PLANNING IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA:
THE ROLE OF THE CITY
IN CREATING A MODERN SOCIALIST SOCIETY

by

JAMES CARL JOHNSTONE
B.A., University of British Columbia, 1970

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF ARTS

in

THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES

School of Community
and Regional Planning

We accept this thesis as conforming
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THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA
December, 1977

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Department of School of Community and Regional Planning

The University of British Columbia
2075 Wesbrook Place
Vancouver, Canada
V6T 1W5

Date January 7, 1978
ABSTRACT

Urbanization and economic development are features common to all nations of the world. This research has been undertaken to determine how planning for these concepts and their related problems is being approached and practiced by the Chinese people in their creation of a new and different society, the People's Republic of China.

The methodology employed is one based on a literature review of theoretical and descriptive materials. Severely limited statistical information has necessitated the qualitative nature of the thesis.

The People's Republic of China has embarked on a path to create a modern socialist state. The traditional exploitation of the countryside by the cities, accompanied by the more recent colonial example of the treaty port, has fostered an anti-urban attitude in China's political philosophy and in its planning actions. Introducing this outlook is one of the objectives of chapter one.

A review of the literature pertaining to socialist political philosophy is the second thesis objective. Political ideology, discussed in chapter three, has been the guiding force of both urban and economic planning while on-going ideological struggle has had profound effects in shifting economic development strategies and related urbanization policies. A unique socialist model of urban and economic development is being created as the Chinese retain social and economic aspects from
each stage of their ideological struggle. The third objective is to analyze available statistical information which can lend support to a discussion of urbanization and economic development. This is done primarily in chapter two.

Urban and economic planning policies, discussed in chapter four, reflect China's broad objectives aimed at eliminating the difference between city and country, between mental and manual labour and between industry and agriculture. Effective linkages have been developed between urban and rural areas to facilitate the outward diffusion of growth and well-being. Dispersal of industry and technology from over-concentrated cities on the eastern seaboard is carried out through policies of industrial decentralization and rural industrialization, by the creation of a revolutionary city structure which links the urban area economically and administratively to the immediate countryside, and through programs such as "hsia fang", to take knowledge and services to rural areas.

Small and medium size centres of China's traditional urban network, in acting as receivers of technology and industry, are playing a major role in fostering the structural transformation of Chinese society while efforts to control the growth of the largest urban centres themselves are meeting with success. While the Chinese do not advocate large cities as such, they are also showing that it is the form of social and political organization and not size, that determines the success of human settlements.
The two basic principles of centralism and mass participation are at the heart of urban and economic planning. The byword is "centralized planning, decentralized control". Planning functions through the administrative structure presented in chapter five.

If there is to be a possibility of learning more about China then additional information must be made known. The actual city planning process and the relation of the urban structure to corresponding political units and the processes and mechanisms that link them are virtually unknown. The dearth of statistical information requires correction. Housing and urban transportation are two specific areas of planning which also require extensive investigation.

Despite the complexity of planning that the literature reveals, it is not presumptuous to state that Chinese socialism has produced a successful and effective planning system. While we cannot duplicate from an entirely different culture and political system, it is possible to learn some of the reasons for their success in freeing the Chinese from exploitation and also to learn of the general feeling of security and well-being among the people in cities, towns and rural areas.

The value of the thesis rests in its ability to mix a compilation of literature about planning and historical political geography. The relevance of the Chinese model is not in being a prototype that can be duplicated in other cultures of the world. Its value rests in the context of the questions
it raises about the structure and relationship of the city to social and economic development processes. This does not preclude the eventual adoption of similar socialist models by other nations of the world.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Urban China: Traditional and Foreign

For a nation that has a history of being overwhelmingly rural and agrarian the urban experience in China is surprisingly, not new. The concept of city living for the Chinese people is an ancient one, dating back nearly four thousand years to a time when "Chinese cities were established first and foremost as political and cultural centres" but which functioned also as nodes for trade and marketing. (Orleans, 1972, p. 58)

These administrative centres of imperial authority served as central places for their immediate hinterland and persevered throughout the centuries as the largest settlements within the geographical areas they controlled. Such important contemporary centres as Shanghai, Kwangchow, Tientsin and Loyang were at one time these hsien* or county capitals, or similar small villages. Until the mid-nineteenth century China remained an inward looking country which accounts for most of the important settlements originally developing in the interior. Rhoads Murphey (1975, p. 166) writes of China:

"Traditionally, there was a much closer and more symbiotic relationship between city and countryside in China than in the West. There was certainly never the same kind of urban and rural split. The two were not seen either as opposites or as rivals nor did the urban-

* A glossary appears at the end of the thesis.
based elite scorn, denigrate, or attempt to ignore the rural world, but saw their function as primarily one of serving and administering the rural sector."

The Chinese historically, says Murphey, have never viewed the city as the Western world has. "There is not the same association as in the West between prosperity and cities, nor the same assumption that industrialization must take place through the agency of huge, crowded, and polluted urban centers." (1975, p. 165)

The forced opening of the treaty ports as Western trading bases in 1842 and particularly after 1860 changed the pattern of urban settlement with these ports eventually becoming the economic, educational and financial centres of China. With rapid industrial growth occurring in the 1920's and 1930's large scale population moves to the coastal cities resulted in the former treaty ports becoming China's largest settlements. It was this factor, "their own recent history," which has also impelled the Chinese to view the city differently:

"Nearly all of the country's biggest cities were part of the treaty-port system of semi-colonial foreign privilege. As such, they were symbols and agents of China's humiliation. It was in these same cities, Shanghai, Canton, Hankow, Tientsin as well as in their lesser analogues, that the Chinese collaborators lived, making a good thing out of the foreign presence and aping Western ways. The Communist Party's struggle for power was crushed in the cities (despite Soviet Marxist doctrine) by the Kuomintang. Cities are still seen as potential breeders of bourgeois counter-revolution and must be shaped and controlled to insure that their contribution is positive rather than negative. Under foreign domination the treaty ports came more and more to resemble alien
Western cities, replicating many of the same problems of alienation, exploitation, and physical or environmental degradation as the industrial revolution had already generated in Europe and America." (Murphey, 1975, p. 165)

China's contemporary revolutionary scheme for urban development views the city "as a consuming and parasitic entity and as a vehicle of foreign imperialism and colonialism." (Ma, p. 114) In fact this policy is directed more toward the recent past "when traditional Chinese patterns were overlaid and disrupted by an essentially Western pattern in the form of the foreign-dominated treaty ports." (Murphey, 1975, p. 166)

It may in fact be this dichotomy of China's urban development that will allow for a different and revolutionary approach to industrialization and urbanization. Sen-dou Chang states "the spatial pattern of Chinese cities today resembles more the system of administrative centers in late imperial China than it does an urban system characteristic of advanced industrial countries. Nor does the urbanization pattern resemble that of the developing nations of the Third World. Rather a dual system of urban centers, one inherited from imperial China and the other from the developed world, can be discerned on the map." (1976, p. 398)

Considering China's anti-urban attitude and the already existing geographically lopsided distribution of large industrial cities on the east coast how is the People's Republic attempting to remedy this situation?
Developing Countries

The colonial era has left China as well as other former overseas colonies with a legacy of economic backwardness and a spatial system conducive to the mobilization of various resources for overseas as opposed to internal markets. According to Logan (1972) it is the belief of many developing nations today that allocation of investment can best benefit the rate of national economic growth and the greatest number of people if applied through both spatial and economic sectors. In ex-colonial countries, he states, the need therefore, particularly for spatial planning, is most pronounced as colonialism has also resulted in a highly centralized spatial structure which has led to marked variations in regional wealth. This condition has been accentuated in most present day developing countries by striving for rapid economic growth through industrialization. In other words, in ex-colonial nations including China "the drive toward a high rate of growth based on industrialization may lead to a movement of the most productive resources to specific areas of concentrated development." (Logan, p. 229)

It is at this point that policy conflicts can and do emerge. In China's case this thesis will demonstrate that in light of China's socialist approach to development that such conflicts have been significant. If locational efficiency is the main reason for investment, then as Logan suggests, regional imbalance will almost certainly increase. However a high rate of economic growth and the demand generated by it are essential for regional and overall national
economic development. The problem is how to disperse the economic wealth and prevent regional imbalance while at the same time avoiding the retardation of national economic growth rates. Logan suggests that "neither of these policies of striving for locational efficiency or regional equity confronts the fundamental problem of how to rearrange the spatial system to increase productivity per capita."
(Logan, p. 230) Spatial planning, he suggests, in third world countries can be directed to disperse nongenerative concomitants of economic growth such as schools, banks and other services in an equitable manner or to activate the productive capacities of the various regions by linking them structurally and organizationally to the national economy. The first is basically an allocative problem while the second actually attempts to foster a structural transformation in society. Implied in this structural transformation is the breaking down of "spatial, economic and institutional barriers that limit a society's capacity for growth." (Logan, p. 230)
In using the spatial system as a key in the structural transformation of a nation the major components are the urban centres, the transportation network that links them, and the organizational structure that facilitates the flow of demand and other incentives through the system. (Logan, pp. 230-231)
China's revolutionary development since 1949 has, in addition to facing similarities with other third world countries, been guided by the socialist laws of location. These laws covering the location of various facilities as
capsulized by Hamilton (p. 85) are as follows:

1) close to the resources or inputs they use;
2) close to the markets they supply;
3) interregionally to develop maximum regional specialization of production where this is optimal;
4) between regions to achieve maximum regional self-sufficiency where this is optimal;
5) as evenly as possible to exploit regionally or locally underutilized resources and to assist in solving regional scarcities;
6) in a dispersed fashion throughout the countryside to "create proletarian bastions of socialism";
7) preferentially in backward, national minority, or underdeveloped regions to achieve greater interregional equality;
8) to eliminate cultural, economic, and social differences between city and country;
9) as strategically as possible to meet war eventualities;
10) to achieve optimal international and intra-bloc division of labor and optimum trade flows;

However, Hamilton states that the interpretation and application of these laws of location are flexible for not only do they overlap, but individual laws themselves incorporate "cultural, economic, military, political, and
social motives which sometimes complement but more often conflict with each other." (Hamilton, p. 85)

The importance of these laws for China's development and for China's planners rests not in the laws themselves but in the criteria that influence the importance Chinese decision-makers attach in choosing particular laws. Hamilton offers five main constituents of spatial decision-making behavior that are theoretically influencing China's socio-economic systems and specifically its urban areas:

1) interaction among decision-makers and vested interests at large;
2) the impact of ideology;
3) the perception of space and environment by decision-makers;
4) the rationality of decisions;
5) the interaction of decision-makers with the economic system.

Considering the number and general nature of these laws it is safe to say that their interpretation and application is indeed quite flexible. These socialist location principles offer Chinese planners a wide range both of criteria and most importantly, criteria interpretation. Hamilton states that over a period of time changing the decision making process in a socialist society from a command to a more decentralized economy can be achieved through the introduction of more participants in the planning process at local and
regional levels as well as giving more attention to location principles and their relevance in specific situations, a more thorough perception of space and environment, better searching and finding of alternative locations, and more rigorous application of impartial criteria. (Hamilton, p. 104)

Revolutionary China is characterized by a geographically lopsided distribution of large industrial cities on the east coast. It is also being guided by a strong socialist political philosophy which advocates an anti-urban attitude. How is the People's Republic attempting to remedy this regional imbalance of relative urban wealth and well-being while at the same time directing China along what is perceived to be the correct path of becoming an industrialized socialist nation? Through what methods are the Chinese ridding their nation of the type of exploitive, bourgeois, urban population that has fostered this anti-urban philosophy?

As Lewis suggests these questions are not easily answered. "The state of China's urban economy has proved as perplexing to the Communists as it has to scholars in the West. Chinese planners have differed over incentives, organizational techniques, managerial principles, and the role of planning itself." (Lewis, 1971, p. 16) Nevertheless, the People's Republic does have definite policies regarding the position of cities in its new society.

**Purpose and Chapter Outline of Thesis**

The intention of this thesis will be to demonstrate
to what extent China has, in its structural transformation through both spatial and economic planning as explained by Logan, followed the criteria outlined by Hamilton in the location and development of its economy and in particular what role its urban centres have played in this national political, economic and social development and what structure and change have been by necessity implemented in the urban centres themselves to complement this national development.

Information will be obtained from two different sources. The first will be a review of the English language literature pertaining to planning and urbanization in China. The second will incorporate into the thesis original information obtained from a July, 1976 visit by the author to the People's Republic. This latter material can be viewed in two parts:

1) specific planning information:
   - city of Ch'ang Ch'un planners interview.
   - visit and discussion at Fengsheng neighborhood committee in Peking.
   - visits to specific factories, rural areas and housing developments in Shenyang, Ch'ang Ch'un, Tangshan, Peking and Canton.

2) general background information about China which creates a better "feeling" and understanding for what the Chinese people are attempting.

Chinese planning information is such that it does not lend itself easily to an exhaustive, integrated discussion
of the pertinent areas of concern just mentioned. This paucity of information is reflected in the somewhat disjointed nature of this thesis. It is intended, however, that these related but disjointed foci of the thesis presented in the various chapters at least be connected but not necessarily integrated.

Achieving the stated objective will require elaboration of national development policies, community organization, and government structure. As well it is essential that an introduction to Mao Tse-tung Thought and Marxist-Leninist theory be provided. Chapter I discusses the purpose of the document and sources of information. A brief review of Chinese cities and urban statistical data, and the problems associated with such information, will be presented in Chapter II to provide information related to the setting for socialist policies beginning in 1949 and to explain certain government policies and actions taken since that date. Intricate inter-relationships between various levels of government and non-government levels of community organization require that economic and regional planning aspects also be discussed, but briefly.

By definition urban planning deals with the physical, social and productive aspects of the organization and development of cities. (Canada-China Friendship Association Newsletter, Jan. 1976, p. 13) Prior to the Cultural Revolution, Chinese planning experts were seen as being separate from the masses; but since the Cultural Revolution, the approach to planning has reflected a growing emphasis on wide-scale
citizen involvement, referred to now as "open door" planning. (Discussion with Ch'ang Ch'un planners, July, 1976) This new political emphasis reopens the pertinent question of how the urban and rural areas should develop and what their relationship will be. Effects of changing political outlooks on policies affecting urban development will be discussed in chapter III. A common misconception is that an ideal design for China's overall Socialist development was automatically at hand with Liberation in 1949. This is not the case. Policies affecting urban centres have fluctuated considerably since that date as the Chinese people have struggled to determine the correct political path to follow. The importance of continuing the revolution cannot be overstated. The magnitude of such events as the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution attest to this. China's cities are an integrated part of this continuing political struggle and changing political outlook.

Planning of the nation's urban areas is not taking place in isolation. Policies of rural industrialization, urban self-sufficiency and self-reliance, controlled city growth, industrial relocation, as well as efforts to alter the nature of life in the city itself have all been affected by, and reflect, the changing political consciousness of the Chinese people and are at the same time intimately related to changing goals of regional and economic development. It is essential, although planning for urban areas is a major focus of this thesis, that the development of cities as part of national
socio-economic systems be discussed. This will be undertaken in chapter IV.

It is within a revolutionary context, via a deliberately designed participatory and egalitarian system, that China's cities are being restructured. Alienation and exploitation can easily be combatted when grass-roots organizations are ubiquitous. New housing programs and provision of basic municipal services have all been planned and created thereby aiding extensively in limiting city growth and preventing overcrowding. The technique of group organization in the workplace and at home provides a vehicle to inculcate new and revolutionary goals, an important task for the once and still potentially exploitive and bourgeois nature of the city.

Planning for the city itself, particularly its planning and administrative structure, relationships to national organization, and citizen participation will be discussed in chapter V.

Concluding comments addressed to urban areas and their role in the national development of the People's Republic will be found in chapter VI. It is intended that the role of the planner in China, the concept of controlled city growth, China as a developing nation and its planning relevance to other third world countries, and the extensive basis for citizen participation and decision making be specifically cited.

Of natural interest is the relationship of occurrences in China to the Canadian planning scene. Any comparison between differing nations presents numerous difficulties.
In this case the pitfalls of cross-cultural and cross-political comparisons are probably even greater. The significance of the discussion to planning in Canada then, will be in a generic sense rather than in direct applicability to a given situation.
CHAPTER II

URBAN CHINA IN PERSPECTIVE

Introduction

It is intended that by consulting virtually all major English language sources containing urban and other demographic information that this chapter will provide supporting demographic knowledge about the size and distribution of China's urban centres and describe various general trends that have occurred in this urban population from 1949 to date. Deficiencies of statistical information will also be commented on. The discussion and presentation of this limited knowledge should make it possible to understand the difficulties and hesitancy in arriving at specific conclusions about China's population centres.

The 1953 Census and Subsequent Demographic Information

The new government of the People's Republic conducted China's first modern census, setting June 30, 1953, as the standard census time. The results, published in 1954, showed that China, excluding Taiwan, had a total population of 582,603,417 of which 505,346,135 persons, or 86.7 percent of the total population were classified as rural. (Cheng-Siang Chen, pp. 55 & 60)

The census, admittedly, was not ideally carried out. Problems existed with trained enumerators, geography was a hindrance, and census takers recorded those people habitually
and legally resident (de jure population) as opposed to counting the number of people actually present at a particular place at a given time. More importantly, it is not known what the actual criteria or definitions were that constituted urban and rural. It was not until November, 1955 that the State Council and the Ministry of Internal Affairs attempted to develop guidelines for such a definition. The following are offered by Sen-dou Chang as three criteria which determined whether a place was urban or not:

1) "seat of a municipal people's committee or people's committee at or above the hsien (or its equivalent) level, regardless of population size;

2) a minimum resident population of 2,000, at least fifty percent of which is nonagricultural;

3) a resident population of between 1,000 and 2,000, seventy-five percent of which is non-agricultural." (Sen-dou Chang, 1976, p. 400)

Unfortunately there is no way of knowing to what extent these definitions have been followed either in the past or the present. For example there was no question in the 1953 census at all regarding occupation. One thing is certain however, and that is the Chinese were serious in carrying out the census and despite its failings it is still the best and only extensive undertaking of its kind for urban analysis. The total Chinese urban population figure of 77,259,282 (1953) is actually believed to be underestimated by some scholars (Sen-dou Chang, 1976, p. 399) The various ratios of urban population for subsequent years are in many
instances interpolations using the 1953 census as a base.

