PRESTIGE, POWER, AND THE CHINESE

by

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ABSTRACT

The extensive literature in the active field of community power studies suffers from a lack of comparative work in areas other than middle-sized North American cities, while the literature on overseas Chinese communities lacks sophisticated methods of study and precise results. This thesis is an attempt to augment the literature in both areas by applying community power study techniques to the overseas Chinese community in Vancouver.

An interview schedule was constructed and interviews were conducted with thirty-five leading Chinese who held at least one office in a Chinese association. Information obtained included the personal background of leaders, their opinions on leaders and associations, and their reports on various recent issues in the Chinese community.

Responses concerning the influence of leaders, the influence of associations, and the basis of leadership were taken as components of ideology. Unfortunately, these components showed little relationship to each other or to the two variables with which they were expected to be associated: the generation and number of offices of the evaluator. Nominations of generally influential leaders were related to nominations of leaders in the particular areas of welfare, representation of the community, the Chinese language schools,

and business. Frequently nominated general influentials were also often named as particularly well-informed about community affairs. There was also a relationship between general nominations and offices held, although the correlation was less than had been expected. The general nominations were slightly biased because second generation leaders were over-represented in the sample, made more general nominations than first generation subjects, and more often nominated leaders of their own generation.

Fifty-five men were named as general influentials; twenty-five of these were nominated by at least two men of one generation. Ten were classed as first generation leaders and fifteen as second generation leaders. The two top groups of influentials were distinct in age, occupation, number of offices, and prominence in school activities. Both groups were distinguished from the thirty lesser leaders in the frequency of their nominations in the particular areas of influence, except for business influence. The first generation leaders were also distinguished by a greater number of offices.

General nominations of associations were also related to nominations in the specific areas of welfare, schools, and representation, as well as to the total general nominations received by the association officers and to the number of

joint-officer links with other associations. First and second generation respondents made much the same associational nominations aside from the greater second generation tendency to nominate associations prominent in welfare. Association nominations were also related to the "distance" between the respondent and the association: his own associations and associations directly linked to them were disproportionately named.

Four main issues were isolated. The number of leaders named for an issue was less than that for a specific issue area, in turn less than the number of general leaders named. Leaders overlapped little from issue to issue. Almost all issue leaders were also named as general leaders. Associations were rarely mentioned as influential in the issues; their activities seem to be confined to their own members as a rule.

General influence was found to be a useful variable for both associations and leaders. It was closely related to more specific influence and to strategic location on communication channels formed by executive overlaps. Broadly, the thesis indicates that it is useful and feasible to approach Chinese communities with the techniques and findings developed for North American towns.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF TABLES

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CHAPTER I

PREVIOUS RESEARCH

The main purpose of this thesis is to grapple with the problems of studying power. Aside from the fact that power is an interesting topic in itself, it appears to be theoretically strategic. It is one of the main facets of society which are distinguished by all of the theorists who are attempting to work toward high-level theory. The clearest example is Levy, who makes the allocation and distribution of power and responsibility one of the analytic aspects of any society. More generally, power is one of the analytic aspects of any concrete structure, that is, it is both pervasive and important causally. S. F. Nadel goes so far as to argue that power is the only variable that would be suitable for the framework of a theory of social structure, since models of social structure should consist of roles linked by some variable which is an important element of every relationship. Models with several linking variables would be prohibitively complex and difficult to compare, while models with trivial linkages would be of little interest and explanatory power. Nadel concludes that social structures are merely static pictures with little or no explanatory usefulness at any time, but he does not retract his assertion that power itself is an important aspect of role relationships.

Parsons has also stressed the potential of power as a crucial variable. He has suggested that power might be a sociological equivalent of the economist's most useful tool, money, because power is a kind of unit of social barter: it can be converted into and from other social values or resources like wealth and prestige. One difficulty with this suggestion is that power, unlike money, has so far defied quantification; it may well not even be possible to define a standard unit of power. However, unquantified operational definitions of power have been extensively explored with much research and debate.

Everyone agrees on a very vague definition similar to Max Weber's: "Power is the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the base on which this probability rests." (Weber, p. 152.) The definition is frankly subjective in the sense that power involves ability to carry out a purpose of some kind. Purpose could be interpreted as a goal of a group of people as well as an individual's goal, but purpose of some kind is essential. It is essential both to fit the way in which the term "power" is generally used and to restrict the scope of the term to something more usefully narrow than potential cause of any kind.

Bierstedt suggests that power is a sociological variable in the sense that is is an attribute of roles and

organizations. He distinguishes power from influence, an "ideological" or cultural variable belonging to values and ideas, and from dominance, a "psychological" variable relating to personal qualities and to face-to-face interaction. Influence in his sense is not power because the objects possessing influence do not also possess goals or wills; and dominance is not power insofar as it involves people treating each other as persons rather than as role players. The distinction of influence from power is clear enough, but the separation of dominance and power is not. Dominance could very easily be seen as a special case of power in which the actors do not set their goals or claim their resources collectively. Possibly this case is so special that it requires a different theory just as it typically leads to different research methods, but this cannot be decided a priori. However, power and dominance are in fact studied in distinct ways by distinct brands of social scientist, and I will make no attempt here to unite the two. Even if the two concepts are not unifiable they may well be capable of connection in the sense that dominance may be involved in the personal ties that seem to be part of the communication processes involved in power, processes which will be briefly discussed below.

So far we have decided that power is some social unit's potential for purposive control of something. At this point agreement stops. Three types of clarification of the

term "power" have been pursued: elaborations based on analogy, formalization, and refinement of research techniques. The commonest analogy is drawn between power and potential or actual cause. For example, "power is the ability to exercise influence while cause is the actual exercise of it." (Riker, p. 347.) Or, "the set of all influence relations is here defined to be that subset of all causal relations such that the behavior of an individual appears as the terminal point in the causal linkage." (March, p. 437.) This comparison has not led to anything more illuminating than vague statements which are not even consistent; for example, in the two statements given above power is defined as a potential in one and as an active process in the other. It does not seem promising to pursue the analogy, especially since the notion of cause is just as thorny as the notion of power. Implicit analogies are also often made between power and some variable from physics: power as potential can be compared to potential energy, and power as active control can be compared to force or to power in the mechanical sense of work done per unit time. Once again the parallels drawn have not been fruitful, perhaps because of the striking difference in the precision of sociological and physical variables. If comparison to cause is unprofitably fuzzy, comparison to mechanics is unprofitably premature.

Prematurity also seems to blight the main formal attempts to define power. Most of these have been conveniently summarized in an article by Riker. The simplest version comes from Shapley and Shubik:

$$P_i = \frac{m(i)}{n!}$$

where P_i is the power of the ith participant in a voting body of n persons, and m(i) is the number of times the ith person is in the pivotal position of being the last person needed to form a winning coalition. Clearly this definition is far too specialized to be very useful.

March's most recent definition is given in terms of ability to restrict outcomes:

$$R_1 I R_2 = m(\Omega_{1k}) \leq m(\Omega_{2k})$$

where R_1 and R_2 are roles, I is the relation "has at least as much influence as," m is some measure on the set of possible outcomes, and Ω_{hk} is the set of possible outcomes given that R_h selects behavior k. It would be difficult to operationalize this formula. How would the set of possible outcomes be determined? How would one determine the hypothetical effect of R's behaviour on a range of outcomes which do not occur? These practical difficulties are less bothersome than the fact that the definition simply does not correspond to the usage of the term "power", since R's ability to restrict outcomes is not necessarily an ability

to get the outcomes he wants. Restriction of outcomes might well be one method of getting his way, but it is not the only one. There is a similar emphasis on control of possible actions in a definition given by Danzger, so his approach will be mentioned here even though it is entirely verbal. He prefers to think of power as the number of possible and suitable lines of action available to an actor, with a line being possible only if the actor says that it is and hence sees that it is. Obviously there are more problems of operationalization here; to name only one, Danzger himself points out that one should allow for the actor's willingness to use lines of action by considering the perceived costs of the lines and the salience of the goals desired. But even if the number of available lines could be measured and weighted with respect to salience and cost, a problem of circularity remains. The criterion of "suitability" of lines of action presumably refers to their efficacy, which in turn is an aspect of the actor's power, which is therefore undefined except in terms of itself: power is the number of ways in which an actor can exercise power.

Dahl has defined amount of power as M, where

$$M = P(B,x \;/\; A,w) - P(B,x \;/\; A,\bar{w})$$

That is, A has power over B's doing x to the extent that A's

performance of some w increases the probability that B will do x. It is not at all clear what this probability is or how it could be measured. Dahl himself does not use this definition in his research. For example, in Who Governs? he treats A's power as A's contribution to decision-making. B drops out of the picture, and probabilities are also forgotten since power is equated with actual exercises of control rather than with potential for such control. Dahl does carry on part of the spirit of the definition by insisting on the importance of x, that is, on the fact that A's power over different decisions (different x's) may vary. In other words, power is issue-specific.

Cartwright gives a definition tailored for the power of one person over another in a small group, for what Bierstedt would call dominance. The definition in effect is that A's power over B is the maximum strength of any act A can perform at a specified time, where the strength of A's act is the difference between the forces on B to comply and to resist. Karlsson defines power as the difference in some utility function of B if B acts to maximize or minimize this function. Neither of these two definitions clarifies the meaning of power much since both involve a retreat to another even vaguer concept like "force" or "utility" which is left unoperationalized.

Riker himself throws in a suggestion that A's power is greater than B's if there are more outcomes in some specified set of outcomes for which some action on A's part is necessary. This approach is once again beset with practical difficulties, especially the fact that any person's action is rarely necessary for any outcome. Most "necessary" actions are probably part of formal power, such as the Governor-General's action of signing a bill which is an action necessary to the outcome of making the bill law. Hence Riker's definition relies largely on formal power, a reliance which is notoriously misleading.

