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ABSTRACT

This thesis reviews the current stylistic literature to gain support for a claim that figurative meaning in general and analogical metaphor in particular are integral processes of language and, as such, are of overriding concern to linguists. The first three chapters are devoted to defining the term 'metaphor' in both broad and narrow senses and to locating figurative language (the broad sense of the term) within the rule-governed scheme that is language. The fourth chapter adds the notion that metaphor is the linguistic sphere's analogue to the dream as viewed by Freud.

The fifth chapter, "Metaphoric Tension," seeks to explain how a metaphor operates. Most of the writers surveyed believe that a kind of tension is operative—a sort of turgor pressure which keeps the figure alive. This tension in turn is best analysed in terms of paired forces, whose impact is centripetal/centrifugal. While the two forces have been described in various ways and under different names, one can be characterized broadly as generalizing and the other as particularizing. That is, every metaphor focusses sharply on the comparison it is making and at the same time suggests "wider and wider contexts" through "semantic plenitude of implication."
Chapter Six discusses the extent to which the individual metaphor is a work of art. Art-object status can be accorded to metaphors partly because of the quasi-visual imagery and the symbolism that goes into their construction, and so imagery's role in figurative speech is examined. In addition, since new metaphors are consciously created by writers (as opposed to frozen or inert metaphors, which are used unwittingly in speech), they are subject to the standards that judge any private artistic enterprise.

Chapter Seven examines logic in metaphor, and finds that it is not a step-by-step quotidian logic at all. In keeping with the fact that greater creativity is permissible in metaphor, the matter of logic is relegated to a subordinate position. Thus, the words which best describe metaphor's logic, words like 'counterlogical,' 'infra-logical,' 'extra-logical,' and, of course, 'analogical,' all contain the element of 'logic,' but in bound form.

The material presented in Chapters Five, Six and Seven has to do with the paired forces underlying metaphors, metaphors' imagery content and their elliptical logic. These peculiarities and others conspire to make metaphors most difficult to paraphrase in discursive language. Chapter Eight is devoted to the question of paraphrase.
Chapter Nine documents a divergent strain of reasoning, which claims that metaphor is a heightened form of ordinary speech. This philosophy holds that metaphor exploits properties latent and untapped in the literal tongue.

The tenth chapter concerns metaphor's cognitive abilities, which, it is generally agreed, are prodigious. It is shown that the analogy (metaphor's prime constituent) is man's cognizing tool par excellence, indispensable in both science and art.

The final chapter summarizes the foregoing and adds a cautionary rider indicating the possible misuses of metaphor. These drawbacks, it is concluded, are almost inconsiderable in light of the richness that figurative speech admits into language.
# Table of Contents

**Introduction** .............................. i

**CHAPTER ONE: Metaphor in the Linguistic Sphere** ........................ 1

The Problem of Univocal Reference .................. 2

**CHAPTER TWO: What is Metaphor Exactly?** .......................... 13

Equivocal Reference .......................... 13

**CHAPTER THREE: Metaphor Seen as Unorthodox Play Within the System** .......................... 19

**CHAPTER FOUR: Metaphor and Dreams** .......................... 27

"Rounded Sensuous Object" .................. 29

Sound-Links .......................... 30

Ambiguous Sense-Links .................. 30

Memory-Links .......................... 33

**CHAPTER FIVE: Metaphoric Tension** .......................... 36

Distance .......................... 36

Abstraction versus Detail .................. 38

Economy .......................... 39

Creative Defining Ability .................. 39
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SIX</td>
<td>The Role of Imagery</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Different Levels and Different Interpretations</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Verification is Centripetal</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Privacy</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEVEN</td>
<td>Metaphor's Particular Logic</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>'Logic' in Bound Form</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Counterlogical in Metaphor</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Metaphor as Extra- or Infra-logical</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Metaphor as Analogical</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Truth Question</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A Poetic Grammar?</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EIGHT</td>
<td>The Difficulty of Paraphrasing Metaphor</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-linearity</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Economy</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Equivocal Reference</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NINE</td>
<td>Metaphor Seen As a Heightened Form of Language</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ambiguity</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Transference</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Context</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Predicating a Nominal</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ethnocentricity</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The English poet Shelley has written that "language is vitally metaphorical." I have used this four-word opinion (multum in parvo) as the springboard for my thesis, seeking to show:

(1) that he is right. Metaphor is a vital and indispensable process of language, and

(2) why he is right. Supposing that metaphor is a necessary condition for language, how does it work?

Who, in particular, uses metaphors, or do we all?

How much do we use them?

Knowingly or unknowingly?

Where?

Why?

How?

In essence, then, my thesis is a literature review. I have looked at roughly forty writers on figurative language and have found that, to a man, they agree that metaphor's role in language is enormous, fundamental.

Their view was new to me. Though I am a linguist on the one hand and an aspiring writer of prose on the other, I had never realized that metaphor had any sort of primacy in language. My private conception of metaphor, insofar as I had one, was of Renaissance vintage; I thought
that metaphor and the other so-called figures of speech were extrinsic to communication and used fitfully as ornaments to one's literary style.

The method and intent of this thesis are simple in the extreme. I have not tested Vancouver high school students on their reactions to and recall of various metaphors, as one colleague* has done. I have made no predictions and tabulated no results.

Instead, my aim was to inform linguists that metaphor is a vital part of their area of concern. If and when linguists do encounter metaphor, it is on the alien ground of literature or in the shadowy grey area of stylistics. I am suggesting, however, that they recognize metaphor as a linguistic phenomenon of the first order.

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CHAPTER ONE

METAPHOR IN THE LINGUISTIC SYSTEM

"a flower in the crannied wall"

Metaphors and other types of figurative language live side by side with the literal in human speech. The fact that there is universal figurative content to communication does not mean that every speaker is imaginative in his use of language, since clearly most people are not. The real reason for the incidence of metaphor in speech is that the process of thought itself is inalienably metaphoric, and speech, in expressing thought, cannot help but be so too.

It seems to me that the linguist, in approaching this area so commonly deemed to be an English-department bailiwick, needs to know the following sorts of things:

1. Where does the literal in speech leave off and the figurative begin?

2. Is the relationship between literal and figurative use of words frozen or does it shift?

2(a). If the relationship is of a shifting, changing nature, is the metaphoric-literal change part of the overall process of language growth?

3. If the process of thought is metaphoric and speech presents thought, why is metaphor not the norm and literal reference the exception?

3(a). Can the relationship in fact be characterized in terms of a norm and an exception?

The purpose of this first chapter is to pinpoint
metaphorical language on the broad map of speech. First, it is necessary to look at the question of reference in general; that is, how a particular word comes to refer to a particular thing.

This question is deeply philosophical, and moreover is functionally inert in linguistic circles. The earliest linguists, de Saussure especially, dealt with the matter, and their conclusions are embedded at the base of the field's literature. Roughly, it has been established that the relationship between a word like 'table' and an actual physical table is an arbitrary but fixed convention. Additionally, the relationship between word and thing in the ordinary spoken language is a more or less univocal one. There is one word per thing, in other words.

The Problem of Univocal Reference

To give a name is an enormous metaphysical task because a name initiates a fixed and binding univocal relationship. Once an object or phenomenon within the human purview is named, it is tagged for life and, unless the name is part of a strict scientific taxonomy, is thenceforth subject to depreciation from constant abrasion and use. Bestowal of a noun-label is especially presumptuous because with the noun, unlike the verb and the adjective, a whole complex of attributes is corralled willy-nilly into the chosen arbitrary label. Thus, for example, utterance of the word 'tree' conjures up images
of leafiness, shadiness, branchiness, tallness, slimness and bark, all at once and indiscriminately. All of these qualities spring to the mind unbidden; even the most stripped-down mental tree is bound to have them.

But once the word 'tree' is found in a context and described, however slightly, the mind's archetypal tree begins to transform—to decrease in leafiness and wax in tallness if the tree in question proves to be an evergreen, or to whiten in bark if a birch. To use a noun clearly and unequivocally in any given sense, then, certain of its attributes must be stressed at the expense of others. The speaker's selection of one particular sense of a noun is continually reaffirmed, too, by connected speech—the greater context in which the noun resides.

In contrast to the task of naming, the designation of verbal and adjectival concepts is not nearly as monumental an undertaking. The concepts involved are simpler than noun concepts and do not decompose into as many shards of meaning. Certainly, the verb 'jump' conjures up the mental image of a leap. It may be a high jump or a low jump that is meant, a jump energetically executed or not, but these qualities cannot be abstracted out of the verb as leafiness may from the noun 'tree.' In fact, W.H. Leatherdale has shown that verbs and adjectives are suffused with additional meaning from their neighbouring nouns. For nouns, in their
polymorphism, actually have a surfeit of meaning, which overflows them and runs, profitably, into the verbs and adjectives, giving them shape and colour. Thus, in 'He ground his teeth' and 'He ground the corn,' the nouns 'teeth' and 'corn' define and differentiate the two senses of 'ground,' a feat which the verb alone is powerless to effectuate.

As any linguist knows, words are but arbitrary labels, with no relation to what they stand for other than the conventional: a tree is a Baum is an arbre. Meaning, or significance, only begins to accrue when words are linked together, so that context becomes the all-important mucilage of speech. As I see it, the noun, in subsuming a complicated Gestalt under a single term, is the most ponderous of the word-classes. Because certain aspects of the noun are emphasized by the larger context of sentence or paragraph, the noun can be seen as being closest to the context, and to the meaningfulness of speech. The other word-classes are arrayed in serried ranks beneath them. (It seems not unreasonable to have such a hierarchy of univocal reference for the word classes. If nouns are at the top, prepositions would be near the bottom and articles at the base).

Each noun has a head-meaning (Empson's term), a sort of archetypal sense in which all of the noun's
defining criteria are filled. For instance, if we agree that 'science' at its most abstract is experimental, mathematic, systematic and painstaking, then when we speak of physics as being a science, we are using the term in its head-meaning; all of the minimum basic requirements are satisfied. Yet, there is a whole constellation of other applications for the word 'science' that are equally legitimate, though they may satisfy only one, two or three of the requisites. Botany is as palpably 'science' as physics is, despite its less mathematic constitution; a Manx cat is still a cat for all that. In other words, every noun is a cover term. The one-to-one correspondence that we might hope to exist between word and thing does not invariably occur. As I said earlier, the reference in literal meaning is only "more or less" univocal, which means "less" more often than not. Each noun-label—deceptively benign—reveals a whole panoply of sockets to plug sense into (its basic defining criteria), and, due to the number and variety of possible contexts, the possibilities of sense re-routing are legion. (This lack of simple univocal reference has given rise to many, if not most, major philosophical arguments, causing thinkers like Bergson and others to overhaul their terminology drastically to avoid the all-too common disclaimer that "It's a question of semantics [sic]."
Francis Bacon is an example of a thinker who set out to tabulate reality as we know it, the better for terms to apply and analogies to be made. Seeking to perfect the somewhat approximate dovetailing of words and physical reality, he arrived at a Table of Essence and Presence (a list of all similarities), a Table of Degrees (a scalar version of same), and a Table of Deviation (a list of all differences). It was a noble attempt, this locking of horns with the universe, to present the panoply of connotations for every word.

So univocal meaning, obviously is a tall order. It is simplifying inordinately to expect that "there is a property or set of properties necessary to anything to entitle one to apply that term." Certainly on the face of it some terms are better suited to univocal definition than others: 'bicycle,' 'brother,' 'cube' and 'mulatto,' to name a few. But even where a relatively straightforward relation between word and thing seems to exist, problems crop up, as Simon points out: "It is true that brothers have in common that they are male siblings, but their having in common that they are male siblings is their having in common that they are brothers and not their having in common something in addition to their being brothers." Though he has deliberately set up a straw man of a tautology to make his point, Simon succeeds in showing that under the philosopher's
burning glass, language is quite capable of disintegrating into a welter of hopeless confusion. As Wittgenstein has intimated, ostensive definition is the last resort of meaning, i.e. the production of one's corporeal brother to substantiate one's point.

Since literal language purports to describe reality, it is the fallacy of that language to imply that a set of terms exist that is adequate to really "cover" reality. ("Plain speech is essentially inaccurate," wrote Hulme). What in fact happens is that the set of terms becomes like so many tokens in the Volksmund. Words are seriously vitiated for "having simultaneously to fit innumerable more or less similar* (which really means never equal, therefore altogether unequal) cases." But not to panic: this is as it should be. After all, existence is not a matter of black and white, but of subtle gradations. As Whitehead wrote, "the different modes of natural existence shade off into each other." Language reproduces existence, describes it, characterizes it, apes it. So if reality proves protean, intractable or ambiguous, we cannot look to language to untangle it because "language and experience interact and prove fundamentally implicated with each other to an extent that makes it difficult to consider them as separate entities." As Empson has shown, ambiguity is simply endemic in language.

* Vide Bacon's tables of similarity and difference.
This looseness of terminology is inevitable in language for another reason, this one developmental. That is, new terms that arise tend to fall in with the pre-existing pattern of nomenclature, resulting in a certain arbitrariness. Wenerberg explains it as follows:

When a new object emerges that has not yet been subsumed under any term, it will be subsumed under some term A because it is similar to some of the objects already subsumed under A. And if still another object emerges that is similar to the former object, it might be subsumed under A as well. But it might very well be the case that if the former object had never emerged, the latter might have been subsumed under some other term instead of A. (IU)

There is historical inevitability to this process. For, if capable of nothing else logical, man is a creature who furthers and expands constructs once he has started them (often to the point of folly or absurdity). Stanley Edgar Hyman instances the process nicely, though his example is not drawn from the linguistic sphere:

Newton banished God from nature, Darwin banished him from life, Freud drove him from the last fastness, the soul. It was all latent in Newton, in Descartes, in Galileo: mechanism would conquer all, once it had conquered nature, for man's body was sprung from nature and his mind from his body. (12)

Another possibility in a pre-existing pattern of nomenclature is reorganization, the "re-routing" of sense referred to above. Rubrics fill up and new ones are created. This can happen when what had previously been a
subsidiary attribute of a term, one of its symptoms,\textsuperscript{13} as it were, begins to serve as a defining criterion in its own right (a head-meaning). Again, Wenerberg elucidates:

Phenomena possessing a feature A are subsumed under concept X, whose defining criterion is A. If all these phenomena also have the feature B in common, this may cause us to subsume under X a new phenomenon that has the feature B but lacks A. Thus, B used to be a symptom but has become a criterion. (14)

Actually, Wenerberg's second growth process is almost as predictable as his first. A construct, once started, is furthered: yes. But a construct, once started, is also deviated from predictably, is taken issue with. Thus, surrealism, dadaism, theater of the absurd, pop art and the rest are very much part of the western tradition; they are not adventitious.