Subsequent urban data has essentially been piecemeal information originating from unchecked reports of provinces and municipalities, news media, travellers and government speeches. There have been reports in several writings that a census of some type was undertaken in 1964, probably by revolutionary committees, but this cannot as yet be confirmed. In spite of the shortcomings of the census itself and subsequent difficulties in availability of information, trends in urbanization and general concepts of city size are available. Analyses by both Western and Chinese scholars provide the following information.

Table I

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
<th>% Urban</th>
<th>Number Urban</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>582,603,417</td>
<td>13.3%</td>
<td>77,259,282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>800,000,000</td>
<td>16-17%</td>
<td>130-140,000,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: the above information excludes Taiwan.

The first decade of the People's Republic was marked by a steady gain in urban population. This reflected "both the relatively successful industrial programs of the First Five Year Plan (1953-57) and the uncontrolled rural to urban migration of the early stages of collectivization and the Great Leap Forward years" (1958-60). (Sen-dou Chang, 1976,
Chen-Siang Chen (1973, p. 68) reports the average annual growth rate of the urban population in the period 1950-56 to be 6.43 percent; between 1957 and 1960 it was 12.2 percent.

The rate of urban population growth during the entire period from 1949 to 1960 has been put at 7.6 percent by K. Chao (p. 385) with the greatest ratio of urban to rural population occurring in 1960 (refer to Table II) with close to 19 percent of China's citizens residing in urban areas. (Sen-dou Chang, 1976, p. 401)

Table II
Urban-Rural Population Ratio In China
1949-1970

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Urban Population</th>
<th>Rural Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>89.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>88.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>88.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>87.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>86.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>86.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>86.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>85.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>85.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>83.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>82.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>81.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>83.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: Information in Table II has been compiled from a number of different sources.
Of China's immense population of 800 million people approximately 83%-84% live in the countryside. However, the urban areas still account for 130-140 million people. Despite the fact, then, that China is predominantly a rural country, urban planning and development still play an important role in Chinese life and in the nation's development.

From 1953 through 1958 year-end population figures were reported annually by the State Statistical Bureau and are probably more reliable than the 1953 census. After 1957 the annual population increase was greater than 20 million people while between 1954 and 1958 it averaged 17 million. Such a large population increase each year was accompanied by a corresponding increase in the working-age group. Cheng-Siang Chen (p. 58) reports that during the First Five Year Plan (1953-1957) the increase in working-age population was estimated to be four million annually and during the Second Five Year Plan (1958-1962), five million, with approximately 25% being absorbed by industry.

Such population trends worried the government and in 1954 birth control programs were officially advocated. A thumbnail chronology of family planning efforts shows significant fluctuations: "...China was able to mount a fully-fledged birth control campaign by 1957, cease all discussion of family planning for about 4 years, initiate another programme in 1962, forget it in 1966, and resume an intensive effort in the 1970s..." (Orleans, 1975, p. 502) Today the government stresses the need for family planning, contraception, the proper spacing of births, and the care of the
mother's health. Young people are encouraged to postpone marriage until the age of 23 to 27 for women and 25 to 29 for men. Small families, up to three children, are encouraged and abortion is readily available. Such efforts combined with wide-spread improvement in all health care services have had dramatic results in mortality and birth rates. (refer to Table III)

Table III
Infant Mortality Rates
in Shanghai and Peking

(Deaths in the first year of life per thousand live births)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Shanghai City Proper</th>
<th>Peking City Proper</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>150.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>117.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>38.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In 1953 the census listed 5,568 urban places in China, nine of which had a population of over one million. (Table IV) Communities of 20,000 people or more had together 51,313,000 inhabitants or 8.8 percent of the national population total. Although the proportion was low the absolute urban population, even then, was significant. (Cheng-Siang Chen, p. 66)
Table IV
Number of Urban Places and the Urban Population by Size of Place: June 1953
(population in thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size of place</th>
<th>number of urban places</th>
<th>urban population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1,000,000 or more</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>21,020 27.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500,000 to 999,999</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>11,279 14.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200,000 to 499,999</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>8,492 11.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100,000 to 199,999</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>7,201 9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50,000 to 99,999</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>5,497 7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20,000 to 49,999</td>
<td>247</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,000 to 19,999</td>
<td>4,228</td>
<td>23,768 30.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,000 to 1,999</td>
<td>727</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than 1,000</td>
<td>193</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>5,568</strong></td>
<td><strong>77,257 100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Urbanization Trends and Contemporary Urban China

Reporting urban population in 1970 to be as high as 160 million Cheng-Siang Chen says China had twenty-one cities of over a million population (Table V) which together "totaled 44,460,000 people, 5.9 percent of the total population of China and 27.8 percent of the urban population."
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>1936</th>
<th>1953</th>
<th>1957</th>
<th>1970</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shanghai</td>
<td>3,727,000</td>
<td>6,204,417</td>
<td>6,900,000</td>
<td>7,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peking</td>
<td>1,551,000</td>
<td>2,768,119</td>
<td>4,010,000</td>
<td>5,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tientsin</td>
<td>1,292,000</td>
<td>2,693,831</td>
<td>3,220,000</td>
<td>3,600,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mukden (Shenyang)</td>
<td>527,000</td>
<td>2,299,900</td>
<td>2,411,000</td>
<td>2,800,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wuhan</td>
<td>1,379,000</td>
<td>1,427,300</td>
<td>2,146,000</td>
<td>2,560,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canton</td>
<td>1,222,000</td>
<td>1,598,900</td>
<td>1,840,000</td>
<td>2,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chungking</td>
<td>446,000</td>
<td>1,772,500</td>
<td>2,121,000</td>
<td>2,400,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nanking</td>
<td>1,019,000</td>
<td>1,091,600</td>
<td>1,419,000</td>
<td>1,750,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harbin</td>
<td>465,000</td>
<td>1,163,000</td>
<td>1,552,000</td>
<td>1,670,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luta (Dairen,</td>
<td>445,000</td>
<td>766,400</td>
<td>1,508,000</td>
<td>1,650,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port Arthur</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sian</td>
<td>155,000</td>
<td>787,300</td>
<td>1,310,000</td>
<td>1,600,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lanchow</td>
<td>106,000</td>
<td>397,400</td>
<td>699,000</td>
<td>1,450,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiyuan</td>
<td>(34)139,000</td>
<td>720,700</td>
<td>1,020,000</td>
<td>1,350,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taishan</td>
<td>515,000</td>
<td>916,800</td>
<td>1,121,000</td>
<td>1,300,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chengdu</td>
<td>516,113</td>
<td>856,700</td>
<td>1,107,000</td>
<td>1,250,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changchun</td>
<td>228,744</td>
<td>855,200</td>
<td>975,000</td>
<td>1,200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kunming</td>
<td>145,000</td>
<td>592,900</td>
<td>880,000</td>
<td>1,100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tsinan</td>
<td>442,000</td>
<td>680,100</td>
<td>862,000</td>
<td>1,100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fushun</td>
<td>118,000</td>
<td>678,600</td>
<td>985,000</td>
<td>1,080,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anshan</td>
<td>166,000</td>
<td>554,890</td>
<td>805,000</td>
<td>1,050,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chengchow ('31)</td>
<td>80,000</td>
<td>594,700</td>
<td>766,000</td>
<td>1,050,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hangchow</td>
<td>589,000</td>
<td>696,600</td>
<td>784,000</td>
<td>960,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tangshan</td>
<td>85,000</td>
<td>693,300</td>
<td>800,000</td>
<td>950,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paotow ('35)</td>
<td>67,206</td>
<td>149,400</td>
<td>(58)650,000</td>
<td>920,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tzepe</td>
<td></td>
<td>184,200</td>
<td>806,000*</td>
<td>850,000*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changsha</td>
<td></td>
<td>507,000</td>
<td>650,600</td>
<td>703,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shihkiachwang</td>
<td></td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>373,400</td>
<td>598,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tsitsihar</td>
<td>76,101</td>
<td>344,700</td>
<td>668,000</td>
<td>760,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soochow</td>
<td>389,797</td>
<td>474,000</td>
<td>633,000</td>
<td>730,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirin</td>
<td>143,250</td>
<td>435,400</td>
<td>568,000</td>
<td>720,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suchow ('35)</td>
<td>160,013</td>
<td>373,000</td>
<td>676,000</td>
<td>700,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foochow ('35)</td>
<td>359,205</td>
<td>553,000</td>
<td>616,000</td>
<td>680,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nanchang</td>
<td>301,000</td>
<td>398,200</td>
<td>508,000</td>
<td>675,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kweiyang</td>
<td>117,000</td>
<td>270,900</td>
<td>504,000</td>
<td>660,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wusih</td>
<td>272,209</td>
<td>581,500</td>
<td>613,000</td>
<td>650,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hoifei</td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td>183,600</td>
<td>304,000</td>
<td>630,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hwainan</td>
<td></td>
<td>286,900</td>
<td>370,000</td>
<td>600,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Penki ('41)</td>
<td>98,203</td>
<td>449,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>600,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loyang ('35)</td>
<td>77,159</td>
<td>171,200</td>
<td></td>
<td>580,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nanning</td>
<td>88,900</td>
<td>194,600</td>
<td>264,000</td>
<td>550,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huhehhot ('35)</td>
<td>83,722</td>
<td>148,400</td>
<td>314,000</td>
<td>530,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sining ('46)</td>
<td>55,564</td>
<td>93,700</td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td>500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urumchi ('43)</td>
<td>80,000</td>
<td>140,700</td>
<td>275,000</td>
<td>500,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The figures for 1936 are based on various prewar sources. The figures for 1953 are census results, for 1957 official estimates. The 1970 estimate was made by the author based on numerous, if fragmentary, data.

*Increase largely a result of territorial expansion of the city limits.

Cities of 500,000 or more numbered 43 in 1970, had a combined population of 59,830,000 or 8.0 percent of the national total and 37.4 percent of the total urban population. (Cheng-Siang Chen, p. 66)

Geographically the proportion of urban dwellers (30%) is highest in the northeastern provinces or Manchuria. Hopei province and Kiangsu province containing Peking and Tientsin in the former and Shanghai in the latter are 20 percent urbanized. No other province or autonomous region has an urban population above the national average of 16-17 percent. Cheng-Siang Chen adds that moderate degrees of urbanization exist in the southeastern coastal provinces of Chekiang, Fukien, and Kwangtung. Urbanization to any great extent is lacking in the northwest and southwest.

The build-up of industry and improvement of transportation networks has resulted not only in the continued growth of existing cities but in many new centres being established. Urban growth has been most pronounced in new industrial and communications centres established in the border regions and in communities such as Taching which are tapping new mineral resources. It is in fact
the pull exerted by industrialization, initially accompanied by the push from the countryside through enforced collectivization and communalization which has been the dominant force promoting urbanization in China. Although the figures are not entirely reliable (see Orleans, 1972, p. 62) the flow of peasants to the cities during most of the 1950s is revealed in Table VI.

**Table VI**

*Size and Rate of Growth of the Urban Population of China*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>End of Year</th>
<th>Total Population in thousands</th>
<th>Total Urban Population in thousands</th>
<th>Per cent Urban</th>
<th>Per cent of Increase Over Preceding Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>541,670</td>
<td>57,650</td>
<td>10.60</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>551,960</td>
<td>61,690</td>
<td>11.12</td>
<td>7.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>563,000</td>
<td>66,320</td>
<td>11.78</td>
<td>7.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>574,820</td>
<td>71,630</td>
<td>12.46</td>
<td>8.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>587,960</td>
<td>77,670</td>
<td>13.21</td>
<td>8.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>614,650</td>
<td>82,850</td>
<td>13.48</td>
<td>1.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>627,800</td>
<td>89,150</td>
<td>14.20</td>
<td>7.60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Efforts by the new regime to contend with the "blind influx" were quick but inconsistent and fluctuating.

From 1952 to 1957 various government departments issued directives to control farmers from migrating to the cities. However, directives were not enough and in 1957 the People's Republic implemented the first youth rustication program or hsia-fang (downward transfer). But 1958 marked the beginnings of the Great Leap Forward, to be facilitated the fol-
owing year by the introduction of the urban commune, both of which severely disrupted the hsia-fang program. Urban migration continued. Second efforts to implement the rustication movement began in 1962 and continued for approximately four years. (Sen-dou Chang, 1976, p. 401) The Cultural Revolution in 1966 initially brought a halt to the rustication movement but the ideological attack was soon revived.

Since liberation in 1949 China has experienced relatively moderate urban growth particularly when compared with other developing nations which have a similar rate of economic development. (Sen-dou Chang, 1976, p. 400)

The flow of people in and out of China's cities continued until the Cultural Revolution in 1966, up to which point in time "China's urban population moved hand-in-hand with her ascending economy, showing a continuous growth during the middle 1960s." (Orleans, 1972, p. 67) It was during the Cultural Revolution that an intensive, and to date consistent, policy of moving significant proportions of the population to the countryside was reborn. Primarily involving the youth of China the campaign "reflected Mao's belief that China's salvation lies in the ultimate collapse of the barriers between the urban mandarins and the impoverished rural masses, urging 'young intellectuals' leaving the cities to 'integrate with the peasants' for the purpose of 'making revolution.'" (Orleans, 1972, p. 68)

Apart from the preceding statements not much more is known about the geographical distribution of China's urban population. According to Leo Orleans, a western scholar
studying China's population, "the geographic distribution of the urban population is as difficult to ascertain as its size." (Orleans, 1972, p. 70) The 1953 census apparently did not include the provincial distribution of the urban population as it listed only those cities with 100,000 or more inhabitants. Putting together scatterings of information about smaller communities in subsequent years E. Ni (see Orleans, 1972, p. 71) was able to produce a mid-1953 estimate for the provincial distribution of urban population. (refer to Table VII)

After 1957 even less information is available to reveal the geographical distribution of urban population. The one bright spot, statistically, and even these are rough figures, is the information obtained in 1964 through 1967 related to the provincial urban population which was used apparently during the Cultural Revolution to announce the establishment of the various Revolutionary Committees. (Onoye, p. 109 and refer to Table VIII)

Table VIII indicates that urban development is highest in the eastern provinces and lowest in the western provinces. Seven provinces along the coast all rank within the top twelve. The four thinly populated provinces of the west (Tibet Autonomous Region, Tsinghai, Sinkiang Autonomous Region, Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region) ranking in the bottom four, in terms of total population, showed a remarkable increase in the ratio of urban to total population. This is an "indication that the establishment of new industrial cities and the development of mining resources began to exercise such influence
Table VII
Provincial Distribution of
Urban Population: 1953
(population in thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Urban</th>
<th>Per cent of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heilungkiang</td>
<td>11,897</td>
<td>3,697</td>
<td>31.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kinn</td>
<td>11,290</td>
<td>3,274</td>
<td>29.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liaoning</td>
<td>20,566</td>
<td>8,648</td>
<td>42.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shansi</td>
<td>14,314</td>
<td>1,846</td>
<td>12.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hopei</td>
<td>43,348</td>
<td>10,077</td>
<td>23.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shantung</td>
<td>48,877</td>
<td>3,356</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honan</td>
<td>44,215</td>
<td>2,889</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hupei</td>
<td>27,790</td>
<td>2,388</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hunan</td>
<td>33,227</td>
<td>2,337</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiangsi</td>
<td>16,773</td>
<td>1,269</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiangsu</td>
<td>47,137</td>
<td>13,733</td>
<td>29.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anhwei</td>
<td>30,663</td>
<td>2,046</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chekiang</td>
<td>22,866</td>
<td>2,234</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>Fukien</td>
<td>13,143</td>
<td>1,583</td>
<td>12.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kwangtung</td>
<td>36,740</td>
<td>4,494</td>
<td>12.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kwangsi</td>
<td>17,591</td>
<td>846</td>
<td>4.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>SW</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kweichow</td>
<td>15,037</td>
<td>586</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yunnan</td>
<td>17,473</td>
<td>1,294</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Szechwan</td>
<td>65,685</td>
<td>6,393</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NW</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sinkiang</td>
<td>4,874</td>
<td>526</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tsinghai</td>
<td>1,676</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inner Mongolia</td>
<td>7,338</td>
<td>782</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kansu and Ningsia</td>
<td>12,928</td>
<td>1,108</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shensi</td>
<td>15,881</td>
<td>1,572</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tibet</td>
<td>1,274</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>12.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>582,603</td>
<td>77,257</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Table VIII
### Urban Population By Province
(1964-1967)
(ten thousand person)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Year-end of 1957</th>
<th>At a Certain Period Recently</th>
<th>Ratio of Increase (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Peking</td>
<td>401</td>
<td>700^3</td>
<td>74.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shanghai</td>
<td>690</td>
<td>1,000^3</td>
<td>44.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tientsin</td>
<td>322</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>24.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heilungkiang</td>
<td>1,486</td>
<td>2,100</td>
<td>41.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shantung</td>
<td>5,403</td>
<td>5,700</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kweichow</td>
<td>1,689</td>
<td>1,700</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shansi</td>
<td>1,596</td>
<td>1,800</td>
<td>12.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tsinghai</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inner Mongolia</td>
<td>920</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>41.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiangsi</td>
<td>1,861</td>
<td>2,200^2</td>
<td>18.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kansu</td>
<td>1,461</td>
<td>1,300^1</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1,500)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honan</td>
<td>4,867</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hopei</td>
<td>4,873</td>
<td>5,400^1</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hupeh</td>
<td>3,079</td>
<td>3,200</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kwangtung</td>
<td>3,796</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirin</td>
<td>1,255</td>
<td>1,700</td>
<td>35.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiangsu</td>
<td>5,213</td>
<td>5,700^1</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chekiang</td>
<td>2,528</td>
<td>3,100</td>
<td>22.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hunan</td>
<td>3,622</td>
<td>3,800</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ningsia</td>
<td>200</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anhwei</td>
<td>3,356</td>
<td>3,500</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shensi</td>
<td>1,813</td>
<td>2,100</td>
<td>15.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liaoning</td>
<td>2,409</td>
<td>2,800</td>
<td>16.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Szechwan</td>
<td>7,216</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yunnan</td>
<td>1,910</td>
<td>2,300</td>
<td>20.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fukien</td>
<td>1,465</td>
<td>1,700</td>
<td>16.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kwangsi</td>
<td>1,939</td>
<td>2,400</td>
<td>23.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sinkiang</td>
<td>564</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>41.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tibet</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>64,653</strong></td>
<td><strong>71,100</strong></td>
<td><strong>9.9</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


1 Hopei includes Peking and Tientsin; Kiangsu includes Shanghai (for the purpose of comparison they are included here, yet they were excluded in the original data). Population of above cities were double counted accordingly, (but had been adjusted in the total).

