PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN AN INTER-AGENCY COMMITTEE:
THE AIRPORT PLANNING COMMITTEE IN VANCOUVER

by

Paul Robert St. Pierre
B.A. University of British Columbia, 1973

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF ARTS

in the School of
Community and Regional Planning

We accept this thesis as conforming
to the required standard

May, 1977

© Paul Robert St. Pierre, 1977
In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for
an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that
the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study.
I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis
for scholarly purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or
by his representatives. It is understood that copying or publication
of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my
written permission.

Department of Community and Regional Planning

The University of British Columbia
2075 Wesbrook Place
Vancouver, Canada
V6T 1W5

Date May 1, 1977
ABSTRACT

The Vancouver Airport Planning Committee met from 1973 to 1976 to examine the implications of an expansion of Vancouver International Airport proposed by the Ministry of Transport. The committee was an experiment for it included participation by eleven agencies, including eight from all levels of government and three non-governmental organizations (two from industry, one from the general public). The committee concluded its activities with the release of a report presenting three decision options for further public discussion. The report is remarkable in the degree of disagreement among agencies that it displays.

This study first presents four political models of public participation in the planning process. One of the models, agency-public joint planning, very closely matches the Airport Planning Committee. Then a number of normative criteria for public participation are developed, against which the experience of the committee can be evaluated.

The case of the Vancouver Airport Planning Committee is presented, based on readings of reports, minutes of meetings, correspondence, memoranda, related documents, and interviews with participants. Application of the criteria to this committee process reveals a number of shortcomings, most serious of which was the failure to develop and assess alternatives which expressed the full range of values represented on the committee. Further interpretation of the reasons for difficulties encountered in the process, reveals that the central
factor was the narrow and rigid policy position adopted by the Ministry of Transport when other agencies perceived the issue to be much broader. The narrow policy position was the result of an interpretation of the role of the committee as only to advise on measures to mitigate the specific runway proposed by MOT. Some other agencies believed that the committee's role was much broader, to study and advise on a number of alternative policies for managing the growing demand for air transportation services. Fundamental differences of values separated the agencies involved, so that the disagreement on the nature of the process was never overcome. Instead conflict characterized the committee process, conflict which is reported and recorded in the Final Report.

Despite these problems the Airport Planning Committee was basically successful in expressing the range of views, and in generating relevant information on the runway proposal. Public participation was successful in stating a value position (characterized as the 'conserver' viewpoint) which governmental agencies did not express.

However the committee process demonstrated an inherent flaw in the agency-public joint planning model. When a diverse set of values is represented within a small problem-solving group dealing with a single issue the necessary conditions for evaluation, bargaining, and decision do not exist. Conflict resolution must take place at the political level; it must not be expected of such a group. The appropriate and important role of such a group is to develop the relevant
range of alternatives and to assess their impact on the values represented. This information must then be passed to the political level for bargaining and decision-making.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter 1: INTRODUCTION 1

2: PUBLIC PARTICIPATION: MODELS AND CRITERIA 4

2:1 The Planning Process 4

2.11 Issue Formulation 4
2.12 Information Gathering 4
2.13 Evaluation 5
2.14 Decision 5
2.15 Implementation 6

2.2 The Models 6

2.21 Technical Analysis 7
2.22 Agency-Public Joint Planning 10
2.23 General Purpose Representative 11
2.24 Pluralistic Model 13

2.3 Criteria 14

2.31 Opportunity to Participate 14
2.32 Information System 15
2.33 Time 17
2.34 Bargaining Opportunity 18
2.35 Efficacy 18
2.36 Efficiency 18
2.37 Summary 20

Chapter 3: THE VANCOUVER INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT PLANNING PROCESS 22

3:1 The Setting 24

3:2 The Actors 28

3.21 Federal 28
3.22 Provincial 32
3.23 Regional and Municipal 32
3.24 Tri-Level 34
3.25 Public and Industry 34
3.26 Airport Planning Committee 36

3.3 The APC Process 39

3.31 Establishing the Process, Jan. 1973 to Feb. 1974 41
3.32 The Tri-Level Meeting, Nov. 1974 47
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.33</td>
<td>Forecasts</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.34</td>
<td>Sorry About the Noise, Feb. 1975</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.35</td>
<td>Resignation of the Chairman, May 1975</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.36</td>
<td>New Proposal, July 1975</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.37</td>
<td>Information, Agreements, and Issues, Nov. 1975</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.38</td>
<td>Deadlines and Delays</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.39</td>
<td>The Final Report, March 1976</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| 3.34    | After the Final Report | 71   |

**Chapter 4:** EVALUATION OF THE AIRPORT PLANNING PROCESS

| 4.1     | Opportunity to Participate | 73   |
| 4.2     | Information System | 76   |
| 4.3     | Time | 86   |
| 4.4     | Bargaining Opportunity | 87   |
| 4.5     | Efficacy | 90   |
| 4.6     | Efficiency | 92   |
| 4.7     | Summary | 94   |

**Chapter 5:** DISCUSSION OF THE COMMITTEE PROCESS AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION

| 5.1     | Interpretation of the APC Process | 96   |
| 5.11    | Basic Characteristics | 98   |
| 5.12    | Failure or Success | 109  |
| 5.2     | On Public Participation | 111  |
| 5.21    | The Role of Public Participation | 114  |
| 5.22    | Conclusions* from the APC Experience | 114  |
| 5.23    | On Conflict | 116  |

**Chapter 6:** CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

| 6.1     | Public Participation | 119  |
| 6.2     | The APC | 119  |
| 6.3     | The Future | 120  |
BIBLIOGRAPHY 122
APPENDIX 1: CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS 127
APPENDIX 2: LIST OF AREAS OF AGREEMENT AND ISSUES IN APC FINAL REPORT 150
APPENDIX 3: A PROGRAM FOR PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT IN THE WORK OF THE AIRPORT PLANNING COMMITTEE 156
LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: Major Events of the APC Process 40
LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: Vancouver International Airport: Runway - Community Relationships 25
Figure 2: Vancouver International Airport: Proposed Parallel Runway Concepts 26
Figure 3: Vancouver International Airport Expansion - Concept 1 27
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

To the members of the APC, and Gordon Stead in particular, for interest and cooperation.

To my advisors, Irving Fox and Brahm Wiesman, for guiding me through the flaming hoops.

To U.B.C. and C.M.H.C. for all those peanut butter sandwiches.

To all who supported my sense of perspective (almost with success).

It is not deathless prose, but it is done.

Thank-you.
PREVIOUSLY COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL ON LEAF xi.
NOT MICROFILMED.

A cartoon from PUNCH, November 5 1975, 1. 805.
NATIONAL AIRLINES

"Of course by not having a runway we avoid all the noise of landings and take-offs."
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION.

Voluntarily or involuntarily a growing number of governmental agencies are involving the public at some stage of the decision-making process. Such public participation is at times quite successful. There are, however, numerous cases where the success of the process is in doubt.

The proposed expansion of the Vancouver International Airport (VIA) is one such doubtful case. An inter-agency committee which included direct citizen involvement was established in 1973. After three years no decision has been announced, and the participants are highly suspicious of one another. The record to date is in an extraordinary planning document - the Airport Planning Committee Final Report (March 1976) - in which the three decision options were proposed, and in which fundamental conflicts among the agencies are displayed. In the report points of agreement among the actors are relatively trivial in nature, but issues of contention are numerous and fundamental.

What did this experimental committee accomplish, and what went wrong? Is it a practical or an acceptable model for the future? This thesis discusses these topics with respect to the committee itself. No attempt is made to judge the issue of whether expansion of the airport should or should not occur. Instead the focus is on process, on the organization, the actors, the interactions, and the sequence of events.

Citizen representatives were among the most active, the most forceful, and the most controversial of all committee
members. This thesis specially emphasizes their role, but in the context of the entire committee. In the final chapter conclusions will be drawn relating to both public participation, and to the committee structure in general.

Without doubt personalities of individual members had an effect on the process to be studied here. These personalities have not been studied in and of themselves, but it has not been possible to ignore them. A judgement about their effect will be found in Chapter 5.

The controversy over expansion is not resolved as this study is written. The Final Report marks the culmination of one stage, but has been followed by a full year of further study and quiet manoeuvring. A second stage of formalized public participation is under current discussion, but its scope and organization are matters of debate. This study focuses on the process up to the production of the Final Report, with some reference to subsequent events. It is too early to evaluate the subsequent events themselves.

The organization of the study is as follows:

Chapter 2 presents four models of public participation in the planning process. The four differ in their interpretation of the agents involved in bargaining and decision-making. The models are followed by a number of criteria which are used to evaluate the public participation program.

In Chapter 3 the case study is presented. The setting is outlined and the sequence of actors and events explained. Positions are summarized, and the present situation sketched.
Chapter 4 is the application of the specific criteria to the case study. Here compliance with the model is discussed and evaluated.

Chapter 5 offers a more general interpretation of the process. A number of fundamental issues concerning the committee and public participation arise from this discussion. These lead to reconsideration of the theory of public participation.

Chapter 6 draws conclusions and makes recommendations based on the preceding material.
CHAPTER 2: PUBLIC PARTICIPATION: MODELS AND CRITERIA

The purpose of this chapter is twofold: first, to present four models of public decision-making processes which express a range of opinion on the role and potential of public participation; second, to present a number of criteria against which the Airport Planning Committee process can be evaluated. It is useful to begin this discussion with a brief outline of the planning process.

2.1 The Planning Process

Several different outlines of the planning process could be presented. They differ not in concept, but in level of detail. Some identify more sequential steps than others; the divisions are unclear because the process can move back and forth (or around and around) as conditions demand. The essential elements are as follows:

2.11 Issue Formulation: This stage is fairly self-evident. Individuals or groups perceive problems or opportunities, and gradually sharpen their articulation of the issue. It is obviously important that the perception of the issue be correct for the result of action to be appropriate. This perception, however, is never fixed, but is constantly adjusted as the planning process proceeds.

2.12 Information Gathering. Information about the actual situation and the probable consequences of action must be collected, and synthesized into a number of alternatives.
Often this stage will have two parts. In the first basic information is collected, which allows a preliminary selection of alternatives. In the second more detailed information on the selected alternatives is collected. Logically the process can be repeated numerous times, each time narrowing the number to be more carefully investigated. In practice, however, the objective is to come quickly to a selection of relevant alternatives which express the range of social values. The range is established by explicit criteria as much as possible, and should include alternatives proposing the status quo, maximum net returns, the conservation ethic, and the most equitable outcome (Fox, 1975, 1-19). These relevant alternatives are then intensively studied.

2.13 Evaluation. The third stage is to estimate the costs and benefits of the selected alternatives, both in monetary and non-monetary terms. In other words tangible, quantifiable values and intangible, unquantifiable values should be considered. Intangible values might be expressed in terms of the cost their achievement will impose on conflicting tangible values (opportunity cost), with the final judgement left to the decision-makers.

2.14 Decision. At some point some person or group must decide to proceed with a plan selected from the proposed alternatives (or derived from them). This is a political stage in the process, involving trade-offs and judgements of value. The decision is likely not to follow the explicit, technical
evaluation of costs and benefits, for the politician is charged with acting in the public interest, and his weighting of uncertain factors is not necessarily the weighting chosen by technicians.

2.15 **Implementation.** Plans or policies are rarely implemented exactly as they were conceived because of unanticipated consequences, new information, and changing conditions (including changing values). How and when adjustments are made is an important problem, and may be the start of the formulation of a new issue, and the repetition of the process. This is why planning is ideally continuous and flexible. In many ways the creation of a plan is only the beginning of planning.

2.2 **The Models**

The models presented in this section summarize four perceptions of the role of public participation in the planning process. The perceptions are presented in a simplified form, without exhaustive discussion of the nuances that are found in actual practice. The purpose is to provide a perspective against which to view the case study that is to be presented.

Many models of public participation in the planning process could be presented. The four discussed here have been selected because they vary in their interpretation of who should be involved in bargaining and decision-making (the fourth stage of the planning process as outlined above). The emphasis is on bargaining, or trading off values, in particular. In all mod-
els validation of the result (decision-taking as distinguished from decision-making) rests with the politician only.

The model first presented is a clear extreme not found in practice. It serves the purpose of highlighting some of the difficulties of the current political system in order to set the stage for the other three models. Criticisms of the other three models are very brief; the intent is not to thoroughly critique them, but to present them as possible real life alternatives to the first.

2.21 Technical Analysis. The underlying philosophy of this model is that a technical solution can be found to a decision-making problem. Improvement in the generation and analysis of information, it is assumed, can indicate with considerable accuracy which decision is the 'right' one. Of course that is an extreme statement of the position, but it does indicate the thrust of benefit cost analysis and other decision-making tools.

In this model the decision-making process is a technical one which places extreme reliance on the experts. Politicians and experts share in the formulation of issues; the experts are then required to gather information and evaluate alternatives. Assuming that the information was adequate and the analysis sophisticated, a clear preference should emerge which the politician can validate in his decision. If the information is poor or biased the politician may choose another alternative. The expert is then expected to implement the decision.
There is no role for public participation in the ideal form of this model. The impacts on the public can in theory be technically determined, and the preferences of the public are included in the process through the elected politician. No need for direct input seems to be necessary.

In its extreme form the model also has no place for political bargaining. Given the necessary information on impacts and on social priorities, the optimum solution can be technically determined, usually through economic and mathematical analysis. The need for debate between different people who represent different interests disappears.

It must be made clear that the extreme form of the model is seldom if ever recommended as the most desirable model in political terms. It does, in fact, run counter to a number of deeply held values of democracy, as explained below. The extreme model is presented here as a necessary foil against which to compare others.

Three major criticisms can be made of this approach to decision-making. The first is a normative criticism: the model threatens the accountability which is a foundation of democratic government. In a complex society such as our own the politician is likely not to have time to decide carefully on all policies and programs; he is likely to accept the advice of his assistants, either formally through delegation of responsibility, or informally through 'rubberstamping'. Therefore administrative agencies now have great power in interpreting, applying, and even creating policy. The concentration of power in the bureaucracies, combined with the
scope of their activities and effects, and with their characteristic secrecy, leads to alienation of the citizenry. They come to feel that government is neither responsive, nor responsible to their needs. Neither is the citizen able to see, nor to influence, the workings of government which affect him. In democratic theory the bureaucracies are accountable to the elected representative, who is accountable to the public. In practice the concentration of expertise and power in the bureaucracies threatens this system.

Closely related to accountability is the issue of representativeness. The bureaucracy and the politicians are often disproportionately influenced by certain powerful interest groups, leaving both the less motivated (the silent majority) and the disadvantaged (such as ethnic, poor, and unorganized) groups under-represented. By ability or by default established special interests gain the ear and sympathy of government to the detriment of other interests.

A second aspect of representativeness concerns external consequences of policies which are inadequately evaluated in the policy-making process. Often because of inadequacies in the legal system affected interests may have neither representation before the decision, nor compensation nor recourse to the courts afterward (See Lucas, 1976, for a summary of Canadian law on this point).

The third major criticism is more sophisticated. Information about public values and priorities cannot be determined technically. Nor are political opinion leaders necessarily
good indicators of public values on a particular topic, because of time pressures on representatives, because of the relative infrequency of elections, and because of the complexity and rate of change of society. Majority votes do not imply majority support for every position taken by the candidate or party. Information on a specific issue can only be obtained from the public directly.

The effect of all of these criticisms is the same. Because of a number of problems the interests of the public are not accurately fed into the decision-making process. The information input is faulty. The important point with respect to the model above is that technical improvements in information management without public participation will not solve these problems. Accurate information on public values can only come from the public.

The next three models are alternative solutions to the problems posed in this discussion.

2.22 Agency-Public Joint Planning. If the problem is that the public interest is not being accurately fed into the decision-making process, one solution is to directly involve members of the public in that decision-making. Obviously not every member of the public could become involved, so it would be reasonable to select representatives of those public interests which would be affected by a particular issue, and place them in a problem-solving group with responsibility for choosing a policy. (See Graham, 1976, for a more detailed description of this model.) The group would include local politicians and
administrators from all relevant government agencies as well as representatives of affected public interests. Although wide representation would be crucial to the legitimacy of the group, the ideal size would be less than 15 members for reasons of group dynamics. The group would have the resources to hire their own experts as necessary, and to administer themselves. They would themselves be responsible for making recommendations to an elected political body, rather than referring the matter back to an agency or agencies.

"Conflict resolution should be the responsibility of the members within these groups, not of some final arbiter above the process. . . . The ultimate aim . . . is to forge a consensus among all participants involved.

The results of the planning process would be submitted as recommendations to an elected body (or bodies) for final approval. Assuming a consensus is reached and assuming the active participation by concerned government officials throughout the planning stage, this final step may well be a formality" (Graham, 1976, 109).

The important characteristic of this model is that it involves members of the public directly in bargaining, in the formation of consensus. As stated in the quotation, the role of the politician is ideally to validate a decision which has been formed within the problem-solving group.

2.23 The General Purpose Representative. To meet the problems of the modern decision-making process the previous model suggested creation of a small problem-solving group responsible for bargaining and consensus. By contrast, this model proposes a strengthening of the original representative system, in which bargaining and consensus are responsibilities of the elected politician. This model is well expressed by
Haefele (1976).

"This new emphasis on citizen participation, on widening the number of interests and groups, is doomed to failure. The bureaucrat's room simply is not big enough to accomodate all, and he has no criterion (nor can he have any) to select from competing claims to his attention" (Haefele, 1976, 127-128).

In this model attempts to involve the public and the bureaucrats directly in bargaining are seen as a fundamental error. The solution to decision-making problems is:

"Instead of a citizen having many different men represent him - one on the school board, another in the sanitary district, a third in the city or suburban council, a fourth on the planning commission, and so on - the citizen should have one man, a general purpose representative, represent him in all those governmental bodies" (Haefele, 1976, 128).

There are two main advantages to this system. One is that it focuses responsibility on one man who is real and identifiable. Both the public and the bureaucracy know with whom to deal. Also the representative, because he is visible, has incentive to discover public preference and act on it.

The second advantage is that the representative cannot recommend policies in isolation, but must resolve conflicts between unrelated policies (such as a highway and a sewage treatment system). He is aware of the constraints on action and must give some policies higher priority than others.

This model explicitly removes the public from bargaining and decision-making. However there is still a role for public participation in the model: providing direct information on public values to the elected representative. Programs which in one way or another elicit a response from the public
on a particular issue can improve the setting of political priorities which frames any technical analysis. Knowledge of public values and goals is important to the decision-making process.

2.24 **Pluralistic Model.** The fourth model includes public participation among a wide range of interests interacting on a continuing basis on a number of issues. All of the relevant governmental agencies, plus all the local elected representatives, plus all the relevant public interests should ideally be involved in the series of negotiations and trade-offs required to reach a decision. In order for the best decisions to be made, it is necessary that the actors represent as many interests as there are affected by the decision to be made. The more the planning system is pluralistic, the closer the decision will approach the public interest.

This model is distinguished from the previous two models by its treatment of bargaining. In the joint-planning model bargaining took place within a small problem-solving group which included agency, public and political representatives. In the general purpose representative model bargaining took place in the elected legislatures only. In the pluralistic model bargaining takes place across a wide range in a number of ways. It is not limited to a particular group; in fact it is essential that as many groups as possible be involved. Although the pluralistic model is harder to visualize than the other two, it is actually closer to actual decision-making practice in situations where numerous agencies must interact on the same issue or issues.
2.3 Criteria.

In order to evaluate a public participation program it is necessary to establish standards of performance. These standards rise from the philosophy of democracy which underlies our system of government, and from the practical necessity of reaching a decision at some stage in order to act. The list here is modified from lists of other authors, in particular O'Brien (1973). There are six major categories, with a number of subsidiary requirements: 1) Opportunity to Participate, 2) Information System, 3) Time, 4) Bargaining Opportunity, 5) Efficacy, and 6) Efficiency. They will be discussed in sequence.

2.3.1 Opportunity to Participate. This is obviously the most basic requirement for without it public participation would not exist. Three detailed criteria are discussed; two are adopted; the other is beyond the scope of this study.

1) There will be a liberal definition of those citizens who can demonstrate an interest (who have legal standing). All affected interests will be able to participate, including those newly perceived and expressed as planning proceeds.

2) The interested citizen will have the opportunity from the earliest stages to present his reasons for or against the proposal. The timing is important in this criterion. Opportunity must not be confined to one stage, either early or late, in the process, but must be extended throughout the process in order for public input to be effective, and to appear to be effective. One reason for this is that active citizen parti-
Participants will in most cases need to familiarize themselves with the technical issues and their consequences before they can be effective in presenting and defending their interests. This educative process is frustrated by opportunity at one stage only.

A third criterion for opportunity is that an appropriate procedure for public participation will be established. The 'appropriateness' of the procedure is a whole subject of inquiry in itself. (See Carney, 1977, for a general discussion.) It includes reference to the type of issue in question (immediate/long range, local/general, etc.), the characteristics of the relevant public (organized/unorganized, knowledgeable/ignorant, etc.), the time-scale of the response of techniques necessary, and so on. This criterion is not discussed or evaluated in this study.

These three criteria relating to opportunity are obviously designed to maximize the representativeness of the planning process.

2.32 Information System. This is the most critical and the most complex set of criteria for public participation. If representativeness is accomplished by having adequate opportunity, there is still an immense potential for manipulation of the process through control of information.

1) The interested citizen will be made aware of issues and their consequences. This implies an obligation on the part of a proponent of an action to inform those who are likely to be affected. Fully satisfying this criterion is likely to be difficult for the proponent for two related reasons. First,
technically oriented proponents are unlikely to be able to set down issues clearly. Second, the very reason for involving citizens in the process is that they will see things that others have missed. The very difficulty of this problem serves to emphasize its importance in the planning process.

2) Technical information will be generated in such a way that the risks, uncertainties, costs and benefits are simply and clearly expressed, to allow the public to understand their implications.

3) There will be discussion of questions of value judgement, not just technical details.

4) There will be real debate and dialogue, including discussion of assumptions. One-way information flow is public relations, not public participation, and is not adequate.

5) Information will be fully disclosed and widely disseminated from the earliest stages of the planning process. This is an important criterion, for secrecy of information can be a major device to dominate a process. The criterion does not mean, however, that there is no place for confidentiality in the process. On the contrary, the ability of actors in the process to contemplate and negotiate in private is necessary. The process of the taking of a position requires confidentiality, but - and this is important - the data on which the position is based must be available to all actors.

6) Alternative solutions which express the range of values of all interested parties will be generated. This also is an important criterion, both for the fact that alternatives are
produced, and that these alternatives cover the full range of values involved, and are not merely technical modifications. In cases where a set of values is not expressed in an alternative, the relevant interest group must be given the resources necessary to generate this alternative and to critique others. Note, however, that the criterion is not that every group have the resources, but that every value set be expressed.

7) Data and analyses necessary for these alternatives will be generated in time to be used in the planning process. This is clearly necessary if the alternatives are to be comparable in accuracy and detail.

8) There will be a means of knowing what decisions have been made in light of public input, and why. In this model the public is not involved in the actual decision, but still must be made aware of that decision.

The criteria for the information system are designed first (obviously), to improve the quality of information used, and second, to maximize the accountability of the planning process. As much as possible the workings of the process are made visible to the public, who by the previous set of criteria have the chance to participate and influence the process.

