard work is the effective remedy for the moral fault of bad-tempered laziness.

The cure for this ill is not to sit still,  
Or frowst with a book by the fire;  
But to take a large hoe and a shovel also,  
And dig till you gently perspire.

The emergence of the moral value of work here asserts itself.

In an early review of the *Just So Stories*, G. K. Chesterton remarked that Kipling draws his animals "not as types and members in an elaborate scheme of knowledge, but as walking portents, things marked by extravagant and peculiar features". This pertinent comment points out quite correctly
the masterly way in which Kipling creates his animal characters. Though they have a significance as moralised 'types', they are also individualised within an imaginative narrative free from cloying reductivism. This is a quality not unique to the animals of the Just So Stories.

The Jungle Books were written mostly in Vermont between 1893-95, and they represent perhaps the best known example of Kipling's animal art. Their appeal is most certainly broad and it is far from uncommon to find that adults as well as children find in their breadth of implication something that warrants serious consideration. Literary criticism should be especially interested in them since here we find some of Kipling's most engaging writing. In his autobiography, Kipling records that once he had blocked out the main ideas of the animal stories "the pen took charge, and I watched it begin to write stories about Mowgli and animals ..." Kipling believed that he wrote his best when his 'Daemon' took charge of his pen in the manner just related and if we take the popularity of Jungle Books to be any measure, he was surely right.

There are two Jungle Books, the first published in 1894 and the second a year later. In addition to these volumes, the story "In the Rukh" should also be included since it too is about Mowgli. The Mowgli stories are only a part of the whole and these are frequently interrupted by plain animal stories, all of which describe the world from what purports to be an animal's eye-view. From this animal perspective and from the engaging sense of living exclusively in an animal society, we gain an interesting vantage point on what values Kipling believed to be central to a social community. This is effected in particular through the juxtaposition of
human and animal societies. Within this framework, it is apparent that
Kipling very firmly supports his animals. The animals themselves usually
typify some ethical quality or its opposite, and to this extent the
traditional fable form is followed. But it should be said that the details
and environment in which these moral 'types' play out their lives is
wholly naturalistic and is far removed from the terse animal fable we
recognise in the Aesopic model. The jungle, together with the animals in
it, are presented as if they are real. Of course, the animals are heavily
anthropomorphised. But when they act out their instincts, preying on one
another, or following the urge of the Springtime madness, we are in little
doubt that they are real animals as they may be observed, "with passions
and instincts which seem to be really those of the animals we are seeing".17

In the first Jungle Book, the three Mowgli stories serve as a Bildungs-
roman in which the young man-cub grows up, learning through hard experience
the nature of moral good and evil. "Kaa's Hunting" deals with this theme
very directly: Mowgli is abducted by the Bandar-log, a group of monkeys
who typify for the other animals lawlessness and mindless chaos. Finally,
Mowgli is rescued through the selfless actions of Bagheera, Baloo, and
Kaa. This whole escapade, written with a lively flourish that secures a
very real sense of fictional place and character, acts as a moral lesson-
in-action for the inexperienced boy. The virtues displayed by the three
rescuing animals are typified in most of the animals who appear in the non-
Mowgli tales. Most often, these virtues are duty, selflessness, service,
an adherence to law, and a respect and love for one's comrades. The non-
Mowgli stories reinforce these values and imply that the highly anthro-
pomorphised animals of the Mowgli series are but exaggerations of qualities observable in Nature.

Within the fablistic context of the Mowgli stories, the great Bagheera represents bravery, courage, and fierce action; he is Mowgli's closest companion. Baloo the Bear represents wisdom; it is his role to teach Mowgli the ways of the jungle. In Hindu mythology the Elephant is one representation of Ganesha, the god of wisdom, and thus the mighty Hathi symbolizes wisdom and intellectual achievement. Kaa stands for prudence and intelligence. The Seeonee wolf-pack are to be seen as a single unit which represents the force of fraternal association and the social advantages of comradeship.

The animals thus far described represent the morally good forces of the jungle. Although they predominate they are not the whole story. Evil also exists and in this sense Kipling's jungle takes on associations with Garden of Eden, with Mowgli perhaps as the first Adam. It is a part of Mowgli's moral education of course that he should taste hate as well as love, discord alongside unity, and that he should learn to discriminate between these contraries. Shere Khan, the lame tiger, is Mowgli's most serious antagonist since from the beginning he regards Mowgli as his 'kill'. He typifies brute animal power and ferocity, but devoid of the moral consciousness that binds the lawful animals. Because he does not conform to the carefully articulated dictates of the 'Law of the Jungle' he is Mowgli's inevitable moral foe. The Bandar-log similarly oppose the 'Law' in that they represent a direct anti thesis to the wolf-pack. Both the monkeys and the wolves identify themselves as a group, but the former are seemingly incapable of holding onto the moral pattern of behaviour that
governs the wolves. In what may be a conscious inversion of Darwin's so-called "Monkey Theory" Kipling depicts the Simian group as inferior in practical wisdom to the 'lower' animals. (Of course, the word "wisdom" here takes on quite a specific meaning, and contrasts sharply with the human measure of I.Q.) The Bandar-log are depicted as devoid of the strong instincts which create the spirit of integrity common amongst the 'free' animals.

It should be apparent to anyone familiar with the *Jungle Books* that to extract from each of the animal characters the moral quality that they most notably represent is to be overly reductive. It is clear that whereas moral qualities are exemplified by an animal, that animal's whole identity is larger than its moralistic importance. To characterise a figure like Bagheera by offering a few moralistic synonyms is to have said very little about the character that he is. He is not a moral 'counter' in the way for example Dryden's Hind and Panther are. It is this quality of the alive realness of an animal that distinguishes Kipling's Bestiary as it is seen in the *Jungle Books*, and this achievement is inextricably linked with Kipling's success as a writer of lively action. Consider for example this passage:

To move down so cunningly that never a leaf stirred; to wade knee-deep in the roaring shallows that drown all noise from behind; to drink, looking backward over one shoulder, every muscle ready for the first desperate bound of keen terror; to role on the sandy margin, and return, wet-muzzled and well-plumped out, to the admiring herd, was a thing that tall-antlered young bucks took a delight in, precisely because they knew that at any moment Bagheera or Shere Khan might leap upon them and bear them down.
Put this way, the predatory instincts become a kind of game in which life is given added zest through the ever-present danger of death. Violence is the natural way of life in the jungle, and here it is given an almost aesthetic appeal. Whether tall-antlered young bucks really experience life like this is an open question. We cannot know how a young buck's mind works, or even if he has a mind that can be said to work at all, but his behaviour gives rise quite spontaneously to an anthropomorphic understanding of his experience. In many cases, direct observation and appreciation of animal behaviour gives rise to something more akin to envy and even sympathetic identification. These are the kinds of response that Kipling himself obviously felt and which he means the reader to feel too; it is this kind of quality which relieves the fiction of overly simplistic moralisms.

The second Jungle Book strikes the reader as at once more elevated than the first. It is as if Kipling only became aware of the larger possibilities of his jungle romance once he had written several of the stories. It is with the second Jungle Book that the larger societal allegories, already hinted at in the first, become more predominant and force themselves on the reader in more deliberate ways. It should be remembered, however, that the kinds of literary qualities already discussed continue to exert a powerful pressure. This must be understood as the ground-swell on which the larger issues ultimately rely.

This more engaged seriousness may be gauged immediately by the very first story, "How Fear Came". This is the animal's version of the biblical Genesis, and we learn that this account of the creation of the animals is
directly involved with the ethical code that goes by the name of the 'Law of the Jungle'. We may note in passing that Kipling's use of this phrase implies more than the usually accepted notion of the "survival of the fittest" within a Nature "red in tooth and claw". Certainly, this is a part of the 'Law' and in it we detect very obvious Darwinian ideas. But to this we must add the very powerful social bonds that keep both the group and the individual strong within a loving and just, that is to say moral, environment. This affectionate and moral assumption is implied within the animals' instinctual behaviour, but for Mowgli it must be learned.

The Genesis and laws of the jungle animals are related by Hathi, who stands as a parallel to Moses. The occasion for retelling this Creation Myth is the "water Truce" which is called and obeyed in times of severe water shortage. The truce demands that no animal should kill or be killed at the water hole, and represents an example of the 'Law of the Jungle' in operation. Hathi describes for all how once upon a time, before the inevitable fall, all the animals lived in peace and harmony. Evil, death, and fear then entered the paradisal state and from that time chaos reigned. The Elephant-God, Tha, had then imposed the 'Law', a code which implies a social covenant and which was a necessary force in a fallen world.

The parallel between this scenario and the biblical equivalent is striking, and clearly an adult reader is unlikely to miss the association. Interestingly, Hathi describes the origins of the world wholly in Elephant terms, just as humans read their origins in human contexts. Kipling seems to be suggesting a subtle parody of human personification, and the humorous aspects of this parody are reinforced when the rather sarcerdotal Hathi is
gently mocked by Mowgli and Bagheera. However, the wisdom that Hathi imparts is taken very seriously, except by Shere Khan who attempts to deride it. It is generally recognised that survival in a harsh and difficult world depends upon socially appropriate checks and balances. The 'Law' itself is given a full poetic iteration that concludes the episode.

Now this is the law of the jungle - as old and as true as the sky;  
And the wolf that shall keep it may prosper, but the wolf that shall break it must die.

As the creeper that girdles the tree trunk the law runneth forward and back -  
For the strength of the pack is the wolf, and the strength of the wolf is the pack.

Now these are the laws of the jungle, and many and mighty are they.  
But the head and the hoof of the law and the haunch and the hump is Obey!

(pp.102-105)

What the whole notion of 'Law' means to Kipling as a socio-political force cannot be understood from the *Jungle Books* alone. Shamsul Islam has written a full-length study of Kipling's concept of 'Law' in which its centrality is more than amply demonstrated. But the *Jungle Books* do stand as the single most fully articulated instance of this concept, and for this reason alone deserve full critical appraisal. For within their romance-like parameters they express many of the values that together create a unified idea of a genuine social cohesiveness. The single thread that links all of Kipling's social ideas is the emphasis on stable community. But this community, it is repeatedly stressed, must be fought for and won, in much the same way that Mowgli must overcome evil and thus join the 'free' animals of the jungle who preserve their community through a reliance
on 'Law'. Even the act of killing other species, all except man that is, is seen as good when undertaken within the lawful code which stipulates that a kill is made out of need and never out of a desire to destroy. This stern morality, however, finds its natural corollary in the principle quality that endears both Mowgli and the reader to the jungle animals: loving affection. The strength of this affection is felt throughout many of the stories and it acts as the social bonding agent which lends virtue to an otherwise apparently ruthless world.

I have been suggesting all along that the humanized view of animals and of animal society we are offered in the *Jungle Books* is essentially positive and suggests something of a social paradigm. This strong feeling is intensified because of our willing identification with the half-animal half-human Mowgli. Through his experiences with the other humans, the society of the jungle animals takes on added virtues and strengths. In the stories "Tiger, Tiger", "Letting in the Jungle", and "The King's Ankus", we see clear examples of the inferiority of human society when compared with that of the animals. We have noted earlier that the *Jungle Books* serve an educational function for Mowgli, and hence for the reader. Mowgli after all is human, and there is a constant insistence that man always returns to man. Implicit in this lies the notion that the values Mowgli has learned in the jungle will later be taken back into the human world. Mowgli will be an inverse kind of Missionary, bringing stern but good news from the lower animals. In this, Mowgli tends to be a Rousseau-esque figure, the natural man in an ideal state of Nature. He is also perhaps a Darwinistic Ur-man who ascends from the jungle into full
humanity. However, the ascension is here ironic in that the glimpses of the human world we are offered suggest more of a descent. Becoming a Park Ranger certainly seems a lame falling-off after his life in the jungle.

Mowgli's involvement with humans, particularly those of the neighboring villages, begins in "Tiger, Tiger!". Upon entering the village he is immediately accepted by Messua and her husband as their long-lost child. Man's duplicity is immediately revealed when the local priest claims the glory (and the reward too he hopes) of recovering the long-lost son. But from the start Mowgli does not fit into the village life. He directly confronts Buldeo, the head man of the village, charging that the great hunter is largely ignorant of the jungle about which he proposes to teach the village children. In particular, Mowgli objects to him speaking of "ghosts and gods and goblins" that live within the animals. He argues that animals are free from the spirits which the villagers project onto them. To prove his point and to show his natural superiority over Buldeo, Mowgli skillfully organizes Shere Khan's assassination. This action is performed with a great deal of intelligent and even scientific cunning. But Buldeo manages to persuade the other villagers that this feat was not the product of natural forces of ordinary but potent intelligence, but was effected through the arts of sinister magic. Mowgli is stoned and turned away from the village society.

With Shere Khan's death and the subsequent hatred that Buldeo feels for Mowgli, Kipling effects a subtle shift of perspective and the threat to Mowgli's moral education becomes assumed within the force of dark ignorance.
and blind superstition that Buldeo represents. The moral problem becomes now the inherent threat of prejudiced irrationality before which the enlightened ethic of rational social laws must be established. It is significant of course that Buldeo is an Indian native whose sense of irrational witchcraft stands in the way of genuine moral and social enlightenment. This problem of the clash between the conflicting ideologies of the East and the West is to be found in greater depth in "The Bridge-Builders". For the present it is sufficient to stress that the lawless evil of Shere Khan is transposed into an Indian concept of an ignorant denial of the natural 'Law'.

In both the animal and human worlds, Kipling gives examples of good and evil, and in both Mowgli is the moral barometer. But it seems clear that in the human world the bad outweighs the good. It is true that Messua and her husband represent morally good forces, but their situation is peculiar and will be dealt with shortly. It is also true that Mowgli first entered the village because the jungle animals rejected him, thus paralleling his later rejection from the village. But it should be remembered that his rejection from the jungle came about mostly because of the animals' understanding that man always returns to man. The Indian natives have no such excuse; as a whole they are easily bullied into believing that not only Mowgli but also Messua and her husband are implicated in black-magic. As a consequence, they intend to burn Messua and her husband at the stake. The threat of this murder prompts the action of the marvelous story "Letting in the Jungle" in which the animals force the villagers to abandon their homes. This whole incident is rendered with
poised control; the sense of the physical encroachment of the jungle is superbly done and breathes life into the fictional world of Nature. It is here too that the theme of revenge appears and with it the fullest expression of Mowgli's anti-human sentiments:

Thou knowest the village of the Man-pack that cast me out? They are idle, and cruel; they play with their mouths, and they do not kill the weaker for food, but for sport. When they are full-fed they would throw their own breed into the Red Flower. This I have seen. It is not well that they should live here anymore. I hate them!.

(p.173)

Human society becomes unworthy of a place in the jungle and the animals thus drive them away. The animal society, rough, just, and eminently alive, acts as a moral police force to eradicate evil. It is a mark of Mowgli's moral education that he recognises the cancer that the villagers represent and thus effects their expulsion. Here as nowhere else, Kipling reveals himself to be wholly on the animals' side in their eradication of the humans. Through them he finds a way of suggesting an adequately vigorous society and therefore a moral force capable of lambasting a humanity that misunderstands Nature. Yet we must interject a caveat here since Kipling is careful to make a distinction between different kinds of human. The distinction is largely on racial grounds, between the native Indians and the strange White Men who live far off and who seem to live by rules of law and justice similar to those of the jungle animals. We should also remember that Mowgli is white and it is suggested that he predominates amongst the animals because of the mysterious powers of genetic leadership.

'And what pack are they?' said Mowgli. 'I do not know. They be white, and it is said that they govern all the land,
and do not suffer people to burn or beat each other without
witness. If we can get thither tonight we live. Otherwise
we die'.

(p.160)

The earnest exhortation of the last clause suggests perhaps the idea
of British civilization that Kipling wished to imply, but it should be
pointed out that this description of Imperial justice is somewhat equivocal.
Are we led to imply that the British only allow people to burn and beat
each other in the presence of witnesses? Despite this small equivocation,
it is made abundantly clear that in escaping from the Indian villagers
and seeking protection from the British, Messua and her husband are not only
saving their lives but are also making a symbolic journey from one concept
of human life to another, from lawless superstition to lawful order. As
if to make the symbolism even more complete, they are protected throughout
the night by the jungle animals. Thus, a transference from Indian ideology
to a British one is effected through the agency of the animals, and this
in microcosm is the method of the whole allegory implied in Mowgil's moral
education. The way to moral and social enlightenment is the education
learned through the ways of animals. Implicit in this of course, is a
partly negative view of Indian society. It is characterised, probably
unfairly, as the epitome of all the forces that stand in the way of moral
law and rational enlightenment. From the English point of view there is
doubtless some truth in this caricature. Kipling experienced first hand
how difficult it sometimes was to enforce British standards of ethical
conduct in a society whose values lay in other areas. That Kipling believed
it was possible for this change in mental habit and sensibility to occur is
perhaps indicated in the journey that Messua and her husband make. But it should be said that the husband is very unwilling to give up the ways of the village and the symbolic journey is thus only a partial escape.

The operative analogy between the British and the jungle animals is I think clearly implied in the *Jungle Books*, and through this subtle and perhaps only partly conscious transference the Bestiary form of literary expression is seen to be especially effective. It is of course arguable that Kipling's account of jungle life is romanticized out of all recognizable proportion, and that as a consequence the analogy breaks down. However, this assumes that Kipling believed the Imperial presence in India to be an embodiment of all moral virtue. There is little doubt that he did not think this. Rather, in both the jungle and the Empire he was projecting an idealised notion of these forces. However, both of these idealisms were founded on some amount of realism, whether it be the already established achievements of the Empire or the direct observation of the vital, natural life within animals.

We have remarked earlier that Kipling was not endeared to Democracy or indeed to liberals and liberalism. This is one aspect of Kipling's thinking that has been thoroughly discussed, and often has been the grounds on which he has been dismissed as an artist. In recent years, efforts have been made to redirect the course of Kipling criticism, and this has sometimes been attempted by the argument that Kipling was an artist and not a political writer of didactic tracts. Besides, the argument runs, if Kipling was an anti-democratic writer then of course he stands alongside such contemporaries as Yeats, Eliot, Lawrence, and Pound, all of whom shared
a similar scepticism about Democracy's principles and practices. Most certainly none of these writers could be described as a Liberal, and to this extent Kipling should be counted amongst their ranks. But it would be wrong I think for Kipling scholars to take too much comfort in this association since it is more apparent than real. Although all of these writers expressed anti-democratic sentiments, it should be remembered that by and large they eschewed the party politics of their day and rejected the whole way of life that a 'political' perspective demands. Kipling, on the other hand, deliberately aligned himself with Imperial and conservative points of view in a very partisan way. Most notably, he made it clear what his response was to such a phenomenon as World War I, and by identifying himself with people and views of the militarist persuasion he opened himself up to the criticism that he was himself a Militarist, and a jingoist to boot. Interestingly, George Orwell found Kipling's willingness to stand up and be counted a commitment preferable to the mean-minded sneering of those he characterised as the "pansy left". Certainly, there are aspects of Kipling's honesty that we dismiss at the peril of our consciences.

Another distinction that should be drawn between Kipling and the other anti-democrats is that he alone sought to present his overt political views in his fiction. He alone sought to use his art as an instrument of didactic political argument. These views find appropriate articulation within Kipling's Bestiary stories. In particular, the animal fable suited his purposes and in such tales as "A Walking Delegate", and "The Mother Hive" we see him draw upon this ancient and popular tradition. Similarly, "Little Foxes", though not a fable, addresses the problem of effective
government within the opposing forms of Democracy and Autocracy. Before we look closely at these stories it should be said that artistic accomplishment and fairness of political characterisation are not always synonymous. Thus, it is not impossible to find redeeming literary qualities in an animal story wholly abhorrent in its political sentiments.

Mrs. Gatty's *Parables from Nature* contains a bee-fable similar in some respects to Kipling's "The Mother Hive", and doubtless Kipling knew Mandeville's *Fable of the Bees*. But as a keen apiarist Kipling would hardly need to rely on these sources for the construction, replete with minute details, of his own bee-hive allegory. This story is something of a model of fictional economy, subtly suggesting a whole range of political statement. The bee-hive is an obviously appropriate metaphor for an efficient body-politic since it works on lines of high efficiency and concentration of duty. In a sense, the bee-hive represents a paradigm of an organized and stable community, taking as its values work, obedience, and mechanical service. These values are those that we see operating within much of Kipling's fiction. But "The Mother Hive" introduces this paradigm only to reveal its peculiar vulnerability before the potential destruction of the wax-moth. Once this infiltrator gains access to the hive, anarchy ensues and the social commune dies.

On the allegorical level there is little room for confusion in an understanding of this fable. It represents an allegorical demonstration of what may happen within a society once the defences of a nation are down and eloquent liberal-destroyers (or dark forces of other nations) are allowed to exert an influence. The wax-moth, who eventually
destroys the hive, gets in when a bad-tempered fracas occurs at the entrance gate. Towards the end of the fable, however, it is made clear that the moth got in because the social fabric of the hive had already begun to disintegrate; the initial enemy was thus on the inside.

To gauge the full range of the fable's effectiveness, we must provide some brief historical contexts. "The Mother Hive" was written in 1908 at a time when European diplomacy was in a highly unstable period. Kipling was always a keen observer of current affairs, particularly so when the Germans were involved, and it was at this time that Germany and the United States were gaining economic superiority over Great Britain. The 1905 German invasion of Morocco brought the political situation to something of a head, since Morocco had previously been the Colonial spill of Britain and France. This military intrusion therefore was felt very deeply as a dangerous infringement of colonial rights, and this feeling was doubtless particularly strong amongst the British Imperial contingent. At this time anti-German feeling was high anyway, and this occurrence must have seemed like a prophecy of future problems.

The military and economic threat that Germany began to impose brought about a salutory warning to Britain, and a popular call to maintain the vigil was doubtless a frequent response. The defence at Tangiers, like the guard at the entrance to the bee-hive, was lax and as a result the natural enemy took the opportunity to make a gain. The parallel between "The Mother Hive" and the Moroccan crisis is quite obvious and it is probable that Kipling was either consciously or unconsciously drawing upon this incident in his fable. There is no external documentation that
irrefutably proves this, and we need not overstate the parellel too much. But certainly the correspondence is there to be seen and it is a correspondence that Kipling's contemporaries would have seen immediately.

The wax-moth then finds an external frame of reference within the larger arena of European politics, but as we have already noted its entry was predetermined by an internal decay. To continue the political parallelism, we might ask what internal politics represent this decay? In 1904 Admiral Sir John Fisher became the First Sea Lord, and one of his first economic rationalizations was to remove from foreign and colonial stations all British gun-boats. This kind of action quickly made the new Sea Lord very unpopular with the more conservative thinkers. Perhaps this was one kind of internal change that Kipling felt threatened the security of the State and in itself suggested an unwarranted liberalisation. But perhaps of far greater significance than this was the national election of 1906 in which the Liberals backed by the new Labour Party, beat the Tories. Kipling was not formally a member of the Conservative Party, even though he was offered an Edinburgh constituency. Though he refused the nomination, there is little doubt that by temperament and by private persuasion, Kipling was a Tory. Interestingly, in a letter he records that he refused the Edinburgh seat because he thought he could serve the Party better through his writing. Such stories as "The Mother Hive" doubtless are attempts to make this support of conservative points of view apparent. The kind of threat that a traditionalist and a Tory and an anti-democrat would see in a Liberal/Labour victory was the kind of threat that would lead to a weakening of national defences and national morale. Looked at
from Kipling's point of view, the 1911 Miner's Strike was ample proof of his worst fears.

Within the contexts of the historical facts already mentioned, "The Mother Hive" takes on an added significance for us as it undoubtedly did for Kipling's generation. Today we must dig for the contemporary political facts that at the time were common knowledge, and largely because the issues of the day are no longer of any vital interest to us the allegorical level of the story must be actively sought. However, there is one further aspect of the fable that must be discussed, or else it would seem that Kipling was offering no hopeful remedy. Within the bee-hive some bees remain loyal and reject the gushing overtures of the liberal wax-moth, finally producing a new Queen to replace the old dying one. It is this group of bees who finally escape the purgative fire of the bee-keeper. These bees, and therefore by implication any remaining active Tory M.P.'s, could salvage something from this lost situation and live to recreate the lost social order. This is the final hope of the fable and it is clear that Kipling intends this to be a rallying call to all the faithful and loyal Tories. We know that Kipling was openly critical of many Tory M.P.'s at this time, charging that their inert and lazy attitudes enabled the more productive liberals to win the election.\textsuperscript{25} There is hope offered in the possibility of Tory inertia resolving into Tory determination, and this applies both to the home as well as the international situation.

The success of this fable, however, does not absolutely depend on our understanding of its political allegory. Without it "The Mother Hive" would be less interesting but it would still be effective in the general social situation it obviously fabulises. A good fable is careful to make
the relationship between the literal action of the story and its allegorical implications as oblique as possible. If this relationship is made too close, then the analogical nature of the fable is jeopardised. Irrespective of the value or worth of its political edges, "The Mother Hive" avoids this masterfully; the political allegories are but echoes and reverberate all the stronger for their subtle presence. In this, Kipling shows himself to be more than adept at a literary form that on the surface seems elementary. We may dislike the political points of view, and certainly Kipling's insulting way of evoking the wax-moth as an obsequiously slimy democrat reveals an attitude that may give rise to some offence, but we should be ready to allow Kipling his literary merits such as they are, and wherever we find them. As a final word, it should be said that although Kipling's principal interest is with the underlying political points of view, this is effected through the lively and detailed account of the life of the bee-hive. Of course, the bees are not so vivid as the animals of the *Jungle Books*, and this is quite appropriate to the characterless uniformity of any bee-hive community.

In his article on Kipling, Edmund Wilson picked out for particular insult the animal allegory "A Walking Delegate". He felt that this was an example of Kipling at his worst, Kipling at his most politically crass. There is some validity to this argument since this story is on one level a ruthless attack on the liberal-democrats. But it should be said that Wilson's argument is mostly a political one; he obviously finds Kipling's attitude distasteful and this reflects itself in his literary appraisal of the story. However, there are tonal aspects of "A Walking Delegate" that
seem to me to off-set this wholly negative account of this lively though provocative animal story.

Writing shortly before his death, Kipling described the genesis of "A Walking Delegate": "There was a small mob of other horses about the landscape, including a meek old stallion with a permanently lame leg, who passed the evening of his days in a horse-power machine which cut wood for us. I tried to give something of the fun and flavour of those days in a story called 'A Walking Delegate' where all the characters are from horse-life". This passage provides an interesting authorial comment to compare with the kind of hard-minded criticism offered by Wilson, and it is clear that the sense of ire expressed by the latter bears little resemblance to Kipling's almost bucolic comments. Of course, Kipling was writing many years after the initial publication of his story, but despite this hindsight perspective it is clear that he did not see "A Walking Delegate" as anything more than a light-hearted literary caprice. We know that the story is in fact a great deal more than that, but it should not be assumed that because Kipling is scorning liberalism he is wholly free from light-heartedness.

As Kipling noted, all the characters in the story are horses, the literary embodiments of the closely observed horses on his Vermont farm. Bearing in mind Kipling's habit of methodical observation, we watch the fictional horses take on anthropomorphic characteristics while at the same time preserving their fundamental sense of horsiness. As with all stories that seek to delineate character, further evidence of individual personality is conveyed through the nuances of dialogue. This technique is very evident
in "A Walking Delegate" where the animals' speech, plus their topics of conversation, combine with small instances of personal anecdote to create conceived characters. The story is very much a dramatised yarn, and it is interesting to see how Kipling has attempted to employ American styles of speech, mostly country and negro dialects, in the presentation of events. The fact that this story is set in America and is essentially about Americans is a point that we will return to.

The narrative describes a confrontation between the tamed, domesticated horses, with the wild, politicized radical who wishes to stir up the feeling of revolution within the others. This is a theme that we recognise in Orwell's *Animal Farm*, and Richard Cook has gone so far as to suggest that Orwell had Kipling's story in mind when he wrote his fable. Against the rational and democratic arguments of Boney the radical, the domestic horses posit the work-ethic and moral straightforwardness. The tame horses put up a front that can only be described as conservative, if not reactionary, even though it is more than adequately demonstrated that Boney is a hypocrite. Boney fails to radicalize the other horses, receiving for his pains a sound drubbing from the Yeoman-like stallions.

It is easy to discern in this story a rather obvious political allegory: the hard-working, responsible citizens repudiate the devious liberal-democrat-anarchist in the moral confidence that all radicals are swindling hypocrites. This interpretation is valid, but only up to a point. As one reads the story it is difficult to take great offence since although the political caricature of a liberal-reformer is there within Boney, this effect is only residual. It is as if Kipling's predominantly negative view
of liberals exerts a force behind the action of the local horses' rejection of an unsocial stranger, without ever becoming the principal focus of interest. Besides, the allegory on this level finally breaks down since the domesticated horses are scarcely held up as moral paradigms. In fact, they are implicitly criticized as much as Boney, in that they are described largely as bumpkins who are ludicrously incapable of understanding Boney's sophisticated and disingenuous arguments. The tame horses most certainly work hard, but in their case this is not seen as a wholly positive quality since they so obviously thrive on what is nothing more than mindless servitude.

"A Walking Delegate" is an American story and it is in this context that Kipling's proper focus lies. We have seen that both the radical and the Vermont horses are ridiculed and satirized. At the time Kipling wrote this story he was experiencing some very serious problems with the Vermont people, particularly with his brother-in-law. The matter actually reached the courts after an incident of assault, and shortly after that Kipling was to leave America somewhat embittered. It should also be remembered that Kipling travelled right across America and saw a sharp distinction between the West and the East, that is to say between Boney and the native Vermont Horses. He admired the spirit of energy he found in the West, yet distrusted some of its lawless wildness. At the same time he found the Vermont people largely lacking in any vibrant or aggressive qualities. Within the contexts of these views on America, Kipling's satirical depiction of his farmyard animals assumes an added significance. "A Walking Delegate" thus becomes a satire on America. Yet it should not be forgotten that the political
attack on the radical democrat is still present, and to this extent this story is a political fable. In effect, Kipling is killing two birds with one stone, and all within a Bestiary form. This is important because it provides a shield for Kipling's views that serves to make his satirical and political edges humorous, and thus all the more effective.

Mistrust of the liberal-democrat reformer is a part of the theme in "Little Foxes". The foxes represent a kind of animal objective correlative around which the theme of effective Colonial government revolves. It should be said that "Little Foxes" is not an animal story proper, since it uses foxes and more importantly fox-hunting only as analogues of lawlessness and order. The foxes themselves rarely appear, and when they do it is only as spectators in awe of the new regime of British Governors who have introduced fox-hunting into the Gihon area of Ethiopia. The foxes symbolise the elements of rebelliousness and disorder that the British strive to eradicate. The process of fox-hunting comes to stand for good government as it is reflected in a strong and Autocratic Governor. The extent to which the local villagers comply with the demands and needs of the fox-hunt determines how successful they will be under English rule. If they stop up the fox-holes, that is if they attempt to stamp out disorder and disavow rebels, they will be amply rewarded.

This active and entirely appropriate analogy is shown to work, and harmony and order is established. (There is some indication that this is a true story as it was related to Kipling on a journey.) This kind of governing works and everyone is happy, except of course the foxes. One of these foxes is a Mr. Groombride who as a liberal M.P. is sent to Gihon to
probe – rumours of torture and illiberal activity. Ironically, this liberal becomes equated with the lawless renegades that autocracy has managed to crush, and thus becomes a further embodiment of the central symbol of the fox. This symbolic transfiguration is an interesting and successful part of the whole story and suggests something of the intricacy of Kipling's art. Less successful however is the crude way that Groombride is caricatured. He is seen as a misguided Baboon who first makes a fool of himself and then attempts to bribe his way out of an unfortunate situation. Pregnant with liberal pieties, Groombride is exposed as a hollow and ridiculous hypocrite.

As a piece of fair-minded political argument "Little Foxes" leaves much to be desired. It is crude and grossly simplistic, written wholly from an involved point of view. At the same time, it should be added that the burlesque nature of Groombride's undoing is not without a drole kind of humour. Of course, this makes the political argument less offensive yet at the same time reinforces it in the minds of those predisposed to a similar political position. Finally, we must say that, given the biased point of view, the metaphor of the fox and of fox-hunting is an engaging and entirely appropriate model for British Colonial rule and is used with deliberate and crafted skill. It works as an adequate way for Kipling to reveal triumphantly the cowardly attitudes that in his view lurk beneath all liberal surfaces.

Within the character of the Governor in "Little Foxes" we see an obvious demonstration of the kind of man necessary to the implementation of the ideas that lead to a healthy and efficient society. In many ways the
Governor is the human equivalent of animals like Bagheera or Hathi, all of whom exercise authority and justice in an uncompromising way. Similarly, the loyal bees of "The Mother Hive" typify the kind of character that is to be held up for admiration. Examples of hero-types, usually men of action, abound in Kipling's fiction and we recognise in this a necessary counterpart to the social ideas he propounded. After all, social laws mean nothing if there are not capable men to implement them. Animal personification is clearly a useful way of presenting the isolated values of humans, particularly if the writer is more concerned with the idea than with character. Thus, it is not surprising to see Kipling rely on this type of literature to express his points of view. We see this of course in almost all the animals we encounter in Kipling's oeuvre. There are some stories, however, which seem to have been written solely for the purpose of descanting on particular moral qualities. Such a story is "Garm - A Hostage", in which the value of loyal affection is demonstrated in a dog's relationship to its master. The striking thing about this particular story is its ability to stave off the ever-present threat of the sentimental pose, so possible in any dog story. Instead, the narrative quite convinces the reader of the truth of the adage that a man's best friend is his dog. Consider for example the uncluttered appraisal of a dog's potential value:

Dogs are at best no more than verminous vagrants, self-scratchers, foul-feeder, and unclean by the law of Moses and Mohammed; but a dog with whom one lives alone for at least six months in the year; a free thing, tied to you so strictly by love that without you he will not stir or exercise; a patient, temperate, humorous, wise soul, who knows your moods before you know them yourself, is not a dog under any ruling.
The kind of moral quality given to the dog Garm receives a more extended treatment in "The Maltese Cat". This story is perhaps one of the better-known of Kipling's animal stories and in it we see exemplified some of the strong qualities of his use of active language. The story describes a game of Polo between the 'Skidar' underdogs and the 'Archangel' champions. The distinction between these two rival teams is as crude as that between Groombride and the Governor, and we are obviously meant to see the battle as one between the military haves and the have-nots. The action is narrated wholly from the horses' point of view, and at no time does a human voice intrude. The horses on the 'Skidar' team, led by the eponymous Maltese Cat represent particular types of human being. The Cat himself is determined and resolute, whereas a horse like Faiz-Ullah is tempermental but given to bouts of stunning athletic performance. On the whole, the 'Skidar' team typifies the virtues of moral integrity and physical courage.

At the level of plot, the story describes the 'Skidar' victory over the better-equipped and better-prepared 'Archangels'. Against great odds the battered but plucky 'Skidar' horses pull through and win all honour and glory. This theme in itself is trite, rather painfully so. However, the story is saved from overbearing drabness by the nature of the unusual narrative point of view. The central focus is not really on the moral victory so much as on the physical action of the polo-match. We witness with some breathlessness the vigour and liveliness of Kipling's language as he articulates the thrust and parry of the game. The balance and flow is captured marvelously within the breathless comments that the 'Skidar'
horses make to each other. Very much like their brothers in "A Walking Delegate", these horses are essentially talkers, and as the game is played we are provided with a running commentary on the action and interaction of the teams. It is this fresh and unusual point of view which redeems the story's rather platitudinous moral theme. The effect of this lively narrative is to lend to the triteness of the theme an authenticity which it wouldn't otherwise have, thus making the argument for moral courage strangely effective. However, it should be said that Kipling goes on to spoil his effect by gilding the lily in describing the Maltese Cat's triumphant but sentimental adulation in the Officer's mess.

The Jungle Books were set in India and obviously reflect ways of natural life impossible elsewhere. Kipling's association with India was profound and it was there that many of his Imperialistic attitudes became fully articulated. We saw within the Jungle Books how an ideological antagonism was established between the native Villagers and the British who lived far off, and this obviously reflected something of the differences between East and West that made Colonial rule especially complex. This theme is continued in "The Bridge-Builders", in which Kipling explores the distinction that he saw between the business of work of the British in India and the inherent conservatism of the Indian people. The animals that appear in this story are the animal-gods of the Hindu pantheon and as such are depicted wholly in abstract rather than physical terms. They appear as a vision to the opium-drugged Findlayson and mark the central episode of the latter half of the story's meticulously constructed narrative. Collectively, the animal-gods represent the spirit of India in its powerful but partly unconscious
denial of the ethic of progress epitomised by the British. The Bull, the Parrot, the Buck, the Ape, the Tigress, and the Elephant all meet with Gunga the river-god, and Krishna the god of human love, and enact what Peroo calls a "punchayet of the gods".  

Kipling's use of these animal-gods clearly shows his familiarity with the Hindu conception of certain important animals. Indeed, it is because of the philosophical centrality of the animal-god tradition that Kipling found it particularly useful to his artistic purpose. This tradition represents a clear example of the deeply ingrained supernaturalism of the Indian concept of life, and as such typifies the ethereal force that the British engineers must overcome, both literally by spanning the Ganges with a bridge, and metaphorically by providing a link between the Eastern and the Western ways of looking at the world. The central unifying fact and metaphor throughout the whole story is the bridge. As a physical construct, the bridge typifies British rationality and enlightenment.

The story falls very noticeably into two parts. In the first we are presented with a vivid and detailed account of the physical bridge. More especially, we are introduced to the two engineers, Findlayson and Hitchcock, who masterminded the construction and who epitomise the qualities of commitment and ability that make bridge-building possible. The bridge represents a physical evocation of the human consciousness capable of its construction. The latter half of the story is altogether different and is 'bridged' to the first by the hallucinatory impact on Findlayson's consciousness. Whereas the first half was crowded with details of a very ordinary reality, the second is a vision involving India's animal-gods. These two forces are
pitched into battle when the Ganges floods and thus threaten the man-made bridge. In the literal and figurative contests, the bridge wins since it withstands the force of the roaring water and since Findlayson finally overcomes the power of opium. By his single-minded act of willed consciousness, Findlayson shrugs off the drug and as one critic puts it reflects "a total dedication to the reality of experience".  

Kipling's animal-gods, the symbols of traditional India, represent the antithesis to Findlayson's positivism. Yet during the actual vision, we appreciate that Kipling's presentation of these beast-gods is more equivocal than we might suppose. They are, it should be repeated, nothing at all like the animals of the Jungle Books, but rather seek to embody an abstract. However, the personified manner is still present. For example, Hanuman the grey Ape is impish and prone to mirthful riddles. He is traditionally the god of work, amongst other things, and finds therefore in the work of the British an unconscious act of devotion to himself. Similarly, Ganesha is the god of money and finds in the commercial explosion caused by the British a similar act of unconscious devotion. Other animals such as the Tigress and the Bull concede that new enterprises such as the Railway have ensured a greater number of pilgrims visiting their temples.

On the surface then, the animal-gods suffer from the illusion that the British effort to assert their way of looking at reality has in fact only established the India status-quo. They find in their inevitable opponent only reflections of their own expanding importance. Only the river-god and Krishna fully understand the threat that the British imply. It is Krishna who warns the animal-gods that little by little they will be
discarded until they are merely "rag-gods, pot-godlings of the tree".  
There is a double-edge however to Krishna's words, since he implies that 
the inevitable decline of the animal-gods and the subsequent ascent of 
Findlayson and his kind is but "Only for a little". The bridge may stand 
for today and the progress represented by the British may last a few hundred 
years, but in the longer scheme of things it is the world of non-human 
nature and her attendant animal-worship which will prevail. This is the 
consolation that Krishna offers the animal-gods, for once the bridges have 
fallen and the Findlaysons forgotten, they will once again become "gods 
of the jungle--names that the hunters of rats and noosers of dogs whisper 
in the thicket and among the caves". They will again assume the potency 
that they once held and once again humans will worship them. Finally, 
Kipling implies, the Eastern mode of consciousness will prevail over the 
Western--in India at least.

This conclusion suggests an inevitable gap between the East and the 
West that will not be permanently bridged by the consciousness of 
technological development. It should be said of course that this is not 
necessarily what Kipling would have liked to see. Doubtless, Kipling 
would prefer it if Findlayson's sort would prevail since within 
the story it is this character who is depicted in the most favourable 
light. Nevertheless, Kipling offers us through this excellent tale a view 
of the deeply ingrained habit of mind which sets up animals as gods and 
suggests through this phenomenon that Western domination of the East is 
finally impossible. It should be remarked that the Indian animal-gods 
provide Kipling with perhaps the most powerful figurative representation
of Indian values available to him. In this we may note the usefulness of Bestiary literature to his thematic and artistic purposes.

"The Mark of the Beast" is similar to the "Bridge Builders" in that its use of an animal is restricted to an abstract animal-god, or rather to a Stone effigy of Hanuman, the monkey-god. As an animal story "The Mark of the Beast" stands alongside "The Dog Hervey" in its attempt to account for what Professor Tompkins has called "the unexplored psychic potentialities of man". In a drunken outrage, Fleete, one of the main characters, stubs out his cigar on a stone effigy of Hanuman. By way of punishment, a leper appears and leans his head on Fleete's chest, imprinting there the mark of the beast in the form of an ugly black sore. This action of revenge reaches an extreme stage when Fleete temporarily degenerates into a lycanthropic state. Two of his friends bring the leper to the wolf-like Fleete and after brutally beating and torturing him, force him to release the spell inflicted on the god-defiler. To bring the story to its final mysterious conclusion, Fleete awakens and remembers nothing at all about the incident. All is left unsettled, bathed in the dimness of the supernatural potentialities of the East.

