INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL

by

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The abuse of narcotic drugs is an international problem in almost every respect, and as such requires international solutions. This thesis deals with both these questions.

Since the last century, when the Sino-Indian opium trade thrived, the international trade in drugs has been of concern to the international community. After an introduction to the various types of narcotics and their properties, the history of drugs is reviewed, specifically with an eye to determining the factors which led to the creation of the international anti-narcotics movement. The international conferences on this subject, beginning with the Shanghai Opium Commission of 1909 and the Hague Opium Conferences several years later, were plagued with difficulties and conflicting objectives among the participants. The narcotics diplomacy which preceded the Second World War paved the way for current international action, but it also illustrated the problems inherent in international regulation.

The modern drug problem, chiefly the abuse of heroin, is studied and seen to be even more global than was the pre-World War II narcotics trade. The involvement of a greater number of states, both directly and indirectly, in the illicit drug traffic has been a stimulus to more vigorous international controls, but at the same time it has proved more difficult to enforce existing agreements throughout the international system. To an extent these difficulties can be attributed
to the nature of the problem itself, as well as to conditions existing in a number of states, but essentially it would seem that the illicit narcotics trade continues to flourish because of the nature of the international system in which it operates. Thus a paradox can be seen: the drug problem cannot be solved on a purely national level and hence international solutions must be adopted, but these solutions are also fated to face obstacles from the very start.
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Preface

The title of this paper is somewhat deceptive, for it is not clear that the international narcotics traffic is in fact controlled. The essential purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that narcotics abuse is fundamentally an international problem, and to explore the successes and failures of the international community's attempts to deal with it. The many ramifications of the heroin trade, which is the main object of this study, strain the analytical framework of this paper somewhat, but the fascinating nature of the topic would seem to make this inevitable. For the convenience of the reader, there are five parts to this study.

The initial portion deals with the history of drugs, and is intended to furnish a background to the narcotics problems of this century.

The second part of the paper examines the achievements of the international narcotics control movement before the Second World War, with a view to elucidating the nature of the obstacles which still block the path to full international cooperation.

In the third section, the modern heroin problem is set forth. The international aspects of the heroin trade make it a problem not easily susceptible to purely national solutions.

The penultimate section investigates the control of the heroin trade, as well as the factors which make it difficult to destroy the
trafficking networks which transport the narcotic.

The fifth part of the paper is the conclusion.

As will be seen, a discussion of heroin trafficking leads into a vast number of areas, underlying the fact that narcotics control is a highly political issue, both domestically and internationally.
I. DRUGS: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Drugs

Virtually any discussion of drugs becomes controversial almost by definition, for even when societies have reached a consensus as to what constitutes drug abuse, there is often little agreement on how to deal with it. When there are basic differences within nations on the question of drugs, it is hardly surprising that a variety of approaches concerning their control have been adopted by different national governments. The disparate perspectives and policies which characterize both the national and international efforts to grapple with the drug issue shall be a recurring theme of this paper.

The term "drug" is used widely and loosely by many authors on the subject. This frequent use of the word has perhaps made its definition rather vague. One standard reference work offers this definition:

A drug is any substance that affects living matter... usually, a substance used in treating illness or relieving pain.1

It is this second, qualifying portion of the definition which distinguishes drugs from a wide range of other substances, including all foods. Within the category of drugs it is also necessary to differentiate between relatively harmless drugs such as aspirin and more dangerous drugs such as heroin. The term "narcotics" is used for this second, often illegal, class of drugs. An acceptable definition of narcotics is:

A class of pain-killing drugs made from opium; also includes certain manufactured drugs that have opium-like effects.2
A century ago opium itself was the subject of concern, but the focus of regulatory efforts has since shifted to the manufactured derivatives of opium: morphine, codeine, and heroin. Morphine is an effective pain-killer, while codeine is valuable as a cough-suppressant. In most countries heroin is considered to have no medical value, but it is made from the same raw material as the other opium derivatives, a fact which has always complicated the efforts to strike at heroin manufacture by disrupting the production of raw opium.

Heroin is the principal, but not the only, narcotic drug. The legal definition of "narcotic" may not be the same as the medical definition, and generally the former interpretation is broader, including substances which, strictly speaking, are not narcotic. In most countries there are currently considered to be four categories of narcotics: opium (and its derivatives), cocaine, marijuana, and synthetic drugs. The first three substances originate in plants, while synthetics are manufactured chemically. Throughout this paper heroin will be the object of study, but first it is worth examining the other two natural narcotic substances.

Cocaine

Cocaine is derived from the leaves of the coca plant (*Erythroxylon coca*). Most of the cocaine which reaches the international trafficking networks originates in Peru or Bolivia. Natives of those and other Latin American countries chew the coca-leaves in order to ingest the drug, but consumers in other regions of the world generally inhale the refined drug. Cocaine is a stimulant, and can cause violent behaviour. Cocaine is psychologically, but not physically, addictive.
Marijuana

While there has been general agreement on the undesirability of both heroin and cocaine, the same cannot be said for the marijuana-hashish family of narcotics. In the past ten or fifteen years marijuana has been accepted by an increasingly large segment of many Western societies as normal, and enforcement of marijuana laws has often been deemphasized by governments. The difference between "hard" and "soft" drugs was not recognized by officials two decades ago, as the following statement by Harry J. Anslinger, former head of the U.S. Federal Bureau of Narcotics, demonstrates:

...marijuana is only and always a scourge which undermines its victims and degrades them mentally, morally, and physically. Medical experts agree on the complete unpredictability of the effect of marijuana on different individuals. A small dose taken by one subject may bring about intense intoxication, raving fits, criminal assaults.... In the earliest stages of intoxication the will power is destroyed and inhibitions and restraints are released; the moral barricades are broken down and often debauchery and sexuality results.... Constant use produces an incapacity for work and a disorientation of purpose. The drug has a corroding effect on the body and on the mind, weakening the entire physical system and often leading to insanity after prolonged use.

The fact that this assessment seems so hysterical today is a good indication as to how much attitudes towards marijuana have changed. The drug currently seems to be in a twilight zone between legality and illegality, and research as to the true effects of marijuana use is still going on. Certainly the main emphasis of international narcotics control has not been directed against marijuana, but rather against the opiates, cocaine, and to a lesser extent hashish.

Opium

With the possible exception of alcohol, no drug has played as
significant a role in human history as has opium. Opium is derived from
the juice of the opium poppy (*Papaver somniferum*), and its medicinal
properties were first uncovered by the Sumerians. By 1550 B.C. this
knowledge had spread from Babylonia to Egypt, and Homer mentions the
drug in the *Iliad*. Opium was embraced by physicians because of its
apparent effect against all manner of ailments. Doses of opium rarely
cured the patient (an objective that was often beyond the abilities of
even the most talented practitioner), but it did have the effect of
alleviating the victim's suffering. As long as sickness could not be
prevented, it was at least made more pleasant.

The twin properties of eliminating pain and inducing euphoria
ensured that opium use would be widespread. Because of religious
prohibitions against alcohol, opium became very widely grown and used
in India, as was discovered by European explorers in the sixteenth
century. From here, the drug spread to China, in part through the
efforts of Portugese traders.

It is the habit-forming properties of the opiates which make them
both so socially disruptive and commercially valuable. As use continues
over a period of time, ever-increasing quantities of the drug are required
to produce the euphoria sought by the addict. The growing tolerance of
the addict's system for the drug also creates the need for a continuing
supply if a chemical imbalance is to be avoided. Abrupt termination of
the habit results in severe withdrawal symptoms--and sometimes death.
Complex medical and moral questions are raised if it is proposed that the
addict should be deprived of his daily drug requirements, as will be seen
later.
It is evident that opiates are excellent commercial products, for most consumers are addicts, who thus provide a reliable and stable market. Addicts are often driven to anti-social and criminal acts in order to secure money to meet their need for drugs, and thus the cost of addiction is borne not only by the addict himself, but by the entire society. As a consequence of this, governments cannot remain indifferent to the problem of addiction, quite apart from moral considerations, for the addict becomes an unproductive and potentially criminal member of society. These observations are valid whether the drug in question is opium, morphine, or heroin, and whether we are speaking of China, Europe, or North America.

Opiate Use in the Nineteenth Century

The Sino-Indian Opium Trade

While societies have had to confront the problems of drug use for many years, the trade in opium only became an international question with the establishment of British power in India in the final third of the eighteenth century. The British objective in stimulating the sale of Indian opium to China was quite simple—what was desired was a dependable source of tax revenue. By establishing an opium concession (and later a government monopoly), the British were able to make their Indian colony profitable. The opium trade, mainly with China, furnished about one-seventh of the total revenue of British India.¹⁵

The emergence of opium as an item of international commerce had ramifications which went well beyond the impact on the Indian budget. Commercial ties had been established between China and Europe at an early date, and many European explorations had as their goal the discovery of
a direct sea route to China. When this direct route was finally established it was an improvement over the indirect trade through Moslem middlemen which had previously dominated Sino-European commerce, but the Europeans were still faced with a difficult problem. There was much the Europeans wanted from the Chinese, but little the Chinese wanted in return. Thus wealthy Europeans were forced to pay in silver for the Chinese luxury goods they desired. This unhealthy balance of trade did not meet with the approval of contemporary European economists, but there seemed to be no alternative as long as Europeans wished to purchase Chinese goods.\textsuperscript{16}

Opium provided an answer to this problem. Opium could be traded for Chinese goods in the place of silver, and thus in the nineteenth century the opium trade became the source of economic as well as social problems for the Chinese. Opium smoking had been prohibited in 1729, and in 1800 the smoking, cultivation, and importation of opium was specifically forbidden.\textsuperscript{17} Since the British not only permitted but encouraged this commerce, the result was the Opium War of 1839–1842. The British victory assured them of the right to trade freely, even though this meant an important limitation on Chinese sovereignty. The Chinese defeat marked a significant new phase of the European encroachment upon Chinese independence, but the increasing use of opium itself (which was greatly facilitated by the elimination of all restrictions after the Opium War) was also an important part of the European ascendancy in China. The trade grew so rapidly that by the 1880s opium was the the most important item being imported into China.\textsuperscript{18} The spread of the habit was so extensive that, it was estimated, in 1906
there were 13,460,000 opium smokers in China out of a population of about 400,000,000—about three and one-half percent of the total population and twenty-seven percent of the adult males.19

**Opiate Use in the United States**

Throughout the nineteenth century narcotic addiction was also on the rise in the United States. Opium smoking never became popular (except in the Chinese communities), but the drug was regularly prescribed by doctors, and was an ingredient in many popular patent medicines. By the turn of the century addiction was widespread, and drug use was so prevalent in the United States that addiction became known to Europeans as the "American Disease."20 In contrast to China, addiction in the United States centered almost exclusively on the manufactured derivatives morphine and cocaine, and on opium-based patent medicines. These latter remedies contributed greatly to the spread of addiction by virtue of the fact that in many cases the public was not aware of the narcotic content of the "cures." Even when this knowledge was available, consumption of the product was often unaffected, for there was little in the public consciousness to inhibit drug use. Coca-Cola, for example, contained cocaine until 1903.21

The steady rise of narcotics consumption in the United States stirred little public awareness or concern until the first decade of this century, when a wave of reformism swept over American politics. This movement was a major factor in fostering the development of both public and official consciousness of drug abuse. This development coincided with the discovery and spread of a new opiate derivative which
held out even greater potential for abuse—heroin.

**Heroin**

Heroin was first synthesized by the English researcher C.R. Wright in 1874, but he discontinued his experiments when he found that dogs under the influence of the drug had adverse reactions. In the 1890s German scientists connected with the Bayer chemical concern investigated the substance further and concluded that it would be effective in relieving respiratory ailments. Heroin was also considered to be a promising cure for opium addiction. Medical experts were enthusiastic about the discovery of a supposedly non-addictive miracle cure, and Bayer's aggressive international advertising campaign made heroin one of the most popular patent medicines. It soon became evident that the preliminary findings of the Bayer chemists were wrong, however; heroin was indeed addictive, and a growing number of addicts, especially in the United States, were using the drug. In less than three decades heroin became the principal factor in American drug abuse, and in 1924 Congress unanimously voted to outlaw the manufacture and importation of heroin.

**The Manufacture of Heroin**

The manufacture of heroin from raw opium involves two chemical processes. The first is fairly simple and has as its objective the extraction of morphine base from the crude opium. Refinement of this morphine base into heroin is more complex, and requires an expert chemist.

The essential ingredient of heroin is morphine, which is the active ingredient of opium, which in turn comes from the opium poppy. The
yearly crop is sown at the end of summer, and a few months later the poppies are ready for harvesting. Each poppy has a brilliant flower, which contains a seed pod about the size of an egg. This pod is slit by the farmer to release a milky sap—opium. When the opium has oozed out and congealed on the surface of the seed pod, it is collected and stored in a viscous mass. In this form the opium can be stored for several years, but it is not easy to transport. For this reason the opium is usually converted to morphine base as close to the poppy fields as is feasible.

The extraction of morphine from the opium is not a complicated operation. The opium is dissolved in hot water, and lime fertilizer is added to precipitate the organic waste. This leaves the morphine suspended near the surface, whereupon it is filtered and heated in a second container. Ammonia is added, causing the morphine to solidify, after which a second filtration yields the white morphine base, which is packaged in cakes or bricks. The morphine base weighs only one-tenth of what the raw opium weighed. The actual morphine content of the base varies from about 50 percent in Southeast Asia to 70 percent or higher in Turkish base. This difference is due to the superior morphine content of Turkish opium; the refining techniques are virtually identical throughout the world.

The second stage, refinement of the morphine base into heroin, is both more difficult and more dangerous than the preparation of the morphine base itself, and considerable expertise is required by the "heroin chemists." Chemically heroin is diacetylmorphine—a morphine molecule bonded with two acetic acid molecules. Heroin, like aspirin, is just a
brand name selected by Bayer to identify the drug. To manufacture ten kilos of heroin the chemist heats ten kilos of morphine base and ten kilos of acetic anhydride together. Both the timing and temperature must be carefully watched in order to avoid chemical destruction of the morphine. When the chemical bonding is complete the diacetylmorphine is treated with water and chloroform to precipitate impurities. The solution is then drained into another flask and sodium carbonate is added to cause the crude heroin to solidify. A suction pump is used to filter the heroin out of this solution. The heroin is further purified by the addition of alcohol and activated charcoal, after which the mixture is heated. Purple, or smoking heroin, commonly known as No. 3 heroin, is purple or brown in colour and is made from crude heroin combined with strychnine and caffeine, as well as barbitone. It is used for smoking and is found primarily in Southeast Asia. The final purity of No. 3 heroin is usually about 15 percent.

To produce the higher quality No. 4 heroin used by Western addicts a final step is required. The heroin is dissolved in alcohol, and ether and hydrochloric acid are added. This causes the formation of tiny white flakes, which are carefully filtered and dried. In its ultimate form the No. 4 heroin resembles soap, either as flakes or powder. Depending upon the skill of the chemist and the caliber of his equipment the heroin will be from 80 to 99 percent pure.

One kilogram of morphine base will convert into slightly more than one kilogram of heroin, the gain in weight being due to the addition of chemicals. Ten kilos of good Turkish opium will thus yield about one kilo of high grade heroin. Indian, Persian, and Southeast Asian opium
is less potent and more is required to make a kilo of heroin.

While the morphine content of the drug increases as it goes through the various refining processes, just the opposite occurs as the nearly pure No. 4 heroin moves down the illicit distribution network. The heroin is adulterated time and again until it is retailed to the consumer-addict, by which time it may have a purity of less than 5 percent. The heroin also becomes more valuable as it moves through each stage of the network, since the entire operation is illegal and thus risky.

The American Reaction to Drug Abuse

Addiction as a Crime

The realization that the United States had a serious drug problem, and the increasing popularity of the new drug heroin led to considerable discussion among public officials in the first two decades of this century. The debate over anti-narcotics legislation revolved not around the existence of the problem, but rather on how to handle it. Professional opinion and the public mood both called for action, but the question was which professionals should be called upon to deal with the addicts: law enforcement officers or medical experts? One point was evident from the start; unlike the debate over liquor, the users of narcotics would not be party to the discussions.

A number of doctors argued that addicts were ill, and that any abrupt cut-off of drugs would not only cause great hardships among addicts, but would force them to obtain drugs illegally. If qualified physicians were allowed to dispense the drugs to addicts, no black market need spring up, and the addicts could be treated according to the best theories. There
were two main counter-arguments. The overprescribing of addictive drugs by physicians was one of the causes of the problem, and thus turning matters over to the medical profession might only make things worse. Secondly, the best method of "curing" addiction was not known, and no one could say with certainty that there was any cure. The only guarantee that the addict would cease his use of the drug lay in preventing his access to it, and it was just this that advocates of the enforcement approach suggested.

The logic of the reformers who pressed for a total ban on narcotics use was bolstered by the popular image of the addict. Several forms of drug abuse were closely identified with various racial and cultural subgroups. An early example of this was the association of opium-smoking with the Chinese immigrants on the West Coast—an association which was valid, for this habit never caught on with whites. It was no coincidence that the first national legislation prohibiting a drug was the Opium Exclusion Act of 1909, for it was clear that this ban would only affect the Chinese users. Equally compelling was the argument that cocaine was a vice peculiar to blacks, even though there was no proof of this assertion. The state and local regulations passed against cocaine in the southern United States before the first World War reflected the fear that cocaine use would cause Negroes to forget their place. These regulations were part of a larger pattern of segregationist legislation, and by stimulating such fears anti-narcotics groups were able to gain support for their cause. In similar fashion heroin use was considered to be confined to juvenile delinquents. These public beliefs about narcotics
remained unchanged despite information to the contrary, such as a Federal government report published in 1919 which concluded that addiction cut across racial and economic barriers.  

The future direction of American drug policies was resolved in the decade 1914-1924 in favour of those pressing for severe restrictions on the availability of narcotics. In 1914 the Harrison Act was passed, which, for Constitutional reasons, utilized the Federal powers of taxation and tariffs to regulate transactions involving narcotics. It was not immediately clear to what extent the Act would restrict the dispensation of drugs by physicians, but after a number of Supreme Court rulings in favour of enforcement agencies the legal supply of narcotics dried up. The Congressional ban on heroin in 1924 merely ratified the Court rulings: the sale and use of narcotics was a crime, and would come under the jurisdiction of the police rather than the medical profession.

Addiction as an International Problem

The identification of narcotics use with various minority groups reflected the vague American belief that the high rate of addiction was not caused by intrinsic flaws in American society, but rather by circumstances beyond American control. The reformers who led the drive to outlaw drug use in the United States were also active in the international anti-opium movement. Once the United States had acted against drug addiction at home, they argued, the problem would be solved provided foreign governments did the same. Since no opium was grown in the United States, this was a convincing argument.
The shift towards narcotics prohibition in the United States thus had a heavy impact on the international narcotics movement. Because it had the worst addiction problem of any Western nation, as well as being an important power in its own right, the United States has played the most significant role throughout this century in pressing for the international control of narcotics. The consensus reached in the United States that drug abuse is best combated by strict prohibition at home and international cooperation abroad has been the key determinant in American foreign policy in this area since before World War I. And unlike its short-lived brother, liquor Prohibition, the prohibition of narcotics has remained in effect, primarily because public and especially official opinion has generally supported it.
II. INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL BEFORE THE SECOND WORLD WAR

The Origins of the International Movement

Prominent Americans concerned with the narcotics problem were convinced that stringent domestic legislation alone could not solve the United States drug problem. Often proponents of the international approach considered domestic legislation to have a greater effect as a demonstration of American good faith to other countries than in its own right. The anti-narcotics movement also tended to attract dedicated, idealistic individuals who concentrated their energies almost exclusively on the narcotics issue. Not surprisingly, these idealists were often at odds with the professional diplomats, for the latter had to consider a far wider range of interests before committing their states to action on the narcotics question. For a variety of reasons, American policy was in the hands of the idealists to a much greater extent than was the case in the European countries.

Indignation at the opium vice was not in itself a sufficient force to propel the United States into a position of leadership in the field of narcotics control. After all, it had only been a few decades earlier that the slave trade had been a major moral issue, and it had been Great Britain which had taken the lead in the face of American indifference or hostility. The basis of the international movement against the opium trade lay in political developments in the Far East.
The Situation in the Far East

The situation in China had changed somewhat since the British victory in the Opium War of 1839 had assured the continued importation of foreign opium into China. Imports had peaked around 1880 at about 6,500 tons each year, but by 1905 this had dropped by half. This was not due to a drop in consumption, but rather to the increased opium production of China herself, which exceeded 22,000 tons by the turn of the century. The fact that China was the world's largest opium producer ruled out any attempts to curtail the trade between China and India, for little moral pressure could be brought to bear against the British to make the financial sacrifice connected with the abandonment of the Indian opium revenues if this would leave the state of affairs in China more or less unchanged. A report by a royal commission published in 1895 concluded that the use of opium was a traditional and well-entrenched social habit which was not injurious to Orientals in many instances. It was not the case that opium use was harmful and evil in Asia as it was in "civilized" countries, and thus it was hardly logical to stop the profitable production of opium in India to satisfy the misguided morality of anti-opium crusaders who did not perceive the issue in the proper perspective.