2.33 Time. This criterion, though very simply stated, is in practice very difficult to meet.

1) Sufficient time must be available in the planning process for adequate information to be generated on which a decision may be based.
2.34 **Bargaining Opportunity.** The criterion of bargaining opportunity relates primarily to the goal of conflict resolution, which is perhaps the most thorny theoretical topic in public participation. Full discussion of it will await Chapter 5, but one simple criterion can be stated here.

1) Procedures must be available for a resolution of differences.

2.35 **Efficacy.** The efficacy in question here is not that of the output of the planning process, but of participation in the process itself.

1) Participants must know that their efforts are of some value, i.e. that they can have some desirable effect. This implies that proponents (and opponents) are not rigidly committed to their proposal, but are willing to modify their position. This is important to the success of any public participation program, for one that is merely ornamental to a firm decision will not accomplish the goals of public participation, and is likely to create rather than resolve conflict.

2.36 **Efficiency.** Efficiency is a very important criterion in all program evaluations. Unfortunately it is a very difficult concept to define clearly once it goes beyond simple measurement of values convertible to money. The allowances to be made for intangible values, and for the element of risk are highly problematic. For example, it seems reasonable that a plan that cannot be implemented is not efficient. It is impossible, however, to be absolutely certain in advance
that any given plan can be implemented. To be excessively cautious is not efficient either.

Two criteria of efficiency will be proposed here; then two more will be discussed and rejected.

1) Public participation will not unduly hamper the normal functioning of government. This does not mean that the ultimate decision must be yes (or no) to the proposal because that would be normal for the proposing agency. Rather the criterion means that other programs not involved in the issue at hand will not be curtailed by loss of funds or personnel to the issue in question. Normal operations such as monitoring and administration will be able to continue.

2) Public participation will not be outrageously expensive in terms of time and money compared to the benefits to be gained from it. This seems to be common sense at first sight, but it is in fact a complicated issue. If the costs of not having public participation are believed to be very high (because a damaging proposal will then be implemented), then the benefits to be gained from participation (the rejection or modification of the proposal) will be seen to be high, and high expenses for participation itself will be justified.

A possible third criterion of efficiency would be that the process aims to produce the most efficient plan. Such a criterion begs the question of what efficiency is, but implies that it is something measurable in terms of quantifiable input and output. This is one common value set. However it is not at all certain that the most efficient plan is also the best
plan. The decision-maker must determine that. Therefore this criterion is not appropriate.

A possible fourth criterion would be that the process serve to approach or achieve the goals for which it was established. This is logical, except that it presupposes a clear statement of goals at the outset of the process which is very rare, and of questionable value. Such a clear goal statement is recommended by many observers in order to reduce conflict and frustration in later stages of the process. However

"(goals) change and one of the important functions of institutions is to adjust the course being pursued in accord with the changing priorities of society. Since performance cannot be assessed in terms of goals, we must make our assessment in terms of the process by which the course of action is decided upon. This in fact is the way we have always judged institutions" (Fox, 1976).

There are advantages to leaving goals vague: it may prevent the direction of the process from becoming too rigid; it may release time and energy for consideration of the issue itself; it may permit considerable areas of agreement and accomplishment to develop before underlying conflicts halt the process. Therefore the measurement of efficiency by goals is not adopted in this thesis.

2.37 Summary. For convenience of reference all the criteria are listed here. Each is condensed to a short phrase which can be remembered. For discussion, please refer back to the previous sections.

Opportunity to Participate:

1) All affected interests can participate.
2) Opportunity from the earliest stages.

Information System
1) Interested citizen made aware.
2) Technical information clear.
3) Discussion of values.
4) Real debate and dialogue.
5) Full disclosure from earliest stages.
6) Alternatives express full range of values.
7) Necessary data generated when needed.
8) Decisions and rationale known.

Time
1) Sufficient Time will be available.

Bargaining Opportunity
1) Procedures for resolution of differences.

Efficacy
1) Participants efforts of value.

Efficiency
1) Normal functioning unhampered.
2) Cost not outrageous.
CHAPTER THREE
THE VANCOUVER INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT PLANNING PROCESS

The events surrounding the proposal to expand the Vancouver International Airport are complex and lengthy. It is difficult to present them in an order that is easily understandable to one not already familiar with the subject. This chapter attempts to provide the information one step at a time, a style which results in a long exposition. The reader who becomes confused about dates, or who wishes more information, is encouraged to refer to Appendix 1: Chronology of Events, for clarification.

Section 3.1 describes the setting. Section 3.2 introduces and briefly discusses the actors in the drama. Section 3.3 sets out the process, the events and the reactions of the actors. This section contains much of the data on which Chapters 4 and 5 depend. Section 3.4 is a brief interpretation of events since March 1976, but these are still in the making, so are not emphasized in the evaluation to follow.

The selection of events to discuss has been a problem in preparing this chapter. Several sources were used: written reports of the Airport Planning Committee, Minutes of all committee meetings (but not of all sub-committee meetings), documents tabled at the meetings and attached to the Minutes, related correspondence and memoranda, reports and research notes of participants, and interviews with the participants themselves. All except the last source were written, but the interviews were still necessary to fill gaps
and to clarify confusing exchanges in the written material. The result of this effort was a massive accumulation of data which had to be synthesized.

Such a synthesis cannot be entirely objective, but precautions against bias were taken. An outline of the important events was prepared from the written material. This was compared to the information from interviews with eight participants from seven agencies, including the editor of the report. The most important events were mentioned repeatedly in the interviews, often with opposing interpretations. Regardless of the agency point of view during the process there was a high degree of agreement over the tone of the whole process (distrust and conflict) and which events were major or typical.

The events discussed were selected for the following reasons. First of all, they were all related to matters of process rather than to matters of substance, in keeping with the focus of this study. Second, some were major events or crises in the process which either had important consequences for the rest of the process, or were climaxes of continued problems. These events are intuitively obvious. Third, some were typical events, often repeated, which indicate the general state of the process. Fourth, some are events which clearly bear upon the previously derived criteria for public participation, events which must be included if these particular criteria are to be used in evaluation.
3.1 The Setting

In the Vancouver metropolitan region live more than one million people, approximately half the population of B.C. The urbanized area is bounded on the north by the coast mountains, on the west by the sea, on the south by the American border. On the east lies the fertile lower Fraser valley, the farm-land of which is now protected by agricultural land reserves. Within 35 miles of downtown Vancouver are only 700 square miles of potential urban land. By comparison, Toronto has 1500 square miles, and Montreal 3000 square miles within 35 miles of their centres (APC March, 1976, 3).

As well as the physical limits to the amount of land available, greater Vancouver faces special problems of sensitivity of the land. This is particularly true in the estuary and delta of the Fraser River, which reaches the sea immediately south of the city. The Fraser still contains the largest run of salmon in the world, despite competing uses of the vital lower reaches by the large urban population.

The Vancouver International Airport is particularly constrained by these factors (see Figures 1 to 3). It is located at the mouth of the North Arm of the Fraser, adjacent to both Vancouver and the urbanized parts of Richmond, and pressed against the estuary which is so important an ecological resource. All extensive land uses are constrained by the lack of land. Airport functions are especially constrained because of the need for flat terrain and for adequate air space relative to other airports.
Figure 2: Vancouver International Airport: Proposed Parallel Runway Concepts

Source: Airport Planning Committee Final Report
FIGURE 3 VANCOUVER INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT EXPANSION — CONCEPT 1

Source: Summary Report of the Ecological Sub-Committee
As part of its normal planning function in the face of growing demand for air services, the federal Ministry of Transport developed a plan to construct a new runway parallel to the existing main runway, but 5700 feet to the north. The parallel runway system would greatly increase capacity and flexibility of air service in the region. A number of concepts for the new runway were proposed. The differences between concepts were basically the length of the runway, and its position on an east-west axis. The different concepts had varying impacts on the amount of fill required in the estuary and the amount of noise generated over urbanized areas, as well as other effects. By 1975 only concept 1 was still under active consideration (see Figures 2 and 3). The other concepts had called for runways further to the west, which would have required both more dredging and more fill in the estuary.

These plans for airport expansion caused concern in other agencies, particularly the Greater Vancouver Regional District which was involved in a planning exercise (the Livable Region Program) which was potentially incompatible with the plans for the new runway. These concerns led in 1973 to the creation of an inter-agency body, the Airport Planning Committee, to study the whole problem.

3.2 The Actors

3.21 Federal. The following are agencies of the Federal Government in Ottawa which played a role in Vancouver airport planning.
Ministry of Transport (MOT): MOT is the transportation agency of the Federal Government, with operational, regulatory and developmental functions. Its major component, concerned with air transport, is the Canadian Air Transport Administration (CATA). Throughout the process all actors referred to MOT rather than to CATA; this small tradition is continued here. However, no other branch of MOT became involved.

MOT policy, as stated in the paper Vancouver International Airport, Master Planning Project, March 27, 1974, is "to ensure that national transportation policy influences and responds to the objectives and programs of the public and private sectors." CATA policy is "on a cost-recoverable basis to the maximum practicable extent, to provide safe and efficient facilities and services for the support of aeronautics consistent with the protection of the environment." Later in the process, in response to specific queries, MOT policy was restated: "It is the policy of the Ministry to accommodate the public demand for air travel, neither to encourage it nor to discourage it" (Airport Planning Committee, Minutes, Dec. 5, 1974). Note that there is an inherent contradiction between this policy and the overall policy stated first. The last stated policy makes no mention of objectives of the public or private sectors. Potential conflict with certain public objectives (such as the Livable Region Program) was one of the basic reasons for establishment of the Airport Planning Committee, and became the subject of study by one of its sub-committees, as explained below.
MOT is responsible for the Canadian air system and thus is the agency which initiated the proposal to expand VIA. A special planning group within the Ministry was established for this specific project, the Vancouver Airport Master Planning Team (VAMPT). This group had much contact with, but no responsibility to, the Airport Planning Committee.

Department of the Environment (DOE): This federal agency administers environmental policy in most of its aspects. There are numerous branches administering fisheries, air, inland water, lands, and so on.

Critical to the operation of DOE is the "Environmental Assessment and Review Process" (EARP), established by Federal Cabinet Directive on Dec. 20, 1973.

"EARP applies to those projects which are initiated by Federal Departments or by agencies which utilize Federal funds, or which involve Federal lands. For any development which can have adverse effects on the environment, an environmental impact study is to be undertaken and the results submitted to Department of the Environment for review, before commitments are made. . . . EARP was designed to leave the conduct of the environmental assessment in the hands of the proponent. However, the preparation of environmental impact assessment guidelines, which determines the scope and comprehensiveness of the required assessment, is the responsibility of DOE, as is the final review of the results of the completed study" (Ecological Sub-Committee, Jan. 1976, p. 16).

The Airport Planning Committee was established before EARP, so the airport project was not officially required to follow the process. However, the study design of the airport project did show much of the same philosophy as EARP, and was finalized in early 1974, after EARP came into effect.

In addition to the regular employees of DOE, the Minister
established, in Feb. 1974, a Special Advisory Panel "for the purpose of reviewing and identifying gaps in the impact study of the proposed expansion of Vancouver International Airport, and making recommendations to the Minister . . . The Panel . . . consists of persons well known for their concern for environmental issues" (Special Advisory Panel, March 22, 1976).

This was strictly a monitoring group, with no direct participation in the planning process.

Ministry of State for Urban Affairs (MSUA). This agency coordinates federal policies which affect urban areas, and was concerned with airport expansion because of its second order effects on the Vancouver urban system. MSUA was an active member of the Tri-Level Committee and of the Airport Planning Committee, but was not as much affected as MOT or DOE. MSUA was also the source of funding for the Greater Vancouver Regional District and the Community Forum.

Department of Public Works (DPW). This agency is the real estate arm of the government and implements capital works projects of other federal agencies. Its' involvement in policy planning itself is negligible, but it is responsible for bridge construction to the airport, dredging for channel maintenance and fill, and expropriation. The first conflict in the airport planning process concerned expropriation of residences for the construction of the new Arthur Laing Bridge to the airport.
3.22 **Provincial.** The province has not been prominent in any part of the process. There was one provincial representative on the Airport Planning Committee. The representative came from the Department of Municipal Affairs or the Department of Transportation and Communication at different stages (and different levels) in the process.

A more active role of the province might have been expected based on the interests at stake. The stance taken seems to have resulted from a recent change of government (in 1972), which gave the airport issue a relatively low priority. Also the province was content to let the local municipal organizations, which are responsible to the provincial government, take the lead in presenting provincial interests.

3.23 **Regional and Municipal.** These agencies are legislated creations of the Provincial Government, under the Municipal Act and the Vancouver Charter.

**City of Vancouver.** The North Arm of the Fraser River separates Vancouver from Sea Island where the airport is located. Air corridors to and from the airport cross the city. Much of the commercial activity in the region occurs within the city boundaries. The main access route to the airport connects directly with Vancouver. One of its expensive residential areas, and one of its major parks are located near the airport. Therefore Vancouver would bear many of the indirect costs (noise, reduced property values, increased ground transportation, reduced park use) and some of the benefits (increased commercial activity) associated with airport expan-
Municipality of Richmond. The airport is located within Richmond, and is its major industry, and its major source of tax revenue. Richmond also suffers from airport noise more than any other municipality, including Vancouver.

Greater Vancouver Regional District (GVRD). This agency administers a number of services and programs that affect the entire urbanized area and fringes surrounding Vancouver, such as water supply and drainage, parks, waste disposal, and regional planning. It is made up of members of local councils who were also directly elected by the voters as members of GVRD. Thus the members are also members of another council, but do not represent that council in GVRD. Rather they represent the voters directly. The GVRD also has its own administrative staff, independent of other agencies.

In 1971 GVRD initiated an extensive planning program called "The Livable Region", to set objectives and priorities in forthcoming policies for the region. Part of this program was a very extensive public participation program. The program culminated in 1975 with the production of The Livable Region 1976/1986, which advocated the management (redistribution) of growth into a multi-centred urban region.

From 1972 GVRD was concerned with the possible effects of airport expansion on their then-developing Livable Region policies. Because of this concern they inserted themselves in the airport planning process in a substantial way. In fact the institutions and processes which followed can in large measure be attributed to this GVRD initiative.
3.24 **Tri-Level**

Greater Vancouver Tri-Level Committee. Tri-level committees are intergovernmental bodies which exist for most urban regions in Canada. MSUA initiated them for the purpose of co-ordinating federal, provincial, and regional policies for each urban area. Each area actually has two committees. The Political Committee is composed of elected representatives; the Staff Committee has no political members. Membership is flexible, varying according to the agenda of a particular meeting.

The Greater Vancouver Tri-Level Political Committee met for the first time on March 31, 1973. Airport expansion had been placed on the agenda by the GVRD, and the establishment of the Airport Planning Committee was approved in principle. At following staff level meetings the terms of reference were defined.

3.25 **Public and Industry.** In a sense both of these categories are public interests, in as much as neither is directly involved in government or policy-making. As the process developed these two interests were shown to be radically opposed, so it is convenient to keep them separate in the analysis.

**Air Carriers.** This air industry group includes all companies with regular scheduled services and passenger charters. As with the B.C. Aviation Council, this group has co-ordination and lobbying functions in the industry.
B.C. Aviation Council (B.C.Av.C.). This organization represents the class of activity known as General Aviation. It includes all private aircraft, and non-scheduled commercial flying. Examples of the latter are aerial photography, forest fire fighting, and aircraft for hire.

Community Forum on Airport Development (CF). This was the public action group which developed out of concerns for noise and ecological damage. It was actively sponsored and promoted by the GVRD. At the Tri-Level meeting which established the Airport Planning Committee, GVRD was specifically charged with organizing a community group. Funding came from MSUA through GVRD. Despite this CF was not bound by policy statements of either agency, and acted as a free agent in the process. The first formal meeting of the CF was Nov. 8, 1973, but ad hoc members were active on the Airport Planning Committee from Aug. 2, 1973. CF adopted these statements as its terms of reference:

"1) To participate in informing the public of the ramifications of airport development.  
2) To stimulate, collect, and convey citizens' concern on airport development to the Airport Planning Committee and all levels of government.  
3) To participate actively in the airport planning process.  
4) To participate in researching various aspects of airport development and other related developments" (CF Newsletter, n.d.).

CF was given three representatives on the Airport Planning Committee, in recognition of three major public organizations that contributed to it: the B.C. Wildlife Federation, the Greater Vancouver Citizens' Committee on Noise Abatement, and the Richmond Ratepayers Association (Bridgeport Chapter). CF
was not a coalition, however, for the Steering Committee was elected at large, rather than having each constituent group provide a representative. Other organizations and unaffiliated individuals did become active in CF, but these three interests continued to make up the bulk of the organization's active membership.

3.26 The Airport Planning Committee (APC). The terms of reference of the APC were defined by the Tri-Level Staff Committee on April 16, 1973. The APC was "to advise on studies needed to ensure that the proposed development of the Vancouver International Airport is compatible with the planning of the various levels of government and the concerns of the public in the communities involved; to consider and make recommendations on the studies undertaken" (APC, March, 1976, 1).

The APC was not funded as a unit itself, but special funds were put aside by participating agencies to fund their own involvement. MOT supplied most of the funding, amounting eventually to $760,000, and all the necessary services such as secretarial support and publishing. DOE also had a large
budget, amounting to $470,000. Most of this went into the ecological studies. MSUA funded both GVRD and - indirectly - CF, to a total of $125,000.

Because membership in the APC was not rigid, and because it was not possible to assess the relative importance of each point of view represented, the committee proceeded by consensus and dissent rather than by majority vote. It took some time for the consensus procedures to be clarified (for example the method of agency comments discussed below), but once established they were generally followed till the end.

The APC was supposed to report back to the Tri-Level Political Committee after completion of its activities, advising this body what actions were recommended. Thus it did not report back through any particular agency, but directly to a joint political body. In addition, members reported back to their own agencies.

These characteristics indicate that the APC was essentially an implementation of the second model of public participation, in chapter 2, agency-public-joint planning.

In material promoting the formal establishment of the CF, GVRD had this comment on the APC:

"The Airport Planning Committee is the first joint planning process among three levels of government and the general public that has been attempted in Canada. No other proposed airport development has been approached this way. Consequently, the process has lots of 'kinks' to be worked out of it. Since the Committee came into existence last summer, the major order of business has been to try to work out those 'kinks' and prove that cooperative planning, rather than unilateral action on the part of one level of government, can produce solutions which meet the needs of local as well as national interest" (GVRD, Oct. 26, 1973).
This can be compared to an MOT statement concerning the previous planning process, made in a letter from I. Jones (MOT) to G. Waddell (CF), June 18, 1974:

"Prior to the formation of the APC and its open planning process which provides for direct citizen involvement, the Ministry had undertaken air transportation facility planning largely in-house. This was not totally without involvement of local governments and municipalities through their elected or planning staff representatives. In this respect, insofar as VIA is concerned, a local consultative committee was in being in 1969 consisting of Ministry and local agencies through which the plans and intentions of the Ministry in respect of the second parallel runway were communicated. Through this consultative committee and other contacts over the years, the following local government and organizational bodies were largely aware of the Ministry's plans and intentions in this area: Government of B.C., City of Vancouver, Municipality of Richmond, Lower Mainland Regional Planning Board, Lower Mainland Airport Consultative Committee."

The APC developed a study design with the assistance of a consultant from B.C. Research. The same consultant eventually wrote the APC Final Report.

The study design involved the creation of six sub-committees. The sub-committees included some members who did not sit on the APC itself, but the chairman of each sub-committee was required to be an APC member. At first CF representatives were not to be active members of sub-committees, but this was changed in Dec. 1973.

The APC Final Report (p. 11) outlines the duties of each sub-committee.

Airport Facilities Sub-Committee: to take inventory of present airport facilities in the Vancouver region and to carry out demand-capacity studies for these airport facilities.
**Airports System Sub-Committee:** to examine alternative means of accommodating forecast air traffic in the Vancouver region.

**Ecological Sub-Committee:** to assess the impact of airport developments on the natural environment.

**Forecasting and Economic Sub-Committee:** to agree upon a range of air traffic forecasts for the Vancouver area, and to assess the economic impact of airports on the region.

**Noise and Social Impact Sub-Committee:** later the Noise Sub-Committee: to assess the effects of aircraft noise and to determine the impact of airports on the human environment, (i.e. livability). In Nov. 1974 the social impact responsibilities were transferred to the PRMD sub-committee, whose description follows.

**Provincial, Regional, and Municipal Development Sub-Committee (PRMD):** to take inventory of existing regional plans and programs and to determine the impact of airports on these. To determine the impact of the airport on regional ground transportation (Social impact added in Nov. 1974).

### 3.3 The APC Process

This section focusses on specific aspects of the process, and the major controversies which arose, more or less in sequence. The written minutes and correspondence are not always sufficient to explain what occurred, so some reliance is placed on oral and written memories of participants. The major events around which the following discussion is structured, are summarized in Table 1.
### TABLE 1: MAJOR EVENTS OF THE APC PROCESS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Quarter</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>Sept./Oct.</td>
<td>MOT filed notice of intent to expropriate on Sea Island.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nov./Dec.</td>
<td>Expropriation hearings took place.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>Jan./Feb.</td>
<td>The APC was created by the Tri-Level Political Committee, March 31.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mar./April</td>
<td>The first meeting of the APC was held, June 6.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>May/June</td>
<td>Provisional public representatives were seated on the APC, Aug. 2.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>July/Aug.</td>
<td>The first meeting of the Community Forum took place Nov. 8.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sept./Oct.</td>
<td>The noise contract controversy took place. The Study Design was adopted, Feb. 21.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nov./Dec.</td>
<td>The main runway at VIA was closed for three months for repairs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mar./April</td>
<td>A Tri-Level Staff meeting was held to review progress of the APC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>May/June</td>
<td>Controversy erupted over MOT's pamphlet: Sorry About the Noise.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>July/Aug.</td>
<td>Controversy forced the APC Chairman to resign, May 30.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sept./Oct.</td>
<td>MOT's new proposal was rejected by the APC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nov./Dec.</td>
<td>CF threatened to leave the APC over the drafting of the Final Report.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Jan./Feb.</td>
<td>The final meeting of the APC took place, Feb. 19.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>March</td>
<td>The Final Report was published.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The immediate cause of the APC process was a confrontation over the expropriation of land on Sea Island for airport expansion. This led to expropriation hearings (January and February 1973) at which the public presented arguments against the expropriation. Convinced that the residents had a just case against expropriation, the GVRD presented a brief supporting that view. Further GVRD initiative caused a change in the process of environmental studies by DOE, announced in February 1973, to one of joint planning among a number of agencies and direct public representatives.

Two related points on this first stage need emphasis. First, MOT had in essence made the decision to proceed. This is clear both from the completion of expropriation proceedings, and from the policy announced on April 13, 1973, that the runway would be built unless major damage were demonstrated. Second, this policy was interpreted widely as meaning 'we're going to do it anyway, unless you can stop us'. This meant that the process began in an atmosphere of distrust of MOT, and disbelief of their commitment to true public participation and joint planning, as opposed to public relations. This lack of trust proved substantial in many respects from other actors' points of view, perhaps partly as a self-fulfilling prophesy.