Very clearly, the theme and tone of this story is different from the one previously discussed, although both rely on similar conceptions of the Indian sense of Religious significance. "The Mark of the Beast" does not pretend to be anything more than a tale of horror and the supernatural very much in the tradition of Edgar Allan Poe. Doubtless, a Victorian England that had only a vague idea of Eastern religious practices would have been more susceptible to this story than we are today. To us it is a brutal
display of Kipling's ability to provoke a sense of psychic unease. But it also reveals the way in which he could cash-in on the English ignorance of Eastern religious symbology. The animal-god itself is merely a symbolic representation, but it should be said that it is felt as real enough within the bestial degradation of Fleete.

The kind of latently potent relationship between man and beast that is presented in "The Mark of the Beast" receives an interesting treatment in another story "Bertran and Bimi". It is plainly a story of horror, brutality, and bestiality—self-consciously so, we feel. Breitmann, a collector of wild animals relates how a friend of his reared an Ape from birth and how this animal seems to have the uncanny habit of being half-human. Bimi is described several times as "more than an Ape", and the claim is made that he has "half a human soul in his belly". The strength of this man/beast identification reaches its climax when in a fit of jealous rage, the Ape murders its master's recent bride. Kipling does not blanch at an effective suggestion of the intensity and vileness of the bride's mutilation—she is literally torn to pieces by the animal brute. This violence is matched when Bertran takes his revenge with similar bestial horror, and through this the half-animal part of man is exposed in all its latent savagery.

There is no doubt that Kipling revels in the disgusting brutality of his own invention, but it should be recognised that there is a certain sense of humour pervading the whole. It is as if Kipling is playing with the responses of his reader in a very conscious way, exploiting the English view of the nature of the jungle in the East. One is reminded very much of
Well's *The Island of Dr. Moreau* as well as a host of other ape satires of the late 19th Century that consciously sought either to challenge or ridicule Darwin's theory of the descent of man. This aspect of Kipling's imagination clearly belongs to an essentially youthful phase in his career when he was interested in using animals and animal-gods to evoke for his English Readers the powerful mysteriousness of the East. However, in a later and incidentally much more accomplished story, Kipling once again explored the psychic potentials of man as they are filtered through the appropriately limited perceptions of an animal.

Professor Tompkins has described "The Dog Hervey" as Kipling's most difficult tale, and it is certainly true that the theme it introduces and the way it introduces it, poses some problems of interpretation. The story is concerned with a series of psychic transferences between a number of humans and a dog. The plot is circuitous to say the least and on occasion it seems as if Kipling has consciously sought to create a riddle of meaning and significance. Moira Sichliffe buys a dog, the runt of the litter, as a futile and figurative attempt to buy back her lost-love, Mr. Shend. This first identification between man and dog is created through their mutual illness. Shend, we learn, was a drunkard who had come to Miss Sichliffe's father to get "patched up". Similarly, the dog Harvey is sickly and therefore stands for Miss Sichliffe as a figurative representation of her lover. But instead of curing the dog of its sickness she projects onto it all her pent-up emotional feeling. Finally, she gives him to the narrator, who is genially known to all as the friend to dogs, and who seems to have the ability to help them.
However, Harvey exerts a very unnerving effect on the narrator. The animal is obviously bewildered by the psychic projection inflicted on him by Miss Sichliffe. The narrator describes the dog's suffering:

He never shifted his position, but stared at me, an intense lopsided stare, eye after eye ... And so it continued as long as he was with me. Where I sat, he sat and stared; where I walked, he walked beside, head stiffly slewed over one shoulder in single-barelled contemplation of me. He never gave tongue, never closed in for a caress, seldom let me stir a step alone.

Very disturbed by this kind of behaviour in a dog, the narrator makes a determined effort to compare Harvey with his own more normal dog:

Now, in Malachi's eye I can see at any hour all there is of the normal decent dog, flecked here and there with that strained half-soul which man's love and association have added to his nature. But with Harvey the eye was perplexed, as a tortured man's. Only by looking far into its deeps could one make out the spirit of the proper animal, beclouded and cowering beneath some unfair burden.

(p.123)

Up to this point in the story it is not difficult to see how Kipling is using the man/dog identification. The dog has become the psychic representative of Shend and in its expression of anxiety projects onto the narrator strong feelings of pity and concern. It should be stressed that by and large the reader feels himself to be in the world of real people and real dogs. After all, it is not unusual for a dog to assume some of the psychological characteristics of its master, and particularly so when the dog is at all sickly. Dogs have highly developed senses and they can very easily detect human feelings, and therefore for Harvey to reflect some of Miss Sichliffe's despair does not strike the reader as an unnatural violation of ordinary reality. This is reinforced by the way that Kipling integrates
other dogs into the narrative and thereby suggests a real world of dog behaviour. This in turn is a reflection of the entirely usual atmospheres that encompass all of the characters, though especially the narrator.

The most interesting aspect of "The Dog Hervey" is the way in which Kipling blends this world of ordinary reality into the dream-like supernaturalism of the narrator's encounter with Shend and the subsequent reunification of the lovers. Through fortuitous circumstances the narrator meets Shend, though initially he doesn't know that he is Miss Sichliffe's ex-lover. In the presence of the narrator, Shend experiences a recurring delirium in which a dog, obviously Harvey, peers at him in exactly the same way the dog had previously looked at the narrator. It is as if the unnerving stare of the dog had prompted the narrator to seek out Shend and then for the dog's preternatural stare to become transposed into Shend's hallucinatory reality. Once all this has been made clear the lovers are reunited and the dog Harvey is released from his unbearable burden.

Kipling is deliberately stretching the reader's credibility somewhat in that he asks us to accept the workings of forces that are purely psychic. Whether or not we can accept this, there is no doubt that Kipling has suggested his theme in an extremely crafted and intricate way and thus has at least earned a full hearing. It would seem that Kipling was really attempting to amuse the patient reader with a story which sought to incorporate the natural and the supernatural within the powerful psychic force of a highly sensitive dog.

Within the three immediately previous stories, Kipling is forcefully suggesting the psychic relationships that may exist between man and animal. It should be said that he invests this theme with perverse and sometimes
cruel humour, but nonetheless it seems clear that the basic idea is a serious one. This sense of psychic closeness with the animal world provides us with an interesting insight into Kipling's thinking. It would seem that his frequent reliance on animal personification, both within fables as well as in his non-fablistic animal stories, serves a purpose more profound than we might be led to suppose. Animals that represent human beings do so not only because this transference effects a simple and effective method of ethical illustration, but also because vestiges of the bestial within man sometimes exert surprising pressures. Kipling seems to point towards this connection, and thus his reliance on animal characters who exemplify human nature and who demonstrate the basic need for social harmony, should be seen to suggest a view of the man/animal relationship in which distinctions are blurred. Kipling's constant interweaving of human and animal characteristics finally produces in the reader the idea that the transference serves more than a figurative function, and that for Kipling the moral distinctions between man and animal were at best marginal.

On two occasions Kipling used animal stories to discuss the abstract qualities of art and artistry, particularly as they relate to moral behaviour. "The Bull that Thought", and "Teem - A Treasure Hunter" were written very late in Kipling's life and in fact the latter of these stories was the last thing he ever wrote. Critics have focused on these stories, to quite a large extent concentrating on the autobiographical elements that seem to be present. They make a case for assuming that the disquisitions on art in both these works are Kipling's reflections on his own artistic life. It is true that there do seem to be some autobiographical overtones, although
it should be remembered that Kipling's daughter records that she spoke to her father on exactly this point and he denied flatly any conscious autobiography. However, Kipling was notoriously reticent about divulging anything of his personal life and we need not assume that what he says is true. Indeed, internal evidence suggests autobiography but it should be stressed that the relationship between the story's literal action and autobiographical echoes is of a delicate kind and in forcing the latter critics have tended to misrepresent the subtle nature of Kipling's artistry.

"The Bull that Thought" must be considered one of Kipling's very best stories. Within its literal and metaphorical parameters it produces a compelling narrative, and this "concealed fable" is undeniably an example of the short story at its most effective. In particular, the qualitative representation of the Bull itself is of striking importance. The Bull's name is Apis, and we recognise in this the name of the Egyptian bull-god of creativity, and this physical beast is described very much in supra-animal terms, at times approaching the status of a Minotaur figure. We have seen before in several stories how Kipling has implied the human in an animal, or vice versa, but nowhere is this so strongly felt as in Apis. For as well as being a very forceful animal, Apis is also depicted as capable of human thought and human cunning. His qualities are so extraordinary that he is seen as an animal personification of the supreme artist, and in this, together with some oblique references in the poem accompanying the story, we detect hints of Kipling's own artistic life. But we must be especially careful not to assume too clumsy a relationship between Apis the artist and Kipling the artist.
The story is narrated by a Monsieur Voiron who once owned Apis and who now evokes the animal in alive and fervent terms. From the very beginning Apis is described as a potent, even demonic figure; his cunning violence is as cruel and swift as it is uncompromising. In every sense this intelligent animal is more powerful than man, and this he proves when he outwits three of the bull-ring matadors and murders them. It is his combination of the physical prowess of an animal with the intelligence of a man that makes Apis the supreme artist he is and which finally earns him his release from the bull-ring.

Throughout, images of art and artistry are used to describe Apis. When still only young he would play with the would-be matadors, feigning moves that gave great delight to any spectator. But Apis would never repeat a trick since repetition is something "no true artist will tolerate". When a little older, Voiron comments that in Apis's movements there was "a breadth of technique that comes of reasoned art, and, above all, the passion that arrives after experience". And in the bull-ring the narrator says that "I began to comprehend that it was an artist we had to deal with". Further images and references accrue to establish very firmly the idea that Kipling wishes us to see in his animal a stunning typification of the demonically inspired artist. Finally, Apis reaches the climax of his bull-ring experiences in confronting an aged but 'artistic' matador: "He raged enormously; he feigned defeat; he despaired in statuesque abandon, and thence flashed into fresh paroxysms of wrath--but always with the detachment of the true artist who knows he is but the vessel of an emotion whence others, not he, must drink" (p.227). With this detachment comes the mastery of achieved art.
Violence is intimately connected with Apis's art, and is itself treated within an artistic context. After he has killed three bulls, Apis's manner of destruction is evoked with horrible clarity: "But Apis had killed in his own style—at dusk, from the ambush of a windbreak—by an oblique charge from behind which knocked the other over. He had then disembowelled him ... Apis went to the bank ... and carefully cleaned his horns in the earth" (p.215). These murders are seen as acts of ritual, concluded by what Voiron calls the "levitical" cleansing of the horns. In an obvious inversion of animal sacrifice by humans, Apis offers up sacrifices to the god of art. This rite of sacred urgency is repeated on three humans: "Apis halted, hooked him under the heart, and threw him to the barrier. We heard his head crack, but he was dead before he hit the wood" (pp.222-223). This sickening act of violence serves its function in further defining the brutal artistry that Apis is capable of. Moreover, this violence should be seen as a necessary preamble to the supreme moment of art that occurs at the end of the story. The close identification between art and violence is made to suggest the inseparability of these forces within a creature like Apis.

In the chapter of his book called "The Aesthetics of Violence", Louis Gilbert has suggested that Kipling is here describing his own predilection for violence (and revenge) within his stories, suggesting that for him the two qualities were intimately linked. If Kipling is doing this then he is answering and confirming one of the chief criticisms that has been levelled at him from his earliest days. Dr. Gilbert goes rather too far with his argument. Bonamy Dobree seems to be more correct when he argues that the linked aspects of violence and art constitute qualities of
the French war-time personality. There are several references throughout the story to the War, and of course the story is set in France and related by a very patriotic Frenchman intent on eulogizing Camargue cattle. Dobree suggests that the numerous killings perpetrated by Apis are the great French battles and that finally the story is a "fable... in praise of France, her valour, her art".44

The two critical arguments given above are partially plausible, but they both seem to make the same error of trying too single-mindedly to find the reality that lies behind the symbol of Apis the bull. This is very often the tendency when confronted with a traditional fable; the reader wants to discern the real meaning which lies behind the literal surface. However, the meaning of Kipling's fables often lie within rather than behind the literal action. Thus, heavy-handed exegetical interpretations tend to distort the story; the peculiar richness of Kipling's narrative line seems to demand that concealed fables, autobiographical or other, exert a residual and quickly evaporating effect. In a story like "The Bull that Thought" the reader is finally thrown back into the surface, teased out of interpretative thought. And once thrown back in this way, we are again struck by the peculiarly potent effect that the animal Apis exerts as a physical presence. The story has the effect it has because the bull is presented with an anthropomorphic dynamism that depends on a very direct understanding of its real potency as an animal.

It is convenient to the argument of this thesis that the last story Kipling ever wrote was an animal story. "Teem - A Treasure Hunter" is a tale which like "The Bull that Thought" is concerned with the value of art
and artistry. This time the art is contained within the refined olfactory qualities of a dog called Teem. His art is to sniff out valuable truffles and it is insisted that for him the values of art and work are inseparable. In this association we find a moral stance. Throughout, Teem exemplifies the adage taught him by his dog-mentor: "At all hazards follow your art. That can never lead to a false scent". This insistence on practising an art well learned is later shown to exert a moral function within the family circumstances of the humans Teem lives with. It is his ability to sniff out the expensive truffles that enables his human owners to stave off starvation and avoid the cruel treatment by their landlord. This part of the story is susceptible to the charge of being sentimental since it so obviously is a variation of the White Knight fairy-story in which outraged innocence is protected from the barbarisms of a hostile world.

Bonamy Dobree has charged that this story has "all the sentimentality of Kipling's dog stories", and on the basis of this judgment avoids the literal surface of the fable and instead prefers to "follow the story as autobiography". Drawing upon earlier comments made by A. C. Bodelson, Dobree concentrates on the apparent correspondences between the lives of Teem and Kipling. Obviously, we are in a similar critical situation to that of "The Bull that Thought", where the whole focus of interest is away from the literal story. Dobree summarizes his position thus:

The whole fable is clear enough. Kipling in his mature period, coming from abroad, brought his treasures of story-telling to an unappreciative public who had not the faintest idea what he was getting at ... but at last the Born One, that is the small group of perceptive and intelligent people, were made aware of and appreciated his truffles ...
Professor Dobree goes on to admit that "the details are a little obscure" but still maintains that the point of the fable is "abundantly plain".

To a reader who comes fresh to this story nothing could be less plain, and to suggest that the details are obscure is to understate. It is true that the personal history of Teem does follow that of Kipling, but so it does for any number of artists we could think of. If there is any analogical correspondence, it is there in such a general way that to suggest anything like parallelism is to grossly exaggerate the real situation. More importantly, to use this kind of argument as a pretext for ignoring the literal story is to abuse the subtlety of Kipling's artistry. For once we look closely at the way that Kipling has dealt with the literal dog, it becomes plain that he has been extremely careful in the way he presented him. It also becomes clear that Dobree's charge of sentimentality comes about as a result of not looking closely enough at Kipling's fablistic manner. In this story at least, Kipling is very careful not to trespass too far against a reader's ever-ready ear for doggy sentimentality. Of course, Teem is anthropomorphised in that for him to represent the abstract qualities of working, moral artistry he must be given the apparent ability to think like a human being. However, Kipling has managed to keep everything that Teem does within the bounds of actual dog behaviour. This is true also of Apis, and the actions of both are plausible within the context of how animals live and behave.

This manifests itself in Teem's sense of smell. Everything he does is as a result of this natural art. When the evil Landlord comes around, for example, Teem knows to distrust him because he senses the smell of fear
within the humans he loves. Similarly, he knows that there is something wrong with the young girl because he smells the aroma of sickness and imminent death. The boundaries of naturalistic decency are not violated here since, as we have noted before both in "The Dog Hervey" and "Garm - A Hostage", dogs are capable of sensing human emotions. Lastly, when he finds the truffles on his family's land he is following the art that he has been taught and thus the moral qualities of this action are predicated on a highly natural phenomenon. It need scarcely be said that such animals do exist and that once trained the dog never loses the habit of performing his artistic duty.

Within the contexts of this clever and subtle handling of the dog, Teem, the whole story comes alive in a way that it perhaps didn't before. There is no doubt that the story is not one of Kipling's best, but at the same time it should be appreciated that a close look at the minutiae of Kipling's art often reveals levels of subtle construction previously unsuspected. In "Teem - A Treasure Hunter" Kipling begins with common notions and instances of animal behaviour, such as natural affection, sensitivity to human emotions, or the willingness to perform trained work, and transforms these into a situation in which those animal actions and habits are made to exemplify morally active virtues. To ignore the literalness of this representation and to proceed to autobiographical suggestions is to miss the fineness of Kipling's art. And Kipling is often at his finest when he is using animals to enact his moral beliefs.
GEORGE ORWELL

In a review of *Burmese Days* Malcolm Muggeridge remarked that both Kipling and Orwell "found it easier to present animals rather than human beings in a sympathetic light".⁠¹ Although this is partly true it does an injustice to both writers, especially Kipling. It would be fairer to say that in the presentation of social and political points of view, the direct simplicity of animal 'types' was more immediately effective than the more complex demands of human characterisation. Bestiary literature has always been a useful medium for the presentation of socio-political ideas, and thus in an age where the exigencies of political necessity force themselves upon people with unprecedented urgency, it is not surprising to see such overtly political activists as Kipling and Orwell resort to the older conventions of the Bestiary tradition.

*Animal Farm* probably stands as the best known example of The Modern Bestiary, and in the strictness of its form it is perhaps the most conventional. Despite the adverse criticisms that have been made of it, this fable still maintains a great popular appeal and continues to excite political controversy. Within its carefully controlled sequence of events, we may still find a lively and convincing demonstration of the usefulness of the Beast-Fable as a form for presenting political argument. The directness of Orwell's political point of view suggests more than anything else the change in the urgency of the political climate that occurred since the heyday of Kipling's England. As Orwell comments in his excellent study of Kipling, Kipling did not foresee "the tank, the bombing plane, the radio and the secret police".⁠² Thus, if we perceive a greater stridency in the
way that Orwell handles his political animals, we may attribute this to the more troubled time in which he lived. However, it should not be assumed that *Animal Farm* is the only example of Bestiary literature that we find in Orwell. Rather, this late fully-fledged animal fable represents a culmination of a number of animal references that precede it. *Animal Farm* stands as the culmination of the animal/proletarian identification at work throughout Orwell's earlier writing.

The extraordinary similarities in the backgrounds of Kipling and Orwell may suggest some of the forces that contributed to each becoming politically active and may account for their reliance on animal literature. Both men sprang from the ranks of those who served the British Empire in the East, where of course such facts as caste distinction and law and order pressed upon the ruling Whites with a clarity denied to those who lived in the relative tranquility of England. The 'White Man's Burden' and the attendant apartheid between the Natives and the Europeans were for both writers very real concerns, and each reacted to them in his own way. As we have seen, Kipling redefined the Imperial mission as a moral duty and turned towards a Rightist political persuasion. Orwell, on the other hand, was to turn away from the British point of view and to identify with the oppressed Natives. However, for neither was this process free from severe equivocation. Kipling did not believe blindly in British Imperial rule and Orwell was not unaware that British Imperialism had its good points.

Within the whole range of Orwell's writing, we see his continual effort to expunge the class snobbery that he felt within him, and this is seen very often in the way he sympathises with the oppressed and
trodden. We should recognise in this of course the purely moral nature of Orwell's political concerns; he wanted to eradicate injustice and oppression because these were wrong. Interestingly, this sympathy with the subjected classes is often paralleled with a sympathy for misused or disabused animals. This is particularly true of the early Eastern essays and novels, where the identification of the status of natives and animals was obviously clear. We should remember too that Orwell knew India well and would have had similar recourse to the Indian conception of animals that we saw in our discussion of Kipling. Doubtless, for example, he would have known the Pancha-Tantra and the whole notion of exemplifying human action within the narrative shield of animal behaviour would have been familiar to him. In a bitterly powerful account of his early schooldays in England, he remarks that "most of the good memories of my childhood, and up to about the age of twenty, are in some ways connected with animals". In the same essay, Orwell goes on to single out the incidents of animal nature study as bright spots in an otherwise dull world.

Orwellian criticism has tended to concentrate on the political aspects of his writing career, as well as his life, and has neglected the moralist and Natural Historian. Richard Cook remarks that such moral qualities as "a sense of responsibility, and ... a code of personal decency" typify both Kipling and Orwell. Behind the political insistences, Cook's argument runs, there lay imperatives of a moral kind. In such essays as "Reflections On a Common Toad" it becomes clear that one of these bases is the right and ability of everyone to enjoy nature: "How many a time have I stood watching
the toads mating, or a pair of hares having a boxing match in the young corn, and thought of all the important persons who would stop me enjoying this if they could ... if a man can't enjoy the return of Spring, why should he be happy in a labour-saving Utopia? Enjoying Nature then is one human activity which is a value to be preserved and enjoying animals is a natural part of this. Orwell was a great bird-watcher and lover of Nature generally, and we find his insistence on the value of Natural History throughout his writing. In his first novel we know that he attempted to write from a Zolaesque, Naturalist standpoint, and this fictional tendency is far from surprising in a writer who confided to Henry Miller that he has "a sort of belly-to-earth attitude" and who always feels uneasy when he "gets away" from the ordinary world where grass is green, stones hard etc. As if to reinforce the point, he discontinues the letter in order "to milk the goat". Elsewhere too, in his comments on D. H. Lawrence for example, Orwell picks out for special praise Lawrence's detailed knowledge of natural life. Similarly, in his notes to The Road to Wigan Pier he makes frequent asides about the state of the natural wild-life, using these comments not only as something valuable in their own right but also as ironic contrasts to the human predicament he is disclosing. Other examples of this attitude may be found throughout Orwell's collected works, and in all of this we discern a quality of Orwell's sensibility that together with his well-known Leftist political persuasions gives rise to the strong sympathetic relationship between the poor and animals.

In his rather obscure book, Alan Sandison describes this naturalistic habit of mind in Orwell with the phrase "Operating Inside Nature". He
rightly points out that this implies for Orwell not just animals but also Wigan, London, and Paris, indeed "everything which in its physicality is capable of making an impact on the senses". The plights of the Burmese natives and the English working class were perhaps the two forces which acted most importantly on Orwell's senses, and very often his attempts to articulate his own responses to them is reflected through animal analogy.

The essay "A Hanging" provides a useful example of the way in which Orwell can use an animal to good effect. Of course, the central focus is on the hanging itself, or rather on the ambivalent feelings aroused in the narrator by the hanging. As a whole, this essay, though perhaps it would be more appropriate to call it a story, is a masterpiece of carefully evoked detail in which an Indian coolie is hanged. Within the context of this human drama, there enters a dog who causes a reflective hiatus within the awful ceremony:

--- a dog, come goodness knows whence, had appeared in the yard. It came bounding among us with a loud volley of barks and leapt round us wagging its whole body, wild with glee at finding so many human beings together. It was a large woolly dog, half Airedale, half pariah. For a moment it pranced round us, and then, before anyone could stop it, it had made a dash for the prisoner, jumping up tried to lick his face. Everybody stood aghast, too taken aback even to grab the dog.

The effect of this rude interruption is to disturb the individual members of the hanging party, especially Orwell, and to inject into the story a vivid detail of natural life. First it should be said that the natural realism of the dog's presence is sufficient to suggest the reality of the occurrence. The dog is real, acting within a real situation. In fact, it is this very feel of real aliveness, and one might even say the playful
freedom of the dog's friendliness, which causes the disturbance registered by the narrator.

Emotionally, this incident with the dog is more complex than it might seem. The ceremony of death, anxious yet numbing, is punctuated by a potent but uncomprehending form of life. Indeed, the dog's inability to understand these human proceedings finds a counterpart in the confusion and lack of proper understanding felt by the Indian coolie. A subtle identification is here being made between the almost hypnotized coolie and the carefree animal. When the dog is finally caught and moved off "still straining and whimpering" we feel that this action is parallel to that of the coolie; both are positive life-forces. The potent life of the natural dog is further paralleled to the entrapped prisoner when as a gesture of the instinctual life left in him, the prisoner side-steps a puddle and thereby avoids getting his feet wet. It is exactly at this point that a moment of revealed consciousness comes to Orwell, and this realization constitutes the central drift of the whole story: "It is curious, but till that moment I had never realized what it means to destroy a healthy, conscious man ... I saw the mystery, the unspeakable wrongness, of cutting a life short when it is in full tide" (p.11). The active life of the dog constitutes an important part in Orwell's arrival at this consciousness.

Other details accrue in "A Hanging" to suggest the carefully juxtaposed worlds of natural animal life with the corruption of man's doings. In the very first paragraph Orwell describes the condemned cells as "animal cages" and the rest of the narrative extends the identification between animal and native, both of which seem to suggest for Orwell examples of hearty, robust
life. We should note too that Orwell's sympathies are very obviously with the coolie, notwithstanding the callousness that he displays with the other Whites after the hanging has been completed. And after the man has been hanged, it is the dog who first approaches: "I let go of the dog, and it galloped immediately to the back of the gallows; but when it got there it stopped short, barked and then retreated into a corner of the yard, where it stood among the weeds, looking timorously out at us" (p.12).

With the uncanny sense of death that dogs have, the animal register is a profound sense of disquiet, and it is the fullness of this feeling which contrasts sharply with the alienated sense of horror that the whites register through their nervous laugh. As George Woodcock has said, "The animal kingdom is identified with that oppressed other world of humanity towards which the narrator, in that moment preceding the hanging, has felt a sudden opening of sympathy". Orwell's response to the death is nothing if not equivocal. It is true that this moment of sympathy is there for the oppressed, and it is a sympathy that we will meet with again in all of Orwell's works. But at the same time, a more compromising tone is also established: a complicity with the other Sahib Whites who know themselves to be protected from the fate of the Indian coolies. The astonishing clash of these two sympathies comprises an essential dilemma that Orwell faced as a White ruler in an oppressed country. "A Hanging" is all the more remarkable for the honesty with which Orwell attempts to face the schizophrenia of his own sympathetic responses. And the strong identification between the oppressed native and the sub-human animal suggests in itself the difficulty of Orwell's position. For on the one hand, he felt more than a
strong liking for animals, yet, on the other, implicit in an identification between native and animal is a condescending aloofness.

The same question of Orwell's sympathy for the oppressed natives and his ambiguous response to the moral and political situations that he confronted appear in "Shooting an Elephant". Indeed, the whole essay pivots on Orwell's ambivalent attitude to the people of Burma as well as to the natural phenomenon of the elephant. Within the narrative, the elephant comes to represent for Orwell a complex problem for his own political conscience. What actually happens in the story is really quite simple, involving as it does the narrator's shooting of an elephant in 'must' that has gone on a rampage and killed a coolie. As a policeman in the Burmese police force, Orwell is called upon to deal with the situation in the best manner possible. Even though he finds that the animal's 'must' has passed he is pressured by the native Burmese people to kill the elephant. At stake, he feels, is his role as a Sahib whose duty it is to rule the oppressed people.

The themes of the story however are more complex than a simple narration of the plot might suggest. "Shooting an Elephant" was finally written in 1936, almost ten years after Orwell left Burma and at a time when his political views were more decisely towards Socialism. From this perspective Orwell no doubt saw his position in Burma with great clarity and saw with greater political consciousness the moral evil of Imperialism. As a result of this we see how Orwell has managed the events of the story to bring out as fully as possible the conditions and duplicities imposed on a decent man serving an indecent system. The Burmese policeman's confron-
tation with an elephant he must kill becomes an important symbolic event rendered with the full force of Orwell's narrative powers.

As we noted in our discussion of Kipling, the Elephant is represented in the Hindu pantheon as the god of wisdom and intellect. Yet within Asian communities, the Elephant is also an animal equivalent to our bull-dozer. As Orwell remarks, "It is a serious matter to shoot an working elephant — it is comparable to destroying a huge and costly piece of machinery". Orwell knows with his rational consciousness that he ought not to kill the elephant but is compelled against his reasonable judgment by his less than reasonable reaction to the pressure of the natives. Implicit in this are two related ideas. First is the notion that a tyrannical ruling nation or class loses its freedom in proportion to the power it exercises. The other idea is that in this process those who are ruled determine and govern the acts of their oppressors. It is clear to the reader that Orwell finds himself trapped within these forces. On the one hand, he recognizes the moral iniquity of British rule: "For at that time I had already made up my mind that imperialism was an evil thing and the sooner I chucked up my job and got out of it the better:"(p.15). From this position Orwell goes on to say that he was implicitly led (theoretically) to be on the side of the oppressed people. Yet we must put this up against some contrary sentiments. "... I thought that the greatest joy in the world would be to drive a bayonet into a Buddhist priest's guts" (p.16).

The dichotomy represented by these two clashing points of view reaches a climax through the powerful presence and even more powerful death of the elephant. The scene is set in one of the poorest parts of the town and the
elephant is initially pictured "tearing up bunches of grass, beating them against his knees to clean them and stuffing them into his mouth". His 'must' is now over and he is as peaceful as a "cow". The pressure of the crowd, evoked forcefully within the texture of the cluttering narrative, makes the death inevitable. The death itself, and its attendant emotions, should be quoted in full:

In that instant, in too short a time, one would have thought, even for the bullet to get there, a mysterious, terrible change had come over the elephant. He neither stirred nor fell, but every line of his body had altered. He looked suddenly stricken, shrunken, immensely old, as though the frightful impact of the bullet had paralysed him without knocking him down. At last, after what seemed a long time—it might have been five seconds, I dare say—he sagged flabbily to his knees. His mouth slobbered. An enormous senility seemed to have settled upon him. One could have imagined him thousands of years old. I fired again into the same spot. At the second shot he did not collapse but climbed with desperate slowness to his feet and stood weakly upright, with legs sagging and head drooping. I fired a third time. That was the shot that did for him. You could see the agony of it jolt his whole body and knock the last remnant of strength from his legs. But in falling he seemed for a moment to rise, for as his hind legs collapsed beneath him he seemed to tower upwards like a high rock toppling, his trunk reaching skywards like a tree. He trumpeted, for the first and only time. And then down he came, his belly towards me, with a crash that seemed to shake the ground even where I lay.

I got up. The Burmans were already racing past me across the mud. It was obvious that the elephant would never rise again, but he was not dead. He was breathing very rhythmically with long rattling gasps, his great mound of a side painfully rising and falling. His mouth was wide open—I could see far down into caverns of pale pink throat. I waited a long time for him to die, but his breathing did not weaken. Finally I fired my two remaining shots into the spot where I thought his heart must be. The thick blood welled out of him like red velvet, but still he did not die. His body did not even jerk when the shots hit him, the tortured breathing continued without a pause. He was dying, very slowly and in great agony, but in some world remote from me where not even a bullet could damage him further. I felt that I had got to put an end to that dreadful noise. It seemed dreadful to see the great beast lying there, powerless to move and yet powerless to die, and not even be able to finish him. I sent back for my small rifle and poured shot after shot into his heart.
and down his throat. They seemed to make no impression. The tortured gasps continued as steadily as the ticking of a clock.

In the end I could not stand it any longer and went away. I heard later that it took him half an hour to die. (pp. 21-22)

The emotions aroused here are not simple, and it is painfully evident that the scene is rendered with a very physical sense of dramatic importance. The protracted death, the stubborn refusal of the elephant to die, produces an accumulated impact of intense suffering, a suffering oddly intensified by the sheer bulk of the dying beast. As one reads this passage there is little doubt that Orwell is on the elephant's side, emotionally and even ideologically. Given the fact that it was he who pulled the trigger, Orwell's essentially humane response to the suffering of the elephant becomes charged with a delicate kind of irony. He wishes intensely to put the animal out of its misery as quickly as possible, but he is impeded through his own inevitable kind of impotence, the impotence felt by a man who attempts to control the life of a force essentially outside his effective governing. The situation of the dying elephant is analogous to Orwell's uneasy duty towards the suppressed Burmese people, and in neither situation can he be said to be in control.

The full ambiguity of this incident is reached when Orwell finally admits that he killed the elephant to "avoid looking a fool". It is a frank confession of moral cowardice. In sympathizing with the Burmese beast that he ironically feels compelled to kill, Orwell clarifies his own double-bind position. By analogy we may say that the elephant stands in some respects for the oppressed Burmese people; both are the recipient of often cruel and senseless oppression. Orwell's sympathies are clearly with
the Burmese natives on this point. But ironically, it is the Burmese people themselves who force him to shoot the animal, and the implication of this would seem to be that the oppressed are ignorant of the political situation that they confront. Rather, they seek to capitalise on the incident, taking the elephant's meat for food. Political conscience is the property only of those sufficiently educated to afford the luxury.

But the figure of the elephant is in reality more complex than we have so far indicated. The working elephant is effectively a tool of British exploitation, unconsciously so of course, and thus is implicated in the larger political connotations. In killing the elephant, Orwell is killing a symbolic aspect of Imperialism, perhaps even the British Empire itself. This does not strike the reader immediately at the conscious level, yet further reflection makes the identification between the dying elephant and the dying Empire seem appropriate, especially since the impotence of Imperial rule is shown so ruthlessly within the submission of Orwell to the will of the mass. Within this context, the emotional rendering of the elephant's death takes on tinctures of conservatism that were never far from Orwell's Socialism. For in killing the elephant, Orwell is also painfully killing a part of himself; he may freely wish for this part to be killed, yet the elimination of deeply ingrained prejudices rarely occurs without some personal discomfort. And we should not be blind to Orwell's repeated insistence that evil though the Empire was, it was not on a relative scale the worst kind of rule possible. He was not naive enough to assume that the British Empire in Burma, of which he was an equivocal part, was either without its astringent virtues or without its moral advantages over many other forms of tyranny.
Within the implicit ambiguity of the elephant then, the dilemmas it brings to the surface, and the complex emotions it gives rise to, Orwell presents us with an engaging and challenging *depiction* of an animal. Of particular significance is the alignment of Orwell's political ambivalences with the conflicting emotions aroused by the animal. This is a correlation that manifests itself elsewhere in Orwell's work, most significantly in *Animal Farm*.

*Burmese Days* is Orwell's only novel of the East, and in a more extended though not necessarily more successful manner than that of the two essays already discussed, this work records the dreadful conflicts that a white man with a conscience feels about the Imperial situation. It is not insignificant that it is in Orwell's writings of the East, that the world of animal nature forces itself into the narrative in meaningful ways. It is in the East, as we have found occasion to remark several times in our discussion of Kipling, that the whole relationship between man and beast is less clear-cut than in the ratiocinative west. Orwell once remarked that in novels about the East, "the scenery is the real subject-matter".15 In describing *Burmese Days* as the only novel that he liked, Orwell comments that it is "the descriptions of scenery" which pleased him most. He might have gone on to say that the most dramatically interesting parts of the novel's natural descriptions and evocations of the Burmese landscape almost invariably involve animals and birds. As one critic puts it, it is almost as if there is "a conspiracy of the land whose agents, in animal form, intervene at crucial moments to help determine the fates of the human characters".16
On the simplest level, animal imagery is used constantly throughout the novel to describe figuratively many of the Asians who inhabit the Burmese town of Kyauktada. U Po Kyin, the machinating Burmese official who seems to personify Orwell's notion that the imperial rulers are in fact ruled by the suppressed people, is described several times by Dr. Veraswami as "a crocodile in human shape. He has the cunning of the crocodile, its cruelty, its bestiality". We need look no further than Kipling's tale "The Undertakers" from the *Second Jungle Book* to find a powerful literary forerunner for the identification of the crocodile with evil. In describing U Po Kyin in this way however, Orwell is doing far more than merely employing a convenient metaphor. He is also relying on the strong Eastern tradition of personifying animals, especially when moral conduct is in question. This tradition of course finds a powerfully religious connotation in the Buddhist belief that a man's moral conduct determines his reincarnated form in the next life. If a man leads an evil life then he will be reincarnated as vermin, and it is noted several times in the course of the novel that doubtless this is how U Po Kyin would reappear, as a rat or a frog. U Po Kyin himself believes that he can make up for the evil he has perpetrated by buying temples and thereby satisfy the gods. He dies before this is done, and within the religious framework of the novel, the assumption is that his animal equivalent is one of the lowest forms of animal life.

Dogs and dog imagery are also very prevalent. This imagery is most usually used by the White Sahibs to describe the Asians, and indeed the pathetic fawning of such Burmese as Mr. Francis, Mr. Samuel, the club
servants, and even Dr. Veraswami, strikes one as having something of the blind attitude of a dog to its master. To every European, with the ambiguous exception of John Flory, the native people are sub-human, in reality no better than dogs. It is Flory's attitude to dogs, as well as to other animals, that sets him apart from the other Whites, and this attitude is curiously similar to his attitudes to the native Burmese. Very much against the grain of popular European sentiment, Flory befriends Dr. Veraswami, and has the unfortunate habit of joining in and enjoying native rituals and festivities. At the same time, he is the only White who keeps a dog, Flo, and he is the only White who exhibits anything like warm receptivity to the natural life of the Burmese countryside. It is against the background of Flory's sensitive admiration for the associated natives and animals that the central drama of the novel is played.

Without any suspicion of the sentimental, Orwell evokes Flo as Flory's faithful companion. They are rarely apart and we learn that every day Flory went through the unpleasant ritual of delousing her. The affection for the dog is felt to be real. Equally real, though somewhat more complicated, is Flory's feelings for Dr. Veraswami. Flory finds in the good Burmese doctor qualities of moral integrity elsewhere lacking amongst all the inhabitants of the community. In this sense, Veraswami is an ally in Flory's internal and external struggle with the callously insensitive people with whom he is forced to live. John Flory's only real comrades then are a dog and a native, and the way in which Flory betrays Veraswami throughout the novel might indcicate that if anywhere the strength of affection was rather more with his dog than a human. Interestingly, at the very end
of the novel when Flory commits suicide, his actions prove the effective
destruction of both Flo and Veraswami. Out of some feeling of comradeship,
Flory shoots his dog, and then by killing himself, ruins the doctor. The
act of suicide proves trebly destructive, since with the death of Flo and
the disgrace of Veraswami, any effective moral counterpart to the likes
of U Po Kyin is annihilated. But just as Flory betrays both Flo and
Veraswami, it should also be remembered that these two between them brought
about the situation that forced him to suicide. After all, if Flory had
not befriended Veraswami, however half-heartedly, he would not have incurred
the wrath of U Po Kyin and thus would not have been confronted by Ma Hla May
in the church. We may remember that it was this confrontation that drove
the final nail into the coffin of Flory's relationship with Elizabeth.
Moreover, it is Flo who gives the whole game away. Flory had hoped to
brave out the incident by refusing to admit his knowledge of his former
mistress, but he is betrayed when Flo unwittingly runs up to Ma Hla May
and shows that he recognizes her as a familiar presence. Thus, just as
Flory brings about the destruction of Flo and Veraswami, so they in turn
cause his final downfall.

Flory's shooting of Flo acts on the reader's imagination to echo an
earlier attempt by Flory to kill the pariah dog whose noisy baying at the
moon so disturbs his sleep. This pariah dog stands as an interesting
counterpart to Flory, since both are outcasts, effectively ostracized from
a social community. The sequence of events within this incident is important,
and establishes I think a clear figurative identification between dog and
human. The dog disturbs Flory till he can "stand it no longer", just as
his loneliness becomes for him an unbearable burden. But somehow he 
lacks the nerve to kill the dog "in cold blood". It is at this stage of 
the proceedings that Flory enters a revery of his past life 
which tells the reader his recent history as well as betraying some of 
his hopes and aspirations. He reflects on his own life, calling himself 
a "spineless cur ... a sneaking, idling, boozing, fornicating, soul-
examining, self-pitying cur". The immediate occasion for this vicious 
self-castigation is his inability to shoot the animal and thus release the 
night from the dog's dreadful howling. But the account of Flory's numerous 
failures indicate a larger reason for this self-hatred. His failure to 
shoot the dog, in itself we feel a humane kind of cowardice and one that 
certainly none of the other Whites would have shared, serves as a symbolic 
example of what Flory feels to be his impotence. It is an irony that that 
part of himself which he considers to be impotent is that part which, if 
changed, would make him either wholly a part of the European community or 
a complete renegade from it. Finally, Flory can go neither way.

In recalling his earlier life, it becomes clear that Burma has truly 
become Flory's home; he has accepted it and even grown to love it. Yet 
since he is a part of a colonial force, he is necessarily alienated from the 
country. This is reflected in his potentially good relationship with 
Veraswami, which finally he denies through cowardice. Flory genuinely 
wishes to be part of Burma and to accept the natives equally, yet the peer 
pressure exerted from the European club prevents him from doing this. 
Finally, the literal and the metaphorical presence of the pariah dog serves 
as a reflection of Flory's alienation. Like the pariah, Flory in his self-
reflection bays at his own moon, trapped by forces seemingly beyond his control, unable to gain happiness and yet unable to accept his position. He even muses on the romantic dream of finding a woman who would share his love of the natural life of Burma, and optimistically comments that "within one there is the possibility of a decent human being". This is the positive side of Flory's personality, the side which responds to the natural world, yet even this proves impossible to sustain. For he seems to find the strength to shoot the dog, to destroy the projected image of himself as an alienated outsider; but with an irony that presages his disastrous affair with the woman of his dreams, Elizabeth, Flory misses the dog who "sitting down fifty yards further away, once more began rhythmically baying".

The only and pathetic outcome of Flory's resolve to shoot the dog is a bruised shoulder.

