

RURAL-URBAN MIGRATION: A CASE STUDY  
OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

by

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ABSTRACT

The People's Republic of China is still a paradox: an old country yet a new nation, a society in evolution from a revolution while it is still in revolution. Before 1949, China was a war-torn country. Dejection and hunger prevailed. Today, there is a clearly apparent feeling of security, well-being and national pride.

This thesis is primarily based on library research to find out more about China, focussing on China's response to its rural-urban movement. The theme is:

"Has China, as a socialist economy practising command planning, been able to better contain and manage urban growth, particularly that due to rural-urban migration, than Third World market economies?"

The Republic of Indonesia is selected as a control because it too gained independence and full sovereignty in 1949. It is also classified as a Third World developing country which inherited a backward economy and a big population. The major difference is that China is a socialist economy while Indonesia is a market economy.

A comparison of the urbanization record of the two countries reveals the following characteristics:

- 1) The annual rate of urban growth is not significantly dissimilar.
- 2) The stage of urbanization is similar.

- 3) The two countries differ in the management of the distribution of urban growth. China managed to reduce its primacy index and control the growth of its two largest cities: Shanghai and Peking. Indonesia is still struggling with the primacy of Djakarta.
- 4) After the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, 1966-68, China adopted the bottom-up "agropolitan" approach to bring industry and social services to the rural communes. Indonesia has begun discussing the concept, but has not implemented the strategy yet.

In other words, China adopted two major strategies in directing the distribution of its urban growth:

- 1) Concentrated Decentralization: directing growth away from the largest cities (particularly former treaty ports) to medium-sized urban centres in the inland;
- 2) The Agropolitan Approach: dispersing industry and other urban functions more widely into the rural areas through the institution of the commune.

The conclusion drawn is that China, as a socialist economy, achieved relatively better results in managing and containing urban growth than Indonesia, a market economy. China may not be able to model the world in its response to rural-urban migration, but the strategies it implemented are worthy of serious consideration by other Third World countries.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

## 1.1 Purpose and Scope of the Study

As more and more people visit and report their impressions of the People's Republic of China (hereafter referred to as China,) some of the mystery and inscrutableness behind the "bamboo curtain" is being dispelled.

China is still a paradox: an old country yet a new nation, a society in evolution from a revolution while it is still in revolution. Before 1949, China was a war-torn country. Dejection and hunger prevailed. Today, there is a clearly apparent feeling of security, well-being and national pride.

The goal of this thesis is to find out more about China by focusing on China's response to its rural-urban movement. The period covered is from 1949 to 1975, just about a year before Mao Tse-Tung's death. The theme of the study is:

"Has China, as a socialist economy practising command planning, been able to better contain and manage urban growth, particularly that due to rural-urban migration, than Third World market economies."

## 1.2 Source Materials

Since the study is based primarily on library research, every effort is made to cover the whole political spectrum existing in the literature, from the pejorative to the totally sympathetic. Of course, neither is free from errors but such an approach increases the likelihood of balance being achieved.

While the perspective has been largely shaped by documented material, insights have also been gained from conversations, interviews, and slide presentations with various China scholars; residents of China who did not leave the country until 1968; and planners of the Canada-China Friendship Association who visited China in the summer of 1976.

### 1.3 Definition of Terminology

Defining "rural" and "urban" within the rural-urban continuum has always been difficult.

However, on November 7, 1955, the twentieth meeting of the State Council of the People's Republic of China established the criteria for defining the urban population. An urban area was to meet one or more of the following criteria:

- 1.3.1 serve as the seat of the municipal people's committee or people's committee above the hsien (county) level;
- 1.3.2 have a population of 2,000 or more, of whom 50% or more are non-agricultural;
- 1.3.3 have a population between 1,000 and 2,000, of whom 75% are non-agricultural.

It is uncertain whether or not these criteria are presently strictly followed by the government, but at least it serves as a guide.<sup>1</sup>

Rural-urban migration is the flow of people from rural

to urban areas. It can be subdivided into seasonal migration and permanent migration. Seasonal migration occurs during slack periods of agricultural production. Rural people migrate to the cities in search of work to supplement their incomes, but return when the busy season starts again. Permanent migration is characterized by rural people moving to the urban areas with the intention to permanently live and work there. This study is mainly concerned with the latter type of internal migration.

Though rural-urban migration contributes to urbanization, the meaning assigned to the word urbanization is broad. On the one hand, urbanization is the process whereby an increasing proportion of a country's population lives in urban areas. This increase can be the result of any combination of three factors: international migration, internal migration, natural population growth. The process proceeds in two dimensions: the increasing in size of urban concentrations, and the multiplication of the points of concentration.<sup>2</sup> In developing countries, there is also a tendency for urbanization to occur fastest in the largest cities; the end product of this process is referred to as primacy.

On the other hand, urbanization also refers to the diffusion of urbanism: the spreading of urban modes of production, living, and thinking from the originating urban centres to outlying towns and rural populations.<sup>3</sup> The present thesis is more concerned with the former, the concentration of numbers, than the latter, the diffusion of ideas.

CHAPTER I FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup>Chang-Siang Chen, "Population Growth and Urbanization in China, 1953-1970," Ekistics, 226 (September, 1974), 192-198.

<sup>2</sup>Brian J.L. Berry, The Human Consequences of Urbanization (London: The MacMillan Press Ltd., 1973), p.27.

<sup>3</sup>John Friedmann and Robert Wulff, The Urban Transition. Comparative Studies of Newly Industrializing Societies (London: Edward Arnold Publishers Ltd., 1975), p.4.

CHAPTER II URBANIZATION AND HUMAN SETTLEMENTS

This chapter represents an attempt to summarize the recent literature on urbanization processes in the Third World. In the context of the thesis, it would be quite impossible, in such a restricted chapter, to do full justice to the many interpretations and insights of scholars who have written in this field.


## 2.1 Urbanization in First and Third Worlds

According to Kingsley Davis, urbanization started its course around 1800. Before 1850, no society could be described as predominantly urbanized. By 1900, only Great Britain could be described as predominantly urbanized. By 1965, all the industrialized nations were highly urbanized.<sup>1</sup>

Davis also observed that, in general, the later a country became industrialized, the faster was its urbanization.

(see graph below.)

Figure 1. Comparative Urbanization



Source: Adapted from Kingsley Davis, "The Urbanization of the Human Population," Scientific American, Vol. 213, No. 3 (September, 1965), 41-54.

A survey of 9 European countries during their period of fastest urban population growth (mostly in latter half of 19th century) showed an average gain of 2.1% per year. The frontier industrialized countries, such as the United States of America, Australia-New Zealand, and Canada, who recorded the fastest urban growth in the first half of the 20th century, showed an average annual gain of 4.2%. For

U.S.S.R. and Japan, the two latecomers into the industrialized camp, the rate was even higher, 4.3% and 5.4% respectively.<sup>2</sup>

Against this background, the average urban growth of 6-7% per annum for the developing countries should not be a cause for alarm, assuming cities in these countries are merely repeating the past history of cities in the now industrialized nations. However, such an assumption is incorrect. The growth of cities in the developing countries today differs in fundamental ways from past history.<sup>3</sup>

During the late 19th and early 20th centuries, people were just learning how to keep crowded populations in cities from dying from epidemics. Because of the higher mortality rate in the cities, their rate of natural increase was lower than that of the countryside. Cities, therefore, needed the surplus labour from the farms and could put it to work producing goods and services that in turn helped to modernize agriculture. The stream of rural out-migration often caused the rural population to decline in absolute as well as relative terms.<sup>4</sup>

The situation is now reversed for the developing countries where urbanization gained momentum only within the last two decades. It is now the cities that have better health services and a lower mortality rate. Hence the rate of natural increase is higher in the cities than in the countryside. Furthermore, in their eagerness to modernize, developing nations often

adopted the "hand-me-down," "century-skipping" process of industrialization, importing the most up-to-date technology from abroad. The result is the mushrooming of capital-intensive industries with low job creation potential. Cities in the Third World, therefore, proved incapable of absorbing the huge labour force increase resulting from natural population growth and rural-urban migration, a phenomenon referred to as over-urbanization. At the same time, though the rural population is declining in relative terms, it is still gaining in absolute numbers.<sup>5</sup>

In conclusion, developing nations are urbanizing more rapidly than developed nations now, mainly because urbanization is a finite process. For example, in the United States, the rural-urban migration process has virtually ended because by 1970, less than 5% of its population is left on the farms.<sup>6</sup> In West Germany, the migration flow is even beginning to reverse.<sup>7</sup>

Developing nations are also urbanizing more rapidly than developed countries did in the heyday of their urban growth. On the one hand, most of the Third World is still in an early stage of urbanization. Roughly 80% of the population is still engaged in agriculture. On the other hand, they are over-urbanized, because the rate and volume of rural out-migration far exceed the current absorptive capacities of their principal cities.<sup>8</sup>

## 2.2 Primacy and Economic Development

Students of urbanization have recognized two kinds of city size distributions: rank-size, according to which the distribution of cities by population size class within countries is truncated lognormal; and primate, whereby a stratum of small towns and cities is dominated by one or more very large cities and there are deficiencies in numbers of cities of intermediate sizes. Rank-size regularities have been associated with economically advanced countries, whereas primate cities have been associated with ex-colonial, economically underdeveloped countries.<sup>9</sup>

Brian Berry in his paper "City Size Distributions and Economic Development"<sup>10</sup> qualified the gross generalizations of the above associations. According to Berry, countries with strong urban traditions and long histories of urbanization, such as India, though economically underdeveloped, also exhibit lognormality. On the other hand, there are economically developed countries such as Japan and Sweden that exhibit primacy in their urban hierarchies.

Without contradicting Berry's clarifications, it is still valid to say that all developing countries, irrespective of primacy or lognormality, are concerned about the rapid and large influx of migrants into their biggest cities. In striving for a rapid rate of economic growth through industrialization, they have accentuated the primacy of their principal cities.

William Alonso has provided a convincing rationale why investors would want to locate manufacturing enterprises in large cities of the Third World. The reasons include transportation network characteristics, the concentration of markets, time-distance relationships, amenity preferences of managers and technicians, the spatial distribution of information, and external economies.<sup>11</sup>

Concomitant with this growing geographic imbalance in the distribution of population and income, there is a growing desire to combine national growth with regional growth, to achieve efficiency and equity. Efficiency is the rate of national economic growth, often measured in terms of the growth of national product. Equity is the spread of that growth, that is, the distributional dimension.

### 2.3 Regional Planning Strategies

In response to the concern for efficiency and equity, three main streams of planning strategy have evolved.

#### 2.3.1 The Growth Poles Strategy

Francois Perroux introduced the concept of "growth poles" into economic literature in 1950, and gave the term meaning in abstract economic space.<sup>12</sup> "Poles" are firms or industries, or groups of firms or industries, where economic growth is initiated. A firm or industry would be termed as a "growth pole" if it possesses the three distinctive features of a 'propulsive' industry,

namely, high inter-sectoral linkages with many other firms or industries; a high degree of dominance<sup>13</sup>; and great size.<sup>14</sup>

When John Friedmann and other scholars transferred the concept to regional planning theories by linking sectoral to spatial development, they gave the propulsive industry or industries location(s) in geographic space, and "growth centres" became identified as the space where "growth poles" are located.<sup>15</sup>

The "growth poles" strategy focuses investment on a relatively small number of selected centres at which there exist or can easily be created the necessary conditions for expanding employment opportunity, and especially the public infrastructure and the external economies that most activities require. Such "growth centres" are then expected to attract commuters and migrants from surrounding areas of labour surplus, and at the same time to stimulate secondary growth of employment in some of those areas. It is assumed that economic growth initiated in these centres will eventually "filter down" the urban hierarchy and spread out from each centre into its immediate periphery. Concentration of public investment at "growth centres" is also justified on the ground that those are the only locations where adequate public services can be provided at reasonable cost, and where there is a prospect that prosperity and

growth can eventually be self-sustaining without permanent subsidy.<sup>16</sup>

While the efficiency argument may be valid, evidence of "trickle down" effects is very tenuous. Rural areas surrounding industrializing cities participate, if at all, to only a very limited extent in the expansion of the urban economy. "Trickling down" may occur because of purchases of raw materials made by the city, but these may be more than offset by the "trickling up" of consumer sales to the "growth centre." The relationship between centre and periphery then becomes one of further exploitation instead of development.