The official position of the British government, as stated in the 1895 report, was that opium use was acceptable in India and China on both economic and moral grounds. This opinion was held even though the Chinese themselves viewed opium, and the Indian trade, as a grave problem. Such a pronouncement would be inconceivable now, for the international community would consider active support of the narcotics traffic to be reprehensible.
It is easily forgotten that less than a century ago almost all countries agreed that the production, transportation and consumption of opium was of interest to governments only in so far as revenues were concerned. This detached attitude had to be changed before effective international action could be taken, and it is in this area that the anti-narcotics movement had its main success.

The reform movement which began in China after the Japanese victory in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 had as one of its main goals the elimination of the opium habit. While many of the political objectives of the reformers were not achieved until after the Revolution of 1911 which deposed the Manchus, the anti-opium campaign was surprisingly effective. At the same time as the Chinese were acting against opium abuse, British policy was undergoing a significant change. The election of a Liberal government in 1906 marked a complete reversal of the British stance on the Sino-Indian opium trade, and in 1907 the British and the Chinese signed the Ten Year Agreement. Under its provisions the amount of opium exported from India was to be reduced by one-tenth each year, so that in ten years the trade would have ceased altogether. Three years after the signing the agreement would be renewed for the remaining seven years if the Chinese anti-opium campaign were proving effective.

To a large extent the American image of the Chinese opium problem was gained through the reports of American missionaries in China, a number of whom were themselves active in the anti-opium movement. Their representations of the evils of opium were in harmony with the views of many government and business leaders, who felt that a united, strong and
free China would be an excellent market for American goods. The American support for the Chinese anti-opium efforts was but a part of the more comprehensive United States trade policy towards China. Despite the interest of a variety of American groups in the Chinese situation, however, it is doubtful that the United States would have become actively involved in the opium question had it not been for the Spanish-American War of 1898 and the ensuing acquisition of the Philippine Islands.

In 1843 the Spanish had implemented a policy of auctioning the right to sell opium to merchants who were then at liberty to sell the drug to the Chinese consumers on the islands. Sales to Filipinos were banned, but the Spanish had not considered it practical to try to eradicate the habit among the Chinese. The system worked fairly well, for addiction was confined to the Chinese population, smuggling was negligible, and the colonial administration collected about $600,000 each year in revenues. Variations of this system, including direct government monopolies, were in effect throughout most of the European possessions in Southeast Asia.

The United States, as a new, and in their own minds a different, colonial power, was reluctant to adopt such a scheme. The Spanish policy was abolished, but as there was little to put in its place, a committee was formed and dispatched to the various Southeast Asian territories to investigate the methods of dealing with opium use. The Opium Committee inquiry was conducted in the latter half of 1903, and in its report the British, French and Dutch systems were rejected. The regulations in these regions:

...do not pretend to be laws for the protection of the people against a vice, but rather commercial regulations guarding a branch of commerce.
The committee drew a sharp contrast between this state of affairs and the commendable Japanese efforts in Formosa to eliminate a serious opium problem by a strict government monopoly, the registration of users, and anti-opium instruction in the schools. The committee recommended similar measures for the Philippines, and in 1905 the United States Congress passed a law prohibiting the importation, sale, and use of opium in the Philippines except for medical purposes. The law went into effect after a three-year preparatory period.

The Shanghai Opium Commission

The direct involvement which the United States now had in the Far Eastern opium problem, coupled with the developments in Britain and China mentioned above, prompted the United States to call for an international meeting on the subject. During 1907 a number of nations were contacted, and it was agreed that the International Opium Commission would meet in Shanghai in 1909. All the major powers attended, but the Commission was not all that the United States had hoped for, since representatives were not able to make commitments on behalf of their respective national governments, as would have been the case had a full conference been called. The Commission encountered several other difficulties. Turkey refused to participate, and Persia sent only an ill-prepared commercial delegate at the last minute. Both these countries were important opium producers. Perhaps more significant was the British refusal to discuss the Sino-Opium trade, on the grounds that this question had been resolved by the Ten Year Agreement, and thus was not a legitimate subject for an international meeting.
The Shanghai Opium Commission was the first truly international attempt to deal with the opium problem, and even though discussion of the Sino-Indian opium trade was precluded there were many basic issues to be examined. The core of the matter was the American contention that any use of opium, other than for medical purposes, was illegitimate, and should be prohibited. The Americans maintained that the principal obstacle to a solution of the opium problem was the reliance by the colonial powers on opium for revenue purposes. The United States submitted eight proposals for discussion, in the hope that they would be unanimously accepted, thus creating norms which could serve as the basis for concerted action at a later conference.

The first American proposal called for a "uniform effort" by the nations represented to limit the use of opium and its derivatives to medical purposes only. The British objected to this on the grounds that opium use in India was common as a household remedy, and hence regulation was wiser and more practical than prohibition. The second American proposal condemned the dependence of certain governments on opium-based revenues, and urged that this dependence be ended quickly so as to facilitate the prohibition of opium outlined in the first proposal. In the face of British objections this proposal was withdrawn.

The next three American proposals met with few objections, as they concerned the categorization of prepared opium and opium derivatives, as well as the duty of states to prevent opium exports to countries which prohibited its use. The last three proposals, however, were much more controversial, and met with strong British objections. The sixth American resolution called for increased inter-governmental
cooperation in order to help each state eliminate its own opium problem. The British were not prepared to support this principle, which they saw as being outside the jurisdiction of the Commission, especially since it implied a British obligation to help the Chinese in their fight against opium. The seventh resolution simply called for the holding of an international conference to formulate a treaty on narcotics control, but this was also withdrawn when it was argued that such a specific recommendation to the governments concerned would be inappropriate.

The greatest furor was raised by the last American proposal, which read in part:

...every nation which effectively prohibits the production of opium and its derivatives in the country, except for medical purposes, should be free to prohibit the importation into its territories of opium or its derivatives, except for medical purposes.

This was squarely aimed at the Anglo-Chinese Ten Year Agreement, and as pointed out above the British were adamant in their refusal to discuss the subject. The British were successful in their efforts to keep the Sino-Indian opium trade out of the international forum, but only at the cost of strengthening the American prejudice against the British on the opium question. In the opinion of the American delegation, the British position on this matter proved that the Ten Year Agreement was: "too weak to stand criticism."

Both Great Britain and China presented proposals to the Commission as well, and the resolutions which were finally adopted unanimously by the delegates were something of an amalgam of all these proposals. Unanimity was deliberately sought by the participants, especially the
American delegation, as a basis for further international action, and thus the outcome of the Commission reflected a compromise between the American and Chinese position and that of the European colonial powers, led by Great Britain. The principles that the non-medical use of opium was illegitimate, and that each state had an obligation to ban opium exports to states which prohibited its use, were in large part accepted. The failure of the Commission to deal with the Sino-Indian opium trade was not as significant as the fact that a consensus was beginning to take shape, based primarily on the American view of the narcotics problem.

The Hague Opium Conferences

Narcotics—a Worldwide Problem

In order to formalize the non-binding recommendations of the Shanghai Opium Commission, the United States began to press for a conference soon after the Commission ended, but not all the countries involved were as eager as the United States. Great Britain insisted that the scope of the proposed conference be widened so as to include the manufactured drugs morphine and cocaine. The additional British condition, that each participating state complete research into these substances, delayed the start of the conference until after the May, 1911 renewal of the Ten Year Agreement.66 While British hesitance revolved around the matter of timing, Germany, as the world's leading manufacturer of drugs, was opposed to the conference on principle. Pressured by chemical concerns such as Bayer, Germany pursued a policy of obstructionism both before and during the conference.67
The consideration of manufactured drugs, as well as opium, made it clear that the proposed conference would deal with all aspects of the international drug problem, not just those connected with the Far East, as had been the case in Shanghai. The very fact that the Hague had been selected as the site for the conference underlined this point. Despite the indifference of a number of states, and the hostility of several others, notably Germany, the Hague Opium Conference convened on December 1, 1911.

The final text of the Convention contained five Chapters, each dealing with a separate aspect of the world drug problem. Chapter I (Articles 1-5) concerned itself with raw opium. The crucial Article was the third, which pledged each power to "prevent the export of raw opium to countries which shall have prohibited its entry." This was an important step forward, but the production of raw opium was left uncontrolled, and in the future this would become an increasingly controversial point.

Chapter II (Articles 6-8) called for the gradual suppression of the trade in prepared opium, but as no time limit was set for the achievement of this goal, the effectiveness of this Chapter was doubtful. Such a weakening of key articles was necessitated by the need to obtain a broad consensus. This was true to an even greater degree with respect to Chapter III (Articles 9-14), which dealt with cocaine and the various opium derivatives.

The British had been concerned with the issue of manufactured drugs well before the conference began, and had come armed with a series of strong proposals to restrict their production. It was in
just this area that German intransigence was centered, however, and after a week's deadlock the British were forced to agree to the insertion of the qualifying phrase "the contracting parties shall use their best endeavors to take..." the measures indicated in the Convention. This left a large loophole, for it was difficult to demonstrate that a given country was not doing its best to carry out the provisions of the Convention, even if it seemed that such were the case.\textsuperscript{71}

In support of their position the German delegates made several arguments. They cited the constitutional difficulties encountered by a federal state in signing a convention which might infringe on state autonomy. They also pointed out that Germany herself had an effective system of domestic control, and that other countries should protect themselves in a similar manner. Finally, the Germans stressed that to be effective any convention would have to be adhered to by all states.\textsuperscript{72}

Chapter IV (Articles 15-19) concerned the situation in China, and its adoption was a victory for the Chinese delegation. This Chapter called for the cessation of opium imports to China with the exception of the imports provided for by the Ten Year Agreement. Thus other nations were prevented from trying to secure a similar exemption for their opium.

Chapter V (Articles 20 and 21) called for each state to "examine the possibility" of making possession of narcotics an offense. The inclusion of this concept implied an acceptance of the American idea that the possession of illegal drugs was evidence demonstrating guilt. The fact that the international community tentatively accepted this legal principle before it was passed into law by the United States Congress illustrates the importance that the American anti-narcotic reformers
placed on international cooperation. The second part of Chapter V, Article 21, provided for the exchange of statistics, information, and the texts of laws and regulations among the contracting powers. This was also based on an American proposal, and as an *ad hoc* measure foreshadowed the systematic exchange of information which would become common later on. This provision was adopted without much controversy.

The same cannot be said for Chapter VI (Articles 22-25), which dealt with how the Convention should be brought into force. The Germans, with French support, continued to demand that all states must adhere to the Convention before it came into force. There was some validity in this, for several important states had not attended the conference; these being Turkey (opium), Switzerland (manufactured drugs), Peru, and Bolivia (coca leaves). On the other hand, waiting until all thirty-four sovereign states had signed the Convention would greatly delay its implementation. An American attempt to split Chapter III away from the rest of the Convention was opposed by the British, who pointed out that they had agreed to participate in the Conference with the understanding that manufactured drugs would be considered on the same basis as opium.

The deadlock was broken by the adoption of a compromise scheme, contained in Chapter VI. Provisions were made for powers not in attendance to sign the Convention, and if all states had not adhered to the Convention by December 31, 1912, the Netherlands agreed to call a second conference to consider the possibility of bringing the Convention into effect without the unanimity desired by the Germans. With this the Hague Conference ended.

**The Results of the Hague Conference**

Was the Conference a success? Few states could be satisfied with
every article, but this was only natural. In many respects the Convention went beyond the resolutions of the Shanghai Opium Commission, especially in recognizing the global nature of the narcotics problem. One of the major issues of the future, the control of manufactured drugs, was raised but not solved.\textsuperscript{77} There were also defects in the Convention, however. The measures which national governments were called upon to implement were not made specific, and thus interpretation of these articles was left to the governments themselves. The regulations suggested by the Convention were all in the national rather than the international sphere.\textsuperscript{78} The most serious flaw was the possibility that the Convention might never come into effect at all. When the Netherlands called the Second Hague Conference on July 1, 1913, twelve powers had not signed the Convention, and of these Turkey, Greece and Switzerland had indicated that they would not sign.\textsuperscript{79}

The only result of the Second Conference was a resolution calling for increased pressure on non-signatories, and an agreement to meet the following year. When the Third Hague Conference convened on June 15, 1914, only Serbia and Turkey had failed to either sign or profess a willingness to do so. Eight powers had also ratified the Convention.\textsuperscript{80} The Americans and British argued that the implementation of the Convention should not be thwarted by a handful of states, but Germany, supported by France and Russia, held to its original position. Eventually a compromise was agreed upon, whereby the Convention would operate among the ratifying states only.\textsuperscript{81}

The painfully slow implementation of the Hague Convention, as well
as the outright refusal of Turkey to sign, made it clear that a truly effective, universal agreement on the control of narcotics was far in the future. Even so, the Convention embodied a number of principles which form the basis for the current international regulatory regime, and thus represented an important step forward. The pledge by the signatories to prohibit opium exports (Chapter I), as well as undertake measures against the trade in prepared opium (Chapter II) and manufactured drugs (Chapter III) indicated that a consensus was forming among the world's powers in the field of narcotics control. What was required in the future was the establishment of international bodies to bring these ideas into practice.

The Implementation of Consensus

After the First World War the international narcotics control movement thus advanced into a new stage. The Hague Convention furnished a legal basis for further anti-narcotics agreements, but it was only through these subsequent agreements that a system of international controls could be created to actually deal with the problems. Once this machinery was in place the most important question would still remain unanswered: would it work?

The Postwar Situation

There were several major political developments, both in Europe and the Far East, which affected the anti-narcotics movement. Perhaps the most significant of these was the formation of the League of Nations, which was given the responsibility of supervising the Hague Convention under Article 23c of the League Covenant. This gave rise to problems
for the United States strongly supported the Hague Convention, but wished to have nothing to do with the League. As a result, American involvement in the League-sponsored conferences was hesitant and at times hostile. 82

While the involvement of the League in the narcotics control movement was something of a mixed blessing, there could be no doubt that the opium problem in China had worsened in the decade following the Shanghai deliberations. The Chinese Revolution in 1911 had led to the disintegration of China into a number of warring provinces, and this was accompanied by a resurgence of opium cultivation throughout the country. The total opium production of China never reached the astronomical levels of the turn of the century, but it was high enough to reverse the effects of the 1906 anti-opium campaign. It was evident that any effective international action in the Far East would be impossible until China was reunified under an effective national government. 83

The drug trade itself was undergoing a significant change at this time. Increasingly, manufactured drugs (morphine, heroin, and cocaine) were replacing the more expensive and bulkier opium. The shift to heroin was worldwide, affecting both the United States 84 and China, where heroin was sold as an anti-opium remedy. 85 These manufactured drugs were produced quite legally and in quantities far in excess of the licit demand 86 with the result that much of the production was diverted into the illicit market. The United States was well aware of this crucial aspect of the narcotics problem, and together with its growing awareness of its own drug problem this resulted in a shift
of priorities; the opium problem in the Far East was now considered secondary to the goals of reducing the rate of addiction in the United States and eliminating the involvement of American nationals in the illicit traffic. This change in outlook represented a realistic view that the world narcotics issue was multifaceted, but unfortunately the United States did not go one step further and conclude that some parts of the drug problem could be dealt with more effectively than others. The American insistence on sweeping solutions instead of piecemeal advances effectively paralyzed the international movement throughout the 1920s.

Failure in Geneva

The American suspicion of the League stemmed not only from the general anti-League, isolationist mood in the United States, but also from the way the League undertook to discharge its responsibility for the control of drugs. The body in charge of this task was the Opium Advisory Committee, which originally had eight members: China, France, Great Britain, Netherlands, India, Japan, Portugal, and Siam. Each of the European members possessed colonies in which there was a government monopoly. The conflict of interests which this caused did not escape the notice of observers, and it accounted for the nickname the committee was given—"the old Opium Bloc."

In November 1924 the Council of the League of Nations decided to convene two conferences; one to deal with the subject of smoking opium in the Far East, and the other to deal with more general questions involving the drug problem. The site for these conferences was Geneva. The
United States did not participate in the first conference, which was confined to those states possessing territories in Asia in which the use of opium was permitted.\textsuperscript{89}

The American position at the Second Geneva Opium Conference (1925) was that a comprehensive program was needed to solve the narcotics problem, and to this end the United States proposed universal acceptance of the illegitimacy of non-medical or non-scientific drug use, the limitation of manufacture, and most importantly, the control of raw opium production.\textsuperscript{90} The entire American package was too radical to have a chance of acceptance. The idea of restricting opium production so as to leave no surplus for illicit use was rejected by most opium-producing states, for this would have reduced their revenues considerably. Similar objections were raised by manufacturing states when their interests were threatened.

The United States also strove to establish a definite timetable for eliminating the traffic in opium, but India, backed by several European states, opposed this proposal on the grounds that it had been discussed at the First Geneva Conference several months previous (without result). It was also felt that the chaotic political situation in China made the establishment of a timetable impractical.

Compromise proved impossible. The American delegation was headed by Representative Stephen G. Porter, Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Porter was vehemently opposed to the League of Nations, but had developed an interest in the narcotics question and thus had joined the State Department and the anti-narcotics groups in pressing for international controls.\textsuperscript{91} He had no intention of weakening the
American proposals just to reach an agreement. In this he was supported by the instructions from Congress which accompanied the appropriation funding the American delegation, for the delegation was forbidden to sign any agreement which did not fully embody the American viewpoint.92 There was no spirit of compromise on either side in any case; at one point near the end of the conference the head of the British delegation asserted that the per capita opium consumption in the United States exceeded that of India, which Porter denounced as "a vile slander upon the American people." Porter himself strongly implied that the British were violating the Hague Convention for financial gain.93 It was in this spirit that the United States delegation withdrew from the Conference on February 6, 1925, citing the futility of further discussions as justification for this drastic action.

The conference continued, even though it was obvious that no truly effective measures could be taken without the cooperation of the United States, which was both an important consumer and manufacturer of drugs. The most significant accomplishment of the Second Conference was the establishment of the Permanent Central (Opium) Board (PCB), a non-governmental body of experts entrusted with the supervision of the international narcotics control system.94 All in all the conference was a failure, especially since the British and Americans were in virtual agreement on the subject of limiting the manufacture of drugs. It was only the American insistence on trying to devise a completely comprehensive agreement that prevented compromise. It required a cooling-off period of several years before the United States rejoined the international movement.95
The 1931 Limitation Conference

By 1930 opinion in both the United States and the League states, notably Great Britain, was leaning towards a reconciliation, and the acrimony in Geneva five years earlier was seen as an unpleasant incident best forgotten. Although the United States had refused to sign the Geneva Convention, it had been complying with many of its articles.

Since the controversy at the Second Geneva Conference had centered on questions related to opium, it was apparent that a conference dealing only with the issue of manufactured drugs would have every chance of success, and the Conference for the Limitation of the Manufacture of Narcotic Drugs accordingly convened in Geneva on May 27, 1931.

A quota system was advocated by the British government, but eventually the conference adopted a more flexible scheme. Each state was called upon to submit an annual estimate of its legitimate drug needs, which would then be examined by a supervisory body. This body would comment on the estimates made, as well as furnish estimates on behalf of states which failed to do so themselves. The quantities manufactured by each state were to be limited to the amount called for by the estimates, with imports, exports, and confiscations taken into account. Under this system the production of heroin would be greatly restricted. By comparing import and export figures, it could be determined whether a state was building up a surplus of narcotics.

The relatively small number of manufacturing countries ensured that these regulations could be brought into force quickly and effectively. The Convention came into effect on July 9, 1933. This system of controls is essentially the same as that in force at the present time.
The success of the Limitation Conference contrasts sharply with the breakup of the Second Opium Conference six years earlier. The essential difference between the two meetings was that the Limitation Conference was considering only one aspect of the narcotics problem, and thus there were real chances for an agreement. As a result, a more optimistic and conciliatory atmosphere prevailed, and compromises were more easily reached. The Limitation Convention was successful in its goal of reducing the diversion of legally produced drugs into the illicit market, but this did not lead to a corresponding reduction in the illicit traffic, for as we shall see clandestine factories were able to maintain the supply. 100

Unsolved Problems

Several major problems remained unsolved, despite the success of the Limitation Conference. A definite plan did not exist for the elimination of the opium trade in the Far East, and matters had advanced little since the Hague Convention, which called for the elimination of the trade, but set no time limit. 101 More serious than this, however, were the questions of the illicit traffic, and the limitation of raw opium production. Neither of these problems has been solved at the present time, and the ineffective attempts at their solution in the 1930s serve to illustrate the difficulties encountered.

In November, 1931, a conference was held in Bangkok to discuss the suppression of opium smoking. There was little hope of any effective agreement, for China did not even participate, and the United States only participated as an observer. The product of the conference was merely
a reiteration of the Hague principle of suppression without a set time limit. In effect, opium smoking was recognized by the international community as a fact of life which would resist corrective measures until fundamental political, social, and economic changes took place in Asia.

It was becoming increasingly clear that even the most ingenious and stringent schemes for restricting narcotics use would have a doubtful effect if smuggling remained uncontrolled. It had been a consistent argument of the European powers with government monopolies in their Asian colonies that prohibition was unworkable because of smuggling, and thus it was for the best if the government sold the opium itself. To deal with this problem, the Conference for the Suppression of the Illicit Traffic in Dangerous Drugs convened in Geneva during the summer of 1936. The resulting convention called for the severe punishment of those involved in trafficking, and the extradition of offenders was provided for, in order to make it as difficult as possible for traffickers to find safe havens or escape punishment. Finally, the exchange of information on the illicit traffic among police and customs officials was facilitated. The effectiveness of these measures was slight, and in any case the advent of the Second World War disrupted both the international anti-drug movement and the traffickers themselves.