Flory's equivocal social and moral dilemmas receive their most dramatic treatment in his doomed and desperate relationship with Elizabeth. She is described quite mercilessly as a shallow-minded, feckless beauty, determined to establish herself within a 'proper' society. As a character she is less than wholesome, but in her response to Flory she serves an obvious function. From the beginning it is apparent that Flory's way of deliberately associating with the natives, together with his inexplicable and effusive praise for the natural beauty of Burma, are not qualities that she is about to admire. To Elizabeth the natives are dirty, sub-humans, fit only for menial duty. In this, her attitude fits exactly that of the other members of the European community. When Flory takes her into the midst of the Burmese pwe, innocently thinking her to be receptive to local colour, she is shocked,
outraged, and even physically disgusted.

Most of the important incidents which concern Flory and Elizabeth involve animals in one way or another. What happens to an animal at a particular time, and what response each makes to it, determines how well or how badly their relationship is progressing. Their first encounter occurs shortly after Elizabeth's arrival. Without any real danger to himself Flory rescues her from a harmless water-buffalo: "He hastened towards her, and, in default of a stick, smacked the buffalo sharply on the nose" (p.76). This show of bravado immediately appeals to Elizabeth's sense of how an English gentleman behaves. Flory has here proved himself to be the master of the animal, and in a way which Elizabeth feels he should be a master to the local natives. This 'up' in their relationship, however, is soon reversed when Flory proves himself to be less than a Sahib by attending the local pwe and then by entering the shop run by a local Chinese merchant. A harmonious balance is restored when Flory introduces Elizabeth to hunting, that archetypal past-time of the British Raj. This episode, the culmination of which is the shooting of the leopard, is probably one of the best parts of the whole novel, and in it we witness the physical passion which for Elizabeth is the natural accompaniment to the destruction of an animal. After her first kill, Orwell makes this cruel and significant comment: "She was conscious of an extraordinary desire to fling her arms round Flory's neck and kiss him; and in some way it was the killing of the pigeon that made her feel this" (p.158). Thus, for Elizabeth, love for Flory and the almost sadistic revery over a destroyed bird are directly associated. We may recall that much later it is Flory's
ignominious fall from a horse when he is attempting to impress Elizabeth that operates as the occasion for her cruel rejection of him. Flory's fall becomes an incident which demonstrates Flory's inability to control an animal and his inability to control the natives whose job it was to ensure that the saddle was properly attached.

Elizabeth's unworthiness is established in an uncompromising way: she is a racist snob who casts animals and natives in the same mould and whose passional responses are triggered by the destruction of the latter. There is a similar identification within Flory too of animals and natives, though for him this is largely a powerful identification of beauty and social justice. Yet in his desperate attempt to win Elizabeth, he becomes implicated in Elizabeth's destructive bent. Nothing shows this more forcefully than two responses that Flory makes towards the gorgeous green pigeons.

Here is the first; Flory is alone:

There was a stirring high up in the peepul tree, and a bubbling noise like pots boiling. A flock of green pigeons were up there, eating the berries. Flory gazed up into the great green dome of the tree, trying to distinguish the birds; they were invisible, they matched the leaves so perfectly, and yet the whole tree was alive with them, shimmering, as though the ghosts of birds were shaking it. Flo rested herself against the roots and growled up at the invisible creatures. Then a single green pigeon fluttered down and perched on a lower branch. It did not know that it was being watched. It was a tender thing, smaller than a tame dove, with jade green back as smooth as velvet, and neck and breast of iridescent colours. Its legs were like the pink wax that dentists use.

The pigeon rocked itself backwards and forwards on the bough, swelling out its breast feathers and laying its coralline beak upon them. A pang went through Flory. Alone, alone, the bitterness of being alone! So often like this, in lonely places in the forest, he would come upon something—bird, flower, tree—beautiful beyond all words, if there had been a soul with whom to share it.

(pp.54-55)
The naturalistic depiction of these birds at once reveals Orwell's strong powers of delicate observation of wildlife. After this experience, Flory goes further into the jungle until he gets lost. There he has tea with some natives who point out his road. It is in this incident that we see Flory as a part of the natural landscape, enjoying it and partly giving himself up to it. To invoke Alan Sandison's phrase, he is "operating inside nature" and has found some happiness. It is true that this happiness is not complete; he needs someone who will share his life and share his sense of oneness with the natural landscape. He hopes to realize this dream with Elizabeth, with whom he has this discussion:

Flory took one of the little green corpses to show to Elizabeth. 'Look at it. Aren't they lovely things? The most beautiful bird in Asia.'

Elizabeth touched its smooth feathers with her finger-tip. It filled her with bitter envy, because she had not shot it. And yet it was curious, but she felt almost an adoration for Flory now that she had seen how he could shoot.

'Just look at its breast-feathers; like a jewel. It's murder to shoot them. The Burmese say that when you kill one of these birds they vomit, meaning to say, "look, here is all I possess, and I've taken nothing of yours. Why do you kill me?" I've never seen one do it, I must admit.'

'Are they good to eat?'

'Very. Even so, I always feel it's a shame to kill them.'

'I wish I could do it like you do!' she said enviously.

( pp.156-157 )

Orwell's purpose here is nothing if not clear, and this passage stands as a direct and significant use of animals to bring out the full implications of a human relationship. The role that the birds play, argues for an extensive view of integrated human life within nature, a way of life that is so obviously impossible to a woman like Elizabeth who has none of the finer feelings for wild-life which for Orwell mark an enlightened man.
Orwell has thus employed animals and birds in *Burmese Days* to create consciously conceived climaxes and confrontations. The close identification between animal and native, an association which Orwell would probably wish us to see as especially ennobling, seems similarly deliberate. In Orwell's world, it seems that how someone responds to animals acts as a direct barometer of their moral authenticity. Another way of putting it is to say that moral worth exists in direct proportion to sympathy with oppressed classes and species.

The man/animal identification reaches its greatest development in Orwell's *Animal Farm*, where the figurative transition is absolute within the fixed form of the Beast-Fable. It is made very clear that the animals represent the workers and revolutionaries of the Soviet uprising of 1917, and it is this historical event that is most obviously being fabulised. Orwell wrote that a part of his aim was "to dispel the Soviet myth", a myth which he felt was wholly detrimental to the future of Socialism.

Orwell's earlier uses of animals reflect his growing consciousness of the evils of Imperialistic Capitalism within the Far East, but with *Animal Farm* we are obviously in Europe. While he was still in Burma he had developed his own political attitude towards the Empire he was serving and this led him to an equivocal sympathy with the oppressed Burmese people. On his return to England this consciousness was expanded and deepened by his realization that to find instances of unjust exploitation he need look no further than England. Almost by accidental analogy, Orwell discovered the English working class and saw in them the English equivalent to the Burmese situation: "They were the symbolic victims of
injustice, playing the same part in England as the Burmese played in Burma.\textsuperscript{20} Orwell then had found the beginnings of the general political principles that led to necessary exploitation of those least able to defend themselves from it, and it ceased to become a problem only associated with the relationship between East and West. This realization however was to be later off-set by Orwell's experiences with the destructive factionalism of the Socialist groups involved with the Spanish Civil War.\textsuperscript{21} The ends and principles of Socialism, he realised, were contingent on the methods of power used to bring Socialism about. The most notorious example of this kind of problem was to be found in the largely degenerative route that the Soviet Union had taken with the Stalinist purges of the 1930's.

\textit{Animal Farm} then is an attempt to describe a political tendency whose ends assume less importance and less credibility as the means become more and more oppressive. But before we look more closely at the way in which the farmyard animals behave and how they contribute to the potency of the situation they help to exemplify, we should offer some comments on the general conditions and limitations established by the form of the Beast-Fable. It has become something of a critical commonplace to suggest that Orwell was a better essayist than he was a novelist, and certainly it is true that \textit{The Road to Wigan Pier} for example is a better weapon in the presentation of political ideas than any one of his pieces of ordinary fiction. This problem is one that all political artists must to some extent feel, since in an attempt to proselytise a writer runs the risk of preaching a point of view too deliberately. At the same time, his political conscience demands that he write about the political situations he finds
to be of central importance. From very early on, politics had been the base-line of Orwell's other interests, and in his novels we can readily appreciate how the normal patterns of imaginative writing were partly insufficient for his political needs.

A compromise seems to have been reached in Animal Farm. In his essay "Why I Write", Orwell recalls that Animal Farm "was the first book in which I tried, with full consciousness of what I was doing, to fuse political purpose and artistic purpose into one whole". Significantly, this work is not a novel at all but rather a Beast-Fable, a sub-genre entirely different in the demands it makes on a writer. No longer is characterization, for example, so severe a problem, since animals are readily useful as character 'types'. The fable form is also appropriate to the general presentation of political ideas since its focus can be better directed towards events and their significance than towards the individuals to whom these situations apply. Inherent in this form, however, are dangers and limitations. After all, to resolve an artistic problem by removing the problem altogether and using an entirely different fictional form is not much of a solution. Moreover, Animal Farm is sub-titled a "fairy story", and when Julian Symons describes it as such and suggests that in this form "there are no human relationships to disturb the fairy-tale pattern" we may have cause to worry that the work acts at less than an adult level. Certainly, a literary success which avoids the problems caused by creating real human beings is a literary success of a circumscribed kind. Implicit in this criticism, however, is the critical principle which demands that fiction subscribe to the conventions of fully-rounded characters, acting within a recognizable fictional reality. The Beast-fable, on the
other hand, is a highly artificial literary form, a complex kind of literary game whose artistic merits serve a more didactic purpose. In this context, success must be gauged not only by literary criteria but also by the criteria of political effectiveness. On this level, *Animal Farm* represents a success, the kind of equivocal achievement for example that Raymond Williams takes it to be: "Past the easy exploitation and the equally easy rejection, the fable in *Animal Farm* offers positive and negative evidence of a permanently interesting kind".24

There is a further quality of the Beast-Fable as a form which should be mentioned here, since it provides yet further evidence of Orwell's propitious use of a Bestiary form of literature for the presentation of his political points of view. In his preface to the Ukrainian edition of his fable, Orwell provides a very significant argument for his use of the traditional animal fable: "On my return from Spain I thought of exposing the Soviet myth in a story that could be easily understood by almost anyone and which could be easily translated into other languages".25 (Stress is mine). We should especially note the egalitarian connotations of this remark since Orwell is suggesting that the Beast-Fable has an immediate appeal not only to the literati of Europe but also the under-educated poor. Furthermore, his insistence on it being easy to translate indicates an Internationalist viewpoint. We may recall that in the Middle Ages preachers often relied on Beast-Fables as a supplement to the morality offered to the poor and illiterate. They did so because they found that this kind of moral story set within the often humorous context of animal life was extremely popular and thus effective as a didactic device. In a more modern
context, the animal fable may reach those people to whom Karl Marx and the double-speak of official media channels are unintelligible. Implicit in this is the idea that political injustice is made all the more easy if the subjected people are kept in blank ignorance of the kind of forces that oppress them. Animal Farm then is an attempt to breach this problem and instruct through the proven effectiveness of the animal fable.

Orwell's desire then was to write a political argument within the literary form best given to the presentation of moral or political ideas. The spirit of this intention goes some way to meeting the criticism of those who consider the Beast-Fable a low-brow literary form. For from the contexts of Orwell's intentions it is plain that his desire to aid the undereducated masses to avail themselves of sufficient political consciousness to recognise the terms of their oppression is a masterstroke of internationalist, and moral strategy. Not to recognise this and to proceed to evaluate Animal Farm by the standards of the 19th Century novel is necessarily to be blind to the genuinely humanitarian, socialistic, and non-literary aims that Orwell set for himself.

The story and details of Animal Farm are so well known that no rehearsal of them is here necessary. Indeed, they are so familiar that many people can tell you what the fable is about without ever actually reading it. Critics too often seem to be embarrassed about discussing this work, finding it already properly understood. When critics do discuss Animal Farm there is a natural tendency for them to dwell at great lengths on the allegorical part of the fable which involves a negative view of the Soviet Revolution and its decline. In the process, the animals constitute metaphor-
ical 'counters' which once understood are no longer of any particular interest. This general insistence on the historical aspects of the Soviet Revolution and the attendant disregard for the animals themselves, has led to a curious and paradoxical estimation of Orwell's fable. On the one hand, the criticism from the leftist political camp sees Orwell "shrieking into the arms of the Capitalists". On the other, the more conservative political pundits see in Animal Farm persuasive evidence that the road all revolutions take is the road to tyranny and injustice. Both points of view seem to accept the same basic idea that implicit in Orwell's fable is a denigration of Socialism, as a political system. This, I argue, is not at all what Orwell was attempting to do, and proper concentration on the exemplary nature of the animal fable and on the moral nature of the animals themselves suggests more justly the nature of Orwell's achievement.

Increasingly, it becomes evident that reading Animal Farm as purely a tract aimed at dispelling "the Soviet myth" is less viable as the historical facts of the Soviet revolution begin to take on more objective and more complex overtones. The animal fable implies a necessary paring down of events into more simplistic narrative patterns, and it is clear that such a form could not adequately suggest the full complexities of an historical situation only partly understood. If Animal Farm then is to have any significance for us today, beyond merely being an interesting curio from the 1940's, this significance must lie beyond the occasion of its specific allegory. That is to say it must have a more general or universal importance. This importance is to be found, I believe, in Orwell's implicit insistence on the moral bases of political action, and the most forceful exemplification of these bases is to be found in the sympathetic responses his proletarian
animals give rise to. It is in them that the true principles of Socialism remain intact and undaunted by the superstructures of power that in their name deprive them of freedom.

Orwell's account of the genesis of *Animal Farm* is of particular interest to our point of view since it establishes a certain habit of mind in Orwell which makes the identification between worker and animal seem almost instinctual:

... I saw a little boy, perhaps ten years old, driving a huge cart-horse along a narrow path, whipping it whenever it tried to turn. It struck me that only if such animals became aware of their strength we should have no power over them, and that men exploit animals in much the same way as the rich exploit the proletariat.  

Cyril Connolly has written that *Animal Farm* is a tale told "by a great lover of liberty and a great lover of animals", and we can readily see within the provenance of his emotional sensibilities this alliance between man and animal is profound and does not in any way suggest a devaluation of his concern for the plight of humanity. Although the above quotation was written after the initial publication of *Animal Farm* and thus has the advantage of a hindsight perspective, it still attests to a transition from animal to proletarian worker that Orwell means us to see within his fable.

In further describing the genesis of *Animal Farm*, Orwell extends his argument in a way that strikes the reader as quite extraordinary:

I proceeded to analyse Marx's theory from the animal's point of view. To them it is clear that the concept of a class struggle between humans was pure illusion, since whenever it was necessary to exploit animals, all humans united against them: the true struggle is between animals and humans.
This passage makes a significant figurative transition from the working people of Marxist theory to the animals whose subjected situation is analogous to it. Both, the argument implicitly runs, are inevitably exploited by any structure of power that seeks to profit by the exploitation of their labour. A sharp distinction is here being made between those interested in socialism disinterestedly, and those interested in it from the point of view of power. It is this kind of distinction that separates the pigs from the working animals, or indeed the trade union official from the factory hand, or the Commissar from the agricultural peasant. This issue concerns private motivations as they operate in the political arena to seek ends distinct from those of the common good. The criticism implied in Animal Farm is thus directed at the institutions of power that in their attempt to direct socialism destroy its essentially moral values of justice, freedom, and liberty. The vitality of the political life of the fable is that those values themselves do not die out within the suppressed workers.

The difference between the pigs and the working animals needs little elaboration. The pigs distinguish themselves as masters of double-speak and political vandalism, and in the terms of the fable they become quite human, that is to say sub-animal. Their duplicity is recorded with detached poise as one by one they destroy the principles on which the revolution was established; their viciousness is evoked with restrained but forceful insistence, and the extreme deviousness of their purpose reaches a climax in their conscious manipulation of language. On the other hand, such animals as Boxer, Clover, and Benjamin are depicted in a laudatory way. Their often
blind devotion to the principles of socialism is experienced as in some respects noble and elevating. Through them the full range of Orwell's sympathies for the working class is established. It should be noted that within this range there is more than enough room for sharp criticism.

The emotional impact, such as it is, that the loyal animals cause is subtly underplayed within Orwell's astringent economy of expression. Orwell seems more than conscious of the attendant dangers of sentimentality that arise when animals are used to exemplify emotion. Thus, even when Boxer is taken away to the knacker's yard, perhaps the most bitter example of the pig's duplicity, the scene is managed with careful control. This kind of control is clearly necessary if the ideational issues at stake are to be seen cleanly and without the obfuscation of anything like mawkish pity. If the principles of socialism are to remain intact within these animals, our sympathy for them must be clear-headed and not based on an overflow of emotional gush.

The principles of socialism are indeed retained within the animals, and this produces in the reader feelings of bitter anger directed against the pigs. It should be noted too, that this is effected all the more cleanly by the animals' view of themselves. Rather than self-pity, they maintain a mundane kind of cheeriness, what Raymond Williams calls "an assured and active and laughing intelligence ... manifested in the very penetration and exposure of the experience of defeat". For Williams, the recognition that the pigs are deceitful is a moral victory, a victory heightened through the animals' refusal to indulge in bitterness of any kind.

Implicit in a reader's sympathy for the animals is a recognition of their inherent blindness to the powers that suppress them. In such works
as The Road to Wigan Pier it is quite clear that Orwell did not suffer any blind illusion about the working-class. In Animal Farm we see that the worker animals are educationally insufficient and this is revealed by their inability to read and understand the changing terms of the Revolutionary principles. Orwell's ideas on the relationship between language and politics are well-known, and the animals' ignorance reflects that of the working-class. An animal like Boxer, for example, is suppressed because he lacks education and is content to believe what his superiors tell him. Needless to say, it is in the pigs' interests to keep the other animals blind to the real situation, and language here becomes the means to ensure political supremacy. It is not difficult to see the parallel between the animals' ignorance and that of most proletarian groups; both place a blind faith in those that rule them and lack the guile to question those to whom they feel subservient. Such an identification between the lower animals and the workers is scarcely complimentary and it is perhaps true to say that Orwell never rejected the idea that animals and the ordinary working man share a similar kind of stupidity, an inability to comprehend the most obvious political truths. Doubtless, this idea is a hold-over from the inevitable identification of animal with sub-human coolie that Orwell would have witnessed in Burma. We should remember, however, that this kind of negative association is offset by the moral qualities of loyalty and honesty that the animals exemplify.

The animals' ignorance in the face of oppression serves an important function. As we have already noted, the Beast-Fable necessarily enforces a simplification of motive and a de-personalising of character. In this latter regard, the Beast-Fable provides the means by which the hard truths of politics are greatly softened within the metaphorical
use of analogical animals. In this process animals act as objective forms through which the working and suppressed peoples may witness a situation similar in all essential features to their own. Orwell is obviously attempting to present the suppressed people with a mirror image of this situation and he realizes the usefulness of an essentially parabolic form which has its basis in a particular and very familiar historical episode. Clearly, if Orwell was to have written a straightforward narrative account using real human beings then working people could only have been alienated by his analogical depiction of them as suppressed by their own political ignorance. In representing the working class as animals this problem is avoided. It is true that to be characterised as an animal could give rise to equal offence, but this does not occur since the engaging spectacle of animals that speak and think humanly, relieves the identification of its sting.

The purpose of Animal Farm should now be quite apparent, and the form in which the exemplary education is set seen as entirely appropriate. It should be stressed that Animal Farm is not offering the poor and the oppressed anything like an active strategy for ridding themselves of their oppressors. On the contrary, Orwell seems to suggest quite the opposite, a quietist inactivity. What is offered, however, is an educative lesson-in-action. You may not be able to defeat your oppressors, you may not even wish to if this implies a travesty of the values you believe in, but at least you can know who your persecutors are and what forces they use to oppress you. A consciousness of the terms of oppression, and in this case we are led to believe that this means the way in which education and information is perverted through the manipulation of language,
is the achieved attitude of the animals at the conclusion of the fable. Thus, the animal fable has performed an exploratory function in discussing the relationship between literacy and politics, and has thereby defined a situation not restricted to the Soviet revolution.

The conclusion of Animal Farm leaves the socialist animals in a passive mood. With the sense of implicit trust that characterizes their approach to the slowly degenerating government of the pigs, they look with incredulity at the fracas between the pigs and the humans occasioned by their attempts to cheat one another at cards. Orwell said of this episode that he wished to convey a sense of the imminent and inevitable struggle that always arises when conflicting power-ideologies meet, even in a mood of alliance. 34 Doubtless, Orwell is drawing on the aggravation and fragmented alliances between Germany and the Soviet Union, as well as on his experiences of the conflicting factions in the Spanish Civil War. Outside of the endlessly destructive cycle of conflicting powers, later to develop into the Cold War, stand the animals who gaze in at the farmhouse window with amazement in their eyes. They are outside of this kind of struggle and there is little indication that at the moment they are capable of doing anything about it. In this, they remain morally righteous as socialists but suppressed nonetheless, and there is little suggestion that by joining the power struggle they will advance their own cause.

The animals then are left in an apparently hopeless case. If they do nothing then they remain suppressed; if they overthrow the pigs they run the grave risk of becoming like them. The only hope, partial as it is, is to become educated in the tactics of power, and then to retreat from the
arena. This strain in Orwell's thinking came about as a reaction to his personal encounters with the superstructures of power which tried individually to impose an order or way of life at all costs. The urge to opt out of this destructivity implies a disillusion with political action itself. In his essay "Inside the Whale" written in 1939, he develops an argument in which he lauds the kind of passivity which he finds in the work of Henry Miller:

...the viewpoint of a man who believes the world-process to be outside his control and who in any case hardly wishes to control it... Progress and reaction have both turned out to be swindles. Seemingly there is nothing left but quietism—robbing reality of its terrors by simply submitting to it. Get inside the Whale (for you are of course). Give yourself over to the world-process, stop fighting against it or pretending that you control it; simply accept it, endure it, record it.

It is this attitude which largely characterizes the response made by the animals of Animal Farm, and through this Orwell is extending his argument about the quietist attitude necessary to a Liberal artist and to socialistic workers. Orwell saw a world of totalitarian governments looming on the near horizon, and he saw the role of the liberal artist as one of passive survival. This is necessary, the argument runs, if the liberal values are to be maintained and if a liberal is going to personally survive. In this sense, perhaps it can be said that Orwell was not a socialist at all, but rather a liberal thinker whose values sometimes coincided with those of socialism, and thus who hung his hat on that particular peg. This is admirably reflected in the values of the animals in Animal Farm who do not allow themselves to become a part of the power process.

Orwell's prognostication of political gloom and of the death of liberal-
ism is reflected in his journalism of the post-war period. In 1946 he remarks that "We shall get nowhere unless we start by recognising that political behaviour is largely non-rational, that the world is suffering from some kind of mental disease which must be diagnosed before it can be cured". Diagnosis suggests study and a passive, reflective attitude rather than action, and once again this is seen within Orwell's liberal animals. In *Burmese Days* we remarked that Orwell's sense of sympathy with the oppressed Burmese was often paralleled by his sympathy for animals, and we saw in this a strong bond between man and animal. In the era of the 1930's and the 1940's, Orwell as a liberal and a man who believed in such passive pastimes as Nature study, himself became an endangered species, threatened by the powers of totalitarianism that would not tolerate his desire to be free and to seek justice. Thus, he becomes like the Burmese peasants or the English working-class, or the Soviet factory worker, an oppressed being whose situation becomes analogous to the perpetual condition of all animals in an anthropocentric world. The animals of *Animal Farm* thereby become analogues of his own political circumstances and as such exemplify a political argument more general yet more individualized than that of the fate of the Soviet Revolution. In this sense, the moment of achieved consciousness exerts a psychological pressure that has as its basis Orwell's fear for the future of humane values. Given his earlier predilection for associating animal and human suffering, what better metaphor could he find than that of a group of animals who personify agents that stand in need of a clear-headed "diagnosis" of the terms of their oppression? Similarly, given Orwell's genuine desire to suggest that his individual
situation is a microcosm of the larger problem faced by everyone who does not have power, his choice of the Beast-fable provides him with the necessary form that can be at once universal and local.
We must avoid a childish distaste for examining the less valued animals. For in all natural things there is something wonderful. And just as Heraclitus is said to have spoken to the visitors who were wanting to see him but stopped when they saw him 'warming himself at the oven' -- he kept telling them to come in and not worry, 'for there are gods here too' -- so we should approach the inquiry about each animal without aversion, knowing that in all of them there is something natural and beautiful.

(Aristotle, De Partibus Animalium.)
In looking closely at Kipling and Orwell we have seen that their respective ways of using animals serve broadly ethical purposes of a socio-political kind. Animals were a measure by which man's actions could be represented in a predominantly abstract way so as to clarify (and simplify) the author's area of interest. By and large the representational mode tended towards the abstraction of the fable and allegory in that the author's purposes were not primarily with the animal as animal but rather with the 'principle' that the animal embodies. There were, of course, many instances where both Kipling and Orwell deliberately sought naturalistic effects, but these tend to be overshadowed by more didactic purposes. In turning our attention towards Thomas Hardy and D. H. Lawrence we must expect a wholly different stylistic and philosophical approach to animals and their relationship to mankind. Here perhaps as nowhere else in the English novel, life, which of necessity includes animals, birds, flowers, and mountains, is presented with the full authority of what we may call an organicist and integrative perspective—life in the real texture of living experience that includes Nature as a whole phenomenon. With these two authors the excessively anthropocentric viewpoint, implicit in such forms as the fable, is to be eschewed in favour of a broader and more inclusive approach.

Nevertheless, it will be seen that although Hardy and Lawrence strive to represent their animals as natural inhabitants of the universe, the old Bestiary moral stances are not lacking. Here too animals are used as devices by which man's behaviour may be juxtaposed, symbolized, and analogized. The way in which an animal is treated, or the way in which a human treats or
responds to an animal may lead the reader to a deliberately intended and usually complex point of view about a particular character. The essential distinction between this kind of Bestiary art and that which we saw in Kipling and Orwell is to be seen in the different fictional technique that is used to represent reality. With Hardy and Lawrence the essence and the necessary function of animals as non-human analogues is in their very quality of being alive and therefore inherently resistant to the abstracting process common to the fable and allegory. Describing an animal becomes the same technical problem of drawing a human being, except of course that literal dialogue is dispensed with. This may be compensated by the aesthetically pleasing spectacle of an animal behaving in its natural way in juxtaposition with a human. In this process an animal may indeed become a symbol for some natural quality of life and the appeal of this symbolism lies in its informing distinctness as something alively 'other'. Functioning in their natural way, or subjected to particular kinds of human degradation, animals may become "objective correlatives" of the human situation.

There are distinctions that have to be made between Hardy and Lawrence. First of all, it is obvious that animals appear far less often in Hardy than they do in Lawrence, and by and large they occupy a less compelling place. Lawrence's animal symbols operate in a large more deliberate way, whereas Hardy's are usually more discreet and inform the human action in less dramatically forceful ways. There are other differences too that should become apparent when we discuss the actual work, all of which reflect the differences that exist both in our authors' themes, private philosophies, and styles. For, although Lawrence began his writing career as a conscious
follower of Hardy,\textsuperscript{1} he grew away from him when he became more firmly sure of himself and his artistic purpose. Nonetheless, in a study of their treatment of animals, Hardy and Lawrence should properly be seen together as partners engaged in an effort to incorporate animals as an organic part of existence, co-relational with man and with qualities of aesthetic and moral importance. Furthermore, both read and knew Darwin's work and their responses to this description of man's place in nature led to their private formulations of what the relationship between man and animal was. In seeing nature as "red in tooth and claw" Hardy saw a natural relationship of suffering between man and animal that he constantly sought to articulate; the pity and terror of human suffering could, in this view, be crystallized through a depiction of animal suffering. Moral regeneration, in part at least, lay in the possibility of recognising the need to meliorate the suffering imposed on all forms of life by Nature through ethical considerations.

Lawrence also recognised the harshness of natural processes and initially accepted Darwin's concept of the natural world. Later, he seems to have rejected these ideas, at least those parts that sought to unite man and animal in an evolutionary connection, and held to an insistence on what he calls an "unfolding of what \textit{is} man."\textsuperscript{2} He did feel, however, that there are "animal principles" in man which link him to the other animals but which are not evolutionary. Though by no means sentimental about animals, Lawrence felt fond regard for them and saw them at their best when unsullied by the de-naturing pressures of anthropomorphism. For Lawrence, animals, together with man, were supreme when engaged in the process of
being independently themselves. As he writes towards the end of his life: "For man, as for flower, beast and bird, the supreme triumph is to be most vividly and perfectly alive."³

If then Hardy and Lawrence are to be seen together in their literary use of animals, what might be their common background? We saw that for Kipling and Orwell the obvious backgrounds lay in the commonly-known mode of animal personification whereby human events can be masked by animal 'types'. But where do we look for a view of man and animal as co-relational? In such fictional forerunners as Fielding and Eliot we see obvious instances of a novelist's attempts to include the larger landscape but this rarely implies the animal world. The Romantic poets too, especially Wordsworth, wrote of the great "unity of things" but this did not stretch to an acceptance of the kinship between man and animal. It would seem that the extensive incorporation of animals into the fiction of Hardy and Lawrence suggests a new departure, precipitated by a new Science which had proven the inter-relatedness of all things. Implicit in this idea is the notion that it is no longer man alone who is the proper and only study for the novel; animals too are a part of the world and man is himself partly animal, and thus it is perhaps also to the animal world we should look to find ways of framing a holistic cosmology pertinent to a post-Darwinian era.

Certainly, both Hardy and Lawrence shared the view that man's domination of the earth, the rigorous implementation of technologies and mechanisms, the systematic denial of viable religious frameworks, were potentially destructive forces. Rationality and social law, as the main-
springs of human endeavour were, in their view at least, leading to entropy of an alarming character. For Hardy this sometimes took the form of the disharmony between Natural Law and Social law, and for Lawrence the egregious imbalance of spirit over instinct. For both, the natural world as it exists in the relationship between animals and in a landscape unscathed by mechanical overproduction is a moral paradigm. In both, there is a strong sense that the organic ways of life are giving way to the mechanical and that through this man is in danger of losing contact with the Nature of which he is a part.

It is within this broad framework that we must view the animals and birds which populate the fiction of Hardy and Lawrence. We must not allow ourselves to forget that any ideas or philosophies that both might have about animal nature are ultimately derived from the simple pleasure that they gained through contact with it. As well as discussing the particular local function that an animal may serve, we must also be careful to discuss the narrative flow and texture within which animals appear and which create their matrix of significance.

THOMAS HARDY

It has become a commonplace of Hardy criticism that his peculiar fictional gift lies in representing Nature in all its beauty and cruelty. His love of the countryside, and particularly "Wessex," animates his novels, and it is this landscape which represents the essential groundswell to which all human activities are ultimately subservient. What is not so frequently commented upon is his often forceful representation of non-human animal and bird life which shares the natural environment with
man. For as Samuel Chew comments: "Man, in Hardy's novels and poems, becomes only one of the many phenomena of interest to the imaginative interpreter of life. The old anthropocentricity is gone." In 1904, Hardy himself, in denying charges that he was a "pessimist", writes: "What are my books but one plea against 'man's inhumanity to man', woman, and to the lower animals."^5

It is significant that Hardy should have chosen to bracket together humans and the lower animals and to see cruelty to either an immoral act of the same magnitude. He derived this advanced and not in the least sentimental view partly from his own tempermental sensitivity to suffering and partly from his reading in such figures as Darwin, Mill, and Schopenhauer. As a boy, Hardy was almost unnaturally sensitive to pain, both to his own but more especially to that of others—especially innocent animals and birds. When Hardy was very young his father threw a stone and hit a fieldfare killing it. The effect that this had on young Hardy is amply demonstrated in the way he recalled the feel of the dead bird in his hand almost a lifetime later. Other incidents are recorded in his note-books and in his official biography, all of which attest to his intense and abiding concern for the well-being of animals and birds.^8

These innate feelings were to find powerful reinforcement in many of the scientific and philosophical works that were to constitute radical new directions in the way that man understood the world and his place in it. According to his biography, Hardy was amongst the very earliest admirers of Darwin's *Origin of Species* (1859),^9 seeing there an augmenting of his own intuitive sense of kinship between man and animal. We should perhaps
remind ourselves that one of the most disturbing aspects of Darwin's work was the proof that it offered concerning the common roots of all animal life. Man's special relationship with the Ape family was not to be described until the appearance of *The Descent of Man* (1871), but there was sufficient argument here to convince anyone (almost anyone) that man was not different in kind from the other animals. In this idea we find ample motive for Lionel Stevenson's sentiment that to Hardy "the essential identity of mankind with the rest of nature is to him a truism." To gauge the effect that Darwin had on Hardy, we might look at this letter he sent to the Humanitarian League:

> Few people seem to perceive as yet that the most far-reaching consequence of the establishment of the common origin of species is ethical; that it logically involves a readjustment of altruistic morals by enlarging as a necessity of rightness the application of what has been called the 'Golden Rule' beyond the area of mere mankind to that of the whole animal kingdom.

The tendency of this passage is quite unmistakable and it reveals in Hardy an ethical attitude towards animals that is the logical outcome of the latest scientific discoveries.

Hardy's view concerning the moral rights of animals was unorthodox, and it probably did not stem wholly from his reading of Darwin. In 1870 Jeremy Bentham's *Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation* sought to refute Descartes' idea that animals felt no pain. By appeals to obvious common sense, and disregarding the knotty question of whether animals can reason, Bentham argued that animals can indeed suffer and for that reason cruelty inflicted on them was morally reprehensible. Scholars are unsure whether Hardy knew Bentham's work directly, but it is likely
that he knew it indirectly, if by no other means than his extensive knowledge of Bentham's follower, John Stuart Mill. Though himself not particularly engaged in the rights of animals, in arguing so persuasively for other moral imperatives, Mill provided Hardy with the kind of logic which led inevitably to the proper treatment of animals. Hardy was to find further support in his convictions by his later discovery of Schopenhauer:

It is asserted that beasts have no rights; the illusion is harboured that our conduct, so far as they are concerned, has no moral significance, or, as it is put in the language of these codes, that 'there are no duties to be fulfilled towards animals'. Such a view is one of revolting coarseness, a barbarism of the West, whose source is Judaism. In philosophy, however, it rests on the assumption, despite all evidence to the contrary, of the radical difference between man and beast, -- a doctrine which, as is well known, was proclaimed with more trenchant emphasis by Descartes than by anyone else ...

Enough has been said to show the private and philosophical evidence which prompted Hardy's special sense of animals. This evidence, such as it is, has not been advanced merely for its own sake. For implicit in this attitude is the logical necessity to depict animals as inherently worthy of respect and attention. After all, if a writer wishes to proffer a sympathetic notion of animals in which their ontological status may be accepted as necessary evidence of their right not to suffer unnecessarily, it is in his interests to portray them naturalistically. His purpose would hardly be forwarded, for example, by a highly fablistic manner since this would tend to reduce the animal and render it humanly. If a reader is to invest animals with integrity similar to that invested in fictional humans, those animals must be no more and no less than them-
selves. What is being described here is a strong logical tendency rather than a prescriptive dogma. Whatever Hardy's attitude towards animals it would be foolish to pretend that this is his main theme; clearly, he is more interested in his human characters, and thus he does not always describe animals in the full naturalistic manner that we would expect from a Seton or a Jack London. Nevertheless, if Hardy's animals are to convince us of their rights we must feel them as real or feel their described situation with empathy.

Suffering animals frequently appear in Hardy's novels and we shall see that when he attempts to describe them he does so in order to convince us of the realness of that suffering. In this his ethical habit is corroborated by his artistic technique. That animals do suffer was to Hardy an obvious truth, and he saw in this a direct link between them and humans. Hardy may be fairly described as a "regressive Darwinist" who read Nature as a place where only the fit survived and where ethical considerations were the only meaningful force for amelioration. This force cannot eliminate the pain that is brought about as a consequence of being alive in a world where Nature is indifferent to human sentiment, but it can help to do away with man-made pain. In this, Hardy shows himself to be a humane and ethical adherent of materialistic naturalism whereby the iron law of necessity may be assuaged. But though generally committed to this kind of rational naturalism, his mode of fiction, particularly towards the latter period of his career as a novelist, becomes frankly symbolic. This is nowhere more so than in his treatment of animal nature. That is to say, certain animal episodes, what happens in them and what they signify to the fiction as a
whole, convey significance beyond the literal action and point to truths embodied in symbolic form.

The most forceful examples of Hardy's Bestiary art occur within the latter part of his career at a time when his vision of the world had deepened and saddened. But some of his earlier work provides us with some interesting examples. *Under the Greenwood Tree* (1872) does not rank very highly in Hardy's oeuvre, yet it has charms of a whimsical kind. Its representation of country life, always sympathetically done, reminds us of the rustic doings of Shakespeare's *As You Like It* and *A Midsummer Night's Dream*; Hardy's rustic characters constitute a definite success in comic characterization. Harvey Curtis Webster writes of this novel that "as a delicate and amusing picture of country life, it has few, if any, equals in English fiction." Accordingly, whatever animal incidents there are reflect the generally light-hearted tenor of the whole; but even in this most uncharacteristic of Hardy's novels, a very strong case is made for the interrelatedness of human and animal life.

The point in Yalbury Wood which abutted on the end of Geoffrey Day's premises was closed with an ancient tree, horizontally of enormous extent, though having no great pretensions to height. Many hundreds of birds had been born amidst the boughs of this single tree; tribes of rabbits and hares had nibbled at its bark from year to year; quaint tufts of fungi had sprung from the cavities of its forks; and countless families of moles and earthworms had crept about its roots. Beneath its shade spread a carefully tended grass-plot, its purpose being to supply a healthy exercise ground for young chickens and pheasants: the hens, their mothers, being enclosed in coops placed upon the same green flooring.

The sense of nature's inclusiveness is marvelously done here and the activities of human, animal, and bird are all encompassed by the symbolic
shroud of the Greenwood tree itself. The description of the tree enjoys a
generalized significance for the rural countryside as a whole and no
essential distinctions are made between human and non-human activities. It
is on this grass-plot that both rabbits play and where the marriage
festivities of the local village people are held, and the processes of each
are rendered complementary.

This kind of congruence receives a delightfully amusing extension in
the chapter "Dick Meets His Father." Dick Dewy wants to marry Fancy Day
but is confused by her coquettish behaviour. He asks for his father's
advice, as a son should, but finds little comfort from his father's ponderous
obtuseness. The whole scene is farcical and most of what is said is totally
inconsequential, consisting of such dithering expressions as "'Ann', I said,
says I..." Throughout this incident the reader is aware of a third party,
Smart (or Smiler) their horse, whose contribution to significant meaning is
quite as valuable as that of the humans. Horse and man alike are embodiments
of the same inability to articulate either emotion or argument.

"Yes," said Dick, with such a clinching period at the end that it
seemed he was never going to add another word. Smiler, thinking
this the close of the conversation, prepared to move on.
'Whe-hey,' said the tranter.

(p.143)
The already comic situation is accentuated by the inclusion of the horse and
it is acknowledged that he has his rights by force of rural habit. Later
on this gentle personification is resumed when Dick touches Smiler's neck
with the whip and the horse "who had been lost in thought for some time"
scampers into action. It would be foolish to overstate this example since
the personified manner is very unusual for Hardy. The case of Smiler is
interesting however in outlining the temperamental similarities that man and animal may share within Hardy's fiction.

*Far From the Madding Crowd* (1874) significantly extends the mode of "pastoral idyll" which fairly characterizes *Greenwood Tree* and by common agreement constitutes Hardy's first major achievement. It is also the first of his works in which the concept of "Wessex" is introduced. But like the former novel, it maintains a fundamental sense of the natural environment and a unity of experience for all its inhabitants. Here especially Hardy gives us what Margaret Drabble calls "a sense of ancient unbroken sympathy between man and the creation." This is particularly felt in the intermingling of human and animal life. With a few minor exceptions the action occurs within the regularized parameters of farming life and the lambing, calving, and harvesting seasons exert a fundamental undertow to all the other incidents. The two major characters, Gabriel Oak and Bathsheba Everdene, first meet through the exigencies of their care of livestock; while Gabriel is tending his sheep he is attracted to "two women and two cows" and it is in this way and under these circumstances that their relationship begins.

Gabriel's principle business concerns sheep, and his fortunes, not to say his very character, are indistinguishable from their welfare. His initial fall from the relative prosperity of a farmer is brought about by the devastation of his flock. The details of this incident are of interest since we see that the sheep's death is brought about by Gabriel's over-ambitious but immature dog. Hardy goes to some pains to describe Gabriel's two dogs, George the Elder and George the Younger, and his evocation of
the former is especially indicative of his naturalistic premise. But the younger dog is more important to the development of the plot. In its innocence the dog drives Gabriel's sheep to their death: "Oak looked over the precipice. The ewes lay dead and dying at its foot—a heap of two hundred mangled carcases, representing in their condition just now at least two hundred more" (p.40). This unfortunate occurrence ruins Gabriel's farm and forces him (fortuitously as it transpires) to become a humble shepherd for Bathsheba. It is worth remarking that the young George drove the ewes over the precipice out of innocent zeal rather than conscious malice and on encountering his master "licked his hand, and made signs implying that he expected some great reward for signal services rendered" (p.40). Later on Gabriel becomes associated with this dog and both are described as "too good to be trustworthy" (p.45). Earlier he had lost his first chance with Bathsheba because of his frank innocence and throughout the novel it is his trustworthiness, his insistence on telling the truth and recommending the proper action, that at once beguiles Bathsheba and yet frightens her away. It is only when Gabriel has considerably matured at the end of the novel, when he has as it were become more fully the elder George, that he finally unites with his beloved.