William Alonso termed this "growth poles" strategy as "concentrated decentralization." He pointed out that while inter-regional disparities may decrease, intra-regional disparities may increase. Even if inter-regional income averages are brought within a common range, no improvement may be obtained in the intra-regional distribution of income and services.<sup>17</sup>

### 2.3.2 The "Do-Nothing" Approach

William Alonso argued that developing nations may be over-reacting to the phenomenon of primacy. By analyzing the history of urbanization in the First World and relating it to Rostow's 'stages of economic growth',<sup>18</sup> he observed that primacy was very rare in very under-developed

economies, rose during the take-off stage, and decreased thereafter. He added this did not mean the largest cities would stop to grow in the mature stage of the economy, but that secondary centres would grow much faster.<sup>19</sup>

Alonso's theory was buttressed by Jeffrey Williamson's thesis that regional income differentials tend to grow larger during the early stages of economic development, then level off, only to decline again with the growing maturity and spatial integration of the economy.<sup>20</sup>

For lack of a better terminology, I have termed this strategy the "Do-nothing" approach. "Do-nothing" scholars are saying that an invisible hand may be at work, and, given world enough and time enough, it may reconcile the efficiency and equity conflicts.

The crux is time. If developing nations simply let nature take its course and do nothing, the time period required for the reduction of regional inequalities through 'spontaneous' market forces might take a century or longer. Then, even if high levels of urbanization, industrialization and per capita incomes prevail, inter-regional and intra-regional differences may be the cause for wide-spread agitation.

### 2.3.3 The Agropolitan Approach

During the recent "Symposium on Regional Development Planning in Asia" sponsored by the United Nations Centre

for Regional Development held in 1975 in Nagoya, Japan, Kenneth Ruddle, John Friedmann and other scholars propounded the concept of an "agropolitan approach" to regional planning in developing countries.<sup>21</sup>

In essence, this strategy calls for investment in small- and medium-sized industries in small rural towns using appropriate technology and local manpower. The industries are to satisfy local consumer needs and also the needs of the agricultural sector for such products as fertilizers and farm tools. In other words, the distinctive features of this approach are the selection of labour-intensive industries, the closeness to the agrarian population, and the sensitivity to local needs.

This line of thinking is strengthened by the concept of "dependent capitalism" expounded initially by Terry McGee,<sup>22</sup> and the idea of "structural transformation of rural areas" expounded by M.I. Logan.<sup>23</sup> According to these theorists, the insensitive transfer of advanced technology from the first world to the third world will only make the recipients technologically, economically, and politically more dependent and vulnerable. Only a self-reliant, autonomous form of development based on native ingenuity in small-scale production, carefully mixed with foreign technology on a highly selective basis, may be capable of reducing primacy and producing an integrated space economy.

Among the three strategies, current wisdom seems to favour the last one. We shall now turn to examine the approach or approaches that China has adopted.

CHAPTER II FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup>Kingsley Davis, "The Urbanization of the Human Population," Scientific American, Volume 213, No.3 (September, 1965), 41-54.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid.

<sup>6</sup>Brian J.L. Berry, The Human Consequences of Urbanization (London: The MacMillan Press Ltd., 1973), pp. 46-47.

<sup>7</sup>J. Gorynski, visiting professor to the University of British Columbia, session on "Planning in a Socialist Country" delivered on February 8, 1977.

<sup>8</sup>Rhoads Murphey, "Urbanization in Asia," Ekistics, Volume 21, No.122 (January, 1966), 8-17.

<sup>9</sup>Brian J.L. Berry, "City Size Distributions and Economic Development," Economic Development and Cultural Change, Volume 9, No.4, Part I (July, 1961), 573-588.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid.

<sup>11</sup>John Friedmann and Robert Wulff, The Urban Transition. Comparative Studies of Newly Industrializing Societies (London: Edward Arnold Publishers Ltd., 1975), p.18.

<sup>12</sup>D.F. Darwent, "Growth Poles and Growth Centres in Regional Planning - A Review," Environment and Planning, Volume 1 (1969), 5-32.

<sup>13</sup>Dominance is said to occur when the flow of goods and services from industry A to industry B is a greater proportion of A's output than is the flow from B to A of B's output. In this case, firm B is said to be 'dominant', firm A dependent.

<sup>14</sup>Rate of economic growth is assumed to be related to size of industry: the bigger the industry, the more dominance.

- <sup>15</sup>Darwent, op. cit.
- <sup>16</sup>Edgar M. Hoover, An Introduction to Regional Economics, 2nd ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1975), pp. 276-290.
- <sup>17</sup>William Alonso, "Urban and Regional Imbalances in Economic Development," (Berkeley: Institute of Urban and Regional Development), reprint #42.
- <sup>18</sup>W.W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1971.)
- <sup>19</sup>Alonso, op. cit.
- <sup>20</sup>Friedmann, Wulff, op. cit., p.20.
- <sup>21</sup>Kenneth Ruddle, "The Agropolitan Approach to Regional Planning: A View from the Hinterland", prepared for Symposium on Regional Development Planning in Asia, sponsored by the United Nations Centre for Regional Development, Nagoya, 1975.
- John Friedmann and Mike Douglass, "Agropolitan Development: Towards a New Strategy for Regional Planning in Asia", prepared for Seminar on Industrialization Strategies and the Growth Pole Approach to Regional Planning and Development: the Asian Experience, sponsored by the United Nations Centre for Regional Development, Nagoya, 1975.
- <sup>22</sup>Friedmann, Wulff, op. cit., p. 36.
- <sup>23</sup>M.I. Logan, "The Spatial System and Planning Strategies in Developing Countries," The Geographical Review, Volume 62 (1972), 229-244.

CHAPTER III CHINA IN CONTEXT

### 3.1 The Land of China

China is often compared with the United States of America, since both are about equal in area. China has nearly 3.7 million sq. miles; the United States approximately 3.6 million sq. miles. Both occupy similar latitudes.<sup>1</sup>

Differences, however, are more important than similarities, the two most important being:

3.1.1 the higher proportion of land in China unsuited for intensive agriculture and settlement;

3.1.2 China's huge population.

Most of China consists of hills, mountains, and high plateaus.<sup>2</sup> Its landform elevations range from the 8,880-meter peak of Mount Everest to the Turfan Depression, 154 meters below sea level.<sup>3</sup>

Of the total land area, only 11% is arable land, which is all under cultivation now. An additional 20.5% of the land is accessible for pasture, and 5.1% is forested and accessible for timber.<sup>4</sup>

The settlement pattern in general corresponds to the country's terrain and climate: sparse in the western deserts and mountains, but dense in the eastern coastal provinces, the North China Plain, and the Yangtse delta.

### 3.2 China in 1949

According to historical records, China's civilization dated back to the year 2670 B.C. For over 4,000 years, China

was its own world, an enormous, ancient, isolated, introspective and self-sufficient empire which considered itself as the centre of civilization. This policy of aloofness was pursued right up to the outbreak of the Opium War in 1840, when Britain used force to insist on its "right" to trade opium for China's tea and silk. The sovereignty of the isolationist kingdom was suddenly challenged by guns and cannons instead of swords and arrows. China found itself ill equipped for modern warfare. The Opium War marked the beginning of a century of turmoil for China - foreign interventions, forced trade, civil wars, and natural calamities.<sup>5</sup>

When the Communist Government assumed control on October 1st, 1949, China was an economically backward, war-torn country.

"The economy inherited by the new regime was a shambles. Since the fall of the Manchu dynasty in 1911, extensive areas of China had been wrecked by revolution, war lordism, civil war, foreign invasion, and flood and famine. Industry and commerce had almost come to a standstill in major urban centres. ... Dams, irrigation systems and canals were in a state of disrepair. Railroad lines had been cut and recut by the contending armies. Inflation had ruined confidence in the money system. And finally, the population had suffered enormous casualties from both man-made and natural disasters and was disorganized, half starved, and exhausted."

A general feeling of fatalism, submissiveness and hopelessness loomed over the nation.

China's leaders in 1949 inherited only two types of

resources: labour and land, no capital. As for labour, it was large in quantity but low in skills. Of the 475 million in 1949, 80% were illiterate, 87% were peasants. At liberation, the Chinese Communist Party (hereafter referred to as CCP) itself was overwhelmingly peasant. There was a great deficiency of managerial, technical and literati skills.

### 3.3 Government and Administration

One of the major challenges confronting the CCP in 1949 was to assert political control over a vast agrarian society. Although there had been a few boundary changes during the period 1949-1975, basically the country is territorially divided into:


- 21 provinces (excluding Taiwan)
- 5 autonomous regions
- 3 independent municipalities (Peking, the capital, Shanghai and Tientsin)<sup>7</sup>

(see Map No.1)



In terms of command, one could speak of a trinity of power, made up of government (or the state,) party, and army.

Graphically, it can be depicted as follows:



The National People's Congress is the supreme source of governmental authority. It is formed by the elected representatives of the 21 provinces, the 5 autonomous regions, the 3 independent cities, and the People's Liberation Army (PLA).<sup>8</sup>

The PLA reports directly to the Chairman of the Central Committee of the CCP.

Under socialism, State and Party are linked, but not identical. Both Soviet and Chinese Communist literature makes it clear that "state" means the formal organization which dominates society. The state is the instrument of the ruling class. In the dictatorship of the proletariat, the state is the instrument of the proletariat. Since it is an instrument, it has a structure. The state is therefore equivalent to the governmental bureaucracy.<sup>9</sup>

The "party", on the other hand, is the organized expression of the will of society. The party actualizes the control of society over the state. Theoretically, however, formal command must flow from the state. The party may propound policy, but technically it cannot issue orders. Orders must come from an organ of the state.<sup>10</sup>

Since Mao is a strict Marxist-Leninist, a utopian theoretician, he clarified the differentiation between the state and party in dialectical terms.

To Mao, the Party is the instrument that forges the

resolution of the contradiction between bureaucracy and masses, or more broadly, state and society in socialism.<sup>11</sup>

By the trinity of powers, it is meant not only that these three are the main branches of power, but that they play interlocking roles in the direction of China. This trinity has become more apparent in recent years: the party has in effect supplanted the judiciary as the instrument of law, and the army has begun to play an increasingly vital role in the civil life of the nation.<sup>12</sup>

### 3.4 Marxism-Leninism in China

From 1949 to 1975, China was led by Chairman Mao Tse-tung, who wanted to transform China into a prosperous, powerful country in the context of a new socialist order in accordance with Marxism-Leninism.

It was Mao's determined adherence to and interpretation of this philosophy which gave China's approach to rural-urban migration some distinctive features. It is therefore necessary to briefly examine the philosophy of Marxism-Leninism and Mao's sinicization of Marxism-Leninism.

#### 3.4.1 Marxism-Leninism

The two main facets of Marxism-Leninism are dialectical materialism and historical materialism.

Dialectical materialism incorporates:

- (i) Realism - Marxists hold material things exist independently of perception of, or thought

about them;

- (ii) Naturalism - Matter existed before minds existed, minds develop out of matter;
- (iii) Dialectics - Matter cannot be adequately understood in mechanical terms, but needs to be understood in contradictions.<sup>13</sup>

Historical and dialectical materialism is an anti-metaphysical, positivistic approach of analyzing mankind's historical developments. It denies the efficacy of metaphysical speculation, and emphasizes empirical observations and experimentations. It holds that the basic cause of development lies in its internal contradictions; development is viewed as a unity of opposites.<sup>14</sup>

#### 3.4.2 Mao's Sinicization of Marxism-Leninism

Mao adopted the theories of Marxism as pure ideology to provide the Chinese people with a "correct" world view.

He did more. He modified and applied the Marxist philosophy to solve local political, social and economic problems. What this meant was that he gradually replaced the practical ideology of Leninism by his own works, the Thoughts of Mao Tse-Tung. These Thoughts translated abstract Marxist theories into practical guidelines for action, norms of behaviour for the whole country. Here lied his ingenuity and his leadership.<sup>15</sup>

Contrary to the bureaucratic mentality of the Soviet Union, Mao was a fervent advocate of the theory of permanent revolution. In his view, man and society would be re-shaped in a never-ending process of struggle which would continue even after full communism had been established, because according to historical materialism, contradictions were inherent in society. The way to solve contradictions was to struggle, criticize and transform.<sup>16</sup>

Mao also differentiated two types of contradictions, antagonistic and non-antagonistic.

In his famous August 1937 lecture at the Anti-Japanese Military and Political College in Yen-an, "On Contradiction," Mao cited the following example:

"Economically, in capitalist society (where the town under bourgeois rule ruthlessly exploits the countryside) ... the contradiction between the town and the countryside is one of extreme antagonism. But in a socialist country and in our revolutionary bases, such an antagonistic contradiction becomes a non-antagonistic contradiction; ..."<sup>17</sup>

This passage revealed Mao's consciousness of the rural-urban contradiction as early as 1937, a contradiction he constantly tried to unify till his death. He realized China was still an agrarian society; in the peasantry lied his strength.

### 3.5 The Chinese Marxist Solution to Development

Upon the unification of China, the CCP promulgated two goals for the nation:

- (i) to develop China's backward economy into a modern, industrialized economy;
- (ii) to establish a new social order in accordance with Marxism-Leninism.