Using an approach that differed from Bacon's but with not dissimilar intent, Ludwig Wittgenstein set out to examine language minutely, to corner and capture the beasts Vagueness and Ambiguity. His attempt is deeply reflective and achieves a measure of success on the descriptive level. One of his theories is called "meaning-as-use." Its main point is that meaning is inextricably context-bound, something I have argued above.

The second conceit is his Family Resemblance theory, and it is so perceptive in describing the vagaries of language that it bears reproducing here:
Consider for example the proceedings that we call 'games.' I mean board-games, card-games, Olympic games, and so on. What is common to them all? if you look at them you will not see something that is common to all, but similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them at that. Are they all 'amusing'? Compare chess with naughts and crosses. Or is there always winning and losing, or competition between players? Think of patience. In ball games, there is winning and losing; but when a child throws his ball at the wall and catches it again, this feature has disappeared. Look at the parts played by skill and luck; and at the difference between skill in chess and skill in tennis. Think now of games like ring-a-ring-a-roses; here is the element of amusement, but how many other characteristic features have disappeared! the result of this examination is: we see a complicated network of similarities overlapping and crisscrossing: sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of detail. I can think of no better expression to characterize these similarities than 'family resemblances:' for the various resemblances between members of a family: build, features, colour of eyes, gait, temperament, etc., etc. overlap and criss-cross in the same way. (15)

This analogy, though vastly appealing, is hardly (or only minimally) a "theory," as Michael Simon has pointed out. This because it has no explanatory or predictive power: it cannot explain why tag and bobbing for apples are games and running a race and fishing are not any more than it can explain why "we do not call reading or washing a game."

When it is thus scrutinized, the whole fabric of language begins to look quite diaphanous (that is not to say "moth-eaten," for the gauziness is even-textured throughout). It is this filminess which makes language a natural medium for poetry: it positively breeds evocation.
Figurative language takes up the slack in plain speech, and as Marcus Hester shows, there is ample slack to take up. He argues that not everything in language is rule-governed, and compares the rules of language to tennis rules, wherein one is not told how high to throw the ball when serving. Wild excesses in throwing the ball are both conceivable and permissible in tennis. The analogue in the linguistic system to this freedom within a rule-governed game is metaphor, or figurative language.

So language is riddled with areas of imprecision, and it is here that metaphor (in its broadest sense, that of "figurative language") grows, a flower in the crannied wall. It not only grows but it luxuriates, achieving, in its imprecise demesne, a certain precision of its own. There are three ways in which this is accomplished, all of which prefigure succeeding stages of my argument, so let it be understood that I will develop them further later on. First, Hester points out that figurative language "accepts all data on an equal footing." The hierarchies of symptoms and criteria (note: see the Wenerberg quote, p. 9) that obtain in the rule-governed part of language do not apply here; an umbrella and a sewing machine can very well come together and miscegenate on an operating table. When a particular metaphor compares A and B,
A and B can be as different as night and day. In fact, a difference of that magnitude would be pitifully tame in the realm of metaphor.

Second, Weller Embler makes the point that symbols are more exact than words. (Here the reader will have to take it on faith for the moment that symbols are somehow part of metaphor). He writes that "we may say that freedom is slavery, but we may not use the image of a seagull in full career as an emblem of imprisonment." The key notion here is that figurative language has its own logic. The terms of its accuracy, its appropriateness and its beauty are judged by criteria that are not those which judge discursive language.

Finally, Scott Buchanan and Martin Foss, working separately, reach the point where they can profitably relate poetry and mathematics. If figurative language admits all data on an equal footing, these data can be seen to function as numbers do in mathematics. In other words, the poetic area of language licenses any juxtaposition of words, so that words come to have enormous latent possibilities of union, just as a number "has as its intrinsic principle the capacity of stretching beyond itself and uniting with others, tending toward a sum."
CHAPTER TWO

WHAT IS METAPHOR EXACTLY?

Equivocal Reference

It is imperative to stop at this point and define metaphor provisionally, to get down some kind of skeletal description which can be fleshed out and clothed in succeeding paragraphs. To begin with, I would like to differentiate metaphor-the-trope from the sense of 'metaphor' that means "figurative language in general." To avoid confusion, I will use a capital "M" whenever I intend the latter sense.

Aristotle's classic quadripartite definition, for example, concerns capital-"M" Metaphor. Small-"m" metaphor, the narrow sense, comes unremarked in the third and fourth sub-categories of his definition. (He did not explicitly make a distinction between Metaphor and metaphor). His typology lists these tropes: (a) trope in which a genus is compared with its species, (b) trope in which a species is compared with one of its genera, (c) trope in which a species is compared with another species, and (d) a trope that makes an analogy. Types (a) and (b) are metonymy and synecdoche respectively, whose workings are relatively ingenuous next to the kind of prodigiousness that metaphor is capable of. The scope of this paper, therefore, will not include them.
The narrow sense of the term, small-"m" metaphor, refers to a particular figure of speech, so that individual instances of this usage are often found prefaced with "the" or "a." Simpler, less masterful metaphors are those that Aristotle describes as being species-to-species comparisons. As Henle explains, they remark "mere qualitative similarity between two characteristics of the same thing." As an illustration, Henle gives the act of referring to a sly person as an "old fox." (Some writers refer to this type of metaphor as elided simile since it is a simple comparison stated implicitly with the copula).

Metaphors involving analogy (with which this study is exclusively concerned) comprise a linguistic phenomenon worthy of investigation. They are the virtuosos of the tropes, and are capable, within the compass of a few words, of great cognitive coups and intellectual bouleversements. Henle characterizes analogical metaphors as those that present two distinct situations, with one understood in terms of the other. His example, from Keats, is

When by my solitary hearth I sit,
And hateful thoughts enwrap my soul in gloom,...

where the poet develops "hateful thoughts" in terms of a cloak or blanket. This is done right under the reader's nose. Yet I.A. Richards has remarked on the "surreptitious"
nature of such a metaphor, because (a) it is in no way syntactically deviant, and (b) the mechanics of its are quite subtle. Cloaks or blankets are not even mentioned, enabling a conceptual dislodgement$^{23}$ to be perpetrated like a feat of legerdemain. Metaphors of this type fairly reverberate with the tension of their stereoscopic$^{24}$ achievement, of which more later. (Note: See Chapter Five).

W.H. Leatherdale observed that the juxtaposition of two situations in a metaphor is essentially a mixing of contexts,$^{25}$ a notion that seems very reasonable in light of the field of connotations (family resemblances) that each term brings with it. What the metaphor does is to select the relevant aspects$^{26}$ of the two terms being compared, so that two vast and multiplex ideas are momentarily wedded* at one point. A Venn diagram would schematically capture this tangential meeting:

![Venn Diagram]

The Basis for a Metaphor

Thus, when a poet exalts the roses in his lady's cheeks; roses are being understood in their "fragrance, pinkness

*One writer calls the encounter a "glancing osculation."$^{27}$
and softness;" their thorniness, leafiness and yellowness are decidedly not relevant aspects.

Imagery, then, is a part of metaphor, though just how much of it is purely visual is a bone of contention among philosophers, as Wilkinson has demonstrated. The selection of relevant aspects to be compared seems to hone the vague and undifferentiated mental image, like the metamorphic tree of page (2). While most writers on metaphor prefer to suppress intimations that its imagistic part is visual, Marcus Hester believes that even a simple comparison like 'I wandered lonely as a cloud' has a quasi-visual element. He says that "one has to see the poet's wandering as a cloud's journey." He goes on to show that seeing-as is an ability that is to literature as ordinary seeing is to the natural world, something that one has to be fitted out with to make one's way. A lack of the commodity--like a tin ear in music--he calls "aspect blindness."

There is good sense in this view of Hester's, since, as Leonard Angel has shown in his "Transformational Analysis of Metaphor," metaphors are rarely marked by special (or deviant) syntax. Rather, they are recognized only by their literal falseness. That is, if a phrase does not seem to read right, unless it is intentionally absurd, one can be fairly sure that it is a metaphor, and is not to be decoded
literally by the reader. A figurative reading means, too, that the metaphor is to be judged on its own grounds and is not to be verified externally.

In this way, the onus is on the reader of literature to discover the metaphors that are bivouacked in the literal language and to mobilize his seeing-as faculty for their apprehension.* Astuteness on his part is a prerequisite, because as Leatherdale rightly points out, "analogical acts by their nature are not likely to be concerned with obvious resemblances." 32

This brings me directly to the position that there are good and bad metaphors. In fact, the less obvious the resemblances that are brought to light, the more masterful and "better" the metaphor. Metaphors that are based on a term's staple connotations (leafiness, shadiness and tallness of 'tree,' for instance) will be lacklustre in comparison with those that exploit its more recherché senses. The former metaphors seem bland and dangerously near-literal—'moon peeping from behind a cloud' is the example given by Beardsley. 33 Good metaphors, on the other hand, seem to say more about their objects and to say it more precisely: Beardsley gives 'inconstant moon' as an example. What is more, the more "surreptitious" the analogical coup, the better the metaphor, writes Christine Brooke-Rose, 34 who submits as exemplary Shakespeare's metaphor 'Thy lustre thickens'

* stalking the wily metaphor?
and Dylan Thomas's 'The wagging clock.' She sees them as especially effective because they transfer meaning from one sphere to another swiftly, completely and with the poet's agency nowhere in evidence.

Metaphors themselves can be viewed as ephemera whose lives have three stages. In the first stage, they shock with their unconventionality. The double-barrelled image, so baldly stated, smarts with newness. (The word 'skyscraper,' when it was first used, had this effect.) Second, they are accepted, and the comparison has a momentary triumph. The difference in kind which they present (like Descartes' body-machine analogy) is bandied about and gloried in. Moribundity is the third stage, where the image's freshness fades from a difference in kind to one of degree. One might, for instance, hear that "the body is merely a machine." Descartes' figure here is at a low ebb, void of all shock value.  

Henle explains a metaphor's slow death in this way:

...where metaphor is used to extend language [e.g. 'skyscraper'], the disappearance of the primary clash of senses produces a literal sense [as in 'table-leg']. In metaphors of the more poetic type, something of the same sort may go on, resulting in a well-established figurative sense of a term and a trite metaphor. (36)
CHAPTER THREE

METAPHOR SEEN AS UNORTHODOX PLAY WITHIN THE SYSTEM

Northrop Frye has written that "we have no real standards to distinguish a verbal structure that is literary from one that is not." I can be less diffident about the matter, I think, by employing Hester's appealing analogy of the tennis-serve. For in language, as in tennis, there is a certain area—the literary or poetic—where no obligatory rules obtain. Lack of rules, as was noted earlier, almost invites wild abandon in the use of a system. The rules of language, like those of most systems, are floutable, rife with loopholes and Catch-22's. Their very existence implicitly condones unorthodox play by anyone who would use them creatively. As Wheelwright put it, literal language is a "must," while Metaphor is a "can" and a "may." The loopholes in language rules—whether these rules be conceived as prescriptive, structural or generative entities—form a haven for figurative language. On the one hand, the rules of language have no jurisdiction over word choice in metaphor, but on the other, metaphorical structures rarely violate the rules of syntax.

The inviolability of the freedom that language affords in its literary sphere is analogous to the freedom that characterizes dreams and jokes. Writing on humour, Freud showed that though life is supposed to be serious
business, dreams and jokes exist to give vent to our fancy.
In dreams, images and situations happily run riot, and the
joke is a similar kind of sanctum, where word-play can be
indulged without fear of "being done away by criticism."\(^{39}\)
Metaphor can be added to the dream and joke phenomena as
another free-zone of human existence, a pocket in language
use where outrageousness in encouraged without fear of reprisals.

Brooke-Rose acknowledges this poetic fiat when she
says, "Poetically, anything may be called any number of
different things."\(^{40}\) There is pleasure to be had in such
unorthodox play, and it is a temptation not to try for
grandiose effects when playing with words. Kenneth Burke
says, for instance, that "one might, without 'demoralization,'
even bring things to a point where, in effect, terms for the
loathesome could be applied to a most admirable person,
and vice versa." With insight that is truly wonderful,
Burke goes on to show that Christ, in his Sermon on the
Mount, was past master of this sort of licensed trans-
substantiation:

He offers a basic conversion concept for a
total transvaluation of values whereby the
signs of poverty were reinterpreted as the
signs of wealth, the signs of hunger as the
signs of fullness, and present weeping was
characterized unmistakably as the first symptom
of subsequent delight.\(^{41}\)
Conceptual dislodgement, then, is highly valued in literature even as it is under opprobrium in plain speech. Samuel Levin, who took on the thankless and fruitless task of writing a grammar for poetry had to admit that poetry can and must frustrate the reader's expectations. (The constant surprises in poetry make it impossible to write a predictive grammar). It is this foiling of expectations that saves poetry from the predictability of advertising jingles, in fact.

