TIME, TENSE AND L'ETRANGER:
AN APPROACH THROUGH PERFORMANCE THEORY

by

JAMES ARTHURS
B.A., University of Durham, 1956
M.A., University of Victoria, 1968

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

in
THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES
(Department of French)

We accept this dissertation as conforming
to the required standard

THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA
December, 1976

© James Arthurs, 1976
In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for
an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that
the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study.
I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis
for scholarly purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or
by his representatives. It is understood that copying or publication
of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my
written permission.

Department of French

The University of British Columbia
2075 Wesbrook Place
Vancouver, Canada
V6T 1W5

Date Dec. 9, 1976.
A study of the considerable literature written around *L'Etranger* makes clear that its wide range of approaches and methodologies raises interesting and important questions of a theoretical nature. In the particular area of language-oriented studies, the disparity of the models proposed or presupposed and, in the case of very similar models, the notable disparity of the conclusions drawn call for further examination of the theory behind them.

Most such models are seen to revolve around the rôle of the narrator and his relation to events recounted in the text. Unlike most linguistic models, these are performance-oriented - a fact that is seen as crucial, raising the question of the nature of a putative performance theory and its relation to models based on *competence/langue*. Consideration of these questions establishes the need for elaboration of the study of *énonciation* (or "allocution") and more particularly of the "*aspect indiciel du langage*" in order to elucidate time and tense in relation to performance.

The method adopted, involving a detailed analysis of the prevailing models in this area (Benveniste and Weinrich), shows the binary elegance of their schemes to be misleading
and at variance with numerous examples of literary usage. The proposal is made that the discours/récit contrast be regarded as belonging to the area of illocutionary forces in general and as such capable of being marked by various devices in addition to tense-forms and "shifters".

A particular set of devices, the presententials, is proposed: founded on the syntactic notion of the higher S, they mark both the force and the time of utterances. A related class, the interruption sentences, is examined and expanded and, along with a third class, the commentary-forms, constitutes an important addition to the markers of sui-reference.

Finally, a detailed inspection of L'Etranger reveals the importance of these devices in the text and, in connection with the oft-discussed "moments de narration", gives rise to a different perspective based on a clearer understanding of the relation of "le temps linguistique" and "le temps chronologique" in the novel and a more precise explanation of the rôle of the reader. In the light of this, various subsidiary aspects are then explained in relation to Camus's intentions and his artistic achievement in L'Etranger.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Notes</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Performance Theory</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Notes</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Time and Tense, I</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Notes</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Time and Tense, II</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Notes</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Time and Tense, III</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Notes</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>L'Etranger</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Notes</td>
<td>219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bibliography</td>
<td>226</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# LIST OF FIGURES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

Of the many people who deserve my thanks, I wish most particularly to express my gratitude to the following:

the Head and members of the French Dept. at UBC, for their encouragement and forbearance;
the Head, Acting Chairman and members of the Linguistics Dept. at UVIC, my colleagues, for their encouragement and support, as well as countless discussions concerning my work;
the members of my Committee, for their willing assistance;
my children, for their remarkable - if frequently incomprehending - tolerance;
my wife Norah, for everything.
CHAPTER ONE

Introduction.

0. The flood of scholarly writings centred around Camus's *L'Etranger* has not gone unabated, yet even today it continues in a steady stream. This literature is an impressive phenomenon, at once astonishing, bewildering and tantalising - by its sheer magnitude, its range and its conclusions. Therefore it is surely with a certain trepidation that one would propose still another study of the work: any addition risks appearing at first gratuitous. And yet, imposing though it is, this literature seems somehow incomplete and in some respects unsatisfying.

0.1 That such a slim volume should have provoked the response it has is in itself astonishing. It has seized the attention of students of every type, the great and the unknown, the perceptive and the mundane, in works ranging from the merest notes to entire volumes devoted to it.¹ Not all of these by any means are specialists in literature; they count in their number psychologists, philosophers, sociologists and linguists. The resultant set of attitudes and stances adopted towards *L'Etranger* has made for a body of work of the utmost
complexity, the source of our bewilderment.

0.2 It is a bewilderment that is scarcely dissipated by one's growing familiarity with the literature. Not only are the themes encountered and the points of view expressed therein so many and diverse, as well as specialised, that it is difficult to encompass them all, but even in individual cases it is often hard to know why a certain approach has been adopted or a certain emphasis laid or, conversely, not laid. In the face of difficulties and uncertainties of this sort, it comes as perhaps no surprise to feel a reluctance to accept, because undemonstrated or inadequately founded, conclusions which yet seem intuitively right. It is in this sense that the literature is frequently tantalising.

1.0 Some of the difficulties alluded to might often be explained as the result of too great a preoccupation with a particular set of interests or a particular methodology. It is undoubtedly with something of the sort in mind that Cruickshank, twenty years ago, said:

"And what is more serious still, a tendency to treat the novel as an illustration of the essay [Le Mythe de Sisyphe] has resulted in such emphasis on the content of L'Etranger that several of its finest technical achievements have escaped notice. The absurdism implied by Meursault's personality and behaviour has too frequently been discussed without adequate attention being paid to the form and medium of its expression. In other words, critics have been slow to explain what it is that makes L'Etranger a novel, a work of art, and not simply the statement of a philosophical attitude".

(1956, p.241)
Some six years later, Barrier (1962) could still claim that there were "deux catégories[:]; celles qui examinent L'Etranger à travers le Mythe de Sisyphe et celles qui veulent ignorer le Mythe de Sisyphe", both attitudes being in his view rather exaggerated (p.2). Very broadly stated, the distinction here is between the "littératureur" and the "linguist" and is based generally on the degree of attention each pays to the text and the language of the work. To these one might add a third group, occupying a kind of middle ground between the others and being quite the largest: it is the group of those who concern themselves with the work as a whole and with its stylistic features, a group in which Barrier himself might claim membership. Yet even here the difficulties and a certain bewilderment exist. Mitterand (1969) speaks with some feeling when he tells us:

"Je ne comprends pas pourquoi certains critiques veulent absolument laver Albert Camus de tout soupçon d'être un styliste. L'un parle, à propos de L'Etranger, 'd'écriture blanche', l'autre de 'style grisaille', un troisième d'un 'style presque constamment égal'. Il faut s'entendre, et sur L'Etranger, et sur le sens du mot style". (p.11)

1.1 It is clear that in Mitterand's view, the critics are not treating common ground, even where they profess to do so, because they are not speaking the same language. Il faut s'entendre: Mitterand is undoubtedly right and has touched unintentionally on a major question, which will form the underlying theme of this work - the question of the model.
Every act of criticism or analysis has as its basis a model, which may be overtly expressed as part of the act or merely left to inference. Upon that model are founded not only the set of procedures used in the act but also the conclusions to which it leads. Thus the question that Mitterand raises is not only crucial but also extremely broad in its scope of application. Therefore, in this work, I do not propose to attack it on all fronts: instead I shall examine those aspects of it that arise directly from a study of that part of the literature dealing with the language and, to a lesser extent, the style of \textit{L'Etranger}. It is this area, it seems to me, that the problem of the model is most clearly revealed.

* * * * * * * *

2.0. There is a general tendency to regard language-oriented studies as more technical and, for that reason, more precise, in the sense that they are more easily delimited in their methods or their scope. This assumption is not always well founded, as numerous examples attest. In the following passage from Renaud (1957), there is no doubt as to the close attention to detail on which his remarks are based:

"La monotonie du rythme, surtout dans les cinquante premières pages du livre, est encore soutenue par le retour fréquent de nombres, notamment de 'deux' qui s'y prête davantage à cause des articles indéfinis qui se trouvent naturellement dans le texte. L'effet est encore accentué par Camus qui volontiers emploie 'un' ou 'une' au lieu de l'article..."
défini. Dans une scène on voit 'deux' petits garçons et derrière eux une mère 'sic'; puis vient le père 'un petit homme' qui avait 'un canotier, un noeud et une canne à la main'. Cela se dit couramment ainsi, comme dans d'autres exemples que nous citerons. Néanmoins ces effets sont adroitement préparés; on ne s'en aperçoit guère sauf en analysant le style. Mais alors on est étonné par la fréquence de ce procédé à la fois simple et ingénieux. Meursault prend l'autobus à deux heures, il demande deux jours de congé, il marche deux kilomètres pour arriver à l'asile. Quand un pensionnaire meurt 'les autres sont nerveux pendant deux ou trois jours' (p.12). Il est vrai qu'il faut ordinairement deux chevalets (p.13) pour supporter une bière, que les gens ont deux bras (p.36), que les curés sont accompagnés de deux enfants de chœur (p.24), mais Camus saisit ces occasions et semble les multiplier afin de maintenir le rythme monotone de l'existence: un ... deux, ... un ... deux ... un ... deux ... trois. Les frelons bourdonnent par deux (p.15); .............................. ......................................................... ." (p.292)

Yet, in spite of the careful observation the passage manifests and in spite of the clarity of the point Renaud makes, one may be permitted to wonder what to make of the whole observation. Is it valid? Does it constitute sufficient evidence to talk about Camus's intentions, to attribute the presence of these admittedly ordinary numerals to a "prédilection" (p.293) of Camus? Can evidence drawn from half a dozen pages above all count as evidence for a regularity alleged to occur over some fifty pages? Does it constitute prima facie evidence of a "monotonie du rythme" or does the latter remain merely an assertion of Renaud's own making? In short, is the whole passage in accord with an established model of analysis, other than that of the explication de texte? One is tempted to think not.
2.1 Of a different order of interest, though likewise focused on the language of the work, is this extract from Fitch (1970d):

"Dans L'Etranger, le rapport entre les deux niveaux de caractérisation est un rapport d'écart, comme s'en est vite rendu compte la critique. [...] Si chaque niveau du texte donne lieu à l'évocation d'un portrait partiel d'un personnage, d'une part un ton de voix et de l'autre les images d'une existence matérielle, et qu'ils concernent tous deux le même personnage, cela ne devrait pas présenter de problème: ils devraient se révéler complémentaires et se fondre pour constituer un personnage cohérent jouissant de l'épaisseur romanesque nécessaire pour convaincre le lecteur de son existence. Or, non seulement ils ne se fondent pas, mais ils ne s'éclairent même pas. En fait, ils ne semblent pas correspondre du tout, comme s'il s'agissait de deux personnages différents. Il en résulte qu'au lieu de se renforcer comme moyens de caractérisation, les deux niveaux d'évocation rivalisent l'un avec l'autre et une tension se crée entre les deux du fait que chacun se réclame du droit de représenter Meursault. L'identité que lui confère la trame des images visuelles et des paroles rapportées du passé paraît certes plus concrète et plus détaillée, bien que toujours énigmatique, que celle qu'on pourrait attribuer à cette voix en présence de laquelle le lecteur se trouve. Mais cette voix qui n'en finit pas de résonner dans la tête du lecteur accompagne toujours l'évocation du protagoniste et par là même entame et mine sérieusement l'existence de celui-ci." (p.223)

Faced with this passage, I find it difficult to know, with certainty, quite what the author is saying. At the same time, I have the feeling that, if I have understood him correctly, I am intuitively in agreement. I infer - or guess - that his remarks are based on Meursault's use of language (this is subsequently confirmed by Fitch (p.227)) but I am at a loss to see how he has derived the remarks from the data. What are the textual data that prompt him to discuss his two levels?
What does he mean by "un ton de voix", "personnage", "identité" and "épaisseur romanesque"? Which are the elements of the text that give rise to these notions? Are his observations directed along the lines of some definite model? In this case, one is tempted to think so, despite the rather imaged language of the passage.

2.2 This uncertainty about the model is by no means typical of the studies that take the language as their point of departure. Pariente (1968) leaves no doubt as to the model and procedures he proposes to use:

"Quand on s'interroge sur le cadre de référence chronologique de L'Etranger, on constate que Camus l'a construit avec beaucoup de soin grâce à l'emploi délibéré des indicateurs temporels du français." (p. 56)

He concludes his description of these indicateurs by proposing that

"en examinant les indicateurs utilisés dans L'Etranger, il sera donc possible de dater la rédaction du texte par rapport aux événements rapportés, et ce travail, fastidieux à première vue, va peu à peu conduire au cœur de la composition si concertée de ce livre". (ibid.)

Equally explicit and even more categorical is Abbou (1969a). He states first of all, and in unmistakable terms, the model that he refuses to use:

"Nous ne saurions sous-estimer [le] travail de l'écrivain en le livrant à l'analyse quantitative des principaux tropes illustrés dans le texte et charriés par une rhétorique multiséculaire. À quoi sert de relever des traces de vocabulaire recherché, des faits de syntaxe archaïque ou classique, si c'est pour les isoler, leur conférer une signification stylistique qu'ils n'ont peut-être pas, et aboutir à des conclusions faussées parce que précipitées?
En outre, procéder ainsi, n'est-ce pas mutiler un personnage en lui retirant la cohérence de son discours, laquelle ne peut dépendre alors que de l'écrivain? Il faut être bien naïf cependant pour considérer, en ce cas, qu'il y a style, car le style reste le choix, effectué par le locuteur, de ses moyens d'expression à partir du capital linguistique, la langue." (p.38)

He goes on, in rather more temperate terms, to give an extremely detailed exposition of his model (pp.39-45), of which the general tenor is indicated in the following way:

"Prudemment, mais sans complexe, tentons une approche du roman. En tant que récit, il est constitué d'une histoire qui renvoie à une réalité sous forme d'événements et de personnages, et d'un discours du narrateur qui destine cette relation à un lecteur. À notre niveau linguistique, ce ne sont pas les événements rapportés qui importent, mais la façon dont le narrateur les porte à notre connaissance. Tout récit est d'abord une mise en forme linguistique, une façon d'organiser la substance du contenu. Avancer que l'œuvre est d'abord un discours, c'est, bien entendu, lui redonner sa nature de communication." (p.39)

2.2.1 While we can admire the clear statement of position by both Pariente and Abbou - their models are the same, apart from a difference of emphasis and range - we must at the same time bear in mind that it serves as a basis for drawing conclusions, as always. In this regard there is great interest to be found in comparing their conclusions: we can do this because, in spite of the principal differences in their objectives, there is one theme that receives their common attention. It is the question of the dating of the narration by Meursault, as well as its nature and motivation. Abbou (p.49) is admirably succinct on the matter:

"... la relation commence un certain jour avant cinq mois
Pariente's position is more complex and must be summarised.

At different moments, he says:

"Meursault a écrit le livre en six ou sept épisodes: cinq ou six pour écrire les quatre premiers chapitres, plus un épisode pour toute la suite." (p.61)

"[le livre] a été écrit en quelques séances dont le nombre a dépendu du mouvement même de l'existence de Meursault, puis les pages obtenues ont été reprises et redistribuées conformément à un découpage non plus vécu et personnel, mais officiel et anonyme. Meursault tenait un journal, ce que nous lisons est un livre, un 'roman'.'" (p.64)

"... on aura le droit d'attribuer le livre tel qu'il est, avec tous ses aspects, à Meursault, si l'on peut admettre qu'il est aussi l'auteur du découpage officiel, malgré son aversion pour la conceptualisation." (p.65)

"Et notre perplexité demeure", to use the words of Abbou (p.37). How can one explain or justify the fact that, starting from the same theoretical position (at least on the question of the dating) and applying themselves to the same data, two authors can produce such significantly different findings? To add to our bewilderment, how can Abbou (1971, p. 175) castigate Rossi (1969) for what he calls "l'assimilation infondée du discours de L'Etranger à un soliloque ou à un monologue"? Does not Abbou claim the same thing, in the same year? Does the fact that Fitch also adheres to the notion of an internal monologue suggest therefore that his model also is the same as Abbou's, after all? Will a difference of model
explain for us the difference between Barrier's opting for a "récit au jour le jour" (with its attendant inconsistencies) (1962, p.28) and Pariente's idea of a diary-cum-novel? Besides the model, other factors may come into play to explain these and other inconsistencies: procedures used after invoking the model may be inadequate or inappropriate; there may be some element of partic pris involved in the drawing of final conclusions. These are aspects that need to be re-examined.

* * * * * * * * *

3.0 Not all models are necessarily appropriate in themselves to the kind of analysis that the language of L'Etranger seems to call for: Abbou has made this point strongly (2.2). It is also beyond the scope of this present study to conduct a detailed comparison of them all. However, a brief survey of the predominant themes found in the literature gives, in my view, a strong indication of the model that is indispensable to a study of the language -more precisely, the linguistic - aspects of L'Etranger.

3.1 The predominant themes, recurring in one form or another in nearly all studies, are those of tense (the Passé Composé in particular) and time (the chronology of events and of the narration). Tense is seen as involving both questions of grammar and questions of expressive force, especially in its
contrast with other tenses (the Passé Simple above all).
Time, on the other hand, is seen as serving a means to an end: less intrinsically interesting in itself, it nevertheless aids in establishing certain truths about the work which permit in turn the elaboration of points of view concerning the work as a whole, both in itself and in its relation to Camus. This approach to questions of time in the work is subsumed under the general heading of what various authors, after Fitch (1968d), call the "moments de narration", in the study of which the study of the tenses plays a fundamental rôle. A third theme, again common to most of the studies, is that of first-person narration, necessarily connected—in the case of L'Étranger above all—with the use of the Passé Composé.

3.2 What is not always clear is the extent to which the individual authors are aware of the theoretical implications, from a linguistic point of view, of the model they have, or seem to have, adopted. Many of them speak of "je" not only as a morphological item but also as referring to the person of the speaker: in the latter case, there is not always some corresponding mention and discussion of the interlocutor that, according to at least one model, is implicitly evoked by the mention of "je". At other times, the interlocutor is given consideration but only as a reader. In Chapter 6, I shall deal in detail with some of these cases: I mention their existence at present merely to make the point that there is not always
assurance on the part of authors as to their own theoretical point of departure.

3.3 A fundamental type of uncertainty that reveals itself in the literature is on the relationship of *langue* and *parole* or, more narrowly defined, *competence* and *performance*. To consider Meursault as a narrator is to regard his language as performance: can one speak of a model of performance? Are there any rules that are specific to language as performance, in fact? In Chapter II, these questions are examined and an answer suggested. In Chapter III, I undertake a close analysis of the model that was evoked in Chapter II — and which corresponds to that most frequently invoked in the literature, that of Benveniste — and, against that background, present three approaches to the question of tense. My attention in Chapter 4 is directed to the question of time as it is marked by the tenses within actual speech and the limitations that exist in that regard and which call for a revision of the original basic theory. Such a revision is proposed and discussed in Chapter 5, in which I propose also additions to the area referred to by Benveniste as the "aspect indiciel du langage".

3.4 In Chapter 6, I return to the theme of *L'Étranger* and the questions of time and tense as manifested in the language of the work, seen in the light of the revised theory. In this chapter also, I take the opportunity to consider various of
the sub-themes that appear in the literature and, for the first time, consider the relationship of Camus to the work in the light both of what I have claimed and what others have claimed previously. Finally, I consider the rôle of the reader in his relationship to the work and offer a new view of the phenomenological nature of that relationship and its implications.
NOTES.

1. The very task of surveying the literature has reached considerable proportions. For this reason, we are indebted to certain scholars whose attention to this aspect of the study of L'Etranger has proven to be of the greatest utility to others. Special mention must be made of the contribution of Brian T. Fitch who, in his rôle of editor of the Série Albert Camus (e.g. 1968a), has helped significantly the preparatory phase of my work.

Hereafter, all bibliographical mentions refer to the entries in the Bibliography following Chapter 6, unless explicitly stated to the contrary. Cross-references to parts of my text are indicated by simple use of the paragraph numbers, unless they refer to a different chapter, in which case the paragraph numbers are preceded by an indication of the chapter: e.g. (Ch. 3:4.1) refers to paragraph 4.1 of Chapter 3.

2. One might even go so far as to wonder if it is to be taken seriously: cf. in this connection the remarks of Abbou, cited hereafter in 2.2.

3. See Fitch (1968d). I say "after all" because a cursory reading of Fitch does not reveal such a similarity: Fitch does not usually specify a model in anything approaching the way Abbou does. By inference, however, the similarities do become apparent.

4. Others undertake a study specifically to test their model, e.g. Coquet (1969)
Sometimes others again are not entirely sound in their use of even the word "model", e.g. Kamber (1971, p.394)
Linguists since the time of Saussure have sought generally to restrict their attention to what he defined as *langue*, all else being classed as *parole*, and little has been done to alter this orientation except for recent attempts by the proponents of transformational-generative grammar to specify it more narrowly as *competence / performance*. The main thrust of the distinction has remained constant:

"... utterances are instances of *parole*, which the linguist takes as evidence for the construction of the underlying common structure: the *langue*. It is therefore the *langue*, the language-system, which the linguist describes. [...] a distinction must be made between 'utterances' and 'sentences'; and [...] the description of a 'language' is, in principle, a two-stage operation. The utterances of a particular 'language' (what speakers actually produce, when we say that they 'are speaking the language') can be described only indirectly, and at the present time very inadequately, on the basis of a prior description of the sentences of the 'language'. This distinction between utterances and sentences is fundamental in most linguistic theory."  

Thus *performance*, though always with us, can usually be conveniently ignored. As a concept, it is part of our current exchange; as a construct, it has had at best a fragmentary existence, serving, more often than not, only a contrastive purpose — that of defining its antonym *competence*. 
0.1 Among French linguists, a similar situation has obtained, though for them the advent of transformational grammar seemed more clearly a revitalization of the somewhat neglected Saussurian version of the distinction in question, as Ruwet points out:

"... cette distinction est très proche de la distinction saussurienne classique entre la langue et la parole: la compétence (la langue) représente le savoir linguistique implicite des sujets parlants, le 'système grammatical existant virtuellement dans chaque cerveau' (Saussure, 1916, p.30); la performance (la parole) représente au contraire l'actualisation ou la manifestation de ce système dans une multitude d'actes concrets, chaque fois différents. C'est la performance qui fournit les données d'observation — corpus de toutes sortes, écrits ou oraux (conversations enregistrées, interviews, récits, articles de journaux, textes littéraires, etc.) — qui permettent d'aborder l'étude de la compétence." 2

0.2 So far, then two points emerge clearly, showing performance as the "junior partner" in the relationship. It seems, first of all, to act as the rough ore from which the nuggets of competence may be extracted and, secondly, it is held to be virtually unapproachable or untreatable except through competence. If this is true, and if the mineral analogy is not false, then a problem presents itself immediately: most extraction processes rely on a detailed knowledge of the lode-bearing medium, of its nature and composition, to facilitate extraction of the mineral and, furthermore, to explain qualitative differences observable in the extracted mineral itself. In the linguistic context, however, no analysis of performance is provided or even attempted. This leaves open
the question of resolving differences that arise concerning the data when they are being dealt with at the competence level.

1.0 Such a question could not be left open for long, however, and it fell to transformational grammar to propose a cogent approach to the problem, with its concept of grammaticality. Judgements of grammaticality, made by native speakers of the language under study, are held to be decisive in questions concerning the validity of data. Such judgements are made on the basis of native-speaker intuition and are taken as correct. In spite of the lively, sometimes extremely bitter controversy that flared around the notion of grammaticality, the concept is today held to be well established and accepted for what it is:

"... le concept de la grammaticalité ne vise à rien d'autre qu'à cerner avec précision une notion avec laquelle les linguistes ont toujours opéré implicitement. Il permet d'éviter les confusions qui résultent de l'emploi de notions vagues, comme celle de 'phrases possibles' (ou 'impossibles'), 'correctes' (ou 'incorrectes'), 'existentes' (ou 'inexistentes'); il permet aussi de résister à l'illusion d'objectivité que donne le recours aux considérations de probabilité."

1.1 Chomsky, in Aspects (pp. 10-15) is careful to discuss the relatedness of the competence and performance aspects of language and his remarks turn about precisely the question of "grammaticalness" as opposed to "acceptability". It is instructive for our purposes to look closely at his analysis.
1.1.1 He cites a set of example sentences and classifies them according to their grammaticalness and/or acceptability, at the same time pointing out that the difference between the terms themselves is essentially a technical one:

"Acceptability is a concept that belongs to the study of performance whereas grammaticalness belongs to the study of competence." (p.11)

Thus it is possible to say that one set of his examples is "low on the scale of acceptability but high on the scale of grammaticalness, in the technical sense of this term". He is referring here to the following sentences:

A i) I called the man who wrote the book that you told me about up

ii) The man who the boy who the students recognised pointed out is a friend of mine.

He observes, in terms which he carefully qualifies as "equally vague and obscure" (note 5, p.195), that the more acceptable sentences are "those that are more likely to be produced, more easily understood, less clumsy, and in some sense more natural", with the corollary that "the unacceptable sentences one would tend to avoid and replace by more acceptable variants, wherever possible, in actual discourse".

1.1.2 Thus his sentences (A i), ii) ) are themselves grammatical since, as he puts it, "the generative rules of the language assign an interpretation to them in exactly the same way in which they assign an interpretation to the somewhat more acceptable sentences". Along with his idea that the
sentences may be "more" or "less" acceptable, he considers grammaticalness also to be a matter of degree, adding however that no necessary and sufficient operational criterion is either available or even likely for dealing with any idea of grammatical gradience.

1.1.3 In his view then the grammaticalness of a sentence has little directly to do with decisions concerning its acceptability in discourse and "unacceptable" can not be taken to equate with "ungrammatical", though, one assumes, both terms could apply in the circumstances of some particular case.

1.2 It follows from this position that native-speaker intuition has to be viewed as a concept of fundamental importance and at the same time a source of great confusion at the empirical level. The degradation of native-speaker intuition as a tool of research is generally well known to linguists, having as its source both the problem of grammatical gradience and the subsequent one of grammar by consensus, but it is perhaps as well to realise that the confusion that has arisen is basically related to the problem of the difference between grammaticalness and acceptability themselves. That is to say, it is surely beyond question that the notion of native-speaker intuition is itself well-founded but that, in order to apply it operationally, it is first necessary to know what is one's operational objective, namely what "grammatical" may be taken
to mean in a given instance and what "acceptable" may be taken to mean in the same instance.

1.2.1 While native-speaker intuition is an indispensable tool in the making of certain linguistic judgements, there is nonetheless some special difficulty involved in the using of the tool. What seems to have gone unnoticed is that this difficulty is the direct outcome of the collision between the notion of idiolect and that of establishing grammar (or grammaticality) by consensus. Now it is not at all obvious that the notion of idiolect precludes necessarily the possibility of establishing grammaticality by consensus. What is clear is that it complicates the process severely. "Consensus" presupposes community, "idiolect" presupposes individuality and, since "grammaticality" presupposes competence, it further presupposes the notion of the individual. Thus, to establish the common ground between idiolects in an attempt to determine grammar of a competence type is, quite necessarily, a difficult and complex procedure. Add to that the almost normal confusion that reigns vis-à-vis of the term "acceptability" and one has a witches' brew of impressive proportions. No brief is held here for the indispensability of the notion of idiolect; it is all the same interesting to note that Chomsky considers that linguistic theory is "concerned primarily with an ideal speaker-listener, in a completely homogeneous speech-community, who knows its language perfectly and is unaffected by [...] performance". (Aspects, p.3)
Such a view excludes idiolect from the domain of the theory, leading one to conclude that it belongs to another area, presumably performance. However, in the consensus situation under discussion, idiolect is presumed to coincide to some degree with competence, or else it would be futile to engage in such native-speaker judgements at all. The clash between these two positions is simply a consequence of the fact that, in the consensus situation, no one is an "ideal speaker-listener" such as Chomsky envisions: the consensus situation represents an attempt to derive such an ideal from the idiolectal speakers present. In addition, Chomsky is not talking about the analytical or input stage of grammatical research whereas the census-takers are.

1.2.2 The idiolect is basically one man's grammar, one man's model, which will coincide only imperfectly with that of another man or of other men. Any grammatical model of the language has to contend with this fact. A most interesting example of this is found in Barrier (1962): it consists of a sentence from *L'Etranger* and his comment on it. He writes

"'J'etais un peu etourdi parce qu'il a fallu que je monte chez Emmanuel.'

Ici, on attend un plus-que-parfait ou un imparfait, selon le sens. [...] il s'agit d'une simplification de la syntaxe des temps, caractéristique de la langue parlée, qui se contente d'approximations". (p.13)

For Barrier, it is clear "selon le sens" that here is an example of a deviation from the rule as regards the sequence
of tenses. He ascribes the deviation to the spoken language and its easy-going use of the grammar. In other words, he considers the occurrence ungrammatical and ascribes it to performance. The grounds on which he does so are the existence in the grammar of French of a rule of the sequence of tenses, his assumption that the string he quotes is an environment requiring that rule to come into play and his basic assumption that the meaning of the string is what he in fact takes it to be. I shall claim later that both of these assumptions are wrong but at this point I claim simply that he has completely misunderstood the sentence. French grammar, as Barrier conceives of it, can not assign an interpretation to the string in question, so Barrier opts for a particular interpretation and finds that it is in accord this time with the grammar. And yet, the string as it stands in the first place does not obviously contravene the rules of the grammar: it does so, or seems to do so, only if the semantic interpretation applied to it requires the intervention of the rule of the sequence of tenses. That particular interpretation, however, is motivated on Barrier's part by considerations that lie quite outside the sentence itself, as I shall demonstrate at a later stage. Suffice for now to say that Barrier's misreading of the sentence leads quite logically to his classifying it as ungrammatical, because his model of the language will not permit him to do otherwise. That he should consign the sentence therefore
to performance is quite in order but, if it is possible to show that the string is not at all ungrammatical, then Barrier's judgement will come to be more informative about his idiolect, perhaps, than about the sentence itself.

1.2.3 In this example, the string was ungrammatical in Barrier's judgement: it is extremely difficult to know whether he finds it at the same time acceptable. Clearly, however, it is acceptable to somebody, namely the person responsible for its appearing in the novel, for whom it may even be grammatical. In any event, Barrier's model of the grammar was unable to assign an interpretation to the string as it stands and one may therefore say, looking at things from a generative point of view this time, that Barrier's grammar would not produce such a string. Such a situation makes manifest yet another facet of the problem of grammaticality and acceptability, namely that certain items may be found acceptable and yet, in addition to departing in some sense from the bounds of grammaticality (at least as the model has it), may even be in conflict with that model, as is the case of the Camus sentence with respect to the Barrier grammar.

1.3 The underlying issue here touches upon our understanding of what is involved in native-speaker judgements generally and is crucial to any discussion of grammaticality and acceptability, as well as their attendant issues. In the following
section, I wish to explore this question.

1.3.1 In sentence 1), we are interested principally in the subordinate clause with which the sentence begins:

1) *Pour ne pas que le piston se coince dans le cylindre, on ajoute ...

Perfectly interpretable, the example is nevertheless ungrammatical or, at best, of highly doubtful grammaticality. Following Ruwet's formulation of the transformational model for French, we may represent 1) as follows:

![Diagram of sentence structure]

In marking the "ne pas" of 1) as NEG in Fig.1, I imply that the rule for NEG-placement has yet to be applied: it is at this point that the example becomes interesting for our purposes. Normal application of the rule would place "ne...pas" around the verb, yielding a perfectly grammatical embedded sentence in the form of "... que le piston ne se coince pas..."
Dans le cylindre”. Likewise, in 2), grammaticality may be "restored" by the application of a rule of "for"-deletion, to yield 2a):

2) * We were hoping for that John would return.
2a) We were hoping that John would return.

It would be tempting to conclude, therefore, that both 1) and 2) are simple examples of a failure to apply a relatively late rule. To so conclude, however, would be to overlook the fact that 1) is decidedly more complicated than 2) and fundamentally different in its implications.

1.3.2 It may be noted, first of all, that I have used what I call a "restorative" technique which permits the identification of the least costly means of restoring grammaticality to the sentence: such identification can be made easily with the aid of native speakers. We note, further, that 2) can also be amended by the more or less costly use of "for-to"-complementation without fear of altering the underlying form. In the case of 1), on the other hand, the neat use of NEG-placement turns out not to be the technique chosen by native speakers who are confronted with this sentence. I can report, moreover, that the informants, when faced with 1) in the form of an utterance (as opposed to a sentence proffered in isolation, as is so often the case in the course of grammatical studies), failed almost to a man to notice or register the lack of grammaticality. Then, when confronted with 1) in
isolation, all the informants gave as the restored form la), rather than lb) which, as noted earlier, results from NEG-placement:

la) *Pour (empêcher) que le piston se coince dans le cylindre, ...

lb) *Pour que le piston ne se coince pas dans le cylindre,

This makes clear that lb), though grammatical and uncostly as a restoration, is not called for and, indeed, is inappropriate in the judgement of the informants. The fact that la) is a more complex sentence — containing a double embedding — indicates a different underlying form from that of lb). Thus not only do we have two different sentences but we see that one of them is now clearly marked as unrelated to the original ungrammatical sentence 1), a fact which renders irrelevant any discussion of the relative cost of restoration and which indicates the lack of similarity to the situation pertaining to 2) and 2a), where two forms of restoration were possible. Obviously then, 1) is not an example of a mere non-application of a late rule and its non-grammaticality needs to be explained in some other way.

1.3.3 The non-grammaticality of 1), I have claimed, is fundamentally different in its implications from that of 2). This is true in more than one respect. Let us consider, first of all, what this sentence tells us about its own phrase structure rules. 6 In *Fig. 1* I have shown NEG as being one of the
items dominated by the node $S$: this formulation presupposes the rule $\text{Prep. Phr. } \Rightarrow \text{Prep. + NP}$, itself implying $\text{NP } \Rightarrow S$. These rules are, of course, part of the set of rules that will generate grammatical sentences in French. Placing the non-terminal node $\text{NEG}$ to the left of the other components of the $S$ in question not only corresponds to the occurrence of $\text{ne...pas}$ in 1) but also reflects what Ruwet calls, in another connection, "l'idée traditionnelle que la négation ... 'porte' sur l'ensemble de la phrase complexe"?, an idea which, as we shall see, is reflected in the intuition of the informants. The usual corollary of this idea, in the kind of tree I have shown, is $\text{NEG}$-placement as in $\text{lb}$), where the $S$ is still the object of the preposition as the phrase-structure rules predict. The same is not true of $\text{la}$), however: here the $S$ is the object of an infinitive, itself an $S$ introduced into the tree and standing as the object of the preposition. One must ask what motivates the introduction of this second $S$. The answer clearly must be linked to the final absence in $\text{la}$) of the $\text{ne...pas}$ element of the original 1). The fact that there is no element $\text{ne...pas}$ in $\text{la}$) means there is presumably no element $\text{NEG}$ either. This in turn means our tree is not correct somehow and that our phrase-structure rules as stated are somehow irrelevant.

