THE BODY/SOUL METAPHOR

IN THE PAPAL/IMPERIAL POLEMIC ON ELEVENTH CENTURY

CHURCH REFORM

by

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# Index

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abstract</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chronological list of authors examined</td>
<td>vii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter One: The Background</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Two: The Eleventh Century Setting</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendices</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A: Excursus on Priestly Dignity and Authority vs Royal or Imperial Power</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B: Excursus: The Gregorians' Defense of the Church's Necessity for Corporal Goods</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Footnotes</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ABSTRACT

An interest in exploring the roots of the Gregorian reform of the Church in the eleventh century led to the reading of the polemical writings by means of which papalists and imperialists contended in the latter decades of the century. It became apparent that argumentation from both sides substantially relied for expression on the metaphorical usage of the terms body and soul and their pertinent synonyms such as flesh and spirit.

In examining the use of these terms—which is the burden of this thesis—it is necessary to study their pre-history. Firstly, as the eleventh century writings examined here (the Libelli de Lite, vols. one and two) abundantly show, the polemists very often cite body/soul metaphorical usage from the Fathers of the Church as well as from the New Testament, particularly from Paul. Since these authorities in turn rest upon a Jewish basis in the context of a Hellenistic Jewish background these formative influences had to be studied. In this way, exploring the roots and subsequent formation of the medieval mentality as it grasped the meaning of body and soul and their mutual relationship one could understand the force of the eleventh century polemical use of the metaphor.¹

The purpose of this thesis then is to explore the use of the body/soul metaphor in order to see specifically to what extent the contending parties agreed in their acceptance of the body/soul relationship as well as disagreed. From this understanding one might gauge the effectiveness of the polemical use of the metaphor in the social and political cause for which it was used. Since the metaphor underlies the major
issues of simony, Nicolaitism, lay investiture and finally the struggle for supremacy between the Empire and the Papacy, the thesis examines it as cutting across these individual contentions and as representing the core issue, i.e. the essentially theological problem of the right relationship between the spiritual and the temporal or material orders.

The Eleventh Century Background

The major event that determined the character and problems of the eleventh century was the journey to Rome in 962 of Otto I (936-973), who ruled over the Eastern portion of the old Carolingian empire, there to be crowned emperor by Pope John XII in St. Peter's. The plan to renew the empire of Charlemagne which had ceased to exist in 924 was one that Otto had cherished for some time but was only able to execute after his victory over the Magyars on the Lechfeld in 955 and further military and political successes in northern Italy had offered the necessary, though relative peace. The Pope agreed to crown Otto and his Lombard wife Adelaide only after Otto had sworn to defend the rights and possessions of the Roman Church. Several days later, on February 2, 962, Otto solemnly reiterated the donations to the Roman Church of Pepin and Charlemagne and renewed the Constitution of Lothair of 824 which stated the emperor's rights to sovereignty over the Papal States. The Pope as local ruler was to exercise ordinary judiciary and administrative power. As well, the pope's right to crown and anoint the emperor was guaranteed. Thus placing himself in the theocratic footsteps of Charlemagne, Otto made possible the beginnings of a Church reform movement.
The task of stabilizing Empire and Church and of recognizing and adjusting their mutual and often interwoven relationships was a hardy one in the tenth century which, not without reason, has been called the *saeculum obscurum* or *ferreum*. The acme of imperial-papal cooperation in reform was attained in the persons of Otto III (983-1002) and his friend and mentor, Gerbert, Pope Sylvester II (999-1003). During the few years of their collaboration, Otto and Sylvester, "the new Constantine and the new Sylvester" strove to lead the corrupt world back to its idealized prototype under the first Christian emperor and Sylvester, bishop of Rome. The pre-eminence, however, was assured to the emperor who established his permanent residence in Rome.

In order to achieve the desired order in society as a whole it was necessary to destroy two evils whose roots and branches often intertwined: simony and "Nicolaitism." These were old problems within Christianity, finding their origin in the New Testament. Simony, a word coined from Simon Magus who attempted to purchase from the Apostles the power of the Holy Spirit (Acts 8: 18-24), was understood in the general sense of buying or selling of spiritual goods. Gregory the Great (590-604) confirmed the already developed notion of *haeresis simoniaca*: "whoever sinned against the Holy Spirit by simony should be regarded as a heretic." By these times it had particularly come to mean "services or fees given or demanded on appointment or ordination to the priesthood or episcopate."

Nicolaitism (or Nicolaism, Knowles, op. cit., p. 169) stems from a vaguely phrased condemnation in the Apocalypse 2: 6, 14 f. It came to mean clerical incontinence and specifically the marriage or concubinage of the clergy, an evil inveighed against canonically since the fourth century. Aside from its spiritually nefarious
consequences, more seriously condemned in monastic reform circles of the eleventh century, it also led to the alienation of church property as priests attempted to provide for their offspring by will or gift. It easily became the left hand of simony in an age when the general economy was tied to the land and church lands were largely bestowed by benefice or clerical office. Nicolaitism was condemned early in the century at the reforming synod of Pavia in 1022 under Pope Benedict VIII and Emperor Henry II. Not only the inner or spiritual reform of the Church but also the preservation of church property motivated this edict. Again, the papal/imperial collaboration was noteworthy.

After the death of Benedict VIII in 1024 the papal contribution to reform was set back by "a long series of flagrant simoniacs" until the one year reign of the reforming Gregory VI. Chaos followed his death until the accession of the notable reformer Leo IX (1049-1054). His reign largely coincided with that of the emperor Henry III (1039-1056) who, in his theocratic zeal for reform, took a step that was to prove explosive in imperial/papal relations. On the consecration of bishops Henry was not content to invest them with the staff alone, as was the now customary function of the lord temporal, but also with the ring symbolizing the spiritual marriage between the bishop and the church. Leo made no direct opposition to this encroachment but equipped his Roman entourage with the reforming personnel which was to mark his reign as "the turning point in the development of the eleventh century papacy." A kinsman of the emperor and Alsatian by birth, he was Henry's candidate for the papacy and fell in with the emperor's plans to call upon northerners and largely monks, i.e. the Cluniacs, the Lotharingians and the hermits of central Italy. Among these
he appointed cardinals Humbert of Silva Candida and Peter Damian, the Italian hermit, already an active proponent of reform. In so doing, Leo changed the nature of the Roman cardinalate from one of merely ceremonial nature to that of the pope's principal advisors and administrators, a move that radically increased the effective power and institutional structure of the Roman Church. Leo was at once vigorous in reform reiterating at a paschal synod in Rome earlier decrees against simony. Thereupon he undertook a series of long journeys—a novelty in papal procedure—highlighting the condemnation of simony and clerical marriage and concubinage.

It is important to stress that, in common with reforming popes among his predecessors, Leo's real fight was with simony and its ally Nicolaitism and not with contesting the foundation of the Carolingian-Ottonian theocracy. This latter was to prove, if not a by-product of the more basic reform, at least a second phase action. 10

Hildebrand, Pope Gregory VII (1073-1085), is the figure who, in his struggle with Emperor Henry IV (1056-1106) brought the contest of empire and papacy to the fore. As Morrison notes, this development came relatively late in the Gregorian reform. It was not an issue from the start. Rather, it emerged from other questions and, from the ecclesiological point of view, it always remained subordinate to more fundamental matters. For disputants on each side, the basic question was not whether Church or Empire should be supreme. It was, instead, whether evil practices, having crept into the Church, had corrupted communication of authentic doctrine. 11

In sum, rather than being a controversy over aspects of constitutional thought, about which neither contestant possessed clear distinctions, it was "a struggle for 'righteousness', a war to sweep away the wickedness that hindered the means for transmitting the means of salvation through preaching and sacraments." 12 F. R. Bennett, in his
Introduction to Gerd Tellenbach's CHURCH, STATE & CHRISTIAN SOCIETY AT THE TIME OF THE INVESTITURE CONTEST focuses on the main problem which both papalists and imperialists laboured under in seeking "to secure the observance of law and 'right order' in the Church." In their largely scriptural and early Christian arsenal of authoritative writings "each side had a different interpretation of the words they used." Just how different were the interpretations and what changes their constitutional effects threatened to bring into a society which so largely accepted the royal headship of the Church did not begin to become apparent until the course of "the first great age of propaganda in world-history" of which the Libelli de Lite are the core.
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HEBREW THOUGHT

The Evolution of Hebrew Thought on the Body/Soul Relationship

From the outset it must be recognized that the very posing of this issue would have been received with incomprehension in the Hebrew world certainly, at least up to approximately the 6th century B.C.E. when Babylonian influences and the later 4th century when Hellenistic influences began to make themselves felt. In what then we may call the traditional Hebrew world there reigned a virtually unquestioned belief in the basic unitary nature of man.

The term "soul," therefore, understood as "the spiritual component of human nature, the principle of life, which survives the dissolution of the human compound of soul and body" was foreign to Hebrew understanding. Indeed the term "soul" used in English and other vernaculars is a misleading if not impossible translation of the Hebrew nepesh.

The Hebrew nepesh, which may adequately be translated by the "self," while distinguished from the flesh [basar] (Dt. 12:23; Is. 10:18) is not to be understood as noncarnal in the sense in which spirit is opposed to flesh or to body. So far does this unitary comprehensiveness extend that even "life" and "death" form "a unified pair of concepts since death is the weakest form of life." Again basar (flesh/body)
frequently has the meaning of "man in this psychosomatic unity."\textsuperscript{4} Therefore, as Hans Walter Wolff remarks, it is not surprising that "concepts like heart, soul, flesh and spirit (but also ear and mouth, hand and arm) are not infrequently interchangeable in Hebrew poetry."\textsuperscript{5} This form of synthetic thinking is careful to avoid "the stereotyped translation of a Hebrew term by the same word (which) inevitably leads the understanding astray in most cases; it misses all too often the real statement that is being made about man."\textsuperscript{6} To sum up according to Wolff, nepesh, "designed to be seen together with the whole form of man,"\textsuperscript{7} enables the Hebrew to use "one and the same word where we need widely differing ones." Nepesh is never given the meaning of an indestructible core of a being, in contradistinction to the physical life, and even capable of living when cut off from that life.\textsuperscript{8} Obviously, then, since "any cult of life or death is lacking and with it also every speculation about the fate of the 'soul' beyond the borders of death,"\textsuperscript{9} its translation into later languages as "soul" in some radical way as distinct from or separable from the body is truly foreign to the traditional Hebrew mind.\textsuperscript{10}

As a necessary corollary it follows that the traditional Hebrew concept of the after-life must deal with man in the fullness of his earthly being. There is no life worthy of the name apart from "life." The concept of a resurrection to life from death for the individual is therefore non-existent. John L. McKenzie states that he has not included a discussion of belief in the resurrection in his book, \textit{A Theology of the Old Testament}, "because it can be proved only for the end of the Old Testament period and because it simply is not a component of the theology of the books of the Old Testament."\textsuperscript{11} To be precise the picture appears more nuanced, the pivotal
point of the distinction being the quality of individuality inherent in the nepesh. The beliefs of the early Hebrews and the Israelites up to the exile of the 6th century B.C.E. were formed out of the context of an organized cult of the dead who, in the popular belief, were thought to be beings endowed with mysterious power as elohim (or godly beings, i.e. beings possessing more than human powers). Therefore, while life in the after-earth of sheol, a dimly perceived underground abode, was at best one of gloomy shade it was decidedly not an annihilation of the nepesh. The head there retained some consciousness and perception; certain personal distinguishing characteristics endured such as one's family or tribal affiliation, the grey hairs of the old man, the wounds of the slain, etc. Still, there was no moral distinction, no reward for the good or punishment for the evil: one fate awaited all.12

THE PROCESS OF DEVELOPMENT

The evolution of the concepts soul/after-life and their increasing individuation or, put in another way, the developing concept of the individualistic soul and its possibility of existing beyond the grave where it is "freed" of the body is an effect, I believe, of three basic and eventually interwoven strands: the inner dynamic of Hebrew search and questioning as in the context of the vicissitudes of national political identity, i.e. national survival; secondly, Babylonian influences from the period of Exile (6th century B.C.E.) and thirdly, Hellenistic influences following upon the Religio-cultural hegemony established by Alexander the Great (4th and following centuries B.C.E.).
The Inner Hebrew Dynamic in Political Context

The whole issue must be understood as a factor of the growth of Yahwism, or of Israelite monotheism over many centuries. In the first place, or antecedently, the early or pre-mosaic Hebrew tribes held in common patrimony with surrounding tribes an active cult of the dead entailing a polytheistic culture fusion.

The dynamics of the Mosaic struggle for Hebrew tribal unity in the face of the perils of the Exodus demanded a consolidation of tribal gods as the sine qua non and ultimate symbol of political unity. This fusion and god-adoption Moses substantially accomplished under the aegis of the god Yahweh who from being the tribal god of Judah and later of the Kenites (the tribe of Moses’ wife) when they lost their tribal independence and were fused with Judah (Judges 1:16) increased his suzerainty from the amalgamated Judah in the south into the north as well. The culmination of this process, i.e. the domination of Judah and therefore of its god Yahweh, over all the Hebrew tribes occurred in the time of David (9th century B.C.E.). It was “then and only then” that “Yahweh became the god of all the people.” Nevertheless the extension of Yahweh’s increasingly sovereign power over all life, even the shadowy existence of Sheol and those detained there was a long and difficulty process. As Charles writes, Yahweh’s rule “for many centuries after Moses was conceived to extend not to the whole upper world, much less to the lower, i.e. Sheol, but only to His own people and His own land. Sheol preserved its independence undiminished in many respects down to the 4th century. This Charles refers to as the “heathen conception of Sheol side by side with the monotheistic conception of Yahweh as creator and ruler of the world for several centuries ...” Such a “heathen
conception", of course, is a vestige of ancestor worship which, though it had
"already withdrawn entirely into the background before the prophetic period"
survived in many of its usages which "still persisted in the popular belief till long
after the exile."^{15}

The Prophets, the Growth of Yahwism and the Individuality of the Soul

The phenomenon of prophecy in Israel arises, significantly, concomitantly
with the rise of the monarchy under Saul (c. 1020 B.C.E.). The two institutions
confronting each other in their beginnings continue to do so throughout their histories
with prophecy often seen as the agent of divine control over the worldly pretensions
of monarchy.^{16} Reform, therefore, at critical periods against the abuse of power
and the consequent recalling and extolling of divine justice is the leitmotif of the
prophets' vocation as the chosen spokesmen for Yahweh. It is their preachments, in
season and out of season, that give much form as well as substance to what has become
known as the chief glory of Israel: ethical monotheism; namely, Yahweh is just and
his justice is seen as increasingly universal.^{17} In this perspective the growth of
Yahweh's dominion, even over Sheol as heathen cultic practices continued to recede,
was a natural consequence powerfully fostered by the prophets. Amos (c. 750 B.C.E.)
with his warning insistence on the "day of the Lord" as a surely coming day of divine
retribution called forth by the current age of intolerable social injustice as evidenced
by the discrepancy between rich and poor makes a first tentative step in this direction.
Amos' vision is bound to an earthly conception but it is recognized as an early
prophetic glimmer of what was to lead to a more transcendent answer. As Bultmann
alleges: "It was above all the question of Yahweh's justice and thus of the ultimate realization of his covenant promise which pressed them towards a solution beyond death."\(^\text{18}\)

With the prophet Jeremiah in the late seventh and early sixth century B.C.E. we learn how powerfully Israel's self-conception and answers to questions re responsibility, God's justice and his fidelity to the covenantal promise of Israel's survival are shaped by the turn of national events. Jeremiah was a witness to the tragic ills that led up to and followed upon the ruin of the kingdom of Judah. The Babylonian Captivity entailing severe social fragmentation and the brusque exposure to a civilization in many ways advanced shook Judaism to its foundations. The commonplaces of national and collective reward and punishment were strained so that what Eichrodt calls "the spiritual independence of the individual" achieved prominence. "Through Jeremiah the foundation of a true individualism was laid, and the law of individual retribution proclaimed."\(^\text{19}\)

Ezekiel, prophet of the Exile, adopts and expands upon Jeremiah's teaching though it would be a mistake to interpret his famous vision of the revivification of the valley of dry bones (ch. 37) in terms of individual resurrection. This would have been inconceivable in the 6th century when it is obviously the "re-creation of the dispersed community" which is represented as "rising from the dead."\(^\text{20}\)

In summation, the Babylonian Captivity caused the rise of a new element of individualism, or perhaps better said, of individual worth and responsibility in Israel.\(^\text{21}\)
The influence of the Babylonian Captivity or of the Exile on Judaism, particularly on Jewish beliefs, is a prime bone of scholarly contention. There is less trouble in ascribing to the religious importance of the Exile the survival of national and religious consciousness. Doctrinal influences arouse more controversy. The operative word is "dualism." While it is overly simple to contend that Judaism "became dualistic" after the Exile probably due to Persian influence particularly as exemplified in Angra Mainya (Destructive Spirit) eternally opposed to Spenta Mainyu (Holy Spirit), still it would be unreasonable to deny a distinct Zoroastrian effect on Jewish conceptions. As we have seen, elohim, or superior powers partaking of the godly, populated early Hebrew experience and persisted, despite the advance of Yahweh to centre stage, especially in the folk religion. Nevertheless, in what must be recognized as a certain Zoroastrian influence, Satan appears among the Jews after 538 B.C.E. (end of the Exile) as 'the Adversary' (Zechariah 3:1-2) and in Job 1:6ff, he is Yahweh's opponent tormenting the suffering Job. Clearly then, this nurturing of Jewish dualism will have determining effects on the traditional unitary body/soul acceptance. So Charles Guignebert judiciously comments that while "the Jews could only conceive of man in his totality, as the vital union of flesh and soul" still "it is none the less easy to see the influence of Persian theories of good and evil and of the distinction between matter, which was bad, and spirit, which was fundamentally good, and of the Greek anthropologists with their discourse of a soul whose fate was independent of the body that had housed it, led the Jews to think of the nepesh as a more definite entity, incorporating all that was divine and eternal in man." Again, this is not full-blown dualism but an important step
that veers in its direction. It was, however, a step fraught with the most serious consequences indeed touching the care of the Hebrew religion, its belief in one God, already in the Persian period of Jewish history a tendency began to show itself towards a modification of Hebrew monotheism in terms of Persian dualism. Granted, this tendency did not fully develop until the period of Greek rule and it was not until late in the Greek period that it is given literary expression in the apocalyptic struggle of God versus the evil power or powers.

The Greek Contribution

While the famous dictum of the Sophist Protagoras (mid 5th century B.C.E.):
"Man is the measure of all things" stamped the Greek character with its classical imprint, it was not without opposition particularly in the thought of Plato who leaned on the Orphic and Pythagorean belief in body/soul dualism.

According to the substance of the Orphic myth of man's nature he is formed from the cosmic struggle between the god Dionysus and the Titans, powers of evil. Man is composed of elements of the divine (Dionysiac) incorporated by the Titans when they devoured the god. Thus man's nature is twofold: "his soul divine, Dionysiac, his body evil, Titanic," or in terms of inferior/superior as expressive of man's radical duality: "his body is of earth, but his soul is of celestial origin." Since the soul has fallen from above into the corrupt mire of a body it must struggle to purify itself so as to return to its pure and natural state. Thus purification entailing rigid Asceticism marks Orphic practices aimed at liberating the soul from the body. This process is conceived as such an arduous task that it entails the
increasingly ascetic living of several lives before the soul is worthy of "salvation." Hence the teaching on transmigration of souls ending finally in the soul's "liberation and eternal rest among the gods or in eternal suffering—we would say, in heaven or hell."28

The soul, therefore, being divine in essence, is immortal and finds itself buried in the corrupt, mortal body because of a rebellion for which it must be punished. Hence the famous Pythagorean dictum related by Philolaus, a disciple of the master: "For the sake of punishment the soul is yoked to the body and buried in it as a tomb."29 More succinctly, Plato will later sloganize the theory that the body is the tomb of the soul with the famous soma sēma (body prison). In stressing, as authors always do, the rigid dualism of this view of body/soul one does well not to assume that the soul was thought of in such terms that it was the only real existent and that the body was merely illusory. This would be going too far. Likewise the concept of God as spirit, even by Pythagoras, was not that of a clearly grasped ens a se, let alone personal but rather he was "nothing more than reason as found in mathematical numbers"—in the nature of a depersonified cosmic principle.30 Still the fact remains that this "idea of the soul as the unity of life and spirit ... as a spiritual being in its own right, quite independent of the corporeal"31 was a doctrine which was to have immense future influence even on the concept of God, indeed so much that Werner Jaeger can declare that "undoubtedly the theory of the divinity of the soul marks a turning-point in the early history of the philosophical idea of God."32

Through the fifth century writers, in particular Pindar, Empedocles and Diogenes of Apollonia we are led to the classic flowering of the Orphic-Pythagorean dualism in the person of Plato.33
So vital is his contribution that Werner Jaeger finds in his Socratic dialogues "the birth of a new religion. Philosophy is for him a way of life that leads to the salvation (soteria) of the soul." It is his concept of the soul that crowns his highest philosophical achievement, his theory of knowledge. This apotheosis of the unchanging, the incorruptible, the essence amid decaying change pits the eternal, immortal soul against the temporal, dissolving body. So the testimony of the Phaedo, the Phaedrus, the Laws and the Timaeus as well as the Republic.

The focus of value, of reality, Plato fixed on the unchangeable essence of soul and the task of philosophy as a rehearsal or training for death when the soul may finally be released from the prison-house of the body, at last freed from the trammels of its passions and pleasures.

Such the teaching of the Phaedo par excellence which is so little tempered that it strikes one "as pure intellectualism divorced from life, its final aim being the eternal preservation of the soul in the cold storage of eternally frozen absolute forms." Even granted that "this is Plato's first word, not his last" the fact remains that it was this exaggerated dualism that was to become "classical" in the history of Platonism. Can a reason be assigned to this exaggeration so as perhaps not only to explain it but also to mitigate it and show something of its illegitimacy when it continues to occupy centre stage through the centuries? It seems that an affirmative answer is found by elucidating Plato's motivation. Throughout his writings, and more especially in the early Phaedo, Plato's primary concern was to "establish the existence of the immortal soul so that its relation to the body is not his immediate concern." Here we have the key to Plato's overemphasis on the
soul. The vindication of its immortal existence so impassioned him that he became a crusader, singlemindedly pursuing the goal to the early exclusion or later almost begrudging admission of the value of the perishable body and its distracting senses. In a word Plato becomes preacher and is guilty in his dialogue-sermons of what may be viewed as excesses of rhetoric, pious exaggerations. Not only dedicated preacher but impassioned poet in addition, Plato pays homage to the soul and ultimately to the world-soul which is the acme and universal home of the forms constituted in unity. Again, the Phaedo particularly and enduringly, portrays this overriding conviction.

PLATONIC INFLUENCE ON JUDAISM

So telling was the influence of Plato that, as Gilbert Murray puts it, perhaps with some exaggeration particularly omitting the influence of Aristotle, "the whole tendency of Greek philosophy after Plato, with some illustrious exceptions, especially among the Romanizing Stoics, was away from the outer world towards the world of the soul." The writings of the post-Platonic period centre not on a mere intellectual knowledge but rather on that special gnosis theou, the knowledge of God whereby the true seeker of wisdom, or philosopher seeks soteria or salvation of the soul. This, as Plato taught, was no mere escapism but certainly a "flight" (phyge) from the senses and their objects which are fleeting and corruptible to the only unchanging, the Eternal. So the essence and direction of the Phaedo which exalted that dialogue to the status of "the spiritual guide of antiquity." Asceticism as the
primary condition of salvation here played an essential and continuing role which was one that "never died out of all subsequent Greek and Hellenistic-Roman religion." Still in Greece itself Plato's influence appeared limited, likely due to the more strongly traditional Greek attachment to the concrete, to this world, to this body as well as to the spirit of man. However when Greek ideas spread to the east in the post-Alexandrian or Hellenistic age the other-worldly emphasis was propagated since Plato himself was probably the greatest single agent of Hellenization.

