LLOYD GEORGE AND THE TURKISH QUESTION: AN EXAMINATION OF
LLOYD GEORGE'S TURKISH POLICY, 1918-1922

by

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ABSTRACT

The events in Turkey in the years 1918 to 1922 are covered by a variety of works. Lloyd George's part in these events has received some attention, but most writers either refer to his role only briefly as part of a general study of the post-war Middle East or focus on a small part of the four year period. No comprehensive study of Lloyd George's Turkish policy has yet been written.

This thesis examines the motivations behind and the execution of Lloyd George's post-First World War Turkish policy. The main sources for this study have been the private papers of government ministers and functionaries, published government documents and various books and articles. A chronological structure has been employed.

By the end of the First World War, the Ottoman Empire and Imperial Russia no longer existed. This required a revision of traditional British policies for the Eastern Mediterranean. The modification in British policy and the course of the war are outlined in Chapter Two, as is Lloyd George's part in forming that policy. The origins of his attitude towards Greece and Turkey are also examined here.
The course of events in post-war Turkey may be divided into four distinct periods. The first period, from the signing of the Mudros Armistice on 30 October 1918 to the Greek landings at Smyrna on 19 May 1919, is covered in Chapter III. The negotiations which led to the Treaty of Sèvres—negotiations in which Lloyd George played so important a role—are examined in the fourth chapter. Chapter Five explores the period from August 1920 to September 1922. During this time, Lloyd George's Turkish policy was to pass from the peak of success at Sèvres to total ruin, with the defeat of the Greeks by the Turkish Nationalists. The final débâcle—the confrontation between the Turkish Nationalists and the British garrison at Chanak and its effects on Lloyd George's career are examined in Chapter VI.

In the final chapter an attempt is made to determine the foundations and manner of executing Lloyd George's Turkish policy.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

At 5.00 p.m. on 19 October 1922, Lloyd George resigned as Prime Minister of Great Britain, ending one of the most controversial premierships in British history. The Lloyd George Coalition of Liberals and Conservatives had endured internal dissension and many crises both during the last two years of the First World War and the first four years of peace. One of these crises, however, convinced Conservatives that they would be a part of Lloyd George's government no longer. On 19 October 1922, by a vote of 187 to 87, they decided to withdraw their support from Lloyd George's coalition. The Prime Minister had little alternative but to resign.

The crisis which occasioned the Conservatives' decision has become known as the Chanak Affair. In late September of 1922, Lloyd George committed a small British force to holding a virtually indefensible piece of Turkish territory against a much larger force of Turkish nationalists. This he did with the support of only a small number of his colleagues and in the face of opposition from within his government, from the British press and from Britain's former allies. The crisis passed and
the British government agreed to most of the nationalists' demands, but the apparent rashness and belligerence of the Prime Minister during the crisis gave the Conservative party the impetus it needed to detach itself from Lloyd George.

The Chanak Affair not only brought about Lloyd George's downfall; it signified the end, or at least the beginning of the end, of the persistent problem of control of the Straits, the waterway between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. This issue and the question of control of the other possessions of the moribund Ottoman Empire had been known as the Eastern Question. Throughout the nineteenth century this had been the cause of much tension, particularly between Britain, France and Russia. Though rivals, the interests of Britain and France had often forced them into partnership to face the common threat of Russian designs on the Straits and the city of Constantinople.

The problem persisted into the twentieth century, its most crucial period being the four years immediately succeeding the First World War. By this time, the Eastern Question had been radically changed by the elimination of two of its principal components, the Ottoman Empire itself and Tsarist Russia, but the situation still defied easy solution. The victorious allies, led by Great Britain, attempted to impose the severest conditions on the defeated Turks, including a permanent occupation of the area around the Straits and of much of Asia Minor. It was
intended that this would be accomplished with the compliance of a powerless figurehead Sultan in Constantinople. The very severity of these conditions, however, prevented their implementation and started a sequence of events which was to see the rise of a vigorous Turkish nationalist movement, the eventual defection of Italy and France from what was to become an increasingly British policy, and the isolation of Great Britain and her client, Greece. The arrangement made at Chanak resulted in the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923 which gave a rejuvenated Turkey control of the Straits, subject to international supervision. The Montreux Convention of 1936 gave Turkey complete control.

During the years 1918-1922, in the face of the gradual estrangement of France and Italy, it was primarily British policy which shaped events in Turkey. This policy was formulated and implemented mainly by the Prime Minister, often over the strident objections of his cabinet colleagues and other policy-making groups within the government. In the light of the unfortunate consequences of Lloyd George's policy, the question as to why he pursued it is an interesting one. To date, it has not attracted the attention which it seems to justify. The matter has not escaped attention entirely, but for a number of reasons the studies at present available do not treat the matter as completely as might be hoped. The major works which do cover the events are either obsolete,—such as Harry N.
Howard's *The Partition of Turkey*¹--deal with them as only one aspect of the post-war Middle Eastern situation,--such as *Mudros to Lausanne*, by Briton Cooper Busch²--treat only a part of the period from 1918 to 1922,--as does Paul C. Helmreich in his book *From Paris to Sevres*³--or cover only one aspect of the whole issue--as does Michael Llewellyn Smith's *Ionian Vision*.⁴

Several good articles on the topic have been published in recent years, including A.L. MacFie's "The British Decision Regarding the Future of Constantinople"⁵ and A.E. Montgomery's "Lloyd George and the Greek Question."⁶ Yet, either because they deal with only one aspect of the question or simply because of the limitations of space, they offer no comprehensive overview of Lloyd George's Turkish policy throughout the whole four year period.

It is therefore the purpose of this thesis to provide a comprehensive study of David Lloyd George's Turkish policy from the time of the armistice at Mudros in 1918 to the Chanak crisis of 1922. There are two fundamental issues to be faced. The first concerns the formulation of the policy, the second its execution.

Regarding the formulation of the policy, it must be determined where and when Lloyd George developed his anti-Turkish frame of mind. He might well, in his younger days, have absorbed some of the Turco-phobia of the late nineteenth
century and never relinquished it. Some aspects of Turkish behaviour during the war, such as the Armenian massacres, would have done little to allay such sentiments. Or it might have been the result of Turkey's participation in the war, for this frustrated Lloyd George's earnest desire to bring the conflict to an early close. Lloyd George's hatred of the Turks stands in contrast to his affection for the Turks' traditional enemies, the Greeks. These opposing attitudes might have been closely related, one having been born out of the other, or they might have been coincidental; his patronage of Greece was not altogether altruistic, for he saw her as a future guardian of British sea routes through the Mediterranean.

The second issue is the execution of the policy. Although Lloyd George was never completely without support for his Turkish policy, he met with strong and consistent opposition to it throughout the four years from 1918 to 1922. Despite this, and the policy's increasing impossibility of success, the Prime Minister was resolute. Within the government, much of the opposition came from the Foreign and War Offices. It is possible that part of the reason for his persistence was that his habitual distrust of the 'experts' of these departments led him to believe that the opposite of what they recommended would be the best course to follow. Another consideration is the amount of time which he was able to devote to the whole question.
During this time, he had to deal with many national and international crises, most of which must have seemed far more important than what was happening in far-off Turkey. It could be that he formulated his policy towards Turkey at the outset and during the fairly well-spaced crises of the period, he merely reverted to his original ideas without either troubling or being able to take the time to devise a new strategy. This suggestion does not seem altogether unlikely given Lloyd George's ignorance on some of the finer points of the matter. At a meeting with the Italian delegates at the Paris Peace Conference, he used a contour map in the mistaken assumption that the different colours represented ethnological distribution.

These are some of the explanations for Lloyd George's post-war Turkish policy. They are as diverse as they are numerous. It is hoped that an investigation of the events will determine what the real foundations of the policy were. In order to comprehend the events of 1918 to 1922, however, it is first necessary to gain some appreciation of the situation in Turkey immediately before and during the war, and the development of British attitudes to Turkey during that time.
CHAPTER II

TURKEY BEFORE 1918

To foil Russia's designs on the Straits and Constantinople had been a common British and French policy throughout the nineteenth century, the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire being the core of that policy. Russia's motivations for her expansionism had been a mixture of religion, strategy and commerce. Constantinople was the cultural and historic home of the Eastern Orthodox Church, and as the Church's importance as one of the pillars of decaying Tsardom grew, so did Russia's ambition to possess Constantinople. Strategically, guaranteed freedom of passage through the Straits—a freedom that only Russian domination would ensure—would have made Russia a great Mediterranean naval power. From a commercial point of view, passage through the Straits was vital to Russia's growing merchant fleet.¹

For her part, Britain was forever afraid of Russian domination of the waterway. A strong Russian naval force in the eastern Mediterranean would have upset the balance of power in an area which was crucial to British imperial communications, endangering access to the Suez Canal, the single most important
and vulnerable part of the routes to India and Australasia. Britain's concern over Russian designs on the Ottoman Empire were heightened by the fact that by the first decade of the twentieth century, she had considerable commercial interests there.¹

France's interests, though similar to those of Great Britain, differed in emphasis. Like Britain, she feared the naval consequences of Russia's ambitions, but her main concerns were financial. By the beginning of the First World War, she had built up large investments in Turkey.² These investments, like those of the British, were made all the more lucrative by a system of financial and legal concessions known as the Capitulations. These rights guaranteed Europeans legal extraterritoriality and exemption from Ottoman taxes.

As well as the interests of these powers, two other factors in pre-war Turkey deserve consideration. The first was the aftermath of the 'Young Turk' revolution of 1908. A group of army officers calling themselves the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) had taken power in Turkey, their aims being a rationalisation of the inefficient government of Sultan Abdul Hamid and a greater degree of tolerance for the non-Turkish subjects of the Ottoman Empire. By 1914, there was cause for disappointment on both these counts,³ but the main cause of worry in Britain and France was the pro-German attitude of some of the Committee's members. The second factor was the in-
crease of German influence within the Ottoman Empire, to some extent a result of the CUP's encouragement, but which had been growing for over a decade before 1908.5

This was the background to the events which brought Turkey into the First World War on the side of the Central Powers, an event which was to have such tragic consequences for the Entente.6 In the light of the disastrous results of Turkey's belligerence, it has been the tendency of historians to portray British actions, particularly between the beginning of the war in Europe and the declarations of war on Turkey early in November 1914, as a compound of ineptitude and stupidity. Indeed, the main events do make it difficult to explain otherwise Britain's attitude towards a once friendly state whose neutrality would have greatly helped Britain's war effort.7

On 20 July 1914, Winston Churchill, as First Lord of the Admiralty, seized two Turkish warships in Newcastle on Tyne. These ships had been built for the Turkish government and had already been paid for. The seizure, the arrogant explanation and the lack of compensation for it, infuriated the Turks and provided the Germans with an excellent chance to buy Turkish goodwill. They replaced the two warships taken by Britain with two of their own, the Goeben and the Breslau.
To woo the Turks further, Berlin offered abolition of the humiliating Capitulations and further military assistance. The pro-German war faction in the Turkish cabinet, led by Enver Bey, was given every assistance to increase its influence. Britain and France did little to reverse the process and the war party justified Berlin's patronage by sailing the Goeben and the Breslau into the Black Sea on 28 October 1914. There they bombarded Russian naval bases at Odessa and Novorossisk, provoking a Russian declaration of war which came on 1 November. Britain and France followed suit a few days later.

However, in late 1914, Turkey's entry into the war on the side of the Central Powers might not have appeared so unfortunate for the Entente as it did later. With Turkey and Germany defeated, the tiresome Eastern Question might be settled once and for all. Britain might gain undisputed possession of the Mesopotamian oilfields; the anomaly of de facto British possession of certain Ottoman territories—such as Egypt—could be resolved and the issue of the Straits and Constantinople could be amicably settled among the victors. From this point of view, even the manner of Turkey's entry into the war was advantageous; it was Turkey who had struck the first blow, allowing the Entente to appear the injured party, something which both the British and the French considered important in their relations with the millions of Moslems in their dominions.
There are signs that for some years before the war, the traditional British policy of shoring up the Ottoman Empire was being questioned. As far back as 1908, the Committee of Imperial Defence had produced a report stating that if this policy were abandoned, the results would not be as drastic as feared.\textsuperscript{10} By 1914, the traditional policy still had a large number of proponents,\textsuperscript{11} but from the outset of the war, there was a distinct difference between British war aims regarding the Ottoman Empire and those regarding the other Central Powers.

In Europe, during the first two years of the war, the Asquith government seems to have looked no further than the defeat of Germany and the restoration of Belgium.\textsuperscript{12} This was not the case for Turkey. Even before she entered the war, the idea that she would pay dearly for taking the side of the Central Powers had already taken root. On 20 October, Asquith conveyed to King George V a cabinet decision that Britain must finally abandon the policy of Ottoman integrity in Europe and Asia.\textsuperscript{13} Only a few days after the declaration of war on Turkey, Asquith stated in his Guildhall speech, "It is the Ottoman Empire and not we who have rung the death knell of Ottoman dominion, not only in Europe but in Asia."\textsuperscript{14}

Given the relatively early dates of these statements, it is questionable whether they are to be regarded as policy or just speculation. And though these aims for the most part
were to be realised, there were, throughout the war, several bodies of opinion which were opposed to meddling with Ottoman integrity. The two most prominent groups were the War Office and the India Office. The War Office was unwilling to consider invasions of Ottoman territory mainly because of the strain on manpower which such adventures would incur. The India Office's opposition was born of the fear that any interference with the Ottoman Empire and particularly any meddling with the status of Constantinople as the seat of the Caliph of Islam would have a disturbing effect on the millions of Moslems within the British Empire.¹⁵

Recommendations for moderation came from other directions. In the first two months of the war, the Cabinet established a committee to determine the best disposition of Ottoman lands consistent with British imperial interests.¹⁶ This Committee, known as the de Bunsen Committee after its chairman, produced its report in June 1915. The report anticipated that most of the non-Turkish areas of the Ottoman Empire would be stripped away and contemplated 'an inevitable increase of [British] imperial responsibility,' particularly with regard to the security of the Persian Gulf.¹⁷

Yet while the de Bunsen Committee envisaged the destruction of the Ottoman Empire, it recommended a sovereign Turkish kingdom in Anatolia. This might have been suggested out of altruism or in the hope that such a state would provide a useful counterpoise to Russian power, but whatever the reason,
the recommendations of the Committee regarding Turkish Asia Minor were to be set aside. The course of the war had already made these counsels of moderation unacceptable.

Within a short time after the declaration of war on Turkey, various members of the British government were debating how the situation could be turned to advantage. One opportunity which Turkey's belligerence afforded was a strategic one. Lloyd George for one opposed the War Office contention that the only place to win the war was in France. He was all for "knocking the props" from under Germany, and Turkey was one of the props he had in mind. The idea of inflicting a crushing military defeat on the Turks gave him intense pleasure. C.P. Scott has recorded that on 14 November 1914, Lloyd George remarked that he was "not strongly anti-German [but that] he should have much greater pleasure in smashing Turkey than in smashing Germany." In the following March, he would still much rather have crushed the Turks than the Germans.

Another advantage was that offers of Turkish lands could be made to gain new allies and to keep old ones enthusiastic. While early dreams of exploiting the strategic advantage soon foundered on the beaches of Gallipoli and in the Mesopotamian deserts, the practice of offering bits and pieces of the Ottoman Empire to whomever it was thought expedient was soon put into effect. Between April 1915 and the end of the war, Britain and
France were to promise much of the Ottoman domains to other nations and groups; in the process they snared themselves in a network of overlapping and contradictory secret agreements and treaties. The list of these arrangements is a long one. It includes the Hussein-McMahon correspondence between Britain and the Arab nationalists; formal recognition of Russia's right to the Straits and Constantinople (April 1915); the Treaty of London by which Italy was induced to enter the war (April 1915); the Sykes-Picot Agreement which divided certain areas in the Levant between Britain and France (May 1916); the Treaty of Saint Jean de Maurienne in which Italian rights were clarified (August 1917); and the Balfour Declaration whereby the British government promised a national home for the Jewish people (May 1917).  

All of these agreements affected British policy towards Turkey. The Hussein-McMahon correspondence had a great effect on Britain's attempts to formulate a strategic plan for the area; it also complicated and embittered negotiations for a post-war settlement of the Middle East between Britain and France. This bitterness and suspicion on the part of France was to have a profound effect on the settlement of post-war Turkey. Another agreement, the Balfour Declaration, was to have a great effect on the future of the Middle East. At the time, however, it did not have much effect upon the post-war settlement of Turkey.
It was the other agreements which were to have the major impact. These agreements represented the compromise of former British and French policies and were to preclude all hope of an easy Turkish settlement at the war's end.

