THE ORIGINS OF THE TSETSEQA IN THE BAXUS:  
A STUDY OF KWAKIUTL PRAYERS, MYTHS AND RITUAL

by

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ABSTRACT

Purpose of Investigation

In using the terms baxus and tsetseqa Kwakiutl make an explicit nature/culture distinction. The winter season, tsetseqa, is dedicated to communal ritual. In the Summer--baxus--Kwakiutl disperse to gather food. The thesis is an investigation into the conceptual significance Kwakiutl give to the distinction. Its purpose is to elucidate how the baxus is related to the tsetseqa; how great social rituals like the winter dance originate in a conception of man's relation to the natural world.

Data and Method

To this end three kinds of texts have been examined: prayers to animals and plants used for food, myths about man's relation to animals, and rituals welcoming animals. Most of the texts are George Hunt's, Boas' Kwakiutl helper. Their analysis is not primarily a formal undertaking, but an attempt at the translation of culture. Kwakiutl conceptions are examined both as part of the expressive system that contains them and for their accessibility and validity in a universal rational framework. The method of analysis is adapted in every case to the type of text. Each type is analysed as a genre in itself and for its relation to the thought of the tsetseqa. The investigation is therefore also a contribution to the question of genre-classification. Analysis is carried out on the lexical and structural levels, focussing on the differentials in the distribution of semantic load and the principles by which textual units are combined.

Findings

The nature/culture dichotomy, expressed as baxus and tsetseqa raises for Kwakiutl the issue of determinism. Baxus life
confronts them with an ethical problem they cannot solve: they find themselves destroying beings they reverence in order to sustain their lives, and so contract a debt to the animals under the laws of necessity. The texts attempt to define the nature of human boundness and find ways of transcending it. Two ways of resolving the dilemma stand out: a symbolic situation consisting of a scheme of guilt and amendment, and a psychological solution consisting of an affective inversion. The two are connected in the sense that the former furnishes a language for the latter. All three kinds of text speak of human accountability through killing and eating. The myths are made up of two opposing syntagms, one of the contract allowing men to live on animals, the other of the inevitability of the animals' retribution. The prayers and rituals speak of men's divided will: their desire to live in peace with the animals and their simultaneous intention to kill them. Hence the texts present the human condition as a dilemma. All three kinds of text indicate however, a resolution through a transposition to the intra- and interpersonal plane of culture. The animals, who give themselves voluntarily to men in the Summer, turn hunters in the Winter with men as their game. The cannibalistic spirits of the tsetseqa represent the obverse of the game animals of the baxus. If men give themselves voluntarily to these animal-spirits of the Winter to be killed and eaten, they can repay the debt of the Summer. The symbolic reversal of roles expresses a realistic solution on the psychological level. Baxus and tsetseqa are connected through an inversion of fear. That which is feared in the baxus life is voluntarily sought and
faced in the tsetseqa. In forestalling death by facing it, the Kwakiutl initiate overcomes necessity on the cultural level and becomes free. The texts connect the animals with the tsetseqa spirits, baxus man as hunter and eater with the initiate who is hunted and eaten, and the animals' gift of life to men with the initiate's gift of life to the community. As the animal's gift is the basis of men's physical life, so the initiate's gift of freedom to the community is the basis of the truly human society.
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GLOSSARY

of the most frequently used Kwakiutl words

hamatsa  initiate of the cannibal society; eater

namima  autonomous household group, Boas' numaym
          (the form of the word is based on a personal
          communication from Chief James Sewid)

baxus  common, ordinary; the profane season

tsætseqa  the secrets (Boas); the sacred season; lies,
           cheating

naualak  supernatural (Boas); extraordinary, unobliged

tlugwi  supernatural treasure, supernatural power
           (Curtis)
Acknowledgements

I owe a great debt to Mr. Tom Hunt of Victoria, B.C., who has a living knowledge of Kwakiutl traditions of thought, and who shared this knowledge by singing hamatsa songs to me and explaining them. His explanations confirmed my interpretation of that most difficult of Kwakiutl concepts, the world centre. I am also indebted to Mrs. Daisy Neel of Alert Bay, B.C., for her interpretation of the hamatsa dance and to the Sewid family generally for their kindness and hospitality. To Mr. Larry Pierre and his mother Selina of Penticton, B.C., I am indebted for extremely interesting information on the relation of animals to men, and to Mr. Cyril Carpenter of Bella Bella, B.C., a friend of long standing, for information about the salmon run and salmon fishing.

I wish to express my warmest thanks to my supervising committee, Professor Wilson Duff (supervisor), Professor Brenda Beck, Professor Kenelm Burridge and Professor Robin Ridington, and at an earlier stage Professor Pierre Maranda for their help and criticism.

The texts that are the subject of my thesis have not been critically examined otherwise. Irving Goldman's The Mouth of Heaven: An Introduction to Kwakiutl Religious Thought unfortunately came out too late for me to consider it in relation to my topic. In my thesis I present the result, not the process of my investigations. The statistical work that underlies many of the sections, particularly those in the chapter on prayers was done by hand, not by computer.
"Friends, what do you think? Shall we discard the use of the red cedar bark which makes us happy? We shall only be downhearted if we should discard it. We shall be asleep all the time."

From a Kwakiutl speech, 1895
INTRODUCTION

The Kwakiutl tsetseqa or winter ritual, as Boas observed and described it, has attracted attention in recent years, because it is realized that its symbolism is the language of a highly sophisticated tradition of thought. What has not been so generally realized, however, is that the tsetseqa is not a closed system within the Kwakiutl context of thought. My aim in this study is to discuss the cultural experience in which the tsetseqa is rooted, namely the ethical and intellectual interpretation the Kwakiutl give to men's relation to the natural world.

The data for the study are three kinds of Kwakiutl texts: prayers, myths and rituals. All three are concerned with the relation between men and animals, culture and nature. The texts were collected between the 1880s and 1930s, mainly by George Hunt, Boas' helper and collaborator in writing and ethnography of the Kwakiutl. Hunt was by language, culture and upbringing a Kwakiutl. Boas taught him a phonetic script, and he transcribed the oral material he collected, adding interlinear translations into English which Boas corrected. Boas carried on a correspondence with Hunt, over many years, asking questions about customs and beliefs which Hunt answered at length. The bulk of Hunt's letters was published in the two volumes of Ethnology of the Kwakiutl: Based on Data collected by George Hunt (1921), and the Religion of the Kwakiutl Indians (1930). These letters are texts in as full a sense as the prayers and myths. The translations preserve the style of the original to a surprising extent. As my study is not a linguistic one, I have used them for quotation, checking my reading of them against the original texts.

In my discussion of the texts I give as few untranslated words as possible, first because their use would not add to an understanding of the material, second because no standard modern transcription is yet
available. When I do give untranslated words it is because they combine in translation various, and sometimes to us contradictory meanings, which I explain. The word is then a form of shorthand which the reader must learn. I use Boas' transcription in the simplified form that is current among anthropologists now.

In speaking about Kwakiutl thought I use the "ethnographic present". When I speak from a historical point of view I use the past tense. Most of the thought I am concerned with was closely bound up with a specific economic situation that belongs to the past and belongs therefore itself to the past.

Except for linguistic work done with Mrs. Emma Hunt of Victoria, B.C. I have not done any fieldwork. I have attended winter dances and potlatches at Alert Bay, B.C., as the guest of the Sewid family, who were generous with their explanations and to whom I owe a debt of gratitude. My thesis is, however, based on texts, and the mistakes that will undoubtedly be found in it are due to my own faulty interpretation of the texts. The Kwakiutl collection of texts is rich enough to allow for studies of far greater breadth and depth than I could undertake within the limits of my thesis. Only when such studies have been made will it be possible to correct specific studies like mine in their light.

My analysis of the texts is not primarily a formal undertaking but an attempt at what has been called the translation of culture. I examine Kwakiutl conceptions both as part of the expressive system that contains them and for their accessibility and validity in a universal rational framework. I have adapted my method of analysis in every case to the type of text under consideration, using different methods for myths and for prayers and rituals, and explaining my usage as I go along. I make an analysis of each type as a genre in itself, as well as examining it
for its relation to the *tsetseqa*. My investigation is therefore also a
contribution to the question of genre-classification. I carry out my
analyses on the lexical and structural levels. On the lexical level I
focus particularly on differences in the semantic load, for instance in
the case of names and epithets for animals, or in puns. On the structu­
ral level I concentrate on the principles by which textual units are
combined and on the question of the relation in which formal principles
stand to "message".

My study is limited to an examination of texts that refer to the
*baxus* life, the life of the Summer half of the year when the Kwakiutl are
semi-nomadic and gather the stores on which they live in the Winter. The
organization of their life during that period is dedicated to harvesting
and collecting. In this context they are faced by the problem of the
destructiveness of their activity in a world to which they feel they belong,
with which they wish to live in harmony and on which they depend for their
lives. The texts are clear about the problem and also about the direc­
tion in which the Kwakiutl look for a solution. They connect the problem
with the *tsetseqa*, the ritual season of the Winter. During that season
the Kwakiutl live entirely on stores, and one would think the dilemma of
the Summer could be put by. Yet the *tsetseqa* is dedicated to attaining
the harmony that is unattainable in the Summer. For this to be possible
there has to be a shift from the *baxus* life--the life that relates men to
the natural world where behaviour is determined--to the intra- and inter­
personal plane of culture where men are free to be responsible for their
actions. I conclude from my examination of the texts that the conceptual
and ethical significance the Kwakiutl give to the *baxus/tsetseqa* dichotomy
resides in this shift.

My argument follows two lines. The major one I pursue in my exami-
nation of rituals (including the prayers), another, which is substantiating and supportive, in my examination of myths. The division is due to the character of the texts. In the texts of prayers and rituals we have the reflection of a direct experience of the dilemma men face in their relation to the outside, non-human world. In the myths we have speculation—an intellectual commentary on the dilemma showing it up in a new and unexpected light. The character of the texts differs in a further respect. Ritual texts are simple in form, close to experience in subject matter, and complex and difficult in thought. Myths on the other hand are highly organized formal texts in the examination of which replicable methods of analysis can be employed. On both counts myths are suitable for testing and validating what has been garnered from the less accessible ritual texts.

I have arranged my material so that three examinations of myth enclose the two examinations of ritual that contain the main argument of the thesis. The discussion of the rituals is found in Chapters 2 and 4, that of myth in Chapters 1, 3 and the Epilogue. In the texts used for Chapters 1--4: the connection between baxus and tsetsega is only suggested; in the Epilogue I examine texts in which it is spelled out explicitly.

In Chapter 1 I attempt to give a general background to Kwakiutl thinking in a formalised account in which I focus on the problem of the relation between individual and society. I analyse the Kwakiutl initiation myth in terms of this problem. My analysis brings out that the Kwakiutl saw the relation as depending on the individual proving himself by an act of courage, and by distributing the gain from this act to the community. I argue that this voluntary act frees the individual, and that the community becomes itself an association of free members through his freedom. This interrelation represents the necessary conceptual background to the
problematic relation between men and animals with its resolution in the
initiation of the tsetseqa, which is the subject of my thesis and which I
begin to discuss in Chapter 2.

In Chapter 2, a study of Kwakiutl prayers, I have set out to establish
the problematic relation of men to non-human beings by considering two
extreme statements, one contained in prayers to the sun, the other in
prayers to animals used for food. Prayers to the sun are the expression
of an ideal state vis-a-vis the outside world; man is simply a grateful
and passive receiver. The fact that this state is ideal also means that
it is a closed system: the relation to the sun, though important in
itself, has no reverberation in Kwakiutl thought as a whole and is not
reflected in ethical action. No link connects it with the tsetseqa. By
contrast the prayers to animals used for food express the dilemma of being
forced to "kill one's friends". Necessity makes the ideal of grateful
passivity impossible here. The prayers thus raise the issue of determi-
nation and freedom, which I take to be the central issue for the Kwakiutl,
generative of thought and of ethical action. They also raise the issue
of the divided will, because, though men do not wish to kill their friends,
they are intent on doing just that. I show how this divided intention
is reflected in a representation of the animals as double-natured, and
how the ambiguity of the representation enables the Kwakiutl to connect
the animals with the initiating spirits of the Winter. I draw the conclu-
sion that this use of symbols opens the way to a genuine resolution of
the dilemma of baxus life in the tsetseqa.

In Chapter 3, a study of the hunting myths of the area, I consolidate
my findings laid out in the chapter on prayers. I show how the myths
concentrate on the double intention of men, reflected again in a represen-
tation of the animal as double. I argue that the hunting myth is closely
related to the initiation myth in form, but turns on an opposed if complementary principle: the hunting myth shows man's failure to find true rapport with the non-human world while the initiation myth explores the possibilities of a true rapport between men. A solution of the problem of determinism is approached in the hunting myths by the evolution of mediator figures which have part in both human and animal nature and unite the claims of nature and culture. I draw the conclusion that this attempt does not represent a satisfactory solution, (1) because the claims of nature and culture cannot in fact be united, (2) because in the super-human mediator figure the solution is removed from the active intellectual and ethical participation of the individual. A comparison of the mediator figure with the figure of the initiate shows that in the tsetseqa the conditions for such an active participation for the individual are present.

In Chapter 4, a study of rituals for animals, I complete the argument of Chapters 2 and 3 by bringing out the isomorphism between the ritual for animals used for food and the initiation ritual. I examine the first salmon ritual from three points of view: as a rite of desacralization; as the rhetorical figure of a "potlatch" with the animal that puts men into the position of having to requite; as a dramatization of the animal as hero, laying down its life voluntarily for men. I try to show how each of these aspects remains "open", demanding completion in the tsetseqa; and how the dramatization of the initiate as hero, laying down his life voluntarily for the community, complements the ritual for animals on the human and social level and represents simultaneously a repaying of the debt accumulated in bexus life.

The Epilogue is not the study of a separate genre, like the preceding chapters, but a bringing together of the strands of the argument through an examination of myths that are transitional between hunting and initia-
tion myths. These myths explicitly spell out the connection between baxus and tsetseqa. They stress the problem of baxus life in the image of the revengeful hostility of the animals and show the process of resolution through the act of courage of the initiate-hero. If the hero voluntarily faces the threat of death the animals represent—if he makes up for his acts of violence as a hunter and eater by letting himself be hunted and eaten—the animals turn into givers of treasure. The treasure is the ritual; and the gaining of the ritual itself is represented in the myth as the change for the whole society from unconsciousness to consciousness, from being ruled by terror of inscrutable outside forces to facing the cause of fear in oneself and by facing it resolving it.

I set out to establish that these myths are about the process of becoming human. As transitional myths, which have part in the thought of the baxus and the tsetseqa, they demonstrate that becoming human involves for the Kwakiutl a development in two directions at once: towards the non-human world the animals represent and towards the interpersonal world of the community of men. The Kwakiutl image this development in two directions by the one act of voluntarily facing that which one most deeply fears—in mythical language the revenge of the animals in their wrathful aspect. I argue that in relation to the animals this means an act of expiation, and on the human level a becoming responsible for one’s own fate. My analysis of the myth shows that the Kwakiutl saw in this change of consciousness the basis of a truly human society.
Footnotes

1. The history of their collection, method of recording and publication has been fully laid out by Boas in his preface to the *Religion of the Kwakiutl Indians*, Part I, Texts (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1930).
CHAPTER 1

PRINCIPLES OF KWAKIUTL THOUGHT

1. Cosmic Order as Norm for Thought

In this introductory section I am putting forward an abbreviated and concentrated account of Kwakiutl forms of thought. It is not meant as an advance summary of my thesis. All I am doing is to show some logical relations that are the substance of Kwakiutl thinking, supporting the particular manifestations. There will be occasion to look back to these principles throughout.

In doing this I make the assumption that there is a system of interrelated terms which permits an account of the cosmology, ritual, myth and theology. "As such" the system is not known. Yet there is a representation of it in every "language" used in the culture: language, visual art, architecture, cooking to mention only a few. The representation of the system in language allows me to use two words—baxus and tsetseqa—as two postulated terms.

The distinction between baxus and tsetseqa is the fundamental opposition in the Kwakiutl structural universe. First and foremost it is a practical one: baxus designates the summer half of the year when the people are dispersed to gather food, tsetseqa the winter half when they live in permanent villages and celebrate their great annual rituals. Secondly the two words are closely bound to cosmic regularities: the increasing strength of the sun and long days of the baxus period bring plants and animals, particularly the spectacular run of fish in their spawning seasons; the tsetseqa period short days and long nights and the disappearance of the rich plant and animal life. Social organisation follows these cosmic
regularities. In the baxus period the secular rank ordering obtains, while in the tsetseqa period the tribe unites to a virtual theocracy.\(^1\)

Because the opposition is a cosmic norm it is, in a society so dependent on the rhythms of nature normative for logical thought. In ancient Greek the word cosmos means organisation, order, an orderly system. The idea of cosmic regularity is therefore for us too bound up with that of a logical system, classification, structure, and taxonomy. This is still truer for the Kwakiutl.

I have made use of four linguistic terms to elucidate four different ways in which the baxus/tsetseqa opposition is treated by the Kwakiutl. The terms can be found in work on componential analysis and semantic linguistics. They are clearly set out at the beginning of Geoffrey Leech's *Towards a Semantic Description of English*.\(^2\) If we analyse the opposition with the help of these terms we find that it is treated by the Kwakiutl in the following ways:

1. as a taxonomic system (on the model of male/female)
2. as a relative system (on the model of above/below)
3. as a predicative structure (on the model of an assertion)
4. as a polar system (on the model of rich/poor)\(^3\)

1(a) Use of the Words Baxus and Tsetseqa

The words are not easily translatable. They are both used as nouns, baxus also as an attribute, while tsetseqa as an attribute is naualak, supernatural, holy, wonderful, magic.

Baxus
1) for the summer period, when the secular social system is in force,
2) in the winter for the group of people who have not been initiated or are temporarily not visited by the spirits,
3) for all that is ordinary in contrast to the extraordinary or supernatural,
4) for persons or actions that profane.

Baxus can, therefore, be translated as profane, ordinary.

Tsetseqa is used

1) for the winter period, when the organisation of the dancing societies is in force,

2) for the winter ceremonial itself,

3) for the members of the highest secret societies.

The word tsetseqa means false, untrue but sgeqela to be good-minded, happy is also used for the ceremonial. In all Kwakiutl dialects the word tsea has to do with the word for or concept of shaman. Boas translated it as "the secrets", a very skilful translation in view of the fact that technically the winter ritual is a mystery.¹

The two words refer, therefore, first of all to the Kwakiutl division of the year. Secondly, they refer to a moiety division that takes place in the winter when the society divides into groups with holy and profane members. The winter ritual cannot take place without the co-operation of both groups, the baxus and the tsetseqa one. It, therefore, reflects the division of the year. Cosmic reality is mirrored in the social reality of the ritual.

1(b) Baxus and Tsetseqa as Taxonomic and as Relative Systems

Of the four ways in which the Kwakiutl treat the difference between baxus and tsetseqa three belong to componential systems while in one a structural relation between the terms is established. A taxonomic system is simply a classification system in which the terms are named to keep them apart. As names for the summer and winter periods baxus and tsetseqa form a binary taxonomic opposition. The two terms are subsumed under year, just as, say, man/woman are subsumed under human being.

Baxus and tsetseqa are, however, not only the names for the summer and
winter period, they also correspond to the opposition between sacred and profane. In Kwakiutl thought sacred and profane are a relative system, and a relative system is not consistent with a taxonomic one. While the purpose of the taxonomic system is to keep the terms apart and fix their differences, in a relative system each term can melt into the other according to the point of view taken. I have given the opposition above/below as an example. Obviously, that which is "above" relative to something lower can also be "below" relative to something higher.

In a relative system the terms should correspond to logical converses, as above/below in fact do. But baxus/tsetseqa in Kwakiutl thought is a somewhat lopsided system. Though the profane always and only exists in relation to the sacred, that which is highest and most sacred has a certain absolute quality which exists independent of the profane. The system is, therefore, like a Chinese box system in which the innermost, most secret box contains something which does not itself belong to the system of boxes. This is generally so with systems of sacred and profane. A Kwakiutl example might almost be created to illustrate the point: at the winter ritual the Kwakiutl have a taboo house in the village which is used for the hamatsa, initiation. It is called lopeq, empty, that is empty of all that is baxus or profane. Inside it is a "secret room" which stands for the house of Baxbakualanuxsiwa, the Great Cannibal. Inside this room dwells the novice, who stands for the Great Cannibal at this juncture, and who is called naualak, supernatural. The members of the community, who are already sanctified by an entrance ceremony, are seated in relation to that sacred space according to their degree of sanctification. The Sparrows, who are most baxus sit farthest away, the Seals, who are tsetseqa, closer. Among the Seals the laxsa, "gone into the house", closest--they are even allowed to enter the inner sanctuary, as their name implies. The
The word means something like having failed, and who have only "leant against the wall"—have to stay outside (see Boas 1897: 446; 506--7; 420). The most sacred is here the novice, who is also the most secret and hidden, and at the same time the centre of the system. Each smaller box is sacred in relation to the larger one that surrounds it and profane in relation to the smaller one it contains.5

1(c) Baxus and tsetseqa as a Predicative Structure

A The Mythico-Scientific Picture

To recapitulate: the purpose of "naming" in a taxonomic system is to set the terms apart and keep them apart. In a relative system the terms are confounded, each term taking on the nature of its opposite according to the vantage point from which it is viewed. The two uses of baxus and tsetseqa belong therefore to two logically incompatible systems.

They are, however, reconciled, or at least approximated, in Kwakiutl thought. The Kwakiutl have worked out an interesting predicative structural relation between the terms. They say that—"in the Summer baxus is on top and tsetseqa below, and in the Winter vice versa" (1897: 418). Each term is here subdivided into itself and its opposite immanent in itself, so that we have instead of a twofold a fourfold division:

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{baxus} \\
\text{tsetseqa}
\end{array}
\quad
\begin{array}{c}
\text{tsetseqa} \\
\text{baxus}
\end{array}
\]

By subdivision the terms form assertions—"in the Summer baxus is on top and tsetseqa below"—and the assertions are reversals of each other ("in the Winter tsetseqa is on top and baxus below"). The assertions refer primarily to baxus and tsetseqa in their nature of sacred and profane. What is asserted is that no such thing as a purely profane season exists,
the sacred is present, though hidden, and vice versa.

The two opposing assertions are seen in the context of the opposition between Summer and Winter, that is, they belong to the binary taxonomic system *baxus/tsetseqa*. Yet they refer to the relative system of sacred and profane. What must be considered is that in the context of the whole statement the reversal is effected by reference to the change of the seasons within the year, so that one could say that time (or the corresponding Kwakiutl concept) mediates the oppositions and also brings the two logically incompatible systems closer. Indeed, if we look at the cosmic context as the Kwakiutl see it a picture emerges, in which the taxonomic system and the relative system are combined in the structural relation of the double assertion.

There is no complete record of how the Kwakiutl saw the world. There is in fact no reason to believe that they had one co-ordinated picture; the fragments mentioned below may well represent two views of the world, held side by side, different because they belong to different contexts but compatible because they are both based on perception and traditional belief. My account has been pieced together from source material in Boas and from the myths. Boas' *Geographical Names of the Kwakiutl Indians* is an important source.

The two main geographical directions the Kwakiutl use are "upstream" and "downstream". Their territory is bounded in the East by the high coastal range which drains into the Pacific. The Pacific itself forms the western boundary of Kwakiutl territory. "Upstream" is therefore the mountains at their back, "downstream" the sea before them, which their villages usually face.

The sea itself is seen as a stream running to our North, where it pours into a hole or entrance of the underworld. The mythical northland
is the abode of the spirits of the winter ritual. Wherever the Kwakiutl are settled, therefore, whether it is on the riverbanks or on the ocean beaches, they live alongside running water that rushes towards the underworld. This gives them a perception of dark, unknown lands, lands of death, lying out to the North and West. When the spirits of the North come to the Kwakiutl villages in the winter, their tsetseqa power, originating in the North, seems to slowly flood the earth.

But these unknown lands are not only lands of death, but simultaneously also of generation. The undersea world is also the place of wealth, and especially to the West lie the countries of the salmon, of twins and of dwarfs, all of which connote wealth and fertility. This conception is connected with another cosmic notion, that of the course of the sun.

The Kwakiutl believe that in its diurnal course the sun sinks into the sea in the West and travels at night through the waters of the underworld, so to speak at the back of the world. At dawn it rises from the mountains of the East and travels the sky by day. It, therefore, travels in the subterranean waters by night but in the daytime it leaps into the celestial sphere that is its element.
It is due to the presence of the sun in the submarine world that this world can be seen as a world of generation as well as a world of death. The sun is reduced to its most condensed form in its travels through the underworld—a sort of spark—and this spark with its potentiality makes the sea "pregnant".

The Kwakiutl also plotted the annual course of the sun, and this scientifically. They saw the world as round, a disk bounded by the horizon or edge of the world. The horizon, or edge of the world was marked by the points at which the sun rose and set in its annual movements. The Kwakiutl plotted these points by taking bearing by means of two fixed landmarks and continuing the line to the horizon. They knew the solstices and the equinoxes. At the time of the Summer solstice the celestial journey of the sun is longest and its stay in the underworld shortest. This makes the earth almost entirely baxus except for a small sector in the North. The Winter solstice falls in the middle of the winter ritual. At this time the sun appears above the horizon for only a few hours. The earth is, therefore, a place of the tsetseqa at this time. But—and this is the point at which the cosmic picture given here co-incides with the assertions about sacred and profane seasons—the earth is never completely given over to either baxus or tsetseqa. Even when the one is most completely "on top" the other can always be seen underneath:

FIGURE 2

baxus world at Summer solstice          tsetseqa world at Winter solstice
B Structure and Mediation

Our next task is to put this mythico-scientific world picture into formal terms.

We have seen that in the Kwakiutl statement about baxus and tsetseqa each term is subdivided into itself and its opposite immanent in itself so that we have instead of a twofold a fourfold division. The subdivided terms form assertions. "When baxus is on top tsetseqa is below" is an assertion. The terms have been put into a specific relationship. They form a structure; a predicative structure because what is said about the main term in each assertion, what modifies it or "divides" it, is the main point of what is asserted.

The assertion formed by each subdivided term is, however, not a simple assertion but is temporally qualified: "in the Summer", "in the Winter". It is the whole statement that forms the assertion: "in the Summer baxus is on top and tsetseqa below, and vice versa in the Winter". The temporal qualifications, read together, show that baxus and tsetseqa are seen as contained in their higher unit, the year. And the reversed positions of the subdivided terms in the assertions show that a movement is intended. Baxus and tsetseqa follow one another inside the unit of the year, and the "year" is that Kwakiutl earth, the disk with a concealed side and a revealed one, a "light" and a "dark" one. Whenever one part rises to the top, the other is necessarily below, and the two alternate through the rhythms of what we call time and the Kwakiutl, more precisely though equally unscientifically, the travels of the sun. A frequent honorific name for the sun is Walking-to-and-fro-in-the-World or Great-Walking-to-and-fro-all-over-the-World. This seems to confirm that the Kwakiutl do not see rhythmically recurring time as cyclic but as a to-ing and fro-ing between extremes, and simultaneously, because of the strongly spatial associations,
a dipping and rising. However, for our purpose it is sufficiently accurate to say that baxus and tsetseqa because they are seasons of the year are mediated by cyclic time. This mediation brings about a reversal of terms—sometimes the one is "on top", sometimes the other—which is itself the consequence of a reversal of functions. One could, therefore, generally say that when baxus and tsetseqa are put into a predicative structural relation inside a framework of time, then time allies itself to function in order to bring about a reversal of terms or, more briefly mediation occurs through a reversal of terms and functions inside a time dimension.

Mediation always has to do with power relations. This will become quite clear below when we discuss the social application of the formula in the polar system. The reversal of terms is a conducting of power from the positive to the negative, or from the fuller, stronger, to the emptier, weaker. The principle should already be apparent here if we look at the relations the terms form inside their higher unit.

When the originally simple binary opposition is represented as four-fold—baxus on top, tsetseqa below in one half of the unit and tsetseqa on top baxus below in the other half—then a dominant-subordinate relationship is established between the terms in each subdivision. And because the relationship of dominance and subordination is reversed in the two halves, equality is achieved between the terms in each full cycle. With perpetually revolving cycles this equality is never concretely realised, but exists as a fact present to the mind. The fact of the balancing middle pervades social thought and action, and is present in myth, and represented in ritual.

By this I do not mean that people celebrating a potlatch have necessarily the baxus/tsetseqa opposition in their minds. They may or may not; it would depend on customary linguistic usage. But the logical
operation of dividing two opposed terms into dominating and subordinate
partners, and then reverse the relation, is a basic principle of Kwakiutl
thought. In the statement the Kwakiutl make about baxus and tsetseqa
cosmic regularity is set up as a general model for applied thought. The
important difference between the model (cosmic) and the applied thought
(social) lies in the different types of mediation that are at issue. On
the level of experiencing the world man is passive; he cannot influence
the motions of the sun, and the cyclic return of baxus to dominate over
tsetseqa and tsetseqa conquering baxus is outside his control. But when
the same logic is applied on social levels of experience, man is active;
he makes happen what happens automatically on the cosmic level. He applies
it to status grading and exchange, to religious experience and to marriage,
represents it in visual art on screens and masks, and develops it in
myths. Due to the stress on the voluntary character mediation has on the
social level, its rhetorical expression is the fight. Its best known
form is the potlatch where it characterizes relations between the host
group and the guest group. In visual art it appears emblem fashion as
the famous Wakashan motif of the bird and the whale, in myth as the fight
between two brothers or the fight of the culture hero with one of the
"owners" of power (e.g. the man who owns the sun, the women who owns fire
or the salmon), in ritual as the fight between the ritual moieties, the
Sparrows and Seals, or the fight between initiate and spirit. On each
level another application of the same formula is worked out. In every
case the terms are opposed as antagonists in a battle. True to the cosmic
model that which is "below" at the beginning of the fight--the smaller, the
weaker--wins in the end. It is a law of these fights that the weaker
defeats the stronger. (The law that in every mediation a permutation of
power takes place at which the fuller pours itself into the emptier remains;
but this new law adds a paradoxical dimension to it through the element of aggressive will in that term which we have so far seen only as negative or subordinate.) Being victorious, the weaker, of course, becomes the stronger and is, in his turn, defeated.

The potlatch provides an excellent illustration of this principle. The structural position of the antagonists is here as follows: When a potlatch begins the host is "weak" and "poor" and his guests, in whose debt he is, are "rich" and "strong". At the end of the potlatch, when he has given away all he has and preferably more than he ever received--this can be done by destruction of property as well as by gift because not exchange but self-denuding is the first object--when he has given all away he becomes "strong" and "rich" and his guests, who are now in his debt are "weak" and "poor". Equality lies between the extremes of giving away as practiced between the two groups, and it is only in connection with this intangible structural mean that it makes sense to talk about mutually beneficial reciprocal exchange.

Why should it be necessary that relations between social groups be reversed all the time? The answer I am prepared to give in the framework of this discussion is not particularly deep. It simply goes back to the fact that there are different types of mediation. On the cosmic level, mediation is ineluctable through time itself. On the social level it is human effort that turns the wheel. What this effort achieves through continued exchange of their relative position is connection between the social groups. Without this effort at connection the society would not exist. Naturally there are societies with a stable status hierarchy where this constant juggling with grading is unheard of and which are still coherent societies. In these cases another sort of effort at connection is at work, for instance, division of labour and mutual interdependence as among
the Indian castes.

But people do not think that connection between groups is itself enough to make a society. They must also be connected with a superhuman world which provides both a measure for their everyday activities and a source of strength. This necessary connection is made by the Kwakiutl exactly on the pattern on which their social groups are connected. In each case an active effort of the will is necessary. In the winter ritual, when mediation is between the profane and the sacred—that is between men and the supernatural spirits—it is by giving away oneself.

This last twist of the principle gives rise to an interesting logical question. How is it that the subordinate partner in the relationship—which is always and inevitably man—should be able to gain dominance by divesting himself of himself? In order to answer we have to turn to the polar system, where mediation is most consequently worked out.

1(d) The Polar System: Kwakiutl Logic of Giving

Up to now we have considered mediation in general terms: one set of relations can be changed into another set of relations by the use of a mediating agent. In the cosmic sphere change is wrought by time, in the sphere of society, by "giving away". With the help of the polar system we can examine the mechanics of mediation more precisely. In speaking of "rich" and "strong" as opposed to "poor" and "weak" we have already arrived at terms that belong to a polar system. Polar terms accept modification by degree: richer, weaker etc. This means that the poles can be moved closer together by using less extreme terms. In this way mediation is achieved between opposed poles. The mediating term is always ambiguous; it has something of the extreme term it replaces and something of its opposite.

In the context of the polar system baxus and tsetseqa stand for pro-
fane in the sense of poor and empty, as opposed to sacred in the sense of
tull and rich. Tsetsêq is here better replaced by its attribute naualak,
supernatural. The profane world can only be defined negatively, as empty
--it only exists in relation to the wealth of the supernatural world. In
the baxus season animals and plants and other blessings come to people to
make them "rich". They are thanked in prayers for their coming and
addressed as "supernatural ones".

Mediation between the two poles--the human, poor and the supernatural,
rich one--cannot be automatic as it was in the cosmic sphere. It is a
complicated process, which depends on human initiative. Basically, it
can only be achieved if the supernatural pours its wealth into the waiting
vessel of the ordinary or profane. But the supernatural is conceived as
self-sufficient, that is, immobile and static, and man has to activate it.
However, according to the do ut des principle we have already met, move­
ment is dependent on giving. What can man give when he is faced with the
supernatural, that itself contains all wealth? Mediation depends here,
as I have already mentioned, on the sacrifice of self. This means in its
turn, that the mediator is annihilated. How is a connection to be estab­
lished if it depends on the wiping out of the connector? It is this that
makes mediation between the human and the supernatural so complicated. At
the same time it is this very complication and its solution that makes
transactions with the supernatural into a standard for action inside the
human sphere. Everything simpler is derived from this perfect model.
We shall therefore analyse a simpler derived example before turning to the
"thing itself" and considering it in detail. The best example is again
the potlatch.

A key term of Kwakiutl thought is wealth. All relationships--whether
between men and men or between men and the supernatural--are power relation-
ships and wealth is the gauge of power. A man is powerful in direct relation to how much wealth he can give away and actually gives away. Correspondingly, a man is not powerless in direct relation to how much wealth he receives, because received wealth helps him to give away in his turn. Receiving therefore creates a state that might be called powerlessness *, or enhanced powerlessness.

In the course of the potlatch the potlatching host narrows the distance between his poverty and the guests' wealth by giving away more and more until--having given as much as he ever received--a point of reversal is reached. If he continues giving the poles move apart again, but now positions are reversed: the host gets richer and more powerful and the guests poorer as they sink deeper into his debt. However, the very fact of their receiving gifts is already the basis of a further reversal because with the help of their wealth they will put him into their debt in turn. Potlatch guests therefore depart in a state of enriched poverty, defeated, but with the potentiality of future victory contained in their defeat.

In the potlatch relationship the mediating objects—that which narrows the gap between the status poles—are material goods. Their significance in Kwakiutl thought lies in the fact that they can be identified with the host (or, more precisely, with his group); his wealth is part of him and as he gives it away or destroys it, it stands in his stead.¹⁶ Power is therefore basically gained by a destruction of the self—even if only in a symbolic gesture. In this way the potlatch reflects the relation between man and the supernatural.

The supernatural, however, is the source of all power and there is, therefore, a radical difference. In the social field it is wealth that mediates status, but only current wealth, wealth that has been spent. The whole principle rests on the possibility of a general exchange in which
the partners are equal. Everyone has the power to gain wealth and the
power to give it away. The salient fact in the field of religious
experience, on the other hand, is that the partners are unequal and that
no wealth circulates between them. The supernatural is the source of all
wealth, and man is always poor face to face with it. Moreover the super­
natural is by its nature unmoved and unmoving, and men have to unlock it
by their own efforts. The de ut possis dare of the potlatch is difficult
to establish here because man has nothing to give. He is, in relation to
the supernatural, not relatively, but absolutely poor. However, the
poorest creature has itself to give, and the moving power of man--that
which changes relation between him and the supernatural--lies in this gift
of himself.

This brings us back to the question of domination. As we have seen,
by Kwakiutl logic it is only through a permutation of power--by the domina­
ted dominating, that is, by a reversal of roles and functions--that the
poor and powerless can become rich and powerful. But the supernatural
cannot be dominated and, in any case, the aim of man in relation to it is
not dominance but, unceasingly to gain its gifts. This is a real impasse
and would be impossible to get out of if the Kwakiutl had not, in myth and
ritual, created a domain in which the supernatural appears on a plane on
which an exchange of power is possible.

We must visualize again man "poor", and the endless distance that
separates him from the supernatural, which is "rich". In initiation, man
moves the poles together by giving himself, voluntarily, to his supernatural
spirit. This gift puts him in a position of dominance: the spirit is in
his debt. Yet, giving himself away--annihilating his self--the man has
become the spirit. And with this putting off of his manhood and putting
on spirithood he has gained all the wealth of the spirit, the spirit-power.
But because he has received this gift he is already again in the spirit's debt, he is "poor" in relation to the spirit, who himself remains unchanged. The gift of the spirit is called Lo'gwe, a supernatural treasure, and the person who gains such a treasure is called Lo'gwenuk.\textsuperscript{17} He corresponds exactly to the guest who departed from the potlatch in a state of "enriched poverty". But what makes the transaction between man and the supernatural so much more complicated is that both have to be host and both have to be guest at one meeting.\textsuperscript{18}

However that may be, man comes away from that meeting still a man, but his powerlessness has now a plus instead of a minus. Among the Tsimshian the novice who had completed his initiation was therefore called "a perfect man".\textsuperscript{19} Though the phrase is not recorded for the Kwakiutl, their conception of the initiate is also that of a perfect man.

The Private and the Public: The Structure of the Kwakiutl Initiation Myth

This section on the structure of the Kwakiutl initiation myth has two aims. First, to show the principles we have discussed in the last section in their application to Kwakiutl collective life. Kwakiutl thought is always applied thought, and the values that determine its application are those of the community of men. The initiation myth gives a concise, if formal account of what the Kwakiutl considered the right relation between individual and society. To investigate this collective perspective completes my survey of the basic principles of Kwakiutl thought. Second, the aim of this section is to provide background information on the tsetseq. We shall be examining texts throughout the thesis that are on the one hand concerned with the problems of baxus life and on the other point forward to their solution in the tsetseq. A study of the initiation myth will give us a comprehensive picture in a condensed form of how
the Kwakiutl represented the thought of the *tsetseqa* to themselves. Familiarity with this picture will make it easier to follow the connections between *baxus* and *tsetseqa* as they emerge from an examination of the prayers, hunting myths and rituals for animals.

In speaking of principles of Kwakiutl thought one cannot avoid touching on the issue of determinism. This issue, which plays a central role in Kwakiutl thinking, does not reveal itself sufficiently clearly in so formalised an account as I am giving in this chapter. I therefore want to point out very briefly its place in the context. In the last section we have considered two things: cosmic regularities that are a norm for thought, but are contemplated by man passively; and the translation of these into the laws of social interrelation, where men are active. This translation of the mechanical and automatic in the natural sphere to the deliberate and willed in culture reflects the issue of determination and freedom on the most general level. In the formal account I give of the initiation myth in this section, the issue is reflected in power groupings. Power appears as "supernatural power" in the myth and is aligned with a state of freedom from necessity. Necessity and lack of power are synonymous. Freedom from necessity is not synonymous with freedom but is represented as a fundamental condition of freedom. This links the power theme with the wealth theme in the myth. "Power" and "wealth" are even linguistically related for the Kwakiutl (see n.17). A comparison with the texts we shall be examining in the following chapters may serve to draw attention to how the issue of determinism is treated in the imagery of the initiation myth. Prayers, hunting myths and rituals for animals all get their impetus from a realistic situation: the necessity to get food. As a consequence they are explicitly concerned with the question of human boundness in relation to the natural world. Initiation myths explore the
possibilities of human freedom, and have no comparable connection with realistic situations of need. Yet possibilities of freedom can only be worked out against a background which formulates, in some way, conditions of necessity or constraint. Initiation myths therefore always begin with a lack, and this lack is represented at its simplest as a famine, that is a collective lack of the basic necessities of life. The end shows a state where the lack is not only overcome but plenty replaces want. Not sufficiency but only plenty can adequately express the idea of freedom. Without being in the least preoccupied with the question of human boundness, the initiation myth therefore "reflects" necessity in order to emphasise possibilities of freedom. The transformation of the beginning state into the end state is always dependent on the deed of an individual who gains power from a supernatural spirit. This power, which is also his "treasure", he distributes to his community. The common-weal is therefore dependent on individual initiative and public spiritedness. The philosophical position seems to be that the conditions for freedom are found in the individual alone, but its field of expression is the public realm. My treatment of the initiation myth is too general to penetrate to the theme of freedom and extrapolate it. To do this I would need to consider actual texts. Nor is such a penetration part of the intention of this introductory chapter. But it should be noted that a study as general as this always must fall short of a satisfactory analysis. The proof is that it cannot do justice to an issue which is, in fact, an important part of the relationship between individual and society.

Finally, a word about the method employed in this section. In 1969 a group of Russian folklorists published a monograph on the structural analysis of fairy tales, a subject to which one of them, Meletinsky, had already devoted a considerable body of work. My own work on Kwakiutl
texts had long convinced me of the existence of a close relationship between the Kwakiutl initiation myth and European fairy tales. Other students of the Kwakiutl had pointed to this relationship earlier, notably Werner Müller, but it had never been methodologically demonstrated.21 With the appearance of Meletinsky's monograph the points on which the analogy rests became clear. His careful scientific examination brings out structural features in the fairy tale which can only be explained through a parallel examination of the Kwakiutl initiation myth. My study of the initiation myth is such a parallel examination. My method in this section is therefore the reverse of that which I applied in the last section. There I elucidate the ways in which the Kwakiutl use the baxus/tsetseqa opposition with the help of linguistic terms. Here I am using the structure of Kwakiutl myth, developed analytically in a living context, to elucidate Meletinsky's formula for the fairy tale. The first method provides an opportunity for us to understand Kwakiutl logic, the second provides an opportunity to see a logic at work in our own fairy tales that is, in the ordinary way, inaccessible to us.

In order to separate out the type of myth I call initiation myth from the Kwakiutl corpus, I have in the past examined a hundred Kwakiutl myths, arbitrarily selected, for their structures. My method of analysis is on record in two papers: "A Methodological Inquiry into the Structure of Kwakiutl Myth" and "Analytical Units in Folkloristics".22

2(a) Meletinsky's Formula of Tests as Structure

In his study of the classical fairy tale Meletinsky makes no claim that his formula applies outside the fairy tale. On the contrary, he describes the structure of the fairy tale as unique and specifically excludes myth from the scope of his formula.23 However, his formula
applies with certain modifications to the Kwakiutl initiation myth.\textsuperscript{24}

These myths have the same structure as the classical fairy tale, but, when looked at in the ethnographic context, it becomes clear that the underlying structural principle is not that of the test or trial of the hero which Meletinsky singles out, but what I call the victory of the weaker over the stronger. While I cannot, therefore, apply Meletinsky's formula directly to the myths, nevertheless it corresponds with a more general scheme, which, because it moves on a higher level of abstraction, covers both fairy tale and myth. Meletinsky's formula is a particular solution of what seems to be a more general rule about tale making. That myth is a sort of metastructure for the fairy tale is, of course, not a new idea. However, the general assumption that the classical fairy tale has developed out of a context of myth and ritual, which Meletinsky shares, seems to me to require more specific substantiation, and I am using Kwakiutl myth and ritual as an illustration of what I take to be a precise original scheme lying behind Meletinsky's scheme for the fairy tale.\textsuperscript{25}

Meletinsky has formulated the structure of the fairy tale on the thematic level in terms of three tests for the hero (see 1974: 80). The passing of each test leads to the attaining of a "tale value," and each value is the condition of the passing of the next test. The tests stand therefore in a hierarchical relationship to one another, with the highest tale value, obtained at the end of the tale, consisting in marriage to the princess. Meletinsky's formula is as follows, with Es signifying tests, Ls tale values, and horizontal bars above letters losses or misfortunes:

\[ E\ell...E\lambda...E\ell...E'\ell...E'\ell' \quad \text{where } E = f(\varepsilon\lambda) \text{ and } E' = f(L) \]

Here Meletinsky closely follows lines mapped out by the classical work of Propp.\textsuperscript{26} He orders Propp's syntagmatic chain of structural units
under fewer, more abstract headings. In calling his units tests he underscores the finding of Propp that the structural unit of the fairy tale has necessarily a binary character; for instance that of struggle-victory, or task-solution, interdiction-transgression, trickery-complicity or whatever the case may be. He goes beyond Propp in his observation that these blocks stand in a hierarchical relationship to one another. Further, he links the binary narrative blocks with a scheme of oppositions that is based on the characteristics of the dramatis personae. The central opposition of the fairy tale is one's own/foreign, and hero and villain are grouped, each with their entourage of characters and objects, on these two opposing sides.

The important thing about Meletinsky's study is that he has shown the unchanging structure of the classical fairy tale in his formula of tests and that he has related the motif to this structure. The "personage characteristics" which underlie the classification of Aarne and Thompson have been examined for their regularities, ordered and brought into relation to the structure. My study does not attempt to add anything to Meletinsky's work, which must be epoch-making for the classification of fairy tales. It is a study of the structure itself in its relation to a living ethnographic context; and incidentally it hopes to show some of the original loci of the motifs in an archaic prototype of the fairy tale. It is not an analysis of individual myths but an examination of the gross relations between Meletinsky's formula and the Kwakiutl initiation myth.

The Kwakiutl myths I am discussing present a precise metastructure of the fairy tale. The structural parts are dramatic episodes which stand in the same hierarchical relationship to one another as the tests of the fairy tale. This relationship is dictated by the ritual to which the stories belong. The ritual poses two problems, one for the initiate
who is the hero of the tale), and one for the community. These problems have to be solved in the course of a tale which is the validating myth of the ritual. The structure is therefore of a dramatic sort, that is, like drama, it consists of a complication-solution pattern. This pattern appears in the individual episodes and in the overall organization which orders the episodes in relation to one another.

For all its differences in “tale-world”—a moral world of hero and villain—the fairy tale is also built on the dramatic pattern of complication-solution. This is why Propp’s type of analysis, which takes actions as stable analytic units is so successful. In the myth and in the fairy tale complication consists of the confrontation of two protagonists. But it is according to the law of the ritual—that is, for an extra-literary reason which cannot be traced in the fairy tale—that the weaker always wins. In the myth this law is spelled out clearly by the weight given to the main oppositions. What Meletinsky calls one’s own/foreign for the fairy tale appears as natural world (village) versus supernatural world (forest, mountain, sea) in the myth. This distinction carries connotations of poor versus rich or powerless versus powerful. The hero who leaves the natural world (of which he is a part) for the supernatural one is always the weaker in an encounter. But his very weakness and the passivity enforced by it are the conditions of his gaining power from the supernatural beings he meets. Even if this law does not appear so clearly on the thematic level it is also present in the fairy tale. In the hierarchy of power set up by the fairy tale the hero is always lowest while the villain is at the top. The villain is active, while the hero is passive; and yet it is the behaviour into which the villain forces him by his dominance that gains the hero his supremacy at the end.
Meletinsky notes the passivity of the hero as a structural feature of the fairy tale but cannot account for it. It is, in fact, part of the peculiar pattern of myth and fairy tale. The complication of this drama is the encounter of a weak, or powerless, protagonist with a powerful one. The solution is the overcoming of the powerful one by the powerless, and the handing on of power. The unifying structural principle in the myth and the fairy tale is the permutation of power, and it is into this context that the passivity of the hero fits.

Let me repeat my argument in terms of the structural study of myth and fairy tale. The structural unit of myth, the dramatic episode with its binary structure of complication-solution, corresponds to Propp's function and Meletinsky's test. The overall dramatic pattern of complication-solution which orders the episodes in relation to one another, corresponds to Meletinsky's hierarchical structure. This double dramatic organization, that repeats the organization of the single unit in that of the whole, could be called the metastructure of the fairy tale in a purely formal, context-free definition.

But the study of myths in their ethnographic context shows the principle underlying this structure, and it is only recognition of this principle that makes a precise account of myth as metastructure for the fairy tale possible. Though the world of the fairy tale has in the main shrunk to the domestic and familial, and motivation and literary devices have changed accordingly, the same logical principle is operative here as in the myth.

The logic of the structure of the myth is, in fact, ritual logic. This logic allows a synthesis of analytic units in the myth that produces a structure even more highly organized and economic than Meletinsky's formula of tests. The same episode appears successively in different
parts of the myth, always on a higher level, as an inversion of or as a parallel to its original form. The key to this structure is the victory of the weaker over the stronger. The myths cannot start with a gain; like the fairy tales they must necessarily start with a loss which establishes the neediness of the human condition. "Human" always has a negative sign in the myth, supernatural a positive sign. But the signs are ambiguous: the goal is not to become supernatural but to become powerful while being human. The confrontation in each episode is between a supernatural and a human protagonist. In these engagements there is a progressive permutation of power, from episode to episode, until at the end of the myth the human appears with a positive sign. This permutation of power is at the basis of the binary character of the tale units, of the hierarchical structure, and of the synthesis that allows one episode to be assimilated to another.

2(b) Complication-Solution Pattern in the Episodes of Kwakiutl Myth

Kwakiutl myths of the initiation type are varied to the eye but, as I have said, their structure is rigidly uniform. There is an overall dramatic structure of complication and solution. This structure is repeated in miniature in every episode. There are five main episodes, each with its own complication-solution pattern.

Episode I

COMPLICATION: situation of lack in the village. This lack can be made explicit in communal terms, for instance as a famine which the Kwakiutl would explain in terms of a lack of power to get game. Or it can be expressed in personal terms: an individual has been insulted, is ostracised, abandoned. This also indicates a lack of power (not only in the individual but the community). In rare cases
the lack becomes only clear retrospectively, when it is amended at the end.

**IMMEDIATE SOLUTION:** departure of the hero. This is a weak solution, depending on the deferred strong one. Hunters depart to the mountains or the sea for game, young men and women go to the forest in search of supernatural power, etc.

**DEFERRED SOLUTION:** return of hero to village with power to amend lack. Distribution of the supernatural treasure the hero gained to the community. This can mean the results of the supernatural power the hero gained in the form of game to stop the famine or a distribution of power in the form of a winter dance. See also episode V for this solution.

**Episode II**

**COMPLICATION:** hero's encounter with supernatural being who has to be compelled to yield some power. This being is always elusive and often terrifying.

**SOLUTION:** hero overcomes elusiveness of supernatural being and obtains some power. The power can be in the form of magic objects or good advice. Good advice refers directly to how to behave in the coming encounter in episode III. Magic objects may or may not be of use in that encounter. In every case the solution of episode II is the preparation for episode III.

**Episode III**

**COMPLICATION:** hero encounters cannibalistic spirit who is out to kill him.
SOLUTION: hero is killed but comes back to life. Sometimes his power to overcome the threatened annihilation is due to the advice he received in the previous episode. But the advice seems to concentrate more on a technique of how to get himself eaten in the right way than how to resuscitate himself. The key to this encounter seems to lie in the right sort of passivity of the hero. The hero's "victory" compels the spirit to give him a treasure which consists in material goods, magical objects, and the spirit's name, songs and dances. The hero takes on the nature of the spirit with the name. In some myths this is made explicit on the spot: the hero in his turn eats the spirit, and the spirit resuscitates himself as the hero has done.

Episode IV

COMPLICATION: hero in form of the spirit cannot re-enter his home village. According to what spirit he met, the hero's form is zoomorphic, amorphic or monstrous. He is not human. He is dangerous because he is cannabalistic. He is often an object of terror to the villagers. In this form he hovers at the edge of the village.

SOLUTION: the hero is recognized, "surrounded" by the villages, and "tamed" or "pacified" by their leaders. Recognition is sometimes the most difficult problem, at other times the surrounding and taming. "Surrounding" and "taming" are ritual acts, part of the public initiation ritual of the winter dance, when the whole community goes out to meet the novice returning from his period of isolation in the form of the spirit who initiated him. The taming is not an exorcism of supernatural power, it is a lulling of it that enables the community to get the supernaturally enraged hero/initiate into the ceremonial house where the winter dance takes place.
Episode V

COMPLICATION: the hero suffers from an excess of supernatural power, he is inhuman; the community from a lack, it is poor.

SOLUTION (deferred solution of I): the hero performs the dances and sings the songs of the spirit or distributes the material treasure he gained, or both. This is the winter dance. The hero's excessive power is exorcised by the dances, he becomes human again. The community takes part in his power and/or wealth and becomes rich and powerful.

In the rhythm of complication-solution there appear some irregularities. Complication I branches into two solutions. The immediate one refers to the hero, the deferred one to the community. The deferred one is taken up at the end of the series. The problem of the community and its solution therefore encloses the problems of the hero and its solutions like a frame. The hero's fate is divided from that of the community in the immediate solution of I, and knitted back into it in the deferred solution of I which closes the tale. Causal connections or their lack are another feature that make the series irregular. The immediate solution of I (the departure) does not logically lead to II (meeting with supernatural being) and the complication of IV—the inhuman form of the hero—does not necessarily lead to the solution: his recognition, surrounding and taming. On the other hand CSII and CSIII, and the solution of IV and CSV are strongly connected. II is the dress rehearsal for III, and the solution of II is the basis of the solution of III in most cases. The solution of IV leads inevitably to the complication of V and its solution. Keeping these irregularities in mind, the rhythm of complications and solution can be formally expressed like this:
CI $S_1$I...CII SII + CIII SIII + CIV...SIV + CV $S_2$I

$S_1$ and $S_2$ stand for immediate and deferred solution respectively. The breaks occur, topographically speaking, where the village ends and the supernatural realm in which the hero gains his power begins. The opposition one's own/foreign which Meletinsky sees as basic for the fairy tale is also the main opposition of the myth. However, in the fairy tale, the hero may remain in the foreign Kingdom where he marries the princess and rules as King. In the myth, which stands in the context of the ritual, this would mean a failure of the hero's expedition, because the goal of the myth (which is really the ritual goal) is the invigoration or enrichment of the community. His return and reintegration are therefore of paramount importance.

2(c) Relation of Episodes to Meletinsky's Formula

Meletinsky's formula connects three tests with the losses and gains of the tale values. The highest value in the classical fairy tale is, according to him, the hero's marriage with the princess and rule over "half a Kingdom". This is the crowning achievement in a tale which is, again according to Meletinsky, centered in all its action on the hero. The values which are in question in the preliminary and basic test lead to this crowning achievement. The magic objects gained in the former enable the hero to pass the latter, and the value gained in the latter has the hand of the princess attached to it as a promise (or is the princess itself, so that passing of test and marriage fuse in one). The third or additional test forms an exception. It is not a logically necessary step in the attainment of the final tale aim. Why, when the tale value is already achieved should the hero hide himself, why should he give the pretender a chance to woo the princess; why introduce the new complication of the false
According to Meletinsky the essential structure of the fairy tale is composed by the preliminary and basic tests.

If one compares the Kwakiutl myths with their rhythms of complication and solution and the tests of Meletinsky's formula with their rhythms of losses and gains it becomes clear that the two series correspond to one another. But, structurally speaking, a much subtler knot is tied in the Kwakiutl tales than in the fairy tale. The first episode with its lack corresponds to the first link in Meletinsky's chain, \( EL \), where some misfortune breaks into the ordered course of life: the villain commits an act of sabotage, the hero breaks an interdiction or is innocently persecuted. From this initial situation rise the three tests: the preliminary test in which the hero gains the magic object, \( eA \), the basic test which he passes with its help, \( EL \), and an additional one in which he refutes the attempts of the counter hero or pretender to displace him and gains the princess. The additional test is given two links, in the formula: \( E'L', \) pretense of false hero, and \( E'L' \), recognition of hero and achievement of tale value. In this way Meletinsky has produced five links, though he speaks throughout of a three test structure. The five links correspond to the five episodes of myth, but the structural logic that connects them is weakened. More precisely, because the tale interest (or narrator's point of view) concentrates on the hero alone we get what seem superfluous structural links which have to be rationalised.

The beginning situation of lack in the myth is one of those germinal places which contain the many possibilities of initial misfortune realized in the fairy tale. But in the myth the personal and the familial are so closely connected with the communal that we always have to do with a collective lack. This lack can only be amended by two steps: the individual deprivation (through danger and death) of the hero and his consequent
abundance, and the liquidation of the community's original lack through the hero. Because of this double point of view—that of the community and that of the hero—the myth episodes are more closely knitted together than the three tests of the fairy tale. If the hero did not return in the form of the spirit he could not bring about that inversion of the initial situation of lack into one of abundance. As he was transformed by the spirit from a poor and powerless human being into a supernatural being, so he transforms the village, by his supernatural wealth, from a poor place to a place of abundance. What is only an additional test in Meletinsky's formula is therefore a structural link of extreme importance: it is the place where supernatural (the hero) and natural (the community) have to come to grips, and where the natural (which is naturally weak) has to overcome the supernatural (which is naturally strong). The solution of this fifth episode is therefore a counterpart of the solution of that third episode, only that the "human hero" is now a whole community. It is easy to see how once the ritual context was lost and the strand of the communal interest had retreated into the background, the "inhumaneness" of the hero in this scene was projected outside on to a pretender—the "false hero". The fairy tale retains with precision a structure which is necessary to the ritual but has, in the main, forgotten the reason for this structure. From half memories and the rationalisations which make up for this loss spring many of the motifs of the tale.

2(d) Nature of the "Basic Test"

What Meletinsky calls the basic test is the most important episode in the myth as in the fairy tale. It is the locus where the tale value is gained. It is the point of reversal, the peripeteia of drama. The nature of this reversal is made very clear in the Kwakiutl myths. There
is no villain in the myths, and the idea of a simple fight with a villain over whom the hero has to gain dominance is lacking, as is the idea that this is a simple test which the hero has to pass. These ideas may be inherent elements. But the structure of this episode is more complex. The hero has to know how to be passive and how to be active in the right way. He has to face being killed but has to know how to come back to life. In one myth Mouse, who is the magic helper, teaches the hero to slip out through the Cannibal's anus when he has swallowed him. Yet this knowledge is not enough. Through being swallowed the hero becomes like the spirit. In the same myth Mouse teaches him to be also the swallow; and when he has his contest with the Cannibal he swallows the Cannibal, who, as the hero did before, comes out again at his anus. This reversal of roles between initiate and spirit is essential to show that now the hero himself has the power of initiator—a power needed when he comes back to the village where has to change the situation of lack into plenty. But the important quality of this "basic test" is that this is the point in the story where the reversal of functions on which the plot structure depends takes place. It is the place of transformation according to Lévi-Strauss' formula \( f_x(a): f_y(b) = f_x(b): f_{a-1}(y) \). While the whole structure of the myth (like that of the fairy tale, as Meletinsky points out) illustrates the dynamic process of the Lévi-Straussian formula, the "basic test" does so very clearly in miniature. In the first part of the formula (a) represents the spirit which is always the eater and (f) his function which is to eat. He only exists in that function. This makes the initiate (b) naturally into him whose function it is to be eaten \( f(y) \). But this state contains its overthrow in itself because, through being eaten, the initiate takes on the function of eater. If (b) drops his natural function and takes on the function of (a)—that is of the
eater--then the very quality of the spirit is permutated and becomes a function of being eaten. The eater eaten.

The concrete image of ingestion makes it clear that through being passive the hero becomes consubstantially one with the spirit, and as a result his weakness turns into strength and his passivity into dominating activity. His eating of the spirit is only an illustration of this permutation of power, and of the fact of the relocation of the source of power and dominating activity. 33

The myth, like the fairy tale, revolves around the acquisition of power. Lévi-Strauss' formula can be expressed in the most general terms in the following way: if power's function of dominating, $f_x(a)$, leads to the hero's function of being dominated, $f_y(b)$, then the hero's function of dominating, $f_x(b)$, leads to a permutation of power's function, $f_{a-1}$, in which power is being dominated (y). 34

It is the nature of such permutation to generate further permutations. So that the hero's meeting with the spirit--the victory of the weaker over the stronger--is the centre of the helicoidal structure whose circles widen to take in the myth as a whole; the ritual; and finally the business of living, in the course of which every Kwakiutl meets power he considers greater than himself.

The hero plays once the role of the initiate in being swallowed by the spirit (being dominated by the supernatural power), once the role of the initiator in swallowing the spirit (dominating the supernatural power). He has therefore two natures, that of dominator and dominated, or, in the language of the myth, that of spirit and man. His double nature enables him to mediate between the society's unsatisfactory (natural) state and its desired (power-imbued) state.

With the weakening of interest in the "community's point of view" the
hero lost this double nature of a mediator. But in the myth the point of
the basic test is just this: that a member of an ordinarily powerless
community should acquire that nature and become capable of turning the
impossible into the possible. (In the fairy tale the animal helpers and
objects, domestic and magic at once, perform this office, but their
influence does not permeate the story and they are less part of the
structure.) The question is, then, how the hero technically solves the
problem of turning a powerless society into a powerful one. The answer
is, in the same way in which he, a powerless human being, was turned into
a powerful "spirit", that is through an inversion of the function of
power.

2(e) Collective Strain and Hero's Strain in Myth and Fairy Tale

There are five episodes of which one can roughly say two belong to the
narrative's collective strain, three to the hero's strain. The commu-
nity's and the hero's strains are intimately connected. They can
(rather unsatisfactorily) be shown in a diagram like this:

FIGURE 3
There are certain points in the diagram that can be marked either positive or negative. Negative is associated with the natural world, with the human and wanting. The peak of the triangle, and the high-end point of the diagonal bar are positive. Positive is associated with the supernatural world and, more generally, with power and plenty. The village at the winter dance is lifted out of its ordinary sphere to a height comparable to the "house of the spirit". The points on the sides of the triangle are intermediary. In narrative terms they are threshold points between the two worlds. The left-hand point is crossed by the bar to show the cutting point of the individual and the collective strain.

The triangle represents the hero's point of view, the diagonal bar the community's. At the beginning point they coincide. The hero moves from there in an arc which should, strictly speaking, curve back to its beginning. At the peak of the arc he is invested with supernatural power and wealth. Such "wealth" is only of use to him at home, in his own surroundings, but its excessive nature (shown in the animal or monstrous shape he has assumed) makes it impossible for him to return home. He is therefore "surrounded" and exorcised of his excessive power by the "display" of it and by the distribution of his powers and wealth to the community. This exorcism makes him human; the end point of the triangle is therefore negative again.

However, his display and distribution enrich the community as a whole; and, re-integrated, the hero is of course part of the community. The end point is therefore connected with the end point of the community's strain (diagonal bar) which is positive. The two points together are the public ritual.

The entwining of the two strands is better expressed in a formula of accumulation and discharge than in the diagram (C = community, H = hero,
p = positive, n = negative

\[ H (n \rightarrow p \rightarrow n) = C (n \rightarrow p) \]

This formula does not apply to the classical fairytale where, according to Meletinsky's findings the conversion of negative to positive in the end represents the hero's personal reward and his "crowning achievement". Nevertheless, Meletinsky's formula for the fairytale fits the diagram I have drawn for the myth in a surprising way, if one remembers that, though speaking of a structure of three tests, Meletinsky actually has five links in his test formula. These links can be correlated to the myth episodes in the following way:

FIGURE 4

In the beginning, EL, when some misfortune has broken into the order of life, we have inevitably a communal situation, even if it is only a family one, and if the misfortune befalls the hero personally it still affects his surroundings. In the end, when the hero is transformed and marries the princess, E'L', we have an event of public significance, even if it is a personal reward for the hero. Marriage and Kingship are both
symbols of social, even cosmic order. The "community interest" (diagonal bar) is therefore present, though it is weak instead of strong as in the myth. The really decisive difference lies in the additional test $E'...E'$. Though it is a test of identification in both cases, in the fairy tale it only uncovers the true nature of the hero (he who has passed the basic test) while in the myth it uncovers the lost member of the society whose return amends the situation of lack in the community he has left. Because of the ritual context of the myths, the distribution at the end has to be to the community which the hero has left, while the fairy tale hero may give the benefit of his exploits to the "foreign Kingdom".

In what sense is $E'*$--the recognition and "transformation" of the hero--then connected to the communal strain in $L'$? Briefly, in this: tests, like the dramatic episodes of myth, are encounters between two protagonists. In the additional test the true hero is not pitched against the false hero, or tested by him; both are pitched against the community for trial between them. (The community is often represented in the person of the King, father of the princess.) Presumably it is in the interest of the community that the true hero marries the princess and ascends the throne. It is therefore a "public display" when the hero throws off his disguise and exposes the pretender. The whole series of tests which have been going on in private between the hero and the helpful-villainous personages of his world would not make sense if there were not a last public judgement made on them.

Compared to the myth this connection with the "common interest" is tentative. It is there, however, and gives the additional test in the fairy tale the same structural function which this link has in the myth: after the hero's removal to a fantastic "other" world, it knits the hero's fate back into the community's in the ordinary world. Even in the fairy
tale, where the hero may marry in a foreign Kingdom, "they lived happily ever after" not in the world of the hero's tests but in the ordinary world. In this sense the hero of the fairy tale too comes home, and "own" and "foreign" are opposed, as they are in the myth, in the sense of human and communal as against private and fantastic.

2(f) Nature of the "Additional Test"

What Meletinsky called the additional test is the link which carries the greatest structural burden in the organization of the myth. From one point of view, it brings the hero-centered strand to conclusion. From another, it begins the community-centered strand. Meletinsky says that the additional test forms "a possible second flow of the fairy tale". A second flow, I believe, means a repetition in another key. This is exactly what the myth shows the "additional test" to be. The second flow is the communal interest asserting itself against the hero-interest.

The episodes are symmetrically arranged around the third episode, the "basic test" in which the hero meets the spirit. The first and last episode correspond to one another as inversions: the end state is the opposite of the state at the beginning. It is not just that lack has been liquidated but that plenty has replaced lack. The second and the fourth episode ("preliminary" and "additional test") also correspond as inversions, if we confine ourselves to the hero's point of view. They are entrance and exit episodes. Through the first the hero enters the supernatural realm, through the second he leaves it. They are bilaterally symmetrical in relation to the "basic test", as are the corresponding links in the fairy tale. In the myth, the second episode is a dress rehearsal for the meeting with the spirit, that is, it points forward to the basic test; in the fourth episode the hero's animal or monstrous form is the
result of his successful meeting with the spirit, that is, it points back to the basic test. In the preliminary test of the fairy tale the hero gains the object which enables him to pass the basic test; in the additional test, the sign of identification proves that he has passed the basic test.

But the fourth episode of myth is not only an inversion of the second, it also forms its parallel. In the second episode the hero meets a supernatural being. It is fugitive or extremely horrible, and has to be tricked or forced before it yields its assistance in the hero's pursuit of supernatural power. In the fourth episode the community goes out to meet a supernatural being (the metamorphosed hero) who is fugitive, horror inspiring, and has to be tricked or forced--surrounded--before he can be tamed enough to help the community in their pursuit of supernatural power. A semantic parallel, not visible to the eye, is that the being the hero meets is of a dual nature, that is, it belongs both to the natural and the supernatural world and can mediate between them. When the hero meets the community in the fourth episode he has also acquired a double nature and can function as mediator between the two worlds. The fourth episode is therefore a repetition of the second episode, but it is more than that: the "additional test" of the myth hero is the "preliminary test" of the myth community. A new plot of tests and tale values starts with changed roles and in a changed scene. The hero is now the initiating spirit, the community the hero. The ceremonial house in the village is the "house of the spirit". But because it is now a "multiple hero" who is initiated, power is not concentrated in a destructive way on an individual, as it was on the hero. Instead of the excess of power which led to an inhuman state in the hero--necessary for channelling power into the "natural world"--we have distribution of power which leads to the invigoration of all. Super-
natural power is now wedded to the human state. This second plot—the communal strain or plot of the multiple hero—is often summarily treated in the myth, not because it was an unimportant part of the story but because it was acted in the public ritual. The myth's main purpose is to describe events which happen in secret, while the initiate is in isolation. This is why the myth plot (like the plot of the fairy tale) is hero-centered. But in itself the acquisition of power by an individual hero is incomplete. Whether the myth describes the winter dance or not, the fact remains that even the hero himself only gains his reward when he has channelled his power to the community. The fairy tale with its inevitable happy ending of a marriage feast insists more on the communal strain than the myth does because, in the living context of the myth, the happy ending is always supplied by the ritual. Myths can therefore end with the fourth episode, which corresponds to $E'\tilde{L}'$; that is, they can end with a loss. In the fourth episode the plot of the community starts and this event, because it is public, can be taken up in the form of the public ritual.

In the winter dance the periphery of the helix has been reached which had its centre in the "basic test". But only on the level of symbolic representation: the dynamic quality of that permutation of power, which is conveyed in Lévi-Strauss' formula and in the picture of the helix, joins myth and ritual and everyday life in the rhythm of the Kwakiutl year. The winter dance ends when the first fish run and the Kwakiutl meet the "great supernatural ones" who have "come to satiate" them. The "eaters" of the Winter are the food of the Summer. When the winter dance comes to an end the Kwakiutl community disperses to gather stores during the nomadic life of the Summer. Every individual Kwakiutl goes out to get his "treasure" from the great supernaturals of the Summer—the fish, the berry
bushes, the game of sea and mountain. But like the hero of the myth he does not keep his accumulated wealth to himself, in private, but distributes it in public because it is only through "giving away" that wealth becomes true wealth and "makes your name great".

We have then a rhythm of gain and distribution, private and public, supernatural realm and ordinary world that corresponds to the alternation of hero's strain and community's strain in the myth; and we have a further distinction of symbolic and material, that distinguishes myth and ritual from everyday life. Acquisition and accumulation happen in private, "giving away" in public. Out alone in the forest, on the ocean or in the mountains, the hero of myth meets his spirit and gains his treasure, as the Kwakiutl hunters and berry gatherers meet the "supernaturals" who give them abundance in the Summer. The myth hero's distribution—which is the community's meeting with their "spirit"—however happens in the communal village, and it is also in the village that the distribution of the wealth gained in the isolation of the Summer takes place in the form of feasts and potlatches. The village is the "natural world" as distinct from the "supernatural world" of forest, mountain and sea. These distinctions are cross-cut by others, but one can generally say that the private, the secret and hidden, are associated with acquisition and concentration of wealth and power, and with the supernatural; the public with distribution, equity, and the sustaining of social life. If one extends the structure of myth to the ethnographic context then there is always a point where the private and the public meet, and the two strains cross, the one to dwindle, the other to increase. This point is the first strain's "additional test" and the second strain's "preliminary test". Alternating lap by lap, at this point:
(1) the single hero, monstrous with supernatural wealth, meets the "multiple hero"--the community--out in quest for wealth;

(2) the multiple hero--the community--full of the wealth of the winter dance, meets the single unit's demand to disperse on their Summer quest of wealth;

(3) the single Kwakiutl, heavy with the wealth of Summer, meets the "multiple hero" in the community's demand for distribution in the potlatch.

The rhythm of these phases, cross-cutting one another at points of double significance can be graphically put like this:

FIGURE 5

The structure of this diagram illustrates Levi-Strauss' theory that "the mythical mind establishes a web of relationships between sociohistorically given facts and it works on a symbolic level underlaid by the interplay of infra- and super-structures." The structure of the fairy
tale cannot be connected as easily with the levels of ordinary life because the ethnographic context is lacking. However, it is perhaps permissible to reconstruct a feature of this missing context from the structure. The structure of the myth is organized around the problem of the relationship between private gain and the public weal. This problem, which is also central to Kwakiutl society as a whole, is solved in the structure rather than explicitly in the content. If Lévi-Strauss is right in saying that "form and content are of the same nature ... The content draws its reality from its structure", then the structure of the fairy tale suggests that the fairy tale, too, was preoccupied with the relationship of individual gain to the common good. This gain can, of course, be interpreted in a psychological or material way.

3 Conclusion

With the above description of the relation between the private and the public, the individual and society, my exposition of Kwakiutl principles of thought comes to an end. Before I begin my examination of the three kinds of text that concern themselves with the problem of the baxus life, I shall briefly review these principles in the light of the subject to which we are turning. It is clear from my exposition that not the cosmos or natural world but men and the relation between men occupy the centre of Kwakiutl thought. However, there is another aspect of Kwakiutl thought, less easily accessible because less systematized, according to which man's relation to the outside world, especially the animals stands at the centre. This aspect reflects the experience of practical or "profane" life. It finds expression in Kwakiutl prayers, in certain kinds of myths and in rituals for animals. It provides the background in which the thought of the tsetseqa is rooted, and is the subject of my thesis. How is it linked
to the principles of thought we have discussed?

Among the principles we have examined that of giving stands out as important. It is giving that makes the perfect man and through him "makes" the society, which is grounded in the acts of givers. Closely related is the principle of the act of courage which, because of its voluntary nature turns the individual into a free being, and through which, in its turn, a mere survival community becomes a free community.

These principles are active in the intra- and interpersonal sphere, where, according to Kwakiutl understanding, man has freedom of decision. They are balanced by the fact that in his relation to the natural world man is a taker, bound by necessity to acts of destruction. This is the fact lamented in the prayers, as I shall show in the next chapter. In profane life, or, to put it in Kwakiutl expressive terms, in the baxus year, man can only be the "imperfect man", the man who is dependent on the life of the world around him and who destroys this life through his dependence. I argue in Chapter 4, in the context of my discussion of the first salmon ritual, that the acts of violence by which the individual appropriates the lives of other beings to sustain his own life also unite men, as do the acts of courage of the tsetseqa. The society that is "made" by them is the survival community, the autonomous social unit called the namima. This household unit celebrates the first salmon ritual and other rituals for animals together. It is based on the secular hierarchy of rank and headed by a chief. I argue that in the Kwakiutl view this was the normal society adapted to the exigencies of baxus life, but that the wider community of givers, whether established in the winter dance society of the communal village or the potlatch society was their ideal civic society or "polity".

Kwakiutl expressive culture links the opposed worlds in a two-fold way,
through the myth of the animal as giver and through the image of eating. In the *baxus* world the animals are free, and are therefore givers, and if an ideal state obtained, men would be simply passive and grateful receivers. But *baxus* man is technological man who traps the animals and despoils the earth. He could not do otherwise, because, as the myth time stories make clear, man would not be man without his arts and crafts, the most important of which are the arts of snaring and trapping. The dilemma is irresoluble. There has to be, therefore, another plane, on which man transcends the definition of technological man, on which he can be active without being destructive, a giver and a maker. This is the plane of the free interrelation between equals, the polity. In the *tsetseqa*, that is on the purely social and cultural level, men imitate the animals' freedom.

The second link is established through the image of eating. One of the remarkable features of Kwakiutl religion, which classifies it as a "primitive religion" is the absence of the substitute—scapegoat or sacrificial victim. Retribution is directly confronted by every individual equally. This becomes clear in the images of hunting and eating. In the Summer men hunt and eat animals, and because they must all eat to sustain their lives they are all equally involved in a transgression against the animals. In the *tsetseqa*, therefore, men are hunted and eaten by spirits. The name given both to animals and to spirits—supernatural ones, or, more accurately unobliged ones—shows that a connection is intended. In fact what we have met as the "passivity of the hero" in the initiation myth gains an aspect of expiation from the vantage point of *baxus* life. From this vantage point the *tsetseqa* itself takes on an aspect of a feast of atonement and reconciliation. But then the *tsetseqa* is many-faceted and cannot be summed up by any one of its aspects.

I shall return to a consideration of myths in Chapter 3, which is a
study of hunting myths, and in the Epilogue, where I examine a variant form of the initiation myth. All the myths I examine in the course of this study belong to a distinct group in the Kwakiutl corpus, though they vary in complexity and the way the issue is posed. On the narrative thematic level the group is characterized by the journey to the other world. This is also a distinguishing feature of the fairy tale. For reasons of space I shall not be able to pursue the cross-culturally important parallel with the fairy tale in my later examinations. To make up for this deficiency to some extent I shall give references to the work of experts on the fairy tale: Greimas, Propp, Meletinsky and others.
Footnotes

1. Not a theocracy in the sense of a rule of priests. The religious principle that rules is (a) the division of the whole community into two equal and balancing halves with complementary functions, (b) membership in dancing societies within which the members of different namimas meet as equals. The tsetseqa season stresses therefore tribal unity, in contrast to the baxus season, which stresses namima autonomy and the ranking of individuals inside the namima, as well as the ranking of namimas inside the tribe.


3. I am grateful to Michel de Virville for suggestions and criticism on this section. He demonstrated that the four forms of opposition described by me can be represented in mathematical and diagrammatic form, and that the diagrams can be condensed into one meta-model. I chose not to include the diagrams; but they can bring out clearly what is implicit in the text: that the four forms the opposition takes represent progressive mobilizations of what is first seen as static. The predicative structure, for instance, is not a system (and should not be treated therefore on the same formal level as the three systems) -- you can feed anything into it. In this case it works as a transformer, and not only reconciles the logically opposed taxonomic and relative systems but "mobilizes" the comparatively fixed relative system into the dynamic polar one.


5. Hubert and Mauss in Sacrifice (London: Cohen and West, 1964) describe the place of sacrifice as a series of concentric circles, each more central and more holy than the one surrounding it. The victim is placed at the centre. The Jewish Temple was constructed on the same principle (Ezekiel XL--XLIV). See also Leviticus XVI, 2: the High Priest penetrates once a year the Holy of Holies, where God dwells in a cloud.


8. The Kwakiutl dramatically convey the slow advance of the spirits from the North with the help of "spirit whistles" that are heard at the beginning of the tsetseqa far to the North of the village, but come nearer and become clearer as the ceremonial gets under way. The whistling noises represent the voices of the spirits.
This world picture is very widespread in the area. The Beaver still speak today of the sun taking "one chicken step a day" to make the world. Tonia Ridington, personal communication.


If we use Lévi-Strauss' formula \( f_x(a): f_y(b): f_{x(a-1)}(y) \) as a picture of the reversal, then the time dimension, seen statically, divides the formula into time past and time future, seen kinetically it changes time past into time present.

