SHADOW CABINET ORGANIZATION

IN CANADA 1963-78

by

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ABSTRACT

The study focuses on shadow cabinet organization, the practice of appointing members to shadow the activities of cabinet ministers by Opposition parties. This practice is analyzed in Canada between 1963 and 1978, a period of continual Progressive Conservative Opposition. The underlying question is whether shadow cabinet organization has become more or less institutionalized during the period.

In the introduction Samuel Huntington's four tests of institutionalization are outlined. They were used in assessing Canadian shadow cabinet institutionalization. To operationalize the tests for this study it proved useful to analyze the institution of the Canadian cabinet system along these dimensions. A comparative study of the British and Australian parliamentary systems in which the appointment of shadow cabinets is an accepted convention also helped isolate the variables to study in the Canadian context.

Although the analysis centers on the period from 1963 to 1978, a brief history of Opposition organization is included. It provides the background for the period and an understanding of the roots of the present organization.

The results of the study reveal that a shadow cabinet organization existed in Canada throughout the period 1963-78. For most of the 15 years its structure and practices were constantly changing. The change was in the direction
of increased institutionalization on at least three of Huntington's four dimensions. On the basis of this study, therefore it is argued that shadow cabinet organization has become an established practice of at least Progressive Conservative Opposition in Canada.
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Chapter I

INTRODUCTION

In the spring of 1963 the Progressive Conservative Party in Canada entered opposition after having formed the government for the previous six years. It has not held office since then, but has been the Official Opposition through five Parliaments in two majority and three minority government situations. The Liberal Party, under two different leaders, has continued to form the government during the period. The number of Conservative Members of Parliament has ranged from a low of 72 in the 28th Parliament, 1968-72, to a high of 107 in the 29th, 1972-74. The Conservatives have had three leaders since 1963. J.G. Diefenbaker, the former Prime Minister, led the party until 1967. In a bitter struggle which shook party unity, Robert L. Stanfield, Premier of Nova Scotia, became the leader in late 1967. He served for nine years, leading his party in three election campaigns, 1968, 1972 and 1974. Joe Clark, a young, relatively inexperienced Member of Parliament with backroom political experience, replaced Stanfield as Leader of the Official Opposition in the winter of 1976. Since that time he has continued to lead the party in Parliament but has not, as yet, fought an election campaign. There have been many interesting changes in Canada's Parliament and her parties in the last 15 years. Some have already been studied by
political scientists. Among the many that have not, is the emergence of a shadow cabinet.

When Diefenbaker first entered opposition, he appointed a shadow cabinet, according to Peter Stursberg, who has edited an oral history of the period. These appointments were officially referred to as caucus committee chairmanships. With the possible exception of 1965, the Opposition has since had a caucus committee system. Lists of chairmen for these committees are released periodically. Prior to 1969 the Conservatives' committee structure closely resembled cabinet structure. There was a corresponding chairman for each minister. Over time, as illustrated in Graph 1, the committee chairmen have come to outnumber the cabinet ministers.

The responsibility for overseeing ministries such as Consumer and Corporate Affairs has been split between two different caucus committees. In other instances, committees are concerned with subjects that are the responsibility of more than one ministry.

Caucus committee chairmen, first appointed in the 1940's, gradually assumed responsibilities beyond simply chairing committee meetings. The responsibilities associated with the position began to change before 1963 but were still evolving during the period from 1963-78. As well as supervising the study of subject areas in caucus, the chairmen became party spokesmen and critics of government.
GRAPH 1

COMPARISON OF SHADOW CABINET AND CABINET SIZE

1963 - 1977

Number of Appointments

Year 1963 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77

Shadow Cabinet

Cabinet
policy. Furthermore, the group of chairmen began to assume collective responsibilities. In the 26th Parliament, 1963-65, the group met only at the call of the chairman of caucus. By 1968 it was meeting daily to plan parliamentary strategy. Gradually over time, as the number of chairmen or critics of particular subject areas increased, a new type of appointment emerged. The first coordinators, three to be exact, were appointed in 1973. They were given responsibility for coordinating policy development in a subject area, in which more than one committee was involved. In the fall of 1977 a complete slate of 6 coordinators was appointed. All but 5 committees had been grouped into policy areas each headed by a coordinator. Now it is these 6 coordinators who meet with the leader daily to plan and coordinate parliamentary strategy.

In spite of the activities of the appointees, official party statements have always continued to use the term caucus chairman rather than shadow, critic or spokesman. Both Robert Stanfield and Joe Clark have stressed that the term shadow cabinet is inappropriate, because appointees would not necessarily become cabinet ministers if the party gained office. However, reporters and journalists throughout the period have referred to the group of appointed chairmen as the shadow cabinet, and to individual chairmen as either the party's spokesmen or critics.
addition the appointees speak of themselves in this manner and Joe Clark has used both of these terms. However, the leaders' hesitation to refer to the group of committee chairmen as a shadow cabinet raises the issue of whether or not it is one. To solve this problem we need a definition of a shadow cabinet.

There are three dimensions to the definition of a shadow cabinet. Firstly, it is a group of Opposition caucus leaders which assume similar roles vis-a-vis the Opposition caucus that the cabinet does in the government party. It is the cabinet which is responsible for the legislative program of the government. Because the functions of government and opposition are very different the shadow cabinet is not primarily involved in policy formation. But if alternative policy formation is being carried on by the Opposition caucus, then the shadow would be involved. A shadow cabinet directs the criticism of the government's program. It decides the issues the party will focus upon in its attempts to embarrass the government. In general terms, it initiates and caucus responds. The important aspect is whether the individuals involved assume responsibilities as a group. If they never meet or do not have collective functions a shadow cabinet does not exist.

Secondly, a shadow cabinet as implied by the name oversees or shadows the activities of the cabinet. Roughly the same division of labour as the cabinet's is adopted by
the shadow. Individuals shadow the activities of cabinet ministers. As well as being critics, shadow cabinet members are party spokesmen upon the subject area for which they are responsible. Thus individual members of the shadow cabinet, as well as the group as a whole, have particular functions to fulfill.

A third dimension of a well-developed shadow cabinet organization involves the notion of the shadow as an alternative cabinet. Once the Opposition party gains office the members of the shadow cabinet become members of the cabinet. However this is only one part of the shadow cabinet definition. It has the other roles, as discussed above, of directing criticism, organizing internal caucus operations and possibly formulating alternative policy. These roles are based on an understanding of Opposition as an important institution distinct from simply being out of office. Consequently, although the group of Conservative committee chairmen may not be a future cabinet, to the extent that it exists as an organized group performing the duties specified above and members have associated individual responsibilities it can be considered a shadow cabinet. Further until the Conservative party forms a future government the claim that the group is not an alternative cabinet remains untested. Once the leader is in the situation of having to choose a cabinet he may find it extremely difficult to deny positions to shadow spokesmen.
There is another objection to considering the Conservative group of chairmen as the alternative cabinet. Other parties exist in Canada which could conceivably form the government. However, the unlikelihood of this happening in the foreseeable future justifies a focus on the Conservative group as a shadow cabinet and ignoring the critic positions in the smaller parties.

It is interesting to speculate on why a shadow cabinet is emerging in Canada and is already well-established in other British parliamentary systems. To explain this, it is necessary to begin with the rationale of the Official Opposition. Most, if not all of its activities focus on achieving office. The Opposition party will seek to discredit the existing government through continual scrutiny of its policies and simultaneously present itself as an alternative. The appointment of a leadership team or shadow cabinet is one means the Opposition can use to both present itself as an alternative and to improve its scrutiny of the government. In posing as an alternative government, there are advantages to an emphasis upon leadership as opposed to policy. If the Opposition formulates and presents policy alternatives, it is vulnerable to counter-attack by the government and other agents of criticism in the political system. Moreover, if voters are largely reacting to the performance of the government, then there is no need for the Opposition to present explicit counterproposals. It
must only appear prepared with a credible team of leaders on hand.

A team of leaders is also likely to further the goal of responsible, effective criticism. One element of what appears as irresponsible criticism is the absence of a coherent united attack. The party is unlikely to appear as a responsible critic if caucus members are advancing conflicting positions. A group of shadow ministers coordinating the caucus' activities solves the problem of the alternative government appearing to speak with many voices. Assigning shadows specific policy areas, in which they are interested or have some experience, even if limited, is likely to result in more cogent and thoroughly researched criticism. Thus, the emergence of shadow cabinet organization should not take us by surprise. It is compatible with the goals of the Official Opposition in the British parliamentary system.

The purpose of this analysis is to look more closely at the development of shadow cabinet organization in Canada in the period from 1963 to 1978. We are interested in judging whether the shadow cabinet has become an established institution, an integral part of the Canadian political system. The last section of this chapter concludes with a note on the methodology and sources used in this analysis. Chapter Two is a comparative study of shadow cabinets in Great Britain and in Australia. In both countries the
organization is a well-established part of the political system. Information on the organization in these two systems serves to clarify the definition just presented and to provide a basis for useful comparison with the Canadian case. Chapter Three is a short history of Opposition caucus organization in Canada. The roots of the shadow cabinet organization prove to be important in its later development. The fourth chapter deals extensively with the shadow cabinet structure, procedures and operations in the period, 1963-78. The conclusions draw together the findings of this study.

Methodology

The first step in answering the question, "How institutionalized is the Canadian shadow cabinet system?" is to find an appropriate definition of an institution. Samuel Huntington defines an institution as a stable, valued organization or pattern of behaviour. He has isolated four aspects to the process of institutionalization. These four criteria provide the basis of our study. They determine the factors searched for and serve as the organizing principle in presenting our findings. At this point the reader is briefly introduced to these concepts as defined by Huntington. Further development of the four and how they were operationalized for this study is included in Chapter Four.

The first criterion is adaptability, whether the
organization has been able to survive over time in light of environmental challenge. The more adaptable an organization, the more highly institutionalized it is considered to be. One rather weak test of adaptability is chronological age. The required assumption, of environmental challenge, makes it a less than completely adequate test. It is a more stringent test of adaptability to identify actual environmental changes and determine how the organization responded to them. Thus Huntington sets out generational age and functional adaptability as two important tests. A generational change in the actors involved is a good test of adaptability. Functional adaptability pertains to how the organization responds to environmental changes which modify or drastically change its primary function.

Huntington's second test of institutionalization is complexity. The more complex an organization is, the greater the degree of institutionalization. There is a greater likelihood that complex organizations as opposed to simple ones will be able to adapt to changes in function. The number and character of organizational sub-units is an important factor of complexity. Are they hierarchically related or functionally specific? Are there different types of sub-units?

The degree of autonomy of the organization is the third test of institutionalization. This test includes consideration of whether the organization has its own rules,
procedures and distinctive patterns of behaviour: To what extent is it independent of other social groups and methods? Is it able to acquire and expend resources without being subject to detailed scrutiny. Can it assimilate new personnel so that its character is not changed.

The fourth and final test of institutionalization is coherence. The more unified and coherent an organization, the more institutionalized. At the very minimum Huntington argued that there must be consensus on the functions of the organization and procedures for resolving internal disputes. Are there disciplinary mechanisms? Are actors willing to focus on group objectives at the expense of private or personal ones?

As well as Huntington's framework of institutionalization, we used a number of the measures R.M. Punnett set out in his work on British shadow cabinets. Of particular importance is his concept of a specialization score which is used in our discussion of autonomy. The Conservative Party Research Office supplied lists of the caucus committee chairmen and coordinators appointed since 1963. The House of Commons Debate Index and the Parliamentary Guide were extensively used in collecting data for the study. Finally, newspapers, magazines, and biographical and autobiographical works on contemporary politicians were searched for clues on Opposition caucus organization.
Chapter One

FOOTNOTES


2 Complete lists of shadow cabinet positions are included in the Appendix.


4 The policy areas are listed in the Appendix.


9 In the Montreal Star, 6 April 1977, Joe Clark referred to Jack Horner as a party spokesman and in the Globe and Mail, 8 April 1977, to David MacDonald as the party's regional development critic.


11 Ibid., p. 13.

13 Ibid., p. 17

14 Ibid., p. 18.

15 Ibid., p. 20.

16 Ibid., p. 22.

Chapter II

COMPARATIVE STUDY OF AUSTRALIAN AND BRITISH SHADOW CABINETS

The purpose of this chapter is to expand upon our definition of a shadow cabinet through a comparative study of the institution in Great Britain and Australia.