None of the formalized definitions is usable or used, which suggests that they are all premature. A formal model of power is more likely to follow than to precede a clarification of the concept. Nevertheless, comparing these attempts is helpful in bringing out a few of the major differences in approaches to power. There is a varying emphasis on power as potential, which has already been discussed. Most important, Riker points out that Shapley and Shubik and March stress power over events while the others stress power over people with or without respect to events. Riker prefers the former emphasis on two grounds. It guarantees that there will always be some power in a system as long as events occur, that is, "it preserves power

in the system;" (Riker, p. 345); and it is parallel to cause in the sense of a necessary and sufficient condition, while power over people is parallel to the more popular notion of cause as a "recipe" or way of making things happen. Both the accuracy and the relevance of these two arguments are open to question. It is not necessarily good to preserve power in a system. And there is really little difference in the power-preservation properties of the two approaches when power over events surely implies power over people as well, and vice versa. The parallels to types of cause are not clear; for example, power over people could be seen in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions for obtaining behaviour from them. Even if the parallels were more convincing, what would they accomplish?

Although I am not impressed by Riker's arguments, I still support his position because it is closer to the one which most people discussing power take at least implicitly. Power is the ability to obtain a desired result; the ability to control some other person or persons is merely a means to this end, or at most a particular kind of result desired by those with a taste for dominance. A discussion of "A's power over B" usually turns to "A's ability to get B to do x" and finally rests on "A's power over the event x which happens to affect B." Dahl's work is a good example that was

discussed earlier. There is still some room for debate on the type of event that should be considered; Dahl uses decisions, and I will argue for issues.

So far we have found analogies and formalizations rather fruitless. The latter did at least suggest possible differences in approach, although the decision between alternative lines was not based on formal properties but on the alternative's meaning or operationalizability. From this one would expect the most useful results in work attempting to match a meaning with a measure for power. This expectation is borne out by a glance at the mass of methodological studies in this area.

The most thoroughly discredited and easily eliminated tradition equates power with resources, as in the equation of national strength with military power or gross national product. Resources certainly can be converted into power, but they are not power itself. Different resources are of different importance as bases of power in different situations; their contribution to power is a variable, not a tautology, and can only be determined if there is some independent measure of power itself. The resource approach is particularly misleading when it involves identifying power with a single resource such as wealth or prestige.

To a certain extent the reputational approach falls into this single-track trap by attribution of power to those who are described as powerful, that is to those who have the resource of a reputation for power. Clearly this is a resource, since people are commonly convinced that it pays to defer to the strong and therefore give the reputedly strong real strength through deference. It will also become clear that this power resource is not power itself. The pioneering reputational study is of course Floyd Hunter's Community Power Structure. Hunter defines power rather loosely as "the acts of men going about the business of moving other men to act in relation to themselves or in relation to organic or inorganic things." (Hunter, p. 2.) He obtained a list of the forty most "powerful" men in Regional City (Atlanta) by asking panels of supposedly well-informed people to name the most influential men in the community and then taking the sociometric leaders of those nominated. The list included 23 businessmen, 6 professionals, 2 union leaders, 4 government figures, and 5 society figures. After interviewing 23 of the leaders, he found that the top 20 formed an inner circle in the sense that they more often chose each other as leaders, more often worked on committees with other leaders, and more often knew each other socially.

"The test for admission to this circle of decision-makers is almost wholly a man's position in the business community in Regional City." (Hunter, p.79.) According to Hunter, the top leaders make the important policy decisions and have lesser leaders like professionals carry them out. "Organizational leaders are prone to get the publicity; the upper echelon economic leaders, the power." (Hunter, p. 87.) The main basis of this power seemed to be economic force: "the power structure holds the means of coercion." (Hunter, p. 193.) He did a parallel study through interviews with prominent members of the Negro subculture and concluded that "the Negro leaders tended to pick the same persons within their own community on policy matters, and there was a high rate of committee interaction among the top leaders. There was a clear differentiation between top organizations and lower ones on a scale of choices." (Hunter, p. 115.)

This study and others in the same tradition have been thoroughly flayed by the decision-making or pluralist school led by Dahl, Polsby, and others. The main criticism has been that the reputational technique probably does not measure power at all: the informants used may well not be accurate, the standards of judgment they use are unknown and are as likely to rest on factors like prestige as on

power, the questions asked presuppose that there are in fact community leaders by asking respondents to name them, and the results of the method are seldom compared to behavioral data. Hunter assumes but does not prove that there is a power structure in the sense of a single permanent hierarchy of general leaders for all important issues; he discusses few actual exercises of power, and these are minor issues which only businessmen are likely to bother to try to control. He glosses over contrary evidence such as the nomination of nonbusinessmen like union officials as leaders, and such as the existence of powerful leadership groups like the Negro leaders outside of his neat economic-political power structure. He pays little attention to the processes of decision-making and policy execution, and bases his assertions on hearsay rather than on observations or reports of power at work, that is, "the primary assumption of the reputational method is that politically active respondents will report political phenomena correctly" (Wolfinger, p. 842) which is a particularly dubious assumption if these reports are supposed to be complex summaries of influence over many areas instead of eye-witness reports of particular actions. Perhaps one could summarize the element of weakness in Hunter's attempt to study power

structure by pointing out that he really describes power ethnostructure.

Polsby (1963) has given an incisive attack on several of the major reputational studies made in the earlier days of the method. He points out that they implicitly or explicitly assume axioms like these: the upper socio-economic class rules, political leaders are subordinate to the upper class, a single power elite rules, it rules in its own interests, and social conflict occurs on the basis of differences in the interests of upper and lower classes. If all this is true, then it makes sense to ask "who are the most powerful people here?" But this sort of question will be very misleading if there are several sets of leaders varying from problem to problem and time to time. The validity of the reputational approach is open to some highly plausible doubts which should be settled by comparing the method with some other one based on more direct observational data.

Before examining the observational techniques that Polsby and other pluralists advocate, we should look over some of the more recent work in the reputational tradition. Many of the flaws in the earlier research have been patched up, and some thought-provoking results have been obtained. The main line of defence has been to abandon the notion of

a single permanent hierarchy, to adjust the method to allow for other possibilities, and to make more specific reference to actual decisions. As far back as 1952, Paul Miller did a mail study of Northern and Southern small communities in which he asked the sponsoring groups of hospital projects to report on the way the hospital issue was settled. He found that the Northern leaders were more closely linked by friendship, were informal rather than official leaders, were opposed by "old families" rather than by rival politicians, and were recruited by appeals to the obligations of their personal ties rather than the obligations of their positions; in short, the North had leaders of influence and the South had leaders of authority. The study indicated that reputational techniques could be combined with an emphasis on specific issues or decisions, and that a modified technique of this kind could uncover variations rather merely reflecting structural assumptions built into it as a method. A better-known study in this spirit was made by Delbert C. Miller (1958) as a comparison of Atlanta with new date gathered from Pacific City (Seattle) and an English City, both similar to Atlanta in size and economy. Miller's variant of the basic technique was to obtain lists of leaders from prominent organizations

and to have ten raters choose those actively supporting or initiating important policy decisions. Miller then took random samples of these Top Influentials and analyzed their choices of ten preferred leaders for a hypothetical project; leaders most often chosen in this way became Key Influentials. As compared to Top Influentials, Key Influentials were better known, more active in organizations, more often on the same committees, and more often members of organizations which the Top Influentials rated important. They were thus distinguishable, but Miller does not make the mistake of concluding that they formed a Hunter-style power hierarchy. "Both Pacific City and English City show a fluid core of 12-15 key influentials, with up to 150 top influentials. Different combinations appear with different issues. No one person or group dominates." (Miller, 1958, p. 306.) The leaders of institutional sectors were "relatively stable " and a few Key Influentials were involved on most crucial issues, but there was a far less rigid structure than Hunter claimed to find, especially in English City. There was also less evidence of business dominance; the proportion of businessmen among the Key Influentials was 67% in Pacific City and 25% in English City, as opposed to 75% in Atlanta. The study once again shows that the reputational technique is more flexible than its opponents are sometimes willing to

admit. The main weaknesses of the study are that it relies on the accuracy of only ten informants.

On the basis of such studies the reputationalists are able to offer vigorous defences like that by D'Antonio, Ehrlich, and Erickson. They point out that their method can be made into a tool capable of distinguishing values of some variable rather than an assumption-laden instrument grinding out built-in results. However, they still have some trouble in identifying the variable which their method measures. The most courageous, like Ehrlich, still argue that the method taps power itself; Ehrlich even goes on the offensive (a rare joy for a reputationalist these days) and claims that his approach is far better than the rival decision-making one because the powerful may not be directly involved in decisions. But how can we know whether reputations do in fact reflect indirect, hidden power behind the scenes unless we find some way of measuring that power more directly? And the argument that reputations reveal backstage power is somewhat tarnished by assertions in the same article that reputations also measure potential power and are closely related to perceptions of power. It is quite plausible that the reputational technique yields results mainly influenced by covertly exercised power, potential power, and the way power is seen, but if it is influenced by all three then

it is hardly a valid measure of any one alone.

There seem to be two paths out of this thicket of possible interpretations. One is to treat the classic reputational method as a measure of no more than it obviously and tautologically is, namely, attributions of power; potential power and its open or hidden exercise are then treated as separate variables whose relationships to reputations is to be determined by research. Agger did a study of this kind which incorporated many of the improvements suggested by the pluralistic criticisms. He overcame the problem of mysteriously chosen and hopefully reliable informants by interviewing a 10% sample of a community of 2,000 people and drawing carefully restricted conclusions from their responses, conclusions not dependent on the omnipotence of those interviewed. He overcame the problem of assuming a single hierarchy of generally powerful leaders by asking about three areas of dispute: schools, local government, and community welfare. Along with other results which will be discussed later, he found that attributions of power were not uniform and that "perceptions of specialized influence seem to be the general rule in our community within the defined political arenas." (Agger, p. 324.) This interpretation of the reputational method is cautious and

sound enough, but it gives no answer to the problem of how power is to be dealt with.