See Robin Horton, "Ritual Man in Africa", Africa: Journal of the International African Institute, XXXIV, No. 2 (April 1964), 85--103, where the question of the theoretical models set up by different kinds of societies is discussed.

The Kwakiutl fight with property, but even more they fight with words. (Their potlatch songs, for instance, are a study in the art of insult.) I use rhetorical in this extended sense.


The Kwakiutl potlatched not as individuals but as groups. However, a head chief or chieftainness was representative of the group and, therefore, host.


According to Mauss (1967: 4) potlatch meant originally both "to nourish" and to "consume". This is surely the best comment on the double potlatch between the cannibalistic spirit and the novice.


convenience the authors are referred to throughout by Meletinsky's name alone. Meletinsky's preliminary and related work can be found in English translation in Maranda's anthology.


22 "Analytic Units" was read as a paper at the meeting of the Canadian Sociology and Anthropology Association in 1970. Both papers are unpublished.

23 His point of view is succinctly summed up in "Problem of the Historical Morphology of the Folktale": "In regard to their respective subjects, one might say that primitive myths, in contrast with developed classical fairytales, represent an unusual metastructure. The subjects of classical fairytales reveal inflexible structural limitations unknown to primitive folklore ... In primitive myths, the syntagmatic levels are quite isolated and structurally equivalent. The action can start with a loss as well as a gain ... The various episodes do not follow each other according to a hierarchy ... In the classical tale, on the other hand, the various separate levels are part of a global hierarchic structure where tests follow each other, each one leading to the next". In Soviet Structural Folkloristics, ed. Pierre Maranda (The Hague: Mouton 1974), 53--59.

24 Boas, who at that date called 'all myths legends, has described the characteristics of the myth I call initiation myth as: "a class of legend which relates entirely to spirits that are still in contact with the Indians, whom they endow with supernatural power". (1897: 383). As myth is apparently not a category that can be satisfactorily defined, I use it synonymously with tale and story. I have discussed the question of a genre distinction between myth and tale in "Myth as Metastructure of the Fairytale", in Soviet Structural Folkloristics, ed. Pierre Maranda (The Hague: Mouton 1974), pp.168--172.

25 In spite of Lévi-Strauss' work and much general controversy, the question whether American Indian myths have "structure" comparable to European folklore is still undecided. Boas, who made the most extensive collections on the Northwest Coast, and was therefore thoroughly familiar with the myths I am discussing here thought Indian myths lacked structure altogether. Alan Dundes has applied the Proppian scheme for fairytales to American Indian myths but achieved only a loose fit, see The Morphology of North American Indian Folktales, FF Communications No. 195 (Helsinki: Snomalainen-Tiedeakatemia, 1964). The point is that "myth" is not a defined category, like has to be compared with like, and the category suitable for comparison with the fairytale is the initiation myth, and also the related hunting myth as Chapter 3 shows.


27 It is not clear from Meletinsky's monograph how far he was aware of the relationship between the fairytale and an initiation ritual. He
mentions thematic derivations in particular cases, but does not note the more important structural correspondences which are the subject of this paper. This may be due to the fact that he was concerned with the differences between fairytale and myth, not with a common derivation.

28 Through making the logical connections between tests into the underlying structural principle he arrives at what is actually an over-reduction. Only the preliminary and basic tests are necessary to complete his scheme. This leaves a number of loose ends: neither the passivity of the hero (though noted as a structural part of the fairytale) nor the additional test can be satisfactorily accounted for, and initial and final state are not structurally fully integrated.

29 It should be remembered that Meletinsky denies that a structural principle organizes myth, and claims that its absence from myth is the main difference between myth and fairytale: "In primitive myths the syntagmatic levels are quite isolated and structurally equivalent. The action can start with a loss as well as a gain. ... The various episodes do not follow each other according to a hierarchy". (1974: 55).

Cf. n. 23.


33 The myth states paradox directly, using violent imagery. The fairytale circumvents paradox by a number of literary devices, worthy of analysis for their own sake. For instance the hero may be split in two. In Hansel and Gretel Hansel is the passive hero, fattened up for food, in his cage, Gretel the active or triumphant hero who turns the witch into food by putting her in the bread oven. Or again, because identification with the "evil" principle is not possible in the moral tale world we have the false hero, embodying evil, and the true one who has to be disentangled from him in the end.

34 See Köngäs Maranda and Maranda, 1971: 46--50 for a parallel in European folklore.

35 The diagram fails to show, for instance, that a point never reappears on the same level in the action but rather on a higher level. Only the spiral can convey this. The second base point of the triangle is, in fact, on a higher level than the first, and the end point of the diagonal bar on a higher one than the peak of the triangle.

36 See discussion of prayers, Chapter 2.

37 Quoted from Köngäs Maranda and Maranda 1971: 10.
CHAPTER 2

KWAKIUTL PRAYERS

1 Introduction

The subject of this chapter is the texts Boas collected under the name of prayers. Kwakiutl prayed to natural species. As a people of fishermen, hunters and gatherers their thought is rooted in their relation to animals and plants. They experience this relation as problematic, and from the problem springs the connection they make with the winter ritual. In the prayer texts we can examine this relation and follow the line that leads from the thought of the Summer to that of the Winter. Though slight in form, the prayers contain more information and speak more directly about the problems inherent in that relation than the other texts I examine in the course of my inquiry. I have therefore attempted in the chapter on prayers a more general explanation of Kwakiutl religious thought than in the other chapters. This introduction and the conclusion, for instance, attempt to put the discussion into a framework of comparative religion.

A study of the texts of prayers must, inevitably, be a study of religious beliefs also. Beliefs are hard to deal with within the conventions agreed upon for anthropological analysis. The reason for the inadequacies of these conventions may be that we still lack an objective standpoint and therefore an objective terminology to deal with belief in our own culture. Yet the study of meaning in religion (which is the study of beliefs) is an important part of that general inquiry into "meaning" which is the characteristic preoccupation of our time. (Cf. Langer in PhilosophySketches: "the concept of meaning,
in all its varieties, is the dominant philosophical concept of our time ... sign, symbol, denotation, signification are our stock in trade".¹ There have, therefore, been a number of recent attempts to enlarge anthropological conventions, often with the help of methods and insights borrowed from other disciplines, in order to gain new vantage points for the anthropological study of beliefs. It is to be hoped, of course, that these attempts will have a two-way effect, and result in better understanding of the significance of religious belief in our own culture.

Among these recent attempts two main approaches stand out. The first concentrates on the formal aspect of symbolization, with help from linguistics and communication theory, the second is concerned with what might be called the truth value of beliefs, and, though less directly indebted to the methods of other disciplines, uses many of the insights of psychology, philosophy and theology. The first, in which Lévi-Strauss has been the seminal mind, and which has become widely popular, has achieved a clearer limitation of the field in which religious meaning is to be sought. Lévi-Strauss particularly has separated formal from religious thought, and, in Totemism and The Savage Mind reconstructed as classificatory, systems that had long been confused with religious ones. The first approach can then be said to have cleared the periphery. The second is directly concerned with the meaning of religious beliefs and representations. It seeks a method of how to analyse and "translate" that meaning. This is pioneer work, undertaken only by a few, and not based on any formalised method that is easy to imitate. It is connected with names like Lienhardt, Evans Pritchard and Burridge in anthropology, R. N. Bellah in sociology, (though Weber has not been superseded there), and Paul Ricoeur in philosophy. Both approaches use field experience or texts or both, and though different in aim are not irreconcilable in
method and constantly fructify one another.

My study of Kwakiutl prayers is oriented toward meaning in religious symbolization. As prayers are formal texts, I approach their meaning through a study of their form and of the conventional representations used in them. Using this approach I hope, however, to say something about how Kwakiutl beliefs might be translated. This introduction will discuss the general problem inherent in such an undertaking.

The collection of Kwakiutl prayers which Hunt made for Boas, and which was published in 1930 in Religion of the Kwakiutl Indians is a unique document in anthropological literature. It allows a direct insight into the relation of a hunting and gathering people to the world around them. It was collected over many years by a participant in the culture and is a large enough body of work to enable us to draw some general conclusions. Direct insight is possible for a number of reasons. (1) The prayers are cast not in archaic or obscure language but in ordinary speech, and are relatively accessible in translation. Even in translation they have a freshness and beauty that evokes a response in the reader. (2) The relation of the people to the external world is not explained to us, as it would be in an informant's exegesis, but is directly presented to us in the prayers. (3) Though the prayers are spontaneous and individual they are cast in a traditional mould. They are therefore not the result of individual opinion or understanding but are "communal representations". In other words they reflect the collective concern of the Kwakiutl, and make it possible for the outsider to judge the quality of Kwakiutl collective concerns.

The position of the prayers in Kwakiutl collective life makes them especially interesting to the student of religion. It reflects on the Durkheimian theory about the division into sacred and profane. We have
seen that Kwakiutl divide their year into a "sacred" half, the tsetseqa, and a "profane", baxus. During the profane half, the Summer, the life of gathering food and laying in stores is in progress, while the sacred half, the Winter, is given over to the great rituals. Naturally the student of symbolic systems, of religion and of thought concentrates his attention on the sacred half. Yet the Kwakiutl life of prayer, which is, without doubt, an expression of Kwakiutl religious thought (though we shall have to define in what sense) is inseparably connected with the profane half of the year. Kwakiutl prayers are the religious expression of the profane way of life.

Such a cross-cutting of the categories of the sacred and profane is of course not unheard of, but it belongs usually to a more differentiated society and is caused by class or caste divisions or division between the official and popular religions. None of this applies in the Kwakiutl case, and this fact alone should make Kwakiutl prayer interesting. Yet it has received no attention; and I think it is probably the fact that this part of Kwakiutl thought and religious practice is submerged as it were in profane life and intermingled with practical tasks which explains why it has not received any attention from students of the Kwakiutl. The prayers have been used as philological texts but have never, to my knowledge, been studied for their sociological implications. Yet they express the groundwork of Kwakiutl thought; and it is impossible to understand the winter ritual without a knowledge of Kwakiutl prayers. One of the tasks of an analysis of the prayers is therefore to establish how they are connected with the system of thought of the winter ritual. Another equally important one is to show how they diverge from that system and are in some ways inimical to the habits of thought of the "sacred" world. I shall take up both these considerations below. Here, I only want to make the
point that we are faced with the phenomenon of a "religious" expression that belongs to "profane" practice. The prayers are never spoken in sacred surroundings or on sacred occasions such as the winter ritual establishes. This does not mean that the sun or other beings of the external world are not prayed to in the Winter. But such prayers would even in the Winter accompany ordinary activities referring to practical living and would not be part of the sacred performances of the winter ritual.4

How, then, are the prayers religious expressions in a profane context? Kwakiutl prayers are addressed to those denizens of the physical world men meet during their working life; animals, plants, rocks and bodies of water among others. All these are living beings to Kwakiutl perception. But it is the notion of meeting them that has particular significance, as we shall see from the prayers. Every such meeting is, in fact, a theophany in the sense in which Eliade uses the word. The animal addressed reveals itself as sacred, naualak. The context is profane because men always bring the being so revealed into an ordinary, utilitarian connection through their prayer. The inherent paradox of a simultaneous revealing of the sacred and profaning it through profane contact can be traced in the structure of the prayers. It is particularly evident in prayers to game (or plants used for food) because here the intention is to kill and eat. Prayers to game animals are therefore the tests cases for our analysis; yet the same principle inheres in all prayers except those to the sun. The context created by men's intentions—an intention forced upon them by necessity—is not only profane in itself but makes bexus in the particular sense this word has in relation to men: it makes men accountable.

The notion of meeting as a theophany has a further relevance here.
Not all natural phenomena are *nvaalak* at all times, though they are potentially so. They reveal themselves as *nvaalak* under special circumstances. Hunting, fishing and gathering provide those circumstances most frequently. But the possibility of the irruption of the sacred into profane life creates in men a correlative attitude: the attitude of attention, of mental alertness, which expresses itself in the style and diction of the prayers. Attention and alertness—"listening" as the Kwakiutl call it—are especially associated with the winter ritual. Kwakiutl speeches opening the winter ritual season are studded with injunctions like "listen!", "attend!", "take care!" and "be happy!" (cf. Boas 1930: 57ff). In a speech made at the time when there was pressure on the Kwakiutl to give up their rituals the speaker expresses the fear that if they gave up the winter dance (symbolised by the red cedarbark) they would be "downhearted": "we shall be asleep all the time" (Boas 1966: 421; see also motto). Prayers then are moments of a particular alertness which Kwakiutl associate with the sacred (and incidentally dangerous) in a context not otherwise marked by such alertness. In them the sacred, which according to Kwakiutl conception is "underneath" in the Summer, surfaces for a moment.

Kwakiutl prayers are spoken by everyone, without distinction of rank or sex. This again makes them interesting as religious expressions of the *baxus* life of the Summer, because that life is characterized by hierarchical social distinctions and by a sexual division of labour. Moreover, both the distinctions of rank and differences of sex are particularly connected with the activities of hunting, fishing and gathering. Chiefs and chieftainesses organise the subsistence activities of the *namima*, and men and women's work is always clearly divided. In the distributions of food and goods, seal feasts and potlatches, distinctions
between rich and poor become evident. Yet prayers, so closely connected themselves with subsistence activities, cross-cut this system and equalise distinctions. Hunt's collection shows not only that everyone prayed, men, women, people of rank and ordinary people, the old and the young (excluding only children), rich and poor, but that everyone's prayers were equally necessary and effective for the well-being of all. The inherited prayer, representing a special privilege and spoken by the chieftainness to open the berrying season is not any more efficacious than, say, "the prayer of the common man to the álachen" (Boas 1930: 203) spoken when fishing is free for all. Both kinds have their own importance, because the relation of men to the non-human world has many facets, and because it depends on individuals. Everyone is a link in a chain that must not be allowed to break at any point. From this attitude it follows that all prayers, regardless of whether they are spoken by men or women, nobles or commoners express the same system of thought and define the relation of men to beings of the non-human world in the same sort of way. This makes Kwakiutl prayers an important part of Kwakiutl studies and religious studies in general, for two reasons: they express the thought of a whole people, and they express thought in relation to everyday life.

However, while this classifies Kwakiutl prayers, the importance of their study depends more immediately on criteria relating to their contents. If our examination is not to be a purely historical-descriptive one we shall have to ask in how far the thought expressed in the prayers is genuinely accessible to us, what knowledge it represents and which value such knowledge might have by comparative standards. What do the prayers then tell us? What are they an account of and what is the quality of the account? This is of course the subject of my inquiry in general; all I am adding here is a wider comparative framework. I have divided my
analysis of the prayers into two parts: first, an examination of the nature of the beings prayed to and of the epithets used to address them, second an examination of the component parts and structure of the prayers. Both examinations involve a great deal of explanation in terms of Kwakiutl beliefs. Such explanations in terms of the native system are necessary in order to bring out the implicit assumptions under which the thought is ordered. Yet Kwakiutl thought is valid in objective terms, that is beyond the expressive system in which it is, for them, contained. The quality of the account the prayers give depends, of course, on the extent to which the things accounted for have a reality outside the "language" which describes them, and are accessible to universal rational knowledge. This makes the task of analysis a twofold one: to show how the Kwakiutl present to themselves the things they talk about in their prayers, and to show what their representation means in universally understandable terms. Because my examination deals with the moral concerns of the Kwakiutl I interpret the general meaning of the prayers in terms of the grasp of the moral implications of experience they show. Such an interpretation creates for us, as outsiders, an avenue of access to the Kwakiutl conceptual system. In doing this I am, however, ignoring another general aspect that makes for another avenue of access, that of comparative religion. This aspect is not of great importance to my thesis in general, which is not on Kwakiutl religion but on Kwakiutl thought. I intend to avoid mention of religion on the whole, partly because of the difficulties of definition, partly because nothing would be added. It also seems to me that a study of the texts alone as they have come down to us in Boas' collection cannot enable us to make a comprehensive and definitive statement about Kwakiutl religion, while fieldwork on the subject has meanwhile, of course, become impossible. However, with an examination of the prayers
we have entered the field of religion, and in order to render Kwakiutl thought clearly we have to put it into some sort of comparative perspective in this field. I shall therefore use this introduction to talk of Kwakiutl thought, which is religious thought, in relation to some recent sociological definitions of religion.

1(a) Definitions of Religion

Among recent accounts of religion the definitions arrived at by Spiro (1966) and Bellah (1969) can usefully be taken as limiting the field within which Kwakiutl religion can usefully be discussed. Both authors are acutely conscious of problems of definition. Spiro approaches the problem from the outside, in a sturdy spirit of common sense, pointing to evidence and appearances:

Since "religion" is a term with historically rooted meanings, a definition must satisfy not only the criterion of cross-cultural applicability but also the criterion of intra-cultural intuitivity; at the least it should not be counter-intuitive. For me, therefore any definition of religion which does not include, as a key variable, the belief in superhuman ... beings who have power to help or harm man is counter-intuitive. Indeed, if anthropological consensus were to exclude such beliefs from the set of variables which is necessarily designated by "religion", an explanation of these beliefs would surely continue to elicit our research energies. (1966: 91)

In other words, religion is a belief in superhuman beings who have power to help or harm men because this is what it means to most people in most places and at most periods. Spiro cites Horton (1960) and Goody (1962) as having recently reached the same conclusions (p.94). In fact the definition reaches back as far as Tylor, who in 1891 defined religion as "the belief in spiritual beings". The question for the anthropologist is, as Spiro points out, how to interpret these superhuman beings. Bellah's definition goes some way toward tackling this problem. His approach in his article "Religious Evolution" is cognitive and psychological, in other
words he starts from the inside, referring to deep-structure rather than appearances.

A brief, handy definition of religion is considerably more difficult than a definition of evolution. An attempt at adequate definition would ... take a paper in itself for adequate explanation. So, for limited purposes only, let me define religion as a set of symbolic forms and acts which relate man to the ultimate conditions of his existence. The purpose of this definition is to indicate exactly what I claim has evolved. It is not the ultimate conditions, nor, in traditional language, God that has evolved, nor is it man in the broadest sense of homo religiosus. (1969: 263)

What has evolved, according to Bellah, is an understanding of religious symbolization; "the historic religions", he says, "discovered the self; the early modern religion found a doctrinal basis on which to accept the self in all its empirical ambiguity; modern religion is beginning to understand the law of the self's own existence and so to help man take responsibility for his own fate" (p.288). A process similar to this historical evolution can, however, be discovered within religious systems themselves, without an objective and articulate understanding of the symbolization. The Kwakiutl are a particularly good example of this. This is why Spiro's and Bellah's definitions together can be taken to delimit the field of Kwakiutl religion. Spiro defines religion as a belief in superhuman beings; Bellah argues that religious evolution leads to a greater discrimination of the self from the outside world and helps man to be responsible for his own fate. The main argument of my thesis is that belief in superhuman beings helps the Kwakiutl to discriminate the self from the outside world, and to achieve a sense of being responsible for their own fate. This is true about those Kwakiutl superhuman beings that are prayed to, and that are phenomena of the outside, non-human world, and those other superhuman beings of the Winter that belong to the intra- and interpersonal human world.
Neither the nature of the two kinds of Kwakiutl superhuman beings, nor the connection between them can be made perfectly clear. There is a residue in religious belief which defies rational explanation, and which is well caught in Spiro's simple definition: belief in superhuman beings who have power to help or harm man. We have not reached a standpoint from which it would be possible to assess the degree of autonomy of these "beings". This makes it difficult to assess their standing in a culture and decide when they are to be taken as externalized and personalized means of thinking and when they are powers that are meant to be conceived as objectively other than human. The relationship between the two categories is fluid even for the participants. Burridge has pointed out the shifting relation between the explainable and the obscure that makes up religion. In his discussion of millenarian movements he defines religion as the systematic ordering of different kinds of power, and says:

But because a religion is concerned with the truth of things, and reaches out to discover and identify those sorts of power which, though sensed and affective, are currently not wholly comprehended, its rules about the use and control of different kinds of powers are grounded in an interplay between experience, working assumptions, and those more rooted assumptions we call faith. As experience widens and deepens, some of the rules and assumptions will be qualified, and others abandoned altogether—a developmental process in which received truths or assumptions give way to new truths and in which the new truths become in their turn the received assumptions of future generations.

In Burridge's context of cargo cult movements the powers not wholly comprehended are embodied by the white man (or another outsider) in a contact situation. But powers not wholly comprehended can be part of the native religion's problematic, embodying goals religious thought strives towards. In the Kwakiutl case one can trace a "developmental" process in the change-over and link between Summer and Winter during the solar year. The "supernatural ones of the Summer", that is, the beings prayed to, are beings connected with practical life. They are not fully comprehensible
because necessity forces men to harm them against their will, and harm might therefore be expected from them in return. Through the "supernatural ones of the Winter" amends can be made, and the coil of guilt and necessity is to some extent undone. But the internalization the process involves discloses new problems, which are now embodied in the powers of the Winter. Hence, in so far as Kwakiutl religion is concerned with the truth of things it is accessible to rational interpretation, but in so far as it identifies in this process powers which are not wholly comprehended, though they are represented, interpretation is on uncertain ground. Yet just because of its concern with truth and its "reaching out" for knowledge not yet attained Kwakiutl religion must include such obscure representations. This is true of all religions, including the higher ones. The importance of the study of religion lies in the interpretation of the "intention" that inheres in these representations, or the "direction" that is given to them by the context in which they appear. The difficulty of the study of religion lies in the obscurity of the representations, especially if they are images of things that cannot be otherwise formulated.

1(b) The Translation of naualak

The Kwakiutl word for a power, or powers, not wholly understood is naualak. We meet this word in the prayers with great frequency as an address to the beings prayed to. In the following pages I shall try to elucidate the Kwakiutl conception of naualak and map out that part of the experience it denotes which is accessible to interpretation. Naualak does not connote superhuman beings in contrast to men, or a divine order of things, a concept for which there is no Kwakiutl equivalent. The salient distinction in Kwakiutl usage is not that between men and super-
human beings or an order that is divine and one that is human but the one between beings and orders, on the one hand, that are non-ordinary, experienced and yet always, at least to some extent obscure, and those on the other that are ordinary and can be understood. Most Kwakiutl superhuman beings are nualak but not all; and men can under certain circumstances become nualak, though they always return to being ordinary.9

I have already discussed the word and its meaning in a general sense in Chapter 1. Its opposite is baxus. In Section 1 I give Boas' translation of the two words: nualak he translates as supernatural, baxus as ordinary or common. In the division of the year into two halves they stand respectively for the sacred and the profane half, and sacred and profane are appropriate translations in many other circumstances. In my analysis of the Kwakiutl initiation myth in Section 2, I speak of a fundamental opposition in the myths between a "natural" and a "supernatural" world. All these are labels which convey the distinction Kwakiutl make with the help of nualak and baxus, but like most labels they are gauged to establishing communication with the outside rather than giving precise information on the content. They are useful for making the first large divisions in the material, and for establishing analytic distinctions and facilitating cross-cultural comparisons. In the task which has been called the translation of culture they are often defensible and sometimes unavoidable. Yet they are dangerous, as everyone working closely with texts realises. They blur distinctions which express the particular "intention" or "direction" of a culture and are in consequence inadequate for cross-cultural usage. Conventionally used distinctions will have to be revised with the help of the evidence accumulating from studies of particular texts. The evidence will again have to be sifted for the principles that emerge as cross-culturally valid.
The difficulty with Kwakiutl texts is that they face us with the constantly stressed distinction between "this" and "another" world. Yet Kwakiutl, like other peoples with a "primitive" religious world view, live in one world, the material world of physical existence. The prayers of individuals are for health, wealth and long life; the values of their great rituals are collective and social. No desire, no value expressed in the texts betrays a straying of the imagination outside the confines of physical and social life. Kwakiutl notions of a life after death, for instance, are indistinct; what is clear about them is that any value that inheres in that life is relative to the value of life on earth. The dead are thought of as owners of wealth (particularly in the sense of fertility, so that one might say they are owners of potential life), and their wealth, like all Kwakiutl wealth is not hoarded but flows back to the living through reincarnation and initiation by the ghosts. Yet in spite of this monistic view the notion of another world plays a role of major importance in Kwakiutl thought. I shall discuss this notion exhaustively at the end of this chapter when I discuss the conception of the world centre; here I want to bring out that the dialectic provided by "the other" (which is naualak) is essential for Kwakiutl thought processes. Every hunter who goes to the sea or the mountains, every woman who goes to collect berries or bark meets beings who have crossed over from another world to their own. In the hunting myths a man or woman has to cross the boundary between the land of the humans and that of the animals, and only after this crossing has been made will the animals come to men to be taken. In the initiation myths the hero crosses into the world of the spirits when he dies and receives the treasure of new life. Only after he has made this crossing and crossed back successfully to the human world can he join his society as an adult of consequence and power.
and with this bring them too the treasure of new life.

In other words, the Kwakiutl can grasp the world, and themselves as distinct from the world only by formulating concepts of "the other". They live in one world, yet this world is not conceived of as static but is made dynamic through a constant play of opposites. Men are opposed to animals, health and long life to disease and death, wealth to less-than-nothing. Everything is only by affirming its opposite and accommodating it in itself. The best example, as for so much in Kwakiutl thought, is the potlatch. Kwakiutl pray for wealth, but they consider themselves rich only if they have stripped themselves to less-than-nothing through giving. It is harder to see that when they pray for health they actually and simultaneously accommodate themselves to disease and death; but the prayers seem to imply just that. This "other" which has to be recognised and known as other in itself and yet has to be accepted and accommodated to as simply the other side of the same thing is basically what naualak describes. It is always the dreaded, the unacceptable which has yet to be accepted if it is to be overcome, but it always becomes the wonderful, magically powerful once it is overcome and synthesis with it achieved. Naualak is therefore not only "other" but also "both"; it is itself the synthesis that has been achieved by uniting thesis and antithesis. In myth and religious belief it is imaged as the other world. The other world is naualak and so are its inhabitants whether they are the spirits that are found in it or the animals who come from it to visit men. Because of this underlying meaning of "other" naualak can in many contexts be simply translated as "out of the ordinary, uncommon, extraordinary, wonderful, full of magic power". Yet where naualak is brought into direct relation with men it has a more precise meaning, to which the above meanings only provide the overtone.
In the prayers the animals and other living beings prayed to are addressed as naualak, "Supernatural Ones" in Boas' translation. The same name is used for the initiate in the public ritual: "the supernatural one" or "our supernatural friend". In both cases naualak refers to a sort of freedom. The animals, who come from the other world, are free in relation to men. The Kwakiutl are extremely conscious of men's physical dependence on the natural world and of the limitations and constrictions physical necessities impose. In the light of their unfreedom they see the animals, who do not depend on them as free. The initiate, who has crossed to the other world and returned possessed with power is also free in relation to other men. Freedom (or acting freely--the conception is never divorced from actual behaviour) has two sides for the Kwakiutl. One is doing as one likes, behaving in an utterly wilful, irresponsible and usually destructive way. The "wildness" of the animals, exemplified for Kwakiutl and other Indians of the area by the grizzly belongs to that category, but also the abnormal, of which Kwakiutl ritual cannibalism is the best example. Freedom in this sense is the epitome of action that lies outside the social bonds. The other side of freedom is in a sense the action in which all social bonds are grounded: it is giving away freely. Such a giving away, though it may be the foundation of all social bonds is also strictly outside the social bonds which are made by reciprocity. It is a voluntary giving, not a return for something given, and it is so wholesale that it cannot be requited. Kwakiutl superhuman beings and men in the ecstasy of initiation are free in this double sense. The animals are wild but they come and give themselves to men. The initiate is wild but he dances and distributes his tlugwi, his "supernatural power" to the community. The spirit, another kind of superhuman being who is so utterly wild and wilful that he is a cannibal and eats the
initiate, is the giver of \textit{tlugwi}, the treasure of new life and power. Beings who can act freely in this double sense are called \textit{naualak}.

\textit{Naualak} could therefore be translated as "free" but in the very precise and culturally restricted sense as "free from that which characterizes the social bonds and the moral community". In order to arrive at a closer translation we have to remember that what characterizes these bonds is equivalent reciprocity: the law of giving, receiving and requiting.

Burridge's \textit{Tangu Traditions} provides a clue to a closer translation. In his chapter "The Moral and the Divine" he deals with a Tangu word, \textit{imbatekas}, that overlaps in ways that are relevant with the Kwakiutl \textit{naualak}.

\textit{Imbatekas} has a wide range of translations: "uncontrollable, odd, unobliged, eccentric, unusual, useless, unfortunate, awesome, remarkable, queer, singular anomalous, evil, wicked, bad ..." It is a word which may be used of almost any act, situation, being, place or thing which does not belong to the normal, preferred, expectable, commonplace order of society or nature. ... On the whole \textit{imbatekas} spells trouble, and trouble is itself associated with the new, the strange, the odd, the unusual, the unobliged, that which is not under control.

The obvious differences would be mainly due to longer and more intense contact with Western ways of thought than Kwakiutl had had at the time their myths and prayers were collected. An older translation of \textit{imbatekas} might have been less negative. The meaning of "wonderful, magic" which is strong in \textit{naualak} in spite of underlying dread seems to be missing; moreover \textit{naualak} could never mean anything as morally unequivocal as "evil, wicked, bad" because this would destroy its essential duality. But the essential meaning of the two words when brought into relation to men converges. \textit{Naualak} like \textit{imbatekas} means "unobliged". All \textit{naualak} beings whether they are superhuman beings, that is animals and spirits, or men, that is the initiate or hunter stand outside the ordinary equivalent reciprocities.
The translation of *naualak* as unobliged brings us back to the question of what Kwakiutl representations of superhuman beings convey. What is the relation of the "unobliged ones" to ordinary men; how do they impinge on moral consciousness? Again we take a hint from Burridge's *Tangu Traditions*. Tangu ethics revolve around reciprocities among Kin and friends. The role of their superhuman beings, who are *imbatekas* is almost wholly punitive and corrective. Themselves amoral, they bring the moral order to man's minds, and move men to restore it through confession where it has been infringed. Kwakiutl, like other hunting and gathering Indians of North America, have a closer relationship to beings of the wild than the horticultural Tangu. The role of the animals, who are superhuman beings is not primarily punitive, but in Kwakiutl thought too these "unobliged ones" bring the moral order to men's minds and move men to restore it where it has been infringed. For the Kwakiutl the moral order also hinges on reciprocities, but first and foremost in their relations to nature. The basic moral law is to live in harmony with all living beings, who are conceived as relations and friends. We shall find this law documented in all three kinds of texts: the prayers, the myths and the rituals. Yet here they are faced with a dilemma: animals give themselves to men so that men can live. Men cannot requite; they cannot offer their own bodies to the animals in return. Moreover, in order to accept the gift men have to kill and so destroy the sacred bond between relations and friends. Animals remain *naualak*, unobliged, but men become through necessity *baxus*, accountable. This is the state of men in the ordinary, *baxus* part of the year, when they gather their stores. But it is a state they cannot remain in: the account has to be squared, an equivalence has to be established.

All the texts we are going to consider: prayers, myths, rituals
show a preoccupation with the squaring of the account. What interests us here is the relationship of the animals, who are the original debtors, to the spirits of the winter dance, who are the avengers. I shall document this relation in the Epilogue with myths which are transitional between hunting and initiation myths. In order to clarify the question concerning the nature of Kwakiutl superhuman spirits a preview is indicated here. In brief, the animals become the initiating spirits of the Winter dance. Equivalence can only be established if men give themselves up to retributational justice and become "unobliged" or "free" themselves in the process. The paradigmatic animals of the initiation myths, Bear, Wolf, Eagle etc. are man eaters, just like the presiding spirit of the winter dance, the Great Cannibal. The relationship is inverted: animals are now the hunters, men the hunted, animals the eaters, men their food. The initiate gives himself voluntarily to his spirit, simultaneously "overcoming" it. This is the mythical account, and the enacted metaphor of the ritual. What does it mean in non-symbolic terms?

The account with the animals cannot be squared in the realm of nature, where the laws of physical necessity obtain. It has to be shifted to the realm of culture, where men are free in the sense that they can take responsibility for themselves and for their interrelations. Kwakiutl initiation is a maturation crisis, a form of the process Jung calls individuation. During his isolation when the initiate meets the spirit he meets himself. It is my understanding of the Kwakiutl material, and my working hypothesis all through this thesis, that the man-eating spirits are those parts of the psyche that are unacceptable to the ego. Externalized in the form of monsters or savage animals it becomes a test of courage to surrender to them. One of the most extravagant but also the most frequent of Kwakiutl images is that of auto-cannibalism. In being
eaten by the spirit (as well as in eating the spirit, a turn of the spiral we have demonstrated in Section 2 of Chapter 1) Kwakiutl eat themselves. Psychologically this means that act of complete self-acceptance which alone can integrate the self. About the difficulty of such a process Kwakiutl imagery leaves no doubt. It seems then that in the psychological sphere also Kwakiutl operate with concepts of "this" and "other", acceptable self, and unacceptable self projected into the spirits and integrated under the image of cannibalism. The symbolism is extravagant; the psychology is unimpeachable by modern standards. Not surprisingly with a people who institutionalize "individuation", the integrated self is congruous with the social personality. The successful initiate becomes a giver in the public ritual. Giving away is the Kwakiutl synonym for acting freely, but giving away is also that which binds the community together. In the public ritual the initiate then "gives himself" once more, but this time for his people. This sets the seal on his social personality. In an association of the free, which is what the winter dance society represents, all members are givers.

1(c) Identification and Discrimination

Let us now turn to the less symbolic aspects of Kwakiutl religion. Animals are not only naualak, not only "superhuman beings who can help or harm man", they are also in mythical language "men" or "like men" or "men like us". The myth texts vacillate between these formulations, while the prayers use the address friend, that is "one of us". In other words, identification is the correlative of differentiation. This would seem to be connected with the fact that superhuman beings are here objects of perception as well as mere conceptions. The fact that Kwakiutl root religious experience in beings of whom they have concrete experience
through their senses should in any case determine our approach to a study of their religion. Instead of beginning by asking: how are their superhuman beings represented? and going on to: what do these representations stand for? we have to begin with: how do Kwakiutl perceive animals? and go on to: how is this perception extended into a unifying ethical conception of the world and man's place in the world?

Identification with the animals has both a practical dimension, in which animals are seen as both like men and superior in the ordinary business of living, and a moral one in which they become objects for emulation of another kind. I shall give a brief outline of these two dimensions here. As I shall not return to the practical side of the relation with the animals in my examination of the prayers I shall quote some of the prayers illustrating it here. This will give me at the same time the opportunity of introducing the reader to the mode of Kwakiutl prayers.

Kwakiutl perceived animals, as I have already said, as superior to men and gifted with volition to a far higher degree. This view of the animals' superiority and freedom was not based on the sense of human dependence alone (a dependence which contrasts strongly with the animals' independence of men). It was also based on a knowledge of the animals' superior skills. In a world where men and animals do not live wholly different lives it is borne in on men that animals are better adapted to and more capable in their sphere of existence than men. The main reason for the respect Kwakiutl had for animals may lie in the fact that they had no domestic animals except the dog. No animal was dependent on them for food or care, no animal was a beast of burden. In such a situation animals are at the same time other than men in being wholly independent, self-contained and uninfluenceable, and like men in being hunters,
fishers and artisans, only infinitely more skilful than men at these jobs.

Kwakiutl had a vivid perception of the animals' skills, and a knowledge of animal life that is detailed and accurate beyond anything we can imagine. They saw that in many of the techniques of everyday life — techniques like weaving or building — even quite small animals rival or surpass men. In the prayers they therefore ask the animals to hand these skills on to them.

The supplications for the animal's special skills blend with those for health, wealth and long life. Both living animals that were not hunted and game animals after the kill were petitioned in this way. It is quite clear from the prayers that their gifts were not conceived to be magically and mechanically inherited through the eating of their substance, but that the handing on is part of the animals' magnanimity, their voluntary friendship for men. I shall quote four prayers, complete with the context Hunt gave them in his letters to Boas. They illustrate what we might call both the natural and supernatural superiority of the animals; how they were like men and how they differed from men in Kwakiutl eyes.

Prayer to the Black Bear

When the black bear is dead, when it has been shot by the hunter, the man sits down on the ground at the right hand side of the bear. Then the man says, praying to it, "Thank you, friend, that you did not make me walk about in vain. Now you have come to take mercy on me so that I obtain game, that I may inherit your power of getting easily with your hands the salmon that you catch. Now I will press my right hand against your left hand," says the man as he takes hold of the left paw of the bear. He says, "O friend, now we press together our working hands that you may give over to me your power of getting everything easily with your hands, friend," says he. Now it is done after this, for now he only skins the bear after this.

(Boas 1930: 193--4)

Prayer to a Beaver after it has been killed

"Welcome, friend, Throwing-down-in-One-Day, you Tree-Feller, for you have agreed to come to me. The reason why I wished to catch you is that you may give me your ability to work that I may be
like you; for nothing is impossible for you to work at, friend, you, Throwing-down-in-One-Day, you Tree-Feller, you Owner-of-the-Weather. And also that nothing evil may befall me in what I am doing, friend," says he.
(op. cit. pp.196-7)

Beaver Used as a Charm

When a woman is with child and if she has a husband who is a hunter of all kinds of animals then, as soon as the woman gives birth to a boy, her husband goes into the woods where he knows that there is a beaver dam. As soon as he sees new cuttings of the beaver, then at once he sits down on the bank where he guesses that the beaver comes up to breathe in the evening. As soon as the beaver comes and emerges he shoots it. Then the man takes with his right hand the right paw of the beaver and turns it on his back. While he is still holding it and while the man is looking at the beaver he says, "You have come, friend, I have come to catch you, friend, Throwing-down-in-One-Day, you Tree-Feller, that you may come and give over to me your power of work for my child which I have obtained by good luck that he may be like you. For there is nothing that you do not know in every kind of work. Now you will go to my house that you may press your working hand against his hand that he may be like you, friend. There is nothing difficult for you in all kinds of work," says he as he takes up the beaver and he goes home to his house. As soon as he enters he puts down on its back the beaver on a board that is always lying on the floor, at the place on which is put down the game as soon as he enters his house. Then the man takes his child in his arms and he sits down at the edge of the board on which the beaver is lying on its back. The child is wrapped up to the waist in its wrappings. Then the man takes the right paw of the beaver and presses it against the right hand of the child and the man says, "O friend, Throwing-down-in-One-Day, you, friend Tree-Feller, you have come, you have reached this our little friend. He will inherit your power of working everything easily, and he will be like you friend, Weather-Owner, you, who does everything easily that you wish to work at, friend. Please, give it over to our little friend," says he as he rubs the face of the child four times against the face of the beaver. "Now, friend, this is the advice given to me by my late fathers, that which should be done when I make a charm for my child from you, Throwing-down-in-One-Day," says he as he takes his child back to its mother. Now the talk about the beaver is at an end.
(op. cit. pp.196-7)

Prayer to a Dead Squirrel

"You, great, good one, you, Healing-Woman, why are you in this way, great, good one? Why have you had bad luck, great, good one, nimble one in our world? I thought you never could have bad luck, great, good Supernatural One. What can we do? For now you must become secular, friend. Now let the supernatural power of your body come over to me that I may inherit from you to do easily all kinds of work, that I may be like you, you who easily does all kinds of work and also that I may be a good walker and never get tired, like you,
you who are a good walker, for you never get tired," says he as he takes the dead squirrel. Then he says to it, "Now I will bury you, friend, as you might be trampled on by the animals that walk about where you are lying dead, friend", says he as he carries the dead squirrel and looks for a good place on really dry ground at the foot of a cedar tree. When he finds it, he plucks off dry moss and wraps it around the squirrel. Then he puts the squirrel on the ground, but he puts a little soil on it, burying it. As soon as this is done he comes and leaves it. That is the end.

(op.cit. pp.200--201)

The examples from the prayers I have given were chosen to illustrate particularly the practical dimension of the Kwakiutl perception of animals. This leaves the question of how this perception is extended into a unifying ethical conception of the world that contains a perception of man's place in the world. I shall give here a brief preview of this question which will be treated at length in the section on the structure of the prayers.

As is clear from the examples, the prayers are dialogues between the orant and the being prayed to. In many of them the orant actually answers for the being he addresses with a phrase that means yes, it will be so. We have, then, in the prayers evidence of an immediate and unselfconsciously given kind of how members of a primitive culture confront the outside world. This context brings up an old problem of comparative religion, that of "participation". In how far did Kwakiutl identify with the outside world; to what degree were they capable of discriminating between self and world? Related to these questions are others, more recent in origin, about the role of symbolization and the degree to which self and world can confront one another without the intermediciy of symbolic representations.

In his article on religious evolution Bellah classifies religions in relation to these questions, and it will be useful to look at Kwakiutl prayers in the context of his discussion. With its unambiguous emphasis
on the this-worldly and the community of men as the ultimate values Kwakiutl
typically a "primitive religion". In this it is also, as
Bellah shrewdly observes of primitive religions, closer to "modern reli-
gion" than any of the historical religions (1969: 265--6). Yet these
are religious values, and Bellah's argument is that one can only speak of
religious evolution in terms of rationalization, that is of the progres-
sively more conscious discrimination of the self from the outside world.
This creates an unbridgeable gap between "primitive" and "modern"
religion, because--and in this Bellah closely follows his predecessors
in the field of religious evolution, Durkheim and Lévi-Bruhl--primitive
religion is essentially a religion of "participation" (op. cit., p.271).

The question of participation has in recent years been brilliantly
brought up to date by Lévi-Strauss in Totemism and The Savage Mind. But Lévi-Strauss has concentrated on primitive systems of classification,
that is on the formal and intellectual level. Where religion is con-
cerned, his judgment does not seem to differ from that of 19th century
anthropology, if one is to take the section on ritual in L'Homme Nu as a
guideline: religious activity is by definition a confusing of categories,
and springs inevitably from a lack of discrimination. In other words,
primitive classification and other systematizations have been saved from
"participation", but where it is a question of religious representations,
especially in the form of superhuman beings, we are stuck with the old
notions.

The question of participation clearly must be looked into freshly,
in spite of the pioneer work done by Lévi-Strauss. Underlying the idea
that primitive religions are religions of participation is a difficulty
about the role of symbolization which research has not yet been able to
resolve satisfactorily. The modern development of thought, to which
Bellah’s "modern religion" belongs is characterised by growing discrimination of the self from the outside world within a process of substituting rational explanation for symbolization, that is within a process of demythologization. Religion on the other hand, and this includes primitive religion and is definitive of all religion, is the attempt to discriminate between the self and the world with the help of symbolic representations. The distinction is not between religion and thought but between two methods of thinking, the first dedicated to working on what is accessible to rational knowledge, the second to working on what is "currently not ... fully comprehended" and can therefore only be expressed with the help of a symbolic mode. (The second method, incidentally, parallels that of science.) Among anthropologists who are also students of religion Lienhardt seems to be the only one to have fully recognised the role played by religious representations in the attempt to separate subject and object.19

I have argued in the foregoing pages that Kwakiutl used the representation of supernatural spirits as a means to become conscious of the self. The spirits are hidden parts of the self which, once accepted, help the initiate to form his personality and play the role in society Kwakiutl think proper to him. In the following pages, which are a comment on the second section of this chapter, I am turning to non-symbolic discrimination between self and world. An examination of the structure of the prayers shows the significance of the part played by the animals in this non-symbolic discrimination. The relation to the animals was not objective in our sense; for this the Kwakiutl sense of the unknown and not fully comprehended was too keen. But when the factors entering into the relation were known, Kwakiutl themselves demythologised. The area of demythologising is important in a culture, for the reason that it
is the only area where thought can be self-critical. Thought cannot be self-critical and mythical at the same time. The two modes exclude one another. Mythical thinking is always formalised. The value of formal, symmetrically balanced and inverted patterns is aesthetic and mnemonic, and for both reasons such patterns are important in the handing on and preservation of culture. But formalization and symbolic representation preclude by their very nature a critical grasp of the situation in hand. Where myth strives to break out of the mere handing on of tradition and link up with experience directly we always get asymmetry and contradiction. Breaking the conventional pattern and replacing it with a new one is one way of introducing critical thought.20 A better one is replacing mythical with non-mythical expression. People can think both mythically and self-critically, and every tradition allows an alternating between the two modes of thought and expression. In short, where primitive religions demythologise they foreshadow the development Bellah calls "modern religion", characterised by non-symbolic discrimination between self and world. Kwakiutl prayers to animals used for food show this development. These prayers not only alternate between a mythical and a self-critical mode of thought and expression, they also give a clue to how the two are connected.

It appears from the prayers that meeting the animals is experienced by Kwakiutl in two different ways: mediated by a myth and in direct recognition of what the relation between man the hunter and the hunted animal means. Both kinds of experience contain elements of participation: the myth is the belief in the animal's voluntary self-sacrifice for men; the recognition is of a relation in which men are forced to kill their loved and reverenced friends. The point that is important in this context is that participation and discrimination, though verbal and logical
opposites, do not exclude one another in experience. It is through participation, that is through sympathetic identification with another that he is apprehended as other, and this apprehension leads naturally to a recognition of the self in its difference. In the prayers discrimination between the subjective and objective is not achieved with the help of imaginary representations which externalise inner experiences, but through the experience of an intense imaginative sympathy with living beings other than oneself. This apprehension of the outer world through an outgoing emotion that both connects and separates can be facilitated by the myth that dramatises the confrontation or it can be achieved through direct insight into the conditions of the meeting. It seems to me that the two methods of apprehending may be connected, and that the myth may represent an education of the understanding. It attributes generosity and altruism to the animal. Inevitably this creates a contrast: the myth of the animal as gentle and freely giving shows off men as violent and preoccupied with taking. The contrast leads to the recognition of the force of necessity and the divided will. When Kwakiutl say in their prayers to the animals they have killed: "I did not mean to harm you, friend" and "do not hold against me what I have done to you", they have made, through their relations with non-human beings one of the most important discoveries about the self: that it is double in will and intention and that even love or goodwill cannot free it from its duplicity.

There could be no sharper discrimination of subjective and objective than a point where men have to confess that they cannot do as they wish, they cannot relate to the world as they think right; that their very intentions are foiled, and foiled by themselves. If animals are represented in Kwakiutl imagery as "superhuman beings who have power to help or harm men", men are seen in these passages of the prayers as beings who
wish to live in harmony with the animals but harm them instead. The issue is sharply focussed on; men could not live if they did not meet the animals with the determination to harm them. Caught in this coil, Kwakiutl do the only realistic and humble thing the dilemma allows for: they apologise to the animals and explain that they are doing what they do not mean to do. These are the passages in the prayers where the problems of the Summer are stated most unambiguously, and where we are at the furthest possible remove--both conceptually and in experience and ethical grasp of experience--from the sacred world of the Winter.

2 Superhuman Beings in Kwakiutl Prayer

This section is an investigation of the nature of the superhuman beings Kwakiutl addressed in prayer. To orient ourselves in the world of Kwakiutl prayer we have to ask a few preliminary questions. What does "pray" mean for the Kwakiutl? How are the beings prayed to selected out of the mass of phenomena in the world? On what occasion, for what purpose are they addressed in prayer? Are they all of the same ontological status for the Kwakiutl? If not, what are the differences?

The Kwakiutl word for to pray is ts' E'lwaga. The word also means to thank, to praise, to ask favours, and this is what Kwakiutl praying, in a stylised form, essentially is. In human intercourse the word means, according to Boas, to praise and to console (Boas 1966: 170). The meaning console is interesting, because not only are some of the prayers in Boas' collection actual laments for animals found dead (Boas 1930: 200 -- 201, 184), but there is always a touch of lament in the prayers to the animals and plants that must be killed for human purposes. The meaning "console" is therefore present even when the word is used in the primary sense of praying to superhuman beings.
In his short note on prayers in his "Religious Terminology of the Kwakiutl" Boas mentions that "the salmon is thanked, also fish, game and trees who are at the same time asked for help" (Boas 1966: 170). This gives the impression that Kwakiutl prayers are directed to natural species alone, (see also Boas 1966: 155 for that impression). In fact the collection of actual prayers Hunt made shows that the range is much wider: prayers are also directed to coppers and to tools, to landmarks, to the protective spirit of the fire, to people newly dead and to the newly born. It is obviously important for an understanding of Kwakiutl prayer to ask what limits the range of beings prayed to and under what general idea they can be subsumed. As a general definition, I would say that Kwakiutl prayer is a dialogue with physical beings other than human, whose powers are conceived as different from and greater than those of human beings.

Animals, plants and objects can also be ordinary and are then not the recipients of prayers. They are prayed to when their power is revealed and they show themselves as "intelligent". This is at a moment of significant contact, often when the human being needs help. On the one hand the range of prayer is therefore limited by the degree of alertness human beings have at their disposal to detect "intelligence" in the extra-human world. On the other it would not be possible to enumerate or classify the recipients of prayer because such "intelligence" can show itself constantly freshly in new aspects of reality. When the potato was introduced to the Northern Indians they prayed to it as Our Lord Potato. Prayer can best be defined as the moment when human intelligence grasps another, extra-human and superhuman "intelligence" and engages with it. Kwakiutl prayers are therefore always dialogues.

Other characteristics of Kwakiutl prayer follow from this definition.
Kwakiutl pray individually. Prayer is spontaneous, though there are many fixed occasions when it is called for, and in spite of the fact that the phrases used are conventional. Formalised collective prayer is very rare because there is no priesthood that could act as mediator between the supplicants and the beings prayed to. The shamans form what might be called a rudimentary priesthood but their powers are limited to healing and cursing (i.e. bringing disease), and in this they resemble more the ambiguous beings prayed to than priests who intercede for men.

Chiefs of the namimas or persons with specially inherited privileges genuinely pray for the group, for instance at the first salmon ceremonial or the feasts that honour the bear or large sea-mammal brought home by the hunter. But these formal group prayers make up a special category. They are exclusively connected with the eating of the animals; they are addressed to the animal as the food that is about to be eaten. As such they are important for an understanding of the scheme of guilt and responsibility that connects the Summer with the Winter. They are in that sense selective and interpretative of what the prayers of individuals more generally express. Because they are part of the first fruit rituals, and because they deal with the act of eating rather than killing, I shall discuss them in that context in Chapter 4.

Kwakiutl prayers are never addressed to invisible powers, either gods or ancestors, but always to a physical presence. There is no indication that Kwakiutl thought certain things inhabited by a spirit, nor is there any general notion of a cosmic spirit inhabiting things. Theoretically all material things could be prayed to. The prayer is always directed to the thing itself. There is no dichotomy between outward form and inward spirit. In prayers to the dead, for instance, it is the dead body that is addressed, while the ancestor whose physical parts...
have decayed is out of the reach of prayer. The newly dead and the newly born can be prayed to because they are non-human, infused with the power of the event that separates them from the ordinary human—the event of birth or death—and yet are physically there. These seem to be the basic conditions for prayer. The prayers are not to what we call material forms but to the power that infuses it, what might be called the form's own native life or spirit. Carved images are symbols and therefore, according to Kwakiutl standards, cannot be prayed to. The carved ancestor figure, for instance, is the ancestor to Kwakiutl; on certain occasions the ancestor speaks through its mouth. But Kwakiutl make a firm distinction between on the one hand what they called "lies" and we call figures of the imagination and on the other real beings. The ancestor cannot be prayed to, however life-like the carving, just as the spirits of the winter dance, however vividly enacted by the dancers cannot be prayed to. Kwakiutl were intensely involved with both kinds of superhuman being, but from the beings of the exterior, non-human world they expected that concrete gain and help towards life which people cannot give to themselves and to these they prayed; from the beings of the interior world they expected gain and guidance in matters in which people are effectual themselves and to these they did not pray. The latter are aids to intelligence in approaching the world and finding out how far man can be an active and effectual master of his fate; the former are the "intelligence" of the world approaching men. It was this approach, made by beings other than themselves, the Kwakiutl celebrated with praise and thanks in their prayers.

To return to the principle of selection among beings prayed to. Prayers are predominantly petitions, and the most frequent principle is that of a special need. It is the cedar most suitable for splitting off
from that is selected for the "begging of a board" (cf. Curtis 1915: 11-12). Out of thousands of trees, it is the tree selected to make a cannibal pole for the ritual that is prayed to. But oddity, or a characteristic that makes things stand out are also occasion for prayers, for instance great size, or beauty in an animal. Such beings are often addressed as "wonderful, magic ones". Among a mass of beings that are the same, for instance fish in a fish run it is the first who is selected for prayer. Finally certain places, for instance cliffs that act as landmarks, have become associated with certain desires or fears and are called upon by everyone passing. The petition may be for protection from bad weather at sea or for luck on a journey.

As I said, the things selected for prayer are always perceived as intelligent. It is therefore natural for Kwakiutl to pray to the tools they have made themselves--dipnets, fish hooks or deadfalls--and ask them to use their minds and do their jobs efficiently. A good example is the "Prayer to the Landotter-Trap".

When the trapper finds a good trail of a landotter, then the man searches for a clear young hemlock which is straight, two fingers thick. As soon as he finds it he prays to it and says, "Thank you, friend, that I have found you, for I have come here to hire you, friend, to work for me that you may be the deadfall of my trap for the landotter who is intelligent when he is being trapped. Now only take care and call the landotter to come under you and when you fall, fall behind the shoulder blades so that you kill him," says he.

As soon as the man has finished working at his landotter trap he sits down at the right hand side of his trap and, looking at the trap he prays to it and says, "O Supernatural One, now you are finished on the ground. Now only take care and do not miss what you are planned for and only kill the landotter for I have obtained you by hiring you, friend, to come and help me in my work, trapping all kinds of fur bearing animals. Now go on, take care, for you are a man, friend," he says as he goes home to his house. (Boas 1930: 198-199)

Such a prayer is almost at what one might call the secular end of the
range. The orant understands thoroughly how his landotter trap is going to work. Note that the trap is "friend", and "a man". Yet there is always the uncertainty that attends particularly the undertakings of a hunting life. The trap is also "Supernatural One". This, and the careful instructions given to the trap show that its "intelligence" is not conceived as mechanical but as volitional. In a tool the element of the unpredictable and uncontrollable in the nature of this intelligence is small. In an animal it is large. Traditionally, and because they are hunters and fishermen, Kwakiutl studied the nature of this intelligence most carefully in the animals, as the example of the hunting myths will show. But the prayers prove that they saw it as present in all things, including those we call inanimate. This "intelligence" is made up of those aspects of meaning we have found in the word naualak: unpredictable, free, unobliged. To predicate such intelligence in things is to experience them as personal beings or powers, which can be engaged with in dialogue. For the limited purposes of my discussion of the prayers only, that is for the purpose of this chapter, I shall call these beings intelligences.

Not all beings prayed to, however, are intelligences. The sun is not an intelligence in this sense. Kwakiutl addressed the sun in prayer more frequently than any other particular being. Boas' collection begins with prayers to the sun, and in a sense which neither Boas nor anyone else has clearly defined, they are the most important part of the collection. At the same time prayers to Sun are so similar in form to the prayers to other beings that no-one has thought to separate them from one another. Yet in fact prayers to Sun are fundamentally different; the epithets used regularly for the intelligences are not found in them, and the structures of the two kinds of prayers are different. My examina-
tion of the prayers in this and the next section will bear out this dis-
tinction. Sun is a being of a different conceptual sort and belongs to
a category by itself. Here I shall briefly define this category.

I said that prayers are never directed to an invisible power, but
always to the physical presence that confronts the orant. In the case
of Sun this statement remains true and yet becomes problematical. Prayers
to Sun seem to be addressed to a personal god who manifests himself in the
sun. I have marked this distinction by dropping the article and using the
capital letter. Sun is the creator god of the Kwakiutl. He is the only
one of their superhuman figures that can be called a god with confidence,
because here the conception is clear cut and the figure singular: neither
in conception nor representation does Sun melt into a group and overlap
with other similar figures. However, if this god manifests himself in
the sun, he also cannot be separated from the physical presence of the
sun. Kwakiutl pray to the physical sun, especially the sun at the zenith,
the midday sun. Prayers to Sun are always offered up in the open facing
the sun. The conception of Sun as creator of men and sustainer of the
world order is so completely rooted in the experience of the actual gene-
rative power and regularity of the sun that it is impossible to speak of
analogy or metaphor.

The conception of Sun is almost entirely confined to the world of
prayer. There is only one kind of myth, part of the trickster Mink's
cycle, in which a Sun figures who corresponds to the Sun of the prayers.
Mink is the son of Sun; Sun is the creator and at the same time the
physical sun. He is an old man in a bejewelled coat who treads the daily
course of the sun. The relation of father to son is interesting. Sun
hands over his coat to Mink, hoping to be relieved of the burden of his
daily celestial journey. But Mink the trickster passes too near the
earth and causes the sinbrand. Sun pitches him down to earth in anger, and it is because of this happening that men learn that Sun is the father of men. One version ends with an enumeration of the descriptive epithets used for Sun in the prayers (Boas 1930: 175--177).22

No other Kwakiutl representations of the sun correspond to this conception. The sun plays a considerable role in myth and ritual art, but is either personalized as a giver of treasure and eater of men as the other initiatory figures, or depicted impersonally as a life and death force. Kwakiutl were astronomers capable of calculating the positions of the sun during the solar year. We have seen in section 1 of Chapter 1 that they paid attention to the solstices and were particularly interested in the winter solstice which coincided with the celebration of the winter ritual. From their preoccupation with the disappearance of the sun one would expect the Sun of the prayers to be the representation of a dual power, a death as well as a life force. Such a conception would have aligned Sun with the conception of the other beings prayed to, who are all "intelligent" in the sense that they may harm as well as help men. Their intelligence reveals them as wilful and unobliged. With Sun it is not so. In their representation of Sun the Kwakiutl pick on the opposite characteristic: reliability, entire trustworthiness. Sun is the principle of order itself, and therefore such categories as we have discussed: freedom and restriction, wilfulness and obligation do not apply to him. He is, of course, free, unobliged, and he is a giver of gifts, but as he is conceived as the order itself within which men and all other beings live, such attributes are irrelevant to him. Hence, though they accept his gifts, men do not feel accountable in relation to Sun. Sun is literally "above it all".
The distinction made between Sun and the intelligences is important. It means that Kwakiutl postulate two principles as simultaneously active in the world; fixed order and open possibility. What significance do they have respectively in Kwakiutl thought? Which of the two permeates Kwakiutl experience more actively? The differences are internal to the prayers, concerning their modes of organization and expression, but I shall approach them first from the outside, through the context Kwakiutl have created by dramatizing their prayers as meetings on journeys.

We have remarked that a condition of praying is the physical presence of the being prayed to. Kwakiutl have no symbolic locale, no shrines at which the invisible power dwells and from which it can be reached in prayer, no image for an invisible power, no priesthood to mediate and intercede for the supplicant. Confrontation between the human and the superhuman is direct, and the histrionic Kwakiutl stress the immediacy of the contact by dramatizing it as a chance encounter. The greeting formulas with which the prayers open are ejaculations of pleased surprise. Through this dramatic medium prayers are presented as happening typically at meetings on a journey, when the superhuman being suddenly materializes in the way of the traveller. We have seen in our discussion of initiation myths (Chapter 1, Section 2) how central the image of the journey is in Kwakiutl thought. In the prayers it takes the form of the image of an encounter between travellers. Behind it stands the belief, traceable in the myths as well as the prayers that all beings move in the orbits of their own system of order. Where the orbits intersect, and the superhuman ones meet the humans, great blessings can be expected. Thus Kwakiutl greet the sun at its rising:
"Welcome, Great Chief, Father, as you come and show yourself this morning. We come and meet alive. O protect me that nothing evil may befall me this day, Chief, Great Father." "Ha". Then he himself answers, the man, in place of Walking-to-and-fro-all-over-the-World, the Sun, the Chief.
(Boas 1930: 182--183)

The bear hunter greets the bear:

"Thank you, friend, that we met. I did not mean to do you any harm, friend. Indeed, this is the reason why you come, made by our creator, that I may come to shoot you, that I may eat you, with my wife, friend."
(op. cit. p.191)

The fisherman's wife greets the salmon she is about to cut:

"Welcome, Supernatural One, you, Swimmer, you have come trying to come to me, you, who always come every year of our world, that you come to set us right that we may be well. Thank you, thank you sincerely, you, Swimmer. I mean this that you, please, will come next year that we may meet alive, that you, please, protect me that nothing evil may befall me, Supernatural One, you, Swimmer. Now I will do what you came here for that I should do to you".
(op. cit. p.207)

Some of the fixed points where Kwakiutl habitually pray, cliffs or waterfalls, are very like shrines. When the Kwakiutl went to Dzawade for the olachen season they always visited the great cascade in their canoes. Men, women and children took off their clothes, and with their sick and those too old and weak to sit up lying on planks they paddled near until the great wind of the fall carrying the spray seaward reached them and drenched them. In this position they prayed; but even here the prayer does not emphasise the spirit of the place but the meeting between two individuals, the human wanderer--here a group--and the supernatural being, whose paths cross and who "meet alive" at the appointed time in the appointed place.

"Welcome, Old Man, we have come and meet alive. I have asked you for this, great, good Supernatural One, last year when we came. I beg you to have mercy and to blow off all evil from us, this our sickness, you great, good Supernatural One, that we may come to life, and also, protect me that I may see you again, Old Man, you great Owner-of-the-World, Supernatural One and also, please,
let be fine the weather you are making, great, good, Supernatural One, you are not a common person, Old Man." "Ha". The Old Man will do so.
(Boas 1930: 190)

In the examples I have given the meeting with Sun is indistinguishable from the meeting with the intelligences. The greeting formula is the same. This is in fact untypical: in the metaphoric language of meetings on a journey, meetings with Sun are generally distinguished from meetings with the unobliged ones by a different kind of greeting formula. The fact that Sun was greeted in the one example given with the same words as one of the beings met with on earth, was due to the fact that the prayer quoted was to the sun at sunrise. There is a moment at sunrise when the sun seems to lie on the horizon, the edge of the earth. The language of Kwakiutl prayer is an extremely sensitive instrument for recording relative position. If the greeting formula says, as it does in our example, "Welcome as you come and show yourself this morning; we meet alive" then orant and being prayed to are on a level; in other words the sun is still earthbound. In all other prayers to Sun quoted in Boas' collection the sun has risen into the sky and another formula is used. I have already mentioned that Kwakiutl were particularly impressed by the power of the sun at the zenith, the "high sun".

The relative positions of the orant and the being prayed to, as well as the gestures accompanying prayer are indicators of the principles that rule the different relationships. The Kwakiutl pray standing or sitting in front of the one prayed to, their eyes fixed on him in attention. They are always face to face with the one prayed to, and in the case of the intelligences the face of the supplicant and of the one prayed to will be in close proximity. To Sun they pray standing up, lifting their face (and often also their hands) in an imploring gesture. Here an
immense distance separates the face of the supplicant from that of the deity. Sun moves in the celestial sphere, going his way inexorably, yet the beings of the terrestrial world are dependent on him for their life. The attention the supplicant fixes on Sun is therefore different from that with which he faces the intelligences in prayer. His first words in greeting Sun are, in fact, a calling down of Sun’s attention:

"Look down upon these who came from you, Great Father! Look down upon these men made by you, Great Father, and protect those who came from you, Chief, Great Father."—"Ha." Now he will do it that way.

(Boas 1930: 183)

The insistence on attention is a feature that belongs to prayers to Sun. Only here do the prayers open regularly with a phrase like "look at me!"—"look down on me!". The prayers to the intelligences express an attention already established, an immediate, mutual attention, a meeting which is not only a crossing of paths but also, at least in hope, a meeting of wishes. Hunt opens his "Prayer to the Fish Running in the Rivers" with an account of this mutual attention: "When a man goes paddling along, and he sees a salmon jumping, then at once he says 'haya!, haya! Come up again, Swimmer, that I may say haya! according to your wishes, for you wish us to say so when you jump, Swimmer, as you are speaking kindly to me when you jump, Swimmer!" (Boas 1930: 184).

The slight differences in the orant attitude, uplifted face in the one case, a straight "facing" in the other, are expressions of a deeper-going dichotomy. Both Sun who moves on high and the beings who move on earth, where their courses intersect with those of men, are adored in the literal sense of that word, that is spoken to, prayed to; but Sun is worshipped as an omnipotent deity. The names by which the supplicant calls to him, Father and Chief, have exactly the force of the Latin genitor and pater, source of my life and ruler over my life. Yet in Sun the
two are more completely linked because Sun as the source of life is not Sun as the beginning of life, in the past, alone, but a source from which life takes its existence at every moment. Sun makes the world continuously, and because he is making it at every moment he is also the ordainer, according to whose will everything happens. The prayers express both ideas, the continuity of creation and the force this has in making every moment into an ordained fate. In the following examples, I have underlined the relevant phrases.

"Please look upon me, Chief, Great Father, and have mercy and protect us against our sickness, [me] and my relatives, and pray, make us well, Great-Walking-all-over-the-World, for you are making in every way this world that you made, Great-Walking-to-and-fro-all-over-the-World, Father."--"Ha," answers the Sun. (Boas 1930: 182)

"O Great Chief, Father, pray look down upon these men made by you, that nothing wrong may befall me this day, for you do as you please with us, Great Chief, Praised-One, Great-Walking-all-over-the-World, Chief."--"Ha". (op. cit. p.182)

In the conception of Sun, then, the Kwakiutl have a creator god who is also ordainer of fate. The conception coalesces with perception: we all depend on the sun’s activity at every moment. At the same time the sun is dependable; he describes his course with a mathematical accuracy, which Kwakiutl measured and which obviously gave them deep satisfaction. The tone in which Sun is prayed to expresses love and trust. Both as “pater” and as “genitor” Sun is conceived as benevolent. He is the model for the Kwakiutl ideal of the good chief. With Sun there is no suspicion of an arbitrary will. In him Kwakiutl worship an omnipotent but wholly dependable and wholly benevolent deity.

Their relation to the beings they meet on earth is different. Though Kwakiutl greet them with the same reverence as they do Sun, and express the same dependence on them, the tone of their prayers shows that
the relation is more complex here. It is first of all more complex in
that the meeting is a physical meeting on earth, and such a meeting
between travellers always involves a risk. Kwakiutl myths are full of
meetings that involve risk, and it is possible to fill in with such myth-
scenes the background of the prayers. A frequent incident is the hero's
meeting at sea with the canoe of a stranger. Kwakiutl travelled by
water, and as their waters were open to the warriors and slave traders
from the North the scene is not unrealistic. An approaching canoe could
mean danger. On the other hand, the stranger in the canoe could be a
fellow-Kwakiutl from a remote tribe or a man of peaceful intentions. In
the myths he is typically a superhuman being. When the two canoes have
come close each of the men gripped the other's bow with his left hand.
In his right he held his weapon. At this moment of face to face contact
the nature of the meeting was decided. They either had a medicine fight
at which one was overcome by the other or they "recognised" one another,
exchanged weapons and called one another "friend". The Kwakiutl "friend"
means "of the same kind". It is used to address the intelligences (but
not Sun) in the prayers.

The intelligences, we have noted, possess volition and power, and in
the intimate moment of meeting there is always a question of how they will
use this power, or, more accurately, how their great power will affect
such entirely different beings as men. But the relation between men and
intelligences is also more complex because man's intention towards them
is double. On the one hand it is as passive as it is in his relation to
Sun: he is the grateful recipient of the blessings they may bestow. On
the other, he is intent on his own purposes, and in the case of prayers
to beings that are used as food, medicines or raw material for artifacts;
his intention is to take their life. The natural uncertainty about the
intention of an "unobliged one" is therefore matched by the duplicity of the supplicant, who prays for something that will destroy the being prayed to but still asks for this being's co-operation. These complexities give the prayers to intelligences an overtone of fear. "Do not let our meeting be bad" is a wish frequently expressed in them.

It is only through the implicit dramatic context of the prayers--the context of the meeting on a journey--that the significance of the difference between prayers to Sun and prayers to the intelligences becomes clearly apparent. Men's journeys and Sun's take place on different planes, and the connection between men and Sun is a vertical one. Men can call up to the Sun to draw down his attention. But they can never interfere with or influence his course. Sun's dependability has the other side of his remoteness. His rule is benevolent but so absolute that there is not even room for a scheme of resignation to his will. His will is simply an enveloping fact: "for you do with us as you please, Great Chief, Praised One".

This is shown in the image of journeys. Sun's journey in the sky manifests an order through which all beings live. Because he moves on high he is there at all times for all men. He constantly gives, and men can only receive in gratitude. The journeys of the intelligences on the other hand manifest particular and limited orders on earth. They are not as calculable as Sun's and even the most regular--for instance the runs of the fish--contain elements of arbitrariness. Men use their own intelligence to intersect these journeys, and in doing so they act on the intelligences. Their meetings are fraught with uncertainty, even danger, but they also mean interaction with beings of superhuman power. From this interaction grows a complex moral relationship which is absent in the case of Sun.
There is another contextual consideration which should occupy us before we go on to an examination of the texts. This is a consideration of the emotions expressed in the prayers, emotions of love and of fear. In what experiences and conceptualizations are these emotions rooted? What are their reverberations in Kwakiutl thought as a whole? Love and fear are closely bound up with ethical norms. Let me say here at once, because the fact is not self-evident before I have quoted more texts, and because my discussion of ethical demands and of fears is sure to obscure it, that Kwakiutl prayers are expressions of love. They could be compared to love poems: their tone is one of delight, and they express expectations of good to come. They also express dread and remorse, but this is not in itself incompatible with love. The love and dread they express is the distillation, in the special form of the prayers, of a general conception of the world. In this section I shall describe what forms the ethical-conceptual background of these emotions.

It was necessary in the last section for the sake of exposition to separate the principle of the relation to Sun from that of the relation to the animals, the order principle from what might be called the opportunist principle. Yet in experience, as we can see from the prayers which express immediate experience, the two relations overlay one another. On the one hand men meet the animals in the ordered world of Sun, and their meetings are part of that harmony. On the other hand the order of Sun is drawn into the moral ambience that characterises the meeting of men and animals. Within that moral ambience what was the law of harmony in an eternal perspective is turned into the demand for harmony in a temporal perspective. The law is implicit in the prayers to Sun, the demand in the prayers to the animals. As demand the law might be phrased:
thou shalt live in harmony with other living beings. In practical living this means "thou shalt not kill". This demand is nowhere explicitly mentioned in the texts and yet plays the role of a key assumption under which the thought of prayers and hunting myths is ordered.

The demand for harmony gives Kwakiutl and North American Indian thinking about the relation between men and animals its special stamp. Much of Indian thought expressed in narration, in visual art and in ritual is an experimenting with possible types of expressions that describe the relationship of man and the living world: relations of identity, of likeness, of bonds made by blood or choice. The animal (or other living being) is a man, it is like a man, it is man's brother or sister, father, mother or child, friend, husband or wife. All living beings are interrelated. The ties of human society are convenient metaphors for their interrelation.

The demand for harmony with all living beings is, on the one hand, the outcome of the experience of a hunting life. On the other hand a hunting life shows that it cannot be fulfilled. Translated into the practical language of "thou shalt not kill" it reveals its absolute and impossible nature. In the range of relations between men and other living beings, not to kill becomes more impossible to the degree to which the living beings are more useful and necessary to subsistence. Yet hunters identify most closely with the game animals on whom they and their communities live. A tension is set up between the absolute demand that cannot be fulfilled and the practical necessity that cannot be gainsaid. From this tension arise the rules that define a hunting life, and, on the individual level, the moral patterns for maturation.

In his *Symbolism of Evil* Paul Ricoeur discusses the nature of the absolute religious demand. Though his context is that of Jewish his-
tory and the moral revaluation introduced by the prophets; his findings are not without relevance to the ethics and moral life we are discussing here. Particularly relevant to our context is Ricoeur's remark that "ethics ... is the slackening of an impulse that is fundamentally hyper-ethical" (loc. cit. p.55). This sums up the conception we are discussing. The demand "thou shalt not kill" is hyperethical when applied to the whole of the living world. The rules of conduct with which a hunting life is hedged in are ethical, and represent a slackening of the original impulse. However, even if the tension is eased on the normative level through rules ordering daily life, it remains on the moral level.

In their hunting myths and first fruit rituals Kwakiutl seem to identify the root of evil in the necessity to eat. Killing and eating "our friends" becomes the expression of the absolute "sin" that is the reverse of the absolute demand. Friend, as I have said, means "of one kind". The Kwakiutl metaphor for sin therefore becomes cannibalism. Taken to its extreme conclusion (a conclusion which the Identification of "of one kind" suggests) cannibalism is the unthinkable eating of oneself. But cannibalism is also used in the winter ritual as metaphor for exculpation. The transformation from the state of being accountable to the state of being free is made through the process of retributinal justice in the course of which the eater becomes the eaten. We shall see this process at work especially in the transitional myths that bridge the gap between the conceptual system of hunting and of initiation, discussed in the Epilogue. These myths foreshadow the solution fully worked out in the initiation myths proper and the winter ritual. But to return to the situation of the Summer.

The prayers, with their immediate relation to experience, express the dilemma. If harmony can only exist between men and animals as long as
men are passive receivers, as they are in relation to Sun, then men when they kill for food step out of their passive roles and shatter this harmony. With the harmony they shatter the basis of their relation to the world and their security. Kwakiutl, caught on the horns of their dilemma, do what other people do under such circumstances. They bring the demand down to a manageable level, and make it fulfillable in detail where it escapes in its entirety. The demand "thou shalt not kill" is broken down into a number of observances and taboos that honour the animal and the same time protect men. They are: you must not kill senselessly or for sport; you must not be "cruel to your game"; you must handle animals and plants reverently; you must honour their remains, put fish bones back into water, bury the bones of land animals, so that the animals can renew themselves from their bones. Examples can be multiplied from all Kwakiutl texts. It is here that prayers and taboos come together. The Kwakiutl word for taboo, *ae 'K·ila*, means literally "to treat well". The word can imply a handling things carefully, to treat reverentially as one would an honoured personage, and to treat warily in case of repercussions (see Boas 1966: 170). The act of praying is itself part of treating the recipient of the prayer well.

But no amount of carefully kept observances adds up to a fulfilling of the absolute demand. There is therefore a continual tension between the implicit whole demand and the explicit compromises—the demand fragmented into observable rules. Keeping the rules regulates life and justifies men. But the justification always falls short. The absolute demand is always there as a measure against which even the most painstaking practice of observances fails. In relation to Sun there is no problem. There are no observances linked with Sun except praise and thanks. The problem arises only with the intelligences, and here par-
particularly with those that serve for food. The question that faces the Kwakiutl is how to find more and more complete ways to satisfy the absolute demand. Yet at the same time consciousness of the absolute and impossible nature of the demand also works against this ethical striving. For consciousness of the demand not to kill makes the animal sacred in a Durkheimian sense of setting them apart. Their sacrality introduces a new aspect into the relationship: fear. In the prayers the animals appear threatening because they are other, sacred.

Up to now we have considered the absolute demand in its general bearing. Not to fulfil it threatens to cut man off from partnership in the living world, from his sources of being. There is also a subjective threat: the wrath of the beings he offends. Again this notion concerns all beings Kwakiutl come into contact with; the smallest herb if plucked irreverently, not "treated well" could send forth a blast of destruction. But Kwakiutl are particularly conscious of the threat from the animals they hunt. The rule that enjoins that animals who have been killed are "treated well" (rules of which the prayers form a part, and which are often mentioned in the prayers themselves) have, as I have noted above, the double force of taboos: they are acts of homage but also actions designed to protect from superhuman vengeance. If the absolute demand in relation to the intelligences used for food is "thou shalt not kill", then it is clear that its opposite pole, the demand fragmented into rules under which it is safe to kill can be translated: nevertheless I want to kill and get away with it. Such an attitude of wilfulness and rebellion would engender fear. The mirror of that fear is the wrath of the animals. The sacrality of the animals has two faces: the face of self-sacrificing altruism and the face of wrath. The fear men feel is not the physical fear of being killed by the animals in revenge, though it is sometimes
expressed as this in the prayers, but an ethical dread engendered by not having fulfilled the absolute demand, by being self-willed and rebellious. The prayers show that even the accidental killing of a small, and in our estimation unimportant, animal causes deep dread (cf. Boas 1930: 201 "Prayer to a Squirrel"). In the hunting myths (and also in visual art) it is, however, the grizzly—the only aggressive game animal—who exemplifies the wrath of the sacred. (In the same myths the bear also exemplifies what might be called the grace of the sacred: the self-sacrifice of the game animals for men).

This fear, because it is not a physical but an ethical dread is a transformative emotion and contains the power to defeat itself and turn into its opposite, moral courage. The absolute demand cannot be fulfilled, but men can overcome their dread of vengeance by offering themselves up to the powers of the sacred that, as they see it, are out to destroy them. This is done in the figure of the initiation. In the winter ritual the initiate is offered, or offers himself to the man-eating spirit. A line leads from the animal in its wrathful aspect to these blood-drinking deities. The wrathfulness of the animal in the Summer, and the "holy terror" of the initiate in the Winter outline the psychic movement that leads in Kwakiutl thought from "having it one's own way" to real independence and freedom.

What then of love? Ricoeur, who has analysed the role dread plays in religious experience in his Symbolism of Evil, and to whose analysis I owe much of my understanding of the Kwakiutl modality of it, remarks that "man enters into the ethical world through fear and not through love" (1969: 30). But he also sees that dread of the sacred is connected with love. He sees this connection made by a progressively growing ethical consciousness. According to him the dread "contains in germ all
later moments" and becomes "on a higher level of the consciousness of evil, the fear of not being able to love any more." (loc. cit.).

We have seen that for Kwakiutl the fear is indeed generative of development and transformational. But it is not the root of a love which grows out of it in a long moral development; rather it is only the simultaneously present and necessary other face of their love. This is clear from the prayers, but becomes particularly clear in an examination of the first salmon ritual. The prayers show that Kwakiutl saw the very beginning of man, his very being made up of the love he has for other beings of this world. With the absolute demand, which expresses this love in terms of action:-thou shalt not kill--morality enters. On this showing Kwakiutl morality does not begin in fear but in love. For the Kwakiutl, as in all religious thought, guilt and fear are rooted in the "law", here in the observances, rules of conduct and taboos which themselves are designed to protect from guilt and justify. The law in its turn is rooted in the impossible demand. The impossible demand is, however, one of love for other beings first and foremost.