The existence of a systematic and rule-governed everyday language is what makes poetry possible, as Owen Thomas noted when he wrote, "...if there were no system, if language were merely chaotic, then there could be no novelty." Thomas goes on to show that Metaphor is, in fact, a deliberate flouting of language rules, an intentional violation of the system. Such violations take two forms, that of formal violation ("paradigmatic" error, in Levin's terminology) and contextual "mistakes" ("syntagmatic.") Formal violation is the stock-in-trade of Metaphor, and involves the deliberate disregarding of a noun's taxonomic features. Thus, a noun that is marked [animate] may be treated as if it were animate in poetry. The violation created is masked by the fact that the metaphor otherwise looks like a literal statement of the form "A is B," which makes the intentional misuse all the more jarring. Thomas gives as
an example Emily Dickinson's figure 'Shame is the Shawl of Pink.' (The nature of the comparison is, again, tangential; that is, shame is like a shawl only in one of its aspects—its enveloping aspect—and its other features are passed over. He gives for comparison the literal sentence 'John Jones is a fisherman,' where transference is complete..."'John Jones' presumably has all the features of 'fisherman.'")

Deliberate contextual violation, on the other hand, is "a more subtle way of transferring incompatible features. e.e. cummings' line 'He sang his didn't and he danced his did' shows two degrees of Levin's contextual violation. In the first place, 'sang' and 'danced' are used transitively where intransitive use is much more common. Thomas characterizes this as a "violation of sub-category features." The intrusion of the words 'didn't' and 'did' is altogether more flagrant, and he considers it to violate major-category features. The poet, in effect, forsakes the paradigms of admissible words for the two direct-object slots, and chooses words from a totally different paradigm. Although disregard for conventional language-rules is abundant here, Thomas insists that "contextual violation is closer to complete grammaticality than formal violation."

The cummings line does in fact scan very well.

Small-'m' metaphor, then, is a great exploiter of existing linguistic structures. Formal violations allow
it to expand phenomenally the types of nominals that can flank the verb "to be," so that the formula "A is B" comes to have an infinite number of possible realizations. Contextual violations, in that they can occur anywhere in the fabric of language, admit an even greater amount of novelty.

I.A. Richards tried to correct the view that figurative language, because of the way it violates rules, is a "deviant" case of language use. He suggested that plain speech could equally well be viewed as deviant and Metaphor as the standard. (There is always such a chicken-and-egg paradox present when the relation of the literal and the figurative are considered. For although I suggested on page (11) that Metaphor takes up the slack in literal language, the reverse could be argued convincingly, too). But I prefer the idea that Metaphor is a sort of protectorate within language where unorthodox conduct is permissible, if only for the reason that original metaphors in the first and second phases of their life-cycle are rare in speech, and speech is the linguist's main concern. The novel metaphor resides in literature, which is, after all, a special instance of language use, one where words are plastic and malleable for the cause of art. Given figurative and literal meaning, if one can be viewed as an epiphenomenon of the other, it is to the linguist's advantage to view the literal as primary and the metaphoric as secondary. I do not mean to suggest that this is anything more than expedient, however.
Discursive language is a given system. Burke shows that one can attempt unorthodox play within the system by practising either fusion ("the methodic merger of particles that had been considered mutually exclusive") or fission ("the methodic blasting apart of verbal particles that had been considered inseparable.") Metaphor delights in fusion, but Brooke-Rose shows that it is also capable of fission. In her exhaustive typology of the different grammatical shapes metaphors can take, she isolates a type which she calls Pure Attribution. A Pure Attribution metaphor "expresses a somewhat artificial split of one idea into two terms which are basically identical." Thus, a metaphor like 'the eyes of the heart' does not imply that the heart has eyes, but that it is eyes, eyes and heart being two manifestations of a generalized seeing ability. As noted earlier, the two terms of the metaphor are sufficiently different that a literal reading would produce an absurdity.

Metaphors of fusion far outnumber those of fission and succeed in merging mutually exclusive particles, a phenomenon British linguists have named Collocation. Their notion is that words like 'white' and 'snow' have a high probability of collocation. Since their goal is to frustrate the expectations, poets tend to merge words whose collocation potential is low, like 'pugilist' and 'bicycle.' With short, commonly used words, the probity of poets is disarming, as Embler points out:
Poets seldom...use such words as 'high,' 'low,' 'up,' 'down,' 'small,' 'strong,' 'weak,' etc. in the metaphorical senses we have been discussing. They mostly use these words only in their literal sense, as though that were the only proper way to use them; as metaphors they are either too vague or empty or uncommunicative on the poetic level. Indeed, the poet's strength comes from his very careful and exact use of the literal and concrete meanings of words...(48)

Collocation potential can, in addition, be viewed as a continuum, with some forms more "normal" and others more "deviant." An example is the array

- broad smile
- free smile
- damp smile
- high smile

where 'broad smile' represents the most normal collocation and 'high smile' the most deviant.

This chapter about unorthodox play has finally to ask the question, "Is there any play with language that is too unorthodox?" I think not. For provided a metaphor conforms to the syntactic rules of a language, whatever two concepts it chooses to collocate are admissible. That is, any nominal-copula-nominal construction is allowed once it is known to be a metaphor.

The writers I examined did not recognize this, but rather believed that there was some sort of a cut-off point at which metaphors ceased to be acceptable and became preposterous. Thomas, for instance, cited 'The Grand Canyon is a saxophone' as a preposterous metaphor, and felt it to be outré because the basis for the analogy made is very slight. It ought to be pointed out, however, that
there is always some basis for comparing two things, even if, as in this case, all that immediately meets the eye is that the things are [-animate]. In metaphor, this is enough. Any writer who feels there to be such a similarity can instantly create a context in which a seemingly preposterous comparison becomes plausible.

Other authors expressed fears that metaphor could go too far, but these fears can also be dismissed as bogus. Hester suggested that metaphor could possible license "free association," but he added that "only an extremely vague or nonsense metaphor will allow free association." According to my argument, a metaphor is only vague when the surrounding context is inadequate to support it. Given an appropriately rich context, no metaphor is nonsensical.
I have made the claim that figurative language and dreams have something in common in being preserves from the meat-and-potatoes world where life is serious business. I have argued that the dream, the metaphor and the joke lend legitimacy to behaviour that is not rule-governed. Whatever is not acceptable in the "real" world is protected, from criticism there, as Freud wrote. So if society is kept in line by the time-space continuum, dreams and jokes are like warps where there is neither time nor space. It follows that dream and joke logic is something unto itself and is not the temporal, spatial logic of quotidian reality. (Think of the frequent unexplained changes of scene that occur in dreams abruptly or even violently while the action placidly continues to unroll). Metaphor is a similar protectorate—not strictly from the time-space continuum, but from the inexorable workings of language—a mechanism which is normally as predictable as clockwork. For generative theory has shown that there is nothing arcane about language; its universality is attributable to the fact that it operates by rule. Even if the transformational model of language does not duplicate the workings of the brain, it is so explanatory of the process of speaking that it might as well be the truth. (In the same way, sound is
more than adequately visualizable in terms of vibrations. Though sound is in fact not a matter of vibrations, the metaphor commonly used is so compelling that it supplants the reality.  

Granted, metaphors and jokes are more language-bound than dreams, but it must be remembered that reality is like an undifferentiated bolus of experience; the linguistic experience cannot be cleanly winnowed out from the non-linguistic. As I quoted Terence Hawkes earlier, it must be remembered that "language and experience" are "fundamentally implicated with each other to an extent that makes it difficult to consider them as separate entities." Also, Edward Sapir has said that reality is "saturated with verbalism." I adduce this evidence to claim that what is true for dreams (that is, suspension of the time-space continuum) can very well be true for metaphors, even though dreams are primarily visual and metaphors primarily verbal. For one thing, the dream is not entirely a matter of imagery. It is verbal as well, with dream words or sentences being every bit as skewed from the Normal as the visual imagery is.

By the same token, then, I submit that in Metaphor the time-space continuum is as dysfunctional as it is in dreams and jokes, and that a metaphor in this sense works like a dream. A metaphor's logic need not be a linear progression from A to B to C, but is rather a random dip
into a "stream of experience which is undifferentiated as to whether its contents are perceived or imagined, fact or fancy."\(^{53}\) (This calls back to mind the statement that in metaphorical language, all data are accepted on an equal footing).

Northrop Frye understood that the language of poetry resembled the dream in more ways than one, that there is more there than invulnerability to criticism. He described the poem as a "rounded sensuous object...having sound-links, ambiguous sense-links and memory-links very much like that of the dream."\(^{54}\) Whether one deals with poems, with figurative language in general or with small-"m" metaphor, the sensuous roundness, sound-links, sense-links and memory-links so glibly enumerated are worlds of significance in themselves. I will discuss the items separately and at greater length.

"Rounded Sensuous Object": Although the purpose of language is communication, communication is not the avowed primary goal of Metaphor. It is plain speech (or, discursive language) that tells person X what person Y had for breakfast this morning, and the utterance—the Communication—is dead as soon as spoke. As Valéry has written, "literal language is happy to die after its sense is transmitted."\(^{55}\)

Metaphor, on the other hand, is slower to die. Since it is a more "artistic" use of language, with a
component of imagery ("sensuous") and even of symbolism, it is three-dimensional ("rounded") and lives on. So although Metaphor communicates, the meaning it packs is different from that of plain speech, being a more personal sort of super-charged meaning.

Sound-links: The sound links in figurative language are a function of the freedom of word-selection that is allowed in the poetic protectorate. Language can be used much more capriciously when one is speaking figuratively, and the sounds of the words themselves can be delighted in and played with. (One thinks of Henry Miller in this regard, and his delight in words like 'organza' and 'bombazine'. Strictly speaking, the words describe women's dress-yardage, but to him they sound orgiastic and bombastic). Sound can even be more important than sense in the word-selection. What results is, of course, not strict literal meaning, but clearly, literal meaning is not what is wanted in Metaphor.

Ambiguous Sense-Links: The links in a metaphor's sense—its logic, that is—are ambiguous for several reasons. In the first place, metaphors compare two things or situations that are only dimly felt to be similar. Often the points of likeness are precipitously narrow (as in Thomas's "preposterous" metaphor) and the figure threatens
to topple from sheer tenuousness. The basis for felt similarity can be highly personal, residing in one person's private code of experience. Douglas Berggren noted this privateness of the individual experience when he wrote about the "personal image of a given poet or artist," citing the elongated figures of El Greco as an example of the particularized form an artist's expression may take. (I would add the death-bias of Sylvia Plath as a literary example. In her poetry and her prose, she saw even the most life-imbued reality as hopelessly deathly).

But even as the "vividly streaming present" that each writer interrogates is particularized, so is it general—there is "collective unconscious," as Jung has shown. The readers of the world always have some ground on which to interpret what its authors write. For collective experience has a communality that is hard to gainsay; however different our individual lives, we manage to understand each other. Rarely is a writer so abstruse that his meaning cannot be grasped, and even if Plath's vision is not shared by her readership, they understand it vividly enough.

Sense-links in Metaphor are also ambiguous because the analogy being made involves a leap from one sphere of phenomena to another, and an intuitive leap at that. Leatherdale describes the sudden flash of insight that
constitutes the analogical act, and he quotes the Duke of Wellington, who wrote:

There is a strange thing one sometimes notices; when one is in the process of considering a question, a whole series of ideas comes to the mind in a flash: you perceive them all but it might take two hours to put on paper all that crossed your mind in one instant. (.57)

This sort of flash insight has an element of intuition in it that places it beyond the sphere of simple scientific method; it is the fabled moment of Archimedes in his bath or Newton and the apple. Since the intuitive leap really comes into its own in scientific metaphors, I will treat it further later when I present the cognitive aspects of Metaphor. However, the analogical act does characterize literary metaphor, too, because to describe one situation in terms of another in the subtle elided form of a metaphor involves a certain jump. Burke noted this when he wrote, "Indeed, the metaphor always has about it precisely this revealing of hitherto unexpected connections which one may notice in the progressions of a dream." 58

Metaphor, therefore, has a sort of economy about it similar to that which Freud found characterized dreams. Accordingly, it has an air of being pre-digested, in that it is the written record of one person's analogical leaps --the writer's. In order to understand a metaphor's aptness, the reader is forced to sort out the jumps that
have been made by working back in reverse order from the \textit{fait accompli} of the finished metaphor to the original insight. (Leonard Angel calls the process "unpacking a metaphor.") The way in which a reader unravels a writer's meaning has been beautifully described by Kenneth Burke:

To make us weep contentedly at the final reunion of brother and sister, the poet hangs telltale lockets about the necks of the little waifs lost in Chapter One. When reading we accept the final reunion as the logical conclusion of the telltale lockets planted in Chapter One—but the order was exactly the reverse, the lockets in Chapter One being the logical consequence of the reunion in chapter last. (60)

\textbf{Memory-Links:} The memory-links in poetry can naturally involve either personal/individual or tribal/collective memory. Berggren, though, has described a more elaborate typology in five levels of poetry's memory-content. His scheme can be visualized as five concentric circles arranged according to comprehensiveness. The innermost circle he calls the "presiding schema of a poem." It is equivalent to one item of a particular poet's vocabulary, like the word 'angel' in Rilke. The second circle is the "personal image of a given poet or artist," which has already been mentioned; this level corresponds to the whole of a poet's vocabulary or diction. Next is the "schema that achieves ancestral vitality," for which he gives the journey—in Dante, in Cervantes, in Kafka, etc.—as an example. This
level is that of the pervasive leitmotiv. Fourth is the "schema whose cultural range extends outside the literary tradition," as, for example, Biblical symbols, and fifth are archetypes, whose import is transcultural. For examples of these, Berggren gives blood, water, light/darkness and up/down.