Although there is no constitutional recognition of shadow cabinet organization in Britain it has become an established institution. It originated with the activities of the "late cabinet."\(^1\) As early as the nineteenth century ex-cabinet ministers unofficially assumed responsibility for overseeing their past portfolios.\(^2\) In 1955 the Labour Opposition began the practice of naming members as official spokesmen for particular policy areas, a practice since continued by both parties.\(^3\) The team of spokesmen is announced publicly on entering opposition and revised periodically. This team is organized along the same lines as the cabinet, with identical portfolio assignments. The entire Opposition is organized as an alternative government with senior and junior appointments--spokesmen who sit in the shadow and others who remain outside, shadow ministers of state and parliamentary secretaries.\(^4\) Opposition organization appears to be as complex as government. The shadow cabinet adapts to changes in cabinet organization--a new cabinet position is followed by the establishment of
an identical shadow position.5

The leader of the British Conservative party selects his own shadow cabinet. The process is slightly more complicated in the Labour party but the leader is still responsible for the actual assignment of subject areas to spokesmen.6 R.M. Punnett's study of British shadow cabinets found that the leader would include representatives of the various social, regional and ideological groups in the party. There are other constraints influencing the leader's appointments. Often he is unable to deny senior parliamentarians or previous leadership rivals shadow positions.7

The British shadow cabinet is basically concerned with one function, that of managing the affairs of parliamentary opposition. Its role in strategy planning includes deciding the list of speakers for debate, formulating party reactions to government pronouncements and selecting the issues to emphasize. Little time is spent considering long-term policy attitudes. As a result shadow cabinet priorities in Britain appear to centre upon improving criticism rather than upon preparation for future periods in government. In the House of Commons the individual shadows are responsible for responding to all policy statements of the minister, for directing criticism in question period and for enunciating party policies in the relevant subject area.8 Over time shadow ministers have come to restrict their contributions to their assigned subjects. By 1967-68 79 percent
of the shadow spokesmen's interjections were on their assigned topics.9

There are practices in both the Labour and the Conservative parties which indicate that the shadow cabinet is an autonomous organization set apart from caucus. In the Conservative party shadow cabinet ministers do not attend meetings of the 1922 Committee. The only link between the two is the chief whip who attends shadow cabinet meetings as well as those of the 1922 Committee.10 Also indicative of the shadow-caucus relations are arrangements made with the research office. In the 1964-70 period of Conservative opposition each shadow minister was assigned to an officer in the Research Department. Backbenchers were not similarly assigned. Priority was to be given to research requests from shadow members. On the basis of extensive interviewing Punnett concludes that, "In general, Conservative backbenchers are probably as deferential towards their Spokesmen in opposition as they are towards Ministers when they are in power."11 In the Labour party, shadows are not necessarily the chairmen of caucus subject groups. This seems to indicate that the shadow cabinet is an entity separate from caucus in this party as well. The degree of autonomy is understandable because of the organization's roots in the activities of ex-ministers.

There is a media and public recognition of shadow cabinets in Britain. The party informs the media of special
shadow cabinet meetings and important decisions that are made. The shadow member is regarded as the official party spokesman and the press will seek him out for official statements within his area of competence. Newspaper articles will often balance a ministerial statement with a shadow member's response. During election campaigns debates between ministers and critics are televised. These extra-parliamentary functions establish the shadow cabinet's autonomy from the caucus, which is essentially a parliamentary entity.

Collective responsibility is a convention of the shadow although it is not adhered to as rigorously as in the cabinet. Some expression of difference in opinion is tolerated. However, shadow members have been dismissed and have resigned because of policy differences. For the most part, however, spokesmen appear willing to accept collective responsibility and thus heighten the coherence of the group. Although there is no promise of a cabinet position involved in accepting a shadow assignment, it does raise expectations of a future ministerial appointment. The facts demonstrate that this is warranted. In the Labour changeover from opposition to government in 1964, 13 out of a shadow cabinet of 18 were appointed to the cabinet. Five were given the portfolio they had been responsible for shadowing. In the 1970 change in government the carryover was even greater than in 1964.
In summary, after 1955 shadow cabinets became an established part of the parliamentary process in Britain. The structure of the cabinet is replicated as well as certain other practices and norms. Even this brief description allows one to conclude that British shadow cabinets are relatively adaptable, complex, autonomous and coherent.

Shadow cabinet organization became firmly established in Australia much later than it did in Great Britain. Prior to 1965 shadow ministers were not regularly appointed. Sometimes the leader would ask past and potential ministers to concentrate their attention on specific subject areas. In his first edition of *Australian Government* written in 1949, Crisp maintained that the frontbench tended to specialize in only a very few instances. He was led to conclude that, "they took less responsibility for their statements than did their counterparts in Britain." The situation changed in 1965 when the Federal Parliamentary Labour party passed a resolution establishing a shadow cabinet. It was to elect an additional number of members who, along with the 14-member elected Parliamentary Executive, would constitute a shadow ministry equal in size to the cabinet. The leader would be responsible for allocating portfolio responsibilities. Yet, as it turned out neither the shadow cabinet appointed after the 1967 nor after the 1970 election was as complex as the cabinet. It was smaller
and consequently did not mirror the portfolio divisions. In both instances the small size of the caucus was the reason why assignments were not identical to those of the cabinet.

When the Liberal party became the Opposition in 1972 it continued the practice of formally appointing shadow ministers. Therefore, as in Britain the organization did not remain identified with only one party but became a general opposition practice. The selection process in the Australian Liberal party is quite similar to that of the British Labour party in Opposition. The leader is not completely free to choose his own shadow cabinet but must include a 15-man executive elected by the caucus. There is some indication that, as in Britain, factors which are important in cabinet-making must also be taken into account in naming shadow cabinets. Balancing state representation in Australian cabinets is one such concern. It is interesting to note a Liberal politician's criticism of the shadow cabinet named in 1974 because it did not accurately reflect state representation within caucus.

Shadow cabinets in Australia are not strictly means of organizing and coordinating the operations of the Opposition party in the House of Representatives. Senators as well as members of the lower house are assigned shadow positions. Usually the proportion of shadow members that are from the Senate is equivalent to the number of Senators
Another piece of evidence suggesting that it is more than simply a caucus organization and truly an alternative cabinet is the inclusion of Country party members in Liberal shadow cabinets rather than the filling of the portfolios usually held by members of this smaller coalescent partner with Liberal members.

An interesting comparison can be drawn between the Australian and the British situations with respect to the role assumed by the shadow spokesmen. As mentioned, the British shadow focuses largely on matters of short-term strategy. The Australian shadow, at least when the Liberal party is in opposition, places higher priority on long-term policy formulation. The shadow cabinet is more than simply an organization concerned with matters of opposition but also prepares for future terms in office. The Liberal party constitution specifically assigns the Parliamentary party the "responsibility for developing and promoting the policies which guide the Party in government."

It is only natural therefore, that the shadow ministers play an important role in this policy formation. Between 1972 and 1974 there had been limited efforts by some shadow members to proceed with policy development. However, staff support was non-existent which retarded these attempts. After the 1974 election though, comprehensive policy review was undertaken. A federal policy support unit was established which organized study sessions of shadow mini-
sters, backbenchers and interested outside experts. The shadows were responsible for drafting the policy proposals which were then submitted to the Policy Coordination Committee which checked for logic and consistency with other party policy. Necessary revisions were the responsibility of the shadow spokesmen. Once the policy statement was acceptable to this committee it would be presented to the whole shadow cabinet. After being approved by it, the paper was publicly released. This policy review process proved quite successful, at least in terms of the number of policy areas studied. In a year nine policy statements were completed and released publicly, eight more were being dealt with by the shadow cabinet and ten had been initially considered by the Coordination Committee. The important role of the shadow minister in this process indicates that it is a position with duties and responsibilities which distinguish it from the ordinary backbencher.

As in Britain shadow members have been dismissed for irresponsible policy statements and ignoring collective responsibility. Others have resigned because they were unwilling to accept a share of responsibility for policy positions.

Perhaps because of the frequent alternation of the party forming the government in recent years shadow cabinet formation is widely accepted by both leading parties. Whether or not this is the case, the government accepts the
shadow cabinet as a legitimate institution in the system. Prior to the election in 1974 Prime Minister Whitlam stated he would allow public service briefing of shadow ministers to minimize any administrative disruptions in the event of a change in government. (The consultations did not in fact take place, supposedly because the Leader of the Opposition would not designate his future ministerial line-up.29) This incident demonstrates that the organization was accepted as an integral part of the Parliamentary system after being established for less than a decade.

In conclusion, although there has been no attempt to exhaustively study shadow cabinet organization in either Britain or Australia, enough information has been gathered to draw at least some tentative comparisons between the two systems. In neither country is there any constitutional recognition of the institution. However, it is accepted as a legitimate organization by politicians in both countries. It has become an integral part of their parliamentary processes and is unlikely to disappear. In both cases the organization appeared to evolve slowly from the informal activities assumed by ex-ministers. Whether it is a replica of the cabinet varies between countries and over time. Yet, in both countries usually the size and division of labour is comparable if not identical with the cabinet. Cabinet selection rules appear to apply, though perhaps not quite as rigidly to shadow formation. One of
the most interesting differences is in terms of the functions which the shadow cabinet perform. Yet, perhaps this difference should not be overemphasized because the policy formation exercise discussed was only one example, undertaken by a party which had formed the government for the previous 23 years. It may turn out to be an isolated occurrence. The description of the Australian and British shadow cabinet structure, practices and functions presented in this chapter hopefully provides the reader with a clearer understanding of shadow cabinets. They will be further compared to the Canadian case in Chapter Four.
Chapter Two


2Punnett, Front-Bench Opposition, p. 36.

3Ibid., p. 59.


5Punnett, Front-Bench Opposition, p. 174.

6Ibid., p. 174.

7Ibid., p. 140.

8Ibid., p. 5, 252-261.

9Ibid., p. 325.

10Ibid., p. 302.

11Ibid., p. 307-308.

12Ibid., p. 5; Turner, Shadow Cabinet, p. 78.


15Punnett, Front-Bench Opposition, p. 369-375.


18 Ibid.


26 Ian Marsh in his article "Policy Making in the Liberal Party," (p.14) gave us the impression that the Policy Coordination Committee was a shadow cabinet committee.

27 Ibid., p. 16.


HISTORY OF OPPOSITION ORGANIZATION IN CANADA

Although this study concentrates on the period from 1963 to 1978 an effort was made to piece together a history of shadow cabinet organization prior to the 1960's. The origins of this institution prove to be important in understanding the current operations of the shadow cabinet.

The earliest reference to a division of labour while in opposition was Chubby Power's recollection of Laurier allocating work to committees headed by his appointees. The practice was not continued after Laurier's death in 1919, rather, as Power recalled, seniority was the basis of an informal allocation of responsibility. The lack of any well-defined division of labour around the turn of the century is not surprising. There simply was no need for it. John English in his book *The Decline of Politics*, argued that decision-making was centralized in the hands of the party leaders. They made all the important decisions concerning party policy and organization. Virtually complete leader control was feasible because of the limited number of decisions that had to be made. Over time, however, the leader's dominance declined as the activities of both government and opposition increased.

The next attempt to formally assign duties occurred during the period of Liberal opposition from 1930 to 1935.
Again Chubby Power provides the details of this organizational attempt. He first convinced Mackenzie King to organize the caucus and was later made Chief of Operations. There were two different bases for groups organized within the caucus. One was organized along sectional or provincial lines to deal with local concerns and criticize the minister from the locality or province. Other groups dealt with particular subjects. These caucus groups were not chaired by ex-ministers, who, according to Power, were kept in reserve. Consequently less well-known MPs were given the opportunity to become involved. As Chief of Operations, Power admits there were difficulties in encouraging Members of Parliament to concentrate their efforts on criticizing a limited number of policies or one particular cabinet minister. One is left with the impression from reading Power, that members were reluctant to take orders from him because they felt he was strictly interested in personal gain. Over time though the Liberal caucus increasingly presented a coherent attack.

Chubby Power felt that there were numerous benefits derived from his efforts. Firstly, opposition members were intimidated by Bennett. They were hesitant to oppose him in the House and thus subject themselves to his ridicule. Assigning responsibilities made it more difficult for people to avoid contributing and resulted in a team of MPs who could bolster one another in their confrontations with
Bennett. Secondly, assigning responsibility for criticizing specific cabinet ministers entailed attacks outside as well as inside the House of Commons which would retard the growth of Ministers' political reputations. Finally in his own words, "the main thing would be to keep the boys interested and possibly amused." Thus early organization was not in response to the need to divide internal caucus responsibilities over strategy planning or coordination. It was an innovation introduced specifically with the party's performance in the House of Commons in mind. It was not an administrative but a political innovation. It is ironic that these two early attempts at organization were not initiated by the Conservative party which has been in opposition for the greater part of this century.

In the Conservative party during the 1920's and 1930's both Meighen and Bennett refused to delegate authority. The backbench seemed to accept the dominance of their leader. Roger Graham, Meighen's biographer, noted that backbenchers would even request Meighen to write their speeches for them. Manion, Bennett's successor, worked at building a sense of teamwork within caucus, but really substantial changes were only introduced by Bracken, Manion's successor in 1945. Bracken instituted the practice of holding weekly caucus meetings. Furthermore, he set up a system of caucus committees to allow for greater involvement of the backbenchers in the making of policy decisions. A functional
division of labour roughly equivalent to the cabinet's was adopted. These committees met regularly during Parliamentary sessions to deal with policy decisions referred to them by caucus. If the matter was considered sufficiently important it would return to caucus but in certain instances, the leader would simply accept the recommendations of the committee. This committee system was continued under Drew's leadership.