After Alexander (d. 323) conquered Palestine in 332 B.C.E., it was inevitable that the subsequent flood of Hellenistic culture would substantially affect the evolution of Judaism. To what extent and how deeply are questions that continue to exercise scholars though all will agree that the Greek language was the primary instrument of hellenization among the Jews particularly since the written word was so highly reverenced among them that they could not fail to be in awe of the overwhelmingly literary Greek heritage.

Returning to the disputed issue of the extent and depth of Greek influence on the Jews it has long been recognized that the predominant effect was felt by the Jews of the Diaspora, particularly in Egypt while some overflow effect was granted on Palestine. In the course of the hellenization of Palestine and with the significant establishment of Greek cities there some inroads were made.

The prime scholar in this field today is Martin Hengel whose two volume book Judaism and Hellenism has much to teach us about the increasing scholarly recognition of Hellenistic influence in Judaism at large, i.e. the Diaspora and continuing Judaism but also in Palestine, and that along definitely religious lines.
Hengel sums up after voluminous proof that "from about the middle of the third century B.C. all Judaism must really be designated 'Hellenistic Judaism' in the strict sense ... " (p. 105) In particular, greater importance is now seen as accruing to the philosophical and religious contribution of the Greeks to Judaism of the Hellenistic-Roman age as well as obviously, to the Christianity which issued forth from it. Granted, early Essenism was an extreme example of foreign religious influences with its "doctrine of the two spirits developed under Iranian influence" which later "brought about a dualistic sharpening of Jewish apocalyptic," (p. 190) some substantial impetus to this final fruit came from the hard pressed Jewish national situation. When salvation in this world--the classical Jewish expectancy--receded ever more into seeming impossibility the nation of a future life in a new world ordained by Yahweh where his chosen people alone would triumph over all their enemies beckoned with increasing allure. Platonism and its doctrine of the separated soul had its role to play there in the development of the Jewish apocalyptic as also did Zoroastrianism and the ancient folk conception of resurrection based on vegetative death followed by renewed life.47

We are interested in these changes as they focus on the soul/body relationship in Jewish eschatology apocalyptic which was "itself a fruit of the Hellenistic period." (p. 212)

Jewish Eschatology in the Hellenistic Period

At the end of a long line of development including the contributions at various points to native Jewish evolution of Iranian and especially Hellenistic ideas the
the distinct changes in Jewish eschatology are embodied in the books of Sirach, Daniel, and Maccabees. Underlying them as well as all is an ongoing individualizing of the human soul which achieves heightened importance in Jewish eyes to the detriment of the body or better said, to the detriment of the classical Hebrew conception of man as a body/soul totality. At any rate the focus in Judaism is definitely shifted from this world to the next.

The Book of Daniel of c. 160 B.C.E. (esp. 12:1-3) offers the first undisputed evidence of a belief in the resurrection though with the important proviso that reference is made "explicitly to the members of the chosen people and to them alone."

Second Maccabees (c. between 100 and 40 B.C.E.) repeats belief in the resurrection of the righteous to the eternal Messianic kingdom on earth, i.e. resurrection of the body and in this holds to the traditional Hebrew attitude about the value of this life. This unitary view, however, "quite in keeping with belief in the Messianic kingdom which prevailed in the second century B.C.E. as an eternal kingdom on the present earth" breaks down henceforth to two views. 1 Enoch (91-104) and the Psalms of Solomon (c. 50-30 B.C.E.) hold "no resurrection of the body at all but only of the spirit" while others as the writer of the Parables said that there would be a resurrection of the body, but that this body would consist of garments of glory and of light (1 Enoch 62:15,16) and that the righteous would be of an angelic nature (51:4)." So, Charles, concludes, we find that "the doctrine of the resurrection which was common among the cultured Pharisees in the century immediately preceding the Christian era was of truly spiritual nature." Certainly
this increasing "transcendent view of the risen righteous" grows surely into a
"resurrection of the spirit only" in later writings of the first century C.E. such as
Jubilees, Assumption of Moses, Philo, Book of Wisdom and 4 Maccabees. References to former earthly bodies are qualified with transfiguration or with raising
to angelic status. And now the resurrection, formerly limited to Israel, begins to
be extended to all mankind. "All these works," Charles notes, "are more or less
leavened by Greek philosophy ... " drawing on "materials from Plato, Aristotle,
the Pythagoreans and Stoics." Never more clearly was Platonic dualism stated
than in Wisdom 9:15: "For the corruptible body burdens the soul and the earthen
shelter weighs down the mind that has many concerns." In 4 Maccabees, written
before 70 C.E. "only a blessed immortality of the soul is taught." To conclude,
it was in this period that "a clear and firm belief in the immortality of the soul"
took hold in Judaism.

Philo of Alexandria (c. 25 B.C.E. – 50 C.E.) represents the acme of Hellen­
istic, particularly Platonic, influence on Jewish thought and synthesizes the two
streams so as "to make Moses appear like a Greek sage and otherwise explain the
Jewish revelation in terms comprehensible to a Greek of the philosophical tradition.
His principal method to achieve this aim was the use of allegorical (or: "other
reading") method of interpreting Scripture. Later Christian scholars, the Alexandrines
and Origen in particular, fastened on to this Philonic discovery which enabled them
to see the Platonic forms (eide or ideas) as "absolute and perfect spiritual beings
that served as both prototype and paradigm for the sensible, material beings of our
world with the notable addition, in Philo and his Christian successors, that the ideas
are now "gathered within the mind of the Creator God; they are, quite literally, his ideas, a status denied of them by Plato. So far did Philo go in his exaltation of soul over body that he believed matter to be incurably evil and hence there could be no resurrection of the body. "Our present life in the body is death," Charles comments, because according to Philo, the body is the "utterly polluted prison' of the soul ... nay, more, it is its sepulchre ...; our soma is our sema." So the Pythagorean/Platonic slogan echoes once more as the leitmotif of the "spiritualizing" tendencies of Hellenism among Jews and Christians.

Philo, therefore, was no mere unique phenomenon. As Copleston admits, Philo's "sharp dualism of soul and body or of the rational and sensual elements in man" and his insistence on the "necessity of man's liberating himself from the power of the sensual" was substantial.

THE PROBLEM OF PAUL

The importance of Paul, the apostle to the Gentiles and the Church's first "theologian" whose ideas and politico-structural aims for Christianity achieve a sure triumph cannot be overestimated. Indeed his contribution to the structuring of the Christian community adds a dimension which is only vaguely present in the Gospels. They, for example, rarely use the term church while in Paul's writings the term is most frequently employed and analyzed. The basic analogue Paul adopts is the human body. However, difficulties abound in attempting to pin down a systematic or consistent Pauline view of the body/soul relationship; Paul the Pharisee
and Paul the Hellene must be contended with. Still general statements can be made. In discussing the problem of dualism in Paul's view on man, Fitzmyer agrees that "a popular, common conception of man as made up of two parts is found at times in Paul's writings (I Cor. 5:3; 7:34; 2 Cor. 12:3-3). Paul's typical use of "flesh" (sarx) denotes "the whole man dominated by natural, earth-oriented tendencies. This notion is prominent in the famous Pauline contrast of 'flesh' and 'spirit' which compares man subject to his earthly tendencies with man under the influence of the Spirit." While Paul's use of body (soma), soul (psyche) and spirit (pneuma) is complex and has given rise to diverse interpretations, one is impressed with the uncomfortable dualism that seems regularly to surface. So much of Paul's anthropology "sounds Platonic" as Helmut Thielicke admits, "but it is not meant that way." Other authors have judged otherwise. Older and conservative writers like Jules Lebreton and Ferdinand Prat, for example hold:

"As to the spirit and the flesh, the teaching of St. Paul differs from that of St. John by laying more stress on concupiscence, the tendency to evil, whereas in St. John, as in the Old Testament, the flesh appears rather as an infirmity and a nothingness."  

"If spirit stands for every man as he is restored by grace, flesh signifies every man as he is impaired by sin." To this Pourrat adds:

"The words 'body' (soma), 'flesh' (sarx), sense-soul (psyche) in the writings of St. Paul generally have a derogatory sense. They denote man's nature corrupted by sin. They are opposed to the word 'spirit' (pneuma), which usually denotes man regenerated by grace."  

The least we can say, I believe, is that we see here in Paul's use of the term 'flesh' "the beginnings of a use which is pejorative, where it is used of human nature not
merely in a neutral sense or even with reference to the dignity of human nature, but with reference to human nature in its weakness. 69

Primacy therefore is accorded the soul of man, the spirit-filled soul and this, under the influence of hellenistic thought, in the context of "an extremely individualistic focus" bearing on an increasingly "spiritualized" eschatology. 70

THE PATRISTIC TRANSITION: JUSTIN

The directions of thought and attitude set so largely by the canonical New Testament scriptures soon flowered in tensions vis-à-vis the intellectual and religious Hellenistic-Roman world with which the new faith came into increasing in-depth encounter. Particularly, the problem of the reconciliation of Greek philosophy with Christianity, as recognized by Paul at Athens came to centre stage with Justin (d. 165 B.C.E.), a convert who progressed through various philosophical schools, most notably Platonic to acknowledgment of the "true philosophy" which was the Christian religion. According to his famous "loan" theory already used by Philo of Alexandria:

'Moses ... is more ancient than all the Greek authors. And whatever philosophers and poets said about the immortality of the soul, or punishments after death, or contemplation of celestial phenomena, or other teachings of the same kind, they were able to understand and explain because they took up the suggestions of the prophets." 71

Even more: "... whatever things have been truly said among all men belong to us Christians." 72 Of these ancient writers for Justin, Plato is facile princeps and in this the Christian apologist typified his age, i.e. the first two Christian centuries, for whom respect for Plato was undoubted. 73 When we examine the Christian
Platonists' critical use of Plato we find that on the score of body/soul dualism they strenuously defended the radical goodness of matter, hence of the body which was to share in the resurrection of the soul. Such resurrection they mostly granted not as a right flowing from the essential Platonic immortal nature of the soul but rather as a special grace of the Creator now Saviour God. However those Platonic features which were to exercise a permanent influence on the development of Christian spirituality, mysticism, theology, internal structure as well as later institutional relations with "the world" can be traced back to "the basic idea which governs the Middle Platonic world-picture: the distinction between the orders of Being and Becoming, inanimate and generate existence, which Justin employs and adapts to define the difference between God and the world." The theme of the "Christian Plato" makes its debut with Justin instructed by Plato's Apology, Crito, Phaedrus, Phaedo and particularly the Timaeus. So successful is the adoption and melding that Gilson can declare that "Greek philosophy and Christian revelation appear as two moments of one and the same revelation of the same divine word who, after speaking to such Greeks as Socrates, or to such Barbarians as Abraham, finally took shape, and became man, and was called Jesus Christ." Tatian, a pupil of Justin's, departs from his master's flirtation with philosophical dualism of body and soul which are for him conjoined as a single being but supports a "religious dualism, that of the material and spiritual man, which corresponds exactly to the Pauline antithesis of sarx and pneuma." This Danielou calls the "dualism of soul and spirit. The former is darkness, and comes from below; it belongs to the realm of matter, and this realm is seen as evil in nature. By contrast spirit comes
from above, and is light." Hence the validity of Gilson's comment that Tatian's "severity introduces the long lineage of those Christian writers to whom nature and, consequently, philosophy will always look suspicious, if not evil." For these later writers subtle distinctions between man's soul and spirit will often be lost and the familiar superiority of soul over body, just as spirit over matter, will be the constant emphasis.

With the Letter to Diognetus of the late second or of the third century we come to a highly important development in the application of the already body/soul or spirit/matter dualism and one which for the first time explicitates in a political sense the tense struggle of the powers of this world (darkness) against the powers of heaven (light). The seeds sown in Paul, watered by Justin and cultivated by Tatian now appear in a mature form which is to become classical within Christianity. Writing on Christians as citizens, the author speaks of

"the wonderful and confessedly strange character of the constitution of their own citizenship. They dwell in their own fatherlands, but as if sojourners in them; they share all things as citizens, and suffer all things as stranger ... To put it shortly, what the soul is in the body the Christians are in the world ... The flesh hates the soul, and wages war upon it, though it has suffered no evil, because it is prevented from gratifying its pleasures, and the world hates the Christians though it has suffered no evil, because they are opposed to its pleasures. The soul loves the flesh which hates it and the limbs, and Christians love those that hate them. The soul has been shut up in the body but itself sustains the body; and Christians are confined in the world as in a prison, but themselves sustain the world. The soul dwells immortal in a mortal tabernacle and Christians sojourn among corruptible things, waiting for the incorruptibility which is in heaven."

Here the dualism is dichotomous and sure. The flesh, which is equivalent to the world, has no goal but that of pursuing its base pleasures for that is its very nature.
The soul's nature, on the contrary, is to love higher things and it is for this reason precisely that the flesh, driven by guilt over its own wickedness, wills to hate the soul and to wage war upon it. The Pythagorean/Platonic slogan of the body as the prison of the soul fills out the picture which rises to a crescendo of denigration of the body/world which is destined to a just corruption and an exaltation of the soul/Christians who, immortal, await an eternal reward in heaven.

A happy exception to the dualistic tendencies we have been examining is furnished by Irenaeus of Lyons (born in Smyrna, Asia Minor; fl. c. 185-190) who worked out an anthropology "in conscious opposition to the dualism of the Gnostics." He affirms that "the created world is good" and, as well, "the natural man is good and requires only to be outstripped." According to Irenaeus, "man is essentially a living and rational being, that is to say, the whole make-up of his soul and body. A soul is not a man, it is a man's soul." Perhaps a more unitary conception came easier to him because he ascribes a certain materiality to the soul, thereby rendering any real dualism pointless. However, as Danielou notes, Irenaeus' unitary concept of man went "utterly against the whole mentality of the world in which (he) lived," mentality from which "even such a man as Origen was never able to escape from ... completely."

Irenaeus did not pit the perfection of the past against the progressive corruption of time; for him soul was no eternal essence as over against a time-conditioned degenerating body. But in these views his thought "unquestionably forms an exception to the general rule."

Tertullian was tempted along no such path. One of the most famous of Latin Apologists, Tertullian (fl. c. 195-c. 220) portrays the "continuing and unavoidable,
if not always acknowledged or even conscious, influence of philosophical ideas on Christian doctrine. A staunch defender of the reality of Christ's body against Gnostic heretics, Tertullian was less understanding of the mere human body as his teachings on marriage show. In the treatise addressed To His Wife he "advises" against remarriage after the death of a spouse; in the Exhortation to Chastity of his semi-Montanist period he commands chastity uncompromisingly while in his Montanist period work on Monogamy he refers to all second marriage as adultery. In all his dualistic belief predominant. For example in his earliest treatise on marriage To His Wife he asks: "Should not the things of earth yield to the things of Heaven? If the spirit, being nobler in origin, is stronger than the flesh, then we have no one to blame but ourselves when we yield to the weaker force." Or again: "First, there is the concupiscence of the flesh, and this has the strongest pull; second, there is the concupiscence of the world. We servants of God ought to scorn both weaknesses, since we renounce both lust and ambition." There, as is obvious, the flesh or the body itself—no metaphorical use of the term by Tertullian!—and the world, two forms of concupiscence, are allied just as we have seen them in the Letter to Diognetus. The equivalence was becoming a commonplace. And we note that the potential or direction of the flesh is towards "lust" while that of the world is towards "ambition". And for Tertullian no qualification was possible except perhaps to add as a final fillip a reference to the passing nature of bodily pleasures, "the fleeting, vagrant desires which come of beauty and youth" as compared to "the blessings of Heaven which last forever."
No praise is too great for the soul, however, and in his *Apologia* he evidently patterns his rhetoric on the Pythagorean/Platonic warhorse: "Yes! the soul, be it cabined and cribbed by the body, be it confined by evil nature, be it robbed of its strength by lusts and desires, be it enslaved to false gods--none the less, when it recovers its senses, as after surfeit, as after sleep, as after some illness, when it recaptures its proper health, the soul names God ..." This Tertullian epitomizes in the famous phrase: "the witness of the soul by nature Christian," the dualistic overtones of its context, however, being dismissed by or simply unknown to its fervent repeaters.

**THE ALEXANDRINES**

The intellectual level of Alexandria and its importance for, in the Roman-Hellenistic, oikoumene was first established by Philo and, in the third century, confirmed by Clement and Origen who continued to foster the relationship between philosophy and faith.

Clement of Alexandria (d. c. 215 C.E.) presents a picture of man as that of "a dual being like the centaur of classical myth, made up of body and soul; it was the lifelong tasks of the Christian 'philosopher gnostic' to cultivate the liberation of the soul from the chains of the body, in preparation for ultimate liberation which was death." Similar dualistic strains or ambivalence afflict Clement's Christology for while he repeatedly affirmed his belief in the historicity of the incarnation and the reality of the flesh of Jesus his understanding of what constitutes true humanity make his Christological formulations "sound docetic" according to Pelikan.
In Origen (184-254) the ambivalence becomes more marked. He attempted to prove the superiority of spirit over matter—and here we read of soul over body—by a theory of two creations. "First there was a heavenly spiritual creation, and then a material creation appeared as a result of the fall of souls. It was this first creation that was man's true home, to which he returned through redemption (cf. De Principiis 2,8,1)."

Man's original corporal state Origen describes as a "'non-bodily sort of body,' in which the substance of man was absorbed into his soul in a way that made this original creation 'spiritual'." It is another small step or progression of thought consonant with this original state that enables Origen to speak of the soul as "having a substance, and life of its own" even though the body, he holds, following St. Paul, which is now 'sown in dishonour will rise in glory' (I Cor. 15:42) at the resurrection. Still Origen never imputes essential evil to the body, he does not condemn it but denigrates it in the schema of being. Only in this fundamental sense he can be called anti-dualist. Overwhelmingly it is his conviction that "immateriality is the highest type of reality."

To conclude, despite attempts to affirm the basic goodness of matter and of the body as God-created, so strong was the opposite pull towards the supremacy of the soul and so extreme the dualistic expressions that "both Greek and Latin Christianity remained committed to a Platonized spirituality and eschatology that defined redemption as the rejection of the body and the flight of the soul from material, sensual nature." So far in our investigation this judgment must be upheld.
In examining the growth of dualism we must make mention of the influence of Plotinus, the non-Christian mystic who effectively became master to most of subsequent Christian mystics and ascetics. A contemporary of Origen's and student of the same mater, Plotinus (204-270) believed that creation was a fall from the unknowable God. At the lowest end of the spectrum and most removed from God is pure matter, a doctrine which one again, though in distinctive fashion stresses "the sharp division between God and the world, pure God and impure world." Indeed, so immaterial, spiritual or perfect is God that we, immersed in matter or simply associated necessarily with it, cannot affirm anything about him. "We can say what he is not, but can never say what he is," a principle that was to find much favour with Church theologians as apophatic theology and with mystics as their ultimate recognition.

Regarding the make-up of man our true self is the 'man within' or our higher soul which "exists eternally close to and continually illumined by Intellect." This higher soul does not 'come down' into the turbulence of the body and the world. This is the function of the high soul's expression on a lower level, i.e. the 'other man' or lower self which is subject to sin and ignorance as arising out of ordinary human experience. The higher soul "does not form a single reality with body but retains the essential separateness of all Platonic soul." Once again, now in the case of Plotinus, despite the stretching of the poles of body (matter) and soul we are constrained to admit that "Plotinus is not a metaphysical dualist" because "matter is produced ... ultimately, by the One." This is a vital distinction but one difficult to hold in
the forefront of consciousness when we hear Plotinus insisting that "the soul of man is man" or "the soul of man is man himself" or "the real man coincides with the rational soul." On these counts Plotinus must be counted a religious dualist.

THE ASCETIC MOVEMENT

Since the mid-third and especially during the fourth century Christian emphasis on the superior nature and the well-being of the soul as over the body gave rise to a one-sided emphasis on the evanescence or frailty if not the gross impediment which was the world. The text of 1 John 2:15-16 ("You must not love this passing world or anything that is in the world.") was feverishly interpreted to make the world appear as the very embodiment of evil. After some two centuries this attitude "acquires almost canonical status in the De contemptu mundi literature from Ambrose to Erasmus." The result was that religiously speaking, "the basic attitude of the Middle Ages was one-sidedly that of flight from the world" as shaped by the monastic, ascetic ideal enunciated primarily by monks who, by profession, had left "the world" to follow and secure the "one thing necessary" (unum necessarium), the salvation of the immortal soul. This attitude, as H.R. Schlette says, "often awakened a harsh dualistic impression," and indeed to such an extent that "the result of this practical understanding of the world is formally and materially equivalent to a basic dualism." It is of the utmost significance that at this juncture, i.e. beginning in the third century that the world is identified with the body whereas the soul is conceived of as so far removed, ideally, from the body that in its highest state it lives a life of virginity. The first great
Christian treatise on virginity, The Symposium of Methodius, written between 270 and 290 holds that virgins are true martyrs "because they had the courage all their lives not to shrink from the Olympic contest of chastity" (7,3). Methodius goes beyond Clement of Alexandria in equating the perfect Christian life with virginity. Chastity, or the soul's perfect abstinence from bodily sexuality is for Methodius the highest of virtues, charity not excepted, since "nothing is superior to chastity in its power to restore mankind to paradise." Heaven he describes "in the language of Plato who presented the world of ideas as the real world, of which we can see only the shadows, like men living in a cave, on whose walls appear the shadows of the things outside."

St. Athanasius, one of the greatest Doctors of the Church (d. 373) echoed Methodius' encomium of virginity in several treatises on the matter and particularly in his life of St. Antony (d. 356), the foremost of desert monks, i.e. hermits or desert dwellers. Antony, as Athanasius informs us, withdrew from the world but was pursued by that quintessence of the world or of evil which was the insistent dreaming of beautiful women. In a treatise on virginity (c. 370) Athanasius writes that the body of a virgin or continent widow "is contaminated by a man, as also worldly habits befoul both the soul and the body of a chaste woman who can then be holy neither in body nor in spirit." Bodies, therefore, in exercising sexuality are equivalent to the "world" and refuge can only be had in the ideal life of virginity.
"A virgin marries God." So declared Ambrose, the valiant bishop of Milan (c. 333-397) and tutor of the convert Augustine (Virgins 1.23,38,52). So close in this union that Ambrose goes even further in holding that "she who does not believe is a woman and should be designated by the name of her bodily sex, whereas she who believes progresses to complete manhood, to the measure of the adulthood of Christ. She then does without worldly name, gender of body, youthful seductiveness, and garrulousness of old age." So strong is this union that the female, lesser creation, becomes assimilated to her origin which was to be absorbed into man and indeed to be taken into the perfect manhood of Christ. Her body, in effect loses all characteristics of its female debility. St. Jerome uttered the same thought in a remarkable statement stressing virginity as the hallmark of ideal belief that

"as long as a woman is for birth and children, she is different from man as body is from soul. But if she wishes to serve Christ more than the world, then she will cease to be a woman and will be called man."