Before presenting the foregoing taxonomy, Berggren offered the insight that the poetic schema whose five subtypes he was about to delineate is "a visualizable phenomenon which serves as a vehicle for expressing something about the inner life of man, or non-spatial reality in general." I find this insight particularly appealing in that it corroborates the argument advanced earlier, where I claimed that metaphorical language has a sort of precise imprecision, a controlled vagueness, well suited to the subtly shaded world it describes. Berggren's thought substantiates my point, because if poetic language is to describe "the inner life of man ...non-spatial reality," it must necessarily be dithyrambic and non-linear in its progress. There is evidence of the same line of thought in The Meaning of Poetic Metaphor, where Hester posits on the part of the reader of literature a "suspension of judgments of perception and value." What he is recommending, in other words, is a sort of wide-open credulous stance (Husserl called it "epoche") for one to adopt, the better to follow and be receptive
to the dithyrambic, non-spatial logic of Metaphor. He goes on to say that the residuum of the process is consciousness. As the reader unpacks the writer's meaning, he is to think blindly through his unconscious mind. What better way is there to decode the faits accomplis of another's unconscious, and what better route to understanding literature?
CHAPTER FIVE

METAPHORIC TENSION

All analogical metaphors can be conceived of as having two parts, a tenor and a vehicle. (I.A. Richards is the source of the terminology.) There is a main idea, the tenor, which is being expressed in terms of a secondary idea, the vehicle. Hence Stanford's expression "stereoscopic vision," which first appeared on page (15), is a particularly appropriate description of metaphor's operation.

In The Meaning of Poetic Metaphor, Marcus Hester produces at one point an extended metaphor from Shakespeare, one in which the tenor Time is conceptualized in terms of a beggar, the vehicle.

Time hath, my lord, a wallet at his back
Wherein he put alms for oblivion
A great-sized monster of ingratitude.
Those scraps are good deeds past,
which are devoured
As fast as they are made, forgot as soon
As done. (63)

This excellent metaphor prompts me to make several observations on metaphorical tenor and vehicle.

Distance. Hester has pointed out that there is great conceptual distance between tenor and vehicle in Shakespeare's figure. For Time is an entity so abstract that it would scarcely exist in the minds of men if there
were not a name for it. (As Benjamin Lee Whorf has intimated, time is perceived differently from culture to culture depending on the nature and complexity of the tense system in each language-family. Time-conceptions can be seen to vary from the highly segmented western version, manifest in datebooks, calendars, itineraries, etc. to the purportedly more holistic and integrated time-notion of the American Indians of the southwest). A beggar, on the other hand, presents quite a fleshly reality, the noun conjuring up staple connotations of poverty, tattered clothes and outstretched hands as minimum defining criteria. However, in that time is classically equated with a doddering greybeard in the western mind, Shakespeare's metaphor does not attempt anything too recherché. Instead, it merely firms up the existing stock metaphor, which in its moribundity was losing the tension of its original impact.

With this, we strike the mother lode of the tenor-and-vehicle conception: namely, that the interaction of tenor and vehicle produces tension. New metaphors—those at the height of their life-span—vibrate almost palpably from the tension inherent in two simultaneous perspectives. (For instance, as noted, several writers have commented on the galvanic effect the word 'skyscraper' had on them when
they first heard it as children. The idea of the Empire State Building scratching at the heavens was then almost too apt for words). The fact that metaphors lose their shock value while we gradually become inured to their charm is a result of the slackening of tension between tenor and vehicle: the idea of a skyscraper becomes commonplace and unremarkable. (This may actually have to do with the fact that the skyscraper phenomenon itself has become hypostatized. Once extra-tall buildings fail to shock, so too their descriptive label begins to pall).

Abstraction versus Detail. Another observation of Hester's is that in Shakespeare's metaphor the tenor Time remains abstract and vague. It is the vehicle "beggar" which bears the brunt of the imagistic fullness. The poet develops the idea of time as wilful and rapacious in successive phrases, going from the notion of "oblivion" to one of a "monster of ingratitude" to that of devouring. This is, in fact, an instance of poetic fission such as Christine Brooke-Rose noted in 'the eyes of the heart.' What Shakespeare undertakes is to take the conceit of time as beggar and ream it out in all possible ways. The ensuing bombardment of images, each only slightly different from the next, is what makes the metaphor so rich.
Economy. I stated earlier that metaphors, like dreams, are economical. The tenor-vehicle notion explains how analogical metaphor comes to be a highly economical mode of expression. Instead of describing time and then describing a beggar and pointing out the similarities between them, the metaphor subsumes the two descriptions into one super-charged capsule. It does this by describing its tenor wholly in the vocabulary of its vehicle, an arrangement as neat as it is elliptical. Karl Uitti noted this feat when he wrote, "Through metaphor the dynamic relationships in nature may be conceived and conveyed in discourse with the smallest deformation..."66

Creative Defining Ability. There is, then, something inalienably creative about metaphor. When Shakespeare gives us the ready-made (earlier I used the term 'pre-digested') figure of time-as-a-beggar, we are being presented with a new perspective on time, with a new bit of wisdom or intelligence. Some writers argue that the writer thus defines similarity for us, (e.g. Hester: "seeing-as defines similarity, not vice versa."67), while others more prudently think that the similarities between tenor and vehicle exist all along and that the writer, with his extra-sensitive palps, merely foregrounds* them in our

* a term of Jan Mukarovsky's used to mean 'de-automatize' or 'make conscious' in this connection.
consciousness. Naturally, the greater the conceptual distinctness of tenor and vehicle, the more prodigious the achievement, because "only a trite metaphor yokes a tenor and vehicle which we all know to be similar." Hester is very astute in stating this defining capability of metaphor (his 'seeing-as' notion) and in comparing it against ordinary perceptual seeing: "The metaphor states the aspects and the problem is to see the common form, while in visual seeing-as, the common element is given and the problem is to see the aspects."

W.H. Leatherdale, who has written about the role of metaphor in science, takes cognizance of the creative possibilities of metaphor in defining similarities and altering perspectives. It is really only this aspect which interests him, indeed, since the emotive or "textural" side, so considerable in literature, is irrelevant in science. He has the highest appreciation of metaphor's ability to define, as shown in this sentence: "Sometimes the topic analogue [the tenor] can hardly be said to exist before it is, as it were, pulled together by the imported analogue [vehicle]."

His exposition of figurative thought's counterpart in science—something he terms the analogical act—is useful for the discussion here. He says that a scientist is familiar with a certain area of phenomena and with all its
attendant concepts, theories and instances. The whole of it is so well known to him that if he focusses on one aspect, the rest is still floating in his consciousness, out of focus but constantly accessible if needed. Suddenly, he sees the field of phenomena in a new way, which strikingly reorganizes it. Either the entities under consideration are different somehow than he thought, or they are related differently than he thought, or they are amenable to different mathematical techniques than he previously supposed applicable. Whichever is the case, he imposes his flash insight (sometimes so masterful as to be an "epoch-making great stroke of synthesis," 71) on the original field of phenomena. Leatherdale also maintains that the more complex the topic analogue is, the more impressive the scientist's analogical act. He adds that

...the topic analogue is itself an amorphous entity, ever growing and changing, sometimes crystallizing out only to dissolve again under the pressure of discordant facts drawn from other areas of the topic analogue. Imported analogues breed and interbreed with each other. (72)

Terence Hawkes has put forward the important insight that the unit of tenor-plus-vehicle is greater than the sum of its parts. That is, the tenor and vehicle seem to rub their significance off on each other, giving the resulting image almost an overabundance of meaning. He gives an
example from Matthew Arnold, a metaphor that compares the individual in society to an island in the sea:

Yes: in the sea of life enisl'd
With echoing straits between us thrown,
Dotting the shoreless watery wild,
We mortals live alone. (73)

Indeed, there is a richness here exceeding both islands at sea or individuals in society. Philip Wheelwright also has an example, this time from *Hamlet*, to prove the same point.

Nay, but to live
In the rank sweat of an enseamed bed
Stew'd in corruption, honeying and making love
Over the nasty sty. (74)

He is right: the whole has fields of implication in it greater than the parts, which at face value make an odd compote of honey, stew and rank sweat.

In addition to this point about the tenor-vehicle unit being greater than the sum of its parts, another useful insight about metaphoric tension is found in Wheelwright. He explains that there are three ways in which tenors are paired with vehicles. All three are processes of language, though the third, epitomized by metaphor, is by far the most creative. In the case of *passive habituation*, an utterance or vehicle is accidentally paired with a thought. For example, the statement "I felt awfully bad about what happened" points "without enforced exactitude" to a feeling. The vagueness inherent in such statements is
what recalls Hulme's remark that plain speech is inaccurate. At another level, there is the case of stipulation, where a sign is paired with a signified within a culture, and the pairing "is achieved and maintained by fiat." Wheelwright feels that the symbols that occur in ordinary language are of this second rank: an example would be the image of time as an old man. The third type of vehicle-tenor relationship is that which is created through the imagination, like the linking of "beggar" with time. These Wheelwright calls the "depth-symbols" of language.

In Black's view, the vehicle acts as a filter for the tenor: "it selects, emphasizes, suppresses and organizes [cf. Leatherdale's comment, page (40)] features of the principal subject by implying statements about it that normally apply to the subsidiary subject." In this way, one can describe a battle in the vocabulary of a game of chess. Chess then acts as a filter to organize the manifold topic of warfare into an understandable complex of strategems, checkmates, etc.

According to Paul Henle, this filtering relationship is highly creative in net effect. Every analogical metaphor does two things: on one hand, it remarks on an antecedent resemblance between things and on the other, it induces a further resemblance of its own. Metaphor, in other words, has a defining capability, expressed by Hawkes in this
fashion: "the act of unifying, of inculcated 'sameness' which is metaphor's stock-in-trade, both stimulates and manifests the imagination." Apropos of the same idea, he quotes Coleridge as writing: "You feel him [Shakespeare] to be a poet inasmuch as for a time he has made you one—an active creative being." As a reader, one is made aware of new resemblances, not to mention new relationships and realities, (the much-vaunted broadened horizons that reading is said to produce).

It is essential to remember, though, that however happy the marriage of the two components, tenor and vehicle always remain conceptually distinct. They must do so if there is to be tension for the metaphor's continued vibration. "Conceptual distinctness" means, of course, that the two things are in different linguistic and cognitive areas. To mate them, one crosses sorts, in Turbayne's terminology. But for the match to be felicitous, the tenor and the vehicle must be only a certain distance apart and no further; too vast a difference is characterized by Turbayne as sort-trespassing; the resultant tenuous metaphor will need much bolstering from context in order to be effective. In a good match, then, with topic and imported analogues just the right distance apart, the sum comes out to greater than the parts. For instance, one can speak of 'rubber joy,' a 'rubber melody,' or a 'rubber soul' and the word 'rubber' adds something to our understanding of melodies, souls, and
joy. On the other hand, 'rubber cube root' could be conceived a sort-trespassing because the apposition of rubber does nothing to inform our perspective on cube roots.

Geoffrey Leech, however, notes that the superimposition of two perspectives results in a sort of vagueness (different from vagueness in discursive language), both as to the grounds of comparison and the things compared. This, I think, has to be admitted. In the first place, we have seen how a conceit like 'the roses of her cheeks' does not actually specify whether the lady's cheeks are pink and soft or yellow and thorny. The basis for the comparison is left to the reader to work out. Moreover, there may be doubt as to what is being compared with what. As an example, Leech gives four possible readings for 'this sea that bares her bosom to the moon,' namely:

1. The sea reflects the image of the moon.
2. The sea is spread out underneath the moon.
3. The sea is made visible by the moon.
4. The sea is tidally affected by the moon.

Like many a student of literature, he has glossed over the poet's meaning, which is near-literal, and advanced all kinds of fanciful unravellings for the image. In any case, such ambiguity is admirably suited to literature (less so to science), where the reader can spin out an ambiguous image along multiple lines, so that the cumulative effect is a beautifully-textured fabric rich in significance.
Metaphor can additionally be conceived in terms of two other sets of paired forces, analogous in their tension-producing impact to tenor/vehicle. Wheelwright, who has been so astute on the subject of tension, defines a type of turgor arising from the interaction of what he calls "epiphor" and "diaphor." Epiphor is the sort of outreach and extension of meaning through comparison that was hinted at in the term 'induced content.' In other words, "metaphors are contagious. They tend to implicate wider and wider contexts in their semantic plentitude of implication." Diaphor, on the other hand, is "a type of inward focus, an internal juxtaposition of qualities which gives the poem the concrete status of a presented object." (This quality has been prefigured by my use of the terms 'pre-digested,' 'fait accompli,' and 'antecedent resemblance.') The interaction of the two forces keeps metaphor afloat, since one is centripetal in effect and the other centrifugal. The effect is the linguistic equivalent of the forces that keep a planet in its orbit, as Burke has suggested. Or alternatively, the forces can be visualized as "inseparable as the convex and concave sides of a single geometric curve." Another expression of the duality in metaphor is captured by the terms "concrete/universal." Although the words seem paradoxical and self-cancelling, elements of concreteness and universality can be seen to co-exist in metaphor. For instance, Hester points out that Shakespeare's
character Falstaff has both particular fullness of detail and universal significance at the same time. So concreteness corresponds to diaphor, or the particularizing tendency. This Wheelwright has styled as a writer's "confrontative imagination"—his ability to particularize and intensify his object and thus get at its quiddity. "[Poetry] evokes something of the very quality, tone and flavor of the concrete...with a directness and a full experiential relevance that [plain speech] cannot do." There is a corresponding tendency to universalize that is embodied in a writer's "archetypal imagination," his ability to see reality as symbolic. (Wheelwright sees Goethe as being past master of the art, with the "depth dimension" stronger in Faust than in Egmont, more insistent in Faust Part II than Faust Part I). Hawkes summarizes by saying that "all good poetry contains a feeling of generalization from a case which has been presented definitely." A case in point would be William Carlos Williams' poem

If the Muses
Choose the young ewe
You shall receive
A stall-fed lamb
As your reward
But if
They prefer the lamb
You shall have the ewe for
Second prize. (89)
It is obvious that the "semantic plenitude of implication" here is wider and more general than the particular fold where muses and stall-fed lambs are sequestered.