Through this kind of identification we see that Gabriel's character and some aspects of his history are relayed to us in abbreviated form, and the vehicle for this is an incident taken from animal life on a farm. But just as sheep bring about Gabriel's ruin so they also lead to a happier future where his earlier wealth will be increased many times over. As Bathsheba's shepherd he shows himself to have a primal sympathy with the
animals he tends, and it is this ability, central to his stalwart honest character, that makes him invaluable to the life of the farm and indirectly to Bathsheba. This is exemplified particularly well when some sheep eat clover and as a result bloat out. The only way to save them is to pierce their stomachs in exactly the right spot. It is a skilled art and only Gabriel is capable of doing it: "Passing his hand over the sheep's left flank, and selecting the proper point, he punctured the skin and rumen with the lance ... then he suddenly withdrew the lance, retaining the tube in its place. A current of air rushed up the tube, forcible enough to have extinguished a candle held at the orifice" (p.162-63). As well as saving the sheep and thus the economic security of the farm Gabriel also brings about a reunification of himself and Bathsheba, and their attenuated relationship continues. He proves himself the rightful mate and this is judged through his way with farm animals.

Rightful mate though he may be, throughout most of the novel Bathsheba is romantically interested in Sergeant Troy and to a lesser extent Farmer Boldover. Gabriel oversees her fate and waits hopelessly on the sidelines of her life. At one point however, when he is shearing sheep, Bathsheba deigns to congratulate him on his proficiency and to acknowledge tacitly his rightful role. But soon Boldover appears and she leaves Gabriel to small-talk with her guest. The following incident then occurs.

Oak's eyes could not forsake them; and in endeavouring to continue his shearing at the same time he watched Boldover's manner, he snipped the sheep in the groin. The animal plunged; Bathsheba instantly gazed towards it, and saw the blood.

'Oh Gabriel!' she exclaimed, with severe remonstrance, 'you who are so strict with the other men—see what you are doing yourself.'

To an outsider there was not much to complain of in this remark;
but to Oak, who knew Bathsheba to be well aware that she herself was the cause of the poor ewe's wound, because she had wounded the shearer in a still more vital part, it had a sting...

(p.171)

This kind of blood-letting and the communion of almost improper relationship that is implied within it constitutes in shortened form the psychological ties and divisions between Gabriel and Bathsheba. Bathsheba's consciousness of Gabriel's feelings for her is conveyed with a fine psychological touch, and Gabriel's mishandling of his function as a sheep-shearer represents for them an overt signal that they are still aware of each other as potential lovers. It is this kind of symbolic action that in Lawrence was to be extended and magnified.21

The strength of the inert feeling that Gabriel has for Bathsheba is evoked particularly well at one of their very first meetings. Throughout there is the constant underplay of sexual feeling between Bathsheba and all the men she attracts, and in calling his heroine Bathsheba Hardy is deliberately bringing to mind the biblical character whose alluring sexuality led King David to sin. Gabriel resists making a fool of himself, unlike Boldover, and discreetly hides the great love he has for Bathsheba. Nevertheless, Hardy makes it quite plain that it is her sexual nature that so powerfully allures. Consider this episode from chapter III.

The girl, who wore no riding habit, looked around for a moment, as if to assure herself that all humanity was out of view, then dexterously dropped backwards flat upon the pony's back, her head over its tail, her feet against its shoulders, and her eyes to the sky. The rapidity of her glide into this position was that of a kingfisher--its noiselessness that of a hawk. Gabriel's eyes had scarcely been able to follow her. The tall lank pony seemed used to such things, and ambled along unconcerned. Thus she passed under the level boughs.

The performer seemed quite at home anywhere between a horse's head and its tail, and the necessity for this abnormal attitude
having ceased with the passage of the plantation, she began to adopt another, even more obviously convenient than the first. She had no side-saddle, and it was very apparent that a firm seat upon the smooth leather beneath her was unattainable sideways. Springing to her accustomed perpendicular like a bowed sapling, and satisfying herself that nobody was in sight, she seated herself in the manner demanded by the saddle, though hardly expected of the woman, and trotted off in the direction of Tewnell Mill.

Clearly, the world of 'Smiler' and his human consorts has given way to an intensity of another sort. Of course, the horse here is not the main focus of attention but it is against its animal power and athleticism—in many cultures the horse is a symbol for male sexuality—that we fully perceive Bathsheba's charms. There is ample suggestion that Gabriel's (and the reader's) erotic interest is aroused by what is seen, and the effect of the vocabulary and the similes firmly establishes Bathsheba's character as at once seductive and predatory. On the strength of this encounter, Gabriel is 'hooked' and it is unnecessarily bashful to deny that the force at work here is sexual and that Bathsheba's alluringness is symbolically amplified by her bodily configuration with the horse.

One last episode from Far From the Madding Crowd must be adduced since it introduces the theme of animal and human suffering. Fanny Robin, Sergeant Troy's jilted lover, becomes destitute because of his abandonment of her and is finally driven to her death at the Casterbridge Union. While on the road to Casterbridge, Troy spots Fanny and seeing himself as responsible arranges to meet her later. He does not pick her up, exhausted though she is, because Bathsheba is with him and he dare not at this time acknowledge his guilt. But while a man abandons Fanny and her tiny baby,
a stray dog does not. This incident, touching without being sentimental, underscores the cruelty that beings may be subject to when people's selfish attitudes triumph.

She [Fanny] became conscious of something touching her hand; it was softness and it was warmth. She opened her eyes, and the substance touched her face. A dog was licking her cheek. He was a huge, heavy, and quiet creature, standing darkly against the low horizon, and at least two feet higher than the present situation of her eyes. Whether Newfoundland, mastiff, bloodhound, or what not, it was impossible to say. He seemed to be too strange and mysterious a nature to belong to any variety among those of popular nomenclature. Being thus assignable to no breed, he was the ideal embodiment of canine greatness—a generalization from what was common to all...The animal, who was as homeless as she, respectfully withdrew a step or two when the woman moved, and, seeing that she did not repulse him, he licked her hand again.

(pp.313-14)

This dog is clearly an embodiment and harbinger of natural mercy and is meant to contrast with Troy. The human world has abandoned poor Fanny and it is left to an animal, highly mythologized in its representation, to aid her. He understands intuitively her desires and a bond between woman and animal is established, causing the narrator to comment that "the woman listened for human sounds only to avoid them" (p.315). She leans heavily on the animal and somehow manages to reach the Casterbridge Union. Once inside she asks after the dog and a man responds "I stoned him away."

The animal's fate now becomes directly associated with that of Fanny as both are cruelly spurned. Shortly afterwards Fanny dies. There is no suggestion that her death was brought on by the news of the dog's stoning but there is a clear suggestion that the incidents are thematically related. 22

The theme of human and animal suffering is resumed in The Mayor of
Casterbridge (1886) but here the significance of the tragic occurrence takes on a heightened Sophoclean tone. Towards the end of the whole unhappy saga, Michael Henchard resolves to pay a visit to his stepdaughter and to make her a present of a caged goldfinch. Prior to this, Henchard had alienated Elizabeth-Jane by deceiving her as to the whereabouts of her real father, Newson. In a mood of deeply-felt regret and sorrow, tinged still with some amount of selfishness, Henchard's aim is to make amends and to congratulate the newly-married couple. He rests the birdcage "under a bush outside" and meets his stepdaughter only to be rebuked by her for his heartless callousness. The bird is forgotten and with its death is lost the possibility of a reunification and reconciliation.

The pathetic significance of this episode should not be underestimated. Placed at the most crucially moving time in Henchard's downfall and subsequent humiliation, it emphasizes the mindless cruelties that natural beings may suffer in an unlucky world. Some while later Elizabeth-Jane comes across "the dead body of a goldfinch" and we are told that "the sadness of the incident had made an impression on her." One commentator has similarly called the slow starvation of the goldfinch "that saddest incident in fiction." The bird's pathetic death is contrasted in its smallness with the decline of the large-spirited Henchard, and the episode is felt as strongly as it is because it provides a crystallized image of life's pathetic outcome.

Tess of the d'Urbervilles perhaps represents the most striking symbolic use of animals that we find in Hardy. In her brilliant essay on this novel Dorothy Van Ghent has described it as "through and through symbolic",24
finding within this symbolism paradoxical evidence of unmistakable "naturalistic premises." It is in this novel too that the character of Tess is drawn together through a complex series of images denoting her as "a trapped animal." Philip Mahone Griffiths' essay on this topic provides us with a very clear outline of how Hardy scrupulously makes an identification between Tess and all other wild animals in fear of entrapment. Through this analogy Hardy sharply exposes the contradiction between Natural Law as it operates within Tess and social law as it operates on her and in spite of her.

From the very beginning of the novel Tess is imaginistically associated with animals. Griffiths has charted the course that this design takes in great detail but only a few examples are appropriate here. With the advent of her unhappy liaison with Alec d'Urberville Tess becomes a victim pursued by a predator and when she looks at him "her large eyes stare like those of a wild animal." Her function as an employee of Alec's mother takes the form of minding the chickens and whistling to some caged bullfinches. In teaching Tess how to whistle, Alec suggests her unconscious identification with the caged birds and immediately prior to the actual seduction Tess lays down in a "couch or nest ... a little rest for the jaded animal being necessary" (p.92). Tess as hunted animal is implied in other ways too. Time and time again Hardy stresses the special sense of oneness that Tess enjoys with the natural environment. Take for example this passage where Tess's instinct to "shun mankind" is extended into self-deprecation:

Walking among the sleeping birds in the hedges, watching the skipping rabbits on a moonlit warren, or standing under a pheasant-laden bough, she looked upon herself as a figure of
Guilt intruding into the haunts of Innocence. But all the while she was making a distinction where there was no difference. Feeling herself in antagonism she was quite in accord. She had been made to break an accepted social law, but no law known to the environment in which she fancied herself such an anomaly. (p.110)

Passages such as this lead us to envision Nature in its pristine condition as a force for innocence and we are to see Tess as sharing it. To herself, of course, she is guilty and feels the weight and burden of the social laws that with her better mind she knows to be unfair and hypocritical. Her mating with Alec and her subsequent pregnancy is for her innocent and this more than anything else links her to the other animals who stand outside society's injunctions. The trap for the innocent animal, Tess, is the contradiction between her natural innocence and her social guilt. Her apparent inability to reconcile these opposites and live becomes the tragic burden of the novel.

Social law is seen here as the foe to innocent animals, and one of the forms this takes is the rationalized mechanisms of technology's incursion into the rural countryside. Tess's future is presaged particularly clearly by this evocation of man's advance:

The narrow lane of stubble encompassing the field grew wider with each circuit, and the standing corn was reduced to smaller area as the morning wore on. Rabbits, hares, snakes, rats, mice, retreated inwards as into a fastness, unaware of the ephemeral nature of their refuge, and of the doom that awaited them later in the day when, their covert shrinking to a more and more horrible narrowness, they were huddled together, friends and foes, till the last few yards of upright wheat fell also under the teeth of the unerring reaper, and they were every one put to death by the sticks and stones of the harvesters. (pp.112-13)

Later events render this passage especially poignant since it foreshadows Tess's death after her struggle to escape the trap.
One further example will suffice to reveal Hardy's structured and intentional identification between Tess and the animals. In attempting to escape from one of Alec's boorish friends who wants to rape her, Tess retreats to the forest and there makes "a sort of nest" and falls asleep. During the night she hears flutterings but it is not till the morning that she finds out that other injured creatures have retreated to her secluded spot.

The plantation wherein she had taken shelter ran down at this spot into a peak, which ended it hitherward, outside the hedge being arable ground. Under the trees several pheasants lay about, their rich plumage dabbled with blood; some were dead, some feebly twitching a wing, some staring up at the sky, some pulsating quickly, some contorted, some stretched out—all of them writhing in agony, except the fortunate ones whose tortures had ended during the night by the inability of nature to bear more.

(T.356)

Tess guesses that these pheasants have been shot by a shooting party but have escaped and "hidden themselves away." She remains blind to the portentous analogy that Hardy is offering, finding in this misery only an example of her own relative happiness. This generosity also leads her to "put the still living birds out of their torture by breaking their necks", and she sees in her own gloom "nothing more tangible than a sense of condemnation under an arbitrary law of society which had no foundation in Nature" (p.357). The irony of this last remark is not fully measured until finally her own neck is broken by the hangman's noose and the unnatural "arbitrary law" shows itself to be a potent enough force. Tess is indeed one of these pheasants that has been mortally wounded and the identification is nothing if not literal. Both birds and Tess are harmed, it should be
remembered, by the same class of man and it is man rather than cruel Nature who is at fault. Through this Hardy is deliberately making a correspondence between the poor and animals, pointing a finger at those irresponsible people who cause unnecessary suffering.

There are several other incidents in *Tess* all of which serve to reinforce our observation that Hardy employs animals as symbolic analogues to human situations. Take for example the death of Prince, the Durbyfield's horse. This animal is the sole source of the family's economic well-being, and when it dies they find themselves in straightened circumstances. Tess is driving the animal at the time but is engrossed by her revery of the good-life that may come her way through her recently discovered aristocratic heritage. Distracted from her pressing realities, she allows Prince to cross over to the other side of the road.

In consternation Tess jumped down, and discovered the dreadful truth. The groan had proceeded from her father's poor horse Prince. The morning mail-cart, with its two noiseless wheels, speeding along those lanes like an arrow, as it always did, had driven into her slow and unlighted equipage. The pointed shaft of the cart had entered the breast of the unhappy Prince like a sword, and from the wound his life's blood was spouting in a stream, and falling with a hiss into the road.

In her despair Tess sprang forward and put her hand upon the hole, with the only result that she became splashed from face to skirt with the crimson drops. Then she stood helplessly looking on. Prince also stood firm and motionless as long as he could; till he suddenly sank down in a heap.

(p.36)

The animal here is an image of wronged innocence and Tess regards herself "in the light of a murderess." Because of her romantic daydreaming her horse suffers and the fault is to be found with Tess's aspirations to become something more than she already is and marry a gentleman. There are two men who stand as possible suitors, Alec and Angel, and as the novel
demonstrates so clearly both are in spirit antithetical to the kind of natural freedom that Tess embodies. To dream of marrying gentlemen who by their natures are divorced from the Nature that Tess is at one with is tantamount to a self-denial, and the outcome of this is the suffering and death of an innocent animal. Tess’s flaw is revealed and it is exploited by Alec who is quick to see that Tess’s concern for her family’s well-being, together with her profound sense of guilt, makes her vulnerable to his desires. Thus, Prince’s death leads to Alec’s opportunity and just as one sin leads to another so the only atonement for Tess’s guilt is the murder of the character whose seduction of her was inextricably linked to the death of the horse.

Whereas it is the horse that figures as Alec’s accompanying animal image, Angel Clare is best typified by the whole cluster of images that are concerned with the dairy herd at the Talbothay farm. The situation at farmer Crick’s is rendered with a fine appreciation for the life that may be enjoyed on a farm when harmony exists between the humans who manage the cows and the cows that are managed. The milking scenes themselves are especially delightful and it is within an aura of natural bounty that the relationship between Tess and Angel develops. As together they learn how to milk cows and begin to understand that the process is more than merely mechanical, bonds of affection spring up. But Angel is not a Gabriel Oak character; to some extent he is playing at being a farmer and even though he apparently opposes his father’s moral and religious postures, we later see that his response to Tess’s confession is founded wholly on a socially acceptable and conventional hypocrisy. We are explicitly told by Hardy
that Angel was rather "more spiritual than animal" (p.249) and his inability to forgive Tess is indicative of his conventional social attitudes.

A sense of the on-coming tragedy is suggested when Angel, overcome by Tess's beauty as she milks a cow, embraces her. Previously, we have been led to understand that a cow's intuitive sense of human harmony determines the amount of milk that she will give. Thus, when Tess's milking of Old Pretty is so rudely disturbed, the cow's obvious distress takes on a portentous significance. Puzzled, she looks around and "seeing two people crouching under her where, by immemorial custom, there should have been only one, lifted her hind leg crossly" (p.195). This is hardly an episode worth labouring, but it is a detail which strikes the reader as indicative of the problems that marriage will bring to the couple. This implicit signal is complemented much later when on the afternoon of the wedding the ominous appearance of an afternoon crowing cock presages imminent disaster. An afternoon crow portends unhappiness and very soon we learn that Retty has attempted suicide, Marian has taken to drink, and Angel abandons Tess. Such animal and bird foreshadowings make their contribution to the development of the plot.

The symbolic quality of the animal occurrences and portents of Tess should by now be established. When animals appear they do so not only as naturalistic backdrops but also as significant symbolic agents that make more manifest the terms and problems facing humanity. Also, the intimate relationship that is suggested between man and animal helps to establish as fully as possible the realities of being alive in a world where Nature and society are frequently at odds. For Hardy, the true paradigm is Nature
in its animal state since its dictates have the sanction of primal reality. Within this paradigm, Tess, together with the other animals who suffer at the hands of man's carelessness or maliciousness, acts as the "parson" or nature goddess and then later as the sacrificial victim. Hardy's case against inhuman behaviour and social conventions is rendered all the more forcefully by the juxtapositioning of the human with the animal and by the suggestion of the closeness of all animal life.

By common assent *Jude the Obscure* (1895) represents a continuation of the movement in Hardy's fiction from rural realism to the sterner environment of town life. Lavish evocations of natural landscapes are now left behind as Hardy presents a more austere vision of man's lot. This is not absolute of course since the early chapters do convey something of the Wessex rural landscape. But by and large the reader senses a world where most of the characters drift towards urban life and where solace from a feeling of kinship with the larger natural world is eradicated. By striving to reach Christminster Jude must leave his familiar surroundings and immerse himself in the world of social aspirations. In this novel especially, we feel that Hardy deliberately attempts to eschew the traditional pattern of the novel where realism is supreme and instead invests his characters with deliberately conceived philosophical attitudes that tend to make them more embodiments of values and aspirations. As Norman Holland points out, in none of the earlier novels "is there such a strong tendency for the people and events to become symbols." Thus, the characterisation tends to be more contrived and to operate at a more symbolic and ideational level.
This is particularly evident in the character of Jude himself. Torn between his lowly rural origins and his urban intellectual aspirations, his inner division becomes an archetype for the fundamental dialectics between rural and urban, body and mind, Arabella and Sue, animal and intellectual. It is in the presentation and working out of this dialectic that animals are used with special appropriateness. Many of the characters' personalities are clarified by their attitude towards animals and this in turn reveals which side of the dialectic a character most naturally leans towards. The problems and tragedies of their lives occur when like Jude's their preferences are mixed or when they attempt to mate with a partner whose leanings are antithetical to their own. Thus, although Jude is sexually drawn to Arabella Donn, her complacency in terms of social aspirations does not satisfy him. By the same token, his intellectual self is drawn to Sue Bridehead but her apparent sexual frigidity makes their relationship incomplete. In fact, wherever we look in Jude we find the same pattern of mismatched lovers whereby the two principal sides of the fundamental opposition of Nature and society are unreconciled.

Pigs play a central role in expressing and clarifying the basic contradiction that lies at the heart of Jude's character. His marriage to Arabella and their subsequent parting is continually symbolized through their involvement with pigs, or indeed, parts of pigs. The first of these incidents occurs when Jude is walking along a path indulging out loud his dream-fantasy of elevating his social standing by earning a place at Christminster. (The dreaming state clearly reminds us of the same condition that was seen in Tess immediately prior to the death of Prince, and we must
anticipate a rude awakening.) His reverie is interrupted when suddenly "something smacked him sharply in the ear, and he became aware that a soft cold substance had been flung at him, and had fallen at his feet." He quickly discovers that it is a pig's pizzle, or penis, that had hit him and the narrator drily comments that "pigs were rather plentiful hereabouts." Arabella and her companions are discovered as the culprits and their motive is to distract him from what they consider his "Hoity-toity" fantasy aspiration. Hardy describes Arabella as a "complete and substantial female animal" and Jude is immediately attracted to her through the mysterious process of intuitive sexual selection.

She saw that he had singled her out from the other three, as a woman is singled out in such cases, for no reasoned purpose of further acquaintance, but in commonplace obedience to conjunctive orders from headquarters...

(p.43)

A reader should be in no doubt as to the meaning of this episode. In throwing a pig's pizzle at Jude, Arabella is issuing the oldest kind of sexual challenge and the symbolism of that part of the pig is used to suggest the nature of the attraction that is being suggested. Implicitly, animal forces (Arabella) are being thrown at Jude in order to undermine his higher intellectual hopes. The dialectic is thus established and we watch how the innocent young Jude lacks the maturity or the common sense to see beyond the strong animalistic sexual urge that comes over him. It must be accepted that at one level of primal sexual sympathy Jude and Arabella are a natural match, and if Jude had not gleaned a sense of things superior from his association with Phillotson, doubtless their marriage would have been more satisfactory. The throwing of the pizzle concretizes and
foreshadows the fateful hold that Arabella (and thus a part of his own sensual nature) will exert on him throughout the rest of the novel. Hardy said of this incident that it was meant "to show the contrast between the ideal life a man wished to lead, and the squalid real life he was fated to lead. The throwing of the pig's pizzle, at the supreme moment of his young dream, is to sharply initiate this contrast." This comment clearly corroborates the idea that a dialectical struggle is in progress and that the two parts of this struggle are typified by the divergent nodes of sexuality and, for want of a better word, spirituality. This idea coheres within the highly symbolic device of the pig, the unclean animal of the Jews (Jude is the German word for jew); but in Hardy's narrative it is not the pig itself which is unclean but the uses to which some people put it. In mutilating pigs, Arabella and her implicit sexual nature become barbarous.

The courtship between Jude and Arabella is significantly extended by another incident concerning pigs. Jude comes across Arabella as she attempts to round up three stray pigs and he helps her catch them. The pigs are not caught but escape only to be returned later by a neighbouring farmer. This series of actions symbolizes the concurrent development of the lover's relationship. The pig catching, or more properly the chase, becomes associated with Arabella's covert attempt to get Jude to make love to her. She fails in this attempt and her private symbolic pigs make their temporary get-away.

The figurative pig is finally caught when Arabella tricks Jude into marrying her. But in economic terms their marriage is immediately seen to be insufficient and therefore Arabella decides to keep a pig and fatten it
for slaughter. The pig, and its subsequent death, now constitutes the symbolic counterpart to the marriage. Immediately before the slaughtering scene itself Arabella's deception is exposed when she confesses that she is not in fact pregnant, though Jude does not find this out till a little later. At any rate it becomes increasingly obvious that the marriage should never have taken place and that Jude's more powerful desire to better himself intellectually is forcing itself into his consciousness. Before it can flower the pig is butchered, bled, and sold. It is this incident, very powerfully rendered, which acts as a culmination of the earlier pig symbolism and which exposes Jude's intense sensitivity to animal suffering. A professional "sticker" is supposed to kill and bleed the pig but when he does not come Arabella resolves that they must do it themselves. Jude does not like the idea at all and as he heats the water that will "scald an animal that as yet lived, and whose voice could be continually heard from a corner of the garden" (p.73), he is uneasy. He is equally disturbed to hear that the pig has not been fed for days so that its "innerds" would be clean; the appearance of a small robin suggests Jude's general feeling of disgust: "A robin peered down at the preparations from the nearest tree, and, not liking the sinister look of the scene, flew away, though hungry" (p.74).

The pig's cry turns from "rage" to "despair" and in the face of Arabella's callous injunction that it should be "eight or ten minutes dying" Jude exhorts her to "have a little pity on the creature." The description of the pig's death, wholly realistic, is suitably gruesome as we witness the animal shriek in agony, "his glazing eyes rivetting them-
selves on Arabella with the eloquently keen reproach of a creature recognizing at last the treachery of those who had seemed his only friends" (p.76). To Jude, the pig is a "fellow-mortal" and to kill it requires a complicity with Arabella's rationalizing epithet that "poor folks must live." In compromising his intuitive abhorrence he loses his higher ethical sense, and this loss parallels his earlier submission to Arabella's sexual advances. Accordingly, propelled by subtle insinuations that it is unmanly to feel "squeamish" Jude kills an animal. From the practical point of view, Arabella's perspective may well be correct, since it is her attitudes that finally allow her to live while Jude's lead to his tragic death. Arabella embodies the great "Will-to-Live" and her preoccupying motive is self-preservation in the most crass sense of the Social Darwinist formula "eat or be eaten." Her attitude is not even really animal but is rather the atavistic gloss which man has often ascribed to animal nature in the wild; in fact, animals generally have a very highly developed social sense of mutual responsibility and their predatory instincts are carefully controlled by the powerful exigencies of immediate 'need'.

The controlled sequence of events which has as its centre the human management of pigs acts as a symbolic analogue to the human situation. There can be little doubt that Hardy deliberately conceived his novel and its development in this way and through this we perceive his perhaps unconscious adoption of a Bestiarist's mantle. In using chosen examples drawn from Natural History, he finds entirely appropriate metaphors for his views on the human moral condition. This is expressed most completely in Jude who seems to feel a primal sympathy for all animals and yet who suffers
a tragic fate. He is indeed the humane man who combines a strong but not overbearing sexual nature with a sense of the value of more transcendent forces. But just as he rises above Arabella and cannot escape her, so his emulation of Phillotson falls short of actual attainment though the lure continues. Interestingly, of the four main characters Arabella and Phillotson win through even though they are antithetical; their similarity lies, however, in their adaptation to conventional stances. Jude exists in suspension between these two opposed conventions, as to some extent does Sue, and he is crucified by it. This position of uneasy equivocation is caught very early on in the novel when he is set by Farmer Troutham to keep the birds off the newly-sown fields. He has been taught by Phillotson "to be kind" to the small birds and he humanely insists that the birds "shall have some dinner" (p.11). Jude's moral sense, however, meets its Nemesis when the farmer returns and beats him. It would seem that there is something profoundly antithetical between human and humane imperatives, the instinct for self-preservation at all costs and the ethical notion that all beings have an equal right to life.

Sue Bridehead also falls into this no-man's land and whereas she survives to the end of the novel it is at the expense of her life's spirit. When she and Jude move house and sell off all their possessions "the most trying suspense of the whole afternoon" is her concern that her two pet pigeons will be bought by a butcher to make someone "a nice pie." They are sold but when Sue walks by and sees the pigeons in the basket the idea that Nature's law is "mutual butchery" is too much for her and she sets them free. Her humane sense of mercy finds an expression through two birds,
whereas the more sensual Jude found his (even though it is too late) through a pig. The difference between the pig and the pigeons indicates the sensual and spiritual flaws that Jude and Sue respectively are prone to. Nonetheless, there is a fundamental unity of humane sentiment and this is reinforced when both respond to the screams of a trapped rabbit at night in the woods. Jude puts the suffering animal out of its misery, and we hear through him sentiments about the barbaric cruelty of trapping that Hardy obviously endorses. But in this image of the trapped rabbit there is a fateful irony. As we have already seen, ethics are not always sufficient for human happiness, and the delightful freedom of a rabbit's nature is not always proof against human and inhuman actions. Similarly, Jude and Sue's feeling of sympathy for animals is not in itself sufficient. Indeed, it is expressly antithetical to the harmonious life within a social community where the ethics of self-preservation predominate.

Within all the animal episodes from *Jude the Obscure* we see how the conflict between ethical behaviour and social law is often deadly and that this opposition is analogous to that between Nature and society. This constitutes an important philosophical problem for Hardy: how can Nature be both ethical and indifferent? With one part of himself man has developed an ethical sense (some men at least), but this seems to be inconsistent with the idea that self-preservation and the survival of the fittest is the law of Nature. After his beating at the hands of Farmer Troutham, Jude perceives "the flaw in the terrestrial scheme, by which what was good for God's birds was bad for God's gardener" (p.13). The problem is brought about largely by man himself whose often savage urge to
survive and moreover to thrive leads to the suppression of any feeling or principle which would stand in his way. John Stuart Mill described the logical outcome of the view that Nature is indifferent but that some men were not, in the following way:

Whatever in nature gives indication of beneficent design proves this beneficence to be armed with only limited power; and the duty of man is to co-operate with the beneficent power, not by imitating but by perpetually striving to amend the course of nature...

This perception, or something like it, allows man to see that the most humane course he can follow is to develop an ethical sense and to oppose that spirit of Nature which tends towards indifference or mere atavistic survival. For Hardy this implied the kind treatment of all animal as well as human life. Jude and Sue embody this idea but we witness in their histories just how difficult it is to succeed in life with this attitude when the society in which you live takes the opposite position as one of its central ideas. Thus, these two characters become the victims of a particular situation where the ethic of survival predominates and humane sentiment is thought of as profoundly opposed to the continuation of progress and life. Clearly, Hardy deeply hoped that the future would hold in store a more developed sense of moral behaviour towards all life, and what optimism there is in Jude the Obscure derives from the sentiment that perhaps Jude's sacrifice will not have been in vain. For despite Jude's tragic end, his kindness and ethical responsibility towards humans and animals heroically shine out, and his character is vindicated by the reader's preconception that such attitudes are the only ones that lend dignity and worth to man.
Evidence is not lacking to show that Lawrence both read, admired, and imitated the fiction of Thomas Hardy. The most notable example of this literary connection is to be found in Lawrence's *Study of Thomas Hardy*, which, although it spends comparatively little time talking directly about Hardy's fiction, never seems to veer away from the concerns that Lawrence saw as implicit within the older writer's world-view. Thus, when Lawrence launches into a diatribe on the relationship between Love and Law, or work, he cannot help but find reinforcement in the fictional lives of a Sue Bridehead or Tess. And in connection with all of this, he cannot avoid the integrative meaning of the flowering poppy whose ability to become most fully itself is the paradigm of nature that man must strive towards: "The wild creatures are like fountains whose sources gather their waters until spring-time, when they leap their highest. But man is a fountain that is always playing, leaping, ebbing, sinking, and springing up."

Unfortunately for some, however, the waters do not continuously erupt into splendour but rather remain thwarted in their true course. In this category Lawrence puts characters like Sue Bridehead, Angel Clare, and Jude, all of whom, to greater and lesser extents, represent the inability to live most fully. Most often they are prevented (in Lawrence's terms) by the crippling effect of the smaller human morality that strives foolishly to contravene the larger impersonal morality of nature:

This is the wonder of Hardy's novels, and gives them their beauty. The vast, unexplored morality of life itself, what we call the immorality of nature surrounds us in its eternal incomprehensibility, and in its midst goes on the little human morality play, with its queer frame of morality and its mechanized
movement; seriously, portentously, till some one of the protagonists chances to look out of the charmed circle, weary of the stage, to look into the wilderness raging, round ... And this is the quality Hardy shares with the great writers ... this setting behind the small action of his protagonists the terrific action of unfathomed nature; setting a smaller system of morality, the one grasped and formulated by the human consciousness within the vast, uncomprehended and incomprehensible morality of nature or of life itself, surpassing human consciousness.

(p.419)

The larger world of "incomprehensible" nature especially appealed to Lawrence, and he saw its representation in Hardy's fiction. He also saw the disharmony in that fiction between the morality of nature and social law. His effort throughout a lifetime was to attempt a reunification between these opposites so that man could partake of the greater cycle of life which is beyond his conscious control yet which incorporates him into its morality. Then perhaps, man would be like the poppy and like the wild animals and birds, who are all instinctually integrated into a round of life. Like Hardy, Lawrence tended to question the advantages which man's progress into intellectual rationalism had given him, and recognised in animal life a proper measure of fulfilling life.

Doubtless, Lawrence arrived at this view partly from the influence of Hardy whom he read when very young. Here, as well as in George Eliot, he would have gleaned his sense of the vast "circumambient universe" of which man was a part but from which he could so easily stray. Lawrence's insistence on such things as the superior knowledge inherent in "blood-consciousness" rather than through ratiocination, surely is nothing more mysterious than the pantheistic-like assertion that like the other animals
man can respond intuitively to the environment which he is in and which is in him. A forgotten aspect of our capabilities lies in being able to live life whole and from the source and not to suppose that our only apprehension of reality is through the peculiarly human capacity for rational thought. Similarly, the fuller experience of the whole body is preferred to the distended operations of the abstract spirit; for Lawrence an overinsistence on the latter leads to a Sue Bridehead whose sexual nature is repressed beneath a perversely overbalanced pseudo-spiritual impulse. It is a pseudo impulse because for Lawrence, body and spirit should not be antithetical but complementary. When they are not—and this is a large claim but one I believe to be central to Lawrence's thinking—civilization is uprooted from nature and we must expect the barbarisms of the Great War.

Within the framework of this argument we can begin to discern that for Lawrence man is in the odious position of being a human animal divorced from animal instincts. The proper and prime pattern is nature itself, and analogues may be found in a poppy and in a horse or a dog. Each example from a nature ungoverned wholly by 'thought' is a living testament to its own capacity to achieve full growth and the splendour of the flowering moment, and it is against this yardstick that man's moral development (in the larger sense) must be gauged. Of course, there are degrees of development and the potential of a cow is less than that of a man and the struggle towards it infinitely less hazardous. But as an analogous form and model, the cow may prove to be an instructive force. As with Hardy, the ethical sense is built upon the aesthetic lesson that may be learned from a keen appreciation of natural life. Also similar in this to Hardy, Lawrence no longer saw that it was proper or logical (since Darwin) to assume that
differences in kind separated man from the other animals or that their presence in fiction was optional. It should be said, however, that Lawrence was not so radically zoophilic as we have seen Hardy to be. But such a vast profusion of animals and birds appear in his fiction that the effect is to more concretely enforce a reader's necessary sympathy for their lives as living counterparts with rights of their own.

The stance indicated above reveals Lawrence as a Bestiarist, and as we shall see, a very good one. In taking examples from Natural History and juxtaposing them with human beings, intrinsic worth or the lack of it may be expressed. In its simplicity and directness it is almost Medieval. The Bestiarists proper thought of themselves as Natural Historians and saw their work in the light of contemporary scientific knowledge. Lawrence's premise is similarly naturalistic and his text has no established foundation unless a particular animal is evoked as it really looks and behaves. For the Bestiarist however, the text is not complete without the commentary. To describe how an animal behaves, though of some intrinsic interest, is not in itself of any significance. The text is completed when a specifically human meaning is found within the description and thus a practical demonstration of how man must live is explicitly enforced. For the Medievalist the demonstration was most often in the form of a moral encomium. For Lawrence, the moral insistence is not so much on how to behave in the smaller moral sense but rather how to be in relation to yourself, your mate, and indeed your universe. The typical actions of animals and birds can help to bring this understanding about either by informative analogy or by direct symbolism. We saw in Hardy how these techniques would be used to
When we come to discuss *The White Peacock* we will see examples that directly remind us of Hardy. But we shall also see how Lawrence extended and improved the methods of animal usage to create wholly naturalistic animals operating in wholly symbolic ways.

Instead of beginning the discussion with Lawrence's first novel, let us look at one of his last, "The Man Who Died." By inverting chronology and writing of a work at the farthest remove from the influence of Hardy, we may ascertain how deeply embedded is Lawrence's habit of biaric thinking. We may begin with a lengthy quotation:

As he came out, the young cock crowed. It was a diminished, pinched cry, but there was that in the voice of the bird stronger than chagrin. It was the necessity to live, and even to cry out the triumph of life. The man who had died stood and watched the cock who had escaped and been caught, ruffling himself up, rising forward on his toes, throwing up his head, and parting his beak in another challenge from life to death. The brave sounds rang out, and though they were diminished by the cord round the bird's leg, they were not cut off. The man who had died looked nakedly on life, and saw a vast resoluteness everywhere flinging itself up in stormy or subtle wave-crests, foam-tips emerging out of the blue invisible, a black and orange cock or the green flame-tongues out of the extremes of the fig tree. They came forth, these things and creatures of spring, glowing with desire and with assertion. They came like crests of foam, out of the blue flood of the invisible desire, out of the vast invisible sea of strength, and they came coloured and tangible, evanescent, yet deathless in their coming. The man who had died looked on the great swing into existence of things that had not died, but he saw no longer their tremulous desire to exist and to be. He heard instead their ringing, ringing, defiant challenge to all other things existing.

In this great rhapsodic hymn to natural life, Christ, who is the protagonist, finds his strength and his deepest analogue in the bright cock whose shrill crowing wakens him from death. The response that the cock demands is one of
sympathetic commitment to the "foam-tips emerging out of the blue invisible." There is no easy paraphrase to phrases like this, but the whole is adequately suggested by every reader's knowledge of what the crowing of a cock sounds like and what its early-morning duty is, as well as by what its symbolic connotations are.

Let us analyze more closely the function and descriptive qualities that the cock enacts. Essentially, we are dealing with two things here. First, we are interested in the way that Lawrence describes and evokes the particularities of a bird, and second we need to discover what function this bird performs. To deal with the first of these, we should especially note the qualities of lively vigour that the bird evinces. In the passage already quoted the characteristic movements and physical gestures of a cock are captured in the almost dumb-show action of his "throwing up his head" and of the apparent voicelessness of "parting his beak." Elsewhere too the jerky energetic quality of a feeding bird engage the reader's attention and assure him that what is being described has actually been seen by the writer and that the rendering is realistic: "He watched the queer, beaky, motion of the creature as it gobbled into itself the scraps of food; its glancing of the eye of life, ever alert and watchful, over-weening and cautious, and the voice of its life crowing triumph and assertion..." (p.133). There are other instances too where the sense of realism is adequately conveyed. It should be said, of course, that pure description is not Lawrence's main purpose but is rather a necessary extension of his thematic interests, and that in many of his other works we find a far greater attention to mimetically created animal behaviour.
The cock here is not humanized even though the human response makes itself manifest in the description. In attempting to describe the bird accurately and to capture its uniqueness, Lawrence is evoking how the bird seems to feel from the human vantage point. There is no pretense, for example, that a human can know what or how a bird feels but neither is there the equally disingenuous notion that we can infer nothing from their typical behaviour. Lawrence despised anthropomorphism whereby an animal was seen as merely an extension of man, but at the same time he recognised there were aspects of animal behaviour that it is obtuse not to see as analogous to human behaviour. To invoke one of Graham Hough's phrases, Lawrence's naturalistic description of animals is "radically subjective". It is my argument, to be developed at some length with reference to examples of Lawrence's fiction, that his animals maintain what we may call their "ontological integrity" and that their effectiveness as symbols, useful and applicable to man, depends upon the concretely established sense of distinct 'otherness' as natural agents. Thus, their anthropomorphic value lies in their very quality of being themselves and inherently opposed to absorption into the human scale of things. Rather, from Lawrence's point of view, it is humans, in part at least, who must become zoophiled.

The cock is successfully evoked in its potent physical aliveness; what F. R. Leavis would call the "concrete thereness of felt life" is achieved in the narrative line. Contingent on this success is the validity of the figurative transition between the life-principle of the bird and the to-be achieved life-force of the resurrected Christ figure. As every reader knows "The Man Who Died" is an audacious (some say blasphemous) rewriting of the events following Christ's crucifixion. Instead
of ascending unto the father in the most usual and transcendent sense of
the expression, Christ is re-born in the flesh and finds "full consciousness
of being" in realizing the phallic necessity of his own sexual nature. The
latter part of the story deals with his relationship with the priestess
of Isis, and its excessively gnomic style is not convincing. But the first
part which concerns Christ's initial awakening and his correspondence with
the life of the cock, is totally successful. It is here with what Mark
Spilka calls "the close, vivid contact between the Christ-figure and the
spunky young gamecock", that Lawrence is at his most impressive.

There is a strong identification then between Christ and the cock.
It is the cock's crow more than its physical appearance that electrifies
Christ's senses and urges him into a sympathetic "defiant challenge to all
other things existing." One morning the cock escapes from the cord that
is partly stifling its physical and spiritual sense and it is at this point
of freedom that he crowed "a loud and splitting crow." To this call Christ
responds and finally turns his back on "the sickness of death in life."
From the beginning Christ sees in the life of the cock a natural flow
which bursts out in a potent way and he realizes that he must follow; the
New Testament injunction to "follow me" is inverted and the bird becomes the
ironic but appropriate master: "And always the man who had died saw not
the bird alone, but the short, sharp wave of life of which the bird was
the crest" (p.133). This notion of 'what is the cock?' is extended when
it mates with a hen:

Then when his favourite hen came strolling unconcernedly near
him, emitting the lure, he pounced on her with all his feathers
vibrating. And the man who had died watched the unsteady, rocking
vibration of the bent bird, and it was not the bird he saw, but one wave-tip of life overlapping for a minute another, in the tide of the swaying ocean of life. And the destiny of life seemed more fierce and compulsive to him even than the destiny of death. The doom of death was a shadow compared to the raging destiny of life, the determined surge of life.

(p.134)

Of special interest in this passage, an interest intensified by our understanding that when Lawrence wrote this he was dying, is the sense of the surging, passionate "wave-tip" of life which is seen to act according to its nature with no subjection to the individual consciousness of the birds. The rhythmic procreation, suggested by the surging repetitive quality of the prose, is an organic occurrence which involves and incorporates all individuals and yet is greater than any. Thus, the bird is at once supremely itself and yet only a part of the larger organism; it is a live symbol of a force within and beyond itself. In a letter, Lawrence wrote that symbolism "avoids the I and puts aside the egoist." He develops this point by arguing that man must take his "decent place" in the whole which can be created by symbolism. What was not needed was the symbolism which we see only as a "subjective expression". The procreation of the cock admirably fits this prescriptive notion of what an effective symbol might be, and Christ recognises the general application that the symbol points to. The bird had come into life to fulfill itself but had been partly prevented by the cord that was attached to its leg. Similarly, Christ was hampered by his own peculiar cord, his submission to a spiritualised death, egotistical to Lawrence's way of thinking, that saw the denial of the flesh as the right path to heavenly salvation. Christ is bound by analogy to the cock:
Yet the flame of life burned up to a sharp point in the cock, so that it eyed askance and haughtily the man who had died. And the man smiled and held the bird dear, and he said to it: 'Surely thou art risen to the Father, among birds.' And the young cock, answering, crowed.