The first concession was the most indicative of Britain's abandonment of her traditional Turkish policy. Afraid that Russia might leave the war, the British and French governments granted Russia not only the Straits and Constantinople, but the islands of Tenedos and Imbros, at the entrance to the Dardanelles, as well.\textsuperscript{24} \textit{Quid pro quos} were extracted from the Russians; British and French interests were not to be compromised, Russia recognised British rights in Egypt and an extension of her influence in Persia, and France was to receive support for her claims in the Rhineland. But these concessions were unimportant compared to the immense significance of Russian ownership of the Straits and Constantinople.

Hard on the heels of the agreement with Petrograd came the Treaty of London, which was not designed to keep an existing ally, but to recruit a new one. The negotiations preceded the Treaty of London which brought Italy into the war were closely connected to those leading to the Straits agreement with Russia as the Turkish situation did play a significant part in the dealings.

Despite her previous treaty with the Central Powers, Italy had demurred from entering the war on their side, and in
the early stages of the war she seemed undecided as to whether neutrality was the best course, or, if not, which of the two camps she should join.\\footnote{25}

Italian entry into the war was not to prove straightforward. Britain was the main protagonist for Italian entry, as Grey believed that the purpose of the allies should be to finish the war as quickly as possible and that an Italian alliance would facilitate this. An additional advantage would be that an Italian presence in Asia Minor would help balance French influence there.\\footnote{26}

The ambitions of France and Russia were stumbling blocks to a swift agreement, and negotiations lasted from February to April 1915. In the end, France's fear of the worsening situation on the Western Front led her to agree to Italy as an ally, and unwillingness to endanger the Straits negotiations caused the Russians to drop their objections. On 26 April, the Treaty of London was signed. Among other things, it gave Italy the Turkish vilayets (provinces) of Smyrna and Aidin. Italy declared war against the Central Powers on 26 May 1915.

Although Greece was not to enter the war until 1917, she too was offered a substantial portion of Asia Minor to bring her into the war. In January 1915, Grey sent a note to Athens to this effect. There is strong evidence to suggest that had
this offer been made earlier it might have been accepted, but in January 1915 it was not. Despite enthusiastic support by Elutherios Venizelos, the Greek Prime Minister, it was rejected by King Constantine, who contended that Greece was exhausted by the two recent Balkan wars. Needless to say, the Allies did not agree. For the first, but not the last time, Greek politics had affected the war and the post-war settlement.

The last of the agreements made before Lloyd George came to the premiership was the Sykes-Picot Agreement, which arose as a result of the agreements with Italy and Russia. The Straits Agreement, if realised, would radically alter the European balance of power, and it followed that Britain and France should wish to increase their holdings to off-set the Russian gains. To do this, it was necessary that the two nations reach an agreement over the distribution of the remainder of the Ottoman Empire. On the face of it, arriving at such an agreement should not prove too difficult since the interests of Britain and France lay largely in different areas. Britain was predominantly interested in the Persian Gulf, parts of Mesopotamia, and the security of Egypt and the Suez Canal. France had long-standing ties with the coast of the eastern Mediterranean; her association could be traced as far back as the Crusades.
Negotiations began in late 1915 between Sir Mark Sykes—a Member of Parliament and the Cabinet Secretariat—and George Picot—an ex-French Consul-General in Beirut—and were supplemented from time to time by the assistance of Grey and Cambon. Tentative agreement was reached in January 1916. The next few months were largely taken up meeting Russian objections to the plan. Agreement was reached among all three powers in an exchange of letters in April and May 1916. Under the terms of the agreement, France would have exclusive jurisdiction in a 'Blue' zone which included Cilicia and Syria as far south as Acre and paramount influence in a region east of the Blue zone to a point beyond Mosul, known as 'Area A'. Britain's 'Red' zone of exclusive possession was in southern Mesopotamia, her area of paramount influence, area B, being to the south and east of the French area A. Haifa and Acre were to go to Britain, the area to the south being under international administration (see map). Russia was to gain Trebizond, Armenia and Kurdistan.

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This was the situation when Lloyd George became Prime Minister in December 1916. Exactly when he had begun to dislike the Turks is not exactly known. During the Balkan War of 1912, he had strongly supported the Bulgarians and had delighted in the defeats inflicted upon the Turks. Prior to that, however, there is no record of his feelings on Turkey and we are left with con-
jecture. Perhaps during his youth he had absorbed some of the Turco-phobia prevalent in Britain in the late nineteenth century. Such speculation is not completely without foundation; Gladstone's thundering denunciations of 1876 are echoed by some of Lloyd George's own pronouncements over four decades later.

It was also in 1912 that he indicated a strong affection for Greece. John Stavridi, the then Greek Consul General in London has recorded several conversations with Lloyd George in which Lloyd George not only anticipated expulsion of the Turks from Europe but suggested that Greece pursue her territorial ambitions on the Ottoman Empire. On 12 December 1912, he met Venizelos for the first time. Venizelos was in London for naval discussions and he and Lloyd George established a long-lasting friendship.

We have seen how Lloyd George indicated his antipathy towards the Turks in the early months of the war. His feelings can hardly have been changed by the events of the next two years. The closure of the Straits was to be a great impediment to the Russian war effort and the British campaigns in Mesopotamia and at Gallipoli required forces which might have been used more effectively elsewhere. The defeat at Gallipoli can have done little to strengthen his arguments for a second front. It is not surprising that on more than one occasion in his first two months as Prime Minister he demanded the break-up of Turkey.
At the close of 1916 he was not alone in his views. It was general Cabinet opinion that no separate peace be negotiated with Turkey. Of the more prominent members of the Cabinet, Balfour, Curzon, Chamberlain and sometimes Montagu favoured a fight to the finish. A joint Allied reply to President Wilson's proposals, issued on 10 January 1917, contained a clause requiring 'the setting free of the populations subject to the bloody tyranny of the Turks, and the turning out of Europe of the Ottoman Empire as decidedly foreign to western civilisation.'

However, it was not long before this near unanimity began to dissolve. There were a number of reasons for this, the two main ones being the changing conditions of the war and the growing conviction that, when the end came, Britain should stand to gain by the changed situation. To deal with the latter first, in the different theatres of the war, different interests were predominant. In the Turkish theatre, the main objective was the creation of a stable environment in which imperial communications would be secure. These imperial considerations must have influenced Lloyd George in his formulation of a Turkish policy.

Lloyd George's premiership was one of the most controversial in British history. His approach to and methods of government have raised questions which are still unresolved. His apparent subordination of the regular channels of government and his creation of his own semi-official administrative bodies
have led a good number of historians to conclude Lloyd George concentrated an unprecedented amount of executive power in the office of the premier. Others maintain that this was not the case. They point to his precarious position in the Commons and suggest that he was a captive of the Conservatives in his coalition, the conclusion being that he was compelled in most cases to carry out their wishes.

The complexities of this debate fall beyond the scope of this study, for in either case, he would have been subject in his decision-making to considerations of imperial security. If he did largely run the government through his secretariats, he would have been subject to the persuasion of Philip Kerr, W. Astor and Lionel Curtis in his Personal Secretariat and Maurice Hankey, L.S. Amery and Mark Sykes in his Cabinet Secretariat. All of these figures were imperialists. On the other hand, if he were a prisoner of the Conservatives, then he would have been compelled to carry out their imperial policy.

This does not take into consideration any imperialist persuasions which the Prime Minister might have had of his own. He was long associated with the doctrines of Social Imperialism, that brand of the doctrine which advocated an invigoration of government and the hope that imperialism would allay the dangers of domestic strife.
For both the members of the War Cabinet and the Secretariats, imperial strategy was of great importance in the eastern Mediterranean. The principle was that the sea routes to the East and the land bridge from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf be secure. Regarding the Turkish homeland, however, the idea does not seem to have been translated into any identifiable policy. During the last two years of the war, there seems to have been little overall agreement on the future of Turkey. What ideas the British government had on Turkey seem to have ranged from complete subjugation by the Allies to a negotiated peace in which the Turkish part of the Ottoman Empire would remain intact.

This indecision was partly a result of the agreements made in the first two years of the war. There was considerable activity in 1917 over the legacy of these agreements. The Treaty of London, was, at Italian insistence, modified in the abortive Treaty of Saint Jean de Maurienne. In the negotiations preceding this second treaty, Lloyd George confirmed the cession of Smyrna and Adalia to Italy. This he did without consulting the Foreign Office, which reacted furiously because of the large amount of British investment there. Yet even before these negotiations had begun, events occurred in the first four months of 1917 which divided the Cabinet on its hard attitude towards Turkey. The event which began this process was Russia's virtual
withdrawal from the war. This raised again the question of the future of Constantinople. At least one member of the government began to suggest that the major obstacle to peace with Turkey had been removed. By April 1917, Lord Milner was arguing for a negotiated peace with Turkey. In this he was supported by the General Staff, to whom a settlement with the Turks had never been the anathema it had been to some of the politicians. Robertson suggested that Russia's withdrawal '... would shut out the Constantinople obstacle which has done more than anything to keep the Turks in the field.'

The notion gained currency as it was realised that the release of German troops from the Eastern Front would press the Entente even harder. Attempts were made by Lloyd George and Robert Cecil, the Minister of Blockade, to reduce the concessions given to Italy in Asia Minor. By the summer of 1917, the notion of a separate peace with the Turks had strengthened to the extent that serious efforts were made to come to terms. Contact was made through various avenues.

But the Cabinet swayed this way and that, seemingly unable to reach a firm decision. In September, Lloyd George and the Cabinet favoured peace with Turkey. Only a month later, the consensus was that the Turks be given as hard a knock as possible. Later in the fall, the situation changed again. Hopes of an agreement with Austria faded and the British govern-
ment, its hand strengthened by Allenby's success in Palestine, once again became enthusiastic over a negotiated Turkish peace. One thing which had influenced the change was that the Italian rout at Caporetto had made the government distinctly less sympathetic to Italy's claims in Asia Minor.

Lloyd George went so far as to declare publicly that the Bolshevik Revolution had precluded all possibility of Turkey's losing her capital and that a separate peace was now possible. He reiterated this in a speech to the Commons on 20 December. Highly secret talks between Turkish agents and Philip Kerr took place in Switzerland. At the same time, Lloyd George attempted what would have been, if successful, one of the most bizarre and characteristic coups of his career. Through the dubious intermediary of Sir Basil Zaharoff, he offered Enver Pasha, the leader of the CUP, ten million dollars as a bribe to take Turkey out of the war. The offer was refused.

In the early part of the new year, British interest in a Turkish peace waned again as hopes of a separate Austrian peace rose. The Turks' attitude hardened too, because the Russian collapse had afforded a golden opportunity for expansion into the Caucasus. This area was inhabited by peoples of Turkish stock and the chance could not be ignored by the pan-Turanian elements in the CUP. Furthermore, optimism over the impending German offensive in the west gave the Turks a little more hope in the outcome of the war.
By the spring of 1918, the British government had finally abandoned the idea of peace with the Turks.\textsuperscript{57} Turkish domination of Russian Armenia would no doubt mean further massacres and any such eastward expansion would menace the security of northern India.\textsuperscript{58} At one point Lloyd George did waver; he contemplated making the same offer to Turkey as he had thought of making to Germany; a free hand in the east in return for peace in the west. The suggestion was given some support by Balfour, but the strident objections of Curzon put a stop to any further discussion of the matter.\textsuperscript{59}

For most of the rest of the war, there was little support for more negotiation.\textsuperscript{60} In late September the sudden collapse of Bulgaria cut Turkey off from any support which the other Central Powers might have been able to give her. Within the British government, debate began immediately as to what should be done. There was no agreement on either the terms to be offered or whether peace should be embodied in a treaty or an armistice. An armistice was finally decided upon and although Turkey was not necessarily to be deprived of Constantinople, control of the Straits would rest in other hands.\textsuperscript{61} Lloyd George determined that Britain should be in a pre-eminent position in the Middle East at the expense of France and the other allies. He regarded the Sykes-Picot Agreement as a dead letter, arguing that the British had borne the brunt of the fighting against Turkey and
that British influence should therefore remain ascendant. Balfour did not agree, but in the end, Lloyd George had his way.  

The Prime Minister's attitude is perhaps understandable, for British objectives had remained basically unchanged since the time of the de Bunsen Committee's report three years before: the security of land and sea routes in the eastern Mediterranean and the freedom of action in Mesopotamia which was required by the growing importance of the oil deposits there. What had changed in the past three years was that the imagined position from which these aims were to be realised bore little resemblance to the actual situation at the war's end, when Britain found herself in an immeasurably strong position in the Middle East. British forces occupied not only those areas which Britain desired, but also most of the region which France claimed. This last was to be useful in the post-war negotiations with France, but in late September of 1918, the French considered Britain to be acting in an arrogant, high handed and devious manner.

When Turkish emissaries arrived at the British naval base at Mudros, the French were excluded from the negotiations. Despite Clemenceau's bitter objections, the talks were conducted between the Turks and the British, and on 30 October Admiral Gough Calthorpe signed the Armistice. The Armistice contained twenty-five clauses, the most important of which required complete demobilisation of the Ottoman armies save for a small force to
maintain law and order, the right of the Allies to occupy any strategic point, the opening of the Straits and secure Allied access to the Black Sea. Hostilities were to cease at noon, 31 October 1918. Turkey was out of the war.
CHAPTER III

MUDROS TO SMYRNA

May 19, Monday.

Most of the Cabinet have come over from London to discuss the future of Turkey. I am summoned to the Rue Nitot, but not asked to attend the meeting. I sit outside, but as there is only a glass partition between me and the Cabinet I hear what they say. Curzon presses for ejection of Turkey from Europe, and accepts Greek zone at Smyrna although with deep regret. Montagu and Milner are all against disturbing the Turk still further. Winston wants to leave him as he is but to give America the mandate over Constantinople and the Straits, with a zone extending as far as Trebizond. A.J.B. wants Constantinople under an American mandate, Smyrna to Greece and the rest of Turkey as an independent kingdom, supervised by foreign 'advisers.' Li.G is non-committal. No decision come to in so far as, through the glass darkly, I can ascertain.


Harold Nicolson's observations of the meeting of several of the members of the British cabinet on May 19, 1919, show how undecided the cabinet was over a settlement with Turkey, and this almost seven months after the signing of the Mudros Armistice. That no firm consensus had emerged during this time indicates not only the indecision in the cabinet, but also the complexity of the whole Turkish issue.
The terms of the Mudros Armistice and the exclusion of France from the attendant negotiations had been aimed at providing a situation favourable to British interests in the eastern Mediterranean. The next step was to arrange a peace settlement which would establish supremacy on a permanent basis; choosing the means to this end was to prove a difficult and divisive task. With the demise of the Ottoman Empire, Britain had lost her traditional means of indirect control over the Straits and the land route from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf. It was imperative that some other means of control be secured. But this radical change in the Levant did not mean that British policymakers could start with a clean slate. For one thing, the shift in the European balance of power in France's favour had made her rivalry in the East a greater menace than before. There were also the wartime agreements to be taken into account and the limitations on a settlement which might result from Wilson's Fourteen points.

With these factors in mind, any approach to the Turkish question seemed to confront a twofold problem: the disposition of Constantinople and Thrace and the administration of the Straits. One solution would be British possession of the area, but to this France would never have agreed, nor, in fact, would have many within the British government. Alternative solutions for Constantinople and Thrace were leaving the Turks in full possession,
internationalising the city and giving Thrace to Bulgaria and Greece, or driving the Turks out of Europe altogether. As for the administration of the Straits, the possibilities included vesting their control in one of the other powers by way of mandate, an international commission, or placing the area in the trust of a small nation, preferably one which was responsive to British interests.

The end of the European war and preparation for the general election occupied Lloyd George for most of the autumn of 1918. It was not until December that he seems to have taken some interest in the problems of the Turkish settlement. Notwithstanding this, the debate within and between various British government departments which had begun before the Mudros Armistice continued for the rest of the year. Within the Foreign Office, suggestions as to how to best secure the Straits and dispose of Constantinople came from a variety of sources. On 9 September, Arnold Toynbee, then employed as a Foreign Office clerk, produced a position paper which proposed an internationalisation of the Straits with self-determination for Turkey and a curtailment of the Capitulations. This was one of the milder proposals. The revulsion over Turkish atrocities during the war had revived the old Gladstonian notion of expelling the Turks 'bag and baggage' from Europe, a sentiment now held not only by Liberals. An approach representative of this view came from Sir Eyre Crowe, an assistant under-secretary.
Crowe favoured not only expelling the Sultan from Constantinople, but ending Turkish power in Europe once and for all. Lord Hardinge, the Permanent Under-Secretary, was more or less in agreement with this latter point of view.