By the 1950's the chairmen of these committees were being referred to as the party's critics. The position as the Conservative critic of a portfolio evolved out of a caucus committee chairmanship. It was initially a caucus assignment rather than the carryover of a governmental one. This is unlike the origins of the British or Australian shadow cabinets. The set of caucus committees was an integral part of the activities of the whole caucus as demonstrated by the chain of policy considerations integrating committees and caucus. Dawson, in his Government of Canada, emphasizes that the committees were not allowed to usurp the strategy planning role of the whole caucus. Because the committees were not allowed to encroach upon the functions of caucus, and the role of party critic was inextricably tied up with chairing committee meetings, it is doubtful they held any special position of influence or authority vis-a-vis caucus. This gradually changed so that by 1957 a certain number of the critics were considered
to have claim to cabinet positions and at least 5 were appointed by Diefenbaker.\textsuperscript{14}

When the Liberal party entered opposition in 1957 it adopted a similar system of critic assignments although it is unclear how closely the positions were tied to caucus committee chairmanships.\textsuperscript{15} However, journalists writing in this period were able to identify critics of particular subject areas.\textsuperscript{16} The key critics were ex-cabinet ministers.\textsuperscript{17}

It is in a reference to this period that we find the first statement concerning the holding of a shadow cabinet meeting to plan parliamentary business. It is probably not a coincidence that this happened in a period when the shadow cabinet contained ex-cabinet ministers. Chevrier, the justice critic, admitted that the ill-fated motion of confidence introduced by Pearson early in 1958 had been discussed in a meeting of the "so-called shadow cabinet" with all members having an opportunity to express their opinions.\textsuperscript{18} He felt that as a result he and his colleagues had to share the responsibility for its introduction in the House.

Reporting of another incident from the same period of Liberal opposition provides insight into the activities of individual critics. Paul Hellyer, the defence critic, returned from a NATO Parliamentarian's Conference in Europe in 1962 convinced that his party's defence position needed revision. He wrote a position paper which represented a
drastic change in the Liberal defence stand. Lester Pearson later used this paper to announce a change in party policy. All the evidence indicates this decision to change the policy was made by Pearson, without discussing it either in caucus or in the shadow cabinet.\\footnote{19} Here is an example of a critic interpreting his assignment as a responsibility to pressure the leader for change in the party's policy when he felt it necessary.

It is impossible to draw any conclusions about the operation of the shadow cabinet from these conflicting examples. The shadow cabinet had been consulted about a parliamentary tactic but not about a policy change. Yet in the first instance the leader had just been elected, while in the second had held the leadership for four years. Moreover, Pearson was far more knowledgeable about defence and external affairs than parliamentary strategy. Any or all of these factors could help explain Pearson's use of his shadow cabinet in these instances. A Liberal shadow cabinet continued to exist until 1963 so non-existence can be ruled out as a reason for the lack of consultation on the change in defence policy in 1962.\\footnote{20}

In summary the position as party critic originated as, and continues to be related to, the assumption of a caucus committee chairmanship. Although the appointment is still officially referred to as a chairmanship, the important question is whether the position has come to
involve additional roles. Also of particular importance, again because of the origins of the position, is the question of whether the shadow cabinet is an autonomous organization allowed to operate without close supervision by caucus. Conversely is the shadow cabinet able to exert its influence upon the caucus? J. Williams writing in the 1950's commends Bracken for having democratized procedure by allowing for greater caucus involvement in decision-making through committee work.²¹ A crucial question is whether chairmen of these committees have come to dominate the affairs of the Opposition so that over the long-run the innovation has not opened up but rather has concentrated decision-making in a select group.
Footnotes


4. Ibid., p. 274-76.

5. Ibid., p. 274.

6. Ibid., p. 272.

7. Ibid., p. 271.


11. Ibid., p. 216.


The following four were assigned the portfolios they had criticized, A.J. Brooks, Veterans Affairs; D. Fulton, Justice; Wm. Hamilton, Postmaster General; and G.R. Pearkes, National Defence. J.M. MacDonnell who had been finance critic was made a minister without portfolio. Stursberg, Diefenbaker, 1:65-68; Diefenbaker, One Canada, 2:42.

In his memoirs, Chubby Power explained that the Liberal party was not very successful at setting up a committee system in 1957, because of limited numbers and lack of opposition experience. Power, A Party Politician, p. 310.


Three of the key critics were Paul Martin, Jack Pickersgill and Lionel Chevrier who had been ministers in Louis St. Laurent's cabinet. Ibid.

Stursberg, Diefenbaker, 1:88.

According to Judy LaMarsh caucus was angrier about not being consulted than about the change in policy. Judy LaMarsh, Bird in a Gilded Cage (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1969), p. 31. As the financial critic, Walter Gordon did not know about the change in policy beforehand. He states he shared the anger felt by the majority of caucus over Pearson's actions. Walter L. Gordon, A Political Memoir (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1977), p. 114-17.


Chapter IV

SHADOW CABINET ORGANIZATION IN CANADA 1963-78

This chapter deals with the institutionalization of shadow cabinet organization in Canada. Huntington's four criteria as presented in Chapter One are used to organize the analysis. However, strict adherence to his explanations make it impossible to identify the particular factors to study. Huntington himself admits that the four tests are abstract and must be specifically defined in relation to the organization under study. Therefore, to operationalize the concepts it proved useful to consider the Canadian cabinet system. The cabinet is accepted to be a well-established institution in the Canadian political system. Because of the parallels between the cabinet and the shadow, the type of factors which make the cabinet a stable institution should also serve as measures of the level of shadow cabinet institutionalization. Most of the factors studied were delineated in this manner. However, because of the differences in function, one cannot expect the shadow to be an exact replica of the cabinet. Therefore, in dealing with aspects of institutionalization related to function the measures were derived from the activities of the British and Australian shadow cabinets. As a result the central question of the study should still be considered as how institutionalized, or how adaptable,
complex, autonomous and coherent is the shadow cabinet, rather than, how closely does it resemble the cabinet. The first section of this chapter, therefore, deals briefly with the Canadian cabinet system. Our only concern is to pinpoint factors which contribute to its institutionalization. These factors summarized in a chart at the end of this section, for easy reference, are used in the latter part of the chapter to analyze the shadow cabinet.

**Canadian Cabinet System**

**Adaptability**

The first test of the cabinet's institutionalization is its adaptability. It has been a central decision-making body through world war, other international crises and periods of minority government, to name just a few potentially challenging situations. Its chronological and generational age are two indicators of adaptability. It has survived since Confederation, over 110 years. In total, 396 different individuals, spanning numerous generations, have acted as cabinet ministers.

A third indicator of adaptability is the cabinet's lack of functional specificity. The phasing out of an organization's primary function is less of a challenge to its continued existence if it performs others as well. Thus a multi-functional organization is more adaptable than one with only one major function. The Canadian cabinet has four roles to fulfill: legislative, executive,
representative and political. As a result, the cabinet continues to be an important institution even though the bureaucracy has encroached upon at least some of its legislative initiative. This is only one example of its adaptability.

Functional adaptability over time is the final important component of cabinet adaptability. It has not really had to adapt to a change, but instead to an increase in the scope and scale of its functions. In response the size of the cabinet has grown. Portfolios have been reorganized in an attempt to achieve a more rational division of labour. The cabinet now operates extensively through a series of committees and it has established additional support bodies. Through these innovations the cabinet has adapted to an increased workload.

Complexity

The Canadian cabinet has become more complex over the years. Changes in response to increased government activity account for this trend. The increased number of cabinet portfolios from 22 in 1963 to 31 in 1977 is one factor. Second, this increased size has been accompanied by the emergence of different types of cabinet appointments. Not only are there ministers with, and without portfolio responsibilities, but also ministers of state with, and without special subject responsibilities. The responsibilities and authority attached to these different types of position
A third component of cabinet complexity is the hierarchy of authority and influence. The workload involved in some cabinet portfolios makes them more important than others. In this respect justice, external affairs and finance are generally regarded as coordinating portfolios. Since 1968 Prime Minister Trudeau has used the Cabinet Committee of Priorities and Planning as the central policy development group. Ministers who are members of this committee are likely more influential in cabinet as a result. Differences in the regularity of turnover of portfolios and the probability of positions being filled by first-time appointees reinforce the sense of a hierarchical structure.

One final indicator of cabinet complexity is the increasing emphasis on committee work as opposed to full cabinet. Under the current prime minister, Pierre Trudeau, all matters go to committee before full cabinet. The activities of cabinet are complicated further by the existence of two types of committees, subject and coordinating committees.

**Autonomy**

Samuel Huntington attaches a broad definition to the concept of autonomy. One aspect is distinctive behaviour patterns. The cabinet can be identified, that is it stands as a distinct entity, in terms of its domination of government contributions in the House of Commons. Government
backbenchers make fewer speeches and raise fewer motions than cabinet ministers. It is the cabinet which introduces legislation, defends it in light of opposition criticism and answers questions. Specialization is a pattern of behaviour distinguishing ministers from backbenchers. They tend to almost exclusively devote their remarks to issues directly related to their portfolio responsibilities. Over a three-month period in the fall of 1977 the average specialization score of cabinet ministers was 78, that is, on average 78% of each cabinet minister's interjections were related to his portfolio assignment.

Second, cabinet is an autonomous organization in the more standard sense of the term. One needs only to be familiar with the principles of cabinet government to understand this. It initiates and does not respond to directions from caucus. Even with the 1969 reforms in the Liberal caucus, cabinet still has the upperhand. Cabinet ministers meet with caucus committees but largely to inform them of their intentions rather than to use the committees as sources of policy input. From one perspective the establishment of caucus committees reinforces the cabinet's control. Because caucus is informed beforehand and given an opportunity to voice reservations the pressures to give full support to the minister's proposals once introduced in the House of Commons are increased. Furthermore the autonomy and the dominance of the cabinet
is enhanced by its access to the information and expertise of the civil service.

Finally the position of parliamentary secretary stands as an intermediary step between caucus and cabinet. Consequently, it not only symbolizes cabinet autonomy but also affords an opportunity outside cabinet to learn of at least some of the practices and behaviour patterns associated with it. This position is an incomplete apprenticeship, but it allows cabinet incumbents to become familiar with the parliamentary role of the cabinet minister. Consequently in theory it is part of a socialization process, so that new recruits do not weaken the distinctive behaviour patterns of the cabinet. Between 1963 and 1978 35, or 60.3% of cabinet appointees had prior experience as parliamentary secretaries.

Coherence

The norm of collective responsibility makes the cabinet a highly coherent organization. Once a decision has been reached all ministers are to publicly share the responsibility for the cabinet's actions. For a period when Pierre Trudeau first became prime minister collective responsibility was relaxed. In the pre-legislation period ministers were allowed to publicly express their own opinions on pending legislation. This freedom was discontinued, however, because the opposition would use ministerial statements to embarrass the government after policy had been
determined.  

If a minister feels he cannot share in the responsibility for a collective decision his alternative is to resign. This stands as a generally accepted procedure for resolving internal disagreements. The prime minister remains the final arbiter and disciplinarian. He has powers of appointment, dismissal, promotion and demotion.

One countervailing force which decreases the coherence of the cabinet is the limits on the leader's selection prerogatives. The imperatives of regional, religious and ethnic representation, and the inclusion of leadership opponents, for instance, will often lead to a cabinet which is not ideologically cohesive or particularly successful at working together. Although the inclusion of ideological rivals or leadership opponents may help unite the party or at least create this image it increases the chances of internal cabinet disagreement. In spite of this weakness, the cabinet is a coherent body. The norm of collective responsibility and the accepted practice of resigning if the decision cannot be supported contribute to its coherence.

These four criteria are interrelated. The cabinet has adapted to increased demands over time by becoming more complex. In turn, a complex organization is better able to adapt to change. If it was not as autonomous as it is, the cabinet would not be as coherent. In conclusion, the following chart lists the indicators of cabinet institu-
tionalization under the appropriate heading. This will allow for easy reference while reading the study of shadow cabinet which has been organized along these lines.