2 The figure in parentheses for Kansu includes Ningsia. Therefore, it is comparable with 1957.
as to alter the fundamental nature of the regions." (Onoye, p. 109) The high urban increase in Kirin and Heilungkiang provinces (the Northeast) represents the further development of already existing industrial centres.

Developmental policies have undoubtedly changed, particularly during the years of the Great Leap Forward when rural industries were stimulated, thereby significantly influencing population patterns, "but there is no doubt that cities continued to expand up to the time of the Cultural Revolution in the mid-1960s. Since then we move into the near unknown" in terms of statistical information. (Thompson, 1975, p. 596) Thompson is correct in his statement. Virtually no demographic, particularly urban, information has been released by Chinese authorities since the Cultural Revolution. Couple this with Mao's philosophy that there is no direct correlation between industrialization and urbanization, which the policies of decentralization of industry and local self-sufficiency are making sure of, and any attempts to determine the distribution of urban population related to the rate and distribution of industrialization are virtually impossible. Even lacking the necessary population figures Orleans (1972, p. 72) believes that "in the final analysis the Chinese Communists will find

3 Comparison of Peking, Shanghai and Tientsin for two periods are impossible, owing to the extension of their boundary.

4 Undoubtedly these are figures for 1965 to 1967. Revolutionary Committees were established in each province during that time, nevertheless, latest census was carried out in 1964 as we studied before, it was possible to use the data of 1964.
it extremely difficult (if not impossible) to change basically
the existing urban patterns - despite some positive efforts
devoted to the problem. The general trend of bringing in-
dustry to the people in the countryside, rather than shifting
the peasants into the cities, will continue to be the long-
range policy of China. It is also assumed that this will
not result in the stagnation and deterioration of China's
cities, since a considerable (and strategically most important)
proportion of China's industry will continue to expand under
central control and direction. In other words, rural industry
developed primarily through local investment will supplement
the large-scale urban economy but certainly will not replace
it."

Although hard data is lacking after the Cultural Revolu-
tion Robin Thompson in the *World Development Journal* (1975)
offers a number of reasons or indications, some of them
statistical, why he believes that in contemporary China
urbanization and related city planning are firmly in control.
The following are capsulized comments which do reflect what
little statistical information actually exists for the late
1960s and early 1970s.

1) the birth rate of 32 to 38 per thousand annually
   has at least been halved since the 1950s and the
   national average is presently 11 to 12 per thousand.
2) time is important in the development of a national
demographic policy. Initial reliance on the Soviet
model of development has changed and China is now
following an independent urban policy.

3) perception by Mao of the vulnerability of agglomerations to attack and his anger and distrust of cities developing at the expense of the rural areas.

4) urbanization is being attacked at its source by enhancing rural life.

5) urban growth is being contained by banning individual and family migration into the cities. This is carried out at the local Party-supervised level.

6) the population of Shanghai, China's largest city, has remained almost constant - 5.5 million - since liberation while in other developing countries empirical evidence shows that primate cities develop faster than the national average.

7) statistics for specific cities such as Changsha indicate a levelling off of population growth. From 1949 to 1959 this centre grew from 380,000 to 600,000. Since 1959 however, Changsha has grown by only 70,000 people.

8) Thompson's visit to six urban centres indicated little sign of new construction beyond efforts at redevelopment in the worst parts of the inner city.

9) the Cultural Revolution has reappraised city planning as it has virtually all aspects of Chinese life. "The really big change in the system of planning wrought by the Cultural Revolution lies in motivation, not in the formal system." Mao is willing to
sacrifice immediate economic growth by building the economy from the bottom up. Relying upon rapid industrial growth based on existing urban centres will not necessarily mean that benefits are diffused throughout society. China is following a policy of "balanced development based on collective, moral incentives." (Thompson, 1975, pp. 596-597)

In light of the preceding comments Orleans will be offered the final word. He suggests that in the future the largest cities in China "should increase at the slowest rate, while the most rapid growth should occur in towns under fifty thousand which in some ways would have closer ties to rural industrial development." Our understanding of what is "urban", he says, will likely have to be redefined to accommodate the new nature of development in China and that in the future when one encounters the statement that China is predominantly an agricultural nation to use this as an indication of China's position in terms of economic development could be seriously misleading. (Orleans, 1972, p. 72)
CHAPTER III

POLITICS IN COMMAND

Introduction

It is essential that an understanding of Chinese ideological struggle be arrived at for it is the political philosophy of Marx, Lenin and Mao Tse-tung which has been guiding all aspects of Chinese society including urban and economic planning policies.

The emphasis of socialist philosophy has fluctuated since liberation as the Chinese have endeavoured to determine the correct socialist path to follow in their development. Mao's influence has been particularly strong in guiding China along a path different from that which other socialist nations have followed.

To explain Chinese socialist philosophy and the struggles the Chinese people have gone through, struggles which have had serious consequences for cities and economic development, several of the basic concepts of socialist philosophy will be referred to with an emphasis placed on the writings of Mao Tse-tung.

The Political Philosophy of Mao Tse-tung

Mao Tse-tung as a Marxist-Leninist and as the leading theoretician of the new China has adhered to the doctrine of dialectical materialism, a concept which is at the heart of socialism and which maintains "that human existence consists
of many contradictions and contending forces. The idea that struggle is basic to life." (Berry, p. 434)

Writing in 1937, Mao stated the central idea of his political philosophy, that of "maodun" or contradiction, which he saw as being both a ubiquitous and permanent feature of social life. Such contradiction would, he contended, continue into both socialist and communist societies. (Mao Tse-tung, On Contradiction, 1937)

Mao further argued that in analyzing a social situation it is first necessary to determine the most important or principal contradiction. Secondly the two sides in the conflict must be identified, the principal aspect and non-principal aspect, with the progressive or revolutionary aspect being supported and advanced.

The theory of contradiction was furthered in 1957 in a speech given by Mao entitled "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People". It was here that a qualitative difference in the theory of contradictions was espoused. Mao referred to antagonistic and non-antagonistic contradictions, the former describing conflicts that developed between the people and enemies of the people, the latter describing conflicts arising between the people. The significance is that methods required to deal with the two types of contradictions are vastly different. "Struggle and criticism", that is discussions and self-criticism within small groups, as well as re-education are means through which non-antagonistic conflicts are resolved; to handle antagonistic conflicts it is necessary
to "exercise dictatorship". (Starr, p. 28)

John Starr in an excellent effort to "conceptualize contemporary Chinese politics" states that "the legitimacy of any leader or leading institution in Mao's schema is based on the leader's revolutionary experience and second on the degree to which he is integrated with the masses of the people and responsive to their opinions and needs." (Starr, p. 28) The idea of legitimacy in real terms, he adds, is expressed through what is called the "mass line". This is a method for determining and implementing policy that requires leaders or cadres to go to the masses, learn from them and communicate their ideas to the centre. The centre will then synthesize the ideas and develop them into policies which are then taken back to the people, explained, modified, and implemented. The process then repeats itself.

Mao wrote in 1943 of the mass line:

"In all the practical work of our Party, all correct leadership is necessarily 'from the masses, to the masses'. This means: take the ideas of the masses (scattered and un-systematic ideas) and concentrate them (through study turn them into concentrated and systematic ideas), then go to the masses and propagate and explain these ideas until the masses embrace them as their own, hold fast to them and translate them into action, and test the correctness of these ideas in such action. Then once again concentrate ideas from the masses and once again go to the masses so that the ideas are persevered in and carried through. And so on, over and over again in an endless spiral, with the ideas becoming more correct, more vital and richer each time." (Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works, Vol. III, p. 119)
The mass line, says Starr, owes much to the idea of "democratic centralism". Although similar in intent to "mass line" Lenin's concept of democratic centralism is different in that Lenin applied his idea primarily to intra-Party relations, while Mao has applied the mass line to relations between the Party and society as a whole. (Starr, p. 29)

The mass line in fact serves as a link between the two central ideas in Chinese ideology: the theory of contradictions and the theory of democratic centralism. Johnson (1976) states:

"There are two elements in the Chinese theory of organization. The first is Marxist-Leninism as a general theoretical guide; the second is the adaptation of Marxist-Leninism to the particular circumstances of China. Mao Tse-tung is the theoretician of the Chinese Revolution. It is Mao who has extracted from the corpus of Marxist-Leninism those aspects that are seen to be most relevant to the Chinese situation. From classical Marxist-Leninism there derive two key theoretical components for the Chinese theory of organization - 'the theory of contradictions' and 'the theory of democratic centralism'." (Johnson, p. 33)

The theory of the mass line, or "from the top down and the bottom up" as it is sometimes known, is in reality an amalgam of the theory of contradictions and the theory of democratic centralism.

"On the local level, at the point of contact with the broad masses of the population, the cadre is a key figure in eliciting support for the general policies of the Communist Party. The
cadres become key figures in the structure of power and authority that will induce change in Chinese society. The theory of contradictions give a guide to the character, bearing, and activity of individual cadres. The theory of democratic centralism indicates what the relationship of the individual to the organization must be. The theory of mass line clarifies the connection between leadership and organization and thereby gives clear direction as to how the two can be meshed to provide a solution to the general problem of effecting change in society." (Johnson, p. 34)

Chapter V describes the structure of China's cities, the structure through which the mass line concept is implemented, and thereby how planning becomes political in China. The planning process is also guided by other fundamental principles.

"Serve the people", one of the most important of these principles encourages people to act in the interests of their comrades and not in the interests of personal gain and self advancement. This approach has generated planning policies and programs which have benefited a majority of people and has resulted in one of the most impressive examples of social development in the world today.

"Self-reliance", which originated from the Red Area of Kiangsi in the early 1930s, calls upon people to use their own resources whenever possible in planning and carrying out new programs and projects so much so that the notion has become ingrained and it is now a matter of pride to do without State support to the greatest extent possible.

All these principles are based on Marxism, Leninism and Mao Tse-tung Thought and are subject to continuous and
intensive study among the Chinese people. It is within this political and ideological context that planning has become a powerful tool in building China into a self-reliant socialist nation.

In surveying the literature about Chinese urban life one cannot help but be impressed by the exceptionally strong focus on the political and social activity of Chinese urban dwellers. As Sawers (1977) states this is very "apparent in the Chinese view of urban form, in their attempts at physical planning of neighborhoods, and in the political organization of the city by neighborhoods". (Sawers, p. 40)

China's urban planning policies over the years have not remained static. They have changed considerably from liberation in 1949 to the present day. However, these changes in urban direction cannot be isolated and viewed by themselves for they mirror a much more significant and profound change in the political philosophy of the People's Republic. Moreover, China's urban policies are strongly interrelated with and parallel Chinese regional and economic planning.

When the Communists came to power in 1949 they had gained considerable experience in agriculture, land reform and rural organization but had little knowledge of urban administration, or industrial and economic planning. Mao Tse-tung had already warned his comrades to "learn how to administer the industry, commerce and communications of big cities, or otherwise we shall not know what to do when
the time comes". (Mao Tse-tung, "Our Study and the Current Situation", Selected Works, Vol. III, p. 172) When the time did come it was stated again, very clearly by Mao, that "we had no experience, China had no experts, the minister was himself an outsider, so we had to copy from foreign countries, and having copied we were unable to distinguish good from bad. The greater part of Soviet planning was correctly applied to China, but part of it was incorrect. It was imported uncritically". (Schram, p. 98-99)

The period 1949-1952 saw national economic policies adopted which were geared to rectification of a war-torn devastated nation. Political objectives were guided by the need to provide basics in housing, food production, clothing, employment and health care while at the same time consolidating political control.

Although a final split did not materialize between the Chinese and the Soviets until 1960 the First Five-Year Plan marked the beginnings of a development strategy which would result seven years later in a formal break. Economic criteria (economism) took precedence over political consideration during this period (1953-57) with the emphasis on expansion of heavy industry being accompanied by centralized economic decision-making and limited local political power. "Urban and regional planning, inherently concerned with local spatial interaction, became totally subsumed in the process of economic planning". (Kirby, p. 140)

The Soviet era of Chinese economic planning greatly
affected the location of production and resultant urban and industrial development. Despite the efforts to redress regional imbalances between interior and coast, the Soviet-influenced plan, although identifying approximately 120 centres for development, saw the bulk of it going to approximately 18 places. (Berger, p. 435)

The first strong feeling of uneasiness about this situation came with Mao's 1957 declaration "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People". It was felt at this time that the bureaucratic elite seen emerging in China would "pose a contradiction between those in authority and the masses, a subsidiary strand raised the entire unresolved problem of planning methodology". (Kirby, p. 144)

This is of extreme importance, for in their planning policies the Chinese have always started from two assumptions. "By overall planning we mean planning which takes into consideration the interests of the 600 million people of our country." (Mao Tse-tung, 1968, p. 112) In other words "without a central and overall national plan it is impossible to organize the economy to serve the interests of the whole working people". (Berger, p. 557) Secondly, "with their view of the inseparability of 'means and ends,' the Maoist mainstream has emphasized that social organization and political and moral outlook are as equally important as the level of growth of production". (Kirby, p. 141)

But in 1956 Mao was forced to characterize China's development as disproportionate and one-sided. The Soviet
approach to economic growth and urban development, which had been copied by China during its first Five-Year Plan, had de-emphasized the manufacture of light industrial and consumer goods, while placing a low priority on agriculture and assigning primary emphasis to heavy industrial production. In applying the theory of contradictions to the main aspects of China's economic and political situation Mao attacked the thought that industrialization could advance rapidly while agricultural development was allowed to slow. (Berger, p. 551) "We must on no account regard industry and agriculture, socialist industrialization and the socialist transformation of agriculture as two separate and isolated things, and on no account must we emphasize the one and play down the other." (Mao Tse-tung, 1971, p. 406) Mao felt that funds required for the accomplishment of both had to be accumulated through the agricultural sector. His observations are extremely important here. They signal the different path that nation was to follow in future years and shaped China's future economic policies and effective planning methods. (Berger, p. 552)

Synthesizing numerous central government reports and subsequent discussions into ten major problems Mao delivered his speech entitled "Ten Great Relationships" in 1956 to an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.

Although not all are of direct significance several do relate strongly to economic and political policies which in
turn directly affect urban development and planning. Roland Berger (1975) in "Economic Planning in the People's Republic of China" has commented on these major contradictions and will be drawn upon extensively in analyzing them.

1) The relationship between heavy industry on the one hand and light industry and agriculture on the other: heavy industry was to continue claiming the emphasis in investment "but the proportion for agriculture and light industry must be somewhat increased". Mao felt that although heavy industry would accumulate capital, light industry and agriculture would accumulate more and faster as well as ensuring the livelihood of the people.

2) The relationship between industry in the coastal regions and industry in the interior: efforts to redress the locational imbalance of industry which had become concentrated on the eastern seaboard during the period of foreign domination was not incorrect. As Mao said, "we have not made any major mistakes on the relationship between the two. However, in recent years we have underestimated coastal industry to some extent and have not given great enough attention to its development." (On The Ten Major Relationships, p. 5) In other words the pendulum had swung too far in introducing industry into the interior of China with not enough attention being paid to China's existing 70% of development where workers could be trained in the coastal industry with its high technical level, good-quality products and low production costs which would also have had a stimulating effect on the technical level and quality of national industry as a whole. (Berger, p. 553)

3) The relationship between economic construction and defence construction: not specifically related to urban development but certainly meriting comment in terms of its economic significance. Too high an expenditure during the First Five-Year Plan, Mao argued, had been placed on military expenditures. "Only with the faster growth of economic construction can there be more progress in defence
construction. One reliable way is to cut military and administrative expenditures down to appropriate proportions and increase expenditures on economic construction." (On The Ten Major Relationships, p. 7)

4) The relationship between the state, the units of production and the producers: as Berger states very important, for the relationship between these units "touches directly on the politics of democratic centralism". (Berger, p. 553) Speaking about the independence of factories under unified leadership Mao said, "it's not right, I'm afraid, to place everything in the hands of the central or the provincial and municipal authorities without leaving the factories any power of their own, any room for independent action, any benefits...In principle, centralization and independence forming a unity of opposites, there must be both centralization and independence...In short, consideration must be given to both sides, not to just one, whether they are the state and the factory, the state and the worker, the factory and the worker, the state and the co-operative, the state and the peasant, or the co-operative and the peasant. To give consideration to only one side, whichever it may be, is harmful to socialism and to the dictatorship of the proletariat". (On The Ten Major Relationships, pp. 9 and 12)

5) The relationship between the central authorities and the local authorities: as Berger summarizes "Mao here argues for an extension of regional power within a unified central plan. His proposals are on the whole tentative, certainly in comparison with the sweeping decentralization of later years". (Berger, p. 553) Mao at this time scorns the scores of governmental hands that are making things difficult for local authorities. "We should," he says, "encourage the style of work in which the local authorities are consulted on the matters to be taken up." We want both unity and particularity. To build a powerful socialist country it is imperative to have a strong and unified central leadership and unified planning and discipline throughout the country; disruption of this indispensable unity is impermissible. At the same time, it is
essential to bring the initiative of the local authorities into full play and let each locality enjoy the particularity suited to its local conditions. "Since the provinces and municipalities have their own complaints about the central departments, can it be that the prefectures, counties, districts and townships have no complaints about the provinces and municipalities? The central authorities should take care to give scope to the initiative of the provinces and municipalities, and in their turn the latter should do the same for the prefectures, counties, districts and townships; the provinces, municipalities, prefectures, counties, districts and townships should all enjoy their own proper independence and rights and should fight for them." (On The Ten Major Relationships, pp. 12-16)

Items (6) "The relationship between the Han nationality and the minority nationalities", (7) "The relationship between party and non-party", (8) "The relationship between revolution and counter-revolution", (9) "The relationship between right and wrong", (10) "The relationship between China and other countries", do not relate directly to urban development and planning and although of major importance to other subject areas will not be dealt with here.

Beginning in 1958 with the Great Leap Forward the Chinese indicated a strong desire to follow a different path from that already attempted by the Soviet Union. They have since abandoned the Soviet model but in so doing have followed a somewhat erratic course in development reflecting both inexperience and political differences.

"This divergence between the economic or 'economist' and the political approach is no abstract or academic issue, nor is it just a theoretical disputation between
people doing the same thing by different methods. Principles of planning, the character of economic development and, indeed, the totality of social and political progress in socialist construction all depend upon which of the two policies is followed."

The Great Leap Forward was in reality a huge campaign or movement as opposed to a well thought-out development strategy. (Eckstein, p. 56) The central objective, the "simultaneous development of agriculture and industry", was to be achieved through two primary means:

1) by mass mobilization of underemployed surplus labor in agriculture.