In planning for China's development, and experimenting towards a pure communist society, the country to date had passed through a number of episodes of contrasting nature.

A brief review of these episodes will provide a better understanding of the seemingly oscillating policies of the country towards rural-urban migration.

#### 3.5.1 1949-1952 - Period of Reconstruction

The most notable achievements of this period were the restoration of law and order, the introduction of a stable currency, and the redistribution of land. By 1952, China became a country of small owner-cultivators. The land reform was significant in that it liberated peasants from the political struggle against the rural landed gentry; and the personal struggle against an inherited hopelessness and tacit acceptance of inferior status.<sup>18</sup>

#### 3.5.2 1953-1957 - The First Five Year Plan

The Soviet model of economic development was adopted.

Industrialization was emphasized at the expense of agriculture. Heavy industry received priority over light industry. Rural villages were forced to pay for the development of heavy industries through high taxation, biased price policies, and high rentals to the tractor stations.<sup>19</sup>

This period was also characterized by Russian aid in terms of loans and expertise. Taking the Russians' advice, material incentives and profitability testing were in increasing use. Investment was concentrated in modern, large-scale industrial enterprises. Education was oriented towards examinations, creation of an administrative elite of cadres and intellectuals, and a professional elite of technicians and managers.

The disparities between the city and its hinterland intensified, especially in the provision of social services such as medical care, education, water and sewage, and electric power. For example, in 1949, there were only 10,000 modern physicians in China. By 1963, 25,000 doctors were graduating annually, but nearly all of them remained in the cities.<sup>20</sup>

In economic terms, the First Five Year Plan was considered a success. According to official figures, the gross output value of all industry increased at an average annual rate of 18%. Scholars in the west, for various reasons, considered this an overestimate, and revised the figure to 14%. Even at this lowered estimate, the achievement was quite impressive.

### 3.5.3 1958-1960 - The Great Leap Forward

The CCP, particularly Mao, was encouraged by the success of the First Five Year Plan, and aimed to achieve a higher growth rate for the Second Five Year Plan.

By the end of the First Five Year Plan, however, Sino-Soviet relations began to deteriorate. Fundamentally, the issue was a dispute over authority. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) viewed China as a new and dangerous challenge to its leadership in the Communist world. China, on the other hand, viewed the Soviet Union's increasing interference in its internal affairs as a threat to its sovereignty and independence.<sup>21</sup>

Imbued with notions of nationalism, self-reliance, and a faith in the masses, Mao initiated the Great Leap Forward Movement in 1958. This movement was a mass campaign to mobilize every citizen to help China to industrialize more rapidly with less dependence on Soviet aid. Indigenous methods of production and small-scale industries were encouraged in 'backyard factories.' Officially termed as "walking with two legs," this policy of dual industrialization - modern, large-scale industries in state factories; indigenous, small-scale industries in backyard factories - represented a departure from the previously adopted Soviet model of sole emphasis on high-technology, capital-intensive techniques.<sup>22</sup>

However, the Great Leap Forward was generally rated by Western scholars as a stumble, rather than a leap of the

Chinese economy. Upon closer examination, this stumble might not be due to the policy per se, but to poor planning and other extraneous factors, such as:

- (i) Because the movement was improvised rather than well-planned, it created bottlenecks in the supply of raw materials and in the transportation system;
- (ii) Many of the backyard furnaces eventually closed down because of inefficiency and lack of skills. At best, the steel and iron produced were of low grade.
- (iii) Production quantity was emphasized to the neglect of maintenance and repair of existing capital and machinery.
- (iv) 1958 was also the year when cooperatives were merged into communes. Private land titles were abolished. Even small private garden plots were cancelled. Many peasants were not ready for this abrupt institutional change. As a result, there was an apparent drop in work motivation among the rural population. Agricultural production declined from the 1957 level.
- (v) The movement coincided with the climatic disasters of 1959-61, with droughts in the north and floods and typhoons in the south.
- (vi) By 1960, the Sino-Soviet conflict culminated in the complete withdrawal of loans and technicians by U.S.S.R.<sup>23</sup>

To recapitulate, the Great Leap was an economic failure. It did, however, disseminate industrial know-how to the masses

and pioneered experimentations with small-scale industries.

#### 3.5.4 1961-1965 - The New Economic Policy

Rebuffed by the set-backs of the Great Leap, China again relapsed into the previous Soviet model of material incentives and professional elitism. Private plots were restored. Control over the "free" market was relaxed. Agricultural and industrial production was increasingly controlled by managers, planners, technocrats and cadres.

#### 3.5.5 1966-1968 - The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution

Just when China's economy was stabilising, production was again interrupted by the Cultural Revolution. Some critics viewed the movement as a personal power struggle between Liu Shao-Chi and Mao Tse-Tung. In a broader perspective, it could be viewed as a struggle between revisionism and pure Marxist socialism.

During the year of the New Economic Policy, two counter-forces against socialism gained momentum:

- (i) the old elite of bourgeois professionals, intellectuals, and landlords tried to wrest back the initiative after the hardships of 1959-61;
- (ii) the tendency of the "new" bureaucratic leaders - the Party cadres - to form a new elite divorced from peasants.

Liao and his followers wanted to give recognition for individual expertise in specialized fields, special privileges

and extra compensation, mental but no physical labour to the educated intelligensia.

Mao and his followers were of the opinion that it mattered little if the means of production was owned by the people. What mattered was that leadership must be incorruptible and that control of the means of production must rest in the hands of the masses. Bureaucratism and elitism were considered symptoms of capitalist restoration and exploitation.

To check the counter-forces to socialism, the entire population was encouraged to challenge and examine every facet and principle, every theoretician and administrator, particularly leaders in the CCP who were taking the capitalist road.

By the economic yardstick, the movement undoubtedly disrupted the economy again. Schools and universities closed for two years. Factories either closed down or ran at 1/3 to 1/2 of capacity. Red guards monopolised the already inadequate railway system. Managers, technocrats, professors, mayors, and cadres were criticized, challenged, and kept in a state of fear and uncertainty. Excesses were rampant, for example, the British Office in Peking was burnt in 1967.<sup>24</sup>

### 3.5.6 1969-1975 - Post Cultural Revolution Era

Though the Cultural Revolution disrupted and slowed China's economic production, it did halt the trend towards

revisionism, bureaucratism, and elitism.

The Post Cultural Revolution era was one of experimentation and change in every facet of life: industry, agriculture, health, education; even art, poetry and music. The contradiction of red versus expert was widely discussed. The solution reached was to integrate intellectual and manual labour, professional and political consciousness.

### 3.6 Summary

To sum up, the vicissitudes of the CCP leadership seem to stem from the different orientations within the party.

Crudely, the CCP could be polarized into two ideal types. They have been variously named as radicals and conservatives; utopians and pragmatists; egalitarians and economic maximizers.

Both camps agree on the two promulgated national goals:

- (i) economic - to modernize and industrialize China;
- (ii) non-economic - to achieve a new Socialist order in accordance with Marxism-Leninism.

They differ, however, in the ordering of the priorities, and the means to the ends.

Egalitarians

- non-economic goals first, even at the expense of stalling economic growth
- equality now, concerned with the spreading of growth
- continued revolution basic to life
- anti-bureaucratism, anti-elitism
- moral incentives only, demand the "Yenan spirit" from the people: equality; comradeship; self-sacrifice; dedication to the country.

Pragmatists

- economic goals first
- equality later, concerned with overall macro growth
- stabilization and peace are pre-requisites for growth
- temporary tolerance for bureaucratism and elitism
- moral and material incentives, willing to bend from the "Yenan" way.

It must be reiterated that the above classification is merely compiled for ease of understanding. Within the CCP, there are certainly more than two political orientations, and within the same person, his thinking may change over time. For example, Mao himself declared he belonged to the centre of the leftist camp, i.e., a central leftist, and denounced the extremities of the ultra-leftists during the Cultural Revolution.<sup>25</sup>

This chapter has provided a backdrop to the Chinese scene. The stage is set for an examination of China's urbanization since 1949.

CHAPTER III FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup>U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, China (U.S.A.: Rand McNally & Co., 1972), p. 5.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid.

<sup>3</sup>Chiao-Min Hsieh, Atlas of China (New York: McGraw-Hill Inc., 1973), p. 81.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid.

<sup>5</sup>Douglas Hurd, The Arrow War. An Anglo-Chinese Confusion (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1967), pp. 170-171.

<sup>6</sup>Arthur G. Ashbrook, Jr., An Economic Profile of Mainland China (New York: Praeger, 1968), p. 18.

<sup>7</sup>Hsieh, op. cit., p. 260.

<sup>8</sup>Franz Schurmann, Ideology and Organization in Communist China, 2nd ed., (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970), pp. 173-221.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid., pp. 105-172.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid., pp. 109-112.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid., p. 180

<sup>13</sup>H.B. Acton, The Illusion of the Epoch: Marxism-Leninism as a Philosophical Creed, 2nd ed., (London: Cohen & West Ltd., 1962), p. 5.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid.

<sup>15</sup>Schurmann, op. cit., pp. 24-57.

<sup>16</sup>Jerome Chen, Mao. Great Lives Observed (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1969), p.161.

<sup>17</sup>Mao Tse-Tung, Selected Works., Volume II 1937-1938, (New York: International Publishers Co., Inc., 1954), p. 51.

<sup>18</sup>Bob and Maggi Whyte, "The Chinese Commune," Community Development Journal, Volume 9, No.1 (January, 1974), 33-39.

<sup>19</sup>Li Choh-Ming, "Economic Development," Communist China, ed. Franz Schurmann and Orville Schell (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1967), 189-208.

<sup>20</sup>Matthew H. Liang, et al, "Chinese Health Care: Determinants of the System," Ergonomics, 220 (March, 1974), 206-211.

<sup>21</sup>Harry Gelman, "The Sino-Soviet Conflict," Communist China, ed. Franz Schurmann and Orville Schell (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1967), 262-284.

<sup>22</sup>Kang Chao, "The Great Leap," Communist China, ed. Franz Schurmann and Orville Schell (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1967), 402-211.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid.

<sup>24</sup>Ross Terrill, 800,000,000 The Real China (New York: Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 1971), p.67.

<sup>25</sup>Ibid.

CHAPTER IV URBANIZATION IN CHINA

#### 4.1 Rate of Urban Growth

Detailed statistical data on the growth of China's urban population are available up to 1957.

Table I. Growth of Urban Population in China  
1949-1957 (in '000s)

Year	Total Population	Urban Population	Urban (%)
1949	541,670	57,650	10.6
1950	551,960	61,690	11.1
1951	563,000	66,320	11.8
1952	574,820	71,630	12.5
1953	587,960	77,670	13.2
1954	601,720	81,550	13.6
1955	614,650	82,850	13.5
1956	627,800	89,150	14.2
1957	642,000	92,000	14.3

Source: Pi-Chao Chen, "Overurbanization, Rustication of Urban-educated Youths, and Politics of Rural Transformation: The Case of China", Comparative Politics, No.4 (April, 1972), 361-386.

Exact figures for the years after 1957 are not available. It is estimated that in 1975, China's total population was 770,000,000  $\pm$  30,000,000, with approximately 20% urban.<sup>1</sup> Based on this estimate, China's urban population grew at an annual rate of 6.76% from 1949-1975.

#### 4.2 Sources of Urban Growth

Urban population growth occurs from four sources:

4.2.1 natural increase in urban areas;

4.2.2 internal rural-urban migration;

4.2.3 extension of urban boundaries;

4.2.4 international migration to urban areas.

Since international migration is outside the scope of this thesis, only the first three sources will be examined.

#### 4.2.1 Natural Increase

When the CCP assumed control in 1949, they were influenced by the Marxist philosophy of class struggles and did not consider China's huge population as a handicap for rapid economic development. Mao, in particular, was of the opinion that the problem was not one of population, but a matter of mobilization of resources and equitable distribution of growth. Because of this initial Marxist bias, birth control programs were given low priority in the early 1950s, and China's population received a boost during the years of reconstruction and the First Five Year Plan. (see Table II.)

Table II. Growth of China's Population 1949-56

End of Year	Population number in '000	% Increase
1949	541,670	-
1950	551,960	1.9
1951	563,000	2.0
1952	574,820	2.1
1953	587,960	2.29
1954	601,720	2.34
1955	614,650	2.14
1956	627,800	2.14

Source: Leo A. Orleans, Every Fifth Child: The Population of China, p. 30.

While the rate of natural increase from 1949-1956 was recorded at 2.27% per annum for the whole population, the urban rate of natural increase was higher than the national average, approximating 3.5%<sup>2</sup>. Based on this rate, it could be calculated that 45.7% of the urban population growth for the period 1949-1957 came from natural increases.