1.3.4 The crucial point here seems to be that the phrase-structure rules do not govern the behaviour of $\text{ne...pas}$, which
is in fact handled by transformations. That is to say that a rule such as $\text{NP} \implies \text{S}$ makes no statement about $\text{S}$ with respect to its being negative or not. The element $\text{NEG}$, on the other hand, is handled quite differently: Ruwet in his analysis claims that

"... au lieu que la négation soit introduite par une transformation singulière facultative, elle est [...] marquée par un élément (Neg) introduit, facultativement, par les règles syntagmatiques. Cet élément appartient à la base de la grammaire, autrement dit, il figure dans certains indicateurs syntagmatiques sous-jacents .... L'interprétation des phrases négatives opérera donc uniquement sur les structures profondes (en interprétant, dans ce cas, le constituant Neg comme signifiant 'négation'), [my emphasis] et le rôle des transformations [négatives] se bornera uniquement à convertir, obligatoirement, des structures profondes possédant le constituant Neg en structures superficielles possédant les éléments ne et pas". 8

Ruwet says essentially two things: NEG is a semantic constituent of the deeper levels of the grammar and that it is obligatorily converted by transformation to ne...pas at the superficial level. I wish to claim that examples 1) and la) themselves make clear that the first of Ruwet's claims is correct and that the second is not.

1.3.5 NEG, belonging to the semantic component of the grammar, is not a component or constituent of $\text{S}$: it is instead a marker of $\text{S}$, as Ruwet also points out, and it is here that our tree, Fig.1, is incorrect. NEG signifies only that a negation is to be included in the structure. If it is assumed that 1) and la) are derived from the same deep structure, as the informants' responses would indicate, two things seem to follow:
one, that the ne...pas of 1) is in fact a representation of NEG. This conclusion allows us to amend our tree as shown in Fig. 2, so that NEG, the marker of S, is outside of S:

![Diagram]

This would suggest that the speaker's error was to apply the obligatory transformation of which Ruwet speaks but too soon, producing an interpretable but ungrammatical surface structure, 1). From our assumption that 1a), the amended version, shares the deep structure of 1), it follows also that the interpretation of the semantic constituent NEG has been carried out in 1a) in such a way as to remove any overt, superficial statement of negation. Instead we see a lexical substitution of equivalent semantic value. The fact that Ruwet's "obligatory" transformation does not occur in 1a) denies that it is obligatory. 9

* * * * * * * * *
2.0 The preceding discussion had as its objective to show that there is frequently a serious misunderstanding of what is involved in native-speaker judgements. Several points have emerged from it. It may be assumed, to start with, that we have asked, in the current manner, whether 1) was "O.K.", the answer being that it was not. In this case, however, the informants' rôle did not stop there. Having met the sentence as an utterance and having failed to register any inability to comprehend it as an utterance, the informants were asked to amend the sentence, which they did.

2.1 It is essential to note at this point that the informants were discussing, in fact, an utterance, not simply a sentence, and were thus at the same time party to the context of discourse of the utterance. In giving an amended version of the sentence, they were relying on their own judgement at work in situ in a situation of reality. That is to say, they were not at that time playing the rôle of informant, they were actually in the position of interlocutors with respect to the sentence itself. Their rôle was already significantly different from that of the informant as it is commonly understood and in which sentences, not utterances, are the object of the inquiry.

2.1.1 A request to amend an utterance is effectively an invitation to assume the rôle of utterer. The fact that, as
interlocutor, the informant finds the utterance interpretable confirms, one may contend, that he has grasped intuitively the deep structure of the sentence. Therein lies the source of his ability to amend it. One is faced not with a question of degree of grammaticality as such but rather, as we have seen between la) and lb), a question of relevance or pertinence with respect to two equally grammatical sentences. Such a judgement by a native speaker is highly significant, as was found in comparing 1) with 2), where both the non-grammaticality and the emendation of 2) were found to be trivial in comparison with the case of 1). What is much more important is that, without the availability of such a native-speaker judgement, one would have had no reason to suppose that lb) was not a perfectly suitable amended form of 1). In such a case it would have been quite unlikely, if not impossible that we would have realised Ruwet's error concerning the obligatory nature of negative transformations or that we would have been able to account in some degree at least for the apparent lack of negation in our amended version, along with all its implications for the semantics of the sentence.

2.1.2 There are undoubtedly objections that might be made to certain aspects of the discussion so far, especially in the sense that it might seem to be a case of the end justifying the means. There may be those who find objectionable also the use of what I have called the restorative technique, since
it involves calling for some form of normative judgement. My justification must be that it is quite precisely on this point that there occurs the misunderstanding I am speaking of regarding native informants, the failure to realise that calling upon an individual to exercise his competence is to do much more than appeal to a theoretical concept. It means asking him to take a sentence, make - or attempt - a reading of it and then to pronounce upon it. It goes all too often unnoticed that without his making a reading of the sentence, the whole process would break down. Now, the only way we can assume he is capable of making such readings is further to assume that to do so is part of his normal rôle, as it is, of course. But the fact that must not be passed over lightly is that this normal rôle belongs to the domain of linguistic performance and no other. The consequence of this is that the informant is being asked to deal with a sentence in the way in which he normally deals with utterances, that is to act as interlocutor with respect to these sentences, to be the addressee within a context of communication and to react as usual. If this is true, as I claim, then we must ask the question: what does "to react as usual" constitute? What, in fact, is the rôle of an interlocutor? It is only a short step then to the question of what is the rôle of the speaker in the act of communication. What, indeed, do we know about performance in general?

2.2 To summarize my discussion around sentence 1), I have
tried to show that a competence-oriented approach would have produced not only a rather trivial comment on 1) but also an irrelevant one, while an approach that took into account factors arising from a performance-oriented view of things revealed more interesting findings. I have subsequently argued that the technique of restoration and discussion, while not the most important aspect of the discussion, is nonetheless justified from the point of view of a proper understanding of native-speaker judgements in relation to both competence and performance. Finally, I have claimed that this proper understanding is not only necessary but frequently lacking and have implied that without it the linguist has little hope of dealing satisfactorily with matters of syntax.

2.2.1 One need not go far to find examples to support this last point. 3) and 4) represent a class of sentence for which I have rarely seen an attempted analysis, let alone a satisfactory one:

3) *Nevertheless, he couldn't escape his father's influence.*

4) *A man's a man, for all that.*

No competence model, as presently constituted, can handle the analysis of such sentences, which are quintessentially bound to the domain of performance. Without an understanding and taking into account of this fact no analysis could ever be possible, even though the sentences themselves are in no way
bizarre within the limits of normal experience, which is to say as utterances. Indeed, as utterances they may be heard, understood and responded to with no predictable difficulty. How then may it be that they defy analysis? Only when the analyst fails to notice either their link with performance or to recognise the particular linguistic manifestation of this link.

2.3 Since I claim there is a set of sentences which present modes of analysis are incapable of treating, it follows that I am also claiming that most linguists are guilty of the type of failure that I have described. It is not difficult to see why this would indeed be the case. Let us re-examine two passages quoted at the beginning of this chapter: Lyons, distinguishing between utterances and sentences, affirmed that

"the utterances of a particular 'language' (what speakers actually produce, when we say that they 'are speaking the language') can be described only indirectly, and at the present time very inadequately, on the basis of a prior description of the sentences of the 'language'. This distinction between utterances and sentences is fundamental in most linguistic theory". [my emphasis]

According to this view, performance/parole is a dependency of competence/langue and one of which we are, furthermore, rather ignorant. Ruwet, for his part, asserts that

"c'est la performance qui fournit les données d'observation — corpus de toutes sortes, écrits ou oraux (conversations enregistrées, interviews, récits, articles de journaux, textes littéraires, etc.) — qui permettent d'aborder l'étude de la compétence". [this emphasis mine]

This view has it that, without performance as the point of
departure, competence studies can achieve nothing. If, in a manual of theoretical linguistics and an introduction to transformational grammar, there is to be found a contradiction as glaring as this one seems to be, little wonder perhaps if there is uncertainty or confusion on the part of other linguists as well.

2.3.1 This confusion, while compounded by virtue of having sprung from seemingly impeccable antecedents, has fortunately not been universally well established. Thus Lyons, abandoning explication for commentary, observes that

"there are, of course, serious problems, both practical and theoretical, involved in deciding what constitute extraneous or linguistically irrelevant factors; and it may well be that, in practice, the 'idealization' of the data advocated by Chomsky does tend to introduce some of the normative considerations that marred much of traditional grammar".\[11\]

Ruwet, as we have seen, envisages an important rôle for performance as a source of invaluable data. But he goes further and is one of the first to remind us that

"nous ne devons pas perdre de vue qu'une grammaire - qui est, rappelons-le, une théorie de la compétence du sujet parlant - doit pouvoir servir de base à une théorie de la performance, c'est-à-dire à une théorie de la manière dont les sujets émettent et/ou reçoivent les énoncés. En particulier, on peut espérer qu'il sera un jour possible de construire une théorie raisonnable de la manière dont les sujets perçoivent et comprennent les énoncés entendus (une théorie du décodage); une théorie de ce genre devrait comprendre, comme un de ses éléments essentiels, une grammaire générative-transformationnelle".\[12\]

This paragraph, the victim of subsequent neglect, states unequivocally the concept of a theory of performance which will
be served by competence theory. No longer the junior partner, the theory of performance is seen here, in its own right, as an objective not a means.

2.4 The development of such a concept in a competence-oriented work such as Ruwet's may at first seem surprising, though this surprise is only symptomatic of the confusion I have referred to. After all, if we consider carefully Chomsky's position, we see that he took as his objective to construct a model of the theoretical concept that was competence. To this end, he eschewed performance items and factors, since for them there was no place within his terms of reference. That is to say, his theory and model of competence sought to say nothing about performance as such. (The theory itself aside, Chomsky permitted himself various observations about performance, its nature and rôle and one may feel equally free to draw conclusions about whether they were valuable or apposite.) Ruwet's observations go beyond Chomsky's in that they envisage the study of the links between two formerly separated areas and are at least suggestive of a scheme of complementarity between competence and performance. This in itself represents a considerable advance in the view of many and is the broad base from which I shall proceed in this study.
My objective is to study an aspect of linguistic performance. To do this, I make certain assumptions. The first is that there is just such a relation of complementarity as I have outlined: from this, two others follow. I assume that I may make use of certain of the techniques of competence studies in dealing with performance - I have in mind particularly the use of phrase-markers and transformational histories as descriptive tools, without direct concern for questions of their explanatory adequacy - and I further assume that it is possible to make statements about performance. This latter is of great importance, not only because it concerns my stated objective but also because it involves certain difficulties with respect to the very use of such terms as "competence" and "performance". These terms, I stated earlier, were in a sense a narrower definition of the contrast previously determined by the terms "langue" and "parole": I feel it is necessary at this point to add a qualification. Chomsky's terms relate within his theory to individuals only, i.e. there is a multitude of competences and of performances. For Saussure, on the other hand, there is a multitude of what he calls parole but only one langue: the latter is a social fact and parole the affair of individuals. The terminologies are different in another respect: for Saussure, a third term exists, that of langage. It is the sum of langue and parole, touching both the social and the individual aspects of the language within the speech community.
It has no stated parallel in the theory that Chomsky proposes and, even in the Saussurean theory, it is difficult to know quite what is its rôle, since it receives little or no attention in most theoretical studies. One interesting attempt to define it more clearly occurs in Dineen (1967), where the three terms are presented as follows:

"When we consider the properties found in these three aspects of language we can see that de Saussure, in defining \textit{la langue}, studied language 'independent of its individual manifestation'. Because it is individual, active, and voluntary, \textit{la parole} is not a social fact; \textit{le langage} includes both social and individual aspects and is not, therefore, a pure social fact; \textit{la langue} is the social fact, being general throughout a community and exercising constraint over the individual speakers. Like Durkheim's collective consciousness, \textit{la langue} is not found complete and perfect in any individual. \textit{La parole} includes anything a speaker might say; \textit{le langage} encompasses anything a speaker might say as well as the constraints that prevent him from saying anything ungrammatical; \textit{la langue} contains the negative limits on what a speaker must say if he is to speak a particular language grammatically." (pp.197-8)

As thus defined, \textit{le langage} is the domain of linguistic activity in which collective constraints come into play with respect to individual choice. Less obvious is that it is also the middle ground between the model and the reality, between generation and production, between what Saussure regarded as "\textit{abstraction}" and \textit{exécution"}. The bi-polarity of competence and performance is a restricted scheme: it allows for no consideration of the social fact. It deals with sentences and disregards utterances and, while it appeals to a concept of native-speaker intuition as an investigative tool, it does so
only with respect to sentences. The bi-polarity of *langue* and *parole* is a significantly different scheme, precisely in that it acknowledges the social fact as a central tenet. It makes, though by implication only, the same strong appeal to intuition with respect, again, to sentences but mitigates the bi-polarity through its third term, *le langage*. Here the sentence and the utterance are in conjunction, the social and the individual aspect are co-occurent and constraint and freedom are coincidentially effective. It is the domain of communication, in which the transmitted utterance becomes or fails to become sentence, through the exercising of native-speaker intuition by the receiver, who applies the collective constraints to the utterance he receives.

3.1 The implications of this are to be clearly understood. Saussure, we are told, held *la parole* to be that which

"désigne l'acte de communication dans sa totalité: la phrase énoncée par l'un des interlocuteurs, entendue et interprétée par l'autre". 14

This is a most puzzling declaration: it leaves one wondering at first whether Saussure equates *la parole* with *l'acte de communication* or with *la phrase énoncée*. In one sense the definition embraces the whole speech-situation: the uttering, the utterer, the thing uttered, the hearer, his hearing of the utterance and his interpreting of it, along with his particular interpretation of it. If this is indeed the way Saussure wished the term *parole* to be taken, then little wonder if he
felt it was unmanageable by scientific methods of analysis. Today as in Saussure's time, there is no scheme of analysis or description adequate to treat such a multifaceted concept. Furthermore, the very unwieldiness of such an interpretation makes it seem intuitively very inappropriate as a counterpart to the concept of *langue*. A neater balance is apparent if one takes *parole* in the sense of *phrase énoncée* or the set of all of these. However, in a purely technical way, the term *phrase énoncée* is somewhat confusing, since *phrase* usually refers to the area of the *langue* and *énoncé* to that of *parole*. To bring the two together is to cross boundaries or else to postulate quite precisely some form of interplay between the two. In the latter case, it is my contention, one is dealing rather with *langage* than with either *langue* or *parole*.

3.1.1 To mark something as a *phrase* is to divorce it entirely from the rôle of *énoncé* and we have seen that this is a practice of long standing aimed at avoiding the problems arising from the arbitrariness of *parole/performance*, which is thus summarily consigned the rôle of providing a corpus of data. What is not so well established is the idea that using the *énoncés* as data is not such a straightforward operation as has been supposed. Ironically enough, it fell to the philosopher not the linguist to point out that

"we very often also use utterances in ways beyond the scope at least of traditional grammar. It has come to be seen that many specially perplexing words embedded in
apparently descriptive statements do not serve to indi-
cate some specially odd additional feature in the reality
reported, but to indicate (not to report) the circumstances
in which the statement is made or reservations to which
it is subject or the way in which it is to be taken and
the like". 16

The implication for the linguist is clear: our data (énonces)
will contain or may contain items which derive strictly from
the fact that an énoncé is an énoncé, items which must either
be abstracted from the corpus so as to allow thenceforth dis-
cussion in terms of phrases or which must somehow be incor-
porated into our discussion of phrases. In other words, for
an énoncé to become a phrase, it must - in terms of its lin-
guistic formulation - be divested of those characteristics
which mark it as an énoncé. What these characteristics are
and how they actually mark an énoncé are thus questions cen-
tral to a study of what I see as the area of langage and
their answers may enable us to deal more satisfactorily with
what Austin calls "specially perplexing words". Without
these answers, we are likely to perpetuate old errors, just
like the philosophers, as Austin points out:

"Along these lines it has by now been shown piecemeal, or
at least made to look likely, that many traditional phi-
losophical perplexities have arisen through a mistake - the
mistake of taking as straightforward statements of fact
utterances which are either (in interesting non-gramma-
tical ways) nonsensical or else intended as something quite
different". 17

The corollary of this is, of course, that if we do not fully
understand the data, then we risk falsifying the data. If we
we are fully to understand the énoncé, then what we must study
is the field of énonciation.

3.2 Terminologies, as is well known, may beg questions. Enonciation is as yet a term without a terminology: the very area to which it refers remains to be defined. Though to my own way of thinking at present it is a part of langage, it remains to be seen whether such is the case. Therefore I propose to set aside all questions of langage, parole/performance, langue/competence and their links with énonciation. Rather, I shall move in the direction of examining what we already know about énonciation, extending this knowledge where possible and indicating those areas where future research seems indispensable. I take as my premise that énonciation does take place and that as participants in it, we already know and intuitively understand a good deal about it, no matter how little this knowledge may already have been elucidated in a formal sense.

3.2.1 The study of énonciation starts from the premise that language is a tool. One can proceed from there to examine the nature of the tool, its uses, the users of the tool and their purposes in using it and, finally, the nature of the work carried out, seen especially as a product or outcome. Such, in very general terms, is the range of study encompassed by the term énonciation: its general principle is expressed by Todorov as follows:

"L'exercice de la parole n'est pas une activité purement
individuelle et chaotique, donc inconnaisable; il existe une part irréductible de l'énonciation mais à côté d'elle il en est d'autres qui se laissent concevoir comme répétition, jeu, convention. Notre objet sera donc constitué par les règles de l'énonciation et les différents champs de leur application.

It is to be understood as the study of phenomena rather than forms. That is to say, the formal apparatus of a language is considered only in terms of its functional relation to particular phenomena rather than simply in the terms of a particular taxonomies. Benveniste is at some pains to make this distinction clear:

"L'emploi des formes, partie nécessaire de toute description, a donné lieu à un grand nombre de modèles, aussi variés que les types linguistiques dont ils procèdent. La diversité des structures linguistiques, autant que nous savons les analyser, ne se laisse pas réduire à un petit nombre de modèles qui comprendraient toujours et seulement les éléments fondamentaux. Du moins disposons-nous ainsi de certaines représentations assez précises, construites au moyen d'une technique approuvée.

Tout autre chose est l'emploi de la langue. Il s'agit ici d'un mécanisme total et constant qui, d'une manière ou d'une autre, affecte la langue entière. La difficulté est de saisir ce grand phénomène, si banal qu'il semble se confondre avec la langue même, si nécessaire qu'il s'échappe à la vue.

L'énonciation est cette mise en fonctionnement de la langue par un acte individuel d'utilisation.

Le discours, dira-t-on, qui est produit chaque fois qu'on parle, cette manifestation de l'énonciation, n'est-ce pas simplement la 'parole'? — Il faut prendre garde à la condition spécifique de l'énonciation: c'est l'acte même de produire un énoncé et non le texte de l'énoncé qui est notre objet. Cet acte est le fait du locuteur qui mobilise la langue pour son compte. La relation du locuteur à la langue détermine les caractères linguistiques de l'énonciation. On doit l'envisager comme le fait du locuteur qui prend la langue pour instrument, et dans les caractères linguistiques qui marquent cette relation."
The essential taxonomies here is that of the phenomena, of the "acts" which are engaged in when the speaker makes his own use of the language.

3.2.2 At the root of this and related notions is the concept of language as action, a concept which, though going back to antiquity, first received scientific prominence in the work of Bronislaw Malinowski. His researches in ethnology led him to the conviction that we must consider language as "a mode of action rather than a countersign of thought". For him, "isolated words are in fact only a linguistic figment, the product of advanced linguistic analysis. The sentence is at times a self-contained linguistic unit, but not even a sentence can be regarded as a full linguistic datum. To us, the real linguistic fact is the full utterance within its context of situation". From this it was but a short step to his now famous notion of "phatic communion" and the non-referential use of language, which was taken up later by Hayakawa for whom even "the prevention of silence is itself an important function of speech".

3.2.3 From the point of view of the linguist, however, it is important to realise that the "phatic" act and the breaking of silence are simply two of the acts that may be accomplished in speaking: the fact that the function of the words used is independent of their sense is merely a characteristic of these two acts, rather than a generalised feature of all speech acts. The linguist, according to Malinowski, must concern himself with "the full utterance within its context of situation": 
without the context, the linguistic fact is incapable of being defined; the context informs us about the utterance.

3.3 The important difference between Malinowski's claim and the direction taken by Benveniste is that Malinowski clearly presupposes that the context of which he speaks is knowable and clear. Benveniste, on the other hand, stresses above all the relationship of the speaker to the language and the fact that this relationship is marked linguistically, a view which permits and encourages the study of the utterance without necessarily having to hand a clear indication of the context in Malinowski's sense. In fact, Benveniste is talking about a much more fundamental and generalised kind of context, not that in which a particular utterance may have occurred but rather the context without which no utterance may ever occur. This, I submit, is the basis of his distinction between énonciation and parole, while Malinowski's claim is centred on instances of parole with no thought of any more fundamental characterisation of the notion of context. One may carry the point further and claim that Malinowski's notion in fact presupposes that of Benveniste, somewhat in the way that within the Saussurean scheme parole presupposes langage. But, as we have seen, Benveniste's notion concerns something which, presupposable or not, is "si nécessaire qu'il s'échappe à la vue" (cf. 19), with the result that it has never been explicated.
3.3.1 What I wish to suggest here is that énonciation has a certain primacy over the study of context as Malinowski has it. That is to say, the two are in relation but ordered. I shall try to illustrate this idea with the example of phatic commu-
nion. If the study of énonciation can show that a certain utterance or set of utterances carries linguistic markers denoting the occurrence of certain acts in the production of the utterance(s), the fact that the acts occur will lead the analyst to predict or specify certain necessary features of the context of the utterance(s). This hypothesis looks at whole utterances as phenomena rather than simply as a linearly organised message and assigns the phenomena to an appropriate place in the taxonomies of phenomena, with an accompanying set of prescribed contextual features.

3.3.1.1 A good example might be British weather-talk: the text of "A beautiful morning, isn't it?" is composed of a (trunc-
cated) main declarative clause followed by a tag-question, the latter serving, "syntactically" at least, as an invitation to contradict the speaker, if desired. However, the uttering of such a string excludes the idea of such contradiction and the invitation, in this case, does not "count" as an invitation, to use Austin's expression. Indeed, the uttering of such a text constitutes an attempt to open communication, to set up an interlocutor, with the text serving not as a sign in the Saussurean sense but rather as a signal in Malinowski's phatic
sense.

3.3.2 Such an analysis clearly does not rely exclusively on linguistic information and, it might be argued, is founded on sociology as much as on linguistics. Indeed, the sociologist interested in the linguistic area of his field deals with precisely such cases and claims that, in uttering certain texts, a speaker is "doing work" of a certain kind, e.g. in this instance, opening up a conversation. This constitutes the kind of labelling of phenomena referred to earlier and is based on the sociologist's knowledge of what utterances in a given speech-community count as what particular phenomena or "work".

3.3.2.1 However, the fact that, shorn of their particular linguistic trappings, such phenomena can occur at all within a community is of prime interest to the anthropologist rather than the sociologist, since it is not obvious that a special device for opening up conversation should even be necessary in a given community. It is the anthropological fact of the existence of such a device that leads to the sociological specification of the linguistic forms used in the exercise of that device. Likewise, the rules of énonciation in a given language permit the speech-community using it to adopt specific linguistic forms for the accomplishment of certain acts. That is to say, the language is structured in such a way as to
accomodate the occurrence of phenomena through the speakers' use of devices and assigns a range of linguistic means of producing them.

3.3.2.2 Putting it in a more formulaic way, one might claim that énonciation : parole :: anthropology : sociology. Todorov has made essentially the same point:

"Il est évident que l'on se meut [...] à la frontière de la linguistique et de l'anthropologie: les actes de parole relèvent de la seconde en tant qu'actes, de la première, en tant que 'de parole'. Ou, pour éviter la confusion 'interdisciplinaire', on devrait dire : ils relèvent d'une linguistique anthropologique qui reste à créer." 22

Nevertheless, not all verbal expression is governed by the rules of énonciation, as Benveniste makes clear:

"Dans la joute verbale pratiquée chez différents peuples et dont une variété typique est le hain-teny des Merinas, il ne s'agit en réalité ni de dialogue ni d'énonciation. Aucun des deux partenaires ne s'énonce tout consiste en proverbes cités et en contre-proverbes contre-cités. Il n'y a pas une seule référence explicite à l'objet du débat. Celui des deux jouteurs qui dispose du plus grand stock de proverbes, ou qui en fait l'usage le plus adroit, le plus malicieux, le moins prévu met l'autre à quia et il est proclamé vainqueur. Ce jeu n'a que les dehors d'un dialogue." 23

Such verbal interplay as Benveniste describes is of undoubted anthropological interest but of minimal interest for the linguist.

3.4 I have mentioned that sociological findings may be useful in examining questions of énonciation. This is a matter of methodology: by a kind of reverse analysis, the hitherto unexplicated area of énonciation may derive benefit from the
overt findings of sociological analysis. In the same way, philosophy contributes to the study inasmuch as a lot of the basic work derives from J.L. Austin and those who have followed in his footsteps.

3.4.1 The range of these diverse contributions as well as that of the entire field of énonciation is indicated by Todorov for whom three main avenues hold out the greatest promise: "l'étude de la force illocutionnaire, celle de l'aspect indiciel du langage, celle enfin de la coloration que donne l'énonciation aux différents énoncés". The first of these is based on the work principally of Austin and Benveniste and is seen in turn as being composed of three areas or phases of study: an initial task of drawing up an inventory of illocutionary forces and, ultimately, studying their place in a general scheme of semiotics; then a description of distinctive features of the various forces, as begun notably by J.R. Searle; finally, the constructing of a general theory of illocutionary forces, a problem which has yet to receive any significant treatment.

3.4.2 The second main approach, concerning the indexical aspect of language, involves four principal topics: the interlocutors, the time of their allocution or interaction, its place and its modalités, defined essentially as the relation that holds between the interlocutors and the utterance. The objective here is succinctly stated: "de distinguer dans la
langue entre ses éléments *symboliques* (ou dénominatifs, ou référentiels) et ses éléments *indiciels* (ou pragmatiques, ou subjectifs). One of the pioneers and perhaps the most outstanding figure in this area of research is Benveniste, whose work will form the basis of much of what is to be proposed in this present study.

3.4.3 Finally, the study of *énonciation* includes the area that has become known, in Europe above all, as *text grammar* or *text linguistics*, especially as it permits what Todorov calls "une typologie des discours", on the principle that "l'énonciation est toujours présente, d'une manière ou d'une autre, à l'intérieur de l'énoncé". Previous research indicates three major types of utterance incorporating a fundamental opposition corresponding roughly to the distinction between monologue and dialogue. This type of study is generally comparable with traditional approaches in rhetoric. Beyond that and on a broader scale is the analysis of larger textual units such as the novel, centred on major oppositions such as that of the two time-lines of narration, "temps du discours et temps de l'histoire", which will be the main focus of attention in the subsequent chapters of this work.

3.5 Throughout his masterly *tour d'horizon*, Todorov leaves no doubt as to his conviction that *énonciation* is an area of study virtually unexplored and ready for full development.
The three main subdivisions outlined above, for example, are for him "directions à travers lesquelles se dessine [...] le futur visage de la linguistique". Benveniste, likewise, sees the field as ripe with possibilities: "De longues perspectives s'ouvrent à l'analyse des formes complexes du discours, à partir du cadre formel esquissé ici". 26

3.5.1 At the same time, difficulties exist that are not lightly to be passed over. At present, the most important of them have to do with matters of definition, both of terminology and concepts. Austin's oft-evoked perlocutionary force, for instance, while related to illocutionary force, is now clearly seen to be non-pertinent to énonciation. Similarly, lines have to be drawn between those linguistic signs that are merely part of syntax and those that are part of énonciation (signes syntaxiques vs signes pragmatiques). Such matters are referred to as "problèmes limitrophes", whose study may relate in some ways to énonciation while at the same time offering significant conclusions which themselves may be misleading or irrelevant for énonciation. One such important area discussed by Todorov is presupposition, which is largely unrelated to énonciation yet is often an indispensable tool for elucidating some of its crucial features.

3.5.2 These and other difficulties are likely to present serious problems, both substantively and methodologically.
When a field is held to be "wide open" this is inevitable; it is further complicated by an interdisciplinary nature. In the case of énonciation, the principal objectives are linguistic, specifically "les règles de l'énonciation" but, since "l'heure des manuels n'a pas sonné", the techniques and methodology of research remain to be developed and refined. Furthermore, the relatedness of the findings of other fields and a readiness to incorporate at least some of them in a programme of linguistic research are in serious conflict with much of traditional linguistic thinking.

3.5.3 However, as I have tried to show in this and the preceding chapter, the study of my topic has benefited relatively little from a non-linguistic approach and is not likely to benefit much further from either traditional or more recent linguistic theory. Therefore, while much of what I shall go on to discuss or propose must seem largely hypothetical, the topic is pursued on the principle that, among hypotheses, there must be one that answers the greatest number of questions.
NOTES

1. Lyons (1968), p.52

2. Ruwet (1967), p.18

3. See, for example, Postal (1966).

4. Ruwet, op.cit., p.41

5. This example was noted in the speech of a native speaker, a man of above average education employed as Regional Service Manager for Citroën of Canada, Ltd. The other informants alluded to were also native speakers of above average education.

6. One might put this another way and say "... what the sentence tells us about the speaker's knowledge (or lack of knowledge) of the phrase structure rules of his own sentence". Such an aspect being outside the range of this study, however, my interest in it here is only to display certain facts and indicate the general interest they hold for the linguist, rather than to explain this particular occurrence of the facts.

7. Ruwet, op.cit., p.296

8. Ibid., pp.342-3

9. It may be fairly observed at this point that Ruwet's treatment of negation in French is somewhat inadequate. He seems unaware that to put NEG outside S, as in Fig. 2, captures the generalisation that in such a configuration the preceding NP must be a nominalisation (not a noun) and that, according to the rules of the grammar, the nominalisation may be either an S or a verb nominalisation (Infinitive) which itself may carry - as in our example - an embedded S. Only in the case of the S-nominalisation does Ruwet's "obligatory" rule apply and it has been seen that this transformation was not even relevant in the view of the informants, for whom the erroneous 1) evidently had a distinctive derivational history indicating a deep structure different from that of 1b). (As for the procedure whereby the deep structure NEG comes to be expressed without an overt negative, that is a question suited more to the study of Generative Semantics than to the present study.)

It is interesting to note that, in French, there are
occurrences of a negative plus an NP at the superficial level. For example, the rules will permit a version of 1) such as 1c):

1c) ?On ajoute qc., pour non pas que ... mais pour que...

Such a sentence would not only be of doubtful grammaticality for some people but, containing non pas rather than ne ... pas, would also belong to a category quite different from the examples we have studied. It belongs squarely to the performative aspect of language and, as I shall show, to the particular area of énonciation.

11. Ibid., p.39
12. op.cit., p.260
13. e.g. Lyons (1968)
15. See, for example, the discussion in Ruwet, op.cit., p.368, note 10.
16. Austin (1965), p.3
17. Ibid.
21. Hayakawa (1952), p.72
22. op.cit., p.5
23. op.cit., p.16
24. op.cit., p.4
25. Ibid., p.7
26. op.cit., p.18
CHAPTER THREE

Time and Tense: I

0. Mention was made in the preceding chapter (3.3.2.1) of the idea that certain procedures may exist in a language providing for the performance of certain acts. It was further pointed out that not all such procedures were to be considered a necessary part of the resources of a given speech-community. The inference is clear that some of what I have referred to as devices are essential; to this may be added the notion that such essential items are likely not to be language-specific. These indispensable devices may be more precisely considered as the rules of énonciation, which not only provide for the performance of specific acts but indeed govern their occurrence. In this chapter, I shall examine some of these rules in their linguistic setting in an attempt to clarify certain points and develop them where possible. I shall concentrate on what Todorov calls "l'aspect indiciel", which receives from Benveniste the narrower specification of "l'acte même, les situations où il se réalise, les instruments de l'accomplissement". (1970, p.14) ¹

1.0 In any énonciation, ² a speaker appropriates the language
and sets it to work for him; this statement, of seeming bana-

lity, is crucial in its implications, as Benveniste insists:

"L'acte individuel par lequel on utilise la langue intro-
duit le locuteur comme paramètre dans les conditions
nécessaires à l'énonciation. Avant l'énonciation, la
langue n'est que la possibilité de la langue. Après
l'énonciation, la langue est effectuée en une instance
de discours, qui émane d'un locuteur, forme sonore qui
atteint un auditeur et qui suscite une autre énonciation
en retour.

En tant que réalisation individuelle, l'énonciation peut
se définir, par rapport à la langue, comme un procès
d'appropriation. Le locuteur s'approprie l'appareil for-
mel de la langue et il énonce sa position de locuteur par
des indices spécifiques, d'une part, et au moyen de pro-
cédés accessoires, de l'autre.

Mais immédiatement, dès qu'il se déclare locuteur et
assume la langue, il implante l'autre en face de lui, quel
que soit le degré de présence qu'il attribue à cet autre.
Toute énonciation est, explicite ou implicite, une allo-
cution, elle postule un allocutaire.

Enfin, dans l'énonciation, la langue se trouve employée à
l'expression d'un certain rapport au monde. La condition
même de cette mobilisation et de cette appropriation de la
langue est, chez le locuteur, le besoin de référer par le
discours, et, chez l'autre, la possibilité de co-référer
identiquement, dans le consensus pragmatique qui fait de
echaque locuteur un co-locuteur. La référence est partie
intégrante de l'énonciation.

Ces conditions initiales vont régir tout le mécanisme de
la référence dans le procédé d'énonciation, en créant une
situation très singulière et dont on ne prend guère
conscience.

L'acte individuel d'appropriation de la langue introduit
celui qui parle dans sa parole. C'est là une donnée
constitutive de l'énonciation. La présence du locuteur à
son énonciation fait que chaque instance de discours
constitue un centre de référence interne. Cette situation
va se manifester par un jeu de formes spécifiques dont la
fonction est de mettre le locuteur en relation constante
et nécessaire avec son énonciation.

Cette description un peu abstraite s'applique à un phéno-
mène linguistique familier dans l'usage, mais dont
l'analyse théorique commence seulement. C'est d'abord l'émergence des indices de personne (le rapport je-tu) qui ne se produit que dans et par l'énonciation: le terme je dénotant l'individu qui profère l'énonciation, le terme tu, l'individu qui est présent comme allocutaire." (ibid.)

Benveniste, in referring to the "terms" je and tu, does not follow the traditional practice of simply calling them "pronouns". To do so, would have been inappropriate in a most significant way, since the category "pronoun" is simply a set of grammatical items capable of being substituted for nouns within the syntax of a language, with the corollary that the so-called "personal pronouns" are substitutes for the members of the set of "proper nouns". This point of view overlooks entirely the nature and function of such pronouns and the fact that they are not, contrary to traditional descriptive categories, a homogeneous set. The "terms" je and tu were labeled above "indices de personne" and, it was suggested parenthetically, are in a special "rapport".