Therefore there is some appeal in the other main interpretative approach, the attempt to make the reputational method measure power after all. As has already been pointed out, this attempt has many difficulties which have been gradually smoothed away. The crucial revisions have been the rational specified selection of respondents and the emphasis on involvement in specific issues as a criterion of leadership. However, when the technique is revised this far it becomes essentially the same as the decision-making procedure, except that it may have a greater reliance on reported rather than observed participation in decisions.

The decision-making approach assumes that power is the exercise of influence over important community decisions, and that power should be studied by closely examining how specific decisions are made. Although this emphasis on direct behavioral data is an improvement on the earlier reputational techniques, there are some remaining problems. The best example of the force and the flaws of the method is still Dahl's classic, Who Governs?. He did a careful and intensive study of New Haven city politics, with the assistance of Polsby and Wolfinger. His analysis focused

chiefly on three issues chosen because they were seen as important and because "they promised to cut across a wide variety of interests and participants." (Dahl, 1961, p. 333.) The major weakness of his study is the lack of a really persuasive reason for the choice of issues studied. Decision-making exponents are acutely aware of this problem, especially since their own attacks on reputationalists have stressed the variability of power from issue to issue. Polsby (1963) suggests that the basic criterion should be the importance of an issue. Trivial decisions may have a greater aggregate effect but are too difficult to study, while a sample of issues is impossible because the universe of issues cannot be specified (since there is infinite downward expansion of less and less important subissues of issues.) He admits that the "importance" of an issue could be seen as any one of several things such as the number of people affected or the number and amount of resources affected, He suggests playing it safe by choosing those issues which are important in all these ways; this is still a slip-shod and makeshift solution. All these suggestions share an implicit attempt to find a criterion of the <u>real</u> importance of an issue or of the effects of its resolution. Surely a less ambiguous and more meaningful criterion would

be importance measured subjectively in terms of the issues seen as important by the community or a subsection of it. The power of a group would then be its ability to arouse and satisfactorily resolve issues important in its own eyes. This subjective definition of importance fits with a subjective definition of power very well. Another advantage of this standard for issues suitable for research is that it avoids an overemphasis on issues which have reached some public arena such as a city council or a School Board. The very ability to get an issue onto a public agenda is a part of power which is overlooked by studies like Dahl's , which concentrates on governmental decisions. Bachrach and Baratz (1962) make a similar point: "power may be, and often is, exercised by confining the scope of decision-making to relatively "safe" issues....To the extent that a person of group -- consciously or unconsciously -- creates or reinforces barriers to the public airing of policy conflicts, that person or group has power." (Bachrach and Baratz, p. 948-949.) However, they suggest an issue criterion which is less useful than that of perceived importance: "any challenge to the predominant values or to the established 'rules of the game' would constitute an 'important' issue; all else, unimportant." (p. 950.) It would be

interesting to see a definition of "predominant" or "established" that did not make use of terms like "power" or "the most powerful group."

The only satisfactory definition of an important issue is an issue seen as important by members of a community or its subgroups; the definitions of the subgroups and the required proportion of members reporting an issue as important can vary at the researcher's pleasure.

Returning to Who Governs?, Dahl uses a more impressionistic way of judging importance, and as a political scientist he selects issues which are bound up with the civic government. Dahl redoubles his emphasis on governmental power by his choice of informants who were overwhelmingly public leaders like members of the Civic Action Committee, the School Board, and the upper ranks of the political parties. These informants named the crucial decisions in the issue-areas in which they were involved themselves; power was then rated in terms of the number of times a person or group initiated or vetoed a crucial decision. Fifty persons or groups had some power; it was confined to a single issue area for all but three of the fifty. Most of these influentials were public officials, which may be partly a result of the choice of issues and respondents.

Dahl lays great stress on the lack of overlap of leaders and subleaders between different issue-areas and uses this as support for a pluralist model of civic politics: different, fluid coalitions of leaders arise on issues of special interest to the coalition members, the leader groups then have to compete for broader support, and widely unpopular positions are hence difficult to push through. Apparently a competing set of leaders furthers democratic rule. The reputationalists are quick to point out that mere variety of leaders, which is all that Dahl found, does not imply a necessary competition of leadership. "If all of the decision-makers shared the same values, then there would be no pluralism at all." (D'Antonio et. al., p. 854.) Leadership may be plural without being pluralistic.

The pluralists suppose that various coalitions compete on the basis of their (undefined) interests, where "interest istelf... is differentially distributed in a pattern which pluralists assume is rational for most actors most of the time." (Polsby, 1963, p. 120.) The problem of what "interests " are could be overcome by taking the actor's word for it; if one insists that there are real or best interests then awkward constructs like "false consciousness" are necessary to explain away behaviour contrary to interest. An actor's subjective interests and issues are nearly

indistinguishable, so the perceived issue once again plays a crucial role in the analysis of power.

Each of the three measures of power discussed above depends on a different basic focus of measurement. The reputational approach emphasizes the individual leader and his image, the pluralist approach stresses decisions and their participants, and the new suggestion would make use of issues. The basic weakness of the first technique is that reputation for power is not power itself, while the weakness of the second is that it underestimates the amount of power exercised outside public forums. I feel that the third method would correct both these faults while retaining the spirit of the usage of the concept "power."

One might well ask whether all this debate about rival techniques is really necessary, whether the different methods actually yield very different results. In almost all studies it is difficult to answer this question because only one instrument set is used and therefore any difference in substantive findings could be explained by differences in the communities studied. Fortunately there is one study which attempts to compare different methods in a single community: the research done by Freeman and others in Syracuse, New York (1963). They studied thirty-nine issues in order to uncover four kinds of leaders: decision-makers,

leaders in associational activity, reputational leaders, and leaders of major associations. The four sets of leaders were compared in terms of the actual number of agreements as a percentage of the total possible agreements. Reputation and position were in 74% agreement and other pairs ranged in agreement from 22% to 39%. Briefly, "which 'leaders' are uncovered seems in large part to be a function of the mode of study." (Freeman et. al., p. 797.)

Pluralists have rightly criticized definitions of power structures in terms of rigid single hierarchies of the kind Hunter thought he found. There is overwhelming contrary evidence of the specialization and transience of the powerful, at least in middle-size American communities. However, it is still meaningful to speak of power structures in the broader sense of structured features of power processes, that is, fairly stable ways in which issues are dealt with. The existence of structures (which might or might not be hierarchical) in this sense appears plausible, especially in the light of evidence on leadership stability. Sometimes this stability is seen as a continuity of the leaders thesmelves. For example, D'Antonio and Erickson (1962) studied El Paso and C. Juarez in 1955 and again in 1958, finding a substantial overlap (about 50%) in the leadership lists for the two periods. They found that each

of six major issues in the time studied involved a partly different small subset of the Key Influentials with fewer Key Influentials on the losing than on the winning side. "In any single issue only a few influentials are directly or importantly involved in the decision. But, the thesis that leaders are limited to single scopes of influence is not supported." (D'Antonio and Erickson, 1962, p. 373) although there was some tendency for politicians to specialize in government projects and businessmen to concentrate on private projects and charities. Hence they claim that there is a real basis for the concept of generalized influence with temporal continuity. However, they offer data which suggest that this general influence may be a complex resultant of specific types of influence: "47 per cent of the variation in the general influence index can be ascribed to the variation in the political and business indexes." (p. 371). D'Antonio and Erickson do not claim to have uncovered a very rigid structure since their influentials formed variable and often opposing coalitions; they admit that they may have merely developed a leadership list. The already weak conclusions of this study are further enfeebled by the fact that it is largely reputational in its method.

The strikingly stable aspect of leadership is not the individual leaders themselves but the characteristics of different succeeding leaders. For example, Olmsted reports on leaders named by "experts" in 1943 and 1949 in a small Minnesota city. He found that the carryover of leaders was only 25%, but that the first set and second set of leaders were similar in the sense that they differed significantly from a sample of the population but not from each other in education, income, occupation, sex, and social participation as measured by the Chapin scale. This "may be regarded as evidence for the operation in this community of a supra-personal social structure through which civic leadership positions are filled and replacements made." (Olmsted, p. 275.) The nature of this structure and its operations remains obscure. As one would expect, reputationalists assert that new leaders are recruited by the old and are therefore chosen on the basis of conformity to established ways, while pluralists assert that leaders work their own way up in a more democratic fashion. Neither assertion is accompanied by much evidence. The little data there is only shows that associations are somehow involved.

Agger, Goldrich, and Swanson (1964) define community power structure in a suitably broad style as "a representation of selected aspects of political power

relations over a specified time period." (Agger et. al., p. 51.) They use a rough typology for comparative study of four American communities:

		Distribution of Political Power	
		Broad	Narrow
Political Leadership Ideology:	Convergent	Consensual Mass	Consensual Elite
	Divergent	Competitive Mass	Competitive Elite

The divergence of leadership ideology refers to the extent to which leaders see each other as enemies rather than rivals with a legitimate claim to a share in power. The authors point out that two of these "power structure" categories are used implicitly or explicitly in the literature. Reputationalists tend to think in terms of the consensual elite or the rule of a small co-operative clique, while pluralists insist that a more accurate model is the consensual mass or the rule by a great many participants who are agreed on basic issues like the worth of democracy and who quarrel amicably over details of policy. Agger and company argue that the appropriateness of one model or another can only be decided by a comparative study, preferably diachronic, of

the kind which they carried out by studying documents, newspapers, and interviews. They were able to find support for some interesting structural hypotheses such as: if the political leadership ideology changes from competitive to consensual, the power distribution changes from mass to elite. Most of their hypotheses involve broad relationships between types of power structure and types of regime, regime being "the 'rules of the game' in political decision-making as political leaders and other citizens in a polity conform to and interpret them." (Agger et. al., p. 82.) For types of regime they offer another four-part typology based on high or low probabilities of the use of illegitimate sanctions to block attempted shifts in the scope of government, crossed with high or low sense of electoral potency. Reputationalists once tended to find a high probability of illegitimate sanctions; pluralist researchers assume that this probability is low.