(p.140)

The same ascension occurs when Christ meets the priestess of Isis.

The bird: 's significance is to be found in its role as a spiritual exemplum. When Christ meets several of his disciples on the road they ask him why he is carrying a cock. He answers: "I am a healer and the bird hath virtue ... I believe the bird is full of life and virtue" (p.145).

The exemplary quality of the bird is offered as a new kind of belief system, pagan at its roots, which sees wild animal and bird life as moral paradigm. The Medieval Bestiaryists believed that the moral wonders of the animal kingdom were put on the earth as direct helpmeets for man. Clearly, Lawrence did not subscribe to quite this belief but if we dismiss from our minds the Christian concept of God and put in its stead a pantheistic god of Nature we might begin to see the connection between Lawrence and the Medieval mind. Lawrence is not much interested in the smaller morality of doing good works etc.; he is more concerned with the larger cosmic morality in which right and wrong are subservient to life and non-life. Animals and birds can teach a jaded humanity what this life is.

When the cock finds its hens and defeats its rivals it has achieved itself, and at this point Christ leaves him behind to continue the search for the same thing. But it should be stressed that the cock's development is not at all identical with Christ's. Lawrence was not so naïve as to suppose that there was exact congruence between animal and human capabilities.
As he notes, "there are animal principles in man", but he still feels that man is a very different kind of animal. Man indeed can behave as the cock does, as is seen when the young slave rapes the female slave, but no creative "fullness of being" will spring from this. The cock's nature is its own and man's is very different from it. Both may indeed be striving for the same general sense of fulfillment but the degree of this attainment, and its essential features, will be radically different. To use one of Lawrence's epithets, an inversion of the famous Aristotelian phrase, "man is an animal who thinks", and he has a nature that must integrate and accommodate his purely intellectual capacities. It is not enough for man merely to reproduce himself and to defeat other contenders. Like Christ, he must find a woman with whom he is in accord and must then struggle to allow his full sensitivity to manifest itself within the relationship. There is no sure way to success and the pitfalls, suggested by the priestess's mother and the Roman soldiers, are many. But, it is insisted, the rewards are also great if man as a fountain is always "springing up."

The cock then is left behind by Christ, both literally and metaphorically, and the identification between man and bird is sharply discontinued. This is important to the narrative art of Lawrence's use of birds and animals. We may see this importance by over-viewing the narrative pattern of the cock's use. At the beginning of the story there is only the bird, resplendent in its aliveness; its crowing awakens the Christ figure and these two come together and are identified in aim. Once this natural identification has served its purpose and Christ has learned the required lesson, the unity of experience is severed and the bird emerges as what it
always was—a bird. As such, and no longer as a natural symbol, it is left to live out its life. Its function has been nothing more than to be itself but its significance has been embodied in the qualities that inhere in it and yet are outside of it. The surge of Lawrence's artistic need to convey full significance of meaning has coincided with the bird's interest in the life of Christ, and when this has occurred the texture of the prose becomes less poetically symbolic. This leaves the animal as an animal, seen for what it is rather than for what it means and unassimilated into the human identity. Thus, Lawrence maintains his naturalism and yet allows his bird to become symbolic, and the emphasis of either at a given point in the narrative is controlled and represented in the surge and regress of the prose.

I have been attempting to describe how animals and birds typically work in Lawrence. There are many variations on this general method but the principle Bestiary mode remains consistent. It reveals that Lawrence had a very close knowledge of Natural History and readily saw how appropriate it could be in outlining human situations. Indeed, if we look outside of his fiction we find ample evidence that Lawrence felt a keen interest in watching animal and bird life and in using his observations to delineate character or to suggest human weakness and strength. Of special interest are short biographical sketches such as "Adolph" and "Rex" both of which portray life in the Lawrence household. The former of these describes with charming intimacy what happens when the father brings home a tiny rabbit. The children learn the lesson that it is impossible to love a wild animal or to smother it with affection. The same theme occurs in the latter
story, although here it is shown that the modern domestic dog can indeed be loved but only at the expense of its proper nature: "We should not have loved Rex so much, and he should not have loved us. There should have been a measure. We tended, all of us, to overstep the limits of our own natures. He should have stayed outside human limits, we should have stayed outside canine limits. Nothing is more fatal than the disaster of too much love" (Phoenix, p.21).

The separateness of species is here strongly indicated, and it parallels other notions of separateness that we find in Lawrence. On numerous occasions he expostulated on the idea that people, especially married couples, should not regard themselves as two parts of one whole but as two wholes that come together to form a new entity larger than the two but incorporating both. With regard to animals, this idea is picked up very extensively in "Love Was Once à Little Boy." This essay focuses on the problem of 'love' and the question of the relationship between two identities crops up. Lawrence helps to clarify his argument through this definition: "...so that love as a desire, is balanced against the opposite desire, to maintain the integrity of the individual self" (Phoenix II, p.444). The stability of a relationship, the argument continues, depends on maintaining the ontological integrity of the individual. But how is this equilibrium to be achieved? Lawrence proceeds to arrive at an analogous evocation of this problem through a lengthy description of his cow Susan. The passage is extremely long, but should be quoted in full:

How can I equilibrate myself with my black cow Susan? I call her daily at six o'clock. And sometimes she comes. But sometimes, again, she doesn't, and I have to hunt her away among the timber.
Possibly she's lying peacefully in cowy inertia, like a black Hindu statue, among the oak-scrub. Then she rises with a sighing heave. My calling was a mere nothing against the black stillness of her cowy passivity. Or possibly she is away down in the bottom corner, lowing sotto voce and blindly to some far-off bull. Then when I call at her, and approach, she screws round her tail and flings her sharp, elastic haunch in the air with a kick and a flick, and plunges off like a buck-rabbit, or like a black demon among the pine trees, her udder swinging like a chime of bells. Or possibly the coyotes have been howling in the night along the top fence. And then I call in vain. It's a question of saddling a horse and sifting the bottom timber. And there at last the horse suddenly winces, starts: and with a certain pang of fear I too catch sight of something black and motionless and alive, and terribly silent, among the tree-trunks. It is Susan, her ears apart, standing like some spider suspended motionless by a thread, from the web of the eternal silence. The strange faculty she has, cow-given, of becoming a suspended ghost, hidden in the very crevices of the atmosphere. It is something in her will. It is her tarnhelm. And then, she doesn't know me. If I am afoot, she knows my voice, but not the advancing me, in a blue shirt and cord trousers. She waits, suspended by the thread, till I come close. Then she reaches forward her nose, to smell. She smells my hand: gives a little snort, exhaling her breath, with a kind of contempt, turns, and ambles up towards the homestead, perfectly assured. If I am on horseback, although she knows the grey horse perfectly well, at the same time she doesn't know what it is. She waits till the wicked Azul, who is a born cow-punching pony, advances mischievously at her. Then round she swings, as if on the blast of some sudden wind, and with her ears back, her head rather down, her black back curved, up she goes, through the timber, with surprising, swimming swiftness. And the Azul, snorting with jolly mischief, dashes after her, and when she is safely in her milking place, still she watches with her great black eyes as I dismount. And she has to smell my hand before the cowy peace of being milked enters her blood. Till then, there is something roaring in the chaos of her universe. When her cowy peace comes, then her universe is silent, and like the sea with an even tide, without sail or smoke: nothing.

That is Susan, my black cow.

And how am I going to equilibrate myself with her? Or even, if you prefer the word, to get in harmony with her?

Equilibrium? Harmony? with that black blossom! Try it!

(p.446)

Apart from anything else, this is an extremely effective and amusing evocation of a cow's typical behaviour. Of course, the observation is "radically subjective" but this should not be confused with anthropomorphism.
Exactly the opposite is the intention of this passage. As Graham Hough remarks, with another context in mind, "it is more an attempt to put common human subjectivity in its place by showing the myriad of queer, separate, non-human existences around it." This is the effect of Lawrence's description of the cow and his relationship to it. Susan is an objective fact, solid, capricious, and resistant to human consciousness, and in thus describing her Lawrence has conveyed her essence and her isolated distinctness; try as he might, he cannot equilibrate himself with Susan, and her separate isolateness remains unique. To Lawrence this is cause for celebration since it stands as proof against the anthropomorphic tendency: "Anthropomorphism, that allows nothing to call its soul its own, save anthropos: and only a special brand, even of him!" The sheer fact of Susan's physical being, together with her obtuse refusal to be consistent or reasonable in her dealings with Lawrence, militates against the 'melting-pot' notion which is assumed within anthropomorphism. The same tendency that tries to make animals sub-humans, strives to make of marriage a merging of identities.

Whereas Lawrence cannot 'equilibrate' himself with Susan, he can have a relationship with her: "There is a sort of relation between us. And this relation is part of the mystery of love: the individuality on each side, mine and Susan's, suspended in the relationship" (p.447). The word 'love' here is strong when we recall that Lawrence is talking about a cow, but of course what he means by 'love' has nothing to do with our romantic notions. Between himself and Susan there is 'love', a relationship which both share and yet which does not consume them. Later, he describes this
as a "third" level of experience, the "stream of desire". Lawrence's use of Susan is extremely literal and we cannot only assume for her a figurative role. What he is saying is that man and animal, himself and Susan, have a profound relationship which partakes of a large sense of the seamless quality of Nature and her various living forms. But at the same time, Susan is figurative in that she represents in concrete form a living demonstration of life's 'otherness'. The physical object is itself the reality of the subjective argument.

There is one further example of Lawrence's non-fiction prose that must be adduced here since it provides us with valuable ideas about what Lawrence thought of animals and how he saw them in relation to man. "Reflections on the Death of a Porcupine" faces the problem of the relationship between species. For an engaged Zoophile, much of what Lawrence has to say is disappointing. Lawrence, whose "dislike of killing him [a porcupine] was greater than the dislike of him" (Phoenix II, p.460), turns volta face and kills an animal. Motives for this action may be found in the porcupine's nuisance factor; it brings great pain to some local dogs who try to interfere with it, but more importantly, it is directly harmful to the life of the ranch. The animal is an annoyance to human beings and this serves as an adequate rationale for its death. The situation is really quite plain and represents a predicament that has been felt by countless sensitive men engaged in living off the land. Jessie Chambers wrote that Lawrence "would shiver in pain" when he heard "the cry of a rabbit tracked by a weasel," and this kind of sensitivity is in accord with what we feel about his character.
Out of this incident come Lawrence's dictums on the subject of predation: "In nature, one creature devours another, and this is an essential part of all existence and of all being. It is not something to lament over, nor something to try to reform" (p.467). From this Lawrence proceeds to argue that man is at the very end of the food chain and moreover, that man is the 'highest' form of life, "more vividly alive." Thus, there are degrees in nature and it is foolish to assert that all creatures are equal and worthy of the same rights: Nature simply isn't built that way. But over and above this syndrome of predation, Lawrence posits a realm of individual being in which "any creature" may attain "its own living self" and escape the dull round of self-preservation. This is true for all living creatures, not man alone, although as we saw in "The Man Who Died", it is man whose creative potential is greatest. An animal, including the human variety, is both an individual and part of a species and each existence is in a sense separate. Man's predatory instinct is very different from his impulse to see the beauty and virtue in a cow. This apparently contradictory reasoning is magnificently exemplified in Sons and Lovers where Lawrence evokes so subtly the variety of ways that flowers can be picked. There is a way of picking them that is egoistical and another that is more in harmony, and similarly there is the slaughter of cattle at the abattoir and there is the primitive's loving reverence for the animal that is being killed. The former is purely destructive but the latter partakes of the greater mystery of the inter-relatedness of all living things.

The value of these ideas lies not so much in what they tell us about the general theme of predation, "eat or be eaten", but what they signify
about Lawrence's pragmatic approach to animal life. One critic notes that Lawrence's apprehension of the world "is far closer to that of primitive religion, which had not thought to distinguish clearly between organic and inorganic, spirit and matter, but saw the whole universe and all parts of it as simply and obviously alive." We are not to infer from this that Lawrence was at all primitivistic in his thinking, but it is clear that his view of life, and particularly animal life, describes a harmony which in essence partakes of the larger moral system and which implies the well-being of most. In this view, preying on animal life is necessary for the preservation of species since this preservation is itself necessary for the higher ability to attain a personal "kingdom of heaven." In eating an animal, man is partaking of its life, drawing sustenance from it, and thus establishing a living relationship. But this in itself is but a baser form of meeting and mingling on the road to mutual creative vitality: "The best way is a pure relationship, which includes the being on each side, and which allows the transfer to take place in a living flow, enhancing the life in both beings" (Phoenix II, p.469). Lawrence's 'relationship' with Susan is of this latter order and the cow stands as an embodiment of Lawrence's intuitive response to animal life; what is revealed is his powerfully felt and conceived sense of integration between all animals who open themselves to the sentient world around them.

This idea manifests itself in much of Lawrence's treatment of birds and animals. But it would be foolish to suggest that his success in this is uniformly high. Take for example The White Peacock. Lawrence began this novel as early as 1906 and it is by common agreement an immature work.
Lawrence excused himself for it by writing "I began it at twenty. Let that be my apology."\(^{15}\) Most critics concur in Lawrence's opinion, finding it, to quote one noted critic, "painfully callow."\(^{16}\) Its technical faults are nowhere more apparent than in its use of bird and animal incidents, many of which seem directly derived from Hardy. The novel is particularly rich in wild life and as Anthony Beal says, in it "land runs wild and unprofitable; rabbits devour the crops and rats invade the barns ... animals and birds are preyed upon, trapped and killed."\(^{17}\) In what must have been a painstaking search, Robert E. Gajdusek records that in this novel "51 animals are brought in; 40 different birds skim, hover, fly, and wheel through this novel; and many of these function as symbols."\(^{18}\) Many do indeed operate symbolically, but the effectiveness of the symbolic technique is not always assured.

For an example of Lawrence's mis-handling of animal symbolism and imagery we may look closely at the relationship which George Saxton has (or nearly has) with Lettie Beardsall. George's essential "animality" and closeness to the life of the countryside is constantly stressed. On occasion, he deliberately contravenes polite rules of conduct by introducing discussions of calves being born, and it is this aspect of his character that at once attracts Lettie and yet repels her. George becomes for her a Bull—"Taurus"—and she refers to him as "a stalled ox—too intent on looking out for his own comfort and only half alive". It is this criticism of him that constitutes the unsatisfactory development of their relationship, and it is significantly extended by Lawrence's descriptions of George's function as a
dairyman. One incident is particularly apposite. Cyril Beardsall, the narrator, arrives at the Saxton farm to inform George that Lettie and Leslie, the more intellectual suitor, are all but engaged. On hearing this news, George stops milking and "the cow looked round and stirred uneasily." George resumes, but "mechanically" and his rhythm is destroyed. As he questions Cyril, his disquiet grows and the cow reflects and responds to his mood: "The cow stirred uneasily, shifting her legs ... Then, quite upset, she shifted again, and swung her tail in his face." The upshot of this episode is that the cow produces very little milk. Clearly, we are reminded of the milking scenes from Hardy's *Tess of the d'Urbervilles* and similar uses of the cow's predisposition are being made. George's inability on this day to draw much milk from the cows reflects his depressed mood but also stands as a symbolic rendering of his failure with Lettie. As with Gabriel Oak, George's worth is suggested through his dealings with animals, and any failure with them suggests romantic problems. We must remember that George is closely identified with the bull "Taurus", and when he is so demonstrably a failure with his cows we discern in this a connection to his inner ability to rise to the demands that Lettie places on him. When he later returns to milking his cow, he remarks "You can't understand them", and the indefiniteness of the pronoun makes the association between Lettie and a cow absolute.

This kind of thing is doubtless what Gajdusek has in mind when he writes that *The White Peacock* "is tightly organized, overlaid with an intricate multi-leveled symbolism, and co-ordinated by a complex stream of allusions." The value judgment inherent in this comment scarcely seems
warranted in view of the clumsiness of the bull/cow analogy as it applies to George and Lettie. The intention is obviously there and the technique of using animals to symbolize a complex human predicament is clearly appropriate to the kind of relationship that is being described. But the intention is not achieved in a convincing way. This failure reflects the generally unsatisfactory nature of Lawrence's depiction of character. The reader is less than convinced that the characters are well-rounded and there seems little sophistication in the handling of the love triangle and the antitheses that lie dormant in it.

Other such bird and animal incidents are not hard to find. There is, for example, the incident in the woods where Lettie and George come across a dead wood-pigeon:

Lettie stooped over a wood-pigeon that lay on the ground on its breast, its wings half-spread. She took it up - its eyes were bursten and bloody; she felt its breast, muffling the dimming iris on its throat.

'It's been fighting," he said.
'What for - a mate?' she asked, looking at him ... 'I think a wood-pigeon must enjoy being fought for - and being won ... Don't you think life is very cruel, George - and love the cruelest of all?'

(p.209)

Lettie then buries the bird and concludes, "He's done with." There is little need to explicate at length what this scenario depicts. George is obviously identified with the wood-pigeon, and its burial suggests the death of his chances with Lettie. In this passage the reader neither feels the reality of the dead bird nor the sting of the implied symbolic significance, and the whole lacks any appeal to the reader's interests.

I have been describing some of the unsuccessful animal episodes that
occur in *The White Peacock*, but it will not do to suggest that everything is of equally inferior quality or that Lawrence's fictional technique of using animals is always unsatisfactory. One of the opening scenes of the novel involves the cat, Mrs. Nickie Ben, who is caught cruelly in an animal trap. This episode is convincing and the reader feels the torture of the animal and registers the significantly opposed approaches that different characters take towards this suffering. To George it is the way of the world for animals to suffer and die and he almost cheerfully drowns the poor animal. To Lettie, whose character is far more refined, his actions are callous and she says that she despises him. But at the same time, Lettie is attracted to the kind of man who acts so deliberately and doesn't allow sentiment to interfere with what must be done. The effect of this episode is interesting and establishes in Lettie particularly the seeds of a divided character whose attitude towards George is one of attraction/repulsion. Unfortunately, the strength of this dichotomy is not satisfactorily developed later on in the novel. But at the beginning it is established and this is achieved through an example of animal suffering.

The success of animal depiction in *The White Peacock* is not to be found in small incidents, but rather in the pervasive quality of animal life that is everywhere felt. This is especially caught within Lawrence's ability to capture the felt presence of physical reality. As Graham Hough writes, the centre of the novel's interest is displaced "so that the circumference of the book includes, not only their characters and their
personal fates, but the whole life of nature which surrounds and flows through them." This, we remember, is the quality that Lawrence particularly admired in Hardy and *The White Peacock* represents a deliberate imitation of the wholeness and integration of all natural life that Hardy had evoked in a novel such as *Far from the Madding Crowd*. It is a Nature that is both wonderful and cruel, and which all humans share. Within the general arena of rural farming life in which man preys on animals for his own well-being there is a wide variety of human sensibility. Cyril for example is rather squeamish about killing rabbits in the corn fields (the reader is reminded of the scenes in *Tess* where after the corn is cut the rabbits and other animals are left exposed to the bludgeonings of the humans). In this he is identified with Lettie and some of the other characters, usually female, who are of a sensitive disposition. On the other side of the dialectic we have people like George and to a more extreme extent, Annable the feral gamekeeper.

This latter character is especially interesting since he typifies a Lawrence gamekeeper 'type' that we are to meet again. For our more limited purposes here, he is interesting because he is represented as someone who has adopted an 'animalistic' life-style and who has rejected the world of civilization. Within him the dialectic between animality and spirituality is strongly evoked. In his attitudes he imagines himself at one with the other animals of the woods where he lives; for him, if there is a difference between animals and men it is to man's advantage to erase it:

> When a man's more than nature he's a devil. Be a good animal, says I, whether it's man or woman. You, sir, a good natural male animal; the lady there — a female un —that's proper --as
long as yer enjoy it.

(p.131)

Annable's hatred of civilization is founded on his experience with his former wife the Lady Chrystabel whose aversion to the animal parts of a sexual relationship led to his overt animalism. Annable's case is inter­esting since he corresponds to what is often thought to be Lawrence's deepest desire: that we should all revert to our animal state and give up the horrible pretense of being anything more than wild animals. Gajdusek sees Annable in a role something like this, describing him as a Laurentian hero who epitomises "a deep sympathy and fusion with nature."23 Kenneth Inniss is surely more correct when he argues that Annable is on Nature's side not because of its positive values but because of its frank destructiveness.24 Certainly, Annable is more preoccupied with hatred of civilization than he is with a "deep sympathy" for nature. It seems clear that his position simply will not do. To regress to a conceived state of animalness is not for Lawrence (here at least) the answer. Annable's death is indicative of his position. His function as a gamekeeper is to prevent the local people from trapping the rabbits on his master's property. As a result of this the farms are over-run and indeed the Saxtons are forced to move away. It is suggested that the farmer's inability to trap the rabbits is a rural perversion; the local Lord prevents them from doing so not out of humanitarian pressures but because he considers them his property and at a later date wishes to trap them for economic profit. Annable is implicitly a party to this perverse position and in protecting the rabbits, with whom he is directly identified, he transgresses the proper relationship between different species living off the same land.
His position is false and it is revealed that in his attempt to become at one with nature he perverts its course. Rather than establishing a balanced opposition between himself and the animals, Annable attempts too literally to become one of them and thus denies his own human nature.

The sense of all-inclusive Nature is felt less strongly in *Sons and Lovers* than it is in *The White Peacock*, and the animals that occur there do not constitute such a ground-swell of natural life. Nonetheless, this novel marks definite technical advances in Lawrence's handling of his animals, as indeed the whole novel marks a substantial improvement over the author's first work. There are several incidents that are important to us but perhaps the most notable involves the great red stallion that intrudes upon the action and helps to symbolize and clarify the mounting emotional tensions of the protagonists. The episode occurs in Chapter IX where Paul Morel is walking out with Miriam Levers and Clara Dawes;

As they were going beside the brook, on the Willey Water side, looking through the brake at the edge of the wood, where pink campions gloved under a few sunbeams, they saw, beyond the tree-trunks and the thin hard bushes, a man leading a great bay horse through the gullies. The big red beast seemed to dance romantically through that dimness of green hazel drift, away there where the air was shadowy, as if it were in the past, among the fading bluebells that might have bloomed for Deidre or Iseult.

The horse is deliberately interfused between the trees and bushes, and the shadowy effect, highlighted by the contrast of the red horse and the green leaves and bushes—both strong primary and pagan colours—endows the beast with mythical and romantic overtones. The horse is rendered literally as a horse but Lawrence very carefully embroiders its appearance with colourful filigree patterns so as to convey something of its potent dynamism.
Paul sees in the horse qualities belonging to the world of Medieval romances, but this only brings out more forcefully Clara's feminist parry-and-thrust. She implicitly rejects any romantic connotations associated with the horse just as she forcefully rejects Paul's playfulness; she is profoundly disenchanted with masculinity, either literally in Paul or symbolically in the stallion. As the horse approaches, however, her attitude undergoes some subtle but profound changes:

The great horse breathed heavily, shifting round its red flanks, and looking suspiciously with its wonderful big eyes upwards from under its lowered head and falling mane.

It danced sideways, shaking its white fetlocks and looking frightened, as it felt itself in the brook.

Clara, walking with a kind of sulky abandon, watched it half-fascinated, half-contemptuous.

'Your horse is a fine fellow,' said Clara... More loving than most men, I should think.' Clara, fascinated by the great beast, went up to stroke his neck... She wanted to look in his eyes. She wanted him to look at her. 'It's a pity he can't talk,' she said.

(PP. 287-288)

Shifts in Clara's disposition are recorded and we are to see the influence of the horse as bearing the responsibility. The significance is made clearer when later she and Paul are able to talk without the hostility that was earlier established. Much later they are to become lovers. The horse is naturalistically evoked but it is clear he bears a significance for the development of the plot that stretches beyond this and assumes a symbolic function. The horse is a transforming catalyst which operates on Clara to effect a radical change in personality that allows for real communication between herself and male characters. The red stallion
embodies qualities of an essentially phallic nature; he is a male fertility symbol, and the colours red and green reinforce this suggestion. The stallion, traditionally a symbol of male potency, represents a special kind of attractiveness and it is obtuse not to see that Lawrence is describing Clara's vital response to male sexuality.

This notion is not merely inferred, it is directly broached within the ensuing conversation with Miss Limb, the stallion's owner. Miss Limb is obviously infatuated with her horse and in her loneliness he stands as something of a male substitute. Paul is quick to notice this, but it is Clara who blurts out "I suppose she wants a man." Her tone is uncertain and there is a half-suggestion that she is derisively offering the kind of comment which she feels Paul (the male chauvinist) would make. Indeed, this is the clichéd response that she might expect from Paul, as it is the response readers of Lawrence might expect him to make. But the obviousness of this comment is undercut since its expectedness does not take away its (for her) cruel and apposite implication. The situation may well be trite but the germ or substance of it is not thereby reduced. This is reflected in the change that does come over Clara as she softens her former intransigence. A good part of her hostile antagonism is thus shown to be a defence beneath which there is deep unhappiness. The horse reveals this, but there is no sense in which the animal is not integral to the literal and naturalistic happenings, no sense that the horse is an artificially brought in symbolic device. Rather, as Mark Spilka remarks, "the symbolic scenes are extremely literal, and the symbols seem to function as integral strands in the web of emotional tensions." Once Clara has opened out to
Paul, in symbolic gesture, he solemnizes their relationship by scattering flowers over her head. Paul's maleness is now the transfixing power.

This episode with the horse contrasts with another animal incident involving a dog. In this incident it is Paul's relationship with Miriam that is clarified. It occurs in the chapter "Defeat of Miriam" and each of the two character's responses to the dog, symbolizes particular qualities of their personality and the distinctions in their responses encapsulates the inevitable dissolution of their relationship. The chapter opens portentously with a statement of Paul's feelings: "Paul was dissatisfied with himself and with everything" (p.264). An essential part of his unhappiness is his concern over his affair with Miriam, and his concern manifests itself petulantly: "Can you never like things without clutching them as if you wanted to pull the heart out of them? Why don't you have a bit more restraint, or reserve, or something?" (pp.267-268). Typically, Miriam feels more sorry for him than she does for herself. The very carefully wrought tension between them is suddenly shattered by the appearance of Bill, the bull-terrier:

At that moment a big bull-terrier came rushing up, open-mouthed, pranced his two paws on the youth's shoulders, licking his face. Paul drew back laughing. Bill was a great relief to him. He pushed the dog aside, but it came leaping back.

'Get out,' said the lad, 'or I'll dot thee one.'

But the dog was not to be pushed away. So Paul had a little battle with the creature, pitching poor Bill away from him, who, however, only floundered tumultuously back again, wild with joy. The two fought together, the man laughing grudgingly, the dog grinning all over. Miriam watched them. There was something pathetic about the man. He wanted so badly to love, to be tender. The rough way he bowled the dog over was really loving. Bill got up, panting with happiness, his brown eyes rolling in his white face, and lumbered back again. He adored Paul. The lad frowned.

'Bill, I've had enough o' thee,' he said.
But the dog only stood with two heavy paws, that quivered with love, upon his thigh, and flickered a red tongue at him. He drew back.

There are several things to remark about this passage. First, we must acknowledge the delightfully caught sense of an actual occurrence, what Dorothy Van Ghent would call "the authenticity of a faithfully observed concrete actuality." The behaviour of the dog is like that of any dog in the same situation and the episode is one that we can all recall. But the significance of the passage extends beyond this. Miriam sees in this lively divigation only something "pathetic" and she reads Paul's behaviour as an attempt to find an outlet for the love which he needs to give—to give to her, that is. In fact, Paul is merely taking refuge quite spontaneously in an event of the moment. He describes himself as feeling only "normal" (for Miriam this is synonymous with "disagreeable") and the dog's interruption allows him to forget the stilted nature of his conversation with Miriam. The appearance of the dog serves to sharpen the dilemma that both face, and their different responses to it express this. Instead of participating in the action and enjoying the dog, Miriam uses it as an occasion to analyze and pity the lover she fears to lose. Her response is symptomatic of her general condition.

The relationship between these two animal episodes should be quite clear, and we should view them as complementary. Each serves a specific purpose in bringing to a head human conflicts, and each brings out the quality of Miriam and Clara that Paul responds to most forcefully. For Miriam, this is her inability to act spontaneously and for Clara it is
her ability to recognise the stallion for what it is and to let her spirit be moved by it. Even the obvious difference between the two animals gives evidence of these values. But there is a fundamental similarity in the way Lawrence uses an animal to act structurally within the narrative flow to effect important thematic and psychological changes and to bring this about through naturalistic action concretized in "unforced symbolic dimension." For Lawrence, this is a deliberately contrived method and we see how *Sons and Lovers* constitutes a dramatic improvement over earlier instances of the same technique.

In general terms, and by common critical assent, *The Rainbow* marks a further improvement in Lawrence's creative powers. But surprisingly, few examples of his Bestiary art occur here and when they do they are not of noticeably higher standard than in *Sons and Lovers*. Nonetheless, there are a few incidents that are more than worthy of mention. To begin with, we should comment on the inclusive sense of Nature that is caught so magically within the first third of the novel. This deals with the relationship between Tom and Lydia Brangwen and the setting is their farm. A general sense of the intermingling of the human and the animal is established with remarkable ease. Take for example, this passage, not in itself expressly focused on animals, but nonetheless one which would be incomplete without them:

The silky fringe of the shawl swayed softly, grains and hay tickled to the floor; he went along a dimly-lit passage behind the mangers, where the horns of the cows pricked out of the obscurity. The child shrank, he balanced stiffly, rested the pan on the manger wall, and tipped out the food, half to this cow, half to the next. There was a noise of chains running as the cows lifted or dropped their heads sharply; then a
contented, soothing sound, a long snuffing as the beast ate in silence.

The journey had to be performed several times. There was the rhythmic sound of the shovel in the barn, then the man returned walking stiffly between the two weights, the face of the child peering out from the shawl. Then the next time, as he stopped, she freed her arm and put it round his neck, clinging soft and warm, making it all easier.

The beast fed, he dropped the pan and sat down on a box, to arrange the child.

'Will the cows go to sleep now?' she said, catching her breath as she spoke.

'Yes.'

'Will they eat all their stuff up first?'

'Yes. Hark at them.'

And the two sat still listening to the sniffing and breathing of cows feeding in the sheds communicating with this small barn. The lantern shed a soft, steady light from one wall. All outside was still in the rain.

Taken in its entire context of Anna's slow adaptation to the new circumstances of life on the farm, this passage is consummately achieved. It is difficult to think of a passage in English fiction to compare with its creation of the peculiar atmospherics of light, sound, and emotional sensation. The cows are vital to this evocation and they represent for both father and stepdaughter objects of intrinsic interest distinct from the fraught human opposition. As such they provide a hiatus in the emotional drama, a focal point of animal activity soothing to the nerves and providing a rich environment in which the two people can become reconciled. The subtle touch of cowy presence is deeply integral to the mood.

The relationship between Tom and Lydia is admirably caught in the sense of integral animal life of which the passage just quoted is a superb example. The second third of the novel involves the young Anna and focuses
on her courtship and marriage to her cousin Will Brangwen. Within this part of the novel the integrated life of the farm is absent. Nonetheless, animal imagery abounds and the hostilities experienced by Will and Anna are seen as vicious and predatory in their nature. The couple are seen engaged in a terrible battle of will-power in which Anna finally emerges the victor. The chapter in which this occurs is called appropriately enough "Anna Victrix" and towards the end there occurs an incident involving two blue-caps, and this incident serves as a symbolic coda to the fierce struggle.

The two blue-caps fight and the reader clearly sees in this an analogue to the fight just witnessed between Will and Anna. As I have already mentioned, Anna has won and in giving birth to Ursula she finds a love-object which further excludes her husband:

He [Will] hovered near to her, never quite able to forget the vague, haunting uncertainty, that seemed to challenge him and which he would not bear. A pang of dread, almost guilt, as of insufficiency, would go over him as he heard her talking to the baby.

(p.194)

This establishes the worrying disquiet that Will now feels; he is unable to fully comprehend what he has lost, but seeing his wife and baby together, watching two birds fight, he is enmeshed in a keen sense of ennui. There follows the fight between the birds, narrated by a victorious and happy Anna oblivious of her husband's sense of defeat:

...'look at the silly blue-caps, my darling, having a fight in the snow! Look at them, my bird--beating the snow about with their wings, and shaking their heads. Oh aren't they wicked things, wicked things! Look at their yellow feathers on the snow there! They'll miss them, won't they, when they're cold later on.'

(p.194)
In a gesture perhaps of maternal protection, Anna raps on the window pane and brings the fight to an abrupt halt. Still crooning, she assures her child what the birds will soon forget all about their fight, and in a tone which suggests that she has forgotten all about her struggle with Will, she turns to her husband and unsolicitedly says: "They are really fighting, they were really fierce with each other" (p.195). The intensity of her own struggle with Will is too close for the reader to ignore the blue-cap analogy. It is significant that Will sees in the bird fight, or rather Anna's obvious enjoyment in watching it, something symptomatic of his own discomfort. Anna herself, it is implied, has reached her "Pisgah Mountain" but only at the expense of her most vital accord with her husband. This indeed is the whole burden of the middle section of the novel, and we are to see their marriage as a failure. From now on their relationship is to be highly sensual but it is to be devoid of further progress; both partners will sink down into their own kinds of torpor. The fighting blue-caps finally are an ironic analogue since whereas it is obviously seen as healthy for the two partners to fight it is not healthy for the female to win so completely as to undermine the confidence of the man. With wild birds, fighting occurs to ensure the proper balance between partners and between rivals, and not for pure victory. By this paradigm, Will and Anna show themselves to have failed in the effort to establish a relationship in which each is sufficient to himself and in which enmity is creative. Instead, they will be eternally opposed and will become resolved only by steeping themselves in sensuality, or work, or motherhood.

The third part of The Rainbow concerns the relationship between Ursula
and Anton Skrebensky, and here too animals are to play an important role. The particular incident in which we are interested occurs towards the very end of the novel when Ursula, exhausted by her dwindling relationship with Anton, encounters a group of horses who seem to persecute her. We should remind ourselves that the whole novel is concerned with three attempts to establish a marriage partnership which is fulfilling. The urge and the impulse is always to remain free within a marriage and not to allow it to thwart the two identities of the partners. Ursula is engaged in just this struggle and she fights against the almost overwhelming urge to marry Skrebensky, who is a decidedly negative influence on her in anything but sexual terms. It is after her final break from him that she walks into a field and meets the running horses. Their appearance is sudden and terrifying:

Suddenly she knew there was something else. Some horses were looming in the rain, not near yet. But they were going to be near ... she did not want to lift her face to them ... she knew the heaviness on her heart. It was the weight of the horses. (p.487)

These forces are felt as real and the pounding of their hooves and surging mass of their form assures us that they are not the products of an hallucination. But at the same time they embody certain psychological fears and concerns that Ursula has and as such are imbued with extra-naturalistic force. The felt pressure of the horses then has a literal and symbolic significance for Ursula; one of their disturbing traits is an ability to outflank her and counter her movements:

She knew they had not gone, she knew they awaited her still. But she went on over the log bridge that their hoofs had churned and drummed, she went on, knowing things about them. She was aware
of their breasts gripped, clenched narrow in a hold that never relaxed, she was aware of their red nostrils flaming with long endurance, and of their haunches, so rounded, so massive, pressing, pressing, pressing to burst the grip upon their breasts, pressing forever till they went mad, running against the walls of time, and never bursting free. Their great haunches were smoothed and darkened with rain. But the darkness and wetness of rain could not put out the hard, urgent, massive fire that was locked within these flanks, never, never.

(p.488)

The intensity and sexual suggestiveness of this passage is astonishing—and through it Lawrence effects his transference from literal horse to what the horse means to Ursula. We saw with the red stallion in Sons and Lovers that the horse bears a directly sexual connotation and this is even more evident here. For Ursula, the pressing crush of these horses represents the sexual potency of Anton as it threatens to engulf her. She is at once profoundly attracted to it and yet aware that by itself such potency can do nothing but run "mad". Anton, with his rather stiff and narrow conception of what life has to offer, is essentially doomed to a conventional marriage and this, Lawrence strongly implies, is the modern problem to be avoided. But for Ursula, the sensual attraction is terribly strong and it is a struggle to overcome it. The fact that she does, makes her distinct from her mother who was satisfied to have babies, and makes her Lawrence's "victrix" in a very special sense.

Only the presence of a group of running horses is powerful enough to convey the lure and the struggle that Ursula experiences. Sensuality of a certain limited sort is the danger here to Ursula and the horses' efforts to cut her off parallel Anton's efforts to make her marry him. Once Ursula has managed to get out of the field the horses immediately lose their symbolic power and become merely naturalistic horses stripped of their
meaning. The rhythmic flow of the prose has become exaggerated with the running flow of the horses and this has elevated them into significant symbols, but once the danger is passed the prose tones down and we see them for what they are rather than for what they mean. The technique here is similar to that described in "The Man Who Died" and it is appropriate in its intention and its effect. It may be, as F. R. Leavis argues, that the end of the novel, of which this scene with the horses is a part, suffers from "a growing sense in the writer of an absence of any conclusion in view." Nonetheless, the success of the horse symbolism, as a well-conceived focusing point in the breakdown of the relationship between Ursula and Anton, is unmistakably achieved.

We have seen that the tripartite organization of *The Rainbow* corresponds with three significant episodes of animal usage. The method seems integral to Lawrence's development of themes. At carefully selected and appropriate times in the narrative development, an animal incident focuses the reader's attention towards some culminating and implicit thematic concern. This manner of fictional representation is considerably extended in *Women in Love*. With this novel we encounter what is perhaps the apex of Lawrence's achievement in the presentation of highly charged examples of Bestiary art. The whole novel works out its major themes through two couples—Ursula and Birkin, Gudrun and Gerald—and the stages of their relationships are carefully marked by strategically placed animal incidents. As we shall see, the former couple emerge at the end of the novel as the only viable survivors, even though there is no suggestion that they have attained a complete integration in their marriage. (Like
The Rainbow, this novel takes as its major theme the relationship between a man and a woman and the kinds of fruition and imaginative life that spring up within it). On the other hand, Gerald and Gudrun enact a process of disintegration—for Gerald the process of his literal death high in the Alps. This couple acts as the counterpoint to the greater possibilities inherent in the former. Between these two couples, Lawrence works out the larger implications of what is at stake when the vital relations between men and women go slack or are submerged within mechanical notions. The dialectic at work is between the organic and the mechanical as these entities apply to human relations.

Each side of the dialectic is attended by several animal incidents which clarify and illuminate the central human meaning implicit with the human action. The first of these episodes occurs in "Coal Dust". We have already been introduced to the four main characters but up to this point little has happened between them. Gudrun has of course seen Gerald and felt immediately attracted to him. Her attraction, however, is tinged with a certain perversity: "his gleaming beauty, maleness, like a young good-humoured, smiling wolf, did not blind her to the significant, sinister stillness in his bearing, the lurking danger of his unsubdued temper."

Gerald is pregnant with a certain kind of attractive danger and the image of the wolf marks him as predatory and unpredictable. He holds no such attraction for Ursula, to whom he is almost invisible. Her lack of interest in him, and even her secret animosity, is expressed in the off-hand way she treats him (pp.55-56). It is this attitude that causes some bad feeling between the sisters, and we are exposed to antithetical
sentiments about Gerald's character. Gerald, "the wolf," has already been established as the young go-ahead manager of the coal mines and his driving energy manifests itself in his introducing machines that will increase the efficiency of the mines. He is a Captain of Industry and an apostle of progress, and in attaching himself to these categories he has, in Birkin's eyes, travestied his deepest nature. This is expressed when he considers it "bad form" for the bride and groom to race to the church door, and Birkin sees in this and related attitudes, Gerald's renunciation of the "life centre" and is "artificially held together by the social mechanism" (p.64).

What this renunciation implies for Gerald as far as his sexual nature is concerned, becomes evident in the chapters "Creme de Menthe" and "Totem". It is here that Gerald meets Minette, the pregnant mistress of the effete Halliday. Apart from its mindless gratuitousness, this relationship apparently offers the reader a purely natural contest between the male hunter and the female victim. At least, this is how it provisionally appears: "She appealed to Gerald strongly. He felt an awful, enjoyable power over her, and instinctive cherishing very near to cruelty. For she was a victim. He felt that she was in his power, and he was generous" (p.71). Gerald is deliberately set up here as the instinctual animal stalking his prey and the sex act itself is identified with a gentle kill. To him, "his was the only will" and Minette was a mere "passive substance". The irony and impotence of Gerald's "will" is later exposed when it becomes apparent that he is a part of a sophisticated charade, a spectacle, in which he was only the means, a stud-like hiatus, in the
ongoing relationship between Halliday and Minette. Gerald's "will" had nowhere to go.

Enough has been said to establish the necessary context of Gerald's character. It has been essential to provide this background since the animal episode that we are concerned with is so tightly knitted into the very matter of the narrative as a whole that to present it in isolation would be to miss its importance. The scene takes place at a level-crossing where Gerald holds his arab-mare too close to the passing train; Gudrun and Ursula look on. At first, Gerald is merely "picturesque" as he sits astride his red mare "pleased with the delicate quivering of the creature between his knees" (p.122). But then as the train crashes by, he becomes an inhuman master insistent on establishing his "will" over that of the horse:

The locomotive chuffed slowly between the banks, hidden. The mare did not like it. She began to wince away, as if hurt by the unknown noise. But Gerald pulled her back and held her head to the gate ... She recoiled like a spring let go. But a glistening, half-smiling look came into Gerald's face.