The question of the illicit traffic produced a conference (albeit an ineffective one), but the deliberations on limiting opium production failed to get off the ground at all. In some ways the proposals for restricting opium production to the levels required by licit usage resembled the limitation of manufactured drugs, but a closer examination
reveals great differences between the two concepts. The major manufacturers of narcotics, such as Germany and the United States, were highly industrialized states, with a capacity to adjust to even large reductions in drug output without undue economic strain. The reason for this was that the relatively small number of skilled workers displaced could be relocated or retrained, for many of the educational and technical skills, as well as the facilities, needed for the manufacture of drugs can be used for other, economically valuable, purposes.

In contrast, the major producers of opium during the interwar period (China, India, the Soviet Union, Persia, Turkey, and Yugoslavia; the latter three being the principal exporting states) were generally agricultural states, often with unstable governments. Only a government in firm control of a country would be able to implement the measures necessary to bring about a reduction of poppy cultivation. Even if agreement could be reached on what quantities of opium were to be produced in which countries, the basically unpredictable nature of farming (due to weather and other factors beyond human control) would complicate the application of controls considerably.

In addition to these very real problems, there remains the effect that such restrictions would have on the peasant farmers involved. Unlike the urban chemist or technician who processes the opium, the farmer is intimately involved with his crop. Entire villages and districts have their social and economic structures based on the opium crop, and it is no easy task to induce, or even force, traditionally conservative peasants to engage in a new livelihood for abstract reasons linked to social problems thousands of miles away. For these reasons, any
attempt to implement a program of poppy substitution or eradication is likely to have serious political consequences. These difficulties prevented any real progress towards the restriction of opium production.

The world political crisis which resulted in the Second World War caused a suspension of the efforts to strengthen the international control of narcotics, and thus the war marks the end of a distinct historical phase of these activities. The international community had not solved all the problems set before it, but this should not obscure the progress which was made. Beginning with the Shanghai Commission of 1909, an increasingly widespread international consensus developed. The 1912 Hague Convention, as well as the later Geneva agreements, incorporated the earlier narcotics control ideals into legally binding conventions.

The international measures recounted above served to transform the narcotics traffic, but not to abolish it. At the beginning of the twentieth century the trade in narcotics was carried on fairly openly, and governments were only involved for the purposes of revenue. By 1939 the narcotics traffic had taken on many of the characteristics now associated with it, for virtually all phases of the traffic had become illicit. If the international control of narcotics were to have a real impact on the availability of drugs, these covert trafficking networks would have to be disrupted, and it was to this task that the international narcotics control movement turned following the Second World War.
III. HEROIN DEMAND AND SUPPLY SINCE WORLD WAR II

The Global Drug Epidemic

The evolution of the illicit drug traffic during the past several decades has been influenced by a great many factors, but the most significant (and least contentious, for authorities on narcotics seldom seem to agree on any aspect of the problem) has been the world-wide increase in narcotics use. It is true that opiate consumption is today at a lower level than was the case during the first half of this century, but this is due solely to the elimination of opium and heroin consumption on the Chinese mainland. In most other nations narcotics use, and especially heroin addiction, has spread greatly since 1945. Not only has the United States experienced an alarming rise in addiction, but a number of other countries have developed heroin and related drug problems where none had previously existed. In the past the traffic in narcotics was considered to be an international problem because drug shipments often crossed international boundaries and thus could not be effectively controlled by a single state. The spread of drug abuse has added a new dimension to the problem, for nations previously involved in the narcotics traffic only in the peripheral sense of being producing, processing, or transit areas for narcotics destined for the United States have found that they also have a drug addiction problem.

The expansion of narcotics use, both in the United States and
other countries, has been most pronounced since the early 1960s, when the most recent heroin epidemic began. The use of the term "epidemic" is appropriate in virtually every sense, for heroin addiction tends to spread in exactly the same manner as do many diseases. These relatively recent developments should be not be overemphasized at the expense of neglecting important trends which occurred earlier, however.

The focus of this paper is on opiate, and to a lesser extent cocaine, abuse, but these substances obviously are not the only ones available to the drug user. Amphetamines and barbituates, as an example, are also abused extensively, often through their overprescription by physicians. Alcohol, although legal, is the most widely abused drug of all. By limiting the discussion to heroin the matter is simplified, as it is not necessary to distinguish between licit and illicit use. In most countries (the principal exception being Great Britain, where heroin has a limited medical usage) heroin is an illegal substance, and any trafficking in it is a criminal act. Heroin represents the cutting edge of the international narcotics issue, since it one of the most powerful, dangerous, and sought-after drugs. Its addictive nature guarantees a relatively stable market, which has made for the emergence of trafficking organizations and networks operating on a long-term basis. Before turning to these organizations and the networks they control, we shall first examine the increases in narcotics use which have stimulated their growth.

_Heroin Use in the United States_

After World War II the narcotics trade in the United States
was in poor shape by almost any standard. Not only had the controlling organizations been seriously disrupted by government prosecution before the war, but the security measures put into effect during the war had made smuggling extremely difficult. This problem was compounded by the wartime shipping shortages which drastically reduced the options open to even the most imaginative smuggler. The heroin shortage which developed in the United States caused a drop in the purity of street (retailed) heroin from about 28 percent in 1938 to less than 3 percent in 1941. The forced withdrawal of many addicts reduced the addict population to about twenty-thousand by the time the war ended—an unprecedentedly low figure. One author commented:

In fact, as the war drew to a close, there was every reason to believe that the scourge of heroin had finally been purged from the United States. Heroin supplies were nonexistent, international criminal syndicates were in disarray, and the addict population was reduced to manageable proportions for the first time in half a century.

This actually seems to be an overstatement of the case. What had really reduced heroin addiction during the war years was the sharp drop in international trade and communication and the rigorous border and port inspections. Both these factors served to cut the United States off from the European and Asian sources of supply, but both were temporary conditions. With the resumption of international trade and the recovery of the world economy after the war it became increasingly difficult to keep heroin out of the country. How American authorities could have taken advantage of the postwar situation is not clear.

The main problem encountered in estimating the prevalence of addiction in a society which prohibits narcotics use is that no accurate
method of counting the addicts exists. Official figures are at best
careful estimates, and at worst deliberate attempts to mislead legislators
and the public. The Federal Bureau of Narcotics (FBN) estimated
that the number of heroin addicts in the United States was about 200,000
in 1914, declined to around 20,000 in 1945, rose to about 60,000 in
the early fifties, and then gradually declined. The accuracy of
these estimates can be questioned, since they suggest:

...without making any allowance for the appearance of new addicts,
that about 42,000 addicts vanished between 1914 and 1925, about
96,000 between 1925 and 1935, and approximately 42,000 between
1935 and 1945....However, it is well known that between 1915 and
1945 the average age of known addicts declined considerably, and
this demonstrates that we must assume a constant stream of new
addicts being addicted each year....

The official tendency to underestimate the extent of heroin use
did not disappear with the onset of the heroin epidemic of the 1960s.
As late as 1969, the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD)
recorded some 68,088 "active narcotic addicts"—an increase of only
4,077 from the previous year. However, the same government publication
conceded that:

The heroin abuse problem had been increasing since World War II
and it continues to increase. Perhaps the most realistic estimate
of the number of opiate addicts in the country is between 100,000
and 200,000.

More recent BNDD estimates cite higher figures. One BNDD statistician,
Dr. Joseph Greenwood, estimated that in 1968 there were actually 315,000
addicts, and in an April 3, 1972 interview Myles J. Amrbose, head
of the Justice Department's Office for Drug Abuse Law Enforcement (DALE),
stated:

...we had the tremendous explosion of drug abuse of the 1960s,
commencing around 1962-63....The Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous
Drugs....said that they estimate now the figure to be 560,000 addicts.
Many different statistical methods have been used to determine the extent of the problem, but all observers agree that heroin addiction began to rise rapidly by the late 1960s. The outburst of addiction which hit the United States had a number of highly significant consequences, including the stimulation of a number of diplomatic initiatives by the American government aimed at curbing the international narcotics traffic. Many of the American proposals, such as the ban on Turkish opium production, represent old wine in new bottles, as we shall see.

Apart from the official, governmental responses to the heroin epidemic, the growth in demand has had an important effect on the structure and workings of the trafficking networks. Of course trafficking in narcotics has always been profitable, for otherwise smuggling would not take place. The heroin trade is a business, and those involved in it have as their objective the maximizing of profits, as do most businesses. The rapid expansion of demand has caused a corresponding growth in the scope and complexity of the international trafficking networks. In part this growth has taken the form of the expansion of groups already involved in the trade, but many new groups have also become involved as profits (and opportunities) rose. In some respects the current networks resemble those of a decade or two ago, but there are also important new features, in part due to the rising demand. It goes without saying that this trend has complicated the task of enforcement officials.

An adequate discussion of the American heroin epidemic lies outside the scope of this paper, and given the complexity of the subject one is tempted to say outside the scope of any single paper. The main causes seem to be more related to social, economic, political, and cultural
factors than with the availability of heroin itself. Prior to the start of the epidemic, heroin use was a social problem which did not particularly concern the average, white, middle class American. In New York City, after the Second World War, for example:

...many of the addicts appeared to be musicians, odd-balls, homosexuals, and others outside society's mainstream...But soon the problem spread and the statistics...make it clear that what politicians are now discovering as an epidemic has been with us for quite some time.126

Included in those groups "outside society's mainstream" were racial minorities, especially blacks. As long as heroin addiction was a problem found only in the urban ghettos, the situation was relatively stable, but when addiction spread to the white suburbs drug control became a burning issue at all levels of government. The drug subculture which characterized the sixties, as well as the lowering of racial barriers, contributed to the increase in heroin use. Besides an increase in the overall number of addicts, the heroin epidemic was marked by a drop in the average age of addicts.

One indication of addiction prevalence is the frequency of heroin-related deaths. These two trends are clearly shown in the figures for New York City, which has steadily contained about half of the addicts in the United States (see table 1 and table 2). Assuming that heroin use is proportional to the frequency of heroin-related deaths, these figures show that heroin use by teenagers has risen even more rapidly than overall heroin use. It is this fact, perhaps more than any other, which has caused so much alarm.

Heroin use in the United States continued to rise until about 1973 or 1974, when it stabilized at anywhere from 500,000 to 700,000 addicts.127
During the past few years a "polydrug" problem has developed, for drug users are increasingly willing to take almost any combination of drugs in order to get high. This phenomenon has included a return to alcohol use by the young, as well as an upsurge in the use of cocaine, amphetamines, and barbituates. The first Drug Abuse Conference, held in Chicago in the spring of 1974, recommended increased attention to multidrug use, if this could be achieved without neglect of the heroin problem. In part, this trend towards multidrug use seems to have been caused by the heroin
shortage which took place in the United States in 1973 and 1974, for heroin use has been on the rise since this latter year. The National Institute on Drug Abuse and Alcoholism estimated in 1976 that about 400,000 persons were daily users of heroin in the United States, and that this figure, while short of the 1971 high of between 500,000 and 600,000, is rising.

Heroin Use in other Countries

The upsurge in heroin addiction of the last decade has not been confined to the United States. A number of other countries have experienced drug epidemics much like that which took place in the United States, although on a smaller scale. This "horizontal proliferation" has underscored the international nature of the narcotics problem. The lesser size of these epidemics does not indicate a lesser problem, for the impact of an increase in addiction corresponds to the relative increase in the number of addicts rather than the absolute increase. The outbreak of an epidemic of heroin use in a country with no experience with the problem is likely to create a high degree of public apprehension, in part because of the novelty of the situation, and in part because of the fear that the epidemic will continue to spread without limit. A similar pattern of response could be observed in the United States. The problem of heroin addiction was a familiar one, and as long as it only affected certain segments of society it could be tolerated. As soon as addiction spread to previously unaffected socio-economic groups, emergency measures were considered appropriate.

A nation with very few addicts reaches this "panic threshold"
much sooner than did the United States. In an epidemic, the fact that heroin addiction appears to spread without limit is of more political consequence than whether it actually does. Few governments can afford to remain inactive and allow an epidemic to run its course, and as a result a comparatively small increase is sufficient to trigger policy changes.

One of the most carefully studied outbreaks of addiction took place in the United Kingdom. Since the British have taken a medical approach to the heroin problem, as opposed to the enforcement-oriented approach of the United States, the increase in the British addict population was closely watched to see if it meant the failure of the British method. Under this system addicts are registered, and thus reliable data is easily obtained, in contrast to most other countries. In 1936 there were only 616 addicts, ninety percent of whom were addicted to morphine. Half of the addicts were women, and 147 were doctors. Most had acquired the habit during medical treatment for something else. By 1953 most of the 290 known addicts were "therapeutic addicts", in that their habits stemmed from such causes.

More important, from the viewpoint of addiction control, was the number of non-therapeutic addicts—those individuals who had acquired the drug habit on their own, usually from friends. By 1959 there were only 47 such addicts, but this total began to rise steadily: to 329 in 1964, 509 in 1965, and 800 in 1966, of whom 300 were under twenty-five years of age. Once it had begun, the epidemic was stimulated by the fact that almost all the new addicts were young males who had started using heroin because of contact with other addicts, and who were in turn
infecting others. In 1968 the British government introduced a system of clinics, which may have been responsible for the peaking of the epidemic in 1969 at 2,881 addicts.137

During this same period France, which has long occupied a position of importance in the smuggling routes to the United States,138 began to acquire a significant domestic drug problem. According to testimony before a United States Senate committee:

The French woke up to the danger shortly after we (the U.S.) did, when there were a number of heroin overdose deaths involving the children of prominent families, and when several surveys established that France was beginning to have a serious addiction problem, with possibly as many as 25,000 (addicts) by the latter part of 1971.139

This increase in addiction was thought by American officials to be the major stimulant to increased French cooperation with United States efforts against the trafficking networks.140

Great Britain and France were not the only western European countries to experience rising drug use. The phenomenon was widespread and affected almost every state, often with interesting national variations. Sweden, for example, has had virtually no heroin problem, but has had to confront an epidemic of intravenous amphetamine use. By 1970 there were between 10,000 and 12,000 psychologically addicted users.141

The increased rate of addiction has been accompanied by a related rise in drug-associated crime: in 1965 one out of every five Swedish males arrested were drug abusers, but this rose to one in four in 1966, and one in three in 1967. The addict population doubled every 30 months with the exception of the period 1965-1967, when legal prescription was tried and the doubling time was shortened to 12 months.142
In Northern Ireland the social and political dislocation which began in 1969 contributed greatly to increased drug use. The number of known drug users jumped from 480 in 1969 to 8,000 in 1972, and an estimated $20 million worth of smuggling was taking place, despite attempts by both Protestant and Roman Catholic militants to stamp out drug use in areas under their control.143

The tendency towards increasing drug abuse has not been limited to North America and Western Europe, but has been seen in the Soviet Union as well. The first such indication came in 1970, when the Soviet humour magazine Krokodil published a story which made the point that the shortage of consumer goods in the Soviet Union was leading youth to both alcohol and marijuana.144 Two years later the U.S.S.R. introduced stringent new drug laws, which demonstrated that the government was concerned about narcotic abuse. Under the terms of this law "addicts are obliged to seek voluntary treatment" and courts are authorized "...if necessary, to commit addicts to rehabilitation centres for one or two years and for a year longer if the addict is uncooperative."145

Outside observers considered the problem to be most serious in the south, where both opium and hemp are grown. The major source of drugs for addicts appeared to be the diversion of narcotics from medical applications.146

The secretive nature of Soviet society makes it difficult to determine the true extent of drug abuse there, but from these few items it can be inferred that the problem is growing. According to reliable, unofficial reports, in 1972 a group of scientific workers was discovered making illegal drugs, including LSD, at the Moscow Institute for Natural Compounds. This incident was not made public within the Soviet Union.147
This was not an isolated occurrence—several individuals had been caught making heroin at a pharmaceutical laboratory at Pyatigorsk in the North Caucasus about two years earlier, and an August 6, 1972 report appeared in the Soviet press telling of the execution of a trafficker for the murder of a would-be-informer. In 1974 Soviet drug laws were again tightened, and in that same year Soviet authorities publicized the arrest and 4-year imprisonment of a Moscow youth for peddling hashish, in an apparent effort to warn away other youths from drugs.

The Soviet Union is not connected to the narcotics trafficking networks, but the presence of drug abuse in even a Communist state demonstrates that this problem affects many different societies in many parts of the world, and thus is international in the truest sense of the word. The fact that a large number of states face similar domestic problems tends to motivate these states towards cooperation, but of greater importance is the fact that the very nature of the illicit drug trade makes an international solution the only feasible alternative.

**The World's Opium Production**

The essence of the global trade in illicit drugs is the transportation of the narcotic from its point of origin to its point of sale. In the case of heroin, the raw material required is opium, and any study of the smuggling networks used to supply the countless addicts throughout the world must begin with an examination of the world's production of opium.

**Licit Production**

As pointed out earlier, opiates have a number of legitimate, medical
and scientific applications, and as a result substantial quantities of
opium are produced legally. The international control of licit production
outlined above\(^1\) has had an important impact on the quantities of
drugs produced, especially in the area of manufacture, as shown by
Table 3.

### TABLE 3

**WORLD (LICIT) PRODUCTION OF DEPENDENCE-PRODUCING DRUGS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1909</th>
<th>1934</th>
<th>1959</th>
<th>1970</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Raw opium (tons)</td>
<td>25,800</td>
<td>6,800</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>1,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poppy straw (tons)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12,600</td>
<td>31,300^a</td>
<td>177,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morphine (kg)</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>26,800</td>
<td>108,200</td>
<td>177,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heroin (kg)</td>
<td>1,100</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Codeine (kg)</td>
<td>17,200</td>
<td>98,000</td>
<td>169,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethylmorphine (bionine) (kg)</td>
<td>1,700</td>
<td>8,200</td>
<td>9,200</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pethidine (kg)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>14,200</td>
<td>14,800</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coca leaves (tons)</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>11,300</td>
<td>18,600</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cocaine (kg)</td>
<td>3,400</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>1,900</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SOURCES:** 1909 opium figure: International Opium Commission, Shanghai, 1909. 1934 opium figure: analytical study by the League Opium Advisory Committee (C.305.M 203. 1937 XI). All other figures: PCB/INCB statistics.

^aThese figures refer to the volume of poppy straw used in the manufacture of morphine.


There have been several important changes during this century, as shown by Table 3. Licit opium production, as well as heroin and cocaine manufacture, has fallen sharply since the mid-1930s. This has occurred despite the steady rise in demand for medicinal drugs such as morphine and
codeine (which is made from morphine). It is clear from these figures that only a part of the heroin and cocaine production of the pre-World War II period was absorbed by the licit market.

Opium is produced for both the licit and the illicit markets; in 1971 the former accounted for about 1,500 tons of opium, the latter another 1,000. By its nature, data on licit production is more easily obtained than is data on illicit production. Figures are submitted to the International Narcotics Control Board by producing countries, and these figures give a fairly accurate picture of licit production. (See TABLE 4). The overall licit production of opium has risen since the mid-1960s, principally because of increased production in India and the resumption of production by Iran after a fourteen-year ban which ended in 1969. The Peoples' Republic of China was estimated to have produced some 100 tons of opium per year for medical purposes, but neither this nor North Vietnamese production is included in the table.

About ninety percent of licit production is used to manufacture morphine, most of which is converted to codeine. The use of poppy straw as an alternate source of raw material for morphine manufacture has increased with time, but in 1971 sixty-five percent of licit morphine production still depended on raw opium harvested in the traditional manner.

Pharmaceutical firms in North America and Western Europe purchase most of the licit opium which reaches the international market. Table 5 lists the quantities of opium exported by the most important exporting states. As can be seen, India dominates the licit opium market, with Turkey being the other major exporter. Table 5 does not show the effects of either the lifting of the Iranian ban on production (1969) or the
Table 4

WORLD LICIT PRODUCTION OF OPIUM, BY COUNTRY (METRIC TONS)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crop Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>India</th>
<th>Turkey</th>
<th>USSR</th>
<th>Iran</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>739</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>307</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>832</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>284</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>849</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>1,007</td>
<td>489</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>609</td>
<td>341</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>660</td>
<td>281</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>643</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>589</td>
<td>377</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>775</td>
<td>511</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>909</td>
<td>593</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>1,253</td>
<td>711</td>
<td>323</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>1,037</td>
<td>709</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>1,203</td>
<td>755</td>
<td>284</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>993</td>
<td>538</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>787</td>
<td>501</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>754</td>
<td>486</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>671</td>
<td>339</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>662</td>
<td>368</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>815</td>
<td>585</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>1,219</td>
<td>868</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>1,157</td>
<td>794</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>1,494+</td>
<td>943</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Data for India, Turkey, and Iran refer to opium containing ten percent moisture. The USSR and most other countries have not provided information to the United Nations on the moisture content of their opium.

aEnding July 30 of the stated year.

bBecause of rounding, components may not add to the totals shown.

cIncluding Yugoslavia (40 tons, reduced to 1 ton in 1970), Japan (4 tons or less annually), Pakistan (12 tons annually), Bulgaria (7 tons in 1952, reduced to little or none in recent years). Data on licit production in China and North Vietnam are not available.