1.1 The notion of person in language receives a full explanation in Benveniste's pioneering study "La Nature des pronoms" (1966a, pp.251-266), in which he shows that the notion is valid only with regard to je and tu and completely lacking in the case of il. The basis of the distinction is the question of systematic identification: unlike any nominal category, definable in a constant and "objective" sense, "je signifie 'la personne qui énonce la présente instance de discours contenant je' ". This fact is crucial, since it means that "je ne peut
être identifié que par l'instance de discours qui le contient et par là seulement. Il ne vaut que dans l'instance où il est produit. Mais, parallèlement, c'est aussi en tant qu'instance de forme **je** qu'il doit être pris; la forme **je** n'a d'existence linguistique que dans l'acte de parole qui la profère." (p.252) Furthermore, just as **je** does not exist in a vacuum, equally it does not exist in isolation.

1.2 In "De la subjectivité dans le langage", (1966a, pp. 258-266), this theme is developed:

"Je n'emploie **je** qu'en m'adressant à quelqu'un, qui sera dans mon allocution un **tu**. C'est cette condition de dialogue qui est constitutive de la **personne**, car elle implique en réciprocité que je deviens **tu** dans l'allocution de celui qui à son tour se désigne par **je**. C'est là que nous voyons un principe dont les conséquences sont à dérouler dans toutes les directions. Le langage n'est possible que parce que chaque locuteur se pose comme **sujet**, en renvoyant à lui-même comme **je** dans son discours. De ce fait, je pose une autre personne, celle qui, tout extérieure qu'elle est à **môî**, devient mon écho auquel je dis **tu** et qui me dit **tu**." (p.260)

This, in turn, permits "une définition symétrique pour **tu**, comme l' 'individu-allocuté dans la présente instance de discours contenant l'instance linguistique **tu**". In no sense therefore can it be claimed that **je-tu** refer to lexical items nor even to concepts or "real" individuals:

"Il n'y a pas de concept 'je' englobant tous les **je** qui s'énoncent à tout instant dans les bouches de tous les locuteurs, au sens où il y a un concept 'arbre' auquel se ramènent tous les emplois individuels de **arbre**. Le 'je' ne dénomme donc aucune entité lexicale. Peut-on dire alors que **je** se réfère à un individu particulier? Si cela était, ce serait une contradiction permanente admise dans le langage, et l'anarchie dans la pratique: comment
le même terme pourrait-il se rapporter indifféremment à n'importe quel individu et en même temps l'identifier dans sa particularité? On est en présence d'une classe de mots, les 'pronoms personnels', qui échappent au statut de tous les autres signes du langage." (p.261)

1.3 As for il, on the other hand, it is the proper of this pronoun to have a referent that is not present and thus a non-participant in the allocutionary situation and, most especially, in what Benveniste calls the "corrélation de personne":

"La 'troisième personne' représente en fait le membre non marqué de la corrélation de personne. C'est pourquoi il n'y a pas truisme à affirmer que la non-personne est le seul mode d'énonciation possible pour les instances de discours qui ne doivent pas renvoyer à elle-mêmes, mais qui prédiquent le procès de n'importe qui ou n'importe quoi hormis l'instance même, ce n'importe qui ou n'importe quoi pouvant toujours être muni d'une référence objective." (pp.255-6)

Thus the third person pronoun is insignificantly different from other classes of substitute, including even verbs such as faire. The same author summarises the situation in the following passage:

"Les formes appelées traditionnellement 'pronoms personnels' nous apparaissent maintenant comme une classe d' 'individus linguistiques', de formes qui renvoient toujours et seulement à des 'individus', qu'il s'agisse de personnes, de moments, de lieux, par opposition aux termes nominaux qui renvoient toujours et seulement à des concepts. Or le statut de ces 'individus linguistiques' tient au fait qu'ils naissent d'une énonciation, qu'ils sont produits par cet événement individuel et, si l'on peut dire, 'semel-natif'. Ils sont engendrés à nouveau chaque fois qu'une énonciation est proférée, et chaque fois ils désignent à neuf." (1970, pp.14-15)

1.4 In essence, then, there are only two persons in
language. This reasoning is founded on the concept of subjectivity, which Benveniste defines thus:

"La 'subjectivité' dont nous traitons ici est la capacité du locuteur à se poser comme 'sujet'. Elle se définit, non par le sentiment que chacun éprouve d'être lui-même (ce sentiment, dans la mesure où l'on peut en faire état, n'est qu'un reflet), mais comme l'unité psychique qui transcende la totalité des expériences vécues qu'elle assemble, et qui assure la permanence de la conscience. Or nous tenons que cette 'subjectivité', qu'on la pose en phénoménologie ou en psychologie, comme on voudra, n'est que l'émergence dans l'être d'une propriété fondamentale du langage. Est 'ego' qui dit 'ego'. Nous trouvons là le fondement de la 'subjectivité', qui se détermine par le statut linguistique de la 'personne'." (1966a, pp. 259-60)

In any allocution, the speaker posits himself as subject and this subjectivity is displayed in turn by the interlocutor on his assuming the rôle of je. Hence, it is possible to say, "La polarité des personnes, telle est dans le langage la condition fondamentale, dont le procès de communication ... n'est qu'une conséquence toute pragmatique". (ibid., p.260)

1.4.1 This "dialectique singulière" is the very condition of communication, from which all else follows. It is the constant, the point of reference of every allocution and sets in motion a whole play of factors whose familiarity masks their importance.

1.5 Each allocution of je is a separate act. As we have seen, the term "semel-natif" has been proffered to symbolise this crucial fact, but elsewhere we find it more cogently
Every occurrence of *je* carries a set of implications concerning the time and circumstances of the act itself. What these implications are and how language provides for them are the questions that must now be examined.

---

2.0 The first and fundamental fact about time in language is that it is inextricably linked to tense: the innumerable series of studies on the various facets of this link are well known. The great majority of these studies are centred on matters principally of the forms and distribution of tenses, whether diachronically or synchronically, within a language or among languages. However, a perusal of such studies will support a startling conclusion: few indeed seem to concern themselves with time. A well established tradition in linguistics has it that matters of time are extralinguistic: they may belong to philosophy or, within linguistics, to semantics but are not required for the linguistic study of verbs and their forms.
2.1 The truly remarkable side of this linguistic attitude to time and tense is that the only basis that permits the comparison of tense-systems is that they deal with the same thing - time, each representing it in its own fashion. Any attempt to compare systems assumes this fact as fundamental and depends upon it. This assumption, in the event, is almost always implicit, even intuitive, and yet is of a magnitude that is, upon reflection, staggering. It implies two things above all: first, that we know already what there is to know about time and, secondly, that time - whatever it may be said to be - is the same for both languages in question, with the further logical implication that it must be the same for all languages, since they are all considered capable of being compared or contrasted. Time is taken for the standard of all tense-comparison. This fact notwithstanding, discussion of time is generally neglected, being left for the most part to the philosopher, the poet or the mystic.

2.2 With his notion of subjectivity, Benveniste provides the means of relating time to tense. Distinguishing between different concepts of time, he sets up a principal opposition between *le temps chronique* and *le temps linguistique*. The former has as its points of reference events, including natural phenomena, and embraces calendar time, which is constructed as a continuum anchored to a particular axis-event as its main reference point (e.g. the birth of Christ, etc.), permitting
thereby a directional view of events (i.e. before or after the axis) counted in units of varying types (month, week, etc.). This view of time allows an individual to locate himself and others with respect to the axis or to particular events in the continuum. At the same time, the units of measurement are themselves "intemporels", as Benveniste puts it, having the same function and nature as numbers. Capable of being distinguished from each other, they offer, of themselves, no means of being related to what he calls "le temps vécu" of human experience:

"Or comme un jour est identique à un autre jour, rien ne dit de tel jour du calendrier, pris en lui-même, s'il est présent, passé ou futur. Il ne peut être rangé sous l'une de ces trois catégories que pour celui qui vit le temps. '13 février 1641' est une date explicite et complète en vertu du système mais qui ne nous laisse pas savoir en quel temps elle est énoncée; on peut donc la prendre aussi bien comme prospective, par exemple dans une clause garantissant la validité d'un traité conclu un siècle plus tôt ou comme retrospective et évoquée deux siècles plus tard." (1966b, p.8)

2.2.1 The problem clearly derives from the reference axis that governs all specifications within le temps chronique. To add to what Benveniste says, it is the atemporality or "anonymity" of the units of measurement that requires a reference axis for the system, but the axis itself is a matter of arbitrary choice. This fact alone explains, for example, the incompatibility of calendars across cultures: seen at this level, the choice of axis is virtually random. And yet, it does not follow that time-reference across cultures is impossible: the
only necessary and sufficient condition is not an understanding of the other's culture but rather of his language.

2.2.2 Le temps linguistique is founded altogether differently from le temps chronique: its axis is constant and unmistakable:

"La langue doit par nécessité ordonner le temps à partir d'un axe, et celui-ci est toujours et seulement l'instance de discours. Il serait impossible de déplacer cet axe référentiel pour le poser dans le passé ou dans l'avenir; on ne peut même imaginer ce que deviendrait une langue où le point de départ de l'ordonnance du temps ne coïnciderait pas avec le présent linguistique et où l'axe temporel serait lui-même une variable de la temporalité." (1966b, p.9)

The reference-axis is always "je" uttered by a speaker who posits himself as subject.

2.2.3 From this fact alone is it possible to organise the linguistic expression of time according to the bi-directional view of events, viz. the construction of past and future tense forms, which are significant only in their relation to the present point in time. Indeed, Benveniste sees them as being of a secondary order, such that

"ces deux références ne reportent pas au temps, mais à des vues sur le temps, projetées en arrière et en avant à partir du point présent";

and this because

"on arrive à cette constatation - surprenante à première vue, mais profondément accordée à la nature réelle du langage - que le seul temps inhérent à la langue est le présent axial du discours, et que ce présent est implicite". (idem. : my emphasis)
2.3 The main thrust of this may be paraphrased as "Qui dit je dit maintenant": it is not essential to express the "présent axial du discours" by means of the morphological present tense. This can be taken to mean therefore that it is possible to express the present in a language with no present tense form: this is indeed the case as numerous languages readily prove, e.g. Russian *Eto dom* = *That (is) a house*. But the more essential inference is that the present may be expressed by more than simply a verb form. The paraphrase "Qui dit je dit maintenant" is not intended to be epigrammatic: it is to be read literally, as a simple axiom derived from the principle of the subjectivity of language. It needs to be extended by the addition of *ici* and *tu*, since not only the time of the allocution is posited by *je* but also its place and interlocutor (more precisely, the allocuté).

2.3.1 Thus when I say "*je*", I make myself subject and *my time* the time and, necessarily therefore, *your time*. Benveniste describes the phenomenon this way:

"Quelque chose de singulier, de très simple et d'infiniment important se produit [...]: la temporalité qui est mienne quand elle ordonne mon discours est d'emblée acceptée comme sienne par mon interlocuteur. Mon 'aujourd'hui' se convertit en son 'aujourd'hui', quoiqu'il ne l'ait pas lui-même instauré dans son propre discours, et mon 'hier' en son 'hier'. Réciproquement, quand il parlera en réponse, je convertirai, devenu récepteur, sa temporalité en la mienne.... L'un et l'autre se trouvent ainsi accordés sur la même longueur d'onde. Le temps du discours n'est ni ramené aux divisions du temps chronique ni enfermé dans une subjectivité solipsiste." (ibid., p.11)
2.3.2 To say that the place of the allocution is posited (2.3), in addition to the temporality, is simply to say that ici embraces the interlocutors and their situation of discourse, whatever it may be. This tripartite system of reference, je-ici-maintenant, is the linguistic means of establishing and constantly reaffirming the "présent axial du discours". From these three stems a series of similar markers - en ce moment, à présent, demain, hier, avant-hier, ceci, etc. - whose meaning derives directly from the allocution. Likewise, a separate series - alors, à ce moment-là, à l'époque, le jour suivant, la veille, etc. - is understood by reference to the same point.

2.3.3 Equally important, however, is the fact that each of these items marks, by its occurrence, the present of allocution, whether the latter has been formally specified or not by some previous item in the utterance. Thus, là may be described as having no other meaning than "not ici"; hier means only "not (and before) aujourd'hui"; demain means only "not (and after) aujourd'hui". The particular retrospective and prospective features attached to hier and demain respectively are not reflected in all such items and expressions like le jour même or la semaine suivante are used indifferently with respect to "past" or "future" meaning. Nevertheless, their occurrence reaffirms the "présent axial du discours" by the same reverse process. These items and
those like them constitute the basis of the aspect indiciel of language, which in turn is both dependent on and constitutive of le temps linguistique, according to whether one considers the speaker's or the hearer's point of view in the allocution.

2.4 Within such a framework, the question of tense is, simply put, a matter of the morphological specification of linguistic time by means of verbal forms. It would be misleading, however, to suggest that the analysis of tense is itself an uncomplicated matter. In this connection, I shall look briefly at two treatments of tense in French — those of Benveniste and Weinrich — and relate them to a more general, if limited, treatment by Reichenbach.

* * * * * * * * *

3.0 Benveniste, basing himself on the concepts of person and subjectivity, distinguishes two groups of tenses in French. The first, "Le système linguistique du discours" (1966a, p.244), comprises all tenses with the exception of what he calls "l'aoriste (simple et composé)", the latter corresponding to what is otherwise known as the passé simple and its compound form, e.g. je donnai and j'eus donné. The other, the system of the récit historique or l'énonciation historique; consists of "l'aoriste, l'imparfait, le plus-que-parfait et le
prospectif" (e.g. je devais partir, a periphrastic substitute for the future) (p.245), thus excluding the present, the perfect (or passé composé) and the future (simple and compound).

3.1 The récit historique uses those tenses which traditionally are referred to as "past" and adopts the "aoriste" as the key tense, to indicate that "il s'agit de la présentation des faits survenus à un certain moment du temps, sans aucune intervention du locuteur dans le récit". Adopting this position, Benveniste therefore defines the récit historique as "le mode d'énonciation qui exclut toute forme linguistique 'autobiographique'" (p.239), adding that

"il faut et il suffit que l'auteur reste fidèle à son propos d'historien et qu'il proscribe tout ce qui est étranger au récit des événements (discours, réflexions, comparaisons). A vrai dire, il n'y a même plus alors de narrateur. .... Personne ne parle ici; les événements semblent se raconter eux-mêmes". (p.241)

This depersonalisation of the récit historique has, for Benveniste, the necessary consequence of excluding all forms of the verb-paradigm except those of the third person:

"Le discours exclura l'aoriste, mais le récit historique, qui l'emploie constamment, n'en retiendra que les formes de 3 personne. La conséquence est que nous arrivâmes et surtout vous arrivâtes ne se rencontrent ni dans le récit historique, parce que formes personnelles, ni dans le discours, parce que formes d'aoriste. En revanche, il arriva, ils arrivèrent se présenteront à chaque instant sous la plume de l'historien, et n'ont pas de substituts possibles." (p.244-5)

3.1.1 He is careful to point out that, while the récit historique is always a written form, the converse does not hold
true for discours, which may be written as well as spoken, with the consequence that

"chaque fois qu'au sein d'un récit historique apparaît un discours, quand l'historien par exemple reproduit les paroles d'un personnage ou qu'il intervient lui-même pour juger les événements rapportés, on passe à un autre système temporel, celui du discours. Le propre du langage est de permettre ces transferts instantanés". (p.242) [my emphasis]

These shifts are marked by changes in tense-forms, by a moving from one system to the other and, of course, from one type of allocution to the other.

3.2 The rigidity of such a position, criticised as we shall see by Weinrich, does not go entirely unnoticed by Benveniste himself. Upon saying that only third-person forms are available to the "aoriste", he adds in a note that "il faudrait nuancer cette affirmation" (p.244). But he attenuates his claim only to the extent of citing as a counter-example Le Grand Meaulnes, which he seems to discount as being the work of a "romancier" not a historian. I wish to look briefly at what he means here. He is claiming that je + "aoriste" is incongruous to the point of being unacceptable. In Le Grand Meaulnes, we see examples such as this:

"Mais lorsque l'heure fut venue de partir et que je me levai pour faire signe au grand Meaulnes, il ne m'aperçut pas d'abord. Adossé à la porte et la tête penchée, il semblait profondément absorbé par ce qui venait d'être dit. En le voyant ainsi, perdu dans ses réflexions, regardant, comme à travers des lieues de brouillard, ces gens paisibles qui travaillaient, je pensai soudain à cette image de Robinson Crusoé, où l'on voit l'adolescent anglais, avant son grand départ, 'fréquentant la boutique
d'un vannier' ...

Et j'y ai souvent pensé depuis." (Alain-Fournier (1968), p.17)

Here occurs the use not only of je + "aoriste" but also of je + Passé Composé: for Benveniste, the incongruousness resides in the co-occurrence of the "aoriste" and the first person. What he leaves unmentioned is the presumably greater incongruousness of the use of both tenses with je: certainly, such a dual temporality is in even greater conflict with his scheme as presented.

3.3 In fact, Le Grand Meaulnes constitutes a serious counter-example to Benveniste's proposal and points to a weakness of his scheme. It will be recalled that, on the basis of the concept of subjectivity, he developed the notion of person in the allocutionary situation and its attendant implications for the so-called "3rd person" of the traditional verb-paradigm (cf. 1.1.2). He insists strongly on this construct of person, drawing on data from a large range of languages (1966a, pp.225-236). The resultant non-personal character of il, taken in conjunction with the severe distributional restrictions applying to the occurrence of the Passé Simple ("aoriste") in modern French, leads him to proscribe the co-occurrence of "personal" forms with that tense.

3.3.1 It is curious that the greatest weight of his proscription falls on nous and, most especially, on vous, with je
being discussed in the sense of its peculiar suitability for use with the Passé Composé rather than its unsuitability for use with the "aoriste". The non-personal it fits eminently well with the "aoriste" function of "la relation objective des événements" (1966a, p.244), on the principle that

"un événement, pour être posé comme tel dans l'expression temporelle, doit avoir cessé d'être présent, il doit ne pouvoir plus être énoncé comme présent" (p.245),

to which is added the corollary that "l'historien ne peut s'historiser sans démentir son dessein". [emphasis mine] He explains that to do so would be to inject the present of the "historien" into his "histoire", something which is in his terms plainly contradictory and impossible.

3.3.2 It is worth noting, nevertheless, that even in one of the passages he quotes as an example of the "histoire" (p.241), there occurs precisely this type of phenomenon: Balzac offers a series of "aoristes" in a sentence ending as follows:

"... et jeta un regard sur son costume, un peu plus riche que ne le permettent en France les lois du goût" (second emphasis mine)

Benveniste's note on this reads merely "Réflexion de l'auteur qui échappe au plan du récit". Clearly, it must be the case that the author here "démentit son dessein" by introducing his present. Such an incursion of "discours" within "histoire" constitutes, as Benveniste does point out, a "transfert" but the apparent anomaly that it represents is not discussed by him. To call the phenomenon a "transfert" is merely to
designate it, however: in no sense does it explain it or motivate it. The question of how to do so remains open and I shall return to it in due course. For the moment, it serves to show Benveniste's over-insistence on the construct of person.

3.4 This insistence has led him empirically to confuse the idea of person with that of subjectivity. Though he nowhere says so, he clearly intends to contrast subjectivity with objectivisation of events, as in histoire, and concludes, as I have tried to make clear, that person constitutes the criterion of this contrast and that the "aoriste" and il are conceptually inseparable as the marker of the objective level of language that is histoire. What is wrong with this argument is prefigured in his own words when he says "L'historien ne peut s'historiser sans démentir son dessein". This use of the word "dessein", with its clear implications of both intent and act, is important in that it sees the "historien" as engaging in a particular kind of "work" - in the sociologist's sense. If he wishes that work to be the uttering of "histoire", then - in modern French at least - he can accomplish his intention to perform that act by the use of a particular tense, the "aoriste". I shall argue later that it is in no way clear that he is also required to respect certain rules of collocation of pronouns with the forms of that tense: the evidence is to be found in Le Grand Meaulnes, as well as the works of
Proust and Maupassant, to show the occurrence of *je* + "aoriste".

3.4.1 Benveniste's stance on person will not allow him to consider the significance of *je* + "aoriste", since this is the very form he has been obliged to proscribe, even while acknowledging its occurrence. His only remark on the question is in a note (p.244) in which he observes, with finality, "Mais il en va autrement de l'histoire" (i.e. as compared with the "romancier"). The implication of this may be taken to be that the "romancier" observes a different set of rules or is able to dispense with the rules partially or completely. It is regrettable that any such implication is not developed, since it deals with a crucial point, namely in what way the "romancier" is different from the "historien" and in what way either may be different from any other allocuteur.

3.4.2 If one takes the position indicated earlier, that the "historien" is engaging in a particular "work", then the "aoriste" may be taken as the device he employs to mark his activity. If his activity is the "objectivisation des événements", then perhaps it is a sufficient condition that he mark it by the "aoriste". If this is the case, then the question becomes: what is the effect of using *je* with the marker of histoire? Does it have any effect that can be described within the scheme of temporality of modern French? In Benveniste's terms, can the subjectivity of *je* be compatible with the
non-subjectivity of the "aoriste"?

* * * * * * * * * * *

4.0 This theme is taken up, in a different way and from a different point of view, by Weinrich (1968). His treatment of the tenses has many points of similarity with Benveniste's but avoids the kind of problem I have just discussed. Its general orientation, as well as the majority of its examples, is more literary than linguistic in its focus but lends itself readily to a discussion of the themes I wish to treat.

4.1 Weinrich seeks to divorce the discussion and analysis of tense from all discussion of time, claiming that the traditional confusion of the two notions has been the main stumbling-block to a clear understanding of tense. He cites the use of the Preterite in Orwell's 1984 to refer to a time which has not yet occurred and Gide's use of the Present in the following extracts from his diary:

"Je vais voir Valéry hier." (p.31)

"Lundi matin, je vais retrouver au Salon M., Ghéon et Jean; Gérard a voulu être des nôtres, de sorte que notre joie est gâchée. Nous nous trainons à cinq de salle en salle." (p.32)

Through these examples, he argues that the tense used is no guide at all to the time alluded to: e.g. in the Gide examples,
both the references are to a time anterior to the allocution. He declines to acquiesce in the approach taken by various scholars, to the effect that particular genres of literature have their own "tense-logic" that must be respected, preferring instead to say,

"las paradojas de los tiempos verbales dejan de serlo en cuanto la lingüística toma en cuenta los textos de la literatura juntamente con las condiciones que imponen sus géneros y, ya a partir de los grados más elementales de la gramática, define cada uno de los tiempos de forma que no queden contradichos por géneros literarios enteros. Y viceversa: la ciencia de la literatura tampoco debe definiir sus conceptos fundamentales contra las leyes estructurales del lenguaje ni conocer sólo los grados más elementos de la gramática". (pp.32-33)

4.2 In short, he seeks a "lingüística de los tiempos" and starts from the notion of communication seen in conjunction with the allocutionary situation, with its "yo" and "tu" and a non-participant "él", along the same lines as Benveniste. From Benveniste also he adopts directly the concept of two temporal groups but with a difference. He opts for a position similar to that discussed earlier regarding the claim that certain activities within the realm of allocution call for certain devices (cf. 3.4.2). He restricts his conception to the use of tense-forms specifically, postulating that for French

"la verdad es que, fijándonos concretamente en grupos de tiempos, y no vagamente en todos los tiempos, aparecen determinadas afinidades entre ambos grupos y ciertas situaciones comunicativas. Considerada como situación comunicativa escrita, una novela muestra inequívoca inclinación por los tiempos del grupo II, mientras que este libro,
Each of his groups is associated with a particular activity, itself related to a particular "view" of the world. Group I concerns itself with what he calls the "mundo comentado" and Group II with the "mundo narrado" (besprochene Welt and erzählte Welt respectively in the original work), the characteristic activity or "work" in each case being narrating (Group II) and "commentary" or non-narrating (Group I).

4.2.1 His method of characterising the activities as narrating is curious and, finally, very important: I give here in full his exposition of his reasons for it:

"El narrar es un comportamiento característico del hombre. Podemos comportarnos frente al mundo narrándolo. Narrándolo empleamos aquella parte del lenguaje que está prevista para narrar. Empleamos en particular los tiempos del relato. Su función en el lenguaje consiste en informar al que escucha una comunicación que esta comunicación es un relato. Ya que absolutamente todo, el mundo entero, verdadero o no verdadero, puede ser objeto de un relato, vamos a llamar a los tiempos del grupo II tiempos del mundo narrado o, abreviadamente, tiempos de la narración. 'Mundo' no significa aquí otra cosa que posible contenido de una comunicación lingüística. Así pues, hay que entender los tiempos del mundo relatado como señales lingüísticas según las cuales el contenido de la comunicación lingüística que lleva consigo ha de ser entendido como relato. En tanto en cuanto formen parte del grupo temporal II de la lengua francesa tienen sólo esta y ninguna otra función. En otras situaciones comunicativas empleamos otros tiempos, a saber, los tiempos del grupo temporal I. Como junto a estos dos grupos no hay un tercero, tendrá que haber una nota común para cada una de las situaciones comunicativas en las que empleamos los tiempos del grupo I. La 'via negativa' es la primera que se nos ofrece. Lo que tienen de común las situaciones comunicativas en que domina ese grupo de tiempos es que el mundo (en el
sentido ya indicado) no es relatado. Mas ¿cómo hablamos cuando no relatamos? Ahora no se trata tanto de hallar un término adecuado para el caso, sino de describir qué diferencia el tipo de estas situaciones comunicativas del tipo de las situaciones comunicativas narrativas." (p.67)

4.2.2 Clearly, the task of finding a term for "non-narration" is an embarrassing one and he prefers instead to concentrate on the two situations of communication. He holds the narrative one to be marked by "una actitud relajada", in terms of which the events narrated "quedan como pasados por el filtro del relato perdiendo mucho de su dramatismo" (p.69), while the non-narrative situation manifests "una actitud tensa" in which

"el hablante está en tensión y su discurso es dramático porque se trata de cosas que le afectan directamente. ... está comprometido; tiene que mover y tiene que reaccionar y su discurso es un fragmento de acción que modifica el mundo en un ápice y que, a su vez, empeña al hablante también en un ápice". (p.69)

4.3 Weinrich's view, in spite of the highly metaphorical terms in which he feels compelled to present it, is basically that there are two fundamental types of communication that stand in opposition to each other and, of this pair, he seems to look upon narration as the marked member. Nowhere does he clearly oppose, formally speaking, the terms "relato" and "discurso" but, as the two passages just quoted would seem to bear out, there is at least an implicit contrast between them. However, in his subsequent analysis, he seems to lay emphasis on narration (and thus his Group II of tenses), especially as this enables him to account for the occurrence, within a
Group I context, of the Imperfect and Pluperfect which are both from Group II.

4.3.1 Benveniste, for his part, is more concerned in the other direction, laying greater emphasis on the tenses of discours. His opposition récit/discours is essentially the same as Weinrich's "relato/discurso" (or narrar/comentar) but is oriented, in the light of the concept of subjectivité, more toward "le présent du discours". He does not address himself to the question of the Imperfect as Weinrich does and it may well be that the latter's scheme is one way richer, in that he introduces the concept of relieve to motivate the transmigration of the Imperfect and the Pluperfect between the groups.

4.3.2 Weinrich, on the other hand, does not look upon the Present as a point de repère: it is for him the "tiempo de nivel cero" of Group I, with a counterpart in Group II in the form of the "tiempos cero" (Passé Simple and Imperfect). These three tenses have absolutely nothing to do with time:

"Esta denominación ["tiempo de nivel cero"] quiere significar que con estos tiempos mentamos solamente el mundo comentado o el mundo narrado y nada más." (p.98)

Thus, the Present does not signify present time, nor the other two past time. Within each group, however, Weinrich postulates a "perspectiva comunicativa" functioning "relativamente en cuanto al punto cero de los grupos temporales correspondientes" and "que podemos llamar retrospectivas y prespectivas" (p.99).
These phenomena of "retrospección" and "prespección" are likewise not expressive of time, although, as Weinrich puts it, they "presuppose" time.

4.4 At this point his proposal becomes frankly much more philosophical than linguistic. It is not easy to deny that, intuitively speaking, he has a point to make when he goes on to develop this theme. Nevertheless, since he seems to be claiming that the presupposition of time just alluded to is the only temporality that attaches to "retrospección" or to "prespección", it is difficult to see how he would wish to motivate the use, in Group II for instance, of the Pluperfect or the Conditional Perfect while ignoring the question of sequentiality of events. What I am alluding to here is an underlying question, namely whether it may be fairly claimed that the sequentiality of events constitutes a part of what a speaker wishes to communicate by or in an utterance. Weinrich seems to have overlooked the question or to have avoided it: instead, he prefers to look at the past from such points of view as truth vs. fiction, compromise vs. liberty (pp.100-103). I submit that here again, as with Benveniste earlier, is an instance of the author's being led astray by his pre-occupation with a single theme, in this case that of the "actitud comunicativa" - narration or non-narration.

4.4.1 Benveniste does deal with the question of sequentiality,
under the heading of "antériorité". He ties this concept specifically to the compound forms of the tenses, while also rejecting the idea that they express time:

"[L'antériorité] crée un rapport logique et intra-linguistique, elle ne reflète pas un rapport chronologique qui serait posé dans la réalité objective. Car l'antériorité intra-linguistique maintient le procès dans le même temps qui est exprimé par la forme corrélative simple." (1966a, p.247)

Two indices mark this property of the compound tenses: they can occur only as bound forms (i.e. in so-called temporal and thus, by definition, subordinate clauses) and they can occur only in the environment of the corresponding simple form. They are thus marked by both a semantic and a syntactic dependency:

"La preuve que la forme d'antériorité ne porte par elle-même aucune référence au temps est qu'elle doit s'appuyer syntaxiquement sur une forme temporelle libre dont elle adoptera la structure formelle pour s'établir au même niveau temporel et remplir ainsi sa fonction propre. C'est pourquoi on ne peut admettre: quand il a écrit .... il envoya." (p.247)

The distribution of the forms of anteriority corresponds to the tense-groupings demanded by the récit/discours contrast:

"Le principe de la distinction est le même: 'quand il a fini son travail, il rentre chez lui' est du discours, à cause du présent, et, aussi bien, de l'antérieur de présent; — 'quand il eut fini ...., il rentra' est un énoncé historique, à cause de l'aoriste, et de l'antérieur d'aoriste." (p.247)

This distributional statement is echoed more or less by Weinrich but any notion of bound forms is foreign to his concept of the clause:

"Cuando se halla presente una conjunción o una palabra
funcional de tipo semejante, la determinación semántica gana en fi jeza. Esto es todo. La semántica más que la sintaxis ha de interesarse por ello. De aquí que no pueda deducirse una estricta diferencia entre oración principal y oración subordinada." (p.279)

4.5 I have tried to show the main differences in the approaches of Benveniste and Weinrich to the questions of time and tense in French, as well as some of the weaker points in their proposals. However, these differences aside, the two proposals clearly coincide to a very great degree and even more, I think, than Weinrich has acknowledged (cf. his p.57). They both postulate an opposition of groups of tenses, each marking any allocution as being either récit or discours and involving a notion of intralinguistic temporality founded on the concept of the allocutionary situation. Within this frame of reference, Weinrich has laid greater stress on the narrative activity and Benveniste on the discours and in each case the stress has been reflected by the types of example discussed.

* * * * * * * * * *

5.0 Reichenbach, in a very different type of exposé, has shown, by implication at least, a similar stance while directing himself toward a different objective. His concern is to illustrate the "time indication given by the tenses" (p.288). He does not discuss the concept of time which he is using but postulates all values of time in reference to the point of
speech (S).

5.1 This allows three immediate indications - "before the point of speech, simultaneous with the point of speech and after the point of speech" - but does not satisfy "the rather complex structure" of tenses. He postulates two further points, point of the event (E) and point of reference (R), whose positions are determined with reference to S. Thus in his example *Peter had gone*, "the point of the event is the time when Peter went; the point of reference is a time between this point and the point of speech" (p.288). Using his notational system - with time shown as a line traced from left to right - this would be symbolised as: \[ E \rightarrow R \rightarrow S \]. In this way, he can contrast - for English - the Simple Past and the Present Perfect so that the difference between them is seen in the position of the point of reference (R):

\[
\text{e.g. } \frac{I \text{ saw John}}{R,E \rightarrow S} \text{ vs. } \frac{I \text{ have seen John}}{E \rightarrow S,R}
\]

in which it is clear that in the case of the Present Perfect "the event is also before the point of speech but it is referred to a point simultaneous with the point of speech, i.e. the points of speech and reference coincide" (p.292).

5.2 Reichenbach discusses the matter of the sequence of tenses and introduces a principle to explain it, using this example (p.293):

"The tenses of the sentence, 'I had mailed the letter when
John came and told me the news', may be diagrammed as follows

1st clause: \( E_1 \rightarrow R_1 \rightarrow S \)

2nd clause: \( R_2, E_2 \rightarrow S \)

3rd clause: \( R_3, E_3 \rightarrow S \)

Here the three reference points coincide. It would be incorrect to say, 'I had mailed the letter when John has come'; in such a combination the reference point would have been changed."

What is shown here is that, in spite of the different times of the events referred to in the separate clauses, the point of reference remains unchanged.

5.3 This principle of the permanence of the reference point offers independent motivation for the concept of opposing tense-groups as variously expounded by Benveniste and Weinrich. Setting aside the differences between their formulations of the groups (i.e. the exclusion by Weinrich of the Imperfect and Pluperfect from Group I whereas Benveniste has them common to both récit and discours), it is clear that one group in both cases (discours/Group I) has as its point of reference the present (point of speech) and the other has its point of reference prior to the point of speech and marked by the Passé Simple. As Benveniste puts it,

"Comme le présent, le parfait appartient au système linguistique du discours, car le repère temporel du parfait est le moment du discours, alors que le repère de l'ao­riste est le moment de l'événement". (1966a, p.244)

This allows him to say therefore of the Perfect,

"C'est le temps de celui qui relate les faits en témoin,"
The coincidence of point of reference and point of speech is the mark of Benveniste's concept of *subjectivité* in the allocutionary situation with its *présent axial du discours*: as we see, 'the Passé Composé also directly implies this same present. Weinrich's "tiempos de comentario" ("Besprechung") can be marked in the same way according to Reichenbach's notation, gaining in the process a more precise and possibly more satisfactory characterisation of Group I than Weinrich's own terms "comentario" or "non-narration".

* * * * * * * * *
NOTES

1. I offer this specification having in mind that it is principally related to syntax. Other aspects such as reference, in particular, will thus not be dealt with in great detail, although their study is an important part of the question of énonciation, as will be seen in the next quotation from Benveniste.

