THE INFLUENCE OF INTRAORGANIZATIONAL CONFLICT UPON THE BEHAVIOUR OF A COLLECTIVE BARGAINING TEAM

by

GORDON DOUGLAS STOREY

B.A., University of British Columbia, 1965

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SCIENCE IN BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION in

THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES

(Factory of Commerce and Business Administration Industrial Relations/Organizational Behavior)

We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard

THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

September, 1978

© Gordon Douglas Storey, 1978
In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by his representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission.

Department of Commerce and Business Administration

The University of British Columbia
2075 Wesbrook Place
Vancouver, Canada
V6T 1W5

Date Oct 6/78
ABSTRACT:
This thesis reports theory development and explorative field observation of potential effects of conflict occurring within a collective bargaining team. From the theoretical bases of Walton and McKersie's (1965) intraorganizational conflict (IOC) concept and Pondy's (1967) process model of conflict, a model of bargaining team IOC is developed. The model partitions bargaining team IOC into functional and dysfunctional subsets. Seven propositions related to the effects of dysfunctional IOC are developed from conflict and decision making literature. These propositions are concerned with the effects of dysfunctional IOC on participation of team members, rule breaking behavior, time delays, and decision styles.

Operational definitions and tests for dysfunctional IOC are developed using Filley's (1975) five item definition of conflict and seven item win-lose, lose-lose, conflict responses. A participant/observer quasi-case analysis of an actual collective bargaining team experience is the basis for data generation.

Many of the propositions are supported in the observed bargaining team environment. While the single case methodology prevents generalized conclusions.
regarding the effects of dysfunctional IOC, the findings tentatively suggest there may be considerable practical payoffs for extending this research area.

The field experience provides some additional research insights regarding the dynamic variable of dysfunctional IOC. In this study, dysfunctional bargaining team IOC is observed as a few recurring issue-related problems flowing throughout the bargaining team interactions. Implications of this study regarding future research on IOC in a bargaining team are suggested.
Table of Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Conflict and Bargaining Team Behavior</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>Theoretical Consequences of IOC</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PART I</td>
<td>IOC Theory and an Operational Model</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. Bargaining Team Behaviors..</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. IOC:A Theoretical Model of Influence</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Conflict Defined and Operationalized</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Functional and Dysfunctional IOC</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PART II</td>
<td>Propositions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. Dysfunctional IOC Outcomes in a Collective Bargaining Team</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Summary</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>Choice of Methodology</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. Introduction</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. The Purpose of Research....</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Present Methods of Researching Conflict</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. An Approach to the Study of Bargaining Team IOC</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>A Field Study of Bargaining Team IOC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. Introduction</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table of Contents (Continued)</td>
<td>Page</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Background</td>
<td>62</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Observation Methods</td>
<td>66</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Dysfunctional IOC Behavior</td>
<td>67</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Summary</td>
<td>97</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER V - Conclusions</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Appropriateness of the Theoretical Model</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Utility of Operational Definitions</td>
<td>104</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Conclusions Related to Propositions</td>
<td>109</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>References</td>
<td>117</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
List of Tables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TABLE I</td>
<td>Member Assessment of Decision Making Style</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLE II</td>
<td>Summary of Proposition Findings</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

List of Figures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FIGURE</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FIGURE 1</td>
<td>Model of Theoretical IOC Generation and Influence Upon Bargaining Team Behavior</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIGURE 2</td>
<td>Hypothetical Illustration of IOC/Tolerance Level Interactions</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIGURE 3</td>
<td>Operational Definition of Functional and Dysfunctional IOC</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIGURE 4</td>
<td>Stages of Theory Generation</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS:

The help and assistance of so many people goes into a project of this sort that it becomes impossible to rightly and faithfully acknowledge them all. To those not specifically recognized here I trust to your kindness and understanding.

A most sincere thank you is of course extended to all the members of my thesis committee. Their professional wisdom, patience and encouragement throughout this long and sometimes stumbling odyssey is most appreciated.

Friends and loved ones most certainly should share in this accomplishment. They provided caring support, sacrificing countless hours of play and leisure time and even putting up with the odd emotional tyrade when things weren't going smoothly. To Graham, Brian and Shannon, thank you.

Supportive critics are indeed rare gems. For the determined and sometimes trying efforts of critiquing my earlier drafts and acting as a sounding board of ideas a very special acknowledgement to my colleague, Debby Cleveland.

For the patient and expert transformation of my illegible handwriting into this finished document credit is extended to my typist, Terry Ross.
Finally, I wish to acknowledge and dedicate this thesis to one who is not able to read it, but who fostered and nurtured my desire to ask questions and to seek their answer - G. (Les) Storey.
CHAPTER ONE: Conflict and Bargaining Team Behavior

Ask industrial relations practitioners and participants of collective bargaining teams if conflict within the team is an important consideration related to its operation and performance and they will emphatically answer, yes. Several seasoned industrial relations negotiators reported a considerable awareness of problems they have encountered due to conflict within the collective bargaining team (W. Rolfe & M. Wilkinson, personal communication, February 1976).

As team leaders, they attempt to treat, that is control, the level of conflict within their teams through a variety of techniques such as preselection of compatible team members, focused discussion, or avoidance of discussion of certain issues, and even the removal of team members. Functioning over a period of several years in both negotiator and team-member collective bargaining roles, this author has directly observed the occurrence and treatment of conflict within the team.

Yet ask these same team leaders what are the particular effects of conflict related to team operation and performance and their responses are extremely vague. Some point to a possible loss of important input from team members as an outcome of
untreated conflict within the team. Others suggest there is a great deal of wasted time when team member conflict surfaces. From such responses an opinion is formed that the treatment of bargaining team conflict is largely an intuitive response, perhaps motivated by some societal value which suggests conflict is non-productive.

One purpose of this research is to explore the existence, nature and measureability of conflict as it may occur within a collective bargaining team. If, as will be theoretically supported, conflict does occur within a collective bargaining team, this research will provide descriptive insights into what symptoms of the variable look like and how conflict operates. In achieving this goal, the research will also provide information on measureability of the conflict variable. An equally important purpose of the research is a preliminary exploration of the effects or results of conflict within the bargaining team.

Why not leave the subject of conflict and bargaining team behavior in the present intuitive state? Further research of the topic is useful for several reasons. First, it is readily acknowledged by the participants that conflict occurs within the bargaining team and that it is treated. The utility of the treatment activity
needs examination. Treatment of conflict requires expenditures of human energy and, often, application of additional human resources. Examination of the utility of such expenditures is one reason for further investigation.

Recently among employers in British Columbia, there has been an increasing trend towards multiunit or association collective bargaining. In multiunit bargaining a negotiating team is made up of representatives from several participating organizations. Each of these representatives, as a team member, will carry forward the more diverse expectations of his parent body. A multiunit bargaining team, therefore, appears to have a high potential for goal incompatibility - a conflict generator. The increasing utilization of a multiunit bargaining structure therefore can be expected to provide greater potential for occurrence of conflict within the bargaining team. Thus a second reason for further investigation of this topic is its timeliness in the industrial relations environment of British Columbia.

A third compelling motivation for additional research on the topic is associated with the observation that the collective bargaining team is a ready-made laboratory with a rich environment for the study of (1976) refers to as a synthetic organization.
Synthetic organizations are thought to have considerable research appeal for the investigation of dynamic variables such as conflict. The richness of the collective bargaining team setting has particular appeal to further research because many of the factors hypothesized as significant to the generation of conflict, e.g. role ambiguity, goal disparity, are present.

The foregoing reasons argue in favor of this research on conflict within a collective bargaining team. It is necessary and timely to discard the veil of intuitive leader response in favor of a more intensive understanding of the nature and effects of conflict as a particular influence upon bargaining team behavior.

While Chapter Two develops in more detail the concepts of conflict and bargaining team behavior utilized in this study, brief definition of them here is in order. **Bargaining team behavior** is considered to be the set of behaviors associated with any or all members of a bargaining team that relate to performing their particular roles within the collective bargaining setting. Team member behavior may occur during separate group meetings (caucuses) during joint negotiating sessions involving two or more parties and during outside activities and discussions pertaining to the
collective bargaining process. Conflict is more appropriately defined as intraorganizational conflict (IOC) following Walton and McKersie's (1965) distinction of a particular type of conflict occurring within the bargaining team. IOC is defined as the subset of bargaining team behaviors that are determined by members of the team to be incompatible with the legitimate roles, functions and goals of the collective bargaining team. Dysfunctional IOC is the particular subset of bargaining team behaviors that is associated, theoretically, with counterproductive behavior responses.

This study makes extensive use of Filley's (1975) classification of win-lose and lose-lose conflict resolution behaviors as a means of operationally defining the response as being counterproductive and therefore the initial behavior as dysfunctional IOC.

It was suggested previously that a rather large gap exists between theoretical knowledge of conflict and its application to the collective bargaining environment. Some attempts to fill this gap, however, are noted in the research literature. Walton and McKersie (1965) developed a conceptual model of behavioral influences on labour relations. They concluded that IOC was a variable of significance in determining overall outcomes in the
collective bargaining environment. Yet their theory does little to define or explain the specific nature of IOC and its effects within the team. Peterson and Tracy (1976) attempted to operationalize the Walton and McKersie model; however, their findings suffered from the same shortcoming as the original Walton and McKersie (1965) model. That is, IOC was perceived by the subjects of the study to be an important variable related to outcomes; however, the study did not show how IOC operated on the teams. Kochan et al (1975) found that IOC contributed to a particular type of negative collective bargaining behavior which they labelled 'multilateral intervention'. Multilateral intervention is the breaking apart of a bargaining team resulting in direct and unsanctioned negotiating contracts (interventions) between a member of the team and the opposing negotiating party. Their study, while demonstrating support for the research issue, did not indicate how IOC works.

The foregoing research leaves unanswered questions regarding the nature of IOC in a bargaining team and the manner of its operation. In this regard, bargaining team behavior generally, and IOC in particular, have been treated as a "black box" within collective bargaining models. The present research, by exploring
the existence and measurability of theoretically determined variables in a specific bargaining team experience, is an attempt to pry open the black box. Due to the explorative nature of the present research it is not expected that results will provide generalizable conclusions, but that they will be suggestive of further research designed to test the propositions which have been developed.

A practical and manageable limit must be placed on the scope of any research. In the initial attempt to pry open the black box of bargaining team behavior, dysfunctional IOC behaviors are considered to have the greatest potential for study. It is anticipated that dysfunctional IOC response behaviors will be more observable than IOC generally and will more likely lead to important negative results of team behavior. Dysfunctional IOC behavior by team members is the selected independent variable studied in this research.

To theoretically establish potential outcomes of dysfunctional IOC behavior requires examination of certain aspects of both organizational behavior and industrial relations fields of knowledge. The refinement of general conflict theory into a set of operational definitions of dysfunctional bargaining team IOC behavior associated with counter productive response
behaviors is the subject of the first part of Chapter Two. It is suggested that three general questions are significant in the research:

Does dysfunctional IOC delay the negotiating process?

Does dysfunctional IOC reduce the participation of team members?

Does dysfunctional IOC jeopardize the overall negotiation process by fostering rulebreaking and autocratic decision style behaviors?

Expansion of these questions into a set of specific propositions related to bargaining team behavioral outcomes is the subject of the second part of Chapter Two.

Chapter Three is concerned with the selection of an appropriate methodological approach to the study of dysfunctional IOC. It presents a review of the present methods utilized, their shortcomings and advantages, and the outline of a research design.

Chapter Four describes the collective bargaining team field study background and contains descriptions of dysfunctional IOC behavior and its results as observed in the field study. Observations are also contained in Chapter Four on the measureability aspects of the operational model.
The final chapter, Five, presents research conclusions regarding both theoretical and operational model findings regarding the outcomes proposed to occur in a bargaining team with dysfunctional IOC; and additional remarks as to further implications of the research.
PART I: IOC Theory and an Operational Model

1. Bargaining Team Behaviors

Understanding the potential effects of IOC upon bargaining team behavior necessitates some clarification as to the typical goals, roles and functions of this organizational group. In the North American labour relations system, achievement of a collective agreement usually involves collective bargaining between management and union bargaining teams each selected to represent its respective principals or constituencies. A collective bargaining team has several functions to perform related to the preparation, evaluation and presentation of economic and working condition demands and counter offers. Working within limits established by their constituencies ultimately, it is decisions made by each team that are reflected in the final products the collective agreement and the ongoing management-union relationship. Thus it is largely to its own bargaining team that each party looks for attainment of collective bargaining goals.

