STUDIES IN THE LIVES OF
THE SONS OF CONSTANTINE

by
EDWARD GEORGE WILSON
B.A., University of Victoria, 1965
M.A., University of British Columbia, 1968

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Department of Classics

The University of British Columbia
2075 Wesbrook Place
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ABSTRACT

The reigns of the emperor Constantine the Great and of his nephew Julian the Apostate have fascinated scholars from the fourth century to the present day. Some have seen in Constantine the founder of the Middle Ages and in Julian the last flowering of the pagan world. However, the eighteen years that passed between the death of Constantine in 337 and the proclamation of Julian as Caesar in 355 have received very little attention because of the paucity of the sources for this period. Only O. Seeck, in his monumental Geschichte des Untergang der antiken Welt (Stuttgart 1922), and G. Gigli, in his notes entitled La dinastia dei secondi Flavii: Costantino II, Costante, Costanzo II (337-361) (Rome 1959), have attempted a detailed analysis of this period, but Seeck's volume, though still essential, has been rendered somewhat dated by recent numismatic and prosopographical studies while Gigli's, which is far less thorough, emphasizes the religious problems of the age at the expense of the political. The task undertaken in this study is to determine the workings of the court during the period for which source-material is poorest (i.e., 337-353) and to show how the government ruled with an iron hand by Constantine I degenerated into the weak administration of Constantius II as revealed in the first surviving books of Ammianus Marcellinus.

Because the period under consideration is poorly documented in
the literary sources, thorough use has been made of the epigraphical, numismatic, and legal sources. The study of the policies and practices of the sons of Constantine is aided to a great extent by an examination of the careers of both their appointees and their opponents. At times the politics of the period are reflected in the contemporary religious disputes, especially in the struggle of Athanasius to overcome the Arian heresy. In other cases the workings of the government can be discerned in the careers of prominent bureaucrats, especially the grand chamberlain Eusebius and the praetorian prefects Ablabius, Flavius Philippus, and Fabius Titianus. These chapters encompass the training of the sons (including Crispus, Constantine II, Constantius II, and Constans), the massacre of their relatives upon the death of their father, the dispute between Constantine II and Constans, the joint reign of Constantius II and Constans, the overthrow of Constans by Magnentius, and the recovery of the West by Constantius II.

The main conclusion reached is that the characters and reigns of the sons of Constantine were determined for the most part not by heredity, nor by the instructions of their father, but by their teachers during their youth and by their advisers at court after the death of their father. Constantine the Great both reigned and ruled, since he had the training of a soldier and achieved supremacy by careful strategy against considerable odds. His sons, however, succeeded to the throne before they were old enough to shake off the influence of their courtiers and can be said only to have reigned, not to have ruled. The executions of their half-brother Crispus and their mother Fausta rendered them suspicious and insecure, to the end that they trusted only
the bureaucrats at court and feared the prefects and generals in the provinces and even one another. A great barrier arose between the three sons and the problems of their subjects. This barrier, the central bureaucracy, grew more corrupt while the initiative of the armies and provincials was sapped. The weakness of the three sons foreshadows that of Arcadius and Honorius in the twilight of the Roman Empire.
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E. G. W.

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DEDICATIO

In Memoriam

P. C. F. Guthrie

Viri Docti atque Amicissimi
ABBREVIATIONS

For the most part, ancient authors and texts are given according to the standard abbreviations found in Liddell and Scott and Lewis and Short. References to modern works are frequently given by author and short title. Both ancient and modern works are listed in their complete forms in the bibliography, where details for the following abbreviations can be found. Whenever possible, the standard abbreviations listed in *L'Année Philologique* are utilized.

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<td>AAT</td>
<td><em>Atti della Accademia delle Scienze di Torino</em></td>
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<td>AE</td>
<td><em>L'Année Épigraphique</em></td>
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<td>AIPhO</td>
<td><em>Annuaire de l'Institut de Philologie et d'Histoire Orientales de l'Université Libre de Bruxelles</em></td>
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<td>AJP</td>
<td><em>American Journal of Philology</em></td>
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<td>BAGB</td>
<td><em>Bulletin de l'Association Guillaume Budé</em></td>
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<td>Budé</td>
<td><em>Les belles lettres: Collection des universités de France publiée sous le patronage de l'association Guillaume Budé</em></td>
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<td>ByzZ</td>
<td><em>Byzantinische Zeitschrift</em></td>
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<td>CAAH</td>
<td><em>Cahiers alsaciens d'Archéologie, d'Art et d'Histoire</em></td>
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<td>CAH</td>
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<td>CIL</td>
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<td>Cohen</td>
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<td>CRAI</td>
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<td>LRBC</td>
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<td>NC</td>
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NPNF Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church
NZ Numismatische Zeitschrift
PBA Proceedings of the British Academy
PG Patrologia Graeca
PL Patrologia Latina
RBN Revue Belge de Numismatique
RE A. Pauly et al., Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft
REA Revue des Études Anciennes
RFIC Rivista di Filologia e d'Istruzione Classica
RIC Roman Imperial Coinage
RhM Rheinisches Museum für Philologie
RN Revue Numismatique
San Journal of the Society of Ancient Numismatics
SNR Schweizerische Numismatische Rundschau
SPFB Sborník Prací Filosofické Fak
Stein-Palanque E. Stein and J.-R. Palanque, Histoire du bas-empire I
Teubner Bibliotheca Teubneriana
ZAnt Živa Antike
CHAPTER ONE

THE SONS AS CAESARS

(1) Problem of the Imperial Succession

On 22 May 337 Constantine the Great died at Nicomedia while making preparations for an expedition against the Persian forces of Sapor II. For some twenty years he had been making provisions for the succession in the event of his sudden demise and it was now that they would come to the test. His solution to the problem of ensuring a peaceful transition of the imperial authority was based upon his own successful rise to power after the death of his father Constantius I. Seeing the strong appeal of dynastic loyalty in his own case, Constantine had determined to place his confidence in the members of his own family, thereby rejecting the artificial system of Diocletian, itself a result of Diocletian's lack of a son, and the forced military proclamations of the third century. Constantine did succeed in eliminating the active role of the army immediately after his death, but he failed to stifle completely the machinations of the officers at court, themselves eager to make use of the army for their own ends. In order to put the imperial succession of 337 into its context, it will be necessary first to survey the practices that had evolved during the first three centuries of the Empire and, secondly, to describe the changes in plans for the succession, changes dictated partly by political considerations.
and partly by the growth of the imperial family. This will lead to an appreciation of the problems faced by the administration upon the death of the elder statesman.

During the course of the Empire few methods had been utilized in order to achieve change and continuity in administration. The primary weakness was that, apart from natural death, the only means of securing a change was the violent one of revolution. The growth of absolutism rendered increasingly impractical the continued existence of the rejected autocrat. Thus there was no alternative to the outright murder of such as Gaius and Domitian. There were no specified rules, agreed upon by the major segments of the community, for ensuring continuity in administration, but certain influences achieved a primary place. The hereditary principle, so powerful in the great families of the Republic, continued to be dominant in the Principate, being transferred simply from the private to the public sphere. Claudius was chosen despite his enforced obscurity, but the common practice was for the intended successor, usually the closest male relation, to be granted at least some of the chief powers and, above all, public acclaim in preparation for his future rule. In this way Augustus reinforced the principle of heredity, and most of his successors followed suit. The Senate of Rome preferred to think that it played a primary part in determining the executive branch in government, but it could enjoy success only when its members acted as one, as, for instance, when it succeeded in rallying public support behind Balbinus and Pupienus. Under normal circumstances, however, the senators themselves were leading contenders for the executive post; this situation merely reflected the
competition among the great families during the late Republic. The Assembly of Rome played no role during the imperial period.

In an empire that owed both its beginning and its continued existence to military might, the army can be expected to have played a fundamental role, and so it did. Military dissatisfaction was the main reason for Nero's suicide; the Senate condemned him only after hearing of Galba's revolt. Whenever there was a revolt against the last surviving member of a dynasty, military anarchy was bound to ensue until one commander should emerge supreme. If he had offspring of his own, as Vespasian had, he was bound by practical considerations, if not by paternal affection, to groom them for the succession. If, like Hadrian, he had no male heirs, he could resort to the adoption of a favourite in order to ensure continuity. The army showed a strong tendency to favour the dynastic system, supporting Elagabalus after the murder of Caracalla and Severus Alexander in turn after the sudden demise of its former favourite. Crises were bound to arise whenever dynasties ended, especially when many outstanding candidates were available and pressure on the frontiers made a rapid choice desirable. This was the case after the murder of Alexander, and in the ensuing years several emperors, such as Philip the Arab, attempted to provide a peaceful succession by the nomination of their sons to the post of Caesar, but did so in vain because of the weakness of their own position; the son was invariably slaughtered with the father. Diocletian was the first to consolidate his power for an extended period. He did this by anticipating the action of the army, appointing a colleague in the administration. When this diarchy proved to be incapable of managing all the concerns, it was
enlarged to the status of a tetrarchy by the addition of two Caesars. Diocletian had no son and was compelled to choose outside his family for a junior partner. His fellow Augustus, Maximian, had a son but was persuaded to bypass him on the ground of his insufficient years. Two outsiders, Constantius I and Galerius, were adopted and each was forced to repudiate his own spouse and to marry the daughter of his Augustus. We can be certain that Diocletian acted as he did as a result of necessity; he had no son and had to choose another. Maximian's son was excluded because of his youth; the time had not yet arrived when conditions were so settled that striplings could succeed to the throne. The tetrarchy worked well but Diocletian determined that he and his colleague should abdicate and entrust their powers to younger men. This being the case, new Caesars had to be chosen. If the standard earlier practice has been followed, Maximian's son Maxentius and Constantius I's son Constantine would have been chosen. Galerius had a son Candidianus who was still a mere boy. Maxentius and Constantine were now old enough but were rejected as lacking in subservience to Galerius. The hereditary method was abandoned once again and Diocletian resorted to Maximin Daia, a nephew of Galerius, and to Severus, both loyal supporters of the eastern rulers. Diocletian lived to see his house of cards in ruins. The second tetrarchy (with Constantius I and Galerius as Augusti and Severus and Maximin Daia as Caesars) was soon seen to violate the basic instincts of the army. When Constantius I died suddenly at York in 306, his army totally neglected the Caesar Severus and hailed as Augustus Constantius I's own son Constantine. Thus early in his career Constantine beheld the strength of dynastic
loyalty in the army; it was this experience that was to shape his own plans for the succession. The successful revolt of Maxentius at Rome later in the same year served to confirm this loyalty. Ten years passed, during which time the members of the first and second tetrarchies succumbed to disease, old age, murder, and civil war until only Constantine and Licinius, a nominee of Galerius, were left as Augusti. Diocletian had died in retirement. Maximian, after three unsuccessful attempts to regain the imperial power at the expense of his son or of his son-in-law Constantine, was ordered by the latter to yield to the ultimate necessity. Galerius had died of disease, having entrusted his realm to his friend Licinius. Maxentius lost his elder son Romulus in 309 by natural causes and, when he himself was killed at the Milvian Bridge, his wife and younger son were put to death by Constantine, two of the few victims in a purge more characteristic of Constantine's moderation in his early years than of his suspicion and brutality at a later time. Maximin Daia, defeated on the field of battle by Licinius, fled to Tarsus, where he fell ill and died. Licinius, also respecting the strength of dynastic loyalty, next indulged in the greatest imperial bloodbath since the dawn of the Principate. Just as Constantine had eliminated the family of Maxentius, so now Licinius, having gained control of the survivors in the East, set out to destroy all possible claimants to the army's loyalty. All who were in any way related to Maximin Daia or who had taken refuge at his court were endangered. Daia's wife, his eight-year old son, and his seven-year old daughter who had been betrothed to Galerius' son Candidianus, were all put to death. Diocletian's wife Prisca, Galerius' wife Valeria and son
Candidianus, and Severus' son Severianus had all fled to Daia's court, either anticipating that he would emerge the ultimate victor or fearing the suspicious nature of Licinius even before the contest. Candidianus and Severianus were put to death immediately. Valeria and Prisca managed to escape for fifteen months but were found hiding in Thessalonica and put to death; it is quite likely that they were attempting to flee to the court of Constantine, who was increasingly at enmity with Licinius. In this way Licinius eliminated all possible contenders for his power in the East. Several of the chief ministers of Daia, including the financial prefect Peucetius and the former prefect of Egypt, Culcianus, were also put to death. In this way Licinius set a precedent for the mass slaughter that was to follow the death of Constantine, the only difference being that he butchered those outside his own family on the ground that they had dynastic claims of their own.

The elimination of Maxentius and Daia left Constantine in possession of Italy, Africa, Raetia, and the rest of the West, while Licinius controlled Pannonia, Moesia, Thrace, and the rest of the East. The two imperial families were united by the marriage of Constantine's sister Constantia with Licinius, an event celebrated during the conference at Milan in January 313. This unity, dictated by the exigencies of war, was far weaker than the bond between Diocletian and Maximian had been; Maximian and the Caesars had owed their imperial rank to Diocletian alone, but Constantine owed his position to his father and the army, while Licinius derived his from Galerius. An attempt was made to create a buffer zone of sorts by the establishment of a supposedly
neutral Caesar in charge of Italy and Illyricum. The potential Caesar, Bassianus, panicked when the two Augusti were unable to agree on the territory that each would surrender and, when he tried to revolt against Constantine, he was arrested and executed. Thus the attempt to secure a modus vivendi between the Augusti resulted in open warfare. Constantine was at first victorious but a stalemate arose at the Campus Mardiensis in Thrace, compelling both to reach an accommodation. Constantine was allowed to keep his ill-gotten gains, Pannonia and Moesia, while Licinius retained Thrace and the rest of the East.

(2) Crispus, Licinius II, and Constantine II Made Caesars

Once peace had been restored, Constantine and Licinius were able to give attention to the problem of the succession. There was no attempt to resort to Diocletian's system of a tetrarchy; that had been a result of Diocletian's lack of a male heir and of the unsettled conditions at the time. In the present case both Augusti had sons. Nor was there an attempt to resort to the system of a triarchy, which had already proved abortive in the case of Bassianus. Instead, Constantine and Licinius resorted to the purely dynastic practice of an earlier period, the main difference being that their sons were still children, quite incapable of playing an active role in the administration for at least several years. The expectation was that their sons would serve merely as heirs apparent and would not be required to render active service, as had been the case for Diocletian's Caesars. On 1 March 317 at Serdica, near the boundary of the jurisdiction of the Augusti,
Constantine decreed in the absence of Licinius that his own sons, Flavius Julius Crispus and Flavius Claudius Constantinus, and Licinius' son, Valerius Licinianus Licinius, should be given the rank of Caesar. Since the background and fate of these Caesars were to have some bearing on the period subsequent to Constantine's death, a brief account will now be given of each of them.

Crispus was by far the eldest of the three Caesars. We do not know the precise date of his birth but, since he had an offspring of his own during 322, we can be certain that he was born no later than 305, probably in 303. He was the son of Minervina, referred to unanimously as a concubine by those sources that deign to mention her at all. It is quite likely that she died in childbirth, since no mention is made of her thereafter. When Constantine married Fausta on 31 March 307 for what were manifestly political ends, Crispus became her step-son. Fausta herself was about twenty years of age at the time of her marriage.

Since the childhood of Constantine II is of greater importance for this study, more emphasis must be given to the problems surrounding his early life. Otto Seeck, whose opinion has been treated as gospel even recently by the editors of the PLRE, was of the opinion that Constantine II was not a son of Fausta and that, therefore, he was a bastard offspring of Constantine. If true, this opinion would do much to explain the later enmity between Constantine II and his younger brothers. However, it is my opinion that Constantine II was the eldest son of Fausta and that J.-R. Palanque and P. C. F. Guthrie adduce good evidence for this conclusion. Seeck's opinion was based primarily on
the evidence given by Zosimus and the *Epitome* attributed to Victor. Zosimus in his hatred for Constantine declares that Constantine II, together with his younger brothers Constantius II and Constans, were born ὀκ ἀπὸ Φαύστης τῆς τοῦ Ἐρκουλίου Μαξιμιανοῦ θυγατρός, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀλλας, ἣ μοιχείας ἐπαγαγὼν μὴ ψιν ἀπέκτεινεν.17 This statement is manifestly false, since Zosimus confuses Fausta with Minervina; also, when Zosimus describes the appointment of the Caesars he is careful to point out Crispus' parentage but makes no effort to show that Constantine II's was similar;18 in effect, then, Zosimus contradicts himself and his evidence can be excluded. There is, of course, the remote possibility that all Constantine's offspring born after his marriage to Fausta were not hers but rather the products of a concubine; this could well have been the case had Fausta been infertile. Fausta's later action in protecting her three sons from her step-son Crispus excludes this possibility. Besides, what was important was that it should be conceivable that Fausta was the mother, that is, that she should be of adequate years and that the children concerned should be born at sufficient intervals. Born in approximately 287, Fausta was quite old enough to have children as many as thirteen years before the appointment of the Caesars. What troubled Seeck was the interval between the births of Constantine II and Constantius II. It is certain that Constantius II was born on 7 August 317, only some five months after the appointment of the three Caesars.19 Zosimus states that Constantine II was born ὦ πρὸ πολλῶν ημερῶν the appointment of the Caesars20 and the *Epitome* that he was born *iisdem diebus*,21 that is, that he was born in February of 317. If this were the case he could not be a son of Fausta. Seeck also
adopted Mommsen's reading of *ILS* 710, thereby accepting the inscription as one dedicated to Fausta and as referring to her as the *noverca* of Crispus, Constantine II, and Constantius II. As Guthrie reveals, this inscription cannot be used as a reliable guide since much of it has been thoroughly erased; we cannot even be certain that the inscription was dedicated to Fausta. The remaining inscriptions and the coins give no cause to doubt the legitimacy of Constantine II or of either of his younger brothers, and Julian is careful to emphasize that all three were sons of Fausta. There is a further indication that Constantine II was a legitimate son of Fausta, and that is the statement of the *Epitome* that Constantius II died in his forty-fourth year. All the other sources, including Ammianus and Eutropius, agree that he died in his forty-fifth year. From this it appears that the author of the *Epitome* and Zosimus, who seems to have followed the same tradition for this period, were under the impression that Constantius II was born in 318; this being the case, they would have seen no conflict between the birth-dates of the two Caesars. If they were mistaken about the birth-date of Constantius II, the chances are that this led them to confuse that of Constantine II as well. Though they may have been mistaken regarding the dates, this does not mean that they erred in stating Arelate to be the birthplace of Constantine II, and therein lies a guide to his *dies natalis*. Constantine was at Arelate on 13 August 316, whither he had gone from Vienna; thereafter he went to Serdica and Sirmium. In those troubled times of civil war and incursions on the frontiers it was most unusual for Constantine to journey to the more peaceful areas of the Empire except for a set purpose; in this case it
is possible that he journeyed to Arelate in order to behold his newborn son; this leads us to believe that Constantine II was born in Arelate in July or early August of 316, one year earlier than his younger brother. Here lies further evidence of the legitimate status of Constantine II. But if, by some chance, Constantine II was born as late as February of 317, Constantine was quite capable of utilizing his bureaucratic machine to convince the populace of his son's legitimacy, for he could recall that telling quotation handed down by Suetonius: τοῖς εὔτυχοὺσι καὶ τρίμηνα παιότα.

The origins of Licinius II remain to be discussed. They would not merit attention were it not for his relationship to Constantine and his common fate with Crispus. The question is whether he was directly related to Constantine. The literary sources are unanimous in referring to him as the son of Constantia by Licinius. The conviction that he was not a son of Constantia but rather the bastard offspring of a union between Licinius and a slave-woman arose from two entries in the Theodosian Code, dated to 336, which state that the son of Licinianus (so called out of Constantine's contempt for his former partner), qui per rescriptum sanc[tissi]mum dignitatis oułmen ascendit, should be deprived of all his property on the ground that the property of all those without living father, consanguineous brother or sister, or lawful offspring should be confiscated to the fisc. The first also decreed that the son of Licinianus (sic) should be scourged, bound with fetters, and reduced to his original birth-status. It appears that this son escaped, for less than three months later a second edict, like the first posted at Carthage, declared as follows:
Liciniani autem filius, qui fugiens comprehensus est, conspe\[dibus vinc]tus ad gynaecei Carthaginis ministerium deputetur. 35

These two entries in the code gave rise to the theory that Licinius II was not the legitimate son of Constantia and that he survived, albeit in obscurity, until 336. However, 

*dignitatis culmen* more likely refers to senatorial rank than to the post of Caesar. Other sources state that Licinius II, the Caesar, survived the death of his father but was murdered along with Crispus in 326. 36 There is an inscription (on a milestone from Constantine's territory in Viennensis) referring to Licinius II as *d. n. Constantini Maximi et Perpetui Aug. sorores [sic] filio*; 37 this does not refer to the same son mentioned in the code but rather to the one recorded by the literary sources. The problem can be solved easily if we postulate two sons. The elder would be the one mentioned in the code; he was probably born before Licinius' betrothal to Constantia in the winter of 311/312; 38 possibly because of fear of offending Constantine at such a critical time (*i.e.*, 1 March 317), Licinius did not insist on raising this son to the Caesarship but left him in relative obscurity; after Licinius' death, Constantine appears to have kept him as a virtual prisoner in Africa until, with his faculties slipping late in life, Constantine sentenced him to the weaving-establishment at Carthage, where he could be worked to death unbeknown to the people. The younger son, Licinius II, was born of Constantia's union with Licinius; since their marriage took place at Milan in January 313, 39 Licinius II could have been born as early as the autumn of that year. Zosimus and the *Epitome* state that he was about twenty months of age when appointed Caesar, thereby placing his birth about
July 315. Since these sources erred in the birth-date of Constantine II, they may well have done so for Licinius II as well. We can be certain that Licinius II was born of Constantia at some time between October 313 and July 315. The inscriptions, listing him between Crispus and Constantine II, imply that he was older than Constantine's younger son.

Although Constantine's sons were not made Caesars until 1 March 317, there appears to have been persuasion applied to Constantine to grant Crispus a role in the government at an earlier period. In the panegyric delivered to Constantine at Trier in the autumn of 313, the orator, while congratulating Constantine for the elimination of Maxentius, nevertheless in a reference both flattering and hortative concludes by saying that the emperor could make himself greater still by enlarging his progeny and giving them a share in the rule:

Quamvis enim, imperator invicte, iam divina suboles tua ad rei publicae vota successerit et adhuc speretur futura numerosior, illa tamen erit vere beata posteritas ut, cum liberos tuos gubernaculis orbis admoveris, tu sis omnium maximus imperator.

Herein the orator anticipates Fausta's children; by this time she was quite capable of motherhood. In 317, however, only Crispus was old enough to play anything resembling an active role in government.

(3) The Training of the New Caesars

Constantine turned to Lactantius, now in old age, for a tutor for Crispus, and sent his eldest son to Gaul to be instructed in Latin studies. Constantine seems to have spent most of his time in
Illyricum, partly to secure the frontier there and partly to keep an eye on Licinius. Crispus probably took no significant part in the administration until the year 320, when increasing pressures on the Rhine caused Constantine to appoint a separate praetorian prefect as an adviser for his eldest son. On 1 March 321 Nazarius delivered his panegyric in honour of Constantine and his sons, celebrating the beginning of the *quinquennalia* of the Caesars. The oration was delivered at Rome in the presence of Constantine's Caesars but Constantine himself was absent. This panegyric, vague and rhetorical though it may be, is by far the main source for Crispus' early career.

Nazarius first apologizes for the recurrence of the Frankish incursions by alleging that Constantine had allowed a few of them to survive in order that that nation might furnish experience for Crispus and grant him the first-fruits of a glorius victory. Crispus is complimented further by being called the greatest of Caesars, for his bravery was capable of great accomplishments in spite of his *pueriles annos*. Nazarius portrays Crispus as enjoying the admiring glances of all his brothers. The campaign itself took place during the previous winter and is briefly described:

> Cruda adhuc hieme iter gelu intractabile, immensum spatio, nivibus infestum incredibili celeritate confecit, ut intelligamus [sic] alacritati eius nihil asperum qui ipsam quam a suis petebat tam laboriosam instituerit voluntatem.

Crispus' accomplishments in the previous winter made Nazarius' task much easier. Thanks to the panegyric, Crispus' fame would be spread and his position as Constantine's heir would be enhanced. Nazarius found the
case of the child Constantine II much more difficult. There was little
to do but to associate him with the glory of his elder brother:

Audīvit haec frater intentus et puerilem animum spes laeta
et blanda gaudia titillarunt, cumque miraretur frатrem,
etiam sibi favit quod ex annis eius quam proximus tantae
gloriae esset agnovit. 52

Towards the end of his panegyric, Nazarius felt obliged to credit the
younger Caesar with at least some independent accomplishment; in so
doing he resorted to flattery even more far-fetched than that of
Crispus:

Te vero, Constantine Caesar, incrementum maximum boni
publici, quibus votis amplēctitur Romana felicitas, quae de
tantum exspectat quantum nomine polliceris! Et licet
aetas adhuc avocet ab imitatioine virtutis paternae, iam
tamen ad pietatem eius natura deducit: iam maturato studio
litteris habilis, iam felix dextera fructuosa subscriptione
laetatur. Delegat multa indulgentissimus parens et quae
per te concedit referri ad gratiam tuam mavult. 53

Galletier's comment may suffice: "La vérité en souffre un peu."
54
Nazarius, however, was quite correct in praising the younger Caesar for
his consulship and the successful beginning of his quinquennalia. 55

It is in this panegyric that we find the first contemporary
mention of Constantine's younger sons, Flavius Julius Constantius and
Flavius Julius Constans. 56 The former was at the time at least a year
younger than Constantine II; the latter was but a few months old. It
would not have been politic for Nazarius to omit them, as they were sons
of Constantine and Fausta, yet it would not have been desirable for him
to give them any prominence, since Constantine had not yet chosen to
clothe them with imperial rank. Nazarius was a master in such delicate
situations:
Tantorum Roma compos bonorum, quae quidem ei sunt cum toto orbe communia, haurit insuper ingentis spei fructum quam praepositam sibi ex Caesaribus nobilissimis habet eorumque fratribus. Quorum iam nomina ipsa veneramur, etsi vota nostra interim proferuntur. 57

Nazarius was capable of looking further ahead, from Constantine's sons to his grandsons:

Tuos, Constantine maxime, tuos liberos ac deinceps nepotes tecum [Roma] optat ut tanto e pluribus petantur quanto maiora noscuntur. 58

It is likely that at this time Constantine was contemplating the marriage of his eldest son to Helena in order to ensure the continuity of his dynasty. If the marriage had been celebrated just before or during the quinquennalia, we can suspect that Nazarius would have given a detailed description of it. We can be sure that the marriage had taken place by early in 322, for on October 30 of that year Constantine celebrated the birth of an offspring to Crispus and his wife Helena by granting pardon to all except sorcerers, homicides, and adulterers. 59

Thus it came about that Crispus was far ahead of his brothers in accomplishments and public acclaim. We cannot be certain how much authority was delegated to him, but this is of little moment. The fact remains that he had experienced active service and was following closely in his father's footsteps. This was only natural, since he was at least ten years older than his brothers.

Almost simultaneously with Nazarius' panegyric, coins were struck commemorating the second consulship of Crispus and Constantine II; this consulship itself coincided with their quinquennalia. 60

However, the coinage paid relatively little attention to Constantine II
in these early years before the death of the elder brother. Coins issued at this period also paid tribute to Crispus' victories over the Franks and the Alamanni. Crispus appears to have spent most of the succeeding years in Gaul, possibly returning briefly to Rome for the birth of his child in the autumn of 322 and then journeying back to his headquarters at Trier. Both Crispus and Constantine II shared in the glory of their father's Sarmatian victory in 322. What is surprising is that there is no surviving reference to commemorate the marriage of Crispus and Helena or the birth of their child apart from the brief entry in the Code. Bruun denies that any of the coins with the legend *Helena N. E.* can be referred to Crispus' wife on the ground that they date to the period before the marriage. In fact, even Helena's origin is shrouded in mystery. Gibbon preferred to regard her as a daughter of Licinius. This may well have been the case, but there is no direct evidence. Against this theory is the fact that the name "Helena" appears to have been confined to the family of Constantius I. It may be that she was a relative of Constantine, perhaps a daughter of Flavius Constantius, consul in 327. The silence regarding her and her offspring after October 322 might be attributed to their death soon after the child's birth. This would have been a temporary setback for Crispus.

A further opportunity for Crispus to prove his mettle was becoming evident even as Nazarius delivered his oration. The relations between Constantine and Licinius were never a model of perfect harmony. It was quite evident that Constantia's marriage to Licinius was not adequate to dispel the suspicion each Augustus entertained for the
other. In addition to their personal goals, their chief administrators would surely not have failed to encourage each to assume sole control. There is no evidence that Constantia made any attempt to reconcile brother and husband as she was to do later after the defeat of her spouse. By as early as 321 relations were rapidly worsening. The panegyric fails to make any mention of Licinius and his son, silence itself being the equivalent of a damnatio memoriae. The consular lists are also telling, since for a Caesar to be nominated consul was to heighten his prestige; a nomination was part of his preparation for the succession. The list runs as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Consul 1</th>
<th>Consul 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>318</td>
<td>Licinius Aug. V</td>
<td>Crispus Caes. I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>319</td>
<td>Constantine Aug. V</td>
<td>Licinius Caes. I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>320</td>
<td>Constantine Aug. VI</td>
<td>Constantine Caes. I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>321</td>
<td>Crispus Caes. II</td>
<td>Constantine Caes. II (West)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>322</td>
<td>Petronius Probianus</td>
<td>Anicius Iulianus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>323</td>
<td>Acilius Severus</td>
<td>Vettius Rufinus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>324</td>
<td>Crispus Caes. III</td>
<td>Constantine Caes. III</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(neither recognized by Licinius)

In appointing consuls for 318 and 319 Constantine observed the principle that the new Caesars should acquire the consulship according to their age and that on each occasion the Augustus of the other part of the Empire should become the colleague of his "brother's" Caesar. This resulted in Licinius' receiving his fifth consulship before Constantine,
and relations remained cordial until the time came to name consuls for
320, when it was necessary that Constantine II receive his first
consulship. If Constantine wished to maintain imperial accord he was
bound to name Licinius to be Constantine II's colleague, but he had
already given Licinius precedence in the fifth consulship and resolved
to affirm his superiority over Licinius by naming himself as his son's
colleague. This was a severe blow to Licinius' prestige but he did not
react noticeably until the following year, when Constantine named
Crispus and Constantine II to be consuls. This second slight was
directed against Licinius II, who was older than Constantine II and
should have been named in his stead. Licinius could not brook this
insult and named himself and his son consuls for 321. Relations
deteriorated so badly that in 322 and 323 Licinius refused to recognize
the consuls, even though they were not members of Constantine's family,
solely on the ground that they were chosen by Constantine. Finally
Constantine symbolized the collapse of the diarchy by appointing only
his own sons as consuls for 324.

(4) The War Against Licinius

The war against Licinius was to demand much greater effort than
that against Maxentius and required all the resources at Constantine's
disposal. The most detailed, and yet in many ways the most confused,
source for this war is Zosimus, who makes no mention of Crispus in this
context and fails to name any of Constantine's commanders. However,
he does refer to Licinius' admiral Amandus and to his fellow Augustus
Martinianus. Crispus' role in the war is a certainty. The most
contemporary source, Eusebius in his *Historia Ecclesiastica*, composed in its present form shortly after the war, states that Crispus shared the command and the victory with his father. Julian remarks that one of Constantine's sons aided him in the war against the tyrant; he fails to mention Crispus by name, but this omission is understandable in view of the *damnatio memoriae* later suffered by Crispus. Several other sources allude to Crispus' role in the war. Therefore, we can be certain that Crispus did take an active part. He who had enjoyed a nominal command against the Franks and Alamanni four years earlier was now old enough to assume a more active function in civil war. Zosimus' failure to mention Crispus in this context can best be attributed to his desire to portray Constantine as the sole aggressor.

The naval campaign against Licinius was to establish Crispus all the more securely as the *de facto* pre-eminent Caesar. At some time before the summer of 324 Crispus was recalled from Gaul to join his father in preparations for the campaign. Constantine used Thessalonica as his main base, gathering his armies there and also providing it with a harbour. While the harbour was being prepared, Crispus assembled a large fleet in the Piraeus. When Constantine set out from Thessalonica into Thrace, Crispus moved the naval forces up to the new harbour. Licinius, defeated at Adrianople on 3 July 324, fled across Thrace and fortified himself in Byzantium. While Constantine pursued Licinius by land, Crispus sailed toward the Hellespont, where he encountered the fleet of Amandus just as Constantine was laying siege to Byzantium. On the first day Crispus, although greatly outnumbered, succeeded in using the confined space to his advantage and got the better of Amandus'
forces near Elaeus in the Chersonese. The following day, reinforced by additional ships from Thrace and aided by the winds, Crispus won a convincing victory off Callipolis. On hearing of the defeat of Amandus, Licinius, having already chosen Martinianus as his fellow Augustus,73 abandoned hope on the sea, by way of which he saw that he would be blockaded, and fled with his treasures to Chalcedon. Since Licinius left only his weaker forces in Byzantium as a rearguard measure, Constantine was soon able to capture that city; Crispus' advance by sea on Byzantium doubtless convinced Licinius' forces there that their cause was hopeless and they surrendered. On entering Byzantium, Constantine met Crispus and learned the details of his naval victory. Licinius' forces were defeated once again at Chrysopolis on 18 September 324 after the fleet had conveyed Constantine's army across; subsequently the survivors surrendered or fled with Licinius to Nicomedia.75 Licinius realized the hopelessness of his position and sent Constantia to arrange the terms of surrender with her brother.

(5) Constantius II Made Caesar

Constantine consented for the moment to spare the lives of Licinius and Martinianus and, after they had abdicated in his presence, he sent them to Thessalonica as a place of retirement.76 The Caesar Licinius II was spared, probably because of the entreaties of his mother, but was stripped of the rank of Caesar.77 Constantine now chose to replace Licinius II with one of his own sons, and on 8 November 324 he raised his third son, Flavius Julius Constantius, to the rank of Caesar.78 Constantius II had been born on 7 August 31779 in Illyricum,
probably at Sirmium. There can be no doubt regarding the legitimacy of Constantius II; one inscription identifies him as the grandson of Maximian, and Julian specifically states that Constantius II's mother was the daughter of an emperor, that is, Fausta, daughter of Maximian. Only Zosimus insists on the illegitimacy of Constantius II and his younger brother Constans, but his account is exceedingly confused, saying that the three sons were born not of Fausta but of another woman whom Constantine later charged with adultery and put to death, whereas he had earlier given an account of how Fausta was the one who was charged and put to death. Zosimus' antipathy to Constantine dictated that that emperor's favourites should, like him, be shown in a bad light, and his testimony, eclipsed by the more contemporary evidence as well as lacking in credibility, should be rejected. Constantius II had been given little publicity before his elevation to imperial rank. In his panegyric of 1 March 321 Nazarius dwelt primarily on the exploits of Constantine and Crispus. The praise of the Caesar Constantine II had been difficult enough without including that of the privati, Constantius II and Constans, quorum iam nomina ipea veneramur, etei vota nostra interim proferuntur. Now that all opposition had been ended, Constantine felt free to promote his third son to imperial rank. A replacement for Licinius II was not strictly necessary, but Constantine had already made one infant (i.e., Constantine II) a Caesar and Constantius II was now at least six years older than his brother had been when appointed Caesar. Bruun's argument that Constantius II was appointed Caesar in reply to Licinius' promotion of Martinianus to the rank of Augustus carries little weight; Martinianus was to serve as a
military commander and Crispus was to be his antidote, whereas Constantius II was too young to be anything other than a figure-head. On 8 November 324 Constantine took advantage of his newly-won supremacy to promote in addition his mother Helena and his wife Fausta to the rank of Augusta. Coins were minted depicting Constantius II in association with his father and his two elder brothers, thereby proclaiming his promotion to the inhabitants of the Empire. The youngest brother, Constans, although only three years younger than Constantius II, was not yet given the rank of Caesar and was to remain a privatus for nine years.

Of the three Caesars, it was Crispus who was the favourite. Eusebius of Caesarea made his final revision of his Historia Ecclesiastica partly in order to praise the father and son for their victory over the last of the persecutors, thereby commencing his role as the spokesman of Constantine's dynastic policy; Eusebius was to continue this task until shortly after Constantine's death, carefully adapting his praise to the changing circumstances. It is quite likely that Eusebius completed this revision of his history during the winter of 324/325 in order to present it to Constantine on 20 May 325, when the Council of Nicaea was convoked. Eusebius praises Constantine for coming to the aid of the Christians in the East ἀμα παιδὶ Κρίσπῳ βασιλεῖ, φιλανθρωποτάτῳ. He next describes how πατὴρ ἀμα καὶ υἱὸς ἀμφώ κόκλω διελύντες τὴν κατὰ τῶν θεομισών παράταξιν, ῥαδίζαν τὴν νίκην ἀποφέρονταί. Eusebius gives praise to Crispus as βασιλεῖ θεοφιλεστάτῳ καὶ τὰ πάντα τοῦ ιπτὸς ὀμοίῳ and for assisting his father in the restoration of the unity of the Roman Empire. Eusebius never mentions the other sons of
Constantine by name in this context, not even the Caesar Constantine II, but he does declare that now, when all tyranny has been purged away, μόνοις ἐφυλάττετο τὰ τῆς προσηκούσης βασιλείας βέβαια τε καὶ ἀνεπίφθονα Κωνσταντίνῳ καὶ τοῖς αὐτοῦ παισίν.  

Praise of a more private nature of the Second Flavians was also composed by the exiled poet Publilius Optatianus Porphyrius. His *carmen* have sometimes been dated to 328 on the ground that Jerome dated his recall from exile to that year, but they were clearly written in late 324 or early 325, since they constantly refer to the *vicaenalia* (starting on 25 July 325) in the future sense. We can, therefore, be quite certain that the presentation of his *carmen* dated to about the same time as the publication of Eusebius' *Historia Ecclesiastica*. Like Eusebius, Optatianus reserves most of his praise for Constantine himself and allocates nearly all of what remains to Crispus. In fact, it is quite likely that he composed most of his verses before hearing of the appointment, dated 8 November 324, of Constantius II to the rank of Caesar. At least, he recognized only two Caesars, that is, Crispus and Constantine II:

\[
\text{virtutum meritis vicennia praecipe vota.} \\
\text{saeclorum crevit gemino spes Caesare certa.}
\]

Whereas Eusebius had praised Crispus for his role in the overthrow of Licinius, Optatianus, probably knowing little about eastern affairs, preferred to dwell upon his earlier ventures in the West, especially his successes against the Franks:

\[
\text{en! Auguste, tuis praesens et tantus ubique imperiis fecunde, paras nunc omine Crispi} \\
\text{Oceani intactas oras, quibus eruta Franci}
\]
Crispus was praised for his deeds of valour against the Franks, but Constantine II was included only with difficulty:

Sed Crispi in fortia vires
non dubiae ripa Rhenum Rhodanumque tueri
ulteriore parant et Francis tristia iura.
iam tu, sancte puer, spes tantae rite quieti
missa polo.97

It was really to Crispus, and Crispus alone, that Optatianus looked so far as future government was concerned:

sancte, salus mundi, armis insignibus ardens,
Crispe, avis melior, te carmina laeta secundo
Clio Musa sonans tua fatur pulchra iuventae.
nobile tu decus es patri, tuque alme Quiritum
et spes orbis eris.98

It is clear that both Eusebius and Optatianus, in the period immediately following the defeat of Licinius, regarded Crispus as the source of future government and that they paid scant regard to the other, far younger, sons of Constantine. The public nature of both works indicates that Constantine, too, had the greatest confidence in his eldest son.

The two years following Licinius' final defeat brought about a drastic change in Constantine's plans for the succession. Family tragedies were not dated with the precision of triumphs by the chronographers and the evidence of the codes and the coinage remains uncertain, but a tentative account of the period can be attempted. Constantine and his family appear to have remained in the vicinity of Nicomedia until late in the summer of 325.99 During the winter of 324, Constantine issued two laws, one abolishing all the laws and
constitutions of Licinius and the other restricting this invalidation. There is no indication in these laws that would imply that Licinius and Martinianus had already been executed. On 20 May 325 the synod was commenced at Nicaea and was attended in part by Constantine. On 19 July 325 he was making arrangements for the initial celebration of his vicennalia, which were held at Nicomedia on 25 July 325. It is not known for certain, but we can assume that most of Constantine's relatives, if not all, were present for the event. The occasion was a joyous one for the entire family now that the last of the opponents had been crushed, but the latter part of the year cast upon these festivities a shadow that was eventually to prove the ruin of the dynasty.

The first hint that has come down to us that Constantine was becoming more apprehensive about his own security is the entry in the Theodosian Code for 17 September 325. Since this rescript is noteworthy for its style as well as for its content, I quote it in its entirety:

> Si quis est cuiuscumque loci ordinis dignitatis, qui se in quaecumque iudicum comitum amicorum vel palatinorum meorum aliquid veraciter et manifeste probare posse confidit, quod non integre adque iuste gessisse videatur, intrepidus et securus accedat, interpellet me: ipse audiam omnia, ipse cognoscam et si fuerit conprobatum, ipse me vindicabo. Dicat, securus et bene sibi conscius dicat: si probaverit, ut dixi, ipse me vindicabo de eo, qui me usque ad hoc tempus simulata integritate deceperit, illum autem, qui hoc prodiderit et conprobaverit, et dignitatis et rebus augebo. Ita mihi summa divinitas semper propitia sit et incolum praestet, ut cupio, felicissima et florente re publica.

It is evident that someone had given Constantine the impression that his life was endangered and had thrown him into a state of panic that ill became a holder of the imperial power. The reason for his sudden
fondness for informers is not difficult to find. It lay in his fear of a revival of the Jovian dynasty. We cannot be certain that Licinius was seeking to establish an alliance with the barbarians of the Danube, but it is plausible that Martinianus had escaped custody at Thessalonica and fled to Cappadocia. Whether or not the allegations were true is of little importance. What matters is that Constantine, Herculii Maximiani, soceri sui, motus exempto, ne iterum depositam purpuram in perniciem rei publicae sumeret, believed that they were and ordered the execution of Licinius at Thessalonica and of Martinianus in Cappadocia. It is quite possible that they were killed shortly before the rescript was issued and that the call went out to arrest all their associates. The rescript is most important in revealing Constantine's suspicious and impulsive nature, which had been largely responsible for ensuring his survival thus far. Licinius, however, had himself to blame for his own execution, since he had set a precedent for such action by his bloodbath upon the death of Maximin Daia.

Surprising as it may seem from the foregoing rescript, Constantine did utilize some moderation, sparing Constantia and the boy Licinius II, the former because she was his own sister and the latter because his youth and his membership in the Second Flavian dynasty were his salvation.

(6) The Death of Crispus

Constantine made Constantius II joint consul with himself for the year 326, thereby ensuring that the new Caesar should share in the celebrations of that year, for on 1 March 326 Crispus and
Constantine II were to celebrate the beginning of their *decennalia* while on 25 July 326 Constantine was to commemorate the end of his *vicennalia*. After 8 March, Constantine and his family set out from Byzantium on their way to Rome, but, before they arrived there, tragedy struck twice, resulting in the first instance in the executions of Crispus and Licinius II, and later in the murder of Fausta. This gruesome family tragedy was never publicized and Eusebius, the main contemporary Christian authority for Constantine's life, thought it best to eliminate all references to an act that he was unable to justify. Pagan authorities, on the other hand, revelled wildly through their pages as they saw the first gaping cracks appearing in the Second Flavian dynasty, and even later Christian authorities could not resist the temptation to adopt their version. The general consensus of those sources that go into any detail is that Fausta for reasons of her own accused Crispus of attempting to commit adultery with her and, since adultery with the Augusta amounted to high treason, thereby secured his execution, and that Helena, mother of Constantine, was incensed at the action of the younger sister of her old enemy, Theodora, convinced Constantine of the innocence of Crispus, informed him that Fausta herself was guilty of adultery with a common courier, and brought it about that Fausta was put to death by suffocation in an overheated bath. The more contemporary authorities, however, do not give any such details; Aurelius Victor states only that Crispus died *incertum qua causa, patris iudicio*, and Eutropius simply declares that Constantine killed *egregium virum filium et sororis filium commodae indolis iuvenem . . ., mox uxorem, post numeros amicos*, thereby implying some sort of
conspiracy, actual or suspected. That Constantine was greatly suspicious of a conspiracy at this time can be gathered from the entry in the Theodosian Code for 17 September 325 quoted above, and certain entries in the codes for the first half of 326 indicate what might well have been a similar preoccupation. Guthrie is of the opinion that Constantine himself, and not Fausta, was the one who arranged Crispus' execution and that in so doing he "was deliberately following a policy that may be described as 'dynastic legitimacy'." It is quite conceivable that Crispus was put to death for dynastic reasons and not because of petty scandal, but it is far more likely that the reasons were those of Fausta and not those of Constantine. Guthrie's theory fails to account for the execution of Fausta and also assumes that Constantine was guilty of a strange inconsistency if he put Crispus to death in order to ensure a purely dynastic succession and later gave his nephews a role in the succession. There is no evidence that Crispus had done anything to incur Constantine's displeasure, but Fausta had good reason to fear her step-son, since in age, prestige, and accomplishments he far surpassed her own three sons. At least ten years older than her own sons, he had already held three consulships and had been praised by Nazarius for his victories over the Franks and Alamanni; in 322 he had had by his wife Helena a son, thereby giving proof of his ability to continue the Second Flavian dynasty; finally, he had played a prominent role in the overthrow of Licinius and had received copious praise for his efforts from Eusebius and Optatianus Porphyrius. Fausta's own sons, with the exception of Constans, had been earmarked for the succession by the title of Caesar and, lacking the maturity and fame of
Crispus, were in a most dangerous position should Constantine suddenly die. They were young enough to lack authority and yet old enough to pose a threat to their step-brother. When Constantius I had died in 306 Constantine had enjoyed a similar advantage in age over his three step-brothers, but they posed no threat since they were devoid of imperial rank. In 306 a general was required for emperor, and in 326, with unity barely restored after years of civil war, one was still of prime necessity. Therefore, if Constantine were to die suddenly, Crispus was the logical choice to replace him. However, Crispus would have had difficulty in dealing with Constantine II and Constantius II, for they too had been earmarked for rule and might be used by his enemies, especially when they became a little older. Fausta, recalling as well the slaughter that Licinius had engaged in after the death of Daia, must have feared greatly for her own sons and so decided to act while time allowed. Constantine's suspicious mood, as revealed in the rescript of 17 September 325, was probably still active; Fausta simply took advantage of this to charge Crispus with high treason. We cannot be certain about the exact nature of the charge, but it seems that she implicated Crispus in the supposed treasonous designs of Licinius and Martinianus. Whether she also accused him of an attempt upon her person, as Zosimus, Zonaras, and Philostorgius recount, cannot be certain. However, the spring of 326 was marked by legislation concerning adultery and rape and, if this was not instigated by Fausta's accusation, it may even have given her the idea for her charge against Crispus. One law, concerning adultery and serving wenches, was issued from Heraclea on 3 February 326; another, on the rape of virgins,
and a third law, on the tutors of virgins, were issued from Aquileia on 1 April and 4 April respectively. Since Crispus was executed at Pola, less than 100 miles from Aquileia, it is most likely that his death occurred shortly before or after this legislation was enacted. For a little while Fausta and her three sons could breathe easily; Constantine believed her accusation because she had earlier saved his life when it was threatened by her own father, Maximian. That her accusation had something to do with the elder Licinius seems likely, for his son, Licinius II, was executed at about the same time as Crispus. This time Constantia was unable to save her son, but she herself survived him for some time with the rank of nobilissima femina and so must not have been implicated in the affair.

Fausta's triumph was short-lived. The sources hostile to Constantine report that Helena, the mother of Constantine, vouched for the innocence of Crispus and prevailed upon her son to punish the guilty party, Fausta, with death on the ground that Fausta herself was guilty of adultery with a common courier. Sidonius Apollinaris claims that, whereas Crispus had been killed by cold poison, Fausta was eliminated by being suffocated in a hot bath. Helena's denunciation of Fausta can be attributed to her hatred of the sister of that Theodora who had replaced her as the wife of Constantius I. On the other hand, Helena favoured Crispus because he was not related by blood to Theodora and Fausta. She had been able to secure the virtual banishment of Constantine's half-brothers Dalmatius and Julius Constantius, both sons of Theodora, but Fausta had prevented her from securing a similar fate for Constantine II, Constantius II, and Constans. Fausta was probably
killed before 25 April 326, for on that day Constantine posted a law to
the effect that the right to denounce a woman for adultery should be
restricted to her closest male relations, ne volentibus temere liceat
foedare conubia. Immediately after their deaths Crispus and Fausta
suffered the customary damnatio memoriae; their coins ceased to be
minted and their names were erased from inscriptions. Constantine
later repented of his impetuous action but the damage had been done. In
an edict dated 22 May 326 he stated that any accusation given verbally
should be considered invalid until substantiated in writing, ut sopita
ira et per haec spatia mentis tranquillitate recepta ad supremam
actionem cum ratione veniant adque consilio. This domestic tragedy
was to leave an indelible impression on the minds of Constantine's three
remaining sons and to kindle in them a deep-seated fear and suspicion
that would plague their own careers. Constantine moved to protect their
interests by decreeing that the inheritance of a woman engaged in
adultery should be granted to her legitimate sons. What remained of
the entourage proceeded to Rome, entering that city on 18 July 326.
There on 25 July Constantine celebrated his vicennalia, but there was
little cause for rejoicing now that he no longer possessed any heir old
enough to take over should he die within the next few years. Ablabius,
who was later to serve under Constantine as praetorian prefect, hit the
mark when he secretly posted the following verse upon the door of the
palace:

Saturni aurea saecla quis requirat?
sunt haec gemmea, sed Neroniana.
After the abortive vicennalia at Rome, Constantine set out toward the East by way of Sirmium and Thessalonica and arrived at Nicomedia by the end of July 327. Here he commenced preparations for the enlargement and adornment of Byzantium. Meanwhile, Constantine II was dispatched to Gaul in place of the deceased Crispus, while Constantius II remained in Italy. Rumours of trouble in the West caused Constantine to cut short his visit to the East. Although still at Nicomedia on 1 March 328, by 5 July he had advanced as far as Oescus on the Danube and by 27 September he was in Trier. It was most likely in August or September that Constantine II was given nominal command over the expedition that decisively routed an incursion of the Alamanni. This victory served to enhance the reputation of his eldest son in the eyes of the military there and to depict him as a capable successor. In order to enhance the reputation of his son throughout Gaul, Constantine now renamed Arelate as Constantina. He also bestowed upon his son the title Alamannicus and nominated him to share the consulship of 329 with himself. The latter proved to be a particular honour, for that year marked the last time that Constantine and any of his sons held the consulship before his death. Thus Constantine II, though still only twelve years old, was rapidly acquiring the pre-eminent position among the Caesars once possessed by Crispus.

It seems that for the next three years Constantine II remained in nominal command of Gaul while his father spent the spring and summer of 329 fortifying the Danube frontier and most of the years 330 and 331
in the neighbourhood of Constantinople. It was probably in the latter part of 331 that the Sarmatians appealed to Constantine for aid against the Goths. Constantine took advantage of this opportunity to give his sons additional experience. He sent Constantius II to assume the nominal command in Gaul, where he could impress his inheritance upon the armies there. In turn, Constantine II was summoned from Gaul to undertake nominal command of the campaign against the Goths. While Constantine himself remained at Marcianopolis in reserve, the younger Constantine crossed the Danube and on 20 April 332 inflicted a decisive defeat upon the Goths. Nearly one hundred thousand of them were destroyed by hunger and cold and, among others, the son of the Gothic king Ariaricus was taken as a hostage. The victory was so complete that the Goths ceased to be a menace to the Empire for many years. Constantine II was rewarded by being granted the title Gothicus and his younger brother, Constantius II, was allowed a share in the title. It is probable that as an additional reward for this victory Constantine II was permitted to marry. We have no knowledge of whom he married, but we can be certain that the bride was one of Theodora's descendants.

(8) Constans Made Caesar

Although a satisfactory solution had been found for the Gothic problem, the year 333 brought rumours of unrest among the Sarmatians and the Persians. Whether he was influenced by consideration of these matters or merely thought the time to be opportune, on 25 December 333 Constantine invested with the rank of Caesar his youngest son, Flavius
Julius Constans. Since Constantine was at Aquae on 11 November and at Constantinople on 30 March, there is a possibility that Constans was formally invested at the new capital. Constans was the last son of Constantine and Fausta. The Epitome of Victor, stating that Constans died at the age of twenty-seven, implies that he had been born in 323. However, the other sources are of the opinion that he died in his thirtieth year, concluding that he must have been born in 320. Confirmation of the earlier date is provided by the only contemporary reference to Constans in his years as a privatus. On 1 March 321, Nazarius, delivering his panegyric to Constantine, speaks of the great hope that Rome derives from the most noble Caesars and from their brothers. These "brothers" could only have been Constantius II and Constans, quorum iam nomina ipsa veneramur, etsi vota nostra interim proferuntur. Coins were minted in honour of the new Caesar, with their obverses showing all three sons. It was probably at this time that Constans was betrothed to Olympias, daughter of Ablabius, consul in 331 and now prefect at Constantine's court.

The year 334 was marked by further difficulties, which were to influence the plans for the succession. When the Argaragantes, the leading tribe of the Sarmatians, had been attacked by the Goths two years earlier, they had armed their dependants, the Limogantes, in order to strengthen their position. Now the Limogantes rose against their masters, driving some northward but many into the Roman Empire. Constantine, having previously dispatched his eldest son, Constantine II, back to Gaul, ordered Constantius II to proceed thence to the Balkans. Constantine himself, together with the new Caesar Constans,
set out west from Constantinople and met Constantius II in the region of Singidunum and Viminacium. Constantine, together with his youngest sons, welcomed the exiled Sarmatians and distributed more than three hundred thousand of them through Thrace, Scythia, Macedonia, and Italy.\textsuperscript{159} Constans was sent west to his new headquarters in Italy; it is quite likely that he escorted some of the settlers there. Henceforth, until the death of his father, he was to remain in Italy. There is no record of his receiving any special mark of distinction as a result of the Sarmatian campaign. Constantius II, on the other hand, was granted the title Sarmaticus for his role in the settlement and proceeded with his father back to the East, where further troubles were brewing.\textsuperscript{160}

It was probably while Constantine and Constantius II were occupied with the settlement of the Sarmatians that Calocaerus, the magister pecoris camelorum, instigated a revolt on Cyprus. There had been a serious earthquake on that island shortly before and the revolt may be attributed to the suffering resulting from it. The revolt was of short duration. Flavius Dalmatius, the eldest half-brother of Constantine, by then probably holding the post of magister militum in the East, quickly took the matter in hand and sentenced Calocaerus to be burnt alive at Tarsus in Cilicia.\textsuperscript{161} The speedy downfall of Calocaerus is evinced by the fact that no coins or inscriptions have been recorded in his name.

Much more serious was the growing threat of Persia. Sapor II, king of Persia, was determined to regain the territory that Galerius had seized in 297. In 334 Tiran, king of the buffer state of Armenia, was
treacherously captured by a satrap of Sapor and blinded. The Persian forces overran Armenia and an Armenian delegation arrived asking for Roman support. Constantine readily agreed to assist them and dispatched to Antioch Constantius II, who had recently returned with him from the Sarmatian campaign. By the time he arrived there, Armenia had been absorbed and Amida captured by the Persians. Constantius II, joining forces with the Armenian refugees, was able to inflict a decisive defeat on the Persians and succeeded in refortifying Antoninopolis and Amida, although he continued to be harassed by guerilla raids. The precise role of Constantius II in this campaign cannot be ascertained. The victory was not deemed adequate to warrant the conferring upon him of the title Persicus. Basically, the operation was devised as a holding measure until Constantine himself could join the campaign. It has commonly been held that it was not Constantius II, but rather his cousin Hannibalianus, who was responsible for the defeat of the Persian army. However, several sources lead us to believe that Constantius II, under the guidance of his father and other advisers, was responsible. Festus is the most explicit:

Constantinus rerum dominus extremo vitae suae tempore expeditionem paravit in Persas. Toto enim orbe pacatis gentibus et recenti de Gothis victoria gloriorsior cunctis in Persas descendebat agminibus. Sub cuius adventu Babyloniae in tantum regna trepidarunt, ut supplex ad eum legatio Persarum adcurreret, facturos se imperata promitterent, nec tamen pro adsiduis eruptionibus, quae sub Constantio Caesare per Orientem temptaverant, veniam mererentur.

Eusebius vouches for the Persian embassy to Constantine's court and dates it to the winter of 336/337. Theophanes also mentions Constantius II's victory over the Persians as well as confirming his
fortification of Amida and Antoninopolis. No literary sources refer to any campaign on the part of Hannibalianus against the Persians. Finally, the mint at Antioch, the closest to the Persian front, struck no coins in honour of Hannibalianus. There is a possibility that Constantine visited Antioch in the spring of 336, but it is remote. Suffice it that Constantius II retained nominal command on the eastern front during the campaigns of 335. His presence there rendered him unable to attend his father's first celebration of his *tricennalia* at Nicomedia on July 25 of that year.

(9) **Dalmatius Made Caesar and Hannibalianus Made King of Kings**

After celebrating the beginning of his *tricennalia* at Nicomedia, Constantine made a drastic change in his plans for the succession. Heretofore he had conferred the title of Caesar upon his own sons only, but the growing threat from Persia demanded his presence on the eastern front, far removed from the Rhine and Danube. Once Constantius II had successfully weathered the campaigning season of 335, Constantine headed west from Nicomedia and toured the Balkans as far as Siscia, doubtless intending to impress the Goths and Sarmatians with his continued vigilance. On 18 September 335, while still in the Balkans, Constantine conferred the rank of Caesar upon Flavius Julius Dalmatius, son of his half-brother Dalmatius, and placed him in charge of the *ripa Gothica*. The new Caesar had not held any distinguished office before but was now about the same age as Constantine II or Constantius II. The reason for the appointment of an additional Caesar was clear at this
critical period. Constantine could anticipate a long and difficult campaign against the Persians, a campaign that would demand all his attention. Although there is no evidence for any trouble on the northern frontier after the settlement of the Sarmatians in 334, still that area demanded constant vigilance. Constantine II was in charge of the defence of Britain and the Rhine, and Constans could readily manage the dioceses of Africa, Italy, and Illyricum, but Constantine himself had normally attended to the dioceses of Dacia, Macedonia, and Thrace. Dalmatius' task was simply to show the imperial colours along the lower reaches of the Danube while Constantine made ready his Persian campaign. Returning to Constantinople, Constantine turned his attention once again to the Armenian problem. Since the Armenian royal house was in the hands of Sapor, Constantine determined to appoint Hannibalianus, brother of the younger Dalmatius, king of kings over Armenia and the neighbouring peoples and gave him in marriage his eldest daughter, Constantina. Hannibalianus was dispatched to Caesarea in Cappadocia until such time as his uncle's campaign should allow him to assume his role in Armenia. Coins were minted throughout the Empire in honour of the new Caesar, Dalmatius, but only Constantinople struck for Hannibalianus; as a client-king and not a Caesar, he was not entitled to a role in the succession. The younger Dalmatius and Hannibalianus, together with their uncle Julius Constantius, were granted the title nobilissimus by Constantine. The appointment of Hannibalianus was no reflection on the ability of Constantius II to deal with the eastern problem; a monarch was required to replace Tiran and Constantine preferred that it be one of his own relatives on whom he
could rely. The death of his mother Helena in 329 had removed the main
obstacle to the promotion of her arch-enemies, the descendants of
Theodora.

The success of Constantius II in repelling the Persian
attacks and the appointment of Hannibalianus produced a temporary
peace, as the Persians sent a delegation to Constantinople shortly
before Easter of 336. The lull in fighting enabled Constantius II
to journey to Constantinople, there to join with his father in the
final celebration of the *tricennalia* on 25 July 336. As part of the
festivities, Constantius II solemnized his marriage with the daughter of
Julius Constantius, Constantine's half-brother, and of Galla. This
was an occasion for great rejoicing:

\[\text{Επειδή δὲ καὶ ὁ τριακονταέτης αὐτῷ τῆς βασιλείας διεπεραίνετο χρόνος, τῷ δευτέρῳ τῶν παιδῶν συνετέλει γάμους, παλαιτάτοις τε καὶ τοῦ πρεσβυτέρου τῆς ἠλικίας διαπραξάμενος. Θάλατι δὲ καὶ ἐστιάσεις ἤγοντο, νυμφοστολούντος αὐτοῦ βασιλέως τῶν παιδῶν, ἐστιώντος τα λαμπρῶς καὶ συμποσιάζοντος, ὅδε μὲν ἄνδρών θυάσον, γυναικῶν δὲ ἀφωρισμένοις ἀλλαχθῆ ξυροῖς· διαδόσεις τε πλουσίας χαρισμάτων, ὅμως ἲμα τόλεσιν ἐδώρουντο.}\]

By this marriage, the descendants of Helena (*i.e.*, Constantine's own
sons and daughters) and those of Theodora (*i.e.*, the offspring of
Constantine's half-brothers and half-sisters) were united into one
family. The name of the wife of Constantius II is unknown. By this
time Constans, the youngest son, had been betrothed to Olympias, the
daughter of the praetorian prefect Ablabius. The reason for this
commitment outside the Flavian dynasty is doubtless to be found in the
absence of any additional eligible descendants of Theodora. Shortly before the end of his tricennalia, Constantine made one further provision for the succession. On 29 April 336, in a rescript posted at Carthage, he sentenced the bastard son of Licinius to be scourged, bound with fetters, and reduced to his original birth-status.\textsuperscript{181} The youth escaped but was apprehended. In another rescript, posted at Carthage on 21 July 336, Constantine sentenced him to be bound in fetters and consigned to service in the imperial weaving establishment at Carthage.\textsuperscript{182} In this way the Flavian dynasty was freed from possible competition on the part of supporters of the old Jovian dynasty.

Although this act served to reassure Constantine's sons, it could not have failed to influence their character, just as the executions of Crispus and Licinius II had done a decade before.

