THE IDEOLOGY OF THE INDIAN REFORM MOVEMENT
IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY PERU

by

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Spanish colonial legislation created an Indian elite in Peru by perpetuating the hierarchical nature of Indian society. Spain gave a number of privileges to the pre-Hispanic Indian leaders so that they would assist in controlling and exploiting the majority Indian population. The intermediary position of these Indian leaders created a tension between the responsibilities and loyalties they derived from Spanish society and those they derived from traditional Indian society. By the eighteenth century Spanish exploitation of Indian society had exacerbated this tension to the point where the Indian elite was often subject to openly conflicting interests. As a result they faced the prospect of losing the social and economic advantages which their intermediary role offered.

Spanish colonial legislation had also, however, assigned colonial administrators a religious obligation to foster the welfare of Indians. Through the protectoral system this obligation was incorporated into the administrative bureaucracy. Throughout the eighteenth century the Indian elite attempted to use both this system and the theories on which it had been founded to regain their effectively privileged status. From 1708 to 1737 the Indian elite centred in Lima petitioned both the Viceregal authorities and the Spanish Crown to demand the implementation of their legal privileges. Based on the theory that the Crown's benevolent intentions towards the Indians as a whole were the source of the privileges granted the elite, they began to incorporate the defense of common Indians into these petitions. Although the administration
responded to these petitions with approval in theory, they brought little in the way of effective reform.

By 1748 these petitions had created a coherent ideology for reform which the Indian elite of Lima presented in a document called the Representación verdadera. A Franciscan, Fr. Calixto Tupac Inga, played an important role in urging the Indians to continue their petitions to the Crown rather than undertake revolt against the Spanish administration. The Representación set out a number of broad reforms in the colonial administration designed to give Indians a more important and responsible position in the government of Indian society under the Spanish regime. These reforms were expressed within the structure of an analogy between the Jews of Babylon and the Indians in Peru.

This analogy was inspired by the writings of early Spanish missionaries and gave the plan for reform a utopian connotation which undermined its appeal for Spanish authorities. On the basis of Hispanic missionary ideals, the Representación went as far as to justify rebellion as a means of destroying the tyrannical Spanish administration. General apprehensions about the possibility of Indian revolt, together with an actual uprising in 1750 led by members of the Lima Indian elite, moved the Viceregal administration to take repressive measures against Indian protest in general and particularly against Fr. Calixto.

This repression effectively put an end to the Lima Indian elite's role as advocates of the welfare of rural Indian society. The pattern of protest established by the Lima elite and the ideology of reform developed in the course of this protest provided, however, the basis for José Gabriel Tupac
Amaru, himself a rural cacique, to advocate reform to improve the condition of oppressed rural Indians. When these appeals failed, he adopted the theory of rebellion developed in the Representación to initiate the rebellion of 1780 which now bears his name. The formation of Indian reformist thought within the framework of Hispanic colonial theory precluded it from developing a realistic assessment of the complex social and economic relationships which existed in colonial Peru. As a result, the Indian reformist movement, ill prepared to meet the challenges presented by the changed circumstances of the 1780's, was destined to die with its last and most radical exponent, Tupac Amaru II.
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INTRODUCTION

The dramatic impact which the rebellion of Tupac Amaru in 1780 had on the Spanish administration of Peru has tended to overshadow the significance of the numerous local revolts and written protests which preceded it. Most historians interpret Indian participation in the rebellion of 1780 as the culmination of the dissent expressed in both written protests and spontaneous uprisings beginning in the 1720's.\(^1\) Few scholars, however, have attempted to investigate the nature of these early manifestations of Indian discontent from any other than the vantage point of the rebellion of Tupac Amaru. As a result, our historical understanding of Indian disaffection with the Spanish administration in the eighteenth century has been colored by the prevailing interpretation of the rebellion of Tupac Amaru as separatist in nature. While the American authority on this rebellion, Lillian Estelle Fisher, considers it to have been conservative and reformist in its intent,\(^2\) this interpretation has not been widely accepted by Peruvian scholars. On the contrary, the separatist interpretation presented by Daniel Valcárcel and Boleslao Lewin has been reiterated and expanded by recent Peruvian studies.\(^3\) In the absence of authoritative studies on earlier manifestations of Indian dissent, this emphasis on the separatist nature of the rebellion of 1780
threatens, by being projected back upon them, to distort our understanding of both the minor revolts and the written protests which preceded the rebellion of Tupac Amaru.

Our knowledge of earlier Indian revolts is still founded largely on the summary descriptions of them given in the *memorias* of the Peruvian Viceroy and on occasional references scattered through otherwise unrelated documents. The rebellion of Juan Santos which broke out in 1742 in the Cerro de la Sal region on the eastern side of the Andes is a notable exception to this general rule. Both Stefano Varese and Mario Castro Arenas have described this rebellion as marginal and messianic in nature. The failure of this rebellion to make any attempt to consolidate the foothold it did gain in the Andean region of Peru together with the complete disintegration of the rebellion on the disappearance of its charismatic leader make any comparison between the rebellion of Juan Santos and that of Tupac Amaru highly debatable. The rebellion of Tupac Amaru drew its prime strength from the support of the Andean Indian population and continued to threaten the Spanish administration even after the execution of its instigator José Gabriel Túpac Amaru.

The mestizo uprising in Cochabamba in 1730 and the conspiracy of Juan Vélez de Córdova in Oruro in 1739, both within the boundaries of present-day Bolivia, offer more possibilities for comparison with the rebellion of Tupac Amaru. Both occurred well within the geographical area
effectively colonized by Spain and reveal at least superficial similarities to the rebellion of 1780. For instance, the uprising in Cochabamba was an immediate result of Spanish attempts to oblige mestizos to pay tribute, also a prime factor in mestizo participation in the rebellion of Tupac Amaru. The conspiracy in Oruro planned to oust the corrupt Spanish administration and install an Indian as King. There is some evidence to support the belief that the followers of Tupac Amaru planned to crown him as the legitimate ruler of Peru. The present lack of a comprehensive evaluation of all the factors involved in the uprising of Cochabamba and conspiracy of Oruro makes any conclusions which might be drawn from these apparent similarities with the rebellion of 1780 highly speculative.

Our understanding of the abortive Indian conspiracy in Lima and subsequent uprising in Huarochiri in 1750 is hampered by a similar lack of studies. The leaders of this uprising also planned to install an Indian as monarch. An analysis of the conditions which enabled the predominantly urban Indian leaders of the conspiracy of Lima to mobilize the more rural population of Huarochiri in an attack on the local Spanish administration would surely further our understanding of the factors influencing the subsequent participation of various Indian groups in the rebellion of Tupac Amaru.

There is, however, still another important source of information on the development of Indian dissent in the eighteenth century which has
perhaps been even more neglected by historians as a result of their tendency to direct attention primarily to factors which support the separatist nationalist interpretation of the rebellion of 1780. While the existence of a considerable body of Indian protest literature dating from 1720 has been acknowledged for many years, the role which this literature may have played in shaping Indian opposition to the Spanish regime in eighteenth-century Peru has yet to be evaluated. This dissertation will study this literature not in the reflected light of the rebellion of Tupac Amaru, but rather in the light of the social and political context in which specific protests emerged and of the cultural traditions within which they were formulated.

Aside from the overview presented in Rubén Vargas Ugarte's *Historia general del Perú*, only one serious study has attempted to interpret the Indian protest literature of the eighteenth century. John Rowe, in his pioneering article "El movimiento nacional inca del siglo XVIII," attempts to demonstrate that this literature formed part of an Indian reformist movement which was inspired by a broad revival of Inca nationalism and culminated in the rebellion of Tupac Amaru.  

Rowe's interpretation presents one major problem. As Rowe himself recognizes, the repeated expressions of fidelity to the Spanish Crown found throughout the Indian protests as well as the Indian reformists'
adoption of Spanish political and religious models conflict with the nationalist interpretation. Rowe tries to resolve this contradiction by suggesting that the influence of Hispanic domination on Inca culture was formal and superficial rather than substantial. He uses a graphic metaphor to state this contention: "un inca a caballo con un sombrero de tres picos no deja de ser un inca." And, as the following quotation makes clear, Rowe also insists that Inca culture exercised a substantial influence on the formulation of the Indian reformists' plans: "Quisieron constituir un gobierno y una sociedad organizados en beneficio del elemento indígena y guiados por la tradición de los incas, con los cuales les sería posible cultivar su propia lengua y desarrollar su propia cultura sin presiones directas de los europeos."

It is clear from these references to language and culture that Rowe believes that the Indian reformists wanted to perpetuate their Incaic cultural and linguistic heritage quite independently of its existing relationship to the dominant Hispanic culture. However, absolutely no evidence to support this belief can be found in any of the Indian protest documents. Although Rowe theorizes that the Inca nationalists' use of Hispanic political and religious models would be guided by Incaic tradition, this dissertation will demonstrate that the use which the Indian protesters did in fact make of these models was guided by Spanish colonial ideals and
the legalistic practices of the Spanish colonial bureaucracy.

Since Rowe's interpretation of "Inca nationalism" as the motivating factor behind the Indian reformist movement conflicts so dramatically both with the declared intent of the protest literature itself and with the activities which the Indian reformists undertook in order to achieve their reformist goals, the evidence on which Rowe bases his interpretation warrants close examination. Rowe supports his theory of the existence of an Inca nationalist movement in the eighteenth century with evidence both of the survival of various elements of Inca culture and of a renewed interest in Inca tradition in the eighteenth century. The evidence presented by Rowe, however, does not constitute convincing proof of the significance of these factors as motivating forces behind the Indian reform movement. On the contrary, some of the evidence can be interpreted to equal advantage to show the Indian reformists' adoption of Hispanic values.

Rowe's own study demonstrates that the main reason for the perpetuation of some elements of Incaic culture was as a means of obtaining privileges from the Spanish administration. For instance, according to Rowe, the preservation of genealogical traditions served primarily to establish the individual's right to enjoy special privileges granted by Spain to the descendants of the Inca nobility or to hold the office of
cacique which guaranteed a limited participation in the benefits to be derived from the exploitation of Indian resources.  

Similarly, Rowe interprets the "representaciones dramáticas de episodios de la historia antigua" as evidence of a revival in Inca nationalist spirit in the eighteenth century. Yet the only dramatization which Rowe specifically mentions was performed in conjunction with the celebration of an important Spanish event, the coronation of King Ferdinand VI in 1748. In this context the "representaciones" served two purposes. They symbolized the voluntary submission of Inca rulers to the Spanish Crown and provided a visible reminder of the privileged status granted the descendants of the Inca rulers within the Spanish colonial system. Thus these "representaciones" are not of themselves demonstrative of a revival in Inca nationalist sentiment.

Rowe deduces a revival in Inca nationalist spirit from the fact that portraits of several eighteenth-century Indian nobles depict them wearing Inca attire while those of the sixteenth-century forbears show them wearing Spanish dress. Yet the vehement protests made by the urban Indian nobles against Spanish decrees prohibiting their wearing silks and fringes, generally considered to be opulent additions to Spanish forms of dress, indicate that these nobles still considered Spanish attire to be a sign of prestige. Tupac Amaru, considered by Rowe to be the leader par
excellence of the Inca nationalist movement, wore both Inca and Spanish dress. 20

One of the main points of evidence on which Rowe's theory of Inca nationalism rests is the revival of interest shown in the eighteenth century in the history of the Incas written by the Inca Garcilaso de la Vega. 21 Rowe provides convincing evidence of Garcilaso's influence on the Indians' version of specific aspects of Inca history. 22 It was Garcilaso's powerful writing, in Rowe's opinion, that induced the Indians to adopt his version of Inca history in spite of its incompatibility with the interpretation which Rowe believes they had received through oral tradition:

Verdad que la historia de Garcilaso se apartó en numerosos puntos de la tradición oral todavía conservada, y ha debido haber debates muy animados entre los nobles sobre estos puntos. Pero quién podía dudar de la autoridad de un libro famoso escrito por un pariente con igual acceso a la tradición y siglo y medio anterior. Los Tomases concluyeron que la tradición misma había debido corromperse, y se conformaron, poniéndose a corregirlo siguiendo las indicaciones del hijo de Chimpu Ocllo. 23

This speculation could easily be avoided by considering the renewed interest in Garcilaso as evidence simply of the discovery by the Indian nobility of a coherent interpretation of a cultural heritage which had otherwise been preserved only in a limited and selective manner during
Indeed, the popularity of Garcilaso's version of Inca history may be seen, not as an indication of Inca nationalism, but rather as proof of the acceptability to the Indian nobility of an interpretation of Inca history and culture based largely on Hispanic values. Garcilaso's interpretation of Inca history was greatly influenced by Renaissance idealism and, as Rowe himself admits, Garcilaso's reputation as an authority on Inca matters was founded largely on the acclaim which his writings received in Europe. Thus the influence of Garcilaso Inca on the Indian nobility in the eighteenth century, like other points of evidence used by Rowe to support his theory of Inca nationalism, is entirely compatible with an interpretation of the Indian reform movement as motivated by Hispanic values and dedicated to the continuation of a reformed Spanish colonial regime in Peru.

This dissertation will support this interpretation with evidence drawn from an analysis of the social and economic position of the Indian groups which provided the leaders of the Indian reform movement as well as from the activities of the Indian reformists and the texts of their written protests. As the following chapters will show, the Indian reform movement was a product of an Indian elite, descendants of the Incaic nobility and hereditary local chiefs. This elite relied on privileges...
granted its members early in the colonial period to maintain a superior social and economic position in relation to the Indian masses.

When changed political and economic conditions in the eighteenth century threatened the elite's superior status, some of its members protested against these changes to the Spanish administration. In these protests they stressed the legal basis for their theoretically privileged position. The failure of these protests to bring effective results caused the reformists to present further and stronger protests incorporating more and more evidence drawn from Spanish colonial legislation and Spanish colonial theorists in support of their cause. By 1750 these protests had resulted in the creation of a coherent ideology for reform based on Spanish protectoral legislation and on the radical religious ideals which had been instrumental in the formation of that legislation. Accordingly, the Indian protests of the eighteenth century were dedicated to establishing not an independent state guided by Inca traditions, but the idealized colonial society which had been the avowed aim of the Spanish regime in America.
NOTES

INTRODUCTION


2 Fisher, pp. 130-139.

3 The separatist interpretation of the rebellion of Túpac Amaru presented by Valcárcel, La rebelión de Túpac Amaru and Lewin, La rebelión de Túpac Amaru has provided the basis for Luis Durand Flórez in Independencia e integración and Juan José Vega in José Gabriel Túpac Amaru (Lima, 1969), to interpret the rebellion of 1780 as a precursor of a state of national independence and integration yet to be established in Peru. The separatist interpretation has also been reiterated by Valcárcel and other contributors.
to the Fifth International Congress of History of America which took place in Lima in 1971. John Fisher in his contribution to that Congress registered a note of dissent with this popular interpretation:

No obstante la hostilidad criolla hacia el levantamiento de Túpac Amaru, y no obstante los limitados objetivos de su jefe, algunos historiadores han sido tentados de considerar a la rebeldía como un intento de lograr la independencia. [Con el sesquicentenario de la independencia del Perú, la presión para hacer de Túpac Amaru el primero de los grandes precursores crece aún más.]


4 Stéfano Varese, La sal de los cerros (Lima, 1968); Mario Castro Arenas, La rebelión de Juan Santos (Lima, 1973); and ed. Francisco A. Loayza, Juan Santos el invencible (Manuscritos del año de 1742 al año de 1755) (Lima, 1942).

5 The Indians led by Juan Santos were in complete control of Andamarca for three days in 1752 but did not attempt to extend their influence further, probably because of the unsuitability of their guerrilla-style warfare to the barren Andean terrain. Castro Arenas, pp. 137-142. In spite of the obvious differences between the rebellion of Juan Santos and that of Túpac Amaru, the personalities and social backgrounds of the two leaders offer some basis for comparison. Castro
Arenas, p. 157.


12 "Movimiento," p. 29.

13 "Movimiento," p. 29.

14 Some of the examples offered by Rowe of the preservation of Inca culture relate largely to the Indian masses, and therefore do not provide evidence for the survival of Inca tradition amongst the Indian nobility whom Rowe himself identifies as the leaders of Inca nationalism. He mentions, for instance, the survival of Inca cults amongst the Indian
masses, yet asserts that these cults had little influence amongst the nobility ("Movimiento," p. 22). On the other hand, Rowe chooses to ignore the evidence which does exist of elements of messianic Christianity in popular rumors of the restoration of the Inca monarchy in the eighteenth century. Prophecies involving the return of the Inca empire to its legitimate rulers were attributed to Santa Rosa and figured in the Lima conspiracy of 1750 and in a popular belief in the imminent coronation of an Inca monarch in 1777. See Vargas, Historia, IV, 249, and Valcárcel, La rebelión, pp. 32-33.

17 See p. 145 of this dissertation.
18 "Movimiento," p. 23.
19 These protests are studied in this dissertation, pp. 120-122.
20 Valcárcel, pp. 47, 74 and Lewin, p. 395.
21 Garcilaso de la Vega, "El Inca," Primera parte de los comentarios reales, que tratan, de el origen de los Incas, reyes que fueron del Perú, de su idolatria, leyes, y gobierno, en paz, y en guerra: de sus vidas, y conquistas; y de todo lo que fue aquel imperio, y su Republica, antes que los Españoles pasaran à él, ed. Nicolás Rodríguez Franco (Madrid, 1723).
Rowe himself states "no conocemos ninguna crónica de la historia inca basada en un registro directo de la tradición oral que fue recopilada después de 1640." ("Movimiento," p. 23.)

"Movimiento," pp. 24, 26; Luis A. Arocena, El inca Garcilaso y el humanismo renacentista (Buenos Aires, 1949); and Donald G. Cáñon, El Inca Garcilaso de la Vega (New York, 1969).
CHAPTER I

The Origins of the Indian Elite in Spanish Colonial Legislation

The eighteenth-century Indian reform movement advocated changes in the Spanish system of governing the Peruvian Indians as a means of strengthening both the human and material resources of Indian society so that they could once again support the privileged groups which had emerged early in the colonial period. The existence of the privileged Indian groups which provided the leaders of the reform movement was a direct result of Spanish colonial policy, and particularly of the system used to govern the Indians in Spanish Peru. This system, consolidated and codified by Francisco de Toledo, Viceroy of Peru from 1569 to 1581, resulted in the creation of an officially sanctioned Indian elite which survived until the end of the eighteenth century.¹

This Indian elite had its origin in Toledo's official adoption of a practice used in Peru by other administrators² and common in other Spanish colonies, the alliance between Spain and a group of influential Indians. These Indians served as a buffer between the minority Spanish government and the Indian majority. In return for assisting Spain in the consolidation
and maintenance of her minority rule and in the exploitation of the colony's resources, these Indians derived power and prestige from their association with the ruling society. As intermediaries between the two societies, they acted both as agents of Spanish society and leaders of Indian society. This role assured them some status, however equivocal, in both societies. Spain guaranteed their privileged status in Indian society by granting them exemption from tribute payment, the head tax which served as the mark of Indian subjugation. This exemption both served as proof of their favored status in Spanish eyes, and, since a similar exemption had marked members of the ruling hierarchy in Incaic times, confirmed their superior status in the eyes of the Indian masses. This exemption also endowed them with a considerable advantage over their fellow Indians, an advantage which they could use to reinforce their prestige with the symbols of wealth and status common to Indian and Spanish society.

While some elements of the colonial Indian elite were drawn from the pre-Hispanic ruling hierarchy, others were created as a result of Spain's imposition of Spanish-patterned institutions on Indian society. Theoretically, Spain's alliance with the existing ruling hierarchy would not only conciliate this influential group, but also provide a means of controlling the numerically superior Indian population. Such an alliance, however, ran counter to prevailing political theories which advocated
isolating the leaders of conquered peoples from a position of power to avoid the risk of rebellion. Toledo devised a system designed to minimize this risk yet still take advantage of the authority of the pre-Hispanic Indian leadership.

The most powerful element of the Incaic ruling hierarchy, the members of the eleven royal ayllus, all direct descendants of Inca rulers, was relegated to a purely symbolic role by the Spanish regime which excluded it from participation in the direct control of the Indian population. The members of the royal ayllus, who may be termed the higher nobility of the Inca regime, were required to demonstrate their loyalty to the Spanish Crown on ceremonial occasions as evidence of their voluntary surrender of sovereignty. In exchange for this service, they were recognized as equals of Spanish nobility and granted exemption from tribute. The systematic withdrawal of real power from the Inca higher nobility forced them either to accept a purely decorative status or to seek positions of power within the system of government created by Toledo for the Indians.

Toledo's system of local government for the Indians combined both Hispanic and Incaic elements under the supervision of a Spanish corregidor de indios, essentially a local governor. As far as possible, however, Toledo attempted to offset the influence of the pre-Hispanic elements by establishing an alternative local leadership patterned on purely Hispanic lines.
Toledo established a number of new Indian communities through a program of wholesale resettlement in the 1570's and 1580's. The government of these towns was copied directly from the Spanish system with Indians occupying the positions of alcalde and regidores. These officials were granted exemption from tribute, a concession which signified in Spanish eyes their equality with the Indian nobility. Many of the Ordenanzas regulating the new towns were designed to ensure the officials' independence by specifically prohibiting the holding of any municipal office by traditional Indian leaders. In practice, however, the Indians' tenacious adherence to traditional patterns of loyalty prevented the emergence of any new leadership group in the towns. Despite the legal ban, the traditional local leaders played a significant part in these municipal governments, either by holding office themselves, or by using their influence to dominate the elected officials.

In traditional Indian communities, Toledo retained the existing leaders as the heads of local government, ascribing to them an additional role as agents in Spain's economic and political control of the Indian masses. The Spaniards applied the term "cacique", previously used to describe the local chiefs in the Caribbean Islands, to these local leaders, known as "curacas" in pre-Hispanic times. The caciques' origins were diverse. Some were descendants of local chiefs, conquered yet retained
as agents by the Incas, while others were descendants of local officials appointed by the Incas. Still others were members of the Inca higher nobility who used their possession of local fiefdoms to become caciques and gain the power which their noble status did not give them.

Toledo's Ordenanzas, however, attributed to these leaders a number of shared characteristics which tended to establish them as a single homogeneous group within the Spanish colonial system. Although the purely local nature of the caciques' authority presented little threat to Spanish rule, Toledo perceived their power as potentially dangerous and attempted to circumscribe it as much as possible. In spite of this, Toledo still managed to conciliate this influential sector of Indian society and maintain their authority over the Indian masses.\(^{10}\) The caciques in turn derived an important advantage over the other intermediary groups from their unique combination of traditional Incaic authority and Spanish-delegated economic and political authority. This dual authority, coupled with the isolation from power of the higher nobility and the reduction to tributary status of the leaders of smaller Indian groups,\(^ {11}\) enabled the caciques to establish themselves as the fulcrum of the Indian elite.

Both the duties and status of the caciques under Spanish rule were comparable to those they held under the Incaic regime. Toledo's Ordenanzas, reflecting the precedence of the Crown's economic interests in America, defined the caciques' duties as agents of economic exploitation in very
specific terms. The caciques were to act as tribute collectors and as purveyors both of forced labor, known as the mita, and of paid labor.\textsuperscript{12} The mita itself was an adaptation of the Incaic system of forced labor administered by the caciques, and the caciques' tribute-collecting functions were similar to those they performed for the Inca.\textsuperscript{13} These similarities tended to reinforce the caciques' new Spanish authority with the authority they exercised in the similar pre-Hispanic activities. In the same way Spain's recognition of the caciques as a privileged minority in Indian society was reinforced by the similarity of the privileges granted them by Spain to those they enjoyed under Incaic rule. By allowing the caciques to have tributaries work for them in domestic tasks and to provide food for their animals and water for their houses, Spanish law confirmed the caciques' traditional Incaic rights to Indian labor. It further enhanced the caciques' traditional claims on Indian resources by permitting the caciques to collect a salary from the tributaries.\textsuperscript{14} Caciques were allotted more land by the Spanish than were the tributaries, just as they had been under the fallen regime. They also enjoyed luxury goods unavailable to the Indian masses. These luxuries served as symbols of status and prestige both in pre-Hispanic and Hispanic times.\textsuperscript{15} The privileged status of the Indian elite rested entirely upon their legal definition as hidalgos or lesser nobility. This definition in turn rested upon what the Spanish perceived to have been their superior and
Pre-Hispanic nobility was, theoretically, both the basis of exemption from tribute and a prerequisite for holding caciqueships. Solórzano, the official commentator on Spanish colonial legislation in the first half of the seventeenth century, explains this relationship, stating that exemption from tribute is not based on office, "gobierno y jurisdiccion (porque eso, ni el ser uno Señor de Vasallos, no basta . . .)," but on nobility, "a título de ser nobles, y por tales tenidos, reputados entre los suyos ellos y sus ascendientes desde el tiempo de su infidelidad." Although this prerequisite was designed to perpetuate the existing Incaic practice of hereditary caciqueships, in fact, such a practice had only just begun to be adopted in many areas recently incorporated into the Inca empire. In these cases, rather than reinforcing traditional patterns of inherited
status, Spain's insistence on hereditary caciqueships actually led to the creation of a new Indian nobility entitled to privileges on the basis of an often spurious hereditary tradition. One observer, the Archbishop Rodrigo de Loaisa, claimed that even in 1586 there were no longer many caciques who held office by legitimate succession.\textsuperscript{19}

The dubious nature of the hereditary claims to nobility of many of the new Indian elite increased their dependence on Spanish good will. Spain took specific measures to reinforce this dependence and ensure that the existence of the hereditary Indian nobility served Spanish interests. The Crown issued titles confirming the nobility of individual Indians in a deliberate attempt to strengthen their ties to Spanish society and demonstrate their dependence on the Crown. Toledo states this aim in the following words: 

\begin{quote}
"... diéronseles a todos los Caciques títulos de sus cacicazgos en nombre de V.M. por los cuales entienden que han de estar y están pendientes de V.M. y de vuestros ministros."\textsuperscript{20}
\end{quote}

One significant modification was made in the Incaic pattern of inheritance to place still further emphasis on the nobility's dependence on their ability to serve Spanish interests: 

\begin{quote}
"... que han de ser preferidos en la sucesión de los dichos cacicazgos los que fueren de mayor cristiandad y virtud, aunque no sean los hijos mayores."\textsuperscript{21}
\end{quote}

Caciqueships were to descend, not necessarily to the oldest, but to the most Christian, of the caciques' sons. This modification was intended merely as a temporary
measure until the hispanization of the caciques and their sons made the observance of unmodified hereditary practices politically advantageous to Spain: "... hasta que se vayan acabando los viejos que hay y están endurecidos en su mala opinión e idolatría y se hacen y son predicadores de ella, y que entren los mozos instruídos y doctrinados en nuestra fe y criados en los colegios que quedaron ordenados."^22

The result of Toledo's legislation was clearly intended to be the formation of a new Indian elite, ostensibly based on pre-Hispanic tradition, but hispanized to the point where this tradition was politically and culturally insignificant. The hispanization of the Indian elite was undertaken, not only by the modification of hereditary patterns, but also by the provision of an Hispanic education for the caciques and their sons as well as for the members of the higher Inca nobility. This education was designed not only to reinforce the elite's alliance with Spain through the sharing of common values, but also to equip its members to act as agents of acculturation amongst the Indian masses: "... porque tengo por muy sin duda que los que más fruto han de tener y pueden hacer en los dichos indios son los caciques y curacas que tuvieren, cuyo ejemplo y pasos siguen y seguirán, mandé y ordené que fundasen dos colegios ... adonde se criasen y ordenasen los hijos de los caciques."^23

Toledo outlined the caciques' role as agents of hispanization in the following lines:
Porque los caciques y principales tienen obligacion á dar buen ejemplo á sus sujetos: Mando que se lo dén con su vida y costumbres, viviendo honesta y recogidamente como cristianos, porque ellos como miembros imitan lo que vieren hacer á sus cabezas, Y para que sus hijos aprendan doctrina y virtud, para enseñar á los demás, cuando lleguen á edad y estado de mandar, los pongan desde niños con sacerdotes que los doctrinen, para que sirvan y consigan lo susodicho, dándoles los alimentos necesarios, hasta que sean de edad de quince años para arriba.24

The need for the caciques to act as examples or agents of Hispanic culture was based on the assumption that the tributaries had otherwise very limited contact with Spanish society, owing either to physical isolation or cultural barriers. Changes in either of these conditions would inevitably result in the caciques' losing importance as a cultural intermediary. Thus the caciques had a considerable interest in maintaining the differences which set the tributary Indians apart from Spanish society. Spain's deliberate perpetuation of many pre-Hispanic characteristics of their office gave the caciques a ready means of preserving these differences, and with them, their role as privileged intermediaries.

The similarity between the caciques' functions and status under the Incaic and Spanish regimes did serve a useful purpose by legitimizing the actions of the new regime in the minds of the tributaries and by maintaining the caciques' authority. At the same time, however, it also tended to perpetuate the traditional relationships on which that authority
was based. The preservation of the hereditary basis of caciqueships and the insistence of Spain on hereditary nobility rather than on office as the basis for many privileges provided another means by which the caciques could, and indeed in their own interest were obliged to, preserve pre-Hispanic social patterns. Thus the preservation of pre-Hispanic characteristics of the office of cacique proved to be directly counter-productive to the hispanization of the tributaries, and the caciques' vested interest in perpetuating pre-Hispanic social patterns was quite at odds with their role as agents of hispanization.

The conflicting cultural demands made on the caciques were paralleled in the economic sphere by equally conflicting interests. Spain's failure to balance her legitimization of the caciques' traditional authority with a perpetuation of their traditional obligations towards the tributaries tended to increase the caciques' real wealth and power. Under the Incaic regime, the caciques were responsible for the arbitration of disputes within the community, the maintenance of native religious rites and the well-being of the weaker, less prosperous members of the community. The caciques' participation in the Spanish system of government gave them an authority unfettered by these obligations, yet the pre-Hispanic basis of the caciques' authority prevented the Spanish from bringing it effectively within the checks and sanctions of Spanish society itself.
As a result the caciques enjoyed an unprecedented and arbitrary power which they used to consolidate their wealth and prestige.

At the same time, the disappearance of their traditional obligations freed the considerable portion of their wealth previously committed to acts of reciprocity. Many caciques used this new source of wealth together with their increased powers to accumulate considerable fortunes. For instance, through their Incaic right to have personal retainers, combined with their Spanish function as purveyors of labor, they were able to rent out their subject Indians as laborers, often at considerable profit. Similarly some caciques used this profit to purchase supplies of labor on the Spanish pattern, effectively hispanizing the caciques' relationship with the tributaries. Other caciques used their profits to reinforce their traditional status by patronage or participation in Inca religious rites. These new fortunes, however accumulated, were passed to the caciques' descendants throughout the colonial period and served to reinforce their hereditary privileged status.26

The caciques' traditional authority over the Indians facilitated the former's participation in the widely accepted practice of using proprietary office for personal gain. The caciques' unique position as interpreters of Spanish demands and justice to the Indians together with the corruption rampant throughout the judicial system in Peru and the tributaries' ignorance of Hispanic practices apparently allowed the caciques to exceed
generally accepted limits in profiting from their office. In adopting this Spanish custom the caciques effectively aligned themselves with Spanish colonial society's economic dependence on the exploitation of Indian resources.

Because of the nature of Spanish economic activity in Peru this dependence led to a reduction in the resources available to Indian society for its own subsistence. For instance, the Indian labor supply was severely depleted by dangerous working conditions in the mines, and the land available to Indian society was reduced both by the imposition of Spanish patterns of land-holding and by the usurpation of Indian lands by Spanish colonists and caciques alike. According to the Marqués de Montesclaros, Viceroy from 1608 to 1615, it was a commonly accepted belief that Spanish dependence on the exploitation of Indian resources was counter-productive to the welfare of Indian society: "... la conservación de ambas repúblicas está encontrada y que por medios que una crece viene a menos la otra."28

In view of this basic economic antagonism between Spanish and Indian society, the caciques' role as agents and beneficiaries of Indian exploitation was at odds with their role as dependants and leaders of Indian society. While the caciques' participation in Spanish exploitation initially increased their wealth and prestige, in the long run it undermined
the very foundation upon which their privileged status rested. On one hand the caciques' exploitation contributed to the erosion of the human and natural resources of Indian society. On the other hand, since the caciques' continued existence as a privileged group depended primarily on their ability to fulfill Spanish demands for labor and tribute, the caciques were, unlike most Spaniards and creoles, committed to the conservation of Indian resources. In addition, the caciques were dependent on the existence of Indian resources in excess of those necessary to fulfill Spanish demands to further their own economic ascendency.

Within the Spanish colonial framework the tension which resulted from the caciques' dual obligations and interests could be resolved only by a clear commitment to either Spanish or Indian interests. Such a commitment, however, would entail the caciques' sacrifice of the benefits they derived from their alliance with the other society. The caciques' overriding loyalty to their own preservation as a privileged group dictated their continued efforts to maintain an equilibrium, however equivocal, between the conflicting economic, social and cultural interests which characterized their dual status.

Political realities had made the caciques' total identification with Indian interests not merely disadvantageous but practically impossible. Not only had the caciques willingly exchanged the reciprocal Incaic basis
of their authority and privileges for a legalistic Hispanic one, but they
had in many cases abused their pre-Hispanic authority in the name of their
new-found Spanish legitimacy. An alliance with purely Indian interests
would deprive them of this legitimacy and hence their only real source of
power. Furthermore, it would oblige the caciques to abandon not only
their role as economic intermediaries, but also the benefits they personally
derived from this role. These benefits included not only legal privileges,
but economic advantages over the tributaries. Most importantly, however,
a commitment to Indian interests would bring the caciques into open conflict
with their Spanish rulers. Such conflict could only prove disastrous both
to the caciques themselves and to the already weakened and fragmented
Indian society upon whose depleted resources they would have to rely.

The caciques' total identification with Spanish interests, while
theoretically possible, was equally disadvantageous to the caciques. The
main effect of many of the caciques' Spanish-granted privileges was simply
to give Spanish ratification to the superior status of the caciques over
the tributary Indians, and to reinforce the powers derived from this
superiority. By abdicating their role as leaders of Indian society, the
caciques would have rendered these privileges useless. In exchange for
abandoning their elite position in Indian society the caciques had only
an illusory hope of gaining an influential position in Spanish society.
In spite of their theoretical equality to Spanish nobility, the caciques' attempts to assimilate themselves effectively to the colonial nobility were severely limited both by popular prejudice and legal restrictions. It was this prejudice and legal discrimination, rather than the Crown's official assurance of Indian equality, which effectively determined the relationship between Indian and Spanish society in colonial Peru.