2. The terminology of the study of énonciation is presently indeterminate, in English at least. In French, the situation is somewhat better; certainly, it has received closer scrutiny from French scholars, (cf. Tesnière (1965), pp. 116-117). Even so, Todorov feels the necessity of adopting a position on the question, as follows:

"Les jargons ayant tendance à se multiplier à ce stade des recherches, fixons dès à présent le sens de quelques termes simples et essentiels: allocution = énonciation d'un discours adressé à quelqu'un; locuteur = celui qui énonce; allocutaire = celui à qui s'adresse le discours; interlocuteur = l'un des participants d'une allocution (indifféremment lequel). Quelques autres termes viendront se joindre à cette liste au cours de l'analyse." (1970b, p.4)

The point of perhaps greatest interest here is the use of the term allocution as an equivalent to énonciation. Although this has not yet become general practice, it offers what I should term the best possibility of an English equivalent for énonciation, viz. "allocution". Enonciation:"enunciation" and allocation:"allocation" are cognate pairs: the former does not constitute an equivalence (except possibly in the case of enunciate a principle and the like) and does not offer us a useful basis for a translation. "Allocation", on the other hand, while existing in English, has limited frequency in its accepted meaning, viz. "a formal address, esp. one warning or advising with authority" (Webster's, 1970, p.37). This limited frequency is not likely, in my view, to interfere with my proposal to use the word as a specifically linguistic term, one which, furthermore, more or less resurrects an earlier meaning grown out of general use, e.g. "Allocation: ... 3. a speaking-to, addressing or accosting. Obs." (O.E.D., 1884, p.236). Besides, the term is effectively presupposed in the established use of the term "allocutionary". It has the added advantage of lacking the linguistic connotations of a term such as "discourse". It can thus
adequately respond to the need to translate both meanings of *énonciation* as they occur in this work, i.e. the field of study and the individual act, as well as in a more general context. I propose to use the term hereafter in place of *énonciation*.

3. I have referred to Benveniste as a pioneer: Todorov (1970b, p.7) calls him a "véritable défricheur". The remarkable fact is that Benveniste has worked persistently and almost alone at the theme of *énonciation* over a period of years. Ironically, the difficulty of summarising his ideas derives largely from this fact. His work, scattered mostly in the form of articles (now in collected form in his 1966a), is often repetitive. Yet, of course, no one piece is a mere restatement: rather, each is written with others in mind with - for the reader - a resultant effect of télescopage whereby a full understanding and appreciation of one of them depends on a knowledge of one or more predecessors. At the same time, his terminology has varied so that, to follow him, one is forced occasionally into a steady routine of cross-checking to be certain whether his position on a point may have changed. Overall, his position has not altered: it has merely become more precise at each stage.

Regarding his terminology, his use of the term *langage* in "De la subjectivité dans le langage" (1966a, pp.258-266), though not discussed as a specific term, seems to come closest to my conception of the term as I have presented it in relation to the Saussurean scheme.

4. See Benveniste's study of this notion in the context of a variety of langages in "Structure des relations de personne dans le verbe" (1966a, pp.227-236)

5. The only area where time tends to be discussed in relation to tense seems to me to be that of translation, where a failure to appreciate the workings of time - as opposed simply to the ramifications of tense-structures - is crucial in its consequences. Translation, of course, is held to be applied linguistics only. In the light of the present discussion, there is a certain irony in the situation.

6. The linguist who has taken time as a theme has tended to remain something of an outsider to his fellows. A striking example is Guillaume, whose system of chronogenèse has found favour with a mere handful of scholars. His finely-wrought scheme of "époques et niveaux temporels" is an attempt to quantify and order the phases of emergent reality with respect to the linguistic representation of events. He deals not only with tense but all verbal
categories, assigning them a place in his conceptual framework of incidence and décadence. For most linguists, however, his categories have left an impression of unreality. With regard to tenses, his main interest for us is that his system revolves around the Present, although he does not attempt to motivate this central rôle from the same point of view as presented here.

7. 1966b, p.5 ff.
8. In any case, any such implication receives no subsequent discussion, since Benveniste moves on to analyse discours.
9. One wonders whether Benveniste himself is quite clear on this point: the only clue to an intended difference is seen in the following observation:

"On peut mettre en fait que quiconque sait écrire et entreprend le récit d'événements passés emploie spontanément l'aoriste comme temps fondamental, qu'il évoque ces événements en historien ou qu'il les a créées en romancier." (1966a, p.243)

Here évoquer is in contrast with créer: to what extent such a contrast will elucidate the question at hand is still unclear, however.

10. I have made use of the Spanish version of the original German edition: Tempus. Besprochene und Erzählte Welt. (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag, 1964). Federico Latorre's work corresponds on almost all points to the original and it is by virtue only of a small number of relatively insignificant differences that it stands as a version rather than simply a translation.

In a late stage of this work, I obtained the French translation of the original, with Michèle Lacoste as the translator (i.e. Weinrich (1973)). It proved to be impossible to utilise this to replace the Spanish version for the quotations I have used. The reason for that is the astonishing nature of Lacoste's work: albeit a translation in name, it is in fact a new edition of the original, with additions and deletions in remarkable number and a vastly altered physical presentation. So changed is it from the Spanish version that it is a major task to try to locate passages initially derived from either of the other two. There is, also, no certainty that the passages in question are still to be found. For this reason, it was decided not to proceed with the planned substitution.

The Lacoste "version", which reads well and seems to be a
fuller version of what Weinrich has to say (in spite of the deletions), will no doubt be the means of Weinrich's acquiring in France a public long denied to him. Never­theless, one would hope that it will not long go under the guise of a translation: otherwise there will be the serious question of how much of it is Weinrich and how much La­coste. The work indeed has all the characteristics of a new edition and it seems reasonable as well as orthodox to expect it to be presented as such.

11. This is today a commonplace, in works of science-fiction especially, and is well known in a different form in the language of French-speaking children who use the Imper­fect in the choosing of rôles for games of make-believe, e.g. "Moi, j'étais le bûcheron".

With regard to the Gide quotations, I have reproduced them in full and with the emphasis laid by Weinrich, because it is not at all clear that he has quite understood the French in this instance. He comments, on the first sentence, in the following vein:

"Je vais voir es una forma que en la gramática francesa vale por futuro. Junto a ella está el adverbio tempo­ral 'ayer'." (second emphasis mine)

On the second quotation, he refers to its "gran aparato de tiempos". His comment, as well as his emphases, reflect the impression that the form Je vais voir, for example, has to be a reference to the future, just as it would be with demain instead of hier. The fact that it thus makes no sense, by any interpretation, seems to escape him, as does the idea that, since the sentence is a diary entry - as he is well aware - the emphasis, for both quotations, is more appropriately "Je vais voir", etc. (These examples do not appear in the Lacoste version.)
I have attempted to indicate in the preceding chapter the nature and scope of the theoretical approach that will serve as the point of departure for all that I wish to discuss in this and succeeding chapters. It becomes appropriate now to look at that theory more closely, to determine its merits and deficiencies and propose suitable modifications. My overall objective is to examine the links between syntax and allocution: in the process I shall touch on questions related to pragmatics, convention, recent syntactic theory and sociological views of language, inasmuch as they all seem to contribute to a conception of what I have termed langage.

It was observed earlier that Weinrich's framework emphasises the narrative activity and his use of the term "non-narration" ("Nicht-Erzählen") supports this view. Apart from the difficulty of finding a term for the non-narrative activity (p.67), he suggests it is easier and more dependable to use narration as the point of departure for the discussion of the two activities. Thus, throughout the discussion, he tends to de-emphasise what Benveniste stresses - the subjec-tivité - and, seeing the tenses as being marked simply as inarration, his claim is that "no existe otro signo identificable
inequívoco en el comentador que el ser alguien totalmente distinto del narrador" (p.70). No particular characteristic marks either the "comentario" or the "comentador" other than what he calls the "actitud tensa" of the latter. 1

1.1 The weakness of this position is revealed in the light of Reichenbach's proposal, where the distinction between the activities is seen to be a matter of specification of the points of event and reference in relation to the point of speech and, particularly, in that the so-called commentary tenses do indeed have a common feature, since in each case the point of reference coincides with the point of speech. Clearly, Weinrich has underplayed the importance of the point of speech as the crux of the tense-system. More than that, he may even have failed fully to realise its importance.

1.2 This possibility is most strongly evinced in his discussion of the supplanting in modern French of the Passé Simple by the Passé Composé, particularly within the framework of the French press. This is an occurrence which, he claims (pp.324-329), is at least largely responsible for the subsequent generalisation of this substitution throughout the language. He presupposes that the earliest newspapers claimed to bring the latest news - the news of the day - but that this claim was realised more idealiter than realiter (p. 326). In this light, he examines the Journal de Paris of
and finds what he considers a bizarre situation, namely that the news of the day, expressed predominantly in the Passé Composé, relates events extending as far back as November or October of 1812. He observes,

"Salta a la vista, sin embargo, que las noticias de los corresponsales, que, naturalmente, son de fecha más antiguad, están muchas veces redactadas en una forma que hace resultar la impresión de novedad" (p.327). [my emphasis]

I have drawn attention here to the words corresponsales and fecha, because, in all the instances which Weinrich gives, it is clearly indicated that there is a correspondent and a precise date, as in this example:

"En el número del 2 de enero de 1813 encontramos, por ejemplo, una noticia de Francfort, fechada el 28-XII-1812, que dice: Il a été AUJOURD'HUI jusqu'à 12 degrés de Réau- mur." (p.327)

1.2.1 In stressing "aujourd'hui", Weinrich wishes to make the point that it is inappropriate in reference to an event of five days earlier. He claims further that the use of the Passé Composé is also inappropriate, since, at least in those days (1813 and before), the use of this tense was subject to the 24-hour rule.2 This being the case, he considers surprising the next two examples, in which the Passé Composé

"se encuentra aunque la noticia se identifique por una fecha correspondiente al día anterior: S.M. l'Empereur A PASSE HIER en revue, dans les cours du palais des Tui-
leries, divers corps de la garde impériale et d'autres troupes de la garnison de Paris (8-II-1813). De la misma manera se encuentra en las noticias que verdadera-
mente son del día, como en la de un corresponsal de Var-
sovia datada el 19-XII-1812, impresa en el periódico del
1-II-1813 y que dice: Le duc de Bassano EST PARTI CE MATIN d'ici pour se rendre à Berlin; il A PASSE cinq jours dans cette ville ..., ya que todas estas noticias, que en sí pueden ser también consideradas como relato, se encuentran en este lugar como noticias del día y pertenecen, por hallarse en periódico, a la esfera del pasado más reciente. Se trata, pues, de una prolongación del lapso de veinticuatro horas, pero de prolongación que cae dentro de la idea de diario." (p.328)

1.2.2 Weinrich, concediendo que given the normal difficulties of communications at that time no paper could be truly up to the minute and could at best present yesterday's events as today's news, is quite prepared to give the newspapers an inch on the matter of the 24-hour rule but complains that they took, in turn, a very substantial mile. However, I contend that this attitude reveals a fundamental misunderstanding of the situation he is discussing.

1.3 Put in its simplest form, Weinrich's objection is that you can not say yesterday if you do not mean "the day before today"; in this form, the objection is incontrovertible. Hence he sees no justification for hier referring to "two days before today" and, consequently, no justification for the Passé Composé. An interesting question, which Weinrich unfortunately does not raise, is how the press was able or allowed to perpetrate such an apparent travesty of the language: the answer surely is that there was in fact no travesty at all. Rather, the problem is falsely posed and the discussion conducted in terms which are, therefore, essentially irrelevant.
1.3.1 For the objection to have any validity, it would be necessary to presuppose something about how "today" is defined or specified and also something about the uttering of the information in question. In Weinrich's case, the first presupposition is that "today" is defined by reference to the reader of the newspaper and specified by the date carried by that edition of the paper. On this basis, any use by the newspaper of the term "today" - and its counterparts "yesterday" and "tomorrow" - is determined by these coordinates, the one "existential" and the other "documentary", so to speak. The second presupposition is that the utterer of the information is the newspaper, with the reader filling the rôle of allocuté. Thus, when the paper "says" the term "today", the reader understands the term to refer to the newspaper's act of uttering; in other words, the point of speech is defined with the newspaper as allocuteur. However, as Weinrich tells us, a particular information (or article) carries its own date at its head, along with the by-line (stated or implied) of an individual correspondent who has a (stated or implied) geographical location. Therefore these indications entail that it is in fact the correspondent who plays the rôle of allocuteur, the allocuté being still the reader (or, possibly, the newspaper editor, who then retails the item). This is because, where such indications are carried, they assume precedence over those carried by the paper itself and the language
used makes this manifest. In such a case the newspaper is without a rôle in the allocutionary situation: at best it can be considered as the medium of communication, comparable to the air on which an oral communication is carried.

1.3.2 As Weinrich's examples show, these indicators are reiterated in the language of the reporter by his use of deictic expressions, both temporal and locational - hier, ici, cette ville, ce matin - along with the use of the Passé Composé. It is unnecessary thereafter for the utterer to use the form je: it has already been postulated by the linguistic behaviour just referred to. In other words, reordering the expression employed earlier, "Qui dit ici et maintenant dit je". This being the case, Weinrich's objection vis-à-vis of the 24-hour rule does not stand, since the person now identified as the speaker has indeed respected the rule.

1.4 The most important fact about the fallacy of Weinrich's position is that it stems from the inadmissibility of his presuppositions. In the first of these, the time is defined in relation to the reader and specified by the date of the paper. However, to be a reader is to be tu, not je: readers do not utter information, they receive it. "Qui dit je dit ici et maintenant" can not be transposed to "Qui est tu dit ici et maintenant", precisely because it is the act of uttering which is crucial. Now while by the interversion of rôles
tu becomes je in his turn, at every moment he is marked as one or the other and only as je does he have the privilege of positing the context. Weinrich's second presupposition, concerning the newspaper as utterer, is inadmissible for the reasons already given.

1.4.1 Je is the privileged pole of the allocutionary axis, and it is simply inexact to claim for the reader/listener that is tu any mode of positing the context of utterance. While this notion is perhaps a mere corollary of that concerning je, it has implications that seem nonetheless to have gone generally unnoticed.

1.5 Further inspection of Weinrich's position makes this clear. His objection to the linguistic formulae that occur is that they do not orient themselves around the date of the edition in which they appear. What he fails to realise is that the dates to which he alludes in such detail are quite extraneous to the basic discussion. They are in no sense determinants of linguistic time as it is represented in the utterance: on the contrary, they merely permit Weinrich himself, speaking this time as je (i.e. positing himself as sujet), to correlate in a chronological sense the occasions on which some other person spoke as je to Weinrich's tu.

1.5.1 Some explanation is in order. Weinrich, when confronted in, let us say, 1964 by the text of the Warsaw reportage
quoted earlier, finds himself in a position indistinguishable from that of a reader of 1813 facing the same text, in that the date of the reading is in either case irrelevant to the time expressed in the utterance that forms the reportage and therefore irrelevant also to the tenses used in the expression of that time. All of this derives simply from the fact that Weinrich and his nineteenth-century counterpart are, as readers, marked as tu and thus must align themselves with the convention whereby any speaker is presumed and empowered to assert, "My now is the only now with meaning in my present uttering". To the tu of that uttering, the chronological specification of that now is without intrinsic interest during the uttering. To judge of the coincidence of dates, as Weinrich does, is to make himself the je and his now the crux of the discussion: while to do so can be perfectly valid, it must be noted that it constitutes an entirely different activity, as a consequence of the total abandonment of the now of the je that was.

* * * * * * * * *

2.0 Linguistically speaking, there can never be more than one je and thus never more than one now: as tu, I must abandon my now in favour of the speaker's, as we have seen Benveniste explain. This is axiomatic and will hold true in all
circumstances, however unusual or paradoxical they seem. Let us consider such a seemingly paradoxical case, (5).

(5) *I'm standing on the corner and this man comes up.*

Here we have a *je* and a Present tense, with the consequent implication of a *now*. The sentence is almost ordinary in its form and seems to offer nothing unusual with respect to the rôle of the *tu* of the allocution. However, we may observe that this sentence can be uttered quite readily by a *je* situated in the centre of a field or ocean. Pragmatically speaking, it is quite clear that the *now* (or the *here and now*) could not, in such a case, be that of the allocution itself. One would seem, therefore, to be faced with a collision of two different specifications of *now*. I shall claim that there is no collision and that there are merely two separate specifications of *now*.

2.1 Let us note, first of all, that no collision occurs if the sentence in question is preceded by an utterance by *je* along the lines of "Let us imagine that ...". In such a case, (5) is marked as not relating to the context of utterance and therefore its Present tense is no longer seen as the "présent axial du discours". The syntax here makes clear that (5) constitutes not an utterance but part of one and that, as the object of a higher S, it is subordinated to the very part which marks the utterance as allocution. From the point of view of allocution, the particular syntactic form of (5) is
insignificantly different from a simple NP such as *an apple*. On the other hand, where no such preceding utterance occurs in the form of a higher S, the syntactic form of (5) will support a reading of the string as an utterance on the part of *je*.

2.2 An analysis undertaken in these terms straddles the boundary between *code* and *convention* in language, between the *langue* on the one hand and on the other its use in the community in the form of *instances* *du discours*. In discussing the form of (5), as well as its relations with a putative higher S, we are dealing with the syntax of the forms as *sentences* of the *langue*, a point of view which excludes consideration of *je/tu* as elements of the analysis. Conversely, on speaking of *je/tu*, we carry the analysis into the area of *discours* and relate it to the act of allocution itself. But this is not in any sense to say that we have thus restricted the analysis to the limits of a particular *instance* *du discours*, nor that the data of the string viewed as a *sentence* have become irrelevant to the analysis. On the contrary, it is on the basis of observing the characteristics of the *sentence* that we construct our analysis of the *conventions* that govern the utterance as part of *discours* or, as I prefer to call it, *langage*.

2.2.1 Our example illustrates this point. If (5) is regarded syntactically as the object of a higher S, it can not
itself count as a complete utterance and thus can neither betoken an act of allocution by je nor be considered to refer to or to arise from the allocutionary situation of which je is a part. It follows that it can not specify that allocutionary situation, even by its use of deictic categories, since that function is performed by the higher S alone. On the other hand, if (5) is regarded as having no higher S, then it has the form of a sentence sanctioned by the langue. It can therefore count as a complete utterance betokening an explicit allocution by je and both referring to and arising from the allocutionary situation of which je is a part. Tu shares with je the context of utterance presupposed in any allocution, so that (5) - considered as an allocution by je - must be taken as positing both je and tu and their common context of utterance.

2.2.2 Now in such a case, where tu is unable pragmatically to relate the form of the allocution to that context, he can conclude only that the act of allocution itself constitutes a false or invalid declaration or else that (5) does not count as a complete allocution. This is to say that the allocution is to be characterised on the basis of the data proffered in the utterance. There is no evidence to suggest that, of the two characterisations indicated here, the conventionally likely one is that of the false declaration. Indeed, it is only with the strongest motivation that tu will ever conclude
that je is in error or lying in his allocution and I know of no syntactic grounds on which such a conclusion might ever be based. At the same time, there is ample motivation for describing a sentence as an incomplete utterance, namely by appealing to the notion of a deleted higher S.

2.2.3 If tu takes (5) as counting as an incomplete utterance, he will, by convention, presuppose the deleted S to have posited that the proposition following it, here (5), does not refer to or arise from the allocutionary situation of which je/tu are part. Given this, tu will then simply accede, according to the principles already discussed, to the specification of now as made by je in his utterance, (5). This now is not the now of the deleted S but a separate now, linked to the other only by, initially, the common feature je and, subsequently, by tu when he has acceded to the new postulation. This is to suggest quite simply that the now of (5) is subordinated to the now of the deleted S in exactly the same way that (5) is subordinated to the deleted S syntactically.

2.3 The general principle embodied in my argument from the deleted S may be stated as follows: the now of a subordinate clause does not mark the allocution of which the clause is a syntactic element. It is a principle with a very precise range of application and does not apply indiscriminately to all subordinate clauses, since not all clauses specify a now.
In (6), for example, it is impossible to perceive now:

(6) They might claim his lying was a bar to rehabilitation. Here nothing indicates any now, let alone the now of the act of allocution. Indeed, such sentences do not allow us to specify even the point of reference, since the underlined clause could refer equally well to a future event, a past one or perhaps even to a present. This is because clauses such as that are merely one transformational possibility of a deep structure that might optionally undergo a different transformation so as to yield, for example, (7):

(7) They might claim his lying to be a bar to rehabilitation. The question of a now cannot even arise here, since the finite form of the verb has disappeared and with it all possibility of tense-reference. In French, a similar situation obtains, with the subjunctive expressing the atemporality of the same type of clause, as in (8):

(8) On pourrait avancer que ses mensonges soient un obstacle à toute possibilité de réadaptation.

2.3.1 The only type of clause to which the above principle applies is that in which one or more elements of the allocutionary situation occur, since it is only on the basis of such an occurrence that one is even entitled to talk of personne and subjectivité, the concepts that underlie the whole notion of allocution. The elements themselves are je/tu, the deictic categories marking ici and the categories that mark
maintenant. If one restricts one's attention to maintenant, as is my aim here, then the categories are: deictics and verbs in tense-form, the particular tense being the Present, "temps axial du discours".

2.3.2 Using the principle I have introduced, I shall proceed to discuss the Present tense, specifically the form most often referred to as the Historic Present, - which Benveniste regards as merely "un artifice de style" (1966a, p.245) - to show that this tense presents serious difficulties for the position taken by Benveniste and Weinrich.

2.3.2.1 First of all, it should be noted that the term itself, "Historic" Present, is one whose use is most often subject to considerable ambiguity, an ambiguity which rarely receives the attention it warrants, with the result that the term is in many contexts a misnomer. For Benveniste, "historique" means "past": "L'énonciation historique, aujourd'hui réservée à la langue écrite, caractérise le récit des événements passés" (1966a, p.238). [second emphasis mine] Now, while it is quite true that writers often make use of the Historic Present to refer to events in the past, it does not follow that "pastness" is the distinctive feature of such use. Indeed, it may be that such a view is abusive of the real nature of the tense. I submit instead that the use of the Present in reference to past events is merely one application
of the principle stated earlier, inasmuch as the now of the Present tense is posited as being other than that of the speaker's allocution. Any stipulation that the reference is to specifically past events must depend on other factors such as specified dates, for example, of which tu is informed by some utterance other than the clause or sentence in which the Present tense is introduced. Clearly, in an occurrence of the Historic Present, it is not the mere use of the tense which indicates pastness of events but rather the use of spatio-temporal coordinates: the occurrence of the tense will itself indicate no more than some other now.

2.4 Rejecting the idea of the Historic Present as the marker of past events, we may consider it as being "historic" simply in the sense of belonging to narration, as opposed to discours/comentario. Taken in this sense, an occurrence of the tense constitutes a device marking the activity being engaged in by the speaker, giving rise to another, less common designation of the tense as Narrative Present. If we adopt this point of view, then we assume that the Historic (=narrative) Present belongs to the other of the tense-groups postulated by Benveniste and Weinrich, viz. récit/narración.

2.4.1 However, to do so is to neglect the salient fact that there is no such thing as the Historic Present tense. There is only the Present tense and what we are discussing is not a
tense but a use of a tense-form. The difference is crucial: the Present as a tense is postulated as belonging to the tenses which mark discours; to posit at the same time that it functions as a marker of narrative is systematically impossible.

2.4.2 The conflict presented here is not resolved by invoking, as Weinrich does, a term like "temporal metaphor" to explain such systematically anomalous occurrences of the Present. The use of the term, affectively powerful though it be, is more suited to a stylistic evaluation of such occurrences than to an explanation of the mechanism that brings them about. If these occurrences are to be regarded as the output of a mechanism, rather than mere anomalies, then they are to be explained as rule-governed behaviour. The rule in question must explain how a tense-form whose use by a speaker counts as a particular device may come to count as a different device and under what circumstances this may happen.

2.4.3 The rule I propose is an application of the principle formulated in the discussion of (5) and is stated informally as follows: where an occurrence of a Present tense marks a now other than the now of the allocution, that occurrence counts as a device marking the activity of narration. The rule depends, clearly, on the knowledge on the part of tu that the events referred to are non-present and on the convention discussed earlier whereby this knowledge is conveyed
either by non-syntactic means (coordinates) or syntactically (by deletion of a higher S). It is thus not a rule of grammar but a rule of grammar-in-use and therefore of language. The convention on which it depends is likewise a device functioning within the speech-community rather than as part of the model that is the langue. Such conventions are established among the members of the speech-community and are the basis of what the sociologist calls "members' practices" or "interpretive procedures", held to be necessary "for making surface structures (the interaction scene) coherent or soci­ally meaningful" (Cicourel, 1973, p.77).

2.5 In arguing that the Narrative Present, as I shall refer to it henceforth, is a rule-governed phenomenon, I have sought to show that, even as a device betokening narration, it is properly understandable only in its relation to the allocution of which it is a part. Furthermore, I have made the implicit claim that this particular narrative device is regulated by the concepts of personne and subjectivité, by the very fact that it is part of allocution. This is an important claim, in that it stands in contradistinction to the position adopted by Benveniste and Weinrich with regard to the matter of récit/narración.

2.5.1 These authors' view of the narrative tenses excludes both the use of je/tu and the context of allocution. Benveniste
is firm on this:

"Il faut et il suffit que l'auteur reste fidèle à son propos d'historien et qu'il proscrive tout ce qui est étranger au récit des événements (discours, réflexions, comparaisons). A vrai dire, il n'y a même plus alors de narrateur." (1966a, p.241)

Weinrich (pp.306-8) takes the same stance. For both of them, there is no person to adopt the rôle of je, as Benveniste makes it unequivocally clear:

"Personne ne parle ici; les événements semblent se raconter eux-mêmes. Le temps fondamental est l'aoriste, qui est le temps de l'événement hors de la personne d'un narrateur." (1966a, p.241) [emphasis mine]

One might say that it is left merely as a pragmatic fact that an utterer must exist for the words to be delivered. The same idea is expressed by Weinrich's concept of relajación, which may here be taken to mean something akin to "non-involvement" in the narration. That is to say, as I understand it, that the narrator takes no "personal" responsibility for the events recounted, given the distance at which the events stand in relation to him personally. Hence the only responsibility he may take is, presumably, for the stylistic features of the recounting. Hence, also, the non-occurrence of je in the text of the narration.

2.5.2 The occurrence of je in (5) must appear to be a disruption of or a departure from this theory, since it specifically indicates a person, in the rôle of je, with consequent implication of the context of allocution. Furthermore, it
implies some degree or kind of responsibility, on the part of that person, for what is specifically a narration.

* * * * * * * *

3.0 It is tempting to consider (5) a counter-example to the arguments of Benveniste and Weinrich. However, such is not the case. What (5) does is reveal the weakness of their claim, namely a misplaced emphasis. Both authors, each in his own way, obviously regard as crucial their assigning of the Present tense to the discours/comentario group, while neglecting to relate the activity of narrating to the persons of the allocution. This emphasis leads them to fail even to consider the occurrence of je with the Narrative Present and thus to fail to account for it. They are drawn to this position largely by the nature of their data: drawing as they do on essentially literary data, they undertake the discussion of the narrative tenses but see them in their literary perspective. Thus Weinrich, for example, in his discussion of the Narrative Present (pp.161-4), is more concerned with the dramatic or stylistic effects of its use within a narrative mode than with an investigation of the implications from the point of view of either grammar or allocution. 8 They both leave the impression that narrating is the work of authors.

3.1 The following examples illustrate the point that it is
possible for narrating to occur in any situation, even those wholly lacking literary character or overtones. (9) is the text taken from a humorous drawing in a newspaper (depicting two wistful middle-management types unwinding over a cocktail and of whom one is speaking thus reminiscently): 

(9) It wasn't perfect but I'll take 1968 any day. Your Dow's pushing a thousand, the ad game is printing money, I haven't met my first wife ..."

Here the three underlined sentences constitute narration: in the first two, the device is the use of the Narrative Present and in the third it is the use of the Present Perfect. This latter tense, while belonging to the discours/comentario group, finds its justification here in the prior use of the Present which provides the point of reference for the Perfect. In addition, reference is made to the je/tu of the allocution. In these ways, the sentences are comparable to (5). On the other hand, they differ in that they count as narrative on the basis of the occurrence, in the preceding sentence, of the temporal coordinate 1968 rather than on the principle of a higher S. (10) is an example encountered in a radio broadcast. It consists of an allocutionary situation where the utterance of the speaker meets with incomprehension on the part of the hearer: this provokes an explanatory utterance by the speaker and a repetition of the original utterance:

(10) Interviewer: And all that's been reversed now.
Interviewee: (indicates incomprehension)
Interviewer: I'm sorry: I'm now back in 1970. All that's been reversed now.
Here as in (5) is an instance of a grammatical sentence that can count as an utterance. Its point of reference is ostensibly indicated as the moment of speech, through the use of the Present Perfect, but taken this way the utterance makes no sense to the tu of the allocution. Only by specifying the intended reference of the deictic now can the speaker validate his utterance for the hearer, who thus understands there is a device denoting narration, namely the Narrative Present.

3.2. The failure of the speaker's utterance to achieve the intended effect is the direct result of the speaker's failure to appreciate fully the rules that govern the situation when it becomes his turn to speak: on assuming the rôle of je, it was his now that was presupposed by the rules. On that particular occasion, however, he had the intention of carrying on in the spirit of the previous je (now the hearer), who had been narrating. Being unmarked in the utterance, this intention was imperceptible to the hearer who therefore took the occurrence of the Present Perfect at face value, as marking an instance of discours in the form this time of a declarative act. The fact that tu indicated incomprehension shows he assumes neither that the speaker is lying nor that there is a higher S (cf. 2.2.2) but rather that he is faced with an invalid declaration.
3.2.1 This assumption on the part of tu is wholly in accordance with the rules, while the utterance by je is not. In any allocutionary situation, tu is obliged to abide by the rules in his interpretation of utterances and must presuppose always that je will do likewise. In this sense, tu is at the mercy of je, so to speak, so that any unorthodoxy or irregularity in the verbal behaviour of je in uttering may result in the impossibility for tu of knowing what the utterance counts as, at least in the intention of je. Tu, having only the rules to help him, is always vulnerable in the sense that he may be readily misled. In the case of (10), two special factors render him particularly vulnerable: the utterance is in the third person (the non-personne of Benveniste) and the social setting of the allocution predisposes the participants towards discours rather than narrating. With regard to the first of these, third person is indeterminate with respect to the discours/récit contrast, so that tu is obliged to depend upon the form of the verb and the presence of the deictic to determine what device is being used. With regard to the second, it is worth noting that the speaker's explanatory utterance uses the je-pronoun, marking discours, and thus reinforces the hearer's predisposition in that direction.

3.3 The focus of this discussion has been on the occurrence of the Narrative Present and the use of the je/tu forms or, in the case of (10), their omission. In both cases, as in
(5), not only is the context non-literary but it is also clearly conversational. Nevertheless, narrating can and does occur within this context. None of the examples presented by Benveniste makes clear that this can happen and Weinrich, while he does discuss the idea (p. 331-336), does so in such a way as to beg the question almost completely. 10

3.3.1 Both authors regard the relationship of discours and récit as a polar opposition, with emphasis on the activity of narrating. That is to say, they accord to narrating a kind of primacy in their scheme of things: we have already seen (cf. 1.0) that Weinrich posits the contrast in terms of narration vs. non-narration, while the overwhelming majority of Benveniste's examples illustrate the idea of récit.

3.4 It is clear that once a fundamental, polar opposition has been set up between discours and récit it is possible to find a reflection of this scheme in the resources of the language and, thus, to achieve a certain elegance in the theory, with each pole having a corresponding set of tenses, deictics and rules. The question arises, however, whether this binary elegance constitutes a confirmation of the underlying theoretical position or whether it is basically misleading. If the latter is the case, as I contend, then the underlying position can not stand as stated, not even when restricted to French.
3.5 In this analysis of the Narrative Present, I have sought to show that an adequate explanation of the device must account for the fact that a narrative occurs with "je" and the fact that the Present occurs as a narrative form and I have proposed a way to do this. At the same time, I have tried to show that narrating is an integral part of non-literary allocution and must be recognised as such. A scheme which puts discours and récit in polar opposition is not fitted to recognise this fact and all the more so if it emphasises récit. While it would be difficult to deny that there are the two activities, discours and récit, it is to be noted that neither Benveniste nor Weinrich speaks of any other activity that might stand under the heading of allocution. No mention is made of promising, denying, etc., only narrating and whatever is not narrating. Yet it is difficult to see how narrating might be defined other than as uttering with a particular illocutionary force and thus on an equal footing with these other activities. \(11\) If we take this to be the case, then narrating is to be seen as one of the kinds of work that may be engaged in within the framework of the allocutionary situation, i.e. one of the options to the work - discours - which, within that framework, is entirely predictable or normal. The two are still seen as being in contrast, with the difference that récit is clearly the marked member of a relationship that is no longer polar but multiple.
This is to say that discourse includes récit, as well as other activities, and has primacy in the scheme of things, so that we then have a basic emphasis placed on the allocutionary situation and its components. The misplaced emphasis which I claimed Benveniste and Weinrich had made is thus rectified.

3.5.1 Once the hypothesis is modified in this way, the previous difficulties no longer arise. It becomes possible also to revise our view of the rôle of the tenses, since, by abandoning the polar relationship, we are no longer bound by the two-group theory of the tenses.

* * * * * * * * *

4.0 Adopting as a point of principle that in a given allocution the speaker is engaged in a particular activity, we say that his utterance carries a particular illocutionary force. The circumstances under which this force may be said to occur, Austin's "happiness conditions", are stated by Austin, developed at length by Searle (1969) and need not be gone into here. Of more pertinent interest is Austin's notion of the "securing of uptake", i.e. the speaker's "bringing about the understanding of the meaning and of the illocutionary force" of the utterance (p.116), and the means of achieving it. This raises the question of how je marks for tu what the utterance is to count as: Austin concentrates on the
performative verb as the most explicit grammatical device available to _je_.

4.1 Austin's remarks, which concern English specifically, apply equally well to French. French grammar, on the other hand, has been viewed as offering yet another explicit device in the form of its tense-system, one which marks the special illocutionary force of narration: this is the claim that underlies the position taken by Benveniste and Weinrich. It is necessary to re-examine this claim, briefly, to determine clearly how the tense-system is expressive of illocutionary force in French. I have argued that the Present tense may mark narration and that narration, therefore, may co-occur with _je_: this runs counter to the position of Benveniste and Weinrich. However, their proposal also includes a claim concerning the Passé Simple: against this, I argue only that it is defective on one point, namely alleged incompatibility with _je_. Not only does this follow from my previous argument but also from the fact that their proposal can not explain or justify usage as found in many literary examples. To maintain the narrative force of the Passé Simple and at the same time sanction its occurrence with _je_ will allow an explanation of just such data.

4.1.1 The point is established with little difficulty. In Maupassant's short story, _Auprès d'un mort_, 12 occurs the
following extract:

"Alors mon compagnon, ayant pris l'autre bougie, se pencha. Puis il me toucha le bras sans dire un mot. Je suivis son regard, et j'aperçus à terre, sous le fauteuil à côté du lit, tout blanc sur le sombre tapis, ouvert comme pour mordre, le râteau de Schopenhauer.

Le travail de la décomposition, desserrant les mâchoires, l'avait fait jaillir de la bouche.

J'ai eu vraiment peur, ce jour-là, monsieur."