The primary source for our knowledge of Constantine's propaganda at this time is the \textit{Laudatio Constantinii} delivered by Eusebius of Caesarea at Constantinople towards the termination of the tricennalia.\textsuperscript{183} Eusebius looked upon the granting of an imperial role to Constantine's sons and nephews with favour:
Eusebius, in mentioning the appointment of more of Constantine's kindred, is referring to the recent promotions of Dalmatius and Hannibalianus. Only Dalmatius, however, has been made a Caesar, as is manifest from the reference to the four most noble Caesars as horses in the imperial chariot. One must be careful to notice that Eusebius is portraying the Caesars as Constantine's assistants, not as his successors. In a speech designed to praise and glorify the sovereign, mention of his mortality would have been most impolitic. Proof that Eusebius considered the Caesars to be merely the assistants of, and not the equals of, their father, the Augustus is contained in the subsequent paragraphs, wherein the imitation of the heavenly empire by the terrestrial one is emphasized:

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If the Empire could be governed only by one, as creation is governed by One, then surely this state of affairs was to continue. The difficulty lies in the immortality of God and the mortality of Constantine. If only one were to govern after his death, surely this was to be his eldest son, just as Constantius I died, ὁ κλήρον τῆς βασιλείας, νόμων φύσεως, τῷ τῇ ἡλικίᾳ προάγοντι τῶν παιδῶν παράδοσις. But Constantine had given his other sons and his eldest nephews a share in the imperium as well, whereas Constantius I had not bestowed any such command upon his other sons, largely because of their youth. If Constantine were to adhere to his own policy, which advocated that there be only one monarch, he still had the opportunity to make this clear by conferring the title of Augustus upon his eldest son and by tempering the authority of the remaining Caesars. This, however, he failed to do. For the moment he put his trust in his own health and in the training undergone by his sons and nephews.

(10) The Training of the Caesars

Of the training of the younger Dalmatius and Hannibalianus little is known. Before their appointments to the court, they had studied rhetoric at Narbo under Exuperius; after being granted the title of Caesar, Dalmatius prevailed upon his uncle to grant Exuperius a governorship in Spain. Their education at that city should come as
no surprise, since Constantine's brothers spent several years in
nominal exile at nearby Tolosa, probably as late as 330. In the case
of Hannibalianus, nothing is known regarding his authority or training
after his appointment to Caesarea in Cappadocia. His brother,
Dalmatius, must have enjoyed the prerogatives that his fellow Caesars
obtained, including a court of his own; whether he had his own
praetorian prefect or not we cannot say for certain.

Regarding the education of the three surviving sons of
Constantine there is little specific information. Aemilius Magnus
Arborius, the rhetorician, was the tutor of a Caesar at
Constantinople; we cannot be certain which son was involved, but it
was most likely either Constans or Constantius II, since Constantine II
had spent most of his time in the West after the defeat of Licinius.
The two primary sources for the education and training of the sons of
Constantine are the fifty-ninth oration of Libanius and the Vita
Constantini of Eusebius. The former, composed long after the death of
Constantine II in 340, relates specifically only to Constantius II
and Constans but its general nature enables it to be useful as a guide
to the up-bringing of Constantine II as well. Eusebius wrote his
biography of Constantine at some time between the death of the elder
statesman and the murder of his eldest son; like Libanius, he is
careful to omit any mention of Constantine's nephews after the tragedy
of 337, just as after 326 he pretended that Crispus had never existed.
Both sources refrain from specific details but still serve as a useful
guide. Libanius is of the opinion that the Caesars received a twofold
education, being equipped for both the management of the Empire and
excellence in rhetoric; their training in regal matters was derived primarily from their own father, who ensured that they would become adept as soldiers and at the same time moulded their minds in the image of justice. Libanius adds that, when they were made Caesars, they were given courts and armies similar to his own, being inferior only in their title. According to Libanius, Constantine was careful to keep each of his sons close to his own court in the early stages of their training, so that he would be able to come to their aid should anything go amiss; once they had proved themselves, they were dispatched to the frontiers where they could experience the actual tasks of government. That this was the case is evident from the careers of the three sons after the death of Crispus, although Libanius pretends that Constantine II had never existed and treats the remaining sons as proceeding in unison along their careers. Constantine II had been aided by his father in the Gothic campaign of 332 and it was only after that year that he remained in sole charge of Gaul. Constantius II had joined with his father in the settlement of the Sarmatians in 334 and it was not until the following year that he was given command of the forces on the eastern front. Constans, it appears, had been dispatched to Italy in 334, less than a year after acquiring the rank of Caesar; because of the more pacific nature of his territory, there was little need for the immediate presence of his father. Eusebius' account of the training of the Caesars serves to supplement, rather than to contradict, the oration of Libanius. Eusebius, writing after the slaughter of 337 and before the death of Constantine II, excludes the cousins from consideration but is able to speak of all three brothers. He emphasizes
the appointment of Christian men as their teachers and administrators, agreeing with Libanius regarding the appointment of a court and military forces to each. According to Eusebius, the three sons were aided by advisers in their early years but later were subject only to their father's instructions. Libanius and Eusebius, although failing to give specific details, are correct in the overall impression. It was natural that Constantine would ensure that his sons should receive the best training for government, if only to secure their survival after his death, and also that they should be granted increasing independence as they matured.

(11) The Death of Constantine

Little is known about the activities of Constantine's sons during his few remaining months after the completion of the tricennalia in Constantinople. The frontiers of the Rhine and Danube appear, from the lack of any evidence to the contrary, to have been peaceful at this time. Constantine II was probably spending most of his time in the vicinity of Trier, where he could keep a close watch along the entire Rhine for any signs of unrest among the Franks and Alamanni; he may, too, have assisted Constans in protecting the upper reaches of the Danube from any Sarmatian threat. Constans himself probably resided at Aquileia during most of this period. The younger Dalmatius guarded the lower reaches of the Danube, probably operating out of Thessalonica; with the exception of his uncle, he was the closest to Constantinople of all those with imperial rank. At some time after the tricennalia had ended in Constantinople, probably in the late summer of 336 or
certainly no later than the early spring of 337, Constantius II left the capital and returned to Antioch in order to guard the eastern frontier while his father prepared an expedition against the Persians. Hannibalianus, so far as is known, continued to reside in Cappadocian Caesarea. Constantine himself, having taken adequate precautions elsewhere in the Empire, continued his preparations for the eastern campaign from the capital. After celebrating Easter there, he fell ill and resorted to the hot baths at Constantinople and later to those at Helenopolis. It was at approximately this time that he dispatched his last edict, this one being to the council of the province of Africa. Whether or not he informed his family of his condition at this stage cannot be ascertained. Proceeding thence towards Nicomedia, he fell seriously ill at Ancyra in the suburbs of that city and, after being baptized, died there on 22 May 337.
Notes to Chapter One

1. We must never lose sight of the fact that Galba, Otho, Vitellius, and Vespasian were, like Caesar and Pompey many years before them, members of the senatorial order, entitled by their rank to sit in the Senate, even though they owed much of their auctoritas to their military experience. Macrinus (217-218 A.D.) was the first Augustus who was not a member of the senatorial order (Herod. 5.1.5).

2. Nerva, being childless, had adopted Trajan as his successor. Trajan in turn is reported to have adopted Hadrian. But it was Hadrian who carried the principle of adoption to an extreme, for he not only adopted Antoninus as his successor but also compelled the latter to adopt the youths Marcus Aurelius and Verus, thereby ensuring the succession to the second generation.

3. Maxentius was regarded as still too young for instruction when Pan. Lat. 2.14.1 was delivered in 289. Therefore, he was probably no more than eight years old when Diocletian and Maximian appointed their Caesars in 293.

4. Thus I interpret Pan. Lat. 10.6.6 (omnia qui statum eius labefactare poterant cum stirpe deletis) in conjunction with Pan. Lat. 9.16.5 (cum uxore ac filio in privatam domum sponte conesserat). Even if they were not killed, Maxentius' wife and younger son were condemned to an obscurity almost tantamount to death.


9. Anon. Val. 5.18; Zos. 2.20.1. T. D. Barnes, "Lactantius and Constantine," JRS 63 (1973) 36-38, dates the war to 316, not to the traditional year of 314.

10. Hieron. Chron. for 317; Cons. Const. for 317; Chron. Pasch. for 317; Anon. Val. 5.19; Vict. Caes. 41.6; Vict. Epit. 41.4; Oros. 7.28.22; Zos. 2.20.2. The evidence for dating the promotion of the Caesars to 316 is very slight, as is shown by M. Thirion, "Les vota impériaux sur les monnaies entre 337 et 364," SNR 44 (1965) 16-17.

11. CTh 9.38.1 of 30 October 322, pardoning most criminals because of the birth of a child to Crispus and Helena.
Whether Minervina was the first wife or merely the concubine of Constantine does not concern us at this point. What matters is that he was a son of Constantine, but not of his wife Fausta, to whom Constantine was married on 31 March 307 (Pan. Lat. 6). Pan. Lat. 6.4.1 can very well be interpreted as referring to Constantine's marriage to Minervina; for this view see J.-R. Palanque, "Chronologie constantiniennne," REA 40 (1938) 245-248. Anon. V. Const. 9 refers to Constantine's first γυναῖκας. For the view that Minervina was in a state of legitimate concubinage with Constantine see X. Lucien-Brun, "Minervina, épouse ou concubine?" BAGB 29 (1970) 391-406.

12 Vict. Epit. 41.4; Zos. 2.20.2; Zon. 13.2.5D. Pan. Lat. 6.

13 Anon. V. Const. 9.

14 E. Galletier, Panégyriques latins (Paris 1952) 2.7, in conjunction with Pan. Lat. 6.6.2, follows Seeck in favouring the year 298 for her birth. But X. Lucien-Brun, "Minervina, épouse ou concubine?" BAGB 29 (1970) 393, shows good reason for dating the birth of Fausta to 287; if she had met Constantine while she was still a child, this must have been before 293, when he was sent east to Diocletian's court.

15 Seeck, Geschichte 4.3 and 377; PLRE 223. This is also the opinion of W. Blum, "Die Jugend des Constantius II bis zu seinem Regierungsantritt. Eine chronologische Untersuchung," Classica et Mediaevalia 30 (1969) 389-391.


17 Zos. 2.39.1.

18 Zos. 2.20.2.

19 For this date see below under the discussion of Constantius II.

20 Zos. 2.20.2.

21 Vict. Epit. 41.4.


23 I have seen this IS at Surrentum (in September 1970). There is no trace of the word novaevcae [sic] and, in any case, as a restoration it involves excessive crowding. Far more likely is genetrici, of which I saw traces (... TR. I). A. Olivetti, "I figli della imperatrice Fausta," AAT 49 (1913-1914) 1242-1251, considers this IS to have been dedicated to Fausta as the noverca of Crispus and the mater of Constantine II and Constantius II.
AE (1952) 107 confirms Constantine II as the offspring of Constantine and Fausta.

Jul. Or. 1.9D. Anon. V. Const. 9 affirms that Constantine had four offspring by Fausta, namely Constantine II, Constantius II, Constans, and Constantina. Zon. 13.2.5D vouches for the three sons.

Vic. Epit. 42.17.

F. Paschoud, Zosime (Paris 1971) 1.212. Paschoud prefers to solve the problem by retaining the date of February 317 for Constantine II and changing that of Constantius II to 7 August 318, but in so doing he is violating the evidence of Amm. 21.15.3 and Eutr. 10.15.2. Phot. Bibl. 258 (483b), an extract from a biography of Athanasius, also states that Constantius II died in his forty-fifth year.

CTh 11.30.5-6.


Suet. Claud. 1. I am indebted to D. G. O. Smith for this reference.

Eutr. 10.6.3; Vict. Caes. 41.6; Anon. Val. 5.19, 28, 29; Hieron. Chron. for 317; Oros. 7.28.22. Vict. Epit. 41.4 and Zos. 2.20.2 only imply that he was a son of Constantia in that they do not specify that he was a bastard, although at the same time they do stipulate this status for Crispus.

CTh 4.6.2-3.

CTh 4.6.2 of 29 April 336.

ad suae originis primordia.

CTh 4.6.3 of 21 July 336.

Anon. Val. 5.19; Hieron. Chron. for 317; Eutr. 10.6.3; Oros. 7.28.26.


Lact. Mort. Pers. 43.2 and Zos. 2.17.2 for the betrothal of Constantia.

Lact. Mort. Pers. 45.1 et al.

Zos. 2.20.3; Vict. Epit. 41.4. This is the opinion of A. Chastagnol, "Propos sur Licinius le Jeune," BSPN 27 (1972) 264-267, who has concluded that Licinius II was the legitimate son of Constantia.
If the filio referred to in Anon. Val. 5.17 is Licinius II and not his illegitimate brother, the earlier date becomes necessary, since Licinius had this filio and his wife with him when he fled from Cibalae on 8 October 314 (Cons. Const. for 314).

e.g., ILS 712–714. AE (1948) 40 is an exception, listing Licinius II after Constantine II.

The prefect may have been Vettius Rufinus or Junius Bassus. The identity of the prefects is confused by the unreliable state of the codes. See J.-R. Palanque, "Les préfets du prétoire de Constantin," AIPhO 10 (1950) 483–485, 491, and PLRE 1.154, 1048.

E. Galletier, Panégyriques latins (Paris 1952) 2.149. P. Bruun, in RIC 7.52, believes that the quinquennalia were celebrated in Sirmium at that time; in his Studies in Constantinian Chronology (New York 1961) 59, he gives further good evidence in favour of Sirmium. Perhaps the panegyric was composed at Rome and delivered at Sirmium.

Pan. Lat. 10.17.1–2.

Pan. Lat. 10.36.3.

Pan. Lat. 10.36.4: fratrum suorumque omnium fruitur aspectu; the brothers included Constantine II, Constantius II (born on 7 August 317 and still a privatus), and Constans, now an infant (born in 320).

Pan. Lat. 10.36.5.

Pan. Lat. 10.37.3.

Pan. Lat. 10.37.5–6.

E. Galletier, Panégyriques latins (Paris 1952) 2.197.

Pan. Lat. 10.3.5, 10.1.1, 10.2.3.

For their origins see below under their promotion to the rank of Caesar.

Pan. Lat. 10.36.1.

Pan. Lat. 10.36.2.
CTh 9.38.1. Nazarius' panegyric (Pan. Lat. 10), delivered on 1 March 321, concentrates on the accomplishments and glories of Crispus towards the beginning and the end of the panegyric itself. His marriage would have been one of them, if he had been married then. Pan. Lat. 6, delivered on 31 March 307 in honour of Maximian and Constantine on the occasion of the marriage of Constantine with Fausta, illustrates the importance conceded to an imperial wedding.

Cohen #2 (7.320), #1 (7.360).

Cohen #1 (7.339), #74 (7.346), #75 (7.346).

For Crispus at Trier see RIC 7.144.

RIC 7.52; Cohen #132 (7.353), #109 (7.377).

RIC 7.493-494.

E. Gibbon, The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire (London 1909) 2.222.

Degrassi 79.

Zos. 2.22-26.

Called 'Ἀβαντός by Zos. and Amandus by Anon. Val. 5.23-26.

Eus. HE 10.9.4-6.

Jul. Or. 1.9D.

Chron. Pasch. for 324; Anon. post Dion. frg. 14; Zon. 13.2.5D.

Cons. Const. for 324; CIL 1, 268; CTh 7.20.1. Entries in the CTh (i.e., 7.20.1 and 15.14.1) imply that the war took place in 323, but it is now generally agreed that Licinius was defeated in 324; see Stein-Palanque 465.

Martinianus had heretofore been Licinius' magister officiorum: Vict. Epit. 41.6; Zos. 2.25.2. The literary sources state that he was made a Caesar, but the coins are unanimous in referring to him as an Augustus: RIC 7.25, 607, 645. PLRE 563 ignores the numismatic evidence and refers to him as a Caesar.

Cons. Const. for 324.

For the campaign, Anon. Val. 5.23-28 is followed; some details from Zos. 2.22-26 are added when they do not conflict with the account in Anon. Val.
Anon. Val. 5.28-29; Zos. 2.28; Vict. Epit. 41.7; Eutr. 10.6. Anon. Val. states that Martinianus was later killed in Cappadocia, but Constantine probably sent him along with Licinius to Thessalonica. Martinianus would have had far less influence in one of Constantine's strongholds than near the eastern frontier.

Anon. Val. 5.29; Theop. for 323 (A.M. 5815).

Cons. Const. for 324, where Constantius should be read for Constantinus; CIL 1, page 276; Vict. Caes. 41.10; Hieron. Chron. for 323 errs in the year, for he died in the thirty-eighth year of his reign (Amm. 21.15.3); Amm. 14.5.1 gives 10 October, erring here as in the case of his death (21.15.3) by listing the month "October" instead of "November"; the reading of the Cons. Const. and of CIL is preferred by most scholars; on this problem see E. Galletier, Ammien Marcellin (Paris 1968) 1.202. Constantius will henceforth be referred to as Constantius II in order that he may not be confused with his other relations. AE (1937) 119 reads: natale Idibus Nob. [sic], i.e., 13 November, but is full of minor errors, as here it omits VI before Idibus; see A. Chastagnol, "Un gouverneur constantinien de Tripolitaine," Latomus 25 (1966) 545. Them. Or. 4.58B states that Constantine defined the boundary of Constantinople and made Constantius II Caesar at the same time; therefore, it is quite likely that Constantius II was officially invested with his new title at Byzantium. The youth of Constantius II is discussed in detail by W. Blum, "Die Jugend des Constantius II," 389-402.

CIL 1, page 270; CIL 1, page 271 errs in reading this date as natalis Constantini minoris; CTh 6.4.10 gives 13 August, reading die natali meo Constanti A. id. Aug., but Mommsen (in his edition of the CTh) prefers the reading of CIL 1, page 270. F. Paschoud, Zosime (Paris 1971) 1.211-212, prefers the year 318 on the ground that Vict. Epit. 42.17 (a source that has much in common with Zosimus) states that Constantius II died in his forty-fourth year; however, the other sources, including Amm. 21.15.3 (which Paschoud neglects to cite), are agreed in stating that Constantius II died in his forty-fifth year.

Jul. Or. 1.5D. Constantine was at Sirmium on 6 June 317 (CTh 11.30.7) and stayed in that vicinity for quite some time.

ILS 730.


Zos. 2.39.1.

Zos. 2.29.2. This confusion may have arisen from a scribe rather than from Zosimus: see F. Paschoud, Zosime (Paris 1971) 1.244-245.
At this time (8 November 324) Constantine II was eight years of age, Constantius II seven, and Constans four; Crispus was about twenty-one.

88 Cohen #1 (7.321), #1 (7.321); these = RIC #68 (7.612) and #70 (7.689) respectively. The former coin served to introduce Constantius II to the imperial household in 324/325, but the latter was not minted until early 326 in order to commemorate his first consulship.

Soc. 1.13 for the date of the Council of Nicaea.

Eus. HE 10.9.4.

Eus. HE 10.9.6.

Eus. HE 10.9.9.

Hieron. Chron. for 328.


Opt. Porph. 5.30-34.


CTh 1.15.1; CJ 6.21.15; CTh 9.1.4.


Soc. 1.13.

CTh 12.6.2, 12.7.1.

Cons. Const. for 326; Hieron. Chron. for 326; Eus. V. Const. 1.1.

CTh 9.1.4.

Soc. 1.4.

See note 76.
Anon. Val. 5.29; Cons. Const. for 325; Vict. Caes. 41.9; Vict. Epit. 41.7-8; Eutr. 10.6; Oros. 7.28.20-21; Soz. 1.7; Zos. 2.28.2; Zon. 13.1.3B. Anon. Val. 5.29 is the source for the details and the quotation. The Cons. Const. dates the death of Licinius to 325. Vict. Caes. 41.9 allows for no time-lag between Licinius' final defeat and his execution, but Vict. Epit. 41.8 states that he was executed after (paulo post) being sent to Thessalonica. Eutr. 10.6 condemns the deed: contra religionem sacramenti privatus occisus est. Zos. 2.28.2 implies that Martinianus was killed immediately while Licinius was spared until he could be removed to Thessalonica.


Various scholars have established different dates for these executions. Most favour the period before Constantine's arrival in Rome, namely Seeck Regesten 176 (between 15 March and 1 April), A. Piganiol, L'Empire chrétien (325-395) (Paris 1947) 35 (between 15 May and 17 June), F. Paschoud, Zosime (Paris 1971) 1.221 (before 18 July). However, P. Bruun, RIC 7.71 and 563, favours the period September-November 326, when Constantine travelled from Rome to Siscia; he bases his conclusion largely on Zos. 2.29 and the panegyric of Optatianus Porphyrius. Zosimus dates the murders to Constantine's sojourn in Rome but his chronology is terribly confused here, for he dates Constantine's conversion to this, his last stay at Rome; Optatianus' panegyric was probably composed in the winter of 324/325 for the vicennalia at Nicomedia and not for those at Rome (see PLRE 1.649 and page 24 above). Zosimus' account, dating the executions to Constantine's sojourn in Rome, is based on an old pagan tradition that strove to associate Constantine's conversion to Christianity with his most reprehensible deeds rather than with his victory at the Milvian Bridge some fourteen years earlier. This pagan tradition, that Constantine turned to Christianity because only that religion's priests would grant him absolution for the murder of his son and wife, had already been refuted by Soz. 1.5. If we can place any faith in the reliability of the S. Artemii Passio, the dispute regarding the date of Constantine's conversion was a lively issue in 362, when Artemius was tried by Julian; after Julian claimed that Constantine was rejected by the gods because of the murder of Crispus and Fausta (Art. Pass. 43), Artemius replied that the executions were justified in the context of contemporary affairs and that, in any case, Constantine had adopted the Christian religion as a result of his victory at the Milvian Bridge (Art. Pass. 45). The pagan aristocracy of Rome, disappointed in the failure of the vicennalia there and angered by Constantine's concentration on the new capital at Byzantium (Zos. 2.30.1: Οὐκ ἐνεγκαθεὶς δὲ τὰς παρὰ πάνων ὃς
\[\text{'Επεζεν βλασφημίας πόλειν ἀντίρρουσιν τῆς 'Ρώμης ἐξήτει, καθ' ἦν αὐτὸν ἔξει βασίλεια καταστάσασθαι}, sought to connect his conversion to Christianity with the tragic events of that year. This pagan tradition soon spread to the Greek-speaking East, there to be adopted by the pagans such as Eunapius and Zosimus and to be refuted by Christians such as Sozomenus. It is quite likely that the pagan tradition was given greater currency by Julian the Apostate, who states explicitly that Constantine turned to Jesus because, of all the gods, only He would grant repeated forgiveness for sins such as murder (Jul. Caes. 336A-B). For further information on this topic see F. Paschoud, Zosime (Paris 1971) 1.219-224, and his "Zosime 2.29 et la version païenne de la conversion de Constantin," Historia 20 (1971) 334-353.

113 Especially Zos. 2.29.1-2; far less enthusiasm is shown by Vict. Caes. 41.11, Vict. Epit. 41.11-12, Eutr. 10.6.3, and Amm. 14.11.20.


115 CTh 9.1.4 on page 26.

116 Guthrie, "The Execution of Crispus," 325. R. C. Blockley, "Constantius Gallus and Julian as Caesars of Constantius II," Latomus 31 (1972) 457-458, believes that Constantine killed Crispus because the latter was constantly increasing in power and threatening to eclipse not only his younger half-brothers but also the Augustus himself.

117 J. Maurice, "Les capitales impériales de Constantin et le meurtre de Crispus," CRAI (1914) 325-327, dates certain coins with the legend PROVIDENTIAE AUGG. to the period immediately following the death of Licinius and concludes that Constantine planned to set up Crispus as a fellow Augustus in Rome. However, there is no other evidence referring to Crispus as an Augustus. It is most likely that this reverse legend was carried over from the joint reign of Constantine and Licinius.

118 Optatianus, looking forward to the vicennalia (4.1, 4.7, 9.35-36) and looking back on the defeat of Licinius (toto victoria in orbe: 7.29), must have composed his poems about the same time as Eusebius' Historia Ecclesiastica, i.e., in the winter of 324/325. He has considerable praise for Crispus' victories over the Franks (5.30-32, 10.24-28), but of Constantine II he can say only that he is spee tantae rite quieti missa polo (5.33-34). What is more, Optatianus mentions only a gemino Caesare (16.36), thereby failing to recognize the recent promotion of Constantius II. All this did not bode well so far as Fausta was concerned for her own offspring. If Crispus' wife and son had died, this would have been only a temporary setback for him. It did not mean that thereafter he would be unable to beget a son.
119 Zos. 2.29.1-2; Zon. 13.2.5D-6A; Philost. 2.4; Anon. V. Const. 35-36.

120 CTh 9.7.1.

121 CTh 9.24.1, 9.8.1. Bruun, *Studies in Constantinian Chronology* 42, prefers to date these two laws to 318 in order to support the evidence of his coinage. Nevertheless, the MSS give the choice of 320 or 326 for the first law and stipulate 326 for the second. Seeck, *Regesten* 176, prefers 326 for both laws.

122 Amm. 14.11.20. The execution could be managed more discreetly at some distance from the court. Constantine feared an uprising on behalf of his son if he did not act quickly enough.


124 Hieron. *Chron.* for 325; Eutr. 10.6.3; Oros. 7.28.26.

125 *ILS* 711, dated after the murder of Crispus by the reference to only two Caesars (*amitae dd. nn. baetissimorum C[aess].*); for her rank see *RIC* 7.570-571.

126 Zos. 2.29.1-2; Philost. 2.4; Anon. V. *Const.* 36; Zon. 13.2.6A; Vict. *Epit.* 41.11-12. Hieron. *Chron.* puts her death in 328, but the numismatic evidence indicates only a short time-lag between the executions: see *RIC* 7.71-72.

127 Sid. Ap. *Ep.* 5.8.2 is the only source to mention that Crispus was poisoned; Zosimus, Philostorgius, and Zonaras agree with him regarding the use of a hot bath for Fausta.

128 CTh 9.7.2.

129 *e.g.*, *ILS* 708, 710.

130 CTh 9.1.5.

131 CTh 9.9.1 of 29 May 326 (thus the MSS and Mommsen; Seeck, *Regesten* 179, prefers 329).

132 *CIL* 1, page 268.


135 CTh 3.32.2, 10.1.5, 11.3.2, 12.5.1.

136 CTh 14.24.1.
Constantine II possessed this title by 30 June 331 at the latest: ILS 6091; the title is also recorded in AE (1934) 158 and ILS 724.

Dd. Nn. Constantinus VIII, Constantinus Caesar III:
Degrassi 80.

e.g., CTh 6.4.1, 2.16.1, 11.27.1, 9.9.1 for the Balkans; CTh 11.30.13, 12.1.17, 16.8.2, 16.8.4, 5.9.1, 1.16.6, 1.16.7 for the area around Constantinople. Constantinople was dedicated on 11 May 330: Cons. Const. for 330, Chron. Pasch. for 330.

Jul. Or. 1.12A; RIC 7.74.

Constantine was at Marcianopolis on 12 April 332: CTh 3.5.4-5.

Anon. Val. 6.31; Cons. Const. for 332; Hieron. Chron. for 332; Jul. Or. 1.9D. Seeck, Geschichte 4.382, prefers to change the date from 20 April to 18 February because of the fame et frigore mentioned by the Anon. Val.

RIC 7.147-148. ILS 6091 of 30 June 331 gives the title of Guth. victor ac trium[fl]ator to Constantine I alone. The title conferred upon Constantine II may have been Germanicus: ILS page CLXXII, a correction of ILS 724.

According to Eus. V. Const. 4.49, Constantine II was married long before the tricennalia of his father ended in 336.

Cons. Const. for 333; Hieron. Chron. for 333; Anon. V. Const. 64; Vict. Caes. 41.13-14; Vict. Epit. 41.23; Eus. Laud. Const. 3.2; Eus. V. Const. 4.40; Zos. 2.35.1.
150 CTh 1.2.6.
151 CTh 8.13.3.

152 Constans was certainly a son of Fausta: Jul. Or. 1.9D; ILS 725; Guthrie, "The Execution of Crispus," 330-331.

153 Seeck, Geschichte 4.3 and 378, dates the birth of Constans to 323.

154 Hieron, Chron. for 350; Zon. 13.6.14A; Eutr. 10.9.3-4. J.-R. Palanque, "Chronologie constantinienne," REA 40 (1938) 250, favours the year 320 on the ground that Eutropius is a more reliable source than the Epitome.

155 Pan. Lat. 10.36.1: eorumque fratribus.
156 Pan. Lat. 10.36.1.
157 RIC 7.564-565.
158 Amm. 20.11.3; Athan. Hist. Ar. 69.

159 For the date: Cons. Const. for 334; Hieron. Chron. for 334. Constantine was at Singidunum on 5 July 334 (CTh 10.15.2), at Viminacium on 4 August 334 (CTh 12.1.21), and at Naissus on 25 August 334 (CTh 11.39.3). Other sources include: Anon. Val. 6.32; Eus. V. Const. 4.6; Amm. 17.12.17-18, 17.13.1.

160 For the title of Sarmaticus: RIC 7.74; Amm. 17.13.25; ILS 724. For Constantius II's journey from Gaul to the East: Jul. Or. 1.13B.

161 For the date: Hieron. Chron. for 334. Other sources include: Anon. Val. 6.35; Vict. Caes. 41.11-12; Oros. 7.28.30; Theoph. for 332 and 333 (A.M. 5824 and 5825); Pol. Silv. Laterculus 63 (page 522). The sources attribute the deed to Constantine directly or to his nephew Dalmatius; however, it was the elder Dalmatius who was in charge; for the evidence see the following chapter.


163 Festus 26. In his commentary on Festus, J. W. Eadie (page 149) contradicts his own author by attributing the success to Hannibalianus.

Bruun, *Studies in Constantinian Chronology* 74.

Bruun, 71-72.

Bruun 72.

18 September is given by *Cons. Const.* for 335; the *Chron. Pasch.* for 335, confused at this point, dates the event to 24 September; Hieron. *Chron.* for 335 is indefinite, dating it to the *tricennalibus Constantini*. For *ripam Gothiam* see *Anon. Val.* 6.35. Other sources include *Vit. Caes.* 41.15, *Vit. Epit.* 41.15, *Zos.* 2.39.2, and *Oros.* 7.28.30. The subjects treated in the last part of this chapter, including the promotion of Dalmatius and Hannibalianus, the education of the Caesars, and the death of Constantine I, are discussed briefly by G. Gigli, *La dinastia dei secondi Flavii: Costantino II, Costanto, Costanzo II* (Rome 1959) 3-6.

The elder Dalmatius, perhaps the eldest son of Constantius I and Theodora, could not have been born earlier than 294, about a year after the promotion of Constantius I. His son, therefore, was probably born in the period 312-320. For the elevation of Constantius I to the rank of Caesar (on 1 March 293) and his marriage to Theodora see *Stein-Palanque* 68. The only possible evidence for an earlier date for the marriage (*Pan. Lat.* 2.11.4 of 21 April 289) is too vague to be useful; for the various points of view see X. Lucien-Brun, "Minervina, épouse ou concubine?" *BAGB* 29 (1970) 404, note 6.

16.8.5 and 16.9.1 were issued from Constantinople on 21 October 335.

Anon. *Val.* 6.35; *Pol. Silv. Laterculus* 63 (page 522); Amm. 14.1.2; Philost. 3.22; *Chron. Pasch.* for 335; *Vit. Epit.* 41.20; *Zos.* 2.39.2. Constantine made him *regem regum et Pontioarwn gentium* (*Anon. Val.* 6.35).

*Chron. Pasch.* for 335.

Coins of Dalmatius are recorded for all active mints in *RIC* 7; the coins of Hannibalianus (*RIC* 7.584, 589) depict him as *rex* and portray a river, generally considered to be the Euphrates.

*Zos.* 2.39.2. This title was normally conferred upon a Caesar, but its application to Hannibalianus and Julius Constantius, who were not such, is exceptional.

176 *Eus. V. Const.* 4.57. On the date see *RIC* 7.75, note 4.
Being the sister of Gallus, she was therefore the daughter of Julius Constantius' first wife, Galla (on Galla as the mother of Gallus see Amm. 14.11.27); none of the sources ventures to mention her name.

After the death of Crispus, Eusebius pretended that he had never existed, thereby regarding Constantine II as the first son and Constantius II as the second son.

For information on the sons of Licinius see pages 11-13 of this chapter.

Eusebius' oration was delivered in 336, not 335, since within it he refers to Dalmatius as a Caesar; Dalmatius was not given this rank until 18 September 335. For the place and date of this oration see Bruun, Studies in Constantinian Chronology 71-72, whose conclusion is supported in detail by H. A. Drake, "When Was the 'de laudibus Constantini' Delivered?" Historia 24 (1975) 345-356.

It is noteworthy that Constantine's half-brothers remained in obscurity until about 330; the death of Constantine's mother Helena in 329 (RIC 7.72-73) appears to have enabled Constantine to treat the descendants of Theodora, the arch-enemy of Helena, with greater distinction. The first sign of favour towards the descendants of Theodora was the nomination of the elder Dalmatius to the consulship of 333. S. Mazzarino, "Note Costantiniane," Aegyptus 20 (1940) 298, writes: "Dopo la morte di Elena, la politica di Costantino rispetto ai suoi fratellastri si è sostanzialmente trasformata; nel 333, il consolato di Dalmazio I segna l'inizio di questo nuovo atteggiamento dinastico, che inciderà profondamente sulla politica interna dell'impero."

PLRE 1.1048 lists Valerius Maximus and Nestorius Timonianus as prefects in Illyricum under Dalmatius Caesar. However, J.-R. Palanque, Essai sur la préfecture du prétoire du bas-empire (Paris 1933) 8-9, has shown good reason for listing Timonianus as prefect of Africa at that time. Our ignorance of the prefectures is due as much to their
transitory character, especially under the reign of Constantine, as to
the deplorable state of the codes. The author of the latest detailed
study of the problem — A. Chastagnol, "Les préfets du prétoire de
Constantin," RÉA 70 (1968) 321-352 — is of the opinion that Nestorius
Timonianus became prefect of Africa in the spring of 337 and that he
could not be Dalmatius' prefect. However, he does believe (page 347)
that a local praetorian prefect did replace the comes in Macedonia-
Thrace when Dalmatius was appointed Caesar there but considers
the person to be anonymous; he believes that this man was the third
praetorian prefect (whose name was erased) listed on the inscription
of Tubernuc, i.e., AE (1925) 72. Each of the other Caesars and Constantine
himself had a praetorian prefect, but Hannibalianus, lacking the rank of
Caesar, had no such official.

190 Aus. Prof. 16.13-16.

191 In 349: thus A. F. Norman in the introduction (page 1) to

192 Soc. 2.4-5 and Soz. 3.2 place the death of Eusebius
shortly before the war between Constantine II and Constans, i.e., no
later than the late winter of 339/340.

193 Lib. Or. 59.33.

194 Lib. Or. 59.34-36.

195 Lib. Or. 59.40.

196 Lib. Or. 59.42-43.

197 Above, page 35.

198 Above, pages 35 and 36.

199 Above, page 36.

200 Eus. V. Const. 4.51-52.

201 Eus. V. Const. 4.52.

202 For the increasing independence of the Caesars after 335
regarding the minting of coins see RIC 7.15-16; this independence was
most noticeable in Gaul.

203 Soz. 2.34; Soc. 1.39-40; Chron. Pasch. for 337. These three
sources all agree that Constantius II was in the far east when he heard
of his father's death. Zon. 13.4.10C specifies that he was in Antioch.

204 Eus. V. Const. 4.60-61; Soz. 2.34; Soc. 1.39.
205 CTh 12.5.2, posted at Carthage on 21 May 337.

206 Cons. Const. for 337; Chron. Pasch. for 337; Hieron. Chron. for 337; Athan. Fest. Ind. 10; Anon. Val. 6.35; Vict. Caes. 41.16; Vict. Epit. 41.15; Eutr. 10.8.2; Oros. 7.28.31; Zos. 2.39.1; Eus. V. Const. 4.64; Soz. 2.34; Soc. 1.39-40; Theod. 1.30; Zon. 13.4.10C.
CHAPTER TWO

THE DEATH OF CONSTANTINE I
AND THE MURDER OF CONSTANTINE II

(1) Eusebius and the Massacre of 337

Constantine the Great bequeathed to his subjects a state relatively secure on its frontiers and welded together by a bureaucracy that had become accustomed to obey but one master. The death of that one ruler was to reveal the divergent interests of the members of the administration, particularly those of his own household. If Constantine is to be faulted on any one point, surely that is his excessive thoroughness in grooming his younger relations to succeed to the imperial power. Having learned from the fate of Crispus not to put all his hope in one person, he had effectively designated three sons and one nephew to administer a tetrarchy of sorts and had granted his other male relations considerable authority. The conflict among the members of his household was soon to resolve itself in a massacre that would leave only his own three sons, Constantine II, Constantius II, and Constans, to be recognized as Augusti on 9 September 337.¹

For the events of the intervening four months we have only one contemporary source, the highly rhetorical Vita Constantini of Eusebius of Caesarea. In this work, composed shortly before his own death in 338, Eusebius makes no mention of any massacre. Rather, he portrays the
administration as possessing so much respect for Constantine as to continue to do obeisance before his corpse until the arrival of his sons. Eusebius strove to please the sons as readily as the father and adapted his biography of Constantine to accord with their desires. Any references to Crispus, Dalmatius, and Hannibalianus were omitted and Constantine was spoken of as οὗτω δή τριάδος λόγω τρίτην γονήν παιδών θεοφιλή κτησάμενος, ταύτην δ' ἐφ' ἐκάστη περιόδω δεκαέτους χρόνου εἰσποίησε τῆς βασιλείας τιμήσας. According to Eusebius, who, it must be remembered, was writing after the event, Constantine willed that only his sons should succeed him:


Eusebius adds that upon Constantine's death messengers were immediately dispatched to the Caesars to inform them of the event:

Τῶν δὲ στρατιωτικῶν ταμάτων ἐκκρίτως ἄνδρας, πίστει καὶ εὐνοίᾳ πάλαι βασιλεῖ θυρσίμους, οἳ ταξιαρχοὶ διετέμποντο, τὰ πεπραγμένα τοῖς Καίσαρι ξέκοψα καθιστῶντες. Καὶ οἶδε μὲν τάδ' ἔπραττον ὡσπερ δ' ἐξ ἐπιτυφυότας κρείττονοι, τὰ πανταχοῦ στρατόπεδα τὸν βασιλέα πυθόμενα θάνατον, μιᾶς ἐκράτει γνώμης, ὠσανεί ἔως τοῖς αὐτοῖς τῷ μεγάλῳ βασιλέα, μηδένα γνωρίζειν ἔτερον, ἢ μύνους τοὺς αὐτοῦ παῖδας Ῥωμαίων αὐτοκράτωρας. Οὔκ εἰς μακρὸν δ' ἥξιον, μὴ Καίσαρας, ἐντεῦθεν δ' ἡδὴ τοὺς ἀπαντάς χρηματίζειν Αὐγούστους· δ' δὲ καὶ μέγιστον τῆς ἀνωτάτῳ βασιλείας γίγνοιτ' ἵνα συμβολον. Οἱ μὲν οὖν ταύτ' ἔπραττον, τὰς οἰκεῖας ψήφους τε καὶ φωνᾶς διὰ
According to Eusebius, the Senate of Rome also declared for the three sons alone and thereby they were confirmed in the imperial power. Eusebius makes no mention of Dalmatius and Hannibalianus, whom, before Constantine's death, he had portrayed as two of the rays of light transmitting his glory to the corners of the Empire. This omission in itself is enough to render Eusebius' account suspect. Later authorities are unanimous in admitting that a massacre did take place, probably before the sons were declared Augusti in September, but some go to great lengths to exonerate Constantius II from any responsibility whereas others defend the butchery on the grounds of political and military necessity. It is my purpose to show that the responsibility lay with Constantius II but that his earlier upbringing and subsequent actions dictated that he should be at the mercy of his advisers at court, who, for reasons of their own, preferred to depreciate others in his presence. First, however, the separate traditions surrounding the events of 337 should be summarized.

(2) Traditions Surrounding the Massacre of 337

The pagan tradition, confirmed by Julian the Apostate, a cousin of Constantius II, and detailed by Zosimus, put all the blame for the slaughter of 337 upon the shoulders of Constantius II. Zosimus is the most explicit, his hatred for the father being transferred to the sons:

'Αλλά τῆς ἀφελῆς οὕτως ἐκάστῳ νεμηθείσης, Κωνστάντιος ὁσπέρ ἐξεπίθετες μὴ κατόπιν γενέσθαι τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς ἀσεβείας
Julian, a son of Julius Constantius, adds to this list of victims another uncle (i.e., the elder Dalmatius), his own eldest brother, and four cousins in addition to the younger Dalmatius and Hannibalianus.

In short, the known male descendants of Theodora were executed with only three exceptions. Gallus, Julian's remaining brother, was spared on the ground that he was about to succumb to illness. Youth itself saved Julian. Nepotianus, the son of Constantine's half-sister Eutropia, was also spared; his age is not specified but, since his mother must have been born before the death of Constantius I in 306 and since Nepotianus himself was old enough in 350 to take the initiative and proclaim himself emperor at Rome, we can safely assume that at the time
of the massacre he was at least as old as Gallus.\footnote{11}

While Constantius II lived, however, Julian adopted what became the official explanation when it became clear that Eusebius' silence was ineffective, namely, that Constantius II was at the mercy of his soldiers and unable to prevent the massacre of his relations and certain bureaucrats. In his first oration in honour of Constantius II, probably delivered just after his appointment as Caesar in 355, Julian praises the emperor for his justice and moderation with a slight qualification:

\begin{quote}
πλην εἰ ποι ἔφτασεν ὑπὸ τῶν κακῶν ἢκὼν ἐτέρους ἐξαμαρτεῖν

*οὐ διεκάλυφας.*\footnote{12}
\end{quote}

The same sentiment, expressed far less rhetorically, is given by official sources from a slightly later period. Eutropius, writing in the reign of Valens, states that Dalmatius Caesar was killed by a military faction, *Constantio patrueti suo sinente potius quam iubente.*\footnote{13} Victor goes even further to remove the blame from Constantius II, saying that Dalmatius was killed *incertum quo suasore.*\footnote{14} A hint of what may have been the real cause is given in Jerome's *Chronicle:* Dalmatius was killed *factione Constantii patruelis et tumultu militari.*\footnote{15} The key word is *factione,* to which we shall return at a later stage. The Fathers of the Church, such as Socrates, preferred for the most part to adopt this version, which shifts the greater part of the blame from the sons of Constantine and places it upon the soldiery, whether acting spontaneously or under the influence of a faction.\footnote{16} The Orthodox tradition of his own day was not so charitable to Constantius II. Athanasius, his implacable enemy on account of the emperor's sympathy
with the Arian faction, bluntly accused him of managing the whole gory business:

Τοὺς μὲν γὰρ θείους κατέσφαξε, καὶ τοὺς ἀνεψιοὺς ἀνείλε καὶ πενθεροῦ (Ἰσως, πενθερὸν) μὲν, ἣτι τὴν θυγατέρα γαμῶν αὐτοῦ, συγγενεῖς δὲ πάσχοντας οὐκ ἐξεῇσεν· ἄλλα καὶ ὀρκὼν ἄς πρὸς πᾶντας παραβάτης γέγονεν.  

A tradition surrounding the events of 337 that has received very little serious attention is that handed down by the Arian source Philostorgius. According to this tradition, Constantine the Great was poisoned by his brothers and, realizing this while on his death-bed, instructed in his will that revenge be inflicted on his murderers and that whichever of his sons should come first should exact this revenge, for he feared lest they too should be overcome by them in a like manner. Philostorgius states that Constantine gave the will to Eusebius of Nicomedia and that Eusebius, fearing lest the brothers of the emperor should ever look for the will and desire to learn what had been written, placed the book in the hand of the corpse and hid it amid the clothing. The tradition concludes with Constantius II's arrival before the other sons, his receipt of the will from Bishop Eusebius, and his success in acting in accordance with the instructions of his father. In the Arian opinion the poisoning of Constantine the Great had been justified by his own murder of Crispus. Clearly the Arians believed that it took three wrongs, and not two, to make a right, thereby condoning the murder of Constantius II's uncles and cousins.

The Arian viewpoint was refuted by those of the Orthodox persuasion. They discounted the poisoning completely and put the blame
for the massacre upon the Arian Constantius II rather than on his father, whose religious views were of a somewhat ambiguous nature. It is in this Orthodox tradition that we can see the machinery of government at work during the interregnum after Constantine's death:

Τελευτῶν δὲ τῷ τῆς αἱρέσεως πρεσβυτέρῳ τὴν διαθήκην παρατίθησιν, ἐνειλικρίνης ἔγχειρίσας Κωνσταντῖνῳ ταύτῃ τῷ παιδί, ὥν καὶ ἡ διαθήκη τῆς πατρᾶς μοίρας καὶ ἀρχής διάδοχου καὶ βασιλέα ἔγραφεν. ὁ δὲ καὶ πρὸς θεόν καὶ πρὸς ἀνθρώπους τὸ πιστὸν ὤν ἔχων πρεσβυτέρος ἐπιδίδωσιν ἐν κρυφῇ τὴν διαθήκην Κωνσταντίῳ, προδότην φανεῖς ἴμα πατρός τε διαθήκης καὶ παιδὸς κληρονομίας. Συνέτρεχον δὲ τῇ προδοσίᾳ Εὐσέβιος τῇ δυσσεβίᾳ πραίτότιτος, καὶ ἄλλοι τινὲς καὶ τῆς δυσσεβείας καὶ τῆς ἀνδρογυνοῦ φόσεως συνθιασώταται. Ἀλλὰ γὰρ προδίδωσι μὲν τὰ πιστευόμενα Κωνσταντίῳ, τῆς δὲ πρὸς ἀνθρώπους αὐτοῦ ἀπιστίας αἰτεῖ μισθαποδοσίαν Κωνστάντιον τῆς ὁρθῆς αὐτοῦ πίστεως προδοσίαν. Καὶ συνεταιρίζεται τὸν Νικομηδίας Εὐσέβιον...

In short, this Orthodox tradition affirms that both Constantine I and Constantius II were deceived by the Arian faction at court, the will of the former being violated and being used to win over the latter. This is the story that was related to Gallus and Julian during their sojourn in Cappadocia, namely, that Constantius II had approved the massacre because he had been deceived and had yielded to the violence and tumult of an undisciplined and mutinous army.

These aforementioned diverse traditions surrounding the massacre of 337 clearly arose from the various factions that either benefited or suffered from the strife for the succession. The
tradition of Eusebius is our most contemporary and reliable but, in assuming that Dalmatius Caesar and his kin simply disappeared, gives rise to many questions. Unable to satisfy public curiosity, it was soon superseded by a new official position presented by both pagan and Christian writers, namely that many were killed after Constantine's death by an uprising of the soldiers. Gradually the truth was leaking out. But soldiers do not act blindly without some sort of leadership, and especially so against the dictates of their late commander-in-chief, for whom they felt the greatest loyalty. The soldiers required someone to convince them that a totally new policy must be invoked. Jerome's Chronicle for 338 sheds further light on the case when it states that Dalmatius was killed by a faction of his cousin Constantius II and by a military uprising. The extant history recorded by Ammianus Marcellinus is dominated to a great extent by the role of factions, and the church history of the entire period is coloured by the conflict between the members of the Arian and Orthodox persuasions. The ecclesiastical dispute is well-documented for most of our period, and we can safely assume that the factions of 353 A.D. revealed by Ammianus did not appear overnight. Clearly, it was a faction of some sort that incited the soldiers to butcher so many of high station. But which faction was it? Were Constantius II and his brothers merely approving already-existing plans or rather did they (or at least one of them) initiate the massacre? Julian, who before the death of Constantius II mouthed the official version portraying his cousin as a victim of military enthusiasm, openly accused him of planning and carrying out the whole gory business once his own revolt was well-established, thereby
founding a more specific pagan tradition that continued to thrive largely because of the strife within the Christian community. If Julian's later version is accepted, there is no particular reason to look for a faction: Constantius II, the nearest surviving son of Constantine the Great, simply ordered the massacre and it was done. Yet it is hard to believe that the soldiers would have violated Constantine's arrangements unless they had been presented with a good reason to do so. If the Arian tradition, that Constantine had been poisoned by his brothers and had lived long enough to note this in his will, was true, then Constantius II certainly had what he needed to inflame the soldiers. The Orthodox tradition, that the poisoning was a falsehood invented by the Arian faction at court to eliminate its own enemies, \(^23\) brings us at long last to our main thesis. The eunuchs at court, acting in concert with the Arians of whom some of them were members, decided that with so many competitors in the Flavian house civil war was almost inevitable and that they should throw in their lot with Constantine's sons alone, especially Constantius II, for they had at least nominal control over the greater part of the Empire and stood the better chance of emerging victorious from any struggle; the ultimate victory of this faction was to lead to its domination of the imperial court, especially in the East, until the death of Constantius II in 361. By revealing each other's dirty linen, the Arian and Orthodox factions give us an insight into the struggle of 337. Heretofore the rather simplistic explanation given by Eutropius and Victor has been generally accepted, but its weakness is that it gives rise to more questions than it answers.
Although Constantine the Great had worked for Christian unity since his defeat of Maxentius and had tried to reconcile the various heresies with the Orthodox church, nevertheless his court came under Arian influence at an early stage largely through his half-sister Constantia. While staying with her husband Licinius at Nicomedia, she had been won over to the Arian cause by Eusebius, the bishop of that city, and by a certain anonymous presbyter. From her death-bed she recommended the presbyter to Constantine as a trustworthy adviser, and towards the end of his own life Constantine, spending most of his time in the region around Constantinople, also came under strong Arian influence. The same holds true for Constantius II, who lived chiefly in the East after 333, but not for Constantine II and Constans, who spent their years as Caesars in the predominately Orthodox West. In the later years of his life, Constantine the Great also fell under the influence of the eunuch Eusebius, who, if not already grand chamberlain, was soon to be so and must already have been a notary at least. Since this Eusebius was loathed by the Orthodox and generally associated by them with the Arians, it is most likely that he was a supporter of the Arian faction. This faction does not seem to have opposed the descendants of Theodora; quite to the contrary, the fortunes of that branch of the household fared very well in the last years of Constantine's life, largely as a result of the death of Helena c. 329. The first great triumph for the Arian faction was the exile of Athanasius, the bishop of Alexandria, to the West. Athanasius, the leader of the Orthodox faction in the East, had been accused of having withheld the grain supply from Constantinople. Constantine preferred to believe the charge and on
5 February 336 exiled him to Trier, the headquarters of his eldest son. The main reason for Constantine's action was doubtless to reduce the disunity in the East while the Persian war was threatening. It had always been his intention to enhance imperial unity and to control the various factions.

When Constantine fell seriously ill at Ancyra, a suburb of Nicomedia, he exhorted the clerics present to grant him baptism. Thereupon he was duly baptized by the bishop of Nicomedia, Eusebius. Shortly after, on 22 May 337, he died. A later tradition, designed to portray Constantius II as both the most loyal and the favoured son, relates that he arrived at his father's bedside before the aging emperor died, much as Constantine himself had done in the case of his own father. This was not the case, as is clearly shown in the contemporary account of Eusebius, writing when Constantius II was only one of three Augusti. Had any one of the sons been present in Constantine's last hours, it is probable that most of the subsequent confusion and intrigue would have been eliminated. Messengers were sent to notify all three sons, but only Constantius II was close enough to make the trip. The other two hesitated to stray too far from the frontiers. While the pretence of obeisance before the dead emperor continued to be performed and the arrival of Constantius II was anticipated, the Arian faction, led by Eusebius of Nicomedia and the praepositus Eusebius, carefully analysed their future. Constantius II and his brothers were young and impressionable; what is more, Constantius II at least was sympathetic to their cause. Constantine's two surviving step-brothers were a different matter. Their long semi-
exile in Gaul, Italy, and Greece had embittered them against Helena and, perhaps, her descendants; being older men schooled in misfortune, they might not prove to be pliable, yet their recent honours conferred by their step-brother might give them considerable support among the troops. Their own sons were less of a threat. But the greatest threat of all was posed by the praetorian prefect of the East, Ablabius, who not only had vast experience in the East and had acquired great influence with Constantine but also was a friend of Athanasius, the leader of the Orthodox faction.\textsuperscript{33} We can be certain that at this time Ablabius was praetorian prefect of the East but it is uncertain whether at the time of Constantine's death he was resident at Constantinople or assisting Constantius II. His subsequent fate makes it quite clear that he was unable to undertake a critical part in the schemes of 337.

It is important to keep in mind that the Eusebian faction was not the only one active or potential in 337. Ablabius, an experienced administrator, must have had a large following, especially among the Orthodox. Athanasius was in nominal exile; the return of this fanatic must be prevented at all costs. Then too there were the descendants of Theodora, especially the two surviving brothers of Constantine the Great; they, like him, could appeal to their descent from Constantius I. Would the favours they had received over the past five years remove any bitterness produced by the long and dangerous semi-exile proposed by Helena and her favourites at court? Then, too, there were the prefects, commanders, and lesser officials not present at the court to be taken into consideration. The critical situation was simply that Constantine had built up too large an experienced bureaucracy and had presented too
many possible successors to his position. The competition was so keen that even brothers mistrusted one another, as was soon to become evident. In short, if civil war was to be avoided, the succession had to be decided quickly. The Eusebian faction, united at court and present beside Constantine's death-bed, was the only one gifted with an ideal opportunity. Yet, though it possessed experience, it lacked authority and required a figure-head. That figure-head was to be Constantius II, the nearest of Constantine's sons and the one most under the influence of the Eusebian faction in recent years. All that was required was to persuade him of the need to remove their actual and potential enemies. Once in their debt, he would be forever in their pocket.

Constantius II was not present at his father's death but arrived soon after and made ready to escort the corpse to Constantinople, where Constantine had already prepared his tomb in the Church of the Holy Apostles. Eusebius the grand chamberlain, Eusebius Bishop of Nicomedia, and the Arian presbyter favoured by Constantia all gave him their condolences. In addition, the presbyter revealed to him the will of the deceased sovereign. The tradition that in his will Constantine left the Empire as a whole to his eldest son, Constantine II, with the other Caesars to play subsidiary roles, is quite likely, just as his own father had entrusted the eldest alone with the supreme power. However, this stipulation would hardly have been the sort to endear the Eusebian faction to Constantius II. Therefore, the will must have undergone alterations by the very administrators charged with drawing it up. The will presented to Constantius II stipulated that he was to
share the governance of the Empire with Constantine II and, to a lesser extent, with Constans. It also related that Constantine I, late in his illness, had discovered that he had been poisoned by his half-brothers and had stipulated that his sons should avenge him in order to save their own lives. \textsuperscript{36} There is a remote possibility that this Arian excuse, that Constantine had been poisoned, was true. But one wonders why the half-brothers would have eliminated the father, who at long last had given them distinction in the Empire, in favour of the sons, who had shown no evidence of special favour. If anything, it was in the interests of the offspring of Theodora to keep the old man alive until such time as their own position was more secure. In fact, if any element was in a position to poison Constantine, that was the Eusebian faction. Thus we can discount the story of the poisoning by the half-brothers as a fiction designed for their elimination. In any case, it should be assumed that Constantine died from natural causes unless there is substantial evidence to the contrary. Constantius II, on the other hand, was quite ready to believe that the will was genuine, for he had no reason to distrust Eusebius and his friends. Fearing for his own safety and that of his brothers, he released the contents of the will to the various civil and military administrators. They, enraged that their beloved emperor should have been poisoned, immediately resorted to the arrest, and possibly the execution, of all who were in any way implicated. Some sources allege that Constantius II himself, and not the ministers at court, engineered the massacre. \textsuperscript{37} This might well have been the case, had he been present at his father's demise and had he been older and more experienced. The discovery of poisoning several
days after the death would have been suspicious. Thus to some extent one can approve of Eutropius' statement, that the butchery took place with Constantius II allowing it rather than ordering it. The list of victims is lengthy.

(3) The Victims of the Massacre of 337

The first to be seized by the soldiers must have been those resident at Constantinople. Among these almost certainly were the two surviving half-brothers of Constantine, Dalmatius and Julius Constantius. A third half-brother, Hannibalianus, had already died, probably several years previously, and so escaped the massacre. His two surviving brothers might have fared better had they not been brought before the public eye. While hounded by Constantine's mother Helena, they had lived in obscurity, first at Tolosa in Gaul and later at Corinth. Had they and their offspring still resided in a private capacity away from the court, they would hardly have been noticed when Constantine died. However, after the death of Helena c. 329, Constantine had taken them increasingly into his confidence. The elder remaining half-brother was Dalmatius. He was first raised from obscurity when he was appointed consul for 333. At some time in this year or perhaps earlier, he was appointed censor and dispatched to Antioch in order to preside at the trial of Athanasius for the alleged murder of Arsenius. The trial came to nought when Arsenius was discovered to be very much alive but it was followed by an appointment of greater consequence. In 334 the so-called magister pecoris camelorum of Cyprus, Calocaerus, indulged in the first revolt of
consequence against the regime of Constantine. Whether Dalmatius was
the one who crushed the revolt is not known for certain, but he was the
judge who sentenced him to be burnt alive at Tarsus in Cilicia. 45
During the following year his services were required once again, this
time to summon an armed band to rescue Athanasius from his enemies after
the Council of Tyre. 46 We know nothing further about Dalmatius' career
after this, but it is highly likely that he went to Nicomedia in 335 and
to Constantinople in 336 to join in the celebration of Constantine's
tricennalia. The Paschal Chronicle mentions the office of  οτρατηγός
'Ρωμαίων, which may refer to the post of magister militum or to his role
as a judge (praetor). 47 The known career of Dalmatius implies that from
333 onwards he was one to be entrusted with important affairs of state.
Most of the source-material refers to his son Dalmatius, made Caesar in
335, as holding the above offices except for that of censor, but there
are good reasons to refute this conclusion. In so far as the office of
consul is concerned, it was standard practice for it to be granted only
to experienced administrators or, in the case of imperial progeny, only
after their receipt of the title of Caesar. Thus Constantine II, Caesar
in 317, held his first consulship in 320; Constantius II, Caesar in 324,
was consul in 326. However, Constans, Caesar in 333, was not given the
consulship by his father and had to wait until 339. That the Caesar
Dalmatius, only a nephew, should have been granted the consulship before
Constantine's own son, is highly improbable. The office of censor and
the duties entailed in investigating the Athanasian dispute clearly
required someone of considerable maturity. This might also have been
the case for the elimination of Calocaerus, although here the command of
the "Dalmatius" could have been nominal. What, then, were the ages of the elder Dalmatius and his eponymous son? The elder Dalmatius, the eldest son of Constantius I and Theodora, must have been born within a few years of the marriage and promotion of the latter in 293.\(^48\) This being the case, he would have been approximately thirty-eight years of age when made consul and censor in 333. His son Dalmatius must have been born in the period 313-325 and so was probably about the same age as Constantius II. Clearly, then, it was the father who held offices involving responsibility. Although the consulship was purely honorary, the censorship involved considerable judicial authority. The title στρατηγὸς Ρωμαίων and the use of troops to rescue Athanasius together imply some sort of military capacity. It has often been assumed that he was a military commander on the eastern front, perhaps even the magister militum. Ensslin, however, prefers to interpret the Greek as praetor, thereby emphasizing the civil nature of the office. In any case, Dalmatius had enough experience and exposure to render himself prominent without enough to safeguard himself against the wiles of the courtiers. Perhaps the Eusebian faction interpreted his defence of Athanasius as support for the Orthodox cause and opposition to their own Arian beliefs, whereas in fact he was only fulfilling the duty of his position. The Eusebian faction could easily instil fear of the elder uncle into the hearts of Constantine's sons.

Little confusion exists regarding the younger surviving half-brother of Constantine the Great, Julius Constantius. He too had endured nominal exile in Gaul and Corinth\(^49\) during Helena's lifetime and came into prominence not long after his elder brother. In all
likelihood he was two years younger than Dalmatius, for he was
nominated for the consulship of 335.\textsuperscript{50} At about the same time he was
invested with the honorific titles of patrician and \textit{nobilissimus}.
Nothing is known about his actual duties or about his relationship with
the factions at court. However, in 336 he had given his daughter in
marriage to Constantius II.\textsuperscript{51} In all likelihood Constantine himself was
the instigator of this in an attempt to unite the interests of both
branches of his family. The attempt was doomed to failure, for
Constantius II was not one to allow filial piety to take precedence over
the advice of his courtiers. The Eusebian faction, once committed to
the elimination of Dalmatius, had to launch a rear-guard action in order
to eliminate any possibility of revenge on the part of the other
descendants of Theodora.\textsuperscript{52} Like Dalmatius, he had been removed from the
influences of the eastern court for many years and could not be relied
upon. He might have used the prestige of his position and relationship
to take revenge upon the faction that had developed around Helena's
circle.

Within the imperial family, the remaining victims of the purge
consisted of the older offspring of the elder Dalmatius and Julius
Constantius. These, especially the younger Dalmatius, would otherwise
seek revenge. Dalmatius, as we have already seen, was probably about
the same age as his cousins Constantine II and Constantius II. Caesar
since 335 along the lower Danube, he must have held the same power as
the other Caesars, especially in view of his age. This authority was
largely nominal, for Constantine the Great ruled as sole Augustus with
an iron hand. Be that as it may, coins of Dalmatius had been issued
from every extant mint in the Empire, which gave him valuable popularity. What is more, the area of which he was in charge was one of the most vulnerable and, therefore, heavily armed in the Empire. The danger that he posed against the sons of Constantine and their supporters was considerable. Upon Constantine's death, the Caesars officially retained their titles and governed in the name of the deceased emperor, but the news of his death travelled rapidly and there remained the risk that functionaries might assume that all the Caesars were automatically to be promoted to Augusti on the instant. Such a one was Flavius Octavianus, the governor of Sardinia, who erected a milestone in honour of Fl. Delmatio [sic] betissimo [sic] Aug. nobilissimo Caes. Uncertain how he should refer to the Caesar, he utilized both titles; it was a common practice to safeguard oneself in this way, but this acknowledgement was particularly insulting to Constans, inasmuch as Sardinia was under his nominal command, not that of Dalmatius. The Caesar Dalmatius simply had to be eliminated before this recognition became widespread. It has commonly been supposed that he was resident at Constantinople with his father and his uncle Julius Constantius, but this need not have been the case. His duties on the lower Danube would have kept him in the vicinity of Serdica or Naissus most of the time, although he almost certainly joined Constantius II, the elder Dalmatius, and Julius Constantius at the celebration of Constantine's tricennalia in Constantinople in 336. The problem for those who would eliminate the father was clearly how to undo the loyalty of the troops of the lower Danube towards the son. Their solution will be described after the remaining victims of the purge have been
discussed.