The parallels in this passage are clear: a married woman is as different from a man as body is from soul. Body is inferior to soul. Marriage is essentially serving the world rather than serving Christ; the world equals the body. The woman who serves Christ "will cease to be a woman" (body/soul) and "will be called man" (soul/heaven).

Even more by consequence it follows that the soul (ideal believer) is without sex because it is really apart from and above the body (bent on worldly aims and involvements primary among which is the spiritual obstacle of sexuality.). The man or woman
wholly devoted to Christ is no longer thought of as body but rather as soul. In the end, to put it in Platonic terms, woman is seen as epitomizing the body which is the prison of the soul which, in turn, is more aligned with the nature of man. The classical motif of woman temptress, and particularly sexual temptress mired in the evil tendencies of the body here feeds the imagination and inclines the reader or hearer to assent to what is by now an accustomed dualism. On a lesser level and in practise, Ambrose moralizes, the "soul of the just man uses the body like an instrument or organ and after the fashion of a renowned artisan she (the soul) leads the obedient body whither she will."¹²⁰ In the end the hope is that in resurrection the body will receive "that deathless life which the soul already possessed.

GREGORY OF NYSSA

One of the most original thinkers and mystics of the Eastern Church is the influential founder of Eastern monasticism, Gregory of Nyssa (d. 394). Particularly in his teaching on the soul and its relationship to the body Gregory lies under the dominance of Platonic philosophy as his treatise *On the Soul and the Resurrection* repeatedly betrays its debt to the *Phaedo*. As well, his mystical theology builds on Platonic thought, though transcends it.¹²¹ One fundamental area in which Platonism and Christianity agreed was that "the Christian understanding of the relation between Creator and creature required 'the concept of an entirely static God, with eminent reality, in relation to an entirely fluent world, with deficient reality' ... " a concept that has as its root Plato's basic belief in the soul's glory being the perfection of
non-change and the body's shame as that of being subject to change which in Plato's mind meant corruption. So the Platonic world-view insinuated is essential dualism into the Christian concept of the soul/body hierarchical relationship.  

AUGUSTINE  

Greatest of the Fathers of both East and West, Augustine, bishop of Hippo in North Africa (d. 430) is the supreme figure whose name, doctrines and attitudes populate the pages of medieval writings. After the New Testament there looms Augustine and since he epitomized so well not only the relationship of a mature Christianity vis-à-vis the world with its institutions and learning but the struggle of orthodox Christianity against innovators and heretics medieval writers, and I refer particularly to those of the eleventh century as examined in this thesis, accorded him a respect and presence that, materially at least, rivals that of the New Testament itself.  

A pervasive influence on Augustine was a marked neoplatonism. At the outset it must be stated that he always maintained that man was "neither his soul apart nor his body apart, but the whole which results from their union." Yet, echoing Plotinus (Enneads 1,1,3) who in turn follows Plato (Alcibiades, 129E) Augustine defines man as "a soul that uses a body." The obvious and literal meaning of this definition is that man is essentially his soul. Now Augustine never fell into this extreme of rigid dualism, as we have shown from his preceding quotation. According to Gilson, Augustine used and interpreted the latter phrase to forcibly express "the
transcendent superiority of the soul over the body" though he immediately adds:
"Even taken in this limited sense, the Plotinian notion of man has deeply influenced
the noetic of Saint Augustine."126 In sum, the great Doctor finds it hard to understand
the body/soul relationship and in his use of the Plotinian formula "a soul that uses a
body" compounds the difficulty.127 Scholars differ on how deeply and how lastingy
Augustine was influenced by the Plotinian dichotomy. It helps to keep in mind that
in order to support his supreme concern which was, as we have mentioned, to aid the
moral act of conversion towards God, Augustine's anthropology and psychology were
largely dependent studies, an effort in ransacking "everything in the philosophical
tradition which can be invoked in support of the soul's basic transcendence over the
body."128

In summation, thrice difficult because of the complexity of the issue, Augustine's
non-systematic approach dictated to by his ethical concerns and the conflicting inter-
pretative emphases of scholars, I choose the evaluation of Robert J. O'Connell, S.J.
Shunning the "generous interpretation," O'Connell finds that key figures in the long
Christian tradition on the body/soul relationship "too often succumbed to the temptation
of considering the body as the 'prison' of the soul, and this 'vale of tears' as the wider
prison of the body-soul amalgam; they frequently complicated the whole matter by
alluding to those aspects of our bodily functions that more readily excite the reflex of
disgust: the smells and sliminess of mucus, pus, and excrement. Inter faeces et urinam
nascimur, Freud loved to say, and then remind us piquantly that the quote was from
St. Augustine.129 These attitudes in Augustine who "borrowed much, overmuch, from
a plotinian view of the human situation (itself heavily indebted to Plato's Phaedo) that
regards man as crucially 'soul' fallen and immersed into an essentially alien world of sense and body" are "quite enough to justify a certain suspicion of the inheritance he has bequeathed us in this regard." Indeed, O'Connell suggests "that Augustine may have been converted from the Manichee dualism with all its remorseless hatred of the body, to a plotinian understanding of the Christian faith that at crucial junctures, only too closely resembled its manichee adversary." Augustine's idea of the soul "as some quasiangelic being, painfully (and shamefully) enveloped (to use the earlier Augustine's language) in the filth, birdlime--yes literally the excrement--of body" is one that has powerfully influenced subsequent Christian writers, including St. Thomas Aquinas.  

While the "later Augustine" came more clearly to see the "psychologically disastrous" as well as "manifestly unchristian" effects of "such an angelistic evaluation of the human condition" still "nothing more disturbed whatever manichaen residues still clung to Augustine's heart, than his painful effort to take seriously (and literally!) the first words God addresses to this masterpiece-couple he has created: a blessing on their nuptial union" so that "even their sexual activity ... was to be sacramental." Indeed "Augustine later admits it took him a certain time to understand and assimilate into his thinking the mystery of Word-made-flesh." Obviously, a serious and deep understanding and acceptance of the Incarnation makes it impossible— or highly absurd—to look on matter and the body as 'soiling' and 'staining' the soul. Resurrection of that very body not understood in negative terms as the "'escape' from the shackles of the body" was what Augustine only "eventually came to see."
Though in The City of God, his last great and crowning work, Augustine was, as is known, at pains to explain that the citizens who "mystically" constituted the "two cities" were "the one of those who live according to their own rule and the other of those who live under God." (Book XIV, Chapter 28). The treatise, therefore, was a mystical one, not a political one. The two types of citizens, and consequently the two diverse cities, were not identifiable externally but only to the eye of God who scrutinizes the hearts of men. Nevertheless, even though it is hardly a treatise on the Church as opposed to the Roman Empire (or in implicit theory the "secular state") the rhetoric as well as the arguments lent themselves to future politically tinged usage. The body-soul metaphor serves as basic referent. The earthly city is, like the object body, "corruptible". Everyone is born of a "damned race" from Adam and is therefore "wicked and carnal" while rebirth in Christ makes one "good and spiritual." The topos of the wicked flesh signifying earth and the things of earth such as earthly rule and the good spirit or soul signifying heaven and things divine was an all too easy one to make.

In XIX:17 Augustine summarizes the political application he entertained for his announcedly mystical thesis of the two cities, an application which, in my opinion, he was driven to willy nilly as a result of his thorough body/soul, spirit/matter, earth/heaven dualism. Writing of the heavenly city, "or rather the part of it which sojourns on earth and lives by faith," Augustine holds it "makes use of this (earthly) peace only because it must, until this mortal condition which necessitates it shall
pass away." Consequently "it lives like a captive and a stranger in the earthly city." Here one sees an evident thought-parallel to the Augustinian motif and metaphor of the soul which "uses" the body as now the heavenly city "makes use of" the earthly city, and indeed, "only because it must," clearly as a consequence of the Fall, i.e. of sin. All therefore than he has already posited as to the relative relationship and worth of soul/body dualism he here uses as basis for the political evaluation of his "two cities." Patterson concludes that "this statement is Augustine's final word on the nature of the Christian empire. It is not a divine politeia, nor the herald of a new age of peace and security, but a pragmatic union of two entities essentially different in their ideals and destined for two quite different ends."

In concluding XIX:17 Augustine returns to contrast in a definitive manner the impermanence of the "peace of earth" of which the heavenly city "avails itself" while in its "state of pilgrimage." When we shall have come to the end of the pilgrimage and attained eternal peace, "this mortal life shall give place to one that is eternal, and our body shall be no more this animal body which by its corruption weighs down the soul, but a spiritual body feeling no want and in all its members subjected to the will." Patterned as it is on the corruptible body, the kingdom of this world is bound to fall away or be transmuted beyond its fallible essence into the one and only eternally valid kingdom which is the divine, otherworldly abode of the soul prefigured here by the Church.
THE OPPOSITION OF THE ACTIVE AND CONTEMPLATIVE LIFE
AS EXPRESSED BY THE BODY/SOUL METAPHOR

An important corollary of the body/soul dualism which we have been considering in the Fathers and one which was to exert a major influence throughout medieval times, particularly, for this thesis consideration in the eleventh century, is the application of the theory to the relationship of the active to the contemplative life.

John Cassian (c. 360-435), a contemporary of Augustine's, was the literary proponent of the monastic life in the West through his Institutiones dealing mainly with the monastic rules and customs of the Egyptian and Palestinian monks following the teaching of Evagrius, as Graef informs us, and his conferences (or collationes), purported conversations with the most famous Desert Fathers, which were the staple reading in medieval monasteries. Like his master Evagrius, Cassian "considers sometimes the human condition itself, which prevents man from being and acting like a disembodied spirit, as sinful." Even other virtues were classed second to this prime activity of the soul for, as Cassian writes, commenting on the Martha and Mary story in the Gospel (a great favourite among monastic writers): "You see then that the Lord placed the principal good in theoria alone, that is, in divine contemplation. Wherefore we hold the other virtues, even though we find them necessary, useful and good, to be considered as of secondary degree because all the rest are sought after for the sake of this one." Through Cassian the Desert Fathers instructed the West in the ways of monastic mysticism.
Augustine was of similar mind. In his early Cassiciacum dialogues he encouraged
the leaving, he had done, of the world of action and its "cares" to adopt the contem­
plative "life of philosophy" wherein one could commune with the Truth which is the
soul's happiness. Here the world and its cares which by common acceptance are of
the body are set strictly underneath the things of the soul. Truth, it was believed in
Platonistic fashion had to do ultimately, if not solely, with the spirit. O'Connell
comments that "preference for the contemplative form of life and the theoretical
supports of that preference run like a golden thread through Augustine's career from
beginning to end."138 His early Plotinian view of the soul "fallen" into the world
of body, sense and time, a view "that incriminates body and sense,"139 highlights
the soul's plunge into action as contrasted with its proper and natural function, the
"rest" of contemplation. This view does not soften with his advancing years, as one
might have hoped, but rather the "philosophical underpinnings of Augustine's original
evaluation of action and the life of action remain essentially intact."140 Above all,
Augustine sought the answer to the haunting struggle of relating the world of body to
the world of soul in the context of man's highest activity which was contemplative
prayer. In this case the answer was clear and, we may say, pre-formed by the
premise. To quote O'Connell, the answer to what man is lies in effect in discovering
wherein the "image" of God resides. In search of the answer we must

"get our minds to wrestle with the job of shearing off what, after
scrutiny, reveals itself as truly excrescence and accretion: the
senses, the imagination, even the 'lower reason' that presides over
our 'action' in this journey of human life. The core of man, his
central reality, is soul, and the contemplative soul. Consequently,
even the corporal aspects of man that make him the image of Christ
in the fullness of resurrection are in the last analysis foreign to man's true and essential reality. For man as incarnate, image of the fullness that is Christ risen, is image "only of the Son." The image Augustine has been gradually uncovering is man as he responds to the creative idea of the triune God who announced the intention of making man "to our image and likeness," an image that is to be found only "in the spirit of the mind." 141

A daring, a most daring step Augustine took here, one that might have seen injurious to the divine status of the Incarnate Son, but so strong was Augustine's "pronouncedly spiritualist view of man" that it persisted to the end and led him perilously close, in my opinion, to heresy. This was the thrust of the magisterial legacy which the authority of Augustine left to the Middle Ages. Of course, it was obvious to any medieval reader or hearer of these thoughts that the world, its kingdoms and princes, shared in the opprobrium of the body. It was a very short step to the more explicit political application of the basic theory.

A NOTE ON PLATO IN THE FATHERS

It is a fact that Platonism in the Middle Ages was to some large extent a surrogate product because Plato's works were, in themselves, almost unknown. Feibleman quotes E. Gilson as saying "Plato was nowhere, but Platonism was everywhere during the Middle Ages." 142 Still the Middle Ages possessed Plato's Timaeus in a Neoplatonist translation with the Meno, Phaedo and others made their appearance in translation in the course of the twelfth century. 143 As well, very much of the spirit of the Phaedo was, as we have seen, incorporated into the Greek and subsequently into the Latin Fathers. This Frederick Grant calls the "'mystical' Plato of the Middle Ages ... a
figure derived from private and unofficial interpretation of his writings, not the frigid overcautious logician of the official Academy. It was this religious interpretation of Plato which underlay large tracts of patristic theology, especially in the East, and appealed so strongly to the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. For my part, however, I feel Grant exaggerates Plato's "frigidity" and underestimates what we have seen to be his religious and ethical concerns centering him on the soul and its purification. Wolfson cites the Father's debt to Plato's *Phaedo*, with regard to immortality (granted, as filtered through Philo's corrected lense or similar such) and Gilson sums up the debt by reckoning that:

"Plato offered himself as an ally of Christianity on several important points: the doctrine of a maker of the universe; of a provident God; of the existence of an intelligible and divine world of which the sensible world is only an image; of the spirituality of the soul and its superiority over the body; of the illumination of the soul by God; of its enslavement to the body and of the necessity for it to liberate itself; last, not the least, the doctrine of the immortality of the soul, and of a life beyond the grave where it will receive the reward or punishment for its acts."

A very weighty list, an eternal debt.

Any any rate it is worth recognizing that in its early origins the Christian adoption or absorption of Platonic motifs, pre-eminent among which loomed the body/soul dualism could happen, as Werner Jaeger reminds us "only in a world that spoke Greek" by which Jaeger means not so much in the linguistic sense of the koine but "the spiritual language of Plato." So was sealed the triumph of the cultural ambition of Alexander to hellenize the world.
What we have seen in "the Greats" is paralleled by the vaster company of those Christian leaders and writers who, with their mentors, formed the teaching cadre which gave to the Church its spirit and direction.

Boethius (c. 480-524), who exercised considerable influence on the asceticism of the Middle Ages, taught that human souls, having formerly associated with the angels "degenerated at contact with the body" so that they are no longer capable of exercising intellectual intuition. Man's soul is "less free when it turns away from God to the knowledge of sensible things and still less so when it allows itself to be governed by the passions of the body it animates. To will what the body desires is the extreme degree of servitude." 149

Cassiodorus (c. 477-570), whose Institutiones became the handbook of the schools of the earlier Middle Ages followed Augustine in stressing the spirituality of the soul. In his treatise On the Soul he praises the virtue of holy souls "who conquer ... the flesh and triumph over themselves as they avidly delight in inflicting a continual death on their live bodies. And woe to that flesh which is not overcome in this world for the flesh which is conquered in this life is without doubt crowned in heaven." Furthermore, "the souls of the saints even while dwelling in this world, yet appear as fellow citizens with the good angels and already to a large extent their associates." 150 In line with the by now traditional teaching the body serves no useful purpose other than that of a field of war for the soul.
Likewise the influential fifth century Dionysius called the Areopagite, memorable proponent of the apophatic or negative theology whereby the unknowability of God is proclaimed to the extent that we know better what God is not than what he is, also emphasizes that "every corporeal image, everything that comes through the senses can only hinder our efforts to form an idea of the Divinity." Dionysius made an original contribution but always along the fundamental lines laid down by Augustine.

After the authority of Augustine comes that of Pope Gregory the Great (d. 604) in the eleventh century _Libelli de Lite_ which are the precise examination of this thesis. A monk always in heart even while occupying the chair of Peter, Gregory was indefatigable in his praise of mystical contemplation. The familiar dualism asserts itself regularly in his writings. "When the mind is suspended in contemplation," he writes, "when it exceeds the constraint of the flesh and strains with all its might to find some freedom of inner security, it cannot long remain above itself, for though the spirit carries it above itself, yet the flesh drags it down." Again, commenting on the disciples' desire to see Jesus he paraphrases the Master: "If I do not withdraw my body, I cannot let you understand what the love of the spirit is. Unless you cease to love my carnal presence, you will never learn true spiritual love for me." Even the soul itself we must hate "when we do not give in to its carnal desire," chief among which, we are sad to read, is marriage. For a young widow Gregory can only recommend "a spiritual marriage with God, which, though she might begin in grief, she would complete in eternal joy, rather than a fleshly marriage, which always begins in joy, but leads finally to grief." Tertullian does not seem far
away from the tone of this harsh advice and it appears that all too often in these writers the hyperbolic if not extreme comparison exalting soul over body was, an irresistible temptation.

In the same century John Scotus Erigena (d. c. 877) evidenced a further, particularly Christian, application of the body/soul dualism which was the Neo-Platonic and Augustinian idea of the absorption, subsidiary to be sure, of philosophy into theology. As Scotus wrote: "What else is the business of philosophy unless it is to expound the rules of the true religion, whereby God, the highest and principal cause of all things is humbly worshipped and reasonably inquired after." 156 For Erigena then, just as bodies "exist much more truly in their divine Ideas than in themselves," 157 so philosophy, leaning on perishable human reasoning power, finds it true and imperishable wisdom in the realm of divinely inspired theology. This subservience awaited the eleventh century Peter Damian (1007-1072) dedicated hermit, reforming cardinal under Pope Gregory VII who embodied without equal among intelligent men the by now classical monastic contemptus saeculi.

POPE GREGORY VII AND HIS GELASIAN SUPPORT

In his March 15, 1081 letter to Hermann, Bishop of Metz, Gregory VII twice relies on his fifth century predecessor, Gelasius, a reliance that is all the more significant, ideologically as well as politically, because of its Augustinian presuppositions. These, I believe, merit emphasizing. In his Fourth Tractate and twelfth letter Gelasius I, pope from 492-496, defines his understanding of the two entities of Church and State. He envisions a society in which "Christian emperors
stand in need of the pontiffs for the attainment of eternal life and the pontiffs make use of imperial governing in the course of attaining temporal things. He adds as a prime modal qualifier that the relationship should obtain "to the extent that spiritual action is removed from carnal impulses" (a carnalibus distaret incursibus). Now coming so soon after Augustine's definition of man, i.e. as a "soul using a body," which again, in its turn, echoed Plato's phrase that "the soul makes use of the body," the Gelasian statement, particularly with its carnal/spiritual rider, conforms to its antecedents. The so-called "Gelasian dyarchy," therefore, while it is supported by subsequent checks and balances on the relationship between the two entities, namely emperors and pontiffs, appears in the light of a distinct hierarchy. That is, as the common understanding of the times held that "spiritual action" is not only removed from "carnal impulses" but also superior to them, so the pontiffs, exercising the former, take precedence over emperors, involved necessarily in the latter. This impression is all the more founded when one refers to Gelasius' twelfth letter, i.e. to the Emperor Anastasius. In this, beginning for our purposes with the famous Duo quippe sunt, the Pope writes: "There are, august emperor, two entities by which this world is chiefly ruled: the sacred authority of the popes and the royal power. Of these the importance of the priests is far weightier because they are to render an account for the kings of men themselves at the divine judgment." Here Gelasius has been badly served by almost all of the translations into English which I have seen. Most refer to the two "powers" by which the world is ruled and describe the priestly "power" as being more important. The point of importance here is brought out by Walter Ullmann who
focusses rightly on the intentional weight behind the Pope's careful choice and use of the distinct terms auctoritas and potestas. To quote Ullmann:

What these Gelasian statements amounted to was the assertion of the pope's superioritas, his sovereignty, in matters touching the Christian complexion of society, and consequently the emperor's inferiority, his subjection to papal rulings in these matters.¹⁶²

Ullmann brings out the contrast between "the pope's auctoritas and to the emperor's regia potestas. Both terms were in fact taken from the Roman constitution in which the 'authority' of the Ruler consisted of his outstanding qualification and was the faculty of shaping things creatively and in a binding manner. The 'power' referred to the execution of what 'authority' had laid down."¹⁶³ As Ullmann comments: "The Gelasian statements were the first clear enunciation of the concept of sovereignty within a Christian corporate body."¹⁶⁴

Gelasius, as summing up the work of the Fathers, particularly of Augustine, as we have noted, regarding the growing sense of self-identification and superiority which the Church was acquiring, appealed to ecclesiastics of the ninth century. The bishops of the empire in 829 in a lengthy major address to the Emperor Louis the Pious quote and comment on Gelasius Duo quippe text. Jonas of Orleans does likewise in the first chapter of his De Institutione Regia while the great Hincmar, Archbishop of Rheims (d. 876) makes use of this text as well as of the passage in the Fourth Tractate which we have cited.¹⁶⁵

As a culmination of these influences decisive in the eleventh century Pope Gregory VII's Letter to Hermann, Bishop of Metz, March 15, 1081, abounds in examples. Jesus "despised a secular kingship, with which the sons of this world are
so puffed up, and came freely to the priesthood of the Cross." Kings and princes are under the influence of "the devil, the prince of the world" while "the priests of Christ are to lie accounted fathers and judges of kings and princes and all the faithful." To the Pope is committed "not only the earthly but also the heavenly power of binding and loosing." The princes of this earth are surpassed in power even by exorcists, let alone priests and bishops to whom they are subject for the salvation of their souls. The "Body of Christ, the true King" here is formed by "any good Christians" while "bad princes" are "the body of the devil." "Worldly kings and princes ... prefer ... their own interests to spiritual things; while religious bishops, despising vain glory, put God's interests before carnal things." Again, "the former, being excessively attached to worldly affairs, hold spiritual things to be of small account; the latter, continuously meditating on heavenly things, despise the things of the world." Finally, "if we are bidden to honour carnal fathers and mothers, how much more the spiritual? And if he who has cursed his carnal father and mother is to pay the penalty of death, what does he deserve who curses his spiritual father and mother?" Here the bodily, the carnal, equals not only the worldly but often the ruler of the worldly kingdoms and indeed the wicked worldly over which is set by divine providence, the spiritual, the heavenly and often the men of the spirit first and foremost who are prelati, the bishops set over and before the worldly, and it is they who have access to the good and salvific. 166

Here Gregory resumes the fundamental teaching of Augustine and Gelasius, though now explicitly stating that the temporal power is the work of sin and the devil. 167 His reformist collaborators like Damian and Humbert of Silva Candida
likewise firmly believed in "the intrinsic superiority of spiritual being to material being" and in this we see the final polarization of Augustine's "two cities." As McIlwain notes, while "it is true that St. Augustine defines the Church as the community of all believers and that his 'City of God' is not the exact counterpart of the visible Church on earth" nevertheless the thrust of his anti-body or anti-matter drive was by means of its own inner dynamic as well as by the growing need for independence on the part of the medieval Church leaders to lead to at least the practical identification of the "City of man" with the empire or the state and the "City of Heaven" with the institutional Church. Gregory epitomizes this identification. Following upon his influential restatement of the issue subsequent writers advanced and explicitated it. The great canonist, Ivo, bishop of Chartres, in his Decretum published in the last decade of the eleventh century quoted St. Gregory Nazianzen as stressing the superior authority of that organ, the Church, to which is committed care of the soul above the State which cares for the needs of the body. Ivo writes: "Does it not seem unjust to you if the spirit yields to the flesh? if heavenly things are surpassed by earthly things? if human affairs are placed before divine?" Cardinal Deusdedit echoed him in his Collectio Canonum and Gratian, in his Decretum (c. 1140) incorporated the same sentiment. These canonical statements establish the definitive political usage of the body/soul metaphor within Christendom. At the end of the twelfth century the canonist Stephen of Tournai was simply explicitating the commonplace when he made use of the standard metaphor to speak politically of "the two modes of life, spiritual and carnal." To these two modes of life corresponded within the commonwealth, the Church, over which Christ
reigns as king "two peoples" ... "the clergy and the laity; two sources of authority (principatus), the priesthood and kingship." The hierarchy of their relationship, however, was obviously patterned on the fundamental distinction between the "spiritual" and the "carnal."