Toledo placed numerous specific restrictions on the Indian nobility's exercise of the privileges to which their theoretical equality to Spanish hidalgos entitled them. Both caciques and nobles were prohibited from traveling to Spain without royal licence. This made it difficult for Indian nobles to cultivate the social and economic links with the metropolis which formed at least one of the visible measures of status in Spanish colonial society.

Two other restrictions not only limited the caciques' economic activities, but contributed to a visible impression of the caciques as inferior to Spanish hidalgos in contradiction to their legal equality. Prohibitions against the caciques' holding negro or mulatto slaves and against using Indian labor on their own land, by limiting in theory at least, the labor supply available to the caciques, clearly placed them in a subordinate position in relation to the Spanish and creole colonists. This subordination was accentuated by another prohibition against caciques' engaging in business dealings with Spaniards without the participation of
the corregidor of their province, a measure originally intended to prevent the caciques' profiting from the abuse of their traditional influence over the tributaries. The corregidores, however, soon transformed this measure into a means by which they could control the caciques' exploitation of the tributaries and assure themselves the main share in the profits of this exploitation. The corregidores' willing collusion made it easy for the caciques to circumvent the restrictions placed on their use of Indian labor. This collusion also made them economically dependent on the corregidores, a situation incompatible with the caciques' theoretical nobility.

Another provision of Toledo's Ordenanzas created a similar dependency with respect to the caciques' access to the judicial system. While caciques were expressly given the right to have their cases heard before the Audiencia rather than the local corregidor, they were at the same time prohibited from going to the Audiencia in person. This obliged them to rely on the good will of their corregidor or the official Indian protector to ensure that their case was heard favorably if at all by the higher judicial authorities. This dependence tended to render the caciques' immunity from the corregidores' legal jurisdiction quite pointless, since the corregidor could very easily influence the evidence given and any decision taken by the local protector, and, if necessary, even by the
Audiencia. The caciques, unable to participate personally at the proceedings of the Audiencia, clearly had little recourse against damaging testimony.

In this way, specific provisions of Toledo's *Ordenanzas* not only undermined the Crown's expressed intent to make the Indian elite equal to Spanish hidalgos, but provided the means for the colonial establishment to perpetuate the subservience and practical inferiority of the Indian elite to all layers of Spanish society. Under these conditions, assimilation of the Indian nobility to Spanish society was but a chimera, an illusory hope based on idealistic theories promulgated by the Crown and a small minority of administrative and religious officials, theories negated in practice by the trend of colonial legislation and out of tune with economic and political realities.

Within the constraints of the separation which existed between the two "republics," the Indian and Spanish, in colonial Peru, the Indian nobility attempted to assimilate its role in Indian society as far as possible to that of the Spanish nobility in Spanish society. This is particularly evident in the case of the higher Indian nobility residing in centres like Cuzco and Lima. Since many of these nobles did not exercise caciqueships they were free from the interests which led the caciques to perpetuate their Incaic characteristics. Rather than pattern their role as nobles along traditional Incaic lines, they created offices
and institutions which paralleled those of the Spanish nobility. For example, the Indian cabildo of Lima emulated the Spanish cabildos in actively safeguarding and seeking to expand the privileges, exemptions and influence of the local nobility. At the same time individual Indian nobles attempted to pursue the military and clerical careers deemed suitable to noble status. Spanish prejudice, however, tended to prevent them from entering the main stream of these careers. Indian nobles formed a separate battalion in the local militia in order to serve in a military capacity. Officials of the Church in Peru, having once been forced to retract a policy which held Indians to be incapable of fulfilling responsible positions in the religious hierarchy, continued to practice unofficial discrimination which tended to restrict Indian participation to the lowest echelons of both the secular and regular hierarchies.\(^{33}\)

The limitations placed either by prejudice or legal restrictions on the Indian nobility's participation in Spanish society and Spanish patterns of economic activity alike, reinforced their dependence on hereditary wealth or Indian society to sustain their superior status. While hereditary fortunes suffered rapid depletion as a result of the expense of maintaining the appearance of superior status, the caciques' share of the profits from the exploitation of Indian resources offered not only an escape from this deteriorating economic situation, but an opportunity for further economic
gains. More importantly it offered this opportunity without the necessity of sacrificing power or prestige in Indian society for the subservient status which was all that most Indians could aspire to as members of Spanish society. Indeed, the caciques' role as intermediaries enabled them to enjoy the best of both worlds as long as their dual allegiance did not become openly conflicting.

Thus the caciques became dedicated to preserving the balance between the loyalties, obligations and interests they experienced as participants in both the dominant Spanish society and the subordinate Indian one. On the one hand the caciques' dual status enabled them to maintain or reinforce their position in one society by virtue of their participation in the other, while on the other hand it prevented their total commitment to either society. Only their alliance with Spain guaranteed the caciques' continued prestige in Indian society, while their authority in Indian society was a prerequisite to their alliance with Spain. By the same token the caciques' status as Indian nobles was the basis of both their economic ascendancy in Indian society and their participation in Spanish economic patterns which at one and the same time contributed to the economic advancement of the caciques and undermined the resources on which the caciques inevitably depended for their survival as a privileged group.
The inconsistencies and apparent contradictions which inevitably arose in the course of the caciques' attempts to maintain their own duality are merely reflections of the dual interests characteristic of the intermediary status attributed to the caciques early in the colonial period. Far from being the signs of deliberate deception and duplicity often attributed to the caciques, these inconsistencies are the inevitable result of the caciques' need to serve two often irreconcilable masters. Paradoxically, the caciques' duality, the sole basis of their privileged position, and their only means of preserving it, posed a grave threat to their survival as the colonial period progressed.
Although many of their specific articles were not observed in detail, or fell into disuse as the colonial period progressed, Toledo's Ordenanzas were generally accepted as a standard by which to elucidate the Crown's often contradictory orders. In the words of the Marqués de Montesclaros who became Viceroy of Peru in 1608, "al fin el señor don Francisco de Toledo lo puso en debida forma, y en sus ordenanzas hallará V.E. todo lo que pudiere desear en este género, pues de aquel maestro todos somos discípulos, yo a lo menos de voluntad confieso." "Relación del estado en que se hallaba el reino del perú, hecha por el Excmo. Señor don Juan de Mendoza y Luna, Marqués de Montesclaros, al Excmo. Señor Príncipe de Esquilache, su sucesor" in Colección de las memorias o relaciones que escribieron los Vizcaíados del Perú acerca del estado en que dejaban las cosas generales del reino, ed. Ricardo Beltrán y Rózpide (Madrid, 1921), I, 157. See also Francisco de Toledo, Ordenanzas que el Señor Viso Rey Don Francisco de Toledo hizo para el buen gobierno de estos Reynos del Perú, ed. Sebastián Lorente (Lima and Madrid, 1867); Juan de Solórzano, Política indiana compuesta por el señor don Juan de
Some Indian groups enjoyed exemption from tribute for reasons other than their nobility. Artisans, for instance, were exempt by virtue of their occupation. A similar exemption was granted to the yanaconas, Indians generally attached as laborers or domestic servants to Spanish haciendas or households. Any Indian who served the Church in its work of converting the native population enjoyed immunity from tribute. In addition to the few Indians who were ordained priests or entered the regular orders, this class of exempt Indians included translators and virtually any Indian employed to do even the most menial task in churches.

Although these exempt Indians did act, in varying degrees, as intermediaries between Spanish and Indian society, their lack of any real power in either society limited their influence. Some few, by combining traditional nobility with their religious functions, did achieve a position
of influence that warrants including them in the Indian elite. In general, however, the members of these exempt groups were to form the basis of an hispanized urban Indian class which emerged in the eighteenth century.


5 Solórzano, lib. 2, cap. 20, pt. 41 and 47.

6 Rowe in "Movimiento," p. 5, states that the highest nobility was either replaced by one loyal to Spain or reduced to cacique status soon after the conquest. John Hemming in The Conquest of the Incas (London and Toronto, 1970), relates the vicissitudes of the Incaic nobility after the conquest. For a general view of Toledo's system of government see Hemming, pp. 392-410 and Philip Ainsworth Means, Fall of the Inca Empire and the Spanish Rule in Peru, 1530-1780 (New York, 1932), pp. 392-410.

Waldemar Espinoza Soriano in "El alcalde mayor indígena en el virreinato del Perú," Estudios Americanos, 17 (Seville, 1960), 25, 33 and 36, shows how the position of alguacil or alcalde mayor, sought as early as the 1560's by caciques as a means of improving their status, became even more influential as a result of Toledo's reduction in the privileges of the Indian nobility. The position of alcalde mayor brought the privilege of being obeyed and respected by other provincial caciques.
7 Recopilación, II, lib. vi, tit. v, ley xx, grants exemption for the Indian alcalde. Karen Spalding, "Indian Rural Society in Colonial Peru: The Example of Huarochirí," Diss. Berkeley, 1967, p. 154, asserts that by 1618 only the alcalde was free from both tribute and mita obligations. Other officials were subject to the mita but exempt from tribute.

8 Ordenanzas, I, 158, 159.


10 Solórzano, lib. 2, cap. 27, notes that the caciques' criminal and civil jurisdiction was reduced and much of it transferred to the Spanish corregidores.


12 Ordenanzas, pp. 184, 185, 192.

At the time of the conquest a hereditary nobility was still being formed in Peru. If local leaders were loyal, the Inca gave them the hereditary position of curaca. If not, however, the Inca appointed a curaca whose son would inherit the position.

Rodrigo de Loaisa, "Memorial de las cosas del Peru tocantes á los Indios," Colección de documentos inéditos para la historia de España (Madrid, 1852), XCIV, 558; Solórzano, lib. 2, cap. 27, pt. 23.

Francisco de Toledo, "Memorial que D. Francisco de Toledo dió al rey nuestro señor, del estado en que dejó las cosas del Peru, después de haber sido en él Virrey y Capitán General trece años, que comenzaron en 1569," in ed. Ricardo Beltrán y Rozpide, Colección de Memorias (Madrid, 1921), I, 88.

26 This discussion of the position of the caciques in the early colonial period is based primarily on the analysis of colonial Indian society presented by Karen Spalding in _De indio a campesino_, pp. 32-87. Wachtel, pp. 81-162, gives more specific details on the changing relationships amongst the Indian tributaries, caciques and Spanish administrators in the sixteenth century.

27 Loaisa, p. 587, describes the result of the aggrandisement of the caciques' powers in the following terms: "... y son tan miserables los indios que no osan quejarse ni hablar palabra contra sus caciques ... antes, con que los caciques los llamen, y les den de beber, se satisfacen, y no se acuerdan de trabajo, agravio ni injuria que les hayan hecho."

28 "Memorial," p. 156.

29 _Recopilación_, II, lib. vi, tft. vii, ley xvii.

30 _Ordenanzas_, p. 190.

31 _Recopilación_, II, lib. vi, tft. vii, ley i and ii; _Ordenanzas_, p. 185.

32 José Antonio Maravall considers Motolinía to have originated the "two republics" concept which became a common means of describing the relationship between Spanish and Indian society throughout the colonial

CHAPTER II

The Subjection of the Indian Elite to Spanish Exploitation in the Eighteenth Century

Both the stability of Indian society and the ascendancy of the caciques were threatened in the eighteenth century by innovations in the Spanish administration of Peru. These innovations formed part of the attempts of the Bourbon monarchy to revive Spain's national strength and international prestige, both of which had suffered severe blows in the seventeenth century. The changes made in the colonial administration were designed to serve two specific ends: that of maximizing Crown revenue from American sources and that of centralizing and simplifying the vast colonial bureaucracy, a bureaucracy dedicated primarily to preserving the interests of its own officials and accustomed to effectively evading Crown legislation.

These ends were inextricably linked in the Peruvian context. The need for bureaucratic reform was subordinate to the prime goal of the Bourbon monarchs, the increase of Crown revenue. Reformists in the eighteenth century virtually equated the Crown's economic prosperity to "el bien común" in terms such as these used by the creole Victorino
Montero in 1747: "El zelo que experimentamos en U.E. por el bien público, honra y gloria de la Monarquía, el empeño en promover los aumentos de los Haberes Reales." Spanish and creole reformists alike agreed that the tradition of autonomy on the part of colonial officials, together with a proliferation of groups and individuals enjoying effective exemption from the Crown's jurisdiction, were the main factors in limiting the Crown's share of American revenue. Montero described the autonomy of the Peruvian administration, particularly the Viceroy, in the following terms:

... no fuè el Real animo de V. Mag. crecer el despotismo de estos Governadores, hasta entender la regalia, como una libre voluntad de cada uno; porque para casos irregulares, se les concedian los Arbitrios de la prudencia, y para los ordinarios, no se havian de apartar del Alfabeto de las Leyes, como que las escritas son la conformidad en las discordias.5

and the economic effects of this situation: "... las Rentas, que hoy andan derramadas, y perdidas por todas las partes de él, donde caminan tan libres las transgressiones." Jorge Juan y Santacilia and Antonio de Ulloa, who investigated the administration of the Viceroyalty of Peru between 1735 and 1745, described the effects of this autonomy: "Todas estas extorsiones hechas ... con el disimulado pretexto de ser celo por el servicio del Rey y Real Hacienda, no son, en efecto, otra cosa sino acrecentamiento de la utilidad propia." Montero expressed the futility of more laws and more intensive exploitation of American resources without a thorough reform of the existing administration:
... no consisten los aumentos de V. Mag. en tener mas Minas, ni en sacar mas Plata, sino en arreglar mejor la obediencia de sus Vassallos, y discurrir medios, y modos de que las Leyes erigidas, y por erigir, tengan mas observancia; porque adonde falta este concierto universal de todos los Reynos, lo mismo es multiplicar Leyes, que ampliarles mas facultades á Virreyes, y Oidores, para que tengan mayor dependencia sobre unos desvalidos Vassallos: esto no es aumentar lo Erarios, sino engrandecer mas á unos Ministros, que se dilatan en Soberanía sobre la Magestad de las riquezas. . . .

These reformists saw the American bureaucracy not only as a prime cause of Spain's loss of American revenue but as an effective stumbling block to reform. Juan and Ulloa wrote:

... si hay algún ministro en aquellos países que se declare por la justicia, hay otros indiferentes á la iniquidad, y aun muchos que se oponen á la reforma. Estos niegan los auxilios necesarios cuando llega la ocasión y aquéllos lo dan con tanta tibieza que infunden ánimo y confianza en los interesados para que hagan oposición á lo que no les tiene cuenta.9

The Spanish minister José de Campillo y Cosío also described the opposition which could be expected from the colonial establishment in the case of attempts to introduce broad reforms: "A primera vista parecerá cercada de imposibilidades su práctica, y crecerán aquellas en los dictámenes de los que por sus propios intereses abominen de ésta."10 These vested interests no doubt played a role in preventing even the formulation of plans for the general reform of the Peruvian administration before 1742,11 the year in which Campillo y Cosío wrote his Nuevo sistema de gobierno económico para la América. Even after that date, Campillo's ideas remained mere theory
until 1762 when in the form of Bernardo Ward's Proyecto económico they formed the basis for the introduction of the intendant system in America.¹²

The Bourbon administration's attempts to solve Spain's internal problems¹³ as well as to bolster her beleaguered international position in the first half of the eighteenth century strained the limits of the nation's human and economic resources. Their full commitment to the solution of these problems also contributed to the Bourbon regime's lack of interest in intensive reform in America. The measures which were taken tended to be those which produced immediate advantages without the expenditure of scarce and valuable human or economic resources.¹⁴ Some of these measures conflicted severely with the interests of Indian society as well as with the long-range interests of the Spanish Crown as it was perceived by reformers like Campillo and Juan and Ulloa.

An increase in the yield from the Crown's three main revenue sources from Peru—mining, import-export taxes and Indian tribute, all of which had declined sharply by the beginning of the eighteenth century¹⁵—was a sure means of supplementing the Crown's dwindling resources. The most obvious means of increasing revenue from these sources, however, involved additional exactions on the Indian masses already overburdened as tributaries, mita laborers and—through the repartimiento—consumers of Spanish goods. Yet this was the one group the reformists insisted on sparing from any increased burdens. Their opinion was that only by fostering the welfare of the Indian population could Spain expect her American domains to prosper.
The Indians were the key resource in the American economy according to both Juan and Ulloa: "... todas cuantas riquezas producen las Indias, y aun su misma subsistencia, se debe al sudor de sus naturales" and Campillo who described them as "el gran tesoro de España. Ellos son la mina mas rica del mundo, que se debe beneficiar con la mas escrupulosa economía." Juan and Ulloa described the benefits that reform should bring to Indian society and the beneficial effect they would have for Spain:

Con estas disposiciones bien observadas podría mejorarse el gobierno de aquellos países, cuyas resultas serían muy favorables á todos. El Monarca lo conocería con el acrecentamiento de los tributos reales y en el adelantamiento de las alcabalas, porque á proporció que se poblaren mas aquellos países seria mayor el consumo de géneros y crecerían los derechos en las aduanas; los particulares los experimentarían en el mayor número de indios para trabajar las minas, para cultivar sus haciendas y para mantener sus manufacturas, y los indios mismos gozarían más descanso con mejores conveniencias, y cualquiera pensión que se hiciese inevitable por la urgencia de los tiempos, les sería soportable y la llevarían con gusto.

Campillo couched his view of the Indians' position under a reformed administration in the broadest terms: "... los infelices Indios; con la ejecucion del Nuevo Sistema gozarán de todos los Privilegios que les concedió la naturaleza en su libertad, y les ha quitado el dominio de los hombres con su Imperio."

This emphasis on the importance of preserving the Indian population was based on a keen awareness, among these and other observers, of the social and economic crisis in Indian society in the first half of the eighteenth century. The Crown, in choosing to pursue short-term economic
gains wherever possible, not only overlooked this crisis, but aggravated the conditions which had given rise to it. The Crown's measures to increase revenue produced increased pressure on the resources of Indian society as a whole to the point of undermining that society's ability to support its privileged groups, and thereby contributing to the dissatisfaction of the Indian elite with the Spanish administration.

Far from expanding to meet any new demands, the resources of Indian society were rapidly being eroded by the combined demands of the Spanish Crown, Church and administrators. The total burden of official and unofficial obligations placed on an individual Peruvian Indian tributary in the eighteenth century generally exceeded his resources. A typical Indian could be expected to have an annual income of between twenty-five and forty-five pesos. Of this amount, at least twenty-one pesos were committed to fixed contributions including the personal tribute paid to the Crown, the tithes and other levies paid to the Church and the obligatory purchase of repartimiento merchandise from the corregidor.

Whatever income remained after these obligations were fulfilled constituted fair game for unofficial and often illegal, yet nevertheless widely accepted exploitation by powerful Spaniards and the caciques who often served, however unwillingly, as their accomplices. It was accepted, indeed expected practice for officials at all levels in the administrative hierarchy to exploit more or less freely their official functions for private profit. The close contact with, and virtually uncontrolled authority
over the Indian tributaries enjoyed by the local corregidores and Church officials gave them ample opportunity to practise such exploitation to advantage.  

Innumerable denunciations of the corregidores by other colonial officials and reformists of various loyalties indicate that these "diputorios de jueces y mercaderes" carried their exploitation to lengths quite intolerable even to the most hardened American bureaucrats. The denunciations also provide an ample record of the nature and extent of the devious practices by which the corregidores profited from their functions as tribute collectors, labor purveyors and monopolistic merchants.

Often in collaboration with caciques the corregidores collected tribute monies from the Indians in advance or more frequently than was authorized in order to provide themselves with working capital. The corregidores also profited by collecting tribute from exempt Indians. Officially tribute was payable only by males between twenty and fifty years of age in order to confine the head tax to the productive members of Indian society. Since Indians outside this group had virtually no resources, assessments made on them were often transferred to relatives already in the tribute-paying sector of Indian society, increasing the tribute obligations of this group.

Not only corregidores, but individual Spaniards and creoles as well were able to profit from their abuse of the mita system. While this obligatory labor service was theoretically restricted to specific projects such as mines, official guide and post service, and other public works, in practice mitayos provided labor for agriculture and textile factories as well.
Juan and Ulloa described how landowners by various assessments quickly em-
bezzled the mitayos' minimal wage and even left them indebted so as to
force the mitayos to continue as employees after the expiration of their
obligatory service. The same authors detailed the practices by which the
owners of obrajes or textile factories "adquiere . . . un derecho injustamente
establecido de esclavizarlos, no sólo al indio mitayo, mas á todos sus hijos." It was also accepted practice for corregidores and landowners who received
Indians as mitayos to realize a profit by renting them out to other individuals
in need of labor.

The repartimiento, an officially sanctioned practice by which the
corregidores forcibly sold merchandise to Indians under their jurisdiction,
provided considerable scope for profit at the expense of the Indian tributaries.
Abuses in the repartimiento system had become so prevalent by the middle of the
eighteenth century that the Viceroy instituted legislation restricting the
repartimiento to specific goods deemed necessary or useful to the Indians,
regulating the price which could be charged for these goods, and restricting
the number of repartimientos which could be undertaken by a single corregidor.

In spite of these restrictions, the abuses which led the Spanish investigators
Juan and Ulloa to call the repartimiento "una tiranía la más horrible que se
pudiera inventar" apparently continued unabated until it was finally
abolished in 1780. While even legal repartimientos placed a heavy burden
on the tributaries' resources, the inflated prices and repeated reparti-
mientos imposed by some corregidores left the Indians debt-ridden.
The Indians' inability to pay for the repartimiento frequently resulted in the corregidores' forcing them into debt slavery. The corregidores cleverly manipulated their authority as tribute collectors to ensure their own profits from the repartimiento as well as their access to debt laborers. By diverting sums which had been paid as tribute to satisfy repartimiento debts, the corregidores kept the Indians indebted to the Crown for tribute, creating for themselves an undeniable justification for continuing to control the labor and income of the tributaries.\textsuperscript{33}

While the combined effects of abusive exploitation and official impositions clearly made the financial position of the average tributary quite untenable, a serious population decline in the first half of the eighteenth century exacerbated the impoverishment of Indian society as a whole. In most parts of Spanish America, the population decline caused by the drastic physical and social changes wrought by the Spanish colonialization had begun to reverse by the eighteenth century. In Peru, however, a number of factors prevented this recovery from occurring. By 1754 both the number of Indian persons and the number of Indian tributaries in the Audiencias of Lima and Charcas were less than half their totals in 1561.\textsuperscript{34}

The sierra communities suffered more than other areas from this depopulation, both because they lost relatively more of their population and because their role as labor purveyors made them more sensitive to the loss of human resources. A plague in 1720 claimed the lives of more than two thirds of the sierra Indians, a loss which was aggravated by voluntary
migration from the sierra regions. Voluntary migration which had served as a means of escaping exploitation during both the Incaic and early Spanish periods once again became a common occurrence and one of grave concern both to Spanish authorities and Indian leaders. While some Indians simply fled to relatively inaccessible areas, others must have moved to the more prosperous urban areas and the coastal and eastern Andean agricultural regions, all of which showed an increase in population between 1628 and 1754 when the majority of the Peruvian provinces showed considerable decreases.

It was on this already depressed and depopulated Indian society that the Spanish Crown placed further burdens in its attempt to increase its revenue from Peru. The specific measures applied for this purpose not only weighed heavily on the Indian masses, the sector of society which could least afford any additional financial obligations, but also contributed to the gradual erosion of the authority of both the Indian caciques and of the Spanish administration itself.

One such measure, composición de tierras, used repeatedly in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as a means of raising needed funds, clearly demonstrates the far-reaching and perhaps largely unanticipated effects which the Crown's pursuit of a policy of immediate financial advantage had on the already overburdened resources of Indian society. The term "composición" was usually used to describe a practice by which the Crown offered to legalize for a fee existing land holdings. In the case of Peru, the Crown subjected to composición the Indian communities' land holdings in excess of those necessary to provide each tributary with an
area calculated to support himself and his dependants. The community land, a carry-over from Incaic land-holding patterns, was usually rented or cultivated to provide additional community income and remained available for distribution to individuals in case of a population increase.

The depressed state of Indian society in the eighteenth century, however, placed composición beyond the means of many Indian communities. In these cases the composiciones served as a means by which Spaniards and creoles could usurp community lands with the Crown's approval. The last composición in the eighteenth century occurred at the lowest point in the Indian population curve, a time when Indian society was hard pressed to meet even existing obligations. At this time the failure of some communities to offer an adequate fee for the composición of their land titles resulted in their lands being sold to the highest bidder. This sale of land had a theoretical justification in the Bourbon premise that vacant land automatically reverted to Crown ownership.

The loss of community lands through composición not only caused hardship by depriving the communities of the income produced by these lands but also contributed to another problem, the existence of landless Indians. Communities with no excess land had no resources with which to support any increase in population and the existing resources had proven inadequate to support the Indian population even at its lowest ebb. This situation, the prime cause of migration, not only continued to discourage the return of Indians who had temporarily left their communities either to serve the mita or to seek a more prosperous existence elsewhere, but also contributed
to the continuing migration of the excess population. Since most migrants fled either to uncolonized regions or to urban areas where they could escape tribute payment, this continued migration represented a serious drain on one of the main sources of Crown revenue.

As a result, when the Indian population did begin to increase, the Crown attempted to remedy the problem of landless Indians in two ways. Neither of these, however, furthered the reformists' ideal of providing the Indians with enough land to maintain themselves. Campillo advocated that "las tierras se den en propiedad a nuestros Indios, y que por consiguiente se les de la plena y pacífica posesión de todo el fruto de su trabajo." The Crown's plan to provide land to all Indians, however, actually reduced the size of individual allotments by simply redividing the existing land available to the Indians amongst the increased population. In attempts to make still more land available to the increasing Indian population the Crown undertook to redistribute lands held by individual Indians in excess of their official allotments. Just as the first measure decreased the land available to the individual tributary, this measure reduced the holdings which members of the Indian elite had managed to accumulate through clever manipulation of their privileged status. Only the Indian nobility who held lands by special royal concessions remained untouched by this measure. The adverse effects of this short-sighted policy of land redistribution were felt by virtually every segment of Indian society, cutting across the boundaries that generally separated the interests of the Indian elite from those of the Indian masses.
The need to increase Crown revenue from American sources was the key factor in decisions to continue both the mita and repartimiento against the advice of many colonial officials. The royal tax or quinta on mine production formed the largest single source of Crown revenue from Peru. By 1700 mining production had declined to less than half its total at the beginning of the century and the improvement of this situation remained a constant concern to reformists throughout the eighteenth century until finally, at the end of the century, a scientific plan to modernize the Peruvian mining industry was undertaken. The Marqués de Castelfuerte, Viceroy in the 1730's, described the mines as "el principal blanco de la atención de este Gobierno, y como el centro de donde han de salir las líneas de la conservación de este Reyno." 

Early efforts to improve mining revenue generally concentrated on the provision of increased manpower, particularly through changes in the administration of the mita system. The mita had always been justified as the only possible means of providing labor for the mines since voluntary laborers were scarce and unwilling to work for meager wages in the debilitating conditions of the mines. The detrimental effects of the mita on Indian society led to consideration of abolishing it throughout the eighteenth century. Felipe V did in fact abolish the mita for Huancavelica owing to the severe effects of the 1720 plague on the mitayos but this measure was never fully implemented. In 1728 the Audiencia seriously contemplated but ultimately decided against abolishing the mita. The question remained under active consideration and in 1732 the Council of the Indies recorded a
majority vote in favor of abolishing the mita. The Crown overruled this vote, insisting on maintaining the mita subject—as ever—to the provisions of the Ordenanzas of Toledo and to those of thirteen new ordenanzas.55

The repartimiento, like the mita, was maintained in spite of contrary opinions, because of the economic advantages it provided the Crown. Most eighteenth-century authorities condemned the sale of often unnecessary and inferior goods at inflated prices through the repartimiento system, yet justified the continued existence of this system on the basis of the Crown's overwhelming interest in its continuance. The following arguments, taken from Manso de Velasco's "Memoria," are typical:

... conociendo que ni las provincias podían sostenerse sin algun repartimiento, ni había quien administrase justicia en ella, solo por el honor y corto sueldo que está asignado a los Corregidores, era indispensable ocurrir a las quejas y condenar por delincuentes estos comercios, al mismo tiempo que era notorio que todos lo practicaban, y que esta negociación era únicamente lo que los llevaba a vivir entre sierras ásperas, temperamentos despreciables y gente inculta, y hacerse cargo de la difícil recaudación de tributos y otros Reales derechos, cuyo cuidado les obligaba a estar en perpetuo movimiento por las grandes distancias que comprende cada provincia, consumiendo en estas diligencias más de lo que importaba el salario.56

The repartimiento not only enabled the Spanish Crown to provide local governors in America at no cost to itself57 but actually provided the Crown with an extra source of revenue through the sale of corregimientos. It was the right to administer the repartimiento that induced individuals to purchase the office of corregidor. Further, the repartimiento provided a captive market for the sale of Spanish products and the Crown also profit-ed from the sale through the imposition of the alcabala on the goods sold.
This was apparently a decisive factor in the Viceroy Superunda's decision in 1751 to maintain the repartimiento despite the contrary opinion of many ministers. The introduction of sales at fixed prices into the repartimiento system in 1756, although apparently securing a certain income for the Crown from the corregidores' sales, did little to check the many abuses perpetrated on the Indians through the corregimiento system. According to the Viceroy Amat y Junient, "Los Aranzeles formados sólo sirven para el cargo de Alcabalas, pero de ningún modo para el arreglo de sus procedimientos, pues cada Corregidor reparte lo que le parece y a los precios a que le induce su mal reglada autoridad y arbitrio." 

In keeping with its overall policy of increasing revenue, the Spanish administration in Peru implemented in the first half of the eighteenth century various measures designed to increase the Crown's tribute revenue. As early as the 1680's the increasing percentage of the Indian population which was exempt from tribute by virtue of holding positions in local Indian government had begun to represent a considerable limitation on tribute revenue. The Viceroy, Duque de la Palata attempted to remedy this situation either by having minor officials selected from those over tribute-paying age or by having these officials pay tribute either personally or from community funds. By the end of the first quarter of the eighteenth century some tribute lists made no provision for the exemption even of alcaldes. Later in the century the Visitor General Areche attempted to apply a similar policy to all Indian religious officials, thereby limiting the classes of Indians enjoying exemption by virtue of office to the caciques and some alcaldes.
This gradual broadening of the tribute base added to the expense of supporting the Indian elite, an expense which already weighed heavily on most Indian communities. At the same time, by removing any personal economic reward for participation in local government, the inclusion of Indian officials as tribute payers destroyed not only the prestige of office but also the incentive for holding office. In spite of this overall trend towards subjecting a greater percentage of the Indian population to tribute payment, the number of Indians who maintained their exemption from tribute by virtue of their cacique status was still significant in 1754, for out of a total population of 612,780 Indians, 2,078 enjoyed such exemption.

Measures to increase tribute revenue affected not only the Indian elite, but the Indian masses as well. Rather than actually curtailing the illegal profits of Spanish officials, many of the steps taken to prevent the misappropriation of tribute funds merely transferred the burden of these profits from the Crown's tribute revenue to the resources of Indian society as a whole. In the 1730's the Viceroy Castelfuerte was particularly active in attempting to increase tribute revenue by eradicating many of the fraudulent practices by which local officials embezzled tribute monies rightly due to the Crown. A particularly common practice was for the corregidor to report the existence of an artificially low number of tributaries and to pocket the monies collected from the real tributaries in excess of this number. The devastating effects of the recent plague on the sierra Indians facilitated this particularly lucrative fraud. Castelfuerte tried to curtail this abuse by sending out
special enumerators whose efforts, he claimed, produced an additional 35,868 Indian tributaries. 66

These tributaries were not, however, always legitimate additions to the tribute rolls. Since the enumerators were paid according to their success in finding new tributaries, 67 it is not surprising that many legitimately exempt Indians were threatened with inclusion, or in fact included as tributaries. Bribery was apparently the only sure way to maintain one's exemption. 68 The inclusion of Indians legally exempted from tribute payment by virtue of their age, sex or infirmities in the tribute lists increased the tribute burden on the productive members of Indian society who had to raise the tribute payments for these individuals. In this way the Crown's attempts to increase tribute revenue contributed to the increasing impoverishment of Indian society.

The administration's policy of increasing tribute revenue, therefore, worked to the serious disadvantage of Indian society, adversely affecting both members of the Indian elite and of the tributary population. It ultimately worked to the disadvantage of the Spanish Crown as well since it antagonized not only members of the Indian elite but also a large part of the mestizo population. Under Castelfuerte all mestizos were included as tributaries unless they could legally establish their mestizo status. 69 The difficulty and expense of doing this forced many mestizos into the socially degrading position of tributaries. The mestizos who had hitherto regarded their association with Spanish society as inviolable, 70 now found themselves outcasts, subject to the same degrading exploitation as the
members of the subordinate Indian society. The mestizos reacted with growing suspicion against further attempts to equate them with the exploited Indians. At the same time the mestizos' new-found identity of interest with the Indian tributaries made the administration wary of offending them further. Manso de Velasco wrote at mid-century that any enumeration was a dangerous undertaking because of the mestizos' fear of the imposition of tribute and mita "que es un servicio que miran como una especie de esclavitud que los altera."\textsuperscript{71}

Since the caciques were exempt from tribute payment, it might seem that the Spanish administration's tendency to include as many Indians and even mestizos as possible in the tribute lists enhanced the position of the caciques. In fact the opposite was the case. The administration's policies increased the impoverishment of the Indian masses and made them less able to support their privileged groups, although the caciques were, to some extent, shielded from this decline by their participation in the corregidores' profits. However, a number of the reforms instituted to prevent the corregidores from defrauding the Crown of tribute revenue had the additional and unanticipated effect of totally undermining the social and economic position of the caciques. Reduced by the tribute system reforms to the status of personal dependants of the corregidores, the caciques found that their privileged status had become purely illusory in practice.

In order to thwart the most common means by which the corregidores defrauded the Crown of tribute revenue, official tribute lists were introduced, fixing the income expected from each corregimiento.\textsuperscript{72} Whereas
formerly the corregidores were able to declare to the Crown a smaller number of tributaries than in fact existed, they were now obliged to present tribute for a fixed number of Indians. This meant that the corregidores could only profit by illegally increasing the amount of the tribute exactions or by collecting from exempt Indians. The corregidores' practice of introducing third or even fourth parties—the caciques themselves or the corregidores' own subordinates, often mestizos or mulattoes—into the process of tribute collection exacerbated this situation, necessitating still more intensive exploitation to provide the profit for these individuals. Lohmann describes the benefits the Crown anticipated from the use of fixed tribute lists:

"Así se consideraba que por el propio interés de los arrendatarios no caerían fácilmente a las propuestas de colusión que les insinuasen los corregidores o los curacas para declarar exentos o fugitivos al mayor número posible de contribuyentes." These official tribute lists together with the practice of selling them, generally to corregidores, for at least the amount of income expected for that corregimiento, resulted in a system of tax farming which benefited the Crown by making its tribute revenue totally independent of the actual administration of the tribute collection.