This policy debate within the British government did not go on without relation to the aims of the other powers. Throughout the latter part of 1918, account was taken in particular of the positions of France and the United States. France's financial interests in Turkey and her mistrust of British motives tended to make her cautious. Referring to the Sykes-Picot Agreement as a starting point for any Middle Eastern settlement, the French were to agree to the expulsion of the Turks from Europe, and were eager to see that no form of British administration be installed. However, in the few months before the Conference, there was little friction between Britain and France apart from the resentment by the French over their exclusion at Mudros and wrangles over the civil and military administration of Constantinople. In fact, France accommodated some British desires in Middle Eastern issues. During his visit to London in December 1918, Clemenceau ceded Mosul and parts of the Levant to Britain. It was probably France's need for support for her claims on Germany which forced her acceptance of this attitude.

The American position was based on the twelfth of Wilson's Fourteen Points, namely that the Straits be placed under
international guarantee and that Turkish sovereignty be assured. In September, Secretary of State Lansing amplified this in a directive to the American peace commissioners. He recommended expulsion of the Turks from Constantinople, an international administration or a mandate for the city and the Straits and a Greek enclave at Smyrna. The American Delegation to the Conference seems to have been divided on the matter of a mandate. Day, Seymour and Lyber wanted either a British or American mandate. Wilson favoured a small power or consortium of powers to run the Straits and Constantinople and expulsion of the Turks. These ideas the President conveyed to Lloyd George when they met in London on 26 December.

The concept of an American mandate was gaining currency in some sections of the British government by the end of the year. Hardinge for one supported it. Such an arrangement would take any responsibility from Britain, and, if the Straits were to be administrated by another power, the United States was far more acceptable than France. The development of the notion of an American mandate was, as we shall see, to have a considerable influence on the Turkish settlement.

Expulsion of the Turks from Europe became Foreign Office policy. It was resisted by the India Office and the War Office, and this inter-departmental debate found a forum in two
meetings held in late December 1918. The first, on 20 December, was a meeting of the Imperial War Cabinet. Although the meeting was somewhat inconclusive, it is worthy of note in two respects. First, the War Office opposed expulsion on the grounds that its execution would be extremely difficult. Second, Lloyd George is recorded as opposing the proposal of an American mandate for Turkey, a position which he was soon to change.19

The second meeting, on 23 December, was one of the Eastern Committee. It was here that Curzon, soon to be Acting Foreign Secretary, clashed with E.S. Montagu of the India Office. Because he believed that expulsion would ensure a greater degree of stability in the area, Curzon adopted the same stance as Crowe.20 Montagu contended that such an act would upset the Moslems of India and aggravate an already delicate situation there.21

The two renewed their fight at the beginning of the new year. On 2 January 1919, Curzon circulated a memorandum outlining his position. In his grandiloquent style, he based his argument on two premises. The first was that in the past the Turkish presence in Europe had been a continual menace to peace and had caused great suffering not only to the subject peoples but to the majority of the Turkish people as well. Secondly, the future stability of the region could only be guaranteed if the Turks were forced from Europe. As he put it:
We can easily imagine the atmosphere in which... an international Commission (of which there could hardly fail, in these conditions, to be a Turkish member) would pursue its work—an atmosphere of incessant conspiracy and cabal. The wily Turk would revel in such a situation as affording renewed scope to his hereditary talents; and round the pivot of his own plots would revolve a whirlwind of international intrigue, in which the representatives of all the nations, who still aspired to his inheritance, would eagerly mix. 22

Montagu's reply was not long in coming. On 8 January his memorandum claimed that the expulsion would be an affront to India's Moslems, an affront made all the greater by the fact that victory over the Turks had been achieved with the help of Moslem arms. 23

The debate continued through January and was taken up in two meetings at the Astoria Hotel on the 30th and 31st of the month, held by representatives of the British Delegation to the Paris Peace Conference. At the first meeting, the Foreign Office proposed an American mandate for the Straits and Constantinople. All three of the armed services objected, the view of the Admiralty holding good for the other two: 'In particular, a mandate given to the United States of America by the League of Nations would afford opportunity and pretext for basing a strong American fleet in the Mediterranean; a danger which, from a strategic point of view, must at all cost be avoided.' On this issue the Foreign Office gave way and it was agreed that Constantinople and the Straits should be internationalised with sufficient land on either side of the waterway to make it militarily defensible. 24
The second meeting raised another issue which was to be of great importance in the future. In the area of Smyrna on the western Anatolian coast, the Greeks and the Italians had conflicting territorial claims. The Italians referred to the Treaty of Saint Jean de Maurienne, the Greeks to the region's ethnic and historical ties with Greece. Major General Thwaites of the War Office argued that Smyrna should stay with the Turks, since giving it to Greece would cause great resentment among the Turkish population. However, Crowe's suggestion that the Greeks be given Smyrna was the one to be carried.²⁵

Despite the agreements reached at these two meetings, the British government was far from united on a Turkish settlement. The principle of international administration for Constantinople and the Straits had been agreed upon, but for months to come, various members of the government were to advocate an American mandate. The issue of expulsion was not settled at all and the Smyrna issue divided the cabinet, for although Crowe had proposed Greek possession of the town, some of his superiors flatly opposed the idea.²⁶

Crowe's support of Greek possession of Smyrna ran counter to the wishes of Hardinge, his superior. Why Crowe felt free to act in this way has given rise to the suggestion that he must have been supported by a greater power than Hardinge, namely
It is possible that the Prime Minister, while waiting for the Americans to declare their position on a mandate, was either trying to force their hand or was providing a possible alternative should the United States decide in the negative. Early support of Greece's claims would ensure their goodwill later.

Lloyd George's position in these events is difficult to determine. In December he had been unenthusiastic about an American mandate, but by January, he and Balfour had joined Curzon in his support of the idea. Several times during 1919 he was to advocate an American mandate, despite Wilson's discouragements. His attitude is not easy to explain. He must have been aware, as Curzon was, that the plan had little chance of success, and it is difficult to see how someone with his perspicacity could have so completely misread the signs. One explanation is that his support of an American mandate was a ploy to put Wilson in a difficult position. By offering the President a mandate which he could not accept, Lloyd George might have been trying to weaken Wilson's objection to British mandates elsewhere. Yet this argument does not account for the Prime Minister's persistence. Nor does it explain the note of disappointment and frustration which Lloyd George expressed on the subject in his *The Truth About the Peace Treaties*, written sixteen years later.
On the matter of expulsion, the Prime Minister was in agreement with Curzon and Crowe. Despite his pronouncements a year earlier in the House of Commons, in early 1919 he maintained that the Turks had to be driven from Europe. Of the two positions he had taken, there is no doubt which one sat more comfortably with him. His loathing for the Turks did not end with the fighting. Indeed, Lloyd George's hatred for the Turks was comparable in its intensity only to Churchill's feelings for the Bolsheviks.

Notwithstanding all this pre-Conference activity, the Paris Peace Conference did not produce a quick settlement on the Turkish question. The differences in policy between the powers and within their delegations impeded a solution: so did hope on the part of Britain and France that the United States would accept a mandate for the Straits and Armenia. Throughout 1919, the solutions offered at the Conference were really only stop-gaps to buy time until a permanent solution was drawn up.

Despite the priority given at the Conference to the other settlements, a good deal of work was done in committee regarding the claims of some nations on the corpse of the Ottoman Empire. The Greek delegation, led by Eleutherios Venizelos, was one of the more notable supplicants. In presenting his country's claims, the Greek Prime Minister exploited his two main advantages: the debt which some of the allies felt they
owed him and his own personality. He was aware that his position at home depended upon a successful annexationist policy at the Conference and he worked tirelessly to that end.34

Although Greece had not entered the war until 1917, Venizelos had campaigned for the Entente from the beginning, but he had been thwarted by King Constantine and his supporters. It was only after an anti-royalist rebellion, largely instigated by Venizelos, that Greece had entered the war.35 Because of these efforts, many of the delegates, particularly from Britain and France, felt that they owed a debt to Venizelos, if not to his country.36

Venizelos' second asset was his personality, which seems to have charmed almost everyone who met him.37 It was probably due to this that the strong bond of friendship existed between him and Lloyd George. In many ways the two men were quite alike, and it is significant that at one stage the British Prime Minister referred to Venizelos as the Lloyd George of Greece.38 Both men had been born in similar circumstances and had entered the legal profession. One was Welsh, the other Cretan; both their homelands being considered somewhat apart from and subservient to the main body of the parent nation. Despite this, the two had broken into the established order and had achieved great success. The two had similar temperaments. Venizelos to a large extent mirrored Lloyd George's mercurial
character and he had the same intuitive approach to the problems which confronted him. These factors worked to cement a strong friendship between them, a friendship which was to have fateful consequences for them both.

On 3 and 4 February, Venizelos presented his demands to the Council of Ten. He asked, among other things, that both eastern and western Thrace be turned over to Greece and that in Asia Minor, major parts of the vilayets of Brusa and Aidin, together with the town of Smyrna, become Greek. He did not push too far, and he refrained from asking for Constantinople, suggesting that it be administered by an international Straits Commission. Instead of these matters being debated in the Council of Ten, it was decided on Lloyd Goerge's suggestion that the situation be examined by an international committee of experts which would submit its findings to the Council.39

The Greek Committee convened on 12 February and produced its findings on 8 March. This report was not conclusive and the Big Four could not agree. They agreed on giving Greece western Thrace despite the predominance of Turks in the area, and all but the Italians recommended the same for Eastern Thrace. The British and French delegation accepted with reservation the Greek claims in Anatolia; the Americans and Italians rejected them.40 After some negotiation, the United States eventually came to side with Britain and France,41 but Italy did not, fear-
ful that her claims under the Saint Jean de Maurienne Treaty would be lost. The report of the Greek Committee seemed to show that Britain and France were working to prevent Italy from claiming what had been promised to her in the wartime agreements. It was not only the report that worried the Italians. Lloyd George, among others, was maintaining that as the Treaty of Saint Jean de Maurienne was never ratified by Russia, it was void, and that in any case Italy had little justification for her claims on Turkey since she had not supplied a single soldier for the Middle Eastern campaign.

To prevent the loss of what had been promised to her in the wartime agreements, Italy began landing forces on the Adalian coast late in March 1919. In the space of a few weeks, these forces were nearing Smyrna. The Paris Peace Conference at first did little to protest these actions, for in April, Italy was heavily involved in the acrimonious debate over the future of Fiume. It was only after Orlando and Sonnino, the Italian Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, piqued by Wilson's appeal to the Italian people in *Le Temps* on April 24 had left the conference, that the other three major powers turned their attention to Asia Minor.

The behaviour of the Italians over their claim to Fiume and the manner of their leaving the Conference caused a great deal of frustration and resentment among the other powers. Wilson had lost all patience and on 2 May he even contemplated
military action against them. His frame of mind was not improved by a report received three days later which alleged that the Italians had been abusing the Greek population of Rhodes. Lloyd George, aware that Orlando and Sonnino were due to return to the Conference on 7 May, at this point proposed that Greek forces be held in readiness to land in Smyrna should the Greek population there be threatened. Wilson, whose dislike of the Italians by this time seemed to know no bounds, went even further and suggested that the Greeks land as soon as possible.

This suggestion to land Greek forces in Smyrna went further than Lloyd George's proposal. The President's suggestion might have come as a surprise to the Prime Minister or it might have been the result of shrewd manipulation on the Welshman's part. Whatever the reason, Lloyd George did not find it unwelcome and gave it his full support, for it ensured a Greek presence in the Smyrna area without having to wait for a peace settlement. It was one concrete step to the realisation of the Prime Minister's hope that the region be administered by an impartial power or by one which was sympathetic to British interests. Whether his call for an American mandate was genuine or a ploy, the United States was proving reluctant to accept the burden. This being so, Lloyd George's support of Greek claims can be understood. British interests, he thought, would be well served by a client state which would be grateful to Britain and dependent on her.
Objections to this development came from several sections of the British government, and from Curzon and the War Office in particular. Although they were in sympathy with Lloyd George's ultimate goal of imperial security, it was his means to that end which they disliked. Both Curzon and the War Office believed that the Prime Minister's method would cause more difficulties than it would solve. However, the Prime Minister was adamant. The arrangements were made and the eager Greeks landed at Smyrna on 14 May 1919 under the protection of British, French and American warships.
CHAPTER IV

THE TREATY OF SÈVRES

You must decide whom you are going to back.
David Lloyd George

The Greek invasion of Asia Minor did little to simplify the problems of a settlement of the Turkish question. The operation was to have both short and long term effects including increased Italian resentment, a growing distrust of British motives on the part of France and the rise of a strong Turkish nationalist movement which would one day confound the plans of Lloyd George and the Greeks.¹

One immediate result of the landings which should have been foreseen was increased tension between Italy and Greece, particularly between their forces in the disputed region. Throughout June 1919, the situation in Asia Minor became more and more precarious and on 10 July, the Greeks fired on the Italians.² The Italians protested immediately to the Supreme Council in Paris, which recommended, on Balfour's suggestion, that General Allenby should be responsible for delineating the two areas of occupation.³ The Italian delegation balked at this, for not without reason,
they suspected the British of being pro-Greek. Tittoni, the new
Italian Foreign Minister, suggested a conference between Italy and
Greece to settle the matter directly.\textsuperscript{4}

The outcome of this conference was that on 18 July
the Tittoni-Venizelos agreement was announced. Under its terms,
Italy would support Greek claims in Thrace and in parts of Albania,
while Greece agreed to an Italian mandate for the rest of Albania.
Italy ceded Smyrna to Greece in return for a free hand in other
parts of Anatolia.\textsuperscript{5} The weak cries of protest from Washington
went unheard in an atmosphere increasingly unresponsive to the
moralising of the American President.

The landings had other effects. Atrocities committed
by the Greeks against Turkish civilians and prisoners of war began
with the landings and continued for some time afterward.\textsuperscript{6} Reports
from both British government and press representatives indicated
the extent and nature of the depredations.\textsuperscript{7} Questions were asked
in Parliament and the government was hard put to find a suitable
reply. In Paris, the Supreme Council recommended that a Commission
of Inquiry be sent to Smyrna to investigate reports that thousands
of Moslems had been massacred and that many more had been driven
from their homes.\textsuperscript{8}

The Commission took several months to report. Its
findings were preceded on 2 October by the report of General Milne,
G.O.C. Constantinople and Commander of the British Army of the Black Sea, on the boundaries of the Italian and Greek zones. His report recommended that the Greeks consolidate their position around Smyrna and that the abandoned territory be occupied by an inter-allied force. But fear by the powers of such a commitment caused this part of the proposal to be abandoned.

A much more damning indictment of the Greek occupation came on 8 November with the Smyrna Commission's report. It stated that since the Armistice, Christian residents of the area had been secure under the governance of Izzet Bey, the Turkish governor. Neither in Smyrna nor in its environs had the civil or military situation justified the Greek landings. The Commission held the Greek commander responsible for a variety of excesses which included the maltreatment of large numbers of civilians and the murder of prisoners of war. Among other things, the report recommended that Allied forces replace the Greek troops and that this Allied force be in turn replaced by the Turkish gendarmerie.

These findings were vigorously disputed by Venizelos and Colonel Mazarakis, the Greek member of the Commission, on the grounds that the Commission had been partial in its procedure. This argument was supported by Eyre Crowe, who claimed that the Commission had not only been partial, but that it had exceeded its jurisdiction. Despite this, the Greeks were to stand censured. On 12 November, the Supreme Council sent a note to
Venizelos. While the Council recognised Venizelos' arguments, it upheld the Commission's findings. The note allowed that Greek forces could remain, but possibly only until the Eastern Question was settled permanently.\(^\text{15}\)

As might be expected, all these activities did not take place against a background of complete Turkish passivity. Since May 1919, a Turkish nationalist movement had been growing. An occupation by Britain, France or the United States might have been accepted by the Turks for even an extended period of time. An invasion by the Greeks, a former subject people, was intolerable.\(^\text{16}\) This indignation caused support for the nationalists to grow. In the mountains of central Anatolia, Mustapha Kemal, a veteran of the Gallipoli campaign, was building up a nationalist army. Old caches of arms were opened up and British troops guarding dumps of weapons which had been surrendered under the Mudros Armistice were driven off or captured and the contents of the dumps were appropriated by the Nationalists.\(^\text{17}\)

Despite these developments during the summer and fall of 1919, it was not until November that the first real steps were taken towards solving the Turkish question. One of the main reasons for this delay was the expectation on the part of Britain and France that the United States would play an active role in the settlement.\(^\text{18}\) By November, however, Wilson's health and the mood of the Republican-dominated Senate had crushed these hopes.\(^\text{19}\)
Britain and France were now in a position to resolve the matter between themselves. Thus, on 10 November, when Poincaré and Pichon, the French President and Foreign Secretary visited London, the matter was broached to Curzon, who had succeeded Balfour as Foreign Secretary a little more than two weeks before.