#### 4.2.2 Rural-urban Migration

Since no national figures on urban territorial changes are available, and international migration to China for the same period was very limited, it could be assumed that 54.3% of the urban population growth for the period was attributable to rural-urban migration.

#### 4.2.3 Territorial Extensions

Although national figures are not available, local figures are available for Shanghai and Peking, and will be discussed in the next chapter.

### 4.3 Distribution of Urban Growth

As mentioned in Chapter III, China was an inward-looking, self-sufficient kingdom until Britain used force to insist on its "right" to trade with China. The Opium War of 1840 ended in the Treaty of Nanking, 1842, with China being forced at gun-point to open five treaty ports for trade: Canton, Shanghai, Amoy, Foochow and Ningpo. After the signing of the treaty, China very soon resumed its attitude of aloofness,

which led to the Second Anglo-Chinese War in 1860. This war ended in another treaty, the Treaty of Tientsin, 1860. By that treaty, China agreed to open an additional 11 treaty ports for commerce. Out of the 16 treaty ports, only five gained prominence, namely, Shanghai, Canton, Tientsin, Nanking, and Wuhan. All are located in the eastern coastal provinces. Of the five, Shanghai was the largest and could be called the primate city of China in 1949.<sup>3</sup>

When the CCP took control in 1949, they found a heavy concentration of urban population and industrial production in the eastern treaty ports. The leaders were anxious to rectify such a lopsided distribution, especially when the treaty ports were remnants of China's semi-colonial past.

The following sections assess China's performance in this regard according to three indices:

- 4.3.1 the primacy index;
- 4.3.2 the 'population' index - changes in population in the 17 largest cities from 1948-1958;
- 4.3.3 the 'industrial plants' index - changes in the allocation of industrial plants among the 17 largest cities from 1948-1960.

#### 4.3.1 The Primacy Index

The primacy index is the ratio of the population of the largest city to the combined population of the top four cities.<sup>4</sup> The top four cities in 1948 and 1958 respectively

are shown in the following tables.

Table III.  
China's Top 4 Cities in 1948

City	1948 Pop in '000s
Shanghai	4,423
Tientsin	1,686
Peking	1,603
Canton	1,414

Table IV.  
China's Top 4 Cities in 1958

City	1958 Pop: in '000s
Shanghai	6,977
Peking	4,148
Tientsin	3,278
Shenyang	2,423


Source: Yuan-Li Wu, The Spatial Economy of Communist China, pp. 209-215.

The primacy index for 1948 was 0.49. By 1958, it was reduced to 0.41, which meant that during that interval, China achieved a more balanced spread of urban growth.


A clearer picture of that spread can be obtained by tracing the growth of China's million cities.

In 1948, there were 7 cities with populations of over 1 million. The number increased to 9 in 1953, 15 in 1958, and 17 in 1960. (see Maps No. 2 and 3.)

Map No.2 MILLION CITIES IN 1953 (TOTAL = 9)



Map No.3 MILLION CITIES IN 1960 (TOTAL = 17)



Source: Adapted from K. Buchanan, Transformation of the Chinese Earth, pp. 270-274.

From the maps, it is apparent that there is a westward dispersion of urban centres away from the eastern coastal provinces towards the inland provinces. Of the 17 million cities in 1960, only five are former treaty ports: Shanghai, Tientsin, Nanking, Canton, and Wuhan.

4.3.2 The 'Population' Index - Changes in Population in the 17 Largest Cities from 1948-1958

A detailed chart of the population growth of China's 17 largest cities in 1948, 1953 and 1958 is shown in Table V.

The ranking of the 17 cities by population over time (1948, 1953, 1958) is depicted in Table VI.

Shanghai was still the largest city in 1958, but Tientsin's second place was replaced by the national capital, Peking. Three of the five treaty ports dropped in rank, namely, Tientsin, Canton and Nanking.

TABLE V. POPULATION GROWTH OF 17 LARGEST CITIES, 1948, 1953, 1958  
(in '000s)

City	Province	1948 Pop	1953 Pop	1958 Pop
<u>Shanghai</u>	Kiangsu	4,423	6,204	6,977
<u>Tientsin</u>	Hopeh	1,686	2,694	3,278
Peking	Hopeh	1,603	2,768	4,148
<u>Canton</u>	Kwangtung	1,414	1,599	1,867
<u>Nanking</u>	Kiangsu	1,230	1,092	1,455
Shenyang	Liaoning	1,121	2,300	2,423
Chungking	Szechwan	1,040	1,847	2,165
<u>Wuhan</u> (tri-cities of Wuchang, Hanchow and Hanyang)	Hupeh	910	1,427	2,226
Tsingtao	Shantung	788	917	1,144
Harbin	Heilungkiang	760	1,163	1,595
Cheng-tu	Szechwan	727	857	1,135
Chang-chun	Kirin	630	855	988
Lu-ta (combines Port Arthur and Dairen)	Liaoning	569	892	1,590
Fu-shun	Liaoning	513	679	1,019
Sian	Shensi	503	787	1,368
Lanchow	Kansu	204	397	732
Tai-yuan	Shansi	200	721	1,053

Source: Yuan-Li Wu, The Spatial Economy of Communist China, pp. 209-215.

Note: former treaty ports are underlined.

TABLE VI. 17 LARGEST CITIES RANKED BY 1948, 1953 AND 1958 POPULATIONS

Rank No.	Rank of Cities in 1948	Rank of Cities in 1953	Rank of Cities in 1958
1	<u>Shanghai</u>	<u>Shanghai</u>	<u>Shanghai</u>
2	<u>Tientsin</u>	Peking	Peking
3	Peking	<u>Tientsin</u>	<u>Tientsin</u>
4	<u>Canton</u>	Shenyang	Shenyang
5	<u>Nanking</u>	Chungking	<u>Wuhan</u>
6	Shenyang	<u>Canton</u>	Chungking
7	Chungking	<u>Wuhan</u>	<u>Canton</u>
8	<u>Wuhan</u>	Harbin	Harbin
9	Tsingtao	<u>Nanking</u>	Lu-ta
10	Harbin	Tsingtao	<u>Nanking</u>
11	Cheng-tu	Lu-ta	Sian
12	Chang-chun	Cheng-tu	Tsingtao
13	Lu-ta	Chang-chun	Cheng-tu
14	Fu-shun	Sian	Tai-yuan
15	Sian	Tai-yuan	Fu-shun
16	Lanchow	Fu-shun	Chang-chun
17	Tai-Yuan	Lanchow	Lanchow

Note: Former treaty ports are underlined.

The growth of China's inland cities becomes more impressive if we take a look at the ranking of the 17 cities by population growth rates.

Table VII ranks the 17 largest cities by population growth rates, 1948-1958.

In terms of growth rates, the top 2 cities in 1948, Shanghai and Tientsin, receded to 11th and 12th in 1958. The bottom two cities in 1948, Lanchow and Tai-yuan, surfaced to first and second in 1958. Four of the five treaty ports dropped in ranking. Canton and Nanking experienced the lowest rates of growth for the period 1948-1958.

TABLE VII 17 LARGEST CITIES RANKED BY POPULATION  
GROWTH RATES, 1948-1958

Rank No.	Rank in 1948 (according to 1948 pop.)	Rank in 1958 (according to column (a) )	Average annual growth rate 1948-1958 (a)	%age increase of 1958 pop over 1948 pop (1948=100%)
1	<u>Shanghai</u>	Tai-yuan	42.7%	527%
2	<u>Tientsin</u>	Lanchow	25.9%	359%
3	Peking	Lu-ta	17.9%	279%
4	<u>Canton</u>	Sian	17.2%	272%
5	<u>Nanking</u>	Peking	15.9%	259%
6	Shenyang	<u>Wuhan</u>	14.5%	245%
7	Chungking	Shenyang	11.6%	216%
8	<u>Wuhan</u>	Harbin	11.0%	210%
9	Tsingtao	Chungking	10.8%	208%
10	Harbin	Fushun	9.9%	199%
11	Cheng-tu	<u>Tientsin</u>	9.4%	194%
12	Chang-chun	<u>Shanghai</u>	5.8%	158%
13	Lu-ta	Chang-chun	5.7%	157%
14	Fushun	Cheng-tu	5.6%	156%
15	Sian	Tsingtao	4.5%	145%
16	Lanchow	<u>Canton</u>	3.2%	133%
17	Tai-yuan	<u>Nanking</u>	1.8%	118%

Note: Former treaty ports are underlined.

4.3.3 The 'Industrial Plants' Index - Changes in the Allocation of Industrial Plants among the largest 17 Cities from 1948-1960

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Dollar values of industrial investments are not available, but the number of industrial plants is available.

Table VIII is the ranking of the 17 cities by number of industrial plants in 1949 and 1960.

Shanghai was the lead in 1949 and maintained the lead in 1960. She was still the largest industrial centre in 1960.

TABLE VIII 17 LARGEST CITIES RANKED BY NUMBER OF INDUSTRIAL PLANTS, 1949, 1960

Rank No.	Rank of Cities in 1949	No. of Plants in 1949	Plants Added since 1949	Rank of Cities in 1960	Total No. of Plants in 1960
1	<u>Shanghai</u>	168	43	<u>Shanghai</u>	212
2	Peking	40	66	Peking	106
3	<u>Tientsin</u>	40	37	<u>Tientsin</u>	77
4	Shenyang	37	34	<u>Canton</u>	73
5	<u>Canton</u>	35	38	Shenyang	71
6	Harbin	28	21	Harbin	49
7	Lu-ta	23	10	<u>Wuhan</u>	47
8	<u>Wuhan</u>	17	29	Chungking	41
9	Chungking	15	25	Luta	33
10	Fushun	13	6	Tai-yuan	33
11	Chang-chun	13	16	<u>Nanking</u>	32
12	Tai-yuan	11	22	Sian	32
13	<u>Nanking</u>	8	24	Changchun	29
14	Sian	7	24	Fushun	19
15	Tsingtao	7	11	Tsingtao	18
16	Lanchow	3	15	Lanchow	18
17	Cheng-tu	2	12	Chengtuo	14

Source: Sen-Dou Chang, "The Million City of Mainland China", Pacific Viewpoint, Volume 9, No.2 (September, 1968), 128-153.

Note: Former treaty ports are underlined.

Again, the growth of industrial capacity in China's inland cities becomes more impressive if we take a look at the ranking of the 17 cities by percentage increase of industrial plants, 1949 to 1960. (see Table IX.)

It can be seen that the highest absolute number of new plants added, 66, was in Peking, reflecting the regime's determination to transform the capital into a strong industrial base. The highest percentage growth, however, occurred in the three inland cities of Cheng-tu, 700%; Lanchow, 600%; and Sian, 443%. Shanghai experienced the lowest percentage growth, 26%.<sup>5</sup>

Shanghai, the number one city in 1949, sank to the bottom in 1960. The bottom two cities in 1949, Lanchow and Cheng-tu, rose to first and second in 1960.

TABLE IX 17 LARGEST CITIES RANKED BY PERCENTAGE INCREASE OF INDUSTRIAL PLANTS, 1949 TO 1960

Rank No.	Rank in 1949 (according to no. of exist- ent plants)	Rank in 1960 (according to column (a) )	Plant Increase in 1960 (1949=100%) (a)
1	<u>Shanghai</u>	Cheng-tu	700%
2	Peking	Lanchow	600
3	<u>Tientsin</u>	Sian	443
4	Shenyang	<u>Nanking</u>	400
5	<u>Canton</u>	Tai-yuan	300
6	Harbin	<u>Wuhan</u>	271
7	Lu-ta	Chungking	267
8	<u>Wuhan</u>	Peking	265
9	Chungking	Tsingtao	257
10	Fushun	Chang-chun	223
11	Chang-chun	<u>Canton</u>	209
12	Tai-yuan	Shenyang	192
13	<u>Nanking</u>	<u>Tientsin</u>	192
14	Sian	Harbin	175
15	Tsingtao	Fushun	146
16	Lanchow	Lu-Ta	143
17	Cheng-tu	<u>Shanghai</u>	126

Note: Former treaty ports are underlined.

CHAPTER IV FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup>Cheng-siang Chen, "Population Growth and Urbanization in China, 1953-1970," Ekistics, 226 (September, 1974), 192-198.

<sup>2</sup>Pi-Chao Chen, "Overurbanization, Rustication of Urban-educated Youths, and Politics of Rural Transformation: The Case of China", Comparative Politics, 4 (April, 1972), 361-86.

<sup>3</sup>Douglas Hurd, The Arrow War (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1967), pp. 170-171.

<sup>4</sup>Brian J.L. Berry, "City Size Distributions and Economic Development," Economic Development and Cultural Change, Volume 9, No.4, Part I (July 1961), 573-588.