Later, Gerald plausibly claims that a horse that will not do what its rider demands is useless. However, the intensity of this passage and the horse's desire to escape, reveals that Gerald's plausibility is partly a rationalization for an inner streak of cruelty:

A sharpened look came on Gerald's face: he bit himself down on the mare like a keen edge biting home, and forced her round. She roared as she breathed, her nostrils were too wide, hot holes, her mouth was apart, her eyes frenzied. It was a repulsive sight. But he held on her unrelaxed, with an almost mechanical relentlessness, keen as a sword pressing into her. Both man and horse were sweating with violence. Yet he seemed calm as a ray of cold sunshine.

(pp.124-125)
In this vicious episode, so strangely a foreshadowing of the horses in Picasso's Guernica, the fear and elastic contortions of the horse are caught marvelously well in the prose. The horse's strenuous efforts to escape the close proximity of the train serve as a contrast to Gerald's mechanical coolness, and we see embodied the conflict between organism and mechanism. The crystallizing effect of this passage relies on the felt pressure of an inhuman "will" coldly overcoming a sensitive organism. As one critic has put it "the whole thing is rendered with shattering immediacy" as the desperate mare is forced back into the terrifying clamour of brakes screeching and the over-close presence of the metal monster whose mechanical energy easily crushes anything in its way. The horse, bleeding and desperate, is described with great accuracy and represents for the reader the antithesis of Gerald whose personality has become subsumed within the figure of the train itself.

Through Gerald's imposition of his "will" over the mare, he is brought very sharply into focus. His use of the "will" is portrayed in crystally clear terms, and the reader registers its destructiveness. Like Ursula, we feel repulsed and angered by Gerald and make the association between "will", cruelty, and the mechanical. The scene with the arab-mare then, has achieved its function of picking up the earlier threads that define Gerald and crystallizing them in a dramatic and forceful way. We recall his earlier attempt to impose his "will" on Minette, and we noted there his subtle impotence. The situation with the horse is somewhat different in that he all too clearly succeeds; but the success is partly vitiated by Gudrun, whose response to the cruel action is one of close sensual
identification. Fascinated by Gerald's cruelty, she becomes implicated in his corruption:

Gudrun was if numbed in her mind by the sense of indomitable soft weight of the man, bearing down into the living body of the horse: the strong indomitable thighs of the blond man clenching the palpitating body of the mare into pure control; a sort of soft white magnetic domination from the loins and thighs and calves, enclosing and encompassing the mare heavily into unutterable subordination, soft-blood-subordination, terrible. (p.126)

The desire to be dominated is apparently evinced in Gudrun's response, but we should remember that this is what we also thought about Minette. It is true that both females want of Gerald the sexual thrill he can give them, but this in itself is not enough. Gudrun, rather than identifying with the horse that is being subjugated, identifies with the man who is doing the dominating, and she too is absorbed by the inhuman process of imposing the "will". As later events reveal, particularly the Highland cattle and Rabbit incidents, Gudrun is taken into Gerald's cruelty not to submit to him but to fight and eventually destroy him. Minette goes to Halliday and finally Gudrun goes to Loerke. The possibility of a balanced partnership is disallowed by Gerald and Gudrun's mutual desire to dominate. Psychologically, as Eliseo Vivas suggests, "the apparently strong industrial magnate turns out to be the weaker ... and the woman knows it from the beginning."36

Ursula's response to the arab-mare incident is equally revealing. To her, the performance is shameful and she upbraids Gerald in an unequivocally emotional way. Like the arab-mare, with whom she implicitly identifies, Ursula gives immediate vent to her feelings:
'Why couldn't he take the horse away, till the trucks had gone by? He's a fool and a bully. Does he think it's manly, to torture a horse? It's a living thing, why should he bully it and torture it?'

(p.125)

This response, angry and honest, characterises Ursula and it is in a similar spirit of right-hearted opposition that she later accepts the challenge Birkin throws down to her. Here, recognising blatant cruelty for what it is Ursula raises her voice. Similar in some ways to Clara Dawes' quick stridency of manner, Ursula enlivens a notion of "pure opposition" to that which she is against and her openness distinguishes her radically from the kind of coercive but disingenuous identification for which Gudrun seems to opt. Gudrun, as seen by her reaction to the arab-mare, feels the spell of awful attraction rather than opposition, a sinking into the deadly game that will later be enacted.

The significance of the arab-mare episode is maintained and extended in the chapter "Carpeting". Here, however, the perspective has shifted and the narrative is more interested in Birkin and Ursula. The ensuing discussion concerns Gerald's cruelty to his horse but underlying this is the general question of the meaning of domination and submission in a man-woman relationship. Gerald's case we have already examined—"I consider that mare is there for my use" (p.154). Hermione supports this view, though in a more laconically liberal way: "I do really think we must have the courage to use the lower animal life for our needs" (p.155). She later amplifies her views on the "will" and maintains that she cured herself of her ailments by the exercise of will-power. The irony in this for Birkin is that in by so doing Hermione has merely replaced one sickness
by another, the latter worse by far than the former. At first glance, Birkin also seems to side with Gerald when he exclaims that "Nothing is so detestable as the maudlin attributing of human feelings and consciousness to animals" (p.155). He speaks this sharply in response to what Hermione has said and it is clear that he sees her quality of being "animal in the head" as a manifestation of this "maudlin" habit. Ursula remains adamant in her position and asserts that the arab-mare "has as much right to her own being, as you have to yours" (p.154).

There are several things going on in this discussion, all of which have ramifications for the central protagonists and all of which ultimately rely for their inspiration on the arab-mare incident. First, as I have already indicated, a figurative transition from horse to woman is implied throughout. On the most elementary level, Gerald's view that the horse must be submissive is the most practical if we take the utilitarian concept of "use" as true. The same is also true of a woman's role--there can only be one master of a household if that house is to be run most efficiently, and therefore the woman must know her place. Birkin's position modifies this attitude by introducing his concept of the "two wills" inherent in horse and woman alike, one which needs to be submissive and one which is inviolate and pure unto itself: "And woman is the same as horses: two wills act in opposition inside her. With one will, she wants to subject herself utterly. With the other she wants to bolt, and pitch her rider to perdition" (p.157). Ursula rises to the challenge and claims that she is a "bolter" and will not subject herself to anyone or thing: "It was
a fight to the death between them—or to new life: though in what the conflict lay, no one could say" (p.159).

The enmity is thus established and finds its most fascinating discussion in the chapter "Mino", where the literal dispute between two cats provides an ambiguous analogue of the predicament Ursula and Birkin face. The scene acts as an important measure by which the quality and difficulty of the problem of 'love' may be gauged. The context is already pretty fairly stated but it is as well to provide a brief resume of the action immediately prior to the entrance of the male and female cats. Birkin has invited Ursula to tea and on her arrival begins to harangue her as to what he wants in a relationship. He wants to meet her "where there is no speech and no terms of agreement" (p.163). His strenuous attempts to articulate his deepest thoughts and needs strike Ursula (and the reader) as rather abstract and his ideas of love become a preacher's dogma flying in the face of the palpably real Ursula. She rejects and satirises his attitudes and intensities and there is established between them a creative antagonism in which neither of their wills dominate. Enter the cats:

A young grey cat that had been sleeping on the sofa jumped down and stretched, rising on its long legs, and arching its slim back. Then it sat considering for a moment, erect and kingly. And then, like a dart, it had shot out of the room, through the open window-doors and into the garden.

'What's he after?' said Birkin, rising.

The young cat trotted lordly down the path, waving his tail. He was an ordinary tabby with white paws, a slender young gentleman. A crouching, fluffy, brownish-grey cat was stealing up the side of the fence. The Mino walked statelily up to her with manly nonchalance. She crouched before him and pressed herself on the ground in humility, a fluffy, soft outcast, looking up at him with wild eyes that were green and lovely as
great jewels. He looked casually down on her. So she crept a few inches further, proceeding on her way to the back door, crouching in a wonderful, soft, self-obliterating manner, and moving like a shadow.

He, going statelily on his slim legs, walked after her, then suddenly, for pure excess, he gave her a slight cuff with his paw on the side of her face. She ran off a few steps, like a blown leaf along the ground, then crouched unobtrusively, in submissive, wild patience. The Mino pretended to take no notice of her. He blinked his eyes superbly at the landscape. In a minute she drew herself together and moved softly, a fleecy brown-grey shadow, a few paces forward. She began to quicken her pace, in a moment she would be gone like a dream, when the young grey lord sprang before her, and gave her a light handsome cuff. She subsided at once, submissively.

'She is a wild cat,' said Birkin. 'She has come in from the woods.'

The eyes of the stray cat flared round for a moment, like great green fires staring at Birkin. Then she had rushed in a soft swift rush, half-way down the garden. Then she paused to look round. The Mino turned his face in pure superiority to his master, and slowly closed his eyes, standing in statuesque young perfection. The wild cat's round, green, wondering eyes were staring all the while like uncanny fires. Then again, like a shadow, she slid towards the kitchen.

In a lovely springing leap, like a wind, the Mino was upon her, and had boxed her twice, very definitely, with a white, delicate fist. She sank and slid back unquestioning. He walked after her, and cuffed her once or twice, leisurely, with sudden little blows of his magic white paws.

(PP.165-166)

Once again, we must pause to comment on the authenticity of the scene as it is caught in Lawrence's descriptive prose. The reader feels (and sees with his inner imaginative eye) that these are cats which exist and which behave in this manner. Their "ontological integrity" is very firmly established and the reader is frankly delighted by this display of animal life, faithfully recorded and amusingly presented. This quality of narrative description goes further than merely being an incidental episode designed to appeal to animal fanciers. For in establishing accurately the cats' literal behaviour and manner, Lawrence is creating an analogue.
to Ursula and Birkin's situation which, because of its unique separateness, cannot be reduced to fit exactly the human beings. The analogy is as interesting for the distinctions that it forces the reader to see between cats and human beings as it is for the similarities.

The incident naturally gives rise to an extension of the couple's prior confrontation. To Birkin Mino is behaving in accordance with its nature and is "on intimate terms" with the stray. To Ursula, he is merely a bully "like all males", unjustly oppressing all females in a show of "will". She equates it with Gerald's use of the arab-mare, though here of course she is being too extreme. Whether we like it or not, Mino and the stray are acting out a process in which roles are established and followed by process of instinct: there is no self-conscious ego involved.

Between Gerald and the mare, however, there is discrepancy in species and no harmonious balance can be achieved. Mino's "bullying" and the stray's "submission" serve the protection of the species as a whole. An episode more useful by way of comparison than the arab-mare, is Gerald's liaison with Minette whose very name is obviously a feminine version of Mino. We saw that Gerald saw himself as a self-conscious Mino figure, engaged in asserting himself over his Minette who was his "fluffy" stray. The shallowness of his self-conscious assumption of "animal" instincts is revealed in the duplicity of the victim's motives. Mino the cat is not conscious in this way and is emphatically not guilty of the same crime against himself and his female partners.

Birkin, of course, is quick to pick up on this kind of argument. With the instinct to propagate in mind, he argues that Mino is not acting
out of churlish chauvinism, but instead "desires to bring this female cat into a pure stable equilibrium, a transcendent and abiding rapport with the single male" (p.167). Birkin provides a gloss on Natural History which, though probably more accurate than Ursula's, has the unfortunate sophistic tendency to support his own point of view. By this time he is only half-serious, but the argument remains. His superconscious formulations strike Ursula as decidedly flawed and she sees such arguing as a means to coerce her into being his "slave". She misunderstands his argument, but it should be said that Birkin's point of view is not without its weaknesses, chief amongst them being his intense and at time ludicrous manner of 'preaching' his gospel. Ursula lets him know what she thinks of this, and thus provides the kind of opposition that Birkin needs.

In what ways does this incident advance the plot and themes of the novel, and what does it tell us about Birkin and Ursula? First of all, like the dog Bill in *Sons and Lovers* it causes a natural hiatus in the activities of the humans which freshens, enlivens, and relieves the human situation. The animal drama literally takes them out of themselves for a few moments and provides them with an analogous situation distinct enough from their own but not too far away from it. The episode also provides a narrow focus on the specifics of the relationship between the sexes, as it is seen in the natural world of animals. Argue as the humans might, their words and thoughts will not change the behaviour of the cats. Strictly speaking, it is immaterial how Birkin or Ursula construe the animals' behaviour since these notions are merely projections of their own most cherished ideas and affect reality not at all. But what the disputation
really crystallizes is the concept of opposition itself which the couple engages in. It is through the vital opposition of ideas that each maintains his separate identity so that at the right moment they may come together and in sharing love bring forth a greater quality of harmony.

The issues that constitute the 'stuff' of this opposition are as tangential to the developing emotional bond between Birkin and Ursula as they are to the bond between the cats. With the cats, this is instinct, but with the humans it is a necessary opposition founded on a powerful underplay of attraction combined with the development of mental consciousness. As if to highlight this similarity, when the landlady interrupts the lovers, "they both looked at her very much as the cats had looked at them, a little while before" (p.168) At this point they are deeply engaged in their by-now playful hostility, Ursula accusing Birkin of having "dished himself" by admitting that he wanted a female "satellite" and Birkin laughingly denying it. What is important is not who is right, but the tone in which the interchange takes place to allow for a more powerful and perhaps sub-vocal attraction. Dialogue in this sense becomes an invisible solution in which other more active agents may foment and join. This is suggested when at the end of the chapter "she put her arms round his neck" and they accept, for a while, the self-consciously sentimental role of traditional lovers.

In the very next chapter there occurs yet another incident in which animals play a vitally important role. Here, however, their significance applies to Gerald and Gudrun and reinforces the earlier evidence of the unhealthiness of their relationship. While the two couples are on an
island, Gudrun is directly compared with Ursula and it is recorded that Gudrun felt "that she was outside of life, an onlooker" (p.185), and that this caused her to suffer a "sense of her own negation". Her effort to overcome this negation is then eurhythmically evoked as she dances before some Highland cattle attempting to release herself from the "invisible chain" which imprisons her:

Gudrun, with arms outspread and her face uplifted, went in a strange palpitating dance towards the cattle, lifting her body towards them as if in a spell, her feet pulsing as if in some little frenzy of unconscious sensation, her arms, her wrists, her hands stretching and heaving and falling and reaching and falling, her breasts lifted and shaken towards the cattle, her throat exposed as in some voluptuous ecstasy towards them, whilst she drifted imperceptibly nearer, an uncanny white figure, towards them, carried away in its own rapt trance, ebbing in strange fluctuations upon the cattle, that waited, and ducked their heads a little in sudden contraction from her, watching all the time as if hypnotized, their bare horns branching in the dear light, as the white figure on the woman ebbed upon them, hypnotizing convulsion of the dance.

(p.187)

Our focus of interest here is not on the cattle as animals but rather as the force they represent to Gudrun which must be overcome by the imposition of her hypnotic will. Through this action she hopes to establish some kind of contact, to assert herself against her own negation and to break free from the unreality which seems to overcome her. The bull is traditionally a symbol of male potency and it is clear that in overcoming these cattle Gudrun imagines that she is overcoming a vital male principle. Like Anna in *The Rainbow* she is engaged in an attempt to win the battle of wills and to defeat her partner. For Gudrun, this partner is Gerald and when he arrives to frighten the cattle away she strikes him across the face in a gesture of mad and demonic power. To his observation that it is she who has
struck the first blow, she retorts that she will also strike the last.

The context for the kind of opposition in which Gudrun and Gerald are engaged is provided by Birkin in a discussion with Ursula:

... When the stream of synthetic creation lapses, we find ourselves part of the inverse process, the blood of destructive creation. Aphrodite is born in the first spasm of universal dissolution -- then the snakes and swans and lotus -- marsh flowers -- and Gudrun and Gerald -- born in the process of destructive creation.

(p.193)

This, then, as we later discover, is to be the true nature of the relationship between Gudrun and Gerald--a process of destruction in which the superimposition of the "will" breeds dissolution and corruption in the vital flow between a man and woman.

This theme is restated in the justly famous "Rabbit" chapter. Many commentators have discussed in great detail this episode and found concrete symbolic embodiment of the destruction already alluded to. This whole passage clearly stands as the parallel to the "Mino" chapter and each characterises the kind of "marriage" that the two couples will make. Whereas the "Mino" chapter is shrouded in a warm envelope of antagonistic affection, "Rabbit" is shot through with viciousness and unholy communion. The scene is presided over by Winifred, Gerald's little sister, and it is against her sentimental smother-love of animals that Gudrun and Gerald's response should be set. Gudrun and Winifred intend to catch Bismark to draw him, but the animal is wild and will not be caught. He is indeed "un mystère", strangely associated with the mystery of desire that Gudrun and Gerald share. The animal is too strong to be caught by Gudrun and it tears her flesh; Gerald arrives and after suffering the vicious slashings-out of the
rabbit brings his hand down hard on its neck and subdues it.

Characteristically, the animal is perceived and described as animal, with the distinctive mysteriousness of a rabbit. The following passage occurs after Bismark has finally been released and the animal becomes once again an animal, distinct from its meaning to the humans:

And suddenly the rabbit, which had been crouching as if it were a flower, so still and soft, suddenly burst into life. Round and round the court it went, as if shot from a gun, round and round like a furry meteorite, in a tense hard circle that seemed to bind their brains. They all stood in amazement, smiling uncannily, as if the rabbit were obeying some unknown incantation... And then quite suddenly it settled down, hobbled among the grass, and sat considering its nose twitching like a bit of fluff in the wind. After having considered for a few minutes, a soft hunch with a black, open eye, which perhaps was looking at them, perhaps was not, it hobbled calmly forward and began to nibble the grass with that mean motion of a rabbit's quick eating.

(p.273)

After the awful preceding incident in which the rabbit had scratched "a deep red score down the silken white flesh" of Gudrun's arm, and where the reader learns that Gudrun and Gerald were "implicated with each other in abhorrent mysteries", this description of the rabbit takes on a peculiarly still quality. The rabbit's vicious slashing has gashed Gudrun's arm and it is the sight of the blood that seems to solemnize a union in the "obscene beyond" of the "abhorrent mysteries" implicit within the "river of dissolution". What phrases like these point to is impossible to say explicitly, but it is clear that the whole complex of significance which centres on the rabbit is a symbolic rendering of this meaning. And it is "a mystery", "un mystère", "ein wunder". Eliseo Vivas is surely right when he argues that this symbol of the rabbit is a "constitutive symbol" which suggest meaning impossible to describe without reduction. And the deep sense of
what this blood-contact is between Gerald and Gudrun is marvelously
effected by Lawrence's use of an animal that by its very nature is a deep
well of frequently savage, frequently mild, incomprehensibility. Once
again, the appropriate symbol is taken from simple observation of natural
life.

In the preceding discussion of *Women in Love*, it has been seen how
certain animal episodes are logistically placed so as to advance and
heighten the author's themes and intensities. Animals would naturally
occur to Lawrence because of their inevitably natural and lively behaviour.
Thus, Lawrence's symbolism may always be kept within the bounds of the
natural and the empirical. Both the symbolist and the naturalistic tech-
niques are used and the balance between these is maintained within the
rhythmic flow of the narrative. Paradoxical though it might seem, Lawrence
achieves the greatest strength of symbolic power when he is being most
successfully naturalistic.

In turning our attention towards two of Lawrence's novellas, "The
Fox" and "St. Mawr", we encounter two works that are most obviously
Bestiary - like in their overall conception. Indeed, for this reason there
is perhaps less to say of them that is not obvious to any reader. In the
novels animal episodes form an on-going relationship with the larger
narrative, but in these more condensed works the animals constitute the
governing symbolic device. Nonetheless, we may briefly look at these works
to see if the way an animal is used deviates from the patterns already
described.

"The Fox", written originally in 1918 but expanded in 1921, uses the
appearance of the literal fox to develop the conflicts that engage two women and a man. The central theme is expressed in the problems encountered by March and Banford in an attempt to run a farm and lead satisfying lives. In this relationship, March acts as the man, functioning as the mainstay of the work, while Banford is the more submissive bird-like feminine partner. There is no suggestion that the relationship is Lesbian, but it is indicated that the inability to manage things is caused by the inherent instability of the all-female arrangement. The heifers are troublesome, the chickens will not behave, but these practical problems are seen as outward manifestations of an essentially psychological and inner dichotomy. The style of life that has been opted for is fruitless, and March feels this particularly strongly.

The bane of the women's life on the farm is the marauding fox who continually steals their chickens. The fox acts, however, in a larger sense than this; his intrusion into the female environment as a male causes consternation of an alarming kind. It is March who encounters him:

She lowered her eyes, and suddenly saw the fox. He was looking up at her. Her chin was pressed down, and his eyes were looking up. They met her eyes. And he knew her. She was spellbound—she knew he knew her. So he looked into her eyes, and her soul failed her. He knew her, he was not daunted.

She struggled, confusedly, she came to herself, and saw him making off, with slow leaps over some fallen boughs, slow, impudent jumps. Then he glanced over his shoulder, and ran smoothly away. She saw his brush held smooth like a feather, she saw his white buttocks twinkle. And he was gone, softly, soft as the wind.

Here as elsewhere, Lawrence is satisfied to evoke the quality of foxness with a few impressionistic strokes rather than relying on more lengthy
descriptions. Implied within such detail as there is about the fox's physical appearance is the woman's response to him. She is "possessed" almost instantaneously, by his quick, self-confident marauding manner. The fox's subtle potency is established principally by the calm assurance of his eye, "half inviting, half contemptuous", and by the piercing "smoothness" of his fur. What this animal represents to March needs little explication. He is a male creature, full of strange potent vitality, and fulfilling a void that exists in her life with Banford.

At its most extreme but obvious implication, the fox suggests itself as a sexual force. John B. Vickery has argued persuasively that the fox is to be identified with "Dionysus as the corn-spirit,"41 in that he represents a powerful primitive fertility deity. Indeed, the tale becomes expressly totemic with the appearance of Henry Grenfell, the human embodiment of what the fox represents:

...to March he was the fox. Whether it was the thrusting forward of his head, or the glisten of fine whitish hairs on the ruddy cheek-bones, or the bright, keen eyes, that can never be said: but the boy was to be the fox, and she could not see him otherwise. (p.93)

The physical similarities between boy and fox are directly pointed to and this serves to further the transition that occurs in March's mind between man and animal. The dimly perceived sexual force of the animal becomes embodied in the demands of the man. Imagistically, Henry is constantly referred to as the hunter, like the fox, and with some amount of cunning (perhaps only partly conscious to himself) he emulates the fox's stalking of the chicken-house by stalking March, and then later, in another context, Banford.
So far, I have suggested the obvious totemic identification between Henry and the fox, his emblem, and pointed to the creatively disruptive function that both these forces serve. For Henry this will later take the form of "accidentally-on-purpose" killing Banford and marrying March. But the fox has another and perhaps broader symbolic function. He represents the dying spirit of potent England: "Since the war the fox was a demon" (p.87), and was to be expunged and rid from the land. When Henry finally comes to shoot the fox he records that "England was little and tight" and that in this constricted environment "the fox didn't have a chance" (p.121). This provides Henry with the rationale to kill the animal: better to die this way than in a trap or at the hands of people who had no sympathy for him. In so far as Henry is directly associated with the fox we must see this added symbolism as applying equally to him. If the fox "doesn't have a chance" in England then neither does Henry. What is there about Henry's fox-like character that makes life for him in England impossible? The answer to this question may be found in his embodiment of essentially Dionysian tendencies. Henry is part-demon, part animal, part pan, and all the forces of modern European life are against him. The story takes place during the Great War and we clearly feel its threatening presence as the backdrop which leads Henry to his gloomy prognostications.

F. R. Leavis claims that "The Fox" is a radically successful work of art and that it is "a study of human mating; of the attraction between a man and a woman that expresses the profound needs of each and has its meaning in a permanent union." I hold this argument to be valid, and within its
contexts we may see the informing appropriateness of Henry being invested with the most potent forces inherent in a male animal engaged in its rightful business. By this logic, even the death of Banford becomes excusable if it leads to the kind of creative union in marriage that Leavis describes. This is not to say, as some critics imply, that Lawrence is advocating murder in the cause of marriage, but is to symbolically describe the profound importance that Lawrence attaches to the male-female union as the cornerstone of individual and social stability. And if it comes to the real crunch, Lawrence implies, the proper male will make a sacrifice of the object that prevents his most intense need. Banford represents this as a woman profoundly antithetical to Henry's Dionysian personality. In this, she is a force for non-life and must not be allowed to stand in the way of life.

The horse St. Mawr stands in the same relation to Lou Witt as the fox does to March. In both stories, the central eponymous animal is conceived in very literal terms, and it is the suggestive power of this literalness that works its power within the psychology of the main protagonists. There is profound disagreement amongst critics as to the overall quality of "St. Mawr" but there is a consensus of favourable impressions as far as the device of the horse is concerned. For Eliseo Vivas, who thinks the story one of Lawrence's worst efforts, "St. Mawr embodies vitality itself, all that is wild and untameable and quivering with the creative power of the cosmos." Leavis, who ranks this story towards the top of the list, similarly argues for the authenticity of the horse: "We are made to feel--and it is an extraordinary creative triumph of the poet--that he [the horse]
represents deep impulses of life that are thwarted in the modern world. Implicit in Leavis's comment is the idea that St. Mawr signifies a force beyond itself yet integral to its very nature. Lou Witt responds profoundly to the significance of the horse where that significance is embodied in his power to be himself:

In the inner dark she saw a handsome bay horse with his clean ears pricked like daggers from his naked head as he swung handsomely round to stare at the open doorway. He had big, black brilliant eyes, with a sharp questioning glint, and that of tense, alert quietness which betrays an animal that can be dangerous.

Lou saw the brilliant skin of the horse crinkle a little in apprehensive anticipation, like the shadow of the descending hand on a bright red-gold liquid.

She laid her hand on his side, and gently stroked him. Then she stroked his shoulder, and then the hard, tense arch of his neck. And she was startled to feel the vivid heat of his life come through to her, through the lacquer of red-gold gloss. So slippery with vivid, hot life.

The horse was really glorious: like a marigold, with a pure golden sheen, a shimmer of gren-gold lacquer, upon a burning red-orange. There on the shoulder you saw the yellow lacquer glisten.

The colour imagery of these passages is especially interesting and establishes the horse as bathed in a colourful sheen of splendour. The effect is a more extensive description of the Dionysian fox, and the power this horse exerts over Lou is similarly vital. Wherever Lou is, from now on St. Mawr is a vital presence to her: "But back of it all was St. Mawr, looming like a bonfire in the dark" (p.39). Indeed, for Lou "since she had really seen St. Mawr looming fiery and terrible in an outer darkness,
she could not believe the world she lived in" (p.35). The principle at work in the live horse is strong enough to overshadow and reduce the everyday world of reality.

How do we describe the power that for Lou St. Mawr exemplifies? Kenneth Inniss is content to speak of it as a "fairly conventional emblem," but this is surely unsatisfactory. To begin with there seems nothing at all "conventional" about St. Mawr, and to characterise him as an emblem (like a flag?) is to divest him of the obvious qualities he contains. Echoing Leavis, Vivas is closer to the truth when he writes, "Within the context of the story, St. Mawr is what he is, he does not represent anything abstract, whether deep forces of life or shallow ones, nor does he stand for anything." This is an effective way of putting it, and it is just this quality of being nothing more than itself which attracts Lou. For her, he is not a symbol in the sense that he represents something other than himself.

The inevitable contrast Lou Witt makes is between the horse and her husband, Rico, and as the story develops it becomes plain that the significance of the horse bears a relation to the failure of Lou and Rico's marriage and to the general impotence of the modern male. The horse is seen to be everything that the modern male is not, and when St. Mawr throws Rico and cripples him this is seen as an outward manifestation of a spiritual paralysis that had set in much earlier and which has turned Rico's marriage into a purely 'platonic' affair. This theme clearly reminds us of the situation in Lady Chatterly's Lover in which Clifford's crippled condition is indicative of something more centrally wrong. The presence of the horse is to crystallize Lou's growing sense of what is wrong with her life.
It is not, it should be stressed, merely a matter of sex, but rather involves the ability of a man to be independently himself and for this to manifest itself in sexual as well as other terms.

The thematic and technical significance of the horse should now be clear: its essential aliveness represents "life" in a way that modern man doesn't. It is expressly the mysterious "animal" quality that is lacking in Rico, the lack of which allows him to be coddled and sentimentalized by Flora Mamby. However, it is strongly indicated that Rico does latently contain the necessary power to attract a woman like Lou:

...that was Rico. He daren't quite bit ... He was afraid of himself, once he let himself go. He didn't want to erupt like some suddenly wicked horse—Rico was really more like a horse than a dog, a horse that might go nasty any moment. For the time he was good, dangerously good.

(p.18)

Rico's latent dangerousness associates him directly with St. Mawr, but of course he never does "let himself go" and his more natural impulses remain submerged beneath his civilized surface. In this, he is radically different from Lewis, the Welsh groom, and Phoenix, the American Indian. It is the former of these that manages, understands, and sympathizes with St. Mawr, and we view him as a near human equivalent to the horse's isolated uniqueness. To a lesser extent, Phoenix is the American version of the aboriginal Briton, Lewis, and both are seen as in contact with themselves in a way denied to men like Rico.

Both Lou Witt and her mother are strangely attracted to these two men, Lou to Phoenix and Mrs. Witt to Lewis. Mrs. Witt says of Lewis, "When I speak to him I never know whether I'm speaking to a man or a horse." The
man is, on the surface at any rate, cold and hard and distant, and sees in Mrs. Witt's affection for him only a willful condescension which precludes the kind of stern respect that he would demand from any woman who he would let touch his body (p.115). Lou develops a similar but far less intense interest in Phoenix, and both women increasingly turn towards men they consider invested with some of the attributes of St. Mawr; both women explore profoundly the idea of discovering men that are the human aspects of the horse. Take, for example, this long quotation in which the theme of man and animals emerges in a instructive way:

'I wonder how old a man Lewis is, Louise! Didn't he look absurdly young, with his ears pricking up?'
'I think Rico said he was forty or forty-one."
'And never been married?'
'No, not as far as I know.'
'Isn't that curious now! -- just an animal! no mind! A man with no mind! I've always thought that the most despicable thing. Yet such wonderful hair to touch. Your Henry has quite a good mind, yet I would simply shrink from touching his hair. I suppose one likes stroking a cat's fur, just the same. Just the animal in man. Curious that I never seem to have met it, Louise. Now I come to think of it, he has the eyes of a human cat: a human tom-cat. Would you call him stupid? Yes, he's very stupid.'

'Why mother ... I think one gets so tired of your men with mind, as you call it ... It seems to me there's something else besides mind and cleverness, or niceness or cleanliness. Perhaps it is the animal. Just think of St. Mawr! I've thought so much about him. We call him an animal, but we never know what it means. He seems a far greater mystery to me than a clever man. He's a horse. Why can't one say in the same way: He's a man? There seems no mystery in being a man. But there's a terrible mystery in St. Mawr ... I love St. Mawr because he isn't intimate ... Why can't men get their life straight, like St. Mawr, and then think? ... And don't misunderstand me, mother. I don't want to be an animal like a horse or a cat or a lioness, though they all fascinate me, the way they get their life straight, not from a lot of old tanks, as we do. I don't admire the cave man, and that sort of thing. But think, mother, if we could get our lives straight from the source, as the animals do, and still be ourselves ... I don't consider the cave man is a
real human animal at all. He's a brute, a degenerate. A pure animal man would be as lovely as a deer or a leopard, burning like a flame fed straight from underneath ... He'd be all the animals in turn, instead of one fixed, automatic thing, which he is now, grinding on the nerves. Ah, no, mother, I want the wonder back again, or I shall die.

(pp.354-58)

It is clear that what Lou so earnestly wants she is unlikely to get. Her vision of manhood in which man becomes "a pure animal" after which he begins to "think" properly and not like a "talking head", is not attainable. But this fact does not in any way vitiate the authenticity of the intensely felt and rightly conceived desire. In terms of the novella, the reader feels that Lou's position is the centrally intelligent one, and the one that Lawrence himself endorses. And the way that Lou arrives at an understanding of what man could be at his best is through the catalytic power of an animal; for Lawrence, we feel that this vital coming into consciousness could not come about by a more potent and instructive source. Of course, the horse itself fades away towards the end of the work, but this occurs not because St. Mawr "is an inadequate focus of what Lawrence wishes to reveal," but because the horse is completely effective as the precipitating way that is not synonymous with the end. Once the horse has served its symbolic function, like so many of Lawrence's animals, it is allowed to regain a more usual focus as an animal living an animal's life, and the power of its symbolic moment requires that this be so.

Thus, when the horse has faded into the background, Lou finds that her consciousness is greatly expanded through contact with him, but that now "even the illusion of the beautiful St. Mawr" is gone. Coming into fuller consciousness, for Lou, does not imply beauty but rather sharp
apprehensions of the bitter struggle that her new vision demands. Gone too is the idea that the more "animal" Phoenix can meet her requirements; he is an Indian with different demands of a white woman, and Lou recognises that he is an inferior being. There is no sentimental illusion that a 'primitive' is in fact nearer to the best "source"; mental consciousness must play its part in man's evolution towards being a "pure animal" and sinking into an Indian torpor is a regression. Phoenix, though perfectly suited to his own society, is insufficient or less of an "animal" than Lou in fact wants: what she wants is expressed in the definition of man which runs "an animal who thinks".

For Lawrence, this implies that man is capable of being more than a horse, or a leopard, because of his thinking potential. Lawrence recognised that it is useless to pretend that thinking, in its right relation to the rest of man, is a perversion. It is an evil, however, when in men like Rico it becomes the substitute for a broader sense of animal life and thereby prevents man from developing and refining his true animal nature. Examples taken from wild animal life may indeed show us the way and the error of our ways. In this notion of finding significance through observing natural animals, and in recognising the purely animal advantages that man has over other species, we find the kernel of what the true Bestiary is about. Seen in this way, the Bestiary becomes a powerful literary tool in exploring the human condition and asking radically important questions about it.
PART III: BEASTLY MAN IN
WELLS, GARNETT, and COLLIER

When a vast image out of Spiritus Mundi
Troubles my sight: somewhere in sands of the desert
A shape with lion body and the head of a man,
A gaze blank and pitiless as the sun,
Is moving its slow thighs, while all about it
Reel shadows of the indignant desert birds.
The darkness drops again; but now I know
That twenty centuries of stony sleep
Were vexed to nightmare by a rocking cradle,
And what rough beast, its hour come round at last,
Slouches towards Bethlehem to be born?

("The Second Coming", W. B. Yeats.)
In the previous sections of this study we have encountered and explored the kind of animal fiction that we are most familiar with. The third part however discusses types of fiction that are more obscure and which suggest interests not in the animal as real but rather as psychological projection. These more unusual examples of Bestiary art rely on differing kinds of animal metamorphoses whereby the direct intermingling of human and animal qualities embodies the author's themes. In this process, the animal is used more as a literary device whose significance only reflects the author's interest in human beings. This kind of literature is emphatically not interested in animals as real natural objects deserving due consideration as unique and worthy. Rather, the tendency is to denigrate the animal and to use it as evidence of the potentially negative aspects of man's character. All three authors with whom Part III is concerned reflect Darwinian thinking and each represents repetitions and variations on such earlier writers of animal literature as Swift, Ovid, and Apuleius.

The question what distinguishes man from the other animals has always been very vexed. Man has recognised that through his greater skills he can eventually overcome and control the other species, but there has also always been the nagging sense of certain unmistakable similarities. Religious doctrines, particularly in the West, have found their own ways of describing what they feel to be man's inherent superiority, but not every civilization has sought to be as categoric on this question as the Christian. The Hindu and Buddhist views of animal life stand as obvious instances of this. In the pre-Christian world too, there is evidence that man did not strive to divorce himself from the other animals. Going back
a long way, Paleolithic man painted animals on cave walls as part of pre-kill rituals, and during this process the priests would dress up as animals and through a process of "sympathetic magic" attempt to become the animal. It is not merely a question of imitation but of direct psychic absorption.

In the early Greek drama too, Jane Harrison has argued that both Tragedy and Comedy sprang from beast fertility rites, vestiges of which remain in Aristophanes' work. Perhaps more important than this, however, is Ovid's Metamorphoses which, in collecting all the extant mythical stories, relies extensively on the interchangeability of man and animal, or man and less animate objects. A more humorous version of this kind of mixing is found in Apuleius' The Golden Ass, in which the author is transformed into an Ass and passes from owner to owner observing and reporting on the follies and vices of men. There are also, of course, countless folk-tales in many different languages in which man turns into a beast and vice versa.

From the variety of man-animal transformations briefly alluded to, we can see that the impulse inherent in it suggests a profoundly strong psychological relationship and bond between different species. Even in a work like Gulliver's Travels in which the Houynhnhnms talk and expose themselves as intelligent and civilized, we see remnants of this old bond. It may be indeed that more modern and literary forms of Bestiary art such as the fable, allegory, and satire, are formalized developments of this more immediate connection, and that the conventions hide and conceal elemental associations.

Of course, examples of magical depictions of the mutuality of human and animal life belong to a primitive and less sophisticated way of looking at things—or such is our convenient interpretation. Modern man sees
examples of metamorphosis as belonging to the world of fairy-tale and superstition, with little or no value apart from historical and anthropological research. But with the advent of the Darwinian era and proof of evolutionary development, there came about a change in this line of thinking which prompted some men into a new perspective. It occurred to some that if indeed wild Nature is savage, ruthless, and merciless—the pessimistic gloss on Darwinian theory—and we belong to that same Nature, then we must be sure that our ethical evolution out of such abhorrent atavism is secure. Seen in this way, the predatory animal and its instincts become the enemy and any vestiges of these instincts in man a danger to be guarded against. If man has evolved out of lower forms, why may he not regress to a bestial condition? Of course, we recognise this conception of animal life as nothing more than a fantasy, a peculiar mirror-image perhaps of what man most fears within himself; wild life both in and out of man is clearly not the threat that this view presupposes. But writers like H. G. Wells seem to have seriously entertained the idea and consequently represented fictional animals in this way. Wells also gave representation to the idea that man's animal origins could rise to the surface and overcome his unguarded civilized self. Sometimes, too, he depicts unpleasant animals suddenly evolving at a prodigious rate and destroying man. As a student of science, Wells relied on what he knew (and what he guessed) about vivisection to provide the vehicle for his adaptation of the metamorphosis theme. Thus, he found a new way of seriously suggesting a very ancient transfiguration, and whereas a primitive perhaps saw the interrelatedness of animal life as wonderful, Wells saw it
as unthinkable. The disintegrative belief in man's inherent superiority was very deeply ingrained in Wells' way of thinking, and this found expression through a very instructive medium of psychological fiction.

With the growing acceptance of, and complacency with, Darwinian thought, such fears and concerns tended to subside. After all, people realized that in day to day life it mattered not at all that we are derived from the same root as a monkey. In literature too, though it was not quite forgotten, the intensities became less and the presentation more consciously 'literary'. Thus we find a writer like David Garnett deliberately playing on Darwinian ideas within an adaptation of the Ovidian model of metamorphosis. It is too reductive to explain this away as only a literary caprice; in directly relying on the change of form from a woman to a fox, Garnett draws upon a deep psychological impulse which becomes manifest in the tensions between a man and a woman. Doubtless, this is what caused the phenomenal sales of Lady Into Fox. But it should be said that these tensions are not so potently present as they are in Ovid or even, for example, in Kafka; Garnett is a careful writer but one who does not feel and represent life intensely. Nonetheless, his work represents the modern British extension of the older Ovidian formula and there are some informing modifications that are of interest to us.

A similar 'literary' development of the ideas fundamental to Darwin is found in John Collier, whose work relies on the frequently satirized "Monkey Theory". Picking up and extending earlier evolutionary satires Collier uses a monkey as a satiric device to point out certain deficiencies prevalent in London society of the Bloomsbury era. In this, he partly
depends on the Apuleian model where the juxtapositioning of an animal in a human world draws out obvious comments and contrasts. The technique and theme is also similar to Swift's in that by endowing an animal with human thought (if not human speech) Collier ironically exposes man's vanities and especially his much-vaunted superiority of "reason". In this way, animals may be used as literary tools appropriate to ridicule man's self-importance. In a more philosophical vein, Montaigne was about much the same business, and it is clear that the technique is not without its astringent and cautionary advantages. With Collier especially, the technique is greatly enhanced by a very keen sense of humour.

H. G. WELLS

In 1884 H. G. Wells entered the Normal School in South Kensington, and it was this experience, and particularly his brief encounter with T. H. Huxley, that was to shape much of his thinking over the rest of his life. It is important to remember that Huxley was then at the height of his powers and taught at the Normal School with the powerful motive of establishing within the curricula of English schools evolutionary science in all its vigour. Wells had worked hard to win his scholarship to study with Huxley, and even though he only took one lecture course from him, it becomes evident that Huxley's views, especially on the relationship between man and animal, Nature and morality, were to influence the younger man's thinking.