Throughout the process MOT adhered to this policy without modification. It was reaffirmed in a letter, July 2, 1974 (Jones to Spencer), when the alternative of no-expansion of
runway facilities was rejected, unless the new runway were proved too damaging. It was reaffirmed on Sept. 30, 1974 in another letter (Lenahan to Jones) which urged the APC to work (quickly) to its terms of reference.

The terms of reference of the APC refer to the "proposed development" of VIA. MOT consistently interpreted this to mean the proposed parallel runway. Other agencies, notably GVRD and CF, consistently interpreted this to mean any proposed development, of which the runway was not the only possibility. Thus other agencies insisted on discussing other alternatives and other policies for management of growth in aviation demand which MOT insisted were beyond the terms of reference of the APC. The APC Minutes of Sept. 12, 1974 clearly state this position:

"The Chairman suggested that the APC is not the forum to debate MOT policies. He reminded members that the terms of reference of the APC were 'to advise on studies needed to ensure that the proposed development of the Vancouver International Airport is compatible with the various levels of Government and the concern of the public in the communities involved'; and also the Minister's statement that the runway would proceed providing there was no major environmental or urban impact. Any consideration of radical alternatives which affect basic Ministry policy would only take place, and in a different forum, where such consideration was a Final Committee recommendation for mitigational easement relative to the compatibility issue.

The Chairman continued, stating that the Ministry in the Study Design went beyond the terms of reference of the APC thereby showing the Ministry's willingness to demonstrate clearly the requirement for the runway and to demonstrate that compromise airport development solutions could be attained from Final Committee recommendations within the constraints of the Committee's terms of reference consistent with the Ministry desire to become an accepted community neighbour."
Such a statement, while clear, hardly reduced conflict for it says nothing of the possibility of demonstrating that the runway is not required, and it places consideration of policy alternatives in the indefinite future.

(These policies included spreading daily peaks by changing schedules or charging differential fares, improving air control capacity with more sophisticated equipment, changing air control procedures which gave absolute priority to arriving aircraft, allocating general aviation (GA) to other airports, increasing aircraft load factors, and possibly reducing demand through taxation.)

This difference in values had been purposively obscured in the terms of reference of the APC:

"As with all negotiated avoidance of collision, its terms of reference involved compromise and the evasion of issues which would have reactivated the confrontation. They are therefore general and wide enough to accommodate all views. . . . It was essential to get the process started. The problem has been that different interpretations have been put on such terms of reference" (Stead, March 23, 1975).

The first meeting of the APC was held on June 6, 1973. (No minutes were kept of the first meeting.) In these first few months MOT made known its desires to limit representation on the committee to one for each agency and four for MOT, including the chairman. Other participants in the early meetings were described in MOT-produced minutes as 'special participants'. However, the fledgling CF in this period consisted of separate areas of interest, and was allowed, after argument, to seat three representatives.

"Out of these discussions about numbers came the understanding that the members often stood for
interests within each agency's area of concern and that the numbers from each agency bore no necessary relation to the importance of their concerns. This, in turn, led to it being explicit that issues were not to be decided by vote" (Stead, Jan. 23, 1977).

MOT had wanted a voting committee, and tried at various points to bring the APC to a vote, without success (for example, July 4, 1975: see Appendix 1). In the Final Report, MOT stated:

"One significant departure from the usual procedure was the agreement to attempt to reach decisions without voting and without empowering anyone to make decisions. This led to endless argument and a regular failure to meet commitments to work schedules" (p. 109).

Provisional citizen representatives were seated on the APC on Aug. 2, 1973, and industry groups on Sept. 13. After extensive preparations and publicity by GVRD, the CF was officially inaugurated on Nov. 8, 1973, and the provisional representatives were made official.

From November 1973 to February 1974 most APC efforts went into developing a formal, written study design to guide future activities. A structure of six sub-committees to guide the various studies was developed in November. MOT wished to provide chairmen for all of the sub-committees, in accordance with civil service tradition, but had not the man-power to provide a person knowledgeable in each study area. They "acquiesced with evident misgivings", according to Stead (Jan. 23, 1977).

In the end MOT chaired the Airport Facilities Sub-Committee, and the Airports System Sub-Committee; other agencies chaired the other four sub-committees.

The formal study design was adopted on Feb. 21, 1974. It included formal rules of procedure covering confidentiality, press contact, and disagreements within the committee. The
formalizing of these rules of procedure indicates the general lack of trust within the APC, and flows directly from the noise contract controversy.

The noise studies were among the first to begin, and they were controversial to the end. In August 1973 MOT called for proposals on a noise impact study, embracing two elements. First, an analysis of operational and developmental alternatives, in other words a technical aviation study. Second, an assessment of noise impact. The second aspect was severely criticized by local members of the APC, who doubted the relevance of the noise unit (NEF) to be used for measurement. "NEF", meaning Noise Exposure Forecast, measures simulated vibration levels (a simulated physical measure), but does not take into account normal noise levels in the city, actual tests under different atmospheric conditions, ground activities (such as engine testing), or actual annoyance of people. Furthermore it is an average which tends to obscure the effect of widely spaced loud noises. Subsequent events cannot be better stated than in a lengthy quote from a letter by a GVRD representative to a senior MOT official in Ottawa, (Stead to Winsor, Jan. 26, 1974).

"This is not a mere matter of the occasional administrative breakdown . . . It has shown a consistent pattern that can only be read one way . . . It was evident from the beginning that any consultant competent in one of the two areas would be unlikely to be able to handle the other one. This is in fact how it turned out . . .

. . . At (a meeting) on October 15th and 16th, both sides gave some ground and an agreement was reached which was recorded. It recommended that the contract . . . be reduced to omit the assessment of noise impact . . . This shift in emphasis was to be further reflected in a change in the title of the project to "Analysis of Operational/Development Alternatives at the Vancouver International Airport" and by removing
Noise Studies. It was explicitly agreed that a detailed work statement was to be prepared accordingly, to be laid before the Airport Planning Committee before the contract was signed. This was never done. . . . When the Noise Sub-Committee next met MOT insisted on including future as well as present NEF's even if outside the scope of the Airport Planning Committee. The meeting concluded with a motion be put before the Airport Planning Committee before the contract was signed. This was never done.

A week later Tony Beak came out and we had another meeting of the Noise Sub-Committee. He insisted on the future NEF's despite the prospect of not having access to GVRD's computer program on demographic patterns. He also made it clear that MOT would proceed with the omitted items on the assessment of noise impact. In his summing up of the sense of the meeting, the chairman noted that the sub-committee did not approve the inclusion of the noise impact elements, but that in any case, final approval of the contract would rest with the Airport Planning Committee, as agreed previously on several occasions. This was never done.

At every meeting of the Airport Planning Committee since then we have asked about the work statement. The answers have been evasive. Then, at the meeting on January 3rd, it is announced that the contract has been signed! About a week ago we are given the work statement to find it is identical with the original."

Subsequent events are recalled in Stead's noted (Jan. 23, 1977).

"Tackaberry returned from Ottawa and reported to Nancy [Cooley] on the phone that McLeish had expressed regret and had agreed to re-negotiate the contract to eliminate the offending portions. At the subsequent APC meeting (7 February, 1974) there was no hint of an apology and I had to drag the details out of Jones item by item, but they did add up to what had been agreed in the first place. At a Noise Sub-Committee meeting 8 February, Beak turned up and refused to honour this commitment, agreeing only after a long argument to withholding the contentious items for the time being, with no apparent awareness of the effect on MOT credibility."

In addition to the obvious abrogation of process here, two further points deserve mention. First, GVRD threatened to withhold demographic data in order to bargain against MOT.
Most information problems in the process involved MOT, especially the forecasting controversy discussed below. Second, one MOT official reported something on the phone which was very difficult later to confirm in an official meeting, and was in any case rejected by another MOT representative at another meeting. After a period of time CF refused to receive or respond to any information by phone, and insisted that everything be in writing. GVRD sent letters back to MOT recording the understood substance of any telephone call, and asking for confirmation (which usually was not given). Other examples of MOT 'double talk' are discussed below.

3.32. The Tri-Level Meeting, Nov. 1974. Minor irritations persisted, but no serious controversy erupted during the spring and summer of 1974. It was becoming increasingly clear to all actors, as the studies continued, that the deadline could not be maintained, and that a consensus position of the APC could not be reached. MOT was stating its interpretation of the terms of reference very clearly (see quotation in Appendix 1, Sept. 12, 1974), and GVRD was moving toward a confrontation.

The staff of GVRD prepared a position paper which emphasized the acceptable (to them) sequence of actions and studies which had to be followed in order to demonstrate the need for the runway. Policies which MOT would not consider were emphasized. The need for MOT to re-establish trust in the APC by introducing measures to mitigate the existing noise situation was stressed. The paper was released to the public on Oct. 23, 1974, and brought a violent denunciation by MOT the following day in the press.
Also on Oct. 23, but not directly related to the GVRD position paper, was the announcement by the Chairman, that a Tri-Level meeting would be held to deal with problems in the APC process. This move seems to have been discussed by various agencies, certainly by GVRD, at informal meetings, but there was opposition because the Tri-Level Committee had been established as an inter-governmental body only. CF was not allowed to attend. They never did accept any of the results of that meeting, which they regarded as unacceptable backroom accommodations among bureaucrats, without public participation.

The meeting took place on Nov. 14, 1974. The essential decisions of the meeting were the following. First, only those studies already underway were to be completed. Other studies provided for in the study design but not yet commenced were to be abandoned. This included, most significantly, the evaluation of findings and alternatives. Second, that a new timetable be adopted, with completion scheduled for April 15, 1975. Third, that a GVRD outline of the final report be approved in principle. The report was to include clear statements of differing views and the development of alternative decision options, a section on policy and management, and a section on an on-going consultative process. Fourth, the taking by agencies of public positions prior to the release of the final report was to be avoided.

CF was particularly upset with the abrogation of process
which they felt the Tri-Level meeting represented, and with the truncation of the study design, especially the loss of the evaluations which they felt were essential to decision making. In protest, they refused to take any stand on the proposed outline.

Other agencies (particularly GVRD) felt that funds for the APC were not going to be extended, and consensus decisions were not going to be reached. They felt that the studies already underway would produce enough information to be passed to the political level for a decision on whether or not to act. Further information collection and analysis was not going to change the outcome of the APC, because the basic conflict was over policies which MOT would not question, which represented fundamental value differences. No amount of technical study could resolve this impasse in the view of the agencies.

3.33 Forecasts. Forecast increases in demand were the evident basis of the MOT proposal for the parallel runway. Detailed forecasting information was required as a basic input into several of the studies being done. GVRD attempts to get these data began in March 1973, before the APC had even been established. At that time a senior MOT official promised to make the information available. Numerous repetitions of the
request and the promise followed. Some examples were a meeting on July 9, 1973, a letter on July 16 following, another letter on Sept. 10, and another meeting on Oct. 2, 1973. The information was supplied on Jan. 14, 1974, one month after the original scheduled date of completion of the study. Even then not all of the information which had been requested was included. That which was supplied appeared to be "basically similar to those (figures) contained in the 1971 study which concluded that a second parallel runway was not required" (letter, Cooley to Jones, April 16, 1974).

"What we wanted was disaggregated data, demand elasticities, income groups, the effect of fuel prices on air fares, how and when exponential growth might eventually be constrained, etc. It later turned out the MOT did not have a lot of this information, but what they had - quite a lot. . . . - was slow in coming . . . My log . . . records repeated promises to provide certain information or to discuss the approach to forecasting, only to as often experience delays which clearly suggested talking to us on this subject was low priority as there was nothing to discuss" (Stead, Jan. 23, 1977).

The meeting to discuss the data finally took place on May 9, 1974.

During the summer of 1974 the Chairman of the Forecasting and Economic Sub-Committee (Stead, GVRD) prepared a report, which, in the fall, was rejected by four of seven agencies on the sub-committee. A second report was drafted, but the first became the Annex to the report of the sub-committee, presenting a view dissenting from MOT.

The essential political elements of the sub-committee report were
"that it should fairly represent all points of view within the sub-committee and that only those whose particular views were being expressed could insist on changes in my draft - they could not demand changes in the description of opposing views. These features . . . had been agreed to by the sub-committee.

. . . MOT attempted to add an Annex II to rebut my Annex after the sub-committee had completed its work on this subject and our report had been tabled with APC, without the sub-committee ever having considered it. Apart from MOT, this approach was unanimously rejected in APC and the substance was later inserted legitimately as agency comments. Much later, when the final sub-committee reports were printed and bound for public release, this report came out with my Annex separated from the covering report of which it was explicitly a part and put in the back of the book as it were mere agency comment. This again was overturned in APC" (Stead, Jan. 23, 1977).

In addition to this manoeuvering, the Chairman of the APC wrote to the Senior Planner at GVRD suggesting a "minor re-structuring" of the last page of the Forecasting Report.

". . . with the suggested modest adjustments, the Airport Planning Committee as a whole can readily accept this report without further time-consuming debate and potential extension of both the Sub-Committee and the Airport Planning Committee's involvement" (Jones to Farry, Dec. 30, 1974).

This was not done.

In commenting on the Forecasting Report (APC, Jan. 1975), an MOT representative offered the following perspective on the MOT position. He emphasized

"the singular accountability the Ministry has, as its mandate, to meet future facility requirements, that can only be predicated on the best forecast information available.

. . . The contention that action to respond to reasonably demonstrated future needs should not be taken until . . . 'a requirement becomes plainly evident . . .' , is tantamount to suggesting that levels of service in the public air transportation system would have to become degraded, possibly even to the point of neglecting safety influences,
before any lay and unaccountable individuals or agencies might find air transportation facility needs 'plainly evident'" (Tackaberry to Jones, Jan. 20, 1975).

On the substance of this argument, it begs the question of whether or not MOT would be able to recognize 'major environmental or urban impact', which they repeatedly stated would halt the runway. In fact damages which DOE considered major MOT strenuously objected to because they were of little significance.

This leads, once again, to a question of values which underlies MOT's 'accountability' argument. Every government agency was as accountable as MOT, but with respect to different values. CF also felt accountable - directly to the public - for the positions they took in APC debates, although their livelihood was not at stake. The point is that no agency was acting irresponsibly in terms of its mandate or its values, but there was an inherent conflict in these mandates and values. The APC was an attempt to bridge these conflicts. Accountability is discussed further in Chapter 5.

3.34 Sorry About the Noise, Feb. 1975. After the Tri-Level meeting (Nov. 14, 1974), the next major controversy concerned an MOT information pamphlet, published in January, 1975, called Sorry About the Noise. The pamphlet was distributed to the public, particularly in response to noise complaints. MOT's opinion was that the pamphlet was part of a normal, even commendable, information program.

"The Brochure is an attempt to overcome [the lack of communication] and I hope will be the fore-runner of many initiatives in this area where, as
I believe you know, we have been criticized. . . . I trust that the foregoing explanations are satisfactory . . . and that you will recognize our sincere desire to both improve the noise control practices and communicate our program to all concerned citizens" (letter Neales to Tyhurst, March 6, 1975)."

Others in the APC believed it was less virtuous.

"It drew to a minor extent on the on-going Noise Studies, but was full of grossly exaggerated, misleading and even erroneous statements . . . In short, it was a propaganda play" (Stead, Jan. 23, 1977)."

Controversy erupted in the APC meeting of Feb. 27, 1975. A motion was adopted that

"The APC was not involved in the preparation of the MOT pamphlet Sorry About the Noise of January 1975, and cannot take a position on the statements it contained" (APC Minutes)."

MOT was asked whether they would withdraw . . . the pamphlet, cease distribution, or insert the APC motion in it. MOT felt that the pamphlet did not breach APC procedures as agreed at the Tri-Level meeting, and were not prepared to cease distribution. The specific answers to the specific questions asked appeared in the following minutes, rather than the minutes of this meeting. MOT stated that they would not insert the motion in the pamphlet.

This controversy was one example of a constant irritation in the process over the quality of Minutes. Minutes were prepared by MOT.

"As a whole they are bland and in no way reflect the tension and dogged battling that went on continually. This was the most trying series of meetings I ever attended, but one does not get this out of the Minutes . . . There are examples where clear intent to avoid compromising statements in print is evident" (Stead, Jan. 23, 1977)."
In the case of the noise pamphlet controversy, only pointed questions at the time of the adoption of minutes from the previous meeting served to get the MOT answers clearly recorded.

3.35 Resignation of the Chairman, May 1975. Throughout the APC process the Chairman had two roles, one as chairman of the APC, the other as MOT representative. He was repeatedly charged with being partial to the MOT role, giving it (complete) priority, and therefore undermining the joint-planning nature of the APC. One example was his attempt to alter the conclusions of the Forecasting Report.

In the spring of 1975 most of the studies were being completed; the sub-committees were adopting them and tabling them for discussion at the APC. The ecological study was among the last to be drafted, in late April 1975. It consisted of a number of lengthy technical reports, and a summary report (APC, July 1975b) which attempted to draw the technical reports together. The conclusions of the summary report were general, and in some cases appeared to contradict the findings of specific component reports. The overall recommendation was a moratorium on further major construction, and the preparation of a comprehensive management policy for the Fraser estuary and delta. "Specifically included should be the expansion of Vancouver International Airport as presently proposed (Ecological Sub-Committee, Jan. 1976, W, emphasis in original)."

When this became known, the APC Chairman, in a letter to the Chairman of the Ecological Sub-Committee, made some highly
critical statements, from the MOT point of view.

"We cannot agree that the airport development issue, particularly in context of Concept One of the Ministry's Proposals, should become a secondary issue to that of a Fraser Estuary/Delta management policy and a Moratorium on all prospective estuary developments. We believe that the use of the airport development issue (Concept One) through disproportionate inflation and translation of concerns as a means of achieving such a policy discredits the Report which was to assess the impact of airport development. . . . Those who seek a wider authority for environmental protection are very transparently using this occasion and this Report through some distortions and questionable judgements to achieve that end. . . . it is suggested that all major Fraser Estuary/Delta development proposals be reviewed in some depth prior to the approval of any single component proposal. This recommendation is philosophically sound but pragmatically questionable . . . In any study timetable, the prospective locations, scope and timing of 'proposed developments' are variables subject to change by the various bodies and jurisdictions acting as proponents which would probably frustrate the objective of such a task.

. . . I must express our intense disappointment with the Report. I do not believe it appropriately conveys the respected input of many of the Environment Canada's technical staff who contributed much to the Report's intended purpose of assessing the impact of airport development and which in my view has been subverted. I believe this Report contains imputations which do not subscribe to a fair assessment of Concept One which is the stated Ministry of Transport development proposal" (Jones to Romaine, May 6, 1975, emphasis in original)."

A storm erupted over this letter, which led to its withdrawal and replacement with a second letter. For the most part the second letter was the same, although the concluding paragraph was redrafted as follows:

"I must express our intense disappointment with the report. I do not believe that it appropriately conveys a fair assessment of the environmental impact of the airport development concepts, particularly with respect to Concept One which is the Ministry's principal proposal for future expansion" (Jones to Romaine, May 23, 1975, emphasis in original)."
DOE and CF immediately prepared a rebuttal of the points made in the MOT letter. This was followed by a third MOT letter, along with a covering letter stating "it is quite clear that our letter of May 23 was ill advised, should not be circulated, and I respectfully request that it be returned to me (Jones to Romaine, May 24, 1975)." The specific comments in the third letter were exceptionally brief, consisting of two short paragraphs stating that more emphasis could have been placed on Concept One, and that the airport expansion should not be covered by a moratorium for it was not a major development.

The request to withdraw the second letter was denied by the Ecological Sub-Committee, and the Chairman resigned without notice on May 30, 1975. He was replaced with a new MOT representative.

3.36 New Proposals, July 1975. In May 1973, just as the APC was being established, MOT provided for study four concepts for the parallel runway, concepts A to D. On Nov. 27, 1973 these were replaced by concepts one to five. All of these concepts included an 11,000 foot runway, but its east-west placement varied, as did the amount of estuary to be filled for the runway and related developments, and the amount of dredging necessary to obtain the fill. These five concepts were the basis of APC study until June 18, 1974, when concepts four and five were dropped. Concepts one to three were retained. Changes in these proposals in July 1975, after all the studies were complete, precipitated the first crisis for
the new chairman.

In June, when MOT was writing the first decision option, it became known that they were considering a runway of 10,600 feet, in the position of that in Concept One, but shorter. This caused some confusion, but was followed on July 17, 1975, with an oral presentation of the 10,600 foot runway proposal to the APC. The following day, July 18, 1975, however, MOT distributed a memorandum, said to be "self-explanatory," which proposed a runway wholly within the Sea Island dyke, which not even the 10,600 foot runway accomplished.

"Following the recommendation of the Ecological Sub-Committee that no runway should be built on Sturgeon Bank until after further studies on the impact of such action and my discussions with Senior Regional DOE officials, I have instructed the Airport Planning Team to revise its plans accordingly and to proceed with a pre-design and engineering proposal for a runway within the dyke. . . . This decision in no way prejudices the future extension of this runway to full redundancy capacity, should DOE studies determine there will be no significant ecological impact and should the demand for such a runway persist" (Neales to APC Chairman).

Controversy and lengthy discussion followed at an APC meeting on July 31, 1975. The new proposal was presented in written form; it was for a runway 9,250 feet in length which did not penetrate the dyke. Discussion at the meeting revolved around the question of whether this new proposal constituted a moving of the goal posts, or only a modification of Concept One. It was eventually agreed that the proposal could not be considered by the APC and would not be discussed in the Final Report. The concept to be discussed in the decision options was to be the 10,600 foot proposal only, with
the 9,250 foot proposal deferred to a second stage of study. Everyone was very careful to get, and reaffirm, explicit statements of this understanding; these are clearly recorded in the Minutes.

Of particular interest in this controversy are the "discussions with Senior Regional DOE officials." At the APC meeting called to discuss the proposal, the Chairman stated that

"(1) MOT and DOE met to discuss if runway was shortened by 9,250 ft. would it meet DOE requirements?

(2) He personally was unaware that MOT were looking at a runway wholly within the dyke" (APC Minutes, July 31, 1975).

Clearly the proposal was a compromise which had the acquiescence, if not the active involvement, of regional DOE staff. Clearly also the two regional staffs were operating without the full knowledge of their own representatives on the APC. The statement of the Chairman, and the fact that an MOT representative could present an apparently final proposal, on July 17, to be followed only one day later by an unannounced proposal, indicates this lack of co-ordination. The same comment applies to DOE, for their representative did not support the proposal at the APC.


The timing, quality, distribution, and form of information were irritants throughout the process. Already in this section many examples have been given: the keeping of minutes, delays in forecasting reporting format, the threatened withholding of computer files by GVRD, a 'propaganda' pamphlet, the content
of the noise studies, and release of the GVRD position paper. There were numerous other cases. The first one even preceded the APC itself. The Hearing Officer of the expropriation hearings made this comment in his report:

"(The) complaint about non-disclosure of pertinent data as to the reasons for the expropriation was related and documented so often during the hearing that I was obliged in the interests of time to cut short the repetition of what I then considered a well-established complaint. . . . I conceded that the Association had established beyond doubt its valiant attempts to get data and that it had been ignored" (Fisher, Jan. 20, 1973).

The Demand/Capacity Analysis of the Runway System at the Vancouver International Airport (APC, July 1975a) was crucial information for MOT's case for a new runway. If capacity were not reached, new facilities would not be required. This study, however, became available only in June, 1975, after all other studies were already complete. This can be related back to the APC meeting of April 18, 1974, itself one full year after the APC was established, when MOT stated that they were at that point ready to begin documenting the case for the new runway.