Here the Passé Simple occurs with _je_ and this fact alone contradicts the claim that the two are incompatible in any categorical sense. Nevertheless, the importance of the quotation lies in the underlined sentence, in which _je_ co-occurs with the Passé Composé to mark _discours_, thereby allowing us to note that narration has ceased. This offers clear evidence that the illocutionary force of the Passé Simple derives quite simply from its alternation with the Passé Composé in the specific environment of _je_. This simple distributional statement is overlooked completely in any attempt to stress the peculiar compatibility of the Passé Simple and _il_; such attempts must therefore be considered irrelevant from an explanatory point of view or looked upon as nothing more than observations of a purely statistical order.

4.2 The foregoing example establishes that consideration of the question of the marking of narration in French must proceed from the premise of its relatedness to _je_ and thus to the allocutionary situation and lends support to my earlier
contention on this point in connection with the Narrative Present (cf. 2.5.2). Other examples illustrate the principle in a different but equally important way. Turning again to Maupassant (p.112), we find the following extract:

"Voici ce que contenait ce cahier.

Jusqu'à l'âge de trente-deux ans, je vécus tranquille, sans amour. La vie m'apparaissait très simple, très bonne et très facile. J'étais riche. J'avais du goût pour tant de choses que je ne pouvais éprouver de passion pour rien. C'est bon de vivre! Je me réveillais heureux, chaque jour, pour faire des choses qui me plaisaient, et je me couchais satisfait, avec l'espérance paisible du lendemain et de l'avenir sans souci.

J'avais eu quelques maîtresses sans avoir jamais senti mon cœur affolé par le désir ou mon âme meurtrie d'amour après la possession. C'est bon de vivre ainsi. C'est meilleur d'aimer mais terrible. Encore, ceux qui aiment comme tout le monde doivent-ils éprouver un ardent bonheur, moindre que le mien peut-être, car l'amour est venu me trouver d'une incroyable manière."

4.2.1 In this example, the Passé Composé does not occur until the last clause and not in conjunction with je. The Passé Simple does occur, with je, early in the passage: alternating with the Imperfect, it marks narration. As in the previous example, the narration is stopped but this time by the sentence I have underlined and which contains the Present. Je does not occur in the sentence but is directly implied, along with the allocutionary situation, on the principle that qui dit maintenant dit je. The occurrence of such a sentence clearly marks a switch to discours and the fact that one is in the presence of a speaker, a personne, not of an author. The
same phenomenon occurs in the second paragraph: in this case the work of narrating has ceased completely after the first sentence, a fact which is established both by the repeated use of the Present and the use of the Passé Composé, which contrasts in its function (earlier described as événementiel) with the Passé Simple of the first paragraph, the événementiel of the narrative mode.  

* * * * * * * * *

5.0 In the preceding discussion, I have proposed that the use of particular tense-forms does mark the illocutionary force of utterances if due account is taken of the allocutionary situation. I have argued, however, that this is possible only if we reject the contention that Passé Simple and je are incompatible in their occurrence and my examples were chosen to show that, in fact, they do co-occur. Now, one objection to this line of argument might be that this is using data that are not valid: I would simply deny such a claim. Nevertheless, while using all available data to make my point concerning the total resources of the language, I should not wish to deny that occurrences of Passé Simple + je are rare, even atypical. On the other hand, I should observe that the more cogent point surely is that the Passé Simple itself is rare in modern French: where it occurs, it may occur with je but where it does not occur, then the question of how to account
for illocutionary force still remains. That is to say, what happens to my distributional claim concerning the contrast between Passé Simple and Passé Composé in the specific environment of *je*, if we assume the disappearance of one term of the contrast?

5.1 Let us note first of all that the disappearance of the Passé Simple from conventional speech in French does not imply the loss of the illocutionary force associated with the form. It implies only that the marking of that force must be done by other means. The function of the Passé Simple - événementiel or aoriste as Benveniste has it - has been assumed, in spoken French, by the Passé Composé. Benveniste describes the result in this way:

"Mais quand j'ai fait, forme composée, devient l' "aoriste du discours", il prend la fonction de forme simple, de sorte que j'ai fait se trouve être tantôt parfait, temps composé, tantôt aoriste, temps simple." (1966a, p. 249)

What he does not describe is the problem of how to differentiate between the two functions in a given occurrence of the form.

5.1.1 Weinrich's position is close to mine in terms of the problem itself, which he poses as follows:

"Le Passé Simple étant conçu comme temps du récit, s'il disparaît de la langue parlée, il rest à savoir comment l'on raconte aujourd'hui." (1973, p. 301)

On the other hand, his response to the problem does not stem from the idea that the Passé Composé has assumed a double
function: for him, the rôle of the Passé Simple is filled by two tenses, Passé Composé and Present. Of these, he claims, it is more often the Present which is substituted, leaving for the Passé Composé an occasional use in what he terms fragmentary narration. 14

5.1.2 To the best of my understanding, based on the examples he discusses, what Weinrich means here is that the Narrative Present occurs in lieu of the Passé Simple. This is perfectly in keeping with his notion of the tense-groups inasmuch as both of these tenses are regarded as "tiempos de nivel cero" in their respective groups, i.e. neither retrospective nor prospective, so that the Present is suitable as a substitute whereas the Passé Composé, a retrospective form in its group, is not.

5.1.3 The problem with this proposal is that it overlooks the question of the "aoriste" character of the Passé Simple as Benveniste sees it, and as I see it, and therefore does not and can not explain how the "pastness" of the Passé Simple can be marked by the Present, even in a narrative use. As I have argued previously, the Narrative Present is timeless. To say then that the narrative function of the defunct Passé Simple is supplied by the Present changes nothing: one can only agree. But to explain the means of expressing the "pastness", one must surely agree with Benveniste that it is
supplied by the Passé Composé. Thus the crucial question is still how to distinguish between the two functions of the Passé Composé, between the two illocutionary forces of a single form. 15
NOTES

1. Although nowhere does Weinrich say so, this idea of the "character" of the two activities, commentary and narration, and the way he presents it are in the last analysis close to Benveniste's concepts of subjectivité and personne: they have an underlying notion of involvement ("actitud tensa") or non-involvement ("actitud relajada") with the "mundo" in question. However, to go from this notion of "character" to the linguistic markers of such character is a long step and one which Weinrich does not take. He remains content to rely on the highly-imaged language of the "actitudes". His position on this allows him to proceed to the definition of the métafora temporal, whereby he accounts in his terms for the occurrence in both of his groups of the Imperfect and Pluperfect. Here again, though, the explanation depends fully on the prior membership of these tenses in the narrative group.

2. cf. p.234

3. Such sentences as this and their implications have been studied by some Generative Semanticists under a general heading of "worlds" and "world-creating sentences". The main thrust of such studies, however, has been on the question of anaphoric reference "between worlds", rather than on temporal questions such as I am discussing.

4. See also Weinrich (p.163) for examples from literature, e.g. ponite ante oculos, etc.

5. Weinrich (p.76) does not share this view. In some respects, his position is similar to that which I have adopted here, though it stops short of what I wish to propose.

6. I suggest that a rule such as proposed here, which seems to me to belong to the category of "interpretive procedures" of which Cicourel speaks, might be characterised as the counterpart in langage of the transformation in grammar. Though I have not seen it thus defined, it seems plausible to consider a transformation to be a filter through which a deep structure must pass to attain what might be termed a conventionally sanctioned formal apparatus (optional or obligatory) for expressing the components of the deep structure. As conventions change in the speech-community, so will
the sanctioning of forms, giving rise - at least in part - to so-called diachronic change, with implications as to which transformations may apply or which ones will change with regard to optionality, etc. In the same way, rules of language will change as the conventions on which they depend are altered or replaced. A good example of this will be seen when the Passé Composé is discussed.

7. cf. the como of a poem, as discussed by Goethe and Schiller (see Weinrich, p.101). The idea of responsibility is appealed to by Weinrich also (p.127, p.145), though without elaboration. (On this, cf. also Ebeling (1973), pp.168 ff.)

8. It is not entirely true or entirely fair to say that Weinrich does not consider the narrator to be a person: his concept of relajación is intended to refer to the state of mind and spirit of the narrator as well as to that of the hearer (cf. pp.76-81). However, he does not follow through with this principle in the more properly linguistic aspects of the discussion.

9. (9) is from the August 17, 1974 edition of the Vancouver Sun (Vancouver, B.C.), p.46. (10) was broadcast from CBU-AM, Vancouver, B.C., March 14, 1975.

10. He says that the Present can be, in oral recounting, a narrative tense but "bajo determinadas circunstancias" (p.333). Thus he appeals, as I do, to the notion of a rule-governed phenomenon but he then specifies the circumstances as being those of the "sistema metafórico temporal", meaning "la presencia, ante todo, de un contexto que no deja lugar a dudas de que el presente no hace de tiempo de comentario".

Two things emerge from this: first of all, he begs the question by saying in effect that the Present is identified as narrative whenever it can not be identified as non-narrative, while failing to suggest any means, rule governed or other, of establishing the identification. Context is mentioned in only a vague way and is apparently presumed to be unmistakable. For my part, I have tried to show that the concept of a higher S offers a linguistic motivation for the Narrative Present.

The second thing to emerge is that here is one of the rare occasions when Weinrich clearly reverses the direction of his thinking inasmuch as he here takes comentario as his starting point rather than narración. Thus, if only temporarily, he corrects the misplaced emphasis of which I speak.
11. The question of récit as seen from the point of view of illocutionary force is still an open one and its dimensions are too great to permit a treatment in this study. It seems clear, though, that even an initial attempt to study it will reveal how complex are the terms récit and discours. Récit, for example, though essentially constative or descriptive, seems related to at least some of the members of the class that Austin calls expositives. Discours, on the other hand, seems to include most if not all of Austin's classes, on the grounds that they may all be expressed by explicit performative verbs. The two terms are in fact so global in nature that to posit a polar relationship between them is a simplistic construct.


13. The allocutionary situation is referred to also by the Voici of the first sentence. Such items as voici fall into the category of markers of discours to be discussed shortly.

14. This is, necessarily, a very simplified version of Weinrich's position, especially his 1973 position, which is a much expanded version. At the same time, it is not a distortion: in the 1973 version, his extra attention is directed to a class of adverbs - principally puis and alors - which he classifies as being, in oral French, "les adverbes de la consécution narrative" and whose function is "jeter un pont entre les diverses formes 'isolantes' du Passé Composé (p.308). He goes so far as to attribute to the occurrence of these forms with the Passé Composé the status of what he calls a virtual "temps synthétique". However, as so often, he accompanies his claim with a disclaimer, to the effect that he would not wish this to be taken as a generalisation and elsewhere (p.307) points out that the theoretical basis for what he is about to discuss - the relationship of adverbs to tense shifts - is lacking.

Thus, while my characterisation of his findings is not fully representative, it omits from its scope only that part of his work that is pure speculation.

15. Weinrich's unwillingness to attribute a dual function to the Passé Composé stems directly from his claim that the Passé Simple is not a tense at all. His conclusion that the empty slot in the temporal system is taken over by the Present and the Passé Composé is largely a statistical one and is nowhere cogently argued from the basis of a theoretical model. There are good grounds for claiming
that this non-Aorist view of the Passé Simple is the weakest part of his whole position: it prevents him from coming to grips with the question of the Passé Composé in modern oral French, with the result that most of his Chapter X (1968) deals with the Passé Simple and the Passé Composé from only an historical point of view.
CHAPTER FIVE

Time and Tense: III

0. I propose in this chapter to pursue the question of the two functions of the Passé Composé. My efforts in this are motivated by an inability to accept a mere distinction between styles - the oral/written contrast - as the basis for an analysis of the tenses of French, since it stems from principles which are, to say the least, suspect. To posit that narration, with its formal devices, is privileged to occur in the written language is implicitly to deny that it occurs in the spoken language, as well as encouraging the postulation that it does not occur with _je_. Such entailments, as I have shown, are not only counter-intuitive but also contrary to fact. Therefore schemes such as discours/récit or comentario/narración are to be regarded overall as theoretical constructs of a certain, essentially historical, validity. Nevertheless, they do offer for my purposes an appropriate procedure for investigation arising out of their underlying premise of a distinction between illocutionary forces and the devices offered by the language to mark that distinction, in the case of the Passé Composé in particular.
While Benveniste does not discuss how this distinction is to be made, it is nevertheless to him that we must look for the basis of an answer. I submit that his concept of subjectivité gives us this basis, in the form of items whose function is to be sui-référentiel (1966a, p.263) and of which he says,

"Le langage propose en quelque sorte des formes 'vides' que chaque locuteur en exercice de discours s'attribue et qu'il rapporte à sa 'personne', définissant en même temps lui-même comme je et un partenaire comme tu. L'instance de discours est ainsi constitutive de toutes les coordonnées qui définissent le sujet ....".

Ricoeur (1973) takes this idea further, linking it to the notion of illocutionary force:

"C'est en effet le propre de l'instance de discours, à la différence des unités de langue, de désigner son propre locuteur. Elle le fait par la vertu des indicateurs de subjectivité que la grammaire distingue des noms d'objets (choses ou actions) et qu'elle réserve à l'expression des actes réflexifs par lesquels le sujet se désigne lui-même en disant quelque chose sur quelque chose. Il nous est donc possible d'affirmer que ce même caractère sui-référentiel du discours fait accéder l'intention du locuteur, en même temps que la force du discours, dans le champ de communicabilité ouvert par le sens et la référence. De cette façon le locuteur se communique - ou communique quelque chose de lui-même - en communiquant le sens, la référence et la force de son discours." (pp.43-44)

Later in the same work, he leaves no doubt as to the importance of this notion to a theory of performance:

"C'est ce point d'implication du locuteur dans son discours qui me paraît faire partie d'une théorie du discours comme tel. Le discours est auto-implicatif. Toutes les langues que nous connaissons sont ainsi faites qu'elles contiennent des éléments d'auto-implication. Je les ai appelés ... des marques de l'auto-implication. Elles seront grammaticales, elles seront lexicales, il y a mille
1.0 These elements exist in language in addition to the tense-system of the verb: we have already discussed some of them in the form of the temporal adverbs and adverb phrases as well as the more pragmatic category of the spatio-temporal coordinates. ¹  Ricoeur speaks of "mille variétés"; for my part, I propose that the whole class of such elements may be subdivided into at least two distinct groups: those, like the types just mentioned, which, referring to and reaffirming the spatio-temporal aspects of the allocutionary situation, are constrained in their use by the tense of the verb above all and those which are not thus constrained. Benveniste puts the distinction this way: "Outre les formes qu'elle commande, l'énonciation donne les conditions nécessaires aux grandes fonctions syntaxiques" (1970, p.15), citing in the second group interrogation, intimation, even assertion and the particles oui and non. Each of these is characterised as implying "un rapport vivant et immédiat de l'énonciateur à l'autre dans une référence nécessaire au temps de l'énonciation". [my emphasis] About the first group, he points out that "ainsi l'énonciation est directement responsable de certains classes de signes qu'elle promeut littéralement à l'existence". These are forms occurring within the sentence and subject to the
grammar of the sentence. The second group, on the other hand, is composed of units which are themselves sentences, their internal construction being secondary to their **sentential function** and each one characterised as a different type of allocutionary act or event.

1.1 The first group, the set of forms, offers the means of **explicit** sui-reference or auto-implication. It also offers the means of distinguishing between the illocutionary forces of a single form, on the principle that these forces will be marked by a varying degree of sui-referentiality. Todorov (1970b, p.8) speaks of "le discours pauvre en indications sur son énonciation [qui] s'oppose à celui qui s'y réfère constamment", noting that "Benveniste les a étudiés sous le nom d'histoire et de discours". Such a principle clearly underlies this first group and needs no justification or further illustration. However, it must be pointed out that in its mode of application the principle does not offer a consistently adequate means of distinguishing illocutionary force. There is frequently an intermingling of tenses with apparently unsuitable markers: Weinrich discusses this in particular reference to the identification of genres, especially the case of the résumé (1973, p.265), with examples such as "Elle écrit une lettre qu'elle lui demande de ne lire que LE LENDEMAIN, puis se met au lit". The use of the narrative marker, in upper case, with the Present which marks **discours** is an
explicit contravention of the principle. What this means is that the resources of the language satisfy the principle in a systematic sense but language data do not always respect it. However the obverse of the case discussed by Weinrich does not occur and it remains true that the forms of the first group, when they occur, constitute explicit instances of sui-referentiality.

1.2 The second group, the "grandes fonctions syntaxiques", does not present a problem of this sort. This is because the elements of this group are unconstrained by the occurrence of tense-forms in their environment, since they are not subject to sentence-grammar in their relations with their environment. These context-free forms can not occur except as part of the allocution: this means that when an utterance can be characterised as, for example, one of the types that Benveniste has in mind then it necessarily constitutes a reference, this time implicit, to the allocutionary situation. It also means, of course, that the illocutionary force of an utterance is a marker of the allocutionary situation. 3

* * * * * * * * * *

2.0 This general notion has been taken up by grammarians in recent times in a first attempt on their part to recognise and take into account the performance aspects of some of the
data. Ross (1970) proposes that

"declarative sentences ... must also be analysed as being implicit performatives, and must be derived from deep structures containing an explicitly represented performatice main verb". (p.223).

Thus the sentence Prices slumped, with the following phrase-marker,

```
S
  NP
  prices
  VP
  V
  slumped
```

must be represented as having in deep structure a higher $S$ of which the original example sentence now figures as the object, as shown here:
This Ross calls the performative analysis (p.224): it consists of making syntactically explicit the main verb, which later has to be deleted along with all but the one NP so as to produce the surface form.

2.1 As a parallel to this, he also offers what he calls the pragmatic analysis, in which

"it would have to be assumed not only that there was a verb of saying and an NP you 'in the air' but also that the you functioned as the indirect object of this verb .... Furthermore, the I that is 'in the air' would have to function as the subject of this verb.... Thus the elements that would have to assumed to be 'in the air' under the pragmatic analysis do not merely form an unstructured set. Rather, they must be assumed to be hierarchically grouped to form a structure which is exactly the same as that of a normal clause in deep structure." (p.255)

At this point, with his notion of hierarchical grouping, Ross's thinking takes the direction already explored by Benveniste under the heading of énonciation. 4

2.1.1 It is important to note that one of the difficulties Ross sees with such a putative theory arises from the structures he places on the theory. He argues this way:

"A precise theory [of language use] would have to specify formally what features of the infinite set of possible contexts can be of linguistic relevance. Furthermore, these features would have to be described with the same primes which are used for the description of syntactic elements, so that the rules which range over syntactic elements will also range over them."(p.257) [my emphasis]

In other words, he insists that the theory be a syntactically oriented theory "with the same primes" as the standard theory
of grammar. He tries to crystallise the issue in a discussion of sentences beginning with the phrase *As for myself*, e.g. *As for myself, I grant you your freedom*. He sees this example as ungrammatical with the difficulty residing in the prefatory phrase: how to generate the form "myself"? Setting aside the fact that I do not find the sentence ungrammatical, I contend that his question is irrelevant and unanswerable. Furthermore, it is unanswerable because it is irrelevant, and that because the sentence is simply not a sentence in terms of the standard grammar. The example consists in fact of two sentences, in these terms, and thus one need not ask Ross's question since it is predicated on the existence of a single sentence.

2.2 Phrases of the type *As for myself*, especially — though not exclusively — in presentential position, are usually classified as adverbs and receive a number of designations such as Sentence Adverbials, Connectives, Intersentential Connectives, Presentential Adverbs, with the function of modifying the following sentence. Now what has never been explained grammatically is just how such "adverbials" can be fitted into a syntactic framework such that they can indeed modify the sentence. This is another way of saying that the terms imply a unit which is composed of the adverbial plus the sentence, thus allowing a syntagmatic relationship between them. Standard grammar does not propose such a unit and so
notions like "connective", as used here, are of course beyond the limits of the grammar.

2.2.1 Semantically, these phrases are relatively transparent. They indicate the way in which the sentence is to be taken. In the case of As for myself, a restriction is placed on the intended range of reference of the sentence. Similar cases are those of Personally, For my part, As far as I am concerned, etc. I shall return to this type of presentential, which I call Group 1. A different type, Group 2, involves the use of an ostensible adverb, such as Scientifically, Politically, Actuarially, Semantically, etc., to indicate the intended context of reference. This type makes a specifically lexical restriction. A third type, Group 3, is Possibly, Probably, and, a recent innovation in North American English above all, Hopefully: these serve to indicate an attitude towards the sentence.

2.2.2 A cursory inspection of this last type makes clear why I have claimed that these phrases are really sentences (cf. 2.1.2). Each of them signifies, at least by equivalence, a higher S. Thus Possibly = It is possible that ..., Probably = It is probable that ..., Hopefully = It is to be hoped that ... . Into this sentence pattern can be embedded the proposition in question: thus Hopefully, p = It is to be hoped that p. The result is a single complex sentence, of a type
sanctioned by the grammar and which frequently occurs. I used above the expression "by equivalence": a more precise statement would be that the use of the phrase has the force of an actual higher S. However, even this does not explain how, syntactically, the higher S is transformed to the form of a phrase. Furthermore, even the suggested procedure of embedding is innappropriate to explain, syntactically, the relation of the sentence (= p) to some putative form of higher S from which a phrase of the first or second type might be derived: what for example would be the higher S with which to equate As for myself? Without precise formulation of the higher S, a syntactic explanation is just impossible.

2.2.3 At the same time, that is not to say that no higher S can be postulated for such phrases: it is merely to say, quite precisely, that we have no way to derive these phrases syntactically from the higher S. 5 Now the important point here is that, even if we can formulate the higher S, we still have the problem of derivation, namely how to transform a sentence into an adverbial modifier. In reality, this is a non-problem, arising from the practice of applying axioms where they do not belong: the axioms of a theory of language are inappropriate to a theory of language use.

2.3 The phrases under discussion are properly to be treated as performance items and as such to be classified as devices
marking illocutionary force. In this light, I propose that it is axiomatic that elements ranking syntactically in the category of higher S will or may be replaced by elements that in utterance rank as devices.

2.3.1 Perret (1971) discusses the granting of the floor in public meetings. She notes that in addition to the explicit form of granting, consisting of the performative *Je donne la parole à ...*, the act may also be implied by other linguistic forms such as "Tu as la parole" or even "Le camarade à l'imper *[sic] blanc!*". About these non-explicit forms she says:

"Le caractère implicite de l'énoncé entendu est en outre pour lui [i.e. tu] une confirmation que l'acte supposé est le bon: si le locuteur s'exprime de façon implicite, c'est qu'il effectue bien l'acte auquel il sait que l'allocutaire s'attend." (p. 49)

Given the appropriate conditions, namely those associated with the explicit speech act - its "happiness conditions" - it is axiomatic that the act may be performed by other, implicit forms of utterance. Without such an axiom, not only would the act not be realised but also it is doubtful if any successful communication would take place at all.

2.3.2 For example, requesting the floor is often accomplished by a question such as "Tu permets?". Taken alone, its meaning as a string would be inappropriate: taken in conjunction with the axiom, as well as with the social rôle of the speaker in the circumstances, it counts as the accomplishing of what
Perret calls "un acte caractéristique". We must note that it is not simply the context that permits this kind of phenomenon: it is the axiom which, in the context, is responsible. Were it only the context, then one ought to be able to assert that virtually any form of utterance would suffice, e.g. a question of the form "Est-ce le bon moment?". Clearly, such an utterance - if intended as a request for the floor - would fail.

2.4 The kinds of implicit speech act that Perret discusses are devices appropriate to a highly structured type of situational context, strongly constrained by sociological and even anthropological factors. They constitute a set of members' practices and enjoy, within their context, an established currency. Naturally, they are of a very special type inasmuch as they are designed to govern actual behaviour and thus have a perlocutionary force also. Nevertheless, being linguistic in character, they serve to show the axiom of substitution at work and illustrate clearly that the axiom is not predicated on any kind of standard, grammatical, syntactic derivation but rather on the concept of preservation of a speech act's illocutionary force by means of conventionally sanctioned forms of utterance operable in a given situation.

In this case, a highly localised situation readily permits us to state the explicit form of utterance for which substitution is made and thus the precise force that is to be preserved, since the explicit utterance is here a performative.
3.0 In contrast with the items just discussed, the presentential phrases are to be viewed as devices of a highly generalised kind, unconstrained by localised situational factors. They are, in a non-trivial sense, clichés of language use. The consequent banality attributed to them must not, however, mask the fact that they have generally remained an enigma from the point of view of linguistic analysis. Concerning them, I have claimed that they are devices and as such the output of the application of an axiom. I have also asserted the impossibility of explaining syntactically the derivation of the phrase from the higher $S$, even when the higher $S$ can be stated, while claiming at the same time that the force of the higher $S$ is preserved in the substitution. The problem arises of how to substantiate this claim.

3.1 It is a vexed question, which belongs to the general area of the study of illocutionary forces but deals with an aspect of the area that has never received much attention. As a rule, most studies concern themselves with the illocutionary force of grammatically complete sentences. Austin himself was concerned also with other types of utterance but in the special sense that each was to be identified with an underlying specific performative in a sentence framework (1965, p. 61). I shall apply this same approach to the question of the presentential phrases but, first of all, it is necessary to look at the strong criticism levelled at it by Benveniste (1966a).
3.1.1 At issue is Austin's claim that "même le mot 'chien' à lui seul peut parfois ... tenir lieu de performatif explicite et formel: on effectue par ce petit mot le même acte que par l'énoncé 'je vous avertis que le chien va vous attaquer' ou bien par 'Messieurs les étrangers sont avertis qu'il existe par ici un chien méchant'". Benveniste takes the position that this is not so and that Austin is working under a certain misapprehension. His comment is well taken:

"L'écriteau est un simple signal: à vous d'en tirer la conclusion que vous voudrez quant à votre comportement. Seule la formule 'je vous avertis que ...' (supposé produite par l'autorité) est performative d'avertissement. Il ne faut pas prendre l'implication extra-linguistique comme équivalent de l'accomplissement linguistique; ces espèces relèvent de deux catégories entièrement différentes. Dans le signal, c'est nous qui suppléons la fonction d'avertissement." (p.275) [cf. note 7, this chapter]

The extralinguistic implications of a notice or sign are thus a matter of pragmatics, of knowledge of the world rather than of the language. The linguistic item in the sign is merely a linguistic gesture, whose interpretation involves questions of semiotics rather than linguistics. The fact of being able to attribute to a given utterance a particular illocutionary force does not justify the claim that the same utterance in any way presupposes linguistically a performative verb.

3.1.2 Benveniste's criticism of Austin's confusion on this point is telling. At the same time, it must not be allowed to detract from the underlying value of Austin's intuition, for if we leave aside the purely pragmatic aspects, this intuition
is essentially correct. I mean by this that there are certain utterances whose interpretation depends entirely on knowledge of the language and is unconstrained by the pragmatics of the allocutionary situation. The presentential phrases are of this kind. Applied to them, a modified version of Austin's claim would have it that they presuppose linguistically a performative verb. If it can be demonstrated that such is the case, then that will constitute a substantiation of my claim that the force of the higher $S$ is preserved by the substitution of a presentential phrase.

3.1.3 The main principle underlying this claim is not disputed by Benveniste: with regard to sentences of the type $M. X$ est nommé ministre plénipotentiaire, he says,

"... il faut reconnaître comme authentiques et admettre comme performatifs les énoncés qui le sont de manière in-apparente, parce qu'ils ne sont qu'implicitement mis au compte de l'autorité habilitée à les produire". (p.272)

Such sentences, with the illocutionary force of a decree are to be understood to imply a performative verb: thus Benveniste tacitly agrees with the principle of deletion and recoverability of the performative. However, here again the deletion concerns the complete performative higher $S$, with no substitution as such involved. Only in his analysis of a special alternative form does his discussion of performatives touch on any kind of substitution:

"Ou encore le prononcé du dictum est rapporté impersonnellement et à la troisième personne: Il est décidé que ... —
Le Président de la République décrète que ... . Le change­ment consiste en une simple transposition. L'énoncé à la troisième personne peut toujours être reconverti en une première personne et reprendre sa forme typique."
(p.272)

Clearly, he agrees with the notion of substitution: at the same time, the explanation he offers is merely a transforma­tional derivation, of the type I have mentioned in the case of presentential Hopefully, ... (cf. 2.2.2) and which, I suggested, was inadequate to explain instances of the first group of presententials or the second. His explanation is thus of very limited use here.

3.1.4 Indeed there is serious doubt as to whether my analysis of Hopefully, ... is itself of real value to an hypothesis based on the principle of a performative higher S and which therefore concerns itself with speech acts. An analysis that states Hopefully, ... = It is to be hoped that... is wholly uninformative with regard to the act that the higher S consti­tutes, unless we simply regard it as a constative act. In that case, the argument for a performative fails, since the performative and the constative acts are in contrast. But in that case also the corollary would be that Hopefully, ... has constative force, an argument that is at least counter-intu­itive.

3.2 I stated earlier that the presententials indicate the way in which the sentence is to be taken. Maintaining this
point of view, it is possible to state that **Hopefully, ...** is an expression of hope with reference to the proposition in the following sentence, e.g.-(11):

(11) **Hopefully, it will not rain tomorrow.**

As this example makes clear, there is in the following sentence no form which can stand as the subject of any form of the verb *hope* so as to form a syntactically transparent expression of hope. The subject lies elsewhere and, as all speakers of the language realise, that subject is - in some sense - the speaker of the utterance. I use the expression "in some sense" because I do not imply that there is an underlying sentence of the form **I hope that ...**, which would of course be constative. I mean to imply merely that the expression of hope originates with the speaker specifically and that in this sense the proposition **it will not rain tomorrow** is placed in relation to its own allocution. As a result, it is now possible to see that Group 1 of the presententials (As for myself, ..., etc.) and Group 3 (Hopefully, ..., etc.) share a characteristic that is not overt in the latter, namely that they both constitute a reference to the speaker.

3.2.1 As for the force of the speaker's utterance, two possible analyses suggest themselves. First, an underlying performative of the form **I say hopefully ...**, which would be a declarative act supporting the conclusion that **Hopefully,... = I say hopefully ...**. This analysis raises two problems.
In the first place, it postulates that Hopefully, ... has declarative force and, secondly, it postulates that at the semantic level the speaker is the subject of hope. On the merit side, it is a very simple and convenient analysis. The other possible analysis involves a double embedding and makes use of the sentence discussed earlier, It is to be hoped that.... It takes the following form:

(12) I assert that it is to be hoped that it will not rain tomorrow.

In this case it follows that Hopefully, ... = I assert that it is to be hoped that .... Although the grammatical subject of hope is not specified in this analysis, there are good grounds for claiming that the assertive force of the utterance causes it to be understood that the subject is not restricted to je but includes at least tu. Some indication that this is true can be seen in the fact that (11) seems to translate better into French as (14) rather than (13):

(13) J'espère qu'il ne va pas pleuvoir demain.

(14) Il faut espérer qu'il ne va pas pleuvoir demain.

3.3 The basic difference between these two analyses of (11) concerns the particular lexicalisation of the performative: in the one case, the form posited is declarative and in the other it is assertive. This constitutes at present one of the major difficulties in the analysis of performatives, as well as of such items as presentential phrases: there seems to be
as yet no clearly established method of distinguishing between the various possible forces, except in those cases where the surface form contains an explicit performative, such as promise, etc., and which have been those on which most analysts have so far concentrated their attention. It is particularly clear in the other groups of the presententials that to lexicalise the underlying performative is the core problem. 11

3.3.1 It is possible, nevertheless, to give those groups an analysis which satisfies my purpose here. Group 2 consists of items which, even superficially, may contain an extra element which clarifies things somewhat. In the case of Politically, ..., for example, it is understood that a verbal form such as speaking has been deleted and that this is always an optional transformation. Thus, Politically, ... = Politically speaking, ... . Normally, this is followed directly by a proposition, e.g. (15)

(15) Politically (speaking), it would be unwise.

If the presentential phrase is reordered, thus Speaking politically, ..., an interesting fact emerges, namely that the grammar requires now a main verb and an expressed grammatical subject. Transforming (15) in this way, we find (16) in which the logical subject inferred in (15) is now specified:

(16) Speaking politically, I ... it would be unwise.

The omission in (16) indicates the place of the main verb, which in this case would be a performative of one type or
another, e.g. contend, submit, observe, conclude, etc. Here again, the precise lexical form is open to question, depending largely on the "happiness conditions" that apply to each act and the possibility of identifying these in the context of the allocution. Leaving aside this question, it is still possible to state that, thanks to the implication of *je*, Group 2 of the presententials, like Group 1 and Group 3, is sui-referential.

3.4. Thus all three groups mark or refer to their own allocution. The same thing is true of yet a fourth group, the commonest of all yet least often discussed and perhaps least understood. This Group 4 comprises However, Nevertheless (or Nonetheless), Moreover, Yet, Still, Notwithstanding, But, etc., as well as phrases such as On the other hand, At the same and that previously cited in (4) (Ch.2: 2.2.1), For all that. Group 4 is different in that its members seem for the most part to offer no sign at all of syntactic relation to their environment and do not by their form suggest membership in any grammatical class. They have no "meaning" as lexical units and receive in the dictionary only an indication of how and where they occur, accompanied in some instances by an indication of the history of the form in question. But, by implication at least, they are all shown to have special illocutionary force. 12
3.4.1 The observation that Group 4 is perhaps least understood needs qualification, since experience shows that the items of the group are adequately understood by speakers. Rather, it is the grammarian who has difficulty placing them as components of a linguistic model. Austin (p. 75) calls them "particles", according them a certain standing as a class, but specifies that they are "connective particles" and, as such, "a special verbal device". They do not form a grammatical class, however, since they connect not sentences but utterances specifically. Thus an instance such as Moreover, p, occurring in isolation, has no validity. This is true regardless of how well-formed p may be, e.g. (17):

(17) Moreover, the Romans were not cowardly men.

Here the proposition the Romans were not cowardly men is both grammatical and semantically transparent as a sentence but as an utterance taken in isolation, it must be set aside as being unsuccessful. It is a case in which there can be no "securing of uptake" on the part of tu, since the conditions for a successful use of moreover - as for the other items of Group 4 - have not been met and the utterance must be discounted. As a "connective", moreover requires a preceding utterance as a point of reference: thus, in the context of a preceding utterance (p_1), moreover and its congener validate as an utterance any grammatical sentence (p_2). Such a context - or utterance-configuration - is essential and thus part of the
"happiness conditions" for the use of items from Group 4. 14

3.4.2 I have said (3.4) that these items have no "meaning" as lexical units. At the same time, I do not wish to suggest that they are therefore devoid of meaning in some sense, nor that they have only a functional or structural meaning. It is not the case, for example, that moreover is equivalent to for all that: each is somehow "understood" differently. The difference lies in their illocutionary meaning or force. Like the other presententials, they indicated how an utterance is to be taken: the question is what these different ways are.

3.4.3 When Austin (p.73) speaks of "the force of the locution", he refers by "locution" to a given utterance of which he says its force is such that it might be specified by an explicit performative verb. Returning to the case of Moreover, p (uttered under appropriate conditions), "locution" is taken to refer to p: p is said to have a certain force. However, since p may take the form of a simple proposition - as in a successful use of (17) - it would be difficult to say that p had of itself a force other than that of statement, i.e. with a putative higher S in the form of I say, just as any other declarative utterance. It is doubtful, however, that this would account satisfactorily for the illocutionary meaning of p in (17), where a more likely higher S would be I add, as exemplified in (18) and (19):
(18) (to \( p_1 \)) I add \( p_2 \)

(19) To that, I add that the Romans were not cowardly men.