TABLE 5

WORLD LICIT OPIUM EXPORTS,
BY COUNTRY (METRIC TONS)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Calendar Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>India</th>
<th>Turkey</th>
<th>Iran</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>755</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>810</td>
<td>358</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>267</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>537</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>393</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>540</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>296</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>668</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>274</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>652</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>493</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>767</td>
<td>593</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>733</td>
<td>626</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>725</td>
<td>658</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>530</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>619</td>
<td>472</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>663</td>
<td>473</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>683</td>
<td>426</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>834</td>
<td>531</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>573</td>
<td>419</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>647</td>
<td>532</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>721</td>
<td>602</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>885</td>
<td>808</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: Data for 1950-1969 are from International Narcotics Control Board reports; data for 1970 are estimated.


Turkish ban which began in 1973 but was discontinued soon afterwards. The increase in world licit production seen in table 4 has not had the effect of depressing world prices, in fact just the opposite has occurred. (See table 6). A number of factors account for this, such as Turkish
attempts to maximize profits immediately before they suspended production, India's near-monopoly position, the general pattern of world inflation, and the international efforts to eliminate poppy production.\textsuperscript{160} Much of the opium produced but not exported is dispensed to addicts in maintenance programs, but these programs often fail to meet the needs of addicts because the price of the legal opium is above that of the black market.

\begin{table}
\centering
\caption{Indian Opium Export Prices}
\begin{tabular}{|l|c|c|}
\hline
Crop Year\textsuperscript{a} & US $ per kg & Crop Year\textsuperscript{a} & US $ per kg \\
\hline
1952 & 15.50 & 1963 & 13.95 \\
1953 & 13.00 & 1964 & 13.00 \\
1954 & 12.60 & 1965 & 13.00 \\
1955 & 12.40 & 1966 & 12.00 \\
1956 & 12.10 & 1967 & 11.50 \\
1957 & 12.40 & 1968 & 11.75 \\
1958 & 14.10 & 1969 & 13.50 \\
1959 & 14.80 & 1970 & 15.00 \\
1960 & 15.50 & 1971 & 18.00 \\
1961 & 15.50 & 1972 & 24.00 \\
1962 & 15.50 & & \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{a}Ending June 30 of stated year.


\textsuperscript{161} In the past the connection between the licit and illicit markets was much closer than it is now. The diversion of licitly produced derivatives into the illicit market has been effectively stopped by the measures contained in the 1931 Limitation Convention.
interaction between the two markets is indirect, an example being that an increase in the price of licit opium will tend to lead towards a corresponding rise in the illicit price, so that farmers will not sell all their opium on the licit market. The fact that the same raw material is used for the manufacture of both heroin and morphine means there will always be a certain interdependence between the licit and illicit markets, but the latter is not merely an offshoot of the former. In terms of size the illicit production of opium is near that of licit opium, and in political, economic, and social terms it is far more important. It is this parallel system of production, manufacture, transportation, and distribution which lies at the core of the world's drug problem.

Illicit Production

Information and statistics on this crucial aspect of the world narcotics problem are difficult to come by, since by definition the subject is illegal. We therefore find ourselves confronted with the same problem that arose in the investigation of addict populations, but on an even larger scale. Table 7 gives an approximate breakdown of illicit production by country for 1971. These figures are rough estimates, and naturally output from each country varies from year to year as growing conditions and prices change, as in the case of the licit market.

The price that the farmer receives for his opium is generally a function of supply and demand. The illicit price is always higher than the licit price, for the farmer is taking some risk in selling
TABLE 7

ESTIMATED ILLICIT OPIUM OUTPUT,
BY MAJOR PRODUCERS - 1971

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Metric Tons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>35 to 80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>20 to 160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burma, Thailand, and Laos</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>10 to 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other a</td>
<td>20 to 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>990 to 1,210</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


a Mainly Eastern Europe.
b Additional amounts probably are produced in Latin America, North Africa, and the Far East.

outside legal channels. Table 8 gives the figures for the various illicit opium producing regions of the world. In India and especially in Turkey illicit production arises as a result of the diversion of raw opium from legal production. The higher price paid by smugglers results in up to two-thirds of the Turkish opium harvest being sold on the illicit market, although there are indications that stricter controls since the Turkish resumption of cultivation may have temporarily restricted this practice.\textsuperscript{163} It is difficult to enforce a government monopoly, one major reason being that the vicissitudes of crop yields make it virtually impossible to prove what the yield of a given field should be, and therefore a farmer can report a smaller harvest than was
TABLE 8

PRICES TO FARMER FOR RAW OPIUM, 1969

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Producing Country</th>
<th>U.S. Dollars per Kilogram</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkey:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Licit</td>
<td>11.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illicit</td>
<td>25.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Licit</td>
<td>10.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illicit</td>
<td>12.00-15.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India: Licit</td>
<td>10.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burma/Laos: Illicit</td>
<td>12.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran: Licit</td>
<td>10.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>12.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


actually brought in, and sell the difference illegally. An increase in the licit price is not an effective measure, for the profits in the heroin trade are so vast that the traffickers can increase their price, if necessary.

Most illicit production comes from poppies which are grown and harvested illegally, rather than from the diversion from licit poppy cultivation. Such production can only take place if the responsible national government is unable to control opium production, or if the authorities are involved in the illicit trade themselves. The largest centre of illicit production is the "Golden Triangle" region of Burma, Thailand, and Laos. The politically unstable situation in this area has led to the development of an opium-dependent economy with the capacity to supply the heroin needs of the entire world if this were found to be necessary (and profitable). The illicit production in
South Asia and other regions stems in part from the lack of government control over these areas, and in part from the corruption of officials.

Despite the fact that the opium poppy itself can grow on almost any continent, there are a relatively small number of countries involved in opium production. The reason for this is that political, social, and economic conditions are the essential ones in determining whether the poppy will be grown, especially if production would be illicit. The cultivation and harvesting of the opium poppy requires a labour-intensive, rural economy, but the returns for opium are higher than almost any other crop, as shown by table 9.

**TABLE 9**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crop</th>
<th>Gross Returns Per Acre</th>
<th>Gross Returns Per Hectare</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Opium</td>
<td>160-200</td>
<td>387-488</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wheat</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barley</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunflower</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alfalfa</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugar Beets</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>341</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The poppy is so lucrative when compared to crops that could be grown instead that only government subsidized crops are more attractive to the farmer. In most cases the economic importance of opium production is confined to relatively small regions of the producing state, however.
In Turkey, for example, legal exports of opium and opium-related products (gum, seed, and straw) were valued at $3,860,000 (US) in 1969, and $3,500,000 (US) a year later. Even if one adds in the substantial revenues from the illicit traffic, the total is still only a fraction of Turkey's total export earnings of $534 million. Even at the local level opium is not the only crop raised, for despite its cash value it cannot be used by the farmer to feed himself and his family, and as a result opium fields are usually small and scattered. This presents yet another obstacle to the elimination of poppy cultivation.

**Heroin Trafficking**

Heroin trafficking, as pointed out earlier, is a business much like any other. The goal of the trafficker is to transform the raw opium into heroin, transport it to the consumer-addict, and distribute it for a profit. Heroin trafficking requires both capital and the managerial skill to use it. The illegal nature of the traffic puts added demands on those involved in it, and in the context of the illicit traffic capital often must be in the form of readily available cash, while managerial and organizational capabilities consist of the knowledge, skill, reliability, and reputation of the individuals in the smuggling ring.

The structure of the heroin trade is similar in all parts of the world, even though a great variety of organizations, groups, and individuals are involved in the traffic. Pressure from police authorities throughout the world has meant that traffickers are forced to function in similar environments regardless of the scene of their activities. The heroin
trade is not controlled by any single organization, one reason being that such a large organization would be too vulnerable to enforcement activities. Instead the trafficking is often done by groups so small and short-lived that one would hesitate to call them "organizations." These groups are set up in a manner quite similar to espionage and terrorist groups, which also face the problem of maintaining their structural integrity and functional capabilities in the face of coercive pressure from public authorities. It is no accident that clandestine political groups themselves are found to utilize their special talents to traffic in heroin from time to time. The major difference between these groups and the full-time traffickers is that of motivation—the professional trafficker is concerned only with making money, and is usually quite unconcerned with politics except in so far as it affects his business.

Since a number of different groups and organizations are involved in heroin trafficking, with each controlling a different part of the smuggling chain, it is common to speak of trafficking "networks," as this accurately conveys the picture of a series of loosely connected operations which, taken together, succeed in moving the narcotics from the point of production to the consumer. Those involved in these networks are conspiratorial and secretive by nature, although important organizations can be extremely powerful and influential. It seems to be something of a paradox that the power wielded by even small states is several orders of magnitude greater than that of even the largest criminal organizations, but these organizations and their associates continue to operate without serious disruption. This situation exists
only because the overwhelming power of the state is not applied, either
because of respect for the rights of suspects or the corruption of
officials, or because national governments themselves are involved in
the drug traffic. These factors will be examined in greater detail
later in this paper.169

One of the root causes of the persistence of the illicit drug
traffic is the enormity of the profits to be made in it. This is shown
in table 10. These figures, like almost all those connected with
the heroin trade, are subject to considerable fluctuations. Crop
failures or seizures of illicit shipments by police can cause short-
term price increases, just as a sudden influx of heroin to a city
can cause a swift drop in the street (retail) price. Prices are also
affected by long-term factors, such as increased demand due to an increase
in addiction rates, stricter enforcement on a continued basis, or
reduced supplies because of national or international action against
producing regions. It is apparent that the profit margin of heroin
trafficking is so large as to protect those involved against these
price changes, which must be considered as the occupational hazards
of the trade. Table 10 also reveals that the United States has retained
its role as the prime market for heroin in the world, for the price of
a kilo of heroin in the United States is the highest in the world. This
approximately corresponds to the greater risk of smuggling heroin into
the United States, both because of more stringent enforcement efforts
and the longer distances which the heroin must travel.

The complexity of the trafficking networks is in large part
determined by the proximity of addict to source. The retail price
### TABLE 10

**OPium/Heroin Price Increases in Trafficking Networks (per kilo)**

**Turkey-France-U.S.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Price to Farmer in Turkey</th>
<th>$22</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wholesale Price in Marseille (after conversion to heroin)</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wholesale Price in New York</td>
<td>2,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retail Price in New York</td>
<td>22,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Middle East-South Asia**

| Price to Farmer in Afghanistan or Pakistan | $15  |
| Border Price in Iran | 100  |
| Wholesale Price in Teheran (after conversion to heroin) | 260  |
| Retail Price in Teheran | 1,300  |

**Southeast Asia**

| Price to Farmer in Golden Triangle | $17  |
| Wholesale Price in Hong Kong (after conversion to heroin) | 230  |
| Retail Price in Hong Kong | 1,000  |


Of heroin in South Asia, and to an extent in Southeast Asia, is not great enough to stimulate trafficking from distant sources of the drug. Thus the trafficking patterns in these areas are fairly simple. In contrast, the price of heroin in the United States is high enough to support the most complex and tortuous smuggling routes. The relationship between supply and demand in the heroin trade is such that it is possible to subdivide the global system into several regional subsystems. Table 11 gives a rough picture of the illicit market as it exists today. Several comments can be made about the figures in this table. The number of
### TABLE 11
ANNUAL CONSUMPTION OF ILLICIT OPIUM AND OPIATES AND SOURCES OF SUPPLY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Users and Addicts(^a) (thousands)</th>
<th>Domestic Illicit Supplies</th>
<th>Net Illicit Imports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan/Pakistan</td>
<td>100-150</td>
<td>75-100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>250-300</td>
<td>175-200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burma/Laos</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore/Malaysia</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Europe</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other(^c)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SOURCE:** U.S. Congressional Record (1971: S8688).

\(^a\) Including heroin and morphine addicts whose consumption is converted to units of raw opium equivalent.

\(^b\) Negligible.

\(^c\) Including Indonesia, South Korea, Japan, the Philippines, Taiwan, Macao, North Africa, and the Near East.


Addicts in North America is obviously many times that given in the table, and the actual heroin requirements of the United States alone are somewhere between 10 and 20 metric tons.\(^{170}\) The figures are useful, however, for they give a rough indication of the world's addict population, as well as showing which regions are the chief importers of opiates. Much of the
world's illicit opium is consumed near the areas of production, and consequently does not reach the international market.

Traditionally there have been three major trafficking networks. These are: 1) Turkey-France-United States network; 2) Southeast Asia network; and 3) Middle East-South Asia network. In the past several years this idealized division of the world heroin trade has changed somewhat, as new groups began to traffic, new routes were developed, and increasingly diverse sources of heroin were found for the United States market. These recent developments are important and will be noted, but it is still analytically convenient to consider each of these networks in turn.

The Turkey-France-United States Network

It is upon this network that much of the popular image of heroin smuggling is based. Briefly, opium is purchased by smugglers in Turkey and converted to morphine, transported to southern France, refined into heroin, and finally smuggled into the United States. Estimates from the United States Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD) stated that in the past about 80% of the heroin entering the United States was of Turkish origin, although this percentage has dropped in recent years.

The development of the heroin trade between Turkey and the United States is perhaps best understood from a historical perspective. The implementation of the Harrison Act following World War I created the need for a black market in heroin, but it remained open as to who would organize and control the potentially lucrative heroin trade. Because of
its traditions which prohibited involvement in either prostitution or narcotics, the American Mafia initially left the heroin business to New York's Jewish gangsters, such as "Legs" Diamond, "Dutch" Schultz, and Meyer Lansky. The Mafia remained content with its profitable domination of the bootleg liquor industry. This situation was altered by the fratricidal gang wars which shook the Mafia in 1930 and 1931, and led to the elimination of the traditional Mafia leaders. The younger mafiosi, led by Charles "Lucky" Luciano, were not bound by the traditions of their predecessors, and with the end of Prohibition imminent, Luciano decided to take the Mafia into the heroin and prostitution rackets. Luciano forged an alliance with the New York Jewish mobs, reorganized the American Mafia into the federal-style crime cartel which it remains today, and established his hold on New York's profitable prostitution racket. He also pioneered the idea of addicting his prostitutes to heroin, in order to keep them docile and in need of money to support their habit. In 1936 Luciano was indicted on sixty-two counts of forced prostitution, and was given a thirty-to fifty-year sentence. Sufficient evidence had also been gathered to indict Luciano for heroin trafficking, but this idea was dropped in favour of the forced prostitution charges, which were calculated to create greater public outrage.

Luciano's imprisonment was a heavy blow to the heroin trade, since he had been the principal organizer of the trade and had had the authority to implement his ideas. The outbreak of the Second World War further crippled smuggling operations, but immediately after the war Luciano
was released from prison and deported to Italy in return for his assistance to the American intelligence effort during the war.\textsuperscript{179} With the help of over one hundred other mafiosi similarly deported, Luciano proceeded to build a highly efficient international narcotics syndicate.\textsuperscript{180} For more than a decade this syndicate smuggled morphine base from Turkey, through Europe, and into the United States without suffering either a major arrest or seizure.\textsuperscript{181}

Initially Luciano's syndicate had relied upon diverting legally produced heroin from a respected Italian pharmaceutical firm, and in the four-year period\textsuperscript{1} 1946-1950 at least 700 kilograms of heroin were funneled into the illicit market in this manner. Investigations by the United States FBN induced a crackdown by Italian authorities,\textsuperscript{182} but by this time Luciano had established a series of clandestine laboratories in Sicily and Marseilles. These were supplied by morphine base from Turkey, which at that time was transported to Sicily and France through Beirut. This part of the smuggling network was controlled by Sami El Khoury, who maintained his high social position and the safety of his trafficking operations with the help of corrupt Lebanese officials, including the directors of Beirut airport, Lebanese customs, the Lebanese narcotics police, and the head of the antisubversive section of the Lebanese police.\textsuperscript{183} Distribution of the heroin in the United States was handled by Meyer Lansky. The only major change in the syndicate's operations during the 1950s was the transfer of the heroin laboratories to Marseilles, for the Italian-based operations were plagued by a series of arrests and interceptions in the early fifties.\textsuperscript{184} The alliance between Luciano's syndicate and the Corsican gangs of Marseilles has
remained an essential feature of the world heroin trafficking scene.

Despite the fact that the Turkey-France-United States network
has tended away from the straightforward system established after the
Second World War, many features of the network have remained the same,
and it is useful to follow the route that the drugs take. This will
serve to illustrate the difficulties facing enforcement officials in
both this specific case and generally.

As stated above, substantial portions of the Turkish opium crop
are diverted to the illicit market. Each village or region has a
collector, who purchases the raw opium from the farmers. A former
opium transporter was asked by American reporters why farmers didn't
report these illegal dealings. After securing the windows, he replied:

We had a farmer here who got into a grudge fight with his
neighbor. The neighbor was a transporter for the local collector.
The farmer told the police, and they arrested the transporter
with 300 kilos of (opium) gum in the false bottom of his truck.
The next morning the collector's men shot the informer dead. Then,
when his family tried to get revenge, six of them were killed.
They (the local collectors) are powerful men in our communities.
They can exert tremendous economic and political influence. It
isn't wise to cross them. They are not afraid to kill. Nothing
happens to them.185

The subject of this interview understandably declined to name
any collectors or verify any names obtained elsewhere.186 These opium
collectors are often prominent citizens in their communities, and the
fear of reprisal is usually sufficient to silence any would-be-informers.
When this fails, the chronically underpaid local authorities can be
bribed. One Istanbul smuggler summed up the situation:

If you know the name of someone big (in the narcotics business)
you can go into a village and within five minutes they can produce
100 kilos of opium for sale. But the police never find anything.
If they did, a little bribe would be paid, and the police would say that they found nothing. That's how it works down there. It must also be kept in mind that most farmers have no objections to participating in the illicit trade, since the collectors offer higher prices than the government, and the extra money is much needed.

Once the opium is acquired by the collectors, it is transformed into morphine base as rapidly as possible at a makeshift laboratory, since the base is much more easily transported than is the opium gum. The morphine base is then transported by donkey, buffalo cart, or truck to one of the towns in Anatolia to await inquiries from one of Istanbul's narcotics merchants. This illustrates one important characteristic of the drug trade—a great many transactions are set up when the buyer contacts the supplier and negotiates a deal. Arrangements are made in advance only in the largest deals. Further, these negotiations are often carried out by individuals who are not known to one another except through an intermediary known and trusted by both. In this way police infiltration is made more difficult.

The large Istanbul smugglers occupy a position of great importance in the heroin network, for they are the only ones capable of moving the accumulated morphine base out of Turkey onto the international market. They are the only ones who have contacts both inside Turkey, to buy the base, and in France, to sell it. They are commonly referred to as patrons, a term which accurately reflects their supervisory and protective functions. These patrons are respected and wealthy members of the Turkish upper classes, and legitimately own enterprises such as hotels, nightclubs, and property, most of which was paid for by profits from
their illicit narcotics dealings. Most of the Turkish patrons have never been in prison, and they mix easily with members of the Turkish establishment, such as business, social, political and governmental leaders. In number there are about fifty, with some being more influential and important than others.190

The smuggling of morphine base out of Turkey is not carried out in a predetermined, systematic manner, nor is there a single patron who controls the traffic. Each shipment of base is negotiated by the representatives of a single patron and the Corsican traffickers in Marseilles who will receive the shipment. The price is determined by considerations of supply and demand, the purity of the base itself, and the distance the shipment must be smuggled. The French traffickers pay on delivery, so that if a shipment is intercepted, it is the patron who must absorb the loss. Each shipment thus involves a certain risk, and several patrons may occasionally combine to finance an unusually large shipment. A patron resembles a stock market investor, for he is under no obligation, formal or otherwise, to provide base to a customer, and he may choose which deals to accept and which to decline. It is an important consideration, of course, that in the long run a reputation for reliability is to the patron's benefit, for he will then participate in bigger, and more profitable, deals.191

The decentralized and compartmentalized patron system makes smuggling out of Turkey very difficult to stop. Enforcement officials cannot cripple the network in one blow, because the patrons operate independently and if one were forced to suspend operations, the others would be unaffected.
If a smuggler working for one of the patrons is arrested, the profits involved in the trade are so great that someone else can always be found to take his place.\textsuperscript{192} The patrons themselves are insured against harassment by their high-level connections, and in case of need a payment to the right official is usually sufficient.

Actual interception of the smuggled morphine base is also infrequent. In the 1950s much of the base was brought across the Turkish-Syrian border and transported to Beirut, where it was taken by sea to either Italy or France. As the network developed, it became more common to transport the base by land through Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and then through either Italy or West Germany to France. On the return trip the smugglers often bring arms, cigarettes, and other illegal goods from Western Europe to Turkey.

Smuggling by land is greatly facilitated by the provisions of the Transports Internationaux Routiere (TIR) agreement, which is accepted by almost all European countries. Because their cargo is sealed at the point of origin, trucks carrying the TIR sign are usually not subject to customs inspections at border crossings. This agreement has stimulated international commerce and transit, but the limitation on border inspections has given smugglers virtually a free hand.\textsuperscript{193} The morphine base itself is an insoluble powder which is very easy to conceal. The vehicles used by smugglers often have several false compartments or hollowed-out areas which serve as ideal hiding places for the base. The volume of traffic is such that customs officials can only make thorough searches when warned in advance of a drug shipment,
but the resources to acquire such intelligence are also lacking in most cases. The Austrian narcotics control office, for example, is only authorized to pay informers in drug cases a maximum of $20, hardly a sufficient sum to compensate an informer for the risk of death he would run by revealing the details of a shipment.\textsuperscript{194}

Once it has passed through the Balkans, the base is shipped through either Italy or Germany. In recent years Munich has become the most widely used stockpiling point, for several reasons. The most important is that there are about 600,000 Turkish contract workers in West Germany, where they help alleviate the German labour shortage while supplementing their families' income. This large Turkish community acts as both a cover for smugglers and a convenient source of raw recruits, since most of the workers return to Turkey for vacations at least once a year.\textsuperscript{195} The ethnic character of the smuggling rings makes infiltration by the police extremely difficult, as is the case so often in narcotics trafficking.\textsuperscript{196} Munich is also conveniently located, being connected to France by superhighways. It is a cosmopolitan city with an underworld sufficiently sophisticated to participate in the drug trade.\textsuperscript{197}

Since smuggling through the Balkans, into Munich, and then into France has proven virtually unstoppable, this route has become the most widely used. Political considerations have also rendered some of the older routes impractical. The smuggling network through Syria and Lebanon was little used even before the current Lebanese civil war broke out. Turkish government suspicion that Syrian-trained left-wing
Turkish terrorists were being infiltrated across the Turkish-Syrian border led to an increase in border patrols in the late 1960s, which added substantially to the risks of crossing the border. Lebanese middlemen and officials were also taking a larger percentage of the profits than the Istanbul patrons cared to give. A combination of higher risks and reduced profits leaves an unfavourable impression on any businessman, and narcotics traffickers are certainly no exception.