T. H. Huxley's Romanes lecture at Oxford on "Evolution and Ethics" made very clear what he thought the relationship between science and Nature must be. He did not blanch from depicting the world of Nature as cruel,
harsh and indifferent to man, out of which he must struggle if human survival is to be possible. Darwin's theories of evolution and the relationship between man and animal had effectively interrupted traditional theological belief (for the present time at least), but at the same time had destroyed the kinds of moral structure that could give life purpose and inherent dignity. New ethical and philosophical mores were needed if man was to feel sure he was more than the chance end-product of adaptation. Man, the argument runs, has developed an ethical sense and a cosmological frame of reference that earnestly strives to learn the meaning of existence. Despite our undeniable association with the anthropoid apes, the quality of self-conscious system-building makes us essentially different in degree. The more developed a society becomes, Huxley argues, the further away man gets from the meaningless round of reproduction and death; the nearer he gets in fact to an ethical responsibility that transcends the purely natural and animal:

Social progress means a checking of the cosmic process at every step and the substitution of it of another, which may be called the ethical process; the end of which is not the survival of those who may happen to be the fittest, in respect of the whole of the conditions which obtain, but of those who are ethically the best.  

It should be noted that there are two ideas fundamental to Huxley's conception of the nature of human reality. On the one hand there was Nature, our purely animal selves, which was blind to everything except the mechanical forces of survival and propagation. On the other hand, there was man, who, for whatever reason, had developed an ethical sense in the face of brute Nature; this latter quality was intimately connected
with the human powers of rational and humane thought and feeling. Christianity reconciled itself to evolution by insisting that man was the highest product of genetic variation and was therefore closer to God than any other form of life, and through this view maintained a vision of life that was progressive and which argued for a yet higher purpose. In this view, the notion that the will of God was still being unravelled and that there was cause to be optimistic about the future was assumed, and this belief gave reason and purpose to human life. Huxley rejected this view, and did not see man's future as necessarily progressive. Humane evolution depended very directly on moral struggle against the animal from which we have sprung. The alternative to this struggle, passive progressivism, could lead to regressive evolution in which humanity became ever more like the lower animals.

It was Huxley's notion about the possibility of regression into animality that was especially to fire the young Wells' imagination and which was to cause his production of stories and novels that discuss the precariousness of human superiority over the lower animals and over the part of himself which was animal still. Wells seems to have been fascinated and horrified with these ideas, for a time at least, and as a result sought artistic expression for them. Taking off from the ideas he would have learned from Huxley and from the intellectual milieu of the new science, Wells attempted to present a picture of regressive evolution and of sudden and horrible spurts of rapid evolution by barbaric lower forms of life. On the other hand, he also tried to clarify the philosophical possibilities of regressive evolution so that people could see ever more
clearly that the future of man depends "not on imitating the cosmic process... but in combating it", not in becoming reconciled to our animality but in fighting it.

In the two related ideas of human regression into animality and the ethical sensibility necessary to prevent this from happening, we find the axis on which so much of Wells' writing revolves. The first idea finds very full discussion in the early Wells within his scientific romances, and the latter is a theme which comprises the bulk of Wells' writing in the present century in which his insistence on a world political organization is to be found. It is the former idea however which this study is interested in, since here we find a radical view of animals and of the man-animal relationship. Animals as real, alive objects rarely appear in Wells' works. Rather, the animal life he depicts so powerfully is that which attempts to usurp man's place or which represents the level to which man could regress on the infinitely flexible ladder of evolution. As V. S. Pritchett has remarked, in Wells "the slimy, the viscous, the foetal reappear; one sees the sticky, shapeless messes of pond life, preposterous in instinct, and frighteningly without mind." What Wells in fact conjures up is a world of animal life that has regressed on the evolutionary timescale and which now represents the haunting phantasies of a mind profoundly uncertain of its own future and of the future of the human species.

It is with The Island of Dr. Moreau (1896) that we see Wells' most fully developed discussion of the dual and conflicting relationship within man of Nature and reason, the animal and the human. In 1924 Wells, reflecting on this novel, provided his readers with a poignant and significant account
of its ideological bases:

It is a theological grotesque, and the influence of Swift is very apparent in it. There was a scandalous trial about that time, the graceless and pitiless downfall of a man of genius, and this story was the response of an imaginative mind to the reminder that humanity is but animal rough-hewn to a reasonable shape and in perpetual internal conflict between instinct and imagination ... It is written just to give the utmost possible vividness to that conception of man as hewn and confused and tormented beasts. When the reader comes to read the writings upon history in this collection, he will find the same idea of man as a re-shaped animal no longer in flaming caricature but as a weighed and settled conviction.

The central argument behind this depressing statement suggests that man's egotistical idea of his ordained predominance over the other animals is based upon a misapprehension of what man actually is. This idea receives its strongest reinforcement from the composite beasts that inhabit Moreau's island. But Wells' tendency to depict man as nothing more than a renegade animal is dealt with in stories outside of this novel, and before we look closely at The Island some account of these should be given. In doing so we will note how Wells' understanding of the nature of man gives rise to what Norman and Jeanne Mackenzie describe as "unconscious fears and fantasies [that] set the archaic monsters ... in a modern scientific context". The deeply-felt fear of the beast, a fear perhaps of imminent psychological terror, is never far from Wells' imagination, which conjures up an animal nature ungoverned and ungovernable by the socializing forces of ethical behaviour.

In 1895 Wells published a short essay called "The Extinction of Man", in which the idea of evolutionary gloom is manifested with full potency: "It is part of the excessive egotism of the human animal that the bare idea
Wells argues that man's eventual extinction could very well be precipitated by other animals whose evolutionary potential might suddenly make them ascendant. In particular, he refers to large predatory crabs, cephalopods, and giant ants, all of which, Wells feels, have the potential to overcome humanity. The final apocalyptic tone is struck when Wells warns: "Even, now, for all we can tell the coming terror may be crouching for its spring and the fall of humanity be at hand." It should be stressed here that Wells' tone suggests he is speaking seriously and is not merely encouraging the kind of sensational feelings that consort well with the sales of books.

There are four short stories that deal with this theme: "The Sea-Raiders", "The Empire of the Ants", "In the Abyss", and "The Avu Observatory." The usual narrative pattern of these stories concerns the appearance of strange threatening beasts, often in remote or far-flung locations. The beasts, or beast, when they appear, do so with the unexpected force and ferociousness that epitomises our worst and most exaggerated fears of beastly creatures; the fear is essentially of the imagination, much like that associated with the fear of any unknown quantity. All of these stories, in one way or another, serve to reinforce the ideas already discussed and all serve as a warning to what Wells characterises as an unbelieving public.

"The Sea-Raiders" is set close to home along the Devonshire coast, yet the real habitation of the monsters we are introduced to is the unknown and unchartered empires below the surface of the sea. With the mock objectivity of a disinterested scientific observer, the narrator introduces
us rather abstractly to the species called 'Haploleuthis Ferox'. He engages in spurious scientific disputation in an attempt to offer factual proof of what he is to relate, but finally abandons this on the pretext that concrete scientific data simply is not available. We see in this technique, typical of Wells, the gesture towards science, a gesture which cannot finally be fulfilled since the very stuff of Wells' writings is the product of a scientific imagination projecting itself into an unknown future. But the tone of the narrative voice serves its function in establishing the credibility of the story. In fact, we are led to believe that Wells is merely repeating a verbatim historical account of an incident chilling in its factuality. Without this technique, and it is a technique supremely well done, there would be little compulsion on the part of the reader to accept the seriousness of the warning that Wells is offering.

The narrative describes the events that befell the Devon coast and which were witnessed by a Mr. Fison. We are told that Fison is "the first one to survive" after seeing the horrible and man-devouring cephalopods, and we are to assume from this that these sea-monsters are extremely carnivorous and are directly responsible for the recent "wave of bathing fatalities and boating accidents". Fison's initial view of the cephalopods is evoked with the full power of Wells' lurid and festering imagination:

The rounded bodies fell apart as he came into sight over the ridge, and displayed the pinkish object to be the partially devoured body of a human being, but whether of a man or woman he was unable to say. And the rounded bodies were new and ghastly-looking creatures, in shape somewhat resembling an octopus, and with huge and very long and flexible tentacles, coiled copiously on the ground. The skin had a glistening texture, unpleasant to see, like shiny leather. The downward bend of the tentacle-surrounded mouth, the curious excrescence of the bend, the tentacles, and the large intelligent eyes, gave the creature a grotesque suggestion of a face. They were
the size of a fair-sized swine about the body, and the tentacles seemed to him to be many feet in length.

I have quoted this passage in full to convey something of Wells' strength in picturing forms of animal life that threaten merely by the ugliness of their appearance; it is a strength comparable with that of Swift, and it should be said that Wells seems to wallow in his own evocations. The effect of the "suggestion of a face", reinforced by the "evil intent" with which their eyes regard Fison, combine to give the cephalopods a strong aura of cunning intelligence. These beasts, it is implied, exemplify preternatural vestiges of human thought and thus are able to select and outwit their victims. What is important for us to note is the mixed qualities of the human and the bestial within a life-form that opposes humanity. Implicit in this mixed identity is both a fear of newly evolved beasts and a fear of man's lessening powers to stave off the threat that is exposed.

The narrative continues, reaching its climax when Fison and some other men row out to sea to engage the monsters in an attempt to save the "women and children" whose boat is drifting dangerously close to the cephalopods. Their efforts are seen as pitifully inadequate; the sea belongs to beings other than man and it is useless for him to wage a war in that element. All except Fison are killed, and the cephalopods do not spare women and children.

The monsters in "The Sea-Raiders" are composite beasts, comprised of octopus and the mental capabilities of man, and to this extent they are fictitious. Within "The Empire of the Ants" it is the common ant that
constitutes a bestial threat to man. However, these ants are peculiar in that they seem possessed of an inordinate amount of scheming intelligence, through which they plan to take over the world. We have become familiar with such fantasies today, perhaps too familiar, largely because of the endless stream of science-fiction that Wells helped to spawn. But we should not assume that Wells is merely indulging his sense of the sensational; as he records in "Man and Extinction":

A world devoured by ants seems incredible now, simply because it is not within our experience; but a naturalist would have a dull imagination who could not see in the numerous species of ants, and in their already high intelligence, far more possibility of strange developments than we have in the solitary human animal.

The story of "The Empire of the Ants" concerns the efforts of Holroyd, a young Lancashire engineer, and Gerilleau, a Creole Sea-Captain, to help some local Brazilians fight a plague of monster ants. Holroyd is inexperienced and this is his first mission away from England where "nature is hedged, ditched and drained into the perfection of submission" (p.93). In the remote regions of a foreign and unknown continent, he makes the private discovery that "man is indeed a rare animal, having but a precarious hold upon this land". Just how precarious this hold is becomes the subject of the story. A peculiarity of the strain of ant which Holroyd is faced with is its ability to inject its victims with a deadly poison; its victims are most often human. Like the cephalopods, these ants represent a powerful threat to mankind and they are also endowed with the disconcerting trait of watching men with consciously evil intent. There are millions of these ants and when Holroyd asks himself 'Who is master here?', he notes:
In a few thousand years men had emerged from barbarism to a stage of civilization that made them feel lords of the future and masters of the earth! ... Suppose presently the ants began to store knowledge, just as men had done by means of books and records, use weapons, form great empires, sustain a planned and organized war?

(p.98)

These speculations are exaggerated and intensified, especially when Wells dwells on the spectacle of a horde of ants swarming a human carcass. The ants are described vividly and it appears that the leaders may be distinguished by "white bands with metal threads" strapped about their bodies. After the death of several crew members, civilized man retreats, beaten temporarily by the ants and by the fear they engender. The narrative at this point discontinues, and, following the formula of the disinterested observer, the narrator takes over and brings us up to date, prophecying when the ants will finally reach Europe. The tone of voice is factual and the impression that Wells wishes to convey is one of straightforward reality. But this tone is deceptive in that whereas at one moment the narrator says plausibly enough that the ants are a "serious pest", in the next he is claiming that they have a system whereby they "manufacture" the poison with which they kill human beings. This implausibility is almost lost in the matter-of-fact tone, and it is this sense of understated impossibility that lends added credibility to Wells' affective abilities.

The stories "In the Abyss" and "The Avu Observatory" discuss the themes we have already described. In both, a frighteningly novel bird or beast appears and horrifies man. The former is set in the deepest ocean and the latter in the thick density of the Malay jungle. Wells' constant recourse to far-flung spots provides him with locations that Europeans wouldn't know;
giant ants in Surbiton are less plausible than in the remote regions of Brazil. But of more importance than this is the common tendency within all these stories to evoke beasts that exhibit signs of latent humanity. All seem to be in various stages of evolutionary development, inferior to that reached by man, but gaining fast. These beasts represent natural agents engaged in the bitter struggle for evolutionary predominance, unrestrained by any ethical sense: they are brute animal nature at its most intensely atavistic. In essence, this is how Wells saw the undisturbed world of animal nature, and it was the precarious achievement of humanity to have curbed these impulses and to have devised ways of improving them. But the victory is not complete, he argues, and the unregenerate beast still lurks in the remote regions of the world—or, more properly, within the remote regions of Wells' psyche.

This vision of animality reoccurs in The Time Machine. Within this novel, perhaps Wells' most famous, we witness a terrifying view of the future as it has degenerated. Implicitly, this novel sought to undermine the notion, fallacious to Wells' thinking, that society was becoming progressively better as a natural consequence of the evolutionary forces in the natural man. The Time Machine functions as an ironic inversion of this optimistic gloss since although time runs forward, thus giving the illusion of advancement, the time traveller describes only the utter bestial degradation of humanity. Both the Eloi and the Morlocks, the two remaining life forms on Earth in the year 802701, have become either fey beasts that are fit only for slaughter or the monstrous beasts that are to slaughter them.
The admixture of the human and the animal is made clear within the Eloi and Morlocks, and it is apparent that these genetic mutants represent the two ways that the man of the future may go. The time traveller first meets the Eloi who he initially considers beautiful creatures inhabiting a paradisal state; they are more delicate versions of William Morris' people in News From Nowhere. But this view is soon vitiated when their marshmallow-like personalities become manifest; they are spineless and characterless, the product of a perfect but degenerate genetic variation. The time traveller spells out how their situation is a result of the progressive scientific outlook of a class elite: "Under the new conditions of perfect comfort and security, that restless energy, that with us is strength, would become weakness." By abandoning all fear, pain, and effort the Eloi have become merely sentimental and bovine animals.

The Morlocks represent the opposite extreme—animal degeneracy through brutality. The original social division between the Eloi and Morlocks came about as the result of a severely imposed class distinction; the Eloi were the ruling technocratic elite while the Morlocks were their slaves, the great unwashed menials. After the Eloi had accomplished all the goals that they had set for themselves, they had gone soft and as a result the Morlocks had taken control. Brute force now ruled the world, and this is Wells' gloomy prognostication for the future of humanity—or at least one of its possibilities. The time traveller's first encounter with the Morlocks is suitably disconcerting: "The old instinctive dread of wild beasts came upon me" (p.49). These human beasts live under ground in complete darkness and in this environment the traveller's encounters with them are entirely
tactile: "I put out my hand and touched something soft" (p.49). These queer ape-like humans hold their heads downwards, and very clearly we are back in the world of the cephalopods and the strange underwater creatures of "In The Abyss", and the response that is evoked within the reader is essentially the same.

In a moment I was clutched by several hands, and there was no mistaking that they were trying to haul me back. I struck another light, and waved it in their dazzled faces. You can scarce imagine how nauseatingly inhuman they looked - those pale, chinless faces and great lidless, pinkish-grey eyes. (p.58)

The grasping hands of preternatural bestiality are clutching at a human in an effort to bring him down to their level, and this vision, symbolic as well as literal, is deliberately thrust before the reader's perceptions.

The conclusion that the time traveller and the reader draws from these experiences is not difficult to discern: the future holds in store two options both of which represent alternate kinds of human depravity. On the one hand there is the fatuous paradise of the Eloi, and on the other the demonic nastiness of the Morlocks. This polarized situation seems at once to convey the two opposite extremes of evolutionary potential and both are equally pessimistic. As Bernard Bergonzi has pointed out, the contrast between a futuristic heaven and a futuristic hell is archetypally "mythical", but the battle is not an open one since in sheer terms of political power it is the Morlocks, described characteristically as "apes, lemurs, worms, spiders, ants, and rats" that finally rule the world. The point being made, frenzied and far-fetched though it may seem to us, is that in the struggle between the human and the animal instincts it is the animal that will win. They win because mental evolution, in isolation from the
more elemental forces and in default of a moral sensibility that will recognise the error of a class-ridden society, leads to an atrophied state of life.

The Time Machine is, of course, set in the future, but the fears it gives rise to are rooted very deeply in England of the late 19th Century. This fear concerning the relationship between humanity and animality reaches its apex, or some would say its zenith, with The Island of Dr. Moreau, surely one of the most brutal novels in the English language. Reviewers and critics responded to this brutality in unequivocal terms; to Chalmers Mitchell, Wells had "put out his talent to the most flatigious usury"; he claims that Wells' insistence on forcing "blood in the sink 'brown and red'" is a travesty of good taste and scientific vraisemblance. Wells defended himself from charges of sensationalism by saying that "it is the best work" he had done up to that time, and charging that to read it "as a mere shocker" is to miss its satirical edge. It may well be true, as Bergonzi has argued, that "the horrified reaction of many readers can be seen not as merely a response to passages of bad taste in the book, but, more significantly, as an unconscious recognition of the implication of its symbolism". Whether or not this psychological interpretation is valid, what is certain is that The Island "takes us into an abyss of human nature", a world where the distinction between man and beast is as unstable as Dr. Jekyll's personality.

The story occurs in a far-flung spot somewhere in the middle of the ocean and is written in the form of a journal. In the characteristic Wellsian fashion, the narrator is detached and merely recites the story as
it was penned by his uncle; he is at some pains to point out that there can be no proof in support of the journal's factuality. His uncle, a young scientist called Edward Prendick is shipwrecked and finds himself rescued by a boat carrying wild animals to Dr. Moreau's remote island. This Moreau, we learn, is engaged in creating beast-men and composite animals through the skillful art of vivisection. Interestingly, Wells recorded in an appended note that "there can be no denying that whatever scientific credibility attaches to the details of this story, the manufacture of monsters—and perhaps even of quasi-human monsters—is within the possibilities of vivisection".21

Dr. Moreau exerts a sinister power over his creatures by virtue of the pain that he inflicted on them during their transformation, and the frequent reminder that this pain could once again be experienced ensures their blind obedience. In the peculiar society of the human beasts who inhabit the island, Dr. Moreau is looked to as a god who is feared and respected; these beings manage to preserve their precarious hold on some semblance of humanity by their almost ecstatic repetition of what is called the "Laws of the Sayer". It is the hypnotic quality of this refrain that enables the beast-men to repress their thinly hidden bestial and wild selves. But while Prendick is on the island things go awry and the beast-men revert to their primitive condition and become savagely cruel. They attack and eventually kill Moreau and his assistants, leaving only the Darwinian-Evolutionist Prendick alive. At first, he toys with the idea of assuming Moreau's role as the pain-inflicting god but eventually succumbs to part-bestial instincts himself, living amidst the beast-men in a precarious
enmity. Finally, he makes a fortuitous escape and returns to England, disturbed and depressed by the nightmare possibility of all men, wherever they may live and however stable and humane the society appears to be, reverting to their fundamentally bestial natures.

Horror and disgust are the two qualities that Wells especially stresses in his descriptions of Prendick's encounter with the sub-human metamorphosed beast-men. Before Prendick even arrives on the island, he meets M'ling, one of Moreau's mutant assistants:

The thing came to me as stark inhumanity. That black figure with its eyes of fire, struck down through all my adult thoughts and feelings, and for a moment the forgotten horrors of childhood came back to my mind.22

Later, the beast-boatmen cause in Prendick "a queer spasm of disgust", and when he finally comes upon the band of creatures who roam wild in the forest, he realizes what it is about them that so disturbs him:

Suddenly, as I watched their grotesque and unaccountable gestures, I perceived clearly for the first time what it was that had offended me, what had given me the two inconsistent and conflicting impressions of utter strangeness and yet of the strangest familiarity. The three creatures engaged in this mysterious rite were human in shape, and yet human beings with the strangest air about them of some familiar animal. Each of these creatures, despite its human form, its rag of clothing, and the rough humanity of its bodily form, had woven into it, into its movements, into the expression of its countenance, into its whole presence, some now irresistible suggestion of a hog, a swinish taint, the unmistakable mark of the beast.

(pp.50-51)

The nausea that grips Prendick is prompted then by the disturbing vestiges of humanity that exist within a form otherwise wholly bestial. The kind of feeling aroused by this is doubtless as ancient as the primal imagination and relies for its literary effect on the communication of intense personal
disgust.

Whereas the broad effect of The Island depends very directly on these shock tactics evoked within the brutally descriptive narrative, it should be recognised that Wells has clearly intended to suggest ideas of a more philosophical bent. The most obvious implications involve the notions of Darwinian thought that we have earlier described in relation to T. H. Huxley. The beast folk contain within themselves the dual characteristics of humanity and bestiality, and this position has been achieved through the scientific contrivances of the brutally unethical Moreau. Moreau, it is implied, represents a creator equivalent to god. In this god-like status, however, Moreau is not the beneficent deity of Christian orthodoxy. This travesty of the traditional God, clearly implied by Wells, is doubtless what shocked so many of his contemporaries, and we see in this inversion and parody of godhead satire of a persuasive force. Moreau must be seen as a demonic figure, single-mindedly fulfilling his mechanistic designs as a personified god whose ways are those of a cruel and amoral Nature. He is, in fact, a parodic and personified form of the Darwinian process of nature and it can be plainly appreciated that his ways are horrendously cruel and ultimately purposeless. However, in his egotistical belief that he can play the god-nature role Moreau is himself subject to the irony of his own beliefs; his power is human and all too limited. Eventually, he is overcome and destroyed by the beings whom he thought he controlled. In a manner strongly reminiscent of Stevenson's Dr. Jekyll, the beast-men slowly but surely revert, and it is not hard to see in this a parable of man; with the death of Moreau the reversion becomes that much quicker.
When there is a god-figure, apparently in control, laying down the "Law" for man to follow, man will toe the line and maintain a balance of civilization over animal chaos. But as soon as this control is lifted, as soon, that is, that god dies, then the beast will emerge from the depths of its soul to obliterate futile attempts at civilization. The death of God was a strong theme at the turn of the Century, and the debate over Darwinian biology, suggested most forcefully by the well-publicized dispute between Huxley and Bishop Wilberforce, could only have complicated this theological conundrum.

The full effectiveness of the beast-men's hold on civilized life is offered through their reliance on the "law of the Sayer". This general use of a "law" is probably derived from Kipling's *Jungle Books* which appeared a year before *The Island*, and it is clear that Wells' conscious use of such a talismanic code serves an ironic purpose. As we may recall, Kipling's fablistic *Jungle Books* are a social allegory that attempt to offer a rational exposition of social stability through the endearing metaphor of the "Law of the Jungle". The boy-scout fraternity of the pack and the mutual responsibility of most of the animals within the jungle forms a paradigm and an allegory of social behaviour. However, in Wells' *The Island* the "Law" chanted by the beast-men becomes a horrible parody of the stable order Kipling tried to depict.

Not to go on all-fours; that is the Law. Are we not Men?
Not to suck up Drink; that is the Law. Are we not Men?
Not to eat Flesh nor Fish; that is the Law. Are we not Men?
Not to claw bark of Trees; that is the Law. Are we not Men?
Not to chase other Men; that is the Law. Are we not Men?

(pp.72-73)
The answer to this pitiful rhetorical question is made fully evident in their gradual decline. The beast-folk are in fact gross parodies of men, forced into an illusory self-concept through the evil agency of Dr. Moreau. The concept of Law, a concept that Kipling embraced as a force necessary to protect civilization, is here fundamentally disparaged and reduced to an idiotic chant of sub-human intensity. As a governing and controlling power, the Law is revealed in Wells as fragile as glass and quite as transparent. Man, Wells implies, will return to a chaos of unregenerate animality if left to his own devices, and this Nature is unremittingly red in tooth and claw.

Wells' implied fear that when social controls are loosened the beast in man emerges occurs within the fictional setting of a remote island on which man is represented in highly exaggerated form as a composite creature. But Wells is careful to extend his idea and his geographical location and brings the action back into his contemporary England. Even when Prendick is home, fear and horror continually overcome him and the relationship between the beast-men of the island and the ordinary London people is made quite obvious:

And I go in fear. I see faces keen and bright, others dull or dangerous, others unsteady, insincere; none that have the calm authority of a reasonable soul. I feel as though the animal was surging up through them; that presently the degradation of the Islanders will be played over again on a larger scale. (p.171)

Of course, the narrative plays this down as an illusion, the last vestige of a psychological trauma. But this narrative is a deceptive ploy, a device to ironically suggest what it attentively denies. The manifest implication
is that what happened on Moreau's island is an exaggerated account of what could happen in England and particularly in London where the usual procedures of civilized life are lost amidst the blank impersonality of the crowd mentality. Society is not in fact progressing through the ever-onwards march of human evolution, but is merely shoring up the sagging defences against the internal beast. This fear, this predisposition to consider the worst possible evolutionary reversal, is clearly founded on a profound anxiety about the relationship between man and animal. The exaggerated form in which this fear or concern is presented also suggests that Wells saw this early work as a sharp warning and reminder to men that if society is to prosper it takes a high degree of conscious awareness, especially in the moral or ethical sphere.

In the early Wells that we have looked at, the dialectical struggle between the human and the animal impulses have become more than apparent. It is worth stressing that Wells' interest was not remotely connected with any kind of naturalistic concern with animals, and that when animals appear they are phantoms on the cusp between man and beast. Wells' art here is an imaginary zoo with real ghosts in it. His use of the man-beast theme is tied up very closely with certain philosophical notions derived from Darwin and Huxley. Throughout his life Wells was concerned with the question of man's place in nature and with the principles, humane and moral, on which human survival was worth having. As his ideas passed through Fabianism and then into more idealistic notions of ethical and global salvation, the guiding spirit that sustained his progressive attitude was his insistence that in a world without a benevolent deity, man needed to
muster every resource at his command. In his early beast stories and novels, we see his exaggerated view of what the alternative to positive humanity might be if the struggle against Nature is relaxed. The pain, fear, and desolation that man invariably feels at being the centre of an indifferent Universe result in primordial fears of the beastly origins of man to which it was possible to regress. In no example of earlier literature, including Swift, can there be found instances of a similarly disturbed and disturbing imagination. Yet this disturbance had its benefits for Wells in that once he had released these deeply felt nightmares, he was free to enlarge his vision and begin the struggle for a humane world. In the 1890's Wells was perhaps caught in that twilight world of the end of faith and before the acceptance of ethical relativism and secularism. His imaginative way out of this, in his early years at least, was through the unrestricted airways of science-fantasy.

But it should not be supposed that Wells' recourse to the man-beast theme must be swallowed wholly seriously. We should recognise that as a journalist he had learned all too well what makes good copy, and we see in his exploitation of the beastly and the horrible an adroit example of his pragmatic creativity. This is not to suggest that Wells was cynical in his literary endeavours of this time, but that his desire to succeed and to pull himself out of the mire into which he had sunk was particularly strong. And it should be remembered that this impulse would have turned to nothing if there wasn't a literary craft capable of its execution. Joseph Conrad and Henry James were not slow to express their admiration for Wells' literary techniques, and we must argue that his narratives often exhibit
a mastery of that special technique which involves persuading the reader to believe in events and beings that are, strictly speaking, absurd. And this strong and impressive quality is nowhere more apparent than in Wells' stories and novels of men and beasts, and of the beasts within men.

DAVID GARNETT

Within David Garnett's *Lady Into Fox* and *Man in the Zoo*, we witness an intermixing of the human and the animal that is faintly reminiscent of Wells' themes. In Garnett's novels however the issue is not clouded by the generally pervasive influence of scientism, but is rather shrouded in the mysterious and miraculous spectacle of animal metamorphosis. In the former novel, the metamorphosis occurs in an obviously direct and Ovidian way: a woman is suddenly and inexplicably changed into a vixen. In the latter work, the metamorphosis takes place purely on the psychological level and does not involve actual physical change of form. In both these works we see an implicit discussion of the man versus beast theme, and in particular of the beastly potential that man is subject to under certain extreme and emotional circumstances. These notions however are entirely different in tone and intensity from their exploration in Wells' fiction and we perceive in this how the questions associated with the acceptance of Darwinism have become by the 1920's of a more 'literary' temper. Nonetheless, the same fundamental questions are inherent in Garnett's early fiction.

*Lady Into Fox* was Garnett's first literary work proper and remains perhaps his finest achievement. It was awarded two literary prizes for its
merits, the James Tait Black prize and the Hawthornden prize. Eventually, it sold over half a million copies and drew reviews that were highly favourable:

Mr. Garnett has achieved a miracle of distinction. The grotesque pitfalls and obvious absurdities of his fable he has escaped by his infallible instinct of style and content ... He has written a little masterpiece of perfect art, for which ordinary praise seems almost an impertinence, so exemplary is this curious and distinguished fable.

Though the modern reader might find this kind of effusion rather too much, it was typical of the contemporary critical attitude. Lytton Strachey considered it a "masterpiece" and more recently W. R. Irwin claims that it reveals that with Garnett "metamorphosis is as viable in the twentieth century as it was in the remote, unchronicled times when mythologies were forming". In 1928 T. S. Eliot felt prompted to describe Garnett as the writer who "surpasses all contemporary prose writers for the competent technique of the craft of writing". In print at least, only D. H. Lawrence and Edwin Muir seem to have taken particular objection to Lady Into Fox.

Since Garnett's work is so little known a brief synopsis of Lady Into Fox is perhaps in order. One day, without any apparent warning, Mrs. Sylvia Tebrick (nee Sylvia Fox) unaccountably changes into a fox. The occurrence happens almost immediately at the beginning of the novel and the reader is thus forced to suspend disbelief for the rest of the tale. The narrator attempts to give some half-hearted rationalization for the change but finally reverts to calling it simply a 'miracle'. By implication the reader is also asked to accept the phenomenon of metamorphosis in a similarly unquestioning way. But although suddenly changed in form, Mrs. Tebrick
only slowly changes in her human habits; it takes weeks before her mental
animalization matches her physical change. Her husband gallantly attempts
to comfort his wife all the time remaining loyal to his matrimonial
responsibilities. However, Mrs. Tebrick quickly becomes wholly vixen and
shows a desire to live wild in the woods with others of her species.
Reluctantly, Tebrick lets her go but later becomes a self-appointed god-
father to her litter. The story reaches its tragic conclusion when Mrs.
Tebrick is mauled to death by a pack of fox-hounds, and Mr. Tebrick,
though badly hurt by the same hounds, slowly recovers and becomes normal.

Garnett informs us that the inspiration for the story came from a
playful fancy engaged in between himself and his recent bride. He says
that the title was suggested by the caption "Daphne mouée en laurier" on
a 16th century woodcut of the Ovidian scene. These comments have tended
to disarm criticism and have led several commentators to accept the story
on the level of a successful fantasy. W. R. Irwin focuses on Garnett's
"method", suggesting that as far as the content goes "a wonder remains a
wonder". Similarly, Caroline Heilbrun remarks that in a Garnett novel
"there is no probing ... into effects that lie beyond the observed events".
This unwillingness to comment on the theme as distinct from the style of
Lady Into Fox is perhaps understandable since the novel deflects scrutiny.
However, the general tenor of fantasy is oddly deceptive in that, with the
exception of the metamorphosis itself, the novel is realistic in detail
and strives to convince the reader that the events it describes are to be
accepted at the literal level. As my argument hopes to show, Lady Into
Fox should properly be seen as a discussion of the potential of an increasing
bestialization within a male/female love relationship. From this perspective
it can be appreciated that the animal metamorphosis acts as a forceful exemplification of a process that is entirely psychological, that it is a powerful literary tool used to bring out the inherent theme.

As the novel opens, echoes of H. G. Wells become apparent:

Wonderful or supernatural events are not so uncommon, rather they are irregular in their incidence. Thus there may be not one marvel to speak of in a century, and then often enough comes a plentiful crop of them; monsters of all sorts swarm suddenly upon the earth, comets blaze in the sky, eclipses frighten nature, meteors fall in rain, while mermaids and sirens beguile, and sea-serpents engulf every passing ship, and terrible cataclysms beset humanity.

With this imagery we are provided with a synopsis of the typical elements of Wellsian scientific romance. Garnett's narrator even adopts the disinterested narrative voice we saw in Wells, and he is at pains to point out that what he relates is indisputable fact confirmed by direct observation.

Clearly, the reader is to suspend his disbelief in the ordinary and to indulge the author in his effort to discuss his themes. Garnett, like Wells, studied at Huxley's college in South Kensington and his first love was Biology; with one eye on evolutionary theory, he develops the idea that if Mrs. Tebrick's metamorphosis had been a "slow change of the whole anatomy by a process of growth", then there would be little difficulty for "the materialism of our age" to have accepted the phenomenon.

The metamorphosis itself is presented with the abruptness of a divine fiat:

Hearing the hunt, Mr. Tebrick quickened his pace so as to reach the edge of the copse, where they might get a good view of the hounds if they came that way. His wife hung back, and he, holding her hand, began almost to drag her. Before they gained the edge of the copse she suddenly snatched her hand away from his very violently and cried out, so that he instantly turned his head.

Where his wife had been the moment before was a small fox, of a very bright red.

(p.5)
Within this brief scenario we are clearly led to perceive that there is some latent quality of foxness in Mrs. Tebrick that is terrified by the thought of the close proximity of the fox-hounds. Indeed, so intense is this fear, intensified of course by Mr. Tebrick's attempt to almost "drag her" towards them, that Mrs. Tebrick literally changes into that which she inherently is. It is not insignificant of course that Mrs. Tebrick's maiden name is Fox, and in this we begin to glimpse a common conflict that might well beset a young woman who, the narrative tells us, "had been strictly brought up by a woman of excellent principles and considerable attainments". Thus, it becomes plain that her reversion to a state of foxhood is a metaphorical exaggeration of a young bride's Diana-like initial disquiet at the possible trauma of sexual love, and this is figuratively suggested by her change of name.

This general and not unusual matrimonial situation obviously throws us back into the action of Ovid's account of Daphne's metamorphosis into a laurel tree. We remember that this change in form is brought about while Daphne is desperately trying to escape from the sexual advances of the god Apollo. In this story we see how a young virgin takes fright at the thought of a first sexual encounter and finds release from this physical and emotional trauma in being transformed into an object that by its very nature is incapable of physical love. Silvia Tebrick is rather like Daphne in that both were reclusive and were brought up within a sheltered environment, and thus both had good reason to be afraid of male sexuality. There is a similar correspondence perhaps between Apollo and Mr. Tebrick in that both are of an amorous nature. The narrator is careful to emphasize that after
Mrs. Tebrick's metamorphosis, Mr. Tebrick feels that it must be his fault since in the relationship he was "much more like a lover than a husband". This insistence on the sexual nature of love, together with the sense of Sylvia being "dragged" along by Tebrick, suggests the novel's governing theme of the difficulty of marital harmony. That the conclusion is reached in a moment of tragedy rather than in a happy consumation argues for an understructure of emotional engagement on the part of the author.

This engagement is strengthened by the exaggerated nature of the schism or division between the male and the female. In transforming Silvia into a vixen Garnett almost seems to elevate the otherwise naturalistic story into a mythological study, or perhaps a beast-epic, of larger significance. The female principle that has sought successfully to escape from the pressures of human love is at once simplified and conceptualized within the fixed and 'other' quality of the vixen. This is a straightforward and, as we may see in numerous other examples of Bestiary art, a highly engaging technique that immediately captures the reader's amused interest and imagination. By seeing a woman who has been miraculously changed into a vixen, the struggle between these two people is made at once more mysterious and plays upon a reader's willing tendency to appreciate an unusual literary representation of a human situation. This is doubtless the appeal of the Ovidian metamorphosis tale, an appeal perhaps subtly strengthened by a powerful residual feeling of alienated relationship between ourselves and the other animals. This is seen, I think, very strongly within the story of Actaeon, in which the relationship between
the hunter and the hunted is a sympathetic one which is subject to ironic reversal of roles through the wilful interference of the gods, many of whom, incidentally, were represented by a particular animal. In Garnett's novel the technique is essentially the same, and a similar impulse towards a symbolic identification between a woman and an animal is clearly felt. This impulse is really a stronger and more mysterious exemplification of the sense of man/animal identity which is seen in fables which personify an animal.

To return for a moment to the Apollo and Daphne myth, we might recall that after Daphne's transformation Apollo embraced the laurel tree and made a devotional commitment to the objectified phenomenon of that which he most had desired:

He placed his hand
Where he had hoped and felt the heart still beating
Under the bark; and he embraced the branches
As if they still were limbs, and kissed the wood,
And the wood shrank from his kisses, and the god
Exclaimed: 'Since you can never be my bride,
My tree at least shall you be!'  

If we were to replace the images of a laurel tree with those of a vixen, then we would have the essential point of view which Mr. Tebrick espouses after the metamorphosis of his wife. But in Lady Into Fox the process of worship and even adoration of the former love-object is taken to very great extremes. Like Apollo, Tebrick at first attempts to cherish the loved one as if it were still human, but finally the vixen shrugs this off and follows the nature that she now is. The sense of loss felt by Tebrick is equal to the pang of forlornness which is evident in Ovid's depiction of
Apollo. But Ovid's story discontinues at this point, whereas for Garnett this is the starting point of his whole drama. In this we find an essential distinction between the Ovidian model and this 20th Century example of the same tradition. With Ovid the moment of change is a completion and a fixing of a human drama, whereas in Garnett's world, and for that matter in Kafka's, the transformation is a new opening out of a human situation: the former metamorphosis implies a completion in fixity and the latter an immediate opening out into further flux. Writing in a slightly different but related context, John Dewey has described the Classical view of change and stasis thus: "Change as change is mere flux and lapse; it insults intelligence. Genuinely to know is to grasp a permanent end that realizes itself through changes, holding them thereby within the metes and bounds of fixed truth". Against this view of the nature of change and flux (metamorphosis) Dewey puts the post-Darwinian idea of ever-increasing evolution, in which change, modulation, and adaptation are the mechanisms which in their aspiring flux are the only intelligence which is not insulting to human reason.

In Dewey's distinction between the Classical and Darwinian notions of change, we may find an interesting parallel to the obvious distinctions that we see between ancient and modern animal metamorphoses. In the modern context, the metamorphosis is merely a vehicle, a highly engaging and profound vehicle, through which and out of which a writer can articulate his themes. Thus, for example, Gregor Samsa's change into an insect, or Mrs. Tebrick's change into a fox, is the symbolic mode by which the themes of radical alienation or inherent bestialism may be most forcefully expressed.
The theme that is articulated in *Lady Into Fox* is subsumed within the character and the character development of Mr. Tebrick. For whereas the reader's attention is most immediately drawn to the animal metamorphosis of Mrs. Tebrick and to the fate that is hers, the central focal point of the remainder of the novel is her husband. Of course, attention is still drawn towards the vixen, and Garnett is very successful in portraying something of the vivid life of a real fox. Nonetheless, our acutest attention is drawn somewhere else.

With each successive degeneration of Mrs. Tebrick, Tebrick's psychological situation undergoes a corresponding change, and thus the novel becomes in part at least a study in degradation from the human to the bestial. In Garnett's juxtaposition of two kinds of metamorphoses, one Ovidian and the other entirely psychological, we find the driving force of the whole story. Tebrick's gradual decline parallels the stages in his wife's bestialisation. At first, when Silvia maintains some semblance of humanity, Tebrick tries his best to arrest the degeneration of the woman he profoundly loves. This stage is clearly reminiscent of Apollo's incredulous effort to caress Daphne when she was already mostly a tree. Indeed, so profound is Tebrick's love, as well perhaps as his dependence, that he cuts all social ties and dismisses his servants in an attempt to keep his wife's change a secret. To save her from going naked, he clothes her, but despite Silvia's initial human inclination to love music and to follow religious observances, finally the true animal nature emerges and she becomes wholly vixen. Through his by now perverse determination not to lose his wife, Tebrick mimicks her bestialization.
Though he always retains his proper human proportions, towards the conclusion of the novel he becomes a self-appointed godfather to Silvia's litter and through this conscious association with animal life becomes more than adept at animal stealth and cunning. At one point the narrator describes his gait as something less than human:

Mr. Tebrick now could follow after them anywhere and keep up with them too, and could go through a wood as silently as a deer. He learnt to conceal himself if ever a labourer passed by so that he was rarely seen, and never but once in their company. But what was most strange of all, he had got a way of going doubled up, often almost on all fours with his hands touching the ground every now and then, particularly when he went uphill.

(p.86)

By the time that Tebrick reaches this stage, his former wife has a fox mate as well as two cubs.

It should be said, however, that Tebrick's bestial degeneration is not a wholly negative force, since his association with the young foxes in particular has its own kind of Franciscan intensity. Of course, by the standards of the local villagers and especially, one supposes, the labourers who saw him mysteriously hiding in hedges accompanied by foxes, he had become completely insane. But by this time, Tebrick is sublimely indifferent to public opinion; his sole satisfaction in life, and the reader feels it to be a truly felt satisfaction, is to share in the family life of the foxes.

Now he was tired, but he was happy and laughed softly for joy, and presently his vixen, coming to him, put her feet upon his shoulders as he sat on the ground, and licked him, and he kissed her back on the muzzle and gathered her in his arms and rolled her in his jacket and then laughed and wept by turns in the excess of his joy.

All his jealousies of the night before were forgotten now. All his desperate sorrow of the morning and the horror of his
dream were gone. What if they were foxes? Mr. Tebrick found that he could be happy with them. As the weather was hot he lay out there all the night, first playing hide and seek with them in the dark till, missing his vixen and the cubs proving obstreperous, he lay down and was soon asleep.  