Pichon's suggestion that Britain and France reconcile their differences in Turkey was readily agreed to by Curzon. A meeting between the British and French Prime Ministers was set for 11 December. There were to be many obstacles to an amicable settlement; these included the traditional mistrust between the two great European powers, a fundamental difference between them on major issues of the Turkish question, and a lack of agreement within the British Cabinet.

The French were suspicious of the motives for Lloyd George's support of the Greeks. They also suspected the manifestly pro-British attitude of the Turkish government in Constantinople. From the time of the Mudros Armistice, the Turkish government had adopted a pro-British stance in spite of Britain's support for Greece. In March 1919, for example, the Grand Vizier had stated that Turkey would submit only to Britain. This sentiment might have been genuine or it might have been an attempt by the Turks to divide their conquerors. Whether it was reciprocated is doubtful. However, in the fall of 1919, persistent rumours of a secret Anglo-Turk treaty did little to allay French suspicions. By
the same token, the British were aware of a meeting which had taken place between Georges Picot and Kemal at Sivas on 6 December, and suspected that France might be drawing away from the Entente to seek her own advantage.

Further, there were marked differences between British and French policies. The French aimed at maintaining Turkish integrity and imposing strict financial controls. Lloyd George and Curzon, while agreeing with the French on the need to keep the Straits open, still advocated expulsion of the Turks from Constantinople, crushing the Turks for all time and enhancing the rights of the minority peoples.23

Nor were things made any easier by the fact that Lloyd George and Curzon had little support for their hard line from the British cabinet. Despite a considerable amount of popular support for expulsion, there was resolute opposition to it within the cabinet.24 Montagu had not changed his stance of almost a year before and in this he was supported by Churchill who was now Secretary of State for War.25 However, the fears of the anti-expulsionists were calmed on 10 December at a meeting of ministers. Here, Lloyd George and Curzon suggested that even after expulsion, the Sultan would be allowed to remain in the city as the Caliph of Islam and to fulfill a role somewhat similar to that of the Pope in the Vatican.26

Despite this compromise, the British Prime Minister was as determined as ever that the Turks should be expelled completely
from Europe. A.E. Montgomery sums up Lloyd George's feelings at the time as follows:

Turkey had cost Great Britain dearly in blood and treasure, and she must be made to pay the price. Her barbaric treatment of her Christian minority population had shocked the civilised world. For this too she must be punished. Lloyd George himself, a strange amalgam of Gladstonian Liberal and Welsh visionary, envisaged a settlement based upon two complementary principles: The Allies should suppress Turkish power once and for all by depriving Turkey of her hereditary guardianship of the Straits; and they should wrest from her control all territories which were not exclusively peopled by Turks. It was to achieve this end that he had successfully contrived to ensure British naval and military predominance at Constantinople and had lent his encouragement and support to the ambitions of the Greek premier, Venizelos.

Thus, when Clemenceau opened the discussions in London on 11 December by saying that he considered Constantinople separate from the Straits and that the city should remain part of Turkey, Lloyd George countered by saying that the British government objected to leaving the city in the hands of the Turks. He maintained that to be a self-supporting economic unit, any international Straits Zone would have to depend on Constantinople for its revenue. He did mention the 'Vatican' proposal, but only obliquely and without any great enthusiasm. Clemenceau's reply was almost a capitulation. He agreed to expulsion but not to the Vatican proposal, saying that it should be forgotten as 'It was quite bad enough to have one Pope in the West.'
Lloyd George and Curzon were thus able to overcome a major obstacle in their fight to deprive Turkey of its capital. Exactly why Clemenceau gave in on this point is not clear. It may be surmised, however, that the French premier was prepared to be conciliatory in the hopes of British support in enforcing the terms of the Treaty of Versailles.\textsuperscript{31}

Negotiations were resumed on 22 December in London between Berthelot, the General Secretary to the French Foreign Office, and Curzon. The talks were held in an attempt to build a common policy between Britain and France before the Supreme Council met to discuss Turkey. From Curzon's point of view, the meeting went successfully. Without Lloyd George present to push Greek claims on Smyrna, agreement was quickly reached on limiting not only Italian, but also Greek influence in Asia Minor.\textsuperscript{32} If Lloyd George did not like that arrangement, the second point which Curzon won must have been to his liking. Berthelot had agreed easily to the Foreign Secretary's proposal that the Turks would lose Constantinople, which together with the Straits Zone would become an independent state.\textsuperscript{33}

At this point, it seemed that Lloyd George and Curzon had every reason to congratulate themselves. Curzon had won points which he considered to be very important. With the possible exception of Armenia, Anatolia would be entirely under Turkish sovereignty, but the Turks would lose Constantinople. The new state on the shores of the Straits would be jointly
administered by several nations, but the real power would rest with "les deux pays qui possessent en Turquie des interess et une influence preponderante," that is Britain and France. Lloyd George, although faced with the likelihood that his Greek clients would be disappointed, could take solace in the fact that the agreement, if realised, would secure British imperial interests and crush the Turks at the same time.

Yet any satisfaction which Lloyd George and Curzon might have felt was short-lived. Those elements in the British government opposed to expulsion soon came to the attack.

Montagu was the first to voice his disapproval of the agreement. Annoyed that Lloyd George had misrepresented the intent of the cabinet when he had met Clemenceau, the Secretary of State for India circulated a memorandum on 1 January 1920. In the memorandum, Montagu reiterated his views on expulsion and maintained that the Foreign Secretary had not pursued his negotiations in accordance with what had been agreed to at the meeting of ministers of 10 December.

Five days later, Montagu repeated these arguments when the cabinet met to discuss the issue. He was opposed by Lloyd George, Curzon and Balfour, but he received help from the War Office. General Wilson, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, put forward the argument that, given the situation in India and the Bolshevik menace occasioned by Denikin's collapse, Britain would find it
hard to muster a large enough force to expel the Turks and maintain order. Another factor was that in all likelihood, imperial troops would have to be used, and because a large number of them would be Indian Moslems, difficulties could arise. A further condition which might have had some bearing on the outcome of the meeting was that the French press had proclaimed that the British government, not the French, would have to take responsibility for the expulsion.

Montagu, supported by the War Office, carried the day. The cabinet voted to leave the Turks and their Sultan in Constantinople and to run the city by some form of international administration. From that day, expulsion of the Turks from Europe ceased to be a part of the proposed Turkish settlement. As might be expected, Curzon protested vigorously, but short of resignation there was little that he could do but accept the decision and reiterate his feelings in a memorandum which he wrote the next day.

Although the cabinet decision was secret, the Quai d'Orsai rightly suspected a division in the British cabinet. Berthelot's note of 11 January reopened the issue of Constantinople. He proposed that the Turks retain the city with a small foothold in Europe, the rest of Eastern Thrace going to Greece. However, as part of this arrangement, the Greeks would lose Smyrna. Both Montagu and the Foreign Office drafted replies, and Lloyd-George, favouring the Foreign Office point of view, showed Montagu's draft to Venizelos. The Greek protested loudly and publicly at the suggested exclusion of Greece from Smyrna. This action by Lloyd
George clearly indicated his pro-Greek bias. In an attempt to have his own way, he used the influence of an outsider to resolve the differences within his cabinet.

The result of this device was another draft which was never sent to France. Prepared by the Foreign Office, it suggested Greek evacuation of Anatolia with Smyrna a free port and that in return Greece should be given an enlarged Eastern Thrace. Matters rested at this point until February and the London Conference. This Conference was in fact a meeting of the Supreme Council in which the main principles of the Turkish settlement were to be agreed on. Although the Anglo-French meetings of the previous December had been meant to smooth the way for this conference, several events had taken place in the interim which would affect the course of the negotiations.

The tensions between Britain and France, effectively concealed at the December meetings, were now much more apparent and severe. Lloyd George's and Curzon's position had been weakened by the cabinet's rejection of their agreement with Berthelot. Clemenceau was no longer Prime Minister of France. He had been replaced by Alexandre Millerand, who, despite his radical socialist beginnings, was now a conservative. Beyond these considerations, an event in Anatolia in January had changed the French attitude to Turkey quite significantly. Kemal, the nationalist leader, had attacked the town of Marash in French-held Cilicia. The town was defended by a force of Armenian levies who were annihilated in a
bitter fight. The battle was followed by the slaughter of the town's twenty thousand inhabitants. The shock of this defeat, together with France's fear for her large financial holdings in Turkey and her growing distrust of British motives, caused France to reconsider her policy towards the Nationalists.

The London Conference first met on 12 February and continued until 10 April, although most of the important work was done in the early stages. There were many issues to be settled, since the purpose of the Conference was to draft a settlement not only for Turkey proper but for the rest of the Ottoman Empire as well. During the first two weeks it was the heads of the delegations who discussed the issues, but at the end of the month a series of committees was established to deal with the matters in detail. The recommendations of these committees were to be reviewed by a committee of Foreign Ministers and Ambassadors.

The issues touching Turkey proper included the Straits and Constantinople, Smyrna and the financial administration of the new state. Since the matter of Constantinople seemed the easiest to settle, it was dealt with first. Although Lloyd George and Curzon would still have had the city separated from the rest of Turkey, there was little that they could do in the face of the cabinet's decision. Millerand opened the negotiations by suggesting that it was desirable to keep the Turks in the city. He maintained that unpredictability of the results of expulsion both in Turkey and on French Moslem possessions made Turkish
possession of Constantinople indispensable. He was supported by Nitti, the new Italian Prime Minister. At this, Lloyd George launched into another of his anti-Turkish diatribes, but in the light of the cabinet decision, there was little that he could do but accept the French proposal.

After some further discussion, Britain, France and Italy came to the conclusion that international occupation of the area around the Straits was necessary in order to guarantee freedom of passage. After recommendations from the military advisors of the three powers and Japan, the conclusion was incorporated into the Draft Synopsis of the Peace with Turkey. Under the terms of this document, a commission was to be established which would be responsible for shipping and would have jurisdiction on both shores of the waterway.

Lloyd George might have lost the battle for Constantinople, but he did win in the negotiations on the fate of Smyrna. Both the French and the Italians wished to see the Greeks gone from Smyrna. So too did some members of the British government, the Foreign Office and the War Office. Against this opposition, Lloyd George put up a spirited fight for Greek possession of the city. That the Turks had been allowed to retain Constantinople was, he argued, concession enough to them. The Greeks had a just claim on Smyrna and it was right that they be allowed to keep it. He continued that the Greeks in Smyrna would be a guarantee against an upsurge of Turkish hostility and would be a bridgehead if war broke out
The Prime Minister was prepared to allow nominal Turkish sovereignty over the area 'in order to save their face,' but that was as far as he was prepared to go. He established a committee which confirmed his view. The allies reluctantly accepted the Greeks into Smyrna and agreed to Greek possession of almost the whole of Eastern Thrace.  

Another issue, which to the French was most important, was the future financial administration of Turkey. The tremendous loss to France occasioned by the confiscation of foreign assets in the Soviet Union made the French delegation resolute in its aim to secure French investments in Turkey. The French delegation proposed a scheme which would give them far-reaching powers in the political and financial administration of the new Turkish state. Because of strident British objection to this proposal, France agreed to a compromise in which a commission would supervise the economic recovery of Turkey. The matter did not rest there, for in early March the French negotiators withdrew their consent and demanded that negotiations be reopened. In the end, the British gave more ground and an agreement was reached.

The issue of financial control of the new Turkey led directly to an allocation of zones of influence wherein the power concerned could pursue its interests without interference from the others. This arrangement came in the form of the Tripartite Agreement. In order to avoid any objection by the United States, the pact took the form of a self-denying ordinance.  

Each power
was to refrain from interfering with the rights of the other in its designated area.

For Turkey proper, it was France and Italy who divided most of the land. Britain's share fell outside the Turkish part of the Ottoman Empire. The boundaries of the zones of influence were roughly those of the Sykes–Picot Agreement and the Treaty of St. Jean de Maurienne. France was to gain permanent control of Cilicia and other parts of south eastern Turkey. Those parts of southern Anatolia which fell outside the French area and a large part of western Anatolia went to Italy. The only important modification in the Italian zone from the original plan in the St. Jean de Maurienne Treaty was the enclave at Smyrna which was to go to the Greeks.

In this fashion, the main issues were settled fairly quickly. It seemed that the Turkish peace was to be to Lloyd George's liking; the safety of the Straits was assured and he had got the Greeks most of what they had wanted. Furthermore, although the Prime Minister had lost the fight for expulsion, there was even to be a temporary consolation for that loss, for the Allies agreed to occupy Constantinople. On 16 March, the decision was carried out.

There were several reasons which caused the Allies to come to this decision. All of them stemmed from fear of the growing power of the Kemalists. The rout of the French forces in Marash had proved Kemal's capabilities in Anatolia, and in the last week of January, an Allied arms dump in Gallipoli had been raided and
eighty-thousand rifles taken. The government in Constantinople was suspected of collaboration with the Nationalists. This was not an unreasonable assumption, since in the election of the previous September, a large number of Nationalists had been elected to the Chamber of Deputies. Salih Pasha, the Grand Vizier, had himself signed an agreement with the Nationalists which recognised their aims. The Chamber of Deputies had even appointed Kemal as governor of Erzerum, an implicit if not an explicit sanction of his activities.

The occupation of Constantinople would accomplish several things. It would be a lesson in discipline to the Turks and would prepare them for the imposition of the forthcoming treaty. It would strengthen the Sultan's position, on whom the Allies placed their hopes for the future of Turkey and it would control the activities of the Nationalists. Using these arguments, Lloyd George, with the help of Curzon, was able to persuade the French and Italian delegations to assist in the occupation of the city. On 16 March, Allied forces occupied Constantinople. The Chamber of Deputies was dissolved and suspected Nationalists were interned and taken to Malta. The Grand Vizier was arrested and replaced by the more pliable Damad Ferid. In this fashion, the Allies thought they had secured Constantinople from Nationalist intrigue.

The wisdom of this occupation is open to question on several points. The seat of Nationalist power was Anatolia, not Constantinople. The occupation of the city did nothing to diminish
Kemal's power; in fact the ill-feeling caused by the occupation resulted in a steady flow of Nationalist recruits from the city. Nor did it strengthen the Sultan's power. He now appeared to be more a puppet of the Allies than ever. One suggestion is that Lloyd George and Curzon, both of whom had argued in favour of the occupation, saw it as a temporary measure which, with luck, might become permanent. 59

At the close of the Conference, the draftsmen were put to work to assemble the terms of the Turkish peace prior to official ratification by the powers. As a venue for the next meeting, the French, already piqued at having to meet outside France at all, suggested Paris. The British, in the light of the anti-British atmosphere in that city, had no wish to return there. 60 To this end, the British shrewdly suggested that the meeting be held in Italy, a suggestion to which the Italians readily agreed. The French had little option but to comply.

When the Supreme Council met in San Remo on 19 April, they did little to change the draft of the treaty concerning Turkey itself. Although the growing strength of the Nationalists worried the French and Italians, they accepted the draft without much objection. It was not signed for another four months, however, and in the interim it sometimes seemed that it might never be. A cease-fire between France and the Nationalists in May was followed by a rapid Nationalist advance to the Sea of Marmora. For a time it looked as if the draft treaty might have to be radically revised.
Enraged at the Treaty's terms and at the fact that Constantinople was contemplating its ratification, Kemal launched an attack on the Ismid peninsula in early June. As Allied forces there had been reduced to a minimum and it was so near to Constantinople, this advance caused a panic. Lloyd George was determined that all he had fought for should not so easily pass away. On 20 June, he accepted Venizelos' offer of the seventy-five thousand strong Greek army to crush the Nationalists.  

It seemed to be only Lloyd George who shared Venizelos' confidence. The French and British military representatives on the Supreme Council, Marshal Foch and Sir Henry Wilson, maintained that ventures against nationalists with interior lines of communication could prove disastrous. Winston Churchill tried to dissuade the Prime Minister by writing: "On this world so torn with strife I dread to see you let loose the Greek armies. For all sakes and certainly for their sakes."

But Lloyd George remained adamant. "You must decide whom you are going to back," he declared to Lord Riddell. "The Turks nearly brought about our defeat in the war... you cannot trust them and they are a decadent race. The Greeks on the other hand are our friends and they are a rising people... of course the military are against the Greeks... the military are confirmed Tories. It is Tory policy to support the Turks. They hate the Greeks." On June 22 he finally persuaded the Allies to sanction a general Greek advance. Not even France and Italy wanted the Nationalists to seize Constantinople with the probable consequence
of the slaughter of Christians and the risks to foreign investments.