The research done in this study has most of the elements advocated in this proposal: attention to the predecision aspects of issues, subjective criteria for the importance of issues, and so on. Methodologically, Agger and his co-workers found that they could not create very precise operations and much of their evidence had to be classified by ex post facto judgment. Substantively, their results are

not too useful from the present point of view because they revolve around government and attitudes toward its scope. One example is the definition of the basic concepts like political participation, which is "action wherein one goal of the actor is the maintenance of or a shift in the scope of government." (p.52.) The results are also of little use here because they are based on intercommunity comparisons and use the community itself as the basic unit of analysis, while the present study will be made in a single community.

It has been suggested that making and effecting decisions is closely bound up in control over information. Richard McCleery remarks that

> "the direct application of coercive force has been regarded as the most primitive and fundamental basis of power in interpersonal relations, and a substantial amount of political theory and governmental practice in the past has developed on that basis. In a stable social system, however, a pattern of communication appears in close association with the power structure; and an "authoritative allocation of values" in that society becomes a matter of the creation and circulation of definitions rather than a matter of the application of force....communication patterns serve as a functional equivalent of force." (McCleery, p. 49.)

Hence a change in formal patterns of power and authority leads to a change in the patterns of communication and vice versa. Also, "Failure of the communication patterns to correspond to the requirements of a given system of authority should result in disorder and anarchy." (McCleery, p. 49-50.) McCleery finds illustrative support for these conjectures in a historical case study of a Hawaiian prison. One of the few other studies bearing on this point is Agger's survey of a small town. His approach is quite similar to that used in Personal Influence: he asked respondents to name people they thought were influentials or good advisors on politics and asked if the informants had ever been asked for advice themselves. Roughly the same people were named as influentials and as good advisors. Agger did not attempt to follow these responses up by interviewing designated advisors and requesters of advice, which may well be a weakness in view of the fact that Katz and Lazarsfeld found that designated influences acknowledged their alleged search for advice only 37% of the time in the sphere of public affairs. Agger, Katz, and Lazarsfeld all found specialization of advisorship. Katz and Lazarsfeld report that "the hypothesis of a generalized leader receives little support in this study....Each arena, it seems, has a corps of leaders of its own." (Katz and Lazarsfeld, p. 334.) The arenas referred to are fashion,

marketing, and public affairs. Agger found further specialization within the public affairs sphere itself: 82% of those who reported being asked for advice named only one area of advisorship from three issue-areas chosen by Agger: schools, local government, and community welfare. These advisors typically were professionals, managers, proprietors, or government officials, and they were active social and political participants. Katz and Lazarsfeld also found that "gregariousness" or number of reported friendships and associational memberships, was a distinguishing feature of public affairs leaders, more important than life-cycle stage or even social class. Agger further distinguishes active advisors, or advisors who regularly discussed politics outside their own family, and found that they were even more associationally active than passive advisors. They more frequently nominated the highest-rated influentials as influentials even after controls on education, aseociational involvement, and frequency of contacts with officials (which about half of them had.) Hence he suggests a kind of two-step flow hypothesis concerning the relationship of leaders and led:

> "the data hint at the importance of formal organizations as influence channels in the community, as well as the possible importance of the roles played by people who resemble the top leadership and who are sought out for advice in the generation or

> maintenance of legitimacy relationships between the masses and the top leadership." (Agger, p. 331.)

The data do indeed hint at the importance of associations in many of the studies so far reviewed. The more powerful, the more prestigeful, the more often consulted a person is, the more associationally involved he is. William Erbe has given a very useful summary of studies relating political activity and associational involvement as well as social class and alienation.

There are two main explanations for the importance of associations in the background of the politically active or powerful. First, associational activity provides training in political skills whether or not the associations are oriented towards politics. Second, many associations are so oriented. They are meeting places for influentials who belong to them, they are channels through which issues and budding leaders are introduced, they are often accepted as representatives of community subgroups or interest groups, and they may even be the effective locus of decision-making itself. Researchers have often found a similar pattern: the reputational or decision-making leaders tend to belong to a small number of key organizations and at the same time to represent all major organizations among them. Some contributors have suggested that voluntary organizations could even be used as units of analysis of communities. For example,

Young and Larson ranked the groups in a small New York community in terms of prestige judgments made by officers and found that an association's prestige was related to its size, age, formality and elaboration of structure, specialization of program, rate of initiation of interorganizational activity, affiliation with groups outside the community, frequency of introduction of community innovations, and the frequency of close friendships between its members. Young and Larson did not deal with political decisions but their findings suggest Links with decision-making nonetheless, links such as the introduction of innovations.

Two final variables have been suggested as correlates of power: ideologies concerning power and perceptions of power. Agger, Goldrich, and Swanson (1964) define political ideologies as "ways of perceiving and reacting to the political system," (Agger et. al., p. 15) as complexes of five elements: conception of the community, e.g., a collection of individuals or interest groups or classes; preferences as to who shall rule; sense of socioeconomic class, that is, the relative amount of prestige, wealth, and so on which people feel they are receiving; sense of cultural class, or the relative amount of respect people feel their values and ideas are receiving; and, finally, attitudes toward the legitimate method of allocating resources. How important is ideology in this sense? "The decisional preferences of

most citizens in the four communities seemed to be more influenced by group and personal interests than by ideology," (Agger et. al., p. 17). But ideologies differentiated the more enduring action groups and were more than usually important in the eyes of reputational leaders who were spokesmen for strong interest groups. Also, ideologically distinct groups appeared to be a prerequisite for extensive and intensive political activity. In other words, even if it was a minor thing in the eyes of most respondents it still seemed to play a crucial role.

Although there is a fairly large body of literature on China and overseas Chinese communities, very little of it fits into this particular area of inquiry. The data available suggest that the same foci worked out for North American communities would also be useful in studying Chinese communities. And studying Chinese communities with this framework would in turn be useful because of the striking lack of comparative work in the area; almost all "comparative " studies involve contrasting such disparate cultures as farming and mining communities in Western U.S.A. Perhaps the greatest single contribution of cross-cultural work would be to forcibly move attention away from formal governments, which are all too easily accepted as the entire arena of political behaviour wherever they exist.

The existing Chinese studies bear on subgroups, leadership traits, and associations mainly. Most observers in the U.S.A., Indonesia, Thailand, Peru, the Caribbean, and Canada agree that the major social cleavages lie between China-born and native-born Chinese, and between more and less wealthy Chinese (see Fried, 1958.) A typical report on differences between China-born and native-born is Skinner's summary concerning Javanese totoks and peranakans.

> "In totok society the elite is composed of wealthy businessmen, who provide leadership for China-oriented organizations and support for the Chinese-language schools; the values stressed are wealth, business skill, community service, and (Chinese) patriotism. In peranakan society the elite is composed of Dutch-educated professionals, executives in large business enterprises and high-status employees; the values stressed are educational attainment, family standing, and financial security." (Fried, 1958,p.7.)

In politics, the totoks think in terms of China while the peranakans are more interested in Indonesian parties. Other observers, including another social scientist in Indonesia (D. E. Willmott, 1960) have reported similar characteristics.

There is also rough agreement on the main characteristics of leaders, even though the definitions of leadership used are inconsistent, vague, and crudely reputational. The basic requirements for leadership seem to be wealth, education, and useful contacts (especially with the local government.) Skinner's detailed analysis of reputational leaders

in Bangkok discovered several variables significantly related to choice as a leader: wealth, self-madeness, political affiliation (Kuomintang or pro-Peking) generation in Thailand, education, evaluation of work, wife's ethnicity. The key variables were wealth and power, where power is defined as the number of other leaders holding executive positions in those groups of which a given leader was an officer. Skinner's careful and detailed work rests almost entirely on prestige and associational position, with only a glance at emergency decision-making.

Skinner and W. E. Willmott (1964) both report that the same leaders were revealed by studying normal organizational prominence or captaincy in emergencies or delegation as an external representative. However, it would be premature to conclude that these overlapping types of power are mutually validated as guides to the entire community leadership. It is likely that different men have power over internal and external affairs, with the external and leaders being chosen from the prestigeful and externally acceptable heads of associations. This possibility is neither revealed nor contradicted by existing data on the Chinese, but it does come up in studies of other minority groups in North America. For example, Thompson reports of New Orleans Negroes that "the patterns of inter-group leadership are determined very largely by the majority group...each social

leader among white men of power will choose a complementary type of Negro leader with whom he is willing to negotiate." (Thompson, p. 119.) Most white officials are segregationists and prefer to work through "Uncle Toms" who have little Negro following; hence there is "little effective communication between accepted leaders of Negroes and the official leaders of white people in New Orleans." (Thompson, p. 119.) Granted there are many differences between Negro and Chinese minority groups, it is still plausible that both might find it convenient or necessary to have special leaders for external affairs because of similar external problems. Specialization of type of leadership has often been noted in Chinese communities. Skinner outlines several patterns, each with a distinctive blend of wealth, power and prestige, and with relatively homogeneous social background; D. E. Willmott remarks that the once integrated leadership of Semarang Chinese now has separated into administrative, political, commercial, and organizational elites; China-born and native-born groups have often been observed to have different leaders.

The importance and elaboration of associations varies from community to community. In prerevolutionary China itself there were a few equivalents to voluntary organizations. Fried (1953) points out that much of Chinese

life involved and demanded relationships that were based neither on kinship nor on the state, but he reports few instances of elaboration of such "civil" bonds of mutual trust into voluntary organizations. In the small city he studied there were frequent business partnerships and a few guilds which operated mainly as Nationalist government fronts. W. E. Willmott (1964) argues the large cities of China had a series of guilds based on locality of origin or on the roughly equivalent criteria of occupation or religion. These guilds offered security, contacts, welfare, temples, and arbitration of disputes to strangers in the city. They were nominally democratic but probably financed and controlled by wealthy merchants. Apparently the guilds were internally solidary but mutually at odds.