3.4.4 Now it is unusual, though clearly not impossible, to find speakers formulating utterances like (19): it is more usual to find (17). It is common also to find utterances like (20):

(20) Nevertheless, I insist that you are wrong.

In this case, as in (19), the performative is both explicit and different from the "universal" I say. In (21), the explicit performative is lacking, while in (22) the presentential form is lacking:

(21) Nevertheless, you are wrong.

(22) I insist you are wrong.

However, both (21) and (22) are endowed with the same force. I wish to claim that in (21) there is no putative higher S which is merely "in the air" but rather a deleted higher S in the form of an explicit performative verb and that its deletion is formally marked by the presence of nevertheless: in other words, an item like nevertheless is the "relic" of a deleted higher S. That is to say that it denotes a speech act, even though it does not constitute one in the sense that the explicit performative verb is said to do so.

3.5 Such a claim presents an inherent difficulty, that of stating the explicit performative form which is deleted. It
is the same difficulty encountered earlier, that of specifying the particular \textit{lexicalisation} of the deleted form (cf. note 11). In the discussion of (20)-(22), I specified the form \textit{I insist}, thus implying that it is the form peculiarly associated with an occurrence of \textit{nevertheless}. However, it would be difficult to sustain this in the face of examples like (23):

(23) \textit{Nevertheless, I find for the defendant.}

For this reason, my claim (3.4.4) deserves to be modified to read "... in the form of \textit{some} explicit performative verb", so as not to exclude examples like (23). This weakened claim remains adequate for my present purposes and its range of operation will correspond typically to the following distribution:

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{l|l}
\textbf{Presentential} & \textbf{Explicit Performative} \\
\hline
Yet & \textit{I insist} that \textit{p} \\
Still & \textit{I claim} that \textit{p} \\
Notwithstanding & \textit{I submit} that \textit{p} \\
Nevertheless & \textit{I maintain} \\
\hline
However & \textit{I contrast} \textit{p} \\
For all that & \textit{I add} that \textit{p} \\
At the same time & \textit{I assert} that \textit{p} \\
On the other hand & \textit{I conclude} \textit{p} \\
But & \textit{I conclude} \textit{p} \\
Yet & \textit{I conclude} \textit{p} \\
\hline
Moreover & \textit{I conclude} \textit{p} \\
Furthermore & \textit{I conclude} \textit{p} \\
In addition & \textit{I conclude} \textit{p} \\
Besides & \textit{I conclude} \textit{p} \\
\end{tabular}
\end{center}
It is to be understood according to this distribution that where a presentential occurs without an explicit performative verb, e.g. (21), the verbs listed here will typically furnish the deleted form. Where the performative does co-occur with the presentential, it will constitute either a non-deletion, e.g. (20), or a substitution, e.g. (23) 15

3.5.1 In summary, to "understand" an occurrence of a presentential of this group is to infer or recover the appropriate lexicalisation of the deleted performative. This is done by convention, as indicated, and when done in the context of an appropriate utterance-configuration brings about the "securing of uptake" whereby the hearer knows what the utterance counts as. The important thing to bear in mind is that, however the utterance counts, it does so here in relation specifically to a preceding utterance. Thus the speech-act - formally deleted or not - constitutes an intervention by the speaker in his own text. It therefore marks both the person of the speaker and the allocation and, since the formal marking is done, textually, by the presentential, we can say that Group 4, like the other three groups, is sui-referential.

* * * * * * * * * *

4.0 My purpose in examining the four groups of presententials was to show, through an analysis focusing on the function
of such items, that they all refer to their own allocution. Seen from this point of view of their function within an utterance-configuration, they form a link between syntax and rhetoric and, as such, are to be considered as devices ranking with the other devices discussed in this study. Thus they form an important extension of the "aspect indiciel du langage".

4.1 Their crucial importance, as markers of an illocutionary force expressible by some explicit performative verb, is that regardless of the context in which they occur they always and necessarily mark _je_ and _discours_. Invulnerable to interference from juxtaposed markers of any other "work", their occurrence within even a context of _récit_, for example, counts as _commentary_. The comparison may be drawn with the use of stage-directions in a play (the "sophisticated device", as Austin puts it (p.74)): they are the utterances of _je_ - here the author - and consist of instructions concerning his text, which itself constitutes _récit_ and into which _je_ otherwise rarely intrudes. 16

4.2 "Boule de Suif" (Maupassant, 1957) provides an example of this phenomenon. In this story of some 60 pages, tenses used above all are those of narration, Imperfect and Passé Simple. The first seven pages are entirely narrative but quite suddenly there occurs a series of interventions by _je_.

Initially these are commentaries of an apostrophic type during which the narration is simply suspended, e.g. (24).

(24) "Et la témérité n'est plus un défaut des bourgeois de Rouen, comme au temps des défenses héroïques où s'illustra leur cité." (p.8)

In (25), the narration is merely interrupted briefly:

(25) On se disait enfin, raison suprême tirée de l'urbanité française, qu'il demeurait bien permis d'être poli.... (p.9)

No device is evident in (25) to indicate je other than the force of the apposition itself, comparable to Austin's class of verdictives (cf. also Ch.6: 2.3.3).

4.2.1 Thereafter, the instances of sui-referentiality consist of presententials: du reste, cependant, cependant (p.9); car, donc (p.10); cependant (p.11); cependant (p.20); cependant (p.33); néanmoins (p.41); mais (p.42)\(^1\); cependant, cependant (p.47); mais (49). One observes two facts: first, these occurrences are infrequent overall and, second, that they occur occasionally in clusters, e.g. pp.9-11, 40-42. The force, given the frequency of cependant, is mainly contrastive and the occurrences constitute a sort of punctuation by je concerning the orientation of his narrative at particular and presumably important points. In all cases, the verb-form of the following proposition, being of the narrative group as defined by Weinrich, serves to emphasise the brevity of the commentary but at the same time to set it into relief as an incursion by je. Thus, in spite of the predominance of the
narrative forms, it is not possible to say that here "il n’y a ... plus alors de narrateur" (Benveniste, 1966a, p.241): more appropriate is Todorov’s formulation of a "discours pauvre en indications sur son énonciation". 18

4.3 I have dwelt at some length on the presententials as markers of illocutionary force and thus of subjectivité, which I claimed at the outset was the basis of a distinction between the functions of an ambivalent Passé Composé. It is appropriate now to return to a direct inspection of the Passé Composé, considering it from this point of view of illocutionary force. The question of this tense is comparable to that discussed earlier in relation to the Narrative Present, where it became clear that the principle of "Qui dit je dit ici et maintenant" did not apply since another now was involved. In the case of a co-occurrence of je + Passé Composé, this principle will also normally apply but where the form of the Passé Composé is in fact a substitution for the Passé Simple in the specific environment of je (cf. Ch.4: 4.1.1), then the principle will not apply since, here again, a different time-reference is involved, namely then instead of now. 19

4.3.1 Benveniste uses the term événementiel (or aoriste) to characterise this type of occurrence of je + Passé Composé (i.e. < Passé Simple) but contrasts it merely with the term Parfait (or accompli) by which he refers to je + Passé Composé
(i.e. Passe Simple), implying at the same time that the form still performs its original function of marking discours. However, as we have also seen, he calls the Passe Simple as well "le temps de l'événement" (whence "événementiel"): thus he has transferred this terminology to the Passe Composé where it occurs with the particular force of récit. He does not offer a corresponding term to denote the force of the Passe Composé in its continuing rôle as a marker of discours. I propose the term actuel for this force, so that we may speak of a contrast between événementiel/actuel.

4.3.2 It is important to mark this contrast precisely, as it corresponds to another contrast, concerning je from the point of view of subjectivité. Where je occurs with an instance of the Passe Composé événementiel (< Passe Simple), i.e. stripped of its customary subjectivité, the question arises as to what becomes then of the personne of je, since je no longer relates to ici-maintenant but to là-alors. I propose for this situation the term of je-personnage to contrast with je-personne of the actuel. The precise reference of this contrast is to the time-distinction (maintenant/alors) and, where appropriate, the spatial distinction (ici/là). Here again, there is a parallel to be drawn with the Present and Narrative Present: the Present (actuel) co-occurs with je-personne and the Narrative Present (événementiel) with je-personnage.
4.4 The personne/personnage contrast that I propose is neither gratuitous nor motivated merely by the need to distinguish the forces of the two uses of a given tense. Rather, the need to distinguish these forces is itself motivated by the existence of the contrast in question, which antedates the disappearance of the Passé Simple in French. To illustrate this, I shall refer to the Maupassant extract quoted earlier (Ch.4: 4.1.1) and which, for convenience, I reproduce here:

"Alors mon compagnon, ayant pris l'autre bougie, se pencha. Puis il me toucha le bras sans dire un mot. Je suivis son regard, et j'aperçus à terre, sous le fauteuil à côté du lit, tout blanc sur le sombre tapis, ouvert comme pour mordre, le ratelier de Schopenhauer.

Le travail de la décomposition, desserrant les mâchoires, l'avait fait jaillir de la bouche.

J'ai eu vraiment peur, ce jour-là, monsieur." (my emphasis)

In this extract, the événementiel is rendered by the Passé Simple forms and the actuel by the Passé Composé in the underlined sentence. In the utterance with the actuel, je denotes the utterer, as a personne of the allocutionary situation, whereas the événementiel does not denote the allocutionary situation and je is thus seen as a personnage standing in relation to the events recounted. Here, clearly, the formal difference of the tense-forms renders explicit the distinction between je-personne and je-personnage.

* * * * * * * * *
5.0 The loss in modern French of the formal distinction between the événementiel and the actuel, brought about by the disappearance to all intents and purposes of the Passé Simple does not entail the loss of the personne/personnage contrast: it merely means that marking of the contrast must be sought elsewhere. That is to say, clearly, that in the absence of such formal distinctions, one must have recourse to an analysis of collocational factors to determine the force of an occurrence of the Passé Composé. These collocational factors are what has already been discussed as "l'aspect indiciel du langage", including now the presententials. The Passé Composé as a form is now like the Present, ambivalent though not necessarily ambiguous as an occurrence. This ambivalence and the resulting ambivalence of the form "je" (as opposed to je, the person of allocution) heighten the importance of the spatio-temporal coordinates and the forms that mark them (cf. Ch.6: 3.0). They, rather than merely the tenses, become the indicators of the time-reference of an utterance and thus of whether a particular occurrence of the Passé Composé is événementiel or actuel.

5.1 Two important consequences stem from this fact. In the first place, the rigid division of tenses into two groups as proposed by Benveniste and Weinrich respectively has become, if not invalidated entirely, at least overtaken by events. As I have sought to show, both the Present and the
LEAF 156 OMITTED IN PAGE NUMBERING.
Passé Composé have become ambivalent forms and thus the schemes that these authors have formulated are to be regarded as dislocated, with respect to the tenses that mark *discours/comentario*, and defective, with respect to the group marking *récit/narración*, since this group's fundamental tense - Passé Simple - is no longer available. In the second place, the importance of time-reference as a means of combating the ambivalence of the tenses coincides with the model proposed by Reichenbach, in which the tenses are postulated as a system of time-reference. While it is true that Reichenbach does not mention concepts such as *subjectivité* and *personne*, there is evidence to suggest they are not be regarded as unrelated to his proposal. On p.289, he comments on a quotation from Keats, as follows:

"'Much have I travelled in the realms of gold,
And many goodly states and kingdoms seen;
Round many western islands have I been
Which bards in fealty to Apollo hold.'

[...] we notice that here obviously the past events are seen, not from a reference point situated also in the past, but from a point of reference which coincides with the point of speech. This is the reason that the words of Keats are not of a narrative type but affect us with the immediacy of a direct report to the reader." [my emphasis]

Although he does not develop this aspect of the question, since it is not his theme, the inference is clearly that the time-reference alters the force of the utterance. We conclude from his comments that for him the *je* of the Keats extract is a *personne*, not a *personnage*.
5.2 The ambivalence of the Passé Composé is different in a significant way from that of the Present. In the case of the Present, the distinction to be made is between discours and récit as the activity of the speaker in a given instance: in this respect, it is paralleled by the case of the Passé Composé. However, the ambivalence of the latter is placed by Benveniste squarely in the domain of discours and by Weinrich in that of "la langue parlée", as we have seen, as the result of the loss of the Passé Simple. The two phases of the historical change they have in mind might thus be exemplified as in (26) and (27):

(26) J'ai connu beaucoup de pays. Je fus d'abord en Espagne pendant la guerre et puis je passai la frontière pour chercher l'asile en France ....

(27) J'ai connu beaucoup de pays. J'ai été d'abord en Espagne pendant la guerre et puis j'ai passé la frontière pour chercher l'asile en France ....

In (26) the contrast between Passé Composé and Passé Simple marks the distinction between discours and récit. The Passé Composé here is, in Benveniste's terms, the Parfait du discours: the je of j'ai connu is the personne, the others being je-personnage. After the loss of the Passé Simple in the spoken language, the resultant version of (26) would be (27), in which only the presence of spatio-temporal coordinates (underlined) permits the recognition of the forms of the récit and in which j'ai connu is now ambiguous as to the contrast personne/personnage.
5.2.1 At the same time, both authors still regard the literary language as essentially unaffected by the historical change, so that for them their respective groupings of the tenses still hold good. As a result they have not taken into account the fact that in those instances where even the written language abandons the Passé Simple - such as *L'Etranger* - the oral/written distinction is lost and the tense-system follows the model of the oral language, as exemplified in (27).

5.3 The change which has overtaken the language in this regard is, in terms of the spoken language, diachronically vast and should not be allowed to cloud the issue when synchronic factors are under consideration. Likewise, considerations based on a sociolinguistic factor such as the oral/written contrast must be set aside when that factor is sociolinguistically no longer dominant. This does not mean the principles evinced by Benveniste and Weinrich are wholly irrelevant from a synchronic point of view. It does mean that the set of markers that they postulate in connexion with those principles has needed to be reanalysed in the light of current data.

5.4 I have tried to show that this is the case by discussing the weaknesses of the theories of Benveniste and Weinrich and attempting to show where a different emphasis must
be placed. By focusing on the ambivalence of the Present and
the Passé Composé, within the specific environment of je, I
have emphasised the importance of the spatio-temporal co-or-
dinates and their markers as the means of disambiguating the
tense-forms where necessary. This disambiguation in the case
of the Passé Composé aims at identifying occurrences of the
tense as being événementiel ( < Passé Simple) or actuel
( ≠ Passé Simple), thereby allowing je to be classed, in the
event, as personne - where Passé Composé is ( ≠ Passé Simple) -
or personnage - where Passé Composé is ( < Passé Simple).
Appealing to the notion of force, I have proposed an addition
to the "aspect indiciel du langage", in the form of the pre-
sententials. These devices, based on the syntactic notion of
the higher S, permit a greater specification of the degree of
sui-referentiality of an utterance, as envisaged in the over-
all study of allocution.

5.5 In the next chapter, I shall apply my findings in an
analysis of the allocutionary factors to be found in L'Étran-
ger. At the same time, I shall present and develop the fin-
dings of other scholars whose work, by its relevance to mine,
seems to strengthen both my proposals and my conclusions.
NOTES

1. There is on this question of pragmatics a marked contrast between the attitude of the linguist and that of the philosopher and the sociologist or sociolinguist. The linguist, generally, is mistrustful of the notion, regarding it as an area not susceptible to proof by demonstration. However, it seems to me that this attitude is not entirely well-founded. Certain facts about language, especially language in use, are not amenable to a standard syntactic analysis: one, mentioned by Benveniste with a different intention, is the negative particle "non". No syntactic analysis can account for this item for, as Benveniste points out, it is not the same thing as ne ... pas, which is certainly syntactic: instead, as he puts it (1970, p.16), "la particule assertive non, substitut d'une proposition, se classe comme la particule oui, dont elle partage le statut, dans les formes qui relèvent de l'énunciation". A different example is a certain type of reflexive of great frequency in French, e.g. La porte se ferme: it is pointless looking for a satisfactory syntactic analysis of such a sentence. Syntactically, it is of the same class as Je me lave, for example, but is clearly a different type nonetheless because, if taken as the same type, it is simply nonsense, while Je me lave is not.

The use of such forms is merely an example of "members' practices within a speech-community, one whereby a semantically invalid syntactic formula is sanctioned to carry, consistently, a different and specific semantic load. The pragmatic impossibility of La porte se ferme has created a semantically empty slot within the resources of the langue and this slot has been given a conventionalised semantic load permitting the continued use of the form within the established syntactic norms. This convention is, in my terms, a rule of langage, as is the use of non and oui, although unlike these it does not arise from the énonciation itself.

These are facts about our use of language and as such are given: they do not really require explanations and most especially not the usual characterisation of them as "avoidance of the Passive". They derive more from common sense with respect to language use and it is for this reason that to reject them is ill-advised.

2. Unlike Benveniste, however, he states that this contrast
"ne compare pas des qualités pures mais des prédominances quantitatives". This is an important qualification because, as Weinrich points out, the statistical data that would permit a more absolute statement do not yet exist and the subtleties of usage are such that the sampling process assumes enormous proportions (1973, Ch. 9.2). In such a case, one is forced regrettably to have recourse to the notion of a tendency, namely that the utterance with the force of discours will tend to be more explicitly sui-referential.

3. This remark is an extrapolation from what Benveniste says, since he does not discuss "force" as such, of course. It is left to Todorov to link the notion of force with the field of énonciation (1970b, p.5). Nevertheless, Benveniste is singularly perceptive about certain aspects of the question of force even when, as we shall see (3.1.1), he seems to be speaking only about performatives. In the present instance, what he means by "les grandes fonctions syntaxiques" is only minimally different from what Austin means by "force".

4. Ross himself does not pursue this further but he does state that to do so would entail the elaboration of "an extended theory of language or a related theory of language use" which would exclude his own "use of colorful terms like 'in the air'" (p.257). He even raises but does not attempt to answer the question of "whether the theory of language can be distinguished from a theory of language use" (p.258).

5. I must stress at this point that this conclusion does not apply at all to the discussion of the higher S in relation to the Narrative Present. In that case, it will be recalled, a deletion of the higher S was specified, leaving the object-clause to become the main sentence of the utterance: this presents no syntactic difficulties whatsoever. Furthermore, the fact that the deletion is specified removes the need for a discussion of the precise form of the higher S, the only relevant point being that, like the adverbials under discussion, it constitutes an indication of how the surface utterance is to be taken, thus justifying the use of the Present.

6. The reasons for its failure are interesting in themselves. While they cannot be gone into here, they have to do with what Perret calls the limited number of rôles available in a context and also with the question of presuppositions involved in the semantic description of verbs: on this, cf. Fillmore (1970)
7. I have not discussed other forms of implicit act brought up by Perret, viz. appellatory interjections and noises, such as "Hep" and "Psitt", or bodily gestures. They are non-linguistic and of little interest other than as an even more extreme illustration of the non-syntactic nature of substitutions.

8. There is one point that should be clarified concerning my analysis of Perret's examples. Since the explicit utterance undergoing substitution here is a performative, the examples may seem to run counter to the axiom as expressed, if this performative is taken as not acting as a higher S. However, this is incorrect: the example, for example, Je donne la parole à X consists of a performative governing a nominalised S (la parole à X), so that the higher S is in fact present. What is misleading about the example is the particular lexicalisation of the performative. The English equivalent, I grant the floor to X, does not present this peculiarity: at the same time, it does involve a similar phenomenon with regard to the floor, which is a very particular lexicalisation of the nominalised S.


10. It is obvious, for example, that similar signs such as "singe", "loup", "éléphant", etc. would not normally count as warnings, whether in or out of the zoo.

The interpretation must also be considered variable, especially from the cultural point of view, since semiotic systems are frequently culture-specific. This is most evident in matters of translation between languages of apparent cultural similarity. (cf. Vinay/Darbelnet, 1960)

11. Probably the most urgent problem in this area is to draw up an inventory of illocutionary forces (cf. Todorov 1970b). Without this, the task of specifying a force lexically by means of a performative is necessarily not only delicate but uncertain. (cf. 3.5)

12. The words "the dictionary" are used here generically, although I have in mind the Compact Oxford English Dictionary (1971): while not stating that the items I cite are a group, it rather assumes it and, for its purposes, offers many of them as an explanation by analogy of "but" (vol.1, p.304: BUT, C III). The item "but" is seen to encompass the forces of all the others, to the extent that it is itself virtually impossible to characterise in terms
of a particular force except by inspection of every instance singly. In addition, it is subject to a special usage, very frequent in L'Etranger, whereby it becomes little more than a marker of continuity within an allocu- tion. (cf. les adverbes de la consécution narrative in Weinrich (1973), p.304ff)

Grouping of these items also occurs, somewhat loosely, in Grevisse (1969) where they are characterised as markers of opposition or restriction (p.994)

13. By "point of reference" I do not mean the same thing as referent, as in the case of anaphoric reference. I mean rather an utterance which serves as a point of departure for a subsequent act.

Likewise, the term utterance-configuration is not to be confused with context of utterance or context of situation: it is intended to refer to the configuration of the utterances occurring about a given point in a discourse and constitutes an observation about the utterances as texts or énoncés.

14. It should be noted that while there may seem to be a certain similarity between the notion of "happiness conditions" and that of "co-occurrence restrictions" in transformational grammar the two are fundamentally different. The former might be said, in transformational terms, to belong to a much deeper, syntactico-semantic level of representation.

15. It is hard to see, in the present state of our knowledge of these matters, how to be more categorical about this kind of distributional statement (cf. note 11). One possible test is that mentioned by Austin (cf. his Lecture Ten) whereby a report is formulated concerning an utterance, e.g. In saying Nevertheless, p, he insisted that... However, this does not always work, since there are certain forms, e.g. I retort, I expostulate, I complain, etc., which usually do not occur in speech (at least as performatives) even though they may be stated in report. In this case, it means that the illocutionary force can be reported but not specified in the form of an explicit performative (except in highly stylised - rhetorical - forms of speech: cf. Ch.6:3.0).

The only way to be more categorical might be to add to the distributional statement a constraint whereby, in given, sociolinguistically localised situations, certain explicit performative verbs will be specified as substitutes,
e.g. in (23), the juridical setting would call for I find.

16. I say "rarely" having in mind other types of intrusion such as that mentioned earlier in connection with Benveniste, whereby the speaker or author inserts a remark of a general nature arising from his narration but separate from it. Such instances occur in the next example and are mainly ironic in nature.

17. There are frequent occurrences of mais, as might be expected, but I have cited only those which seem to be presentential in the sense which I have defined, rather than merely "adverbes de la consécution narrative", mentioned in note 12.

18. cf. note 2

19. Indeed one might equally claim that the Narrative Present involves a then, rather than "another now", since the altered time-reference - be it Future or Past - calls for then.

20. The proposed terms are comparable with what is found in German as "Erzählendes Ich/Erlebendes Ich" or in English as "narrating I/experiencing I": cf. Lehtonen (1973), in which the author points out also that "la terminologie française ne semble pas avoir été fixée" (p.390). However, my terms have not quite the same import, as will become clear in the next chapter.

21. This idea is similar to Weinrich's (cf. note 14, Ch. 4) except that I postulate the necessity of specifying in each case which pole of the contrast is involved, whereas Weinrich sees only the necessity to specify narration, whence his idea of a "temps synthétique".

22. Neither Benveniste nor Weinrich uses an example like (26), which I have formulated expressly for the point under discussion; indeed, they nowhere acknowledge the existence of a usage built on such a model, even though it is implicit in their analysis of the French tenses. Weinrich, in his discussion of "transitions temporelles (hétérogènes)" (1973, pp.203-205), touches on the possibility of such a model, but considers it rare.

It is perhaps not so rare. I have given examples of it from Alain-Fournier and Maupassant and it is to be found even today in, for example, some of the articles of Paris-Match, from which I have taken the following extract which was given there in the form of direct quotation:
"En 1965, je suis tombé malade. J'ai perdu 14 kilos, je ne pesais plus que 54 kilos (aujourd'hui 68).

Je n'avais plus un sou. Je suis alors reparti pour Cayenne. De 1966 à 1970, je suis de nouveau devenu chef de scierie, puis je me suis occupé de transports de matériaux pour la construction des canalisations d'adduction d'eau à Cayenne. J'avais besoin d'argent pour monter mon propre chantier d'or. Je voulais l'installer à Marauder. J'avais bien prospecté la région et c'est là où, me semblait-il, j'aurais le plus de chance d'avoir un bon rendement. Je fis la demande d'un permis de prospection que j'obtins et, cette fois, je m'installai complètement. Il fallait apporter tout le matériel par pirogue et ensuite le porter à dos d'homme jusqu'au village, puis jusqu'au chantier. Nous avons construit d'abord 14 carbet dans le village pour les ouvriers et moi-même. Ensuite il fallait ouvrir le chantier. Nous décidâmes de le créer à 5 km du village; la forêt recouvrant tout, il fallut d'abord défricher. Nous installâmes les motopompes après avoir creusé dans la roche. Pour faire fonctionner les moteurs, il nous fallait 50 litres de fuel par jour. Tout cela, nous allions le chercher à Maripa-Soula, ou à Saint-Laurent-du-Maroni. Ah! qu'est-ce que nous avons travaillé."

(The extract constitutes an unusual assemblage of tenses and, while I would not necessarily offer it as an example of the best of usage, it is there nevertheless and at least proves the point that the model in question is available for analysis.

23. Weinrich's analysis of the tenses of L'Etranger is most informative in this regard, since it is still dominated by his concept of Group II tenses.
CHAPTER SIX

L'Etranger

0. The tense-forms of L'Etranger, considered above all as a linear phenomenon, offer a very special order of interest. It is an interest which goes beyond the much discussed use of the Passé Composé itself to touch principally on what have been called the "moments de narration", studied notably by Barrier (1962), Fitch (1968d), Pariente (1968) and Fletcher (1971). As I pointed out in Chapter 1, to talk of the "moments de narration" is to focus on the question of the relation between time and tense and the allocutionary situation.

1.0 I propose in this chapter to study the occurrences of tense-forms in L'Etranger, their distribution and accompanying occurrences of the various forms grouped under the heading of "l'aspect indiciel du langage". Following that, I shall consider these occurrences from the point of view of their illocutionary force and the perception of such force by tu. By this means, it will be possible to consider the rôle of both je and tu in the allocutionary situation of which the text is the manifestation and thence to consider what can be said of the allocutionary situation itself. In a final section, I shall examine briefly what might be referred to as the
perlocutionary force of the whole work, thus bringing into consideration for the first time Camus as author.

1.1 **L'Etranger** opens (1:1) with a paragraph containing a series of tenses: Passé Composé (equally possibly Présent + participe passé), Présent, Passé Composé, Présent, Imparfait. In this series, the Présent predominates and is found also in the opening of the second paragraph, in which, following a series of three forms in the Futur, there occurs a sequence of forms - Passé Composé and Imparfait - in which the Passé Composé predominates. The paragraph closes with a sequence comprising Futur, Présent, Imparfait, Futur and Futur Composé.

1.1.1 A Passé Composé and an Imparfait open the next paragraph and predominate thereafter through the entire chapter. A number of points are to be noted. First, there are no more occurrences of the Futur in the chapter nor indeed in the remainder of Part I, other than in direct quotations. Second, there are several instances of the *discours indirect libre*, in which various forms occur, e.g. Conditionnel and Conditionnel Composé: since these forms are predictable within such a framework, they need not detain us here. Thirdly, throughout the rest of the chapter there are occurrences, more or less isolated in each case, of the Présent: they are interspersed, therefore, among the forms of the Passé Composé and the Imparfait. This is a phenomenon to which I shall
return in due course: for the moment, I shall simply cite the instances in question:

p. 8:  
   1. Il a perdu son oncle il y a quelques mois.  
   11. C'est à cause de tout cela sans doute, ....  

p. 9:  
   1. L'asile est à deux kilomètres du village.  
   11. C'est un petit vieux, avec ....  

p.13:  Je ne sais pas quel geste j'ai fait, ....  

p.15:  Comme j'aime bien le café au lait, j'ai accepté ....  

p.16:  Je crois que j'ai somnolé un peu.  

p.17:  
   1. Je les voyais comme je n'ai jamais vu personne.  
   11. Je crois plutôt qu'ils me saluait.  

p.19:  
   1. Mais je crois maintenant que c'était une impression fausse.  
   11. Ensuite, je ne sais plus.  
   111. Je me souviens qu'à un moment ....  

p.25:  Je ne sais pas pourquoi nous avons attendu ....  

p.28:  ... que je ne me souviens plus de rien.  

Further instances of the Présent, occurring within direct quotation, are ignored here. Finally, there is one clear instance of a Passé Composé which I note here for discussion later; it can be compared with the form occurring in p.17:i above:  

p.28:  J'ai encore gardé quelques images de cette journée.  

1.1.2  I:2 is a short chapter opening on similar lines to I:1: a series of Passé Composé, Présent, Plusqueparfait, Passé Composé, Imparfait, Présent, Passé Composé, Présent.  

From the start of the second paragraph to the end of the
chapter, the predominant tenses are again the Passé Composé and the Imparfait (setting aside as before tense-forms imposed by rules of quotation, etc.). Once again, we find interspersed occurrences of the Présent:

p.31: Elle aussi, je crois.

p.32: De toute façon, on est toujours un peu fautif.

p.33:  i. Je n'aime pas le dimanche.
       ii. ... ils m'auraient posé des questions et je n'aime pas cela.
       iii. Maintenant il est trop grand pour moi ....
       iv. Je ne vis plus que dans cette pièce, ... la glace est jaunie ....
       v. Le reste est à l'abandon.

p.34:  i. ... où je mets les choses qui m'amusent dans les journaux.
       ii. Ma chambre donne sur la rue principale ...  
       iii. ... un petit homme assez frêle que je connais de vue.

p.35: Les spectacles étaient partout commencés, je crois.

1.1.3  I:3, also relatively short, is marked throughout by a predominance of Passé Composé and Imparfait forms. However, it is also very different from I:1, I:2 in that it contains a number of relatively protracted passages marked by the Présent. These passages are sandwiched between the main tense-forms already mentioned and are distributed as follows:

p.39: A midi, j'aime bien ce moment. Le soir, j'y trouve moins de plaisir parce que la serviette roulante qu'on utilise est tout à fait humide: elle a servi toute la journée.

p.41: Il y a huit ans qu'on les voit ensemble. L'épagneul a une maladie de peau, le rouge, je crois, ..........................
................., personne ne peut savoir.

p.43: Dans le quartier, on dit qu'il vit des femmes.  
Il est toujours habillé très correctement.

p.44: Lui aussi n'a qu'une chambre ................ 
.......................... clichés de femmes nues.

The question will arise later whether such instances are comparable with those cases occurring in isolation that have been cited for the earlier chapters.

1.1.4 I:4 consists entirely of instances of Passé Composé and Imparfait, with the exception of three sentences employing the Présent. These are:

p.53: ... Emmanuel qui ne comprend pas toujours ce qui se passe sur l'écran. Il faut alors lui donner des explications.

p.61: Je ne sais pas pourquoi j'ai pensé à maman.

1.1.5 In I:5, the tenses follow the same pattern of distribution as in the preceding chapter. The three instances of an interspersed Présent are:

p.62: ... parce que je sais que le patron n'aime pas qu'on nous téléphone de la ville.

p.70: 1. Mais selon lui, sa vraie maladie, c'était la vieillesse, et la vieillesse ne se guérit pas.  
ii. J'ai répondu, je ne sais pas encore pourquoi, que j'ignorais jusqu'ici ....

1.1.6 Apart from a sequence of two sentences in the Présent, I:6 is composed entirely of Passé Composé and Imparfait. The exceptions are these:

p.79: Je ne sais pas pourquoi cela a fait rire Marie.
Je crois qu'elle avait un peu trop bu.

1.1.7 This brief inspection of Part I makes clear the major pattern of distribution of the tenses and, in particular, the decreasing number of interspersed forms of the Présent. At this stage, I do not propose to attribute any significance to this distribution; instead, I shall proceed to the inspection of Part II.

1.2 II:1 is a relatively long chapter employing the Passé Composé and the Imparfait, with only one instance of the Présent. This occurs in the last page:

p.105: ... je peux dire que je m'étonnais presque ...

1.2.1 II:2, of roughly similar length, shows the same distribution, this time with five interspersed Présent forms:

p.106: Il y a des choses dont je n'ai jamais aimé parler.

p.111: Je ne sais pas combien de temps a passé.

p.117: Je peux dire que, dans les derniers mois, ....

p.119: ... c'était l'heure dont je ne veux pas parler, ....

p.120: ... personne ne peut imaginer ce que sont les soirs dans les prisons.

In addition, there occurs an instance of the Passé Composé which, like that in the sentence cited above for p.106 (cf also in p.17:1), is different from the others in the chapter:

p.112: ... les choses dont je n'ai jamais aimé parler.
1.2.2 II:3, in which the Passé Composé and Imparfait again predominate, contains six instances of the Présent distributed as follows:

p.121: Je peux dire qu'au fond l'été a très vite remplacé l'été.

      ii. Je sais bien que c'était une idée niaise ....
      iii. Cependant, la différence n'est pas grande et c'est en tout cas l'idée qui m'est venue.
      iv. Mais je crois qu'il n'avait pas pu mettre son col ....
      v. Je crois bien que d'abord ....

1.2.3 II:4 presents the same distribution as II:3, with the following six instances of the Présent:

p.144:  i. ... il est toujours intéressant d'entendre parler de soi.
      ii. ... je peux dire qu'on a beaucoup parlé de moi

p.145: D'ailleurs, je dois reconnaître que l'intérêt qu'on trouve à occuper les gens ne dure pas longtemps.

p.152: Mais je crois que j'étais déjà très loin de cette salle d'audience.

p.153: A la fin, je me souviens seulement que ....

p.157: Je crois bien que c'était de la considération.

1.2.4 In II:5, the final chapter, the same basic distribution of tenses is found but in markedly different proportions: there are some thirty-one instances of the Présent interspersed among the Passé Composé and Imparfait forms. Rather than cite all of them, I shall distinguish between them, giving examples of the different types.
1.3 The first category may be compared to generalities such as the proverb or the universal truth:

p.159: On ne sait jamais ce qui peut arriver.

p.163: On se fait toujours des idées exagérées de ce qu'on ne connaît pas.

This type does not involve the use of "je" (cf. also p.144:1).

1.4 In the second type, "je" does occur but the sentence itself is not quite the same as the "interspersed" type previously referred to: rather, it is one of a cluster of sentences constituting a series with a different force from that of the interspersed form. An example of this type opens the chapter; its force will become apparent in later discussion:

p.158: Pour la troisième fois, j'ai refusé de recevoir l'aumônier. Je n'ai rien à lui dire, je n'ai pas envie de parler, ....