It appears that several roles and functions are carried out by bargaining team members. Team members act as important linkages between their parent organizational group or groups and the bargaining team.
In this communicator role, team members provide input to the negotiating process and feedback to their parent organization(s) or groups on the progress of negotiations. Team members also perform a variety of support functions such as acting as spokesman and performing research assistance to the team. On occasion, one or more members of the team may be asked to assume a devil's advocate role, facilitating further exploration of alternatives or weaknesses in the team's negotiating position(s). Team members may also carry out a human relations leadership role by attending to the social atmosphere in the group. The human relations leadership function is particularly evident when negotiations become protracted placing heavy demands upon team members' resources, time and energy. Fulfilling these roles and functions necessitates frequent interactions among team members as well as with their respective parent organizations or constituents; therefore the potential for IOC behaviors is high.

2. IOC: A Theoretical Model of Influence

Research on lateral conflict, i.e. between group members, suggests several factors or variables that contribute to conflictual behavior. These may be broadly grouped into the following three categories: individual member influences; structural and behavioral
influences and environmental influences.

Individual member influences, according to several studies reviewed by Rubin and Brown (1975), are causes of conflict associated with differing backgrounds such as age, race, social background, member's status, and personality; eg. risk taking propensity, tolerance to ambiguity, self concepts, motives, and attitudes. Rubin and Brown (1975) suggest that these factors generate in a bargaining team member an idiosyncratic interpersonal orientation that is predictive of the member's reaction to bargaining team social relations. While the predictive validity of team member interpersonal orientation is not of direct concern to this research, the theorized existence of differing interpersonal orientations supports the notion of individual team member influences as an important factor contributing to IOC.

Team member behavior is also influenced by the specific nature of the structural and behavioral factors at work within the group. Conflict generation has been shown to be correlated with several of these factors. Filley (1975) draws together nine social relationship characteristics associated in conflict research with generation of conflictual behavior. For example, the ambiguity of role definitions within the group is seen as a potential conflict generator. In other words, a lack of formal structure within the group may cause conflictual
behavior. Physical and time separation among the members can cause communication barriers and conflictual behavior. A need for consensus on the team’s decision may generate conflictual behavior. Finally, the existence of behavioral regulations, while reducing the possibility of ambiguity, also generates a potential for resistance of the members to controls (Filley, 1975).

Major environmental influences upon the team also contribute to the generation of IOC. Rubin and Brown (1975) note the importance of audience pressures on team member behavior. Significant audiences to a bargaining team are their respective principals and constituents, who may have common collective bargaining goals or very differing ones; third parties, such as mediators or conciliators; and often the general public. The anticipated or actual reactions of the opposing negotiating party will also generate environmental pressures on the team members, particularly if they are interpreted or perceived differently by various team members.

The independent and joint influences of these factors are thought to generate a variety of actual team members IOC behaviors throughout the interaction processes, i.e. caucuses, joint negotiating sessions and other meetings of the group. Pondy (1967) theoretically demonstrated this linkage by developing a systems model of conflict to describe the flow of conflictual behavior.
generation from antecedent or potential causes, such as those described above, through to manifest behaviors, such as aggression, repression, or withdrawal, by group members. Pondy's (1967) conflict model is known as a process model of conflict. The process model suggests the importance of looking at the interactions of the bargaining team for indications of IOC behaviors. Further, it suggests that there is a flow of conflictual behaviors occurring throughout the team's interaction processes.

The process model of conflict also suggests that when IOC behavior is manifest, i.e., becomes observable within a group, it is treated in some manner to reduce or eliminate any perceived counterproductive effects. Treatment or response behaviors have been categorized by Filley (1975) as three general types: win-win, win-lose, and lose-lose. Filley's (1975) typology categorizes response behaviors according to the results gained by each conflictual party. A win-win response behavior is so labelled because each party to the conflict achieves objectives. Filley (1975) presents problem solving through consensus and integrative decision making as win-win conflict resolution behaviors. The win-lose response behavior, creates a winning party that achieves its objectives and a losing party that fails to do so. Common win-lose behavioral
responses to conflict are exercising authority or power, ignoring the other party, or resorting to majority or minority rule. The third type of response behavior, lose-lose, is applied to a conflict where neither party is able to achieve its objectives. Compromising, using side payments to "bribe" the other party, submitting an issue to a neutral third party, and resorting to rules, are thought of as behaviors of the lose-lose type although sometimes they may result in win-lose outcomes.

Response behaviors to IOC are deliberate attempts to prevent or modify anticipated counterproductive IOC effects in a bargaining team. For example, a bargaining team leader may treat aggressive behavior of a team member which could lead to outbursts at the bargaining table by invoking a rule (lose-lose) that only the team leader may speak at the table. In another example, a member may personalize an attack on another team member in order to win a particular tactical argument and the team leader may elect an autocratic decision style (lose-lose) which removes the debate from discussion. Seen in these two examples, invoking rules and selecting an autocratic decision style, are deliberate responses which attempt to modify or prevent the anticipated effects. Yet as Filley (1975) suggests,
the nature of the response has a significant bearing on
the longer run operation of the team. Conflict that is
not truly resolved is itself a generator of future
conflict through the flow of interactions within the
team. Thus the response is itself a structural and
behavioral influence, generating the potential for
future conflict. A hypothetical example will illustrate
this influence. At an office party one team member
unwittingly discloses an important confidential
bargaining position to an opposing team member. This
disclosure becomes known to another member of the team
who openly criticizes the errant member at their next
caucus meeting. As the criticism is highly personalized
it is considered a win-lose response behavior. If the
personal criticism causes further IOC behavior in
retaliation for the apparent putdown or embarrassment
in front of other team members, the win-lose response
behavior is a generator of future IOC behavior.

Results of conflictual behavior have been another
major focus of research. Conflict that is either left
untreated or ineffectively resolved has been shown to
reduce the level of member participation (Walton and
Dutton, 1969; Kee, 1970), negatively affect the
cohesiveness of the group (Lott, 1961), reduce group
performance (Homans, 1950), reduce trust and communications
FIGURE 1: MODEL OF THEORETICAL IOC GENERATION AND INFLUENCE UPON BARGAINING TEAM BEHAVIOR

Influences

Individual Member

1A

Structural and Behavioral Behaviors

LB

Environmental

1C

Interaction Processes

IOC Behaviors

2

Resp onses

Resolved IOC,

↑

win-win

win-lose

lose-lose

3

Behavioral Outcomes

Positive

4A

Eg.

Cooperation

High Performance

Negative

4B

Eg.

Low participation

Rule breaking

Low Group Performance

Potential Generators of IOC
(Deutsch, 1973), alter perceptions of members towards an increased sensitivity to differences between members (Deutsch, 1973), and render ineffective a problem solving task orientation (Deutsch, 1973; Filley, 1975). Yet Filley (1975) suggests that some conflict diffuses more severe conflict, stimulates the search for new facts and solutions, increases group cohesion and performance and acts to provide identifiable measures of power and ability. Related to the functions and objectives of a collective bargaining team, the foregoing research suggests that there are both positive and negative outcomes of IOC behaviors. As with response, the outcome effects, particularly when negatively valued by team members, are potential generators of further IOC.

The foregoing discussion relating conflict theory to the potential generation and influence of IOC on bargaining team behavior is summarized in Figure 1.

***************
Insert Figure 1
***************

IOC may be generated by interactions of any or all of the variables within the three influence factors of individual member influences, structural and behavioral
influences, and environmental influences (frames 1A, 1B, and 1C). IOC behaviors are manifest in the team interaction processes (frame 2). Responses to IOC behaviors (frame 3) may modify IOC behavior. Response behaviors, however, also include the legitimate expression of conflict; thus they do not necessarily alter IOC. The response as a potential generator of IOC is illustrated by the dotted line linking frame 1B and 3. Response that truly resolves IOC behavior eliminates any further outcomes and is illustrated in Figure 1 by an arrow exiting the model from frame 3. The interaction between IOC and the response (frames 2 & 3) produces a variety of outcomes which have been positively and negatively dichotomized in relation to aiding or blocking the achievement of a bargaining team's functions and objectives (frames 4A and 4B). The dotted line between negative outcomes (frame 4B) and structural and behavioral influences (frame 1B) shows that these behaviors are also potential generators of future IOC.

The focus of research in this study is upon the nature and measureability of IOC and its effects. Operational definitions of frames 2 and 3, therefore, are concentrated upon in the next two sections of this chapter. As it is thought that the negative outcomes of IOC have more research potential, Part II of this chapter develops propositions in relation to frame 4B.
3. **Conflict Defined and Operationalized**

Walton and McKersie (1965) label conflict that occurs between members of one party to the negotiating process as intraorganizational conflict (IOC). This is to be carefully distinguished from industrial relations conflict, or interorganizational conflict, between unions and management, which is the more commonly studied collective bargaining behavior.

What is IOC? Rubin and Brown (1975) suggest that "Conflict is a state that exists whenever incompatible activities occur" (p. 4). This statement provides certain insights into the nature of IOC. It suggests that conflict is a flow of certain activities or behaviors that occur during the group members' interactions or process of attaining desired outcomes.

The flow approach to the nature of conflict is supported by Mack and Snyder (1966), Pondy (1967) and Filley (1975) who view conflict as a social process inherently part of all group interactions. Filley's description of the characteristics of the conflictual situation provides operational clarity:

1. At least two parties (individuals or groups) are involved in some kind of interaction.

2. Mutually exclusive goals and/or mutually exclusive values exist, in fact or as perceived by the parties involved.
3. Interaction is characterized by behavior designed to defeat, reduce, or suppress the opponent or to gain a mutually designated victory.

4. The parties face each other with mutually opposing actions and counteractions.

5. Each party attempts to create an imbalance or relatively favoured position of power vis-a-vis the other (Filley, 1975, p. 4)

Yet, as Rubin and Brown note it is only certain incompatible activities which are regarded as conflictual. Deutsch (1973) suggests that it is the perception of one or more of the members which designates behavior or actions as incompatible. This notion is also reflected by Filley in (2) above.

The definition of bargaining team IOC adopted in this study therefore is that particular class of behaviors or activities occurring during the social interaction process which are perceived by a member of members as being incompatible with the roles, functions and/or objectives of the team. Identification of IOC incidents in the study will be made through application of the five noted characteristics of conflict (Filley, 1975).

It is important to recognize that the term "incompatible" has not been given a value connotation in
the foregoing definition. The distinction between functional and dysfunctional IOC is discussed in the next section of this chapter.

Viewing IOC as a flow of incompatible behaviors occurring throughout the bargaining team experience has the advantage of allowing examination of varying levels of IOC. Support for suggesting a variation in IOC levels is given by Pondy (1967). Pondy conceptualized the aftermath of an effective or ineffective conflict resolution process to be a varying level of residual conflict. As illustrated in Figure 1, this residue is a behavioral influence on future conflict.

4. Functional and Dysfunctional IOC

How is an observer able to distinguish IOC behavior from other social interactions within a group? One approach may be to let the group members identify it. As noted in the preceding section, Deutsch (1973) suggests that members make a perceptual distinction regarding an incompatible behavior. That is, one member makes a judgement of the behavior of another member as to whether it is IOC. Yet even when a group member perceives IOC he must make a further decision as to whether or not to actively respond. Ignoring the IOC behavior is a passive response which, according to learning theorists, may lead to extinction of the
behavior. On the other hand, having decided to actively respond, the nature of the response will be one of the three types: win-win, win-lose or lose-lose. While it is impossible to observe the internal decision making processes of team members, their active response behaviors are clearly more observable.

Figure 2 graphically presents a purely hypothetical example of the interacting mechanisms of incompatible behaviors, IOC, and a team member's variable tolerance level during the collective bargaining process. It is important to emphasize that actual relationships are not postulated as following the illustrated pattern.

****************
Insert Figure 2
****************

As presented in Figure 2, there may be several periods during the team interaction processes where the level of IOC exceeds a team member's tolerance. During such time periods, i.e. the shaded areas of Figure 2, incompatible behaviors are more likely to be focused upon and responded to. In addition, when the level of IOC exceeds a team member's tolerance level he may be more likely to respond in a counterproductive, i.e. win-lose or lose-lose, manner. He is fed up with the perceived IOC behavior. The foregoing does not imply that
Hypothetical Illustration of IOC/Tolerance Level Interaction

counterproductive responses to IOC Behaviors

IOC

IOC level

t=0

time +1 +2

team formation

+n
+1 completion of negotiations
all IOC behavior occurring during this period will be counterproductively treated. Filley (1975) clearly indicates that conflict can be treated by a resolution mechanism of the win-win type as well.