The elimination of the elder Dalmatius also required that of his younger son, Hannibalianus, whom Constantine had planned to install as King of Armenia after the completion of his Persian campaign in 337. His marriage to Constantine's eldest daughter Constantina had been yet another attempt to unite the interests of the descendants of Theodora and Helena. Once again, Constantius II was not to be swayed by fraternal affection once he had been convinced of the necessity to remove possible rivals. However, on his trip from Antioch to Nicomedia Constantius II, though he probably met Hannibalianus at Caesarea in Cappadocia, probably did not take any action against him at the time, for he had not yet been subjected to the wiles of the Eusebian faction.

The elimination of Julius Constantius rendered necessary the close scrutiny of his three sons. All three, lacking official appointments, were resident at Constantinople with their father. The eldest was old enough to warrant fear on the part of the conspirators and so was put to death. He was probably about the same age as Constans, i.e., 17, since his father must have been born about 300 A.D. Like the second son, he was an issue of Julius Constantius' first marriage, with Galla. The second son, Gallus, was to survive the massacre, partly because of his age (for he was only twelve years old at the time) and partly on account of his supposedly fatal illness. He had been born in Etruria in 325, before his father Julius Constantius had been allowed to proceed to Corinth, and, later still, to advance to imperial favour upon the death of Helena. The third son, Julian, had been born
to Julius Constantius and his second wife, Basilina, in 332. Since he was born in Constantinople, it is clear that by that time Constantine's half-brothers and their families had been welcomed back into the imperial fold. Because Julian was only six years of age, he was considered harmless and thereby saved from participation in the massacre. He and perhaps his brother Gallus as well were under the tutelage of Eusebius, Bishop of Nicomedia, and doubtless their instructor in holy writ was unwilling to destroy his own flock. One other nephew of Constantine is known to have survived the massacre of 337, and this was Julius Nepotianus. He was the son of Constantine's sister Eutropia and was to perish with her in a futile revolt at Rome several years later. It is highly probable that his father was Virius Nepotianus, consul in 336. The coins produced at Rome during his brief reign in 350 portray a man at least 30 years of age; his mother was probably born about 300 A.D., and so it is likely that in 337 he was about the same age as Constantius II. One wonders how, in view of his age, he survived the massacre of 337. The fact that several years later he was to obtain his support at Rome indicates that he and his mother spent most of their time in Italy. There he would be beyond the sphere of influence of the Eusebian faction, who could hope to eliminate him only by enlisting the support of Constantine II or of Constans. His survival in the West indicates that there was no sudden impulse on the part of the soldiers to kill all the descendants of Theodora, but rather that this was the effort of a faction whose power was confined to the eastern part of the Empire. Had he been resident in Constantinople, he would have been killed. The very fact that
Constantine had not yet conferred upon him any prestigious title or office also rendered him more obscure. Julian informed the Athenians that in the massacre of 337 six of his cousins perished. We have already accounted for two of them, Dalmatius Caesar and Hannibalianus. With regard to the other four, we can only indulge in speculation. They were probably younger sons of Dalmatius, of the elder Hannibalianus, and of Anastasia, the third sister of Constantine the Great. All had four marks against them: they were descendants of Theodora; they were old enough to prove troublesome; unlike Gallus, they were healthy; they also doubtless resided near Constantinople, that is, near the headquarters of the Eusebian faction.

The descendants of Theodora were not the only victims of the dynastic purge of 337. According to Jerome, many nobles were killed as well. Of these, however, we possess the names of only two, Flavius Optatus and Flavius Ablabius; a third, Valerius Maximus, can be postulated as a victim. The rest remain unknown: the fact that our record of a man's career does not extend beyond 338 does not mean that he was executed. Doubtless many were due for retirement, whereas others found the change of administration to be a convenient time for withdrawal from public life. Still others may have died of natural causes. In the case of most administrators, our knowledge of their careers is fragmentary at best.

Flavius Optatus was killed along with Constantine's brothers and nephews in 337. He had taught Licinius' son and had remained in the lowly station of γραμμάτων διδάσκαλος until Constantine seized the East. Then, more by virtue of his wife's charms than through any
ability of his own, he ascended to the supreme height of the consulship, holding that office in 334, a year after Dalmatius the Elder and a year before Julius Constantius. He is the first recorded holder of the title of patrician; this title, conferred on Julius Constantius about a year later, may not have granted any specific power but it did endow the holder with great prestige. This prestige was deemed a threat by the Eusebian faction at court, especially since Julius Constantius held the same title. Only these two patricians are recorded before 350, and both perished in the massacre. The title itself was the greatest danger to Optatus.

The other victim of whom we have definite knowledge is Flavius Ablabius. Ablabius was of very humble origin, a native of Crete, where he enjoyed his first official position as an assistant of the governor of that island. Once Constantine the Great had defeated Licinius, Ablabius, ever eager for richer pastures, headed for Asia Minor, where he made his way into the confidence of the conqueror. Constantine enrolled him into the Senate and made him vicar of the diocese of Asiana. After Constantine returned from the slaughter of Crispus and Fausta in 326, Ablabius was promoted to the rank of praetorian prefect; as such, he was to have greater influence at the court than any other individual, largely because he held the office not for just a few years but until Constantine's death. His main competitor for influence at court was the pagan philosopher Sopater, whose downfall he engineered by calumny, deceit, and false accusation, tactics that were later to be used against him by his own enemies. His daughter Olympias was betrothed to Constans, probably in 333 when the latter was made
Caesar. Although he probably served as praetorian prefect of Constantius II in Italy in 329, Ablabius was to spend most of his life in the East. Consequently, he was to have but little direct contact with Constantine II. Ablabius probably accompanied Constantine I back to the East in order to assist with the dedication of Constantinople in 330 and remained there until 336, when, after the completion of the tricennalia, he accompanied Constantius II to Antioch in order to prepare the Persian campaign. Thus, after Constantine I, his greatest influence was upon Constantius II. The extent of his power can be gauged from the remarks of those who despised him for his lowly birth. Libanius, writing in 390, says that Ablabius, once he had entered the court, ruled the ruler himself and that, whenever he entered the Senate, he was a god among men. Eunapius, writing a few years later than Libanius, says that Ablabius proved to be so much the darling of Fortune, which delights in all things new, that he became even more powerful than the emperor himself, influencing the emperor as though the latter were an undisciplined mob. Clearly, Ablabius was a power to reckon with once Constantine died. Yet, powerful as he was, he did not lead the Eusebian faction. His role as a prefect tended to separate his interests from those of the eunuchs at court who had no official civil duties. But what mostly set him at odds with them was his sympathy with Athanasius and the Orthodox cause. In 332 Athanasius had entrusted his Easter letter to Ablabius, whom he describes as one of the godly, that is, the Orthodox. Had Ablabius been present at Constantine's death-bed, he would have been able to take charge of the situation as the highest-ranking official in attendance.
and thereby secure his personal survival, if nothing else. But his ultimate fate, delayed though it may have been to the spring of 338, indicates that he was not privy to the plots hatched while Constantine lay dying but rather was in Antioch with Constantius II. The eunuchs at the court were thus able to add him to their list of intended victims; he was unsympathetic and, worst of all, exceedingly influential, and they felt compelled to eliminate him in order to secure their own futures.

That there was a third victim among the chief administrators is implied by an erasure on an important inscription from Tubernuc in Africa Proconsularis. Because of its importance for the imperial succession of 337 it is quoted here in full:

\[
\text{virtute clementia m[emor]ando pie-

tate omnes a[ntecedenti] d. n. Fl. Clau-
dio Consta[n]t[i]no iu]niori
\]

Aug.

L. Papius Pacatianus Fl. Ablabius ////
///C. Annius Tiberianus Nes-
[to]ri[u]s Timonianus viri cla-
[rissimi praefecti pretorio.

The dedication was inscribed when Constantine II was still only a nobilissimus Caesar and was altered shortly after 9 September 337, when he and his two brothers were officially recognized as Augusti. It is quite likely that similar inscriptions were also set up in honour of the other Caesars and of Constantine I, if he was still alive at the time, for Africa was part of the nominal responsibility of Constans, not of Constantine II. Four prefects are listed, but one or two words have been erased in the midst of their names. It has sometimes been supposed
that the original words expressed Ablabius' relationship to the imperial house through the betrothal of his daughter Olympias to Constans: *adfin[is]Caes[arum]* is a favoured reading. The supposition is that, when Ablabius fell into disgrace after the massacre, only his relationship was erased. But the common practice in the case of *damnatio memoriae* had always been to erase the name itself, leaving the titles and descriptions untouched in most cases. Besides, to have expressed such a relationship in the case of Ablabius without granting honorific titles to the other prefects would have been undiplomatic. Also, during the years 335 to 337 there must have been at least five, and sometimes six, praetorian prefects, for the Augustus and each of the Caesars (now including Dalmatius) had one and there is good evidence that, in addition, for the period 327 to 338 the regular vicar of Africa had been replaced by a prefect. 91

This being the case, it is almost a certainty that the name of one of the prefects was erased. The question is, which one? Pacatianus was prefect of Italy and probably had held this office since 330, serving Constans after 333. Ablabius had been prefect at the court of Constantine I since at least 330 and had probably gone to Antioch with Constantius II after the celebration of the *tricennalia* in the summer of 336. Next follow the erased words. Tiberianus had been prefect of Gaul, Britain, and Spain since 336. We are left with Timonianus, the last of the prefects in our list to be appointed. He was the new prefect of Africa, succeeding Gregorius there after 4 February 337. It could be argued that he was a new appointment to the prefecture of Macedonia and that it was Gregorius' name that has
been erased from the inscription (Gregorius being prefect of Africa from at least 21 July 336 to 4 February 337), but it would be strange if the prefect largely responsible for the erection of the dedication in the first place was suddenly put to one side while the prefect serving the ill-fated Dalmatius Caesar survived till after the promotion of the three remaining Caesars to Augusti. Rather, Timonianus replaced Gregorius as prefect of Africa soon after 4 February 337. The last praetorian prefect to be appointed, he appears last in the list. There is no reason to believe that Dalmatius was the only Caesar without a prefect; we can therefore conclude that the individual whose name was erased was the prefect of Macedonia. Who was he? Three distinct possibilities emerge. Gregorius himself might have been transferred to Macedonia immediately after his retirement from Africa, but two objections can be made to this theory, one being that too little time is left between his abandonment of his old post and his receipt of the new one (c. 4 February 337 - 1 March 337), the other being that we are left in ignorance with regard to Dalmatius' prefect from September 335 to March 337. Another possibility is the veteran administrator Evagrius, last attested as praetorian prefect of Constantine I on 22 August 336. He might very well have taken up the post in Macedonia soon thereafter, but again two objections come to mind: in the first instance, it would have been somewhat demeaning for a chief counsellor of the Augustus to be reduced to the service of the lowest-ranking Caesar, and in the second place Evagrius, verified as praetorian prefect at least as early as 326, should, if still prefect at the time the stone was inscribed, have been listed first, not third, among the prefects; as well, we are
still left in the dark with regard to the identity of the first prefect of Dalmatius Caesar.

The third candidate for the prefecture of Macedonia is Valerius Maximus, and it is his name that is the most likely to have been erased from the inscription of Tubernuc. The main objection to the choice of his name is that he was probably senior to both Pacatianus and Ablabius, having held the rank of praetorian prefect as early as 21 January 327, although by 337 he may not have served as prefect for as many years as Pacatianus and Ablabius. However, he could readily have been assigned to Dalmatius in the autumn of 335 because, unlike the others, he appears to have held no other official post after 333, thereby being available to serve in this new capacity. He was certainly serving as a praetorian prefect on 2 August 337, when he received a rescript in the name of Constantine Augustus, since laws continued to be issued in the name of the deceased emperor until his three sons were declared Augusti in September. Had this appointment been a very recent one, the name of Maximus should have been added to the list of prefects when the title of Constantine II was changed, but this was not the case. Rather, it was obliterated. By some means Maximus escaped the purge of June - July 337; perhaps he had even assisted in the elimination of Dalmatius. But between 2 August and 9 September he was removed from office. It may be that finally, with Dalmatius dead, his office had been rendered redundant and he had merely been forced into retirement. On the other hand, if this was so, his name need not have been erased, for it was still valid for the original dedication. The erasure of his name renders it far more likely that he
suffered damnatio memoriae and its inevitable consequence, death. At first Constantius II may have trusted him on the ground that, about five years earlier, Maximus had been his own prefect and mentor in Gaul. But it is very likely that, after the main purge, the eunuchs, fearing this experienced administrator, stirred up Constantius II's suspicions of Dalmatius' prefect and caused him to be executed, much as they were to eliminate Ablabius in the early part of 338. Doubtless there were other victims of the purge, but they cannot be identified with any certainty. It now remains to summarize the order of events on the basis of the preceding conclusions.

(4) Summary of Events Surrounding the Death of Constantine the Great

As was stated earlier, the account given by Eusebius of Caesarea of the death and funeral of Constantine I is clear and lucid but, when it is compared with his earlier writings, many questions arise. Our attempt now is to follow his account and at the same time to fill in the gaps that were omitted for political reasons.

Constantine I was assailed by his final illness shortly after Easter Day at Constantinople, that is, soon after 3 April 337. When he took a turn for the worse, he resorted first to the baths of his own city and next to those at Helenopolis. Since he had made such careful preparations for the succession, devising a tetrarchy of sorts, it is almost certain that he took the precaution of notifying the four Caesars and Hannibalianus of his illness. There was as yet no good reason for them to desert their posts and rush to the Augustus, even if they were able to do so. Had not Diocletian recovered from a serious
illness? It was probably well into May when Constantine I, realizing that his end was near, met with several bishops in the suburbs of Nicomedia. He had been postponing baptism as long as possible, in accordance with common practice at the time, and now felt ready for that rite. He was duly baptized there by Eusebius, bishop of Nicomedia and leader of the Arian faction. Thereupon he made the final arrangement of his affairs, including the allotment of the Empire to his heirs. Finally, on 22 May 337, Constantine died at midday. The numerous following events, in some degree contemporaneous, are dealt with by Eusebius in no strict chronological order but rather according to topic. Grief immediately took hold of the court and, as the soldiers and bureaucrats came to pay their respects, the news spread rapidly to the people outside the palace. Clearly, Rumour herself would have rapidly publicized the event throughout the Empire, but the administrators resolved to dispatch officers to inform the Caesars of the event. This in itself was unusual: custom had always been for the troops and administrators, upon the death of an emperor, to declare his eldest son Augustus, just as had happened when Constantius I had died at York and the title had been conferred upon Constantine I. The very fact that the new Augusti were not so declared until 9 September 337, over three months later, is clear proof of the dissension among the different factions of the administration. These factions, accustomed for so long to the rule of one Augustus, could not see the feasibility of a new tetrarchy. However, those who were present at the death-bed, especially Eusebius the grand-chamberlain and Eusebius Bishop of Nicomedia, were in the best position to act. Confident that
civil war would ensue if all Constantine's relatives were given shares in the rule, they resolved to back the Caesar most amenable to their cause and one of the closest, Constantius II. They could do nothing to prevent the other Caesars and Hannibalianus from finding out at an early stage about Constantine's death, and they had good reason to hope that Constantius II would not delay his arrival. If we assume that the news travelled as fast as 250 kilometres a day, it would have reached Hannibalianus at Caesarea and Dalmatius, probably at Naissus, first, in about three days. Constantius II would have received the news in four days, Constans in six days, and Constantine II in nine days. Of the three sons, only Constantius II hastened to Constantinople. For Constantine II, the journey would have been a lengthy one and his absence from the frontier might have encouraged incursions. The same was true for Constans, but to a lesser extent. It is possible that they informed the court that a meeting should be held in the Balkans early in the autumn when the risk of attack was less. Dalmatius and Hannibalianus might readily have set out for Constantinople to join their father. The journey would have taken each of them about a week. Constantius II must have taken about twelve days, arriving in Constantinople about 7 June. In leaving Antioch he was taking the great risk of a Persian offensive, but he would have left prominent commanders on the eastern front, possibly including Ablabius. By the time Constantius II arrived in Nicomedia, the body of his father had already been removed to Constantinople. Here the same honours were paid to the deceased as when he was alive and legislation continued to be issued in his name. The latter act was a result not so much of reverence
for Constantine I as of the inability of the factions at court to agree on the succession.

Arriving in Constantinople, Constantius II proceeded to pay respects to his father. It is at this point that Eusebius fails to inform us of the machinations at court. Among the first to greet him were the grand-chamberlain Eusebius, Eusebius Bishop of Nicomedia, and the Arian presbyter. Taking him aside, the presbyter revealed the forged will, which pretended that the deceased had been poisoned by his own brothers and urged that the three sons of the Augustus should save themselves by eliminating the descendants of Theodora. Heretofore Constantius II had always been able to consult his father when faced with a dilemma. Now, still in only his twentieth year, he panicked and put his faith in his father's advisers, that is, in the Eusebian faction. Had he been compelled to struggle in order to attain his present position, his attitude might have been much more independent. With the supposed criminals present in the same palace, he had no time to consult his brothers. The "will" was proclaimed before the troops; a great uproar arose; the soldiers swept through the city and arrested Dalmatius the Elder, his sons Dalmatius Caesar and Hannibalicianus, Julius Constantius and his three sons, and the patrician Optatus. Not all were killed. Julius Constantius' younger sons Gallus and Julian were spared on the ground that they were yet harmless; Nepotianus, son of Eutropia, was far off in Italy and could not in any way be connected with the alleged poisoning. The prefect Ablabius could not be implicated readily either; the Eusebian faction required more time to deal with him. It is most likely that the others were put to death
immediately, before they had any chance to defend themselves. Valerius Maximus survived as the prefect of Illyricum for the time being, since the only reason for the murder of Dalmatius Caesar (and of Hannibalianus and the eldest son of Julius Constantius for that matter) was the fear that they might seek to avenge their fathers. Therefore, when Eusebius relates that the soldiers ἔστρεψαν τὰ πνευματικὰ τὸν βασιλέα πυθόμενα θάνατον, ηὔσαι ἐκράτει γνώμης, ὡσανεί ζωντος αὐτοῖς τοῦ μεγάλου βασιλέως, μηδὲνα γνωρίζειν ἔτερον, ἵνα μόνον τοὺς αὐτοῦ παῖδας ἡμαῖρον αὐτοκράτορας, he is referring to the state of affairs immediately after the massacre. It is quite possible that Constantius II, rather than engineering the massacre, merely condoned it as a necessity and strove to save the youngest descendants of Theodora from the executioner. As events were to show, the grand-chamberlain Eusebius had good reason to desire the elimination of Gallus and Julian. The massacre perpetrated by Licinius in 313 had set a precedent and, to the extent that he had engineered it himself, it was the more outrageous. But Constantius II had been deceived into the murder not of members of a different family but of those to whom he was connected by ties of blood and marriage.

Soon after the massacre, Constantius II and his supporters put on the mask of piety and escorted the corpse of his father to the Church of the Holy Apostles, where, after the due rites of the Christian Church, he was interred as the thirteenth apostle. The succession, however, was far from being settled. The elimination of Dalmatius had confused the jurisdictions of the Caesars. As well, their relative roles had to be decided. Was one to have priority as sole Augustus or
were all to share the title with varying responsibilities and powers?

(5) The Meeting of the Three Sons in 337

In order to settle the problems of state, Constantius II and his brothers agreed to meet in the Balkans in the early autumn, when the risk of a major barbarian or Persian incursion was diminished. It has frequently been affirmed that the brothers did not meet until the summer of 338 and that the general massacre also occurred in that year. The main evidence adduced for this theory consists of three enactments in the Theodosian Code, one of which was issued from Viminacium and another from Sirmium. It is clear from these enactments that one (or more) of the brothers was present in the Balkans in 338, and Jerome's dating of the murders of Dalmatius Caesar and Ablabius to 338 might imply that the conference did not take place until that year, but the evidence for an imperial conference in 337 is itself based on more than the mere practicality of such a date.

In the first place, the proclamation of the three sons as Augusti on 9 September 337 implies not only a previous conference to determine their respective roles but also a meeting that took place towards the end, rather than the beginning, of the summer. Julian, praising Constantius II in 355, suggests that the conference, which he locates in Pannonia, occurred very soon after the death of Constantine the Great, when the East was in a turmoil and Constantius II was uncertain which way to turn. He also states that, after the conference, Constantius II rushed back to Syria in order to deal with the Persian threat.
Far more telling evidence is given by Athanasius, soon to become one of Constantius II's bitterest enemies. The bishop of Alexandria, when hard pressed by his Arian foes including Eusebius of Nicomedia, had appealed to Constantine I without success and had been exiled from Constantinople to Trier on 7 November 335. There in the West, few Arians existed with whom he could quarrel; Constantine II was himself of Orthodox leaning and sympathetic to Athanasius' cause. When news of his father's death reached Trier, Constantine II determined upon the restoration of at least this one exiled bishop to his see. This policy, though well-intentioned and practical in Athanasius' case because no successor had been appointed to his see, was nevertheless to give rise to even greater religious friction. In a letter dated 17 June 337, Constantine II wrote to the church at Alexandria, urging the people there to welcome back Athanasius as their bishop. Athanasius, whose struggle to dominate the church in Egypt became almost legendary, must have set out toward the East soon after the epistle was sent, before even waiting for a reply. In his Apologia ad Constantium, composed about twenty years later, Athanasius recalls meeting Constantius II for the first time at Viminacium in Moesia and conversing with him later at Caesarea in Cappadocia and Antioch in Syria. Since Athanasius returned triumphantly to Alexandria on 23 November 337, he must have enjoyed these audiences with Constantius II in the summer and autumn of 337, not of 338. It follows, therefore, that Constantius II journeyed to the Balkans in 337, not in 338, there to meet with his two brothers.

Further evidence for the presence of one or more of the
brothers in the Balkans in 337 is provided by two entries in the codes for that year, namely *CTh* 11.1.4 issued from Thessalonica on 6 December and *CJ* 5.17.7 issued from Naissus on an unstipulated day in that year. Since Constantine I was not present in the Balkans in 337, the latter enactment must date either to the interregnum after his death or to the period following the proclamation of the three sons as Augusti. It has frequently been considered that this law was addressed either to Dalmatius the Elder or to his son Dalmatius Caesar, and that therefore the law should be dated to the summer of 337, since it is highly unlikely that either Dalmatius could have held any important post after the proclamation of the Augusti. However, edicts were not addressed to Caesars but to their officials. Also, as we have already shown, Dalmatius the Elder was one of the first victims in the massacre of June 337. Therefore, this edict was addressed to some other Dalmatius, in all likelihood the *praepositus* Flavius Dalmatius who died near Viminacium. As in the case of other edicts issued during the interregnum, it was published in the name of the deceased Augustus.

To sum up, during the summer of 337 the three brothers made preparations for their meeting. Constantine II was probably the first to move, having in his company Athanasius. At Aquileia or thereabouts Constans was added to the train. Constantius II in the meantime was held back first by the massacre of his relatives and secondly by Sapor's unsuccessful two-month siege of Nisibis. On 2 August 337 either Constantius II or his elder brother Constantine II issued, in the name of their late father, an edict addressed to Valerius Maximus, the prefect on the lower Danube of the recently murdered Dalmatius Caesar.
Until the division of the Empire was decided, the role of the fifth prefect was continued as if his Caesar still lived. Late in August or early in September the three brothers met at Viminacium. The western Caesars had to acknowledge the massacre of their relatives as a fait accompli and all assumed the title of Augustus on 9 September 337. This was probably the first occasion on which all three brothers had been together since before 333, when Constans had been made a Caesar, and now much had to be decided. Constantine II was now twenty-one years of age, Constantius II was twenty, and Constans was only seventeen.

(6) The Division of Authority in 337

Several questions faced the three brothers and their advisers when they met at Viminacium. First and most pressing was the allotment of powers in the new administration. Now that Dalmatius had been eliminated, there could not be a tetrarchy of sorts as Constantine I seems to have envisaged. Was only the eldest son to become an Augustus, or were all three to share the title? The question was answered effectively on 9 September. It had always been customary for the Caesars to be promoted to the rank of Augusti upon the death of the senior emperor and, no matter how much Constantine II and Constantius II may have wanted to exclude their "baby" brother from a share in the inheritance, the tradition was too strong to be broken and he attained an equal title. It next behooved them to determine what to do about both the memory and the territory of Dalmatius Caesar. The former was easily decided: his memory was condemned and his name was erased from certain inscriptions, although the programme was far from thorough.
and his name survived on many stones. The problem of his territory, which included the dioceses of Thrace and Moesia, was far more difficult. If Constans was to enjoy equal authority with his elder brothers, the most equitable arrangement would have been to allot to him, in addition to his current nominal command over Africa, Italy, and Pannonia, all the territory of Dalmatius, that is, all the Balkans as far as Constantinople. This was not to be the case. As J.-R. Palanque has shown, the two older brothers could not envisage a three-fold division of the Empire. As will be demonstrated presently, Constantine II found it grievous enough to endure any partner of equal standing. The solution was found in the settlement reached between Constantine I and Licinius after their first civil war. All the East and the diocese of Thrace were allotted to Constantius II, whereas Constantine II assumed control of the entire West as far as Thrace. Constans was left with the empty title of Augustus and became an emperor "sans terre." The officials who had only nominally been under his jurisdiction as Caesar continued to be so now that he was an Augustus. The difference was that they were now supposed to follow the dictates not of Constantine I, but of the new Augustus Constantine II. As events were to prove, however, Constans still enjoyed considerable support in Italy, where he had represented his father since 334. How long this situation was to endure is uncertain. The position of Constans would become more embarrassing as he grew older. It is possible that the brothers had great expectations of success on the Persian front and anticipated that one of them might eventually administer Armenia and Mesopotamia. However, while Sapor was laying siege to Nisibis, they had little reason
to enjoy such hopes. Far more likely is the theory that the elder brothers were constrained to admit Constans as a fellow Augustus by the dynastic loyalty of the administration and the army. Constans could have had nothing to do with the alleged plot against Constantine I, and so he could not be brushed aside as Dalmatius Caesar had been. So long as he remained subservient to his eldest brother, all went well. But in less than three years he asserted his independence.

Another cause of friction at the meeting of the brothers was the problem of the relative roles of Constantine II and Constantius II. The traditional approach, notable especially in the case of Diocletian and his tetrarchy, had been for the senior Augustus to assume the initiative in legislation and imperial policy and to enjoy a certain authority over his junior colleagues. Constantine II was the eldest brother and had also been a Caesar for some seven years longer than Constantius II, and so there is reason to expect that he planned to dominate the new administration. The very fact that his father had entrusted him with one of the most vulnerable parts of the Empire and, moreover, the part farthest removed from him in his last years goes to show that Constantine I had greater confidence in his eldest son. Further evidence for Constantine I's marked favour towards his eldest son is provided by a series of silver medallions minted during the last year or so of his life. Constantine I, hounded by intrigue in favour of each of the Caesars, decided to take advantage of the vicennalia of Constantine II's appointment as Caesar to issue these special coins in his honour without giving the other Caesars any share, as was normally the practice. These coins were minted in the West and as far
east as at least Thessalonica and served to show Constantine II "comme héritier spirituel de l'empire, grâce auquel l'unité, que seule la forte personnalité de l'empereur a pu conserver, serait affermée et perpétee."\textsuperscript{142} The inscriptions, however, normally list Constantine II first among the Caesars as befitting his age but in other respects give him no pre-eminence. After the death of Constantine I, his eldest son attempted almost immediately to exercise his father's authority by authorizing Athanasius' return to Alexandria. This act amounted to interference in a territory over which as Caesar he had no control. In short, he considered himself alone to be the sole heir to all the prerogatives of his father, though he was willing to let his brothers share the title of Augustus and some nominal authority.

The coins minted after the conference at Viminacium reflect the new policy instituted so recently by Constantine I. Constantine II struck gold and silver medallions at Siscia, the nearest mint, soon after the conference. On these medallions all three Augusti wear the normal state regalia, but only Constantine II has the nimbus, the footstool, and the prominent central position; as well, he is depicted as larger than his brothers.\textsuperscript{143} On his own coins minted after the conference, Constantine II continued to utilize the legend \textit{vota XX multa XXX}, thereby dating his \textit{imperium} from the year in which he had been appointed Caesar. Constantius II and Constans, on the other hand, inaugurated new vows as Augusti. As Caesar Constans had celebrated no vows and Constantius II, even though he had been Caesar since 324, had celebrated them only on occasion; rather, it was customary for them to share in their father's vows. H. B. Mattingly has concluded from this
evidence that as Caesars Constans did not possess the *imperium* and Constantius II, though he may have had it nominally, rarely made use of it. That this had been the case in recent years may have been true for Constans but hardly so for Constantius II, who, though frequently accompanied by his father, had been forced to bear the brunt of the Persian offensive in 336. In spite of his experience, though, Constantius II followed the same practice as his younger brother after the conference at Viminacium in that both dated their vows from their proclamation as Augusti, utilizing the legend *vota V multa X*. This apparent equality of the two younger Augusti reflects their equal stature, inferior to that of their eldest brother, on the medallions minted by Constantine I in honour of his son's *vicennalia*.

The inscriptions are more clear-cut in revealing the acknowledgement of Constantine II as the senior Augustus even in the East. One Greek inscription from Achaea is not particularly significant in naming Constantine II alone, for it was quite common for separate inscriptions to be dedicated to individual Augusti and Caesars; however, it implies his superiority, referring to him as τὸν μέγιστον καὶ θειότατον Αὐτοκράτορα. Yet another inscription, from Phrygia, refers to Constantine II as *Maximo Aug(usto)* and to his brothers only as *Aug(ustis)*. Moving eastwards to Cyprus, we encounter three inscriptions showing the advancement of Constantine II in the imperial hierarchy. In one inscription, dated 333-335, Constantine I is referred to as *victori maximo ac triumfatori, semper Aug(usto)* while his sons are all referred to as *nob(ilissimis) Caes(aribus)* and are listed in order of their ages. In another inscription, dated 9 September 337 -
March 340, Constantine II is clearly given precedence over his brothers, being called [ma]ximo triumfatori Aug[usto] while his brothers are referred to as [v]ictoribus semper Aug[ustis]. This distinction is all the more striking in that the inscription was set up deep in the territory of Constantius II, in a part of the Empire that could not have seen Constantine II since he was a mere boy. Finally, even further east, near Antioch was set up another inscription in honour of the three Augusti: herein Constantine II is referred to as Maximo while his brothers are victorib(us) semper Aug(ustis). Suffice it to say that Constantine II not only portrayed himself as but also was recognized as the primus inter pares in the new triarchy. However, as events were to prove, he could not command the profound respect and blind obedience that had been enjoyed by his father.

(7) The Problem of the Initiation of Legislation

As well as the division of territory among the brothers, the initiation of legislation has to be discussed. During the period of the tetrarchy led first by Diocletian and later by Constantius I and finally by Galerius, legislation had been the exclusive prerogative of the senior Augustus. After the defeat of Maxentius, Constantine I had been recognized as senior Augustus by Licinius, and legislation continued to originate from the western court until the end of their first civil war, when Constantine I renounced his sole right to legislate in the Empire. This situation had lasted for ten years until the defeat of Licinius enabled Constantine I to become the sole legislator. Whatever
the decision reached at Viminacium, Constantius II published his own edicts in the East in 338 and later years. The members of the court of Constantius II may have been willing to grant Constantine II the appearance of absolute authority but not the substance, for this would reduce their own initiative. Since Constantius II had been in the East with his father since at least 335, whereas Constantine II had been in the West, it was natural that Constantius II should inherit his father's advisers, men most unwilling to play second fiddle to their western counterparts once they had tasted the ambrosia of power. Thus the laws promulgated show clearly that two emperors were exercising legislative authority and that consequently the Empire had been split much as it had been between the civil wars of Constantine I and Licinius. Constantine II issued laws from Thessalonica (6 December 337: CTh 11.1.4), from Viminacium (12 June 338: CTh 10.10.4), from Sirmium (27 July 338: CTh 15.1.5), and from Trier (8 January 339: CTh 12.1.27), while Constantius II issued laws from Antioch (11 October 338: CTh 12.1.23), from Emesa (28 October 338: CTh 12.1.25), and again from Emesa (27 December 338: CTh 2.6.4). All the laws of Constantine II pertain to the West, whereas those of Constantius II almost certainly pertain to the East. It would not be until very early in 340 that Constans would attempt to exercise his own legislative authority.

(8) The Nomination of the Consuls 338-340

If Constantine II abdicated the right of the senior Augustus to legislate exclusively in the Empire, did he retain the prerogative of naming the consuls? Since the three brothers were together in the
autumn of 337, it is most likely that they discussed the problem and came up with a mutually satisfactory solution. One would expect that they would have chosen two of their own number to be consuls, but the weakness of this solution was that one would thereby suffer a loss of prestige. None of them, except for Constantine II in his early years, had ever been closely associated with the office. Constantine II had held the office four times, but the last occasion was in 329 and he must have felt the need for his name to date the records for another year. Constantius II was in even more dire straits; he had been consul only once, in 326. But Constans, though he had been a Caesar for nearly four years, had not been deemed worthy of the office. Instead, it had gone to Julius Constantius and other favourites of Constans' father. The consuls chosen for 338\textsuperscript{155} were not men of great reputation. About one, Flavius Ursus, little is known; he may have served as magister utriusque militiae under Constantine I along the Danube a few years previously, but this is far from certain.\textsuperscript{156} The second, Flavius Polemius, was almost certainly supported by Constantine II in that he favoured the Orthodox cause. Indeed, it is quite possible that Athanasius himself, then at Viminacium with the brothers, recommended him for the consulship, for some eight years later Polemius, by then a comes under Constantius II, was one of those who wrote to Athanasius and urged him to return from what was then his second exile.\textsuperscript{157} The appointment of Polemius would not have been pleasing to the Eusebian faction, but for the time being there was little they could do about it. The consulships of the two succeeding years indicate that, even if Constantine II did exercise the exclusive right of naming consuls, he consulted the
interests of both of his brothers and the opinion of Constantius II. For 339 he named both brothers to the consulship. For 340, two prominent nobles were chosen. One, Lucius Aradius Valerius Proculus, was clearly the choice of Constantine II. Proculus, a devout pagan, was not the sort to be favoured by either Constans, the decidedly Orthodox sympathizer, or by Constantius II, the devout Arian. What is more, nearly his entire career had been devoted to administration in the West, especially in Italy and Africa, and he had been appointed urban prefect of Rome by Constantine I in 337 and had held that office into the new year, 338. After the death of Constantine II in the early part of 340, he appears to have fallen into obscurity until made urban prefect for a second time by Magnentius, the murderer of Constans. Clearly, therefore, Proculus at least was a favourite of Constantine II. His colleague, Septimius Acindynus, however, was in all likelihood appointed to the consulship at the suggestion of Constantius II. Although seemingly of western origin, he was praetorian prefect of the East from at least 27 December 338 to 24 August 340 and as such the choice of Constantius II. Therefore we cannot conclude with any certainty that Constantine II inherited from his father the right of designating the consuls. If, perchance, he did, he consulted his brothers, especially Constantius II, before actually appointing the consuls.

(9) The Authority of Constantine II and Constantius II

In view of the evidence cited, which indicates that Constantine II claimed and to some extent enjoyed a certain jurisdiction superior to
that of his brothers, we can soon dispense with the base flattery of a later period that pretended that Constantine I had wanted his own position to be assumed by the second brother, Constantius II. Julian, delivering his first oration in honour of his cousin Constantius II soon after being appointed Caesar in 355, was able to take advantage of the fact that Constantine II had become by now a mere memory (having died in 340). Addressing Constantius II, he says:

"καλ τῆς μὲν ἐν παισί σωφροσύνης μάρτυς ὁ πατὴρ γέγονεν ἀξίομαχος, 
σοὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ τὰ πρὸς τοὺς ἀδελφοὺς διοικεῖν 
ἐπιτρέψας μὴν, δυντι γε οὐδὲ πρεσβυτάτῳ τῶν ἔκεινου παιδῶν." 165

But Julian had earlier in the same oration admitted that Constantius II had become master of but a third of the Empire, τοῦ τρίτου μορίου . . . οὐδαμῶς πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον ἔρρωσαί δοκοῦντος, 166 and by contradicting himself renders his information invalid. A year or two later, while campaigning in Gaul, Julian composed a second panegyric of Constantius II, likening him to the Homeric heroes. In this he embellished the theme that Constantius II was the favoured son:

"τυχόν δὲ καὶ ἤδη τοῦ λεγομένου ξυνίτετε, εἶ τε οὕτω δῆλον, 
αὐτίκα μάλα ξυνηστεῖ ἐννοήσαντες πρῶτον μὲν ὦς αὐτὸν ὁ πατὴρ 
ἡγάπα διαφερόντως . . . Καὶ αὐτοῦ σημεῖον τῆς γνώμης, 
πρῶτον μὲν δτι Κωνσταντίῳ ταύτῃ ἔξειλε τὴν μοίραν, ἥν αὐτῷ 
πρότερον προσήκειν ἔχειν ὑπέλαβεν, εἰθ’ δτι τελευτῶν τὸν βίον, 
τὸν πρεσβύτατον καὶ τὸν νεώτατον ἄφεσι σχολὴν ἄγοντας, τούτου 
δὴ ἀρχόλον ἐκάλει καὶ ἐπέτρεψε τά' περὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν εξομπαντα. 167"

The reason for Julian's flattery and exaggeration is easily discerned. His elder brother, Gallus Caesar, had just been put to death by
Constantius II, and Julian, the new Caesar, had to tread very carefully. Since Constantine II had been dead for more than fifteen years, few would have remembered him well, and those who did would have every reason to flatter the quick and to debase the dead. In short, Julian's panegyrics in no way invalidate the theory that Constantine II enjoyed a certain pre-eminence over his younger brothers.  

(10) The Honours Paid to Constantine I

Before the three brothers departed from Viminacium, the honours to be paid to their late father had to be decided upon. Some numismatic commemoration was called for, but the old pagan practice of referring to the deceased sovereign as *divus* might offend Christian sensibilities. When Eusebius of Caesarea describes the coins that were minted in Constantine's honour, he mentions the veiled head on the obverse and the scene on the reverse (Constantine I as a charioteer, drawn by four horses, with a hand stretched downward from above to receive him up to heaven) but omits the legend *Divus Constantinus*. Constantine II and Constantius II were not troubled by this manifestly pagan slogan on a Christian coin. Doubtless they hoped in this way to appease both religious elements and also, by honouring their father, to strengthen the loyalty of the armies to themselves. Constantine II minted such coins at Trier, Lugdunum, and Arelate (still called Constantina). Constantius II was even more enthusiastic, minting them at Heraclea, Constantinople, Nicomedia, Cyzicus, Antioch, and Alexandria. It will be noticed from the above list that the Italian and Balkan mints are absent, namely, Aquileia, Rome, Siscia,
Thessalonica. It was no coincidence that all these mints (with the exception of the one at Thessalonica) were located in the territory that had been under the nominal control of Constans as a Caesar. One would have expected the posthumous coins to have been minted at Siscia first of all, for this mint was nearest to the conference of the brothers, but this was not the case. Posthumous coins of Constantine I were minted at Aquileia, but they differed markedly from the rest in that they were merely continuations of the normal types, with no reference to Constantine I as divus. What conclusions can be deduced from this situation? In the first place, the posthumous coins were probably not minted until 338, for Constantine II spent at least part of the winter 337/8 in the Balkans and did not return to Gaul until 338; if they had been minted earlier, we should be able to find a consistency throughout the West. Thus it was that Constantine II and Constantius II publicized their respect for their father openly. Constans, on the other hand, revealed his independent tendencies at an early stage. Once his brothers had departed, he refused to allow the mints to publish any posthumous coins. Doubtless the standard issues from Aquileia were minted only as a concession to his eldest brother, who might have otherwise wheeled about and enforced his own policy. But why was Constans so unwilling to respect the memory of his own father? The usual answer is that Constans was opposed to posthumous coins on religious grounds, but surely Eusebius and the elder brothers were no less Christian than Constans and yet they were able to reconcile posthumous coins with their religious principles. A far more likely reason is the assumption that Constans left the conference at Viminacium far
more embittered against his own father than against his brothers. After all, had not Constantine I waited until Constans was thirteen years old before appointing him Caesar, whereas Constantine II had been only one year old and Constantius II six years old when they were made Caesars? What is more, Constans had been appointed to the most pacific part of the Empire and had never been granted a share in his father's campaigns. In short, Constans, doubtless spurred on by his remaining court, refused to pay homage to the memory of his own father because the arrangements made by him had ensured that Constans would have an inferior position in the succession. The master of the mint at Aquileia, caught in the midst of the dispute, decided to compromise by continuing to mint the regular coins of Constantine I; those farther east took solace in the absence of the other brothers and minted no commemorative coins.

Posthumous coins in honour of a recently deceased Augustus had always been commonplace when he was succeeded by his own son and so the coins of Divus Constantinus should have come as no surprise. However, the coins minted in Trier, Rome, and Constantinople in honour of Flavia Julia Helena Augusta and Flavia Maxima Theodora Augusta were highly unusual. Minted soon after the conference at Viminacium, these coins must have constituted part of the agreement among the three brothers. The coins do not refer to the ladies in question as *divae* and thereby depart to some extent from the pagan tradition, but nevertheless they carry the practice of posthumous coinage to an extreme. Why did the sons bother to commemorate Helena, the first wife of Constantius I, for she had died more than seven years earlier? And why did they
mint coins in honour of his second wife, Theodora, who had probably been dead for about twenty-five years? Why did the sons not pay homage to the memory of their own mother, Fausta, or of their aunt, Constantia, the former deceased in 326 and the latter dead for some five to ten years? The answer to these questions is to be found in Constantine I's dynastic policy, which sought to unite the descendants of his mother, Helena, and of his step-mother, Theodora. We know that the late rex regum Hannibalianus, a grandson of Theodora, had been married to Constantina, a grand-daughter of Helena, in 335, and, what is more important, that Constantius II, a grandson of Helena, had married a grand-daughter of Theodora (i.e., a daughter of Julius Constantius and Galla) in the following year. We can also be quite certain that Constantine II, married before his younger brother, had been united by Constantine I with some other descendant of Theodora, in all likelihood a daughter of his half-brother Dalmatius the Elder. The difficult aspect was that the male line of Theodora, with the exception of the youngest members, had just been killed in the massacre. The death of Constantine I, which aroused Sapor to renewed activity, had also shaken the Empire internally, as witnessed by the delay in the proclamation of the new Augusti. Under these circumstances, the three sons required all the support they could get.

In sum, the posthumous coins of Helena and Theodora were an attempt to gain the support of the factions loyal to both households. At the same time, the coins of Helena served to pay homage as well to her son, Constantine I, and those of Theodora to honour the wives of the two older brothers. Constans, betrothed to Olympias, the daughter of
the praetorian prefect Ablabius, did not have this motive. On the other hand, he had no grudge against Helena and Theodora and consequently no objection to the minting of their coins. The three brothers found it more politic to appeal to the memory of the two older women than to that of their mother Fausta, who represented both households (one by blood, the other by marriage) but had already suffered damnatio memoriae. Constantia, a daughter of Theodora and their own aunt, did not merit consideration as she represented only a part of the household of Theodora. Once the brothers had consolidated their support by appealing to the memory of their ancestors, they turned to the appointment of new administrators.

(11) The Praetorian Prefects 337 - 340

Our information for most of the offices of state before 353, the first year recorded in the extant history of Ammianus Marcellinus, is very scanty. Even the office of the praetorian prefecture is poorly documented, partly because so few of the edicts survived until the compilation of the Theodosian Code and partly because so many discrepancies exist in the code itself. We shall deal first with the praetorian prefects and then briefly with other prominent officials of the day. The inscription of Tubernuc, mentioned earlier, indicates that in the summer of 337 the Empire was managed by five prefects. However, an inscription from Thrace, dated to the spring of 341, shows a stabilized situation with only three regional prefects. Clearly, the administration had undergone a considerable overhaul in those four years, one dictated by the changing circumstances. The existence of
only three prefects can be traced back to the conference at Viminacium in September 337.

With regard to Africa, it was decided to revert to the old system by the replacement of the praetorian prefect Nestorius Timonianus with the vicar Aco Catullinus; thereby Africa fell once again under the jurisdiction of the prefect of Italy, where it was to remain. That this was an attempt to co-ordinate the administration of these two highly interdependent areas and not simply a result of the massacre of 337 is evident from the subsequent fate of Timonianus: his name was left upon the original dedication at Tubernuc and, lacking any further information, we must assume that for the present at least he enjoyed an honourable retirement.

Another case, however, was not so pleasant. Once Dalmatius Caesar had been eliminated in the purge and his territory along the lower Danube had been divided more or less equally between Constantine II and Constantius II, his own praetorian prefect, Valerius Maximus, was no longer required since the diocese of Thrace came under the jurisdiction of the prefect of the East while the rest of Illyricum came under the prefect of Italy. But the name of the fifth prefect, i.e., Valerius Maximus, was not left intact upon the inscription of Tubernuc when the stone was altered soon after 9 September 337, but rather it was chiselled out. Such an erasure in nearly every case indicates damnatio memoriae and not mere retirement, and so we must assume that Maximus, in favour as late as 2 August 337, had either spoken out against the massacre or, in view of his great experience in administration, had succumbed to the intrigue of his enemies at court.
What, then, was the fate of the three remaining prefects, Tiberianus in Gaul, Pacatianus in Italy, and Ablabius in the East? At some time before 340, in all likelihood late in 337 or in 338, Tiberianus relinquished the office of prefect of Gaul. The identity of his successor is not known for certain, but he may have been Ambrosius, quite naturally a favourite and appointee of Constantine II. 182 Pacatianus, who had served under Constans ever since the Caesar first arrived in Italy in 334, benefited greatly by the addition of Africa and Illyricum to his jurisdiction. His ultimate fate is unknown, but his successor, Antonius Marcellinus, was in office by 29 April 340 183 and it is tempting to believe that Pacatianus, whose prefecture dated back at least as far as 12 April 332, served at first as prefect of Constantine II and remained in power until the latter's death brought about the appointment of Marcellinus by Constans.

We leave the realm of speculation and approximation only when we turn to the prefecture of the East. There Evagrius had retired, probably late in 336, leaving Flavius Ablabius as the sole prefect. Ablabius' ultimate fate leads us to believe that he was with Constantius II at Antioch when the news of the death of Constantine I was announced, for he played no role in the plots hatched at Constantinople before the arrival there of the second son. His name remained unaltered on the inscription of Tubernuc, so that we can conclude that, unlike Valerius Maximus, he was still in favour at court in September 337. Yet late in 337 or early in 338 he fell out of favour and was put to death. His downfall is vividly described by Eunapius:

'Αβλαβίω δὲ τὸν παῖδα κατέλιπε Κωνστάντιον, συμβασιλεύσαντα μὲν
For this detailed account of the workings of the court we are to be exceedingly grateful, although it does fail to answer two questions. How was it that Ablabius fell out of favour so suddenly? Was the decision to put him out to pasture reached during or after the
conference at Viminacium? As has been shown earlier, Ablabius was one of the most influential figures in the administration during the last years of Constantine I. From his humble beginnings in Crete, he had risen to become vicar of Asiana soon after Constantine I's final victory over Licinius (324 A.D.) and had been praetorian prefect (at first of Italy, but for the most part of the East) since 329. In 333 his daughter Olympias had been betrothed to Constans, this action being a decisive mark of imperial favour. For several years his influence had been counter-balanced by that of the pagan philosopher Sopater, but, by persuading the superstitious Constantine I that Sopater was responsible for holding back the grain transports from Constantinople by the magical device of fettering the winds, Ablabius had managed to secure the execution of his strongest competitor. The Arian faction, led by Eusebius of Nicomedia, had no use for Ablabius, a sympathizer of Athanasius. Even those eunuchs at court who were not of the Arian persuasion must have been alienated from him, since their responsibilities were so diverse.

In sum, Ablabius, primarily because of his great influence, had made many enemies within and without the bureaucracy, pagan and Arian alike. The Eusebian faction doubtless decided to press for his retirement while Constantius II was still at Antioch with Ablabius. If Ablabius and most of the other prefects remained in their appointed areas instead of accompanying the sons of Constantine I to the conference at Viminacium, the task of the Eusebian faction would have been rendered much easier. They could argue, with some degree of veracity, that the sons could render themselves more secure if they
replaced the appointees of their father with new administrators who would be indebted to the new order. That this was true in their own case as well was a thought that was carefully obscured. If, on the other hand, the praetorian prefects did attend the meeting at Viminacium, the task of the Arians would have been rendered more difficult but far from impossible. After all, the older administrators may actually have welcomed retirement. Eunapius states that Ablabius was relieved of his authority soon after the death of Constantine I, and so we must conclude that his retirement occurred no later than the conference at Viminacium. His replacement was in all likelihood Septimius Acindynus, in office by 27 December 338\textsuperscript{187} at the latest. Since Acindynus had a western background,\textsuperscript{188} whereas that of Ablabius had been eastern, the chances are good that he was an appointee of Constantine II.\textsuperscript{189} This being the case, it is most likely that his appointment, and consequently Ablabius' retirement, can be dated to the conference at Viminacium. Mere retirement was no disgrace, and the name of Ablabius, just like that of Timonianus, remained intact on the inscription of Tubernuc.

However, once the conference was over and Constantius II was returning to the eastern front and Ablabius was withdrawing to his Bithynian estate, the Eusebian faction had an ideal opportunity to instil in Constantius II fear of his former administrator: would the prefect who had almost ruled Constantine the Great be content with a private, rural existence? Ablabius was tricked into declaring imperial aspirations. It is possible that, fearing his enemies at court, he had decided on revolt as the only means of safety. Whatever the case, the
suspicions of Constantius II had been aroused and were appeased only by the murder of Ablabius. Even if he suffered damnatio memoriae, no one bothered to chisel out his name from the inscription at Tubernuc.

(12) Urban Prefects and Other Officials 337-340

Little is known about the other officials during the period 337-340 with the exception of the praefecti urbis Romae. The latest appointee of Constantine I, Lucius Aradius Valerius Proculus, remained in office throughout the crisis, from 10 March 337 to 13 January 338. Though a pagan, he did not suffer at the hands of the new administration. His career is further evidence that by far the greatest part of the intrigue occurred in the East, at the court of Constantius II. When appointed to this office, he was honoured by the Augustus and Caesars with a statue in the Forum of Trajan. Later he was nominated to the consulship of 340 together with Septimius Acindynus. Thereafter he remained in obscurity until 351, when he chose to serve as urban prefect once again, this time under the usurper Magnentius. His virtual retirement from the death of Constantine II in 340 to that of Constans in 350 may be best ascribed to Constans' mistrust of the favourites of his eldest brother. For his earlier good fortune he was indebted primarily to Constantine I and Constantine II, even though he served in territory under the nominal control of Constans. Once Constans had eliminated his eldest brother, Proculus fell from favour. His successor in the office of urban prefect, Maecilius Hilarianus, held the position from 13 January 338 to 14 July 339 and, having already held the consulship in 332, was clearly a favourite of Constantine I. We
do not have sufficient information to determine whether he was the choice of Constantine II or of Constans. Suffice it that his retirement was an honourable one, for in 354, at an advanced age, he was appointed praetorian prefect by the surviving brother, Constantius II. \footnote{196}

Hilarianus was succeeded in the urban praefecture by Lucius Turcius Apronianus, who held that office for only a short period, from 14 July 339 to 25 October 339. \footnote{197} Since Apronianus was never promoted to the consulship or any other high office under Constans, it is possible that he was shunned by that Augustus as a favourite of Constantine II. It is just as possible, however, that he was the choice of Constans, since his death during the joint reign of Constantius II and Constans may have precluded any further promotion, \footnote{198} and since both of his sons prospered under Constans. \footnote{199} As in the case of Hilarianus, we cannot be certain whether he acquired the urban prefecture through the favour of Constantine II or through Constans. During the period now under consideration (337-340), we have no definite information on such important officers as the magistri officiorum, the magistri militum, the comites sacrarum largitionum, the comites rerum privatarum, and the agentes in rebus. The role of the infamous praepositus sacri cubiculi, Eusebius, in the succession of the sons and in the massacre has already been discussed at length. His pernicious influence at the court of Constantius II will be traced until he began to plot the elimination of Gallus Caesar in 353. Since our information about Eusebius and lesser officials, such as the cubicularii and notarii, is based primarily upon ecclesiastical sources for this period, we would do well to turn to the fate of Athanasius, so closely is it related to the politics of the
(13) The Return of Athanasius and His Second Exile

Once the death of Constantine I had been made known in the West, Constantine II wrote a letter, dated 17 June 337, to the Alexandrians, urging them to welcome back as bishop Athanasius. In all likelihood Athanasius travelled with Constantine II as far as Viminacium where he had his first interview with Constantius II. The Arians of the East, most notably Eusebius of Nicomedia, had no desire to see the return to their midst of their most bitter enemy but were powerless when confronted with the resolve of the eldest Caesar. The meeting at Viminacium must have ended very soon after 9 September, for Constantius II was urgently required on the eastern front, where Sapor was conducting raids. We cannot be sure whether Athanasius actually travelled with Constantius II but we do know that they twice had formal interviews, one at Caesarea in Cappadocia and another at Antioch. On 23 November 337, Athanasius returned to Alexandria, to the joy of the Orthodox and the grief of the Arians. His sojourn was to be a short one, for in the absence of Constantine II and Athanasius, the Arians were free to stir up the suspicions of Constantius II against the Bishop of Alexandria. The Arians' reliance, like that of their opponents, upon the secular arm was an integral part of the politics of the period. Finally, in 338 they were able to persuade Constantius II to appoint as prefect of Egypt one Philagrius, a strong supporter of their faction who had held that same office once before in the last years of Constantine I and had been relieved of his command in late 337, doubtless in order to
further Constantine II's policy of the restoration of exiles. The new bishop was not to be chosen by the clergy of Egypt; rather, the Arians chose Gregorius to be the new bishop and persuaded Constantius II to dispatch him together with Philagrius to Egypt. Doubtless Eusebius of Nicomedia was the main instigator behind this intrusion of the secular arm into ecclesiastical affairs. However, since a eunuch, Arsacius by name, was sent together with Philagrius, it is quite possible that the grand chamberlain Eusebius had a share in the plot; Arsacius was probably one of his cubiculii. Athanasius and his followers were no match for a military force. On 18 March 339 he was forced to flee from his church, and four days later Gregorius entered Alexandria as bishop. Athanasius dared not risk an appeal to Constantius II but instead set out for Rome, where he could anticipate a friendly reception from Bishop Julius and protection from the Orthodox Constantine II and Constans.

In securing the deposition of Athanasius the Arians had appealed to Constantius II's love of civil order; they had fostered riots in Alexandria and then had attributed them to a fictitious attempt by Athanasius to crush his enemies. Although possessing stronger Arian sympathies than his father had had, Constantius II was very much like him in giving the highest priority to public order; he did not desire that the strength of the Empire should be drained by civil discord, especially when the Persians were launching a major offensive. Likewise, the Arians at court were able to persuade him to intervene in the ecclesiastical affairs of Constantinople itself. There, upon the death of Bishop Alexander, Paul and Macedonius had struggled for the
bishopric and the spoils had gone to Paul, a strong supporter of the Nicene Creed, although disturbances remained. Now that Constantinople was rapidly eclipsing Nicomedia as the chief city in the area of the Bosporus, Eusebius, the bishop of Nicomedia, desired to acquire control of the newer, more prestigious, see. Persuading Constantius II that only a strong personality such as his own could bring peace to ecclesiastical affairs there, Eusebius secured the expulsion of Paul and the bishopric for himself. Paul, along with other Orthodox exiles, joined Athanasius in the West, where a major catastrophe was brewing in the secular arena. 207

(14) Constantius II in the East 337–340

After the conclusion of the meeting of the three brothers at Viminacium, Constantius II hastened to the eastern front by way of Caesarea and Antioch, where he found to his relief that the Persian offensive had not enjoyed any marked success. In all likelihood Constantius II spent most of his time during the next few years in the vicinity of Antioch, although he may have occasionally ventured as far as Constantinople. For this period there are extant no edicts issued from Constantinople (nor from Rome, for that matter), and the situation appears to have resulted from two causes. In the first place, hostilities between the brothers in the West and against the Persians in the East compelled the Augusti to refrain from enjoying the luxuries of the titular capitals. In the second place, there may well have been an agreement at Viminacium to the effect that they would treat their capitals as common property in order not to cause each other offence.
In any case, Constantius II had little opportunity to bother with Constantinople or to dispute the allocation of territory as agreed upon at Viminacium, for even while he was at the conference with his brothers the situation in the East was deteriorating rapidly. The Persians, taking advantage of the uncertainty in the Empire following the death of Constantine I and also of dissension in Rome's ally Armenia, had succeeded in capturing the Armenian king and in setting up their favourites in Armenia. As well, they overran Mesopotamia and besieged Nisibis for two months, though they were unable to take that city. The return of Constantius II to the eastern front in the winter of 337/8 led to the regrouping of the Roman forces.

It was clear that Constantius II did not dare to stray far from the frontier without encouraging further Persian aggression. Besides, any neglect of the war on his part could very well lead to the usurpation of one of his own commanders. In 338 Constantius II took the offensive, drove the Persian forces from Armenia, and re-established there a regime sympathetic to the Roman cause. However, continued Persian raids were to demand most of his attention throughout the following decade and to render him incapable of any concerted effort in western affairs. Entries in the Theodosian Code enable us to verify Constantius II's presence on the eastern front for the autumn and winter of 338. He can still be found there in the late summer of 340, after the crisis in the West had been resolved.

(15) Constantine II and Constans 337-338

In the West, Constantine II and Constans sought to make do as best they could with the difficult agreement reached at Viminacium. The
question was not how much longer Constans could endure to content himself with only the trappings, but not the substance, of an Augustus, for he was now essentially still a Caesar with the title of an Augustus, but rather how long it would be before his officers, most of whom had been appointed by Constantine I, would revolt, now that their independence had been undermined by the officials of Constantine II. So long as Constantine II remained in the Balkans, he was able to manage affairs in his own right. Meanwhile, his entourage doubtless made its presence felt as it undermined the authority of the former administrators of Constans and Dalmatius.

After the conference at Viminacium, Constantine II, to judge from his activities during the following year, resolved to undertake the inspection of his own territory, doubtless to reinforce his claim to the entire West as well as to ensure the security of the frontiers. It is quite possible that he and Constans accompanied Constantius II as far as Thessalonica, where they spent the winter while Constantius II rushed on through to Antioch, for we can be certain that in early December at least Constantine II resided at Thessalonica.

In 338 Constantine II, probably still accompanied by Constans, returned to Viminacium, favouring this town as one where his presence would be most noticeable to the tribes across the Danube. While he resided there in June, he decided that the time had arrived to put an end to the witch-hunt that had been taking place ever since the death of Constantine I. By now the massacre of the brothers and nephews of Constantine I had been completed, and even Ablabius was dead in the East. There can be little doubt that the dynastic slaughter of 337 had
originated in the eastern court. Constantine II had been unable to stop it, for most had been killed before he had a chance to intervene. In his edict of 12 June 338, Constantine II prohibited the lodging of secret informations, considering that thereby he and his colleagues would be *innocentiam securitate firmantem et quorundam audaciam prohibentes*. On 18 June 338, he turned to those anonymous denunciations that already existed and ordered that, in accordance with an earlier law of his father, they all be destroyed by fire. Both these edicts are directed to Africa, the former to Aurelius Celsinus, the proconsul of Africa, and the latter to the Africans in general. Africa is one of the most remote areas, and there is no evidence that any of the relatives of Constantine I lived there or that any of his brothers or nephews had ever so much as visited that diocese. It is most likely that edicts similar to these were dispatched to all areas of the western part of the Empire, and that the desire of Constantine II was to ensure an end to the intrigue following upon the death of his father. However, there is another possibility, namely that certain officials there, under the nominal command of Constans while his father was still alive, were trying to engineer a revolt in his favour and in opposition to Constantine II in order to regain their influence. These officials could have made use of the supporters of the Donatist heresy, still a force to reckon with. A revolt in Africa would have been critical since, by cutting off the grain-supply to Rome, it could have extended itself to southern Italy as well. In any case, Constantine II had no use for anonymous denunciations and determined to put an end to intrigue under his jurisdiction.
There is no evidence that at this time Constantius II passed any edict condemning anonymous denunciations. However, later in the same year, Constantius II did give vent to his impatience with regard to the protracted imprisonment of those charged with, but not convicted of, criminal offences; in his edict he declared that all such cases were to be heard and judged within the space of one month and that any judge failing to act in this way would be visited with like imprisonment. Later, after the death of his younger brother, Constantius II was to make considerable use of anonymous denunciations.

Constantine II, after attempting to end intrigue, moved in the middle of the summer a short distance west to Sirmium. After ensuring the security of the Danube frontier, Constantine II journeyed to Trier in order to spend the winter of 338/9 in the city that had been his most common abode for several years. Before actually journeying to Trier, Constantine II honoured Constantius II and Constans with the consulship for 339. He himself had already held the office four times, but Constantius II had held it only once before and Constans had never enjoyed its prestige. But by leaving Constans alone with his advisers in the Balkans, Constantine II was making a fatal mistake.

(16) The Revolt of Constans

To the best of our knowledge Constantine II spent the year 339 and the winter of 339/40 in Gaul. It was during the summer of 339 that an upheaval occurred on the Danube that destroyed the precarious relationship of the eldest and youngest brothers. The Sarmatians attacked, in all likelihood taking advantage of the preoccupation of
Constantine II with the defence of the Rhine and of Constantius II with the raids of Sapor. The soldiers already had their Augustus in Constans, and under his leadership the Sarmatians were driven back. Thus it came to pass that in an emergency the army, unable to wait for Constantine II, turned to Constans and thereby rendered him an Augustus in more than just name. He was hailed Sarmaticus, just as Constantine II had been named Gothicus in 332 for a similar accomplishment. The first great step toward a breach between the brothers had been taken. As well as affronting Constantine II by failing to make him a participant in the honour, Constans also may have trespassed upon the jurisdiction of Constantius II. An inscription from Troesmis, near the mouth of the Danube, indicates that the fortifications were strengthened there at this time by Sappo, the dux limitis of Scythia. Since Scythia, part of the diocese of Thrace, was under the jurisdiction of Constantius II and yet the latter, harassed on the eastern front, could not have responded quickly to the threat on the Danube, it is quite possible that Constans had assumed the initiative here as well.