On a similar subject, GVRD on March 14, 1975 requested an updated cost estimate for the new runway. MOT refused to prepare this estimate, claiming that mitigational recommendations in the Final Report would affect the cost. GVRD and CF claimed that the politicians could not decide without knowing the costs. Others, including MOT, agreed, but felt that the cost information was not immediately needed.

This whole exchange is typical of the manoeuvres that
continually took place. Evaluation of proposals had been abandoned at the Tri-Level meeting of Nov. 14, 1974, so cost estimates would not seem to be appropriate. However construction costs were escalating at an unprecedented rate, and the required expenditure, if clearly stated, was likely to decide politicians against the runway. In this case the manoeuvre was stalemated.

Another case of controversy over the form of reports was that of the Alternative Airport Site Studies (APC, April 1975) completed in Nov. 1974. This report eliminated all alternatives to VIA on the basis of some combination of airspace constraints, bird hazard, and environment concerns. There were, however, serious methodological doubts, especially on the part of GVRD. Despite this dissension the Chairman of the Airports System Sub-Committee did not include the other views in the report, on the model of the Annex to the Forecasting Report.

"I offered to draft an insert since he claimed not to be able to express our views. This offer was accepted. When the report appeared, my draft had been appended specifically as a comment rather than as part of the report. CF and DOE comments were added in later drafts and, in the case of CF, there was added a rebuttal by the Chairman, which was at no time provided for and never tried at any other time" (Stead, Jan. 23, 1977).

A final example of attempts to change the form of reports concerned the Final Report itself. With the repeatedly delayed deadline slipping again, in Jan. 16, 1976 the Chairman circulated a memo suggesting that the report should be issued in two volumes, the decision options and agency comments to be published after the first several sections. This was strongly
resisted by APC members, such as GVRD.

"We strongly urge you NOT to accede to whatever demands are being made to publish the report in two volumes. To do so offers no advantages except a few days in time, and would effectively destroy the coherence of the report that all members have worked hard to achieve" (Fawcett to Hosgood, Jan. 23, 1976).

The report was eventually published in a single volume.

Numerous and irritating though all the examples of information management were, they did not compare in severity with the final major crisis of the APC, which concerned the section of the Final Report on areas of agreement and issues which had arisen from APC work. This conflict simmered through September and October, and erupted in November 1975.

In the study design adopted in February 1974, there was provision for a section setting out differences in view among APC members. The existence of such a section was reaffirmed in the draft outline adopted at the Tri-Level meeting, November 1974. It was mentioned often in the course of APC business, and drafting of it began in July 1975, under the title "Areas of Agreement and Issues." The procedure followed in listing these was fairly simple. If a statement was opposed by no member of the APC, it became an area of agreement. If opposed by one or more - but one was sufficient - it became an issue. These rules of procedure were used, of course, by critics of MOT's inflexible policy position to introduce to the report issues which they had not succeeded in covering in the studies. The editor completed the first draft of this section in August 1975, and comments were requested. GVRD responded on Sept. 3.
"The basic issue is whether aviation is one function among many serving society with its needs determined by balancing priorities or whether aviation has prior claim on society with other functions adjusting as best they may" (letter, Farry to Roberts, Sept. 3, 1975).

The letter also suggested additions to the list of issues, and revisions of some items from the list of agreements to the list of issues, because GVRD disagreed.

Most interesting, however, is the proposed addition of seven areas of agreement. These had never been formally stated, but GVRD felt that they had been tacitly accepted at previous meetings. At least no opposition had been offered. Of these tacit agreements, only two remained agreed once put in writing. The others became issues because of the objections (mainly) of MOT.

"Throughout the process there were numerous instances where MOT officers would say things to GVRD representatives (and, no doubt to others) that they later refused to confirm. . . . (In this case our comments) pointed out the absence from (the editor's) draft of seven areas of agreement, including the fact of too much noise with present configuration, the halving off of GA, the abandonment of the cross-wind, public access to foreshore for recreation and others. . . . All but two unimportant areas became issues when thus brought out into the open" (Stead, Jan. 23, 1977).

The main controversy, however, was yet to come. At an APC meeting on Oct. 20, MOT proposed combining the 'Issues' section with the decision options. GVRD thought this would be a disservice to the reader, that the 'Issues' section was important, and that it should be strongly and clearly worded (APC Minutes, Oct. 20, 1975). Subsequently two special workshops were held on Oct. 23 and 29, at which the list of areas of agreement and issues was examined in detail.
The controversy broke into the open on Nov. 13, 1975, in an APC meeting. Very lengthy and stormy discussion took place on the question of how best to present the Issues section in the Final Report.

"The Chairman summarized that the draft section on Issues appeared to have been rejected by a majority of the people. Alternatives suggested were to include the issues in the decision options, a separate appendix or in agency comments.

... Discussion then centred around the issues of whether or not a change in the process was occurring. 

... Discussion followed on the matter of dropping the Section F of the draft as it stands and the material being included elsewhere, either in the Decision Options or in the Agency Comments - in other words it is removed from the Report as a whole. Mr. Paulik felt the process was changing and previous agreement was not being followed. He suggested on behalf of CF that they recommend CF no longer participate for reasons given earlier. "The rules are being changed, so we would like to take our leave at this time.'

... The Community Forum representatives then left the meeting.

... Mr. Romaine felt he must take the matter under advisement back to DOE to determine the future action in view of the 'major shift in process.'

... The GGVRD staff position was that removal of the Issues section constituted a major shift in the process and they disagreed with that shift.

... Mr. Macleod (DPW) stated it was not a change in process but a restructuring to make the Report understandable by those not closely associated with the problems" (APC Minutes, Nov. 13, 1975).

The statement by DPW was similar to others by MOT, Richmond, Vancouver, Air Carriers, and MSUA, that is, that no change in process was occurring.

The following day the Acting Chairman of the CF wrote a very critical letter to the Chairman of the APC. It outlined the development of APC thinking regarding a section on Issues, and stressed the continual APC acceptance of the need of such
"We simply did not believe and still do not believe that those responsible for making a decision could reasonably do so without being provided with a specific section in the final report that sets out the issues that have emerged after two years of study by all the agencies involved.

... at no time ... was the need for this section seriously questioned at the APC. The main problem has been the lack of sufficient attention to it.

... It is not unreasonable to suggest that the reversal of position by MOT representatives appeared only as it became more and more clear that this particular section was articulating both sides of the argument connected with airport expansion.

... It is particularly regrettable that you, the Chairman, have participated in this on a partisan basis as an employee of the MOT rather than as an impartial chairman of the APC and the custodian of its procedures and processes" (letter, Starling to Hosgood, Nov. 14, 1975).

This letter, particularly the paragraph questioning the integrity of the chairman, led to threatened legal action (libel), which was never actually acted upon.

The vehemence of this controversy seems to the observer to be strangely out of proportion to the issue at stake. Although MOT were accused of attempting to eliminate the Issues section, strictly speaking this was not the suggestion. MOT's proposed format would, however, have made the Issues much less clear to an outside reader or politician. Had they been combined with either the decision options (which had been written by specific agencies) or the agency comments they would have appeared under the name of a single agency, rather than under the name of the APC itself.
The violence of the reaction must be related to the high level of suspicion and tension that had been maintained throughout the process for over two years. The APC was born of a confrontation over expropriation, and it lurched from crisis to crisis until the end. Between crises was not peace, but a state of cold war. CF was often tempted to leave the APC, but felt they could not maintain their credibility unless they did so over a very specific issue which the public could quickly grasp. They were hypersensitive throughout to violations of procedure, both major and minor, for they often felt that the bureaucrats were coming to secret accommodations behind their backs. This was obviously a self-reinforcing cycle, for CF's extreme suspicion alienated them from others, who continued their business, which justified CF's suspicion.

The outcome of the Issues controversy was that the section remained in the report, and CF returned to the APC. Keeping the section in probably delayed the Final Report by a month or two.

3.38 Deadlines and Delays. Time was another constant irritation in the APC process. It is, of course, necessary to have deadlines, but they may be realistic or unrealistic, and they may be played for strategic advantage by any actor. This certainly was the case in the APC.

The slippage of deadlines is indicated by the following sequence. In April 1973, when the APC was established, a deadline of July 1974 was set. MOT aimed for this date, but claimed they would not insist on it at the expense of the
of the quality of studies. In Feb. 1974, when the study design was adopted, the deadline was extended to Nov. 1974. To the observer this is a very short time in which to complete the studies planned, particularly ecological ones. Some were already underway however, and delays in obtaining information on others were not anticipated. In Oct. 1974 the deadline was reset by the chairman at Jan. 1975. A month later, in Nov. 1974, at the Tri-Level meeting, the deadline was extended to April 15, 1975. There was a strong implication that the politicians simply would not provide time or funds to continue beyond that date, and more pressure began to be applied. In April 1975 most of the studies were complete, but the deadline had to be relaxed again for review purposes, to July 1975. Considerable pressure was exerted to meet this deadline, but after the two crises of the resignation of the chairman and the new proposal, this proved impossible to maintain. Also at this point CF announced that they were going to draft a third decision option, which had been discussed but not acted on. Reluctantly the deadline was changed to Oct. 1975. This proved impossible to meet when the Issues conflict arose, so the deadline again was delayed to early 1976. The APC actually completed its business on Feb. 19, 1976, and the report was published in early March.

There was a definite feeling on the part of MOT's critics, particularly CF, that the deadlines unacceptably prejudiced the process. The studies which they felt were necessary simply could not be done in the time-frame allowed. Furthermore, they all had to start simultaneously, whereas some were logically
prior to others. Also, too little time was allowed for
review of drafts and addition of comments. Finally, there
were recurrent and ominous statements from MOT that little or
no time would be allotted for public discussion and review
after the Final Report, which had been agreed to from the
very establishment of the APC in March 1973. For example, on
Dec. 11, 1974 the Minister of Transport announced in a press
release that the expected date of completion was mid April
1975, and the

"Federal Government expects to announce its decision
on the runway based on the Committee recommendations
by the end of next April."

MOT's point of view was different, of course. From the
beginning they felt that the APC was to consider only the
parallel runway proposal and no other policy matters. There­
fore the scope of studies necessary was much more restricted,
and the time-frame not unreasonable. There was also the
underlying assumption, stated above (page 42 ) that the stu­
dies were to "demonstrate clearly the requirement for the
runway," with no belief that it might conceivably demonstrate
anything different. MOT was consistently boggled when other
members of the APC questioned the assumptions of their experts.
These were technical matters which should not be trifled with.
To MOT the repeated questioning of these assumptions was bar­
gaining in bad faith. So MOT responded accordingly, with
strategic actions, which, of course, made the situation worse.

One example of this loss of faith all round directly con­
cerned deadlines. In an interview with a CF representative it
was stated that as time went on, CF came more and more to disbelieve and ignore time restrictions, because the early ones had been too restricted and designed to favour MOT. In fact, as time wore on, CF learned to manipulate time itself, and did so knowingly. With two years already spent on the process, the small extra delays came to be less and less significant, so the power of time shifted more and more to CF and the other critics of MOT. It is clear that many of these delays were legitimate with respect to the accepted process, but it is also clear that the delays served the policy purposes of CF, GVRD, and DOE, at least.

The point here is neither to condone nor to condemn the manipulations of time on all sides, but to emphasize the conditions which caused and reinforced these actions. These were the initial short time-frame, which was based on a fundamentally different interpretation of the objective and scope of the APC.

3.39 The Final Report, March 1976. In the Final Report two sections were devoted to areas of agreement and issues. The first concerns those items which arose from the work of the sub-committees and the APC. The second section concerns broader items,

"which bear on a number of study areas, or from fundamental differences in perception of the problem being addressed by the APC, or from differences of opinion on procedural matters during the APC process" (APC, March 1976, 67).

Areas of agreement and issues had the following definitions:

"An Area of Agreement statement concerns a matter which has the unanimous agreement of all APC"
An Issue Statement concerns a matter on which there is a difference of views within the APC. It is only necessary for one APC member agency to disagree on some matter with one other agency on the committee to create an issue" (APC, March, 1976, 57).

Appendix 2 of this thesis lists, without discussion, all the areas of agreement and issues included in the report. It is no surprise that areas of agreement are few and relatively trivial, whereas issues are numerous and critical.

The report presented three decision options. The first option, written by MOT, was to decide to build a parallel runway at VIA. It recommended that

"1. The Ministry of Transport should proceed with the planning, design, and construction of a parallel runway at Vancouver International Airport.
2. All mitigational recommendations arising from the Airport Planning Committee studies, consistent with safe and efficient air transportation management and concurrent protection of the environment, should be incorporated into the proposed runway design, construction and future airport operational procedures.
3. A permanent consultative process on issues of airport-community concerns and relationships should be established" (APC, March, 1976, 78).

This decision option was supported by the Air Carriers, B.C. Aviation Council, DPW, and Richmond.

The second decision option, prepared by GVRD, proposed that the decision be postponed. In summary, its major recommendations were: 1. that federal authorities publicly commit themselves to co-operation with local authorities, particularly to action on the present noise climate, on resolving conflicts among environmental and urban objectives, and on establishing an inter-agency body (with public representation, and with
a limited life-span); 2. that the inter-agency body deal with noise abatement, impact on the Fraser estuary/delta, recreational use of Sea Island, the rate of air traffic growth, measures to make more efficient use of existing airport facilities, and related policy considerations (APC, March 1976, 86). This decision option was supported by Vancouver and MSUA.

The third decision option, prepared by CF, was for a decision not to proceed with the parallel runway now. Note that the distinction between decision options two and three is quite subtle. The second option is 'not to decide now;' the third option is 'to decide not to act now.' Specific recommendations of the third option were: 1. to implement and enforce effective procedures to monitor and regulate airport noise; 2. to take action on protection of the estuary, by declaring a moratorium and by developing a management policy; 3. to collect and use information on the APC process as a basis for further participation of this sort; 4. to develop public understanding through public hearings; and 5. to establish the often-mentioned ongoing consultative process. This option was not supported by any agencies other than CF.

DOE officially supported none of the three options, but the moratorium recommendations in the Summary Report of the Ecological Sub-Committee (APC, July, 1975b) indicated that they opposed the MOT option.

These three decision options were followed by final position statements by each member agency, emphasizing the points it felt were important in each decision option, and rebutting points it felt were unjustified. However no position statement
rebuts any other position statement; they are final comments.

3.4 After the Final Report

Throughout the APC process two points were made repeatedly concerning the period after the Final Report was released. First, there would be ample time for public discussion and review by all agencies before the Minister made his decision. Second, an ongoing, consultative body would be set up to deal with future airport/community interactions. The exact form of this body was never specified, but the principle of its existence was often reaffirmed (for example, at the Tri-Level meeting, Nov. 14, 1974).

With the release of the Final Report, the Minister of Transport, in a press release dated March 12, 1976 invited public comment

"relating to the proposal to construct a runway that extends onto the Sea Island foreshore, but more particularly because he views it as a better solution, he would like comments to concentrate on a relatively recent proposal . . . for a shorter runway within the Sea Island dyke" (Press Release No. 32/76).

The shorter runway, of course, was specifically excluded from APC analysis on July 31, 1975, so the Final Report said nothing of it. The opinion that it was a "better proposal" was attacked as prejudging an issue that should be subjected to full study, preferably by a body comparable to the APC. Subsequently, on April 6, 1976, MOT announced that the short runway would be studied under EARP.

In an interview with CF on May 15, 1976, the Minister of Transport suggested pre-loading (spreading of fill material) of
the proposed runway before the decision had been made to build it, because this would cost little and would save time and money should the decision be made to go ahead. This, combined with a prior announcement by MOT on March 24, 1976 that they were proceeding with the planning of a second terminal building, raised the deepest suspicions of their critics that the decision had been made to proceed, but was simply not being announced. This belief was reinforced on Nov. 5, 1976, when a call for tender for a massive dredging operation was published in the paper.

The indications were that MOT, having failed to achieve the result it desired through the APC process, was going to implement it in small, but irreversible steps, behind the scenes, and without any public participation. The momentum behind the decision to expand was gathering again.

As this is being written, in March, 1977, there is still no clear evidence. Certainly there is no evidence at all to indicate that the runway has been abandoned, or that a new process involving the public is about to begin. There is circumstantial evidence that the decision to build is being made in incremental steps. The EARP committee has been meeting, but none of its results are public. This, however, is for another thesis.
CHAPTER 4: EVALUATION OF THE AIRPORT PLANNING PROCESS

This chapter applies the criteria developed in Chapter 2 to the process described in Chapter 3. The criteria discussed below are in the same order as presented in Chapter 2. The evaluation directly covers what happened, with little interpretation of how and why these events happened. The latter is the subject of Chapter 5.

4.1 Opportunity to Participate

1) All affected interests can participate

Prior to the establishment of the APC all affected interests did not have an opportunity to participate in airport planning. There were two public hearings on the issue of expropriation, but these were in reaction to a decision within MOT to use that land for airport facilities regardless of specific developments. Citizens were not encouraged to par-take in the planning of the use of that land, just as they had no part in the decision to expropriate. Presumably MOT planned to conduct their planning in-house, with referrals to other agencies, as described in Chapter 3.1, and an environmental study as announced in the press release of Feb. 21, 1973 (see Appendix 1).

The initiative of GVRD to establish the APC with direct citizen participation did allow all affected interests to be involved. Invitations were sent to 139 local organizations regarding the initial CF meeting, Nov. 8, 1973. Of these 38 have maintained either interest or involvement with CF through-
out the process. Many who lost interest were in more distant parts of the region, not directly affected.

Others seem to have different positions from that which CF developed, for example, the Richmond Chamber of Commerce. A representative of the Richmond Chamber of Commerce attended some early meetings of the APC, in fact, but this representation did not continue. The reasons for this are not certain, but it appears that the organization lost interest, or felt that others were presenting its views at the APC. It was, in any case, not forced to withdraw.

The CF represented a wide range of community opinion, but it was not fully representative of all of the community. The three CF members on the APC in theory represented three community views: Vancouver opinion, Richmond opinion (both especially concerned with noise), and environmentalist opinion. Because there was no way to measure the relative importance of these, or other, opinions, the APC was explicitly a non-voting committee with flexible membership. This appears to have been a disappointment to MOT, who wished a voting committee with one member from each agency and four from MOT.

MOT also appear to have been disappointed in not supplying the chairmen for all of the sub-committees, as is the tradition in the civil service. They did not have adequate or appropriate manpower to do this, and lost considerable control over the process as a result. Their other actions, plus unwritten comments at the time of the selection of chairmen, indicate that MOT wanted this control.
After the Final Report, citizens have not had an opportunity to participate in the planning process. Numerous assurances have been given by politicians that they will be involved in any future investigation of the issue which might precede a political decision, but the state of such an investigation is unclear.

In summary the opportunity to participate was not provided before the APC. The APC considerably improved the planning process by greatly increasing the number of interests participating. It is uncertain whether all community interests were represented by the CF. Some, such as Chambers of Commerce may have been effectively precluded by the position developed by the CF during the process.

2) Opportunity from the earliest stages.

Discussion of the first criterion has already indicated that there was not satisfactory participation before the APC was established. During the APC process opportunity was provided, with the public representatives having an equal voice with all other members of the APC. Although the original plan was for CF to have observers but no working members on sub-committees, this was changed to allow citizen representatives full active membership (see Appendix 1, July 5, 1973, and Dec. 13, 1973).

After the APC, of course, no opportunity has yet been provided to participate in the study of the new proposal for a 9,250 foot runway.
4.2 Information System

1) Interested citizen made aware.

During the APC process several information channels were maintained. Most important was the creation of CF, which was stimulated and organized by GVRD. Once organized it was the steering committee of CF which was active, but a number of public meetings were held as the process continued. CF also distributed a newsletter at irregular intervals.

GVRD undertook to publish the APC News with the full support of the APC. Only three of these were ever completed, however. GVRD also released its Position Paper for public comment, causing the controversy discussed in Section 3.32.

MOT, at the suggestion of the APC, opened a 24 hour telephone line for noise complaints in April 1974. Their information pamphlet, Sorry About the Noise, was distributed, in part, with responses to complaints received on this line. This was, as discussed previously, highly criticized by APC members as a propaganda ploy.

During the APC process an Ad-Hoc Information Sub-Committee was established to deal with the problems of distributing APC supporting documents to interested members of the public. The outcome of this consideration was the establishment of the APC Information Centre at the old (south) airport terminal building. The existence of this centre, which held copies of published studies plus numerous one-of-a-kind documents, was advertised in local papers.

All sub-committee reports were published in the period January to July 1975.
The Final Report was published in March 1976, and was distributed to an initial mailing list. Remaining copies were to be sold for $7. CF gave all its copies away and requested more copies from MOT for continued free distribution. MOT refused to release the copies, stating that they could still be purchased at the airport.

"Regarding the 123 copies earmarked 'Ad Hoc Request (Free),' I have strictly observed the intent of the APC in releasing these copies. That is they have been given only on request to news media, to libraries and to universities and colleges which either were omitted from the original list or which requested an additional copy for a specific department or purpose" (Hosgood to Watchorn, Oct. 29, 1976).

After the report was released, Vancouver held a public meeting (April 6) at which the issues were discussed. GVRD had planned one for early fall, but cancelled this when the Minister announced that construction would not start before 1978 in any case (in a press release, Aug. 12, 1976).

Evidently a number of active channels were used to alert the interested public, including public meetings, newsletters, a position paper, technical and summary reports, and information pamphlets. The major newspapers also gave extensive coverage of major conflicts in the APC. The extent and effect of these initiatives are not known. For example, CF has been criticized by other APC members for not holding enough public meetings, and losing touch with public opinion.

The quality of the information made available is discussed in the following criterion.

2) Technical information clear.

The clarity of information depends on two major factors,
the style of presentation, and the knowledge of the audience (transmission and reception).

The audience in this case could be taken to be the general public, APC members, other experts, or politicians. The first and last category have less specific knowledge, and require less technical information. APC members and other experts require more technical, but still comprehensible information. This is also true of public representatives on the APC who have received a forced and intensive training in air control technology and procedures, forecasting methods, economic analysis, noise measurement, ecological assessment, and so on. These members are no longer complete laymen. "If I've learned anything it is that the smoke surrounding technical issues is genuinely smoke. The technical issues are not that hard to understand" (Tyhurst, Mar. 3, 1977).

The reports produced by the APC meet the demands of both audiences. The sub-committee reports contain methodology, data, analyses and conclusions to allow the expert to follow the argument. Each of these reports is summarized in the APC Final Report, giving the outline of the argument, the conclusions, and the reaction and critique of each agency to the report. The last is important, for it emphasizes the assumptions, underlying values, and limitations of each report.

The clarity of transmission is also satisfactory in most cases. Some reports had to be redrafted for stylistic reasons (eg. Alternative Airport Site Studies, APC, April 1975), and are (if not elegant prose) at least intelligible.
Another aspect of clarity concerns the content of the message rather than the style of presentation. Does the information produced explain what the effects of the proposal will be, for various relevant audiences? From this point of view the APC results show some failures.

Risks and uncertainties are explained in most of the reports, particularly the ecological studies and the forecasts. It is perhaps in the nature of these topics to identify doubts, for ecological systems are so complex that full information can never be achieved, and forecasts are necessarily based on assumptions which can be challenged.