An example of team member behavior may aid understanding of the conceptual distinctions drawn above. Suppose a member is intermittently late for team meetings throughout the bargaining experience. This behavior is interpreted as IOC by a team member because they have a lengthy agenda to complete. When the interpreting team member's tolerance to IOC is less than the level of IOC he will in all probability respond to the IOC behavior and is likely to respond in a counterproductive manner. This process is identified to the observer by the responding member's personally focused criticism of the tardy member.

It is this counterproductive response which indicates to the observer that dysfunctional IOC behavior has occurred in the view of the responding member. Due to the recycling nature of IOC behaviors; i.e. the flow of conflict, it is likely that the tardiness issue will again be raised in the interaction processes of the team and again responded to. The recycling activity allows an observer to follow the now identified dysfunctional IOC behavior through to its conclusion even when the outcomes
are not immediately identifiable. In the example, the conclusion might be the correcting of the tardiness by the team member (immediate) or perhaps complete withdrawal of the team member from the experience (longer run outcome).

Conflict research has been particularly criticized for imposing a value system implying a social "goodness" for cooperative behavior and social "badness" for adversarial behavior (Thomas and Kilmann, 1977). Letting the team member identify IOC behavior, as signaled to the observer by his various responses, at least places the value judgement of behavior within the team.

The crux of the issue in operationally defining dysfunctional IOC becomes one of determining a set of observable counterproductive IOC response behaviors that does not confound the proposed outcomes. Filley (1975), summarizing research on conflict resolution, presents a set of behavioral response characteristics of win-lose and lose-lose behavior that is thought to be useful. Filley's set of counterproductive conflict response behaviors have the following characteristics:

1. There is a clear we-they distinction between the parties rather than a we-versus-the-problem orientation.

2. Energies are directed towards the other party in an atmosphere of total victory or total defeat.
3. Each party sees the issue only from its own point of view, rather than defining the problem in terms of mutual needs.

4. The emphasis in the process is upon attainment of a solution, rather than upon a definition of goals, values, or motives to be attained with the solution.

5. Conflicts are personalized rather than depersonalized via an objective focus on facts and issues.

6. There is no differentiation of conflict-resolution activities from other group processes, nor is there a planned sequence of those activities.

7. The parties are conflict-oriented, emphasizing the immediate disagreement, rather than relationship-oriented emphasizing the long-term effect of their differences and how they are resolved. (Filley, 1975, p. 25)

These characteristics may be used as a checklist of observed response behaviors in a bargaining team. That is, they are the operational determinants of counterproductive behavioral responses to IOC.

It is noted that defining IOC behavior as functional or dysfunctional by using productive and counterproductive response behavior characteristics does not overlap proposed negative and positive outcomes as the latter refer to more general results of IOC which are not necessarily observable at the time an IOC behavior occurs. These outcomes may emerge at a much later time. In part this time delay may occur as a
result of the recycling process of IOC described earlier. The distinction between functional and dysfunctional IOC is made by observing the nature of the response; win-win for functional IOC and win-lose or lose-lose identifying dysfunctional IOC. These responses are observable at, or close to, the time an IOC behavior occurs.

As the use of these characteristics to categorize conflict responses has not been attempted in other research, a remaining unanswered question is the number of these characteristics that must be present in order to classify an IOC behavior as dysfunctional. This is a measurement question to which the field study of Chapter Four will address itself.

Figure 3 summarizes the foregoing development of operational definitions for functional and dysfunctional IOC.

***************
Insert Figure 3
***************

In the interaction processes of a bargaining team an incompatible behavior in relation to team roles, functions or objectives occurs (IOC). If IOC is responded to, the response behavior will be one of the three types presented by Filley (1975) and grouped in Figure 3 as either productive (win-win) or
FIGURE 3

OPERATIONAL DEFINITION
OF FUNCTIONAL AND DYSFUNCTIONAL IOC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EVENT</th>
<th>RESPONSE</th>
<th>IOC TYPE</th>
<th>OUTCOMES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>An Incompatible Behavior (IOC)</td>
<td>→ Productive (win-win)</td>
<td>→ Functional</td>
<td>→ Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>→ Counterproductive (win-lose lose-lose)</td>
<td>→ Dys-functional</td>
<td>→ Negative</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Classified as IOC by test of Filley's five characteristics of conflictual behavior.

Identified to observer by Filley's set of seven counter-productive conflict response behaviors.
counterproductive (win-lose or lose-lose). Productive responses lead to classification of the IOC behavior as functional and to positive outcomes. Counterproductive responses lead to classification of the IOC behavior as dysfunctional and to negative outcomes. As the focus of this research is upon potential negative outcomes of IOC, particular attention should be directed to the win-lose and lose-lose characteristics of response behavior. These are anticipated to be more observable, or distinct from other social interaction behaviors, because they are most likely to occur when a team member's tolerance to IOC is exceeded. The second line of the IOC operational definition process shown in Figure 3, therefore, has been selected as the operational model for further examination which is reported in Chapter Four.

Part II of this chapter turns attention to development of a set of specific propositions regarding potential outcomes of the occurrence of dysfunctional IOC behaviors.
Part II PROPOSITIONS

1. Dysfunctional IOC Outcomes in a Collective Bargaining Team

Three general questions regarding the potential effects of dysfunctional IOC were presented in Chapter One. Rephrased from personal observations and discussions it is suggested that dysfunctional IOC may influence the following: the time period required to conclude a collective agreement, the level of participation of team members, and the successful completion of the negotiating process. Turning to the organizational behavior and industrial relations fields of knowledge, these impressions are expanded into a set of research supported propositions.

i. Extension of the negotiating time period

Deutsch (1973) found that willingness of members to cooperate with one another, given that they perceive themselves to be in a conflictual situation, was reduced as the size of the conflict increased. The close, although not exact, parallel between changing size of conflict and varying levels of IOC (Pondy, 1967), suggests that as dysfunctional IOC reaches an observable state cooperation may be reduced.

That the level of cooperation can be related to speed of achievement of objectives has been demonstrated by Druckman (1968). He found, in observing dyadic
outcomes, that the speed of joint labour management negotiations was enhanced when joint prenegotiation discussions were held, i.e. cooperation between the parties was increased.

If, as Druckman (1968), suggests a high level of cooperation speeds completion of the task, it may be expected that dysfunctional IOC by reducing cooperation, will extend the negotiating process. Specific behavioral effects may be more caucus time spent resolving lack of cooperation between member issues, additional meetings and private sessions between some or all members of a team attempting to reconcile differences, absences from meetings by team members thus causing delays in needed information-input or decision making, and possibly total withdrawal of one or more members of a team. This latter behavior has an effect upon time needed to complete the negotiation process only if replacement of a team member is made, thus causing delays while the new member is oriented and updated.

Proposition I - The occurrence of dysfunctional IOC during the collective bargaining process may result in a lengthening of the time taken to conclude a collective agreement.
As collective bargaining is often carried out under critical, externally imposed constraints, such as a strike or lockout deadline, and/or internally imposed pressures to achieve results, the remedy for low cooperation may also take the behavioral form of increased inputs to foster cooperation. For example, a team may schedule additional caucus meetings or extend the meeting hours to deal with the process issue of dysfunctional IOC. These inputs have the effect of increasing the often already heavy human resource expenditure, i.e. salaries and time away from other tasks, associated with operating a collective bargaining team.

Proposition IA - Where time-limits prevent extension of the negotiating process, an outcome of dysfunctional IOC is an increase in team resource inputs; i.e. more time is allocated by one or more team members, or external agents must be introduced, to attempt a resolution of dysfunctional IOC.

ii. Reduction of Input

Part of the communicator role of team members is to provide informational input related to the expectations of their membership, their personal expertise on
contractual issues, and perceptions of the other party's motives and anticipated actions. Communication in a team caucus is necessary to fulfill this function. Yet a competitive process has been shown by Deutsch (1973) to lead to either a lack of communication or misleading communication. Walton and Dutton (1969) also noted these behaviors in their studies of inter-unit conflict.

Proposition II - Dysfunctional IOC may result in team member behavior that either withholds informational input and/or presents information in such a manner as to mislead other team members.

iii. Team member behavior in opposition to rules of the team

The collective bargaining process requires that members of a team share positions and information of a confidential nature. A team's bargaining power may be severely limited if information as to a team's ultimate position on an issue were to be prematurely communicated to the other party. In fact, the strategy of the opposing party is to determine this; therefore knowledge of divisions within a team related to issues and strategy may be played upon by the other team. As a result clear rules of behavior for team members are
normally established at the outset. One such rule often established is for only the spokesman/negotiator to communicate with the other party in joint bargaining sessions. Other members of the team, while often present at the sessions, will only speak at the request of their spokesman. Another rule is the prohibition of discussion between the parties of items related to collective bargaining other than at formal joint negotiating sessions.

Empirical evidence of rule breaking behavior was found by Kochan, et al (1975), regarding multi-lateral intervention as discussed in the introduction to this study. Kochan attributes this rule breaking behavior to the occurrence of IOC in the employer's bargaining team.

Proposition III - Dysfunctional IOC may result in the breakdown of previously agreed upon team rules.

iv. **Acceptance/commitment of team members through decision making style**

The treatment process, such as decision making style, also has been theoretically shown to effect the outcomes of conflict. Vroom and Yetton, (1973) develop a normative model of effective decision making styles
based upon situational variables of the decision problem. They conclude that effective decision making through a participative process is dictated by a need for acceptance by group members in order to ensure its execution. Another situational variable Vroom and Yetton link with selection of a participative decision style to ensure execution is a low probability that the group members will accept, without question, the decision of a leader. Finally, Vroom and Yetton (1973), suggest that where there is likelihood of disagreement or conflict over the preferred solution a participative decision making style is most effective.

Vroom and Yetton define participative decision making. Two styles are paraphrased which they view as appropriate for the foregoing situations:

1. The leader shares the problem with the group members as a group, obtaining their collective ideas and suggestions. Then the leader makes a decision, which may or may not reflect the group's influence.
This consultative approach is participative as to input of alternatives but not necessarily as to the decision reached.

2. The leader shares the problem with the group members as a group. Together alternatives are generated and evaluated in an attempt to reach agreement (consensus) on a solution. The leader's role is much like a chairman. The leader does not try to influence the group to adopt personally preferred solutions and is willing to accept and implement any solution which has the support of the entire group.

Choice of decision making style between the two outlined, according to Vroom and Yetton, is based upon whether or not group members can be trusted by the decision maker to select an alternative in accordance with organizational, i.e. team, goals. If it is believed they can be trusted, then the group based mode, (2), is viewed as more effective in the normative model.

The following points, therefore, suggest that the treatment process, i.e. decision making style within the bargaining team, should be of a participative nature.

1. One typical bargaining team role identified at the beginning of this chapter is the function of providing feedback to the parent
organization(s) from the team. As the process of collective bargaining involves a series of team decisions related to goals, strategies and tactics, the agreement with these decisions often requires considerable selling of the team's decisions to its principals. This persuasion process is particularly apparent when the memorandum of agreement is concluded between the management and union bargaining teams and each party must then return to its principals for a ratification decision.

2. Bargaining team members are not likely to accept 'a priori' a team leader's decisions. Again, from their roles it may be seen that one function is to provide input. A priori decision making on goals, strategy and tactics of the team would tend to negate this function. There will, however, on occasion be various members of the bargaining team with particular knowledge which carries more weight in the alternative selected.

3. Finally, as preceding sections of this study have already asserted, there is evidence to support the observation that conflict may well occur among bargaining team members.
Yet as Filley (1975) notes, one of the characteristics of win-lose and lose-lose conflict resolution behavior is the attempt to defeat the other party in the situation. Under such circumstances it is reasonable to suggest that the members will vie for power over the decision making process. The treatment process will not be as normatively indicated. Winning the dysfunctional IOC is therefore taken as the autocratic selection of a particular alternative. Thus dysfunctional IOC, by precipitating autocratic decision making, may reduce the potential effectiveness of the bargaining team.

Proposition IVA - When a bargaining team decision on the new or revised collective agreement item is made in response to dysfunctional IOC behaviors, the decision will be made in a nonparticipative decision style.

As the foregoing discussion has argued, a critical time for persuasive feedback of bargaining team members is when their principals engage in the ratification process, i.e. the decision to accept or reject the negotiated settlement. Vroom and Yetton (1973) suggest that group members are more willing to carry out or
enact a solution, if they participate in the decision. In the collective bargaining team sphere, enacting a solution means persuading the team's principals that the memorandum of agreement is the best that can be obtained.

Proposition IVB - When team decisions as to new or revised collective agreement items are made in a nonparticipative manner the cumulative effect will be to reduce the active participation of team members in persuading principals to ratify the memorandum of agreement.