It now remains to focus on the use of the body/soul metaphor in the Libelli de Lite to see how the papal party and the imperial party used the tradition at their disposal in their struggle for reform.
Chapter Two

THE ELEVENTH CENTURY SETTING:

BODY/SOUL RELATIONSHIP

Cardinal Humbert of Silva Candida, Pope Gregory VII's valued theoretician of the Church reform movement, transmits the now inherited conviction of the superiority of soul over body in the context of the Pauline injunction that Christians should remember that "their bodies are the temple of the Holy Spirit" (1 Cor. 6:19). Still in his polemic against the simoniacs, Humbert departs from the balance of Paul's text. Simoniacs, on account of their sacrilege, suffer in the end damnation of the body and they "suffer so much more in the soul insofar as the soul is better than the body."\(^1\)

On the other side of the political fence, i.e., among the supporters of the Emperor Henry IV, Sigebert, monk of Gembloux, holds the same teaching. In his *Apology Against those who Inveigh Against the Marriage of Married Priests* (c. 1074 or 1075), he cites Augustine's *On Lying* to the effect that "since no one doubts that the spirit (animus) is better than the body, the integrity of the spirit which can be preserved in eternity is to be preferred to the integrity of the body".\(^2\) While Humbert remembers that the whole man, "body and soul", is to be offered to God as "a sacrifice, living, holy, pleasing to God" according to Paul in Romans 12:1-2,\(^3\) bluntly he argues repeating the refrain that "the soul is worth more (potior) than the body."\(^4\) Sinful souls can best be described as "carnal souls".\(^5\)
Bernold of Constance (born c. 1054, died 1100), a powerful and prolific defender of the papal cause, re-enforced the anti-body motif with particular respect to the priesthood which he assumes as the acme of the Christian life. Priests, he holds, must flee the physical and sexual desires of their bodies in order worthily to celebrate the sacrament of the Lord's body. Basing himself on 1 Peter 3,7, he writes: "For even the prince of the Apostles in his letter commands even laymen to spare their wives lest their prayers be hindered." That vessel of election, Paul, agrees with him saying: "abstinete, vos ad tempus, ut vacetis orationi." If therefore laymen are prohibited from the conjugal act on the day in which they determine to pray, it clearly follows that priests, whose daily office it is to pray or sacrifice or baptize, should never have sexual relations with their wives from the day of ordination on. Bernold recalls the practice in the time of Pope Gregory the Great when "not even the laity could receive the divine sacraments unless they had preserved continence for three days" like David in the Old Testament.

In his second letter On the Incontinence of Priests (1075) Bernold amplifies his concept of body/soul dualism in holding that the cleric guilty of sin should be punished so that "there should perish in him his carnal nature (carnalitas) which is inclined to death." Therefore "may his spirituality, which seeks eternal goods, revive: let him then perish in the flesh that he may be saved in his spirit." Here the flesh is presented as ineluctably inclined to sin and consequently to death just as the spirit or soul by nature tends to virtue and life.

The obvious pitfall for the clergy is the married state. Bernold cites Pope Sylvester I (314-335) who, as Bernold states, "called the Council of Nicaea and
corroborated it with his apostolic authority." According to Sylvester, "no priest may marry after having received the priestly honour. If, however, anyone should act contrary to this, we order him to be deprived of his honour for twelve years. If anyone should act contrary to this present and public order he shall be damned forever." The fundamental reason Jerome had well stated, according to Bernold, namely "because women living with men germinate thorns and pierce the recesses of the mind with a sharp sword." Here woman as symbol of the corrupt flesh and man as that of the noble mind is implicit but obvious.

Harkening back to the application of body/soul dualism to the Old/New Testament antithesis, Bernold describes the Old Testament as consisting in mysteries and carnal observances. With the advent of Christ, "the end as fulfillment of the Law", these were done away with. "Whoever therefore proposes that a carnal observance from the (Old) Law which is contrary to the New Testament should still be observed, doubtless he is a Judaizer along with the Galatians and even with the Ebionites. The marriage of priests is reckoned as among the carnal observances of the Law." Bernold continues to explain that since among the Jews priesthood was conferred by family descent marriage was necessary for them but since Christian priests are more widely chosen "they are rightly forbidden to marry".

The same precarious balancing of the soul/body relationship is attempted to the detriment of the body in later writings of which the following are a selection from the Gregorian camp, which was the more outspoken on the issue. The anonymous writer of Pro Gregorio towards the end of the eleventh century begrudgingly admits that "although God dwells in the minds of the faithful, still the Apostle calls their bodies the temple of the Holy Spirit."
At best the body is a vehicle or means to reach the goal that really matters, i.e., the welfare of the soul. As Humbert says of the sacraments: "They signify what they are and what they possess in themselves. So the visible font is a sign of baptism which, however, has within itself the substance (i.e. the virtue or power), i.e. the Holy Spirit who confers a spiritual and invisible washing on the interior man in his spirit (mens) through a bodily and visible sign which is shown to the eyes of the flesh by means of that dipping of the exterior man into water." 13

Bonizo of Sutri provides a storehouse of implicit and explicit illustrations of the body's inferiority to the soul, many of which are by now commonplaces in Christian rhetoric. Writing on the death of Pope Gregory VII, he depicts him as "seized by bodily weakness" and "giving up his soul to heaven". 14 The convention of the body, prey to weakness, and the soul, untouchable by death but rather freed of the body's chains, he explicates by stating that in death "the soul is liberated from the slavery of the body". 15

Abbot Godfrey (d. 1119) follows custom in declaring that "the soul is worth more than the body". 16 And finally, another Gregorian partisan, the monk Placid, in 1111 excoriates the crime of a simoniacal bishop using the traditional analogy. "To the eyes of the flesh indeed he appears to be a great bishop, but with the help of divine insight he is looked upon as a great leper. By means of money he acquired an order not his due but in the eyes of God he lost his inner self. The flesh undertook the dignity but the soul lost its integrity. The servile flesh became the master of the soul which was the master and has become the servant of the flesh. The flesh rules over the people and the soul serves the devil. The priesthood is aligned with the
flesh and readies the soul for perdition ... What he gave when he was ordained a bishop was gold and what he lost was his soul. Finally as evil men like this "do not die in the body, as Ananias and Saphira did, they will die in the soul which is superior to the body for it will be cast out from the fellowship of the faithful and be thrust into the depths of hell".

It is to be noted in these writings in general that the Augustinian fluidity of vocabulary in reference to the soul continues. *Anima* (soul) is often meant by *mens* (mind) just as *caro* (flesh) stands for *corpus* (body). For example, Humbert, writing of Satan profaning men through sin, holds that "their minds are befogged by error and their bodies befouled by the stench of every kind of wantonness". Obviously, error here means moral error or sin which properly afflicts the soul.

The general political application of such spiritual dualism is ready to hand and is so intimated by Bernold citing 1 John 2, 15-18: "Do not love the world or the things that are in the world. If anyone loves the world, the love of the Father is not in him; because all that is in the world is the lust of the flesh and the lust of the eyes and the pride of life, which is not from the Father, but from the world. And the world with its lusts is passing away, but he who does the will of God abides forever. Dear children, it is the last hour and the whole world is placed in the power of the evil one." "This life" should not be considered, therefore, "of much value since it is a temptation and mist appearing for a trifle, else, unhappily you lose the life to come which is of everlasting happiness." Here the flesh equals the world which is destined to damnation because it is "in the power of the evil one".
THE SOUL-FILLED BODY

Is there no escape in this world from the trammels of the body and its nefarious proclivities? Happily there is and this is the person of Jesus Christ, the soul-filled body par excellence in whom the Holy Spirit resides. In him the body is totally subservient to the will of the soul. On this the whole of Christianity is in full accord and therefore both the papal and the imperial parties here find themselves in agreement. Humbert sums it all up in the now classical phrase inherited from St. Paul (1 Cor. 12, 27) when he refers to "the body of Christ which is his Church." \(^{22}\)

Stressing with equal conviction and graphic ardour that the Church is to be acknowledged as the body of Christ to which all must be joined for their eternal salvation is the anonymous imperialist author of the treatise On Preserving the Unity of the Church:

"Therefore the Word, the soul and the flesh is one Christ in the one person of God and man. But he destroys Jesus who denies either his divinity or his soul or his flesh. He as well destroys Jesus who corrupts the commands and words of Jesus either by wrong living or by still more wrongly interpreting them. But he also destroys Jesus who splits the unity of the Church. The one man is Christ, head and body; and his body is the Church."\(^{23}\)

Also Cardinal Deusdedit, Gregory's supporter, writing to Viator and Pancratz, holds:

"It is not the body of Christ that the schismatic affects. No one can pretend that Christ is divided without being rebuked by the Apostle. Evidently there is but one Church, as is often said, which is the body of Christ, and it cannot be divided into two or more parts. So likewise when someone departs from it (for that person) the Church ceases to be."\(^{24}\)
Even more forcefully Deusdedit cites Augustine against the Donatists:

"The Catholic Church alone is the body of Christ of which the head is the saviour of his body. The Holy Spirit gives life to no one outside this body... He who is an enemy of unity is no partaker of divine charity. And so those who are outside the Church do not have the Holy Spirit." 25

THE QUESTION OF ORDER WITHIN THE ONE BODY

Though the body, i.e., the Church, be one, as acknowledged by both sides to the controversy, the vital argument hinged on the question of headship or hierarchy within the body. The ideal was expressed by Gregory's staunch defender, Gebehard, Archbishop of Salzburg, who in his Letter to Hermann, Bishop of Metz in 1081 declared "in the one body of Christ which is the Church neither should the lesser members be oppressed by the more distinguished ones nor should the inferior members flatter their superiors". 26

The reason for this equality, Humbert reminds us, is because, as St. Augustine stressed in his Tracts on the Letters of John, "the sons of God are the body of the only begotten Son of God". 27 Speaking sacramentally, Bernold cites St. Gregory the Great from his Fourth Book of Dialogue: "Then... it will be the true host to God for us when we shall have made ourselves the host." 28 The host is the body of the Lord which we have become by virtue of our incorporation into the Church. Still, the necessary ordering of the body requires the extended metaphorical treatment of its parts principally divided into head and members.
Humbert, at the end of his work Against the Simoniacs, names "Christ, the head of the Church". Another Gregorian, Bernard of Constance, echoes him, reminding his readers that "Christ is head of the body of which you are the members". Bernold, for his part, refers to Christians as "joined in one body with Christ the head".

Henry's followers are in agreement as the anonymous author of On Preserving the Unity of the Church explicitly shows: "the Lord commends the unity of the Church which, working through charity, builds itself up in the unity of its members into heaven in the Redeemer himself, he who is head of the Church". And again: "Love ... remains integral in the elect of God because the head and the body, which is Christ and the Church, are not estranged from each other." At the end of our period the monk Placid and Abbot Godfrey, papal supporters, sum up the main teaching. Placid holds "that Christ is the head of the Church and the holy Church is his body". Godfrey refers simply to "Christ who is the head of the Church".

However, within the main stream of this tradition there were several diverse currents some of which seemed truly countercurrents. The ideal, if not idyllic, picture will suffer severe modification. The traditional distinction between "the vine and the branches" motif gave rise to various contenders for headship in the Church.

The anonymous author of Statements on the Disagreement between the Pope and the King (1084) holds that "... the Son of God ... wanted the Apostolic See to be, through Blessed Peter, the head of the universal Church." This he argues
as a strong papalist against the Eastern Church which considered itself "the root of the Christian religion because of its doctors and native sons, i.e. Peter and Paul (which) it sent like branches and palms of holy preaching to the western regions ... boasting therefore that it was the head of the whole of Christianity and the Roman Church its tail, as it were". 37

The papalist position is bolstered by authorities ably arrayed by Manegold of Lautenbach:

"The most holy Roman Church received the primacy not from the Apostles but from our Lord himself, as he said to Blessed Peter: 'Thou art Peter and upon this rock I shall build my Church' (Matthew, 16,18). Therefore this Apostolic See has been constituted as the hinge and head of all the Churches by the Lord and by no other. So just as the door is guided by the hinge, therefore according to the Lord's ordering all the churches are ruled by the authority of this holy see." 38

Zephyrinus also stipulates the same thing in a similar saying:

"All, especially the oppressed, should appeal and have recourse to the Roman Church, as if to a mother in order to be nourished at her breast, defended by her authority and relieved from oppression." 39

Callistus, indeed, a man of outstanding sanctity, says the same thing:

"No one doubts but that the Apostolic Church is the mother of all churches from whose rules you are in no way to deviate. And as the son came to do the will of the father, so you also fulfill the will of your mother which is the Church whose head, as has been previously said, is the Roman Church." 40

Here Manegold, uncautiously perhaps, mixes the metaphors in at once referring to the Apostolic or Roman Church as mother as well as naming the Church at large Mother. Or perhaps in his mind the Roman see so essentially represented
the Church that it could be used as its adequate equivalent. What makes these passages most striking is the omission of Jesus as head of the Church and the significant insertion of the Roman See. So it would seem from Manegold's citation of Pope Virgilius writing to Euterus the bishop:

"No one, whether of little learning or of mature wisdom, doubts that the Roman Church is the foundation and form of the churches and from her all churches take their leadership. Of this no true believer is ignorant."

And shortly further on:

"Wherefore, he says, the holy Roman Church, consecrated by the Lord's word, has the primacy of all churches. To her both the most weighty business, complaints and judgments of bishops as well as the more important questions of the churches are always to be referred as if to the head."41

Pope Gregory the Great adds his authority to the claim:

"The apostolic commands should not be resisted out of hardened pride but for the sake of salvation and in obedience the orders issued by the Roman and apostolic authority are to be carried out if you desire to have communion with this same holy Church which is the head of you all."42

Finally:

"Every matter of our holy religion must be referred to the Apostolic See as if to the head of the churches and take its norm from her as from her it took its beginning lest it appear to lose the head of the institution."43

HEADSHIP IN THE CHURCH BODY

The headship of the Apostolic or Roman See (equivalent terms since no cognizance was taken of the several apostolic sees of the East) meant, for the papal party especially, the headship of the Pope over the Church. But this occurs in the
context of and as the culmination of the ecclesiastical hierarchy. Already in 1052 Peter Damian depicted a hierarchical ordering of the Church based on the familiar body/soul metaphor:

"Just as one soul is diffused throughout all the members of the body, so the holy universal church is fed by one spirit of God. Wherefore as Paul writes to the Corinthians: 'For as the body is one and has many members, and all the members of the body, many as they are, form one body, so also is it with Christ. For in one Spirit we were all baptized into one body...' (1 Cor. 12:12,13) But since the soul is one it surely gives life to all the members, but it does not minister one and the same strength to all the members; for it grants to some certain, we might say, prerogatives which it does not impart to the others. For since the rest of the members receive life in common from her (the soul) the eye receives in a special sense from her not simply life alone but also sight, and the ear hearing, the heart understanding, the nose the sense of smell and the tongue speech.

"The same soul is in no way different, yet it joins various functions to the individual members. So also the Holy Spirit, insofar as it grants faith to all those reborn in Christ, infuses life, as we say, into all the members of the Church in accord with the divine saying: "how my just one lives by faith", (Hebrews 10:38) how when it raises some to the ministries of ecclesiastical dignity it grants in effect special gifts to certain superior members. Furthermore the soul does not discern whether the eyes are crossed, the ears malformed or the nose pug-nosed. But whether they are handsome or ugly, she distributes to each one the function which is its own right so that somehow she seems to pay little attention to whose members they are but rather to value the places in which they are constituted by nature. And so the Holy Spirit in conferring the sacrament of spiritual grace pays not so much attention to the individual's merit as to the function of the grade received."

"Clearly what is special to clerics is not so much for their particular benefit but rather that which they commonly owe to the welfare of the whole community."45

Humbert's stand is more unequivocally clergy-oriented. Citing St. Ambrose, he writes:
"As when the head is corrupted by an overwhelming sickness it necessarily follows that the rest of the body is flooded by the lethal illness, so when those who are recognized as the head of the church corrupt their own body by a deathly sickness no single part of the body can escape the fatal contagion brought about by negligent priests." 46

Once again we note the unequivocal reference to the clergy as the head of the Church. That this can stand, as it does, without immediate and qualifying reference to the supreme headship of Jesus portrays a significant shift if not of doctrine at least of emphasis in the attitude and awareness particularly of the proponents of the papacy.

In his third book Against the Simoniacs Humbert returns to his polemic identifying priests with the Church.

"We have heard," he writes, "that these (sacriligious persons) persecute the clerics and priests of the Lord and defame them thereby piling evil upon evil and falling still further away not understanding that God's church consists of priests and grows into the temple of God. And just as he who lays waste God's church despoils and invades her fields and bequests becomes guilty of sacrilege, so also he who persecutes her priests is evidently guilty of sacrilege and is so judged." 47

The lone explicit voice raised in direct contradiction to the papal headship of the Church comes from the monk Gregory of Catania in his Orthodox Imperial Defense (1111 A.D.). Protesting his Christian orthodoxy he declares "the king to be the head of the Church". He continues on a motif of St. John Chrysostom to describe the Church's head which is the kingdom and its heart which is the priesthood. Still, the ultimate head Gregory was careful to recognize as Jesus Christ. Nevertheless he subsequently returns to his favourite theme of the emperor as head of the Church followed by the priests. Indeed, by virtue of "their sacred anointing kings
and princes are called Christs"—a conclusion Gregory arrived at through the Greek meaning of Christos and parallel Hebrew meaning of messiah which was "anointed".

He writes:

"We are satisfied with those things which our fathers left us and in these we hope to be saved. In this matter we hold to the doctrine of our Lord Jesus Christ given to the apostles and far be it from us in any way to treat less than honestly his Church arranged and united by him in its head and individual members. In the beginning of this story we hold it timely to bring out their (i.e. his opponents') presumptuous novelties or excrescences so that we may reply to all of them one after another in a Catholic fashion. Now they declare that the kingdom and the imperial dignity absolutely have no rank of prominence in holy Church, nor is the emperor's consent required in the papal election, nor should he be given the right according to authentic custom to invest a prelate of the Church with staff and ring. But first of all let us see what levels or dignities and what orders constitute holy Church. Then we shall with great diligence consider the indissoluble connection of the head and its members."48

"The Lord himself chose her (the Church) as his spouse, certainly holy and immaculate and without stain or wrinkle, and established and founded in her some indeed as apostles, others prophets, still others evangelists and others pastors and doctors for the completion of the saints for the work of the ministry, for the building up of the body of Christ. He established in her princes and higher powers for whom the same apostle demands continual prayers, saying: I urge, therefore, first of all that supplications, prayers, intercessions and thanksgivings be made for all men, for kings and for all in high positions." (I Tim. 2:1-2)

Isidore follows on this:

"The princes of this world sometimes hold the heights of received power in the Church so that they may safeguard ecclesiastical discipline to the extent that what the priest cannot make prevail through the teaching of doctrine, (their) power may command out of fear of discipline so that those within the Church who act against its faith and discipline may be crushed by the severity of the princes; let the princely power impose on the necks of the proud that discipline which the good of the Church is not able to bring about. That we should, however, understand the king to be the head of the Church we are warned by holy Scripture which says
to Saul: When you were small in your own eyes I established your head in Israel. (I Kings 15:17) John Chrysostom writes on this: Holy Church has a head which is the kingdom and a heart which is the priesthood. Just as the heart is the seat of wisdom so the priests are the receptacles of spiritual wisdom; and just as if the stomach is healthy the whole body is strong and if it is sick the whole body is weakened, so if the priesthood is whole, the entire Church flourishes; if however it is corrupt, everyone's faith is withered. Now by the heart and the stomach we mean the priesthood because in spiritual things they govern the whole people."

"The same holy Church has fitting offices deputed to its individual members; it has a left hand and a right hand. She herself says so in the Song of Songs: His left hand under my head and his right hand shall embrace me (B:3). For the left hand we understand the kingdom; for the right hand the priesthood. The left hand of the bridegroom, i.e. of Christ, is said to be under the head of the Church because it is upheld and defended temporally by secular prelates. His right hand shall embrace because it is by means of the institution of priesthood that she knows her founder through whom she will merit eternal life, that they may know thee, the only true God, and him whom thou hast sent, Jesus known through the constitution of the priesthood dispenses eternal life to the faithful. For just as in one body many members make one body, so the multitude of the faithful joined through faith and love to its head, which is Christ, are one body with him. And just as eyes see with the whole body, and ears hear and the mouth speaks and the hands work in unison with their body, so ought also the spiritual members of the Church to work so that each and every member of holy Church may show forth his own function. The eyes are the doctors who minister spiritual light to the others; the ears are the good hearers who humbly listen to their teachers' words; the nose means those who can discern the fragrance of virtues from the smell of vice; the mouth means those who teach others; the hands those who provide the necessities, like the almsgivers; the feet those who run to free the guiltless and visit the sick. Just as if the members of the one body are at odds with each other the common function fails, so the kingdom and the priesthood will destroy the beauty of all Christianity if they do not agree. Lest this happen every grade or member should be allowed his own function, and, as Christ the Lord ordered, render to Caesar the things that are Caesar's and to God the things that are God's (cf. Matthew 22:21). Note here that first he said: Render to Caesar the things that are Caesar's; and secondly, to God the things that are God's, so that the debt of subjection may first be paid to the head of the Church, that is, the emperor and secondly the priests receive the function of honour."
To the emperor indeed to render earthly advantages; to the priests, however, i.e., to the popes or other clerics, we render spiritual ones. Now it does not seem unbecoming regarding this precept of the Lord if the Church's prelates first receive the approval of their own honour, i.e. by means of investiture of the staff and ring from the emperor rather than by consecrated by the pope because if the prince is proclaimed as head of the Church, he is by no means to be rejected by the creation of the office or ministry of his members."

Opponents, i.e. the papal party, stand to be pitied:

"... they have sought not the glory of the most high God but their own honour and that far beyond measure. They devoted themselves not to the welfare of holy Church and the flock of Christ as true pastors should, but they gave themselves over to detestable slaughter like cruel wolves. Therefore if the people or community should take part in the bishop's ordination, how much more does it not become the head of the people, i.e. the prince, to be present. For how will the kingdom and the priesthood be able to achieve unity and concord if they fall out in the beginning of their establishment? For on account of their sacred anointing kings and princes are called christs and so are united by the sacraments of the Church in their ministry or office and prelacy that in no way should they be divided. After the Lord Christ mercifully joined the kingdom and the priesthood, both being subsumed in his sacred body, who could be so demented as to claim unreasonably that they should be separated. Therefore let the pope be ruled by harmony with the prince so that the Church may flourish in temporal matters by this obedience. For the princes are God's ministers and if the Church lacked their ministrations she would lose the defense of her earthly domain. If she did so she would be invaded by the impious, oppressed by tyrants and destroyed by any and all wicked men."