One thing led to another, especially when Constantine II showed no indication of intervening on the Danube. Constans, doubtless urged on by his advisers, proceeded to take the initiative. He struck a medallion to celebrate his victory, and on it he portrayed himself and Constantius II as equals, both wearing the consular dress while Constantine II was depicted with the conventional state-costume. All three brothers were depicted as of equal size, whereas before Constantine II had towered above the others. In this way Constans proclaimed himself the third ruling Augustus. However, he still
recognized the precedence of Constantine II, for he granted him the central position and depicted himself and Constantius II as turning towards him.\textsuperscript{225} It was in all likelihood this conciliatory gesture that caused Constantine II to consider any intervention at this time merely superfluous. So long as Constans did not appoint new officials or publish edicts of his own, there was no real challenge to Constantine II's domination of the West.

In so far as independent legislation is concerned, J.-R Palanque\textsuperscript{226} would like to date it to as early as 6 April 339, for he declares that an edict of this date and another of 23 July 339 were issued by Constans from the neighbourhood of Savaria in western Pannonia and that both edicts contradicted previous legislation of the elder brothers. In so dating these edicts, he accepts the conclusions reached earlier by Otto Seeck,\textsuperscript{227} conclusions based upon careful reasoning but, though probable, not so well-founded as to allow one to base other arguments upon them. The manuscripts are unanimous in dating \textit{CTh} 10.10.6 to 6 April 342 and in locating it at Savaria. Seeck's argument that Constans could not have been at Savaria in 342 is based on the ground that he was campaigning against the Franks in that year. However, Savaria is not so far from the Rhine that Constans could not have journeyed thither in the spring before waging a campaign to the north-west, and scholars both earlier and later than Seeck have cast their votes in favour of the manuscripts' tradition.\textsuperscript{228} It is a pity that \textit{CTh} 10.10.6 cannot be ascribed with certainty to the year 339, for otherwise we could readily accept Palanque's conclusion that the \textit{comes rei privatae} Eusebius, to whom it was addressed, was an appointee of the
new sovereign and that, as early as this date, Constans was constituting a court and ministry of his own. The edict, confirming the donations of his father, does contradict earlier legislation of Constantine II and of Constantius II, but this factor does not in any way influence the dating.

The other edict upon which Palanque bases his argument is \(CTh\) 12.1.41, dated to 23 July 353 by the manuscripts. Palanque and Seeck again prefer to change the year to 339, largely because this edict, addressed to the senate of Carthage, is similar to \(CTh\) 10.10.6 in being of somewhat a conservative nature: titles of rank are to remain valid if granted by special imperial favour. However, the place of origin of this edict is unknown and, even if dated to 339, it could have been given by Constantine II. Mommsen prefers to retain this edict in 353, and this appears to be the best approach; it was part of Constantius II's attempt to settle western affairs after the defeat and just before the suicide of Magnentius.

What, then, was the situation with regard to the other western edicts of 339? We do not know their place of origin, but none of them needs have been derived from the court of Constans. Two are addressed to the urban prefect of Rome, Hilarianus, and pertain to the regular obligations of praetors and other senators. The other is addressed to the vicar of Africa, Catullinus, clearly an appointee of Constantine II, for he had been part of the general settlement reached at Viminacium, wherein the praetorian prefects of Africa and the lower Danube had been replaced by vicars.

It is not until we reach the early part of 340 that we can find
any certain evidence of legislative independence on the part of Constans. Two entries in the Theodosian Code, one for 19 January 340\(^2\) and the other for 2 February 340,\(^2\) originated from Naissus. Since Constantine II was in Gaul and Constantius II was still near the eastern front, we can be quite certain that they came from the court of Constans. Constantine II was bound to be upset because of this violation of his own legislative authority, it being grievous enough that he had already found it necessary to agree to the autonomy of Constantius II, but the two edicts in question added insult to injury. Had they applied to Illyricum, they would not have been so offensive, but they amounted to direct interference in both Africa and Italy. The earlier edict pertains to the senate of Cirta in Numidia and imposes the return of all decurions to their duties, whereas the later one is addressed to Callepius, the rationalis of Corsica, Sardinia, and Sicily,\(^2\) and concerns the ownership of imperial grants of property. Surely no emergency in Illyricum warranted these edicts; rather, they were a blatant interference in the jurisdiction of the eldest brother.\(^2\) This new-found initiative of Constans arose from several causes. Doubtless one was his own increasing maturity: only seventeen years of age when his father died, he was now approaching his twentieth year. Another cause was his success in defending the Danube against the Gothic tribes; an occurrence of this type had frequently caused the soldiers to urge their leader to assume independence and would do so again. In short, the armies of the Danube, rarely visited by Constantine II, felt as if he had abandoned them and put their faith in Constans.
There were attributed, however, other far less noble causes. Athanasius, it will be recalled, had been driven from his church in Alexandria in the spring of 339 and had retreated to the West. Much later, in 355, Constantius II, by now a bitter enemy of Athanasius, insisted that the prelate had occasioned the death of the elder of his two brothers, that is, of Constantine II.237 Since in the succeeding struggle for authority Constantine II was to perish, it was implied that, upon reaching the West, Athanasius had set out to develop enmity between the brothers. This charge, beyond a doubt, originated with the Arian faction at the eastern court, in particular from the lips of either the grand chamberlain Eusebius or of Eusebius now bishop of Constantinople; their purpose was to discredit Athanasius, their most bitter enemy. Even if we did not have Athanasius' reply to the charge, we should be able to appreciate its lack of substance without any difficulty, for both Constantine II and Constans supported Athanasius and the Orthodox cause, the former during his first exile in Gaul and the latter especially during the years 341 to 346; in short, Athanasius had nothing to gain by stirring up dissension between his supporters, although doubtless he strained their relationship with Constantius II. In his own defence, composed soon after the accusation by Constantius II, Athanasius insists on his innocence: he declares that, after leaving Alexandria, he went straight to Rome (i.e., to Bishop Julius), not to Constans or anyone else, and that his correspondence with Constans took place only when it was necessary to repudiate the attacks of Eusebius and his associates and when, at a later date, he sent religious works on request.238 We can, in sum,
dismiss any religious dispute involving Athanasius as a cause of Constans' virtual rebellion against his brother.

The ancient sources cite only one other person as under the suspicion of having aroused enmity between Constantine II and Constans. In his account of the last year (361 A.D.) of Constantius II, Ammianus Marcellinus mentions that the emperor, after returning to Antioch from Mesopotamia, was visited by a certain Amphilochius, a former tribune from Paphlagonia, *quem dudum sub Constante militante discordiarum sevisse causas inter priores, fratres, suspiciones contiguae veritati puleabant.* Both Constantius II and Ammianus were convinced of Amphilochius' guilt when an accident occurred on the following day and, though many were injured, only he perished. It is remarkable that Amphilochius should have still been unpopular at court twenty-one years after the crime that he was supposed to have committed. Indeed, since Constans had emerged victorious from the contest, one is surprised that Amphilochius was not regarded as a hero. However, there had intervened in 350 the assassination of Constans by Magnentius and the bloody victory of Constantius II over the usurper at Mursa. It is possible that, as a result, some viewed the former tribune as at least partly responsible for the reduction of the Flavian household, for, had Constantine II and Constans continued to govern in peace, the revolt of Magnentius could not have succeeded. Our ignorance regarding the earlier career of Amphilochius prevents us from knowing whether he owed his rank to Constantine I, Constantine II, or Constans. In any case, he clearly had renounced his allegiance to Constantine II and had actively urged Constans to do likewise, persuading him to appoint his own
officials and to issue legislation that would voice his claim to Italy, Africa, and Illyricum.

The sources fail to mention any other officials who supported Constans in his attempt to win over the West, but there are some possibilities. A notable one is Fabius Titianus, a favourite of Constantine I who had been named to the consulship of 337 and had been appointed urban prefect of Rome by Constantine II on 25 October 339. Titianus might very well have aided and abetted Constans, for after the death of Constantine II he not only continued as urban prefect until 25 February 341 but also, upon relinquishing that post, was made praetorian prefect of Gaul, a post that he held for nine years, an unusually long appointment. Since he later turned against Constans, it is quite possible that he had done so earlier in the case of Constantine II. On the other hand, he may have been only a shrewd opportunist who could always convince the new emperor that he had always at heart been his most devoted servant. The latter theory has more substance, since it is known that he was absent from his post at Rome for just over a month not long after the death of Constantine II in order to visit Constans and that during this period he was replaced by the vicar Julius Tertullus. Titianus held the urban prefecture of Rome twice, and on both occasions he was succeeded in the office by Aurelius Celsinus. It has been conjectured that they were related. In any case, Celsinus had served in 338 and 339 as proconsul of Africa, and the fact that he was later honoured with the prefecture by Constans may be an indication that he had earlier worked to bring Africa into Constans' jurisdiction, just as Titianus may have
done in the case of Italy. Yet another official who may have assisted Constans was Antonius Marcellinus who, like Celsinus, had once been proconsul of Africa; later, in 340, he was to be awarded with the prefecture of Italy, Africa, and Illyricum by Constans. Yet still another officer who may have supported Constans was Aco Catullinus, vicar of Africa under Constantine II and rewarded with the prefecture of Italy, Africa, and Illyricum in 341. Unfortunately our knowledge about other officials of this period, especially about military ones such as the *magistri, duces*, and *comites* of the central part of the Empire, is so fragmentary as to be useless in determining the basis of Constans' support.

(17) The Death of Constantine II

The breakdown of the authority of Constantine II in Africa, Italy, and especially Illyricum was caused primarily by his neglect of that area ever since Constans assumed nominal control there in 334. He had returned in the autumn of 337 to confer with his brothers and had inspected Illyricum in 338 but then had returned to his favourite capital, Trier. After his Sarmatian victory, Constans required little encouragement in order to commence his own legislation. In all likelihood his interference was at first restricted to Illyricum, but by February of 340 he was also taking the initiative in Africa and Italy. This interference was accompanied by the appointment of officials by Constans, an act guaranteed to infuriate Constantine II. To him it was inconceivable that three Augusti should rule the Empire and that the West should be divided, and so he could only conclude that
Constans was setting out to usurp the rule of the entire West. The conflict was very serious because each brother did not have distinct territory; with regard to the West, it was all or nothing for either, and one of the two sovereigns was excessive.254

It was probably in March 340 that Constantine II set out for the north of Italy. If one rather confused source is to be believed, Constantine II was pretending to bring troops to the aid of Constantius II, hard pressed on the Persian front.255 Yet if this was the case, surely there was no need for him to accompany them. As well, other sources describing his subsequent death imply that the force that accompanied him was a small one, far too weak to be of use on a major campaign. Quite to the contrary, Constantine II, doubtless supposing that by the element of surprise alone he could overwhelm the opposition much as his father had done, progressed rapidly from Trier towards northern Italy. Constans, resident at Naissus,256 dispatched some of his forces towards Aquileia in order to head off the advance of his brother. When these forces refused to obey the instructions of Constantine II, he, the eldest Augustus, determined to crush them in order to set an example for others, but he lacked the military, as well as the diplomatic, prowess of his father. His opponents set up an ambush and then pretended to flee. While the soldiers of Constantine II pursued their intended victims, those lying in ambush attacked them from the rear, whereupon the fugitives wheeled about and entrapped the enemy in the middle. The result was the defeat of the forces of Constantine II and his own death, for, unable to escape, he was killed and his body was tossed into the river Alsa near Aquileia.257
The date of the death of Constantine II can be determined more precisely than merely in terms of the year 340. On 2 February 340, Constans was still at Naissus, but by 9 April he had arrived at Aquileia, the scene of his brother's death. Since Constans had not led his troops in battle but had merely followed them with reinforcements, we can be safe in dating the death of Constantine II to the latter part of March or the first week of April at the latest.

Constans' first extant laws as the emperor of the entire West show no trace of vindictiveness against his eldest brother; rather, they refer to the mundane topic of private actions against the fisc. Both these laws are addressed to the new vicar of Africa, Petronius, who may have just succeeded Aco Catullinus. As such Petronius may have been one of the first appointees of Constans. Another recent appointee was the recipient of an edict of 29 April 340, Antonius Marcellinus. Marcellinus, by now praetorian prefect of Italy, Illyricum, and Africa, may have been appointed to this position by Constans several months earlier when Constans first began to show signs of independence. In any case, he probably succeeded Pacatianus, an appointee of Constantine I who had been active in public administration for over thirty years and was by now due for retirement. In this first edict addressed to Marcellinus, Constans abolished the tax-exemptions granted by his late brother, whom he disrespectfully referred to as *publicus ac noster inimicus*. Even if he had not planned the death of his eldest brother, Constans made no attempt to avoid that impression or to welcome into his court those who had served the late Augustus.

Fabius Titianus, the urban prefect of Rome, retained his
position but only after making a special trip to the court of Constans. It has been surmised that Ambrosius, the father of Saint Ambrose, had succeeded Tiberianus as prefect of Gaul and that, after accompanying Constantine II on his abortive journey to Italy, he had been executed, but the evidence for this viewpoint is very conjectural. We do know that the elder Ambrosius had been the praetorian prefect of Gaul when his son was born, but the year of birth of the latter is uncertain; it may have been either 334 or 340. Even if the latter date is correct and the elder Ambrosius was prefect of Gaul in 340, the original source does not state specifically that Ambrosius died in his prefecture, but rather only that several years later the younger Ambrosius lived in Rome with his sister and his widowed mother. Thus, as well as being ignorant of the date of the prefecture, we do not know whether the elder Ambrosius died in office or some years later. Finally, our only knowledge of the death of Ambrosius is Paulinus' reference to his widow; there is no hint of a violent death, and therefore we should assume a natural one. In sum, we cannot be certain who was the praetorian prefect of Constantine II in his last days; it may even have been his father's appointee, Tiberianus. Also, we do not know about the fate of that prefect. All we can say with certainty is that the journey of the urban prefect, Fabius Titianus, to the court of Constans paid off, for when, on 25 February 341, he laid down his position at Rome, he set forth to serve his new master in a new capacity as praetorian prefect of Gaul.

In addition to settling his new administration, Constans also took steps to encourage the elimination of even the memory of his eldest
brother. One of his first steps was to give back to Constantina in southern Gaul its old name of Arelate, which it had lost just over twelve years earlier when it had been renamed in honour of Constantine II. Of course, Constans could have proclaimed that the city had been named in honour of Constantine I, but, as was explained earlier, his filial piety was remarkably sparse. The city was to be called Arelate until it was recovered by Constantius II in 353, at which time it was renamed Constantia. This damnatio memoriae of Constantine II extended to the inscriptions but was not carried out with much thoroughness in the West. Of the thirty-one inscriptions in the West that carried or implied the name of Constantine II, only three, one in Africa, one in Spain, and one in northern Italy, reveal the erasure of his name. In the East, on the other hand, Constantius II not only supported his brother's policy but carried it out more successfully, for there, out of thirteen inscriptions referring to Constantine II, four suffered erasure. Preoccupied on the eastern front, Constantius II could only acknowledge his brother's deed and hope to secure his cooperation. Constans' lack of success in securing the damnatio memoriae of Constantine II in the prefecture of Gaul indicates that many there in the army and the administration regretted the death of Constantine II and accepted the rule of Constans only grudgingly. Two of them in particular were later to ensure that Constans suffered a like fate.
Notes to Chapter Two

1^Cons. Const. for 337. There is a brief discussion of the massacre by G. Gigli, La dinastia dei secondi Flavii: Costantino II, Costante, Costanzo II (337-361) (Rome 1959) 6-8.

2Eus. V. Const. 4.66-67. For the date of the composition of the Vita Constantini see Seeck, Geschichte 4.406.

3Eus. V. Const. 4.40.

4Eus. V. Const. 4.51.

5Eus. V. Const. 4.68.

6Eus. V. Const. 4.69.

7Eus. Laud. Const. 3.3-4.

8Zos. 2.40.1-3.

9Jul. Ep. ad Ath. 270C-271B. Lib. Or. 18.31 also refers to Constantius II as the murderer of many of Julian's relations. Yet the other major pagan source, Amm. 25.3.23, refers only to the deaths of many in the strife for the succession to the throne and does not allocate the blame; were his account complete, much conjecture could be eliminated. Jul. Ep. ad Ath. 273B hints that the motives of Constantius II had been covetous as well as political. By the elimination of his relatives, who lived for the most part in the East, he had been able to confiscate most of their property. Later, the murders weighed heavily upon his conscience, and he attributed to them his failure in the Persian wars and his lack of a son (Jul. Ep. ad Ath. 271A).

10Soc. 3.1; Soz. 5.2; Lib. Or. 18.10.

11Hieron. Chron. for 350; Cons. Const. for 350; Chron. Pasch. for 349; Soc. 2.25-26; Soz. 4.1; Vict. Caes. 42.6-8; Vict. Epit. 42.3; Eutr. 10.11.2; Zos. 2.43.1-4; Athan. Ap. Const. 6.

12Jul. Or. 1.17A.

13Eutr. 10.9.1. This is the explanation favoured by A. Olivetti, "Sulle stragi di Costantinopoli succedute alla morte di Costantino il Grande," RFIC 43 (1915) 67-79. In this article Olivetti summarizes the opinions, both ancient and modern, regarding the massacre of 337.

14Vict. Caes. 41.22.

15Hieron. Chron. for 338.
16 Soc. 2.25. Greg. Naz. *Contra Julian*. 4.21 even excuses the soldiers, saying that they made a revolution through fear of a revolution, that is, that they feared a revolt by the partisans of Dalmatius and Hannibalianus.


18 Philost. 2.16. This is essentially the verdict of X. Lucien-Brun, "Constance II et le massacre des princes," *BAGB* 32 (1973) 585-602. He believes that Constantine the Great was himself responsible for the massacre of 337, for he knew well the antipathy between the descendants of Helena and those of Theodora and, nevertheless, gave the latter a role in the government in order to furnish Constantius II with a pretext to eliminate them. This being the case, Constantine I himself must have invented the story of his own poisoning. If Lucien-Brun's argument is true, then why did Constantine I fail to promote Nepotianus as well? The descendants of Theodora could have been ignored or quietly eliminated if they had never been given publicity. Constantine I was risking the lives of his sons unnecessarily, if we accept Lucien-Brun's theory, for he could have ensured their safety far better by arranging the massacre of his half-brothers and nephews long before his own sickness and death.

19 Philost. 2.4. The tradition that Constantine I was poisoned by his own brothers is also found in *Art. Pass.* 7 and 45 and in Zon. 13.4.10B.

20 Phot. *Bibl.* 256, from the *Politia sanctorum patrum Metrophanis et Alexandri*. Similar accounts can be found in *Bibl.* 257 (from the *Vita Pauli Episcopi Constantinopolitanus Confessoris*) and in *Bibl.* 258 (from the *Excerpta ex Athanasii Vita*). This Orthodox tradition is recounted by Soc. 1.38–39, 2.2, Soz. 2.34, and Theoph. for 336 (A.M. 5828), according to whom Constantine I entrusted his will to the Arian presbyter who had been recommended to him by his late sister Constantia.


22 The chief faction at the court of Constantius II was led by the grand chamberlain Eusebius, whose interests generally coincided with those of the other eunuchs and of the Arian leaders. His entourage included such vile bureaucrats as the notary Paulus Catena. This faction was envious of a far less organized group, the military and civilian administrators outside the court such as Silvanus and Ursicinus. But at the death of Constantine I the struggle was primarily between the supporters of the descendants of Theodora and of those of Helena. The eunuchs at court supported the latter in the hope that thereby they would dominate the court.
It is possible that the story of the poisoning was invented after the murders in order to justify them, as F. Paschoud declares in his commentary on Zos. 2.39.1 (page 244, note 52): "C'est évidemment une fable (d'origine arienne?) destinée à excuser les meurtres. . . ."

But in an autocratic society there was little need for excuses after the act, only for persuasion that the act was necessary, supplemented by, perhaps, a healthy bribe offered to the soldiers. Eusebius of Caesarea did not seek to justify the executions of Crispus and Fausta; rather, he simply pretended that they had never existed.

Soz. 2.34. It may very well be that this presbyter did not exist, and that only Eusebius of Nicomedia was involved.

For Eusebius as grand chamberlain in 337 see Phot. Bibl. 256.

Soc. 2.2; Soz. 3.1.

Soc. 1.35.

Athan. Fest. Ind. 8.

Nearly all our information for the period 314-353 is restricted to the dispute between the religious factions. However, we can discern in this the workings of the secular factions, so evident in the history of Ammianus.

Eus. V. Const. 4.61-62; Hieron. Chron. for 337; Chron. Pasch. for 337.

Cons. Const. for 337; Soc. 1.40.

Jul. Or. 1.16C-D; Zon. 13.4.10C.


Eus. V. Const. 4.67-68; Soc. 1.39.

That a will did exist is verified by Eus. V. Const. 4.63.

Phot. Bibl. 256 and 258 records the Orthodox tradition, that on his deathbed Constantine I enjoined the Arian presbyter to give the will to his son Constantine II, whom the will designated as emperor and as successor to his father's rule, and that the presbyter secretly gave the will to Constantius II instead, thereby betraying the father, the will, and the inheritance of the son. For the numismatic evidence in favour of the aspirations of Constantine I for his eldest surviving son see above pages 102-104. Soc. 2.2 states that Constantius II was pleased by the contents of the will as revealed to him. It is, therefore, quite possible that the Arians at court had made some alterations in the will before they presented it to Constantius II. What pleased Constantius II most of all was his inheritance of the eastern half of the Empire, that part with which he was most familiar.
This is the Arian tradition: *Art. Pass.* 7 and 45; Philost. 2.4 and 2.16; Zon. 13.4.10C.


Eutr. 10.9.1.

Hannibalianus is mentioned only by *Art. Pass.* 7, Zon. 12.33.644D, and *Chron. Pasch.* for 304. Soc. 3.1 refers to only the two brothers who survived until 337. Jul. *Ep. ad Ath.* 270C-D makes no mention of him in relation to the massacre.

Aus. *Prof.* 16.11-12. The sons of Dalmatius were educated at Narbo and it is likely that he also spent some time there: Aus. *Prof.* 17.8-11. Since his son Gallus was born at Massa in Etruria (Amm. 14.11.27), Julius Constantius probably spent some time there as well.


When the brothers are listed, his name is given first: *Art. Pass.* 7; *Chron. Pasch.* for 304; Zon. 12.33.644D, where he is erroneously called Constantinus. His consulship preceded that of his brother by two years. In discussing the separate careers of Dalmatius the Elder and Dalmatius Caesar, his son, I am indebted to the arguments of W. Ensslin, "Dalmatius Censor, der Halbbruder Konstantins I," *RhM* 78 (1929) 199-212.

Degrassi 80. It is commonly acknowledged (e.g., in *PLRE* 241) that he had held some earlier office in 321 or 324, as the recipient of CTh 12.17.1. However, there is no certainty that this was the case. Another Fl. Dalmatius (*PLRE* 240, number 5), *praepositus* in Moesia, may well have been the recipient of this law, since the lack of a title for the recipient indicates one of a stature lower than that of a member of the imperial household.

Athan. *Apol. c. Ar.* 65; Soc. 1.27 (referring to the younger Dalmatius); *Chron. Pasch.* for 335 (giving the title of censor to the elder Dalmatius).

Hieron. *Chron.* for 334; Theoph. for 333 (A.M. 5825); Anon. Val. 6.35; Oros. 7.28.30; Vict. *Caes.* 41.11-12. Only Theophanes attributes the execution of Calocaerus to Dalmatius.

Theoph. for 335 (A.M. 5827); Anon. *Vita Const.* 70.

*Chron. Pasch.* for 335.

Otto Seeck in *RE* 4(1).1041, followed by W. Ensslin, "Dalmatius Censor, der Halbbruder Konstantins I," *RhM* 78 (1929) 200, prefers to date Dalmatius' birth to 290 on the ground that *Pan. Lat.*
2.11.4 (Tu quidem certe, imperator, tantum esse in concordia bonum
statuis ut etiam eos qui circa te potissimo funguntur officio
necessitudine tibi et affinitate devinzeris), delivered by Mamertinus on
21 April 289, refers to the marriage of Constantius I and Theodora. But
the passage is very imprecise and cannot by itself warrant this
conclusion, especially when the other sources for the marriage imply
that it was part and parcel of Constantius I's promotion to the rank of
Caesar on 1 March 293. These sources include Eutr. 9.22.1, Anon. Val.
panegyric may refer to Afranius Hannibalianus and his wife Eutropia, who
later left him to marry Maximian: PLRE 407.

50 Degrassi 80. Dalmatius was consul in 333.
51 Eus. V. Const. 4.49; Jul. Ep. ad Ath. 272D; Athan. Hist. Ar.
69. For the date see chapter 1, page 40.
52 Zos. 2.39.2 gives the impression that Julius Constantius
shared the rule with his five nephews for a period after the death of
Constantine I. However, Zosimus does not always present his data in
strict chronological order; the passage in question is a flashback to
the order of things as ordained by Constantine I in his final years.
Although Zosimus refers to Julius Constantius as a nobilissimus, Art.
Pass. 7 calls him and the other two half-brothers Caesars as well; in
this case the author of the Art. Pass. is confused, for there is no
numismatic evidence that any of the three half-brothers was ever Caesar.

53 For the career of Dalmatius to 337 see chapter 1, pages 38-39
and 43-44.
54 ILS 720. There are no coins that refer to Dalmatius as an
Augustus: Seeck, Geschichte 4.390. There is a slight possibility that
the editor of the inscription erred, and that we should read AC in
place of AUG, it being common for adjectives to be so joined (e.g., ILS
708, 709, 710, 715, 722, and 726). If this was the case, Constans did
not need to worry so much about the recognition given Dalmatius. Most
of the inscriptions from CIL and ILS warrant a thorough re-examination
of the stones themselves.
55 The diplomatic solution was, of course, to dedicate an
inscription to all the Augusti and Caesars (as in JRS 29 [1939] 187,
from Cyprus), just as coins were minted in honour of all of them at the
extant mints. Milestones, however, often contained only the name of the
local ruler. What is surprising is not so much the possibility that
Dalmatius was recognized as an Augustus as the fact that a milestone in
Constans' territory was dedicated to him and not to Constans. The
confusion in the provinces regarding the succession is reflected in
other inscriptions. For example, Dalmatius enjoyed dedications in
Constans' territory (ILS 719 from Africa) and in that of Constantine II
It has commonly been supposed that CJ 5.17.7, dated 337 and published at Naissus, was addressed to either Dalmatius the Elder or to his son the Caesar: PLRE 241. This was not the case, unless the rescript was received at Naissus and published at Constantinople, for Constantine I spent 337 in Constantinople and its environs. Even so, Dalmatius the Elder, not his son, would be the recipient for rescripts might be given jointly by Caesars but were not addressed to them. The most plausible explanation is that the Imp. Constantinus A. refers not to Constantine I but to his son Constantine II, who was in the Balkans in the autumn of 337. Thus, the Dalmatius addressed is most likely Fl. Dalmatius (PLRE 240, number 5), a praepositus buried near Viminacium, itself only about 160 kilometres from Naissus.

Hannibalianus received his appointment as king of Armenia after his brother Dalmatius was appointed Caesar. Since his position was of lesser importance (it was insignificant in the succession) and was of a slightly later date, it is clear that he was somewhat younger than Dalmatius. The images on the coins are of little use in distinguishing their ages.

Julius Constantius, the youngest son of Constantius I, was at least two years younger than the elder Dalmatius, himself born about 295.

Julian was in his thirty-second year when he died on 26 June 363: Amm. 22.9.2, 25.3.23; Cons. Const. for 363. F. D. Gilliard, "The Birth-Date of Julian the Apostate," CSCA 4 (1971) 147-151, furnishes evidence that Julian was born in the last week of April or the first three weeks of May, 332 A.D.

Pan. Lat. 11.2.3; Jul. Ep. 48.443B; Amm. 22.9.2, 25.3.23. Zon. 13.10.20B.

In 350: Eutr. 10.11.2; Vict. Caes. 42.6; Vict. Epit. 42.3; Zos. 2.43.2; Athan. Ap. Const. 6.
Of all the Nepotiani of the fourth century, he is the most likely: PLRE 625.

Revolt in 350: Hieron. Chron. for 350; Cons. Const. for 350. The coins are highly individual, the portraiture being quite independent of that of Constans and Magnentius, so that we can assume it to be quite accurate.

Jul. Ep. ad Ath. 270C-D.

Hieron. Chron. for 338: the date will be discussed below.

Zos. 2.40.2.

Optatus' career is outlined in Lib. Or. 42.26-27.

Degrassi 80; Lib. Or. 42.26; Athan. Fest. Ep. 6.

Zos. 2.40.2; Athan. Fest. Ep. 6; Chron. Pasch. for 334.

The theory has been advanced that Optatus at some time lost his first wife, the daughter of a Paphlagonian innkeeper, and married Constantine I's half-sister Anastasia, Constantia having died and Eutropia being married to Nepotianus. If so, the connexion would have rendered him a stronger competitor in the struggle for power. However, there is no evidence to support this theory. See W. Ensslin, RE 18(1).761, and F. Paschoud, Zostime, page 247, note 53.

Lib. Or. 42.23; Eun. V. Soph. 463.

ILS 6091; PLRE 3.

He was prefect from at least 329: PLRE 3.

Eun. V. Soph. 463-464; Zos. 2.40.3.

Amm. 20.11.3.

His consulship in 331 (Degrassi 80) was in part a reward for his aid in the foundation of the new city.

PLRE 3-4.

εκράτει τοῦ κρατοῦντος: Lib. Or. 42.23.

θέας εν ἀνθέρασος η: Lib. Or. 42.23.

ωσυς σύτω πλείωνα ἐδύνατο τοῦ βασιλεῦοντος: Eun. V. Soph.

ωσπερ ἀτάκτῳ δήμῳ: Eun. V. Soph. 464.


A very likely time was 1 March 337, the day that marked the completion of the decennalia of Constantine II.

See the list of vicars of Africa in PLRE 1079.

CTh 12.1.22.

CTh 9.3.2 of 3 February 326.

In the practice of listing prefects according to their seniority in the praetorium I agree with the arguments in favour of this system as presented by A. Chastagnol, "Les préfets du prétoire de Constantin," REA 70 (1968) esp. 339-341.

CTh 1.5.2.

Ablabius was a prefect continuously from 329 to 337 (8 years), Pacatianus from at least 332 to 337 (5 years), and Valerius Maximus (even if we assume that he was the praetorian prefect of Dalmatius from 18 September 335) during 327, 328, 332, 333, and 336 (5 years): PLRE 1048.

CTh 8.1.3 of 5 May 333.

CTh 13.4.2.

For Constantius II in Gaul in late 331 through 332 see Jul. Or. 1.12A and RIC 7.74. In 332 there were three praetorian prefects. Flavius Ablabius was in the East at the court of Constantine I (Athan. Fest. Ep. 4). Lucius Papius Pacatianus was a prefect from 332 to 337 and, since codes addressed to him in 334 and 335 (CTh 14.4.1 and CTh 8.9.1) concern Rome, it is commonly assumed (e.g., in PLRE 656) that throughout this period he was prefect of Italy. The third, Valerius Maximus, the recipient of CJ 6.36.7 of May/June 332 and of CTh 8.1.3 of 5 May 333, must have been the prefect of Constantius II in Gaul at the time.

A. Piganiol, L'empire chrétien 75, conjectures that Felicianus, one of the consuls of 337, may have been a victim since his name was erased from ILS 6112. However, the erasures on this inscription appear to have resulted from a private grudge, not from imperial policy, for they are somewhat random and directed primarily at
Aurelius Gentianus, a patron of Paestum whom the inscription was originally set up to honour.

101 Primarily, that in Eus. V. Const. 4.60-75.

102 Eus. V. Const. 4.60; Athan. Fest. Ind. 9.

103 Eus. V. Const. 4.61.

104 Eus. V. Const. 4.61.

105 Eus. V. Const. 4.62; Hieron. Chron. for 337; Chron. Pasch. for 337.

106 Eus. V. Const. 4.63. It is important to remember that Eusebius, writing post factum, omits any mention of the other relatives.

107 Eus. V. Const. 4.64.

108 Eus. V. Const. 4.65.

109 Eus. V. Const. 4.68.

110 Diocletian's system had altered the usual practice, in that his Caesars were experienced administrators bound to the Augusti by ties of marriage, not of blood. This practice was a result of two factors, namely, the need for capable administrators to assist in the revitalization of the state and Diocletian's lack of a son. But Constantine I himself had experienced dynastic loyalty, for, when his father died, the troops did not wait for Galerius' decision in favour of the Caesar Severus but chose Constantine I. Constantine I might have been killed had he not accepted the offer of the troops.

111 Eus. V. Const. 4.70.

112 We cannot be certain that they journeyed to Constantinople upon hearing about the death of Constantine I. It is, however, likely that they did go there, because the massacre of at least most of the victims took place in that city.

113 Eus. V. Const. 4.66 implies that the soldiers moved the body to Constantinople very soon after death.

114 Eus. V. Const. 4.67; CTh 13.4.2; CJ 10.66.1.

115 It is clear from Eus. V. Const. 4.65-70 that none of Constantine I's sons was present at his deathbed. Eusebius could have extolled Constantius II's piety even more by claiming that he had arrived before his father's death (as Julian insinuated in his Or. 1.16D), but he preferred a factual account. If Constantius II had arrived earlier, we can be sure that Eusebius would have stated
so. Eusebius' view is taken up by Soc. 1.39, that of Julian by Zon. 13.4.10C.

116 The "will" might very well have decreed the relative status of the three sons. This topic will be developed below.

117 Victor's (Caes. 41.15) statement that Dalmatius had been made Caesar obstantibus validi militaribus is clearly a post factum observation based on Dalmatius' ultimate fate.

118 Eus. V. Const. 4.68.

119 Eus. V. Const. 4.70-71. The greater part of the massacre doubtless occurred in the early summer of 337, before the intended victims had an opportunity to organize their forces. Some, notably Seeck, Geschichte 4.391, adhere strictly to Jerome's date of 338 for the massacre, but this year denies the urgency of the situation. Besides, as Seeck admits, Jerome's chronicle is quite unreliable: for example, it dates the promotion of Constantius II to imperial rank to 323, not 324, and the death of Crispus to 325, not 326, and the death of Fausta to 328, not 326.

120 E.g., by Seeck, Regesten 186 and Geschichte 4.41 and 397.

121 CTh 10.10.4 of 12 June from Viminacium; CTh 9.34.5 of 18 June, also probably from Viminacium; CTh 15.1.5 of 27 July from Sirmium.

122 Cons. Const. for 337. Hieron. Chron. gives the year 337 without a specific date.

123 Jul. Or. 1.19A.

124 Athan. Fest. Ind. 8. This source implies that his exile was not immediate, and that he did not actually leave until 5 February 336.

125 Seeck, Geschichte 4.44, considers that the experienced Athanasius had acquired a dangerous influence over Constantine II.

126 Athan. Apol. c. Ar. 87. The year is not given, but, since Constantine II mentions the recent death of his father and still refers to himself as a Caesar, the letter must have been written before 9 September 337.


128 Athan. Fest. Ind. 10. According to this source, Athanasius returned to Alexandria in the year in which Constantine I died, i.e., 337. Baynes, "Athanasiana," JEA 11 (1925) 58-69, agrees that the massacre (at least the greater part of it) took place in the summer of 337 and that the brothers met at Viminacium in September of that year. However, his argument that Athanasius could not possibly have reached
Alexandria from Viminacium in just over two months and that therefore he
did not reach that city until the autumn of 338 is far from convincing.
Stein-Palanque 486, note 18, is in agreement with Baynes' chronology.
Seeck, Geschicht e 4.397, is also of the opinion that Athanasius did not
reach Alexandria until November 338, but this conclusion is based upon
his dating of the massacre and of the meeting of the brothers to 338.
Theod. 2.1 is of the opinion that Athanasius stayed at Trier for two
years and four months, but this was actually the duration of his
absence from Alexandria, that is, from 11 July 335 (Fest. Ind. 8) to
23 November 337 (Fest. Ind. 10).

129 As recently as by the editors of PLRE 241.

(1925) 58-69, says that CJ 5.17.7 need not be directed to the Caesar or
the elder Dalmatius, but to some other Dalmatius.

131 The first siege of Nisibis is dated to 338 by Seeck,
Geschicht e 4.411-412. However, the Chron. Pasch. and Theophanes
(A.M. 5829) date it to the same year as Constantine I's death, i.e., 337.
Jerome places it along with the massacre in 338, but, since the latter
took place in 337, the siege probably did so also. Eadie, The
Breviario of Festus 149, and Baynes, "Athenasiana," JEA 11 (1925) 66,
oppose Seeck in that they prefer 337 for the siege of Nisibis. Sapor
almost stumbled over himself in his enthusiasm to take advantage of the
death of Constantine I.

132 CTh 13.4.2.

133 Cons. Const. for 337. Hieron. Chron. gives the year 337
only.

134 AE (1934) 158 from Rome; AE (1948) 50 from Delphi.

CIL 10.8021, ILS 720, and AE (1889) 40 from Sardinia; ILS 719 from
Africa; AE (1934) 158 from Rome.

136 J.-R. Palanque, "Collégialité et partages dans l'empire
romain aux IVe et Ve siècles," REA 46 (1944) 47-64 and 280-298.

137 Palanque, "Collégialité," 58. It has sometimes been assumed
(e.g., by Seeck, Geschicht e 4.46-47), on the basis of Vict. Epit. 41.20
and Anon. Val. 35, that Thrace was allotted to Constans and that some
years later he offered it to Constantius II in exchange for
neutrality in his dispute with Constantine II. However, both passages
refer to the allotment as finalized by Constantine I in 335, when
Dalmatius was made a Caesar. Zos. 2.39.2 gives the division as
determined at the conference in 337; according to him, Constantine II
together with Constans were allotted all the West as far as
Constantinople, but Constantius II had already taken the initiative
there and so obtained of the territory of Dalmatius that part that had belonged to Licinius after 314 (Stein-Palanque 485, note 4). Zon. 13.5.11B-C confirms that Constantius II was allotted Thrace as well as the East. Also, only Constantius II had been present at Constantinople (a part of Thrace) during the massacre there. Gigli, *La dinastia dei secondi Flavii* 8-9, believes that Thrace gradually fell under the jurisdiction of Constantius II as Constantine II devoted his attention to affairs in Gaul, but he adduces little evidence for this opinion.

138 He was already seventeen and yet being treated much as Constantine II had been when made Caesar as only a baby, for he possessed the title without the substance. In short, he had no more authority than when he had been a Caesar. Rather than administering part of the Empire under the tutelage of his eldest brother, he was merely an Augustus "sans terre" because his brothers could not accept a tripartite division of the Empire. For this view see Palanque, "Collégialité," 57-58.

139 The Orthodox tradition, hostile to Constantius II, records that Constantine I, on his deathbed, enjoined the Arian presbyter to give the will to his son Constantine II, whom the will designated as emperor and as successor to his father's rule, and that the presbyter secretly gave the will to Constantius II instead, thereby betraying the father, the will, and the inheritance of the son: Phot. *Bibl.* 256 and 258. If this account is true, here is further evidence for the supremacy intended for Constantine II.

140 These medallions were usually attributed to Constantius II and Constantius Gallus until convincing evidence was brought to bear by J. Lafaurie in his "Une série de médailles d'argent de Constantin I et Constantin II," *RN* 11 (1949) 35-48. They are illustrated also as Cohen #30 (7.368) and Cohen #60 (8.40).

141 The celebrations began on 1 March 336.

142 Lafaurie, "Une série de médailles," 45.

143 M. Woloch, "Indications of Imperial Status on Roman Coins, A.D. 337-383," *NC* 6 (1966) 172 and plate 14.1. See also Cohen #28 (7.409). M. Thirion, "Les vota impériaux sur les monnaies entre 337 et 364," *SNR* 44 (1965) 8-9, believes that these medallions, inscribed VOT V, marked the *vota soluta* of Constans (made Caesar 25 December 333) and that, therefore, the central figure was Constans, not Constantine II. It is equally possible, however, that they marked the *vota suspepta* of all three new Augusti and that the eldest, Constantine II, enjoyed the central position.

144 H. Mattingly, "The Imperial Vota," *PBA* 37 (1951) 258-259.

145 *AE* (1960) 306 from Aegosthena, about twenty-five kilometres south of Thebes.
146 *CIL* 3.7175: the names of the younger sons are confused in this text. Whether this situation was produced by the original stonemason or by the carelessness of the editors of *CIL*, only an examination of the stone itself can reveal.

147 T. B. Mitford, "Milestones in Western Cyprus," *JRS* 29 (1939) 188-192.

148 *CIL* 3.6963.


151 In addition, *CTh* 12.1.26, of 1 November 338, must have been issued by Constantine II, for it is addressed to Catullinus, the vicar of Africa.

152 This law is addressed to a certain Julianus, whose position is unknown. He was probably the governor of a province (*PLRE* 469). Since the law was given at Antioch, it is highly unlikely that it would pertain to some far western province.

153 The destination of this law is unknown, but a place in the East is by far the more likely.

154 The MSS read "dat. et pp. . . . Antioch"; Palanque, "Collégialité et partages," 55, prefers the edict to have been given at Emesa and posted at Antioch. This law is addressed to Acindynus, the praetorian prefect of the East.

155 Degrassi 80.

156 See *PLRE* 989, especially the reference to Apsyrtus.


158 Degrassi 80.

159 Symm. *Ep.* 1.2: *simplex caelicolum cultus*.

160 *PLRE* 747.

161 He was urban prefect from 10 March 337 to 13 January 338: *Chron.* 354, page 68.

162 *Chron.* 354, page 69.

163 *PLRE* 11: he had been vicar of Spain under Constantine I and had a villa at Bauli, but later he served both as prefect of the East and as consul at the same time.
Palanque, "Collégialité et partages," 282, affirms that there is no reason to doubt Constantine II's authority in the matter of the consulships. But all that is certain is that he co-ordinated the business.

Jul. Or. 1.45C.

Jul. Or. 1.18C.

Jul. Or. 2.94A-B.

W. Blum, "Die Jugend des Constantius II. bis zu seinem Regierungsantritt. Eine chronologische Untersuchung," Classica et Mediaevalia 30 (1969) 390, accepts Julian's statements in his panegyrics of Constantius II as the absolute truth and therefore considers that Constantius II, not Constantine II, was the favoured son.

Eus. V. Const. 4.73. For coins with the legend Divus Constantinus and their attributes see LRBC 5, 8, 11, 23, 25, 27, 29, 31, and 32.

LRBC 17-18.

LRBC 5, 6, 16, and 25. These coins were not produced elsewhere.

For the date of the death of Helena see chapter 1, note 188.

Nothing is known about Theodora after the death of her husband Constantius I. She may have died as early as 306. We can be certain that she died before 324, since she was not promoted to the rank of Augusta in that year as Helena and Fausta were. See chapter 1, page 23.

Fausta had been executed in 326. See chapter 1, page 31-32.

Constantia had predeceased Constantine I, who had been present at her deathbed: Soc. 1.25; Soz. 2.27.

For further information on these marriages see chapter 1, pages 34, 39, and 40.

For this betrothal see chapter 1, page 35.

Theodora and Fausta were both daughters of Eutropia, the former by Afranius Hannibalianus and the latter by Maximian Augustus; Fausta, by marrying Constantine I, became the daughter-in-law of Helena: PLRE 1128-1129. Coins of Fausta ceased to be minted in 326: RIC 7.71, note 10. Yet tribute was paid to Fausta in either 338 or 339 in a less ostentatious way. In order to commemorate the restoration of the forum at Arelate, an inscription, namely AE (1952) 107, was
erected there by Julius Atheneus [sic] in honour of the deified Constantine I, his son Claudius Constantinus, and Flavia Fausta Augusta matri. Such an important inscription must have had the approval of Constantine II. It may have been an attempt to rehabilitate the memory of his mother or to emphasize his own legitimacy as a son of an Augusta, not of a concubine. This inscription was purely local, whereas the coins made a universal appeal.

179 The coins of Constantia, nobilissima femina, are commonly dated to 326-327: LRBC 24, and RIC 7.27 and 571. J. Lafaurie, "Médaillon constantiniën," RN 17 (1955) 235-236, dates these coins to 338 but gives no reason for violating the standard date.

180 Inscription of Tubernuc in Africa Proconsularis: AE (1925) 72. Inscription of Traiana in Thrace: ILS 8944. Both these inscriptions are analysed in detail by A. Chastagnol, "Les préfets du prétoire de Constantin," REA 70 (1968) 321-352, to which I am indebted for much of the following analysis.

181 Greg. Naz. Or. 4.21 states that after the death of Constantine I imperial affairs were managed by νέων προστατών.

182 PLRE 51.

183 CTh 11.12.1.

184 Eun. V. Soph. 464. Also Hieron. Chron. for 338: Ablabius praefectus praetorio et multo [sic] nobilium occisi. Zos. 2.40.3, like Jerome, associates the murder of Ablabius with that of other nobles, in this case the patrician Optatus. Like Eunapius, Zosimus shows no sympathy for Ablabius, who allegedly had master-minded the downfall of the pagan philosopher Sopater.

185 See above, pages 86-88.

186 The revenge taken upon the powerful after the death of the old autocrat is described by Seeck, Geschichte 4.42-43: "Die Hochverratsprozesse, denen auf Befehl des Constantius die einflussreichsten Katuren seines Vaters zum Opfer gefallen waren, hatten die Folgen gehabt, die in jenem knechtischen Zeitalter die natürlichen und selbstverständlichen waren. Wer sich unter der vorigen Regierung vor dem Übermut der Beamten hatte ducken müssen, der glaubte jetzt die Gelegenheit zur Rache benutzen zu können, und zahllose Denuntiationen liefen gegen diejenigen ein, die noch vor kurzem die Macht in Händen gehabt hatten."

187 CTh 2.6.4.

188 See the references to Spain and Italy in PLRE 11.
Piganiol, *L'empereur Constantin* 209, voices the possibility that Constantine II counted on Ablabius in order to make his right of primogeniture triumph. It is true that both Constantine II and Ablabius were supporters of Athanasius, but this does not mean that Ablabius automatically supported Constantine II. Quite to the contrary, Ablabius, to the best of our knowledge, never served Constantine II but rather acted as an adviser of Constantine I and Constantius II in the East (*PLRE* 3).


See his priesthoods in *PLRE* 747.

*AE* (1934) 158, inscribed when Constantine I was still living.

Degrassi 80.

Chron. 354, page 69.

Chron. 354, page 68; Degrassi 80. For the career of Hilarianus see Chastagnol, *Les fastes* 103-105.

*PLRE* 433.

Chron. 354, page 68. The career of Apronianus is described by *PLRE* 88 and by Chastagnol, *Les fastes* 105-107.

Apronianus is referred to as *c(larissimae) m(emoriae) v(iro)* in *ILS* 1230, inscribed before the death of Constans in 350. See Chastagnol, *Les fastes* 106.

One son, Lucius Turcius Apronianus Asterius, became *corrector* of Tuscia and Umbria in 342 (*PLRE* 88); the other son, Lucius Turcius Secundus Asterius, served as *corrector* of Picenum and Flaminia at some time during the decade 340/350 (*PLRE* 817-818).

Athan. *Apol. c. Ar.* 87: the year is not specified but can be determined by reference to the recent death of Constantine I and by Constantine II's use of the title of Caesar, which he held until 9 September 337. See also Athan. *Hist. Ar.* 8 and 50, Soc. 2.2-3, Soz. 3.2, and Theod. 2.1.


*PLRE* 694.

Athan. *Hist. Ar.* 10; *PLRE* 110.

Athan. *Fest. Ind.* 11.
For the Orthodoxy of Constantine II and Constans see Theod. 5.6. For that of Constans see Soz. 3.18.

Constantius II was exasperated by the disorders at Alexandria: Soc. 2.3.

According to Soc. 2.15, Athanasius arrived in Italy after the death of Constantine II. But his death can be dated to the early spring of 340. Since Athanasius was expelled from his church in March 339, he must have arrived in the West by the autumn of that year. There is a possibility that he first went to Trier, whence he had derived so much support in 337, and that only after the death of the eldest brother did he go to Italy. See above, pages 133-134. With regard to Paul of Constantinople see Athan. Hist. Ar. 7, Soc. 2.7, and Soz. 3.4 and 3.8.

The sources for the Persian wars from 337 to 353 are vague, contradictory, and confusing, especially with respect to Armenia. My summary is based primarily upon Eadie's commentary (pages 149-150) on Festus' Breviarium (in the fourth line of page 150, Eadie errs in referring to Constans; he clearly means the eastern emperor, i.e., Constantius II). Hieron. Chron. dates the siege of Nisibis to 338; however, since he dates the murder of Dalmatius Caesar to the same year, his chronology cannot be considered reliable. The precise date of the recovery of Armenia and even the name of the new Armenian king are uncertain. Suffice it that the Persian threat demanded most of Constantius II's attention, thereby severely limiting his involvement in the feud between his brothers. Lib. Or. 59.74, delivered in 349 (some six years earlier than Jul. Or. 1), exaggerates the fear of the Persians and makes no mention of Armenia or Nisibis. Julian, on the other hand, magnifies the Persian threat in order to render the Roman victory all the more glorious. See also Stein-Palanque 137. Eastern affairs in 337-350, including their antecedents, are discussed also by Gigli, La dinastia dei secondi Flavii 10-19.

CTh 12.1.23, given at Antioch on 11 October 338; CTh 12.1.25, given at Emesa on 28 October 338; CTh 2.6.4, given at Antioch on 27 December 338.

CTh 12.1.30, given at Edessa [MSS Bessa] on 12 August 340; CTh 6.4.5-6, given at Antioch on 9 September 340.

Gibbon 2.244 puts the blame for the dissension solely upon the three sons of Constantine I, not upon their administrators: "After the partition of the Empire three years had scarcely elapsed, before the sons of Constantine seemed impatient to convince mankind that they were incapable of contenting themselves with the dominions which they were unqualified to govern."
CTh 11.1.4 (6 December 337), given at Thessalonica; CTh 11.9.2 (12 December 337), addressed to Egnatius Faustinus, the governor of Baetica. The latter edict, definitely pertaining to the territory of Constantine II, was clearly published by that Augustus. By this date, Constantius II was already in Syria; therefore, only Constantine II could have issued both of these edicts. In both cases the MSS attribute the laws to Constantius II; the short reign and shameful death of Constantine II caused his laws to be attributed after his death to Constantius II or Constans. Seeck, Geschichte 4.40, remarks that Constantine II journeyed as far as Thessalonica in order to secure his own share for himself, that is, in order to establish his presence there.

CTh 10.10.4, published 12 June 338 at Viminacium.

CTh 9.34.5, published 18 June 338. Since this edict follows the former one so closely and, like it, is addressed to Africa, it almost certainly was issued from the same western town, Viminacium.

The text of the code refers to him as a praetorian prefect, but epigraphical evidence makes it clear that he was the proconsul of Africa. Later, in 341, he was promoted to the position of urban prefect of Rome. For his career see PLRE 192.

For this observation I am indebted to J. A. S. Evans.

CTh 9.1.7 of 18 October 338. That this edict originated from the court of Constantius II (i.e., the eastern court) can be determined not only by the prescript, which names Constantius II, but also by the recipient, Domitius Leontius, who was later praetorian prefect of the East and was, at this time, probably a vicar. For the career of Leontius see PLRE 502, and note that error creeps in at the beginning of the tenth line from the bottom of the page: as praetorian prefect of the East, Leontius was under Constantius II, not under Constans.

CTh 15.1.5 of 27 July 338, given at Sirmium.

CTh 12.1.27 of 8 January 339, given at Trier.

Degrassi 80.

Constantine II had been consul in 320, 321, 324, and 329, whereas Constantius II had held that office only in 326: see Degrassi 79-80.

Seeck, Geschichte 4.399, dates the Sarmatian campaign to the winter of 338/9, but this date is unlikely for two reasons. In the first place, it would have been careless of the Sarmatians to attack so soon after Constantine II had inspected that frontier (CTh 15.1.5 of 27 July 338, given at Sirmium), and in the second place it was extremely unusual to campaign in the winter.
Constans had received no special honour before the death of his father because he had never been entrusted with a campaign, but before the death of his eldest brother in 340 he was recognized as Sarmaticus, as witnessed by ILS 724.

M. Woloch, "Indications of Imperial Status on Roman Coins, A.D. 337-383," NC 6 (1966) 172-173. It is important to remember that Constantius II and Constans were consuls in 339. After the death of Constantine II, the surviving brothers were depicted equally, although Constantius II was granted the superior position to the viewer's left (Woloch 173).

Palanque, "Collégialité et partages," 57-58.

Seeck, Geschichte 4.399 and Regesten 48.


CTh 12.1.25 of 28 October 338; CTh 12.1.26 of 1 November 338; CTh 12.1.27 of 8 January 339.

T. Mommsen, Codex Theodosianus, volume 1, page CCXXX.

CTh 6.4.3 of 25 March 339; CTh 6.4.4 of 28 June 339.

CTh 11.36.4 of 29 August 339.

CTh 12.1.29. M. Fortina, La legislazione dell' imperatore Costante (Novara 1955) 6, considers this edict to be the first published independently by Constans.

CTh 10.10.5.

Callepio, rationali trium provinciarum: the three provinces are identified in LRE 1.48.

Gigli, La dinastia dei secondi Flavii 35-39, believes that Africa was the main bone of contention between the brothers. But what was at stake was the jurisdiction of the entire West.

Soz. 4.11; Theod. 2.13.


Amm. 21.6.2. I give here J. C. Rolfe's text for the phrase inter priores, fratres. V. Gardthausen prefers inter primores fratres. In either case, fratres in this context can refer only to Constantine II
and Constans. The other brother, Crispus, had been executed in 326.

240 Degras: For the career of Titianus see Chastagnol, Les fastes 107-111.

241 Chron. 354, page 68.

242 PLRE 918.

243 As urban prefect from 27 February 350 to 1 March 351, he served Magnentius, the murderer of Constans: Chron. 354, page 69.


245 Chron. 354, pages 68 and 69: 25 October 339-25 February 341 under Constantine II and Constans, 27 February 350-1 March 351 under Magnentius. Celsinus' dates were 25 February 341-1 April 342 under Constans and 1 March 351-12 May 351 under Magnentius.

246 PLRE 192. For the career of Celsinus see Chastagnol, Les fastes 112-114.

247 CTh 10.10.4 of 12 June 338; CTh 12.1.27 of 8 January 339. CIL 8.12272, dated to this period by the rule of three Augusti, verifies that Celsinus was proconsul of Africa, not praetorian prefect as indicated by CTh 10.10.4.

248 CIL 8.25524: he probably held this office before 333, since from then to 337 Africa normally had its own praetorian prefect.

249 CTh 11.12.1 of 29 April 340.

250 CTh 15.1.5 of 27 July 338, CTh 11.36.4 of 29 August 339, and other edicts of this period.

251 CTh 8.2.1 and CTh 12.1.31, both of 24 June 341. For his jurisdiction see PLRE 188.

252 CTh 12.1.29 of 19 January 340 and CTh 10.10.5 of 2 February 340. Two literary sources state that the main point at issue was the administration of Italy and Africa: Vict. Epit. 41.21 (ob Italiæ Africæque ius) and Zos. 2.41.1 (περὶ τῆς ὑπὸ Καρχηδόνα Λιβύης καὶ Ἰταλίας).

253 Art. Pass. 9: οἴ δὲ τῆς χώρας στρατηγοῦ τε καὶ φύλακες, οὕς ἐκ Κώνστας ἐχειροτόνησεν.
Palanque, "Collégialité et partages," 57-58. Paschoud (on page 248 of his commentary on Zosimus) is of the opinion that Constantine II finally agreed to the partition of the West but was willing to let Constans have only Illyricum. But the advance of Constantine II to Aquileia posed a threat not only to Constans' rule of Illyricum but also to his life; in sending troops against his brother, Constans showed his realization that it was a case of all or nothing so far as the West was concerned.

Zos. 2.41.1. This is a confused account, wherein Zosimus says that Constans was the one who was pretending to send aid to Constantius II but who was really attacking Constantine II. The substitution of names produces a sensible narrative. On this problem see Paschoud's commentary on Zosimus, note 54 on pages 113, 114, and 248.

CTh 10.10.5 of 2 February 340 was issued from Naissus. Zon. 13.5.11D agrees in stating that Constans was in Dacia.

Our most detailed source for the last days of Constantine II is Zon. 13.5.11C-12A. That he died in 340 is stipulated by Hieron. Chron. for 340, Cons. Const. for 340, and Soc. 2.5; it is implied by Vict. Caes. 41.22 and Zos. 2.41.1. Soc. 2.4 and Soz. 3.2 state that Eusebius of Caesarea predeceased Constantine II by a short time; by his death he was spared the tragedy of the dissension within the house of Constantine I. The battle is located by the river Alsa near Aquileia by Hieron. Chron. for 340, Vict. Epit. 41.21, Eutr. 10.9.2, Soz. 3.2, and Ruf. 1.15. That Constans was not present at the battle but merely the beneficiary of the loyalty of his soldiers is implied by Chron. Pasch. for 337, Theoph. for 339 (A.M. 5831), Eutr. 10.9.2, Oros. 7.29.5, Soc. 2.5, Soz. 3.2, Ruf. 1.15, Philost. 3.1 (which confuses Constantine II and Constans), and Zon. 13.5.11D-12A. The carelessness of Constantine II is emphasized by Vict. Epit. 41.21, Eutr. 10.9.2, and Oros. 7.29.5. Constantius II, busy on the eastern front, was unable to participate in this western tragedy and did not benefit from it: Jul. Or. 2.94B-95A attributes this to the moderation of Constantius II, but in fact it was a result of military necessity.

CTh 10.10.5.

CTh 2.6.5 and CTh 10.15.3.

CTh 2.6.5 and CTh 10.15.3.

CTh 11.12.1.

PLRE 548.

Pacatianus had been praetorian prefect from at least 12 April 332 (CTh 3.5.4) to the autumn of 337 (when he was listed first among the prefects on the inscription of Tubernuc). His earliest
recorded post is governor of Sardinia under the usurper Domitius Alexander c. 309 A.D. (AE [1966] 169). For further details on his career see PLRE 656.

264 Chron. 354, page 68.

265 PLRE 51.

266 Paulin. V. Amb. 3: Igitur posito in administratione praefecturae Galliarum patre eius Ambrosio, natus est Ambrosius.

267 Paulin. V. Amb. 4: Postea vero cum adolevisset, et esset in urbe Roma constitutus cum matre vidua et sorore.

268 Chron. 354, page 68. ILS 8944, dated before 24 June 341 when Aco Catullinus was a praetorian prefect (CTh 8.2.1), lists him as the junior colleague of Antonius Marcellinus and Domitius Leontius.

269 LRBC 9.

270 LRBC 54.


CHAPTER THREE

THE JOINT RULE OF CONSTANTIUS II AND CONSTANS

(1) Constantius II in the East 340-349

After the elimination of Constantine II, his two younger brothers, Constantius II and Constans, ruled in relative harmony for a decade. This period of stability was to end suddenly in January 350 with a revolt in the West and the assassination of Constans. Our knowledge of the intervening years is meagre, to say the least. The literary sources describe only the Persian wars and the religious disputes in any detail. For further information, we must rely upon concise references that serve only to whet the appetite. It is now, more than at any other period, that we miss the reliable witness of Ammianus Marcellinus. Yet the subsequent assassination of Constans and the civil war that fatally weakened the Empire indicate that the relationship between the brothers was subject to stress and that Constans never succeeded in completely winning over the former subjects of Constantine II. There follows a brief description of the events of the years 340-350, then an analysis of the religious crisis during that period, and finally a discussion of the various officials appointed by the two brothers. It is only with this information that one can discern the continuing breakdown of the Flavian household.

Howsoever Constantius II viewed the dispute between his
brothers, there was little that he could do to avert the catastrophe. After Constans assumed control of the entire West, Constantius II was unable to wield any influence there, even if certain of his courtiers urged him to enlarge his own sector. His lack of contact with his remaining brother was due almost entirely to the offensive of the Persian king, Sapor, along the eastern frontier. It was his lack of success against Sapor, as opposed to his uncanny ability to survive domestic calamities, that led his contemporaries to conclude that he was to be feared only in civil disputes.\textsuperscript{1} Even in journeying to Constantinople for his father's funeral and thence to Viminacium for the meeting with his brothers Constantius II had taken a considerable risk, since he perforce left the eastern front in the hands of his commanders. Any serious Persian offensive, in view of the political instability of the time, might have led to the proclamation of one of those commanders to the rank of Augustus. Constantius II was fortunate in that no revolt occurred, and in 338 the worst threat he had to deal with was that posed by Ablabius, who was soon eliminated. During the summer of 337 the Persians had besieged Nisibis for two months without success, and in 338 Constantius II was able to take the offensive and drive them forth from Armenia. His victory, however, was but a temporary respite, and, knowing this, he spent most of the following decade in the vicinity of Antioch.\textsuperscript{2}

Year after year, the Persians conducted raids between the Tigris and the Euphrates in the early summer and Constantius II sent forces to oppose them.\textsuperscript{3} For a few years there were no major engagements but, even so, Constantius II proved to be totally unable to discourage these tactics. The Persian gains were but temporary, and it seems clear
that Sapor's main purpose was not the restoration of Asia Minor to Persian rule but rather the replenishment of his own treasury. Constantius II did not always lead his troops to the front. The repetitious nature of the Persian wars, combined with the variety of their intensity and the occasional presence of Constantius II, led to considerable confusion in the sources regarding eastern affairs from 340 to 350.

In 340 Constantius II played a rather active role, for he did advance at least as far as Edessa before returning to Antioch to spend the winter. The concentration of the armed forces along the frontier afflicted some of the provincials almost as much as the Persian raids did, for Constantius II felt compelled to threaten his own officials and soldiers with punishment if they did not cease to demand supplies from local magistrates and hosts who were unwilling.