Further, it is suggested that the internal decision of the team members regarding the proposed memorandum of agreement may also be influenced the effect of dysfunctional IOC on decision making style. If Proposition IVA is found to be supported then it is also reasonable to suggest that a team experiencing a high proportion of autocratic decisions may have suppressed disagreement with the negotiated package. In this critical decision, however, the increased perceived pressure from an important audience, i.e. the parent organization(s), no longer avoidable, may motivate a negative or no recommendation stance. Thus
the decision to accept, reject or make no recommendation on the memorandum of agreement may be particularly vulnerable to the cumulative effect of autocratic decisions in the team.

Proposition IVC - The cumulative effect of participative decisions vis-a-vis non-participative decisions, as this balance is influenced by dysfunctional IOC, may be to influence the overall decision of the team regarding its recommendation to its constituents; i.e. where nonparticipative decisions predominate the team recommendation will be to reject, or to make no recommendation.

2. Summary
Part I of this chapter introduced the various roles and functions of a bargaining team and developed a model of theoretical influences of IOC on team behavior. Application of Filley's (1975) research on interpersonal conflict resolution suggested operational definitions for IOC based upon productive and counterproductive response behaviors of team members. Particularly, the Observational advantage of further examination of dysfunctional IOC, as identified by Filley's (1975) win-lose and lose-lose response characteristics,
received attention. The exceeding of a team member's tolerance to IOC promoted this conclusion.

Part II of the chapter developed a set of specific propositions concerning the possible outcomes of dysfunctional IOC on bargaining team behavior. These propositions suggested direct negative outcomes of dysfunctional IOC are as follows: time delays, increased resource requirements, reduced or misleading input or members, rule breaking behavior, and autocratic decision making. Indirect negative outcomes of dysfunctional IOC, by perpetuating autocratic decision making, are suggested as the following: a lower commitment by team members to ratification of the collective agreement, and an increased probability of the team making a rejection or no recommendation decision regarding the concluded memorandum of agreement. Chapter Three presents methodological considerations in developing a test for the propositions and outlines the selected method of study in a real-world environment. Chapter Four presents a field study of a collective bargaining team and findings related to both the measureability of IOC and the proposed outcomes.
CHAPTER III - The Choice of Methodology

1. Introduction

The subject of interpersonal and organizational conflict has been an identified focus of research activities of behavioral scientists for several decades. Among early noteworthy researchers to identify conflict as an important variable in the study of organizational behavior are March and Simon (1958), Cyert and March (1963), and Pondy (1967). These researchers attempted to gain a conceptual understanding of conflict and also to identify the multiple factors which contributed to or caused conflict in an organizational setting. More recently the attention of behavioral science researchers has shifted towards studying methods of conflict resolution and also towards some of the more specific social patterns of resolution behavior such as bargaining and negotiation. Applied behavioral scientists of the organizational development school are perhaps the major innovators using functional conflict to bring about organizational and interpersonal behavior changes. Leadership theorists, such as Vroom and Yetton (1973), have made attempts to include the conflict variable as a determinant of effective decision making within the group context. With the great amount of research activity that has been generated in respect to the topic of
conflict, one might assume that there have also developed a few standard methodologies for the measurement of conflict and its behavioral influences, i.e. causes and consequences. One purpose of this chapter is to determine if this has occurred. Naturally, as one begins to determine what has been done in regard to a particular area of interest, a further question occurs: "What else might be attempted?". This then is the second purpose for investigating conflict methodology. To paraphrase Karl Weick (1974), looking at the alternatives to what we are presently doing in studying organizational behavior may plough some new ground for theory generation or conceptualization.

2. The Purpose of Research

The choice of research methodology will depend upon several criteria. Certainly the knowledgeable use of a particular research design involves the awareness of research method shortcomings. Several methodological researchers such as Campbell and Stanley (1963), and Runkel and McGrath (1972), have produced useful guides for the investigator.

More central to the particular choice of a research methodology, however, is examination of the investigator's purpose. This refers to the types of questions the investigator wants answered as well as to the uses of the results.
stepping into the skin of the researcher as he/she is contemplating research design. The researcher approaches a problem from a particular background of knowledge, training and experience in both research methodology and real world phenomena. A given researcher thus has a particular perception of the state of the art in regard to questions of interest. For example, one researcher on conflict might perceive the research problem as a need for additional data generation about the specific nature of conflict in order to generate theoretical concepts which will better explain conflictual behavior and its consequences. Such an approach may be in sympathy to Weick's and Pondy's appeals to behavioral scientists for deeper and more innovative searches for new data to support theory generation,(Weick,1974;Pondy, 1976). Alternatively, another researcher may wish to test out a theory developed elsewhere e.g. Tedeschi, Schlenker, and Bonoma's Subjective Expected Utility Theory of Conflict (Tedeschi,1973). In this latter instance the researcher will be more interested in a tightly designed experiment which provides evidence to support or reject the hypothesized construct. Yet a third researcher may be interested in replication of a research approach upon a different subject group to expand the generalizability of previous findings, e.g.
Child's replication of the Aston Study (Child, 1972). It would appear that these three research purposes will have different methodological considerations and research design components. It is concluded, in regard to purpose, that methodological selection will depend upon the stage of the research program and the particular interests of the researcher.

Figure 4, below is taken from Tedeschi, et al., (1973) as an illustration of the various stages of theory generation and testing as related to the real world.

Stage 1, the real world, is formulated from the observations of researchers and others concerning events that are perceived to have occurred. In Stage 2, investigations by various methods such as interviews, historical analysis, and questionnaires help to frame a rough conceptualization of what variables might be important towards developing a theory to explain the phenomena. Gradually as more data become available the theoretician is able to generate an untested theory or model, Stage 3. Experimentation, Stage 4, then attempts to prove or disprove the cause-effect nature of the theory and its generalizability. A tested theory then has credibility in altering the behavior of the real
Figure 4

Stages of Theory Generation

Stage 1
Real World

Stage 2
Conceptualizations and Primitive Images

Stage 3
Theories and Models (Formal Symbols)

Stage 4
Experiments

Source: Tedeschi, Schlenker, and Bonomo; 1973, p. 199.
world as the actors perceive its utility. From the above it can be seen that choice of research methods will depend largely upon in which development stage researchers believe the theory to be.

3. Present Methods of Researching Conflict

The study of conflict has largely been carried out through the research paradigm of mixed motive games, a Stage 4 method. Social psychologists have relied heavily upon laboratory experimentation using mixed motive dyadic or "N" - person games as surrogates of real world exchange situations. Rubin and Brown (1975) note that one particular game, the Prisoner's Dilemma, "has given rise to hundreds of experimental studies" (Rubin and Brown, 1975, p. 297).

Tedeschi, et al., (1973) suggest that various game types can be classified according to the richness of social interactions that may occur between subjects participating in the game. In this context they view the "minimal social situation" game first outlined by Sidowski, Wycoff and Tabory (1956) and further utilized by Kelly, Thibaut, Radloff and Mundy (1962) as a simple game. The Acme-Bolt Trucking game developed by Deutsch and Krauss (1960, 1962) is a complex game because it attempts to enrich the social environment with more real world characteristics. This richness of
social environment variable within a game paradigm has increased the methodological significance of using a laboratory test vehicle for approximating a real world of circumstance.

Yet the mixed motive game paradigm has not gone without criticism. First, Rubin and Brown (1975) suggest, "...the study of bargaining needs to find a way of developing richer and more interesting lab paradigms than are presently available" (Rubin and Brown, 1975, p. 297). Second, they suggest from their review of game research that many of the manipulated or premeasured independent variables are a consequence of experimental economics rather than intrinsic interest or theoretical importance. Third, Rubin and Brown(1975) note that the subjects participating in game research are usually college age, middle class students. Finally, Rubin and Brown (1975) suggest that individual differences are hard to measure in the lab game paradigm due to the presence of more visible situational variables. Carl Stevens' (1963) treatise on Strategy and Collective Bargaining Negotiations includes comments upon the use of game theory as a methodological tool for studying the process of negotiations. He summarizes this discussion as follows:

"Generally speaking, the format of game theory analysis is such as to exclude from the analysis the many negotiatory phenomenon of prime importance and interest. Tactical
entities which may be accommodated by the analysis, for example, coercive not bluffs, are treated outside the formal structure of the game and in such a way as to abstract from the most interesting problems associated with them. Although in principle some such tactics (moves) might be incorporated in the game matrix, the analytical gain to be had thereby is not immediately obvious" (Stevens, 1963, p. 156).

Stevens goes on to suggest that the contribution of game analysis to the theory of negotiation ends where the collective bargaining researcher's interest begin. Levinson also attacks the use of game theory for studying the process of collective bargaining. Drawing from Vickery's critique of games, Levinson notes

"The most basic difficulty arises from the fact that the application of game theory requires that the "payoff matrix" be completely known in advance by each player and that it be identical for each player ... the negotiating process itself cannot be analyzed in terms of game theory, since the former is a dynamic process where as the latter is statistic in its formulation" (Levinson, 1966, p. 11).

Vickery and Levinson's conclusion is that game theory "says relatively little about the real world of collective bargaining" (Levinson, 1966, p. 12).

Before totally disregarding games, however, it is important to review some of the comments of Tedeschi, Schlenker, and Bonoma (1975) on the appropriate use of games as research tools. Extracting from their arguments, it can be stated that the authors make a clear distinction between experimental games in models,
in computer simulations and in man machine simulations. The latter two refer to at least partial attempts at theory construction whereas the former serves the function of theory evaluation.

"Games are essentially tools of experimentation to be used in control interaction settings in which certain conflict variables are systematically manipulated. Games are tools of scientific discovery, and results of studies that employ them must eventually be used for the purpose of theory construction or theory evaluation." (Tedeschi, et al, 1975, p. 204).

They further conclude that games may have internal validity. However, the behavioral scientist has too readily transformed the findings of a game experiment to generalizable constructs. In other words, external validity has not been sufficiently researched. In conclusion, games, such as mixed-motive experiments, may be appropriate tools for theory validation. However to generate a theory of the influence of IOC on the behavior of a collective bargaining team is to extend their use beyond accepted methodological principles.

A second major approach to the study of conflict has been to use questionnaire data. Kochan (1975) used this method to study collective bargaining in municipal fire departments in the U.S.A. Questionnaire surveys have also been used as representations of
real situations to which respondents project how they would behave in a given set of described circumstances. Marwell and Schmitt (1967) used this technique to study social influence processes.

Thomas and Kilmann (1977) have some rather significant findings in regard to the influence of social desirability factors specifically as related to the use of questionnaires in determining effectiveness of conflict resolution techniques. In particular, examining the operational questionnaires used by Blake and Mouton, Lawrence and Lorsch, and Hall, they found that respondents likely are answering as they perceive they should respond rather than as they actually react to conflict situations. Thomas and Kilmann conclude:

"In terms of research design, the results also underscore the desirability of obtaining observable or other objective measures where possible to reduce the intrusion of social desirability into the data, or at least of obtaining ratings of different variables from independent sources to minimize the halo effect." (Thomas and Kilmann, 1977, p. 752).

These conclusions are supported by Krupp in regard to March and Simon's measure of conflict as well (Thomas and Kilmann, 1977).

Another method for studying conflict noted in the collective bargaining and organizational behavior
literature involves gathering natural data from organizations through field observations. These methods are more commonly termed case studies or a series of case studies, such as carried out by Levinson (1966), Stevens (1963), and Walton and McKersie (1965). Nachmais and Nachmais (1976) provide a succinct description of the case study approach to data collection:

"The One Shot Case Study involves an observation of a single group. This design is an observation only of what exists at the time of the study; as such, it has no control over extrinsic and intrinsic factors. In addition, it does not allow for manipulation of the independent variables or for before-after or control group-experimental-group comparison. Furthermore, since case studies analyze single unsampled systems, they are weak in generalization as well. Studies that employ the One Shot Case Study design have no checks on internal validity and thus are of little use in testing causal relations. Indeed, this design has been denoted by some methodologists as pre-experimental. However, the One Shot Case Study is useful in exploratory research Sellitz, et al, (1959) designate it as "stimulating insight," maintaining that the intensive case-study approach is particularly useful in unformulated areas, where it might suggest hypotheses for further research". (Nachmais and Nachmais, 1976, p.42).

From the foregoing it can be seen that as with the other methodologies, there are several shortcomings as well as advantages associated with the case study method. Runkel and McGrath, (1972) in assessing the pros and
cons of utilizing the case study design conclude:

"the investigator ends up learning a lot about complex and meaningful behavioral systems, but he does not know with high confidence what he has learned." (Runkel and McGrath, 1972, p. 94).