A day later, the Greeks began a short but amazingly successful campaign. In a few weeks they had taken Brusa, one hundred and fifty miles inland, occupied Thrace and driven the Nationalists from the Sea of Marmora. The news was received with great delight by Lloyd George. The victory had vindicated his support of the Greeks and seemed to show that the military experts, whom the Prime Minister had always disliked, were lacking in judgement.

There were further delays in the signing of the treaty. Another Greco-Italian quarrel broke out and the Turks delayed the signing as much as possible. However, on 10 August 1920, the delegates of the powers and the representatives of the Sultan's government signed the Treaty of Sevres. The Treaty of Sevres was one of the most punitive treaties of modern times. John Maynard Keynes' soubriquet of a Carthaginian peace was more applicable to this treaty than to the Treaty of Versailles.

Under its terms, Turkey was obliged to surrender Eastern Thrace, her Arab lands, the islands in the Aegean and the Gallipoli peninsula; Smyrna and its surrounding region were to be given to Greece. The only foothold Turkey would have in Europe was the city of Constantinople, over which the Turks would have only nominal control and which would be well within range of Greek
artillery from the new Greek possession of Eastern Thrace.

On the Anatolian mainland, the Treaty "imposed an elaborate grillwork of restrictions and servitudes on the country as to extinguish its sovereign independence in fact if not in name." The Capitulations were restored in their entirety. Anatolia was divided into spheres of influence among the European powers. Despite the rights the powers had given themselves, however, it was undoubtedly Greece which profited most from the Treaty of Sèvres.

The Treaty of Sèvres represented a considerable victory for Lloyd George. Against the objections of the other Allies and some members of his own government, he had secured a predominance of British influence in the Straits and physical possession of one side of them for a very grateful Greece. It seemed that the Turks were crushed once and for all. Nor was the Prime Minister wrong in his anticipation of gratitude from Greece. Venizelos wrote to say: "I feel that I am quite unable to give adequate support to my feelings, for indeed, all that Greece has now realised of her legitimate claims is due in major part to your powerful and effective support and no words of mine can efficiently express my country's deep sense of thankfulness to you." As Venizelos returned to a rapturous welcome in Greece, another feature of the Treaty of Sèvres had not yet become apparent. As the High Commissioners in Constantinople and the military had warned, the Treaty was a treaty which could not be enforced.
By the time it was signed, whatever unity of purpose there had been amongst the Allies was fast disappearing. The Treaty could not paper over the cracks in the splitting facade of allied unity and it ignored the ever-growing strength of the Nationalists. The very severity of the terms was to make the Treaty difficult to enforce. T.E. Lawrence commented: "Sèvres was a happier treaty than Versailles in that it would not be revised--it would be forgotten."
CHAPTER V

THE REVIVAL OF TURKEY

Mr. Lloyd George has put his money on the wrong horse. We shall never get peace in Palestine or Mesopotamia, or Egypt or India, until we make love to the Turks. It may be very immoral, or it may not. It is a fact. Can anyone tell me why Mr. Lloyd George backed the Greeks? I know it was not upon the advice of Curzon, or the British Ambassador in Constantinople, or Lord Reading. I was at the Quai d'Orsai when Lloyd George gave Smyrna to the Greeks and I had to arrange for troops to go there. Why did Lloyd George back them? Was it to please Zaharoff, or was it because Venizelos told him that the Greeks were so prolific that they could rebuild the Near East in two or three years?

Sir Henry Wilson.

Sir Henry Wilson's concern was shared by the War Office and by many Conservatives both in and out of government. To them it seemed that Lloyd George, in an attempt to ensure the security of the Empire, was following a course which was sure to endanger that security. As time went by, the events in Turkey seemed to confirm this. The unfortunate consequences of the Prime Minister's policy and its impossibility of success became increasingly apparent, yet Lloyd George was to cling tenaciously to his purpose.

Besides the severity of the Treaty of Sèvres, two other factors were to work against its implementation. One was the Turkish Nationalist army, the other the instability of Greek politics. Had the Greek domestic situation remained stable, the
course of events might have been quite different. However, at the time of the signing of the Treaty of Sèvres, King Alexander was bitten by a pet monkey. The bite brought on blood poisoning from which the king died on 25 October.

An election had been set for the late fall and the king's death brought a new element into the campaign. While Venizelos was reluctant to allow Alexander's father Constantine to return from his Swiss exile, the opposition campaigned for his restoration. The royalists were supported by all those who were dissatisfied with Venizelos' administration. Despite the Prime Minister's success in Paris, in Greece he was unpopular to a degree which was greatly underestimated by all but a few in the Allied governments. His very success in Paris had entailed a prolonged absence from Athens and important domestic matters had been neglected. The civil administration was corrupt and the martial law which had not been rescinded since the war had given the Venizelos government an aura of tyranny. Thus, in the election of 14 November, Venizelos won less than one-third of the seats in the National Assembly. These results may not seem surprising in retrospect, but they were received with shock and incredulity in London, Paris and Rome. Lloyd George despaired of democracy.

The likelihood that the new Greek government would recall Constantine caused great concern among the Allied governments. The Allies, particularly the British, disliked Constantine intensely because of his supposed sympathies for the Central Powers during
the war. However, Lloyd George was quick to recover from his shock. In Parliament, he pointed out that this unfortunate circumstance should not wreck a long-term policy of friendship and mutual self-interest between Great Britain and Greece. In this he had Curzon's support. The Foreign Secretary had opposed the Greek presence in Asia Minor, but he felt obliged to uphold it now that it was provided for in the Treaty of Sèvres. The French and the Italians did not see it in quite the same light. It was just one more factor which made them drift closer to Kemal's Nationalists.

In late November and early December 1920, the Allies met in London to discuss the Greek situation. The French delegation proposed a series of strong measures which included a revision of the Treaty of Sèvres in Turkey's favour, a rupture of diplomatic relations with Greece and the termination of financial and military aid. This put Lloyd George in an awkward position. He would not contemplate returning Smyrna to the Turks, but his dislike of Constantine was as strong as that of the French. A compromise was reached on 4 December when it was decided that should the Greeks accept Constantine's return, military and economic aid to Greece would be cut off. Two days later, Constantine did return and the Allies carried out their threat.

As if this was not a sufficient hindrance to the Greek military effort in Anatolia, its effectiveness was further impaired by the actions of the new government. In an attempt to consolidate
its power, the government carried out a rigorous purge of the civil service and had restored royalist officers to the army. The manner in which this restoration took place caused a great deal of resentment among the original officers of the Army of Anatolia. Many resigned and others were removed from active service. The royalists who replaced them were, if not incompetent, certainly inexperienced; many of them had not seen service since the Balkan Wars. Partly as a result of this, the Greeks sustained a serious defeat in the valley of İnönü in the closing weeks of the year.

The defeat did not diminish Lloyd George's hope for a Greek, if not a Constantinist victory, in Anatolia. There is evidence to suggest that in the first weeks of 1921, he was trying to engineer a change in the domestic politics of Greece. In January 1921, Philip Kerr met three Venizelists from Constantinople. The latter proposed using the Venizelist divisions in Turkey to establish a Hellenic state in Turkey which, like the Provisional Government in Salonika during the war, would be independent of Constantine in Athens. Through Kerr, Lloyd George encouraged the Greeks, although he did not offer any concrete support.

Other pressures were working on the Prime Minister at this time. The War Office was suggesting that some accommodation be made between the Greeks and the Turks. This view was endorsed by the French and Italian governments and Lloyd George finally succumbed to the pressure. The Supreme Council met in London on 21 February, having invited not only representatives
from Athens and Constantinople, but from Ankara as well.

At this stage both the British and French governments were undecided as to the best course to follow. There were several options open to Great Britain. Harold Nicolson suggested turning Turkey into a quasi-British colony with the same status as Egypt had before the war. This, he believed, would cause a diplomatic break with France, but it would be the price to be paid for a successful Middle Eastern policy.  

On the other hand, Sir Horace Rumbold, British High Commissioner in Constantinople, along with the War Office suggested using Constantinople's return as an excuse for abandoning Greece and making a reconciliation with the Turks.

Neither Lloyd George nor Curzon favoured either of these extreme solutions. They were not prepared to forfeit the advantages of the Treaty of Sevres, but neither were they willing to fight for them and risk alienating France. At the Conference, Lloyd George wished not to appear to be negotiating with the Nationalists for peace. He was supported by Curzon, who was determined to preserve the substance of the Treaty by making minor concessions.

Aristide Briand, the new French premier, also had reservations about abandoning the Treaty of Sévres. But the harsh treatment which the French forces had received in Cilicia at the hands of Kemal's Nationalists had convinced him that the Greeks could not be relied upon to uphold the Treaty against the
Nationalists. The Italians were by now prepared to give Kemal all that he wanted.

On 24 February, the Allies proposed a plan which it was hoped would resolve the issues of Smyrna and Eastern Thrace in a peaceful manner. Briand proposed that a plebiscite be held in the two areas to determine the preference of the populations for Greek or Turkish rule. Lloyd George concurred and Bekir Sami Bey, the Nationalist representative, agreed to the proposal provided that the referenda be internationally supervised. The quid pro quo for this would be that the Treaty of Sèvres would be re-opened for negotiation. On 4 March the Greeks turned the proposal down. They were afraid that once they evacuated the areas for the plebiscites, it would not be easy to return.

On 10 March, Lloyd George put forward another plan, one in which the Greeks would make the sacrifices. In this scheme, Greece would remain in Thrace and Gallipoli but their tenure in Smyrna would be severely restricted. This plan was not received favourably by either the Greeks or the Turks, who left the Conference without giving a reply.

The Greeks' responses to these proposals were only partly due to their own interpretation of the situation. For Lloyd George was playing a double game: not with the Venizelists this time but with the Constantinists. At the same time as he was agreeing publicly to the various peace proposals at the Conference, he was privately encouraging the Greeks to resume the conflict.
On 1 and 9 March, Kerr and Hankey respectively transmitted messages from Lloyd George to the Greek representatives. These messages were to the effect that a fresh Greek advance would not be discouraged by the British government. On 10 March, Lloyd George himself confirmed Hankey's message to Kalageropoulos, the head of the Greek delegation. Similarly, on 19 March, he again told Kalageropoulos that the Greeks were at liberty to undertake whatever operations they thought necessary without fear of Allied interference.

Several factors caused the Prime Minister to act in this fashion. Firstly, there was the hope that what could not be gained at the Conference could be achieved on the battlefield. Perhaps just as important was that other developments at the Conference had made necessary the forcing of a decision as soon as possible. Count Sforza, the Italian Foreign Minister, concluded an agreement with Bekir Sami in which Italy would evacuate south western Anatolia in return for economic concessions. As if this was not bad enough for Lloyd George and Curzon, Briand made an agreement whereby French forces would be withdrawn from Cilicia in return for certain guarantees for Syria and the safety of France's commercial interests in Turkey. This agreement, besides its implication that the Treaty of Sèvres had been abandoned, released large numbers of Turkish troops to fight the Greeks. This meant that any Greek attack should take place before these forces reached the lines.

The Greek attack which began on 23 March was a failure. A Kemalist victory at the second battle of İnönü brought to an
end any hope for an early Greek victory. In the British government, nervousness was expressed in several quarters. In the War Office, Kemal's strength was fully appreciated and the concept of a strong Turkey as a bulwark against Bolshevism was gaining ground. A memorandum written on 25 March by General Harington—Milne's replacement as military Commander of Constantinople—recommending a complete British withdrawal from Turkey received support a day later in a memorandum from Wilson. To discuss the problem a special Cabinet Committee on the Future of Constantinople met on 1, 2, and 9 June. It was decided that the proposals of the London Conference would be put forward again, with an offer of British aid to enforce them. But the Greeks refused and this time Lloyd George did not have much to do with their decision. They had decided on a major summer offensive under the nominal command of the king, who had sailed for Smyrna on 11 June.

Yet Lloyd George still supported the Greeks, both publicly and in private. In a letter to Curzon written on 16 June, he castigated the Turks, praised the Greeks and cast scorn on the War Office. "It is not safe to assume," he wrote, "that British and French military opinion about the value of the morale of the Greek army can always be depended upon. They were clearly wrong in their estimate of the army a year ago. It is just possible that the same people may have made the same mistake now." A month later, after a Greek victory at Eski Shehir, he wrote a biting letter to
Worthington Evans, the War Minister, in which he wondered whether or not the War Office had an Intelligence Department. But it was not his private letters which were to have so much an effect on the course of events as his verbal declarations. The Prime Minister proceeded to intimate that British support for the Greeks would be forthcoming in the near future. He explained his feelings to Churchill in the following manner.

The Greeks are the people of the future in the Eastern Mediterranean. They are prolific and full of energy. They represent Christianity and civilisation against barbarism. Their fighting power is grotesquely underrated by our generals. A greater Greece will be an invaluable asset to the British Empire. They are good sailors; they will develop a naval power; they will possess all the most important islands in the Eastern Mediterranean! These islands are the potential submarine bases of the future; they lie on the flank of our communications through the Suez Canal and with India, the far East and Australasia.

These sentiments were not lost upon the Greeks. Arnold Toynbee was to recall later, "Nothing struck me more forcibly during the eight months that I was in touch with the Greek army and public than the universal belief that Great Britain would see them through. It was the one point on which all Greeks were in enthusiastic agreement." This was unfortunate for the Greeks. Churchill noted, "This was the worst of all possible situations. The Greeks deserved at the least either to be backed up through thick and thin with the moral or diplomatic support of a united British government, or chilled to the bone with repeated douches of cold water."
In the end, it was to be the War Office which was to be proven right, not the Prime Minister. An indecisive battle fought on the Sakaria River in August was to be the beginning of the end for the Greeks. Given their advanced position and extended lines of communication, a victory was vital for the Greeks, but the most they could do was to fight the Turks to a standstill. The Greeks had to withdraw to Eski Shehir to wait out the winter. In Britain a growing opposition to Lloyd George's and Curzon's policies pointed out that defeat for the Greeks would now not only mean a frustration of British foreign policy, but that British economic interests in the area would be threatened. 31

To add to these problems, a big setback to the Prime Minister's policy came from France in the October of 1921 in the form of the Treaty of Angora. For several weeks, the British government had been aware of negotiations between the French agent Franklin Bouillon and the Nationalists. The denials of the French government had done little to allay British anxiety, but the announcement of the Treaty still came as a shock. 32

Under the Treaty, France agreed to end the official state of war between her and the Nationalists, to cede some ten thousand square miles of Syrian territory and to give diplomatic support to the Kemalists. In return, more economic concessions were given to France by the Nationalists. 33 The Treaty marked for France the end of a long drift away from any support for British policy. Many factors had caused this evolution; there was the original
bitterness over the British behaviour at the signing of the Mudros Armistice, the increasing cost of the campaign in Cilicia, the return of Constantine to the throne, fear for the large investments in Turkey and pressure from Catholic interests which feared the rise of influence of the Orthodox Church which a Greek victory would bring. Further cause came from suspicions of British intent regarding the execution of the Sykes-Picot Agreement. The defeat at Sakaria had pushed the French over the brink, and had convinced them that the best guarantee for French interests would be Nationalist goodwill. The signing of the Treaty of Angora also meant that the implementation of the Treaty of Sévres would be virtually impossible.

The treaty also meant that France had abandoned the notion of using the Turkish situation as a lever to pressure Britain into accepting French aims in the Rhineland and providing guarantees against a future German attack. A year before, Berthelot had admitted to Hardinge that this was the case. The signing of the Treaty of Ankara put an end to this strategy. Despite this, the hope that Britain would guarantee French security did not die. Shortly before and after the Treaty was announced, Briand revived the idea. In light of the poor relations between France and Britain at that time, there was little chance that such a scheme would be realized.

Perhaps as a result of this setback, perhaps because of the difficult domestic situation which Lloyd George faced at this
time, the Prime Minister seems to have temporarily lost interest in the Turkish question. He refused to see Gounaris, the Greek Minister of war, and did not attend the unsuccessful Near East Conference in March of the following year. Thus, for a period of several months, the burden of the Near East settlement fell upon Curzon.

The Foreign Secretary began his work on 5 November by writing a letter to the French government which bluntly stated that France, in signing the Angora Treaty, had violated the wartime agreement that no ally should make a separate peace with a common enemy. Still hoping to maintain a primacy of British influence through a Greek victory, he authorised a loan for Greece.

On the other hand, only a few weeks later, he persuaded the French and Italian governments to consider a compromise peace plan; if accepted the plan would have meant the complete reversal of British policy. It allowed for the gradual withdrawal of Greek forces from Asia Minor, the indigenous minorities populations being guaranteed safety. The Allies agreed to this and Athens was pressured into giving a reluctant acceptance. The Turks, sensing ultimate victory, rejected it out of hand.