These favorable results were equalled by the negative results which this independence had on both the Indian tributaries and the caciques. The Bishop of Cuzco succinctly described the exploitation which resulted from this system of tribute collection: "... valiéndose del especioso título de Reales Tributos, no ay violencia que no ejecuten." As well as losing the main basis for their privileged position—their usefulness to the Crown
as intermediaries in the tribute collection—the caciques found themselves relegated to the status of personal debt collectors for the corregidores or their agents.

The autonomy gained by the corregidores through these innovations in the tribute collection process facilitated their further subjugation of the caciques. The corregidores and their underlings viewed the amount of tribute they had undertaken to collect as a debt for which the caciques as Indian leaders were personally responsible. Caciques often paid out of their own pockets the tribute of Indians from whom they could not collect and it was not unknown for caciques to be imprisoned for failing to pay tributes they had been unable to collect. By the same token the caciques were held responsible for the payment of the repartimiento, often disguised as tribute.

The insignificant role left to the caciques in the reformed tribute collecting system meant that the Spanish government was no longer interested in maintaining their privileged status. The caciques, therefore, largely abandoned by the Crown, became helpless victims of the corregidores' arbitrary power. In spite of the fact that the caciqueship was by law a hereditary office, the corregidores were now able to go so far as to depose caciques with impunity, simply by making the claim that they held office illegally due to their failure to obtain royal confirmation. Many caciques were vulnerable on this basis since the considerable financial outlay involved in obtaining confirmation forced them to dispense with it.

The caciques' subjugation to the corregidores effectively destroyed both the economic and social advantages of office. The corregidores'
arbitrariness has not only impoverished the caciques but reduced them, in reality, to the status of tribute payers by placing on them the obligations which the tributaries themselves were unable to meet. The exploitation in which the caciques were forced to participate in order to maintain the corregidores' protection had become so abusive as to damage the caciques' acceptance by the Indians as their legitimate leaders. At the same time the caciques' loss of access to the Crown impeded their ability to function as representatives of the Indian community and hence to reinforce their hereditary status through effective leadership. The protector León y Escandón summed up the caciques' position at the middle of the eighteenth century as "de peor condicion que los pleveyos haviendo de hacerse cargo de una obligacion tan graboza que les fueran inutiles los privilegios y exemptions que la piedad de su Magd. les tiene concedidas." 81

The caciques' subservient status made them indistinguishable in Spanish eyes from the mass of Indians whose character was generally interpreted in unflattering terms such as these used by the Viceroy Castelfuerte: "... el genio de esta nacion, en quien entregarse al ocio es un vicio de naturaleza, y por aquella insensibilidad que con una filosofía de vajeza no se dejan penetrar del interes de la ganancia." 82 Juan and Ulloa described the attitudes of Spaniards to the children of caciques in the eighteenth century as follows: "... el desprecio y odio con que los españoles de su edad los tratarían en las escuelas de alla ... basta que sean indios para que todos tengan á desdoro el enseñarles, aun los mismos mestizos." 83
Many caciques were unwilling to accept without protest this loss of status and prestige and sought ways to counteract the corregidores' power either by soliciting the enforcement of existing legislation or by attempting to occupy influential positions outside their traditional role as caciques. As later chapters will demonstrate, the caciques' efforts to reestablish a balance between their by now openly conflicting interests in Spanish exploitation and the welfare of Indian society were made primarily through existing legal channels with the assistance of the urban Indian elite. The nature of these procedures and the Spanish colonial theories on which they were founded proved to be the overriding influence on the ideology of reform developed by the Indian elite in the eighteenth century. From its inception the goals and ideals of the Indian reformist movement were both conceived and expressed within the strictures of Spanish colonial ideals.
NOTES

CHAPTER II


2 Most studies of reform in the Spanish administration of Peru in the eighteenth century dwell on the implementation of the intendant system in 1784. See John Robert Fisher, *Government and Society in Colonial Peru: The Intendant System, 1784-1814* (London, 1970). Leon G. Campbell, "The Army of Peru and the Túpac Amaru Revolt, 1780-1783," *Hispanic American Historical Review*, 56:1 (Feb. 1976), 31-57, has studied the military reorganization in Peru after 1761. The concentration of these studies on the latter part of the eighteenth century is indicative of the fact that earlier innovations did not represent a comprehensive reorganization, but rather isolated efforts designed primarily to increase Crown revenue. John TéPaske, "La crisis del siglo XVIII en el virreinato del Perú," in ed. Bernardo García Martínez,
Historia y sociedad en el mundo de habla española (Mexico, 1970), pp. 263-279, analyzes the extent of reforms made in the first half of the eighteenth century in Peru. These included insistence on compliance with existing laws, the enforcement of residencias, measures designed to subordinate the Church to Viceregal authority, and investigations into existing practices. For a general view of the extent of the autonomy of both local government and the central judiciary in eighteenth-century Peru see John Preston Moore, The Cabildo in Peru under the Bourbons, 1700-1824 (Durham, 1966); Leon G. Campbell, "A Creole Establishment: Creole Domination of the Audiencia of Lima during the Late Eighteenth Century," Hispanic American Historical Review, 52:1 (Feb. 1972), 1-25; and Guillermo Lohmann Villena, Los ministros de la Audiencia de Lima en el reinado de los Borbones (Seville, 1974).


4 Victorino Montero, Estado político del reyno del Peru, gobierno sin leyes: ministros relaxados: thesoros con pobreza: fertilidad sin cultivo: sabiduría desestimada: milicia sin honor: ciudades sin amor patricio: la justicia sin templo: Hurtos por Comercios: Integridad tenida por locura: Rey, el Mayor de Ricos Dominios, pobre de Thesoros (Madrid, c. 1747), "dedicatoria." With the exception of writing out in full abbreviations which might prove difficult for the reader I have consistently reproduced the orthography of the books and manuscripts from which quotations are transcribed.

5 Estado político, p. 2.

6 Estado político, p. 15.
Jorge Juan y Santacilia and Antonio de Ulloa, *Noticias Secretas de América*, sobre el estado naval, militar y político de los Reinos del Perú y Provincia de Quito, escritas fielmente según las instrucciones del Excmo. Sr. Marqués de la Ensenada, Primer Secretario de Estado y presentadas en informe secreto a D. Fernando VI, sacadas a luz para el verdadero conocimiento del gobierno de los españoles en la América Meridional por D. David Barry (London, 1826), rpt. Biblioteca Ayacucho 31, 32 (Madrid, 1918), I, 250.

Estado político, p. 37.

Noticias secretas, I, 305.

Joseph del Campillo y Cosío, *Nuevo sistema de gobierno económico para la América: Con los males y daños que le causa el que hoy tiene, de los que participa copiosamente España; y remedios universales para que la primera tenga considerables ventajas, y la segunda mayores intereses* (Madrid, 1789), "exordio" p. 13.

TePaske describes a number of specific reforms beginning in 1713 designed to reduce the privileges of various colonial groups. While many of them attempted to subordinate the Church to the viceregal authorities, others aimed to limit the prerogatives of royal officials from Viceroy to corregidores. Some reforms undermined the privileges of large sectors of colonial society. For example, Lima's commercial interests were affected by the abolition in 1724 of the Consulado's privilege of collecting various taxes as well as by the definitive introduction in 1740 of registros sueltos which signified the end of Lima's trade monopoly. Mining interests were upset by the possibility of having to use only paid labor when the
discontinuance of the mita system was considered in 1720—(pp. 271-275).
A new tax on all goods entering urban areas, introduced in 1741 to finance
defence, also affected urban interests. José Manso de Velasco, Conde de
Superunda, "Relación," in ed. Manuel Atanasio Fuentes, Memorias de los
Vireyes que han gobernado el Perú durante el tiempo del coloniaje español
(Lima, 1859), IV, 144.

12 Bernardo Ward, Proyecto económico, En que se proponen varias pro-
videncias, dirigidas á promover los intereses de España, con los medios y
fondos necesarios para su plantificación: Escrito en el año de 1762 Por
D. Bernardo Ward, del Consejo de S.M. y su Ministro de la Real Junta de
Comercio y Moneda. Obra postuma (Madrid, 1787). Campillo's plan forms
part II, pp. 225-314 of this work. Campillo was an influential figure in
Spain in the first half of the eighteenth century. Before his death in
1743 he was Home Secretary and for a short time in 1741 Prime Minister.
Miguel Artola, "Campillo y las reformas de Carlos III," Revista de Indias,
12:50 (Oct.-Dec. 1952), 685-704, gives an account of the influence of
Campillo's ideas on economic reform in the second half of the eighteenth
century. Neither Campillo's ideas concerning the urgency of reform in
Spain's American colonies, nor those of Juan and Ulloa whose report was
actually commissioned by the Marqués de la Ensenada, Secretary of State for
the Indies, were given serious consideration until the 1760's. Miguel Artola,
"América en el pensamiento español del siglo XVIII," Revista de Indias, 29:115
(Jan.-Dec. 1969), 51-77, gives an interesting account of a number of pro-
posals made by Spaniards throughout the eighteenth century for the
reorganization of colonial commerce and administration.


14 Campillo warned that the problems to be tackled in reforming the American bureaucracy amounted to "un estrago tan monstruoso, que es menester la mano poderosa de un Monarca como el nuestro, para repararle" (Nuevo sistema, "exordio," p. 11) and Montero foresaw the need for armed intervention to impose reform in the face of widespread opposition (pp. 14 ff.). The fears expressed by these authors were realized in the 1760's when the Viceroy Amat's attempts to centralize the administration met with intense opposition on the part of creoles and Spaniards alike. See Vicente Rodríguez Casado and Florentino Pérez Embid, "Estudio preliminar," in Manuel de Amat y Junient, Memoria de gobierno, ed. Rodríguez Casado and Pérez Embid (Seville, 1947), P. LIII. Antonio de Ulloa experienced at first hand the opposition of vested interests to reform when he attempted to enforce existing legislation as Governor of the Huancavelica mercury mine in 1758. See Henry F. Dobyns and Paul L. Doughty, Peru: A Cultural History (New York, 1976), p. 121.
Carlos Sempat Assadourian, "Integración y desintegración regional en el espacio colonial, un enfoque histórico," Revista Latinoamericana de Estudios urbano regionales, 11:4 (March 1972), 11-24; Céspedes, p. 75; and José de Armendáriz, Marqués de Castelfuerte, "Relación del estado de los reynos del Perú," in ed. Manuel Atanasio Fuentes, Memorias (Lima, 1859), III, 199.

Noticias secretas, I, 288.

Nuevo sistema, p. 54.

Noticias secretas, I, 287.


Spalding estimates that a hypothetical Indian could be expected to earn fifteen to thirty pesos in wages for working six months of the year and another ten to fifteen pesos per year from the sale of yearlings produced by his cattle. "Huarochirí," p. 59.


While corregidores were subject to an inspection at the end of their terms, the corruption of the officials entrusted with administering it negated its effectiveness. The Bishop of Cuzco condemned the residencia in 1744 as "una mera ceremonia." See letter transcribed by Michel Colin in Le Cuzco à la fin du XVIIe et au début du XVIIIe siècle (Paris, 1966), p. 216. The following works indicate that Church officials, particularly Indian curates, engaged in exploitative practices similar to those of the corregidores: Nuevo sistema, p. 107; Noticias secretas, II, 9-30; Amat, Memoria, pp. 188 ff.; and Representación verdadera [1748] transcribed by
Francisco A. Loayza in *Fray Calixto Tupak Inka* (Lima, 1948), pp. 9, 10, 13.

For details of this document see Chapter V of this dissertation.


26 Noticias secretas, I, 256, 257.

27 Noticias secretas, I, 290, 297.

28 Noticias secretas, I, 298-299.

29 One of the most important Indian spokesmen in the eighteenth century described these abuses: "... prosiguen los dueños de las haciendas en dar, y prestar dichos Indios [de mita] llevando para si lo que ajustan de cada uno."

"Por la ordenanza ... se manda no se repartan Indios a los trabajos y obrajes ... y sin embargo de esta prohibición ... siguiendo su ambición, y codicia, mandan a los Caciques, que cada Pueblo, que por su cortedad no les corresponda dicho repartimiento, les den en plata el importe de Indios, que si tuviese bastante vecindad se deba repartir." Vicente Morachimo, *Manifiesto de los agravios, bexacciones, y molestias, que padecen los indios del reyno del Perú. Dedicado a los señores de el real, y supraemo Consejo, y Cámara de Indias, por el procurador y diputado general de dichos indios* [Madrid, 1732], transcribed by Fernando Silva Santisteban, "Morachimo, Cacique intercesor de los indios," *Idea* (Lima), Nos. 25, 26, 27 (July-Oct. 1955, Jan.-March 1956, Apr.-June 1956), No. 27.
A price list for each corregimiento was officially fixed in 1756. Lohmann, *El corregidor*, p. 427; Vargas Ugarte, *Historia*, IV, 238.

Noticias secretas, I, 261.


Kubler gives the number of Indian persons as 1,490,137 in 1561 and 612,780 in 1754, and a still lower number in 1796, 608,894. "The Quechua," p. 334. Population figures for 1754 are based on estimates made in the eighteenth century, not on actual censuses.

This was the estimate of the eighteenth-century scientist Cosme Bueno. Kubler does not question it, but it is possible that Cosme Bueno attributed to the plague general population decreases resulting from conditions of severe exploitation. Kubler, p. 336.

This was because before 1732 only individuals residing in the same province where they were born or where their ascendants had lived were subject to full tribute and mita payment. Thus until 1732 an Indian could avoid or decrease these obligations by leaving his native province. See Rowe, "Incas," p. 189; Kubler, pp. 347, 377; Lohmann, *El corregidor*, p. 437; Manuel Vicente Villarán, *Apuntes sobre la realidad de los indígenas del Perú ante las leyes de Indias* (Lima, 1964), pp. 158-162; Rodrigo de Loaisa, p. 604.

Kubler, p. 339, noted that the population of Chucuito province which provided mitayos for Potosí shrank by two thirds between 1628 and 1754. The *Estado político* proposed the multiplication of bishoprics and corregimientos as a means of reducing "de los Montes, y Desiertos las gentes a vida mas
urbana; y a lo menos, en Sacramentos, y Tributos, havia mas exactitud."
(p. 25). Campillo echoed this concern in his *Nuevo sistema*, p. 9, as did the *Noticias secretas*, p. 283. Indian spokesmen expressed their concern rather more dramatically: "... no tenemos otro consuelo que el desierto y desamparo en que nos vemos, que acogernos a los bosques de los desiertos y montañas, a perecer en las tempestades de la necesidad." *Representación in Calixto*, p. 13. Morachimo wrote "Tenientes generales ... alquilan Indios a diferentes hacendados Españoles, para que trabajen en sus haciendas, razón por que se despueblan muchos Pueblos, en grave perjuicio de el Real Erario, por faltar lo que aquellos huidos contribuían; y muchos se pasan a las Montañas a habitar entre infieles" and alleged that the extension of the term of a corregidor whose cacique had complained and been imprisoned served as "exemplar que ha causado el retirarse muchos Indios a las Montañas." *Manifiesto* (Idea, No. 25, p. 65). The Marqués de Castelfuerte expressed his concern over the problem of voluntary migration as follows: "... y es preciso a más trasladarlos de las montañas donde son fieras a los lugares donde han de ser hombres, no seria imposible obligarles a mudar la traslación a otra qualesquiera parte, pues entonces no pueden tener mas inclinacion a una que a otra: he discurrido hasta aquí de la despoblacion que han sido y son habituales en el Reyno. --Pero haviéndose añadido al de los otros la peste que imbió sus provincias en los últimos años precedentes á mi gobierno, fué preciso que consumiese mucha parte de sus naturales, y (lo que fue peor para la República) que sirviese de pretexto para la diminucion de mitas y tributos." "Relación," p. 135.
Eleven of fifty-one provinces increased in population during this period. Kubler, pp. 337 and 339. For a description of the urban Indian population see Vargas Ugarte, *Historia*, IV, 254; Spalding, *De indio a campesino*, pp. 177-180.

Spalding, "Huarochiri," p. 127. Much of the following discussion of the Indian elite's loss of status in the eighteenth century is based on both specific data and the general analysis presented by Spalding in "Huarochiri." This analysis is presented in broader terms in *De indio a campesino*, pp. 147-192.

Váldez de la Torre, *Evolución*, pp. 68, 69. Solórzano, lib. vi, cap. xii, pt. 12, wrote: "... quando se mandare hacer esta exhibicion de titulos y nueva medida de las heredades, no se vaya con ánimo de despojar y desposeer de ellas a sus antiguos poseedores y labradores, sino de obligarles á sirvan con alguna honesta composicion."


Noticias secretas, I, 324.

Campillo's idea was that this would provide an incentive for the Indians to work. *Nuevo sistema*, p. 86.


This redistribution of land held by individual Indians occurred in the 1770's. Spalding, "Huarochiri," p. 134.

Spalding, "Huarochiri," p. 134

Castelfuerte, "Relación," p. 199; Sempat Assadourian, p. 21.

Parry, p. 284. Sempat Assadourian gives the traditional explanation
for this decrease: "... baja de la ley, con rendimientos decrecientes y costes crecientes de explotación, la necesidad de nuevas inversiones para afrontar problemas técnicos de la producción, la desacumulación de capital infligida a la colonia por la política metropolitana," p. 17.


51 "Relación," p. 145.

52 Castelfuerte's "Relación" outlines the problems encountered in attempting to use voluntary labor, the decision to reinstitute the mita, and the conditions necessary for its effective operation. Castelfuerte undertook a new enumeration of Indians subject to the mita of Huancavelica and Potosí and claimed to have effected an increase in the number of mitayos available on a continuous basis from 447 to 550 (pp. 135, 152-153, 158).

53 The main deterrents to voluntary labor in the mines were in fact the poor salary and oppressive working conditions. The customary justification of the mita did not, however, reflect these factors: "Es común sentir en todos aquellos países y particularmente en los de la sierra, el que si los indios no se hicieran mita serían perezosos." Noticias secretas, I, 306. See also Castelfuerte, "Relación," pp. 152-153; Manso, p. 89; and Estado político, p. 30. For a graphic description of conditions in the silver and mercury mines see Dobyns and Doughty, pp. 102-104, 121-122.

55 Vargas, Historia, IV, 173.
56 "Relación," p. 151. See also Estado político, pp. 22-23; Representación in Calixto, p. 44; Lohmann, El corregidor, pp. 434-437; and Vargas, Historia, IV, 236-238.
57 Juan and Ulloa advocated providing salaries drawn from increased tribute payments to compensate the corregidores. Noticias secretas, I, 284. The corregidor did receive a salary, but this salary was often less than the sum paid by the corregidor to purchase the office.
58 Vargas, Historia, IV, 239.
59 Amat, Memoria, p. 189.
64 Manso, "Relación," Appendix, p. 15.
65 Castelfuerte, "Relación," p. 135; letter of Castelfuerte to King, 1728, Archivo General de Indias, hereafter cited as AGI (Lima 542); and Manso, p. 92.
67 Manso, p. 93.
68 Castelfuerte, "Relación," p. 281.
69 Castelfuerte, "Relación," p. 136; Manso, p. 79.
70 Vargas, Historia, IV, 167-170.
71 Manso, p. 79.
72 TePaske, p. 275 and Vargas, Historia, IV, 217.
Lohmann, El corregidor, p. 274. Juan and Ulloa describe a variation of this practice, introduced in Quito after their arrival: "... la cobranza ... se saca a pregón y se remata en un tanto, al que mas da, en cuyo caso es preferido el corregidor si lo quiere tomar en la misma cantidad en que se ha rematado ... no tiene mas obligación el corregidor sino entregar en las Cajas Reales la cantidad en que tomo la cobranza conforme se van cumpliendo los tercios, y queda exento de dar Cuentas." Noticias secretas, p. 254.

Colin, Le Cuzco, p. 216.


Morachimo, Manifiesto (Idea, No. 25, p. 5).

For example, the cacique of Siete Huarangas in Caxamarca remained prisoner from 1736 to 1744 for failing to make good on tribute he was unable to collect. Pedro de León y Escandón, Protector of the Indians for the Audiencia of Lima and later a Minister of the Council of the Indies, wrote a lengthy defense of this cacique which can be seen in AGI (Lima 540).

Colin, p. 216. Morachimo protested "el modo que tienen estos de cobrar el importe de los generos que repartieron con violencia, y contra todas disposiciones de lo que entran los Caciques de los Reales tributos, dexando estos sin satisfacer, y su obligacion al olvido; de lo que resulta, que los Caciques salen alcanzados, y sus haciendas suelen pagar lo que no deben." Manifiesto (Idea, No. 25, p. 5).

The Bishop of Cuzco protested that corregidores "despojan a los caciques lexitimos, ponen en su lugar mosos de su facción, para que estos

81 León y Escandón.  
82 Castelfuerte, "Relación," p. 152; Noticias secretas, p. 306; 
"... son de su naturaleza flojos," Manso, p. 151; "... es una Gente entregada a la ociosidad y embriaguez," "Descripción dialogada de todos los pueblos del Perú," anonymous [eighteenth century] in AGI (Indiferente general 1528), p. 6; Juan and Ulloa commented that few Indians were left around Lima and lamented the impoverishment of two caciques reduced to teaching music in Lima. These comments probably reflect the greater Hispanization of urban Indians in relation to their rural counterparts. They also seem to indicate that the authors compared the urban caciques unfavorably with the rural caciques. See Voyage historique de l'Amérique meridionale, fait par ordre du roi d'Espagne (Amsterdam and Leipzig, 1752), p. 435.  
83 Noticias secretas, I, 340.  
CHAPTER III

The Origins of Indian Reformist Thought, Radical Religious Ideals and the Spanish Protectoral System

The first step in the formation of the reformist ideology which reached its apogee in the Rebellion of Tupac Amaru was the Indian elite's adoption of a protectoral role towards the Indian masses. While this step can be explained in social terms as a reaction to the increasing marginalization of the Indian elite in eighteenth-century Peru, its cultural and ideological origins are rooted in Spanish colonial theories and institutions dating from the discovery itself. The Indian reformist ideology can only be fully understood in terms of both the ideals advocated by sixteenth-century missionaries and the pattern of political agitation established by them. The eighteenth-century Indian reformists perpetuated the dialectic which, initiated by these early missionaries, served to shape the history of Spanish colonial legislation and institutions. This dialectic is described by Lewis Hanke in the following terms: "... las tendencias abusivas y los principios rigurosos... la doctrina liberal... La dualidad y los encuentros a que dio origen."¹

This dialectic, like the institutions which embodied it, the Protector of the Indians and the Crown's missionary agents, had its origins in Spain's adoption of a religious basis for her secular authority in America. Spain justified her conquest of America by a Papal donation which gave her jurisdiction over America in return for undertaking the religious conversion of
the American Indians. Although the nature and extent of the jurisdiction authorized by this grant was subject to considerable debate, the Spanish Crown officially acknowledged on many occasions that its right to rule in America was dependent on its fulfillment of the obligation of Christianizing the inhabitants of the newly discovered continent.

This belief paved the way for the Church to play an influential role in the Spanish conquest of America. The nature of that role was shaped by the militant spirit and radical religious beliefs of many of the early missionaries. The last years of Spain's reconquest were imbued with a religious militancy exemplified by Ximénez de Cisneros' uncompromising attitude towards the Moorish inhabitants of Granada. The discovery of America, coinciding as it did with the culmination of the Christian reconquest of Spain, provided a new focus for this militancy and appeared to many to be a sign of a divinely-ordered plan for Spain to extend her crusades to America as the leader of a world-wide Christian empire. This view was substantiated by a type of Biblical exegesis popular amongst many of the Spaniards involved in early expeditions to America.

This exegesis drew an analogy between events of the Old Testament and Christian history, an analogy which could be extended to predict the course of future history by interpreting the Old Testament as prophetic. The originator of this analogy, Joachim of Fiore, had carried it through only until 1260 which he placed as the end of the second age of man. He had predicted that the third and final age, like the preceding ages, would be initiated by an Antichrist, traumas and precursors. This third age, however,
would embrace all mankind in a spiritual empire of which the monastery was the prototype and under the leadership of viri spirituali of whom monks were the obvious precursors. Joachim's analogy was incorporated, together with his interpretation of the third age of man, into orthodox Biblical exegesis through Nicholas of Lyre's biblical commentaries. Although written in the fourteenth century, Nicholas of Lyre's commentaries were considered authoritative at the end of the fifteenth century and continued to be influential throughout the seventeenth century. They were included in numerous early printed editions of the Bible, including the Polyglot Bible prepared under the supervision of Ximénez de Cisneros.

This Joachimite exegesis, with its concept of reform as a necessary prelude to the establishment of the third age, was an influential factor in reformist trends within the Church throughout the medieval and renaissance periods. One such movement, led by Ximénez de Cisneros, himself a member of the Observantine Franciscan Order which had been established by some of the most fervent believers in Joachimism, the Spiritual Franciscans, coincided with the discovery of America. As confessor and principal advisor to Queen Isabella, and later as regent, Cardinal Ximénez combined two Joachimite-influenced trends—reformism and analogistic Biblical exegesis—in an approach which greatly influenced Spain's ideals of Empire. Ximénez made reforms both within his own religious order and in the secular clergy in an attempt to bring their practices more into line with the spirituality and simplicity of the primitive Church. At the same time Ximénez supported religious wars against Africa and expeditions to America, the first steps in establishing
Spain as the head of a spiritual empire. This reformism and religious imperialism was transferred to America by Christopher Columbus and the friars who accompanied the early expeditions. As members of the Observantine Franciscan Order they shared the radical ideals which had inspired Ximénez and found in America a new opportunity for realizing them.⁸

Columbus was the first to apply the prophetic interpretation of the Old Testament to the discovery of America, equating America with Jerusalem, the Promised Land of the Old Testament. Similar comparisons involving the Spanish Empire and the Jews of the Old Testament became common in the sixteenth century. The most elaborate examples of these analogies are found in the writings of Fr. Gerónimo de Mendieta. Mendieta identified the Indians before their exposure to Christianity with the Jews in the Egyptian captivity. According to Mendieta, Cortés had led the Indians into the Christian Spanish Empire just as Moses had led the Jews into the Promised Land. However, the corruption of Spanish secular rule led Mendieta to compare the plight of the Indians with the Babylonian captivity. A more moderate version of the analogy between Spain's role in America and the events of the Old Testament saw Spain as the chosen people, destined to establish the New Jerusalem in America. This New Jerusalem would be ruled by spiritual leaders who would repudiate European society as the corrupt kingdom prophesied by the Biblical Babylon.⁹ The missionary orders, seeing themselves as precursors of these spiritual leaders, envisioned for themselves a role in America far exceeding that officially ascribed to them as Spain's missionary agents. They saw their mission not merely as one of converting Indians, but also of reforming and subordinating
secular society to spiritual direction.

The essentially medieval reformism of the missionary orders was reinforced by a renaissance idealism which agreed with the former in repudiating existing European society in favor of the simplicity of a golden age, represented within Christian history by the primitive Church. The following lines by Vasco de Quiroga, the Bishop of Michoacán renowned for his experiments in the peaceful conversion of Indians, demonstrate the similarity between medieval and renaissance ideals in the American context:

... reformar y restaurar y legitimar, si posible fuese, la doctrina y vida cristiana, y su santa simplicidad, mansedumbre, humildad, piedad y caridad en esta Renaciente Iglesia en esta edad dorada entre estos naturales, que en la nuestra de hierro lo repugna tanto nuestra casi natural soberbia, codicia, ambición y malicia desenfrenadas.10

The Crown's designation of the mendicant orders as its agents in the conversion of the American natives assured these proponents of radical religious ideals an influential voice in shaping the Church's role in America. The official invitation to the mendicant orders to send missionaries to America was largely the work of a prominent Franciscan and member of the Council of the Indies, Fr. Juan Bernal Diaz de Luco. The publication of this invitation in 1533 together with a manifesto by the first Bishop of Mexico, Fr. Zumárraga,11 another Franciscan whose reformist ideals brought him into conflict with secular interests, must be taken as an indication of Crown support for the radical ideals represented by their authors.

The Crown supported both in theory and in practice the missionaries' commitment to the spirit of primitive Christianity exemplified by Fr. Francisco de los Angeles' designation of twelve missionaries to evangelize
Mexico as symbolic of the twelve apostles. As late as 1568 the Junta de Indias suggested that even bishops in America should maintain the poverty of the mendicant orders in order to preserve the sense of the primitive Church. Until 1583 the Crown's policy of giving preference to members of the missionary orders in appointments to bishoprics assured the continuing influence of this ideal. Of 178 bishops appointed in Spain's American possessions in the sixteenth century, 123 were members of missionary orders. From 1546 on the Crown through the Council of the Indies undertook the expense of sending missionaries to America, fully half of whom in the sixteenth century were members of the Franciscan order.

The radical aims of these Crown-supported missionaries conflicted with the secular interests essential to Spain's colonial effort. By attributing to the conquered society the obligation of providing the human and material resources necessary to support the Spanish presence in return for the benefits of Christianity and civilization, Spain's colonial theory justified the control of the indigenous population by individual Spaniards. This control was effected through the encomienda system adopted in 1503. This system gave individual Spaniards the right to demand goods and services from the Indians under their jurisdiction and the obligation to oversee the welfare and conversion of those Indians.

Despite an active and well-publicized campaign to convince the Crown that the encomienda prejudiced the Indians' conversion, and therefore Spain's title to America, the missionaries never succeeded in reversing this concession to secular interests. Neither this failure nor the failure of their missionary
experiments, however, succeeded in undermining the Crown's official commitment
to the missionary cause throughout the colonial period.\textsuperscript{15}

The prime concern assigned to the Council of the Indies, the highest
authority on the government of the Spanish colonies, was:

\begin{quote}
... la conversión y doctrina, y sobre todo se desvelen y ocupen con todas sus fuerzas y entendimiento en proveer y poner ministros suficientes para ello, y todos los otros medios necesarios y convenientes para que los indios y naturales se conviertan y conserven en el conocimiento de Dios nuestro Señor, honra y alabanza de su santo nombre, de forma que, cumpliendo Nos con esta parte que tanto nos obliga y a que tanto deseamos satisfacer, los del dicho Consejo descarguen sus conciencias, pues con ello descargamos la nuestra.\textsuperscript{16}
\end{quote}

The authoritative compiler and commentator of Spanish colonial legislation,
Juan de Solórzano, described the theory behind the Crown's obligation to pro-
tect the Indians:

\begin{quote}
Y conociendo esta miseria de los Indios, y lo que por razon de ella necesitan de ser amparados, no se hallará cosa que más repitan, y encarguen infinitas Cédulas, Ordenanzas, y Provisiones Reales, que en todos tiempos para ello se han despachado, dándoles todos los nombres, ó epitetos de desventura que he referido, y ordenando, y mandando apretadamente, que se desvelen los Virreyes, Audiencias, Governadores, y Prelados en su defensa, y que este sea siempre su principal estudio, y cuidado.
\end{quote}

Solórzano quoted as typical the following instruction to the Council of the
Indies:

\begin{quote}
... provean lo que convenga para la conversión, y buen tratamiento de los Indios, de manera que en sus personas y haciendas no se les haga mal tratamiento, ni daño alguno, antes en todo sean tratados... y favorecidos como vasallos nuestros, castigando con rigor á los que al contrario hicieren, para que con esto los dichos Indios entiendan la merced que les deseamos hacer, y conozcan, que haverlos puesto Nos debaxo de nuestra protección, y
While the constant repetition of the Crown's benevolent intent towards the Indians in instructions to virtually all colonial officials and in legislation designed to control specific abuses may have relieved the Monarch's conscience, it did little to resolve the discrepancy between the damaging effects of the colonial system on Indian society and the avowed protective intent of that system.

On the contrary, by attributing protectoral functions to virtually all its colonial officials, and incorporating protectoral measures into the very institutions designed to facilitate colonial exploitation, the Crown transferred its own moral dilemma to every layer of its colonial bureaucracy. In most cases, the officials resolved this dilemma according to the Crown's own example, subordinating Indian welfare to their own personal economic advantage. The paternalistic ideas and policies espoused by the Crown could easily be applied both to justify and facilitate authoritarian control over the Indians.

From the missionaries' point of view the Indians' childlike nature and lack of appreciation for European values made it necessary to shelter them from the damaging effects which might result from their ignorant participation in Spanish-patterned social and legal relationships. One of the most radical Franciscans, Motolinía, carried this argument to its logical extreme to advocate the Indians' complete isolation from Roman law: "... porque toda ella es de los que non sunt sui sed alieni juris, y asi no les pueden cuadrar ni convenir las disposiciones del Derecho, el cual habla con los hombres que son capaces de el, y lo saben entender y pedir." Consequently the Indians
required not only paternal protection, but paternal authority to facilitate their conversion to Christianity: "... por ser esta gente tan misera y baja que si con ellos no se tiene toda autoridad, no se tiene ninguna, y si no los tiene muy debajo de la mano y sujetos, no hay mano para con ellos."\(^{19}\)

These arguments, developed initially to serve the missionary cause, were generalized to justify authoritarian control over the Indians not only by the colonial administration but by individual Spaniards as well.\(^{20}\)

There did, however, exist throughout the entire colonial period one institution specifically designed to prevent the transformation of the Crown's benevolent paternalism into tyrannical authoritarianism. The office of protector of the Indians was assigned the sole task of preventing and rectifying abusive treatment of Indians.\(^{21}\)

The Crown first conferred the title of protector of the Indians on religious officials, particularly bishops, ostensibly to reinforce with secular powers the religious authority they invoked in their attempts to prevent unjust treatment of Indians. Ximénez' appointment of Las Casas as Protector general de los indios, responsible directly to the Crown, was typical of these early appointments. A lack of clearly defined jurisdiction paralyzed the efforts of these protectors to act within the framework of the secular administration. Obliged to resort to their moral and religious suasion to carry out their Crown-designated obligations, these early protectors rekindled the colonists' resentment of clerical interference in what they considered to be purely secular matters. Thus the dual authority of the clerical protectors, rather than strengthening their influence, served only to exacerbate the antagonism between secular and religious interests over the
treatment of the Indians. The Crown attempted to reduce this animosity by transferring the official protectoral function to lay officials.

This measure was, however, far from being successful. Some lay protectors had already been appointed in order to compensate for the limitations that time and distance imposed on the clerics' ability to fulfill their responsibilities. Naturally these lay protectors became the objects of the same hostility directed towards their clerical superiors. Nevertheless by 1589 the position of protector of the Indians was definitively established as a fixture of the Spanish colonial administration.

As specified in the Recopilación de Indias the protectors' activities involved the discovery, verification and presentation to the appropriate authorities of cases in which the powerful abused their position to infringe upon the rights of the weak. For minor offences the protectors were empowered to levy fines or short prison sentences. This was a very limited power, however, since corregidores and members of Audiencias were exempt from this jurisdiction and accusations involving them had to be presented to the Audiencia or Viceroy respectively. In order to ensure the protectors every opportunity of gaining justice for the Indians, they were guaranteed access to higher authorities such as the Audiencia, Council of the Indies and the monarch himself.