One particular problem of the case-method concerns the role of observer. As noted by the now celebrated "Hawthorne effect", researchers influence, often unwittingly, the system under study. Yet methodologists now view this is a problem not only of the field research designs but also of laboratory studies (Phillips, 1976; Runkel and McGrath, 1972). On this point, Runkel and McGrath illustrate the researcher's dilemma:

"whether to learn something with relatively low confidence about the existing system or to learn something with relatively high confidence about a system that is now different from what it was when the researcher gathered information about it" (Runkel and McGrath, 1972, p. 90).

Thus intervention or participation increases confidence at a price.

In a case study the degree of certainty is also lowered by the high potential for missed variables thereby creating "unknown error" that confounds the observations (Runkel and McGrath, 1972).

It might appear that the case study approach has little to offer a study of IOC. Yet there is a specific advantage lending weight to its use. It has been previously asserted that the collective bargaining team
operation is a 'rich' environment. As such it represents a relatively complex set of organization behavior events which, it is believed, would be most difficult to re-create in an artificial environment. The criticisms of other industrial relations researchers on this point have already been noted. External validity is therefore a major issue in industrial relations research. The case study method is ranked high on this methodological consideration. As Runkel and McGrath comment,"...a field study can be a matchless way of learning the variables, their ranges and combinations that might reward study by more rigorous strategy" (Runkel and McGrath, 1972, p. 94). Also, Nachmais and Nachmais (1976) quoted above, support this conclusion as to the utility of the method.

From this review it is concluded that there is no particular research route clear of methodological impediments. The choice therefore becomes one of trade-offs and researcher preference. Also the choice must be made on the availability of data and with regard for the particular variables under study. The opportunity for a researcher to participate in an actual collective bargaining team experience is relatively infrequent. The negotiation process, at least until its conclusion is necessarily surrounded
with a high wall of secrecy and confidentiality as to the internal team process. Employers and unions, therefore, are most reluctant to increase these confidentiality concerns by permitting observers access to their "inner sanctum." Also, the time commitment necessary for an investigator to observe a team from formation to dissolution presents a pragmatic research problem.

As the unique opportunity of directly participating on an actual collective bargaining team was available, the selection of a quasi-case method of analysis was perhaps a natural one. The term quasi-case method is used to differentiate from the classic case method. The latter eliminates or avoids participant influence as much as possible. As more fully discussed in the next section of this chapter, the data gathering portion of this study was carried out while the researcher was a participant. The analysis and reporting portions more closely follow the classic case method. Therefore, the term quasi-case method is used. The foregoing methodology review also provides evidence suggesting this close approximation of a case is a preferential method of studying dysfunctional IOC given its early stage of theoretical development.
4. An Approach To The Study of Bargaining Team IOC

Mindful of the constraints suggested by the previous section, it is important at the outset of this section to specify the perceived stage of research development regarding bargaining team conflict before suggesting a methodological approach. From a review of the general literature on interpersonal and organizational conflict as well as the specific topic of conflict as related to bargaining and negotiations, this author is of the opinion that conflict is still a very ambiguous concept. In particular, researchers do not have a very good picture of what social behaviors can be classified as conflictual in a collective bargaining team. In relation to the Tedeschi, et al, model noted earlier the study of bargaining team conflict is at the primitive images Stage. This suggests that data gathering in greater depth is appropriate to generate more theoretical considerations about conflict in the collective bargaining team situation. Methods used for data generation are direct observation, interviews and questionnaires. As to the possible choice between these fieldwork methods, Sieber (1973) has made relevant comments which suggest an interplay between observations, interviews and survey questionnaires as having value.

The methodological approach adopted for this study
of bargaining team dysfunctional IOC outcomes is to obtain field observations of an actual collective bargaining team. The data collected provide a basis for case analysis of the variables of interest. In consideration of the multi-method approach suggested above, the field observations are supplemented by interview and questionnaire responses.

In conclusion, the research approach chosen for this study is a clear compromise recognizing the methodological impediments of initial low generalizability and high uncertainty that are being made.

From the review of conflict research to date, it is concluded that a useful purpose of further research would be generation of additional data related to conflict within the dynamics of a collective bargaining team. As noted earlier, research is needed to pry open the black box of bargaining team process. A field study of one specific bargaining team experience is considered a convenient and useful way of doing so.

The quasi-case method followed in this study of IOC behavior is outlined in the following steps:

Step I: The researcher, as participant/observer, became a member of a collective bargaining team. By joining a team the inside information as to behaviors
exhibited during the team's caucuses, joint negotiating sessions, and other activities were directly available.

Step II: During the actual bargaining team experience observations of team member behaviors were noted in an investigator maintained log.

Step III: Supplemental information on observed behaviors was gathered from other team members through personal interviews and a questionnaire of perceived decision styles employed in the interaction processes.

Step IV: At the conclusion of the collective bargaining experience, observation notes, interview material, and survey responses were analyzed for indications of IOC behavior through the application of the five item operational definition of IOC presented in Chapter Two. Similarly, dysfunctional IOC, as a specific subset of behaviors, was isolated according to the seven item counterproductive response behavior test.

Step V: Analysis of the material then involved
distinguishing outcomes or effects of dysfunctional IOC behaviors on the study team. The noted effects were indicators of the support or lack thereof for the propositions developed in Chapter Two. During the analysis data were also gathered as to the utility of the IOC and dysfunctional IOC operational tests.

Actual field study observations and analysis are reported in Chapter Four. Conclusions from the analysis and recommendations regarding further research on bargaining team IOC are the subjects of Chapter Five.
CHAPTER IV - A Field Study of Bargaining Team IOC

1. Introduction

The author accepted an offer from a British Columbia employer to act as their external labour relations participant/advisor. It should be emphasized that the participant/advisor role was not research oriented in the view of the employer. The assigned role, based on training and prior collective bargaining experience, was to advise and assist the employer in attaining a workable and acceptable collective agreement. Data gathered in support of this research therefore was a secondary, personal concern. While combining the roles of researcher and participant/advisor may well be criticized from a purely academic standpoint, (see Chapter III), it was the one way of overcoming the access and time constraint problems in this labour relations research.

The nature of research on real world conflict necessitates the use of fictitious names for the organization and its actors. The description of setting and background are expressed in general terms for the same reason.

A description of the background related to the industry, the actors, and the negotiation process is presented first followed by details of the observation
methods employed. Finally the observed behavioral incidents are related to the propositions stated in Chapter II.

2. **Background**

Northwinds College is a two year post secondary institution offering courses to students in academic, vocational and technical programs. As well, the College has a career division offering a wide variety of courses through night school and similar extended education facilities. The College is funded by the Provincial Government, through the Department of Education.

Policy is determined by a College Council which is composed of selected representatives of the community (appointed by the Minister of Education) and school boards (elected). Employee relations policy is the joint responsibility of two Council committees with overlapping membership.

Community colleges are relatively new to the B.C. educational environment. Many of them, including Northwinds, have experienced severe growth pains both in operating and capital circumstances. These troubles have been reflected in changing policies and directions of the Council dictated often by the exigencies of the moment. Thus, the organization's internal political environment must be classified as turbulent.
The administration of Northwinds College is composed of a Principal, Bursar, and several Deans. There is no formally identified personnel/industrial relations position although many of these functions are carried out by various members of administration principally the Bursar.

Formalized unionization was established with the faculty organization two years prior to this study. The College and the Faculty Association had just concluded negotiation of a two year agreement as this study began. College bargaining with Faculty was carried out by some members of the Council in conjunction with the Principal and Bursar.

Initial contact with Northwinds College was prior to commencement of collective bargaining. Application to the Labour Relations Board of B.C. for union certification had already been initiated by a local of a provincial association of non-teaching employees. Affiliation of these employees with a provincial association came about as a result of organizational efforts by the association in conjunction with frustrated attempts by an informal non-teaching staff group to renew and upgrade economic and personnel policy items.

The collective bargaining team studied in this case was selected, in consultation with the author, to engage in collective negotiations aimed at achieving a first agreement with this yet to be certified trade
union of non-teaching staff. The team's operation actually commenced prior to union certification. It dealt first with its own goals and roles, then managerial exclusion issues, and finally collective negotiations proper. The participant/observer role spanned the time period of approximately one year. There was a varying frequency of bargaining team meetings during the year ranging from a minimum of once or twice a month to a maximum of approximately fifteen working days per month during joint negotiation periods.

The principal actors, i.e. team members, in this study were three members of Northwinds College's administrative and College Council group and the author.

Team member A was an appointed member of the College Council whose primary role was to provide input and feedback between policy makers of the Council and the bargaining team. Team Member B was a member of administration responsible for input and feedback between the bargaining team and other members of administration. Team Member C, also a member of administration, was more directly responsible for the day to day management of the non-teaching staff. As such, Team Member C provided direct input on the existing employer relations policies and procedures and the feasibility of changing same. The fourth member
of the team was the author acting as advisor, as a direct participant on the bargaining team as chairman, and in joint bargaining sessions often, although not always, as spokesman. It was agreed that, in the event of unresolved disputes, the author as chairman of the team had the right to make a final determination of the issue in question.

It was established in the first team meeting that each member in addition to his input/feedback roles was also expected to share his personal recommendations as to strategy and content decisions during the team experience.

Partially due to dysfunctional IOC, some structural changes occurred over the one year period. First, Team Member A was partially replaced by another member of council, D, who assumed an alternate's role in regard to input and feedback to council. D did not attend joint bargaining sessions. A second structural change occurred near the end of the year when Team Member C resigned from Northwinds College. C was not replaced on the team. Finally, on some occasions both A and D participated in team caucuses in particular when Council concern was high regarding the slow progress of collective bargaining.
From the foregoing, it is already apparent that the dividing line between team members and other interested parties can quickly become blurred, particularly when negotiations are as protracted as in this case. For study purposes, however, the team shall be considered as A, B, C, and the author, with A replaced or supplemented by D on some occasions.

The study team was successful in achieving a first agreement after seven months of direct negotiations. Agreement was reached after mediation had been attempted by a Department of Labour officer. Strike notice had been served on Northwinds College before mediation commenced; however, a strike did not occur. The mediation officer's role is not seen as significant to outcomes of IOC recorded in this study as he primarily dealt with interorganizational conflict.

3. Observation and Analysis Process

During the entire team experience, notes were kept of both bargaining team caucus meetings and union/management bargaining sessions. In addition observations of conflict behavior were noted. In one to one conversations, observations were checked out with other members of the team and any variations in perceptions of events subsequently noted. A post-bargaining interview with the one available team member
was also conducted. Observations made in this interview are incorporated in the descriptions of dysfunctional IOC presented in the next section.

These data are the basis for the IOC analysis. By applying the operational tests for IOC presented in Chapter Two, dysfunctional IOC behaviors and effects are identified. As additional information, primarily to counteract any perceptual bias on the part of the observer, a midpoint and endpoint questionnaire on perceptions of decision making styles was distributed to the two remaining team members. The report of the analyses and findings are presented along with each description. The results of the questionnaire responses are presented at the end of the next section.

4. **Dysfunctional IOC Behavior**

Analysis of the case material demonstrated the particular relevance of Pondy's (1973) process model of conflict. Identification of conflict behavior seems to take on a cumulative nature. Analysis of the data showed that while one or more observed IOC behaviors could be clearly classified as dysfunctional, according to the seven item counterproductive response criteria, in each case there were previous IOC behaviors and responses which formed part of the total conflict picture. As a result, the nature of dysfunctional IOC associated with
the study team is more correctly described as a
dysfunctional IOC problem often ebbing and rising
throughout the bargaining team process. An IOC problem
is conceptualized as a set of related IOC behaviors.
The analysis also shows that the longer a problem
remains unresolved, the more clearly counterproductive
became the response behaviors of the bargaining team
members.

The observation that bargaining team dysfunctional
IOC is a set of problems rather than individual
behaviors is a significant finding of the study which
is more thoroughly discussed in Chapter Five.

Five dysfunctional IOC problems were identified.
The following subsections present summaries of dys-
functional IOC data collected during the field study,
test results determining their qualification as dys-
functional IOC behavior and evidence concerning the
proposed effects of dysfunctional IOC.

A. Problem I: College Council Criticism of Control
   of Operation Costs

i. Description:

   For a variety of reasons there existed among
certain influential members of Northwinds College
Council a relatively critical opinion of past ad-
ministrative performance regarding what appeared to be
excessive operating cost increases. The critical opinion
was expressed to the author by members A and D, Council
representatives, upon first contact with them. The administrative representatives, B and C, were aware of this opinion and frequently responded to perceived expression of it by offering counter-arguments based primarily upon an inner knowledge of the college's past financial history. The differences pervaded several bargaining team meetings and continued to surface throughout the entire year of data collection. Council criticism was particularly focused upon team member C, who on numerous occasions responded by defending the administrative staff's past and current awareness of financial responsibility and careful control of operating costs. Demonstrated IOC associated with bargaining team behavior is described in the following observations:

1) C tentatively agreed to a compromise position regarding voluntary exclusion from union certification of certain firstline supervisors provided A would agree to gain Council support for more administrative staff. Agreement by A, a Council representative, would signify to C a relaxation of the tight financial controls imposed by Council previously. The commencement of joint bargaining sessions was delayed by this interplay between C and A.
2) The author, A and D spent two hours in private session discussing, but not resolving, the general problem of Council's tight rein on operating costs that had resulted from their doubts regarding administrative performance. Inadequate administrative support staff was directly causing delays in the preparation of collective bargaining material.