Love itself has two sides, and morality is generated between the two. One is a sympathetic one that strives for union. The desire for harmony expressed in the absolute demand and in the epithet "friend"-"of my kind"--expresses that side. The other side of love consists in the ability to recognise difference and grant the other his objective otherness. Kwakiutl hunting myths are a record of this side of love. Myths are a speculative form, and in their hunting myths the Kwakiutl study the otherness of the animals intently. The questions animating the hunting myths are: how far are men and animals the same and how do they differ? What is the right relation between men and animals? The innumerable versions in which these myths come show the importance these questions had for the Indian
hunters. The right relation is that men eat animals. Animals are precisely not "friends", that is of one kind with men.

The field of tension is therefore established between two demands of love. In the rituals this tension is resolved in a process of moral self-development. The first fruit rituals (rituals for first salmon and first bear, discussed in Chapter 4) enact myths told from the point of view of the animal. The initiation rituals are their counterpart; they are the answers to the questions that were posed by taking the animals' point of view. The former belong to the life of the Summer, the latter to that of the Winter. Within the rhythm of the ritual year, the important step from identification to discrimination and self-knowledge is made.

The prayers are, epistemologically speaking, the expression of an earlier stage. Myths are speculative thought, rituals formalised transformational action. Prayers are records of the experience that precedes both the mythical thought and the ritual action. The prayers record two types of direct experience: the experience man has of himself as destructive of the animal, though he loves the animal and does not wish him harm, and the experience he has of the animal as double, capable of destructive wrath as well as of generosity. As praying allows no time for speculation, both experiences are recorded in conventionalized condensed expressions. In the next section we shall consider the expression the experience of the paradoxical duality of the animal takes.

2(c) The Nature of the Epithets in Kwakiutl Prayer

The language of the prayers is simple and easy to understand even for outsiders. It is far simpler than the language used in ritual songs (the prayers' nearest poetic cousins), which is highly symbolic, or that used:
in myths, which describes a remote, non-ordinary reality. It belongs on the whole to rational, universally understandable discourse, though not to everyday speech, from which it is divided by certain poetic devices, which we shall discuss in the next chapter. The discourse assumes a knowledge of beliefs and customs current in the culture, but not more than any person versed in the most general lore of the culture would have. As I mentioned in the introduction, there is nothing esoteric about Kwakiutl prayer, everybody can pray and all prayers are equally effective. Nor is there any special efficacy connected with certain words or turns of phrase. The prayers are straightforward expressions of trust in the powers met with, confident of a response.

The prayers are, however, not always straightforward trusting expressions. There are phrases in which the simple meaning becomes ambiguous, and these exceptions are the more striking because of the general openness of the prayers. Obscurities occur in two sorts of phrases: (1) where the dilemma arising from having to kill is referred to, (2) in the epithets with which the animals are addressed. The first kind I shall discuss under "Dispensations" and "Formulas of Justification" in the next section. There we have to do with an obscurity of thought: the issue is approached in an oblique manner. Here we have to do with an obscurity of language: the epithets are verbal paradoxes, suggesting a quality and its opposite simultaneously, cancelling sense. Both kinds of phrases are what I call generative loci for thought. They are those parts of the prayers that are taken up and developed in Kwakiutl thought otherwise, outside the prayers. They are taken up again particularly in the winter ritual.

In the epithets, I said, we have to do with verbal paradoxes. Their double-meaning does not appear in the translations because Boas has chosen
to translate always only the logically correct "good sense" of the word. It is logical that in praying for health one would not address a disease bringer, and asking for wealth one would not ask someone known to consume wealth and make people poor. Yet if we insist on a semantically correct reading of the names with which the Kwakiutl address their superhuman beings, this is precisely what the Kwakiutl do. Even allowing for the fact that the epithets may have been used conventionally and without much thought of their double meaning, this shows that the Kwakiutl were compelled by a different logic. The context of their thought as a whole suggests indeed that the "logical inconsistency" was deliberate. If they want health they address the being prayed to as "Healing Woman", which is the name for the spirit of disease among them. Boas remarks in *Tsimshian Mythology* about this Kwakiutl word that "... the whole may be translated as 'pestilence woman'" (1916: 546); but in fact an unmediated double-sense is intended: "healing-and-pestilence woman". The Kwakiutl are naturally not led to do this by an insufficiency of language. They have univocal epithets at their disposal in which the opposing attributes are divided, and they use them in the prayers on appropriate occasions. (See my discussion of the prayer of a sick woman on p.121). That the use of the ambiguous name is deliberate is also shown by the fact that the same names are used when speaking of the spirit of the winter ritual. Their use in the winter ritual above all makes it clear that for Kwakiutl health and disease come from the same source; and that it is in the end up to men to wring life from the unthinkable opposition. The life men finally gain in the winter ritual is, however, not the same as the security of physical health they ask for in the prayers. The ambiguity of the names by which they address the animals may be a reminder that it is in the nature of things that the physical
health they ask for in the prayers will never be a secure possession with them.

The epithets are generative loci then in the sense that they lead on to the winter ritual and link the world of nature with the world of the mind. Through this link the Kwakiutl conception of animals is deepened, and they become significant far beyond their practical use. The passages in which the dilemma of having to kill is referred to are generative loci in another sense. In them the Kwakiutl lament what I have called their divided will. The winter ritual takes up this theme of psychological division therapeutically. In the initiation the personality of the novice is split, and the symbolic representations of the ritual show him to himself as split. They help him to heal the split himself, or at least accommodate the inevitable contradictions of his nature. Both these parts of the prayers' discourse therefore point forward to the winter ritual. I shall limit myself here to the epithets and examine the expression of the dilemma in the next section.

One of the most important findings of my analysis is that in prayers to Sun there is no comparable "thickening of language" into symbolism (and naturally no mention of the dilemma). Prayers to Sun are understandable rational discourse in every part. The qualities of the "generative loci" can only be appreciated in a comparison that juxtaposes prayers to Sun with prayers to intelligences. I have therefore put both my lexical examination of epithets, and the structural one of the formulas which is the subject of the next section into this comparative framework.

In the following pages I give the classifactory table I have made up for the epithets, using "secrecy" as a parameter. The epithets can be divided according to their relative accessibility of meaning. But "secrecy" alone does not do justice to the role they play in the prayers.
Those more accessible in meaning also fit the discourse as a whole. By translating those that are less accessible, and have a double sense as if they had a single and fitting one, Boas has obscured the fact that the epithets set up a war of meaning within the prayers. What is remarkable about them is that the more "secret" they are the less connection they have with the general discourse until they actually establish an underlying counter-meaning. The epithet carries its own semantic load which is separate from the drift of the discourse. The heavier that semantic load, the more remote the name becomes from ordinary speech and the more alien to the obvious drift of the discourse, but simultaneously the more "pregnant" in connection with Kwakiutl thought as a whole.

Prayers, we know, are dialogues between a man and his superhuman partner. Because of the dramatic context in which the prayers are set, that of a surprise meeting on a journey, they are studded with exclamatory terms of address. Names of the partner in prayers are always used in the vocative, never in a declaratory statement. However, the proper name of the being addressed, which would designate him in ordinary language, is never used at all. The prayers have been given captions in Boas' collection; they are designated "to the Sun", "to the Salmon" etc. But "Sun" is never used in prayers to the sun, or "Salmon" in prayers to the salmon. Instead of the name an epithet that is at the same time a title is used. There are two different types of titles used with roughly three different types of semantic load.

To repeat, the semantic loads are distributed differently in prayers to Sun and prayers to the intelligences. I distinguish between the semantic loads by their amount of "secrecy". Being titles and not ordinary names they are all secret to some extent. But there is a range from an "open secret" (Salmon = Swimmer) to a sacred name. I distinguish
between the types of titles as descriptive and honorific.

(1) **Descriptive titles for Sun**

For instance: "Walking-to-and-fro-in-the-World", "Going-from-End-to-End". For those who know, these titles describe the yearly journey of the sun, which circumscribes, and therefore makes the world. They are synonyms for "creator". This is an open secret for those who share in the culture.

(2) **Honorific titles for Sun**

"Father", "Chief". These are commonly used words. They are semantically marked here only because they are used for Sun, who stands for the generative, ordering and loving power in the universe. They are "open secrets". Other honorific titles like "Our Lord", "Praised One", "Prayed To" speak for themselves.

(3) **Descriptive titles for intelligences**

They range in semantic loads from entirely open--"Tree-Feller" for the beaver--to intermediary secret ones like "Weather Maker" which is also used for the beaver and depends on a knowledge of magic culture lore. Some depend on minute observation like "Flabby Skin in Mouth" for the halibut, others belong to a sort of professional jargon, like "Younger Brother" for the halibut hook (for its canniness and usefulness--younger brothers served their elder brother). This is commonly shared knowledge.

(4) **Honorific titles for intelligences**

For instance: "Friend, Supernatural One, Healing Woman, Long-Life-Maker". In contrast to Sun, who is always addressed with the most open and ordinary honorific titles, the intelligences
are regularly addressed by epithets that are secret as well as sacred. "Supernatural One" (naualak) is the chief of these. The word means basically "unobliged". Sun is never addressed as "Supernatural One". Other honorific titles of the intelligences, "Healing Woman", "Long-Life-Maker", have a double meaning. Though Sun is asked for health in the prayers, he is never addressed by either of these titles. What Boas translates as "Healing Woman" has actually got the meaning "Healing and Pestilence Woman" (Boas 1916: 546). "Long-Life-Maker" is apostrophised in winter dance speeches as "Who-makes-our-life-short". Another honorific title, used for salmon and twins (who "are" salmon) is "Rich-Maker-Woman". It is also never used for Sun. Sun is never asked for wealth, while intelligences regularly are. "Rich-Maker-Woman" also has a double meaning. This is again clear from the winter dance where the givers of wealth--the winter dance power and the initiate--are apostrophised in the ritual songs as "poor makers" and "swallowers of wealth" (cf. Boas 1897: 459, 460 among others). All these semantically heavily loaded honorific titles of the intelligences are also names for the sacred power of the winter dance. While the honorific titles of Sun--"Father", "Chief"--connote each of them an undivided power--the power to generate and order--the honorific titles of the intelligences connote a divided power--at their most extreme the power to destroy as well as make. Correspondingly, while all Sun's titles are open to understanding, the titles of the intelligences are, at their most extreme, not accessible to the mind at all.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE I</th>
<th>DESCRIPTIVE TITLE</th>
<th>HONORIFIC TITLE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SUN</td>
<td>INTELLIGENCE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPEN</td>
<td>&quot;Walking-to-and-fro-in-the-World&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;Swimmer&quot; (salmon)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SECRET</td>
<td>&quot;Going-from-End-to-End&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;Tree Feller&quot; (beaver)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;Flabby-Skin-in-Mouth&quot; (halibut)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;Nimble One&quot; (squirrel)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| INTER-  | "Weather Maker" (beaver) | "Satiater" (salmon) | "Chief of the Upper World" | "{berries}"
| MEDIATE| "Satiater" (salmon) | "Clever Handed One" (medicinal plant) | "grandfather" | "grandchildren"
| SECRET  | "Younger Brother" (halibut hook) | "Scenting Woman" (halibut) | "Dancer" (olachen) |
|         |                   |                   | "Acropolis" (copper) |
| SECRET  |                   |                   | "Tide Woman" (general for products of sea) |
|         |                   |                   | "Supernatural One" (general) |
|         |                   |                   | "Supernatural Power of the Ground" (especially for medicinal plants) |
|         |                   |                   | "Healing Woman" (general) |
|         |                   |                   | "Long-Life-Maker" (general) |
|         |                   |                   | "Rich Maker Woman" (esp. for salmon) |
The table does not represent a quantitative but a qualitative comparative analysis. I have not listed all the epithets that appear in the prayers, because the same names occur in many variant forms. The categories are, however, always kept distinct, except for the overlap in the most "open" section between honorific titles of Sun and of intelligences.

The table shows at a glance that all Sun's titles are in the "open" section. None of them are even of an intermediate secret kind. In the equation I make between "secrecy" and semantic load this means that titles for Sun do not have a heavy semantic load. (No war of meaning is set up by them.) The important difference of semantic load is between that of the honorific titles for Sun and that of the honorific titles for intelligences. The difference is not that Sun's titles are exoteric and the intelligences' esoteric. All the names are current among the people, who, as we know, all pray. The difference lies rather in the fact that the honorific titles of intelligences carry a semantic overload and point to something beyond themselves. While all the titles could be called sacred, in so far as they set the recipient apart from the ordinary, the most extreme of the honorific titles for intelligences are also the sacred names for the winter dance spirit, the quintessence of the sacred (navalak) in the Kwakiutl expressive system. In the prayers these titles appear and remain cryptic, ambiguous and unintelligible. Even their unintelligibility is not open but hidden under a surface sense. One of the meanings dominates—the good one, which fits into the context of the prayer. The other is latent but well known; it contradicts the dominant meaning and so makes nonsense of the context.

Perhaps nonsense is too strong a word. Let us by way of example look at a number of prayers for health to medicinal plants. The context
is made by an urgent wish for help and an obvious trust in the intelligences good will to cure. The first is the prayer of a woman whose husband has prepared medicine from the roots of the wild gooseberry bush to cure an extremely painful boil. In Boas' translation the prayer reads

"O, Supernatural One, now you have come to this cruel, unmerciful great sickness. Go on, pray, make me well, for I am poor, you, Who-Makes-Well-the-Sick, you, Healing-Woman. Please, cure me, please, you Asked-to-Make-Well-the-Sick, for these are your names, Supernatural Ones. Please, ease the pain of this boil which is on me, please, you, Long-Life-Maker, please," says she.

(Boas 1930: 230)

The next is the prayer of a man whose wife has prepared Digestia leaves as a hot fomentation for a swelling on his shoulder.

"O Supernatural One, now you have come to this cruel sickness which troubles me. Go on, please, take it off and, please, lick it off, you, Supernatural One, and, please, ease the pain, you, Long-Life-Maker and, please, make me well, you, Healing-Woman. Please, take pity on me and make me strong, Supernatural One. I should not say this to you, Supernatural One, if I did not believe in you, for I really believe in your power of making me well, Supernatural One," says he.

(op. cit. p.224)

The last is the prayer of a father to the bark of salmonberry vines that is to be put on the burn of his child, an old sore that refuses to heal.

"O, Supernatural One, now I put you on to the sore of my child that you may lick off this great sickness, that you, please, make it heal, you, Supernatural One, that, please, it may heal up, please, you, Healing-Woman, you, Long-Life-Maker, please, take pity on me that my mind may be at rest, you, Supernatural One."

(op. cit. p.218)

The urgency and emotional sincerity of these prayers speak for themselves. It is the more remarkable that when literally translated their meaning becomes complex and expresses in turn a more complex view of life than Boas' translation would lead one to expect. Considering that Boas' "Supernatural Ones" are the unoblighed ones that are free to
do as they like, and the other epithets have conventionally established meanings that contradict their consoling surface meanings, the prayers seem to express considerable courage and acceptance of the uncertainties of the human condition. With the double sense of the epithets restored, the last example I have given would, for instance, read like this:

O, Unobligerd One, now I put you on the sore of my child, that you may lick off this great sickness, that you, please, make it heal, you Unobligerd One, that please it may heal up, please, you Healing and Disease Bringing Woman, you, Long-Life-Maker-Who-Makes-Our-Life-Short, please take pity on me that my mind may be at rest, you, Unobligerd One.

In spite of what I have said about courage and acceptance above, this translation forces the question on us: why does the orant, in the face of his obvious trust and gratitude, establish an underlying counter-current to the sense he wants to express? It is tempting to see here mainly a trick of language at work. The orant is clearly not asking that simultaneously with health disease and death be meted out to him. We do not have to do here, however, with a purely linguistic phenomenon, but with a philosophical style that is typical of Kwakiutl expressive culture as a whole. It is for instance attested in Wilson Duff's work on the visual art of the area. In visual art and artefacts Duff has found it particularly connected with sexual imagery. Womb and penis, for instance, both "life-bringers" in their dominant sense, are simultaneously represented as "death-bringers", the womb, say, as the mouth of a rattlesnake, the penis as a war club. Such visual double-speak occurs even in the utensils used for female puberty rites, that is in a context where the wish for fertility, for the life-bringing capacity, is unequivocal. 32 We shall find the same style of thinking present in the texts examined in Chapters 3 and 4, though in narrative-discursive and enacted form, and put to different uses. The linguistic paradoxes of the epithets are the
most contracted examples of the style and the ones least amenable to interpretation. Yet what we have to do with here is, I believe, the dominant motif of Kwakiutl thought.

How then are we to approach the contradictions contained in the epithets in the framework of Kwakiutl thought as a whole? The relation between the two meanings, I believe, is here the same as in the case of the baxus/tsetsea opposition discussed in Chapter 1. Within the cosmic context the Kwakiutl make their point of view explicit: "In the Summer baxus is on top and tsetsea underneath, and in the Winter vice versa." Similarly here. In the situation of the prayers healing is on top. But just because healing is on top its opposite, killing, is underneath and will have its time. The Kwakiutl were not forced semantically to confound healing and killing power. If the occasion demanded they used names in the prayers in which healing and killing powers are clearly separated, as the prayer of the woman to the water hemlock shows:

"O, Supernatural One, I come to ask you to try to heal me, that you heal me, you who is asked to heal and, please, save me, you, Life-Owner, and do not let me be overcome by the Short-Life-Maker-Woman and by the Killing-Woman; and, please, take me away from them that I may live a little while. Now go on, Supernatural One, now you will go into me and you will drive away my diseases that I may vomit."
(Boas 1930: 211--12)

But the general tendency of Kwakiutl thought is not to lodge opposites in two different things but to apprehend a thing as itself and its opposite simultaneously. The thing exists, it "lives" and has its living relation to men by its play between extremes. Being is always apprehended as mobile by the Kwakiutl, never as in classical thought as at rest.

Here too lies the reason why the epithets for the intelligences are the same as the names of the winter dance power. The changing play
between dominant and subordinate aspect the epithets contain is extended here in another dimension, that represented by the division of the solar year. In the tsetsega season, the dark part of the year, not health and long life but disease and death are the dominant motif. However, just as disease and death are present in the Summer, though "underneath", so health and long life are present in the tsetsega. They are translated from the merely physical to a more comprehensive plane, a plane Kwakiutl call variously well-being, good-mindedness, being happy, which is physical, ethical and conceptual at the same time. In the speeches opening the winter dance season the winter dance power is called "Healing Woman", and here the word has definitely the dominant sense of Pestilence Woman, the dark power of the tsetsega that is associated with disease and death. Yet the same power is also called "Happy Maker" and the ceremonial house in which it dwells "Time of Happiness" and "place of well-being". I give, as examples, two brief extracts from such winter dance speeches:

Now spoke Squatter, the Assembler, and said: "Now come, you several friends, you have come into this house which has changed on the ground, this house of the supernatural power, the house of Healing Woman. We have come to be assembled, friends, in this house which has a name, this Time of Happiness, this place of well-being, the house, the receptacle of the winter ceremonial. Now just take care, friends, take good care when our great friends, the dance owners come". (Boas 1930: 121)

"Now Welcome, great friends, sit down comfortably in your seats. Come friend" said he, as he called by names the dancers. "Come and take care of us in this house which has become different on the ground beginning this night; and you also, all you friends, you have come into this assembly house which has become different on the ground, my house for the winter ceremonial. Now welcome, for you have come to be happy with this happy maker, the red cedar bark, when it came and was put on us by Healing Woman." (op. cit., p.65)

I have mentioned in the introduction to this part that to be happy denotes the alertness and energy that means life in the full sense to the
Kwakiutl. This is the life and well-being that is "underneath" the tsetsequa in the Winter. The physical life for which Kwakiutl ask in their prayers must be accepted in its double sense: as containing death; as, by being lived, bringing us nearer death with every moment. Such acceptance takes courage. In the winter dance we have moved from the courage to accept fate to the courage to be responsible for one's own fate. This shift from the passive to the active is imaged in the initiate's "act of courage" which transforms death into life.

3. Formulas and their Combination: the Structure of the Prayers

In the last section I have discussed how Kwakiutl understand and represent to themselves the superhuman beings they pray to. In this section I am enquiring into the experience that generates such representations. For that purpose I turn from parts of the text (the greeting formulas, the epithets) to the prayer text as a whole. Considered as a whole, the text gives an account of the relationship between the supplicant and the being supplicated, and from this account we can extrapolate what experience basically informs the prayers. According to my understanding of the text, the experience that informs the prayers is that of human accountableness. The consciousness of accountableness seems to have two sides for the Kwakiutl: it is both the reality of the human condition (that which makes men baxus in relation to the beings they pray to) and the challenge to change that condition to one in which the account is balanced and men are free.

The experience of accountableness is not the only experience that informs the prayers, and it does not inform all prayers to an equal extent. Where the being prayed to impinges on human experience but is itself impervious to human action it plays no role. The greater the extent of
human interaction with the being prayed to the more relevant the experience of accountableness. In most cases this accountableness remains implicit and can only be deduced from an examination of the prayers' structure (see subsection 3e). But where human action actually destroys the being prayed to as in the case of all things turned to human use, but particularly that of the animals and plants used for food, the expression of accountableness becomes part of the discourse; it is "discussed between" the orant and the being to whom he is praying. These prayers represent the end-case of the experience of human interaction with beings other than human. They in particular are the subject of my investigation.

Kwakiutl prayers are conceived as dialogues with beings of a considerable presence and power. When they speak of being accountable they do not do it dispassionately and objectively but as if in answer to some question or accusation. It is the defence that we hear in the prayers, not the accusation. Analytically we have therefore to work our way backward from the explicit defence, which takes a number of variant forms, to that which makes up the experience of accountability itself.

The only way in which such an analysis can proceed is through an examination of the prayers' form. Though they are slight and "informal", Kwakiutl prayers are an art form, one might almost say an artefact. Analysis shows stable comparative units and more than that, certain stable combinations of such units, each of which is the formal expression of a different type of experience. The main comparative distinctions is again between prayers to Sun and to the intelligences. Without the contrast that prayers to Sun afford it would be difficult to appreciate fully the force of the meaning prayers to the intelligences have.

The structure of prayers to Sun is stabler than that of prayers to
intelligences and poses fewer problems of interpretation. After having defined my constituent units, which I shall do in the remainder of this introductory subsection I begin therefore with a preliminary examination of the structure of prayers to Sun (3a). Prayers to intelligences pose considerable problems of interpretation. These are approached from three angles in the following three subsections: dispensations (3b); duality in intelligences and in men (3c); and justification (3d). With the results of these investigations I return to the structure and a comparative analysis of prayers to Sun and to the intelligences (3e).

Like oral epic poetry, where this feature has received most attention, Kwakiutl prayers are made up of conventional set phrases. Following Lord, who has done the pioneering work on oral composition, I call these phrases formulas. In Lord's field of investigation, the sung epic, which can be very long, formulas are one of the many mnemonic devices the "singer of tales" uses to keep control over his material. Kwakiutl prayers are short, and as they are neither sung nor chanted but spoken, they cannot be strictly called poetry but only a form of heightened prose. There are therefore no metrical conditions present and the supplicant hardly needs mnemonic devices to remind him of the appropriate form in which to cast his prayer. Nevertheless, the set phrases of which the prayers are made up are formulas in Lord's sense. They are a group of words regularly employed to express a given essential idea. Though the outward form of the prayers is so simple that they can hardly qualify as oral poetry, the given essential ideas they express are not at all simple. The formulas, just because they are ready-made, preserve these ideas intact and guarantee their accuracy. They are therefore mnemonic devices of another sort: not to help the memory of the composer, which in this case needs no help, but to transmit a connection of ideas that is
vital to the intellectual life of the people who commonly use the prayers.

Though Kwakiiutl prayers are short, they are complete pieces with a beginning and an end. In their simple organization the formula plays another important role: it divides the piece into sections which, in their combination, form the structure of the prayer. The prayers are so simple that we have no other divisions, no stanzas, episodes, etc. Nevertheless, the relation of parts to one another is important, as in any other composition. I have therefore extended Lord's use of "formula" to designate these parts, without, I think, doing violence to the spirit of his definition. For instance, every prayer, as we have already found, opens with a "greeting formula" in my terminology. The verbal form and the given essential idea it expresses is different in prayers to Sun and prayers to intelligences. These two different formulas in the strict sense are, however, connected on a more abstract level by expressing the same concept, that of a greeting offered to the being prayed to. They are the same formula not verbally but in the abstracted conceptual sense. They appear in given places in the prayers and have a given relationship to other parts of the prayer as well as across types, to one another.

This account of Kwakiiutl prayers inevitably brings up the question of spontaneity. No two prayers in Hunt's collection are the same and the tone of each of them has a freshness and immediacy which makes it unique. This air of spontaneity is due to the conception we have already discussed: prayers are expressions of joy and surprise at an unexpected meeting. Therefore, though the prayers are made up of formulas and more or less strict combinations of formulas Kwakiiutl seem never to have "recited" their prayers. The occasion is always experienced as new, and the challenge it brings with it as slightly different from that of any other occasion. In actual fact, idiosyncracies of expression and verbal
inventiveness are limited to minor alterations of the formulas. But the newness of each situation is felt with such immediacy that, with the help of minor changes on the verbal level each prayer has an expressive power of its own.

The prayers give an impression that Kwakiutl enjoyed playing with the formulas and were conscious of alternate verbal formulations for one idea. George Hunt draws attention to such an alternative in his "Prayer to the Fish Running in the Rivers": "'Welcome, friend Swimmer, we have met again in good health'. (This 'we have met again in good health' means the same as 'we have met alive')." (Boas 1930: 184). From this it is clear that Kwakiutl prayers, like other oral compositions, were never mere repetitions of words yet at the same time were formulaic. The formulas out of which they are made up must therefore be defined in the first place conceptually, by the idea they express, and only secondarily verbally by the group of words used.

Each prayer represents a balance between free composition and restraint. Where does the restraint come from? What tells the supplicant that in this particular situation certain formulas are right, and certain combinations of formulas, but not others? Prayers have, after all, no plot, no story-lines to hold them together. The restraint must lie outside the prayer. I call the shaping factor behind the prayer a grammar of occasion. Every occasion exerts pressures on the supplicant, pressures that are made up of physical factors such as his closeness to or distance from the being prayed to, and pressures that come from inside, from the customs he follows and beliefs he has learnt to attach to particular beings and particular situations. The sum of these factors makes up a grammar of occasion that gives each individual prayer its force of meaning and its coherence. Clearly such a grammar is both constraining
and conducive to new and spontaneous expression. Prayers are in fact a language within a language, with the formulas corresponding to word-units that make sense as long as they are arranged according to the commonly accepted grammar, but that can otherwise be used with individual freedom. It is a special language in that the formulas express complex, culturally given ideas.

The general definition for the grammar of occasions is, then, that it gives a particular prayer its particular shape. It controls the choice of formulas (with the latitude I have mentioned) and the combination of formulas. Beyond this general definition, however, the grammar of occasion also brings out major divisions in the corpus of the prayers as a whole. I have already discussed the stable difference in the greeting formulas based on different orant attitudes. Prayers which travel vertically up to the sun, and which travel an immense distance, are different from those which travel horizontally and only a small distance. The structure is different according to the different conceptions that attach to Sun and to the intelligences.

All Kwakiutl prayers have one basic structural core: that of the greeting formula and the petition formula, arranged in this order. In prayers to Sun the greeting formula is an invocation: Sun's attention is called down to the world of men. In prayers to intelligences the greeting formula is a salutation: an intelligence already aware and attentive is thanked for its coming. Petition formulas also are different for the two types of prayers in spite of a large overlap. Both Sun and intelligences are asked for protection, help and mercy (literally a taking pity). Both are asked for health and success. But in the case of Sun these supplications remain general, because Sun is the overall and general source of all good, while in the case of the intelligences the range is much wider.
Animals and plants can be called upon for the most general but also very particular kinds of blessings, that fit the particular character of the being prayed to and need of the supplicant. The main petitions to the "unobliged ones" are for long life and wealth. Sun, who is not an unobliged one, is never asked for either. This may be due to the fact that the conception of Sun is that of an unchanging order, while a long life is measured by the change that interrupts flow, and wealth for Kwakiutl is always associated with exchange. Sun with his yearly journeys circumscribes the world and makes time. He is always present, even at the times of his most extreme withdrawal, because without him there would be no world and the flow of time would stop. Animals on the contrary, come and go in mysterious fashion, particularly hibernating animals like the bear, or the salmon with their rhythmic withdrawal to the deep sea and sudden "runs" on the inland waters. Occasions of meetings are both occasions for an exchange of wealth and landmarks by which one can gauge the length of one's life. These "unexpected" meetings are part of the grammar of occasion that forms the prayers to intelligences, just as Sun's constant presence forms the prayers to him. It is therefore not surprising that each type of prayer contains formulas which are not shared between them.

3(a) The Structure of Prayers to Sun: A Preconsideration

All Kwakiutl prayers begin with a formula of greeting. Only very rarely is it omitted and the supplicant, pressed by his need, hastens into petition without this proper opening. The greeting formula expresses love and trust; it also expresses the reverence men owe to beings superior in power. But it contains more than the emotions it expresses. Out of the greeting formula the structure of the prayer is generated. The
greeting offered to Sun: "look down on me, Chief, Great Father" generates a different structure from the "We meet alive" with which the intelligences are greeted. The structure of prayers to Sun is surprisingly stable and far simpler than that of prayers to intelligences. I shall therefore preface my examination of the latter with a brief look at the former, and take the opportunity for a few general remarks on the form.

The key word in the greeting formulas to Sun is the verb to look. Almost every prayer to Sun begins with a phrase containing "look": "Look at me", "look down upon me", "pray look down upon these men made by you", "look down upon these men who came from you". We shall see later that the two key words of prayers to intelligences are to come and to meet. The difference is significant. The most important thing in a prayer to Sun is that Sun's face should be turned to men, his eyes open upon men. Without Sun's face turned towards the earth men cannot live and nothing can prosper. The opening of a prayer to Sun is therefore a call for the attention of the father who makes all things and who lets them prosper each according to its kind under rules that unite them all in harmony.

As I have pointed out, this call for attention, this "look at me, look down upon those who came from you", has also a dimension of anxiety. It is a call across a gulf. Sun follows his course inexorably; on his regularity the whole world depends. His very regularity and the dependability which is mathematically measurable is also the index of the dependency of his creatures. A paradox arises here. Sun cannot be influenced. Yet he must be kept attentive because everything depends in the ultimate sense on him. The call for attention can therefore be paraphrased: "look down lest anything fall out of your order; hold up your order in this world". This is what the structure of formulas bears out.
The formulas that make up the prayers do not necessarily coincide with sentences. The opening formula that invokes Sun to look down is often only a half-sentence, coupled with a new formula, a petition for protection. Sentence caesuras are, of course, functions of the transcription of oral into written texts, but the swift following up of the greeting with a petition is present in the spoken version. It mirrors the urgency that is the outcome of the tension between Sun's inexorability and man's anxiety. The opening sentence of a prayer to Sun may, for instance, read: "Look down upon me, Walking-all-over-the-World, and have mercy on me". In other words, a formula of invocation is followed by one of petition in one sentence of supplication. The petition may continue for several sentences, if the supplicant has special favours to ask, or stop there if he is simply calling for Sun's blessing in a general way. Structurally the expansion of the petition formula is unimportant if it occurs. What is structurally important is that the two formulas of invocation and petition are followed by a third which we do not find in prayers to intelligences: the formula that affirms Sun's omnipotence and man's entire dependence. It may run: "you do with us as you please" or "you are making this world as you please" (Boas 1930: 182 c) and d); see also the quotations in 2(a) above). This formula closes the prayer, and is given prominence by its position at the end. It is only followed by the formula of response which corresponds to the amen of Christian prayer and which shows that the prayer is a dialogue.

Such a structure may be compressed into one short sentence and still contain all the three formulas that are characteristic of prayers to Sun, as in this example:

"Look at me, Chief, that nothing evil may happen to me this day, made by you as you please, Great-Walking-to-and-fro-all-over-the-World, Chief."--"Ha".
(Boas 1930: 182)
The formulas may also be absorbed into one another. In the "Prayer to Chief Sun" there is no set phrase asserting Sun's omnipotence, but the spirit of the assertion is expressed in the insistence that men are the creatures of Sun.

"Look down upon these who came from you, Great Father! Look down upon these men made by you, Great Father, and protect those who came from you, Chief, Great Father."--"Ha". Now he will do it that way.

(op. cit. p.183)

In moments of danger, when the prayer is nothing but a cry for help, the conventional set phrases that characterise a prayer to Sun normally may disappear and be replaced by words more immediately appropriate to the situation. This has happened in the "Prayer to the Sun when a Canoe is Caught in a Gale at Sea". What is interesting about this prayer is that it illustrates the constraint of the grammar of occasion particularly clearly. The occasion is extreme and allows only the briefest and most unconventional expression. Yet the rules of the grammar hold: in spite of compression and absorption of the formulas into one another the prayer still follows the schema of invocation of a power who is above and whose attention can be called down; petition for the establishment of an order that is Sun's order; affirmation of Sun's unlimited power, made here by calling a world that is at this moment swallowed up in chaos "your world". It seems that the moment of crisis is particularly apt to bring out and make explicit the order principle that informs the prayers.

"Press down the sea in your world, Great Chief, Father, that it may become good, that your world may become right on the water, Great Father."

(op. cit. p.183)

With the help of these examples we can then abstract a simple scheme for the structure of prayers to Sun.
TABLE II

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abstract scheme</th>
<th>Type of set phrase</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Invocation</td>
<td>&quot;Look down upon me&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petition</td>
<td>&quot;Have mercy on me and protect me&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affirmation of Sun's omnipotence and man's dependence</td>
<td>&quot;You have made and are at any moment making this world&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Response</td>
<td>&quot;Yes, I will do so&quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Not every link is present in all the prayers. But in the sample we have in Boas' *Religion of the Kwakiutl Indians* the structure of prayers to Sun is surprisingly consistent, both in the presence of links and in their sequence. Exceptions are two hymns of praise, the songs of women who dreamt about Sun, which are not dialogues, and belong in form to the ritual songs (op. cit. p.183 c and d), and the "Prayer to the Sun at Sunrise" which uses the greeting formula proper to an intelligence (op. cit. pp.182--3; see also 2(a) above; where I have quoted and discussed this prayer). The latter is a reminder of the overlap that exists between prayers to Sun and to the intelligences. The intelligences are also independent sources of order, and have powers surpassing those of men, so that men are dependent on them as they are on Sun. But on the one hand their orders are different from the order of Sun, and on the other they, like all living beings, depend on Sun's order. They therefore occupy to a certain extent an intermediary position between Sun and men, and the overlap in formulas one can detect in the prayers here and there is due to that intermediary position.

3(b) Dispensations in the Prayers to Intelligences

The formulas that make up prayers to the intelligences express complex ideas, far more complex than those of prayers to Sun. It will therefore
be necessary to give a background of ideas before going on to a discussion of the formulas themselves and their structural relations. The greater complexity of the prayers to the intelligences is due to the fact that men's relation to the intelligences is closer and fraught with more uncertainties than their relation to Sun. Sun is conceived of as univalent. He can engage with men in one way only, a benevolent one. Man responds with undivided trust and gratitude, his anxiety being only that Sun should uphold his order to combat the accidents that tend to occur on this earth. The intelligences are seen as multivalent; they can engage with men in at least two ways, benevolently or malevolently. Man's reaction is one of gratitude tempered by dread. Moreover, man's intention towards the intelligences is itself ambivalent, and this ambivalence introduces a further factor of division and tension.

Owing to this complicated relation the ideas that are expressed in the formulas are themselves complicated. It is possible to distinguish three separate impulsions which find expression in different formulas but can be subsumed under the more abstract class of formulas of justification. The first is an impulsion of desire—the desire to make the wished-for state come true. On the expressive level it "legitimizes" the difficult relation between men and intelligences by calling on established orders. But as the orders were themselves established as the outcome of the desire, the reasoning is circular here and not realistic. The second is an impulsion of fear—fear of the intelligences' ambivalence and men's double intentions. It is realistic, given the conceptual framework of the Kwakiutl world, and finds its proper expression in prayer for a good outcome. The third is an impulsion of what I can only call accurate moral perception—the perception of what the relation between men and the intelligences ought to be, joined to the perception that in the nature of
things this relation cannot be achieved. This is the most realistic of
the impulsions in universal terms, and represents Kwakiutl understanding
of men's relation to the non-human world at its most serious. In the
prayers it finds its most adequate expression in apology. I shall
discuss this background in relation to the formulas in the next three
subsections.

The metaphor through which the ideas are conveyed is spatial. The
prayers to the intelligences are an investigation of the origins of
actions, causes and effects, and of the boundaries of actions, but they
investigate not with the help of abstract language but with the help of
a "scene", a geographical backdrop of journeys, known and unknown coun-
tries, and the boundaries between them. Most languages retain echoes of
the connection between abstract causal thinking and images of space, for
instance the colloquial North American "how come" which is probably based
on the German "wiesecommt es" which means both "what is the cause" and
"what does it mean". We do not see what is unknown any more as a travel-
ler coming from an unknown country. Yet this is the force the metaphoric
and dramatic context of the prayers has. That which is uncertain, which
has to be thought about and studied for its effects is also that which
comes "from the other side of the world".

References to space, explicitly and implicitly, are far more frequent
in prayers to the intelligences than in those to Sun. Yet the greeting
formulas as we have seen are based in both kinds of prayer on a sense of
space. In prayers to Sun the invocation to "look down" conjures up what
we call "space" itself: the distance between Sun above and the supplicant
down on earth. This is why in prayers to Sun the greeting must take the
form of an invocation. The distance is physical and figurative: the
invocation conveys the tension that exists between Sun's inexorableness
and men's personal need of him. Out of this tension the prayer grows. The greeting formulas that open the prayers to the intelligences are not invocations but salutations. They establish the more familiar relationship of beings who journey on earth and meet in the course of their coming and going. If the dominant verb in the greeting formula for Sun is "to look", the dominant verbs in the greeting formula to the intelligences are "to come" and "to meet". It is out of the coming and meeting, that is out of the contact, both physical and figurative, between the intelligences and the supplicants that the tension of these prayers arises. What constitutes this tension will be the subject of my investigation in the following three subsections. It is evident not only in the greeting formula from which the prayer develops but can be identified in the structure which holds the prayer together as a whole.

The verb "to come" is generally used in the greeting formula in one of three ways: (1) to show that both partners of the dialogue have moved independently to the same place and meet at the appointed times--"we come and meet alive"; (2) to thank the one prayed to for his decision in coming--"you have come to take mercy on me", or "I thank you heartily that you have come and walked in front of me", or "thank you, Great Supernatural One, you have come, you have reached me"; (3) to tell the one prayed to that he, the supplicant has come to meet the intelligence in order to ask for something. This is frequent in meetings with medicinal plants which have to be searched for. It is vividly expressed, for instance, in the somewhat unorthodox opening to this prayer:

"Don't be startled, Supernatural One, by my coming and sitting down to make a request of you, Supernatural One. I mean this, this is the reason why I come to you. I come to you to pray you, please, to (let me) take some of your blanket, Sore-Healer, that it may heal the burn of my child (or he might say the sore of my child), that, please, may heal up his burn, Supernatural One," says he as he peels off the loose bark of the salmonberry bush. (Boas 1930: 218)
In all cases, including the last one, it is the coming of the intelligence and his meeting of men that is the miraculous event. The coming of the intelligence has nothing to do with the mobility, in naturalistic terms, of the being prayed to. Every intelligence comes forth from its own non-human dimensions of origin--its "home", its place of essential being--at the moment of prayer to meet the supplicant. The coming of the game that meet the hunter, of the running fish, of the plants in Spring or of the berries when they ripen is the language which expresses in spatial terms the magic contact that is established. It is their coming from another, supra-human dimension that gives the intelligences their "wealth" and with it their power to succour or oppose.35

Animals and plants that are for use come to men under certain dispensations.36 The dispensation is usually mentioned in close connection with the salutation, often in the same sentence, though distinct and separate formulas are used. Dispensations are mentioned in the prayer to control a situation--the miraculous event, the theophany--which is fraught with risk and which, according to Kwakiutl moral perception is also fraught with a deep-going ambiguity. They are those beliefs and customs which legitimize men's behaviour to the intelligences and absolve them from an impossible responsibility. They spring from the wish to create the harmony between men and other beings, asked for in the impossible demand, through observances on a possible level, and they assert that the harmony exists through the dispensation, even though men are forced to act violently and destructively in practice.

There are three major dispensations mentioned in the prayers to those intelligences that are appropriated for human use. The principles of order they call on are disparate, but all of the principles of order are used in the prayers, sometimes simultaneously in one prayer. They are:
(1) the heteronomous order of Sun under which the coming of the intelligence is ordained;

(2) the autonomous order of the intelligences under which the intelligences have bound themselves by contract to come;

(3) the order of sacrifice under which the intelligences come voluntarily to give themselves to men.

The first order, which might be called the dispensation of providence, is not mentioned outside the prayers. The second order, the contract, is one of the subjects of the hunting myths, and we shall discuss its use in myth in the following chapter. The third order, belief in the sacrificial intention of the Intelligences permeates Kwakiutl thinking. It is not often explicit in the texts (an exception is the Bear Mother story) but informs them as a basic assumption. One might say that all Kwakiutl ritual from the individual rites of hunters to communal events like the winter ritual is informed by this basic scheme. Because of the important part it plays in Kwakiutl thought as a whole I discuss it more fully in this analysis than the other two dispensations.

(1) The order of providence is frequently invoked in prayers to animals and plants that are used for food. The usual formulation is: "you have come brought by our creator". It is strikingly absent in prayers to medicinal plants, though it comes up exceptionally; as in the prayer to the bark of the pigeon tree: "I have come and found you, Supernatural One, indeed for this is why you come, sent by the one who made you, that you, please, may make us well when we are sick with constipation", (Boas 1930: 219). Medicinal plants are usually treated as autonomous. It is tempting to think that the order of providence was introduced by Christianity and became a favourite dispensation at a time when the use of medicinal plants became old fashioned. In that case prayers to medicinal plants might represent an older prayer structure. But there
is no evidence whatever to support such a speculation. Still, the absence of the mention of providence in the prayers to medicinal plants presents a puzzle, because on the whole, invocations of the order of providence mingle easily with invocations of orders (2) and (3). The "Prayer to the Olachen" is an example.

"Now welcome, fish, you who have come, brought by the Chief of the World-Above that I see you again, that I come to exert my privilege of being the first to string you, fish. I mean this, that you may have mercy on me that I may see you again next year when you come back to this your happy place, fish" (Boas 1930: 203)

Such a privilege could only have been given by the fish themselves to the ancestresses of the praying woman, and locates the prayer therefore in the autonomous order of the animals (2), in spite of the reference to (1). Sometimes, indeed, the order of providence seems to be simply interpolated, as in the prayer to the bear which invokes his sacrificial intention: "Indeed this is why you have come, made by our creator, that I may come to shoot you, that I may eat you, with my wife, friend" (op. cit. 191). Though the conception of the creator-ordainer had not doubt been influenced by Christian teaching by the time Hunt collected the prayers it is probable that it existed aboriginally. Josef Haekel's work on the Northwest coast seems to show this conclusively. The concept of the power of Sun may have overlapped with the concept of the power of the intelligences in such a way that both could be invoked in one prayer without any serious conceptual hiatus being created. Indeed this is what the language of the prayers suggests. Intelligences too are sometimes addressed "Chief of the Upper World"; the decisive difference is that Sun is never addressed by the ambiguous epithets of the intelligences.

(2) This is the autonomous order of the intelligences. They are
the originators of the relation with men, and responsible for the laws
that govern that relation. The order is referred to in prayers to
animals and plants that are used for food, in prayers to medicinal plants
and in prayers to plants that yield raw material. (For one of the latter,
see Boas 1966: 160). The animals are the teachers of men; they have
taught them how to "play" with them, that is how to catch them and kill
them, prepare them and use them. The "play" is a game with rules; every­
thing has to be done in the way in which the ancestors were taught at the
first meeting of men and animals. (Cf. Chapter 3, 3(c)B, "Rules of the
Game"). Sometimes the rules were given in a dream-vision, and such
prayers are often handed down in families. Here are the "Prayers to the
Sockeye Salmon" in which the ritual rules of "treating well", given in a
vision at the beginning of time are observed.

As soon as he caught the sockeye salmon with his hook, then he
clapped it once so that it was not really dead and he put it down
on the pebbly beach near the bank of the river. He did not allow
the sockeye salmon to lie on the soil at the foot of trees. As
soon as nine sockeye salmon had been hooked he broke off long
withes of young cedar. He twisted them and as soon as he reached
the (thick) end of his twisting, he strung it through the necks of
the sockeye salmon so that the end of the withe showed at the mouth
of the sockeye salmon. Then he tied together the ends of the
cedar withes. As soon as he had done so he looked at the sockeye
salmon that had been strung up on the hoop of cedar withes. Then
he said praying to them, "O Swimmers, this is the dream given by
you, to be the way of my late grandfathers when they first caught
you at your playground in this river. Now you will be in the same
way, Swimmers. I do not club you twice, for I do not wish to club
to death your souls; so that you may go home to the place where you
come from, Supernatural Ones, you, givers of heavy weight. I mean
this, Swimmers, why should I not go to the end of the dream given
by you? Now I shall wear you as a neckring going to my house,
Supernatural Ones, you, Swimmers", said he as he took the hoop-shaped
string of sockeye salmon and put it around his neck. Then he came
home. As soon as he entered his house his wife took a new mat made
of broad strips and spread it out. Now Head-of-the-World took off
his neckring of sockeye salmon strung up. Then he took hold of the
sides of the ring of the sockeye salmon which were strung up and
said, "O Swimmers, how I come and take you into my house. Now I
will go and lay you down on this mat which is spread on the floor
for you, Swimmers. This is your own saying when you came and gave
a dream to my late grandfathers. Now you will go," said he as he
turned around and put down the ring of sockeye salmon strung upon
the mat that had been spread out. That was all the work of Head-
of-the-World, except the making of roasting tongs. Immediately
the wife of Head-of-the-World... took her carrying basket and
went to the woods to get dead moss. As soon as she found the
defad moss she puts it into her basket and came home. She
carried the basket containing the dead moss and put it down near
the edge of the mat which had been spread out, on which the
sockeye salmon were laid. Then she took her fish knife and
... sat down at the edge of the mat... She took up one of the
sockeye salmon with her left hand and holding with her right
hand her fishknife, ... prayed to the sockeye salmon and said,
"Thank you, Swimmers, you, Supernatural Ones, that you have come
to try to save our lives, (mine) and my husbands, that we may
not die of hunger, you, Long-Life-Maker, only protect us that
nothing evil may befall us, you, Rich-Maker-Woman; and also this,
that we may meet again next year, good, great Supernatural Ones,"
says she and then she cut the sockeye salmon.
(Boas 1930: 205--206)

Some of the prayers to medicinal plants describe complicated
procedures that were given to the ancestor to effect the cure (cf.
pp.213, 216, 239). Others are simple recipes, as this prayer to puce-
danum seeds by a woman who is plagued with a headache:

"You have come, Supernatural-Power-of-the-Ground, and this is the
reason why I carefully keep you that you may be ready for me when
I have a headache. Now I have a headache, and now I act accord­
ing to the dream given by you to my late grandfathers when you told
them to chew you at once and to blow you on to the place where the
sickness appears. Now I will do this, Supernatural-Power-of-the-
Ground, and please, ease my headache, you, Source-of-Healing,
Supernatural One. Go on, please, make me well, you, Long-Life-
Maker, you, Source-of-Life. Please save me, please, Supernatural
One."
(op. cit. p.242)

Under this order, whether a contract with the ancestors is mentioned
or not, the intelligence is a free agent, as in (3). But rather than
sacrificially he appears here as a giver of laws and as a maker of the
civilized world, the world that is ruled by the right relations between
men and other living beings. From the point of view of men to refer to
this order is both to rehearse a taboo and to fulfil a contract. To
follow "the dream given to the ancestors" means treating the intelligence
well. (The literal meaning of the Kwakiutl word for taboo). It also
means fulfilling the human part of a reciprocal contract that promises reward for careful and reverential execution. The point at which the notion of taboo—do not do this or do this because of the consequences that will follow—overlaps with the notion of contract lies in the autonomy which this order expresses. The order is grounded in nothing but the goodwill of the two parties. If men fulfil their part the contract offers a dispensation also in the sense of a special remission in view of the severity of the absolute demand.

(3) The sacrificial order stresses the free will of the animals and plants who give themselves to men so that men can live. "Indeed this is the reason why you come ... that I may eat you, with my wife", says the hunter to the bear he has shot (p.191). And the fisherman's wife prays before she cuts the salmon: "Now I will do what you came here for that I should do to you" (p.207). The prayer to the young cedar stresses the intelligences' compassion for men:

"Look at me, friend, I come to ask you for your dress, for you have come to take pity on us; for there is nothing for which you can not be used, because it is your way that there is nothing for which we can not use you, for you are really willing to give us your dress. I come to beg you for his, Long-Life-Maker, for I am going to make a basket for lily roots out of you. I pray you, friend, not to feel angry with me on account of what I am going to do to you; and I beg you friend to tell our friends about what I ask of you. Take care, friend! Keep sickness away from me, so that I may not be killed by sickness or in war, friend!"36

In its stress on the intelligences' own decision in coming, this order is closely linked to the autonomous order of (2), under which animals and plants also suffer a voluntary death from the hands of men. But while the dispensation in (2) is the contract, made in the beginning of time and involving men in reciprocal duties, the coming under (3) is a free gift and the dispensation lies in the freedom with which it is given. This is an important point because it shows clearly the distribution of
freedom and boundness in the life of the Summer. The intelligences, who are givers, are free; men, who are receivers, bound. The freedom of the intelligences is most clearly demonstrated in animals because animals are most important in subsistence on the one hand, and on the other, because they are most like men physically and mentally. Animals show that they can "act freely" by being capable of that freest of decisions, voluntary death. They are sacred, naualak, like the initiate who also shows that he is capable of acting freely by going into death. And like the initiate the animal renews itself through its sacrifice: by being killed it is regenerated.

This innate logic makes the sacrificial order the strongest of all dispensations. To refuse a gift would be wrong in general; to refuse the animals' gift of themselves would mean cutting them off from what they most desire, renewal. All that is left to men is to accept the animals' gift of themselves in gratitude, and, by treating their bones well, ensure that they can regenerate themselves. By their consenting passivity and attending to the rules of a hunting life men restore the harmony which the act of killing has destroyed. (Killing is in fact not mentioned in the prayers, and death is only mentioned in prayers to dead animals that have not been killed by the orant).

From this point of balance, created by the conception of the animals' voluntary death, Kwakiutl thought branches out in two directions, both doubtful or critical of the dispensation.

(a) The idea of the animals' self-sacrifice is not adequate to deal with the problem of reciprocity. As receivers men are bound, not free, and have to requite. Requiting means returning full measure. The animals give freely, but accepting this gift men accumulate a debt that is hard to deal with. The animals have given their substance, their very
life. If men want to discharge their debt they have to give a gift of equal magnitude and significance. In the image of receiving and giving, the debt and the gift, the dispensation of the sacrificial order is critically developed into a new dimension, that of the winter dance. Only the voluntary gift of the initiate's life, given as selflessly as the animals give themselves to men is an act magnanimous enough to restore the balance. The problematic of the debt to the animal is formulated in rhetorical terms in the first salmon and bear rituals. I shall discuss the potlatch-figure of these rituals in the section on the rhetoric of the ritual, Chapter 4. What makes this metaphor "persuasive" and "performative" is the implicit assumption of a full requital.

(b) The idea of the animal's self-sacrifice is not adequate to deal with the act of killing and the consequent guilt. It seems to exonerate and yet, with its stress on the sacrificial intention of the animals it throws into sharp relief the fact that the intention of men towards the animal is murderous. The conclusion that men involve themselves in guilt in spite of the dispensation does not escape the Kwakiutl. It is taken up in the prayers themselves (see subsection on formulas of justification 3(d) below), in the hunting myths (Chapter 3) and the first fruit rituals (Chapter 4). In the Bear Mother myths, discussed in the section on self-sacrifice and justice (Chapter 3), the revenge of the bear follows close upon his sacrificial gift. The parallel with the initiate, who also gives his life voluntarily, is not a straight one. The initiate is made sacred (naulak) through his death. But the animal, who is sacred to start with, is profaned (made baxus) by being killed. (See next subsection, and Chapter 4, 2 and 4.) At this point Kwakiutl thought turns away from dispensation and considers guilt. Not the animals' free decision to die, which is myth, but the act of killing, which in fact is now the
point of departure. Direct conceptual confrontation of the act of killing seems to have been impossible for Kwak'utl—a fact which testifies itself to the importance of the problem. The prayers contain, however, comment that comes near to a confrontation. To this comment we shall turn in the next two subsections.

All dispensations, that is all systems designed to regulate the meeting of men and animals, express the Kwakiutl sense of human accountability. In the prayers the dispensations are therefore cast in the form of explanations to the animal (or other being) as a defence of action. The action defended (but not mentioned) is the act of killing. The accusation derives from the conception which we have formulated earlier as the absolute demand that men should live in harmony with other living beings. The very coming of the animal and men's meeting with it expresses the harmonious order of the world and embodies concretely the absolute demand. Yet the meeting point is also the point of death for the animal. In the dialogue that ensues the human partner, the killer, mentions the dispensations in the form of justifications. These self-justifications should not be taken as self-righteous, though without knowledge of the cultural context one takes them to be so. They are serious justifications of human action which express, simultaneously, that justification does not cover the case. In the formulas of justification we get, therefore, the most direct expression of the clash between absolute demand and fragmented demand adjusted to the conditions of living. We could put it like this: in prayer, which, as we have said is a "listening"—an attentive meditation—the act of killing rises up against the orant as something more weighty than the justification can deal with. Accusation becomes stronger than defense. The defense can cope with human moral law but the absolute demand exceeds what is humanly possible. The sanction
is superhuman because the beings involved are superhuman. It is immaterial whether the impossibility of fulfilling the absolute demand has made them superhuman in Kwakiutl thought or whether their superhuman qualities have been instrumental in forming the absolute demand. In any case, they are conceived to have power greater than human, and the offence against them is a sacrilegious act. Before we discuss the formulas of justification themselves we should therefore examine how the superhuman nature of the animals is conceived and expressed in the prayers, and how this conception influences the estimation of the human act of killing.

3(c) Wealth, and the Duality of Intelligences and of Men

A Animals and the Duplicity of Giving

I have mentioned that the thought or "philosophy" of the prayers is not simple, though the prayers are simple in language and simple in form. One of the most difficult of the conceptions informing the prayers is that of wealth. For Kwakiutl wealth is a metaphor for superabundant life, the life everyone wishes for. But the associations of wealth are with death. It is the dead, for instance, that are the true owners of the wealth of the world. In the prayers the beings prayed to are wealth-bringers and wealth-givers, yet it is their wealth which gives them the feared double nature that makes them incalculable. The orant therefore asks the animal to whom he is praying for its wealth, not to "let their meeting be bad". He does this even at the most innocuous meeting, where the wealth in question is nothing but what might be called the supernatural blessing of the animal, as in this prayer to a squirrel:

"Great, good one, Healing-Woman, we come and have met, you Long-Life-Maker. Do not let our meeting be bad, Supernatural One, only protect me that no evil may befall me from sickness and that the curses of those who hate me may not penetrate me, you, Long-Life-Maker, and that you may, please, just give over
to me your wealth that I also may be rich as you are, great, good Supernatural One."
(Boas 1930: 200)

Men too are affected by wealth in a double way. The Kwakiutl see wealth even in the adumbrated form in which it appears in the prayers as a limited commodity; in taking it from the beings prayed to they diminish these beings. The cause of increase for themselves, of their life and superabundance is the cause of decrease for other beings. In the absence of reciprocity, which is not possible between men and the beings of the outside world because men cannot requite, this destroys the harmony so precious to the Kwakiutl. Taking, then, becomes a means of accumulating guilt, becoming enmeshed and unfree.

Sun is entirely outside this conundrum. He is not asked for wealth in the prayers and none of his epithets describe him as wealthy. Wealth is one of the metaphors through which the Kwakiutl express engagement and interaction. It is used particularly but by no means exclusively in relation to the game animals. Game is the type-case, where taking is most obviously killing, and the enrichment of one the death of the other.

The conception is deepened in a religious dimension through the fact that "rich" and "poor" as well as sacred and profane are connotations of naualak and baxus. I have discussed these connotations in Section 1 of Chapter 1. Naualak is the sacred from which all wealth comes; men belong to the ordinary baxus world dependent on the wealth of the naualak. The interaction between men and the naualak beings of the prayers adds another dimension to this relation. If these beings are sacred as well as rich, taking from them not only diminishes them, it profanes them. The language of wealth is capable then of expressing themes of moral transgression, and this in spite of the fact that it belongs entirely to the cosmic or "geographical" language of the myth of the other world.
The "dispensations" spring from the desire that all be well. But the complement of this desire is a fear. The fear has its origin as much in the double intention of man as in the ambiguous nature of the being prayed to. But because the double nature of the beings prayed to is an expression of their sacrality, and their sacrality is, in its turn, the measure for the offence that lies in a double intention towards them, we shall turn to an examination of the intelligences' nature first.

There are passages in the prayers even apart from the epithets, that show that the beings prayed to are believed to have equal power to do evil and good. The intelligences are not blamed for being dangerous to men; in fact there seems to be an assumption that their two powers are one at the root, indivisible, and that they have to be reminded not to use the destructive one inadvertently. "Do not let our meeting be bad" is the most general of such reminders. Sometimes the prayer mirrors a situation where the danger is an understandable fear of revenge. For instance, when a boy has killed a squirrel wantonly by throwing stones, his father will find the squirrel to pray to it. I have already mentioned that children do not pray. The father does not say "do not be angry, he is only a small boy", he takes the guilt on himself and asks the squirrel not to put forward its destructive power.

**Prayer to the Squirrel**

Now it is this, when a boy has killed by throwing stones, a squirrel, then the father of the boy searches for the place where the squirrel lies dead. As soon as he finds it the man sits down and prays to the squirrel and says, "O, you great, good one; great, good Supernatural One, I have killed you accidentally, Healing-Woman. You will only use your good name, you Healing-Woman, you great Long-Life-Maker, you, great, good Supernatural One. These are your names, friend, and only have mercy on me that no evil may befall me on account of what I have done to you. I killed you accidentally, great, good Supernatural One. Now I pray you to, please, help me and, please, protect me that nothing wrong may happen to me in all my work," says he and he takes the dead squirrel and goes to bury it at the bottom of a tree as he wraps
The names the father uses in this prayer are life and death names. Healing Woman and Long Life Maker are first of all life names in this context, and when the man says: "these are your names, friend," he urges the dead squirrel to put forward its life-power. Behind them stand "Pestilence Woman" and "who-makes-our-lives-short" as their inseparable other side. The orant is conscious of the double meaning of the names. He prays therefore: "you will only use your good name, you Healing Woman, you great Long Life Maker, you great good Supernatural One".

What this double power is is not explained in the prayers. Sometimes there is what might be called a scientific explanation, as in the prayer to a medicinal plant whose "thin roots" were believed to be poisonous. Here, then, was an intelligence who could kill as well as heal in a physical, non-occult sense.

Prayer to Hellebore

When a man first finds hellebore as he goes looking for it on the banks of a river, the man sits down on the ground near to the hellebore. He says, "At last I come and find you, great, good Supernatural One, you, Life-Maker, you, Long-Life-Maker. I come to pray to you, friend, that you may make well my wife who is troubled with constipation, that you may have mercy and scrape away what causes constipation of my poor wife, that you may set her right. Please, scrape out her inside that all the badness may come out. This is my prayer to your good hand, great, good, Supernatural One, for whom there is nothing that he cannot do to all kinds of sickness. I pray you, Supernatural One, that you do not allow also your bad hand to come which often causes accidents to secular men," says the man as he digs out the hellebore. He does not pull out the hellebore, for he does not want also to come out the thin roots, for he only cuts them off from the round end of the hellebore, for that is which is referred to by the Indians as "bad hand of the hellebore", the thin roots.

The cause of the fear, however, as it applies not to a poisonous plant but to all intelligences is explicit in that last sentence of the prayer. Men are secular, baxus, and that is why they are vulnerable to
the sacred power of the ubobilged ones. The intelligences are not willy-
fully malicious, the danger is the outcome of a qualitative difference
in their state of being: men, being secular are weak and the beings
prayed to are strong.

This ontological difference is put in terms of a mythical geography,
as a difference of "countries". Men are the inhabitants of only one
country, the ordinary baxus world. The intelligences mediate between
two countries, their home, which is the supernatural "other" world and
the ordinary world in which they meet men. Their own country is a land
of wealth from which wealth flows to enrich the ordinary, naturally poor
world. It flows through the mediation of the intelligences themselves
who are therefore wealth-bringers--the "Rich Maker Woman" of the prayers.
There is no abstract conceptual definition of this "wealth" in any Kwakiutl
text or informant's comment. Yet it is a key principle of Kwakiutl
thought. It is therefore important that we examine the mythological
images in which it is expressed. These are many: salmon country (also
the land of the twins), copper country, the land of the dwarfs, and the
land of the dead in the ghost stories. These places lie out West and
North from Kwakiutl country in the Pacific ocean where the sun sinks.
They lie beyond the "edge of the world" (cf. Chapter 1, 1(c)A, and 4(a)
below). The mythical imagery suggests that they are places of life but
also of death. The nature of their wealth, however, lies in the rela-
tionship in which life stands to death here. It is a life-in-death
relationship, that is a place of life in the sense that death is constantly
converted into life here. Salmon country for instance is the place where
the "ghosts of the salmon" arrive in canoes, at the same time it is a
village teeming with birds and children. The children are the dead
salmon renewed and revitalized. Equally the land of the dead teems with
playing children who ferry the dead across a river. It is a reservoir of souls and the children are the souls of the newly to-be-born (cf. the prayer of a mother for her dead child quoted below). This place of life-in-death then stands in direct opposition to the human world which is death-in-life, that is a place in which life is constantly converted into death. The wealth the Rich Maker Women bring is therefore first and foremost and in its most general terms the conversion of death into life: for instance as food they convert famine into plenty, as medicinal plants illness into health. Their power is not necessarily attached to naturalistic properties but is the property of them all, because all mediate between their supernatural country of life-in-death and the human world. To the Kwakiutl this property is most clearly expressed in beings that travel rhythmically between a place unknown to them and their own, Kwakiutl country. Migratory birds and salmon are such beings who mysteriously disappear and return.

Prayer to the Migratory Birds

"Welcome, Supernatural Ones, we have come to meet alive, friends, you, Long-Life-Makers. You have come and I pray you again that you have mercy and take out again this my sickness when you go back to the place where you always disappear, friends. Now protect me again during the time when you are here in the summer in this good country where I treat you well, Long-Life-Makers, Supernatural Ones." Then the man himself replies to his words, on behalf of the birds. He says, "Ha, I will do this". (op. cit., p.184)

Prayer to the Fish Running in the Rivers

When a man goes paddling along and he sees a salmon jumping, then at once he says, "haya, haya! Come up again Swimmer, that I may say haya, according to your wishes, for you wish us to say so when you jump, Swimmer, as you are speaking kindly to me when you jump, Swimmer."

"Welcome, friend Swimmer, we have met again in good health." [This "we have met again in good health", means the same as "we have met alive"]; "Welcome, Supernatural One, you, Long-Life-Maker, for you come to set me right again as is always done by you. Now pray take out my sickness and take it back
to your rich country at the outer side of our world, Supernatural One." Then the man himself answers his speech and says, "Ha, I will do so."
(op. cit. p.184--5)

In the "Prayer of a Mother for her Dead Child" we see that human beings are believed to have the same migratory pattern. As the migratory birds and the salmon were asked to take the orant's sickness back to their "rich country at the outer side of our world", so the mother asks her child to change its sickness to health "in the place to which you are going" and return to her.

"Ah, ah, ah, what is the reason, child, that you have done this to me? I have tried hard to treat you well when you came to me to have me for your mother. Look at all your toys and all the kinds of things. What is the reason that you desert me, child? May it be that I did something, child, to you in the way I treated you, child? I will try better when you come back to me, child. Please, only become at once well in the place to which you are going. As soon as you are made well, please, come back to me, child. Please, do not stay away there. Please, only have mercy on me who is your mother, child."
(op. cit. p.202)

Yet in spite of sporadic references to reincarnation and the land of the dead as a land of wealth, human beings were not considered wealth-bringers for mankind in the same way as animals. Humans are individuals and individuals are mortal, even if in the case of a small child, who has died, the mother hopes that it may be returned to her. Kwakiutl consider animals immortal because they think of them as species not as individuals. The same salmon is saluted every year with "we meet alive". As an immortal "supernatural one" he brings his new life to lay it down again as a gift for men.

An explanation of the danger that contact with the intelligences brings to men is best approached through the geographical image we are discussing. No man, that is no secular being, can pass across the edge of the world and enter the country of the animals without dying. "Cross-
ing" is death itself. We shall see in the conclusion that the land of the animals coincides with the Kwakiutl conception of the "world centre", and periphery and centre of this place of the mind are the same. The mythical hero who makes a journey to the land of the animals dies and is regenerated again. The animals who are met with on earth, however, bring this power of death with them, though their gift is life. The paradox of their bringing death with life cannot be satisfactorily elucidated with the help of the wealth-imagery of the prayers alone. It needs the more comprehensive philosophical conception of the world-centre, which informs the Kwakiutl use of the image of wealth. I shall attempt to elucidate this complicated conception in the conclusion to this chapter (Section 4). Here it must suffice that the ambiguity of the intelligences, which is "explained" by the ambiguity of their place of origin, is the source of danger to men. Conversely secular men are at a disadvantage in any case: they are subject to illness and accident and constantly threatened by death in life. They are therefore seen as simultaneously vulnerable to the power of the intelligences and in need of their wealth to convert death into life.

8 Men and the Duplicity of Taking

In this view, men appear entirely passive and dependent. This is because up to now we have only considered what might be called the duplicity of giving. The animals with their double nature represent the "giving side" of wealth. There is also a point of view that shows men as active. In this view men represent the duplicity of taking, the "taking side" of wealth. Taking must be distinguished from passive receiving, which is part of a harmonious relation and does not contain a contradictory meaning. Taking is in a sense the contradictory meaning
of receiving; it has overtones of violence, and men are morally implicated by it. Many of the intelligences—the salmon is the outstanding example—bring life in the concrete form of their own substance. In order to take their gift—in order to live—men have to kill them. Killing them means bringing them down to their own level, that of death in life. With this act the balance between life and death, which the mediation of the animals has established, is, at least for the moment, destroyed and the world becomes a world of death. The secular world is not a world of transformation, death is death in it.

Only by considering the full impact the act has for Kwakiutl: that by killing they create a world of death in which transformation is not possible, can we judge the seriousness the impasse has for them. The impasse is unavoidable because of their theories of wealth and giving. To be sacred means to be wealthy, to be secular, poor. Men, who are poor, naturally ask the sacred ones for their gifts. Their asking, however—that is their need—is limitless: they ask until the sacred ones are poor. This also means that they are not sacred any more but secular. Only one of the prayers mentions the fact explicitly which the first salmon ritual makes quite clear: that animals become secular when they are killed (cf. Chapter 4, 2).

If a Kwakiutl kills an animal for food he does not mention in his prayer that he is making it secular. Instead he gives his reason for the deed, apologising and referring to the dispensations. But when he finds an animal already dead, when the deed has been done by an invisible agent, he laments that the animal has had to become secular. At the same time he asks to be the inheritor of its power. Laments for dead animals are among the finest of Kwakiutl prayers. They also show the pattern that connects death with impoverishment and secularity very clearly:
"You, great, good one, you, Healing-Woman, why are you in this way, great, good one? Why have you had bad luck, great, good one, nimble one in our world? I thought you never could have bad luck, great, good, Supernatural One. What can we do? For now you must become secular, friend. Now let the supernatural power of your body come over to me that I may inherit from you to do easily all kinds of work". (Boas 1930: 200--201)

This prayer, quoted in full in the introduction to this chapter, should be compared with "Prayer of a Man who found a Dead Killer Whale" (op. cit. p.184) which begins "Oh, it is great how you lie here on the ground, Great Supernatural One. What has made you unlucky?", and with the prayer to a dead wolf, quoted by Curtis. The latter shows particularly clearly the exchange of life for life. The wolf's "life" (which could also be paraphrased as his "wealth" or his sacrality) is thought to be contained in a quartz crystal he carries in his shoulder. The orants ask for this symbol of his life "so that we may have long life". 40

Making a "sacred one" secular by killing it is, then, only the last link in the chain of taking from the intelligences. Death, which secularizes, is also a form of poverty; it follows that all taking is a form of killing, that the prayers to the intelligences, which always ask for wealth, are a form of killing. It is this radical connotation of taking that makes man reprehensible in his own mind in his relation to the intelligences. Where this reprehensibleness becomes explicit in formulas of justification that are apologies we have reached an end-case of the prayers.

In the next section we shall examine examples of such end-cases: prayers that put in direct language what is implied in the image-language of all the prayers. Here, all that is left is to sum up what has emerged from an examination of the image-language of wealth; from the image of a double nature of the animals and the implication of a double intention in man. What emerges stands in strange contrast to the festive tone
of greeting that dominates the prayers. The Kwakiutl see their inter-
relation with the animals as creating a world of death. The radical
giving of the animals, though it gives life, also brings death to men.
The radical taking of men brings death to the animals, and involves men
in an irresolvable conflict of guilt. The prayers convey, in a language
not easily read by us, a perception of what we might call the fallen
world.

3(d) Formulas of Justification

The "duplicity of taking" is hidden by a symbol in the prayers: the
symbol of wealth that points to the contradiction that when you receive
the animal's gift passively, you actively deprive it of its superiority
and strength. The "duplicity of killing", to which we turn in this
section, is the conceptual complement of the duplicity of taking, but it
it not hidden by a symbol. It is cast in the form of justifications.
All formulas of justification in the prayers express accountableness; all
are about killing, but they are double because all also express the
essential innocence of the killer. Even if the orant mentions only the
dispensation of providence to the animal: "you have been sent me by our
creator", his reference is to his double position as innocent killer.
What we have to do with here is a consciousness of internal incompatibles,
not a symbol referring to a dilemma. The painful division of experience
is not externalized and projected here but is internalized as a division
of the will. The will is necessarily divided, because if men did not
kill they could not live. The division of the will is most openly
referred to in those formulas of justification that take the form of
apologies. These then are our test-cases.

In the justification formulas we have an explicit confrontation
with the absolute (and impossible) demand to live in harmony with other living beings. The orant's never-ending need which finds expression in asking for wealth in the petition formulas common to all prayers, is an implicit transgression of the demand. The formulas of justification found in prayers to animals and plants used for food confront the demand in the practical form of "thou shalt not kill" and recognise and accept explicitly that it cannot be fulfilled. Because the relation of men with the beings they pray to is one of love and trust the recognition is expressed in the forms of apology, explanation and justification. I have discussed explanation and justification sufficiently in the section on dispensations. Here I am concerned with what I have called in that section the impulsion to accurate moral perception—the perception of what the relation between men and animals ought to be joined to the perception that in the nature of things this relation cannot be achieved. Explanation and justification obscure such direct perception. It can only adequately be expressed in the form of an apology. Apologies in the prayers are part of explanations and justifications and yet represent an advance over them. I shall examine here primarily how the spirit of apology informs the prayers, and secondarily how formulas of justification are constructed and combined with other formulas to make up the prayer typical of supplication to the intelligences.

The "Prayer to the Black Bear" is the only one in Boas' collection to mention killing (the word is shooting) in the prayer text. Hunt's account of the killing and skinning of the bear is long and circumstantial. Every action of the hunter is accompanied by a separate prayer. I shall quote the beginning only, to give an impression of the setting in which the formula of apology appears. If we see only the text of the prayers, it is too easy to forget the context of actual slaughter in which
they are spoken.

When the hunter goes into the woods to hunt quadrupeds and he sees a black bear he shoots it. As soon as he has killed it, then the hunter goes to where the bear that he has shot lies dead and stands by its side and says, "Thank you, friend, that we met. I did not mean to do you any harm, friend. Indeed, this is the reason why you come, made by our creator, that I may come to shoot you, that I may eat you, with my wife, friend."—"Ha," says he as he takes his knife.

(Boas 1930: 191)

Here the whole of the prayer text, apart from a short greeting formula is made up of a formula of justification. It is clear that justification is no white-washing of the self. The hunter is saying that the bear has come (and brought about the meeting and crossing of their ways) for the hunter to kill him, so that he and his family will be able to eat. (In parenthesis he is also saying that their creator made the bear for this purpose). But before he puts the case in this light he apologises. In his apology he comes nearer to the truth of his experience than when he justifies his action with the help of a myth.

The phrase "I did not mean to do you any harm, friend" expresses consciousness of the dilemma he finds himself in. Naturally one cannot divorce this sentence of apology from the immediately following explanation of the necessity that drove the hunter to kill. But in the case of bears the plea of necessity is doubtful; at least on the coast bears were not necessary food. The prestige connected with bear hunting, on the other hand, was very high indeed. The phrase therefore has its own significance. It is saying: I did that which I do not want to do; the conditions of the world in which we meet, including my own make-up are of such a kind that they foil my will and my intention. The hunter touches here on the root of his dilemma and his guilt. The demand for harmony is not an arbitrary demand but a law that is perceived as right and in which the will acquiesces. Yet in action the will betrays itself and
contradicts perception and intention with an opposite intention: the will to kill. The dilemma between acquiescing and active will can be expressed directly only as a lie. "I killed you accidentally" says the man to the dead squirrel, though his little son, whose place he takes, has thrown stones. Equally the hunter did mean to harm the bear or he would not be a hunter. Yet at the moment of the animal's death he must make the situation clear; he must put it on record that the intention to kill is not his only intention and that the act he has committed does not speak for itself. He can only do this by denying that he has done what he has done.

This denial can take extreme forms. The "lies" of bear hunters to the bear are well known from accounts of bear hunts in North America, Siberia and Northern Europe. Reported they sound comic and pathetic, as when the Siberian peoples say to the bear they have killed "do not blame us, it was a Russian who did it". Here the internalization, the recognition of the divided will, has escaped again into an externalization. An early account from North America comes from Alexander Henry, who in his *Travels and Adventures in Canada and the Indian Territories between the years 1760 and 1796* describes how he and the family whose prisoner and adopted son he was find and kill a bear when they are on the verge of starvation.

Accordingly, in the morning, we surrounded the tree, both men and women, as many at a time as could conveniently work at it; and here we toiled, like beaver, till the sun went down. This day's work carried us about half way through the trunk; and the next morning we renewed the attack, continuing it till about two o'clock, in the afternoon, when the tree fell to the ground. For a few minutes, everything remained quiet, and I feared that all our expectations were disappointed; but, as I advanced to the opening, there came out, to the great satisfaction of all our party, a bear of extraordinary size, which, before she had proceeded many yards, I shot.

The bear being dead, all my assistants approached, and all, but
more particularly my old mother (as I was wont to call her), took her head in their hands, stroking and kissing it several times; begging a thousand pardons for taking away her life; calling her their relation and grandmother; and requesting her not to lay the fault upon them, since it was truly an Englishman that had put her to death. 41

One could wish that Henry had quoted the prayer verbatim. Though we can see that his account is substantially accurate, we can also see through comparison with accurately quoted texts that the tone is distorted by his amusement at these primitive evasions and fears. This distorting tone, which prevails generally in reports that do not give the texts verbatim has in its turn distorted anthropological interpretation. "I did not mean to harm you, friend" has overtones of fear and evasion, but comes from a realistic bafflement with the movements of the will itself, and with the conditions that necessarily produce such a will. The fears are realistic and self-critical.

There are other expressions of the dilemma, set phrases that entreat the intelligences to use their goodwill toward the orant even if he has harmed them. The fisherman prays to the salmon: "Do not feel wrong about what I have done to you", the berry picker asks the berries not to blame her if she does as her ancestors did, the bark gatherer the cedar not to be angry with her for taking her dress. These phrases refer to the divided will implicitly: what they make explicit is the magnanimity the "unobliged ones" of the Summer were conceived to have: they are asked that for which one cannot easily ask a fellowman, that they forego justice and forgive freely. This conception of the animals' magnanimity underlies also the first salmon ceremonial and similar rituals. The section on the myth of the ritual in Chapter 4 will show that the conception makes one of the most important connections with the winter dance. The blend of independence and altruism in the animal serves as a model for the
initiate and for the interrelation between members of the winter dance society.

The main import of the phrases of apology that occur here and there in the prayers is, however, not one of connection between the world of the Summer and the winter ritual but of disconnection. Kwakiutl so to speak confess in them that they pursue an existence which is particularly human and cannot be brought into accord with the absolute demand for harmony among living beings. In considering their relations to the animals they achieve here a view of reality that takes in contradiction without recourse to symbolic representation. They see this reality as psychological (the divided will) but are conscious of a physiological determinant (the necessity to eat). Yet their view has the particularly active character that is typical of Kwakiutl thought. It does not contemplate the divided will, but seems to be directed to turning men's deep-seated sense of belonging to the world into the task of making them really belong. In other words, Kwakiutl use the impossible demand in a heuristic way. Their first step seems to be to become conscious of the hiatus that divides men from the world, their second to find out what kind of world men can really belong to. The first is taken in the prayer passages that speak of the divided will. The second is taken in the winter dance. In the winter dance society Kwakiutl have created the image of a world in which men can live in harmony. It is interesting that it is not a society based on kin ties or economic interest groups, and that even the division of labour (which is sexual in Kwakiutl secular society) is abolished. Winter dance society is based on two principles: individual distinction—the mark of the individual's ability to stand on his own feet and be responsible for his own fate—and interpersonal equality through sharing. In this Kwakiutl have achieved a union of
contraries which seems to make a world to which people can belong. It is a fragment of the real world, because it is purely human and social, and because it is temporary and based on stores collected under very different social conditions. Nevertheless, even if it is only an image of a society, it is an image that is lived for four months every year, and this makes it a phenomenon of great sociological interest.