With this, I think that I have stated the case for the dualities that most writers see as participating in Metaphor. The yin-yang two-pronged approach is one that is highly explanatory of nearly any phenomenon. (Witness Jakobson's binary system of phonological features). As Ernest Jones has noted, it was a device that was used exhaustively by Freud in his work.

Most students of Freud have been struck by what has been called his obstinate dualism. Running all through his work there is what Heinz Hartmann has called 'a very characteristic kind of dialectical thinking that tends to base theories on the interaction of two opposite powers.' This was, of course most pronounced in his basic classifications: love-hunger; ego-sexuality; auto-eroticism-hetero-eroticism; Eros-Thanatos; life-death, and so on. It is as if Freud had a difficulty in contemplating any topic unless he could divide it into two opposites, and never more than two. (90)
CHAPTER SIX

THE ROLE OF IMAGERY

I have already suggested that Metaphor amounts to an "artistic" use of language, one where words are not used for ordinary communications of a factual nature. No, instead words are used by a poet the same way a sculptor uses marble or a painter uses paint. Each of these artists aims to immortalize his material: the painter must paint pictures and not houses, the sculptor sculpt Pietàs and not coffee tables and the poet write, not speak. Valéry recognized just how conscious this immortalizing tendency is when he wrote that "Poetry implies a decision to change the function of language."91 'Decision' is the key word here. Hester formulated the same statement in slightly less aphoristic fashion: "In poetry, there is the particular problem of transforming the normal, practical function of language into a presentational symbol."92

By what processes do the words that serve so stalwartly in ordinary speech become presentational? As shown in Chapter One, words were originally applied to things or ideas arbitrarily, so that what results is a language that is au fond nothing more than a set of conventions. To make this random set of bywords in any way presentational in impact, pattern must somehow be imposed on it.
Roger Fowler wrote that pattern emerges only coincidentally in casual utterances, but is the norm in the non-casual use of language. Because just as surely as discursive meaning resides in arbitrariness, symbolic meaning resides in pattering. An utterance in plain speech, like 'I felt awfully bad about what happened' imparts only the most vague, random kind of signification. But if such a sentence were to be viewed as patterned due to its predictability, this would set up a false paradox. In point of fact, the discursive sentence is highly predictable. However, by true patterning, I mean the impress of the individual writer on the palimpsest of language. A Tom Wolfe sentence is never as predictable as one from plain speech, but without a doubt it is predictably different from one by Thomas Wolfe. Hester writes that pictures are presentational because of their arrangement. Intentional arrangement makes speech presentational as well.

Pattern in prose or poetry is a complicated textural web or matrix in which the individual trope is embedded, a web with both synchronic and diachronic dimensions. In an essay titled "Imagery: From Sensation to Symbol," Norman Friedman characterized both the warp and woof of the fabric I am positing here when he explained how an image (the individual trope, in other words) achieves symbolic value. First it must be read for itself, i.e. at
face value. Then, it can be read in view of its heredity, or diachronic dimension. That is, since the image has been used over time by all the writers of the given language, it has acquired both a history of its own and an archetypal pattern of recurrence in the language. Corresponding exactly to this second level is the third, which is contextual or synchronic. Here the image has a certain frequency of recurrence in the work of a given author, as well as a relation to the other images populating the work of that writer. In this complicated fashion, then, a grid of pattern is superimposed on the functioning arbitrariness that is language.

Besides patterning, though, there is still another way for language to become presentational, and that is through "similarity." Henle explicates this notion in his definition of 'icon,' (which speaks right to my point in that 'iconic' is more or less synonymous with 'presentational.'] He says:

A sign is a symbol insofar as it signifies according to an arbitrary rule, insofar as it is a conventional sign. A sign is an icon to the extent that it signifies in virtue of similarity.* Thus, ordinary words are symbols, but onomatopoeic words contain an iconic element as well. (96)

In the last sentence, Henle chooses to construe 'similarity' in terms of sound imagery, of which there is no dearth in poetry; it is clear that sound-effects can override sense

*Italics mine
in word-selection. However, I can see no reason why the similarity he stipulates cannot apply to the analogy that is a sufficient condition for all metaphors of Aristotle's fourth type. If this is reasonable, then it will substantiate the intimation I voiced earlier that imagery figures in metaphor. The similarity or comparison presented by metaphor's analogy lends to the whole figure an iconicity or presentational quality.

Of course, whatever sound-imagery there is in Metaphor adds to this three-dimensional effect, and gives the individual figure an extra gout of meaning. Thus the onomatopoetic term (and the analogical metaphor, as I am arguing by extension) has surplus content in that it unites concept and percept.\(^97\) Schematically,

\[
\text{sense (CONCEPT)} + \text{sound (PERCEPT)} = \text{SURPLUS CONTENT}
\]

The supercharge of figurative speech, mentioned above as coming from the sum of tenor plus vehicle, is therefore traceable to a second source. What results is a "multiple iconicity" on the part of the figure, the ability, cited by Henle,\(^98\) of metaphors to "be spun out, following a line
of analogy or even several lines at once, carrying it quite far." This capability has been instanced by Brooke-Rose, who shows that the metaphor 'the ship ploughs the waves' can be spun out into a six-way relation, involving:

- the plough
- the ship
- the ground
- the waves
- the action of ploughing, and
- the action of sailing. (99)

Kenneth Burke adds to our information on the subject when he claims that proverbs also have such a surfeit. Of the saw, 'Among blind men the one-eyed is king,' he observes that

It teaches the relativity and deficiency of all worldly power and this wisdom, without being expressly stated, rises above the transient analogy and its inadequate formula. (100)

As we shall see later, the fact that proverbs and metaphors contain this glut of power in a benign literal-looking casing (the "inadequate formula" mentioned) makes them next to impossible to paraphrase accurately in plain speech.

Working from the domain of science, Leatherdale has also found the supercharge concept useful, and he has filed under the rubric of surplus connotations those terms that do double duty, having enough meaning to function importantly in scientific and non-scientific contexts,
such as:

corpuscle  equilibrium
vortex     stress
field      energy
discharge  orbit
polarity   repression (101)

So similarity and pattern in concert make ordinary language presentational. Once they have done this, the product—Metaphor—is encoded; it has "the concrete status of presented object." As such, literary output is subject to the same conditions that govern other icons/works of art, namely these:

Different Levels and Different Interpretations. The work of art is both what it is and what it seems to be. (The two levels are neatly recapitulated in language as literal aspect and figurative aspect). Any good painting—let us choose Picasso's Les Demoiselles d'Avignon—will serve as an example: that which meets the eye has meaning, but there is a wealth of extra meaning that only extra spelunking into art history and Picasso will disclose.

Verification is Centripetal. James Jarret wrote that

...the realism demanded in poetry is that the poet's assumed premises determine his poem's content. Thus the verification relevant to a poem is an internal or centripetal verification. Strict external verification is not essentially aesthetic. (102)

This amounts to the fact that each work of art (and therefore each metaphor) presents a truth but not necessarily
the truth. Each one is the presentation of a private reality and as such cannot be judged by any one external standard.

Privacy. In that it arises from one person's cosmography, the work of art is not fully public. Our critical faculty is therefore at an arm's-length remove from the created object. Hester explains: "Critical discussions of metaphorical meaning presuppose that a metaphor is shared in some sense though it is not fully public...the metaphor is intersubjective but not publicly observable."[103]

Coleridge gives an appealing description of the intensely personal process of artistic creation. He writes, "For from my childhood I have been accustomed to abstract, and as it were, to unrealize whatever of more than common interest my eyes dwelt on by a sort of transfusion of my consciousness to identify myself with the object."[104]

And in her Grammar of Metaphor, Brooke-Rose notes that metaphors formed with the definite article (like Dickinson's 'Shame is the Shawl of Pink') have an "element of assumed recognition,"[105] a privacy of expression that gives the reader a "feeling of missed significance;" the poet has a "you-know-what-I-mean" tone.

As final attestation to Metaphor's status as a presentational object, I will cite Karl Uitti's scheme,[106]
which locates metaphor mid-way between two poles. At the bottom is raw material, a stockpile of all the images that can possibly be used in writing. At the top is myth, a fully fabricated tissue of words that has been accepted and is believed by an audience or reading public. Since Uitti places metaphor at a central point between these two states, I infer that this means that in metaphor, the raw material of images has been organized and shaped into an _objet_ ready for presentation but not yet accepted or taken to heart as myth.
'Logic' in Bound Form

I claimed in the foregoing chapter that "strict external verification" is not expected of a work of art or of a metaphor. The criteria that determine both a metaphor's meaning and its worth—aesthetic criteria, I have argued—are not those used to judge ordinary reportorial speech. In effect, each work of art acts as its own referent, with the result that the standards used to interpret Picasso's Demoiselles are different from those one would apply to DeKooning's portraits of women. The same Ding-an-sich quality obtains in the linguistic sphere, where the literary objet d'art is just as much a special instance and a particularized entity. Thus, if you are in doubt about the meaning of a literal sentence, you can ask for an explanation. However, if in doubt about the meaning of a poem, your only recourse is to read the poem again.107

In that case, one wonders if figurative speech is logical at all in the ordinary sense. How does the fact that each metaphor has its own logic work in practice, and how does this elastic custom-made logic stack up against ordinary inflexible logic? I will argue that logic per se does not figure in Metaphor. Rather, the words best used to describe the workings of figurative language are
'counterlogical,' 'extralogical,' 'infra-' and 'analogical,' all of which contain the element of 'logic' certainly, but in bound, submerged form.

The Counterlogical in Metaphor

As Hester put it, there is an open-door policy on the kinds of data that are admissible in a figure of speech: all are admitted on an equal footing. Certain words enter into poetic diction just for the joy of their sound (percept) with no consideration at all being given to their meaning (concept). According to Hester, both the logical (meaningful) and counterlogical (auditory, rhyme, meter, alliteration) elements function iconically in the poem. In this way, the canons of normal logic are evaded (through "poetic license"), forsaken in order to create a whole that is not standard-issue English. But importantly, the literary work of art is a whole above all, where the counterlogical elements chime in with the logical, bringing about a unity that makes it no less than a microcosm. In this way, William's poem about stall-fed lambs is a preserve unto itself. The logic that characterizes it is distinct from the logic of ordinary speech and distant again from the logic of other poems. If you want it explained after the first reading, a second reading is the only solution.
(For comparison, note that the counterlogical is equally and comparably present in the visual arts, where it also tones in to provide an effect of unity and oneness. For instance, a pointillist painting by Seurat may seem to have an untoward amount of, say, green in it when examined close up. However, from normal viewing distance, the green will resolve into an effect that in undeniably the right effect. The same open-door policy of aesthetics allows Henry Miller to include "a golden marshmallow octopus with rubber hinges and molten hoofs...oysters...doing the St. Vitus dance, some with lockjaw, some with double-jointed knees..." in the description of a bacchanalian dance hall. Read seriatim, the bizarre images coagulate into an effect that is exactly Miller and exactly appropriate. In jazz, too, one finds the pleasing whole deriving from a slightly discordant admixture of elements).

As several authors have pointed out, the creative door is wider open now than it has ever been. I mean to say, the growing secularization of life over the centuries has destroyed moral absolutes that could once be appealed to for guidance as to what is admissible into art. Brooke-Rose has shown that in love poetry by Donne and his contemporaries, Love is the criterion that is appealed to. Only those images that harmonized with the prevailing love-ideal were admitted into the metaphors of those poets.
Likewise, God was the arbiter in poetry by Milton, such that his figure 'the Foe' could only be one foe—Satan; that is, God's foe. Rosamond Tuve came to a conclusion similar to Brooke-Rose's when she wrote that the imagery of Renaissance and metaphysical writers derived from their belief in absolute values, while the moderns, doubting these absolutes, "rely more heavily upon the sensory textures of their experience itself."

Hester concludes his long and thoughtful book on metaphor with an aperçu pertaining to the admixture of logical and counterlogical elements. His remark is to the effect that if metaphor will admit and marry data that in the discursive language are thought to be incontrovertibly opposed, (cf. Kenneth Burke's phrase 'licensed transsubstantiation'), then perhaps our "irreducible polarities" in general need overhauling. There is the seed of a truth in his intimation which far exceeds the scope of this paper—the suggestion that in all the two-sided philosophical controversies that have been raging incessantly throughout history, there is no real duality at stake. Rather, all participants have a corner on the truth; or, as the Certs ad goes, 'It's a breath mint.' 'It's a candy mint.' 'You're both right. It's two...two...two mints in one.'
Metaphor as Extra- or Infra logical

Leatherdale quite justifiably adds the notion that metaphor is extralogical. From his scientific perspective, he sees that the kinetic theory of gases has been explained in terms of billiard balls in motion, and that this dithyrambic analogy, which caroms wildly from one sphere of phenomena to explain another, is nothing if not extralogical.

Thomas, too, is correct in characterizing metaphor as infralogical, saying that metaphor "historically or logically precedes the solidified meanings of conceptual language." Hester as well recognized metaphor to be the precursor of literal language, and wrote "...metaphor in any creative field, whether literature or physics, is always on the cutting edge." (Hester's formulation is probably the safer of the two since he does not speak directly to the problem of whether figurative or literal reference is more basic).

Metaphor as Anal ogical

'Anal ogical', though, is far and away the best description of metaphor's process. The prefix 'ana-' means 'up,' 'throughout,' 'again,' and 'back' and serves to chart the erratic course of metaphor's particular logic.

According to Kenneth Burke, analogical reasoning provides a better description of reality than its logical counterpart.
Our notion of causality as a succession of pushes from behind is...a disguised way of insisting that experience abide by the conventions of a good argument...I do not see why the universe should accommodate itself to a man-made medium of communication when there is so strongly a creative or poietic quality about its goings on...{(116)}

Moreover, he adduces that the predisposition to analogizing—to seeing parallels in everything—is natural in a culture where Science is the incumbent deity. For science, unlike religion, insists on a universal regularity where no sudden salvations or retributions are enacted. Therefore, it provides a framework of "universal regularity" within which the analogical act proceeds as the main mode of divination.