Finally, Gregory shows that, when he was in this world, Christ,

"as under the law, was subject to earthly power ... Indeed if the prince is so constituted in the Church by God alone like Saul who was head in Israel, what member have we ever heard of condemning his head?"
THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN KINGDOM AND PRIESTHOOD

Within the scriptural context the debate or tug-of-war raged with attempts at finding a harmony between the two offices of kingdom and priesthood. Again and again the body/soul metaphor surfaces, particularly on Gregory's side in its sacramental application.

Peter Damian's first work in 1052 initiates this aspect of the struggle:

"Since one is called a priest precisely because he renders a sacred thing, that is, because he offers a sacrifice to God, what can be found more sublime in the Church, or what of greater eminence than the priesthood through which the mystery of the Lord's body and blood is offered?" 49

Still:

"It is recognized that the kingdom and priesthood were instituted by God and therefore, although the person of the administrator may be ascertained as thoroughly unworthy, still now and again suitable grace accompanies the office which in itself is good." 50

But the priestly blessing, contrary to the royal action, is of a higher spiritual nature.

"Why wonder if the priestly blessing which is sown like seed in the soul of the receiver, i.e. the priesthood, works invisibly by the breath of the Holy Spirit." 51

Humbert enters the fray to castigate those, even some bishops, who batten on the confusion generated by the dispute. Concerning the blasphemous statement of some bishops playing off pope and emperor, he writes:

"to the confusion of Holy Church and his own perdition, such a bishop would be accustomed to curry popular favour by saying: 'The Roman Pope, I say, is the Father, the Emperor is the Son and I, running back and forth between the two of them, am the Holy Spirit.'" 52
"Wherefore he who wills to confer the priestly and royal dignity without blame and with good effect should say that within the present Church the priesthood is likened to the soul and the kingdom to the body in that they mutually love each other and in turn need each other while necessarily working for each other's good. Therefore as the soul is pre-eminent and gives commands, so the priestly dignity acts towards the kingly insofar as the heavenly is above the earthly. In this way all things are not in a jumble but in order, the priesthood like the soul should foreordain what is to be done; the kingdom, secondly, like the head of the body is over all its members and precedes them, as is right. For just as it is proper for kings to follow ecclesiastics, so it behooves the laity to follow their kings for the advantage of Church and country; in this way the people are to be taught by one of these powers and ruled by the other ..."53

The following year (1058) in his second writing, the Synod Debate, Peter Damian builds upon this comparison. "Not only the Roman people," he writes, "but also the Roman emperor, who is head of the people, owes obedience to the Pope because he is a universal pontiff."54 Again: "The carnal mother helps her son in earthly affairs, and should not Mother Church offer her son the king help in spiritual gifts?"55 In this comparison Peter manages neatly to convey the inferiority of the carnal mother, i.e. the king--and by extension the kingdom--to the exalted spiritual mother, Mother Church. Mutuality is stated through in the context of distinct hierarchy.

Finally from Peter's conclusion we read:

"From now on, therefore, my dear ones, let us work together, you on the one side as counsellors of the royal court, we on the other as co-ministers of the Apostolic See, both parties in this one dedication striving so that the supreme priesthood and the Roman empire might be allied together to the effect that humankind which is ruled by these two heights in both substances may never--God forbid!--be split up into parts as has recently been done by Cadalus.... And so may the two summits of the world concur in perpetual union so that
the lower members may not shrink back due to their discord seeing that, as in one mediator of God and man, these two, the kingdom, that is, and the priesthood, are forged together by a divine mystery. Likewise may these two sublime persons be joined together in such unanimity that by a certain glue of mutual charity both the king may be found in the Roman pontiff and the Roman pontiff may be found in the king, except, that is, for the pope's privilege which no one besides him is allowed to assume. For the rest let him coerce evil doers by means of public law when the case dictates and as well let the king with his bishops decide on the state of souls, having cited the authority of the sacred canons. Let the former, like a parent, always be pre-eminent by means of his paternal right, and let the latter rest in the loving embrace of the former like an only begotten and outstanding son.\(^{56}\)

We are left, once again, with the portrayal of an ideal mutuality in which the king cares for souls and the pope for bodies—secondary tasks for both—but always with respect to the pope's superior "privilege".

Manegold has recourse to the formula of the king's consecration to shore up the same argument of papal superiority. As the pope presents the king with the sword he says:

"Receive the sword from the hands of the bishops, unworthy though these hands may be, yet consecrated by the office of the holy apostles. It is conferred on you according to proper form and divinely ordained by the function of our blessing for the defense of the holy Church ...\(^{57}\)

Here the task of the mundane or corporeal sword and that of its holder, i.e. the king, is to subserve the spiritual sword and its holder, the chief bishop, i.e. the pope, who incarnates the soul of the Church.

Finally, Deusdedit applies papal superiority in the strict legal sense. He writes:

"Who in his right mind would tolerate secular judges bringing judgment of condemnation against priests, levites and other ministers of God, that is, against the judges of their souls? That would be equivalent to judging their own judges."
Especially since the priestly authority excels in rendering judgments
and even secular ones, except in cases of blood, as in promulgating
laws. So indeed did the apostle order the judicial affairs of Christians
to be brought to the Church and to be settled by priests." (Cf. I Cor.
6:4) 58

Bolstering his argument is his clear conviction that "regarding the promulgation
of laws it is certain that the priesthood holds the primacy since Almighty God gave
laws first of all not through kings to priests but through priests to kings and the rest
of the faithful." 59

In Henry's camp Wido of Osnabrück had tried to strike a balance citing the
Emperor Valentinian concerning St. Ambrose's episcopal rights in Milan. When
Ambrose was made bishop, Valentinian prayed: "I thank you, Almighty Saviour,
because while I indeed have given to this man (the care of) bodies, you have given
him the souls." 60 Wido concludes that Ambrose "was such a holy man ... that he
would never have accepted consecration or the care of men on the order or by the
gift of the emperor if he had known this to be unjust." 61

Hugh of Fleury, a proponent of the emperor's, addressed a Treatise on the
Royal Power and the Priestly Dignity to Henry, King of England, shortly after 1102.
Combating those who think that earthly kingdoms are ordained by men and not by
God, i.e. those who place the priestly dignity before the royal majesty, this late­
comer to the debate decries his enemies who "believe they know that of which they
are ignorant." 62 He writes:

"For our founder and saviour, the Lord Jesus Christ, was pleased by
a most holy mystery to be called at the same time king and priest
so that he could show us the bond or affinity that should fittingly
join the king and the priest, for that which is joined in unity is
indissoluble. Surely should these powers fall into dissension and conflict peace is destroyed and the Church which Christ himself was pleased to redeem by his own blood is unhappily thrown into confusion. 63

"It is my desire, then, that you yourselves, all you my venerable fathers and lords, may daily progress in Christ Jesus our Lord and that also the body of holy Church may in these times be strengthened in proper order and continually enjoy the lasting bond of peace." 64

Concerning the divinely-willed order within the body, Hugh calls upon the order of creation according to which God subjected all the creatures of the world to the first man. In applying the metaphor he writes:

"And so that we likewise may acknowledge this in the form of our body we see all the members of the body subject to the head. All, I say, the members of the human body are evidently and in orderly fashion subjected to and of lesser position than the head. Wherefore it is obviously clear to us that Almighty God not only distinguished the human body with various characteristics of its members but also he ordained the whole world with certain levels and powers just as we know the heavenly court to be set up in which our very God the Almighty Father alone possesses royal dignity and in which, after himself, we know the angels, archangels, thrones and dominations and whatever other powers preside among themselves in a wonderful and orderly distinction." 65

Again, taking the commonplace that "man is the head of the woman" as expressed by St. Paul (I Cor. 11:3), Hugh applies the underlying principle of order to the Trinity:

"The Father and the Son also are of one substance, but in respect of order, not of nature, the Father we know to be greater, for again, as Paul witnesses: God is the head of Christ. For, as we have previously said, the Father is from no one. The Son, however, is from the Father so that the essence of the most high Trinity is adored and venerated in the unity of the Deity." 66

Recalling the Gelasian formula, Hugh continues:
"The principal elements by which this world is ruled are two: the royal and the priestly. The Lord Jesus Christ himself, by a holy mystery, decided to bear these two powers in his person alone so he is at the same time king and priest indeed because by the sacrifice of his body he has cleansed us from the filth of our sins and reconciled us to his Father.

"Indeed the king we see as possessing in the body of his kingdom the image of the Almighty Father just as the bishop bears that of Christ. Wherefore all the bishops of his kingdom are rightly subjected to the king just as the Son is recognized as subject to the Father, not by nature, but by order, so that the whole kingdom may be reduced to one principle."67

To Hugh it seemed obvious that the earthly body corporate should mirror the spiritual body of the triune God. What greater dignity—and consequently unity—could it possess?

Despite his eulogy of kingship, Hugh weakened the argument of principle by basing the king's superiority on the practical utility he showed by instilling fear into those who could not be touched by the implicitly superior force of divine doctrinal instruction imparted by the priests. After showing how the Jews were plunged into disorder with everyone doing whatever pleased him because, as was recorded in the Book of Judges "there was no king in Israel" (Judges 17:6), Hugh continues:

"It is clearly evident from these words that where there is no king to rule the people and to keep it from rash acts the whole body of the kingdom is shaken. Wherefore is he truly called a king who knows how properly to regulate his subjects and rule their way of life. It is for this reason, I say, that Almighty God is acknowledged as having set over the rest of men a king who together with them shares the human condition of birth and death so that due to his own (salutory) fears he may restrain his subjects from evil and at the same time provide them with laws for a good life. In this way the earthly kingdom often benefits the heavenly one since what the priest cannot effect by doctrinal instruction the royal power can do or command through the fear of discipline. For the people is easily corrected by fear of the king. The king however is in no way deterred from unjust paths except only by fear of God and dread of hell."68
RECRIMINATIONS

Since the theoretical problem of the struggle between kingdom and priesthood could not be satisfactorily solved but proved to be at least as thorny as the prime metaphor used in hopes of clarifying it, i.e., the body/soul relationship, the arguments on both sides tended to veer towards recriminations over the practical misuse or abuse of office. Threats of punishment, i.e., excommunication in particular, were a natural by-product.

The papal party does not hide its own corruption. "The whole body of the Church," Peter Damian tells us, relying on the accustomed metaphor, is afflicted by "the simoniacal plague" which "snaked its lethal way" throughout the members and "freely broke out in all degrees of the clergy ..." 69 Such "demons" will be "expelled from the body" "our Redeemer says" by the "power of the Holy Spirit." 70

Indeed as Jesus "wiped away even the sins of the flesh...why should we wonder then if the strong hand of the Lord, capable of effecting any desire, should do in the spirit which gives life that which it attempts even in the flesh which is of no use at all (non prodest quicquam)." 71 As a matter of sad fact, far from the emperor and his party being the only cause of woe Rome herself was indicted by Damian in frank and impartial terms. He writes:

"For since the Roman see which in truth is the mother of all churches was prey to venality like an infected root, she spread the poison of the simoniacal disease throughout the branches of the rest of the churches as well." 72

Humbert echoes him in thundering tones. The Church, he says, is the "spouse of Christ ... whose chastity has been prostituted, sold and doomed by sacrilegious rapists." 73
"From the topmost rank of the Church down to the lowest, all do not hesitate to busy themselves with ecclesiastical affairs. Emperors indeed, kings, princes, judges and one and all who have any power in this world before everything else involve themselves in this and seek this involvement, i.e. those who ought to protect ecclesiastical things for the benefit of ecclesiastical right with the spiritual sword as well as those who should do so with the material sword. Nor do they weigh carefully how criminal and detestable they become to God and man ... "74

Humbert draws on the ideal example of Moses who

"...as he frequently entered and left the tabernacle, inside he was wrapt in contemplation, outside he was pressed with the business affairs of the weak; while inside he meditated on the divine depths, outside he bore the burdens of the fleshly (carnalium). Priests ought to conform to this type in the Church so that while they go outside to engage in affairs for the needs of their subjects, inside they withdraw into themselves to contemplate the commandments. Just like Paul who is taken up with heavenly secrets and yet, moved by condescension, he examines the marriage bed of carnal folk."75

This passage is a good example of the "spiritualizing" of the Old Testament as well as the elevation of the contemplative life (the anima/soul) over the active life (the corpus/body or the carnal).

Henry's party also warmed to the attack on clerical and especially papal abuses.

The anonymous writer of the treatise On Preserving the Unity of the Church follows St. Augustine to accuse those who break the unity of the Church of "the same of schism" which is "worse than the crime of idolatry."76

The pope is judged so guilty:

"Hence as our previous words have sufficiently proven it is very much contrary to the divine order of things as well as to ecclesiastical peace, not to be subject to higher powers, furthermore we may ask if the pope's offense against the king were just since it certainly split the unity of the Church, for the love of which unity, that is to say, we are fully engaged, whatever we had spoken of these things, not for the defense
of the other part, seeing as God does not want parts in his church, since the whole body of the Church, whose head is Christ, is redeemed by Christ himself; and therefore where there is lacking the fullness, which is called the catholic, i.e. the universal Church, there is not the Church of Christ but of evil ones as it (the Church) is split into parts."

"Is it not something terrible and is not the sacrament of the body of the Lord despised when the king communicates at the altar as a sign of ecclesiastical reconciliation? Because surely the sacrament of piety is also a sign of unity and the bond of charity ... And if the king who has fallen guilty on his own is made even more guilty through the action of the pope, which one of them is held responsible for the greater fault? This I ask you to consider and believe. Now there are proper to kings certain ornaments like a crown and purple as well as other insignia of the kingdom which, for a period of time the pope, on his own decision, forbade to the king, that is with this reason in mind, so that in this way either the person of the king himself would be held as of no account, until the kingdom should be strengthened, which was already being accomplished by the election of another king, provided that he was the legitimate king in Italy, or if while not permitted to he did resume the kingly ornaments, he (the pope) would then have a surer reason for excommunicating him, which seems not to be the task of piety nor the sign of concord and unity. Wherefore Pope St. Gregory writes in homilies and so teaches that he who uses this power of binding and loosing for his own desires and not for the welfare of his subjects should be deprived of it. Now when the king returned to Italy he found after his absence a new king and increased enemies from whom he took the strength of his rulership, by the help of divine grace and likewise relying on the well-disposed favour of the princes towards himself since God had touched their hearts. Then indeed he had shown the Roman Pontiff due honour and obedience according to the primacy of the Church of Rome, humbly bearing with patience the sentence of excommunication so that after offering satisfaction he could as a result merit the grace of reconciliation. But when he did this and was totally involved in it so that, with the help of the same Roman Pontiff whose appointed task is to be the prince of peace, he might bring peace to the kingdom and likewise lead the Church of Christ back to unity while also gathering together those things that were scattered, behold he perceived an enemy in him with whom he had placed all his hope, inasmuch as he planned against him and gave help not to himself or to his kingdom but to his enemies in order either to expel him or to ruin him completely, all of which is not the
duty of those concerning which the prophet says from the Lord: 'How beautiful,' he speaks, 'are the feet of those bringing the good news of peace, the good news of well-being.' (Rom. 10:15; Nahum 1:15) Therefore Christ is peace and the inheritance of the Church is peace because Jerusalem which is on high and is the mother of us all, is understood as a vision of peace so that our homeland has no other name but that of peace. He however who works against peace works against Christ and the Church. 'For he,' it is said, 'who is not with me is against me and he who does not gather with me scatters,' (Luke 11:23) that is he splits the unity of the Church because surely no one can be saved unless he is within the unity of the Church.

"(As such persons) are not even to be counted as Catholics...how can the king be judged or condemned according to the threats of the above-mentioned Pope Hildebrand?"78

So the anonymous author makes his brief for the king as preserver of the unity of the one body which is the Church over which the pope has manifestly lost his rights since he has been the source of disunity. In short, the king serves the head of the body of the Church who is Christ; hence he partakes in that headship.

Gregory's crimes are listed in all their horror:

"Behold then in our time Pope Gregory, also called Hildebrand, when once he opened his mouth he divided the Church ... so that throughout these seventeen or even more years the kingdom of the Roman empire is everywhere filled with wards and sedition, the burning and destruction of churches and monasteries and so much that bishop is thrust against bishop, clergy against clergy, people against people, even son against father and father against son and brother against brother."79

Hildebrand's divisiveness was such that

"he divided unto himself from the Church many bishops and abbots, and from the public rulership many dukes and counts so that now they are not one body either of the Church or of the civil government nor is there one heart and one soul of the multitude of believers, according to the discipline of the Church, but there are, as the comic has it, so many men, as many opinions ..."80
"Behold then Hildebrand's bishops since doubtless they are murderers both of bodies and of souls, of bodies indeed because they, as men of blood and full of deceit, have used the hands of their followers for the killing of many, of souls in fact because they slaughtered all those they separated from the unity of the Catholic Church."

"Therefore whether it is Gregory, or Hildebrand, or anyone else who presides over a part, not over the Church, he could not condemn King Henry who surely strives for this, yearns for this and mightily works for this, namely that there be one body of the Church, to the extent that in the same manner there may also be one body of the commonweal (reipublicae)."

"Therefore since each dignity, that is the kingly and the pontifical, is so ordained by God to the extent that spiritual action stands apart from temporal invasion and God's soldier by no means involves himself in worldly affairs... look, I beseech you, and see how Hildebrand and his bishops, egregiously opposing the plan of God, tried to root out and destroy those two principals whereby the world is ruled; and they even wanted all the other bishops to be like themselves, those truly who are not bishops, and to have the kind of kings that they themselves could rule over with royal power."

In a final crescendo of recrimination the author recalls St. Paul's teaching that

"the Church is the body of this head (i.e. Jesus Christ) and anyone who leaves the fellowship of this body's unity is held by the common judgment of the holy fathers to be a foreigner, a profane person and an enemy. Now certain bishops broke off into the party of Hildebrand holding that to be of greater value than the universality of God's Catholic Church. Out of this it happened from the enemy's sowing of the tares of many scandals in the Lord's field that in their bishoprics we find not baptisms but murders, not the consecration of holy chrism but the shedding of human blood, not any other sacraments of Christ and the Church, which are the common work of God's bishops, but maledictions which are the work of the devil's servants... (In the words of St. Cyprian such actions) subvert the faith, corrupt the truth and shatter unity."

This sin, we are told, following St. Augustine in his sermon on blasphemy against the Holy Spirit, is unforgivable:
"Whoever is guilty of impenitence against the spirit, in which unity and the fellowship of communion accrue to the Church, will never be forgiven because he himself blocks forgiveness and rightly he will be damned in his spirit who is divided in himself as well as divided against the Holy Spirit who in himself is not divided."

Peter Crassus in 1084 recommends a fitting punishment for Hildebrand's crimes. Since Gregory has not treated Henry "as a father should" but rather acted "contrary to the laws excommunicating and anathematizing him, deceitfully setting snares throughout his kingdom" and finally planning "death for him against the force of human nature", so Gregory, convicted of "such great cruelty can by no means be called father." He deserves therefore the punishment the Code reserves for parracides, i.e. death "not by the sword nor by burning nor by any other solemn punishment" but he should be "sewn up in a bag with a dog, a rooster, an ape, and a viper and set into a pack of snakes together with these deadly punishments, then, according to the possibilities of the area, either to be thrown into the nearby sea or into a river. There let him die bit by bit a living death, dead to the earth and refused entry into heaven."}

Writing shortly after 1098, Benno, a cardinal and supporter of Henry, indulged in an especially scandalous story of Gregory's iniquity. He writes:

"The Emperor was accustomed to make frequent visits to pray at the Church of St. Mary which is on the Aventine hill. Now Hildebrand, who had carefully sought out information from his spies on all the Emperor's doings, made note of the spot where he used most often to stand or be prostrate in prayer. Having promised money to a certain man he induced him to secretly place large stones upon the beams of the church and so set them so that he could let them fall down on the head of the emperor at prayer and crush him. When the perpetrator of such a great crime hurried to carry out the plan and place a very weighty stone on the beams the weight of the stone
carried him down and he fell from the beams to the floor by the judgment of God, where he was crushed to death by his own stone. When the Romans found this out they bound the wretch's feet and had him dragged around the squares of the city for three days. The emperor, however, with his accustomed clemency, ordered him to be buried. "86

Throughout the listing of these recriminations we observe authors on both sides of the controversy accepting quite generally the new-accepted theory of the superiority of clergy over laity as not only articulated by but to a substantial extent formulated by the soul over body supremacy. Within the narrow political confines which this theory imposed there was but little room for innovative thinking regarding the growing autonomy or, less strongly said, increasing sense of value accruing to the world and its governmental needs. The changing times of the eleventh century which saw the dramatic growth of cities and societal relationships of all sorts, particularly political and economical, demanded new premises in the argument for rulership, but the long-forged hierarchical theories, well withstood the building pressures. In the end the only recourse appeared to be a sterile, and at least theoretically illogical, battle of recriminations of which the papacy was, according to the documents, the prime target. If the pope could be shown to be a grossly scandalous man then arguments could be raised, as we have seen, for his removal. This was the anti-papal cry as based, for example, on Pope Simplicius' declaration: "He who abuses the power committed to him deserves to lose its privilege,"87 or on the biblical injunction from Matthew 18:9: "And if thy eye is an occasion of sin to thee, pluck it out and cast it from thee! It is better for thee to enter into life with one eye, than, having two eyes, to be cast into hell-fire."88 But such
non-orthodox approaches, even though Humbert found them attractive, were to be rejected by the majority who, like Damian, recalled the force of the traditional implications of the Leonine "unworthy heir of Blessed Peter" (*indignus haeres beati Petri*). No matter how unworthy, the legitimate pope could in no way be removed.

The theoretical stalemate was only to be modified in a practical sense at least by the changing realities of political life, and needless to say by uneasy compromise, as occasioned by the Concordat of Worms in 1122.
CONCLUSION

Professor Martin P. Nilsson concluded his study of Greek religion with the conviction that the beliefs and doctrines traditionally cited as the core issue in the study of the syncretic movements of late antiquity were but secondary factors to "the heart of the matter." This Nilsson identified as "the spiritual soil from which these growths arose and drew their nourishment," a substratum that "has been touched on only in passing and in general terms."¹ The mise-au-point seems apt in the parallel question of Church reform in the eleventh century since the contentious issues of simony, Nicolaitism and finally of the imperial/papal struggle for supremacy appear substantially to be manifestations of the now age-old direction Western Christian culture has taken in its attitudes to the body/soul relationship. This substratum or "spiritual soil" which we have explored in Chapter One manifests itself, in the course of the eleventh century, in two periods with correspondingly different results.