<sup>5</sup>Sen-Dou Chang, "The Million City of Mainland China," Pacific Viewpoint, Volume 9, No.2 (September, 1968), 128-153.

CHAPTER V CHINA'S TWO LARGEST CITIES:  
SHANGHAI AND PEKING

The previous chapter traced China's urbanization record on a national scale. This chapter will focus on the urban growth of China's two largest cities, Shanghai and Peking.

## 5.1 Shanghai

### 5.1.1 Brief History

Shanghai, China's historically outward-looking "international city" bears the impress of the country's semi-colonial past.

The city grew as a result of the forced opening by Britain in the 19th century. For many years, the city was divided into British, French, American and Japanese concessions, whose residents enjoyed extra-territorial rights on Chinese soil.

### 5.1.2 Rate of Growth, 1948-1958

Today, Shanghai is still the country's number one city. The population on December, 1971, was recorded at 10,820,000. This figure of 10.8 million, though frequently quoted, is seldom elaborated, and gives a very incomplete picture of the city's growth.

In 1948, Shanghai's population was 4,423,000. By mid 1958, it was 6,977,000, an absolute increase of 2,554,000 or an average annual growth rate of 5.8%.<sup>1</sup>

### 5.1.3 Sources of Growth, 1948-1958

For the year 1956, the birth rate in Shanghai was

40.3 per thousand, the death rate 6.7 per thousand, resulting in a net natural increase of 33.6 per thousand or 3.36%.<sup>2</sup>


One can assume, therefore, that within the period 1948-1958, less than half of the city's population growth was caused by rural-urban migration.

#### 5.1.4 Boundary Extension, 1958

In 1958, Shanghai extended her municipal boundary and incorporated a large tract of agricultural land.

The major areas of Shanghai in 1965 is shown on Map No. 4.

MAP NO. 4 SHANGHAI: MAJOR AREAS



- coast-line
- - - municipal boundary
- ▣ urban core
- rural Shanghai
- ▣ suburban Shanghai

Source; L. Alan Eyre, "Shanghai - World's  
Second City?" Professional Geographer,  
volume 13, No. 1 (January, 1971) 28-30.

Three zones are clearly discernible:

- (i) Ex-imperial Shanghai - This is the historic densely populated core representing the outline of the city some thirty years ago, an area less than 47 sq. km. Densities in this core may reach 48,262 persons per sq. km.
- (ii) Semi-rural Shanghai - This is the suburban ring of industry, satellite towns, and rural communities. Density is much lower, about 6,950 persons per sq. km. This ring encompasses approximately 414 sq. km.
- (iii) Rural-Shanghai - This is the rural hinterland of vegetable and rice communes, with small-scale rural industries. This area covers 5335 sq. km.<sup>3</sup>


Upon closer examination, only the City Proper of Shanghai, i.e. ex-imperial Shanghai plus semi-rural Shanghai, can be classified as being truly urban. Rural Shanghai was incorporated into independent Shanghai shih (city) in 1958 based on the theme of local self-sufficiency to provide the City Proper with food: rice, vegetables, milk etc.

Of the 10.8 million people reported in Shanghai in 1971 by the China Cartographic Institute, Peking, the distribution between City Proper and Rural Shanghai was about 5.7 million to 5.1 million.<sup>4</sup>

Collating the data and adjusting for territorial

expansion, the trend of Shanghai's urban growth is depicted in the following graph:

Figure 2. POPULATION OF SHANGHAI, 1948-1971



The statistics suggest that by 1971, Shanghai's urban growth is under control and that the City Proper has actually lost population. From 1948-1958, the annual growth rate was 5.8%. From 1958-1971, the annual growth rate was negative, a -1.4%.

## 5.2 Peking

### 5.2.1 Brief History

Peking has been the national capital of China for various dynasties. The city grew as an administrative, political, and cultural centre rather than an economic centre. Before 1949, the only industry present in Peking was the manufacture of labour- and skill-intensive art handicrafts, e.g., the manufacture of fine procelain and delicately carved sculptures of jade and ivory.

In 1949, Peking was made the capital of China. In sharp contrast to Shanghai, Peking is the symbol of the new inward-looking national spirit. The government deliberately wanted to transform Peking into an industrial, as well as an administrative, political and cultural centre.

### 5.2.2 Rate of Growth, 1948-1958

In 1948, the population of Peking was 1,603,000. In 1958, the number was 4,148,000, an absolute increase of 2,545,000 or an annual average growth rate of 15.9%.<sup>5</sup> This was very much higher than the 5.8% comparable statistic for Shanghai for the same period.

### 5.2.3 Sources of Growth, 1948-1958

In 1956, the birth rate in Peking was 39.3 per thousand, the death rate 6.7 per thousand, resulting in a net natural increase of 32.6 per thousand or 3.26% per annum. This meant that about 75% of the urban growth in Peking during that period was the result of rural migration. This was partly due to the industrialization of Peking


and partly due to the influx of cadres to staff the central government.

#### 5.2.4 Boundary Extension, 1958

In 1958, Peking also extended its municipal boundary to incorporate large areas of farm land. The form of the capital city bears resemblance to Shanghai. (see maps No. 5 and 6).



MAP No. 6 WALLED CITY OF PEKING



Source: Adapted from Sen-Dou Chang, "Peking: The Growing Metropolis of Communist China," Geographical Review, Volume 55 (1965), 313-327.


Three zones can be identified:

- (i) Central City - This is the walled city which contains old China's Imperial City and Forbidden City. This core, with its government buildings, commercial districts and old residential areas, is the most densely populated and covers approximately 71 sq. km.
- (ii) Suburbs - This is the suburban fringe of new factories, schools and workers' dormitories, and occupies about 1,353 sq. km.
- (iii) Rural Peking - This is the newly incorporated area of intensive farmland providing the city with grain, vegetables, milk and fruits. The area is about 16,376 sq. km.<sup>6</sup>

Again, only the City Proper of Peking, i.e. the Central City plus the Suburbs, can be classified as being truly urban. In 1971, the City Proper's population was 4.2 million, while Rural Peking was inhabited by 3.5 million people.<sup>7</sup>

Adjusting for the territorial expansion in 1958, the trend of urban growth in the capital is shown in the graph below. (see figure 3.)

Figure 3. POPULATION OF PEKING, 1948-1971



Peking has not been depopulated, but stabilized. From 1948-1958, the average annual growth rate was 15.9%. From 1958-1971, the equivalent growth rate was a meagre 0.19%.

### 5.3 Summary

In conclusion, this comparison of Shanghai with Peking suggests the following:

5.3.1 For the two largest cities in China, population has actually decreased in one and been held almost constant in the other

5.3.2 The large cities often enlarge their perimeters to incorporate agricultural areas so as to be self-sufficient in food. The pattern is usually composed

of four concentric rings:

- (i) the central core
- (ii) the suburb communities organized around  
factories
- (iii) vegetable communes
- (iv) rice communes

CHAPTER V FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup>Yuan-Li Wu with H.C. Ling and Grace Hsiao Wu, The Spatial Economy of Communist China (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1967), pp. 209-215.

<sup>2</sup>Etsuzo Onoye, "Regional Distribution of Urban Population in China," Developing Economies, 8 (March, 1970), 93-127.

<sup>3</sup>L. Alan Eyre, "Shanghai - World's Second City?" Professional Geographer, Volume 23, No.1 (January, 1971), 28-30.

<sup>4</sup>Ross Terrill, Flowers on a Iron Tree (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1975), pp. 6-7.

<sup>5</sup>Wu, et al, op. cit.

<sup>6</sup>Sen-Dou Chang, "Peking: The Growing Metropolis of Communist China," Geographical Review, Volume 55 (1965), 313-327.

<sup>7</sup>Han Suyin, "Population Growth and Birth Control in China," Eastern Horizon, Volume XII, No.5 (1973), 8-16.

CHAPTER VI CHINA'S RESPONSE TO RURAL-URBAN MIGRATION

After having dealt with the rate of China's urban growth, the sources, and spread of that growth, this chapter will deal with the "how" issue, the policies and programs adopted by the government that influence internal migration.

However, it is very difficult to isolate China's policies on rural-urban migration from its policies on economic development, because in China's recent history, urbanization is an effect of deliberate industrialization. It is also virtually impossible to divorce China's economic system from her social and political systems, because the three interact as a whole. One of the greatest dilemmas of Mao's leadership was how to foster rapid industrialization, how to cope with scarcity, while building and perpetuating a socialist, and hopefully, eventually a communist, society. Throughout China's last quarter century, the crucial issues that divide the top policy-makers are:

- 1) the pace of economic development
- 2) the rate of investment
- 3) the inter-sectoral pattern (priorities) of investment
- 4) the distribution of the generative and non-generative aspects of growth
- 5) the structure of incentives
- 6) the importance of technical skills and technical inputs in general in the development process

In search for direction, the last quarter century in China was marked by fluctuating policies and directives, as briefly outlined in Chapter III.

In order to highlight the relevant policies with impacts

on internal migration, the author proposes to organize this chapter along Mao's three great contradictions:

- 6.1 the contradiction between agriculture and industry
- 6.2 the contradiction between city and countryside
- 6.3 the contradiction between mental and physical labour

#### 6.1 The Contradiction between Agriculture and Industry

##### 6.1.1 Phase I - The Paramountcy of Industry, 1949-1957

In its eagerness to modernize, China adopted the Soviet model of economic development in its First Five Year Plan, 1953-1957. Industry was given precedence over agriculture, heavy industry over light industry. Through taxation and biased price policies, the agricultural sector was intentionally pressured to provide capital for the industrial sector. During the First Five Year Plan, 32.6 billion yuan\* were invested in manufacture, trade, transport and construction; but only 3.5 billion yuan were invested in agriculture.<sup>1</sup>

As to the distribution of industrial investment, the CCP was caught in a dilemma. From the start, Chinese leaders realized that industrial investment allocated to the biggest cities would yield the maximum economic payoffs in the shortest time span, due to the interplay of the forces of internal economies of scale and external economies of urbanization. However, the decision-makers

\*1 Renmenbi Yuan = US\$0.515

harboured reservations. Nearly all of the country's biggest cities in 1949 were legacies of the treaty-port system of semi-colonial foreign privileges. As such, they remained as symbols of China's past humiliation. Further, they were all concentrated in the coastal regions.

To resolve this dilemma between economic efficiency and national pride, China adopted a policy equivalent to the one termed by William Alonso as "concentrated decentralization." Investment was to be divided between the biggest treatyports on the coast, and medium-sized urban centres in the inland with growth potentials. An examination of various policy statements would further clarify this strategy.

In a report to the first session of the First National People's Congress on September 23, 1954, Chou En-lai stated that the First Five-Year Plan would give China new industrial regions and bases, and thereby mark the beginning of a change in the irrational distribution of Chinese industry.

The First Five-Year Plan, published in 1955, contained a statement on the general principles of industrial location:

"We shall locate the productive forces of industry in different parts of the country in such a way that they will be close to producing areas of raw materials and fuel and also to consumer markets. They will also satisfy the requirements for the strengthening of national security, lead to the gradual improvement of the irrational locational pattern, and elevate the economic level of the backward areas. In the establishment of industrial areas, we shall, first of all,

utilize, reconstruct, and transform the existing industrial bases so as to avoid over-concentration of enterprises and to bring about a suitable measure of decentralization."<sup>2</sup>

In line with this locational policy, 55% of capital investment for the First Five Year Plan was directed toward interior medium-sized urban centres.<sup>3</sup> The criteria adopted in selecting growth centres were either proximity to a natural resource, such as coal; or geographic nodality, the characteristic of most existing provincial centres.<sup>4</sup>

Two examples of the growth of inland urban centres are Pao-t'ou in Inner Mongolia and Lanchow in Kansu.

In 1938, Pao-t'ou had only 55,536 people. It was principally a collecting centre for livestock products, especially wool, from the provinces of northwest China. Today, Pao-t'ou is one of the million-plus cities and is the third largest steel producer in China, ranking after Anshan and Wuhan.

The rise of Lanchow from a city of 80,000 in 1942 to one of more than 2 million today is also the result of well-planned and coordinated development of industry and transportation. Before 1952, Lanchow was not served by a railway. Today, it is the junction where four major railways meet.<sup>5</sup>

However, this "industry paramount" policy of the First Five Year Plan did not improve centre-periphery inequities. Instead, social and economic disparities between city and countryside intensified. City dwellers

enjoyed higher incomes, better social, educational, and recreational facilities. At the same time, collectivization of agriculture was gaining speed in the rural areas, from mutual aid teams to advanced mutual aid teams, to cooperatives, and to advanced cooperatives. The cities, therefore, became magnets attracting a continual stream of migration from the farms.