Morphine base is still smuggled out of Turkey by ship, for this avoids customs inspections once at sea, and large quantities of base can be hidden in any number of ingenious places: some patrons even own ships outfitted with specially designed hidden compartments. The relatively small number of ships involved in international trade, as compared to cars and trucks, gives customs officials fewer objects of search, however, and ships traveling directly between Turkish and French ports are given special attention by French customs officials. The risk of seizure can be reduced in several ways: the base can be put in waterproof containers and dumped overboard with marker buoys attached, to be recovered by French motor launches employed by the smugglers; or the contraband can be transferred to a non-Turkish ship on the high seas, thus avoiding the intensive search reserved for Turkish vessels. Small boats also make frequent runs across the Black Sea to Bulgaria and Rumania, whereupon the base joins the flow of the land route. Of all the possible smuggling routes, it is only the air route which has been effectively closed to traffickers, since private plane use is restricted by the Turkish government, and anti-hijacking searches have discouraged smuggling on commercial flights.
Once the morphine base has been successfully transported to France, the Turkish patrons receive payment and no longer carry any responsibility for the safety of the drugs. The centre of the heroin industry in France is Marseilles, a city ideally suited for criminal activity, especially smuggling. It is France's largest seaport, and is dominated by one of the most efficient and powerful criminal networks in the world—a loosely organized underworld known to the French simply as the "milieu." At the core of the milieu are the Corsicans, who make up a substantial portion of Marseilles' population. The main characteristic of the Corsicans is their loyalty to one another; ethnic solidarity is so strong that it is almost impossible to find a Corsican who will inform on a fellow Corsican. This loyalty has developed as a result of the dire poverty in Corsica itself, which forced mass emigration to France over the years. The only way the Corsicans could survive in the outside world was to stick together, and when many of the immigrants turned to criminal activities, this solidarity made them very successful.

The Marseilles underworld is organized into a number of "tightly structured clans, all of which recognize a common hierarchy of power and prestige."201 The similarities between the Corsicans and the Sicilians have prompted speculation as to whether there is a Corsican equivalent to the Sicilian Mafia. The reluctance of members of the Corsican underworld to inform, and the relative absence of organized gang wars among the Corsican syndicates has fueled this speculation. The whole notion of a superpowerful criminal organization which controls much of the world's illicit narcotics trade is an intriguing one, and
has been propounded in some sections of the popular press, as the following excerpt from *Time* magazine shows:

The Union Corse, an organization that originated in the parched hills of Corsica but is today centered in Marseilles, rules more in fact than even James Bond imagined in fiction. It dominates the worldwide trafficking in narcotics, and in particular controls the supply and processing of heroin flowing into the U.S. from France, South America, and Southeast Asia. Though it is relatively weak in the U.S., the Union Corse is far more powerful than the Mafia in many parts of the world.

As an organization, the Union Corse is more tightly knit and more secretive than its Sicilian counterpart....

The reference to James Bond is revealing, for it was Ian Fleming's description of a meeting between Bond and the supposed head of the "Union Corse" which has probably done the most to create the myth of the organization. In actual fact it is unlikely that such an organization exists. In testimony before a Senate subcommittee this point was made:

There are some who believe that there is an organization called the Union Corse, or the "Corsican Union," which ties the entire Corsican criminal underworld together, in the manner of the Mafia. The majority of the French and American narcotics agents, however, believe that, instead of one big syndicate, the Corsicans operate through a fairly large number of small and intermediate syndicates. On one point there is complete agreement: there is a tremendous sense of ethnic and familial solidarity among the Corsicans, and the Corsican criminal, when he is apprehended, is far more difficult to break down and far less prone to "sing" about his confederates than are the Mafiosi.

The fact that violence among the Corsican criminal groups is less frequent than that between the Mafia "families" does not mean that the *milieu* is more structured than the Mafia: quite the opposite is the case. The Mafia needs formal patterns of authority to keep intra-organizational violence under control, but no overall controlling body exists for the Corsican syndicates. The leaders of the biggest clans are able, by virtue of their prestige and authority, to impose
discipline and mediate vendettas involving lesser groups. 204

Another major difference between the Corsican syndicates and the Mafia is the type of criminal activities in which they are involved. The Mafia, especially in the United States, divides "territory" among bosses, who then enrich themselves using every conceivable racket—prostitution, gambling, narcotics, protection, etc. Mafia families are thus large, because many of these activities require sizable amounts of manpower. In contrast, the Corsican syndicates have mastered more refined criminal techniques, specializing in heroin manufacturing, international smuggling, art thefts, and counterfeiting. A number of Corsican gangsters have established themselves on other continents, from where they help coordinate complex smuggling operations. 205

These differences between the Corsican syndicates and the Mafia have been a major factor in the long-standing and successful alliance between the two. The Corsican syndicates process the morphine base which arrives from Turkey, and smuggle into the United States, where it is distributed by the Mafia, although other groups have become increasingly important since the early 1960s, when the top leaders of the American Mafia apparently decided to get out of much of the risky heroin business. 206 Opinions differ on this, however, and there are indications that the Mafia has remained as at least a banker of the heroin trade, and possibly a wholesaler as well. 207

One other factor which has given the Corsican syndicates such power in Marseilles has been their intimate involvement with the French government and intelligence agencies, which will be examined in detail later in this paper. 208 These syndicates are perhaps the most important
organizations in the world heroin trade. The laboratories they operate were described to a United States Senate committee:

...the Marseilles area laboratories usually were operated by three or four individuals, including a husband and wife "caretaker" team who lived in the villas for cover purposes. In each case the laboratories occupied only a few rooms in the villa and operated in an inconspicuous manner. The operators often used bottled gas and bypassed the commercial electric meter to hide the unusual quantities of gas and electricity needed in the conversion process.

These laboratories apparently operated mainly on a commission basis, charging several hundred dollars for each kilogram of morphine base converted into heroin. Other laboratories, however, have also purchased their own morphine base supplies and have sold the heroin directly to heroin traffickers. Traditionally, laboratories have produced an average of about 20 kilograms of heroin per week. They usually remain in operation until an entire batch of morphine base has been processed. If there are no further orders or if the laboratory is "hot," it is then shut down, dismantled, meticulously cleaned and moved to another location.

Skill and knowledge are essential attributes of a good heroin "chemist," but the laboratories themselves are often simple and thus are easily concealed and moved. In theory the dozen or so heroin labs in and around Marseilles constitute a bottleneck in the entire network, but in practice they are difficult to find, harder to raid, and virtually impossible to eliminate. United States officials have tended to put a heavy emphasis on closing down the heroin labs, but officials, aware of the ease with which new labs can be set up, have been more skeptical. Great care is taken in bringing the base to the labs; usually an incoming shipment is stored in another location to avoid possible police surveillance before being taken to the lab. Another problem faced by narcotics agents is that much of the local police force has been infiltrated or bribed by the syndicates, and thus any information given to the police is quickly known throughout the milieu. In short, even if heroin labs can be found and shut
down, they are easily replaced, and therefore it is impossible to
stop the flow of heroin at this point.

Once processed, the heroin is smuggled into the United States
by a wide variety of routes, and an even wider variety of methods.
In the past the direct route from France to the United States, and
especially New York, was used extensively, but as enforcement increased
traffickers developed more complex routes which included Canada, Mexico,
and Latin America. The advantages of the direct route are fairly
obvious: there are no intermediate transit points and, perhaps more
importantly, no middlemen to deal with. The risk of seizure increases
with the number of countries transited, and the risk of infiltration
by narcotics agents or betrayal by other traffickers is heightened if
the shipment must pass through many hands. These disadvantages are
balanced by the more rigorous enforcement efforts on the East Coast
of the United States.

Only a small percentage of the illicit heroin entering the United
States is intercepted, despite the fact that the United States Customs
Service is one of the best-trained and least corrupt in the world. The
main obstacle in the path of Customs officials is the sheer volume of
traffic entering the United States (see Figure 1). The various duties
of the Customs Service have increased several times since 1950, but the
resources of the Service have grown at a much slower rate. Illicit
drug seizures have increased each year from about 1965 until recently, but observers do not agree on what this means. Some have considered
that the increased seizures mean that enforcement efforts are working,
but it is also possible that more heroin is intercepted simply because
Figure 1. Key Customs Workload and Manpower

more is smuggled. It is difficult to judge the effect of seizures because there is no real way of telling how much heroin actually gets through. It may well be, as one author has said, that only a dock strike can cause a heroin panic.

The traffic through Latin America has become increasingly important in recent years. Many Latin American cities have been involved in the traffic, including: Panama; Curacao; Santiago (Chile); Asuncion (Paraguay); Buenos Aires; Sao Paulo; and Bogota (Columbia). In the early seventies about thirty to thirty-five percent of the heroin entering the United States passed through these transit points. The "Latin American connection," as it has been called, has existed since the 1950s, when it was established by August Ricord and Joe Orsini, who were Corsican gangsters forced to flee France because of collaboration with the Germans in the war. Ricord dominated the Latin American traffic until his arrest in 1972, which forced a reorganization of the traffic.

The same traffickers often deal in cocaine as well as heroin. All of the cocaine consumed in the United States originates in Latin America, especially Peru and Bolivia. The great increase in demand in the United States over the past few years has caused the price of coca leaves to jump by 1500% in two years: $4 a bale in 1973 to $60 a bale in 1975. A kilo of cocaine sells for between $4,000 and $8,500 in Latin America, but is worth $75,000 to $100,000 on the streets of New York City. Since 1964 coca leaf production in Peru has increased at the rate of twenty percent each year, and in 1974 20 million kilos were produced, of which only 4 million were legally exported or used locally by Indians for chewing. As is often the case, the smugglers work "both sides of the street,"
moving items such as arms, cigarettes, and electronic parts from the United States back to Latin America on the return trip.\textsuperscript{222}

Heroin trafficking networks, especially the Turkish-French-United States network, are loosely structured webs of contacts, involving a large number of individuals who are insulated from one another where possible. Because of this the arrest of a courier will often fail to disclose the identity of those employing him, or that of his next contact along the smuggling trail. The network has developed the capacity to move narcotics from Turkey to the United States over a wide variety of routes, but each shipment is a discrete business venture, and is planned carefully in view of factors such as the risk of seizure on certain routes and the demand for the drugs in the United States. The high-level traffickers thus have a great degree of flexibility in choosing smuggling routes: a successful route can be used repeatedly, or can be deemphasized if enforcement officers are thought to be suspicious. When these options are skillfully utilized, seizures by Customs or narcotics agents become a matter of luck or intelligence from informants--unless "amateur" smugglers are dabbling in the drug trade in the hope of making a quick profit. The mass arrest of an entire trafficking ring is usually a result of tedious and lengthy undercover work, and it has proved impossible to significantly reduce the overall flow of heroin in this manner.

Once the heroin reaches the United States, it moves down the distribution chain. Each time the heroin is resold it is adulterated, so that by the time it reaches the addict its purity will be less than ten percent. At each level those involved take their cut of the profits,
and naturally it is the larger dealers, who handle bigger volumes, who make the greatest profits. Often street pushers are addicts themselves who supply other users in order to maintain their own habit. At no other point in the entire trafficking network can anyone else be found who uses the narcotics, with the exception of the farmers who grow the opium. In the past Italian-American criminals controlled the financing, importation and distribution of heroin in the United States, but the Mafia's withdrawal from some of the more risky aspects of the traffic has opened the way to other ethnic groups. Cubans have become heavily involved in both heroin and cocaine trafficking. The Cuban revolution dispersed the Cuban underworld throughout the western hemisphere, and many of these refugees have maintained their contacts with one another, forming the nuclei of trafficking rings. These traffickers receive their supplies of heroin from the Corsican producers.

At the lower levels of the drug trade in the United States other minority groups, such as blacks and Puerto Ricans, control much of the distribution chain. These groups have worked their way up, so to speak beginning as street pushers and gradually establishing themselves at higher levels. Because of their intimate knowledge of the urban ghettos, which consume much of the heroin, established traffickers find it convenient to do business with these relatively new dealers. At this level the narcotics trade is much more fractionalized and disorganized than in Turkey or France, and it is here that most drug-related murders take place, as low-level dealers jockey for position, attempt to cheat one another, or try to take over someone else's business. Despite this
seemingly constant turmoil, outlets for heroin can always be found.

The Southeast Asia Network

The second major opiate trafficking network is situated in Southeast Asia. The "Golden Triangle" region of Burma, Thailand, and Laos produced about 700 tons of illicit opium in 1971, although some have put this figure as high as 1,000 tons. About 400 tons of this are consumed by the hill tribes who produce it, but a price increase can induce some of this onto the international market. It was only in the late 1960s that Southeast Asian heroin began to find its way to the United States. In 1968 Santo Trafficante, Jr., the Mafia chieftan of Florida and a close associate of both Luciano and Meyer Lansky, traveled to Saigon, Hong Kong, and Singapore to negotiate narcotics purchases from Southeast Asian traffickers. This visit was part of the trend towards an integration of the Southeast Asian network, which was in the past a regional system, with the more established Turkish-French-American network. The result has been a truly global heroin trafficking network—a development which has only increased the difficulties encountered by enforcement agencies everywhere.

The production and transportation of opium in the tri-border region are dominated by a number of independent political factions, each with control of vaguely defined areas of opium producing land. These groups include both Communist and anti-Communist rebel forces in the Shan states of Burma, as well as remnants of Chinese Nationalist forces pushed out of China in 1949. Because of the lack of national governmental authority in these regions, the production, collection, and transportation
of opium were carried out more or less openly until about 1971, when American pressure forced the narcotics dealers to operate with some discretion. At this point in the trafficking network brute force is a satisfactory substitute for stealth, for the opium is moved from the hilly centres of production to the south in large, heavily guarded caravans. Eventually the opium is smuggled into Bangkok by a wide variety of methods, all of which are aided by the inefficiency and corruptibility of the Thai police and government officials. Before the end of the Vietnam war narcotics were also shipped through Vientiane to Saigon.

From Bangkok the opium or morphine base is transported to a variety of locations. Some of the narcotics remain in Thailand to supply the approximately 150,000 users, most of whom smoke No. 3 heroin. Most of the rest is shipped to either Singapore or Hong Kong. About 30 tons of raw opium are consumed in Singapore and Malaysia, while Hong Kong was estimated to import about 10 tons of morphine base and 50 tons of raw opium each per year, but this latter estimate seems low in view of Hong Kong's importance as a centre for heroin processing.

Hong Kong is the centre of the Asian drug trade, and in this respect, as in several others, the British colony resembles Marseilles. The criminal syndicates who dominate the heroin trafficking in Europe and the Western Hemisphere are Corsican and Sicilian; in Asia they are ethnic Chinese, and almost exclusively made up of members of the chiu chau dialect group. The current structure of the Asian heroin trafficking network has been determined by events which took place over a period of decades, and a review of these developments will serve to illustrate
the close connection between politics and the narcotics traffic.

The syndicates now operating out of Hong Kong had their origins in Shanghai in the nineteenth century, when the *chiu chau* were used by British opium merchants as operators and protectors of their opium dens. The British withdrawal from the opium dens after the First World War left the *chiu chau* without sponsorship, just at the moment they were confronted by notorious Green Gang, which operated out of Shanghai's French concession. A series of bitter gang wars for control over the city's illicit drug traffic resulted first in chaos, then in the formation of a "cartel" under a young Green Gang leader, Tu Yueh-sheng. Tu became known as "The Opium King," and began the importation of massive quantities of heroin into China from European and Japanese pharmaceutical firms. Over 10 tons of these "antiopium pills" were imported each year from 1923 onwards. The magnitude of these shipments was in large part responsible for the success of the 1931 Limitation Conference in Geneva. Tu's organization responded to the restrictions placed on surplus licit manufacture by purchasing Chinese opium and refining it into heroin in Shanghai in order to supply both a growing domestic market and the international market. As in the case of the Marseilles syndicates, Tu and the Green Gang allied themselves with the right-wing politicians against Communist labor unions, thus gaining the gratitude of Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist government. The Japanese occupation of Shanghai forced many of Shanghai's gangsters to relocate in Chungking during World War II, but the course of the civil war which followed the Japanese surrender
made it clear that Shanghai was no longer a suitable base of operation, since most of the gangsters had taken part in the 1927 massacre of Shanghai's Communists. As a result of this, most of Shanghai's underworld emigrated to Hong Kong, where the local branches of both the Green Gang and the chiu chau syndicates first welcomed their Shanghai bosses, and then used their knowledge of the Hong Kong underworld to usurp the authority of the newcomers. The narcotics cartel established by Tu Yueh-sheng broke up at this time, and Tu's death in 1951 made renewed struggles between the two groups inevitable. The Green Gang was unable to retain the dominance it had exercised over the Shanghai narcotics trade, since their rivals had strong local connections with chiu chau street gangs and police officials, as well as with the eight percent of the colony's population belonging to their dialect group. By utilizing their intelligence capabilities, the chiu chau avoided street fights and instead fed information to police, with the result that by the mid-1950s the once-powerful Green Gang was shattered beyond repair by police raids, arrests, and deportations.

After the elimination of their competition in the heroin manufacturing business, the chiu chau took control of the opium traffic out of Bangkok, which was facilitated by the fact that most of Bangkok's commerce was controlled by chiu chau merchants. This left only the retail distribution of narcotics in Hong Kong outside of chiu chau control. The prospects for ousting the Cantonese Triad societies from their position of strength in this most lucrative sector of the narcotics trade appeared remote, since the Cantonese made up over eighty percent
of the population, and their criminal organizations were larger and more powerful. However, these groups were outlawed by the Hong Kong police following three days of rioting in October, 1956, thus removing another enemy of the *chiu chau* syndicates. When the police launched a drive against street pushers and small opium dens in the mid-1960s, the syndicates were able to complete their monopoly of the drug trade by opening more efficient and better protected heroin "supermarkets."\(^{241}\)

At the present time, the *chiu chau* syndicates have a firm grip on the Southeast Asian narcotics trade, supervising all stages of the network, with the exception of the actual production of the raw opium. Virtually nothing is known of the structure of the *chiu chau* syndicates, in contrast to the information which has been uncovered about the Sicilian Mafia and the Corsican syndicates. Given the high level of cooperation and coordination among *chiu chau* traffickers, it is likely that there exists some kind of unified syndicate,\(^{242}\) but the absence of facts makes it impossible to determine how formal such an organization might be.

It is also unclear as to how much heroin is being smuggled out of Hong Kong onto the international market. Most of Hong Kong's addicts use No. 3, or smoking, heroin, but substantial amounts of No. 4 heroin are produced in Hong Kong for export. In 1969, a ring of Australian traffickers was broken up after operating for a year smuggling heroin to the United States via London, and three years later another ring involving Filipinos was uncovered. Both rings were financed and directed *chiu chau* based in Hong Kong, and the latter ring alone
successfully brought about 1,000 kilos of heroin into the United States in one-year period. Since this would account for about ten percent of the American heroin consumption during that period, it is difficult to accept FBN estimates that only five percent of the heroin reaching the United States was coming from Southeast Asia at the time. Similarly suspect is a United States Cabinet Committee conclusion that; "Perhaps because their diversified activities in Hong Kong are sufficiently profitable, the major dealers there have never shown much interest in actively developing markets abroad for No. 4 heroin."

The end of the Indochina war has seen an increase in Thailand's importance as a production and distribution centre for the Southeast Asian drug trade. With Vietnam no longer available as a transit area, new routes to the United States have been developed. Much of the opium and heroin moves through Thailand into Malaysia and Singapore, while the rest travels the established routes to Hong Kong. Apart from the effect on smuggling routes, the political developments in Indochina have had little effect on the heroin trade: United States officials reported that in 1975 a bumper crop of opium was harvested in the Golden Triangle, and more high-grade heroin was coming out of the hill regions than ever before.