After a winter spent at Antioch, Constantius II endured another summer of Persian harassment. Upon his return to Antioch in the autumn of 341, Constantius II attended an eastern synod there that had been summoned partly on account of the dedication of the church and partly to strengthen the position of the Arian faction. This synod was noteworthy largely because it marked the last great effort of Eusebius, formerly bishop of Nicomedia and now bishop of Constantinople, to secure the domination of his faction. Either very late in 341 or early in 342 Eusebius died and strife broke out at Constantinople between the two factions, one supporting the Orthodox candidate Paul and the other the Arian sympathizer Macedonius. In the riots that followed, the proconsul of that city, Alexander, was wounded and forced to flee to
Perinthus. Constantius II, whether by accident on account of pressure on the eastern front or on purpose through fear of offending his brother, had been in the habit of leaving the eastern capital to its own devices but now he was forced to intervene. He sent Hermogenes, his magister equitum whom he was dispatching to Thrace in any event, to Constantinople in order to restore order there. So great was the violence that the partisans of Paul, assuming that Hermogenes would favour the Arian candidate, set the commander's house on fire and, dragging him forth, killed him. Constantius II resolved to punish the citizens of Constantinople for their insubordination and set out from Antioch in the middle of winter. Arriving there, he exiled Paul to Emesa where he would be able to keep a close watch on him. Yet, realizing that Macedonius was partly guilty of the murder of Hermogenes, he could not accept him as the new bishop and instead refused to give his approval to any candidate. However, in the absence of Paul, his chief rival, Macedonius became de facto bishop of Constantinople. The city itself was punished for its insubordination by the reduction of its free allowance of wheat to one-half the amount instituted by Constantine I. Having satisfied himself that the city was secure, Constantius II hastened back to Antioch. There can be no uncertainty regarding Constantius II's influence in Constantinople, for there was no further uprising against his authority and he did not return there until 346.

The little evidence we have indicates that Constantius II spent the rest of the year 342 in the vicinity of Antioch and that once again he was harassed by Persian incursions. It was doubtless these incursions and the heavy expense that they entailed that gave rise to
two of his most savage edicts, both published on 18 February 343. Both were addressed to his praetorian prefect Domitius Leontius. The first edict promised rewards to the accusers of any persons found guilty of counterfeiting *solidi* and decreed that these criminals should be burnt to death; in contrast, Constantine I had stipulated the simple death penalty as the most severe punishment for this crime. The second edict insisted that all *solidi* were to be accepted at their face value and that anyone attempting to negotiate them for a different value or clipping off a portion of the edge in order to diminish the weight was to be afflicted with the appropriate penalty, the most severe again being consignment to the flames.

In the early summer of 343 Constantius II moved his headquarters east to Hierapolis, and from there he directed a campaign that marked his first real success since the death of his eldest brother. Invading the Persian province of Adiabene, he won a victory that bestowed upon him the title Adiabenicus and conquered a town whose inhabitants he transplanted to Thrace. The transfer of these Persian prisoners to Thrace, where they were to cultivate abandoned lands, indicates that, in addition to having control over that diocese, Constantius II had allowed it to fall into neglect. Whether the farms had been abandoned because of economic distress or because of invasions from across the Danube, we cannot be certain. In the latter part of this year there also took place the Synod of Serdica; this synod, to be discussed in greater detail later, completely failed to restore the unity of the church, and for this lack of success Constantius II himself was to receive some of the blame.
Once he had returned from the front with his spoils and had dispatched his prisoners to Thrace, Constantius II spent the winter of 343/4 at Antioch, where he received the envoys from the Synod of Serdica. Sapor, meanwhile, commenced the persecution of the Christians in his realm; this act may indicate that Constantius II's success in the previous year had been due in part to the help of Christian sympathizers in Adiabene. The year 344 was marked by further disturbances on the Persian front, in all likelihood in the vicinity of Singara. With regard to the year 345, we cannot be certain what the situation on the eastern front was. We do know that Constantius II paid a visit to Nisibis in the spring of that year but we have no idea regarding his motive, whether it was to repel a Persian invasion or to inspect the fortifications on the frontier. The latter is more likely, for in 346 at great expense Seleucia, the chief port of Antioch, was improved. If Constantius II was anticipating a more concentrated attack, he was not disappointed, for in 346 the Persians besieged Nisibis for three months and Constantius II had to launch a major campaign to relieve the city. He himself advanced at least as far as Edessa before journeying to Constantinople for the winter.

The late spring of 347 once again found Constantius II close to the eastern front, namely at Hierapolis. The losses suffered in the siege and relief of Nisibis probably gave rise to an edict issued from Hierapolis: it stipulated that, if a soldier had died intestate and without a close heir, his property should be granted to his unit. The summer of 347 again was noteworthy for strife along the border with Persia, but the warfare of the following year makes it clear that
Sapor was preparing himself for a major attack rather than mere raids.

The year 348 should have marked one of the most glorious periods in the joint reign of Constantius II and Constans, for in that year was celebrated the one thousand-one hundredth anniversary of the founding of the city of Rome. However, a serious setback suffered by Constantius II in the East was to have far-reaching effects in the West as well. The Persian attack in the summer of this year was by far the most formidable; it was no mere skirmish or raid as in the previous years. Nisibis was besieged, though without success, and nearby Bezabde and Amida were captured by the Persians. In addition, when Constantius II marched to the relief of these communities, he was unable to restrain his soldiers after they had won a nominal victory near Singara and in the ensuing battle that lasted through the night his force, trapped by the Persians, suffered heavy casualties. The losses were not permanent, for Sapor returned home with his booty and, probably in the same year, Constantius II was able to recover whatever remained of Amida and Bezabde. In addition, Sapor had paid a heavy price for his spoils, losing in the battle the heir to his kingdom. But, despite Constantius II's attempts to make his people forget the campaign of 348, it was recalled as one of the darkest moments of his reign. The fear of another attack in the following year compelled him to place more of his manpower and supplies along the eastern front and rendered any intervention in the West impossible for some time. It is probable that Constantius II spent the winter of 348/9 at Antioch, for we find him there in the spring of 349. The winter and spring were spent in an attempt to revitalize the army and the economy in the East in
preparation for yet another season of campaigning against Sapor. However, no major attack occurred that has been recorded. Sapor too had suffered heavy losses in 348, especially in the person of his heir, and he needed time to regroup his forces. There may have been occasional raids on a minor scale. It was probably in this year that the Romans recovered and rebuilt Bezabde and Amida. Towards the autumn Constantius II felt secure enough to venture a return to his eastern capital, Constantinople, last visited in 342 under trying circumstances. Here he attended to such mundane topics as municipal salaries and public works. Doubtless Constantius II was still at Constantinople in late January or early February of 350 when he received the news of the assassination of his brother Constans.

(2) Constans in the West 340-349

In the West Constans did not suffer from the pressure of the Persian wars. His activities were more varied. Constantius II became noted for his frustration in foreign affairs and his uncanny ability to overcome his domestic opponents, but the case of Constans was very much the opposite. Soon after the murder of his eldest brother, Constantine II, Constans arrived at Aquileia, the scene of the tragedy. It was now April of 340. As became manifest ten years later when he was murdered by some of the old Gallic administrators of Constantine II, Constans' most serious mistake was his failure to treat the death of his brother as an unfortunate accident and thereby to win the loyalty of the populace, both military and civilian, in the dioceses of Britain, Gaul, and Spain where the influence of his brother had been greatest. Instead,
he encouraged the *damnatio memoriae* of Constantine II and referred to him as *publicus ac noster inimicus*.\(^35\)

After spending some time at Aquileia, Constans journeyed to Milan, where in all likelihood he spent the winter of 340/1. While there, he issued an edict to the provincials wherein he informed them that they were in no way bound to give supplies to quartered persons and that they should lodge official complaints against any persons who seized these goods from them when they were unwilling.\(^36\) This law might have endeared him to most of the citizens, but it was not to prove popular with the civil and military officials. During the following spring, or perhaps a little later, Constans advanced his court north to Lauriacum near the Danube.\(^37\) Whether this was merely a tour of inspection or a reaction to barbarian incursions we cannot say. He was not able to stay there for long because, during that summer, the Franks crossed the Rhine and raided the provinces there. Constans, moving swiftly to the attack in a manner similar to that of his father, advanced into Gaul, where he met with some success before the approach of winter put an end to military operations.\(^38\)

The sources do not indicate where Constans spent the winter of 341/2, but, in view of the threat posed by the Franks, Trier, the headquarters of his late brother, is the most plausible location. In the spring of 342 Constans made a hurried trip to Savaria near the Danube frontier, possibly in order to inspect the defences there, and next he journeyed to Milan, where he granted Athanasius, the exiled bishop of Alexandria, an audience for the first time.\(^39\) Finally, in the early summer, Constans marched north to Trier, where he waged a successful
campaign against the Franks and compelled them to enter into a treaty of peace. There can be little doubt that the Frankish incursions of 341-342 had been encouraged by the dispute between Constans and Constantine II and by the death of the latter, but the victory of Constans safe-guarded the frontier of the Rhine until his own death in 350. Doubtless it also won him valuable support among the armies in Gaul that had been dominated by his eldest brother.

Constans, however, was rarely able to leave well enough alone. In 341, as he was beginning to acquire military glory in Gaul, he made the serious blunder of antagonizing the pagans, many of whom were in the army. His edict prohibiting pagan sacrifice is violent in its tone and in this respect is reminiscent of some of the legislation of his father dated to 326. The words themselves reveal the character of their author:

Cesset superstitio, sacrificiorum aboleatur insania. Nam quicumque contra legem divi principis parentis nostri et hanc nostrae mansuetudinis iussionem ausus fuerit sacrificia celebrare, competens in eum vindicta et praesens sententia exeratur.

We do not know why Constans decided in this year to oppose the pagans. Athanasius was certainly not responsible, for he did not meet Constans until the following year. A possible reason is that he was attempting to depict himself as a more zealous Christian than his brothers. But, whatever the reason, Constans, who had just taken over vast new territories, was foolish to publish these sentiments. In his edict he refers to an earlier law of his father but this law is not extant, if it ever existed at all. The only extant law of Constantine I on this topic is far more pagan than Christian: lightning is to be interpreted by
soothsayers, and only domestic sacrifices are prohibited. The law of Constans had no serious repercussions, for the moment at least, and the army served him effectively in the summer of 342 by bending the Franks to his will. But there must have been rumblings of discontent in the administration, for in late 342 he decided to enact a compromise of sorts. Addressing the prefect of Rome, he declared that, although all superstitions were to be completely eradicated, nevertheless the buildings of the temples were to remain undisturbed; his reason, that these temples served as the focal points for various forms of entertainment for the people of Rome, was a very practical one, since the people when amused were less likely to be troublesome. Constans had doubtless heard of the bloody riots in Constantinople in the previous winter and had no desire that they should be repeated at Rome.

After his campaign against the Franks, Constans retired to Milan for the winter of 342/3. He did not remain there, but suddenly in late January or early February 343 he marched north to Boulogne and set sail for Britain. Of Constans' expedition to Britain we can determine a few facts: it took place in the middle of winter, the worst possible time of the year; it involved a very small contingent, perhaps only one boat; it was a complete surprise to everyone in Britain; and it proved to be highly successful. But what possessed Constans to forgo the comforts of Milan for a dangerous voyage across the Channel? If Constans intended merely to make himself known in an area that he had never visited before and that had been under the effective control of his eldest brother for several years, surely he would have made his voyage in the summer. Two possibilities remain: either the diocese of
Britain was hard-pressed by incursions or a revolt was brewing there. My own conclusion is that both elements were involved, and that Constans made his sudden voyage in order to eliminate disaffection arising from the death of Britain's former ruler Constantine II and from his own failure to take an active interest in the defence of the province. One wonders why he took such a small contingent with him. Even if Libanius' figure of one hundred is a rhetorical exaggeration, the fact remains that the expedition was noteworthy for its small number of soldiers. My belief is that the situation in Britain was not yet serious, that Constans considered that his opponents there were few and had not yet been able to enlist much support, and that the rank and file of the army, if not all the officers, were still loyal to the Second Flavian dynasty. In short, a large force was not needed; it might have antagonized and insulted the forces already in Britain. Constans trusted his soldiers in Britain far more than the Franks along the Rhine, and consequently left most of his forces south of the Channel. I believe that Constans made this journey suddenly for two reasons; in the first place because he did not expect that he would have the opportunity to journey to Britain for a long time if he did not do so in the winter, and in the second place because he hoped that his arrival would endear himself to the soldiers and nip in the bud any conspiracy. The identity of Constans' opponents in Britain is not difficult to determine. Seven years later Constans' murderer, Magnentius, derived considerable support from Britain; it is possible that this support came primarily from those who, seeking to avenge the death of Constantine II by the overthrow of Constans, failed in their first attempt in the winter of 342/3
and later took advantage of the revolt in Gaul in 349/50. Ammianus implies that the Picts and Scots had been harassing the Roman provinces, doubtless starting this operation soon after they heard about the death of Constantine II. 48 Constans was comparatively unknown in Britain and, when the Roman army there was hard-pressed, some officers must have been tempted to proclaim one of their own number emperor. Had not the British army ensured the success of Constantine I? Of course, Constans had not dealt with the defence of Britain in 342 because he had been occupied with the incursions of the Franks. Libanius emphasizes that Constans' voyage was all the more glorious because it was not dictated by a revolt or any other exigency, but in so doing he protests too much. 49 In fact, Constans took a risk in entrusting himself to the fickle winds, a beleaguered population, and a developing conspiracy, but he had in his favour the element of surprise. The provincials and the army rallied to him, the defences were organized, and doubtless a few inquisitions eliminated some of those who were disaffected with his rule. Constans may have made a treaty of peace with the Picts and Scots before he returned to the continent. 50 It is likely that he also revitalized the Arcani, a class of men who toured the North and informed the Roman administration about the actions and plans of the Scottish clans. 51 In order to commemorate his success in Britain, Constans arranged for the minting of a contorniate depicting on the reverse himself, armed, setting out from Boulogne on a ship complete with military standards, rowers, and, on the prow, a Victory; the legend reads Bononia Oceanen. 52 Constans probably arranged for the minting of this medallion at Trier, where he ensured the enforcement of the peace
with the Franks during 343. We remain ignorant of Constans' secular activities during the year 344. He may have used Trier, Milan, or Aquileia as his headquarters. However, in all likelihood he spent the winter of 344/5 at Aquileia, for just before Easter of 345 he met there with Bishop Athanasius. By the middle of May, he had moved his court north to Trier. His frequent residence there may indicate not only the comparative insecurity of the frontier of the Rhine but also his own desire to make himself well-known to the armies there. By the summer, he had advanced to the frontier itself at Cologne. During the course of 345 Constans did not give all his attention to the realm of his late brother but concerned himself with his older territory. In Africa the dispute between the Donatists and the Orthodox Christians was once again coming to a head. Constans dispatched to the troubled area two of his trusted officials, Macarius and Paulus. They carried with them a large sum of money ostensibly for distribution among the poor, but there were those who considered it to be a bribe designed to restore unity in the African churches. The Donatists vigorously opposed Constans' officials, so much so that the latter had to invoke the aid of the comes Silvester, who resorted to military might in order to restore peace. The victims of the soldiers were regarded by their fellow Donatists as martyrs, whereas Macarius and Paulus (and, by inference, Constans himself) were considered to be persecutors. And so it happened that Constans, who was trying to end the persecution of the Orthodox in the East, himself became embroiled in religious dissension in the West.

It is most likely that Constans held his court at Trier during
the winter of 345/6, for Bishop Athanasius met him there before returning to Alexandria later that year. By March, however, he had advanced to Sirmium, where he could tend to the security of the frontier of the Danube. It is possible that late in the summer he met with his brother Constantius II at Thessalonica or Constantinople, for Constantius II appears to have been present at Constantinople immediately before his return to the relief of Nisibis and by the end of the year Constans was at Thessalonica. The brothers certainly had just cause to meet in 346, for that year marked their joint consulship, evidence of their reconciliation after several years of friction resulting to a great extent from the struggle of Athanasius to be restored to his see.

After Constans had spent the winter of 346/7 at Thessalonica, we have no definite indication regarding his movements. He was in Milan in the early summer of 348, and his emphasis now on administrative reforms in that region renders it highly likely that during the spring of 347 he gradually advanced to his headquarters at Milan. Although his presence on the Danube frontier had a military significance, Constans busied himself as well with administrative reform. On 12 June 347 he appointed Ulpius Limenius both urban prefect of Rome and, consecutively, prefect of Italy and Africa. Heretofore Italy, Africa, and Illyricum had been under the jurisdiction of a single prefect, but now Illyricum received its own prefect in the person of Vulcacius Rufinus. The result was twofold: an increase in the number of praetorian prefects in the West from two to three, and a diminution of the importance of the office of the prefect of Rome.
this time Constans had travelled extensively throughout the West with the exceptions of Spain and Africa and must have seen that Illyricum had more in common with Gaul than with Italy and Africa, that is to say, that the concerns of Gaul and Illyricum were primarily military, whereas those of Italy and Africa were economic. He might have felt that the central prefect had too many tasks and that, on the other hand, the urban prefect was somewhat redundant. A further possibility is that Constans had reached an understanding with his brother to lower the status of Rome in order to eliminate any unnecessary expansion of the bureaucracy of Constantinople, for that city was still ruled by a proconsul, not by an urban prefect. But Ulpius Limenius, and his successors Eustathius (only a temporary appointee) and Hermogenes, were the only urban prefects to be praetorian prefects contemporaneously. Constans' experiment died with him in the revolt of 350 and, although separate prefects were appointed for Illyricum until the death of Constantius II in 361, the prefects of Italy and Africa and the urban prefects were once again distinct. On 11 December 359, over six years after recovering the rest of the Empire for the Flavian house from the usurper Magnentius, Constantius II solved the problem of Constantinople and Rome by increasing the prestige of the former rather than by decreasing that of the latter: he appointed Honoratus as the first urban prefect of Constantinople. Constans' reform, temporary though it was, was to prove helpful to Constantius II during the preparations in 350 for the civil war, for in part it ensured the independence of Illyricum and thereby the continued allegiance of that critical area to the Flavian household when Italy and Africa had been subjected to
Magnentius. This allegiance was also due, of course, to Constans' considerable attention to that area, especially since 339, and to his nominal authority over it in the previous two years since the death of his father.

Constans spent the summer of 348 in Milan and it is quite likely that he stayed there throughout the following winter. His headquarters in 349 are not known, although it is possible that he still remained there for several months. What is certain is that he spent the winter of 349/50 at Augustodunum in central Gaul. Constans' lack of involvement in the defence of the Rhine and Danube frontiers in the last two years of his life is a tribute to the thoroughness of his measures there during the previous eight years. The Franks had sought to take advantage of the death of Constantine II but Constans had frustrated their attempt in quick order. The Alamanni too had feared the leadership of Constans. The young Augustus had more than one motive in his sudden journeys back and forth along the frontiers, even as far as Britain, but his primary motive was to endear himself to the provincials and the soldiers, especially in Gaul and Britain, where he had been known only through the coinage before 340. Yet, as we shall see presently, although he had been highly successful in his foreign policy, Constans had failed to win the absolute allegiance of the bureaucracy and the army in Gaul.

In the spring of 349 he issued an edict that was in its tone reminiscent of his edict of 341 regarding the prohibition of sacrifices. That earlier edict had antagonized the pagans, many of whom were in the army, but the present one was directed against an
important part of the bureaucracy, the overseers and other officials of
the imperial estates. Constans directed that the provincial governors
should see to it that the same discipline that governed the provincials
should also govern all the administrators of the imperial estates and
that all offenders should be subject to exquisite punishment:

Sceleratos convictosque carcer teneat, tormenta dilacerent,
gladius ultor interimæt. Eo enim modo licentia inveteratae
desperationis inhibetur, si intellegant uno sibi ac pari
studio vivendum esse cum ceteris.

Constans' purpose was a noble one, that is, to ensure that the burdens
of duties and taxes would be shared equally by those within and without
the administration. But the violence of his language reveals the
frustration that all emperors faced in trying to root out corruption
from their own administrations. This type of edict could often produce
more harm than good, for few provincials would realize any relief
whereas the administrators would become disaffected towards their
sovereign.

Two other edicts of this year pertained to a much more
critical field, military affairs. One was an attempt to restrict the
tendency of soldiers to enjoy the frequent visits of their households.
According to this edict, soldiers were to be allowed to have their
households come to them only if given special permission in advance to
do so, and even then they were to receive only their wives, children,
and those slaves bought with their own savings, but not those slaves who
were enrolled on the tax-lists. Constans thus strove to ensure the
discipline of the army, but thereby he ran the risk of alienating the
soldiers. The other edict of this period was far more demanding.
According to it, all those soldiers who had been released to the leisure of civilian life before their terms of service had been completed and while their health was unimpaired were to be restored to their original units.\(^7\) Doubtless many soldiers had obtained premature discharge by means of administrative corruption, especially now that the Danube and Rhine frontiers were at peace and the opportunity for obtaining booty was greatly reduced. Yet the law sought to punish only the common soldiers themselves, and not the officers who had demanded bribes for the favour. This law, just though it may have been, must have aroused considerable hostility against Constans.

The last two edicts of this emperor to come down to us were moderate in tone. In one Constans declares that the rape of virgins is to be punished by simple capital punishment and not by the terrible penalty of molten lead once invoked by his father.\(^7\) In the other, the inheritances of soldiers are to go to their own unit, and not to the fisc, if no will or close heir exists to claim it.\(^7\) This law bears a marked resemblance to an earlier one of Constantius II and may have been inspired by it.\(^7\) It was the sort of law guaranteed to endear an emperor to his veterans, but it came too late to save Constans from a bloody fate early in the following year.

### (3) The Relationship between Constantius II and Constans

The relationship between Constantius II and Constans during their decade of joint rule can best be described as somewhat strained in the first five years and as quite harmonious in the last five. It was, perhaps, fortunate that both were most preoccupied with defence and
foreign affairs during the earlier period, so much so that they could scarcely indulge in civil war even if they had wanted to. Even in the early period, however, relations were generally cordial. Whenever the two Augusti were depicted on the coinage, Constantius II was granted the superior position to the viewer's left. In this way Constans acknowledged the superiority of his elder brother, although in all other respects the two were depicted as equal.\(^79\) Constantius II allowed Constans to issue independent legislation, just as Constantine II had recognized that Augusti as far removed as he and Constantius II were had to issue separate edicts. Constans, however, always listed his elder brother first as a mark of respect.\(^80\) There are also indications that the brothers did correspond in an attempt to develop a harmonious policy. For example, in an edict of 347 Constantius II decreed that, if a soldier was to die intestate and without a close heir, his property was to go to his unit and not to the fisc, and just over two years later Constans published a very similar edict in the West.\(^81\) The similarity is so great that there can be little doubt that Constans deliberately adapted his brother's law for his own use. It follows that the edicts of each Augustus were valid only within his own territory, even though the names of both headed each enactment and in theory both shared the entire Empire.\(^82\) Just as Constantine I had conceded the right of independent legislation to Licinius and Constantine II had yielded to the same demand by Constantius II, so now Constantius II was obliged, primarily by the military demands on the frontier, to grant the same right to Constans.

The virtual equality of Constantius II and Constans, with a
slight deference to the seniority of Constantius II, can be concluded from the inscriptions erected in their honour during the decade of their joint reign. In fact, inscriptions in honour of both Augusti are more common than those in honour of individual monarchs. It is noteworthy that in every case, including inscriptions erected in the western provinces, the name of Constantius II is listed first. Herein is further proof that Constans recognized the seniority of his brother. Of the inscriptions in honour of Constans alone, all are western with three notable exceptions. One inscription was dedicated by the three praetorian prefects, Antonius Marcellinus, Domitius Leontius, and Fabius Titianus, in honour of Constans and was set up at Traianopolis in Thrace. It can be dated to the spring of 341, for by 24 June 341 Marcellinus had been succeeded by Aco Catullinus, whereas Titianus, the junior member, did not become praetorian prefect until the end of his term as urban prefect on 25 February 341. But this dedication to Constans in the territory of his brother does not signify any special status for Constans there, since it is clear from the wording of the inscription that a similar one, in honour of Constantius II, had been set up nearby. The other two inscriptions are best considered as a unit, since one is virtually a translation of the other. These are dedicated to Constans by Lucius Caelius Montius, the proconsul of Asia, and are to be found at Ephesus. Montius, however, did not honour Constans alone, for at Assos he dedicated an inscription to Constantius II. Also, in another inscription with which he was associated, the names of both Constantius II and Constans appear. Thus it is safe to say that nowhere in the Empire did Constans enjoy any superiority over
his brother.

Because Constantius II outlived his brother by nearly twelve years, it is difficult to determine his influence in the West before 350; most of the inscriptions of Constantius II in the West are difficult to date, and so we shall concern ourselves only with the few that can be securely dated before 350. One from Spain might be of significance were it not for the fact that it is simply a mate for another one of Constans at the same location. Duplicate inscriptions like these have no importance except to show that, although the Empire was divided in practice, it remained in theory an entity. The same is true for two inscriptions from Salona in honour of Constantius II; they are merely the mates of one in honour of Constans, an inscription dedicated at the same place by the same Flavius Julius Rufinus Sarmentius. In conclusion, Constantius II and Constans were both recognized as Augusti throughout the Empire. But, in so far as the inscriptions are concerned, neither enjoyed any marked superiority over the other, although, when both were named, the honour of being listed first was granted to Constantius II as senior Augustus. Neither in the coins nor in the inscriptions is there evidence for any severe stress in the relations between the Augusti, but the literary sources reveal a different situation.

(4) The Fate of the Survivors of the Massacre of 337

When we turn our attention to the fate of the three remaining male relations of the sons of Constantine I, we can discern a difference in policy. Nepotianus, who was in all likelihood about the
same age as Constantius II, had survived the massacre largely because he was far removed from the main scene of carnage at Constantinople. As was pointed out in the previous chapter, there is no evidence that the courts of Constantine II and Constans perpetrated any crimes against the other relations of Constantine I; rather, the evidence that we have points to the guilt of members of the eastern court, most notably the praepositus sacri cubiculi, Eusebius. It is generally agreed that Nepotianus was the son of Constantine I's half-sister Eutropia, and of Virius Nepotianus, consul in 336. Nepotianus had probably been born in Rome and, because of the strong links of the Nepotiani with that city, it is likely that he and his mother had remained there up to the death of Constantine I. The eldest son, Constantine II, did nothing to harm Nepotianus and his mother, nor is there any evidence that Constans did so after 340. On the other hand, there is no reason to believe that Constantine II or Constans did anything to promote him. Nepotianus was not to be feared because, unlike Dalmatius and Hannibalianus, he had not been rendered conspicuous by their father. What is more, the city of Rome was no longer regarded as strategic and was far removed from the main armies. And so Constans allowed Nepotianus and his family to reside at peace in Italy. There appear to have been no members of the western court who had any reason to desire his removal.

The situation in the East was totally different. There the Arian faction and the eunuchs at court, most notably the infamous Eusebius, had beguiled Constantius II into the elimination of most of his male relations. There survived, however, Gallus and Julian, both sons of Julius Constantius, a half-brother of Constantine I. Their
eldest brother had perished in the massacre, but Gallus, about twelve
years of age, had been saved because it was thought that his illness
would prove to be fatal. Julian, only about six years of age, had been
spared because it was considered that his extreme youth would render him
harmless. However, those who had engineered the deaths of Julius
Constantius and his eldest son soon had two causes for alarm: Gallus
recovered from his illness, and both he and Julian continued to mature.
Those at court who had been responsible for the death of Julius
Constantius persuaded Constantius II to send Gallus to Tralles, near
Ephesus, for his education; there, far removed from the armies, he
would provide no hope for those who might see in him a legitimate
successor to the great Constantine. Julian, some six years younger, was
not yet a serious threat and was allowed to remain at Constantinople,
where he was given as tutor the eunuch Mardonius, who had once been the
teacher of his mother Basilina. Here he also studied grammar under
Nicocles of Sparta and rhetoric under Hecebolius. But, as Julian began
to mature, Constantius II feared lest he become too popular in the
eastern capital and sent him to Nicomedia, where he could be removed
from the public eye much as Gallus had been when sent to Tralles.
Julian had not been long at Nicomedia when the relations between
Constantius II and Constans reached their lowest point. This occurred
in the spring of 344, when Constantius II received the envoys from the
Synod of Serdica and was threatened with war by Constans if he would not
allow the return of Athanasius to Alexandria. There was always the
threat that the eastern Orthodox Christians, frustrated by Constantius
II's support of the Arians, would look to either Gallus or Julian for
support. In any case, Constantius II feared his cousins and
dispatched them to Macellum, a castle in Cappadocia not far from
Caesarea. Here they were held in virtual imprisonment for six years
until the murder of Constans and the resulting civil war forced
Constantius II to make use of their services. Much later, when trying
to justify his own actions to the Athenians, Julian described the
sojourn of his brother and himself at Macellum:

It was to their imprisonment at Macellum that Julian attributed the
harsh nature of Gallus.

In conclusion, the treatment meted out by Constantius II and
Constans to their surviving male relations differed markedly. Constans
neither harmed nor helped Nepotianus, the reason for this being simply
that he and his court had done nothing to injure Nepotianus and his
family in the crisis of 337 and therefore had nothing to fear from one
who had never enjoyed any marked favour from Constantine I.
Constantius II, on the other hand, had been persuaded by his courtiers
to murder the father and oldest brother of Gallus and Julian, and
therefore both he and the members of his court had good reason to fear
the two youths. There may have been some members of the eastern court who advocated the assassination of Gallus and Julian, but Constantius II forced them to be content with the exile of his relations, for he preferred to save his cousins in case any emergency required their services. He had no son of his own and, even if he had had one, that son would have been far too young to take part in imperial affairs even as late as 350, when Constans’ murder gave rise to a crisis. The main concern of Constantius II was with the Persian war and with the recalcitrant Athanasius.

(5) The Struggle of Athanasius and the Triumph of Toleration

It is in the struggle of Athanasius to be restored to his see of Alexandria that we can best discern the workings of the two imperial courts at this period. Whereas the West was, for the most part, of the Orthodox persuasion, the East was rent asunder by a bitter feud between the Orthodox, of whom Athanasius was a prominent member, and the Arians. In the West there was little conflict between the churches and the court, for Constans too was an Orthodox Christian. But in the East both factions struggled for the support of Constantius II who, greatly indebted to the Arians for his triumph over his relations, tended to favour their cause. Preoccupied by the Persian war, Constantius II sought domestic peace and considered the stubborn Athanasius to be one of his greatest obstacles. Constantius II’s solution had been to reappoint as prefect of Egypt Flavius Philagrius, a sympathizer with the Arian cause. Philagrius had marched on Alexandria and evicted Athanasius and set up the Arian bishop Gregory in his place on 22 March
Overwhelmed by the military support of his opponents, Athanasius had fled to Rome in search of aid from Julius, the bishop of that city.

And so it happened that Athanasius was present at Rome when Constantine II was ambushed and killed by the forces of Constans in March 340. This political crisis in the West had little effect on Athanasius, for by it he exchanged one sympathizer for another. In any case, his main concern was to gain the support of the western bishops, especially Julius, for the restoration of himself and of Paul of Constantinople to their respective sees. This assistance did come about in the winter of 340/1, when Bishop Julius convoked a synod of western bishops at Rome; this synod declared the deposition of Athanasius unlawful and called for his restoration to his see, but without effect. Athanasius remained at Rome during the spring of 341, for it was too dangerous for him to attempt to return while Constantius II still recognized Gregory as bishop of Alexandria. Partly in reaction to the western synod, Eusebius of Constantinople convoked a synod of eastern bishops at Antioch in the summer of 341, ostensibly in order to make arrangements for the dedication of the new church there but really in order to confirm the expulsion of Athanasius and the installation of Gregory. This they accomplished without any difficulty, for Constantius II himself, who had resolved upon the exile of Athanasius, was present at the synod. The result was a stalemate as the split between the Orthodox and the Arians widened. For this, Constantius II was not to be blamed, for his original intention had been to restore peace to the Church by expelling its most obnoxious member.
Within a few months the Arian leader, Eusebius of Constantinople, died, and the crisis rapidly reached its peak. Upon the news of his death, Paul returned to Constantinople in order to lay claim to his see while the Arians favoured their associate, Macedonius, as the new bishop. Riots broke out between the factions, the proconsul Alexander was wounded and fled from the city, and Constantius II sent his magister equitum, Hermogenes, to restore order. But when Hermogenes himself was killed by the rioters, Constantius II, fearing that a religious disturbance was rapidly becoming a revolt against his own authority, hastened from Antioch to Constantinople and took charge of affairs. In addition to punishing the people as a whole, he exiled Paul to Emesa and, disgusted with the violence of the Arians, refused to allow Macedonius to take charge of the church there, so that for a time Constantinople was devoid of a bishop until Constantius II finally relented and recognized Macedonius.

Constantius II's management of the crisis at Constantinople indicates that his support of the Arians was not so whole-hearted as it once had been. The restoration of Athanasius to his see, however, was out of the question so long as Gregory was bishop there, for Constantius II could not bring himself to depose the very candidate whom he had supported in the first instance. There is another indication that Constantius II's attitude towards the Orthodox was beginning to mellow, and this is contained in an edict addressed to the prefect of Egypt, Longinus, who had replaced Philagrius. In this edict, given on 26 February 342, Constantius II reminded Longinus that Orthodox bishops and clerics were not to be liable to the duties of decurions, that is, that
in this respect at least the Orthodox and the Arians were to be treated equally. Clearly Constantius II was determined to end the religious friction in the East, but it was Constans who was to be largely responsible for the restoration of the exiles.

During the course of his exile at Rome, Athanasius had been careful not to interfere in the politics of the West. His pleas for support had been directed through Julius to the other bishops. In fact, Athanasius did not have to ask Constans for aid because he could be certain that other bishops, most notably Maximinus of Trier, would intercede on his behalf. But when the Arians had been frustrated in their designs by Julius, they attempted to win over Constans himself to their point of view; their action prompted Athanasius to write to Constans in order to defend himself. Finally, despairing of the division within the Church, certain bishops wrote to Constans, urging him to arrange with Constantius II the convening of a synod that would be designed to establish peace within the Church. Accordingly Constans wrote to Athanasius and summoned him to their first meeting, at Milan, in the spring of 342. There he explained to the bishop that he had written to Constantius II in order to arrange an ecclesiastical conference. Called north by his campaign against the Franks, Constans summoned Athanasius to Trier, where they took time out from the campaign to discuss the problems of the Church with Hosius, the aged bishop of Corduba. It was probably at this time that Constans announced that he had written to his brother to arrange a synod at Serdica, a location ideally suited on account of its proximity to the territory of Constantius II. Constans had been won over by Athanasius,
Maximinus, and Hosius to the view that unity should be re-established in the Church. They could not persuade him to insist upon the restoration of the exiles but only to enable the bishops to find their own solution. Before the Synod of Serdica, Constans preferred to leave the clerics to their own devices; he did not follow Constantius II's practice of appointing agents such as Philagrius to interfere in ecclesiastical affairs. His attitude in part resulted from a reluctance to interfere in matters that pertained to his brother's jurisdiction. But frustration would soon change his relationship with the Church.

The bishops from the East and the West met at Serdica in the autumn of 343. Neither of the Augusti attended, Constans still being concerned with the security of Gaul and Britain and Constantius II being occupied by yet another Persian invasion. However, the synod was doomed to failure when the secular arm put in an unwarranted appearance. Constans did not send any of his officials but Constantius II either dispatched, or allowed to attend, the comes Musonianus (an old adviser of his father), the castrensis Hesychius, and the comes Philagrius, formerly prefect of Egypt. The Arians were incensed when the Orthodox objected to the intimidating presence of these imperial bureaucrats, while they themselves refused to negotiate so long as Athanasius and Paul and the other exiles were allowed to attend. And so the synod never really commenced, for the Arian members returned to Philippopolis in Thrace, where they proceeded to excommunicate Hosius (who had presided at Serdica), Maximinus, Athanasius, and the other leaders of the Orthodox faction. Back at Serdica, the Orthodox members treated the Arians in like fashion, most notably Ursacius of Singidunum
and Valens of Mursa. In this way Constans' attempt to restore the unity of the Church was doomed to failure. Athanasius made his way to Naissus, while Paul, who had journeyed from Emesa to Serdica, advanced to Thessalonica, but neither dared to enter the territory of Constantius II. When it became clear that neither bishop would be able to return without help from the secular arm, they both journeyed to the court of Constans at Aquileia.

When news of the proceedings at Serdica and Philippopolis reached the Augusti at Aquileia and Antioch, the relations between them deteriorated to the lowest point in their careers. Constantius II was not disturbed very much, largely because he feared any repercussions resulting from the return of Paul and Athanasius. The Arian eunuchs at his court, most notably the praepositus Eusebius, must have been overjoyed upon learning that their most vehement opponent would not be returning. But Constans, on the other hand, was enraged that the bishops from his territory should be intimidated by eastern officials and insulted by the sudden departure of their eastern counterparts on the pretext of the need to celebrate Constantius II's recent victory over the Persians. In addition, Paul and Athanasius were disquieting in the West, to say the least, and their return to their respective sees was imperative. It was later alleged that Constans did not act of his own free will but rather was won over by his ministers at court, in particular Eustathius, his comes rerum privatarum, who had themselves been bribed by Athanasius. Athanasius, on the other hand, goes to great pains to emphasize that he in no way attempted to develop enmity between the Augusti. But the fact remains that, merely by canvassing
for support for his return to his see, Athanasius was attempting to have Constans enforce his will upon Constantius II. Bribery was not really necessary, for the Orthodox supporters at court would have been glad to help Athanasius, just as the eunuchs at the eastern court assisted Macedonius. But the net result was the same: Athanasius' attempt to return to Alexandria did produce friction between the brothers.

At first the negotiations were more diplomatic, but finally Constans lost his patience and sent two bishops and Flavius Salia, his magister equitum, to Constantius II at Antioch. The support of the Church by the secular arm was made manifest by the presence of Salia, and it is clear that Constans had decided to resort to his brother's practice. The three envoys bore a letter, in which Constans insisted upon the restoration of Paul and Athanasius to their sees and threatened, if Constantius II were unwilling to welcome them back, that he himself would come with an army and restore them by force if necessary. The eastern court was reduced to a panic at this point, for the last thing Constantius II desired was that another civil war should arise within his family; he realized all too well that the survivor would be hard pressed to manage the affairs of the entire Empire. Moreover, he feared that in any contest with Constans the westerner would be the victor, for he was fresh from successful campaigns in Britain and along the Rhine and had the cream of the imperial armies at his disposal. The Arian bishops and their supporters at court realized that, if Constantius II were defeated by Constans, they would lose all their power and influence; on the other hand, Paul was not as determined as Athanasius and might be dealt with more readily once he returned, whereas
Athanasius himself could do little more than produce chaos in Egypt. If both were welcomed back, they would be at the mercy of their enemies. And so the court advised Constantius II that it would be better to yield to Constans' request. Constantius II informed his brother of his decision, and the wheels were set in motion for the return of the exiles. Constantinople was not expected to provide a serious problem, for the Arian Macedonius had never been officially recognized as bishop by Constantius II. In Alexandria, Gregory was ill and not expected to live much longer, so that Athanasius would not have long to wait in order to recover his see.

Since the Synod of Serdica took place late in 343, the negotiations between the Augusti must have taken place throughout the following year, with both Athanasius and Paul proceeding to the court of Constans by no later than the summer of that year. We remain ignorant of the details of the agreement worked out by the Augusti. It appears that a compromise was reached, namely, that Athanasius and Paul would succeed Gregory and Macedonius respectively once the latter pair had either resigned from their sees or died. Since Gregory was quite ill, Athanasius could be content to wait, although it is possible that Constantius II invited him to return to Alexandria, but not in the role of bishop, before the death of Gregory. Paul, on the other hand, was frustrated by the good health of Macedonius and returned suddenly to Constantinople, either late in 344 or early in 345. There he installed himself in the Orthodox church, while Macedonius occupied the Arian. There arose the threat of further riots, similar to those of 341/2, although by now Gallus and Julian had been removed to Cappadocia.
and were no longer able to take advantage of such a situation. The reaction of Constantius II indicates clearly that he had not authorized the return of Paul at this time, for he sent his praetorian prefect Flavius Philippus from his court at Antioch with orders to expel Paul and to set up Macedonius as the recognized bishop of Constantinople. Philippus, learning from the fateful experience of Hermogenes, resorted to craft rather than to a formal command. By this means he was able to spirit Paul out of the city before the Orthodox even realized what had happened. He dispatched Paul to his hometown of Thessalonica, with the command that he should never venture into Thrace or the rest of the East. Philippus then with a military guard escorted Macedonius to the main church and there officially installed him as bishop of Constantinople, a task accomplished with considerable bloodshed. The very fact that Constans never objected to this expulsion of Paul indicates that his agreement with Constantius II had not included the immediate restoration of Paul to the eastern capital. Since Macedonius outlived both Constans and Paul, the latter never did become bishop of Constantinople again.

Meanwhile, Gregory lingered on in Alexandria. Athanasius met Constans at Aquileia in the spring of 345, probably in order to be certain of his support before the Augustus journeyed to Trier. While he hesitated, doubting whether he should trust in the support of Constans and the invitations of Constantius II, Gregory died at Alexandria on 26 June 345. All barriers to Athanasius' return were removed, and with them went most of the friction that had been building up between Constantius II and Constans. In order to celebrate the
renewal of their fraternal affection, both agreed to hold the consulship in 346. Upon receiving yet a third letter from Constantius II, Athanasius journeyed from Aquileia to Rome in order to pay his respects to his long-time supporter, Bishop Julius, and then set out for Trier, where Constans had spent the winter of 345/6. In view of certain entries in the Theodosian Code, there is a possibility that Constans accompanied Athanasius from Trier via Sirmium to Constantinople, where they met with Constantius II. If they did so, Constantius II was not able to remain there for long, because the siege of Nisibis called him back to the eastern front. Athanasius may have accompanied him as far as Antioch. From that point Athanasius advanced slowly southwards, and finally on 21 October 346 he made a triumphant entry into Alexandria. Here he was to remain for over nine years until, with Constans dead, his enemies at court were able to have him sent into exile again. His return to Alexandria had been the result of the support of Constans, but in the end it had been the death of Gregory that had enabled him to recover his see.

In so far as religious matters were concerned, the ensuing three years were unusually peaceful. Earlier, in 345, Constans had been faced with riots by the Donatists in Africa, but his decision to leave them to their own devices had led to an end to the troubles there. Like Constantius II, Constans had discovered that religious toleration, with the minimum of intervention by the state, was the key to internal peace. Some time earlier, Constans had encountered a reaction to his anti-pagan legislation and had moderated his position. At some time between 343 and 348, Firmicus Maternus, a convert from paganism, had
addressed to both Augusti his *De Errore Profanarum Religionum*, a violent attack on paganism in which he urged them to eradicate it completely from the Empire, but his work had little immediate effect, for neither Constantius II nor Constans had any desire to alienate a large number of his subjects.\(^{136}\) They found that it was far more effective to give special privileges to the Christians, especially the clerics. The year 347 was not marked by any ecclesiastical troubles of note. The year 348, marking the 1100th anniversary of the founding of the city of Rome, was also quiet; in that Constantius II and Constans paid little attention to the anniversary, the pagans could consider that they had been insulted.\(^{137}\) In 349 an additional incentive was given to the Christians when it was enacted that clerics were to be exempted from all curial duties.\(^{138}\) In short, conditions were almost too peaceful on the religious front now that Constantius II and Constans had adopted a common policy of toleration. But political unrest, brewing in the West, would soon bring about the death of Paul and further afflictions for Athanasius. Since this unrest had arisen partly out of Constans' own policy of appointments, it is desirable now to turn to the political scene during his joint reign with his brother.

(6) The Consuls 340–350

Our knowledge regarding most of the officials appointed during the decade 340–350 is scanty with the exceptions of the consuls, the urban prefects, and the praetorian prefects. Since the consuls were appointed annually, their names can indicate with some precision the changing relationships of the two Augusti. Before the death of
Constantine II, the appointment of the consuls had been clear-cut: Constantine II, both the western and the senior Augustus, had appointed the consuls, although he took into account the wishes of his colleagues, especially Constantius II. But with his death a problem arose, for the senior Augustus was no longer in the West, although it was in the West, in the great families of Italy, that most of the suitable candidates for the consulship were to be found. The appointments of the first five years indicate that Constans, although acknowledging the primacy of his brother in most respects, did not always consult with him regarding the consulship but frequently took the initiative himself. This situation was to be expected, for Constantius II had spent most of his adult life in the East, where few noteworthy candidates for the consulship were to be found, whereas Constans had spent most of the time since his appointment as Caesar in the north of Italy.  

Of the last consuls appointed by Constantine II (those of 340), Septimius Acindynus, although possessing strong western connexions, had most recently served as praetorian prefect of the East and must have been appointed upon the recommendation of Constantius II; nothing is known about him after his consulship and we must conclude that he played no active role in politics thereafter and that he died in honourable retirement. The other consul of 340, Lucius Aradius Valerius Proculus, had been an even greater favourite of Constantine I and had held numerous offices, mostly in the West. Among the last acts of Constantine I had been the appointment of Proculus to the urban prefecture of Rome and the erection of his statue in the Forum of Trajan. Constantine II had continued to shower favour upon Proculus
by making him a consul for 340, but once Constans took over the West he faded into obscurity. Ordinarily one would assume retirement from public life, but Proculus returned to active politics in 351 when he was made urban prefect of Rome for a second time by the usurper Magnentius. It is quite likely that Constans disliked Proculus both because he had been a favourite of Constantine II and because he was an enthusiastic pagan. However, Constans' subsequent appointment of pagans to the consulship and urban prefecture indicates that he considered a compromise of his Christian principles and aspirations to be necessary if he was to find suitable candidates for these posts and to obtain the support of the great aristocratic pagan families. Proculus' appointment by Magnentius may indicate that he was one of the usurper's chief supporters, that is, that he was one of the favourites of Constantine II whom Constans proved to be unable to placate.

If one is to judge by their careers, both the consuls of 341 were favourites of Constans and appointed by him. Antonius Marcellinus had served Constans since at least 29 April 340 as praetorian prefect of Italy, Illyricum, and Africa, and may have been one of the first appointees of Constans. His earlier offices in the West and his patronage of Bulla Regia in Africa Proconsularis also bespeak a western origin. We remain ignorant of the later career of Marcellinus, except for the fact that he was replaced as praetorian prefect by Aco Catullinus no later than 24 June 341. Again, we should assume an honourable retirement. The other consul of 341, Petronius Probinus, was a member of a great Roman aristocratic family: his father, Petronius Probianus, had been consul in 322. We are ignorant of Probinus'
earlier offices, but it is recorded that he was later made urban prefect of Rome, a sign of Constans' continued goodwill towards him. Constans' failure to appoint an associate of Constantius II to the consulship was a result of their strained relations following the death of their eldest brother. As Constans sought to establish his own independence during 340, Constantius II, envious because his younger brother now controlled Rome itself, set up a new senate at Constantinople. Their relationship improved markedly during 341, so that both brothers agreed to hold the consulship of 342, Constantius II for the third and Constans for the second time.

During 342 relations between Constantius II and Constans deteriorated somewhat. There may have been other causes, but the expulsion of Paul from Constantinople and the meetings of Athanasius and Constans at Milan and Trier developed some friction between the Augusti. It is not surprising, therefore, to discover two westerners appointed to the consulship for 343. About one, Marcus Maecius Memmius Furius Baburius Caecilianus Placidus, a great deal is known thanks to an inscription from Puteoli, of which town he was patron. As well as being a devout pagan, he had served as praefectus annonae of Rome, presumably under Constantine II or Constans, then as comes ordinis primi, in all likelihood under Constans, next as comes Orientis Aegypti et Mesopotamiae, clearly under Constantius II, and at the time of his appointment as praetorian prefect of Italy, Illyricum, and Africa. Therefore, with his experience in the East, brief though it may have been, he was an ideal choice, one guaranteed not to antagonize Constantius II. About the other consul, Flavius Romulus, little is
known. However, the other known Romuli of this period have western, not eastern, connexions, and it is safe to assume that he too was the personal choice of Constans. Placidus later advanced to become urban prefect under Constans, but there is no information on the later career of Romulus.

The year of their consulship, 343, was marked by an improvement in the relations between the Augusti, resulting in part from their agreement to hold a general synod at Serdica in an attempt to unite the Christian factions. It comes as no surprise, therefore, that one of the consuls chosen for 344 was Flavius Domitius Leontius, who had served Constantius II as praetorian prefect of the East since 340. Of the consuls appointed by Constans, he was the first who was definitely not a western aristocrat; rather, the dedication to him of a statue by the ordo of Berytus leads us to the conclusion that he was a native of that city. His appointment marked a great concession by Constans to his elder brother. The identity of the second consul of 344 has been open to dispute. Some have concluded that his name was Flavius Sallustius Bonosus, whereas others are of the opinion that two men were involved, one, Flavius Bonosus, being recognized in the West and even there only as late as April or May, and the other, Flavius Julius Sallustius, being recognized in the East all year and in the West after April or May. The identity of this consul would be of little importance were it not for the fact that, if two consules posteriores were recognized in the West and only one in the East, we should have a definite indication that Constantius II, and not Constans, was the one entitled to name the consuls. But the preponderance of western
aristocrats in the consulship during the years under consideration has already led to the conclusion that Constans was naming the consuls. Also, if Bonosus was distinct from Sallustius, it seems strange that Constantius II, after rejecting him as consul, would utilize his services as *magister equitum* some three years later. Otto Seeck thinks that the annulling of the consulship of Bonosus was related to Constantius II's principle not to confer senatorial titles on military men, but Sallustius also had a military career, so that Seeck's objection cannot stand. Finally, there is nothing in the known careers of Bonosus and Sallustius to indicate that any conflict existed in their offices. In short, Degrassi's verdict in favour of Flavius Sallustius Bonosus as a single *consul posterior* accords best with the evidence. Sallustius Bonosus can then be regarded as a person of western origin who may have served as *magister militum* in the West before 344 and who did serve as *comes* and *magister peditum* in the East during 344 and as *magister equitum* in the East in 347. We can conclude from this that he, like Leontius, was approved by Constantius II.

The news of the failure of the Synod of Serdica to reach a solution to the dispute between the Arians and the Orthodox reached the Augusti early in 344, and once again friction developed between the imperial courts. This situation is reflected in the consuls appointed for 345, for both are westerners, indicating a certain failure of Constans to seek the advice of his brother. Of one, Flavius Amantius, only his consulship is known but there is no reason to consider him to have any strong eastern affiliation. The other consul, Marcus Nummius Albinus, could trace his ancestry back to the patricians of the
late republic and himself had held the quaestorship and urban praetorship. He had also been a comes domesticus ordinis primi, doubtless at the court of Constans, and we can only conclude that he was a favourite of the western Augustus. 167

One of the major causes for the dissension between the Augusti came to an end when Bishop Gregory died at Alexandria on 26 June 345 and Constantius II encouraged Athanasius to return to his see. 168 From this point until the death of Constans in early 350, a set pattern emerges in the consulships: in each year there is a western and an eastern representative. This amicable solution was a result of the improving relations between the two Augusti and also, perhaps, of an agreement reached in 346, whereby Constantius II may have guaranteed to welcome back Athanasius and to grant religious toleration in the East on the condition that he be given the privilege of nominating one of the consuls. In order to symbolize their new-found unity, Constantius II and Constans held the consulship in 346, Constantius II for the fourth and Constans for the third time.

For the year 347 Constans nominated Vulcaciuss Rufinus to the consulship. This act was particularly significant because it marked a reconciliation of sorts with the more distant relations of the two Augusti, for Rufinus' sister Galla, deceased since about 330, had been the wife of the murdered Julius Constantius and the mother not only of Gallus but also of his murdered elder brother and of his sister, at present the wife of Constantius II himself. 169 Rufinus was the scion of an old aristocratic family 170 and had already enjoyed an outstanding career, having been comes ordinis primi intra consistorium (presumably
of Constans, but possibly of one of his brothers) and comes per Orientem of Constantius II.171 Since 344 or thereabouts he had been the praetorian prefect of Italy, Africa, and Illyricum and, although his command was to be reduced in the summer of 347, he was to remain prefect of Illyricum for some two years after the death of Constans and to serve as prefect of Gaul under Constantius II and finally, in his old age, as prefect of Italy, Illyricum, and Africa under Valentinian.172 Rufinus' service as comes of the East in 342 ensured his familiarity with, and acceptance by, Constantius II,173 while his present office as a praetorian prefect in the West rendered him an obvious choice for Constans to make. The second consul, Flavius Eusebius, was nominated by Constantius II. We are ignorant of his earlier career, but it is known that he had been magister equitum et peditum of Constantius II and that he was a comes of Constantius II as well.174 Of all the Eusebii, he is the one most likely to have been the father of Eusebia, the second wife of Constantius II, and of the consuls of 359, Eusebius and Hypatius. If so, he was no Roman aristocrat, but rather a native of Thessalonica who by means of imperial service became the first consul of his family.175 Unlike Rufinus, who remained steadfastly loyal to the Second Flavians, Eusebius died too soon, probably not long after his consulship, and did not live to take part in the civil war between Constantius II and Magnentius.176

The choice of the consuls for the year 348 was especially significant, for that year marked officially the 1100th anniversary of the founding of the city of Rome. On this occasion it was Constantius II who was to have the honour of naming the first consul; in so doing he
chose a most appropriate name, for Flavius Philippus recalled the fact that Philip the Arab had been emperor during the anniversary of 248. But Flavius Philippus was no great Roman aristocrat such as one might expect to be chosen for so important an event; rather, if we are to believe Libanius, he was the son of a sausage-maker in the East. Philippus had been fortunate enough to secure an education that qualified him to become a notary at the court of Constantius II. It was said that his rapid promotion thereafter was due to the influence of the eunuchs at the court of Constantius II; this may have been the case, but his career indicates that he was a loyal and competent servant of Constantius II. He had been the praetorian prefect of the East since the autumn of 344, and one of his earliest acts had been the deportation of Paul from Constantinople to Thessalonica. Philippus had shown himself to be far more competent than Hermogenes, who had lost his life in a similar attempt about three years earlier, for it was by craft that he spirited the bishop out of the city, presenting the Orthodox supporters there with no choice but to endure the Arian Macedonius. Philippus was to remain in office as prefect of the East until after the death of Constans. In 351 he was to serve as a special envoy to the court of the usurper Magnentius, where his loyalty to Constantius II was to cost him first his freedom and finally his life. There is no evidence that Philippus was ever closely associated with Constans or that they had ever been at odds. His acceptance by Constans is, if anything, proof that Constans had not insisted upon the immediate restoration of Paul as he had upon that of Athanasius. Constans' choice for the consulship of 348 was Flavius Salia, who had served as his
magister equitum since 344 and continued to do so at least until the end of his consulship. It was Salia who, shortly after the end of the abortive Synod of Serdica, had been sent along with two bishops by Constans to demand the restoration of Athanasius to Alexandria.\textsuperscript{182} Thus, as Philippus supported the Arian cause, so Salia gave the support of the western forces to the Orthodox. We should not conclude from this that Constantius II and Constans chose their respective candidates in order to spite each other. Quite to the contrary, for at least three years Constans had been content with the exile of Paul to Thessalonica and Constantius II had welcomed back Athanasius a year earlier, so that the religious dispute had been removed from the political arena for some time. Philippus was chosen for this year partly because of the significance of his name, although Salia's name had no special importance.\textsuperscript{183} In fact, we are ignorant of his racial and social background; a personal conjecture is that he may have been one of the Salian Franks in the imperial service and may have been granted the praenomen Flavius in return for his contributions and the nomen Salia as a pun upon his origin.\textsuperscript{184}

In nominating the consuls for 349, Constans resorted in both cases to his own administrators, one of whom had served Constantius II in the East with distinction. This one, quite possibly recommended by Constantius II himself, was Ulpius Limenius. We know nothing definite about his origin or his early career. The only other Limenius recorded at this epoch served as a protector in the East and might have been his father, but the possibility must remain that the Limenii were of Italian origin and owned extensive property in the East.\textsuperscript{185} Be that as
it may, the first recorded office of Ulpius Limenius was that of proconsul of Constantinople; he succeeded the first recorded proconsul, Alexander, in 342 and forced the rhetorician Libanius to leave that city and go to Nicomedia. When we next read of Limenius, he has been promoted by Constans to a two-fold position, that of urban prefect of Rome and of praetorian prefect of Italy and Africa. He was the first person recorded to have held these offices simultaneously. Limenius became prefect on 12 June 347 and still held the offices when his consulship commenced in 349; however, he appears to have died in office on 8 April 349, since there was an interregnum of 41 days in the urban prefecture before his successor took office. In sum, Limenius, as a loyal servant of both Augusti, was a perfect choice in order to symbolize the accord between them. The second choice for the consulship of 349 was an experienced administrator of Constans, Aco Catullinus Philomathius. Catullinus was born into a noble Italian family and his rank declared his eligibility for the consulship. He had served as vicar of Africa in 338-9 and therefore had been appointed to this post by Constantine II. His rapid promotion after the death of the eldest brother leads us to believe that he had abetted Constans in the struggle between the western Augusti. For once Antonius Marcellinus had resigned as praetorian prefect of Italy, Africa, and Illyricum early in the summer of 341, Catullinus replaced him and held that post until the summer of 342, when he was appointed urban prefect of Rome, a post that he held until the spring of 344. The consulship in 349 was the crowning glory of a distinguished career. As a pagan Catullinus during his urban prefecture had been able to mollify somewhat Constans'
Christian zeal by persuading him to safe-guard the temples at Rome. We know nothing about his career after his consulship, although, since that office usually marked the end of an active career, he probably retired into private life and played no part in the imminent overthrow of Constans.

When the time came to nominate the consuls for 350, the relations between Constans and Constantius II were still amicable if the consuls chosen are any indication. Yet the official proclamation of these consuls was to be one of Constans' last acts before his assassination. Regarding the identity of the first consul there has been considerable confusion. Degrassi took the two variants available and combined them into one name, Flavius Anicius Sergius. Seeck, however, believed that there were two consules priores in 350, one appointed by Constans and another appointed by Magnentius and recognized by Constantius II after the death of Constans. The evidence for the existence of one, Flavius Anicius, consists solely of a single inscription extant only in a transcript; according to this, he was consul on or before 29 April 350. All the other sources, including the fasti, refer only to a Flavius Sergius, but the earliest dated reference to him is 7 June 350. The suggestion has been made that Anicius, for whom the only evidence was found at Rome, was the choice of Constans and that he was disgraced, quite possibly because of the overthrow of Constans, and was replaced by Sergius, who was recognized by both Magnentius and Constantius II. If this were the case, we should possess the material for a fine conjecture regarding the downfall of Constans: Constantius II, for whatever reason, refused to
accept Constans' nominee, Anicius, and, when friction developed between the Augusti, there arose a western usurper, Magnentius, who took advantage of it to overthrow Constans and to join with Constantius II in creating a new consul, Sergius. This conjecture, however, has only flimsy evidence to support it. For example, there is no evidence whatsoever that the relations between Constantius II and Magnentius were ever anything but hostile; it is difficult to believe that they could have agreed upon the naming of the consuls, since Constantius II was unwilling to concede even a small part of the Empire to Magnentius. Also, "a disgraced consul ordinarius was not normally replaced by another consul ordinarius, but his colleague remained as sole consul of the year." Yet another objection is that the Roman inscription mentioned above, the evidence for a Flavius Anicius, is extant only in a transcript and therefore itself is suspect. The problem with which we are faced is somewhat similar to that involving one of the consuls of 344, Flavius Sallustius Bonosus. As in that case, Degrassi was quite correct in linking the names. Whoever recorded the inscription of Anicius at Rome might have neglected the cognomen Sergius. Even if he did record it correctly, it still could refer to Sergius. The Anicii were a powerful family at Rome and it would have been clear to the people there which Anicius was meant, but elsewhere he was defined more explicitly as Sergius, and in those cases the name Anicius was dropped because of the tendency for the names of consuls to be abbreviated, especially when they were used for dating. We can conclude that the consul prior of 350 was Flavius Anicius Sergius; as a western aristocrat, he was the personal choice of Constans. The consul posterior of 350,
Flavius Nigrinianus, was the personal choice of Constantius II if his background is any indication. His son, Florentius, was a native of Antioch and the likelihood is that he, too, called that city his home. In all other respects we are ignorant of the career of Nigrinianus.

In sum, the consulships for the decade of 340-350 reflect the political situation of the period. In the first half of the decade, when the restoration of Athanasius was at issue, Constans sometimes urged Constantius II to choose one of the consuls and sometimes he chose them both himself. In the second half of the decade, Constans and Constantius II symbolized their harmony by each naming a consul for each year. It now remains to discern the policy of the brothers with regard to the other offices of state.

(7) The Praetorian Prefects 340-350

Another office for which we have considerable information during this decade is the praetorian prefecture. Since each Augustus appointed his own prefects, we shall deal first with the East, which was under the jurisdiction of Constantius II and was governed by only one prefect at a time. The first prefect, Septimius Acindynus, was probably appointed as early as the summer of 337 and has already been discussed in the previous chapter. Suffice it that he served Constantius II faithfully until the late summer of 340 and that he appears to have retired from active political life at that time. He was honoured by being named to the consulship of 340. Of noble birth, he had a villa at Bauli and may have gone there for his retirement.
The prefects following Acindynus were not of noble birth, although they too were elevated to the consulship. The first, Flavius Domitius Leontius, held office from the autumn of 340 until at least the summer of 344. Probably a native of Berytus, he had arisen per singulos honorum grados to the prefecture and, while still prefect, achieved the supreme honour by being named consul for 344. Like Acindynus, Leontius fails to appear in history after his prefecture had been crowned by the consulship.

Leontius' successor in the prefecture of the East, Flavius Philippus, commenced that office in the middle of 344 and outlived Constans, with the result that he served Constantius II until the summer of 351 when he was held captive by the usurper Magnentius. Philippus was an even more outstanding example of the opportunity for promotion available in the East, for, according to Libanius, he had been born the son of a sausage-seller. Unlike his predecessors in the East, however, he did not have to wait until nearly the end of his prefecture before obtaining the consulship, but instead he was made consul for 348. His success as a prefect, especially in managing the exile of Bishop Paul, was not the sole reason for his consulship. His name served not only to mark the 1100th year of Rome but also to remind the people that the 1000th year had been celebrated by the emperor Philip. What is more, he was said by Libanius to have achieved his promotion through the influence of the eunuchs at court. We may be sure that it was ability, more than anything else, that resulted in his promotion, and that Libanius, who was born of a curial family, felt bitter against Philippus through a comparison of his own modest
accomplishments with the great responsibility of the prefect. Yet prefects of humble origin were more likely to succeed at the eastern court because there was certain to be less friction between them and the eunuchs who dominated that court than there would have been in the case of those of noble or curial status who despised the eunuchs. Thus Acindynus was succeeded by two prefects who were not of noble western birth. By contrast, in the West Constans resorted for the most part to members of the senatorial aristocracy for the office of praetorian prefect.