While the distribution of the stream of out-migration was to a certain extent directed to the inland growth centres, the absolute numbers of rural out-migration plus natural urban increase were still too much for the government to handle. The growth of urban employment could not keep pace with the growth of the urban labour force.

For example, between 1953 and 1957, non-agricultural employment increased from 36.5 million persons to 40.9 million persons, an absolute increase of 4.4 million or an annual average increase of 2.2%. The urban population for the same period increased from 71.6 million to 94.4 million, an absolute increase of 22.8 million or an average annual increase of 5.9%.<sup>6</sup> Even assuming all non-agricultural employment growth occurred in urban areas, which was highly unlikely, the gap was still very obvious. China was experiencing the problems of over-urbanization, particularly urban unemployment or underemployment, though evidence was unclear as to which was the case. The reason for this was because emphasis was placed on heavy industry, a high-

technology, capital-consumptive industry with low job creation potential.

6.1.2 Phase II "Agriculture as the Foundation and Industry as the Lead"

By the end of the First Five Year Plan, Mao became increasingly uneasy with the Soviet model of economic development, i.e. industrialization at the expense of agriculture.

In 1957, Mao wrote:

"As China is a great agricultural country, with over 80% of its population in the villages, its industry and agriculture must be developed simultaneously. Only then will industry have raw materials and a market, and only so will it be possible to accumulate fairly large funds for the building up of a powerful heavy industry."

Hence, after 1957, China departed from the Soviet model and began experimenting for a model of its own, aiming to strike a balance between agriculture and industry, and heavy industry and light industry.

(i) Hui-hsiang

However, though Mao himself propagandized the slogan "agriculture as the foundation and industry as the lead" in 1957, he was at the same time encouraged by the economic achievements of the First Five Year Plan. This led to his initiation of the Great Leap in 1958, with the aim of achieving an even higher rate of growth in a shorter time span. When the "leap" became a "stumble", China's over-urbanization problems were intensified.

Because the campaign was ill-planned and poorly organized, little governmental assistance - in terms of industrial know-how and capital - was given to the rural areas to set up small industries. As a result, the rural population took the occasion to flock to the cities in search of opportunities. A reported 20 million peasants migrated to the cities in 1958.

When the Great Leap failed and the cities proved incapable of absorbing the huge influx, the Chinese authorities implemented the most massive deurbanization policy ever recorded, the hui-hsiang movement, (meaning return to the village.)<sup>8</sup> Within one year, 1962, a reported 20 million were returned to the hsiangs (villages) where they came from. The People's Liberation Army was deployed. Ration cards were cancelled. The residents' household registrations were transferred back to the hsiangs. There was no way for the intended transmigrants to obtain food in the cities even if they chose to disobey.

This hui-hsiang movement was corroborated by circumstantial evidence. In the same year, 1962, there was a great exodus of Chinese refugees into Hong Kong, largely because of deliberate relaxation of emigration controls by the Peking government. The Hong Kong government found itself unable and unwilling to absorb the sudden influx of legal migrants from China, and had to initiate negotiations with Peking to curb the flow.<sup>9</sup>

Although the hui-hsiang was a one-time emergency program adopted in 1962 to return peasants who flocked to the cities in 1958, it was significant in that it demonstrated that the Chinese government would not hesitate to employ coercive measures if circumstances warranted such coercion.

As mentioned in Chapter III, the Great Leap pioneered experimentations with small-scale industries. This experiment evolved into the policy of "walking with two legs," which meant:

- a) the allocation of modern capital-intensive industrial investments to the cities; and
- b) indigenous labour-intensive industries to the communes.

The policy of "walking with two legs" was firmly established as a central directive after the Cultural Revolution. One of the dimensions of the policy, the decentralization of industry to rural areas, is in fact similar to the "agropolitan" approach advocated by Kenneth Ruddle and others in 1975. It must be pointed out, however, that the Chinese began implementing this policy in 1969, and therefore the idea originated with the Chinese.

(ii) The Agropolitan Approach

Essentially, this policy resulted in the establishment of small- and medium-sized factories in market towns of 5,000 or so population servicing an approximate 50,000

people in the hinterland agricultural communes. To effectively promote industry in these settlements in the lowest level of the urban hierarchy, a "Five Smalls" policy was promulgated: small machinery factories, small fertilizer plants, small cement factories, small iron and steel plants, small coal mines.<sup>10</sup> The factories were small not only in size, but also in the fact that they were run and owned by the local communes. Chiefly, the industries were to serve local needs, such as manufacturing fertilizers and agricultural machinery. A few were export-oriented, such as basket weaving. The most important feature, however, was the government's active encouragement to the local people to innovate appropriate technology.

A good example was the manufacture of semi-transplanters in the commune factories. By hand, rice shoots could be transplanted at a maximum rate of 1 mou (0.165 acres) per day. With an advanced transplanter, the rate could be increased to 20-30 mou per day. With a semi-transplanter, the rate was 3-4 mou per day.<sup>11</sup> Among these three alternatives, the semi-transplanter technology was encouraged, which was a sensible policy for China with abundant manpower but scarce capital. The cost involved was lower than the advanced transplanter; the job-displacement effect caused by such semi-mechanization was relatively low; but gains in productivity were positive, though modest.

As for the displaced agrarian labour, they were absorbed by industry; and also by side-line occupations, such as: orchards, fisheries, surveying and exploiting local mineral resources, land reclamation, water conservancy, forestry, etc.<sup>12</sup>

Some minor resistance from the large urban factories had been documented in the literature. The managers were directed by the central government to send technicians to make rounds in the villages as consultant/resource personnel. Fees chargeable for the services were very minimal, much to the displeasure of those factory managers who were profit-conscious.<sup>13</sup>

This opens up one of the favourite counter arguments against the agropolitan approach to regional development, which is: small- and medium-scale industries are not as efficient as large-scale industries in economic terms. This argument is valid if we only take a short-term, nothing-but-economic perspective. If we consider the long-term, costs may be relatively favourable and benefits great, not only in accelerated economic growth but also in distributing its rewards more equitably. If we evaluate via cost/benefit analysis, incorporating economic as well as social costs and benefits, the benefits may outweigh the costs in that the experience of industrialization, both problems and benefits, are spread more widely among the nation as a whole. In essence, this means a levelling in the disparities of living standards between urban and

rural areas.

To date, the top nine cities in China still account for 60% of the total industrial output.<sup>14</sup> It is estimated the rural industries would at most account for only 10%,<sup>15</sup> but the result becomes more meaningful if we examine the distribution of that 10%. In 1972, the rural industries accounted for:

- a) 16% of the generating capacity of hydro-power stations
- b) 60% of chemical fertilizer production
- c) 40% of cement production
- d) 80% of the total value of farm machinery.<sup>16</sup>


It is immediately apparent that the rural industries are right on target, producing the products required by local communes.

The effects of this "agropolitan" approach on rural-urban migration are very positive. It deals directly with the roots of over-urbanization. Jobs are brought to the people, thereby stemming the rural exodus in the place of origin.

## 6.2 The Contradiction Between City and Countryside

When faced with the rural-urban continuum, one is often tempted to question the reason for the relative polarization. Without probing into details, Swedner's graph provides a helpful visual explanation:

Figure 4. Model of the Development of Rural and Urban Areas



Source: Adapted from T.G. McGee, The Urbanization Process in the Third World, p.14.

Even when Mao was still fighting guerilla wars back in the 1930s, he was already acutely aware of the differences between the core and the periphery, the city and the countryside. To Mao, cities exert corrupting influences over socialist men, and survive by exploiting the rural hinterland. This anti-urbanism attitude persisted till his death. During his entire rule, Mao devoted a vast amount of energy to try to close the gap, to unify the city and the countryside. Two of the most important policy responses in this respect are:

6.2.1 the hsia-hsiang movement; and

6.2.2 the barefoot doctors.

6.2.1 The Hsia-hsiang Movement

The full name of this policy is the "hsia-hsiang shang-shan yun-tung", which means the "down-to-the-countryside and up-to-the-mountain movement". It has variously been labelled as the hsia-hsiang movement, the rustication movement, or the down-to-the-countryside movement.

(i) The Target Population

Hsia-hsiang as an official policy was initiated in 1957 in response to the gap between urban population growth and urban employment growth. The target population of the movement are:

- (a) graduates of urban primary schools, secondary schools, universities and technical colleges who have terminated education and not assigned jobs in cities;
- (b) street youths - young urban residents not in school and without a job;
- (c) cadres of party, government or industrial-commercial enterprises, whose skills are not needed in urban areas but desperately needed in rural areas.<sup>17</sup>

(ii) Objectives

Although the movement primarily attempts to reverse the rural outflow, its objectives are manifold:

- (a) In line with the policy of "agriculture as the foundation", hsia-hsiang aims at re-educating urban youths by the masses, i.e. China's peasantry.

- (b) Equipped with better education, the youths can act as catalysts for agricultural and industrial development;
- (c) By reassigning cadres to rural and border areas, governmental control over these areas is further strengthened;
- (d) Some youths are assigned to marginal areas for land reclamation projects such as water conservancy, irrigation and terracing; or to frontier regions to join the People's Liberation Army;
- (e) The program lowers unemployment rates in the cities.

The Chinese authorities were being very realistic when they launched the hsia-hsiang movement. They were thinking of both the areas of origin and the areas of destination. Hsia-hsiang is not only a deurbanization mechanism. It is also a means to diffuse technology and know-how. This policy complements the policy of "walking with two legs."

(iii) Implementation of the Hsia-hsiang Movement

In 1957, Peking issued a directive that all graduates of primary and secondary schools who came to cities, but failed to enter higher educational institutions or get a job, should return to the villages where they originally came from. From September, 1957 to February, 1958, an estimated one million were resettled in the countryside.

With the Great Leap in 1958, hsia-hsiang was

suspended and was not re-instated until 1962. Caution must be exercised to differentiate the hsia-hsiang movement from the hui-hsiang movement mentioned earlier. The hui-hsiang movement was an emergency one time measure to return the twenty million peasants who flocked to the cities during the Great Leap. Hsia-hsiang is a long-term program directed primarily at the urban educated young, and serves purposes other than migration control.

From 1962, when the program was re-instated, to August, 1965, an estimated 942,000 were relocated to agrarian farms. An Office of Resettling Youth in the Countryside was set up to implement the program.<sup>18</sup>

With the initiation of the Cultural Revolution in 1966, the program was once more interrupted. In fact, the urban/rural movement was reversed. Many rusticated youths who were formerly relocated to the countryside took the opportunity to go back to the cities and join the Red Guards to make revolution. From 1966 to 1968, millions of Red Guards - composed of students of secondary schools, colleges and universities - roamed the country to make revolution and to exchange revolutionary experience.

When the Revolution was finally brought to order by the army and the party in late 1968, hsia-hsiang was revived with added vigour. Responsibility for implementing the program was shifted to the "Workers' Mao Tse-tung Thought Propagating Teams" dispatched to educational

institutions.<sup>19</sup>

Between January 1969 and July 1971, more than 4 million were reassigned to the countryside to settle down and take root. (see Table X).

TABLE X. HSIA-HSIANG FLOW FROM JAN 1969 TO JULY 1971  
(IN PERSONS)

Province	Place of Origin	Place of Destination
Hopeh	542,173 + 6n	502,101 + 3n
Shansi	220	226,976 + n
Liaoning	231,972	303,404
Kirin	132,030	56,487 + n
Heilungkiang	23	228,397 + n
Shensi	247,010	217,217 + n
Honan	28	524,028
Kiangsu	973,049 + 3n	725,193 + n
Anhwei	264,000 + 3n	330,000 + 3n
Chekiang	202,329	2255
Fukien	2n	n
Hupeh	231,617	277 + n
Hunan	300,350 & n	350 + n
Kiangsi	12,754 & n	67,293 + 3n
Kwangtung	349,566 + 2n	16,551 + 2n
Kwangsi Chuang A.R.	220	2049
Szechwan	750,185	256,370
Kweichow	0	265,000
Yunnan	0	301,000 + 2n
Inner Mongolia A.R.	0	71,286 + 2n
Kansu & Ninghsia Hui A.R.	5171	7041
Tibet	200	0
Unspecified	10,382 & 3n	83,500 + n
Totals	4,253,069 + 17n	4,047,575 + 22n
n	a group with unspecified number	

Source: Christopher L. Salter, "Hsia-Fang: The Use of Migration by the Chinese in their Quest for a Classless Society", Proceedings of the Association of American Geographers, Volume 4 (1972), 96-99

Table X reveals that the primary places of origin were the urban centres. The top three provinces were Kiangsu, Hopeh and Kwangtung. Kiangsu has Shanghai; Hopeh has Peking and Tientsin; Kwangtung has Canton. The less developed provinces and border regions, such as Kweichow, Yunnan and Inner Mongolia had zero out-migration but substantial in-migration.<sup>20</sup>

The figures also reveal that intra-provincial flows were stronger than inter-provincial flows. The provinces of Hopeh, Liaoning, Shensi, Kiangsu, Anhwei and Szechwan were heavy destination as well as origin areas. This reflects the fact that urban youths were generally sent to the rural areas within their own province rather than to a different province.