2) by a much greater reliance on production processes based on technological dualism. (Eckstein, p. 56)

It was hoped in this way that labour could be converted into capital and that surplus labour could expand small-scale industrial production in the rural areas.

One of the dramatic outcomes of this movement was that the existing highly centralized system virtually disappeared with 80 per cent of the centrally controlled enterprises being transferred to provincial authorities. The Chinese Communist Party however, did not relinquish its control over a planned economy. "The byword was 'centralized planning, decentralized control'." (Kirby, p. 141)
Table IX
Changes In Decentralization
Of Industrial Administration
1957-1959

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1957</th>
<th>1958</th>
<th>1959</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central control (percent)</td>
<td>46.0</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>26.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local control (percent)</td>
<td>54.0</td>
<td>73.0</td>
<td>74.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Kirby suggests "the numerous Soviet cases of over-agglomeration, of interregional imbalance and intersectorial rivalry were seen by the Chinese as stemming directly from strategies obsessed with increasing production. Implicit in early Marxist writings was the aim of 'ironing out' the difference between town and country - a task requiring the most careful consideration of spatial complexities at the local level". (Kirby, p. 141)

The Advent of the Urban Commune

Another outcome of the Great Leap was the formation of the urban commune. Not wanting the best agricultural workers to leave the countryside and being faced at this time (1957) with a large inflow of population to urban areas the Chinese found themselves faced with the question of not only how to maintain order in the cities but how to mobilize the vast urban populations toward economic productivity. (Schurmann, 1966, p. 382) To activate the underemployed Peking introduced in 1958, the urban commune, a short-lived idea designed to make the urban population productively useful and at the
same time providing a social base and offering people a new sense of community. From the very start the urban commune found itself facing a number of problems from administrative and jurisdictional confusion to economic inefficiency of street industries. (Orleans, 1972, p. 65) Analyzing the first fifteen years of organization and politics in China, Shurmann adds extensively to the urban commune experiment and summarizes it:

"The urban communes of 1958 lacked an adequate economic base. The Chinese Communists were aware of this and sought to use organizational methods to make up for material weakness, in short, to use human labor as a substitute for material capital. However, to make organization work, they felt it had to be turned into community. The experiment of the urban communes sought to create community. It failed because any attempt to create community by force is doomed. The more an external political group tries to impose communal organization, the greater will be the human resistance to it." (Shurmann, 1966, p. 402)

Although the urban commune was quickly abandoned the thrust of Chinese urban planning since the Great Leap Forward period has been continually directed toward the design of neighborhoods for promotion of social and political interaction. This still evolving and apparently effective urban neighborhood model is discussed in chapter V. Although fluctuating as China's policies altered, one major program of the Great Leap Forward has been retained and that is the movement of people, particularly educated youth, to the countryside. This is discussed briefly in chapter II.
The failure of the urban commune was coupled with a more severe problem. The Great Leap Forward itself was not a resounding success. The internal crisis which followed this failure was added to by ensuing natural calamities all of which resulted in a complete revision of China's economic policies, revisions which were profoundly felt in the cities. Schurmann writes of the cities in the early 1960s:

"The failure of the urban communes and the economic crisis of 1960-61 left them (the Chinese) with the same two dilemmas they had faced when they entered the Great Leap Forward. Since early 1961, Peking has shown that it regards the economic problem as primary; to resolve it, it has returned to a policy of offering material incentives. It has also accepted the fact that living standards had to be improved, though the cult of austerity still remains. The Chinese Communist leaders have realized that economic development in general, and resolution of their urban problem in particular, cannot be achieved by political-organizational means alone. They have realized that there must be some self-motivated participation by the producers. To this end, they have allowed the market to operate again at the lower levels of the economy." (Schurmann, 1966, p. 403)

Schurmann continues and states that few attempts were made in the early 1960s to change the nature of the city:

"One can presume that as organizational experiments have diminished, the control factor has become increasingly important. Bureaucratic administration, including the police, plays a much greater role than it did during the Great Leap Forward. Under these circumstances, basic-level administration may slowly be reassuming the forms of the early 1950s...It is clear that the Chinese Communists have created effective political institutions for governing China's cities. They have
yet to create effective economic institutions to resolve the dilemma of population, and effective social institutions to resolve the dilemma of community. Neither of these dilemmas will be resolved unless Peking allows true growth 'from the bottom up', as well as growth 'from the top down'. " (Schurmann, 1966, p. 403)

Politically this period of the early 1960's to the beginning of the Cultural Revolution in 1966 was retrogressive. The strong moral flavour of the 1950's, the period of moral incentives rather than physical coercion and economic incentives was overtaken by "new policies which promoted wage incentives in the Bukhavinist mould - extra pay for factory and commune management, for technicians, and overtime bonuses. Accompanying these changes was a retrenchment of central power over production, and also an increase in the role in the market forces in industry and agriculture". (Kirby, p. 142)

Despite numerous changes in development policy, agriculture has remained the basis for economic development especially since 1960 and the beginning of the natural calamities. Agriculture is still seen as the basis for producing surpluses which in turn can be used to finance industrialization. This emphasis on the importance of agriculture to the Chinese people and their political philosophy is reflected in the Maoist slogan "take agriculture as the base and industry as the leading sector". Unassuming though it may appear to be, this statement symbolizes China's development strategy and stresses the relationship of China's cities to its national development.
"This has meant the somewhat belated, but rational, diversion of scarce investment funds from industry to agriculture and the replanning of the industrial sector to give more prominence to production of fertilizers, pumps, and agricultural equipment and machinery. It has also further underlined the chief role of cities, still the major bases, as serving agriculture and the countryside." (Murphey, 1976, p. 317)

This was further departure from the Soviet approach. An anti-urban bias was built in China's developmental policies based on the view that cities are corrupting and dehumanizing. China resolved, not only to tie the cities economically to the countryside, but to avoid the construction of new metropolitan areas. Any increases in population would have to be absorbed by the rural areas and by the smaller centres.

The period 1960 to 1964, known as the New Economic Policy, witnessed, to the accompaniment of "the growth of a privileged stratum of factory managers and technocrats, closely linked to the Party committees of the provinces", the reemergence of "expertness" as opposed to "redness". (Wheelwright and McFarlane, p. 114-115) This type of issue was to come to the fore during the three year Cultural Revolution (1966-1969).

The Cultural Revolution

The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution was a time of massive political upheaval, a period of time which saw profound assessment of both socialist methodology and socialist goals. There was in essence, a struggle between
two factions in the Chinese Communist Party, between the forces and ideology represented by Mao, the creator of the Chinese Revolution, and the administrative pragmatists managing the country, the latter represented by Liu Shao-Chi. Edgar Snow writes of the Liu group:

"They tended to put economics before man, encourage effort by material incentives first and zeal second, push production without class struggle, boost technology by relying on 'experts', put economics in command of politics to serve technology, and favor the city over the countryside." (Snow, p. 16)

The adherents of Liu Shao-Chi's line were attempting to destroy the few successes of the Great Leap Forward, that is the economic and social changes which had actually been implemented in the countryside during that period. The Cultural Revolution was to be an offensive to restore the revolutionary zeal characteristic of China in the 1950's. "The Cultural Revolution posed a challenge to the immemorial division of labor and, notably, to the division between town and countryside, that underlies the divisions between social classes. The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution thus represents an ideological and political struggle the effects of which bear both on the economic base and on the superstructure, destroying the old social relationships and giving rise to new ones." (Bettelheim, p. 8-9)

One of the most significant forms of struggle that emerged during the Cultural Revolution, particularly in terms of planning, was that of "area" versus "line". Liu Shao-chi was identified with the revisionists, that is
Soviet oriented economists who had over-emphasized the importance of the "line" to the detriment of the regional or "area" needs. The correct strategy for national development, according to Mao and his followers, was area-oriented. "To generalize, this means that the policy sought is one which strives to represent the sum of the specific needs of industrial sectors and the specific needs of areas." (Kirby, p. 142)

"Formerly all the large manufacturing enterprises were directly controlled by ministries at the centre. The enterprise received its plan of production and its allocation of materials from the ministry concerned. At an early stage, this may have been necessary, but as the industrial enterprise gained experience, it became a great nuisance...This is now called the 'tyranny of the line'. Under the new system, (since the Cultural Revolution) production plans are made in terms of areas. Each of the enterprises formerly under central control has been given to the province where it is situated. Their output and requirements are now included in the local and provincial plan...some enterprises formerly in the province's sphere have been put under district or county planning..." (Robinson, p. 19-20)

Actually both "area" and "line" types of organization exist bringing both into decision making roles. One interesting aspect of this dual organization is that it has altered the involvement of the members of any given production unit. Previously through the line concept production targets would be the primary objective discussed by the factory, its corresponding national departments and appropriate intermediaries. When consultations and matters of production are transferred to a lower level in the hier-
archy such as a city or a city department, other factors such as pollution control are more easily considered.

Another aspect of dual organization is that while the line approach is more likely to produce larger producer units serving a larger region, the area concept in planning, potentially can give rise to smaller production units serving a smaller area and thereby resulting in decentralization. The true practical significance of such a process becomes apparent when considered with other political concepts guiding urban and regional planning. Coupled with self-reliance and self-sufficiency the area approach could result in a large number of small production units serving a whole region thus having a profound effect on a regional transportation network. Moreover, the shift in emphasis from line to area can be applied to areas of society other than industry. (Schenk, 1974, p. 383)

Fundamental changes in the formal economic and municipal planning networks were not made during the Cultural Revolution. The most significant change came with the advent of the revolutionary committees, composed of a "three-in-one" combination of representatives of the masses, the army, and revolutionary cadres. Committees were eventually established at all levels of the administrative hierarchy from the provinces down to the prefectures, the counties and municipalities and into the communes, as well as the districts and neighborhoods of the cities themselves.

At the factory level what this type of change meant
was that, instead of factory managers consulting with provincial bureaus, revolutionary committees were now sent from the factory to consult with revolutionary committees of the municipal or provincial government and its various agencies.

It was during the Cultural Revolution that street revolutionary committees were established in the cities to conduct residential mass criticism meetings. Many of the existing residents' committees were taken over and study courses set up for local residents. There were undoubtedly excesses during this campaign, but it was from this period that the degree of grass-roots participation in the political process at the neighbourhood level has been strengthened and continuous. The revolutionary committees today "play a crucial role in integrating neighborhoods into a common political outlook and mutually supportive behavior". (Sawers, p. 45)

The effect of the Cultural Revolution on city planning was particularly noticeable in the city of Ch'ang Ch'un in China's northeast. During the author's visit there, a discussion about city planning in general and the effects of the Cultural Revolution in particular took place with a small group of Chinese planners. Mao, they said, had encouraged the organization of the masses. The people were to be relied upon in planning and managing the city. However, before the Cultural Revolution the planners had "closed doors". They were divorced from practice, the masses, and reality. Planning was often unpredictable. "Planning,
planning, planning, they are drawings on paper. When they're completed they hang on the walls." The planners recounted how Mao had told the Chinese people that the cities now belonged to them and that everything in the cities should be managed by people in those cities. Planners however had become experts and closed their doors to the people. Now, after the Cultural Revolution they were relying on the masses in planning and managing the city. To avoid being divorced from the masses, the Ch'ang Ch'un planners actually worked on the construction of buildings, roadways and gas pipe lines which they had helped design. "Closed door" planning, the revisionist line, had been replaced by "open door" planning, Mao's revolutionary line. The formal planning system apparently remained intact. (Discussion with Ch'ang Ch'un planners, July, 1976) The real change in the system of planning wrought by the Cultural Revolution rested in motivation, not in the formal system. (Wheelwright and McFarlane, p. 141)

The Cultural Revolution reappraised city living as it did most other aspects of life in China and brought dramatic change in the development of China's urban areas. It is now desired that urban areas which are becoming primarily self-sufficient be integrated with the surrounding countryside. Continued urban industrialization will be accompanied by rural industrial development. City factories are now encouraged to engage in agriculture while rural communes are developing small machine-tool industries. The significance
of this development strategy to urbanization and planning is almost obvious. There will be a lessening of political and financial dependence by the countryside on the city. Some narrowing of the cultural and intellectual gap between city and country should occur. The city, structured to socialize and politicize its own citizens and to serve the countryside as well, should no longer constitute an administrative and bureaucratic elite divorced from but controlling planning, production and the countryside. What has occurred in urban planning and urban administration since the Cultural Revolution is that the Chinese are practicing what their political theory preaches. Moreover the concept of industrializing and improving life generally in the countryside should not be viewed as the countryside now dominating the city. In reality the efforts are being made to integrate the two. The program of integration is one that guides planning in each individual city. Thus each community adapts to political and developmental concepts to meet its own needs and particularities rather than conforming and being subjugated to a national norm.

China has assumed the task of solving the contradiction between city and countryside. Accepting this as a major political goal has meant that a central concern of Chinese policy since 1957 has been to alter the nature of the large bureaucratic industrial centres and to integrate the cities into the countryside. The tension between city and country is viewed as a "primary contradiction in the social organi-
zation of the people". The Cultural Revolution has been a major event in China's short socialist history and has played a major role in the process "in which the domination of urban intellectuals was challenged and social and political organization made to take on a new form consistent with a fundamental economic aim of releasing the country from the domination of the towns". (Harvey, p. 236-237)

Summary

Mao Tse-tung's contribution to socialist philosophy and the Chinese people's willingness to adapt this socialist philosophy to their own particular situation, as well as their willingness to learn from their errors, has led that nation along a path different from that which other socialist states have followed. Political struggle led by Mao to prevent China from resorting to capitalist ways and to direct national development along both economic ("line") and spatial ("area") paths will ensure that differences between urban and rural will eventually disappear. The Cultural Revolution reasserted the needs of the agricultural sector and placed balanced development before the immediate economic benefits of rapid urbanization. The existence of a multitude of small centres as discussed in chapters one and two provide already existing nodes of development to receive the technology and knowledge being decentralized or diffused from larger established centres thus ensuring that national economic wealth will be dispersed throughout the entire nation.
CHAPTER IV

URBAN AND ECONOMIC PLANNING POLICIES

Introduction

It is proposed that urban and economic planning policies described in this chapter are the major components of a national philosophy designed to permanently alter the relationship of the city to the surrounding countryside and to the nation as a whole. Policies of industrial decentralization, controlled city growth, regional self-reliance and others will be presented as the means by which the People's Republic is eradicating regional imbalance and eliminating differences between city and countryside. This will be accomplished by explaining the dual system of cities as introduced in chapter one and by elaborating upon the role the various types of settlements in China's system of cities are playing in regional development and in the diffusion of knowledge and technology.

Urban and regional planning policies are guided by the underlying political philosophy described in the preceding chapter.

Efforts to Redress Regional Imbalance and Exploitation

The Chinese are consciously avoiding the pattern of urbanization and industrial development so characteristic of other parts of the globe; that is, the swelling of massive urban conglomerations and their attendant problems and the
pattern of regional imbalance in economic growth. China's contemporary policies forsaking this process are based on industrial decentralization, on rural industrialization, on controlled city growth, on diversification rather than specialization, and on regional self-reliance both in industry and agriculture. Rhoads Murphey describes the approach as being essentially threefold:

"(1) limit the growth of the existing big cities and, at the same time, change their nature by purging them of the selfish elitism and bourgeois attitudes which they breed as well as attacking overcrowding, alienation, exploitation, and environmental degradation through new planning and controls,

(2) allocate new urban and industrial investment primarily to previously neglected or underdeveloped parts of the country in closer relationship to the actual distribution of people and resources, and

(3) foster regional and local self-sufficiency so that urban and industrial functions need not be so heavily concentrated in a few giant centers, but can be performed on a smaller and less problem-generating scale by each locality for itself through regional and local centers." (Murphey, 1975, p. 166)

Partially based on practical necessity; transportation inadequacies and national defence, these policies in reality are founded in socialist ideology, in a desire to redesign an urban and industrial system in a new revolutionary context. There exists a desire to minimize the differences between city and country and most importantly to change the very nature of existing cities and to rid Chinese society of the perceived root of the problem: "the tendency toward
elitism which these cities, especially with their recent history of colonialism, collaborationism, and bourgeois values, foster". (Murphey, 1975, p. 166) As Murphey suggests, the much sought-after goal of changing the nature of the existing cities is probably the most difficult of all.

For purposes here Sigurdson's concept of industrial decentralization, a generic name for transferring industry out of a metropolis to any other community, will be utilized. "The chief aim of an industrial decentralization policy is usually to achieve a shift of future industrial growth from a metropolitan area to secondary urban centres." (Sigurdson, p. 528) Rural industrialization is of significance to urban planning and development not only for its contribution to overall national economic development but because "rural industry plays an important role in the social transformation of the Chinese countryside and contributes considerably to rectifying the imbalance between urban and rural areas". (Sigurdson, p. 527)

Efforts to decentralize industry and its related concentration is carried out in a two-fold manner. First, is that attempts are being made to diversify and strengthen the economic base and to increase the self-sufficiency of existing cities through the addition of different types of industries to the already existing economic structure. At the same time efforts are under way to direct growth geographically inland away from the coast to both new and already established centres.
Mao's 1956 statement, discussed in the preceding chapter, sheds some light on the concept of industrializing the interior of the nation. As Berger suggests, Mao adopted a dialectical approach in discussing the relationship of coastal cities to the interior: "If we make full use of the capacity both in plant and technology of coastal industry and develop it properly, then we shall have all the more strength to develop and maintain industry in the interior." (Berger, p. 553)

Implicitly acknowledged in this statement is that large-scale cities were not necessarily to be discouraged but that "construction on a grand scale under China's present circumstances" was ill-advised. The dispersal of industrial cities was not a matter of scattering cities randomly but a policy of alleviating and preventing urban congestion rather than precluding large-scale cities forever. New and old industrial plants were dispersed to existing cities where industry was negligible or locational circumstances were favorable. (Tien, 1973, p. 70)

In fact during the 1950's it appeared that China's urban policies were designed to manipulate the rapid flow of urbanization rather than to prevent it, although this is not the case now. The need to develop industry was accepted by the First Five-Year Plan (1953-57) with anticipated growth to be channeled into medium-sized cities in the interior and moderate development to occur in the coastal centres.
"The abnormal concentration of our industry in a few areas and in the coastal cities is irrational both from the economic point of view and in respect to national defence. The geographical distribution of our new industrial capital construction must conform to the long-term interests of the state, and take account of conditions at different stages of our development. It must follow the principle of appropriately distributing our industrial productive forces over various parts of the country, locating industries close to sources of raw materials and fuel and areas of consumption, and complying with the need to strengthen national defence, so as to change gradually the irrational distribution of industry and develop the economy of backward areas.