In the West Constans had two praetorian prefects before the summer of 347 and three thereafter. The situation in the prefecture of Gaul was at its simplest. There, after the death of Constantine II, Constans cashiered the last prefect of his eldest brother, in all likelihood Tiberianus or Ambrosius, and promoted in his stead Fabius Titianus. Of all the officials serving the imperial courts from the death of Constantine I to that of Magnentius, Titianus is, with the exception of Constantius II's chamberlain Eusebius, the most interesting. Titianus, in short, was the perfect opportunist. By means of his hasty trip to Constans' court after the death of Constantine II, Titianus had ingratiated himself with his new Augustus in order to retain his office of urban prefect of Rome until 22 February 341. Then, so thoroughly and convincingly had he changed his spots, so to speak, that Constans appointed him to be prefect of Gaul, an office that he held until shortly after the murder of Constans early in 350. Fabius Titianus, just like most of Constans' prefects, was a Roman aristocrat and a pagan. So illustrious had his career been even
before the proclamation of the three sons as Augusti that their father, Constantine I, had made him consul for 337. Consequently, Constans felt no need to bestow this honour upon him. Apart from the entries in the Theodosian Code addressed to him, we remain ignorant of Titianus' career as praetorian prefect. He must, however, have played a prominent part in the campaigns along the Rhine and in Britain. The very fact that this *vir eloquens* was later made urban prefect for a second time by the usurper Magnentius indicates that he was to play no small role in the overthrow of Constans himself.

In the central prefecture of Italy, Africa, and Illyricum Constans did not place all his confidence in one man, as he had done in Gaul, but rather granted the office for shorter terms to several candidates and ultimately split the prefecture. He did, however, continue at first his practice of appointing nobles and pagans, for he was afraid to antagonize the senatorial aristocracy before he had the opportunity to consolidate his position. The first appointee of Constans to the central prefecture was Antonius Marcellinus. Marcellinus succeeded Pacatianus, the prefect of Constantine II, either shortly before or after the death of that emperor. Although it is not at all certain that he was a pagan, Marcellinus was of noble birth, likely of a Roman family but possibly of a Greek one. What rank, if any, he had held under Constantine II is unknown, but the edict he received from Constans soon after the death of the eldest brother leads us to believe that he had supported Constans in his attempt to gain independence from his brother. In requital for his services, Constans nominated him to the consulship of 341.
Before the summer of 341, Marcellinus had been succeeded in the prefecture by Aco Catullinus, who, like him, held the office for approximately one year, a very short time compared to the tenure of Fabius Titianus. Catullinus was a pagan and of noble birth. Unlike Marcellinus, who was promoted directly to the consulship, Catullinus was made urban prefect of Rome for nearly a two-year period after his praetorian prefecture and was not honoured with the supreme dignity of the consulship until 349. What role, if any, he or Antonius Marcellinus played in the overthrow of Constans is unknown. Both appear to have been in retirement by that time if they were not already dead.

The same fate, that is, no active part in the politics of 350, seems to have applied as well to Catullinus' successor in the prefecture, Marcus Maecius Memmius Furius Baburius Caecilianus Placidus. The latter, a strong pagan and noble, held the praetorian prefecture for nearly two years, and before the end of that jurisdiction was made consul for 343. Under normal circumstances this would have marked the end of his public life, but, in a reversal of Catullinus' career, he was made urban prefect of Rome for the first half of 347. As praetorian prefect Placidus served during the Synod of Serdica but, being a pagan, he probably took little interest in it.

Constans' last appointee to the combined prefecture of Italy, Africa, and Illyricum was Vulcacios Rufinus who was, along with Titianus, the only prefect known to have played an active part in the ensuing struggle for the West. A noble and a pagan, Rufinus had served most recently as the comes per Orientem of Constantius II when Constans
chose him for the central prefecture. It was during the course of his prefecture, which commenced in the summer of 344, that Constans resolved upon a major change in the administration of the West. Rufinus had already served three years as prefect when, in the early summer of 347, Constans divided the central prefecture in two. The eastern half, consisting of Illyricum, continued to be entrusted to the care of Rufinus but Italy and Africa were granted their own praetorian prefect, Ulpius Limenius, who was entrusted concurrently with the urban prefecture of Rome. This action was no slight against Rufinus, who not only was made consul for 347 but also was allowed to continue as prefect of Illyricum so long as Constans lived. Even after the death of his benefactor, Rufinus remained at his post, first under Vetranio and soon after under Constantius II who eventually transferred him from Illyricum to Gaul. Constans, retaining Rufinus as prefect for six years, three times as long as his immediate forerunner in the office, was proved by events not to have misplaced his confidence, although Titianus, whose tenure was even longer, did prove to be a betrayer. Rufinus' services in Italy were acknowledged by the citizens of Ravenna, in all likelihood upon his retirement from that area. The reason for the division of the central prefecture was a very practical one. The administration of Illyricum was concerned primarily with the defence of the Danube, whereas that of Italy and Africa conflicted to some extent with the jurisdiction of the urban prefect of Rome. For example, although the urban prefect had to ensure an adequate supply of food-stuffs (especially grain) for the populace of Rome, most of that grain came from Africa, which was not under his jurisdiction. On the other
hand, the urban prefect had little involvement with Illyricum. The solution was simple: the division of the central prefecture and the coalescing of the functions of the praetorian prefect of Italy and Africa and those of the urban prefect together in one person.

Just as Vulcavius Rufinus was the first to manage the new praetorian prefecture of Illyricum, so Ulpius Limenius was the first to hold consecutively the two positions of urban prefect of Rome and praetorian prefect of Italy and Africa, commencing his duties on 12 June 347. His earlier service as proconsul of Constantinople had provided him with excellent experience for his new position. Of his origin and religious persuasion we remain ignorant, although his eastern background is implied by the office of proconsul of Constantinople. Like the other praetorian prefects of this decade, Limenius was awarded the consulship, in his case that of 349. Limenius ceased to be prefect 8 April 349 and, because there followed an interregnum of 41 days in the urban prefecture, it has been conjectured that he died suddenly at that time, thereby being deprived of involvement in the debacle that was to follow in less than a year's time. The interregnum itself makes it clear that Limenius was not executed, but rather died a natural death.

We cannot be certain who filled the role of acting urban and praetorian prefect during the interregnum, but it may have been Eustathius, who in 345, as the comes rei privatae of Constans, had supported Athanasius in his bid to return to Alexandria. If so, Eustathius was almost certainly an Orthodox Christian and, what is more, one of eastern, not Italian, origin. His appointment, however, was
temporary, for on 19 May 349 Hermogenes was installed as urban and praetorian prefect. The possibility that Hermogenes was of eastern origin and a Christian is great, but his identity cannot be securely established. In any case, he served Constans until the latter's death and continued to do so until the forces of the usurper Magnentius gained control of Rome on 27 February 350, at which time he was relieved of his offices. Whether he was executed or forced into retirement or retired temporarily only to serve Constantius II at a later date is unknown. Suffice it that there is no evidence that he played any active part in the crisis that accompanied his withdrawal from office and that, for whatever reason, he never attained the consulship. Constans' reform of the central prefecture, although it did not survive his death, was a practical measure designed to simplify the administration and to eliminate some of its internal conflicts. Limenius and Hermogenes were not "merely stop-gaps." But the eastern connexions of these new urban prefects must have antagonized the senatorial nobility, to the end that its support for Constans was diminished. Constans may have chosen easterners for the urban prefecture in order to symbolize his new-found accord with Constantius II after 346, but in so doing he added to his enemies in the prefecture of Gaul a considerable number of the Italian aristocracy.

(8) The Urban Prefects 340-350

The precise dating of the praetorian prefectures of Ulpius Limenius and Hermogenes is a result of their contemporary offices as urban prefects, for which the dating is secure throughout this period
thanks to the Chronographer of 354. Mention has already been made of most of the urban prefects because of their tendency to be promoted to the consulship and to hold the praetorian prefecture either before or after their office at Rome. Of the urban prefects who served under Constans, all, with the exception of Limenius and Hermogenes, provide no indication that they were not noble and pagan, and even in the case of these last two prefects there is no evidence that they were not pagans. Constans found it necessary to compromise his Christian principles to this extent. The first two urban prefects to serve under Constans were especially significant. The first, Fabius Titianus, had been honoured by Constantine I with the consulship and had been appointed urban prefect by Constantine II.\textsuperscript{232} When the latter perished in the fraternal conflict at the beginning of 340, Titianus had hastened north and had succeeded in ingratiating himself with Constans, the new master of the West. After the end of his urban prefecture, Constans appointed him praetorian prefect of Gaul, and it was in this capacity that he assisted in the overthrow of Constans in 350.\textsuperscript{233} As urban prefect for a second time under the usurper Magnentius, Titianus was to complete his treachery by insulting the entire Flavian household.\textsuperscript{234} In seeking an accommodation with Constans immediately after the death of Constantine II, Titianus was reconciling himself with a \textit{fait accompli} and following Seneca's principle, that it is better to compromise with a tyrant, and thereby to exercise at least a small salutary influence upon him, than to retire completely from public life and wield no influence at all.\textsuperscript{235} Yet as prefect of Gaul in the winter of 349/50 Titianus must have been privy to the plot against Constans. One reason is not hard to find:
Titianus was incensed that the urban prefecture, once the preserve of nobles like himself, had been debased by the recent appointments of those new men from the East, Ulpius Limenius and Hermogenes. Through Magnentius Titianus got his revenge by being appointed urban prefect for a second time after the removal of Hermogenes.

The first urban prefect appointed by Constans, Aurelius Celsinus, was also destined to betray the Flavian house. Celsinus, who may have been related to Titianus, had served Constantine II as proconsul of Africa but he too made his peace with the youngest Augustus and held the urban prefecture for just over a year. Later he also must have disapproved of the appointments of Limenius and Hermogenes, but he had an additional reason for siding with Magnentius: he was one of the few urban prefects never to hold the praetorian prefecture and the consulship, so that if he was to receive those offices he would have to side with the usurper, there being no hope of promotion under Constans. And so Celsinus served as Magnentius' second urban prefect.

In their betrayal of Constans, Titianus and Celsinus were to be joined by yet another urban prefect, Lucius Aradius Valerius Proculus. Proculus, it is true, had been appointed by Constantine I and had served him with great distinction from 10 March 337 until his death, after which he had served the three sons until some four months after their proclamation as Augusti. In addition, Constantine II had honoured him by naming him to the consulship of 340, but thereafter he disappeared from public office until late 351, when he became the fifth urban prefect of Magnentius. Proculus, therefore, had a grudge
against Constans very similar to that of Aurelius Celsinus, in that he was given no further appointments, especially the coveted one of praetorian prefect. All three urban prefects (Titianus, Celsinus, and Proculus) had in common a legitimate complaint of the aristocracy, that Constans had affronted their order by appointing easterners to the prefecture of Rome.

The other urban prefects, that is, the five holding the office after Celsinus and before Limenius, appear to have played no part in the crisis of 350. The first, Quintus Flavius Maesius Egnatius Lollianus, was a possible exception to this rule, for at some time during the decade 340–350 he also served Constans as a comes and then disappeared from the political scene until late in 354 when Constantius II, recently victorious over the murderer of Constans, appointed him consul for 355 and made him praetorian prefect of Illyricum. The chances are good, therefore, that, unlike his three noble colleagues recently mentioned, Lollianus remained loyal to the Flavian household; he may have been one of those senators who fled to the court of Constantius II soon after the triumph of Magnentius in the West.

With regard to the four urban prefects who served after Lollianus and before the reform that advanced Limenius to the leadership of Rome, we cannot be certain whether they took any part in the conflict between Magnentius and the Flavian house. The first, Aco Catullinus, had served Constans as praetorian prefect of Italy, Africa, and Illyricum in 341 before acting as urban prefect for just over two years from 342 to 344; Constans later exalted him to the consulship of 349, but nothing is known about him thereafter.
Catullinus' successor, Quintus Rusticus, served for just over one year, from the spring of 344 to the summer of 345. It was during his tenure that the authority of the urban prefect was reduced somewhat as *clarissimi* were granted the right of appeal against his verdict; this reform pointed ahead to the major one of 347. However, nothing else is known about Rusticus, who may have died soon after his prefecture.

Rusticus was succeeded as urban prefect by Petronius Probinus, who held the office until nearly the end of 346. Probinus, a member of a great aristocratic family, had already held the consulship in 341. There is some evidence, though very tenuous, that he may have been a Christian. Nothing, however, is known about him after his urban prefecture.

Probinus' successor, Marcus Maecius Memmius Furius Baburius Caecilianus Placidus, had, like Rusticus, been consul before his urban prefecture, in his case in 343. But Placidus had also been the praetorian prefect of Italy, Africa, and Illyricum from 342 to 344. He governed the city of Rome from the end of 346 to 12 June 347, when the administrative reform took place that entrusted the praetorian prefecture of Italy and Africa and the urban prefecture to the same individual. Nothing further is known about Placidus, so that we cannot be certain whether his reaction to the reform and its beneficiaries, who were of eastern connexions (namely, Limenius and Hermogenes), was favourable or not.

To sum up, Constans' reform of the urban prefecture and his division of the central prefecture were logical changes in the
administration. The first change did not itself displease the senatorial aristocracy, although its beneficiaries, Limenius and Hermogenes, did by their non-Italian origin insult senatorial aristocrats like Titianus, Celsinus, and Proculus. The second change was to be of considerable help in retaining the allegiance of Illyricum to the Flavian dynasty.

(9) Other Officials 340-350

So little is known about the other officials who managed the administration of the Empire during the decade 340-350 that it is difficult to discern what parts they played in imperial policy, especially in so far as the imminent overthrow of Constans is concerned. One about whom a certain amount is known was Flavius Eugenius, who spent most of his career in the palatine service in the West. Eugenius was almost certainly of Greek origin. He probably held the rank of magister admissionum in 345 when he witnessed Athanasius' interview with Constans at Aquileia. Subsequently he became comes ordinis prymi at court and ultimately the magister officiorum of Constans. Eugenius, like so many of his fellow bureaucrats, was not hesitant to abuse the powers of his office. So influential was he with Constans that, when he took a fancy to the property of Aristophanes, a decurion of Corinth and relative by marriage, he was able to terrorize him so much as to cause him to abandon his home and flee to Syria, where he came under a different jurisdiction. Yet, although some may have suffered, Constans was pleased with the conduct of his minister and may have granted him an honorary praetorian prefecture and designated him consul.
ordinarius.²⁵⁹ It has often been assumed, on the ground that Eugenius' name is not found in the fasti, that he predeceased his master, but this was not the case, for as late as 357 Athanasius declared that he could still call him to witness even though Maximinus of Trier and Protasius of Milan, both also present at the meeting with Constans in 345, had since died.²⁶⁰ It was probably not long before his own death that Constans arranged in the Forum of Trajan at Rome the erection of a statue of Eugenius in gratitude for his services.²⁶¹ We cannot be certain how long Eugenius remained magister officiorum, but it is possible that he still held the office when Constans was assassinated. If so, he was in no way guilty of conspiracy in that crime but rather fled to the East, possibly to Corinth, in order to escape from the fury of the insurgents. For Eugenius was not safe within the realm of Magnentius, whose supporters had severely damaged his statue at Rome. Later, Constantius II and Julian were to see to the restoration of that monument.²⁶²

Just as Eugenius was a loyal supporter of Constans, so his successor in the office of magister officiorum, Marcellinus, appointed by the usurper Magnentius, had proved to be a traitor to the Flavian house.²⁶³ This Marcellinus had served as the comes rei privatae of Constans in Gaul and through disaffection with Constans' rule was to become the leading supporter of Magnentius.²⁶⁴ Since Marcellinus' entire known career was spent in Gaul, there is a strong possibility that his original service had been under Constantine II and that, somewhat like Fabius Titianus, he bided his time until the opportunity arose to avenge his former master.
One official whose role in the crisis of 350 must have been very important was the praepositus sacri cubiculi of Constans. It is very unfortunate that the only reference to a praepositus of Constans is very late in date and highly unreliable. This work, concerned with the history and monuments of Constantinople, states that a statue of a bull was erected in the Hippodrome by Valentinianus, the praepositus of Constans. Even if this account were accurate it would still be of little use to us because we would not know whether Valentinianus was still the praepositus of Constans in his last days. Dunlap saw fit only to insert Valentinianus in his list of praepositi and otherwise ignored him, but the editors of the PLRE put so little faith in his actual existence that they eliminated him from their list altogether. Valentinianus, much to our chagrin, is useless for this thesis. If he did exist, he was much more likely to have served in the East, for our source is concerned with Constantinople. His very name gives rise to suspicion, for all the Valentiniani listed in the PLRE served as governors or military officials, not as eunuchs at court. A eunuch who certainly did serve at the court of Constans was Eutherius, who later was to be the praepositus sacri cubiculi of the Caesar Julian. Eutherius may have been a cubicularius of Constans. Whatever his capacity, he gave Constans good advice that was ignored. This advice might have dealt with the growing disaffection among the senatorial aristocracy and the military officers in the former territory of Constantine II. By some means or other Eutherius survived the regime of Magnentius. His loyalty to the Flavian house must have been unquestioned, for otherwise Constantius II would never have made him a
Of the military commanders who served Constans in his last days and took part in the subsequent crisis there was, of course, Magnentius himself, who held at first the office of protector under Constans and later served as his comes rei militaris in command of the Joviani and Herculiani, both palatine legions. Magnentius' revolt against Constans must have been quite unexpected inasmuch as he was greatly indebted to Constans, who had once saved him from the sedition of the troops. We do not know who served as magister militum in Gaul late in Constans' reign, but he was very fortunate to have as magister peditum in Illyricum Vetranio, who had held that post for a long time and remained loyal to the Flavian house, conspiring with the praetorian prefect of Illyricum, Vulcacius Rufinus, to withhold Illyricum from Magnentius. Yet another military official who remained loyal to Constans, though unsuccessfully, was his comes Actus, who tried to block the passes of the Julian Alps to the forces of the usurper but was captured by treachery. Actus probably paid the supreme penalty for his loyalty to his deceased sovereign. One soldier whose loyalty to Constans was later called into question was Gratianus, the father of the future emperors Valentinian and Valens. His earlier offices had probably been held under Constantine I, but towards the end of his career he commanded the army in Britain with the rank of comes; it is quite possible that as such he accompanied Constans on his British campaign in the winter of 342/3. Later, after an honourable discharge, he had retired to his home at Cibalae in Pannonia, where he was said to have shown hospitality to Magnentius when that usurper was marching
east. This accusation certainly does not force us to conclude that Gratianus was one of those administrators of Constans who had become disenchanted with Constans and supported Magnentius; rather, Gratianus had no choice but to be friendly to Magnentius when confronted by the armed might of the usurper.

(10) Libanius and the Anniversary of 348

Although in the East Sapor continued to pose a major threat and in the West the seeds of revolt were beginning to sprout in Gaul and in the Roman Senate, nevertheless all appeared on the surface to be satisfactory when, either late in 348 or early in 349, the rhetorician Libanius delivered his oration at Nicomedia in honour of the two Augusti. There was much to be thankful for, above all the lack of any major civil war since the defeat of Licinius in 324. The bloodbath at Constantinople following the death of Constantine I and the skirmish in which Constantine II perished had left the mass of the people unscathed. The frontiers of the Rhine and the Danube were secure, and, bluster though he might, Sapor had been unable to make any major incursions along the Euphrates. In 348, the 1100th anniversary of the founding of Rome, there was much to celebrate, but Constantius II and Constans paid little heed to this important milestone. It is true that they did mark the occasion by issuing a new bronze coinage with the legend *fel. temp. reparatio*, but there were no organized festivities as there had been in 248, when there was far less cause for celebration. Sextus Aurelius Victor, writing c. 361 before the death of Constantius II, lamented this fact in his account of the emperor Philip the Arab:
Et quoniam nomen admonuit, mea quoque aetate post mille centesimus consule Philippo excessit nullis, ut solet, sollemnibus frequentatus: adeo in dies cura minima Romanae urbis. 

Victor's sentiments no doubt reflected those of the traditionalists in the Empire, especially of the pagan aristocracy. Libanius, on the other hand, in giving a public oration was unable to give vent to his true feelings.

Although his oration of 348/9 coincided with the 1100th anniversary of Rome, Libanius makes no mention of that anniversary but instead dwells upon the virtues and deeds of Constantius II and Constans, as well as those of their ancestors Constantius I and Constantine I. There is, of course, no mention of Constantine II, for Libanius found it far more politic to pretend that the loser had never existed. Instead, he devoted over a quarter of his oration to a panegyric on the noble birth and education of the two Augusti. 

The very fact that over a third of the oration is concerned with the Persian wars of Constantius II makes it clear that the primary reason for the composition of this oration was an attempt to dispel the ugly rumours regarding a Roman defeat at Singara in 348 and, by forced argument, to picture that engagement as a triumph of Constantius II's sagacity. Far less space, only one-seventh of the oration, was devoted to the heroic deeds of Constans. This was only logical, since the oration was directed primarily to the eastern court. It is, however, noteworthy that the only deeds described in detail are the Frankish and British campaigns of 341-343, and the implication is clear that Libanius did not describe more recent events in the West simply because Constans' military
glory was becoming somewhat tarnished. Libanius made up for the lack of specific illustrations of Constans' recent activity by indulging in a general study of his character, placing the greatest emphasis upon the speed of his decision and action. 282

In the last part of his oration Libanius ceases to treat the two brothers separately and extols the harmony of their rule, remarking on how it contrasted with the envy that used to exist between emperors:

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ἀλλὰ νῦν ἂπας μὲν ὁ παλαιὸς χρόνος ἠττηται, ἂπας δὲ φθόνου χαλεπῶς ὀφθαλμὸς ὑπερφιὰσται, φιλίας δὲ σύνδεσμος ἀρραγής τὰς τῶν βασιλέων συνέχει ψυχᾶς. Ἡ δὲ ἀρχὴ τοῖς μὲν τόποις διήρηται, ταῖς δὲ εὐνοίαις συνάπτεται, καὶ τὸ τῆς οἰκείσχητος ὄνομα πιστοῦται τοῖς ἔργοις. 283
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This harmony, of course, was in contrast to their bitter relationship after the Synod of Serdica, but Libanius does not deign to mention the strained relations of the first half of the decade. As has been pointed out earlier in this chapter, there is every reason to believe that Libanius, in describing the unity of the Augusti, was quite correct, if we make allowances for rhetorical exaggeration. He concluded from the deep trust the Augusti had in one another and in their subjects that there was no possibility of any insurrection. 284 Hindsight enables us to smile at this remark, for in less than two years Constans would be assassinated, but on the surface, at least, the reign of the Second Flavian dynasty seemed very secure when Libanius delivered his oration. It seemed to him that there would be no end to the free interchange of goods and peoples between East and West so long as Constantius II and Constans continued to rule jointly. 285
Notes to Chapter Three

1 E.g., Amm. 21.16.15.
2 See chapter 2, pages 124 and 125, for details regarding eastern affairs in 337-340.
3 Lib. Or. 18.207.
4 CTh 12.1.30 of 12 August 340; CTh 6.4.5-6 of 9 September 340.
5 CTh 7.9.2 of 11 October 340.
6 CTh 5.13.1-2 of 12 February 341.
7 Seeck, Regesten 190 (conclusion from Lib. Or. 18.207).
8 Soc. 2.8; Soz. 3.5; Stein-Palanque 135. A major concern of the council was Athanasius, who had fled to Rome in 339. His part in the politics of the period will be dealt with later in this chapter.
9 Soc. 2.12; Soz. 3.7. Seeck, Geschichte 4.70 and 414, dates the death of Eusebius to the first months of 341.
10 Lib. Or. 1.45-46.
11 Constantius II had returned to Antioch by 31 March 342 (CTh 3.12.1), so that the sequence of events from the death of Eusebius to the intervention of Constantius II at Constantinople must have taken place during the winter of 341/2, and not simply early in 342 as the sources imply. Cons. Const. for 342, Hieron. Chron. for 342, Athan. Hist. Ar. 7 and Hist. Aceph. 2, Soc. 2.12-13, Soz. 3.7, and Amm. 14.10.2, are the major sources for this event. Lib. Or. 59.96, mentioning a sudden journey away from the Persian frontier in mid-winter, may also refer to the trouble at Constantinople. See also Stein-Palanque 135 and Seeck, Geschichte 4:415.
12 Seeck, Regesten 190, relying on Lib. Or. 18.207; CTh 3.12.1, 12.1.33, 12.1.34, 11.36.6.
13 CTh 9.21.5, 9.22.1.
14 CTh 8.1.1 and 12.1.35 of 27 June 343; CTh 15.8.1 of 4 July 343.
15 That this victory took place in 343 can be concluded from its relationship to the Synod of Serdica, held during the autumn of that year (Seeck, Regesten 193, based on Athan. Fest. Ind. 15 and Ap. Const. 4); the Arians separated from that synod on the ground that they felt obliged to celebrate Constantius II's victory. For the title
Adiabenicus see Seeck, Geschichts 4.419 and Piganiol, L'empire chrétien 76: Constantius II held the title by 354 (ILS 732), and, since his main Persian victory occurred in 343, he almost certainly received it in this year. The victory is referred to in Athan. Hist. Ar. 16 and is described in some detail in Lib. Or. 59.83-85.

16 Athan. Hist. Ar. 20.

17 Hieron. Chron. for 344.

18 According to Festus 27, there were two battles near Singara, at the second of which Constantius II was present. Since there is considerable confusion in the sources whether the major engagement there took place in 344 or 348, it is probable that the campaign in 344 also took place near Singara and thereby led to the uncertainty of the sources. For further discussion of this problem see later in this chapter the summary of the events of 348. Trouble on the Persian frontier is also dated to this year by Seeck, Regesten 192, based upon Lib. Or. 18.207.

19 CTh 11.7.5 of 12 May 345.


21 Hieron. Chron. for 346; Seeck, Regesten 194. Nisibis had been besieged for two months in 337 as well: see chapter 2, note 208 on page 157. E. A. Thompson, "Constantine, Constantius II, and the Lower Danube Frontier," Hermes 84 (1956) 372-381, conjectures that in this year or earlier in the 340s the Goths took advantage of Constantius II's preoccupation with the eastern frontier in order to seize all Roman territory north of the lower Danube and to establish themselves in the subsequent treaty as paid federates. The aggression of Sapor drained the resources of Thrace at a time when vigilance was essential there.

22 Athan. Apol. c. Ar. 51, Hist. Ar. 44; Seeck, Regesten 194. It is possible that Constantius II spent at least part of the winter of 346/7 at Constantinople, since he was at Ancyra in Galatia on 8 March 347 (CTh 11.36.8). It is highly unlikely that he would have travelled so far from the Persian border without proceeding to the eastern capital. There may, of course, be an error in the transcription of the code. Constantius II also spent some time at Constantinople in the late summer of 346 if any confidence is to be placed in CTh 11.39.4 of 27 August 346.

23 CTh 5.6.1 of 11 May 347.

24 Seeck, Regesten 194 (based upon Lib. Or. 18.207).

25 The celebration consisted almost solely of the introduction of a new bronze coinage with the legend fel. temp. reparatio. Several

26 The sources for this campaign are unable to agree on the date. Hieron. and Cons. Const. both specify 348, but Jul. Or. 1.26B-C implies that it took place about six years before the death of Constans in 350, that is, in 344, and Theophanes dates it to 343 (A.M. 5835). The confusion doubtless arose from the fact that there were two battles waged near Singara in the 340s; according to Festus 27, Constantius II was present at the second one, so that Festus seems to date the major campaign to 348. Yet Eadie, the editor of Festus, prefers 344, though with considerable hesitation (page 150 of his commentary). Among other moderns, Stein-Palanque 488, note 37, favour 344, while Seeck, Regesten 196 and Geschichte 4.424, Pignoli, L'empire chrétien 76, A. Olivetti, "Osservazioni storiche e cronologiche sulla guerra di Costanzo II contro i Persiani," AAT 50 (1914-1915) 1014-1032, Gigli, La dinastia dei secondi Flavii 17-19, and Sabbah, Amm. Marc. 198, note 178, prefer 348. The date would not be important, but, the later the battle took place, the more it must have related to the revolt in the West in 350. In fact, Sabbah prefers 348 for that very reason. The evidence of Theophanes can be dismissed readily, since that chronicle is notoriously unreliable. The agreement of Hieron. and the Cons. Const., however, is formidable, the latter source in particular proving to be very reliable for this period (when it does err, it misses the mark by no more than one year); besides, neither of these sources was under any political influence regarding this matter. But, of all the sources, Julian's oration, delivered in late 355 or early 356, is the most contemporary; it is an attempt to "whitewash" his cousin Constantius II, whom he hated and feared because of the murder of his kin. It is strange to find such a precise statement as "six years" in a panegyric, and we must ask why Julian should bother to specify the date. The answer may be that he was deliberately confusing the true victory of 344 with the Pyrrhic one of 348 in order to pretend that Constantius II had never suffered a loss. Valesius was so convinced that the dating of Julian was incorrect that he sought to emend the text of Or. 1.26B from Ἐκτον το τρίτον (as noted in Bidez' edition of Julian). This solution to the problem has been convincingly rejected by J. B. Bury, "Date of the Battle of Singara," ByzZ 5 (1896) 302-305. Bury himself argues strongly in favour of 344 as the year for the setback at Singara, but he fails to take into account Festus' mention of two, and possibly three, battles at Singara during the 340s. Because of the confusion of our sources, we can reach no firm conclusion regarding the date of the battle at Singara at which Constantius II's forces suffered a reverse. I have decided in favour of 348, but with hesitation.

27 Amida was in Roman hands by 359 at the latest, and Singara and Bezabde by 360 (Amm. 18.6.17, 20.6.1, 20.7.1).
Other sources referring to the battle at Singara as a disaster include Amm. 18.5.7, Eutr. 10.10.1, and Soc. 2.25. Jul. Or. 1.22D-25B and Lib. Or. 59.99-120 go to great lengths to render the battle a victory for Constantius II. Libanius' oration, delivered in late 348 or early 349, concentrates on this battle more than on anything else. This might be further evidence that the battle took place in 348: Constantius II was desperately trying to refute the rumours regarding the Roman failure before they had a chance to become current.

CTh 12.1.39 of 1 April 349.

CTh 7.22.6 of 2 February 349 deals with the sons of soldiers, who are themselves to serve as such and not on the staffs of provincial governors; CTh 8.4.4, of the same date, is concerned with commissary officers; CTh 12.6.3 of 1 August 349 deals with tax receivers, especially those at Alexandria.

See this chapter, note 22.

CTh 12.2.1 and 15.1.6, both of 3 October 349.

CTh 2.6.5 and 10.15.3, both of 9 April 340. Constans had gone thither from Naissus: CTh 10.10.5.

CTh 11.12.1 of 29 April 340. For the damnatio memoriae, see chapter 2, pages 139-140.

CTh 7.9.1 of 12 August 340. About two months later, Constantius II issued a similar law (CTh 7.9.2).

CTh 8.2.1 and 12.1.31 of 24 June 341.

Hieron. Chron. for 341; Cons. Const. for 341; Soc. 2.10. According to Jerome, the campaign took place vario eventu.

For Savaria see CTh 10.10.6 of 6 April 342 and Lib. Or. 59.133 (καὶ τὸν βασιλέα ..., ἐν ταῖς Παλαισι ἔλεσεν ὑπὲρ τῶν δικτων βουλευότατοι). On the dating of this edict see chapter 2, pages 130-131. For Milan see Athan. Ap. Const. 4.

For Hieron. Chron. for 342; Cons. Const. for 342; Theoph. for 342 (A.M. 5834); Soc. 2.13; Lib. Or. 59.131-133. Two inscriptions from Salona in Dalmatia, ILS 728 and CIL 3.8709, refer to the victoriae Francicae of Constans. Athanasius followed Constans to Gaul at this time: Athan. Ap. Const. 4. It has been surmised (e.g., by Pigniol, L'empire chrétien 78) that Constans allowed the Franks to settle in Toxandria, west of the Rhine, but there is no evidence for this in the passage cited (Lib. Or. 59.127) or even in another that is more pertinent (Lib. Or. 59.135): Libanius says that many tribes fled to
Rome for refuge, but he does not say that they secured their objective. Numismatic evidence for Constans' victory over the Franks is furnished by K. Kraft, "Die Taten der Kaiser Constans und Constantius II," JNG 9 (1958) 141-186, especially 173-175.

41CTh 16.10.2, which lacks a precise date. Theod. 5.20 refers to this law. There is no evidence that any attack other than this legal one was unleashed against the pagans. In this way Constans lost support, for he antagonized the pagans but failed to win over the Christians, who expected legislation, such as the confiscation of pagan property, that would benefit their cause.

42CTh 6.10.1 of 17 December 320. There may have existed an enactment wherein Constantine I prohibited pagan sacrifices; his primary method, however, was to provide incentives for conversion to Christianity. Domestic sacrifices, like any other secret meetings, were prohibited primarily on political grounds, for they could be subversive.

43CTh 16.10.3 of 1 November 342.

44CTh 9.7.3 of 4 December 342.

45CTh 11.16.5, given at Boulogne on 25 January 343. Sources for the British expedition include Lib. Or. 59.137-141, Firm. Mat. Prof. Rel. 29, and Amm. 20.1.1.

46Lib. Or. 59.139 states that Constans put on board only one hundred men.

47Amm. 14.5.6: the notary Paulus was sent to Britain in the autumn of 353 ut militares quosdam perduceret, ausos conspirasse Magnentio.

48Amm. 20.1.1.

49Lib. Or. 59.141.

50Amm. 20.1.1 declares that by 360 the Scots and Picts had broken a peace that had been agreed upon.

51Piganiol, L'empire chrétien 78, relying upon Amm. 28.3.8.

52Cohen #331 (8.313).

53CTh 12.1.36 of 30 June 343.


55CTh 10.10.7 of 15 May 345.
56 CTh 3.5.7 of 9 June or 11 July 345.

57 Piganiol, *L'empire chrétien* 80-81; *PLRE* 524-525. Stein-Palanque 136 date this trouble with the Donatists to 347, two years later.

58 Athan. Ap. Const. 4 refers to a meeting of Constans and Athanasius in Gaul before the bishop's return to Alexandria. See also Piganiol, *L'empire chrétien* 84, note 79.

59 CTh 10.10.8 of 5 March 346.

60 CTh 11.39.4 of 27 August 346; CTh 11.7.7 of 6 December 346.

61 Degrassi 81. The part played by Athanasius in the politics of the period will be discussed presently.


63 Chron. 354, page 68.

64 Rufinus had been praetorian prefect of Italy, Africa, and Illyricum since 344, but now he was left with Illyricum alone; *PLRE* 782.

65 Piganiol, *L'empire chrétien* 79-80, dates the beginning of the reduction of the authority of the urban prefect to CTh 11.30.23 of 2 July 345 (posted, not given, on that day). According to this edict, clarissimi were once again to have the right of appeal against the verdicts of the urban prefect. With reference to the virtual merger of the offices of the praetorian and urban prefectures, Piganiol mentions Hermogenes but neglects to list Ulpius Limenius. M. Fortina, *La legislazione dell' imperatore Costante* (Novara 1955) 17, believes that the edict of 2 July 345 reveals Constans' policy of subordinating the jurisdiction of the praefectus urbi to that of the praefectus praetorio.

66 Ulpius Limenius himself had been proconsul of Constantinople in 342: Lib. Or. 1.45, dated by the reference to the riots in the capital.

67 Chron. 354, pages 68 and 69. For Eustathius, who may have been agens vices praefecti praetorio between the death of Limenius and the appointment of Hermogenes, see *PLRE* 311 and this chapter, page 217.

68 Chron. 354, page 69; *PLRE* 1049.

69 Cons. Const. for 359; Hieron. Chron. for 359; Chron. Pasch. for 359 (giving the date 11 September); Soc. 2.41; Soz. 4.23.

70 CTh 10.14.2 of 17 June 348.
His court was there when the revolt of Magnentius took place on 18 January 350. For the details, see chapter four, page 254.

According to Amm. 30.7.5, the emperor Julian was the only one feared by the Alamanni after the death of Constans.

*CTh* 16.10.2 of 341; *CTh* 2.1.1 of 8 May 349 (the MSS date this edict to 8 March, but the suggestion found in *PLRE* 311 is adopted here).

*CTh* 7.1.3 of 30 May 349.

*CTh* 7.1.4 of 27 June 349 (MSS 350).

*CTh* 9.24.2 of 12 November 349; *CTh* 9.24.1 of 1 April 320 or 326.

*CJ* 6.62.3 of 28 December 349.

*CTh* 5.6.1 of 11 May 347.


Whenever both their names are given, this is always the case. However, the editors of the codes frequently confused the names of the Augusti and Caesars of the period: for example, *CTh* 9.24.2 of 12 November 349 is headed *Imp. Constantius A. ad Tatianum [sic]*, but Titianus was the prefect of Constans, not of Constantius II.

*CTh* 5.6.1 of 11 May 347; *CJ* 6.62.3 of 28 December 349.

There are exceptions to the rule that both Augusti had their names at the beginning of each edict. For example, see *CTh* 9.17.1 addressed by Constantius [sic] to Titianus, the prefect of Rome, and *CTh* 9.24.2, addressed by Constantius [sic] to Tatianus [sic], the prefect of Gaul. Both edicts must have been issued by Constans, and the errors can be attributed to the carelessness of the editors of the codes.


*ILS* 8944.

*CTh* 8.2.1 and 12.1.31; *PLRE* 188.

*Chron.* 354, page 68; *PLRE* 918.
87 ILS 8944: n.m. [q.] eorum semper devotionis[i] indicates clearly that more than one Augustus was involved.

88 ILS 5704; AE (1968) 477.

89 ILS 8808.

90 AE (1913) 171, from Ephesus.

91 ILS 725; ILS 730.


94 PLRE 624–625: Virius Nepotianus himself may have been the son or grandson of the elder Virius Nepotianus, consul in 301.

95 All the Nepotiani listed in PLRE have western backgrounds, and three of them have specific western connexions.

96 Jul. Ep. ad Ath. 271B; Soc. 3.1; Soz. 5.2.

97 Jul. Misop. 352A–C.

98 Soc. 3.1.

99 Soc. 3.1; Lib. Or. 13.10, 18.13. Most scholars, such as PLRE 477, date Julian's removal to Nicomedia to 344. However, there is good reason to date it to the early spring of 342. During the winter of 341/2, there had occurred the riots at Constantinople between the supporters of Paul and Macedonius. These riots had resulted in the death of Hermogenes and a sudden trip by Constantius II to the eastern capital. It is quite possible that Constantius II feared that these riots could lead to the proclamation of Julian as Augustus in the absence of himself on the eastern front. N. H. Baynes, "The Early Life of Julian the Apostate," JHS 45 (1925) 252, believed that Julian was sent to his relative, Bishop Eusebius, at Nicomedia soon after the massacre of 337 and that c. 339 he returned to Constantinople when Eusebius became bishop of that city; Baynes concluded that c. 342 Julian was sent to Macellum from Constantinople, not from Nicomedia.

100 The crisis of religion will be described presently.

101 Jul. Ep. ad Ath. 271B; Amm. 15.2.7; Soz. 5.2. I find it difficult to date the exile of Gallus and Julian to Macellum as early as 342 (Baynes, "The Early Life of Julian the Apostate" 252) or 341 (A. Hadjinicolou, "Macellum, lieu d'exil de l'Empereur Julien," Byzantion 21 [1951] 16), years favoured by C. Head, The Emperor Julian (Boston 1976) 20 and 194. Jul. Ep. ad Ath. 271B–272A specifies that the brothers spent six years at Macellum and that Gallus was summoned
straight from the country to the court before he was made Caesar in 351. My date of 344 is close to that of 345 preferred by Seeck, *Geschichte* 4.433.

102 *Jul. Ep. ad Ath.* 271C-D.

103 *Jul. Ep. ad Ath.* 271D.

104 Constantius II had married a daughter of Julius Constantius in 336 and, even if he had had a son soon after the marriage, that offspring would have been a mere infant when the fate of Gallus and Julian was under discussion. Constantius II's only child was Constantia, a posthumous daughter born in the winter of 361/2 (Amm. 21.15.6).


106 Piganiol, *L'empire chrétien* 82.


108 Soc. 2.8; Soz. 3.5; Athan. *De Syn.* 35.

109 Soc. 2.12; Soz. 3.7; Athan. *Apol. c. Ar.* 36.

110 Soc. 2.12-13; Soz. 3.7; Hieron. *Chron.* for 342; *Cons. Const.* for 342; Athan. *Hist. Aceph.* 2; Athan. *Hist. Ar.* 7; Amm. 14.10.2; Theoph. for 357 (A.M. 5849); Lib. *Or.* 59.95-98. For Alexander see also Lib. *Or.* 1.44-45.

111 CTh 16.2.11 of 26 February 342. He is called Longinianus by the code, but Longinus by Athan. *Fest. Ep.* 13-14 and *Fest. Ind.* 13-15. The edict is dated to 354 by the compilers of the code, but the references in Athanasius determine 342 to be the year.

112 Seeck, *Geschichte* 4.73, states that Maximinus acquired considerable influence over Constans when the latter made Trier his headquarters in 341 and 342.


115 For the date Seeck, *Regesten* 193 and *Geschichte* 4.416-417, and Stein-Palanque 487, note 27, are followed. Athan. *Fest. Ind.* 15 implies that the synod met before September 343, but it took place that autumn, only the summons for it being issued earlier in the year. See also Athan. *Ap. Const.* 4. Soc. 2.20 and Soz. 3.2 dated the synod to 347.

116 For Musonianus and Hesychius see Athan. *Apol. c. Ar.* 36 and *Hist. Ar.* 15. For Philagrius, who as prefect of Egypt had replaced
Athanasius with Gregory in 339, see Athan. Fest. Ind. 15 and Hist. Ar. 18; since he helped the Arians at Philippopolis and Adrianople soon after the synod, it is very likely that he was also present at the synod itself.

117 For the proceedings of the synod see Soc. 2.20 and Soz. 3.11, both of whom date it to 347. See also Athan. Hist. Ar. 15-19 and Apol. c. Ar. 36.


119 Constantius II was at Antioch when he was addressed by the envoys from the synod: Athan. Hist. Ar. 20. Constans invited Athanasius to Aquileia about Easter 344 (Athan. Ap. Const. 4, Fest. Ind. 16), so that it is quite likely that he spent the winter of 343/4 there.

120 Philost. 3.12.

121 Athan. Ap. Const. 2-5. Much later, after the death of Constans, Constantius II was convinced by his court that Athanasius had played some role in the death of Constantine II and that he had excited Constans to enmity against the emperor of the East: Theod. 2.13; Soz. 4.11.

122 Theod. 2.8, who refers to him as Salianus. For his rank and the spelling of his name see PLRE 796.

123 Soc. 2.22-23; Soz. 3.20; Philost. 3.12; Ruf. 1.19.

124 Soc. 2.23; Soz. 3.24. Macedonius was not officially recognized as bishop of Constantinople and therefore Paul's action was correct. However, by returning to Constantinople, Paul forced Constantius II to make a decision that he preferred to postpone. When Constantius II later ordered the eviction of Paul, he gave tacit approval to Macedonius.

125 Soc. 2.16; Soz. 3.9. Since Domitian Leontius was still prefect of the East on 6 July 344, the expulsion of Paul must have occurred after that date: CTh 13.4.3 and A. H. M. Jones, "The Career of Flavius Philippus," Historia 4 (1955) 229.

126 Athan. Ap. Const. 3. For the date see Seeck, Regesten 193.

127 Athan. Fest. Ind. 18.

128 Degrassi 81.

129 Athan. Apol. c. Ar. 51, Ap. Const. 4; Soc. 2.23; Soz. 3.20.
CTh 10.10.8 of 5 March 346 at Sirmium; CTh 11.39.4 of 27 August 346 at Constantinople; CTh 11.7.7 of 6 December 346 at Thessalonica.

Hieron. Chron. for 346.

Soz. 3.20.


See this chapter, page 176.

See this chapter, pages 172-173.

On the dating of the De Errore see PLRE 568.

Vict. Caes. 28.2. For the bronze coins with the legend fel. temp. reparatio see this chapter, page 231, note 25.

CTh 16.2.9 of 11 April 349.

The consuls of 340-350 are listed in Degrassi 80-81.

He had a villa at Bauli (Symm. Ep. 1.1) and had served as vicar of Spain under Crispus Caesar (CIL 2.4107).

He was prefect from at least 27 December 338 to 24 August 340: PLRE 11.

ILS 1240. Of his offices, that farthest east was the governorship of Thrace and Europa, although as comes ordinis primi intra palatium he must have spent some time with Constantine I in the East.

Chron. 354, page 68: from 10 March 337 to 13 January 338.

AE (1934) 158.

He was urban prefect from 18 December 351 to 9 September 352: Chron. 354, page 69.

His priesthoods are listed in ILS 1240.

CTh 11.12.1 of 29 April 340. For his jurisdiction see PLRE 548-549.

He had been a praeses of Lugdunensis Prima (CTh 11.3.1, of uncertain date) and proconsul of Africa (CIL 8.25524).

CTh 8.2.1 and 12.1.31 of 24 June 341. For the jurisdiction of Catullinus see PLRE 188.
Degrassi 79; ILS 1266.

Chron. 354, page 68; ILS 1266; Chastagnol, Les fastes 124-125.

LRE 132, based on CTh 6.4.5-6 of 9 September 340, enactments concerning the expenditures of praetors.

ILS 1231. Placidus' career is described by Chastagnol, Les fastes 124-128.

For the conjectured dates of his offices see PLRE 705.

The tendency is for the Romuli to have African connexions: see PLRE 771-772.

Chron. 354, page 68. He was urban prefect from 26 December 346 to 12 June 347. M. T. W. Arnheim, The Senatorial Aristocracy in the Later Roman Empire (Oxford 1972) 80, describes Placidus as follows: "His career, both civil and religious, is that of a great pagan aristocrat, and his name combines some of the noblest strains of his day."

There is a remote possibility that he is identical with the Romulus who later served as magister equitum of Magnentius (PLRE 771: Romulus 2). But, in view of the diminution in prestige, this is very unlikely.

He was prefect of the East from at least 11 October 340 to 6 July 344: PLRE 502.

E.g., Degrassi 81.

E.g., Seeck, RE 3.714 and RE 1A.1958-1959; PLRE 164 and 798.

CTh 5.6.1 of 11 May 347, dat . . . . Hierapolis . . . ad Bonosum mag. equitum.

Seeck, RE 3.714, referring to Amm. 21.16.1-2. Of. Arn. Bono., found on brick-stamps from Pannonia Superior, need not refer to our "Flavius Bonosus"; this being the case, "Bonosus" need not have had a prominent military career before being named to the consulship. For the evidence, see PLRE 164.

He was comes and magister peditum in 344: PLRE 798.

Two prominent Bonosi and two outstanding Sallustii in PLRE have western origins.
Amantius may be identical with the senator Crepereius Amantius. See PLRE 51.


Athan. *Fest. Ind.* 18.

For Gallus as sister of Rufinus see Amm. 14.11.27; she had died before her husband Julius Constantius married Basilina, the mother of Julian. For Gallus as the mother of Gallus and his elder brother and his sister, the first wife of Constantius II, see Jul. *Ep. ad Ath.* 272D.

For Rufinus as a member of the Neratii see Arnheim, *The Senatorial Aristocracy* 117-118.

ILS 1237.

For the dates and jurisdictions of the prefectures of Rufinus see PLRE 782-783.

CTh 12.1.33.

He is referred to as *exmagistro equitum et peditum* in CTh 11.1.1, dated to 315 by the manuscripts but to 360 by Seeck. This law, issued from Constantinople, is directed to Proclianus, the vicar of Africa (his office being given in CTh 4.13.4 and 11.36.10), and remarks on special exemption from taxation to be granted to his lands; thus it is possible that Eusebius owned estates in Africa. For the rank of *comes* see PLRE 308. His eastern connexions, and therefore offices, are deduced from Constantius II's special interest in his welfare and from his place of birth.

Of all the Eusebii in PLRE, he is the one most likely to have been the parent of such distinguished offspring. It is known that their father was the first consul in the family (Jul. *Or.* 3.107D-109A) and that he was a native of Thessalonica.

He was already dead in early 353 when his daughter Eusebia married Constantius II: Jul. *Or.* 3.110C-D. For the date see Jul. *Or.* 3.109A-B and chapter 4, page 278. Julian's emphasis on Thessalonica in his praise of Eusebia (*Or.* 3.107D, 110B) indicates that she and her mother were born in that city and implies that her father also derived his origin there. Eusebia is identified as the sister of the consuls Eusebius and Hypatius by Amm. 21.6.4 and 29.2.9.


Lib. *Or.* 42.24-25. Since after 15 March 351 Constantius II and his Caesar Gallus decreed that a bronze gilt statue of Philippus be
erected at Chytrae in Cyprus, that has been conjectured to have been his native town (ILS 738).

179 Lib. Or, 42.11. Libanius, however, had little use for eunuchs and notaries at court.

180 For the prefecture of Philippus, see PLRE 696. For the expulsion of Paul see this chapter, pages 195–196. If one judges him by his actions, Philippus was a strong Arian.

181 The final three years of the life of Philippus will be discussed in chapter 4, pages 277–281.

182 On Salia's mission to the East, see Theod. 2.6, which refers to him as Salianus. For his rank, see PLRE 796.

183 Vict. Caes. 28.2.

184 Since Salia's career was a military one, the likelihood of barbarian birth or descent is considerable. One is reminded of the Frank Silvanus, magister peditum in the West c. 353–355 under Constantius II (Amm. 15.5.16).

185 For the other Limenius see PLRE 510.

186 Lib. Or. 1.44-48: these disturbances occurred during the winter of 341/2. Libanius gives a one-sided account, portraying himself as the victim of his enemies and the proconsul. As proconsul of Constantinople, Ulpius Limenius must have been closely associated with the senate of that city and not with the Senate of Rome. For his career see Chastagnol, Les fastes 128–130, who regards him as an easterner.

187 Chron. 354, page 68. For his jurisdiction as praetorian prefect see PLRE 782. For his death see Chastagnol, Les fastes 129.

188 On the nobility of Catullinus see Arnheim, The Senatorial Aristocracy 78-79.

189 CTh 15.1.5 of 27 July 338; CTh 12.1.26 of 1 November 338; CTh 6.22.2 and 12.1.24 of 27 November 338; CTh 11.36.4 of 29 August 339.

190 CTh 8.2.1 and 12.1.31, of 24 June 341, and PLRE 188 for the date and jurisdiction of his praetorian prefecture. For his urban prefecture, from 6 July 342 to 11 April 344, see Chron. 354, page 68.

191 CTh 16.10.3 of 1 November 342.

192 Seeck, RE 2A.1691 and Geschichte 4.427–428. In these articles Seeck reverses the consuls, considering Sergius, not Anicius, to be the earlier one. He conjectures that Sergius was a creature of Constans on the ground that after the death of the Augustus in the
territory of Magnentius his consulate was annulled and entrusted to a Flavius Anicius. But the evidence given in *PLRE* 67 completely reverses this situation, for the evidence for Anicius is before any for Sergius.

193 *CIL* 6.498.

194 For Anicius see *PLRE* 67; for Sergius see *PLRE* 826.

195 *PLRE* 67.

196 *PLRE* 67.

197 For a stemma of the Anicii see *PLRE* 1133.

198 Nigrinianus is called the father of Florentius in Amm. 15.5.12 and 22.3.6. Lib. *Ep.* 113 implies that Florentius, like Libanius, was a native of Antioch. See also *PLRE* 631.

199 Re Acindynus in general see chapter 2, pages 108 and 119, and *PLRE* 11. Re the villa at Bauli see Symm. *Ep.* 1.1.

200 For the dating of the prefecture I follow *PLRE* 502, to which I add *CTh* 9.21.5 and 9.22.1 of 18 February 343 and *CTh* 8.1.1 of 27 June 343. His prefecture lasted at least from 11 October 340 (*CTh* 7.9.2) to 6 July 344 (*CTh* 13.4.3).

201 *ILS* 1234, dedicated in his honour by the *ordo* of Berytus.

202 The first recorded act of Philippus as prefect was his expulsion of Paul from Constantinople; this act can be dated at any time from late 344 (pages 195 and 196 of this chapter) to the autumn of 346, the date preferred by A. H. M. Jones, "The Career of Flavius Philippus," *Historia* 4 (1955) 229; but the editors of *PLRE* 696 prefer late 344. If Philippus was not the immediate successor of Leontius, Maiorinus may have held the office for a year or so (*PLRE* 537-538).

203 For the career of Philippus after 350 see chapter 4, pages 277-281.

204 Lib. *Or.* 42.24.

205 See this chapter, pages 205-207 and 243, note 183.

206 Lib. *Or.* 42.11.

207 For the identity of the last praetorian prefect of Constantine II see chapter 2, pages 138-139.

208 *Chron.* 354, page 68.
The earliest reference to his prefecture is ILS 8944, dated before the summer of 341 (PLRE 918). The last reference is CTh 9.24.2 of 12 November 349. Hieron. Chron. for 345 defines his prefecture as that of Gaul. Titianus was urban prefect under Magnentius on 27 February 350: Chron. 354, page 69.

On the nobility of Titianus see Arnheim, The Senatorial Aristocracy 82. He served as quindecimvir saoris faciundis (ILS 8983, dated to his second urban prefecture).

Degrassi 80.

Hieron. Chron. for 345.

For further details on this problem see chapter 2, page 116.

For his noble birth see CIL 8.25524. For the theory that he may have been a native of Greece see PLRE 545.

CTh 11.12.1 of 29 April 340, addressed to Marcellinus and referring to Constantine II as publicus ac noster inimicus.

Catullinus is first recorded as praetorian prefect in CTh 8.2.1 and 12.1.31, both of 24 June 341. The likelihood is that he held this post until shortly before his appointment to the urban prefecture on 6 July 342. For the career of Catullinus see Chastagnol, Les fastes 121-123.

For his noble lineage see Arnheim, The Senatorial Aristocracy 79. For his paganism see CIL 2.2635 (a dedication to Jupiter) and CTh 16.10.3 of 1 November 342 (allowing the preservation of temples at Rome).

He was urban prefect from 6 July 342 to 11 April 344: Chron. 354, page 68.

Arnheim, The Senatorial Aristocracy 80: "His career, both civil and religious, is that of a great pagan aristocrat, and his name combines some of the noblest strains of his day." Placidus probably succeeded Catullinus no later than 6 July 342 and remained in office at least as late as 28 May 344: PLRE 705.

Placidus was urban prefect from 26 December 346 to 12 June 347: Chron. 354, page 68.

He served as pontifex major: ILS 1237. For the nobility of Rufinus see Arnheim, The Senatorial Aristocracy 118. For the office of comes see CTh 12.1.33 of 5 April 342.

For the division of the central prefecture see PLRE 782. Ulpius Limenius replaced Rufinus in Italy and Africa on 12 June 347: Chron. 354, page 68.
Another possible motive for this administrative change may have been an agreement between the Augusti to equalize the status of Rome and Constantinople. This move must have been unpopular with the senatorial aristocracy. For this theory see also this chapter, page 178.

Chron. 354, page 68. For his career see Chastagnol, Les fastes 128-130.

Lib. Or. 1.45. See this chapter, pages 207-208.

Chron. 354, page 68; PLRE 510. An interregnum indicates an unexpected event, catching the emperor by surprise, for he normally decided upon the replacement before removing the former appointee from office.

For this conjecture see PLRE 311. Regarding Eustathius and Athanasius see Philost. 3.12.

Hermogenes served from 19 May 349 to 27 February 350: Chron. 354, pages 68 and 69.

He may be identical with two other eastern administrators of the same name: PLRE 423-425. For his identity and career see Chastagnol, Les fastes 130.

They are so regarded by Arnheim, The Senatorial Aristocracy 76.

Degrassi 80. He was urban prefect from 25 October 339 to 25 February 341, except for the period 5 May - 10 June 340, when he was absent from the city and at the court of Constans and was therefore replaced by the vicarius Junius Tertullus: Chron. 354, page 68. For the career of Titianus see Chastagnol, Les fastes 107-111.

For Titianus as praetorian prefect see this chapter, pages 213-214.

He was urban prefect a second time from 27 February 350 to 1 March 351: Chron. 354, page 69.

For the sentiment that it is preferable to engage in public affairs if there is any hope of accomplishing some good see Seneca De Otio 3.2-5. Once the salutary influence of Seneca and Burrus had been removed, the government of Nero worsened.

For the conjecture that Celsinus and Titianus were relatives see PLRE 192, where his proconsulate is also discussed. Celsinus was urban prefect from 25 February 341 to 1 April 342: Chron. 354, page 68. For his career see Chastagnol, Les fastes 112-114.

He was urban prefect a second time from 1 March 351 to 12 May 351: *Chron.* 354, page 69.

Proculus was urban prefect for the first time from 10 March 337 to 13 January 338: *Chron.* 354, page 68. For his career see Chastagnol, *Les fastes* 96-102.

He was urban prefect a second time from 18 December 351 to 9 September 352: *Chron.* 354, page 69.

Lollianus was urban prefect from 1 April 342 to 6 July 342: *Chron.* 354, page 68. For his career see Chastagnol, *Les fastes* 114-121.

*ILS* 1232 and *PLRE* 513. Since all the other offices in this inscription were held under Constans and Constantius II, and since the inscription itself dates to the sole reign of Constantius II, it is highly unlikely that this office would have been held under Magnentius.

Degrassi 82. For this prefecture see *PLRE* 513.

See this chapter, page 215.

Catullinus was urban prefect from 6 July 342 to 11 April 344: *Chron.* 354, page 68. For his career see Chastagnol, *Les fastes* 121-123.

Degrassi 81.

Rusticus served from 11 April 344 to 5 July 345: *Chron.* 354, page 68. For his career see Chastagnol, *Les fastes* 123-124.

*CTh* 11.30.23, posted at Rome on 2 July 345.

Probinus served from 5 July 345 to 26 December 346: *Chron.* 354, page 68.

Chastagnol, *La préfecture urbaine* 416 and *Les fastes* 124-125, is of the opinion that Probinus was a Christian. There is evidence that his son, Sextus Claudius Petronius Probus, was a Christian (*PLRE* 739), but this does not ensure that Probinus himself was one.

For his praetorian prefecture see this chapter, page 215.

Placidus served from 26 December 346 to 12 June 347: *Chron.* 354, page 68. For his career see Chastagnol, *Les fastes* 125-128.

The alienation of Constans and the senatorial aristocracy is also discussed by Chastagnol, *La préfecture urbaine* 416-417.
He was related by marriage to Aristophanes of Corinth: Lib. Or. 14.5, 14.10. Most of the Eugenii in PLRE have definite Greek connexions.

Athan. Ap. Const. 3. For the conjecture that he was magister admissionum at the time, see PLRE 292. This passage refers to the meeting of Athanasius with Constans at Aquileia in 345, not to their earlier meeting at Milan in 342 as conjectured by PLRE 292: Seeck, Regesten 193.

There is a strong possibility that these two honours were conferred upon him by Constantius II in c. 357-360.

This passage, Athan. Ap. Const. 3, has been misconstrued by as recent a publication as PLRE 292. Athanasius composed his Apologia ad Constantium in its present form in 357, although the early chapters may date as early as 353: Jan-M. Szymusiak in his edition of Athanasius' Apologies, page 55. It is clear that when he wrote it Eugenius was still alive and that, therefore, he outlived Constans. This being the case, the titles ex praefecto praetorio and consuli ordinario designato were probably granted to him just before his death by Constantius II, not by Constans.

ILS 1244 refers to a statua... quam ante sub divo Constante vitae et fidelissimae devotionis gratia meruit.

ILS 1244 refers to the decree of Constantius II and Julian that the statue be restored. It is important to note that this inscription is not the original dedication of Constans and that some of the offices upon it could date as late as 360, although the restoration is more likely to have been ordered by Constantius II when he visited Rome in 357.

For his rank of magister officiorum see Zos. 2.43.4.

Zos. 2.42.2: τῷ τοῦ τιμιείου προεστηκέτι. I adopt the Latin translation found in PLRE 546. Marcellinus may, however, have been the comes sacrarum largitionum. See R. T. Ridley, "The Fourth and Fifth Century Civil and Military Hierarchy in Zosimus," Byzantion 40 (1970) 92, note 2.

Anonymi Narrationes Breves Chronographiae 42.

For Eutherius and Constans see Amm. 16.7.5. For the conjecture that he was a *cubicularius* of Constans see *PLRE* 1068.

For Eutherius as the *praepositus cubiculi* of Julian see Amm. 16.7.2.

Zon. 13.6.13A; Zos. 2.42.2; *PLRE* 532.

For Vetranio as *magister peditum* of Constans: Jul. *Or.* 1.26C, 33A; Vict. *Caes.* 41.26; Vict. *Epit.* 41.25; Zos. 2.43.1; Joh. Ant. fr. 173; Zon. 13.7.15C.

Amm. 31.11.3.

Amm. 30.7.2-3.


This legend in the coinage and, by consequence, the anniversary of the founding of Rome, were often dated to 346, largely on the assumption that the Romans tended to commence their celebrations early. This view was held by J. P. C. Kent when he assisted in the composition of the *LRBC*, but a further analysis caused him to support instead H. B. Mattingly's view that the coins and the anniversary first dated to 348. For Kent's detailed argument see his article, "Fel. Temp. Reparatio," *NC* 7 (1967) 83-90.

Especially Lib. *Or.* 59.10-47.

Especially Lib. *Or.* 59.71-93, 99-120.

Singara is covered in Lib. *Or.* 59.99-120.


For the Frankish campaign see Lib. *Or.* 59.127-136; for the British campaign see Lib. *Or.* 59.137-141.

Lib. *Or.* 59.144-149.

Lib. *Or.* 59.152.