Checklist

Adaptability
1. chronological age
2. generational age
3. functional variability
4. functional adaptability over time

Complexity
1. size increase
2. different types of appointments
3. hierarchy of authority
4. committee system

Autonomy
1. distinct patterns of behaviour
   - dominance of House of Commons
   - specialization
2. autonomy in activities from the caucus
3. socialization

Coherence
1. make-up of organization
2. discipline
3. collective responsibility

Shadow Cabinet

Adaptability

Shadow cabinet organization does not have the same roots as the cabinet in the Canadian political system. But with the possible exception of one year it has existed for the past 15 years of Conservative opposition, both in periods of majority and minority government, in pre and post
election sessions. Between 1963 and 1978, 107 different individuals served as party critics. Only four out of 51 critics in 1977 had been first appointed in 1963. Furthermore, among the critics in both the 29th and 30th Parliaments, 1972-74 and 1974-77, the median year of entering Parliament was 1968 and 1972 respectively. Thus, the organization has continued to exist with people who were not familiar with its beginning.

In 1963, 50% of the critics were ex-cabinet ministers. In 1977 only 3.9% or 2 were ex-ministers. This is significant because one would expect ex-ministers to likely retain ministerial behaviour patterns and therefore to possibly act as an ex-cabinet. However, shadow cabinets did not disappear as the ex-ministers left the caucus and as backbenchers with experience at serving while their party was in government were replaced by ones without this experience.

Since 1963 the organization has also survived two changes in leadership. Robert Stanfield succeeded John Diefenbaker in 1967 and Joe Clark, Stanfield in 1976. Diefenbaker had been one of the first chairman of the caucus committees established by Bracken in 1942. Thus he was a member of the first generation which had established the practice. Yet Joe Clark's victory in 1976 symbolizes the beginning of a new generation of leadership. The shadow cabinet organization survived this generational transition
and was actually strengthened by it, as will be discussed below. Robert Stanfield was, and Joe Clark is, to a greater degree than Diefenbaker, committed to a team approach in opposition. Although the continued existence of the shadow cabinet under three different leaders is one test of its adaptability, it is not an especially rigorous test because of the leadership styles of the recent leaders. The more stringent test would be whether the institution could survive a leader committed to running more of a "one-man show."

The functions of a shadow cabinet are very different from those of a cabinet. It has no executive or legislative responsibilities. In general terms the primary function of a shadow cabinet is political. Its rationale is to help the Opposition party achieve its goal of gaining office. In theory it can do this by performing more than one function. Although the study of the cabinet does not help identify the particular functions to be expected of a shadow cabinet, the notion of functional variability is still a relevant test of institutionalization.

The mere existence of a shadow cabinet creates the image of readiness, of a group of potential leaders prepared to assume cabinet posts once its party gains office. Secondly, as with the British model, the shadow cabinet may perform the function of organizing and directing the strategy of parliamentary opposition. Third, as in Australia it may have policy-making responsibilities aimed at both
acquiring public support and providing the basis of a legislative program once in office. Finally, as in the British case, one may note the role of individual shadows as official party spokesmen with extra-parliamentary duties to perform. The next part of this section discusses how the group of Canadian shadows has gradually assumed these roles.

The origins of the shadow or spokesman position were discussed in the previous chapter. Recall that in the 1950's the committees and chairmen were not allowed to usurp the strategy planning function of the whole caucus. Yet, by 1976 the emphasis had changed. In speaking of his group of appointees Joe Clark identified one of its responsibilities as "the task of ensuring that the policies and programs of this government are subject to effective continuous scrutiny within the parliamentary process." Thus, as in Britain, strategy planning has become a shadow cabinet responsibility. In the same press statement the Conservative leader also stressed the group's importance in "demonstrate[ing] both in Parliament and in the country at large the fact that our party has a team ready and able to provide a competent, positive alternative to the present administration." Here is an expression of the first function of a shadow cabinet--portraying to the public the image of a prepared alternative government. In comparison, Joe Clark only offhandedly mentioned the shadow spokesman's
role in the functional organization of the caucus.

Thus over the years the responsibility entailed by these appointments has changed from the mere chairing of a committee to that of acting as a party's critic, and along with a group of colleagues, posing as an alternative government. No doubt this change occurred gradually, making it impossible to pinpoint exactly when the appointment began to be understood as more than a responsibility strictly related to internal caucus organization. However, some of it occurred during the period covered in this study. During both the 26th and the 27th Parliaments, from 1963 to 1968, the list of assignments was released under the heading "Progressive Conservative caucus committees" and the lists included the names of vice-chairmen and secretaries as well as the chairmen of the committees. The list for 1964 indicated the committee chairmen would meet, not at the call of the leader, but of the caucus chairman. There is some evidence, therefore, that at least during the mid-1960's (the Diefenbaker period) a chairmanship was still considered a caucus appointment. Beginning with the period of Stanfield's leadership the lists usually included only the names of the chairmen. It also became less common to refer to the chairmanships as being assigned by caucus. Rather they were understood to be the leader's appointments approved or confirmed by caucus. The trend culminated in 1976 with the list of assignments being released by the
Opposition Leader's Office rather than the Chairman of Caucus. Even though Joe Clark has continued to refer to the positions as chairmanships, the description of their duties, quoted above, indicates they are no longer simply acting as chairmen of caucus committees. Now the Canadian shadow cabinet appears to have an image-building role, an opposition planning function, policy-related duties and even the beginnings of extra-parliamentary responsibilities.

The group of chairmen organize the strategy and tactics of parliamentary opposition. In the Stanfield period the group, ranging in size from 24 to 40, met daily to plan and coordinate question period and to decide on the points of government vulnerability to focus upon. In slightly modified form this practice has been continued by Joe Clark. Not only does the shadow cabinet act as a planning or coordinating body, but the shadow members are responsible for responding to government policy pronouncements and leading the criticism of their subject area in the House of Commons.

Second, as a group the shadow cabinet appears to have certain policy related responsibilities although their primary focus is on planning parliamentary strategy. A former research director of the Conservative party identified committee chairmen as those responsible for harmonizing policy. Further, the role of the coordinator, more fully
discussed below, has been defined as "ensuring orderly and compatible policy formulation in areas of broad scope." The type of policy formation referred to is rather unclear. Both Stanfield and Clark have maintained ongoing outside policy committees separate from caucus. Thus the type of policy in question may be simply commitments emerging out of questions, responses to government announcements and off-hand statements made to the press.

Third, there is some evidence of spokesmen performing extra-parliamentary functions. Alvin Armstrong in his biography of Flora MacDonald mentions that while Flora was critic of Indian Affairs and Northern Development she visited all of the Indian bands in Canada and kept in contact with their leaders. Flora received, as well as delivered, briefs on mercury poisoning, land claims, and other Indian concerns. In Edwin Black's article on opposition research he discusses the demands placed upon the office arising out of the extra-parliamentary speeches of committee chairmen "making major policy statements, radio, television and live addresses...." The spokesman role does not appear to be limited to Parliament although the extent of extra-parliamentary responsibilities is unclear.

Over the past 15 years the Conservative party has increasingly emphasized the shadow cabinet in its efforts to appear as an alternative government. One indicator of this is the concern with balancing regional representation
in shadow appointments. Regional representation is an established principle of Canadian cabinet-making. The various regions of Canada have come to expect representatives in the cabinet who can express the different regional concerns in the making of national policy. Yet to the extent that the shadow is not a policy formulating body, this is not a rationale for following the convention.

Nevertheless insofar as there are specific regional policy concerns there will be particular regional bases of criticism. Further and perhaps more importantly, the representation of regions and interest groups in shadow ranks indicates the Opposition's willingness to play by the rules of the game. It demonstrates its recognition of and accommodation to the importance of regionalism in national politics. First and foremost, regional representation is likely a 'political' rather than a 'policy-making' consideration.14

During the 26th Parliament Diefenbaker had no representatives from British Columbia in the shadow cabinet. Although there were 15 caucus members from Saskatchewan, and 10 from Nova Scotia, neither province was represented in the group of chairmen. However, as with the move away from an understanding of the position strictly as a committee chairmanship, changes in regional representation followed the leadership change. After 1968 there has always been shadow representation of all the provinces represented in caucus. In fact in the 28th Parliament the
only time a province, British Columbia, was not represented in caucus Stanfield considered regional input so crucial that outsiders were requested to keep caucus informed on the British Columbian perspective. Clark has admitted that striking a regional balance influenced his appointments in 1976. Further excluding the Diefenbaker period because of the dominance of ex-ministers, the fisheries critic has always been from the Maritimes. Farmers, usually from the Prairies, have been the agriculture critics and people from outside of central Canada the transport critics. Thus, as cabinet portfolios have come to be identified with certain areas of the country, so have shadow positions.

There is a further function the shadow cabinet performs in respect to image-building. A disunited and openly warring party is unlikely to either carry on effective opposition or portray the image of an alternative government. Assigning responsibilities keeps a greater number of caucus members involved in the day-to-day operations of opposition. People directly involved are less likely to be frustrated and openly critical of their own party strategy, policies or leader. Thus the assignment of shadow positions has possibly been used to promote members' attachments to the party. If the shadow cabinet has been used in this manner, one would expect particular pressures to increase the number of assignments in long periods of opposition, a majority government situation and when the
leader is not securely in charge. If any period since 1963 fits this description it is the 28th Parliament from 1968-1972. There is some evidence to support the hypothesis. After a small shadow cabinet of 20-22 members under Diefenbaker's leadership the organization began to grow during the 28th Parliament and numbered 34 by the end of the fourth session. However, except for the first session of the 29th Parliament there has been a steady upward trend in the size of the shadow as discussed in Chapter One. Because the change was of this nature there is probably a more logical explanation than the promoting of solidarity.

The cabinet adapted to the overall increase in government activity during the 1960's by expanding in size and, in certain cases, reorganizing ministries. The same pressures can account for the increase in the shadow ranks. As with the cabinet, it is not an issue of adapting to a changed function, but rather a need to change to be able to carry on the same function, the scrutiny of government activities. In certain instances new shadow assignments were established following new ministries or the reorganization of old ones. More interesting is that in numerous other cases shadow positions for particular subjects existed prior to ministries. In general the trend over the period has been away from a shadow division of labour which duplicates the cabinet's. In the 26th
Parliament the shadow cabinet was slightly smaller than the cabinet with no shadows of the President of the Privy Council, the Solicitor-General or the Associate Minister of Defence. By the first session of the 28th Parliament the shadow cabinet was an exact duplicate of its counterpart. Since then, with the exception of the first session of the 29th Parliament, there have been an increasing number of appointments made each session. By the third session of the 30th Parliament there were 44 shadows but only 32 ministries. This trend is unlike the British and Australian examples, where there has been a tendency to duplicate the cabinet both in size and division of responsibility. As well as the trend to appoint shadows to subjects that were not yet separate ministries, there was a tendency to at first appoint two or more shadows to large ministries. This predated the division of a ministry into two appointments. Thus there is now, for instance, a critic for health and another for welfare. In 1977 there were four critics of agriculture, a general spokesman and three others concentrating on livestock, the wheat board, and eastern agriculture. The transportation position has been divided into air, ground and marine. The Opposition, in view of its limited resources, was not able to respond to the pressures arising from increased government activity by expanding the ranks of its support
Instead it has divided the responsibilities among more of its Members of Parliament.

Finally, the appointment of coordinators is a response to problems arising out of the increasing number of shadow positions. The establishment of this relatively new type of position is part of the shadow cabinet's adaptation to changing circumstances. The details of coordinators and coordinating committees are dealt with in the next section on complexity.

In summary shadow cabinet organization has existed during the past 15 years of Conservative opposition. It has survived a number of environmental changes during that time, most importantly changes in leadership. Only a few critics first appointed in 1963 remain in the present shadow cabinet. During that time a process, no doubt begun in the past, has evolved further so that an appointment now means more than a committee chairmanship. By 1977, the shadow cabinet was a group of party spokesmen. It had adapted itself to the challenges of overseeing more and more government activity. Further it is a multifunctional organization as the cabinet is, though with very different functions to fulfill.

**Complexity**

Over the long-term there has been a sharp rise in the number of shadow members from 19 in 1963 to 51 in 1978. Until 1970 the assignments basically mirrored cabinet
portfolios. Since then the shift has been away from portfolio shadows to subject spokesmen. There are certain assignments such as justice, finance, external affairs which remain identical to the cabinet portfolios. In other instances portfolio concerns such as health and welfare, and Indian affairs and northern development have been divided into their subject components. There is a third type of critic which assumes responsibility for a particular subject, such as the pipeline or youth. There are a number of ministries with responsibilities relating to these general subjects. These different types of assignments increase the complexity of the organization and result in a shadow cabinet that is not a mirror image of the cabinet.

In recent years the coordinator position has emerged which entails responsibilities very different from those of the individual spokesmen. Three policy development coordinators were first appointed in the fall of 1973. As announced, these people were to be responsible for "ensuring orderly and compatible policy formulation in areas of broad scope." As an example the caucus chairman in his press release explained that the energy coordinator would "coordinate the activities of committees on Industry, Trade and Commerce, Indian and Northern Affairs, Energy, Mines and Resources as well as Economic Affairs and Taxation as they apply to energy." At the same time Rural Affairs,
and Transportation and Communications coordinators were appointed. The Energy and Rural Affairs coordinators were dropped the next year. However, the concept of such a position was not abandoned. Coordinators were appointed for Canadian-American Relations, Social and Legal Affairs, and Transportation and Communications. In the fall of 1977 a complete slate of six coordinators was named. They were to act as the chairmen of coordinating committees which included the critics responsible for the subjects and portfolios in the wider policy area.