In order to change the irrational distribution of industry, we must build up new industrial bases, but the utilization, reconstruction and extension of existing industrial bases is a prerequisite for the establishment of new industrial bases.

Whether we are reconstructing and extending existing industrial bases or building new ones, we must avoid over-construction; a suitable distance should separate enterprises one from the other. A proper relationship should also be observed in the building of large, medium and small enterprises.

The First Five-Year Plan makes the following basic arrangements for the geographical distribution of industrial capital construction:

1. The industrial foundation already established in the Northeast, in Shanghai and other cities must be rationally utilized and full use made of it in order to accelerate our industrial construction...

2. The building of new industrial areas like those in North, Northeast and Central China must be actively pushed ahead so that two new industrial bases centered on the integrated iron and steel works in Paotow
and Wuhan can be established during the period of the Second Five-Year Plan.

3. A start must be made with part of the industrial construction scheduled for Southwest China along with active preparation of conditions for the building of a new industrial base there.

...This will greatly transform the economic life of a vast area of our country, and since this new geographical distribution of industry is based on the growth of heavy industry, it will eventually transform the whole nature of the original distribution of industry in China.

...The First Five-Year Plan also makes new and more rational arrangements for the location of new light industrial enterprises (mainly textile enterprises). This will to a certain extent remedy the former concentration of light industry in the coastal cities and transfer it to the interior where it will be near to sources of raw materials and areas of consumption.

To satisfy the needs of the interior, gradual steps should be taken to move certain transportable industrial enterprises from the coastal cities to the interior." (First Five-Year Plan for Development of the National Economy of the People's Republic of China in 1953-1957, pp. 40-42)

L. J. Lau has provided statistical evidence showing the gross value of factory output, gross value of industrial fixed assets, and basic construction investment between inland and coastal areas.
Table X
Percentage Distribution of the Gross Value of Factory Output at 1952 Prices and Gross Value of Industrial Fixed Assets at Original Cost Between Inland and Coastal Areas, 1949-57 (per cent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Inland Areas</th>
<th>Coastal Areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>77.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>73.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>72.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>30.1</td>
<td>69.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>68.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>32.1</td>
<td>67.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Gross Value of Factory Output at 1952 Prices (1)

Gross Value of Industrial Fixed Assets at Original Cost (2)

1953 100.0 52.0 48.0
1954 100.0 57.0 43.0
1955


Note: Coastal areas consist of Peking, Tientsin, Shanghai, Hopei, Liaoning, Shantung, Kiangsu, Fukien, Kwangtung, and Chekiang.
Table XI

Percentage Distribution of Basic Construction
Investment in Industry at Current Prices
Between Inland and Coastal Areas,
1950-55 (per cent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Inland Areas</th>
<th>Coastal Areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950-52</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>50.2</td>
<td>49.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953-55</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>55.2</td>
<td>44.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950-55</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>54.2</td>
<td>45.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The tables reveal that construction investment, value of industrial fixed assets and value of factory output not only increased over time but that although only 30 per cent of the gross value of factory output was produced inland, this area owned more than 50 per cent of the gross value of industrial assets and received more than 50 per cent of total basic construction investment in industry. "This serves to reveal the privileged position of the inland areas as against the coastal areas." (p. 566)

Lau offers four reasons for this strategy of dispersal: reduced vulnerability to attack, relocation of population resulting in increased control of the northern and western border provinces, dispersal would lead to technological spin-off, and it would be rational when considering the location of resources and consumers.

Since 1949 a number of new centres have been es-
established in previously remote parts of the country or in previously undeveloped provincial towns which since then have been transformed into thriving industrial centres. In most instances the development of the newest cities has been related to local resources such as iron ore, coal or oil or to resources which had lain untouched while growth was centred so unevenly in the treaty ports.

Sen-dou Chang sees 181 urban units (1975) forming the urban system in China: three independent municipalities, seventy-eight prefecture-level municipalities and one hundred hsien-level municipalities. However, only nine of the seventy-eight prefecture-level centres can be described as being truly new "with no historical antecedent as a county seat or a rural market town; they exemplify the location and function of new cities in contemporary China". See Table XII. (Sen-dou Chang, 1976, p. 407) Of the one hundred hsien-level municipalities, seventy-nine were administrative centres and twelve market towns prior to 1949. Only nine have been newly created settlements since liberation but for virtually all eighteen new centres their founding has been resource oriented. See Table XIII.
Table XII
Newly Developed Cities With The Status Of Prefecture-Level Municipality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Major Function</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shihtsuishan</td>
<td>Inner Mongolia</td>
<td>Coal Mine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karamai</td>
<td>Sinkiang</td>
<td>Oil Field</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shuahgyashan</td>
<td>Heilungkiang</td>
<td>Coal Mine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hokang</td>
<td>Heilungkiang</td>
<td>Coal Mine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chihsi</td>
<td>Heilungkiang</td>
<td>Coal Mine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anta</td>
<td>Heilungkiang</td>
<td>Oil Field</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pingtingshan</td>
<td>Honan</td>
<td>Coal Mine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuk'ou</td>
<td>Szechwan</td>
<td>Iron Ore Mine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maanshan</td>
<td>Anhwei</td>
<td>Iron Ore Mine</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table XIII
Newly Developed Cities With The Status Of Hsien-Level Municipality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Major Function</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ich'un</td>
<td>Heilungkiang</td>
<td>Lumber Industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chitaiho</td>
<td>Heilungkiang</td>
<td>Coal Mine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungchiang</td>
<td>Kirin</td>
<td>Coal Mine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chiaotso</td>
<td>Honan</td>
<td>Coal Mine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanmenhsia</td>
<td>Honan</td>
<td>Hydroelectricity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Erhlien</td>
<td>Inner Mongolia</td>
<td>Railroad Terminal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haipowan</td>
<td>Inner Mongolia</td>
<td>Coal Mine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wuta</td>
<td>Inner Mongolia</td>
<td>Coal Mine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lengshuichiang</td>
<td>Hunan</td>
<td>Iron Ore Mine</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Paotow is an excellent example of how new policies directed toward development of the interior are working:
"In 1938 the city had only 55,536 people and was principally a collecting center for livestock products (especially wool) from the provinces of northwest China. Part of the foodstuffs produced in the adjacent irrigation areas were also channeled through it. Today, Paotow is a huge urban center teeming with approximately a million inhabitants and is the third largest steel producer in China, ranking next after Anshan and Wuhan." (Cheng-Siang Chen, p. 69)

The city of Lanchow has developed in a similar manner and is also an excellent example of the effect the expanding national network of railways and highways has had on a number of communities. It has risen in population from 80,000 people in 1942 to 1.2 million today in the actual urban area and 2 million in the entire administrative area of the city. Lanchow's growth is a direct result of the coordination between industrial growth and transportation. It is the converging point for four railways and several highways and is the location for a number of industries including oil refineries, rubber, aluminum, and chemicals. (Cheng-Siang Chen, p. 69)

Modern transport has undoubtedly played a strong role in the selection by the central authority of traditional capital cities as "development poles" for regional development. The previous system of "economic cooperative regions" was replaced after the Cultural Revolution when this "supra-provincial system of economic regionalization patterned after the Soviet model, lost its significance in the wake of the campaign for self-reliance and self-sufficiency at all administrative levels". In 1958 seven "economic co-
operative regions" had been implemented, each containing three or four provinces "as a rational economic regionalization to stimulate regional economic development and to promote self-sufficiency". (Sen-dou Chang, 1976, p. 403)

The enhancement of the traditional capital cities' locational advantage through modern transportation has been coupled with a recent policy of placing an emphasis on the creation of a complex of modern industries in each province "including iron and steel, heavy machinery, motor vehicles, agricultural machinery, and modern textiles". The concept of establishing a modern sector of heavy industry in each cooperative region has thus been replaced by policies allocating capital investment to each capital city which has a "better infrastructure for industrial construction and commands nodality in both traditional and modern transport systems". Effects of this type of development on existing centres has been compiled by Sen-dou Chang in an analysis of primate cities.
Table XIV

Primacy and Growth of the Capital Cities
in Provinces and Autonomous Regions in China

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provincial Unit</th>
<th>Capital City</th>
<th>Primacy Index in 1970</th>
<th>Population of Capital City in 1,000's</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kansu</td>
<td>Lanchou</td>
<td>19.33</td>
<td>397, 1,450, 265.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinghai</td>
<td>Hsining</td>
<td>16.67</td>
<td>94, 500, 431.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yunnan</td>
<td>Kiummung</td>
<td>14.67</td>
<td>699, 1,100, 57.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hupei</td>
<td>Wuhan</td>
<td>12.80</td>
<td>1,427, 2,560, 79.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kwangtung</td>
<td>Canton</td>
<td>8.33</td>
<td>1,599, 2,500, 56.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shensi</td>
<td>Sian</td>
<td>8.00</td>
<td>787, 1,600, 103.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ninghsia</td>
<td>Yinchiuhan</td>
<td>6.67</td>
<td>84, 240, 185.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sinkiang</td>
<td>Urumchi</td>
<td>6.67</td>
<td>141, 500, 254.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chekiang</td>
<td>Hangchou</td>
<td>4.80</td>
<td>697, 960, 37.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fukien</td>
<td>Fuchou</td>
<td>3.40</td>
<td>533, 680, 22.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiangsi</td>
<td>Nanchiang</td>
<td>3.35</td>
<td>398, 675, 69.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kweichow</td>
<td>Kweiyang</td>
<td>3.30</td>
<td>271, 660, 143.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hunan</td>
<td>Chiangsha</td>
<td>2.75</td>
<td>651, 825, 26.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiangsu</td>
<td>Nanking</td>
<td>2.39</td>
<td>1,092, 1,750, 60.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heilungkiang</td>
<td>Harbin</td>
<td>2.19</td>
<td>1,163, 1,670, 43.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shansi</td>
<td>Taiyuan</td>
<td>2.08</td>
<td>721, 1,350, 87.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kwangsi</td>
<td>Nanning</td>
<td>1.83</td>
<td>195, 550, 182.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honan</td>
<td>Chengchou</td>
<td>1.81</td>
<td>595, 1,050, 76.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liaoning</td>
<td>Shenyang</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>2,300, 2,800, 21.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirin</td>
<td>Ch'angchun</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>855, 1,200, 40.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anhwei</td>
<td>Hofei</td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td>184, 630, 292.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shantung</td>
<td>Chinan</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>680, 1,100, 61.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hopei</td>
<td>Shihchiachuang</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>373, 800, 114.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inner Mongolia</td>
<td>Huhchot</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>148, 530, 258.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Szechwan</td>
<td>Ch'engtu</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>857, 1,250, 45.86</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: Statistics have been compiled from a number of different sources.

Note: Primacy index is defined as the ratio between the population of the primate or largest city and that of the second largest city.

Although not apparent in the table, Sen-dou Chang notes that in the economically well-developed provinces primacy has...
declined since liberation but increased in the less developed provinces. Regional self-reliance programs have probably not been able to support such large capital cities in the border provinces unaided. Assistance, in the form of capital and technology through the central government, to these provincial cities has probably been more instrumental in their growth than efforts toward self-sufficiency and self-reliance.

The effects of both the eastward inland movement of industry and efforts to decentralize industry on the system of Chinese cities is perhaps best represented cartographically. (Refer to following maps)

Dual System of Cities

As indicated in the introductory chapter China has a dual system of cities. Below the independent and provincial cities are those urban areas, prefectural and hsien cities, which have the greatest contact with the rural areas. Prefectural cities, administratively, are an intermediate level between provincial and county (hsien) authority and serve as the source in the "trickling down process of innovation and technology from large industrial cities and provincial capitals". It is usually into these centres that heavy industry and advanced technology have first been introduced as a measure to bolster the provincial hinterland. "Three out of four iron and steel plants in Honan...are located in the three prefectural cities. Among the thirteen chemical industrial plants in Chekiang, four are in the capital city of Hangchou, seven in the four prefectural
Map II
Cities of China, 1970

POPULATION
- 5,000,000
- 2,500,000
- 1,000,000
- 500,000
- 250,000
- 100,000
- 50,000

cities, and only two are located in hsien cities." These centres also account for the bulk of farm machinery produced in the provinces as well as providing hand tractors, diesel engines, simple machine tools and electric motors. (Sen-dou Chang, 1976, p. 410)

Prefectural cities have been described as the "convergence zone of two technological processes, the trickling down of the modern sector of the economy from the top, and the spilling over of the intermediate technology from hsien and communes". (Sen-dou Chang, 1976, p. 410)

Below the prefectural city is the hsien city level of administration. Changed significantly after the introduction of the commune it is the hsien which acted as "the basic administrative unit for the vast empire of imperial China for more than 2,000 years and the system is well maintained at the present time..." The hsien, numbering approximately 2,010 in 1975, each with a population between 5,000 and 20,000 people, have had their administrative responsibilities decreased as the communes and brigades assumed more local responsibilities. Most important are the changes introduced to the hsien by the Cultural Revolution. Since that momentus event promoting "self-reliance and self-sufficiency for every level of territorial units ...the hsien city has been designated as the primary site of rural industrialization and many of these cities have been rejuvenated through the infusion of small and medium scale industrial enterprises". (Sen-dou Chang, 1976, p. 410)
Industries operating at this level function to improve the local agricultural productivity and to supply simple consumer goods for the needs of rural areas. Industrial activities at the hsien level usually comprise three basic units:

1) the five small industries which produce chemical fertilizers, cement, farm machinery and implements, generators and transformers, and spare parts. These are primarily operated by the hsien. The production of iron can also be included in this category.

2) repair and manufacture of farm machinery. Simple farm implements and tools are produced while agricultural implements are repaired. Smaller units here are run by the brigade or commune while larger complex units are operated by the hsien.

3) light industry processes agricultural produce and provides the locality with consumer goods.

The majority of the larger enterprises, machine tool and power plants, cement factories etc. are the responsibility of the hsien while the agricultural processing plants have been developed at the commune and sometimes brigade level.

Sigurdson, in his analysis to differentiate between rural industrialization and industrial decentralization has categorized Chinese communities into four size ranges:

1) Rural communities with up to 10,000 to 20,000 inhabitants (market towns).

2) Small urban centres with up to about 200,000
inhabitants.

3) Secondary urban centres with up to about 1,000,000 inhabitants.

4) Metropolitan centres with over 1,000,000 inhabitants.

The population marks are only approximate as the economic base of the community is the most important feature. Sigurdson defines small urban centres "as those whose existence is based mainly on the services they furnish to the surrounding rural areas. In secondary urban centres other activities take precedence over agro-related activities, and agriculture in the surrounding countryside is based mainly on the demand for food created by the urban centre. Metropolitan areas are the one or few largest population centres in almost any country, in which most industry, government and commerce are concentrated". (Sigurdson, p. 528) Industries decentralized to smaller urban centres or to rural communities, and which mostly process natural resources, Sigurdson has termed regional industries. The relationship of rural industry to the process of industrial decentralization is revealed in figure I. The aim of decentralization, explained on page 59 of this chapter, is to move or build industrial enterprises in secondary centres characterized by a population of 200,000 or more, whereas rural industrialization is designed to create industries which will serve a small market, provide employment in the countryside and create a stronger economic base for that particular locality.

China's dual system of cities, being linked physically
Figure 1
The Relation Between Rural Industrialization and Industrial Decentralization

and functionally and expressing a strong degree of overlap, have formulated a pattern of hierarchical diffusion as technological diffusion and economic development have "trickled down" through the various levels of the administrative hierarchy. The first fifteen years of industrial growth created an "economic efficiency...with a better functional articulation" between the large industrial cities, with much of the industrial achievement occurring in supra-provincial centres such as Shenyang, Anshan, Tientsin, Wuhan, Paotow and Chungking. Although this was particularly true when the seven economic cooperative regions existed it has since been changing. From the mid-1960's on provincial and some prefectural cities have benefited from the "trickling down" process but as of the first half of the 1970's it has been the prefectural and to a lesser extent the hsien cities which have benefited. The significance of this process as seen by the central authorities, despite the costs and difficulty in bringing modern technology to over 2,000 hsien centres, is that it is a means of "transforming the so-called 'functionally effective area' to a 'political effective area' in the nation-building process for a vast country". (Sen-dou Chang, 1976, p. 413)

The influence of the Cultural Revolution on policies of self-reliance and self-sufficiency and on the prevailing "anti-urban" have also strongly modified city growth rates. Despite serious limitations on statistical information, particularly demographic, there is evidence that city growth
rates in various parts of the country have been modified or completely reversed. It appears that the municipalities of Peking and Shanghai have remained stable in their population over the past ten years, while the period 1953-72 saw cities in the population groups of from 50,000 to 100,000 to 500,000 grow the fastest with respective increases in the number of centres from 71 to 105 and 77 to 91. (Sen-dou Chang, 1976, p. 414) See Table XV.

Table XV

Number of Chinese Urban Settlements
By Size, 1953-1972

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size Group of Population</th>
<th>Number of Settlements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 5,000,000</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3,000,000-5,000,000</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,000,000-3,000,000</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,000,000-2,000,000</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500,000-1,000,000</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100,000-500,000</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50,000-100,000</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10,000-50,000</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: Statistics have been compiled from several different sources.

As a result of following a philosophy which states that industry must serve agriculture and urban areas must serve rural areas the Chinese urban network, one which is fairly uniform throughout the country, is still based on the tradi-
tional system of administrative centres. This dispersed pattern of urban centres "parallels the increasingly de-centralized control of industrial enterprises" particularly since changes in development policy after the Cultural Revolution. (Sen-dou Chang, 1976, p. 414)

The developmental planning process for the nation as a whole is still very much within the purvue of the central government with adaptive planning, solving local problems with local ingenuity and resources, the responsibility of the lower city levels. The ability for smaller centres to do this is improved when small and medium-sized industries established in small urban centres foster more efficient use of local talent and resources.