But to return to the prayers. Here the impetus is to clarify. In the phrases of apology Kwakiutl express recognition of the fact that men cannot belong to a harmonious natural world and that with half of their minds and intentions they do not want to belong to such a world. In the phrases that immediately follow on the apology, they point out the reasons that justify their breaking the bond of harmony by killing the animals. The bear hunter's "I did not mean to do you any harm, friend" is therefore immediately followed by "Indeed this is the reason why you come ... that I may come to shoot you, that I may eat you with my wife, friend", or again, the fisherman's "Do not feel wrong about what I have done to you, friend Swimmer" goes on "for that is the reason why you come, that I may spear you that I may eat you, Supernatural One, you, Long Life Giver". The order of phrases that express inner division and remorse, explain, and justify is not always the same but they are always causally connected as justifications. For this reason they can be gathered under the name formulas of justification. Formulas of justification follow naturally and logically on the greeting formula that mentions the coming and meeting. Only after this, when the praying person has put as it were his dilemma to the intelligences and made them arbiters of his case does he go on to ask them for wealth in a formula of petition.

This structure is present particularly in prayers to the bear, the salmon and the berries. These are also the three intelligences that are
singed out for communal ritual in the wider cultural area. Kwakiutl
did not have a communal first fruit ritual at the beginning of the berry
season, but no-one in the namima started picking until the woman who had
inherited the privilege to pick the first berries had prayed to them in
the following way:

"I have come, Supernatural Ones, you, Long-Life-Makers, that I
may take you, for that is the reason why you have come, brought
by your creator, that you may come and satisfy me; you,
Supernatural Ones; and this, that you do not blame me for
what I do to you when I set fire to you the way it is done by
my root (ancestor) who set fire to you in his manner when you
get old on the ground that you may bear much fruit. Look!
I come now dressed with my large basket and my small basket
that you may go into it, Healing-Woman; you, Supernatural
Ones. I mean this, that you may not be evilly disposed
towards me, friends. That you may only treat me well."
(Boas 1930: 203)

The structure of this prayer bears out all the points I have made
about prayers to intelligences. The greeting formula is rudimentary but
just because of its bareness expresses the essence of all greeting formu-
las: I have come that I may take you. In the justification formula that
follows, the woman explains both the order of providence and of the con-
tract with the ancestor, and entreats the berries not to blame her for
acting as she does. The petition formula--often the longest in the
prayers--is contracted here into one point: that the berries may go into
the basket. The woman addresses the berries by their ambiguous names,
"Healing Women" and "Unobliged Ones", and asks that they use their bene-
ficient and not their maleficient powers in coming to her: "that you may
not be evilly disposed towards me, friends. That you may only treat me
well".

I shall add, for comparison, the complete version of the prayer to
the sockeye salmon from which I have quoted a fragment before.

And also this when a man goes to spear the sockeye salmon which
come gathering at the mouth of the river of Gwadze. Then the
spearsman stands in the bow of his spearing canoe. Generally his wife is the steersman. As soon as he spears a sockeye salmon and when he hits the sockeye salmon that is speared by him, then the man makes a squeaking sound. And when the man hauls in the sockeye salmon into his little canoe he takes his club and he clubs it once. After he has pulled out his spear point from the sockeye salmon, he holds with his two hands the sockeye salmon and the man looks at it and prays to it and says, "We have come to meet alive, Swimmer. Do not feel wrong about what I have done to you, friend Swimmer, for that is the reason why you come that I may spear you, that I may eat you, Supernatural One, you, Long-Life-Giver, you, Swimmer. Now protect us, (me) and my wife, that we may keep well, that nothing may be difficult for us that we wish to get from you, Rich-Maker-Woman. Now call after you your father and your mother and uncles and aunts and elder brothers and sisters to come to me also, you, Swimmers, you Satiater," says he. Then he puts down his salmon which he has speared, in his canoe. As soon as he has speared many sockeye salmon he goes home. When he arrives at the beach of his house, the man steps out of his canoe, with his wife. Then his wife takes her carrying basket and gives it to her husband. He goes down the beach and puts into it the sockeye salmon which he has speared (which has two names, also sockeye salmon obtained by spearing), into the carrying basket. Then his wife spreads a new mat in her house. As soon as she has done so, her husband comes carrying the basket containing the sockeye salmon and pours the sockeye salmon obtained by spearing on the mat that has been spread out. Now his wife takes her fishknife and sits down alongside the mat. Then she holds with her left hand one sockeye salmon and holding with her first hand her fishknife she prays to the sockeye salmon and says, "Welcome, Supernatural One, you, Swimmer, you have come trying to come to me, you, who always come every year of our world, that you come to set us right that we may be well. Thank you, thank you sincerely, you, Swimmer. I mean this, that you, please, will come next year that we may meet alive, that you, please, protect me that nothing evil may befall me, Supernatural One, you, Swimmer. Now I will do what you came here for that I should do to you," says she and she cuts it. Here is, where I shall stop my words, for you know all the ways of what is done with the salmon.

(op. cit. p.206--207)

The context shows that the prayers of the berry pickers, bear hunters and salmon fishers are the verbal part of very rudimentary rituals. These private rites, oriented to the individual's relation to the intelligence complement the formal public ceremonies, discussed in Chapter 4, by which a whole namima celebrates the coming of certain intelligences. The question is, then, what is the main concern of the rudimentary in contrast
to the developed rites or in what way do the prayers complement the rituals? (Rituals are of course actions, not words, but it is in the words that we look for a clue to the action). I shall take up this question in the introduction to Chapter 4. The discussion of the formulas of justification bears, however, so closely on the question of first fruit rituals that I shall briefly take it up here. The central action in the first salmon ritual is that of eating. The first salmon are eaten as a communal sacrilegious act. The prayer spoken before the meal expresses both gratitude for the animals' sacrificial gift of their bodies and fear of the consequences of eating them (see Chapter 4, 2(c)). The mental orientation in these rituals is therefore essentially the same as that we have found in the formulas of justification. It also points to the dilemma men find themselves in vis-a-vis the animals. Yet the animals are eaten communally in these rituals, and as I point out in my introduction to Chapter 4, the ritual implies a shift from individual responsibility to a communally conceived responsibility. The main concern of the prayers as expressed in the formulas of justification is the responsibility of killing. Killing seems to be the individual act par excellence for Kwakiutl. In the Salmon Boy myths, which explore the meaning of killing and eating, killing remains the responsibility of the individual while "eating" is shifted from an individual to a communal plane (see Chapter 3, 2(b)).

If the act of stopping and praying after one has killed an animal or before one picks a plant has any ritual significance it is the one which Lévi-Strauss points out in L'Homme Nu: it introduces an element of slowing down and reflection, a pause in the enterprise. The prayer is the verbal expression of that reflection. Lévi-Strauss, who thinks of ritual as an irrational game, attributes little inherent significance to the
pause. Yet pausing and reflecting cannot be separated. They bring the significance of the enterprise home to consciousness. Kwakiutl express consciousness of the contradictory nature of reality in their prayers, and in the justification formulas, especially in apology, they seem to become conscious of the contradictory nature of the self. Such pausing and reflecting is part of being human, part of asking the question of the way in which man can belong to the world.

3(e) The Structure of the Prayers

We have considered the component parts of the prayers to the intelligences; it remains now to consider the structural implications. How are the parts combined and in how far is the combination significant? If the main concern of these prayers is with killing this should be expressed in the structure. Equally it should be possible to deduce the different concern of the prayers to Sun from structural implications.

To speak of structural implications in the case of forms as slight and simple as the Kwakiutl prayers seems exaggerated. Structure in oral forms becomes important where there is much heterogeneous material to be ordered and the message is complicated. As I have pointed out, in such cases the organization of parts has a mnemonic function that helps the speaker control his material and the listeners to grasp the relative importance of points. In this way form can express content. The simple form of the prayers puts no burden on the memory, and there is no speaker-listener context (at least in the conventional sense) to tax the method of communication. Yet the prayers have a "message" and its accuracy matters to the Kwakiutl and this, I think accounts for the fact that even in so slight an oral-literary form we should find some of the devices known from more elaborate oral literature.
One of the best known devices of oral composition is framing: the surrounding of an important episode by two less important episodes, one leading up to it and another concluding it (and possibly leading on to another). This simple device for stressing an important episode has the inherent characteristic that the first and third episodes are, in some sense, reversals of one another while the central episode has to be complex and capable of latching on in a different way to each of the framing ones. Framing is therefore related to that more elaborate device, chiastic structuring, which is based on the principle of repeating a scheme in reversed form, so that the scheme that appears in the first move as a b c appears in the second as c b a, to borrow the simple example of a rhyme scheme. Chiastic structuring is a device frequently found in oral-literary forms. It also characterises the visual art and ritual behaviour of non-literary peoples. In the texts we are considering in the framework of this inquiry we find it most elaborately used in the hunting myths (Chapter 3). The same principle establishes the relation between the salmon ritual and the initiation ritual (Chapter 4).

The prayers are too simple in composition to show anything like a formal chiastic scheme. But in so far as they have a structure at all, this structure is based on framing, and in this sense they belong (even if only as simple pre-forms) to the art form of the texts we are considering here, and to the form of Kwakiutl art more generally. In the prayers the content of the formulas does the work which is done in more elaborate compositions by a complicated disposition of parts. We shall therefore consider this content in a structural light.

Generally speaking the structural core of Kwakiutl prayers is greeting formula and petition. The two formulas are present both in prayers to Sun and in prayers to intelligences. Yet the two types of prayers are
each made up of three formulas, and greeting and petition have a different relation to each other and the third formula in each type. For prayers to Sun I abstracted the scheme: Invocation/Petition/Affirmation of Sun's omnipotence. For prayers to intelligences that are used for food our examination yields an equally simple but different scheme: Salutation/Justification/Petition.

The formal difference if we compare the two is clear. What is the central formula in prayers to Sun is part of the frame in prayers to intelligences. Are these different dispositions significant?

TABLE III

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sun</th>
<th>Intelligences</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greeting</td>
<td>Greeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petition</td>
<td>Justification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affirmation of Sun's omnipotence</td>
<td>Petition</td>
</tr>
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Prayers to Sun begin with a greeting formula that invokes Sun, asking him to look at the beings he has created and pay attention to them. They end with an assertion not only of Sun's omnipotence but of his omni-competence: everything that happens on earth happens according to Sun's will, which is active in the world every day as it was at the creation. Logically the two formulas cancel one another, because the first invokes a power which the last affirms to be omnipresent and not influenceable in any case--"for you do as you please with us". The Kwakiutl, however, did not see the world as a mechanically ordered whole in which men play mechanical parts. They see the world as a whole, indeed, and men as a part of it, but because men are not mechanical this world itself of which they are a part cannot be mechanical. Men have volition, and special desires and needs, and the petition which stands
between invocation and affirmation, and which is the core of the prayers to Sun, express exactly that volitional nature which makes the world a living and not a mechanical whole. The petitions ask for protection from evil, from sickness, from maleficient accident; and for a "making right" of Sun's world. They are often connected by a causal conjunction to the affirmation of Sun's omnipotence, as in the "Prayer of a Sick Man" (Boas 1930: 182): "... and pray, make us well, Great-Walking-all-over-the-World, for you are making in every way this world that you made". In other words, because Sun is the living power that makes the world at every moment, the whole of creation is in balance from moment to moment, and with his prayer man can spring into the breach. Man needs Sun's order to live under, an order free from evil, sickness and fatal accident. Should Sun's order be disturbed and man threatened (for instance by sickness), man can through his petition help Sun restore his order. Just because Sun is the creator and man part of the world he makes, man can, with him, make the world from moment to moment. This is the burden the petition formula carries. In their supplications to Sun Kwakiutl took part in Sun's creative activity, helping to make Sun's world right, so that they, too could live in it and enjoy its goodness.

Without the logical contradiction between the invocation formula and the formula of affirmation the petition formula could not have the force it has. As it is, it holds the exact balance between belief in the personal attention of Sun as "father" and his absolute ordaining power as "chief". Structurally considered, then, the petition in the prayers to Sun presents us with a precise rendering of man's condition in the world. According to this rendering man is neither absolutely free nor enthralled by fate but a living and active part of a living and active whole.

Prayers to intelligences that are used for food also fall into three
parts, but here the formula of justification stands in the middle and petition is a part of the frame. This arrangement is due to the wholly different situation, both logical and actual, that arises from the meeting on earth of a man and an "unobliged one". On the purely logical level there is no contradiction here between the first part of the frame--"we come and meet alive"--and the last "give over to me your wealth that I also may be rich as you are"--to use two characteristic formulations of salutation and petition as illustration. But there is all the same a certain clash between the two parts of the frame here. "We meet alive" is a formula of gratitude that could be paraphrased as "thank you for helping me survive since our last meeting". "Give me your wealth" means in all cases where the animal or plant is used for food "die for me so that I can live through your death". The inverse positions of the two parts of the frame are in fact here due to the oppositions of rich and poor, sacred and profane and the conceptions connected with them. The situation in the greeting formula is that of a poor and ordinary man meeting a rich and sacred being. The one presented by the petition formula is that of a man made rich and a being who has been stripped of its sacred power, at least for the period of its death. (That this death is seen as a temporary one is clear from the greeting formula in which the animal that was killed last year is greeted as a living friend this year.) The formulas that make up the frame contain therefore paradigmatically each the opposition rich/poor and the transformation of the original poor into rich and rich into poor. The transformation is effected through an exchange which is explicit in the "give over to me your wealth". The paradigm of two paired oppositions standing at the beginning and end of a story, with a crossing over in the middle in which the load is exchanged is frequently found in myths. Good examples are the trickster and trans-
former stories in which the original owner of a vital necessity—day-light or water—is tricked out of his possession, and a state of lack in the world is rectified to make human life possible. Prayers, however, are not myths and the prayers which have the structure we are discussing do not centre on the transformation itself, as the myths would, but on the moral implications the transformation has. The prayer confronts a real situation in the material world: the animal or plant that is prayed to is reduced from being sacred (its state of life) to being ordinary (through death). The supplicant who is doing the reducing is a real person, who feels the sacrilege involved in his action and whose main concern therefore is to apologise and to explain. Again the middle formula represents the balance between beginning and end; and, as in prayers to Sun, it is the human position in relation to the extra-human that is the central concern. But the human position in relation to the intelligences is contradictory and questionable in a way that the relation to Sun is not. The middle formula, which holds the two contradictory states of mind together, does so not by resolving the contradiction but by confronting it.

The fact that the contradictions inherent in the relations of humans and animals is not resolved in the prayers shows that the prayers kept at all times very close to practical and experienced reality. Yet the prayers are "structures" as well—mental artefacts with a fixed conventional form. The very formal and structural relations of the parts of these prayers, by putting the justification formula in the central position draw the attention to the dilemma that is inherent in necessity. In other words, what the form of the prayer strives to preserve is that closeness to painful and contradictory reality from which the content (phrased as justification and explanation) constantly tries to escape.
If framing or chiastic structuring (of which framing is a simple form) is a mnemonic device it is possible that here, where it does not serve the purpose of ordering unwieldy masses of heterogeneous material but appears in its simplest form, it functions to keep the memory close to a double-sided experience. In that case the structure of the prayers itself is important as an expression of the main concern of Kwakiutl thought.

I have not included the principles that rule relations in the prayers in my "Principles of Kwakiutl Thought". This is because these principles do not form themselves a logically complete system. The thought of the prayers comes out of and returns to contradictory reality rather than seeking for logical resolution. Nevertheless, just because it pertinaciously faces irresolvable contradictions it deserves a serious place in Kwakiutl thought as a whole. It deals with phenomena and facts. The facts are complex because they are made up of a material, spiritual and moral reality. If Kwakiutl did not return constantly in their prayers to these complex facts their thought would not have any significance for us and would not have the value it has in a framework of comparative thought.

4. Conclusion

A discussion of Kwakiutl prayers could not proceed without a discussion of Sun. Sun is a personal and omnipotent god quite unlike the naualak (sacred, unobliged) beings we have taken as the centre of our examination. An analysis of the prayers from a different point of view—a point of view that did not have the relation of the baxus and the tsetseqa as its focus—might make a case for Kwakiutl religion as monotheistic, or at least centred on a high god. The prayers to intelligences would then appear not as acts of adoration but dialogues with fellow creatures superior to men but dependent like them on a supreme
power. This position—whether it is made tenable in view of a possible Christian influence on the conception of Sun or not—is certainly defensible in view of the texts.

The point of view I have taken in my examination brings out a different criterion for what can be called the centre or pivot of a religion. In *Nuer Religion*, where E.E. Evans-Pritchard puts forward a plea for more systematic studies of primitive philosophies with reference to their chief characteristic he remarks: "The test of what is the dominant motif is usually, perhaps always, to what a people attribute dangers and sickness and other misfortunes and what steps they take to avoid or eliminate them". Now Sun, to whom people related in a personal and intent life of prayer, is wholly benevolent, the source of order alone and not of misfortune and other disorders. It seems to me that a careful analysis of the texts shows that the conception of Sun in spite of its apparent dominance does not have the integrating power to function as the centre and pivot of Kwakiutl religious thought. To apply Evans-Pritchard's test: disease and misfortune do not seem to come from Sun but are closely associated on the level of religious symbolism with the *tsetseeq* power, the spirit of the winter dance. On the moral level their origin is seen to lie in man himself through his relation with the animals. The necessity that involves man in killing also involves him in misfortune and death. Yet neither the animals nor the spirit of the winter dance are represented merely or even strictly speaking, as punitive. Both bring life, the animals physical life, the winter dance power regeneration—life on a plane where man has control over his fate. Their powers are dual, though the animals are primarily benevolent (with malevolence "underneath"), the winter dance power primarily malevolent (with benevolence "underneath"). I would say that the dominant motif of Kwakiutl
religious thought is these dualistically conceived powers. Moreover, each engages with a dualistically conceived man, so that Kwakiutl religious thought can be pictured schematically as a figure of two quaternities facing one another across the Summer/Winter division. Sun with its simply conceived power plays no role in this configuration of thought.

Kwakiutl thought suggests that the criterion for what is the dominating conception in primitive philosophies might be a dualistically conceived power. Evans-Pritchard's description of Spirit—the dominating conception of Nuer religion—would support such a hypothesis. In the context of deliberating whether Nuer religion could be called a religion of fear (as a missionary to the Nuer suggests) he says: "I think what fits the facts best is to say that it is a religion of both fear and trust, which may be opposite but are not contraries, or that the Nuer attitude towards Spirit might be described as ambiguous, and perhaps as ambivalent" (op. cit. p.312). On p.318, where he takes up the question of the ambiguities and paradoxes posed by Nuer religion he says that God (Spirit) "is both a friend and a foe, whom one summons for aid and asks to turn away, seeking at the same time union and separation from him" (cf. also pp.196 and 197, where the dangerousness of Spirit is more emphatically referred to). Kwakiutl religion could not be called monotheistic like Nuer religion, not because it lacks a supreme ruler of the universe and men's fate (which it has in Sun), but because this supreme ruler is not "both a friend and a foe". It seems at least possible that contradictory attributes are a necessary requirement for the figure that embodies the dominant conception in a religious system of thought. Almost all traditional religious symbolism (including that of the historic religions) works with paradox, with the statement that the one (whoever
or whatever this one is) is made up of two balancing but irreconcilable opposites. Perhaps the dominant figure in any particular religion in order to be dominant has to be double in this sense because this duplicity is vitally linked (though we do not exactly know how) to the recognition of the self as divided, a recognition that is essential for religious regeneration. In the historic religions such a conception would be the root of the theodicies that characterise their theologies. Two studies of religion come to mind in this context. Carl Jung has explored the connection of the conception of an immoral god with ethical development in his "Answer to Job". Of greater relevance to the material discussed here is Paul Ricœur's *The Symbolism of Evil* (1967) in which he explores the connection between symbols, conceptions of fault and sin, and a dualistically conceived biblical god.

4(a) The World Centre

Kwakiutl thought is not primarily theistic at all, nor is it manistic in the sense this word has taken on in anthropological usage. It is centred on a dualistically represented power that is conceived impersonally as the spirit of the winter dance--Healing and Pestilence Woman--or even more impersonally as a place: the world centre. We have seen the importance of spatial conceptions in the prayers, especially where the double nature of the animals is in question. For the Kwakiutl space makes a more versatile conceptual tool for inquiry into cause and effect, into the origin of disease and death and the measure of control men can achieve than a figure, anthropomorphic or other. The world centre is such a tool. As an image-symbol it is extremely comprehensive; it can accommodate the conception of the animals and their problematic relations to men as well as and simultaneously with the psychological
conception of the spirits of the winter ritual. Moreover, it is not purely a spatial image but an image of space-time similar to, but far more inclusive than the meetings on journeys that make such important points of conjunction and reversal in the prayers. Space and time lend themselves to the conceptual formation of paradox and reversal more easily than bodily forms. A space-time image like the world centre can express the play of opposites relatively easily with the help of concepts of motion, direction and speed. Up and down, stasis and kinesis are oppositions that are contraries, and it is obvious that they cannot exist simultaneously. At the world centre they exist simultaneously in a play of contradiction that analogically throws light on the less easily conveyed play between being and non-being. In any case it is this play of contradictions that generates the world. What is important in our context is that it does not only generate the world on the cosmic and physical level but on the psychic one as well, that for men the conception of the world centre establishes a moral continuity between the two. This moral continuity excludes the direct and realistic confrontation of having to kill. It includes the perception of the divided will in a formalised and schematic way as part of what one might call a scheme of redemption. In the conception of the world centre we have a scheme in which the problems of disease and death and deliverance from disease and death, transgression and guilt and redemption through sacrifice and renewal are caught up together and conceptually linked. In such a representation the physical world and the psychic world become one; experience is redeemed from being fragmentary and the world makes sense as a whole. If the study of religion is the examination and evaluation of such representations, then the examination of the world centre is an important part of this discussion of Kwakiutl prayers.
The world centre is not really a philosophical concept, because it is an image of something that cannot be known, while it is yet experienced and can be thought about; but it is a philosophical conception. It is given material symbolic form in the winter ritual and linguistic form in Kwakiutl ritual songs, in speeches and myths. We have no informant’s commentary on it. In view of the fact of its pivotal position in Kwakiutl expressive culture, a fact of which Boas must have been aware, it seems extraordinary that he did not ask to have it commented on. Its main role is that of a unifying conception in the initiation system of thought. But it also serves to conceptualise, on a highly abstract level, the relation between men and animals on the one hand and animals and supernatural spirits on the other. In this way it becomes important as a link between the Winter and the Summer. I shall try to give an outline of this double relation here.

First a brief summary of the sources.

1) **Initiation Myths as Source of World Centre Images**

In the initiation myths the world centre is indicated by a pole or a hole in or near the house of the initiating spirit. Both have associations with death and life. The image of the hole particularly can have double associations; door to the house of the spirit, set with teeth (snapping door) = mouth of the spirit; hole to the underworld of the dead, but also pool (or other container) with the water of life, world axis (a shaft through the middle of the universe). The pole image is more usually destructive as "snapping pole" (cannibal pole) or "death bringer" (a lance, or magic wand that kills at a distance), but also appears as tree, post, mountain, etc. of the world in an upholding, supporting capacity. The cannibal's house always has both a snapping pole and a pool with the water of life to indicate that we are at the world centre.
here. The images proliferate and combine endlessly. One variation is interesting in the context of the prayers: the world centre image that includes animals. Looking down into the "hole" (here presumably the hollow axis of the universe) the initiate may see "many animals and fishes" (Boas and Hunt 1905: 100), or arriving at the base of the "post of the world" in a submarine journey he may see sea-mammals crowded against the world pole, which "look like food dishes" (Boas 1943: 215--216). The animals are wealth symbols here with a special connotation of fertility; especially the world centre as hole or vessel is connected with such life-and-wealth symbolism (cf. Duff 1975: 40ff).

2) Ritual Songs as Source for Descriptive Terms

The word "world centre" (literally "middle of the world") crops up in songs sung by and for the cannibal initiate at the public ritual. "World centre" is of course itself only a metaphoric description of a conception which cannot be expressed except in images. It is therefore not surprising that we find a number of synonyms in the songs. Kwakiutl poetry (not unlike the poetry of the psalms) went in for the repetition of a line in other forms. In these variations we find synonyms, which themselves remind one of another poetic technique, that of the Anglo-Saxon Kennings. The initiate for instance sings: "I have been where you cry 'hunger' for me, Cannibal, at the middle of the world; I have been where you cry 'hunger' for me, Cannibal, at the post of the world". (Boas 1897: 688). On the community sings to the initiate: "You were led to his cannibal pole in the place of honour of his house the centre rear seat, and this house is our world; you were led to his cannibal pole which is the milky way of our world; you were led to his cannibal pole on the right hand side of our world". (op. cit. p.691). From these "Kennings" in the songs
we also learn that the world centre is synonymous with the "edge" or "rim of the world", also called sometimes the "far end" or "North end" of the world (see Boas and Hunt 1905: 479 and 482; also Boas 1897 throughout the Appendix). Congruence of centre with periphery is of course one of the paradoxes well known from archaic thought generally; it also appears in Jungian psychology associated with the concept of individuation.

3) Hunting Myths as World Centre Images

In hunting myths the world centre appears as the place where the game comes from, and to which the animals return when they have been killed to renew their life (cf. for instance the Salmon Boy and Bear Mother myths of the coast). In Kwakiutl mythical geography the country of the animals is at the periphery of the world. Salmon country for instance lies far out to the West in the Pacific ocean. To go there one has to cross into the other world, and the crossing point is imaged as an opening and shutting hole, a snapping mouth set with teeth or a similar place of death (see the hole Salmon Boy has to pass through in the Bella Bella version, Chapter 3, 2; in some Salmon Boy myths Salmon Woman, whom the hero marries, has a vagina dentata). The animals' home is simultaneously a place teeming with wealth and fertility, imaged as swarming with playing children, birds, flowers, feasting and playing people (see Salmon Boy myths). It can actually have the name "Place of Wealth" or "Place of Well-being" in the myths (cf. Boas 1935: 208). These are also names used for the winter dance houses in the village in which initiations are celebrated (cf Boas 1930: 121). The winter dance house is an earthly copy of the spirit's house in which the treasure is gained. The name "Place of Wealth" or a similar name can also be used for the ultimate
destination of the dead, who are imagined as gathered at the world centre (cf. Boas 1910: 315, "Making-Satiated-on-the-other-Side-of-the-World"). Land of the animals, house of the spirit, winter dance house and house of the dead are therefore all conceptually correlated as points of death-and-life.

With the help of these mythical images and descriptive names (of which I have given only a few examples in each case) it is possible to arrive at the more abstract definition of the world centre which follows.

The world centre is conveyed by the Kwakiutl as an unthinkable paradox. It is simultaneously nothing and everything, a place of annihilation and origin. The image most frequently used to describe it in Kwakiutl mythology is the "post of the world" which upholds the universe. The image of the centre as upholding or supporting has a psychological and moral as well as a physical-material dimension. In journeying to the "middle of the world" the initiate-hero of myth and ritual reaches a point within himself that is not easily reached in everyday life. One could say that in the world centre of mythical geography--far out in the wilderness--he is faced with an image of the self that is usually hidden by everyday associations. To meet himself in this way and to recognise himself in what he meets, requires an act of inner decision, an "overcoming of the self". For this decision he needs knowledge to guide him and courage to inspire him. Imagery and plot of the initiation myth therefore always associate the world centre image with a test of the knowledge and courage of the hero.

When the Kwakiutl initiate arrives "at the centre of the world" or "at the pole of the world" (see the ritual songs quoted above) he has come to a double moment in which he is faced with a choice. His inner conflict is mirrored in the duality of the world centre. In the initia-
tion myths and ritual the world centre always stands for the inner dimension. The initiating spirits, who personify the world centre, also belong to that inner dimension. The animals, on the other hand, belong to the outer, physical dimension. Yet they are addressed in the prayers with the same ambiguous names that mark the spirits of the tsetsefa as personifications of the world centre. In the absence of an elaborate mythology about it the whole outer dimension, the connection of the animals to the world centre and the relation of men to the animals through the world centre are far more difficult to explain than anything that has to do with the inner dimension and the spirits. One thing is clear from the prayers: unlike men animals have a direct, immediate, one might say effortless relation to the world centre. They are themselves part of it, while men come into contact with it only through the extreme effort made in initiation. The question to apply ourselves to is then how this relation, in the case of the animals and of men is conceived.

I shall begin with a schematised account of the relations, followed by a longer explanatory description. The world centre is conceived as a coincidence of opposites. In "real life" the opposites are divided and so to speak strung out along the road of experience. In the physical world man meets the animal with a double desire: to be its friend and not harm it, and to kill and eat it in order to live. In this sphere all is fixed: man's intention may be genuinely divided but he can in fact follow only one desire, the destructive one. The animals' response is correspondingly double: they give men physical life, which contains its own opposite, death. The world centre is the telescoped image-expression of enantiodromia, the Heraklitan view about the play of opposites in the course of events that maintains that all that is must go over into its opposite. In the physical world the life men gain from the animals turns into death.
Such a principle, based on the experiences of physical life, invites a transference to the psychological sphere and a changed application. In the "psychological" world 47 a terrifying and bloodthirsty spirit faces man with a choice: to let himself be eaten or flee and avoid him. Here man is free to decide. If he has the courage to give himself to the spirit, the spirit, who eats him, converts his death into new life by spewing him out again. (If he should flee the spirit would devour him in any case, but for ever). The Heraklitan principle is applied again: if man chooses death freely, making it a first choice, he will ultimately gain life.

We can picture this configuration of Kwakiutl thought as two quaternities, each complete in itself, yet the two connected in a fixed chronological sequence. Both quaternities are made up of a pair of antagonists facing one another; each antagonist is "split" and therefore appears double. In the physical sphere the relation of man to animal is fixed under the law of necessity. Under this law they are joined in an antisyzygy, a wrong marriage. In the psychological world the relation of man to spirit is under the law of freedom. Man can dictate the relation here, and can therefore right what was wrong in the relation in the physical world. The animals reappear here as the spirits and man as their victim. In other words the two pairs of antagonists are really one pair, viewed under different aspects. The animals as spirits bring man the death which can be converted into life.

I have shown the two quaternities and their connection in the following diagram. The left half of the diagram represents the physical sphere in which man meets the animal through the world centre, the right half the psychological sphere in which man meets the spirit through the world centre. In the physical sphere man's divided desire that opts for killing leads to
injury whose final issue is death. In the psychological sphere the choice of being passive in the face of a threat to one's life is an assertion of freedom of action and leads to regeneration as someone capable of acting freely.

FIGURE 6

The world centre is, then, a place where opposites coincide. Relations that pass through the world centre are ambiguous. In the physical world man faces the animal with a double intention and the animal faces man with a doubtful blessing. In the psychological world man faces the spirit with a choice of attitude and the spirit faces man with a paradoxical death. But the world centre does not only yoke man + animal and man + spirit ambiguously in separate physical and psychological spheres. Because it is the centre it unites these spheres. It
links the man-animal and man-spirit relationship in such a way that one is transformed into the other, and a duality that remains unresolved in the physical world is resolved in the psychological one.

Let us now return for the moment to an abstract description. The world centre is always conveyed in mythology by irreconcilable opposites. It is a pole which is a hole; to reach it you go up in order to find yourself down or vice versa; time there passes so fast it stands still. If the concept is in fact one of a mutual cancelling of opposites, then the world centre is conceived as a nothing, the mathematical zero point. The material world, on the other hand, is conceived as made up of opposites: space as the opposition of above and below, time as past and future and all material bodies as belonging to these oppositions. The world centre is the place where these oppositions, from their extreme positions on an axis are brought together in one point. They cease to exist as oppositions, and with this reduction and concentration to a point all material bodies must cease to exist. The world centre is therefore, first of all, the point of death.

Yet such a point where opposites meet and cancel one another as opposites is also the point of generation. Again the mathematical zero point provides the exact parallel. But the sexual example is nearer to Kwakiutl imagery: the opposites of male and female abandon their distinct existence, fuse, and in ceasing to exist give existence to the germ of new life. This germ, incidentally, contains in itself again the potentiality for either maleness or femaleness. But the point here is that the world centre is the place of the dynamic transformation of death into life. Seen statically it is the point of nothing which is also everything; dynamically the emptiness in which everything exists in potentiality, the place of seed.
In the world centre, then, annihilation and origin are one. Now when Kwakiutl pray to the animals they are not simply addressing themselves to emanations of the world centre but to beings in which the force of the centre is imminent. The animals are on the one hand material forms that have come from the world centre as from a source, but on the other the dynamic principle of the centre is inherent in them and they live and operate within it. This gives them their duality and makes them dangerous to men. Kwakiutl hope and believe that they will bring them life and therefore pray to them for health, wealth and long life. But they are conscious that the life they ask for must contain in itself death; and they fear the death-dealing power which, to them, all life-bringers inevitably hold. This mingled hope and fear is most evident in the prayers to animals that are hunted and killed for food. It is through Kwakiutl conceptions of killing and eating, especially the eating of animal substance, that we can trace how they see the living beings they meet in the world and the world centre and why they address them with the ambiguous names that mirror the ambiguity of the world centre. Kwakiutl are acutely aware that the physical life for which they ask, which is the animals' gift and which they nourish with the bodies of the animals they kill is a life inside death. Through eating they grow to life but also inevitably towards death. They literally eat their own death. In accepting the animals' gift of life, then, they accept death.

The conception of eating as a means of life which is also a means of death becomes the origin of the conception of the initiation. It is also the point of connection between the concrete animals of the real world and the spirits of the inner world of initiation. The imaginary world of initiation represents the plane on which Kwakiutl find it possible to escape the life-in-death of physical necessity. It is
imaginary not because it is unreal but because its reality can only be conveyed through images. In this imaginary world a man, the initiate, goes on a journey, crosses a boundary, and reaches the world centre. There he is eaten by a spirit and through his death gains new life. It can be seen that this journey is a reversal of that of the animals, who come from the world centre, are eaten by men in the real world, and ultimately, after having sustained their lives, bring them death. The meeting with the animals takes place in the "natural" world, where the animals bring men life which ultimately turns to death. The meeting with the spirits takes place in the "supernatural" world where men die and are reborn. One could perhaps say that the close but inverted relation between animals and spirits represents Kwakiutl acceptance of the ineluctability of the human condition on the plane of physical reality and their belief that on another plane this condition can be transformed. Kwakiutl are realists but not fatalists. The spirits as personifications of the world centre refer, as I have said, to its inner psychic dimension, but particularly they refer to that dimension under its moral aspect. On the inner plane questions of death and life concern the personality, and the answers are not fixed but depend on choice and will. The initiate gains "life" by a free decision to choose "death". It has to be noted, however, that the Kwakiutl conception despite its stress on individual decision is not individualistic or soteriological. The decision to choose the death which gives him life is always followed, or paralleled, by another decision expressed through the image of wealth. This is the decision to give away his treasure, in other words to share his new life with the community. "Life" or "wealth" or "distinction" only comes to Kwakiutl in this double sense of a personal completeness that relates to others. It is in this sense too that the freedom gained by a choice of
death must be understood: in conquering death the individual has freed himself potentially but his freedom is realised in "giving", that is it exists substantially only in so far as it joins him to others. Freedom for Kwakiutl has an entirely adult, public or civic character.

To return to the animals. Eating and dying, receiving and giving seem to be, then, the operative concepts that join men to the world centre and to the animals, and join the concrete animals to the imaginary spirits. I shall briefly recapitulate the line of thought as I understand it. In the real world men eat animals. The animals offer their bodies to men as gifts, but men can only accept them by an intervening act of violence, killing. As a consequence, the animals bring not only the gifts of health, wealth and long life for which Kwakiutl pray but also sickness and death. In the imaginary world of initiation men are eaten by the spirits. They offer themselves, voluntarily facing death, and with this "act of passivity" make amends for the violence to which they are forced in the sphere of physical existence. For this they receive the gift of what we might call spiritual life, tlugwi, the "supernatural treasure" or "supernatural power". With the tlugwi we move to the intra- and interpersonal plane. In psychological terms it is the gift of inner independence. Independence is shown by giving--in the winter ritual by distributing the treasure to the community. Here the stress is shifted from the individually psychological to the social and collective. Through having let themselves be eaten by the spirit the Kwakiutl convert their individual proneness to death into a proneness to life. By giving away their treasure (again an individual form of dying) they are transforming a mere survival community, bound together by the need to eat and therefore bound to death, into a community of the free, a living polity based on the free activity of its members. With this the winter
dance society gains the attributes of the world centre: transformation of death into life, potentiality for action in the world.

This elucidation of the conception of the world centre does not answer all the cruxes connected with Kwakiutl prayers but it goes some way towards answering them. It does not tell us why Kwakiutl pray to the animals, but it tells us that prayer is directed to beings who are real and other than human, and not to beings who are imaginary and representations of a psychological process. It also goes some way toward explaining why Kwakiutl use the same names to address the animals in prayers as they give to the spirits of the winter ritual and the teetseqa spirit itself. What remains still obscure, not on the level of representations but of rational thought is how Kwakiutl connected the different planes of experience represented. The world centre is a philosophical conception, the animals phenomena of the real world, and the winter dance spirits "externalizations", that is creations of the imagination embodying mental processes. As the Kwakiutl use the same imagery for all three planes, using physical reality as the basis for their imagery, we conclude that the connection is metaphoric. Yet in a context where we look for more than just formal equations and formal explanations words like metaphor are virtually useless. We can assume, following Burridge, that in the connections the Kwakiutl make they are "reaching out for new truths", experimenting with experience in a changing situation. Certainly making the connections between the Summer and the Winter, the animals and the initiating spirits seems to have been one of the urgent preoccupations of Kwakiutl thought at the period of contact to which the texts go back. At that time having the right relation with the animals was still felt to be of vital importance, while the spirits, representing problems of the relation of personality and community had become the focus of interest in an intensi-
fied way. The crux of the situation as Kwakiutl saw it was not coming to terms with the white man but coming to terms with the new wealth he had brought, handling this wealth so that it would not injure but strengthen Kwakiutl patterns of communal life. The relation to the animals was not irrelevant here. Animals are the traditional wealth bringers, and the new wealth at least at the early time of contact, the fur-trading period, was gained by overkilling. Overkilling was a crime, as it is in most hunting and fishing societies, and the prayers show that the Kwakiutl must have seen it as the most certain way of making the animals use their equilibrating power and bring illness and death. There is no doubt that illness and death accompanied the new wealth, as the dwindling numbers on the demographic charts of a slightly later period prove. The dilemma in which men are involved in their relation to the outside world, represented in the prayers as the problem of the double nature of the animals and, correspondingly, of man's double desire was therefore a particularly acute issue at the time.

4(b) The Validity of Kwakiutl Thought

To conclude, let us return to the question of the validity of Kwakiutl thought apart from the language in which it is cast. In the world centre we have a symbolic synthesis of the problems of the Summer with those of the Winter. Can this synthesis be expressed in rational language or is it untranslatable from the symbolic language in which it is cast? The crux is again those non-symbolic passages in the prayers where Kwakiutl apologise to the animals for doing what they do not mean to do and explain the necessity that drives them. If these statements express a realistic grasp of the situation, as we said they did—a realistic grasp both of the psychological reality of the divided will and the physical one of
having to kill in order to live--then the synthesis on the symbolic level would be invalidated. The synthesis depends on the conception of the dual nature of the animals. Is the conception of the duality of the animals then a projection of man's divided will onto the outside world? To a certain extent it must be. But if it were merely a projection, men could not relate to "the ultimate conditions of their existence" through this representation of the animals; in fact the representation would in that case be the escape from or substitute for such a relating. There would also be little point in facing the painful issue with the animals directly (as the passages of apology do) if the conception of the animals as double provided a way around it. In fact the representation of the double-natured animals involves some of the most important issues of Kwakiutl culture and "philosophy", and the question whether such representations are accessible to rational explanation at all, and if so in what form the explanation of them can be cast, is therefore unavoidable. Our knowledge of the process of symbolization is still rudimentary, and apart from the terminology of psychology we have no method that allows us to view psychic processes at a remove. We can, however, make hypotheses that lie in the realm of the possible and the knowable and that are therefore legitimate. What I am putting forward below about the connection between the dilemma and the symbolization is such a hypothesis.

It can perhaps be assumed that a division of the will, with its evenly balanced and irreconcilable desires, creates an unbearable tension which, just because of the polar nature of the desires, makes and releases amounts of mental energy that are transferable. The theory sounds mechanised and pseudo-scientific; the process has however been observed in clinical psychiatry and led Freud to his theory of displacement in compulsion neurosis, Jung to his theory about the normal formation of
The process is found in individuals; my application of it to collective thought must be taken as hypothetical. According to my theory, then, the dilemma in which the Kwakiutl find themselves in relation to the animals, and which crystallises as the problem of killing and eating, leads as a primary symbol formation to the image of the double-natured animal, always accompanied by images of killing and eating. In itself the image of the double-natured animal does not represent a solution, it rather mirrors the divided will, preserving the polar nature of the original dilemma. Through its inherent tension it becomes itself, in its turn, a source of mental energy, stimulating thought and at the same time providing a language in which thought can be cast. With the energy generated by the tension persisting at the core of a hunting and gathering existence, and a vigorous language imbued with this tension the Kwakiutl turn to new problems. The new problems are capable of resolution because they belong to the moral and intellectual order alone, and the mind is therefore not thwarted by the laws of physical existence as it was in the case of the original dilemma. From a study of the texts it appears that the Kwakiutl tackle three major new problems with the help of the images of the double-natured animal and of killing and eating: (1) the problem of justice, (2) the problem of maturation, (3) the problem of a harmonious world in which men can live at peace. The three can be reduced to one underlying problem, that of the harmonious world. In the case of (1), however, the harmony applies to the relation of men to the outside, non-human world; in the case of (2) and (3) to the intra- and interpersonal world. The symbols with their inherent duplicity are transposed onto these other levels on which individual and social vectors come into play. I shall discuss in the following pages first (1) separately, and then (2) and (3) together.
The problem of justice finds its clearest expression in the hunting myths, which are the subject of the next chapter. The conception of justice advanced in these myths is that of a duality that implies perfect parity. The same polar images that we found symbolising the divided will in the prayers express this conception in the myths. The problem of justice is symbolized mainly in two ways: by the kindness and wrath of the bear—his giving himself for men and destroying men; and as the man who kills and eats children (who are salmon) and is killed and eaten by his parents (as a salmon). Justice is shown as "blind", that is as entirely impartial in these myths; the balance that is achieved is so perfect that complete stasis threatens to result—a condition which baffles the mind and under which life cannot continue. The condition of stasis is avoided in the myths by the introduction of two figures, each of whom represents a synthesis between the two opposed and equally balanced claims of justice. On the symbolic level the synthesis is represented by a superhuman mediator figure, who is animal and man at once, and who watches over the rights of both the hunters and the hunted. This mediator figure has the fearful attributes of the double-natured animal. On the more realistic level the synthesis is achieved in the figure of the good hunter, who through abstinence and training becomes the equal of the animal. Here the synthesis rests on the belief that in return for giving up some of his human qualities (becoming "subhuman" in terms of ordinary society) a man can attain superhuman qualities that attune him to the desires and thoughts of the animals. The "good hunter" is close to the initiate in conception, as we shall see below.

In the hunting myths an abstract problem is treated, that of justice between men and animals. But the narrative framework within which this problem is set forth is the realistic one of a hunting and gathering life.
The salmon and bears we meet with in the myths, and the killing and eating that takes place, however fantastic, refer in the end to real salmon and bears and the real problems of killing and eating. When we turn now to the problems connected with the winter ritual this relationship changes. The problems of maturity and harmony are set forth with the help of the same imagery, an imagery taken from the dilemma of the divided will vis-a-vis the animals. But a great many new factors now enrich this imagery, factors of a psychological nature that have nothing to do with the animals. Animal imagery is often used in myth and ritual to describe the link between human phyllogenetic and ontogenetic development, and the Kwakiutl winter ritual is an attempt of this kind. The animals and actions of killing and eating become here, then, metaphors for psychic processes. However, the original dilemma concerning the animals is never entirely lost sight of, and we shall return at the end to the question whether the winter ritual also constitutes a solution in rationally acceptable terms to this dilemma.

(2) and (3). The Kwakiutl had hunting myths, but they did not develop the problem of justice and its resolution as vigorously as did their neighbours to the North. They too are concerned with achieving a state of harmony, but their interest has shifted to the social, and harmony with and within nature is no longer sought for by them with the same intensity. Instead it becomes a problem connected with the nature/culture distinction which gives all Kwakiutl thought its direction. That which forever escapes them in the natural world they set about creating when they make their cultural world, the ts’etse’qa.

A discussion of the ts’etse’qa itself is outside the scope of this investigation. Yet the question of the validity of Kwakiutl thought cannot be raised without an attempt at interpreting the ts’etse’qa. If I
offer an interpretation here it must be understood to be in a purely hypothetical spirit, as a theory put forward in a condensed form which I cannot substantiate in this context.

I have dubbed the two problems the Kwakiutl tackle with the help of the images of killing and eating and of the double-natured animals "maturation" where they concern the individual and "a state of harmony" where they concern society. This dubbing involves a paradox. If we accept it, then "maturation" involves for the Kwakiutl what we would call an infantalization or regression. Similarly, the "state of harmony" involves an unusual amount of anti-social and destructive behaviour. Nevertheless I believe that my dubbing does justice to the problems the Kwakiutl are in fact tackling. To them maturity does not simply mean the successful process of socialization, and harmony actually means a state of society in which "anti-social" behaviour has been given a place and has become "social".

In order to understand the Kwakiutl conception of the tsetseqa we have to return to the distinction they make between Summer and Winter and recall Evans-Pritchard's test of the dominant motif in a culture. Evans-Pritchard's "dangers, sickness and other misfortunes" we have to define here more generally as all that is destructive, all that tends towards death. In the Summer men destroy the animals in order to live and are themselves threatened by disease and death. Harmony cannot be established under these conditions. In the Winter destructiveness--the tendency to death that is inherent in all life--is itself part of the harmony. How is this possible? It is only possible in world of play, and the winter dance, as the name "dance" indicates, is such a world. It is not only free from the restrictive social apparatus of the baxus world: social hierarchy, labour, sexual division of labour, it also allows regressive
and instinctual drives their range. These are death-drives—at least in the sense that under normal social conditions they are so destructive that they cannot be given expression. Witness for instance the cannibalism that plays such a role in the ritual, and that goes back to infantile wishes and fears generated by the family situation.  

But here a social mode has been found in which the death-drives can be transformed into life-giving entities. In the winter dance they are no longer destructive of harmony and, consequently, to be suppressed, but are positive and instrumental in establishing harmony. Cannibalism plays a unifying role throughout the winter dance. The transformation of the anti-social and destructive into the socially constructive can be demonstrated on the individual and the collective level. I shall turn to the individual first.

If my theory is correct, the cannibalistic spirits of initiation represent the unacceptable parts of the self. The Cannibal is a polar symbol—eater and giver—but at the same time he is the "other" part of the self, the part which civilized consciousness has been taught to reject. As we know, the first aim of Kwakiutl initiation is identity with the Cannibal. The "maturation crisis" of initiation would then suggest not a process of repression—that is socialization—but a process of what we might call liberation, in which the infantile and primitive parts of the psyche are activated and integrated. In other words, the self-renewal of initiation seems to be dependent on regression. That this is so is borne out by an examination of the isolation period which is, without any doubt, a period of desocialization. We have to understand the word maturation in the paradoxical sense here that the infantile is redeemed and installed in its own right. This would produce the equation of "mature" with naualak, "free, unobliged". In the initiate the individual has returned
to a state of unrestriction. This, one would assume, must lead to a state of chaos collectively. The winter dance society presents, however, the very opposite of a picture of chaos; it presents a picture of a harmonious whole in which the "free play" of each individual (represented by his dance) is assimilated into the ordered movement of all, the winter dance. What sort of society can assimilate an unrestricted individual?

Let us sum up once more the individual aspect before we return to the collective. The Kwakiutl ideal of the complete human being (the "perfect man" of initiation) is not the perfectly socialized individual but the individual who can "act freely". Freedom involves for them a return and acceptance of the repressed. The images of killing and eating, and of the double-natured animals assist in the integration of a self whose unacceptable parts have become accepted. This liberation on the personal level is a prerequisite for entering the winter dance society, which is an association of the free. The question that arises is that of the principle by which such an association can be organised.

Logically it can be organised only if there is an absence of domination. This is, in fact, the main organising principle of the winter dance society, if an absence can be called an organising principle. The winter dance society is ordered, and part of this order, as of any order, is hierarchy. It is in fact a very highly ordered society, because it is ordered according to an aesthetic pattern. But the pivot on which this order turns is not domination and subordination but balance: everything is matched with something else that is its exact counterpart and keeps it in balance. The basic principle that implements this state of balance is the division of power and authority. The community is divided into the ritual moiety divisions of the tsetseqa, the Sparrows and the Seals. The Seals have power, the Sparrows authority. This is a conscious overthrow
of the principle of the baxus society in which power and authority are united in the chief, and which is based socially on domination and subordination. It is perhaps for that reason that the monistic conception of Sun, the model for the Kwakiutl good chief cannot find any place in the winter dance. Here everything is balanced against its opposite. Domination and subordination would make such a balancing impossible. The Sparrows provide the administrative framework within which the dances take place. From "master of ceremony" to "messengers" they have executive authority to organise the events. The Seals on the other hand have power—the "supernatural power" that unfolds in the dances. The power of the Seals is deferred to, it has all the prestige. But without the organising activities of the Sparrows who bring the people together it could not be displayed, it would not have a field in which to play. The Seals, again, are responsible for the new initiates who return "wild" from their isolation. Their wildness has to be "tamed" or "pacified". This does not imply an exorcism of their ecstatic powers but a channelling of it into the dance. Again the "freedom" of the initiates could not be realised if it could not be displayed, find a field which it can order with its power. The display is at the same time the distribution of their "treasure", and the distribution unites the community by imbuing it with new life. I have already mentioned that the treasure seems to be the "unrepression" of the initiate; yet in giving it away it not only loses its destructive nature but seems to promote harmony in the community. The initiate himself is then, not the "other" any more; in giving away he is integrated into the community and his freedom is one with his responsibility. It is only in this sense, in the public ritual, that his maturation is completed.

The three groups--Sparrows, Seals and initiates--make up the winter
dance society, and between them, achieve a state of synkinesis in which all are free and all move to the pattern of a varied but harmonious dance. They achieve this state partly through a separation of power from authority, partly through a use of symbols which seems to have objectively therapeutic or liberating effects. The dance expresses the Kwakiutl idea of a world in which men can live in peace. This world is limited to the social realm, and moreover is a play-society, based on stores and only temporarily free from the necessity of labour. In time it extends to no more than the smaller half of the year. But within this compass the Kwakiutl achieve something rare: an accommodation of the contradictions that make ordinary life strained and unhappy; a possibility for the individual to be both free and part of a community. We remember that the Kwakiutl call the *tsetseqa* "time of happiness" and "place of well-being".

The polar symbols permeate *tsetseqa* thinking and are inseparable from the accommodation of contradictions that is taking place. In the ritual moiety division the Seals with their power stand over against the Sparrows as do the *nualak* animals against *baxus* men. Through this repetition and inversion of the subsistence pattern of the Summer the debt of the Summer is paid; the animals whom men have hunted and eaten are now made the hunters and eaters. As men are at peace in a world without any domination, so men and animals are at peace through this reversal. When the speaker in the winter ritual "tell[s] our world that we have been covered by the red cedarbark", this is a gesture of man and world united, of culture and nature reconciled. But this reconciliation is symbolic, and in conclusion we have to ask ourselves whether this solution of the dilemma of the Summer has a validity outside its symbolism, similar to the solutions of the "new" problems we have been discussing, or whether it can only be expressed in terms of its symbolism.
I think we can speak of a solution in rational terms from two points of view, if we are ready to grant, what the Kwakiutl seem to assume, that there are "real" solutions that are not "direct" solutions. The first is a view of the dilemma as guilt which can be redeemed. That the Kwakiutl felt guilt over the killing and eating of animals is incontrovertible from the evidence of the texts, but guilt should here not be taken in the sense of an inturned brooding. On the contrary, it seems to make morally and intellectually active and attentive. The polar symbols are generated by genuine worry over the animals. They permeate Kwakiutl thought and become both vehicles for thought and quickeners of thought under the impetus of a feeling of guilt. The energetic activity of mind, with its stress on independence and giving (altruism) is itself a form of amendment if reality is granted to the world of the mind at all.

The second is a view of the dilemma not as guilt but as debt, and seems to suggest that there are debts of gratitude that can never be repaid directly and that can still be considered payable. A child for instance cannot repay his parents for what they have done for him; he can only repay them by growing into a mature and responsible adult. The Kwakiutl seem to see their relationship to the animals, whom they see as superior to themselves as well as like them in a similar light. They resolve the dilemma on the only level where it is possible for them, that is on the level where "man is responsible for his own fate", to quote Bellah. They do this through the initiation. The splitting of the self by externalising the unacceptable parts and the self-acceptance of initiation has nothing to do with the divided will towards the animals and does not repay the animals. The Kwakiutl make use of what could be called an anagogical connection. By becoming free himself and linking up freely with others in the society of men the initiate pays the animal back, as a
child is supposed to pay back its parents, not literally but by imitating in his own life-mode their responsibility and independence.
Footnotes


3 And, it should be added, without a knowledge of the minor rituals of the Summer. These minor rituals, which celebrate the coming of animals and plants to men (see Chapter 4), are an extension and comment on the thought of the prayers.

4 This is true in principal. In practice there is an interesting margin of overlap in the entrance and exit ceremonies of the ritual when prayers are spoken. The divisional principle can be studied there in action: it is always the physical thing that is prayed to, never a thing representing a spiritual quantity.

5 The most frequent injunction is to be happy. Happiness describes for the Kwakiutl the state of energetic alertness connected with the winter ritual. Cf. the extracts from winter dance speeches quoted in 2(c) below.


8 Isetseqa is clearly also such a word, but it is restricted to the winter dance period. Naualak is the more comprehensive term.

9 The initiate who, because of some faulty handling of the naualak power cannot be "tamed" or "pacified" has to be killed or is lost in the wilds. The tamed initiate is not ordinary, but he has reached a necessary middle stage where the human can come into contact with the naualak power, and from which a return to the ordinary is possible. Cf. Boas 1897: 407--8 for an account of a failure to tame.

10 For the conception of the grizzly see Boas 1930: 194--196; also my description of Bear Mother myths in Chapter 3. As for cannibalism, eating one's own kind was a more unthinkable act that any other for the Kwakiutl. The Bear Mother myths combine the conception of the wildness of the animals with that of cannibalism, see especially the Beaver myth discussed at the end of Chapter 3. In the Epilogue I discuss the myths that relate the wildness of the animals to the winter ritual.

11 The word is rarely used for the spirits, which are sufficiently characterised by their actions. They are sometimes referred to as "the supernatural people" in the myths.
12 In this sense tsetseqa, which, we remember, is etymologically related to lying, cheating also means free. During the tsetseqa period society is not the ordinary moral community but an association of the free.


14 It appears from other parts of Burridge's text that imbakekas shares the duality of naualak, cf. pp.153 and 157 op. cit.

15 For the "wildness" of the hunter see Boas 1930: 194 ff. Cf. also the conception of the good hunter described in Chapter 3, end. The hunter is in a peculiar position: vis-a-vis the animal he is a man haunted by guilt, that is baxus, accountable. Vis-a-vis the community he is both "wild" and a giver of gifts that cannot be requited, that is naualak, unobliged.

16 Dogs are anomalies: they occupy a position in the semantic universe at the same time closer to men and closer to tools. They were used for hunting, and had names that were handed on inside namimas like people's names. In the dog myths (which form a special group) dogs change places with their masters. In initiation myths on the other hand, the initiating animal (for instance Mountain Goat) gives away hunting dogs like any other magic object; the dog is here nothing but a contraption that never fails in the hunt.


20 Cf. Chapter 3 for the role played by irregularity in myth patterns. Asymmetry is to form what contradiction is to content. Points of contradiction are always key points in Kwakiutl thought, see below 2(c) and Chapter 4, 3.

21 In this respect the Kwakiutl differ sharply from other North American Indians, for instance the Indians of the Plains and Eastern Woodlands.

22 The myth is still alive among the Kwakiutl; I was given a version once on a flying sheet in a beer parlour. It is, however, not alive because of a continued veneration for Sun, but because of the perennial popularity of the trickster Mink.


24 Cf. East Indian philosophy, to which Kwakiutl philosophy seems related. In India the hyperethical demand is converted into the ethical system of purity versus impurity. Vegetarianism is an expression of that system. Vegetarianism could not help the Kwakiutl who believed that all
living beings, plants as much as animals were "of one kind" with man.

25 Catherine McClellan's The Girl who Married the Bear, Publications in Ethnology, No. 2 (Ottawa: National Museums of Canada, 1970), a collection of Bear Mother stories which includes the personal history of the narrators is a chronicle of the complex of feelings discussed here. See for instance version 7, p.42. The stories are discussed in detail in Chapter 3.

26 See the epilogue for an illustration of this line.

27 That such a dialogue is a serious undertaking which needs responsible persons as partners is shown in the fact that no children's prayers are recorded. On the occasions when it is necessary for a child to pray parents will pray in its stead (see Boas 1930: 201 and 208--9).


29 Cf. Boas 1930: 197, "Use of Beaver Castorium to Call Rain".

30 Cf. the use of "younger brother" in the Bear Mother myths, Chapter 3, 3 (c).

31 The following examples do not represent the complete prayer, which begins when the healing plant is encountered at its location, but a part. For the context see Boas 1930 at the appropriate pages.

32 Images Stone B.C.: Thirty Centuries of Northwest Coast Indian Sculpture (Sanichton, B.C.: Hancock House, 1975), see especially the sections "Fonts of Life".

33 Albert B. Lord, The Singer of Tales (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1960), p.30. Parry's definition of the formula which Lord uses is "a group of words which is regularly employed under the same metrical conditions to express a given essential idea".

34 The conception of the "attentive" sun and the "sleeping" sun is also present in ritual. Cf. the magnificent transformation sun-mask pictured by Boas in Secret Societies 1897: 630.

35 Cf. the curious double use of the word to come in the greeting formulas of the prayers that accompany the making of a halibut hook, Boas, 1966: 160. To the spruce roots the orant says, for instance: "Oh friend, come, for you, yourself, have called me to come and get you, friend".

36 Dispensation is used here in the sense of the system under which the thing in question is administered. The meaning of a release from an obligation is also not unimportant in our context.

37 Haekel has touched on the problem of the concept of a supreme being on the Northwest Coast in many of his articles. See for instance


39 For accounts of the land of the salmon see particularly the Salmon Boy myths of the coast. The myths of the northern people are more explicit about the ghost salmon that arrive from the earth. For accounts of the land of the dead see particularly the ghost stories in Kwakiutl Tales (Boas 1910) and Kwakiutl Tales New Series (Boas 1943). Cf also Chapter 3, 2 (a), and 4 (a) below.

40 Edward S. Curtis, The North American Indian, Vol. 10 (1915, rpt. New York: Johnson Reprint Co., 1970), p.37. For a discussion of the quartz crystal as a third eye and container of life and sacrality see Chapter 4, 2 (c). In Northwest Coast art shoulders and other life-centres of the body were marked with an eye, cf. Duff in Images of Stone B.C., 1975; for a striking example, see p.140.

41 Ed. James Bain (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1901). For my account of the ritual for the dead bear see Chapter 4, 3.

42 For a discussion of Lévi-Strauss on ritual see Chapter 4, 4.


45 In myth and ritual this impersonal conception is personified as the cannibalistic initiating spirit with whom the hero-initiate can engage. Werner Müller takes the Great Cannibal, patron of the winter ritual as the dominant figure in Kwakiutl thought, see Weltbild und Kult der Kwakiutl Indianer (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1955), while G.W. Locher asserts that the Sisiul, the mythical double-headed serpent has this position in Kwakiutl religion, see The Serpent in Kwakiutl Religion (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1932). Both are, of course, right; both the Cannibal and the Sisiul are personifications of the dual power, swallower and givers at once.

46 The congruence of outer and inner dimension, though quite clear from imagery and plot, is nowhere in Kwakiutl texts explained in non-symbolic language. For a description in rational terms we have to go to parallel conceptions, for instance, the Dharma Kaya of India as explained by Hindu and Buddhist commentators. The image of the world pole is etymologically present in the word: dharma is derived from the word-root dhri meaning to support, uphold. A commentary in the Tibetan Book of the Dead tells us that "Dharma is that which upholds and supports the universe as also the individual. Dharma is in mankind Right Conduct, the result of True Knowledge". Ed. W.Y. Evans-Wentz (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1960), p.11, n. 1.

47 The myth world as externalised subconscious.
It would seem that in this, too, the Dharma Kaya is a conception of the same kind: it is known both as "the Void" and "Place of the Densely Packed".

For Jung's theory, which is more relevant to our context than Freud's see for instance, Psychological Types, or: The Psychology of Individuation, trans. G. Baynes (London: Kegan Paul, 1923), p.608 ff.

The Kwakiutl hunter gave up the most obvious human attribute, that of speech. His withdrawal from social life no doubt did in fact increase his capabilities as a hunter.

The drives that come to the fore in the winter ritual seem to be predominantly the aggressive drives. The sexual drives seem not to have played the same predominant role, at least according to Boas' account. But cf. this account from Curtis (1915: 170): "Among the Wikenno the winter names of all males refer to the female organs, and vice versa, which indicates the admitted fact that the winter is a season of uncommon sexual promiscuity".

It may be objected that Kwakiutl ritual cannibalism is, after all, only a metaphor -- it exists only in the imagination. But the repressed infantile wish to kill and to eat also exists only in the imagination and still needs resolution, see Freud on this question in Totem and Taboo, trans. A.A. Brill (New York: Vintage Books, 1918), p.205. There is no reason to think that they cannot be resolved in play, that is on the plane of the imagination, if they are allowed open expression.

See Boas 1930: 71.
CHAPTER 3

HUNTING MYTHS OF THE AREA

1 Introduction

The texts I am discussing in this chapter under the name of hunting myths do not come from the Kwakiutl linguistic region alone. They are part of a complex of myths that is widespread in the North Pacific area. The distinguishing feature of this complex is that the myths relate closely to hunting ritual. This ritual is of two kinds: one kind is designed to help the hunter or fishermen to get his game, the other is designed to help him escape the consequences of the act of killing. The second is the more important one in the myths. The myths are by no means just a chart for the ritual or a rationalization of the ritual in narrative form, though they also incidentally fulfil both these functions. They are speculative thought that concerns itself with the validity of the ritual in the face of the problematic relations that exist between men and animals, hunter and hunted. The central concern of the myths is therefore the same as that of the prayers to animals and plants used for food. The myths do not in fact add substantially to the thought of the prayers; rather they provide consolidation of the findings based on the prayers. They are concerned with the questions we have discussed in the sections on dispensations and justifications. The double nature of the animals, or, conversely, the double intention of men is their main subject. But instead of being condensed into a few phrases and verbal paradoxes as it is in the prayers this subject is unfolded here in a thorough and compelling way through the narrative.
If the myths treat the same questions as the prayers it may be asked why I devote a separate chapter to them. Is it only to confirm the findings of the prayers by comparison with a different medium? Partly indeed this is the purpose. The prayer texts are so slight and the statements contained in them, though often direct, so condensed and abbreviated that it may be thought that they cannot support the weight of the interpretation I put on them. In the myths everything is treated thoroughly and the statements of the prayers are repeated, though here entirely in the symbolic language of myth imagery. But the myths, taken mostly from neighbours of the Kwakiutl, also put the thought of the prayers into the wider framework of the thought of a culture area. The comparison shows us what is particularly Kwakiutl and what belongs to the thought of the area at large. The resolution of the dilemma concerning men’s relation with the animals within the framework of the *tsetsega*, for instance, seems to be particularly Kwakiutl. But my examination of the myths shows that the dilemma itself, the conflict of desire, the feelings of guilt and fear of retribution arising from killing and eating, and the attempts at resolution on the one hand through ritual observances and on the other through large imaginary syntheses, bridging the nature/culture dichotomy, belong to a philosophical style far more widespread. The scope of my investigation is too limited to allow me to determine how widespread this style is. If it were to be determined, a more generally based examination of the hunting myths which express this style through their form as well as their content would be a reasonable point of departure.

There are, however, good reasons for devoting a separate chapter to hunting myths apart from what the comparison with the prayers affords. I am examining in this chapter myths from two well-known myth complexes, Salmon Boy and Bear Mother. Both kinds describe the rituals used to
"propitiate" animals killed for food. Their subject matter is therefore related not just to prayers but more closely still to the first salmon and bear rituals which form the subject of the next and last chapter. The reason why it is worthwhile devoting a whole chapter to the myths does not, however, lie mainly in the subject matter but in the form in which this subject matter is conveyed. The myths are the only complex, highly organised texts we have that bear on the relation between men and animals. In this they have two advantages over the other, less formal texts at our disposal.

(1) Because the myths are comparatively remote from immediate experience and the subject is developed at leisure, they are the only speculative accounts of the problem we have. Because they are speculative, the problem has become a more abstract and philosophical one than it is in the form it takes in prayers and rituals. I have already mentioned in my conclusion to the last chapter that in the myths it takes on the form of an exploration of the question of justice. The myths are interested in what the balance of human behaviour within nature would be if such a balance could be drawn. Such a speculative exploration of the causes, results and limitations of action provides evidence of a new kind concerning the attitude of hunting peoples to the nature/culture dichotomy. The speculative thought of the myths is presented in a highly organised form that allows us to speak here of a system of thought.

(2) The systematic aspects of the speculation are, simultaneously, the organizational aspects of the narrative. This allows us to approach the content or message here through an analysis of form. A demonstration of a cultural problem through the form of a given text has two advantages: first it excludes interpretations that are due to the analyst's bias, and secondly interpretation is arrived at by a method that can be demonstrated.
repeated and falsified. The highly complex and formal organization of
the myth texts allows me to lay my stress on method in this chapter, and
to show that certain important aspects of content can only be ascertained
through an analysis of form.

The most important discovery made in this chapter is that of the
isomorphism of the developed Salmon Boy and Bear Mother stories. The
plots of the two kinds of story differ widely. Only a structural analy­
sis on the basis of relations between narrative units can reveal this
isomorphism. In each kind of story a reversal of what has been establis­
hed takes place. Formally the second part stands in a chiastic relation­ship to the first. If it has been established in the first part that
animals will give themselves to men the second part establishes that men
will perish in the same way as the animals or through the agency of the
animals. In terms of action the first and second part cancel one
another out, and a state of stasis results that would make a continuance
of active life (based on hunting) impossible. In each case this stasis,
resulting from the equally balanced claims of animals and men, is defeated
by the appearance of a "master of the animals" figure. This superhuman
figure, who is not introduced as a deus ex machina but is made, one might
say under our eyes, in the crucible of the plot-action of first and second
part combined, emerges at the end of the tale to demonstrate that not
stasis but movement through balanced reciprocal relations is the aim of
the narrative. The mediator figure is always both human and animal in a
synthesis exceeding both. It can therefore represent justice for both.
It unites the claims of culture and nature; it acts as the protector of
both the game and the hunter.

The nature/culture dilemma is, then, embedded in the form of the myth
and can be elucidated through a study of the form. The resolution of the
dilemma through the "master of animals" is also part of the myth form. Yet solution through this mediator figure is purely conceptual—as I have said the figure is the "logical outcome" the problem built up in parts 1 and 2—and perhaps for that reason does not seem to constitute a "strong" solution. A second kind of solution is offered in some of the myths in the figure of the good hunter. The good hunter effects a nature-culture mediation by modification of his human nature through ritual observances. He becomes a figure midway between scapegoat and redeemer for his social group, yet remains within the scope of what every human being can attain. In this the good hunter is a type figure for the initiate. The initiate could also be called the good hunter's anti-type in so far as he modifies his human nature through unrepression (ecstatic modification) while the good hunter modifies his human nature through greater repression (ascetic modification). In any case, the connection between the thought of the myth and that of the testesqa lies here: in each case the nature/culture dichotomy is attenuated by an individual's sacrifice of his "humanness" for the sake of the group. Humanness has to be taken here in the sense of the normal or conventionally acceptable personality. Its modification can lead either to greater closeness with animals or to the ideal of the fully human (the "perfect man") we find in initiation. This conclusion is borne out by my examination of the connection between the first salmon ritual and the initiation ritual in the next chapter, and by that of the transitional myths which link hunting and initiation, in the Epilogue.

1(a) Analytical Situation and Method

My study of Kwakiutl prayers and first fruit rituals defined the problem of my thesis. Both kinds of text contain direct references, in universally understandable rational language to the unease felt over the
killing and eating of animals, and both contain linguistic elements and structural indications that point to a resolution of the dilemma concerning the animals in the winter ritual. The problem was to find a body of work that would act as control for my findings and make it possible to view them in a more comprehensible perspective. In choosing Salmon Boy and Bear Mother stories I knew I was choosing myths that contain ritual prescriptions for the treatment of animals. I also knew that the "language" of myth is formal and symbolic and that I would find some of the symbolic aspects of the prayers elaborated in these texts. By and large I could reasonably hope that Salmon Boy and Bear Mother stories would throw light on the cultural conception of animals and of the relation between men and animals. At the beginning of my study of the myths I was unaware of the extent to which this expectation was justified, and of how fortunate my decision was to analyse Salmon Boy and Bear Mother myths side by side. My selection of the actual versions was arbitrary except in so far as it was guided by the wish to include the Kwakiutl versions and those culturally and linguistically most closely related to them.

There is to my knowledge no other study so far in existence that has pointed out the isomorphism between Salmon Boy and Bear Mother stories. Nor have the mediator figures at the end of these stories been compared or their significance been recognised.

This analytical situation also dictates the method. An analysis of the myths on the level of abstraction of, say, Propp (1968) or Dundes (1964) would not be in place. Naturally the parts of the myths I am examining fit into the larger, more general pattern of American Indian mythology: there is probably not a single episode that cannot occur with different actors and in a different setting. But as Boas remarks in another context (diffusion): "it is necessary to apply this method judi-
ciously, and the logical connection of what I have called "elements" must be taken into account. It is that logical connection that I am concerned with. We have to do here with two methodologically different aims. One method is suitable to study the armature of the mythmakers in the widest sense. It necessarily deals with large samples, wide distribution and is metalinguistic. The other method is suitable for the study of message. It confines itself to groups of tales. It pays attention not only to the functions but to the dramatic personae, because much of the message is contained in them—in their names, in their cultural evaluation—and their interrelations. The myths I have chosen for instance are about the salmon and bear and their relation to the people who hunt them. The only animals that can be substituted without changing the message-structure are other game animals. But even here, though the tales about salmon and bear are isomorphic on one level, there are subtle structural differences between them according to the roles the two animals play in real life and in the conceptual system. Substitution among the dramatis personae has therefore structural reverberations. In both kinds of tale a human hero is kidnapped by the animals. But labels like "interdiction-violation" and "abduction by villain", though they apply, are useless: the important thing here is that it is the salmon or the bear that abduct, because the myth explores the relation to the salmon and the bear.

My analytic system for the chapter is simple. I examine first the salmon stories for armature and message, then the bear stories for armature and message. The two terms are taken from Lévi-Strauss' vocabulary, and if the meaning he gives them is expanded, I explain how. I use four separate methods of approach in the course of the chapter. The stories are examined (1) for the underlying beliefs which, systematised, make up the armature (salmon stories); (2) for the interrelation of episodes
which convey message (salmon and bear stories); (3) for division into narrative units which expresses the armature in the abstract and shows its link to message (bear and salmon stories); (4) for puns and word play which convey message with the help of a moral grid (bear stories). To make an analysis of this kind, two major synchronic structurings have to be taken into account: the narrative structure which involves the arrangement of the units of action, and the character structure which involves the deployment of actors. Ideally they should be studied separately, and fully. For reasons of space I cannot give full treatment here to either of them. I shall have to limit myself mainly to an analysis of the narrative structure, and even here concentrate on the main episodes. The character structure can only be touched on in passing. I have used the "common sense" nomenclature of analysis which has, in one form or another, long been current in the study of American Indian mythology. I use episode for a unit that expresses a single coherent idea; incident for its constituent parts; main episode for the climactic peak of a narrative sequence (Du Bois' "core"), minor episode for the supporting episodes of such a sequence; extended main episode for the stable cluster of main episode flanked by two minor episodes that are reversals of one another. I use Propp's term move for the narrative sequence that can, theoretically, stand alone as one story; and as my complex myths are made up of two consecutive moves I also use part 1 and part 2 for these sequences. My terminology is unsatisfactory but adequate for the purpose of the analysis, in view of the fact that the sample is small and the myths closely related in content. And, I repeat, the inquiry I am conducting should not be confused with a general morphological study.
1(b) Theoretical Position

In *From Honey to Ashes*, Lévi-Strauss discusses the question of the completeness of any particular myth version. His discussion bears on the question of how to decide what the message of a myth is, and how to decide whether that message is satisfactorily conveyed in any particular myth. These are obviously important questions for my inquiry, and I shall begin a consideration of them with a fairly full account of what he has to say.

The occasion for his general remarks is a particular inconsistency that has struck him about his explanations. He says on p.127:

A short while back I recalled a rule of structural analysis which is that a myth should always be accepted as it is. But on the very same page I may have infringed this rule by proposing to fill in what I said was a gap in the Apanaye version with the help of the more precise account provided by the Kraho version. To be consistent ought I not to have accepted the Apanaye version "as it was"...

He then goes on to solve the crux by proposing that there are two possibilities. (1) Myths belonging to different communities may transmit the same message without being all equally detailed or equally clear in expression. As in all the instances the general sense of the message is the same, each one containing more or less information, it is legitimate to complete the less satisfactory ones with the help of the more explicit. (2) An entirely different case is presented by myths with intrinsically different messages. In this case the quantity and quality of the information is of less consequence than the content, and each message has to be accepted "as it is". Here we cannot make good the insufficiency by combining separate messages into one single message. If we did, the resulting message would have no meaning apart from that which the person receiving it might care to attribute to it.

This of course makes it only the more urgent that we should be told how to distinguish between the two. But Lévi-Strauss does not give a
very satisfactory theoretical answer. "The problem is a difficult one, and there is no hiding the fact that in the present state of both theory and method it is often necessary to settle the question empirically". He proceeds to do just this for his own case by recourse to history. But does the proof that myths have the same message, and can be completed with the help of one another, really lie in the argument that the people who tell these myths form a linguistic and ethnographic family, and the myths "only a few centuries ago at the most were indistinguishable"? (p.128). Whatever the merit of his assertion, it is a meagre theoretical offering considering the importance of the question. I shall try to add something to it in this chapter.

Looking at the question from another empirical vantage point, the conditions of oral composition, it appears that message is a very changeable quantity. (1) It is affected by culture change, which in its turn may affect different branches of ethnographic families differently. (2) The sex of the narrator affects it even if the structure-changes in this case are very subtle. The McClellan collection of Bear Mother stories, which we shall examine later, is a case in point. Myths convey messages at different levels, and Bear Mother has a message on the level of hunting (men's relation to animals) and on the social level (intrafamily relations). On the whole it is the men who tell the hunting story (ascertainable by structural comparison with other hunting myths) while the women, who have an important position in their matrilineal society but know the problems of hunting only at one remove stress the social message. (3) Finally the message is modified on the communication level by what the sender knows the receiver can take in. Most of the texts we have are myths as told to an anthropologist. The narrator's estimate of an anthropologist's capabilities may lead to shorter versions and simpler
messages than the full myth in its cultural context warrants.\(^9\)

This brings me to the important question of what is a complete myth. The narrator is always concerned to finish his story and transmit a message. But a complicated message is tied to a complex story and needs time to unfold. If there is no time, or the audience is not mature or informed enough to be relied on for background knowledge, the narrator can refashion his story so that it is shorter yet complete, and has a different message.\(^10\) The narrative units (episodes) are so constituted that they can be combined in different ways, and the narrator has such a fund of knowledge of the possible forms that he can change a story in the telling. A skilful narrator can of course also condense the story by leaving out minor episodes and stripping all episodes he uses of as many incidents as sense permits. The story is then still complex and carries the complicated message. Many of McClellan's informants have done just that. In my designation of stories as long and short versions such a story would qualify as a long version though it takes little time to tell.

If these are the conditions of oral composition then it is clear that each myth has to be taken "as it is". However, under normal conditions of myth-telling inside the culture the myth is not the short and compact story the anthropologist usually hears. It is a link in a chain of related stories or part of one long story. Serious myth-telling goes on for days and nights, sometimes for weeks.\(^11\) When the short version becomes part of this long version or cycle the local and limited message it has in isolation is pushed into the background in favour of the more important message that unfolds out of its relation to the whole. In the analysis of short myths there is therefore reason to look for a message which may be incomplete and obscure in the myth as it is but can be elucidated by a comparison with the long version or cycle. It would be
present over and above the obvious and complete message. The anthropologist should look then for two messages: one of the myth as it is, another of the myth in its relation to a greater whole.

This raises the question of where we find the message and how we extrapolate it. Myths are made up of episodes. From the point of view of oral composition an episode is that which the narrator tells in "one breath", that before and after which he makes a tiny pause. Episode is to the myth what conventional phrase is to the prayer: a well-worn formula that acquires unique significance because of the structural position and relation to other episodes. On the idea expressed in the episode the direction of the narrative depends (sequence of units). But only some episodes are essential to the tale, and it is their relation to one another that dictates the structure of the whole (hierarchy and interrelation of units). A one-move tale has the following hierarchy: Opening (= disjunctual marking point); events that lead up to crisis (= minor episodes); crisis (= main episode); events that result from crisis (= minor episodes); closing (= conjunctional marking point). The message lies in the relation of minor to main episodes and of opening to closing point.