Both political realities and the specific regulations of the Ordenanzas of Toledo tended to limit the powers of the local protectors in Peru, thereby creating two different kinds of protectors within the administration. The activities of the local officials were basically limited to settling minor complaints and authorizing business and legal transactions undertaken by
Indians while the protectors attached to the Audiencias handled complaints involving abuses by Spanish officials as well as claims to valuable lands or titles. The Ordenanzas made the authorization of the Audiencia, Viceroy or Council of the Indies an effective prerequisite to the imposition of solutions detrimental to Spanish or creole interests, reinforcing the limitations placed on the local protectors by the corregidores' and oidores' exemption from their jurisdiction.

Given the controlling influence which the corregidores had over all aspects of Indian exploitation in the eighteenth century, the Ordenanzas' designation of the corregidor as the first official to whom the protector should turn for the rectification of abuses seriously inhibited the ability of the local protectors to gain redress without recourse to the Audiencia. The Ordenanzas' designation of local officials whose lack of good will towards the Indians had been proven time and again, to execute sentences in favor of the Indians compounded the inability of the local protectors to achieve justice for Indian plaintiffs. Since the higher courts recognized the protectoral system as the only means through which common Indians could legally present appeals, the ineffectiveness of its local representatives provided a real barrier to the Indians' access to the judicial system.

This ineffectiveness no doubt contributed to the local protectors' abdication of their role as advocates of Indian welfare in favor of participation in the lucrative conspiracy of interests dependent on Indian exploitation. By the second half of the eighteenth century the local protectors' abdication of their role as Indian advocates was widely acknowledged and attested to by the Viceroy himself. Amat commented:
... los Yndios no pueden seguir sus demandas por los trámites del derecho, por no tener Abogados y Procuradores que se hagan cargo de sus defensas a vista de la miseria en que se hallan constituidos, ni es factible ocurrjan doscientas o trescientas leguas por veinte y cinco o treinta pesos, por los que son bejados y oprimidos. . . .28

The ineffectiveness of the local protectors in the eighteenth century meant that the protectors attached to the Audiencia, initially instituted to receive appeals and resolve serious cases, were left as virtually sole arbiters of the Crown's protectoral legislation within the colonial administration. Toledo had established three separate officials to carry out protectoral functions at the Audiencia level. One, the general protector, was responsible for preparing cases for presentation to the Fiscal, a Crown attorney, the Audiencia and Viceroy. The Fiscal, who in practice either doubled as or served as a superior to the general protector, with the assistance of another lawyer, considered the merits of the various cases and if necessary forwarded them to higher authorities for resolution. None of these three officials, however, had any judicial powers beyond those limited ones attributed to all protectors. As a result their influence was restricted to presenting the Indians' cases and making recommendations. The Fiscal was to present the pleas of Indians residing in the jurisdiction of the Audiencia to that court for resolution,29 present appeals from local protectors for the Audiencia's judgment, and finally to present cases to the Viceroy for resolution or furtherance to the Council of the Indies.30 The Audiencia was, therefore, the decisive judge of Indian cases unless the Viceroy deemed them worthy of consideration by the Council of the Indies.
The Audiencia's judgment was prejudiced by its members' familial and economic association with the individuals implicated in Indian exploitation. Although anyone having vested interests in colonial society was theoretically excluded from membership in the Audiencia, in practice the network of interests which linked judges to other colonial groups was widely acknowledged as the main cause of corruption in the Peruvian Audiencias in the eighteenth century. The Viceroy Amat protested to the King that this corruption was of such long standing and so firmly entrenched that only the replacement of the existing judges by new ones chosen precisely for their lack of interest in colonial society could hope to reestablish justice. The author of the Estado político described the Audiencia as the apex of a pyramid of corrupt officials who, for their own profit, encouraged legal disputes which were inevitably resolved to the advantage of the party whose resources reached the highest.

The corregidores took full advantage of this corruption by maintaining permanent representatives at the Audiencia to ensure that their influence outweighed that of their opponents, a particularly easy achievement when these were, like most Indian plaintiffs, virtually indigent. The Audiencia's control over Indian appeals was reinforced by its jurisdiction over repartimientos, one of the main sources of Indian grievances in the eighteenth century. This jurisdiction made it impossible for the Viceroy or the protectors to provide redress against abuses in the repartimiento system without the Audiencia's approval.

The subjection of Indian complaints to the interested judgment of the Audiencia resulted in justice being beyond the reach of individual Indians.
and enabled the Viceregal administration to thwart benevolent legislation with impunity. For example, the Audiencia of Lima repeatedly refused to post and enforce a royal order guaranteeing the Indians' right to join religious orders and be selected for positions in the ecclesiastical hierarchy. Similarly, the Audiencia arbitrarily denied an Indian appeal, supported by the protector and the official in charge of the provision of mita laborers, asking that the official wage scale for these laborers be enforced. Not only did the court refuse the Indians' request, but it attempted to forestall any appeal by ordering them to keep silent on the matter.

In the face of the corrupt judgments of the Audiencia, the Indians and their protectors had little recourse but to undertake expensive and time-consuming appeals to the Council of the Indies. Even these, however, could prove futile, since the Council's benevolence towards Indian claims was frequently more apparent than real. All too often that court left the implementation of its decisions or the determination of the exact nature of the redress granted to the discretion of the Audiencia with results that were all too predictable. As Montero suggested:

Què remedio puede darse en tan inmensa distancia, que no vuelva, a que informen de lo cierto Virreyes, y Audiencias? Si estos son los reos, como embiarán la confession de sus culpas? Quando llegue el caso, de que V. Mag. sea tocado de Divino impulso, y embie el remedio, se quezarán los Ministros, de que se les ha quitado el Poder.

In this way even the decisions taken by the Council of the Indies, theoretically the highest court of appeal and second only to the monarch in its authority over Indian matters, were dependent in practice on the arbitrariness of the Peruvian Audiencias. In the absence of corrective measures such a
The situation could only encourage further independence on the part of colonial administrators, further erosion of Spain's legitimate authority, and further transgressions of protectoral legislation.

The Audiencia's effective control over even the Council of the Indies' decisions on Indian appeals must have discouraged the making of appeals by all but the most idealistic and dedicated advocates of Indian welfare, a description which was far from being universally applicable to Peruvian protectors in the eighteenth century. In the first half of that century the protectors attached to the Audiencia of Lima were either concurrently or subsequently appointed judges of the Audiencia and, as such, were obviously subject to the same economic and social pressures which had led to the corruption of the Audiencia as a whole. In 1744 the caciques of Huarochirí described just how these pressures affected their efforts to gain redress against abuses committed by their corregidor:

... no emos alcanzado de los Oidores, siquiera el merecer ser oydos, los Procuradores de los Naturales ...; sobornados del corregidor no han querido firmar nuestros escritos ... pues determinaron los oidores ... contra el parecer del Fiscal Bilbao se dejasen nuestros capitulos para la residencia; resolucion que ellos mismos abominan quando governaba el de la Moncloa, diciendo que era contra justicia y orden de S. Mag. y viendonos sin amparo ni patrocinio de Protector Fiscal porque Don Juan de Peralta por el parentesco tan cercano que tiene con Don Miguel Nuñez y ser este quien favorece mas al corregidor ha sido en contra de nuestra justicia, y el que oy sirve la plaza de Protector Don Francisco de Rojas es su cuñado.

The protectors' ambition for advancement within the colonial bureaucracy and their effective subordination to the corrupt Audiencia rendered the official protectoral system (at best) powerless to eradicate abuses practised in the
interests of colonial exploitation. At worst, the protectoral system became merely one more institution which thrived on the very abuses it was designed to prevent.40

In the context of the dual secular-religious nature of Spanish colonial theory, the subordination of the highest echelons of the protectoral hierarchy to the Audiencias marks the final step in the gradual subordination of Spain's religious ideals to temporal ambitions. The balance and duality which Spain had struggled to maintain were irreversibly shattered as the real power of the colonial administration made a mockery of the Crown's benevolent intentions towards the Indians: "... aunque tienen los Indios, y V. Mag. Protectores, que los defiendan, y Fiscales, que miren el cumplimiento de las Leyes, si éstos, y los Supremos Governadores son los interessados en la desercion, y tienen utilidad en ella, quién avisa a V. Mag. de la ruina del Reyno?"41

A rhetorical question, but one to which the author himself provided a partial answer: "Qué Particular, desnudo de la Jurisdicion, y authoridad, será creido? Qué Apostolico Obispo, y Missionero, de los que han dado el grito, han conseguido el remedio?"42 Some members of the clergy did make considerable efforts to advise the monarch of the plight of the Peruvian Indians. The clergy had a legal as well as a moral obligation to foster the well-being of the Indians.43 In meeting these obligations, however, the clergy was hampered by two factors—the participation of a large number of its own members in illegal exploitation44 and the secular administration's tendency to view the Church's support of Indian welfare as a challenge to its own authority.
In Peru resentment of clerical sponsorship of Indian rights was rooted not only in the jurisdictional disputes involving early clerical protectors, but also in the missionaries' alliance with the Peruvian caciques in order to discredit the encomienda system. At the height of the debate over the perpetuity of the encomienda system Fr. Domingo de Santo Tomás, a close collaborator of Las Casas, had presented to the Crown an offer from the Peruvian caciques of a sum superior to any offered by the encomenderos if the King would agree to abolish the encomienda. This collaboration between the clergy and Indians not only set a precedent for future politically-motivated alliances, but also reinforced secular suspicion of the clergy's motives in forming such alliances. This suspicion continued to influence the administration's reaction to clerical championship of reformist ideals on behalf of the Indians throughout the eighteenth century.

The Church in Peru remained, throughout the colonial period, committed in theory to protectoral ideals and a number of clerics did attempt to use their religious authority to effect changes in the administration of Indian affairs. The Church's obligation to censure unjust treatment of Indians was incorporated into the rules for confessors drawn up by Fr. Jerónimo de Loaysa and adopted both by the Second Provincial Council of Lima held in 1567 and by the Jesuit order. These rules were included in turn in Fr. Alonso de la Peña Montenegro's *Itinerario para párcocos de indios*, available in several eighteenth-century editions.45

The case of Fr. Buenaventura de Salinas y Córdova demonstrates that the ideals of the early missionaries continued to inspire the actions of some members of the clergy in the seventeenth century and that these actions
generally had political repercussions. Fr. Buenaventura made his sympathy for the Indians publically known in his *Memorial de las historias del Nuevo Mundo Piru* ... in 1630. In the composition of this work, he drew on official archival sources as well as on memorials by a protector of the Indians, Domingo de Luna, by another early defender of the Indians, Juan Ortiz de Cervantes, and on the compendious works of Solórzano. In short, Salinas' theoretical knowledge of protectoral ideals was ample. In his *Memorial* Fr. Buenaventura described the oppression under which the Indians suffered in spite of voluminous legislation designed to ensure their freedom. Fr. Buenaventura went farther than the predictable condemnation of the administration's failure to enforce this legislation and placed the responsibility for the oppression of the Indians squarely on the shoulders of the Spanish monarch:

... el Rey, que duerme, se echa a dormir descuidado con los que les assisten, es sueño tan malo, que la muerte no lo quiere por hermano, y le niega el parentesco; deudo tiene con la perdicion, y el infierno. Reinar es velar. Quien duerme no Reina (dixo otra voz mas valiente que la mia), y Rey que cierra los ojos, dá la guarda de sus ovejas a los lobos. Y el Ministro, que guarda el sueño a su Rey, lo entierra vivo, no le sirve, porque lo infama; no le descansa, porque quando le guarda el sueño, le pierde la honra, y la conciencia: y estas dos cosas traen apresurada su penitencia, con la ruina, y desolación de los Reinos.

In 1635 Salinas, following the pattern set by the early missionaries, attempted to use his religious influence to remedy specific abuses which he claimed to have observed. In a sermon, preached at Cuzco in the presence of the corregidor and curate, he rebuked them for their treatment of the Indians. In a later description of these accusations, Fr. Buenaventura clearly revealed
his adherence to the ideal of the Crown as a representative of primitive Christianity:

... reprehendi lo que avia visto, afeando aquellos tratos por crueldes, tiranos, y vedados en los Corregidores, y en los Curas, no solo por la Ley de Dios, sino por tantas, y tan justas Cedulas, Instruciones, y Pragmaticas, dadas por tantos Reyes Catolicos, y un Real, y Supremo Consejo de las Indias, que con el mismo zelo, que tuvieron Christo, y los Apostoles, no consentian, sino que prohibian (como avemos dicho) con severissimas penas que se vendiesse la justicia, y se tratasse, y contratasse con la Doctrina Evangelica.

Fr. Buenaventura's outspoken sermon was attacked by the Bishop of Cuzco. In a protest to the Crown, the Bishop alleged that the sermon undermined the prestige of the Church and accused the Crown of ruling "tyranicamente." The Bishop's immediate concern, however, appeared to be the effects of Fr. Buenaventura's accusations on the Church's ability to raise funds. In view of the Bishop's earlier praise for Salinas' Memorial this may indeed have been the main motivation for his protest.

In spite of the Bishop's hostility Fr. Buenaventura's reputation within his own order was enhanced by his uncompromising stance. He received a promotion which necessitated his travelling to Spain and later to Rome. In conjunction with these projected trips he was appointed by the city of Lima and the Bishop of Lima to represent them in different matters. At the same time, however, the Crown acceded to the Bishop of Cuzco's appeals and ordered Salinas to appear before the Council of the Indies to defend his actions. Although Fr. Buenaventura won the confidence of its ministers and continued to be promoted until he was finally made Comisario general for New Spain, his political rivals still attempted to use his censure of the corregidor and
curate to discredit him. They were unable, however, to sway the opinion of the Council which, by granting Fr. Buenaventura the permission necessary for him to go to Mexico, once again affirmed its patronage of the protectoral cause.

As royal appointees, bishops enjoyed access to both the Council of the Indies and the Crown and some took advantage of their right to address these bodies to publicize Indian grievances. In 1695 the Bishop of Cuzco protested precisely the conditions which rendered the official protectoral system inaccessible to rural Indians:

Tengo por inexcusable y de mucha importancia las visitas generales de la Tierra, porque muchos vasallos de V. Mag. que se hallan retirados de las Reales Audiencias, y son pobres no pueden ocurrir pedir justicia a Vuestros Virreyes, y Oydores, así por la dificultad que les ofrecen las distancias, como por no tener medios para costear agentes y otros ministros de semejante ejercicio que no se mueven sin interés, y les sucede de ordinario no tener recurso en los corregidores, principalmente contra personas poderosas, a quienes estos atienden siempre o por utilidad, o por respeto, con que a estos pobres los tiene condenados su miseria a no lograr alivio alguno en las opresiones que padecen por no poderla solicitar: y siendo la Real Voluntad de V. Mag. que sean desagraviados no podrá conseguirse, sino en caso de salir un Ministro de Vuestra Real Audiencia a buscarlos a sus pueblos.50

A later Bishop of Cuzco pointed out this same situation in 1744 and stressed that the Indians considered clerical intervention the only possible means of bringing their plight to the attention of benevolent authorities.51 In another letter of that same year, the Bishop reiterated the point, made so many times by sixteenth-century missionaries, that the clergy's inability to control secular exploitation was detrimental to the conversion of the Indians:
... y aunque los curas y yo quisieramos poner algún remedio son tan absolutos que pasan los términos del respeto y atropellan hasta lo más sagrado; y valiéndose del espacioso título de Reales Tributos, no ay biolencia que no ejecuten; de que se origina no poder los curas sugetar sus filigreses al cumplimiento de los preceptos Divinos, porque los están ahuyentando, sabiendo que si ban a la iglesia, o a la entrada o a la salida, los an de prender y castigar.52

In the eighteenth century the clergy's advocacy of Indian rights was encouraged to some extent by the antagonism created amongst the clergy by the Bourbon administration's regalist policies. Both the secular and regular clergy were affected. Castelfuerte carried out a particularly vigorous and bitter campaign to bring the bishops under closer Viceregal control. The administration's consideration of a proposal to replace the regular clergy employed as priests in Indian communities with members of the secular clergy gained the animosity of the religious orders. The public execution of two Franciscans in 1731 further inflamed the members of that order against the administration. This antagonism and the mutual suspicion it engendered once again made the clerical advocacy of Indian protection a highly political issue. For the clergy, the defense of Indian rights could enhance their influence over the Indians as well as gain them the theoretical support of the Council of the Indies in their struggles with the secular administration. For the colonial administration, on the other hand, the clergy's support of Indian complaints provided a basis for accusing its members of subversion and constituted another argument for increasing secular control over the Church's activities.
An incident described to the King by the Marqués de Castelfuerte provides a clear example of the political factors involved in the clergy's championship of Indian causes in the eighteenth century. The incident came to the Viceroy's attention as a result of a complaint by the corregidor of Andahuaylas, Gregorio Ortiz de Landaeta. The curate of San Gerónimo, Gaspar de Prado y Manzanilla had, alleged Ortiz, encouraged the Indians to rebel against him in protest of his imprisonment of a cacique, Bernardo Otinaya, for failing to comply with the mita of Huancavelica. The corregidor complained to the Bishop about the curate's actions. The Bishop, however, far from taking corrective action, proceeded to excommunicate the corregidor and, according to Ortiz, tried to incite the Indians to further hostilities against him "con el ofrezimiento de que iba a redimirlos de la obligazion de los Tributos ..."

As further evidence of his solidarity with the curate, the Bishop then named him his personal secretary.53

In the Viceroy Castelfuerte's consideration of this incident, the essential question of justice and the transgression of benevolent legislation raised by the cacique's imprisonment was submerged beneath the overriding struggle for power between secular and clerical authorities. Nevertheless the incident is along with other clerical protests evidence of the dedication of some members of the clergy to the religious ideals which inspired Spain's colonial effort.

In spite of the failure of the official protectoral system and the association of much of the clergy with secular interests, both the official protectors and the clerics who championed Indian welfare managed to keep alive
the ideals of Las Casas and the early missionaries. The official protectoral system perpetuated the theoretical connection between the Crown's right to rule in America, its religious obligation and its legal recognition of the Indians as being free yet privileged and protected vassals. The Indians' clerical supporters, on the other hand, preserved the radical missionary ideal of the Church as authoritative arbiter of colonial society's relationship with the native population. The complex of benevolent ideals, theories and laws preserved both through the institutions and practices of the colonial administration and through the agitation of dedicated clerics formed a protectoral tradition which provided a ready-made vehicle through which marginalized caciques could express their own grievances and those of the Indian tributaries.
CHAPTER III

1 Silvio Zavala, "Ideario de Vasco Quiroga" in Recuerdo de Vasco Quiroga (Mexico, 1965), p. 55.

2 Constantino Bayle, El protector de indios (Seville, 1945), p. 11.

Even after 1550 when the Pope's temporal authority was denied by most authorities, rendering this justification irrelevant, Spanish legislation continued to reiterate it. See Lewis Hanke, The Spanish Struggle for Justice in the Conquest of America (Boston and Toronto, 1965), pp. 26 and 152. The main sources for the following argument are widely available and in order to avoid repetitious footnotes for facts and interpretations which are generally accepted as authoritative I refer the reader to the following works for corroboration: Hanke, Spanish Struggle for Justice and Aristotle and the American Indians—A Study of Race Prejudice in the Modern World (London, 1959), and John Leddy Phelan, The Millenial Kingdom of the Franciscans in the New World (Berkeley, 1956).


4 See Luis Weckmann, "The Middle Ages in the Conquest of America," Speculum, 26 (Jan. 1951), 130-141 for a discussion of the medieval elements in
the Spanish conquest.


6 Lubac, III, 355.

7 The *Postillae* were included in the following early editions of the Bible: Nuremberg, 1481; Venice, 1485 and Lubeck, 1494, and in later editions such as Lyon, 1590; Douai, 1617; Anvers, 1634 and Paris, 1660. For evidence of Nicholas of Lyre's acceptability as an orthodox commentator in Spain see Marcel Bataillon, *Erasmo y España* (Mexico and Buenos Aires, 1950), I, 33, 39 and 460; II, 41.

8 Francis Borgia Steck, "Christopher Columbus and the Franciscans," *The Americas*, 3 (1946-1947), 319-341, details the influence of Franciscans on Columbus' theories as well as the Franciscan participation in early expeditions (pp. 326, 327, 328, 332). Weckman notes traces of spiritual Franciscanism in Fr. Pedro de Gante (p. 327).

9 Bishop Stafileo at the Council of Rota in 1528 drew a similar analogy between the corruption of the Roman Church and the Biblical Babylon (Janelle, p. 47).

10 Quoted by Silvio Zavala in "La Utopía de Tomás Moro en la Nueva España" in *Recuerdo de Vasco Quiroga*, p. 34.


12 Francisco Solano, "Algunos aspectos de la política del Consejo sobre la organización de la Iglesia indiana en el siglo XVI" in Demetrio Ramos et al,
El Consejo de las Indias en el siglo XVI (Valladolid, 1970), p. 177.

13 Solano, p. 178; Phelan, p. 51.

14 Pedro Borges, "El Consejo de Indias y el paso de misioneros a América durante el siglo XVI" in El Consejo, pp. 182-185. Borges estimates the total number of missionaries sent to America in the sixteenth century at 5,150 (p. 188) while Solano (p. 178) places the number of Franciscans at 2,559.

15 Bayle, pp. 23-80. A real cédula of 1660 forming a Junta to consider the situation of the Indians in Peru is but one example of the Crown's legislation in favor of the Indians. This Junta was formed in response to a presentation made by Juan de Padilla, Alcalde de Crimen of Lima, on the abuses suffered by the Indians. León Pinelo at the time protector for the Audiencia of Lima, agreed on the general sense of Padilla's presentation, but insisted that the laws were adequate and their enforcement at fault. The Junta continued to function as an overseer of the enforcement of protectoral legislation. See Jorge Basadre, El Conde de Lemos y su tiempo (Lima, 1948), pp. 112-113;

"Memorial de D. Juan de Padilla," transcribed by Vargas, Historia, III, 391-420.

16 Recopilación, lib. 2, tít. 2, ley 8.

17 Solórzano, lib. 2, cap. 28, pt. 6 and 7.

18 Quoted by José Antonio Maravall in "La utopía," p. 225.

19 Quoted by Maravall in "La utopía," p. 221.

20 Solórzano, lib. 2, cap. 28, pt. 4. See also Estado político, p. 30:

"Estas Leyes fueron Santas, y lo son, si se cumplieran como V. Mag. las ordena; porque en quanto á lo primero, de obligar á los Indios á que trabajen, es una providencia Paternal . . . el modo es piadosisimo, porque está mandado, que sean bien tratados . . . pero el uso no es esto: porque lo que se practica, en
The details of the following description of the early protectoral system are drawn from Constantino Bayle, *El protector de indios*.  

21 *Recopilación*, tit. 5, lib. 6. See also Bayle, pp. 67-70.  


23 *Ordenanzas*, I, 246.  


25 *Ordenanzas*, I, 237.  


27 No study of the activities of the protectors of the Audiencia of Lima in the eighteenth century exists. Judging from the cases which I have seen in the *Archivo de Indias*, some protectors, such as León y Escandón, appear to have been more active than others. This may, however, have been partly due to the persistence of caciques and clerics in urging that appeals be forwarded to the Council of the Indies. One Indian source even treated the furtherance of complaints to Spanish courts as evidence of bad faith on the part of the protector, quite in contradiction to the belief that it represented a sincere effort to achieve justice for the Indians:

> Don Juan de Peralta, protector fiscal de los Naturales con su acos tumbrada impiedad no solo no nos patrocinio [sic] conforme a su obligación sino que le experimentamos contrario en todo hasta pedir que no fuesemos oídos en este reyno, determinando el virrey llevasemos nuestra causa al Real Consejo, asegurado de que nuestra pobreza no podia costear la saca del proceso ni el espíritu apagado del Indio tendría valor para llevar la contienda aun reino tan apartado de este. (Quoted by M. Colin, p. 73)

Protectoral appointments at the Audiencia level were certainly subject to irregularities. In 1720 a protector, López de Ceyza, was asked to withdraw and
return his salary. Later Tomás Brun, who figures in other documents as a protector who refused to act on the Indians' behalf, asked to be paid his protector's salary in Spain, but was refused. (AGI, Lima 438). In contrast to this evidence confirming the limited activities of Audiencia protectors in defense of the Indians, documents in the Archivo de Indias provide little information on the activities of local protectors. Since some Indian documents mention their existence and their failure to fulfill their functions, it seems logical to conclude that they were subject to the same corruption as other local officials. A study of documents in Peruvian archives would undoubtedly shed more light on the nature and extent of the official protectors' activities throughout the colonial period.

28 Amat, Memoria, p. 191; Noticias secretas, I, 317, 330, 331. The gist of virtually all Indian complaints seen by the Council of the Indies points to the local protectors' abdication of their obligations.

29 Ordenanzas, I, 260-261.
30 Ordenanzas, I, 263.
31 Manuel de Amat, "El Virrey Amat da cuenta al Rey de los defectos y vicios de organización del Virreinato del Perú--1762" in Revista de la Biblioteca nacional (Buenos Aires), 7 (1942), 346-347.
32 Estado político, pp. 10, 10v and 11.
33 Amat, Memoria, p. 303.
34 See p. 125 of this dissertation.
35 . . . y aviendose controvertido con los dueños de las haciendas, vistos los autos en la Audiencia de Lima, y lo que sobre [ellos] dixo el vuestro Fiscal, Protector General, e Informe hecho por Don Martín de Zamudio, a cuyo cargo estaba el repartimiento de los Indios (que
todo fue tan favorable, como arreglado a justicia) se declare, no aver lugar a la pretension de los Indios, y se les impuso perpetuo silencio en esta causa, mandando no se les admitiese mas pedimento: Esta determinacion, Señor, no la estrafiaron los Indios, a vista de que algunos Ministros, Corregidores, y parientes de los unos, y los otros son interesados en las Mitas y Reparticiones de Indios para los trabajos, en las haciendas que tienen, contra lo dispuesto por leyes, y Ordenanzas.

(Morachimo, Manifiesto [Idea, No. 27])

36 See p. 127 of this dissertation.

37 Estado político, p. 30v.

38 See Lohmann, Los ministros.


40 The sale of the office of protector, its small salary and the short tenure of the position all left it open to corruption. Bayle, pp. 105-108.

41 Estado político, p. 30.

42 Estado político, p. 30.

43 Recopilación, lib. 6, tit. 6, ley 14.

44 Luis Merino, Las Noticias secretas de América: Estudio crítico de las acusaciones de Ulloa sobre general relajación del clero colonial (1720-1765) (Washington, 1956), describes the various factors involved in the accusations of corruption amongst the clergy in eighteenth-century Peru, as well as the administration's attempts to force the ecclesiastical hierarchy to remedy this corruption.

45 Alonso de la Peña Montenegro, Itinerario para párrcos de indios (Madrid, 1668). Subsequent editions included the following: Lyon, 1678; Amberes, 1698, 1726, 1737 and 1754; and Madrid, 1771. See Hanke, Aristotle, p. 82.
Fr. Buenaventura de Salinas y Córdova, Memorial de las historias del Nuevo Mundo Piru: Meritos, y excelencias de la ciudad de Lima cabeza de sus ricos, y estendidos reynos, y el estado presente en que se hallan. Para inclinar a la magestad de su Catolico Monarca Don Felipe IV (Madrid, 1630).

The following discussion of Salinas is based on Warren Cook's "Fray Buenaventura de Salinas y Córdova Su Vida y su Obra," Revista del Museo Nacional (Lima), 24 (1955), 19-48.

47 Quoted by Cook, p. 29.

48 Quoted by Cook, p. 31.

49 . . . otras palabras escandalosas y malsionantes y que pudieran conectar los ánimos de los oyentes en deservicio de Su Majestad, y en particular en tiempo que instado de necesidades en que se hallaba por la defensa de la religión católica, está pidiendo donativos de sus vasallos á los estados eclesiásticos y secular, á cuya ejecución el señor Conde de Chinchón, virrey destos reinos, acude con el cuidado que es notorio, y Su Señoría Ilustrísima, de orden suya, actualmente lo está pidiendo á los clérigos deste obispado. (Quoted by Cook, p. 32.)

50 Letter of Bishop of Cuzco to King, transcribed by Colin, p. 214.


52 Letter transcribed by Colin, p. 516.

53 Letter of Castelfuerte to King, 11 Aug., 1727, AGI (Lima 425).
Documents in the Archivo General de Indias allow us to trace the development of a coherent and unified line of protest on the part of the Indian elite from 1708 through the 1730's. Initially, this protest consisted of appeals from the Indian elite of Lima for measures to forestall the loss of prestige and status which threatened to make the elite indistinguishable from the mass of urban Indians. In the 1720's, however, this type of appeal was combined with the advocacy of the welfare of oppressed rural Indians. Through these protests the Indian elite, by voicing the resentment and frustration of both urban and rural Indians, aimed to achieve reforms which would both improve the welfare of Indian society as a whole and reestablish the elite's position as privileged leaders. By expressing these aims through Hispanic legal channels and within the context of existing legislation the elite ensured their own participation in any benefits to be reaped from their reformist agitation. By invoking Hispanic sources to justify their proposals they gradually created a coherent ideology of reform based on protectoral ideals.

The caciques and Indian nobles residing in the vicinity of Lima enjoyed a relatively advantageous social position in comparison to the oppressed condition of rural Indians. Although our knowledge of urban Indian society in the eighteenth century is still fragmentary, there is some evidence to support the view that it differed considerably from its rural counterpart.1
proportion of the Indian population of Lima was composed either of artisans who, by virtue of their occupation, enjoyed exemption from the tribute and mita exactions levied on rural Indians or of immigrants from outlying areas, who were subject only to reduced exactions. As a result, the conditions which contributed to the caciques' influence in rural areas did not exist in Lima. Neither, of course, did the conditions which facilitated the corregidores' subjugation of both the tributaries and caciques in rural areas. The Indians of Lima had easier access to judicial channels of redress. As residents of the capital they could exercise their prerogatives of appeal to the Audiencia without the expense entailed in travelling or sending representatives long distances. Similarly, legal cases involving Indians resident in Lima were dealt with directly by the protector, foregoing the expense and futility of initiating legal procedures with local authorities.

Still more significant, however, was the greater Hispanization of urban Indian society. The Indian population of Lima, centered mainly in an area known as El Cercado, had constant contact with Spaniards, largely through their employment in trades and as vendors in the public plazas of Lima. The Cercado itself had an active Indian government patterned after Spanish municipal government. Indians occupied not only posts in this civic administration but also positions as notaries working closely with the protector of the Indians in approving business and legal contracts entered into by Indians. The Indian nobility formed its own military regiment and played an ostentatious role in Spanish ceremonial occasions. The artisan population was organized in Spanish-patterned guilds, and there is growing evidence that urban Indians enjoyed in
practice a number of privileges theoretically reserved for the Indian nobility and Spaniards. Slaves, horses, Spanish dress, and land holdings beyond the official allotments were common accoutrements of the relatively prosperous Indian population of Lima.

The Indian elite of Lima were in a good position to appreciate the situation of their rural counterparts. The Cercado was an obligatory stopping point for rural Indians heading for the Spanish city of Lima and particularly for caciques coming to present their cases to Viceregal authorities. Awareness of the plight of rural Indians was intensified during the 1720's and 30's by the imprisonment of a number of caciques in Lima, as a result of their attempts to gain redress against abusive corregidores, and by an influx of rural Indians fleeing from the depressed conditions of their native areas. The Hispanization of the Indian elite of Lima, combined with their relatively easy access to legal channels, and awareness of the widespread nature of Indian oppression all placed them in an excellent position to assume the leadership of a reform movement in the interests of Indian society as a whole.

The elite's interest in sponsoring such a movement was largely determined by their own gradual loss of status. The urban Indian elite no longer enjoyed a status easily differentiated as superior in wealth and privilege to that of the artisan population. On the contrary, the gap which separated the elite from the artisan population was narrowed as the luxuries theoretically reserved for the nobility became available to many members of urban Indian society. This development, also partially a result of the increasing impoverishment of the Indian nobility, threatened to effectively submerge the legally privileged
elite into the growing ranks of the urban Indian masses.

The ability of the Indian elite to maintain a superior economic position in relation to the Indian masses was limited in the first half of the eighteenth century by the economic crisis which affected Peruvian society as a whole. When neither traditional relationships between caciques and nobles and Indian tributaries nor Spanish-patterned economic activity proved adequate to halt the gradual erosion of the urban elite's prestige, they began to explore other means of reasserting their ascendancy over the Indian masses. By taking an active role in the defense of the interests of Indians of all ranks, the elite attempted to regain their prestige within Indian society and to win Spanish support for the reestablishment of the hierarchical structure of Indian society postulated by colonial laws.

Between 1708 and 1727 a total of twenty-eight members of the Indian elite put their signatures to one or more of four appeals directed either to the Crown or to Viceregal authorities. Five of these individuals signed two of these appeals and one man, Francisco Saba Capac Inga, signed three, indicating some continuity in leadership. This conclusion is supported by the common objective of all these appeals: to reestablish the prestige of the Indian elite through the implementation of the privileges granted the Indian nobility by Spanish law and secure the enforcement of measures designed to benefit the Indian masses.

In 1708 nine Indians petitioned the Crown in the name of "Los Naturales de este Reyno," demanding that Viceregal authorities be forced to publish a decree of 1697 issued in favor of the Indian nobility. This decree stressed
the equality of the Indian and Spanish nobility and expressly confirmed the Indian nobility's right to hold positions reserved to the nobility. The cardinal importance of the decree in providing a legal basis for the Indian elite's claims warrants its detailed consideration here:

By providing a common justification for the privileges of the Indian nobility and the free status of the Indian commoners this decree gave the Indian elite a theoretical basis for associating their own interests with the defense of oppressed Indians. As a result, demands for the publication of the charter of privileges became characteristic of the Indian protest movement.

At the same time, the decree of 1697 clearly established a theoretical link between the Indians' freedom and the subordination of Spain's colonial endeavour to a religious goal:
declarando de nuevo que atenderé y premiaré, siempre a los descendientes de Indios Gentiles de unos y otros Reinos de las Indias, consolándolos con mi Real amparo y patrocinio por medio de los Prelados Eclesiásticos y demás Ministros del Santo Evangelio, Virreyes, Audiencias y demás Gobernadores de todas las Ciudades, Villas y Lugares de aquellos Reynos, para que los aconsejen, gobierren y encaminen al bien principal del conocimiento de nuestra Santa Fe Católica, su observancia y Vida Política y a que se apliquen a emplearse en mi servicio y gozar la remuneración que en él corresponda al mérito y calidad de cada uno, según y como los demás vasallos míos, en mis dilatados dominios de la Europa, con quienes han de ser iguales en el todo los de una y otra América.