Curzon had to contend with other obstacles. Opposition was growing in Britain. In March 1922, Edwin Montagu gave the Indian Viceroy permission to publish a note which stated that the King's Moslem subjects would not stand for a continued anti-Turkish policy. It was a gesture which cost Montagu his
career, but it helped create an atmosphere in which it was impossible for Greece to raise the loan she needed to continue the fight. Yet, in the face of these setbacks and obstacles, Curzon still encouraged Gounaris: to hold on to Anatolia.  

This advice was not so dubious as it seems at first sight. By the end of March 1922 events had come almost full circle from the previous March. Despite the diplomatic and military setbacks which Britain's Turkish policy had suffered, it was still possible that a successful military operation would cut the Gordian Knot and break Turkish resistance. But the chances of a Greek success were now infinitely more remote. The Greek army had not stood up well to the severe Anatolian winter. Weary after three years' fighting, ill-fed and poorly equipped, the army's morale had sunk to a very low point. The Turks, on the other hand, had been steadily gaining strength throughout the winter months.

It was at this point that several Greek generals decided to write off Anatolia and salvage what they could by holding Eastern Thrace. General Hajianestes believed the taking of Constantinople would scare the Turks into a settlement. On 22 July 1922, to the chagrin of the Allied governments, twenty thousand Greek troops were withdrawn from Smyrna and were landed in Thrace. Their march on Constantinople was thwarted by General Harington, who on his own authority told the Greeks that any advance on Constantinople would be resisted by armed force.
This action was reluctantly endorsed by a furious Lloyd George, who had been hoping for such a deus ex machina to the impasse in Turkey. However, as Harington's act was a proper enforcement of the Treaty of Sèvres, the Prime Minister could not object. Some days later, however, Lloyd George rallied to the Greek cause once more and returned to his fateful policy of implying support when none was to come. In a speech in the Commons on 4 August, he declared;

I forgot who it was who said that we were not fair as between the parties. I am not sure that we are. What has happened? Here is a war between Greece and Turkey. We are defending the capital of one of the parties against the other. We must not overlook that fact, and it is a very important fact. If we were not there, there is absolutely no doubt that the Greeks would occupy the capital in a very few hours, and that would produce a decision. . . . We cannot allow this sort of thing to go on indefinitely. That is the position. We only want to see a just peace established. 45

This was one of the last such speeches that the Prime Minister was to make on the matter. It was to have immediate and far-reaching consequences. In both Athens and Ankara, it was assumed to be a signal for the Greeks to renew their struggle. Parts of it were incorporated into Greek army orders, but it was not they who struck first. Taking advantage of the fact that the twenty thousand Greek soldiers despatched to Thrace had not yet returned to Anatolia, the Nationalists struck along the entire front of the Sakaria River. It was the beginning of a rout. In less than a month there was not a single Greek soldier left in Anatolia save for the prisoners and the dead.
CHAPTER VI

CHANAK

The Greek evacuation of Smyrna and its subsequent occupation by Kemal's forces were accompanied by atrocities similar in nature and scope to those which had marred the Greek landings of three years before. This time, however, the entire Greek part of the city was destroyed by fire. The Greeks and Turks accused each other of starting the fire, but whoever was responsible, the incident was not unwelcome to the Turks. To crown their victory of clearing Anatolia of the Greeks, the seat of Greek commercial power had now been destroyed.

The Turks' elation was not shared in London. Even before the final débâcle at Smyrna, the British government was preparing for Kemal's next move. Once he had cleared the Smyrna area of Greeks, there was little doubt that Kemal would turn north to the Straits. There he would face the Allied forces who occupied the Neutral Zone, the area designated by the Treaty of Sèvres as running along the shores of the Straits and the Sea of Marmora. Kemal was most likely to probe this zone at the town of Chanak on the south side of the Dardanelles. The boundaries of the zone had been drawn in such a way that Chanak could not be easily defended. Any defending force would have to be supplied from
the other side of the Dardanelles. Chanak was garrisoned by a British force of less than one thousand men, which, even with the support of the warships in the Straits, would be hard put to delay Kemal's forty-five thousand man army.

The possibility of such a confrontation caused a great deal of consternation in the British government. A decision had to be reached as soon as possible and this would be difficult. There was more involved than a simple decision whether to make a stand at Chanak or not; the consequences of both alternatives were unattractive.

If it were decided to show Kemal that the British government still intended to enforce the Treaty of Sèvres and hold the Neutral Zone around Chanak, large numbers of troops would have to be found. Little help could be expected from the small garrison at Constantinople. British troops could be brought in from the other parts of the Empire, but most of these were hard pressed to keep order in their own assigned areas, and the use of the Dominions' troops had not yet been considered. Another possibility was a general mobilisation at home, but this would have been an extremely unpopular measure. The Royal Navy could support the Chanak garrison, but naval guns, firing on their flat trajectories, would have been of little use on the hilly terrain around Chanak. The reactions of France and Italy were unpredictable. Could any support be expected from the Allies at all; would they remain neutral or would they even undermine the operation in some way?
The other alternative, that of surrendering Chanak without a fight, was fraught with difficulties of a different nature. For one thing, the prestige of the British Empire would suffer terribly by surrendering to a man who until recently had been considered little more than a bandit chief. Also, Kemal's possession of the Asian side of the Straits would mean loss of freedom of navigation in the waterway. With this gone, it would only be a matter of time before the Nationalists were on the European side of the water. If this happened, one of the great hopes of the Allies, that a civilised polity would replace the barbaric regime of the Turks in Europe, would disappear. Large numbers of Greeks and Armenians living in Constantinople and Eastern Thrace would be in a dangerous position.

To address these problems, the cabinet met on 7 September. Lloyd George still touted the Greeks. He hoped that with new leadership they could be relied upon for support in this emergency. But whatever became of the Greeks, the Turks must not pass. The Prime Minister pointed out to the cabinet, 'In no circumstances could we allow the Gallipoli peninsula to be held by the Turks. It was the most important strategic position in the world and the closing of the Straits prolonged the war by two years.'

The Prime Minister was supported in this attitude by Curzon and Churchill. The Foreign Secretary said that Nationalist possession of Thrace would mean that the 'whole of the fruits of the war as to the Balkan situation would be thrown away.' Churchill, now Colonial Secretary, echoed this by saying that the line of deep water separating Europe from Asia was of great significance and that
As at this time any threat to the Neutral Zone was still only a possibility, the results of the meeting were somewhat inconclusive. The main outcome was that further naval reinforcements were to be brought into the Straits and that Curzon should do his best to persuade the Italians and the French to provide support. If the Nationalists were to challenge Chanak, it was to be given up without a fight, and strong forces on the opposite shore would keep the waterway open to shipping. These ambivalent decisions were made almost a week before the Greek evacuation of Smyrna allowed Kemal to turn his forces northward.

The Cabinet next met to discuss Chanak on 15 September. This meeting was altogether more urgent. Despite Curzon's hopes of an international conference to settle matters between the Greeks and Turks, the main worry was the military situation at Chanak. Acting on his own initiative, General Harington had reinforced the Chanak garrison with troops from Constantinople. He had also accepted some reinforcements from his French and Italian colleagues, Generals Charpy and Mombelli. But even after these additions, the Allied garrison stood at only seven thousand men, hardly a match for Kemal's forty-five thousand.

Lloyd George was still eager to hit the Turks as hard as possible. He began searching for new allies. Now that the Greeks were crushed, he suggested an alliance made up of Czechs,
Roumanians and Serbs. In this the Prime Minister was supported by the Colonial Secretary, who, despite his previous opposition to Lloyd George's Turkish policy, was to be one of the Prime Minister's staunchest allies during the Chanak crisis. The reasons for Churchill's change of view seem to have been a combination of an unwillingness to see Britain lose prestige and a desire to confine any fighting to Asia Minor. Churchill wished the Cabinet to follow the advice of General Harington that if the Straits were to be held, they should be fortified on both sides. There seems to have been little in the way of dissenting opinion at the meeting. Austen Chamberlain was cold at first, but later, along with Hamar Greenwood, he suggested that the Dominions be asked to provide support.

Several decisions were reached at the meeting. Arrangements were made to send reinforcements from Egypt and Malta. The Balkan nations were to be asked for assistance. Finally, Churchill was to draft a telegram for Lloyd George which asked the Dominions for help in a possible war with the Turkish Nationalists.

At the same time that the telegram was despatched, it was released by Churchill as part of a press communiqué on the Turkish situation. This communiqué, which had been composed at Lloyd George's request, outlined the present dangers in the strongest terms. All of Britain's wartime efforts were to be set at nought, and new perils would arise if Kemal crossed into Europe.
The communique claimed that 'The reappearance of the victorious Turk on the European shore would provoke a situation of the gravest character throughout the Balkans, and very likely to lead to bloodshed on a large scale in regions already cruelly devastated.' But, the release said, Britain would stand resolute to prevent this occurrence. In this they would be supported by France and Italy, and the Dominions had been asked for help.  

The statement that France and Italy would help was optimistic in the extreme, if not a downright lie. The reference to the Dominions' telegram was unfortunate. Due to the time differences, some of the Dominion Prime Ministers found out about the telegrams from their newspapers before they had read the message itself. Mackenzie King was unaware of the existence of the telegram until he was asked about it by a reporter. King was cool to the request, viewing it as "an election scheme by Lloyd George & Co." A Cabinet meeting in Ottawa on 18 September produced a reply to the telegram stating "that public opinion in Canada would demand authorisation on the part of Parliament as a necessary preliminary to the despatch of a contingent." The replies from the other Dominions were almost as disappointing. Of the three other Dominions and the colony of Newfoundland, only one, New Zealand, offered help. It was this one favourable reply that the British government chose for release to the press.
For the most part, press reaction to these manoeuvres was not encouraging for Lloyd George. The *Daily Mail* ran a campaign over the next few days to turn public opinion against the possible war, publishing the Canadian and Australian replies to the telegram. The *Times* urged caution. Only the *Daily Express* and the *Daily Chronicle* supported the Prime Minister.¹⁷

The mood of the press at this time mirrored the general unpopularity of the Lloyd George Coalition. Throughout the year it had been subject to attack on several fronts. The British economy had shown little sign of vigour since the end of the war. Inflation was still running at a fairly high rate and wages had not kept pace. The unemployed totalled well over a million. The Honours Scandal of the previous June was to cast doubt on Lloyd George's integrity for the rest of his life. Once an ally of the working classes, the Prime Minister was now despised by labour as he appeared to be in the pockets of the industrialists.¹⁸ Those Conservatives who had disliked and distrusted him for years now found their numbers growing fast. They criticised him for heavy overspending on certain government projects, of which the Housing Scandal was one example. Furthermore, these Conservatives argued that their party had clung to the Prime Minister's coat tails for too long, and that if a move were not made soon to break away from the Coalition, the party could lose its separate identity for good.¹⁹
As well as being embattled at home, Lloyd George had to face more unfavourable developments overseas. On 19 September, the British in Chanak found themselves more isolated than ever. Kemal's forces were advancing on them, and on that day the French and Italian contingents were withdrawn and sent back to Constantinople. This did not indicate a change of policy on the part of France and Italy; the home governments had been against any kind of confrontation with Kemal from the beginning. What seems to have happened is that their generals on the spot had offered assistance to Harington on their own initiative and when the home governments found this out the order was rescinded immediately.  

Despite this, the hard-working Curzon was in Paris on 20 September attempting to create some semblance of Allied unity. He held several stormy meetings with the truculent Poincaré, now President of France. Poincaré said that he would not prevent Kemal from crossing to Europe and Curzon accused Poincaré of bad faith. At one point the Foreign Secretary was reduced to tears, but he did manage to persuade the French and Italians to send a joint note with Britain asking Kemal to discuss the future of the Straits at an international conference. On the same day as the note was sent, 23 September, Lloyd George made a major concession to Kemal. In cabinet he reluctantly agreed to cede Eastern Thrace to Turkey. 

Notwithstanding this concession and the other obstacles with which he was faced, Lloyd George was still determined to hit
the Turks as hard as he could.\textsuperscript{23} He was not quite alone. He had
the support of Lord Birkenhead, Sir Robert Horne and of course
Churchill. Churchill was to record later, "The government might
break up and we might be relieved of our burden. The nation might
not support us: they could find others to advise them. The press
might howl, the Allies might bolt. We intended to force the
Turk to a negotiated peace before he set foot in Europe."\textsuperscript{24}

Preparations for war went ahead. On 23 September, the
cabinet ordered Air Force units and more warships to the area. Two
days later, the cabinet met again. Present were the Chiefs of
Staff of the three armed services. Although there had as yet been
no shots fired between the two sides at Chanak, the situation there
was very tense. Hugh Trenchard, the Air Chief Marshall, stated
that although the Air Force could be of some assistance, it could
not prevent an eastward Kemalist advance towards the Ismid
Peninsula and thence to Constantinople. Admiral Brock expressed
similar limitations for his naval force. It was then proposed by
Lord Lee and accepted by the cabinet that the two eastern garrisons
would be withdrawn if necessary and that all the forces be concen-
trated at Chanak and Gallipoli.\textsuperscript{25}

It is not easy to understand the logic behind this de-
cision. The waterway from the Aegean to the Black Sea has two
narrow; those at Gallipoli and at Constantinople. For safe
passage, control of both narrows is essential. The cabinet decision
contemplated the surrender of one of those narrows. What was the purpose of holding the other? Having crossed to Europe, Kemal could have approached the British position at Gallipoli from the rear and have recreated the situation of 1915. Aside from the strategic aspects of the matter, such a situation would have had drastic political consequences. Lloyd George was unpopular enough. His position would have been untenable were Britain embroiled in a war which had no purpose and which there was no chance of winning. The only possible explanation for the Prime Minister's decision must be that his ingrained hatred of the Turks was such that even under these circumstances he could not bear to lose face by admitting defeat.

Another factor which made Lloyd George's opponents more anxious was that on 27 September a revolution occurred in Greece. For the first time but not the last, a junta of colonels came to power and Constantine was deposed. The king's removal was not unwelcome in western Europe, but the leader of the junta, Colonel Plastiras, began talking of reorganising the army to combat the Turks. What was just as disturbing was that the new government sent Venizelos to London to gain support for the venture. The possibility of a renewed association between Lloyd George and his old friend made even some of his supporters quail. Beaverbrook for one moderated the Express' support for the Prime Minister.

From the 27 September, the cabinet met almost continually. Several of these meetings were inconclusive, but the meeting of
the morning of 28 September produced the most warlike measure to
date. A telegram was despatched to Harington to the effect that
if the Turks were not withdrawn from the Chanak perimeter by a
set hour on 30 September, Harington was to open fire. The local
Turkish commander was to be informed of this.28

Over the next few days the tension increased. The Prime
Minister, Churchill and Horne were all for facing Kemal down and
they were more than ready to go to war. Others showed more re­
straint. Curzon was for giving the Kemalists more time. General
Harington delayed giving the ultimatum to the Turks in the hope
that the danger of war would pass.29 Franklin Bouillon, a French
agent, talked to Kemal in Ankara and tried to persuade him to
accept the terms of the note of 23 September.

Although Harington was for giving the Turks more time,
his superior was not. At a meeting of the cabinet on 29 September,
Worthington Evans, the Minister of War, maintained that delay only
helped Kemal, as he was building up his forces for an all-out
attack. The outcome was that another telegram was sent to
Harington urging him to present the ultimatum without delay.30

The atmosphere at the meetings of 30 September was for
the most part even tenser than the previous day. This was the
day on which Harington was to open fire on the Turks if they had
not moved. But the Turks had not moved and Harington had not
opened fire. Hankey records that there were furious outbursts
from Lloyd George, Churchill and their supporters.31 A telegram
from Harington which asked for more time did not help matters.\textsuperscript{32}

However, a ray of hope came from Paris in the form of a telegram from Hardinge. As a result of Franklin Bouillon's persuasions, Kemal was prepared to negotiate.\textsuperscript{33} On the following day, the cabinet sent a telegram to Constantinople to inform Harington that he was to go to the small town of Mudania on the southern shore of the Sea of Marmara. There he was to negotiate with Kemal. The focus of activity moved from London to Mudania, and the cabinet could now meet less frequently.

The tone of the cabinet meetings of the last few days of September and the 1 October is perhaps best described by Curzon. He related his experiences to Hardinge in a letter on 1 October.

\begin{quote}
I can hardly describe to you the atmosphere in which I have lived during the last few days.

A section of the Cabinet including the P.M., Churchill and the Lord Chancellor with Chamberlain, Horne and others in hot pursuit have been wild for ultimatums, advances, gunfire and war. L.G. has also revived his particular passion for dragging in the Greeks. The General Staff lost their heads and advised that we were going to be first netted in and subsequently beaten at Chanak. . . . I have fought alone against this Ephesian band. They even wanted to fall upon poor Harington who has shown far superior judgement and discretion to theirs, and tear him in pieces. Last night they proposed to veto Mudania, to censure Harington, and let the guns go at Chanak. We have spent the whole day hammering over instructions to Harington and I have sent them to you. . . .