If a tale contains a second move, it becomes a complex tale. But in fact the second move is formally speaking in itself a new and separate tale. Its structure is like that of the simple one-move tale above. But the main episodes of both and to a lesser extent the minor ones are structurally connected. The myth maker has a number of connecting devices at his disposal (which we shall discuss in connection with the actual tales) of which chiasmus is the most striking (abc-cba). The message of the complex tale lies in the relation of the first structure to the second.

The ways of relating episodes across the tale divisions are not only
formal (aesthetic) but also conceptual and moral. They belong to what Armstrong has called the condition of the tale. It is only by considering the three aspects simultaneously (the formal, conceptual and ethical) that we arrive at an understanding of the message. The three aspects are also present in the simple tale, but there is a considerable deepening of them in the complex tale. This more than anything else convinces me that the complicated message of the long versions is the basic tale from which the shorter versions derive.

I am aware that I am in disagreement on this point with eminent anthropologists. Radin, for instance, who has pondered the question deeply believes that cycles are a late literary form, a sort of epic made up of originally separate short myths (1956: 121 ff). Radin does not explore how the questions which the cycles raise and treat, and which cannot be raised and treated in a less elaborate form were dealt with before the cycles were composed. Yet they are questions which are of vital interest to the people who tell the myths. I find, however, some confirmation of my view in Propp’s Morphology of the Folk Tale. Propp asserts there that a particular type of two-move tale is "the basic type of tale". He cannot prove it nor does he attempt to, he can only assert his conviction that "only a combination of the two moves produces an entirely complete tale", and that "to this one tale all the tales of one class [Russian fairy tales] are traced" (1968: 103--4).

What Propp claims there for the whole class of fairy tales I claim here only for the hunting myth. But I consider the structure and message of the hunting myth to be of fundamental importance for the whole of mythology.

One more phenomenon defines the relation between short and long versions, that of structural irregularity. I said that the structure
was dictated by the relation of essential episodes to one another and that the message depended on that relation. (For reasons of space I cannot here define the nature of inessential episodes or deal adequately with their structural significance.) However, in one myth some episodes may be essential to the structure of the myth as it is and others to the structure of the longer version. When the short version becomes part of the long version the "unnecessary" or "askew" bits find their proper place. Alternately, essential and inessential episodes may clash and semantically overload the myth so that two complete but logically contradictory messages result. These structural imbalances are important and must be paid careful attention to because they are always signs of something more wanting to be said, something which inside the limitations of the myth as it is cannot be said. The narrator, while he is telling his story with the one message is reaching out for another with another message. Nor are the two unconnected. The narrator, different from the analyst in that he can survey the whole field, puts in with the askew bit the possibility of a wider view. For the analyst the askew bit indicates a point where a new development of thought begins.

2 Killing and Eating: The Salmon Boy Stories

We shall be comparing myths that belong to several Northwest coast groups: Kwakiutl, Nootka, Tsimshian, Haida and Inland Tlingit. Though the people who tell them belong to one culture area (except the Inland Tlingit who straddle two areas, Northwest coast and Subarctic), they have different patterns of social organisation. The stories have a general message that concerns the relation of men to animals and that is the same for these people who all live under the same ecological conditions. But they also have a social message that is necessarily different in signifi-
cant details. I shall concentrate my analysis on the "hunting myth", that is on the expression of problems that the stories of these hunting, fishing and gathering peoples had in common. The problems are those that are also articulated in the Kwaiutl prayers to animals and plants killed for food. They arise in the same ecological and general cultural situation in an area where stories and ideas travelled to and fro.

We shall begin by discussing the Salmon Boy myths and go on to the Bear Mother. I shall use the following abbreviations. SB for Salmon Boy, BM for the girl who married the bear, BBSB, NSB, TSSB, HSB for the SB myths from respectively the Bella Bella, Nootka, Tsimshian and Haida.

The distribution of the SB myth has been charted by Erna Gunther in her "A Further Analysis of the First Salmon Ceremony". The myth is well distributed on the Northwest coast but the centre seems to lie in the Coast Salish area. For the Kwakiutl only one version has been collected, the Bella Bellä one I am using. It forms a group with a version from the Nootka. The Nootka are both linguistically and culturally closely related to the Southern Kwakiutl. I have therefore taken the two versions as a basis for my analysis and give abstracts for both. The Tsimshian and Haida versions will have to be treated more briefly.

In the course of a discussion of salmon myths Gunther gives a short synopsis of the plot of SB myths which runs as follows:

The myth of Salmon Boy has a more direct connection with the ceremony in that it described the ritual for the first salmon. The plot varies but little. A boy is taken to the salmon country where he is told to club a child when he wants food, eat and throw the bones into the water. The child revives immediately. The boy returns to his father's village in the salmon run and is caught by his father. He teaches his people how to treat the salmon.

Laconically summed up like this the plot is startling. We ask ourselves why, if the boy was in salmon country did he club a child in order
to feed? And when he returns in the salmon run is he a salmon? If so, does his father club and eat him? And if so how can he teach his people how to treat the salmon? These questions are justified, each one of them touching one of the "mysteries" of the myth. Unconnected as the episodes of the plot synopsis seem, Gunther has put her finger on the main paradigm: departure, return; killing and eating; teaching. These themes appear not once but several times in one myth; they are treated on several isotopies and it is through these redundancies that the message becomes apparent. In this sense one can say that the greater the redundancy in one particular myth the more complete the message.

I have divided my abstracts of the myths into paragraphs to facilitate comparison of episodes.

A The Bella Bella Salmon Boy myth is found in *Tsimshian Mythology* (Boas 1916: 886 ff).

A chief and his three sons are invited to a feast. The boys refuse to go, but when the father comes back with some food the eldest jumps up from the bed where he has been lying and eats it. Annoyed, his father says: "What are you doing with my food? If you are a good boy you may marry the daughter of Maesila, the Salmon Chief."

The boy is mortified by the reproach and stays in bed for three days. Then he goes out bird-shooting by the beach. After he has shot three birds his arrow hits a dry salmon bone, and hits it again and again. He wishes the bone might be a fresh salmon and take him to the Salmon Chief's country. The bone replies to his thoughts, telling him to gather up all the remaining bones and throw them into the sea. The bones become a salmon who takes him on his back, swimming away with him.

They travel for a long time before reaching Salmon country. On their way they come to a hole through which the salmon must pass. An eagle sits by the hole, watching it. When the eagle looks away for a moment, the salmon rushes through the hole.

As soon as they have passed through the hole the boy sees that the salmon are like people. They travel on in their canoe past many villages and come to the town of the Salmon Chief. Many children are playing outside the town, and there are many birds and flowers. The salmon shows the boy a lake where the Chief's daughter goes to bathe.
The boy hides by the lake, and when two pretty girls come to bathe he jumps out and carries one of them away. She smells very sweet. She marries him and is soon pregnant. Her father the chief is much annoyed and calls the people together to find out who the child's father is. One by one the animals come forward and claim a paternity denied by the girl. The boy comes in unseen, but the people can smell him. He makes his claim and the girl admits that he is the father of her child. The Salmon Chief allows the boy to sit on a mat with his daughter. With this they are officially married. Some time later the girl has twin-children, who grow up very fast.

The young husband is hungry for salmon. The chief notices his depression and when he is told the reason tells him to go to the playground of the children by the river and throw a child into the water. The young man does as he is told and the child turns into a salmon, which he takes home, cooks and eats. His salmon-wife carefully spreads a mat and tells him to put the bones on it and not to lose a single one. Then he is to take the bones to the river and throw them in. When he does, the bones turn immediately into the boy he has thrown into the river before.

After some time the young man gets so homesick that he will not get up in the morning any more. When the chief hears of it he prepares a canoe to take him home, filled with boxes of food. The young man with his wife and children leaves in the canoe. On their return journey they do not pass through the hole watched over by the eagle.

The young man thinks he has been away four days but it has been four years. When his people finally recognise him again, he enters his house with his wife and children, and the people dance in his honour. He sends them to bring in the load from his canoe. But nobody can lift the boxes. His shaman wife has to carry them in. She tells her father-in-law to build a large house and call all the people together. No-one believes that the boxes contain enough food for a big potlatch but they turn out to be inexhaustible. One contains salmon, the other berries, the other meat and tallow.

The Nootka Salmon Boy myth is found in Tsimshian Mythology

(Boas 1916: 919 ff).

A Nootka head chief and his friend are gambling partners. The friend finds himself losing and decides to gain supernatural power to give him luck. Wives could help their husbands in such a quest if they lay still during the night while their husbands were out in the forest. The husband has asked his wife for her help; but every night while he is out purifying himself the chief comes and sleeps with her. Warned by an old man the husband surprises the pair and tears out his rival's right eye.

The head chief, who had been a handsome man is deeply mortified
and hides in his house. Finally he seeks the advice of a wise man, who decides he can get his eye back only if he finds a wife with supernatural power. He makes a garment of swan-skin for his chief that will enable him to fly around the world.

Our hero flies up and down the coast of Vancouver Island and Cape Flattery, looking among the tribes for a woman to please him. Not finding anyone pretty enough he turns to the open sea, and after a long flight comes to strange countries. Flying by night, he hears the children playing in the villages and the people singing and dancing and making merry. No-one ever sleeps, but by day the people seem to go blind. These are the villages of the fish-people.

Our hero has a trick of attracting the people by drifting very near their beaches, and when they come out to catch him looking around for a woman he likes. One early morning, drifting in a bay in front of the village of the salmon people, he sees a very pretty woman. He decides to let her father, Chief Fast Swimmer, catch him. Immediately the Salmon Princess asks her father for the pretty white swan as a pet. Her father says "yes, because I love you", but asks to be left alone for a moment with the strange bird. As soon as they are alone together our hero lifts off his swan mask and says: "Oh Chief Fast Swimmer, I am a man, and have come to marry your princess". The chief who has been expecting just this laughs with pleasure. Before calling in his daughter and his people for the marriage ceremony, he arranges for one of his wise men to put back our hero's missing eye and give him a general beauty treatment.

The human chief has brought eagle down from his world, which he gives to his father-in-law to distribute at the marriage potlatch. (The salmon people value eagle down highly and come to the rivers of the earth to get it). The valuable gift enhances our hero in the people's eyes; they say "Here is a chief! See, he has much valuable property!" and treat him with friendliness. When he is hungry they send a little boy into the water. He turns into a salmon, and they catch him, cut him open and roast him. When our hero has finished eating they pick up all the bones and skin and put them back into the water. Immediately this is done the boy comes back to life.

Our hero spends a happy time with the salmon people. His wife bears him two children. Yet at the thought of his parents he becomes melancholy. When the Salmon Chief hears of this he decides that they will all accompany his son-in-law home. The salmon are pleased because they have heard much of the other part of the world, and are curious to see it. Before they start out they instruct our hero in what they want men to do for them. Salmon like eagle down and large mussel shells; they do not want men to use blunt-pointed spears on them, for it hurts; also the sticks of the salmon traps should be shaved well, with a good sharp point on them. When men cook and eat them they are to pick up all the bones and skin and throw them into the sea "because then"
the salmon end their instruction "we can go home again. If they don't do that we cannot come to life again".

The Salmon Chief then gives his son-in-law his best salmon-skin blanket called "ten-times-jumper-blanket". When he puts it on to go into the water he is a salmon, when he comes out of the water he is a man again.

Meanwhile scouts have been sent to find out how our hero's parents are. They report that they live in a tiny house by the beach, have burnt off their hair in mourning and are treated with derision. It is clearly high time for our hero to come back. When the salmon reach a point near his village, he is told to go and instruct his father and all his people to move to a certain river and make a salmon trap there. Four salmon will be caught, and they are to club them, cut them, roast them and eat them. Every little piece of bone and skin is to be picked up and thrown into the water.

In his ten-times-jumper-blanket our hero swims to the beach where his father lives and, turning into a man, visits the old man and instructs him according to the word of the salmon. He then swims back to the waiting salmon. The salmon people divide from this point on, different groups turning into different streams. Our hero arrives with his family of wife and two children at the river he has named to his father on the following morning.

That morning all the people go with his father to the stream, for the old man has told them they will find their lost head chief there. The old man builds a salmon weir, which is entered by four salmon. He catches them, clubs them and takes them to his wife to cut them and cook them. When the old woman has prepared them they call all their friends to come and eat with them. After the meal the old man picks up every piece of skin and bone (for he has faith in what his son has told him) and calls the people to accompany him to the river. They all see him throw the bones into the water, and all see their former head chief with his wife and two children come out of the water.

The people are happy to have their chief back but they are not sure whether he is really flesh and blood. They therefore make a feast to test him. They think if it were really their lost head chief (of whom they think as dead) he would not eat. He eats up, however, whatever is offered to him. Then he tells them what the salmon have asked him to hand on to his people: what the salmon would like people to do for them, and that the women, cutting salmon should always keep their legs wide open, and only use a large mussel-shell for cutting; and that the men should not use blunt-pointed spear-heads, for it hurts the salmon more than sharp ones. The story ends: this is how the Indians know that salmon are men as we are.

The two stories are alike in making a strong connection between eating and marriage. Greedy eating is generally linked with creativity and therefore also sexual potency and fertility on the Northwest coast, but
the other SB stories we shall look at do not make the connection. Here the father's shocked remonstrances in BBSB are immediately and for us unaccountably followed by his suggestion that his greedy son marry the daughter of the Salmon Chief. In fact the preoccupation with eating and marriage seems to take inverted and complementary forms in the two myths. BBSB starts with a bout of irregular eating and ends with a regular marriage display (the potlatch given by the hero to his people with his wife's gifts). NSB starts with a bout of irregular marriage and ends with an eating display (the hero eats the food offered to him at his people's feast voraciously to prove he is not a ghost). BBSB begins with a feast from which the hero is absent but which is nevertheless the occasion for an act of gluttony that severs him from his society. NSB ends with a feast at which the hero is present and at which an act of gluttony incorporates him into his society. In each story the hero marries a salmon wife, that is a representative of the animals yielding the most important supply of food. The supernatural wife brings wealth to him and his people. This connection of a supernatural marriage with food is an important facet of the hunting story but we shall not meet it again until we discuss the BM stories where it turns up again in a different key.

Of the two versions BBSB is the shorter and simpler. Apart from one structural oddity, to which I shall come, it has in fact the structure of the most usual Kwakiutl myth, the treasure-gaining story. This is a weak version of the initiation myth and tells of the departure of a hero, his entry into a non-human supernatural world, his gaining of a treasure, departure, and return to the human world where he distributes his treasure to his people. Only in the most remote and symbolic way does the BBSB story convey the fact that the treasure is the coming of the salmon, in the
form of its regular and reliable coming, the salmon runs. One of the inexhaustible boxes is filled with salmon. But on this count the story is as interested in the coming of the berries and the game (whose most important dietary part was the fat) as in the salmon.

The narrative structure of BBSB consists then, pared down to its essentials, in three episodes:

Departure to salmon country
Marriage to salmon wife
Return to human world and distribution of treasure

In this structure departure and return form the frame and marriage the main episode because it is through the marriage that the treasure is gained. The story is hero-concentrated to a great degree; the message is that a poor hero who has disgraced himself as a child can return as a rich man and through potlatching achieve a social position as chief and leader of his people. What I have called "the communal strand" in my analysis of the initiation myth is very weakly developed though it is present (cf. Chapter 1, 2(e)).

Every specific episode of the story furthers this simple scheme except one. Following directly on the episode of the marriage we find an episode which is not connected with the narrative current the scheme outlines. This is the episode in which SB kills the salmon child, eats it and regenerates it through its bones. Strictly speaking there are two episodes: the father-in-law's instructions and the deed itself. We know from Gunther's synopsis that they belong to the paradigm of the SB myth; the killing and eating is in fact the main episode of the myth. The event takes place in the middle of the story and it, instead of the marriage, could be the centre, the peripeteia of the drama. But it does not link up closely with the sequence of events of the story, while the
marriage is well integrated especially with the beginning and end. In BBSB we have a good example of a story with two messages. The treasure-gaining myth and its message is complete, but side by side with its main episode, in a structurally important position stands an episode that would make it into a hunting myth. The message of that myth is obscure and incomplete. We can account for this structural irregularity in three ways: BBSB was told on the fringe of the diffusional circle of SB and is therefore a poor version; that the Kwakiutl are culturally biased toward treasure-gaining myths rather than hunting myths; that when BBSB was collected the initiation myth had become so fashionable that it tended to swallow up and transform the old hunting myths. Each of these arguments has something to be said for it but none of them is decisive. We shall later see that each narrator has the choice of several forms and the skill to recompose a complex story as a simple one. The complete hunting myth is complex, but even in an area where it is well-known in its complex form it may be told in a simple form that resembles structurally and in message the treasure-gaining myth.

2(a) The Armature

Though BBSB is a poor version of the SB myth and of the hunting myth in general it provides an excellent example for the mythical armature of the group. Armature is the ready-to-hand equipment myth makers use to project a particular content. Lévi-Strauss, to whom we owe the use of the word as an analytical term, defines it as "a combination of properties that remain invariant in two or several myths" (1970: 199). Greimas has refined on this definition. Armature (or "framework") refers "to the structural state of the myth as narration. This status appears to be double: it might be said (1) that the totality of structural properties
common to all mythological tales constitutes a narrative model, and (2) that this model must account for the myth as a discursive transphrastic unity where a specific content is structured in a specific way" (1971: 82). In the SB myths the specific content is that it is the salmon that are visited, and that this visit results in the coming of salmon to men, that is the salmon runs. Hunting myths are the nearest metagroup of SB myths: they tell of a visit to the land of the animals and its consequences. The largest group is the story of the visit to another world of which the visit to the world of the dead is perhaps the prototype. Propp has touched on this last possibility in his *Morphology of the Folk-tale* (1968: 106--7).

Given the geographical, ecological and cultural conditions on the Northwest coast, *Salmon Boy* provides a particularly coherent and comprehensive example of this armature because of the periodic nature of the salmon runs. For an important characteristic of the armature is repetition of the visit and regular alternation of the visitants. In other words the myth is a type happening whose anti-type is found in everyday life. It provides an etiological angle (which is lost in the treasure-gaining stories and the European fairy tales that concentrate on the biography of a hero): that the two worlds were once separated, and stagnated without contact and life-giving interaction. The "visit to the other world" is the event which started the alternations on which human life depends. The hunting myths make this quite clear: the original visit, that moved the animals to come, has to be repeated by the hunter who goes out alone into the wilderness. Without his visit the animals will not come. In the armature of the SB myths an archaic foundation of this alternation is uncovered: as salmon leave their home periodically to visit men and bring them life, so men have to leave their homes at
their appointed time and travel to the land of the dead.

The armature of the SB myth is made up of a threefold contrast: that between land and sea, between men and salmon, and between life and death. The first is the simplest and is obvious in a Northwest coast context; the second depends on the first and brings up the question of the similarities and dissimilarities between salmon and men; the third is ambiguous, and, as it applies to both land and sea dwellers, men and salmon, constitutes the binding term between the other two. A further contrast, that between birds on the one hand and salmon and men on the other is important for the myths but is not a part of the armature; it belongs rather to the code. ¹⁸

The force of these contrasts lies in the geographical and ecological situation of the people who tell the SB stories. The Northwest coast is a sunken coast cut by innumerable fjords and studded with islands. It falls, in many places steeply, from the coast range to the Pacific. The coast range is studded with lakes and drains into the Pacific in innumerable creeks and rivers. This terrain of sea and land, salt water and fresh water is one of the great spawning grounds of the world. The salmon, coming from the deep sea ascend the mountains where they spawn in the upland lakes and rivers. Each run of salmon is followed into the fjords by a cavalcade of sea mammals, which prey on them. Hunting as well as fishing is easy under these conditions and brings great wealth. It is as if the whole animal kingdom were in movement led by the salmon. In this view the salmon appears as a "master of the animals", and it is as this he is in fact depicted in the scene when the Salmon Chief calls all the animals for the paternity test.

This great movement of the salmon and of wealth is an "upstream" movement. The salmon travels West to East, and West to East is there-
fore the direction of food, of wealth and of life. The three inexhaustible boxes in the story, containing salmon, berries and game travel West to East. The opposite direction, East to West, "downstream", is therefore predictably the direction taken by the dead. The shaman travels "downstream" when he wants to recapture the soul of someone sick. Yet this defining of directions from the point of view of men alone is too simple. If men and salmon form a contrasting pair then the myth does not only ask what these directions mean for men but what they mean for the salmon. And for the salmon West to East is the direction of death, while, if their bones are ritually treated by men who eat them and not left to dry on land, East to West is their journey to life.

Men and salmon therefore make their journeys under opposite signs. But this is not enough. Salmon, who die when they go from the sea to the land are dependent on the piety of men for their regeneration. If this piety is performed the land becomes ultimately a place of transformation for them and therefore a place of potential new life. Men travelling to the land of the dead also reach a place of transformation, often called "Place of Wealth" from which they return in a new incarnation. The dead then find life-in-death at the end of their journey as do the salmon. Land and sea both offer points of transformation, and men and salmon travel to and fro between these points, their paths crossing, their journeys always under opposite signs.

For the armature of the myth this provides us with three terms, two simple and one complex: (1) man (on land), (2) salmon (in sea), (3) travel or mutual visits—in abstract terms alternation between them. The complex term unites the two simple terms into a system of ordered relationships. We know that the alternation stands for the alternation of life and death. In the salmon myths (and all the hunting myths) this system
of ordered relationships is a moral one and stands under the sign of justice. The salmon, coming to men bring food, that is life to them. But men who nourish their life with such food are mortal and doomed to die. In the mythical view, concerned with origins and eschatology the salmon therefore also bring them death. Conversely, men kill and eat salmon. Salmon like all animals are immortal but only by being killed and eaten can they be regenerated from their bones. Men therefore also bring life to the salmon.

In the complete hunting myth this system of justice is spelled out as the message on the level of the action units. In BBSB it is implicit in the armature which is projected through the imagery. The hero travels West on the back of the salmon who is simultaneously the canoe (Seelen-schiff) for the hero and the salmon ghost ready to be renewed. They come to a hole watched by an eagle, one of the "mouth of death" images so frequent in Kwakiutl mythology. Immediately on passing through this hole the hero sees that "salmon are men" while simultaneously he becomes invisible. The salmon village, characterised by a river, swarming children, birds and flowers is the Kwakiutl mythological image of the land of the dead. It is the universal mythical image of the place of transformation, where death and generation are one. It is in this place, at this river, that we must visualise SB killing a child, eating it and throwing its bones into the water to revive it. His act is the concrete expression of the place as life-in-death. At the same time his act is a type act: men will perform it in the human world, and, because Salmon Boy, who travelled into death and came back alive performed it at the "centre of the world" it can be efficaciously repeated in the human world. In the myth the justice of the system is reversed: SB dies first and then eats and lives. In the real world men eat and live first and then die.
It is clear how the scheme of the armature can be used for two distinct kinds of myth, according to whether the stress is on the man’s journey to the other world to gain renewal for men (land+sea) or the salmon’s journey to the earth to gain renewal for themselves (sea+land). The former makes a treasure-gaining story with the coming of the salmon as the treasure. The latter is usually longer because it undertakes to spell out the system of justice not only metaphorically but in the events that take place after the coming of the salmon on earth, that is in terms of the structure of action-units. From the point of view of the armature these additions are only redundancies. But it is only through these redundancies that we can comprehend the message of the hunting myth. At the end of the next subsection we shall turn to NSB which stresses in almost equal parts the journey for the sake of human renewal, and the journey of the salmon and the price men pay for their coming. The result of this semantic overloading is a myth that is simultaneously a complete treasure gaining myth and an almost complete hunting myth. They cannot be both complete because the two messages contradict one another.

2(b) The Message

Both armature and message are found in the narrative structure of the myth. The armature provides us with a cosmic-geographical map of where the events take place, and with a scheme of departures and arrivals. (This scheme, as we shall see in 3(b) is also the abstract structure of narrative events used by the myth maker). The message is conveyed through the action units, more precisely through the tension which their structural relations to one another create. Naturally the message of a myth cannot be paraphrased. Its most economic statement is the myth itself. To make the distinction between the armature and message-structure quite
clear I shall repeat them for BBSB here in schematic form.

(1) The armature of the myth is provided by a threefold contrast:

men/salmon,    land/sea,    life/death

This contrast is organised into a three-term system:

men (land, life) on their own
salmon (sea, death) on their own
alternation: travel:
East←→West, upstream→downstream = life/death←→death/life

The system comprises two simple terms and a complex one that unites the two into a harmonious whole. The myth visualises the harmonious whole in the following way:

Men = land dwellers: travel downstream to death

Are regenerated at a "place of wealth" and return upstream to life

(In the story the journey to death is metaphorical. The place of wealth is the land of the salmon. The treasure gained there is the coming of the salmon. Man's physical life on earth is secured if the salmon come as food).

Salmon = sea dwellers: travel upstream to death

Are regenerated when men put their remains into water

Return downstream to life

(In the story the salmon teach men through the hero how to kill, eat and regenerate them. They travel to the earth voluntarily to be killed and eaten. Their renewal is secured if men honour their remains).
(2) The scheme embraces treasure gaining myths and hunting myths. The narrative sequence prescribes that the visit of a man to salmon country must come first. If the stress falls on the man's visit to the salmon and the salmon's visit to men is neglected we get the message of a treasure gaining myth. The treasure is the coming of the salmon but in the BBSB this aspect remains implicit as part of the incomplete message structure of the hunting myth. The conditions of gaining the treasure are two: (1) marriage to Salmon Woman (2) learning how to kill, eat and regenerate the salmon. In BBSB both conditions are present but only (1) is logically connected with the other episodes of the story while (2) remains isolated. This is the reason why the message structure of BBSB is that of the treasure-gaining story, and why the story is almost entirely hero-concentrated. Marriage to a Salmon Woman may bring luck to one man; learning how to treat the salmon belongs to mankind.

TABLE IV

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Message structure of BBSB:</th>
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<tr>
<td>Separation of (poor) hero from (poor) society</td>
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<tr>
<td>Journey to Salmon world</td>
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<tr>
<td>Marriage to Salmon Woman</td>
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<tr>
<td>Being taught how to treat the salmon</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gaining of treasure (inexhaustible boxes as &quot;dowry&quot;)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Return of (rich) hero to human world</td>
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<tr>
<td>Integration into (now rich) society through distribution</td>
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The scheme shows the "framing" device myth makers use to convey a message. The episodes are arranged in balancing pairs whose members do not simply stand in apposition but are arranged logically in relation to
one another as questions are to answers. The pairs or "frames" are fitted into one another like Chinese boxes. Seen chronologically a series of questions, each logically and sequentially connected with the former, resolves itself into a series of answers in such a way that the last answer answers the first question. The most widely separated pairs form the true frame of the story. The pattern is known to classical scholarship as annular pattern (or onion pattern) and was first noticed in the Homeric epics. Meanwhile it has been recognised as a universal device of oral composition. By completing the frames one by one the oral composer is firmly kept on the path of his story.

The onion pattern usually has a centre and the centre is usually not a binary unit of balancing episodes but a trinary unit in which two minor episodes flank a major one which forms the climax of the story. The scheme above shows two things: that the episode in which SB learns to kill and eat the salmon has this central position, and that it is quite unconnected with the other action units of the story. It is abruptly introduced after the marriage episode. Only if one knows the plot of the SB myth and understands that the treasure lies in the knowledge of how to treat the salmon does the significance of its central position become clear. Simultaneously one realises in what lies the incompleteness of BBSB as a SB myth. The knowledge of how to treat the salmon the hero gains in salmon country is useless unless it is handed on to men in the human world. The etiology of the myth—the treasure as the coming of the salmon—must be culturally understood as the beginning of lawful and sanctified salmon fishing. The SB myth cannot, therefore, be hero-concentrated as can a treasure-gaining myth. SB is mankind's (or the group's) link with the salmon; through him, or through the knowledge he brings back, salmon fishing becomes, culturally speaking, possible. At
the centre of the salmon myth stands the covenant the salmon make with men which provides that the salmon are sacrificially killed and eaten by men while men through the ritual treatment of their bones allow them to regenerate themselves. SB is the mediator of this contract. His mediation necessarily involves the bringing back of a message from the salmon which must form the answer to the killing and eating episode. The contractual aspect provides us, in the narrowest sense, with the pattern of question and answer. A contract depends on the mutual responsiveness of two parties. This pattern should be present in the complete SB myth. In a wider sense the question raised by the killing and eating in salmon country affects not only conduct but an ethical standard of balancing justice or retribution. This is a more problematic aspect and will only emerge as an unquestionable part of the hunting myth in a discussion of the BM group.

Examined closely, the episode in BBSB in which SB learns how to treat the salmon falls into two parts: (1) preliminary instructions, (2) the actual act of putting into practice what he has been taught. This division of the main episode into verbal instruction and act or event is a stable feature of the SB myths. The redundancy is striking: the narrator uses the same words for the teaching and for the description of the act. Nevertheless it is not simply the same information repeated to clarify it and underline its importance. Teaching and act, though couched in the same words, carry different semantic loads in the story. This becomes clear in the fuller versions. We therefore have to do not with incidents of one episode but with two different, though closely related episodes. In the teaching episode the myth maker treats the contractual aspect of the relationship between salmon and men; the killing and eating episode is a type-act. Set in the salmon world
clearly both look for their "answer" in the human world. The episode in which the hero is taught demands a counter-episode in which he teaches his people; the description of the type-act in the salmon world asks for a description of its anti-type in the human world.

Compared from this point of view both NSB and BBSB show deficiencies of structure, but NSB is by far the more complete version. In NSB the episode of the killing, eating and regeneration of the salmon is very casually treated and the hero is not instructed at all. However, the story is less hero-concentrated than BBSB and the account of the salmon's return with the hero to the human world is unusually full. A lot of teaching takes place in the course of the return sequence. The salmon teach the hero, the hero teaches his people, first his parents alone, later, when he is retransformed into a man, his group. The teaching falls into two parts which we might call practical salmon lore and ritual teaching. The salmon people teach the hero first "what the salmon like"—for instance about the use of sharp points in spearing them. The Salmon Chief then instructs the hero in how to treat the salmon ritually and to hand on this knowledge to his father. The father is to re-enact the primal killing and eating scene but this time with the hero (as a salmon) as victim. Subsequently the hero teaches his father and then, when he has been retransformed into a man he teaches his people practical salmon lore, including the fact that the salmon are men and that the women cutting them must behave as if they were "husbands".23

This amount of teaching, which packs the latter part of NSB can be reduced to a simple formal scheme. I give comparative outlines of the structures of BBSB and NSB, with the missing episodes in square brackets, to show the relation of instruction to act in the SB story.
BBSB

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Journey to salmon world as a man</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Instruction: to hero: how to treat the salmon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Act: death and regeneration of the salmon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instruction: to people: how to treat the salmon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Return to human world as man</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NSB

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Journey to salmon world as a man</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Instruction: to hero₁: how to treat the salmon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Act: death and regeneration of the salmon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instruction: for the people: how to treat the salmon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preliminary return to human world as a salmon/man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instruction: to hero₂: how to treat the salmon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Act: death as salmon and regeneration as man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instruction: to people: how to treat the salmon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Return to human world as a man</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The frame of NSB is still that of a treasure-gaining myth. It begins with the (poor) hero leaving the human world and ends with the (rich) hero coming back to the human world and being integrated into his society on the basis of the treasure he brings. The treasure is here definitely the coming of the salmon (the story stresses the etiological element) aligned with the teaching of salmon lore.

The contractual message is complete here (unlike in BBSB): the hero hands on the knowledge gathered from the salmon. This is done partly in verbal form and partly through a repetition of the type-act. The most interesting thing about the organisation of action-units in NSB is the repetition of the type-act. The overall story has one frame, the departure-return frame of the treasure-gaining tale. But this frame is,
one might say artificially divided into two inner frames by a preliminary return of the hero. During this interim period the hero goes through several metamorphoses, appearing sometimes as human at others as a salmon. This vacillation between two forms allows for a significant repetition of the type-act in the human world. In human form the hero can teach his people how to treat salmon (he teaches them first through an individual, his father, hero\textsubscript{1} in the scheme), in animal form he can then become the object of their ritual treatment and regain lasting human status through regeneration. The repetition of the type-act is significant for two reasons. (1) While the proto-typical act in salmon country was performed by the hero alone, the type-act in the human world is shared by the community. The father kills the salmon (his son) and the mother cuts him, but all their friends are invited to eat him. This communal meal clearly institutes the first salmon ritual. (2) The repetition contains a significant reversal: the hunter of the main episode in the first frame becomes the game of the main episode in the second. This reversal foreshadows the preoccupation of the full hunting myth with retributive justice. Formally this problem can only be worked out in a complex, two-move tale. NSB, with the device of a division through the hero's curiously indeterminate half-return, has moved towards the complex hunting tale, and can convey a hunting tale message.

A brief comparison with the initiation tale seems necessary at this point. In both kinds of story there is a cannibalistic meal in the other world, a "surrounding" to bring the hero back to this world, and a second cannibalistic meal in the human world. The differences are precise in spite of the overlap on the metaphoric level. In the initiation myth the hero who has journeyed into the other world is eaten by the spirit and turned into a spirit. When he returns and is "surrounded", he "eats"
the community. In the course of that act he is made human again, while the community is enhanced. In the SB myth on the other hand the hero who has journeyed into the other world eats the salmon and regenerates the salmon again from its bones. He returns to the human world as a salmon and is "surrounded" (literally, in the salmon weir) and eaten by the community. Through this act he is regenerated as a human being and the community has gained food, that is health and wealth through the salmon ritual.

The sacrificial element in these stories is obvious. However, the first (initiation) is about the regeneration of man, the second (hunting) about the regeneration of salmon. In the first a man sacrifices himself voluntarily to gain life-enhancement for his group. In the second the salmon is sacrificed to gain food, that is physical life-continuity for the group. Only the second involves men in guilt and retribution. The closeness of the two, both on the formal and the metaphoric level, is due to the fact that the initiation myth is a rethinking of the problem of the hunting myth and a resolution of the guilt-retribution complex on another plane. This can be most clearly demonstrated with the help of the rituals to which the two kinds of myth are respectively attached, the first salmon and the initiation ritual. We shall turn to the rituals in the next chapter. The logical connection, which makes the hunting myth a form of the initiation myth, is not necessarily also a chronological-historical one. The two rituals have existed prehistorically side by side and so have presumably the two kinds of myth. It is however tempting to regard the great emphasis on initiation in historical times as a deepening of the "human side" under the stress of acculturation conditions. The treasure-gaining myth as I said is a weak form of the initiation myth. NSB then attempts to pack two contradictory messages into one myth:
(a) that in killing and eating animals the hero (here an Everyman figure) involves himself in guilt and has to face retribution, (b) that the hero (here an individual) returns from the other world to enhance himself and his community. The myth maker of NSB manages this difficult task remarkably well, mainly by an ambiguous use of the regeneration theme: the hero is killed as a salmon but regenerated into a man (not a salmon-who-is-also-a-man, but an ordinary flesh and blood mortal). In this way he blunts, however, the form of the retribution theme.

The theme is taken up more vigorously in TSSB (Boas 1916: 192) and HSB (Swanton 1905: 7). These two versions and many other SB myths develop the tragic aspect of the SB figure. SB is Everyman in one sense but more immediately in the narrative he is that member whom the community sacrifices for the sake of the well-being of all. The hero who travels to salmon country suffers a sort of soul-loss. He returns but can never be fully human again. The salmon have his soul, though he may not know it. In the end this forces him to return to them; but true to his ambiguous nature as salmon and man he remains connected with his human home by watching over the salmon run.

This plot is developed in a story with a clearly defined complex structure of two moves. The division between move 1 and move 2 is made by the hero's return to the human world. The two moves are connected through the reversal of the hero's fate described in the two main episodes. In move 1, which is set in the salmon world, SB kills a salmon. In move 2, set in the human world, SB is killed as a salmon. The setting of the two episodes is significant. The salmon killed by SB can regenerate himself on the spot because he is killed in the place of regeneration. SB, killed as a salmon in the human world, where mortality reigns, has to travel back to salmon country for his regeneration and can be regenerated there only as
a metaphoric man, that is a salmon-spirit. The human cycle of reincarna-
tion is lost to him, but instead a more powerful state of immortality is
his fate. As a man transformed into the salmon-spirit he looks after men
and salmon. He takes over the office of what is known as a "master of
animals"; in this case he controls the salmon run and makes sure that both
salmon and men fulfil their mutual obligations.

TSSB, the longest and most complex of the hunting myths we are con-
sidering, brings out the reversal of the two main episodes most clearly.
It reverses the incidents of the main episode of move 1 on two different
isotopies in two separate moves, 2 and 3. Murder and cannibalism are
vividly if half-humourously presented in the first main episode. In this
version SB does not have to reject the food offered him by the salmon. He
therefore kills "children" gratuitously, not driven by hunger. "He took a
club and when he saw a good-looking boy he took hold of him and clubbed
him. The boy was at once transformed into a nice little spring salmon.
He took it and went up a little farther along the sand-hill[where the
children were playing, sliding down]. Then he started a fire and roasted
the whole small spring salmon; and when it was done he ate it all."
(pp.194--5). On another occasion he chooses "a beautiful fat youth".

In move 2 the problem raised in move 1 is taken up in terms of eat-
ing (cannibalism) in move 3 in terms of killing (hunting). In move 2 SB
travels in the salmon run in the stomach of the Salmon Chief. In other
words the eater has become food, and food to be eaten by his own kind.
(No actual eating is described). The transformation from killer to killed
in move 3 is more complicated. SB, now a normal youth again, takes up
his old occupation of eagle hunting. His companions do not know what he
uses for bait on these occasions, but the story tells us: "The prince
himself lay down at the opening of the trap and became like a small spring
salmon, very pretty to look at and shining brightly". The parallel with the "nice little spring salmon" he has eaten in salmon country can hardly be missed. A bait, however, is a kind of deceptive hunter, a hunter masquerading as prey. SB, who has been a hunter and killer in salmon country, still thinks of himself as a hunter. However, by using his salmon form he has inadvertently become game. A hawk swoops down and takes the pretty little spring salmon by the throat, flying away with it. The companions find the prince dead, his mouth full of blood.

We shall meet the hunt in the deceptive mode again in the BM stories and in the same structural position. Only then the hunter of the first main episode does not become the game of the second main episode in the form of his former prey (the salmon), but the game of the first main episode (the bear) becomes the hunter of those that think they will hunt him in the second main episode.

The reversed hunting episode is followed by the hero's return to the salmon world. I shall use the description of that event as given in TSSB and add that in HSB for comparison. The content varies but the principle of the message structure remains the same. The hero who has had an ambivalent nature through most of the story leaves the human state altogether in order to take over the duties to which he is appointed in the supernatural world.

The Tsimshian prince has been buried in a grave box placed on high stilts. His best friend is mourning and watching under the burial platform. "Before daylight he [the friend] thought he heard the sound of people coming up the river in canoes ... Soon the canoes reached the beach in front of the place where they were. The people went up to where the coffin was ... one of them climbed up to the coffin. He loosened the rope round the coffin and opened it. Then he said: 'Dear Prince, your
father the Chief sent us to take you down to him'. Then the prince arose and went down laughing for joy and his beloved friend stood there speechless." The friend recovers himself, however, and accompanies the prince unnoticed to salmon country. Here he is taught by the prince how to club a child for his food. When he gets homesick and asks the prince to go back with him the prince answers: "I will go back with you and as soon as I arrive at home I shall die and then I shall stay with my grandfather and his people." (p.203). The prince has taken over the role of the Salmon Chief. The Salmon Chief took the prince back in his own stomach when he became homesick on his first visit, and died when the prince's mother cut her son out of him. Note also that the prince has become the source of knowledge about how to treat the salmon, identified with his "father" the Salmon Chief, while the friend is now the transmitter of that knowledge to the human world.

HSB is explicit about the soul-loss experienced by the SB. The hero has become a shaman after his return from salmon country and lives an ordinary life with his people. But apparently his "soul" has remained a salmon. There is again a hunt in the deceptive mode though this time the hero, because of his divided state of being, of which he is unconscious, manages to hunt and kill himself. "They [the social group] moved away and the next year they came to the same place to get salmon. When the salmon came again and ran up a shining one was on top. Then he the SB told them not to spear it, but it was the very one they tried to spear. By and by he made a spear for himself and speared it. When he had pulled it ashore and the salmon died he too, died. He did not know that it was his own soul." (Swanton. 1905: 13). The Haida SB does not return to the salmon world of the story after his death but becomes what one might call a metaphoric salmon and the spirit of the salmon run. The essence
of the salmon for men is not that he is a deep-sea creature but that he "runs", living in both salt and fresh water, mediating sea and land. The shaman, who can "drum" himself into another dimension, is a double creature of the same sort. The supernatural office the SB takes up after his death is described in those terms. "After four nights were passed they put him into a pool where salt and fresh waters mingled, where he had directed that he should be placed ... They also put his drum there. After this had turned around to the right for a while it vanished into a deep hole in the bottom. And now when there is going to be plenty of salmon, they hear his drum sound in the deep place."

We are now in a position to single out the main episodes of a complete version of the SB myth and to interpret the message in its outline. In the next section I shall discuss the BM myths to show (1) how a different story--different on the lexemic level--can have the same structure of components, (2) how message is related to lexemic content and structural content. Preoccupation with killing, eating, the animal's self-sacrifice and the problem of justice is common to all hunting myths. But while SB myths concentrate on killing and eating, BM myths stress self-sacrifice and retributive justice. This is due to the shift on the lexemic level--bear replaces salmon. The isomorphism on the level of componental structure (structure of action units) is, however striking. I append a comparative sketch of the two structures which illustrates both points.
TABLE VI

**Salmon Boy**

Journey to salmon world as a human

Instruction: to SB: how to treat the salmon

Act: death of salmon: killed by SB as hunter

Instruction: to fishing people: how to treat the salmon

Return to human world part man part salmon

Act: death of hunter: SB killed as salmon

Return to salmon country as salmon spirit

**Bear Mother**

Journey to bear world as a human

Instruction: to BM: how to treat the bear

Act: death of bear: killed by hunters, brothers of BM

Instruction: to hunters: how to treat the bear

Return to human world part woman part bear

Act: death of hunters: killed by bear who used to be their sister

Return to bear world as bear spirit
Self-sacrifice and Justice: the Bear Mother Stories

The distribution of Bear Mother has not been mapped as has that of Salmon Boy. Like Salmon Boy the story is closely related to hunting ritual. From Hallowell's study of "Bear Ceremonialism in the Northern Hemisphere" one would guess that the Bear Mother story has a wider distribution than Salmon Boy, and that it is the prototype of Salmon Boy. I base this assumption on the very close parallel between bear rites and salmon rites. In our region the Bear Mother story is associated with the coast where it is densely distributed particularly in the North. For my examination I shall, however, use McClellan's 1970 collection from the Southern Yukon. My choice is dictated by two reasons, (1) the versions were all collected in a comparatively small area, and though the eleven versions vary individually it is clear that all the narrators were telling the same story; (2) a coherent collection like McClellan's demonstrates the relation of short version to long version (or single myth to cycle) more clearly than a collection that is dispersed over space and time.

Though the stories were collected in the Interior Tlingit area, their centre seems to be among the coastal Tlingit. Many of the narrators preface their version with "It's said to have happened down on the coast". McClellan calls the story "The Girl Who Married the Bear", a title given by her, not by her narrators. I prefer to follow Barbeau in calling it "Bear Mother" because that title links it to the widely spread beliefs about an animal mother or game mother (meat mother) which are of great importance among hunting peoples. Moreover it points up the connection with the Salmon Boy story. Both heroes--the boy who married the salmon and the girl who married the bear--are at the end of the myth assimilated to the "Master of Animals" or "Mother of Animals", that is to the figure which can give or
The difference between the figures in the two kinds of story is one of the important points in the comparison. The male figure as Salmon Chief shows predominantly benevolent features. This is no doubt connected with the fact that salmon are the food par excellence, that the runs, though they vary in strength, can be relied upon, and that the fish are passive in relation to men. As Bear Mother the female figure shows more threatening features commensurate with the power of the bear who kills people, is a rival in fishing and gathering, and only marginally food.

The Northwest coast and Plateau peoples do not have a well-defined personalised Mother Earth figure as have many of the peoples of the Plains and Eastern Woodlands. Yet the concept is present and the bear is known as husband of the earth, or Bear Mother from whose womb the animals and all living beings spring. This close association of the bear with the earth must be realised as a background to the Bear Mother stories. In the bear some of the innate condition of strife and hostility that exists between technological man and the earth as mother of all living beings is articulated. Technological man is under archaic conditions always man the hunter and trapper. The bear, more than any other animal of the hunting myths, lights up the relation between men and animals.

Like the SB myths the BM stories have a social facet that makes them stories about interhuman problems, as well as a "hunting" one that makes them stories about the relation between men and animals. I consider the latter to be the primary one and shall concentrate on it in my analysis. The former has been excellently analysed by McClellan in the part of her introduction called "The Cultural Context of the Story" (1970: 6--16). To McClellan the social facet is the important one. However justified her interpretation is, comparison with the SB myth shows that it is the relation between men and animals that is the focus. Analysis on the lexemic level
will show the importance of the social facet while analysis on the semantic level, which means an analysis of the structure shows that the story embodies and projects the problems of hunting. The one is the cultural "language" in which the story is cast, the other the much more widely authoritative message. However, in practice the two make the woof and the warp of the story.

For reasons of space I shall tell the BM story here as a compositum of the 11 versions in the McClellan collection. This compositum is (with one modification) the full version or cycle which, under the conditions McClellan describes, no one had the time to tell. I introduce the story by quoting part of McClellan's Summary (p.IX):

One of the most popular stories of the Southern Yukon Indians ... is about a girl who was taken away by a bear after she had insulted it. He first appears in human form and she marries him and has children by him. Later her brothers kill the bear, who is their brother-in-law, and the girl returns home. However, when her brothers urge her to don a bearskin against her wishes, she turns into a bear forever and kills her brothers. The two chief themes that the story develops are conflict between the consanguine and affinal loyalties and the uneasy balance of harmony between animals and humans. The Yukon Indians also link the tale to their ritual observances for the corpses of bears, since the bear taught his wife what should be done and she instructed her brothers.

Compositum of "The Girl Who Married the Bear" (McClellan 1970)

In the old days people were careful about bear droppings. Everyone walked around them. If you stepped on them or jumped over them you might arouse the anger of the bear.

When the people had finished drying salmon they went up to the mountains to berry. A girl is out berrying with a group of women. She is saucy: "the one who never speaks the right way". She slips on some bear droppings and calls the bear names. On the way back the girl's packing strap breaks and she spills her berries. The others finally leave her to pick them up by herself. A nice young man suddenly appears and offers to help. (In one version he looks like her husband). He takes her away, and she marries him.

That night they walk for a long time. Every time they walk over a windfall the girl feels some subtle change. What she thinks are
windfalls are really mountains they are crossing.

All Summer long the girl and her husband hunt gophers, fish for salmon and pick berries. The girl wonders where the stores are kept. The food disappears, but when they strike camp at night her husband always has some to cook. He is carrying it in a secret cache under his arm.

One night the girl wakes up in her husband's arms. He is asleep. Looking down she suddenly sees that the hand on her breast has grizzly bear claws. Then she knows she has married a bear. She shuts her eyes and goes to sleep again. There is nothing she can do. In the morning her husband appears again as a man.

It is growing cold and the bear is looking for winter quarters. He goes to the sheer slopes of the mountains. The girl has four brothers who are hunters. She knows where they hunt mountain goat and bear, and she chooses a place in the brothers' hunting grounds. When her husband asks her to break off spruce branches to line their den she breaks them high up to mark the place for her brothers.

The bear and his wife go to sleep. Towards Spring the girl knows she is pregnant. The child stirs in her womb earlier than a human child would. The girl herself is beginning to grow fur. She bears two cubs who are half bear-half human.

When the snow begins to melt the bear begins to sleep uneasily. He asks his wife to look outside and report on the weather for him. She goes out and makes a snowball which she rubs on her body to make it smell of her. (In other versions she embraces the bear as if she were loving him, and then makes the snowball). She rolls it down the hill for her brothers' dogs to find.

Division of plot. Plot A is the main story line
Plot B is found in four versions.

Plot A:

The bear dreams that his wife's brothers are looking for him and will kill him. He decides to fight. He puts on his "swords" (his canines), and tells his wife he will play with her brothers. She pleads with him, asking him to spare them and let them kill him. She reminds him that they are his brothers-in-law, and that if he kills them he will be harming his children, whose guardians they are. He decides to die without fighting.

His knowledge of his approaching death grows. He teaches his wife how to treat his remains ritually, and asks her to teach her brothers. He tells her that bears are always to be treated with reverence by hunters and never played with or laughed at.

The dogs find the snowball and lead the brothers to the den. The
bear husband asks his wife why she has betrayed him. When the brothers arrive at the entrance of the den he goes outside, leaving his swords behind, and is killed.

Plot B

The four brothers know that their sister has been taken by a bear, and they go out to find her and kill the bear. They prepare themselves ritually and each tries, but they all fail except the youngest. The youngest seems always to be asleep. His elder brothers laugh at him and tell him he will never get his sister. But he puts his mind to it, and he alone observes the proper ritual training. His mind gets so strong that he "sees" the place in the high mountains where the bear has hidden his den. As a result, the bear knows that the youngest brother will kill him. When the dog finds the snowball and leads his master up to the den the bear comes out and lies down quietly. The youngest brother kills him, and the four brothers meet to butcher the carcass.

Here plot B unites with plot A again

The youngest brother comes back to the den to collect the detachable copper arrowheads he has dropped. He finds his sister and her babies in the den. She tells him that they have killed their brother-in-law, and teaches him how to treat the bear’s remains. The brothers obey her instructions and perform the first memorial ritual for the bear, which is like the mourning rite for a dead relative.

The girl and her children excite the distaste of the brothers because of their bear-like appearance. The brothers (in some versions the villagers) debate whether to kill her. But the youngest brother points out that such a woman might be useful to them. Her mother comes out with clothes for her and the children. For a long time the girl cannot bear the smell of humans. She camps by herself and only gradually moves nearer the village.

Finally the girl returns to the village. Her bearlikeness seems to disappear. She is of great help in the bear hunt, because she can point out the bears' dens to the hunters from the valley. She recognises them by the smoke rising from the bears' camp-fires, invisible to human sight.

One day, when her brothers have shot a bear and two cubs, they ask her to put on the skin and play at being a bear for them. They will shoot at her, but put bark points on their arrows so that they will not hurt her. The girl implores them not to "fool around" and tells them she will turn bear if they do. They persist and throw the skins over her and her children. She changes into a bear, attacks her brothers and tears them to pieces.
The youngest brother has watched her closely, and sees that she is not his sister but a bear. He changes his bark arrowheads for real ones and shoots at her, hitting her in the throat. She spares him alone of the brothers.

The villagers can do nothing. They watch her going, walking high upon the mountain side, a she bear with her cubs. She has turned bear for good and will not come back again. She walks away taking the course of the sun.

3(a) Some Remarks on the Armature and Code

There is no need to discuss the armature of the BM stories in the light of beliefs, after the lengthy discussion of the SB myths. It is clear that the two cycles belong to a meta-group that is characterised by a threefold movement between the human world and the world of the animals. There are differences: SB's journey takes him below to the submarine world of the fish, BM's up to the mountain world of the bears, SB is a man, BM a woman and so on. But both heroes end their journeying in the world of the animals as gigantic supernatural figures surpassing both men and animals. In both cycles the complex term which unifies the two simple terms (men in the valleys; bears in the mountains) is the life/death alternation. Yet it is here that the most significant difference is located. In the BM stories the journey of the human being into death (which provided the necessary analogy in the SB stories to the coming of the salmon) is hardly touched on. Instead, the life/death contrast is moved forward into the centre of the action and posited in the character of the bear. The bear himself is life-bringer (through his self-sacrifice) and death-dealer (through his revenge). This is a difference we should briefly consider. It is connected with the difference in the sex of the hero. Its implications are caught in the cluster of images that opens the story and forms, so to speak, its overture. These are the berrying-images; and, as the SB myths could be said to be based on a bird-hunting code, so
BM myths seem to be based on a berrying code.  

The division of labour among the Northwest coast peoples was a sexual division. Men hunted, women gathered vegetables. The division in its turn defined the sexes and was reinforced by a sexual metaphor: game was the hunter's "wife", roots and berries the gatherer's "husband". If in the salmon stories therefore a boy marries a salmon this connotes the approved way of getting salmon. In terms of the metaphor he contracts a proper marriage. If in the bear stories the hunter marries a bear this is equally right. But if a girl marries a bear something is wrong. Is she usurping male privilege? This is not made clear, but in any case she is crossing some dangerous borderline. The metaphor is of a "wild marriage", an anomaly. Perhaps the question, wild in what way? is not so important. Both salmon and bear happen in fact to belong to ambiguous categories.

Salmon is game while fished for and killed and therefore "wife" to the fisherman. But when the fish are cut to be smoked they become "husband" to the women (cf. end of NSB).

It is hard to say in how far this sexual metaphor enters into the conception of the particular animal. In the case of the bear the ambiguity seems to be part of the conception of "bearness". "Bearness" can be depicted as male or female, and each form again as mild (game) or wild (revenger). The ambiguity of the sexual metaphor is given one sort of expression in a Lillooet prayer to the bear. Here the bear is called upon as a "master of the game", a figure that has always (and explicitly) bisexual connotations in the mythology of the area. His bisexuality is described as his "mystery" in the prayer. His male power is so great that it can turn all animals into game (that is into females), and equally he is so female that in imitating him they all become female (that is game). "O thou greatest of all animals, thou man of animals, now my friend, thou
art dead. May thy mystery make all other animals like women when I hunt them! May they follow thee and fall an easy prey to me!" (Hallowell 1926: 60). Bears hunted after the hibernation period were notoriously easy prey, and regarded as giving themselves. The prayer is of course an expression of the wish of the hunter, and therefore supplicates the bear's benevolence alone.

In the action structure of our story the ambiguity of the bear's nature shows itself in a different form. At the beginning the bear appears as male. His initial wildness is suppressed and he appears to the hunters as passive (game) and therefore benevolent. The naturalistic background is here the bear after hibernation coming from his den: At the end of the story the bear appears in a female, wild and active form, which is experienced as malevolent by the hunters. The naturalistic background is here the bear at the end of the Summer, when both bears and men are berrying, and especially the she bear with cubs who can, notoriously, become dangerous. The fact that the she bear who tears the hunters to pieces is a bear who has come out to feed on berries (see particularly versions 1b, p.22 and 2, p.27), links the end of the story to its beginning, which is set in a berrying patch. It also closes the cycle of the sexual ambiguity of the bear as it is expressed in our myths.

In any case, whatever the weight of the sexual accents at the beginning of the story, in marrying the bear the girl crosses the border of proper behaviour and is exposed. One of the ways in which McClellan's narrators imply the dangerousness of the union is in stressing the physical relation between her and the bear. Their attitude seems to be Victorian: sexual intensity (which in spite of their modern reticence is strongly conveyed) is the sign of a relation that is beyond the pale. A similar association of ideas may have led the Haida, in their famous carvings of
Bear Mother, to portray the couple in the most extravagant sexual positions.  

But to return to the role of food as an indicator of norm. The scene for the meeting is set in a berrying patch. (In nine of the eleven versions the abduction of the girl takes place while she is berrying. In one she is gathering wild rhubarb). A berrying patch is "where the bear goes out", and she steps on the droppings (or jumps over them) and calls out insults to the bear. To insult the supernatural ones is one way of "calling" them. The first result of her call is that her packing strap breaks and her berries fall to the ground. Her berries, which should always be "above" are below, and are turned into "dirt". Dirt is culturally equated with excrement and nothing. In this way she denies her "true husband" and opens the way to unknown "wild" possibilities. Her companions desert her and the bear approaches her, in one version in the guise of her husband ("false husband").

The value sign that connects the cluster of images with which the story opens is shit. I cannot go here into the very complex connotations bear shit has on the Northwest coast. Suffice it to say that it is a sacred substance, of a value equal to food and has to be "treated well" like food. In the coastal BM myths it is literally food: the bears shit berries on to clean mats to feed their visitors. To treat it as "shit" as the girl does is not only to insult the bear but to insult the berries. We can say therefore that the girl (a) treats that as shit which should be treated like food (bear droppings), (b) treats food which should be treated as metaphoric husband as shit (berries), and (c) treats a "false husband", which should be a nothing to her, as husband (the bear).

Naturally this flouting of the proper values has not only negative results. As insult is an inverted call for the supernatural so wrong
behaviour makes a breach through which the supernatural can come into contact with men. Nevertheless the reversal of values and play with appearance and reality with which the story opens is meant to show that the narrative has a negative cast. It establishes the bear not only as the giver of wealth but the avenger. The life/death alternation, which is acceptable in terms of regeneration, as in the SB stories, becomes frightening when it is put in terms of the love-and-wrath of the animals on which men depend.

3(b) Narrative Units

Armature is the formal equipment used by the myth maker to convey a particular content. In our discussion of the armature of the SB myth we have concentrated on background and discussed the cultural beliefs that, brought into systematic relation, make up the framework of the myth. The beliefs concerned death and regeneration, and the operative image was that of the journey. We shall not repeat this exercise for the BM myth but examine another, related aspect of the framework: the articulation of the story by narrative units. Armature becomes here the equipment necessary for the myth maker to organise his story material, and for the analyst to recognize the "narrative model". The examination should also show the link that connects the framework (which is general and belongs to the meta-group) with the message structure (which is particular and belongs to the subgroups and even individual myths).

In other words, to be complete a discussion of armature must take into account two aspects: background beliefs and formal articulation of the narrative. Together these two aspects can show how a particular content can be conveyed through a general form.

The threefold movement which characterises the armature of the SB and
BM stories allow us to divide the text into four sequences. Departures and returns act as marking points where one sequence ends and a new one begins. (I have designated sequences with Roman, marking points with Arabic numerals). (1) "Departure to the other world" ends the sequence that leads up to that departure and introduces the sequence that takes place in the other world, (2) "Return to the human world" ends the latter and introduces the events that take place after the hero's return, (3) "Second departure to the other world" again ends the latter and introduces the hero's final journey. What Greimas calls "disjunctive syntagms" (1970: 86) then act as the major points of articulation for the text. The sequences they separate are not of equal value in the narrative. Sequence I and IV are in the nature of an introduction and a conclusion. They are often condensed and of great symbolic depth. In other words they are closely tied to the system of thought and belief that is external to the narrative, and their elucidation is important to the message.

Point (2) "Return to the human world" is a marking point of particular weight because it divides the text into two parts (or moves) and marks the middle of the story. The story itself is enacted in sequence II and III, that is in the sequences that are enclosed by the three disjunctive marking points, and are not open at one end or the other like I and IV. The two enclosed sequences are each internally articulated by a marking point which is a turning point of the story. The two turning points belong to what Greimas calls behavioral syntagms and glosses as tests. In the hunting myth they are not tests but the acts that complement verbal instruction, in other words the type acts. They form the two peripeteias of the two-move dramatic narrative and allow us to subdivide the two main sequences together (II and III) again into four parts. We have therefore an outer framework that articulates the whole of the narrative by dividing it
into four sequences with the help of three disjunctional marking points, and an inner framework that divides the heart of the narrative into four subsequences with the help of the three disjunctional marking points and two behavioural marking points.

The two peripeteias are deaths; the death of the bear or salmon in part 1 and the death of the hunters or Salmon Boy in part 2. The four subsequences are made up of the events leading up to and following the deaths. The two peripeteias are the main episodes of the myths. The message is concentrated in them, and the differences in message in the bear and salmon stories depend on the differences in the two pairs of deaths. The difference in the events leading up to them and following them, that is in the minor episodes, are naturally dictated by these differences in the main episodes.

In each myth the two main episodes (peripeteias of part 1 and 2) form a pair. Their contents are symmetrically inverted and complement one another, in this way conveying the message. The message therefore cannot be gathered from the content of the main episodes directly but only from the tension between the two.

The two main sequences (II and III) are finally articulated internally by four minor marking points which express what Greimas calls contractual syntagms. Each main episode is flanked by two minor episodes with whom it forms a unit (the extended main episode). The two minor episodes surrounding a main episode stand in a symmetrical relation to one another. The first consists of instructions to an individual, including the charge that they be handed on to the group. The second consists of the instructions being handed on to the group. The two minor episodes stand to the main episodes as verbalizations (demands, promises) stand to act (fulfilment). The instruction in the first minor episode is
always the sufferer in the main episode. The instructed individual of the first minor episode becomes the instructor of the group in the second minor episode.

All further articulation of the narrative belongs to the message-structure of particular versions and cannot be dealt with on the level of the meta-group. I shall sum up the findings of this section in a table. As the contractual syntagm is very important in the hunting myth but its nature cannot be clearly shown in the table, I shall give a schematic account of it as it appears in the SB and BM stories beforehand.

TABLE VII

Contractual syntagm in SB and BM myths:

SB part 1  
Salmon instruct(s) SB  
Salmon die(s)  
Salmon Boy instructs his people

SB part 2  
SB instructs his father  
SB dies  
Father instructs the group

BM part 1  
Bear instructs wife  
Bear dies  
Wife instructs brothers

BM part 2  
Brothers instruct sister [in false hunt]  
Brothers are killed  
Sister instructs group [wrathfully, as BM]
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SEQUENCE I</th>
<th>SEQUENCE II</th>
<th>SEQUENCE III</th>
<th>SEQUENCE IV</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marking point (1) (disjunctional)</td>
<td>Minor marking point (a) (contractual)</td>
<td>Minor marking point (c) (contractual)</td>
<td>Overture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEQUENCE II</td>
<td>1. PERIPETEIA (performative)</td>
<td>2. PERIPETEIA (performative)</td>
<td>Departure to the other world</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minor marking point (b) (contractual)</td>
<td>Minor marking point (d) (contractual)</td>
<td>Main narrative sequence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Events</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Instructions to individuals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Return to human world</td>
<td>Death of animal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Instructions to group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Events</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Second departure to other world</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Conclusion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Main narrative sequence
Instructions to individual
Death of hunter(s)
Instructions to group
Events

Overture
Departure to the other world
Main narrative sequence
Events
Instructions to individuals
Death of animal
Instructions to group
Events
Return to human world
Main narrative sequence
Events
Instructions to individual
Death of animal
Instructions to group
Events
Second departure to other world
Conclusion
3(c) Shorter and Longer Versions: The Stories and their Message-Structure

My abstract of the BM story is a compositum made up out of the eleven versions McClellan collected. From internal evidence and McClellan's comments it would seem that most of the narrators could have told a story of the length of the compositum, because all the incidents seem to be known to all. (Various things interfered, the two most important the time factor and that they were unprepared and had not collected their memories. The most valuable additions are made by narrators who had had time to think about the stories). In actual fact, they told different stories of various lengths. Each of the stories is complete in itself. Again we can adduce the most valuable evidence for the relation between short myth and cycle. Leaving out minor variations, which we have not time to consider here, the eleven versions can be divided into three types: (1) the shortest version which is the story of a supernatural marriage; (2) the core version which is the true hunting myth, and deals with the bear's self-sacrifice and revenge, that is with the double nature of the "supernatural ones" and men's double intentions; (3) the longest version which is the story of the perfect hunter, superimposed on the true hunting myth (i.e. the core version). The last version contains an internal contradiction which is shown in the compositum by the splitting into Plot A and Plot B.

A The Shortest Version

Given the compositum it would be an interesting exercise to explore the theoretical possibilities of division into shorter versions. The different messages these theoretically gained versions have could be examined, and then compared with the versions actually gained in the field. The most obvious theoretical division would seem to be to cut the story off at
the completion of part 1. This would make a hunting myth that includes
the teaching of the rules of bear hunting and the bear's sacrificial
death, but leaves out the reversal theme: the brothers' breaking of the
contract and the bear's retribution. None of McClellan's narrators told
this story (which is an interesting sociological fact in itself). The
simplest version she was told (version 4, p. 34) breaks off after part 1
but leaves out the contract between bear and hunters. It is simply the
story of the girl who married the bear, betrayed him to her hunting brot-
hers, was re-accepted into the community, and, because of her supernatural
association, gave valuable help in the bear hunt. Similar in structure
to the BBSB myth it lacks the odd episode or asymmetry which connects the
latter to the hunting myth and yet it is not a treasure-gaining tale. The
girl seems to gain nothing; the community gains through her double nature,
half human-half bear, but seems, at least at first, very doubtful whether
it wants such a gain. Yet the version resembles the treasure-gaining
myth in an important point: it has an unequivocal hero. Of all the
stories it most deserves the title McClellan has given the collection.

The message structure of the story is roughly the following:

TABLE IX

   - Girl insults bear
   - Marriage to bear (journey to bear world)
   - Betrayal of bear
   - Death of bear
   - Recognition and acceptance of girl
   - Return to village
   - Girl aids in bear hunt
The story is not about the bear as the others are nor is it about the hunters. The bear does not sacrifice himself (at least the narrator does not indicate that he does) and the hunters learn nothing from him. The story is about a hero who made a supernatural marriage and was changed by it. The interesting thing about hero-centred stories is their link to the initiation myth, or to put it in extra-literary terms, to the experience of introspection that initiation supplies and that lies at the bottom of the change in the hero.

Here (as in the treasure-gaining myths where the hero becomes rich) the change is seen as extraneous. "She was all hairy now. All over her body and limbs—like a bear." The narrator focuses on the problem: how can so changed a being who has become monstrous, be integrated again? All the "questions" of the first part and "answers" of the second are related to this problem, and the answers seem troubled and uncertain. For instance, though her betrayal of the bear leads logically to her recognition and acceptance, the villagers hesitate and want to kill her. Her marriage to the bear makes her return to the village slow and painful: "She had trouble getting used to the smell of humans. She didn't like their smell. When she first came down she could hardly come close to camp because the smell of humans was so strong." Immediately after this comes the description of her help in bear hunting which ends the story. Having broken through to the supernatural once (with the insult that "called" the bear), she can now see the bear's camp fires which are hidden from ordinary human eyes. Taken by themselves these features are also present in other versions, but those versions are longer and the same items have a different value in the structure. There they point forward to part 2, to the fact that the girl's domestication is only apparent and that she will revert to bear. Here we have no part 2. The problem around which the
story is built is in fact similar to the main crux of the initiation story (the main crux from the community's point of view): how can the monstrous being be tamed enough—but not tamed too much—tamed so far that we can profit from its power? The problem is similar but the plot is different and partly inverted. In our story the heroine is changed through marriage to a supernatural being who dies, in the initiation story the hero or heroine is changed through death at the hands of a supernatural being. Both are changed into something monstrous and hover at the edge of the village. But the initiate-hero is reluctant to enter and the villagers eager to "surround" him while the girl wants to go home but cannot, and the villagers debate whether they will kill her. Yet whether their good fortune comes to the villagers because of or in spite of their exertions it comes through a double natured, human-supernatural being. The message—simpler than that of the initiation myth—is concerned with the integration of such a being into the community.

B The Core Version

The core version is the story of the bear who sacrifices himself to the hunters (or to men; in this as in the SB myth men are defined as hunters and eaters) and who takes revenge on the hunters when they abuse his gift. The story is told through the girl who mediates between bear and men throughout, for the good of men and for their undoing. In so far as she is human she is destroyed herself by this mediation. In so far as she is a supernatural being and a bear she lives on for ever, watching over the relations between hunter and hunted. The parallel with the Salmon Boy story is obvious but the differences are more interesting. When the Salmon Boy has completed his mission with his people he dies, and, turning into a salmon, goes back to the salmon as Salmon Chief. The girl who
married the bear does not die but kills, having been dramatically trans­formed into a bear. She then leaves for ever as a bear. The bear is brought throughout the stories into connection with the sun and she takes the road of the sun when she leaves. "And when she had killed her brothers, she walked out just the way the sun goes. She walked on out north and clockwise; Jake motions the way she went." (Version 1b, p.21). In both kinds of story the human being who has been in the animal world seems to have forfeited his soul to the animals, and this soul is represented both as the animal form and as a skin or garment that can be put on over the human form. Salmon Boy puts on the Ten-times-jumper-blanket when he wants to swim in the salmon run. The girl turns into a bear when the bear skin is thrown over her, and as a bear revenges her husband. Both become presiding animal spirits, but the girl an angry and vengeful spirit commanding the awe of men.

The angry aspect of the bear is an important part of the core myth. There are Athapascan versions that concentrate entirely on the hunter's guilt and the wrath of the bear. Ridington has one from the Beaver in which the brothers kill the bear without knowing that he is their sister's husband. The bear does not sacrifice himself but is killed because his wife refuses to talk to her brothers. After his death she will not leave the den and only consents to go home with them when they have given her her husband's skin, head and backbone to carry. These are the parts that in our stories are mentioned as the remains of the bear that have to be ritually venerated. On their way back she walks a little behind her brothers. One of the "hands" of the bear hangs down from the bundle of its skin, and its claws swing across the tracks she makes. (They are walking in the snow). Whenever she is out of sight behind a hill the hunters' dogs "speak to one another" (one of the narrators comments that
"the dogs know when one of the medicine animals, the bosses, the giant animals ... is near"). The hunters' sister who is carrying the bear's skin is here transformed in the presence of the brothers, without their noticing it, into one of the "giant animals". The swinging hand wipes out her tracks and with them her identity as a human being and as a woman who, being "game", should leave tracks. Her nature is changed and she turns hunter (following her brother's tracks). That night she chews off the heads of her mother and brothers and all the people in the camp. Two children, who survive because they have been hidden in an earth-lodge, the young girl because her first period had started, her younger brother to share her seclusion "so that he would become a good hunter", speak to their elder sister: "Why did you cause to lie down the one who gave us birth, and the ones who have stood beside us?" and she answers "I am not sade [elder sister] but kleeze [bear]. Those bodies are not people to me. Those are the ones that caused kleeze my man, to lie down."\(^32\)

The image of the bear's hand wiping out the woman's tracks conveys in a different cultural idiom what our stories say when they make the girl insult the bear droppings and spill her berries. She repudiates her woman's role and with it, naturally, her human role. This perverts her doubly, from a woman into a hunter, from a human being (who hunts animals) into a hunter of men. The perversion is, however, confined to the natural level. On the supernatural level, where she is identified with the bear, she becomes a "medicine animal", "one of the bosses". As the Bear Mother she is awful, but she is also the one who sends the animals and gives the good hunters luck.

Our core version does not confine itself to the angry aspect of the bear, as does the Athapasean version, but the anger of the bear must nevertheless be insisted on as one of the main themes. The comparison with the
Athapascan version is meant to define this theme clearly. The core version, to which most of the stories in McClellan's collection belong, has a far more complicated message for the hunter than the Beaver version. This message is conveyed in the two-part structure, and is double: it speaks of the love and the anger of the bear, and of men's good intentions and their failings. Men's good intentions are, however, always qualified because they can never come up to that absolute demand not to kill which rules the true (or ideal) relation between them and the animals. Men's intentions are therefore always double and can only be made "good" by the generosity of the bear and by obeying rules of conduct laid down by the bear. The two-part structure therefore corresponds to a double duplicity: part 1 speaks of the love of the bear expressed in his voluntary death for men, part 2 of his anger that comes equally unexpectedly; in part 1 men are neutral and their intentions are made good in prospect by the rules given by the bear, in part 2 they break the contract, and their intentions are revealed as generally bad. On the one hand man the hunter is always in the wrong and retribution must be expected, given the double nature of the bear. On the other, given the possibility of good intention and careful conduct in men, the good hunter (who does not overkill and performs the rituals) may be spared, and even gain favour with the bear and honour among men.

This "awful and delicate balance" between men and animals is expressed in the language of family relations. Through the girl the bear and the hunters are brothers. The hunters' crime is basically that of killing "one of us". In Ridington's version the narrator comments: "They had not intended to use their strength to kill one of those who is one of us ..." (MS p.122). But through the girl and her children the bear is also the hunters' brother-in-law and as such has a moral obligation to
sacrifice himself for them. In the main episode of part 1 the bear therefore behaves according to the highest moral human standards, as a "brother" who gives his life for his kin. This makes the reversal in the second main episode (part 2) more ironic when the bear (this time as the she-bear with cubs) suddenly shows her enmity. Thought of as a "sister" and trusted, she turns and kills her unsuspecting brothers. The structure of the story, expressed in the language of family relations, is perfectly chiastic, not only formally but conceptually. The order in the triad of episodes that makes up the extended main episode in part 1: instruction to hero, act, instruction to community: a b c, is reversed in part 2 and becomes c b a. At the same time the message is inverted; what was positive in part 1 becomes negative in part 2.

TABLE X

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Girl insults bear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journey to bear world (marriage to bear)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Betrayal of bear to brothers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teaching of mourning ritual to human wife</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Death as a giving oneself for one's kin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teaching of mourning ritual to brothers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Return to human world: re-acceptance of sister into family</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Help in bear hunt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forgetting of teaching by brothers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Death as a murder of kin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forgetting by sister that she was human</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Return to bear world</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Girl becomes Bear Mother</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In spite of the formal and conceptual perfection of the structure we cannot help asking certain questions. Why does the wife betray her husband? Why does the bear sacrifice himself? Why do the brothers insist on playing with the bear skin? Why does the sister (as bear) kill the brothers?

The first answer is that certain constraints are binding for the message-structure of the story. If the narrator wants to tell a hunting story then the bear must die, and for him to die the wife must betray him. As we have seen the wife behaves quite differently in the Beaver Story from the wife in McClellan's stories: in the former she simply refuses a request, in the latter she actively shows her brothers the way and actively persuades her husband not to fight. Nevertheless the result is exactly the same: the bear goes out and is killed by the brothers. From this we can assume that there is a skeleton of rules to which the myth makers keep and around which they build their particular local or individual versions of the story. The second and complementary set to the rules I have mentioned above must be that the brothers somehow cover the sister with the bear skin, and the sister turns into a bear and kills them. Again the rules are realised quite differently in the Ridington version and in McClellan's: in the former they give her her husband's skin to pack, in the latter they insist on "playing bear" with her. The result is again the same in both cases, the skin having been put on her she becomes the bear, and, as the grizzly will turn against the hunters who have harmed him and will even track them down or kill them from an ambush, so she turns against her brothers.

The ultimate reason for these rules may be formal considerations. Meletinsky in his study of the fairy tale calls them "rules of the game"
and understands by this the recipe: according to which a story is made, and, one might add, remembered and retold. There is no doubt, however, that these rules, whether their inspiration is really formal or whether they stem from another kind of experience, are linked to other rules, the rules of conduct in a society. The link can be of the most various, and quite indirect, as for instance in the trickster stories. But it is always there. It is the way the narrators rationalise the constraints of the story. To us, who are interested in what might be called the moral philosophy of the people who told these hunting myths the rationalisations are of first importance.

The best definition to my knowledge of the relationship between the "givens" of a story and the particular way they are rendered by a narrator or group at a particular time is found in Jolles' "Einfache Formen". There is no Urform; the givens or "primitive forms" exist only as possibilities, i.e. potentialities; in the individual narration, in which they achieve contemporary meaning, they become actualities.

The "primitive forms" must be of great potentiality if they are to go on generating new contemporary "actual forms" over a long period of time. They are in fact the generative places I have discussed earlier which, obscure in themselves, are puzzles that ask for solution and contain, in fact, solutions. They are the points from which thought springs and because they are, and always remain puzzles, they constantly generate new thought.

After all the preliminary work we have done, we can trace the development from the potential to the actual forms in our Bear Mother stories very clearly. To explore the links between givens (which exist only as potentialities) and actualizations is another way of exploring the relationship between short version and long version, single myth and cycle.
I should remind the reader here that when I speak of the primitive forms as puzzles or as existing only as potentialities I do not mean that they exist as concepts, that is in the abstract. They could not be the "givens" of a story unless they were concrete formations. Analytic language is particularly poor in precise definitions for such formations. We call them image, symbol and in particular cases verbal paradox. That they are concrete is shown by the striking similarities between the primitive forms of the oral traditions and the visual art of a cultural period or era.

The basic primitive form of the Bear Mother story is the two-facedness of the bear. The bear has a benevolent face and an angry face, a male face and a female face (though this takes us already on to the road of actualization: basically the primitive form of this story is "the two faces of the one face of the bear" or however such a paradox can be expressed). In the visual medium this is the double-faced mask so frequent on the Northwest coast. In the stories we are examining, with their complex two-move structures this primitive form is particularly evident. But it is equally present in the simple story of the Beaver (where the bear story is only a part of a more elaborate myth).

The primitive form is actualized in the core of the myth, what I have called the extended main episode. Our complex and sophisticated Bear Mother story, according to the primitive form it realises has two main episodes, falls into two halves, and tells to all intents and purposes two stories. The first is the story of the bear; it is the male half of the tale as a whole (bear as husband). From the girl's betrayal to her recognition by her brothers the hero of the tale is the bear. The second is the story of the girl. It is the female half of the tale as a whole (sister as bear). From the bother's decision to play at bear to
the end when she is seen high upon on the mountains with her cubs the
heroine of the tale is the girl. As I have said, the male half is the
benevolent face of the bear, the female half the malevolent face of the
bear. As bear husband the bear is loving to the extent that he sacri­
fices himself for his kin. As bear sister the bear is an avenger, dis­
penser of an awful justice, and holder of a power far greater than men's
(Bear Mother). The basic pattern is surely that which we have already
seen in the names of the "supernatural ones" called on in the Kwakiutl
prayers and the name of the ritual power: Healing and Pestilence Woman.
Only here a further division into male and female is added, as in the
Chinese Yin and Yang.