The Truth Question

As for truth in Metaphor, I have already hinted that metaphors reflect individual small truths rather than a single large one. The literature on the subject tends to favour this view, with Hester, for one, claiming that "Poetry, thus metaphorical images, do not refer to the natural world, but do refer to reality." He means that the natural world is constituted of numerous individual realities. In its entirety, nature is too vast to mirror accurately, so what the individual metaphor (poem, novel, etc.) presents is a small refraction of one of the component truths. This view is also held by Owen Thomas, who points to the great number of different metaphors on the subject
of love, time, death, etc. as proof that verisimilitude can be—and is—achieved variously. Colin Turbayne's view is that the metaphor-maker is in effect a genuine metaphysician, in that he knows his allocation of facts to be arbitrary and only a truth. He suggests that literal-minded thinkers are much lesser metaphysicians because they accept holus bolus the sorting and bundling of concepts that literal language gives them pre-packaged.*

It is evident, however, that the fragmentary truth and insight offered by a metaphor can be generalized on to the natural world at large, with results that are sometimes good and sometimes bad. Burke, for one, feels that when Darwin's thinking placed man in the category of ape, metaphorical insight was at work there. Once the metaphor was exploded to cosmic proportions, it proved to have cosmic reverberations. But Stephen Pepper, contrariwise, believes that to map one metaphor (he calls it a "root metaphor") on to a reality larger than the one for which it was

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*I am suggesting here a trimmed-down version of B.L. Whorf's hypothesis of linguistic relativism: namely, that the superordinate categories in every language are different and that "languages are organized along different lines...There are Latin words which have no equivalent in Greek and Hebrew words which have no equivalent in either Latin or Greek. And these are not isolated words alone: entire sections of the vocabulary are organized in different ways in different languages." (121) These pre-ordained categories, like the innate mental categories posited by Kant, cannot help but have a mind-bending influence, though this hypothesis is far from provable as yet.
originally intended is dangerous.

This structure* is then elevated into a hypothesis for the explanation of other uncriticized facts, as a result of which these become critically interpreted in terms of the root metaphor. In the course of this interpretation, the root metaphor itself may undergo critical analysis and refinement which reciprocally increases its range and power of interpretation. When it assumes unlimited range, or world-wide scope, then it is a metaphysical hypothesis, and a catalogue of its principal descriptive concepts is a set of metaphysical categories...

He illustrates with a number of cosmic-scaled philosophies, all of which can be seen to stem from a rather limited original metaphor, and suggests that when so blown up, the resultant theories always prove to contain "some internal ulcer of contradiction." One cannot help but think back to Hester's idea that there are no irreducible polarities and to Whitehead's view that there is no black or white but only shades of grey. If life were a black-and-white matter, an expanded root metaphor might be able to serve as an adequate summary of reality. According to Nietzsche, man goes his philosophical way with just this tender misconception in tow, feeling that the analogies he makes are adequate to the world that confronts him.

What therefore is truth? A mobile army of metaphors, metonymies, anthropomorphisms: in short a sum of human relations which became poetically and rhetorically intensified, metamorphosed, adorned and after long usage seem to a nation fixed, canonic and binding. (125)

*(the original root metaphor, which is "framed first on the basis of a rather small set of facts")
A Poetic Grammar?

It would seem too that the freedom let in by Metaphor's open-door policy is such that linguists cannot write a grammar for Metaphor in the way that they can write a grammar for a language. Samuel Levin, in *Linguistic Structures in Poetry*, appears to have made the fullest attempt at rule-writing. His premise is that if the generation of structures is rule-governed, then these rules should be able to assess the extent to which a generated structure is deviant. But his suggestions in this regard are spotty, and are adequate only as descriptive (not as explanatory) theory. In sum, he notes that: (a) structures called "couplings" are peculiar to poetry and explain "the fact that poetry tends to remain in one's mind;" (b) it is probably better to extend the existing transformational grammar to cover poetry rather than to class poetry as deviant; (c) the poet operates with an altered lexicon; and (d) as mentioned before, poetic violations can be viewed as either syntagmatic or paradigmatic in nature.

But other linguists are less optimistic than Levin in outlook. A.L. Binns, for instance, despairs of the possibility of writing a grammar for Metaphor for two reasons. First, he explains that such an ambition would involve
...the assumption that it is possible to prescribe in linguistic terms alone the sufficient and necessary conditions for the production of all the sentences of the literature of the past, as well as those of...the literature of the future. (128)

In that linguistics has yet to study extensively units of speech that are longer than sentence-length, he is correct for the time being. His other point is also good. It is that everyday speech is purposive (except for what Sapir called "phatic" or comforting speech), with language-use that is determined by the situation and what is to be communicated. "In literature on the other hand we know nothing of the imagined situation until the author has told us; our knowledge of the situation is derived from the language..."129 In other words, the individual work of literature is self-referential, and the language used in it is highly specific, determined by a posteriori sorts of dictates.*

Another writer, James Peter Thorne,130 is as chary as Binns about the possibility of a poetic grammar. He says that there is no way to elasticize the fixed rules of English without increasing the burden on English grammar unthinkably. That is, there is no ready way to get our grammar to generate a structure like 'he danced his did' and at the same time to exclude something like 'we thumped their hads.' Better, he says, to write a grammar for each poem on the premise that each poem is actually a

* Recall Burke's passage about the tell-tale lockets. The writer has a full-blown literary conception in mind and lets the reader into it by spoon-feeding him a bit at a time.
sample of a different language. As such, each poetic grammar can have a finite lexicon, enabling it to produce the proper forms, eliminate starred forms and "show how certain irregularities are regular in the context of the poem in which they appear."
CHAPTER EIGHT

THE DIFFICULTY OF PARAPHRASING METAPHOR

Non-linearity

I have expressed the view that poetic language describes a "non-spatial reality...the inner life of man," and that in doing so, its own processes are non-linear. Monroe Beardsley's approach to this non-linear nature is to point out that the analogy expressed by a metaphor is not a reversible two-way analogy. His example is 'The man is a lion;' its obverse is altogether different in meaning: 'the lion is a man.' Thus the A : B relation in metaphor is not equal to B : A.

Economy

If non-linearity serves to make metaphors difficult to paraphrase, their economical nature has the same effect. Angel, for instance, demonstrates that 'Necessity is the mother of invention' reads as follows in paraphrase: "The relationship between necessity and invention is like the relation between a mother and her offspring." The longer version is infinitely more ungainly. Not only that, but the longer more "explanatory" periphrasis actually seems to explain less, to take away from the clarity of the shorter version. (cf. Burke's attempted paraphrase of 'Among blind men the one-eyed is king'). Note that
the same principle seems to hold true in "ordinary" language: wherever a thought can be expressed with concision and clarity, the shorter version is at a premium over the longer. Thus, the Italian proverb 'Detto, fatto' expresses everything that its English equivalent 'no sooner said than done' does. Actually, it expresses more because its terseness is perfectly consonant with its theme.

Equivocal Reference

Metaphors are additionally hard to reproduce in discursive speech because they are understood "intuitively rather than explicitly" according to Christine Brooke-Rose. It is by intuition that the reader interprets a metaphor like 'the meadows laugh' as meaning 'the meadows are full of flowers' without being told. This being true, we recognize metaphors in our reading rather than strictly understanding them. Turbayne in this connection gives the three stages of recognition. (These are coterminous with only the first and second stages of the metaphorical life-span, since Turbayne does not account for moribundity in metaphor.) They are: (a) detection. The reader becomes aware that something is amiss in the text and that although what he is reading is expressed in the form of a literal truth, it is meant to be read
otherwise. Burke calls this metaphor's "perspective by incongruity." \(^{135}\) (b) attempt to undress it. The reader refers to the literal meaning of the word at issue. For example, when confronted with something like 'the meadows laugh,' he refers to what he knows about "regular" laughing. (c) restoration. The reader restores the metaphor to its place in the text, having assimilated the fact that it is different and the reason why. \(^{136}\)

Paraphrasing can also yield an embarras de richesse, as Leech demonstrated when he tried to re-word 'the sea that bares her bosom to the moon.' This profusion of possible interpretations results from the fact that both tenor and vehicle trail with them a covey of connotations, many of which appear feasible as far as the reader can see. Leonard Angel adds too that the more original a metaphor, the more difficult it is to pry it from context. For individual images are tightly welded to the metaphor-systems of whole poems, \(^{137}\) to the greater texture that exists. When one attempts to "spin them out along multiple lines" as Leech did, the result is the one documented by Angel: \(^{138}\) the possible number of periphrastic constructions is equal to the possible number of "fourth terms."

i.e. "the relationship between necessity and invention is like the relation between a mother and her..."

POSSIBLE FOURTH TERMS

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{offspring} \\
\text{baby} \\
\text{progeny} \\
\text{child}
\end{align*}
\]
The matter of texture just mentioned finds its place in a three-fold typology that Berggren has made of metaphors. It bears reproducing here:

1. **isolated pictorial metaphors.** These are metaphors as the Classicists understood them, i.e. rhetorical niceties to adorn more substantive discourse.  
   --APPEAL TO EMPRIRICAL INTUITION

2. **structural metaphors.** These are the analogical type. Scientific metaphors are exclusively structural in nature; many (though not all) literary metaphors are structural also.  
   --APPEAL TO INTELLECTUAL INTUITION

3. **textural metaphors.** These are "based on an emotional intuition of similarity or disparity."  
   --APPEAL TO LYRICAL INTUITION.

Levin hinted at a linguistic explanation of this texture of lyricism, which is *ipso facto* author-specific. He showed that language consists of a framework wherein are situated position-slots; the writer has an option to fill the slots with one of a number of words (selection from a paradigm), so that one writer's predilection to certain types of words may provide an explanation of his style or diction. (While this view of Levin's is plausible, I find it too insubstantial to be very useful).

The point is, though, that each writer maps his inner landscape on to the outer; this is the allusion in Middleton Murry's title *Countries of the Mind*. For one
man will write of 'brooding mountains.' For him, the neutral mountains are seen to brood.* But 'laughing mountains' are equally permissible in another writer's cosmography. Stanley Edgar Hyman has identified this all-too natural tendency to project. (He carries its implications further than I would feel safe doing, however):

The ideas of Darwin, Marx, Frazer and Freud are then as true as any ideas that explain our world to our satisfaction. If they arose out of the thinker's own nature, if Darwin projected his slow-and-steady personality on nature or Freud his wishful childhood, we can be sure of similar personal correlations underlying even Euclid's geometry or Newton's mechanics. Ideas come from minds and minds are the products of an individual's nature and experience. (141)

Freud is indeed a most likely case-in-point for this kind of thinking. Hyman, for one, explains Freud's many metaphors of warfare (involving fortresses, sally-ports, watchmen and besiegers) as a projection of his own inner state: "For a divided personality dealing with an ambivalent subject matter, what better metaphor than warfare?" Ernest Jones is equally aware of this line of thought. When he presented the paragraph on Freud's conceiving his greatest ideas in duality-form (quoted at the end of Chapter Five), he followed it with this:

One is naturally tempted to correlate this tendency with its manifestation in Freud's own personality. There was the fight between scientific discipline and philosophical speculation; his passionate love urge and his unusually great sexual repression;

* e.g. for T.S. Eliot,

'April is the cruellest month, breeding
'Lilacs out of the dead ground.'
his vigorous masculinity, which shines through all his writings, and his feminine needs; his desire to create everything himself and his longing to receive stimulation from another; his love of independence and his needs of dependence. (143)

More prudent than Hyman, Jones adds a cautionary rider: "But such thoughts assuredly bring the risk of falsification from the lure of simplistic solutions." 144

A final aspect of metaphor's intractability to paraphrase is its all-around ineluctability. Even those eighteenth century writers who railed against metaphysical metaphors unwittingly peppered [sic] their own invective with metaphors. The following example from Samuel Johnson (1779) is illustrative. (The accursed metaphors are underscored).

The most heterogeneous ideas are yoked by violence together; nature and art are ransacked for illustrations; their learning instructs and their sensibility surprises; but the reader commonly thinks his improvement dearly bought and, though he sometimes admires, is seldom pleased. (145)
CHAPTER NINE

METAPHOR SEEN AS A HEIGHTENED FORM OF LANGUAGE

Up to this point, I have described Metaphor as a special protectorate existing, as it were, in the tenebrous unpoliced areas of a rule-governed over-language. Thus far, this conception has been workable and fruitful. However, there is a complimentary strain of reasoning that advances another view—that metaphor is but a heightened form of the ordinary language. Let us understand "heightened" through an analogy to histology: a cell dye brings out into sharp relief the essential features of the cytoplasm. Metaphor viewed as a heightened version of ordinary language is similarly tinctured, with the major features of language showing up sharper and brighter.

Terence Hawkes most clearly presents the case for this line of thought when he says that poetic language differs in degree, not in kind, from the discursive tongue. To support this credo, he quotes Winifred Nowottny to the effect that "metaphor is a linguistic phenomenon;" the linguistic devices used by poets are essentially an exploration and an expansion of potentialities latent in the language used by everybody. (Before Wordsworth's claim in the "Preface to Lyrical Ballads" that poets' language should be no different from the words of everyday speech, a special poetic vocabulary was thought to be necessary). Wheelwright bolstered the view with his statement that the
ordinary language is a 'must' while the poetic is a 'can' and a 'may,' thereby implying that the difference is one of degree. He cautioned that there is no "conceptual chasm" separating literal and figurative language.