The Middle East-South Asia Network

The third major trafficking network involves South Asia, with Iran as the principal consuming nation. Iran has a long history of opiate abuse, and in 1955 approximately 7.5% of a population of 20 million was thought to use opium. In that year, the government
instituted a ban on the production and consumption of opium, which resulted in a decline in addiction, so that today there are 300,000 to 350,000 opium users in Iran, of whom about one-third are registered with the government. Throughout the period of prohibition users in Iran turned to the illicit market for their drugs. Official Iranian estimates put narcotics consumption in 1972 at 350 tons, of which registered addicts consumed 155 tons, and non-registered addicts 180 tons. The resumption of opium cultivation in 1969 and the dispensation of drugs to registered addicts failed to eliminate the illicit traffic into Iran. In contrast to most countries, opium smoking is the main form of abuse in Iran, although heroin use is on the upswing.248

Most of the illicit opium entering Iran is grown in Afghanistan. Compared to the other two trafficking networks, the South Asian system is exceedingly simple. Local Afghan merchants and businessmen often act as intermediaries between the opium growers and the smugglers. The actual smuggling is carried out by the nomadic tribes who dwell along the Iranian-Afghan border. The rugged nature of the terrain and the length of the border makes smuggling very difficult to stop. Since Iran intensified its anti-drug efforts in 1969 (including imposition of the death penalty for smuggling), the smuggling caravans have avoided the main border-crossings, and have also been larger and more heavily armed.249

Smaller amounts of opium are smuggled from Pakistan to Afghanistan, and some Indian opium is also diverted into the illicit market, despite fairly effective controls by the Indian government. In many cases, especially
in Afghanistan, local officials are involved in the trafficking, but there is little to indicate participation by top government officials.\textsuperscript{250} There is also no indication that international drug-trafficking syndicates are operating in this area, for the Afghan and Pakistani opium has a lower morphine content than either Turkish or Southeast Asian opium, and is thus less suitable for the international market. Therefore the South Asian network is almost purely regional, but if illicit opium supplies from other parts of the world should become more difficult to procure, substantial quantities of opium are available in South Asia. The area is of much greater importance in the world hashish traffic,\textsuperscript{251} and presumably the trafficking network which moves this drug into Europe is capable of transporting heroin as well if the situation were to call for it.\textsuperscript{252}

Apart from these three trafficking networks, smaller quantities of opium are produced and processed into heroin in other areas of the world. The most important of these centres of production is Mexico, since virtually all of its opium is refined into heroin and smuggled into the United States. Mexico's importance as a source of heroin has grown in recent years, both because of its strategic location along the Latin American trafficking routes and increasing enforcement activities against French sources.\textsuperscript{254} It was reported recently that 90\% of the heroin seized by American police in the first half of 1975 was of the distinctive Mexican "brown" (because of impurities) variety, as compared to 40\% in 1972, 63\% in 1973, and 76\% in 1974.\textsuperscript{255} It is rather doubtful that 90\% of the heroin consumed by American addicts originates in Mexico,
though, since the approximately 15 tons of opium produced each year in
that country\textsuperscript{256} would only yield enough heroin to meet a small fraction
of that used by the United States. The Mexican heroin is moved into
the United States along the same routes traveled by heroin from outside
sources, cocaine, and marijuana.

The world narcotics problem, and especially the heroin problem,
which is serving as the focal point in this paper, can be seen from the
above discussion to be international in every sense. It is difficult
to find more than a handful of states which are not involved as either
producing, consuming, or transit states in the heroin trade. The
drug problem is not new, as was shown in the first two parts of this
paper. What is new is the expanded nature of the problem, and in the
next part of this paper we shall examine the steps taken by the
international community in the light of these developments, and the
degree of success or failure these efforts have encountered.
IV. INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL SINCE THE SECOND WORLD WAR

The Machinery of International Control

As the reader will recall, a fairly large number of international conventions and agreements were concluded before World War II.257 The disagreements encountered at the various conferences were important in that they demonstrated how progress in international narcotics control depended on the reconciliation of the diverse interests of the most important states. This holds true today as well. As far as the actual content of the conventions is concerned, the stated goals of the international community have become wider and more explicit over time: the 1912 Hague Convention was: "Determined to bring about the gradual suppression of the abuse of opium, morphine and cocaine, as also of the drugs prepared or derived....(therefrom)...."258 whereas a recent agreement, the 1961 Single Convention stated that: "The Parties, concerned with the health and welfare of mankind....recognizing that addiction to narcotic drugs constitutes a serious evil for the individual and is fraught with social and economic dangers to mankind...."259 In the fifty-year period following the Hague Conference, the international community concluded that narcotics abuse had ramifications which went beyond the use of the drugs themselves.

Apart from reflecting, and to an extent molding, the attitudes of the international community, the various conventions contributed to the structure of international narcotics control. The 1925 convention260
established a system to regulate the international drug trade, for
exports were only permitted with the approval of the importing state. The 1931 convention brought into existence the system of estimates, which restricted manufacture to the previously stated, legitimate needs of importing states. Several other international agreements have been concluded since the Second World War. In 1948, a treaty was concluded which brought a number of hitherto uncontrolled synthetic narcotics under international jurisdiction. A 1953 treaty provided for restrictions on licit production of opium. The most important agreement was the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, which was established in March, 1961 and came into force on December 13, 1964. The purpose of the Single Convention, as the name implies, was to incorporate the essential features of all the preceding treaties, thus rendering them void. Each party to the Single Convention has undertaken the following obligations, which represent the culmination of the international narcotics control movement begun some fifty years earlier:

a) establishing or adjusting national legislation to conform to the convention;
b) maintaining a system of licenses (for manufacturers, wholesalers, and others), permits and prescriptions (for dispensing of drugs), record-keeping, reports, controls and inspections;
c) establishing estimates of national requirements of drugs, transmitting them to INCB (International Narcotics Control Board), and enforcing the established estimates;
d) maintaining a system of export and import authorizations and import certificates;
e) maintaining statistics and other documentation, and transmitting them, respectively, to the INCB and the secretary-general;
f) coordinating preventive and repressive actions against illicit traffic and arranging for treatment of addicts;
g) cooperating with other nations and the international agencies in counteracting the illicit traffic and in extradition and other questions relating to the punishment of offences.
The only other agreements to be reached since the Single Convention have been the Vienna Convention on Psychotropic Substances (1971) and the 1972 protocol amending the Single Convention. The main impact of these agreements has been procedural, such as bringing new substances under international control. The control mechanism as established in 1961 remains intact.265

The International Regime

Implementation of the international regime is carried out primarily through national institutions; in this respect narcotics control differs little from most other international regulatory efforts. Nations are always reluctant to surrender any of their sovereignty, particularly in the sensitive matter of law enforcement. Thus there are well-defined areas in which the international control mechanism operates:

a) placing new drugs under control or altering the regimes of control;
b) documentation and evaluation of the operations of the control system;
c) establishing (by INCB) of drug-need estimates for different countries and supervising the working of the control system;
d) employing sanctions, ranging from criticism to the imposition of an embargo, against countries in breach of treaty provisions;
e) technical assistance;
f) inducing changes in the system of control, ranging from recommendations to the elaboration of new treaties.266

Although the functions of the international bodies concerned with narcotics control are mainly of an information-gathering and advisory nature, they are not without importance. There are a large number of international agencies which deal with the drug problem, simply because narcotics abuse has widespread implications, but there are a relatively small number of bodies which deal principally with this topic. Figure 2 illustrates these bodies and their relationships to
Organizational Structure of the International Drug Control Machinery, 1972

Figure 2. Organizational Structure of the International Drug Control Machinery, 1972

one another. The United Nations has overall responsibility for narcotics control, a function it inherited from the League of Nations. Figure 3 lists the main drug control agencies and their predecessors.

Political bodies

League of Nations
Advisory Committee on Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs (1921-40)

United Nations
Commission on Narcotic Drugs (1946-)

Expert Bodies

League of Nations and United Nations
PCB Permanent Central Opium (or Narcotics) Board (1929-67)
DSB Drug Supervisory Body (1933-67)
INCB International Narcotics Control Board (1968-)

Health bodies

League of Nations
Provisional Health Committee (1921-23)
Health Committee (1924-45)

World Health Organization (WHO)
Expert Committee on Habit Forming Drugs (1949)
Expert Committee on Drugs Liable to produce Addiction (1950-55)
Expert Committee on Addiction-Producing Drugs (1956-64)
Expert Committee on Dependence-Producing Drugs (1965-67)
Expert Committee on Drug Dependence (1968-)

Secretariats

Opium Traffic Section of the League
UN Division of Narcotic Drugs
INCB Secretariat
WHO Drug Dependence Unit, now Drug Dependence and Alcoholism

Figure 3. Key Drug Control Organs and Their Predecessors

Although most of the agencies concerned with narcotics control have changed their names one or more times (the best example being the WHO Expert Committee on Drug Dependence—see Figure 3), such renaming or reorganization often has little effect on a body's composition and operation, because many of the individuals in the agencies remain the same. 267

As the international control system currently operates, the United Nations General Assembly has the power to make important decisions in the narcotics field, but these actions are almost always based upon recommendations by the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). Since ECOSOC has many responsibilities besides narcotics control, it in turn relies on the Commission on Narcotic Drugs. 268 The three principal agencies involved in international narcotics control are the International Narcotics Control Board, the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, and the World Health Organization.

The International Narcotics Control Board

The International Narcotics Control Board's (INCB) main function is to compile statistical data submitted by national governments in accordance with the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs. Each year the Board publishes an annual report, as well as three, separate, statistical documents. These are entitled: "Estimate of World Requirements of Narcotic Drugs and Estimates of World Production of Opium" (the main vehicle of the estimate system, which limits licit production to the levels required by legitimate consumption); "Statistics on Narcotic Drugs" (which gives nine tables detailing the licit trade in drugs, as
well as giving information on seizures of illicit drugs); and "Comparative Statement of Estimates and Statistics" (in which the rigour with which each country has stayed within its own estimates is examined). The effectiveness of the estimate system depends upon the accuracy of the reports submitted by each national government, for although the INCB is empowered to question the content and completeness of submissions, it does no information gathering on its own. The Board also makes estimates for states who fail to do so; in 1935 the Board established estimates for 48 countries and received them from 123; in 1972 the figures were 14 and 174 (each state is required to make 10 returns per year). The three statistical reports are published as supplements to the basic annual report of the INCB, which is more subjective and comments on both the efficacy of the system of returns and, more recently, the world drug scene as a whole.269

The Commission on Narcotic Drugs

In contrast to the INCB, the Commission on Narcotic Drugs is primarily a political body. Under the League, when it was known as the Opium Advisory Committee, it directed the international control movement.270 Originally this body had eight members, which was increased to fifteen. The expansion of the United Nations has led to a corresponding expansion of the Commission to the present size of thirty members. The Commission is assisted in its work by the Division of Narcotic Drugs, which investigates many aspects of the drug trade and publishes the "Bulletin on Narcotic Drugs," which consists of information about international control efforts, as well as scientific
submissions. Both of these organs are dominated by the Western states, especially the United States, which reflects both the pattern of international power and the degrees of interest shown in narcotics control by the various countries in the world. 271

The World Health Organization

The primary concern of the World Health Organization (WHO) is the regulation of the licit drug trade, especially the testing of new drugs to determine their safety. The narcotics question absorbs only a minor part of WHO's energies. WHO, naturally enough, looks exclusively at the medical aspects of the drug problem, and enforcement matters are outside its competence. WHO experts keep in touch with both the INCB and the Commission on Narcotic Drugs (see Figure 2), and make recommendations to these bodies. 272

The Suppression of Heroin Trafficking

The machinery for the international control of the narcotics traffic which has evolved over the past seventy years has probably reached as effective a level as possible, given the desire of each state to preserve its own sovereignty. The estimates system has curbed the diversion of licitly produced narcotics into the illicit market, but multilateral agreements themselves cannot be effective against traffickers, for their arrest and the destruction of the trafficking networks can only be accomplished by police actions which national governments alone can undertake. The international agency most closely connected to these efforts is the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), which has no field agents and merely
conveys information about individuals involved in crimes of an international nature to interested governments. The fact that no intergovernmental organizations possess enforcement powers underscores the point that in the present international system the nation-state has a monopoly of the legitimate use of force. Even small states have the resources to deal with trafficking if they really wanted to, and it follows that substantial illicit traffic survives only because a number of national governments condone it, either directly or indirectly.

There are several obstacles to the effective application of national power against the illicit traffic. Corruption at the lower levels of a government may impede the sincere anti-drug efforts of higher officials. If corruption is widespread, the sincerity of these efforts is itself brought into question. Corruption, often at high levels, is to be found in almost all poorer countries, although it is not a malaise confined solely to them.

The second factor hampering rigorous enforcement of anti-narcotics laws is bureaucratic confusion and the lack of cooperation between anti-drug agencies. At times there is also discord between narcotics enforcement agencies and organizations in somewhat related fields, such as intelligence agencies.

The third, and perhaps most significant, obstacle facing enforcement officials is the involvement of national governments in trafficking. The international trade in narcotics is an economic enterprise, but a highly political one as well. Not only can governmental authorities become corrupted and participate in narcotics trafficking, either passively by ignoring smugglers, or actively by smuggling themselves,
but governments themselves can condone trafficking as serving the national interest. When governments find it expedient to lend a measure of support to narcotics traffickers, the enforcement aspect of the problem is almost wholly overshadowed by the political implications. Once narcotics trafficking is politicized in this manner, there can be little hope for an improvement in the situation until the underlying political factors are altered.

**Corruption**

It is difficult to know where to begin a discussion of corruption, simply because it is so widespread that it is virtually universal. Police and customs officials in most underdeveloped countries are poorly trained, and even more poorly paid. At the same time, narcotics traffickers make enormous profits, and are willing and able to pay police for their services. Corruption is a way of life in many countries, and it is not seen as immoral to accept bribes, since such payments are common and represent a necessary supplement to an official's income. When corruption is rampant at all levels of the bureaucracy, bribes from narcotics traffickers are nothing out of the ordinary, except that payments from smugglers are usually larger than those from ordinary travelers.

It is possible to cite an unlimited number of examples of corruption in the less developed countries, and in most cases it would be noteworthy only to mention the discovery of a completely honest official. Payments are often made to higher officials on a regular basis, in order to ensure the unhampered movement of drug shipments, while bribes
are only paid to lower-ranked personnel when necessary—when a shipment is actually uncovered or a trafficker arrested. This system of evading police interference functions effectively in both Turkey and Southeast Asia, but it is not confined to producing areas. It is likely that in any country through which heroin or other drugs are shipped, enforcement officials on many levels will be paid off by the traffickers. If arrangements of this nature cannot be made, there are always more cooperative police to be found in other countries.

Corruption also extends to the judicial systems of many less developed states. In Columbia, for example, judges compete for the privilege of trying cases involving drug traffickers because of the large payoffs they will receive. Any position in the governing structure is usually seen as an opportunity to enrich oneself, and when the narcotics trade is in the picture there are many such prospects. One author assessed the situation in Southeast Asia as follows:

The Thai government is heavily implicated in the opium traffic. Every important trafficker in Thailand has an "advisor" in the narcotics police, and most would never think of moving a major drug shipment without first checking with the police to make sure that there is no possibility of seizure or arrest. U.S. narcotics agents serving in Thailand have learned that any information they give the Thai police force is turned over to the syndicates in a matter of hours. Moreover, officials in the U.S. Bureau of Narcotics feel that corruption is not just a matter of individual wrongdoing, and claim to have evidence that indicates that corruption goes to the very top of Thailand's current military government.

In South Vietnam almost every powerful political leader is somewhat implicated in the sale of heroin to American soldiers, and many are working closely with Corsican syndicates to ship large quantities of narcotics to the United States and Europe. The Laotian elite are actively involved in the manufacture and export of heroin, and resident Corsican smugglers are treated like honored foreign dignitaries.

The end of the Indochina war altered the structure of the heroin
trade in Southeast Asia, but in general the above assessment holds true today. The pro-American governments in Vietnam and Laos may have been extreme examples, but the same type of corruption is found in many other states. Latin American dictators have traditionally acquired personal fortunes while in office, one reason being the unstable nature of their positions. When a coup might force a leader into exile, it is only logical to make provisions which will ensure that that exile will be comfortable. This mentality may have contributed to the widespread corruption in Vietnam, where almost every top official in the government tried to amass money outside of the country to be used if and when the Communists took over. Corruption often extends to the very top levels of governments. For example, in December, 1974, Luis Rivadeneira, a Latin American smuggler, was arrested in Ecuador with two kilos of cocaine. Ecuador's Minister of Government, Admiral Poveda, the head of all the law enforcement agencies in that country, interceded on his behalf, and all charges were quickly dropped. Half of the 200 active drug traffickers operating out of Columbia have been indicted in the United States, but none has been extradited, and the traffic continues unabated. Similar situations exist in many other countries.

The fact that corruption is so widespread and accepted in the less developed states should not leave the impression that officials in developed states are immune from the lure of bribes. The distribution of narcotics is greatly facilitated by the corruption of police, and in this regard the New York Police Department has special problems, New York City being the centre of heroin consumption in the world. The
most blatant example of corruption in that city was the revelation
that approximately twenty percent of the heroin and cocaine seized
by police between 1961 and 1972 had been stolen, and lengthy
investigations of the thefts (which totaled some $70 million) began
in mid-1973. In comparison to police in underdeveloped countries,
however, the customs officials and enforcement agents in North America
and Western Europe are efficient and dedicated, and not easily bribed.
Bribery is viewed as somewhat immoral and at odds with the role of
public servant, and thus corruption is an individual, secretive affair,
rather than the open, almost institutionalized practice common to
poorer countries. A major cause of this difference is the higher
salaries paid to western officials, which makes the acceptance of
bribes less obligatory.

Without the services rendered by the many corrupt officials in
their employ, international narcotics traffickers would face a much
more difficult task. It is worth bearing this in mind when discussing
wide-ranging international schemes for ending the illicit trade in
narcotics. No matter how logical and impressive a plan might be, it
cannot be carried out properly if the officials on the spot are paid
off by traffickers. The corruption of officials is not absolutely
essential to the activities of traffickers, nor would the elimination
of corruption (if that could be accomplished) necessarily bring about
an end to the illicit traffic. It would be more accurate to say that
bribery, corruption, and, if necessary, intimidation are the lubricants
which ensure the smooth and continuous functioning of the machinery of
the international narcotics traffic.
Bureaucratic Confusion

Apart from luck, intelligence is the most crucial factor in preventing narcotics smuggling. Customs and enforcement officials find themselves overworked at almost every point, and faced with an ever-growing volume of international trade and commerce to supervise. Only a fraction of the goods crossing international borders can be thoroughly searched, and authorities are consequently forced to limit their investigations to cases where definite knowledge of a narcotics shipment has been obtained.

Basically, two avenues are open to narcotics agents trying to secure such intelligence. For reasons of his own, an informer may alert authorities to the details of an incoming shipment, including the names of other traffickers. More often, narcotics agents are forced to infiltrate trafficking rings by posing as smugglers and making purchases of narcotics in increasingly amounts. An element of risk is connected with both methods, since the accepted penalty for informers and spies is death, and those involved in the narcotics traffic have no inhibitions in carrying it out.

Law enforcement operations against drug trafficking rings are major undertakings, which must be carefully planned and convincingly executed. The surveillance of suspects involves long and often fruitless hours of boring work, and convincing traffickers that an undercover agent is actually a fellow trafficker is both time-consuming and dangerous. Much of the work of authorities is directed towards the painstaking accumulation of intelligence on trafficking routes and
those using them, and such an endeavor would be greatly facilitated by a close coordination of activities by the various agencies working against the illicit traffic.

In reality, there is seldom such cooperation, and certainly not on an international level. As far as the rapid, systematic exchange of routine information is concerned, the police forces and narcotics agencies of the world are not integrated to the extent of their transnational rivals, the trafficking rings and international drug syndicates. This is only natural, for the infringements upon national sovereignty implied by full cooperation among national law enforcement agencies are considerable, and more than the current international system is likely to accept in the foreseeable future. Interagency cooperation on the international level has been one of the main themes of American drug policy over the past five years, and the principal means of facilitating cooperation has been the posting of narcotics agents in foreign countries, as well as the corresponding assignment of foreign agents to the United States. An example of this was the exchange of personnel between the BNDD and the French Judiciary Police in 1971. In mid-1972, approximately one out of every ten BNDD agents was posted outside the United States.

A similar lack of cooperation is often evident between agencies within a nation. There are a number of Federal agencies in the United States concerned with narcotics enforcement, such as the Customs Service, the Treasury department, the Justice department, and so on. In addition, state and local police forces are also involved in the enforcement of narcotics laws. This diffusion of powers is typical
of a modern, bureaucratic state, and many countries spread the responsibility for narcotics enforcement around to several agencies. This leads to problems, however. With only a limited amount of resources available for law enforcement, each department exhibits the natural bureaucratic tendency to preserve and expand itself at the expense of rival groups—which can result in an overall drop in efficiency because of friction between agencies. This can become serious if more than one agency is working on a single case, and vital information is not shared.

Conflict also develops between Federal and local authorities. Federal agents may consider local police as provincial and amateurish, while local police in turn resent the "intrusion" of Federal narcotics agents. The different operational procedures of Federal and local officials may also lead to friction. In practice these problems are often avoided because those involved are personally acquainted with one another and have some respect for each other's abilities. It is difficult to say in advance whether the friction between enforcement agencies will be serious enough to affect actual operations, for much depends on the personalities of those involved, as well as the nature of the case.

Conflict is sometimes more pronounced between narcotics agencies and intelligence agencies. Both operate in much the same environment, but often their objectives are in opposition. Traffickers are sometimes assisted or employed by intelligence agencies,286 and thus different branches of a government can be working at cross-purposes. It was
recently revealed that the American Central Intelligence Agency, in violation of its charter, infiltrated the BNDD on then Attorney General John Mitchell's authorization, supposedly to help eliminate corruption. The program lasted from 1971 to 1973, when it was discontinued after the BNDD was absorbed by the new Drug Enforcement Administration. Many observers were concerned that the CIA agreed so readily to the scheme, fearing that the CIA had as its true objective the attainment of a secret hold over the drug agency. This has been the most graphic example of inter-agency disharmony yet to surface. The only beneficiaries of the lack of cooperation between enforcement agencies, of course, are the drug traffickers themselves.