3) At a lunchtime bargaining team meeting also attended by D, C and D engaged in a heated, personalized discussion as the tight controls and each indirectly referred to the differing underlying opinions of who was properly to blame for previous 'excessive' operating cost increases. Emotions raised in this discussion continued throughout the afternoon team caucus as C, apparently seething, continually attacked bargaining suggestions and positions offered by A. A left the meeting early. The author made several negotiating decisions in the absence of one or more team members.

4) A reported to the author that the differing perspectives between Administration and Council regarding responsibility for excessive past operating costs is one reason for
nonattendance at team caucuses. A felt, "they are attempting to thwart my reappointment to College Council", which was up for renewal shortly. Due to A's continuing absence from team caucuses and joint negotiating meetings, D partially replaced A who retained official status as a team member. D's greater involvement required additional updating meetings and written communications. D did not regularly attend team caucuses or joint bargaining sessions. However, he was actively involved in content decisions regarding the potential collective agreement.

The data also shows B's behavior eventually to be affected by the criticism of the financial responsibility problem. For example, B personally interpreted the apparent split between Council and Administration as an indication of future lack of support by Council to be expected in regard to the results attained by the bargaining team. B vocalized this concern on several occasions. Also, during the middle period of bargaining, B demonstrated a "who cares?" approach towards achieving collective bargaining objectives. This approach was observed by the reduced amount of input B contributed during this period, and late
arrival at and early departure from caucus meetings. When questioned about the reason behind this apparent change of attitude, B offered other competing workload pressures as an explanation. B also referred to the continuing absence of C and stated that Council was either not concerned about the collective bargaining outcomes or, more likely was "hanging" the administrative representatives on the bargaining team. Following the latter expressed reason, B's middle period behavior can be interpreted as withdrawal from a perceived awkward situation.

The apparent continuing Council pressure over operating cost responsibility was also expressed by C as a major reason for his eventual resignation from Northwinds College. This resignation permanently reduced the available input on the bargaining team.

ii. Dysfunctional IOC Indicators:

Applying Filley's (1975) seven win-lose and lose-lose factors as a counterproductive response test of dysfunctional IOC it is found:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Evidence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. We-they distinction</td>
<td>The we-they distinction between Council members A and D, and C (Administration) particularly is evident.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Factor (cont'd)

2. Atmosphere of total defeat or victory

3. Own point of view

4. Emphasis on attaining a solution

5. Personalized conflict

6. Undifferentiated resolution activities

Evidence

Withdrawal and resignation actions by A and C respectively must be considered as defeat outcomes. Each party appeared to hold to his own point of view even in open confrontation. The interactions, such as the compromise proposal and the additional meetings, were focused upon solutions although the author attempted problem solving with a goal orientation on several occasions. Conflict was definitely personalized. The conflict resolution processes, mainly confrontation and withdrawal, were largely intermixed with the overall bargaining team meetings.
7. Immediate disagreement

When the problem was emphasized, it consumed the actors' full attention. Intervention by the author was necessary to redirect attention to the collective bargaining objectives.

iii. Proposition Support:

Problem I lends evidence of support to several of the propositions.

Proposition I, that the occurrence of dysfunctional IOC may result in a lengthening of the time taken to conclude a collective agreement, is supported by the evidence showing occurrence of C's tradeoff maneuver regarding managerial exclusions. This delayed resolution of the issue and therefore the commencement of joint bargaining sessions.

Proposition IA, that where time-limits prevent extension of the negotiating process an outcome of dysfunctional IOC is an increase in inputs, is supported by the evidence showing considerable caucus time was utilized in attempting a resolution to Problem I.
Proposition II, that dysfunctional IOC may result in team member behavior that either withholds information input and/or presents misleading information, is supported by evidence demonstrating a reduction in input by B, A and eventually C. As a result of the charges and counter-charges occurring in team caucuses, there is also some support seen for suggesting that during these periods, misleading input was received.

Proposition III, that dysfunctional IOC may result in the breakdown of previously agreed upon team rules, is supported by evidence of non-attendance and late attendance at caucuses.

Proposition IVA, that nonparticipative decision making will occur under dysfunctional IOC conditions, is supported by evidence that several decisions were made without benefit of full team discussion or agreement.

Proposition IVB, that team member participation will be reduced in persuading principals to ratify the memorandum of agreement when decisions are made in a non-participative manner, is supported by evidence of the resignation of C.
B. Problem II - Absence and Withdrawal of a Team Member

This problem, while probably closely allied to Problem I in root cause, is indicated separately because of the variation in manifest IOC behaviors.

i. Description:

Throughout the bargaining team experience, team member A had a problem of attendance both during union management negotiating sessions and during team caucuses. As related earlier, A's primary role was to provide input/feedback to Council. A's absence, therefore, was cause for considerable concern by the remainder of the team.

After initial participation in the bargaining team goal setting and role determination meetings, A was intermittently absent during the first half of the bargaining experience. This fact was continually commented upon by B and C, and the author was asked and encouraged by B and C to remedy the situation by either assuring A's attendance or somehow altering the team structure. Additional private discussions with A and D achieved short term results. However, A's absences then reoccurred. Some caucus time was spent either waiting for an anticipated showing of A, or discussing the absence of A. As time progressed, A's input as a participant began to be discounted by B and C. When input was received, often indirectly from A, it was
reviewed more cursorily than was input from B or C. Several non-flattering comments concerning A's motivation for team membership were offered by B and C in A's absence. In an attempt to maintain Council input and feedback, as the role of A dictated, D was drawn far more heavily into bargaining team discussions from the midpoint on.

One incident of IOC as related to decision making style occurred as a direct result of A's absences. The team was committed to make a major counterproposal during an evening session with the union. The preparation of this counterproposal had received considerable discussion by B and C; however, A was absent during most of it. In the afternoon preceding the evening negotiating session, A attended the caucus, presenting a long list of proposed changes. After a heated exchange primarily between the author and A, the author as chairman exercised his prerogative to move ahead, disregarding many of the proposed amendments. A was absent from the team for the remainder of the bargaining period, approximately four months. A, however, participated in the final team caucus during mediation and appeared very supportive of the team's results. Discussion with a close friend (and a Council member) of A's confirmed the author's impression that A held a
strong aversion to the nature of discussion over collective bargaining strategies and outcomes taking place in the caucuses. A private conversation with A confirmed that this, along with external time pressures and problem I, were reasons for withdrawal.

A's absence also was referred to by B as distressing and creating a high degree of personal insecurity. As noted in Problem I, this manifested itself in B's resetting personal time priorities to lower that of the collective bargaining role during the middle period of negotiations.

ii. Dysfunctional IOC Indicators:

Problem II meets all seven counterproductive response test factors:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Evidence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. We-they distinction</td>
<td>A and the author definitely held a we-they distinction during the confrontation over late changes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Atmosphere of total defeat or victory</td>
<td>Invoking the chairman's prerogative to make a decision had the effect of defeating A; also the other team members B and C often aligned themselves against A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factor (cont'd)</td>
<td>Evidence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Own point of view</td>
<td>From the rest of the team's viewpoint, A's attendance was mandatory whereas A contradicted this in action.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Emphasis on attaining a solution</td>
<td>Several attempts were made to find a solution with the partial substitution of D ultimately occurring.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Personalized conflict</td>
<td>Personalized comments are noted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Undifferentiated resolution activities</td>
<td>The absence of A as a discussion topic occurred throughout the bargaining team caucuses.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Immediate disagreement emphasized</td>
<td>When raised as an issue with A, the topic became conflictual with excuses and defensive arguments being exchanged with B, C and the author.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
iii. **Proposition Support:**

I. **Lengthening of time to reach agreement**

More joint sessions were necessary as a result of A's absence. Therefore, this proposition is supported.

IA. **Increased Team Resource Inputs**

The major ramification of this dysfunctional IOC problem was the necessity to restructure and reorient the team to partially include D. IA is definitely supported.

II. **Withholding information and/or misleading information**

Withdrawal of A, for a period reduced input, not only of A but as noted, also of B.

III. **Rule breaking behavior**

The rule of attendance was broken reestablished with A and then broken again.

IVA. **Occurrence of nonparticipative decision making**

Absence of A during the counterproposal period forced the author to make some arbitrary decisions particularly concerning Council positions.

IVB. **Reduced participation in selling agreement**

Non-support for this proposition is also evident. The absence of A did not appear to reduce A's support.
for the final document. The partial addition of D perhaps increased the ultimate support for ratification.

C. Problem III - Exclusion of Firstline Supervisors from Union Certification

i. Description:

This problem centered around the prenegotiation issue of establishing a team position regarding certain College questioned supervisory inclusions in the union's certified bargaining unit. The team members held a thorough review of the alternatives available. It became apparent during the review that the members held varying views on the issue. Further, they appeared to defer to C who had the greatest stake in the issue as C was the administrator of several of the questioned positions.

As problem solving did not appear to resolve the matter, the author persuaded C to select a particular alternative based upon "expert" knowledge as to the probabilities of success of the other alternatives. While it at first appeared that persuasion had resolved the issue, two weeks later C again balked by refusing to support the alternative.

As noted in Problem I, C then exacted a trade-off price from A before finally conceding the position. C's balking had a four hour delaying effect on the team
caucus determination of other business. Further, it required additional resources through A's referral of C's demand to D. There was a degree of betrayal feelings experienced by the author and some personal animosity and anger directly expressed towards C. C responded by explaining the tight control situation and that this was a way of counterattacking Council. The problem occurred during the first month or two of team association and did not appear to have a long lasting effect on either the author or C's subsequent behaviors towards each other.

ii. **Dysfunctional IOC Indicators:**

Problem III presents evidence in support of the seven Filley (1975) win-lose, lose-lose factors. In assessing these indices, however, they appear to be they are less strongly supported than with Problems I or II.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Evidence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. We-they distinction</td>
<td>A we-they distinction arose as problem solving attempts failed to reach a compromise. This occurred particularly between C and the author.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factor (cont'd)</td>
<td>Evidence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Atmosphere of total defeat or victory</td>
<td>As problem solving failed the author found himself reaching for additional expertise information (which C could not refute) in order to persuade C. This action is viewed as an attempt to defeat C.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Own point of view</td>
<td>Clearly C and the author saw the exclusion issue differently, each operating from his own point of view.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Emphasis on attaining a solution</td>
<td>Eventual solution was a compromise sweetened by some promise of budgetary support for C.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Personalized conflict</td>
<td>Conflict between C and the author became somewhat personalized with residual emotional reactions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Undifferentiated resolution activities</td>
<td>The conflict appeared to take precedent over all other issues until resolved, i.e., four hour discussion.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
7. Immediate disagreement

For a brief time, C and the emphasized author were definitely verbally in disagreement on the issue.

iii. Proposition Support:
I. Lengthening of time to reach agreement

The inability of the team to resolve this problem delayed the commencement of negotiations between the union and management.

IA. Increased Team Resource Inputs

Additional resources were required to resolve the issue. D was consulted. Additional information on the feasibility of other alternatives was also gathered.

II. Withholding information and/or misleading information

There was a misleading impression of acceptance of particular alternative by C during the middle stage of this problem.

IVA. Occurrence of nonparticipative decision making

The use of expertise power by the author achieved the initial alternative which was subsequently balked at by C.
D. Problem IV - Competing Team Member Time Pressures

i. Description:

This problem focus is upon the competing time pressures of the bargaining team members. As reported in Problem I and II, A indicated competing time pressures were part of the reason for absences and withdrawal behavior. B and C also repeatedly raised competing demands, both personal and organizational, on their time as a problem. Observations of their behavior include lateness and absences from caucuses and an expressed unwillingness for union-management negotiating sessions to be held more frequently than once per week. The subject of frequency of negotiating sessions was dealt with in several caucuses with a variety of solutions explored. One partial solution adopted was to increase the author’s research role and to add clerical help for compiling labour relations statistics.

Competing time pressures of team members also became a disagreement personally focused between the author and other team members. On one occasion, the author was accused of being excessively singleminded regarding collective bargaining and insensitive to the other time demands of team members. These accusations were responded to by no longer
drawing attention to the subject, i.e. suppression behavior, on the author's part.