The first period, as noted in the introduction, is marked by the imperial/papal collaboration in the service of moral reform within the Christian society. In this area the long assumed superiority of soul over body lends effective theological undergirding to the extirpation of simony and Nicolaitism but when the increasing complexities of a developing society focus attention ever more urgently on the unitary conduct of Christianity and the balance of the political/religious tandem is threatened recourse by both sides to the classical metaphor leads to inconsistency, forced applications and failure.² In brief, the metaphor could not sustain the dichotomous usage it was put to in the political struggle between pope and emperor. In particular, the assumed
inferiority of body to soul could not bear the politically divisive weight which the Gregorians tended to place upon it nor did it offer an adequate theoretical basis for the emerging supremacy of the Empire. It was, it seems, this unequal and inferior relationship of body to soul which for so many centuries had proclaimed, as Damian phrased it, that the flesh "non prodest quicquam" (is of no use at all) which failed to provide the needed substructure for a society in the process of metamorphosis or birth. It failed to provide the fabric for the dynamic social myth which the times required. The previous political application of the metaphor as classically made by Augustine envisioned the earthly city as clearly the manifestation of a transitory state of pilgrimage and soon to be succeeded by the heavenly kingdom, the eternal abode of faithful souls. But the vigorous a-borning society of the late eleventh century bears little relationship to the precarious state of the Roman Empire in Augustine's last years. Therefore the assured superiority of soul over body, of Church over Empire, of Pope over Emperor can no longer receive easy acceptance. The changed social setting changes the context of interpretation. This theoretical inadequacy leads to laboured contradictions in usage as when the imperialist Peter Crassus raised the kingdom to the status of anima and relegated the priesthood to the category of corpus. Or again, when Humbert violates the traditional hierarchy of the metaphor by assimilating the Church's worldly goods and possessions into anima rather than corpus. Humbert, however, in effect admits the novelty of his metaphorical interpretation by admitting that it is "unspeakable and beyond human measure" and as such "must be piously believed." Hence the increasingly strained application of the metaphor in the expression of views "often without logical order."
Seen in this light the papal/imperial battle of recriminations reveals a vital significance beyond that of merely customary name-calling and mutual denigration. The tenor of its frustrated illogicality bears witness to the breakdown of the body/soul metaphor under the heavier ad hoc political demands made upon it. At all times effective in inveighing against the usual moral abuses, it could no longer serve as perspective for a comprehensive picture of emerging reality. The Concordat of Worms was a product of these starker political exigencies, "a pragmatic agreement" signifying the ineffectivity of the theoretical arsenal available to both sides.

In sum, it is the contention of this thesis that the common struggle for "righteousness," the "basic question," as Morrison recalls it, has, at its roots, the moral and theological concerns and problems which in the polemical writings of the time are synthesized in the body/soul metaphor. It is here that we find epitomized or in kernel form the tensions if not contradictions between the world and the after-life, or the "two cities," and certainly now between the clergy and laity, the pope and emperor, and finally the coming struggle between the Church and the State. These tensions were the legitimate and necessary offspring of the classical roots of Christian medieval society as portrayed and mediated by a basic dualism. The force of this dualism, as shown in Chapter One, was distinctly determinative of the complex medieval mentality and its recognition militates against a too facile assumption of a "medieval synthesis."
APPENDICES
Appendix A

EXCURSUS ON PRIESTLY DIGNITY AND AUTHORITY

VS

ROYAL OR IMPERIAL POWER

We have already seen in Chapter One the distinction Pope Gelasius at the end of the fifth century had made between the two institutions of world rule: "the sacred authority of the popes" (auctoritas sacrata pontificum) and the royal power (regalis potestas). While Gelasius has been badly served by his translators and hence the force of his distinction weakened, as noted, the eleventh century polemicists, though not entirely consistent, attempted to be careful in the use of these terms.

Once again Humbert is the first to confront the issue. Self-servers, he tells his readers, delight "the wide open and avid ears of princes by immoderately making great of mundane power (potestas) most especially of the imperial and royal fullness of power (potentia, which I translate as fullness of power to distinguish its nature, as Humbert does, from the lesser potestas) and by making little of ecclesiastical dignity.\textsuperscript{1} Here the term dignity is used, as occasionally subsequent and particularly papal writers use it, as a synonym for divinely granted auctoritas. Further on in the same treatise Humbert returns to the disparity between "ecclesiastical dignity" and "lay power".\textsuperscript{2} Potentia Humbert uses for "the Saviour's incomprehensible powerful-ness\textsuperscript{3}, which evidently is superior to "lay power" as also is the clerical order:

"For there is a special clerical order (ordo) in the Church like eyes in the head of which the Lord says: He who touches you, touches the pupil of my eye (Zach. 2:8). There is also lay power (potestas)
like the breast and arms ready to obey and defend the Church. Next there come the common people (vulgus) like to the inferior members of the extremities at the same time subject to and very closely related to the ecclesiastical and secular powers (potestas-tibus). Furthermore it is not incongruous to see the possessions of the Church as the hair of the head and the resources of the world (facultates saeculi) as the nails or hairs of the rest of the body. He who indiscriminately or violently deprives the exterior man of these things necessarily and in a grave manner offends the interior man by means of a disgraceful and presumptuous injury ...

"Wherefore just as evil odors and worms soon take over the body when the soul departs, dissolving it into ashes to men's extreme abomination and abjection, so also when ecclesiastical things lose their sanctification they soon fall into ruin abandoned to the power of demons by the greatest curse of God and the holy fathers."^4

Here Humbert uses potestas of both ecclesiastical and secular powers. Since the usual distinction is therefore not maintained, potestas, as used generically, loses any distinguishing mark as a basis for comparison. Still, the body/soul metaphor serves its accustomed role in showing the absolute necessity for the Church's sanctification (soul) of earthly possessions (body) lest these corporal things be delivered up to their natural tendency which is ineluctably evil (into the power of demons).

Peter Crassus in 1084 can only agree with his papalist opponent's, Humbert's, theoretical position, though using Roman law for his support. However he deftly designates the royal power as supreme judge in practice. Envisioning so great a goal as the removal of Pope Gregory himself, Henry's defender states:

"As is written in the book of the Novellae: 'If any cleric or monk is accused before the bishop and he has been able to ascertain the truth, let him according to the ecclesiastical canons deprive (the guilty one) of his honour or status and then the competent judge should apprehend him and having judged the case according to the laws let him put an end to him.' There is no doubt that this judgment belongs to the royal power (potestas) (for) as St. Augustine
says: 'We are surprised that the Christian powers (potestates) do not move against these detestable trouble-makers in the Church. They do not move? And how will they render an account of their kingdom to their God?''

And again:

"... this is the duty of the Christian kings of this world, that they desire to achieve in their time a peaceful Mother Church from whom they have been spiritually reborn."5

As kings, according to Peter, are reborn "spiritually" from the anima of the Church, so they have rights or powers over the corpus, i.e. in achieving peace in this world (saeculum). That is, they have corporal or secular power only because they are born of the anima and this obviously—from the text and context—can be superior, as God's action, to the status and will of the pastor or Pope. The kingdom here is thereby raised to the status of anima and the clergy relegated to that of corpus in an ingenious turnabout. At about the same time Guido of Ferrara, of the emperor's camp, tried to steer a middle course which foreshadows the ultimate solution to the problem.

"Now there are two rights granted to all bishops, a spiritual or a divine right and another which is a secular right: one is of heaven, the other of the civic forum. For all those things that belong to the episcopal office are spiritual, are divine because, though they are (carried on) through the bishop's ministry, still they are given by the Holy Spirit. But however secular judgments and all those things which are granted to churches by princes of the world and secular men, such as courts, fields and all the regalia, these things, though they pass over into divine rights, yet are called secular just as they are granted by seculars. Therefore those divine things which are imparted by the Holy Spirit are evidently not subject to the imperial power (potestati). Those however, that are imparted by the emperors, as they do not belong to the churches by perpetual right, unless they are given over again by succeeding
emperors and kings, are referred to rally as in some way subject to
the kings and emperors. Unless they were confirmed to the churches
by succeeding emperors and kings, they revert to the imperial rights. 

In summing up, Guido declares:

"Therefore those divine things given by the Holy Spirit through the
minister do not belong to emperors and kings; those things, however,
granted by emperors and kings and needing their confirmation are
subject to the emperors and kings by the fact that they are had
through them and are so to be had." 

On the papal side, Bernold uses potestas for both pope and emperor but is
careful to qualify the pope's potestas as "the fullness of power" (plenitudo potestatis)
and as "universal and principal power". Such is the strength of papal power that it
rules over that of all bishops, is able to judge secular princes even as the Church
judges the angels, according to the apostle. Finally the Roman Pontiffs can cut off
disobedient secular rulers from the body "so that they are seen to occupy not even
the last place among Christians".

Having quoted Pope St. Gregory the Great that the Holy Roman Church so
distributes its offices to other churches "that they are called unto a part of the burden,
not unto the fullness of power", Bernold holds:

"It is clearly proven that any bishop has not so much power over
the flock committed to him as has the apostolic leader (praesul,
i.e. the pope) who, although he has divided his burden among
the individual bishops, by no means however has he deprived
himself of his universal and principal power, just as the king does
not lessen his royal power even though he has divided his kingdom
among various dukes, counts or judges. Since therefore the
apostolic lord has such principal power (potestas) in every church
(so) that even against the will of the bishop of any church he can
dispose whatever matters in that church according to canonical
regulations, who could deny that he can condemn anywhere in
the world both the subjects of bishops and even those bishops them-
selves who are contemptuous of the apostolic institution." 

"Also Pope St. Gregory decreed that kings lost their dignities and are not to participate in the body and blood of the Lord if they should presume to condemn the decrees of the apostolic see."

"... What wonder should it cause that holy Church has the power of judging secular princes as her members since according to the Apostle she is undoubtedly to judge even the angels. 'Do you not know,' he says, 'that we shall judge the angels? How much more secular things?' (I Cor. 6,3) By no means therefore shall we hesitate to subject kings and emperors to ecclesiastical judgment, if we desire to believe and give assent to the evangelical and apostolic sanctions."

Finally, Bernold asserts the rights of the head of the body corporate in cases of extreme concern.

"Nor is it surprising that the Roman Pontiffs can take away secular dignities from seculars so that they no longer rule over Christians, that they can totally cut them off from the body so they are seen to occupy not even the last place among Christians."

Pithy statements of ecclesiastical superiority come from the pens of Manegold and Deusdedit, though Manegold does not observe the niceties of the Gelasian distinction of words: "As the royal dignity and strength (potentia) excels all worldly (mundanas) powers (potestates) ..."

Manegold asks:

"... whether the deposition of an emperor without due order or the rash damnation of an apostolic pontiff is the greater fault. But by every reason and without any doubt a crime against the apostolic leader appears as so much more serious insofar as the apostolic power (potestas) is superior to the earthly rule (imperium)."

Cardinal Deusdedit adds:

"Nor is it surprising that priestly authority (auctoritatem) which God himself constituted by himself is superior in these cases to the royal power (potestatem) which human ingenuity has set up and which is but permitted by God not willed by him."
Bernard of Constance reiterates a comparison used by Pope Gregory VII in his second letter to Hermann of Metz a few years before:

"The episcopal honour and sublimity cannot be equalled by any comparisons. If you compare it to the splendour of kings and the crown of princes it is like comparing the metal lead to the splendour of gold."15

Hugh of Fleury counters for the imperial party only against the abuse of rightful authority on the part of Hildebrand. In principle he here agrees with the superiority of priesthood over kingdom:

"The royal power (potestas) is placed under the discipline of religion. For though the king is endowed with the apex of power, he is still held bound by the ties of the Christian faith. Yet he is to be corrected not with inflated pride but by charitable affection."16

"Therefore God and the Lord Jesus Christ granted the bishop the privilege of opening and closing heaven to men. To him even kings and all earthly powers bow their heads for the love of Christ ..."17

"Therefore all bishops are to be honoured as the keepers of the keys of the heavenly kingdom and the judges of human failings. They have it as their right to afflict with judicial severity secular men who commit crimes in places consecrated to God and, after just consideration, to give penances for other crimes. As well they are obliged to afflict all priests and clerics with their judicial sentence so that the privilege of their authority may be preserved both in earthly as well as in spiritual judgment."18

In his second book of On the Royal Power and Priestly Dignity Hugh concludes:

"... in the previous book we have satisfactorily show, I think, that all power is ordained by God. Now however we have decided to make it quite evident to our readers that God himself has placed and constituted in his holy Church two special powers (potestates), i.e. the royal and the priestly, not without a great and salutary
sacrament. God's very wisdom, assuming flesh in which he could be made visible, accepted these two powers in the unity of his person and therefore by a certain kinship mutually united and conjoined them in his flesh so that they may be bound by the one and perpetual charity which should never be broken and that both of them faithfully remaining together may mutually be associated and joined. They always need each others' help and influence and unless they agree among themselves the whole body of the Church flounders and the people wander uncertainly about. Hence... the God and Lord of all aptly appointed two powers in the Church to which he took care to commit the ordering of all those things that are carried on within her.

In a happy metaphor Hugh depicts the need for unison of operation:

"The offspring (of the Church) are surrounded by these two powers like two wings and protected from the adversities of the world."

Finally Hugh parallels the relationship between the two powers to the familiar relationship existing between the Old and New Testaments. Inevitably the Old Testament figured by the Jews, i.e. the immature, bespeaks the perils of the body while the New Testament, figured by the Gentiles (an illogical but by now commonplace assumption in the avid search for the extended metaphor), i.e., the mature, points to the heavenly beatitude which is the province of the soul:

"After God and Our Lord Jesus Christ by his death redeemed man whom he had made from death and from the captivity of our flesh raised him from the dead and introduced him into heaven, the Old Testament was superseded just as mature age outgrows childhood."

So the first disciples

"set the foundations of the Church on the cornerstone Christ Jesus on which both walls of distinct origin, i.e. from the Jews and from the Gentiles, were joined together by kindred charity."
EXCURSUS: THE GREGORIANS' DEFENSE OF THE CHURCH'S NECESSITY FOR CORPORAL GOODS

In our documents it is striking that the Church's necessity of corporal goods, while never denied by the emperor's party, was vigorously proposed and defended by the Gregorians. The pattern underlying the argumentation is the body/soul metaphor, though sometimes with novel applications. Basically corporal things, i.e. material possessions, are vital to the Church as body is to soul and subordinated in like manner by divine institution.

The monk Guido, writing between 1023 and 1033, sustains that in regard to simony

"if anyone should object that it is not the consecration but the things that flow from the consecration that are sold, he appears indeed to be saying something, but clearly he knows nothing. For since the bishop or abbot or any other such officer of a corporal church can do nothing without corporal and external things, just as the soul cannot exist in time without the body, so anyone who sells one of these parts without which the other cannot exist really sells them both."

Humbert, to arrive at the same conclusion, has recourse to the Lord's prohibition of divorce citing Matthew 19,6: "What God has joined man may not separate." He writes showing that as there are two before marriage but only "one flesh" after marriage "as the Lord testifies", so a parallel is drawn to contemporary church problems.
"... as the rational soul and the flesh form one man, so the clerical order and ecclesiastical possessions form the Lord's one sanctification. If anyone divides this in a secular fashion, he effects nothing but a spiritual death... So you sin against God and his servants when you separate their sanctified possessions from their sanctification. And this is far more dangerous than in the case of adultery because in the latter you scandalize one person while in the former you scandalize many thousands of men. But if anyone should scandalize one of God's little ones and therefore should be thrown into the depth of the sea with a millstone about his neck (cf. Matthew 18,6; Mark 9,41) what do we think he deserves who out of ambition and usurpation scandalizes so many little ones together with older ones? By means of this scandal he dissolves through his adultery the marriage of Christ and the Church. This is homicide and, even more, a sacrilege whereby on account of his evil passion he deprives the Church of the seal of divine matrimony, i.e. the Holy Spirit that sanctifies, enlivens and beautifies her.

In this carefully wrought argument he shows how corporal goods bestowed on the Church radically transcend the merely corporal and become associated with the anima. He writes that "whatever the faithful bestow on holy Church in their observance of the Lord's precepts" is thereby elevated

"from earthly to heavenly treasures. These they transfer through the hands of the poor in spirit, to whom belongs the kingdom of heaven, and whose advocate and consoler is the Holy Spirit, from whom proceeds all sanctification, for indeed he is sanctification itself. By him the whole body of the Church everywhere protects the Lord's disciples and all the faithful taking the place of (the Lord's) bodily presence."

Further on in the same writing Humbert presses his belief of the assimilation of bodily goods into the spiritual or soul-form of the Church. This he calls "the entire body."

"If anyone should still doubt whether God's spirit sanctifies and rules the entire body of the Church or should ask how this is done, let him know that it is unspeakable and beyond the human measure. Wherefore, it must be piously believed and understood lest, if it is impiously discussed, it suffer offense. Yet the soul can, insofar
as it is granted to a creature, preach to men about such a great master craftsman, the Spirit, so that their picayune minds may have some idea of his ineffable breath of presence. In this way they may arrive at some degree, however, slight, of envisioning the Saviour's incomprehensible powerfulness. Indeed, "the soul," as Blessed Augustine says in writing to St. Jerome (letter 166, no. 4) 'extends not by local diffusion but by a certain vital intention throughout the entire body which it animates ... it is both entire in all parts and entire in the single parts.' Wherefore what believer could by now doubt that the Holy Spirit fills the entire Church with his exceedingly ineffable sanctification so as to sanctify according to the quality of her ministers and belongings each and every member which is joined to her and obligated to her."

Bernold makes the metaphor explicit. Citing Pope St. Paschal (817–824), he contends:

"... a bishop or an abbot or anyone else (placed over) a bodily church can do no good without bodily and exterior things, just as the soul cannot live temporally without the body."5

Deusdedit makes use of the same metaphor, citing Pope Paschal's letter to the Milanese:

"If anyone should object that it is not the consecration that is sold but the things themselves that flow from the consecration, he indeed appears to say something but knows nothing at all for since a bishop or an abbot of the body of the Church can do nothing without the external bodily appurtenances just as the soul cannot live in time without the body, whoever sells one of these things without which the other is useless actually sells both."6

Finally, towards the end of 1111, Placid, a monk of the papal party, sums up the now common argument relying on "the Holy Spirit who is pleased to give his Church not only spiritual gifts but also corporal ones".7 He continues:
"If the bishop is obliged to receive the secular possessions of the Church from seculars and its spiritual possessions from spiritual persons then the Church is somehow split. Just as he who separates the body from the soul destroys a man, so he who separates the corporal possessions of the Church from the spiritual destroys the Church. Just as a man cannot live in this life without a body so the Church cannot exist in this world without corporal things. For not only the other gifts of God but also baptism itself cannot be conferred without using corporal things. Therefore he who contends that spiritual things come from spiritual men and corporal things from secular princes desires to establish two entrances for the flock of Christ. And this is evidently contrary to him who declared himself to be the one entrance." ⁸

"That which is God's we will to render to God alone because we desire the election of bishops and abbots to be done by each church as it is laid down by the holy Fathers. He who is elected ought to govern the affairs of the Church and to provide for the welfare both of souls and of bodies." ⁹

The intention of this divine ordering is, of course, the greater good, i.e. the salvation of souls. Placid argues that the priests of the Lord have not been granted rights over "secular affairs"

"to the extent that the neglect spiritual things becoming involved in secular things but so that they may devote themselves more and more to saving the souls of sinners." ¹⁰

That is why

"when the Church elects a pastor from out of her household she orders him to take care of both the souls and the bodies of her weak members." ¹¹

Placid concludes:

"Now what is the vice of the simoniacal heresy if not the yearning after spiritual honour on account of the ease and glory of this world? Spiritual honour is understood not only in the imposing of hands but also in external ecclesiastical things which St. Paschal I, holder of the apostolic see, testifies should flow from every
consecration. And rightly so. For just as the soul gives life to and rules the body, so also the corporal things of the Church are sanctified by the gifts of the Holy Spirit and he who has received spiritual sanctity also rightly possesses the corporal elements. For as the soul cannot exist in this life without the body, so holy Church in the present life cannot exercise her spiritual gifts without her corporal ones. 12
FOOTNOTES

Foreword

1) The body/soul metaphor because of its rich historical background as well as its pervasive use throughout the Middle Ages was of far more significance than other common metaphors used in contention between the two parties such as the famous text of Luke 22: 38: "But they said, 'Lord, behold, here are two swords.' And he said to them, 'It is enough.'" The eleventh century saw these two swords as symbols of spiritual and temporal power but it would be hard to show that the text had any such meaning when first uttered or subsequently understood down to the eleventh century. Interestingly, indeed, Alcuin in a response to a query from Charlemagne interpreted the two swords metaphorphically as body and soul, so laying the foundations for the future application to priesthood (spiritual function) and empire (material or corporal function). Cf. Joseph Lecler, "L’argument des deux glaives" in RECHERCHES DE SCIENCE RELIGIEUSE, Vol. xxi (1931), p. 299-339.


4) Ibid., p. 342.


7) Morrison, op. cit., p. 271. It is worth noting that between c. 1000 and c. 1118 A.D. there reigned six German kings while twenty-six ecclesiastics, including four anti-popes, occupied the throne of Peter. Hence the obvious stability of the empire over the papacy in this aspect of policy continuity, let alone the often dubious or inferior quality of individual popes. Leadership, almost by papal default, devolved upon the Emperors.


10) Knowles notes that Leo, "the friend of a truly devout emperor ... did not solve, and perhaps did not realize, the problem of lay control of episcopal and papal elections...." Op. cit., p. 172. The strengthened papacy, Leo's work, was later to grapple with the problem.

11) Morrison, op. cit., p. 266.

12) Ibid., p. 267. Knowles concurs: "In the past attention was often directed almost exclusively to the contest between empire and papacy, and, within that contest itself, to the controversy over the particular point of lay investiture. It is only within the last fifty years that this great dispute, the contest (lis) par excellence for German historians, has been seen more correctly as one aspect of a vast movement of moral, disciplinary and administrative reform affecting the whole of society and not only the papacy and clergy." Op. cit., p. 165. Cf. also Jedin, op. cit., p. 202, 257.


14) Ibid., p. ix.
FOOTNOTES

Chapter One

1) John L. McKenzie, S.J., THE TWO EDGED SWORD, An Interpretation of the Old Testament, (Milwaukee: Bruce Pub. Co., 1956), p. 251. Note: Throughout the text of this thesis the term "Old Testament" will be used as it is found in writers cited or referred to. Otherwise the proper Jewish terms will be given preference, scil. Hebrew or Jewish Scriptures or Bible, or, when it is not ambiguous, simply the Bible.

2) John L. McKenzie, S.J., DICTIONARY OF THE BIBLE, (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1965), art. "Soul," p. 836 ff. McKenzie, remarking on the close association of nepesh with life, suggests that it is often translated by "life." Still, even this is deceptive since man becomes a "living nepesh" (Genesis 2: 7) by the reception of the breath of God into his nostrils. In sum, no single word in modern languages, nor in Latin and Greek, can satisfactorily translate nepesh precisely because it is the seat of man's appetites, quite carnal such as hunger and thirst as well as a more "spiritual" activity such as knowing, thinking, choosing etc. Its key significance is one of totality, a psycho-physical totality rather than what can be conceived by either the necessarily polar terms of body and soul (or spirit).


5) Hans Walter Wolff, ANTHROPOLOGY OF THE OLD TESTAMENT (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1974), p. 7. Wolff offers the most extended and satisfying treatment of this issue. Regarding nepesh, W. tabulates that while it occurs 755 times in the Old Testament, it is translated only on 600 occasions in the Greek Septuagint by psyche thereby showing that "even the ancient writers noticed that the word bore another meaning in not a few places." (Wolff, p. 10).

6) Ibid., p. 8.

7) Ibid., p. 10 ff.

8) Ibid., p. 20

9) Ibid. Two observations will clarify W's point here: a) he is specifically speaking of nepesh as "the whole man" as opposed to later ideas of disembodied "soul"; b) he refers to the mainstream of the Hebrew Scriptures, neglecting pre-scriptural cult of the dead and such strands of it as existed through scriptural times in the form of a persistent undertone arising from the popular religion. Cf. Wolff, p. 102 ff.