The Politicization of Narcotics Trafficking

As pointed out above, there are a number of similarities between narcotics trafficking and intelligence or espionage activities. Criminal organizations have developed many of the same capabilities possessed by national intelligence agencies, even though their objectives are quite different, and narcotics syndicates are not under national control. In view of this, it is not surprising that these organizations have cooperated with some frequency. This is one aspect of the politicization of the narcotics traffic.

Nongovernmental political groups, especially terrorist organizations, also must acquire the capacity for covert action, and are able to use this capability to traffic in narcotics. In this case, trafficking again becomes an almost completely political activity.

A nation may deliberately encourage narcotics use, even to the
extent of manufacturing the drugs, in another country, with the objective of debilitating the target country. When this stage is reached, the trafficking is secondary to the strategic and diplomatic implications of such strategic warfare. That drug abuse can have definite political and military implications was shown by the heroin epidemic among the American troops in Vietnam. In surveying the different facets of politicized trafficking, it should be remembered that narcotics trafficking also has many less direct political implications.

Government Support of Traffickers

Even when it is not national policy to support narcotics trafficking *per se*, governments can find themselves allied with traffickers in a variety of ways. The Green Gang waged counterrevolutionary terror in Shanghai on behalf of Chiang Kai-shek, and in Marseilles the Corsican syndicates supported Fascist demonstrators in their struggles with leftists before World War II. In both cases, the gangsters were rewarded by the governments involved, and allowed to conduct their activities without molestation. The role of criminal organizations as the natural counterweight to left-wing, mass organizations is not confined to these two notable examples from the interwar years. The United States utilized both the Mafia in Italy and the Corsican syndicates in Marseilles to break strikes and weaken Communist support. The involvement of the CIA with groups who were, among other things, trafficking heroin was a portent of things to come.

This same pattern of support for criminal groups in return for anti-Communist assistance has marked the narcotics trade in Indochina
since World War II. The French military and intelligence agencies were actively involved in the opium trade during the First Indochina war, both with the objective of obtaining much-needed funds and securing the allegiance of minority groups such as hill tribesmen. Most of the opium was consumed in Indochina, although some of it reached the international market. The French also supported the Binh Xuyen river pirates, who controlled most of the criminal activities in and around Saigon by 1954. The Binh Xuyen was able to secure the city from Viet Minh terror by operating a vast network of spies and informers—all paid at the expense of the areas controlled by the gang. The Binh Xuyen control of Saigon, as well as the French influence in South Vietnam, was destroyed by the American-backed forces of Prime Minister Ngo Dinh Diem in savage fighting during April, 1955, and for a short time the alliance of anti-Communists and narcotics traffickers came to an end.292

As the struggle between the various American-supported regimes and the Communists intensified in South Vietnam and Laos, the United States found itself in a position quite analogous to that of the French a decade earlier. As McCoy points out:

Given the striking similarities between the French and American war machines, it is hardly surprising that the broad outlines of "Operation X" (the secret French operation which controlled the opium trade in the early 1950s) reemerged after U.S. intervention. As the CIA became involved in Laos in the early 1960s it became aware of the truth of Colonel Tringuier's axiom, "To have the Meo, one must buy their opium." At a time when there was no ground or air transport to and from the mountains of Laos except CIA aircraft, opium continued to flow out of the villages of Lacs to transit points such as Long Tieng. There, government air forces, this time Vietnamese and Lao instead of French, transported narcotics to Saigon, where parties associated with Vietnamese political
leaders were involved in domestic distribution and arranged for export to Europe through Corsican syndicates...the U.S. Embassy, as part of its unqualified support of the Thieu-Ky regime, looked the other way when presented with evidence that members of that regime were involved in the GI heroin traffic. While American complicity is certainly much less conscious and overt than that of the French a decade earlier...the consequences were far more serious.293

The American involvement in the Indochina narcotics trade was the subject of considerable public discussion several years ago, and further elaboration on the subject is outside the scope of this paper.294 It is worth noting that American support for those involved in the narcotics traffic was not confined to Vietnam and Laos. A substantial portion of the opium output of the turbulent Burmese Shan States is controlled by the remnant of the Kuomintang armies driven out of China in 1949. Funded by the CIA as the nucleus of a projected Nationalist Chinese invasion of the mainland, these irregular forces were later used for intelligence-gathering raids into Yunnan. American support made the Kuomintang troops one of the most powerful armed groups in Burma, and soon this irregular army dominated much of the Burmese opium production, which it expanded for the sake of revenues. In 1972 these forces controlled about one-third of the world's illicit opium supply.295

When vital national interests are judged to be involved, events have demonstrated that cooperation with heroin traffickers is an acceptable policy. In most cases intelligence agencies take charge of such cooperation, for open dealings with drug traffickers would be very bad public relations. At times the relationship between the two can become so close that the two tend to become indistinguishable, as in the example of the French Secret Service—Service de Documentation
Exterieur et du Contre-Espionage (SDECE).

In April, 1971, Roger Delouette was arrested in the United States for smuggling heroin. Delouette was a low-ranking agent with SDECE, and he claimed that he was only following orders from his superiors. After official French denials the matter more or less ended, but subsequently evidence emerged which indicated that Michel Debre, the State Minister for Defence in the Gaullist government, had intervened on Delouette's behalf some three years earlier by awarding him back pay and finding him a new assignment, both without the knowledge of Delouette's immediate superiors in SDECE. According to Delouette, this "new assignment" involved both counterfeiting and heroin smuggling. French officials, including Debre, take the opposite view and claim that Delouette was operating completely on his own.296

The Delouette case had its origins in the turmoil of French politics in the late 1950s and early 1960s. De Gaulle was attempting to consolidate his newly-formed Fifth Republic and deal with the explosive Algerian question, while at the same time the Secret Army Organization (OAS) was attempting to kill him and topple his government. For counter-terror operations the Gaullists turned to, among others, the French underworld. Delouette was apparently an agent turned smuggler who found himself in an exposed position as a result of a power struggle between hard-line Gaullists and the supporters of the new French President, Pompidou, who was attempting to gain a measure of control over the various French intelligence services.297 He was not the only example of a French agent engaging in criminal activities, others being:
Michael Victor Mertz: Mertz was a hero in the Resistance and was awarded several honours by the French government. After the war he worked for French intelligence, and by 1960 he was also smuggling Marseilles heroin into the United States, even though he remained in SDECE. This activity was interrupted in 1961 by a SDECE assignment to penetrate the OAS and obtain information about planned terrorist missions. Mertz discovered that a bombing attack was to be made on President de Gaulle, and using the details he uncovered, it was arranged to allow the attack, without any actual danger to de Gaulle's life. The operation was successful; public opinion swung in favour of the Gaullists, the plotters were arrested, and the French government relocated Mertz and his family in Canada, where he revived the North American end of his heroin syndicate.

By the end of 1968 the Mertz ring had brought nearly half a billion dollars worth of heroin into the United States, despite several arrests by French police (usually on the basis of information provided by American authorities). Those arrested were usually released pending trial, as was Mertz himself in 1969. When the Delouette case broke in 1971, the French government finally tried Mertz and he received a five-year sentence for trafficking, but eight months later he was again free.

Ange Simonpieri: Simonpieri was born in Corsica, and was a minor figure in the Marseilles underworld before he was recruited into the SDECE counterterror squad in 1960. He served first in Algeria, then in Paris, where he specialized in the interrogation of OAS suspects. After 1963 he assisted Gaullist politicians in their electioneering, as
well as returning to his earlier vocation as a heroin trafficker. By 1970 enough evidence had been gathered to call for Simonpieri's arrest, but health reasons and official foot-dragging delayed any action until 1971, when the publicity from the Delouette affair and American pressure about the role of SDECE in the heroin trade induced the French government to try Simonpieri and sentence him to a five-year term in a prison hospital. 299

**Joseph Attia:** Attia was a notorious criminal in France until his death in 1972, but he was also a top assassin for SDECE. During World War II he saved the life of a French officer, Colonel Jacques Beaumont, who later became a top SDECE officer. Beaumont also testified on behalf of Attia at the latter's robbery and murder trial in 1953, where he was found guilty of only a minor charge. After this he was employed by SDECE on a number of missions, despite his habit of occasionally absconding with SDECE funds for Spanish vacations instead of carrying out his assignments. Attia was part of the counterterror campaign against the OAS both in Algeria and Paris, where the nightclub he opened served as a clearing-house for heroin deals. According to American narcotics agents, Attia also provided financial backing for many of these shipments.

During the 1960s, Attia was in and out of French jails, mostly on extortion charges, but this did not end his usefulness to SDECE. In 1963 SDECE operatives kidnapped Colonel Argoud, an OAS leader, from his Munich hotel room, and Argoud testified that Attia was one of his abductors, although Attia was supposed to have been in a French prison
at the time. Attia was also indirectly involved in the murder of the Moroccan leftist Ben Barka in 1965, which was carried out by SDECE at the request of the pro-French General Oufkir, advisor to the Moroccan king. Several of Attia's lieutenants enticed Barka to Paris under pretext, abducted him, and then murdered him.

Attia was released from prison in 1968, and he carried on several minor criminal activities before his death in 1972 of cancer. On the night he died, both his apartment and his Paris nightclub were burglarized, presumably by SDECE, to remove any potentially embarrassing documents or memoirs.300

Christian David: David was recruited into the SDECE counterterror operation in the early 1960s after his escape from a French prison. Later he was used on small missions by SDECE in Africa until he was recalled to Paris in 1965 to help carry out the Ben Barka assassination. Several months later he killed a French policeman investigating the case, escaped a nation-wide manhunt with the help of the French underworld, and went to South America with the assistance of one of Marseilles' biggest heroin bosses. David promptly joined a heroin ring smuggling drugs into the United States, and was arrested by Brazilian police in 1972. Under torture, he confessed all, including his role in the Ben Barka murder, and was deported to the United States, where he is currently serving a long prison term for trafficking.301

Andre Labay: Labay was not a hired killer like Attia and David, but was employed by SDECE as a confidence man. In Algeria he infiltrated the OAS, and later he established a series of fronts for SDECE operation and communication centres in various countries. On October 5, 1971, Labay
entered the BNDD office in Paris and proposed that American authorities assist him in transporting a 100-kilo shipment of heroin to the United States. In return, narcotics agents could follow him on the next shipment and arrest the entire ring. The BNDD notified French authorities and Labay was arrested on the following day with his 100 kilos. Enforcement officers concluded that Labay's offer stemmed from his fear that several members of the ring had already been arrested and he would be implicated, but another view is that the exposure of the Delouette case had severed any Labay-SDECE connections, which had the effect of putting everyone on his own resources. 302

Another important organization in France, besides the official intelligence agency SDECE, is the Service d'Action Civique (SAC). The SAC charter states that the goal of the organization is simply to bring together supporters of General de Gaulle, but there is more involved than this. SAC members serve as bodyguards and enforcers for Gaullist candidates, and in return are granted a degree of protection from police. SAC was originally set up in 1958 to crystallize support for de Gaulle. Many of those who joined were underworld figures, including a number of heroin traffickers, such as David, Simonpierrri, and Labay. Total membership is about 15,000. SAC is part "parallel police force," part political organization, and in part just a formalization of the network of friendships, debts, and favours—due which still permeates the French government, intelligence community, and underworld. 303

This fairly detailed discussion of the relationship between
the French government and underworld figures makes it clear that SDECE has to some extent been involved in heroin smuggling, and that without doubt the prosecution of drug offenders has often been deliberately delayed by the French government because of connections between the accused traffickers and high officials in the government or intelligence agencies. Without the chance arrest of Delouette most of what is now known would have remained secret. According to a top European lawyer, the French reluctance to prosecute known traffickers "...put on record the breakdown of the French police system with regard to certain persons in France."304

This type of government involvement is a great hindrance to the effective enforcement of narcotics laws. The detection and arrest of traffickers is rendered more difficult, but this is less important than the fact that the responsible national authorities protect the trafficker rather than punish him. In a system of sovereign states the international community must rely on the enforcement of national laws, for there is no international authority which can try and punish international criminals such as narcotics traffickers. If this obligation is not met, there is no legal recourse possible against the individual offender—measures can only be contemplated against the state itself. Sanctions will seldom be imposed, for it is recognized that national security is a more important concern than narcotics control. It is impossible to determine how many states are involved in the narcotics traffic through their intelligence agencies, for all these operations are covert and are rarely exposed. Given the present international environment, such involvement is likely to continue unabated.
Terrorists as Smugglers

It is also difficult to determine how many clandestine political groups are involved in the narcotics traffic. Terrorist organizations have the same capability as narcotics syndicates and intelligence agencies in that they can operate covertly in the face of pressure from hostile authorities. One author points out:

Liberation movements, by and large, do have a regular underground network operation that provides them with weapons and through which other information and materials are passed on. To engage in narcotic(s) trade would not require any change in organization.

Given the facts that narcotics trafficking is highly profitable, revolutionary movements are often short of funds, and moral considerations are easily subordinated to the goals of the movement, it is not surprising that several instances of trafficking by extremist groups have been found. Testimony before a United States Congressional Committee revealed that members of Al Fatah and the Palestine Liberation Front were operating extensive narcotics smuggling rings in Germany, which were connected to regular criminal networks in Europe. The profits from this trafficking were presumably used to finance guerrilla activities against Israel. Black September, another Palestinian terrorist organization, is active in smuggling hashish into Europe, and half-kilo bags of the drug are decorated with a picture of a fedayeen with a submachine gun. These operations are facilitated by the readiness of a number of Arab states to issue passports to the smugglers. There are also indications that left-wing Italian groups have been involved in narcotics trafficking. It is to be expected that this trend towards the increasing involvement of clandestine
political groups in the illicit drug traffic will continue, for it is difficult to find a better way to finance revolutionary activities. These groups are dedicated and skillful, but they are not "criminal" in the usual sense of the word, and thus they confront police with new problems. Terrorists are not known to narcotics police, as are professional smugglers, and extra effort is required to detect and infiltrate terrorist smuggling rings.

Strategic Implications

Nations generally do not require the revenues associated with direct involvement in narcotics trafficking; it is more common that certain individuals and interest groups, such as poppy farmers, benefit from unofficial participation. However, the debilitating effects of widespread narcotics use make drug trafficking a potent strategic weapon. Opium use was a major factor in weakening China during the nineteenth century, although the British were primarily interested in the Indian budget, rather than on the effects their opium exports were having on China. It is more difficult to find examples where one nation has deliberately sought to increase addiction in another country by trafficking in narcotics with the objective of disrupting the social structure of the target state for political or military advantage.

The best, and the only documented, example of such national involvement in narcotics trafficking was the Japanese policy towards China in the 1930s and early 1940s. As a preparation for war and a means of resolving the conflict once it had begun, the Japanese military
and occupying authorities actively encouraged the production and consump­tion of opium and heroin by Chinese. These efforts were successful in reversing the effects of the Nationalist government's anti-opium campaign which had commenced several years before the Japanese invasion. 311

The image of a state flooding an enemy country with drugs is an intriguing one, appealing as it does to one's sense of the dramatic. It is also comforting to the "victim" nation, for a narcotics problem can be blamed on the conspiratorial machinations of a foreign power, rather than on social, economic, or enforcement shortcomings at home. In this vein the head of the United States Federal Bureau of Narcotics (later the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs), Harry Anslinger, took the position that Communist China was responsible for the drug problem in the United States. In his 1961 book The Murderers, he wrote:

One primary outlet for the Red Chinese traffic has been Hong Kong. Heroin made in Chinese factories out of poppies grown in China is smuggled into Hong Kong and onto freighters and planes to Malaya, Macao, the Philippines, the Hawaiian Islands, the United States, or, going the other direction, India, Egypt, Africa, and Europe.

A prime "target area" in the United States was California...312

Taiwanese officials, naturally enough, supported Anslinger's views, and continued to make accusations against the Peoples' Republic of China after his retirement in the 1960s. 313 Charges of Chinese Communist complicity in the narcotics traffic have come from other, disparate sources, including Alabama Governor George Wallace 314 and the Soviet Union. 315 Most experts agree these charges have only one thing in common: they are false. The Peoples' Republic of China is no longer an important factor in the global heroin system as either a
producer or a consumer. 356

The most outstanding example of the direct military effect of narcotics addiction is to be found in the GI heroin epidemic which occurred in 1970 and 1971 among American troops in Vietnam. There are many statistics on the epidemic, and all show a sudden and explosive increase in addiction starting in the middle of 1970. Drug arrests rose dramatically: from 47 in 1965, to 452 in 1966, 1,390 in 1967, 3,460 in 1968, 8,446 in 1969, and over 11,000 in 1970. 317 103 GIs died of heroin overdoses in 1970, for a quarterly average of 26, but in the first three months of 1971 there were 35 such deaths. The usual estimate was that 10-15% of United States military personnel were addicted, but some officials put the figure even higher, and in some units half the soldiers were addicted to heroin. 318 Everyone agreed that the problem was critical. One Congressional expert, Representative Robert H. Steele (Rep., Conn.), put the problem in perspective by noting that "...the soldier going to Vietnam runs a far greater risk of becoming a heroin addict than a combat casualty." 319

The importance of the epidemic lies in both its causes and its consequences. There are several explanations as to why the epidemic of heroin use broke out when it did. It was widely held at the time that the root cause was the boredom and low morale of the American troops in Vietnam—-one Army psychiatrist compared life in Vietnam to that in city ghettos. 320 Others, such as McCoy, point out that morale was low for several years before the epidemic, and the most important factor was the sales campaign in Vietnam itself. He concluded:
...the simple fact is that there would have been no epidemic without this well-organized, comprehensive sales campaign. The real root of the problem...[lay]...with those Vietnamese officials who organized and protected the heroin traffic.\textsuperscript{321}

The epidemic itself was triggered by the introduction of master chemists from Hong Kong to the Golden Triangle, which created the capability of manufacturing very pure No. 4 heroin\textsuperscript{322} Once the product was available, it could be moved into Vietnam through established smuggling channels.

The view has also been advanced that the epidemic was not simply an economic undertaking by the Chinese syndicates, but rather was Communist-inspired. General Lewis Walt testified before a Senate subcommittee that the price charged for the heroin was too small to make any real profits for the wholesalers, and that a higher price could easily have been obtained. The idea of the Communists was to spread heroin use as rapidly as possible, to demoralize American troops in the short run and weaken American society in the long run, and hopefully to increase pressures for an American withdrawal. Walt claimed that this opinion was supported by evidence from Vietcong defectors and the beliefs of a "number of senior Western officials who follow the world drug situation closely," but he was forced to conclude that:

Hard evidence is hard to come by...If they (the Communists) played any role at all, it would have been far, far back on the other side of the Cambodian or Laotian frontier, operating through a handful of principals who could not clearly be tagged as Vietcong.\textsuperscript{323}

All this leaves the Vietnam heroin epidemic something of a mystery. It is clear that Communist involvement did not extend so far as to include North Vietnamese production of the opium and heroin itself,\textsuperscript{324}
but it is impossible to ascertain, until further evidence is available, whether the Communists played any role at all. Regardless of the cause of the epidemic, it is clear that its ultimate effect was to convince many Americans that a total American withdrawal from Indochina was the only solution to the problem of heroin use in the military. The heroin epidemic is reported to have directly influenced the Nixon Administration's decision to increase the rate of American withdrawal in 1971.²²⁵

When drug trafficking is politicized in any of the ways outlined above, the operations of narcotics enforcement agencies cannot help but be gravely impaired. At this point effective enforcement is no longer just a question of more agents or more efficient utilization of resources; rather fundamental political factors must be altered before the illicit traffic can be halted. Without these political and diplomatic developments the flow of heroin will continue.

The Turkish Opium Ban

The complex nature of the world's trafficking networks, and the corresponding difficulty in reducing the traffic, has sparked renewed interest in the American proposal to limit raw opium production, which was first made fifty years ago at the Second Geneva Opium Conference.²²⁶ This concept is attractive for its simplicity: without opium there can be no heroin, and without heroin the narcotics problem is eliminated. In practice, of course, the restriction of opium production is anything but simple.²²⁷ The United States failed in its attempt to gain acceptance of a universal system of restriction, but in 1972 was successful in
pressuring Turkey into a total ban on poppy cultivation. This bilateral agreement is worth examining, both for its own sake, and as a possible example for other producing states.