The major failure in APC technical information is the lack of any kind of evaluation of costs, either monetary or intangible. The economic study which was done did not include costs of expansion, either the costs of airport facilities, or the costs of increased services (e.g. ground transport facilities) demanded throughout the region. Neither did it consider social costs such as stress from noise, or changed property values, or other indirect effects. It was not a cost benefit analysis in any sense (and did not claim to be).

There is therefore a gap in the usefulness of the information produced for the interested public. The likely impacts on any given citizen are made much clearer by the reports than they would be without them because numerous consequences were identified which are not intuitively obvious (such as the effects of dredging and fill on salmon population). However the magnitude of these impacts is not always clear (for example the effects of noise on property values), and the costs of
alternative solutions are not discussed at all. Without this information the citizen cannot determine which course of action is most preferable from his point of view.

3) Discussion of values

Basic value differences underlay the whole APC process. It is worth repeating the analysis of the editor of the Final Report - not himself an official member of the APC and not aligned with any agency - as to what these values were.

"The first view . . . was that the problem before APC was to determine what adverse effects, if any, the proposed parallel runway would have on the surrounding communities and the region in general; and what mitigating action would have to be taken to make the runway compatible. . . . This will be referred to as the 'proposed expansion' view of the problem.

The second view . . . was that the problem before the APC was to assess the need for expanding the capacity of air facilities in the Lower Mainland, to determine the alternative forms such expansion might take if it is needed and to select the alternatives which are compatible with regional objectives . . . This will be referred to as the 'regional' view of the problem.

. . . the first focuses directly on the 'compatibility' of the parallel runway at VIA, the second is concerned with the more general question of the need for, and likely impact of, any expansion or air facilities in the Lower Mainland.

. . . A study program which would produce enough information to meet the requirements of the 'regional' view would be more than adequate to cover the needs of the 'proposed expansion' view. Thus despite the measure of accommodation reached during the development of the study design, the two perceptions of the problem persisted.

The Community Forum view of the problem underwent further development after the study design was accepted by the APC. . . . In their view questions of the need to constrain all aspects of growth, of which the proposed expansion of VIA was only an example, should be taken into account by the committee towards the develop-
ment of a 'conserver' society. For convenience this will be referred to as the 'conservation' view of the problem. . . . The difficulties were by no means as clear to the committee while the APC was conducting its studies as they may now appear in retrospect" (APC, March, 1976, 9-10).

Discussion of the wider values (regional and conservation views) was often frustrated by MOT's insistence on restricting business to the proposed expansion view. The unsuccessful attempts to decide matters by vote, instead of by consensus with minority report was another aspect of the stifling of discussion on values. A third aspect was the resistance and manipulation of sub-committee reports with dissenting sections (Forecasting, Jan. 1975, and Alternative Sites, April 1975). A fourth aspect was the attempted elimination of the specific section on Issues and Areas of Agreement.

Underlying the narrow interpretation of MOT and its allies on the question of values was a basic disagreement on the objectives of the APC itself. MOT's position, which was completely logical from their point of view, was that the decision to build the runway was a perfectly legitimate one but which needed modification because of its impacts. Opponents of MOT believed the purpose of the APC was more general; it was to investigate alternative solutions to the problem of growing demand. MOT did not believe that the wider solutions were relevant to what they perceived to be the problem at hand. This difference of opinion is a major theme in the discussion in Chapter 5.

4) Real debate and dialogue.

All members of the APC had an equal voice in its business
and in its decisions (or disagreements). Most procedural debates took place in the APC itself, while most substantive debates took place on the sub-committee level. An example of the latter is the debate over the appropriate noise indicator, and the design of the noise study. Noise Exposure Forecasts were considered too arbitrary to describe actual conditions and actual impact on people. They were searchingly critiqued by members of the Noise Sub-Committee. As discussed above, the response of MOT to this critique - attempting to sign the noise study contract without APC approval of its form - led to one of the serious crises in the process.

A second example of such debate was the Annex to the Forecasting Report (APC, Jan. 1975) which offered an extensive critique of the forecasting assumptions and methods being used. This Annex was first distributed as an agency comment, not an opposing view within the sub-committee. In both of these cases attempts were made to stifle the debate. This resulted from the basic disagreement about the function of the APC. This disagreement led to many lengthy arguments (instead of debates) in the APC and its sub-committees, and led members to manoeuvre for position instead of debating the merits of the issues.

CF and GVRD were particularly persistent in their questioning of assumptions, though they were not always successful in having them analyzed. It was important that they (and all other agencies) were equally involved in drafting the study design and the terms of reference for each study. Without this par-
ticipation much of the debate that did occur would have been frustrated.

In summary, effective debate proved very difficult because agencies disagreed on the basic function of the APC.

5) Full disclosure from earliest stages.

It is not necessary to detail this topic again, but it is clear that there were major failings on this criterion in the airport planning process. The statement of the Hearing Officer (Jan. 20, 1973) regarding retention of data by MOT is the first example. GVRD's threatened withholding of demographic data is another.

The data on forecasting and the demand/capacity analysis of the airport, vital pieces of information for MOT's desire to expand in the first place, were the most critical examples. The forecasting data were not supplied till Jan. 14, 1974, could not be discussed with MOT before May 9, 1974, and were judged incomplete at that time. Some of this data existed but was not made available for a long period of time; some of it did not exist and had to be generated.

In the same period, April 18, 1974, MOT stated that they were now ready to begin documenting the case for the new runway. Logically, one and a half years after the notice to expropriate had been issued was rather late to begin to document the need for the parallel runway which made the expropriation necessary in the first place.

In summary, some information required for planning purposes was withheld when required for some other purposes.
information was not generated when required (see criterion seven).

6) **Alternatives express full range of values.**

Without doubt this was a major failure of the APC process. MOT consistently refused to consider policy modifications which would take into account the values of GVRD and CF. Only after the studies were complete did they propose the short runway alternative, which they perceived (incorrectly) as expressing the values of DOE. Alternative sites to VIA were considered in the Airports System Report (APC, April 1975), but the methodology on which other sites were compared to VIA and rejected is questionable, and was unacceptable to CF, GVRD, and DOE. Doubt lingers about alternative sites, although it is likely that no politically feasible or technically superior site is available (Roberts, Mar. 9, 1977). Assumptions made in the study (that there would be no major shift in the role of VIA) precluded a clear assessment of opposing values on the matter of airport sites.

The alternatives that were considered were concepts one, two, and three. A study which truly expressed opposing values would have also studied the shorter runway (within the dyke) proposal, the possibility of building no runway at all (meeting demand through policy adjustments), and the possible use of another airport site. The last, if it were to be eliminated from consideration, would have to be done on the basis of a study which did not prejudge that issue by its assumptions and methodology. Furthermore, all these alternatives would have
had to be studied from the beginning, not inserted later in the process.

By the end of the APC process the number of alternatives had been reduced to one, a 10,600 foot runway requiring about 30 acres of fill in the estuary. For the actors, for the public, for the politicians this is a yes/no position which does not allow for resolution of conflicts. A take-it-or-leave-it proposition can only be expected to polarize opinion, and it certainly has. Final attempts at reconciliation are probably responsible for the shift, in the decision options, away from the action itself, to the time at which it should be decided. MOT wants the decision to be yes, now. GVRD wants no decision now (with other action first - especially noise abatement). CF wants a decision no, now (but with options for new proposals to be studied in future). These are only alternatives in a peculiar sense of the word, one step removed from the real problem at hand, which is to manage in one way or another the demand for air services.

In summary a critical failing of the APC process has been its lack of alternatives. It has stemmed from a fundamental difference within the APC about the role of the committee.

7) Necessary data when needed

Information relevant to this criterion has been discussed under 'full disclosure,' above. The questionable value of the forecasting data, and the late production of the demand/capacity analysis indicate failure to satisfy the criterion.
The forecasts and demand/capacity analysis were required as basic inputs to the work of the APC in general. Also important in this criterion are data relevant to specific alternatives. Since only one proposal was extensively studied, this is a moot point.

8) Decisions and rationale known.

Officially the decision on the parallel runway has not been made. However dredging and terminal expansion planning, which may or may not be connected with runway construction, are underway. Furthermore, the EARP studies on the short runway proposal are maintaining a very low profile. There are, therefore, legitimate suspicions that the runway issue has effectively (if not explicitly) been decided.

However, air traffic demand is not growing as expected. In March 1977 CP Air, one of the major airlines at VIA, announced plans to sell five of their aircraft. Also the federal government is attempting to restrain its spending in order to reduce inflation. It is possible, therefore, that the proposal has been quietly dropped.

At this stage the status of the decision is not known. This may soon change, but at this time the criterion has not been met.

4.3 Time

1) Sufficient time will be available

It is not possible to tell exactly how much time of the three years of APC business was lost through procedural wrangles and how much was legitimately required simply to conduct
adequate studies. For the most part, once study terms of reference had been established, the sub-committee proceeded with the studies while the wrangles occurred in the APC itself. The business of the sub-committees was over by June 1975, after which nine months of APC activity were still required to produce the Final Report. Clearly most of this time was spent in disagreements about procedure, especially in the development of the section on areas of agreement and issues.

MOT was genuinely surprised and shocked at the assumptions other members insisted on questioning, and the expansion of studies that this made necessary. MOT's initial restricted view of the scope of the APC, and their unfamiliarity with the complexity of studies to be made, probably explains the first deadlines, which turned out to be inadequate. Unfortunately for all these deadlines contributed to the loss of trust which made the whole process so difficult.

The three years which eventually were allotted to the APC do seem to be sufficient for the studies required. However the basic disagreement on the scope of the APC led to a series of short term deadlines which aggravated difficulties in the committee, and prevented it to some extent from effectively using the time available.

Time is discussed further in section 5.11.

4.4 Bargaining Opportunity

1) Procedures for resolution of differences.

Early in the APC process it was decided that decisions were not to be taken by votes, because it was not possible to
judge the relative importance of each of the interests represented. There is no apparent alternative here, for none of the members of the APC were elected and the importance of their interests could not be compared. However the lack of a voting procedure was seen as a major flaw in the process by MOT, DPW, Richmond, and the B.C. Aviation Council (APC, March, 1976, 70). These agencies felt that the result of the consensus method was to stress minority views disproportionately. While this view does express a legitimate concern, it also begs the question of how to determine which views are, in fact, minority views. It could not be done within the APC itself.

This formal procedure for taking a decision is not the only aspect of the resolution of differences. There is also the modifying of position through bargaining, compromise, or - in the words of the CF - accommodation.

When MOT wrote decision option one in June 1975 it became apparent that they had modified their proposal from an 11,000 foot runway to a 10,600 foot runway. Shortly afterward they attempted to introduce a 9,250 foot runway proposal, but were rebuffed. These are clearly attempts to compromise, especially with DOE who were concerned with the effect of fill on the estuary. The first compromise was accepted (for study purposes) as a modification of the original proposals. The second was felt to embody a new set of values which had not been considered, so was rejected. The problem was in the timing of the proposal. MOT seemed willing to compromise only after it became clear that they were facing very substantial, organized opposition. Little compromise was allowed for in their original position.
Had the short runway proposal been studied from the beginning it would have allowed comparison of the values it represented, and some information for trading these off with other alternatives.

There is yet another aspect to the question of bargaining. MOT consistently refused to consider alternative policy measures, desired especially by GVRD, which would have "made better use of existing facilities." In doing so they reduced their own opportunity to bargain, and effectively precluded the possibility of reaching an agreement. Vancouver, GVRD, and Richmond all had great interest in reducing noise, but MOT continually refused to commit themselves to the noise mitigation measures which were proposed. A major example of this was the desire of the municipalities to phase out the crosswind runway except for emergency situations. MOT let it be understood that this was possible, but refused to commit themselves to it, or to commit themselves to studying it. This rigidity of policy, the narrow interpretation of the scope of the APC, left all members with a non-negotiable position, because all the negotiable items were removed from the table.

However, MOT's position was consistent throughout the process. They felt that consideration of these wider policies was outside the terms of reference of the APC. The difference between this position and those of other agencies, GVRD and CF in particular, could apparently only be resolved by reference to a higher authority. This higher authority existed in
the form of the Tri-Level Political Committee. However to have unequivocally clarified the intent of the terms of reference at the beginning of the process would probably have prevented the formation of the APC in the first place. Some ambiguity was necessary in order to bring the parties to the table.

The vagueness of the terms of reference is further discussed in Chapter 5, as is the role of bargaining. The major point to be developed is that although there was no bargaining in the APC, it should not occur there in any case, but should provide information for bargaining in another sphere.

4.5 **Efficacy**

1) **Participants' efforts of value**

While the process was underway there was considerable doubt among members as to the value of the exercise. CF threatened to withdraw twice, and carried out the threat once. They were tempted to withdraw at many other points, however, and did not do so because the issue was not pointed enough to report to the public. GVRD individual participants often felt like withdrawing because no progress was apparent. MOT often showed that it wanted to wrap the process up as quickly as possible. These attitudes were all part of the general loss of faith among the participants which was brought about by rigidity of position and profound differences in values.

All members did perservere, however, and now point to several positive results of the exercise. First, the most environmentally damaging concepts have been dropped. Therefore, whether the final decision is to build or not to build, environ-
mental matters will still have made a significant impact. It may be that environmental values generally have received added power in decision-making. Second, the decision has been delayed. This is of advantage to those who are conducting further studies (particularly DOE), and to MOT because demand has not grown as was predicted at the time of the first steps, the expropriations and establishment of the APC. The runway may still be built, but not so far in advance and with as much surplus capacity as would otherwise have occurred.

Third, there has been a great educational advantage for the members personally, for the public generally, and for the experts in the field. Airport/community conflicts have erupted across Canada (especially Pickering and Mirabel) and in other countries. In few of these cases have there been studies attempted which have actually broken new ground in the information and techniques of resolving them. Public enquiries, such as occurred at Pickering, do not build on the level of knowledge of those who participate, do not progressively educate citizens or administrators. The APC did this, and is therefore a uniquely valuable experiment to some of its members.

MOT has now established a small research office in Ottawa which is investigating some of the policy alternatives which GVRD emphasized so consistently. It is directed by a former member of the APC. This office indicates the educational accomplishments of the APC.

The lack of assessment of alternatives was earlier identified as a major failure of the APC. The studies produced identify many of the relevant issues, but do not compare
solutions. The studies in themselves do not allow politicians to make a decision. The necessity for further study of the short runway proposal is an indication of this.

Therefore it seems that the APC was not as effective as it might have been. A great deal was achieved considering the initial momentum for a quick decision to go ahead, but the process could have been more effective than it in fact was.

4.6 Efficiency

1) Normal functioning unhampered.

Evidence exists to show that the APC did in fact, compete with other activities of some agencies. For example, on Aug. 1, 1974, Vancouver announced that it had not the resources to provide a chairman for the Noise Sub-Committee. Three weeks later, on Aug. 22, 1974 GVRD announced that it had to restrict its participation in the APC (by relinquishing chairmanship of the PRMD Sub-Committee in particular), because of the priority of its major planning program, the Livable Region. The conflict in these cases was resolved by giving the APC a lower priority than normal functions.

In the case of DOE normal functions were altered, but perhaps not hampered. DOE began to focus its activities on a particular problem area, the Fraser estuary/delta, in a new way. It was this focussing which led to the recommendation of a moratorium and estuary/delta management policy that so upset MOT.

MOT's normal airport operations were not hampered, but certainly plans for routine expansion were, necessarily of
course. MOT also assumed most of the secretarial and support duties for the APC, but there is no indication either way on whether or not this overloaded their system.

In general, the APC caused some minor hindrances to normal operations, but because special funds were provided for APC business, these effects were not severe.

2) **Cost not outrageous**

From June 1973 to May 1975 the direct funding of the APC was $1,355,000. Of this MOT spent $760,000, DOE spent $470,000, and MSUA spent $125,000 (APC, March 1976, 13). The MSUA funds were used to support GVRD and CF participation. These figures, however, do not include the value of staff time for attendance at meetings, so the actual cost of the APC is much higher.

The APC met for three years, and failed to reach a decision, or to present studies that in themselves allowed politicians to make a decision. Therefore from the point of view of those who expected a decision, the cost would seem to be outrageous.

There is, however, another level to this argument. In the opinion of most of the actors substantial benefits were achieved. The most environmentally damaging concepts have been dropped; substantial new research has been done; alternative policies to expansion are now being seriously considered in MOT planning, and so on. These benefits are of very high value to the agencies involved. The cost of not participating, and therefore not achieving these benefits, would have been very
great. In addition the estimated cost of the expansion in 1971 prices was approximately $100 million (Stead, Feb. 28, 1977). This cost has inflated, perhaps doubled. The expenditure of $2 million on studies is less than 2% of the projected total cost. From this point of view then, the cost of the APC was not outrageous.

Probably no evaluation of this criterion can be definitive. However, in summary the cost was not outrageous in comparison with the alternative of no participation. It was outrageous in terms of what a well-designed and implemented process could have produced.

4.7 Summary

The APC process met the various criteria in different degrees. For the most part all affected interests could participate and the interested citizen was made aware. Although frustrations were common, the value of the efforts of participation can also be seen. Values were discussed and real debate took place at times, but they were hampered by differing interpretations of the role of the APC. Valuable technical information was released, but it lacked assessment of alternatives and costs. Overall enough time was provided, but only by allowing deadlines to slip several times. The disruption to normal functioning appeared to be minor. The cost of the process was not outrageous considering the benefits gained, but great room for improvement existed.

The process was not established before commitments were taken, so the opportunity to participate came later than would
be desired. There were problems both in withholding information and in not generating new information in time. There is doubt now about the status of the decision on the runway issue.

The major deficiencies of the APC process related to the lack of alternatives expressing the full range of values which should have been assessed. The underlying factor was a disagreement on the implications of the APC's terms of reference. These points are discussed in detail in Chapter 5.
CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION OF THE COMMITTEE PROCESS AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION

This chapter picks up some of the more important and more interesting threads of the discussion to this point, and develops them further. The first section addresses two basic questions: 1) What fundamental characteristics of the process shaped, or perhaps determined, the outcome? 2) Was the APC process a failure? Most of the ideas expressed in this section arose in interviews with APC members. The discussions are more in the nature of hypotheses than proof.

The second section returns specifically to the theme of public participation. Several problems arose in the APC process which prompt a re-appraisal of the theory discussed in Chapter 2. An assessment of the contributions of the public to the APC is presented, and some implications for future public participation programs are explored.

5.1 Interpretation of the APC Process

The proper title for this section is: What Really Happened? In exploring this theme it is worthwhile to keep in mind a number of background conditions.

In the most general context MOT seems to have been caught in a change of social values that was unpredicted and apparently unmanageable. The protest movements of the sixties led both to the environmental awareness of the seventies and to the creation of ad hoc political action groups on a wide scale. In essence new values demanded their political enfranchisement. Ironically MOT had proposed a runway to be built on filled land
in the estuary, in order to reduce the noise impact, at the same time as the new environmental concerns were achieving political power. The airport expansion issue became a test case for both the new environmental values and the new political philosophy. It was in these senses that it was experimental.

Several aspects of the committee structure deserve re-statement. [Many of these thoughts originate with Stead and Roberts]. First, membership was the widest possible including direct citizen involvement in planning. This certainly was experimental. Second, the committee itself determined its direction (studies), and its limitations. These were not decreed by any higher authority. Third, the committee was not provided with a separate staff or with powers to force compliance. Its official position was advisory. Fourth, funding was explicitly provided for the preparation of opposing cases. This again, was experimental and controversial. Fifth, the committee operated by consensus and dissent rather than by voting. Sixth, the committee itself, not the developer, made recommendations to the political decision-makers.

Comments on the role of MOT also deserve emphasis. MOT is criticized in this paper for many failures. Several reasons for this are apparent. First, MOT had more resources than any other agency, and had almost all the technical aviation expertise on the committee. Second, it was responsible for letting contracts and for secretarial support of the APC, including minutes. Third, MOT had a single objective, whereas opponents of their views had diverse, even confused objectives (Stead,
Jan. 23, 1977). Thus, MOT had both more potential for manipulating the process, and more opportunity to make errors.

5.11 Basic Characteristics of the Process.

Trust. The lack of trust among members of the APC has been mentioned numerous times above. It is probably the single most distinctive characteristic of the process. There were two major aspects to this distrust (Roberts, Mar. 9, 1977). First, all information had to be in writing and tabled at the APC before it legitimately became APC business. CF in particular insisted on this strategy, to the point of refusing to give or receive information over the phone. This policy, of course, delayed APC business. Second, all official and expert information was doubted, and calls were made for independent verification of all figures. Part of this is the asking of naive questions, but, as discussed above, judgement and some measure of trust was required to keep the process moving.

Related to this point is the observation that the critical citizen will distrust technical information translated into the common language by experts, but will be likely to believe the same information if a public representative is involved in the translation (Stead, Feb. 28, 1977).

Distrust in the APC did not form from the air itself. It had specific, identifiable sources. The most obvious was the confrontation over expropriation which preceded, which in fact caused the APC. It was handled with a singular lack of finesse by MOT, a heavy-handed style that local residents see as completely typical of the insensitivity of federal departments
whose eyes, ears, and decision powers are all concentrated in Ottawa, 2,500 miles away. Both the public and other agencies entered the process with doubts about how their inputs were to be used. Because of the other characteristics to be discussed below this initial suspicion was never overcome.

Another aspect to the problem of trust is the difference in value systems. For those who ate, slept, lived, and dreamed aviation it was inconceivable that their motives and their expertise would be seriously challenged. It tended to be interpreted as an attack on their integrity, as arguing in bad faith. When such 'unreasonable' attacks continued, all sides were pushed toward manipulation of the process, which reinforced the original problem.

All problems in the process tended to reinforce distrust, which in turn reinforced the problems. This is true for time constraints, availability of information, and willingness to admit errors or to modify positions. After a time no one could have the benefit of the doubt on any of these problems, particularly MOT.

**Personality.** There is no doubt that personalities played a large role in the APC. Possibly the greatest costs of the whole process were personal ones, as individuals were worn down by the constant fighting and tension in meetings. The greatest problem personalities were the first chairman of the APC, and the most active representative of the CF. The personality clash between them was total and monumental.

The chairman was an old-style civil servant, expert in
his field, able to implement policies and operate programs. It is widely acknowledged by members of the committee, however, that he was not equipped by training or inclination to chair a committee in which there was conflict and radical differences in values.

The CF representative was exceedingly intelligent, and very comfortable in situations of conflict (he was a psychiatrist by training). He was also extremely suspicious of the power of the bureaucracy, and their tendency to accommodate with one another. He believed strongly in the adversary role in the search for truth.

Despite this pronounced personality conflict, and others, it is not the case that personalities determined the outcome of the APC. Personalities intensified the issues and the polarity of members, but did not cause them. The issues were there before the individuals; in some cases they were built into the structure of the committee. If the process had been structured differently, these personalities would not have been stimulated to conflict.

The conflicts that came to be attributed to personality often had these other roots. For example, fundamental differences in values, and basic problems with the objectives of the committee fed personality conflicts, and were sustained by them. The following discussion of structural factors clarifies these points.