The sentences of this category are to be compared with the earlier examples from 1:3, since they also raise the question of their relatedness to the interspersed type of Présent.

1.5 The third type is the now familiar interspersed sentence, with the following occurrences:

p.158: Je ne sais combien de fois je me suis demandé s'il y avait ....

p.159: 1. Dans un sens, je crois que cela m'aurait suffi.  
ii. Mais cela ne parle pas à l'imagination.

p.161: J'avais tort, je crois, de penser à cette possibilité.

p.162: Je dis que c'est le côté défectueux. Cela est vrai, dans un sens.
There are also infrequent occurrences of other tense forms:— one example of the Futur, various instances of the Conditionnel and Conditionnel Composé. There are also five instances of a form that has evoked comment in previous studies; thus, Weinrich 1973:309) says, echoing Barrier,

"Camus a eu quelque peine à se glisser dans ce rôle volontairement effacé du narrateur. On a déjà remarqué que le Passé Simple lui a échappé à cinq reprises, malgré sa ferme intention d'éviter ce temps 'littéraire'. [...] Certains Imparfais du subjonctif, au moins aussi littéraires et pédants, se sont même glissés, quelquefois, dans le texte. Il n'est visiblement pas si simple, lorsqu'on entreprend un récit écrit, de renoncer à un temps qui est justement prévu à cet effet."

The five instances of this subjunctive form to which I have referred are all contained in utterances by Meursault, rather than in the words of any other speaker. The interesting fact that emerges from this is that they occur within indirect discourse (including discours indirect libre) and only there, as in this example:

Qu'importait que Raymond fût mon copain autant que Céleste qui valait mieux que lui? Qu'importait que Marie donnât aujourd'hui sa bouche à un nouveau Meursault?

Furthermore, when occurring in a different environment, the
form emerges as the Présent du subjonctif, as in this example:

p.154: Tout ce que je faisais d'inutile en ce lieu m'est alors remonté à la gorge et je n'ai eu qu'une hâte, c'est qu'on en finisse et que je retrouve ma cellule avec le sommeil.

With one exception, the many such examples in the work permit us to say that Meursault's grammar has a context-sensitive rule constraining his otherwise conventional general abandonment of this Imparfait form. The exception, on p.104, is the one cited by Barrier (1962:10) in asserting that such occurrences are errors. One such case might well be an oversight but the pattern of the majority would seem to give the lie to the claim of a general lapse on the part of Camus. Since the occurrences seem to be idiolectal rather than merely conventional or pedantic, it is reasonable to attribute them to the compétence of Meursault rather than to the performance of Camus.5

Turning to the "aspect indiciel" in the language of L'Etranger, I do not propose to enumerate all the occurrences. Barrier (p.107 seq.) has already done this for the most part, observing that "les indications temporelles sont extrêmement fréquentes, et souvent très précises", although his conclusions on this point show, as Weinrich (1968:339) points out, that he has not grasped the function of these occurrences nor
of their frequency. This turns out to be a serious mistake and, added to the fact that Barrier's count concerns only Part I, prevents him from fully appreciating the differences in temporality that are to be perceived.

2.1 For Abbou (1969a:51), these differences concern principally "le temps linguistique" and "le temps chronique", along with their respective markers. He points out that

"les marques du temps linguistique, mode de représentation propre à la communication orale, prédominent. Ainsi la première partie jusqu'au chapitre IV ne dispose que de telles marques, 'Aujourd'hui', 'dentièrement demain', 'après-demain', 'aujourd'hui', 'c'est aujourd'hui samedi', 'depuis hier'. [.................................]

Ce n'est qu'à partir de la seconde partie, et cela peut être considéré comme signe d'évolution, que les opérateurs effectuent le transfert du temps linguistique en temps chronique: 'huit jours APRES', 'ce jour-LA', 'en ces heures-LA', 'onze mois', 'quelques jours APRES', 'AU BOUT de quelques semaines', etc.". 6

2.1.1 Once this shift to le temps chronique has taken place, what becomes all-important, in Abbou's view, is the events being recounted and especially the sequentiality of these events: the language is that of "then" and "next". Thus in II:1 already we find this series of indicators: "La première fois ...", "Huit jours après ...", "Puis ...", "Au début ...", "Après ...", "Le lendemain ...", "Peu de temps après ...", "Par la suite ...", "Et au bout des onze mois ...". The same kind of series is found in the following chapters, though with steadily decreasing frequency.
2.1.2 It would be wrong, however, to leave as Abbou does here the impression that the frequency of the markers of le temps chronique, which he takes as the mark of "narration historique", draws the line between a narrative second part of the work and a non-narrative first part. These same indicators exist in the first part also; what is different is merely their frequency of distribution. In I:1, ignoring for now the first two paragraphs, no chronological indications are given at all, other than "à deux heures". I:2 opens with the indication that "c'est aujourd'hui samedi" (cf. note 6), followed by a discussion of "samedi" and "dimanche" and the further indications "c'était vraiment dimanche..." and "c'était toujours un dimanche de tiré". No such specification occurs at all in I:3 (although the clear contextual inference is that it is Monday) and I:4 has the sole indication "Hier, c'était samedi", while in I:5 no specification is given. The opening words of I:6 identify "Le dimanche" but the chapter has only one subsequent occurrence, "la veille".

2.1.3 Somewhat more frequent in Part I are the markers of sequentiality. Puis, encore, puis, ensuite, puis, alors, puis, ensuite, puis, ensuite, puis, ensuite, puis, ensuite, puis, ensuite all occur in I:1, although they are relatively infrequent considering this series occurs over twenty-nine pages. I:2 in particular shows a startling lack of this type of marker, while in I:3, 4, 5 the frequency rises again, to drop markedly
The third group of markers to be noted in this connection has the function of indicating not sequentiality but rather the point within a sequence at which an event occurs. Thus: \textit{à un moment, peu après, à ce moment}, etc. This group occurs frequently and, as Weinrich (1968:339) has noted, serves to mark the accompanying tense-forms as part of narration, i.e. Passé Composé (<Passé Simple).

2.2 The effect of all of these markers is, clearly, to indicate the narrative character of much of the language of \textit{L'Etranger}, even in Part I. However, there are other indicators to consider.

2.2.1 As Abbou has pointed out with his examples, there are those items which identify the forms of \textit{le temps linguisitique} and thus of \textit{discours}, i.e. by marking the spatio-temporal coordinates of the allocutionary situation. However, taken as forms, these "shifters" (cf. Todorov: 1967a) are deceptive in certain instances, as I have shown in the discussion of the Narrative Present. In \textit{L'Etranger} we find such instances, all clearly showing the reference to another now:

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textit{Maintenant je comprenais, c'était si naturel.}
  \item \textit{J'ai répondu que je l'aborderais exactement comme je l'abordais en ce moment.}
\end{itemize}

Carrying this further, we find examples such as the following,
displaying a remarkable cooccurrence of tense-forms:

p.70: ... sa vraie maladie, c'était la vieillesse, et la vieillesse ne se guérit pas.

p.123: Je sais bien que c'était une idée niaise puisque ici ce n'était pas le ridicule qu'ils cherchaient ....

p.166: Dans le fond, je n'ignorais pas que mourir à trente ans ou à soixante ans importe peu puisque, naturellement, dans les deux cas, d'autres hommes et d'autres femmes vivront. Rien n'était plus claire, en somme. C'était toujours moi qui mourrais, que ce soit maintenant ou dans vingt ans.

p.167: Du moment qu'on meurt, comment et quand, cela n'importe pas, c'était évident.

p.173: Peut-être, il y a bien longtemps, y avais-je cherché un visage.

p.177: ... que m'importaient son Dieu, les vies qu'on choisit, les destins qu'on élit ....

2.3 Obviously, it is not to examples like these that one must look for indications of *le temps linguistique*: from the point of view of systematic distinction between *discours* and *récit*, such examples are anomalous. At the same time, their form can not be called in any sense erroneous, since their use by speakers of the language is well established. It is remarkable that the occurrence of these instances in *L'Etranger* has been generally overlooked, in spite of the fact that it raises questions of great interest for the work as a whole.

2.3.1 Setting the "shifters" aside for now, I wish to examine the presence in the text of two other types of marker. The first of these is the presententials, described earlier as
indicators of a deleted speech-act and thus of the allocu- tionary situation. This group is not of high frequency in the work, occurring some twenty-five times altogether, but found principally in Part II. The particular forms are pourtant, cependant, d'ailleurs, du reste, au contraire and seulement, the first three being the most common. Their number is given as an approximation because it depends in fact on one's view of what may be counted a presentential. The figure given is for the forms cited but there are numerous other forms whose inclusion merits consideration. They are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>French</th>
<th>English</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>sans doute</td>
<td>à bien réfléchir</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>en somme</td>
<td>en y réfléchissant bien</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>somme toute</td>
<td>justement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>là encore</td>
<td>dans un sens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>en réalité</td>
<td>en quelque sorte</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>à vrai dire</td>
<td>réflexion faite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>en tout cas</td>
<td>du moins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>surtout</td>
<td>naturellement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>évidemment</td>
<td>peut-être</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>seulement</td>
<td>tout bien considéré</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tout de même</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.3.2 At present, the question of whether these forms can be counted as presententials admits of no ready answer, above all from a syntactic point of view, but there is at least suggestive evidence that further study of the matter is justified. Certain of the forms would seem to have the force of a performative, as these examples show:

p.104: Seulement, j'étais accompagné de mon avocat .... (Seulement = "je vous prie de noter que ...")

p. 97: Surtout, je voyais que je le mettais mal à l'aise.
Others are less easy to equate with a performative. They have, nonetheless, like the presententials, the force of an intervention by the speaker in his own text, a form of commentary on his own utterance:

p.103: Evidemment, j'ai dit non une fois de plus. (Evidemment = "vous ne serez pas étonné d'apprendre que ...")

p.106: En réalité, je n'étais pas réellement en prison. les premiers jours. (En réalité = "je vous assure que ...")

It goes without saying that the equivalences shown here are at best tentative and that one is faced with the same problem of lexicalisation as in the case of the presententials. Such commentary-forms, as I shall call them, are fairly evenly distributed throughout the work and parallel closely certain elements which, for Abbou (1969a:55), "donnent à la communication une allure de message-objet et de métalangage". Thus I would claim that, when compared with the presententials, they are equally, though perhaps differently, sui-referential.

2.3.3 The second major type of marker I shall consider is one whose status as a marker is not widely established: indeed, it has received very little attention at all so far (cf. Levenston, 1974:410). Nevertheless, it merits inclusion here because of both its general importance as a phenomenon and its frequency in L'Etranger. The type in question is the "interruption sentence" (or "parenthetic sentence"), of which
Kruisinga (quoted by Levenston, p.411) has this to say:

"It sometimes happens that a speaker interrupts himself, whether in the course of a sentence, or of a series of sentences, to make a statement or an observation that may serve to make the situation, whether with regard to the subject or to the predicate of the sentence, clearer, or to add a comment that the speaker neglected to make beforehand, or wishes to make before he has completed his sentence. Such sentences have the structure of a simple or compound sentence (often a shortened one) but are spoken with a different intonation from the rest; in print they are denoted by parentheses, whence their name parenthetic sentences".

Within this general category, two distinct types can be established: one continues, in one way or another, the grammar of the interrupted sentence whereas the other is grammatically independent and receives the name "interruption sentence". to distinguish it from the first type, called "clause modifier" by Eyestone (see Levenston, pp.412-13). An example of such an interruption sentence is found in this sentence from L'Etranger:

"Malgré la chaleur (j'étais en manche de chemise), il avait un costume sombre, un col cassé ...." (p.95)

Throughout the work, this type of sentence occurs some eleven times, more or less evenly distributed over both parts. 9

2.4 Levenston's study does not claim to be exhaustive; on the contrary, the author hopes it will encourage others to pursue the examination of "this fascinating and little studied aspect of narrative technique" (p.414). Carrying his analysis further, I have encountered another type of interruption sentence, very common in L'Etranger, which corresponds to the
same general function as outlined but with some formal differences.

2.4.1 First of all, it does not occur within any kind of typographic parenthesis: it is a completely independent sentence or even, on occasion, more than one, e.g. p.19, p.165. Secondly, in the majority of instances in *L'Etranger*, it contains some indication or other of the present, i.e. speaker present. Thirdly, it constitutes a comment or some supplementary information on the whole situation being mentioned at a particular moment, rather than on a "subject" or "predicate" as Kruisinga saw it. Fourthly, it invariably occurs "within a series of sentences", one of the contexts mentioned by Kruisinga though, oddly, overlooked by Levenston in his otherwise interesting paper.

2.4.2 Some examples from *L'Etranger* will illustrate this phenomenon; in all cases, the interruption sentence is underlined:

p. 8: J'étais un peu étourdi parce qu'il a fallu que je monte chez Emmanuel pour lui emprunter une cravate noire et un brassard. Il a perdu son oncle, il y a quelques mois.

p. 9: Pendant tout ce temps, le concierge m'a parlé et ensuite, j'ai vu le directeur: il m'a reçu dans son bureau. C'est un petit vieux, avec la Légion d'honneur. Il m'a regardé de ses yeux clairs.

p.11: 1. Ils se taisaient quand nous passions. Et derrière nous, les conversations reprenaient. On aurait dit d'un jacassement assourdi de perroches.

p.19: i. J'avais même l'impression que cette morte, couchée au milieu d'eux, ne signifiait rien à leurs yeux. Mais je crois maintenant que c'était une impression fausse.

ii. Nous avons tous pris du café, servi par le concierge. Ensuite, je ne sais plus. La nuit a passé. Je me souviens seulement qu'à un moment j'ai ouvert les yeux et j'ai vu ....

Sentences of this type, though predominant in Part I, occur quite frequently throughout the entire work. 10

* * * * * * * * *

3.0 In my analysis of the "aspect indiciel", I left the "shifters" aside in order to concentrate on the presententials, the commentary-forms and both types of interruption sentence. My reason for doing so is that these four phenomena, in spite of their formal differences, form an overall category of marker of the allocutionary situation, each marking an intervention by the speaker in his own text. This intervention is attributable only to je and only at the moment of allocution. That is to say, it marks je-personne in an unambiguous way and this regardless of whether its narrative context is first-person or third-person. However, in the case of first-person narration, this fact is of crucial importance, precisely because the "shifters" themselves, given the constraints placed
upon their co-occurrence with the Narrative Present, are not reliable markers. The four markers under discussion — for which I propose the term "intervention-forms" — have as their common peculiarity that they mark the présent du discours in such a way that they are not placed under any constraints, even by the Narrative Present, e.g. (30).

(30) C'est sa première fois à Madrid et il tombe malade le premier jour. Il y en a qui n'ont pas de chance! Il doit garder sa chambre pendant une semaine, après quoi il ne lui reste que quatre jours de vacances.

Furthermore, as devices marking the "work" in which je engages, they are indispensable to the allocutionary situation, which lacks the provision available to the third person narrator, for example, of characterising by the use of report the "work" betokened by the utterance of a speaker. This is, in fact, a rule of performance and is reflected in the fact that in the language there are certain lexical items that je can not use, although they are freely available to the speaker in the third person narrative mode. Certain items do not exist as performatives, while they are commonly used to report the verbal acts of a speaker. For example, je may expostulate but he may not do so by saying, "I expostulate", though his act may be characterised by the report "He expostulated". Likewise, in French, je may not retort by saying "Je rétorque" but may say, narratively, "J'ai rétorqué (que ...)". (This is an area that has received very little attention, in spite of its practical importance in such spheres as legal language.)
3.1 In all cases except that of the performative and certain highly stylised forms of allocution such as oratory or poetry, *je* does not specify or characterise by lexical means, at the moment of allocution, the force of his own utterance. Thus, though Salamano insults his dog, he does not say, "*Je t'insulte: Salaud! Charogne!*". Meursault, on the other hand, does say, adopting the third person narrative mode, "*Salamano était en train d'insulter son chien. Il lui disait:"Salaud! Charogne!".* (p.43). Only by the force of the devices it contains can an utterance by *je* be characterised and the corollary of this is that it can be characterised only by other than *je*. The *intervention-forms* not only constitute, as markers of *je-personne*, an extension of the "aspect indiciel du langage" but also play a particularly important rôle, in the text of *L'Etranger* most especially, in elucidating for *tu* the allocutionary situation.

3.1.1 It is a mistaken practice, no matter how common, to assume that *tu* is, to use the term proposed by Prince (1973: 178), a "narrataire, c'est à dire quelqu'un à qui le narrateur s'adresse". Equally mistaken is the assumption that *tu* is, specifically, a "lecteur". These terms, though related to the study of *énonciation*, nevertheless clash with a fundamental perspective of that field inasmuch as they are oriented exclusively about the notion of *récit* as opposed to *discours*, even though it is of the latter specifically that *tu*
is an element. More properly, *tu* is the *destinataire* or, even more precisely, the *allocutaire*. Linguistic performance is contingent upon this fact and the resources of the language systematically founded upon it. The medium of transmission is initially of stylistic rather than linguistic interest.12

3.1.2 In my analysis of the forms encountered in *L'Etranger*, I took no account of *tu*, concentrating instead on the relative frequency of occurrence of the various forms. *Tu*, not being an analyst, is interested more in the occurrence of these forms within an utterance-configuration and in the force of the utterances marked by them. What is important for *tu* is the syntagmatic rather than the paradigmatic consideration of the markers and nowhere is this more important than with regard to the question of time.

3.2 Bearing in mind that any marker of *je-personne* is necessarily a marker of the allocution, we may posit it also as a marker of what I shall refer to as real time. Real time, the same thing as *le temps linguistique*, stands in contrast to what I call event-time, a term intended to cover all temporal specifications within a purely narrative mode. Event-time, therefore, will share the markers of *je-personnage*.13 While, clearly, both terms thus cover a good deal of ground, they offer the consequent advantage of simplifying discussion. Between them, there is one very important difference: real time implies *tu*, event-time does not.
3.2.1 To consider time and its markers in L'Etranger, we must, like tu, begin at the beginning. As Fletcher (1971:126) has pointed out in his analysis of the tenses, "we have a strong impression of present time which continues throughout the first two paragraphs". This impression is in fact very strongly marked, by the "shifters" and a combination of tense forms as well as "je": aujourd'hui, est (morte), je ne sais pas, veut, est, prendrai, arriverai, pourrai, rentrerai, demain soir, fera, après-demain, verra, pour le moment, c'est, sera, aura revêtu. In addition, we note the presence of intervention-forms such as peut-être, en somme, sans doute, au contraire as well as in the form of interruption sentences: Ou peut-être hier, je ne sais pas; Cela ne veut rien dire; C'était peut-être hier. Thus the series of utterances addressed to tu is marked as sui-referential to a high degree and indicative, therefore, of real time.

3.2.2 At the same time, one can point to two possible counterindications to this. First, in C'était peut-être hier, an elliptical sentence with the deleted secondary clause "qu'elle est morte", it might seem more usual to say, within real time, "C'est peut-être hier ... " rather than "C'était ... "), which is perhaps more indicative of event-time and the "distance narrative" associated with it (cf. Lehtonen 1973:390). In the second place, there is the curious case of the opening sentence itself: Aujourd'hui, maman est morte. It is instructive
to consider how it should be translated into English. There are three possibilities: Today, Mother is dead/has died/died.

In French, the combination of *Aujourd'hui* + Passé Composé, usually indicative of *real time*, suggests a translation with either has died or, perhaps, is dead. However, the syntax of the next sentence, *Ou peut-être hier, je ne sais pas*, may be taken only as containing a deleted secondary clause, with the complete sentence reading, therefore, *Ou peut-être (est-elle morte) hier* (or, alternatively, *Ou peut-être (est-ce) hier (qu'elle est morte)*). In this case, it is clear that the ellipsis is predicated on the syntax of the opening sentence itself. So this fact suggests that the opening sentence must be glossed as Today, Mother died and that the temporal indication of the verb form is *event-time* (Passé Composé < Passé Simple), as in the case of *C'était*. The question of how to explain or justify the co-occurrence of *aujourd'hui* and a narrative tense is readily answered if we recall the principle of an other now, which here would apply to the other markers whose presence has been noted. Reference has been made already to the unreliable nature of the "shifters": here we have a prime example. What is ostensibly marked as *real time* is just as likely to be *event-time*, in the form of what we may call *pseudo-real time*.

3.3 The term *pseudo-real time* is offered as distinct from the notion of the narrative present, since the latter is based
on tu's pragmatic observation that the spatio-temporal coordinates of the text have become those of an other now. In the case under discussion, tu literally can not make, at the time of allocution, such an observation: the grounds for it are simply lacking, since tu has only the textual markers on which to rely. In these circumstances, tu is all the more heavily dependent on not only the markers themselves but above all on the sequence of the markers, i.e. the syntagmatic relations mentioned earlier, for any recognition of a change of temporal reference. The removal of the pragmatic aspect brings in its train the need to reconsider the relationship between time and tense. It becomes plain that Weinrich's contention that they are unrelated is essentially a statement about le temps chronologique and is of little help in considering a situation such as the opening of L'Etranger in which the questions raised by the text revolve around le temps linguistique and the allocutionary situation. Tu's dependence on tense-forms and their accompanying markers is what has to be considered. When these elements mark a time (real time) which only subsequently is seen not to be real time, it is not enough to talk about a use of the Narrative Present, since this name presupposes an awareness by tu of its narrative force. Clearly, tu is not aware of such a force in the case in question. Furthermore, the presence of the intervention-forms raises questions here, since, in all normal circumstances, they are unambiguously sui-referential, while here,
under these circumstances, as later becomes clear, they are not unambiguous.

3.3.1 Thus tu faces a dilemma, whether he realises it or not at this point. The question of tu's awareness of such matters has been taken up by Barrier and Fletcher above all. They are of essentially one mind, feeling that, as Barrier puts it, "Quant aux déplacements, parfois illogiques, des moments de narration, ils ne sont pas perceptibles au cours d'une lecture normale" (p.28). Fletcher, for whom there is nothing at all illogical about the shifts, is rather less categorical and content to say "the reader is not immediately aware" (p.126) of such a "virtually unnoticed shift" (p.127). The shift which Fletcher has in mind here and which he calls "one of the major time-breaks of the novel" is the introduction of the Passé Composé at the opening of the third paragraph, j'ai pris l'autobus à deux heures. As I have shown in my analysis of the tense distribution, the tenses that predominate from this point on are the Passé Composé and the Imparfait which, along with the "shifters", mark event-time. It is the feeling of both Barrier and Fletcher that this shift goes "virtually unnoticed" because of the temporal ambiguity of the Passé Composé. However, their view must surely count as an overstatement, since, as we have seen, there can be no such temporal ambiguity where the usual narrative "shifters" are concerned,
as for example when Meursault says,

p. 9: Pendant tout ce temps, le concierge a parlé et ensuite, j'ai vu le directeur.

or. even earlier,

p. 8: J'ai dormi pendant presque tout le trajet.

Thus, unless one makes the quite unjustified assumption that tu is insensitive to such signals, tu must be aware of the shift to event-time and the narrative force of the utterances. In the same way, once the narrative force has been established as the general mode used by je, then tu presumably is capable of being aware of any subsequent shift away from it, as in those cases noted already of the Présent and the other markers of discours interspersed throughout the narrative. Tu is not engaged in a game of chance with regard to the utterances of je: the rules of allocution are the governing factor. Thus, when Fletcher says,

"the reader [is] in doubt as to when the story was composed. The first two paragraphs are fraught with ambiguity and, indeed, deceit on this last point" (p.127),

he invites criticism on two points. First, he assumes again that the reader (tu) actually wonders about the matter (otherwise, his point is irrelevant) and on this it can be said at best that, if he wonders about it at all, he may indeed find ambiguity but that he need not so wonder. Secondly, he imputes deceit to the utterer but it is not clear whether he has in mind here Meursault or Camus: if the latter, then his remark might pass but, if the former, then it requires some
solid justification, which it does not really receive.

3.4 I have termed the position of Barrier and Fletcher an overstatement but, in spite of my criticisms, I do not consider it essentially incorrect. Rather, I take the view that tu is aware of these shifts but undisturbed by them, in contrast to the critical analyst of the text whose involvement with the form of the utterances has an entirely different basis. This, of course, puts the matter in a different light and needs to be justified from the evidence of the text.

3.4.1 With the opening of the third paragraph, J'ai pris l'autobus à deux heures, tu recognises both the force of narration and the consequent fact that the Présent of the earlier utterances is not real time but pseudo-real time. Some seven paragraphs later, tu realises clearly that the speaker is making a real-time utterance:

p.13: Je ne sais pas quel geste j'ai fait, mais il est resté, debout derrière moi.

For Fletcher (p.127), "several pages must pass before the true perspective [i.e. real time] is hinted at", namely on p.19. In fact, even before that page, there are four more such "hints":

p.15: Comme j'aime beaucoup le café au lait, j'ai accepté ....

p.16: Je crois que j'ai somnolé un peu.

* p.17: 1. Je les voyais comme je n'ai jamais vu personne ....
11. Je crois plutôt qu'ils me saluaient.
After this and in addition to Fletcher's examples, we find:

p.19:   Ensuite, je ne sais plus.
p.25:   Je ne sais pas pourquoi nous avons attendu ....
p.28:   1. ... que je ne me souviens plus de rien.
*       ii. J'ai encore gardé quelques images de cette journée.

At least ten times in the first chapter alone, tu is made aware of real time, through utterances incorporating je, Présent and the force of commentary by je on his own text. (The two sentences marked by an asterisk are two examples, rare in this book, of the Parfait (Passé Composé ≠ Passé Simple).) To these may be added the presence in the same chapter of at least eight other intervention-forms, as noted earlier. Tu by now has noted and acquiesced in a pattern of event-time alternating with real time. Only twice does pseudo-real time recur in the chapter. One, very early, is on p. 8: Il a perdu son oncle, il y a quelques mois. The other is the unusual example occurring within discours indirect libre (see note 2).

3.4.2 The same basic pattern is found in I:2. C'est aujourd'hui (p.30) is revealed to be pseudo-real time by the occurrence of Le soir, Marie avait tout oublie (p.32) in which, as several authors have pointed out, the use of the definite article (rather than "Ce soir") immediately places the utterances concerning "samedi" into event-time. Then a shift to real time occurs with Elle aussi, je crois (p.31). I:3 opens
with *Aujourd'hui* (p.39) and recounts the day's events but, once again, *Le soir* (p.41) establishes *event-time* and thereby the *pseudo-real time* of the opening. There are three further instances of *pseudo-real time* within the narration (pp. 41-43, 43-44, 44). On p.39, an eight line passage in the Présent (Meursault discussing the pleasures of a dry towel) raises the question of whether it is *real time* or *pseudo-real time*. If the passage is taken as a protracted "interruption", it can be claimed to mark *je* and thus *real time*. A certain ambiguity hovers over the opening of I:4, *J'ai bien travaillé toute la semaine*. For Barrier (1962:17, note 2), it contains "un des rares exemples" of the Parfait; Fletcher (1971:127), on the other hand, translates it as "I had a busy time in the office throughout the week". Certainly, it is difficult to see why Barrier reads it as he does. For the rest of the chapter, *event-time* is established, though not without some anomalies. First of all, an *event-time* utterance, *Je suis allé au cinéma deux fois avec Emmanuel*, is completed by a relative clause in the Présent, *qui ne comprend pas toujours ce qui se passe sur l'écran* and this in turn is amplified by a new sentence, also in the Présent, *Il faut alors lui donner des explications*, to be followed, in the next sentence, by *event-time* again (p.53). I wish to suggest that these utterances in the Présent are to be compared with the passage from p.39, discussed above, inasmuch as they do not constitute narration and have, indeed, the force of commentary on
the part of *je*.\(^{20}\) As such, they indicate real time and are matched in the chapter by only one other instance, *Je ne sais pas pourquoi j'ai pensé à maman*, at the end of the chapter (p. 61).

3.4.3 The second anomaly involves the use of the "shifters" and, since it raises some important and interesting questions, I propose to examine it in some depth. Although *Hier, c'était samedi* (p. 53) indicates that *Ce matin* (p. 54) is Sunday, Meursault, after recounting that day's events, says, "Mais il fallait que je me lève tôt le lendemain" (p. 61). Barrier (p. 23) and Pariente (1968:58) are prompted by this to claim that I:4 is the product of two separate rédactions. Their reaction is thus to seek to explain the "recul temporel", as Barrier has it, which *le lendemain* seems to them to impose. This reaction stems directly from their ready acceptance of *Hier* and *Ce matin* as literally precise temporal markers. However, in their reaction they are driven to give an explanation which posits something very fundamental about the allocutionary situation not only of the utterances in question but also of the entire work (*cf.* note 12). For this reason, I consider their explanation unjustified and shall argue that both it and their reaction are quite unnecessary inasmuch as the text has already shown very clearly Meursault's special use of the "shifters". I shall argue here from a particular instance in I:2 involving almost the same forms as those under discussion.
3.4.3.1 The three utterances involved are:

p.30: 1. C'est aujourd'hui samedi

ii. J'ai eu de la peine à me lever parce que j'étais fatigué de ma journée d'hier

p.32: Le soir, Marie avait tout oublié.

Here, Le soir makes clear that event-time is indicated and therefore that within the narration aujourd'hui is pseudo-real time. It follows from this that hier is also pseudo-real time, not literally "hier" but rather a transformation of "la veille" and occurring here merely as an entailment of the use of aujourd'hui; it is this latter use that needs to be explained.

Now, the chapter opens with three sentences indicating event-time but including the Présent quoted here. The other half of the paragraph has mainly the Présent. For the sake of convenience, I give the paragraph here:

"En me réveillant, j'ai compris pourquoi mon patron avait l'air mécontent quand je lui ai demandé mes deux jours de congé: c'est aujourd'hui samedi. Je l'avais pour ainsi dire oublé, mais en me levant, cette idée m'est venue. Mon patron, tout naturellement, a pensé que j'aurais ainsi quatre jours de vacances avec mon dimanche et cela ne pouvait pas lui faire plaisir. Mais d'une part, ce n'est pas de ma faute si on a enterré maman hier au lieu d'aujourd'hui et d'autre part, j'aurais eu mon samedi et mon dimanche de toute façon. Bien entendu, cela ne m'empêche pas de comprendre tout de même mon patron."

The next paragraph opens with the second of the sentences quoted above and throughout is indicative of event-time (with the exception of one intervention-form, Elle aussi, je crois). The question is how to explain the appearance of C'est aujourd'hui samedi in the midst of the narrative tenses. Considering this question in the light of the next sentence in the
paragraph, Je l'avais pour ainsi dire oublié, mais en me levant, cette idée m'est venue, I suggest that the Présent in question and the other Présent forms in the second half of the paragraph form an utterance-configuration that corresponds very closely to a stream-of-consciousness technique (i.e. in pseudo-real time) triggered in this case by the words cette idée. Within such a context, the sentence Ce n'est pas de ma faute si on a enterré maman hier au lieu d'aujourd'hui fits perfectly well and serves as the motivation for the transformation (la veille $\rightarrow$ hier) mentioned earlier (cf. p.30:11). This causes no disorientation of tu for whom the force of the utterances in the Présent is indicative of an other now.

3.4.3.2 This is not, of course, to suggest that the notion of stream-of-consciousness is to be generalised as the explanation of all such instances of an other now. (Indeed, it is rarely encountered in L'Etranger where, in most cases, the nearest approach to it is marked by the use of discours indirect libre: cf. note 2.) Rather, I wish to say that tu acquiesces in the spurious use of the real time markers in the form of the "shifters". Putting it differently, one might say he reacts just as if the orthographical representation of such utterances were as follows:

C'est "aujourd'hui" samedi.

... j'étais fatigué de ma journée d' "hier"

Le soir, Marie avait tout oublié.
Here, the use of the quotation-marks is intended to make clear the non-literal use of the "shifter" in question, while their absence around *Le soir* confirms that the "attitude locutionnelle" is narrative. In other words, *tu* accepts these "shifters" for what they are, markers not of *le temps linguistique* but in fact of *le temps chronique* (cf. note 6).

3.4.4 To take the "shifters" literally is thus not only to misread the text but also quite unnecessary. Furthermore, it commits the commentator to either one of two kinds of explanation. One is to construct a "cadre de référence chronologique" of an inordinately complicated nature, fraught with serious implications for the allocutionary situation: this is the solution adopted by Pariente (1968:57) and which forces him into a decidedly circular argument. The other, chosen by Barrier (1962:27) after the example of Viggiani, consists of imputing "des inadvertances de la part de Camus".21

3.4.5 The solution I have proposed avoids these problems and has the added merit of establishing a generalised view of Meursault's use of the "shifters" without, as yet, having recourse to explanations involving the allocutionary situation. Thus, to return now to the question of 1:4, one might represent as follows the utterances that gave rise to this discussion:

"Hier", c'était samedi.

"Ce matin", Marie est restée ....
Mais il fallait que je me lève tôt le lendemain.

Now since the same phenomenon has been encountered in I:1:

"Aujourd'hui", maman est morte.

Ou peut-être "hier", je ne sais pas.

and in I:3:

"Aujourd'hui", j'ai beaucoup travaillé au bureau.

by the time it recurs: in I:4 it is an established device in what Fletcher (1971) appropriately calls Meursault's "rhetoric". We have already seen him use it with "Maintenant" but, while such a use is of very general occurrence among French speakers, Meursault's use of "aujourd'hui"/"hier" is rather less so. (He applies it occasionally to even the spatial "shifters", e.g. in I:6, Rester "ici" ou partir, cela revenait au même.) The effect of the device is to establish a frame of temporal reference in pseudo-real time such that, once it has been established, it continues to serve as the frame of reference for those utterances which have an overtly narrative force, i.e. the third in each of the series treated in this discussion.

3.4.5.1 In I:5 and I:6, a modified version of the device is used: no mention of "aujourd'hui" is made but the use of the narrative markers makes clear that the frame of temporal reference is in each case a particular day, which remains unspecified. Thus in I:5, Meursault refers to Le soir (of a day that is not indicated) and in I:6, while he situates the events on a particular day, Le dimanche, referring also to
la veille, no indication is given of which Sunday it is. It is as if _tu_ were already supposed to know of which days Meursault is speaking, just as he knew in the earlier chapters.\(^{22}\)

3.5 This pattern of **pseudo-real time** superseded by **event-time**, itself dominated by **real time**, constitutes a stylistic technique applied consistently throughout most of the first part of the book: if we include the modified form just discussed, then we may say throughout the entire first part.\(^{23}\)

In the second part, this technique is abandoned almost entirely: the use of **pseudo-real time** is restricted to the final chapter, II:5, leaving **event-time** prevalent, as seen in my earlier analysis. Instead, a different pattern is initiated through an increased use of **intervention-forms** and the Présent. By means of these sui-referential forms there occurs a constant cycle of reversion to **real time** whereby narration is set aside and it is _je-personne_ that figures in the language at these moments. In II:2, 3, 4, the opening is **real time** paralleling the **pseudo-real time** openings found in Part I but contrasting with them by the lack of any use of the "shifters". This dominance of **real time** over **event-time** is very marked, going even beyond the kind of formal consideration offered here. Thus Fletcher (1971:131) is able to say, "Meursault, ranging to and fro over the months in gaol, generalises about the experience rather than transcribes it in sequence as he had done in Part I". In the final chapter,
both of these patterns are joined: the opening is phrased in tense-forms that include Passé Composé, Présent, Futur and these are accompanied by one "shifter", en ce moment. As before, tu seems to be faced with real time utterances, an impression supported not only by the number of occurrences of the Présent itself but also by the Passé Composé forms, which here can be construed only as Parfait. Then the shift to event-time occurs, in a narration comprised mainly of the Imparfait interspersed with real time utterances. This pattern goes on for some time before there occurs a reprise of the opening sentence, which makes clear that the opening was only pseudo-real time:

p.167: "C'est à un semblable moment que j'ai refusé une fois de plus de recevoir l'aumônier".