Perhaps the guilds served as models for the associations which sprung up in overseas Chinese communities. In any case, voluntary organizations are found in all of these groups even though their role in them differs considerably. Associations may be diffuse, localized, and unconnected as in Semarang, or specialized and closely linked in an elaborate hierarchy by joint officerships as in Bangkok and Singapore. W. E. Willmott has suggested that the complexity of associational pattern depends on the size of the community, the type of migration (isolated immigrants re-

quiring associational techniques of solidarity more than immigrants who moved as part of a lineage), the presence or absence of a perceived threat which would encourage unification within a few associations, and the nature of the external rule. Besides varying in complexity, associations vary in the extent to which they are used as decision-making forums for community problems. This extent appears to be less closely related to associational complexity than to the range of problems left open by external powers for autonomous Chinese economic or political control. For example, the associational structure in Phnom-Penh is described as roughly similar to that of Bangkok: "the overall pattern that emerges is of a closely-knit network of associations, with interlocking leaders forming the links between them and arranging them in a rough hierarchy of power." (W. E. Willmott, p. 341.) However, the Phnom Penh associations deal mainly with maintaining a sense of being Chinese while in Bangkok "the Chamber of Commerce and the seven speech-group associations are considered to constitute the de facto 'government' of the Chinese community, recognition being accorded not only that community but by the Thai government as well." (Skinner, p. 156.) The Bangkok associational leaders acted on a wide range of problems including welfare, education, and relations with the Thai

government, a situation which the Thai found useful on the whole since "the Chinese leaders are often forced, by virtue of their peculiar relation to the Thai government, to help enforce Thai government measures which they wholeheartedly disapprove." (Skinner, p. 157.) But in Phnom Penh the associations, though elaborate, do not play a similar role. "Because overall economic power is not in the hands of Chinese leaders, the political issues handled by the associational structure have to do primarily with the ritual identity of the Chinese community and with prestige." (W. E. Willmott, p. 3.)

On the whole the data available so far are not detailed enough to support much more than confidence that associations will somehow be involved in whatever decisions are open for Chinese decision; whatever the range of Chinese control, Chinese affiliation with associations should be worth investigating. The pattern of activity may again be parallel to that of American Negroes. "The voluntary associations function in much the same way as the church to provide the Negro not only with an opportunity for self-expression but also with an avenue to compete for prestige, to hold office, to exercise power and control, to win applause and acclaim." (Babchuk and Thompson, p. 654.) Babchuk and Thompson report a pattern of organizational

involvement similar to the overall North American one: Negroes are more involved if they have higher occupational rank, more years of education, higher income, longer residence in their community, more friends. One would expect Chinese organizational activity to depend on the same variables as well as on additional ones like assimilation (although assimilation may affect the kind of associations joined rather than their number.)

Assimilation is often referred to in the literature but its measures have typically been weak; either it is judged impressionistically or it is arbitrarily equated with likely-looking indices. For example, Skinner rates Thai-ification in terms of proportion of life spent in Thailand, nationality, wife's ethnicity, and Thair honours or positions. Such indices are attractively convenient and fortunately there is a study by Fong offering some validation of their use. Fong studied 336 Chinese college students in North America in terms of assimilation, internalization of Western norms, and indices of progressive removal from China and Chinese culture. Assimilation was defined as one's identification as a Chinese or as an American and was measured by attitude questions on whether one had more fun with Chinese, preferred their company, and so on. Internalization of Western norms was measured by the frequency

of giving responses modal for a Caucasian North American student sample on questions requiring interpretation of the emotions expressed by a series of stick figures. The indices of removal were generation in America, parental citizenship status, residence (that is, its closeness to Chinatown), and the ethnicity of intimate friends. All of these were significantly related to assimilation and internalization. One interesting result was that the Hong Kong students, who did not plan to remain in North America, had internalization scores higher than those of fourth-generation North American Chinese and almost as high as those of the fifth generation, while also having by far the lowest assimilation scores. These results bear out the observation frequently made by Rose Hum Lee and others that Chinese from rapidly modernizing Chinese cities are more Western than many Western Chinese who are insulated within a Chinese community founded by immigrants from a less Westernized China.

CHAPTER II

PURPOSE AND METHOD

The aim of the thesis project was to study prestige, power, and ideolgoy in the Vancouver Chinese Community. At first it was hoped to examine power in the manner recommended in Chapter I, that is, by beginning with issue selection by a random sample of the Chinese population. Unfortunately this was not feasible because the Chinese population cannot be precisely located or sampled and because this procedurewould have required more time, money, and interpreters than were available. Therefore the subjects were drawn from the ranks of association officers, a group which could easily be identified from the pages of the Chinatown News. In some ways this restricted population was much more useful than a more inclusive one would have been. Officers are typically much more co-operative and well-informed than others and are also more likely to speak fluent English.

The 152 known officers were sampled by means of a random number table (Blalock, 1960) in such a way as to select all of the 12 officers holding at least three positions, half of the 22 officers holding two positions, and one quarter of the 118 officers holding one position.

This sample proved quite useless since many of its members could not be located and about half of those located were unable or unwilling to give an interview. Nevertheless, the 35 officers finally used as respondents included representatives of all categories of the variable under research.

Slight bias was found as a result of the fact that second generation leaders were more readily interviewed and were probably over-represented. Eighteen of the thirty-five subjects were second generation while the entire pool of association officers appears to be much more than half composed of first generation men. (No precise figures are available but there is a consensus among informants on this point.) The effects of this over-representation do not seem to be sweeping. The prestige variable was examined as a test case. Subjects of a given generation do tend to nominate prestige leaders of that generation (see Table I) and the second generation respondents gave twice as many general nominations (an average of 8.1 to the first generation's 4.4), so that the prestige variable is over-influenced by second generation opinions.

TABLE I

Generation and Prestige Nominations

	Generation of Nominator	
Generation of Nominated	I	II
I	43	55
II	30	75

Chi - square = 5.21; df = 1; significant at p = .05. The Table is based on all nominations for which the nominated's generation is known; the generation of fourteen nominees was unknown.

However, the generations made similar general nominations overall ($r = .73$, $F_{1,55} = 60$, significant at $p = .001$) so that the bias introduced is not overwhelming. Finally, whatever the sample loses in representativeness of the universe of association officers it gains in representativeness of the associational leaders of both of the two major subgroups formed by the generations.

The responses obtained were comparable since they were elicited mostly on the basis of a single interview schedule. Some questions had to be discarded because most

subjects refused to answer or showed considerable discomfort when answering. The most troublesome question was Number 11, "Aside from your wife and children, do you have any relatives living in Canada? (Get names, places.)" Relatives are a sensitive topic for many Chinese because of the frequency of illegal immigration. The other most resented questions concerned the ethnicity of intimate friends and the names of friends seen often socially. Respondents often found these queries impertinent or replied that they had no intimate friends and little "social life." Almost all respondents were willing to indicate the proportion of their friends in general who were Chinese. Occasionally questions had to be reworded, especially for subjects with less than perfect English, but these changes did not affect the meaning of the stimuli and seemed to evoke the same type of responses. In short, the research procedure was to gather comparable data from a generally representative, though not random, selection of association officers.

Although restricted, this focus on offices is highly useful for the study of power for two main reasons. First, the associations in any community can be thought of as a concrete structure with a corresponding analytic power structure, in other words, the associations are a suitable

focus for the study of power in general even if they are not a sufficiently complete arena for the full study of community power. Second, knowledge about associations is indirectly useful for community studies because previous research has made it obvious that associations play some role, often a major role, in community power. Most of the following hypotheses are used implicitly in at least some of the power studies discussed in the original proposal, and few of them have received even a single rough direct test. Hence their importance is obvious despite their striking lack of surprise value.

Several hypotheses were set out before research began. The predictions emphasized two gross hypotheses:

1) Communication is a base of power and of prestige.

2) Ideology varies with relationship to the community and with relationship to channels of communication.

More specific propositions were made with the help of a few operational definitions.

<u>Leader</u>: a positional leader, anyone holding at least one executive position in an association with a large proportion of Chinese members who consider the organization to be primarily Chinese. This definition includes officers

of Chinatown branches of fraternal organizations (Elks and Lions) which less assimilated Chinese dismiss as not really Chinese at all.

Communication channels: communication channels between associations are shared officers, and communication channels between officers are shared executives. This definition is based on the plausible (and frequent) assumption that men holding office in several groups will pass news and opinions from one to another, and on the parallel assumption that men meeting on the same executives will pass information to each other. This passage certainly could be made in many other ways, especially through other regular connections of the leaders such as the links found useful in prior research: kinship, friendship, and business partnership or dependency. This possibility was not expected to be important. For one thing, these links do not seem to be very numerous in Vancouver's Chinese leadership. Analysis of club reports and gossip columns in the Chinatown News reveals 152 current leaders with only four business links and four kinship links between a handful of them. Also, prior research suggests that political communication does not flow through all possible channels of communication; probably it flows through political

organizations and only rarely spills over into friendship, kinship, or business situations to which it is far less relevant. Hence the first hypothesis:

> H1: the accuracy of hypotheses involving communication channels will not be significantly improved by adding friendship, kinship, and business links to associational links in the reckoning of communication channels.

Communication channels for current officers were calculated and charted from information in the Chinatown News. One main block of inter-connected associations, several small blocks, and a few isolated groups were revealed. Since these groups lack communication channels of a positional kind with the main block, and since this block is large enough that it is probably important and interesting to other groups, these groups may seek information about the main block and are most likely to do so through the kinship, friendship, and business links introduced above. Hence:

> H2: if H1 must be rejected, the predictive improvement produced by using nonpositional as well as positional links as channels will be greater for small blocks and isolates than for the main block.