This basic form is monolithic and paradoxical. In the narrative,
however, it becomes articulated. Hero and heroine, male and female, are
antagonistic and have antagonists. The antagonists are in each part of
the story the hunters. The hunters are also "brothers", brothers of the
bear and of their sister. The primitive form of the story (the form
articulated into the requirements of narrative) contains men and bears,
brothers and sisters. The pattern of this primitive form is that the
girl-as-wife identifies with the hunters and causes the death of the bear,
and the girl-as-sister identifies with the bear and causes the death of the
hunters. We have seen that this was the pattern not only in our stories
but in Ridington's very different story. This narrative pattern clearly
again contains a paradox, as does the basic form. We cannot solve it,
we have to accept it simply as given, as the "rules of the game" for this
story. But we can see that it must have to do with other rules, the
rules of conduct in a hunting society. In the deployment of actors we
see the taboos of an archaic society: hunting rules and menstruation
taboos, marriage rules and incest taboos.
Seeing the link between the two kinds of rule does not explain anything; the taboos are just as much primitive forms as the givens of the story. But taboos involve actions; they are not iconic representations like the subject heroes. Actions lend themselves to rationalizations. The ancient taboos that are inherent in the deployment of actors and which even we can still see, may not have any "meaning", at least they are unfathomable, to us and to the narrators. But it is through this link that the narrators can actualise their story and that we can analyse it. The ancient taboos, whatever they are, are constantly translated into rules of conduct in contemporary circumstances. Approval and disapproval are distributed, actions are marked with plusses and minusses. With the help of these markings the myth maker translates the primitive forms into a narration. The markings do not appear in the story, they are in the minds of the myth maker and his audience and guide the story line, connecting episodes and appointing proportions. As such they are difficult to get for the outsider. They have, however, their own expressive form; they appear as suggestive witticisms or word play. We do not exactly connect rules of conduct with wit, and I am not suggesting that they appear as jokes, though their logical form gives them an affinity to jokes and riddles. But it is a fact that in oral traditions (proverb, story, song) moral judgments appear in conceptually and verbally witty forms. This wit is like a second grid, overlaying the ununderstandable and unchangeable primitive forms, giving them a quickness of meaning, but itself probably quick to change its meaning with changes in moral attitudes. (The change is almost untestable because the collecting of oral traditions is almost always also the death of oral traditions.) Both grids are ordering devices for the story, the first unchangeable, the second changeable but still traditional, because it reflects the moral beliefs of the commu-
Both belong to the traditional equipment of the good story
teller. But it is the second that makes the first intelligible to us.

One of the important moral notions that connects part 1 and part 2 of the BM story is the notion of the good hunter. In the longest version of the story, which we shall discuss in the next section, the notion becomes a rival theme, and the good hunter a rival hero of the bear. In the core version, however, the notion simply quickens the story with meaning, and if the good hunter appears as a figure at all he has a subservient role. The notion of the good hunter is realised in a pun on the word "to play", which occurs in two key positions, in the first and second main episodes, and functions to bind the two parts together. "To play" as a term in hunting means to kill an animal. (It has also a sexual meaning, and that the respective preys of men and women are called "wives" and "husbands" is relevant here, as well as the cross-culturally more stable association of women with game). Such playing is done by rules and the players have to know the rules of the game. Now in native belief the animals themselves have taught men the rules (cf. Kwakiutl prayers) and stories like Bear Mother and Salmon Boy are simultaneously records of this teaching and descriptions of the game. Basically the rules are that men "treat the animals well", that is fulfil the ritual and practical prescriptions given them by the animals, and the animals let themselves be killed without fighting and without taking revenge. This arrangement has naturally a reverse side. If men ignore the rules, for instance do not fulfil their ritual obligations to honour the animals' remains or the practical ones of fighting with well-sharpened weapons then to "play" means that the animal kills the hunter.

In the first part of the Bear Mother story we have an origin-situation in which the hunters who come to kill the bear are still untaught and the
bear still belongs to those prototypical animals who once hunted men.
Yet through his wife and her children he has become the brother-in-law of
the hunters. He is caught in the conflict between the wish to "play" with
them and the wish to behave like a true brother-in-law and let himself be
killed, that is, play the game by the new rules, the covenant between
animals and men. The wife is the mediator between old and new. "'Be
good to your brothers-in-law' she says. Don't hurt any of them!' And
the bear says, he tells his wife 'I am going to play with my brothers-in-
law,' he says. He has a spear--sagat--up there on the roof. And that
thing there is really the teeth of the bear that he has up there ...
(version 2, p.26).

In exact apposition stands the sequence in the second part when the
brothers ask their sister to play with them. This time "play" does not
have the double meaning of killing and it is not important what word the
narrator uses here. The idea however is important: the brothers propose
(a) to play with the bearskin, a part of the bear which they have been told
to venerate (in some versions the taboo is shifted to laughing: they have
been told not to laugh at the bear and when they see their sister in the
skin, behaving like a bear, they laugh), (b) with their sister, an action
which seems to involve a hidden incest taboo connected with the sexual
meaning of play. In any case this play is the false cause of a series of
false effects. The whole sequence is in the deceptive mode. The brot-
hers think they are only playing, and use toy arrows. They think they
are hunters while they are, in fact, game. The rules of the game are
going against them. The sister, who has warned them: "I can't play that
I am a bear" and "I am going to be a bear for good after you have finished
playing with me" is forced to act automatically and against her will once
she has changed into a bear. Almost all the narrators stress "she could
not help herself", and one adds "tears ran down her face".

It is however, only the episode of the youngest brother (which appears in only 4 of the 11 versions) that fully explains her behaviour in terms of the play on "play". One of the rules of playing with animals (given by the animals themselves, as we saw in the SB myth) is that weapons should be prepared that are sharp and effective when the animals arrive at their playground (Kwakiutl term for fishing site). The youngest brother sees that the being that comes out of the wood to his playground is not their sister but a bear. He changes his spruce bark arrows for copper ones. He shoots at her and hits her in the throat. This cannot kill her because she is a spirit, but because he knows how to "play" she spares him, again strictly according to the rules of the game.

The youngest brother is an impersonation of the good hunter, used as a foil to show off the bad hunters. This use of foil is fully developed in the longest version which I shall discuss next. Here it sharpens the play on "play": bad hunters do not know how to "play", good hunters know.

The whole grid of rules kept and rules broken, conduct evaluated positively or negatively according to traditional usage fits precisely over the grid made by the primitive form. We remember that the primitive forms of the BM story were the iconic one of the two faces of the bear, and the narrative one of the girl as wife identifying with the hunters and causing the death of the bear and the girl as sister identifying with the bear and causing the death of the hunters. As the rules of his game they pose two problems to the narrator, (1) how to show the two faces of the bear by clearly distinguishing the one from the other (a problem shared by the artist in wood or paint and by the producer of ritual); (2) how to make the behaviour of the girl intelligible (a narrator's problem). The rules of conduct that order the hunting society provide a solution for both
at once. (1) Right conduct = right relation between bear and hunters (and secondarily between hunters and sister because the woman partakes in the nature of the bear) marks the face of the bear "benevolent"; wrong conduct marks it "malevolent". Conduct thus serves both as distinguishing mark and as intelligible distinction. (2) The same rules explain the paradoxical behaviour of the girl as wife and sister. As wife she helps the bear realise the new order between men and animals. The tragedy of his death is mitigated by the fact that through the ritual, which she teaches the hunters, he will be able to regenerate himself. As sister she plays the role of arbiter and judge guarding the rules that enable men and animals to live together. She holds this office as "sister", because a sister goes away to connect one in a lawful and peaceful way with outsiders who would in the ordinary state of affairs be one's enemies. "Sister" can therefore in principal stand for a guardian of the laws that connect one with beings other than oneself.\textsuperscript{43}

I sum up with a schematic table of decisions and rules in which + stands for right, - for wrong.\textsuperscript{44}
TABLE XI

Part 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Events</th>
<th>Marks</th>
<th>Reasons for marks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Decision of bear to &quot;play&quot; with his brothers-in-law</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>his adversaries are his kin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision of bear not to &quot;play&quot;</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>animals give themselves to hunters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bear teaches wife rules of game</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bear plays the game by dying</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sister teaches brothers rules of game</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sister returns home</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Part 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Events</th>
<th>Marks</th>
<th>Reasons for marks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Decision of brothers to play with their sister</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>incest taboo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision of brothers not to &quot;play&quot; (i.e. decision to use toy arrows)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>sister is bear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bear plays the game by killing</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>(a) retribution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(b) result of broken contract</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(c) hunters who do not know how to &quot;play&quot; are game</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youngest brother's decision to &quot;play&quot; (i.e. to use real arrows)</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>sister is bear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bear's decision to spare youngest brother</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>good hunter, knows when to &quot;play&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sister departs permanently for bear world and becomes Bear Mother</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

C The Longest Version

The longest version is the core version changed slightly in part 1. Instead of all the brothers killing the bear together and finding their sister incidentally the brothers compete in trying to find their sister and killing the bear. The youngest succeeds while the others fail.
One would think that such a slight plot variation would make little difference, but it changes the message structure fundamentally. One of the basic notions connected with the two faces of the bear is that of retributive justice. It could be expressed as "he who kills must be killed". We have found the same notion underlying the division in the SB tales in the form of "he who eats must be eaten". Now in the longest version of the BM story he who kills in part 1—the superior brother—is precisely not he who is killed in part 2 but he who is saved (again on account of his superiority). In this way the centre is shifted from bilaterally symmetrical division to repetition in another key.

There are two examples of the longest version in McClellan's collection (versions 1 and 2, pp.15--27) both told by knowledgeable old men, one of whom has closer associations to the coastal Tlingit, the other to the Inland Athapascans (p.24). The version can therefore not be blamed on the narrator getting his stories mixed up (of which the older of the two men was apparently sometimes accused, p.15) nor on regional variation. We must accept it as coming from men who were both authorities on their own culture (especially the older, who called himself a shaman), and who had been successful hunters all their lives.

In this version the good hunter is introduced as subject hero. We have already met him as the youngest brother who knows how to "play" when confronted by a bear. Here he moves into the centre of the story. To realise the impact of such a shift of emphasis we must remember that the retributonal justice of the core version has universal application and that the actors in that drama are type figures standing for every man. The salient characteristic of the good hunter is that he is different from other men. His difference is characterised in two ways: by election (unknown to others he is akin to a supernatural being), and by self-
discipline and training. The two go together: the good hunter trains in special, more effective ways because he is elected, but he is also elected because of the superior concentration and seriousness of his training. The object of his training, the game animal, in our story the bear (himself a shaman), knows that the good hunter is stronger than he is and submits voluntarily to him.

Part 1 and Part 2 of our story are therefore not any longer connected by the formula: he who kills the bear shall die by the bear but instead by: he who can kill the bear shall be spared by the bear. The first formula has universal application because all men are guilty of the killing of animals if only by eating them. The second puts the stress on abilities that can only be developed by the individual and inside the individual. Everyone has these abilities but they are developed unevenly by men.

The two formulas express different points of view about hunting. Both points of view may exist in the same society, and are not contradictory, but they cannot exist without trouble in the same story. The story of the good hunter makes for a basically different pattern: the deployment of actors is not any longer bear versus hunters, but good hunter (+ bear) versus bad hunters. Nevertheless the two narrators who tell the longest version have tried to combine the core myth with the myth of the good hunter. Considering the formal difficulties they are surprisingly successful. There is a hiatus where one would expect it, in the first main episode, where the theme of retribution has to be prepared for if one wants to tell the core myth with its general message. If the bear has been killed by the youngest brother alone, the elder brothers must be somehow involved in the killing. The first narrator solves this crux brilliantly if my reading of the text is right (p.19) by extending the
episode, shifting from killing to eating. Only the youngest can climb the steep mountain side to the bear den. The elder ones come near because they have heard his dogs but must wait below. The carcass of the bear rolls down. The sister tells the brother(s) that the bear is their brother-in-law, must be treated ritually, and is good to eat. "You skin the bear good. That's your brother-in-law, i Kani! ... Treat him good. It's good to use to eat' she said". When they have skinned the bear they eat a communal meal of his ribs. Having successfully dealt with this crux, the narrator is in trouble because he has to deal now with the sister's recognition by the youngest brother. He therefore says "wrong here" (p.19) and goes back to before the youngest brother has met up with the older brothers. All the brothers have now been involved in the death of the bear as eaters. The communal meal of "one side of the ribs" has ritual connotations and reminds one of the episode in NSB where the father invites all his friends to eat the Salmon Boy, whom he has caught and killed as a salmon. (Their meal is an image of the first salmon ceremonial, in which the individual guilt of killing is distributed to all in a communal meal). In the other text of the longest version there is a confusion of pronouns at the critical point. The brothers reach the den together. The context clearly suggests that the youngest brother alone kills the bear. But the text runs: "As soon as he runs out, they i.e. the younger brother? kill the bear". (p.26). The difficulty over English pronouns is here not just the usual linguistic one but also conceptual.

A hiatus at this point suggests a semantic overloading of the first part. Propp in his Morphology has a brief note, which is relevant here, on the rare cases in which two functions that are mutually exclusive are employed in one move (1968: 102). For the Russian fairy tale they are
"struggle with the villain and victory over him" and "difficult task and its solution". Disregarding the moral valuations of the fairytale, struggle-victory might well describe the fight with the bear, and task-solution the youngest brother's secret training, his finding the sister and killing the bear, while his elder brothers fail at the same task. Task-solution could also describe the second main episode, in part 2, which has the character of a riddle with the main clue hidden: that the sister is a bear. Only the youngest brother gets the clue and acts on it. Now Propp in the same passage asserts that the tale which has in one move a fight and the other a difficult task (in this order) is "the basic type of all tales". "But in speaking about Russian fairytales" he says "we are compelled to say that today this is the tale to which all the tales of our class are traced". (pp.103--104). The core version of the BM story, it would seem belongs to that class. In this case Propp's morphology may have far more general applications and should be examined for them. The longest version, however, would seem to prove that the combination of the two functions in one move, which Propp considered a violation of the rule because it occurred only three times in a hundred tales, also make up a tale-type. Obviously a difficult one to tell, but possible with thought and skill. Part 1: task set for all brothers. Leads to struggle-victory as solution. Youngest brother succeeds. Shares victory (in form of communal eating of vanquished) with others. Attached to victory is a moral obligation which all are charged to keep. Part 2: all disregard obligation. Result: all are faced with a new task. Youngest brother succeeds in solving it correctly. Others are destroyed by their ignorance. Here struggle-victory in part 1 leads to task-solution in part 2 as in the core myth. The hunters who have been victorious are tested. They fail. At the same time solution of a task in part 1 leads
to the solution of the task in part 2, and the one who has succeeded in the first succeeds in the second. The combination is possible if the emphasis is shifted from the moral preoccupation (guilt-retribution) to a psychological one (extraordinary powers). Such a shift seems to represent an attempt at solving the problem of guilt-retribution, and is as such clearly of the greatest importance for our examination of the origin of the thought of the Winter in the thought of the Summer. Again, where we have structural irregularity, a "thickening" of conceptual possibilities partly contradictory to one another and a resulting opaqueness in the message we have also a new departure in thought.

Assuming such a shift of emphasis, task-solution would not be a separate function but an internalization of struggle-victory. The struggle takes place inside, and the enemy to be overcome is the self. Abstinence (fasting, continence) and discipline (training) make the hunter into a man of extraordinary powers. The outside enemy dissolves—-he goes over to the hunter, becomes a friend. The bear gives himself to the youngest brother who has observed the proper preparatory rites. One of the songs which the bear-wife hands on to her brothers in the longest version as part of the bear’s testament goes: "I went through every one of those young people/and the last brother—/I know he did the right thing." The translation (the narrator’s own) may be clumsy but the meaning is clear, as it is in his comment: "And he [the bear] dreams that the last one is going to get him. So he can’t help it. When he finds him, he comes right out and gives himself up." (p.27). This is a shamanistic conception of how the dilemma can be resolved; and the wit or word-play that formally connects part 1 and part 2 in the longest version stems directly from a shamanistic view of the world. It is a play on "seeing" and on "light", on "being asleep" and on "dreaming".
We remember that in the second main episode the youngest brother proved himself a good hunter because he could see that his sister was really a bear. He could see when the others were blind, and he knew (how to "play") when they were ignorant. In the longest version the difference between the seeing youngest brother and the unseeing eldest brother is made quite clear:

When they come to the place where the bears were the place where they were going to play with their sister a bear came out feeding on berries. And those four brothers went after it. And first they put spruce bark points on their arrows. And the youngest of the brothers looked, and it didn't look like his sister. Every place there were real bears walking. They never put those bear skins on their backs. The younger brother sees that they are full bears. He told his oldest brother: "That's not our sister. Can't you see it? It's different from our sister. That is a grown bear. Watch out!" So they walked close to it, and after a while the oldest brother shot his bow and arrow. And just as soon as she heard the bow and arrow make a noise like that, she jumped on the boys.
(p.23)

This difference between the brother who can "see" and the others who are blind is prepared for in a paradoxical way. In part 1 the four brothers go out to find their sister and kill the bear. The three elder brothers are active hunters who go out one after the other, but fail. The youngest is always asleep. "The youngest kid is always sleeping. When the oldest brother comes back and his kid brother is sleeping yet he says, 'You're no good. Do you think you are going to get your sister?'". The youngest brother's sleep is, however, more effective than the older one's wakefulness. The narrator tells us that he first "wishes to himself" that he might get his sister and then "knows" it. When his day comes, he goes straight to the bear's den (p.18--19). In this version the youngest brother does not train. There is however an implicit link with a motif that is frequent on the coast: that of the despised younger brother (or poor boy or orphan) secretly training while...
the others think he is asleep. The theme of the duality of appearance and reality is in its turn usually linked to the two sides of the extraordinary man: that he is extraordinary by (hidden) election and by training. What seems to others sleep is concentration of powers.

Exactly the same combination of "seeing" and sleeping is found in the bear, except that the bear as a supernatural being needs no training and no election. He has what the youngest brother achieves. He "sees" the brothers starting out looking for him, and like the youngest brother knows the future, for he tells his wife "your brothers will kill me". In most versions he dreams that they will kill him. (The theme of prophetic seeing and dreaming is by no means limited to the longest version, it is only fully developed in it.) The bear's dream corresponds to the youngest brother's sleep. Knowledge and seeing comes to them when they are by normal standards unknowing and unseeing. The second narrator of the longest version adds the interesting image of light. To appreciate it we must keep in mind that the bear who dreams in the dark cave of his death is, throughout the collection, associated with the sun. His skin and his head must be exposed in the memorial ritual to the sun in the right way. When the girl leaves for ever as a bear she takes the way of the sun. In this version the brothers all train but only the youngest trains properly (p.27 end). Training makes their minds like light. The narrator uses "flashlight", and the image is of a spotlight "feeling" the mountains.

Way before that the bear saw what his brothers-in-law were doing ... Before he starts out, the bear tells his wife, "Your oldest brother is coming after us!" The bear knows when he leaves home. And when the brother was coming closer he has something in his mind just like a flashlight. And the bear just gets ahold of it and he shoves that thing out. He did that with three of those boys. *gatuqu* ... is the mind of a person ... And finally the bear tells his wife: "The younger of your brothers is going to go this morning, and it looks as if he is going to get us," he
said.... And not very long after that, that man's mind comes. The bear shoves the young man's mind out of the cave. But not very long after it comes again. He tries it three times, and he can't make it. The third [sic] time that mind comes inside that place there, the bear never shoves that person's mind out. (pp.25--26)

Obviously the youngest brother has finally achieved the same powers of seeing as the bear. As the bear can see him in his house so he can see the bear in his den. He is therefore able to find the bear. But why does the bear come out to be killed by him and does not fight? (a point stressed by the first narrator). Apparently as the boy knows (in his sleep) that he will find his sister, so the bear knows (through his dreams) that he will be killed by the boy. Seeing and knowing go together, as in the second main episode where to be able to see the reality hidden to others meant also the knowledge how to cope with it.

Seeing and knowing then makes the bear and the good hunter equals, the bear through native power, the hunter through acquired power. But the powers of seeing and knowing are so complete that they make them more than equals, they make them friends who, because they see perfectly, work together for the same end. In the figure of the good hunter the longest version resolves the dilemma of the relation between men and animals. It is resolved not on the plane of natural justice--blood for blood--but a more ideal justice: as the hunter gives himself (that is gives himself up as an ordinary human being, gives up normal desires and inclinations), the animal will give itself. The Kwakiutl initiation ritual accepts the same logic but reverses it: as we accept the voluntary death of the animals in the Summer so must we give ourselves voluntarily to the spirits in the Winter. (The spirits in their turn have much in common with "the medicine animals, the bosses"). The longest version with its human figure who is equal to a supernatural figure, and its imagery of seeing and light
is of all the versions closest to the initiation myth in which the human hero becomes one with the spirit. However, in spite of all approximations to the initiation myth, one essential difference remains: in the hunting myth the voluntary death of the animal stands at the centre, in the initiation myth the voluntary death of the human being.

A formal summing up will show that the play on "seeing" makes a structural grid for the longest version. To see is used in the sense of seeing with the inner eye, perfect seeing or prophetic seeing. This kind of seeing is used in three different ways in the myth (1) conjunctively to connect man and "supernatural one", (2) disjunctively to separate them, and (3) discriminatively, to distinguish "seeing" from seeing. In part 1 the good hunter and the bear "see" as one and therefore act as one. The hunter's wish to kill the bear is the bear's wish to give himself to the hunter. In part 2 "seeing" separates the good hunter and the bear; it makes the good hunter use sharp arrows and the bear leave for ever. This episode also distinguishes the brother who "sees" from those who merely see (a form of blindness). Finally in the middle of the story "seeing" and seeing are harmoniously distributed between sister and younger brother. The sister who is a supernatural being after her sojourn with the bear can "see" and guides her brother's seeing, which, with her help, is effective.

That same spring she tells her younger brother who got her that she wants to have a good time bear hunting. She tells her brother: "I see smoke, ik [younger brother], bear smoke." ... "Where" her brother asks. "Out there. You see that tree standing up? Right there. You go there and look for it." He goes and sees a bear right there every time she says that. ... Just the woman can see the smoke. Nobody else can see it. (p.20)

A table will show the structural grid based on "seeing":
TABLE XII

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Girl insults bear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journeys to bear world</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Betrays den to youngest brother</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youngest brother's training enables him to &quot;see&quot; bear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bear teaches wife rules</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bear lets himself be killed by youngest brother who can &quot;see&quot; him</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wife teaches brothers rules</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returns to human world. Aids youngest brother in bear hunt with her ability to &quot;see&quot; bears.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brothers play with bear skin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bear kills elder brothers who cannot &quot;see&quot; him</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youngest brother saved by his ability to &quot;see&quot; bear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returns to bear world</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Girl becomes Bear Mother</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Summary

1) Armature: The myths I have discussed form a group by virtue of their armature. A threefold movement brings a subject hero from this world to the world of the animals, back to this world, and to the world of the animals again.

2) Message: Within this group each short myth is complete and says something unique to itself. But each short myth also says something that can only be understood in relation to the long version or cycle.

(a) Short Versions: the myths deal with a problem peculiar to hunting: the problem of guilt and retribution in men's relation to
the animals. The problem stems from the real life dilemma that men have to kill in order to live. The short versions take up facets of the problem and attempt to solve the problem on a manageable scale. Such facets are:

the making of a contract with the animals
the fortifying of man so that he becomes the equal of the animals
the re-integration of men that have been with the animals

(b) Long Versions: the group of myths that share the same armature falls into two subgroups, salmon myths and bear myths (SB and BM myths).
Stable throughout the group: the hunter who kills the prey in part 1 becomes himself prey in part 2. This suggests that the idea of justice is central to the myth.

Subgroups of long versions

(A) Stable throughout the salmon versions: the "prey" of the hero in part 1 is a salmon; in part 2 the hero is killed as a salmon. Formulated in general terms: the hunter is killed in the form of his victim (when he assumes this form).

\[
\frac{\text{hero as hunter}}{\text{salmon}} = \frac{\text{hero as salmon}}{x \text{ as hunter}}
\]

(B) Stable throughout the bear versions: the hunter in part 1 is man, his prey the bear; in part 2 the bear is the hunter and his prey man. In general terms: the prey becomes the hunter.

\[
\frac{\text{hunter}}{\text{bear}} = \frac{\text{bear}}{\text{hunter}}
\]

where the denominator of part 1 becomes the numerator of part 2 and vice versa.

This is also the formula for the initiation tale where, in the mutual
eating of spirit and initiate = hero

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{spirit} \\
\text{initiate}
\end{array} = \begin{array}{c}
\text{initiate} \\
\text{spirit}
\end{array}
\]

(C) **Comparison:** the difference between the subgroups is dependent on the difference between the animal protagonists of the subgroups.

(a) Salmon = food. Where justice reverses the relationship men therefore become food (= salmon). The eater eaten. (b) Bears are game, but they are the only game that can reverse the relationship between hunter and hunted. They are dangerous; they are also the rivals of men in "hunting" salmon and berries. When justice reverses the relationship men therefore not only become game but bears hunters. The hunter hunted and the game as hunter.

Both formulations express a problematic relation between men and animals. On the level of the relation between men and animals the problem cannot be resolved. But both formulations enter also into the initiation myth where they express a problematic relation to the self and between men. Transposed to that level the problem seems to be capable of resolution.

3) **Significance of mediator figures: a comparison**

The conception of justice on which the myths centre is not clearly explicit in their content. The myths deal with justice through their form. The conception of justice expressed in the form is a primitive conception of mechanical retribution. This conception comes out in the symmetry of the myth; it also expresses an underlying philosophical view of the absolute nature of necessity and the uneluctability of fate. The significance of the figures of the mediator and the good hunter lies in the fact that in them this view is questioned. This connects these figures with the
initiate and the animal-spirits of the tsetseqa.

(a) Mediator. The mediator figures introduce a modification of the conception of justice as mechanical and ineluctable retribution. Salmon Boy and Bear Mother are human beings who sacrifice a part of their humanity in order to assimilate a part of animal nature, and so come closer to the animals than men can normally hope to do. This sacrifice of their humanity (which the myths do not necessarily represent as voluntary) is meant to make a breach in the dividing line between men and animals, or, to use another image, it is shown to be the bridge on which the animals can cross to the human world. The principle of a modification of humanity for the sake of a closer connection with the animals introduces a more active element into the conception of justice: justice need not mean just retribution suffered passively but can be actively influenced by men. However, the fact that the myths represent this sacrifice of humanity as an etiological event weakens the active ingredient in the conception. Salmon Boy and Bear Mother are undoubtedly on one level meant to be paradigmatic—they are Everyman figures—but the etiological angle of the myth removes them to the past and so to speak fossilizes them as superhuman beings. They can in this guise arbitrate between men and animals in an altogether sovereign manner. On the one hand, that there is now such a figure watching over the salmon run, or over hunting in general, certainly gives men a more active part in their experience of the world. They themselves can now influence the working of justice through obeying the injunctions these figures have conveyed to them and over whose execution they watch. In observing the rules taught them, they are able to modify their own humanity in a small way. But on the other hand the fact that these figures of the past have made contact with the animals once and for all times, and
sacrificed their humanity for all men, also minimizes the scope of active involvement for the ordinary individual.

(b) **Good Hunter.** In this context, the introduction of the "good hunter" figure means a step towards a greater and more active human participation. It further modifies the mechanical conception of justice by introducing a principle of control over experience that is open to everyone. This is the principle of "training"--of establishing the connection between men and animals through an effort at self-discipline. The significance of this step lies not only in the fact that training is a possibility of which everyone who has the strength of mind can avail himself, but also in the related fact that though it entails a considerable sacrifice of the hunter's humanity, it allows him to remain a member of the human community. In the figure of the good hunter, then, the more significant step towards "taking responsibility for one's own fate", to use Bellah's phrase, has been made. The hunter figure represents the possibility that through self-denial and the rejection of the pleasures of sociability one gains a strength of concentration (possibly in the sense of "being oneself") that equals that of the animals. With this one has gained participation in their nature; one can divine their wishes and, hopefully, coordinate the necessities of human existence with the wishes of the animals. Basically both the superhuman figure of the mediator and the human figure of the good hunter are attempts to resolve the dilemma inherent in the relation to the animals, or to overcome the nature/culture dichotomy through an act of participation.

(c) **Comparison hunter-initiate.** Many features connect the "good hunter" of our myths with the initiate of the winter ritual. It is important to show the closeness of the connection in order to bring out the full scope of the contrast that divides them. Like the good hunter
the initiate removes himself from human contact voluntarily. He sacrifices his humanity even more drastically (though more temporarily) than the hunter. I have mentioned above that the initiate modifies his human nature ecstatically, while the hunter modifies his ascetically, but in fact no sharp dividing line can be drawn between the two. Though the hunter generally uses self-disciplinary measures there is an element of "unrepression" in his training that aligns his method with those of the initiate. In our myths, the youngest brother's immoderate sleeping is an example which can be compared to the bed-wetting, soiling, dirtiness and laziness of other powerful world-renewing or society-renewing personalities of myth. Conversely, the initiate is not just "unrepressed" but trains in his isolation through fasting and purifications.

Yet the initiate is divided from the good hunter by a decisive further step in the direction of "taking responsibility for one's own fate". It is only in the initiate that the shift from a passive acceptance of experience to an active participation in experience is completed. This could be done because the initiate belongs to what one might call a philosophical way of looking at the world where a clear nature/culture distinction has been made, as it has been made in the Kwakiutl distinction between baxus and tsetseqa. With this distinction the realm of necessity, where experience is determined, becomes clearly defined, and this definition promotes an apprehension of the areas where men have finally "the possibility of creating a form of experience they desire and freeing themselves symbolically from what they must otherwise passively endure", to use Lienhardt's formulation. The superhuman mediator and the good hunter figures of the hunting myth are approximations to this possibility. But the effort to transcend necessity they represent is doomed because the difference between experiences that can be dominated by men and those
that cannot has not been clearly understood. There is no realistic way in which men can close the gap between themselves and the animals, and resolve the dilemma that forces them to kill and eat their friends. The step from the figure of the hunter to that of the initiate—a very small step in representational terms— involves the shift from preoccupation with the possibility of freedom of action in the extra-human world to that possibility in the intra- and interhuman world. According to Kwakiutl understanding, the social world is the area where men are free to shape their experience and are, indeed, responsible for the proper shaping of it. This "social world", where men are for part of the year free from the constricting interaction with the extra-human world is the tsetseqa.

(d) Comparison mediator figure and winter dance spirit

In this context the difference between the mediator figure of the hunting myths and the cannibalistic and gift-giving figure of the initiation myth becomes important. The two kinds of figure are so close and the conceptual overlap between them is so great that the areas of distinction need pointing out. The shift I have mentioned above from a preoccupation with the extra-human world to a preoccupation with the intra- and interhuman world makes it necessary to translate the animals into spirits so that they can express metaphorically the problems of psychic and social integration. The mediator figures of hunting myths are also "translated" animals, but with a distinction. In figures like the Salmon Boy and the Bear Mother men have tried to transcend necessity by fusion with the animals. In these figures the human is amalgamated with the extra-human in an attempt to overcome the dilemma that divides men from the extra-human. This attempt, we have said, is doomed to failure. By contrast the animal-spirits of the winter dance are figures that express
the distinction between men and the extra-human world. They do this on
the symbolic level of the scheme of guilt and amendment and on the
psychological level, where they assist toward an overcoming of fear. As
"hunters of men" the animal spirits stand clearly over against men as
embodiments of guilt towards the animals and of the desire to make amends.
There is no attempt here to bridge the gap between men and animals by an
amalgamation.

The animals are conceived, here, as in the hunting myths, as having
a "gentle" (benevolent) side and a "wild" (malevolent) one. In the
tsetseqa the wild side of the animal is translated into a human metaphor.
The animal spirits meet the initiate as embodiments of his own fear. I
interpret this fear as being basically a fear of himself. If he identi-
fies with the animal spirit this is not a man-animal fusion but an attempt
to overcome the horror of oneself in an animal image. On the other hand
this act of courage also links man to the animal in its gentle aspect.
The initiate's act of courage, which ultimately benefits his community,
parallels the animal's act of courage in giving itself to man for his
sustenance. The animal gives itself to man within the natural sphere,
where it is conceived as being able to act freely. In emulating the
animal in the social sphere--the only sphere where man is conceived as
able to act freely--the initiate in some measure repays the animal. His
emulation, because of the shift of levels it involves, is not of the
order of a participation but is based on a distinction.

I shall discuss the connection between the animal of the baxus world
of the Summer, as it is represented in prayers and welcoming rituals, and
the animal spirits of the testseqa in the next chapter. Especially the
last section, "The Myth of the Ritual" is relevant to this summary, as
is also the Epilogue.
Footnotes

1. I base this statement mainly on the fact that transitional myths, in which the animals from being game turn into initiators, and givers of the winter ritual are typically Kwakiutl. See my discussion of two such myths in the Epilogue.

2. "Type" and "anti-type" belong to exegetical terminology. The anti-type fulfills or completes the type (Christ the anti-type of Adam). In our case ecstatic and ascetic are therefore not simply opposites but have points in common. The good hunter of the Bear Mother story, though he disciplines himself also shows signs of "unrepression", for instance he sleeps while his brothers work, see 3(c) below.

3. All resolution of the nature/culture dilemma seems to be achieved by this recipe. The hero (or heroine) of the hunting myth who becomes the master of animals figure at the end of the myth also achieves his vital synthesis through a sacrifice of his humanness. He becomes, one might say "the perfect animal" to the initiate's the "perfect man".


8. The results of Lévi-Strauss' analysis are summed up at the end of his chapter, pp.148--50.

9. See Demetracopoulou and Du Bois 1932: 392 on the reaction of different narrators to the recording situation.

10. Paul Radin in The Trickster (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1956) comments on the fact that variability is not due to mistaken telling but that a significant difference in what is told is established.

11. See Catherine McClellan, The Girl Who Married the Bear (Ottawa: National Museums of Canada, 1970). One of the narrators' complaints that come up again and again is that there is not enough time to tell the story properly. Cf. for instance p.15: "Before beginning with the story itself, Jake explained how hard it was to find a short story to tell. Some stories require two or three full days, because they fit together like intertwined fingers (Jake demonstrated). Part way through his narrative he informed us that he was cutting this story short so that he could finish it during the afternoon".

13 I do not think a distinction between long version and cycle can be usefully made, and use the words interchangeably. On this point, and on a reversal of Radin's point, that is a field situation in which former cycles are disintegrating into short myths, see Demetracopoulou and Du Bois 1932: 380.

14 Univ. of Washington Publications in Anthropology, 2 (1928), 129--173.

15 The work of eminent folklorists has made it clear that (if put in culture-free terms) we have here a basic pattern typical of European folktales. Cf. Propp, Meletinksy, Greimas. A.J. Greimas classifies them as "dramatic narratives" which are all dichotomised into a before versus and after. See "The Interpretation of Myth", in *Structural Analysis of Oral Traditions*, ed. Pierre Maranda (Philadelphia: Univ. of Pennsylvania Press, 1971), p.83.


17 See also Greimas 1971: 83 (3) for a more abstract definition of this meta-group.

18 SB stories have, surprisingly, what could be called a bird-hunting code. Cf. BM stories, which have a berrying code (see 3(a) below). Many SB myths, especially of the northern coast, begin with a bird hunt, as does indeed BBSB. Cf. also the hole guarded by the eagle in BBSB, the eagle hunt in TSB, and SB as a swan in NSB.

19 Cf. the "ghost stories" in *Kwakiutl Tales* (Boas 1910) and *Kwakiutl Tales, New Series* (Boas 1943).

20 Cf. the world centre, Chapter 2, 4(a).


23 Levi-Strauss remarks on the interesting point of salmon as husband in "Asidwal", in *The Structural Study of Myth and Totemism*, ed. Edmund Leach (London: Tavistock, 1967), p.31. He does not raise an even more interesting point: why do the men treat the salmon they fish for as wives (cf. marriage to Salmon Woman) while women treat the salmon they cut and prepare as husbands? The difference between male and female food is culturally important. Men give female food to women, women male food to men. Neither should hunt or gather food of the same sex. But only the salmon is treated as male and female food: given to the women as female food to cut, given back to the men as male food to be eaten. See also n.29 below on this subject.

25 *American Anthropologist* n.s., 28 (1926), 1--175.

26 It is interesting in the light of modern psychology that this "mother" is a life and death figure, not unlike Healing and Pestilence Woman. The verbal paradox is missing but the concept is present, as our analysis will show.

27 The idea of the bear as mother of all living beings seems to be still alive among the Indians. Wilson Duff has a poem from a Tlingit student which expresses it beautifully. Personal communication.

28 "Code" as defined by Lévi-Strauss in the *Savage Mind* as a "means of fixing significations by transposing them into terms of other significations" (1966: 172).

29 Ideally, then, the sexes given one another their husbands and wives for food. For a discussion of the symbolism involved see Eric Schwimmer's "Objects of Mediation: Myth and Praxis", in *The Unconscious in Culture*, ed. Ino Rossi (New York: Dutton, 1974), 209--237.


31 Cf. however the treatment given to excrement in the Kwakiutl story "The Girl Who Married the Grizzly Bear" (Curtis 1915: 271) and the equivalent Tlingit myths. There excrement is not food but money and the valuable stuff is not the bears' but the girl's. The treatment one might say is not rational but Freudian.


33 Cf. Kwakiutl prayers (for instance Boas 1930: 191) where the bear is addressed as "friend". Friend is literally "one of us" and it was the word the Kwakiutl used for fellow members of the *namima*.


36 Jolles calls them Wortgebärde, word gesture.

38. This is why, when we do not understand the second grid, we supply ourselves a new one. Roland Barthes has based a theory of criticism on that fact.

39. The authority given for the second grid is usually that this is what the old people did, said, or thought. But under the circumstances of myth telling "what the old people did" can be taken as the contemporary ideal.

40. An index of excellence of McClellan's narrators is that they are capable of word play in English, though it is a language hardly any of them know well. When the appropriate verbal play cannot be imitated they use paraphrasing, to make the point clear.

41. Cf. Boas 1966: 158--9: "The killing of animals is sometimes called playing games with the fisherman or hunter who sends them back to their home".

42. In the other versions either all the brothers are killed (in retribution for the killing of the bear, as in the Beaver story and/or because they have broken the contact) or only the younger brothers, or the youngest are killed. In the latter case the assumption is presumably that only kids would be ignorant enough to defy the rules given by the bear.

43. Wilson Duff has suggested to me that under modern conditions the bear might stand for the white man. In the light of the functions of the secondary grid such an extension would be possible.

44. I am not suggesting that the explanations of the grid are the message of the myth. As rationalizations the explanations are unsubtle, and schematizing them as I have done makes them more unsubtle. The myth with its message is subtle.

45. My reading would have to be checked against McClellan's field MS.

46. All the figures discussed in this summary are mediator figures in a general sense, because all mediate between the human and a superhuman state of existence. I have, however, in the following discussion used the word specifically for the "master of the animals" figures of the Salmon Boy and the Bear Mother.

47. In the introduction to this chapter.


49. For the overlap see particularly mountain goat hunters' myths in Kwakiutl Texts (Boas and Hunt, 1905), also the mountain goat hunter's dance in the winter ritual in which Big Horn, master of the mountain goats appears in person. Big Horn is not a tsetseqa spirit in the developed sense but a transitional spirit whose gift is luck in hunting. Cf. Epilogue, Elxabae.
CHAPTER 4

THE KWAKIUTL SALMON RITUAL

1 Introduction

In this chapter I shall take up the problem of the relation between men and animals once more, this time through an examination of rituals that celebrate the coming of an animal to men. I shall concentrate on the first salmon ritual of the Kwakiutl. We should bear in mind however, that the salmon is not the only animal that is ritually venerated, and that ritual veneration is only one expression of a general pattern of behaviour towards all animals and plants killed for food. Some animals or plants are chosen to represent this pattern in ritual form, usually because of their material importance; and with this selection their conceptual significance becomes greater than that of others. But in principle they are specific instances through which a general attitude is expressed. In the Northwest coast area it is particularly the salmon, the bear and berries which are singled out for ritual treatment. The singling out of these three "intelligences", then, makes up a conceptual chain which binds the prayers, the hunting myths and the rituals together. We have found throughout our examination that salmon, bear and berries constitute what might be called test cases for thought in this area. In view of this, our first concern here must be to define in what way the approach through ritual differs from that of the prayers and the myths.

One thing that links prayers and myths together for all their heterogeneity, and contrasts them with the rituals, is that they are concerned with the relation of the individual to the animal. Rituals
organise collective life; they are therefore concerned with the relation of the group to the animal. In the prayers the individual Kwakiutl speaks to the animal he has met, and myths speculate about the effect of individual moral behaviour on the relation to animals. But in their ritual the Kwakiutl seem to think about how men as a group, as a species even (for the social group always stands implicitly for mankind) treat the animals with whom they interact in their daily life. The group represents the cultural system, which exceeds in generality and validity any question of individual behaviour. We may therefore hope that in examining the rituals we shall be able to come up with something that might be called a meta-statement on what is significant in the relation between man and animals. Though the statement itself is naturally culture-bound, the methods of extrapolating it involve an examination of the character and purpose of ritual in general, and this will be our secondary task in this chapter.

In turning from the myths to the rituals we must also return to some extent to the prayers. The salmon ritual includes prayers, and the ritual situation is not unlike that of the prayers. Both ritual and prayer celebrate a meeting with an animal, and both are formally prescribed occasions. Both bring about a slowing down of the tempo of practical life, and constitute pauses between event and event. Kwakiutl prayers are in fact considered by ethnologists to be rituals of the same order as the first salmon rite, only simpler. Gunther in her "Further Analysis of the First Salmon Ceremony" makes no explicit difference between the two. As the Oxford dictionary defines rite simply as "a formal procedure or act in a religious or other solemn performance", and ritual as "a prescribed order of performing religious and other devotional service" such inclusiveness cannot be gainsaid.
For our purpose it is more profitable to look for the differences. The most obvious difference, on which we have already touched, is that while the prayer is essentially a personal act the first salmon ritual is a communal one. We shall see below how the supplicant who prays to the animal during the ritual prays for the community, while the orant generally prays for himself. Another important difference is that while the prayer is a contemplation of an act, the ritual is an act itself. The prayer is spoken after the act of killing, sometimes before, and revolves this act in the mind. In the first salmon ritual people come together to eat the salmon. This is primarily a physical act though it fuses with an act of contemplation. And speaking of a physical act, it is important to realise that the ritual consists of common everyday actions: the cutting up, cooking and eating of the salmon. These everyday actions are lifted out of the ordinary, given a frame, and formalised into a feast. Taking account of the ordinariness of the action makes it possible to define a basic characteristic of the salmon ritual. An everyday action can be lifted up into a ritual action for two purposes. (1) In order to stand symbolically for something else. In the Eucharist, for instance, bread and wine point beyond: themselves, and the rite does not consider the action of eating and drinking. (2) In order to be emphasised, singled out and considered for its own sake. Here discontinuity is introduced into the stream of ordinary activity, and a bundle of actions, for instance the preparing and eating of salmon, which would pass normally unnoticed, is made significant. My example shows that I consider the first salmon ritual to be of this latter kind. It is a heightened experience of an everyday act, heightened by group participation and formality; and through this heightening, a consideration of its meaning is achieved.

But to pursue the difference between ritual and prayer further.
In the prayer the orant contemplates the act of killing the animal, and in self-justification and remorse communicates with the animal about it. He lays bare the dilemma which forces him to kill a friend and a "supernatural one" in words. The discrepancy between his action and his words is never fully resolved. The ritual goes further, is more drastic and uncompromising, along the same lines. The participants so to speak enact the dilemma. While the prayers speak of the need for food, in apology, the ritual is essentially the act of eating. The prayers assert only the personal need but the ritual demonstrates the universal need. This greater comprehensiveness of the ritual has two results. (1) Individual guilt is lightened by this demonstration of communal and even universal guilt. Society steps in, exonerating the individual. But by doing this it also negates the individual; it asserts his impotence and the power and competence of the group of which he is an "organic" part. The individual is not equipped to deal conclusively with the dilemma with which experience confronts him. Let it therefore be handed over to the group. In the communal meal, in sharing an animal's body with his fellow members, the individual symbolically confirms his physical and intellectual dependence on the group. To the extent that this takes place the group is unified through the ritual. (2) the group action of the first salmon ritual does not, however, resolve the dilemma that caused the original sense of guilt, but points it up sharply. Though individual guilt is absorbed in universal guilt, guilt is demonstrated more deliberately and drastically. The group is not competent to solve to problem. It is only competent, through the authority of a public institution, which the salmon ritual is, to focus on it in more generally valid terms. It is this focussing, as a group action, which seems to lead to the realization that the problem can only be dealt with by being internalized, that is resolved
within the individual. Resolution presupposes the willingness to pay recompense in the same drastic manner in which the original violence was committed. This can only be done through individuals, and it cannot be done contemplatively and privately, as in the apologies of the prayers but must be done publicly and actively, just as the first salmon ritual was a public and active demonstration of the dilemma. Resolution therefore means a shift back to the individual, who becomes again as important as he was as the original perpetrator of the act of violence. He is now the perpetrator of an act of courage which can only be an individual act. But resolution also means a further shift, back to the group which is communally redeemed by the individual's act of courage.

These two further shifts are not made in the Summer, when the salmon ritual takes place, but in the Winter. The society the individual relates to then is the winter dance society, that is a group whose members have all proven themselves competent individually. Here the former relation between individual and society is reversed: if amendment and resolution of the dilemma was possible on the individual level it is also possible on the communal one. The individual is therefore confirmed in this second society.

In this chapter I shall take the Kwakiutl first salmon ritual as an "incomplete version", completed only in the context of the Kwakiutl year, and I shall take Kwakiutl moral thought as a shifting of emphasis from the individual to the communal on two planes of experience, the external and the internal. In order to have a basis for this account in the social and ecological conditions of the Kwakiutl, we must briefly turn to the composition and functions of the group that celebrates the salmon ritual.
1(a) The Social Context of the Ritual

Among the Kwakiutl the social unit within which the first salmon ritual is celebrated is the namima. In this the Kwakiutl follow the pattern that is typical of the whole area in which the Pacific salmon is fished for and the ritual celebrated. Among these peoples, whatever their social organisation, it is invariably the economic group that fishes together that provides the unit for the ritual. The peculiar character of the Kwakiutl organization into namimas and tribe makes the significance of this fact stand out more clearly than it does among neighbouring peoples with organizations based more strictly on kinship units or more loosely on bands.

The nature of the Kwakiutl namima has already been discussed. It was basically economic: the namima was the household group. This group settled in the Summer in various sites where its members had an inherited right to do their fishing, sea-mammal hunting, berrying and land-hunting. The Bella Bella Salmon Boy story is an illustration of the localization of salmon fishing rights. When the Salmon Chief precisely describes the place where that first salmon weir is to be built in which Salmon Boy and his family are going to be caught he is defining the fishing site of Salmon Boy's namima. Not only the river but the place on the river is named. When, a little later on in the myth, the salmon disperse, every group going to a named river or creek, then this defines the sites at which, according to the narrator of the myth, the neighbouring namimas have a right to fish. The myth serves as a document for the group which owns it. It documents the legal right to fish for salmon in the place named by Salmon Chief, and it also maps out the legal sites of the neighbouring groups, all of which are enumerated as the destination of the dispersing salmon. Naturally the myths of different groups may conflict in details, but in principle a myth
like Salmon Boy is a legal and geographical "map" of a fishing area.

The actual fishing at these namima sites was done in separate family groups, and the catches were owned by the individual families which prepared and cured their own stores for the winter. The families had again their own places to fish in within the namima-owned area. But no family began to fish for itself when the salmon run was approaching. They all waited until the first salmon ritual had been celebrated. It marked the communal decision to fish. One of the men (among the Kwakiutl he did not need to be a chief) caught the first four salmon and his wife cut and prepared them. The couple then were hosts at a ritual which was in character a first fruit rite, and not essentially different from the berry and crab apple feasts at which neighbours and friends shared the first day's harvest of the season. The invocation which belonged to the ritual was made by the person highest in rank, in the name of all. The communal nature of this invocation is in striking contrast to ordinary prayers. Ordinary prayers are offered up in the name of an individual using the pronoun I, even if the orant is spokesman for a group. So the woman whose privilege it is to pick the first berries says: "I have come that I may take you ... for that is the reason why you have come ... that you may come and satisfy me; ... and this that you do not blame me for what I do to you. ... I mean this, that you may not be evilly disposed to me, friends. That you may only treat me well." (Boas 1930: 203). By contrast, the prayer offered upon the course of the ritual, while it is close in subject matter, is offered in the name of the group, the orant using "we": "Now we pray you, Supernatural Ones, to protect us from danger that nothing evil may happen to us when we eat you ... for that is the reason you come here, that we may catch you for food." (Boas 1921, I: 610).
It is clear that the danger every berry picker and salmon fisher faces individually as she or he pursue their work has become a danger faced communally in the ritual. In the ordinary prayer the danger is based on the guilt of killing, in the ritual on the guilt of eating. The guilt of eating, which could easily be as individual as that of killing, has been deliberately made communal by a shared ritual meal. Why was the group that was chosen for this insistent communality neither the family—the actual working group—nor the tribe—the ultimate ritual group—but the namima? We know that the namima is the autonomous political unit as well as the economic unit. It is structured by a hierarchy of ranks through which its economic work is organised and its political worth represented. It belongs to secular life: it functions in the Summer and is dissolved in the Winter in favour of a tribal organization by dancing societies. If the first salmon, caught by an individual fisherman, are communally eaten by this secular economic group then we know without doubt that the ritual belongs to the structures of necessity and not of freedom. But what necessity is put forward by the symbolic unifying act?

It must be the necessity for survival. Under the conditions of a hunting and gathering life neither the individual nor the family nor the tribe are units competent to ensure survival. The social group that celebrates the ritual is basically the survival group, the groups within which people depend on one another for their lives. It is well known that these groups have to have exactly the right economic strength under the given ecological circumstances. If they are too large they have to split, if too small they are absorbed. The Kwakiutl namima belongs to this pattern, even if in the rich coastal region and at the time from which our description of the ritual dates the pattern was becoming more conceptual than economic. What is put forward then, first of all is the
necessity to act as a group. Secondly, the responsibility for action is the group's. The individual may be bound to kill in order to live and so, willy-nilly, involve himself in guilt. But in actual fact he cannot live by his killing. He is dependent on the group for his life and his killing only makes sense inside the group. The ritual confirms that men as a group are bound by the necessity to kill and to eat, and that guilt is therefore communal.

Individual guilt tends to dissolve in this perspective, but without being effectively resolved. Both ethically and conceptually, the move from the individual to the collective is largely sterile. It does not lead to a conception of the group as specifically human. It has, however, two corollaries which, as insights into the nature of society, and the relation of society to the outside world lead to further thought.

One corollary is that it reveals that society is based on violence. The move from individual to collective guilt, instead of resolving the dilemma of men's relation to the animals deepens it. Society cannot exist without violence and men can only exist as members of society. This means that society, itself built on violence, negates the individual who, in the measure in which he becomes less accountable for his own violence becomes also more bound. In fact men as a member of society is doubly bound: by the necessity to kill in order to live and by the necessity to belong to society in order to live.

The second corollary is a gain in objectivity. The move away from the individual is also a move away from the exclusive preoccupation with self-justification and cupidity. From the vantage point of the group the animal victim is seen more objectively, as a being in its own right, than this is possible for the praying individual, who muddles it with his fears, desires and intentions. In other words the group--more secure in its
power, more effectively destructive—is also in a position to be more compassionate than the individual. I use compassion purely in the philosophical sense Rousseau gave it (cf. Lévi-Strauss 1963: 101), and shall discuss its application to the salmon ritual at length in the section on the myth of the ritual. In being able to identify with the salmon, one might say in making the ritual the salmon's drama—or tragedy—the group necessarily also differentiates itself from the salmon, if only because it has the part of the villain. In differentiating itself it must define itself as human, however unflattering the designation is under the circumstances. But it is just this unflattering view of man accompanying the differentiation and self-recognition that forms the Kwakiutl image of the human as accountable and responsible, and as finally free through a discharging of responsibility within a new society, whose conception is specifically human.

However, this is being precipitate. The salmon ritual does no more than put forward, in the myth that attaches to it, the salmon's point of view. It does not itself contain a move towards recompense and amendment. But through its objectivity it sharpens the sense of responsibility. And because responsibility was incurred by the group through the dependence of the individual on the group it can only be discharged through the opposite move, the move of separating the individual from the group on which he depends. This reversal takes place in the Winter, in the initiation ceremony. It must be remembered that the novice-initiate is not yet a member of a dancing society. Seats in dancing societies are handed on inside the namimas by inheritance, though they can only be actualized through initiation. The novice-initiate is therefore divided from that very household group which is a survival society when he goes into isolation. Naturally he "dies".
The parallel is precisely made in the representations of the two rituals. It is as if the namime said in the Summer, through the representations of the salmon ritual:

Men can only survive inside the group. Let them negate their individuality and be incorporated in the group to live.

Men can only survive if they eat. Let them dispose of their guilt of killing by eating in communion and live.

and in the Winter, through the representations of the initiation ritual:

Men can only survive inside the group? Let them affirm their individuality and go into the forest alone, to die.

Men can only survive if they eat? Let them amend their guilt of killing by fasting, in isolation, and die.

Further, in this move back to individuality men become free like the animal of their myth, who also leaves his "home" and enters the alien world (human in its case) to die. In having become the equal of the animal men have paid their debt on the only level on which it is payable—a logic we have already observed in the story of the good hunter. This is the full consequence of "compassion", of seeing from the others point of view. This seeing, or remembering, paradoxically originates in the survival group, by definition a wholly self-centred group. The impetus towards a human society then comes from the survival group, out of its dialogue with the animals whom it needs for survival. The new society is human because it is not based on the necessity to survive but on the capacity for choice and decision and self-abnegation. We must always remember, however, that this line of thought does not represent steps in an evolutionary development, an advance from a less than human to a human condition. Men were men in the circle of the Kwakiutl year, and the Kwakiutl saw the human condition as the condition of belonging to both societies: in the Summer, to the secular society that is based on necessity and violence, in the Winter to the sacred one that is made through
men's capacity to overcome their fears and live together without domination or subordination.

2 The Ritual Syntax: Desacralization

I mentioned in the introduction that my account of the salmon ritual would be as of an "incomplete version". This was an allusion to the hunting myths; and as with the myths the ritual is incomplete only from one point of view but complete from another. It is incomplete as part of the system of thought that is developed and displayed in the Kwakiutl year as a whole. As a system of symbols it can be taken as complete in itself. Its symbolic system allies it to other rituals of the same kind, from other parts of the world, and makes it comparable and classifiable.

Taking both points of view into account, if we want to understand the salmon ritual in itself and in its relation to the winter ritual, we must analyse its constitution and decide to what general class of rituals it belongs. This is not easy. Apart from Hubert and Mauss' monograph on the sacrifice, which appeared in 1898, little systematic methodological work has been done on what Evans Pritchard calls "the grammar" of the ritual in his foreword to that monograph (1964: viii). The excellent work which has been done in recent years on ritual symbolism and its connection with social organization represents, of course, a methodologically different approach, which is not relevant to my kind of inquiry. I shall therefore have to a certain extent break new ground in this chapter.

The Kwakiutl had three great ritual complexes: hunting and gathering rituals, of which the first salmon ritual was the most important, the potlatch and the winter dance. Life crisis rituals can be assimilated to the latter two complexes. The complex of hunting and gathering rituals stands apart: it belongs wholly to the life of the Summer, is directed to
the outside non-human world, and, according to Kwakiutl conceptual distinctions stands under the sign of receiving, while the other two are characterised by giving. This implicit basic disposition is important, because the dominant motif of the salmon ritual can be traced back to it in the end.

In this section I shall examine the order and arrangement of the parts or phases of the salmon ritual, that is the ritual syntax. I shall begin with a description of the ritual procedure, follow this by an account of my methods of classification, and finally analyse the construction.

2(a) Procedure

According to Gunther, who has brought the data for the salmon rituals of the Pacific area together, the Kwakiutl had a salmon ritual for every species that ran in their waters. She remarks: "This is a thoroughly Kwakiutl characteristic, for their life is exceptionally full of ritual acts" (1928: 142). This may be true but we have, in fact, only one description of a Kwakiutl salmon ritual, that for the first silver salmon. The other examples Gunther has in mind are prayers and descriptions of the return of remains to the water. When her monograph appeared in 1928 it was not yet fully realized to what an extent these were everyday actions performed by individuals, not only for first catches but in the course of their daily labour. They show a spontaneous and living religiosiry, but they are not rituals of the same order as that for the first silver salmon. This became clear when Boas' collection of prayers in The Religion of the Kwakiutl Indians (1930) came out two years later. It is of course no proof that the Kwakiutl did not have a first salmon ritual for every species. The only account of such a ritual, however, is that for the first silver salmon, sent by George Hunt to Boas in a letter, probably in answer to a question. (Unfortunately we do not know what the question was
if there was one). Hunt's text was printed in 1913-14 in the first part of *The Ethnology of the Kwakiutl* (1921), a volume that is dedicated in greater part to the Kwakiutl recipes collected from Mrs. Hunt. The text is in fact headed like a recipe: "Eyes and salmon heads roasted together with backbone and tail in this manner:”, though Boas does not print it in the section for recipes but in a subsection headed "Beliefs and Customs". For the Hunts recipes and occasions clearly cannot be divided; there are certain ways of doing things on certain occasions. It is therefore possible that the only full description of the Kwakiutl first salmon ritual we have was intended as a sort of cooking instruction, and that the ritual context is incidental. Such ethnographic accidents no doubt influence our interpretation when we work from texts. They are, however, only an exaggerated example of a selectiveness that is always and necessarily at work. In this case the result is a description of the ritual that puts the emphasis on the preparing and eating of the salmon. This is unusual in ethnographic descriptions of rituals of this kind. What strikes the observer usually are the entrance ceremonies with which the animal is welcomed. The cutting up is often done in private (cf. the Ainu bear festival, where it is the only phase of the ritual from which the outsider is rigorously excluded) and the communal eating may strike the observer as nothing more than a particularly jolly meal. In fact these two ritual actions are of central importance, as we know from the Salmon Boy myths. We can therefore count ourselves lucky to have Hunt's painstaking description, which does not pass over these aspects of the ritual.

Boas' collection of texts in *Ethnology of the Kwakiutl* contains no general information about Kwakiutl salmon rituals. Hunt's reports, which are always about particular details, are printed without any attempt at summarising. Boas has, however, divided the accounts Hunt gave him under
several headings, though they were undoubtedly continuous pieces originally. The dividing is due to Hunt's tendency, mentioned above, to include technical, social and religious aspects in one description, a tendency which ran counter to Boas' methods of classifying cultural traits. For our subject we find prayers and ritual actions under "Beliefs and Customs" (610--612); technical details under "Preservation of Food" (303--304) and "Recipes," (e.g. 353). Cross-referencing is excellent, so that the accounts can be pieced together again, as they clearly must be for the purpose of our inquiry. There are further difficulties. The description of the ritual refers to the first silver salmon, as I have said, but the welcoming prayer of the woman which opens the ritual is not quoted, though it is mentioned. It is quoted verbatim in a description of the custom relating to the first dog salmon, where it is, however, not followed up with a description of a ritual. This leaves us in doubt whether a full ritual was celebrated for any salmon species apart from the silver salmon, and also forces us to amend our account of the ritual for the silver salmon with bits relating to the treatment of the dog salmon. I do not think this is necessarily of great account, because from a knowledge of Kwakiutl customs one can reconstruct the general situation with regard to the salmon ritual as something like this. All first salmon were greeted with a welcoming prayer before they were cut. (We know this from the collection of prayers in Religion of the Kwakiutl Indians and Ethnology of the Kwakiutl). The Kwakiutl did not separate a "salmon ritual" either from the general custom of giving feasts and eating first fruits together, or from the various techniques of food preparation that are aspects of such feasts. Cutting and cooking techniques varied according to the season and kind of salmon, whether it was meant to be eaten fresh or preserved, was caught in the sea or upriver, was fat or lean. A ritual procedure which, as cross-cultural
comparison shows must be ancient and stable, was knitted into these various procedures, sometimes dominating them, sometimes swallowed up by them. In giving us an account of the ritual for the first silver salmon George Hunt probably chose the occasion on which the ritual pattern appears most unmistakably and emphatically. Yet even here the practical and seasonal aspects must be thought of as integral and relevant parts of the whole.

I summarize the main phases of the ritual given in Ethnology of the Kwakiutl, Part I. Phases 2 and 3 summarize the description of customs relating to the first dog salmon, what follows relates to the first four silver salmon of the season.

(1) Preliminary (pp. 302, 609). The first salmon are caught and brought in.

(2) Welcoming (p. 609). The wife of the fisherman meets her husband at the beach to receive the salmon. She prays:

"Oh Supernatural Ones! Oh Swimmers! I thank you that you are willing to come to us. Don't let your coming be bad, for you come to be food for us. Therefore, I beg you to protect me and the one who takes mercy on me, hat we may not die without cause, Swimmers."

She replies "yes" herself, and takes the salmon to a higher part of the beach where she has spread a mat.

(3) Cutting (pp. 303, 304). She splits the salmon, cleans it and with a sharp knife cuts the meat "thin along its skin". Hunt provides two pictures, p.304, that show (1) the salmon meat after cutting, shaped like a salmon spread out, the bones of course missing; (2) the way this meat was hung over cross-poles to dry. The two pictures provide us with an illustration of the incidents in cannibal myths, when men are found in the Cannibal's house cut and drying over the fire (see Epilogue). It provides also a clue to the
"split representation" of Northwest coast art. Finally it is important for the ritual that this sort of cutting leaves the woman with a complete skeleton.

(4) Cooking (p.610--11). She has cut the salmon so that head and tail have remained on the backbone. She puts the four skeletons on the upright toasting tongs, pushing tail and backbone down between the tongs until the end of the tongs reach to the eyes of the salmon head. (Hunt provides a picture of such a skeleton standing upright in the tongs, p.610). She takes the tongs with the salmon heads to her house and places them by the side of the fire. She waits for the skin of the head to blacken, and then puts them over the fire.

(5) Communal meal (p.611--12). I quote Hunt’s description of the salmon ritual verbatim from this point to the end.

Then her husband at once invites his numaym to come and eat it, for he must take care not to keep it overnight in the house; for the first people said that if the roasted eyes were kept overnight in the house when they are first caught, then the silver salmon would disappear from the sea. Therefore they do in this way. As soon as the guests come in, they sit down in the rear of the fire, on the mat that has been spread out for them. When all the guests are in, the woman takes a new food mat and spreads it in front of those she is going to give to eat. Then she takes down the four roasting-tongs with the eyes in them that have been over the fire and places them before her guests. Then she takes the salmon out of the roasting tongs. After she has done so she gives water to them to drink; and after they finish drinking, then the one highest in rank prays to what they are going to eat. He says: "Oh friends! Thank you that we meet alive. We have lived until this time when you came this year. Now we pray you, Supernatural Ones, to protect us from danger, that nothing evil may happen to us when we eat you, Supernatural Ones! For that is the reason why you come here that we may catch you for food. We know that only your bodies are dead here, but your souls come to watch over us when we are going to eat what you have given us to eat now". Thus he says and when he stops he says,
"Indeed!" As soon as he stops speaking they begin to eat, and his friends also eat. Then the man takes up a bucket and goes to draw fresh water, and when he comes back he puts down the water he has drawn and waits for them to finish eating. After they have eaten the water is put in front of them and they drink. Then his wife picks up the pieces of bone and skin and puts them on the food-mat; and when she has them all she folds up the mat and goes to throw the contents into the sea; and the guests only rub their hands together to dry off the fat from their hands, for they are careful not to wash their hands, and not to wipe their hands with cedar-bark. After they have done so, they go out.

(6) Restoration to the sea (pp.612, 611, 609). The incident of the gathering of the salmon bones and throwing them into the sea is a separate phase. Earlier on, the women has already thrown the slime into the sea when she had cut and cleaned the salmon. These incidents belong together as one formal phase, even if they are separated in time; in both, different vital parts of the salmon are returned to the sea "for it is said that the various kinds of salmon at once come to life when the intestines are put into the water at the mouth of the river" (p.609).

2(b) Classification

In her analysis of the first salmon ritual (1928) Gunther remarks that Kwakiutl life is exceptionally full of rituals. Yet to describe them she uses only two classifications: the salmon ritual belongs to the "minor rituals" in contrast to potlatch and winterdance which are "major". The use of the words minor and major suggests that rituals are all much the same, only some are bigger and more important, others smaller and more negligible. It is true that the word ritual in anthropological usage implies a certain form that remains stable whether the occasion is larger or smaller. My own working definition of this form is that rituals are
framed events (framed by what Hubert and Mauss have called entry and exit ceremonies); inside this frame a transformation (or transformations) is enacted. But this is an overly general distinction; for classification purposes rituals must be separated from one another by structure and essence. We shall turn to essence first and work towards a discrimination by structural features in the course of this and the following sections. The relevant questions are: What is the purpose of the ritual? What is its "tendency" or direction? What or who is transformed?

As a first step in classification we shall take Propp's advice, given in his Morphology when he comes to the task of separating his tales by essence. He suggests that to guard against errors in logic we must "note that a proper classification may be accomplished in a threefold manner: (1) according to the varieties of one sign ...; (2) according to the absence of presence of one or another sign ...; (3) according to mutually exclusive signs". I shall adopt Propp's set of criteria for "essential" classification. The relevant signs remain to be found. These emerge if we compare the salmon ritual with the initiation ritual. I believe that the signs that emerge have a universal bearing on the classification of rituals, but this is a contention that would require support from further comparative studies. Here my aim is only to set up a way of distinguishing the sorts of Kwakiutl ritual.

(1) According to the varieties of one sign: (a) rituals often strive to consecrate the use of something in order to bind any evil effect that could follow from that use. (The use of sexuality, for instance, or of killing in war). The one sign by which we can separate the salmon ritual from the initiation ritual is that the former strives for a consecrated procuring of food, the latter for a consecrated procuring of
power. (b) Rituals can be separated according to what or who is transformed. At the centre of the salmon ritual stands the death and transformation of a salmon, at the centre of the initiation ritual the death and transformation of a man.

(2) According to the absence or presence of one or another sign: no example.

(3) According to mutually exclusive signs: an important differentiation is whether a ritual is **objective** (directed toward a thing, or non-human being of the external world) or **subjective** (directed toward a person or persons). The salmon ritual in so far as it is directed to the salmon is an objective externally directed ritual in contrast to the initiation ritual which is entirely subjective and internally directed.

To sum up: the salmon ritual is a food-gathering ritual, centred on the problem of what the procuring and eating of food means; it is an objective ritual; and the transformation it enacts is that of an animal. As it is the first salmon that is ritually eaten it can be further classified as a first fruit ritual. The anthropologist who has gathered the evidence for food procuring rituals on a worldwide basis is Frazer, in *The Golden Bough*. Following him, anthropology has regarded these rituals firmly as agrarian. But the harvest ritual or agrarian rite, of which the first fruit ritual is a subclass (cf. Frazer 1925, Vol.II, p. 48), is already present with the same essential tendencies and structural features in the rituals of non-agrarian peoples. In his *Spirits of the Corn and of the Wild*, Frazer has separated harvest rituals (see especially Chapter V of Vol.I), first fruit rituals (Vol.II, Chapters X and XI) and the propitiation of wild animals by hunters (Vol.II, Chapter XIV). This is, of
course, a possible classification but Frazer overlooked in making it that morphologically we have to do with one type, and that whether the object of the ritual is the spirit of the corn or that of the animal, and whether the "harvest" is domesticated or wild is immaterial in view of the fact that all show the same structure. However, because these rituals have been regarded in the history of anthropology as specifically agricultural I shall speak of "agrarian rites", using inverted commas to show that the designation is analytical. This classification allows me to show the close relation between "agrarian rites" and "hunting rites" of certain kinds. The "agrarian rite", regardless of whether it was performed for domesticated plants or wild animals (or plants) has certain features which, as I hope to show, can only have their origin in the thought of hunting peoples. In certain variations of the "agrarian rite", which I shall discuss in the next section, features like the elaborate welcoming ceremonial for the animals predominate, and reshape the whole into a "hunting rite". But we have to keep in mind that in all its manifestations we have morphologically speaking to do with the same ritual. Features such as the welcoming ceremonial have their origin in a hunting mentality; they are an expression of the close relation between the hunter and his prey. We shall examine this relationship from several angles in the course of our discussion of the rituals and in the Epilogue; it is complex and ambiguous. Its main feature is that the prey is personalized; it becomes an equal--antagonist or friend. Yet we find the same ceremonial customs, denoting the same relationship, in rituals for the corn, where it cannot have developed.

Frazer mentions the customs surrounding the first salmon among the Kwakiutl in the same volume in which he describes at length the customs surrounding the "Corn Mother", but does not realise the identity of form
between them. This is due to the absence of systematic analysis. Frazer rationalises rather than analyses. In fact, if one abstracts from the situation, the agrarian rites described by Frazer in his section on the Corn Mother comply with those celebrated over the first salmon or bear.

What then are the relevant features? I would select five customs and two items of belief that remain stable. Not all these features are necessarily simultaneously present in the customs of all the peoples celebrating these rituals but they make up the full structural inventory. A striking feature of this inventory is that structurally identical features may be expressed through psychologically opposed attitudes: love-fear; welcoming-abhorrence; and others.

1) Selection of a part and separation from the rest. Conceptually, this is a metonymic operation in which the part, which is conceived as the "spirit" of the whole stands for the whole.

2) Paying reverence to that part, for instance honouring it in public celebration, taking it into the village in procession etc. (Conversely abusing it, taking it into the village secretly, where it is considered a misfortune when discovered.)

3) Dramatic killing of the part. (An interesting aspect of this feature is that it can be accompanied by a certain gloating, cf. Frazer on the Killing of the Corn Mother, see items of belief below).

4) Communal eating of the part. (This may be preceded by mourning ceremonies or expressions of remorse but is on the whole a cheerful occasion).

5) Resowing of the part. If it has been eaten in the form of a substitute (e.g. as an animal that stands for the Corn Mother), the originally selected part--last sheaf, harvest crown etc.-- is sown. If the selected part has been eaten itself, as is the case with the
first salmon or bear, bones and other remains are sown.

Two items of belief attach to rituals of this kind. They are of a psychological nature and are important for their interpretation. They are:

1) that in killing and eating the "spirit", man is triumphing over a force greater than himself, and therefore potentially dangerous and possibly hostile. (Cf. Frazer, 1925, Vol.I on the customs of 'crying the neck' (pp.264--269), which is simultaneously a mourning ceremony and a triumphant execution).

2) that the "spirit" is murderous and/or cannibalistic. Children in rural Europe were told not to pick flowers in the fields and not to step on the corn or the Corn Mother would kill them. (Cf. Frazer, op. cit. pp.132--133).

With this list of customs and beliefs we have already turned towards structure. We must, however, consider another important classificatory aspect, which escapes Frazer, but which Hubert and Mauss recognized and mentioned in their monograph on the sacrifice. Discussing the general functions of the sacrifice they remark that sacrifices do not necessarily and only increase the holiness of the sacrificer (the object of sacrifice) but may work the other way, decreasing and eliminating a religious character that is not any longer wanted or necessary (1964: 52 ff). "This" they say, "might be termed the sacrifice of desacralization", and continue:

Things, like persons may be in a state of such great sanctity that because of it they become unusable and dangerous. Sacrifices of this kind become necessary. This is particularly the case with the products of the earth. Each species of fruits, cereal and other products is sacred in its entirety, forbidden, so long as a rite, often of a sacrificial nature, has not rid it of the prohibition which protects it. To effect this there is concentrated in one portion of the species of the fruit all the power contained in the others. Then this part is sacrificed, and by virtue of this alone, the others are released. Or, again, it passes through two stages of desacralization: the whole of the
consecration is first of all concentrated in the first fruits, then these fruits themselves are represented by a victim who is eliminated.

The appropriateness or inappropriateness of the terminology of sacrifice to the agrarian rite will be discussed below. What is important here is that Mauss has put his finger on an essential attribute of the agrarian rite: it is a rite of desacralization. The object of the ritual is conveyed from a sacred to a profane state. Mauss also shows that subjective as well as objective rituals can be rituals of desacralization. In our original classification of the first salmon ritual, in which we used the initiation ritual as comparison, we noticed that the first salmon ritual is an objective rite, and that the transformation it enacts is of an animal, while the initiation ritual is subjectice and enacts the transformation of a man. To this classification we can add now that the direction of the two rituals is opposed: in the salmon ritual the salmon is desacralized, in the initiation ritual the man is sacralized. In this inversion lies the connection between salmon ritual and initiation ritual.

2(c) Construction

"Agrarian" rites, according to anthropological usage, were directed to the earth and/or the crop of the earth. As we use the term here this is not necessarily so except in the widest sense of the word. The Kwakiutl were a people of fishermen and sea mammal hunters with no agriculture. For them the treasure of the earth lay in the water, so that the field of the agriculturalists becomes the sea, and their crop, or harvest the salmon run. While Frazer's "spirit of the field" is anthropomorphised, or zoomorphised, becoming the Corn Mother, (Great Mother, Old Woman, Old Man, Corn Baby etc.) or the Wolf (Cock, Here, Goat, Bull, Horse, Fox, Pig etc.), the Kwakiutl "spirit of the sea" remains itself, the salmon. But because
the generic salmon has to be distinguished from all the innumerable actual salmon it is defined as the Salmon Chief - the greatest, the best, the most powerful of the salmon. In a more general form the spirit of the sea was a mythic serpent, the Sisiul, giver and withholder of treasure. This is a conception of the spirit of the water the Kwakiutl share with Salish speaking peoples. The Sisiul is not only mistress of the sea but of all water; she can represent the network of underground waterways as well as "flying water" from the clouds. She is imagined as a traveller who can travel underground, above ground and in the air. To human eyes she sometimes appears as a salmon, and indeed the salmon is also essentially a traveller between different and opposed worlds, the submarine world, the surface world of fjords and rivers, and the mountain world of freshwater streams and lakes to which it climbs to spawn. In accordance with their natures of travellers between opposed worlds these personifications of the spirit of the water were seen as potential givers yet as withholders of treasure, who had to be overcome, one might say, done in, before the blessing they held could be appropriated.

The best systematic description of the agrarian rite is still that by Hubert and Mauss in *Sacrifice* (1964: 64ff). According to the orientation of their monograph they call it the agricultural sacrifice. The first principles of the salmon ritual are succinctly described if we translate their "land" and "field" as "sea". I shall quote the most salient part in this translation, putting Mauss' words in brackets:

These sacrifices have a double object. Firstly, they are destined to allow the sea or river to be fished and the salmon utilized by lifting the prohibitions that protect them (allow the land to be worked and its products utilized ...). Second they are means of fertilizing the sea (fertilizing the cultivated fields) and of preserving its life when after the intensive fishing (after the harvest) it appears stripped and dead. In fact the sea (the fields) and its product is considered eminently alive. There resides in it a religious principle that slumbers
in winter, reappears in spring, is manifested in the salmon runs (harvest) and makes the fishing (harvest) difficult for mortals to enter upon. Sometimes this principle is even represented as a spirit that mounts guard over the sea and its denizens (the earth and its fruits). It must therefore be eliminated in order that the salmon runs can be made use of (that the use of the harvest and its crops be made possible). But at the same time, since it is the very life of the sea (field), after having been expelled it must be recreated and fixed in the water (earth) whose fertility it produces. The sacrifices of simple desacralization may be adequate for the first need but not for the second. Thus, for the most part, agrarian sacrifices have a multiplicity of effects.
(1964: 66--67)

The salmon ritual then, if we take Mauss' description of the agrarian rite as a guide, falls into two contradictory parts: a rite of desacralization that makes the harvesting of the salmon possible at all, and a rite of consecration that ensures the fertility of the sea, that is the return of the salmon. The prohibitions that protect the salmon are in their most general form, as we know, the absolute demand that man should live in harmony with the world; expressed, in regard to the animals, in the demand that men should not kill. As we have seen in the myths and prayers, this demand is adjusted to reality in the form of various dispensations. We shall examine the ritual both for the form the prohibitions take and for dispensations if there are any.

Mauss' contention that there is a "religious principle" that slumbers in the Winter and reappears in the Spring is vividly illustrated by Kwakiutl beliefs. The religious principle is not abstracted but is immanent in the living beings of this world themselves--the "unobliged ones". Animals and plants "go home" below the sea or into the mountains in the Winter and travel abroad into human country again in the Spring. The general religious principle is condensed in figures like the Salmon Chief and the Bear Mother, figures called by the Beaver, we remember, "the medicine animals, the bosses". For the Kwakiutl and other Northwest coast peoples,
the first salmon of the run is such a figure. The picture they have is of
the salmon chief, leading his people from their village in the deep sea;
swimming ahead of them, and falling into the hands of men. This picture
gives some indication of the sacrilege that is committed but also the
triumph and victory that is involved in catching the first salmon. Another
pointer to the status of this salmon and the principle it embodies are the
names with which the first salmon is addressed in the ritual. The
Tsimshian call it Chief Spring Salmon, Quartz Nose, Three Jumps. Chief
Spring Salmon and Three Jumps (cf. NSB Ten times jumper blanket) are
epithets that occur in the Salmon Boy myths for a "master of animals".
Quartz Nose refers to a symbol for the religious principle itself or per­
haps better, for an aspect of it. Exceptionally powerful animals were
believed to carry quartz crystals in their bodies in which their force
took concrete form. Among men only shamans carried such crystals in their
bodies. Quartz crystals play an important role in the shamanic thought
of the Northwest coast. They seem to be taken as solidified light, and
the imagery of the crystal is related to that of light and seeing I have
discussed at the end of the last chapter. Such crystals, carried in the
body, were a third eye and their organization, for which they were prized,
was probably an image for the power of "seeing", with its overtones of a
high psychic organization. In "Quartz Nose" all this is barely touched
on, but the epithet shows the sacredness and distinction of the first sal­
mon; how he is set apart from all that is ordinary and profane. In our
context it shows the concentration of the sacred principle in the first
salmon, and the force the people celebrating the ritual saw themselves
confronted with, the power that opposed them.

If the first salmon ritual was first and foremost a ritual of desac­
ralization, then the first task the celebrating community must have set
itself would have been to strip the salmon of their sacred character. Only if this was accomplished, they could approach the salmon and catch, kill and eat it without danger. This task is in fact the very essence of the ritual. It dictates the timing and the ritual procedure. Timing the ritual was the first stage: the Salmon ritual was performed when the salmon run had begun, but no-one would have dreamed of fishing before it had been performed. Concentrating the general principle of sacrality, which is immanent in all salmon, and making it particular and even personal in the first salmon was the second step. The solemn processions with which the salmon was carried ashore by some peoples is such a device of singling out and concentrating. It is missing in the Kwakiutl ritual, where it is replaced by the woman's welcoming prayer. The next and most important step was to strip this symbol of the salmon's sacrality of its power, and with this release all salmon for profane use. This was done in the communal meal—communal because the danger involved and the retribution threatening such an act could best be supported distributed among the group. 