(p.83)

But the almost transcendent happiness that Tebrick finds in his association with Silvia and her cubs is nonetheless a denial of the human being that he is. This is brought home most fully when with the start of the hunting season, despite Tebrick's vain efforts to protect her, Silvia is mauled to death. Finally, the narrative implies, the differentiation between species is absolute and transgression against this law only brings about despair. In the end, an Apollo cannot find requited love in a laurel tree, and a man cannot change his nature to suit that of a partner without destroying himself.

Whereas the related themes of the problems of young marriage and the bestial degeneration of a man desperately seeking the object of his desire do exert a pressure upon the reader, it should be said that they do not embody the same seriousness of purpose that we feel in Ovid or in Kafka. Lady Into Fox has about it a fable-like quality in which themes seem to be inertly present rather than forced through with engaged consciousness. The peculiar tonal effect of the novel may perhaps be usefully indicated through a brief comparison with Kafka's "Metamorphosis". The introspective and haunting effect of Kafka's tale distinguishes it radically from the relatively placid and subtly melancholic world of Garnett's novel. With Garnett, notwithstanding the magical act of metamorphosis, we are in a world of fairly ordinary life. The voice of the uninvolved and impersonal
narrator is used whereas Kafka brings home the very forceful subjective account of an experience of radical alienation. This distinction in the narrative point of view is reflected within the intensities of the two novels; *Lady Into Fox* is by comparison rural and plain and has none of the powerful and tortuous appeal of Gregor Samsa's agony. Indeed, because of the narrative point of view we are not afforded any real knowledge of what Mrs. Tebrick feels about her own degeneration; with Samsa, on the other hand, we are only too painfully aware of the growing consciousness of his own situation.

Despite the comparative lack of vitality in *Lady Into Fox*, it should still be appreciated that the themes I have articulated are present. Also, it would be less than fair to judge Garnett's novel too harshly on the basis of a comparison with a story of such obviously different intentions. We should especially comment on the purposely controlled range of feelings that the author allows his narrator; we are inextricably in a world of the bucolic English countryside where the rural backdrop almost necessitates a certain gentleness in the handling of themes and issues. Moreover, Garnett's evocation of Silvia as a natural fox is well done, and the guiding idea of animal metamorphosis which precipitates his study of human animal-ization strikes the reader with a literary freshness and surprise.

The theme of the degradation of man then, through the operative literary metaphor of curious and moving animalization, functions in a way that convinces the reader of Garnett's interest in the theme of human bestialization. This same idea finds expression in Garnett's second novel *A Man in the Zoo*, in which a clarification of Garnett's interests seems to
occur. Written in 1924 this work is important in that it picks up the man/woman/animal theme and makes it more fully intelligible by developing it in a more direct and less fantastic way. In this story no actual animal metamorphosis takes place; the highly engaging literary technique of metamorphosis is now left behind and in its stead we have narrative straightforwardness. Yet although there may have been a change in literary technique the same themes are common to both; indeed to re-read Lady Into Fox after reading its sequel is to see it in an altogether clearer light.

John Cromartie and Josephine Lackett enter a zoo and before long an argument ensues. In the typical lover's quarrel both are to blame in that each refuses to make any compromise on a particular issue. Momentarily breaking off from their argument, they comment ironically on how unfortunate it is for animals to be caged and deprived of their liberty, and there is the suggestion that they are both backing into cages of their own making because of their uncompromising temperaments. The situation is taken one step further when as the result of a jeer thrown out by Josephine, Cromartie gets himself put in a cage as a human animal. Surrounded by his books, a man joins his cousins as a displayed animal. Quite naturally, this draws a large crowd and in the face of this Cromartie maintains an almost prim and obstinate privacy. But little by little, he degenerates until he finally befriends a lonely caracal who eventually becomes his cage-mate. Both of the lovers, in fact, are driven to the edge of madness and finally desire nothing more than to marry and live in the cage, together with the caracal. This final emotional shift is precipitated by a series of events which result in an hallucination in which Cromartie imagines that because
of his bestialized condition he has truly become less than human. At this point, as W. R. Irwin has adroitly remarked, "In all but will Cromartie has become in earnest what he ironically pretended to be when he offered himself for exhibit—an animal". The psychological metamorphosis has now become complete and as a result of this shock Cromartie recognises the nature of his own humanity.

As I have already noted, A Man in the Zoo is concerned with the same theme as Garnett's earlier novel; both concern themselves with an increasing bestialization, and it should be especially noted that this tendency towards becoming an animal, or of allowing the inner animal to emerge, is precipitated from within a lover's relationship. It is almost as if it is in this close confrontation with someone of the opposite sex that the more elemental characteristics of men and women are brought to the fore and regressive evolution is temporarily effected. We may recall that the immediate and sudden metamorphosis of Mrs. Tebrick comes about as a result of her husband's attempt to pull her towards the fox-hunt. There is an inherent sense of tension in this opposition which in A Man in the Zoo is made very clear within the initial argument of the two lovers. A battle-of-wills is obviously in evidence, though in the former novel it is of a more subtle nature. The important point is that under the peculiar tensions of young adult love tendencies towards the animal within man become apparent. Garnett is clearly well-versed in Darwinism and in the dispute that raged over whether man was in fact more of an angel or more of a brute beast. The process of civilization, which involves such obvious qualities as necessary compromise as well as foregoing former filial ties, are rather
easily placed to one side under the necessities of more fundamental pressures.

Under the pressure of love, Cromartie voluntarily becomes an animal just like any other and offers himself as an exhibit in a zoo no different in essence from a neighbouring Orang-outang. By consciously identifying himself with the zoo animals, Cromartie is of course relying on popular notions of man's relationship with his simian cousins. This theme, broadly Darwinian in its implications, operates in an obviously conscious way. In one of the more thoughtful comments to be found on David Garnett, a reviewer for the "Nation and Atheneum" wrote that with A Man in the Zoo "Mr. Garnett has not taken the fatally easy way of remaining where the last page of Lady into Fox left him", but instead has written a "better book ... which has something on the other side of it". This "something" or what the reviewer later calls an "interesting problem", is clearly the overt development of the bestial possibilities within a human relationship. At the beginning of the novel and in the middle of the initial argument, Josephine attacks Cromartie by declaring, "My vanity, do you think having you in love with me pleases my vanity? I might as well have a baboon or a bear. You are tarzan of the apes; you ought to be shut up in the zoo. The collection here is incomplete without you. You are a survival--atavism at its worst". This incisive and eloquent account of Cromartie's attitudes prompts him to challenge her sentiments by taking her advice and putting it into practice. Of course, we should remember that whereas it is the male figure who feels the sting of the argument, Josephine is no better. The challenge simply stated is this: if you can't behave towards another person in a
humane and equal way then you have effectively become no better than any other ape who acts solely by predetermined hierarchical instinct. As such, the logical place for you is a zoo.

Under the emotional influence of Josephine's sharp words, Cromartie later beings to accept her diagnosis and says, "Perhaps I am the missing link, and the zoo is the best place for me" (p.8). And again in his letter to the zoo's Board of Governors, he makes the almost insanely plausible argument that, given Darwin's *Origin of Species*, to have a zoo without a man on display is like having "*Hamlet* without the Prince of Denmark". He also very pertinently remarks that "every child would grow up imbued with the outlook of a Darwin, and would become aware not only of his own exact place in the animal kingdom, but also in what he resembled, and in what he differed from the apes" (pp.10-11). Put this way, his argument makes bizarre sense, and as a result the Board allow him to be put in a cage as an exhibit. Indeed, so successful is this arrangement that at one point policemen are called in to keep order amongst the crowds who push and shove to catch a glimpse of this extraordinary spectacle. As a further consequence, the zoo decides to construct a whole "Man House" in which different varieties could be shown; at the conclusion of the novel they already have a negro called Joe Tennison on display.

The effect of this strange but logical sequence of events is to cause in Cromartie, and in the reader, an unusual perspective on the relationship between man and the other animals. After all, if man is an animal in his behaviour and has not learned the kinds of social mores that might make him different from his simian cousins, why shouldn't he be seen in a zoo?
We see in this temporary and salutory confusion a gentler and more humorous discussion of the themes of Wells. But of course in Garnett's novel, the deadly serious and prophetic mode is replaced by the satirical social comedy, and the reader never really forgets that although Garnett's logic is perversely correct the situation he describes is impossible. The whole fictional strategy is a wryly humorous literary ploy to provoke the reader into questioning not only the surface absurdity of anti-social behaviour but also the larger implications that this implies within the broader framework of philosophical anthropology.

Thus, in *A Man in the Zoo* the figurative identification between a man, Cromartie, and the animals who inhabit the zoo is shown to reflect Garnett's interest in establishing by analogy of a post-Darwinian kind in what ways man is different from the other animals and in what ways he is in danger of regressing to their level. Finally, of course, Cromartie and Josephine find themselves and leave the zoo behind; in reestablishing their relationship they implicitly eschew the kinds of threat that the novel as a whole points to. The general tone of 'Social Comedy' sets it apart from the earlier *Lady Into Fox*, but nevertheless the operative mode of relying upon animals and the interrelationship between man and animal to discuss human problems is consistent. It should be remarked that in Garnett the fear of the beast or of the beastly potential of man is turned towards expressly literary and satirical purposes, and thus is largely without the engaged intensity and seriousness that we saw exemplified in Wells. In thus drawing upon a certain wry sense of humour the force of the points being made is lessened and a suspicion of modish complacency is aroused within
the reader. Therefore, in Garnett's novels, a certain lethargic inertness of theme and of satirical edge is apparent, and this necessarily leads to criticism of an adverse kind. Finally, in terms of literary appraisal, we must concur with Edwin Muir's cogent observation: "... when I write my final essay in this series I may have to put her [Woolf] down along with Strachey and Garnett among the forces which are imposing a premature and hardening limitation on contemporary literature--fencing it off into a small perfection which is devoid of further progress".\textsuperscript{17}

\textbf{JOHN COLLIER}

Satire as a literary sub-genre frequently finds its force in exaggerating human situations and comparing them to fictitious or farfetched paradigms. In this regard, animals have long proven to be of great practical use. If a writer wishes to exaggerate or diminish a particular human quality, what more appropriate device could he find than an animal which by its very nature suggests that exaggeration or diminution. The celebrated Houynhnhsms from Swift's \textit{Gulliver's Travels} serve as an obvious example of this kind of satirical device, as does the much earlier \textit{The Golden Ass} by Apuleius. This is even more true when animals such as apes are used, since even to the scientifically ignorant observer, man and ape share some rather obvious characteristics.

Not surprisingly, in the years that followed the publication of Darwin's \textit{Origins of Species}, a spate of novels appeared that sought to ridicule evolutionary theories by means of the satirical interchange of human and animal qualities. Leo Henkin has provided a very full account
of these satires. Of course, these post-Darwinian works were not the first anti-evolutionary animal satires; in the earlier part of the century Thomas Love Peacock's *Melincourt* sought, amongst other things, to deride and ridicule the evolutionary thinking of Lord Monboddo. A fervent strain in these later satires was that which was directed against the so-called "Monkey-Theory". (i.e. the descent of man from other members of the ape species). What Darwin had actually said was that both man and the lesser apes were descended from the same main root though each represented entirely different branches. The popular understanding of this soon degenerated into the view, still very prevalent, that man was once an ape, identical to those who now inhabit the African jungles, and that man's evolution was a fortuitous escape from this bestial bondage. John Collier's *His Monkey Wife* (1931) constitutes a modern extension of this kind of literature, and represents a much-undervalued example of the long tradition of using animals to ridicule man's self-concept. As such it is a necessary part of this study.

The action settles around Alfred Fatigay who is a schoolmaster in a remote part of the African Congo; he befriends a female chimpanzee, Emily, whom he allows to become his constant companion. Through his harmless habit of talking to himself, Fatigay teaches Emily the English language, though sadly she never learns to speak. We are asked, of course, to rein in our obvious objection that a chimpanzee could not possibly learn human language in this way; as with the metamorphosis in *Lady Into Fox* we are asked to suspend our disbelief if the fantasy aspects of the novel are to be allowed to lead into the proper themes. Little by little, young Emily
educates herself in all the elementary social graces and even prompts Fatigay into teaching her how to dance. As Emily's human consciousness grows, so does her love for her master. When Fatigay's English fiancee (news of whom almost kills poor Emily) seems over-reticent in her resolve to marry him, he decides to embark for England taking his chimpanzee with him to give to Amy Flint, his intended, as a companion.

Once in England, Emily instinctively recognises the worthlessness of Amy whereas Fatigay is hoodwinked time and time again by her cunning duplicity. Emily is given to her master's fiancee, and is treated in a manner befitting a sub-human slave. The trials and tribulations of Fatigay's love for Amy continue until he forces the crisis and Amy agrees to marry him. However, at knife-point Emily forces Amy to switch wedding regalia, and Fatigay marries his chimpanzee. Unfortunately, Fatigay will have none of it and gives Emily £100 to go away and pursue her life as best she might. In the process, he loses both Emily and Amy and finally becomes a starving destitute. He is later rescued by Emily who, subsequent to her humiliation, went on to make a fortune as a freak attraction dancer. Through her benevolent personality and his final realization of Amy's intrinsic worthlessness, Fatigay unites himself emotionally with his chimpanzee. They return to the simple life of Boboma in the Congo where the novel leaves them on the verge of a tooth-grating sexual consummation that has long been promised.

From this synopsis it is obvious what kind of use Collier has made of the ape-satire tradition. Emily's quick ascent into human consciousness is a parody of evolutionary theory, and this action ironically points to
the superiority of a chimpanzee over a modern woman. We will have more
to say about this later. What is not immediately obvious from a summary
of the plot is the literary art that gives the novel such a poignant sense
of diabolic reality. It is this style, consciously and satirically
'period', that distinguishes Collier's novel from other earlier examples
of the same or similar theme. A few quotations are perhaps useful here:

Do you wonder, when you see her emerge into the shaft of lamp­
light, smiling her Irish smile, brushing the floor with the
knuckles of her strong capable hands, do you wonder that the
branches of the great tree, that which shades the bedrooms
from the aching moon, are sometimes torn asunder when a dark
face juts over a straining hairy torso. 3

Literature this was, in its wider aspects, that made the future
seem incredibly rich, not in colour and sensation merely, but
in possibilities. And at the thought of these possibilities
the living principle awoke, like sap, in Emily's heart, so
cramped and contracted by an iron resolution she had made to
feel and hope no more.

(p.13)

Why did she not reveal her talents to Mr. Fatigay? From this
delicate motive: so that when he met her, barefooted as it
were, at the altar, and there bestowed her apparent nothingness
and poverty the right to clothe herself in his material and
mental grandeur, she might then surprise and gratify him by
revealing that she was not altogether so dowerless as he had
supposed, since, though she came to him bare of gold and jewels
and securities, she brought with the treasure of a well-stocked
mind, a possession which, all the books said, was infinitely
to be preferred.

(pp.29-30)

From this coy, delicate, and precious language we glean a picture of
Emily as bearing a "rather Charlotte Bronte interior". Deliberate satire
is intended here, directed in style and content against the world of
Romance as it is crudely descended from such novels as Jane Eyre or Evelina—
those novels, in short, that rely on extended descriptions of a pale and refined female sensibility engaged in the not so refined business of finding a man and marrying him. In accordance with this fictional pattern, Collier endows his chimpanzee heroine with the requisite qualities of "meek pride, hopeless hope, and timid determination". But the other qualities of a tougher wildness that are perhaps suggested by her namesake, Emily Bronte, are conveyed in the form of her physical, hairy, prehensile self. It is this contrast between Emily's physical, animal attributes and the extended descriptions of her delicate sensibility that is the chief vehicle for the pungency of the satire on women that constitutes the core of the novel. We are never allowed to forget that Emily is a chimpanzee, even though many of the characters in the novel do—or at least have trouble making a distinction between their normal acquaintances and this newcomer to the group--and it is this continuous sense of Emily's animality that satirically reduces the distinctions between sophisticated London society and a monkey. A similar process is here in evidence that we have seen in both Wells and Garnett: the moral qualities that separate man from the other animals are closed.

Emily's character is not completely lily-white. Early on in the novel she repudiates her monkey swain, Henry, in a very cruel way, and her trick to get Fatigay to marry her is scarecely honourable. Yet despite these failings in Emily's character, compared to Amy Flint she is goodness personified. It is against Amy and her London literary 'set' that Collier's full blast of satire is turned.4 Amy is seen to engage in the kind of emotional politicking that is pursued entirely for intellectual stimulation and idle
vanity. In his biting characterization of Amy, Collier almost seems to border on the misogynist, so low a creature is she to him. Indeed, it is directly implied that Amy and others like her are infinitely more bestial than Emily, and even the painfully obtuse Fatigay arrives at this conclusion: "...a man would be better off with any chimp in the world, much less Emily, than with a woman of your sort" (p.262). And even earlier at the botched marriage, Amy has cause to wonder about Fatigay's apparent inability to tell the difference between herself and a chimp: "Is it possible he didn't realize I was human" (p.201). To this the author dourly presents Fatigay's thoughts: "How often her lover had had reason to conceive, on different grounds, a similar misapprehension" (p.201). Thus, Amy implicitly becomes the beast and Emily a paragon of womanly humanity. In this role, Emily is portrayed in a manner that is just close enough to the boundaries of the possible, especially through the consistent tone of the narrative which insists on the plausibility of everything that occurs, that the sleight against Amy on this level is felt sharply. London becomes the jungle and Boboma, as witnessed at the conclusion of the novel, is the model for civilized life.

The first intimation of Collier's satire against women occurs when Emily blunders upon one of George Moore's novels which castigates "that woman of thirty". From her narrow vision of womanhood, consisting entirely of herself, the black native women, and the heroines of Fatigay's limited library, Emily is shocked by "certain elements which seemed alien and antagonistic to its (the world's) central principle of domestic bliss. These were to put it bluntly, women" (pp.16-17). In particular it is the
modern woman that so affronts Emily's "perhaps old-fashioned" views on domestic harmony and the relationship of a woman to a man. It is not that she does not consider herself "modern in the worthier sense", but that she resents and despises the way in which many of her contemporaries "appeared to fling away all regard for graciousness and responsibility ... in order to loot and ravage a few masculine privileges" (p.49). This early dictum, itself a parody of the traditional womanly heroine, later becomes the stick with which Amy is unmercifully beaten.

Our first view of Amy is at the quayside where she is to meet the returning Fatigay. He exhausts himself in a vain effort to find his betrothed, even broaching the subject of her whereabouts with a lavatory attendant, only to find that in order to avoid an emotional scene she had immediately got into a taxi. "Just the same old Alfred. Didn't you guess how I'd feel about the public scene?" Immediately, Amy scorns Emily and sees in her a love-slave to Fatigay. Reflecting on the nature of jealousy, Collier bitingly remarks that Amy's "cold and sterile nature" caused her to be jealous not because she loved Fatigay but rather because she resented Emily's territorial intrusion. She proclaims majestically that she will "keep the creature," fastening on this as the "best method of chastising the impertinence to love with a strength of which she was incapable" (p.79). She further suggests that poor Emily should sit on the taxi's roof, and the image that is thus conveyed of a coyly dressed chimpanzee riding around London on top of a taxi is the kind of image that His Monkey Wife continuously throws at the reader.

As the action develops, examples of Amy's cruel inhumanity cohere to
form a brutish picture of her. The panorama is broadened somewhat by the inclusion of her friends, Bloomsbury-like artists and writers, who share her qualities of selfishness and self-righteousness. But the particular aspect of Amy's character that comes into most question is her frigidity. Time and time again poor Alfred finds the sexual urge too great and attempts to make love to his fiancee. But this example of modern womanhood bluntly refuses, even though she is a notorious London flirt. "It may well be in the nature of your sex ... in animals and in those men who are nothing more. Doubtless the monkey that sits there could bear you out in that. But I cannot think that any true man ... could be so utterly lacking in self-control" (p.88). Others of Amy's 'set' however, exhibit quite a different response to sex. But as Collier adroitly remarks, while there is evidence of an ample sufficiency of sex in the modern woman there is a problem in its distribution, "for half, like Amy, have none at all, and the other half have perhaps twice too much" (pp.87-88).

Amy's apparent sexual unresponsiveness becomes directly associated with her inhuman manipulation of people and their emotions. After the fateful marriage when poor Fatigay is wretched and destitute, we learn that Amy's sexual life,"had been balanced and satisfied by the vision of Mr. Fatigay suffering for her in an exile in which there were the fewest possible counter attractions to her image" (p.254). This view of Amy as someone who experiences vicarious sexual pleasure through denial and control over others receives an ironic twist when in comparison to a chimpanzee she becomes less than desirable. Amy's love, no doubt the modern kind, is made of cruelty and emotional power, and finds in the human act of sex an
example of terrible bestiality. Even though all of this is narrated with an impish and distracting humour the point about manipulative and sexless love is squarely made.

I have suggested that a part of the novel's satiric effectiveness is brought about not only by the juxtapositioning of modern woman and chimpanzee, but also by the stylistic quality of the narrative as pastiche 'Romance'. Of interest to us are the parallels that exist between His Monkey Wife and Thomas Love Peacock's Melincourt. Peacock's novel, itself a parody of "romantic" fiction, centres around the emotional involvement of Anthelia and Forrester, both of whom drip with sensibility. Forrester befriends an Ourang-outang, Sir Oran Haut-ton, who performs several noble deeds in the cause of "natural justice". Peacock's satire here is directed against Lord Monboddo's theories concerning the human status of Ourang-outang. A pre-Darwinian evolutionist, Monboddo believed that this particular branch of the monkey family was in fact quite as human as all of us, but that they had been unfairly relegated to a sub-human category by prejudiced zoologists. By introducing an Ourang-outang into his novel, Peacock is obviously satirizing the apparent nonsense that this theory struck him to be. In so far as the English ladies and gentlemen of the novel give credence to the view that Sir Oran is human, to the extent of sending him (though not endowed with the ability of speech) to parliament, Peacock is also satirizing a public which he feels is gullible enough to believe cranks like Monboddo.

Collier's technique is essentially the same as Peacock's and similar
theories and people bear the brunt of the ridicule. Of course, Collier takes greater license with his chimpanzee by introducing a strong sexual element into the story. In Peacock, the Simian character is tangential to the love theme whereas Emily is central to it. Indeed, Collier has depicted a mate more than worthy of Sir Oran, and it seems likely that Collier has deliberately relied on Melincourt for his model and outline.

Collier's invocation of Darwinian theory is obviously less than serious; it bears a function only in providing a popular and well-known framework for the presentation of a satire against humanity. The framework is especially useful because it activates a reader's familiarity with our descent from something like Emily, and this is further enhanced by her presentation as a ludicrous parody of Regency female decencies. Emily provides the vehicle for Collier's direct attack on the moral condition of the emancipated new woman. In this, a chimpanzee becomes a literary agent most useful for its ability to provoke astringent mirth. It is true that Collier's descriptions do provide us with the general sense of a real (if humanized) animal, and this is clearly necessary if the reader is to sense the daring near-plausibility of the plot. As with Garnett's Lady Into Fox, some naturalistic detail is vital to the effect of the whole, but this is only secondary. Indeed, rather like fablistic animals, Collier's chimpanzee is important only for the anthropomorphized function it embodies. Although after reading authors like Hardy and Lawrence we may have developed a taste for seeing fictional animals as inherently worthy, we should credit a writer like Collier for his success with fictional animals of a very different intention. We should indeed be glad that Bestiary
literature can take to itself such extravagantly different techniques and provide the modern readership with a variety of pleasurable and educational literature.
Afterword

This study set as its aim the exploration of different kinds of animal fiction in English literature between the years 1870 and 1945. Neither an inclusive account nor a survey, it was interested in the literary techniques and thematic concerns that a particular author uses and focuses upon through animal depiction. Focusing more upon real or "really-imagined" animals than on animal imagery, I have sought to give articulation to what appears to be a substantial revival in the fortunes of Bestiary literature. The reality of this revival, I hope, is evinced in the engaged manner in which the authors in this study have described their animal characters. The various authorial attitudes towards animals may very well be different, but there is a consistency in employing them for very serious ends.

This seriousness is particularly revealed in the moral concerns each writer evinces. At the very beginning of this study, we had occasion to remark that earlier instances of Bestiary literature imparted moral lessons, usually of a proverbial kind. Doubtless, this is why animals are so often found in children's literature, the implicit argument being that children stand more in need of moral guidance than do adults. In our modern world, where moral bases are still suffering from the blitzkrieg they endured earlier this century, it is clear that grown men and women also need paradigms of behaviour and being which represent some sanctioned authenticity. The advent of scientific rationalism and the overshadowing of religious ethical systems by a more pragmatic reason has not been without its obvious and unreasonable ironies. As in earlier ages then, man turned towards the world of animal nature, realistically or figuratively or
'fantastically', to find a better orientation to the world—to find a more satisfactory view of his place in Nature.

Such is the underlying burden of "The Modern Bestiary". The urge to use animals as this kind of yardstick is founded on the close yet distant relationship they bear to us. Their status as analogues is readily understood and the authenticity of their behaviour is based upon our observation of their systems of intuition; most usually, animals do not behave in a way at variance with what we conceive to be their natural state of being. With the development of our rational and cerebral qualities we have, in common parlance, "de-natured" ourselves, and sought to become more-than-animal. When there was an established moral and theological framework which satisfactorily explained our superiority over the other animals, we had an easy rationalization that made our status as more-than-animal favourable and progressive. Without such a base, however, the rationalistic and spiritualistic view of our advantages is more difficult to sustain, and the appeal of intuitive animal life takes on a greater urgency. As we saw with Wells, this need not express itself only in a positive way.

But the attractiveness of animals as moral analogues has also a more simple explanation, and one that gives aesthetic and emotional support to more elevated ideas. Most people like animals! They enjoy the grace and beauty that an animal may exemplify and there is a mysterious quality of 'otherness' too which makes them endearing. Similarly, the appeal of animals that will not submit to our yoke lies in the 'wild' quality of living that most of us at one time or another have yearned for in ourselves. We recognise even in the most domesticated dog certain obscure qualities
that our most extreme sentimentalism cannot anthropomorphise or delimit. Of course, we make practical distinctions between our pets and those animals that will later appear on our dinner tables and this moral treachery (the phrase is not too strong) doubtless leads to the suspicion, held by many people, that affection for and interest in animals is inherently sentimental. If nothing more, this study should have assuaged the facile view that to be interested in fictional animals implies a lack of interest in humans. This argument is not a straw dog; it is surprising how long such notions persist and how many people infer that such literary interests are riotously eccentric. This study reveals, however, that an author's reliance on animal characters, either as fine examples of potent life or as transfigured moral 'counters', implies a very real involvement with human existence and an intensification of it. Darwin proved that man and animal are kin, and more recent researchers such as Konrad Lorenz suggest that our patterns of behaviour follow those observable in other animals. How long it will be until it strikes us that distinctions along speciest lines tend to deflect our attention from the individuated but seamless quality of life? The literature of "The Modern Bestiary" may here play a vital role.
Introduction


2 For an introductory account of this literature see T.H.White, The Bestiary (New York: Putnam, 1960); for a more scholarly work see Montague James, The Bestiary (London: Roxburghe Club, 1928).


5 See The Experimental Novel and Other Essays, trans. M. Sherman (New York: Has kell House, 1974). Zola's aim was to write fiction that corresponded to the kind of detailed analysis integral to the scientific method. Within this Naturalistic method the more "animal" drives of man tend to be stressed. The present study's use of the word naturalism intends to suggest a technical bias towards representing animal nature as it can be empirically observed.

6 For a manifesto of this attitude see Roberts' "Introduction" to Kindred of the Wild (London: Duckworth, 1903).

Aquinas, for example, held that although cruelty to animals was wrong it was not a sin. Such cruelty is frowned upon because it may lead to cruelty amongst humans. For an interesting discussion of the history of attitudes towards animals see Peter Singer, *Animal Liberation* (New York: Discuss Books, 1977); see also Stephen R.L. Clark, *The Moral Status of Animals* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977).


The fullest demonstration of Chardin's subtle reconciliation of Evolution with Christianity is to be found in *The Phenomenon of Man*, trans. Bernard Wall (New York: Harper & Row, 1959).

**Part I.: General & Rudyard Kipling.**


2. Ibid., 1394a.


There has been little critical discussion of Kipling's animal fiction. The most well-known and the most damning appraisal is Edmund Wilson's which sees in Kipling's reliance on animals a weakening of idea. The present study questions Wilson's assumptions. See "The Kipling that Nobody Read," *The Wound and the Bow* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1947), rpt. in *Kipling's Mind and Art*, pp. 17-69.

Kipling does not explicitly say whether he knew this fable tradition first-hand but it is likely that he would have known it at least informally through his nannies and young Indian friends. Animal stories based on the more formal *Pancha-Tantra* are very common in the Indian oral folk-lore traditions.


"Kipling's Place in the History of Ideas," *Victorian Studies*, 3(June
1960), 323-348, rpt. in Kipling's Mind and Art, 97-125.

14 Wilson, p. 50.


17 Jamiluddin, p. 125.

18 In "In the Rukh" Muller explicitly refers to Mowgli as "Adam in der garden" and there is a consistent sense in which Mowgli is the embodiment of primal man whose soul is fought over by the opposing forces of law and anarchy.


20 "This code [of Law] consists of rules of conduct that are determined by five basic elements: reason, the common good, ethical values, law-making authority and promulgation, and custom and tradition. In other words the code is sanctioned by the forces of social control which impose upon individuals certain rules which they break at their peril. It is only by strict adherence to this code that an ideal social structure can be evolved." (p.146).

21 The best literary study of Kipling is still J.M.S.Tompkins, The Art of Rudyard Kipling (Lincoln: Univ. of Nebraska Press, 1959).


25 Ibid., p. 409.

26 Wilson, p. 51.

27 *Something of Myself*, p. 126.

28 "Rudyard Kipling and George Orwell," *Modern Fiction Studies*, VI, 125-135.


30 *Something of Myself*, p. 179.

31 *Actions and Reactions* (New York: Scribner's, 1909), pp.63-64.


33 Gilbert, p.141.


35 Tompkins, p. 162.

36 Ibid., p.162.


39 Quoted in Dobree, p.165.

40 Dobree, p.164.

41 See Dobree, p.164.
As early as 1899 Kipling was villified as a "hooligan" whose predilection for violence was his most obvious asset. Vestiges of this view remain in Orwell's essay and such attitudes persist as données of Kipling criticism. See Robert Buchanan's savage attack "The Voice of the Hooligan," Contemporary Review (1899), rpt. in Kipling: The Critical Heritage, pp.233-249.

Dobree, p.164.


Dobree, p.165.

Ibid., p.167.

George Orwell.


CEJL, IV, 345.

Cook, pp.134-135.

CEJL, IV, 144.

CEJL, I, 228.
"He [Lawrence] was in essence, a lyric poet, and an undisciplined enthusiasm for 'Nature', i.e. the surface of the earth, was one of his principle qualities." CEJL, IV, 31.

See CEJL, I, 170-214.

"Nature to Orwell is a sort of moral gold-standard. To abandon it is not only to debase the spiritual life but to destroy the very currency of the personal self." The Last Man in Europe (London: Macmillan, 1974), p.12.

Ibid., pp.13-14.


Collected Essays, p.19.

Orwell comments, for example, on the distinctions between British Imperialism and later less sympathetic Imperial nations. Whatever its faults, he argues, the British Empire held to notions of moral duty that saved it from the crass exploitation of labour and resources that other colonial powers did not balk at. See Orwell's essay on Kipling (CJEL, II).


Woodcock, p.96.

Rats, of course, are to make a negative appearance in 1984 as a horrible example of Big Brother's evil power. Interestingly, in that novel Winston Smith is imagistically linked with the free animals that have so far escaped the power of the state.

19 CEJL, III, 405.

20 The Road to Wigan Pier, p.130.

21 See Orwell's account of his experiences in Spain during the Civil War in Homage to Catalonia.

22 CEJL, I, 7.


24 George Orwell (London: Fontana Books, 1971), p.71. Professor Williams has written a stimulating and convincing argument in praise of Animal Farm, for which I am indebted. He briefly discusses Orwell's "residue of thinking of the poor as animals" and though I arrived at my views independently his comments are especially encouraging.

25 CEJL, III, 405.

26 For one of the more lively discussions of the allegorical correspondences see John Atkins, George Orwell: A Literary Study (London: John Calder, 1954).

27 Only a few critics address the question of Orwell's success in depicting animals. Jeffrey Meyers offers this comment: "Orwell fused his artistic and political purposes so well that the animals are completely convincing on the literal level." A Reader's Guide to George Orwell (London: Thames & Hudson, 1975), p.130. In that these animals are very heavily personified and allegorized it is hard to understand how this can be so. The reader is only very generally aware that the animals are in a naturalistic sense 'real'. See also Meyers' "Orwell's Bestiary: The Political Allegory of Animal Farm," Studies in the 20th Century, 8 (1971), 65-84.

28 Quoted in Williams, p.69.
Part II: General and Thomas Hardy.


2 The Collected Letters of D.H.Lawrence, ed. with an introd. by Harry T. Moore, Vol. I (New York: Viking Press, 1962), p.518. Hereafter referred to as Collected Letters. Lawrence is here very firm in his antipathy to evolutionary theory. Jessie Chambers has argued that when he was a young man Lawrence was deeply impressed by the rationalistic teaching of scientific evolutionism. (D.H.Lawrence: A Personal Record, p.112.) This apparent change in heart is explained perhaps by Lawrence's growing suspicion of theories, however convincing logically, which have a reductivist tendency. It was not that by the terms of science Evolution was wrong but that those very terms delimited the more creative interpretations of life. As such it was to be eschewed.


7 F.E. Hardy, *The Life of Thomas Hardy: 1840-1928* (London: Macmillan, 1965), p.444. Hereafter referred to as *The Life*. Readers should be warned that although Mrs. Hardy's name appears as the author, it was Hardy himself who carefully selected the contents of his own biography and who persuaded his wife to hide the duplicity.

8 *The Life*, p.312.

9 Ibid., p.153.


11 *The Life*, p.349.

12 Hardy recorded in his notebook that like other students of his day he knew Mill's *On Liberty* "almost by heart" (*The Life*, p.330); for a discussion of Hardy and Mill see Roy Morrell, *Thomas Hardy: The Will and the Way* (Kuala Lumpur: Univ. of Malaya Press, 1965), pp.92-94.


Leo Henkin defines the term thus: "The literature of regressive evolution or degeneration represents man as essentially an animal, endowed with consciousness and intellect that serve simply to make him aware of the cruelty of the world and the futility of existence." Henkin, p.223) This description, though generally useful, does not adequately take into account Hardy's delight in Nature or his later sense of "evolutionary meliorism" through which man could improve his lot.

16 On a Darkling Plain (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1946), p.100.

17 Under the Greenwood Tree (London: Macmillan, 1928), p.266. The uniform Macmillan "Wessex" edition is used throughout. The first citation from each novel will be noted but subsequent quotes will be paginated in parantheses immediately after the quotation.


19 Ibid., p.165.


21 We are perhaps particularly reminded of the "Rabbit" chapter from Women in Love where Gerald and Gudrun's perverse bond is mysteriously solemnized by the gash of blood on Gudrun's arm

22 Hardy was very fond of dogs as may be appreciated by his notes on the occasion of the death of his own dog "Wessex". See The Life, p.434.


27 When Tess is introduced to Alec's mother's bullfinches, she describes herself as feeling like a "parson" and then the later baptism of her baby concretizes the sense we have of her as Nature's priestess. Before she is finally caught, Tess lies down on the altar-stone at Stonehenge and this establishes her as a sacrificial victim that Nature offers to appease the savage god of society.

28 "Jude the Obscure: Hardy's Symbolic Indictment of Christianity," Nineteenth Century Fiction, IX (1954), 50.


30 The Life, p.272.


D.H.Lawrence.

1 "Study of Thomas Hardy," Phoenix, ed. with an introd. by Edward McDonald (New York: Viking Press, 1936), p.421. Hereafter referred to as Phoenix. This volume was supplemented by further unpublished pieces of prose by Lawrence and will be referred to as Phoenix II.

2 Many critics refer to the literary relationship between Hardy and Lawrence but few are particularly explicit. For a close argument of the direct influence of Hardy on Lawrence see Raney Stanford.
The essay "Love Was Once a Little Boy" (Phoenix II) is especially interesting for the way it describes Lawrence's sense of "relationship" with Susan his cow. She provides him with a direct analogue of the kind of inviolable selfhood which cannot be absorbed into another identity. This is the way, Lawrence argues, that humans should be too and the highly engaging description of Susan, her obtuse and impenetrable 'otherness', forms an entirely satisfactory example of the point Lawrence wishes to make.


Collected Letters, p.302.

For stimulating discussions about Lawrence's conception of God see Hough, pp.224-225, and Spilka,pp.44-47.

"The essence of morality is the basic desire to preserve the perfect correspondence between the self and the object, to have no trespass and no breach of integrity, nor yet any refaulture in the vitalistic interchange." Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious (London: Heinemann, 1961), p.226. The usefulness of animals as analogues which meet this kind of ontological morality should be obvious.


Phoenix II, p. 449.

For an explication of this particular scene and a discussion of the subtlety of Lawrence's art which produces it see Spilka's chapter "How to Pick Flowers."

Hough, p.224.

Collected Letters, p.73.


For a full discussion of the dialectical struggle between the animal and spiritual forces within Lawrence's use of animals see Kenneth Inniss, D.H.Lawrence's Bestiary (The Hague: Mouton & Co., 1971). Inniss is concerned with Lawrence's world-view as it manifests itself within his animal tropes and symbols and as a consequence pays scant attention to what Charles Rossman describes as the "poetic matrix that breathes life and meaning" into Lawrence's animals. ("Towards D.H.L. and His Visual Bestiary," DHLR, VII (1974), 298).

Nevertheless, Inniss' book is very informative and I acknowledge my debt to him here. My own approach, however, is very different from his and I attempt to see Lawrence's Bestiary in a larger context and to provide some suggestions about the qualities that "breathe life" into Lawrence's fictional animals.

The White Peacock (London: Heinemann, 1955), p.89. With the exception of this text the Penguin editions have been used throughout this study. The Heinemann is used here since the Penguin edition of The White Peacock is not so readily available as the other works, whereas most public libraries carry
the Heinemann series. In general, the Penguin editions are more reliable than others by way of printing errors.

21 Gajdusek, p.194.

22 Hough, p. 32.

23 Gajdusek, p.191.

24 Inniss, p.113.


26 Spilka, p.40.

27 Van Ghent, p. 255.

28 Ibid., p.250.


30 Lawrence's description of the geese with which the young Anna remonstrates is also worthy of comment. His quick impressionistic strokes seem to capture the essence of the birds' movements: "The heavy, balanced birds looked at the fierce little face and the fleece of keen hair thrust between the bars, and they raised their heads and swayed off, producing the long, can-canking, protesting noise of geese, rocking their ship-like, beautiful white bodies in a line beyond the gate." (p.68)

The classic instance of Anton's lack of imagination occurs when Ursula questions him about what his life means to him and what he understands by the word duty. Ursula ridicules him for his obtuse conventionality and her worst fears are realized when he marries his Colonel's daughter.

Leavis, p.150.


Leavis, p.162.


In particular see Leavis, pp.192-193, Vivas, pp.245-250, and Inniss, pp.144-150.

For a discussion of Lawrence's depiction of rabbits see W.S.Marks, "D.H.Lawrence and his rabbit Adolph: Three Symbolic Permutations," Criticism, X (1968), 200-216.

Vivas, pp.273-291.


See Inniss, p.163.

Vivas, p.153.

Leavis, p.249.

Inniss, p.169.

Vivas, p. 161.

Inniss, p.171.


1 See Klingender, pp.11-27.


4 Evolution and Ethics and Other Essays (London: Macmillan, 1898).

5 Ibid., p.81.

6 Ibid., p.83.


9 Mackenzie, p.119.


11 Ibid., p.179.
12 The Short Stories of H.G.Wells (London: Ernest Benn, 1957), pp.420-421. Subsequent references to Wells' short stories are from this text.

13 Certain Personal Matters, p. 177.

14 The Short Stories of H.G.Wells, p. 37.


16 Ibid., p.53.


18 The Young Man, (August 1897), p.256; also quoted in Bergonzi, p.98.

19 Bergonzi, p.99.

20 Pritchett, p.36.


24 See The Critical Heritage, pp.60 & 199.

David Garnett.

2 *International Book Review*, (Summer 1923).


7 Ibid., p.245.

8 Irwin, p.392.

9 Heilbrun, p.199.


11 See Heilbrun, p. 197.


14 Irwin, p.391.

15 *Nation and Atheneum*, (April 26,1924).


17 *Selected Letters of Edwin Muir*, p.49.

John Collier.

1 Henkin discusses a variety of fascinating novels most of which have long
been forgotten. Of particular note are John Davidson's *Earl Lavender* (1895) and W.H. Mallock's *The New Paul and Virginia*. Such satires make an excellent read and like Collier's *His Monkey Wife* constitute a decidedly off-beat element in the English novel.

2 No critical work has been done on Collier apart from the few prefaces and introductions written by such admirers as Osbert Sitwell, Clifton Fadiman, and Anthony Burgess. For an introduction to the novels and short stories of Collier the reader is directed to *The John Collier Reader*, ed. with an introd. by Anthony Burgess (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1972).

3 *His Monkey Wife* (London: John Davies, 1931), p. 3.

4 Collier returned to attack Bloomsbury in another ape satire called "Variation on a Theme," *Fancies and Goodnights* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1951).
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