Thus the charter of privileges presented the legal rights of the Indian nobility and the freedom of the tributaries as marks of royal protection of the Indians. This interpretation provided the theoretical framework for the Indian reformist ideology, confining it within the boundaries of Spanish protectoral theory.

The petition of "Los Naturales de este Reyno" of 1708 set a precedent for the protestors' use of certain specific protectoral concepts to their own ends. For instance, by adopting the characterization of the Indians as inherently malleable and therefore easily abused as an argument for the implementation of protectoral legislation the Indian elite followed the pattern of protest established by sixteenth-century reformists. They blamed the miserable state of the Indians, not on their own docile character, but rather on the Spaniards' self-interested abuse of that character:

... las miserias que padecen por la infelizidad de su estado a que los a reducido la Violencia y codicia de algunos que inconcideradamente atropellando los fueros dela racon abusan de la mansedumbre, y rendimiento genial delos Yndios naturales de este Reyno.
The submission of this petition to the Crown by Indians clearly invalidated this generalization. Nevertheless, they continued to use it as the early missionaries had, to support their proposals for the Crown's benevolent intervention to control the relationship between Indian and Spanish society.

In 1711 thirteen caciques headed by Francisco Saba Capac Inga petitioned the Viceroy both for the implementation of the charter of privileges and for general reforms in the interest of Indian welfare. In support of their appeal, the authors cited the Crown's temporal interests as well as its protectoral intent. Stressing the services and loyalty rendered by the Indian elite to the Crown, the petition asked that the charter be proclaimed by public crier in order to combat the discrimination which kept the Indian elite from obtaining the just reward for these services. In order to bolster the effects of this proclamation, the Indians also called for the education of the Indian elite as provided for in the charter. The education of the Indian elite, the petition argued, would serve not only to make Indians eligible for office-holding, a prerequisite of which was the ability to speak Spanish, but also to combat the popular Spanish belief that Indians were incapable of understanding and dealing with European social and political concepts. The Indian petition urged that the Peruvian administration emulate the example of Mexico where they claimed that many Indians had, through education, been able to enter the clergy: "... se experimentará mucha actitud e idoniedad en los Sugetos para todos cargos concediéndoseles los estudios."

In conjunction with their advocacy of these specific measures designed to benefit the Indian elite, the petition of 1711 called for the implementation
of the Crown's benevolent intentions towards the tributary Indians. On the basis of the link established in the charter of privileges between the Indian nobility's privileged status and the tributaries' freedom, the petition likened the services rendered to the Crown by the Indian masses to those performed by the Indian nobility, suggesting that the Crown's protection of the tributaries was the corresponding reward for these services:

"... igualmente contribuyen a Su Majestad en sus Tributos, y en sus tandas personales uno de los mas utiles servicios a su corona, pues a la continuacion de su trabajo y obediencia conque se actuan en sus mitas, se trabajan las Minas, se labran los thesoros que este Reino fructifica, se cultivan los sembrados y son en todo para todo lo que mas sirven, razon y trabajo tan atendido que no ay tan repetido encargo como el del alibio que los muchos y reales despachos manifiestan."

The petitioners were swift, however, to qualify this apparently worldly conception of the Crown's protectoral role as simply a function of economic utility by subordinating it to the overriding religious considerations expressed in a letter written by Felipe IV in 1628. This letter echoed the radical view that lack of interest in the welfare of the Indians was not merely a failure of administration, but a sin against God and a threat to Spain's right to rule in America:

"... lo tengo de remediar, y mandaros hazer cargo de las mas lebes omiciones en esto; por ser contra Dios, y contra mi, y en total destruccin y ruina de esos Reynos, cuyos Naturales estimo y quiero sean tratados como lo merecen Vassallos que tanto sirven à la Monarchia y tanto la han engrandecido & ilustrado."

The letter of Felipe IV, like the charter of privileges, became a touchstone for Indian protest documents throughout the eighteenth century, serving to fix the theoretical basis of the Indian reformist movement firmly in Spanish
protectoral theory and radical religious ideals.

The petition of 1711 is important on a number of counts. It provided the basic theoretical orientation which all future protests were to follow. It also provided the outline of a specific program of reform which later protests followed and embellished. The petition's concern for the welfare of the Indian masses reaffirmed the Indian elite's use of protest in the name of the masses as a means of effectively reassuming its traditional role as leaders of Indian society.

The favorable opinion that the protector of the Indians rendered on the petition of 1711 encouraged the Indians' determination to seek reform through the protectoral system. Although the protectors, in keeping with their assigned role as advocates for the abused Indians, always supported the Indian appeals on paper, setting out the legal points on which they were based and often adding further theoretical justification for the Indians' position, this support seldom resulted in effective action. The recommendation of the protector, Isidro de Eceiza, that the charter of privileges be published as the Indians had requested, remained like most protectoral opinions, a matter of record and little more.

The response of the Crown itself to the petitions followed a similar pattern, maintaining the Indians' faith in the ultimate justice of Spain's protectoral system by responding to their petitions with dramatic orders for the implementation of protectoral measures. One such order was issued in 1722 in response to some further petitions organized by Saba Capac. These petitions combined the interests of urban and rural Indians, asking for
redress against specific grievances such as abusive repartimientos, illegal charges levied on the Indians who did business in the plaza of Lima, and the administration's failure to pay Indian soldiers for their services. The Crown ordered that these complaints be settled to the Indians' advantage and insisted on the enforcement of the many laws which had been established to prevent such grievances:

The Crown's order adopted a severe stand in respect to the abuse of Indians by colonial officials, ordering the Viceroy and the protector to give preference to the settlement of the Indians' specific grievances over and above any other consideration. Although the order placed the main responsibility for the protection of the Indians on the protector it charged the two Fiscales with fulfilling the protector's responsibility in case of his failure or incapacity:
In addition to encouraging the Indians' belief in the Crown's benevolence as contrasted to the exploitative attitude of the colonial administration, this order and others of a similar kind enlarged the body of protectoral legislation upon which the Indians based their appeals.

In 1724 Francisco Saba Capac Inga and sixteen other members of the Indian elite again petitioned the Viceroy for the implementation of the decree of 1697. The signatories of this appeal included caciques, mainly from the area around Lima, one principal from Cuzco, a number of officers of the Indian regiment, and four individuals of unspecified status. It is clear that the motive of the petitioners in advocating the publication of the decree was not so much one of furthering their social ambitions as of curtailing the deterioration in their prestige and status.

The appeal of 1724 was submitted in reaction to a specific incident, which threatened the Indians' status as free vassals of the Spanish Crown: the publication on 14 March 1724 of a Viceregal proclamation prohibiting the wearing of silks and fringes by Indians, mestizos, negroes, mulattoes and samboes. The obvious adverse effect of this prohibition on the Indian elite's ability to dress like Spaniards was insignificant in comparison to its other ramifications which far exceeded those of any mere sumptuary legislation. By applying to Indians and mestizos regulations designed for the enslaved castas the proclamation set a precedent for dealing with Indians and mestizos not on the same basis as free Spaniards, but as members of a subservient group bereft of even the basic human freedoms. The implications of this precedent were immediately recognized and challenged by the Indian elite.
In the petition its representatives pointed directly to the charter of privileges as proof of their equality to Spaniards as vassals of the Spanish Crown,

... sin estender Su Vassallaje al tratamiento de siervos, y esclavos, sino arreglandolo al conque se govierman y atienden a los Españoles en que solo los diferencia el color, como lo mandó el Señor Rey Don Carlos Segundo ... en la Real Cedula despachada en Madrid en doze de Marzo de mil seiscientos y noventa y siete.

The Indian elite perceived the proclamation as evidence of the gradual deterioration in their own status and wealth as well as of the transformation of Indian society as a whole into a servile class:

... aunque el agravio del tiempo con las calamidades comunes y estado miserable en que ha puesto la pobreza a nuestra Nacion, ha dejado solo esta real memoria para el agradecimiento, y para recuerdo del dolor, pues las cadenas conque honra con las Reales Armas, muchas de las casas de los Principales Indios se conservan en el Real Privilegio que guardan los interesados; y fuera cosa disonate el que personas tan recomendables quedassen expuestas al atropellamiento de qualquier inferior Ministro de Justicia, solo por su moderada descencia, aun no con el lustre correspondiente a sus obligaciones y calidades, igualandolos la generalidad con los siervos, y esclavos, o los libertinos descendientes de ellos, debiendo solo ser comprendidos con los Españoles, y los Indios Nobles y Cavalleros, con los Españoles Cavalleros y Nobles, por ser este el Real animo como lo determina la dicha Real Cedula en cuya Razon hablan los Titulos enteros de la nueva Recopilacion distintas, y varias Cedulas Reales, y todos los Autores Regnicolas.

The Indian elite considered the administration's refusal to observe the privileges of the Indian nobility as a contributing factor to a spiral effect by which the increasing subordination of Indian society to Spaniards rendered Indians even more incapable of asserting their rights and consequently more
easily subject to further subjugation. The only effective means of stopping this spiral was, in the opinion of the Indian elite, the intervention of the most powerful colonial authorities. By gaining the support of the Viceroy, Council of the Indies and the Crown itself, the Indian reformers believed they could reestablish Indian society as an equal and parallel counterpart to Spanish society in Peru. In keeping with this belief, their pleas for the retraction of the proclamation of 1724 were aimed at interrupting the downward spiral through the intervention of Viceregal authorities.

Again the protector and even the Viceroy gave theoretical support to the elite's demands. The protector recommended that the proclamation be retracted as far as it applied to Indians, and that the charter of privileges be published. On 9 May 1724 a Viceregal decree ordered that the proclamation be applied to Indians only in so far as it was to Spaniards and that the provisions of the numerous decrees granted for the Indians' benefit be upheld.

The failure of this decree to order the publication of the charter served, however, to offset this apparent victory for the Indians' cause. The administration's failure to implement the Viceregal decree further undermined this victory, and caused the Indian elite to address the Viceroy again in 1724.

In response to this second appeal, the Viceroy not only reiterated his order as to the proclamation's limitation but adopted a proposal, made by the Fiscal, to ensure that the Indians could effectively exercise their rights and privileges. Under this proposal, the Viceroy would send information as to the Indians' rights and privileges to the Indian Cabildos, or town councils, and request them to present an annual report on the state of Indian
society, with particular reference to the enforcement of protectoral legisla-
tion. On this occasion, the Indians' appeals achieved much more than the custom-
ary support in principle from the Viceregal authorities. The appeals elicited
from the Spanish a measure which actually encouraged and facilitated the
making of representations concerning Indian grievances by all sectors of
Indian society.

This one, slight success gave some justification for the Indian elite's
persistence in believing, despite all evidence to the contrary, in the
administration's protestations of benevolence. An unshakeable and absolute
faith in the ultimate justice of the Spanish regime characterized the Indian
reformist ideology from its inception until its death throes in the rebellion
of Tupac Amaru. In the 1720's, such a faith had perhaps more plausibility
than at any other time since not only did the petitions of 1724 secure one
real albeit slight concession from the Viceroy, but the Indian elite acquired
its own representative at the Spanish Court and could thus petition the Council
of the Indies and the Crown directly.

The name of this persistent and able representative was Vicente
Morachimo, "cazique de los quatro Pueblos de Indios, Santiago, Chocope, Cao,
y San Estevan del Valle de Chicama, jurisdiccion de la Ciudad de Truxillo."
His career as an advocate of Indian interests had begun some time before 1715.
Like the group of Indian petitioners headed by Saba Capac in 1711, he had
first sought to gain redress from the Audiencia of Lima for the usurpation of
Indian lands in his jurisdiction by intruding Spaniards. When the protector
refused to present the case, Morachimo, acting as agent for the Indians of
Chicama, then spent seven years in futile efforts to wring concessions from the Audiencia. Finally, having secured an appointment as procurador de los naturales from the Viceroy Santo Buono, Morachimo was able to go to Spain in 1721 to present the case to the Court in person.

He must have been an able and persistent advocate, since the Council of the Indies took a favorable view of the specific complaints he presented and, in 1722, ordered the Audiencia to proceed to their "desagravio," stating that "la primera diligencia avia deser ponerlos en posesion de las tierras de que se les hubiese despojado." Repetitions of this order in 1724 and 1725 indicate that it had brought little in the way of effective change, despite threats to take "una severissima resolución" against the protector involved. However, the very fact that the order was repeated indicates how effective Morachimo was in gaining the ear of the Council.

Morachimo's importance transcended his success in his own cases. He was a living example of and gave validity to the claim, made frequently on paper, of the identity of the interests of the Indian elite and the Indian masses. In the course of his advocacy of the rights of the Indians under his jurisdiction Morachimo gained a considerable reputation in Peru as a leader, serving as an example to other caciques and members of the Indian elite of how they too, by taking an active role in defense of the Indian masses, could regain their prestige within Indian society. Morachimo's continued residence in Madrid, where he lived until 1737, provided the Indian elite with an agent whose proven good will and influence served to further their cases before the Council of the Indies.
In December, 1724, for example, a group of petitioners, headed by Francisco Saba, enlisted Morachimo's services in order to present to the Crown the complaints made to Viceregal authorities in that same year: The association of Indians and negroes in the proclamation of 14 March, illegal assessments made on Indian merchants, and the administration's failure to publish the charter of privileges. Among several documents supporting these claims Morachimo presented to the Crown the 1708 petition of "Los Naturales de este Reyno" which, he claimed, had been withheld by the individual to whom it had been entrusted:

... aviendo hallado en esta Corte unos Memoriales firmados de algunos Indios Principales que avian remitido a VMgd, solicitando que las honras con que la catholica piedad de todos los Señores Reyes, y de VMgd, tengan el cumplimiento que se debe dar alo contenido enlas Rs.Zedulas, que hasta aora se han arrimado Âl olvido, por ser solamente en favor de aquellos Miserables Vasallos de VMgd.; Y teniendo el sobre encargo de otros Indios sobre este particular, presenta à VMgd el dho memorial que ha mas de 16 anos que ha estado guardado sinque la Persona que se encargo de presentarlo lo aya hecho en tanto tiempo. Morachimo's efforts reaped benefits for the Indian elite in the dispatch of a decree dated 28 January 1725 ordering the publication and implementation of the charter of privileges.

In a printed memorial presented to the Crown in 1724, Morachimo demonstrated his commitment to the interests of various groups within Indian society. This memorial integrated into a single complaint the various strands of Indian protest represented in Indian appeals made up to that time. By combining complaints over the Viceregal administration's refusal to settle the land claims of the Indians of Chicama and over the abusive mita demands in the
province of Loxa with demands for the implementation of the privileges of the Indian nobility and of the rights of the urban Indians, this Memorial created a precedent for the Indian elite's advocacy of the welfare of every sector of Indian society: rural or urban, noble or common.

Morachimo's printed memorial of 1724 is of equal importance for its discussion of the theoretical basis of the protection of Indian rights within the Spanish system. Morachimo definitively linked the question of Indian welfare with the radical view of protectoral ideals. He also identified the protectoral system itself as the prime vehicle through which the Indian reformists should work to improve the condition of Indian society. The following assertion by Morachimo could easily have come from the pen of any of the more radical sixteenth-century missionaries: "Es tan perjudicial a los pobres Indios la dicha vecindad de Espanoles." Morachimo attributed this damage specifically to a lack of protectors. He identified the ideal protector as a religious official with secular power to control the relationship between Spaniards and Indians, as exemplified by the Jesuit curates. This conception of the protector was, of course, identical to the one which had, prior to the secularization of the office of protector, guided the activities of the earliest religious protectors.

The fact that this concept of the protector as an official endowed with dual authority had been abandoned because it generated conflicts which undermined the Crown's colonial interests apparently went unrecognized by the Indian elite. In fact, Morachimo's description of the Jesuits, the only contemporary practitioners of this otherwise obsolete dual authority, indicates
that, on the contrary, the Indian elite perceived such dual authority as being in the Crown's best interest:

... cada uno de aquellos curas atiende a la conservación de sus Filigresses, procurando en los enteros de Mitas... que los Indios, que van numerados, se entreguen con la condición, de que han de volver precisamente con sus hijos, y mujer, dando satisfaccion el Azoguero, y Minero si fallece algún Indio... y faltando esta circunstancia, no se les dá otro en lugar del que no buelve a su casa, y con este buen régimen se halla V. Mag. bien servido, y el Pueblo mas aliviado, y sin el menoscabo de tributarios.  

The emphasis placed by Morachimo on the protectoral system was to be a decisive influence in the drafting of the next general appeal presented by the Indian elite to the Crown in 1726. Morachimo's printed memorial of 1724, together with the decrees of 1725, had been forwarded to the Indian petitioners.

The protesters in turn presented these documents to the Viceroy but, in May, 1726, advised Morachimo of their failure to secure the implementation of the orders. Taking their cue from Morachimo's memorial of 1724 their letter to him placed a large part of the blame for this failure on the protector's lack of interest:

Don Santiago Barrientos, a nada saca la cara por mucho que del nos emos Valido Solo sirve de responder en las Vistas y eso Con mucha Tibiesa y contemplacion como lo hizo enla Zedula de honores esto es teniendo en supoder la Rl Cedula que habla con el enque solisite el desagravio de los Indios.

In a similar vein, identifying themselves as "Los Indios Casiques y Principales delos Contornos de esta Ciudad de Lima Corte de los Dilatados Reynos del Peru," and writing on behalf of Indian society as a whole, "nuestra Pobre humilde y Miserable Nacion," the Indian elite formally addressed the
Crown in the petition of 1726 mentioned above. Adopting a collective voice, they identified the interests of all Indians with those most oppressed:

... se hace Imposible, el poder referir los [agravios] que padecemos corporal y espiritualmente padece el Cuerpo Sr, Las Continuas Tareas âque nos dedican, y si estas no Cumplimos como Deseamos somos Oprimidos con careseles y asotes con Argollas y Cadenas enlos Òbrajes y minas sin Distintibo de la Noblesa y Plebe de los yndios ... y lo que mas siente el Alma es lo poco que se Cuida de los medios para su Salbacion.

Like Morachimo, these authors attributed the sorry plight of Indian society primarily to a lack of dedicated protectors: "Continuamente temimos Biendnos sin Protector ni persona que se Dedique como se deve y Vuestra Magd. lo tiene Mandado, y dispuesto para atencion de Nfas Causas." According to the petitioners, the ineffectiveness of the existing protectors had created a situation in which the Crown's benevolent legislation served primarily as a pretext for the oppression of Indian society:

Siempre nos Vemos âbatidos y Mantenidos el estado que la malicia, desde los primeros Descubrimientos de las Yndias, Nos procuró Constituir, privandonos dela Educacion Politica, y Cibil, para Mantenernos en miserable servidumbre de esta, la Rl. munificensia de V. Mag.

Accordingly, the Indian elite perceived the Indians' current condition in terms of the sixteenth-century polemic between religious and secular interests over the treatment of the Indians. Their view of the state of Indian subjugation in the eighteenth century as fulfilling the worst fears expressed by the early missionaries is a common one in Indian protest, often conveyed by the image of a world in reverse, where everything serves a purpose opposite to that which was intended.
The Indian petitioners of the 1720's gave very high priority to the efficient functioning of the office of protector since they saw its effectiveness as the key to the reestablishment of Indian society as a free and equal partner in the two "republics" which constituted colonial Peru. This emphasis on the protectoral office led the Indian elite to request in the 1730's that the office of protector be held by Indians. The Indian protests directed to the Crown in the 1720's all stressed the failure of the existing protectors to fulfill their obligations and Morachimo's advocacy of Indian welfare lent credibility to proposals in the 1730's that Indians act as protectors. The obvious grasp of Hispanic values and legal theory shown in the Indians' protests negated what was the main reason for reserving the office of protector to Spaniards: the Indians' inability to recognize and pursue their own best interests.

The impact of Morachimo's advocacy of the welfare of Indian society, continued in 1732 in his Manifiesto de los agravios, bexaciones, y molestias que padecen los indios del reyno del Peru, was strengthened by the arrival in Spain of another representative of the Peruvian Indians, Pedro Nieto de Vargas, a former Alcalde del Crimen of the Audiencia of Lima. Although not himself an Indian, Nieto had served as a representative of Indians in Lima throughout the 1720's, often forwarding their cases to the Crown via Morachimo. In Spain as "Diputado de los Indios del Reyno del Perú" between 1732 and 1734 Pedro Nieto wrote a memorial to the Crown describing with the most calculated understatement he could manage the Indians' fear that the benevolent decrees issued at Morachimo's behest had suffered the same fate as earlier royal orders:
... les dicta la experiencia un justo rezelo de la duración de sus agravios, peligando el Real justificado intento de V. Mag. en tan inmensas distancias, de tanto pielago, que hacen mitigar en los executores, el ardor fervoroso de las Reales determinaciones de V. Mag. ya porque forzandolas la necesidad a passar por tan varios, y estranos conductos para su ejecucion, pierden la pureza de su dichoso origen; ya por padecer naturalmente las cosas no pequeno vicio, quando no es facil acordar, y unir la influencia a la produccion. No es este nuevo pensamiento del Suplicante, quando lo tiene executoriado el tiempo, por medio de repetidas demostraciones.31

This point, however, is merely the introduction to Nieto's main argument: the necessity of Indians acting as their own protectors. Nieto pointed out that the Indians had begun appointing unofficial defenders from amongst their own ranks as a direct result of Morachimo's success. He further argued that the Indians' willingness to occupy the office of protector, coupled with the considerable abilities and education of many noble Indians, made the continued employment of Spanish protectors unnecessary:

Oy, Senor, se hallan aquellos Naturales reducidos a vida política, y sociable, cuyo defecto, por las ya dichas Ordenanzas del ano passado de 1575 (tiempo en que aun duraban aquellas conquistas) se les pudo haver negado este consuelo; pues como personas rudas, y barbaras, difíciles de reducir a la sociedad de las gentes, tenían la inaptitud bastante para darles Curadores, y Defensores; cuya razón enteramente, falta en los tiempo presente, en que de aquellos Naturales ay sugetos aplicados a la Jurisprudencia, y demas facultades, y ciencias, e instruidos en sus leyes municipales, costumbres, y practicas de aquellos Juzgados.32

Nieto's arguments were referred for an opinion to the Fiscal of the Council of the Indies who reported that Indians were indeed eligible for appointment as "defensores particulares de las ciudades, villas y lugares de aquel Reyno," but not as general protectors at the Audiencia level.33 This
opinion was evidently communicated in some way to the Indians in Peru, for it formed the basis of at least one Indian's request for appointment to the position of protector.

This request was made in a petition presented by Morachimo in 1737 on behalf of Hilario García Llaglla. The petition is particularly interesting for the way in which it highlights the Indian elite's view of the protectoral role as a means of regaining the prestige due to them as nobles. García, who claimed to be a descendant of Thopa Inga Yupanqui and Huaynacapac, appears to have been the epitome of the dispossessed Indian noble. The petition made it quite clear that the office of protector was the very least reward due to García Llaglla in view of the nobility and services of his ancestors. By first setting out García Llaglla's right to a mayorazgo and a caciqueship, the petition presented the granting of the position of protector as a minor concession or gesture through which the Crown could demonstrate its gratitude for services rendered. García Llaglla claimed that ill treatment by Spaniards had forced his ancestors to abandon a mayorazgo granted to them in Cuzco by Charles V. In spite of this misfortune his family, having fled to Chucuito, had managed to obtain a caciqueship which his father exercised at the time of the petition.

The petition clearly demonstrates, however, that García Llaglla's aspirations to the office of protector were determined, to some extent at least, by the salary it carried. The petition boasted that García Llaglla's father was "exerciendo el cargo de Cazique Governador y Alcalde Ordinario . . . sin mas galardon ni salario que su aplicazion por solo fomentar patrocinar y mantener a los Indios." Such altruism may not, however, have been altogether
voluntary and the petition, by requesting that García Llaglla be given the post of "Protector de los naturales de dicha provincia con el salario que otros Protectores han tenido," clearly indicated that he had no intention of following in his father's footsteps in this regard.

Since this petition clearly fell within the bounds of the Fiscal's opinion sanctioning the appointment of Indians as protectors on a local level, the Council of the Indies referred it to the Audiencia of Lima for resolution. The fact that most referrals of this sort resulted in little benefit to the Indian appellants, together with later Indian references to the Audiencia's failure to implement the recommendation that Indians be appointed protectors, indicate that, not only was García Llaglla probably denied the opportunity of serving as protector, but that the Fiscal's recommendation in favor of Indians serving as protectors was never put into practice. García's petition does, however, provide proof that at least some members of the Indian elite did attempt to improve their social standing by serving in positions such as that of protector.

Nieto de Vargas' memorial, quite apart from the contribution it made to the Indians' attempts to take a more active part in their own protection, served to strengthen the Indian reform movement's reliance in its abstract argument upon sixteenth-century protectoral theories. Nieto's arguments reiterated not only the elite's dependence on the charter of privileges as evidence of the Crown's benevolent intent toward the Indian nobility but also their claim that the misapplication of protectoral legislation constituted a prime cause of the depressed state of Indian society. At the same time Nieto
carried the association between Indian reform and radical religious ideals further than any earlier appeal had done.

Nieto attributed the negative effects of the Crown's protectoral legislation to the temporal interests of the colonial administration. In so doing he set up a clear distinction between the advocates and abusers of protectoral legislation, contrasting the religious idealism of the former to the irreligious self-interest of the latter:

... pues no ay clausula en sus Reales determinaciones, que no respire amor, compassion, y piedad, y que no les imponga en nuevo vassallage, passando à esclavitud su reconocimiento; pero los Ministros, que son los conductos por donde se dirigen las piedades de V. Mag. se convierten en arcaduces, que vician sus Reales intentos; pues no ay Decreto que mire à la conservacion de los Naturales; que no sea motivo para su mayor ruina, convirtiendo lo sagrado en lo sacrilego de sus injustas operaciones: proviniendo esta injuria de la luz del oro, que deslumbra las intenciones mas justas.  

In these lines Nieto suggests an apocalyptic image of the world in reverse which is quite in tune with the radical religious belief that secular society represented the fulfillment of the disasters prophesied through the Biblical Babylon.

Nieto emphasized that Spain's missionary role provided the theoretical basis for the Indians' voluntary submission to the Spanish Crown. He referred to history as witness to the fact that Spain's rule in Peru fell far short of fulfilling the obligations entrusted to the Spanish Crown: "... hallará V. Mag. en sus Chronicas, que no tuvieron leve motivo las Plumas estrangeras, para afear en nuestra Nacion una de las facciones mas floriosas, que aclama el universo entre sus descubrimientos."  Furthermore he invoked the testimony of early missionaries and protectoral advocates to support this accusation:
"... mereció la lastima de los mas doctos, sabios, y piadosos Escritores, que tocaron con la misma experiencia, y mas inmediatez las expresadas vexaciones, y agravios." In this way Nieto drew an analogy between the sixteenth-century polemic over Indian welfare and the eighteenth-century Indian reform movement, an analogy which was supported not only by a similar conception of the protectoral system, but also by increasingly similar theoretical arguments.

Nieto argued for reform in the administration of the Indians as a necessary measure to fulfill Spain's divinely appointed mission in America, describing that mission in terms reminiscent of the prophetic interpretation of Spain as the chosen nation of the New Testament:

Y aun fue notable observación de mas erudita Pluma, que la gloria de esta hazaña, fue particular cuidado de la Divina Providencia, reservarla á los augustos predecesores de V. Mag. y á la Nación Española; porque si aquel descubrimiento lo emprendiera otra Nación, estaba expuesto á peligrosas, y mayores contingencias; á la ejecución, por la remisión de los Conquistadores, á la Fé, por los errores de sus Sectas; y para que esto se obrasse por Nación igualmente valerosa, que Catholica, era necesario fuese por la Española, que en las sinceridades la de Religion conserva su pureza. De las otras Naciones, unas por remissas, y de menos ardimiento, y otras por menos puras en la Fé, se pudiera temer el efecto, que Dios pretendía en esta conquista: España juntaba el valor, y la constancia con la pureza de sus Dogmas; qué mucho que fuese la escogida?

Nieto's allusions to the purity of Spain's religion bring to mind the reformist orientation of the early missionaries. This association is reinforced by the writer's use of the image of Columbus seeking support for his spiritual vision of the New World and finding it only in Spain:

Para cuyo pensamiento, Señor, nos dà no sè si superior, o mysterioso motivo los mismos intentos del successo:
pues consta, que Christoval Colón anduvo peregrinando por tantas, y tan varias Naciones, y Reynos buscando quien le ayudase ... y sola España pudo cooperar a ella.40

By employing these associations to support his arguments for administrative reform, Nieto seems to be assigning to Spain the dual religious role envisioned for her by the radical missionaries: the conversion of the American natives and the establishment of a pristine form of Christianity as the ruling principle of colonial society.

The various Indian protests presented to the Crown through Vicente Morachimo and Nieto de Vargas laid the theoretical basis for the development of the Indian reformist ideology throughout the 1740's. The dependence of these early protests on the charter of privileges as a basis for both the freedom of the Indian masses and the privileged status of the Indian elite committed the Indian protesters to a loyalist position towards the Spanish Monarchy. This loyalism was maintained through the elite's continuing use of the protectoral system as a means of eliciting reformist measures.

The protectoral system was, however, a paradoxical vehicle for the elite's sponsorship of Indian welfare. Since their very efforts to defend their fellow Indians against abuses of power directly negated the legal definition of Indians as minors, incapable of recognizing and pursuing their own best interests, the elite's advocacy of Indian welfare signalled the obsolescence of the whole protectoral system based on this definition. The elite's dedication to working through the protectoral system can only be explained as one of self-preservation. Through the continuation of the protectoral system, the Indian elite could ensure the perpetuation of Indian
society as separate and parallel to Spanish society in Peru and, within this separate society, the perpetuation of the hierarchical structure ratified by Spanish law. This structure assured the elite's monopoly of the privileges and influence which could be derived through their occupation of the role of intermediary between the two societies. The elite was attempting to reestablish itself in that role during the 1720's and 1730's by claiming to represent and express the interests of Indian society as a whole.
There is no adequate study of urban Indian society and the following description is based largely on inferences made from Indian protest documents and from the information presented by Emilio Harth-terré in *Negros e indios—un estamento social ignorado del Perú colonial* (Lima, 1973), as well as on the comments made by Karen Spalding in *De indio a campesino* (Lima: Instituto de Estudios peruanos, 1974), pp. 173-183, and Vargas Ugarte, *Historia general del Perú*, IV, 253-256.

According to a letter to the Viceroy forwarded to the Crown by Nieto de Vargas, five caciques, including the author, José Choquihuanca, found themselves imprisoned in Lima as a result of having attempted to gain redress against excessive repartimientos. Letter of José Choquihuanca to Viceroy, 6 Sept. 1727, AGI (Lima 495). "Los Casiques Principales y Governadores delos Terminos de esta Ciudad, por si y en Nombre del comun de Indios existentes en ella" noted "la facilidad que se prienden a los yndios que Vayan a pedir Justicia, de los agravios y Extorciones que padecen de Correxidores y de sus Thenientes, y estas priciones se ejecutan por medio de agentes y apoderados de dhos Corregidores."

Signed copy, dated 6 September 1727, of petition originally directed to the Viceroy on 23 December 1726, AGI (Lima 495).

Petition to Crown [1708], AGI (Lima 438). Hereafter cited as petition of 1708, the signatories of this petition were Francisco Esteban Montero,
Cristobal Asmare, Pablo de la Cruz, Pedro Valentin, Francisco Chuqui paucar Atauchi Ynga, Felipe Ysidoro Colquiruna, Juan Bautista Cinchiguaman [Lorenzo?] Avendaño.

Copy of petition to Viceroy [October, 1711], AGI (Lima 495). Hereafter cited as petition of 1711, its signatories were: Domingo Chayguac, Francisco Paulli Chumbi Saba Capac Inga, Lazaro Poma Inga, Juan Carlos Acasio, Bartholome Rodriguez Apoalaya, Francisco Chuqui paucar, Salvador Puycon, Juan Navarro, Joseph Anastacio Pacheco, Juan Poma Inga, Nicolas Galindo, Juan Gonzales Cargua Paucar, Antonio Gomes Vilca Guaman.

Copy of petition to Viceroy [between 15 March and 1 April 1724], AGI (Lima 495). Hereafter cited as petition of 1724, its signatories were Francisco Saba Capac Inga, Juan Ucho Inga Tito Yupanqui, Joseph de la Cueva Tito Guascar Inga, Ventura Songo CasiGualpa, Pasqual Casaamusa y Santillán, Pedro Panta Chumbe, Sebastian de los Reyes, Salvador Puycon, Lorenzo de Abendaño, Carlos Acasio, Joseph de Castro, Jazinto Chumbi, Blas Calderon, Rodrigo Gago, Alonzo Condor Poma, Ramon de la Rosa.

Petition to Crown, 13 May 1726, AGI (Lima 495). Hereafter cited as petition of 1726, it was signed by Joseph Tibursio Parral Chimo Capac Ligua Geoquel, Francisco Atun Apo Cuismango Saba Capac Ynga, Lorenzo de Abendaño, Domingo Chayguac, Andres del Peso Carbajal Caxa Paica, Salvador Puicon.

4 Petition of 1708.

5 I am quoting from the first printed edition of this decree (1766) reprinted in Rubén Vargas Ugarte, Impresos peruanos publicados en el extranjero, Biblioteca peruana, VI (Lima, 1949), 127.
The original version "Real Cédula que se considere a los descendientes de caciques como nobles en su raza," Madrid, 26 March 1697, can be found in ed. Richard Konetzke, *Colección de documentos para la historia de la formación social de Hispanoamérica* (1493-1810) (Madrid, 1953), III, 67.

6 Petition of 1711.

7 Quoted in petition of 1711.

8 Copy of opinion of protector Ezeiza, rendered in Lima, 26 October 1711, AGI (Lima 495).

9 Copy of real cédula of 31 March 1722, AGI (Lima 495). Since I have been unable to identify precisely the appeals to which this decree refers, my description of them is based on the references in the decree itself.

10 Petition of 1724.

11 Copy of opinion of the protector, Barrientos, rendered in Lima 27 April 1724, AGI (Lima 495).

12 Copy of memorial to Viceroy, 27 June 1724, AGI (Lima 495).

13 Copy of Viceregal decree, 17 July 1724. Copy of opinion of Fiscal rendered in Lima 3 July 1724, AGI (Lima 495).

14 Vicente Morachimo, Señor, Don Vicente Morachimo, Cazique de los quatro pueblos de Indios, Santiago, Chocope, Cac, y San Estevan del Valle de Chicama, jurisdiccion de la Ciudad de Truxillo, Reyno del Perú, por sí, y por los referidos quatro Pueblos, de que fue nombrado Procurador por el Virrey, puesto a los Reales pies de V. Mag. dice: Que viene quatro mil leguas de aqui, no tanto por su propio interés, quanto por hacer presente a V. Mag. el desamparo total de los miserables Indios, y la tyrania con que generalmente son tratados de todos los Ministros Españoles, y en especial de los Visitadores [Madrid, 1722],
5pp., AGI (Lima 437), hereafter cited as Morachimo, 1722.