Lib. *Or.* 59.169-172. In section 170, Libanius contrasts the imperial unity of his own day with the great stress of an earlier time between East and West. He probably has in mind the two civil wars between Constantine I and Licinius.
CHAPTER FOUR

THE DEATH OF CONSTANS AND
THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST MAGNENTIUS

(1) The Revolt of Magnentius

Almost imperceptibly over the last years of his reign Constans had been alienating enough influential citizens in his half of the Empire so that, when Constantius II suffered a reverse near Singara and remained hard-pressed on the eastern front, plots were hatched in order to encompass his downfall. The common literary tradition, even of the Christian authors, states that Constans was overthrown because the soldiers were disgusted by his homosexual affairs with certain barbarian captives whom he kept about his court. Their implication is that he had virtually abandoned military affairs in order to spend most of his time in hunting and other pursuits with these catamites. There may be some truth behind this tradition. One would expect it from the pagan sources, but it is found even in the Orthodox Christian sources, who must have found it a bitter pill to swallow, for Constans was a strong supporter of their cause. The tradition of Constans' perversion is further substantiated by the fact that he remained betrothed to Olympias, the daughter of the late praetorian prefect Ablabius, but never married her. She survived the slaughter of her fiancé and escaped to the East, where she was married off by Constantius II to Arsaces III, king of
Armenia, at some time between 354 and 358. 3

It is likely that the soldiers were upset far more by Constans' lack of initiative in obtaining an heir than by his morals. Constantius II, on the other hand, had at least consummated his marriage with the daughter of Julius Constantius and, although they did not yet have children, there was at least hope. 4 There can be no doubt that the authority of Constantine I had been greatly enhanced by his own progeny. Constans, on the other hand, seemed to have little concern for the future. The soldiers must also have been dissatisfied with Constans' military performance in recent years. From 341 to 343 especially he had been very active in securing the frontiers but, now that peace reigned in the West, his main concern had turned from defence to discipline. In this way Constans continued to win the respect of the barbarians while alienating his own soldiers. In the earlier part of his reign Constans had published an edict prohibiting sacrifices and, although he had moderated his position somewhat thereafter, there must have been many pagans in both the army and the Senate who would have preferred a less bigoted administrator on the western throne. Nor can his sponsorship of the return of Athanasius to Alexandria have appealed to the Arians in the West such as Valens, bishop of Mursa. But one of Constans' most serious mistakes was the alienation of many members of the senatorial aristocracy, which was far stronger in the West than in the East. Some regarded his religious attitude as far more narrow-minded than his father's and as a definite threat to their own beliefs and traditions, but most of them must have felt insulted by the appointment of the easterners Ulpius Limenius and Hermogenes to the
urban prefecture of Rome, an office held heretofore almost exclusively by members of the great noble families. By displeasing both the civilian and military authorities Constans ensured their mutual co-operation.\(^5\) Constantine I had, for the most part, separated the civil and military functions in an effort to lessen the chances of usurpation. Most notably, the praetorian prefects no longer served in a military capacity. But he had not totally eliminated the possibility of collusion between the civil and military authorities. It was this collusion that was to prove Constans' downfall.

The death of Constans and the resulting civil war between Constantius II and Magnentius are, unlike the affairs of the preceding decade, well-described by several authorities, in particular Zosimus and Zonaras,\(^6\) although our most reliable source, the history of Ammianus Marcellinus, is extant only for the period immediately following these events. We have no way of knowing how long ago the plot against Constans had been formed, but it was remarkable for its success. Among those who took part were a certain Chrestius,\(^7\) who may have been a general in Gaul, Fabius Titianus, the praetorian prefect of Gaul and the leader of the senatorial faction opposed to Constans,\(^8\) and Marcellinus, the \textit{comes rei privatae} of Constans.\(^9\) The success of the revolt was, above all, due to the close co-operation of these representatives of the three fundamental branches of the government and to the canny use that they made of the discontent of the soldiers in Gaul. Their candidate for the new emperor of the West was Flavius Magnus Magnentius, the commander of the palatine legions called the Joviani and Herculiani.\(^10\) Magnentius was, at the age of forty-seven, at the prime of his life. He
had been born at Ambianum about 303 of a British father and a Frankish mother; because his mother had lacked the *ius conubii*, Magnentius had not been considered a full Roman citizen but rather a Laetus, that is, a descendant of the barbarians from the area east of the Rhine who had been granted territory in the *agri deserti* of Gaul. Magnentius owed his early advancement to Constantine I, who saw in him a promising soldier. In order to secure promotion, Magnentius had undertaken a Latin education. It is virtually certain that, after the death of Constantine I, he had served the eldest son, Constantine II, in Gaul or Illyricum and that, after the death of the latter, he had perforce given his allegiance to Constans. If Magnentius felt any deep regret at the triumph of Constans, he never dared to give voice to it. His promotion in the army continued apace, and he served first as a *protector* and finally, at the time when he was chosen by the conspirators, as a *comes* in command of the Joviani and Herculiani, both palatine legions whose very names betray the continuing dominance of paganism in the army. Magnentius himself was probably a pagan, although he was to use Christian symbols on his coins. His policy was one of complete religious toleration, and thereby he was able to appeal to most elements of the Senate and the army. The Senate would, no doubt, have preferred as its candidate one of its own members; Fabius Titianus was an obvious candidate because of not only his birth but also his administrative experience, but the revolt, though supported by a large segment of the Senate, was basically military, as became manifest as soon as it took place.

Although Magnentius was the candidate, the coup itself was
engineered by the *comes rei privatae* Marcellinus, who invited many of his fellow administrators, including Magnentius and almost certainly Titianus, to the celebration of his son's birthday. Constans must have been invited, but did not attend for, though it was the middle of winter, he had departed from the winter-quarters of the court at Augustodunum in order to take part in a hunting-expedition with a few boon companions. On the appointed day, 18 January 350, the party was prolonged far into the night. At this point, Magnentius excused himself and left the main chamber on the pretext of relieving himself. But, when he returned, he appeared as if on stage, clad in the imperial robes. The conspirators, taking advantage of the element of surprise and the intoxication of the other guests, hailed Magnentius as Augustus. Whether any intimidation by the guards was necessary we do not know, but the final result was that Magnentius was acknowledged as emperor by the entire court present at Augustodunum. Zosimus, our main source for this event, describes the consequences as follows:

Τὸν δὲ περὶ τὸ δείπνον ἀνείπόντων αὐτὸν βασιλέα, πάντες ὀμοίως δόσι τὴν πόλιν Ἀδριανούπολιν ἱκουν (ἐν αὐτῇ γὰρ ταῦτα ἐπράξθη) τῆς αὐτῆς ἐγκύνητο γνώμης ἐπεὶ δὲ ἡ φήμη καὶ περαιτέρω διέτρεχεν, δὲ ἐκ τῶν ἀγρῶν ἥχλοι εἷς ἑστὶ συνέρρει τῆς πολέως ἐν τοῖς δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἐν Ἰλλυρίων ἱππέων εἰς ἀναπληρώσιν τῶν ἕν Κελτίων ταχύτατων ἀποσταλέντες ἀνεμίγγαν τοῖς ἐπὶ ταῦτῃ τῇ πράξει συνειλεγένοις. Καὶ ἀπλὰς εἰπεῖν ὀμίλου στρατιωτικοῦ παντὸς οἱ προσθέτες ἐἰς ἐν συνελθόντες, ἐπειδὴ τῶς ἀρχηγοῦς τῆς συνωμοσίας ἐκβολήσαντας εἶδον, οὐκ εἰδότες σχεδὸν τὸ πραττόμενον, ἐπεβόων ἀπαντεῖς, Σεβαστὸν ἀνακαλοῦντες
The proclamation of Magnentius is remarkable not only for its sudden, almost spontaneous, success in the region of Augustodunum but also for Constans' reaction to it, for he was probably only a few kilometres away from that city. One would expect him to have proceeded posthaste to Trier or some other large military headquarters in order to gather a force before the news of Magnentius' proclamation could arrive there. Rather, he fled with his companions in the opposite direction towards Spain, where he could anticipate little military aid. Meanwhile, Magnentius had dispatched Gaiso, whom he may have appointed as his magister militum, along with a picked band in order to apprehend Constans. Gaiso soon caught up with Constans at Helena, a little town just north of the Pyrenees and close to the Mediterranean, and there the youngest son of Constantine I was put to death.

What is most remarkable about the assassination of Constans is the suddenness of his decline from absolute supremacy in the West to abject flight. We wonder why he fled towards Spain and what, if anything, he hoped to accomplish there. There can be only one reason for his failure to enlist the aid of the troops along the Rhine, and that is his conclusion that he no longer enjoyed their confidence. This he was able to deduce from the enthusiastic reception met by Magnentius at Augustodunum and the support given to the military by the financial and judicial wings of the government, represented by Marcellinus and Titianus respectively. In picking Magnentius, the conspirators made it clear that they wanted a great general to be their emperor, and that they regarded Constans' recent activity as inadequate. But the primary
cause for the revolt against Constans was revealed by its location, for
the prefecture of Gaul had never forgiven Constans for his
insubordination and his conflict with Constantine II. The sudden
death of the latter had left the troops there unprepared to oppose
Constans, and his swift action in dealing with the Franks and the unrest
in Britain, coupled with the dynastic loyalty to the house of
Constantine I, had prevented any revolt against his authority. Illyricum
did not revolt partly because Constans had been more active there and
partly because that area was too close to the territory of Constantius
II, who might have sent considerable aid to his younger brother in
spite of the pressures on the eastern frontier. But Gaul was far from
Constantius II's sphere of influence and was also the headquarters of
the faction that had served under Constantine II, both as Caesar and as
Augustus, for a number of years.

It is unlikely that Constans was heading for Italy, largely
because there were few troops there to support him if Magnentius should
send a large force across the Alps. Also, his opponents in the
senatorial aristocracy might already have overwhelmed the faction that
supported him, and in any case it would have been very risky to under-
take a lengthy sea-voyage in mid-winter. It is far more likely that
Constans had given up all hope of an effective resistance to
Magnetius and planned to flee to the court of Constantius II by way of
North Africa and Egypt. Gaiso, however, proved too fast for him and put
him to death at Helena, probably only a few days after the proclamation
of Magnentius.

The power of Magnentius spread rapidly throughout the West.
Instead of wasting his time with the pursuit of Constans, he had entrusted Gaiso with that task, and had himself set out for Trier, the most strategic city in the West, where he gained control of the mint, probably before the end of January. By 27 February he had taken possession of Rome, this time by means of envoys. At what time he gained effective control of Africa we cannot say, but it was probably not later than the end of March. Magnentius' main concern was with Illyricum, and so during February he advanced from Trier to Aquileia, but by the time he reached that city he was too late to add that all-important prefecture to his holdings.

As Magnentius' control of the West was consolidated, there remained the problem of the attitude to be adopted toward the late Constans and the living Constantius II. Since Constans himself had been the primary reason for the revolt in the West, his damnatio memoriae was assured. However, because Magnentius' main concern was defence against Constantius II and also because his reign was short in any case, the erasure of Constans' name from inscriptions was far from thorough. Of thirty-four inscriptions of Constans found in the area controlled by Magnentius, only ten suffered the erasure of his name. Of these ten, two were altered by the insertion of Magnentius' name in the place of that of Constans. Stones bearing the mutilated name of Constans have been discovered almost solely in the prefecture of Italy and Africa, an area in which he supposedly enjoyed great support, and not in Gaul or Britain, where one would most expect to find them. This is as much an accident of preservation as anything else, but it does show clearly how seriously Constans' popularity had waned. The haphazard nature of the
damnatio memoriae is illustrated at Celeia in Noricum, the easternmost location where it can be found; here a more recent inscription, dedicated to Constans as an Augustus, was left unscathed whereas in an earlier one, dedicated to him when he was still a Caesar, his name was thoroughly mutilated.

Although Constantius II had aided and abetted Constans in the damnatio memoriae of Constantine II, he could not bring himself to co-operate with the usurper, no matter how much he and Constans had quarrelled over Athanasius; therefore we find no traces of the damnatio memoriae of Constans in the prefecture of the East. Nor are there any traces of it in the prefecture of Illyricum except for the far western part dominated by Magnentius for a brief time in 351. Several years later, when Constantius II and his Caesar Julian repaired the statue of Flavius Eugenius, Constans' magister officiorum, in the Forum of Trajan at Rome, they also rehabilitated the memory of Constans, referring to him as divus. Although Magnentius treated the memory of Constans without mercy, he did not venture to erase the name of Constantius II from the inscriptions. Even when the names of both brothers were on an inscription, only Constans, and not Constantius II, was obliterated. In two African inscriptions Constans was replaced by Magnentius but Constantius II remained unscathed. At some time in the latter half of 350 the administration of Magnentius proved itself so eager to come to an agreement with Constantius II that it even authorized in Africa an inscription dedicated to the most blessed times of our lords Flavius Julius Constantius and Magnus Magnentius and Magnus Decentius (by the late summer of 350 the Caesar of Magnentius). Thus Magnentius even
went so far as to grant the prior position to Constantius II, but later, after the defeat and death of the usurper, Constantius II was not to reveal the same benevolence; rather, he had the names of Magnentius and Decentius obliterated from the stone.

Magnentius expressed his willingness to reach an accommodation with Constantius II on his coins as well. Although the minting of the coins of Constans was ended as soon as the forces of the usurper gained control of the mints, nevertheless Magnentius continued to mint coins in honour of Constantius II at Arelate, Aquileia, and Rome until at least the middle of 350, when Constantius II showed no sign of co-operation. For in the East Constantius II, still busy with the Persian war, struck no coins in honour of Magnentius. In conclusion, the epigraphic and numismatic evidence makes it quite clear that the revolt in the West was not an attempt by the conspirators there to gain control of the entire Empire but rather an attempt to eliminate only Constans, in whom many had lost their confidence. However, Constantius II soon indicated that he intended to avenge his brother.

On his coins Magnentius continued the standard legend of Fel. Temp. Reparatio but also minted coins whose legends were designed to proclaim the great hope that now belonged to the West. These legends included Liberator Reipublicae, Renobatio [sic] Urbis Romae, and Restitutor Libertatis. His efforts to improve the defences of the Rhine were celebrated by the legend Triumphator Gentium Barbarum. Somewhat similar sentiments can be found on certain of his inscriptions, wherein he delighted to be referred to as liberator orbis Romani, restitutor libertatis et rei publicae, and conservator militum et
The implication is that Constans had become an overbearing tyrant in his last few years and that Magnentius was but the leader of a popular uprising against an oppressive administration. The mention of liberty and the republic reflects the dissatisfaction of the senatorial aristocracy with Constans; the references to the soldiers and provincials reflect the soldiers' distaste for unrewarded strict discipline and the heavy burden of taxation on the people as a whole.

One might well ask why a similar revolt had not broken out against Constantius II in the East. Several reasons come to mind. For one thing, the senatorial aristocracy was not as influential or powerful there; in any case, the grievance of that class was against Constans alone. The soldiers of the East might also have undergone severe discipline but at least the Persian incursions were a good reason for it and there was always the possibility of acquiring booty from the troops of Sapor as they retreated in the autumn (not to mention the greater temptation of robbing their fellow citizens when the opportunity presented itself). In the West, on the other hand, there was strict discipline but little to show for it, since the frontiers had been reasonably quiet since the British campaign of 342/3. Because of the almost constant Persian harassment in the East the burden of taxation must have been, if anything, greater than it was in the West, but the provincials in the East not only were more accustomed to such oppression but also realized that their contributions were all that stood between them and a bloody Persian sweep of the East. In short, the constant threat in the East tended to unite the population there behind Constantius II, but in the West several years of peace had given
men a chance to contemplate internal reforms. Yet not even there was the entire population ready to desert the Second Flavian dynasty.

(2) The Revolt of Vetranio

Magnentius, after his proclamation, was careful to secure thorough control over Britain, Gaul, and Spain before proceeding towards the Balkans. Proof of his dilatory nature is the fact that Fabius Titianus, one of his chief supporters, did not become urban prefect of Rome until 27 February 350, forty days after the original proclamation at Augustodunum. By this time Magnentius himself had arrived at Aquileia, but the news of his revolt had already arrived at the eastern court. Before Magnentius had the opportunity to enter the Balkans, he was informed that a certain Vetranio had been declared Augustus at Mursa on 1 March 350. This Vetranio was already an older man, and had held the post of magister peditum under Constans for several years before his troops declared him their emperor. It was his revolt that was to weaken Magnentius and strengthen Constantius II to such an extent that Constantius II would emerge victorious from the inevitable contest, for, had Magnentius acquired the military might of the Illyrian legions, his forces might have overwhelmed those that Constantius II was able to bring from the eastern front. The proclamation of Vetranio illustrates the hold that the Second Flavian dynasty still held on the people even though the support of Constans himself may have dissipated over recent years. Yet even here the antagonism against Constans must have been less than it was in Gaul if only because he had passed through that area early in 334 only a short time after he had been made Caesar. On the
other hand, he had not visited Gaul until his troops had ambushed and eliminated Constantine II. But Illyricum had an even better reason for failing to side with Magnentius, and that was the proximity of Constantius II, who spent the winter of 349/350 at Constantinople between his campaigns on the eastern front. When the news of the death of Constans reached his ears, Constantius II had to decide whether to summon many of his forces from the eastern front and with them march immediately against the usurper in the hope of a quick victory or to entrust Illyricum to a man of proven loyalty and set out for the East in the hope that he might be able to eliminate the Persian threat there. It is to Constantius II's credit that he chose the second alternative, putting the defence of the Empire before any personal grudge. While he set out for the East, his sister Constantina and Vulcaciuss Rufinus, the praetorian prefect of Constans in Illyricum, headed west and crowned Vetranio Augustus there.

From Constantius II's point of view Vetranio was an ideal choice. His long military experience on the Danube had endeared him to the troops there so that there was little chance that they would betray him to Magnentius. Also, his advanced years were a guarantee that his abdication could be readily obtained without any danger to himself or to Constantius II. In securing the proclamation of Vetranio, Constantius II was greatly indebted to Constantina and Vulcaciuss Rufinus. Constantina, the eldest daughter of Constantine I, had been married to the ill-fated Hannibalianus and had probably lived at the court at Constantinople since his death; her support for her blood-relation Constantius II is self-evident. However, the support of Vulcaciuss
Rufinus for the Second Flavian dynasty comes as a surprise, for he had suffered more than anyone else by the division of the great central prefecture in 347; from the position of sole prefect of Italy, Africa, and Illyricum, he had been left with only Illyricum when the eastern upstart Ulpius Limenius was made joint urban prefect and praetorian prefect of Italy and Africa soon after the reconciliation of the two imperial brothers. It may have been his earlier position as *comes* of the East in 342 that persuaded Rufinus to support Constantius II in preference to Magnentius by promoting the candidature of Vetranio and serving the latter in place of Constans as praetorian prefect of Illyricum. Then again, his relationship to the Flavian household may have been the main determining factor in his decision to repudiate Magnentius. We remain ignorant regarding the other officials of Vetranio with the exception of Gomoarius, his *tribunus scholae Scutariorum*, who was later to betray his master and to serve Constantius II in Gaul.

I have found no inscription that may have referred to Vetranio. Since in practice he was acting on behalf of the Flavian family, Vetranio did not erase Constans' name and replace it with his own as Magnentius had done. Rather, no inscriptions of Constans were damaged in Illyricum and, therefore, Vetranio did not indulge in the *damnatio memoriae* of his late emperor. With regard to the coins, however, Vetranio followed a policy similar to that of Magnentius. At both mints under his control, namely Siscia and Thessalonica, coins were minted in honour of Constantius II as well as of Vetranio himself. The relations between Vetranio and Magnentius on the one hand and
Constantius II on the other were far better in some ways than between the two usurpers themselves. Constantius II, however, steadfastly refused to recognize either western usurper publicly, even though he himself had been instrumental in choosing Vetranio. Therefore it is clear that, whereas Magnentius was content with the West and Vetranio with his role as a temporary expedient, Constantius II would be content with nothing less than the recovery of the entire Empire.

(3) The Officials of Magnentius

At some time during 350 Magnentius turned to the problem of the consulship. Its value for publicity was not to be denied him and, as was common during times of stress, he nominated himself to the consulship for 351. He chose as his colleague Gaiso, who served as one of his chief commanders and had been responsible for killing Constans. It is somewhat surprising that Magnentius did not choose one of the senatorial aristocrats as a colleague, for this action would have done much to reconcile to him the senatorial order as a whole, from which he now had but partial support. Constantius II, of course, refused to recognize the choices of the usurper; being too busy with the Persian war, he contented himself by referring to 351 as the year after the consulship of Sergius and Nigrinianus. To the consulship of 352 Magnentius nominated his own brother Decentius, whom he had since made a Caesar, and Paulus, a partisan who is otherwise unknown. Constantius II countered this by making himself consul for the fifth time and his cousin Gallus, since made Caesar, consul for the first time. The last consuls nominated by Magnentius were those for 353. At that time, with
his fortunes ebbing fast, he nominated both himself and Decentius for the second time. Once again, Constantius II reacted, this time making himself consul for the sixth time and Gallus consul for the second time. In short, during the civil war both combatants used the consulship to publicize themselves rather than to reward their supporters. Gaiso and Paulus, both appointed by Magnentius, were exceptions to this rule.

With regard to the praetorian prefecture and the urban prefecture Magnentius returned to the system in use before Constans decided to split the central prefecture and to unite that of Italy and Africa with the urban prefecture in the person of a single officer. At first Fabius Titianus served as praetorian prefect in Gaul but, when he was sent forth to undertake the urban prefecture of Rome on 27 February 350, he was replaced by another senator, Nunechius by name. However, Nunechius did not hold the post for long, for later in the year he was sent as an envoy to the East and arrested by Constantius II. We do not know the identity of his successor. Because of the action of Vetranio, Magnentius was unable to reunite the central prefecture, but he did appoint a separate praetorian prefect for Italy and Africa. His first appointee, Anicetus, was sent to Rome but soon perished there in an uprising. Anicetus was probably a senator. Once again, we have no information regarding his successor.

When we turn to the urban prefecture we are on much firmer ground. On 27 February 350 Hermogenes, the appointee of Constans, was replaced by one of the most flexible characters of the period, Fabius Titianus, whose conduct was governed by expediency. Honoured with the
consulship by Constantine I and with the urban prefecture by
Constantine II, he had convinced Constans of his loyalty and had served
him, first as urban prefect and, for the better part of nine years, as
prefect of Gaul. Highly instrumental in the overthrow of Constans and
in winning over to the side of the usurper many of the senatorial class,
Titianus served as urban prefect for just over a year, until 1 March
351. Not much later Magnentius was to send him as an envoy to
Constantius II.58

Titianus' successor as urban prefect, Aurelius Celsinus, held
the post for only a short time, until 12 May 351.59 He, too, had
served as urban prefect before and, on that occasion as well, had
succeeded the same Titianus. This coincidence has led to the conjecture
that Titianus and Celsinus were related.60 We know of no position held
by Celsinus between his first and second prefectures, so that it is
quite possible that he had fallen out of favour at the court of Constans
in the meantime.

For his next two urban prefects Magnentius turned to men who
had not held the office before. Celius Probatus served as urban prefect
for less than a month, from 12 May to 7 June 351; unfortunately, nothing
else is known about him.61 His successor, Clodius Celsinus Adelphius,
was, like all the urban prefects of Magnentius, a Roman noble.62 He had
already served as corrector and proconsul before being named urban
prefect.63 It was Celsinus' misfortune to be serving as urban prefect
when Magnentius lost the disastrous battle at Mursa in Pannonia on 28
September 351. Subsequently he was accused by Dorus, a former doctor of
the targeteers and at this time centurion in charge of the works of art
The doubt surrounding Celsinus convinced Magnentius that he should once again put his trust in an experienced administrator, and so on 18 December 351 he appointed as urban prefect Lucius Aradius Valerius Proculus Populonius. Proculus, a strong pagan and a prominent Roman aristocrat, had held several governorships under Constantine I and had also served him as *comes ordinis primi intra palatium*. Constantine I had capped this distinguished career by ordering a statue to be set up in the Forum of Trajan in his honour and by making him urban prefect on 10 March 337. After the death of the elder Constantine, Proculus remained as the urban prefect of Constantine II until 13 January 338. It was to Constantine II that he owed the supreme honour, that is, the consulship of 340. We have no record of any office that he may have held under Constans. This is not surprising, however, since the consulship usually marked retirement from at Rome, of aiming at a higher station. The charge was a plausible one, for at the time Magnentius had to retreat hurriedly to Aquileia, but we have no means of knowing whether there was any truth behind the accusation. Celsinus might have been aiming at the purple for himself or he might have been engaging in secret negotiations with Constantius II, the victor at Mursa. The latter alternative is quite possible, for, after the final defeat of Magnentius, Celsinus' wife, the poetess Proba, composed an epic poem on the civil war in which praise was heaped upon the conqueror, Constantius II. The continued good fortune of his wife and sons renders it far more likely that Celsinus merely fell into political obscurity and did not suffer unduly at the hands of either Magnentius or Constantius II.
public life. Proculus must have supported Magnentius because of his disgust with Constans' attitude towards the urban prefecture, and we can be sure that he was already of an advanced age when he served the usurper as urban prefect. The ultimate fate of Proculus is unknown, but he did not suffer damnatio memoriae and we can assume that he was reconciled with Constantius II before his death. It is highly unlikely that he died in office, since there was no interregnum between himself and his successor, Septimius Mnasea. The very fact that Mnasea served as urban prefect for a very short time, from 9 to 26 September 352, when Magnentius was losing northern Italy to Constantius II, makes it likely that he was the last appointee of Magnentius rather than the first of Constantius II. 68

From the list of urban prefects appointed by Magnentius the conclusion has been drawn that he in fact enjoyed very little support in Italy, particularly among members of the senatorial class, and that consequently he was compelled to resort to the appointment of veterans who had already held that office. 69 It is true that the attitude of the senators, and of the army for that matter, had been primarily a negative one. It was not so much that they loved Magnentius as that they hated Constans the more. As far as the senators were concerned, a strong military commander such as Magnentius was the lesser evil, although they would doubtless have preferred the proclamation of a more Romanized general. Once Constans had been eliminated, there must have been many who found it difficult to swear allegiance to an emperor of barbarian ancestry, 70 who in addition still felt a certain loyalty to the Second Flavian dynasty itself and, consequently, to Constantius II. It must be
kept constantly in mind that the revolt in the West was directed against Constans alone. Nevertheless, there must have been far more senators who supported Magnentius than the mere one or two a year required to administer the urban prefecture. Rather, Magnentius appointed Titianus specifically because of the invaluable support he had given him. But his main reason for appointing those who had already held the same office, namely Fabius Titianus, Aurelius Celsinus, and Valerius Proculus, was his need for experienced administrators to manage affairs in those very troubled times when an attack by Constantius II could be expected at almost any moment. Doubtless Constantius II's success over his kin in 337 was a cause for concern. Magnentius' policy was justified by one instance in which he did appoint a person who had never held that office before: Clodius Celsinus had the misfortune of falling under suspicion after the battle of Mursa, whereas someone like Titianus would have controlled the unrest at Rome far more resolutely.

Few of the other officials of Magnentius are known, their subsequent damnatio memoriae having eliminated most traces of their existence. One of the most prominent, Marcellinus, has already been discussed. While serving as the comes rei privatae of Constans he conspired with Titianus and others to secure the proclamation of Magnentius. He was rewarded by being promoted to the office of magister officiorum and served as a most efficient, if rather ruthless, bureaucrat until he disappeared at the battle of Mursa. His successor is unknown. The identities of Magnentius' quaestor sacri palatii, comes rei privatae, comes sacrarum largitionum, and praepositus sacri cubiculi, all of whom must have wielded considerable influence.
during his reign, are unknown. Little is known even regarding his military officials. One who might have served him, Vetranio, the magister peditum in Illyricum, seized the purple for himself. However, the identity of three magistri who did serve Magnentius is known. The first, the magister militum Gaiso, had quickly murdered Constans and had been rewarded by being granted the consulship of 351. His replacement, Marcellinus (not to be confused with the magister officiorum), served for only a short time. Sent as an envoy to Constantius II, he was arrested and did not return. Romulus, the only known magister equitum of Magnentius, perished at the battle of Mursa. For these three officials we have no inscriptions or entries in the codes that might give us additional information. All, however, had probably served Constans in an important military capacity before changing their allegiance to Magnentius. Only one other important official is known for certain and that is Gerontius, a comes who later suffered exile as the penalty for his support of Magnentius. These were the known supporters of Magnentius when he undertook the difficult problem of negotiating with both Constantius II and Vetranio.

(4) Preparations and Negotiations before Mursa

Although any designs that Magnentius may have had upon Illyricum had been thwarted by the proclamation of Vetranio there on 1 March 350, nevertheless he could take solace in the fact that Constantius II too was having his troubles. Once again, probably late in the spring, Sapor and his forces swept across the Tigris and laid siege to Nisibis. While Constantius II headed post-haste to Antioch
and the eastern front, Magnentius sent to the East by way of Africa an embassy consisting of two bishops, Sarbatius and Maximus, and two palatines, Clementius and Valens. This embassy seems to have had a double purpose. It was, above all, to attempt to reach some sort of agreement with Constantius II whereby he and Magnentius would recognize each other as Augusti of the East and West respectively. However, the presence of the bishops betrayed a second purpose, for on their way to Constantius II the envoys halted at Alexandria and attempted to gain the support of Athanasius for their cause. Perhaps Magnentius' plan was that Athanasius could act as a thorn in the side of Constantius II just as Vetranio did in the case of Magnentius himself. But the plan failed. Instead, Athanasius refused to co-operate with the usurper and openly declared his loyalty to Constantius II. The embassy also failed to secure Constantius II's official recognition of Magnentius. Later, the Arians at the court of Constantius II were to make much of this embassy, alleging that Athanasius had been privy to a plot with Magnentius to overthrow the entire Flavian household. But the accusation was manifestly false, since Athanasius had been in Egypt for nearly four years, had no means of knowing Magnentius, and was heavily indebted to Constans for his support. Still, the temptation to make life miserable for Constantius II and his Arian friends must have been a strong one for Athanasius.

In the East, Constantius II tried to requite Magnentius with similar treatment. The proclamation of Vetranio by Constantius II's sister Constantina and his distant relation Vulcadius Rufinus had been a great success but Vetranio pleaded for reinforcements from the East.
Above all, Constantius II had to play for time in order to ensure that Magnentius would not have the opportunity to burst into Illyricum until the troops had a chance to return from the eastern front. The solution was almost certain to involve the sacrifice of a relative, but Constantius II had discovered his kin to be expendable. Earlier, in the description of the massacre of 337, mention was made of the survival of three male relatives of the sons of Constantine I, namely, their cousins Gallus, Julian, and Nepotianus. In 350 Gallus and Julian were still in semi-exile at Macellum in Cappadocia, but Nepotianus was at Rome with his mother Eutropia, a half-sister of Constantine I. We do not know for certain whether or not Constantius II or Constantina or the two in concert were instrumental in fomenting a revolution in Italy as they had been in Illyricum, but, with Magnentius already in control of most of the West except for Illyricum, it must be admitted that anyone would have been a fool to go against him without the promise of external support. Besides, the revolt of Nepotianus was simply too convenient for Constantius II.

But when Nepotianus revolted at Rome on 3 June 350 his prospects were not at all favourable, there being no sizeable army in the area whose services he could acquire by bribery or other means. Instead, he relied primarily on gladiators and ne'er-do-wells whom he had gathered together outside the city. This motley crew was probably financed by those senators who resolutely opposed Magnentius; in fact, many of the ruffians were probably their retainers. Julius Nepotianus, taking advantage of the temporary absence of the urban prefect Fabius Titianus, marched on Rome, but outside the gates he was
opposed by a band of citizens hastily recruited by the praetorian
prefect Anicetus. The forces from the city were no match for the
organized crew of Nepotianus and many, including Anicetus, were
killed. Once inside the city the so-called army of Nepotianus set
about looting parts of the city, almost certainly the homes of
senators like Titianus who had sided with Magnentius. Little else is
known about the revolt of Nepotianus apart from his sudden downfall
about twenty-seven days later. No inscriptions bearing his name are
extant; if he was responsible for the mutilation of any of the
inscriptions of Magnentius, he did not bother to add his own name to
them. His coins are rare, for he controlled only the mint at Rome, and
even that for slightly less than a month. His appeal was to both the
pagan senatorial aristocrats and the Christians, for on his coins he
gave great prominence to legends such as gloria Romanorum and urbs Roma
and also utilized on occasion the Christogram. In this way he hoped
to gain further support from those aristocrats who loathed the fact that
the son of a barbarian woman was on the throne and from the Christians,
who were incensed that Magnentius had permitted the revival of nocturnal
sacrifices. But above all he appealed to the memory of his uncle,
Constantine I, the "liberator" of the city from the "tyranny" of
Maxentius, by naming himself Flavius Nepotianus Constantinus Augustus.

Nepotianus' greatest weakness was his failure to attempt to
undermine the loyalty of the troops of Magnentius, who gave him but
little opportunity in any case. Although the distraction of the revolt
of Nepotianus was adequate to forestall any invasion of Illyricum,
Magnentius did not consider it important enough to warrant his personal
intervention. Instead, he dispatched from Aquileia an armed force under the command of Marcellinus, his magister officiorum. On his march southwards, Marcellinus was probably accompanied by Titianus, who arranged with Heraclides, the leader of the senatorial faction favourable to Magnentius, the betrayal of the city. The soldiers made short work of the mob of Nepotianus. On 30 June 350 he himself was killed and his head was carried aloft on a pike through the city. All those who were suspected of having aided Nepotianus were proscribed and their property was ordered to be confiscated. Of those who were murdered Eutropia, the mother of Nepotianus, was the most conspicuous. Some of the senators, however, succeeded in escaping across the Adriatic Sea to the court of Vetranio.

Although the summer of 350 had been unsuccessful for Constantius II in the West, in the East for the first time since he had assumed the control from his father he could breathe easily. Sapor had besieged Nisibis for nearly four months when the news reached him that the Chionites and Gilanes, who inhabited the banks of the Caspian Sea, were attacking Persia along that front. In view of the fact that Constantius II was later to urge the Franks and Alamanni to harass Magnentius, there is a possibility that he had been the inspiration behind this unrest on the Persian frontier. Whether Constantius II was responsible or not, the harassment of the Persians was an answer to his prayers, for it was to ensure that the Empire would be free from any serious Persian threat until 358. Sapor arranged a truce with Constantius II and abandoned Nisibis. Soon thereafter Constantius II visited both Nisibis and Edessa and, with the summer waning, set out for
the West. It is possible that he added Gallus and Julian to his retinue at Macellum in Cappadocia and, continuing by way of Ancyra in Galatia, deposited them at Nicomedia or Constantinople before continuing to Heraclea in Thrace, where he arrived in the early autumn.

The news of Constantius II's truce with Sapor was a crushing blow to Magnentius. It, along with the revolt of Nepotianus, signified that Magnentius could not safely leave the area around Aquileia without risking another revolt or a frontal attack by Vetranio. For, although Magnentius and Vetranio pretended to be on friendly terms, in reality they did not trust each other. In order to secure the frontier of the Rhine Magnentius appointed his own brother, Magnus Decentius, Caesar and sent him to the northern frontier.

The news that Constantius II was approaching Thrace was the signal for both Magnentius and Vetranio to send envoys to him; Magnentius' hope, as always, was to secure Constantius II's recognition of himself as Augustus of the West, whereas Vetranio's plan was a far more subtle one. Magnentius sent as envoys his magister militum Marcellinus (not to be confused with his magister officiorum Marcellinus, who had recently killed Nepotianus) and Nunechius, who had probably been his praetorian prefect of Gaul. Vetranio's envoys included Vulcarius Rufinus, the praetorian prefect of Illyricum, and a certain Maximus, who was probably a nephew of Rufinus. These ambassadors impressed upon Constantius II the danger of a civil war, since they knew that the united forces of Magnentius and Vetranio were more than a match for those of Constantius II. They added that their
Augusti would be happy to acknowledge Constantius II as the senior Augustus. The envoys of Magnentius proposed that their Augustus and Constantius II should cement an alliance by arranging for Magnentius' marriage to Constantina, the sister of Constantius II, and for Constantius II's marriage to the daughter of Magnentius. The offer of this alliance must have sorely tempted Constantius II, but the proposed marriage would have given Magnentius a degree of legitimacy and this in turn would have encouraged usurpation in the East as well. Besides, Constantius II realized full well that the unity between Magnentius and Vetranio was only superficial. Confident in the loyalty of Vetranio to the house of Constantine I, Constantius II ordered the arrest of the ambassadors, with the exception of Rufinus and possibly Maximus. The die was cast.

After sending Rufinus ahead, Constantius II advanced to Serdica, a few miles beyond the border of Thrace, and there Vetranio came to meet him. Together they advanced to Vetranio's main camp at Naissus, where preparations were made to win the soldiers of Vetranio over to Constantius II. In fact, the army of Illyricum never had been hostile to Constantius II, since Vetranio had always minted coins bearing the image of that Augustus as well as of himself. In order to shore up loyalty to the Flavian dynasty, certain officers of Vetranio such as Gomoarius, a *tribunus scholae scutariorum*, distributed bribes. When the assembly had been convoked on 25 December 350, Constantius II, recognized as the senior Augustus, was allowed to address the throng first. His appeal to the loyalty of the soldiers to the house of Constantine I brought such a favourable response that
Vetranio knelt before him and abdicated. Constantius II raised him up, called him father, and sent him to a prosperous retirement at Prusa in Bithynia, where Vetranio was to survive for six years before suffering a natural death. The ease with which Constantius II won over the troops of Vetranio indicates conclusively that the revolt in Illyricum on 1 March of that same year had been against Magnentius rather than against Constantius II.

Constantius II advanced west in order to spend the rest of the winter at Sirmium. The Orthodox Christians had good reason to fear his success, however, for he sent his praetorian prefect of the East, Flavius Philippus, who had accompanied him thus far, to Thessalonica. There Philippus arrested Paul, the former bishop of Constantinople, and sent him to Cucusus in Cappadocia where he was strangled to death. The fate of Paul boded ill for the Orthodox in both East and West. After ordering the elimination of Paul, Philippus rejoined Constantius II at Sirmium for the winter, where preparations were being made for the inevitable campaign against Magnentius.

While wintering at Sirmium, Constantius II realized that the campaign against Magnentius would require his undivided attention. There was the possibility that a revolt might be instigated in the East by agents of Magnentius who might take advantage of any Persian incursions or of any strife between the Arian and Orthodox Christians. At present Constantius II was only thirty-three years of age. Even if he had had any children by his first wife they would have been too young to control affairs in those troubled times. But his first wife, the daughter of Julius Constantius, had given birth to no children and
had died before 350. It had been Constantius II's bereavement that had made Magnentius' offer of his daughter so timely, and it was in all likelihood when he was in Illyricum in the winter of 350/1 that Constantius II married Eusebia, a native of Thessalonica and probably the daughter of Flavius Eusebius, consul in 347. The marriage did not solve his immediate problem, an assistant in the East. Constantius II had been seriously handicapped since becoming an Augustus by an obsessive mistrust of anyone in authority who was not present at his very court. My second chapter described in detail how the eunuchs at court, in particular his grand chamberlain Eusebius, had gained so much influence over him that he heeded them even in preference to his own kin. It was their plotting that had been responsible for the long sojourn of Gallus and Julian at Macellum in Cappadocia. But now Constantius II felt that he, like Magnentius, needed a Caesar, a junior partner to show the colours far behind the battle-line. Having seen the strength of dynastic loyalty in action when his appeal to the memory of Constantine I had won over the troops of Vetranio, Constantius II determined to make one of his few remaining kin a participant in the imperium. And so it came about that he summoned to Sirmium his eldest surviving cousin, Gallus, now about twenty-five years of age, and on 15 March 351 invested him with the rank of Caesar and a name, Flavius Claudius Constantius, that would serve to remind the population in the East of their Augustus himself. To Gallus Constantius II gave as wife his own sister Constantina, widow of the ill-fated Hannibalianus and proposed wife of Magnentius. Thalassius, a comes of Constantius II, was appointed to be his praetorian prefect. It is likely that
Vulcadius Rufinus, uncle of Gallus, had urged upon Constantius II the promotion of his nephew, but in any case Constantius II had little choice, for the only close relations he had left after the massacre of 337 were Gallus and his half-brother Julian, who was about five years younger. The fact that Thalassius was still at the court of Constantius II and that Flavius Philippus was still officially prefect of the East late in 351 leads us to the conclusion that Gallus and his entourage may not have set out for his new headquarters at Antioch until early in 352.

(5) The Campaign of 351

In the spring of 351 one of Constantius II's primary worries was that Decentius Caesar would suddenly send a large number of reinforcements from the Rhine to assist his brother. The tribes there had kept the peace since 342 when Constans had compelled them to submit to a treaty but the news of his death must have filled them with new hope. Constantius II yielded to temptation and placed his own political future before the welfare of the Empire as a whole when he sent agents to the Alamanni and urged them to attack Decentius. By so doing he was to facilitate his own victory that year but also to inflict upon Gaul a pestilence that would take himself and, later, Julian Caesar several years to eradicate. This plan must have been suggested to him by the eunuchs at court, for the advice was so bad that it could come only from those totally ignorant of the fragility of the peace in the West. The war of 351 is covered in considerable detail by Julian, Zosimus, and Zonaras and will be described here only in an abbreviated
Magnentius realized from the preparations of Constantius II that there was no possibility of a peaceful solution to their quarrel and decided to take the first step. By tricking and capturing Actus, the comes of Constantius II in charge of the westernmost defences of Illyricum, he succeeded in marching from Aquileia and breaking through the Julian Alps. Immediately after this, Constantius II set out from Sirmium, but, when he heard that his front-line defences had suffered an additional reverse at Atrans, he decided to set up his main camp at Cibalis, between Sirmium and Mursa. At this point both combatants, by now realizing that neither one had a decided advantage over the other, sent envoys to each other in the hope that they would accomplish by subterfuge what was doubtful by arms. While Magnentius debated how to cross the Savus River, there arrived at his camp Flavius Philippus, the prefect of the East, supposedly to confer about a peace treaty but really to meddle with Magnentius' troops and to ascertain what their plans were. Philippus had been escorted to the camp by Marcellinus, the magister officiorum and chief supporter of Magnentius. Invited to speak before the soldiers, Philippus rebuked them for their disloyalty to the dynasty of the great Constantine, under whom so many of them had served, and urged that they content themselves with the rule of the prefecture of Gaul. Philippus' mention of Constantine I caused the troops to waver, and only by reminding them that it was against the corrupt government of Constans, a vile beast, that they had revolted was Magnentius able to confirm their allegiance to himself. Magnentius detained Philippus on the ground that he had abused his role as envoy.
and made use of his name in order to secure a crossing of the Savus River. This led Constantius II to believe that Philippus had deserted to Magnentius and as a result he cashiered his prefect. Later in the year Philippus died, still in the custody of Magnentius. Subsequently Constantius II learnt of the loyalty of his prefect and rehabilitated his memory by the erection of gilded statues of him in all the leading cities. Even earlier, when Philippus had failed to return from his mission, two of his staunchest supporters, Latinus, an Alamann, and Thalassius, the prefect of Gallus, absented themselves from a banquet at Cibalis in order to register their concern.

While Constantius II was still trying to discover the fate of Philippus, there arrived at his camp Fabius Titianus, who was, after Marcellinus, the chief supporter of Magnentius and until recently (1 March 351) the urban prefect of Rome. The arrogance of Titianus knew no bounds:

'Αλλά τούτο βουλευομένων αυτῶν ἦκεν Τιτιανός, εἰς τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐν 'Ρώμῃ συγκλήτου βουλής, λέγουσι ἀπὸ Μαγνεντίου φέρων ὑπερφάνους, δὲ κατὰ Κωνσταντίνου καὶ τῶν ἐξ αὐτοῦ γεγονότων ἡτοπα πολλὰ συμφόρησας, καὶ τὴν τῶν πόλεων ἀπάλειαν τῇ περὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀναθέτει εἰκελεία, τῆς ἀρχῆς ἐκέλευεν ἐκστάναι Ἔγνως Κωνστάντιον, εἰς τὴν αὐτῷ μετ' ἀσφαλείας συγχωρήσειν, ἀγαπῶντι. Constantius II rejected this proposal and ordered Titianus to return to his master, even though Philippus was still a prisoner of Magnentius. When Magnentius marched on Siscia, Constantius II moved the mint to Sirmium and brought it about that coins were minted there for the first
time in twenty-five years. This was probably in August, when Magnentius occupied Siscia. 127 Thence he rushed past Constantius II's camp at Cibalis and tried but failed to take Sirmium itself. Finally, when he laid siege to Mursa, Constantius II marched forth from Cibalis to relieve the town, for he was superior in cavalry and knew that the ground around Mursa gave him the best hope for a victory. 128 Although Magnentius had overrun the westernmost part of Illyricum, he had done so largely because Constantius II had withdrawn most of his forces to the vicinity of Mursa. It is very unlikely that Magnentius was able to increase his forces substantially as a result of his new conquests.

On 28 September 351 the two forces met in battle outside Mursa. 129 Those of Magnentius were outnumbered greatly, being about 36,000 compared to the 80,000 of Constantius II. 130 The reason for this was simple: Constantius II had at his disposal the entire Illyrian army and a sizeable portion of the army of the East, whereas Magnentius had been compelled by Constantius II's dealings with the Alamanni to leave some of his best troops with Decentius. Also, Constantius II was far stronger in cavalry, a force more suitable for fighting on the plains of Mursa. 131 An additional advantage accrued to Constantius II when Silvanus, one of the tribunes of Magnentius, betrayed his master and led the forces under his command across to the side of Constantius II. 132 It has been conjectured that Silvanus had been persuaded in some way by Flavius Philippus to defect to the side of Constantius II. 133 This may have been the case. Philippus could always appeal to Silvanus' ancestry, for his father Bonitus had served Constantine I with distinction. 134 However, Silvanus must have realized, in view of the
preparations on either side, the potential for a major disaster and so elected to side with the one more likely to be the winner in the hope that others would follow suit and force Magnentius to abdicate. Silvanus was disappointed, however, and when the forces met the struggle was long and resolute. Constantius II himself did not take part, preferring to pray for victory at a shrine in Mursa. When his soldiers finally got the upper hand, Constantius II was informed of his victory first by Valens, the Arian bishop of Mursa. As a result of this encounter Valens and his fellow Arian, Bishop Ursacius of Singidunum, acquired over Constantius II the same baneful influence that Eusebius of Nicomedia had once had. Valens found his task much easier because most of the eunuchs at court tended to sympathize with the Arian cause. Once certain that the victory was his, Constantius II tried to put an end to the carnage, but the soldiers on both sides had worked themselves into such a frenzy that they refused to listen to reason. Finally, Magnentius and the remnants of his band retreated toward the Julian Alps. The cost of the victory was terrible: Constantius II lost about 30,000 out of a total force of 80,000 while Magnentius lost 24,000 out of 36,000. This disaster, although it did ensure the ultimate triumph of Constantius II, seriously weakened the Empire, already imperilled by Constantius II's negotiations with the Alamanni. The significance of the event was not lost on a contemporary, Eutropius:

Non multo post Magnentius apud Mursam profligatus acie est ac paene captus. Ingentes Romani imperii vires ea dimicatione consumptae sunt, ad quaelibet bella externa idoneae, quae multum triumphorum possent securitatisque conferre.
In the battle Magnentius lost Marcellinus, his magister officiorum and most steadfast supporter. It is possible that Fabius Titianus also perished in the battle. If not, he did not survive much longer, for after the final defeat of Magnentius he suffered damnatio memoriae.

After the battle Magnentius made his way to Aquileia for the winter while Constantius II set up camp at Sirmium and Gallus and his associates departed for Antioch. It was probably during the course of this winter (351/2) that Magnentius, realizing that his only hope would be to produce unrest in the East, sent some trusted associates to assassinate Gallus. They, however, bungled the plot and were executed by Gallus. This plot had no immediate result, but in the long run it brought out the worst in Gallus' nature. Already in poor spirits as a result of the murder of his kin and six years of virtual imprisonment at Macellum, he now became even more fearful and suspicious and, aided by his wife who had no desire to become a widow a second time, instituted a reign of terror at Antioch. In the West, additional senators defected to Constantius II. Some did so out of genuine loyalty to the Second Flavian dynasty, but others abandoned Magnentius only in order to join what was almost certain to be the winning side. Constantius II's proclamation of a general amnesty for all who would swear allegiance to him produced gratifying results.

(6) The Last Months of Magnentius

Early in 352, Decentius was busy at Trier attempting to safeguard the frontier and at the same time to recruit enough soldiers in order to be able to spare some of them for his brother.
resided at Aquileia and tried to defend the Julian Alps; he had already nipped a possible rebellion at Rome in the bud by replacing the urban prefect Adelphius, whose loyalty had been called into question, with Valerius Proculus, a more experienced administrator. Gallus made his headquarters at Antioch, where he was successful in keeping the Persians at bay. Meanwhile, Constantius II, residing at Sirmium, had spent part of his time interfering in ecclesiastical matters; there he had attended a synod that deposed the Orthodox bishop Photinus and replaced him with Germinius, one of the Arian persuasion. Further proof that Constantius II was still very much under the influence of his courtiers is an edict, addressed to his praetorian prefect of Illyricum, stating that eunuchs were henceforth to have the right to make wills. In another edict he increased the privileges of palace attendants: henceforth, even when on leave from service, they were to be immune from municipal duties; of course, chamberlains like Eusebius came under this classification. Months passed, and the only remarkable political activity occurred in the East, where Gallus undertook a persecution of the Jews by destroying Diocaesarea and executed several nobles at Antioch after crushing a revolt and burning several towns.

Constantius II did not pay any serious attention to military matters until June, when he published an edict clearly designed to endear himself to the troops; in it he stipulated that veterans must be immune from compulsory public services. In fact, Constantius II delayed his attack till so late in the summer that, when he did actually advance on the Julian Alps late in August or early in September, Magnentius was taken by surprise and, without putting up any substantial
resistance, fled from Aquileia westwards in the direction of Milan. It was alleged that he had intended to journey to Rome in order to put to death his political enemies there but did not do so because Italy had become too hostile for him. Rather, there were two reasons for his failure to head south into Italy. In the first place, he desperately needed reinforcements, and these could be found in abundance in Gaul if anywhere, and certainly not in Italy. In the second place, Constantius II was proving to be a tactician of considerable ability, for he had dispatched transports from as far away as Egypt to land troops at the mouth of the Po, whence they could dominate northern Italy, in Africa in order to secure that all-important granary, and near the Pyrenees in order to cut off Magnentius from Spain. Magnentius did fight a successful rear-guard action at Ticinum, but it was designed only to ensure his safe passage across the Alps to Lugdunum.

With Magnentius beyond the confines of the Alps, Constantius II gained complete control over Italy. On 26 September 352 he installed as his first urban prefect at Rome Naeratius Cerealis, who had once been praefectus annonae of Constantine I and one of those senators who had fled to the court of Constantius II after the battle at Mursa. His sympathy with the household of Constantine I is understandable, for he was a brother of Vulcacius Rufinus, the praetorian prefect of Constantius II in Illyricum, and also of Galla, the late mother of Gallus Caesar. Another noble who was active at this time was Memmius Vitrasius Orfitus, who was to succeed Cerealis as urban prefect on 8 December 353. Orfitus, like Cerealis, had held no office under Magnentius. It is quite likely that he had fled to the court of
Constantius II after the abortive attempt of Nepotianus (whom he may have supported), for inscriptional evidence records him as a *comes ordinis secundi*[^161] and refers to him as *expeditiones bellicas gubemans*,[^162] almost certainly a reference to the campaign against Magnentius. Consequently, he was one of the few senators of his day to serve in an important military capacity.[^163] After Magnentius had been driven from Italy, Orfitus returned to Rome and next served as the envoy of the Senate and the People to Constantius II.[^164] His services in winning over Italy for Constantius II were amply rewarded: he was promoted to the rank of *comes ordinis primi* and then made proconsul of Africa in order to secure that province for Constantius II before becoming urban prefect at Rome.[^165]

While Magnentius was abandoning Italy, his brother Decentius Caesar was not faring well in the North. There at long last the machinations of Constantius II were proving to be more productive. Probably in September, Chnodomarius, a leading king of the Alamanni, crossed the Rhine and inflicted a severe defeat on Decentius who, in all likelihood, had committed too much of his strength to the support of his brother. In short, the collusion of Constantius II and the barbarians paid off, but at a great cost to the Empire.[^166] In addition, Argentoratum was stormed and burned by the barbarians shortly before winter put an end to their incursions.[^167] Constantius II could relax, safe in the knowledge that Decentius was far too busy to come to the aid of Magnentius.  

Constantius II himself spent the winter of 352/3 at Milan. There, on 3 November, he published an edict annulling all the acts of
the tyrant that were contrary to existing law:

Quae tyrannus vel eius iudices contra ius statuerunt, infirmari iubemus reddita possessione expulsis, ut qui vult ab initio agat. Emancipationes autem et manumissiones et pacta sub eo facta et transactiones valere oportet. 168

Constantius II spent the rest of the winter in preparations for the final elimination of Magnentius and Decentius. By this time at the latest, if not a couple of years earlier, he had married Eusebia. 169 Magnentius, in a last desperate bid for support, changed the symbols on his coins, depicting on the reverse a large cross bordered by an alpha and an omega. In this way he, a pagan, hoped to win the allegiance of the Orthodox Christians who far outnumbered the Arians in the West. 170 The Orthodox had good reason to fear Constantius II's intentions, for he had already sent Paul off to execution and deposed Photinus, and now he was planning to crush Athanasius as well, possibly at the urging of Bishop Valens of Mursa. On 23 May 353 Montanus, a silentiarius of Constantius II, arrived at Alexandria and in a rather unfriendly manner instructed Athanasius to proceed to the court. No reason and no definite order were given, so that Athanasius remained at Alexandria. 171 It would not be until 356 that Constantius II would be able to secure the exile of Athanasius, whom he considered to be the greatest enemy to the Arian cause. 172 Pierre Bastien dates to this period (specifically, 9 June 353) the distribution of goods confiscated from the partisans of Magnentius, but the entry in the code upon which his statement is based actually pertains to the year 315 and refers to Maxentius, not to Magnentius. 173 Some doubtless did suffer, especially the relatives of those who had supported Magnentius, but the purpose was not so much
revenge as the acquisition of supplies for the final campaign against the usurper.

The offensive of Constantius II did not commence until July 353, when it coincided very conveniently with a revolt against Decentius. This revolt took place at Trier and was led by a certain Poemenius, who shut the gates and succeeded in excluding Decentius from his own capital. The revolt may have been a spontaneous one, arising not out of any specific plan of Constantius II but rather out of that natural human desire to side with the winner, for by now it must have been quite obvious that Magnentius had little chance of emerging victorious. An indication that Constantius II did not instigate the revolt is the fact that, when Poemenius had seized the mint at Trier and started to mint coins in honour of Constantius II, he placed on the reverse the legend of alpha and omega just as Magnentius and Decentius had done. This legend was repugnant to the Arian Constantius II. The revolt of Poemenius did serve Constantius II's purpose, however, for it ensured that Decentius would not be able to aid his brother.

In July Constantius II marched forth from Milan by way of Mount Geneva. At Mons Seleuci he joined battle with the forces of Magnentius and emerged victorious. Beaten, Magnentius retreated to Lugdunum and, when he realized that his cause was lost and that his own men were planning to betray him, he first killed his own mother, who had accompanied him throughout his campaigns, and then himself on 10 August 353. The news of his suicide spread rapidly and reached Decentius at Senones, whither he had advanced in a last desperate attempt to aid his brother. Realizing that all was lost, Decentius hanged himself on 18
August 353, thereby signalling both the end of the civil war and the
restoration of imperial unity under one Augustus for the first time
since the death of Constantine I. 179 The head of Magnentius was
paraded about the camp of Constantius II as proof that the long war was
at an end. 180

By 6 September 353 Constantius II himself had arrived at
Lugdunum, where he sought to put at rest the minds of all those who had
not been guilty of any serious crimes:

Omnia penitus amputentur, quae tyrannicum tempus poterat
habere tristissima. Universos ergo praecipimus esse securos
exceptis quinque criminibus, quae capite vindicantur. 181

Constantius II appointed officials to see to the administration of the
prefecture of Gaul and sent some of his own soldiers to the frontier of
the Rhine in place of those of Magnentius who, considered untrustworthy
and turbulent, were sent to the East where none but foreign wars were to
be feared. 182 He then proceeded to Arelate where, on 8 November 353, he
celebrated his tricennalia. 183 It was probably at this time that
Arelate was renamed Constantia in his honour, just as it had been named
Constantina in honour of Constantine II until the death of that
prince. 184 The threat of further trouble remained, and so Constantius
II determined to put an end to the nocturnal sacrifices permitted by
Magnentius, for these provided an excellent opportunity for subversive
activities. On 23 November 353 he promulgated an edict to that effect:

Aboleantur sacrificia nocturna Magnentio auctore permissa
et nefaria deinceps licentia repellatur. 185

Quite rapidly, as his control extended throughout the West,
Constantius II's policy of leniency towards the supporters of his rival
hardened into one of outright cruelty as the eunuchs and others, at his court sought the elimination of all who had ever opposed them or who threatened to replace them in the favour of the Augustus. The damnatio memoriae of Magnentius and Decentius was surprisingly lacking in thoroughness. Only in Italy were the names erased with a vengeance. But their followers did not fare so well. Gerontius, a comes of Magnentius, was tortured at Arelate during that winter and condemned to exile. Those in Britain, whether or not they had actively supported Magnentius and Decentius, had the misfortune of being visited by the notarius Paulus who, once absent from the court, exceeded his instructions and inflicted misery upon many.

The penalties inflicted upon the supporters of Magnentius during the winter of 353/4, along with the atrocities committed by Gallus in the East and the fate suffered by that young Caesar, are described in detail in the first extant book of Ammianus Marcellinus. In this book and the following ones, Ammianus reveals to us a Constantius II remarkably similar to the young man who in 337 rushed from Antioch to Constantinople in order to conduct his father's funeral and to secure the Empire for himself and his brothers. Constantius II was always ready to give heed to his immediate advisers at court, and always preferred to believe them, to whom he considered himself indebted, rather than his officials on the spot in the provinces or even his own kindred. The eunuchs at court, having alienated Gallus and Julian by recommending the murder of their kin, feared the two young men and also the military commanders, for they had before their eyes the temporary success of Magnentius. No matter how well-intentioned Constantius II
may have been, he was frequently to encourage intrigue and revolts by viewing all who served him abroad with suspicion.
Notes to Chapter Four

1 The life and revolt of Magnentius are discussed by P. Bastien, *Le monnayage de Magnence* (350-353) (Wetteren 1964) especially 7-25. To this book is indebted a substantial part of this chapter, especially its chronological sequence. J. Babelon, "Magnence, à propos de quelques médailons de Trèves," *Mémorial d'un voyage d'études de la Société nationale des Antiquaires de France en Rhénanie* (juillet 1851) (Paris 1953) 201-219, strives to counteract the unfavourable opinion of Magnentius handed down by antiquity and emphasizes Magnentius' attempts to seek a rapprochement with Constantius II. W. Kellner, *Libertas und Christogramm: Motivgeschichtliche Untersuchungen zur Münzprägung des Kaisers Magnentius* (350-353) (Karlsruhe 1969), relates the legends of Magnentius' coins to those of his contemporaries and of earlier emperors.

2 *Vikt. Caes.* 41.23-24; *Eutr.* 10.9.3; *Zos.* 2.42.1; *Oros.* 7.29.7; *Art. Pass.* 10; *Joh. Ant.* frg. 172; *Zon.* 13.5.12A, 13D.

3 Our sources refer to her as only the betrothed of Constans much later when she was married off to Arsaces of Armenia: *Amm.* 20.11.3 (*sponsam*); *Athan. Hist. Ar.* 69 (μνηστήν). For the date of her marriage to Arsaces see N. H. Baynes, "Rome and Armenia in the Fourth Century," *EHR* 25 (1910) 631-632.

4 Constantius II was to have only one child, Constantia, born of his third and last wife Faustina shortly after his death: *Amm.* 21.15.6.

5 For Constans' alienation of various segments of society see chapter 3, pages 172-173, 179-181, and 218-221.

6 *Zos.* 2.42-54; *Zon.* 13.5.12A-13.9.18D.

7 *Vikt. Epit.* 41.22.

8 For Titianus see chapter 3, pages 219-220.

9 For Marcellinus see chapter 3, page 224.

10 *Zos.* 2.42.2.

11 For Ambianum as the birth-place of Magnentius see J. Bidez, "Amiens, ville natale de l'empereur Magnence," *REA* 27 (1925) 312-318. Soon after the death of Constans, Magnentius installed a mint at Ambianum. According to Ph. V. Hill, "The Ambianum Coins of Constantius II," *NC* 9 (1949) 114-115, it is more likely that the few coins struck in honour of Constantius II at this mint were produced in 353, when the fall of Magnentius was virtually certain, or immediately after his fall, by officials who thus hoped that the mint "would not be closed and they themselves would not suffer the punishment which the victor, who was
notorious for his cruelty, would mete out to his enemy's supporters."
The phases of this mint at Ambianum are described by P. Bastien, "L'atelier monétaire d'Amiens au IVe siècle," BSAP 50 (1963-1964) 65-68. According to Vict. Epit. 42.6, Magnentius was approximately fifty years of age when he died in 353. For his British father see Zon. 13.6.13A. Jul. Or. 1.33D-34A considered him to be a simple barbarian, as did Vict. Caes. 41.25 and Epit. 42.7. Zos. 2.54.1 also considered him to be of barbarian descent but affirmed that he had lived among the Laeti in Gaul. For further information regarding the descent of Magnentius see Bastien, Le monnayage de Magnence 7.

12 Zos. 2.46.3.
13 Zos. 2.54.1 specifies a Latin education; Vict. Epit. 42.7 only implies it.
14 Zon. 13.6.13A.
15 Zos. 2.42.2.
16 Bastien, Le monnayage de Magnence 8. J. Babelon, "Les monnaies de l'empereur Magnence," BSAF (1945-1947) 36-37, believes that Christian emblems on some of Magnentius' coins prove that he was not a pagan. However, no dedicated Christian would have permitted nocturnal sacrifices as Magnentius did (CTh 16.10.5 of 23 November 353).

17 The detailed sources for the revolt of Magnentius are Zos. 2.42, Vict. Epit. 41.22, and Zon. 13.6.13A-C. Our account is based primarily upon the version of Zosimus. That of Zonaras differs from the other two sources primarily in attributing the birthday to Magnentius, not to Marcellinus' son. It has been suggested that Magnentius enjoyed sudden success at Augustodunum because that town had always ranked below Trier and Arelate under Constantine I and his sons and was therefore ill-disposed to the Flavian household: Bastien, Le monnayage de Magnence 9, note 19. For the date of the revolt the source is Cons. Const. for 350; Hieron. Chron. gives only the year, 350. Chron. Pasch. gives the year 349, and this factor, plus other evidence, led L. Laffranchi to conclude that the revolt took place in the autumn of 349 and that 18 January 350 marked the death of Constans, not the proclamation of Magnentius. This theory is ably refuted by Bastien, Le monnayage de Magnence 9-10.