10) Walther Eichrodt refines the thought in reminding us of the "unhappy rendering" of the term nepesh by "soul" as an effect of Greek beliefs concerning the soul. While in Hebrew thought living men receive God's creative force or ruach so much so that one can speak of ruach in a subsidiary sense as the individual life force of a man, still
this ruach returns to God once the nepesh dies. E. warns about "how dangerous it must be for the understanding of Old Testament psychology to translate nepesh as "soul" tout court. First and foremost the word means "life", and what is more, in contradistinction to ruach, life bound up with a body."

To conclude, ruach is "the universal breath of life, supra-individual in character." "If nepesh is the individual life in association with a body, ruach is the life force present everywhere and existing independently over against the single individual."

Still, I believe E. exceeds when he says that at death the nepesh "ceases to exist." Yes, it dies, but as E. himself writes, though it leaves a man at death "this does not mean that one can ask where it has gone! It is enough that it has disappeared. More frequently it is described as having been taken or swept away." Clearly then, there is no question of an annihilated existence. Cf. Walther Eichrodt, THEOLOGY OF THE OLD TESTAMENT, trans. J.A. Baker, (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1967), vol. II, p. 134 ff.

Perhaps the best solution of this seeming contradiction comes from a willing consideration of the linguistic difficulty of speaking of the state after death as paradoxical: life, but hardly meriting the name. R.H. Charles phrases it best to my mind when he describes the problem of post-Exilic Judaism re survival after death: "They still believed that the soul subsisted after death, though it did not exist. This subsistence is indeed purely shadowy and negative - so negative that all the faculties of the soul were suspended, and Sheol, the abode of the souls, became a synonym of Abaddon or destruction (Job XXVI. 6; Prov. XV, II, XXVII. 20)." (Italics are Charles's.) R.H. Charles, ESCHATOLOGY, the Doctrine of a Future Life in Israel, Judaism and Christianity, a Critical Study (1899) (New York: Schocken Books, Inc. 1963), p. 43. Note: sometimes listed as A CRITICAL HISTORY OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE FUTURE LIFE IN ISRAEL, JUDAISM AND CHRISTIANITY.

11) John L. McKenzie, A THEOLOGY OF THE OLD TESTAMENT, (New York: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1974), p. 307. The author goes on to note that continuing life after personal death is expressed in terms of the enduring nation, not of the individual person and it is in this light that Hebrew references to the future life must be read and interpreted. "Except in the Greek period," he states, "and in a few texts, the relation of the individual person to Yahweh after death is simply not a matter of belief or concern" (p. 308). On the vital issue of the national survival of the Jewish people, or its God-given resurrection or restoration to life after deathly humiliation, defeat and captivity cf. the disquisition of Jean de Fraine, S.J. on "corporate personality" in the Old Testament in ADAM AND THE FAMILY OF MAN, (New York: Alba House, 1965),

13) Theophile J. Meek, HEBREW ORIGINS (New York: Harper and Row, 1936; Harper Torchbook Edition, 1960), p. 117. This development, a process of some 300 years, i.e. from Moses to David, is only with difficulty reconstructed from the Bible since "in the Old Testament records, as we have them now in their final late form, Yahweh is never represented as the God of one group alone, but of the nation as a whole, i.e. of "Israel" and the God of that nation from its beginning, the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob." Cf. Meek, p. 116.

14) R.H. Charles, op. cit., p. 35, 36. C. cites Psalm 88. 5:
Like the slain that lie in the grave
Whom thou rememberest no more
And they are cut off from thy hand.
and Isaiah 38, 18:
For Sheol cannot praise thee;
Death cannot celebrate thee.
They that go down in the pit cannot hope for thy truth.

It is by reason of this dichotomous situation that moral retribution of rewards and punishments has no currency in Sheol.

15) Ibid., p. 41. Bultmann corroborates this by affirming that:
"of all areas of the previously non-Yahwehistic cultus, that of death remained longest unfused into the legitimate religion. As long as the religious powers of Israel were engaged in such persistent struggle with the cult of the dead - that is, as long as this area was devalued by it religiously - it also resisted a positive incorporation into the religion of Yahweh." LIFE AND DEATH, Bible Key Words from Gerhard Kittel's THEOLOGISCHES WORTERBUCH ZUM NEUEN TESTAMENT (London: Adam and Charles Black, 1965), p. 11.


17) Bruce Vawter carefully notes that Jewish "ethical monotheism" is not, as some used to hold, "the creation or discovery of the prophets of Israel but that "they were heirs of a long tradition of ethical monotheism which they themselves ascribe to Israel's earliest origins, to that mysterious encounter of God and man that we know as revelation. It was to defend and further this revelation that the prophets spoke to Israel." Bruce Vawter, THE CONSCIENCE OF ISRAEL, PRE-EXILIC PROPHETS AND PROPHECY (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1961), p. 18. Still, as we have seen, one must look more critically at the claim of monotheism for "Israel's earliest origins."

18) R. Bultmann, LIFE AND DEATH, p. 12. Andre-Marie Dubarle agrees that "Jewish belief in immortality, in spite of being relatively new, has its roots in the oldest strata of the religious thought of Israel." He finds its origins along the following two principal lines of development: "Faith in a just retribution and the hope of an after-life, or at least a vague notion of it." "Divine justice" dominates as "an essential element in the Israelite religion." Art., "Belief in Immortality in the Old Testament and Judaism," in Pierre Benoit and Roland Murphy, ed.,


21) Lest this seem or pass as an unqualifiedly positive gain, it should be recognized that such an "advance" can only be achieved at some cost to the solidarity of the collectivity or of the nation. The Hebrew "corporate personality" so vital for survival as a politeia will feel the effects of the incipient change.


23) Ibid., art. "The Devil." Theodor Gaster cautions that the Satan of the Job narrative "is not the archfiend, perpetually opposed to God. Such a conception ... belongs to later thought, when Iranian dualism made inroads into traditional Hebrew thinking. Here the name denotes simply a member of the pantheon who happens on this particular occasion to "throw a monkey wrench" into the proceedings, but who is subject to God. The word simply means "obstructor!"" Cf. Theodor H. Gaster, MYTH, LEGEND AND CUSTOM IN THE OLD TESTAMENT (New York: Harper and Row, 1969; Harper Torchbook edition, 1975), vol. II, p. 785. While admitting G's main point that one must beware of reading a later, more mature Jewish dualism as a result of Zoroastrianism into the earlier Job account (fifth century), still the fact that 'Satan' is first used as a distinctive being in this writing indicates a significant direction. Pierre Grelot in his INTRODUCTION TO THE BIBLE (New York: Herder and Herder, 1967), agrees that "after the Exile it seems that the contact of Jewish thought with the religion of the Persians, which had been strongly implanted in Babylon since the time of Cyrus, stimulated the development and facilitated the systematization of an angelology" (p. 275). Finally, Oesterley and Robinson grant that "it is possible that the angelology and demonology of the Persians directly influenced Judaism" (op. cit., p. 275) so much as to leave "permanent marks" (ibid., p. 232). It is of interest to point out the Job story has ancient parallels (shared roots?) such as in the literature of Egypt (c. 800 B.C.E.), Mesopotamia (c. 1000 B.C.E.) and particularly Sumerian, the 'Sumerian Job' from c. 1800 B.C.E.


As Van Imschoot cautions, one must remember when speaking of Iranian and Jewish dualisms that the Jews never absorbed the developed rigid metaphysical or ineluctable Iranian dualism of two eternally conflicting principles. Judaism, in spite of flirtation to the contrary, never indulged in such full-blown dualism. Cf. Paul Van Imschoot, THEOLOGY OF THE OLD TESTAMENT, Vol. I: God (Tournai: Desclée and Co., 1965), p. 131, 132. It may therefore be saying too much to echo R.C. Zaehner's statement that the Jewish exiles in Babylonia "seem to have


28) Werner Jaeger, art. cit., p. 105. Baker notes that this myth "involving the notions of sin (i.e. revolt against the god or gods; J.R.), death and resurrection, was in its various forms basic to the various Dionysiac cults of the ancient world." H. Baker, op. cit., p. 114. The intermedizing steps of this liberation as espoused by Pythagoreanism are "theoria (contemplation), kosmos (an orderliness found in the arrangement of the universe) and katharsis (purification). By contemplating the principle of order revealed in the universe -and especially in the regular movements of the heavenly bodies- and by assimilating himself to that orderliness, man himself was progressively purified until he eventually escaped from the cycle of birth and attained immortality." G.S. Kirk and J.E. Raven, THE PRESOCRATIC PHILOSOPHERS (Cambridge at the University Press, 1971), p. 228. Here
the parallel to Hindu teachings on samsara or rebirth and moksha or liberation are obvious.

Note: Cornford (op. cit., p. 198) helpfully describes theoria (from theos) as the state of mind of "passionate sympathetic contemplation, in which the spectator is identified with the suffering God, dies in his death, and rises again in his new birth." This he cites as the only process whereby "truth" can be known, i.e. through personal experience, as the phrase pathein mathein sums up.

29) Cf. John Mansley Robinson, AN INTRODUCTION TO EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1968), p. 58 f. where Robinson discusses the radical difference between soul and body in terms of the division between "upper" and "lower," indicative of the "heaven" (above) and "hell" (below) to which Werner Jaeger refers.

Erwin Rohde whose two volume work PSYCHE, THE CULT OF SOULS AND BELIEF IN IMMORTALITY AMONG THE GREEKS (New York: Harper and Row, Harper Torchbook, 1966; first edition, London, 1925) is highly informative for this entire general topic, explains the theory of ecstasy in the service of required purification of the soul: "...the soul of a person ... 'possessed' was no longer 'at home' but 'abroad,' having left its body behind. This was the literal and primitive meaning understood by the Greek when he spoke of the ekstasis of the soul...." It is a period of 'brief madness,' hardly a state of delusion but rather a "hieromania, a sacred madness in which the soul, leaving the body, winged its way to union with the God." This is the condition of enthousiasmos, i.e. the state of those who "live and have their being in the god." But such an ekstasis is only possible, we note, when "the soul is liberated from the cramping prison of the body." (Rohde, vol. two, p. 259, 260.)

30) P.T. Raju, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE PHILOSOPHY (Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1970; copyright 1962 by the University of Nebraska Press), p. 20.


32) Ibid., p. 88. Professor Jaeger clarifies that he means not philosophy in the strict sense but what should rather be called a philosophical theology since it "takes the transcendent world for its province."

33) Pindar in his second Olympian ode writes:
Day and night the sun shines for the guiltless in the world beyond, they do not disquiet the earth with the strength of their hands, neither the water of the sea, but among the honoured gods they enjoy a life: without tears; while the wicked suffer pain the sight of which none can bear; but those who have kept their soul free from unjust deeds and have maintained an innocent state for the space of three lifetimes both here and beyond, they will walk the path of Zeus to Kronos' tower. There the ocean breezes sweep across the Island of the Blessed. Flowers of gold flame from the radiant trees on the mainland, while the
water nourishes others, and with garlands of these the blessed decorate themselves. Werner Jaeger, IMMORTALITY AND RESURRECTION, p. 104.

Empedocles of Agrigentum in his epic poem PURIFICATIONS refers to the soul as of divine origin but forced to dwell on earth in exile from God in an endless migration through all forms of life, human, animal and vegetative. Diogenes of Apollonia calls the soul "a small part of God" which returns to its divine origin when separated from the body in death. Cf. Werner Jaeger, art. cit., p. 104 to 107.

34) Ibid., p. 108. Likewise Professor Dodds in his THE GREEKS AND THE IRRATIONAL (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1968), says that this "new religious pattern" by "setting soul and body at odds ... introduced into European culture a new interpretation of human existence, the interpretation we call puritanical" (p. 139). This change he cites as a "new and revolutionary conception of the relation between body and soul" (p. 142). On the progression of Plato's thought concerning dualism, cf. F.E. Peters, THE HARVEST OF HELLENISM (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1970), p. 661. Peters amplifies on later Platonism's attitude to matter as exemplified in Plato's use of the term soma or body: "From the beginning to the end of the Platonic tradition matter was never endowed with a positive quality of its own, however malevolent. The world was deficient but never radically evil. Platonism never knew a true dualism in the sense of equal and opposed principles" (p. 656).


36) Ibid. Cf. also p. 147: "In the Phaedo we find the soul essentially akin to the ideas; so close is this kinship that the soul, there looked upon as pure intellect, is unduly separated from the body, its pleasures and pains and is in danger of leaving it with a life of its own."

37) Commenting on Plato's acceptance of the "magico-religious view of the psyche," and his consequent "puritan dualism" which attributed all the sins and sufferings of the psyche to the pollution arising from contact with a mortal body," E.R. Dodds (THE GREEKS AND THE IRRATIONAL, p. 212) sees in the PHAEDO the philosophically clothed formulation "that was to become classical: only when by death or by self-discipline the rational self is purged of 'the folly of the body' can it resume its true nature which is divine and sinless; the good life is the practise of that purgation." Attesting to the overwhelming influence of this Plato's early stance, Dodds says: "Both and antiquity and today, the general reader has been inclined to regard this as Plato's last word on the matter" (p. 213). In support, Dodds cites A.-J. Festugiere's remark that for Plato in the PHAEDO, "le corps, c'est le mal, et c'est tout le mal."

38) Grube, op. cit., p. 145.

39) Frederick Copleston, S.J. draws attention to Plato's ethical concerns, a healthy regard for which must aid one in reading his encomiums on the superiority of soul over body. He writes that Plato's psychological doctrine lacks strict systematic elaboration because "his interest was undoubtedly largely ethical in character." Cf. Copleston's A HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY, vol. one: Greece and Rome, p. 215.
R. Hackforth agrees in identifying the fundamental purpose of the PHAEDO to be not to prove that the human soul is immortal, not to pay tribute to the beloved friend and master Socrates, not even to expound the philosophical bases for the doctrine of Forms or Ideas—though all these aims are achieved—but rather to stress "the essential teaching of Socrates himself, namely that man's supreme concern is the 'tendance of his soul' or (in more modern language) the furthering of his insight into moral and spiritual values and the application of that insight in all his conduct. That is, for Socrates and Plato alike, the way of philosophy...." R. Hackforth, PLATO'S PHAEDO, translated with an Introduction and commentary (Cambridge at the University Press, 1972), p. 3.

40) Gilbert Murray, FIVE STAGES OF GREEK RELIGION (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Co., no date: first published in 1912 as FOUR STAGES OF GREEK RELIGION; the addition of another chapter in 1925 resulted in its present title), p. 154.

Frederick Copleston entirely agrees, even taking Aristotle into consideration. "It was the characteristically Platonic attitude," he writes, "that triumphed in ancient philosophy rather than the characteristically Aristotelian attitude." (Op. cit., p. 498). Regarding the nature of these "characteristics" Copleston, referring to the core issue of soul/body, clarifies that man is himself the bond between the psychical and the corporeal. These elements remain distinct but intimately related. "Plato laid the emphasis on the fact of distinction, Aristotle on that of the intimate relationship" (p. 499).

41) It is this gnosis which Murray first thought an advance or a rise and which he later recognized to be a failure or a fall as instructed by Professor J.B. Bury. Bury's words in conversation with Murray contain the phrase that Murray was to make well known: "It is not a rise, it is a fall or a failure of something, a sort of failure of nerve." Ibid., p. xiii; emphasis mine. The period in question is from c. 300 B.C.E. through the first century of the Christian era and is characterized by a loss of confidence in earthly possibilities and a consequent turning to the "other world" as variously conceived. According to Sidney Hook, it betrays a flight from responsibility "that drove the ancient world into the shelters of pagan and Christian supernaturalism." Cf. Sidney Hook, THE QUEST FOR BEING (New York: Delta Books, 1963, p. 73 ff. E. Rohde (PSYCHE, vol. two, p. 544) makes the phrase his own. This 'atmosphere' in the first century B.C.E., the "decisive period of Weltwende," is helpfully described by E.R. Dodds in THE GREEKS AND THE IRRATIONAL, p. 247 ff.


43) A. Angus, THE MYSTERY RELIGIONS, p. 151.


45) F.E. Peters, op. cit., p. 188.
46) Martin Hengel, *Judaism and Hellenism*, two vols. (London and Philadelphia: SCM Press, 1974). References are to vol. one. In a review of Hengel's work (*Cross Currents*, Spring, 1975) Michael S. Kogan praises the book as "an extremely important reference work, the major function of which is to support with extensive new evidence" and "the extensive and intensive Hellenizing influences working within Palestine which gradually but profoundly reshaped all aspects of Jewish existence." In sum, "Palestinian Judaism in the second century B.C. was 'Hellenized Judaism' as surely as was the Judaism of the Diaspora," minor differences aside. Kogan then accepts Hengel's central argument "that all Judaism was Hellenized Judaism by the end of the first century of Greek dominance." Religiously, and for the particular interest of this thesis, Hengel recognizes, as does Hadas, Hellenistic influences on Jewish religious literature of the period, especially Jewish Wisdom literature and apocalyptic writings which emphasized "the newly discovered Hellenistic stress on the plight of the isolated individual consciousness." Shades of the Orphic/Pythagorean/Platonic *soteria* tes psyches!

47) Hengel writes: "The indications of the historical origin of resurrection are on the one hand in the direction of Iranian religion ... while on the other hand conceptions of resurrection communicated by the dying and rising of vegetation deities had certainly been known in Israel for some time." (p. 196).

48) Oesterley-Robinson, *op. cit.*, p. 342 recognize strong Zoroastrian influence to the extent that "Jewish eschatological and apocalyptic ideas as we find them during and after the Persian period have been added to by elements taken from the eschatology of Persia.... Jewish eschatology in its later phases is ... indebted to Persia." Cf. p. 345 ff. for a comparison of Iranian and Jewish apocalyptic.

Again, Oesterley in his book *The Jews and Judaism During the Greek Period* (Port Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat Press, 1970; first published, 1941) emphasizes the presence of Hellenistic influences but cites especially the "influence of the religion of ancient Persia in the domain of eschatology which is to be discerned in many directions" (p. 296).

49) Oesterley-Robinson comment in regard to the growing Jewish belief in the destruction of this world: "The frequent occurrence of this theme of world-destruction, adapted, as we have seen, from Iranian eschatology, arises from the fact that the Jewish Apocalyptists regarded this world, with the majority of mankind, as hopelessly corrupt; in their despair of amelioration they became pessimists; there was nothing for it but utter annihilation in order that a fresh start might be made, and in a new world, i.e. the Messianic times (p. 354).


52) Loc. cit.

53) Ibid., p. 299, 300. Also p. 310.


55) Ibid., p. 322.


57) F.E. Peters, op. cit., p. 303. Etienne Gilson confirms that Philo "whose exegesis of Scripture was full of Platonic and Stoic elements ... was, for the first Christian theologians of Alexandria, just about what Moses Maimonides was to be later on to the scholastic theologians of the thirteenth century: a model to imitate, and, if possible, to excell." E. Gilson, HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY IN THE MIDDLE AGES (New York: Random House, 1955), p. 29; also p. 36.

58) Ibid., p. 305. Cf. also E. Gilson, op. cit., p. 40. This move, as Bultmann asserts, leads Philo and his followers to reinterpret God's transcendence in a Greek sense. As well, the understanding of man shifts to "the domination of the physical and sensual by the spiritual" ... a product now of "Greek anthropology, with its fundamental antithesis between body and soul (spirit)...." R. Bultmann, PRIMITIVE CHRISTIANITY IN ITS CONTEMPORARY SETTING (New York: Meridian Books, 1957), p. 96, 97.


60) F. Copleston, S.J., op. cit., p. 461, 462. Regarding Platonic dualism Copleston goes so far as to hold that "this dualistic conception reappears in Neo-Platonism", in St. Augustine, in Descartes etc. Moreover, in spite of the adoption of the Peripatetic doctrine of the soul by St. Thomas Aquinas and his school, the Platonic way of speaking remains and must always remain the 'popular' way of speaking among Christians, since the fact that influenced Plato's thought, the fact of the interior conflict in man, naturally looms large in the minds of all those who support the Christian Ethic" (p. 211). Copleston's premise of the fact of man's interior conflict hardly necessitates his Platonic dualism as conclusion. The point of interest and value is that Copleston is here merely echoing so very much of Christian traditional acceptance of Platonic dualism. In common with thinkers of the early Church, C. sees Plato as important in the praeaparatio evangelica of the pagan world and "the Platonic ascent above pre-Socratic materialism" as "a predisposing factor towards the acceptance of a religion which
insists on the supreme reality of the transcendent and on the
abiding character of spiritual values. Early Christian thinkers cer-
tainly recognized in Platonism a certain kinship, even though more
or less remote, with their own Weltanschauung and, though Aristotle
was later to become the philosopher par excellence of Scholasticism,
Augustinianism stands rather in the line of Platonic tradition" (p.
503, 504). Indeed, C. calls Neo-Platonism which was "the last breath,
the last flower, of ancient pagan philosophy" become, in the thought
of St. Augustine, "the first stage of Christian philosophy" (p. 506).
The transition appears continuous and quite smooth, as befits C's view
of the plan of "divine Providence." His basic conviction is substan-
tiated by Chadwick: "The history of Christian philosophy begins not
with a Christian but with a Jew, Philo of Alexandria, elder contempo-
rary of St. Paul." (Chadwick, CAMBRIDGE HISTORY, p. 137.)

61) Jean Daniélou speaks of "the orthodoxy of triumphant Pauline
Christianity" in discussing the early Church's adoption of Paul's
system of ecclesial order. Cf. J. Daniélou, art. "A New Vision of
Christian Origins: Judaeo-Christianity," in CROSS CURRENTS, Spring,
1968, p. 163 ff.

62) According to the Biblical scholar Joseph Fitzmyer, S.J., the
Hellenistic atmosphere in which Paul lived for some ten years after
his conversion "cannot be lightly dismissed." Indeed "the whole
question of the influence of Greek culture on Paul's thought and
theology needs reassessment today." Fitzmyer provides some relevant

As to Paul's use of his "larger stock of knowledge of the
Hellenistic Jewish philosophical literature" and his debt to Philo,
cf. Harry A. Wolfson, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE CHURCH FATHERS (Cambridge,

Finally, in SAINT PAUL ET LA CULTURE GRECQUE, Norbert Hugede,
noting Paul's "dualistic concept of man" (p. 115) in which he is
"closer to Greek philosophy than to the Old Testament" finds the
"secret of the Pauline soul" to be a "pessimistic dualism, an anguished
struggle against sin (and) the need of a Saviour." (p. 117) This merely
shows "up to what point the Apostle belonged to his epoch, immersed
himself in it and adapted himself to its concerns to the point that
he cannot be extricated from it without modifying the very presentation
of his message" (p. 119). Strong words. Hugede, in several places,
shows Paul as taking these positions for the greater effectiveness
of his preaching or ethico-religious motives. For example: "For him
Hellenism was a means of action, the right hand of his preaching,
which allowed him, according to a desire often expressed, to adapt
himself to the religious conceptions of the Greeks in making himself
all things to all men." (p. 204; cf. also p. 116 & 153). Therefore,
Paul's anthropology, we are warned, is predominantly of a functional
character in the service of his Christocentric soteriology. Does it
therefore have a contingent character much limited to time, place and
practical or ad hoc usefulness?

63) Fitzmyer, op. cit., p. 62.