Time. There were two major problems related to time on the APC. An obvious one is the problem of deadlines. Unreal-
istic deadlines were often set (by MOT). They were unrealistic in several senses. First, they did not allow the studies to be properly sequenced and completed. For example, the engineering concepts which were submitted as proposals were not sufficiently detailed to allow environmental studies on their impact (Roberts, Mar. 9, 1977). The time taken to generate this information sparked distrust among the ecological experts (Romaine, Jan. 20, 1977). Then, insufficient time was allowed for the completion and integration of the ecological studies. Probably this originates in a lack of appreciation for the complexity and time-scale of ecological processes.

Second, the deadlines were unrealistic because they did not take into account the distribution of resources (man-days in particular) among agencies. MOT had several people full-time on airport expansion. Regional and municipal agencies, however, only had part-time or special consultant staff on the problem. They could not digest or produce information as quickly. Public representatives were even more constrained. They had full-time jobs elsewhere which absorbed most of their time and energy.

Third, they were unrealistic because they took no account of the time required for any group process to work (Cooley, Mar. 11, 1977). Time to be spent in discussion, in circulation, in revision, was consistently underestimated. Circulation was a particular problem for DOE, which is an agglomeration of the many government bodies dealing with environmental matters. Integration of these bodies is still
loose (Roberts, Mar. 9, 1977).

In general the deadlines were unrealistic because nobody, and particularly MOT, had any real idea of the difficulty and scope of the experiment undertaken (Roberts, Mar. 9, 1977).

The second major aspect of time was not the deadlines, but the time at which the APC got underway. By this time many agencies had taken public positions of the airport issue, positions which were fairly rigid and from which retreat was difficult (Stead, Feb. 25, 1977). MOT in particular, through continuation of expropriation proceedings, was committed to expansion.

**Chairmanship.** The very party that was most distrusted, that had the most to win or lose, MOT, supplied the chairman. This fact alone led to an untenable conflict within the individual. On the one hand he was an MOT employee, under pressure from his superiors to get the job done; on the other hand he was chairing a diverse, conflicting, and forceful committee, a role which required flexibility and diplomacy. In the conflict the former role tended to dominate. However, even the most impartial chairman would not have had the benefit of the doubt if he had been supplied by MOT (Cooley, Mar. 11, 1977). He would be, and was, in an inherently weak position where he could not intervene without appearing to be partisan (Roberts, Mar. 9, 1977).

At least one participant believes that the question of the chairmanship is not quite to the point.
"MOT was able to insist on an MOT chairman. In this, they were following civil service tradition, but this tradition assumes that issues will be settled on the merits and that therefore the chairman will be neutral but have enough interest to drive things to a conclusion. ... With policy-oriented officials this works, or at least used to. With tunnel-vision technocrats, it does not. They have no understanding or appreciation of points of view other than their own" (Stead, Jan. 23, 1977).

This argument is examined in detail below.

**Voting and Adversaries.** Without a means of measuring the relative importance of each view represented it was not possible to decide by vote in the APC. Even had such voting been possible, many members would have opposed its use. The object of the APC was to flush out the facts, and a non-voting procedure forces the articulation of opposing positions (Pickstone, Mar. 8, 1977). Voting would have closed many issues with no recourse for the losing position to have their views expressed (Romaine, Mar. 8, 1977).

The necessity to proceed by consensus, however, did slow committee progress. It was suggested that procedural matters could have been decided by vote, and substantive matters by consensus (Roberts, Mar. 9, 1977). However one can only agree to accept or change matters of procedure if there is mutual trust in the committee, which there was not (Cooley, Mar. 11, 1977).

All matters were decided by consensus, with dissenting comments being appended to reports. This method placed even greater responsibility and strain on the chairman, who was in a poor position to handle it. It was especially difficult
because CF believed in an adversary system such as is used in parliament and the courts. They believed that a fundamental adversary relationship existed between industry and the public (Tyhurst, Mar. 3, 1977). The adversary relationship works because it is governed by the rules of order and good faith (Tyhurst, Mar. 3, 1977).

However, good faith was apparently lacking in this process, and rules of order which were applied (legal and parliamentary) are inappropriate to the administrative function. It is possible to reach a fair and just decision without following such strict procedure, through bargaining. The strict rules of order serve situations in which grounds for agreement cannot be found among interested parties. But this is clearly a value position, and a position which CF profoundly suspects. Bargaining, or "accommodation among bureaucrats" is basically rejected by them.

Policy Rigidity. The narrow scope of policies and alternatives which MOT considered within the terms of reference of the APC has been discussed above. Throughout the process mitigation measures had to be dug out by other members; they were not suggested by MOT (Pickstone, Mar. 8, 1977). That reluctance characterizes much of MOT's behaviour in the APC.

The refusal to consider policy alternatives was a fundamental error of MOT. They created a situation where compromise was impossible because of the issue they chose (Tyhurst, Mar. 3, 1977). In effect by their interpretation of their terms of reference, MOT defined away the very bar-
gaining items which could have led to an agreement. Because they were committed from the beginning to one policy - a runway in one of three positions - they created a situation of confrontation where they could only win or lose. Until late in the process they refused to modify this position. By the time they did modify their proposal, July 1975, it was too late for the APC to consider, and the opposition positions were also inflexible.

Bargaining requires that all parties have something to trade. For the most part other agencies had only their opposition to trade. This meant that a compromise was possible, but not a bargain. In a compromise each party will give up something they want; in a bargain each party will give up something in exchange for something else more important to them.

GVRD insisted throughout the process that they were not necessarily opposed to the runway, that they would accept it if the need were properly demonstrated, and if alternative policies to handle the demand for aviation were investigated. However, they had no other issue with which to trade with MOT; they were in a position to compromise only.

DOE was in a complicated position. The Ecological Subcommittee, which was dominated by DOE personnel, produced a report that gave up nothing substantial, that made no concessions on environment matters. Furthermore, DOE was not willing to bend in terms of the time frame until their information was assembled (Romaine, Mar. 8, 1977). However the regional staff of DOE, superior in the DOE hierarchy to their own APC representatives, were tacitly, perhaps actively involved in the
preparation of the short runway proposal in July 1975. DOE and MOT were both controlled by the same political body (the Federal Cabinet), and the compromising between them - whether attempted or real - was seen as a legitimate procedure. Other members of the APC, however, were not involved, and predictably reacted with outrage.

CF also had their opposition to compromise with, but they chose in the circumstances to tirelessly identify and pursue issues rather than to accommodate. Given MOT's position this was not a surprising reaction, but it did reinforce the polarity in the committee.

It is necessary to emphasize here that the purpose of bargaining is not to obscure different points of view or to arrive at a single proposal. Information should be generated on a number of alternatives embodying different values before decisions are taken. Bargaining requires this information input in order to be effective. In the APC case, few true alternatives were studied, so there was no comparative information which would allow bargaining to occur.

**Technocrats vs. Policy Advisors.** Behind MOT's reluctance to bargain are a number of factors related to the structure of the agencies involved in the APC.

A basic flaw in the committee was the choice of agency personnel to sit on it. MOT in particular chose technically oriented and trained people, operators and implementors of policy, but not people who were able to question policy. It was not even in their job description to question policy; policy was passed down from on high (Romaine, Mar. 8, 1977). In the following discussion this
type of person will be referred to as a 'technocrat'.

Sitting on the same committee with the technocrats were policy advisors, people specifically trained to consider policy and to trade-off conflicting values. The municipal agencies, GVRD in particular, had this type of representative. This fundamental difference made the outcome of the process structurally inevitable from the beginning (Roberts, Mar. 9, 1977).

Behind this problem lies another, the centralization of federal policy-making power in Ottawa. The local members of the APC were in close contact with their politicians (and with their public, see below). They could get quick guidance on policy matters. The federal members, however, were many steps removed from policy-making, and even more removed from their politicians. There was no flexibility in the hierarchy to allow policy questions to be quickly considered even if the MOT representatives had wished to. In fact later in the process one MOT representative did attempt to suggest some policy alternatives to his MOT superiors, but was rebuffed (Stead, Jan. 23, 1977). On these matters, the MOT representatives were on a short leash. They needed a policy advisor either on the APC or on call to the APC, but MOT did not to supply one (Roberts, Mar. 9, 1977).

There is a further aspect to this problem. While the MOT representatives were not free to question policy, it is an open question as to whether they could think policy. Perhaps it was not a matter of external constraints on MOT representa-
tives, but of internal pattern of thought (Stead, Feb. 25, 1977). MOT appears to have relatively few generally trained personnel; they are all technical people. If this is so there are two results (Stead, Feb. 25, 1977). First, there is greater pressure from the outside for inter-agency committees and public participation, because single-purpose decisions are being made. Second, there is less generalist manpower available within the Ministry to handle this demand. Conflict is inevitable.

**Municipal vs. Cabinet Governments.** Another problem in the process is the contrast between the principle of cabinet secrecy and of open government. The practice of secrecy tends to reach throughout the federal bureaucracy, instead of being confined to the cabinet. In local government

"there is no 'government' and 'opposition' in the Parliamentary sense and no Cabinet . . . The politicians are right on top of the people who want to feel involved. Thus there is no need for any kind of solidarity, nor for the secrecy that goes with it, and every reason for openness. . . . There remains some conflict of doctrine as between the two approaches which make parliamentary and municipal government somewhat uneasy partners" (Stead, Jan. 23, 1977).

The MOT representatives, operating from a tradition of secrecy, were particularly uncertain about the APC experiment. Although they repeatedly stated that the APC was an 'open planning process', their narrow position, their reticence with information, and their compromises with DOE outside the APC cast doubt on their interpretation of this concept.

**Summary.** All of these factors were interacting in a com-
plicated manner to maintain problems in the APC, and to pre-
vent a truly constructive interchange of views. Technocratic
vs. policy training, and secret vs. open government traditions,
led to rigid policy positions and a reluctance to bargain,
which accentuated the adversary stance of actors, which de-
creased trust, which accentuated personality problems, which
aggravated time problems, and so on.

The critical factor seems to be the inability of MOT to
bring policy alternatives into their position for discussion
or analysis. By restricting themselves to the single question
of the parallel runway they shut out the central problem which
others were pressing recognition of, that of managing the
demand for air traffic through policies made compatible to
other interests. The APC which MOT had in mind was not address-
ing the relevant need.

However, it was by no means clear to all the actors at
the beginning of the process what this relevant need was.
Only GVRD in the first months had a clear idea of the broader
points they wished to make. To make the points GVRD had to
accept an APC which was not structured to their liking, and
to use the runway issue as a demonstration case. Thus there
was game playing from the beginning, and the rules of the game
were unclear. As trust failed the game playing became more
active manipulation of the process on all sides.

5.12. Failure or Success. Because of the lack of trust
among participants, the high personal costs, and particularly
because of the lack of agreement and the lack of a decision, there is a strong tendency among participants to characterize the APC process as a failure. This tendency, however, is always qualified in interviews. Most participants, while stating how trying the process was, still affirm that it was successful.

Several of the accomplishments have been discussed above. It was an advance in the state of the art in several planning fields - particularly environmental studies, noise, and forecasting. The most environmentally damaging alternatives have been eliminated. Indeed environmental values in general have emerged stronger from the process. Alternative policies have been suggested and are now under study in MOT; they are no longer completely beyond the range of the conceivable. The delay of the decision has allowed better information to be gathered about demand growth rates, environmental matters, and others. It has precluded the building to overcapacity which MOT's original schedule involved.

The most important accomplishment, however, relates to information and options. Several participants stated that it was not necessary to produce a single answer from the APC process. Indeed the very success of the APC lies in its exposition of diverse views, its identification of issues and effects. Every party is now better equipped to state their case, and the politicians are better able to decide. Without the APC much of this information would not have been developed.

There is, however, another apparent failure of the process. It did not demonstrate the potential advantages of solving
problems through inter-agency committees, nor did it demonstrate the potential contributions of citizen participation. There is an understandable reluctance on the part of the federal agencies involved to re-activate the APC or any similar organization.

Public participation is not in and of itself a cure for stalemate or confrontation. In fact, as the APC process shows, it carries with it considerable danger when commitments have already been made. The solution for stalemate is to find some common ground for agreement. MOT was not able to discover this ground, so failed to meet their objectives. Further discussion of conflict resolution follows in section 5.2.

5.2 On Public Participation

5.2.1 The Role of Public Participation. One of the more important questions to be asked about the process is whether the presence of direct public representatives added anything to the process. If the APC had been strictly an inter-agency committee, would anything have been missed?

The answer is that the public definitely did make a contribution, though a controversial one. They saw their role as being that of asking naive questions, either questions to which the answers were assumed, or questions which had never been asked and to which there was no answer prepared. Because they were free of institutional restraints the public representatives could ask questions and pursue points which no agency could discuss.

An important aspect of this questioning was that it forced
agency representatives to broaden their scope of concern; it forced a certain amount of integration of study areas. Some of these areas tend to be missed in agency interaction for two reasons. First, one agency will be very reluctant to question in the accepted field of expertise of any other. Therefore critical assumptions go unchallenged. Second, some questions fall between the perceived boundaries of the agencies, and none will address them. There is a case in point here, for in the beginning DOE did not consider that the effects of noise on humans fell within their jurisdiction. Their inclination was to concern themselves solely with the natural environment, and explicitly not with the human environment. After a period of time DOE became involved in the noise studies.

In terms of specific substantial contributions to the final product, CF is responsible for Decision Option 3. In more general terms, it is responsible for the expression of the 'conservation' viewpoint, the basic questioning of the growth philosophy (Roberts, Mar. 9, 1977). This is a legitimate interest which would not otherwise have been expressed.

There is, of course, another side to public participation in this issue. The asking of naive questions can go on forever, it can become a means of obstruction rather than a means of forcing thought or of eliminating an alternative. The distinction is one of judgement, based on a certain degree of trust. One must believe that members are arguing in good faith, that they are arguing to learn and not arguing to win.
Such trust was almost completely lacking in the APC, and naivety thus became a weapon to prolong the process.

A second problem with public participation in this process was extreme doubt about the representativeness of the CF. Many members believe that it was a legitimate public group which was 'captured' by a particular activist interest, and which lost contact with the community at large. This does not mean that the views it came to express were invalid - they were not - but that these views received (in the opinion of some) disproportionate emphasis, and disproportionate power in shaping the planning process. This was particularly true because the most forceful individual on the entire committee was a CF representative. This problem is inherent in public participation, of course. It was one reason why the committee did not proceed by voting. But where it becomes extreme it tends to discredit the very idea of public participation among those who are doubtful of its potential value.

Related to representativeness is the problem of accountability. Representatives of the public did not have their jobs or livelihoods at stake, they had no obligation to produce a solution to the overriding problem of managing the demand for air travel, and they did not have to account for expenses of time and money. The last point does not refer to their internal finances, but to their option of calling for more studies and more complete information before decisions were taken. The constraints on information generation and analysis did not necessarily bind the CF. In the atmosphere of confrontation requests for studies which may have been legiti-
mate were interpreted as obstructionist. It is never possible
to generate perfect information, but CF would apparently not
be satisfied with loss.

In summary, the APC experience raised three dilemmas of
public participation: doubtful representativeness, no true
accountability, and conflict intensification.

5.22 Conclusions from the APC Experience. The three
dilemmas of public participation stated in the preceding para-
graph are precisely the criticisms which are often made of the
agency-public joint planning model introduced in Chapter 2.
The APC was an example of the joint planning approach in ac-
tion, and it demonstrated effectively the inherent flaw in
the model. In a condition of a great diversity of values,
consensus on a single issue is impossible to achieve in a
small group. The most that can be achieved is that the rele-
vant alternatives will be generated and analyzed, and that
positions on them will be expressed. This in itself is a very
important service to the decision-making process. Except for
the lack of true alternatives this is what actually happened
in the APC.

"In some situations participation is urged as
a way to reduce tension and resolve conflicts.
Underlying this emphasis are assumptions that
sharing points of view increases understanding and
tolerance and that the very process of involvement
weakens a tendency toward dogmatic assertions and
reduces personal biases and mistrust. Insofar as
conflicts rest upon misinformation [this may be so]
. . . . At the same time, the proposition that par-
ticipation leads to consensus would in most sit-
uations be of dubious validity. There is reason
to believe that in a nonhomogeneous community
increased participation will highlight differences
and increase conflict. Probably the proper question is whether a condition for consensus already exists — in which case participation may further its realization. But where a condition of diversity exists participation can contribute little to conflict resolution and may even increase conflict by creating confrontations and inducing polarization. Where a diversity of interests is clearly established, participation can contribute to conflict resolution only in highly structured situations with institutionalized procedures and a willingness to accept unacceptable decisions (as in litigation)" (Wengert, 1976, 26-27).

The actors in the APC expected more of the process. They felt that the problems could be resolved within the scope of the APC itself, whereas it soon became evident that it would be necessary to resolve them at the political level. Reference to the political level was necessary because the problems were confined to a single major issue involving value differences which accentuated conflict. When there is a sharp difference in values there must be multiple issues, and something to trade away on all sides, before bargaining can occur and conflicts can be resolved. This, and exactly this, is the role of the politician.

In the APC there was a confusion of duties: the generation of information and the achievement of consensus. The latter is a political act which was not possible because of the opposing interests involved. The confrontation in the APC could have been avoided if the diversity of values had been recognized early, and if the committee had committed itself to generating factual information only, on alternatives expressing each value position. Instead information was generated on a restricted range of alternatives, later reduced
to one only, and an attempt was made (or expected) to determine what the best course of action would be. This meant that facts themselves could not be agreed on. Uncertainties became critical points of disagreement because alternative policies were not examined.

Had alternatives been generated, each could have been assessed according to its impact on direct monetary cost, safety, noise, environmental damage, and other values. In this situation, where comparative knowledge is available, it is easier for actors to agree on the facts because at least the relative impact of each alternative can be determined. The uncertainty about absolute figures is not as important as when only one alternative is considered.

The role of public participation in such an analysis is to ensure that their interests are expressed in at least one alternative, and that the impacts on them are discussed with respect to each alternative examined. They are not placed in the position of single-handedly stopping the implementation of some threatened actions. Instead they ensure that their case is made before the political decision is made.

5.23 On Conflict. Underlying the conflict in the APC was a basic disagreement on what the objectives of the process were. This disagreement was stated as two issues in the Final Report.

"It is an issue whether or not, when considering a development such as the proposed expansion of VIA, it is necessary to provide for: i) A statement of underlying policies that determine development objectives; ii) An examination of these policies
in terms of their contemporary relevance and their application to the specific development under study; iii) An examination of alternative policies present or future" (APC, March 1976, 68).

"It is an issue whether or not the APC's terms of reference provide for the examination of existing policies of governments and their departments and for the consideration of alternative policies and the exploration of such alternatives" (APC, March 1976, 70).

The two issues are whether or not alternatives should be examined in general, and whether or not they were within the specific scope of the APC.

MOT found they had a problem (increasing demand for air services beyond the capacity of the VIA) and a solution (build a parallel runway). They expected the APC to tell them how to mitigate the effects of their solution. From GVRD's point of view there would be a problem if MOT growth forecasts were reasonable, and there were a number of possible solutions.

The job of the APC was to assess the need, and compare the alternatives.

The conflict which arose seemed out of proportion to the importance of the proposal being studied because more than the proposal was actually involved. Opponents to MOT were trying to express new values and to demonstrate that the existing planning process was not adequate to these values. They had to give public visibility to the process, through conflict, in order to make their wider point.

For many years prior to the APC MOT operated with a number of accepted procedures which appeared to satisfy the values of the day. Plans for the new runway existed and apparently caused no objection. Suddenly (to MOT at least), they were
caught in a change of values. New interests demanded expression, and they demanded such expression in new political forms. The APC was set up to deal with these interests and these political forms, and it became the scene of conflict.

Most of the conflict could have been avoided had alternatives which expressed the full range of values been examined. That is the ideal. Realistically however, the necessary alternatives could not be generated, precisely because it was not known what the full range of values was. The new values had to be demonstrated in a test case; they could not become part of the planning process through abstract argument only. To change attitudes, to challenge basic assumptions, to change existing procedures, conflict was necessary.

In future cases when new values are to be expressed this will continue to be the case. The issue will at first not be clear (except, perhaps, to a few); conflict will clarify it; resolution will come with the integration of the new values into the process. The conflict is very likely to be out of proportion to the proposal in dispute precisely because the proposal does not take into account all the relevant values. Situations of conflict such as the APC are not common, but are bound to reoccur in a changing society. Conflict is a legitimate (though unpleasant) outcome of a planning process which contains in itself very valuable information. What is important is that the information be received and incorporated into the planning process.
6.1 Public Participation

Some way must be found in the planning process to include the views of the public that is affected by a proposal in order to generate the necessary relevant alternatives. The public served an important function on the APC by asking naive questions, and by developing a third decision option and a third point of view.

The agency-public joint planning model has a basic flaw. Where participants in a small problem-solving group have diverse interests they cannot be expected to reach agreement. The necessary conditions for evaluation, bargaining, and decision, for the resolution of conflict, do not exist. Such a group would have to have either a relatively narrow range of value differences, or a wide scope for trading, in order to successfully agree.

Such a group can, however, serve a very important function in the decision-making process. It can and should identify the relevant alternatives and assess their impact. Bargaining and decision-making should not be expected of such a group.

The experience of the APC suggests that the general purpose representative and the pluralistic models may be more appropriate for public participation. However their limitations were not specifically examined in this thesis.

6.2 The APC

The APC was both a success and a failure. It succeeded in
opening a fairly closed, single-purpose planning process, and inserting into it a number of other values. It improved significantly the information available on the effects of airport expansion, especially in terms of forecasts, noise, and environmental impacts. Agencies, politicians, and the public at large understand the effects better than if the APC had not existed. Most importantly, the APC succeeded in expressing the full range of views on the issues which exist. All of this adds up to an important improvement in the information system.

The APC failed to assess the full range of alternatives. Although the range was mentioned it was not studied, and adequate comparative information was not generated. It also failed, unavoidably perhaps, to operate without distrust, so did not build confidence on the value of public participation. The distrust stemmed from the narrow policy interpretation which MOT placed on the APC, which rested on a fundamental difference of opinion as to the objectives of the process.

MOT has been much criticized in this thesis. The reader should remember, however, that it is not an inherent evil in the agency which caused problems, but an unfamiliarity with this kind of process, and a necessity to adjust to unfamiliar values and political philosophies.

6.3 The Future

If an inter-agency process such as the APC is to be established, ideally it should be instituted when an important problem is first perceived. It should be a co-operative effort to understand the implications of the problem and the full range of alternatives avail-
able to manage it. The process, then, should begin before positions become rigid, and should proceed to examine alternatives.

It should be explicitly understood from the beginning that the group is not expected to agree or decide.

Ideally the problem which is addressed should be appropriate to the need felt by the participants. Restriction of the issue to a subsidiary one creates frustration and confrontation. The agencies on the committee should provide members of approximately equal policy scope, so that one agency is not constantly talking in a wider sphere than another.

Without these agreements on the scope and objectives of the process it will not run smoothly, conflict is bound to arise.

Yet realistically such agreement cannot always be expected at the beginning of a process. Often the problem is not perceived until after inflexible positions are adopted. The scope of the alternatives may not be perceived until half way through a problem-solving process. In these cases conflict is inevitable and necessary in order to express the full range of values. If a repetition of the conflict in future is to be avoided, it is crucial that the new values expressed be incorporated visibly into the decision-making process. It will be easier to establish a small group which can operate with trust because it will be better known from the beginning what the relevant range of alternatives is.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Airport Planning Committee, 1973 to 1976, Minutes.
- Feb. 1974, Vancouver Area Airports-Study Design for the Airport Planning Committee.