Prestige: reputation for power, or the frequency with which a group or person is nominated as important; also referred to as "general influence."

H3: the more offices, or channels to other leaders a leader has, the more prestige he has.

H4: the more channels to other associations an association has, the more prestige it has.

H5: the stronger the communication channels between two executives, the more frequently the executive members will name each other's associations and officers as important, i.e., the stronger the communication the greater the ascribed prestige.

Power: the frequency with which a leader or association is reported to have initiated, carried through, or vetoed an issue thought to affect the Chinese community.

H6: the more channels to other leaders a leader has, the more power he has.

H7: the more channels to other associations an association has, the more power it has.

If both prestige and power are related to communication channels, then they should also be related to each other. Prestige should also be related to power on the grounds that the communications fostering a reputation for power should be

concerned with the exercise of power or possession of potential power, other subjects being less relevant. Hence:

H8: The more power a leader has, the more prestige he has.

H9: The more power an association has, the more prestige it has.

Ideology: perception and evaluation of power in the community. This complex variable is related to Agger et. al.'s concept at a very general level, but the specific factors involved are different. Agger et.al. dealt with particulars such as attitude toward governmental scope which were more suitable to their small American cities than they would be to Vancouver Chinese. This project used a different operationalization based on the remarkably and conveniently small range of categories that the sixteen respondents used in the preliminary interviews in response to very vague questions.

Leadership scope: respondents asserted that leadership in Chinatown was either nonexistent, confined to particular subgroups, or at least in part representative of the whole community. In other words, the Chinese are just as divided as political scientists on the question of the generality of influence.

Associational scope: similarly, respondents claimed that associations had no importance, importance only in particular subgroups, or general importance in the case of one or two organizations (generally the C.B.A.)

Perceived base of power: leadership was said to rest on some community service, activity, or on some attribute such as wealth, clanship, or education.

The preliminary interviews were too few and too incomplete to provide a clear pattern of relationship between ideology and other variables, but they did hint at some interesting hypotheses.

H10: the more contacts with other leaders a leader has, the more he is likely to assert the existence of broad leadership and associational scope with service as the basis of leadership. (These variables are no doubt interacting. Men with a low opinion of the importance of the power structure do not bother to play an active role in it, and men without a very active role do not hear much about leadership and associational activities or associate much with more more active men who have a high opinion of the

importance of these activities.)

H11: the more assimilated a leader is, the less he is likely to assert the existence of broad leadership and associational scope with service as the basis of leadership. More assimilated leaders are more likely to be interested and informed about non-Chinese groups, activities, and power, and therefore to be less interested and impressed by Chinese affairs.

Assimilation: previous research indicated the usefulness of wife's generation plus Fong's indices of removal - generation, residence, and ethnicity of intimate friends. As noted above, the last factor had to be replaced by ethnicity of friends in general. The data collected showed a rough scale of assimilation. The twelve men who displayed one or two non-Chinese factors all reported these as a Canadian-born wife and/or residence outside of Chinatown or the predominantly Chinese area near it. Except for one man with a China Valley home, none of the men reporting three or four non-Chinese factors had a China-born wife or Chinese area home. All of the nine men reporting three non-Chinese elements named Canadian birth as one; the remaining Chinese element was the reporting of most or all of their friends

as Chinese in eight cases and the report of a Chinese home in the ninth. The process of assimilation clearly involves choosing a Canadian wife or home for first-generation men; second generation men take Canadian wives and homes and may also assimilate to the highest degree by choosing or gaining Canadian friends. Since there is a natural division between the generations in extent of assimilation, since generation is frequently referred to as an important variable by the Chinese themselves, and since the leader sample is divided in half between Canadian-born and China-born, the assimilation variable was condensed into a generational dichotomy.

All the hypotheses so far discussed have referred to general prestige or power. However, as was pointed out in Chapter I, power and prestige vary from issue to issue in North American communities studied and presumably also vary in Chinese communities. On any given issue only some leaders will be interested and qualified enough to become involved, and few leaders will have the time or inclination to participate in several issues at once.

H12: the leaders named for any issue will be a minority of those nominated as generally influential.

H13: At most a minority of the leaders named for any issue will also be leaders for another issue.

Pluralists often argue that the issue-specificity of power renders nominations of general influentials meaningless, while reputationalists reply that a reputation for general influence is a convenient and meaningful index of past and present exercises of power on many issues. If the latter position is correct then general influence reputation should be related to more specific reports of influence, the relationship declining in strength as the reports become more specific and hence less comprehensive. At any given stage of specificity the general nominations should be more closely related to all areas reported than to any one of them alone. In order to test these predictions the subjects were asked to name the most influential leaders and associations in special areas as well as general leaders and specific issue leaders. The areas chosen were Welfare, Representation of theCommunity, and Language Schools. Because of the long-standing interest in the relationship of business to power, business leader nominations were also requested even though business prominence should not be very closely related to influence if influence is indeed based on communication; business success is a power base which must be activated before its

possessor gains influence.

H14: General prestige is related to nominations in Welfare, Representation, and Schools, and is more closely related to the sum of nominations in all three areas.

H15: Prestige is more closely related to the sum of nominations in the three areas than it is to power as measured from specific issues.

H16: Prestige and power will not be closely related to business prominence.

One final speculative hypothesis drew on the closing questionnaire item, "Could you please recommend two or three people who usually know what is going on among the Chinese?" These information leaders should be influence leaders as well if communication plays the prominent role expected. General leaders are most likely to be considered at the hub of events.

H17: Information nominations are closely related to general influence nominations.

Information is examined with respect to prestige rather than power because it is itself measured through general reputation. Power could be profitably compared to reported knowledge of specific issues, a variable which was neglected.

CHAPTER III

RESULTS

H1

No additional kinship or business links were found. Only a few respondents were willing to name the people they saw most often socially or the people with whom they most often discussed Chinese affairs, so little can be said about friendship as a communication channel. The data available indicate that friendship may be a news medium, at least among the second generation respondents (who were somewhat less reserved about discussing personal questions.) Occasionally, a subject would give some information and add that he had heard it from "my friend X," or give a list of leaders and refer to some of them as friends. The term "friend" seemed to apply to anything from a close confidante to someone to whom the respondent did not wish to appear hostile, someone such as a prominent political opponent. In summary, H1 holds for kinship and business links and is not testable for friendship links.

H2

This hypothesis is not applicable for kinship and business links. It may or may not be applicable for

friendship links and is not testable for them with the data obtained.

H3

The number of association offices which a leader had was in fact correlated positively with the number of nominations he received as a general influential: $r = .47$, $F_{1,64} = 50$, significant at $p = .01$. The correlation is not as large as expected; office-holding only accounts for about a quarter of the variation in prestige ($r^2 = .2209$). Either communication channels are only a partial base of power reputation or offices are not the m ost important communication channel, or both. The latter suggestion is strengthened by the possible communication role of friendship noted above, and the former suggestion is borne out by data given below which indicate that issue activities are also related to prestige nominations.

H4

For associations, there was a much closer relationship between general influence nominations and the number of other associations to which an association was linked by at

least one joint officer: $r = .70$, $F_{1,24} = 23$, significant at $p = .01$. In this case communication channels account for half ($r^2 = .49$) of the variation in prestige. This increased effectiveness may occur because the information passed along executive interlock channels tends to be association news, which is highly relevant to the formation of opinions of associations. It is also doubtless relevant to formation of opinions of leaders, but many other kinds of news (such as reports of current projects or individual actions) would also be involved.

Since leader and association prestige scores are both related to different aspects of office-holding, it is plausible to expect that they are related in turn. In fact, the number of general influence nominations received by an association is correlated with the total of all such nominations received by the members of the executive: $r = .72$, $F_{1,24} = 26$, significant at $p = .01$. Probably a group and its leadership acquire influence reputation from each other. Both have influence bases which are in a sense independent: the group gains influence from the size of its membership and the extent of its property (owned in the association's name), while the leaders pursue activities and have wealth or other attributes of their own.

H5

Table II shows that leaders do tend to disproportionately give general influence nominations to leaders on their own executives or leaders on executives sharing at least one officer with their own; Table III shows that they also tend to over-nominate their own associations or groups linked to them by interlocking offices.

TABLE II

Leader Nominations and Distance

	Total	Number Nominated
Leaders on the respondent's own executives	228	30
Leaders on linked executives	630	41
Leaders on other executives and any nominated leaders not on an executive	2992	94

Chi - square = 52.7; df = 2; significant at p = .001

TABLE III

Association Nominations and Distance

	Total	Number Nominated
Respondents' associations	59	23
Associations linked to his	208	34
Other associations	1029	38

Chi - square = 131.7; df = 2; significant at p = .001

Before proceeding to a test of H6, it is necessary to give a detailed report of findings relevant to the power variable. When asked, "During the last year, have there been any issues, disagreements, or major projects among the Chinese?" fifteen of the thirty-five subjects replied "None". Nevertheless most of the fifteen were able to give information about specific issues when these were suggested. All suggested issues had been named spontaneously by at least one respondent. Only seven men have no information at all, and five of these were not probed about example issues. The reports obtained seem quite reliable since they varied in subject, detail, or

opinion but only contain one contradiction on a minor matter of fact and since they were in agreement with newspaper reports of issues wherever these were available. The readiness and consistency of responses about specific issues indicates that these issues are well-known.

It should be noted that many or most of the hotly contested issues in Chinatown may have been overlooked because of the issue level set for this project, the level of issues concerning the Chinese community as a whole rather than issues in which the community itself is a protagonist or issues confined to particular groups within the community. Intra-association conflicts were frequently mentioned as a normal part of community life. These are irrelevant to a limited study of community power but might well repay later study.