"Among the advantages of this type of development were the small amount of capital required for construction, the use of some infrastructure and housing in the traditional administrative centers, the ability to absorb rural underemployment, the utilization of indigenous technology, the educational function of such enterprises, and the capability of rural industries to spur the initiative of the mass rural population." (Sen-dou Chang, 1976, p. 414)

Walking On Two Legs

The Chinese policy of "walking on two legs", that is, following an approach to economic development which utilizes both modern and traditional technologies in both the agricultural and industrial sectors, has fostered a dual sector
economy and maintained the presence of a dual system of cities throughout the nation. The advantages of this approach to development and planning, especially to small and medium centres, are:

1) support of the expansion of the modern industrial sector by allowing traditional technologies to handle the less complex, more labor intensive aspects of these enterprises;

2) expansion of the agrarian sector with the aid of local industrialization in small cities to relieve agricultural bottlenecks in the developmental process;

3) alleviation of the employment problem by the absorption of surplus labor into small scale, labor intensive enterprises at the levels of communes and hsien;

4) contributions to both increased production and national morale by the large unskilled or semiskilled segments of the population in the rural areas. (Sen-dou Chang, 1976, p. 415)

Developmental policies resulting in the dual system of cities has linked agriculture with industry and modern technology to traditional technology. It is through this linkage that Chinese urban policy has aimed to alleviate the three contradictions between city and country, between industry and agriculture and between mental and manual labour.

Expansion of Municipal Boundaries Advances Self-Sufficiency

An important feature of Chinese municipalities is the extensive area brought under their jurisdiction through expansion of municipal boundaries. The enlargement of the
municipal area has largely been an effort to make each centre "as self-sufficient as possible in terms of water, fuel, construction materials, secondary foods such as vegetables and fruits, and, in recent years, even the staple food for the large urban population". (Sen-dou Chang, 1976, p. 407)

Expansion also aimed at integrating urban and rural areas through the flow of technology and capital to the immediate hinterland of the developed urban centre.

Reasons for the expansion of municipal boundaries vary considerably according to local conditions. Sen-dou Chang suggests that inclusion of several large reservoirs was reason for the northward areal expansion of Peking in 1958, an expansion which annexed nine hsien (counties) and resulted in more than 17,800 square kilometers in total being brought under its jurisdiction. The westward expansion of Hangchou was undertaken apparently to incorporate the Hsinanchiang Hydroelectric station, the largest in south China. In 1973, the administrative territory of Tientsin was increased from 4,000 to more than 11,000 square kilometers, while a similar expansion increased Shanghai's territory to 5,800 square kilometers. (Sen-dou Chang, 1976, pp. 407-408)

One desired effect of this territorial expansion has been to accelerate the development of rural areas within the boundaries of the respective municipality:

"In the annexed areas of the municipality of Peking, for example, twenty communities, each with a population of 10,000 or more
had emerged by 1972. Among these twenty communities, only five serve as hsien cities; the remainder are production centers of small and medium-sized enterprises. Communes located within large municipalities appear to be more prosperous and populous, as illustrated by the Red Star Sino-Korean Friendship Commune, located to the south of the old walled area of Peking. The commune has more than 10,000 people whose mechanized agriculture has become a show place for foreign visitors in recent years." (Sen-dou Chang, 1976, p. 409)

Sigurdson (p. 531) estimates that rural areas under the administration of the larger cities have 20 per cent or more of their labour force in industry while for the nation as a whole approximately 5 per cent of the total labour force is engaged in rural industries. Whatever the local reason for expansion of municipal boundaries the widespread inclusion of large rural areas within cities has undoubtedly been aimed at minimizing the differences between city and country and between industry and agriculture.

Integration of urban and rural is actually brought about through the diffusing of technology to the countryside thereby increasing agricultural productivity, and by sub-contracting parts of the urban industrial processes to the small, rural, labour-intensive enterprises. For the cities the inclusion of a large agriculture base provides not only a short-distance food supply but a stimulative to various primary industries within the municipalities. (Sen-dou Chang, 1976, p. 409) The extension of municipal authority into adjacent areas has also enhanced the ability of cities, particularly centres such as Peking, to make long-range
plans and to expand various construction projects. (Tien, p. 70)

It was during the mid 1970's that Chinese descriptions of urban life placed a renewed emphasis on urban self-sufficiency. Prior to that during the 1950's and 1960's individual factory production and its subsequent effects on urban development was more closely tied to national plans and priorities for increasing industrial productivity. Planning emphasis in the 1970's has been placed at the lower administrative levels thereby increasing the influence of cities and provinces in decision making and indirectly in the encouragement of cities to serve the needs of their own regions. (Buck, p. 31)

"The development of industries in rural areas around Shanghai, Peking and Tientsin - with a substantial amount of subcontracting - may indicate the long-term prospects for rural industry in the rest of the country. The formation of technical and organizational skills is only in the early stages of development in most parts of rural China. This and the still low level of mechanization explains why the industrial level is still comparatively low compared with more favoured rural areas around the big cities."
(Sigurdson, p. 531)

**Transfer of People to the Countryside**

The development of organizational or production skills in the rural areas is dependent on the transfer not only of technology but also of people to the countryside. Person to person contact has been relied upon extensively in transmitting the desired knowledge. Trained personnel such as
managers, technicians and engineers from advanced urban plants journey to smaller rural enterprises while rural citizens are sent to advanced industrial units for learning. Some urban dwellers have been moved permanently to work in the countryside while educated youth are asked to spend at least two years in the nation's countryside. Sigurdson analyzes the formation of skills in the rural areas as being largely reliant upon:

(1) Training of personnel
   (a) City-based, old factories train workers recruited to rural factories.
   (b) Rural factories undertake training of new workers.
(2) Transfer of personnel
   (a) Technical personnel are transferred from old to new factories.
   (b) Newly graduated students are allocated to new, rural factories.

(Sigurdson, p. 535)

Not all components of this process can be analyzed here. Pertinent to the discussion of cities in China however is the movement to the countryside of the educated youth. Viewed in a total context the downward transfer of educated youth to the countryside (hsia fang) is more than graduated middle school (high school) students being sent to work on communes or in small rural factories. It is in this move-
ment of young urban educated people to the countryside that the political philosophy of present day China is epitomized.

"A December 1975 Red Flag article reminded readers that the DCY (down-to-countryside youth) program is 'of far-reaching significance for combating and preventing revisionism, for consolidating the dictatorship of the proletariat, for restricting bourgeois rights, for gradually narrowing the three major differences, for strengthening the construction of the countryside, and for promoting the development of socialist agriculture'. It further resurrected a quotation from Mao which points out that the only criterion for judging whether a youth is a revolutionary is 'whether or not he is willing to integrate himself with the broad masses of workers and peasants and does so in practice'."

According to Current Scene the number of youths sent down in 1975 came to 2 million. The large-scale movement to send youths to the countryside was launched in 1968 by Mao and since that date has resulted in the rustication of at least 12 million young people. (Current Scene, Feb. 1976, Vol. 14, p. 16) This migration scheme has not been organized to populate the sparsely settled border regions although such a policy does exist. "Rather, it is a migration process whereby urbanites relocate in any rural area, thereby gaining access to primary involvement in the agrarian scene." This is corroborated by Salter's analysis of rustication which shows that "the majority of all hsia fang movements with specified goal areas were intraprovincial". (Salter, p. 97)

Dissatisfaction with the program does exist with resentment being felt by all parties involved, parents, students and peasants alike. Innovations in the program have been
attempted. Following the "Chuchow model", policies have been generalized in many parts of China establishing linkages between rural communes on the one hand and urban factories and other organizations on the other. Parents, through the units to which they belong, play a larger role in the resettlement of students while better preparations are made to receive the students in the rural areas. Additional efforts to make the rustication program even more palatable are being made.

Considering the total population of China the number of people involved in the hsia fang program will not significantly alter the urban landscapes or the social makeup of the major cities along the eastern seaboard of China. "However, the fact that even this number of people are reported to have willingly left the city for a different and relatively exhausting experiment in 'mass struggle' is significant. If these numbers are not looked at in the aggregate but rather considered as individuals undergoing the various hsia fang hardships, then the entire movement takes on a vitality and sense of exciting experimentation as normal rural-to-urban migration flows are reversed in an attempt to continue some of the battles which gave China its revolutionary cohesiveness in the early 1950's."

(Salter, p. 99)

The hsia fang program is only one of the mechanisms utilized for instilling revolutionary essence in the urban population. By temporarily moving the urban literati away
from the city and immersing them in manual labour and rural living. China will benefit the rural areas, ease population pressure somewhat in the cities, but most importantly in-still in the young people a rural cognizance and ensure progress toward a classless society.

Summary

China's evolving political philosophy, under the leadership of Mao Tse-tung, has influenced policies of industrialization and economic development and their subsequent effects on urbanization. Development directed inland, initially via the First Five-Year Plan, was based more on existing centres than on new settlements albeit new communities certainly have been created. Although benefiting China, inland development was over-emphasized and required correction from the political leadership of Mao Tse-tung. Similarly, changes in political ideology brought about by the Cultural Revolution have had significant impact on local and national development. The Cultural Revolution resulted in less centralized control over industry and placed increased emphasis on policies of self-reliance and self-sufficiency as well as strongly modifying the growth rates of China's largest cities.

Utilization of the traditional network of settlements as recipients of technology and knowledge, particularly the prefectural and hsien centres, has partially accounted for the success in further development of provincial hinterlands and rural industrialization. The performance of these centres in acting as receivers of technological diffusion and economic
development has linked them structurally and organizationally to the national economy. The traditional urban settlements of China are proving to be a key in the structural transformation of Chinese society.
CHAPTER V  
ADMINISTRATIVE PLANNING STRUCTURE

Introduction

China is a socialist society, a society characterized by an increasingly decentralized as opposed to a command economy. Such decentralization requires the introduction of more participants in the planning process at local and regional levels. It is also a society philosophically distrustful of urban settlements. Cities of pre-1949 Chinese society are viewed as being areas of concentrated wealth, exploiters of the countryside and internally alienating.

One of the aims of this thesis is to explain the national development policies and political philosophy affecting city development and to elaborate upon the urban planning process in light of these policies and political philosophy. The aim of this chapter is to explain how China's cities are related to other units of national development, a structure designed to help disperse previously concentrated wealth, and how they are structured internally to prevent exploitation and involve the masses in decision making processes.

Administrative Structure

The framework of China's administrative structure was first established by Article 53 of the 1954 Constitution. (Shabad, 1972, p. 28)

"Article 53. The administrative division of the People's Republic of China is as
(1) The country is divided into provinces, autonomous regions, and cities directly under the central authority;

(2) Provinces and autonomous regions are divided into autonomous chou, counties, autonomous counties, and cities;

(3) Counties and autonomous counties are divided into hsiang, nationality hsiang, and towns.

Cities directly under the central authority and other large cities are divided into districts. Autonomous chou are divided into counties, autonomous counties, and cities.

Autonomous regions, autonomous chou and autonomous counties are all national autonomous areas. (Jan, Government of Communist China, 1966, p. 630)

Numerous changes have been made since that date, particularly between 1954 and 1958, so that by the end of 1976 China consisted administratively of three municipalities directly under the control of the Central Government in Peking, 21 provinces, and five autonomous regions. The People's Republic of China Atlas lists further administrative subdivisions within this structure (refer to table XVI) while Theodore Shabad in China's Changing Map gives a detailed explanation of this breakdown.

Provisions of the 1954 Constitution divided provinces and autonomous provinces into autonomous chou, hsien (counties), autonomous hsien, and cities. Hsien and autonomous hsien were further divided into hsiang (rural townships), towns (chen), and national hsiang. (Shabad, 1972, p. 29) All of the autonomous divisions "are areas of national autonomy in which ethnic minority groups are granted the right to self-adminis-
tration under local leaders in a way that assures effective political control". (Shabad, 1972, p. 29)

The draft 1971 Constitution affirmed the 1954 administrative pattern as well as recognizing the introduction of the special district (Chuan Ch'u), an intermediate level between the province and hsien which "combines groups of hsien into regional patterns within province". The replacement by the commune of the lowest-level rural division, the hsiang, during the Great Leap Forward was also recognized. The special district has been implemented probably to "avoid the need for direct provincial administration of the many hsien". (Shabad, 1972, p. 30)

For clarity Shabad suggests discussion in terms of administrative subordination. The first-order divisions are quite straightforward and are those directly subordinate to the central government. Although not explicitly provided for in the 1954 Constitutions the intermediate-level division or subprovincial level consists of the special district (renamed "area" in 1971), autonomous chou, and those cities directly under provincial jurisdiction.

The placement of an urban area into a particular classification is a sensitive indicator of the level of economic development that particular city has reached. Thus it is that "the intermediate-level of administration is represented by about eighty cities that have reached a sufficiently large population or advanced economic development to be considered equivalent to the areas or autonomous chou". (Shabad, 1972, p. 30)
# TABLE XVI
## ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province Level (First Order)</th>
<th>Subprovince Level (Intermediate)</th>
<th>County Level (Second Order)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anhwei</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chekiang</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fukien</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heilungkiang</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honan</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hopeh</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hunan</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hupeh</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kansu</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiangsi</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiangsu</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirin</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kwangfunch</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kweichow</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liaoning</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shansi</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shantung</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shensi</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Szechwan</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tsinghai</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yunnan</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Auton. Region | | | | | |
| Inner Mongolia | 7g | 2 | 8 | 74 | 3 |
| Kwangsi Chuang | 8 | 1 | 72 | 8 |
| Ninasia Hui | 1 | 2 | 16 | |
| Sinkiang Uighur | 5 | 6 | 2 | 73 | 6 |
| Tibet | 5 | 1 | | 70 |

| Municipality | | | | | |
| Peking | 9 | | | | |
| Shanghai | 10 | | | | |
| Tientsin | | | | | |

| Total | 29 | 178 | 79 | 90 | 2,057 | 69 |

---

*The country is divided into 29 first-order units—21 provinces (sheng), 5 autonomous regions (tzu-chih chou), and 3 municipalities (shih)—directly under the central authority.*

*At the subprovince (intermediate) level, provinces and autonomous regions are divided into special districts (chuan-ch'u)*
or autonomous chou (tzu-chi chou). A number of municipalities also exist at this level.

Counties (hsien) are the basic second-order unit. Other second-order units include autonomous hsien (tzu-chi hsien) and hsien-level shih. The term hsien is normally used instead of its English equivalent.

Subprovincial totals do not reflect changes caused by the presumed reapportionment and realignment of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region (IMAR) because of lack of data.

Kwangtung has an atypical unit-administrative district (hsing-cheng ch'u) comprising the island of Hainan. It functions as the top administrative organization of the island.

Includes one town (chen) in Yunnan that functions at the second-order hsien level.

The subprovince level unit in IMAR is officially designated as league (meng).

Includes 52 banners (ch'i), a hsien-level unit in IMAR.

IMAR autonomous hsien-level unit is termed tzu-chih ch'i.

Hsien information unavailable.


Hsien and autonomous hsien represent most of the second-order division. Cities at this level usually have a smaller population and are not as well developed industrially as cities at the intermediate level, and as well are subordinate to areas or autonomous chou of the intermediate order.

Shabad describes third-order divisions, not included in the C.I.A. Atlas, which are further divisions of the hsien and autonomous hsien into rural (hsiang) and urban administrative units. However, as stated, by 1958 the hsiang had been replaced by the commune which became the basic rural poli-
tical unit below the hsien while the commune itself was further divided into production brigades and production teams (refer to Figure II). The basic urban administrative unit became the town or "chen". A market town is usually the administrative seat of a hsien, thus its position is owed mainly to a local farm market rather than to industry. Towns at this level are subordinate to the hsien. Industrial development of any significance would probably result in the promotion of a town to a city or "shih".

"Changes in the administrative structure of China can be interpreted in the context of economic development." This is particularly true in the towns and municipalities where "administrative changes are an even more sensitive indicator of urban industrial development". (Shabad, 1972, p. 32)

The three levels of cities in this structure can be assumed to reflect relative population size and industrial importance. A city under central government jurisdiction will perform more important functions than a city at the sub-provincial level (under provincial authority), and a sub-provincial city is probably more significant than a city at the hsien level (under the authority of the area or special district). (Shabad, 1972, p. 33)

Responsibility for the planning of China's cities rests with the municipal and provincial governments while the central government takes a direct responsibility in the three autonomous centres of Shanghai, Peking and Tientsin. It is possible to represent diagramatically the structure and administration of Chinese society, however it is important to remember that
Figure II

Administrative-Political Structure

although the structure and its implied relationships as presented in Figure II may appear to be hierarchical, the state and mass organs of administration as depicted cannot adequately reveal how the all-important power of the Communist Party is actually exercised. Similar views have been expressed by Nick Jeffrey, who advises consideration of "formal, operational, and other organizational aspects". (Jeffrey, p. 144) Susan Rifkin, in a slightly different context, argues that "Chinese policy decisions and implementations...are holistic", and that in analyzing the People's Republic we cannot "separate economic, social and political goals". (Rifkin, p. 259) More on this after the following explanation of city structure.

Urban Structure

There is a hierarchy of local government which administers Chinese cities, some of it organizational and mandatory, the remainder mass organizational and voluntary. Moreover, the municipal administration of a city covers not only the entire urban area but encompasses adjoining communes and sometimes entire counties, many of which themselves contain small industrial enterprises (refer to pages 80-83). Thus under the jurisdiction of provincial and autonomous cities are urban districts, county districts as well as certain institutions and factories.

Every major Chinese town and city is divided into a number of districts, each with its own administration and bureaus and containing anywhere from 250,000 to 500,000 people. Smaller towns may come under the jurisdiction of the rural
sector and become centres of commune administration. The city of Ch'ang Ch'un, an urban area of 1.3 million population, is divided into five districts (four urban and one on the fringe of the city) each possessing a section for city planning. The districts together work under the unified leadership of the city through the Bureau of City Construction and Planning and exchange materials and personnel as a means of "mutual aid".