18 Zos. 2.42.4-5.
19 Zon. 13.6.13D-14B gives three versions of the death of Constans. According to one, Constans did not hear of the revolt until his assassins arrived and killed him and his sleeping companions near the banks of the Rhone. According to the second version, Constans found out about the revolt and, deserted by his followers, fled to a temple, whence he was cast forth and slain. According to the third version, he died at Helena. It is this last version that agrees with
the evidence presented by the other sources: Zos. 2.42.5, Eutr. 10.9.4, Vict. Epit. 41.23. According to Amm. 15.5.16, the only witness to Constans' death was the candidatus Laniogaisus. Other sources for the death of Constans include Vict. Caes. 41.23, Athan. Pest. Ind. 22, Hieron. Chron. for 350, Cons. Const. for 350, Chron. Pasch. for 349, Art. Pass. 10, Philost. 3.22, Soc. 2.25-26, Soz. 4.1, Ruf. 1.19, Athan. Hist. Ar. 24, Oros. 7.29.7-8, and Jul. Or. 1.26B-C. For the conjecture that Gaiso was magister militum see PLRE 380. The downfall of Constans is described by Gigli, La dinastia dei secondi Flavii 40-47.

20 Constans had alienated the soldiers by imposing on them an excessive discipline and by granting them no return in the form of booty or increased pay: Eutr. 10.9.3, Vict. Caes. 41.23.

21 Gaul and Britain had always tended to assert their independence from the central authority: the most notable instance was the separate Gallic Empire that arose out of the crisis of the third century.

22 Bastien, Le monnayage de Magnence 11 and 26.


24 Bastien, Le monnayage de Magnence 13 and 26, dates the occupation of Africa to March or April.


28 *CIL* 3.5209.

29 *ILS* 723.

30 *ILS* 723 from Celeia in Noricum.

31 *ILS* 1244.


33 *AE* (1933) 105. For a detailed analysis of this inscription see L. Poinssot, "Une inscription de Musti, contemporaine de Magnence," *CRAI* (1933) 21-24.

34 Bastien, Le monnayage de Magnence 12; LRBC 41.

35 *E.g.*, Cohen #11 (8.10).
36. E.g., Cohen #26 (8.12).
37. E.g., Cohen #27 (8.12).
38. E.g., Cohen #28 (8.12).
39. E.g., Cohen #35 (8.14).
40. All these titles are to be found on each of CIL 5.8061, CIL 6.1167, CIL 9.5937, CIL 9.5940, CIL 9.5951, CIL 11.6640, CIL 11.6643, ILS 741, ILS 742, and AE (1951) 17. CIL 13.9135 refers to him as restitutor publicae libertatis.
41. For the theory that the reform of the bronze coinage in 348 was a failure (in that the official mints did not strike sufficient coins and thereby encouraged unofficial imitations) see L. P. Healey, "Was the Coinage Reform of Constans and Constantius II a Failure?", San 3 (1971-1972) 22.
42. Cons. Const. for 350; Chron. 354, page 69.
43. Cons. Const. for 350, Chron. Pasch. for 349, Soc. 2.25-26, and Soz. 4.1 locate the proclamation of Vetranio at Sirmium. Hieron. Chron. for 350, Vict. Epit. 41.25, and Zos. 2.43.1 locate it at Mursa. For variety, Chron. Pasch. for 350 locates it at Naissus. The precise date is derived from the Cons. Const. (the Chron. Pasch. also mentions 1 March but cannot determine the year). The likelihood is that Vetranio was proclaimed emperor at the town of Mursa and set up his headquarters at the more important centre, Sirmium. See Seeck, Geschichts 4.99 and 427. The reign of Vetranio is described by Gigli, La dinastia dei secondi Flavii 47-55.
44. Joh. Ant. frg. 173; Eutr. 10.10.2; Oros. 7.29.9; Jul. Or. 1.30B. Vetranio had been born in Moesia (Vict. Caes. 41.26) and was reputed to be practically illiterate when made Augustus (the sources in this note). One can detect the bias of Victor and Eutropius against the soldier-emperors.
45. Vict. Caes. 41.26 specifies that he was magister peditum. Other sources portray him as the supreme military commander in Illyricum: Vict. Epit. 41.25, Zos. 2.43.1, Jul. Or. 1.26C and 33A, Joh. Ant. frg. 173.
46. CTh 12.2.1 and 15.1.6 of 3 October 349.
47. Philost. 3.22, Chron. Pasch. for 350, and Theoph. for 357 (A.M. 5849) vouch for the role played by Constantina. That of Vulcadius Rufinus will be discussed presently.
48. Constantina's ill-fated marriage to Hannibalianus was discussed in chapter 1, page 39.
For the career of Rufinus see chapter 3, pages 204-205. Rufinus' support of Vetranio is suggested by A. Chastagnol, *La préfecture urbaine à Rome* 421. Bastien, *Le monnayage de Magnence* 11-12, is also of the opinion that the revolt of Vetranio and his subsequent abdication were far too convenient for Constantius II to have been mere coincidence.

Amm. 20.9.5, 21.8.1.

Bastien, *Le monnayage de Magnence* 12, note 49; LRBC 42; J. P. C. Kent, "Carausius II - Fact or Fiction?", *NC* 17 (1957) 83.

If Cohen #6 (8.4-5) is authentic, there was at least one series of coins minted at Constantinople in honour of Vetranio. This coin may reflect the machinations of Constantina there; on the other hand, she may have carried the die with her to Vetranio in order to give him the beginnings of his own coinage.

Degrassi 81.

Degrassi 82.

Degrassi 82.

Titianus will be discussed in greater detail presently. Nunechius is referred to as a senator and prefect (συγκλητικός ὑπαρχός) by Petr. Patr. frg. 16, our only source for this individual. For the conjecture that he was praetorian prefect of Gaul see PLRE 635.

Zos. 2.43.3-4 identifies Anicetus as the prefect who failed to save Rome for Magnentius later in the year. His activity at Rome indicates that he must have been prefect of Italy and Africa: *PLRE* 66-67.

Titianus served as urban prefect from 27 February 350 to 1 March 351: *Chron.* 354, page 69. For the career of Titianus see chapter 3, pages 213-214. His activity as an envoy is described by Zos. 2.49.1-2. Titianus' part in the conspiracy against Constans is discussed by Chastagnol, *La préfecture urbaine à Rome* 419-420.

Celsinus served as urban prefect from 1 March 351 to 12 May 351: *Chron.* 354, page 69.

Chastagnol, *La préfecture urbaine à Rome* 420, speculates that Celsinus' son had married Titianus' daughter.


Adelphius served as urban prefect from 7 June 351 to 18 December 351: *Chron.* 354, page 69. For the nobility of Adelphius see Arnheim, *The Senatorial Aristocracy* 55. For his career in general see Chastagnol, *Les fastes* 131-134.
PLRE 192.

Amm. 16.6.2.

PLRE 732 lists the sources for Proba. Chastagnol, *La préfecture urbaine à Rome* 422, is of the opinion that Celsinus did not return completely into the good graces of Constantius II. One son, Quintus Clodius Hermogenianus Olybrius, much later became urban prefect, prefect of Illyricum, prefect of the East, and finally consul in 379 (PLRE 640-642); the other son, Faltonius Probus Alypius, though temporarily banished in 370/1, later became vicar of Africa and rose to the urban prefecture in 391 (PLRE 49).

Proculus served as urban prefect from 18 December 351 to 9 September 352: *Chron.* 354, page 69.

For the earlier career of Proculus see chapter 3, page 199. For the rank of *comes ordinis princi* see ILS 1240.

*Chron.* 354, page 69. Chastagnol, *La préfecture urbaine à Rome* 422 and *Les fastes* 134-135, thinks it more likely that Mnasea was an appointee of Magnentius.

Chastagnol, *La préfecture urbaine à Rome* 420: "S'il est incontestable qu'une fraction de la noblesse a bien accueilli Magnence, il s'agit néanmoins d'une minorité, et preuve en est que, sur les cinq préfets, trois avaient déjà occupé la fonction une première fois auparavant. Comme les secondes préfectures sont relativement rares au IVe siècle, on est conduit à penser que cette succession de praefecti iterum est due à la nécessité et que le choix du prince se trouvait limité par suite du petit nombre de sénateurs ralliés. La majorité des grands seigneurs romains a en effet boudé le régime: ni Naeratius Cerealis, ni Lollianus Mavortius, ni Orfitus, ni Maecilius Hilarianus, entre autres, n'ont exercé de fonction sous Magnence." Bastien, *Le monnayage de Magnence* 13, agrees with this statement of Chastagnol.


For the career of Marcellinus see chapter 3, page 224.

For Gaiso see this chapter, pages 255 and 264, also Vict. *Epit.* 41.23, Zos. 2.42.5, and *Chron.* 354, page 69.

Petr. Patr. frg. 16. *PLRE* 546 is careful to point out that Marcellinus, the μάγιστρον δημοκρίτων (Zos. 2.43.4) was not identical with Marcellinus, the στρατηλάτης (Petr. Patr. frg. 16). The latter was arrested by Constantius II in 350, whereas the former perished in the battle of Mursa in 351, as described by Jul. Or. 2.57D-59B. Bastien, *Le monnayage de Magnence* 16, fails to notice that two separate officers with the same name were involved.
74 Zos. 2.52.2. Jul. Or. 2.57D may refer to him: see PLRE 771. Paschoud, in his commentary on Zosimus (note 67, page 260), is very sceptical about the existence of our Romulus: "Quant à l'existence réelle d'un personnage de ce nom (Zosime est seul à le citer) occupant cette fonction, elle est des plus douteuses!"

75 Amm. 14.5.1.

76 Jul. Or. 1.27A-28D, 2.64B-66D; Philost. 3.22; Amm. 19.9.9; Theoph. for 349 (A.M. 5841). Bastien, Le monnayage de Magnence 11, dates the commencement of this siege of Nisibis to the end of 349. Seeck, Regesten 198, dates it to the spring of 350 and his verdict is preferred here, since Jul. Or. 1.27A makes it clear that the Persians attacked only after they heard about the usurpation of Magnentius.

77 The embassy, its rejection by Athanasius, and this bishop's declaration that he never had any correspondence with Magnentius are found in Athan. Ap. Const. 9-10. This embassy is dated to March-April 350 by Bastien, Le monnayage de Magnence 13.

78 Jul. Or. 1.26C.

79 J. Šašel, "The Struggle between Magnentius and Constantius II for Italy and Illyricum," ZAnt 21 (1971) 208, believes that the revolt of Nepotianus was instigated by the Constantinian family. The brief reign of Nepotianus is described by Gigli, La dinastia dei secondi Flavii 46-47.

80 For Nepotianus as son of Eutropia, a half-sister of Constantine I, see Vict. Epit. 42.3 and Zos. 2.43.2; Eutropia is implied, but not specifically named, by Eutr. 10.11.2, Oros. 9.29.11, Vict. Caes. 42.6, Soc. 2.25, and Soz. 4.1. For the date and location of the revolt see Cons. Const. for 350, Chron. Pasch. for 350, Soc. 2.26, and Hieron. Chron. for 350 (the latter two do not specify a particular day in 350 for the revolt). Other literary sources for the revolt of Nepotianus include Zos. 2.43.1-4, Joh. Ant. frg. 174 (describing his downfall only), Amm. 28.1.1 (a reference to his death at Rome), Pan. Lat. 11.13.3 (Heus, verbi gratia, Nepotiane atque Silvane, per infestos gladios praesenteaque mortes imperium petivistis), and Athan. Ap. Const. 6 (a reference to the death of Eutropia).

81 Zos. 2.43.3 refers to Anicetus as a praetorian prefect. Vict. Caes. 42.6, stating that the urban prefect was killed, clearly errs, for Titianus served as urban prefect both before and after the death of Nepotianus. On the identity of Anicetus see Bastien, Le monnayage de Magnence 13-14, PLRE 66-67, and Paschoud's commentary on Zosimus, page 251.

82 The looting is described by Vict. Caes. 42.7. According to Vict. Caes. 42.8, the reign of Nepotianus lasted twenty-seven days; according to Vict. Epit. 42.3, Eutr. 10.11.2, and Joh. Ant. frg. 174 it lasted twenty-eight days.
According to Bastien, Le monnayage de Magnence 14-15, Nepotianus also minted coins in honour of Constantius II.

The campaign and atrocities of Marcellinus are described by Zos. 2.43.4 and Jul. Or. 2.58C-D.


Hieron. Chron. for 350: Nepotiani caput pilo per urbem circumlatum multaeque proscriptiones nobilium et caedes factae. For the downfall of Nepotianus see also Cons. Const. for 350, Eutr. 10.11.2, Joh. Ant. frg. 174, Zos. 2.43.4, and Pan. Lat. 11.13.3. P. Künzle, "Ein Kaiser unter den Märtyrern?", Akten des VII. Internationalen Kongresses für christliche Archäologie (Trier, 5-11 September 1965) 595-606, reveals that Nepotianus' name, more or less deformed, is listed among the martyrs commemorated on 29 June in the Martyrology of Jerome. If his theory is correct, Nepotianus died on 29 June, not on 30 June, and was considered to be a victim of the decidedly pagan Magnentius. It is important to remember, however, that the struggle in the West was primarily political, not religious, for Nepotianus and Magnentius appealed to pagans and Christians alike.


Bastien, Le monnayage de Magnence 14; Jul. Or. 1.38C, 1.48B, and 2.97B.

Stein-Palanque 138; Zon. 13.7.15B; Amm. 14.3.1, 15.13.4, 16.9.3-4, 17.5.1. Sapor's siege of Nisibis in 350 and the barbarian attacks upon the Persian Empire are discussed also by Gigli, La dinastia dei secondi Flavii 31-34.

Zon. 13.7.15B; Philost. 3.22.

Seeck, Regesten 198: at Ancyra at this time Themistius delivered his first panegyric (Or. 1) to Constantius II.

It was at Heraclea that Constantius II received the ambassadors of Magnentius and Vetranio: Zon. 13.7.15C, Petr. Patr. frg. 16. This embassy probably arrived in September 350: Bastien, Le monnayage de Magnence 16. Later events, in particular the abdication of Vetranio in the presence of Constantius II at Naissus on 25 December 350, lead us to believe that Constantius II arrived in Thrace no later than the autumn of 350. However, Bastien's argument, that Marcellinus must have set out as an ambassador to Constantius II after his defeat of Nepotianus on 30 June 350, is not valid, since two different Marcellini
were involved. The one who crushed Nepotianus was the magister officiorum of Magnentius (Zos. 2.43.4: μάγιστρον ὀφφικίων), whereas the one who served as ambassador was the magister militum of Magnentius (Petr. Patr. frg. 16: στρατηλάτης; also PLRE 546).

Decentius is referred to as only a relative of Magnentius by Vict. Epit. 42.2 and Zos. 2.45.2 but as a brother by Vict. Caes. 42.9, Eutr. 10.12.2, Oros. 7.29.13, Soc. 2.32, Soz. 4.7, and Zon. 13.8.16B. The chronicles specify the date of his death but not that of his proclamation. Zosimus and Zonaras refer to his proclamation after their accounts of the abdication of Vetranio, itself dated 25 December 350 by Cons. Const. Bastien, Le monnayage de Magnence 15, prefers to date it much earlier, to July-August 350, on the basis of numismatic evidence. The main objection to this date is that, if Decentius was made Caesar then, surely he and not Gaiso would have shared the consulship of 351 with Magnentius. The proclamation of Decentius can be dated earlier than 15 March 351, when Gallus was made Caesar, since an inscription from North Africa, namely AE (1933) 105, was erected in honour of Constantius II, Magnentius, and Decentius but does not mention Gallus. Therefore, we can be certain that the proclamation of Decentius dates before that of Gallus. Here the chronology of Bastien is followed, but with great reluctance. Perhaps a more likely date for the proclamation of Decentius is January of 351, just after the news of the abdication of Vetranio reached Magnentius and at a time when it was too late for Magnentius to make Decentius a colleague in the consulship for 351. Bastien's dating leaves much to be desired, for it violates the principle that in times of stress the consulship was shared by the holders of imperial titles. See also Seeck, Geschichte 4.431, who prefers to date the proclamation of Decentius to the end of 350.

The sources for these negotiations between the western usurpers and Constantius II are Zon. 13.7.15C-D and Petr. Patr. frg. 16. The negotiations are dated to the autumn of 350 by Bastien, Le monnayage de Magnence 26, and Seeck, Regesten 198.

For the identity of Marcellinus see this chapter, page 275.

For the identity of Nunechius see this chapter, page 265.

For Vulcacius Rufinus see this chapter, pages 262-263.

For the conjecture that Maximus was a nephew of Vulcacius Rufinus see Chastagnol, La préfecture urbaine à Rome 421, and Bastien, Le monnayage de Magnence 16.

It was perhaps as a result of his failure to obtain Constantina to wife that Magnentius now married Justina. For this marriage and the conjecture that Justina herself, who was to survive the death of her husband and to become later the wife of Valentinian I, was related to the Flavian household see Bastien, Le monnayage de Magnence 17.
The abdication of Vetranio is located at Naissus by Hieron. Chron. for 351, and this place is accepted by most modern commentators. Zon. 13.7.16A locates it at Serdica, where Vetranio and Constantius II first met. Soc. 2.28 and Soz. 4.4 locate it at Sirmium.

Amm. 21.8.1.

The precise day of the abdication, 25 December, is given by Cons. Const. for 351. It is possible that Constantius II chose this date because it marked the dies imperii of the late Constans. On this day the former soldiers of Constans used to receive a donative in his name and, therefore, they were now particularly susceptible to an appeal to his memory. Both Cons. Const. and Hieron. Chron. date the abdication to 351, but, thanks to Chron. Pasch. for 350 and Vict. Caes. 42.1-3 that both affirm that Vetranio abdicated after only ten months of rule, we can be certain that the year involved was 350. What is more, all the sources list the abdication of Vetranio before the promotion of Gallus to imperial rank, an event taking place on 15 March 351. See Seeck, Geschichtle 4.429-430.

For the fact that Vetranio survived for six years more at Prusa in Bithynia see Zon. 13.7.16A. Other sources for the abdication of Vetranio include Amm. 15.1.2, Zos. 2.44.1-4, Vict. Epit. 41.25, Eutr. 10.11.1, Oros. 7.29.10, Athan. Hist. Ar. 49, Philost. 3.22-24, Lib. Or. 1.81, Them. Or. 2.37A, 38A, 45B-46A, 4,55D-56B, 62B-62C, 6.80C-80D, and Jul. Or. 1.30B-33D, 47C-47D, and 2.76C-78A. The versions of Themistius and Julian, both panegyrics of Constantius II, give the official version after the facts and tend to downgrade the role of Vetranio in saving Illyricum for Constantius II even to the point of insulting him. Constantius II appears more glorious in their accounts than he perhaps would if his plans with Vetranio had been revealed. Themistius and Julian imply that Vetranio had violated his oath to assist Constantius II, but the evidence accumulated in this chapter proves that both Augusti co-operated to the full, Vetranio saving Illyricum for Constantius II and the latter providing that aged general with a safe and peaceful retirement.

Constantius II was at Sirmium on 15 March 351 when he made his cousin Gallus a Caesar. See this chapter, page 278.

Athan. Apol. de Puga 3, Hist. Ar. 7. This event is wrongly dated to 342 by Hieron. Chron. Soc. 2.26 and Soz. 4.2 place it after the usurpation of Magnentius and Vetranio and before the appointment of Gallus as Caesar on 15 March 351. The most likely time would have been soon after Constantius II's arrival at Heraclea. For further information on this problem see A. H. M. Jones, "The Career of Flavius Philippus," Historia 4 (1955) 231.
Constantius II married Eusebia no earlier than January 351 and no later than June 353. The earlier date is rendered more likely by Constantius II's refusal to marry Magnentius' daughter at Heraclea in the autumn of 350 and by his proximity to Eusebia's home-town of Thessalonica. The later date is insinuated by Jul. Or. 3.109A-B and 110D, for there it is stated that he did not marry Eusebia until he had recovered most of the Empire from the usurper. It is quite likely that Constantius II determined to marry Eusebia early in 351 but postponed the ceremony itself until after Magnentius had been driven beyond the Alps late in 352. Bastien, *Le monnayage de Magnence* 25, prefers the later date for the marriage and situates it at Milan. On Eusebia's ancestry and place of birth see chapter 3, page 205.

For Sirmium as the location of the investment of Gallus see *Art. Pass.* 12. The precise date is given by Cons. Const. and Chron. Pasch.; Athan. Fest. Ind. 24 and Hieron. Chron. for 351 give only the year. For the official name of Gallus see, *exempli gratia*, ILS 737. Other sources for the investiture of Gallus include Amm. 14.1.1, Vict. Casse. 42.9, Vict. Epit. 42.1, Eutr. 10.12.2, Oros. 7.29.14, Zos. 2.45.1-2, Zon. 13.8.16B, Soc. 2.28, Soz. 4.4, Theod. 3.1, Philost. 3.25, and Lib. Or. 18.16-17. Julian later gives two very different versions. In the first (Or. 1.45A-B), composed shortly after his own promotion, Julian emphasizes the generosity of Constantius II in sharing the glory, but not the danger, of his rule. In the second (*Ep. ad Ath.* 270C-272D) his tone is completely different, for he alleges that Constantius II had no sooner appointed Gallus than he began to be jealous of him and to seek to encompass his downfall.

For Constantina's marriage to Hannibalianus see chapter 1, page 39. For Magnentius' proposal to marry her see this chapter, pages 275-276. For her marriage to Gallus the sources include Amm. 14.1.2, 14.7.4, 14.11.6, 14.11.22, 21.1.5, Vict. Epit. 42.1, Zos. 2.45.1, Zon. 13.8.16B, *Art. Pass.* 12, Philost. 3.28, Lib. Or. 37.8, and Jul. *Ep. ad Ath.* 272D. According to the last-named source, Constantina was to have a daughter by Gallus before her own death in 354. Ammianus regarded her as a savage fury goading on her husband to greater and greater crimes. Rather, she had already lost one husband, Hannibalianus, on account of political intrigue, and was determined to save her second one at all costs.

*Art. Pass.* 12; Stein-Palanque 140.

Amm. 14.11.27.

The evidence for Thalassius' continued presence in Illyricum as late as the battle of Mursa on 28 September 351 is provided by A. H. M. Jones, "The Career of Flavius Philippus," *Historia* 4 (1955) 230.

Lib. Or. 18.33, Soz. 5.1, Zos. 2.53.3. Zosimus mentions this act in a later context, late 352. However, the barbarian attacks
on Decentius in that year make it almost certain that Constantius II began his negotiations with the Alamanni in 351, when he needed them the most. See Bastien, *Le monnayage de Magnence* 18, note 92. The campaign is described by Gigli, *La dinastia dei secondi Flavii* 56-65.


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Amm. 31.11.3.

Zos. 2.45.3; Jul. Or. 1.35C, 2.58A.

Zos. 2.48.3.

Zos. 2.46.2-2.47.3, referring to Constans as πονηροῦ Θερίου.

Zos. 2.48.1-5, 2.49.2.

Ath. *Hist. Ar.* 7: Philippus was deposed from his office within a year of the death of Bishop Paul.

*ILS* 738 from Cyprus; L. J. Swift and J. H. Oliver, "Constantius II on Flavius Philippus," *AJP* 83 (1962) 247-264, describing an inscription from Ephesus.


Zos. 2.49.1.

Zos. 2.49.2. Jul. Or. 2.96A may have Titianus in mind when he states that Constantius II spared even the close friends of Magnentius who had curried the favour of the latter by slandering the emperor of the East: see *PLRE* 919.
and 76.

Zos. 2.49.2; Bastien, *Le monnayage de Magnence* 18; LRBC 69

Zos. 2.49.2-4; Bastien, *Le monnayage de Magnence* 19.

*Cons. Const.* for 351.

Zon. 13.8.17B.

In his two panegyrics on Constantius II, Julian is careful to point this out.

Amm. 15.5.33; Vict. *Caes.* 42.15; Jul. *Or.* 1.48B, 2.97C; Zon. 13.8.16B.


Amm. 15.5.33.

Sulp. Sev. *Chron.* 38. In his panegyrics on Constantius II, Julian portrays Constantius II as the active leader and Magnentius as the abject coward: these descriptions reflect the ability of flattery to distort the truth!

Zos. 2.51.1-2.

Zon. 13.8.17B.

Eutr. 10.12.1. The magnitude of this disaster is also appreciated by Zos. 2.51.1, Hieron. *Chron.* for 351, Vict. *Epit.* 42.4, Joh. Ant. frg. 174, and Oros. 7.29.12.

Jul. *Or.* 2.58C-59B.

According to Zos. 2.49.1-2, Constantius II allowed Titianus to return to the court of Magnentius not long before the battle at Mursa. Although Jul. *Or.* 1.38B, 2.58B and 2.96A, claims that after the battle Constantius II issued a general amnesty to all except those guilty of the murders at Rome, the erasure of the name of Titianus from an inscription at Rome points towards his ultimate disgrace, if not death (*ILS* 741). Chastagnol, *La préfecture urbaine à Rome* 422, believes that Titianus suffered only the confiscation of his property, but this plus the loss of his honours were the lightest penalty that could have been invoked in the case of *damnatio memoriae*, unless the erasures of his name were perpetrated by his opponents at Rome and not as a result of imperial policy.

For Aquileia see Jul. *Or.* 2.71C-72A. In the late autumn Constantius II, once again under strong Arian influence thanks to the ingenious device of Bishop Valens of Mursa, sat in judgement on Bishop
Photinus at Sirmium: Soc. 2.28-29; Soz. 4.6; Seeck, Regesten 198; Bastien, *Le monnayage de Magnence* 20. By fleeing to Aquileia, Magnentius abandoned the mint at Siscia.

142 Zon. 13.8.17D-18A. It is possible that this is the plot described by Amm. 14.7.4, who, however, makes no mention of Magnentius in this connexion. See E. A. Thompson, *The Historical Work of Ammianus Marcellinus* (Cambridge 1947) 57 and 63.

143 Hieron. Chron. for 352 indicates that the trouble in the East began as early as this year.

144 V. Neri, "Il miliario di S. Maria in Acquedotto alla luce dei più recenti studi magnenziani," *Studi Romagnoli* 20 (1969) 369-374, dates to this period the Italian inscriptions, such as *CIL* 11.6640, in which Magnentius is referred to as *liberator orbis Romani, restitutor libertatis et rei publicae, and conservator militum et provincialium*. Neri believes that Magnentius was trying to improve a situation that was becoming more and more difficult.


146 Bastien, *Le monnayage de Magnence* 21. The last months of Magnentius are described by Gigli, *La dinastia dei secondi Flavii* 66-71.

147 See this chapter, pages 266-267.

148 Art. Pass. 12; Philost. 3.28; Zon. 13.9.18D. Ammianus fails to mention in his extant books the successful defence of the East undertaken by Gallus. For an analysis of the attitudes towards Gallus see Thompson, *The Historical Work of Ammianus Marcellinus* 56-58.

149 See this chapter, page 305, note 141.

150 *CJ* 6.22.5 of 26 February 352, given at Sirmium.

151 *CTh* 6.53.3 of 27 April 352, given at Sirmium.

152 Hieron, Chron. for 352; Art. Pass. 12; Soc. 2.33; Soz. 4.7; Vict. Caes. 42.11. As Victor explains, the Jews had revolted and set up a certain Patricius *in regni speciem*.

153 *CTh* 7.20.6 of 24 June 352, given at Sirmium. For the date see *PLRE* 413.

154 Jul. Or. 1.39B-D. For the date see Bastien, *Le monnayage de Magnence* 21.

155 Soc. 2.32; Soz. 4.7.

156 Jul. Or. 1.40C, 2.74C; Zos. 2.53.3.
Vict. Epit. 42.5.

Cerealis served as urban prefect from 26 September 352 to 8 December 353: Chron. 354, page 69. He had been praefectus annonae in 328: CTh 14.24.1 of 1 March 328. Since he served on the court that tried Photinus at Sirmium late in 351 (PLRE 198), it is possible that he had just arrived there from Italy. For his career see Chastagnol, Les fastes 135-139.

Amm. 14.11.27.

Chron. 354, page 69. He is last mentioned as urban prefect (for the first time) on 6 July 355: CTh 14.3.2. For his career see Chastagnol, Les fastes 139-147. On the nobility of Orfitus see Arnheim, The Senatorial Aristocracy 126.

ILS 1243.

CIL 6.1739, 1740, 1742.

Chastagnol, La préfecture urbaine à Rome 421-422.

He served as legatus secundo difficillimis temporibus petitu Senatus et P(opuli) R(omani): CIL 6.1739, 1740, 1742; ILS 1243. See PLRE 652 and Chastagnol, La préfecture urbaine à Rome 422.

ILS 1243; Chastagnol, La préfecture urbaine à Rome 423.

Amm. 16.12.4-5. For the dating of this invasion see Bastien, Le monnayage de Magnence 22-23, who concludes as follows: "L'attaque des Alamans a donc coïncidé avec l'occupation de l'Italie par Constance II. La collusion de l'empereur et des barbares, dénoncée par Julien, se trouve ainsi confirmée."


CTh 15.14.5 of 3 November 352, given at Milan.

See this chapter, pages 277-278.

Bastien, Le monnayage de Magnence 24. Earlier, J. P. C. Kent, "Notes on Some Fourth-Century Coin Types," NC 14 (1954) 216-217, had stated that this new design was not utilized in order to win Orthodox support but was rather the result of an astronomical phenomenon.
Athan. Hist. Acep. 3: according to this source, Athanasius had sent an embassy from Alexandria to Constantius II at Milan only four days before the arrival of Montanus at Alexandria. Other sources are Athan. Fest. Ind. 25 and Ap. Const. 19.

Athanasius was forced to abandon his church on 9 February 356: Athan. Fest. Ind. 28.

173 Bastien, Le monnayage de Magnence 28. The manuscripts date CTh 10.8.4 to 9 June 346. Since this edict deals with the property of those who sub hoste publico egerunt aqve in proelio poenas debitas pependerunt, it could refer to the supporters of Constantine II, killed in 340; however, in this case it should have been issued much closer to his overthrow. The edict is addressed to Juvenalis, the rationalis of Numidia, and therein lies the clue, for there is extant an inscription from Cirta in Numidia dedicated to Flav. Val. Constantino] by Iulius Juvenal[ius] rat. Numidiae et Mau[ret]ianum (ILS 691). Although the emperor's name is incomplete, it almost certainly refers to Constantine I, who is always called Valerius, not to Constantius II, who is called Julius in nearly every instance. This being the case, the edict almost certainly dates to the fourth consulship of Constantine I, that is to the year 315, and not to the fourth consulship of Constantius II, that is 346. The hoste publico, therefore, must have been Maxentius, not Constantine II or Magnentius. See PLRE 491.

Amm. 15.6.4. This revolt is dated to July 353 by Bastien, Le monnayage de Magnence 24. It is also dated to 353 by J. P. C. Kent, "The Revolt of Trier against Magnentius," NC 19 (1959) 105-108, and by LRBC 45-46. The date is based upon the coin-types struck by Poemenius in honour of Constantius II.

Bastien, Le monnayage de Magnence 24.

Bastien, Le monnayage de Magnence 25. Constantius II was in Milan as late as 3 July 353: CTh 16.8.7 (dated 357 by the manuscripts, 353 by PLRE 886).

Soc. 2.32; Soz. 4.7; Jul. Or. 1.40A-B, 2.74C.

For the date see Seeck, Geschichte 4.439. Chron. Pasch. for 354 gives 10 August, Cons. Const. for 353 gives 11 August, and Soc. 2.32 gives 15 August. Lugdunum is mentioned by Hieron. Chron. for 353, Cons. Const. for 353, Chron. Pasch. for 354, Vict. Epit. 42.6, Eutr. 10.12.2, Oros. 7.29.13, Joh. Ant. frg. 174, Philost. 3.26, Soc. 2.32, and Soz. 4.7. Some sources allege that Magnentius killed his own mother before taking his own life: Joh. Ant. frg. 174, Soc. 2.32, Soz. 4.7. It was also said that he killed (Philost. 3.26, Soc. 2.32, Soz. 4.7) or attempted to kill (Zon. 13.9.18B-D) a brother by the name of Desiderius; this brother may be fictitious and may result from confusion regarding the death of the Caesar Decentius a few days later. According to Vict. Epit. 42.6, Magnentius was in his fiftieth year when
he committed suicide. Other sources include Zos. 2.53.3–2.54.1 and Jul. Or. 1.40A–B, 2.74C, and 2.95D–96A.

179 For the precise date see Cons. Const. for 353. For the location see Hieron. Chron. for 353, Eutr. 10.12.2, and Oros. 7.29.13. Other sources include Vict. Caes. 42.10, Vict. Epit. 42.8, Zos. 2.54.2, Zon. 13.9.18C, and Joh. Ant. frg. 174.

180 Amm. 22.14.4.

181 CTh 9.38.2 of 6 September 353, given at Lugdunum. This edict is discussed by R. C. Blockley, Ammianus Marcellinus: A Study of his Historiography and Political Thought (Brussels, 1975) 185–186. For a silver medallion that might have been issued at this time see J. P. C. Kent, "An Unpublished Silver Medallion of Constantius II," NC 15 (1955) 237–238; the obverse shows Constantius II holding a branch with his left hand and a spear with his right, the former suggesting mercy for the conquered and the latter symbolizing the downfall of the arrogant.

182 Amm. 18.9.3.

183 On the date of Constantius II's tricennalia see chapter 1, pages 21 and 53. 10 October, the date given by Amm. 14.5.1, has rightly been called into question. To this period M. Thirion, "Les vota impériaux sur les monnaies entre 337 et 364," SNR 44 (1965) 12, dates solidi with the legend VOT XXX MULT XXXX; these coins commemorated both the beginning of the tricennalia of Constantius II and his defeat of Magnentius. Constantius II did not visit Rome until 357. When he did so, part of his purpose was to celebrate a triumph over Roman blood, that is, a victory in civil war: post Magnenti exitium absque nomine ex sanguine Romano triumphaturus (Amm. 16.10.1). This triumph was considered to be somewhat disgraceful: see Amm. 16.10.2 and P. Jal, La guerre civile à Rome (Paris 1963) 447 and 460.

184 LRBC 9 and 54. H. Rolland, "Deux dates de chronologie arlésienne," Latomus 13 (1954) 203, prefers 10 October 353, the date given in the manuscripts of Amm. 14.5.1.

185 CTh 16.10.5 of 23 November 353.

186 The inscriptions from which the name of Magnentius was erased included only one from Africa and four from Italy: AE (1933) 105 from Africa, with the name of Decentius erased as well but, of course, the name of Constantius II retained; CIL 9.5940, CIL 11.6640, ILS 741 (with the name of Fabius Titianus also erased), and AE (1951) 17 from Italy. On the other hand, there are some twenty-eight non-mutilated inscriptions of Magnentius and Decentius: CIL 2.4744, CIL 2.4765, CIL 2.4827, CIL 5.8061, CIL 6.1167 (with the name of Titianus also extant), CIL 8.10169, CIL 8.22193, CIL 8.22197, CIL 8.22285, CIL 8.22552 (Magnentius listed with Constantius II), CIL 8.22558

187 Amm. 14.5.1.

188 Amm. 14.5.6-9. According to C. H. V. Sutherland, "Carausius II, Censeris, and the Barbarous Fel. Temp. Reparatio Overstrikes," NC 5 (1945) 125-133, and Ph. V. Hill, "Barbarous Imitations of Fourth-Century Roman Coins," NC 10 (1950) 247-248, there could have been usurpers in Britain named Carausius and Censeris, men who had taken advantage of the civil war between Constantius II and Magnentius. It is unlikely, however, that these usurpers existed. Rather, these coins were simply overstrikes designed to evade the laws of forgery at a time of economic stress: J. P. C. Kent, "Carausius II - Fact or Fiction?", NC 17 (1957) 78-83. Kent, in a letter dated 15 February 1974, is of the opinion that another coin, of a "Saturninus," struck at this period at Siscia was an altered coin of Constantius Gallus. Kent continues as follows: "Further, I have no doubt that all recorded pieces of Desiderius [the fictitious second brother of Magnentius], Constantina [the wife of Gallus], and Silvanus [usurper at Cologne in 355] are concoctions of the Renaissance or later periods." In conclusion, we can be quite certain that Carausius II, Censeris, Saturninus, and Desiderius did not exist as usurpers in the middle of the fourth century, that coins were never minted in honour of Constantina, and that Silvanus never produced coins in his own name simply because his revolt lasted only twenty-eight days and never involved the mint at Trier.

189 A very useful critique of Ammianus' coverage of Gallus is provided by E. A. Thompson, The Historical Work of Ammianus Marcellinus (Cambridge 1947) 56-71. R. N. Mooney, "Gallus Caesar's Last Journey," CPh 53 (1958) 175-177, is in basic agreement with Thompson, although he considers that Gallus' reaction to the summons of Constantius II was a result of terror, not of self-sacrifice. More recent analyses are provided by R. C. Blockley's recent endeavours, "Constantius Gallus and Julian as Caesars of Constantius II," Latomus 31 (1972) 433-468, and Ammianus Marcellinus: A Study of his Historiography and Political Thought (Brussells 1975) 18-29. C. A. Balducci, "Gallo," RFIC 18 (1940) 264-271, considers that Gallus' predicament was the result of a conflict between the civil administration and the military. See also Gibbon 2.260-269 and C. di Spigno, "Appunti per una lettura del libro XIV di Ammiano Marcellino," Orpheus 7 (1960) 133-151.
CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION

The study of the last eight years of the reign of Constantius II and of the brief reign of Julian that marked the end of the Second Flavian dynasty is facilitated by a considerable improvement in both the quality and the quantity of the primary sources. In addition to the detailed account of those years given by Ammianus Marcellinus, there are extant many letters and orations composed by contemporaries of Constantius II. Various works composed by the rhetorician Libanius, like Ammianus a native of Antioch, are useful for this period, but none more so than the five speeches pertaining to Julian as Augustus and three written in defence of Julian's policies and actions soon after his death. The philosopher Themistius was a native of Constantinople and spent most of his life in that city, being adlected into its senate in 355 and serving as its last proconsul in 358-9. His speeches in honour of Constantius II, and also the speech of that emperor granting him membership in the senate, must, like those of Libanius, be used with care; they provide few details regarding events of the period but do convey the aspirations of the administration if not its accomplishments. Both Libanius and Themistius advocated religious toleration and, by praising Constantius II and Julian for their moderation and humanity, attempted to instill these virtues ever deeper into the hearts of the
princes. Far more political, and less philosophical, was the oration of Claudius Mamertinus on the occasion of the commencement of his consuls-ship in January 362. Mamertinus' main purpose was not the expression of his gratitude to Julian for being granted the highest honour but rather a spirited defence of Julian's revolt against Constantius II. Mamertinus portrays the court of Constantius II as riddled with intrigue and suspicion. He declares that the administrators of Constantius II deliberately deceived their Augustus in order to foment dissension between him and Julian Caesar and that they left Julian no choice but revolution if he was to save himself from their wiles and not suffer the fate of his brother Gallus. Mamertinus regarded Constantius II not as evil but as misguided. The main contemporary Christian source, Athanasius, was not so charitable. He was forced to abandon his church for a third time in 356 and soon despaired of making excuses for his treatment at the hands of Constantius II. Instead of blaming the Arian eunuchs at court for the intransigent attitude of the emperor, he blamed Constantius II himself for the persecution meted out against the Orthodox and labelled him the Antichrist. None of the aforementioned sources, including Ammianus, attempts to explain the origin of the state of affairs at the court of Constantius II. This task was undertaken by the emperor's cousin, Julian.

Julian's survival long after the murder of his father Julius Constantius and his eldest brother in 337 can best be attributed to his youth and his obscurity, the latter being forced upon him by Constantius II. Julian also escaped death when his elder brother, Gallus Caesar, was executed late in 354. Made Caesar in Gaul late in 355, largely at
the instigation of Eusebia, the second wife of Constantius II, Julian encountered at first hand the machinations of the various factions of the bureaucracy. At first Julian tried desperately to please his cousin Constantius II. Keeping the fate of his brother Gallus in mind, he resorted to base flattery in his two panegyrics of Constantius II, although his praise of Eusebia in his third oration was far more sincere. As the years passed and Julian proved to be unable to reconcile the desires of his own soldiers and those of the bureaucrats of Constantius II, his relations with his cousin worsened until his army mutinied and proclaimed him Augustus. Since Constantius II, worked into a fit of rage by his court, refused to recognize Julian as anyone greater than a subordinate, civil war was inevitable. Julian ceased to flatter Constantius II and, as he marched east from Gaul, he sought to justify his actions by listing his grievances against his cousin. One of these letters is extant, that addressed to the senate and people of Athens. In this letter Julian heaps scorn upon the excuse proffered for the crimes of Constantius II, namely, that he had indulged in the persecution of his uncles and cousins because he was deceived by his court and intimidated by his mutinous army. Throughout this letter Julian expresses his conviction that Constantius II at heart envied and mistrusted both Gallus and himself and required little encouragement from the eunuchs, the most influential of whom was the grand chamberlain Eusebius. Julian makes no attempt to analyse the behaviour of Constantine II and Constans, probably because they were practically unknown to him.

Constantius II died of natural causes before he and Julian had
the opportunity to meet in battle and declared Julian his successor. In his satire on the Caesars, written soon after his annexation of the East, Julian concentrated his attack upon the corrupt practices of Constantine I and left his sons nearly unscathed. For a close analysis of the causes of the weaknesses of Constantius II and his brothers, one must turn to Julian's seventh oration, directed against the Cynic Heraclius who had ventured to recite before Julian a myth in which the gods were treated with irreverence. After criticizing Heraclius for his impropriety, Julian adds a myth of his own as an illustration of correct practice. This myth is, in part, an attempt to vindicate his actions and to portray himself as a second Hercules, chosen by the gods to remedy the sins of his uncle Constantine I and his sons. In the myth Julian tells of a very rich man (i.e., Constantine I) who had vast holdings of land, part of which he had inherited from his father (i.e., Constantius I) and part of which he had acquired, by both fair means and foul, from his neighbours (i.e., Maxentius and Licinius). This rich man had several wives (i.e., Minervina and Fausta) and by them several sons and daughters (i.e., Crispus, Constantine II, Constantius II, Constans, Helena, and Constantina), among the survivors of whom he divided his property when he died. Julian relates that the rich man had failed to instruct his sons in the proper management of the estate but rather had put his trust in the number of his sons. The result was that, even when he was still alive, his sons, lacking a suitable education, fell to quarrelling, since each one desired to be as wealthy as his father and to possess the entire estate. Their relatives (i.e., Dalmatius the Elder, Julius Constantius, Dalmatius Caesar, Hannibalianus, and others)
also took part in this game of avarice, since they had a similar upbringing. When the father died, a massacre ensued until in the end only one of the sons (i.e., Constantius II) remained in possession of the estate. Julian next describes how Zeus and Helios took pity on a cousin of the sons (i.e., Julian) and proceeded to instruct him in the correct way of managing the estate by revealing the weaknesses of his cousin. After pointing out the sole surviving heir, Helios encouraged the youth to analyse both him and his servants. The youth concluded that the heir was negligent and devoted to pleasure and that of his servants, a few were honest but most were grasping and brutal. He added that the majority of the herdsmen not only ruined the flocks but also kept most of the returns for themselves and returned the heir but little, while they had the audacity to complain that they were being defrauded of their wages. The youth considered this to be a serious case of mismanagement. Thereupon Helios told him that he was fated to govern in place of his cousin the heir, and Athene instructed him in good government. She pointed out that the heir did not appreciate the efforts of his good servants because flatterers had made him their own slave and that consequently he was disliked by the good and exploited by those who were supposed to be serving him. Athene's final instruction to the youth was that, when he returned to the estate, he should befriend, not flatter, his cousin. The fable ends as Helios sends the youth to his appointed task.

It was Julian's belief, therefore, that Constantine I had made his sons acquisitive but not competent, to the end that they trusted their own courtiers more than one another and became the slaves, not the
rulers, of their own advisers. He concluded that, as a result, they quarrelled with one another and put an end to the rule of their own family. Libanius, who had earlier glorified the education of the sons of Constantine I, was of a similar opinion. In his thirteenth oration, delivered to Julian upon his arrival in Antioch in the summer of 362, Libanius states his belief that a person consigned to a private position in his early years is more capable of administration than someone born in the purple, since the former has practical knowledge of the affairs that he will have to manage. Libanius' theme was later taken up by Edward Gibbon:

But the genius of Constantine himself had been formed by adversity and experience. . . . His destined successors had the misfortune of being born and educated in the Imperial purple. Incessantly surrounded with a train of flatterers, they passed their youth in the enjoyment of luxury and the expectation of a throne; nor would the dignity of their rank permit them to descend from that elevated station from whence the various characters of human nature appear to wear a smooth and uniform aspect.

The problem faced by the sons of Constantine the Great was not how to reign, but how to rule. Loyalty to the Second Flavian dynasty remained strong even in the West, as Magnentius discovered when Flavius Philippus almost succeeded in winning the usurper's troops over to the side of Constantius II by appealing to the benefits they had received under Constantine I. This loyalty enabled them to reign. But in order to rule they had to be the masters of their own house and to be cognizant of the problems faced by the population as a whole. This they proved to be unable to do. The bureaucracy, ever larger and more complicated, cut them off from the realities of administration. Their father, Constantine I, had inherited the rule of the prefecture of Gaul
from his father, Constantius I, but the army was instrumental in his success. Constantine I had received the training of a soldier, not of an emperor, in the East and had become the darling of the British army before the death of his father. His practical experience, not loyalty to his father, enabled him to overcome Maximian, Maxentius, and finally Licinius. The soldiers preferred to follow the proven commander, even though the marital status of his mother Helena was open to question, rather than his half-brothers, the sons of Constantius I and Theodora, who were too young and inexperienced for their liking. Constantine I's ascendancy over his half-brothers was so great that he did not murder them as threats to his authority but rather allowed them to enjoy comfortable private lives, albeit in cities remote from the frontiers and the armies.

After the defeat of Licinius in 324, Constantine I found himself in a position very similar to his father's in 306. Like his father, he had one son (i.e., Crispus), by far the oldest and most experienced but of questionable birth-status (i.e., he had been born of the concubine Minervina), who stood head and shoulders above the others, who, though legitimate (i.e., sons of Fausta), were still mere infants. The solution seemed simple, that is, to groom Crispus for the succession and to relegate the other sons to a private existence, but this was not possible. Constantine I had already made both Constantine II and Constantius II Caesars, largely in order to increase his prestige vis-à-vis that of Licinius, and he did not want to demote them because by so doing he would have been violating tradition, affronting his wife Fausta, and ignoring the one great difference between his position in
324 and his father's in 306. Constantius I had only the prefecture of Gaul to entrust to his son, and this territory was easily managed by one emperor, but in 324 Constantine I ruled the entire Roman Empire and feared that even his eldest son would not be able to rule the population effectively if the father should suddenly be incapacitated.

Constantine I's difficulty, in short, was the problem of reconciling dynastic loyalty and the old system of Diocletian's tetrarchy, itself an admission that the Empire had grown too complex for one man to manage. Fausta still lived and urged Constantine I to grant her own sons the same powers as Crispus had. But a tetrarchy consisting of Constantine I's sons was certain not to succeed, because the three younger brothers owed everything to their father, not to Crispus. The tetrarchy of Diocletian had succeeded only because Diocletian's fellow Augustus Maximian and his Caesars Constantius I and Galerius owed their rank to Diocletian alone, who was a master statesman. After the abdication of Diocletian and Maximian, political chaos had ensued, out of which Constantine I had emerged as sole ruler. Confident that Crispus was not yet capable of managing the whole, Constantine I compromised the dynastic and tetrarchic systems in the hope that his sons would remain united after his death and thereby be able to manage the problems of Empire.

It was inevitable, however, that Crispus, by far the eldest, should take precedence over his brothers. A clear sign of this had been his posting to Gaul, for as Constantine I advanced to the East that prefecture required the son possessing the greatest ability. Fausta's fear of Crispus' ascendancy gave rise to factions in the administration:
on the one hand, Helena, jealous of Theodora and her relatives including Fausta, supported the primacy of Crispus; on the other hand, Fausta considered that the safety of her own sons could be guaranteed only by the elimination of Crispus. By devious means she accomplished her purpose but at the same time encompassed her own demise.

Helena, triumphant, persuaded her son Constantine I to continue the enforced obscurity of the sons of Theodora but after her death in 329 he recalled them from semi-exile and gave them positions of power and distinction. In 335, after having already made Constans a Caesar in 333, Constantine I completed the restoration of the house of Theodora by making the younger Dalmatius a Caesar and Hannibalianus King of Kings of Armenia. Constantine I's problem had become the opposite of Diocletian's: whereas Diocletian had no male relations to whom he might turn, Constantine I had too many aspiring to power. The competition for the succession became so keen that various elements in the bureaucracy sought to support what each hoped would be the winning candidate. Constantine I tried to resolve the problem by intermarriage: he arranged the marriage of a daughter of Julius Constantius to Constantius II and of his own daughter Constantina to Hannibalianus, but the competition within the Second Flavian dynasty remained, largely because of the education of the young Caesars.

So long as the Caesars remained at court with their father, he served as their foremost instructor and was able to mould their characters along a path conducive to harmony and competence. But, when he sent them forth from the court to the provinces in order to give them experience and publicity, he lost much of his influence on their
education and entrusted them to other administrators. As the Caesars began to mature, their father appointed for them courts of their own. The bureaucrats at each court realized that, as their Caesar gained in power, they would prosper; conversely, if their Caesar was eliminated, they would be demoted and become the servants of the victor.

In the West, where they spent their years as Caesars, Constantine II and Constans fell under the influence of Orthodox bishops, most notably Julius of Rome, Maximinus of Trier, and, for a short time, the exiled Athanasius. In the East, Constantius II became heavily imbued with Arian doctrine, particularly by Eusebius, the bishop of Nicomedia. The Arians gained power at the eastern court by winning over first Constantia, sister of Constantine I, then the eunuchs, and finally through them the emperor himself and the Caesar Constantius II. Dalmatius, half-brother of Constantine I, had aided their most violent Orthodox opponent, Athanasius. This was not surprising, since the offspring of Theodora had spent many years in the primarily Orthodox West. Once the Arians at the eastern court determined upon the elimination of the elder Dalmatius, they realized that his sons and his brother Julius Constantius would also have to be killed if revenge was to be avoided. The Caesars, who had little experience in the field and were constantly subjected to the persuasion and flattery of self-seeking bishops and bureaucrats at court, became the tools of these advisers. Their minds were poisoned against the prefects, vicars, masters of the soldiers, and even each other. The unity of the three sons of Constantine I had been destroyed to a great extent even before their father died. Constantius II, brought up in this atmosphere of
fear and suspicion and also realizing full well the inferiority of himself and his brothers to their father, was easily persuaded to approve the massacre of the descendants of Theodora and of their supporters. It is unfair to accuse him of the murders, but it is certainly right to find him guilty of injustice, for he failed to try the defendants but condemned them sight unseen. In this respect he betrayed the impulsive nature of his father, who had condemned Crispus and Fausta to death without a proper investigation of the charges.

With the murder of Dalmatius Caesar, the new tetrarchy, founded on the dynastic principle and on the loyalty of its members to its recently deceased progenitor, ceased to exist. No sooner had the news of his death reached each court than the bureaucrats and bishops tried to persuade each remaining Caesar to seize a greater share of the Empire. The attempt by Constantine I to secure a certain primacy for his eldest surviving son, Constantine II, failed, nor was the position of Constans at all clear. Intent upon keeping all the power for himself while he still lived, Constantine I gave no definite plans for the government that was to succeed him. His will probably allocated primacy to Constantine II, not to Constantius II as the eastern eunuchs and bishops doctored it, but it failed to define this concept. Even if it had done so, it would have been of little use, for the younger sons owed no allegiance or debt to their brother. The result was that Constans, in the weakest position, resented his father's seemingly half-hearted preparations for him while Constantine II and Constantius II, the former with good reason, the latter deceived by his court, each believed that he himself was to inherit his father's position as supreme
monarch.

Hostilities on the frontiers and the meeting of the three brothers at Viminacium forestalled civil war. In fact, the meeting of the brothers frustrated the schemes of their courtiers. Had the three been together with their father when he died, they would probably have reigned jointly in peace thereafter. As matters stood, the bureaucrats flourished by isolating the brothers from one another and from the civil and military officials of the provinces. Each courtier feared demotion and perhaps worse if his Augustus should die; consequently, their actions were understandable, even if exceedingly self-centred. When the brothers returned to their customary headquarters, the eunuchs and others at court were free to hound them with fear and suspicion again. In the East, they secured the murder of their most powerful opponent, Ablabius. In the West, they exhorted Constans to assert greater independence. Constantine II, furious at the insubordination of his youngest brother, attacked with a small force and was killed in an ambush. Constantine II was not the great general that his father had been; his speed, but not his carelessness, was reminiscent of his father. Italy, Africa, and the prefecture of Gaul were caught unawares and took the logical step of recognizing Constans as their Augustus. In the East, Constantius II was too busy with the Persian wars to interfere. In the West, Constans had no need of a second court and so many of the officials of Constantine II were demoted in favour of his own administrators or cashiered altogether. The result was a lingering discontent in Gaul that festered and broke out into open rebellion in 350.
During the early years of the joint reign of Constantius II and Constans their relationship was often strained but civil war was avoided because both, whatever their shortcomings, gave priority to the defence of the Empire against the Persians in the East and the Franks in the West. Our only detailed evidence for the friction between the brothers concerns the struggle of Athanasius to be restored to his see at Alexandria. In the West the Orthodox bishops entreated Constans to enforce the return of Athanasius to his see, while in the East the Arians besought Constantius II to do all in his power to impede the return of Athanasius. Constantius II had exiled Athanasius because he believed that this action would bring religious peace to the East. When he realized that turmoil did not end with the departure of Athanasius, Constantius II became less tolerant of the Arians. But when he was threatened with war by Constans if he would not welcome back Athanasius, even his advisers agreed that it would be better to endure Athanasius than to risk all. The timely death of Gregorius, the Arian bishop of Alexandria, gave Constantius II the opportunity he needed to extricate himself from a difficult dilemma. With the restoration of Athanasius, the relations between the two Augusti improved markedly. But while Constantius II concerned himself with the Persian menace, certain policies of Constans alienated a growing segment of western society.

Support for revolution against Constans came from four main sources. In the first place, Constans' failure to respect the memory of Constantine II and his tendency to vilify his late brother ensured that he never won the devoted allegiance of the civil and military establishment of the prefecture of Gaul. Evidence for this is essentially two-
fold: his mid-winter campaign to put down unrest in Britain and his own murder in Gaul at the hands of western officials. A second source of discontent was his almost fanatical support of Orthodox Christianity, an affront to Arians, Donatists, and pagans alike, especially to those in the Senate and the army. His attempt to modify his earlier legislation in favour of the Orthodox faith proved to be too little and too late; the harm had been done. The third source of disaffection was his downgrading of the Senate and of the city of Rome by the unification of the urban prefecture and the praetorian prefecture of Italy and Africa and by the appointment of easterners to the new joint position. Whether this was done on his own initiative or at the instigation of Constantius II, the result was the same, namely, the alienation of many of the senatorial class, most notably Fabius Titianus, the praetorian prefect of Gaul. His fourth mistake, and perhaps his greatest, was his failure to take an active part in military affairs in the last years of his life and his demand for ever greater discipline in the army without the bestowal of satisfactory compensation.

When the reign of Constans became undesirable to too many people, several elements of society engineered his removal. The attempt of Constantine I to lessen the possibility of rebellion by the separation of civil and military functions proved to be a failure, for it did not eliminate conspiracy. When the chief civil administrator, Fabius Titianus, a senior financial officer, Marcellinus, and a leading commander, Magnentius, decided that the deposition of Constans was necessary, it was done. The conspirators chose Magnentius as their new emperor because they were convinced that the army preferred, and the
Empire required, a general, one who would ensure the safety of the frontiers and adopt a more tolerant internal policy. Their choice was vindicated by the army and the provincials in Gaul for, although Constans escaped for a short time, he was unable to gain support and finally perished, abandoned by all but a few friends. What is more, Magnentius required no campaigns in order to win the rest of the West. Britain and Spain rallied to his cause with enthusiasm, although Italy and Africa contained many dissidents, especially in the senatorial class.

Magnetius' success in the West was reminiscent of that of Constantine I. Both were soldier-emperors, respected by the armies far more than Constans, who had spent his formative years in the pacific centres of Constantinople and Aquileia and had left the initiative in most military matters to his generals except in the three years immediately following the murder of Constantine II. Support for the Second Flavian dynasty remained strong in Italy and enabled Nepotianus, a nephew of Constantine I, to enjoy a brief success at Rome, but his lack of a strong military force caused his downfall. Magnentius' failure to maintain the momentum of his revolution and to enjoy the success of Constantine I by advancing rapidly towards the East was largely a result of his lack of ambition. Unlike Constantine I, he felt no sense of a divine mission to conquer and rule the entire Empire. Instead, he seemed content with his lot after ridding the West of Constans and fortifying the Julian Alps in order to ward off attacks from the East. He recognized both Vetranio, an aged general who was the choice of the Second Flavians to hold Illyricum against Magnentius, and
Constantius II, and sought by means of intermarriage to cement a strong alliance with the eastern emperor. Magnentius might have achieved his desire of a peaceful joint reign with Vetranio and Constantius II had not the Persian pressure on the East eased, enabling Constantius II to adopt an aggressive internal policy. Constantius II had another important reason to oppose Magnentius: if he recognized the murderer of his brother Constans, he would encourage usurpation in his own territory.

The armies and peoples of Illyricum had no special grievances against Constans, who had paid more attention to their welfare than had his brother Constantine II. Consequently, it was quite easy for Constantius II to win over the troops of that area by a brilliantly staged harangue and to secure the abdication of Vetranio, whose main purpose had been to hold Illyricum for the Second Flavians. Constantius II, however, was not so successful when dealing with the armies of Gaul. It is true that Flavius Philippus, the prefect of Constantius II, was able to cause the loyalty of Magnentius' troops to waver by recalling their exploits under Constantine I, but Magnentius soon regained their support by appealing to their grievances against Constans, a son totally unworthy of his father. With the exception of some cavalrymen led by Silvanus, the army of Gaul remained loyal to Magnentius. In fact, it was the fanatical allegiance on both sides that produced the great carnage at Mursa. By collaborating with the barbarians beyond the Rhine (a tactic that he may have utilized in the East against the Persians), Constantius II had forced Magnentius to leave many of his forces with his brother Decentius and so had ensured that his own army
would outnumber his opponent's at Mursa. This practice was to prove disastrous to the West, but it did ensure a bloody victory at Mursa for Constantius II. Even so, the loyalty of Gaul to Magnentius was so strong that Constantius II required nearly two more years in order to put an end to rebellion in the West. The soldiers and administrators in the West realized, quite correctly, that Constantius II would show them little mercy and, as a result, fought on tenaciously until no hope was left. Yet their subsequent support of Julian Caesar, even though he was appointed by Constantius II, shows that they were still content with the concept of the Second Flavian dynasty; it was only Constans whom they found objectionable, although they feared the suspicious mind of his brother.

Constantius II did not completely trust his eastern armies and, when campaigning in the West, sent to them his cousin Gallus, giving him the name Flavius Claudius Constantius so that he might better represent the Augustus. Yet, no sooner had Gallus set out for the East than Constantius II began to fear him. Constantius II's greatest problem was his suspicion of all but his closest personal advisers, men who feared the prefects, masters of the soldiers, and other administrators serving at a distance from the court and did their best to ensure that none of them would become influential with the emperor. This powerful faction at court was led by the grand chamberlain Eusebius, who served in that capacity during the entire reign of Constantius II and lived long enough to pay the ultimate penalty under Julian Augustus. Eusebius feared lest Gallus become powerful because he had been one of those who engineered the murder of Gallus' father, Julius Constantius. Constantius II,
however, was already indebted to Vulcacius Rufinus, an uncle of Gallus who, as prefect of Illyricum under Constans, had been instrumental in saving Illyricum for the Second Flavian dynasty by the timely proclamation of Vetranio. Besides, Constantius II, even though distrustful of Gallus, preferred that a relative should serve as his representative in the East.

Gallus' main problem was twofold: the ambiguity of his position as Caesar and the intrigue indulged in by his old enemies both in the East and at the court of Constantius II. Gallus, highly temperamental partly as a result of the horrors of his youth, was unable to convince Constantius II of his loyalty and of the insidious plots of the eunuchs and was executed soon after Constantius II put an end to Magnentius' rebellion. The crisis in Gaul resulting from Constantius II's intrigue with the barbarians and the defeat of Magnentius and Decentius compelled him to turn one year after the death of Gallus to his last surviving male relative, Julian, and to send him as Caesar into the stricken provinces. Julian faced the same problems that Gallus had encountered but proved to be more able to cope with them. In fact, Constantius II died before he was able to oppose Julian in battle.

In sum, the characters and reigns of the sons of Constantine I were determined for the most part not by heredity, nor by the instructions of their father, but by their teachers during their youth and by their advisers at court after the death of their father. The Empire was so large and complex that the great general Constantine I was barely able to manage it. His sons inherited it before they were old enough to spurn the flattery and pleading of the eunuchs at court and of
the bishops who sought to overcome their Christian opponents by the use of the secular arm. The murders of Crispus and Fausta, and later of most of their other relatives, rendered all three sons suspicious and insecure; consequently, they turned even more to their advisers at court, for they trusted only those who were within their grasp. A great barrier arose between the sons and the problems of their subjects. This barrier, the central bureaucracy, grew more corrupt while the initiative of the armies and the provincials was sapped. Proof that knowledge of the problems involved could bring about a much happier state of affairs is to be found in Julian's subsequent revitalization of Gaul.

The crimes of this period were perpetrated not by the sons of Constantine I, who knew little about the true state of affairs, but by their advisers at court, most notably the grand chamberlain Eusebius. Their weakness foreshadows that of Arcadius and Honorius and other emperors born in the purple. The growing influence of the bureaucrats of the court at the expense of the authority of the emperor himself is made abundantly clear in Ammianus' account of the last eight years of the reign of Constantius II.

Scribant reliqua potiores, aetate et doctrinis florentes.
Quos id (si libuerit) aggressuros, procudere linguas ad maiores moneo stilos.
Notes to Chapter Five

2. Jul. Or. 7.227C-234C.
5. Amm. 31.16.9.
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