The dominant theme of the following reports on issues is "nothing really came of it". As a rule, something was proposed by some interest group, was discussed for a while, and was allowed to die out. Power in Chinatown seems confined to the issue-raising phase of decision-making. The respondents themselves often pointed this out, always regretfully, and attributed it to Chinese "individualism" or "selfishness". The Chinese, according to the Chinese leaders,

always work for themselves or their families and do not co-operate for the common good. At the same time informants also declared that the associations were once very important as the forum of community government and community effort in the early years of the Chinese ghettoes. In other words, the Chinese have co-operated when this seemed necessary and feasible. The current lack of large-scale projects is probably a result of specific rather than general cultural factors, the most striking elements being intra-Chinese divisions of viewpoint and the growing lack of interest in maintaining a distinctively Chinese community.

Infrequently Mentioned Issues

1) Lions' home for the aged. Two respondents said that an ad hoc Lions committee has been formed to investigate the possibility of a home for elderly Chinese without families or money. This investigation has not yet been pushed outside the club but may later develop into an issue.

2) Red Feather campaign of 1965. According to a particularly well-informed source, the young lawyer who lead the 1965 campaign bypassed the older generation's associations and asked for canvassers from the second generation groups. Older Chinese criticized him for bypassing the C.B.A., traditional organizer of community welfare. The only effect of this disagreement was to underline the division between

older and younger Chinese.

3) C.B.A. revision. A few of the younger respondents criticized the C.B.A. as ineffectual and unrepresentative. They hinted that they would like to see a younger leaders' coup to revitalize Chinese activities. Like (1), this is a potential issue area worth watching.

4) Immigration. Vague references were made to disagreements on the content of briefs submitted to the government on behalf of the Chinese, and some criticisms of Chinese spokesmen were made.

Frequently Mentioned Issues

1) Chinese New Year. Unfortunately, no probing was done for this issue. Five subjects named it spontaneously as an important event that always aroused talk. The New Year Festival is usually organized by the C.B.A. and financed by the Chinese restaurants, with other associations making contributions such as Lion Dances. This year the celebrations were not held because the restaurants had some disagreement with the other associations involved and there was not enough money. This incident is the only available example of "big business" control of a decisional outcome, though wealthy groups may have exercised control by refusal to finance over earlier stages of other issues which have not come to a decision.

2) Redevelopment. Twenty-four respondents commented on some phase of this issue. In 1963 the Central Mortgage and Housing Company asked for bids for the redevelopment of part of the Chinese residential area. Many of the older residents were upset because they did not want to leave China Valley, while most of the younger Chinese were in favor of improving the area and hastening assimilation. Of the eight men named as leaders in favor of redevelopment, six were second generation Chinese. All but two were in some line of business other than real estate, and the two real estate men were second generation people strongly in favor of assimilation. The four men named as opponents of renewal were real estate businessmen who were uniformly described as active in the hope of financial gain. The most nominated opponent presented a plan for a housing project with an Oriental flavour. The plan aroused considerable discussion, most of it critical, until it was rejected in 1964 as not conforming to C.M.H.C. building standards. Since then the issue has died away; seven respondents dismissed it as a thing of the past and only one asserted that it was still an open question since the C.B.A. continues to raise the matter and send delegations to City Hall. The only factual disagreement in the reports concerns whether or not associations property was involved, with one subject remarking that some was and one asserting none was. No-one

claimed that the associations played an active role in the issue. External governments and internal real estate men were both issue-raisers; the external authorities set the issue decision; second-generation businessmen were involved as leading opponents in the issue discussion.

3) Chinese Community Center. Fourteen subjects discussed this perennial suggestion which gained more force two years ago when the young men active in the sports associations took it up. Although the sports groups only became active about five years ago, they were soon very popular with young immigrants and their games overflowed available facilities at the Gibbs Boys Club. The head of the Chinese Basketball League and a second generation leader set up a community center committee to which all associations were invited to send delegates. At first, youth groups or their senior organization sponsors were most active. Then the Lions became the most interested (They received as many mentions as the youth groups themselves); three active Lions were reported as involved in the issue. Douglas Jung was also named as an exponent of the proposal. No individual youth leaders were named except by the Basketball League head himself. Last year the three Chinese language newspapers came out in favor of it. All respondents agreed that a center would be a good thing, especially for the young

people, and none could think of any opposition to it. Despite these favorable factors, the issue has not been pushed to a conclusion. Half the reporting subjects commented that the center was not off the ground, because of the lack of a concrete plan or of money or of both. At present the committee on behalf of a center is composed largely of non-Chinese social workers and the center will probably never be built unless a non-Chinese government provides the details and the financing. In summary, the youth group leaders acted as issue-raisers but prominence in issue-discussion soon passed to second-generation business and professional men and their associations. No Chinese leader or group has acted as an issue decision-maker or is likely to do so.

4) Chinese politics. Six respondents commented on this. "Chinese politics" refers to the activities of the Chinese Nationalist Party, or Kuomintang (K.M.T.) and its two opponents: the supporters of the People's Republic of China, and the Chinese Freemasons. The former group were described as a small set of young men with more racial or national pride than Marxism, who pursue harmless activities in two small but active associations. The three subjects who commented on the relative strength of these groups agreed that most Chinese in Canada disliked the Communists, but only a small minority give more than nominal support to the K.M.T. Probably the most popular group, and certainly the largest, is the Freemasons,

a widespread group with a long history of opposition to the K.M.T. However, the political aspect of the Freemasons seems to be losing prominence as its leaders argue that a Canadian Chinese association should ignore Chinese problems in favor of increased attention to the welfare of its own members. One of their leaders is also a leader of the other anti-K.M.T, group. The leaders of all three groups are well known and consistently named, although several respondents refused to name leading supporters of mainland China because they "really shouldn't say about something like that." Apparently this political area contains some prominent issue debaters, but no decisions or decision makers since the three potential combatants never come head to head. None of them appear to have sought influence over a community issue other than political debate.

5) Canadian politics. Fifteen respondents discussed this. Younger Chinese have become interested in Canadian politics in recent years. The older people are partially cut off by the language barrier, although the Chinese Times publicized the Canadian party viewpoints. About half the respondents commented in some way on the pragmatism of Chinese interest in politics. Federal elections rouse concern because the federal government controls immigration; but provincial governments control nothing of special importance to the

to the Chinese, so the provincial election which occurred shortly after the interviewing period, passed unnoticed. Debate is slack unless an election is near, since there are no votes to gain. Votes themselves are cast for the most promising policies rather than for principles: Douglas Jung was supported because he was Chinese, and was rejected in favor of Jack Nicholson when the latter proved more attentive to Chinese problems.

Nevertheless some men are known as consistent political leaders in and out of election periods. Twelve political leaders were named, six for the dominant Liberals and two each for the Conservatives, New Democratic Party, and Social Credit. At least seven of them are young businessmen or professionals. These political leaders also tend to be participants in Chinese politics: two are active supporters of the K.M.T., two are the leading supporters of mainland China, and five are prominent Freemasons. There was no suggestion that the three Chinese parties themselves take a hand in Canadian politics. Two associations were named as politically active, one a second generation group and the other Douglas Jung's locality group.

H6

This hypothesis must be rejected. The number of offices a leader holds has virtually no statistical association

with the number of times he is named as involved in the specific issues: $r = .0057$, $F_{1,44} = .00003$, not significant at $p = .05$. Since office-holding is associated with prestige but not with power, it may account for much of the variation in prestige not explainable by variation in power. The correlation between general nominations and the sum of issue nominations and offices held is $r = .49$, $F_{1,60} = 18.94$, significant at $p = .01$. However, this is not much better than the correlation of $r = .47$ reported above between general influence and offices alone, and it is much worse than the correlation, reported below, of $r = .76$ between general influence and power above. The discrepancy between prestige and power is not yet explained.

H7

This hypothesis must also be rejected. The correlation between an association's issue nominations and the number of other associations to which it is linked is only $r = .084$, $F_{1,18} = .0128$, not significant at $p = .05$.

H8

Although power for leaders is not related to communications channels, it is related to prestige as

predicted: $r = .76$, $F_{1,65} = 89.76$, significant at $p = .01$.

H9

The relationship between power and prestige also holds for groups, although not so closely as for leaders. Even though only eight associations were named as participants in the four main issues, there was a correlation between issue nominations and prestige nominations for organizations of $r = .59$, $F_{1,21} = 11.31$, significant at $p = .01$.

H10

This hypothesis must be rejected since no relationship could be found between office-holding and any component of evaluation. This can be seen from Tables IV, V and VI below. In Tables IV and V "a" represents the response "they are not influential" or "there are no Chinese with influence" "b" represents responses indicating restricted spheres of influence, and "c" represents the response "some of them are influential in the Chinese community as a whole."

TABLE IV

Positions and Evaluation of Scope of Leader Influence

Leader Scope	One Position	More Than One
a,b	11	14
c	4	5

Chi - square (corrected) = .00058; df = 1; not significant at p = .05.

TABLE V

Positions and Evaluation of Scope of Association Influence

Association Scope	One Position	More Than One
a,b	12	15
c	3	3

Chi - square (corrected) = .033; df = 1; not significant at p = .05.

TABLE VI

Positions and Reported Basis of Leadership

Basis	One Position	More Than One
Activity	8	11
Other	5	6

Chi - square = .0234; df = 1; not significant at p = .05

H11

This hypothesis must be rejected since Tables VII, VIII and IX show no relationship between generation and ideology.

TABLE VII

Generation and Evaluation of Scope of Leader Influence

Evaluation of Leader Scope	First Generation	Second Generation
a,b	11	14
c	5	2

Chi - square (corrected for continuity) = 0.731; df = 1, not significant at p = .05.

TABLE VIII

Generation and Evaluation of Scope of Association Influence

Evaluation of Association Scope	First Generation	Second Generation
a,b	12	15
c	5	2

Chi - square (corrected for continuity) = 0.719, df = 1, not significant at p = .05.