City districts are further divided into street committees (in Shanghai, Peking and Tientsin called neighbourhood committees) each possessing a population of from 50,000 to 100,000 citizens. This is the smallest unit of state administration and is "the lowest urban level at which state cadre are appointed to the Revolutionary Committees and to the sub-offices of the bureaux". (Jeffrey, p. 146)

The residential committees in the autonomous cities (neighbourhoods in provincial cities) are formed from approximately 60 modern housing blocks and 6,000 residents each. The residents' committee system was extended to all of China in 1954. Also at this time neighbourhood committees (street committees in provincial cities) were established as branches of city government in all major cities of China. "They were mandatory in cities with over 100,000 population, optional in cities between 50,000 and 100,000 population, and not expected in cities of fewer than 50,000 population." (Sidel, Ruth. p. 28) The residents' committee is directly responsible to the neighbourhood committee, which in turn is the administrative level the city administration uses to relate to the people (refer to Figure II). From Jeffrey's experience of Shanghai:
"these were described as 'self-governing mass organizations under the leadership of the Neighbourhood RevCom'. In this case, 20 Residents Groups (one for each block) would meet together on occasion and elect their third of the elected members of the Residential Committee. The tasks of the Residential Committee were said to include: (i) implement tasks such as hygienic programmes; (ii) take the demands of the people to the Neighbourhood RevCom; (iii) organize social work visits; (iv) push propaganda about family planning; (v) recommend to the Housing Bureau on housing for new couples; (vi) run old people's places of study and recreation." (Jeffrey, p. 145)

Following the street committee are mass organizations called neighbourhood committees and residents groups. They are voluntary groups whose members are mainly women and retired workers. Although lacking specific administrative functions the role of the neighbourhood committee, with a population ranging from 2500 to 12,000 people, is to provide some forms of housing, contribute a share of labour for such projects as road building, and according to Jeffrey to "organize the broad mass, encourage political study, and promote self-reliance". (Jeffrey, p. 146)

The newest level of mass organization, appearing after the Cultural Revolution and imparted to the author during his 1976 visit to China is that of the socialist court-yard. Explained by a group of planners in Ch'ang Ch'un, and further elaborated upon during a visit to Fengsheng neighbourhood committee in Peking, the purposes of this new but not yet ubiquitous community organ is to organize a number of activities:
1) retired workers and other workers help educate young people outside of school
2) leaders organize study sessions for residents
3) citizens perform art and other activities, take part in sports meets, learn Peking operas, and help put out wall newspapers
4) supervise class enemies. People who exhibit tendencies to return to the old ways of pre-revolutionary China are watched
5) organize people to do physical labour
6) summon people to express their current thought

As explained by the Ch'ang Ch'un planners the formation of the socialist courtyard is in keeping with Mao's thought to "contribute more unpaid after the eight hour workday" and that the dictatorship of the proletariat should be organized at the grass roots level. For this level of mass organization this meant about 30 households per socialist courtyard with a management committee of three to five people. In Fengsheng neighbourhood we were told that since the Cultural Revolution the masses are better organized and socialist courtyards have organized under residents' committees. In this neighbourhood there are 970 socialist courtyards with residents' committees consisting of from 30 to 60 courtyards. Time is spent, we were told, studying the principles of Chairman Mao and taking
part in cultural and recreational activities.

This urban administrative structure encompasses all major cities and towns, while smaller centres of population come under the jurisdiction of commune administrations.

Planning In China

Although one should be wary of comparisons between China and other nations it is absolutely essential to realize that planning in China is significantly different from planning elsewhere. This aspect will be touched upon later. The point to note here is that in China spatial or physical planning is not separate from economic or production planning, and the planning of China's cities is not divorced from the rural or national economic planning of the state as a whole. It is imperative in a discussion of Chinese urban planning that the national economic forces at work affecting cities be considered and explained, even if done so briefly. Roland Berger (1975) offers an excellent accounting of the economic planning process in the People's Republic, particularly at the Provincial level, while detailed analyses of industrial planning and its relationship to the political and administrative structure are available from Barry Richman and Franz Schurmann (1968). Wheelwright and McFarlane in the Chinese Road To Socialism discuss the effects of the cultural revolution on the Chinese political economy. Efforts to change fundamentally the organization of work and its management and location is reported by Charles Bettelheim in Cultural
State planning in China begins with the "formulation of essentially political directives by top party and government authorities indicating their key priorities and preferences with respect to national economic activity - for example, the relative emphasis on the development of heavy and light industry, defense, agriculture. These directives are translated into concrete operating terms by the State Planning Commission and other appropriate central organs." (Richman, p. 706-707) It is this agency, the State Planning Commission, which actually prepares China's annual and five-year plans, and its proposals are ratified by the central government.

Long-term planning, periods of ten to twenty years, comes under the auspices of the National Economic Commission. "China's general economic and industrial development objectives, strategies, and policies" are determined by this organization. It concerns itself with "the relationships between light and heavy industry and agricultural development, automation and technical progress, the types, locations, and construction of new industries and factories, priorities for product development, optimum plant size in a given sector, and so forth." (Richman, p. 685)

Although the centralization of economic planning powers appears to be the situation both provincial and municipal authorities have maintained considerable authority and independence particularly in those areas of the nation demonstrating a greater self-sufficiency. It would appear, according to
Richman, that as long as operations continue to run smoothly, provinces and cities have been allowed to retain considerable power over financial controls and industrial administration.

Berger offers the following example from his knowledge of Shensi Province to explain part of the annual planning process at the provincial level. In September or October of each year provisional economic targets for the following year are sent by the State Planning Commission to the first order level (Table I). These provisional targets, based on the results of the first three-quarters of the current year, are divided into nine main categories: "industrial development; agricultural development; main capital construction projects; raw materials; finance; communications and transport; commerce; wages and social services." (p. 559)

The procedures followed here are the same for provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions. The province reviews past and future considerations and "then divide the provisional targets into plans for each of the units at the next lower level - the administrative region, and any towns and factories under direct leadership of the province". (p. 559) In the example of Shensi (Chart II), a provisional plan is worked out for each of the administrative regions, towns and several factories under the leadership of the province.

Each administrative region below the province reviews the provisional targets in terms of its own situation and then decides on an appropriate division into plans for each
of the counties, towns and factories under its regional leadership. Counties vary significantly in population size from 400,000 to 750,000 with an average, in Shensi, of thirteen counties to each administrative region. The number of counties in each administrative region also varies throughout China.

Figure III

Shensi Province
Structural Levels Involved
In The Planning Process

SHENSI PROVINCE (population 21 million) (Sheng)

3 cities under direct leadership of Province (Sian, Tungchan, Paoki)

7 administrative regions (Zhuan Qu)

93 counties (Xian)

2 county towns under the leadership of administrative regions (Yenan, Sienyang)

2,500 communes (Gong She)

30,000 production brigades (Sheng Chan Da Dui)

140,000 production teams (Sheng Chan Xiao Dui)


It is at the lower levels, the commune and the factory, that the concept of the "mass line" comes into full play. Goals
proposed from above are discussed fully by the factory as a whole and also by each individual workshop. Berger states "the targets for major factories are divided into: output; varieties, qualities; major raw materials, fuels, power costs, etc.; cost of production; profit; labour and productivity". (p. 560) A similar process occurs on the communes. However, it is these grass roots which are so important in making the concepts of the "mass line" and from the "top down and the bottom up" work.

At every stage in this structure an exchange has occurred between the upper and lower levels before the plan is passed upward to the level above. Modifications may not only be made at any stage but discussions are on-going throughout the year.

Provisional plans with their suggested modifications from the 21 provinces, three municipalities and five autonomous regions are then forwarded to the Central Planning Commission in Peking where they are co-ordinated and centralized. At this point these proposals from the geographical "areas" are combined with the proposals from various industrial ministries or "lines". It is up to the Planning Commission to co-ordinate the proposals from both into one plan. Once this has been accomplished the plan, perhaps further modified, goes through the same process involving each level.

Devolution of Planning Powers

There are several significant points to make here. First, the Chinese consider that this method of "devolution of powers"
allows for the most valuable ideas to be incorporated into the plan and for reconciliation to occur at all levels. Secondly, "the structural relationships are one thing, the common purpose deriving from understanding of policy is another and more important feature". (p. 561)

What this entire structure expresses is a "devolution of planning powers" which distinguishes Chinese planning from planning as we know it and accounts, according to Robin Thompson (1975, p. 602) for one of the major distinguishing features of Chinese planning at the urban level. Detailed information about the actual relationships between various government levels is not readily available but illustrations can attest to the existence of an administrative/political hierarchy and to a decentralization of certain planning powers.

The following account comes from Robin Thompson as a result of his 1974 visit to the city of Changsha:

"The Ma-Yi-Hsing Neighbourhood is an old quarter of Changsha, with poor housing and cramped industries. Redevelopment is gradually taking place. Initiatives have mainly come from the Neighbourhood Committee, which has, for instance, superintended the erection of three new blocks of flats. The idea emanated locally; the Committee decided which slums most urgently warranted clearance and who needed new accommodation; the flats were built by residents' labour with the help of their two full-time builders.

However, these projects are subject to discussion and control with higher tiers. Urban District and Street Committees will usually have one member responsible for planning matters who would advise and liaise at Neighbourhood level. In our Changsha example, planning permission was required from the City Planning Bureau, which operates a development control machinery reminiscent of Britain's. However,
criteria used in evaluating applications include not only technical standards of design and density, but also contribution to production, minimizing of journeys to work, elimination of 'wastes', and linkages with related activities. The Changsha Bureau had consulted the City Housing and Industry Bureaux at its own municipal level to check that the resources needed for the Ma-Yi-Hsing projects were compatible with general quotas. This case demonstrates how devolution of planning meshes with an aspatial, incremental methodology."

(Thompson, 1975, p. 602)

There is less known about the counties under municipal jurisdiction than other administrative organs. Once again Jeffrey offers his own limited experience of this relationship:

"The County Districts of Provincial Cities we had no formal experience of, aside from the two provincial factories which are in Wuhan and Changsha county districts. The Wuhan county districts cover 1300 sq. km. (cf. 190 sq. km. of urban districts), and contain 26 People's Communes and one state farm of over 500 sq. km. providing directly for the heavy industry there. In Changsha, the five urban districts cover 40 sq. km., and the county districts 4000 sq. km., with 15 per cent of the total population. County districts, as in Shanghai, serve two functions: to provide specialized agricultural services to the cities and factories; and to provide an administrative/political structure for controlled urban development and dispersal. In Changsha it was emphasized that planning was to facilitate the integration of agriculture and industry, and of the rural and the urban."

(Jeffrey, 1974, p. 146)

Urban planning is in reality subordinate to state and local economic planning. Decisions related to the expansion or location of industry must be integrated into economic plans and carried out through the numerous bureaus at the city level. Placing an emphasis on "self-reliance" has meant however, that the initiative for production expansion
usually comes from the factory itself and not from above; that is planning authorities at either the national or local levels. (Buck, p. 27)

Two illustrations explain the relationship of neighbourhood factories to the overall structure. The first, an example of factory expansion in Shanghai; the second, a brief illustration of the relationship between neighbourhood factory, municipal bureaus and the state government.

"...in Shanghai Ch'en Yu-jui, a member of the T'ien-shan District Revolutionary Committee told us about how further expansion of such a neighborhood factory would proceed. He explained that the decision for expansion ordinarily would come from the factory itself. Naturally, the expanded lines would match lines desired in the national and Shanghai economic plans. After receiving the approval from the factory staff and management, such a project would be reviewed and approved by the neighborhood and district revolutionary committees. Finally, the departments of the Shanghai municipal government would allocate the land, structures and capital goods required and the factory would pay for this expansion out of "accumulation" or what we would call retained earnings. Ch'en stressed that this approach was an example of the way in which self-reliance works in an urban production context." (Buck, p. 27)

In 1966, in Shenyang, at the neighbourhood level, nine housewives established a metallurgical factory utilizing waste materials from slag heaps. Creating their own hand tools and rebuilding outdated machinery the operation expanded over the years to eventually employ close to 200 individuals. The production of spare parts for agricultural machinery became so important that the factory is now in-
corporated into the national planning scheme and functions under the municipal bureau of agricultural machinery. Wage levels are determined by the Municipal Labour Bureau.

A major feature of many Chinese cities, and something the people are very proud of, are large production facilities such as heavy industrial plants. These large enterprises, virtual communities themselves, relate to the structure in two ways. They are part of the intricate state national plan as well as being an important component in the urban planning and administrative process. In Ch'ang Ch'un the largest truck factory in China employs 20,000 workers and produces 60,000 units annually. The plant itself is under the unified leadership of the city while decisions to locate the plant and design the industrial areas was worked out with various municipal bureaus. The important characteristic of this type of enterprise is that it represents a new type of community established since liberation; activities are integrated with production. Clinics, day care facilities, a hospital, six primary and four middle schools, a middle technical school (for spare time study) and a foreign language college are all attached to and managed by workers at this industrial facility.

The Emergence Of The Revolutionary Committees

It is not the purpose of this thesis to explain the political structure of China. However, it is conceivable that the preceding administrative description may be deceiving.
At every level of the administrative structure there is a corresponding political unit operating at the same time and intimately linked with its corresponding administrative body. At many levels this Communist Party organ is the Revolutionary Committee.

Revolutionary committees emerged during the Cultural Revolution. They are organs of administration and political power for geographic areas, for factories and for institutions. "There is now a revolutionary committee, as the organ of political power, at every level from the provinces to the neighbourhood." (Robinson, p. 14) The basic units of political power in the city are the revolutionary committees of enterprises and neighbourhoods. (Robinson, p. 15) Every person in China is represented by this organ usually at the place of work but those who are retired and those who are members of a workers' family are represented by the Revolutionary Committee of their place of residence. (Jeffrey, p. 144)

"The workers living in a particular neighbourhood are concerned with their factories. The neighbourhood represents mainly housewives and retired people. Street committees elect representatives and these are represented on the neighbourhood committee along with cadres and the PLA (though the PLA representation seems to be vestigial). The cadres at the neighbourhood level are paid salaries by the city. It is their business not only to bring down suggestions from above but also to carry the views of the people up. For instance, they collect the customers' views about the quality and variety of goods to the local shops. When some special task comes up, say a campaign to improve sanitation before the hot weather begins,
meetings and discussions are held. The meetings may divide into groups under street committees. Plans can be modified according to the views that get support." (Robinson, p. 16)

There is an executive provided from a standing committee for every revolutionary committee while at higher levels each standing committee has a civil service or staff of officials. Parallel to each level in the structure are Party Committees representing the Party members in each organization. "The Party...is concerned with policy and the revolutionary committees are charged with carrying out the Party's policy." (Robinson, p. 14) The following is an account of the revolutionary committee of the large city of Shanghai as told by Joan Robinson:

"I was given some details of the revolutionary committee of Shanghai, which ranks as a province. Others are on the same pattern. There are 150 members, of whom representatives of the masses are 105, cadres 21, and PLA representatives 24. The representatives of the masses consist of 43 workers, 21 peasants (from the counties surrounding the city), 8 Red Guards (now at middle school, no longer university students), 16 intellectuals, concerned with the arts and cultural activities, and 17 commercial workers. The committee as a whole meets generally twice a year, to hear a report on the year's work and to discuss the annual plan. It is responsible for appointing the standing committee which carries out the duties of the old provincial government. The administration of the province is carried out through bureaux concerned with planning, commerce, finance, education and health, and so forth, and there are corresponding departments at the lower levels." (Robinson, p. 15)

Jeffrey writes of the revolutionary committee and provides the following table:
### Table XVII

**Composition of Various Revolutionary Committees**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rev Com Members</th>
<th>Cadre</th>
<th>Tech</th>
<th>Workers</th>
<th>Peas' ts</th>
<th>Wom</th>
<th>PLA</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>% Wom</th>
<th>% Party</th>
<th>Total Employed</th>
<th>% Wom</th>
<th>% Party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Industrial</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steelworks</td>
<td>40+</td>
<td>40+</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>68,000</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>many</td>
<td>68,000</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>many</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machine F Factory</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>12.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Docks District</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>21</td>
<td></td>
<td>44</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>many</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>many</td>
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<tr>
<td>Porcelain Factory</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1,826</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,826</td>
<td>18</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
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<tr>
<td>Shen Deh County</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>within: 39</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>720 th</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Sing Chiang P.C.</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>20.5 th</td>
<td>20.5 th</td>
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<td>20.5 th</td>
<td>20.5 th</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>teacher</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The revolutionary committees "were described as 'basic units of proletariat power' (they included workers), and as providing the 'unified leadership' (they included political and administrative cadre). The Rev Coms have members responsible to the mass (Responsible Members) and Standing Members. The latter make up a Standing Committee which meets more often. At the Hunan porcelain factory we were told that the Rev Com is a provisional power organization, and an executive for the Party Committee." (Jeffrey, p. 147)

Both authors mention the existence of "considerable" overlap between Party Committees and Revolutionary Committees and the relative disappearance of the PLA from the Revolutionary Committees.

The significance of the revolutionary committees is that for certain geographic areas and for state factories and institutions these bodies are the organs of administration and thus take their respective place in the administrative structure for planning. The revolutionary committee can also be viewed as being part of the leadership of the Communist Party of China. Considering that this committee exists at each level it is possible to consider it as a horizontal complementary component to each administrative component appearing in figure II. The incorporation of revolutionary committees for factories and institutions into the structure indicates indirectly the power of industry and finance in China's planning structure.
Significance To Planning

The administrative political structure as presented is significant to planning as it reflects many of the ultimate goals of urban planning and the planning and political policies behind the overall development of the state.

Most noteworthy has been the devolution of planning powers notably those related to resource allocation, questions related to utilization, and technical decisions. Political decisions are part of the party structure not discussed here. The Chinese people have shown an amazing ability to struggle and deal with planning problems through a political and administrative framework (solution through discussion and debate) as opposed to leaving planning in the hands of the experts. Jeffrey offers two main characteristics of Chinese planning structure. One is that "policies made and decisions taken under the leadership of the Party, a relation which is both vertical and horizontal (the latter being the 'unified leadership' of policy and administration through Revolutionary Committees)". Secondly, "that decisions are subject to a 'two-way' flow of proposals from above and below, with considerable 'leeway' in proposals". (Jeffrey, p. 147)

In essence, bureaucracies and technical experts, particularly since the Cultural Revolution, have been limited. The system of "from the top down and the bottom up" appears to be enjoying a healthy life. The Chinese method of planning is different, as is the role of the planner, because public participation is different and practised extensively. The
The sources of the planners advice and that of other decision makers comes from a number of different areas. The complexity of the administrative process can attest to that.

The planning of China's cities is not divorced from economic or production planning for the nation as a whole, while physical or spatial planning is subservient to economic and production planning. The administrative structure reflects efforts to achieve balanced development between industry and agriculture and to eliminate the differences between city and countryside.

Summary

All levels of Chinese society participate in the planning process, a process which is being implemented at the most local level possible. The basic principles of both economic and urban planning policies are centralization and mass participation, as reflected by the discussion of political philosophy in chapter three.

Structured as Chinese society may appear to be, it is not a rigid structure. Numerous alterations in economic and urban planning frameworks have accompanied corresponding changes in the developing political philosophy. Neither do the central authorities have complete say in all matters. The Chinese people through the leadership of Mao Tse-tung and notably as a result of the Cultural Revolution have thwarted overcentralization.

Several things are certain about the structure of the
nations cities. They are being designed internally in such a manner as to cease the breeding of bourgeois-minded elites; to serve the masses; and to integrate administratively with the countryside for dispersal of industry and technology.

Important to discuss, no matter how briefly, are the effects on the planning structure of political organs such as the revolutionary committees. China is a nation in transformation; a people committed to goals which will require decades to achieve. Undoubtedly along the way remnants of capitalist and bourgeois tendencies will surface. The societal structure described and the relation of political organs to it is significant when the need to retain control is understood.