The time problem seemed to have a secondary behavioral effect as the drawn out nature of this team experience made it at times difficult for members to remain highly motivated. Data from one caucus showed B and C to demonstrate and express boredom and be sensitive to symptoms of fatigue. On another occasion, very offhanded ill-considered reactions to joint session bargaining were expressed. The competing time problem remained with the team to the end of negotiations at which time B was actually on vacation. The final settlement was agreed upon by the author, B and D in a long distance telephone conversation. ii. **Dysfunctional IOC Indicators:**

The criteria show that dysfunctional indicators are present in this problem for most factors. This is perhaps surprising as, at first glance, competing time pressures are a fairly normal organizational circumstance. Competing time pressures appear more counterproductive when studied in the problem context than when viewed as separate absence and withdrawal behaviors.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Evidence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. We-they distinction</td>
<td>When pressure for valuable time was generated by the author it quickly became evident that there was a we-they distinction between the parties.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Atmosphere of total defeat or victory</td>
<td>The behavior of the author in overlooding bargaining team time demands was a successful attempt by B and C to defeat the other party.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Own point of view</td>
<td>Clearly the issue was seen from each person's own point of view.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Emphasis on attaining a solution</td>
<td>Solutions raised were to add resources or ignore the problem.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Personalized conflict</td>
<td>The author was attacked in relation to accusations of being an insensitive, self-centered person for pursuing the issue.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Undifferentiated resolution activities</td>
<td>The time pressure problem was continually intermixed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Factor (cont'd)  Evidence

7. Immediate disagreement  When the problem was
emphasized  focused upon, B and C were
immediately defensive, taking pains to justify the
high priorities of other demands upon their time.

iii. Proposition Support:

I. Lengthening of time to reach agreement

This problem definitely extended considerably
the time necessary to reach agreement.

IA. Increased Team Resource Inputs

As additional resources and increased time by the
author were needed to achieve a partial solution, this
proposition is definitely supported

II. Withholding information and/or misleading
information

By definition this proposition is supported.

It is also suggested that misleading information
was presented in support of other high priorities.

III. Rule breaking behavior

Rules of attendance and deadlines regarding
attendance were broken.

IVA. Occurrence of nonparticipative decision making

Occasionally, decisions were made by the author on
behalf of the team with reduced or no other team member input.

E. Problem V - Disagreement Over Collective Agreement

Content Issues

i. Description:

Goal and content issues are normally anticipated to be a major source of IOC. Perhaps because of the team's initial mutual determination and agreement of collective bargaining goals, there were only a few items of this nature that generated prolonged discussion and debate. A major incident occurred as the counterproposals were in the final stage of preparation. Concerns about the apparent generosity of the package were raised by A, B and C. A was overruled on some proposed changes and a somewhat heated, personally focused exchange occurred between A and the author. It was implied that A was challenging the author's knowledge of labour relations. A became insecure, more hesitant and withdrawn.

Content disputes by extending caucuses, within the team, also delayed the progress of joint negotiations on a few occasions.

The data indicate that various team members expressed reluctance to become specific over counterproposals. B, in particular, expressed a "wait and see" approach,
expressly withholding a decision to agree with the counterproposals step by step, until the author generated a total package of draft counterproposals.

ii. **Dysfunctional IOC Indicators:**

Applying the seven win-lose, lose-lose factors to this problem supports its classification as dysfunctional IOC:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Evidence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. We-they distinction</td>
<td>There was a we-they distinction between all members related to some content issues.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Atmosphere of total defeat or victory</td>
<td>When content issues were being debated, A's input was often ignored as being not knowledgeable as to the College's operating methods.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Own point of view</td>
<td>B and C saw these disputed content issues from the focus of Administration, eg. feasibility to work within proposed agreement whereas A saw these same issues from a Council viewpoint, eg. cost constraints.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factor (cont'd)</td>
<td>Evidence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Emphasis on attaining a solution</td>
<td>The solution usually applied to such content disputes was a vote whereby A was normally overruled.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Personalized conflict</td>
<td>The interchange between A and the author was definitely personalized, although many of the other content discussions were not.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Undifferentiated resolution activities</td>
<td>This conflict resolution process was not differentiated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Immediate disagreement emphasized</td>
<td>During the discussion of the content issues, the team members held to their particular views thus, in this sense, they were outcome focused. The discussion between A and the author referred to above was definitely oriented to a win-lose style of resolution.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
iii. Proposition Support:

I. Lengthening of time to reach agreement
   Delays in joint bargaining occurred.

   IA. Increased Team Resource Inputs
       Increased and lengthened team meeting periods were
       needed to resolve content issues.

II. Withholding information and/or misleading information

   Insofar as the exchange between A and the author
   contributed to the withdrawal of A, input was reduced.

   Evidence of increased input is also noted in
   regard to content issues. As content issues received
   attention, input of team members was increased. This
   additional input took the form of a member offering
   additional evidence supporting a particular point of
   view in regard to the content issue under discussion.

   IVA. Occurrence of nonparticipative decision making

       Content issues required infrequent autocratic
       decision making.

   An additional problem was isolated from the data.
   Its occurrence, however, is viewed as so atypical that
   it has been omitted from the analysis. The problem was
   the resignation of C from the team which prompted some
   conflictual incidents that were resolved by the
   remaining members. C subsequently reported feeling
some lasting resentment towards other team members over the treatment received upon resignation.

F. Additional Findings

i. Decision Style

In Chapter Two, Part Two, Vroom and Yetton's (1973) normative model of situationally determined decision styles was discussed in regard to prescribing the appropriate decision style for use when conflict is present within a group. Perceptions of the members regarding the frequency of various decision styles suggested by Vroom and Yetton (1973) was thought to be a measure of the influence of IOC on selection of a particular decision mode. To gather these perceptions, a questionnaire based upon the Vroom and Yetton decision style descriptions (1973, p. 13) was administered to team members B and C twice, at the midpoint of the bargaining experience and at the end. Team member A's continuous absence prevented more complete data collection. Table I reproduces the decision style descriptions in column 1, the midpoint responses of team members B and C in columns 2 and 3, and the final responses in columns 4 and 5. Figures shown represent perceived percentages of team decisions made according to the respective decision style.

***************
Insert Table I
***************
TABLE I

Member Assessment of Decision Making Style

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description of Decision Style</th>
<th>Midpoint Evaluation</th>
<th>Final Evaluation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Member 1</td>
<td>Member 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Leader solves problem or makes decision himself using information available to leader at the time.</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Leader obtains the necessary information from bargaining team, then decides the solution to problem himself. Leader may or may not tell bargaining team what the problem is in getting information from them. The role played by the other bargaining team members in making the decision is clearly one of providing the necessary information to leader, rather than generating or evaluating alternative solutions.</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Description of Decision Style</td>
<td>Midpoint Evaluation</td>
<td>Final Evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Member 1</td>
<td>Member 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Leader shares the problem with the bargaining team individually getting their ideas and suggestions without bringing them together as a group. Then leader makes the decision, which may or may not reflect bargaining team's influence.</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Leader shares the problem with bargaining team as a group, obtaining collective ideas and suggestions. Then leader makes the decision, which may or may not reflect bargaining team's influence.</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Leader shares the problem with bargaining team as a group. Together the team generates and evaluates alternatives and attempts to reach agreement (consensus) on a solution. Leaders role is much like a chairman. Leader does not try to influence the group to adopt &quot;leader&quot; solution, and leader is willing to accept and implement any solution which has the support of the entire group.</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>95%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
It appears from these data that the two team members responding consistently viewed the overall decision making style of the bargaining team as participative. Thus, while the five dysfunctional problems indicated support for Proposition IVA, occurrence of a nonparticipative decision style, there were not enough of these decisions to produce an effect as suggested by Propositions IVB, reduced participation in selling agreement, or IVC, IOC affecting recommendations.

ii. Functional IOC:

Another observation on IOC gained from the analysis is that a large portion of the behaviors classified as perceived incompatible behaviors, that is conflict, were not dysfunctional. Most of the conflict observed related to different viewpoints within the team on content issues. Examples of functional conflict were found in all of the team caucuses discussing the relative pros and cons of a union demand or management counterproposal. As incompatible viewpoints were expressed these interchanges, when tested by the five item (Filley, 1973) definition, were characterized as conflictual yet highly functional. As indicated previously, only a few of these issues became dysfunctional.

Discriminating features of dysfunctional versus functional IOC, as shown by comparing these behaviors,
appears to be the length of time required to resolve them and the permanence of the solution achieved. Functional IOC is quickly and permanently resolved. Dysfunctional IOC, which is recurring, consumes considerable bargaining team time and energy.

5. **Summary**

Table II reports the findings of dysfunctional IOC described in this Chapter.

***************
Insert Table II
***************
### Table II - Summary of Proposition Findings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Problems</th>
<th>I Council Criticism Effect</th>
<th>II Team Member Withdrawal</th>
<th>III Exclusion from Union Certification</th>
<th>IV Competing Time Pressures</th>
<th>V Content Issue Disagreements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Propositions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. Lengthening of time to reach</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>agreement</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IA. Increased Team Resource Inputs</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Withholding Information and/or</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S/R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>misleading info.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. Rule breaking Behavior</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td></td>
<td>S</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV.A. Occurrence of nonparticipation</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision Making</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV.B. Reduced Participation in</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selling Agreement</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV.C. Recommendation to reject or no</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>R</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>recommendation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Key** -
- **S** - Proposition Supported
- **R** - Proposition Refuted by Data
- **Blank** - No evidence observed
Analysis of data presents strong support for IOC behavioral effects associated with time delays and increased team resources. Reduction of valuable and needed inputs through the withholding of information and the potential for misleading information to be presented is also found in four of the five dysfunctional IOC problems observed. Dysfunctional IOC, in this analysis, appears to foster nonparticipative decisions in all problems. The data therefore supports proposition IVA. The potential effects of rulebreaking behavior are less strongly supported. Findings equally support and reject the effect of nonparticipative decision making style on team member participation. Also, as the team recommended acceptance, this proposition is rejected. The supplementary information presented in Table I suggests, according to two members' perceptions, most decisions were made in a participative mode. This information may explain the lack of support found in the analysis regarding Proposition IVB, reduced participation of team members in selling a memorandum of agreement to principals, and Proposition IVC, team members recommend rejection or make no recommendation to their principals.

Conclusions related to the operational definitions and indicators of dysfunctional IOC, the propositions, and suggestions for further research are the subjects of Chapter Five.
CHAPTER FIVE - Conclusions

From the experiences gained in field study of an actual collective bargaining team, outlined in Chapter Four, it is now possible to make some conclusions in regard to both the theoretical and operational model of IOC behavior and to discuss the findings related to the proposed outcomes. Implications of these conclusions suggesting further areas for research on the topic of bargaining team IOC are also discussed in the final section of this chapter.

1. Appropriateness of the Theoretical Model

Figure One, presented in Chapter Two, theoretically described the nature of IOC occurring in a collective bargaining team. The field study data of Chapter Four provides considerable evidence in support of the model. IOC behaviors were found to be abundantly present. Evidence was found of IOC behaviors in team caucuses, in private meetings between some members of the team, and in the joint negotiating sessions. IOC treatment processes, that is response behaviors, were also found. Response behaviors were observed of both the productive and counterproductive types. For example, several attempts at problem solving activity and considerable participative decision making indicated the occurrence of win-win or productive responses. Similarly, personalized attempts
to defeat another team member and nonparticipative
decision styles, as evidenced in the five problems
presented in Chapter Four, indicated the occurrence of
win-lose and lose-lose, counterproductive responses.
That dysfunctional IOC behavior has an outcome effect on
team behavior is also evident in the varying support
found for the propositions.

The model conceptualized IOC as a dynamic
phenomenon, a flow of behaviors, operating throughout the
team experience. Two particular causes of IOC through
feedback within the model were suggested: response
behaviors and negative outcomes. The dynamic
conceptualization of IOC implies that observations of a
team's behavior cannot concentrate just on initiating
behaviors or just on responses to determine potential
outcomes. Initiating behavior, IOC, alone may be
counteracted by a variety of responses that serve to
nullify any effects. Response behaviors alone do not
guarantee a particular set of outcomes. It is the
reaction of the initiating member's behavior to a
response that determines whether or not IOC is resolved
or becomes a generator of subsequent IOC behavior. Thus
observation of bargaining team IOC must focus upon the
interplay between initiating and response behaviors flowing
throughout the bargaining team experience. These combined interactions will determine outcomes of IOC. In the analysis of the field study, selection of focal problems appeared to clarify combinations of behaviors that led to various outcomes. Corroborating evidence from the team members supported the focal problem approach as it was observed that they also tended to perceptually focus or dwell on certain issues or problems.