There is evidence of a hierarchy of importance in shadow assignments, as in cabinet organization. Recall that the degree of shadow cabinet involvement in policy-making remains unclear. Therefore, it is inappropriate to define hierarchy in terms of influence in policy-making. One would expect a hierarchy of shadow positions, if it exists, to involve differences in influence on strategy planning. Because of the nature of the shadow role one would predict that the hierarchy would correspond to the cabinet's with the most important positions shadowing the most important cabinet positions.

The turnover of shadow positions varies. The top three portfolios in the cabinet hierarchy, finance, justice and external affairs, are among those with the lowest turnover along with energy, mines and resources, national defence, federal-provincial relations and health. All
except for health are counterparts of existing cabinet portfolios. Two others with low turnover are national revenue and the post office which have been filled by two ex-ministers, Marcel Lambert and Walter Dinsdale for a long time. Those with the highest turnover are regional development, science, consumer and corporate affairs and housing, all relatively new cabinet portfolios. Two are the responsibilities of ministers of state in the cabinet.  

The likelihood of shadow positions being filled by first-time appointees also varies. There is a marked tendency to find freshmen assuming responsibility for unemployment insurance, small business, youth, multiculturalism, supply and services and agriculture. Neither of the two which are cabinet portfolios are particularly influential in that organization. Two are shadowing ministers of state, and youth has no cabinet counterpart. In recent years it has been uncommon for first time appointees to be critics of justice, external affairs, industry, trade and commerce, or health and welfare. However, this has changed over time. During the Diefenbaker period a number of freshmen shadows criticized the industry, trade and commerce and external affairs portfolios and the only freshmen critics of justice and health and welfare were appointed by Diefenbaker. After 1968 there has been only one first-time appointee for industry, trade and commerce, Paul Hellyer, and one for external affairs, Claude Wagner,
both men with ministerial experience. Finance has been filled by two first-time appointees, James Gillies and Sinclair Stevens each with a well-established reputation in either the academic or business community before entering politics. From these two indicators there appears to be a hierarchy of appointments in the shadow cabinet, ranging from shadows which correspond to the coordinating cabinet portfolios at the top to shadows of other portfolios, ministries of state and at the bottom subject assignments which have no cabinet counterparts.

There is one other indicator of a hierarchical structure. Normally the list of chairmanships are released in alphabetical order. However, there was a departure from this practice in the last two sessions of the 28th Parliament. Finance, external affairs, justice and the privy council topped the list with youth, fisheries, science, veterans affairs and treasury board at the bottom. The lists were not drawn up according to precedence, as is the practice with the cabinet. The order did not reflect either parliamentary or shadow cabinet experience. For example Angus Maclean, an ex-minister, who had been an MP since 1959 and a shadow since 1963 was near the bottom of the list. His assignment was fisheries. On the other hand, Louis Comeau, a member for two years with no experience as a shadow was near the top of the list. His subject area was energy, mines and resources. There is no way to
ascertain whether the order of these two lists reflected a difference in the prestige or influence of the appointments. However, it corresponds to the hierarchy derived from the differences in turnover and first-time appointments.

The best evidence of a hierarchical division of responsibility is the coordinator position. Policy coordinators were first appointed in 1973 and 1974. In 1976 Clark requested Stevens in finance, Balfour in industry, trade and commerce and Kempling in science and technology to work as an economic team. Those responsible for treasury board, supply and services, public works and public service staff relations were also asked to work jointly as a government operations group. This intermediate entity between individual shadows and the full shadow cabinet was carried a step further in the fall of 1977 when most of the shadows were organized into a set of coordinating committees. A coordinator was to head each of these committees. Not only are the responsibilities of these appointees substantially different from the individual shadows but their responsibilities place them in a position of authority over the subject or portfolio shadows. They are to coordinate the activities in the broad subject areas and make sure people work in conjunction with one another. Joe Clark stated that the coordinator "would have final responsibility as party spokesman in a particular field." Strategy planning is no longer a full shadow cabinet exercise. It is
the six coordinators who now meet with the leader daily. If the position evolves over time in such a way as to entail final responsibility in a policy area, it is unlike any position in either the Canadian cabinet or the British and the Australian shadow cabinets.

The coordinators appointed in October 1977, all senior MPs, had served as shadow spokesmen. Five out of seven had been spokesmen in the subject area they were assigned to coordinate. The two exceptions were Lincoln Alexander as coordinator of government operations and Allan Lawrence, food and resources. However, Lawrence had experience as a provincial minister of resources. All except one, Dan Mazankowski (transport and communications), were also assigned responsibilities as shadow spokesmen. The coordinator position is roughly parallel to the superministers appointed by Premier William Davis of Ontario in 1972. It will be interesting to see whether these positions result in the same problems with lines of responsibility as arose in Ontario.25

In conclusion, over the past fifteen years it appears that the shadow cabinet has become a more complex organization. The number of positions has increased. There are two different types, shadow spokesmen and coordinators. There appears to be a hierarchy of influence in the shadow cabinet. There are reasons to believe the incumbents of the justice, external affairs and finance shadows are particularly in-
fluential. Certainly the explicit assignment of final responsibility for coordination of policy in an area subordinates individual spokesmen and places these appointees in authoritative positions.

Autonomy

This section begins with a discussion of behaviour patterns which distinguish the shadow cabinet from the Opposition backbenchers. The shadow cabinet's domination of Opposition contributions in the House of Commons and the specialization of their activities make it possible to distinguish them from other members.

As illustrated in Table I the shadow cabinet dominates address in reply, written questions, private members' bills and adjournment motions. In the case of adjournment motions there has been a steady trend of increasing shadow cabinet dominance. Although the pattern is not of steady increase in respect to address in reply and private member's bills, over the long term the trend is in that same direction of greater shadow dominance. The situation is not as clear with written questions. In the second session of the 30th Parliament the backbench asked only 1.7% fewer questions than would have been expected if there had been equal initiative among all caucus members. However, the situation is distorted by the extensive activity of the two backbenchers. Tom Cossitt and Robert Howie asked 23.3% of all the Conservative questions. Thus the lack of shadow cabinet
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Session</th>
<th>Type of Contribution</th>
<th>% of Total Caucus</th>
<th>Address in Reply</th>
<th>Questions on Notice</th>
<th>Private Member's Bills</th>
<th>Adjourn Motions</th>
<th>Index of the Level of Activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>26-1</td>
<td>shadow backbenchers</td>
<td>20.6%</td>
<td>22.9%</td>
<td>36.7%</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td></td>
<td>.937</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27-1</td>
<td>shadow backbenchers</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>35.7</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>.584</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28-1</td>
<td>shadow backbenchers</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>43.4</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>.594</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29-1</td>
<td>shadow backbenchers</td>
<td>33.6</td>
<td>45.7</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>41.0</td>
<td>.813</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-2</td>
<td>shadow backbenchers</td>
<td>39.8</td>
<td>48.6</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>43.3</td>
<td>.835</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


a) Each score represents the percentage of that type of contribution made by either the shadow cabinet or the backbench. For example the shadow cabinet accounted for 22.9% of the Opposition Addresses in Reply in 1963.

b) The index of the level of activity is a measure of the increased activity of individual spokesmen. It was derived by dividing the total number of debate contributions made by the shadow appointees by the number of appointees and the number of days in the session.
dominance is not a result of the questioning practices of the entire backbench. Excluding these two from the computations revealed that shadow ministers asked 54.1% of the rest of the questions while they comprised 41.8% of the remaining caucus. Thus with the exception of these two members the shadow cabinet has come to dominate written questions to a degree not indicated by the figures in Table I. The final column in the table is a measure of the increased activity of the individual spokesmen. It represents the average number of debate contributions made each day by each individual spokesman. Since the 27th Parliament there has been a steady increase in the debate activity of spokesmen. The index for the 26th Parliament does not fit into this general pattern of increased activity over time. This score indicates that during 1963, on average, each spokesman contributed almost daily. This comparatively high index for the 26th Parliament at least be partially explained by the make-up of the shadow cabinet. Fifty-three percent of the positions were filled by ex-ministers. Secondly it was the first session of opposition for the Conservative party. Thus it is quite possible that the carryover of a cabinet pattern of behaviour accounts for the situation in 1963. Overall, however, the general trend has been toward greater shadow cabinet domination of Opposition contributions in the House of Commons.
Specialization of contributions is a behaviour pattern of the Canadian cabinet and the British shadow which has gradually been adopted by the Canadian shadow as well. The general trend toward increased specialization of debate contributions can be seen in Graph 2. A specialization score is a measure of the shadow member's concentration of attention on his assigned subject. Specialization of debate scores were calculated by dividing interjections on assigned topic by total number of contributions.\textsuperscript{26} In 1963 the average specialization score of shadow ministers was 25.1. In the first six months of the third session of the 30th Parliament it had reached 45.9. There was a steady increase in the Diefenbaker period from 25.1 to 36.4. During Stanfield's leadership the highest average was reached in the first session of minority government. However, it fell afterwards so that when Robert Stanfield left office it was only one point above what it had been in the first session of his leadership. The average score for the entire 15-year period peaked at 48.3 in the first session of Joe Clark's leadership. The particular emphasis he placed on a team approach has already been mentioned.

Furthermore specialization is a shadow cabinet pattern of behaviour which distinguishes critics from opposition backbenchers. A sample of 118 backbenchers was drawn, approximately 20 for each of five sessions of
Graph 2

AVERAGE SHADOW CABINET SPECIALIZATION OVER TIME

Specialization Score

average specialization score of Shadow Cabinet members

Year

1963 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77
Parliament spanning the 15 years under examination, and including at least one session under the leadership of the three different leaders. A problem with studying specialization of backbenchers was deciding what subject one expected them to concentrate their attention on. For the session where vice-chairmen of the caucus committees were known they were included in the sample. In these instances the computation involved expressing the number of their contributions on the subject covered by the committee they vice-chaired as a percentage of their total debate contributions. Yet the sample could not be exclusively comprised of vice-chairmen because they were not known for the 28th and 29th Parliaments. Thus by checking the attendance records of House of Commons standing committees the sample was expanded to include those who attended committee meetings regularly. It was felt that good attendance demonstrated at least an interest in the subject area and consequently, provided the rationale for testing whether the backbencher focussed his attention on this subject.

As demonstrated by Graph 3 backbenchers do not tend to focus their attention on one subject. Nor is there any pattern of increased specialization over time, as there has been in respect to the shadow cabinet.
Graph 3

COMPARISON OF SPOKESMEN AND BACKBENCH SPECIALIZATION SCORES

Specialization Score

shadow spokesmen

backbenchers

Parliament and Session

26-1  27-1  28-1  29-1  30-2
Thus while the backbenchers had an average specialization score 7.3 points below the shadow average in 1963, by 1976 the difference had increased to 27.6 points. It is also interesting to note (see Table II) that the group of vice-chairmen in the 27th and the 30th Parliaments had higher average scores than the entire group of backbenchers, although still not as high as the group of shadows.

A more thorough study of shadow cabinet specialization was organized by posing a series of questions to research. Are shadow ministers specialized in activities other than debate contributions? Secondly, a series of questions was posed about possible factors that influence specialization. Does specialization vary with parliamentary, cabinet and shadow cabinet experience. Is it possible that the level of activity or the subject influences the degree of specialization? The final topic in this section deals with the expression of regional concerns as a factor weakening specialization.

Specialization of contributions other than debate has varied over time (see Table III). Debate proves to be neither the only nor the most highly specialized activity. Oral questions are more highly specialized. Three three-month periods of questions revealed a trend of increasing specialization over time. The same general pattern pertains to questions on notice. There is no discernible pattern with respect to private members' bills even ignoring
Table II

**COMPARISON OF SPOKESMEN AND BACKBENCH SPECIALIZATION SCORES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Shadow</th>
<th>Backbench</th>
<th>Vice-chairmen</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n</td>
<td>n</td>
<td>n</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26-1</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27-1</td>
<td>35.6</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28-1</td>
<td>37.8</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29-1</td>
<td>44.5</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-2</td>
<td>48.3</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>27.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source:* House of Commons Debate for five sessions of Parliament.