15 Morachimo, 1722, p. 5.
16 Morachimo, 1722, p. 1.

17 Copy of instructions to the Audiencia of Lima for the redress of grievances over the usurpation of Indian lands, 1722, AGI (Lima 437).

18 Instructions "Para Despachar un memorial de Dn. Vizente Morachimo" [1724], AGI (Lima 438).

Copy of real cédula issued 27 January 1725, AGI (Lima 495).

19 Copy of real cédula, 27 January 1725.

20 For instance Blas Caxiamarca Condor Guanca wrote to Morachimo on 7 March 1737, saying that he had seen many letters written by Morachimo to his relatives and friends in Peru and had decided to take advantage of Morachimo's influence to present his own case. Letter in AGI (Lima 495). There are numerous similar letters by Indians to Morachimo in this location.


22 Letter from Morachimo to Crown, AGI (Lima 438). [January 1725].

23 Copy of real cédula issued 28 January 1725, AGI (Lima 495).

24 Vicente Morachimo, Señor, Don Vicente Mora Chimo Capac, Cacique principal de los Pueblos de Indios Santiago, San Pedro, y San Pablo de Chocope, Santa María Magdalena de Cao, y San Estevan, en el Valle de Chicama, San Salvador de Manciche, y Puerto de Guanchaco, todos de la Jurisdiccion de la Ciudad de Truxillo, y Procurador General de sus Naturales, por nombramiento del Gobierno superior del Reyno del Perú, usando de la facultad de este titulo, por sí, y en
nombre de dichos Indios, se pone a los Reynos el año de 1721. a pedir justicia contra Don Pedro de Alsamora, Visitador de Tierras [Madrid, 1724], 6 pp., hereafter cited as Morachimo, 1724.

25 Morachimo, 1724, p. 4v.
26 Morachimo, 1724, p. 4v.
27 Letter to Morachimo, 12 May 1726, AGI (Lima 495).
28 Petition of 1726.
29 Vicente Mora Chimo Capac, Manifiesto de los agravios, bexaciones y molestias que padecen los indios del reyno del Peru, dedicado a los señores de el real, y supremo consejo y camara de Indias. Por el procurador, y diputado general de dichos indios [Madrid, 1732].
31 Pedro Nieto de Vargas, Señor. Don Pedro Nieto de Vargas, Diputado de los Indios del Reyno del Peru, en virtud de sus Poderes Generales, felizmente exaltado baxo de los Reales pies de V. Mag. dice: Que por el año pasado de 1732. expuso a la docta, y justificada censura de los Ministros de V. Mag. en su Real Consejo de las Indias, un breve resumen de los agravios, que padecian los Indios de aquellas Provincias [Madrid, 1734], p. 1. As its title indicates this document was printed as a follow-up to the presentation made by Nieto de Vargas to the Consejo de Indias in 1732. This fact, together with other internal evidence, indicates that the printed memorial contains the same arguments as Nieto made to the Consejo in 1732.
32 Nieto, p. 4v.
33 Fiscal's opinion rendered in Madrid, 3 November 1732, AGI (Lima 440).
34 Petition of Hilario García Llaglla, AGI (Lima 441).
35 "Representación" in Calixto, p. 21; Nieto, p. 1.

36 Nieto, p. 2.

37 Nieto, p. 1v.

38 Nieto, p. 2v.

39 Nieto, p. 1v.

40 Nieto, p. 1v.
CHAPTER V

Radical Reform: The Representación verdadera

While the 1730's saw the development of an Indian protest movement in which the Indian elite took a leading role, petitioning the Spanish Crown in restrained and supplicant tones, the 1740's witnessed a number of new developments in the reform movement. While it retained the same goals, it developed a more coherent plan for achieving its aims. The movement adopted a more radical tone and language to express its increasing discontent with the existing administration. At the same time the movement gained a new leader, Fr. Calixto Tupac Inga.

Fr. Calixto was destined to play, in the protest movement of the 1740's, much the same role as Morachimo had played in the 1720's and 1730's. A mestizo, Fr. Calixto claimed to be a direct descendant of Tupac Inga Yupanqui and he was accepted as such by the caciques as well as by Spaniards and creoles. He had come to Lima as early as 1727 when he was admitted to the Franciscan Order in the low rank of a "donate." From 1736 onwards, he travelled extensively in Peru as a missionary. This experience gave him ample opportunity to evaluate at first hand the plight of rural Indians throughout Peru.¹ He also had personal experience of the discrimination which prevented the Indian elite from exercising their noble prerogatives. Although the charter of privileges specifically stated that noble Indians should be allowed to enter the clergy and be ordained as priests, the Franciscan Order refused to promote Fr. Calixto
beyond the rank of donate, a position which prohibited him from serving as a priest. These circumstances placed Fr. Calixto in an excellent position to represent both the interests of the Indian masses and those of the Indian elite and his activities demonstrate that he was an able and dedicated advocate of reform.

Fr. Calixto's career as an Indian representative began almost by chance. In 1744 the Franciscan Order in Peru selected him to accompany Fr. José Gil Muñoz, Commissary of the missions of Cerro de la Sal, on his journey to Spain in order to plead for greater support for the missions threatened by the rebellion of Juan Santos. The Indian Cabildo of Lima saw in the appointment of these envoys the opportunity to have Indian interests represented in Spain by individuals whose status as missionaries guaranteed them a hearing by the Council of the Indies. The Indian Cabildo gave official authority to both Fr. Calixto and Fr. José Gil to present on its behalf yet another petition for the publication of the charter of privileges. As it happened an unfortunate error in navigation and the subsequent ill health of Fr. José Gil forced the two friars to remain in Guatemala and they never managed to present the petition.

On his return to Peru, Fr. Calixto renewed his contact with the Indian Cabildo of Lima and continued to maintain this contact either personally or, when his work took him away from Lima, through his fellow Franciscan, Fr. Juan de San Antonio. Fr. Calixto was in Lima in 1748 during the festivities in honor of the coronation of Ferdinand VI. The coronation of a new Monarch would inevitably bring about thoughts of innovation and reform and two specific events prompted the Indian elite of Lima to give serious consideration to the possibility of renewing their appeals to the Crown.
On one hand the Indians had played a prominent part in the celebrations in Lima of the coronation and the display which the Indian nobles had made in the ceremonial procession evidently renewed their pride in their dependence on the Crown:

Señor, esta lealtad se probó, segunda vez, en el año de 1748, en las plausible fiestas que en la Ciudad de los Reyes, Corte del Peru, hicieron vuestros indios, en los días 21 y 22 de Febrero ... se llevaron el primer lugar en la pública aclamación no vulgar y popular sólo, sino muy cierta, discreta y crítica; de que ... fueron los más plausible, lucidas, alegres, grandes, majestuosas, augustas, reales, pomposas, heroicas suntuosas y magníficas que se han visto en estos dos siglos; y que quedaron atrasadas no sólo las pasadas y presente que vuestros vasallos los españoles han hecho, y ni aún en los antiguos tiempos romanos, y de todas las naciones.

On the other hand an incident occurring just fifteen days after these celebrations provided the Indian elite with a poignant reminder of the injustices to which they were subjected by the Spanish administration in complete disregard for their legal privileges:

Pues, Señor, no habían pasado quince días del leal, real rendido y glorioso obsequio, que en vuestro aplauso y alabanzas de vuestra coronación habían celebrado vuestros indios, cuando ya tuvieron las alabanzas que acostumbran los españoles repartir a los indios; porque un alcalde español, públicamente, por las calles y plazas sacó y puso a la vergüenza, por un motivo muy leve y ridículo, a una india principal, y que había hecho uno de los principales papeles en la función de la fiesta de vuestra coronación. (p. 20)

Thus the events surrounding the celebrations in Lima provided the Indian elite with both a visible representation of their theoretical nobility and a sharp reminder of the disparagement of their privileges by the Spanish administration.

These circumstances led the Indian Cabildo and groups of Indian nobles to hold a series of discussions and meetings in which they reevaluated their
position within colonial society. Some of the nobles revealed themselves to be utterly disillusioned with the existing situation and with the feasibility of achieving change by peaceful means. These nobles were evidently overruled by others who insisted on at least one more attempt to persuade the Crown to implement reforms that would upgrade the status of the Indian elite. Fr. Calixto was a determined advocate of this course of action.  

The outcome of these meetings reflected the division which existed within the Indian elite as to the most efficacious way of bringing about the changes which they all agreed were necessary in the Spanish administration of Peru. The Cabildo decided on one hand to make another effort to have the petition of 1744 regarding the charter of privileges presented to the Crown. This decision represented the will of the most conservative elements within the Indian elite. On the other hand, the concerns of the radical elements of the Indian elite were to be expressed in another petition of broader scope. The petition which was drafted for this purpose is probably the most important document of the entire Indian protest literature in eighteenth-century Peru, the Representación verdadera y exclamación rendida y lamentable que toda la nación indiana hace a la Majestad del Señor Rey de las Españas y Emperador de las Indias, el Señor don Fernando VI, pidiendo los atienda y remedie, sacándolos del afrentoso vituperio y oprobio en que están más de doscientos años.  

The Representación, as it will henceforth be called, was the culminating and most developed expression of the Indian reformist ideology. The circumstances surrounding this document's composition and presentation to the Crown, its contribution to the ideology of the protest movement, and its contents
therefore warrant detailed examination. This document, which, as the title indicates, was anonymous and purported to speak in the name of the entire Indian nation, depicted the Spanish administration in Peru in the blackest possible terms and called on the Crown to implement the Indian elite's plan for reforming the government of the Indians in Peru. This plan, as presented in the Representación, although based on the reforms suggested in earlier Indian protests, went much further than these in advocating the participation of Indians in their own government. The drastic nature of the reforms demanded by the Representación was reinforced by the vivid and uncompromising terms in which they were expressed. The document based its appeal on the Crown's avowed religious obligation to protect and convert the American natives and presented the Indians' demands in the dramatic tone and language of the early missionary advocates of Indian welfare.

Who actually wrote the Representación cannot be established on the basis of the evidence available. The point is not, however, of great importance since the document did incorporate, in a radical form, the aims of the Indian elite as a whole. The Indian Cabildo of Lima certainly had some hand in either the drafting or the publication of the Representación. It was probably written in the immediate aftermath of the Lima meetings of early 1748 and printed illegally in Lima, some time between August and November of that same year.

In spite of the fact that the Representación expressed the reformist ideals held by a majority of the Indian elite, its aggressive tone evidently led the conservative elements of the Indian Cabildo to hesitate in authorizing its presentation to the Crown. Fr. Calixto, continuing his efforts to assuage the most dissatisfied members of the Indian elite, offered in the middle of
1748 to go to Spain himself in order to present both the petition for the publication of the charter of privileges and the Representación. The Cabildo, however, refused to give him formal authority as its agent. It may be that the failure of Fr. Calixto's previous mission to Spain on behalf of the Cabildo made them wary of underwriting another journey for him. Certainly Fr. Calixto's position as a Franciscan gave cause for the Cabildo to doubt that his superiors would grant him permission to go to Spain to present such an inflammatory document as the Representación. On the other hand, Fr. Calixto's proposal may have been simply premature, made before the Cabildo had been willing to commit itself to authorizing the presentation of the Representación.

The Cabildo did ultimately choose as its agent an Indian called Francisco de Zeballos. The delegation of Zeballos demonstrates that the Indian Cabildo was finally convinced to adopt slightly more drastic measures than the routine petitioning it had hitherto authorized. Not only was Zeballos entrusted with the Representación, but he was sent without the viceregal permission necessary for an Indian to travel legally to Spain. In fact, the Cabildo made absolutely no attempt to gain such permission. Unlike the Indian elite in the 1720's and 1730's who had depended on representatives like Morachimo and Nieto de Vargas officially appointed or authorized by the Viceroy, to further their cause, the Indian elite in 1748 had despaired of obtaining any such authorization and pinned their hopes solely on the ultimate benevolence of the Monarch himself. Francisco de Zeballos did not, however, prove to be the enterprising man that the Cabildo had imagined him to be and, discouraged by the difficulties he encountered in attempting to make his clandestine journey, he abandoned his
mission in Buenos Aires and returned to Peru.

In view of the failure of Zeballos to go to Spain the Cabildo evidently abandoned the plan to present the Representación through an Indian emissary and concentrated its immediate efforts on winning the long-sought publication of the charter of privileges. The Cabildo appointed two agents already in Madrid to present the petition regarding the decree of 1697. These advocates, Fr. Pérez Martín and Ladrón de Guevara, however, pocketed their fee without doing anything to advance the Indians' cause.  

Meanwhile, Fr. Calixto had left Lima, probably shortly before Zeballos was appointed to go to Spain. The Cabildo, by giving the Franciscan copies of both the petition regarding the charter of privileges and the Representación, had implicitly encouraged him to continue his advocacy of the Indian cause. This tacit support coupled with his apparent ignorance of Zeballos' appointment no doubt led Fr. Calixto to hope that he might yet persuade the Cabildo to sponsor his journey to Spain. In any case, taking advantage of his acknowledged, although unofficial, status as a representative of the Indian Cabildo of Lima, Fr. Calixto presented the Representación to the Indian Cabildo of Cuzco in the hope that its members might underwrite his journey to Spain:

... los fervorosos deseos que siempre he tenido de aliviar a mis amados hermanos y parientes, como lo expresé en varias ocasiones, y principalmente en todas las juntas y consultas que tuvimos después de las fiestas reales de la coronación de nuestro Rey y Señor Don Fernando Sexto... Con ese ánimo o empeño pasé al valle de Jauja a mediados de Agosto del año de 1748; y el mismo año, a principios de Noviembre, pasé a la gran ciudad del Cuzco, con el manifiesto o "Exclamación" para manifestarla a nuestros parientes, caciques y nobles de dicha Ciudad y sus provincias, a fin de conmover sus ánimos, para que ayudasen a tan importante obra con alguna limosna; mas fue en vano todo mi trabajo y afán, porque ninguno quiso concurrir.
The Indian Cabildo of Cuzco, however, beset by fear of reprisals from Spanish authorities, declined to support Fr. Calixto's plan to present the document to the Crown. This refusal dashed Fr. Calixto's last hope of gaining any formal authority from the Peruvian Indian elite as a whole for his mission to Spain.

With undiminished zeal, Fr. Calixto next attempted to secure formal authorization from the officials of his own and of the Jesuit Order to present the manifesto to the Crown. Like the Indian Cabildo these officials, while approving the ideas of the Representación in theory, refused to play any part in its presentation to the Crown. They did, however, unwittingly inspire Fr. Calixto to take the matter into his own hands by their disparaging remarks about the Indians' character:

... personas doctas ... convinieron en que era muy importante el que la dicha Exclamation se pusiese en las manos del Rey, nuestro Señor, mas dificultaban el modo de que esto se ejecutase. Y dijeron más los consultores, encareciendo grandemente, que si ellos fuesen indios, habían de saltar por sobre tejados, que aunque tuvieran que venir nadando sobre las aguas y comiendo yerbas, habían de venir a dar a saber a Su Majestad de lo que padecían; pero que los indios no lo harían así, por no haber hombres entre ellos, y sobre todo que eran tímidos, y otras infinitas cosas dijeron, apocándonos.17

It was only natural that Fr. Calixto found these remarks by religious officials not only repugnant but personally insulting. Throughout its development the Indian reform movement had repudiated, as a mere pretext to justify the subordination of the Indians, the characterization of Indians as being weak and incompetent. The reformers particularly objected to the application of this characterization to the Indian elite. Being anything but
timid and determined to prove it not only to the Indian Cabildos which had mistrusted him but to his religious superiors as well, Fr. Calixto set out for Spain with the sole support of a fellow Franciscan, Fr. Isidoro de Cala y Ortega, who agreed to accompany him. The pair left Cuzco on 25 September 1749 and, travelling by way of Buenos Aires, Rio de Janeiro and Lisbon, arrived in Madrid on 22 August 1750.

After discovering the difficulties and delays involved in the formal presentation of a petition to the King, Fr. Calixto decided to circumvent these official procedures. In a feat of remarkable daring he approached the King's hunting party, broke through the ranks of soldiers guarding the royal carriage and handed the Representación to the Monarch in person:

... aunque nos habían ponderado mucho la mucha dificultad que había en ver al Rey y poderle hablar; no obstante, a costa de riesgos y peligros, aun de la propia vida, le salimos al encuentro, metiéndonos por entre la chusma de soldados, y le entregamos a Su Majestad (es de advertir que no paró la carroza de Su Majestad, sólo sacó la cabeza por dos veces) nuestro escrito, dicho día 23.

The document was passed on to the Council of the Indies where it was the subject of considerable attention. Fr. Isidoro de Cala appeared twice before members of the Council to present his version of the Indians' case. The Council recognized the Indians' rights to enter religious orders and receive ecclesiastical dignities on the same basis as Spaniards. This concession proved personally advantageous to Fr. Calixto who was finally, in September 1751, promoted to the status of legate in the Franciscan Order. All the other proposals made in the Representación were, however, systematically and completely rejected as being unjustified and dangerous:
Siendo no apreciables otras instancias, que se hacen, y que deben ser repelidas, como la de que se quiten los Corregidores, y las mitas, y que se exija un tribunal, que conozca de las causas de los Indios privativamente . . . se deben repeler las tres referidas como impracticables, y que contienen novedad que pudiera causar alteración en el gobierno establecido, y otras perniciosas consecuencias.23

The Representación was considered sufficiently subversive for the Council of the Indies to order the confiscation of whatever copies of the illegally printed edition a quiet investigation could uncover. This order yielded, however, only the two copies that Fr. Calixto and Fr. Isidoro had taken to Spain.24

The remaining copies circulating in Peru must have made stimulating and instructive reading for Spaniards and creoles as well as for literate Indians. The Representación, as the collective voice of the Indians, presented to the public as a fait accompli the solidarity between the interests of the Indian elite and those of the Indian masses, an alliance hitherto known only to those bureaucrats who dealt directly with earlier Indian appeals. At the same time the specific demands of the Representación constituted a coherent program through which the Indian elite could exercise the privileges of their nobility to the advantage of all sectors of Indian society.

The Indian elite perceived itself as fulfilling, through its reformist agitation, the obligations inherent in the noble status of its members. Fr. Calixto wrote that his main motivation in undertaking "empresa tan grande" was "haber nacido con obligaciones."25 The Indian Cabildo of Lima described its collective duty in the following terms:

... por Nosotros propios, y en nombre de Dichos Cavildos . . . y de todo el comun de Yndios . . . como cabeza que es de todas las demas comunidades
The program for reform advocated in the *Representación* was based on and incorporated in the specific reforms demanded by earlier Indian appeals. Echoing earlier protests against the equation of Indians with the servile classes, the document compared the Indians' status to that of slaves:

¿Hay mayor oprobio que el nuestro? ¿Que una generación adusta, extraña y servil sea de mejor condición que la de los Indios? ¿Que el negro esclavo se pueda libertar, y quede libre para irse donde quisiere, y pueda pasar a España; y el Indio, aún el noble, sea tributario y mitayo de vuestros siervos, y no tenga albedrío para libremente vivir donde le duere conveniente, y no tenga modo de pasar a España a ver a su Rey, y mostrarle sus heridas? ¿Que el mulato y zambo, nacido de los negros, sea libre y no pague tributo; y el indio pagándolo siempre jamás se liberte de su abatimiento; y mestizo, hijo del español sea envilecido por lo que tiene de indio? (p. 12)

In order to rectify this situation, the *Representación* called for the same reforms as demanded in earlier protests: the implementation of the charter of privileges, and the education of Indians in *colegios reales* and seminaries as well as in special schools to be established for Indians in all towns and cities.

To facilitate the achievement of real equality with the Spanish nobility, the *Representación* advocated giving the Indian nobility permission to travel freely between Peru and Spain. This proposal was made in the spirit, shared by earlier protesters, of absolute faith in the ultimate justice of the Spanish Crown:

Y que los indios nobles y principales puedan libremente . . . pasar a vuestra Corte y presencia real, como los españoles lo hacen, cuando necesitan pasar...
a España; derogando las leyes que vedan nuestro libre tránsito a los Reinos de España; pues de ellas se sigue el universal daño que padecemos y el no remediar-se nada, no sabiendo nuestros reyes, clara y verbalmente los males nuestros. (p. 26)

The *Representación* proposed more drastic measures than any earlier protest to curb the abuses of the mita and corregimiento systems. Employing precisely the reasoning usually invoked to justify the mita system—the necessity of forced labor because of the Indians' disinclination to offer voluntary labor—the *Representación* argued for the abolition of the mita since it affected only Indians:

... pues habiendo en el Reino tanta gente libre y ociosa, como muchos que se dicen ser españoles, pero mal nacidos y ociosos, negros libres, mulatos y zambos, de que se compone tanta parte del Reino; no es razón que sólo el Indio sea forzado a ser mitayo, y por eso sólo es tenido por bajo, esclavo y de condición servil; y los demás, siendo tan plebeyos y de condición tan baja, sean reputados por de mejor calidad que los indios; y debiendo ser temidos los negros libres, mulatos, zambos y demás gente feroz y voluntaria, la temida sólo es la gente india, siendo tan mansa y humilde, tan débil e indefensa; será quizás, porque la conocen tener razón. (p. 43)

The use by the Indian reformists of this characterization of Indians as weak and defenceless as an argument in support of their radical demands involved an underlying paradox which is also apparent in their employment of the traditional justification of the mita as an argument for its abolition. Reformist ideals which demanded the substantial dismantling of the traditional system of rule were formulated and expressed within the terms of the very protectoral theories which had served to justify that system.
This same basic paradox underlay the Representación's insistence, in apparent contradiction to the reformists' goal of ending the Indians' legal status as minors, on the continuance of the protectoral system: "... que los dejen poseer libremente sus bienes, tratar y comerciar con ellos, como el español maneja los suyos; y así también sean ellos los que administren los bienes, haciendas y casas de sus hospitales, cofradías y comunidades." (p. 41)

Any logical weakness of this contradiction was, however, insignificant in comparison to the very real advantages which the Indian elite could derive from the continuance of the protectoral system if it were reformed in accordance with Nieto de Vargas' proposal, presented in 1732, that Indians be appointed as protectors.

The intermediary nature of the office of protector would place its Indian incumbents in an excellent position to monitor the relationship between Indian and Spanish society, while the protectors' direct access to and familiarity with the Spanish judicial system would enable them to act as intermediaries in the Indians' utilization of that system. Since by Spanish law only Indians of noble status could hold the office of protector, this office could serve as a means by which the Indian elite could demonstrate effective leadership in order to reinforce the hierarchical nature of Indian society which in turn guaranteed the privileged status of the Indian nobility.

As with the Spanish protectoral system, so the Indian reformists adapted the Spanish corregimiento system to serve their own ends. The Representación attributed the widely acknowledged abuses of the corregimiento system to the corruption of the Spaniards who held the office of corregidor rather than to the system itself:
... siendo los Corregidores españoles los que más daño han hecho y hacen al Reino, en especial a los Indios, con sus exorbitantes extorsiones y continuos agravios, con que por cerca de doscientos años los tienen hostilizados, consumidos y peores que esclavos, sean quitados absoluta y totalmente; y se pongan jueces o corregidores indios, para los indios, quienes los gobiernen como es razón, y estén los indios como vasallos de Su Majestad; sujetos sólo al Rey y a los Virreyes en lo temporal, y a los Obispos en lo espiritual. (p. 43)

This proposal that Spanish corregidores be replaced by Indians implied the continuation of the corregimiento as a means by which the Spanish Crown could continue to control and profit from the exploitation of Indian resources. Indeed, the Representación specifically predicted an increase in Crown revenue as a direct result of the more moderate demands which the Indian corregidores would make on Indian resources in comparison to the inflated demands of Spanish officials:

Daran los Indios para Su Majestad los tributos muy puntuales, y además podrá Su Majestad coger parte de las rentas que da a los corregidores españoles; pues siéndolo los Indios en sus propias tierras, y como más moderados y menos vanos en sus gastos, no le serán tan costosos a Su Majestad, quien con esto abrirá el camino, para que se puedan salvar los corregidores, y para que todos los indios gentiles se conviertan, y salgan de la idolatría, en que los detiene el horror y miedo que tienen a los corregidores. Con esto se salvarán todos, se aumentarán el Reino y los vasallos; y todos, así españoles como indios, tendrán paz, gobernando españoles a los españoles, indios a los indios. (p. 45)

Thus the Representación advocated, on both temporal and religious grounds, reforms in the corregimiento system.

While the reformists spelled out the benefits to be derived by the Crown and the Indian tributaries from these reforms, the benefits which would accrue
to the Indian elite were never directly mentioned and so must be inferred.
The Representación certainly left room for the Indian corregidores to profit financially from their office. The Indian corregidores, like the Indian protectors, would enjoy the privileges of an intermediary role, particularly through their effective participation in the collection of tribute revenue. If the changes advocated by the manifesto had in fact been implemented, the newly introduced Indian officials might have derived other benefits as well. For instance, the beneficial effect which the removal of the Spanish corregidores might have had on Indian welfare might have redounded to the credit of the new Indian appointees, legitimizing not only their participation in the Spanish administrative system, but also their privileged status in the hierarchical structure of Indian society.

These specific proposals were part of an overall plan for reform in the government of the Peruvian Indians. This reform was envisioned by the Representación as a restoration of the parallel Indian and Spanish societies alleged to have existed in Peru. This parallelism, achieved by the separation of the government of the two societies, giving the members of each responsibility for their own administration, would accentuate the importance of any intermediary roles.

By adopting the Spanish criterion of noble status as a prerequisite to holding offices such as protector and corregidor which did function as intermediaries between Spanish and Indian society, the Indian elite could assure its monopoly over these important positions. In turn, the effective leadership which the elite could demonstrate through these positions would serve to enhance its prestige in both Spanish and Indian eyes. This prestige would be
consolidated by the participation of some members of the Indian elite in the highest levels of the colonial administration, for the Representación proposed that the Spanish and Indian administrations be integrated at the level of the Audiencia. Indians would serve alongside Spaniards as bishops and judges: "... se les confieran los obispados y canongías, el ser calificadores, consultores y ministros del Santo Tribunal y las garnachas en las audiencias." (p. 43)

By the late 1740's, as the Representación makes clear, the Indian elite had finally lost all faith in the local Spanish administration and identified it as the prime agent responsible for sabotaging the implementation of reforms ordered by the Crown in response to earlier Indian appeals:

... y con mandar que sean favorecidos, aliviados y atendidos, por tal cual queja que ellos han hecho por mano y boca de algunos Reverendos Obispos o personas religiosas, y por tal o cual indio que, en más de dos siglos, ha pasado entre mil peligros y riesgos a España; pero no saben si son obedecidos, y si lo han solicitado, han sido engañados por sus Ministros, quienes representan, a las Majestades, imposibles en la práctica de sus Reales Cáedulas; porque la práctica es contraria a sus logros y conveniencias temporales; y aunque penda la fama, la honra, la vida, el alivio y salvación del Indio de la ejecución de la voluntad del Rey, esta no se hace en levantar al caído indio, sanar al enfermo indio, salvar al perdido indio, si está de por medio el daño leve y temporal del español, cuya conveniencia prepondera más que la vida, fama, honra y salvación del indio. (p. 50)

The Representación therefore proposed the formation of a new and independent tribunal to implement reforms in favor of the Indians. This proposal resembled in many ways the missionary proposals, made in the early colonial period, that religious control over the relationship between Spaniards and Indians was the only remedy for the oppressed state of Indian society.
Obviously, the creation of such a tribunal would meet with precisely the same opposition from the secular administration as the early missionary protectors had encountered. Such a tribunal,

... excepto, inhibido y absoluto, que inmediatamente estuviese sujeto a Su Majestad, que se compusiese de uno, dos, o más obispos y otras personas nobles que hay en el Reino: eclesiásticos, seculares y religiosos, muy temerosos de Dios y muy servidores de Su Majestad ... (p. 46)

would imply the Crown's complete repudiation of its own administration and its absolute identification with the interests of Indian society. The Indian elite based their belief in the existence of this identification on the Crown's continuing acknowledgement of its dedication to the missionary cause and to Indian welfare.

This belief, although quite incompatible with political reality, did enable the Indian reformers to present their plans in the terms of the Spanish protectoral ideals and to support their arguments by appeals to tradition. Moreover, the pattern of thought displayed by the Indian reformists was one commonly used by oppressed groups when formulating their demands for change. By claiming to act within traditional ideals and by attributing the highest ideals to the Monarch, the reformers are able to cloak in flattery the most daring reprimands. The Monarch, given his unassailable authority and honorable intentions, is never accused of any real wrongdoing, but is portrayed as himself being abused and deceived by the very elements responsible for the abuse of the masses. The Monarch is guilty only of ignorance, and that excusable, since his advisers are all corrupt and have conspired to keep the truth from him. This premise had become a traditional feature of reform movements in Spain itself marked by the
common rallying cry "Viva el rey y muera el mal gobierno."

This argument also provides the reforming group with the means of reconciling their assertion of the Crown's benevolent intentions with the failure of their protests to achieve beneficial results. The existing oppression is viewed as a creation of the Crown's administrators who deliberately disregard the Crown's high intentions and true interests and who govern only to promote their own corrupt ends. In the words of the Representación:

\[
\ldots \text{prácticamente lo que experimentamos es un gobierno violento, duro, cruel y tirano que los ministros del Rey han inventado, distinto de todo lo que se ha practicado en todos los reinos católicos, y muy otro de la sana intención del Rey. (p. 23)}
\]

In view of the Monarch's benevolence and omnipotence all that is required to persuade him to dismiss his corrupt administrators is for him to be enlightened about the true condition of his oppressed subjects. Thus neither the laws nor the Monarch are to blame for his subjects' oppression. On the contrary, the reestablishment of the Monarch's effective authority over his corrupt administration and the implementation of the Crown's benevolent legislation and intent are seen as the means by which the welfare of the oppressed subjects can best be served.

What made this pattern of thought particularly apt as a vehicle for presenting Indian reformist demands was its similarity both to the approach of the early missionaries for demanding reform in the American colonies and to the formula adopted by contemporary Spaniards to urge reform of the Imperial system.

The early missionaries in whose works the Indian reformists found both inspiration and theoretical guidance had first applied this pattern of reform to America by envisioning themselves as called upon to reestablish the Primitive
Church in America. Subsequent reformist thought regarding Spanish America tended to follow this precedent by expressing ideals in terms of a return to the past. Similarly Spanish theorists in the eighteenth century attributed their nation's decadent condition to its disregard for the traditions and ideals which had formed the basis of its golden age and advocated a return to these traditional values as a means of regaining Spain's former greatness. In a broader context still, until the French Revolution reformers invariably placed their ideal society in the past rather than in the future, presenting themselves as restorers of ancient virtues and not as innovators.

This tendency to think in the terms of the past is exemplified, in respect to the reform of the American colonies, by the writings of the Spanish reformer Campillo y Cossio. Like the Indian reformers, Campillo considered the existing laws to be eminently wise and just, needing only to be implemented in order to bring about a beneficial change in the state of Indian society:

> La inobservancia de algunas excelentes Leyes ha sido la fuente de que dimanan los males, que aniquilaron a aquellos Naturales, o inutilizaron a España un mundo entero lleno de riquezas.

Campillo and the Representación agree in portraying the earlier Spanish Monarchs as exemplars. Campillo particularly called for measures to support the laws of Charles V and Philip II while the Representación implored Ferdinand VI to emulate his namesake Ferdinand I so that "el católico, el piadoso, el deseado, vuestro nombre se esculpirá en el bronce de la eternidad, haciendo esta justa restitution que os suplicamos en la generación de los indios, declarando y mandando lo que está mandado por vuestros progenitores" (p. 25). Similarly both the Spaniard, Campillo, and the anonymous author of the Representación
called for the reinstitution and revision of existing laws. The Representación asked "que se revuelvan y registren todas las leyes . . . reformense y háganse otras según el tiempo presente" (p. 30), while Campillo planned to "restituir . . . la política de su primitivo instituto en los más de los puntos, quitando los abusos, que ha introducido el tiempo, y proporcionando nuestro sistema al estado presente de las cosas, según el tiempo en que vivimos." 31

The similarity in ideas and conceptual approach between the Spanish reformist writers and the Representación is patent but this similarity is minimal when compared to the profound debt that this compelling appeal owes to the theories and language of the early missionary writers. The view of Spain's rights and obligations in America presented by the Representación reflected the missionary interpretation of the religious basis of Spain's jurisdiction in America: "... la Santa Madre Iglesia Católica Romana . . . os ha encomendado la Iglesia Americana, y constituido su Padre y Patrón" (p. 31).

Because of this essentially religious basis for Spain's jurisdiction in America, the Representación portrayed the Crown's secular and religious roles as inseparable: "Siendo Vos, Señor, Rey cristiano y católico, o Monarca del Mundo, imagen del Príncipe de las alturas, Cristo; y él puso en sus hombros su principado y cargó las iniquidades de todos, y vos también debéis hacer lo mismo" (p. 11). Consequently the Representación identified two grounds on which the Crown had a religious obligation to undertake reform: to remove the impediments which abusive administration had placed in the way of the Indians' conversion and to remove the impediments placed in the way of the Monarch's own salvation by his complicity with this abusive administration:
Y así descargando vuestra conciencia, descargando este pesadísimo e insoportable yugo que tenemos, no en ser vuestros vasallos y súbditos, sino en no ser tratados como racionales y hombres cristianos, sino como brutos y fieras de las selvas. (p. 11)

The Representación attributed the refusal of some Indians to accept Christianity directly to the oppressive policies of the Spanish colonists by asserting that the Indians "jamás han puesto embarazo a la Ley Cristiana; y se supone no está la culpa de su idiotismo, rusticidad e ignorancia, sino de los españoles que desde el principio los han tratado peores que a burros, y más abatidos que los mismos perros" (p. 36). In support of this argument the Representación cited Garcilaso de la Vega's assertion that an Incaic prophecy concerning the coming of a new and better religion made the Indians highly receptive to conversion to Christianity:

... pues también es tradición que los Indios e Incas supieron trescientos años antes, que vendría otra ley mejor que la que le dieron sus Reyes, como lo afirma Garcilaso en los "Comentarios"; y así la abrazaron con tanta facilidad y sin repugnancia, pues es cierto que ellos jamás han puesto embarazo a la Ley Cristiana. (p. 36)

The Representación not only adopted this view that the Indians were eager to receive Spaniards as missionaries, but actually attributed unconverted Indians with expressing the missionary theory which limited Spain's right to impose temporal authority against the will of the Indians:

... por fin se repite lo que el Maestro Melández dice de la gentilidad de las montañas de este Perú, que están los indios sin convertirse, aun conociendo ser santa y necesaria para salvarse la ley de Nuestro Señor Jesucristo, y que un Rey de la Montaña le dijo a su Emperador: "Asegúranos ¡oh, Rey! de que los de esta Nación (esto es los españoles soldados), de este Padre, no pasarán a nosotros, que lo demás está hecho, por mi voto y el de todos." Esto es que recibirían la Ley Cristiana, con tal que los españoles no los avasallasen, para afrentarlos, deshonrarlos, cautivarlos y consumirlos. (p. 35)
By placing this argument devised by sixteenth-century Spanish missionaries in the mouths of a group of admittedly unhispanized Indians the Representación creates a lapse in credibility which can only be attributed to its dedication to missionary ideals and its perhaps overzealous use of missionary arguments for rhetorical effect.