Observation of IOC problems in the field study appears to support the recycling conceptualization of both response behaviors and negative outcomes in the model. For example, win-lose treatment of team member A's late input of counterproposal changes noted in Problem II generated further withdrawal from the team of A. An example of a negative outcome as a conflict generator was that the extention of time to completion contributed to the low motivated, reduced input responses of team member B recorded in Problem IV.

Within an IOC problem there may exist a variety of IOC behaviors, classified as functional or dysfunctional according to elicited response behaviors. For example, in Problem III, the initial compromise attained through problem solving (win-win) defines these IOC behaviors as functional. Yet overall, Problem III retained the
characteristics of dysfunctional conflict. The occurrence of both functional and dysfunctional IOC behaviors by the same actor within problem III supports the concept of varying team member tolerance levels to IOC.

The evidence of Problem III also suggests that tolerance levels may be influenced by the effectiveness of the response behavior in resolving IOC. If the problem solving activity (win-win response behavior) had truly resolved the IOC, then the predominant IOC behavior would have been functional and not a case for further analysis. As the problem solving attempt failed however, IOC behavior continued and became increasingly dysfunctional as win-lose and lose-lose responses were then elicited. The foregoing suggests that tolerance levels to IOC are lowered as particular IOC problems continue to occur. Also, it suggests that the more team member energy that is consumed in unsuccessfully attempting to resolve IOC, the lower the tolerance level becomes. Time and energy are therefore viewed as important contributing influences to dysfunctional IOC in this problem.

The corollary to extension of time to resolve IOC is the increased amount of IOC behavior that also occurs in Problem III. Thus the concept suggesting
variation of IOC levels in a bargaining team experience is also supported.

While Problem III shows support for the tolerance level and IOC level concepts, it is recognized that methodological considerations prevent a general conclusion being drawn on the merits of these concepts. This initial support is interesting, however, as a point for further research on the concepts.

2. Utility of Operational Definitions

i. IOC Behavior

The operational definition of IOC, taken from Filley's (1975) process definition of conflict, presented five characteristics of a conflictual situation. It was found when carrying out analysis that only two characteristics differentiated IOC from other behaviors in a collective bargaining team. These are:

1. The parties face each other with mutually opposing actions and counteractions.

2. Each party attempts to create an imbalance or relatively favoured position of power vis-a-vis the other (Filley, 1975, p. 4).

These two characteristics, therefore, became the operational distinctions in the field study as to behaviors adjudicated as incompatible, i.e. IOC.

This finding does not refute the potential value of the other three characteristics of a conflictual situation (Filley, 1975). Rather it suggests that they
were either always present, as in the case of "at least two parties involved in some kind of interaction," or operationally useless, as in the case of goal/value measurement and focus of behavior to defeat" or to gain a mutually designated victory," in the case study.

Stated succinctly, IOC behavior in a collective bargaining team was found to be most readily identified by incompatible acts of aggressive and extended debate, the exercising of power, suppression and withdrawal.

ii. Dysfunctional IOC

As an operational approach, Chapter Two suggested the use of Filley's (1975) seven characteristics of win-lose and lose-lose behavior as an identifying check¬list of counterproductive responses. Observations reported in Chapter Four appear to support the utility of this approach to recognizing perceived dysfunctional IOC by team members.

Parenthetically the problem of avoiding a tautology between operationally distinguishing dysfunctional IOC and the developed propositions is by no means an insignificant one. Such an observation clearly argues from a very specific operational definition of dysfunctional IOC, thus supporting the choice of Filley over that of other researchers, eg. Deutsch (1973), which tended to confuse observable behavior and outcomes.
The foregoing, however, is not meant to imply that the selected approach to recognizing dysfunctional IOC was free of operational identity problems. Two characteristics lack some operational clarity. Characteristic six, "lack of differentiation of conflict-resolving activities", provided some measurement difficulty. In any group process it appears to be normal for members to focus upon perceived conflict in an attempt to resolve IOC. At that point in time, an observer would gain the impression that there is a distinction between this activity and "other group processes." The second phase of this characteristic, relating to lack of a "planned sequence of (IOC) resolution activities" is more clearly observable. Characteristic seven, "the parties are conflict-oriented", appears to be redundant as an identifier particularly with reference to characteristics one and three.

iii. Identification of Dysfunctional IOC Problems

Perhaps as anticipated by the discussion of varying tolerance levels to IOC in Chapter Two, the identification of individual dysfunctional IOC behaviors was not, in isolation, useful in relation to the propositions raised. In this regard the long term nature of the field study probably rescued the findings from the danger of discovering almost no supporting evidence. As noted in Chapter Four, the cumulative linkage of IOC behaviors
must be made, i.e., an IOC problem identified, in order to gain a picture of the operation and effects of dysfunctional IOC in a bargaining team.

While the proposition findings reported in Chapter Four are believed to be ramifications of the reported dysfunctional IOC problems, readers will be quick to note an additional interpretive process that enters into these findings. A researcher must assume some additional interpretive responsibility for making the appropriate data linkages to develop the more abstract problem from observed IOC behaviors.

Setting the unit of analysis as a dysfunctional IOC problem also somewhat weakens the evidence related to proposed outcomes of dysfunctional IOC behavior on a bargaining team. As individual behaviors included in a dysfunctional IOC problem are not necessarily viewed in isolation as dysfunctional, the support found for propositions is clearly more controversial. It raises the disturbing question as to whether IOC incidents in a bargaining team, either of a functional or dysfunctional nature, will also provide evidence in support of the propositions.
It is also apparent that direct analysis of dysfunctional bargaining team IOC will not provide evidence related to overall perceived decision making styles. In fact, the limited linkages made between observed behavior and decision making style would equally support positive and negative conclusions regarding Proposition IVB. Additional data on perceived decision making style, however, was obtained by use of the supplementary questionnaire. This reaffirms the previously noted advantage of using more than one data gathering technique in the explorative field study.

iv. Weighting of Dysfunctional IOC Problems

It was indicated in the analysis of dysfunctional IOC that Problem II, Exclusion from Union Certification Issue, did not appear to have the same concentration of counterproductive response characteristics as other problems. The strength of support for the IOC indicators within the problem was less. Also, there appeared to be no long lasting behavioral effects associated with Problem III. This suggests a conclusion that IOC behavior is issue related.

A more refined test for counterproductive responses may provide additional insight on bargaining team IOC. For example, if a weighted scale of a counterproductive responses indicators was developed, then problems
could be ranked on severity of dysfunctionality. From this ranking there may be evidence related to the impact of variously ranked problems on outcomes. The variation in impact, based upon field study data, is thought to be related to the amount of time a dysfunctional problem exists and the team member energies it consumes.

At this juncture, however, the only conclusion which can be made is that there are observable differences in the impact of various dysfunctional IOC problems on the propositions.

3. Conclusions Related to Propositions

The last section of Chapter Four presented a summary of the respective findings concerning the propositions. This section discusses these findings in more detail.

I - The occurrence of dysfunctional IOC during the collective bargaining process results in a lengthening of the time taken to conclude a collective agreement.

Proposition I is supported by all five dysfunctional IOC problems. Particularly noted are outcomes that delayed the commencement of joint union-management negotiations and an extended number of
sessions.

IA - Where time-limits prevent extension of the negotiating process an outcome of dysfunctional IOC is an increase in team resource inputs;...

Proposition IA is also supported by all five problems. Evidence has been presented showing an increase in caucus time. Also presented was evidence of additional resource inputs through the partial restructuring of the team to include D, and additional clerical assistance.

II - Dysfunctional IOC may result in team member behavior that either withholds information and/or presents information in such a manner as to mislead other team members.

While Proposition II is supported by behavioral evidence in four problems, the support for withholding information appears stronger than for presenting misleading information.

It is also noted that evidence showing nonsupport for Proposition II is recorded for Problem V, content issues. Increased input was observed as the behavioral outcome. These contradictory observations may be explained by the existence of functional IOC behaviors,
within a dysfunctionally classified IOC problem. That is, increased input reflected a functional aspect of discussions on content issues. In the field study most of the IOC observed that was focused on content issues did not demonstrate counterproductive response indicators, i.e. it was classified as functional IOC.

III - Dysfunctional IOC may result in the breakdown of previously agreed upon team rules.

There is limited support for Proposition III as evidence was found of ruling breaking behavior in three problems. The nature of rule breaking behavior was different from that originally anticipated. In the field study, time commitments and attendance deadlines were broken within the team's agreed upon operating methods. Rule breaking behavior does not seem as significant as originally envisioned. The particular outcomes may be due to an absence of restrictive rules regarding speaking at the table for C and the author particularly, as the spokesman/negotiator role was shared.

IVA - When a bargaining team decision on the new or revised collective agreement item is made in response to dysfunctional IOC behaviors, the
decision will be made in a nonparticipative decision style.

Evidence from the case analysis supports this proposition. All problems showed that decision making by the author was forced to be more autocratic when dysfunctional IOC prevailed. Expert power, compromises and a voting mechanism were used to make decisions in these circumstances.

IVB - When team decisions as to new or revised collective agreement items are made in a nonparticipative manner the cumulative effect will be to reduce the active participation of team members in persuading principals to ratify the memorandum of agreement.

Field study data has shown two opposing behavioral observations regarding this proposition. The loss of team member C is viewed as support of the proposition whereas the continued support of team member A opposed it.

More significant, however, than the direct observations are the supplementary data of Table I indicating team members perceived between 80% and 95% of bargaining team decisions were made in a participative style. The supplementary data support a conclusion
that the five observed problems of dysfunctional IOC did not produce sufficient nonparticipative decision making behavior to reduce team member willingness to sell ratification of the memorandum of agreement. Speculation as to a cause for this suggest that leader awareness of the potential negative effects of nonparticipative decisions tended to produce an avoidance of this style except where IOC forced its use. As the amount or intensity of dysfunctional IOC was insufficient to necessitate greater use of a nonparticipative decision style, Proposition IVB could not be supported by the evidence.

IVC - The cumulative effect of participative decisions vis-a-vis nonparticipative decisions, as this balance is influenced by dysfunctional IOC, may be to influence the overall decision of the team regarding its recommendation to its constituents;...

As the decision style questionnaire responses of Table I show a high level of participative decision making and the team did recommend acceptance to its constituents, this proposition is supported. The interesting question remains, however, as to whether a greater number of dysfunctional IOC problems would generate
sufficient nonparticipative decisions within the team to stimulate a "reject" or "no recommendation" decision.

Alternative reasons for such recommendations are viewed as quite feasible in a collective bargaining circumstance. For example, a content issue may be so central to a team's goal that in and of itself it influences the recommendation of the team regarding ratification. Proposition IVC is not intended to refute such occurrences. Rather, it suggests a particular linkage between dysfunctional IOC, decision making style and a proposed outcome.

3. Concluding Comments

The research has attempted to gain a clearer picture of conflict in its many manifest or observable forms within a collective bargaining team. It has produced, it is hoped, a clearer picture of what real world bargaining team conflict looks like.

The nature of IOC has been bisected by a flexible partition envisaged between functional and dysfunctional IOC behaviors. On review, it may be questioned as to whether this partition is relevant or useful. Clearly some aspects of bargaining team IOC behaviors are productive. Yet, as noted previously, so too are some behaviors within a dysfunctional problem productive. The dividing line appears to be one of time and team
energy utilized in the attempts to resolve IOC. Unsuccessful attempts to resolve IOC give rise to counterproductive IOC response behavior. Successful resolution does not. Perhaps a refocusing of attention in the operational model to look closer at both productive and counterproductive responses to unresolved bargaining team IOC would be useful. In other words further study of frame 4A of the conceptual model in Chapter Two is suggested.

Structural variables may produce significant effects on IOC. The effect of size and various assignments of functional responsibility as structural factors of bargaining team membership are thought to be particular areas for productive research of a comparative nature.

While the present research deliberately omitted an in depth study of the particular causes of the bargaining team's IOC, use of the focal problem approach inadvertently introduced perceived cause as a classification technique. Future research of collective bargaining team IOC, therefore, should expand study of the causes of IOC. Certain factors may be more important as IOC generators than others.

The field study supports the introductory comments as to a collective bargaining team providing a rich
environment for studying conflictual behavior. The data indicated most of the bargaining team interaction to be somewhat conflictual. Whether this is uniquely different from other group interaction processes is a question left to comparative researchers. The results show, however, that more generalizable research on the effects of bargaining team IOC is warranted.

If the developed propositions are also supported by results from study of several teams, there would appear to be a significant potential for cost reduction and increased team performance in collective bargaining.
REFERENCES