*a* The scores are the average specialization scores of debate contributions for the shadow cabinet and the sample of backbenchers for each session of Parliament.
### Table III

**COMPARISON OF SPOKESMEN**

**SPECIALIZATION IN VARIOUS ACTIVITIES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Debate</th>
<th>Questions on Notice</th>
<th>Private Member's Bills</th>
<th>Adjourn. Motions</th>
<th>Oral Questions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>n^b</td>
<td>n</td>
<td>n</td>
<td>n</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26-1</td>
<td>25.1^a</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>40.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27-1</td>
<td>35.6</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>433</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28-1</td>
<td>37.8</td>
<td>31.5</td>
<td>404</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>56.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29-1</td>
<td>44.5</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>351</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>42.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-2</td>
<td>48.3</td>
<td>48.3</td>
<td>487</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>23.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** House of Commons Debate for five sessions of Parliament

a) Scores represent the average specialization score of the shadow cabinet for the particular activity.

b) n represents the total number of written questions, private member's bills, and adjournment motions, oral questions, introduced by shadow members.
the score of 100 in the 26th Parliament (because it is based on only one bill). Since 1968 the specialization of adjournment motions has decreased. As a result, over time the variability across activities has increased. The general pattern is oral questions, the most specialized, followed by contributions to debate and written questions. This is understandable in light of the opportunities afforded by each of these types of activities. Oral question period is the most highly publicized in terms of newspaper reporting and television coverage. It offers a good opportunity for conveying the image of the Opposition as an alternative government. On the other hand written questions allow the shadow spokesmen to ask questions on constituency and regional concerns as will be elaborated later.

Shadow spokesman specialization has varied with parliamentary experience (see Table IV). In both 1963 and 1965 spokesmen with ten or more years of parliamentary experience (and consequently prior experience in opposition) had considerably higher specialization scores than the more inexperienced shadow members. However, by 1968 the most experienced were no longer the most specialized. Because parliamentary experience is correlated with specialization for only these two parliaments one is suspicious that it may be ministerial experience which is important. The six individuals with ten or more years of parliamentary experience in the 26th Parliament were all ex-ministers.
### Table IV

**SPECIALIZATION SCORES OF SHADOW CABINET MEMBERS BY PARLIAMENTARY EXPERIENCE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years Experciene</th>
<th>10 yrs. or more</th>
<th>5 to 10 yrs.</th>
<th>less than 5 yrs.</th>
<th>n</th>
<th>n</th>
<th>n</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>26-1</td>
<td>44.7a</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27-1</td>
<td>46.4</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>29.4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28-1</td>
<td>35.2</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29-1</td>
<td>41.2</td>
<td>38.0</td>
<td>57.5</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-2</td>
<td>52.9</td>
<td>45.5</td>
<td>47.6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** House of Commons Debate for five sessions of Parliament.

**a)** The scores are the average specialization scores of debate contributions.
The same is true of six out of the seven in the 27th Parliament.

As shown in Table V, the ex-ministers had a higher average specialization score than the entire group of spokesmen in both sessions of the 26th Parliament. However, there was no difference between the activities of ex-ministers and the other shadow critics in the 27th Parliament. In the 26th Parliament all of the ex-ministers were critics of their past portfolios. There were a number of exceptions to this in the next Parliament. As stated, specialization is a cabinet behaviour pattern. Thus, the relatively higher specialization of ex-ministers in this early period probably results from their recent cabinet experience.

Over the four sessions the ex-ministers' scores remained relatively constant. Therefore, the increase in the specialization of the entire group, as shown, results from those without ministerial experience becoming more specialized. As the other appointees became accustomed to their role as spokesmen they came to increasingly resemble the ex-ministers.

In light of their recent experience in cabinet the average scores of the ex-ministers are surprisingly low. This probably resulted from a number of factors. No doubt, the responsibilities of a spokesman were not so onerous as to be sufficiently time-consuming to preclude preparation
Table V

SPECIALIZATION SCORES OF SHADOW CABINET MEMBERS BY MINISTERIAL EXPERIENCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Shadow Cabinet</th>
<th>Ex-Ministers</th>
<th>Non Ex-Ministers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n</td>
<td>n</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26-1</td>
<td>25.1&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26-2</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27-1</td>
<td>35.6</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27-2</td>
<td>36.4</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: House of Commons Debate for four sessions of Parliament

26th 1st 1963
26th 2nd 1964-65
27th 1st 1966-67
27th 2nd 1967-68

<sup>a</sup> The scores are the average specialization scores of debate contributions.
to speak on other subjects. Furthermore, there may not have been the leader's encouragement to concentrate their efforts on the one subject. In addition it is possible this group of men saw themselves as senior party spokesmen rather than strictly portfolio critics. In this respect, they tended to monopolize the shadow cabinet activities. The ex-ministers comprised 52.6% of the shadow cabinet but made 62.9% of the shadow's contributions to debate.

Perhaps of greater importance in determining a spokesman's behaviour is not his parliamentary but his shadow cabinet experience. This seems logical because specialization was not a behaviour pattern of backbenchers but was restricted to shadow members. Table VI presents figures on how specialization varied according to shadow experience. Although the difference in certain sessions was not very large, with the exception of the 29th Parliament there was a pattern. First-time appointees tend to have lower scores than experienced shadows. Specialization appears to be a behaviour pattern which is learned after a member becomes a shadow minister.

A study of scores subdivided by general policy area did not reveal any significant differences which persisted over time. In the earlier Parliaments under study, shadows in the subject areas of finance and transportation were relatively more specialized. Yet, over the years at one time or the other food and resources, government opera-
Table VI

SPECIALIZATION OF SHADOW CABINET MEMBERS BY SHADOW EXPERIENCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>First-time Appointee</th>
<th>One Prior Appointment</th>
<th>Some Experience</th>
<th>Very Experienced</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n</td>
<td>n</td>
<td>n</td>
<td>n</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27-1</td>
<td>34.1\textsuperscript{a}</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>35.7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28-1</td>
<td>32.1</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>48.4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29-1</td>
<td>54.7</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>39.2</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-2</td>
<td>36.9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>51.1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textbf{Source:} House of Commons Debate for four sessions of Parliament.

\textbf{a)} The scores are the average specialization scores of debate contributions.
tions and cultural policy were also the areas with the relatively higher specialization scores. Thus subject area does not appear to have a discernible independent effect on specialization.

Another interesting factor which may influence concentration of attention is the level of activity of the spokesman. Until Joe Clark took over the leadership of the Conservative party the most active shadow spokesmen also had the highest specialization scores (see Table VII). The difference in the specialization scores between the more and less active halves of the shadow cabinet ranged from 7 to 20 points. It would appear that those people who took their role seriously both accepted the responsibility of leading House of Commons criticism and concentrated on their assigned topic.

Finally, we were interested in studying how specialization as a behaviour pattern changed with a change in assignment. Is there an immediate adjustment to the new subject or do the spokesmen continue to deal with their prior assignments? A sample of 35 MPs involved in one of three different shadow cabinet shuffles was analyzed. In only seven cases were the specialization scores on past assignments greater than the score on the present assignment. In four other instances MPs concentrated on a subject which they were not assigned until the next session. For the most part shadow members tended to concentrate on their current assign-
Table VII

SPECIALIZATION OF SHADOW CABINET MEMBERS

BY LEVEL OF ACTIVITY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>High (^a)</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>n</th>
<th>n</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>26-1</td>
<td>28.6 (^b)</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27-1</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28-1</td>
<td>48.4</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29-1</td>
<td>48.2</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-2</td>
<td>45.9</td>
<td>53.3</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-3</td>
<td>46.2</td>
<td>45.6</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** House of Commons Debate for six sessions of Parliament.
30th 3rd 18 October 1977 to 7 April 1978.

a) The high and low levels of activity are relative. The group of shadow members was split approximately in half according to number of debate contributions.

b) The scores are the average specialization scores of debate contributions.
ments to the exclusion of any previous or expected future responsibilities. As a result, concentration on a topic other than the one assigned is not the cause of low specialization scores.

One countervailing pressure on shadow specialization is the expression of constituency concerns. Spokesmen are also MPs representing particular constituencies in the country. As constituent representatives, there are pressures on them to voice regional or constituency concerns. Thus speaking on regional interests is likely to be one factor accounting for the relative lack of specialization. As expected there are consistently higher regional scores on written questions than on debate contributions (see Table VIII). Questions on notice are especially suited to requesting information for constituents, or on other local matters.

It is difficult to predict the effect of parliamentary experience on regional specialization. Members elected in the recent past may be especially concerned with re-election and thus devote attention to regional and constituent matters. On the other hand, those with ten years experience may only have served for this length of time because they have recognized the importance of constituency service. Early in the period the more experienced were far less concerned with regional matters (see Table IX). Yet, as noted before, it is impossible to separate the effects
Table VIII

REGIONAL VS. SUBJECT SPECIALIZATION
OF SHADOW CABINET MEMBERS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Debate Subject Regional</th>
<th>Questions on Notice Subject Regional</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>a) 25.1 18.9</td>
<td>b) 17.8 33.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>25.1 18.9</td>
<td>17.8 33.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>27.1 35.6 8.6</td>
<td>30.2 22.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>28.1 37.8 9.0</td>
<td>31.5 17.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>29.1 44.5 10.8</td>
<td>24.0 18.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>30.2 48.3 10.9</td>
<td>48.3 18.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: House of Commons Debate for five sessions of Parliament.

a) The scores are the average specialization scores for the group of shadow members.

b) Regional scores were constructed, as the subject scores were, by dividing the number of interjections of a regional nature by the total number of contributions. To qualify as a regional concern there had to be noted in the Hansard Index, constituency, or other provincial place name, or some indication the contribution was specifically about the home region either the Maritimes, Quebec, Ontario, the Prairies, British Columbia or the North.
### Table IX

**REGIONAL SPECIALIZATION OF SHADOW CABINET MEMBERS BY PARLIAMENTARY EXPERIENCE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>10 yrs. or more experience</th>
<th>5 to 10 yrs. experience</th>
<th>less than 5 yrs. experience</th>
<th>Total Shadow</th>
<th>Cabinet</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>n</td>
<td>n</td>
<td>n</td>
<td>n</td>
<td>n</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26-1 7.1^a</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>28.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27-1 5.2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28-1 11.2</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29-1 10.6</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-2 16.0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** House of Commons Debate for five sessions of Parliament.

a) The scores are average regional specialization scores of debate contributions.
of parliamentary and previous ministerial experience in the 26th and 27th Parliaments. One hundred percent of those with ten years or more of parliamentary service in the 26th and 70% in the 27th were ex-ministers. It may be that ex-ministers feel secure in their position and do not consider it necessary to devote time, at least in the House, to constituency matters. In addition as ministers they did not deal with local problems by raising them in the House but rather by directing them to the appropriate colleague or department. Thus, their lower regional scores may be a further example of carryover of ministerial patterns of behaviour.

It is interesting to note that concern with voicing regional matters varies quite significantly between regions in Canada (see Table X). The different spokesmen from the north have had consistently higher regional scores. Over time the scores of eastern spokesmen have been relatively high but have fluctuated without any clear pattern emerging. Quebec scores have declined over time. Prairie scores have steadily increased and spokesmen from Ontario have had consistently low regional scores. Thus in relation to this study the impact of the expression of regional concerns on shadow subject specialization varies between regions in Canada.

In addition to distinctive patterns of behaviour there are factors related to a more conventional definition of autonomy that need to be looked at. Of particular concern
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Quebec</th>
<th>Ontario</th>
<th>Prairies</th>
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Source: House of Commons Debate for five sessions of Parliament

a) The scores are the average regional specialization scores of debate contributions.
is relations with caucus. Is the shadow cabinet an appendage of the caucus, closely scrutinized, or is it free to initiate action? Recall that shadow cabinets in Britain are relatively autonomous organizations which act independently, and are not held accountable by caucus.

There are indications of increasing Canadian shadow cabinet autonomy from caucus. Beginning in 1968 the committee of chairmen began to meet regularly, rather than at the discretion of the Chairman of Caucus or even the leader. In describing the situation in the 1950's Dawson emphasized that the caucus committees and chairmen were not expected to encroach upon the caucus' responsibility for Parliamentary strategy planning. However, by 1968 the shadow cabinet was primarily responsible for this task. Also, as discussed in the section on adaptability, chairmen have begun to assume extra-parliamentary roles which is further evidence of their increasing autonomy and independence from caucus.

The relations between the Conservative caucus and its research unit are another indication of autonomy. In making requests for research, committee chairmen are given responsibilities which place them in a position of authority over the rest of the caucus. As set up in 1969 the research office was organized along the same lines as the caucus committee system. Each committee was assigned research staff. In a press interview, Edwin Black, the first director
of the office speaks of "the work (being) divided up, with each researcher reporting to the caucus committee chairman."\(^{28}\) All requests for research were to be approved by the committee chairmen before being referred to the research director. Moreover, the committee chairmen along with their committees were to be responsible for deciding the research priorities."\(^{29}\) Thus, at least in theory, the chairman was to be a vital link in the chain of contact with the research office. The spokesman exercised authority over his committee members by either approving or rejecting requests for research.