Boyce, Helen, Nov. 18, 1975, letter to J. Sauve.


Canada - B.C. Okanagan Basic Agreement, March 1974, Public Involvement, Technical Supplement XI.

Chang, Ian, March 15, 1977, Interview.


_______, April 16, 1974, letter to I. Jones.

_______, Sept. 16, 1974, memorandum to GVRD Chairman.

_______, Nov. 19, 1975, letter to J. Roberts.

_______, March 11, 1977, Interview.


Farry G., Sept. 3, 1975, letter to J. Roberts.

Fawcett, Brian, Jan. 23, 1976, letter to D. Hosgood.


Hosgood, D.G., July 5, 1975, Proposals for the Processing (i.e. Review and Approval) of the APC Final Report.


LeBlanc, Romeo, Nov. 1, 1976, letter to E. Watchorn.


Ministry of Transport, November 1971, Vancouver International Airport -- Capacity/Demand Analysis for Selected Runway Configurations.

______, Oct. 27, 1972, An Analysis of the Vancouver International Airport Runway System, with Reference to the Requirement for a Parallel Runway 08L 26R.


______, March 27, 1974, Vancouver International Airport Master Planning Project.


______, January, 1975, Sorry About the Noise, 8 pp.


Neales W., March 6, 1975, letter to J. Tyhurst.

______, July 18, 1975, memorandum to the Airport Planning Committee, 1 p.


Pickstone, H., March 8, 1977, Interview.


______, March 9, 1977, Interview.

______, March 11, 1977, Interview.

Romaine, Mike, Jan. 22, 1976, letter to D. Hosgood.


______, March 8, 1977, Interview.

Smith, Darrel, Nov. 21, 1974, memorandum to the Airport Planning Committee.

______, March 31, 1977, Interview.

Starling, R., Nov. 14, 1975, letter to D. Hosgood.


______, March 2, 1977, Interview.


Tackaberry, Chuck, Jan. 20, 1975, letter to I. Jones.

Tri-Level Staff Committee, Nov. 14, 1974, Minutes.

Tyhurst, J. S., Jan. 18, 1977, Interview.


Vancouver Province, Nov. 5, 1976, MOT call for tender, p. 17a.


APPENDIX 1

Chronology of Events

This is a selection of events which emphasizes the procedural aspect of airport planning. In this section the events are set out, ratherly dryly, without any attempt to link them thematically, which is the object of section 3.3. Those for whom this data is not critical should omit this section.

3.31 Until March 1976

In most cases below the comments are those of the author. In a few cases they are those of the GVRD, in a document titled "Chronology of the Sea Island Airport Issue" (n.d.). Where this source is used the agency is identified.

Pre-1972. Plans for the expansion of VIA have existed in rough for more than 20 years. MOT has been acquiring land on Sea Island on the market throughout this period.


August and September 1972. MOT filed notice of intent to expropriate in the Burkeville and Cora-Brown-McDonald subdivisions on Sea Island.
Sept. 25, 1972. GVRD held a livability meeting with the Sea Island Community and Ratepayers Association. The Ratepayers asked that the GVRD send an expert witness to upcoming hearings in connection with the expropriation.

(from GVRD)

Oct. 27, 1972. A second MOT report (An Analysis of the Vancouver International Airport Runway System, with Reference to the Requirement for a Parallel Runway 08L 26R) concluded as follows:

"2. An adequate standby runway is required to meet the operational needs of the air carriers.

3. The consideration of operating problems, the runway maintenance requirements, and cost benefit analysis strongly support the case for a new runway with full air carrier capability to be operational by 1976."

'Runway maintenance requirements' here refers to the need for major maintenance to the main runway at VIA, which would require the closing the runway for several months. Such a closure would restrict normal operations of some long distance flights, and reduce income to both air carriers and MOT.

Note that the expropriation proceedings began before this report was completed. At some point in 1972 MOT evidently reached a judgement that the second runway would be required.

Dec. 4, 1972. The first expropriation hearing opened, and was immediately adjourned to allow the Ratepayers to study data supplied by MOT three days previously.
Jan. 4, 1973. A meeting was held at the GVRD offices between senior planning staff members and MOT planning officials regarding plans for the Arthur Laing Bridge, the proposed new runway and the proposed Provincial ferry terminal. MOT claimed noise from the expanded airport would not be a problem. (from GVRD)

Jan. 8-15, 1973. The expropriation hearing reconvened. The GVRD Public Program assigned a worker to follow the issue. The Ratepayers asked him to have the GVRD send an expert witness to the hearings to comment on the regional implications of the airport expansion. The Board refused to send a person to speak. (from GVRD)

One of the major controversies of the process is already apparent in this earliest stage.

"(The) complaint about non-disclosure of pertinent data as to the reasons for the expropriation was related and documented so often during the hearing that I was obliged in the interests of time to cut short the repetition of what I then considered a well-established complaint . . . I conceded that the Association had established beyond doubt its valiant attempts to get data and that it had been ignored. (Fisher, Jan. 20, 1973)

January 1973. The Minister of the Environment requested an environmental impact assessment, and formed a steering committee within DOE.

Feb. 7, 1973. The second expropriation hearing proceeded without GVRD appearance, but staff discussion continued. The staff became convinced that the Ratepayers' grievances were well founded. The staff prepared information
for the Planning Committee seeking their approval for the preparation of a case to be presented at the hearing. (from GVRD)

Feb. 14, 1973. The Executive Committee authorized the request that the district formally press for a new planning process and present its concerns at the expropriation hearings. (from GVRD)

Feb. 16, 1973. The GVRD solicitor began his presentation at the hearing. The basis of the presentation was that the expansion as planned could result in damage to the region's livability. He pressed for a new involvement of local governments and communities in decisions regarding projects like the airport. At the same time Richmond and Vancouver sent politicians and civil servants to protest the unilateral development of the airport area. (from GVRD)

Feb. 16-19, 1973. When MOT failed to furnish the GVRD with materials as required under the Expropriation Act, legal action in Federal Court was undertaken. The case was eventually dismissed but it was established that the MOT did not have a comprehensive plan based on thorough research, especially in regard to environmental effects. (from GVRD)

Feb. 21, 1973. In a press release (Nov. 14/73) the Ministers of DOE, MSUA, and MOT stated:

"If, after reviewing the Hearing Officer's report, the Federal Government decided to proceed with a second new parallel runway for Vancouver International
Airport, no construction would take place until a full twelve-month environmental study had been completed and made public. If public discussions of the studies revealed that detrimental effects would result from the construction of the new proposed runway, alternative actions would have to be implemented to offset the anticipated increase in traffic.

Feb. - March, 1973. The airport issue was placed on the agenda of the Tri-Level meeting at the initiative of GVRD. The staff developed a Terms of Reference for a study of airport requirements to be presented at the meeting. The Ratepayers were granted $40,000 by the Minister of Transport to study their community. However, the expropriations were confirmed. An ombudsman was appointed to mediate between federal property owners and those people being expropriated. (from GVRD)

March 31, 1973. The Tri-Level Political Committee met for the first time. The airport issue was the major item on the agenda. The establishment of the APC was approved in principle.

April 13, 1973. An MOT press release stated that a parallel runway would be built if environmental and urban studies revealed that no major detrimental effects would result, and that the land would be used for other aviation purposes if the runway were not constructed.

April 16, 1973. The Tri-Level Staff Committee met in Victoria. A modified version of GVRD's proposed process was agreed to, and terms of reference for the creation of
the APC were established.

April 25, 1973. A meeting of representatives of concerned citizen groups endorsed the agreement worked out on April 16. (from GVRD)

May 14, 1973. At the second Tri-Level staff meeting in Ottawa it was reported that all three governments involved accepted the April 16th agreement. (from GVRD)

May 1973. Four concepts (A-D) for the parallel runway were proposed by MOT to provide DOE with a basis for ecological assessment.

June 6, 1973. The first meeting of the APC was held. Representation was reported as follows: MOT, four members including the chairman; DOE, one member; GVRD, one member; Vancouver, one member; Richmond, one member; MSUA, one member; DPW, one member; B.C., one member. In fact other representatives were present, but MOT recorded them as 'special participants', as it wished to allow each agency only one official representative.

July 5, 1973. GVRD tabled a proposal on public involvement in the APC, at an APC meeting. The proposal recommended "ways that citizens could speak for themselves, not a mechanism for GVRD to act as an intermediary between citizens' groups and the Airport Planning Committee. (letter, Cooley to APC, July 5, 1973)." The proposal also emphasized the creation of a cooperative rather than confrontative
process, and the importance of directly involving citizens in order to gradually dispel the conflicts and suspicion which already surrounded the issue and the APC. See Appendix 3 for the full text.

July 19, 1973. The proposal was generally accepted at an APC meeting, with the proviso that members of the to-be-created Community Forum were to be observers only at the sub-committee level, although they would be active members of the APC itself.

Aug. 2, 1973. The first provisional members of the public were seated on the APC.

Sept. 10, 1973. In a letter to an MOT representative, a GVRD representative makes the following comments on policy, forecasting information, and delays:

"If this process establishes that the pressure of air traffic is likely to exceed the capacity of present facilities with present operating procedures, we must then examine a wide variety of alternatives, including operating procedures and scheduling, use of alternative sites and policy options such as changes in routing and other aspects of carrier regulation. But proper traffic forecasts must come first; simplistic mathematical projections from the recent past . . . will not carry conviction. . . . This has been indicated repeatedly in my letter of March 29, 1973, other written material and discussions with Bill Neales, Tony Beak and others in June and July . . . ."

"The deadline we are working to has been laid down by the Minister . . . If anything, GVRD is more interested in a balanced analysis of the whole question than in the exact timing (Stead to Jones)."

Sept. 13, 1973. Representation from the Air Carriers and the B.C. Aviation Council was added to the APC.
Nov. 1, 1973. Consultants from B.C. Research Council became involved in drafting a study design acceptable to all members of the APC. Less formal designs were already being acted upon.

Nov. 8, 1973. Approximately 120 people from 30 organizations attended the first meeting of the Community Forum.

Nov. 27, 1973. MOT replaced concepts A to D for airport expansion with concepts 1 to 5.

"Essentially, this latter series represent(ed) a refinement of the former one . . . however, the lower limit of the range of areas to be filled (was) reduced (Ecological Sub-Committee, Jan. 1976, 20)."

Nov. 29-30, 1973. A workshop on sub-committees and the study design was held. It was agreed that sub-committee chairmen would be appointed by the APC (rather than any one agency), and that the chairman in each case would have some knowledge in the field.

Dec. 13, 1973. It was suggested in an APC meeting that CF representatives be accepted as active members of sub-committees. The minutes are not clear on whether this was adopted as APC policy, but CF members did take an active role in sub-committees throughout the process.


Jan. 3, 1974. At an APC meeting MOT announced the signing of a contract with a consultant for a noise study.
Contentious discussion followed, as recorded in the Minutes:

"There is general agreement that if the APC approves all study terms of reference then there is no need to return to the APC for contract approval unless changes have been made to the originally agreed to terms of reference. In the case of the APS study, while the terms of reference were processed through the sub-committee, no formal approval was given by the APC as a whole. The fact that there were some contentious issues in the terms of reference, and MOT's unbending stand concerning their position would indicate that the terms of reference should have gone back to the APC before any contract was let, regardless of the time constraint."

Jan. 14, 1974. MOT provided a great deal of forecasting data to GWRD (but not all that had been requested).

Feb. 21, 1974. The study design establishing six official sub-committees was adopted by the APC.

Feb. 1974. The Special Advisory Panel to the Minister of the Environment was established.

April 1974. MOT opened a 24 hour phone line to receive noise complaints at the airport.

April 18, 1974. MOT stated that they could now begin to document the case for the new runway (APC Minutes).

June 18, 1974. MOT eliminated concepts 4 and 5 from consideration, after a request for review of the concepts by DOE. Evaluation proceeded only on concepts 1-3.

July 2, 1974. In responding to a letter from a citizen requesting that the alternative of no expansion be studied, I. Jones restated MOT policy:
"From the Ministry of Transport's position, I must advise that the alternative of no expansion of the existing airport runway facilities will only arise if it is determined that major environmental or urban penalties would result from such airport development. This has been a consistent position of the Ministry" (letter, Jones to Spencer).

July 13, 1974. The existing main runway at VIA was closed for a three month period to allow extensive maintenance work. Aircraft operations were slightly reduced during this period.

Aug. 22, 1974. GVRD announced that it would have to restrict its role in the APC because of the priority of the Regional Plan.

Sept. 16, 1974. GVRD was developing a position paper on the airport issue. In an internal GVRD memo to the Chairman of the GVRD, a representative on the APC stated:

"The implied threat of a confrontation from GVRD has prompted local MOT officials to talk seriously about dealing with local problems. Discussions with them are now becoming useful and hold the possibility that we may be able to hammer out a position the Vancouver Ministry personnel can substantially agree to. If this is possible, we may be able to head off another full-scale confrontation" (Cooley to Chairman, GVRD).

Oct. 23, 1974. The Chairman of the APC cancelled an APC meeting scheduled for the following day, pending a meeting of the Tri-Level Staff Committee. The more seems to have been prompted by continued delays in APC deadlines, and a threatening exhaustion of finds. Several agencies seem to have been involved in informal discussions which led
to this more, but CF was not involved, nor were they permitted to attend the subsequent Tri-Level meeting.

Also on Oct. 23, in the afternoon, GVRD held a press conference at which they released a staff position paper which was highly critical of MOT's position. The GVRD Board took no position on the staff views, rather the Board released them for public discussion.

Although these events occurred on the same day, it seems that neither caused the other, but that both were a result of the background events of the preceding months.

Nov. 14, 1974. The Tri-Level Staff Committee met on this date. At this meeting a new timetable for completion of the work of the APC was set out. Certain aspects of the original study design, notably the evaluation analysis, were abandoned. Policy issues raised by APC discussions, but beyond the terms of reference of the APC, were identified, but no commitments were made. Finally,

"It was agreed, after considerable discussion, that it would be destructive of the APC process if individual parties or agencies were to take public positions on the airport issue prior to the release of the final report. There should be no need for this since the approach suggested for the APC's final report has provided for agreements and disagreements within the APC to be clearly set out" (Tri-Level Staff Committee Minutes, Nov. 14, 1974).

Both of the statements in this quotation subsequently became controversies in the process.

The CF, not a member of the Tri-Level Committee, made numerous comments on the Tri-Level meeting in a Memorandum dated Dec. 9, 1974.
"In a letter dated October 23rd, the Chairman of the APC cancelled the APC meeting for the following day and notified members that this was because there was '... agreement among the local and Federal Government participants on the APC that, for ourselves, it was necessary to consult with the Greater Vancouver Tri-Level committee (staff) in respect to the immediate past and prospective future difficulties in our committee ...' The difficulties were not described and this action was taken without any prior discussion with or agreement by the APC. ... It has been frequently suggested that the difficulties are the problem of 'reaching consensus' in the APC. But, the possibility of disagreement was specifically anticipated in the original study design, and there is no reference there to any absolute necessity for reaching consensus. In fact, not only is the possibility of reaching disagreement recognized, but procedures are set out for dealing with it. ... In all of this, the Chairman has functioned as a staff member of MOT rather than as Chairman of the APC and custodian of its procedures."

"... In our view, also, a major reason for the slippage being experienced in the planning process to date has not been simply lack of consensus but is the result of failure to ensure a clear understanding before the fact, on tasks and functions, terms of reference and procedures - and especially, a failure then to adhere to and monitor systematically what has been agreed to. ... This has been exacerbated by the Chairman's repeated tendency to act as a representative staff member of MOT rather than as Chairman of the APC." (CF, Dec. 9, 1974)

The controversy over referral to the Tri-Level Committee had repercussions throughout the rest of the APC process.

Nov. 1974. Responsibility for a social impact study was shifted to the PRMD Sub-Committee, but this sub-committee had considerable difficulty defining what an adequate social impact study entailed.

Nov. 21, 1974. The Airports System Report was tabled at the APC. It eliminated all alternatives to VIA on the basis
of some combination of airspace constraints, bird hazard, and environmental concerns.

A memorandum from the Chairman of the AS Sub-Committee to the APC, Nov. 21, 1974, makes these comments:

"Considerable discussion has taken place between myself and the Community forum representative and at this point I am not aware of any resolution reached that rendered the report acceptable to them - I can only reiterate that they have been involved in the process from the beginning, have had representation . . . I do feel that two re-writes of a rather technical report should be considered as evidence of an attempt at cooperation" (Smith to Jones).

Dec. 11, 1974. An MOT press release stated that the APC was expected to report by mid-April 1975: The Minister expected to announce his decision by the end of April 1975. The APC would be replaced by a permanent airport consultative committee.

Dec. 12, 1974. In action arising from the Tri-Level meeting, it was agreed at an APC meeting that three alternatives would be presented in the final report: 1) proceed now, 2) do not proceed, 3) postpone a decision

Dec. 13, 1974. The first meeting of sub-committee chairman was held. These meetings were designed to monitor the progress of the various studies, and to discuss the form of reports.

Dec. 30, 1974. The Chairman of the APC, in a letter to the Senior Planning Associate of the GVRD, made these suggestions:
"I believe we agreed that it would be desirable to attempt a minor re-structuring of the draft October 22 report ... In part we have attempted to achieve this by re-writing the last page ... I believe that with the suggested modest adjustments, the Airport Planning Committee as a whole can readily accept this report without further time-consuming debate and potential extension of both the Sub-Committee and the Airport Planning Committee's involvement" (Jones to Farry).

Jan. 6, 1975. In a letter from MOT to DOE, concept I was identified as the major proposal.

Jan. 9, 1975. The Forecast Report (APC, Jan. 1975) was tabled at the APC.

Jan. 1975. MOT published an information pamphlet titled Sorry About the Noise. Also, the Economic Study (APC, Feb. 1975c) was tabled at the APC.

Feb 6, 1975. Both the Engineering Feasibility Study (APC, Feb. 1975 a) and the Ground Transportation Study (APC, Feb. 1975 b) were tabled at the APC.

Feb. 27, 1975. Controversy over the MOT information pamphlet erupted. A motion was made at the APC meeting stating that "the APC was not involved in the preparation of the MOT pamphlet Sorry About the Noise of January 1975, and cannot take a position on the statements it contained." The Chairman stated that he did not consider that the pamphlet breached the Tri-Level agreement of Nov. 14, 1974. The pamphlet did not prejudice the work of the APC. MOT was not prepared to stop distribution.
April 17, 1975. GvRD presented the Livable Region Plan (GvRD, 1975) to the APC.

May, 1975. A Social Concerns Study (APC, May, 1975) (instead of a full Social Impact Study) was tabled at the APC. The Ecological Report was also discussed. Its main recommendation was for a moratorium on all major development on the Fraser Estuary/Delta, specifically including airport expansion, pending the establishment of a comprehensive Estuary/Delta management and protection policy.

May 6, 1975. I. Jones, in a letter to the Chairman of the Ecological Sub-Committee, made some highly critical statements about the Ecological Report, from the MOT point of view:

"We cannot agree that the airport development issue, particularly in context of Concept One of the Ministry's proposals, should become a secondary issue to that of a Fraser Estuary/Delta management policy and a Moratorium on all prospective estuary developments. We believe that the use of the airport development issue (Concept One) through disproportionate inflation and translation of concerns as a means of achieving such a policy discredits the Report which was to assess the impact of airport development . . . Those . . . I must express our intense disappointment with the Report. I do not believe it appropriately conveys the respected input of many of the Environment Canada's technical staff who contributed much to the Report's intended purpose of assessing the impact of airport development and which in my view has been subverted. I believe this Report contains imputations which do not subscribe to a fair assessment of Concept One which is the stated Ministry of Transport development proposal."

(emphasis in original)

A storm erupted over this letter, which led to the following series of events.
May 23, 1975. A second letter was tabled, and the first one withdrawn at a meeting of the Ecological Sub-Committee. For the most part the second letter was the same.

DOE and CF immediately prepared a rebuttal of the points made in the MOT letter.

May 24, 1975. A third letter was sent superceding the first two, along with a covering letter stating "it is quite clear that our letter of May 23 was ill advised, should not be circulated, and I respectfully request that it be returned to me" (Jones to Romaine, May 24, 1975).

May 27, 1975. At a special meeting of the Ecological Sub-Committee the request to withdraw the letter of May 23, 1975 was rejected.

May 30, 1975. The Chairman of the APC, I. Jones, resigned and was replaced by D. Hosgood, also of MOT.

June 1975. The Urban Issues Study (APC, June 1975 a) and the Noise Study (APC, June 1975 b) were published.

June 5, 1975. The Runway Demand/Capacity Analysis (APC, July 1975 a) was reviewed by the APC. There was criticism that so crucial a report should become available so late in the process.

June 12, 1975. The Ecological Sub-Committee Report (APC, July 1975 b) was reviewed at the APC.
June 27, 1975. The Air Carriers commented in an APC meeting:

"(We) believe that it is possible to marry the two option statements, so ably set forth by the MOT and GVRD into a single document. We do not anticipate that anyone will come forward to prepare a statement on the third option - Do Not Proceed with the second runway - since the work of the APC has proven that option to be invalid" (Minutes).

July 4, 1975. The Chairman sent a memorandum to the APC: "Proposals for the Processing (i.e. review and approval) of the APC Final Report".

"The sole objective of the Review is to ensure the report is complete, accurate, fair and equitable and that it meets the general directions received from the Tri-Level Staff Committee. Therefore, as no 'positions' are involved, acceptance shall be by simple majority vote, each member agency having one vote. Amendments to the draft shall be made by motion, regularly moved and seconded by voting representatives of the member agencies. Amendments shall carry by simple majority."

July 15, 1975. In a CF memorandum, "Final Report of APC: Review and Approval Process and Timetable", the position was stated that decisions on procedure and/or content will not be made by voting, but by discussion and consensus, including disagreement. Also,

"A significant portion of the development of the section on Areas of Agreement and Issues ... will depend upon the completion of the section on Decision Options. As this is a totally new section or area of information and commentary for the APC and its member agencies, and as this section comprises both an attempt at problem identification and public information, it is not only new material but also pivotal."

July 17, 1975. A meeting of the APC dealt with confusion as to the development concepts under study. The written
concepts dealt with an 11,000 foot runway, but in the
decision option written by MOT was an amended concept dealing
with a 10,600 foot runway. The Chairman stated that he had
asked the Chairman of the Ecological Sub-Committee about the
significance of the acreage change, and found that it was not
significant. An MOT representative gave an oral briefing on
the 10,600 foot runway, and was asked to provide written doc­
umentation.

The CF announced that it was drafting the third decision
option - Do Not Proceed. GVRD supported CF's critique (July
15) of MOT's proposed review procedure (July 4).

July 18, 1975. An MOT memorandum to the Chairman of the
APC announced a revised runway concept wholly within the Sea
Island dyke.

"I have instructed the Airport Planning Project Team
to revise its plans accordingly and to proceed with
a pre-design and engineering proposal for a runway
within the dyke.

This decision in no way prejudices the future
extension of this runway to full redundancy capa­
city, should DOE studies determine there will be
no significant ecological impact and should the
demand for such a runway persist" (Neales to APC).