Leonard Johnston, art. "The Flesh and the Spirit" in THE WAY (London: April, 1971), p. 92. In referring to "the beginnings" Johnston surely means such in the Christian scriptures. He attempts an interesting elucidation of the possible root of the problem. When he warns of the difficulty of interpreting Paul's use of the term 'flesh;' as indeed John's use of the term 'world' in a non-technical sense. "If we take 'world' in the ordinary sense, or 'flesh' as meaning simply the material body, then it leads to the practical conclusion that everything in the world is evil; that only the spiritual universe, the purely divine, is good; that everything physical, material or natural is wrong, impure, inherently tainted and abhorrent. This is a view which has been condemned often enough, which most Christians would reject if put to them explicitly; but it is one which still manages to colour many of our unconscious reactions." (p. 93)


R.H. Charles, ESCHATOLOGY, gives an account in chapter XI of "The Pauline Eschatology in its Four Stages" in which he shows Paul's progression from a soul/body holistic conception to an increasing emphasis on the spiritual soul. The belief is from the this-world focus of the eschatology of Thessalonians I and II to the other-world concerns of Ephesians. Robert M. Grant agrees and places the discussion in terms of Gnosticism. In Paul's earliest letters, like those to the Thessalonians, Grant writes, "there are no traces whatever of anything resembling Gnostic doctrine. Instead, there is a vigorous and rather crude apocalyptic eschatology; the Lord is going to come down from heaven and we shall meet him in the air (I Thessalonians 4:16-17)." (p. 155) A change is evident in Galatians and in Colossians: "Paul himself is moving in the direction of Gnosticism." (p. 160) Heinrich Schlier has worked out the Gnostic background for Ephesians which Grant agrees is an incipient Gnosticism" (p. 161). Cf. Robert M. Grant, GNOSTICISM AND EARLY CHRISTIANITY (New York: Harper and Row; Harper Torchbooks, revised edition, 1966).

The exploration of Paul as Gnostic is beyond this study and secondly, the label is a difficult one to understand because of its well-known complexities, origins etc. Suffice it to lay stress on
Paul's dualistic tendencies and their progression.


72) Cf. SECOND APOLOGY 13:3-6, cited in Norris, p. 51.


In his SECOND APOLOGY Justin goes so far as to declare that Plato had drunk at the purest source since Christ had been "known in part even by Socrates." Cited by Jaroslav Pelikan, THE EMERGENCE OF THE CATHOLIC TRADITION (100-600), vol. one of his THE CHRISTIAN TRADITION, A HISTORY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF DOCTRINE (London and Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1971), p. 31.

74) Norris, op. cit., p. 65.


76) Etienne Gilson, op. cit., p. 13.

77) J. Danielou, op. cit., p. 392.

78) Ibid., p. 391.


81) J. Danielou, op. cit., p. 398.

82) Ibid., p. 404.

83) Gilson, op. cit., p. 23.

84 Ibid. Gilson adds that "although he conceived the soul as material, Irenaeus ascribed to it some characteristics which should have led him to conceive it as spiritual." It seems improper to put opposite words in Irenaeus' mouth.

85) J. Danielou, op. cit., p. 404.

86) Greek was, even in Rome, the language of the Western Church as well up to the middle of the third century. Tertullian's sharp legal and literary mind contributed to the direction of Latin theology by the originality of his writings -indeed in some ways surpassing St. Augustine- by his vivid style and the coining of new Latin theological terms to replace the Greek, like sacramentum for mysterion to refer to the sacraments of the Church.
87) Cf. Pelikan, op. cit., p. 50 who warns that the "victory of theology over classical philosophy ... was by no means as one-sided as the spokesmen for Christian doctrine claimed it was."

88) Cf. excerpts from Tertullian's ON THE FLESH OF CHRIST in Herbert Musurillo, THE FATHERS OF THE PRIMITIVE CHURCH (Toronto: Mentor-Omega Books, 1966), p. 156. Here Tertullian fought against the Gnostic Marcion who bent the Scriptures to fit his dualistic beliefs "by racking (them) on the Procrustean bed of an exaggerated Paulinism." Marcion so abominated Judaism that "the dualism of all others which seemed to him to matter was that between the Gospel and the Old Testament. He will not allow to the Christian revelation any preparation in Jewish prophecy, nor to Christ even so much as his Jewish descent. Judaism is wholly natural, Christianity wholly supernatural." Cf. K. E. Kirk, THE VISION OF GOD, p. 218 ff.

89) I cite here only from Tertullian's Catholic period since he later left the Church to profess the ascetical extremes of Montanism.


92) Ibid.

93) Ibid., p. 15.


95) Ibid. Consequently John T. Noonan, CONTRACEPTION (Toronto: Mentor-Omega Books, 1967; first published, Harvard University Press, 1965) finds in Clement's ethical thought that "the influence of Philo and the Stoics is evident" (p. 101). As regards sexual desire Clement writes: "The human ideal of continence, I mean that which is set forth by Greek philosophers, teaches that one should fight desire and not be subservient to it so as to bring it to practical effect. But our ideal is not to experience desire at all. (Stromateis 3, 7.57; Noonan, p. 102) Nevertheless, as Danielou cautions, even if Clement holds the soul higher than the body, yet resists regarding "the soul as good by nature and the body as evil; each of them becomes what human freedom makes it." Cf. Danielou, op. cit., p. 411 re Stromateis IV, 26: 164, 3.

96) Pelikan, op. cit., p. 47.


98) Ibid.

101) Gilson, op. cit., p. 39. Cf. also p. 42 re the fall of the spirit (nous) to become a soul (psyche) by becoming incarnate. Men therefore are ensouled spirits "that receive human bodies in punishment for the wrong choice made by their free will." (Gilson, p. 42.)


103) A.E. Taylor notes that it was Plato's religious theology primarily as seen through the medium of Plotinus which passed into the thought of the Western Church via, in the main, Augustine, Boethius and Dionysius. Cf. A.E. Taylor, PLATONISM AND ITS INFLUENCE (New York: Cooper Square Publishers, Inc., 1963), p. 20.


105) Ibid.


107) Ibid., p. 224 and 254.

108) Ibid., p. 255. Still, "the body is an obstacle, if one wishes to use it in intellectual pursuits," Plotinus warns, echoing Plato's PHAEDO despite the fact that "it is no more in the body than it is in a vase." It is, of course, different with "pure souls, which are no longer subject in any way to the allurements of the body" because they "cannot in any way be the souls of any body whatsoever." They are freed. Citations from Elmer O'Brien, THE ESSENTIAL PLOTINUS (Toronto: Mentor Books, 1964), p. 147, 148 and 152.

Hence Plotinus regards it as death for the soul "while still sunk in body to lie down in matter and drench itself with it," i.e. "to sink in wickedness." (ENNEADS I. VIII. 13 as cited in R. Bultmann, LIFE AND DEATH, p. 31) Bodily death is then for Plotinus an undoubted good for the soul.

109) Ibid., p. 256.


112) Ibid., p. 6.
113) H.R. Schlette, DIE NICHTIGKEIT DER WELT, p. 35, cited in A. Auer etc., op. cit., p. 7 and 40. Dom Aelred Graham in THE END OF RELIGION (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Janovish, 1971), p. 90, notes that while "Christian monks of the third and subsequent centuries no longer appealed to Gnostic doctrine ... the nature of their contempt for the world could scarcely be distinguished from the earlier dualism."


115) Ibid., p. 75. Herbert Musurillo (op. cit., p 213) agrees that according to Methodius "the entire purpose of the Christian life is ultimately to restore man's control over his passions, and especially the capacity to be chaste."


117) Cited in Noam, op. cit., p. 94. Ambrose taught that priests, if married, should not have intercourse with their wives, a conclusion that flowed naturally from his doctrine of the virgin's (man or woman) divine nuptials. Anything less would be tantamount to a sacrilegious adultery.


119) Ibid. Jerome, COMMENTARIUM IN EPISTOLAM AD EPHESIOS LIBRI III in PATROLOGIA LATINA, 26.533. Rosemary R. Ruether cites Jerome reiterating this idea in a letter to Lucinus: "... from a spouse, she has become your sister, from a woman, a man, from a subject, an equal ... under the same yoke she hastens with you towards the kingdom of heaven." To which Ruether comments: "For the female virginity is not an affirmation of her being as a woman but an assumption of the nature of the male, which is identified with the truly human: rationality, strength, courage, steadfastness, loyalty." R.R. Ruether, RELIGION AND SEXISM, p. 234.

Likewise St. Gregory Nazianzen (d. 389) utters an increasing commonplace when writing of his mother: "In body she was a woman, in her behaviour, higher than a man." (From ON HIS OWN LIFE, verse 60, PATROLOGIA GRAECA, 21, 590, cited in George Tavard, WOMAN IN CHRISTIAN TRADITION (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1973), p. 48. We later refer to Augustine on this theme.

120) ENCHIRIDION ASCETICUM, p. 265, no. 439 from Ambrose's treatise DE BONO MORTIS (388-390).

121) Pelikan, op. cit., p. 50, 51.


123) Cf. Hans von Campenhausen, THE FATHERS OF THE LATIN CHURCH (Stan-

124) Beginning in mid-eleventh century the Church was experiencing a rebirth of Augustinianism as the result of a developing interest in the preceding centuries whereby collections of venerable authorities were being collected and republished. It was in this general and sophisticated resurgence that Augustine emerged as an even more dominant authority. His enormous influence, which was to grow even greater throughout the twelfth century, was evidenced by Ivo, bishop of Chartres from 1091 to 1116, at the acme of our period. A zealous proponent of the Gregorian reform, Ivo, about 1094, improved on and enlarged the Decretum of Burchard in which Augustine was the chief authority on sexual matters. Ivo and his school thereby set Augustine in the vanguard at the beginning of this new era for Western theology. Obviously, therefore, Augustine's theological anthropology or his view of the relationship of soul and body was of essential and basic importance. Cf. John Noonan, op. cit., p. 211-213.


126) Ibid.

127) In what one senses as perhaps the fruit of an excessive apologetic Christopher Dawson appears to minimize to the point of obliterating the problem of Manichaean dualism in Augustine when he contends that "Manichaean ... heresies like Marcionism and sects like Mandaism" belong "in their essential nature" to "a totally different world from that of Western Hellenism or even from the Judaeo-Christian tradition." This is painting with too broad a brush and thereby missing the vital interrelationships and influences —and Augustine's doctrines are a fertile field for such investigation—which, if they are not of the "essential nature" of these heterodoxies and heresies, are none the less real. Cf. Christopher Dawson, THE FORMATION OF CHRISTENDOM (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1967), p. 104.


Rev. Professor Jean Meyendorff, the noted Russian Orthodox ecclesiologist and theologian, sees the matter differently from another perspective. He writes regarding man's knowledge of God in Augustine: "... with the help of grace he is enabled to develop his natural capacity
to know God. This capacity is, for Augustine, the sensus mentis—an intellectual sense—which, by nature, belongs solely to the soul, and which has the faculty to know the essence of God, once the soul is liberated from its present dependence on the body. A platonizing dualism in anthropology thereby replaced in Augustine his first Manichean dualism, which latter was ontological." Rev. Jean Meyendorff, art. "La signification de la reforme dans l'histoire du Christianisme" in CONTACTS, revue francaise de l'Orthodoxie, 4th trimester, 1963, p. 262.


130) Ibid., p. 16.

131) Ibid., p. 17. Aelred Graham (op. cit., p. 180) likewise scores Augustine's "residual Manichaeism."

132) Ibid., p. 18.


134) Re man and woman in Augustine's view of human sexuality the following may be noted. Ambrose and Jerome described the fervent believer as meriting no longer to be called a woman (term representing weakness and sin) but to be called a man (meaning virtue, i.e. virtus or manliness, typical of grace). Augustine follows suit, affirming that while Eve has a rational nature, being like Adam a compound of spirit and body, yet "in relation to man she stands for body vis-a-vis male spirit." This bodyliness is her "nature" since the male alone is the full image of God. (Cf. R.R. Ruether, op. cit, p. 156; also cf. Augustine, CONFESSIONS 13. 32; DE OPERE MONACH. 40. Also Ruether, p. 161.) As Tavard puts it, commenting on Augustine's thought here, "woman is caught in a permanent squeeze between her soul —image of God— and body, which cannot image God. For this reason, woman was, in Paradise itself, nearer to Satan than Adam could be. In the Augustinian logic, this makes her somehow loathsome to a Christian: 'In her the good Christian ... likes what is human /quod homo est/; loathes what is feminine /quod uxor est/.' (Cf. G. Tavard, op. cit., p. 115, citing Augustine's LETTER VIII TO OLYMPIA, no. 12.

Thus, overwhelmingly, the leading Fathers of the Latin Church with Augustine at their head inherit the classical Platonic, Neo-Platonic and apocalyptic Jewish doctrine of the superiority of soul over body and explicate the soul/body dualism with male/female dualism. This dualistic anthropology of essential subordination entailed, as we have seen, the allied political application of world/earth to heaven and consequently of worldly powers to heavenly powers which were, as was obvious to all, concentrated by divine ordinance in the Church and particularly in the hierarchy though most sublimely in the person of the pope, the Vicar of Christ. As body is the symbol of sin the equation extends itself to woman and world as co-equal symbols needing
the grace of redemption through soul, through man and through man
par excellence, the virginal man, celibate priest culminating in the
High Priest.

In summation, Jaroslav Pelikan observes that "the victory of
orthodox Christian doctrine over classical thought was to some extent
a Pyrrhic victory, for the theology that triumphed over Greek philosophy
has continued to be shaped ever since by the language and thought of
classical metaphysics." (Cf. Pelikan, op. cit., p. 44) Rosemary
Ruether is right in calling attention to the fact that "the dualism
in antiquity that became the cultural mould within which Christianity
was formed," i.e. particularly marked by Greek, Jewish and Oriental
religious influence, was characteristic of a world in an "alienated,
anticosmic stage of development." (Cf. R.R. Ruether, op. cit., p. 151)
In this context soul over body dualism was the only and inescapable
conclusion.

136) Ibid., p. 103.
137) THE CONFERENCES (419 to 428 C.E.), ENCHIRIDION ASCETICUM, p.
415, no. 788.

templation" in R.A. Markus, ed., AUGUSTINE, A COLLECTION OF CRITICAL
ESSAYS, p. 38 ff. The quotation is from p. 41 and the emphasis is mine,
to show the dominance of soul over body superiority throughout the
whole of Augustine.

139) The highest mystical evaluations, according to Augustine, were
possible only when the soul in effect left the body. He writes: "When
the attention of the mind is completely averted and withdrawn from the
senses of the body, it is more especially called ecstasy. Then, though
the eyes may be open, whatever bodily objects may be present, these are
not seen, nor are any sounds heard at all: all the mind's attention is
directed either to the images of bodies in an imaginary, or without a
bodily image, to incorporeal things in an intellectual vision." (Graef,
op. cit., p. 111) But Augustine was to go further in purging the bodily,
as we shall see. (Cf. O'Connell, p. 41.)

140) O'Connell, art. cit., p. 47.
141) Ibid., p. 48.

142) J. Feibleman, RELIGIOUS PLATONISM (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood

143) Henry Bamford Parkes, THE DIVINE ORDER (New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
Inc., 1969), p. 179 refers to the then known fragments of "the most
mystical and anti-scientific of Plato's Dialogues, the TIMAEUS," a
statement corrected by Richard A. Norris (op. cit., p. 23) who says
that "Plato bills Timaeus's narrative as myth" which, of course, is far from being "anti-scientific."


145) Harry A. Wolfson, art., "Immortality and Resurrection in the Philosophy of the Church Fathers," in Oscar Cullmann etc. eds., IMMORTALITY AND RESURRECTION, p. 56. Again, (p. 78) Wolfson writes: "The conception of the soul common to all the Fathers is essentially Platonic, the main characteristic of that Platonic conception of the soul is its separability from the body."

146) E. Gilson, HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY IN THE MIDDLE AGES, p. 93.

147) Werner Jaeger, art. cit., p. 113.

148) P. Pourrat, CHRISTIAN SPIRITUALITY, vol. one, p. 266.

149) E. Gilson, HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY IN THE MIDDLE AGES, p. 102.

150) Quoted in ENCHIRIDION ASCETICUM, p. 533, no. 1066.


152) Graef, op. cit., p. 113.


154) From Gregory's HOMILIES ON THE GOSPELS, 37. 2 in ENCHIRIDION ASCETICUM, p. 603, no. 1256.


157) E. Gilson, HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY IN THE MIDDLE AGES, p. 124. While some of Erigena's more abstruse applications of his basic Neo-Platonic philosophy were, as R.R. R. Bolgar says, "not in the center but on the extreme fringe of Christian thought" from the ninth to the twelfth century and as such were to be condemned in 1225 by Pope Honorius who ordered all copies of DE DIVISIONE NATURAE to be burnt, Scotus's underlying theses were very much of his age. He may be looked upon as the last refiner of Platonic subtleties before the advent of Aristotelian thought in the twelfth century. Cf. R.R. Bolgar, THE CLASSICAL HERITAGE AND ITS BENEFICIARIES (New York: Harper and Row, 1954), p. 176.
158) Emphasis mine. The Latin text is cited in R.W. and A.J. Carlyle, A HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL POLITICAL THEORY IN THE WEST, (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1903), vol. one, p. 190. The text is: ut et Christiani imperatores pro æterna vita pontificibus indigerent, et pontifices pro temporalium cursu rerum imperialibus dispositionibus uterentur (II). Carlyle, in a less happy translation, renders: "and the ecclesiastic depends upon the government of the emperor in temporal things." The force of uterentur, less than one of dependence, which could be understood as radical, means quite simply to make use of some easements as a tool or convenience. The distinction is obviously intended as major: the emperors need the popes; the popes (merely) use the emperors.

159) As cited in Hackforth's PHAEDO, p. 83.


163) Ibid.


165) Carlyle, op. cit., vol one, p. 254, 255.

166) Cf. text in Ehler and Morrall, CHURCH AND STATE THROUGH THE CENTURIES, p. 29 ff.


FOOTNOTES

Eleventh Century


4. Ibid., p. 153, ch. 12, 1.12.

5. Ibid., p. 168, ch. 23, 1.17.

6. De Prohibenda Sacerdotum incontinentia, Letter No. 1, 1074, L. de L., vol. II, p. 7, 1.24 ff. In the same year Pope Gregory VII in synod forbade clerics to live with their wives but declared nothing about the issue of the validity of their Masses. In 1085 Manegold of Lautenbach, another papal proponent, drew an argument for the celibacy of the clergy from the Old Testament practice of having priests who offered hosts for the people be outside their home and also purified, separated from their wives as well as from wine which provoked libido. Manegold reiterates the refrain that he who is to be engaged in constant prayer must refrain from marriage. (cf. Manegoldi ad Gebehardum Liber, L. de L., vol. I, p. 352, 1.34.)


8. Ibid., p. 33, 1.5 f. Bernold found the theme of the fallibility of the body a favourite theme to which he regularly returned, e.g., in his sixth letter of the same book (1076) he writes: "If I said anything which could detract from your or anyone's welfare...I should not hesitate to be delivered to bodily destruction." (cf. p. 26, 1.24 f.) Citing St. Jerome, Bernold writes: "I am not allowed to sit in the presence of a priest; he, if I have sinned, is allowed to hand me over to Satan for the destruction of my flesh so that my spirit may be saved on the day of the Lord." L. de L., vol. I, p. 145, 1.16 f.


11. Ibid., p. 72, 1.10-16.


15. Ibid., p. 617, 1.14.


18. Ibid., p. 611, 1.1.


25. Ibid., p. 363, 1.21 ff.; citing Augustine, Letter 185, c. 11, #50. Bernold also finds similar sentiments in Augustine. "Anyone," he writes, "separated from the Catholic Church, even though he may think he is living a praiseworthy life, by this crime alone, i.e. that he has perished from the unity of Christ, he has not life but the wrath of God remains upon him." (Bernold L. de L., vol. I, p. 45, 1.11 f.)

Likewise Manegold of Lautenbach excoriates Henry's followers who, in rejecting obedience to the apostolic see "committed the sin of idolatry. They did not fear to lacerate Christ's body by means of their schismatic conspiracy." (Manegoldi ad Gebehardum Liber, L. de L., vol. I, p. 393, 1.35)


33. Ibid.


37. Ibid., p. 455, 1.15 ff.


39. Ibid., 1.23 f.

40. Ibid., 1.30 f.

41. Ibid., p. 323, 1.15 f.

42. Ibid., 1.37 f.

43. Ibid.


45. Ibid., p. 30. 1.11.


50. Ibid., p. 31, 1.7 ff.

51. Ibid., p. 45, 1.12.

52. Adversus Simoniacos, Book Three, L. de L., p. 225, 1.27 ff.

53. Ibid., p. 225, 1.40 ff.


55. Ibid., p. 81, 1.18 f.

56. Ibid.


59. Ibid., p. 353, 1.21 ff.

61. Ibid., 1.41 f.


63. Ibid., 1.34 ff.

64. Ibid., p. 467, 1.17 ff.

65. Ibid., p. 467.

66. Ibid., p. 468, 1.17 ff.

67. Ibid.

68. Ibid., p. 469, 1.1 ff.


70. Ibid., p. 44, 1.25.

71. Ibid., p. 45, 1.30 ff. Here, as so often, surfaces the denigration of the body of flesh which symbolized the world and the things of the world, particularly the dangers of worldly rulership.

72. Ibid., p. 59, 1.35 f.


74. Ibid., p. 205, 1.4 ff.

75. Ibid., p. 208, 1.16 ff.

77. Ibid., p. 191, 1.13 ff.

78. Ibid., p. 192, 193.

79. Ibid., p. 193, 1.33 ff.

80. Ibid., p. 212, 1.38 ff.

81. Ibid., p. 213, 1.7 ff.

82. Ibid., p. 228, 1.15 ff.

83. Ibid., p. 231.

84. Ibid., p. 233, 1.9 ff. and passim.

85. Defensio Henrici IV regis, L. de L., vol. I, p. 441, 1.7 ff. The Roman


FOOTNOTES

Conclusion


3. As Morrison puts it: "For papal thinkers in the eleventh century, the Church was more than the Church as Cyprian and Augustine conceived it.... The identification of the papacy with imperial qualities, particularly in the field of law, were symptomatic of the creation of an administrative body and of claims to universal juridical competence quite unknown in the age of the apologists and Fathers." (Morrison, op. cit., p. 281.) Thus Morrison can present his most telling argument that "the Gregorian view of Church law" was "the very antithesis of the idea of tradition." It was indeed "tradition discarded." (Morrison, p. 280.) M. cautions, however, that such ardent papal polemicists as Gebehard, Manegold and Bonizo did not go so far as to simply reject the rightful leadership of the emperor as Gregory appears to have done. For them it was a question of disputing order or precedence. Cf. Morrison, p. 399.


7. Ibid.

FOOTNOTES

Appendix A


2. Ibid., p. 235, 1.48 ff.

3. Ibid., p. 235, 1.8 ff.

4. Ibid., p. 235, 1.29 ff.


7. Ibid., p. 565, 1.5 ff.


10. Ibid., 1.34 ff.


13. Ibid., p. 386.


17. Ibid., p. 477, 1.17 f.

18. Ibid., p. 478, 1.8 ff.

19. Ibid., p. 483, 1.7 ff.

20. Ibid., p. 485, 1.12 ff.

21. Ibid., p. 485, 1.17 f.

22. Ibid., p. 485, 1.28 ff.
FOOTNOTES

Appendix B


3. Ibid., p. 231, 1.43 ff.

4. Ibid., p. 235, 1.4 and following, including passim excerpts from the argumentation.


8. Ibid., p. 586, 1.26 ff. The biblical reference is to John 10, 9.

9. Ibid., p. 591, 1.19 ff.

10. Ibid., p. 592, 1.24 ff.

11. Ibid., p. 598, 1.35 f.

12. Ibid., p. 604, 1.37 ff.