From 1969 to 1975, an estimated total of 10-15 million urban youths were rusticated. The exact figures are unknown. Compared to the total urban population, the number was not massive. Nevertheless, it represented a significant reverse migration stream back to the rural sector.<sup>21</sup>

(iv) Management of Resistance

However, as hsiahsiang became institutionalized as a long-term program, resistance gradually surfaced. There were instances when the rusticated youths became

targets for the peasants' hostility and envy toward city dwellers.<sup>22</sup> Some brigade leaders and villagers still held distrust and resentment. They thought the students were a nuisance, must have done something wrong, and that the central government was "dumping" bad elements and social misfits into their communes.<sup>23</sup> Conversely, the urban youths found it hard to adapt to the hard work and simple living of the countryside. They also complained of difficulties in communication with the poorly educated peasants, and the villagers' unappreciative attitudes for their talents.<sup>24</sup>

To lessen resistance and promote understanding between the students and peasants, rural cadres were given special responsibilities to follow-up and look after the progress and welfare of the students, at the same time correcting the misconceptions of the villagers. Also, the government had deliberately on occasions promoted some dedicated and competent students to join local administration, from production brigade up the social ladder to provincial government. Many were admitted to the CCP as recognition of merit. Others were chosen to be trained as barefoot doctors. Thus there was a tacit but observable channel of upward social mobility to sustain the dedication and commitment of students to the hsia-hsiang program.<sup>25</sup>

It is pertinent to mention here that the hsia-hsiang

program was complemented by a change in admission policy in the educational system. Before the Cultural Revolution, admission into colleges and other institutions of higher education was based on academic marks obtained in final senior high school examinations. After the Cultural Revolution, high school graduates could not immediately apply for admission, but had to work for two years in a factory, or in the communes, or in the army. The decision to apply for admission to higher education was no longer individual. The student had to be recommended by his comrades on the work team; the assessment was based on his job performance, political consciousness, social behaviour, and vocational abilities. Thus, the students had another reason to work hard and contribute when they were rusticated, at least for the initial two years.<sup>26</sup>

According to the literature, the hsia-hsiang policy is still implemented today. Generalizing, the program has proven itself to be effective in curbing population concentration in the largest cities, such as Shanghai and Peking. More important, however, is the role of the students as agents of change in the receiving areas. Educated and/or skilled manpower is directed away from cities where there is a surplus of educated people to communes where there is a deficiency, places where their skills can be put to use.

### 6.2.2 The Barefoot Doctors

One of the major differences between rural and urban areas in China is the level of social services available. Mao was very unhappy that the 20% urban dwellers continued to enjoy better services than their 80% rural counterparts. In 1965, he personally indicted the Health Ministry for its biased concentration of medical delivery facilities. On June 25 of the same year, he issued a directive which essentially stated health delivery must be implemented in rural areas. The directive speeded up the Barefoot Doctor program.

In the 1930s, Dr. Norman Bethune, a Canadian physician who served with the Communist Eighth Route Army, started to train peasants to carry out simple paramedical duties. In the 1950s, the number of paramedics started to grow, but it was after Mao's directive of 1965 that the movement gained momentum.<sup>27</sup>

Barefoot doctors are paramedics who receive training from 3 months to 2 years. The curriculum and period of training varies from region to region, depending on local needs. Basically, their duties include environmental sanitation, health education, immunizations, first aid, simple primary medical care, after-care, and therapeutics.<sup>28</sup>

The distinguishing fact is that they are half physician, and half worker or farmer. They devote only part of their

time to medical care. Apart from that, they work regularly as factory workers or farmers in the paddies. In line with the policy of "self-sufficiency", Chinese herbal medicine as well as Western medicine are dispensed for treatments.

This program is a significant positive step in equalizing one of the important differentials between rural and urban areas - medical care. Before the Cultural Revolution, the physician/population ratio in rural areas was 1:8,000. By 1975, with the increase of paramedics, the ratio had improved to 1:700.<sup>29</sup>

This deconcentration of health delivery helps to mitigate the rural "pushes" and the urban "pulls" of rural/urban migration.

### 6.3 The Contradiction Between Mental and Manual Labour

#### 6.3.1 Initiation of Hsia-fang

The stratification between scholars and peasants, between mental and physical labour, has always been rigid in Chinese culture, more so than in Western societies. An educated scholar does not do any manual work. His valet carries his books and serves him left and right. Since China is 80% agrarian, Mao was determined to break this tradition, this "bourgeois exploitative" value system.

The hsia-fang movement is a deliberate attempt to unify this contradiction. "Hsia-fang" means a "downward transfer". It has two facets: a downward transfer of top cadres and professionals to lower levels within the same organization; or a transfer to the bottom-most level, either farms or factories, to engage in physical labour.

As distinct from hsia-hsiang, in which migrants are expected to "strike roots" and stay, hsia-fang is a temporary training of at least one month per year in lower labour, but the trainees are expected to return to their former positions in the cities.

In February of 1957, in his speech on "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People", Mao said:

"Of late, there has appeared a dangerous tendency among leadership personnel not to share the sufferings of the masses but rather to be mindful of personal position and profit."<sup>30</sup>

In the fall of the same year, following the Third Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee in October, the hsia-fang system was initiated.<sup>31</sup>

### 6.3.2 Target Population

The target population of the program are:

- (i) young intellectuals in power, the cadres and professionals, who have not suffered or personally witnessed the oppression and exploitation from which the masses formerly suffered at the hands of the landed gentry and capitalists;
- (ii) other cadres and technocrats who are divorced from manual production and who increasingly show disdain towards manual labour.

### 6.3.3 Objectives

The objectives of the program are:

- (i) to temper talent with redness, to unify theory and practice:

Hsia-fang is an experiment manifesting Mao's belief in the continuing value to be gained from primary cognizance of rural reality. Labour participation is considered as a major method of ensuring that expertise be tempered with "redness", or virtue. Hsia-fang is to re-educate intellectuals, to rectify their bourgeois tendencies, and ensure that knowledge is used to serve the people rather than for selfish ends.

Hsia-fang also marks the beginning of the red and expert debates: those who are technologically proficient but politically uncommitted to China's socialist revolutionary ideals; and the politically committed model workers and peasants without high education;

(ii) to stimulate the enthusiasm of the masses:

By dispatching senior cadres to work and mix with the masses, the government hopes to raise their morale and encourage their zeal for production.<sup>32</sup>

#### 6.3.4 Implementation of the Program

From October 1957 through February 1958, an estimated 1.3 million cadres were transferred.<sup>33</sup> Contrary to the hsia-hsiang movement, hsia-fang was not interrupted during the Great Leap years. Another million were transferred by the end of 1958. There was a marked decline, however, in the New Economic Policy era when Liu Shao-chi advocated more reliance on professionals and technology. The program revived again after the Cultural Revolution. The reinstatement was indicated by Mao in his speech on National Day, October 1, 1968. He said:

"Going down to do manual labour gives vast numbers of cadres an excellent opportunity to study once again. This applies to all cadres except those who are old, weak, ill or disabled. All cadres presently functioning should also go down by turns to do manual labour."<sup>34</sup>

### 6.3.5 Extent of Success

With the founding of the first May 7th cadre school in Heilungkiang Province on May 7th, 1968,<sup>35</sup> hsia-fang became established as a permanent national program. Cadre schools mushroomed in suburban satellite towns and rural communes.

Ever since the institutionalization of the program, there had been reports that some cadres paid lip service to the training, and merely observed rather than participated in physical labour. Other reports stated that the peasants in charge of the cadre schools were intimidated by the important personages sent from government offices to the villages, and let the cadres have their way.<sup>36</sup>

On the other hand, there had been cases of true enlightenment. For instance, a biology teacher assigned to clean latrines, and the Deputy Director of the East District of Peking, assigned to collect refuse and garbage, finished their training with broadened horizons and a deeper concern for the daily lives of the masses who supported their urban living.<sup>37</sup>

One cadre who had returned from a ten months' stint in a commune wrote the following lines:

I was a city man  
From tip to toe  
Things on the farm  
I just didn't know  
But the peasants gave me a warm hello  
Before I learnt to wield a hoe

After ten months I wasn't the same  
I left with much more than I came  
I filled in the gaps of my school education  
Learnt that labour makes the nation  
Today it's back to the city once more<sup>38</sup>  
An intellectual who knows the score.

#### 6.3.6 Summary

In summary, the hsia-fang system is an innovative program to preserve the revolutionary zeal of socialist transformation, to prevent the formation of a new elite of technocrats and cadre bureaucrats, divorced from the masses. Experts without "redness" tend to regard knowledge as their own personal property. They are not prepared to respond to the call of mother country. This is especially the case with the younger generation of "three-doors" cadres - from door of home, to door of school, to door of government office.<sup>39</sup>

Hsia-fang is also a vehicle to unify the contradiction of mental and manual labour. The program attempts to accent the value and importance of agricultural labour; however, the impact on deurbanization is minimal. In the case where cadres and experts are "downgraded" to the countryside, they are scheduled to return to the city. In the case where they are "downgraded" to lower levels of the organization within the city, the program has no deurbanization impact at all.

CHAPTER VI FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup>Ralph W. Huenemann, "Urban Rationing in Communist China," The China Quarterly, No.26 (April-June, 1966), 45-57.

<sup>2</sup>Yuan-Li Wu with H.C. Ling and Grace Wu, The Spatial Economy of Communist China (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1967), p.16.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid.

<sup>4</sup>Sen-Dou Chang, "The Million City of Mainland China," Pacific Viewpoint, Volume 9, No.2 (September, 1968), 128-153.

<sup>5</sup>Cheng-Siang Chen, "Population Growth and urbanization in China, 1953-1970," Ekistics, 226, (September, 1974), 192-198.

<sup>6</sup>John Philip Emerson, "Manpower Absorption in the Non-agricultural Branches of the Economy of Communist China, 1953-58," The China Quarterly, No.7 (July-September, 1961), 69-84.

<sup>7</sup>Reeitsu Kojima, "Development of the Ideas of the Great Leap Forward After the Cultural Revolution," Ekistics, 226 (September, 1974), 209-216.

<sup>8</sup>Franz Schurmann, Ideology and Organization in Communist China, 2nd ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970), pp. 366-400.

<sup>9</sup>Stanley Karnow, "Why They Fled: Refugee Accounts," Communist China, ed. Franz Schurmann and Orville Schell. (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1967), 454-467.

<sup>10</sup>Roland Berger, "The Mechanization of Chinese Agriculture," Eastern Horizon, Volume XI, No.3 (1972), pp. 7-26.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid.

<sup>13</sup>Leo Goodstadt, China's Search for Plenty - Economics of Mao (New York: Weatherhill, 1973), p. 204.

<sup>14</sup>Brian J.L. Berry, Edgar C. Conkling and D. Michael Ray, The Geography of Economic Systems (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1976), p.457.

<sup>15</sup>Rhoads Murphey, "Aspects of Urbanization in Contemporary China: A Revolutionary Model", Proceedings of the Association of American Geographers, Volume 7 (1975), pp. 165-168.

<sup>16</sup>Berger, op. cit.

<sup>17</sup>Pi-Chao Chen, "Over-urbanization, Rustication of Urban-educated Youths, and Politics of Rural Transformation: The Case of China," Comparative Politics, 4, (April, 1972), 361-286.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid.

<sup>20</sup>Christopher L. Salter, "Hsia-fang: The Use of Migration by the Chinese in their Quest for a Classless Society," Proceedings of the Association of American Geographers, Volume 4 (1972), 96-99.

<sup>21</sup>Laurence J.C. Ma, "Anti-Urbanism in China," Proceedings of the Association of American Geographers, Volume 8 (1976), 114-118.

<sup>22</sup>John Wilson Lewis (ed.), The City in Communist China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1971), p. 273.

<sup>23</sup>Ross Terrill, Flowers on a Iron Tree (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1975), p.217.

<sup>24</sup>Rhoads Murphey, "City and Countryside as Ideological Issues: India and China," Comparative Studies in Society and History, Volume 14 (June, 1972), 250-267.

<sup>25</sup>Goodstadt, op. cit., p. 230.

<sup>26</sup>Peter Kwong-ming New, "Barefoot Doctors & Health Care in the People's Republic of China," Ekistics, 226 (September, 1974), 220-224.

<sup>27</sup>Ibid.

<sup>28</sup>Matthew H. Liang, et al, "Chinese Health Care: Determinants of the System," Ekistics, 220 (March, 1974), 206-211.