There are other examples of spokesmen exercising personal initiative. It appears that spokesmen were allowed to organize their responsibilities and assign duties to others. For instance, Flora MacDonald, while the Indian Affairs and Northern Development critic, divided her shadow responsibilities into three sections each under a subcommittee chairman.\(^{30}\) MacDonald expected and received reports from each of these subcommittees. In addition Doug Roche indicated that Claude Wagner, as External Affairs critic, had subcommittees under him. Roche was asked by Wagner to head the subcommittee on International Development.\(^{31}\) The secondary sources these examples were taken from gave the impression that the individual critics were solely responsible for organizing the subcommittees. However, it remains unclear whether such steps can be taken by the critics on their own, or whether they must be approved by the shadow cabinet, the
The third and final test of shadow cabinet autonomy is whether positions comparable to parliamentary secretaries exist, and serve as apprenticeships for shadow positions. The hierarchy within the shadow cabinet has already been discussed in this light. We are now interested in positions outside of the shadow which are intermediate steps between it and the backbenches. Is a vice-chairmanship or responsibility for a special study viewed as a preparation for a shadow spokesmanship? There cannot be a complete study of this factor since the vice-chairmen during the Stanfield period are not known. The assignment of responsibility for special studies began in the 29th Parliament and has been continued on a smaller scale. Between 1964 and 1968 there were 27 first-time appointees assigned chairmanships. Fifteen or 55.5% of them had served as vice-chairmen. This represents 44.1% of the total number of vice-chairmen during that period. Since 1974 there have been 24 first-time appointees, 45.8% of them have had previous special studies responsibilities. Counting vice-chairmanships, as well as special studies, means that at least 58.3% had some duties other than those of the ordinary MP prior to appointment. This percentage could be higher because many could have held vice-chairmanships during the Stanfield period which we are unaware of. Though the percentages are not overwhelmingly high there is some evidence
that vice-chairmanships or special studies responsibilities represent apprenticeships, a step between being a backbencher and a spokesman.

Between 1963 and 1977, 84 new appointments were made to the shadow cabinet excluding the first line-up in 1963 and all the ex-ministers appointed after that. Only 13 of the 84 or 15.5% of them were freshmen MPs when appointed to the shadow. Generally members are not assigned shadow responsibilities until they have had a chance to familiarize themselves with House of Commons and caucus procedures.

In summary the shadow cabinet has become more autonomous over time. Increasingly specialization is a behaviour pattern that distinguishes its members from backbenchers. Examples, not only of the shadow cabinet's autonomy, but exercise of authority over the caucus have been discussed. The shadow cabinet has become a group which acts independently of caucus. Caucus' approval of its initiatives does not appear to be necessary.

Another important issue that has not been dealt with is the shadow cabinet's initiative vis-a-vis the leader. At one point in the Diefenbaker period the shadow cabinet disagreed with the leader's tactics. John Diefenbaker had planned to filibuster the rule changes in 1965. Yet, the shadow cabinet, which was not particularly anti-Diefenbaker, felt its party could not afford to be labelled obstructionist once again. When Diefenbaker was confronted by his key
committee chairmen he was forced to back down. On the other hand, Claude Wagner, in resigning his post as chairman of the committee of chairmen in 1977, said it had not been a meaningful position because decisions had been made by Joe Clark. In this instance, Wagner's complaint revealed the leader's dominance over the shadow cabinet. The practice of selecting someone other than the leader to act as the chairman of the committee of chairmen began in 1976. Clark had just become leader by defeating Wagner, a much older and more experienced politician, by a 65-vote margin. Thus it is quite possible that this position was given to Wagner in order to present the appearance of an united party. Yet the position was retained after Wagner's resignation and given to James Gillies. It will be interesting to see what happens to it now that Gillies has declared his intention to retire from politics.

Coherence

The norm of collective responsibility has not been an established convention of shadow cabinet operation. There are some indications of its emergence but they are very recent. Furthermore, there is little evidence of any other practices which ensure coherence.

In the periods of intra-party fighting and leadership challenge under Diefenbaker and Stanfield the caucus was never divided in such a way as to pit the backbench against
the shadow cabinet as a whole. John Diefenbaker gave key appointments in 1963 to people who had supported him. 34 Yet ex-ministers such as G. Nowlan, L. Balcer, H.J. Flemming and P. Martineau whose loyalties to Diefenbaker were questionable during the 1962 cabinet crisis were also included. 35 During the Diefenbaker period his shadow cabinet was never strictly filled with his supporters. As an example, G. Fairweather, T. Bell, H. Macquarrie, P. Nowlan, D. Mac-Donald, Davie Fulton, all early opponents of John Diefenbaker, were members of the shadow cabinet prior to 1967. 36 This is in direct contrast to expectations of prime minister-caucus relations. A prime minister is not likely to tolerate cabinet ministers openly expressing their dissatisfaction with his leadership.

Robert Stanfield was faced with a hostile caucus after the 1968 election. Only two of his leadership opponents, J. Diefenbaker and G. Hees, were still members of caucus but many Diefenbaker supporters remained MPs. Neither Diefenbaker nor Hees were made members of the shadow cabinet in 1968 (George Hees was appointed chairman of caucus), but the committee chairmen were not just chosen from among Stanfield's supporters. Most of those who had worked hard during his leadership campaign were appointed. They included G. Fairweather, G. Aiken, D. Harkness and David McDonald, 37 but also included were such well-known Diefenbaker supporters as W. Dinsdale, W. Monteith,
A. MacLean, T. Ricard, M. Asselin, W. Nesbitt, J. Horner to name just a few. When Joe Clark took over the leadership in 1976 he was confronted with a different situation. Many more of his leadership rivals were members of the caucus than had been the case with Stanfield in 1968. All 8 of them were given shadow assignments. In an interview Joe Clark explained that the other leadership candidates were given responsibilities to demonstrate that "the Progressive Conservatives can function as a co-ordinated party." Consequently opposition selection of shadow members appears to parallel the use of cabinet appointments to nurture party unity. Strong personal loyalty for the leader has not been a cohesive principle of shadow cabinets. Coherence of the shadow does not appear to be a very important goal of the appointment process.

The next question is whether dismissal is used in a disciplinary fashion. There have been 14 shadow cabinet shuffles since 1963, an average of one a year. Yet the shuffles have not been evenly spaced either yearly or sessionally. There were only three during the five years of Diefenbaker's leadership. In the Stanfield years from 1968 to 1976 there were eight. During his first nineteen months Joe Clark shuffled the shadow cabinet three times. There is no longer an implication that a chairmanship is necessarily a yearly or sessional appointment. Over the fifteen years, 107 different individuals have been committee
chairmen as compared to 80 who have been cabinet ministers. As a result there have been more shadow cabinet than cabinet shuffles which have involved dropping appointees. Forty-eight appointees have held more than one chairmanship. Seventeen people have been dropped from the shadow cabinet and then reappointed at some time in the future (by contrast to three cabinet ministers, W. Gordon, B. Mackasey and A. Ouellet). Thus frequent shuffling of shadow cabinets and dismissal of appointees is a general practice.

However, there is little evidence that dismissal is used as a disciplinary measure. Lack of reappointment has never been consistently correlated with low specialization. Therefore, it is not used to encourage greater concentration on assigned topic. Three shadow spokesmen were among the Tory rebels who voted against the Official Languages Act in 1969. In the next shuffle only one was dropped, and another rebel who had not been in the shadow cabinet previously was appointed. After the Prairie regional caucus challenge to Stanfield's leadership in 1970 none of the Western members were replaced as chairmen. J. Horner, the instigator, continued as the transport critic and three more Western members were appointed spokesmen in the next shuffle, which increased Prairie representation in the shadow from 25 to 28.6%. There is no evidence at all of shadow cabinet appointments or dismissals being related to the loyalties or the performance of the ap-
pointees prior to 1976. There are a number of possible reasons. First, perhaps J. Diefenbaker and R. Stanfield did not think the critic positions were sufficiently important to fill them strictly with their own supporters. Second, it could have been that certain of their critics were too influential in the caucus to be denied positions. Third, it is possible they were attempting to use the assignment of these positions to get people involved and create loyalty among the dissidents. A reason for the large total number of people involved could be that members are unwilling to assume the extra responsibilities of being a shadow for extended periods. Although it was impossible to find any concrete evidence it is possible that at least a number of the dismissals resulted from the expressed wishes of the critic.

After becoming leader, Clark increased the emphasis on the coherence of the shadow cabinet. In first announcing his appointments in April 1976, he explained the appointments were only to last for the rest of that year at which time the performance of those involved would be reviewed. However, the statement that replacement has not been correlated with specialization scores pertains to this period as much as any other. Thus if Clark has been evaluating the performance of his shadows, he does not appear to be particularly concerned with specialization.

Joe Clark would like to see collective responsibility
adopted as a shadow cabinet practice. He asked Jack Horner to resign from the shadow cabinet after he became aware Horner was considering joining the Liberals. In his comments to the press Clark said, "I can't have a front-bencher, a spokesman for the party, negotiating with the enemy." In March 1977, David MacDonald was dismissed from the party's strategy planning committee when he broke party lines and voted against an immigration bill. As reported it had been Clark's initial intention, though he did not carry through with it, to relieve MacDonald of his duties as the critic on regional development. At that time a party source said, "Clark had decided to impose some rules of solidarity on the Shadow as Trudeau does on the Cabinet." Clark in responding to MacDonald's angry constituents explained, "I'm trying to pursue new ground to see that the party holds together better." In David MacDonald's opinion, collective responsibility was different in the shadow than in the cabinet. The actions against Horner and MacDonald indicate that Clark, more so than his predecessors, wants a disciplined, coherent shadow cabinet.

Although Joe Clark has continued to emphasize the team approach and the importance of presenting a coherent credible alternative to the present government, he has not been willing to resolve one of the major obstacles to greater coherence. Appointment as a shadow spokesman continues to hold no promise of a future cabinet position.
In this sense the spokesmen do not truly represent an alternative cabinet as they do in Britain where there is considerable carryover from shadow to cabinet appointments. This may have prompted David MacDonald's response to his problems. The spokesmen's unwillingness to adhere to the convention of collective responsibility, or to devote more time to their assigned responsibilities may result from the lack of long-term benefits in doing so. Yet both Robert Stanfield and Joe Clark have been unwilling to make any commitments along these lines. If a shadow appointment included the promise of a future cabinet position, the leader's options once in office would be narrowed. Second, it would preclude to some extent using the promise of cabinet positions as an incentive to entice good candidates. In an interview in spring 1978, Joe Clark stated that it was quite likely, if he formed the next government that some of his future ministers would have no parliamentary experience. In the same interview he was asked to comment on a statement of Sinclair Stevens, the finance critic, who has said that he should not be thought of as the next Conservative finance minister. In response Clark stated that he had not ruled out Stevens as the future minister, but he was not willing to commit himself to him either. He mentioned three other possible appointees, none of whom were even members of the caucus in 1978.
In summary the shadow cabinet has not been a particularly coherent organization. Factions within the Conservative party during the 15 years under study have been mirrored in the shadow cabinet. As discussed previously there has been some hesitancy on the part of shadow spokesmen to sacrifice their own private objectives in respect to the voicing of regional concerns for the goals of the entire group. Finally it is unclear whether Clark's attempt to introduce stricter adherence to the norm of collective responsibility will be successful. The shadow cabinet is a very different organization from the cabinet. There is no similar imperative to collective responsibility, nor the same incentives for individuals to accept that responsibility until such time as the shadow cabinet is explicitly constituted as an alternative government.
Chapter Four

FOOTNOTES

1 Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, p.12.


3 Justice, external affairs and finance are generally regarded as coordinating portfolios and thus at the top of the cabinet hierarchy. Between 1963-77 there were three Secretaries of State for External Affairs, six Finance Ministers as compared to nine Ministers of Manpower and Immigration and ten Postmasters General. Portfolios commonly held by freshmen are national revenue, solicitor-general and postmaster general.


5 Matheson, Prime Minister and Cabinet, p. 17-18.

6 John Diefenbaker had been the chairman of the justice and dominion-provincial relations committee from 1942 to 1946. In 1946 he became chairman of external affairs. Williams, The Conservative Party, p. 217; Diefenbaker, One Canada, 1:236.


8 Ibid.


11 Thomas Symons, President of Trent University at the time, headed a policy committee during Robert Stanfield's leadership. Joe Clark appointed a 20-man policy advisory committee in the fall of 1976. Five MPs serve on it as well as other party members and people specifically sought out because of their expertise in a policy area. E. Gerstein is the chairman.


14 An example of public or at least media expectations of regional representation in the shadow cabinet is indicated by difficulties Clark was confronted with, in naming six policy coordinators. A Vancouver Sun correspondent wanted to know why there was not a coordinator from British Columbia when there were 12 members of caucus from that province. Clark's response was, "You face problems when you choose six coordinators. You have to choose them from somewhere and that means that some other places are not going to have a coordinator [from] there." (Vancouver Sun, 26 November 1977).