Three other writers working separately sing the same tune in a different key. Their contention is that the very fixity of the standard language invites metaphoric heightening and provides a stable plasmic matrix or backdrop against which experimentation is possible. Owen Thomas, for example, wrote that metaphor is made possible through the existence of a systematic language; the corollary is that a chaotic non-system of communication would produce no poetry. Edward Stankiewicz agreed that "poetic language takes full cognizance of the rules of the linguistic system, and if it admits 'deviations,' they themselves are conditioned by the language or the given poetic tradition." Mukarovsky carried the conclusion furthest, going out on a theoretical limb as he opined: "The more the norm of the standard is stabilized in a given language, the more varied can be its violation and therefore the more possibilities for poetry in that language." (Actually, he has said nothing that wasn't implicit in the others' thoughts. It is just that one wants proof of such a bold statement.)
What features, then, does metaphor highlight in the standard language? I have this five-item list:

(1) Ambiguity

Empson, doyen and chief litigant of ambiguity, must necessarily be consulted in this regard. He sees ambiguity as an inalienable feature of all language, and defines it this way: "any verbal nuance, however slight, which gives room for alternative reactions to the same piece of language...In a sufficiently extended sense any prose statement could be called ambiguous." Quite explicitly he recognizes that metaphor heightens this tendency to nuance. First, he accords it a major role in language ("metaphor is the normal mode of development of a language") and then he allows how ambiguity is its modus operandi ("the machinations of ambiguity are among the very roots of poetry."). Terence Hawkes sums up with this: "in the use it makes of metaphor's multiple 'ambiguities,' poetry in fact exploits the central characteristic of language itself."

(2) Transference

Several writers have concluded that poetic language capitalizes on the "transference" that they see as being inseparable from the process of communication. Definitions of transference are somewhat fog-shrouded, as is the exact
heightening effect that Metaphor is thought to have. However, I think that I can appropriate their view into my argument without being too Procrustean in effect. Wheelwright defines transference thus: "to designate any element in human experience which is not merely contemplated for its own sake alone, but is employed to mean, to intend, to stand proxy for something beyond itself."\textsuperscript{156} It seems that he is referring to the quite commonplace way in which an arbitrary sign is agreed to stand for a concept, idea or object. As I showed at the outset, such naming is a ponderous process, with the arbitrary label "standing proxy for" a whole raft of interlocked connotations. Nowottny and Brooke-Rose seem to believe that when one writes metaphorically, one can exploit the normal transference relation. The former writes that Metaphor is the best means for using language to cover the unusual situation and the unnamed phenomenon for the simple reason that metaphor frees him [the poet] from the necessity of referring via conventions of reference...Metaphor permits him to use, if not any, then almost any area of the whole system of our language. (157)

Brooke-Rose similarly believes that poetic license allows transference to go from context to context so that "instead of a ready-made phrase or proverb, we have the echoing phraseology from a different realm of thought or from a different genre."\textsuperscript{158} While this is all very well, though, I think Owen Thomas is the most astute on the subject. As I quoted him earlier, he believes that in
Metaphor transference is incomplete, whereas it is complete in discursive language. Therefore, in a literal sentence like 'John Jones is a fisherman,' transference is complete; "John Jones presumably has all the features of 'fisherman.'" But in Emily Dickinson's figurative statement 'Shame is the Shawl of Pink,' shame has only one of the features of a shawl. The poet, then, is violating "language's taxonomic system," which assumes that transference shall be complete.

(3) Context

If context figures in plain speech, it is even more prominent in poetic language, which is (as Leatherdale wrote) "a mixing of contexts." In his Symbol and Metaphor in Human Experience, Martin Foss summarizes the notion in this fashion: "connected speech is metaphorical in that it gives each word contextual meaning beyond its ordinary sense." He means that context is so signal in Metaphor's constitution that connected speech can be called "metaphorical" insofar as it involves context. Nowotny—above, under (2)—shows how the creative writer is able to tinker ad libitum with different contexts.

(4) Predicating a Nominal

There is a fourth excellent case made for the view that Metaphor is a heightened version of language, Thomas being its main proponent. He says that "the most
fundamental process in language consists of predicating a nominal, and lists as most basic the structures 'something is something,' 'something has something' and 'something does something.' (The fact that 'to be,' 'to have,' and 'to make' are invariably the most irregular verbs in a language attests to the inordinately heavy functional load they carry). He observes that metaphor, working within the framework of 'something is something' "makes a more complete use of linguistic structures than other kinds of figurative language." Brooke-Rose calls this kind of metaphor the "copula link," noting at the same time that the structure 'A is B' allows for metaphors that are authoritative, didactic, highly original and/or paradoxical.

(5) Ethnocentricity

The fact that a culture's metaphors are ethnocentric or peculiar to that one culture will be touched on here and dealt with in full later. It is only important to note here, while on the topic of heightened language, that every language "contains...overt 'ways of putting' things" (see my modified statement of the linguistic relativism hypothesis, page (63), footnote), "covert...presuppositions about the nature of the 'reality' outside us." If this
is so, Metaphor heightens this culture-specific nature of language. As Hawkes puts it,

What this means finally is that metaphor in all societies will have a 'normative' and reinforcing aspect, as well as an exploratory one...It will retrench and corroborate as much as it will expand our vision...(168)

and then later: "Like language itself, metaphor thus binds the culture together in a rough unity of experience." 169

Finally, the suggestion is offered by Wheelwright that pattern (the same patterning dealt with in the iconicity chapter) is the cell dye—the outside agent that causes the five above-named linguistic features to stand out so clearly. He defines patterning as a process that highlights what is already there. "The stylization of poetic language is an imaginative emphasizing of certain features and toning down of others in accordance with the rhythmic life of language itself." 170 Leatherdale warns against flooding the cell structure with the dye; he cautions that Metaphor should not be allowed to take over. "While the claim that all language is metaphorical," he says, "is to be rejected, the salient role of metaphor in the growth of language and proliferation of concepts is accepted..." 171 Metaphor is not everything in language, but in Shelley's words, "language is vitally metaphorical." 172
CHAPTER TEN
METAPHOR AND COGNITION

As a subtopic of the subject Metaphor, the question of cognition is hydra-headed in its complexity. Fortunately, though, there is much material in the literature, if not an excess of sweeping epigrammatic statements on the subject, which I should like to knit together here. I will use the necessary evil of subject headings to keep the aspects and ramifications of Metaphor's cognitive side discrete.

Expressing the Original

There is little doubt that metaphor is an ideal linguistic tool for expressing original thoughts. As Wallace Stevens puts it, "Reality is a cliché from which we escape by metaphor." Hyman came to this conclusion after his in-depth study of the prose styles of the four great original thinkers Darwin, Marx, Frazer and Freud. He found that their writing was interlarded with metaphors, so much so that original ideas scarcely seemed expressible without the device.* Certain of his subjects deprecated this tendency, Freud, for instance denying that his metaphors were in any way integral to his ideas themselves.

*Maurice Cornforth, in a Marxist critique of the modern "linguistic philosophy," somewhat testily alludes to the metaphoricizing in Wittgenstein's prose: "He was a man with a passion for picturesque analogies. Beginning with pictures, he then substituted a tool box, then got on to games, and the treatment of illness, and finished up with flies in a fly-bottle." (174)
But Hyman brushes Freud's disclaimer aside, and asserts that "Any book of ideas is to some degree metaphorical; a great book of ideas consists of profound metaphors in a realized form..."¹⁷⁵ Leatherdale agrees, and further believes that novelty and the ability to embody novelty is so characteristic of metaphor that it can be used to define it, the presence of originality serving to distinguish true metaphor from false.

If one can substitute a simile for a specific attribute of likeness then the simile is merely an ornament. Similarly, even though a word may be used quasi-metaphorically, if it amounts to a mere substitution for another word or words which have been learned ostensively then it is not really metaphorical but only pseudo-metaphorical. (¹⁷⁶)

**Defining-Inducing Ability**

One way in which metaphors express the original is found in their manner of defining similarity. As Black succinctly and somewhat too sweepingly put it, "the metaphor creates the similarity [rather than formulating] some similarity antecedently existing."¹⁷⁷ (In concentrating on metaphor's ability to induce a resemblance he is exaggerating, and falsifies the situation somewhat by omitting mention of the antecedent resemblance that exists before the poet or the original mind reifies it. Because even in a far-fetched comparison like Eliot's
Let us go then, you and I
Where the evening is spread out against the sky
Like a patient etherized on a table,
there is a point where patient and evening, like Grand Canyon and saxophone, are and always have been congruent.*
It pre-dates Eliot's achievement of recognizing it.) John Middleton Murry captured the creative/defining aspect, saying that in a true metaphor,

i. true similarity is perceived,
ii. the similarity was hitherto unperceived or only rarely perceived, and
iii. the perception affects the reader like a revelation. (178)
Aphoristically, Parkhurst concurs. He writes: "Any supreme insight is a metaphor."179

Analogizing the Known to the Unknown

To many, this is the human mode of cognition in a nutshell; without a doubt, it is the one and only method of science today. In Embler's words, "we are constantly at work transmuting the incongruous in thought and experience into the congruous."180 For this function, metaphor is ideally suited. It "constitutes the indispensable principle for integrating diverse phenomena and perspectives without sacrificing their diversity."181

* the congruity would be revealed in a semantic feature of the two item's lexical properties.
A Helpful Vagueness

Furthermore, there is a semantic haze in metaphor, which has been variously called "controlled vagueness" or soft focus. It stems from the fact discussed earlier that metaphors state a comparison without defining the basis for that comparison. We profit from the vagueness, both in literature (Wheelwright's example)

Expressive language has its superiority to stenolanguage [i.e., literal speech] principally in its ability to suggest...something of that ineluctibly liminal character of human experience. (182)

and in science (Leatherdale):

For science needs the inoculation of ambiguity and the semantic haze that surrounds the neutral analogy of a model or the unexplored resources of a metaphor if it is to marshal its resources for survival and growth. Too doctrinaire an axiomatization, or literal reconstruction, even supposing this were possible in any neutral untheoretically infected way, might free science from the infection of error due to uncritical reliance on a model or metaphor, but it would kill science in the process. (183)

Deriving Hypotheses

Besides allowing it to capture the original thought elegantly, "the non-literalness of metaphor makes it indispensable for positing hypotheses." The word 'indispensable' stands out in this opinion of Leatherdale's because, as I have shown above, it is clear that metaphor is man's cognizing tool par excellence, and quite possibly his only such. Nietzsche has written a wonderful essay
about this primacy of metaphor, where he likens metaphor-making in man and the ceaseless knowledge-quest to the other compulsive ordering/patterning phenomena that exist in the animal world.

Just as the bee works at the same time at the cells and fills them with honey, thus science works irresistibly at the great columbarium of ideas, the cemetery of perceptions, builds ever newer and higher storeys; supports, purifies, renews the old cells. (185)

Murry is of the same mind: "...metaphor appears as the instinctive and necessary act of the mind exploring and ordering experience." 186

As Stephen Pepper pointed out, there is an irresistible urge to generalize a good metaphor, to make it applicable to a greater and greater number of instances. This hypothesizing is healthy if it is not overdone. (Pepper thinks that, in metaphysics at least, it is the only alternative to dogma--naturally the better choice). For one thing, "whole works of scientific research, even entire schools, are hardly more than the patient repetition, in all its ramifications, of a fertile metaphor." 187 For another, Turbayne has shown that we speak almost exclusively in metaphors in some disciplines just because of the nature of the material involved: religion and psychology come to mind. Therefore, in these fields,
innovation consists of nothing but the substitution of new metaphors for old.

The Analogical Act

The cognitive capability of metaphor lies in the analogy that it makes. (Whatever part of metaphor is not analogical-cognitive belongs to its emotive-textural side). In science, particularly, the act of analogizing new phenomena to old is a bold prehensile gesture with a good part of intuition mixed in. It goes far beyond mere method, so that "What imported analogy and the analogical act lead to is not a limited inference to such-and-such a property or properties but a multi-dimensional, gestalt-like insight into new ways of looking at phenomena." As such, analogizing is the gift of certain people only. Logicians who are accomplished in step-by-step reasoning rarely have this spark, while those that do are rarely logicians as well. William James has asked (rhetorically): "Why cannot anyone reason as well as anyone else? Why does it need a Newton to notice the law of squares, a Darwin to notice the survival of the fittest?"

Mary Hesse has shown that analogies in science are of two kinds: disposable and permanent. A sample of the former is the one Kepler made comparing the sun
and planets to the hub and spokes of a wheel. The metaphor had a heuristic use but proved dispensable as the solar system notion began to sustain itself unaided. In other cases, however, the imported analogue in scientific metaphors has infiltrated its topic analogue, mingled with it, and finally proved an undetachable part of the whole concept. Hesse states it thus:

At the other extreme there are analogies which are implied in the whole way in which phenomena are observed and in the language in which theories are expressed. The particle theory has provided such an analogy ever since Democritus developed his philosophy of atomism. (1914)

Lastly, Leatherdale cites another two-fold classification of analogies. The first type is the observation of a simple resemblance, which is basically transparent common-sense cognizing. The other type is more prodigious, and compares one relation (in the mathematical sense) to another. He gives many examples of such analogies from science, but the most interesting one (to me) works both ways. That is, an organism can be explained in terms of a society; likewise it is possible to explain a society as if it were an organism.

Poetry and Mathematics

The foregoing section on analogy illumines the well-hidden fact that analogical thought is common to
both science/mathematics and poetry/literature. Or as Thomas expresses it, "In discussing abstractions, both in science and in the arts, we must see one thing in terms of another." Curiously, the discovery of this common element dissolves the iron-clad dichotomy the two disciplines have always been thought to embody. If we indeed understand the fundamental mode of cognition in each case to be analogizing, then differences coalesce and fuse. It becomes harder to tell one from the other.

Very simply, poetry and mathematics are two very successful attempts to deal with ideas...Both employ sets of symbols and systems of notation...They exchange disguises, so that mathematics, commonly accepted for its hardheadedness, rigor and accuracy is often poetry creating a world of fancy; and poetry, commonly loved for its playful spontaneity and utter ineffectualness, becomes the mathematical demiurge, joining words-images into a word of hard persuasive fact.