We know from the prayers that when an animal died it became secular; also that its particular force, which had made it a "supernatural one", could be inherited by the person who found it and treated it reverently. Curtis tells the story of the two canoers who found the body of a wolf. They first wrapped it in one of their own blankets, then asked it to return their kindness with this special gift: "Real friend ... Now that the living spirit is out of you, we want that lucky part of your body to come to us, in return for what we give you. We are going to bury you. We want you to leave us with the hwela [a quartz crystal found in the mountains, a piece of which every wolf is believed to carry in his right fore-shoulder and which is, in reality, his life]. Leave it with us so that we may have long life ... Done, friend." In this transaction between an
animal, made secular by accidental death, and men who are asking for the gift of its life-force because it is now free, we have, as it were, the innocent model for the act of desacralization in the salmon ritual. For here the situation is that men are faced by living animals (in the immense concentration of the salmon run) whose own life force must be converted by an act of violence into life for men. Here it is a question of appropriating the crystal by force, to borrow the image from the wolf incident. This is what I think the Kwakiutl are doing in their ritual.

If we turn, with this problem in mind, to the communal meal, of which we fortunately have such a detailed account for the Kwakiutl, the first thing that strikes us is the oddity of the parts selected for it. We must keep in mind that the text is headed like a recipe: "Eyes and salmon heads roasted together with backbone and tail in the following manner:". It is a strange meal that consists of eyes and a skeleton, though there would be some meat on the heads. There can be no doubt at all, that what was offered to the celebrating community was not primarily the salmon's meat but an ensemble of vital parts, head, backbone and tail, the upper and lower centres between which the life-force plays. The same parts are singled out for veneration in the ritual for the bear as described in the Bear Mother myths. The eyes play an important role in both cases: in the ritual prescriptions for the bear the head is placed so that the morning sun strikes the eyes. I suggest, though with some hesitation, that in the salmon ritual, in eating the eyes (whose "light" is "blackened" by the fire) the Kwakiutl symbolically destroyed the life-force of the salmon; robbing the Salmon Chief of his "crystal". If this is the case they would, in one highly condensed symbolic act, have defeated the whole of the sacred force that opposed them, and be free to fish. This, in any case, is the first and main object of the communal meal. To appropriate the life-force
for themselves through the same symbol, the salmon's eyes, is here secondary. In the case of animals killed for food the latter must follow on the former as a matter of course because here the gift of life is the animal's concrete body that in death nourishes the human body and gives it life.

The eating of "eyes and salmon heads" is only one part of the communal meal, the non-verbal part. No doubt as enactment it is the most important part, and carries its own complete meaning. There is, however, a verbal part, the prayer that precedes it. Here we may look for comment on the non-verbal part.

The prayer opens with a greeting formula that refers to the yearly cycle and the rhythm that connects the life of men with that of the salmon. From then on it is entirely preoccupied with eating. It has therefore direct bearing on the ritual meal that is about to take place. How is the eating viewed in the prayer? There is only one answer: with fear. After the greeting the prayer launches into intense supplication: "protect us from danger, that nothing evil may happen to us when we eat you". As it is the salmon that are asked for protection, while they themselves are eaten, the danger must arise here from the human act of eating rather than the double nature of the salmon. The salmon is in fact divided, but not into a giver and destroyer. It is "soul" separated from "body". The bodies are dead; but the soul is addressed as the rational benevolent principle that has knowledge and memory of its sacrificial intention: "for that is the reason why you come here, that we may catch you for food. We know that only your bodies are dead here, but your souls come to watch over us when we are going to eat what you have given us to eat now".

In the separation of body and soul lies the hope of retaining the good will of the salmon, because the soul, which seems to be imagined as
hovering over the eaters during the meal, will be the life principle of the new salmon, or revitalized salmon, when the bones have been thrown in the water.

In order to understand the fear of eating which the ritual expresses we must know what eating involved for the Kwakiutl. Eating a ritual meal is, of course, not eating; it is eating reconsidered, eating lifted out of the ordinary situation and moved into a context of thought. Yet in the salmon ritual, eating has not been transposed to the symbolic and imaginary as it has in the winter ritual. It is real eating that is considered.

We know from the prayers that death profanes an animal. The salmon and all the fish and game animals that are killed for food are deliberately profaned. In this lies the guilt of the individual hunter and fisherman. In being eaten, however, an animal seems to be more drastically profaned. Ingestion meant identification to the Kwakiutl, as the cannibal myths and the cannibal dances clearly show. In being ingested by profane men the animal becomes part of their baxus nature. To be baxus means to be common, ordinary, but also by implication to be unfree, bound. While they are being ingested the animals lose their free nature. We know that for men being bound involves a paradox: while they want to live in harmony with the world they also want to destroy this harmony. The deliberate trend of their desires is destructive, and this is why being baxus for them also means to be accountable in the sense of being liable to be called to account for the guilt they have incurred. For the animals, too, being bound involves a paradox. Their freedom, in relation to men, consists in their decision to give themselves to men. The very result of this freedom is that they become bound, which in their case means becoming a physical part of a profane, by definition unfree organism. But because the deliberate trend of their desires is constructive, not destructive, to be baxus for
them does not mean to be accountable.

If one considers the concentration of sanctity into the first salmon, the heightened and deliberate way in which it is eaten by the group, and the belief that the salmon is an innocent and generous victim—that he has come of his own free will—one can understand the fear expressed in the prayer. The fear is not of a personal nature; like all the gestures and words of the ritual it refers to a general state. It is the expression of a consciousness of the full enormity of an act; an act which in an everyday context would pass unnoticed. The first salmon ritual is therefore a feast of recollection, or remembrance. The guilt that is brought to remembrance, and that gives rise to the fear, is again not personal, but general. It acts as the lens through which man's place in the scheme of things can be recognised clearly. Man is obscurely bound by necessity to destroy that which he recognises as good. Only guilt, which shifts the stress from necessity to responsibility—to being baxus as being accountable—can give the impetus that leads away from obscurity and moral passivity to a more conscious and active position.

The verbal part of the ritual, the prayer of supplication with its explicitly emphasised fear of the consequences such eating might bring, introduces then a new feature into a ritual of desacralization. The object of the ritual cannot simply be to strip the salmon of a sanctity so great that it makes it unusable for men. It is true that the first object of the ritual is to lower the salmon to the level of baxus men, so that fishing can be carried out without danger. This object is achieved by eating the first salmon in whom the sanctity of the salmon run is concentrated. But through the prayer of supplication the position of men and salmon as mere antagonists in a struggle in which men are victorious is modified. The salmon is divided into body and soul; and while the body
is eaten, the soul is believed to be "watching over us" protectively. The conscious part of the salmon is asked to protect from the danger the desecrating action might bring. This shows that the participants can hope for a positive result of an action they recognize as destructive. The salmon retains, even while he is incorporated, and so bound, some of his voluntary power—his "soul"—and this is trusted to be benevolent. The prayer of supplication expresses then consciousness of guilt (fear), and trust or hope. This is a constructive combination, because as I have said above, consciousness of guilt is here an impetus to an intellectually and morally active attitude. We can on this basis venture to suggest that the communal meal for which the vital parts of the salmon are selected, is not only an act of desacralization directed to the salmon, but also one from which a certain amount of consecration is gained for men. If the salmon is lowered to the level of baxus men by the act of eating, men are also raised by the same act, to the level of neualak salmon, at least to a certain modest extent. It is on this basis that men and salmon can meet in the fishing season, and that fishing is possible.

If this interpretation is correct, the verbal and non-verbal part of the ritual of the communal meal communicate the same message but with different means. The combination of fear and hope of the prayer presents the ritual as an effort at consciousness in which fear means seeing. The non-verbal part condenses this into one two-faceted symbol: the eating of eyes. The salmon's eyes are put out, and in eating them men become more seeing.

We have now examined the first and main part of the salmon ritual, the desacralization. We have seen that this part itself is divided and takes a double direction, to the salmon and to men. To sum up our findings so far, we can say:
1) the salmon ritual is first and mainly an objective ritual, directed toward the salmon. It consists of a communal act of desacralization, that of eating the salmon and through the process of identification by ingestion, lowering it to secular status.

2) Second and subordinately the salmon ritual is subjective, i.e. directed toward the people who celebrate it. It consists of a consecration of these people who by partaking of the salmon are enhanced in their powers.

3) The consequence of the double action of the ritual is to make salmon fishing possible.

Before turning to the last part of the ritual, the reconsecration of the salmon and the sea, we must complete this part by considering its relationship to sacrifice. The communal meal of the agrarian rite inevitably brings sacrifice to the mind. Frazer has recognised that we have to do here with two forms, and distinguishes them as "sacrament" and "sacrifice" (see 1925, Vol.2: "The Sacrament of First Fruits", Chapter X; "The Sacrifice of First Fruits", Chapter XI; "Types of Animal Sacrament" Chapter XVII). The beginning sentences of Chapter XI contain his definition of the difference: "In the preceding chapter we saw that primitive peoples often partake of the new corn and the new fruits sacramentally, because they suppose them to be instinct with divine spirit or life. At a later age, when the fruits of the earth are conceived as created rather than as animated by a divinity, the new fruits are no longer partaken of sacramentally as the body and blood of a god; but a portion of them is offered to the divine beings who are believed to have produced them" (p.109).

In other words, in a sacrament the god is eaten; in a sacrifice something of one's own is offered to the god, and connection or reconciliation with him established through the sacrificed part. The Kwakiutl salmon ritual
belongs by this definition without any doubt to the sacraments. The confrontation between baxus men and nauvak salmon is direct; no intermediary is used to connect them.

In agrarian rites that have as their object the desacralization of the corn an animal is sometimes substituted for the corn, representing the spirit of the corn. This animal is killed and ceremoniously eaten at a harvest supper. As it represents the corn, we should here be in the presence of a sacrament. However, according to Hubert and Mauss’ findings, this animal can have the mediating character of a sacrifice, and the immolation can turn the agricultural rite into an agricultural sacrifice. It stands both for the spirit of the corn, which must be profaned to make harvesting safe, and for the ploughmen and reapers who are the profaners. (1964: 69–70). The act of killing the victim is consequently also the act of retribution which purifies the harvesters from the stain of sacrilege and allows them to be newly born. Mauss sums up his argument: “Thus, in the first moment of the rite, a double action takes place: (i) the desacralization of the harvested and threshed corn by means of the victim which represents it; (ii) the redemption of the harvest women and the ploughmen by the immolation of this victim who represents them” (p.70). The knot of guilt and redemption is tied and loosened in one and the same moment, during the sacrifice, and the meal that follows can only be a meal of reconciliation. In such a case the communal meal cannot be part of the process of desacralization; it must be a subjective ritual pure and simple, consecrating the participants by setting the seal on their redemption.

In the agrarian sacrifice we have a radically different ritual from that of the Kwakiutl. The Kwakiutl, because of their division of the year into secular and sacred, their conception of men’s role in the former as passive, the latter as active, distribute guilt and redemption between the
salmon ritual (representative of the life of the Summer) and the winter ritual (representative of the life of the Winter). It is possible that the difference lies essentially in the entire lack of representation in the salmon ritual. The salmon in the first salmon ritual is the spirit of the salmon and the sea itself. The cakes made of barley corn and eaten at the harvest supper similarly are "John Barleycorn". But the animal in the agrarian rite represents the spirit of the corn in an unrelated figure; and, presumably, if this figure can stand for one thing it can also stand for another. It can therefore become the victim of a sacrifice. The death of a first salmon is, on the other hand, always a murder. The act of sacrifice does not make guilty itself, it is performed to wipe out guilt otherwise contracted. The act of murder is itself the guilty act. By no stretch of the imagination can one see the murderer reprieved by his own act. Redemption can only lie in an act of retribution. If the reapers offer an animal that stands for themselves as retributory offering they can achieve desacralization and retribution in one act. For the Kwakiutl who confront the salmon directly, there is no such way. Retribution and redemption are indeed achieved by them, too, in the act of dying and being reborn. But they must actively undergo this death in the same way in which the salmon actively undergoes his own death when he voluntarily offers himself to men.

Redemption therefore lies for the Kwakiutl in a form of imitation. As men eat salmon in the Summer, so spirits eat men in the Winter. And though the salmon cannot stand for men in the Summer, and by his death work their redemption, he can stand for them metaphorically in the Winter. In the initiation myths men are pictured as salmon. The cannibalistic spirits of the winter cut them, split them and hang them up to dry as the fisherman's wife does the salmon in Hunt's description. Being a salmon
means here being hunted and being food. On this metaphoric level, and on it alone, the death of the salmon provides the link between guilt and redemption. Men's active imitation of the passivity of the salmon finds no place in the rituals of the Summer. The salmon ritual leaves them with the open problem of sacrilege, which can only be resolved in the Winter.

This brings us to the last part of the ritual, the reconsecration of the salmon and the sea. To paraphrase and adapt Mauss, the "very life of the sea, after having been expelled, must be recreated and fixed in the water whose fertility it produces". In the salmon ritual this is done by collecting the bones after the meal and throwing them in the sea. The salmon of the ritual, we remember, was a skeleton; only eyes and meat adhering to the head could be eaten. The bones that are used to fertilize the sea are therefore the same "vital parts" that played a role in the ritual: head, backbone and tail.

With this last part of the salmon ritual we are in the presence of a rite of a different order from those we have up to now considered. The rite is part of the syntax of the ritual, and completes it in itself. But it does not link up with ethical action beyond the ritual as do the other ritual phases, and has therefore no part in linking the ritual to the thought of the Winter. I shall therefore outline its significance here only briefly, and shall not return to it in my further discussions of the salmon ritual.

Head, backbone and tail are an image of duality and charge, as in the well-known Kundalini symbolism of India to which the Kwakiutl conception seems to be related. In the consecration rite of the salmon ritual they take on an aspect of sexual duality and creativity that makes them suitable for a metaphoric fertilizing of the sea. The salmon as head, backbone and tail is here the effigy of the Sisiul, the doubleheaded serpent who is the
very spirit of the sea and the Kwakiutl mythical impersonation of potency as duality and charge. This vitalistic symbolism links the consecration rite with the rites prescribed for the bear throughout the Northern hemisphere, and the bear rites in turn throw further light on the salmon rite. We know from the Bear Mother myths that the venerated parts are head, skin and tail. The line of red ochre Tsimshian hunters drew between head and tail on the inside of a bearskin can, I believe, confidently be identified as a spine. In Siberian bear rituals "tail" is sometimes used euphemistically for penis (Hallowell 1926). The bones of the bear are therefore suitable to fertilise the earth as those of the salmon are to fertilise the sea.

Another aspect of this vitalistic symbolism concerns the life of the salmon itself and is expressed in the dry/wet opposition. We have seen that in our ritual the salmon was deliberately "dried", even to blackening it. Returned to the sea it is "wetted", and this moistening is believed to restore it to its old completeness. Drying connotes death or a state of suspended animation, wetting life. Initiation myths borrow this metaphor from the salmon ritual. We shall see in the Baxbakualanuxsiwe myth discussed below (Epilogue) that the people who had suffered ritual death were dried like fish, but could be revived by the water of life. The man-eater on the other hand is got rid of by "overdrying": put into an earth oven on hot stones, where conventionally food is steamed with the addition of water, he is denied water and therefore burnt to ashes.

Important though this vitalistic symbolism is for Kwakiutl thought it is outside the subject of my thesis proper. The consecration rite does not involve the participants of the ritual in ethical action or generate ethical action beyond the immediate occasion. It contains no tension and creates no conflict of desire and no remorse. It is an affirmation of
man's unity with the world, and in this resembles the prayers to Sun, which also lack reverberation in Kwakiutl thought as a whole. It is therefore not part of the "open question" the salmon ritual otherwise represents.

3 The Rhetoric of the Ritual: the Guest as Host

This section interrupts my examination of the first salmon ritual with a broadly based account of the rhetoric used in the genre of animal rituals that I have defined in the last chapter. By rhetoric I mean those conventions of presentation that "move" the participants in a double sense: move them to take certain attitudes to the animal, and influence their behaviour, that is move them to action. For instance, to celebrate the ritual as a feast at which the animal is host to men, to take the example of the rhetorical convention at the centre of our discussion, moves people to requite. There is a deep-rooted tradition in archaic society that having accepted a gift one returns that gift. The animal's gift, however--its body--cannot be returned. The situation set up by the rhetorical convention is therefore baffling and disturbing. The rhetorical figure moves by challenging thought and invention. It makes the ritual into an open question that demands an answer. For the Kwakiutl this answer lies outside the salmon ritual; they requite the animal's gift of its life by a similar act of courage in the initiation ritual of the Winter. In this way a connecting arc is established between the thought and behaviour of the Summer, which is rooted in necessity and formulated in the ritual conventions we have discussed, and the wholly different thought and behaviour of the Winter.

Conventions of presentation vary locally of course, and to a limited extent this section explores such variation. Its main aim is however to show how they move participants to that unease of mind which moves them to
take further thought and action.

It is clear from the anthropological literature, especially Frazer's vast accumulations of evidence, that the rituals we are discussing are both happy and uneasy occasions. This is usually explained in a naturalistic manner as the direct result of experience: joy over the harvest or successful hunt, fear that the bounty may stop. But neither the joy nor the fear is "natural"; it is to a large measure created by the ritual itself, by means of art. We have to ask ourselves therefore how the ritual makers (whom I take to be the participants themselves) created these tensions, and why they created them. I shall show in this chapter that with the help of rhetorical conventions joy and unease are deliberately counterbalanced in the rituals, and that a structure of carefully worked out interior contradiction, which is stable, gives them their character of open questions which demand an answer.

The section is unusual in the framework of this chapter in that I have taken the ritual for the bear rather than the salmon ritual as my example. There are two reasons. (1) In the bear ritual the pattern of the feast at which the animal is host to men is more clearly apparent than it is in the ritual for any other animal. This is partly due to the belief, widespread in Indian North America, that the bear is the host par excellence. In popular belief he is rich, he carries his wealth with him under his skin, he can nourish himself from his own body, for instance by sucking his paws during hibernation. In the Bear Mother stories, we remember, he carries all the stores accumulated by himself and his wife in an invisible cachen under his arm. When he cooks he takes his material from his own body. In the very widespread "bungling host" myth, Bear, who is more often than any other animal the ideal host, feeds his visitors with meat cut out of his side, without taking harm. (2) We have seen in the hunting myths that
the bear is a highly personalised figure in Indian hunting lore. This is
the second reason why I have taken bear rituals as representative for a
rhetorical convention that makes the animal into a partner in an exchange
of gifts. Looked at from this point of view it seems that the convention
first belonged to the bear ritual and spread to rituals for other animals.
The basis of the convention is that the animal is considered in its singu­
larlarity, as an individual. The bear with his strikingly "human" physique
and habits is more obviously "one of us" than most animals. The conven­
tion of the guest as host presupposes the concept of an exchange between
equals. The tradition, also found in the hunting myths, that animals are
"men as we are" therefore forms the basis for the rhetorical figure of the
ritual. To individualise an animal means treating it as a man. Dealings
between men rest on reciprocity. Men are connected through giving,
receiving and requiting. If they are to be connected with animals, and
animals with them, this is the model for their connection. It also seems
probable that individualising the animal is particularly a practice of the
hunter who, in the course of the chase and the struggle to kill forms a
personal relationship with his prey. As all rituals of this kind perso­
nalise their object, even if it is a vegetable crop or a run of salmon, it is
possible that they are rooted in the hunting mentality, and that their form
is carried over from hunting rituals. The concept of the part that stands
for the whole makes this individualization possible even in the most
unlikely cases. The "Mother" or the "Chief" plays the role of giver-away
for the species.

I am comparing in this section the Kwakiutl ritual for the first bear
of the season with two spatially and temporally far-flung traditions: the
Ainu bear festival, and a ritual for the bear from the Eastern Woodlands of
North America, reported by an 18th century traveller. The comparison shows
how widespread the rhetorical convention is, what a time-depth it has, and how closely it is connected with the bear. The Ainu tradition elaborates particularly the "myth of mutuality" that belongs to that convention. According to it animals and men practice mutually beneficial reciprocal exchange. We have met this myth already as one of the dispensations used in the prayers to excuse killing. The account of the bear ritual from the Woodlands, on the other hand, adds the realistic aspect that also belongs to that rhetorical figure, the mourning over the necessity that forces men to kill their friends. This too we know from the prayers and the hunting myths but only in the Woodlands ritual is it expressed directly. Each of the two examples then stresses another aspect of the ritual but examination shows that it is the combination of the two that makes up the telling force of the ritual.

The ritual syntax is like the "primitive form" of myth; it can never be analysed in itself, only in one of its actual manifestations. The designation agrarian rite embraces itself a number of possible actual manifestations, but in so far as it explicitly emphasises the rite of desacralization it is nearest to a satisfactory illustration of that syntax. In Hunt's description of the Kwakiutl first salmon ritual we were lucky to have a good example. However, Kwakiutl custom passed over certain parts of the ritual very lightly; the entry ceremony—the welcoming of the salmon—becomes nothing but the private act of the woman receiving the salmon, and the exit ceremony—the reconsecration—is again a quietly performed private act. The whole emphasis is on the communal meal which is described in great detail, including its preparation.

In this chapter I shall turn to the question of emphasis. Emphasis does not change the syntax of the ritual, which remains an arrangement of
the same parts, ordered in the same way. It does two things. It changes
the outward appearance of the ritual so that we are apparently confronted
by a variety of forms when there is in fact, structurally, only one form.
In itself this would hardly interest us, but each change of emphasis is
effected by using a different rhetorical convention, each of which gives us
a new insight into the essence of the ritual. Having separated the salmon
ritual by essence from other rituals we are now turning to a closer examina-
tion of that essence. Rhetoric is the technique of persuasion, as well as
the body of rules that ensures eloquent expression. In oral cultures
rhetoric is of greater importance than in literary ones because it is one
of the means through which cultural identification is achieved, that is, it
is not persuasion to a private opinion, that of the rhetor, but to a commu-
nal cause; not private thinking but communal thinking. I use rhetoric
therefore in an extended sense that takes in, apart from the speeches made
in the ritual where we have them (and they were transcribed verbatim
unfortunately only too rarely), the non-verbal behaviour that also expres-
ses the "figure of thought" and follows the rules of expression, imposed
by that figure.

By ritual rhetoric I do not mean mainly the myth that explains the
ritual—though myths and rhetorical conventions constantly fuse—but the
impressive and persuasive figure under which the ritual is executed. In
L'Homme Nu Lévi-Strauss has called the approach that treats myths and
ritual as mutually interpretative a confusion such that the cat does not
know its own kittens. Myth is thought, ritual irrational and vapid
action. The distinction has much to be said for it, and should give us
pause; I shall consider it in the next section, where we are concerned
with the myth of the salmon ritual. Meanwhile, however, I shall continue
as if the cat knew its own kittens, that is on the "superficial" level
where it is assumed that the ritual expresses the thought and intention of the participants.

Rhetorical conventions are important, because they express the essence of the ritual very forcefully, though always through emphasis on one selected aspect. Sometimes, however, not the whole essence can be expressed because the aspect that has been selected cannot logically accommodate it. Where the emphasis shifts for instance to the last part, so that the whole ritual becomes a rite of consecration there is no room for the expression of desacralization. Mauss, who has very clearly recognised the variety of forms in which the agricultural sacrifice presents itself says about such a shift: "But in sacrifices whose purpose it is to fertilise the earth, that is, to infuse into it a divine life, or to render more active the life it may possess, there is no longer a question, as before, of eliminating from it a sacred character. One must be communicated to it". (1964: 71--2).

Such rituals may assume desacralization as an implicit background, perhaps simply conceived as the ordinary wear and tear of time. The salmon ritual becomes then a world renewal ritual, in which the arrival of the salmon run provides the impetus for a reconsecration of water and earth. The Yurok of Northern California celebrated such a ritual at the time of their largest salmon run, which falls in the Autumn. Another example is the annual bladder feast of the Eskimos of Bering Straits which Nelson recounts. In the bladder feast the sexual imagery I have described as part of the reconsecration rite is particularly vivid. A hole is cut in the ice of the frozen sea, and the bladders of the sea-mammals killed in the course of the year are pushed through it, refertilizing the waters and at the same time giving the animals a chance of being reborn. Such rites are world renewal and fertility rituals; yet just because of the emphasis on the vitalistic principle, which the shift to the consecration phase (the exit
phase of the ritual as a whole) implies, they lose in interest as subjects of our investigation.

When the emphasis is shifted forward, on the other hand, to the entry ceremony, the rite of welcoming the animal, we get a rhetorical figure that expresses the problematic and open nature of the ritual particularly clearly. I have called this figure "the guest as host". It represents the animal, which is welcomed as an honoured guest, as the real host at the feast given in its honour, and therefore raises the problem of a suitable requital. This shift of emphasis from the "meal" to the "welcoming" does not impair the essence of the ritual, and syntactically the ritual remains complete in all its parts, only the beginning overshadows the rest through the vividness of its presentation. The form is used for the salmon ritual but it seems to belong more naturally still to the bear ritual, because the animal for whom it is celebrated is conceived in that very personal way which is typical of the relation to the bear. However, the same ritual in less elaborate form is celebrated for other animals among the Kwakiutl and other Northwest coast peoples. The animal is received like a high ranking guest arrived on a visit. A banquet with speeches is given in his (or her) honour. As behooves such a guest he will requite, and indeed gives a feast in which he gives himself, his own body, to his former hosts who are now his guests. The communal meal is here the feast at which the guest has turned host. The metaphoric model is undoubtedly the Northwest coast potlatch. Yet this rhetorical convention of the ritual is extremely widespread, and was used, for instance in the harvest celebrations of the European peasantry. The Corn Mother was brought to the village in procession, with singing and dancing. Prayers of supplication were offered to her, and then she was eaten either as cakes shaped like human figures, or in the form of an animal. But then the potlatch
pattern of receiving and requiting is, of course, not typical of the North-west coast alone but belongs to archaic thought itself. In this section I shall be mainly concerned with an examination of the ritual in this form. I shall first examine it as it has been reported for the first salmon ritual of the Tsimshian, and then turn to the Kwakiutl bear ritual which contains particularly valuable evidence.

I shall quote Gunther's account of the Tsimshian first salmon ceremony, because it gives an idea of the cultural context to which the ritual customs belong. In spite of its excellencies, however, this account cannot be taken as authoritative for the Tsimshian first salmon ritual. Gunther took it from Boas' description in _Tsimshian Mythology_ (1916: 450) and Boas, in turn, took it from the Tsimshian Salmon Boy Myth we have discussed in the last chapter (1916: 192). It is well known that Boas' attempt in _Tsimshian Mythology_ to describe the "life of the people as it appears in their tales and traditions" (p.43) ran into the difficulty that myths do not really describe the life of the people: but their thought, which uses the incidents of life for its own purposes. Here, the description of the salmon ritual is clearly subordinated to the plot of the myth. Through a comparison with other, isomorphic rituals we can judge how this subordination effects the description. It breaks off at a point at which the actual ritual could not have come to an end, because at this point the story swerves from a description of the ritual. This is when the salmon is cut: in the story, Salmon Boy is found at this point in embryonic form in Salmon Chief's stomach and absorbs the narrator's interest; in an actual ritual the celebrating community would go on to the communal meal.

Having made this reservation we are free to appreciate the extraordinary interest of the account. It centres on the pageant with which the salmon is brought in from the beach and conducted to the chief's house,
and: on the cutting which is done here inside the feast house. The first
phase is brilliant and noisy, the second quiet and solemn. This is of
particular interest in relation to the Kwakiutl first salmon ritual.

There the fisherman's wife (after having prayed to the four salmon) takes
them up quickly to the higher part of the beach to cut them in solitude.

Here the fisherman husband (impersonated by the shaman) guides the salmon
to the village in public procession. The cutting is always done by women,
but there, in contrast to the Kwakiutl custom, publicly by two women sha­
mans who, one would assume, must be impersonating the fisherman's wife.

"When the first salmon has been caught, four old shamans are
called to the fisherman's platform. They bring along a new
cedar bark mat, bird's down, red ochre and other paraphernalia
belonging to a shaman" ... The shaman is present because he is the
normal ceremonial leader. The use of a new mat may be
traced to two customs: in the first fruit ceremonies of the
Lillooet as well as their salmon ceremony: new utensils are used;
and furthermore, Tsimshian custom dictates that "when a visitor is
led into a house, a good new mat is spread for him" (Boas RBAE 31: 437).
They spread the cedarbark mat on the platform, and the
shaman fisherman puts on his attire, holding the rattle in his
right hand, the eagle tail in his left". In some accounts it is
definitely stated that the shaman changes clothing with the fisher­
man. This change of clothing might be interpreted as an attempt
to make the shaman and fisherman seem one ... "The shamans take
up the mat at its four corners and carry up the salmon (in the same
way as a guest is welcomed); the fisherman shaman going ahead of
them, shaking his rattle and swinging his eagle tail". A person
who is the object of ceremony is carried in a blanket, the four
corners held by four men. A bride is carried on an elkskin blanket
to the house of the groom's father ... "The salmon is carried to
the chief's house; and all the young people who are considered
unclean are ordered to leave the house, while all the old people enter:
in front of the procession". It is appropriate that the
ceremony should be conducted in the chief's house, for all honoured
guests are received there ... "All the shamans in the village
dress up and come in, following the salmon ... Inside (the house)
the salmon is placed on a large cedar board, and the shamans march
around it four times. Meanwhile the singers sit down in their
proper places around the house, and the fisherman shaman calls two
old women shamans to cut the salmon ... They take up their mussel­
shell knives, while all the people keep quiet. They call the salmon
by its honorary names: Chief Spring Salmon, Quartz Nose, Two Gills
on Back, Lightning Following One Another, and Three Jumps".
(1928: 139--140)

Gunther comments that the customs described here have not been "fitted
into any one ceremonial pattern", but are echoes of the various ceremonial patterns of the Tsimshian, the honouring of guests, shamanistic cures etc. This is patently not the case. That the "language" through which a ritual pattern is conveyed is culture-bound goes without saying. But the ritual belongs to the meta-group of the "agrarian rite", with the emphasis shifted to the entrance ceremony, though the account remains uncompleted because of the nature of the source. We can find parallels in Frazer's collection of agrarian rites where the entrance ceremony is equally elaborated and therefore is also that of the guest honoured because he is in fact the host, the giver of gifts.

I shall supplement the Tsimshian account of the first salmon ritual with a Kwakiutl account of a first bear ritual. The ritual pattern is the same: they are both first fruit rites, the stress is on the entrance ceremony, and the rhetoric is that of the feast. But the Kwakiutl account, though very short, shows the pattern in its completeness and allows us to make structural inferences that throw further light on the purpose of the ceremony.

It used to be the custom that when the first bear of the season was killed, the hunter would bring it to the village, and while yet a short distance away could call, "I have a visitor". Then all the people very solemnly and quietly would assemble in his house. The bear was placed in a sitting posture in the place of honour in the middle of the back part of the room, with a ring of cedar bark about its neck and eagle down on its head. Food was then given to each person, and a portion was placed before the bear. Great solemnity prevailed. The bear was treated as the honoured guest, and was so addressed in the speeches. The people one by one would advance and take his paws in their hands as if uttering a supplication. After the ceremonial meal was over, the bear was skinned and prepared for food. (Curtis 1915: 36)

Structurally this is the same ritual as the first salmon ceremony of the Tsimshian. The stress is again on the entry ceremony the welcoming of the animal. But in spite of its brevity we have here a fuller account
of the ritual structure. The ritual proceeds in three stages:

1) The bear is welcomed as a visitor of importance. Signs of honouring him are the seat in the middle of the rear of the house, which is the place of honour in a Kwakiutl house, the neck ring and eagle down with which he is adorned, the speeches made in his honour, and the banquet given for him.

These signs correspond to the ceremonial procession for the salmon among the Tsimshian. Taking into account differences of usage, the two ways of honouring a guest are not mutually exclusive but could occur in either society together.

2) Individual supplication to the bear by the members of the community.

Missing in the Tsimshian account, probably due to the bias of the account as part of a myth. The phase is important structurally because it contains the clash of feeling that accompanies the capture of an animal. It is an articulation of the dilemma. Its place between the feast for the animal given by men, and the feast for men given by the animal is significant.

3) Cutting up and eating of the bear.

The ceremony of cutting up the animal is given greater prominence in the Tsimshian account, which breaks off here. What follows is the communal meal.

If we take the rhetorical convention that is employed here seriously—the convention of the obligations of giving, receiving and requiting—the pattern that emerges is something like this: a renowned person comes to visit a social group. He is received with a feast of welcome. In return he gives a potlatch for his host group with the gifts he has brought for them. The gifts are his own substance, given so that they can eat. Before he gives himself they each come up to him to ask his pardon for
their taking, and to thank him for his gift. It is a pattern of two feasts, and of the transformation of the hosts into guests, the guest into host. The people who have received the bear as their guest become his guests; he becomes the host. The ritual is a condensed statement of the pattern of the potlatch rhythm. Further, we have seen in Chapter 1 that the potlatch always implies a self-sacrifice of the host to his guests. His possessions are an extension of himself; in giving them away he symbolically gives himself. In the hunting ritual, where the animal as game visits men, we have the concrete prefiguration of such giving. There is nothing symbolic about the self-sacrifice of the visitor. The gift he brings to give away to the human community is himself. Distinctions may be made, as in the Kwakiutl prayer to the salmon, that it is only his body which men take while his soul lives on, but about the central fact there is no doubt: it is his life which he lays down as a gift.

Of the three phases strictly speaking only the first and the third belong to the rhetorical figure of the guest as host. In the first phase the animal is honoured as a distinguished visitor and a feast and entertainment given for it. In the third phase the animal requites with a feast far more important: it gives its own substance to feed the people. This feast is at the same time a direct sustaining of the people's life, who eat their host, and a sign or pledge that this first animal, who has been entertained so generously, will see to it that its fellow animals, fellow-members of the species, will come and let themselves be caught in plenty. In other words the ritual is a reenactment of the original contract between men and animals. Men and animals give to one another; if they do so with scrupulous care, especially on the human side, they are quits.

The first and third phase belong to those mythical conventions which
in the prayers we have called dispensations. If they made up the ritual by themselves it would be an entirely happy event. Men could have their cake and eat it; in this case eat the animal and live in harmony with it. The second phase however stands in direct contradiction to this convention. The clash is not so much on the surface, where an apology to the animal can perhaps be aligned with the mythical convention that men and animals are quits, but deeper down, in the unease that perceives that, realistically assessed, men and animals are not quits and can never be quits. In the phase of supplication the people implore the animal not to be angry about the taking of its life, which they do, in fact, from necessity, and for which they have nothing to offer in return. This interlude between the first and third phase that establishes the relation of secular man, who, being secular is poor and has nothing to give, with a supernatural giver is the conceptual pivot of the ritual as a whole. Without it the rhetorical convention of the first and second phase—the guest as host—would remain a "dead metaphor", incomplete intellectually and morally, and without any transforming power. In other words the contradictory intervening phase makes the rhetoric persuasive because it links it with reality.

Unfortunately, we have no verbatim accounts of the speeches and prayers for the Kwakiutl bear ritual and the Tsimshian salmon ritual. This is a serious lack because speeches and prayers provide an exegesis of the ritual action. Without such commentary the rituals tend to strike us as irrational or at best vaguely and obscurely symbolical. In fact they are precise statements of clearly formed attitudes. We know enough about the background, from an examination of the prayers and myths in the preceding two chapters to see that what I have said about the rhetorical convention of the ritual is generally true. But ritual adds a new dimension to the question of the relation between men and animals, and we are therefore in need of a
particular exegesis. The only verbatim evidence for the rhetorical convention of the guest as host we have used so far is the prayer spoken before the communal meal in the Kwakiutl salmon ritual. This means our evidence comes from a ritual that does not emphasise this convention. Moreover, this prayer represents structurally the second phase—it is interspersed between welcoming (the women’s prayer on the beach) and eating (the communal meal). Yet for all these differences the last phrase of the prayer expresses clearly the figure of the salmon as hosts at the meal in which their own bodies are consumed: "... your souls come to watch over us when we are going to eat what you have given us to eat now". For exegetical commentary on the bear ritual we have to go outside Kwakiutl territory, simply because our Kwakiutl sources are too scant, not because such commentary could not have been gained. But this necessity also has the virtue of making us see the Kwakiutl-Northwest coast convention in its greater context. The concepts underlying the bear ritual are astonishingly uniform in the boreal woodland area in which the bear is venerated. As Hallowell has demonstrated in his "Bear Ceremonialism in the Northern Hemisphere" (1926) there is a circumpolar "culture area", stretching from Finland through Northern Asia and North America in which the same concepts are elaborated in different forms. They were found most clearly articulated among the Ainu, for whom the bear is the supreme divine being. The Ainu word Kamui, a god, means usually a bear.15 In what follows I shall do three things. (1) I shall give an account of the mythico-rhetorical figure of the guest as host, taken from Kyosuke Kindaichi's comments on the Ainu bear festival. This is the clearest account of the principle of the bear ritual we have in the literature, but it is clear by virtue of ignoring the second, contradictory phase of the ritual. (2) I shall supplement this account with one from Alexander Henry, prisoner and friend of Eastern
Woodland Indians in the 18th century. Henry’s account contains an excellent description of the second phase. With its help I shall be able to demonstrate that the complete ritual depends on its structurally contradictory nature. [3] I shall discuss the rhetorical figure once more as the Kwakiutl conceived it, as a potlatch metaphor, and show that because of its ambiguity it can contain the contradiction of the ritual. As any true rhetorical figure it is a persuasive and organizing metaphor that moves in both senses, emotionally, and towards a new point of view. Here, again the locus of contradiction becomes the departing point for new action and thought.

(1) Kindaichi is an outstanding student of the Ainu. His "Concepts behind the Ainu Bear Festival" is the best analysis of the bear ritual I know of. The Ainu, like the Kwakiutl, venerated the salmon as well as the bear; an analysis of prayers, myths and rituals along the lines traced in my thesis might be rewarding. I quote Kindaichi’s account for two reasons: for the articulateness and precision with which the two-way host-guest relations is treated, and for the recognition that we have to do here with the general principle of the relation of men to all non-human living beings, not only animals used for food but all animals, not only animals but plants; a living world of "othernesses" that are grasped in their separate identities and bound to men with bonds of mutual giving. The mythical world of the "two countries" is the same as in Kwakiutl belief. In contrast to Kwakiutl belief, however, there is in Kindaichi’s account no indication that the two countries involve a doubleness of the "supernatural ones", as it is expressed, for instance, in the epithets of the prayers; a doubleness that, moreover, reflects the duplicity of human intentions. All is well here between men and animals. Another parallel to Kwakiutl belief is the division into body and soul. The bodies the people
eat at the ritual are only animals' garments; the soul, with its potential for renewal, remains untouched. Again, there is no indication in this account of the fear that accompanies the division into body and soul and the eating of the body, as it is so clearly expressed in the Kwakiutl: prayer spoken during the salmon ritual. Kindaichi has neglected these aspects (though they are clearly present in the texts that describe the Ainu bear ritual) for the sake of the logic and coherence of the concepts. The result is one of the most beautiful and incisive descriptions of the "myth of mutuality" that forms the conceptual basis of the rhetorical figure of the guest as host. Its deficiencies as a description of the ritual we can amend from other sources.

Outside of this world, where men are living, there is a country of gods, where the gods, it is thought, live in human form ... These gods sometimes come to this world of men to play, where the god, a bear, comes in a disguise of black fur, sharp claws and a big form, the wolf ... comes in a white robe, the fox ... comes in a yellowish-brown disguise, others in disguises of birds, or of insects or of fish. These forms of living things are nothing but the disguise in which those gods visit this world. (p.345) ... Not only animal forms but also grasses and trees are gods: the corn and the lily bulb, for example, are gods called ... "food gods" ... Among the Ainu people (who feared to eat the lily bulb) there was a man who was brave enough to eat one; he found it had a fine taste and all the others became willing to eat it. After that, the god of the lily bulb was able to return to his Kingdom of gods, without wandering in vain upon the earth. Thus the gods who came to this world can return happily to the Kingdom of gods, only by being freed of their hayokube (or willingly eaten and being respected) at the hands of the Ainu tribe. Therefore, the flesh and the skin of the bear, of the owl or the salmon, which are: their disguises, are given to the Ainu who catch them; and the Ainu receive them and eat them in thankfulness. Thus the gods, who came down to earth to play, can go home to the Kingdom of gods. (p.346) ... These gods of another world come to this land in the disguise of various living things; and when they are caught and killed at the hands of the Ainu people, their spirits come in the house, not through the usual doors, but through the inner window and sit at the left side of the fire-place, which is usually the seat of guests. This window is called ... "the window through which the gods enter". The visitor-spirit is a present to man, if it is seen from the point of view of the Ainu; but it is a guest as seen from the point of view of the gods. When, thus, gods visit the house of the Ainu, the disguise (or meat and fur) is a complimentary gift to the people of the house. Then
they hold a banquet, calling the people of their neighbourhood and eating this "souvenir" of the gods all together. It is called "to give a banquet" if it is seen from the viewpoint of men, but it means "an entertainment" as seen from that of the gods. ... When men bring home such game as a bear or a deer, it is the god's visit to their home; it means entirely the welcome of a guest, his entertainment, and send-off. It is surprising that there is a great difference between the mind of the Ainu and ours [Japanese] when game was caught. When a deer or a bear was caught, they say in the Ainu language shumau-an; an means "there is" and shumau means that "a god returns to his former self by being killed by the hand of men". It does not mean death but a new life in the form of a god. When a living thing is killed by men, its skull is decorated with flowers and the skull is called ... "returning god". After killing a creature they make an offering to the spirit and say, "Go thou home to thy fatherland with the souvenir". This is called "sending off", of which there are many expressions such as "to let go" or "to dispatch" or "to let depart". The word Kumamatsuri, "the bear festival", is Jomante in Ainu language, which means "sending off". (p.347--348)

What is striking about this description of Ainu belief is that the Ainu are capable of giving a synchronic account of the ritual from the point of view of the animal and of men. What we shall discuss in the next section as one of the most important characteristics of these rituals—that they are exercises in seeing from the other's point of view—is caught here in the language. The spirit who comes through its special window is simultaneously "a gift" (to men) and "a guest" (of men); the communal meal is "a banquet" (for men) and "an entertainment" (for the bear). The first and third ritual phases are linguistically joined together. The second phase with its remorse, lamentation and supplication to the bear not to be angry is neglected here. Interestingly it is conducted, at least among the Ainu of Volcano Bay, Yezo, by the women alone, who dramatise their feelings by turning against the men who have killed the bear (Frazer 1925: 188). Among the Ainu of Saghalien both men and women weep and make speeches asking the bear's forgiveness, reminding him at the same time that it is his duty to sacrifice himself for them (op. cit. p.188). I shall not quote these speeches, which Kindajchi so unaccountably ignores, but turn back to North America for an account of the second phase.
Alexander Henry's description is notable on several counts. One is that the ritual, celebrated by a small group—the family with which he travelled, whose prisoner he was and who had adopted him—loses in ceremoniousness and gains in spontaneous feeling as well as in verbal articulateness. These people lived very near the bone—when Henry discovered and shot the bear they were on the verge of starving to death. In spite of its spontaneity the ritual has the same formal structure as the Kwakiutl bear ritual, with all its phases, and in the same order; and perhaps because of the spontaneity and the smallness of the group we get less ceremony and a precise, explicit summing up in ordinary language of the "concepts behind the bear ritual". The rhetorical figure, and the "myth of mutuality" are only indicated. Yet all through, the same procedure obtains as in the Kwakiutl salmon ritual and bear ritual. First an individual prayer is spoken when the bear is killed, here not by the killer—Alexander—but by the woman he calls my old mother. This prayer, in which she asks for forgiveness, she accompanies by stroking and kissing the bear (p.136). The first phase of the ritual is a "welcoming" in the lodge, where the bear's head is set on a scaffold and decorated with the wealth of the family, silver bracelets and "wampum" belts. This is followed by what Henry calls the feast of the manes—the mourning rite for the bear—which is followed by the communal meal. The "feast of the manes" has, then, the exact structural position between "welcoming" and "eating" as the supplication in the Kwakiutl bear ritual, when everyone takes the bear's hand, or the communal prayer in the Kwakiutl first salmon ritual. In this account this phase is, however, the high point of the ritual as a whole, and the speech that accompanies it makes clear in universally understandable language the dilemma of necessity that inspires it.
The next morning, after taking the bear home and putting the head on a scaffold no sooner appeared, than preparations were made for a feast of the manes. The lodge was cleaned and swept; and the head of the bear lifted up and a new shroud blanket, which had never been used before, spread under it. The pipes were now lit: and Wawatam blew tobacco-smoke into the nostrils of the bear, telling me to do the same, and thus appease the anger of the bear, on account of my having killed her. I endeavoured to persuade my benefactor and friendly adviser, that she no longer had any life and assured him that I was under no apprehension from her displeasure; but the first proposition obtained no credit, and the second gave but little satisfaction. At length, the feast being ready, Wawatam commenced a speech, resembling, in many things, his address to the manes of his relations and departed companions but, having this peculiarity, that he here deplored the necessity under which man laboured thus to destroy their friends. He represented, however, that the misfortune was unavoidable, since without doing so, they could by no means subsist. The speech ended, we all ate heartily of the bear's flesh; and even the head itself, after remaining three days on the scaffold, was put into the kettle.

In the ritual of these hard-living people the myth of the happy harmony between men and animals, grounded on mutual giving has almost disappeared. It is just hinted at in the gifts of valuables and the new mat the bear is offered at his coming to the lodge. What is stressed is the extreme opposite of harmony: that men have to destroy their friends in order to live. (The italics in the quote are the author's.) One cannot conceive of a state more drastically opposed to that proposed in the myth; it is imaginatively, logically, and as an experience the absolute negation of a state of happy mutuality. The mutual giving and receiving of the myth presupposes two free and equal partners. This state is doubly negated: not only is one of the partners destroyed—an act that allows him to give (i.e. himself) but puts an end to mutuality--but even as a destroyer the other partner has not acted freely but under the compulsion of necessity. In other words, he was from the outset unfitted for the free mutuality the myth proposes. This is the reality to which Wawatam points in his speech.

(3) Henry's Woodland Indians stress the second phase as the centre of the ritual. They do not even thank the bear for coming: from the old woman's
prayer on their dialogue with the bear speaks of sorrow and asks forgiveness. Which, then, are the "concepts behind the bear ritual"? It would seem that the dilemma of necessity, expressed in the second phase, is the point of departure. If the reality of the fellowship between men and animals is accepted, then the second phase represents the realistic view of the case. The myth of mutuality would represent then the absolute resolution of the dilemma in the realm of logical possibility—logical only, because, as I have pointed out, the real state of affairs and the myth-state are perfect opposites. Morally this absolute solution could be phrased as the absolute demand, which clashes with what is humanly possible but stimulates to find solutions within the range of the possible. Here the myth enters again, not as a logical possibility or an impossible moral demand but as a metaphor.

According to Fernandez metaphors can be persuasive or performative, they are "a strategic predication upon an inchoate pronoun (an I, a you, a we, a they) which makes a movement and leads to performance". In other words, metaphors move people (along a continuum or several continua) in what Fernandez calls "a cultural quality space" (p.48), and make people act in new ways. The metaphor of the potlatch is both persuasive and performative in Fernandez sense. This is why I have examined it as a rhetorical figure, the guest as host. In the ritual which stresses the welcoming, the visit of the honoured guest, as do the Kwakiutl bear ritual and the Tsimshian salmon ritual this rhetorical figure is emphatically used. The people who are persuaded or moved by it (along a continuum in their cultural space), or are stimulated by it to performance, are the participants in the ritual. But it is only through two things; the myth of mutuality, which contains the principle of the ritual, and the non-mutuality of reality expressed in the second phase of the ritual, that we can chart
in what direction the metaphor of the potlatch moves people and what it persuades them to do.

The continuum on which people are moved is the time continuum Summer-Winter. The two poles are encrusted with cultural connotations: boundness by necessity, passivity, receiving--freedom by activity, giving. In the Summer men are faced with objective problems, their relation with the outside, non-human world. In the Winter they look inward and concern themselves with problems of human interrelation. The potlatch metaphor enacted in the salmon and bear ritual moves them on this continuum from a non-mutual reality to a mutual reality. It does not move them far, but the winter dance completes the movement. The *myth* of mutuality prefigures the *reality* of mutuality, but it prefigures it on a plane where it is not possible, in men's relation with the animals. It nevertheless constitutes the beginning and the end point, the primordial point of departure and the eschatological point of arrival.

The metaphor is the mover because of its two-sideness. Fernandez has well said that metaphorical assertion is a way of avoiding building up precise intellectual structures (p.42). The potlatch metaphor accommodates the *myth of mutuality* and the *reality of non-mutuality*. It builds up a potlatch model in which men, by entertaining their visitor, are in the position of givers, and his "banquet" for them is a requiting of their gift. Simultaneously it points out, according to an inherent law of the potlatch, that men are now in debt, because the gift of the animal's substance has to be repaid with a gift of equal or greater value and men have not the power of such a gift. In receiving they have taken up a challenge they cannot meet and are in a condition of irremediable debt, bound by their non-freedom. The metaphor then does three things: (a) reflects symbolically the mutuality that is mythical in the Summer, (b) conceptually shows that the
Summer puts men in debt, (c) persuasively points to a solution; that men must make themselves free and become givers in the Winter. In this way it moves men in the Summer-Winter continuum, in a cultural quality space where activity is better than passivity, and to be a giver better than a receiver.

The fact that men can never pay their original creditors adds a further shade of ambiguity to the metaphor, and keeps it continually fresh. Men will always return to the necessity of being receivers where they cannot requite as Winter turns to Summer. And they will always struggle to free themselves and repay their debt as Summer turns to Winter.

4 The Myth of the Ritual: The Animal as Hero

To discuss a ritual in terms of the myth has become problematic since Lévi-Strauss has pronounced against any intermingling of ritual with myth. In his section on ritual in L'Homme Nu Lévi-Strauss insists on stripping ritual of all content and analysing it as pure form. The form which he finds underlying the varying contents he regards as stable for all rituals, and the interpretation he gives to this form as valid for all rituals. This method raises two questions, one concerning the definition of ritual, the other the meaning. What is, then, a ritual? Is Lévi-Strauss' account of this stable form itself the definition of what a ritual is, in other words are ceremonies that do not correspond to that form not rituals? And second, is Lévi-Strauss' interpretation of this form the only possible one or are there others that would cover this and a variety of other forms and so allow a more widely based interpretation, which would suggest in turn a different definition?

These questions are not directly relevant to the subject in hand, but what Lévi-Strauss says in the course of his discussion about the role of anxiety in ritual and the modalities of myth is so pertinent and has such
clarifying force that one cannot avoid taking up the whole problem. This section therefore contains apart from its proper subject—a description of the myth of the ritual and an examination of the role the myth plays—a report of Lévi-Strauss’ approach to the problem of ritual and myth in general.

Reduced to its simplest elements the myth of the first salmon ritual (or of rituals for other animals, e.g. the bear) can be told in three sentences. The animal leaves its supernatural home in sea or mountain and travels to this world, where it meets with men. Here it is killed and eaten. Regenerating itself from its bones, it returns to its supernatural home. An assumption accompanying the myth is that this series of events will repeat itself year after year.

Each of the basic elements contained in these three sentences can be elaborated and deepened. We have seen in the last section how the rhetorical figure of the guest as host can elaborate the meeting with men. Received as a guest the animal is showered with honours and invited to a feast. In return it gives a feast at which it offers its body. According to the law of giving, receiving, and requiting (the "potlatch law") men have now to offer an equal gift or remain in the animal’s debt. With the help of the potlatch metaphor the simple elements of meeting with the animal, and eating it, have gained a moral force that influences behaviour. From the myths we have discussed in the last chapter we know how other parts of the story are deepened and ethically mobilized in native thought. The Salmon Boy myths throw light on the element of eating the animal. In these stories the salmon teach the boy that though they "are men" (a point that has been established the moment he crossed the border into their world) they are food for men. In other words though they are the same in all general respects they are different in one pertinent respect. Identifi-
cation—seeing that the salmon are men as we are—leads to a recognition of the differences: men and salmon feed differently, and salmon are food for men. In the salmon ritual, where the salmon is treated as a man, the problem of identification and differentiation stands again at the centre.

The Bear Mother stories take up another aspect of this problem, and show how the element of killing can be elaborated. The bear has the strength and intelligence to kill the hunters who persecute him. Nevertheless, he decides to leave his den voluntarily and let himself be killed. This elaboration represents the act of killing so to speak inside out: as a voluntary act on the animal's part that is yet a passive act; a decision to suffer death rather than cause it. The animal, who is like a man, has the ideal human qualities of voluntariness and unselfishness. These qualities provide the necessary mediation between identifying and differentiating in the problematic relation between men and animals, where men are forced to eat their friends. The bear's sacrificial act shows how different the animals are from men, but points out simultaneously the way to being like them.

I have already remarked that according to Lévi-Strauss this myth, simple or elaborated, should be treated as unconnected with the essential tendency of the ritual. Myth and ritual are, according to him, basically contradictory forms of expression, and to treat them as if they belonged together leads to confusion. If we want to establish that the myth in fact expresses the essential tendency of the ritual, which I wish to do, we have to discuss Lévi-Strauss' theory. To do this it will be necessary to ask the following questions:

1) Considering ritual separated from myth, as Lévi-Strauss suggests, what would it be and what would its effect on behaviour be?
2) Considering myth along with ritual, in contradiction to Lévi-Strauss' suggestion, does the enactment of ritual add anything conceptually to the myth?

3) Again considering myth along with ritual, does the enactment increase the human scope of the participants; do they learn something which the myth alone could not have told them, are potentials of acting and thinking created which the myth alone cannot create?

In order to answer these questions we have to take issue with Lévi-Strauss on three points: the definition of ritual, the definition of myth, and the role of emotion in ritual. These points are taken up in his section on ritual in L'Homme Nu. 22

4(a) Ritual as Anxiety

The section on ritual in L'Homme Nu arises from the criticism levelled at Lévi-Strauss that his anthropology denies the importance of affective life (p.596--7). Lévi-Strauss begins therefore by making an assertion which he has made before, notably in The Savage Mind, that emotion and what arises from emotion is obscure, and that what is refractory to explanation can ipso facto not be used for explanation. When he adds here that "All manifestations of affective life that would not reflect at the level of consciousness some worthy incident thwarting or accelerating the process of understanding do not belong to the human sciences; they belong to biology and others should deal with them", one can only agree. But when he defines ritual in the course of his discussion as obscure emotion that cannot properly be the object of intellectual operations because it lacks itself an intellectual nature one becomes uneasy. Yet he argues a convincing case by a definition of ritual that separates it from myth of all description: ritual whose language, if it uses language, does not proceed
by argument but by a sort of incantation. This incantation, according to Lévi-Strauss, endeavours to reconstruct the wholeness of experience, to recapture life as it was before thought destroyed it. Ritual is essentially separate from and antagonistic to thought. Myth, on the other hand, is thought.

Then, while myth resolutely turns its back on the continuous, to cut up and disjoin the world by means of distinction, of contrasts and oppositions, ritual proceeds in the opposite direction: starting with discrete units which are imposed upon it by a previous conceptualization of reality, ritual runs after the continuous and tries to catch up to it, despite the fact that the initial rupture accomplished by mythical thought renders this task impossible for ever. Hence the mixture that is so characteristic of ritual, a combination of stubbornness and impotence explains why it has always a compulsive and desperate aspect. Conversely, (and, Undoubtedly this is why, despite what precedes, men, who should have learned from failure and vacuousness, have never given it up) ritual has what we could call the majestic quality of magic: it is a complicated game, irrational in essence, contrary to mythical thought, but nevertheless indispensible as it introduces in all slightly serious enterprises an element of slowness and of reflection, pauses and intermediary stages and can even moderate war. Contrary to what an unenlightened naturist imagines, ritual does not spring from a spontaneous reaction to the experienced: rather it turns upon experience and the states of anxiety which create it or are created by it--and then accompany it--let us say in both cases. It does not express, supposing that they exist, an immediate relation between man and the world but rather the opposite: i.e. a mental reservation, born of a fear that by starting from a schematic and conceptualised view of the world, his immediate subconscious datum, man cannot manage to find his way back to the experienced.

The argument raises two major questions. Does ritual really try to recapture "the experienced"? And is it by definition a state of anxiety? The answers naturally depend on how one defines ritual. Before we look at Lévi-Strauss' definition in the light of examples, a few brief general remarks.

There is no doubt that rituals strive for wholeness. The conception of a harmony between all living beings, which inspires the rituals we are discussing is an example of a striving for a wholeness of experience that
has never existed and can never be attained. (It is not, however, sought through incantation or any compulsive gestural behaviour, and it is not sought in the ritual alone but in the myths and prayers that relate to the same complex of thought). However, is this conception of wholeness not exactly the myth of the ritual? And is this myth of a wholeness of experience really confused with "the experienced"? Our examination of the ritual, with its carefully juxtaposed contradictory phases, seems to show that it was recognised as a construct and used to quicken thought and moral perception.

Nevertheless one cannot deny that the rituals we are discussing spring from anxiety and cause anxiety. Certainly the first fruit rites do not show a tough attitude to the animals and the living world. But is anxiety necessarily contrary to thought? Only if it is a constricting, wholly inturned emotion, as is that desperate and doomed attempt to run after the continuous Lévi-Strauss describes. If it turns outward and considers necessity in the light of other beings, who have, like men, their own laws and their own powers, anxiety becomes itself a spur to thought. We have seen how this looking outward leads to identifications and differentiations, to conceptions of voluntariness and selflessness that are in their origins simultaneously emotional and intellectual. Anxiety in these rituals seems to me one of those "manifestations of affective life that reflect at the level of consciousness some worthy incident accelerating the process of understanding". But in Lévi-Strauss' terms I am speaking here again of the myth and not of the ritual. Before we can go any further we have to discuss his definition of ritual per se.

4(b) The Definition of Ritual: Subdivision and Repetition

Lévi-Strauss' general axiom, as we have seen, is that myth is an
intellectual, ritual an emotional effort of man to come to terms with the world. Experience of life, sensory experience, is itself never direct and non-analytical; mere seeing has a physiological element of selection that starts as a binary coding in the eye and is continued in the organization of the perceived within the brain. Myth builds on this basically analytical nature of experience by multiplying and elaborating the possible combinations. In doing this it works "in the metaphoric style: it subsumes individualities under a general paradigm, enlarging and impoverishing the concrete data at the same time. This is done by forcing the details, one after the other, to cross discontinuous thresholds which separate the empirical from the symbolic, the imaginary, and lastly the schematised order of things". Ritual, on the contrary, "nourishes the illusion that it is possible to go contrary to the movement of the myth and to remake the continuum starting from the discrete". "This desperate endeavour, always doomed to fail, of recovering the continuity of experience which has been lived and later destroyed by the effects of a schematism which mythical speculation has substituted for it constitutes the essence of ritual".

Ignoring a slight contradiction--continuity of experience can never have been lived according to the argument, and must therefore itself be a mental construct--the position is as follows: myth disjoins the world by means of large distinctions, contrasts and oppositions, that is, it moves from non-thought to thought. Ritual reacts with anxiety to the widening of the distance between the intellect and life. It endeavours to fill the gaps mythical thought has created through finer and finer distinctions, finally blurring all distinction with endless repetition.

Lévi-Strauss arrives at this absolute contrast by a special definition of myth that deprives ritual of all mythical elements. Myth has two modalities, explicit and implicit. In its explicit mode it is a narration
whose importance and internal organizations is clear in its own right. In its implicit mode the myth "exists only as notes, sketches or fragments; instead of there being a link joining them each remains tied to such and such a phase of the ritual; it makes up the gloss and it is only during the ritual acts themselves that mythical representations are evoked" (p. 598). Both modalities belong to myth alone. The habit of treating the second as part of ritual has led to confusion concerning the true nature of ritual. Ritual in its pure form is non-linguistic:

On the side of and beyond myth the same gradation is noticed starting from explicit mythology, which represents, in the full sense of the word, a literature and progressing to implicit mythology where speech fragments become responsible for non-linguistic behaviors, and lastly to ritual in its pure form which, at its limit, one could conceive of as losing all affinity with language because it would consist of sacred words--unintelligible to the common people, or coming from an archaic language which people no longer understand, or even formulae devoid of intrinsic significance as often can be found in magic--in corporal gestures or in chosen and manipulated objects. At this moment, ritual, as music at the other end of the system, definitely drops out of language and if we want to understand its distinctive nature, we must face this pure form and not the intermediary states. How then shall we define ritual? We shall say that it consists of uttered words, performed motions, objects manipulated independently of all gloss or allowed exegesis or required by these three types of activity and which depend on implicit mythology and not on ritual itself. Under these conditions, it is not with mythology that we should compare ritual to bring out its distinctive qualities ... but with secular life, where the three types of activity are equally represented; from here on then, the problem brought about by the nature of the ritual will consist: firstly, to enquire why one must say words, make motions and manipulate objects in order to obtain the results which ritual requires, and secondly, how these operations, as executed during rites, differ from analogous operations of everyday life: in other words and without wondering about the contents which would inevitably bring us back to mythology--thus producing the illusion that we are defining ritual when, in fact, we are speaking of the accompanying myth--we will ask three questions on which depend the whole interpretation of the ritual: during rites, what distinctive manners are we referring to? How does one gesticulate? And what particular criteria dictate the choice of ritualistic objects and their handling? (pp. 599--600)

These are extremely interesting questions. Lévi-Strauss does not follow them up, however, but deals from here on exclusively with ritual
texts--the long texts of long rituals, such as the Navaho healing chants. In doing so he refrains from searching for what the words say but limits himself to "knowing in what way the words speak" (my italics). In other words Lévi-Strauss is approaching ritual now as one might a poem when one is looking for patterns rather than meaning: sound patterns, rhyme patterns, rhythm, metre.

Two observations have to be made on this point, and this applies to the choice and to the manipulation of objects as well as to the performance of the motions. In all these cases, ritual calls constantly for two procedures, subdivision on the one hand, and repetition on the other. First, as a subdivision within classes of objects and types of gestures, ritual infinitely differentiates and attributes discriminative values to the smallest nuances. It is not interested in anything as a whole, but on the contrary, clarifies the varieties and sub-varieties of all taxonomies, be they animal, vegetable and mineral, or those of which man is liberally the originator, such as raw materials, shapes, gestures and objects. The same kind of gesture acquires a role and a distinct meaning, and its place in the ritual changes depending on whether it is performed beginning from the right or the left, from the top or the bottom, from within or without. The same applies to speech. (p.601). ... In appearance, the process of subdivision and of repetition are opposite to each other; it is thus a question of sometimes introducing differences, however small they be, into operations which may appear to be identical; and at other times, of reproducing a statement on and on until it is lost sight of. But, in fact, the first process is eventually reducible to the second which constitutes, in some way, its limit. Such differences, having become infinitesimal, have a tendency to fuse themselves into a quasi-identity ... (p.602).

This definition of ritual by subdivision and repetition at first sight strikes one as convincing. At least a great many rituals, if not all, correspond to this "pure form". But second thoughts about this form make one uneasy. The pattern Lévi-Strauss has found is a non-pattern; its very execution as a pattern means a sinking into inanity and chaos. There are two things in this definition which it will be wise to keep apart:

(1) an account of ritual as consisting of subdivision and repetition;
(2) an assertion that this practice leads to a loss of all differentiation.

Lévi-Strauss' account of the ritual process as subdivision and repeti-
tion immediately brings to mind the world renewal rituals of Indian North America. In these widespread rituals the invariable practice is to dismember the objective world with the help of symbolic objects, or in words, to the smallest possible integral units, and then build it up again from these units until a whole new world is created. The accompanying exegesis may tell us that without such a dismembering and "remembering" the world will lose its soundness and deteriorate. The same process can, however, also be seen in rituals where not the natural world but man and society are the centre of attention. Two Kwakiutl rituals come to mind on reading Lévi-Strauss' description: the seal feast and the entrance ritual to the winter dance season. The former is one of those social occasions, so frequent in Kwakiutl life, that can hardly be called a ritual. The seal is an important catch, and is only eaten communally at a feast given by the chief. The animal is cut up into as many parts as there are members in the namima. The parts are distributed according to rank, each part having a fixed relation to a social position, so that, for instance, the chief gets the head, the two men nearest to him in rank right and left flippers, and so on.

It is quite clear what process is at work here. It is the same process Lévi-Strauss has described in The Savage Mind as detotalization and retotalization; only here it is used in the ephemeral context of a feast, and the animal is not "the ancestor". However, in dismembering and eating an animal the society "remembers" itself, exploiting the full force of the pun through the ritual gestures. The conceptual process of identification and distinction that is at work involves, exactly as Lévi-Strauss noted it for totemism, a passage between concrete and abstract, animal and human. An analogy is made between the concrete parts of the dismembered animal and the concrete parts of the society, the individuals.
The portions of meat will never make a whole animal again; the animal, in its wholeness and perfection can only be remembered now. On the other hand, society too is never more than an abstract entity, dependent on concrete signs to body it forth. When the individuals eat the animal, each his appointed part, the society is "remembered" in the image of the wholeness and perfection of the animal.

Basically, the same process is at work in the entrance ceremony to the winter dance season, but here we have to do with a full-fledged ritual that answers more closely to Lévi-Strauss' definition. The purpose of the ritual is the sanctification of the group about to celebrate the winter ritual together, a "going through" as the Kwakiutl call it. This purpose is achieved by manipulating a number of objects: tallow, charcoal, red cedar bark, eagle down in a predetermined manner and in fixed sequence. The manipulations are subdivided into "bundles" that form gestural units. Cutting the red cedar bark and distributing it are, for instance, two separate units. For each an individual is called by name, and his right to the privilege of performing the gestures is recited in a speech. The actor called on repeats each single gesture four times, three times as a feint and the fourth effectively. Each object is treated formally in the same way as the one preceding it. This rhythm of subdivision and repetition is finally broken when the ritual culminates in a long-lasting silence and the announcement: "Friends, we have gone through".

Here the "logical operator", to use Lévi-Strauss's term, is not a concrete animal but a mystic experience, "going through", and the relation between the operator and the goal of the ritual is a close and intricate one in comparison with the preceding case. Strictly speaking, "going through" can only be known to individual ecstatic experience, such as the initiate's experience in isolation. But a "privilege" is the concrete
sign of the ineffable experience. In the displaying of privileges the Kwakiutl achieve identification with one another through differentiation from one another. The privileges are all different, just as the mystic experience in initiation is given a different content by the individual. This particularises the individual. In essence, however, the experience is the same: that of "going through", of being changed. In repeating the particular experiences, down to the smallest nuances, in the token form of the privileges, the Kwakiutl succeed in building up the universal experience of "going through" and enacting it communally. The communal experience confirms and delimits the group.

In the case of either ritual the smallest constituent unit is carefully preserved in its integrity, because it is on particularization that generalization and abstraction depend. Repetition stresses the unit in its particularity and so keeps it distinct. But is the final effect not after all to eliminate all these distinctions and make them fuse into one communal experience? There is always this lower limit: as the animal could not be reconstituted, even in memory, if its smallest constituent parts were not kept integral, at least in the mind, so the communal experience could not be built up unless the smallest constituent privilege was separately enacted. The Kwakiutl custom of making everything "a privilege" shows this principle very clearly.

Not all rituals show the subdivision and repetition Levi-Strauss stresses as typical. Subdivision and repetition is a method that can be used but is not necessarily used in the process of identifying and differentiating. Identification and differentiation in their turn cannot define ritual because they are intellectual operations with a more general scope, as their use in totemism and other classifying systems show. But generically ritual belongs to this group of operations.
The operation differs in complexity according to whether we have to do with a subjective or an objective ritual. In the subjective ritual, to which the two Kwakiutl examples discussed above belong, an already existing unit (the namima, the winter dance society) is dismembered in order to be "remembered" through its separate parts, the individuals. In other words the human group confronts itself, and through division or differentiation identifies itself. There is also cross-identification with an outside unit but the "outsider" acts as a comparative standard. The change which the ritual seeks to bring about through differentiation and reidentification concerns the group and is self-referent.

The salmon ritual, and others like it, are objective rituals in which the celebrating group confronts an "outsider" directly. The animal is no longer a means to self-reference, it is the object of curiosity. The human group wants to know about an other. Knowledge can be gained through a taking apart and putting together again, which is the technique of the world renewal rituals where subdivision and repetition play a large role. But it can also be gained, especially in the case of a related living creature, through comparison with and differentiation from oneself. In the salmon ritual a relation of identification and differentiation is established between the animal and man. The intellectual operation is the same as in the subjective ritual but simpler. Instead of self-reference and a non-human operator, taken from the animal or spiritual world, there is direct reference to a non-human protagonist. Identification and differentiation is not sought within the human group but between the human and the non-human being. The method is not that of a decomposition of the self (the individual or the collective self) in order to apprehend that self, but a direct apprehension of an other as "one of us" that shows existing distinctions. Clearly this is not merely an intellectual process but also
one of the sympathetic imagination. In this process the animal is neither anthropomorphised nor treated as one of a species. It is individualized, and so becomes comparable—one of us—while remaining itself.

To conclude I return to Lévi-Strauss' definition of ritual per se. It depended on these assertions:

1) ritual in its pure form can be recognised if it is freed from all mythic encrustations, including the gloss given to it in its cultural context;

2) ritual then shows itself to consist of a pattern of subdivision and repetition that lead to a loss of differentiation;

3) this pattern represents the desperate attempt—desperate because always doomed to failure—to recapture the continuity of experience. Lévi-Strauss' definition would exclude the first salmon ceremony and other first fruit and hunting rites from being rituals. As we have seen from the Kwakiutl text for the first salmon ritual these rituals, considered as gestures and objects manipulated, are everyday acts performed at a normal everyday tempo. That they are in fact pauses in everyday activity and introduce that "element of slowness and reflection" which Lévi-Strauss so perceptively notes as a characteristic of ritual is due to the accompanying myth of the first salmon. The implicit myth, referred to in speeches and prayers and alive in the consciousness of the participants, is here the only thing that distinguishes ritual action from everyday action. Without it the Kwakiutl first salmon ritual would be the cutting up of the salmon and cooking and eating a delectable part of it.

However, a pattern of subdivision and repetition, even if absent in some rituals, is a characteristic feature of most rituals. (It is also a feature of narrative and descriptive prose in general in Indian North America; but there, as Lévi-Strauss explains, it has a metonymic function
instead of the metaphoric one it has for ritual—cf. p. 579). Yet what it achieves, according to my investigations, is not non-differentiation but a rendering prominent of the smallest integral units, which are thus stressed as constituent units of the whole. Subdivision and repetition belong therefore to the operation of differentiation and identification which we also find in totemic systems. This makes ritual not a "complicated game, irrational in essence, contrary to mythical thought" but an intelligent operation, directed to understanding and coping with circumstances, related to mythical thought and yet more experimental and less speculative than it.

Finally, the question of emotion. When Lévi-Strauss writes: "The ritual's compulsion to mark off the smallest constituent of experience by means of subdivision, and then to multiply them by repetition, illustrates a deep throbbing need of protection against all cutting or eventual disruption which might compromise its unfolding" it seems to me that he infringes his own rule about the analysis of ritual per se and provides a gloss. This immediately raises the question why Lévi-Strauss' gloss (his implicit myth) should have more interpretative value than the native one (the implicit myth). Perhaps at the level of deep structure reached by the analysis glossing is in order. This is the anthropologist as god, looking through the people he studies. But what if he should draw invalid conclusions from valid findings?

If ritual action is approached through the implicit myth, and so allowed to be intelligent, it is quite clear that ritual emotion is not necessarily self-protective. Subjective rituals include typically a risking of the self, and objective rituals show an openness to the outside world and the non-human other that is an intelligent exercise of the emotion of sympathy. By separating emotion in ritual from its reasonable source in the implicit myth and reducing it to the "throbbing need of
protection" against the disruption of experience, Lévi-Strauss is practising a "ritualism from without" that gives the lie to his best anthropological insights. He is making ritual bizarre and irrational by not looking at it "from within". Naturally if ritual were as obscure as he makes it it would not be a suitable subject for the human sciences. But if we examine ritual in the light of its accompanying myth we find that not only are clear ideas expressed but that they are ideas that are relevant to human thought in general.

4(c) Myth, Ritual and Emotion

Let us return now to the hunting and first fruit rituals that celebrate the coming of the animal, and ask ourselves two questions: what change of consciousness do the emotions these rituals arouse produce in the participants? and, what is the difference between the myth about the animal that exists only in connection with the ritual and the independent narrative on the same subject? We shall start with the second question.

In making the distinction between implicit and explicit myth Lévi-Strauss has given us an invaluable tool for the investigation of ritual. Simply making the distinction raises the possibility that an implicit myth may be different from the explicit one on the same subject, and that this difference will tell us something about the ritual that would have escaped us otherwise. A myth that exists only as fragments of narrative, each of them tied to a phase of the ritual, and that is organised only by the enactment of the ritual, should tell us something about the conceptual tendency or "intention" of the ritual as distinct from that of myth.

In many cases implicit and explicit myths differ only in the greater detail and precision with which the explicit myth is told. The difference is similar to that between a public and a secret version, where the public
version corresponds to the implicit myth which people have in mind while
the ritual proceeds, and the secret version to the explicit myth, told
only by those who own it. This is the case with the Kwakiutl initiation
myth. It is therefore interesting that in the case of the hunting myths
and the myths attached to the hunting rituals, we have to do with two
related and yet formally totally different stories. The difference lies
in the point of view: it is as if the explicit myth were a story made up
by men for men, the implicit myth one made up by animals for men. The
explicit myth has a human hero and tells of his adventures in the land of
the animals. The implicit myth has an animal hero and tells of what
befalls him when he visits men. There is no explicit myth that is told
entirely from the point of view of the animal, or, to express it differen-
tly, that has an animal as hero. The hunting myths seem to struggle to
achieve this point of view, and we have seen that the Bear Mother story
comes close to it at the point of crisis, when the bear is killed. But
the framework and most of the plot are based on the adventures of a human
hero and deal with human concerns. The human hero leaves this world for
the world of the animals and succeeds in some way in overcoming the animal
before he returns to this world with his prize. (In a second move retri-
bution may follow and a balance of justice between men and animals be
established whose pivot is the transformed hero.) The myth of the ritual
gives us the complement to this story. It is the myth of the animal who
comes voluntarily to the world of men to give itself to men. Here the
animal is the tragic and triumphant hero who engages our sympathy, and man
his uncertain antagonist, who rouses appropriately divided feelings. The
story, organised by the ritual phases of welcoming, supplication, eating,
and the consecration of the remains is that of the animal suffering
annihilation for the sake of men, and its final restoration. The organi-
sing ritual actions reflect therefore the ability of seeing from another's point of view. This becomes particularly clear if we consider how the phases of the ritual express contradictory moods: joy over the animal's coming, remorse and grief that necessity should force one to kill one's friends, gratitude for the gift of the animal's body at the meal. Each mood is an appropriate response to another aspect of the animal's story; like the contrasting pieces of a mosaic they make up the whole together.

Such a story represents an advance over that told from the human point of view because the subjective distinction between "us" and "them", "own" and "foreign" is overcome. It is an intellectual advance, because the cognitive perspective is broadened, made on the basis of an emotional advance, because it presupposes the ability to feel with others. This advance is linked with the ritual, for it is the ritual that gives the myth its form. For this reason alone, implicit myth and ritual should not be separated. It is here, too, and not in some contentless form, that we should look for the role emotion plays in ritual. What is the quality of the emotions aroused by hunting and first fruit rites? There is no doubt that much of the anxiety we have found expressed in these rituals concerns the self. In the prayer spoken before the communal meal in the Kwakiutl first salmon ritual the participants are afraid that the act of eating might destroy them. Yet this anxiety, which we have also found in the "feast of the manes" celebrated for the bear, has its origin in an apprehension of the animal as an independent agent and sufferer in the ritual drama. Only this apprehension of the animal as a being in its own right can lead to the comprehension of the role men play, a comprehension of their dilemma that forces them to kill their friends. The emotion displayed in the ritual is therefore not blindly reflexive but outgoing; it embraces both perspectives, that of the animal and of men. The myth that
is told from the animal's point of view is an exercise in identification and differentiation: in feeling with the animal men can see their actions in their true light; the problem of their difference from the animal presents itself and has to be dealt with. All outgoing emotions that apprehend others in their difference have a dual emotional and intellectual aspect: love, mercy, justice, equity, amity. They are therefore humanising emotions, opposed to the inturned emotions of fear, hatred, envy, self-pity which are regressive and cloud the rational faculties.

If Lévi-Strauss had chosen to analyse emotion in ritual from this point of view he would have found a far more promising field of inquiry. Even subdivision and repetition, as we have seen, can be a movement of curiosity toward the world, an attempt to grasp a thing in its parts in order to know the whole. And if the Osage enumerate the parts of an animal's body in their ritual with loving care they learn at the same time about themselves. In another context Lévi-Strauss is fully aware of the role played by emotion in the development of what is specifically human. In the last chapter of Totemism, "Totemism from Within", he described the passage from nature to culture as dependent on sympathetic identification with animals. Paraphrasing Rousseau he says: "It is because man felt originally identical to all those like him (among which as Rousseau explicitly says, we must include animals) that he came to acquire the capacity to distinguish himself as he distinguishes them, i.e. to use the diversity of species as a conceptual support for social differentiation". (p.101). The source of this capacity he defines, again following Rousseau as "the only psychic state of which the content is indissociably both affective and intellectual, and which the act of consciousness suffices to transfer from one level to the other, viz., compassion" (loc. cit.).