16 Joe Clark, Re: Progressive Conservative Chairmen, p. 2.

17 The Postmaster General and Communications were combined into one shadow position after the ministries were combined in 1969. An environment shadow was established following the ministry in 1972 and a small business following its counterpart in 1976.

18 Housing was established as a shadow position in December, 1969, yet the Ministry of State for Urban Affairs with housing as a responsibility was not established until June 1971. Similarly science became a shadow assignment in February 1971, a ministry of state in the summer of 1971; fitness and amateur sport a shadow position in spring 1976, a ministry of state in summer 1976; multiculturalism a

19 In 1976 the budget of the Office of Opposition Leader and the Conservative research unit was between $700,000 and $800,000. The Conservative party estimated that the government spent approximately $18 million on comparable concerns. (Robert Jamieson, "Tory policymakers get day in the Sun," Financial Post, 4 September 1976.)

20 Statement by Dan Mazankowski.

21 Ibid.

22 Because the shadow positions have not all existed for the same length of time a measure had to be constructed to allow for comparison in turnover. The number of changes in a shadow assignment caused by electoral defeat of the incumbent was subtracted from the total number of changes. This figure was then divided by the number of sessions of Parliament in which the shadow position had existed.

23 To allow comparison in terms of first-time appointments, the number of times the appointment had been held by a first-time appointee was divided by the number of sessions of Parliament in which the shadow position had existed.


26 Punnett, Front-Bench Opposition, Appendix E, p. 473-81.

27 The general policy areas designated for coordinating committees by the party were used in studying this variable.


30 Armstrong, Flora, p. 136.


34 Newman, Distemper of Our Times, p. 94.

35 Stursberg, Diefenbaker, p. 61, chpt. 4; Peter Newman, Renegade in Power: The Diefenbaker Year (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1963), p. 368.


38 Ibid., p. 226.

39 The following is a list of Joe Clark's opponents and the positions he gave them in the shadow cabinet in April, 1976:

John Fraser - Labour
James Gillies - Energy, Mines and Resources
Heward Grafftey - Consumer and Corporate Affairs
Jack Horner - Transport
Flora MacDonald - Federal-Provincial Relations
Patrick Nowlan - Communications
Sinclair Stevens - Finance
Claude Wagner - External Affairs

40 Vancouver Sun, 26 November 1977
In the 26th Parliament 44.4% of the members with below average specialization scores in the first session were dropped from the shadow cabinet in the second session. The following is a list of percentages of those with below average specialization scores dropped in other instances. Those who suffered electoral defeat were excluded from the calculations.

| 26-2 - 27-1 | 33.3% | 28-4 - 29-1 | 20% |
| 27-1 - 27-2 | 0     | 29-1 - 29-2 | 7.7 |
| 27-2 - 28-1 | 16.7  | 29-2 - 30-1 | 12.5|
| 28-1 - 28-2 | 54.5  | 30-1 - 30-2 | 45  |
| 28-2 - 28-3 | 14.3  | 30-2 - 30-3 | 0   |
| 28-3 - 28-4 | 0     |               |     |

41 Montreal Star, 6 April 1977.
42 Globe and Mail, 8 April 1977.
43 Ibid., 18 May 1977.
44 Ibid., 8 April 1977.

There has been a good deal of speculation and rather less evidence on the attracting of candidates with promise of a cabinet position. John Diefenbaker revealed in his memoirs, One Canada, 3:261, that he had promised a cabinet position to Duff Roblin in 1965 if both Roblin and the Conservatives were successful. Another recent example which resulted in speculation of such promises being given was the attraction as Conservative candidates in 1972 of James Gillies, Dean of the Faculty of Administrative Studies, York University; Sinclair Stevens, Chairman of Comtech Group International Limited and Peter Bawden, President of Peter Bawden Drilling Services Limited. (Robert Catherwood, "Where have all the Angry Tories Gone," Financial Post, 18 March 1972.

47 Vancouver Sun, 27 May 1978.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
CONCLUSIONS

We shall here highlight only the most important factors concerning the assertion of shadow cabinet institutionalization. The first supporting factor is the change in functions. The shadow cabinet is now more than simply a group of caucus committee chairmen. The individual members, as well as chairing committee meetings, act as parliamentary critics and party spokesmen. In addition, (although this is an area which requires further research) the shadow cabinet performs at least some collective duties related to strategy planning. Second, the two different types of shadow position and the hierarchy of responsibility which links them, makes the shadow cabinet a relatively complex organization. The specialization of activities distinguishes shadow cabinet positions from the backbenches. Finally, (although this is another area which needs further study) the shadow cabinet appears to be autonomous rather than directly responsible to the caucus.

In direct contrast to these indicators of shadow cabinet institutionalization is its lack of coherence. Collective responsibility is not an accepted convention of shadow cabinet practice. There does not even appear to be agreement among the actors on its collective functions or
the responsibilities attached to the individual positions. Only recently has there been an attempt to encourage collective responsibility or to discipline the spokesmen.

Crudely speaking then, the shadow cabinet passes the formal tests of institutionalization on three dimensions but fails on a fourth. We certainly found the shadow cabinet to be a more stable and valued organization in 1978 than it had been in 1963 and there is little reason to predict its demise.

A final consideration is with the relationship between developments in shadow cabinet organization and the changes in leadership. Interview data would be necessary to firmly establish the cause-effect relationship. However, we think it is valid to infer that changes in leadership were a major cause of changes in the shadow cabinet. To summarize briefly, during John Diefenbaker's leadership there were only about 20 shadow positions. The group of chairmen met irregularly, at the call of the caucus chairman and less than one-third of a critic's contributions in Commons debate were on his assigned topic. Under Robert Stanfield the size of the shadow cabinet increased from 24 in 1968 to 41 in 1974. It became a regular practice to hold daily shadow cabinet meetings. The appointment of coordinators was first experimented with during this period and shadow spokesmen began to increasingly concentrate their attention upon assigned topics. When Joe Clark became leader a
complete slate of coordinators was appointed. He made the first attempt to impose collective responsibility on the shadow cabinet. The mean specialization score peaked in the first session of his leadership. In his press release announcing the shadow appointments Clark gave an explicit description of the purpose of the shadow cabinet; to convey to the public that the party is prepared and willing to take office, and to ensure effective, continual scrutiny of government policies.

There are factors, in addition to the general personality differences, which have contributed to the individual leaders' commitment to a team approach. Before becoming the national party leader Stanfield had served as the Premier of Nova Scotia for 10 years. As premier of a long and politically successful administration he learned of the merits of delegating responsibility, something with which John Diefenbaker had always had difficulty. Because he was faced with such a hostile, fractious caucus he had to use all the means at his disposal to create loyalty among his backbenchers. Joe Clark, as a young, inexperienced leader with few political credits probably used shadow appointments for the same purpose. But also, Clark's assumption of the leadership symbolizes the emergence of a new generation of Canadian politicians. He brings a new philosophy to politics, that of being a professional politician. In response to a question about his lack of
practical experience he responded:

...what I run is a party. And I've run it pretty successfully and that's the germane experience. I'm a professional in politics and being prime minister requires a professional in politics...And I've been able to make the party plan. We're not at all a rag-tag outfit and that was our reputation some years ago.

The increased emphasis on a team of leaders or a shadow cabinet can be understood as part of a move toward professionalized politics. People, such as Joe Clark, are beginning to realize politics is too important an undertaking to operate with only an ad-hoc, informal division of labour. "Rag-tag outfits" are no longer satisfactory.

In conclusion, there has been continuous development of this institution in the past 15 years under three different leaders. The long term of opposition was quite likely a pressure leading the Conservative party to systematize shadow practices. Consequently whether it is an emerging institution in Canadian government or just a feature of the Conservative party in opposition remains to be seen. The answer to this question depends upon it being replicated by another party in opposition in the future.
Chapter Five

FOOTNOTES

Increased specialization has not resulted from a growing consensus among shadow cabinet members that they should concentrate their efforts. A study of the standard deviations of mean specialization scores reveals as much variability now as there was 15 years ago. The standard deviations have fluctuated from a low of 18.6 to a high of 27.2, with no discernible pattern to the change over time.

Standard Deviations of Mean Specialization Scores

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John Bird in a Financial Post article deals with some of the influences 10 years as a provincial premier had on Stanfield's opposition style. See John Bird, "Responsible but not yet an Alternative," Financial Post, 11 April 1970. For a discussion of John Diefenbaker's problems with delegating responsibilities see Newman, Renegade in Power, p. 92.

Vancouver Sun, 27 May 1978.
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## APPENDIX

### Comparative List of Cabinet and Shadow Cabinet Positions

#### 26th Parliament 1st Session

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### 28th Parliament 1st Session

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28th Parliament 2nd Session

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29th Parliament 2nd Session

Cabinet

Agriculture
Communications
Consumer and Corporate Affairs
Energy, Mines and Resources
Environment
External Affairs
Finance
Fisheries
Indian Affairs and Northern Development
Industry, Trade and Commerce
Justice
Labour
Manpower and Immigration
National Defence
National Health and Welfare
National Revenue
Postmaster General
President of the Privy Council
President of the Treasury Board
Public Works
Regional Economic Expansion
Science and Technology
Secretary of State
Solicitor General
Supply and Services
Transport
Urban Affairs
Veterans Affairs

Shadow Cabinet

Agriculture - livestock
3 co-chairmen
Communications
Consumer Affairs
Corporate Affairs
Economic Affairs and Taxation
Energy, Mines and Resources
Energy policy development coordinator
Environment
External Affairs
Fisheries
Indian Affairs and Northern Development
Immigration
Industry, Trade and Commerce
Justice & Status of Women
Labour and Unemployment Insurance Commission
Manpower
Multiculturalism
National Defence
National Health and Welfare
Post Office, Supply & Services
Provincial Relations
Public Works
Regional Development
Rural Affairs coordinator
Science
Secretary of State
Solicitor General
Transport and DEVCO
Transportation and Communications coordinator
Veterans Affairs
Wheat Board
Youth
Cabinet
Agriculture
Communications
Consumer and Corporate Affairs
Energy, Mines and Resources
Environment
External Affairs
Finance
Fisheries
Fitness and Sport

Indian Affairs and Northern Development
Industry, Trade and Commerce
Justice
Labour
Manpower and Immigration
National Defence
National Health and Welfare
National Revenue

Postmaster General
President of the Privy Council
President of the Treasury Board

Public Works
Regional Economic Expansion
Science and Technology
Secretary of State

Shadow Cabinet
Agriculture - 3 co-chairmen
livestock
dairy
Communications
Consumer Affairs
Corporate Affairs, Treasury Board and National Revenue
Energy, Mines and Resources
Environment
External Affairs
Canada-U.S. Relations coordinator
Finance
Fisheries
Forestry
Health
Housing and Urban Affairs
Immigration and Multiculturalism
Indian Affairs
Industry, Trade and Commerce
Justice
Labour
Manpower, Welfare and U.I.C.
National Defence

Northern Affairs
Post Office

Provincial Relations
Public Service Relations
Public Works
Regional Economic Development
DEVCO
Science
Secretary of State
Social and Legal Affairs co-ordinator with special responsibilities for Status of Women and Human Rights
Solicitor General
### 30th Parliament 1st Session (continued)

**Cabinet**
- Supply and Services
- Transport
- Urban Affairs
- Veterans Affairs

**Shadow Cabinet**
- Supply and Services
- Transport
- Transportation and Communications coordinator
- Veterans Affairs
- Wheat Board
- Youth

### 30th Parliament 3rd Session

**Cabinet**
- Agriculture
- Communications
- Consumer and Corporate Affairs
- Employment and Immigration
- Energy, Mines and Resources
- Environment
- External Affairs
- Federal-provincial Relations
- Finance
- Fisheries
- Fitness and Amateur Sport
- Indian Affairs and Northern Development
- Industry, Trade and Commerce
- Justice
- Labour
- Multiculturalism
- National Defence
- National Health and Welfare
- National Revenue
- Postmaster General

**Shadow Cabinet**
- Agriculture
- 4 co-chairmen
  - livestock
  - wheat board
- east agriculture
- Communications
- Consumer Affairs
- Corporate Affairs
- Employment
- Energy, Mines and Resources
- Environment
- External Affairs
- Federal-provincial Relations
- Finance
- Fisheries
- Fitness and Amateur Sport
- Health
- Housing and Urban Affairs
- Indian Affairs
- Industry, Trade and Commerce
- Justice
- Labour
- Multiculturalism
- National Defence
- National Revenue
- Northern Development
- Pipeline
- Post Office
30th Parliament 3rd Session (continued)

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Shadow Cabinet Coordinators - 1977

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- Social Policy
- Cultural Policy
- Food and Resources
- Government Operations
- Transport and Communications
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