A similar lapse in logic is the uncritical repetition of Las Casas' assertion that the Indians possessed vast amounts of hidden wealth, the location of which, the Representación alleged, the Indians might reveal if assured of a fair share of the treasure:

... por este gobierno discordé se detiene el descubrimiento de muchas e innumerables riquezas de grandes tesoros, así de minas de oro y plata, que están ocultas por los antiguos, como de inmensas cantidades de oro, plata y piedras preciosas que tenían sacadas, y las escondieron; y sus descendientes pueden saber donde están, y se pierden, como lo afirma el Ilustrísimo Obispo Casas (fol. 43), porque ven y conocen los Indios que no lo han de lograr, y que es para mayor trabajo y afrenta de ellos el descubrirlos, como les sucedió en la Conquista, que mientras más oro daban a los españoles, más se desaforaban en matarlos y destruirlos. (p. 35)

The most plausible explanation for dragging in this reference to Las Casas is a desire to invoke directly the authority of the Spanish missionary writers in support of the Indians' cause. Surely if the prime intention had been to appeal to the Crown's cupidity the inside knowledge of the Indian elite would have provided more convincing evidence of the existence of hidden treasure than a rhetorical mention in Las Casas.

Thus Hispanic missionary ideals influenced not only the definition and expression of the goals pursued by the Indian reformists, but also the conceptual framework in which these reformers thought and the rhetoric in which
they expressed their own championship of Indian welfare. The Representación described the role of the Indian reform movement not in terms of attaining a new and untried ideal, but as the belated fulfillment of the goals set by the missionaries for Spanish colonialism in the sixteenth century:

Poned este timbre nuevo más en vuestros blasones, y seréis proclamado nuevo Conquistador y nuevo Monarca de las Indias, amplificando así muchísimo más vuestro Imperio y el de Cristo. Y se dirá de vos, gloriosísimamente, que habéis acabado la empresa, que dejaron principiada ocho gloriosos Reyes de España y de las Indias, de quienes descendéis. Y que vos, Señor, sois nuevamente el católico Don Fernando, en cuyo tiempo se dió a vuestra corona este nuevo mundo. (p. 32)

The drastic reforms advocated by the Representación, its uncompromising repudiation of the local Spanish administration and its idealization of the benevolent Monarch and the spirit and laws of the early Spanish regime in America are all manifestations of the radical, utopian spirit which increasingly characterized the thought of the Indian reformers in the late 1740's. In part a product of the Indian elite's worsening position and of their deepening despair over the failure of their protests to achieve results, this spirit was also a consequence of the reform movement's close identification with the early Spanish missionaries. As the Representación bears witness, the Indian reformers used arguments and language that closely echoed those used by these early advocates of Indian welfare. As a consequence the Indian reformers' perception of the world was shaped in the image of that of these missionaries.

Influenced by the prophetic interpretation of the events of the Old Testament, the early missionaries expressed their radical ideals by means of analogies between episodes in the Bible and incidents in the discovery and conquest of America: analogies between, for example, the Indians and the ten
lost tribes of Israel, between America and the Promised Land of the Old Testament, between the Spanish State in America and the Jews of the Old Testament as the Chosen People, and between the oppression of the Indians under Spanish rule and the plight of the Jews in captivity.\textsuperscript{32}

So deeply was the \textit{Representación} influenced by the early missionaries' method of arguing by analogy from the Old Testament that its very structure incorporated the analogy between the oppression of the Peruvian Indians and the plight of the Jews in their Babylonian captivity by means of presenting its demands for reform in the form of a commentary on the \textit{Lamentations} of Jeremiah. Throughout the greater part of the \textit{Representación} each section forms an elaboration on a specific verse of Jeremiah as an analogy for the situation of the Peruvian Indians.

The application of the lament of Jeremiah to the American context had originally been suggested by Fr. Gerónimo de Mendieta, that most radical of early missionary writers. Mendieta compared the fall of the Christian Church in America, caused by the corruption of secular elements, to the fall of Jerusalem:

\begin{quote}
... se venía muy a pelo asentarme con Jeremías sobre nuestra Indiana Iglesia, y con lágrimas, sopesos y voces que llegaran al cielo (como el hacía sobre la destruida ciudad de Jerusalem), lamentarla y plañirla, recontando su miserable caída y gran desventura, y aun para ellos no poco me pudiera aprovechar de las palabras y sentencias del mismo profeta.\textsuperscript{33}
\end{quote}

Indeed, as the phrase from its title indicates, \textit{Exclamación de los indios americanos, usando para ella de la misma que hizo el profeta Jeremías}, this is precisely what the \textit{Representación} did: relate in the very words of Jeremiah the fall of the Peruvian Indians from their golden age, identified by the
Indian reformers not with the Inca period but with the unfulfilled Christian utopia proposed by the early missionaries and thwarted by secular interests.

The eighteenth-century document, like the early missionary writings, identified the practices of the Primitive Church as models to be followed by the Church in America. The Representación invoked these practices as precedents for the specific reforms advocated by the Indian elite:

Haced, Señor, que se ejecute en ella, lo que en el principio de la Iglesia se mandó y practicó, que fue: el que el hombre crístico, católico, apto e idóneo para el sagrado ministerio del obispado, sacerdocio, dignidad eclesiástica y de las religiones, aunque fuesen nuevamente convertidos del Gentilismo (saliendo de los diez años, que el tiempo de ser neófitos) fuese admitido a las Ordenes eclesiásticas y religiosas.

(p. 31)

In referring directly to the precedent of the Primitive Church, the Representación incorporated into the ideology of the Indian protest movement a religious argument for a reform which they had advocated on legal grounds to no avail for forty years. By adopting this analogy with the Primitive Church the Representación implicitly placed the Indian reformist aims in a new and broader context. These aims now had significance not only as a means of bettering the condition of Indian society, but also as a means of realizing a Christian utopia. Similarly, the document's use of biblical analogy to depict the oppression of the Indians under Spanish administration gave the Indians' plight a significance beyond that which the simple recitation of specific grievances could possibly have. While the Representación portrayed in utopian terms the reformed society it envisioned it portrayed the existing situation in apocalyptic terms.
The very analogy between the Christian Spanish regime and the corrupt and eventually doomed societies by which the Jews were oppressed implied an uncompromising condemnation of Spanish rule in America. The terms in which this analogy was elaborated served only to make the Representación's depiction of the Spanish regime still blacker:

Bebemos nuestra agua, con el dinero; compramos nuestra leña, con el precio. Porque en las Indias, Señor, los indios vuestros vasallos y vuestros hijos, bebemos nuestras lágrimas que son nuestra agua continua, comprándola con la paga; pues pagamos para que nos maltraten, y para que llorar nos hagan. Compramos o los leños en que nos crucifiquen, o la leña con que nos quememos y consuman. Pagamos nuestra agua, pues pagamos a los curas y pastores de nuestras almas, para que nos administren las aguas puras de la Gracia; y llevándose copiosísimas cantidades de nuestro sudor, lágrimas y trabajos, estamos a secas y sedientos del Saber, entre los cienos y lodazales inmundos de la Ignorancia.

Parece, Señor... que nos dominan egipcios y no españoles; que nos sujetan Faraones y no Reyes católicos; Nabucos y no reyes cristianos; pues aún el pan que debíamos comer... de nuestro sudor y trabajo, si le comemos se nos vuelve in piedras ponzoñosas, que nos matan; y de nuestro trabajo y sudor, sacando el español ganancia y honra, lo que cogemos es hartura de oprobios y afrentas, que son nuestro cotidiano pan. (p. 10)34

Yet this harsh condemnation of Spanish rule in America as one of apocalyptic corruption and confusion, extreme though it may seem, derived a certain legitimacy from being based on influential missionary authorities. Las Casas, for example, had characterized the oppression suffered by the Indians in America as far worse than that of the Jews in Egypt: "... la tiránica gobernación, mucho más injusta y más cruel que la con que Faraón oprimió en Egipto a los judíos."35 The Representación elaborated on this comparison by stating that the destruction of Indian society in America "no
tiene comparación con cautiverio alguno, que han padecido las gentes sub-
yugadas por otras naciones," (p. 40) since the Indians, willing converts to
Christianity, were being subjugated unnecessarily, willfully and hypocritical-
ly in the name of Christianity. Similar condemnations by the early Indian
advocates such as Las Casas had been given ratification by the Spanish Crown
through such concessions as the New Laws of 1542. Indeed it was precisely
this ratification, together with the Representación's adoption of the fiction
of the benevolent Monarch, that enabled the Indian elite to use this biblical
analogy to vilify the Spanish administration with impunity.

Furthermore the extension of this analogy characterizing the Spanish
regime as being worse than any imposed on the Jews allowed the Indian reformists
to ponder the punishment which God might deem suitable to such heinous tyranny.
Early missionary sources provided precedents for just speculations. Mendieta,
for example, identified Spain's punishment with the troubles prophesied in the
Apocalypse.\textsuperscript{36} Las Casas, on the other hand, considered the economic reper-
cussions on Spain of the diminution of the Indian population as a just
punishment for Spanish tyranny in America.\textsuperscript{37} The Representación expressed
this same view: "¿No se está viendo, Señor, la poderosa mano de Dios que
insensiblemente castiga este delito; pues cada día hay menos indios, sin ser
el monjío y la fraillía quienes los aminoran, sino el sumo trabajo y mal trata-
miento de los obrajes, minas y mitas que los consumen" (p. 14). The
Representación expressed in still more general terms the belief that Spain
was destined to suffer some even more devastating castigation for its tyranny
in America:
Y cómo también Dios, recto y justo juez, los castigará aquí, fuera de la pena que en la otra vida, precisamente, les espera, por delito tan atroz y crimen tan inhumano; que es la injuria tan grave y tan general a toda una nación, tan limpia, tan noble, tan dilatada, tan numerosa, tan humilde, tan desinteresada, anticuada por más de doscientos años.
(p. 39)

In daring terms the Representación went on to suggest the nature of this punishment. Since Spanish tyranny had led to the destruction of the peace and prosperity of Indian society the Representación suggested that a similar fate would befall Spain as a punishment befitting her crimes:

Los vasallos son el cimiento del Reino, estando firme el cimiento, lo está el edificio, se asegura el Reino y goza de paz y sosiego. Por eso se ha procurado persuadir en este papel, el asegurar los vasallos, cimentándolos en la firmeza de la Paz, la cual, sin duda, se perpetuará muy fuerte, si se destruye la discordia, que se entabló desde el principio entre los españoles e indios. Estos viven sin sosiego por la continua persecución y maltrato, que de los españoles reciben. Los españoles están, entre sí mismos, sin paz y en continua zozobra, que parece su conciencia acusadora les dicta, aún cuando están más seguros; porque conocen que cuanto con el Indio hacen, es sin razón; por esto no hay movimiento del Indio que no le dé cuidado, aun estando más descuidado el Indio, y sin jamás pensar lo que el español le acumula. El mismo español con su tiranía para con el indio, se pone el espantajo que le amedrenta. Podía decir al español, lo que San Pablo dice ... "Quieres no temer? Obra bien". Por esto se proponen estos eficaces remedios. (p. 40)

In using these terms, the Representación provided a precedent of great importance for the Indian protest movement. The arguments of the Representación provided a justification for rebellion both on a secular and religious basis, suggesting that rebellion was not only the inevitable and legitimate response to tyranny, but was also the divinely ordained punishment most suitable to the crime of tyranny.
In providing a detailed justification for rebellion against a tyrannical administration, the Representación was not breaking new ground. Similar rationalizations had not only been accepted by the early missionaries but were in fact being applied by reformers and missionaries alike to Indian rebellions in the eighteenth century. The Franciscan missionaries attributed the rebellion of Juan Santos largely to the imprudent and abusive attitude of secular Spaniards towards the newly converted Indians. Similarly, the Estado político suggested that the uprisings of 1730 in Paraguay, like the conspiracy of Juan Vélez de Córdova in 1739, and the Rebellion of Juan Santos in the 1740's may indeed have constituted divine sanctions against the tyrannical Spanish regime:

Todos estos rumores, bien pueden ser disposiciones de Dios, quien transfiere los Reynos de unas en otras Naciones; pero si quando lo hace, es quando govierna la tyrania, y falta la Justicia, los Ministros de V.M. son los tyranos, rompen los estatutos Catholicos, y Reales; y si V.M. no los sostiene, es el Real Catholic animo de V.M. el innocente, que padecerà el estrago.

By this same reasoning the Representación assigned the culpability for Indian rebellion to the Spaniards rather than the Indians:

Cierto es, Señor, que en la sublevación que en estos años hizo un indio o mestizo ... no conocido por nosotros, en las montañas del Cerro de la Sal y Conversiones del Orden de San Francisco, siendo quienes causaron estos ruidos, los mismos españoles corregidores y soldados, con sus exorbitantes molestias y faltas de caridad discreta, para portarse con unos bárbaros incultos y recién convertidos, con ponderada prudencia. (p. 17)

Thus the Representación presented a justification for rebellion which was acceptable not only in terms of traditional Hispanic religious and political ideals but also in terms of eighteenth-century reformist ideas.
On one hand, the drastic nature of the reforms suggested by the \textit{Representación} made it a plausible solution to the desperate plight of Indian society. On the other hand, the details of these reforms protected the position which the Indian elite had established for itself as spokesman and coordinator of the ambitions and demands of all sectors of Indian society. The \textit{Representación}'s use of biblical analogy not only facilitated the radicalization of Indian reformist demands by placing them in an otherworldly context, but also by providing the basis for a justification of rebellion against the tyrannical administration. This justification enabled the Indian reform movement to continue to represent the most disillusioned members of the Indian elite as well as the dissatisfied Indian masses who were increasingly giving vent to their frustrations in spontaneous uprisings. As early as 1748 then the Indian reform movement had provided a theoretical justification for rebellion as a means of serving the interests of both the Crown and the Indians by removing the corrupt administration.
1 Letter of Fr. Calixto de San José Tupac Inca to the King (Madrid, n.d.); Fr. Isidoro de Cala y Ortega; Certificate of identity of Fr. Calixto de San José (Madrid, 7 May 1751); and Fr. Juan de San Antonio, Certificate of identity of Fr. Calixto de San José (Cádiz, 17 May 1751). These documents, the originals of which are in AGI (Lima 988) are transcribed in F.A. Loayza, ed., Calixto, pp. 66, 69 and 72-74.

2 Letter of Fr. Calixto de San José Tupac Inca to the King transcribed in Calixto, p. 79.

3 Fr. Juan de San Antonio, Certificate of identity of Fr. Calixto in Calixto, p. 69, and letter of Fr. José Gil Muñoz to the King (12 Sept. 1745), original in AGI (Lima 541), quoted in Calixto, p. 75.

4 "Nos Los Cavildos, Justicias y Regimientos de los Naturales de esta Ciudad, y del Pueblo de Santiago del Cercado," "poder" given to Fr. Calixto de San José Tupac Inca, Lima, 30 Oct. 1756, in AGI (Lima 988). This document refers to the original "poder" given to Fr. Calixto and Fr. José Gil in 1744.

5 Letter of Fr. José Gil Muñoz to the King, quoted in Calixto, p. 73.

6 Fr. Juan de San Antonio, Certificate in Calixto, p. 74.

7 Representación verdadera y exclamación rendida y lamentable que toda la nación indiana hace a la Majestad del Señor Rey de las Españas y Emperador de las Indias, el Señor don Fernando VI, pidiendo los atienda y remedie,
sacándolos del afrentoso vituperio y oprobio en que están más de doscientos años, transcribed in Calixto, p. 19. Subsequent references to this document will appear as page numbers following the relevant citation. The authorship of this document is considered in note 10.

8 No direct evidence exists as to the nature of these meetings of the Indian Cabildo and elite in 1748. The indirect evidence offers two apparently conflicting interpretations of the proceedings of these meetings. The Viceroy Superunda in two letters to the King, dated 24 September 1750 and 15 January 1757 denounced these meetings as having initiated the planning for the abortive Lima conspiracy of 1750 and the subsequent Huarochirí revolt. Superunda also alleged that the Indians involved in the meetings had a manifesto of their grievances published and designated an Indian to present it to the King in Spain. These letters of Superunda have both been printed, the first as document 4 in Castro Arenas, La rebelión, pp. xxi-xxiv, and the second in Calixto, pp. 84-91. Letters written by Fr. Calixto to the King and to the Indian Cabildo of Lima as well as a deposition presented by Fr. Isidoro de Cala y Ortega to the Council of the Indies in 1750 present a slightly different interpretation. They indicate that there were some members of the Indian elite and Cabildo who advocated outright rebellion, but that these individuals were dissuaded temporarily from this course of action by Fr. Calixto and others. According to Cala: "... ha llegado el caso, que el año pasado de 48 por el mes de marzo fue tan fuerte que sino fuera por haverlos contenido los Indios Principales, huvieran subcedido, muchas muertes y desgracias, por haverles ofrezido estos, harían Informe haziéndole presente a VM de la Injurias y agravios que padezian; y como VM es fuente de la Justicia, y que lo podrá remediar." Fr. Calixto's letters are
transcribed in *Calixto*, pp. 49-61 and p. 65, while Cala's deposition is in AGI (Lima 541). The assumption that there were within the Indian Cabildo and elite advocates of rebellion and of protest is a logical explanation for the apparent contradiction between Superunda's accusation that the Lima meetings of 1748 spawned the revolt of 1750 and Fr. Calixto and Fr. Isidoro's assertions that the advocates of rebellion were convinced to wait at least until the outcome of one petition to the new Monarch had been determined. Indeed the failure of this petition could have led the advocates of rebellion to act in 1750 as Superunda alleges. This is the interpretation that is presented in the dissertation. The relationship of the meetings of 1748 to the rebellion of 1750 is considered in Chapter VI.

As mentioned in the text, the Representación was printed illicitly in Lima, according to Toribio Medina some time between August and November 1748 (III, p. 554). I have unfortunately been unable to consult a copy of this illegal edition, the details of which can be found in José Toribio Medina, *La imprenta en Lima (1584-1824)* (Santiago, 1904-07), III, 543 ff. The Representación is transcribed in Loayza, *Calixto*, pp. 5-48 from the manuscript copy in AGI (Lima 988). For the reader's convenience, the quotations from the Representación in the dissertation are taken from the transcription in *Calixto*.

José Toribio Medina (*La imprenta en Lima*, III, 554) considered Fr. Calixto to be the author of the Representación. This identification is based, however, not on any direct evidence, but on the role which Fr. Calixto played in presenting the document to the Crown. F.A. Loayza apparently considered Fr. Calixto to have been one of the "religiosos Franciscanos" who wrote the Representación (*Calixto*, p. 4). Vargas Ugarte thought either Garro or Cala...
y Ortega could have written it (Historia, IV, 244). The identification of Garro as the author of the Representación is based on a reference made by Superunda to Garro as "religioso sacerdote de su Orden y autor del manifiesto que tanto influyó en la comisión de los indios, le habían severamente corregido sus prelados, poniéndole en estrechas reclusiones, privándole de la comunicación con indios, con precepto de que no tomase pluma ni se le dejase aparato de escribir." (Letter to the King, 15 January 1757, in Calixto, p. 88.) Garro did write a protest on behalf of the Indians to the Pope. This protest, however, the Planctus indorum (see note 33 for a more detailed description) was in Latin and therefore is unlikely to be the one referred to by Superunda. Indeed internal evidence places the writing of the Planctus after the uprising of Huarochirí to which Superunda is referring (see note 33). The theory that Superunda's reference to Garro's authorship of an incendiary document applies to the Representación is supported by other indirect evidence. A reference to Fr. Antonio in Fr. Calixto's letter to the Indian Cabildo of Lima (in Calixto, p. 58) as well as a reference to the Indian delegate Zeballos in the Planctus (p. 42) substantiate Superunda's accusations that Garro was closely involved with the Indian protest movement. Similarities in the texts of the Planctus and Representación are so numerous as to indicate that if Fr. Antonio de Garro, the author of the Planctus, was not also the author of the Representación, he certainly played a major role in drafting it.

11 The Representación was certainly composed before Fr. Calixto left Lima in August 1748 but it may not have been published until later that year. Fr. Calixto's references to the Representación tend to indicate that it was printed some time between August and November of 1748. On one occasion Fr.
Calixto mentioned having gone to Cuzco with the document (letter to Indian Cabildo, in Calixto, p. 49), while on another he mentioned the Cabildo having sent him a copy in Cuzco (letter to the King, in Calixto, p. 66).

Fr. Calixto himself attributed his failure to receive the Cabildo's support to its unwarranted mistrust of his promises:

... los mismos de nuestra Nación, quienes han discurrido que yo les engañaba, por cuyo motivo no han querido concurrir con dinero alguno para facilitar nuestra pretensión. También vivo muy quejoso de vuestras mercedes, por no haber querido creer la palabra que les di, de que en la primera ocasión que pudiera pasar a España, lo había de ejecutar; mas vuestras mercedes no lo creyeron, y por eso no quisieron enviarme sus poderes (muy confiados en Don Francisco Ceballos, mas Dios vuelve por mí).

Letter to Indian Cabildo transcribed in Calixto, p. 54.

The Viceroy Superunda, in his letter of 15 January 1757 (Calixto, p. 85), Fr. Calixto himself, in his letter to the Indian Cabildo of 14 November 1750 (Calixto, p. 54) and Fr. Antonio Garro in the Planctus indorum (p. 42) all agreed that Zeballos was appointed to take the Representación to Spain. Precisely when in 1749 the appointment was made is not clear. However, Fr. Calixto who in late September 1749 left Cuzco for Buenos Aires on his way to Madrid, met, at Santiago de Cotagaita in southern Bolivia, Zeballos who was already returning home from Buenos Aires. In view of the distances travelled, it follows that Zeballos must have been appointed before September 1749, and probably not later than the middle of that year. See letter of Fr. Calixto to the Indian Cabildo in Calixto, p. 57 for the details of Pérez Martín and Ladrón de Guevara's appointment.

The Indian Cabildo of Lima itself recognized its own encouragement of Fr. Calixto in a "poder" of 1756:
... proporcionándose ocasión el año pasado de mil setecientos quarenta y nueve de que el dicho fraí Calixto de San Joseph hubiese emprendido nuevo viaje a los dichos Reinos de España, le volvimos a recomendar este negocio, entregándole a este señor la dicha representación [petition for the implementation of the cédula de honores] con mas otro manifiesto impreso [Representación] de los agravios que padecen los Indios.

See "poder" given to Fr. Calixto Túpac Inca by the Indian Cabildo of Lima (30 October 1756) in AGI (Lima 988).

15 If, as deduced in note 13, Francisco de Zeballos was not appointed before the middle of 1749 and if, as appears likely, Fr. Calixto did not return to Lima after leaving there in August 1748, it is quite reasonable to assume that he did not learn of Zeballos' official appointment by the Indian Cabildo of Lima until he met with Zeballos at Santiago de Cotagaita in late 1749. This assumption would explain what otherwise would be the unnecessary duplication by Fr. Calixto of the task assigned to Zeballos. More importantly, however, it explains why Fr. Calixto appears to have retained hopes of securing an official appointment from the Cabildo up to the time of his departure for Spain. He did not learn of the appointment of Pérez Martín and Ladrón de Guevara until he was actually in Spain. See letter of Fr. Calixto to the Indian Cabildo in Calixto, p. 57.

16 Letter to Indian Cabildo in Calixto, p. 49. See also p. 59:

... Señores, para dar cumplimiento de lo que yo les ofrecí de ser su mensajero o embajador, en nombre de toda la Nación, di principio de mi viaje desde esa Ciudad ... con la esperanza de que los caciques, y en particular los parientes del Cuzco me habían facilitar con plata; mas no sucedió así. Eso es fiarse de hombres, y más de parientes.

17 Fr. Calixto, letter to Indian Cabildo in Calixto, p. 60.
18 Fr. Calixto described his motivation in the following terms: "El fundamento que yo tuve, para los gastos que se han hecho, es porque vuestras mercedes no dijesen de mí que por no tener ánimo ni crédito, había dejado perder una ocasión tan buena." Letter to Indian Cabildo in Calixto, p. 57.

19 Fr. Calixto's letter to the Indian Cabildo detailed the difficulties the pair encountered, particularly their need to borrow money at every turn in order to complete their voyage (Calixto, pp. 49-52).

20 Letter to Indian Cabildo in Calixto, p. 53.

21 "... los Señores Consejeros hicieron llamar al dicho Reverendo Padre mi compañero para que declarase los agravios que hacían los españoles a los de nuestra Nación." (Fr. Calixto, letter to Indian Cabildo, Calixto, p. 54.) Fr. Isidoro's two declarations, the one without date and the other dated 9 January 1751, are in AGI (Lima 541). In this location as well as in AGI (Lima 988) are to be found a number of letters exchanged between Franciscan officials and officials of the Council of the Indies. These letters, which run from 23 September 1750 to 11 May 1751, are concerned with the Council's attempts to track down the various protests presented by Fr. Calixto and Fr. Isidoro. The Council's deliberations over the Representación were most intense in May, 1751, undoubtedly as a result of Superunda's letter of 24 September 1750 implicating the Representación in the Lima conspiracy of that same year. See Chapter VI for further details.

22 In response to instructions from the Fiscal of the Council of the Indies, Joaquín Joseph Vázquez y Morales, that Fr. Calixto's Indian ancestry was no impediment to his full participation in religious orders, Fr. Matías de Velasco, Comisario general de Indias, complied reluctantly with the order
in the following terms: "... para que, en inteligencia de todo, y sin embargo de la constitución de mi orden, que lo prohíbe, pueda admitir a ella, y a la profesión de su instituto al hermano Calixto Tupac." See letter to Vázquez y Morales, 31 July 1751, AGI (Lima 541). The Ministro General of the Franciscan Order formally ordered on 21 September 1751 that Fr. Calixto be given the Franciscan habit and allowed to take vows (letter in Calixto, p. 75).

23 Opinion of the Fiscal of the Council of the Indies in AGI (Lima 541).

24 The Council appreciated, as its Fiscal noted when reporting on his search for the printed copies of the Representación,

... los inconvenientes, que podia ocasionar, se divulgase por medio de la impresión, principalmente en la América, su contexto; se me dió domission verbal, y reservada, para que averiguase con maña de los referidos, que numero de ellos tenian, y los procurase sacar de su poder, y recoger todos con el pretexto mas disimulado ... y haviendome asegurado ambos, que se havia dado a la Estampa en Indias, y solo se les havian entregado allá, para segui aqui esta dependencia, el exemplar presentado, y otro maltratado vastantemente y con algo escrito de pluma á sus margenes, que havia traído y retenia en si el otro Hermano y estaban prontos igualmente a exhibir; se me previno que assi lo dejase.

Report of Vázquez y Morales to Marqués de la Ensenada, 10 May 1751, in AGI (Lima 988).

25 Letter to Indian Cabildo of Lima, Calixto, p. 57.

26 "Poder," 30 October 1756.

27 A separate petition requesting this permission was presented to the Crown through Juan de Bustamante Carlos Inca, a member of the Indian nobility who resided at Court in the capacity of "Gentilhombre de boca" to the King. Fr. Calixto praised Juan de Bustamante in the letter to the Indian Cabildo (Calixto, p. 61). However, a royal decree issued on 19 January 1751 refused
to grant this permission although it insisted that the Viceroy should authorize caciques and Indian nobles to travel to Spain if they could demonstrate "justo motivo." (Real cédula in Calixto, p. 63.)

28 See Zavala, Recuerdo de Vasco Quiroga, pp. 14, 34 and 61; Phelan, The Millenial Kingdom; and Maravall, "La utopía," p. 205. Las Casas wrote: "... este es el tiempo de las misericordias, escondido en los siglos pasados, como dice el Apóstol, e venido oportuno agora para nuevo vivir de todos estos pueblos, ¿por qué se convierte este tiempo en tiempo de tribulación, ...?" and insisted that Christ's own example of peaceful conversion should be followed in America: "... esta es la puerta de salir la doctrina de Cristo e su sacro Evangelio a convertir los extraños de su fe y de su Iglesia. Pues si esta es la puerta señores, y el camino de convertir estas gentes que tenéis a vuestro cargo, ¿por qué en lugar de enviar ovejas ... enviáis lobos ...?"


29 Maravall, "La utopía," p. 207.

30 Nuevo sistema, p. 38.

31 Nuevo sistema, p. 4.
See Phelan, pp. 21-31 and p. 69. This type of analogy is particularly frequent in Las Casas, *Apologética historia sumaria cuanto a las cualidades, disposición, descripción, cielo y suelo destas tierras, y condiciones naturales, policías, repúblicas, maneras de vivir e costumbres de las gentes destas Indias occidentales y meridionales, cuyo imperio soberano pertenece a los reyes de Castilla, Obras escogidas*, III and IV, Biblioteca de autores, V. 105 and 106. See for example I, 68; II, 108. See also Las Casas, "Entre los remedios que don fray Bartolomé de las Casas, obispo de la Ciudad Real de Chiapa, refirió por mandado del Emperador rey" in ed. Juan Pérez de Tudela Bueso, *Tratados de Fray Bartolomé de las Casas*, II (Mexico and Buenos Aires, 1965). Las Casas draws an analogy between God's refusal to give the true religion to the Jews until they had escaped the tyranny of Pharoah and the inability of the Indians to receive Christianity until the tyranny of the Spaniards is removed:

Diola, empero, cuando concurrieron ambas a dos disposiciones, pueblo e libertad juntamente. Y esto nunca fue hasta que Dios, con mano válida y rigurosa, los libertó y sacó del poderío tiránico de Faraón. ... Sobre todas las leyes ... nunca otra hobo ni habrá que así requiera las dichas dos disposiciones como la ley evangélica de Jesucristo.

(p. 665)

Similarly, he considered that the Spanish tyranny in America was worse than any suffered by the Jews because it did not affect "una gente sola, como persuadía Amán al rey Asuero, que matase el pueblo de los judíos; pero de infinitos reinos, pueblos y gentes" (p. 841). See also, Las Casas, "Este es un tratado que el obispo de la ciudad real de Chiapa, don fray Bartolomé de las Casas o Casaus, compuso, por comisión del Consejo Real de las Indias, sobre la materia de los indios que se han hecho en ellas esclavos" in *Tratados*, I, 508-509. The comparison between the Jews and the Indians must have been a
very common one for Fr. Diego de Landa noted that Spaniards often used to justify their abusive treatment of the Indians: "Que los españoles se desculpan con dezir que siendo ellos pocos no podian sugetar tanta gente sin ponerles miedo con castigos terribles, y traen exemplos de historias, y de la passada de los Hebreos á la tierra de promission con grandes crueldades por mandado de Dios." See "Relación de las cosas de Yucatán sacada de la que escribió el Padre Fray Diego de Landa," Colección de documentos inéditos relativos al descubrimiento, 2nd series, XIII (Madrid, 1900), p. 304.

33 Gerónimo de Mendieta, Historia eclesiástica indiana (Mexico, 1945), II, 122. Another appeal, written in Latin and directed to the Pope, entitled Planctus indorum christianorum in America Peruntina: SeuVae Lacrimabile, Lamentabilis Luctus, atque ululatus, multus que Ploratus abimo corde, used this same analogy: "Ad Matrem Suam Sanctam Ecleciam, ficus Natio Indorum clamat verbis Jeremiae plangentis" (p. 8). Although not written by an Indian, the Planctus and the author to whom it is generally attributed are linked both in theory and in practice to the Indian reform movement. Although the Planctus was published without an indication of place or date, internal evidence places its writing some time in 1750 (p. 42). It was attributed in the early nineteenth century to Fr. Antonio Garro, a Lector de idioma Índico in the Convento de Jesús in Lima, an attribution which is supported both by Spanish and Indian sources. Fr. Antonio was evidently in close touch with the Indian reformists for Fr. Calixto mentioned in his letter to the Indian Cabildo of Lima having forwarded a copy of a petition to Garro (Calixto, p. 58). The Planctus itself related the return of the Indian emissary Zeballos from Buenos Aires (p. 42). The Planctus drew directly on many of the missionary authors whose theories
were expressed in the Representación, as well as on the Biblical commentaries of Nicholas of Lyre which had formed the basis of the early missionaries' own prophetic interpretation of the events of the Old Testament (pp. 40, 41, 86 and passim). For discussions of the authorship of the Planctus see José Toribio Polo, "Un libro raro," Revista Peruana, 1 (1879), 624-634, and Vargas Ugarte, Historia, IV, 244, 245.

34 Cf. Planctus, p. 99:

Sic licet habeant aquam suam, pretio comparatam, non habent peiori fortuna, Hebreis captivis à Nabuco, nam tunc, teste Ieremia, aquam suam pretio bibebant, aquam nostram pretio bibimus. Sed in hac Babilonia, Americae Indi Naturales, & Domini, Isuae regiones, nec aquam suam, bibunt sua pecunia, nec ligna sua comparant pretio.


36 Phelan, p. 102.

37 "... estos reinos de España, de que Vuestra Majestad es rey natural y señor, están en muy gran peligro de ser perdidos, y destruídos, y robados, opresos y asolados. ... La razón desto es porque Dios, que es justísimo ... está muy indignado, enojado y ofendido de grandes ofensas y pecados que los de España han cometido y obrado en todas las Indias, afgiando y oprimiendo, tiranizando, y robando, y matando tantas y tales gentes sin razón y justicia alguna, y en tan poquitos años despoblando tantas y tales tierras." (Las Casas, "Entre los Remedios," p. 811.)

38 Fr. Joseph de San Antonio, letter to King, 27 December 1752, in AGI (Lima 541).

39 Estado político, p. 25v.
On 21 June 1750, the Spanish administration discovered within the Indian elite of Lima a conspiracy aimed at overthrowing the Spanish administration. An official investigation into this conspiracy revealed that its leaders had planned to occupy the Viceregal Palace and the munitions depot, kill the Spanish ministers and eventually install an Indian as King. They planned to win the support of negro slaves by liberating them and that of rural Indians by exempting them from mita and tribute payment.