This vindicates our approach to ritual and implicit myth. The passage
from nature to culture, as Lévi-Strauss is well aware in Totemism and The Savage Mind is not so much a historical evolutionary fact (of which we can know little) as a process of maturation which every society has to make possible for its individuals. Men being what they are, it has to be constantly renewed and repeated. The rituals, feasts and prayers for animals which punctuate Kwakiutl life in the Summer are a constant exercise in compassion, or sympathy, and provide the necessary affective basis for cultural life, not only for the secular social differentiations which are effective during the Summer, but more importantly for the conceptions of freedom that are effective in the Winter. The passage from nature to culture is however not one from affectivity to intellectuality (or animality to humanity) as Lévi-Strauss suggests (loc. cit.) but from inturned emotion and irrationality to outgoing emotion and rationality. Compassion, though an emotion, is neither natural nor is it animal or unintelligent. It is itself a faculty of the mature mind and necessary for intelligent thinking. It is not a step, qualitatively a little lower, towards being human but a part of being human. The difficult step is that from self-regarding emotion to an awareness of others. This step was apparently made under archaic conditions first in regard to the animals. Having once been made, its impetus carried it beyond this context. The Kwakiutl conceptions of justice, freedom and equality, which we find in the winter ritual, are a development from the relation between men and animals as it is built up in the hunting and first fruit rituals of the Summer.

This is a large claim to make for rituals which are really nothing more than the solemnised communal eating of animals, killed for food in any case. But as we have seen, the importance of the ritual lies in the fact that the everyday act of eating the animal is here performed in the light of the myth, which puts it into the wider context of the cultural system of
thought. The role eating plays in Kwakiutl thought is well known, but it can only be understood if its origin in the dilemma that is enacted in the hunting rituals is understood. The animal that is received as an honoured visitor in the first phase is eaten in the third phase of the ritual. The clash between treating it as "one of us" and as food would be unbridgeable if it were not for a special juggling with the capacity for compassion. Imaginative identification with the animal hits on the solution which we call the implicit myth: that in a situation where men are not free (being forced to kill for food) the animal is a free agent, and that it uses its freedom to give itself for men, to satisfy their need. "Compassion" in men for the animal is translated into the animal's compassion for men; and only in this way is it possible to eat and think of what one is doing. The myth makes possible the step from eating as a reflex to eating as a conscious act in which emotion and understanding are equally bound up. From the consciousness of what one is doing in eating the animal arise the ethical notions that make the groundwork of Kwakiutl thought.

"Eating" cannot therefore here be opposed to "thinking". It is part of Lévi-Strauss' theory of the passage from nature to culture (which is also the passage from affectivity to intellectuality) that in rituals animals are eaten, in totemic systems they are used to mark conceptual differences. He develops the distinction in *The Savage Mind* (1966: 224ff), where he comes to the conclusion that classificatory systems, because they belong to the level of language, always aim to make sense, while the system of sacrifice "represents a private discourse wanting in good sense" (p.228), and returns to it in *L'Homme Nu* with

... ritual does not create categories [laws, axioms] it rather endeavors, if not to disown them, at least to temporarily obliterate the distinctions and the oppositions which they impose, making apparent all kinds of ambiguities, compromises and connections between them. Hence I was able to show elsewhere how a ritual such as the sacrifice as a system of thought is in diametric
opposition with totemism, even though both use the same empirical material: animals and plants are destined in the one case to pure and simple material destruction, or to use as food, in the other case they are promoted to an intellectual function which may result in their use as food being either forbidden or limited by diverse restrictions.

(p.608)

This qualitative distinction between ritual and classificatory systems, "eating" and "thinking" does not hold up in the light of the Kwakiutl material. In the seal feast the animal is eaten and yet used to mark conceptual differences. Similarly in the first fruit and hunting rituals the very object is its use for food and yet, in being eaten, the animal becomes food for thought.

Thought, bound to the physical act of eating, begins with gratitude to the animal for the gift of life. It contemplates the characteristics of the animal as hero, and develops from there to consider human capacities. The characteristics which make the animal a hero are voluntariness and selflessness. The animal is free, that is it can do as it likes, and it chooses to gives itself to men. Starting from this fact, freedom and altruism (giving) become the main issues of Kwakiutl thought. In relation to the animals men will always be bound by the necessity to eat. They cannot repay them with an equal gift; they have to remain, in relation to them, grateful receivers. But in the Winter necessity is overcome; and freedom and altruism is possible between men. Men become great, they become the heroes of their own myth, if they act voluntarily and selflessly like the animals. A great man is free, and his freedom is established by giving; at the same time, his freedom is irrevocably anchored in the boundness of the Summer and in receiving the animal's gift.

4(d) The Salmon Ritual and the Initiation Ritual: A Comparison

The connection between the Summer and the Winter is not merely estab-
lished on the basis of an emotion of gratitude that turns into emulation, or speculative thought about the nature of freedom. The link is too important to be left to the vagaries of feeling and thought. It is formalised in the precise relation between the first salmon ritual (or other rituals of the same kind) and the initiation ritual of the winter dance.

Here, again, it is the myth of the ritual that has to be considered, because it is the implicit myths on which the precise relation depends. As a series of gestures the two rituals are connected as concrete act to metaphorical act. The salmon ritual, a simple occasion, is basically the act of eating a meal. The initiation ritual, a very elaborate occasion, centres on a metaphoric meal, that is moreover repeated twice over: once out of sight, when the spirit makes a meal of the initiate in isolation, once in public, when the initiate "eats" the community. Only on the level of the implicit myths, that is where meaning is given through words, can the correspondence between the two series of gestures be evaluated.

The myth of the initiation ritual, like that of the salmon ritual, can be told in three sentences. A man leaves his home in the human world for the wilderness of the forest where he meets the "supernatural people", the spirits. There he is killed and eaten. Then he is resuscitated and given a treasure, with which he returns to the human world.

The myth is one of the best known to anthropology, because it makes the mythical framework of the rite de passage. As Van Gennep first pointed out, and Durkheim, Mauss and Hubert elaborated, the experience that is wrapped up in these mythical terms is one periodically repeated in the life of individuals wherever a traditional social framework persists. It is the experience of the life crisis rite, in which an individual is taken out of his normal circumstances and transformed into an extraordinary, and "saved" being. Returning to ordinary life he is different; he has gained
the "treasure" of a new human status, a term that must be understood to have a simultaneously social and spiritual significance. Because society depends on "new men" it is itself enriched by that treasure.

What has this myth, or the experience that is expressed through it to do with the salmon ritual? We shall consider the correspondence first on the formal level, where it shows both a pattern of inversion and of parallels. As framework for the comparison we shall use Leach's generalised model for such rites de passage; a model in which the ritual itself is analysed in terms of three phases of extraordinary time, that interrupt the flow of ordinary time. He calls this model the "Durkheimian scheme" and uses for the initiate, who is the main actor (or sufferer) the Durkheimian term "moral person". Leaving aside Leach's interest in time, we find that the sequences embrace three distinct "states of the moral person" which are relevant to our comparison.

Phase A. The rite of sacralization or separation. The moral person is transferred from the Secular-Profane world to the Sacred World; he "dies".

Phase B. The marginal state. The moral person is in a sacred condition, a kind of suspended animation. Ordinary social time has stopped.

Phase C. The rite of desacralization or aggregation. The moral person is brought back from the Sacred to the Profane world; he is "reborn"; secular time starts anew.

This scheme can be further mythologised. We see in it the familiar pattern of the mythical armature: "separation", which is social and spatial, becomes departure to the supernatural world, "aggregation" the return to this world. Between the two takes place the peripeteia of the
drama, the ritual death and resurrection. The whole tendency or direction of this implicit myth is from a non-sacred state, and back again to a profane state that is, however, enhanced by the experience.

The armature of the implicit myth of the salmon ritual corresponds to it in direct reversal: departure to the human world, (ritual) death, return to the supernatural world. In other words the heroes of the two myths start at diametrically opposed points, the animal in the sacred realm, the human hero in the profane one; they travel in opposite directions, "crossing paths", and reach their crisis at diametrically opposed points, each in what is from his point of view the other world; then return each to his point of departure. The pattern of their journeys can be diagrammatically put like this:

FIGURE 7

\[ \text{ANIMAL} \quad \text{Death and Revival} \quad \text{MAN} \quad \text{Death and Revival} \]

\[ \text{ANIMAL} \quad \text{Departure} \quad \text{MAN} \quad \text{Departure} \]

\[ \text{SACRED WORLD} \quad \text{Death and Revival} \quad \text{PROFANE WORLD} \quad \text{Death and Revival} \]

\[ \text{ANIMAL} \quad \text{Return} \quad \text{MAN} \quad \text{Return} \]
The peripeteia of the animal hero’s drama takes place in the ordinary world of men. This means two things: that he, a "supernatural one", is desacralized in death, and that his death is real, physical death. His body goes to the men who eat him. It is nevertheless a death that is mythically seen as the equivalent of the initiate's ritual death because, as a "supernatural one", the salmon belongs to the immortals who can be revived from their bones. The initiate on the other hand, who is profane to start with, suffers a ritual death in the supernatural world which sacralises him. This sacralization is conveyed symbolically through his being eaten by the supernatural spirit, as the salmon's desacralization is conveyed through his being eaten by men.

If therefore, we use the "Durkheimian scheme", and put the two rituals side by side, their implicit myths can be seen to be perfect mirror inversions of one another. 27
### TABLE XIII

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Salmon Ritual</th>
<th>Initiation Ritual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Phase A</strong></td>
<td><strong>Phase A</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SEPARATION</strong></td>
<td><strong>SACRALIZATION</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The salmon is transferred from the sacred world to the secular/profane one. He dies</td>
<td>The initiate is transferred from the secular/profane world to the sacred one. He dies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Phase B</strong></td>
<td><strong>Phase B</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>THE MARGINAL STATE</strong></td>
<td><strong>THE MARGINAL STATE</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The salmon is in a secular condition, a kind of suspended animation. Secular men have eaten him, and he is identified with them.</td>
<td>The initiate is in a sacred condition, a kind of suspended animation. The supernatural spirit has eaten him, and he is identified with him.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Phase C</strong></td>
<td><strong>Phase C</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AGGREGATION</strong></td>
<td><strong>DESACRALIZATION</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The salmon is brought back from the profane to the sacred world. His bones are put into the water: he is reborn.</td>
<td>The initiate is brought back from the sacred to the profane world. He has &quot;gone through&quot; the spirit: he is reborn.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The table suggests an examination from two points of view: that of the action units, and that of the characters or actors. We shall turn first to the former, and remain for the moment on the formal level. The table is arranged so that each phase of the two rituals corresponds horizontally one with the other, each forming the other's inversion. It is an arrangement of perfect parity which suggests that the two rituals are equal but mirror pictures of one another. There is, however, another possibility in which the two rituals are arranged vertically like the two moves of the hunting myth. The complete version of the hunting myth, we remember, consisted of two parts that were inversions of one another synchronically, but diachronically represented a sequence of events in which the second part was the consequence of the first. The first part contained the "questions" to which the second part gave the "answers", and this arrangement created the correspondence across the caesura. If we move the right hand column of the table, that concerns the initiate, below the left hand one we get the same relation between the two rituals. What strikes one first, on the purely formal level is the perfect chiasmus of the relation: desacralization, liminality, sacralization--sacralization, liminality, desacralization (abc--cba). But this relation only makes sense in the light of the questions raised in the first ritual and the answers given in the second.

The two rituals with their implicit myths are clearly separate entities, each complete in themselves, with a different kind of hero and referring to different spheres of experience. They are in Kwakiutl thought, however, connected through the animal who is hero of the first story and, as the "spirit" antagonist of the hero in the second. We shall examine the relationship between the animal which is the hunter's game and the cannibalistic initiating spirit more carefully in the Epilogue. Here
it suffices to remember the Bear Mother myth. The sequential and consequential connection between the two rituals is, roughly speaking, that in the first move (the salmon ritual) men kill an animal in order to eat it, in the second (the initiation ritual) an animal-spirit kills a man and eats him. The symmetry of the implicit myths is far more perfect, because they are more general and less naturalistic than the explicit myths. The message-pattern is the same, at least on this level: it is one of retributional justice. The question raised by the first move is in both cases "on what condition do you get life given to you", and the answer in the second move: "on condition that you pay with your life". The debt of life is death. This is why the myth of the coming of the salmon is also, implicitly, a myth about the origin of death.

Considering the sequential and consequential connection between the two rituals in terms of formal balances ignores, however, the important shift in ethical perspective that takes place in moving from one to the other. If we consider this shift we can appreciate the advance the two-ritual pattern represents over the two-move pattern of the hunting myth in respect of human initiative and responsibility for action. In the salmon ritual men act from necessity. Baxus life forces them to kill, and the only freedom they have is to recognise killing for what it is and develop a consciousness of being accountable. In the initiation ritual, on the other hand, men are by no means the victims of a mechanistically working justice. Here they can choose that retribution should overtake them. They can redeem themselves by seeking this retribution, and by voluntarily exposing themselves to the death which in the Summer they inflict.

This shift from the determined to the voluntary is accompanied by a restructuring. In the salmon ritual man's attitude is the same throughout, dictated by his conflicting wishes not to harm the animal and to have
it for his prey. His dilemma imparts a static aspect to the ritual. By contrast the initiation ritual is dynamic, a series of changes and transformations caused by man himself, and first and foremost directed to himself. Changed himself, he becomes a transformer. It is true that life in the Winter is conceived as the sphere of freedom where man can be effective because he is free. But freedom and effectiveness are not conceived as givens: the initiate is only free in so far as he makes himself free and his freedom is primarily shown in overcoming what might be called an instinctive conservatism and reluctance to be an agent. In this sense the initiation ritual is the consequence of the salmon ritual, because men have moved from acceptance to action. The question is what has inspired this move. In order to find the answer we must turn now from the action to the characters of the implicit myth.

I have been talking as if man were the hero of both rituals. Actually the fatalistic attitude of the first salmon ritual is due to the fact that man is not an agent, or, at least, is compelled by necessity where he is an agent, that is in killing the animal. The agent, or free being, of the salmon ritual is the salmon. In this he resembles the initiate, or rather the initiate resembles him because the animal seems to have served as model. Freedom of action is what they share as heroes of myths; indeed it is what makes them both heroes of myth. While the connection between the rituals as far as the action structure went was based on the principle of inversion, where the character structure is concerned it is based on parallelism. The characters of the heroes of the implicit myths are of the same kind, their actions are motivated by the same force. The connection is sequential in so far as the initiate, who as a man is in the animal’s debt, is also motivated to pay men’s debt to the animals.

The motivating forces for the animal and the initiate are voluntari-
ness and selflessness. Both leave their home for the same reasons. In the salmon’s case the altruistic intention is obvious: he is going to give his life for men so that they can live. In the initiate’s case it is not so obvious, but salmon and men start from opposite positions and their acts of selflessness are therefore different and have to be considered each in their contexts. The salmon is free; nothing could compel him to come. In deciding to come to men he voluntarily faces death. He sacrifices his unbounded freedom in the decision to give himself. Men, on the other hand, are not free, and the initiate sacrifices himself to gain freedom for them. The gift of the salmon has given men freedom on the economic level: during the Winter they are free from the need to collect food. They can never repay the animal’s gift directly; they can only answer its challenge by a deed as voluntary and greathearted as that of the salmon. If the salmon, who is free to do as he likes and an immortal, can narrow his freedom to a decision to die for men, then men, who are bound and mortal, can do something similar with their boundness. If they face death voluntarily, choosing to die at their own time, they narrow necessity to a point at which they gain freedom.

Such a forcing of necessity cannot be done by a whole community at once, yet all the members of the community want to have part in the freedom it brings. The society therefore splits at every winter ritual, sending a part of itself, the initiates, out to die. The initiates voluntarily face death and in doing so become free. This freedom is their new life. When they return and are incorporated again they become the new life of the society, which, through them, is free. The implicit myth of the initiate as hero and the salmon as hero therefore run exactly parallel, though on different levels of experience. The salmon chooses death voluntarily, sacrificing himself for men. Through his decision men
gain new life, that is the continuation of their life is assured. The salmon's act is the basis of **physical** life. The initiate chooses death voluntarily sacrificing himself for his group. Through his decision his society gains new life in the sense of the freedom of mind that is gained by a triumph over necessity. The initiate's act is the basis of **civic** life, because a society of the free is based, according to Kwakiutl conception, on giving to one another.

The conceptual link between the two rituals with their implicit myths is clear. It lies in facing death voluntarily and giving one's life for others. But how does the initiate's act in which he emulates the salmon repay the salmon for his original gift, the gift of his life to men? We have already discussed this question (Chapter 22, 4(b)). It cannot repay him directly because "supernatural ones" are self-sufficient. It can only be paid on the level on which the responsibility that has been accepted with the animal's gift is discharged by being adult and responsible to others. The greatness of the salmon's gift lies in the fact that he is entirely free to choose; the greatness of the initiate's gift in the fact that he chooses to overcome himself where he is most stringently bound, in his fear of retribution which is a fear of death.

5 **Summary**

A) **The "openness" of the ritual.** I said at the beginning of my discussion that I would treat the salmon ritual as an incomplete version--an "open question" that demands an answer. I have shown this openness in each of the three aspects of the ritual taken up in the three sections of this chapter. Here I shall briefly restate the forms it takes. (The numbers of my divisions correspond to the section numbers in the chapter.)

1) The salmon ritual is an **objective ritual** and a ritual of desacraliza-
tion. Objective rituals of desacralization seem necessarily to be "open", because they cannot contain the elements of expiation which reconcile after an act of transgression. The contrast with sacrifice points up this condition clearly. Hubert and Mauss describe the process of desacralization which allows people to harvest, and the additional structural conditions which turn such a rite into a sacrifice and allow for expiation of the sacrilege. In the first salmon ritual, the structural conditions of the sacrifice are missing; expiation has therefore to be sought for outside the ritual, in a new expressive form.

2) The rhetorical figure of the animal as a guest who becomes host at the ritual, giving its own substance, suggests the potlatch context. A gift received in this context has to be requited with a gift of at least equal value. As such a requital is impossible, the rhetoric of the ritual implies that men are in the animal's debt. The figure of the animal as host is a persuasive and performative metaphor in the sense that it "moves" people to an active concern with possibilities of repayment.

3) The myth of the animal as hero is an implicit myth which exists only in connection with the ritual. Through it the ritual becomes an exercise in sympathetic imagination. The animal is seen both as "like us" and as "other" in the singularity of its fate, which moves it to sacrifice itself for men. The courage and altruism of the animal stimulates emulation; and so it comes about that the non-interested apperception of a non-human being becomes the beginning of being human. In Kwakiutl expressive culture, becoming human is enacted through the symbolism of the initiation ritual. The point of becoming human, then, unfolds simultaneously in two directions: in the direction of the understanding of an other (ritual for animals), and in the direction of the understanding of the self (initiation ritual). This accounts for the parity between the two rituals. The understanding
of the other can also be seen as a challenge which cannot be taken up without an understanding of the self, and in this lies the "openness" of the ritual for animals seen under this aspect.

8) The shift from group to individual. In so far as the ritual is "open" and leads on to the tsetseqa, this transition also involves a shift from group responsibility to individual responsibility. I shall briefly review this shift in relation to the three aspects of the ritual.

1) Desacralization. The communally perpetrated desacralization through the ritual meal, though it leaves the ritual "open", does not necessarily lead to a shift to the individual. We have seen in Hubert and Mauss' example of a sacrifice that such a sacrilege can also be communally expiated. (The ploughmen and reapers in the ritual they describe are collectively cleansed through the symbolism of the sacrifice.)

2) Requiting. The rhetorical figure of the guest as host individualises the animal. The problem is that the animal's personal sacrifice of its life has to be requited with an equal gift. Only an individual sacrifice, and only the sacrifice of a life can be a proper requital. Here the shift from collective to individual responsibility is clear. Simultaneously the problem is shifted from the physical to the psychological plane, and becomes a question of inner decision and courage.

3) Animal as hero. The myth of the animal as hero makes a shift from collective to individual responsibility inevitable. Only an individual can be a hero, and emulation of such a hero is an individual act. Here the shift also has a further dynamic aspect, which leads from the individual to a new form of collectivity. The animal gives its life for men. Men gain their physical existence through his sacrifice. To emulate the animal properly the initiate therefore not only gives his life as a requital for the animal's gift or a retribution for mankind's wrong, but also gives
his life for his group and ensures through his sacrifice a superior communal life for them. Initiation turns on freedom here: the animal can give itself because it is free; the initiate, in imitating it, becomes free and his gift to the community is freedom.
Footnotes

1 Erna Gunther, "A Further Analysis of the First Salmon Ceremony", Univ. of Washington Publications in Anthropology, 2, No. 5 (June 1928), 128--173. See particularly pp. 141 and 142.

2 Cf. Boas' map of namima-owned fishing sites in Geographical Names of the Kwakiutl Indians, Columbia Univ. Contributions to Anthropology, 20 (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1934). The boundaries extend into the sea to comprise fishing grounds and inland to comprise camping ground or temporary village site, behind that berrying grounds and above it in the mountains hunting grounds.


4 Among the recipes can be found descriptions of first fruit rituals, seal feasts etc. Kwakiutl social and ceremonial life is conveyed with great vividness and immediacy. The recipes are therefore an important source of information on my subject.


6 The evidence is collected mainly in Sir James Frazer, Spirits of the Corn and of the Wild (London: Macmillan, 1925). The fact that these rituals were recognised first among agricultural peoples and therefore taken to be specifically agrarian rites is, of course, not simply the result of Frazer's personal experience and bias. His work is based on that of early German anthropologists who were classicists or folklorists with European fields. Classical texts and work among European peasants strengthened the impression that the rituals were generically connected with agriculture. Hence our "agrarian rites".

7 Cf. Hunt's fascinating account "I Desired to Learn the Ways of the Shaman" in Boas 1930: 1--41.

8 Among other Northwest coast groups sometimes one person, distinguished and therefore unusually powerful, was selected for the dangerous act of eating the first salmon.


11 I suggest this with hesitation because the blackening of head and eyes and revealing of the skeleton also betokens a state of being "dry" as a state of being at rest before coming to life again. The notions we have to do with here are widespread and archaic. Cf. for instance Richard Broxton Ollins', The Origins of European Thought (Cambridge: Univ. Press, 1951), pp. 260--63. Yet with the Kwakiutl a double image seems to be at stake, that of preservation (in death) and of a transformation which involves a
being destroyed and created anew. For the latter they used the image of food and ingestion. Cf. the double sense of the imagery in Baxbakualan-uxsiwa (Epilogue). I think such a double image is intended here: the eyes which are "put out" are, after all, also the main part selected for the communal meal.

12 For an interesting note on head and tail as the potent parts where seed is stored and life resides see Onians, 1951: 126, n.3 (holy bone ¼ tail end of spine: the "seed that grew into a new body"). Tail, penis and womb can be equated as the lower centre, balancing the centre of the head. The spine is the vital connection between the two.


14 See Frazer 1925. Frazer has made the pattern unrecognisable by dividing the ritual into separate customs. In Vol. I, Chapter V. p.146, we find descriptions of the welcoming of the Corn Mother like a guest; in Vol. II, Chapter X. p.48, the return feast is described, in which the Corn Mother provides the banquet with her own body.

15 Cf. Kyosuke Kindaichi 1949: 345 (for full reference to his article see n.16).


17 It would be interesting to know whether the word "to play" used in this context could have the double sense of "to kill" it has for the Kwakiutl, who "play" with an animal, sending it home.


19 For the prayer see Chapter 1, 3 (d).


22 For quotations I use the translation made by Brenda Beck for a seminar given by her in January 1973 at the Univ. of B.C. The page numbers refer to the French edition.

23 Chicago: Univ. of Chic. Press, 1966. See particularly Chapter VI "Universalization and Particularization".

24 Myth time stories with their animal tricksters belong, of course, to a different genre. An "animal-person" is no an animal.
Though the "Durkheimian scheme" has been known to anthropology for a long time, and rituals of disacralization even longer, the two have never, to my knowledge, been brought together as they are in my table, to show their relation of symmetrical inversion. As a result they have never before been examined for their logical connection.
The purpose of this epilogue is to bring the strands of the last three chapters together. I find that I can show my findings in the mirror, as it were, of myths which have as their story-content the transition from baxus to tsetseqa, and I shall use this mirror to sum up my thesis. The myths "reflect" my findings because they do not start from the assumptions familiar to us from the texts we have examined, but start from the conclusions we have drawn.

My task in the foregoing chapters on prayers, hunting myths and rituals for animals was to examine the thought of the baxus life. The texts all dealt with the problem of a justification for killing and eating beings animated by the same life and intelligence as men. No finally valid justification could be found, and the dilemma imposed by necessity remained irresolvable. Yet the very, painstaking labour of examining the conditions of determination itself, of which these texts are evidence, yields an understanding of the conditions of freedom. This, in abstract language, is "the origin of the tsetseqa in the baxus". In terms of textual analysis, it was a matter of bringing to the forefront those elements of the texts which refer to the tsetseqa. In showing this evidence, and developing my thesis of the connection, my task of examining the thought of the Summer is ended.

In this epilogue I want to go a step beyond the limits of my investigation of texts that belong to baxus life. My reason is that though the texts we have examined show the connections with the tsetseqa, it is difficult to define the meaning of these connections. The meaning we have given them always demanded an interpretative leap. It was not expressed in the material, but gathered from cumulative evidence and knowledge of
the culture. Given the texts, which, as expressions of baxus life concentrated on the problem—the question and not the answer—this is not surprising. A question which can legitimately be asked in this context, however, is whether the Kwakiutl did not have traditions that express the connection between baxus and tsetseqa directly. On the whole the Kwakiutl conceptualised the connection as an opposition, and dramatised moving from the baxus to the tsetseqa season, for instance, as a total change. Their general concern with motivations and values makes it natural, however, to wonder whether they did not formulate somewhere the process of change itself, and the ethical and psychological values that they attached to this change. Such texts would express the thought of the baxus and tsetseqa simultaneously. Without falling into the purview of this thesis precisely, they would be important as concrete evidence supporting the deductions made from the thesis material.

Such texts do exist in the Kwakiutl mythological corpus. I have called them transitional myths; first, because they have affinities with both hunting myths and initiation myths without belonging fully to either, second, because they actually describe a process of transition, formulating it as a change of mind. These texts do not approach the relation between men and animals from the realistic angle of the need to kill and eat as do the texts we have examined. They are not any longer about the plight of the hunter who is forced to kill his friends. The mythmakers have made here the step into that imaginary realm where retribution has become reality: they are about the plight of the hunter who is pursued and killed by the animals. They belong to the hunting myths in so far as they elaborate on the second move of the myth, which describes the animal’s retribution. Their last word, however, is not retribution but a victory for men and a new bond between men and animals (or, more correctly, animal-
spirits). They describe the gaining of the ritual, of the tsetseqa power from the animal-spirits.

In this epilogue I shall look at two myths which show two different transitional stages between the system of thought that is turned outward, toward the relation with animals, and that which is turned inward, toward the relation with the self and society. The first myth, Elxabee, is an initiation myth still enclosed in the ways of thought of the Summer, that is of a hunting society where the need for food and the necessity to kill are the paramount problems. The myth is interesting for the way in which it combines the fatalistic hunting doctrine of retributional justice with the initiation doctrine of the act of courage that makes human effort effective and releases from the mechanical workings of retribution. Yet the change to maturity in the initiate is not seen in social terms but terms of hunting: his initiatory experience makes him capable of mastering the animals and provide an inexhaustible supply of food. The story remains focussed on the relation between men and animals. The second myth, Baxbakualanuxsiwa, is the origin myth of the cannibal ritual. The focus is therefore on society, and on the contrast between the state of culture before the ritual was obtained and after. The animals in this story are not real animals any more but spirits, and hunting and food have become metaphors. Nevertheless the myth-imagery is based on the conception of a mechanical retributive justice through which the hunter becomes the hunted, the eater the eaten. This reversal is, however, reversed again; in fact the plot can be seen as a series of possible transformations of the relation between hunter and hunted, eater and eaten. The story is neither an allegory nor a parable, yet it has a civic theme, which is clothed in the garb of a fantastic hunter's story.

I have chosen these two myths because they articulate an aspect of
the relation between men and animals we have not paid sufficient attention to: they show the animals as man-eaters. This aspect should be examined to complete our picture of how the Kwakiutl saw the animals and thought of their inter-relation with them. It is further important, because the animals, seen in this particular way are themselves the transforming agents that change the system of the Summer into that of the Winter. We have had an indication of this characteristic of the animals (and indeed other living creatures) in the prayers. There they are greeted as friends but addressed by epithets that point to a double nature and that also refer to the dangerous spirits of the winter dance. The animals of the myths I shall analyse here actually act out that double nature, or rather act out that feared hidden "other side", and with this, though they are real animals, become spirits of the winter dance.

The animals are not the heroes of these myths; explicit myths never have animal heroes. They are the antagonists of the human hero. The myths are ultimately about becoming human (in the sense in which the initiate is the pattern of the human, the "perfect man") and about human freedom. Freedom, in the Kwakiutl conception of it, is never seen apart from being bound; it is in fact based on being bound. Conceptually, the transition from boundness to freedom is made by a complicated interplay between passivity and activity in which the animals are important agents. In Kwakiutl thought freedom has two sides: imperiousness--doing whatever one pleases, regardless of law--and giving to others. Giving is the social form of acting freely, and it is seen as a development from imperiousness, which is overcome for the sake of socially constructive freedom. This conception does not apply to human beings alone but covers both human beings and animals. I shall briefly restate here the relation between men and animals that expresses for the Kwakiutl the transition from the
baxus life to the tssetse. Animals are naturally free, but this makes them wild and independent. They are by nature dangerous and intractable. In the world of the Summer, however, destructive freedom--imperiousness--is transformed into constructive freedom by the animals' decision to give themselves to men. Through this decision the wild animal--the animal as "teeth barer"--is changed into the mild animal, the animal as game. We must remember that in both its forms the animal is free and active. Man is in a curious complementary position. Unlike the animal he is not free in the Summer, and as receiver of the gift he is passive. But in order to appropriate the gift he must temper passivity with activity--he must use active violence. So, as the animal modifies its activity with a little passivity and becomes game, the man modifies his passivity with a little activity and becomes a hunter and eater. His change, however, in spite of the perfect complementarity between the hunter-eater and the game, burdens him with guilt, because he has broken through the passive role appropriate to him in the Summer, while the animal, in becoming a giver, has never injured its active role. Man has appropriated a freedom not properly his own. Amendment demands a perfect reversal. So it comes about that in the middle of the life of the Winter, when man is active and free he must be capable of making himself passive. He meets the animal again, but now it is the animal in its anti-social character, the imperious being and teeth barer. In this form the animal is the cannibalistic spirit of the winter ritual. The initiate's act of courage--the act that makes him free--lies in his capacity to be passive toward the animal and let himself be killed and eaten. In other words, in the Summer men are hunters and eaters and the animal shows itself in its mild aspect, as game; while in the Winter the animal shows itself in its wild aspect as hunter and eater, and man is its game.
This relation between animals and men forms the substructure of the two myths we shall be discussing. The full structure of the initiation story, as I have described it in Chapter 1 is missing, but both myths are approximations to it. The overtones of retributive justice come from the kinship to the hunting myth. Justice can only be done by a reversal of the relationships between animals and men, a reversal which turns game into hunter, eater into eaten. The four terms and their possible transformations into one another seem to exercise a fascination over the minds of the Kwakiutl and their neighbours. The mythology of the region explores all the logical possibilities of the set. In reading the myths, it will be interesting to note how these transformations advance the plots, particularly the plot of the second story.

(a) Elxabae: the animals' "animal" as hero

The first myth we shall discuss, Elxabae, reflects the geographical setting of the people who tell it. The Dzawadenox, one of the tribes of the Kwakiutl, live at the end of Kingcome Inlet, on the mainland opposite the North end of Vancouver Island. The inlet is deep and narrow at their village site, and the surrounding country is mountainous and deeply wooded. It is hunter's country, abounding with bear, mountain goat and other game of all kinds. Yet the salmon runs up the inlet and the river that empties into it, and it is therefore also a fisherman's country. The bear, like men, roams the mountains and comes down to the river to fish. He is both an equal, though immensely more powerful, and a rival. I abstract from the myth of the same name in Kwakiutl Texts.

Elxabae

The first ones of the Dzawadenox were suffering from a famine. They asked their chief for help, who sent his son to look for salmon. The youth finds many salmon jumping in the river and makes a salmon trap to catch them. The next morning, however,
he finds his trap broken and only the jawbone of a dog-salmon near by. He mends the trap but the same thing happens, and happens again. Up to then he has trekked forward and backward between the village and the river patiently, mending by day what had been destroyed in the night, and not spoken to anyone in order not to break his luck. On the third day he tells his father, and announces that he will take his spear and watch by his trap all night. His father warns him to take care: it might be the grizzly bear, who is very wild. Elxabae has watched all night in vain by his salmon trap when he sees, at dawn, a large grizzly coming down to the river. He makes straight for Elxabae’s trap and breaks it to pieces. Elxabae tries to stab him but the bear simply takes his spear and throws it away. He gathers the youth up in his arms and carries him into the forest, to his house. Arrived there he tells him not to be afraid, because he is his guest and will meet his (the grizzly’s) tribe the next morning at a feast to which they will be invited. Elxabae wants to know where this tribe is but the bear tells him not to be anxious and to sleep well. Early the next morning, after a sleepless night, Elxabae hears his host say to his speaker: “Call our tribe, that they come quickly today to taste the game that I caught yesterday”. The youth cannot help guessing that this little joke refers to him. The animals begin to assemble: first the black bear, then the wolf, the wolverine, the deer, the elk, and all the different kinds of animals. Their host greets them with “welcome, friends: I only longed for you. You have all come in; therefore I shall invite this kind of animal to sit among you in the house” and he calls to Elxabae to come and be introduced to his tribe. When Elxabae stands beside him in the doorway the grizzly says: “O friends, look at me! I have invited you that you may all partake of a little of this”, and he taps the youth on the temples. Elxabae does not survive this friendly gesture. He is at once carved up by the “carver of man’s flesh”. Meanwhile the host makes a speech in which he explains how Elxabae attacked him by the river when he was visiting his (the bear’s) salmon trap, and how he forestalled him in the nick of time by throwing his spear away. The meal is then distributed among the guests, and when the animals have all eaten they go home again. The wolf is the first to feel qualms about what they have done. He tells the others that he feels sorry about the pretty young fellow and suggests they go to a place near the bear’s house and vomit him up. The animals all feel the same, and so it comes about that sitting together the black bear vomits what he has eaten first, then the wolf, the wolverine, the deer, the elk, and so on in proper order. The wolf puts the pieces of flesh together and sprinkles the water of life on them. Elxabae comes back to life at once. The wolf advises him to go back to his late host, the grizzly, who, impressed by his powers of revival, will welcome him and invite him to a diving contest. Elxabae is to pretend that the bear spends hardly any time under water. This will make the bear angry, and he will dive longer and longer. At the fourth and longest dive Elxabae is to grab the mask the bear has taken off and run for his life. Everything happens as planned. The grizzly takes his mask off before going into the water, and Elxabae tricks him into staying under so long that he can pick up the mask, swing it on his shoulder and make for home. He has almost reached his father’s house when
he hears the growling of many grizzlies behind him. He has just
time to ask his mother to call all their people into the house,
and bar the door, when the grizzlies arrive. The chief of the
grizzlies begs the youth through his speaker to return the food-
obtaining mask to him. But the people in the house respond with
the war cry and the grizzlies are frightened. Then the chief
grizzly speaks himself: "O friend Elxabae! Bring my food-
obtaining mask here. You shall try to imitate me when you have
your winter dance. Your name shall be Great Grizzly Bear. And
that is the same as my grizzly-bear mask when it is used. That
means also that you will be rich in food, for I shall always be
near you". At this Elxabae returns the mask to the grizzly bear.
(Boas & Hunt, 1905: 25--36)

Like any hunting myth Elxabae begins with a journey to the world of
the animals. Here, as in the hunting myths, animals are people: they
live in houses, have a chief and celebrate feasts. But in contrast to
the stories we are familiar with the animals do not offer themselves as
food to teach the hero the right relationship between men and them.
Instead they eat the "animal" that has come to them, captured by their
chief. The tone of delighted irony cannot be missed. The story is a
parody of the right relations so carefully built up in mythology elsewhere.

In a sense it can be said to pick up where the second move of the
hunting myth begins, that is with a reversal of roles. Elxabae (and his
fellow-tribesmen) has every intention to be a hunter and eater of animals.
But he becomes the game of the bear, and the food even of creatures as
gently herbivorous as deer and elk. The story is making the point that
in this reversed world all the animals are teeth bærers, all of them are
carnivorous (just as in the real world all men are hunters, because they
all eat animals). Such a situation of reversal is often met with in
mythologies that make a distinction between myth time and real time. In
myth time animals hunted men. This allows men in real time to be hunters
of animals. If the reversal has been projected into the past in this
way, the guilt over hunting is appeased beforehand. In contrast to
this pattern, Kwakiutl thought is little concerned with anticipatory
excuse, but very much concerned with actual expiation. For Kwakiutl the
reversal takes place with the change from Summer to Winter, and the
problem of guilt has to be faced freshly within the cycle of every year.
This pattern is reflected in their mythology. Elxabae is set in real
time, and the resolution of the hunting problem is found in its initiation
structure.

The armature, though very simple, is unusually fine as befits a fine
myth. It uses the three main features of local terrain to place the main
events: village, river, mountain (or forest—the two are synonymous).
The narrator has a perfectly chiastic structure to hand to remind him
how to deploy and order his material. The track of the hero’s journey is:
village+river+mountain—mountain+river+village or, diagramatically, as it
is an upward journey from the village on the inlet to the river, and from
the river to the bear’s den:

FIGURE 8

Each point corresponds to the other in an inversion. The lower
points are further apart; the two points at the peak are so close as to
be almost one. For brevity’s sake I shall formalise my description of
what takes place at these points, denoting with an A the point on the
upward journey, an $A_1$ the same point on the journey down.

1) Village Events in the village make up the frame of the story.
The "before" and "after" situations of this frame should define what the
story is about.
Village A (a) collective: Famine. The people ask their chief for help. 

(b) They have no bear ritual.

(b) individual: Elxabae has technical knowledge and skill with which he is to reverse situation of famine.

Village A (a) collective: The people help their chief. Through Elxabae's prowess their situation will be one of plenty. They also gain the bear ritual.

(b) individual: Elxabae has supernatural power added to his merely human skill. He is a dancer; he can provide for his people.

2) River. Judged by the length of the description and the care lavished on it the river is the most important place in the story. The making of the salmon trap is described in detail: first Elxabae's fitness for the task (he has learnt his skill from his father); the materials he uses, the journeys he makes to get it, the weaving of the basket, the journeys to and fro, the mending of the destroyed basket. Almost equal care is lavished on the diving scene which describes the power of the bear's long breath and Elxabae's cheating.

River A (a) Building of salmon trap. Technical skill of Elxabae.

(b) Trick played by bear. Theft of salmon (food). Bear defeats Elxabae.

(c) Elxabae's technical skill is of no avail.

River A (b) Diving contest. Natural skill of bear.

(b) Trick played by Elxabae. Theft of food-obtaining mask. Elxabae defeats bear.

(c) Elxabae's victory in the medicine fight gives him power.
3) **Mountain.** The two points here are the house of the grizzly, chief of the animals, and the place near his house where the animals assemble after the feast. Structurally they can be considered as one: the point of peripeteia; death and resurrection of the hero.

**Mountain A** Elxabae is killed, cut in pieces and eaten.

**Mountain A₁** Elxabae is vomited, pieced together and resuscitated.

The core episode has therefore itself two parts which are reversals of one another. The episode is not a test as it is in the fully developed initiation myth (Elxabae passes a test when he successfully tricks the bear by the river, and this test is symmetrically arranged to balance the bear's tricking him out of his salmon). It is surely meant to be something else that has not immediately to do with the hero as a person: it is meant to bring the hunting ritual and the initiation ritual together to show their inter-relationship. The scene in the mountains is at the same time a take-off of a human hunting festival, the mockery directed against the listeners, and an orthodox account of an initiation.

The first comparison that comes to mind is the seal feast I have described in the last chapter. The hunter, here the chief himself, returns with an important bag. He calls his people together for a feast at which the "animal" is cut up by a professional carver, and distributed to the guests according to rank. In other words, the animals are "remembering" their society by dismembering a man. And because this is myth, not reality, they can do something even better: instead of just remembering the "animal" as it has been, in their minds, they can literally re-member him, vomiting up the pieces in their proper order, according to rank, and putting them together again.

The second, and most obvious comparison is with the welcoming ritual
for the animals. As is appropriate, the ritual that is enacted has an accompanying myth. The myth is without any doubt that of the "animal" as hero (though a man makes such a hilariously bad hero). Elxabae is greeted as a guest who has come from another world, and a feast is arranged for him. He is then cut up and eaten in a communal meal at which he is the (unwilling) host. Finally he is revived (in a somewhat unorthodox manner) from his "remains" and sent home. The most ironic touch is that in the exact place where remorse is expressed in the salmon or bear rituals over having to kill the animal, the grizzly bear explains that he had to kill in self-defence because Elxabae tried to spear him.

The initiation myth runs parallel to this take-off of the myth of the animal as hero. All that is needed is a shift from the animals' to the human point of view. From the human point of view, the animals' communal meal is a ritual dismemberment of the initiate. Man has given up his role as hunter, and is passively given over to the cannibalistic animals. Having been ingested by them he has "gone through" and emerges a new man. His regeneration should make a man of power of Elxabae and it is indeed followed by a medicine fight in which he defeats a supernatural being. The treasure he gains has then first of all the spiritual significance of marking his having "gone through", of his having, by being passive at the right moment, achieved a greater than ordinary power of being active, of being able to "act freely". But the visible form the treasure takes shows clearly that acting freely is seen here in terms of hunting, that is seen in terms of the initiate's relation to animals before it is seen in terms of his relation to men. The grizzly's "mask" is, of course, his animal form. In taking his mask, Elxabae has metaphorically killed him, and can now ask for his power, as the hunter who has killed an animal can. The bear's power is his ability to get food,
hence the name "food-obtaining mask". Bears were especially admired by the Kwakiutl for their skill in catching salmon. We must remember that Elxabae set out originally to put an end to the famine in the village by catching salmon. The grizzly proved a better fisherman then. When he promises Elxabae however, at the end of the story, that he will be his guardian spirit and that this means he will be "rich in food", Elxabae obtains what the Kwakiutl bear hunter asks when he prays to the bear:

"Thank you, friend, that you did not make me walk about in vain. Now you have come to take mercy on me, so that I obtain game, that I may inherit your power of getting easily with your hands the salmon that you catch. Now I will press my right hand against your left hand" says the man as he takes hold of the left paw of the bear. He says "O friend, now we press together our working hands that you may give over to me your power of getting everything easily with your hands, friend."

(Boas 1930: 193-4)

The great insistence on the bear's hands in the prayer remains one of the detailed care with which the myth described Elxabae's handiwork, the making of the salmon trap. In the myth Elxabae has to add to the technical skill of his hands the "supernatural skill" or power of the bear. He does this by becoming an initiate, which means first of all losing his skill and becoming passive. Through the ritual he becomes then a "full man", equal to the bear.

(b) Baxbakualanuxsiwa: the hunters' hunter as food

With the second myth, Baxbakualanuxsiwa, we are turning away from the preoccupation with hunting and food, at least on a realistic and moral level. The story is not concerned with the relation to animals any more but with social relations, a point that is made at the outset, because, while the first story started with a lack of food the second one starts with a lack of men. The members of a tribe are disappearing one by one, and at the point where the story begins only one couple with their three
grown-up sons are left. In spite of this different orientation, however, the imagery of the myth is taken from hunting and food-preparation to such an extent that one can say that this is the dominant theme. As I have pointed out, however, the theme has become metaphorical here, that is, the hunting and preparing of food that is going on point to something else, beyond themselves. They point to a psychological transformation. The story is about the gaining of the cannibal ritual, and the point it seems to make is that before they had the ritual men were forced to live in a sort of bad dream whose events they could not control. With the gaining of the ritual they learn to live in reality, which turns out to be a facing on their own account that which has held them in a spell of terror before.

Baxbakualanuxsiwa, or Cannibal at North End of the World, as our myth translates the name, is the presiding spirit of the Kwakiutl winter ritual. The name indicates a being who lives at the lowest point of the world, downstream, because the ocean is a river flowing North. Literally translated his name means in fact: he who first ate man at the mouth of the river. The river is the ocean, its mouth the point where it pours through a hole into the underworld. The Cannibal is therefore a guardian at the gate of death, or the gate or mouth of death himself. In our story, however, his house is in the mountains, and he is a hunter who scours the forest in search of his prey, men. In his animal appearance he is a kind of monstrous bird of prey, who lives at the top of the mountain and swoops down on his victims. In spite of the apparent clash, there is no real contradiction between the location his name connotes and the location the myth explicitly gives him, because his house is that "centre of the world" where up and down make no sense, and above and below are the same. What is important in our context is that as a dweller in the mountains and
forests and a hunter of men he is clearly related to the animals we met in the last story. The bear’s house was another such “centre of the world”, and the transforming power of the cannibalistic animals derived from being part of this centre.

The initiating spirits of the Kwakiutl were in fact historically mainly animals, like the Bear and the Wolf of that story. The Cannibal as the dominating figure of the winter dance was an importation from the extreme North of Kwakiutl territory. With the diffusion of the ritual South in historical times, and the veritable fashion that started for the Cannibal, Baxbakualanuxsiwa became the main initiating spirit of the Kwakiutl. A new mythology grew up around his figure.

In his review of Locher’s *Serpent in Kwakiutl Religion* Boas uses the example of the recent introduction of the cannibal myths to argue against any attempt to systematize mythologies. He writes:

My accounts of personal reminiscences of the Kwakiutl go back approximately to 1850 and a number of earlier dates are well authenticated, so that many details of their history can be traced back to the beginning of the 19th century. I conclude from these reports that the complete cycle of the cannibal myths did not penetrate into Kwakiutl mythology before the first half of the 19th century, and that the related ritual has been introduced piecemeal as a result of intermarriage with the northern tribes. Even at the present time the scene of the principal myth of this cycle is laid in Rivers Inlet, outside of Kwakiutl territory, and the myth is narrated as belonging to one of the subsidiary groups of that tribe. The countless stories in which the cannibal spirit has been substituted for wolves, bears and other creatures which bring supernatural gifts are obviously new inventions to prove the rights of other groups to the highly esteemed ritual.

(1940: 448)

Yet the argument could be turned around. That the mythological figure of Baxbakualanuxsiwa was accepted so eagerly and his ritual so highly esteemed may be due to the fact that he fitted into an existing system, and that he sharpened some points of that system in a way that was congenial to the prevailing climate of thought. That is exactly what
I think happened when the cannibal spirit was substituted for the wolves and bears Boas mentions. Boas characterises these creatures as bringers of supernatural gifts, but does not mention that they are also man-eaters. The gift is essentially the gift of new life. It cannot be gained without dying first. To be eaten means "going through" a supernatural being, and through the identification receiving their power. Boas has therefore overlooked that the change of fashion that made the Cannibal replace the animals as an initiating spirit does not represent a change of principle, but on the contrary represents a considerable sharpening of the principle. The animals as initiating spirits appear as eaters of men in contradistinction to their normal role, which is to be food for men. This is true of at least some of them. In the Cannibal the connection with real life is severed, and the essential point taken hold of: that man the hunter and eater is to be turned into the hunted and eaten. Where the animals' double nature makes them usually mild, and hunters and eaters of men only extraordinarily, the Cannibal is completely wild and nothing but a hunter and eater of men. In one of his forms he is described as "all mouths", or covered with thousands of mouths, through which the wind whistles. His cry is hap, which means hunger, eating. (The name of the cannibal dancer in the ritual, hamatsa, means eater). With this cry he scours the woods, looking for his food, men. He treats humans as they treat animals. I abstract from the family history of the same name in Ethnology of the Kwakiutl.²

Baxbakualanuxsiwa

The Somxolidex were a happy people because their tribe was so numerous. At that time they had only a minor ceremonial, not the great winter ritual. Suddenly the people began to disappear when they went inland, until finally only one family with three sons is left. The boys are mountain goat hunters; their sister has disappeared when she was in isolation for her first period. The boys decide to look for the lost people of their tribe. On their way through the forest they meet an old woman who warns them:
"Beware of the one who is killing your tribesmen, children. Don't go near the house whose smoke looks like blood, which looks like the rainbow. It is the house of Cannibal-at-North-End-of-World. And don't go to the house with black smoke. It is the house of Grizzly Bear and he will hurt you. Go to the house with the white smoke, for that is the house of Mountain Goat." She gives them magic objects that will turn into obstacles in the way of a pursuer if thrown over their shoulders. The brothers go on and find the house she has warned them against. Their sister sits in the house with a little boy. The child cries for the blood he sees trickling from a scratch on one of the brothers' legs. The sister asks her brother to scrape some of it off with a stick and give it to the child. The little boy is quiet as soon as he has the blood to lick. Behind them in the large house the brothers see the bodies of their tribesmen hanging up to dry over the fire. They escape from the house with the excuse that they have to fetch their arrows, and run for home. Behind them they hear their sister calling out: "Cannibal-at-North-End-of-World! Meat came to you! Come back, Cannibal-at-North-End-of-World! The game that came to your house is going home!" Immediately the cry of the Cannibal is heard, hap, hap, hunger, hunger. He pursues the boys, but with the help of the old woman's magical gifts they outrun him. They reach home, and have just time to tie a cedar bark rope around the house and tell their parents of their experiences, when the Cannibal is heard on the roof of their house. He takes out a roof board and begins to come in head first. The father remains impeccably polite: "Oh son-in-law, Cannibal-at-North-End-of-World. Don't be in a hurry. Come in the morning with your wife and my grandson, and you shall have my three sons to eat. Meanwhile, go away for a little while." The Cannibal is content and leaves. During the night the family prepares a trap for him. They dig a pit in the floor of the house, line the bottom with stones and light a fire in it. They cut boards the size of the pit, and stack them near it. Finally they kill three dogs, take out their intestines and bury their bodies. At daylight they cover up the pit in which a fire has been burning all night. Close to it they place a settee covered with two new mats. The boys lie down on boards stark naked, with the fresh dogs' intestines coiled on their middles. They have hardly had time to arrange themselves when the cannibal cry is heard outside and the Cannibal enters with his wife and little son. He sees the naked bodies and wants to rush to eat them, but the father restrains him: "don't, son-in-law. We don't behave like that when we are invited. Come and sit down." The Cannibal sits down with his little boy on one of the mats on the settee, while his wife sits on the other. "Now I shall tell you a story", begins the father. "We always tell our guests a story first. What story shall I tell you, my grandchildren? Maybe it will be this about the one who walked about under the trees of the mountain with a cloud hanging half way up on it." The Cannibal begins to snore. His wife and child are also asleep. The men lift the mat on which the Cannibal is reclining with his little boy, and throw them into the pit with the red-hot stones. The mother covers the pit quickly with the heavy boards. For a long time the voice of the Cannibal is heard from the pit crying hap. When all is finally quiet the father removes the boards and waves a large hat in the pit. Fine ashes rise in a cloud, and he says: "You shall
be the mosquitoes of later generations." The daughter wakes up, and is angry at first to find her husband and child killed. But when her mother speaks sharply to her: "Look at your brothers! They almost did not escape when they were hunted by your husband!" she comes to her senses. In the morning she guides the others to the Cannibal's house by a secret path. Her father almost faints when he sees the bodies of his tribesmen hanging over the fire to dry. But his daughter has them taken down and laid out, and brings her father the bladder of a mountain goat, filled with liquid, and says: "Now sprinkle the water of life over our tribesmen." When the water of life touches the dried bodies the people sit up and rub their eyes as if they had been asleep. They do not know what happened to them, and know nothing about Cannibal-at-North-End-of-the-World to whose house they had been taken. Now the tribe is complete again and everyone is very happy. They gather the treasures of the Cannibal's house, his red cedar bark, masks and other dancing paraphernalia, his cured skins and dried meat of mountain goats. The girl leads them home, and at home tells her father that he must now give a winter dance. She will guide him in everything he needs to know. She and her three brothers will disappear into the woods as cannibal dancers. After four months they will have to be captured again. Then the dance will begin in the village, where her father's house is to be ceremonial house for the dancers. (Hunt attaches a diagram, showing the house with the sacred rooms of the dancers, the "house of Baxbakualanuxsiwa"). The tribe agree to celebrate the winter dance, and two more women are selected, so that three female and three male dancers "disappear" when the time comes. When they are captured and brought back to the village after four months they have become man-eaters. Tamers and healing dancers accompany them to "press down" their rage. The account ends with a detailed description of the dances, paraphernalia and customs of the winter ritual.

(Boas 1921: 1222-1248)

The essential point of Baxbakualanuxsiwa is the difference between the state of affairs at the beginning of the story and the state of affairs at the end. In this Baxbakualanuxsiwa is an unusually good example of that large class Greimas has called dramatic narratives, all of which are dichotomised, according to him, into a before versus an after. European fairy tales are typical of this class. We do not want to pause here over cross-cultural comparisons, but it is evident that Baxbakualanuxsiwa fits in with patterns discovered by students of the classical fairy tale, especially Propp and Meletinsky.

If beginning and end are of such importance in this story, then Baxbakualanuxsiwa must be essentially the story of a society. The back-
ground shows us the people: happy, because they are a large group, pursuing their tasks which often lead them inland, in possession of a minor ritual. Against this background develops the dramatic narrative of the disappearance of the whole group. At the end the people are again numerous and presumably happy; we leave them celebrating the winter dance they have gained. The questions we have to ask ourselves in such a context are clearly: what happens to these people in the interim, how are they changed? Or: what characterises them before and after? In what way is the society different after the acquisition of the winter dance?

One might say that the beginning shows the society in its "natural" state. This can be taken to be the secular state of the Summer, though the story projects it into the historical past and it becomes the state in which they did not yet have the winter ritual. In this normal state the people follow their occupations, that is to say they go inland to hunt and gather food. Inland means mountains and forest, the world of the animals, which is also the world of the spirits. The three houses the old woman mentions to the boys characterise this world: the house of Mountain Goat is relatively harmless; Mountain Goat is presumably a "master of mountain goats", the representative of the species which in this area is the main game of the hunter. The house of Bear is dangerous: Bear is an animal, but in the "wild" form of a man-eating animal-spirit. The house of the Cannibal-at-North-End-of-World is where the tribesmen have disappeared to: the Cannibal is not an animal at all any more but purely a spirit, anthropomorphic, amorphic or of changeable form, an eater and initiator of men. It is the last house the heroes go to, and it is only the Cannibal we have to do with in the story; in other words the problems of the hunting myth are left behind. Yet the beginning of the story suggests that the "natural" state of society, when men go inland to hunt and gather food,
is overshadowed by a fear of retribution, a fear of reversal which means
that the hunters and gatherers of food may be hunted and gathered as food.
The fear is given form at the beginning of the dramatic narrative, when
people suddenly disappear when they go inland. The end of the story
should therefore logically be an overcoming of that fear; not a "natural"
state but a state in some way hallowed so that people are safe. The
question, then, is how the acquisition of the winter ritual can lead to
such a state. If we can answer it it will be clear that the story rep­
resents indeed a transition, even mediation between the problems of the
Summer and those of the Winter.

The armature of Baxbukualanuxsiwa is of a peculiar kind. It follows
the pattern of the initiation story--the hero leaves the village, goes to
the house of the spirit in the forest, and returns home with a treasure--
but it repeats this pattern with variations three times. It is also
different in that the peripeteia takes place not in the house of the spirit
but in the village. Nor is this episode, in which the fortunes of the
heroes turn, given a central position in the formal scheme. The central
position is given to the revival of the tribesmen and gaining of the winter
ritual. This in itself shows the importance given to society in this
story, though on the face of it it is a story of the adventures of the
three brothers. I shall in the following give again a somewhat forma­
lised account, which is meant to do no more than show the main elements
of the story in their relation.

The framework of the myth can be examined from two points of view, a
spatial and a temporal one. Spatially the framework is made up by two
solid points--the father's house in the village and the Cannibal's house
in the forest--and the lines that run between them. Seen temporally, it
is divided into three phases: the period when people disappear and the
existence of the tribe is threatened; the period when people are revived and return and the tribe is restored; and the period when the tribe celebrates the winter dance. Each phase takes shape as a journey. The journey is the concept in which space and time meet. The first might be called a journey into the unknown. The existence of the Cannibal is not known yet, the people who are snatched by him do not know where they are taken or what is happening to them, the people who go out to look for them do not know what they are up against. Reality has the quality of a nightmare in this period. The second journey is to what is known, and is entirely happy: the sister leads the way, the brothers already know what sight to expect in the Cannibal's house and the parent's initial horror is quickly overcome by the revival of their tribesmen. The third journey is of a different kind altogether. It is only implied in the myth, and is a journey of the mind. All the myth tells us is that the initiates for the cannibal dance disappear into the forest for four months. Yet what is implied and what can be supplied by everyone in the culture is that the isolation of the cannibal initiates means a visit to the Cannibal's house, where they are killed, eaten and revived again. The initiates therefore experience, on a different level, what the whole tribe experienced in the earlier part of the story. In fact the story of the tribesmen who were hung like split salmon in the smoke of the Cannibal's fire, of the boys who were almost eaten by the Cannibal and of the girl who married the Cannibal, itself supplies the dancers with their experience. It consists of the initiation theme with variations, and the narrator does not need to repeat it. The first and third journey are therefore connected as a going into death, or a variation of it. Formally the story stresses this connection through the word "disappear". In the beginning of the story the tribesmen suddenly disappear. The same word is used technically
in the winter dance: the initiates "disappear" when they go into isolation. The meaning of the story crystallizes around these two uses of "disappear". The first disappearance is involuntary and quite helpless: people are simply the prey of the Cannibal. The second disappearance is voluntary and in full knowledge: the initiates are still the Cannibal's prey but they choose to submit to him for the sake of the gift of new life.

The mediating link between the involuntary experience of the tribesmen and the voluntary experience of the initiates is the adventures of the brothers, which are neither voluntary nor involuntary. The brothers escape initially thanks to the gifts of the powerful old woman, but their true escape, and their defeat of the Cannibal is due to trickery. The trick seems to be conceptually the mediating term between the involuntary (i.e. experience that is forced on one) and the voluntary (experience one chooses) in Kwakiutl thought, and perhaps in archaic thought generally. It has something of both: it is used because one is in a spot in which one would not choose to be. And it is an active shaping of events, a making of the experience rather than suffering an old form of it. One could therefore say that trickery (the lie, deceit) are a preform of the voluntary as it is shown in the initiation ritual. In Kwakiutl mythology the trickster and transformer tales stand midway between myth time and real time as the Kwakiutl see it. Real time tales are tales of human effort, often tales of spirit quests which centre on a test or tests. The trick, which changes the myth world to the real world preceded the development of human beings. In Baxbakualanuxsiwa we have a similar situation on a small scale. The nightmare world in which people are hunted by monsters whom they don't know and cannot fight, and eaten by them, is a sort of myth time. The monster is caught by a trick in which he is lured by food which he is prevented from eating. He is finally himself
"cooked" to cinders and turned from giant size into the tiny mosquito, (a bloodsucker the Kwakiutl thought harmless). With this change people reach their proper scale and real time begins. In real time people go out voluntarily to offer themselves to monsters in order to gain power.

On the symbolic level the whole myth is held together by images of hunting and eating. An examination of the images of food preparation reveals surprisingly that the methods used in the Cannibal's house are of a civilized kind, while those used in the father's house are of a savage kind. The bodies of the tribesmen are treated in the Cannibal's house by what is one of the commonest methods of preserving salmon. They are split and hung up on racks to dry. But though the myth on one level indicates in this image that they are dead and have become food for the Cannibal, it indicates simultaneously, on another, that in this dry state they are "preserved" and that life exists as a potentiality in them. The second possibility is vindicated when they are resurrected by the water of life, which is also found in the Cannibal's house. The parallel with the Kwakiutl first salmon ritual can hardly be overlooked: the salmon is first blackened over the fire, then revived in the water. But at the same time he is also dead and eaten; he "goes through" men as the initiates "go through" the Cannibal. The food imagery of the Cannibal's house has, then, a double significance: as an image of eating and ingestion it points to identification with the spirit and gaining of power; as an image of drying over fire and being revived with water it points to a death that leads to new life. Both images belong also to archaic European thought, as Onians has pointed out; even the analogy of dead bodies with smoked fish can be found in Homer. In our myth, the civilized cooking methods that the tribesmen receive in the Cannibal's house forecast the treatment the initiates will receive there. They too will find life in death there
because the centre of the world is the place of life in death and of the
transformation of death into life. On the other hand, the methods used
in the father's house are different because the issue is different. Here
a mythical monster has to be deprived of its power so that men can be
safe. When the brothers turn themselves into food for the Cannibal they
turn themselves into food not yet fully prepared for eating. They stop,
so to speak, at the cutting stage, waiting on their slabs like cut salmon.
The Cannibal is eager to eat them raw, but is prevented. The whole scene
is in the deceptive mode: the brothers pretend to be food not yet
cooked, and the Cannibal is told to wait for food he will never eat. The
second cooking method that is suggested in the scene in the father's
house is steaming in an earth oven. To prepare food in this way a pit is
dug, and lined with stones heated in the fire. The food is put on the
hot stones, and the pit is sealed off. The food is however thickly
wrapped in leaves and water is poured over it, so that it cooks gently in
the steam. The Cannibal is "cooked" by this method, but is exposed to
too much heat and deprived of water. The method is the opposite of that
with which the tribesmen are treated in his house. They are dried,
because they are far enough from the fire, and as a result can be revived
by water. He is burnt, because he is too close to the fire and deprived
of water. He can only rise as the almost bodiless mosquito. On the
other hand, the method is in apposition to that with which the brothers
were treated. The brothers are undercooked: they are raw food, and
therefore unetable. The Cannibal is overcooked: he is burnt food and
therefore unetable. The lesson to be derived from all these cooking
methods is a strange one. The brothers return to their old natural
selves after their unsuccessful attempt at turning themselves into food;
the Cannibal, too, as a mosquito, remains himself, only diminished in scope
and power. The lesson is undoubtedly that you have to be properly cooked, made eatable, to be twice-born and gain new life.

The material I have brought together so far can be summed up with the help of a simple diagram.

FIGURE 9

(Initiates eaten and revived)

People revived with water of life.

People into food: dried over fire to be eaten.

Brothers, hunted by cannibal, escape

Hunted by cannibal

Initiates disappear

Initiates captured by tribe

Voluntary

Father's house

Winter dance: full of people, tribe restored.

Involuntary

Father's house

Empty of Children; Village empty of people.
Baxbakualanuxsiwa turns on the concept of voluntariness. Involuntary disappearance becomes voluntary disappearance; what has been a diminishing of the tribe becomes an enriching of the tribe. The mediating trick depends on the brothers turning themselves voluntarily into food with the result that the Cannibal, who has been the only one active so far is turned involuntarily into food. The change in the Cannibal is only relative to the change in the people, because he is a thought-being and changes as they change. If he turns from a giant to a mosquito he does so because fear has been conquered through the courageous actions of the last family. But more importantly, if he changes for the whole tribe from simply a mysterious power that snatches them out of life to a giver of the winter dance, then this is due to a change in them from fear to courage, ignorance to knowledge and a passive attitude to an active one. The change is not worked out in this story in terms of the maturation of an individual. It is not an initiation story but the story of the acquisition of the winter dance; that is, the change concerns a whole tribe and ultimately mankind in the cosmic-historical perspective such myths take. In what terms, then, does the myth see the change of a whole people?

The beginning sentences of the myth contain a summing up of the situation; they define the fear and even, by pointing to a lack suggest the remedy. "The Somxolidex were always happy because their number was great. And they used only the lewelaxa ceremonial; they had no winter ceremonial. Suddenly those who went inland from their houses disappeared..." The fear is for the survival of the tribe. As long as their numbers are great the Somxolidex will continue as a unit but if people disappear the tribe will disappear. The minor ritual the people celebrate is no safeguard, but the acquisition of the winter ritual will be. So far the myth. Now, we have found that the characteristic of the
winter ritual which the myth stresses is precisely the disappearing of the initiates. In other words the tribe guards its safety by imitating its peril; its concern is with its unity and wholeness and for this reason it splits itself apart and risks a number of its young people, so risking itself. The myth articulates the religious paradox about losing your life in order to gain it on a collective level.

What "life" can the tribe, as a collectivity, hope to gain by exposing itself? The myth gives only an indirect answer: it can hope to be itself; not any longer the plaything of unknown forces greater than itself but conscious, in command, and in possession of the initiative. The situation of danger has shifted from the outside to the inside; and if death means being surprised by the danger and overcome against one's will, life means knowing of it and meeting it by one's own choice. The society like the individual, defines itself against its own fear—the fear to which the imagery of the myth has given such vivid colour. The myth focuses on the society and takes little account of the individual. Its main question is: how does the state of the society differ after the acquisition of the winter ritual? But it comes to the same conclusion as other initiation stories. Like the individual the society itself can only become free, that is autonomous and independent if it can overcome its unconsciousness and its fear. The shift from the outside to the inside is made concrete as the acquisition of the winter ritual, and it means in psychological terms—even in collective psychological terms—a shift from a passive to an active attitude. With the acquisition of the winter ritual men have moved into an era in which they are masters of their own fate. And because men never are master of their fate entirely, and yet have to labour constantly to define the small area where such mastery is possible) the etiological myth of the origin of the winter ritual is
really a myth of the "origin of the tsetseqa in the baxus". In baxus life men are bound by necessity, but, as the Kwakiutl say, the tsetseqa is underneath. From a reading of the texts it appears that this means that the state of determination, expressed as baxus contains in itself the possibility of freedom, which has to be recognised and developed, however, by men themselves. In other words, the Kwakiutl do not conceive baxus and tsetseqa simply as seasons of the year that follow one another automatically; rather, the solar year is the image in which the two co-existing conditions of the human state are reflected. Baxus life comes to men by necessity; the tsetseqa has to be helped to dominance in its own sphere by an effort on the side of men.

(c) Summary

To sum up I shall first recapitulate in schematic form the problems of baxus life (the problems of the hunting life) and of the tsetseqa (the problems of civic life) and the principles that connect them. Second I shall look once more at the myths we have examined and ask how they make the principles of the transition from baxus to tsetseqa explicit.

1) Recapitulation of the Problems of the Baxus and the Tsetseqa, and of the Principles that Connect Them.

A The Problem and Its Solution Abstracted

I Hunting

(a) The central problem of the hunting life: how to escape the revenge of the animals.

(b) Conditions of solution: none. Justice demands a reversal that gives the animals an opportunity of revenge.

(c) Solution: men must emulate the animals' sacrificial act, and offer themselves voluntarily as game and food for them. In other words the solution lies in a paradox: do voluntarily that which you fear. The paradox contains the possibility of transformation
and therefore of a new state in which the dilemma of the old state is overcome.

II Initiation

(a) The central problem of the civic life: how to build a society that is strong from within and can withstand the dangers of disintegration that threaten it.

(b) Conditions of solution: a society of strong members that have each individually learnt to overcome their fears and to be independent and active.

(c) Solution: the society risks itself by splitting off a part of itself (the initiates) and sending them to the world of the spirits. The individual initiate voluntarily faces death in the world of the cannibalistic spirits. In other words, the solution (played out on a collective and individual level) lies here also in the paradox: do voluntarily that which you fear. The initiate who has managed to overcome his fear and to meet the spirit passively, returns free and active. From this reservoir of individual initiative and courage the society builds its independent strength.

B The Conceptual Link between I and II

The same act by which the animals are repaid is also the act that makes men free and enables them to build a free society. The act of voluntary sacrifice ensures a double freedom: in relation to the animals (that is retrospectively) it discharges from the responsibility accumulated in the Summer; in relation to men (prospectively) it ensures the civic life of the Winter. The hallmark of life in the Winter is a society made up of free members.

C The Sources for the foregoing abstractions

To I: Hunting

To I (a) Prayers. The problem of the hunting life finds direct expression in the prayers. They express remorse over killing, the hope not to be punished. They justify and explain human conduct. They also express fear of reprisal.

To I (b) Hunting myths. In the hunting myths the absence of any conditions of solutions on the level of baxus life finds expression. They are formally based on a scheme of reversal that expresses a sense of automatic and inescapable justice. The hunter is turned into food, the game into hunter.

To I (c) Rituals for animals. Though the solution is not expressed here it is implicit in the relationship of parity that exists between the first salmon ritual and the initiation ritual. The relation implies a scheme of reversal, like that of the hunting myth, but unlike the hunting myths' scheme it contains a resolution of the dilemma. Justice is done and responsibility discharged--man is not destroyed but redeemed.
To II: **Initiation** (The following sources are beyond the scope of this thesis. They are however formally summed up in the examination of the initiation myth in Chapter 1.)

II (a), (b), (c) are expressed in the initiation myths and the initiation ritual. The myths are tales of transformation. They tell of the initiate-hero's meeting with the spirit, his death, resurrection and gaining of the treasure. They could be called myths of individuation. The ritual enacts the taming of the initiate. It shows him in his wild state in which he brings the basically anti-social freedom of the spirit to the community. The ritual changes anti-social into socially viable and even socially constructive freedom, expressed as giving (distribution of treasure). It might be called a ritual of social transformation, because the ritual process turns an ordinary society into a polity whose members are linked through their freedom, not through their need of one another.

To B **Conceptual Link**

Sources for the conceptual link are found in all the material I have examined. In the thesis material the connections remain implicit, in the material used for the epilogue they are explicit. I give a summary of only the most obvious ones.

**Implicit Links**

(a) Prayers. The prayers are linked to the tsetseqa by the epithets with which the orant addresses the intelligences he prays to. The honorific titles he gives to the intelligences are the names he uses for the spirit of the winter ritual. The meaning of the connection can only be extrapolated through a study of the Kwakiutl conception of the world centre.

(b) Hunting myths. The links are here only approximate, and, in so far as the myths do not belong to the Kwakiutl corpus, comparative. They are present in the mediator figures that dominate the myths in their complete versions. The "master of animals" figure and the "good hunter" figure show conceptual correspondences to the animal-spirits and initiate of the Kwakiutl winter ritual.

(g) Salmon ritual. The conceptual link finds expression in the perfect parity between the myth of the salmon ritual and the myth of the initiation ritual.

**Explicit Links**

Myths of transition. The myths discussed in the epilogue deal with the problem of the hunting life and the problem of initiation simultaneously. The problems of hunting are transposed from the natural plane, where they are insoluble, to the intra- and interpersonal plane of culture. On that plane, an affective inversion
is possible, which frees the hero and the society psychologically. That which was blindly feared and accepted is brought into consciousness and actively sought, and with this facing of it, overcome.

2 RECAPITULATION OF PRINCIPLES OF TRANSITION WITH THE HELP OF THE MYTHS OF THE EPILOGUE.

If a myth was to make the process of transition from the baxus to the tsetseqa, from hunting to initiation explicit, the story context would have to bring together two aspects:

- retribution for killing and eating animals (which is a syndrome of the hunting life);
- a transformation of retribution into the principle that makes men independent (which belongs to initiation).

In each of the myths of the epilogue these two aspects are brought together, but in different ways. Both myths turn basically on the same problem, but the issue is posed differently in each of them and the narrator uses different key images to make it explicit. I shall restate below in schematic form how the issue is posed in each myth, and how the transition from the baxus to the tsetseqa is worked out with the help of a retribution scheme and a transformation scheme.

Elxabae

(A) Problem: Elxabae is a simple myth. It turns on the problem of how to become fully human, and does this under the image of activity. The story contrasts a state of being human based, on technical skill (which leads to mere fruitless activity) with a state of being "fully human" based on a power that makes active in a way fruitful for oneself and others.

(B) Retribution scheme. The hero, Elxabae, is "technological man" skilled at killing animals for food by technological means. His efforts are destroyed by the bear, who, as Chief of the Animals, revenges the animals by turning Elxabae into food for them. His
death, however, turns the animals into his debtors; they pity him and give him new life.

(C) Transformation scheme. Through his death and resuscitation Elxabae becomes the equal of the bear. The bear's gift of the ritual is the pledge of a new bond, in which the animal-spirit becomes the guardian of the man and adds his superhuman power to his merely human skills. In obtaining this gift Elxabae has become fully human in the sense in which the initiate becomes a "perfect man". He has passively and actively redeemed his debts to the animals by suffering dismemberment, and by returning to the bear (whom he dreads) for a contest of strength. In doing this he has become active in a new way: by facing his death and overcoming his fear he has learnt to "act freely". His capacity for acting freely is shown in the myth by his possession of the ritual dance and his ability to provide successfully from now on for his people.

Baxbakualanuxsiwa

(A) Problem: Baxbakualanuxsiwa is a complex story. It also turns on the problem of becoming fully human. In order to understand the image under which the conception of being human is developed here we must first consider an aspect of its complexity. It is an amalgam of two stories, of which the first follows a pattern frequent in Interior Salish and Northern Athapascan mythology, while the second is a typical Kwakiutl story.

(B) Retribution scheme. The first of the two Kernel stories has a pure hunting theme in the sense that it addresses itself to the problem of the right relation between men and animals.

In myth time the animals are of giant size, carnivorous, and hunt men. A culture hero transforms them by magic means into game, making them normal in size and harmless, so that they
can be hunted by men. With their transformation real time and the era of men begins.

Here the element of retribution is reversed, and this reversal has entered, in a modified form into our myth (where people who first disappear are innocent victims of carnivorous monsters). The animals have made themselves guilty in mythical times, and men are therefore absolved from the guilt for hunting and eating them in real time. Put into this historical perspective, the hunting theme could not fuse with an initiation theme. In Baxbakualanuxsiwa however, the Kernel story appears in a changed form. It is set in real time and has an initiation slant because the Cannibal is not transformed by the magic word of a transformer but by the act of courage of human heroes who offer themselves to him as food. The etiological angle—that from a giant mosquito he is turned into a normal sized mosquito—has become a loose motif.

(C) Transformation scheme. The trick of the heroes gives expression to the initiation theme which is inherent in the second Kernel story.

A spirit has a house in an inaccessible part of the world. In it he stores the dried bodies of people he has caught and turned into food. A hero seeks the spirit at his house, suffers death and revival there and/or overcomes the spirit, brings the people back to life and gains the treasure of the ritual.

The story introduces the image on which "becoming human" in Baxbakualanuxsiwa turns, the image of voluntariness. In the first Kernel story the transition from the prehuman to the human state is made passively as part of history. In the second Kernel story a transition to being "fully human" is made actively by the hero, beginning with his deliberate decision to seek out the spirit. In
Baxbakualanuxsiwa the theme of voluntariness is developed in two stages. It is developed in preparatory form in the decision of the heroes "to seek him who is killing our tribesmen", and in the trick they play the Cannibal. It is represented in fully developed form in the play on "disappearing". To "disappear" means at the end of the story to enter voluntarily the world into which people disappeared involuntarily at the beginning. Here the significance of the remarkable fusion between the two Kernel stories achieved by the narrator becomes clear. Eliade's claim that ritual is a return to the origins and re-establishment of primordial conditions is verified in an unexpected manner. The myth is one of a return to primordial conditions in order to overcome these conditions, or a myth designed to overcome myth. Myth time is here a world of fears. The dreamlike quality it assumes in our myth would suggest that it is a world of being haunted by inner or imaginary fears. To reenter it voluntarily is to face these fears and to dispel them by facing them. The conceptual gap between the giant animals of the Kernel story and the cannibalistic spirits of our myth would then be unimportant here. The emphasis in the myth is on the transformation of a spellbound passivity into "human" activity. Becoming human is rendered here first as a becoming aware (the people who have disappeared involuntarily have been as if asleep and are unaware of what happened to them), second as being capable of converting "natural" fear into a "cultural" act of courage. It is in this sense that the myth approaches the nature/culture dichotomy and makes the principle of transition explicit.

In the myths of the epilogue the strands of the argument I have
been pursuing throughout my thesis come together. The texts of prayers, hunting myths and rituals for animals are evidence of the painstaking labour the Kwakiutl expended on examining the conditions of determination. This very labour, as I said, yields them an understanding of the conditions of freedom. At its most abstract this process is the "origin of the tsetseqa in the baxus". In my examination of the texts I have shown the origin of the tsetseqa more concretely to be a transposition of the unresolvable dilemma met with in the natural world to the intra- and interpersonal plane of culture, where man is capable of being responsible for his actions. The transposition is made through an inversion of fear. The conditions of baxus life produce fear. If that which is feared is voluntarily sought and faced, the transition from baxus life to the tsetseqa has been made. The tsetseqa itself is defined by freedom from necessity. Necessity is part of physical life, and the most ineluctable necessity is death. In forestalling death by facing it, the Kwakiutl initiate overcomes necessity on the cultural level and becomes free. The winter dance--the tsetseqa--is the collective expression of that freedom. These connections between the baxus and the tsetseqa are only implied in the thesis texts which concentrate on the problems of baxus life. They become explicit, however, and could be demonstrated, in the texts chosen for the epilogue, because these texts have the transition from the baxus life to the tsetseqa as their subject.
Footnotes


2 The text was collected by Hunt and published in Boas' collection of family histories. Hunt sent the texts as letters to Boas, and they are full of interesting incidental information, especially this particular one, which is very long. See "Family Histories" in Ethnology of the Kwakiutl: Based on Data Collected by George Hunt, 35th Report of the Bureau of American Ethnology, Part II, 1913--14 (Washington: Gov. Printing Office, 1921).

3 See Chapter 3, n.15.

4 For the theme of the giant animals which hunt men and have to be reduced to normal size before men can safely inhabit the world see Beaver Tales, ed. Toni and Robin Ridington (unpublished).

5 See Onians 1951: 260--262, but especially p.261. The Kwakiutl text stressed that it is the warriors of the tribe who hang, dried up, like smoked fish in the Cannibal's house. The phrase Homer uses to describe the remains of the Greek warriors is "dry like smoked fish". The etymological connection of "skeleton" with "dried up body" Onians points out is interesting in view of the blackening of head and eyes and use of a skeleton in the Kwakiutl first salmon ritual.
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