<sup>29</sup>Rodney Tasker, (ed.), Far Eastern Economic Review. Asia 1976 Yearbook (Hong Kong: South China Morning Post Ltd., 1976), pp. 138-156.

<sup>30</sup>Rensselaer W. Lee, "The Hsia-fang System: Marxism and Modernization," The China Quarterly, No.28 (October-December, 1966), 40-62.

<sup>31</sup>Lewis, op. cit. pp. 117-118.

<sup>32</sup>Lee, op. cit.

<sup>33</sup>Ibid.

<sup>34</sup>Salter, op. cit.

<sup>35</sup>Paul Pickowicz, "Teaching the Teachers," Eastern Horizon, Volume XI, No.3 (1972), 42-47.

<sup>36</sup>Goodstadt, op. cit., pp. 192-199.

<sup>37</sup>Pickowicz, op. cit.

<sup>38</sup>Lee, op. cit.

<sup>39</sup>Pickowicz, op. cit.

CHAPTER VII ASSESSMENT OF CHINA'S ACHIEVEMENT

China's record of urbanization has been examined in isolation. This chapter assesses China's performance relative to other developing countries.

The Republic of Indonesia is chosen as a control because it too gained independence and full sovereignty in 1949. It is also classified as a Third World developing country which inherited a backward economy and a big population. The major difference between the two is that China is a socialist economy practising command planning while Indonesia is a market economy practising indicative planning. This comparison would throw light on the theme of this thesis.

#### 7.1 China's Record of Achievement

There are two widely held views about China's urbanization. One expressed by Peter Wiles in "The Political Economy of Communism" is that China has achieved industrialization without urbanization. This statement is an overly-generous compliment. China's urban population has grown at an average annual rate of 6.76% for the past 26 years.

The second view, which the author tends to agree with, is represented by Neville Maxwell. He is of the opinion that China has succeeded in stemming urban drift by limiting migration, by birth control, and by creating conditions of prosperity in the countryside.<sup>1</sup> This view is supplemented by Rhoads Murphey's observation that China's most challenging departure from Western industrialization models is the effort to disperse industry and other urban functions more

widely into the rural areas through the institution of the commune. In Murphey's article on the "Aspects of Urbanization in Contemporary China: A Revolutionary Model", he wrote the following about the commune industries:

"A great deal has been accomplished in this connection and I have no intention whatever of denigrating it or of implying that it is window dressing. On the contrary, it stands in my view as one of the truly significant<sup>2</sup> and innovative achievements of this century."

Having said all this, we shall now compare China with Indonesia. The points of comparison are:

- (a) the rate of urbanization
- (b) the stage of urbanization
- (c) the distribution of urbanization

## 7.2 Comparison with Indonesia

### 7.2.1 The Rate of Urbanization

The official estimated population of Indonesia in 1950 was 77.2 million<sup>3</sup>, 9.05% urban.<sup>4</sup> In 1971, the census figure was 118 million, 17.4% urban.<sup>5</sup> This amounts to an average annual urban growth rate of 8.6% over a 21 year period. Compared with China's 6.76%, Indonesia has been urbanizing at a faster rate. However, since both countries' figures involved estimates, and there may also be variances in the definition of urban and rural, the author prefers to take the view that there does not seem to be too significant a difference in the rate

of urban growth for China and Indonesia.

### 7.2.2 The Stage of Urbanization

The stage of urbanization for the two countries is also very similar. In both cases, approximately 80% of the population is engaged in agriculture today.

### 7.2.3 The Distribution of Urbanization

Two aspects of distribution will be explored: inter-regional distribution, and intra-regional distribution.

#### (i) Inter-regional Distribution

##### (a) The Primacy Index

From 1948 to 1958, China managed to decrease its primacy index from 0.49 to 0.41, thereby achieving a more balanced spread of urban growth.

From 1961 to 1971, Indonesia increased its primacy index from 0.55 to 0.57, which meant urban growth was further polarized instead of decentralized.

##### (b) Management of the Largest City(ies)


As mentioned previously, China managed to depopulate Shanghai, the largest city, and to stabilize the population of Peking, the second largest city.

The results are quite impressive considering that there are two major sources of urban growth,<sup>6</sup> given that municipal boundaries are held constant: net internal migration and net natural increase.

Thus, it can be deduced that there must have been a stream of reversed rural-urban migration from Shanghai and Peking during the period 1958-1971, at least sufficient to counter the net natural increase in the two urban areas for the same interval.

In Indonesia, the government is still struggling with the continual urban growth in its primate city, Djakarta. (see Figure 5.)

Figure 5. POPULATION OF DJAKARTA 1950-1971



(c) Concentrated Decentralization - Growth of  
Inland Urban Centres

Because of China's semi-colonial past, the CCP since 1949 deliberately directed growth away from the coastal treaty ports to inland growth centres. As a result of this deliberate strategy, by 1960, the national capital and most other provincial capitals were developed into industrial, as well as regional distribution and collection centres.

Turning to Indonesia, the Dutch legacy of urban primacy is still baffling decision-makers. Urban and industrial growth is still most concentrated in Djakarta, followed by Surabaya and Bandung. If this condition of primacy continues to exist, there will be a contraction rather than a dispersion of development as national economic growth proceeds.

(ii) Intra-regional Distribution

Intra-regional distribution is concerned with distribution of economic and social growth between the city and its hinterland. Two issues will be dealt with under this section: the generative aspects of economic distribution, and the allocative aspects of social welfare distribution.

(a) Generative Distribution - The Agropolitan  
Approach

While the Indonesian government only recently started to talk about the agropolitan bottom-up

approach to regional development, China began experimenting with the concept in 1969. Although hard statistics are not available, most China observers concur that some market towns in the communes have been developed into agropolitan centres. This does not mean rural industry will replace urban industry; it will supplement it.

(b) Allocative Distribution - The Barefoot Doctors

In this respect, China can only claim substantial improvements in one area - the delivery of health care. With the assistance of paramedics, the disparity in the level of health care between the city and its hinterland has been drastically reduced.

The Indonesian government, however, has no comparative program in this area nor in any other area of social services.

7.3 Reasons for China's Better Performance

According to the above comparison, China managed to control urban growth better than Indonesia. The reasons for the better performance are, of course, many and varied, but the following three are the most important:

7.3.1 Control of Investment Funds

China is a socialist country practising command planning. Therefore, the central government has complete control over the allocation of investment capital.

Indonesia, as a market economy, is primarily dependent upon foreign aid and private investment, domestic or foreign. The government has virtually no direct control over the allocation of investment capital, particularly in the secondary and tertiary sectors. According to a 1972 survey, 45% of potential investors (non-extractive industries only) wanted to locate in Djakarta. Such behaviour would undoubtedly exacerbate Indonesia's primacy problem.

### 7.3.2 Connectivity

Of prime importance in diffusion of development is the transportation system. Between 1950-1971, China built 11,000 miles of new railway trackage, resulting in a total of 25,000 miles. With the exception of Tibet, every province and autonomous region has direct access to a main line.<sup>8</sup>

Indonesia, on the other hand, has not been able to develop a comparable transportation system to support the nation's economic development. The best roads and railways are still concentrated in Java. The country is further handicapped by the waters separating the various islands within the archipelago.

### 7.3.3 Ideology and Organization

In coping with scarcity and social change, China's solution is to substitute ideology and organization for inadequate capital and technology: ideology as the motive force, organization as resource mobilization.

Within the regime's first 20 years, the Communists achieved a fundamental institutional breakthrough. For the first time in Chinese history, they developed an "octopus" political system strong enough to control and transform society: communes in the countryside and neighbourhoods in the cities. Major economic, cultural, educational and rural activities are brought within the scope of governmental management.

In contrast to individualism and competition, the Socialist ideology stressed collectivity and cooperation. In implementing policies, "carrots and sticks" are used. Where moral suasion fails, thinly concealed coercion is employed, but even then, it is psychological coercion rather than physical coercion. Group pressure is often used to breed conformity.

In Indonesia, the traditional cultural system and institutional system are breaking down under the impact of industrialization, but the leadership has failed to fill in the resulting vacuum. For instance, the governmental bureaucracy is plagued with corruption, whereas the Socialist ideology in China has largely eliminated this problem.

Another example is in the organization of agriculture. Back in 1952, when land reform was completed in China, the average household farm was about 0.6 hectares. By collectivizing agriculture, China's communes now average

1,900 hectares per farm<sup>9</sup>, and operations have become much more efficient.

In Indonesia, the average farm size has dwindled to about 0.5 hectares. The food produced from such a small plot has proved incapable of supporting families even at the minimum subsistence level. Perhaps the Indonesian government should also give serious thought to the advantages of agricultural collectivization.

CHAPTER VII FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup>Peter Wilsher and Rosemary Righter, The Exploding Cities (London: Andre Deutsch Ltd., 1975), pp. 184-185.

<sup>2</sup>Rhoads Murphey, "Aspects of Urbanization in Contemporary China: A Revolutionary Model," Proceedings of the Association of American Geographers, Volume 7 (1975), 165-168.

<sup>3</sup>Widjojo Nitisastro, Population Trends in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970), p. 124.

<sup>4</sup>Sugijanto Soegijoko and Budhy T. Sugijanto, "Urban Areas in Indonesia as Development Catalyst," Prisma, No.3 (April, 1976), 52-62.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid.

<sup>6</sup>International migration to China's urban areas since 1949 has been very limited. The exact figure is not known. Since international migration is outside the scope of this thesis, it will not be expored in the comparison.

<sup>7</sup>Selo Soemardjan, Imbalances in Development: The Indonesian Experience (Ohio: Ohio University Centre for International Studies, 1972), p.20.


<sup>8</sup>Brian J.L. Berry, Edgar C. Conkling, and D. Michael Ray, The Geography of Economic Systems (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1976), pp. 413-453.

<sup>9</sup>Ace Leroy Hollibaugh, "The Geographical, Social and Political Implications of De-urbanization and De-centralization in the People's Republic of China" (unpublished Master's thesis, Department of G<sub>e</sub>ography, Simon Fraser University, 1975), p. 15.

CHAPTER VIII SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING COMMENTS

## 8.1 Summary

As an overview, we can summarize China's record of modernization, industrialization, and urbanization in the following paradigm.



The policies adopted by China to manage urban growth can be grouped under three headings:

8.1.1 Directed Transmigration to Reverse the Rural-Urban Flow

Three programs have been adopted: huihsiang, hsia-hsiang, and hsia-fang.

Hui-hsiang was a temporary program implemented in 1962 to return the twenty million peasants who flocked to the cities during the Great Leap.

Hsia-hsiang is a permanent program initiated in 1957 and is still in force today. It is directed at urban educated youths. Upon graduation, most students will be assigned jobs in the countryside. They are expected to live there permanently and contribute to the socialist reconstruction of the rural economy.

Hsia-fang is also a permanent program initiated in the same year, 1957. However, this program is directed at cadres and professionals. They may be transferred to the countryside to learn from the peasants, but the period of transfer is specified; or they may be transferred to lower levels in the organization within the city. Therefore, the reversed rural-urban flow created by this program, if any, is of minimal impact in relieving the population pressures of the cities.

### 8.1.2 Concentrated Decentralization

By adopting the "growth poles" strategy, China managed to direct a portion of rural out-migration to medium-sized urban centres in the inland.

### 8.1.3 Rural Agropolitan Centres

By adopting the "agropolitan" strategy, China is in fact improving job opportunities and social services in the rural areas. The long-term effect is a convergence in living standards between the city and its hinterland. The pull forces of the city become less attractive. At the same time, the push forces of the hinterland lessen in severity and become tolerable. People are encouraged to stay in the rural areas.

The author is of the opinion that the relative success of China over Indonesia in managing and controlling urban growth is attributable to the adoption of these three strategies. China may not be able to model the world in its response to rural-urban migration, but the strategies it adopted are certainly worthy of serious consideration by other leaders of the Third World.

## 8.2 Suggestions for Further Research

Before closing, a word of caution may be in order for future researchers who may be interested to pursue this field.

Hard statistical data on urbanization is available until 1960, but after that date, there has been a real paucity in official statistical data. This does not mean that there are no data available. After 1960, many volumes of statistics have been compiled by Eastern and Western scholars who follow China's developments very closely, but the data presented are based on guestimates, not official statistical releases.

However, this limitation in data will not apply to scholars who are willing and able to devote time and energy to conduct primary research in China. It would be interesting to trace the development of agropolitan centres in the communes; or a life history of a rusticated youth; or the policy changes in China after the death of Chairman Mao Tse-Tung.

When Mao died in 1976, China suffered the loss of a great leader. At the same time, the country was ready to turn over a new leaf. The developments in China after Mao's death should provide fascinating avenues of research for China scholars.

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