I mean at all costs if I can to avoid war and above all war with Greece on our side; but the struggle is not yet over for some of my colleagues literally smell of gunpowder. \textsuperscript{34}
\end{quote}
The conference at Mudania did not go smoothly and the smell of gunpowder must have been stronger there than in London. Instead of Kemal attending, he had sent his lieutenant, Ismet Bey, who had made his reputation commanding the Nationalists at their two victories in the valley of Inönü.

As Eastern Thrace had already been granted to Kemal in the note of 23 September, all that was left to negotiate was the transfer of power and the length of time the British would remain in Chanak. The Nationalists wanted to move immediately; the British wanted at least a month's delay in order to arrange for the safety of Greek and other Christian minorities.

The talks broke down several times and in Britain anxiety increased as it seemed that war was imminent. On 7 October, Bonar Law, the former leader of the Conservatives wrote a letter to The Times and the Express which castigated the government for its stance on the Chanak affair. As well as a challenge to the government, the letter was a rallying call for the Conservatives in the Coalition to reform the Conservative party as an independent political force. Although it did rally the Conservatives, the letter did not have any effect on Lloyd George and his supporters. They remained as truculent as ever. They responded to the deteriorating situation at Mudania and the menacing posture of the Turks by sending Harington a telegram which ordered him to open fire immediately. Harington received the message on 8 October. With the telegram in his pocket, he faced Ismet. Harington's
terms were that thirty days must pass before the Nationalists were allowed into Eastern Thrace and Constantinople; he wanted Chanak to be held by the British for a little longer. The final details of the negotiations would be agreed upon at a conference at Lausanne later in the year. After a tense pause, Ismet gave in and the Chanak Crisis was over.

The Mudania Convention was signed on 11 October and came into effect at midnight on 14/15 October. Save for one last fiery anti-Turkish speech at the Manchester Reform Club on 14 October, Lloyd George made no more utterances on Turkey when he was Prime Minister. The agreement at Mudania had extinguished any lingering hopes he might have had for the success of his Turkish policy. In fact, the Chanak Crisis was the occasion, if not the cause, of his downfall. The sudden danger of a pointless war had frightened the public. Lloyd George's rash arrogance had compared poorly with Harington's moderation. Bonar Law's letter, too, had left its mark. The Times, the Express and the Daily Mail all proposed Bonar Law as an alternative to Lloyd George. Conservatives, long resentful of the little Welshman's tutelage, now found cause to withdraw their support for his coalition. On 19 October, the Conservative party met at the Carleton Club; by a vote of 187 to 87 it was decided to leave the Coalition. By 5 p.m. on the same day, Lloyd George resigned his premiership. He was replaced by Bonar Law and never regained the power he loved so much. Curzon sur-
vived him and as Foreign Secretary in the Conservative government; he was to take much of the credit for the final settlement of the Eastern Question at the Conference of Lausanne which began in December 1922.
CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

All the major powers influenced the events in post-war Turkey. To assess the importance of the role of each of these powers is difficult; to estimate the influence of individuals within the different governments is even more so. There is little doubt, however, that of all who were involved, Lloyd George bears a major part of the responsibility for the outcome of the course of events. The foreign policy of a nation cannot often be explained adequately in terms of the role of one individual; however, Lloyd George was the chief architect and executor of Britain's post-war Greek and Turkish policies.

The final outcome was far from Lloyd George's aspirations. A defeated, exhausted Greece, and a vigorous, rejuvenated Turkey were the opposite of the Prime Minister's wishes. This is not to mention the fact that the final crisis at Chanak signalled the end of his premiership. Throughout the post-war period, Lloyd George had contrived at a strong Greece which would serve British imperial interests—control of the Straits and the destruction of Turkey. He pursued this policy despite opposition from within the British government, from the British press and from Britain's allies. In the early stages, some mitigation of his demands might well have
secured a good part of what he wanted. Yet the zeal with which he pursued his ambitions was to prevent their realisation.

The question as to why he adopted this policy still remains. There are several possible explanations, but three in particular deserve closer consideration. The first is Lloyd George's fondness for the Greeks, the second his hatred for the Turks, and the third his perception of the needs of British imperial security. His affection for Greece can be traced back to before the war and was founded in old liberal notions, religious sentiment and democratic ideals. These feelings found a focus in Venizelos, to whom the Welshman became firmly attached. Yet even after Venizelos fell from power in 1920, and the chances that Greece would ever realise her goal grew steadily more remote, the Prime Minister remained constant. Both publicly and privately, Lloyd George encouraged the Greeks in their operations against the Turks. In the face of scepticism from various government departments and from other governments, he supported the Greeks in the summer of 1920 in launching what was to be a successful campaign against the Kemalists. At the London Conference of the following March, he secretly told the Greeks to try their luck against the Turks once more, in spite of the peace negotiations which were in progress. Publicly, his support for Greece never wavered, as his speech to the Commons on 4 August 1922 indicates.

It has been remarked that, despite its constancy, Lloyd George's support for Greece was only superficial, that it never
went beyond words. No British troops were ever dispatched to aid the Greeks even when, under the Treaty of Sèvres, this might have been possible. It might seem that Lloyd George's support stopped where it would have cost men and money to go further. Yet such suggestions disregard the fact that the domestic situation in Britain precluded the possibility of military and financial aid for the Greeks. Also, given the opposition to his Greek policy, there was a limit as to how far he could go.

Lloyd George's hatred for the Turks stemmed from the same roots as his love for the Greeks, and the Turks were everything the Greeks were not. They were not democratic, even after the Young Turk revolution; they were of an alien religion and it was a liberal tradition to hate the Turks and their brutality. Their participation in the war only magnified in Lloyd George a hostility to them which had been apparent before the war.

How closely related were Lloyd George's feelings towards these people? Was his love for Greece born out of his hatred for Turkey, or was his punitive Turkish policy a result of his wish to see Greece prosper? A good case could be made in support of both these possibilities. The most likely explanation is that at first—before the First World War—these feelings were only loosely associated, and that during the war the chance to defeat Turkey and subsequently punish her gave him the opportunity to indulge his liking for the Greeks. Lloyd George's feelings for Greece and Turkey gradually became so entwined as to become inextricable.
These sentiments fitted very comfortably into Lloyd George's perception of the needs of British imperial security in the eastern Mediterranean. It has been said, in a slightly different context, that, in the Middle East, Lloyd George sought Britain's interest and God's purpose. Whether this was because of genuine Christian convictions, or a readiness to impress his non-conformist supporters is a moot point. Nevertheless, the notion of fostering the growth of a client Christian state at the expense of the Moslem Turks sat well with him. As early as 1912, he had adopted the notion of an enlarged Greece as an agent of British imperial interests in the eastern Mediterranean. Over the years, this idea took deep root in Lloyd George's mind. Nine years later, in 1921, he was still advocating the idea as strongly as ever. He saw the Greeks as a vigorous people representing Christianity against barbarism. He saw them as a potentially strong naval power, who, if supported and cultivated, would be invaluable in protecting Britain's communications.

It is debatable whether this vision of Lloyd George was grounded in reality. Her relatively small population, and after the war, her increasing military and economic debilitation, made it doubtful that Greece could have expanded to the extent that Lloyd George wished. Even had she done so, the instability of her governments made it unlikely that her friendship and gratitude to Britain would have lasted long. Criticism to this effect came from Sir Henry Wilson, Chief of the Imperial General
Wilson questioned Greece's ability to fulfill such a role. He also suggested that Britain's real interests lay in strong ties with Turkey. He argued this not only from the aspect of security in the Mediterranean, but with regard to the sentiments of Britain's Moslem subjects throughout the Empire. Moreover, after the establishment of the Bolsheviks in Russia, a good case was made that Britain should cultivate a friendly Turkey as a bulwark against Russia.

If Lloyd George's support of Greece was for the combination of reasons stated above, two other questions remain. The first is concerned with the Prime Minister's persistence in a policy which had such unfortunate results on Britain's relations with her former allies, which showed increasing impossibility of success, and which drew strong opposition from within the British government. The second asks how he was able to follow such a course at all.

The reason for the Prime Minister's adherence to the policy seems to have been a combination of ignorance and stubbornness. Given the events, it is hard to see how someone so astute as Lloyd George could have so completely misread the signs. He overestimated the strength and endurance of the Greeks and he completely misunderstood the strength and nature of the Kemalist movement. With this in mind, the conclusion must be drawn that once Lloyd George had established a policy for Greece and Turkey, he never revised it, no matter how much this might have been required by the circumstances. Whenever a crisis occurred in the area he reverted to his original
plan without either troubling or being able to take the time to devise a new one. This seems all the more likely when one considers all the other issues which confronted the Prime Minister during those years, a good many of which must have seemed more urgent than what was happening to the Turks or to the Greeks. Internationally, there were innumerable conferences concerning the post-war treaties. At home, the situation was no less demanding. There was the problem of his position within the Coalition, Labour problems, the housing and honours scandals, and the Irish question to name only some. Frances Stevenson, Lloyd George's secretary, rarely mentions Turkey in her diary of the time. Lloyd George's lack of preparedness on the finer points of the issue confirms that he had taken little time to learn the complexities of the issue.

Another factor which contributed to the Prime Minister's tenacity was the nature and source of the opposition to his policy within the government. The chief sources were the Unionists, the Foreign Office and the War Office. Lloyd George had little liking for the Unionists and he held the Foreign Office in contempt. His experience during the war had taught him to distrust the advice of the 'experts' at the War Office. The opposition from these groups made Lloyd George all the more determined to carry out his policy, and give him gratification when events seemed to prove him right.

There is still the question as to how the Prime Minister was able to carry out his policy in the face of opposition
from Britain's allies and from within his own government. None of
the other major powers encouraged Lloyd George in his Greek policy,
but for several reasons, their influence had little effect on the
Prime Minister. The possibility that the United States might play
an important role in the future of Turkey intrigued Lloyd George
for the greater part of 1919.\textsuperscript{16} However, the American abdication
in November 1919 of any such involvement left France as the only
major power which might have influenced him. France did oppose
Lloyd George's policy, as her gradual rapproch\`ement with the
Nationalists shows. On the other hand, certain other considera-
tions forced France to co-operate with Britain, first in drafting
the Treaty of Sevres and later in enforcing it, however reluctantly.\textsuperscript{17}
This ambivalent behaviour mitigated the effect that any French
criticism might have had.

The unusual nature of Lloyd George's premiership is
still a subject of controversy. The amount of executive power
he had is difficult to determine.\textsuperscript{18} In the context of the Turkish
situation after the war, however, it is evident that he enjoyed a
considerable amount of freedom in imposing his wishes. This is
not to say that he was free to carry out his Greek and Turkish
policies without interference. The Cabinet decision of January
1920 to abandon the notion of expelling the Turks from Constantinople,
the withdrawal of financial support to Greece in 1921, General
Harington's repulse of the Greek advance on Constantinople in
July 1922 all show that there were limits to the Prime Minister's power.

Against this must be weighed what Lloyd George was able to accomplish. His work in framing the Treaty of Sèvres, his support of the Greek landings in Smyrna, and his subsequent encouragement of their campaigns, all in the face of strident opposition from many sources within the government, indicate that his ability to execute an unpopular policy was much greater than that enjoyed by other British Prime Ministers of this century.

Lloyd George did have some support for his Greek policy. We have seen that he received support from Eyre Crowe. He was also aided by Philip Kerr, the member of the Prime Minister's Secretariat who was responsible for foreign affairs. Like Lloyd George, Kerr was contemptuous of the Foreign Office and he was as much a phil-hellene as the Prime Minister. He worked hard to justify the Prime Minister's Greek policy to its many critics. Another source of support was Sir Maurice Hankey of the Cabinet Secretariat. Although Hankey had expressed misgivings about the Greek landings at Smyrna, he was subsequently a strong proponent of the Prime Minister's policy.

Such support from his advisors was no doubt of assistance to Lloyd George. However, the freedom which enabled him to prosecute his policy is directly attributable to the disunity of the opposition from within the government. The Foreign Office
had been weakened during Balfour's term as Foreign Secretary. Curzon, his successor, lacked the resolution to successfully oppose the Prime Minister. Moreover, once the Treaty of Sévres was signed, he worked to preserve its substance. Within the Foreign Office, there was disunity over the Turkish issue.\textsuperscript{22} It was not only the Foreign Office which was divided. Over several important issues, the main sources of opposition to Lloyd George's policy failed to reach an agreement among themselves. The intra-government debate over Turkey before the Paris Peace Conference and the sharp exchange between Curzon and Montagu show this clearly.\textsuperscript{23} Thus, while Lloyd George was ultimately circumscribed in the scope of his actions, he did enjoy a great amount of freedom to carry out his policy.

It could be argued that the opposition, disorganised as it was, impeded Lloyd George sufficiently to ensure the failure of his policy. Yet had the Greeks been as strong and resilient, the Turks as weak as Lloyd George believed, the Prime Minister's plan would have succeeded despite the opposition. The fundamental flaw in Lloyd George's plan was his overestimation of the Greeks and his underestimation of the Turkish Nationalists.

The Chanak Crisis and the fall of Lloyd George ended the period in which Anglo-Turkish relations were at their worst. The Treaty of Lausanne was signed on 24 July 1923. Curzon played a major part in drafting the Treaty,\textsuperscript{24} and its terms satisfied most of the Nationalists' demands. Complete control of the Straits
passed to Turkey in 1936 under the terms of the Montreux Convention, to which Great Britain was a signatory. By this time, under Kemal's tutelage, the Turkish Republic had established itself as a stable and peaceable democracy. None of Lloyd George's fears of Turkish barbarism in Europe or his concern over the freedom of the Straits had proven justified, and friendly relations had developed between Britain and Turkey. The rapprochement continued and in 1938 and 1939, Britain gave loans to Turkey for her economic development. Shortly after the beginning of the Second World War, Britain, France and Turkey signed the Treaty of Mutual Assistance. Among other things, this agreement gave Turkey guarantees against German aggression. It was signed on 19 October 1939, within a few days of the twenty-fifth anniversary of Turkey's entry into the First World War.
FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER I

1 Harry N. Howard, The Partition of Turkey, A Diplomatic History (New York: 1933).


These included the National Bank of Turkey, the Constantinople Telephone Company, railways and diverse mining and manufacturing interests; Gottlieb, Diplomacy, Chapter 1, passim; Ulrich Trumpener, Germany and the Ottoman Empire 1914-1918 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), pp. 9-12.

Among other things these investments included a thirty per cent interest in the Bagdad Railway, the tobacco monopoly and sixty two per cent of the Ottoman Debt, which in 1914 totalled £143,200,000; Gottlieb, Diplomacy, Chapter 1, passim; Trumpener, Germany and the Ottoman Empire, pp. 9-12.

For an account of the activities of the CUP between 1908 and 1914, see Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 210-230; Andrew Mango "The Young Turks," in Middle East Studies 8 (January 1972), pp. 107-117.


The closure of the Straits in September 1914 had a disastrous effect on Russia, as it starved her of vital war materials. With the Baltic closed by the German Fleet, the only other routes open to the western allies were the difficult one to Archangel and the impossibly lengthy one from the Pacific through Siberia.
A short but comprehensive account of Turkey's entry into the First World War is given in Z.A.B. Zeman's *A Diplomatic History of the First World War*, pp. 49-60; see also Trumpener, *Germany and the Ottoman Empire*, pp. 21-61; Weber, *Eagles on the Crescent*, pp. 16-58.


When referring to the period, Grey has recorded; "... It had always been our policy to keep Russia out of Constantinople and the Straits. We fought for that object in the Crimean War ... and it was our main policy under Beaconsfield ... of course it was our policy still." Edward Grey, *Twenty Five Years 1892-1916* (London: 1925), Vol. II, pp. 180-181.


In the early months of the war the Turkish Sultan, in his fear of repercussions among the Moslems in the Empire caused consternation in several government departments, but particularly in the India Office. When Montagu became Secretary of State for India in 1917 he took up the cry that Britain's Turkish policy should, as far as possible, be such as to avoid upsetting the Moslems of the Empire. It is doubtful, however, whether the declaration of a *Jihad* had any effect at all upon the course of the war.


18 Churchill has claimed that the planning for an attack on Gallipoli was actually under way before the Allied declarations of war on Turkey. Winston Churchill, The World Crisis, 1915. (London: 1923), pp. 46-47, cited in Klieman, "Britain's War Aims," p. 238.


20 In a memorandum dated 1 January 1915, Lloyd George proposed sending an expedition to Syria to defeat the Turks, arguing that every possible means of bringing the war to a successful conclusion should be explored. Klieman, "British War Aims," p. 239.