The Viceroy Superunda did not take this conspiracy lightly. On the contrary, eleven Indians were apprehended and six executed on 22 July 1750 for their part in the plot. The remaining five were granted a pardon, but before they were released, two of them escaped. These two, Pedro Santos and Francisco García Jimenez, also known as Francisco Inga, fled to the province of Huarochirí where they instigated an uprising against the local Spanish administration. News of this revolt reached Lima at the end of July 1750, and led the Viceroy to keep the remaining conspirators of Lima in prison. Because of the relatively sparse Spanish population of Huarochirí and the province's difficulty of access the rebels rapidly consolidated a hold on the region. The Viceroy sent troops, some of the leaders of which were Indian nobles, from Lima to pacify the revolt. These troops with the support of the inhabitants of one loyal town, Langa,
turned the tide against the rebels. Pedro Santos and Francisco Inga were both executed and a number of other participants in the uprising were exiled to the Juan Fernández Islands.

This revolt, like the conspiracy of Lima, occurring at a time when the Rebellion of Juan Santos in the montaña region still raged in spite of the administration's efforts to suppress it, confirmed the worst fears of many colonials that widespread Indian rebellion could break out at any time. Spaniards and creoles alike expressed the opinion that only a catalyst was necessary to move the oppressed Indian population to open confrontation with the administration. Juan and Ulloa considered that this anxiety over the threat of Indian revolt was a decisive factor in the opposition of creoles and Spaniards to proposals designed to give the Indians a larger role in their own administration:

... pretexitar que con la demasiada autoridad que se les daba a con la grande protección que tenían los indios, saldrían de su encogimiento y se sublevarían, haciendo un rey de su nación. Esta es la fantasma con que atemorizan.\(^2\)

Similarly, the Estado político revealed a concern that a foreign nation could easily induce the Indians to rebel:

... quan arriesgado tiene este Reyno ... de faltar el contrapeso resulta estar sin fiel la balanza, y próximo el peligro de un Reyno distante ... porque estando en los mayores la culpa, pudieron estos, armando a los menores, hacer del último delito un baluarte, que los defendiese del castigo.\(^3\)

The Viceroy evidently shared these apprehensions as he indicated in a later description of the factors which had led to the revolt of Huarochirí: "... en medio del humilde abatimiento que parece les es connatural a los indios, tienen
pronta disposición a dejarse arrebatar, en habiendo malignidad que los influya."

As a result of these fears, Superunda investigated whether the conspirators of Lima might have been in contact with Juan Santos or with the Indians of any other province. Although he pronounced himself satisfied that they had not, his fear of Indian revolt was still far from allayed. He initiated precautionary measures to thwart the outbreak of any further Indian revolt.⁵

Superunda believed that both the Representación itself and the individuals responsible for its drafting and presentation to the Crown were implicated in the conspiracy of Lima. He traced the planning of the conspiracy to the meetings in Lima in 1748 and asserted that the document drafted as a result of those meetings inspired the Indians to revolt. This document was, as we established in Chapter V, the Representación. Certainly by justifying rebellion within the framework of Spanish colonial theory the Representación could have reinforced the opinion already held by some members of the Indian elite that revolt was a practical and legitimate solution to their plight. Thus there is some basis for the Viceroy's suspicion of the Representación. Although the intention of the Representación was, as we have indicated, to achieve broad reforms which would ameliorate the condition of Indians of all ranks, it is quite feasible that its graphic description of Indian oppression did in fact serve to intensify Indian unrest.

The Viceroy considered Fr. Calixto, because of his association with the meetings of 1748 and the Representación, to be a dangerous influence on the Indians.⁶ Fr. Calixto, however, had indicated that his sponsorship of the Representación was determined precisely by his interest in preventing rebellion. Fr. Isidoro de Cala y Ortega corroborated that this was indeed Fr. Calixto's
main purpose. A detailed analysis of the sequence of events involved in the production of the Representación, the appointment of Zeballos as the Cabildo's agent, and the conspiracy in Lima indicates that there was no concrete basis for Superunda's suspicion of Fr. Calixto.

Zeballos, remember, and not Fr. Calixto, was officially delegated to take the Representación to Spain. Zeballos' return to Lima some time in late 1749 without having completed his mission can only have deepened the Indians' despair over their inability to gain even a hearing by the Crown. Although the Lima Indian elite would probably have learned through Zeballos of Fr. Calixto's attempt to go to Spain, this information would do little to mitigate their despair. According to Fr. Calixto the Indian Cabildo already had serious doubts about his reliability, and Zeballos, in view of his own failure to reach Spain, would no doubt have reinforced these doubts by painting a very black picture of the friar's chances of carrying out his plan. Thus having every reason to believe that the decision taken in 1748 to present a new petition to the Crown had been founded on false hopes, the conspirators of Lima must have abandoned their commitment to that decision and initiated plans to use violence to overthrow the administration as they had advocated in 1748.

Since Fr. Calixto had left Peru before the Indians of Lima became aware of the failure of Zeballos' mission, he obviously could have played no part in those plans. His correspondence with the Indian Cabildo of Lima in November, 1750, five months after the plot was revealed, gives no indication that he was even aware of its existence. The gist of this letter supports the assumption that Fr. Calixto, although conscious of the lack of faith which some members of the Indian elite had in the efficacy of petitioning the Crown,
believed that even these individuals remained committed to the decision made in 1748 to foreswear violence until the outcome of the Representación was known.

Superunda's suspicion of Fr. Calixto stemmed, then, not from any concrete evidence, but from the Viceroy's well-founded apprehensions regarding the outbreak of Indian revolt. As a direct result of the Lima conspiracy, Superunda adopted a policy of keeping a close watch on any new manifestations of Indian discontent.

It was to an atmosphere of fear and suspicion created by Superunda's precautionary measures towards Indian protest that Fr. Calixto returned in 1753. The friar, no doubt flush with the victory of his promotion and of the royal protection he had been given for his return journey, was anxious to resume his championship of Indian welfare. Although he had won no concessions for Indian society as a whole while in Spain, his personal successes gave him a good basis for arguing that now, if he could win the Indian Cabildo's authorization, he could really advance their interests. As his earlier activities demonstrated, Fr. Calixto was both astute and determined, and he finally convinced the Indian Cabildo to give him the official authorization which he felt would enable him to present their case effectively to the Crown. In October 1756 the Indian Cabildo of Lima authorized Fr. Calixto to present the petition originally entrusted to him in 1744 as well as other petitions at his own or the Cabildo's discretion.8

The meetings which Fr. Calixto held with Indian nobles and the Indian Cabildo at this time were betrayed by an Indian official to the corregidor of the Cercado.9 In view of Superunda's policy of nipping any new manifestations
of Indian discontent in the bud, he launched an investigation to determine the aims of the secret meetings. In the context of Superunda's repressive policy secrecy would be essential if, as Fr. Calixto had asserted before, his aim continued to be the representation of even the most radical elements of Indian society in protests to the Crown. A detailed examination of the evidence gathered by the investigation entrusted to a judge of the Audiencia of Lima reveals nothing to indicate that Fr. Calixto or his cohorts were planning anything more drastic than further petitions to the Crown.

The judge, assisted by Fr. Calixto's superiors, entered his cell and took all the papers he could find. According to Superunda these papers turned up only three documents of interest. One was the Cabildo's appointment of Fr. Calixto as their agent. The second was the letter written by Fr. Calixto to the Indian Cabildo when he was in Spain, a letter which, in Superunda's opinion, demonstrated "toda la animosidad de este sujeto." This description was tailored to fit the Viceroy's preconceived image of Fr. Calixto. In fact the letter in question was written in an attempt to convince the members of the Indian Cabildo to appoint Fr. Calixto as their official representative. Although it detailed the circumstances of his journey to Spain the only animosity it revealed was directed towards the Indian Cabildo for having refused to appoint him in the first place.

The third document was a letter written from Madrid to the Indian Cabildo of Lima by a Peruvian Indian noble, Felipe Tacuri Mena. Superunda described the tone of this letter as malevolent and there is some basis for this impression. Felipe Tacuri expressed his bitter disappointment at the failure of a Peruvian Indian noble who resided in Mexico, Julián Sirilo y Castilla, to win the support
of the Crown and Council of the Indies for a plan to establish a school for Indians. This school was intended to be run strictly by Indians. Felipe Tacuri placed the blame for the failure of this plan on the Indian Cabildo of Lima itself. He accused the Indian Cabildo of only making enemies by presenting wide-ranging indictments of the Spanish administration to the Crown and argued that if only the Cabildo would restrict its petitions to specific demands they might be met.\textsuperscript{11} If this letter had any effect on the Indian elite of Lima it would probably have been as a moderating influence. It may in fact have swayed the Cabildo to authorize once again the presentation of the petition regarding the charter of privileges since Tacuri Mena specifically noted that he expected favorable results from just such a petition.\textsuperscript{12}

Although Superunda explicitly stated that none of the evidence produced by the investigation into the Indian meetings of 1756 constituted proof of any subversive plans, he nevertheless clung to his policy of severe reprisals against Indians involved in any sort of protest. Fr. Calixto, whom Superunda quite rightly identified as the instigator of the meetings, bore the brunt of these reprisals. Fr. Calixto was imprisoned in his cell and prohibited from having any contact with Indians. In November 1757 the Viceroy ordered him exiled to Spain where he was confined to the Franciscan monastery in Adamuz and strictly prohibited from returning to America.\textsuperscript{13}

Not only did the exile of Fr. Calixto put an end to his career as an Indian representative, but it also marked the end of the culminating phase of the Indian reform movement. While Superunda's repressive policies towards manifestations of Indian discontent amongst the Indian elite of Lima effectively stifled Indian protests in the short term, it did so at great expense in
the long run. Fr. Calixto had played an influential role in conciliating the advocates of violence to a policy of peaceful agitation. Similarly, the Indian elite of Lima, by channeling the discontent of rural caciques into the Indian reform movement, had provided these Indian leaders with some hope of alleviating their oppressed condition. The failure of the Representación to bring beneficial results destroyed the faith of all but the most rabid Hispanophiles within the Lima Indian elite in continued protest. Viceroy Superunda's effective suppression of the expression of Indian grievances through any channels but those subject to Viceregal control\textsuperscript{14} compounded this loss of faith. In fact, Superunda's policy effectively suppressed Indian protest in Lima until after his reign.

Some time in the 1760's, however, the Lima Cabildo must have presented yet another appeal for the publication of the charter of privileges and in 1766 the document was finally published in Lima.\textsuperscript{15} The fact that the Indian elite could now attempt to upgrade their status through education and employment in careers suitable to their theoretical nobility may explain to a large extent why the Lima Cabildo abandoned its advocacy of the welfare of Indian society as a whole. The implementation of the charter of privileges would have opened up a whole new avenue of upward mobility to the urban Indians and hence reduced their interest in the welfare of their rural compatriots.

By this time the unrest which according to many observers had been seething within Peruvian Indian society for some time was gaining expression in an increasing number of spontaneous uprisings. For instance, in the province of Sicasica the frustrations vented by the Indians in 1770 in the murder of an official involved in the administration of the repartimiento erupted again in
1771 in a mutiny by three thousand Indians against the corregidor. Similarly in 1774 the Indians of Pataz imprisoned two corregidores whom they released after being guaranteed a pardon by the imprisoned officials. The Audiencia of La Plata conducted an investigation into that uprising and concluded that abusive repartimientos had been its main cause. The gravity of this outbreak moved the Audiencia to assert that it dared not attempt to apprehend its instigator for fear of grave consequences.

These uprisings all had common features. They were directed against corregidores and they were either led by caciques or initiated in support of the rights of abused caciques. This latter fact indicates that the rural caciques were recognized by the tributaries as leaders and spokesmen. These caciques were therefore in a position to direct the resentment of rural Indians against the Spanish administration. The ineffectiveness of the protectoral system and the abdication of the Lima Indian elite of their role as advocates of oppressed rural Indians left violence as the only possible means by which these Indians could hope to put an end to their exploitation by colonial officials.

The Lima Indian elite's abdication of its role as advocates of the welfare of all groups of Indian society together with the proliferation of rural Indian uprisings in the 1770's provide the background for us to present an interpretation of the Rebellion of Tupac Amaru in the 1780's consistent both with José Gabriel's declared reformist, loyalist position and with his adoption of rebellion as a means of achieving reformist aims. Both Tupac Amaru's activities before and after he initiated rebellion and the theories presented in his writings substantiate our theory that Tupac Amaru adapted
the Indian reformist ideology to the changed conditions of the 1770's.\textsuperscript{17}

Although a rural cacique, José Gabriel Tupac Amaru was a wealthy and privileged one. He had been educated in the Jesuit college of San Francisco de Borja in Cuzco where he was made aware of the legal and religious basis of Spain's protectoral policy towards the Peruvian Indians. As his subsequent activities and writings reveal José Gabriel was under the illusion that this policy could in fact play a decisive role in the actions of the colonial administration and the Crown. His repeated declarations of adhesion to the Spanish Monarchy were but one reflection of his belief in the ultimate justice of the Spanish regime.

As early as 1770, Tupac Amaru attempted, just as the Indian reformists had done, to take full advantage of the legal privileges to which he was entitled as an Indian noble. His education in the reality of the Spanish regime was about to begin. He travelled to Lima in order to lay claim to the marquisate of Oropesa. Although his claim to this title was tenuous, it was approved in theory by the Audiencia. Tupac Amaru's victory, however, was short-lived, for the official recognition of his claim was withheld from publication. Like earlier reformists such as Morachimo and Fr. Calixto whose achievement of support in theory from the Council of the Indies had proven to bring no effective action on the part of the colonial administration, José Gabriel must have been somewhat disillusioned by the inconclusive outcome of his claims to the marquisate.

In 1777 he was threatened with the possibility of losing his caciqueship to a usurper, Diego Felipe Betancour. This threat came not from the conditions which enabled individuals willing to cooperate with corregidores to usurp
rightful but impoverished caciques, but rather from the widely acknowledged corruption of the Audiencia of Lima. Betancour had initiated legal proceedings to prove his claim to the caciqueship held by José Gabriel. The inconclusive results of this litigation gave Tupac Amaru an ever greater personal stake in the reform of the Spanish administration. While in Lima to rebut Betancour's claims, José Gabriel adopted precisely the tactic which had characterized the attempts of the Lima Indian elite to win the implementation of their theoretical privileges. He attempted to reinforce his theoretical right to the caciqueship with effective leadership of the Indians of his jurisdiction. Indeed he presented a petition against the mita of Potosí not only on behalf of the Indians of his own jurisdiction, but also on behalf of those of other caciqueships. Again, however, his experience repeated that of the Indian reformists of Morachimo's time. José Gabriel's petition was rebuffed for lack of evidence. This disappointment must have led him at least to consider the conclusion reached by some members of the Lima Indian elite by 1748—that it was futile to attempt to gain concessions for any segment of Indian society through the existing colonial bureaucracy.

There is some evidence to support the belief that at this time José Gabriel attempted to present his case to the Spanish Crown through the intervention of an uncle, Blas Tupac Amaru. By 1780, however, there was ample evidence that Indians throughout the Viceroyalty were prepared to rebel against their corregidores. At the same time, the Crown's appointment of the Visitor José Antonio de Areche to initiate reforms in the Peruvian administration as a foundation for the implementation of the intendant system gave cause for José Gabriel to hope that at last the Monarch had taken definitive action to rout
the corrupt administration. Much as Areche's actions belied it, his instructions were predicated not only on a desire to modernize the colonial economy and administration, but on a desire to do so in a way which would effectively ameliorate the conditions of the Indians. It was the Indian population which theorists such as Campillo on whose plan the proposed reforms were based identified as the Crown's greatest treasures in America. A prime factor in the plan to integrate Indians into a productive colonial economy was the abolition of the office of corregidor and its substitution by intendants. In view of this plan, Tupac Amaru's decision to initiate an Indian revolt by murdering a corregidor could be interpreted as an attempt to demonstrate the cacique's aim of hastening reforms already approved by the Crown. By harnessing the Indian revolts already occurring in various parts of Peru and directing them to serve the aims of the Crown, José Gabriel, like Fr. Calixto earlier, may in fact have been making a last-ditch effort to preserve the Spanish Monarchy in Peru in the belief that the Crown was indeed on the verge of finally implementing the protectoral policies it had so long espoused. The writings of Tupac Amaru confirm this theory.

Both at the beginning and the end of his leadership of the Indian rebellion Tupac Amaru described himself as a continuer of a long tradition of protest emanating from both Indian and Spanish sources. In November 1780, addressing himself to the creoles, he attributed his advocacy of the Indians' cause to the same motive which had inspired earlier appeals by members of the Indian nobility—an obligation inherent in the privileged status of the nobility:

Como los repetidos clamores de los naturales de estas Provincias... aunque habían producido varias Justas quejas, a todos los Tribunales, no hallaban remedio oportuno para contenerlos, y que pues yo como el más Distinguido debía mirarlos con aquella lástima que la misma naturaleza exige, y más con estos infelices.
In March 1781, Tupac Amaru explained the failure of earlier appeals to achieve effective reform in terms characteristic of the Indian protest movement—the Monarch's ignorance of the true plight of the Peruvian Indians:

Público y notorio es lo que contra ellos han informado al Real Consejo los SS. Arzobispos, Obispos, Cabildos, Prelados y Religiones, Curas y otras personas constituidas en dignidad y letras, pidiendo remedio a favor de este Reyno: causa de ellos, como al presente ha sucedido y está sucediendo, y ha sido tan grande nuestro infortunio para que no sean atendidos en los Reales Consejos: será la causa porque no han llegado a los reales oídos.22

José Gabriel Tupac Amaru held the Indian reformists' view that the Spanish Monarch's benevolence towards his Indian subjects was thwarted by the deliberate and malevolent intervention of his own administrators. José Gabriel defined the Crown's legislation as an indication of the Monarch's real commitment to the protection of Indian welfare in terms similar to those of earlier Indian protests. Compare for example the following lines from the _Representación_:

... pues no hay otra cosa en los archivos y leyes y cédulas, con que nos han favorecido, tan inmensa y copiosamente, vuestros gloriosísimos progenitores ... si por lo que se experimenta practicado todo es en contra de lo que está mandado; por eso lloramos y gemimos. (p. 8)

with these words of Tupac Amaru:

No tengo voces para explicar su real grandeza, que como es nuestro amparo, protección y escudo, es el paño de lágrimas nuestras; que como es nuestro Padre y Señor, es nuestro refugio y consuelo: no halla voces nuestro reconocimiento, amor y fidelidad, para del todo explicar y decir, que cosa es el Rey mi Señor: publiquen su real grandeza, expliquen la fragua de su amor las Recopiladas de Indias, las ordenanzas y cédulas reales, las provisiones, encargos, ruegos y demás prevenciones, dirigidas a los SS. Vireyes, Presidentes ... que juzgo en todo lo referido no hay punto, ápice ni coma que no sea a favor de sus pobres indios neófitos ... es pues de sentir que siendo tan excesivo el favor y amor de nuestros soberanos, que nos amparan y protejen, sea mayor la fragua de nuestro tormento y cautiverio.23
Tupac Amaru's description of the plight of Indian society as one of captivity is reminiscent of the terms in which the Representación expressed the Indians' despair over their subjugation. In fact, Tupac Amaru used the same analogy as the Representación, the comparison between the captivity of the Jews and that of the Christian Indians. More importantly, he used this analogy in essentially the same way to depict the Indians' plight as far worse than that of the Jews in captivity:

Por providencia divina, libertaron al infeliz pueblo de Israel del poder de Goliat y Faraón: fue la razón porque las lágrimas de estos pobres cautivos dieron tales voces de compasión, pidiendo justicia al cielo, que en cortos años salieron de su martirio y tormento para la tierra de promisión: mas ¡ay! que al fin lograron su deseo, aunque con tanto llanto y lágrimas. Mas nosotros, infelices indios, con más suspiros y lágrimas que ellos, en tantos siglos no hemos podido conseguir ningún alivio.24

Similarly, José Gabriel followed the pattern set by the Representación in attributing the tyranny suffered by the Indians not to the Spanish Monarch but to the corrupt Spanish administration. The collective nature of this tyranny was expressed in terms of a multiplicity of Pharaohs. José Gabriel wrote "el Faraón que nos persigue, maltrata y hostiliza, no es uno solo, sino muchos, tan inicuos y de corazones tan depravados"25 and the Representación stated "parece que nos dominan egipcios y no españoles; que nos sujetan Faraones y no Reyes católicos" (p. 10).

Both Tupac Amaru and the Representación gave an identical explanation for the greater severity of the Indians' oppression in relation to that of other societies throughout history. Compare the Representación's "eran los egipcios idólatras y católicas los judíos; pero acá los españoles son cristianos y cristianos son los indios. Si fueron cautivados por Nabuco Donosor, por Necao,
Alejandro, Antioco y los Romanos, hubo la disparidad de ser unos infieles, y fieles los otros" (p. 40) with Tupac Amaru's "los Nerones y Atilas, de quienes la historia refiere sus iniquidades, y de sólo oir se estremecen los cuerpos y lloran los corazones. En estos hay disculpa porque al fin fueron infieles; pero los correjedores, siendo bautizados, desdicen del cristianismo con sus obras, y mas parecen Ateistas, Calvinistas y Luteranos, porque son enemigos de Dios y de los hombres, idólatras del oro y la plata."

In keeping with his accusation that the Spanish administrators were idolaters, José Gabriel invoked the missionary argument that such corrupt officials were destined for divine punishment for their oppression of the Indians: "... saben que hay Dios, y no lo creen remunerador y justiciero, y sus obras nos lo manifiestan ... ellos nunca se confiesan, porque están con el robo en la mano, y no hallan sacerdote que los absuelva."27

Just as the Representación had used such a consideration as a basis for suggesting that rebellion would be a suitable castigation for tyranny, José Gabriel Tupac Amaru accused the Spanish administration of illegitimacy both on religious grounds as "apóstatas de la fe" and on secular grounds as "traidores al Rey."28 Therefore, he concluded that the destruction of this tyrannical administration would be a great service to the Crown: "... luego ellos deben ser destruidos a fuego y sangre en el instante; luego matando nosotros a los correjedores y sus seguidores, hacemos grandes servicios a su Majestad, y somos dignos de premio y correspondencia."29

José Gabriel's adherence to the belief that by rebelling against the administration, he could serve the joint interests of the Indians and of the Crown was based on the same unwarranted faith in the Crown's avowed devotion
to protectoral ideals that had permeated the Indian reform movement from its inception. This faith had been maintained over two centuries by the Spanish Crown's lip-service to protectoral ideals in contradiction to the exploitative policies pursued by its colonial administration. The designation of a specific institution, the protectoral system, to execute the Crown's benevolent intentions had not only perpetuated the fiction of its benevolence, but also provided a vehicle through which Indians could formulate their complaints against the Spanish administration within the framework of Spanish colonial theory. The existence of a ready-made explanation for the cause of the Indians' oppression as well as a ready-made panacea for that oppression proved to be a limiting factor on the development of Indian reformist thought in eighteenth-century Peru. The reformists' adoption of legislation based on sixteenth-century radical missionary ideals as a panacea for the detrimental effects which the Spanish colonial regime had had on Indian society prevented them from developing a realistic awareness of the complex social and economic relationships which existed amongst the various sectors of colonial society. As a result, the Indian reformist ideology was ill prepared to meet the challenge of effecting a practical alliance with non-Indian groups such as the clergy and the creoles whose support could have spelled the success of the rebellion of 1780.
The following discussion of the conspiracy of Lima in 1750 and the subsequent uprising in Huarochirí is based on descriptions of the events given by the Viceroy, Superunda, in letters to the King. The first of these was written on 24 September 1750 and has been transcribed by Castro Arenas, pp. xxi-xxiv. The second was dated 15 January 1757 and has been transcribed in Calixto, pp. 84-91. Since the main concern in this chapter is the interpretation of the events described in these letters, I will simply refer the reader to these sources for corroboration of the facts. A number of additional details on the rebellion in Huarochirí, presented in Vargas, Historia, IV, 248-253, also serve as a basis for our description of the events of 1750.

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2 Noticias secretas, I, 331.

3 Estado político, p. 8.

4 Superunda, 1756 in Calixto, p. 86.

5 "He tomado todas las medidas, para que este vecindario no viva en descuido e imprudente confianza y evite con la precaución el peligro a que pueden exponerlo en el despecho y la barbaridad de una nación siempre mal contenta y fácilmente movible y que según acredita la experiencia de los tiempos pasados, no depone el pensamiento de romper la obediencia." See Superunda, 1751 in Castro Arenas, p. xxiii.
In his letter of 1750 Superunda described the proponents of the Representación as "religiosos de cortos talentos y que haciendo capricho su patrocinio no advierten las malas consecuencias de alentarles unos pensamientos tan fuera de toda prudencia de gobierno." (In Castro Arenas, p. xxii.)

... los mismos de nuestra Nación ... han discurrido que yo les engañaba, por cuyo motivo no han querido concurrir con dinero alguno para facilitar nuestra pretensión. También vivo muy quejoso de vuestras mercedes, por no haber querido creer la palabra que les di, de que en la primera ocasión que pudiera pasar a España, lo había de ejecutar.

See Fr. Calixto, letter to Indian Cabildo in Calixto, p. 54.

"Poder" of 30 October 1756. See note 4, Chapter V.

Superunda, 1757, in Calixto, p. 87.

Letter of Felipe Tacuri Mena to the Indian Cabildo of Lima (Madrid, 30 July 1755) transcribed in Calixto, pp. 80-83.

"... todos los Señores están a mi favor por dirigirme mi memorial sólo a mi pretensión, sin dar quejas de nadie, porque el dar quejas de todos es lo que nos pierde, y no hacemos adeptos." See Tacuri Mena in Calixto, p. 82.

"Tengo presentado un memorial al Consejo, en que pido se me dé un decreto, en que mande a todas las Religiones generalmente reciban a todos los indios, concurriendo en ellos las condiciones necesarias ... y ... todos los Señores están a mi favor." See Tacuri Mena in Calixto, p. 82.

... he hecho advertir a los más racionales y menos sospechosos se abstengan de semejantes juntas y con-
currencias secretas, que las puertas del Palacio están siempre abiertas para oirles en justicia, que no se
dejen llevar de sugestiones interesadas, y cualesquiera recursos e instancias que quieran hacer a Vuestra Majestad,
las practiquen por medio de sus protectores y ministros que tienen señalados para que los favorezcan.

Superunda, 1757, in Calixto, p. 90.

Reprinted in Vargas, Impresos peruanos, VI, 127 ff.

These uprisings are described in Amat, Memoria, pp. 292-298.

Since the main interest in the following description of Tupac Amaru's activities is in providing a basis for comparison with the activities of earlier Indian reformists, I refer the reader to the standard authorities, L. Fisher, The Last Inca Revolt; Daniel Varcárcel, La rebelión de Tupac Amaru and B. Lewin, La rebelión de Tupac Amaru for corroboration of the facts.

See Lewin, p. 337 and Rowe, "Movimiento," p. 36 for evidence on this possible appeal to the Crown.


For a discussion of Areche's innovations and their contribution to the climate of dissent which preceded the outbreak of the rebellion of 1780 see L. Fisher, The Last Inca Revolt, pp. 18-21; B. Lewin, La rebelión, pp. 307-313; Vicente Palacio Atard, Areche Y Guirior, Observaciones sobre el fracaso de una visita al Perú (Seville, 1946); and J. Fisher, "La rebelión de Tupac Amaru."

The preceding association between the Crown's intention of abolishing the corregidores and the Spanish Monarchy's traditional protectoral ideals and their possible influence on Tupac Amaru's murder of the corregidor is based on the argument presented by Juan Pérez de Tudela y Bueso, "Acerca del significado de
Tupac Amaru en la historia política de la Monarquía indiana" in *Quinto congreso*, pp. 454-455.

21 José Gabriel Tupac Amaru, Edicto (17 November 1780), in Lewin, p. 421.

22 José Gabriel Tupac Amaru, "Carta a José Antonio Areche" in Manuel de Odriozola, ed., *Documentos históricos del Perú* (Lima, 1863), I, 146.

Hereafter cited as "Carta a Areche."

23 "Carta a Areche," p. 146.

24 "Carta a Areche," p. 146.


26 "Carta a Areche," p. 146.

27 "Carta a Areche," p. 150.


I
ARCHIVAL SOURCES
ARCHIVO GENERAL DE INDIAS

A. Petitions of Individual Indian Advocates Listed Chronologically

Señor, Don Vicente Morachimo, Cazique de los quatro pueblos de Indios, Santiago, Chocope, Cao, y San Estevan del Valle de Chicama, jurisdiccion de la Ciudad de Truxillo, Reyno del Perù, por si, y por los referidos quatro Pueblos, de que fue nombrado Procurador por el Virrey, puesto á los Reales pies de V. Mag. dice: Que viene quatro mil leguas de aqui, no tanto por su propio interes, quanto por hacer presentes á V. Mag. el desamparo total de los miserables Indios, y la tyrania con que generalmente son tratados de todos los Ministros Españoles, y en especial de los Visitadores. [Madrid, 1722] (Lima 437).

Señor, Don Vicente Mora Chimo Capac, Cacique principal de los Pueblos de Indios Santiago, San Pedro, y San Pablo de Chocope, Santa Maria Magdalena de Cao, y San Estevan, en el Valle de Chicama, San Salvador de Manciche, y Puerto de Guanchaco, todos de la Jurisdiccion de la Ciudad de Truxillo, y Procurador General de sus Naturales, por nombramiento del Gobierno superior del Reyno del Perù, usando de la facultad de este titulo, por si, y en nombre de dichos Indios, se pone á los Reales pies de V. Mag. y dice: Que aviendo passado á estos Reynos el año de 1721, á pedir justicia contra Don Pedro de Alsamora, Visitador de Tierras. [Madrid, 1724] (Lima 438).


Choquihuanca, José. Letter to Viceroy Castelfuerte. 6 September 1727. (Lima 495).

Señor. Don Pedro Nieto de Vargas, Diputado de los Indios del Reyno del Perù, en virtud de sus Poderes Generales, felizmente exaltado bajo de los Reales pies de V. Mag. dice: Que por el año passado de 1732, expuso á la docta, y justificada censura de los Ministros de V. Mag. en su Real Consejo de las Indias, un breve resumen de los agravios, que padecian los Indios de aquellas Provincias. [Madrid, 1734] (Lima 440).

Caxiamarca Condor Guanca, Blas. Letter to Morachimo. 7 March 1737. (Lima 495).


Cala y Ortega, Fr. Isidoro de. Deposition to the Council of the Indies. N.d. (Lima 541).

Deposition to the Council of the Indies. 9 January 1751. (Lima 541).

B. Collective Indian Petitions Listed Chronologically

Petition to the Crown signed by Francisco Esteban Montero, Cristobal Asmare, Pablo de la Cruz, Pedro Valentín, Francisco Chuqui paucar Atachi Inga, Felipe Isidoro Colquiruna, Juan Bautista Cinchiguaman, [Lorenzo?] Avendaño. Lima [1708] (Lima 438).

Copy of petition to the Viceroy signed by Domingo Chaguac, Francisco Paulli Chumbi Saba Capac Inga, Lazaro Poma Inga, Juan Carlos Acasio, Bartholome Rodriguez Apoalaya, Francisco Chuqui paucar, Salvador Puycon, Juan Navarro, Joseph Anastacio Pacheco, Juan Poma Inga, Nicolas Galindo, Juan Gonzalez Cargua Paucar, Antonio Gomes Vilca Guaman. [October, 1711] (Lima 495).

Copy of petition to the Viceroy signed by Francisco Saba Capac Inga, Juan Ucho Inga Tito Yupanqui, Joseph de la Cueva Tito Guascar Inga, Ventura Songo Cusi Gualpa, Pasqual Cassamusa y Santillán, Pedro Panta Chumbe, Sebastian de los Reyes, Salvador Puycon, Lorenzo de Abendaño, Carlos Acasio, Joseph de Castro, Jazinto Chumbi, Blas Calderon, Rodrigo Gago, Alonzo Condor Poma, Ramon de la Rosa. [Between 15 March and 1 April 1724] (Lima 495).

Copy of memorial to the Viceroy. 27 June 1724. (Lima 495).


Petition to the Crown signed by Joseph Tibursio Parral Chimo Capac Ligua Geoquel, Francisco Atun Apo Cuismango Saba Capac Ynga, Lorenzo de Avendaño, Domingo Chayguac, Andres del Peso Carbajal Caxa Paica, Salvador Puycon. 13 May 1726. (Lima 495).
Signed copy of petition originally directed to the Viceroy on 23 December 1726.
Francisco Saba Capac Inga, Joseph Chimo Capac Parral Ligua, Jacinto Chumbi, Marcos Paucar Copacondori, Domingo Chaiguac, Alfonzo Poma Condori Mango Inca. 6 September 1727. (Lima 495).

Señor. Los Caciques y Comun de Indios de Payta y Colán, Repartimiento de la Ciudad de Piura, en el Reyno del Perú de V. Mag. dicen: Que siendo tantas y tan repetidas las vexaciones que experimentan en la exaccion de los Tributos, les han puesto y ponen en la mayor, y mas lamentable ruina de verse precisados a ausentarse de aquel Pais, al no darse por V. Mag. las providencias que contenga, reformen, y refrenen los excessos y ambiciones con que se procede à la exaccion, en el modo, y en la quota. [1736] (Lima 441).

Representación verdadera y exclamación rendida y lamentable que toda la nación indiana hace a la Majestad del Señor Rey de las Españas y Emperador de las Indias, el Señor don Fernando VI, pidiendo los atienda y remedie, sacándolos del afluentes vituperio y oprobio en que están más de doscientos años. [Copy made in 1749] (Lima 988).

"Nos Los Cavildos, Justicias y Regimientos de los Naturales de esta Ciudad, y del Pueblo de Santiago del Cercado." "Poder" given to Fr. Calixto de San José Tupac Inca. Lima, 30 October 1756. (Lima 988).

C. Colonial Administration: Documents Listed Chronologically

Copy of real cédula of 31 March 1722. (Lima 495).

Copy of instructions to the Audiencia of Lima for redress of Indian grievances. 1722. (Lima 437).


Opinion of Protector of the Audiencia of Lima. 27 April 1724. (Lima 495).

Opinion of Protector of the Audiencia of Lima. 3 July 1724. (Lima 495).

Copy of Viceregal decree. 17 July 1724. (Lima 495).

Copy of real cédula of 27 January 1725. (Lima 495).

Copy of real cédula of 28 January 1725. (Lima 495).

Arméndariz, José de, Marqués de Castelfuerte. Letter to the King. 1728. (Lima 542).

Arméndariz, José de, Marqués de Castelfuerte. Letter to the King. 11 August 1727. (Lima 425).
Opinion of the Fiscal of the Council of the Indies. 3 November 1732. (Lima 440).


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