July 21 and 23, 1975. GVRD and CF reacted with surprise
to the introduction of what was, to them, yet another develop­
ment proposal different from the one verbally outlined in the
meeting of July 17. They called for clarification of how
this proposal affected the APC process, and how the APC should respond.
July 31, 1975. After lengthy discussion at an APC meeting, it was decided that the APC would not consider the 9250 foot runway proposal in their report, but would confine themselves to the previous 10,600 foot proposal. The shorter runway proposal was to be deferred to a second stage process, where it would have to be specifically studied.

There was also considerable discussion on what process might follow the APC Final Report. This "ongoing consultative process" had been mentioned in numerous preceding meetings, and confirmed in the Tri-Level meeting of Nov. 14, 1974.

"The Chairman felt it was long agreed that an ongoing consultative process was an essential development and that there is going to be a recommendation to that effect in the final APC report, but, that the 'how and details' were beyond the terms of reference of the APC" (Minutes).

Sept. 8, 1975. The editor of the report, an outside consultant, requested direction from the APC in a memorandum - "Notes on Two Editorial Questions Arising from the Working Paper on Areas of Agreement and Issues". The second question was "How can broader issues before the APC and APC member agencies' positions on these issues be identified for inclusion in the final report?"

Nov. 13, 1975. Stormy discussion took place at an APC meeting over the Issues section of the draft report. MOT and others were reluctant to have it as a separate section, and suggested either combining it with the decision options or with agency comments. CF, DOE, and GWRD felt that it was a major shift in process. CF left the meeting half way
through, suggesting that they may have to 'go public' with their concerns.

**Nov. 18, 1975.** The Special Advisory Panel to the Minister of the Environment, advised that the Issues section be reintroduced, or that DOE withdraw from the APC. (letter, Boyce to Sauvé)

**Nov. 19, 1975.** The GVRD asked the editor of the report to sign and return a letter guaranteeing that no changes will be made to any material without prior GVRD approval. (letter, Cooley to Roberts) The letter was signed by the editor, and returned to GVRD.

**Nov. 27, 1975.** Serious antagonism erupted between the Chairman and CF at an APC meeting over the CF letter of Nov. 14, 1975, which discussed the meeting of Nov. 13. The Chairman threatened legal action. This threat was never acted upon.

**Jan. and Feb. 1976.** APC member agencies reviewed the final report, and commented on the decision options. The Issues section remained in the report.

**Jan. 22, 1976.** A DOE representative made these comments about an attempt by the Chairman to speed up the review process:

"Your request for agencies to submit their final comments on the final APC report, prior to the receipt of or knowledge of when the second and final draft of this document will be available for review, is unacceptable . . . It is considered extremely unwise for any agency to
prepare, submit, and commit itself to a particular set of comments, in the absence of the prior opportunity to adequately review the final document” (Romaine to Hosgood).

The GVRD sent a similar letter on the following day.

Feb. 19, 1976. The final meeting of the APC took place.

March 1976. The Ecological Sub-Committee Report was published by DOE. Also, the Final Report of the APC was published.


"relating to the proposal to construct a runway that extends onto the Sea Island foreshore, but more particularly because he views it as a better solution, he would like comments to concentrate on a relatively recent proposal . . . for a shorter runway within the Sea Island dyke" (Press Release No. 32/76).

The CF responded in detail to this press release, particularly to the section quoted above.

"This is a truly extraordinary request. First of all, how does the Minister come to the view that it is a better solution? He could not have based this on the APC studies because those studies do not consider it" (CF n.d. March 12, 1976).

The CF was also very concerned that public hearings were not to be held, and all information and discussion was to flow through MOT.

March 24, 1976. MOT announced plans to build a second airport terminal by 1980. It was not immediately clear how this announcement related to the possible new runway as
discussed by the APC.

April 6, 1976. At a public meeting sponsored by Vancouver City, MOT announced that they favoured the runway within the dyke (i.e., approximately 9200 feet long), and that this was being studied through EARP.

May 15, 1976. CF met with the Minister of Transport in Vancouver. He mentioned that he might decide to go ahead with pre-loading of the runway (meaning dredging and spreading fill) before a decision on the runway itself was made. This would, at little cost, save considerable time if a decision were eventually made to go ahead.

Aug. 12, 1976. In a press release the Minister of Transport announced that

"a proposed new runway at Vancouver International Airport will be given further and deliberate consideration and will not be started before 1978 in any case. . . . Consideration (will be) of a shorter runway located within the dyke" (Press Release No. 115/76).

Nov. 1, 1976. The Minister of Environment, in a letter to the Chairman of the CF, stated,

"I believe that a comprehensive policy covering all development in this area makes sense in terms of environmental planning but it may be necessary to assess current individual development proposals on their own merits until this policy has been established" (LeBlanc to Watchorn).

Nov. 2, 1976. An all-candidates meeting in Vancouver City was unanimously opposed to expansion at VIA.
Nov. 5, 1976. An advertisement for tender calling for the dredging of borrow site no. 3 (in the North Arm of the Fraser) was published in the Vancouver Province. The eventual use of the dredge spoil was not immediately clear.

Nov. 17, 1976. A new Noise Committee was established, with representation from MOT, Vancouver, GVRD, and Richmond. A broader consultative committee was being planned.

Dec. 2, 1976. CF was incorporated under the Societies Act of B.C. as a non-profit society.
APPENDIX 2

List of Areas of Agreement and Issues in APC Final Report

Arising from APC Studies

It is an issue whether or not the MOT Air Traffic Activity Forecasts should be accepted for making decisions in the immediate future on the construction of the proposed parallel runway at Vancouver International Airport.

It is an issue whether or not an adequate investigation has been made of alternative sites to VIA for a major air carrier airport and, more specifically, whether or not VIA is the only reasonable site for such an airport.

It is an issue whether or not an adequate investigation has been made of possible Traffic Allocation Scenarios for the Vancouver Airports System and, more specifically, whether the conclusions of the investigation on the need for, and timing of, a parallel runway at VIA are acceptable.

It is an issue whether or not sufficient evidence has been presented to show that the runway requirements of air traffic at VIA will exceed present runway capacity in the period 1980-1982 and that therefore additional runway capacity must be brought into service during this same period.

It is agreed that in view of the technical nature of the engineering feasibility study and its clearly stated limitation with respect to ecological considerations, the report on the study is acceptable to all APC members.

It is agreed that an analysis of the existing ground transportation system on Sea Island has identified under various assumptions, some of which were adopted for study purposes, the practical capacity of VIA ground transportation facilities and the years in which those facilities will reach their respective capacities. . . . It is also agreed that alternative strategies for providing possible increases in ground transportation capacity to and on Sea Island are subjects for further study.

It is agreed that the investigation of the economic impact of VIA on the region, while producing some information on the contribution of the airport to the local economy, is incomplete; and that more study with more comprehensive terms of reference would be required to obtain an adequate view of the airport's effects on the region in economic terms.

It is agreed that further steps to mitigate the noise impact of air operations both at VIA and in the region generally should be undertaken now.
It is agreed that an inter-agency process should be established now to take action on the mitigation of aeronautical noise at VIA and in the region generally.

It is agreed that monitoring action on noise mitigation procedures must include means of effective regulation and enforcement. They should apply to the procedures under the control of both aeronautical and community authorities.

It is agreed that respecting the problem of noise at national, provincial, regional, and local levels, there is a need to identify and clarify jurisdictional responsibilities and, in the process of developing policy and action, provide for the participation of all affected jurisdictions.

It is an issue whether or not aeronautical noise is a problem now in the Greater Vancouver Region.

It is an issue whether or not the noise studies conducted on behalf of the APC provide an adequate picture of the present and future aeronautical noise environment of the Greater Vancouver region.

It is an issue whether or not some or all the proposed aeronautical noise mitigation procedures will improve the present and future noise environment in the Greater Vancouver region and maintain it within socially tolerable units.

It is an issue whether or not the proposed aeronautical noise mitigation procedures have been examined as to feasibility, acceptability and enforceability and whether or not upon examination they will be found to be so.

It is an issue whether or not MOT has either the legislated and/or administrative capacity to implement and enforce the proposed aeronautical noise mitigation procedures.

It is an issue whether or not successful steps have been taken towards mitigation of aeronautical noise in the Greater Vancouver region.

It is an issue whether or not construction and use of the proposed parallel runway, the phasing out of the crosswind runway for jet aircraft use and implementation of some of the recommended mitigation procedures will together result in a reduction in the number of persons likely to be highly annoyed by aircraft noise in Richmond.

It is an issue whether or not constructing the proposed parallel runway will with increasing air traffic, result in an increased number of persons likely to be highly annoyed by aircraft noise in Richmond.
It is an issue whether or not the crosswind runway will be eliminated if a parallel runway is constructed.

It is an issue whether or not the inter-agency process should provide for participation by all interests from the aeronautical sector, the three levels of government and interested sectors of the public.

It is an issue whether or not the establishment of an inter-agency process, and formal agreement on noise mitigation procedures must precede a decision on the construction of the proposed parallel runway.

It is agreed that the Fraser Estuary/Delta is a nationally unique ecologically sensitive area which supports valuable commercial and recreational fisheries resources, the largest wintering population of waterfowl in Canada and a host of resource oriented and marine uses. It is further agreed that there is at present no comprehensive policy for the rational protection and use of the Fraser River Estuary/Delta and that such a policy is needed.

It is agreed that no one appears at present to be completely certain as to the actual degree of danger to the viability of the Fraser Estuary/Delta inherent in any further development proposals.

It is an issue whether or not to proceed with the expansion of the airport as presently proposed in view of the findings and recommendations of the Summary Report of the Ecological Sub-Committee of the APC.

It is an issue whether or not there should be a moratorium on further major developments in the Fraser Estuary/Delta for a defined period during which an overall policy for management and protection of the area will be prepared.

It is an issue whether or not any moratorium on further major developments in the Fraser Estuary/Delta should apply to the proposed expansion at VIA.

It is an issue whether or not a conflict exists between the MOT proposals to provide facilities for our services in anticipation of projected growth in demand, and the GWRD objective of managing all aspects of growth in the region.

It is agreed that increased air traffic at VIA will result in increased ground traffic and without a significant swing to public transit this extra volume will result in increased vehicular congestion in the regional ground transportation network.

It is an issue whether or not aeronautical noise in the Greater Vancouver Region has a major impact on land use planning.
It is an issue whether or not the definition of Noise Impact Zones will have a positive impact on land use planning around VIA and whether the positive impacts of such zones will outweigh the difficulties that may arise with respect to both land use and other aspects of urban living.

It is an issue whether or not expansion of VIA will conflict with policies relating to land use on or adjacent to Sea Island.

It is an issue whether or not public access to the dykes and shores of Sea Island has high priority and should be preserved and if possible extended.

It is an issue whether or not public access to the dykes and shores of Sea Island should have equal claim with airport use or should take precedence over airport use.

It is an issue whether or not a portion of the north side of Sea Island should be preserved as a park for public use to insure that it is compatible with the land being set aside for park use on the opposite shore of the Fraser River in Vancouver.

It is agreed that although a Social Impact Study of the proposed expansion of VIA on the Greater Vancouver Region was provided for in the APC Study Design, it was in fact not carried out.

It is an issue whether or not a Social Impact Study could have been carried out.

Broader Areas of Agreement and Issues

It is an issue whether or not expansion of the air travel industry represents an appropriate allocation of energy and fuel priorities including related economic costs.

It is an issue whether or not expansion of VIA represents that waste of resources and facilities now being recognized as characteristic of a 'consumer' society as contrasted to a 'conserver' society.

It is an issue whether or not, when considering a development such as the proposed expansion of VIA, it is necessary to provide for: i) A statement of underlying policies that determine development objectives; ii) An examination of these policies in terms of their contemporary relevance and their application to the specific development under study; iii) An examination of alternative policies present or future.

It is an issue whether or not transportation policies and practices follow growth patterns or whether they create and promote growth.
It is an issue whether or not the development of air services and their supporting facilities is to take precedence over the competing requirements of other Federal departments, other levels of government and community interests.

It is an issue whether or not the demand for air services should be satisfied no matter how generated, or whether some reasonable level of service should be set to balance the needs of the users of air services with those of non-users.

It is an issue whether or not the proposed investment in the expansion of VIA and other air facilities in the Lower Mainland is consistent with public priorities both regionally and nationally.

It is an issue whether or not there are limits to the volume of air traffic that the Greater Vancouver Region can advantageously absorb given the constraints imposed by local characteristics.

It is an issue whether or not the capacity of existing airport facilities can be increased by the adoption of different technologies, procedures, and policies, as an alternative to immediate expansion of, or addition to, the facilities at VIA.

It is an issue whether or not general aviation should be phased out of Vancouver International Airport in the next few years.

It is an issue whether or not construction of a parallel runway at VIA should begin in advance of demonstrated need in face of present uncertainties as to whether the forecast demand for our services will materialize in the projected time frame and the likelihood that such expansion once initiated, may be irreversible.

It is an issue whether or not the proposed parallel runway would have major adverse urban and environmental consequences.

It is an issue whether or not the decision on the proposed parallel runway should await development of policies concerning the environment, transportation, urban growth management, and other matters identified during the work of the APC.

It is an issue whether or not there is a need to make an early decision on the construction of a parallel runway at VIA to remove uncertainties in planning for MOT, the Township of Richmond and the air industry.

It is an issue whether or not a case has been made and can be made at this time for the expansion of VIA.

It is an issue whether or not the APC's terms of reference provide for the examination of existing policies of govern-
ments and their departments, and for the consideration of alternative policies and the exploration of such alternatives.

It is an issue whether or not there were serious deficiencies and abrogations of agreed-upon procedures in the APC process which pose questions as to the validity and usefulness of the work of the APC, its sub-committees and study reports.

It is an issue whether or not the abandonment of both the development and application of an evaluation methodology, which was provided for in the APC study design, constitutes a serious deficiency in the work of the APC and its sub-committees.

It is an issue whether or not there was adequate participation of, and consultation with, all jurisdictions affected by the proposed expansion of VIA during the APC study process.

It is an issue whether or not the proposals for airport expansion were specified in sufficient detail and made available in a consistent and timely manner to the APC study process.

It is an issue whether or not a realistic estimate of up-to-date development costs of airport expansion and the costs of noise mitigation are required for planning, decision making and public understanding.

It is an issue whether or not there has been any evaluation of social costs occasioned by the proposed expansion of VIA and its direct and indirect consequences.

It is an issue whether or not the information gathered in the course of the work of the APC is sufficiently complete in critical areas as a basis for a decision on the proposed expansion of VIA.

It is agreed that when the APC's work is completed and the committee is disbanded there shall be some form of ongoing consultative process on airport operations and development involving both airport and community interests.

It is agreed that the APC has examined a number of airport expansion concepts put forward by the MOT and that the only concept to be addressed in the decision option statements in the final APC report shall be Modified Concept I with a runway length of 10,600 feet.

It is agreed that the APC has not considered and agreed not to consider the proposal for a parallel runway of length 9,250 feet put forward by MOT on July 18th, 1975 and the APC recommends that this and any other runway concept proposed . . . should be subject to study by the ongoing consultative process and to the requirements of the Environmental Assessment and Review Process.
APPENDIX 3

A Proposal for Public Involvement in the Work of the Airport Planning Committee

DRAFT PROPOSAL - A PROGRAM FOR PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT IN THE WORK OF THE AIRPORT PLANNING COMMITTEE

BACKGROUND

At the first Tri-Level Committee meeting held for the Greater Vancouver Region (which took place on March 31, 1973), it was suggested by the Greater Vancouver Regional District and agreed by the Federal Ministers involved that a consultative process should be established to review the planning for the proposed expansion of the Vancouver International Airport. Prior to that time, the planning for the airport had been carried on with little relation to the planning for the Region as a whole or to the concerns of the affected public. As a consequence, when the Federal government began expropriation proceedings on Sea Island, there was a great deal of misunderstanding, anger and conflict. Thus, the consultative process was suggested and agreed to as a way to allow the various involved agencies of the three levels of government and the concerned public to try to sort out on a co-operative, rather than a confrontation, basis the many competing interests and consequences of alternative proposals for the future operations of the Vancouver International Airport.

A further meeting was held on April 16, 1973 by staff representatives of the three levels of government to work out the details of a consultative process and report back to their respective governments for approval. It was agreed at that meeting, and subsequently accepted by all parties, that an Airport Planning Committee would be established with representation from all affected parties, and that the GVRD would undertake to recommend methods for developing direct involvement of citizens in the planning process of that Committee. It is as a result of that commitment that the proposals contained below are presented for consideration.

OBJECTIVES

The present and future operations of the Vancouver International Airport touch on the lives of many people, in their daily living patterns, their means of livelihood, and their recreational activities. Thus residents of the Greater Vancouver Region have many different levels of interest and concern over the proposals for the airport. It is the intent here to try to develop a program which can accommodate as many of these levels of interest and concern as possible. Thus the proposals below are an attempt to satisfy four major objectives.
1. To allow any interested resident of the Region to follow the work of the Airport Planning Committee from beginning to end and stay abreast of the general progress of the studies being undertaken.

2. To permit individuals and groups who have strong views on particular aspects of the airport development or its consequences to present their views to the Committee while the planning process is underway.

3. To allow direct participation in the work of the Committee and its sub-committees for representatives of those groups which have both a strong continuing interest in the future of the airport and the time available to devote to the process.

4. To permit as broad-based and full participation as possible without significantly extending the time required to complete the planning for the future of the Vancouver International Airport.

It is important to see these objectives and the recommendations which follow in the context of the history of the development of the Airport Planning Committee. The Committee was created as a result of confrontation and conflict which have left a good deal of residual suspicion. There are many residents of the Region who are not entirely convinced of the acceptability of the motivations and methodologies being followed in the airport planning exercise. And in a climate of suspicion quite innocent actions or oversights can be quickly misconstrued as attempts to hide information or make decisions in secret. Thus, it is extremely important that the Committee allow the public to follow its deliberations closely if these existing suspicions are to be dispelled and future ones avoided.

RECOMMENDED PROGRAM

The five-point program outlined below is recommended with the expectation that it will allow the gradual dissipation of the suspicions about the airport planning program and the growth of a truly co-operative planning process.

1. Citizen representation should be added to the Airport Planning Committee in the form of Region residents who will sit as working members of the Committee. It is recommended that citizens sit, not as observers, but as working members who will accept the responsibility to fully follow the complicated planning process and to accept the working conventions of the Committee, which may include the need for confidential treatment of material.

2. Citizen representation should also be added to the sub-committees on the same basis - that is as full working members with the same commitments of responsibility and time.
3. The Airport Planning Committee schedule time in regular meetings or hold special meetings to hear from special interest groups, if the sitting citizens representatives do not feel that they can adequately speak for the special interest in question.

4. The Airport Planning Committee arrange for periodic briefings by its members to report progress to public meetings called in the Region.

5. The Airport Planning Committee produce a regular newsletter reporting on its activities. The newsletter should be a technical, educational document which can keep people abreast of the progress of the Committee and which can begin to lay the groundwork for people's understanding of the difficult choices which may have to be made between competing interests in the final decisions as to the disposition of the air industry in the Vancouver Region.

It is suggested that only a newsletter be produced and that the Committee not undertake to make press releases of any kind. The newsletter could of course be picked up by the press if they considered it newsworthy. However, the newsletter should strive to be educational in a substantive sense, rather than seek to be "newsworthy" in a reporter's terms.

METHODOLOGY

To Obtain Citizen Representation

It is suggested that a Citizens' Forum on Vancouver Airport Planning be formed to act as the central clearing house and organizational focus for the interested citizens groups. An initial round of invitations would be issued to groups to send representatives to sit on that Committee. Invitations would be issued to --

(a) Resident Groups. For example, ratepayer organizations, ad hoc associations which have already grown up around the airport plans in Richmond and Vancouver, and groups in other parts of the Region as they become interested or feel themselves directly affected by the airport plans.

(b) Business and Commercial Groups. For example, Chambers of Commerce, Boards of Trade, Commercial fishery associations, etc.

(c) Special Purpose Groups. For example, recreation associations, conservation groups, civil aviation groups, etc.
The Citizens' Forum, once formed, would then take the responsibility of selecting a small number of individuals to represent it on the Airport Planning Committee. It would be clearly understood that those individuals representing the Citizens' Forum must be willing to devote the time to attend Committee meetings, to follow fully the work of the Committee and to act as responsible members of the Committee, accepting the possible need for confidential treatment of some material. It is suggested that a minimum of three citizen members be selected by the Citizens' Forum.

The Citizens' Forum would also undertake to find individuals to participate in the work of the subcommittees if it was thought desirable or necessary. A subcommittee of obvious interest is the one dealing with noise, the present members of which have already recommended that a citizen member be added. However, neither the Citizens' Forum nor the Airport Planning Committee may feel that citizen representatives are required on all subcommittees.

It is recommended that all representatives of the Citizens' Forum who attend Airport Planning Committee and subcommittee meetings be paid an honorarium in order that participation not be limited only to those who can afford to attend what are likely to be predominantly daytime meetings. GVRD would take responsibility for such payment.

The Citizens' Forum is envisioned as a group with an elastic membership. No initial canvass will pick up all groups who are interested in the airport and its development. Therefore, it is expected that as the Airport Planning Committee begins its work, as newsletters are distributed, and as word generally gets around as to the operations of the Committee, more groups will become interested in the planning process. The Citizens' Forum would then absorb new members and bring them up to date on the process. It would thus allow an expanding base of informed citizenry while still maintaining a small, stable representation on the Airport Planning Committee and its subcommittees.

GVRD staff are willing to undertake the responsibility of initiating the Citizens' Forum in cooperation with other members of the Airport Planning Committee, and to work closely with it throughout the Airport planning process. Informal discussions have been held with several interested groups to date, and the ideas contained in this proposal are generally acceptable to them.

To Schedule Special Hearings or Public Meetings

If the Citizens' Forum acts as the central clearing house and organizational focus for citizens, business and special purpose organizations, then it can advise the Airport Planning Committee as to the need for and timing of special hearings and public meetings. The Airport Planning Committee through its citizen members, and other members as needed, would keep the Citizens' Forum fully briefed on
its activities. Then, if special purpose interests wanted to be heard, they and the Citizens' Forum representatives would work out whether the representatives could speak for them or submit a brief on their behalf, or whether the group should be heard directly. If the latter course of action were chosen, then the Citizens' Forum representatives and the Airport Planning Committee Chairman could select a date for the group or group(s) to be heard.

Similarly, the Citizens' Forum representatives would advise the rest of the Airport Planning Committee when they thought a briefing was necessary for a particular group in the Region, or whether general public meetings should be called to report progress.

To Produce a Regular Newsletter

It is suggested that the Airport Planning Committee constitute a subcommittee which would supervise the production of the newsletter and approve the copy for each before it was printed and released. The GVRD will volunteer its resources to produce draft copy for approval by the subcommittee for the first few issues, on the understanding that the arrangement will be reviewed in the Fall (or earlier if any member of the Committee so wishes).

The initial distribution of the newsletter can be to all organizations represented on the Citizens' Forum and to any other parties members of the Committee think are appropriate. The GVRD would like to distribute it to the individuals and institutions (including the media) on its mailing list, which number approximately 3,000. Other members may have similar lists they would like to mail to.