21 C.P. Scott, Journals, 27 November 1914, 50901, cited in Rothwell, British War Aims and Peace Diplomacy, p. 126.


Gottlieb, Diplomacy, pp. 317-318.

On 19 August 1914, Venizelos had sent a message to Grey in which, seemingly with Constantine's approval, he placed the Greek forces at the disposal of the Entente. Grey, wishing to avoid complications in the Balkans, had politely declined the offer. This refusal was later to be regretted; Lloyd George wrote, "The practical refusal of this offer of an effective Greek alliance was therefore a stupendous error of judgement. It turned out to be a calamitous error, not only for both Britain and Greece, but also for the world, for it prolonged this devastating war for two years." David Lloyd George, The Truth About the Peace Treaties (London: Gollancz, 1938), Vol. II, p. 1209. See also, Michael Llewellyn Smith, Ionian Vision (London: Penguin, 1973), p. 35; C. Jay Smith Jr., "Great Britain and the Straits," p. 1019.


Kedourie, England and the Middle East, pp. 31, 34-35.

However, some areas were under dispute. Kitchener, for one, favoured strong British influence in southern Palestine in order to protect the Suez Canal. Kedourie, England and the Middle East, p. 34.


The Sykes Picot Agreement can be found in D.B.F.P., First Series, Vol. IV, pp. 245-247, Grey to Cambon, 16 May 1916.

The Mosul vilayet was included in the French area A in order to provide a buffer between Russian and British possessions. See Rothwell, British War Aims, p. 29.


Smith, Ionian Vision, p. 18.

See nn. 21 and 22.

Rothwell, British War Aims, pp. 126-127.

This ill-feeling towards the Turks was no doubt heightened by the fact that at this time, the Turks were carrying out an almost successful attempt at genocide on the Armenian people. See Trumpener, Germany and the Ottoman Empire, pp. 67, 125, 361, 369.

There were some dissenters, including Bonar Law and the War Office. See Rothwell, War Aims, p. 127; Memo. by Hardinge, 1 November 1916, F.O. 371/2780/173725/48.

Rothwell, War Aims, p. 65.


Rothwell, War Aims, p. 5.

Several of these men were members of the Round Table. For an insight into this 'open conspiracy' of imperialists, its aims and effectiveness, see Elizabeth Monroe's "The Round Table and the Middle Eastern Peace Settlement," Round Table 60 (November, 1970), pp. 479-490.

In the post-war negotiations over a Turkish peace settlement, it was argued that as the Russian government had never ratified the Treaty of Saint Jean de Maurienne, Italy's claims were therefore void. See below, Chapter III.


An account of the situation at this time between the western Allies and Russia is given in L.P. Morris' "The Russians, the Allies and the War, February - July 1917," Slavonic and Eastern European Review 50 (January, 1972), pp. 29-48. See also Hardinge to Beaumont, 1 February 1917, Hardinge Papers, H.P. 29/332; Hardinge to Hirtzel 14 April 1917, HP 31/147.

Rothwell, War Aims, p. 131.

As well as the desire for a separate Turkish peace, this might have been prompted by a growing realisation on the part of Britain that the Italian contribution to the allied war effort had not lived up to original expectations.

Rothwell, War Aims, pp. 135-136.


Hardinge to Granville, 19 November 1917, Hardinge Papers HP 35/178. Minute by Drummond, 15 December 1917, F.O. 371/104218117/132; Minute by Cecil, 15 December 1917, F.O. Ibid.

Rothwell, War Aims, p. 176.


Rothwell, War Aims, p. 175.

Gwynne Dyer, "The Turkish Armistice of 1918," Middle East Studies 8 (October, 1972), p. 313; Jacob to Graham, 6 April 1918, F.O. 146/18; Hardinge to Wingate 28 February 1918, Hardinge Papers, HP 36/324.

59. War Cabinet 24/6/18 Cab 23/6.

60. Wingate to Hardinge, 16 July 1918, Hardinge Papers Hp 38/149-53; Memo by George Lloyd, August 1918, Cecil Papers RCP 51094/55; Memo by Nicolson, August 1918, RCP 51094/25-37.


63. Hankey to Balfour, 12 August 1918, Cecil Papers, RCP 51094/16.


65. Busch, Mudros, pp. 12-20. For the text of the Mudros Armistice, see Dyer, "Turkish Armistice," Appendix I.
CHAPTER III


5 See above, p. 20.


7 Memo by Hardinge on the fate of Constantinople, 13 December 1918, F.O. 371/3417.


9 Helmreich, *Sèvres*, p. 16.


12 But not all. They were adamant that Syria be theirs. See Helmreich, *Paris to Sevres*, pp. 64-65; Busch, *Mudros to Lausanne*, p. 85.

14 Harry N. Howard, Turkey, the Straits and United States Policy (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974), p. 45.

15 Helmreich, From Paris to Sévres, p. 22.

16 Howard, Turkey, the Straits and U.S. Policy, p. 53.


18 Drummond to Balfour, 5 December 1918, F.O. 371/3385.

19 Imperial War Cabinet Minutes, 20 December 1918, Cab. 23/42. (London, Public Record Office).


21 Busch, Mudros to Lausanne, p. 79.

22 Memo by Curzon on the future of Constantinople, 2 January 1919, Cab. 29/2.

23 Memo by E.S. Montagu on the future of Constantinople, 8 January 1919, Cab. 29/2.


26 Curzon, Balfour and Hardinge all opposed Greek possession of Smyrna. See 'A Note of Warning About the Middle East' by Lord Curzon, 25 March 1919, F.O. 608/7037: Balfour to Crowe, 26 March 1919, F.O. 608/94.


31 Lloyd George, *The Truth About the Peace Treaties* 2, pp. 1266-1267.

32 See Chapter II, n. 55.


37 Venizelos seems to have charmed almost everyone who met him, whether or not they sympathised with his aims. Harold Nicolson wrote: "I can't tell you the position Venizelos has here! He and Lenin are the only two really great men in Europe." *Peacemaking 1919*, p. 136: see also Hardinge to Granville, F.O. private, 28 November 1918, HP 39/283.


40 Helmreich, From Paris to Sevres, pp. 84-86; Smith, Ionian Vision, pp. 75-77.


42 It is probable that the Italians' insistence on their rights in Asia Minor was not motivated solely by a determination to enforce the Treaty of Saint Jean de Maurienne for its own sake. At this same time, Italy was involved in contentious negotiations over her claims in the Adriatic. It is likely that she intended to use Asia Minor as a bargaining counter in these negotiations. This supposition is supported by some of Harold Nicolson's observations; "General Talbot, the "friend of Venizelos," comes to tell me in strict secrecy that Sonnino has offered the Greeks a deal under which the Italians would support Greek claims to the Dodecanese and Smyrna, provided the Greeks will give up all claim to northern Epirus and thus give to Albania (i.e., Italy) the coast opposite Corfu. I suggest that Sonnino ... wishes to get "compensation" for a surrender which he may have to make in any case." Nicolson, Peacemaking, p. 246.


44 Lowe and Marzari, Italian Foreign Policy, p. 170.


48 See below, Chapter V, n. 28; Smith, Ionian Vision, p. 15.

FOOTNOTES
CHAPTER IV


2Message from Fitzmaurice to Calthorpe, 10 July 1919, referred to in Calthorpe to Balfour, 10 July 1919, Documents on British Foreign Policy (hereafter referred to as D.B.F.P.). First Series, Vol. IV, p. 680; Message from Fitzmaurice to Calthorpe, 14 July 1919, F.O. 608/91.


5Crowe to Curzon, 2 August 1919, F.O. 608/54.


16. Telegram from Calthorpe to Curzon, "Greek Advance in Western Anatolia, 1 July 1919, F.O. 608/89.


26 Conference of Ministers, 10 December 1919, Cab. 23/35.


35 "The Turkish Peace II," Memorandum by Montagu, 1 January 1920, Curzon Papers 382.

36 Meeting of 6 January 1920, Cab. 23/20.

38 "I ask to place on record my earnest and emphatic dissent from the decision arrived at by the majority of the Cabinet yesterday—in opposition to the advice of the Prime Minister and two successive Foreign Secretaries—to retain the Turk in Constantinople. I believe this to be a short sighted and, in the long run, a most unfortunate decision." Harold Nicolson, Curzon; the Last Phase (London: Constable, 1934), p. 113.

39 Note to Curzon from Berthelot, 11 January 1920, D.B.F.P., First Series, Vol. IV, pp. 1016-1025. The core of the French policy was that France should have a predominant influence in the administration of the new Turkish state, and given her large investments in Turkey, this was likely. It was in her interests, therefore, to see that the new Turkey was as large as possible; to this end, Clemenceau's capitulation of the previous month notwithstanding, the French efforts were directed.

40 Helmreich, Paris to Sèvres, p. 219; Busch, Mudros to Lausanne, pp. 196-197.

41 As a result of the extremely anti-British tenor of the French press, the British had refused to hold the conference in Paris: Memorandum, by Vansittart on French activities in Constantinople, 12 January 1920, F.O. 608/272; Hardinge to Grahame, 12 February 1920, Hardinge Papers, HP 42/130; Grahame to Campbell, 13 February 1920, F.O. 800/153.

42 Helmreich, Paris to Sèvres, p. 222.

43 Smith, Ionian Vision, p. 104; Helmreich, Paris to Sèvres, p. 253; Sonyel argues that reports of the massacre were merely rumours grossly exaggerated for political purposes. See Turkish Diplomacy, p. 26.

44 Sonyel, Turkish Diplomacy, p. 24.

46 Ibid., p. 50.

47 Ibid., p. 54.

48 Curzon to Lloyd George, "Asia Minor and Greece," 9 April 1920, Curzon Papers, CP F/3/3; Curzon to Kerr, 12 March 1920, CP F/3/3.


50 Given the intense hostility between the Greeks and Turks, a Greek occupation was the last thing to guarantee against an upsurge of Turkish hostility.


52 Ibid., p. 119.

53 Ibid., pp. 341-350.

54 Ibid., pp. 128-133.

55 Busch, Mudros to Lausanne, pp. 201-203.

56 Sonyel, Turkish Diplomacy, p. 19.

57 Helmreich, Sèvres, p. 278.


59 Helmreich, Sèvres, p. 282.

60 See p. 4, n41.


63 Cited in Walder, Chanak, p. 84.


67 Howard M. Sachar, The Emergence of the Middle East, 1914-1922, p. 326.

68 Ibid., p. 330.

69 Robeck to Curzon, 8 March 1920, D.B.F.P., First Series, Vol. XIII, p. 17; Robeck to Curzon, 1 April 1920, Ibid., p. 53; General Staff Memo, on the Turkish Peace Treaty, 1 April 1920; Ibid., pp. 54-57; Gilbert, Churchill, p. 485.

FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER V


14. Conclusions of a Conference of Ministers, 18 February 1921, Cab. 23/24/14, Appendix I.


21. Final Interview between the Greek Delegation and Mr. Lloyd George, 19 March 1921, India Office Library, 10L Mss Curzon, F/1/7.


24. CP 46/2981, 1921.
Montgomery, "Greek Question," pp. 275-276; Smith, 
Ionian Vision, pp. 216-217; Martin Gilbert, Winston Churchill: The 
pp. 590-592.

Lloyd George to Curzon, 16 June 1921, India Office 
Library, 1OL Mss Eur Curzon, F/4/3 G-L.


Churchill, World Crisis, p. 415.

Walder, Chanak, p. 120.

W.S. Churchill, World Crisis (London: 1923-31), Vol. V, 
p. 417. For a summary of Churchill's reasons for opposing Lloyd 
Goerge's policy at this time, see Gilbert, Stricken World, pp. 
590-591.

Howard M. Sachar, The Emergence of the Middle East, 1914- 

For Curzon's feelings on the matter, see Curzon's 
letters to Hardinge, 2 November 1921, Harding Papers HP 44/251-4; 
28 and 29 November 1921, HP 44/277-80.

Sonyel, Turkish Diplomacy, pp. 137-138; Nicolson, 

Sachar, Middle East, p. 430.

Lowe & Dockrill, Mirage, p. 369.

Above, p. 371.

Montgomery, Greek Question, p. 279.

Above, p. 284.

Correspondence between His Majesty's Government and the 
French Government Respecting the Angora Agreement of 20 October 
1921, Command Papers, CP 1970, 1922.
Minutes of a Fifth Meeting Between Lord Curzon, MM Gounaris, Baltazzis and Ragnabe, 19 November 1921, Command Papers, CP 3504.

Montgomery, Greek Question, pp. 277-278.

Larew, Greco Turkish War, p. 267.

Above, p. 268.

Montgomery, Greek Question, p. 282; Larew, Greco-Turkish War, p. 268.

FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER VI


2 See attached map.

3 Since the end of the First World War, both India and Egypt had experienced nationalist disturbances.

4 War-weariness and the economic situation would have made this an extremely unpopular choice. See above, p. 52.

5 A full grasp of the military situation seems to have eluded the cabinet for quite some time. As late as 25 September they were unaware that the Chanak parameter was four, not fifteen miles long. Cab 24/39, 25 September, CP 4235.


7 Cab 23/31/48 7 September 1922.

8 Cab 23/31/48; Gilbert, Churchill, p. 820.


10 Rumbold to Curzon, 14 September, 1922, Documents on British Foreign Policy (hereafter referred to as D.B.F.P.), First Series, Vol. XVIII, pp. 21-22.

12 Gilbert, Churchill, pp. 827-829.

13 An explanation for this volte face is to be found in Churchill's The World Crisis: The Aftermath, pp. 445-448. "But surely the last word had not yet been spoken; surely there was still time, not indeed to retrieve the disaster, but at least to bring about a peace which would leave the Allies some vestiges of respect and would protect Europe from a new conflagration. ... If indeed unhappily he [the Turk] re-entered Europe, it could be by Treaty, and not by violence. Defeat is a nauseating draught: and that the victors in the greatest of all wars should gulp it down, was not readily to be accepted. ... So having done my utmost for three years to procure a friendly peace with Mustapha Kemal and the withdrawal of the Greeks from Asia Minor, and having consistently opposed my friend the Prime Minister upon this issue, I now found myself whole-heartedly upon his side in resisting the consequences of a policy which I had condemned." See also; Roskill, Hankey, p. 289; Walder, Chanak, p. 191; Gilbert, Churchill, p. 285.

14 Curzon's ideas were not available to this meeting. He was bedridden as a result of a persistent back ailment.

15 The working of the communique was approved by the principal members of the Cabinet, although the ailing Curzon's opinion was not sought. See Walder, Chanak, p. 224.

16 R. MacGregor Dawson, William Lyon Mackenzie King, 1874-1923, pp. 410-411. Lloyd George countered this rebuff by requesting Canada to indicate that she would "stand by the Empire," to which King chillingly responded that "we have not thought it necessary to reassert the loyalty of Canada to the British Empire." Dawson's Mackenzie King, loc. cit.

17 The Daily Express, 18 September 1922, The Daily Chronicle, 18 September 1922.


Telephone message from Hardinge, 20 September 1922, Cab 24/139.


Cabinet Committee, 23 September 1922, Cab 23/31; Roskill, Hankey, p. 288.

Walder, Chanak, p. 255.


Cab 24/139, 25 September 1922.

Smith, Ionian Vision, pp. 312-316; Walder Chanak, pp. 266-268.

The Daily Express, 26 September 1922. The Daily Chronicle remained steadfastly loyal throughout the whole of the Chanak Crisis.


Curzon to Hardinge, 1st October 1922, Hardinge Papers, HP/45. For a full account of General Harington's part in the Chanak Crisis,

Curzon to Rumbold 1 October 1922, D.B.F.P., pp. 120-123.

Roskill, Hankey, p. 291; Gilbert, Churchill, pp. 845-848; for documentation of Cabinet minutes, see Busch, p. 355, n. 83.


34 Curzon to Hardinge, 1 October 1922, Hardinge Papers, HP/45.

35 See above, p. 85.

36 The Times, 7 October 1922; The Daily Express, 7 October 1922.

37 Walder, Chanak, p. 315.

38 Walder, Chanak, p. 316.

39 Nicolson, Curzon, p. 279; Walder, Chanak, p. 322. The full text of the speech can be found in The Daily Chronicle, 16 October 1922.
FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER VII

1 See above, pp. 18-19.

2 Above, pp. 60-61.

3 Above, pp. 69-70.

4 Above, p. 77.


9 Above, p. 72, n. 28.


11 Above, pp. 20-21.

12 Chapter I, p. 6, n. 7.

14 Chapter I, p. 6, n. 8.

15 Above, p. 70, n. 26; p. 71, n. 27.

16 Above, Chapters III and IV.

17 Above, p. 31.


22 Above p. 35.

23 Above, p. 34.


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