From this point on, the pattern is that of constant shifting between event-time and real time, coming to an end in event-time.

* * * * * * * * * * * *

4.0 Despite the differences between the two parts, there is a fundamental unity that I have tried to show by my analysis of time in the work: throughout, there is the dominance of real time over event-time, of je-personne over je-personnage.

4.1 The enormous proportion of narrative markers in the text is a statistical fact that, nevertheless, does nothing to alter the perception that tu has of je and his rôle in the
allocutionary situation. The narrative force of such markers is clearly seen to be only one of various forces occurring in the allocution: at all times it is clearly je who is speaking. It is not possible to say here as we have seen Benveniste say, "Personne ne parle ici; les événements semblent se raconter eux-mêmes". The real-time utterances are a constant reminder of who is speaking.

4.1.1 Equally crucial in this respect is the rôle of pseudo-real time. The principle of an other now, I have argued, is founded on the pragmatic observation by tu that the spatio-temporal coordinates of a given utterance — as marked by the "shifters" and the Present tense — do not arise out of the allocutionary situation in which tu and je are participants. Pseudo-real time, posited as a convention of linguistic performance, constitutes therefore a reaffirmation of the allocutionary situation itself, since, without the allocutionary situation, pseudo-real time can have neither sense nor function. Even in a third-person narrative, tu's ability to comprehend the Narrative Present is founded on this same principle, however "anonymous" the narrator seems otherwise to be. It is well and good to consider the Narrative Present as a stylistic device, a means of heightening dramatic effect; the syntactico-semantic mechanics of the device are nevertheless tied to the principle of an other now, itself based on real time.
4.2 The entire array of the formal properties of the language of *L’Étranger* attests to the dominance of real time and the concepts of subjectivité and personne as enunciated by Benveniste, showing je and tu to be, in accordance with first principles, partners in an allocutionary situation of classic simplicity, displaying the characteristics of the most ordinary kind of allocution, that of conversation. *L’Étranger* is the text of a conversation. I offer this less as a claim than a conclusion, based on the earlier claim that tu is undisturbed by the time-shifts observable in the language of Meursault. In conversation, such time-shifts — especially those introducing pseudo-real time — are observed directly as devices marking a change of illocutionary force within an utterance-configuration and, as such, merely commensurate with devices indicative of other types of force within other utterances.

4.3 The conversational attributes of Meursault’s language have often been commented on, though always from a point of view of style. Thus, for example, Fletcher (1971:126) speaks of "informal address" and "conversational immediacy", while Barrier (1962:27) cites forms whose function is "ajouter un élément d'authenticité". Such observations refer to what is commonly known as the tone of a certain sample of language and, almost invariably, are author-oriented. They do not carry the implication that the sample in question is, in fact, an extract from the text of a conversation. For them to do so
would be to posit certain aspects of the allocutionary situation which would be contrary to the basic assumptions the writers have already made with regard to that situation. My claim, on the other hand, is explicitly that *L'Etranger* is a conversation between Meursault and *tu*, a one-to-one communication, with all the linguistic attributes and mechanisms that such an allocutionary situation requires. Having discussed at length the linguistic features that have brought me to this conclusion, I wish to address myself briefly to the question of how justified it seems from the point of view of the allocutionary situation, in the light, especially, of some of its literary implications.

* * * * * * * *

5.0 My deliberations in this final section will be guided by one principle above all: in any conversation, each partner brings to it what he is and what he knows. This is, in its simplest form, the allocutionary situation of all conversation: the world of *je* and the world of *tu* come together and this juxtaposition forms the point of departure for the sequential phenomenon that is conversation.

5.1 Generally speaking, studies on *L'Etranger* show agreement on one general point, namely that it is a communication on the part of Meursault. With whom, where, when and even why there is this communication are questions that have
received a variety of answers. Some are quite categorical: for Pariente (1968), it is clear that Meursault is writing a diary, while for Mitterand (1969) the work is clearly a soliloquy or monologue. On the other hand, it is only in their denial of such suggestions that some scholars seem categorical, as for example Rey (1970) for whom, according to the report of Fitch (1971:240), "ni l'hypothèse d'un 'journal' ni celle d'un 'monologue' n'est acceptable". Rey's own approach to the question is not clear (cf. p. 29) and tends to consider Camus more than Meursault. Fitch himself (1968d) is more explicit and reasoned than Mitterand in concluding that it is a "monologue intérieur" rather than a journal, but his solution, as Quilliot (1969b:187) tellingly observes, only raises further problems: "Il est bien vrai qu'on voit mal pourquoi Meursault aurait écrit son journal. ... Mais est-il naturel, étant ce qu'il est, qu'il [...] revive [son passé] au présent?"

This concern of Quilliot for verisimilitude is reminiscent of Girard's contention (1968:37) that "Meursault ne lit pas et n'écrit pas. On ne l'imagine pas en train de soumettre un manuscrit à un éditeur, ou en train de corriger des épreuves" and casts doubt, therefore, on the acceptability of any proposal that Meursault is engaged in some kind of rédaction. In yet other cases, the allocutionary situation is referred to only in passing and somewhat obliquely: Renaud (1957:295) looks upon Meursault's text as a "retour dans le passé" in which "le narrateur est en train de retracer une période de sa
vie", though observing elsewhere (p.290) that, with regard to time, "ce sera le présent seul qui comptera", leaving unresolved the potential contradiction between these ideas. Cruickshank's characterization of Meursault as "a character within the novel's own world speaking directly, and in his own person, to the reader" (1956:243) seems tantalisingly precise in its formulation yet, lacking any kind of development, leaves one to wonder in fact how metaphorical is his use of terms. It is fair to say that all of these studies, with possible exception of Fletcher's and Cruickshank's, are concerned more with Meursault-je than with tu and more with questions of temps chronologique than those of temps linguistique. All are dominated, furthermore, by a recognition of the pragmatic fact that L'Etranger is a book yet do not dwell on the relationship of reader to text. As Ong (1975), Weiss (1974), Poulet (1969) and Prince (1971, 1973) have pointed out, the reader plays a crucial phenomenological rôle in any written work and that this rôle varies from one kind of text to another. In the case of L'Etranger, it offers a special order of interest.

5.2 Pariente (1968:53) makes the following observation:

"Dans la vie courante, [...] il n'arrive guère qu'on parle sans s'adresser à un ou plusieurs interlocuteurs définis, qui ne sont peut-être pas présents en chair et en os, mais avec qui du moins on partage un certain nombre de circonstances et parfois même toute une histoire, des interlocuteurs donc qui peuvent apparaître comme des complices auxquels il n'est pas besoin de tout dire pour se faire entendre, initiés qu'ils sont par situation à certains
aspects de ce qu'on souhaite exprimer." [my emphasis]

That is to say je comes to a conversation with certain expectations, certain things that he takes for granted with respect to his allocutionary obligations towards tu. The assumptions he makes in this regard are reflected in his linguistic behaviour and in his text.

5.2.1 Meursault says "Aujourd'hui": he does not define it or locate it but merely says it, because he assumes quite conventionally that tu is aware what "aujourd'hui" means in the utterance even when, as we have seen, it does not refer to real time. He says "maman" and "l'asile", again without recourse to any kind of referential specification: tu is assumed to know who "maman" is - that is, to know the person whom Meursault calls "maman" - and, in the same way, to know of the "asile" which is referred to. Likewise, je does not identify himself, the name "Meursault" occurring only later in the text and in the form of reported speech. Barrier (1962:22), noting the lack of expository details in L'Etranger, observes "Cependant, comme la plupart des romanciers, à partir des années 30, évitent ce genre de préparation, nous ne nous y arrêterons pas". For him, this absence is a matter of literary fashion. However, his comment is once again an observation on the work of Camus and misses the fact that, Camus notwithstanding, Meursault's linguistic behaviour is governed by sociolinguistic factors of a conventionalised kind. Tu
here receives no elucidation or exposition because he needs none, as je is well aware. Thus, while L'Etranger has an opening, it has no beginning: it opens in medias res, with the allocutionary situation already established. Tu is part of the world of je and in his conversational rôle has no difficulty in perceiving and comprehending the tense-shifts we have observed. All of this is presupposed in the utterances of Meursault.

5.3 Nevertheless, L'Etranger is incontrovertibly a book and "book" entails "reader". For the reader, the book is a material object in his world, an object which he possesses. Yet, as Poulet (1969:55) points out,

"As soon as I replace my direct perception of reality by the words of a book, I deliver myself, bound hand and foot to the omnipotence of fiction. I say farewell to what is, in order to feign belief in what is not. I surround myself with fictitious beings; I become the prey of language. There is no escaping this takeover. Language surrounds me with its unreality".

Poulet's explanation of the consequences of this phenomenon is as follows:

"Everything happens [...] as though, from the moment I become a prey to what I read, I begin to share the use of my consciousness with this being [...] who is the conscious subject esconced at the heart of the work. He and I, we start having a common consciousness. Doubtless, within this community of feeling, the parts played by each of us are not of equal importance. The consciousness inherent in the work is active and potent; it occupies the foreground; it is clearly related to its own world, to objects which are its objects. In opposition, I myself, although conscious of whatever it may be conscious of, I play a much more humble rôle, content to record passively all that is going in me. [...] Thus I often have the
impression, while reading, of simply witnessing an action which at the same time concerns and yet does not concern me. This provokes a certain feeling of surprise within me. *I am a consciousness astonished by an existence which is not mine, but which I experience as though it were mine."

(59-60) [second emphasis mine]

From the pragmatic fact of the reader's attachment to his own world and his own reality comes the "astonishment" at his incorporation into the world of the book, an astonishment which, as Poulet goes on to say, is the source of the reader's critical faculty in relation to the book. But it is the incorporation into the world of the book that is of interest here and it is language that brings it about. In *L'Etranger*, the reader is immediately incorporated into the rôle of tu within the world of Meursault; the whole play of the language both posits this allocutionary rôle and, of course, stems from it.

5.4 To identify *tu* with the reader is to introduce into our consideration of the work a new dimension, namely the author. Camus is responsible for casting the allocutionary rôles of Meursault and *tu* and thus for the phenomenological consequences of the incorporation of *tu*. While the reader as *tu* "accepts an existence" which is not his and the presuppositions on which, linguistically, it is founded, he brings to this experience none of the knowledge and familiarity with which, as *tu*, he is conventionally endowed. Instead, he brings only the knowledge born of his experience in his own world. Thus, tied by sociolinguistic conventions to his
allocutionary rôle, he is at the same time disoriented in this rôle by his ignorance of the facts of a world not his. This is Camus's doing: he uses no expository techniques to orient the reader, he offers him no help, he merely leaves him, as tu, to Meursault and to his own devices.

5.4.1 The reader is confronted by two anomalies: the person of Meursault and the facts of which Meursault speaks. As Meursault's allocutionary partner, he has an almost conventional rôle to play both in receiving the speaker's utterances and in reacting to them. The rôle is not quite conventional, though, inasmuch as he may not intervene and take his turn to speak. Thus, he can not seek clarification or explanation nor can he express his reaction to Meursault's communication. In this precise yet important way, he is deprived. I say "precise" because in all but his ability to become je his rôle is complete and conventional, above all in his ability to respond emotionally and intellectually to the person of Meursault. I say "important" because, in his deprived state, he is obliged to accept and rely on what Meursault says. Without Meursault's communication to him as tu, he can know nothing about Meursault's world; by his acceptance of the rôle of tu, he acquiesces in the truth of what Meursault tells him. He can have no predisposition to suppose that Meursault is lying. While this is another way of stating Coleridge's "willing suspension of disbelief", it is also more than that: it shows
how Camus has achieved a complete entrapment of the reader. It is a master-stroke with great phenomenological consequences for the whole work.

5.4.2 From the lips of Meursault, the reader becomes acquainted with Meursault himself and the events of Meursault's world both past and present. He absorbs not only the narrative of past events and their relation to each other but also those events consisting of the acts of Meursault in his uttering—the declarations and comments, his style of expression, the attitudes he displays towards his world. He is given no portrait of Meursault; rather, he concocts one on the basis of his direct observation of Meursault. One ventures to suggest that the resultant portrait is not likely, in the case of most readers, to be flattering to its subject. One might indeed go further and say not only that Meursault can hardly be accused of "gilding the pill" with respect to himself but also that the reader is thereby further induced to acquiesce in the veracity of the narrative element of Meursault's allocution. The reader's reactions, whatever they be, spring from himself and so will vary from reader to reader. Thus, throughout Part I of L'Etranger, the reader as tu is engaged in formulating his own individual view and opinions of the person of Meursault. However, these opinions aside, his knowledge of the past events of Meursault's world and Meursault's relation to them is shared in all particulars by all readers.
through Meursault's own account of them. This "common knowledge" is, by the end of Part I, something to which — within his purview of Meursault's world — the reader is uniquely privy. Furthermore, since the reader has to posit the veracity of what Meursault says, this knowledge constitutes an adequate, if not necessarily complete, purview of Meursault's world. Up to the moment of utterance of the last word of Part I, there have been for the reader as tu no other events in Meursault's world and beyond that moment, since it is the present, there simply is no time and therefore there can be no events.28

5.4.3 Throughout Part I, the reader as tu is the recipient of Meursault's account of his world and the observer of Meursault himself. In Part II, he becomes the recipient of what is, in large part, Meursault's account of someone else's account of Meursault's world and of Meursault himself. At the same time, he continues his own direct observation of Meursault and his world as in Part I. His purview of Meursault's world and its events is enlarged — principally by the events of and surrounding the trial and the posture of both Meursault and others in relation to these events — as is the "common knowledge" to which he is still uniquely privy — here principally the events beyond the trial, e.g. in prison, and Meursault's posture in relation to these.

5.4.4 The crucial difference between the reader's experience in Parts I and II is his realisation in Part II that his privy
knowledge acquired in Part I is at odds with the public knowledge on the same matters that is available in Meursault's world and represented in the work by the utterances of the judge and, ultimately, by the jury. This places him in a position to react to the utterances and actions of the judge or, in other words, to adopt a posture towards them in the same way that he has adopted a posture towards Meursault and his utterances and actions.

5.4.5 The reader's purview of Meursault's world, thanks to his privy knowledge, is clearly greater than that of the court and he is thus able, from his privileged position as tu, to assess the reliability of the judge's utterances, being under no allocutionary or other obligation merely to accept them. He is in a position to judge the judge. This, I submit, is precisely what he is intended to do. Speaking metaphorically, it is what might be called the perlocutionary force of the work. Camus, by his skilful use of linguistic and socio-linguistic conventions, has achieved a phenomenological tour de force whereby the reader becomes a character in the work not only in the sense of having the rôle of tu but also by his condemnation of the judge. This is to say much more than merely that every book needs a reader in order to exist as a sound in the forest needs an ear for its realisation. Rather, it is to say that without the reader in the rôle of tu L'Etranger would remain organically defective.
5.5 It can not be assumed, of course, that all readers will indeed condemn the judge: each of us may know of instances to the contrary. But such a case does not diminish Camus's achievement, since by refusing to condemn the judge such a reader effectively "condemns" himself, at least in the view of Camus. Either way, Camus's objective is realised. Likewise, it must not be assumed that to condemn the judge one must like Meursault or, for that matter, Camus. Camus, however, has gambled that a condemnation will occur but, careful to cover his bet, he has also loaded the dice.

5.5.1 The theme of trickery on Camus's part has appeared quite frequently throughout the literature from Thody (1961: 21) on, though not always with the same orientation. To my mind, the trick lies in Camus's placing the reader in the rôle of tu while depriving him of the knowledge with which, as tu, he has the right to be endowed. In this situation, the reader has no idea that Meursault is a criminal until learning of it from Meursault himself nor, until almost the end of the book, any inkling of Meursault's condemnation for his criminality. He is forced to rely on the evidence as furnished by Meursault, if he is to condemn the judge in accordance with Camus's wish. His view is thus undisturbed by the benefit of foreknowledge of events. A clear instance of how important this is concerns the reader's attitude towards the death of the Arab. At the end of Part I, the reader is able to decide for himself whether
Meursault's act was a killing or, more than that, a murder. It is to be noted, however, that nothing in the text can count as a legally unmistakable indication of murder: the reader must decide. Thus he judges Meursault. At the time of this judgement, he is unaware that a court will judge, indeed has already judged Meursault. With his judgement made, and for his own reasons, the reader learns in Part II of the procedures involved in a legal judgement of Meursault and the reasons invoked therein, to find not only that they are perhaps not his reasons but also that they are invalid. From this stems the condemnation intended by Camus.

5.6 Thody has argued that a second reading of *L'Etranger* is required and that it will, in a particular sense, contradict the first. A second reading, required or not, is certainly most instructive though, contrary to Thody's idea, it does not, I claim, contradict the first. Rather, it substantiates it. Whatever one's reaction to the person of Meursault on the first reading, it is not likely to be different on the second. Even one's attitude to the killing is not likely to change. What will most probably be altered is the weight the reader is now prepared to give to these feelings and reactions, precisely because he knows during the rereading of Part I that a trial is to follow. Indeed, it is not too fanciful to suggest that, on a second reading, the reader will reject as irrelevant many of his own reactions precisely because he now knows, from his
knowledge of the trial, that they were irrelevant when cited by the prosecutor. In other words, his purview of Meursault's world is thoroughly different; he is no longer the deprived tu of the first reading.

5.6.1 Seen from this point of view, Meursault's utterances have the illocutionary force of evidence-giving and their linguistic and stylistic characteristics bear this out. The lack of argument and causal relationships, the unexplained statements of liking or preference, the lack of reticence in connexion with his own character, these and other characteristics have been cited many times as being indicative of a "témoignage" but are seen as devices used by Camus to impart a tone of authenticity to the text or as rhetorical deviousness resorted to by Meursault the better to manipulate the reader. However, none of the critics making such claims or observations seems to have realised that to so claim is to posit very precise features of the context of utterance of the text and to imply an allocutionary situation of such a kind that it must give rise to the very linguistic features that are encountered in the text and which I have sought in this work to analyse and explain.

5.7 Here is not the place to engage in speculation on the style of Camus in his other works nor to make statements on their comparative worth. One may say, though, that in
L'Etranger Camus engaged in a work of consummate skill, bringing off a condemnation of society by society itself. The unsuspecting reader, complying with the conventions he himself has helped to create, moves with the inevitability of the dawn to fulfil the rôle so masterfully prepared for him. The work is like no other; it stands apart, with the flashing hardness of a jewel.

* * * * * * * *
NOTES

1. Reference to chapters will be made as follows: e.g. I:1, where the Roman numeral indicates Part I of the work and the Arabic refers to chapter 1.

2. Discussion of the discours indirect libre is treated in detail in Fitch (1968b) and is not pertinent to this study, except for the observation that it is a device marking narration on the part of the speaker. However, there is one curious example of it: on p. 14, in connection with the conversation between Meursault and the concierge, discours indirect libre is presented using the Présent instead of the Imparfait and the Passé Composé instead of the Plusqueparfait:

"C'est alors qu'il m'avait appris qu'il avait vécu à Paris et qu'il avait du mal à l'oublier. A Paris, on reste avec le mort trois, quatre jours quelquefois. Ici on n'a pas le temps, on ne s'est pas fait à l'idée que déjà il faut courir derrière le corbillard. Sa femme lui avait dit alors: 'Tais-toi, ce ne sont pas des choses à raconter à monsieur'."

3. Such cases as this, where C'est dominates a clause in a Past tense, are of great interest but difficult to analyse, especially since we find in some cases C'était instead of C'est. It is not fully clear what purpose this contrast serves or indeed whether C'est-C'était is established as a contrast within the language generally.

4. Concerning the occurrences of the Passé Simple (in the Livre de Poche edition, they are found on pp. 24 (twice), 34, 37, 113), I am inclined to agree with Barrier (1962:10) that "Ce sont certainement des inadvertances". Some support for this is found in Rossi (1969:5-18) where evidence is shown of the scrupulousness with which Camus seems to have transcribed for L'Etranger sections of material from the Cahiers.

5. A similar position taken by Fitch (1968d) on the question of the language of L'Etranger is attacked by Barrier (1962:8) on the grounds that it would bring about a situation in which "l'on finira par oublier complètement Camus". Fitch has surely shown the greater acumen in this matter, however; he is certainly less prone to attribute error to Camus, realizing that to do so is to make the more crucial error of failing to distinguish, in his own words, "le style de ce qui est ... sa raison d'être — le personnage
de Meursault" (quoted by Barrier, p. 8). For while Camus is ultimately responsible for all that L'Etranger contains, the details in question belong - and are represented as belonging - to the world of Meursault rather than the world of Camus.

As for Meursault's particular usage of the Imperfect Subjunctive, it would be interesting to know whether this occurs with other individual French speakers.

6. Even Abbou does not observe the distinctions consistently. For example, by specifying samedi, the instance he quotes - "c'est aujourd'hui samedi" - constitutes a reference to le temps chronique. This fact and others like it form an important part of what I shall claim later. In addition, it should be pointed out that Abbou's inclusion of the item "enterrement demain" is erroneous, to say the least, since these are the words of the telegramme and not, like the others, of Meursault.

7. This figure does not include occurrences of mais, in spite of its high frequency. Mais is very ambiguous from this point of view: in many instances it might be said that it does not function as a presentential at all but merely as a device to mark the continuation of narrative. At the same time, I am persuaded that Weinrich's characterisation of mais as an "adverbe de consécution narrative" may well be an exaggeration.

8. cf. Todorov (1967a:503; 1970b:7-8) and Benveniste (1970:16-17) on the importance of such questions and, above all, Allerton & Cruttenden (1974) where categories are proposed within the range of these commentary-forms, though without any aim of relating them to the speech situation. Their so-called "syntactic" analysis of these items is interesting inasmuch as it raises the whole question of how to express the force of an item by a satisfactory paraphrase. The authors' success in this is a matter of question but their attempt makes clear the difficulties involved, especially that of the membership of specific items in the classes proposed, e.g. possibly and probably (p. 16).

9. They occur on pp. 24, 29, 41, 62, 70, 95, 106, 138, 151, 162, 167. Two are worth special mention. The first (p. 62) is as described by Kruisinga but raises the question of whether the interruption is by Meursault or else by Raymond and merely reported by Meursault (in discours indirect libre):

"Raymond m'a téléphoné au bureau. Il m'a dit qu'un de ses amis (il lui avait parlé de moi) m'invitait à passer la journée de dimanche dans son éabanon, près
d'Alger."
(My own reading is that it is Meursault speaking.) The second is from p.151:

"... comme j'avais envie de parler, j'ai dit, un peu au hasard d'ailleurs, que je n'avais pas eu l'intention de tuer l'Arabe." [my emphasis]

Here the parentheses are lacking but, if we take into account the presentential d'ailleurs, the force is the same as if they were present. This is a particularly interesting example, for while the interruption is in one sense not grammatically independent of the interrupted sentence (i.e. au hasard = adverbial), it must be regarded at the same time — given the force of d'ailleurs — as having the force of a complete performative utterance and thus as being, in some sense of the term, grammatically independent (cf. the example cited from p.41: "... le rouge, je crois, ...")..

10. In addition, we find the occasional case of a long series of sentences which suspend the narration, e.g. pp.39-40, 41-42, 43. These are not counted among the interruptions and, generally speaking, might be classified as "digressions", especially in view of their length. To what extent they may be compared with interruptions is hard to say, since the tenses involved make for certain difficulties in this regard. In pp. 41-42, for example it is not clear to me whether the forms of the Présent are Présent du discours or Narrative Present. This seems to be an area in which Levenston's approach might prove profitable.

11. In this connection, see note 41 of the preceding chapter. Also, it should be noted that this idea does not conflict with the notion of performative, since the latter is not the characterising of a force but the performance of an act. The reason Salamano does not use the utterance mentioned in the discussion is that it would constitute an invalid use of a performative form, since Je t'insulte would have descriptive force, i.e. the whole utterance would then mean "Je t'insulte en disant 'Salaud! ...'". For the form to count as a performative, he would have to say merely "Je t'insulte!" with no elaboration.

12. The error to which I refer is no casual matter. Unless proof can be shown that Meursault actually wrote the text found in L'Etranger (such is the objective of those who seek, for example, to demonstrate that he wrote a diary), the use of a word like rédaction is not only a misnomer but also, and above all, misleading: if there is no proof
that Meursault actually was an "author", then the use of "rédaction" is valid only in relation to Camus. The implications of this difference are crucial.

13. The question of terms for this notion is raised in Lehtonen (1973:390). The term real time is chosen in preference to others such as le présent du narrateur, etc., also mentioned by Lehtonen: these have, in my view, the defect of over-emphasising narration (cf. my earlier remarks to the same effect with reference to Benveniste and Weinrich). The use by Fletcher (1971) of the terms "'real' present" (p.128) and "'true' present (p.131) approximates my use of real time but, as his use of quotation marks implies, he does not seek to define systematically what he means by them nor how to identify such occurrences in the text. When he does in fact explicate "'true' present" as "that of the rédaction" (p.131), he makes an assumption concerning the allocutionary situation which he does not elucidate and which I, for one, am unable to accept. (However, it is only fair to add that he also points out later (p.152) that "the medium [of transmission] itself is not significant".)

14. cf. also note 3 of this chapter. However, in spite of my reluctance to make claims in this matter, I am persuaded by my own reading of the text that this instance of C'était is a key to the whole question of time and tense in the work. Furthermore, Meursault's own use of C'est and C'était would seem to substantiate this: cf. instances on pp.8, 9, 10, 14, 16, 17, etc., etc.

15. Fletcher (1971), whose conclusions concerning the tenses are essentially the same as mine, asserts (p.126) that in the opening paragraphs the "present time" is in fact "dramatic present", a term I take to be comparable with my pseudo-real time. He does not explain his use of the term, though,—above all from the point of view of tu—and leaves the impression that his observation is strictly intuitive. To say as he does that the dramatic present "is not always provoked necessarily by a majority use of the present tense itself" is not to offer a foundation for his intuition.


17. Barrier, conscious of this, undertakes to rely on his own reactions as a reader rather than as a critic. To a large extent, he succeeds in this, as for example when he observes the use of the definite article in Le soir, etc. (p. 23) and the "interventions du narrateur" (p.24). However,
it is surely as a critic that he finds error and illogi-
cality in the text.

18. It is a vexed question, however. Although he does not
cite this passage, Fletcher (1971:127) says of others that
I have mentioned that they "are descriptive and not nar-
rational" and this would seem to lend support to my asser-
tion.

19. This is especially true in the light of the tenses of the
next sentence: "Raymond est venu et m'a dit qu'il avait
envoyé la lettre". If the utterance were in real time
— in accordance with Barrier's claim — one would expect
a envoyé instead; cf. also Fletcher's translation of this,
in real time (Raymond has been and told me that he's sent
the letter), where the same difference is manifested.

20. What is anomalous here is precisely the fact that the
first of these forms not only has no parentheses but also
no evident separation from the main clause. This sentence
would in any case require some explanation and, while the
easiest thing would be to adopt Barrier's notion of a Per-
fect, the preceding note makes clear why this is untenable.

21. Here one cannot do better than to say with Pariente (1968:
59), "Il est impossible de prendre un écrit au sérieux si
l'on recourt à la psychologie de son auteur dès qu'il
reçoit une tournure inattendue".

22. It would be more accurate to say "thought he knew", for
the chronological information is in fact quite hazy. That
is to say, one doesn't know with any certainty at any
given moment, apart from the weekend following the funeral,
what time has elapsed. Thus, when we read in I:4: "J'ai
bien travaillé toute la semaine" and "Hier, c'était samedi
...", etc., one does not actually know which day or which
week is supposed to be indicated — hence my earlier refe-
rence to the "spurious" use of the shifters.

23. Bearing in mind that pseudo-real time, with its other now,
is finally just as much a narrative marker as is some more
obvious form of event-time, it becomes plain why I am un-
willing to accept Abbou's characterisation of Part I as
non-narrative, i.e. dominated by le temps linguistique
through its normal markers: He bases his approach on a
relatively inflexible version of the discours-récit con-
trast with no concept like that of pseudo-real time and
thus his reading of the shifters is literal.

24. It is much less clear why Mitterand draws this conclusion,
however.
25. Pariente (1968) is the notable exception to this statement, devoting the first pages of his study to just such basic questions. Even he, however, concentrates on _je_.

26. Ong (1975:13), speaking of Hemingway, says that his "exclusion of indefinite in favor of definite articles signals the reader that he is from the first on familiar ground. He shares the author's familiarity with the subject matter". Camus's use of techniques borrowed from Hemingway has often been referred to (e.g. Thody (1961:20) and Cruickshank (1956:252)) but this particular point of similarity has not, to my knowledge, been previously noted.

My claim regarding the function of "maman" likewise concerns the the notion of familiarity, as opposed to intimacy or other affective factors. I stress this to avoid any association with the type of misconception all too common in a certain kind of "poetics" today, e.g. Kamber (1971), according to whom "maman" is a marker not only of tenderness and intimacy but also of a certain childishness in Meursault. The waywardness of such a conclusion goes beyond mere shades and degrees of opinion: it constitutes indeed, whether Kamber realises it or not, a very strong sociolinguistic claim that, I submit, Kamber would be very hard put to justify or demonstrate. At all events, he makes no attempt to do so but merely imputes to the reader (of _L'Etranger_) his own conclusion, suggesting thereby a strong coloration — from the second word of the book on — of the reader's perception of Meursault. There are probably better grounds for claiming that Kamber's observation is not that of a reader at all but rather the post facto reflection of a critic and, as such, related only tenuously if at all to _tu_.

27. For this reason, I cannot completely share the attitude of Fitch (1969a:152), when he peremptorily dismisses Somers' declaration that he "liked Meursault more than Roquentin". Such a personal response to the person of Meursault is certainly not unimportant — however contrary to the general reaction of readers — because it has its underlying source in the allocutionary rôle of _tu_, something which Fitch has naturally not discussed. Fletcher (1971: 126ff) treats this same general theme, drawing important if not all well-founded conclusions from the fact of the reader's reactions to Meursault.

28. This is a much misunderstood aspect of _L'Etranger_. Its importance from a phenomenological point of view is frequently missed by critics. Even a perceptive critic like Fletcher (1971) — though he is not alone in this — sees fit to accuse Meursault of "deceit" (p.127), of being "a
man who masks his eloquence the more effectively to snare us into succumbing to it" (p.129), of creating "an illusion of [...] objective veracity" (p.128). In so saying, he is drawing a conclusion about Meursault's behaviour based on a reading of the complete work, not merely of Part I. Having said this, I go on to point out that his arguments regarding Meursault's intentions are less forceful than they at first appear and that, with a markedly different stance on this point, one might yet arrive at the same fundamental conclusions. Some of his claims are simply too strong and lead to a certain confusion between what is true of Meursault and what is true of Camus (cf. the comments of Fitch (1971:187) on the similar stance adopted by Bersani in this regard).

29. Sometimes the "truchement" is seen to be on the part of Meursault himself, e.g. Barrier (1962:73), or even on the part of both character and author, e.g. Fletcher (1971: 134).
BIBLIOGRAPHY


London: Methuen
[Paris: Emile-Paul, 1913]


New York: Oxford University Press

(1965): How to do things with words.
New York: Oxford University Press

BALLY, Ch. (1965): Linguistique générale et linguistique française, 4e éd. rev. et corr.
Berne: Francke


Paris: Gallimard


CASTEX, P-G. (1965): Albert Camus et "L'Etranger". Paris: José Corti


Montréal: Editions Montmorency


(1968a): Albert Camus 1. Autour de "L'Etranger" (Textes réunis [et présentés] par Brian T. Fitch), La Revue des Lettres Modernes, nos. 170-174


(1968c): "Quelques critiques sur L'Etranger", La Revue des Lettres Modernes, nos. 170-174, pp. 219-236

(1968d): Narrateur et narration dans "L'Etranger" d'Albert Camus, analyse d'un fait littéraire, Archives des Lettres Modernes, no. 34, (2e édition revue et augmentée).


--------------(1970): "Camus and the parable of the perfect sentence", in Albert Camus II: *Symposium*, XXIV, no. 3 (Fall, 1970), pp. 254-261

GUILLAUME, G. (1952): *La langue est-elle ou n'est-elle pas un système?* Québec: Presses de l'Université Laval

--------------(1955): *Époques et niveaux temporels dans le système de la conjugaison française*. Québec: Presses de l'Université Laval

GUIRAUD, P. (1961): *La stylistique* (3e éd.)

Paris: P.U.F. (Collection: Que sais-je?)


Hajičová, E., J. Panevová & P. SGALL (1971): "The meaning of tense and its recursive properties (Part II)", *Philologica Pragensia* 14:2, pp. 57-64

Praga: Československá akademie


MAUPASSANT, Guy de (1957): Boule de Suif. Paris: Albin Michel (Série Livre de Poche #650)


OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, COMPACT EDITION. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971


New York: Fred. Ungar

New York: Grune & Stratton


London: Oxford University Press


Toronto: Macmillan


Paris: Hatier

Montréal: Editions de l'Université de Montréal. Montmorency
Rosenbaum, eds., Readings in English transformational
grammar, pp. 222-272
Waltham, Mass.: Ginn

(1975): "Where to do things with words", in P. Cole & J. L.
Morgan, eds., Syntax and semantics, vol. 3: Speech
Acts, pp. 233-256

232 (giugno, 1969), pp. 3-40

Paris: Plon - Recherches en Sciences Humaines 22

American Anthropologist, vol. 70, no. 6 (Dec.,
Bloomington: Indiana University Press

(1970): "The turn to talk", in J. J. Gumperz & D. Hymes,
eds., Directions in Sociolinguistics, pp. 346-380
New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston

Linguistic Inquiry, vol. III, no. 3 (Summer, 1972),
pp. 321-347

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press


SOMERS, P. P., jr. (1969): "Camus Sì, Sartre No; or, The delightful M.
Meursault", French Review, XLII, no. 5 (April,
1969), pp. 693-700

STAMPE, D. (1968): "Toward a grammar of meaning", Philosophical Review,
LXXVII, no. 2 (April, 1968), pp. 137-174

(1975): "Meaning and truth in the theory of Speech Acts", in P.
3: Speech Acts, pp. 1-40

Garden City: Doubleday Anchor Books, A364

(1964): "Intention and convention."


(1970a): L’énonciation; numéro rédigé par Tzvetan Todorov, Langages, 17 (mars, 1970)