Of course, the disciplines are different, even if at times they seem to exchange disguises. The main distinction between the fields resides in the fact that their uses (goals or functions, alternatively) are different. Consequently, as Leatherdale astutely shows, a metaphor in science serves a different end-in-view from literary metaphor.
In general, then, the differences between literary and scientific metaphors depend on their uses. In both literature and science, metaphor is a means to an unfolding, a revelation, a new perspective or focus, but while in literature metaphor seeks to shake off the routine and familiar and reflect and refract in new lights so as to unify and colour a world grown grey and featureless from too much familiarity, in science metaphor seeks to identify, to make the strange and unknown familiar, the complex and anarchic simple and ordered, and by contrast with literature and art, to disencumber our experience from the sensual and the concrete and the particular circumstances of time and place.

(194)

Notwithstanding divergent uses, however, both disciplines rely on formula, symbol and pattern, a system which proves extensible in each field, should the mind desire such an effect. (cf. Stephen Pepper and the large world-hypothesis derived from a root metaphor). Buchanan has said as much --that in each field, a pleasing metaphor can be blown up into an allegory. "An algebraic equation is a complex pattern of ratios, and the corresponding poetic forms are expanded metaphors." 195

Growth of Knowledge and Language

There is a further conclusion, virtually irrefutable and of surpassing interest to linguists, to be drawn about metaphor's role in cognition: figurative language is undeniably a major contributor to language growth. Hester notes, for example, that "almost any word will show a metaphorical origin if its etymology is studied." 196 In
point of fact, a backward glance into the history of any word will reveal that the figurative and literal senses are in a precarious balance which is subject to change. The word 'spirit' represents a metaphorical use of the idea of breath (Latin: *spiro*); similarly, 'foot' (as in 'foot of the mountain') is a hypostatized metaphor that has lost its tension. But there is debate as to which sense came first, the figurative or the literal. Some of the writers studied believe that originally all words were literal and that usage later became extended metaphorically. It is also conceivable that literal language emerged from the non-literal. Leatherdale arbitrates the delicate conclusion, pleasing to all, that words were originally ores or amalgams from which purely literal meanings have since been refined. "The early vocabulary of mankind was both a-literal and a-metaphorical." If this is true, both of Leonard Bloomfield's formulations (breath mint and candy mint) are correct: "Language is a book of faded metaphors": fine. But equally well, "Poetry is a blazoned book of language." If as language grows, the literal and figurative senses interact with each other to good effect. The fanciful use of a word can only extend language, and the metaphor that is born in one poet's mind can live happily ever after in the Volksmund. In short, "What today counts as an
observed concomitant of a phenomenon will tomorrow be used to define it." Beardsley's notion of a good novel metaphor is that "the metaphor transforms a property into a sense, actualizes potential connotations; establishes staple connotations."  

It should be understood, however, that whatever fusions metaphor works in language, they are not binding. They are subject to subsequent fission and fusion will later occur between different sets of phenomena. As Nietzsche has written, "the congelation and coagulation of a metaphor does not at all guarantee the necessity and exclusive justification of that metaphor." His image of the bee-built honeycomb is apt: we too make honeycomb-like mental constructs, which are ever superseded and discarded.  

As I have shown more than once, the first time a metaphor fuses a tenor and a vehicle, the contact is brief, fleeting. A and B meet only tangentially, touching at two coincident points. But once the image achieves a measure of success—if it proves applicable to additional phenomena than those first observed—it can stick. (This is what Nietzsche means by 'congelation,' 'coagulation.') Both literature and science are susceptible to the cohesion effect, which Berggren describes as follows:
Having been told for so long that heaven is up, the Christian—even in this day of astronauts—confuses the textural import of such a spatial schema with the actual or physical spatiality of the schema itself. A believed but distanced and exalted absurdity results analogously. When any scientific schema acquires sufficient scientific respectability, it too tends to be transposed into the domain of 'sacred play.' (203)

Science is perhaps more prone to have its metaphors stick than poetry because theories that seem explanatory are so highly prized. According to Hesse, there is enormous vested interest in theories "and therefore they can never easily be abandoned when new facts do not appear to fit in with the system of explanation which the analogies presuppose." To Burke, the adhesion of the two points in a metaphor is due to piety, a word which he uses in the extended sense of "to conform with the 'sources of one's being.'" In other words, he feels there is a vested interest in any formulation, be it literary or scientific. Correspondingly, he posits the phenomenon of "logonomical purgatory"—this is the "rending and tearing" that occurs every time a successful osculation is sundered. He believes that fusion and fission occur ceaselessly in philosophical history. This being true, "even the most conscientious of the new doctrines necessarily contains an element of impiety, with a corresponding sense of guilt (though the doctrine may later become an orthodoxy, with its generally accepted code of proprieties and improprieties)."
The Residuum is Knowledge

The leftovers of the thinking process (which Nietzsche characterized as superseded "hexahedral" constructions) constitute a body of knowledge. The dead and dormant metaphors littering the linguistic battlefield are, as Middleton Murray suggested, "the record of past cognitive exploration." Schönh expanded this idea when he wrote that "our language, at any given time, gives us a cross-section of our processes of concept formation or discovery. The metaphors in language are to be explained as signs of concepts at various stages of displacement, just as fossils are to be explained as signs of living things at various stages of development." Lastly, if one's turn of mind is to favour any version of the linguistic relativism hypothesis, it should be noted that each language's repository of knowledge—its discarded "columbarium" or spider-web, as Nietzsche visualized it—is singular. The result is that words are not exactly the pat nomenclature that is popularly supposed. One cannot truly translate those of language A into language B without some loss of depth. Because, as Tullio de Mauro observed, "For the first time it became absolutely clear that languages are not transcriptions of...universally equal and predefined concepts, but rather [are] historically diversified bases upon which notions and concepts are built."
CHAPTER ELEVEN

CONCLUSION

A Warning on the Dangers of Metaphor's Misuse

The post-Aristotelian classicists regarded metaphor as an inconsequential figure of speech—one of a roster of tropes whose purpose was nothing more than to ornament, frivolously, the serious stuff of discourse. Curiously, however, the classical scholars viewed metaphor simultaneously as a threat to purposive writing. Thus there existed a contradiction in their thinking about figurative language. On the one hand, it was nugatory, frivolous and trifling. But metaphor, particularly the metaphysical variety, was also felt to be pernicious; its fancifulness seemed capable of infecting literal writing. It was widely thought that metaphor had "no real claim to positive 'meaning' in its own right, since it works negatively by subverting the 'proper meanings of words.'" 209

There was, in the eighteenth century, a virulent desire to clear language of metaphors and to return to simple unembroidered speech. The metaphors of the period engendered this reaction, because they were in fact often extrinsic to the writer's intent, as well as being overwrought in their striving after fanciful effects. For instance, Dryden's bathetic metaphor about the pustules of
smallpox drew exacerbated raillery from critics of metaphorical expression:

Like Rose-bud, stuck i' th' Lily-skin about
Each little Pimple had a Tear in it. (210)

Samuel Johnson's indictment of the yoking together of heterogeneous ideas by violence is in this critical vein, as was Samuel Parker's statement (1670) that "fulsome and luscious" metaphors deserved to be outlawed by an act of Parliament. 211

As I have claimed in this paper, the twentieth-century conception of metaphor is a much more positive one. The device is understood to be one that is intrinsic to language and invaluable to language growth and the pursuit of knowledge. As a linguistic phenomenon, it is in some ways a heightened, sharpened version of the literal tongue; however, its status as quasi-artform is due to infiltration of iconic-imagistic elements into the language, features that are regularly debarred entrance into literal speech. As such, the metaphor is a rather unorthodox phenomenon linguistically, and is beyond the reach of the generative grammars that are otherwise so explanatory of communication.

There are, naturally enough, certain dangers inherent in the use of metaphor. These are problems devolving from the twentieth-century conception, however, and are nothing like the rabid fears expressed by Parker and Johnson.
Ethnocentricity

I first touched on this topic in Chapter Nine, the issue being at that time that just as each language is a "historically diversified base" of its own, so too are each people's metaphors language- and culture-specific. Of all the modern writers on metaphorical language, Terence Hawkes seems the most keenly aware that metaphor tends to "retrench and corroborate" the "covert...presuppositions" that every language harbors. Margaret Mead has also spoken directly to this point: "the metaphor we may embody in the statement 'Love will find a way' may simply not exist in some countries, or may have an utterly different role (and so call forth appropriately different responses) in others." Of the covert presuppositions in language, one of the most prevalent in English is the spatial/temporal. Whorf noted that spatial assumptions are implicit in many English expressions that need not have any spatial content at all: 'to reach a point,' 'to come to a conclusion,' and 'higher education,' for example. Cognate with this tendency is the widely-believed notion that heaven and God are "up," cited by Berggren on page (92). As Embler has stated, then, "Our thinking and our speech are still very much bound by the Cartesian coordinates of height, depth, length and breadth."
If this is true, it follows that there are innate presuppositions over and above [sic] the spatial and temporal, in our language, forming a "cultural reservoir" upon which we draw. Our writers dip into this common pool (collective unconscious) for their material, whereas readers refer to it to interpret the images and metaphors they read. For instance, in our culture, the word 'eagle' brings to mind 'high-flying' and 'fast' as staple connotations; likewise, 'snail' conjures up 'grounded' and 'slow' right away. But in other languages, 'eagle' and 'snail' would not be thus counterpoised. That is, 'eagle' could just as well be understood primarily as being 'feathered,' so that its opposite in the national mind would be a non-feathered animal not necessarily a snail. Implicit assumptions of this type abound in every culture, and they act to inform the individual poetic tradition on every level.

(2) Authoritativeness of the Copula-Link

As Virgil Aldrich held in his essay "Art and the Human Form," there is a danger inherent in the "A is B" form of a metaphor, a form which is far more authoritative in tone than the "A is like B" that announces a simile. There is a temptation, as Nietzsche noted, to forget "that the original metaphors of perception are metaphors."
The nature of this particular mistake is that what was originally intended as a metaphor becomes a myth (see Uitti's scheme at the end of Chapter Six). The original metaphor presents a truth, and this truth can be so well-received ("like a revelation," as Murry expressed it) that it comes to be taken for the truth. Theodore Sarbin has shown that mythologizing-a-metaphor is at bottom responsible for the current misunderstanding of mental illness. He claims that the original metaphor was that of demonic possession, and its amplification is to blame for the modern "myth of mental illness" so well-documented by Thomas Szasz. In this case, the original metaphor has been pernicious in effect, with its analogy serving to determine the phenomenon under consideration.

Brooke-Rose isolates another repercussion of the copula's authoritativeness. She says that once A is said to be B, it is dangerous to try and equate A with another B in the same poem. This is the "one purely logical difficulty in the very strength of the copula;" it is so "didactic in tone, and so strong and direct that if one term is equated with two different things, we may be more aware of the incongruity." She says that poets finding themselves in this situation either attempt to tone down the incongruity (for example, by listing the metaphors one after the other, incantation-style, so that the disparate
images seem to flow into one. She quotes William of Shoreham's

Our Lady is the dove of Noah,
the bush of Sinai,
the rod of Aaron)

or to brazen out the incongruity in paradox (e.g. Chaucer: "And ye, that ben of beaute crop and roote.")

(3) Attitude-Shifting

Clearly, then, a metaphor is capable of inducing attitude-shifts in a readership. Turbayne explains that

the attitude-shifts produced by an effective metaphor point to a later stage of its life. A story often told--like advertising and propaganda--comes to be believed more seriously. Those details stressed tend to stay stressed while those suppressed tend to stay suppressed until another effective metaphor restores them. (221)

He sees this congelation or "sticking" as eventually reductive in effect; it can obstruct thought as easily as it can be mind-expanding. Thus, he says that

The long continued association of two ideas, especially if the association has theoretical and practical benefit, tends to result in our confusing them...In the sense of metaphor, the confusion is aided by the following factors: first, the two ideas already share the same name, a factor of great power in producing the belief in identity. Second, we are not always told that the two ideas are really different. (222)

A shift in attitude, whether activated by a metaphor or not, is potentially a dangerous entity. It wears built-in
blinkers, and tends to want to apotheosize itself.  
"The error is exposed in its fullest parochialism," wrote Burke,

when the contemporary epigones of psycho-analysis set about to interpret for us the hidden sexual motives at the roots of such intense and brilliant theologians as St. Augustine. The entire motivation by which Augustine lived and wrote is categorically discarded in favor of a few sexual impulses, which can, at best, be shown to have been an ingredient in his motivation.

By what authority can one call them the essence of his motivation? Non-sexual interests may be interpreted as the symbolization of sexual interests; but then again, sexual interests may themselves be considered as the symbolization of non-sexual interests...What, except the strong sexual orientation of our society in contrast with the strong religious orientation of St. Augustine's society, determines which shall be called the true motive and which the symbolic accretion?" (223)

Burke also notes that mythologizing or analogical extension is accomplished first by over-simplifying events and then by abstracting similarities from the reduced inventory. In this fashion, a certain interpretation of history--whatever it may be--sees certain events as recurring in patterns to the exclusion of other events perhaps equally prevalent.

(4) Seeing Too Much Analogically

The over-simplifying tendency is akin to one mentioned by Wittgenstein, that of seeing too much analogically. He claimed that philosophical perplexity
is attributable to this predilection, and that "Deceived by similarities of form and neglectful of differences of function, we interpret one part of our linguistic system on the false analogy of some other." \(^{224}\)

All in all, though, these four dangers amount to nothing more than a token caveat which will serve as a coda to my exposition of a prodigious linguistic/literary device. It is a small price to pay for the abundance of riches afforded by metaphor.
FOOTNOTES


13. Wenerberg, *op. cit.*, p. 120.


18. Ibid., p. 118.


25. Leatherdale, op. cit., p. 98.


27. Leatherdale, op. cit., p. 93.


33. Beardsley, op. cit., p. 81.
40. Brooke-Rose, op. cit., p. 113.
44. Ibid., p. 40.
50. Hester, op. cit., p. 142.
51. Leatherdale, op. cit., p. 51.
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