TABLE IX

Generation and Reported Basis of Leadership

Basis	First Generation	Second Generation
Activity	11	8
Other	3	8

Chi - square (corrected for continuity) = 1.477; df = 1, not significant at p = .05.

The rejection of H10 and H11 does not necessarily imply that ideology is a useless variable. Since ideology has been profitably used in previous studies it is more plausible to conclude that this variable has not been strategically operationalized. This view is given some support by the fact that the components of ideology are themselves not related, as can be seen from Table X. Further exploration might reveal some scalable components for a new operational definition. Unfortunately, the data collected for this project do not offer any obvious leads.

TABLE X

The Components of Ideology

Scope	Leadership Base	
	Activity	Other
a,a; a,b; b,a	2	2
b,b	9	8
c,c; c,b; b,c	8	1

Chi - square (corrected) = 1.979; df = 2, not significant at p =.05.

H12

The men nominated as participants in any single issue are indeed a minority of all those nominated as possessing general influence. The largest number of men nominated was twelve, for Canadian politics, which is about 22% of the total of fifty-five nominated as general influentials.

The number of men named in each special area of influence was also less than fifty-five though not always a minority: thirty-one in Welfare, twenty-six in Representation, and twenty-two in Schools.

H13

A minority of the nominated participants for any one issue were also nominated for any other issue, as predicted. The highest proportion of overlap was in the community center issue. 40% (two out of five) of its leaders were also political nominees.

H14 For Leaders

As can be seen from Table XI, general influence has the expected relationships to special area influence and to the sum of nominations in special areas. When nominations for all three areas are taken together, they account for more than two-thirds of the variation in general influence nominations ($r^2 = .71$). It seems likely that even more of the variation could have been explained if more than three areas of influence had been tapped.

TABLE XI

Leaders: General and Special Area Influence and Business Prominence

Types of Influence Related	r	F	N-2	Significance Level
General; Welfare	.51	21	61	.01
General; Representation.	.66	46	59	.01
General; Schools	.39	10	60	.01
General; Sum of Welfare, Representation and Schools	.84	201	83	.01
General; Business	.27	5	67	.05
General; Sum of the Special Areas and Business	.83	176	83	.01

For each correlation, "N" was taken as the number of men receiving at least one nomination on one of the variables involved.

H15 For Leaders

As expected, there is a closer relationship between general influence and the sum of special influences than between general influence and power, r being .84 in the former case and .76 in the latter.

Another interesting feature of special area influence is the connection between power in the sphere of Canadian politics and influence nominations in the area of Representation: $r = .42$, $F_{1,26} = 5.707$, significant at $p = .05$. This is consistant with the observation, made by several subjects that the role of representation of the Chinese is passing from the C.B.A. to the political leaders who have personal contacts with the government through the Liberal Party.

No other attempt was made to relate power and special area prestige. Presumably such a relationship exists for the same reasons that power is related to general influence reputation, but it would be proper to test this with power and influence reports from the same special areas.

H16

Referring once more to Table XI, it is clear that general influence is less closely related to nominations for

business importance than to nominations in any of the special areas. The correlation, $r = .27$, is significant but indicates an explanation of only a small fraction of the variation ($r^2 = .0629$). Most of the association between prestige and business prominence is rooted in the high prestige possessed by a few heavily nominated, highly successful businessmen who have at one time been moderately active in the community but who are retired or retiring now. If business nominations are added to the special area nominations then the association with prestige is actually weakened slightly ($r = .83$ compared to $r = .84$). This does not mean that business success interferes with political success, however. A certain amount of wealth is very useful in acquiring a good reputation, especially in Welfare and Schools. But this sort of effect is not brought out by adding business scores to special area scores since the same influence is simply counted twice. Business prominence is an asset in acquiring special influence (and thus general influence) rather than being a special area of influence itself.

H14 For Associations

Once again general prestige nominations are related to special area nominations, more closely related to the sum

of special influences than to any one of them taken separately. (See Table XII).

TABLE XII

Associations: General and Special Area Influence

Types of Influence Related	r	F	N-2	Significance Level
General; Welfare	.49	7.6	24	.05
General; Representation	.44	5.6	24	.05
General; Schools	.70	23.1	24	.01
General; Sum of Welfare, Representation and Schools	.89	90.3	24	.01

H15 For Associations

General influence is more closely related to the sum of special area influences than to power, r = .89 as opposed to r = .59.

H17

The hypothesis is supported since general prestige nominations and nominations as well-informed are closely related: $r = .83$, $F_{1,55} = 126$, significant at $p = .01$. This relationship is about the same as that between general influence and the sum of special influences.

This concludes the testing of the formal predictions set out before research began. Some additional ex post facto results were worked out in order to obtain a more detailed picture of the Chinese leaders in Vancouver. This part of the analysis was not entirely a piece of hit-or-miss exploratory research since it was inspired by the expectation that two such consistently distinguished actors' categories as the two generations should have separate and distinctive sets of leaders. No more precise hypotheses were set out.

It was in fact possible to distinguish different leaders recognized by the different groups. Of the fifty-five leaders named as generally influential, twenty-five were named at least twice by the second generation respondents or at least twice by the first generation respondents. Fifteen of these in turn received at least two-thirds of their nominations from second generation respondents and they are therefore classed as leaders of the second generation.

The two-thirds cutting point was set in order to divide the twenty-five leaders roughly in half and in order to counter-balance the effect of over-representation of second generation votes. The remaining ten leaders are classed as leaders of the first generation. Leaders of a given generation did not always belong to that generation.

The data available for the ages and occupations of leaders are incomplete and sometimes vague, but they still present a striking contrast between the ageing businessmen leading the first generation and the younger professionals and managerial employees leading the second. (See Table XIII). In other words, the leaders of each generation epitomize the success image or typical success pattern of that generation.

TABLE XIII

Generation Leaders: Ages and Occupations

	Leaders of the First Generation (N=10)	Leaders of the Second Generation (N=15)
Professionals and Managers	0	10
Business Owners	6	2
Over 50 years old	9	3

Some further differences are displayed in Table XIV. Leaders of the first generation have significantly more offices and more nominations for influence in Schools. They also tend to have more nominations in Business and Welfare, although the differences are not very significant.

TABLE XIV

Generation Leaders and Influence Areas

	First: Mean Score	Second: Mean Score	t	df	Significance Level
Welfare	3.2	1.3	1.66	11	.10
Represent-ation	2.9	4.0	.613	25	-
Schools	3.5	.06	3.78	9	.005
Business	6.1	1.4	1.55	9	.10
Offices	2.7	1.1	2.37	13	.005

A one-tailed test was used. df's were estimated by the formula found in Blalock (1960, p. 176).

Of course leaders of either generation also differed from the remaining thirty leaders who received general influence nominations. Since both groups of leaders of the generations had more total prestige on the whole, it is not surprising that they both also had significantly more nominations in all of the special areas than leaders of neither generation received, given H14. The details are not presented. From Table XV it can be seen that the leaders of the first generation differ more sharply from non-generation leaders than leaders of the second generation do, so far as Business nominations and office-holding goes. These results re-emphasize the greater importance of business prominence and office-holding for leadership of the first generation, a difference already indicated by Table XIV.

TABLE XV

Generation and Non-Generation Leaders

		Mean Score	Non-Generation Leader: Mean Score	t	df	Significance Level
Business	Leaders of First	6.1	1.33	1.56	10	.10
	Leaders of Second	1.4	1.33	.106	45	-
Offices	Leaders of First	2.7	0.93	2.70	12	.005
	Leaders of Second	1.1	0.93	1.53	33	.10

One final generational difference may be observed with respect to power. Of the twenty-one men named as a participant in some issues, eleven were second generation, six were first generation, and the generation of four is not known. 30% of the leaders of the first generation were named as issue participants while 70% of the leaders of the second generation were so named.

In summary, the two generations do have distinguishable sets of leaders with different personal characteristics and different patterns of activity. Leaders of the first generation are older, more likely to be owners of their own businesses more prominent in Schools and Welfare, more active in office-holding, and less active in participation in issues.

CHAPTER IV

MAJOR CONCLUSIONS

Seventeen hypotheses were examined on the basis of interviews with thirty-five officers of Chinese associations.

Hypotheses relating ideology to generation and office-holding had to be rejected. Possibly another operational definition of ideology would prove more useful, although the data provide no striking clues to a new interpretation.

Hypotheses relating power to communication channels also had to be rejected. On the other hand, the predicted relation held between communication channels and prestige and between power and prestige. This suggests that communication channels may be effective in translating the exercise of power into the reputation for power.

Nominations for general influence were related to nominations for influence in special areas and more closely related to the sum of special area nominations; the correlation of prestige with power was less than that of prestige with total special influence. Prestige is related to more specific reports of influence, the relationship weakening as the specificity of the reports increases and strengthening as the scope of the reports broadens. This is consistent with the view that prestige is at least partially an overall

measure of power exercise.

As measured by general influence nominations, leadership is related to office-holding or possession of communication channels as one would expect from the earlier studies of Chinese communities in which associations played an important political role. However, associations may not be the most important factor in leadership, which is more closely related to total special area influence or to power than to office-holding. Probably this represents a shift away from reliance on associations. Minority communities under external pressure are likely to need strong organizations for self-help and self defence, while the external society is likely to encourage this trend by working through associations and thus enhancing their power. As the external pressures relax the associations will serve fewer purposes so that power and prestige will drift more into the hands of issue participants, although associations will continue to have importance because of their efficiency for a wealth of political purposes. This interpretation of the apparent difference in association roles in various Chinese communities is supported by some of the data found in the present project. First generation leaders, who passed formative years in China and a more hostile Canada, nominate leaders with more

offices than those nominated by the second generation subjects who have lived closer to or within the non-Chinese society.

Leaders of the two generations were also distinguishable by their ages, occupations, patterns of special area prominence and issue participation.

Chinese overseas communities can be profitably analyzed with standard community power research tools. At least one such community displays much the same mechanisms of power and prestige as have been found in North American cities.

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