Unfortunately, and what this thesis reflects, is that little is actually known about details of urban planning processes or the internal structure and day to day workings of the city itself. Knowledge is scant about the relationship of the various levels of urban structure one to the other, or of details of the ties that state or mass organizations have with corresponding Communist Party units. This is one aspect related to the planning of China's cities where there is a significant gap in knowledge. At present our understanding of the urban planning process is quite superficial.
CHAPTER VI

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Introduction

It is a difficult task to draw from the existing limited knowledge, concrete conclusions about planning and urban centres in the People's Republic of China. By necessity, the qualitative nature of this thesis will allow only general qualitative conclusions. That is to say, issues raised from the previous discussion of the People's Republic will be of significance in a generic sense as opposed to their importance in specific situations or in terms of their direct applicability to Canada or other foreign societies. The occasional statistical information presented does lend credence to the stronger indications of certain accomplishments in Chinese society.

Political Ideology

What is certain is that the Chinese have embarked on a program to create a society where distinctions among the masses will be abolished and that this primary goal is based on and guided by a still-evolving, strong, socialist political philosophy.

CONCLUSION: POLITICAL IDEOLOGY IS THE GUIDING FORCE OF CHINA'S URBAN AND ECONOMIC PLANNING.

Mao Tse-tung has warned that centralized governing of
people and material will come about through the integrative planning of an industrialized society and that the creation of such an industrialized, technological society will also result in both an inequality of responsibility and an inequality of participation in decisions. Man must be freed not only from the "necessity of eking out a living and finding the means of subsistence, but also from the imperatives of technology". If this is not accomplished then the masses will succumb to a new group of rulers, a group characterized by technicians who supply material comforts, and directors who shape the responses of workers to technological needs. (Wheelwright and McFarlane, pp. 216-217)

Mao has suggested a new political order which will meet the needs of factory and commune in the creation of material property and a "meaningful group life". This is to be accomplished in the present necessarily hierarchical organization of industry and government. (Wheelwright and McFarlane, p. 217)

Followers of Mao Tse-tung maintain that like pre-1949 Chinese society, the years 1952-1957 and 1962-1964 were characterized by an ever increasing powerful government apparatus and a strong tendency to establish ascendancy of the higher classes over the lower. They have also consistently warned that urban economic life is hierarchically structured.

They warn of the concentration of power, produced by industrial society, and the need of the masses to combat it. The two "enemies", the "imperatives of technology and industrialism, and the concentration of power in the hands of those who promote
them" must be struggled with. If technological and economic expansion become objectives in themselves and "politics is kept from interfering with the inner imperatives and 'self-evident success' of industrial development", then the masses will find themselves deprived of true freedom even if they acquire the "indispensable Marxian material conditions of freedom". (Wheelwright and McFarlane, p. 216)

Post-1949 Chinese society has been characterized by a continuing struggle to determine the correct socialist path to follow. From the early to mid-1950's, the government obviously planned to concentrate on heavy industry in the medium and small cities of China's interior provinces. During this period the general factors underlying industrial location as analyzed by Wu in *The Spatial Economy of Communist China* are (1) regional specialization; (2) intraregional self-sufficiency within the broad framework of interregional trade; (3) proximity to raw materials, fuels, and markets; (4) considerations of national security; (5) and geographical balance between new and established economic bases. In Wu's analysis a comparison of these general principles with the "objective laws" of socialist location demonstrate that they coincide closely with theoretical propositions developed for the Soviet economy.

By 1959, Mao and other Chinese leaders were pointing out that in the development of industrial bases concern should be shown for the proper balance between new and existing centres. The Soviet model had demonstrated that it was not suited to China's resources and realities resulting in a shift of strategy
designed to accelerate the overall rate of economic growth, placing an emphasis on labour, and reducing agricultural bottle-necks.

The relative failure of the Great Leap Forward accompanied by a huge drive to return the urban population to the countryside resulted in significant changes in the spatial economy between 1961 and 1965. The main shift was in emphasis from new to existing industrial centres. Apart from allocative changes the early 1960's were characterized by a considerable reliance on material incentives in both agriculture and industry. This gave rise to what the Chinese referred to as "capitalist tendencies" and "economism" or "revisionism". There was considerable concern, particularly on Mao's part, that these changes would eventually lead to greater income differentiation and class stratification. This marked the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, a revolutionary period which left basic allocative priorities intact. The same objectives in Chinese society were still aimed at but through differing means. It was hoped that instilling a new spirit or work ethic would reduce material incentives and remuneration and replace these with Maoist ideals. Although not disappearing entirely wage differentials were reduced and barriers of rank and function in the government and army broken down.

CONCLUSION: MAOIST IDEOLOGICAL STRUGGLE HAS HAD PROFOUND EFFECTS IN SHIFTING ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES AND RELATED URBANIZATION POLICIES.

Of greatest importance in analyzing the consequences of
changes in urban and economic policies from 1949 to the present is not the actual shifts in development strategies, economic priorities; or methods of implementing economic programs. Each of the various development strategies over time has had lasting effects. Rural industries, small-scale industry and handicrafts introduced during the Great Leap Forward and labour-intensive mass irrigation, flood control, of considerable importance during the First Five-Year Plan, have been retained to varying extents. Thus despite the shifts in strategies and priorities there has been continuity. There has also been perpetual tension between material incentives and ideological persuasion from liberation on.

CONCLUSION: A UNIQUE SOCIALIST MODEL OF DEVELOPMENT IS BEING CREATED AS CHINA RETAINS SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS FROM EACH STAGE OF ITS IDEOLOGICAL STRUGGLE.

In their efforts to create both a socialist and a modern society Chinese planners, policy-makers and other leaders have been faced with a series of questions regarding conflicts between agricultural and industrial investments, rates of economic growth, policies assuring high rates of growth while improving income distribution etc. Similarly the rate of advancement among raw materials, investment goods and consumer goods have necessitated a whole series of additional questions. Economic development principles have in reality been formulated in very broad strategies. Of true significance then has been the flexibility and willingness of Chinese leaders, cadres and the population to
innovate, experiment and learn from their mistakes. One thing is certain about post-liberation China and that is that it has not been a conformist stagnant society. Changes have been many and of great importance. It is the contention of this thesis that as China's policies have shifted from the early 1950's on that it has been the criteria influencing Chinese decision-makers in choosing particular socialist laws of location that is most important (refer to Hamilton in Chapter I). Interaction among decision-makers and vested interests at large; the impact of ideology; and the interaction of decision-makers with the economic system can be identified as strongly influencing economic and urban decision-making. Lack of information precludes discussion of other suggested influences.

Urban and Economic Planning Policies

Urban and economic planning policies reflect China's broad objective aimed at eliminating the difference between city and country. These policies have tended to establish a community of mutual interest and cooperation between peasant and city dweller in much the same way city planning is designed to foster a sense of community and belonging within the urban areas themselves.

From these policies it can be safely stated that no longer are Chinese cities merely consumer entities draining the surrounding countryside of its capital, labour and entrepreneurial attributes. On the other hand it would be totally erroneous to even suggest that the differences between city and countryside
have been completely eradicated, for beyond a doubt the cities are still established as the production centres. But industrial production is no longer confined solely to them. Rural areas have been industrialized, provided in most cases with specific types of industry, and in addition equipped with health and education services which were almost unheard of in years past.

CONCLUSION: EFFECTIVE LINKAGES HAVE BEEN DEVELOPED BETWEEN URBAN AND RURAL AREAS TO FACILITATE THE OUTWARD DIFFUSION OF GROWTH AND WELL-BEING.

As Logan states, "if big-city dominance occurs in a developing country without an improvement in methods of diffusion and without the deliberate building of strong urban-rural structural relationships, there will be a contraction rather than a dispersion of development as national economic growth proceeds". He develops his arguments further. A central issue for any developing nation "is the mechanism whereby the growth generated in the city is diffused outward". The diffusion outward is apparently stronger when economic development is high; this being a result of improved communications, a higher level of education and stronger forces working for the removal of obstacles.

CONCLUSION: STRONG MECHANISMS FOR DISPERSING GROWTH OUTWARD EXIST. THEY ARE:

1) POLICIES OF INDUSTRIAL DECENTRALIZATION AND RURAL INDUSTRIALIZATION.

2) CREATION OF A REVOLUTIONARY CITY STRUCTURE WHICH LINKS THE URBAN AREA ADMINISTRATIVELY AND ECONOMICALLY TO THE IMMEDIATE COUNTRYSIDE.

3) PROGRAMS, SUCH AS "HSIA FANG", TO TAKE KNOWLEDGE AND SERVICES TO RURAL AREAS.
Logan postulates that if it is not possible for developing nations to improve transportation, communication and organizational linkages between urban places and rural areas then it would be desirable to create a "spread of towns of particular sizes to foster the articulation of the developmental impulses generated in the largest center". (Logan, pp. 240-241)

By adopting urban and economic policies which are aimed at minimizing the three differences: differences between urban and rural, between mental and manual labour, and between industry and agriculture Chinese ideology has required industry to serve agriculture and urban centres to serve rural areas. By utilizing the traditional dispersed urban structure such policies have reinforced the relatively uniform distribution of small and medium sized cities throughout the country and allowed them to parallel the increasingly decentralized control of industrial enterprises.

Policies for dispersing growth outward will help foster structural change in Chinese society by ensuring that improved standards in rural areas are not cosmetic, that these areas are not just being allocated nongenerative concomitants of economic growth. This allocation of growth is being accomplished by utilizing the multitude of small and medium size centres of China's traditional urban network.

CONCLUSION: SMALL AND MEDIUM SIZE CENTRES OF CHINA'S TRADITIONAL URBAN NETWORK ARE PLAYING A MAJOR ROLE, AS RECEIVERS OF TECHNOLOGY AND INDUSTRY, IN FOSTERING THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF CHINESE SOCIETY.
Although much of economic planning is still in the hands of the central government this process of decentralization has quickened, particularly since the Cultural Revolution. Accompanied from this period on by increased anti-urbanism and improved programs of urban and regional self-reliance and self-sufficiency, city growth rates have been significantly modified.

An important aspect of this concept of controlled city growth that must be realized is that the Chinese have not declared war on the cities. They are not attempting to control city growth in the sense of doing away with urban areas altogether. Their objective is to prevent cities from becoming excessively large and developing alienating characteristics. They are preventing them from playing the role they played in years past. This objective is being accomplished by changing the nature of their existing cities and life within them and by directing growth, both new growth and established industries, into small and medium sized centres.

CONCLUSION: THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IS MEETING WITH SUCCESS IN CONTROLLING THE GROWTH OF ITS LARGEST CITIES.

By controlling urbanization a nation is in reality controlling and guiding its economic and social development; in China's case, through a strong political framework, albeit a fluctuating one. Such a policy takes time to implement. The economic momentum of the previous society, the demographic forces at work and in particular the change in political philosophy that has been undertaken all require significant
time for their effects to be felt.

Therefore urbanization as a state has not been contained. That is to say, in actual numbers (120-140 million people) there are more Chinese living in urban areas today than ever before in China's history. There are approximately 25 "million cities" now compared to nine in 1953. Urbanization as a process, that is the movement of people from rural areas to urban, has for all intensive purposes been curtailed, particularly since the Cultural Revolution. Being 13 percent urbanized in 1953, approximately 19 percent urbanized in the early 1960s, China now appears to be 16-17 percent urbanized despite the economic and industrial growth which has occurred over the past ten years. Urban growth is continuing but it is being directed into small and medium size cities and into newer cities established away from coastal areas. The largest metropolitan communities such as Shanghai are being made more comfortable for living by redirecting population either into satellite communities or back to the countryside. The population of Shanghai reportedly has changed little since 1949, varying between 5.5 and 6 million. (Sen-dou Chang, 1976, p. 414)

Urban planning in China strongly parallels regional development planning and given the political and economic philosophy of that nation the two in reality are inseparable. Within the city itself the Chinese have stressed community in their planning, so that physically the metropolitan centre resembles a series of communities where a large central core or downtown does not exist or is at least de-emphasized. To
foster this sense of community the Chinese have attempted where possible to structure a neighbourhood around production facilities as well as through the creation of extensive social and political services. Communist propaganda and theory, in fact, has traditionally focused on the work place whereas in other societies, particularly the Western world, the focus has been on the community at large.

Chinese society is well structured and well organized. However, there is still a remarkable decentralization of activity, with considerable local autonomy for economic institutions and various levels of community organization. Centralizing factors most certainly exist in economic planning. In their planning the Chinese start from the assumption that without a central and over-all national plan it would be impossible to develop the economy to serve the interests of all the people. The byword is centralized planning, decentralized control. The internal structure of the Chinese city reflects that decentralized control. In fact, living in a Chinese neighbourhood means constant involvement in the political, social and economic life of that neighbourhood. Achieving the above has required that devolution of political power and decentralization of national investment and production be firmly established in Chinese policy. (Kirby, p. 143)

From the preceding statements it can be concluded that the central government has control over national economic planning, developmental planning, but local areas or institutions have significant control over their own affairs and problems, adaptive planning.
CONCLUSION: THE TWO BASIC PRINCIPLES OF CENTRALISM AND MASS PARTICIPATION ARE THE HEART OF URBAN AND ECONOMIC PLANNING.

One aspect of planning that has not been discussed at great lengths, but which should nonetheless be mentioned, is that of the role of the planner. The people are not willing to see planning for a socialist society divided into bureaucratic parts. They want to see planning, particularly at the local level, take into consideration local complexities and thus fuse industry and agriculture, mental and manual labour, and city and countryside.

The Cultural Revolution certainly strengthened this outlook and resulted in important changes in the role the planner as "technician" or "expert" played. In essence bureaucracies and technical experts have been limited or de-emphasized while the "bottom up" and "top down" process is enjoying a very healthy life. The Chinese people have shown an amazing ability to struggle and deal with planning problems through a political framework as opposed to leaving planning in the hands of the experts.

Lessons To Be Learned And Further Investigation

The relevance of the Chinese model is not in being a prototype of urban and economic development that can be duplicated in other nations, whether they be developed or Third World. Its value rests in the context of the questions it raises about the structure and relationship of the city to
social and economic development processes. The Maoist model is obviously not a perfected one. The Chinese do not profess it to be so. But it is a design that offers great promise as an alternative approach at a time when the quality of life in many countries of the world is being questioned. It is up to us to study and learn from the Chinese experience.

CONCLUSION: LESSONS TO BE LEARNED FROM CHINA'S EXPERIENCE IN URBAN AND ECONOMIC PLANNING ARE GENERIC IN NATURE. FOR SOME PEOPLES AN ALTERNATIVE SOCIETY IS OFFERED.

In the preceding discussion the onus has been placed on the individual to study the Chinese experience and learn from it. If this is to be a possibility then much more knowledge of the People's Republic will have to be made known to us. Reference has been made already to serious limitations of statistical information and to the actual planning process in the cities themselves. The relation of the urban structure to the corresponding political units and the processes and mechanisms between these organizations is only lightly discussed in the literature. The specific areas of housing and urban transportation also require extensive investigation.
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GLOSSARY

Cadre  Used in reference to a full-time functionary of the Party or the government. Also used to designate anyone exercising leadership in an ordinary political or working situation.

Centre  Party and state agencies in Peking.

Great Leap Forward  Initiated by Mao in 1958 - a plan to utilize China's vast manpower to effect improvement in industry and agriculture without foreign help. Cooperatives were merged into people's communes. All agricultural resources were mobilized, and new techniques such as early planting were employed. Industry was largely decentralized, and small-scale production at the family and village level was encouraged. Natural disasters and serious crop failures in 1959, 1960, and 1961 led to the failure of the Great Leap and a temporary lessening of Mao's direct leadership.

Hsiafang  Periodically large numbers of workers are sent down from the cities to the countryside. Each year a large number of urban youth are sent to the countryside upon graduation from middle school. Hsiafang serves as one of the means through which the barriers between urban and rural labour on the one hand and mental and manual on the other are to be removed.

Hsianq  Lowest-level rural civil division, replaced during the Great Leap Forward by the commune. The commune became the basic rural political unit below the hsien.

Hsien  Hsien-level municipalities are the lowest level of official cities and are under the administration of prefectural authorities with a status equivalent to a county. They are the contact centres of modern technology and inter-technology, and serve as the catalyst for modernization and transformation in the rural areas. A non-urban hsien is a county-size rural unit.

Mass Line  This term designates the type of leadership expected of cadres dating back to the 1930s. They are to inquire among the masses for their ideas and desires, translate these into specific policy proposals and take those back to the people to be put into practice, and to be improved upon depending upon the experience of the practice. The principle is summed up in the slogan "From the masses, to the masses".

Neighbourhood Committee  Largely voluntary organizations
composed of local people numbering between 2,500 and 12,000 population. It has no specified administrative function. The committee's tasks are to organize people for study, to conduct educational propaganda, to organize work in the home, to organize the neighbourhood on questions of hygiene and to organize local cultural productions.

**Prefecture** Prefecture-level municipalities are under the control of provinces or autonomous regions. They serve as the regional cores of a decentralized urban system and are aggregates of modern sectors of the national economy. They have the status of a prefecture. Prefectures are an intermediate level of administration between provinces and hsien and include several hsien under their supervision.

**Revolutionary Committee** A representative body of workers or members of a particular organization that arose during the Cultural Revolution as its leading policy-making and supervisory body. They are currently the leadership bodies of all social units of Chinese society from communes to provinces.

**Shih** Or municipality, defined as a settlement with a population of 100,000 or more.

**Socialist Courtyard** A new lower level of urban government still in the experimental stage. The "socialist courtyard" or "multi-story building management committee", which encompasses between 100 and 200 people, undertakes activities to organize courtyard residents for study and criticism, promote extra-curricular education for youths and teenagers, improve environmental hygiene and establish new socialist ideas and culture.

**Street Committee** The smallest unit of state administration, encompassing between 50,000 and 100,000 people. It oversees factories, clinics, study groups and schools. It also handles inter-personal disputes. It is responsible for carrying out the policies of the government.

**Treaty Ports** After the Opium War of 1838-42, five cities were designated treaty ports, where the Western powers were allowed to set up trading posts and live under the provisions of the Nanking treaty, which provided immunity from Chinese law. As Western pressure increased, the number of these ports expanded into the scores. At the larger ones, such as Shanghai, Tientsin, and Hankow, the powers were granted territorial concessions, which, in effect, were small colonies totally under the rule of the various Western nations.