The agreement was concluded on June 30, 1971, and under its terms all opium-growing in Turkey was banned, with the last legal crop being harvested in 1972. The United States was to provide $35 million to the Turkish government, to be used to compensate the farmers for loss of revenues, and to find alternate crops. Problems began to arise immediately after the ban came into effect. No suitable substitute for opium could be found, and an American study to find such a crop began only after the ban itself was brought into effect. Turkish officials complained that the money pledged by the United States was insufficient, and that $400 million would be a more realistic figure. The cessation of Turkish production also caused a shortage of licit opium on the international market. After two years, the Turkish government decided to resume poppy cultivation, citing the following reasons:

a) In time, the plight and poverty of 1,500,000 people directly affected by the ban gained a new dimension and the efforts made in order to solve the problems related to the prohibition did not succeed. Consequently, economic chaos in the region and social unrest among the people reached a level that no democratically elected government could ignore any longer.

b) While the ban gave the wrong impression to the world public opinion that all opium poppy growers in Turkey had been involved in illicit traffic and the Turkish Government had been unable to control it, other countries tended to increase their production to meet the growing need for opium and opium alkaloids in the world market.

c) A serious shortage of opium to be used for pharmaceutical purposes has been felt all over the world. Yet the kind of opium produced in Turkey is of highest quality as far as the medical and scientific use is concerned.
d) The suppression of poppy cultivation resulted in an annual loss of 500 million TL for the Turkish economy.

e) The external assistance to compensate the cultivators and to ensure industrial and agricultural development of the region remained highly insufficient.

f) It was proved only after the ban that the cultivation of substitute crops was practically impossible because of the poor character of the soil as well as the adverse climatic conditions prevailing in the region.332

This is the official position of the Turkish government, and there is some truth in it. The failure of the Turkish ban emphasized several points. Any such program in the future must be well-researched and prepared, and the economic, social and political consequences of a ban must be carefully considered. Restrictions should also be applied to all producing countries, to prevent states from taking advantage of a reduction in a competitor's production.

This type of universal agreement would seem to be further away from reality now than was the case in Geneva five decades ago. The question remains as to whether bilateral agreements of the United States-Turkey variety, for all their flaws, actually have an effect on the illicit traffic. The answer would seem to be yes. During the period when the Turkish ban was in effect, heroin became more difficult to obtain in the United States, especially on the east coast. French heroin was retailing at 15% purity in 1971, but the combined effects of the Turkish ban, increased enforcement by French police, and the breakup of the "Latin American Connection" caused a drop in purity to 2%.333 During this same period the number of addicts in the United States also dropped.334 One report stated that, of heroin discovered by police in the first half of 1975, only 2% was French connection heroin, as
compared to 44% in 1972.  

The elimination of the Turkish source of opium would not put the French traffickers out of business, of course, for opium can be brought into the trafficking network from other areas of the world. Despite the fact that Turkey has resumed poppy cultivation, it is an encouraging sign that the ban had an effect on the illicit traffic. It also seems possible that the new control measures taken by the Turkish government, in cooperation with the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control, may be sufficient to prevent the diversion of opium into the illicit market. The key to this new method is the prohibition of seed pod lancing (to release the opium from the poppy) and its replacement by poppy straw harvesting, in which the entire plant is processed into morphine. In this manner all the poppies planted are channeled into the licit market, and the farmer has no opportunity to divert some of his opium to the smugglers. The Turkish government has also increased the licit price paid to farmers, and American and United Nations officials have both expressed satisfaction with the precautions taken by the Turkish government. In 1975 100,000 farmers were licensed to cultivate the poppy, but this year twice that number have received licenses. Only time will tell whether these control efforts will prove sufficient to prevent diversion into the illicit market, for traffickers seem to be waiting for a relaxation of the controls at present. The effects of the ban and its aftermath indicate that, for all the difficulties involved, the limitation of opium production to the amount required by legitimate world usage is a feasible option which must be explored in
the future.
V. CONCLUSION

Narcotics trafficking is an international problem in every respect, and its elimination thus requires international cooperation. The international narcotics control movement has existed for seventy years, numerous treaties and agreements have been signed, and an elaborate mechanism of control has been established, yet heroin use continues in many countries at near-record levels. At first glance, it would seem that the international community has failed completely in its efforts to solve the problem of narcotics abuse.

It would be irresponsible to abandon the attempts at international control without suggesting viable alternatives. Frustrated observers have recommended that the United States and other countries adopt the type of heroin maintenance scheme used in Great Britain. In effect, this would mean the legalization of heroin. Once addiction ceased to be a criminal activity, addicts would not be forced to steal to support their habits, for the price of heroin would drop drastically, or could be administered free by the state. This is also the idea behind methadone maintenance as practiced in the United States, but it is naïve to suppose that legalized heroin is a magical solution to the dilemma posed by drugs. A proper discussion of this proposal involves research into the motives of drug addicts; motives which vary with the individual concerned. It is not certain whether certain individuals are predisposed to heroin addiction, or whether the determining
factors are social and economic. Heroin maintenance raises two questions. Will heroin use spread if heroin is dispensed legally? The epidemic nature of heroin addiction makes this a strong possibility, and the Swedish experience with legalized amphetamines\(^3\) raises the possibility that legalization would stimulate heroin use. The second question is whether a country such as the United States can tolerate an addict population of nearly half a million, even if no increase took place after the implementation of a maintenance program. Great Britain, it must be remembered, has an addict population of less than three thousand. In short, heroin maintenance is an acceptable alternative for Great Britain, but this does not make it a universal solution.

The complexity of the international drug problem is so great that there can be no single solution. It may be that the ultimate answer lies in eliminating the poverty and alienation in Western societies that leads to drug abuse, but this goal is a distant one at best. Treatment for addicts on an individual basis is a necessary part of any anti-drug program, as is education in schools as to the dangers of drug use. These measures have been ineffective, however, as long as drugs are readily available. The use of drugs such as heroin may be symptomatic of personal or social problems, but once an individual is addicted the narcotics habit itself becomes the cause for concern. A number of interesting analyses of heroin systems are available,\(^3\) and a wide variety of domestic responses to heroin addiction can be considered. Regardless of the avenue of approach, the reduction of the supply of illicit heroin can only help reduce addiction and its spread.
And therefore we are led back to the enforcement solution to heroin addiction. Drug abuse cannot be eliminated simply by jailing pushers, much less addicts, but if police repression is combined with intelligent social and medical policies, progress can be made against the heroin plague. Once the importance of adequate enforcement of narcotics laws is acknowledged, the international control of narcotics is placed in the proper setting, for only through international cooperation can this, or any other, international problem be dealt with. This paper has discussed both the narcotics traffic and the international attempts to curtail it. To what extent have these measures succeeded, and why have failures occurred?

The successes of the international narcotics control movement should not be underestimated. One hundred years ago most governments considered the opium trade to be only one more source of revenue, and any regulation was for the purpose of increasing government income. The acceptance of the American principle that only the medical and scientific usage of opium and its derivatives was legitimate has been the basis for all subsequent control efforts. Subsequent acceptance of principles such as the obligation of each state to ban opium exports to states prohibiting its use, or that the possession of illicit drugs implied guilt, led to the creation of an international consensus on the narcotics problem.

From this consensus stemmed the system of international controls. International bodies were empowered to make estimates of drug needs for states, and the diversion of licitly produced drugs into the illicit
market was stopped. However, it has proved difficult to make progress beyond this point.

There are a number of reasons for the failure to halt international narcotics trafficking. Some of these are connected to the nature of the problem itself. Poppy fields are often scattered and in inaccessible locations, and are thus difficult to detect, much less eradicate. Heroin is so potent that relatively small quantities are worth a great deal, and thus smugglers can transport shipments with ease. The consumer-addicts are difficult to treat, and no agreement has been reached by experts on the most effective approach to addiction, with the result that the demand for heroin and other drugs cannot be quickly reduced.

More important than these factors are the social, economic, and especially political constraints on effective international action. On the national level, corruption is the most significant obstacle. The actual implementation of international agreements depends on national police forces, but in many cases national police cannot operate against traffickers. In many states, narcotics control is of less importance than a number of other goals, and thus it naturally has a lower priority. The most outstanding example of such a conflict is the clash between the requirements of national security and drug enforcement, in which the former almost always wins out.

This leads into the third category of the impediments to international control—the current nature of the international system. National security must be emphasized because of the power-conscious nature of the system. As a result, governments find themselves allied with drug traffickers, or even trafficking themselves. Cooperation between
anti-drug agencies on the international level is wanting, in large part because of the tendency of each state to safeguard its own sovereignty. International bodies have been confined to information-gathering roles for this same reason, with a resultant loss of effectiveness.

Other developments since the Second World War have increased the difficulties facing enforcement officials. The growth of international commerce has increased the opportunities available to smugglers, and international agreements that foster international trade, such as the TIR, have also facilitated narcotics smuggling. In the Third World, the uneven spread of Western affluence has made bureaucrats and police officials more vulnerable to corruption than ever, to the benefit of traffickers. Even the development of nuclear weapons has had an impact on narcotics trafficking, for the nuclear stalemate has led to a greater emphasis on covert struggles for power and influence, and in this arena drug traffickers are valuable allies.

All these factors, as well as the general drift towards hedonism which some attribute to western societies, have stimulated the illicit traffic in narcotics and made solutions more difficult. In retrospect, narcotics abuse is the ideal problem for the twentieth century. A nation can only solve its drug problem if it is willing to take draconian measures, as was the case in Communist China. Even here, these steps were aimed at more fundamental political and social problems, and drug abuse was eliminated en passant. For countries unwilling to take such measures, international cooperation is the only alternative. The narcotics trade is so bound up with the essential features of the international system that it is unlikely that it can be completely eliminated until
the system itself has changed. In the short term, the international community can only continue to implement limited, incremental solutions to the problem. Increasingly close and effective cooperation between police forces, the eradication of illicit opium production, technical advances in enforcement procedures, and efforts to isolate traffickers from their political allies are all worthwhile steps which should help to slow the flow of heroin. A reduction in the volume of narcotics reaching developed states would facilitate the control of heroin use, perhaps allowing domestic programs to make an impression on addiction rates. The complete elimination of narcotics abuse must await the solution of the social, political, and economic problems which encourage illicit production and stimulate consumption.
APPENDIX 1

The Resolutions adopted by the International Opium Commission, Shanghai, 1909

In Resolution 1 the Commission gave warm and emphatic recognition to the sincerity of the Chinese government and people in their anti-opium campaign and to the progress which they had already made.

Resolution 2 called on each government concerned to take measures "for the gradual suppression of the practice of opium smoking in its own territories and possessions, with due regard to the varying circumstances of each country concerned."

Resolution 3 expressed the desirability of each of the participating government's re-examining its system of regulation in light of the near unanimous agreement that the use of opium for other than medical purposes should be prohibited or carefully regulated.

Resolution 4 stressed the duty of each country to prevent the export of opium and its various products to countries which prohibit their entry.

Resolution 5 called for drastic measures by all governments in their territories and possessions to control the manufacture, sale, and distribution of morphine and other opium derivatives so as to curtail the grave and growing danger caused by these products.

Resolution 6 expressed the desirability of each government's conducting an investigation of the scientific aspects of antiopium remedies and of "the properties and effects of opium and its products."

Resolution 7 called on governments which had not done so to take steps to close as soon as possible the opium divans in their concessions and settlements in China.

Resolution 8 recommended negotiations between China and the governments concerned for the adoption of "effective and prompt measures" for the prohibition of the trade in and manufacture of anti-opium remedies in the foreign concessions and settlements in China.

The final resolution urged the governments concerned to apply their pharmacy laws to their subjects in the consular districts, concessions, and settlements in China.

Taylor, American Diplomacy and the Narcotics Traffic, p. 76-77, (Citing the Report of the Shanghai Opium Commission, p. 84.)
## APPENDIX 2

**Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, Foreign Agents on Board, August 31, 1972**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Agents on Board</th>
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<td><strong>Mexico City Regional Office:</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guadalajara</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hermosillo</td>
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<td>Monterrey</td>
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<td>Quito, Ecuador</td>
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<td>Izmir, Turkey</td>
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<td>Vientiane, Laos</td>
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<td>Location</td>
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<td>------------------------------</td>
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<td>Hong Kong</td>
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<tr>
<td>Manila, P.I.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Seoul, Korea</td>
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<td><strong>Paris Regional Office:</strong></td>
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<td>Barcelona, Spain</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rabat, Morocco</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bonn, Germany</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frankfurt, Germany</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Munich, Germany</td>
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<tr>
<td>Milan, Italy</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rome, Italy</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Brussels, Belgium</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Canada:</strong></td>
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<td>Montreal</td>
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<td>Vancouver</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grand total:</strong></td>
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</tr>
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<td>(of a total of 1,121 agents)</td>
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APPENDIX 3  A Hypothesis on American Involvement in Heroin Trafficking
Notes


2. Ibid., p. 109. In this paper the terms drugs and narcotics will be used interchangeably.

3. Britain being the principal exception.


8. One of the most recent proposals to this effect was made by a White House study group investigating the priorities of United States drug enforcement: see New York Times, September 17, 1975, p. 59.


10. Ibid., p. 1.

11. Ibid., p. 2.


13. "The physical signs of abstinence consist of yawning, lacrimination, sneezing, perspiration, rapid breathing, dilated pupils, elevated temperature and blood pressure, loss of appetite, vomiting, diarrhea, and insomnia. In addition, during withdrawal, addicts complain of such symptoms as muscular aches and pains, nausea, cramps, nervousness and restlessness." Clifton K. Himmelsbach, "Opiate Addiction," in Cull and Hardy, Types of Drug Abusers and Their Abuses, p. 23.

14. See below, p. 11-12.


16. Ibid., p. 367.

17. Ibid., pp. 367-68.


21. Ibid., pp. 1–3.


25. Ibid., p. 5. Also, see below, p. 13.

26. Ibid., pp. 9–12.


32. Blum, Drug Dealers—Taking Action, p. 73.


34. The purity of the average fix has tended to drop with time. Before World War II addicts could buy heroin that was almost 30% pure in the United States. See below, p. 39.

35. See below, p. 61.

36. Although by the turn of the century the rate of addiction in the United States had begun to drop. Musto, The American Disease, p. 3.

37. Ibid., pp. 69–90.

38. Ibid., pp. 3–4.


42. Musto, The American Disease, pp. 69–90.


44. Musto, The American Disease, pp. 24–53.
51. Ibid., p. 32.
53. Ibid., pp. 24-28.
54. Ibid., p. 54.
59. This was the view taken by the British royal commission in 1894. See above p. 16.
61. Ibid., pp. 52-53, cited by ibid., p. 69.
62. Ibid.
63. Ibid., p. 48, cited by ibid., p. 69.
65. For the nine resolutions adopted at Shanghai see appendix I.
66. See above, p. 17. The British intention, of course, was to delay the proposed conference until the agreement with China was confirmed. In this way the Sino-Indian opium trade would not be discussed at the conference. After this goal had been accomplished, the British were more amenable to the American initiatives. Bruun, The Gentlemen's Club, pp. 11-12.

67. Ibid., p. 12.

68. Taylor, American Diplomacy and the Narcotics Traffic, p. 83.


70. See below, p. 30.


72. Ibid.

73. See above, pp. 11-13.

74. See below, pp. 90-97.

75. Taylor, American Diplomacy and the Narcotics Traffic, p. 106.


77. See below, pp. 32-33.


80. Ibid., p. 114.

81. Ibid., pp. 118-19.

82. See below, pp. 29-30.


84. See above, pp. 11-13.


86. See below, table 3, p. 49.


89. Taylor, American Diplomacy and the Narcotics Traffic, p. 172.

90. Ibid., pp. 159-60.

91. Ibid., pp. 157-58.


94. See below, p. 95.
96. Ibid.
98. Ibid.
100. Bruun, The Gentlemen's Club, p. 15.
101. See above, p. 23.
104. See below, pp. 38-39.
105. Taylor, American Diplomacy and the Narcotics Traffic, p. 301
106. These general observations apply both to the period under discussion and the present. See below, pp. 121-25 for an illustration of these problems in the Turkish context.
108. See below, pp. 118-19.
109. See below, pp. 42-43.
110. As was the case with opium earlier; see above, p. 7, 12.
111. See below, p. 64.
113. Ibid.
115. The Federal Bureau of Narcotics was originally part of the Prohibition bureau, but became a separate organization in 1930. Later it became the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, which was in turn incorporated into the Drug Enforcement Agency in 1973.
119. Ibid.
120. Ashley, Heroin, p. 41. This estimate was only made public in late 1971.
122. For example, the American-Turkish agreement to ban Turkish poppy cultivation. See below, pp. 121-25.


124. See below, pp. 58-90.

125. Although this view is open to question. See the Vietnam heroin epidemic, below, pp. 119-21.


128. Ibid., February 9, 1975, p. 16.

129. Ibid., April 2, 1974, p. 25.

130. See below, p. 123.


132. To use a term borrowed from the study of nuclear weapons: "vertical" proliferation refers to an increase within a country; "horizontal" proliferation to the spread to other countries in the international system.

133. See above, p. 42.


136. Ibid., pp. 98-103.

137. Ibid., p. 92.

138. See below, pp. 63-81.


140. Ibid., pp. 140-42.


142. Ibid.

143. Ibid., August 12, 1973, p. 3. During the four-year period 1969-1973 8 pushers were killed by militants. Jack Scully, the head of Ulster's 13-man drug squad summed up the situation: "I don't want to sound alarmist, but we have a real problem on our hands."

144. Ibid., December 20, 1970, p. 2. Alcoholism has long been a major social problem in the Soviet Union.

145. Ibid., September 13, 1972, p. 4. How obligatory treatment can be "voluntary" is one of the finer points of Soviet justice.

146. Ibid.

147. Ibid., November 13, 1972, p. 4.

148. Ibid.

149. Ibid., May 27, 1974, p. 2.

150. Ibid., December 28, 1974, p. 5.
151. See above, pp. 32-33.
154. See below, pp. 95-96.
155. See below, pp. 86-87.
157. See below, p. 124.
159. See below, pp. 121-25.
161. See above, pp. 32-33.
164. For a more extensive discussion of the Golden Triangle, see below, pp. 81-82.
165. See below, pp. 86-88, 99-103.
167. See above, p. 41.
168. See below, pp. 116-17.
169. See below, pp. 97-121.
170. The lower figure is given by Newsday, The Heroin Trail, p. 10; the higher figure by Ashley, Heroin, p. 23. These figure are for 1972.
171. For instance, Robin Moore, The French Connection: The World's Most Crucial Narcotics Investigation (Bantam, 1970), and the film of the same name.
178. See above, p. 39.

181. Ibid., pp. 83, 89, cited by Ibid.

182. Ibid.


186. Ibid.

187. Ibid., p. 12.

188. See above, p. 9.


190. Ibid., pp. 26-27.

191. Ibid., pp. 26-29.

192. Ibid., p. 29.


196. Ibid.


198. Ibid., p. 48.

199. Ibid., p. 49.

200. Ibid., pp. 49-50.


205. Ibid.


207. Ibid., pp. 20-21.


210. See above, pp. 8-10.

211. A Nice police commissioner, Jean-Pierre Sanguy, remarked: "They (the heroin labs) are only kitchens, any cook can put one up." Newsday, *The Heroin Trail*, p. 78.

212. A United States narcotics agent was assigned to uncover the location of heroin labs in Marseilles in the late 1950s, but after he told the local police his information the labs disappeared before they could be raided. He later returned with a false passport and identity, discovered several more labs—and blew them up. Ibid., p. 90.
214. Ibid.
216. Ashley, Heroin, pp. 22-23.
217. Ibid.
221. Ibid.
223. See above, p. 74.
229. Ibid., pp. 242-353.
234. Ibid.
237. See above, pp. 32-33.
240. Ibid., pp. 228-29.
241. Ibid., pp. 229-32.
242. Ibid., p. 233.
243. Ibid.
244. Ibid., p. 239.
248. Ibid., pp. 162-64.
250. Ibid.
253. See above, p. 55.
256. Ibid., April 21, 1975, p. 1.
257. See above, pp. 15-36.
260. See above, pp. 29-31.
261. See above, pp. 32-33.
262. This analysis is from Bruun, The Gentlemen's Club, p. 45.
263. Ibid., pp. 18-19, 45.
266. Ibid., p. 46.
269. Bruun, The Gentlemen's Club, pp. 75-86.
270. See above, p. 29.
272. Ibid., pp. 66-74.
273. A more detailed discussion of INTERPOL is to be found in Michael Fooner, Interpol: the inside story of the international crime-fighting organization (Chicago, H. Regnery Co, 1973)
274. Several of these are given below, but it would futile to provide extensive documentation of this type of corruption.
275. For a more detailed examination of this topic see McCoy, The Politics of Heroin in Southeast, for conditions there, and Newsday, The Heroin Trail, for Europe.
278. See above, p. 86.
279. New York Times, April 21, 1975, p. 1. Poveda explained that Rivadeneira was a close relative of one of his friends.
280. Ibid., April 24, 1975, p. 1.
283. See above, pp. 76-77.
286. See below, pp. 107-15.
288. See above, p. 59.
291. Ibid., pp. 20-23, 37-47.
292. Ibid., pp. 90-126.
293. Ibid., p. 152.
294. The interested reader is advised to consult McCoy's excellent study The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia, upon which much of the preceding has been based.
295. Ibid., pp. 126-35.
297. Ibid., pp. 99-109, for a more detailed account of this case.
298. Ibid., pp. 111-19.
299. Ibid., p. 119.
301. Ibid., pp. 124-26.
303. Ibid., pp. 128-31.
304. Ibid., p. 121.
306. Ibid.
310. See above, pp. 5-7.
311. See Frederick T. Merrill, Japan and the Opium Menace (New York: International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations; and the Foreign Policy Association, 1942)
315. Ibid., November 18, 1974, p. 15. For a convenient, although somewhat hysterical, summary of the charges against China, see Patricia Young, The Death Peddlers (Canada, 1973).
322. Ibid., p. 181.
326. See above, p. 30.
327. See above, pp. 34-36.
329. Ibid., pp. 16-17.
330. Ibid., p. 3.
334. Ibid., March 18, 1976, p. 29.
336. See above, p. 9.
337. *Facts on Turkish Poppy*, pp. 15-16.
341. See above, p. 46.
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Owen, David E. *British Opium Policy in China and India.* New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1934.


